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PERSONAL AND PARTY 
 GOVERNMENT 
 
 A CHAPTER IN THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF 
 
 THE EARLY YEARS OF THE REIGN 
 
 OF GEORGE III, 1760— 1766 
 
 BY 
 
 D. A. WINSTANLEY, M.A. 
 
 FELLOW AND LECTURER OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE 
 
 CAMBRIDGE 
 
 AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 I9IO 
 
•$>^' 
 
 
 (JEambrtUge : 
 
 PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A. 
 AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 
 to 
 
PREFACE 
 
 TN the following pages an attempt is made to narrate 
 -*- the struggle between the crown and the whig party 
 from the accession of George III to the downfall of the 
 first Kockingham administration. The tale is tangled 
 and involved, and it has been necessary, in order to 
 preserve the continuity of the story, to omit much of 
 vital interest in the history of the time. Thus the highly 
 important negotiations with France, and the Peace of 
 Paris, are only considered in their bearing upon domestic 
 politics; and although this limited treatment might well 
 deserve censure in a work professing to be a general 
 account of the period, it may possibly be excused in what 
 claims to be no more than a study of only one aspect of 
 the early years of the reign of George III. 
 
 It would be a mistake, however, to deny or belittle 
 the importance of the contest between the king and the 
 whig leaders. It was no mere selfish lust for power that 
 impelled George III to wage war upon the men who had 
 enslaved his grandfather, but a conscientious conviction 
 that it was his duty, as a constitutional monarch, to rule 
 as well as to reign. Nor were his opponents influenced 
 by sordid and ignoble motives. Believing firmly in the 
 principles of party government, Newcastle and his followers 
 saw in the increase of the power of the crown a menace to 
 
VI PREFACE 
 
 the safety of the nation and the predominance of parlia- 
 ment; and, though worsted in the encounter, and con- 
 demned to dwell, save for a brief and unhappy interval, 
 in the wilderness of opposition, the ideals, for which they 
 endured defeat, were destined ultimately to triumph. 
 The defects of the whigs, and they were many, have not 
 been spared by historians; but it is to their credit that 
 in their struggle with the monarchy they were fighting 
 not for places but for principles. 
 
 Their failure is somewhat surprising, seeing how much 
 they had in their favour. It might have been anticipated 
 that a youthful king, inexperienced in affairs, and too apt 
 to disregard public opinion when it conflicted with his 
 own will, would find himself no match for men who had 
 grown grey in the service of his grandfather, and had 
 accumulated a rich store of political experience. The 
 success of the crown cannot be attributed to any one 
 cause, and due account must be taken of the fact that 
 an organised opposition to the administration was an 
 irregular and unrecognised feature of the constitutional 
 life of the period. But, when all reservations have been 
 made, it remains true that Pitt, by refusing to throw 
 in his lot with the whigs at the critical moment of their 
 fortunes, did not a little to gain for the king the authority 
 which he was so grossly to misuse. Great as were his 
 achievements, and worthy as he is of the high place 
 he holds in English history, Pitt failed as a domestic 
 politician; and the early years of the reign of George III 
 constitute the record of his failure. 
 
PREFACE Vll 
 
 Use has been made of the valuable Newcastle, 
 Hardwicke, and Bute papers at the British Museum ; 
 and no student of the eighteenth century can fail to owe 
 much to the many distinguished historians who have 
 devoted themselves to that period. I am also deeply 
 indebted to Dr Foakes-Jackson of Jesus college, and 
 to Mr H. W. V. Temperley of Peterhouse, for much 
 kind assistance. By a generous expenditure of time 
 and trouble they were able to remove many blemishes, 
 and suggest many improvements; and while the author 
 is solely responsible for the many defects of his work, 
 they have no small share in any merits which it may 
 possess. I must also thank Dr A. W. Ward, master 
 of Peterhouse, who was good enough to give much needed 
 help. 
 
 D. A. W. 
 
 March 2, 1910. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTEB 
 
 I. The Accession op George III 
 
 II. The Fall op Pitt 
 
 III. The Supremacy of Bute . 
 
 IV. The Grenville Ministry 
 
 V. The Fall of George Grenville 
 
 VI. The Eockingham Ministry 
 
 PAGE 
 
 1 
 43 
 
 78 
 156 
 204 
 240 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 I. William Pitt and his latest Biographer 
 
 276 
 
 II. The Election of a High Steward of the Uni- 
 versity of Cambridge in the year 1764 . . 284 
 
 III. Placemen and the repeal of the Stamp Act . 305 
 
 Index 308 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III. 
 
 The accession of George III to the English throne on 
 October 25th, 1760, marks the beginning of an important 
 epoch in the constitutional and political history of this 
 country. Having but recently attained his majority when 
 he inherited the crown, the new prince was to reign for 
 sixty years, frequently to the detriment of the nation whose 
 welfare, nevertheless, he sincerely had at heart. The 
 domestic and personal misfortunes of his later life, and 
 the courage he displayed under the burden of adversity, 
 gained for him the affection of his subjects, causing them 
 to forget his faults as a ruler ; but those who knew him 
 in his younger days regarded him with a less friendly 
 and more critical eye. Lord Waldegrave, who had acted 
 as his governor, formed an unfavourable opinion of his 
 character, crediting him with obstinacy, uncharitableness, 
 and a lack of frankness 1 ; and, unfortunately, these defects 
 were exaggerated rather than diminished by the education 
 he had received. For fear that he might be contaminated 
 by the lax morality of his age, he had not been permitted 
 to mix freely in society; and though this restriction 
 doubtless prevented him from contracting many vicious 
 1 Waldegrave Memoirs, pp. 8 — 10. 
 
2 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 habits, it seriously restricted the limits of his mental 
 horizon. A tendency to act upon prejudices which he 
 mistook for principles, an inability to credit his op- 
 ponents with sincerity and good faith, an inveteracy of 
 resentment, and a blind adherence to his own opinions, 
 however little founded on reason and knowledge, were the 
 distinguishing characteristics of George III throughout his 
 long reign. Sincerely and unaffectedly pious, genuinely 
 anxious for his people's welfare, he possessed many qualities 
 admirable and attractive in a private individual; and, 
 even as a constitutional monarch, he might have acted a 
 useful part in the intelligent discharge of the formal 
 duties of his office. But, unfortunately both for himself 
 and his country, he elected to play a more ambitious role, 
 and one for which he was intellectually unfit. 
 
 The task which he set himself to perform was no less 
 than the restoration of the personal power of the monarchy 
 which, since the Ee volution of 1688, had suffered a sensible 
 declension. The great struggle in the seventeenth century 
 between the crown and parliament for supremacy in the 
 state, in the course of which one king had lost his life 
 upon the scaffold, and another had been obliged to seek 
 refuge in France, had ended in a victory for the popular 
 assembly; and Greorge III had no wish to go back upon 
 a settlement which had been ratified by time and ac- 
 quiesced in by the majority of the nation. The preroga- 
 tives, claimed and exercised by the Stuart monarchs, had 
 perished with them; and, after the Eevolution of 1688, 
 it was impossible for an English sovereign to assert a 
 supremacy over the law of the land or a right to rule 
 independently of the will of parliament. Henceforth he 
 was compelled to recognise that very definite limits had 
 been placed to his authority; and that, if he was the 
 leader of the nation, he was also, in a sense, its servant. 
 
THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 3 
 
 It would be a mistake, however, to imagine that the 
 statesmen responsible for placing William of Orange upon 
 the English throne intended to deprive him and his suc- 
 cessors of all influence upon the government of the state. 
 The political principles, which inspired the leaders of the 
 Revolution, are embodied in the two great statutes of the 
 period, the Bill of Rights and' the Act of Settlement, 
 neither of which are directed towards the annihilation 
 of the royal authority, aiming rather at the restraint of 
 those powers which had rendered the government of the 
 Stuarts insupportable. The law of the land was made 
 superior to the arbitrary will of the sovereign by the 
 abolition of the suspending and dispensing powers, and 
 by making the tenure of the judicial office independent of 
 the good pleasure of the crown ; whilst annual sessions of 
 parliament were rendered indispensable by the necessity 
 of passing the Mutiny Act every year, and by the exten- 
 sion of the practice of appropriation of supplies. Thus the 
 effect of the Revolution was to institute, for the first time 
 in English history, a limited monarchy with parliament as 
 the supreme power ; but, restricted as the royal authority 
 was, it still remained considerable. An immense amount 
 of patronage was still vested in the king; his choice of 
 ministers was unfettered by legal restrictions; he could 
 dismiss parliament at pleasure, and could even refuse to 
 sanction a measure approved by both houses. Possessed 
 of such extensive powers, it is not surprising that neither 
 William III nor Anne were cyphers in the politics of their 
 time, and often exercised a decisive influence upon the 
 course of national affairs. 
 
 The outcome of the constitutional struggle had been, 
 therefore, not to destroy the royal prerogative, but to insure 
 that it was used in accordance with the will of parliament. 
 That body, as representative of the nation, was made 
 
 1—2 
 
4 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 responsible for the proper use of the authority of the 
 crown; but, unfortunately, nothing was done to equip it 
 for the adequate performance of this onerous task. Those, 
 who had reformed the monarchy, had omitted to reform 
 the parliament. No steps had been taken to extend the 
 franchise, to diminish the number of rotten boroughs, or 
 to check the practice of bribery at elections. It was still 
 possible for seats to be purchased in the open market, for 
 two or three freeholders to return a representative, and 
 for a member to accept a bribe at the hands of the 
 government without being called to account by indignant 
 constituents. It is true that parliament could control the 
 king, but it is equally true that the king, if he chose 
 to do so, could control parliament. In Cornwall, which 
 returned more borough members than any other English 
 county, and was notorious for electioneering corruption, 
 the crown was possessed of considerable influence 1 ; and, 
 in other parts of England, it was customary for certain 
 constituencies, known as treasury boroughs, always to 
 return the nominees of the ministry of the day. More- 
 over, the members of a large number of boroughs were 
 practically appointed by private individuals or close 
 corporations who, regarding the privilege as a species 
 of property, were often found willing to sell their rights; 
 and it was open to the monarch to compete with his sub- 
 jects in the purchase of seats. 
 
 The defects in the electoral system were not the only 
 means possessed by the king of influencing the body 
 
 1 According to Coxe, Lord Falmouth, at the General Election of 
 1741, " gained over many of the Cornish boroughs which had usually 
 returned the members recommended by the crown," and, apparently, in 
 1774, a later Lord Falmouth was able to return the members of six 
 Cornish boroughs. See Coxe's Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole (1798), i. 
 684; Porritt's The Vnreformed House of Commons, i. 340. 
 
THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 5 
 
 which had undertaken to defend the national liberty. 
 The extensive patronage, which he still retained, enabled 
 him to reward richly those who rendered him personal 
 service; and members of parliament who dared to 
 frustrate the wishes of the crown, did so with the 
 knowledge that they were probably cutting themselves 
 off from the valuable prizes of public life. A peerage, a 
 public office, or a rich sinecure which would confer 
 affluence upon the happy recipient, were among the 
 usual rewards offered to men who were willing to 
 sacrifice their convictions to their advancement. It has 
 been related how, in the middle of the eighteenth century, 
 " one nobleman had eight thousand a year in sinecures, 
 and the colonelcies of three regiments. Another, as 
 auditor of the exchequer, inside which he never looked, 
 had eight thousand pounds in years of peace and twenty 
 thousand in years of war 1 ." The same tale is told by 
 Horace Walpole who enumerates with great complacency 
 the various patent places conferred upon him by an affec- 
 tionate father, and proudly asserts that " he who holds an 
 ancient patent place enjoys it as much by law as any 
 gentleman holds his estate, and by more ancient tenure 
 than most gentlemen hold theirs 2 ." When, moreover, it 
 is remembered that the granting of offices of great profit 
 and no obligations did not exhaust the resources of the 
 crown, that it was still possible for valuable government 
 contracts to be assigned as rewards for political services, 
 and for the supporters of the ministry to be enriched at 
 the public expense, some idea can be formed of the golden 
 prospect which revealed itself to those who entered into 
 
 1 Trevelyan's The Early History of Charles James Fox (Silver Library 
 edition), pp. 97, 98. 
 
 2 Walpole's Works (1798), n. 363—370. The essay is also printed 
 in Cunningham's edition of Walpole's Letters, i. 
 
6 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 politics, not with the idea of serving their country, but 
 with the intention of founding a fortune 1 . 
 
 Thus, by a wise dispensation of his patronage, by in- 
 fluencing elections, and corrupting the chosen of the people, 
 it was still possible for an English king, even after the 
 Revolution settlement, to rule in apparent submission to 
 parliament but really in accordance with his own wishes. 
 Able to control the guardian placed over him, he could 
 still exercise a decisive influence over the course of politics; 
 for a subservient house of commons, bribed and cajoled 
 into submission, would support the ministers whom the 
 king approved, and the royal prerogative, nominally exer- 
 cised under parliamentary supervision, would, in effect, 
 be uncontrolled. Yet nothing is more certain than that, 
 in spite of these many advantages, the English monarchy, 
 after the death of Queen Anne, declined in prestige and 
 influence, and by the time that G-eorge III ascended the 
 throne had reached the nadir of its fortunes. The new 
 ruler discovered that his patronage was dispensed by the 
 ministers who, as his grandfather had bitterly remarked, 
 were indeed "kings in this country," that members of 
 
 1 On his accession, George I was informed by Lord Cowper that 
 "the parties are so near an equality and the generality of the world so 
 much in love with the advantages a king of Great Britain has to bestow, 
 without the least exceeding the bounds of law, that 'tis wholly in your 
 Majesty's power by showing your favour in due time (before the elec- 
 tions) to one or other of them, to give which of them you please a clear 
 majority in all succeeding parliaments," Cowper's An impartial History 
 of parties. Thoyras Rapin in his Dissertation sur les Whigs et les Torys 
 (1717) also comments upon the influence possessed by the crown: "Le 
 premier abus consiste dans la trop grande influence que la cour a dans 
 les elections des membres de la Chambre Basse, et par consequent sur 
 les deliberations du Parlement. ...On peut juger de l'effet que produisent 
 ces intrigues par cette seule consideration. C'est qu'ordinairement le 
 Parlement est Whig quand le ministere est Whig, et qu'il est Tory, quand 
 les ministres sont Torys " (pp. 156 — 158). 
 
THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 7 
 
 parliament looked to the cabinet rather than to the crown 
 for guidance, and that what may be termed the political 
 machinery had been captured by a few men who utilised 
 it to maintain themselves in power and to diminish the 
 authority of the crown. 
 
 This unanticipated development had been brought 
 about by a strange mixture of chance and design. The 
 death of Queen Anne without issue placed in the person 
 of George I a foreigner upon the English throne ; and the 
 monarchy could not but be affected by the change. Past 
 fifty years of age when he inherited the royal dignity, 
 unable to speak the language of his new subjects, and 
 caring little for the land he had come to rule, George I 
 was not likely to be an object of English loyalty; and, 
 though the nation might acquiesce in the accession of the 
 Hanoverian dynasty as a safeguard against Catholicism 
 and the predominance of French influence in Europe, it 
 was hardly likely to become enthusiastic at the spectacle 
 of a German elector installed upon the throne of the 
 Stuarts. The part played by George I in the government 
 of the country, and especially in the sphere of foreign 
 policy, has doubtless been unduly minimised, but it remains 
 true that, unable to count upon the affection of his people, 
 and unacquainted with the domestic politics and constitu- 
 tional customs of his new dominions, he was obliged to 
 entrust what came to be known as the management of 
 the house of commons to his ministers who, in order that 
 they should adequately accomplish this task, had to be 
 allowed to dispose of the royal patronage. Thus what the 
 king should have preserved in his own hands, if jealous 
 of his prerogative, was delegated to his advisers, with the 
 result that it was the ministers and not the crown who 
 granted peerages, appointed to bishoprics, and filled up 
 those numerous places of which the occupants had nothing 
 
8 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 to do but draw their pay; and it is hardly surprising that 
 the house of commons in time became more intent upon 
 pleasing the king's servants than upon pleasing the king 
 himself. 
 
 It was a further blow to the royal influence that the 
 new dynasty was deprived, by the circumstances attending 
 its accession, of the power of choosing its ministers indis- 
 criminately from either political party. Unable to confide 
 in the tories, whom he suspected of having intrigued in 
 the interests of the banished Stuarts, George I was obliged 
 to place his trust in the whigs who used the royal favour 
 to establish themselves in power and to drive their 
 political opponents into the wilderness of opposition. 
 His example was followed by his successor; and the 
 whig predominance, which continued until the early 
 years of the reign of George III, is one of the most 
 striking and significant features of the constitutional 
 history of the eighteenth century. It now became 
 possible for the ministry to be composed of men holding 
 the same political opinions, and thus possessed of the 
 strength which comes from union; and, when it is re- 
 membered that the custom of the sovereign attending 
 the meetings of the cabinet ceased after the death of 
 Queen Anne, it can be seen how great was the probability 
 of a ministry, united in opinion and secure of a majority 
 in the house of commons, taking up an independent and 
 even hostile attitude towards the court. Thus the banish- 
 ment of the tories from political life, and the transference 
 of the crown to a foreign house, fostered the growth of an 
 oligarchy which was to rule England until the accession 
 of George III. A few great nobles, the leaders of the 
 whig party, adding to the influence they possessed as 
 borough proprietors and great landowners the vast 
 resources of the royal patronage, effectively controlled 
 
THE ACCESSION OF GEOEGE III 9 
 
 parliament; and the king found himself unable to dis- 
 pense with their services, not because they were approved 
 by the country, but because of their following in the 
 house of commons. The great "Revolution families," as 
 they came to be called, the Russells, the Cavendishes, 
 and the Pelhams, established themselves in power by using 
 the influence of the crown against the crown itself ; and 
 it was left for George II to discover that, in order to 
 protect himself from the Jacobites, he had sold himself 
 into slavery to the whigs. At the end of his reign he 
 complained with some bitterness that " he had a right to 
 choose those who were to serve him, though at present so 
 far from an option, he was not even allowed a negative 1 ." 
 Parliament, which in former days had resisted the crown 
 in the name of the people, now prevailed against the king 
 in the interests of the whig aristocracy. 
 
 Victory, however, as well as defeat is apt to be a cause 
 of division; and those, who had succeeded in bringing the 
 monarchy into subjection, soon fell to quarrelling amongst 
 themselves. During the last years of Queen Anne the 
 whigs, threatened by the tory supremacy, had presented 
 a more or less united front to the enemy ; but no sooner 
 had they prevailed over their opponents than divisions 
 began to appear in their ranks. Sunderland and Towns- 
 hend competed for the royal favour during the early part 
 of George I's reign ; and though the schism was temporarily 
 healed by Walpole's rise to power, and the deaths of his 
 two most formidable rivals, Sunderland and Stanhope, it 
 was soon to break out afresh. Walpole was obliged to 
 work with colleagues who had no intention of submitting 
 to the dictation of a single member of the cabinet, and 
 after his resignation in 1742, it became more apparent 
 than ever before that the whig party was split up into 
 1 Waldegrave Memoirs, p. 133. 
 
10 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 rival sections, divided from each other by no question of 
 principle but by personal predilections. While some 
 gathered round the banner raised by the Duke of 
 Bedford, others enlisted under the Duke of Newcastle, 
 and the importance of a statesman was measured, not by 
 the favour he enjoyed at court or his popularity with the 
 country, but by the extent of his following in both houses 
 of parliament. The importance of these divisions must 
 not, however, be exaggerated, for though Newcastle and 
 Bedford were in a sense rivals, they were often found 
 willing to work together ; and the whig leaders, however 
 great their internal dissensions, were apt to unite when 
 their authority was threatened by the crown. 
 
 The most typical, and in many ways the most success- 
 ful politician of the period, was Thomas Pelham-Holles, 
 Duke of Newcastle. Succeeding to the barony of Pelham 
 on the death of his father in 1712, he was created Earl of 
 Clare in 1714; and, in the year following, received the 
 title of Duke of Newcastle upon Tyne, as a reward for 
 raising a troop of horse for service against the Pretender. 
 Many years later he was given a second dukedom, that 
 of Newcastle-under-Lyme, as a consolation for the loss of 
 office. Possessed of great wealth, for, in addition to his 
 paternal inheritance, he had succeeded early in life to 
 the vast estates of his uncle, John Holies, Duke of New- 
 castle, he embarked upon a political career, declaring 
 for the House of Brunswick and whig principles. Rising 
 quickly to official importance, he became secretary of 
 state in 1724, and continued to hold that office until the 
 death of his brother, Henry Pelham, compelled him to 
 exchange it for the first Lordship of the treasury, which 
 post he occupied when George III ascended the throne. 
 Few eighteenth century statesmen were more bitterly 
 attacked by their contemporaries or have been more 
 
THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 11 
 
 severely judged by historians. Depicted as a treacherous 
 buffoon, and as devoid of any ability save a capacity for 
 low intrigue, Newcastle has been caricatured rather than 
 portrayed by writers who never grow weary of relating 
 his rather foolish mannerisms and his many eccentricities. 
 Though inferior to Pitt, both as a man and a statesman, 
 Newcastle proved himself a capable politician and an 
 industrious administrator. He was by no means so 
 habitually deficient in his management of foreign affairs 
 as has been often represented ; but it is unlikely that 
 he would have risen to the eminence he attained if he had 
 not shown himself a thoroughly efficient party manager. 
 Throughout a lengthy political career he remained true 
 to his belief in the principles of party government, and 
 spared no pains to gain a following which would support 
 him in parliament. He was not squeamish of the means. 
 he practised to obtain his end, and for him the church, 
 the civil service, the bench, seats in parliament, honours, 
 and titles existed largely to buy and keep adherents. 
 But, in thus openly carrying on a crusade of corruption, 
 he differed little from most of his contemporaries, save 
 that he was rewarded by greater success ; and if he had 
 been more scrupulous, it is not improbable that the whig 
 predominance would have been seriously endangered, and 
 George III anticipated by his grandfather in the design 
 of restoring the personal power of the crown. His devotion 
 to party intrigue, sometimes, indeed, led him to under- 
 estimate the importance of events which fell outside that 
 sphere of activity; but, as will be seen, he was by no 
 means destitute of real political insight. He may be 
 accused of having lowered the standard of public life, 
 but it is to his credit that, in an age of greed and cor- 
 ruption, he was free from all reproach of desiring to make 
 the pursuit of politics lead to the acquisition of wealth j 
 
12 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 and, when the days of adversity came, and he was obliged 
 to retire from office, it was found that he had very 
 materially reduced his own fortune in the service of his 
 party. 
 
 Newcastle's most intimate friends and political advisers 
 were his brother, Henry Pelham, Philip Yorke, first Earl 
 of Hardwicke, and William Cavendish, fourth Duke of 
 Devonshire. Pelham, a dull and painstaking politician, 
 did not survive the reign of Greorge II, but Hardwicke 
 was to live to see the overthrow of the once triumphant 
 party, and to die in the hour of defeat. The son of a 
 small attorney at Dover, he rose by sheer ability and un- 
 remitting industry from the ranks of the middle classes 
 to be lord chancellor of England; and, although his 
 comparatively humble origin was never forgotten by his 
 enemies, he was the cherished friend of Newcastle who 
 was accustomed to ask his advice in every political crisis. 
 In seeking counsel in this quarter Newcastle was guided 
 by a true instinct ; for, though a zealous whig and a firm 
 believer in the principles of party government, Hardwicke 
 was a wise statesman as well as an ardent politician, and 
 had other interests at heart besides the triumph of the 
 particular faction of which he was a member. In legal 
 circles he will always be remembered as one of the 
 greatest of equity judges ; and as a minister his fame has 
 been unjustly tarnished by the attacks directed against 
 him on account of his association with Newcastle. He 
 can at least never be accused of being a mere time-server, 
 for it should be remembered in his favour that, in the face 
 of much temptation, he remained true to the cause he had 
 espoused when it had ceased to be profitable to do so. 
 
 The other member of this narrow circle, William 
 Cavendish, fourth Duke of Devonshire, was a typical 
 representative of a family which has always played an 
 
THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 13 
 
 honourable part in English history. Inheriting his 
 political principles almost as much as his name and his 
 estates, the Duke of Devonshire rose to high office in the 
 state ; and, although of mediocre ability, was gifted with 
 that equable temperament which is among the inheritances 
 of his house. A strictly honourable politician, and possessed 
 of a fund of sound common-sense, he was universally re- 
 spected and liked, even by those who were opposed to 
 him; and was often called upon to settle differences which 
 had arisen between men not endowed with his happy 
 disposition. 
 
 A rival section of the whig party was led by John, 
 Duke of Bedford, who was destined to play a leading and 
 not always glorious part in the early years of George Ill's 
 reign. With an ancestry as distinguished as the Caven- 
 dishes, Bedford's political importance was inevitable ; but, 
 though always asserting his adherence to whig principles, 
 he refused to submit to the Pelham predominance, and 
 formed a faction of his own, which came to be known as 
 the "Bloomsbury gang." A proud and passionate man, 
 prone to take offence, and jealous of his own importance, 
 Bedford was not easy to work with ; but he was by no 
 means without political acumen ; and though he supported 
 the unpopular side in the negotiations which concluded 
 the Seven Years' war, he was able to give a consistent 
 defence of the policy he advocated. In an age carried 
 away by Pitt's imperial ideals, Bedford was what would 
 now be called a "little Englander"; and his reputation 
 has suffered in consequence. Unfortunately, too, for his 
 good fame, though himself a man of strict honour, his 
 followers were some of the most abandoned politicians of 
 the day, preferring places to principles and their own 
 advancement to the country's welfare. During the reign 
 of George II, Grower, Sandwich, and Rigby were the 
 
14 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 leading members of this discredited faction ; and before 
 any negotiation with Bedford could be brought to a suc- 
 cessful issue, it was generally found necessary to satisfy 
 the rapacious appetites of his followers. Lord Grower was 
 perhaps the most respectable member of the party, with 
 the exception of its leader ; but of Rigby nothing good is 
 related save that he drank fair 1 . An unblushing and 
 unscrupulous placeman, he had no thought or care save 
 for his own profit; and under an appearance of jollity and 
 good-nature, concealed a heartless and cynical tempera- 
 ment. By callous self-seeking, and an effrontery which 
 nothing could abash, he became of some political im- 
 portance, and will always be remembered as the " brazen 
 boatswain of the Bedford crew." 
 
 If Bigby was the most grasping, Lord Sandwich was 
 certainly the most dissolute member of this faction. With 
 some pretensions as a patron of art, capable of industry, 
 and not without administrative ability, he would have 
 I>een quite fitted for high political office, were it not that 
 he shocked an easy-going age in the matter of morality 
 by the extent and variety of his excesses. A leading 
 member of one of the most famous Hell-Fire clubs of the 
 period, Sandwich lived and died in defiance of public 
 decency ; and when George III appointed him to be 
 secretary of state, men, forgetting that politicians cannot 
 be pickers and choosers, wondered how so pious a king 
 could select so infamous a servant. 
 
 Out of the circle of these whig politicians it was 
 Newcastle who rose to pre-eminence in the period after the 
 fall of Walpole. He forced G eorge II to dismiss Carteret, 
 the minister favoured at court, and succeeded in driving 
 Bedford from the cabinet ; and the struggle was perhaps 
 not so ignoble as it is usually represented. Reprehensible 
 1 Trevelyan's The Early History of Charles James Fox, p. 71. 
 
THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 15 
 
 as were the means adopted by Newcastle to gain followers, 
 he at least prevailed by aid of a parliamentary majority, 
 thus testifying to the real strength of a minister under 
 a constitutional monarchy. For ten years he governed 
 England in alliance with his brother and Hardwicke ; but 
 the death of Henry Pelham in 1754 struck a mortal blow 
 at his power. Pelham, as first Lord of the treasury and 
 leader of the lower house, had undertaken the manage- 
 ment of the house of commons. It was he that had 
 dispensed Newcastle's bribes and promises, keeping the 
 party together and winning over waverers at critical 
 moments ; and, now that he was gone, it was difficult to 
 find another to take his place. Newcastle, confined to the 
 house of lords, was unable unaided to execute properly 
 this most necessary part of his work ; and there was a real 
 danger that whoever was allowed to bribe and corrupt 
 the members of the lower house would gain sufficient 
 power to enable him to strike for independence. It was 
 not until 1755 that Newcastle, driven to despair by the 
 rising tide of opposition, entrusted the task to Henry Fox 
 who, at the same time, was given the seals of secretary of 
 state. Fox was not long in discovering that he had 
 embarked upon a forlorn hope. There was every sign 
 that the country would shortly be involved in another 
 great continental struggle ; and, though war had not yet 
 been declared with France, hostilities between the two 
 countries had already begun in America where an English 
 force had been almost completely annihilated. The nation, 
 which had always regarded Newcastle with indifference, 
 now began to look upon him with disgust. The capture 
 of Minorca by the French, which followed immediately 
 upon the formal declaration of war, fanned the fury of the 
 people against an administration apparently betraying 
 every symptom of incompetence. The system of patronage, 
 
16 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 so effective in the past, now broke down in the face of 
 what threatened to be a great national catastrophe; for 
 it was impossible that members of parliament should 
 remain unaffected by so vigorous an outcry on the part 
 of the country. Abandoned by Fox, who perceived the 
 danger of being engulfed in the rising storm, Newcastle 
 resigned office in the autumn of 1756, and was succeeded 
 by an administration in which the Duke of Devonshire 
 was first Lord of the treasury, and William Pitt secre- 
 tary of state. 
 
 The elder Pitt was perhaps the only politician of the 
 period who was really popular with the nation at large. 
 The grandson of a governor of Madras who acquired 
 notoriety by the purchase of a famous diamond, he entered 
 parliament in 1735, quickly distinguishing himself by the 
 perfection of his oratory and the fierceness of his onslaughts 
 upon Walpole's administration. A member of that little 
 band nicknamed " the Patriots," he continued to oppose, 
 even after Walpole's fall, pouring the vials of his rhetorical 
 wrath upon Carteret whom he denounced, in the rather 
 florid style that he affected, as having "drunk of the 
 potion described in poetic fictions, which made men forget 
 their country." Much of his criticism was grossly and 
 absurdly unfair; and in the bitterness of his language 
 and the ferocity of his attack, he has been equalled by 
 many a soured politician. He was, however, no needy 
 placeman offering himself for sale, and was honourably 
 distinguished by the pure and disinterested motives which 
 inspired his conduct. He did not seek for office because 
 of any emolument it might bring, nor to satisfy a craving 
 for self -aggrandisement ; but because he was convinced 
 that he, alone, was capable of saving the country. He 
 had many faults, and was often bombastic and overbearing; 
 but he was possessed of all the self-assurance of true 
 
THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 17 
 
 greatness, and, in an age of few moral ideals, cherished 
 a passionate devotion to England. All else, profit, places, 
 even the principles of party government, seemed to him 
 naught when weighed against the national glory; and 
 though doubtless his excessive patriotism sometimes led 
 him to disregard the common bonds uniting different 
 states, and to sacrifice domestic to imperial politics, his 
 errors were those of the intellect and not of the heart. 
 He was sometimes mistaken, but he was never mean 1 . 
 
 There hardly seemed room for such a man in the 
 narrow field of eighteenth century politics; and it is 
 significant that Pitt was more than twenty years in 
 parliament before he rose to anything higher than a 
 subordinate post in the administration. But during this 
 period of probation he was laying the foundations of his 
 popularity with the nation which greeted with enthusiasm 
 a politician so different from the ordinary type. When in 
 1746 he accepted the office of paymaster of the forces, he 
 astonished his contemporaries by refusing to take advan- 
 tage of the valuable perquisites belonging to that post; 
 and though a theatrical element was not absent from 
 this act of self-denial, it was also inspired by a delicacy of 
 feeling not often found in the political life of the time. 
 The spectacle of a comparatively poor man declining to 
 enrich himself at the public expense was not one to which 
 that age was accustomed; and it is not surprising that 
 the people began to believe that Pitt differed not only, in 
 degree but in kind from the men who surrounded him, 
 and to regard him with a feeling akin to personal devotion. 
 The support of the nation, however, profited little in a 
 parliament in which the Pelhams were predominant : and 
 though by his marriage with Lord Temple's sister Pitt 
 
 1 For an examination of Dr von Euville's estimate of Pitt's character, 
 see Appendix i. 
 
 W. y<^ 2 
 
18 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 secured a certain measure of political influence, it was 
 as nothing compared with that enjoyed by Newcastle. 
 Disliked by George II who had neither forgotten nor 
 forgiven his many disparaging references to Hanover, 
 comparatively powerless in parliament, and feared by the 
 statesmen of the period as much as he was trusted by the 
 people, it seemed as though he was condemned to illus- 
 trate how imperfectly the house of commons represented 
 the country. 
 
 His opportunity came when the disastrous opening of 
 the Seven Years' war produced something approaching 
 to a national panic, and forced Newcastle into resignation. 
 In the administration which was formed in December, 1756, 
 Pitt was the real leader, though Devonshire the nominal 
 premier. After a five months term of power, however, 
 the new ministers found that they had embarked upon a 
 hopeless undertaking, and that it was impossible to prevail, 
 unsupported by the crown, in a parliament still dominated 
 by Newcastle. Popular opinion had been successful in 
 forcing Pitt into the cabinet, but it was not able to, keep 
 him there; and he was dismissed by the king in the 
 spring of 1757. A ministerial interregnum of eleven 
 weeks followed. The nation expressed its approval of the 
 fallen minister by voting him gold boxes ; and, unable to 
 construct a cabinet in which the popular statesman was 
 not included, George II was compelled to swallow his 
 pride and sanction the formation of an administration in 
 which Newcastle was first lord of the treasury, and Pitt 
 secretary of state. 
 
 This was the famous coalition ministry which raised 
 the country to a pinnacle of glory not attained by it 
 since the days when the victories of Marlborough forced 
 Louis XIV to sue for peace. The Seven Years' war, 
 which had opened so disastrously, was converted into 
 
THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 19 
 
 a series of triumphs astonishing to those who had come 
 to believe that the sun of England's greatness had set. 
 Canada was conquered, the French power in India over- 
 thrown, English naval supremacy asserted, and the country- 
 embarked upon a flood of success which showed no signs 
 of abating. Pitt had succeeded in evoking a spirit of 
 daring and enterprise which had too long lain dormant ; 
 and though some of the details of his policy may be ad- 
 versely criticised, it remains true that he had taught the 
 country the secret of its greatness. And those who had 
 been taught were grateful for the lesson, lavishing upon 
 Pitt a wealth of confidence denied to all his colleagues. 
 Secure of a parliamentary majority, and overwhelmingly 
 popular with the country, the coalition ministry has every 
 claim to be considered one of the most powerful adminis- 
 trations ever formed. 
 
 Such was the political situation when George III came 
 to the throne, determined to free the crown from its 
 subjection to the whig party. The death of his father in 
 1751 had secured the predominance of the influence of 
 his mother, the Princess Dowager, and her friend and 
 counsellor, Lord Bute, who trained the young prince for 
 the work they intended him to accomplish. It has been 
 said that it was from Lord Bute that George III received 
 his first lessons in English constitutional history^ and it 
 is not likely that the teacher minimised the prerogatives 
 of an English king. The boy was not slow to learn the 
 lesson. Knowing little of the world, surrounded by those 
 who flattered his pride, and sincerely anxious to fulfil the 
 duties of his responsible station, it is not improbable that, 
 early in life, he came to regard himself as destined to 
 overthrow those who had humiliated his grandfather. His 
 
 1 History of England from the accession to the decease of George III, 
 by John Adolphus (1840), i. 12. 
 
 2—2 
 
20 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 inclinations did not long remain unknown, and, when 
 George II died, it was reported that his successor, though 
 prepared to continue the same ministers in power, was 
 likely to retain more authority in his own hands 1 . 
 
 Those responsible for the education of the young 
 prince had taken as their gospel Bolingbroke's famous 
 pamphlet, The Idea of a Patriot King. The leader of the 
 tories at the close of Queen Anne's reign, Bolingbroke had 
 seen all his hopes dashed to the ground by the establish- 
 ment of the Hanoverian dynasty. Knowing that he would 
 receive but little mercy at the hands of his triumphant 
 opponents, he had fled to France, and placed himself at 
 the disposal of the Pretender, only to find that the Stuarts 
 in exile had lost none of their old incapacity. Abandoning 
 the jacobite cause as hopeless, Bolingbroke obtained the 
 royal pardon, and was permitted to return to England, 
 though not allowed to take his seat in the house of lords. 
 Denied his full rights as an English peer, and cherishing 
 a deep-rooted animosity against Walpole, he waged un- 
 ceasing war against the ministry with his pen. A most 
 accomplished writer, he was possessed of all the skill of 
 an experienced politician in seizing hold of the weak 
 points of a strong case; and, though unable to express his 
 opinions in parliament, was one of the most formidable 
 antagonists of the administration, doing not a little to fan 
 the popular dislike of Walpole. It is customary to sneer 
 at Bolingbroke's political philosophy and to regard him as 
 the champion of despotic ideals of government; but this is 
 to do him a serious injustice. It is to his credit that he 
 perceived the fatal flaws in the system of party govern- 
 ment as it was conceived in the eighteenth century, and 
 it was in the best known of all his works, The Idea of 
 
 1 Horace Walpole's Letters (edited by Mrs Paget Toynbee), iv. 
 444—448. 
 
THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 21 
 
 a Patriot King, that lie ruthlessly exposed the weak 
 spots in the whig armour. Written in 1738, though not 
 published till a few years later 1 , few political tracts have 
 been so bitterly attacked or so grossly misrepresented : 
 and the version of its teaching which has obtained popular 
 currency is more of a parody than a reproduction. With 
 a grace of style rarely equalled and perhaps never sur- 
 passed, the author depicts with telling effect the condition 
 to which the country had been brought by the rule of 
 bribery and corruption. The old national spirit had been 
 killed, and men now regarded political life either with 
 indifference or as a happy hunting ground for competent 
 adventurers. Sunk in a senseless apathy, the nation 
 watched with dull eyes its representatives fight and 
 squabble for places and emoluments ; and while each man 
 sought his own advantage, no one gave a care to the 
 state. If ruin was to be averted, political life must be 
 regenerated; and, according to Bolingbroke, the monarchy 
 alone could raise England from the slough into which it 
 had fallen. The king who undertook this task would not 
 be compelled to ride rough-shod over the constitution, 
 purging the evils of the body politic with the draughts of 
 despotism. Content to restrain his authority within legal 
 limits, he would seek to govern, not at the dictation of a 
 faction, but in accordance with the popular will. Choosing 
 as his ministers those whom the people approved, making 
 war upon the parties which rent the nation with their 
 factious strife, the patriot king would look to the country 
 for guidance, finding his greatest happiness, not in the 
 enjoyment of the pomp of royalty, but in the execution 
 of the wishes of his subjects. Neither a whig nor 
 a tory, with no interest but the country's welfare, he 
 
 1 Bolingbroke entrusted the manuscript of the pamphlet to Pope who 
 secretly printed fifteen hundred copies of it. 
 
22 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 would be, in the truest sense of the word, a national 
 monarch 1 . 
 
 It is vain to deny the attractive character of the argu- 
 ment, and those responsible for George Ill's education 
 may be excused for thinking that, in basing their instruc- 
 tion upon such a foundation, they were preparing their 
 young charge to fulfil his highest duties as a constitutional 
 king. Unfortunately, however, Bolingbroke did not 
 explain the method to be employed by his ideal ruler to 
 ascertain the national will; and frankly admitted that 
 a patriot king was " the most uncommon of all phenomena, 
 in the physical or moral world." At the present time 
 parliamentary elections form a rough but reliable index 
 of public opinion ; but this has only been brought about by 
 the reform and extension of the franchise and the almost 
 total abolition of electioneering bribery. In the eighteenth 
 century neither the debates in the house of commons nor 
 the results of elections were at all indicative of the trend 
 of thought in the country; and it was not easy for the 
 king, save on questions which stirred the nation to its 
 depths, to hear the voice of his people. The monarch,, 
 therefore, who undertook the part allotted to him by 
 Bolingbroke, would be beset with difficulties, many of 
 which might prove insuperable. Unless gifted with a rare 
 political insight, he might easily misread the signs of the 
 times, and, instead of being the servant of his subjects, 
 become the slave to his own prejudices. Not until parlia- 
 ment had been reformed and corruption abolished could 
 Bolingbroke's ideal monarchy come into being; and his 
 teaching has suffered in reputation by imperfect execution 
 at the hands of one, not inclined to submission, and too apt 
 to refuse advice not in accordance with his own opinions. 
 
 1 For an interesting discussion of this pamphlet, see Bolingbroke and 
 his Times: The Sequel, by Walter Sichel (1902), pp. 365—372. 
 
THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 23 
 
 G-eorge III had imbibed but part of Bolingbroke's 
 political philosophy. He had been taught to dislike the 
 party system, to distrust the whigs, and to despise his 
 predecessor for the humiliation he had endured at the 
 hands of his ministers ; but it is very doubtful whether he 
 had learned to submit himself to the dictates of his subjects. 
 He intended to inaugurate a new epoch in the relations 
 between the crown and the cabinet, to wrest from his 
 ministers the power which they had stolen from the 
 monarchy, and, without transcending the limits of his 
 prerogative, to exercise a decisive influence over the 
 national destinies. It was no easy task that he had set 
 himself to perform. If Newcastle had stood alone, the 
 cry of oligarchical usurpation might have been raised, and 
 an appeal made to the country against an unrepresen- 
 tative house of commons. If Pitt had stood alone, he 
 might have been attacked in parliament, and advantage 
 taken of the fact that he had but a scanty personal 
 following, and looked to the nation rather than its repre- 
 sentatives for his strength. But the union of parlia- 
 mentary influence with popular support boded ill for the 
 designs of the crown; and the coalition ministry seemed 
 destined to withstand all the assaults which might be 
 levied against it. 
 
 Yet the enterprise was not so hopeless as it seemed at 
 the first glance. Newcastle and Pitt were men of such 
 different and opposite characteristics that it was not easy 
 for them to work in harmony. Their alliance had been of 
 the nature of a marriage of convenience, and, like many 
 such an union, had been productive of friction. To those 
 thrown into close contact with him, Pitt's faults were some- 
 times more obvious than his many virtues. He was often 
 bombastic and unreasonable, and never hesitated to show 
 his contempt for men whom he thought deserved it. He 
 
24 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 always preferred to dictate rather than explain; and 
 many of his schemes appeared wild and visionary to more 
 prosaic minds. Newcastle, who was of a jealous tempera- 
 ment, and had grown accustomed to predominance in the 
 ministry, fretted under the pre-eminence of his great 
 colleague, and on certain questions, moreover, funda- 
 mentally disagreed with him. Whereas Pitt desired to 
 continue the war until France agreed to terms which 
 ensured the supremacy of England, Newcastle sighed for 
 a speedy peace. Pitt was anxious for, and Newcastle was 
 opposed to the meditated attack upon Belleisle; and they 
 were not in agreement over the Militia Bill, Newcastle's 
 resistance to that measure being strengthened by the 
 support of Greorge II who, only a few days before his 
 death, had reproached him when he confessed his inability 
 to secure its rejection 1 . Thus the ground was prepared 
 for the attack. To accentuate the strained relations 
 between the two leading members of the administration, 
 to foment their jealousies, and, after driving them apart, 
 to crush them separately, was the obvious course for 
 George III to follow. It is impossible to prove that he 
 deliberately pursued this policy 2 ; but it is certain that 
 during the first year of the new reign there was a marked 
 increase in the lack of harmony between Pitt and New- 
 castle, and that the latter was willing to lean upon the court 
 for protection against a colleague who seemed prepared to 
 take all power into his own hands. 
 
 It would not be enough, however, to drive the two 
 leaders of the coalition further apart : steps must also be 
 
 i Add. MS. 32913, f. 45, f. 183, f. 226. 
 
 2 According to the second Lord Hardwicke, the King " principally 
 availed himself with great wit and finesse of the dissensions between 
 the Duke of Newcastle and Mr Pitt; that he played off one against the 
 other occasionally, till he got rid of the popular minister" (Memoirs of 
 the Marquis of Rockingham, by Lord Albemarle, 1852, i. 6). 
 
THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 25 
 
 taken to undermine the parliamentary power of the whig 
 party. Newcastle's hold over the house of commons 
 was the fruit of bribery and corruption. He had traf- 
 ficked in boroughs like a huckster 1 , and had dispensed 
 the patronage of the crown to reward his followers and 
 purchase new adherents. Preferments in church and 
 state had been bestowed with a lavish hand upon those 
 who had earned recognition by faithful service to the 
 ministry. Seats in parliament had been bought and sold, 
 and by devoting himself to the work of corruption with 
 an enthusiasm worthy of a better cause, Newcastle had 
 built up a party which might be hated but could not 
 be despised. Pitt, in spite of his popularity with the 
 country, had not been able to maintain himself in power, 
 save by an alliance with the man who had captured the 
 political machinery ; and the great whig chieftain, secure 
 of a following in the house of commons, might well prove 
 a match for a youthful and inexperienced king. 
 
 Two courses were open to George III if he wished to 
 strike at the root of Newcastle's predominance. Playing 
 the part allotted to him by Bolingbroke, he might appeal 
 to the nation against a corrupt house of commons. He 
 might raise the standard of purity of election and initiate 
 a movement for parliamentary reform. If bribery were 
 discountenanced and rotten boroughs destroyed, New- 
 castle's power would crumble away, for if the nation were 
 allowed to speak, it would not be in his favour. But 
 though Newcastle might be overthrown, it was not likely 
 that the king would profit by his fall. An appeal to the 
 country would almost certainly result in an accession of 
 
 1 Mr Basil Williams' article, entitled " The Duke of Newcastle and 
 the Election of 1734," published in the English Historical Revieiv, xn., 
 throws an interesting and valuable light upon Newcastle's electioneer- 
 ing methods. 
 
26 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 strength to Pitt; and the king might discover that he 
 had only substituted one master for another. Moreover, 
 those who wear crowns are seldom revolutionaries, and a 
 reformation of a franchise would mean a veritable revo- 
 lution of the constitution. An easier, if less honourable, 
 path lay before George III. He could fight Newcastle 
 with his own weapons. The latter had built up his power 
 partly by the use of the patronage of the crown, and it 
 was open to the new king to deprive him of that source 
 of strength. If G-eorge III took into his own hands the 
 dispensation of the royal patronage, it would be easy for 
 him to win supporters in the house of commons, and 
 undermine Newcastle's power. Owners of boroughs and 
 members of parliament would quickly learn that obedience 
 to the court rather than to the minister was the sure road 
 to promotion; and few would hesitate to serve one who 
 could reward them so richly for their devotion. If he 
 had adopted the more difficult course, George III might 
 have earned a different reputation in history, and acquired 
 the glory given to those who fail in a noble cause ; but he 
 was not the man to tread a path bestrewn with obstacles 
 and leading to an unknown destination. He preferred to 
 use the simpler means which lay ready to his hand, and 
 follow the well established precedents of bribery and 
 corruption. The whigs could scarcely complain if the 
 king was prepared to use their weapons against them- 
 selves, though they might be mortified at finding how 
 aptly the young sovereign had learned their methods of 
 government \ 
 
 1 It should be noted, however, that George III never conceived him- 
 self as destroying or deflecting the course of the constitution. He 
 sincerely believed that tbe king governed as well as reigned, and was 
 "entitled to use the prerogative granted to the crown by law. He 
 never allowed that he was obliged to choose his ministers at the dictation 
 
THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 27 
 
 Behind the parliament lay the nation, and the crown 
 could not afford to neglect altogether the force of public 
 opinion. The voice of the people was sometimes heard 
 and occasionally exercised an influence over the actions 
 of ministers. Walpole had withdrawn the Excise Bill on 
 account of the popular feeling against it, and this is not 
 the only instance of the power of the people. The same 
 minister had declared war on Spain in response to popular 
 pressure, and the directors of the South Sea company 
 were sacrificed to appease the indignation of the country. 
 Only a few years before the accession of George III, an 
 enlightened measure of toleration, the Jew Naturaliza- 
 tion Act, had been repealed because of the outcry raised 
 against it. It was said, with some plausibility, that Pitt 
 had climbed into office on the shoulders of the people; 
 and there was no doubt that it would be a material 
 advantage to the king in his contest with Newcastle and 
 his followers if he could count upon the approval of the 
 majority of his subjects. If George III provoked an 
 angry feeling of resentment in the country, those whose 
 supremacy he designed to overthrow might become en- 
 deared to the people; and it therefore behoved him to 
 walk warily. It is true that much might be forgiven him 
 if he were personally popular, and it has often been 
 assumed that in the early days of his reign he possessed 
 the affection of his subjects. This, however, seems to be 
 open to doubt. It is certain that he had many advantages 
 denied to his grandfather. His youth, his domestic 
 virtues, and his simplicity of character were all in his 
 
 of parliament or the nation. On March 22nd, 1778, he wrote to Lord 
 North "I wrote on that day unto you; I again repeat it — strengthen 
 this administration by an accession from any quarter, but I will never 
 consent to removing the members of the present cabinet from my 
 service." Correspondence of King George III with Lord North, 1867, 
 ii. 159. 
 
28 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 favour; and, as the first of his line who was thoroughly- 
 English in his tastes and habits, he was likely to become 
 a favourite with a race which has always been charac- 
 terised by an aversion to foreigners. Many of those who 
 went to court to pay their respects to the new king were 
 gratified by his gracious conduct and unaffected manners 1 , . 
 and compared him favourably with his predecessor who 
 had always preferred Hanover to England, and had been 
 too honest or too indifferent to conceal his preference. 
 Yet the gratification expressed by a few courtiers must 
 not be taken as representative of the feeling of the 
 nation ; and the outburst of loyalty, which usually greets 
 the accession of a new king, is of small political signifi- 
 cance. Lord Holland, who was a shrewd judge of men 
 and affairs, was of the opinion that George III was never 
 popular 2 : and this judgment appears less surprising 
 when it is remembered that the two persons most closely 
 associated with the young king were his mother, the 
 Princess Dowager, and her adviser, Lord Bute. The 
 former was generally supposed to have become Bute's 
 mistress, and though the scandal may have been a ma- 
 licious lie, it was very generally believed, and wrought 
 much harm 3 . The moral failings of great personages are 
 apt to be condoned, but those who credited the rumour, 
 though they might have forgiven the princess for her 
 want of restraint, found it hard to pardon her for her 
 lack of taste. Her offence was that she had chosen a 
 Scotchman for her paramour. The natives of North 
 Britain are not, and never have been popular in England ; 
 
 1 Walpole's Letters (edited by Mrs Paget Toynbee), iv. 454 — 457. 
 
 2 The Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox (1902), i. 76. 
 
 3 It is interesting to note tbat Lord Waldegrave apparently believed 
 that a closer tie than friendship united the Princess of Wales with Lord 
 Bute (Waldegrave's Memoirs, pp. 38, 39). 
 
THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 29 
 
 and in the eighteenth century they were heartily and 
 generally detested and despised. Johnson and Wilkes, 
 though they had little else in common, agreed in hating 
 the Scotch ; and it was unfortunate for the king that his 
 mother's friend and his own counsellor belonged to that 
 much abused nation. It was believed that Bute would 
 lavish the royal bounty upon his fellow-countrymen, and 
 that Scotchmen would flock to the court of St James to 
 fill their pockets at the expense of Englishmen. Bute 
 from the very beginning was unpopular ; and it is by no 
 means improbable that his master was included in the 
 same condemnation. 
 
 It would seem likely, therefore, that Lord Holland was 
 substantially correct in his opinion, and the king, though 
 he might attain popularity, could not count upon it as 
 an initial advantage. He would be obliged to enter upon 
 his design of regaining the authority which his predecessor 
 had lost, without the support of the people ; and he would 
 be wise to avoid a contest on questions which might affect 
 the interests or arouse the passions of the nation. Un- 
 fortunately, this was impossible. Before he could hope 
 to attain success, it was necessary that England should 
 withdraw from the contest in which she was engaged. 
 As long as the country was involved in war, Pitt seemed 
 indispensable. The success which had attended the 
 English arms was almost exclusively attributed to him, 
 and great would be the outcry if he retired from the 
 cabinet before peace was made 1 . The king, however, did 
 not wish to have a servant who could not be dismissed 
 with impunity; and, therefore, both he and Bute were 
 
 1 In August, 1761, Bussy informed Choiseul that Pitt was "L'idole du 
 peuple, qui le regarde comme le seul auteur de ses succes et qui n'a pas 
 la meme confiance dans les autres membres du Conseil." See Le Due 
 de Choiseul et VAngleterre, Revue Historique, lxxi. 
 
30 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 anxious for the conclusion of peace, in order that they 
 might gain greater freedom of action. They were con- 
 fronted by a problem which called for delicate handling, 
 and which could not be treated without arousing the 
 interest of the nation. To conclude the war without 
 gaining substantial advantages would cast opprobrium on 
 those who thwarted the designs of a great statesman, 
 and neglected to profit by what had been so laboriously 
 achieved. To refuse to make peace, except on terms 
 which the people would regard as satisfactory, might 
 indefinitely prolong the struggle, and defer the time when 
 Pitt's services ceased to be necessary. The riddle was by 
 no means easy, and the attempt that was made to solve it 
 will be dealt with in a later chapter. It is well, however, 
 to bear in mind that, from the outset, George III was 
 forced to enter upon a struggle with his ministry on a 
 question not of parliamentary but of national interest : 
 before Pitt and Newcastle could be taught that they no 
 longer held office independently of the goodwill of the crown, 
 it was necessary that peace should be made with France. 
 Some time, however, must be allowed to elapse before 
 even this preliminary step was taken. The death of 
 George II rendered necessary the dissolution of parlia- 
 ment, and negotiations for peace could not be begun until 
 after the general election. Moreover, so much turned upon 
 the success of these negotiations which would be conducted 
 by the cabinet, that it was advisable to make changes in 
 the administration, and introduce those who would be 
 likely to work in the King's interests. Thus the first six 
 months of the new reign were largely occupied by the 
 general election and the ministerial changes. The latter 
 were by no means unimportant. Henley, the lord 
 keeper, was promoted to be lord chancellor early in 
 1761, and Bute declared that Henley owed his elevation 
 
THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 31 
 
 to him 1 . The new chancellor was likely to prove ready 
 to comply with the wishes of the king. Educated at 
 Oxford, he did not, to use the phrase of one of his bio- 
 graphers, "altogether neglect classical learning"; but he 
 chiefly occupied himself in cultivating a taste for port, 
 and laying the foundations of a collection of tales more 
 amusing than edifying. He was rewarded for these 
 accomplishments by being elected a fellow of All Souls' 2 . 
 In politics he had attached himself to the Leicester House 
 party ; and his promotion to the chancellorship was not, 
 therefore, without significance. He was to prove himself 
 a subservient instrument of the court, untrammelled by 
 political principles, and ready to betray and desert his 
 colleagues at the bidding of the king. 
 
 George Grrenville, who held the post of treasurer of 
 the navy, was given the rank of cabinet councillor; and 
 though this was a position rather of dignity than of 
 power, and did not carry with it the right of attending 
 the meetings of the smaller or inner cabinet 3 , it was 
 specially arranged that Grrenville should be informed of 
 all important business by Bute's secretary, Jenkinson 4 . 
 G-renville, though connected by marriage with Pitt, was 
 not in entire sympathy with him, and had openly opposed 
 him in parliament in December, 1760 5 ; and it is possible 
 that his promotion was not entirely unconnected with 
 this incident. Legge, the chancellor of the exchequer, 
 whom the king disliked and treated with marked cold- 
 
 1 Dodington's Diary (1784), p. 428. 
 
 2 Campbell's Lives of the Lord Chancellors, v. 177. It is reported 
 that when George III said to Henley " Your friends tell me, my lord, 
 that you like a glass of wine," the latter replied, "They have mis- 
 informed your majesty: they should have said a bottle." 
 
 3 English Historical Review, xvn. 680. 
 
 4 Grenville Papers (1852), i. 360, 361. 
 
 5 Add. MS. 35352, f. 157. 
 
32 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 ness 1 , was dismissed from his office in spite of Newcastle's 
 plea that he might be retained 2 . His place was taken by 
 Lord Barrington, a politician of slender abilities and a 
 sincere believer in the doctrine that support should always 
 be given to the ministers approved by the king, irrespec- 
 tive of the party to which they belonged 3 . To become 
 chancellor of the exchequer, Barrington resigned his 
 office of secretary at war in favour of Charles Townshend, 
 a brilliant and erratic politician who was known to be 
 ambitious, and was suspected of an inclination to oppose 
 Newcastle 4 . 
 
 It would be easy to lay too great a stress upon the 
 changes thus made. Legge fell, not because he was 
 politically dangerous, but because in the past he had 
 offended the king and Bute in the matter of an election. 
 The promotion of Henley might have been expected and 
 could hardly be criticised; and if Barrington was preju- 
 diced in favour of the royal prerogative, he was also 
 closely connected with Newcastle. What had been done 
 was rather indicative of the new influences at work than 
 productive of great results, and pales in importance before 
 the introduction of Bute into the cabinet. The king's 
 favourite did not belong to that ring of noblemen amongst 
 whom the prizes of political life were usually shared. 
 During the reign of George II he had confined him- 
 self to the politics of Leicester House, and was little 
 known outside that narrow circle. He had never dis- 
 played any great political ability, and was generally 
 
 1 Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, i. 7. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32919, f. 402. 
 
 3 Lecky's History of England in the eighteenth century (Cabinet 
 Edition), m. 188. 
 
 4 " That gentleman is a person of great wit and understanding, but 
 very pushing, and has often thwarted the Duke of Newcastle in his 
 measures." P.R.O., Foreign State Papers Miscell., March 10th, 1761. 
 
THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 33 
 
 considered to be more suited for an office of ceremony than 
 of business. Nervously sensitive as to his own dignity, 
 chilly in manner, and excessively haughty, he was not 
 likely to win adherents, and only too likely to make 
 enemies. His talents did not lie in the direction of public 
 life, and, realising his own limitations, he preferred to be 
 the prompter in the wings rather than the actor on the 
 stage. Bute was not of the order of royal favourites who 
 exploit the crown to promote their own advancement. 
 On the contrary, it seems that not selfish ambition but 
 genuine affection for the king's person led him to take 
 his place in the political arena; and, though he may 
 have been unwise, he was not base. He displayed an 
 unfeigned reluctance to assume the cares of administra- 
 tion, but he had to struggle against a will stronger than 
 his own. His pupil and master had determined that he 
 should have high office in the ministry, and that men 
 should learn that there were other avenues to greatness 
 than the favour of the whig party. On the day that he 
 succeeded to the throne, the king pressed Bute to become 
 secretary of state 1 . The offer was wisely refused, but 
 two days later Bute took his seat at the privy council, 
 and before a month had elapsed had joined the cabinet 
 as groom of the stole 2 . 
 
 In normal circumstances a groom of the stole 
 would have little weight in the cabinet council. Only 
 summoned to meetings of the larger cabinet, which 
 were for the most part formal in their character, he 
 could not claim to attend those smaller meetings, some- 
 times called conciliabula, at which the most important 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32919, f. 481. 
 
 2 Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, I. 12, 13. Hunt's History 
 of England, 1760 — 1801 (Vol. x. of Political History of England, 12 
 volumes), p. 8: E.H.R. xvn. 681. 
 
 w. 3 
 
34 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 business was discussed. Yet it is likely that Bute, 
 transcending the limits of his office, was a member of 
 the inner cabinet. He was known to be in the most 
 intimate confidence of the king, and it was hardly 
 possible that he should be kept in ignorance of the most 
 urgent affairs of state 1 . Lord Holland states that Bute 
 was present at a meeting of the smaller cabinet in 
 November, 1760 2 . " I suppose/' said Bute himself to Lord 
 Temple, " your Lordship does not mean to look upon me 
 as a bare groom of the stole. The king will have it other- 
 wise 3 ." It would seem, therefore, that, from the very 
 outset, Bute commanded an exceptional position, and, 
 though holding an office of little political importance, 
 ranked with those who were entrusted with the most 
 intimate secrets of government. He was the king's 
 minister in the narrowest sense of that term, and those 
 who denied him their confidence did so at their peril. He 
 possessed the substance without the form of power. 
 
 It may well cause surprise that Bute consented to leave 
 a post of so -much advantage to undertake the work of 
 a secretary of state. The more important office would 
 bring with it increased responsibilities and more arduous 
 duties. As secretary of state he would be far more open 
 to parliamentary and popular criticism. The circle of his 
 enemies would be widened by his advancement to so 
 eminent a position, and his authority would not be ex- 
 tended in proportion. In after years he always affirmed 
 that it was against his own will, and in obedience to the 
 wishes of the king, that he took the higher office; and 
 
 1 Bute's exceptional position may be estimated from the fact that it 
 was he who, early in the reign, offered the presidency of the council to 
 Lord Hardwicke (Add. MS. 35428, f. 1). 
 
 2 Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, i. 12, 13. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32919, f. 285. 
 
THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 35 
 
 there is no reason to doubt the truth of this statement. 
 Unused to business, and aware of his own unpopularity, 
 he might well hesitate to become a colleague of Pitt 1 . 
 The burdens of office would weigh doubly heavy on 
 one unaccustomed to the transaction of affairs; and yet 
 there can be little doubt that the king was right in 
 pressing his favourite to undertake the duties from which 
 he shrank 2 . If the royal designs were to be executed 
 successfully, it was necessary that Bute should hold high 
 office in the administration. Those in the cabinet might 
 understand the position of a groom of the stole enjoying 
 the intimate confidence of the crown ; but if the ministry 
 continued much as it had been at the close of the late 
 reign, members of parliament and proprietors of boroughs 
 would still regard Pitt and Newcastle as the leaders in 
 the political world, and act accordingly. The promotion 
 of Bute was to be the outward and visible sign of the 
 restoration of the royal authority ; and, in order that men 
 might understand the change that had taken place, the 
 form and substance of power must be united. 
 
 Yet, necessary as it might be, it was a step of no little 
 daring. Pitt would certainly be offended, and if the 
 ministers had united in opposition to the intruder, the 
 king might have received a mortifying defeat. But 
 what might have failed, if attempted to be brought about 
 hy the undisguised exercise of the royal authority, could 
 
 1 On the day that George II died, Pitt informed Bute that it was not 
 for the good of the country that he should be given high political office 
 (Rockingham Memoirs, i. 149, 150). 
 
 2 On March 24th, 1761, Bute wrote to the King " I take the office 
 that of all others my mind has the most repugnance to, and I am torn 
 from one that I have reason to dote on... Each fond wish of my heart 
 crys out against this important change, but duty and gratitude con- 
 demns one to the trial. I make it then, but not without violent emotions 
 and unpleasant forebodings." Add. MS. 36797, f. 47. 
 
 3—2 
 
36 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 be effected by intrigue. Newcastle and Pitt had not 
 drawn nearer together in face of the common danger, 
 and the former might be willing to receive an ally against 
 his dictatorial colleague. He was selected to play the 
 part of a traitor within the camp, and fell into the trap 
 which had been so carefully laid for him. It was early 
 in 1761 that the intrigue began which resulted in Bute 
 becoming secretary of state. The Comte de Viry, the 
 Sardinian ambassador, acted as intermediary between 
 Bute and Newcastle; and the latter was won over to 
 give his consent to the proposed change. Devonshire and 
 Hardwicke, Newcastle's staunch political allies, were taken 
 into the secret, and agreed to accede to the king's wishes. 
 As it was known that Pitt would object, he was not told 
 until his opposition would have been useless. The plot 
 was crowned with success, and within six months of his 
 accession the king had scored a notable triumph, and laid 
 a firm foundation for future aggressions 1 . 
 
 More than a year later Newcastle was repenting of 
 his duplicity. To his partner in crime, the Duke of 
 Devonshire, he wrote: "I own, I did, in council with 
 your Grace and my friends, prefer my Lord Bute to him 
 (Pitt), and was an insignificant instrument to bring my 
 Lord Bute into the secretary's office 2 ." Yet, shortsighted 
 and foolish as his conduct may have been, it is not in- 
 capable of explanation. He had suffered much at the 
 hands of Pitt who had often treated his colleagues as 
 subordinates, and refused to listen to their advice. He 
 suspected that Pitt would rather prolong the war than 
 conclude a treaty which he considered unfavourable; and, 
 anxious for peace, Newcastle was willing to lean for 
 
 1 For a detailed account of this intrigue, see E. H. R., xvn. 683 — 
 685. 
 
 a Add. MS. 32941, f. 36. 
 
THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 37 
 
 assistance upon the king's favourite. He believed, 
 though wrongly, that he had strengthened his position 
 in the administration, and gratified the crown. "Lord 
 Bute's system/' he wrote about this time, "is certainly 
 founded upon the firmest confidence in us 1 " ; and he was 
 assured by Viry that Bute was anxious to bring about 
 peace 2 . By adroit diplomacy the king had accomplished 
 what might have seemed impossible. He had secured a 
 party in the administration for the favourite, and had suc- 
 ceeded in hoodwinking Newcastle whose present fears 
 made him blind to future possibilities. 
 
 Thus, by the end of March, 1761, the ministry had 
 suffered an important transformation. Bute had been 
 given a commanding position in the official world, and 
 the breach between Newcastle and Pitt had been widened. 
 Moreover, during the same period, parliament had been 
 dissolved, and a general election held. The election of a 
 new parliament was of great importance at this particular 
 juncture. In previous elections Newcastle had been per- 
 mitted to traffic in boroughs and to use the influence of 
 the crown to purchase adherents for himself. If he were 
 still allowed a free hand in this nefarious business, the 
 results would be the same as they had been in the past. 
 A majority of those returned would be inclined to sup- 
 port the ministers against the king ; and the latter might 
 find that his advisers were able to appeal to parliament 
 against the crown. It was necessary, therefore, that 
 Newcastle should learn that the old order had passed 
 away with the old king. In December, 1760, instructions 
 went forth from the court that no money was to be given for 
 the purchase of seats 3 ; and Lord Anson was commanded 
 by the king to inform the workmen in the royal dock- 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32920, f. 61. 2 Ibid. f. 158. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32915, f. 332. 
 
38 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 yards that they might vote for whom they pleased, even 
 though the chancellor of the exchequer was a candidate. 
 The grant of such exceptional freedom was probably 
 dictated by a desire to prevent the election of Legge, 
 and cannot be taken as indicative of the general policy 
 followed. On the contrary, Bute declared that while the 
 king intended to nominate the members for the royal 
 boroughs, Newcastle must be allowed to use the crown 
 influence arising from the customs and the excise 1 . But 
 such influence would only be available in certain places : 
 elsewhere, Newcastle, unable to depend upon financial 
 assistance from the crown, would be fighting at a dis- 
 advantage. It has been said that Bute privately used 
 the king's money to influence elections 2 ; but whether he 
 was guilty of this breach of faith or not, Newcastle would 
 be handicapped in the purchase of seats. Previous elec- 
 tions had constituted a serious drain upon his own financial 
 resources, and he now found himself engaged in a struggle 
 with opponents more wealthy than himself. He would 
 have to encounter the rivalry of men, enriched with the 
 plunder of the Bast, anxious to get into parliament, and 
 careless of the means they adopted to attain their end. 
 Borough proprietors reaped a golden harvest, and, though 
 the court had pretended to discountenance bribery, the 
 general election was frankly and openly corrupt. In an 
 access of cynicism the borough of Sudbury advertised 
 itself for sale, and the keenness of the competition can be 
 estimated from the fact that at Andover there were no 
 less than nine candidates 3 . 
 
 1 Dodington's Diary, p. 433. 
 
 2 Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, i. 41 : Walpole's Memoirs 
 of the reign of George the Third (edited by G. F. Russell Barker, 1894), 
 i. 31. 
 
 3 Walpole's Memoirs, i. 31. 
 
THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 39 
 
 Nor was it lack of funds alone that stood in Newcastle's 
 way. In previous elections men who placed their boroughs 
 at his disposal might hope to obtain some reward at the 
 hands of the crown ; but this was no longer the case, and 
 Newcastle was unable to guarantee that those who 
 served him would be rewarded by the king for their 
 fidelity. Times had changed, and those who controlled 
 elections might prefer to exercise their influence in favour 
 of the king rather than of his ministers. Politicians, like 
 other men, are apt to turn from the setting to the rising 
 sun, and Newcastle was to learn that the support of the 
 court in the past had been of greater value than he, per- 
 haps, realised. When he appealed to Bubb Dodington 
 for his interest in the Weymouth election, the answer was 
 returned that Dodington had promised to use his influence 
 in favour of those who would certainly be approved by 
 Newcastle because they were agreeable to the king 1 . 
 Formerly the order had been reversed, and men had been 
 approved by the king because they were supported by 
 the minister. 
 
 Yet, in spite of the disabilities against which he 
 struggled, Newcastle believed that he had succeeded. He 
 reckoned upon two hundred and ninety-two supporters 
 and one hundred and eight opponents in the new parlia- 
 ment, and professed himself uncertain as to the conduct 
 of one hundred and thirteen members 2 . Thus, if even all 
 those whom he doubted joined the ranks of the opposition, 
 Newcastle would have a clear majority; and if his estimate 
 
 1 Dodington' s Diary, pp. 415, 416. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32999, f. 323. This document is undated, but its refer- 
 ence to the parliament of 1761 is proved by the inclusion of the Marquis 
 of Tavistock amongst the members of the house of commons. The 
 parliament of 1761 was the first and only one in which he sat. It is 
 interesting to note that Newcastle included William Pitt amongst those 
 members whose conduct he regarded as uncertain. 
 
40 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 had been correct, he could have afforded to disregard the 
 hostility of the court. Events were to prove him guilty 
 of a gross error of judgment. The parliament, which he 
 had thus classified, was to see him fall from office un- 
 moved, was to approve the Peace of Paris which he 
 condemned, and was to defend George Grenville against 
 the attacks of the whig opposition. It was to degenerate 
 into a tool of the court, and to be used to thwart those 
 who dared to oppose the wishes of the king. Newcastle, 
 in believing that if he had not gained a triumph he had 
 at least averted a defeat in the general election, mis- 
 understood the political situation; and it is necessary to 
 understand how he came to be guilty of so faulty a 
 forecast. 
 
 It was noticed by contemporaries that the new parlia- 
 ment contained an unusual number of members who had 
 never sat before 1 . Many of these novices probably 
 belonged to that class which had enriched itself in 
 India, and was anxious to play a part in political life 
 in England. Unattached to any political party, possibly 
 devoid of any political principles save those which they 
 had picked up during their sojourn in the East, they 
 would be willing to tread the path which led to honours 
 if not to honour. Removed beyond the need of money, 
 they would be more likely to be influenced by the smiles 
 of a king than the guineas of a minister. Covetous of 
 the prizes which the crown could confer, they would not 
 be inclined to support Newcastle against the court, and 
 the king could count upon their aid when he wished to 
 overthrow his ministers. Moreover, Newcastle was to dis- 
 cover that those who had served him loyally in the past, 
 when he had been the dispenser of patronage,^ were ready 
 
 1 P. R. 0., Foreign State Papers Miscell., March 10th, 1761 ; Horace 
 Walpole's Letters, v. 28, 30. 
 
THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 41 
 
 to desert him when he could no longer reward them for 
 their devotion. The greedy crew of placemen, uninfluenced 
 by sentimental attachment or considerations of loyalty, 
 abandoned their old leader when he was unable to 
 satisfy their appetites. They rallied to the banner of 
 the court; and Newcastle, deprived of the great part of 
 the patronage which he had formerly dispensed, found his 
 own weapon turned against himself. By the general 
 election of 1761 the king had gained a parliament 
 which could be bought. 
 
 Other signs that a new order of things had arisen had 
 not been wanting. The king's speech at the first privy 
 council meeting of the reign was probably composed 
 by Lord Bute, and was in any case not the work of 
 his ministers 1 . In its original form it contained a re- 
 flection upon the war, describing it as "bloody and 
 expensive " ; but before it was printed the objectionable 
 words were deleted. The speech from the throne at the 
 opening of parliament was drafted by Lord Hardwicke, 
 and submitted to Bute who returned it with an addition 
 in the king's own hand, emphasising the English birth 
 and education of the new sovereign 2 . Newcastle also 
 received a disagreeable if salutary lesson in the disposal 
 of patronage. On his own initiative the king added five 
 tory lords and commoners to the lords and grooms of 
 the bedchamber, leaving Newcastle to discover what had 
 been done as best he might 3 . Nor was this the only 
 
 1 FitzMaurice's Life of Shelburne (1878), i. 43. Walpole's Memoirs, 
 i. 7, 8. Rockingham Memoirs, i. 8 — 11. Life and Letters of Lady Sarah 
 Lennox, i. 5, 6. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32914, f. 345. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32915, f, 332: "a most extraordinary phaenomenon," 
 wrote Newcastle, "appeared yesterday, of which I had the first notice 
 by an accidental information from Ned Finch at my Lady Yarmouth's." 
 Ibid. 
 
42 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 rebuff that the old duke suffered. He had often cause to 
 complain of the chilly treatment he received at court; 
 and, to one so chagrined, it was scanty comfort to be 
 told that " the king would have everything go on for the 
 present as it was in his grandfathers time, and 'til the 
 several officers are appointed after the expiration of the 
 six months; but when the new appointments are made, 
 the king will then declare whom he will call to his 
 cabinet council 1 ." It is little wonder that the old states- 
 man felt the ground slipping from under his feet. He 
 lived in fear that Pitt, whom he did not trust, might ally 
 himself with Bute 2 , and his suspicions, baseless though 
 they were, influenced him to welcome with alacrity the 
 advances of the king's favourite. 
 
 The time had now come to begin the negotiations for 
 peace. Not until England had withdrawn from the 
 European conflict could the king exercise a free choice 
 as to those who were to serve him. It was not so much 
 that he desired to rid himself of Pitt, but that he wished 
 to have liberty to do so if he chose. No servant of the 
 crown must claim to be indispensable, and peace was 
 necessary in order that Pitt should learn that he held 
 office by the goodwill of the court. 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32914, f. 171. 
 
 2 When it was announced that no money were to be given by the 
 crown for the purchase of seats, Newcastle believed that he detected a 
 consequence of an alliance between Bute and Pitt. Add. MS. 32915, 
 f. 332. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE FALL OF PITT. 
 
 The unsuccessful negotiations for peace with France, 
 begun in March and broken off in the following September, 
 exercised a decisive influence upon English politics by- 
 bringing about the fall of Pitt. The fact that they proved in 
 the end abortive must not lead to the supposition that they 
 were necessarily ill-judged or premature. Public opinion 
 was certainly in favour of a pacification on terms justified 
 by the recent glorious successes of the English arms, as 
 the strain of the lengthy and exhausting contest was 
 beginning to show itself in the fall in British securities, 
 and the general disinclination on the part of capitalists 
 to invest their money 1 . The Bavarian minister at the 
 English court believed that the desire for peace was very- 
 general throughout the country 2 , and the instant rise of 
 the funds at the first rumours of negotiations with France 3 
 is evidence that the commercial community, which had 
 suffered severely at the hands of French privateers 4 , was 
 desirous of pursuing its avocations unmolested. 
 
 Yet, though the majority of Englishmen may have 
 wished for a peace, there were few who did not desire it 
 to be such as would secure the unchallenged supremacy 
 of England. Many lives had been lost and much ex- 
 
 1 Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, i. 41 ; P. R. 0., Foreign 
 State Papers Miscell., Jan. 9th, 1761. 
 
 2 P. R. 0., Foreign State Papers Miscell., Jan. 9th, 1761. 
 
 3 P. R. 0., Foreign State Papers Miscell., March 17th, 1761. 
 
 4 Hunt's Political History of England, 1760—1801, p. 2. 
 
44 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 penditure incurred in the pursuit of victory. The national 
 enemy had been overthrown in the New World and 
 humiliated in India; and it was felt that substantial 
 advantages must be gained in return for so extravagant 
 an outlay and so distinguished a success. France appeared 
 to have reached the nadir of her fortunes ; and, though an 
 insignificant minority may have considered any peace, 
 however unfavourable to England, preferable to the pro- 
 longation of the war, public opinion generally desired that 
 terms should be exacted which should make the con- 
 clusion of the contest, not only advantageous to England, 
 but disastrous to France. 
 
 Whether the war, however, was brought to an end 
 depended far more on the king and his ministers than on 
 the wishes of the nation at large, and the ministry was not 
 agreed as to terms. Some like Bedford were willing to 
 make any concessions in favour of peace. Newcastle, 
 Hardwicke, and Devonshire were against the continuance 
 of the war, and feared that Pitt would insist on such 
 onerous terms that France, exhausted as she was, would 
 prefer to continue an apparently hopeless struggle rather 
 than conclude a peace fraught with ruin and dishonour. 
 Their alarm, to a certain degree, was unfounded. Pitt was 
 no Attila, intent upon rapine and slaughter. He had no 
 wish needlessly to prolong the war ; but, though ready to 
 make peace, intended it to be of such a character as would 
 cause it to rank amongst the most glorious in English 
 history. He made no secret of the terms which he would 
 expect France to accept 1 . Canada, with its islands, its 
 harbours, and its fisheries, must be surrendered to England, 
 and the fishing privileges off the island of Newfound- 
 land, which had been allowed to the French by the treaty 
 of Utrecht, must be given up. Favourable as the war 
 1 Add. MS. 32921, f. 340, f. 381. 
 
THE FALL OF PITT 45 
 
 had been to England, it cannot be said that these demands 
 erred on the side of moderation. If fulfilled, the French 
 fisheries in the New World would be entirely destroyed, 
 and a valuable training ground for the French navy lost. 
 The English would be left supreme in North America, and 
 it was only too likely that the hostility of other countries, 
 and especially Spain, would be aroused by the spectacle 
 of so unrivalled a predominance 1 . 
 
 If Pitt was not unreasonable, he may at least be said 
 to have been exacting. He was anxious that France 
 should pay the uttermost farthing; but it was by no 
 means certain that that country was in so reduced a 
 condition as to agree to any terms that might be de- 
 manded. There was a danger that the negotiations might 
 be abruptly broken off. It was not probable that Newcastle 
 and his friends would be able to prevail against a states- 
 man of the type of Pitt. Animated by the confidence 
 born of success, realising to the full that his services were 
 indispensable, they felt that he would, if thwarted, resign 
 the helm, and leave his colleagues the task of carrying 
 on the war which he, alone, was capable of conducting. 
 Newcastle understood the need of some potent ally to aid 
 in overthrowing the supremacy of one accustomed to 
 dominate the ministry and to exact submission to his 
 will ; and his hopes, and those of his followers, naturally 
 rested upon the king and Lord Bute. The latter had 
 promised to assist Newcastle in the question of peace, and, 
 with Bute as an ally, the old duke might hope to stand 
 his ground against his overbearing colleague. Promises, 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32921, f. 381: "But at the end he raised the point of 
 the fishery,... on which he had much set his heart. I spoke to him 
 very fairly on that subject, that I wished it as much as he ; but Spain 
 and all the rest of Europe would be against our engrossing such a 
 monopoly." Hardwicke to Newcastle, April 6th, 1761. Ibid. f. 340. 
 
46 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 however, are easy to make and difficult to fulfil; and 
 Bute was not so chivalrous as to ruin himself for the sake 
 of a pledge he had given. His position, and that of the 
 king, was one of no little difficulty. He was anxious 
 that war should cease, in order that his master might 
 reap all the benefits of the popularity of having inaugurated 
 his reign by conferring the blessings of peace upon a 
 nation wearied by a long struggle; and also might be 
 able, whenever he felt it necessary, to dispense with the 
 services of Pitt. For these reasons Bute naturally inclined 
 to lend his support to Newcastle ; but there was another 
 side to the picture. Pitt was the popular hero, the states- 
 man trusted by the people. He was known to have no 
 attachment, save to the country to which he had devoted 
 himself. In his hatred and dread of France he was 
 supported by the majority of his fellow-countrymen who 
 approved of his attempt to extract the most favourable 
 terms from the enemy of England. If Bute lent his name 
 and assistance to those endeavouring to thwart the popular 
 minister in so beneficent a design, he would become more 
 detestable to the people than ever; and the king, his 
 master, might have to share in the unpopularity of his 
 servant. The new secretary of state found himself at 
 the beginning of his official career between the horns of 
 a dilemma. The part he had to play was mapped out for 
 him by circumstances. He must hold the balance between 
 the two factions in the administration. He could not 
 afford to throw in his lot unreservedly with the party 
 ■opposed to a continuance of the war, nor could he purchase 
 popularity by a whole-hearted alliance with Pitt. He 
 was obliged to steer a middle course, and to aim at 
 bringing about a peace which would satisfy the national 
 ambition and yet be acceptable to France. It was no 
 easy role that Bute was forced to adopt, calling for 
 
THE FALL OF PITT 47 
 
 greater insight and political ability than he probably- 
 possessed 1 . 
 
 Before it is possible to estimate the probability of a 
 settlement being concluded between England and France, 
 some account must be taken of the forces at work in 
 the latter country. There is reason to believe that 
 Choiseul, the French minister, was sincerely desirous of 
 bringing the war to an end. His country had suffered 
 much in the conflict with England; and was not in a 
 condition indefinitely to prolong hostilities. In striving, 
 however, to attain this goal, Choiseul would have to face, 
 not only the opposition of his ally, Austria, but also a 
 powerful faction in France itself, pledged to the support 
 of Austrian interests, and anxious to continue the war 2 . 
 The existence of this party could not but exercise an 
 influence on Choiseul's policy. However anxious he might 
 be to free his country from the strain of a long and 
 unsuccessful contest, he was obliged to face the fact that 
 there were those who were ready to accuse him of a too 
 ready compliance with the demands of England. The 
 cry that France was being sacrificed to the implacable 
 hatred of her ancient enemy would be easily raised and 
 with difficulty refuted; and it would seem that there 
 "was a very definite limit of concessions beyond which 
 Choiseul could not afford to go. Peace would only be 
 attained if this limit coincided with what the English 
 ministers were willing to accept. 
 
 Spain, which had certain rights in dispute with England, 
 and had found in Pitt a minister whom it was impossible 
 to cajole or intimidate, had an immediate interest in the 
 negotiations pending with France. The unbending atti- 
 tude adopted by the English minister would tend to be 
 
 1 Von Ruville's Graf von Chatham, n. 425. 
 
 2 P.R.O., Foreign State Papers MiscelL, Jan. 13th, 1761. 
 
48 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 intensified rather than diminished if he succeeded in 
 making peace on his own terms; and Spain might be 
 » called upon, either to forego what she thought to be 
 legitimately" her due, or embark single-handed upon a 
 struggle with a country which had astonished the world 
 by its victories. It was therefore to her interest to secure 
 an alliance with France. It was probable that her 
 grievances would be listened to with more attention by 
 the English ministers if they knew that France was ready 
 to take up arms on her behalf. But the hope of such an 
 alliance would be dashed to the ground by the conclusion 
 of peace. Having come to terms with her rival, France 
 would certainly not be willing to risk another quarrel; 
 and Spain would be left to fight her own battles unassisted. 
 If France was to be won to espouse the Spanish cause, it 
 must be before peace was concluded with England 1 . If 
 he found the English administration unbending and 
 exacting in its demands, Choiseul might be inclined to 
 listen to the overtures of the Spanish government ; and, in 
 return for championing a quarrel which was not his own, 
 win an ally for a war which he could not conclude 2 . 
 
 1 Chatham Correspondence, n. 95, 96. 
 
 2 A passage in the instructions given to Bussy supports this view : 
 " Le sieur de Bussy doit aussi marquer de la confiance a M. le comte 
 de Fuentes, ambassadeur d'Espagne. La cour de Madrid a propose a 
 Sa majeste" de conclure un traite" offensif et defensif. Le projet de ce 
 traits tel qu'il a £te communique" par le marquis de Grimaldi, serait 
 sujet a. de grands inconve"nients dans les circonstances presentes. Le 
 Roi a juge a propos de diviser en deux parties le projet espagnol et de 
 proposer a Sa Majesty Catholique un traite" d'amitie, de garantie, pure- 
 ment defensif, lequel serait une espece de pacte de famille. II est a 
 pr^sumer que la negociation de ce traite qui est si analogue a l'interet 
 et aux sentiments des deux souverains, aura le succes que l'on en doit 
 attendre. De plus, le Roi qui a communique a Sa Majeste" Catholique 
 sa position actuelle politique, vis-a-vis de FAngleterre, proposera a ce 
 prince de difterer les engagements offensifs contre la Grande-Bretagne 
 
THE FALL OF PITT 49 
 
 Thus, for different reasons, both Spain and Austria 
 desired to delay the conclusion of peace, and had cause 
 to fear the pacific tendencies of Choiseul. The latter 
 would shun an alliance with Spain as long as he retained 
 hope of peace with England. But he was not a free 
 agent, and would be willing to throw himself into the 
 arms of Spain if he found that he could only make peace 
 with England upon terms to which he could not afford to 
 agree. The situation was intricate, and difficult to unravel ; 
 but it is at least certain that the longer the negotiations 
 continued the greater would be the chance of failure; 
 for time would be given to the Austrian and Spanish 
 factions to bring pressure to bear upon Choiseul, and 
 drive him to continue the war. 
 
 It was on the last day of March, 1761, that the Russian 
 ambassador in England, Prince Galitzin, communicated to 
 Pitt the terms of peace proposed by the French govern- 
 ment 1 . They appeared to be of a liberal and conciliatory 
 character. England and her allies were invited to take 
 part in a peace congress which was to meet at Augsburg 2 ; 
 but, as the delays of an European congress are proverbial, 
 Choiseul suggested that the attainment of peace might be 
 
 jusqu'a ce qu'il soit instruit du degre" de volonte' que le Eoi et le ministre 
 britanniques ont pour la paix en g£n6ral, et les conditions definitives 
 que, relativement a la France, ils voudront mettre au r^tablissement de 
 la paix entre les deux royaumes. Si les Anglais se pretaient a une 
 paix raisonnable, il serait contraire a l'objet du Eoi, de signer un traite' 
 offensif contre PAngleterre, lequel traite ranimerait certainement le feu 
 de la guerre. Si, au contraire, le ministere britannique porte ses pre- 
 tentions a un degre 1 insoutenable, nous taeherons de conserver, en ce 
 cas, la bonne volont6 de l'Espagne, pour qu'elle se joigne a nous dans le 
 seul parti qui restera de se faire rendre justice par les armes." Quoted 
 in Waddington's La Guerre de Sept Ans, iv. 514, 515. 
 
 1 Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, i. 41 ; P. K. 0., Foreign 
 State Papers Miscell., April 3rd, 1761. 
 
 2 This congress never met. 
 
 w. 4 
 
50 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 facilitated if the particular interests of England and 
 France were considered separately. As a basis of dis- 
 cussion, he suggested that the two countries should remain 
 in possession of the territory they occupied in various 
 parts of the world at certain fixed dates. In Europe, 
 May 1st, 1761, was the date named as determining posses- 
 sion; in the West Indies and Africa, July 1st, 1761; and 
 in the East Indies, September 1st, 1761. These epochs, 
 however, were not to be taken as final or beyond discussion. 
 They, as well as the question of the compensation to be 
 given for the surrender of the conquests of each country, 
 were to be subjects of negotiation 1 . 
 
 Such terms were by no means disadvantageous to 
 England ; and Newcastle was overjoyed to find the enemy 
 so liberally inclined 2 . Pitt was not so enthusiastic, and 
 thought that he espied a dangerous ambiguity in the 
 proposals 3 . He suspected that Choiseul intended to con- 
 sider those portions of the territories of the elector of 
 Hanover and the landgrave of Hesse, England's allies, 
 which had been occupied by the French, as conquests 
 wrested from Britain; and if his suspicions were correct, 
 the terms were not so favourable as Newcastle imagined. 
 It would be impossible for England to allow her allies 
 to suffer for the part they had taken in the war; and, 
 therefore, if Choiseul's offer was accepted, part of the 
 English conquests might have to be sacrificed in order to 
 win back for the German princes what they had lost. 
 
 It was not necessary, however, to reject the French 
 terms because of an ambiguity ; nor in the English answer 
 was the doubtful point touched upon 4 . The English ministers 
 agreed to send representatives to the congress at Augsburg, 
 
 1 Parliamentary History, xv. 1023 — 1025. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32921, f. 272. 3 Ibid. 
 
 4 This reticence was due to Pitt. Add. MS. 32921, f. 340. 
 
THE FALL OF PITT 51 
 
 and to conduct separate negotiations with France. Assent 
 was given to the principle of uti 'possidetis as laid down 
 by Choiseul; but the actual dates named in the French 
 proposals were not agreed to, that point being left over 
 for further discussion. Choiseul returned a far from con- 
 ciliatory answer. Retreating from the position he had 
 formerly taken up, he declared that the dates, as fixed by 
 France in her first proposals, could not be changed; and that 
 the continental war could not be brought to a conclusion 
 unless, at the same time, France and England had arrived 
 at a pacific settlement 1 . The demand that the epochs 
 must be taken as fixed was rejected by the cabinet at 
 a meeting on April 27th ; and it has been reported that 
 Pitt was largely responsible for the firm line adopted 2 . 
 His attitude was quite intelligible, even to those who 
 disapproved of it. He hoped soon to hear of the capture 
 of Belleisle, against which an English expedition had 
 been despatched ; and as France would probably be willing 
 to redeem that island at a great cost, it was important 
 that the dates should be so arranged as to leave England 
 in possession of it. The final determination of the epochs 
 must therefore be left until Belleisle had been taken. 
 
 The preliminary moves having been made, it was 
 necessary for the two courts to exchange representatives. 
 It was arranged that Bussy should come to England and 
 Stanley go to France. The instructions to be given to the 
 English representative were thoroughly discussed at a 
 cabinet meeting on May 13th 3 . It was agreed that Stanley 
 must inform Choiseul that England desired a separate 
 peace with France, to be concluded before and indepen- 
 dently of the general European pacification; but a far 
 
 1 Pari. Hist., xv. 1028—1030; Add. MS. 32922, f. 61. 
 
 2 Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, i. 43. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32923, f. 63. 
 
 4—2 
 
52 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 more knotty question was whether the losses of the German 
 allies of England should be counted as conquests made 
 upon the English crown. From the outset of the negotia- 
 tions, Pitt had realised the importance of this question ; 
 and at the cabinet meeting demanded that Stanley should 
 receive definite instructions regarding it. He refused, 
 however, to express any opinion himself ; and this unusual 
 reticence aroused the distrust of his colleagues who sus- 
 pected that he was encouraging them to do what he feared 
 to do himself. It would be dangerous to declare that the 
 German allies of the English crown should be left for relief 
 to the congress of Augsburg, for the king, in his capacity of 
 elector of Hanover, might well be offended by such treat- 
 ment ; but if, on the other hand, the conquests of England 
 were sacrificed in order to buy back the territories of 
 petty German princes, popular disapproval might be 
 evoked, and the cry raised that once more England was 
 being sacrificed to Germany. Safety lay in the path of 
 inaction ; and Pitt's colleagues refused to be driven where 
 he himself was disinclined to go. No decision was arrived 
 at, nor was Stanley given instructions on this point, but he 
 received orders not to sign any act with France, without 
 the authority of one of the secretaries of state; and, 
 though the negotiations were to be considered as sepa- 
 rate from those to be conducted at Augsburg, he was 
 instructed to inform the French minister that England 
 would not desert her ally, the king of Prussia 1 . 
 
 With the despatch of Bussy and Stanley to their 
 respective destinations, the negotiations may be said to 
 have begun in earnest. In conversation with Pitt, Bussy 
 did not show himself pacifically inclined, though to New- 
 castle and Hardwicke he was conciliatory throughout 2 . 
 
 1 Thackeray's Life of Pitt, i. 506—509. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32923, f. 367; Ibid. 32926, f. 205. 
 
THE FALL OF PITT 53 
 
 He was reported by Stanley to be in the interests of a 
 family opposed to Choiseul l ; and it is not unlikely that 
 he utilised his official position to work as an ally of the 
 party in France opposed to peace. If this were so, it 
 would explain the difference of his attitude towards Pitt 
 and Newcastle. Time must be given to allow of an alliance 
 being concluded between France and Spain, and, there- 
 fore, the peace party in the English cabinet must be 
 encouraged to continue the negotiations. But to guard 
 against the contingency of terms being offered by England 
 which Choiseul could accept with perfect safety to his 
 reputation, Pitt must be induced to believe that the 
 French government was not sincerely desirous of peace ; 
 and a haughty and unbending attitude on the part of the 
 French emissary would go far towards conveying this 
 impression. 
 
 If Pitt was disappointed by his conversations with 
 Bussy, Stanley formed a very favourable opinion of 
 Choiseul. The latter showed himself conciliatory and 
 ready to meet the English representative half-way. Re- 
 turning to his original proposition, he consented to allow 
 the epochs to be made a subject of negotiation; but 
 argued that the German allies of the English crown must 
 be included in the treaty between the two countries. This 
 demand, though it might cause unpleasant consequences, 
 was only reasonable ; and after the fall of Belleisle, which 
 capitulated on June 7th, the English ministers were ready 
 to offer terms of peace. These were decided upon at a 
 cabinet meeting on June 16th 2 . The epochs were so 
 arranged as to include Belleisle amongst the English 
 possessions; and it was expressly stipulated that the 
 terms agreed upon between the two courts must be 
 
 1 Thackeray's Life of Pitt, u. 524. 
 
 2 Grenville Papers, i. 365, 367. 
 
54 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 considered as final irrespective of what happened at 
 Augsburg, and that the treaty must be signed by- 
 August 1st. 
 
 Though the English ministers were reported to have 
 agreed unanimously to these proposals 1 , it is not likely 
 that they would have escaped criticism in France. As 
 a matter of fact, they were never considered, for Choiseul,, 
 before he had seen the English despatch, had confided to 
 Stanley terms of peace to be communicated to the English 
 government. The greatest stress was laid upon the 
 necessity of secrecy; and the offer was only to be com- 
 municated to those ministers whom it was absolutely 
 necessary to trust. By these new proposals Choiseul 
 abandoned the principle of uti possidetis which he had 
 been the first to enunciate, and sketched out a definite 
 settlement. Minorca was to be restored to England, in 
 return for which, Guadeloupe, Mariegalante, and G-oree 
 were to be given back to France. Canada, with new 
 boundaries, was to remain in the possession of England ; 
 but the island of Cape Breton, lying to the north-east of 
 Nova Scotia, was to be restored to France on the condition 
 that it should not be fortified. The French were still to 
 enjoy the fishing privileges off the coast of Newfoundland 
 granted to them by the treaty of Utrecht; but they 
 undertook to surrender their conquests from the German 
 allies of England 2 . 
 
 There is no reason to believe that Choiseul was acting 
 insincerely in offering these terms. They were dictated 
 by a desire for peace and a fear of the faction who schemed 
 to continue the war. If they had been accepted, England 
 would have regained possession of Minorca and acquired 
 the province of Canada in the New World ; and it might 
 
 1 Grenville Papers, i. 365, 367. 
 
 2 Thackeray's Life of Pitt, i. 539. 
 
THE FALL OF PITT 55 
 
 be argued that this would afford ample compensation for 
 the five years of warfare. France, on the other hand, 
 would not have surrendered everything of any value. 
 Canada would no longer be hers, and Minorca would once 
 more be in the possession of England; but the fishing 
 rights off Newfoundland would not have been forfeited, 
 and the possession of Cape Breton implied the enjoyment 
 of the fisheries in the gulf of St Lawrence 1 . Choiseul, 
 indeed, had defined his policy far more than he had ever 
 done before. To win England over to the side of peace, 
 he had offered to surrender a large and important pro- 
 vince : to placate his fellow-countrymen, he had preserved 
 the French fishing rights in the American seas. It was 
 a daring bid for peace, an attempt to over-ride the oppo- 
 sition of the Austrian faction, and to free his country from 
 its most formidable antagonist 2 . 
 
 A critical point in the negotiations had been reached ; 
 and whether peace was concluded depended very largely 
 upon the events of the next few weeks. Newcastle, 
 delighted with the French terms, flattered himself that 
 the end of the war was in sight; but Bute displayed 
 greater acuteness, and was far less enthusiastic 3 . The 
 cabinet met on June 24th to consider the French proposals 4 . 
 All the ministers agreed in refusing to allow the boundaries 
 of Canada to be defined anew, and in repudiating the 
 demand that Cape Breton should be restored to France. 
 Over the question of the Newfoundland fisheries they 
 disagreed. Pitt's views on this point were well known; 
 
 1 It is unlikely that Choiseul would have wished to retain Cape 
 Breton except he proposed that France should preserve her right of 
 fishing in the gulf of St Lawrence. 
 
 2 It is difficult to understand Choiseul's desire for secrecy except 
 that he feared that the terms might be misunderstood in France, and 
 afford a handle for his opponents. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32924, f. 311. * Ibid. 
 
56 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 and it could have caused no surprise to his colleagues 
 when he argued against this concession. Supported by 
 his brother-in-law, Lord Temple, he was opposed by 
 Granville, Hardwicke, Bedford, Halifax, and Newcastle. 
 They did not deny the value to England of such a 
 monopoly if it could be acquired, but dwelt upon the 
 jealousy it would provoke among the maritime powers of 
 Europe. With legal acuteness, Hardwicke pointed out 
 that if France was denied the rights granted her by the 
 treaty of Utrecht, she could hardly be expected to fulfil 
 the stipulations of the same treaty regarding the fortifica- 
 tions of Dunkirk. Between the two parties Bute steered 
 a middle course. He was anxious that an attempt should 
 be made to expel the French from the Newfoundland 
 fisheries, but was content to abandon the demand if 
 refused by Ohoiseul. The question was left undecided, 
 until the cabinet met again; but, in the interval, Bute 
 was careful to inform Newcastle that the king approved 
 of the policy which his favourite had advocated l . 
 
 The attitude of those who opposed Pitt on this point is 
 certainly not without justification. An acquisition may 
 be of great value, but this does not constitute a cogent 
 reason for demanding it as a necessary condition of peace. 
 To drive the enemy to despair by exacting too onerous 
 terms is faulty diplomacy. A treaty must of necessity 
 be of the nature of a compromise; and few wars would 
 have been concluded, save by the complete exhaustion of 
 the combatants, if the victorious country had always 
 enforced an unconditional surrender upon its defeated 
 opponent. Moreover, particular circumstances might 
 render it inexpedient to press France closely on this point. 
 She had enjoyed the right of fishing off Newfoundland for 
 many years; and to be called upon to surrender it at 
 1 Add. MS. 32924, f. 311. 
 
THE FALL OF PITT 57 
 
 a time when she was to be compelled to abandon the gulf 
 of St Lawrence, might well seem too exacting. There can 
 be little doubt that Newcastle and his friends were right 
 in their opposition to Pitt; but they did not know how 
 right they were. They were unaware of the perils which 
 beset Choiseul, and how fatal it would be for him to 
 conclude a peace which could be construed as unduly 
 favourable to England. 
 
 Bute, more influenced by considerations of domestic 
 than of foreign policy, played a deeper and more subtle 
 game. Convinced that neither he nor his master was in 
 a position to give hostages to fortune, he desired above all 
 things to avoid anything which might reflect unpopularity 
 upon the king ; and, anxious as he was for peace, he was 
 cautious as to the means of obtaining it. It would seriously 
 hinder the cause he had so much at heart if he could be 
 taunted with having prevented Pitt from gaining a valu- 
 able acquisition for England. He could not afford to 
 throw in his lot with Newcastle and his followers; but 
 neither did he dare to take his stand by the side of Pitt, 
 and imperil the chance of peace. He chose the path of 
 compromise and safety; and utilised the two opposing 
 parties for his own ends. 
 
 The cabinet met again on Friday, June 26th ; and Pitt 
 placed before the assembled ministers the draft of his 
 answer to the French proposals 1 . He explained that he 
 had framed his reply in accordance with what he had 
 understood to be the wishes of the majority of the 
 council, leaving the point of the Newfoundland fisheries 
 undetermined ; and then went on to say that he considered 
 the policy advocated by Bute puerile and illusory. This 
 provoked the latter to defend his opinion with no little 
 asperity. To calm him, he was assured that the form in 
 1 Add. MS. 32924, f. 311. 
 
58 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 which the letter had been cast ensured that an attempt 
 would be made to expel the French from the Newfound- 
 land fisheries; and, to place the matter beyond doubt, a 
 sentence was added stating that the French could not 
 be permitted to continue to enjoy the rights granted by 
 the treaty of Utrecht without substantial compensation. 
 Stanley was also instructed to inform Choiseul that 
 England would only consent to restore Guadeloupe and 
 Mariegalante in return for the immediate evacuation of 
 the territory of her German allies ; and that peace could 
 not be made unless France consented to surrender Canada 
 in its entirety, together with the rights of fishing, to cede 
 Senegal and Goree to England, to reduce Dunkirk to the 
 condition stipulated for by the treaty of Utrecht, and to 
 restore all that she had conquered in Germany 1 . 
 
 Choiseul was disappointed by the English answer. He 
 had striven for peace but had failed to soften the hearts 
 of the British ministers. He might well feel that they 
 had accepted all his concessions and retained all their 
 own prejudices. It was the question of the fisheries which 
 weighed most heavily upon him. He affected to care 
 little for the French fishing rights off Newfoundland; 
 but pleaded for a defenceless port in Cape Breton, which 
 might serve as a shelter for the French fishing boats. 
 " Donnez-nous," he remarked to Stanley, " de la peche et 
 sauvez nous le point d'honneur pour Dunkerque, car ce 
 n'est que cela la paix est faite 2 ." The parting of the ways 
 had come. Choiseul had followed one line of policy, and 
 it had ended in failure. He had discovered that peace 
 with England could only be bought by the surrender of 
 the fisheries; and the price was more than he could afford 
 to pay. By his side stood Grimaldi, the Spanish am- 
 
 1 Thackeray's Life of Pitt, i. 543. 
 
 2 Ibid. ii. 532. 
 
THE FALL OF PITT 59 
 
 bassador in France, tempting him with the bribe of an 
 alliance with Spain; and as the hope of peace with 
 England faded, the value of the Spanish alliance in- 
 creased. With a new ally it might still be possible to 
 continue the war. France was not yet at the end of her 
 resources, and England was feeling the burden of the 
 contest. The negotiations were continued, but hence- 
 forth Choiseul showed a greater compliance towards 
 Spain, and prepared for a contingency which did not seem 
 unlikely to come to pass. 
 
 It is well to remember that Pitt was not solely re- 
 sponsible for the English demands which induced Choiseul 
 to waver in his inclination towards peace and to draw 
 nearer to Spain. Bute was equally convinced that the 
 limits of concession had been reached; and censured 
 Bedford for being too ready to make sacrifices in the 
 cause of peace 1 . There was a danger of a deadlock. 
 Both countries seemed determined not to make any 
 further concessions; and Choiseul, having failed to con- 
 ciliate his opponents, endeavoured to intimidate them. 
 The French terms which arrived in England on July 20th 
 breathed no spirit of compromise, and if the English 
 ministers had found fault with the former proposals, they 
 were not likely to be content with these. Choiseul again 
 
 1 Bedford Correspondence, in. 29 — 34. M. Waddington, however, 
 is of a different opinion: "A notre avis, c'est bien a Pitt qu'incombe la 
 responsabilite de l'echec. Com me conditions de paix, il e^ait bien deter- 
 mine a n'accorder que celles qui imposent au vaincu la loi du vainqueur. 
 Humilier la France, ruiner son commerce, lni enlever ses colonies, et 
 detruire sa marine, il n'eut pas d'autre but et ne le cacha pas. II fit 
 ajourner les concessions qui, accordees des le d^but, eussent assur^ la signa- 
 ture des pr^liminaires, les combattit avec energie, et quand elles lui furenfc 
 arracMes par ses collegues moins intraitables, il les transmit avec des 
 expressions, des commentaires et des restrictions qui en att^nuerent 
 beaucoup la ported." La Guerre de Sept Am, iv. 600, 601. 
 
60 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 demanded a share in the Newfoundland fisheries and the 
 cession of Cape Breton; and though France agreed to 
 surrender its conquests from the German allies of England, 
 an exception was made of the territories of the king of 
 Prussia. It was argued that as these had been conquered 
 and governed in the name of Austria, they could not be 
 restored without the consent of that power. With the3e 
 terms were despatched two private memorials from the 
 French court to Bussy, calling upon England to terminate 
 her dispute with Spain, and declaring that Austria could 
 only consent to a separate peace between England and 
 France if she were allowed to retain possession of the 
 Prussian territory conquered by the French 1 . 
 
 Choiseul had thrown down the glove. He had ex- 
 changed the olive branch for the sword, and sought to 
 frighten England by vaunting the intimacy between 
 France and Spain. It is difficult to believe that he ex- 
 pected his new offer to be accepted unmodified ; it is far 
 more probable that he intended it to serve another purpose. 
 French pride would be gratified by the firm stand taken 
 upon the fishery question ; the gratitude of Austria might 
 be expected for the loyalty of her ally. Spain could not 
 be unmindful that France had championed her interests, 
 and risked the hope of peace with England in conse- 
 
 1 Thackeray's Life of Pitt, n. 547, 552, 553. The two private 
 memorials were presented to Pitt by Bussy on July 23rd. Some time 
 later, Choiseul informed Stanley that Bussy had been instructed to 
 produce or suppress the Spanish memorial as he thought best; and 
 that he had been persuaded to produce it by the Spanish ambassador 
 in England, Fuentes. It seems clear that both Choiseul and Bussy were 
 not in favour of immediately producing the Spanish memorial; and 
 that this momentous step was taken in accordance with the wishes of 
 Louis XV, Grimaldi, and Fuentes. Waddington's La Guerre de Sept 
 Ans, iv. 560 — 563 ; Le Due de Choiseul et VAngleterre ; Revue Historique, 
 Tome Soixante-onzieme ; Thackeray's Life of Pitt, i. 570; Add. MS. 
 32925, f. 312 ; Ibid. 32926, f. 47. 
 
THE FALL OF PITT 61 
 
 quence. It was a diplomatic move of no little adroitness. 
 France no longer stood detached from Austria and at 
 the mercy of England. Choiseul had sown the seed which 
 was to produce the Family Compact; and intimated to the 
 English ministers that he had reached the limit of his 
 concessions, and was preparing to conclude new alliances. 
 England must decide either to forego her demands or 
 incur the risk of driving Spain into the arms of France. 
 Choiseul had thrown in his lot with the Austrian and 
 Spanish factions, using them as pawns in the game against 
 England. 
 
 The political situation in England was not favourable 
 to a policy of surrender. The tide of victory showed no 
 sign of turning, and news had just arrived of the capture 
 of Pondicherry and Dominica 1 . These fresh triumphs 
 would strengthen the position of those who were in favour 
 of continuing the war rather than yielding further to the 
 demands of France. Bute, who was more in sympathy 
 with Pitt than his opponents, had been endeavouring to 
 "spirit up the Dukes of Newcastle, Devonshire, and 
 Bedford, to something vigorous 2 ." When, therefore, the 
 cabinet met on July 21st, all the ministers were unanimous 
 in regarding the French terms as unsatisfactory; and 
 Bute is reported to have taken an active part in the dis- 
 cussion 3 . At a further meeting on July 24th, an answer 
 to the French proposals was decided upon, and delivered 
 by Stanley to Choiseul five days later. Unanimity again 
 prevailed 4 ; and though Newcastle complained of the 
 manner in which Pitt had executed the instructions of the 
 cabinet, he received little sympathy from either the king 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32925, f. 202 ; Grenville Papers, i. 376. 
 
 2 Grenville Papers, i. 376. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32925, ff. 251, 329 ; Ibid. 35352, f. 176. 
 
 4 Thackeray's Life of Pitt, n. 554 ; Grenville Papers, i. 378, 379. 
 
62 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 or Bute 1 . The English, answer was certainly not con- 
 ciliatory. Many of the French demands were unhesitat- 
 ingly rejected. The right of fishing in the gulf of 
 St Lawrence and the possession of Cape Breton were 
 again refused, and the two private memorials declared 
 to be inadmissible. The French were not to continue 
 to enjoy their privileges in the Newfoundland fisheries, 
 unless prepared to demolish the fortifications of Dunkirk; 
 and the distinction drawn between the king of Prussia 
 and the other German allies of England was definitely 
 repudiated 2 . 
 
 If Choiseul had hoped to intimidate the English 
 government, he must be counted to have failed. No sign 
 of surrender in any material point could be detected in 
 the answer to his proposals. He had met with a serious 
 rebuff, and the continuance of the war appeared certain, 
 unless he was willing to forego some of his demands. 
 The policy adopted by the English administration was 
 agreeable to the wishes of Pitt, and warmly approved 
 by Bute 3 . Left to themselves, Newcastle and his friends 
 would probably have been more conciliatory; but they 
 could not hope to prevail against the alliance of the two 
 secretaries of state, and meekly followed their lead 4 . This 
 union, temporary in its nature, and soon to be broken, 
 exercised a decisive influence upon the course of the 
 negotiations. It may be held to be responsible for their 
 failure. Choiseul can hardly be blamed for thinking that 
 the English ministers had taken up a position from which 
 they would not retreat. Peace seemed out of the question 
 
 i Add. MS. 32926, f. 187. 
 
 2 Thackeray's Life of Pitt, n. 557. 
 
 3 Grenville Papers, i. 378, 379. 
 
 4 For some curious gossip about the alliance of Pitt and Bute at this 
 time, see the Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, i. pp. 51, 52. 
 
THE FALL OF PITT 63 
 
 unless he was willing to surrender the French fishing 
 rights in the gulf of St Lawrence ; and that concession 
 he could not afford to make. Nothing was left but war, 
 and after he received the English answer, he informed 
 Havrincour, the representative of France in Sweden, that 
 the king had definitely made up his mind to continue 
 the war, but wished to conceal his intentions for the 
 present, and to prolong the negotiations with England 1 . 
 It is not difficult to discover the reason which impelled 
 Choiseul to adopt this policy of duplicity. If the war 
 was still to go on, France must win Spain as an ally ; and 
 it was necessary to gain time to bind the two countries 
 together by a treaty of alliance. The positions of the 
 two Bourbon powers were reversed. Up to this point it 
 had been Spain that needed the assistance of France : it 
 was now France that needed the assistance of Spain 2 . 
 Choiseul was about to take decisive action, to throw him- 
 self upon the side of Spain, and drag that power into the 
 war, because he believed that peace with England had 
 passed out of the sphere of practical politics. In this he 
 was wrong. The firm attitude adopted by the English 
 ministry depended solely upon the union of Pitt and 
 Bute. The latter, thinking that France might respond to 
 pressure, and anxious to avoid the reproach that he had 
 been instrumental in preventing the country from re- 
 ceiving an adequate reward for her many triumphs, united 
 with Pitt to withstand Choiseul's demands. But he was 
 
 i Add. MS. 32926, f. 67. 
 
 2 Six months later, Hardwicke wrote to Newcastle, "I am now con- 
 vinced that the intercepted letter in the summer from Choiseul to 
 Havrincour in cypher wherein mention was made of training on the 
 negotiations between England and France till the latter end of September 
 — deserved more weight to be laid upon it than we were willing to allow 
 it at that time " (Add. MS. 32932, f. 366). 
 
64 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 not inclined to sacrifice the hope of peace to this alliance. 
 If Choiseul adhered firmly to his terms, if it appeared 
 necessary to purchase peace by allowing the French to 
 fish in the gulf of St Lawrence, Bute would be willing to 
 make the surrender demanded. The time was shortly to 
 come when he would be in alliance with Newcastle, and 
 urging that concessions should be made to France. 
 When, however, that time came, he had waited too long. 
 When England was willing to make concessions, France 
 was too deeply committed to Spain to be able to accept 
 them. 
 
 The negotiations continued, but Choiseul was no longer 
 acting sincerely. He wished not for peace but for time 
 to allow him to conclude an alliance with Spain : not till 
 that had been accomplished could he afford to defy 
 England. He was obliged to pursue an intricate and 
 double-faced policy demanding no little care and skill. 
 His plans would be seriously affected if the English 
 ministers, convinced of the impossibility of attaining 
 peace, broke off the negotiations before he had concluded 
 an alliance with Spain ; and, to guard against this danger, 
 he was compelled to frame terms, sufficiently exacting to 
 prevent them being accepted without hesitation, and yet 
 sufficiently conciliatory to afford an excuse for the con- 
 tinuance of the negotiations. The French ultimatum, 
 which arrived in England early in August, was inspired by 
 these principles 1 . Not intended to be accepted, it was 
 meant to afford discussion by which the negotiations 
 might be prolonged 2 . Choiseul agreed to surrender Groree 
 on certain conditions, but on the other points in dispute no 
 material concessions were made. Yet to Newcastle, Bussy 
 
 1 Thackeray's Life of Pitt, n. 566. 
 
 2 For evidence that the ultimatum was not intended to be accepted, 
 see von Ruville's William Pitt, Graf von Chatham, ir. 458. 
 
THE FALL OF PITT 65 
 
 talked smoothly of peace, with the intention of buoying 
 him up in the hope that all was not yet desperate 1 . 
 
 The interest now centres round the divisions in the 
 English cabinet. The success of Choiseul's tortuous 
 policy depended on the peace party in the cabinet per- 
 sisting in the negotiations despite the opposition of Pitt. 
 Though Newcastle was shocked by the French ultimatum, 
 he refused to believe that peace was out of the question 2 . 
 Anxious that the English demands should be as low as 
 possible, he hesitated between surrender on the fishery 
 question and the risk of continuing the war against the 
 combined powers of France and Spain 3 . But against 
 Newcastle and his friends stood Pitt who seemed to enjoy 
 a greater predominance than ever. Stormy meetings of 
 the cabinet were held on August 13th and the day 
 following. At the first of these, it was agreed that a 
 meeting between Pitt and Bussy must take place, and that 
 a letter should be written to the latter informing him of 
 this decision. Pitt presented the draft of this note to the 
 ministers when they met on August 14th. It was not 
 couched in conciliatory language. Formal regrets were 
 expressed that " the happy moment to put an end to so 
 many miseries is not yet come." The document did not 
 escape criticism, but Pitt refused to alter what he had 
 written ; and the letter was finally approved by a narrow 
 majority 4 . 
 
 Not only the policy of Choiseul, but the designs of the 
 king were threatened by the power wielded by Pitt at 
 
 i Add. MS. 32926, f. 205. 
 
 2 Ibid. 32926, f. 269, f. 281. 
 
 3 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 25, 26; Bedford Correspondence, in. 35 — 36. 
 
 4 Add. MS. 35870, f. 297 (E.H.R., April 1906); Chatham Corre- 
 spondence, ii. 136 ; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 26 — 28 ; Thackeray's Life 
 of Pitt, ii. 589. For an account of the interview between Pitt and Bussy, 
 see Waddington's La Guerre de Sept Ans, n. 579, 580. 
 
 W. 5 
 
66 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 this moment. Bute had thrown in his lot with the popular 
 minister, and had actively supported his policy against 
 the opposition of Newcastle ; but it was not the intention 
 of either the king or his favourite to place supreme 
 authority in the hands of a man who had climbed to 
 power on the shoulders of the people, and looked for his 
 strength, neither to the court nor to the parliament, but 
 to the nation. Yet there was a danger that the outcome 
 of Bute's policy would be the unchallenged supremacy 
 of Pitt. The warmest advocate of peace, the Duke of 
 Bedford, had already declared his intention of ceasing 
 to attend cabinet meetings, and it was probable that his 
 example would be followed, in the near future, by the 
 Duke of Devonshire 1 . Newcastle was threatening to 
 retire 2 , and, though he was prone to talk of retirement 
 and remain in office, it was not likely that he would con- 
 tinue in the service of the crown, if abandoned by his 
 friends. The utter collapse of the peace-party and the 
 consequent triumph of Pitt did not appear improbable; 
 and, if this catastrophe were to be averted, it was time 
 that the king stretched out a saving hand to those in 
 favour of concessions. 
 
 The first signs of a change of front on the part of Bute 
 and his master can be discerned shortly after the cabinet 
 meeting on August 14th. No answer had yet been given 
 to the French ultimatum, and the character of the reply 
 would largely depend upon the course of action pursued 
 by Bute. If the latter continued in alliance with Pitt, 
 the answer would be haughty and unyielding; only by 
 winning Bute over to the side of peace could Newcastle 
 hope to effect a modification of the English demands. 
 And Bute was not unwilling to be won. He had gone far 
 
 1 Bedford Correspondence, in. 36 — 39 ; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 30. 
 
 2 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 30—31 ; Add. MS. 32927, f. 68. 
 
THE FALL OF PITT 67 
 
 enough in support of Pitt. He could never be reproached 
 with having failed, through inertia or cowardice, to gain 
 important acquisitions for England, and it would not be 
 the action of a wise statesman to imperil peace by per- 
 sisting in demands which the enemy refused to grant. 
 The time had come for retreat from a position which could 
 be no longer occupied with advantage. 
 
 Thus, at the moment that Newcastle was striving to 
 gain the assistance of Bute, the latter was willing to come 
 to an arrangement with him. The Duke of Devon- 
 shire played the part of mediator, and discovered that 
 he had undertaken an unexpectedly easy task. On 
 August 16th he had an interview with the king who told 
 him that he was in favour of allowing the French to fish 
 in the gulf of St Lawrence, and of granting a port of 
 shelter for their ships 1 ; and it is not without significance 
 that he expressed himself most warmly in favour of the 
 Duke of Bedford continuing to attend the meetings of 
 the cabinet, i Two days later, Devonshire had an inter- 
 view with Bute, and was satisfied that the latter would 
 support the peace party in the administration. At a 
 second meeting, a few days later, the compact was sealed 
 and signed. Bute readily agreed to the necessity of a 
 good understanding with Newcastle, declared his readi- 
 ness to work with him, and denied that he was connected 
 with anybody else 2 . 
 
 A cabinet revolution had occurred. Bute had united 
 with the minister whom he had formerly neglected, and 
 the balance of power in the administration had shifted. 
 Newcastle and his friends were now in a stronger position 
 than they had occupied since the beginning of the nego- 
 tiations. They had secured an important ally, and 
 
 1 Bedford Correspondence, m. 36 — 39. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32927, f. 154. 
 
 S— 2 
 
68 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 pursued a policy approved by the king. The change in 
 the political situation was not long in making itself felt. 
 An answer to the French ultimatum had to be framed; and 
 the cabinet met on August 19th, August 20th, and August 
 24th, to settle the terms to be offered. At these meetings, 
 the party in favour of concession and conciliation carried 
 the day. Though Pitt and Temple neither modified nor 
 concealed their opinions, they acquiesced in the decision of 
 the majority, for the sake of preserving unanimity 1 . The 
 right of fishing in the gulf of St Lawrence, except on 
 the coasts belonging to England, was granted to France ; 
 and the island of St Pierre was offered as a shelter for 
 the French fishing vessels. The privileges of the French 
 in the Newfoundland fisheries were to continue if the 
 stipulations of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in regard 
 to the fortifications of Dunkirk were executed. The 
 ministers, however, still adhered to their demand that the 
 French should restore that part of the territory of the 
 king of Prussia which they had conquered 2 . 
 
 Pitt had suffered a serious rebuff. He had been out- 
 voted in the cabinet, and compelled to consent to a policy 
 which he did not approve. France had been allowed 
 more than he had ever been willing to grant. The 
 material point of the fisheries had been decided in her 
 favour ; and in place of the stipulations of the treaty of 
 Utrecht in regard to the fortifications of Dunkirk, the 
 more moderate provisions of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle 
 had been substituted. Had such terms been offered a few 
 weeks earlier, peace might have been made. It was now 
 
 1 Rockingham Memoirs, I. 33—34; Add. MS. 35870, f. 301, f. 303 
 (E.H.R., April 1906). 
 
 2 In the Parliamentary History, and by Thackeray in his Life of 
 Pitt, the English ultimatum is dated August 16th. It was not despatched, 
 however, until later, as can be seen by the covering letter to Stanley, 
 dated August 27th. Add. MS. 32927, f. 220. 
 
THE FALL OF PITT 69 
 
 too late. Choiseul had despaired prematurely, and reaped 
 the fruits of his precipitancy. He had sold his freedom in 
 order to insure his safety; and when England offered 
 terms which, if a free agent, he would have gladly 
 welcomed, he was too deeply committed to Spain to be 
 able to accept them. The Family Compact between the 
 two countries had been signed on August 15th, and France 
 was pledged to the support of Spanish interests. To 
 the English ultimatum Choiseul was obliged to return an 
 answer which shattered the last remaining hopes of peace; 
 and, after a meeting of the cabinet on September 15th, 
 Stanley was ordered to return home. 
 
 Thus failure and disappointment stared in the face 
 those who had so laboriously striven to make peace 
 between two countries labouring under the burden of a 
 world- waged conflict. The war was to continue ; and one 
 result of the attempt of the English ministers to come to 
 terms with France had been to draw that country nearer 
 to Spain. That was the new element in the situation; 
 and whereas for France the situation had improved since 
 the beginning of the negotiations, for England it had 
 changed for the worse. The danger of a war with Spain 
 had been discussed at the cabinet meeting which decided 
 upon the recall of Stanley 1 : it was a question which 
 could not be neglected with safety. It was destined to 
 precipitate a political crisis, to drive Pitt and Temple 
 from power ; and to sow the seeds of dissension between 
 those who should have united to withstand the aggressive 
 policy of the crown. With the exception of Pitt and 
 Temple, the ministers have been severely censured for 
 their policy at this juncture; but, before it is possible 
 to form a fair judgment, it is necessary to form a clear 
 idea of the information at their disposal. Not until 
 1 Add. MS. 32928, f. 187, f. 193. 
 
70 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 we know how much they knew of the relations between 
 the two Bourbon powers, can we decide the degree of their 
 guilt in refusing to follow the advice of Pitt and declare 
 war upon Spain. 
 
 All were agreed that the intimacy between France 
 and Spain had become much closer since the beginning of 
 the peace negotiations. In addition to the information 
 given in Stanley's despatches, there was the Spanish 
 memorial to prove the friendly nature of the relations; 
 between the two countries. Intimacy, however, varies in 
 degree, and, as existing between two countries, can hardly 
 prove a dangerous factor in international politics unless 
 ratified and cemented by a formal treaty of alliance. 
 The Family Compact had been signed on August 15th, 
 and Spain had pledged herself to take up arms on 
 behalf of France, if called upon to do so. The English 
 ministers were aware of the existence of this treaty 
 through an intercepted letter written by Grrimaldi; and, 
 from the same source, they acquired the information that 
 France had pledged herself to continue the war until 
 the Spanish grievances against England were removed ! „ 
 From Stanley they had learnt that France had under- 
 taken to support Spanish interests in the negotiations, 
 with England 2 . What they did not know, and it was an 
 important lacuna in their information, was that, by an 
 article of the Family Compact, Spain had pledged herself 
 to go to war on behalf of France. 
 
 Such was the information at the disposal of those who 
 had to decide upon the proper policy to be pursued. 
 Reduced to the simplest terms, the question was whether 
 England should declare war on Spain because she sus- 
 pected that country of an alliance with France directed 
 
 1 Chatham Correspondence, n. 139 — 141. 
 
 2 Ibid., n. 140, Note 2. 
 
THE FALL OF PITT 71 
 
 against her interests. Much could be urged in favour of 
 a bellicose policy. It was in the highest degree unlikely 
 that France would have committed herself so deeply to 
 the interests of Spain, and imperilled the hope of a pacific 
 settlement with England in consequence, except she could 
 count upon receiving some material advantage in return. 
 The nature of the advantage was not known; but it could 
 be safely surmised. Everything pointed to the fact that 
 Spain was ready, on behalf of her ally, to take up arms 
 against England : that was the price she would be called 
 upon to pay in return for French assistance. This was 
 the conclusion at which Pitt arrived, and he, therefore, 
 favoured a declaration of war against Spain. The in- 
 formation he possessed was not such as could be published 
 to the world as a justification of his conduct. But he was 
 willing to incur odium, ready to suffer the accusation of 
 needlessly provoking hostilities, knowing that time would 
 justify him. He saw that war between England and 
 Spain was certain. England, standing as she did to Spain, 
 could not disregard or view with indifference a rapproche- 
 ment between that country and France. Inquiries as to 
 the exact nature of the Family Compact could not be 
 avoided; and if, as seemed highly probable, that treaty 
 contained clauses hostile to England, the inquiries would 
 end in war. Therefore, if Pitt was correct in his surmise 
 as to the character of the treaty, war between the two 
 countries was inevitable, sooner or later ; and it was to 
 the interest of England that it should be sooner. Specula- 
 tion, and the weighing of evidence, led to a conclusion 
 which could not be proved, but yet was invested with the 
 strongest degree of probability. It is the mark of a 
 great statesman to be willing to act upon the most prob- 
 able hypothesis: he who waits for certainty denies his 
 own powers of insight, and gives the advantage to the 
 
72 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 enemy. It was no craving to extend the area of warfare, 
 no desire for a fresh foe to be overthrown by the victorious 
 arms of England, that drove Pitt to adopt a warlike 
 attitude : he saw that a conflict with Spain was inevitable, 
 but that it still remained within the power of England to 
 shatter the designs of that country by driving her into 
 war before she was ready to undertake it. 
 
 Save for Lord Temple, Pitt stood alone in his opinion. 
 To Newcastle his policy seemed that of a visionary, flown 
 with conquest and intoxicated by success. The resources 
 of England were not unlimited, and Newcastle had Lord 
 Anson's authority for believing them insufficient to support 
 a war with Spain 1 . He fixed his gaze on the present 
 rather than on the future; and preferred to postpone 
 the evil day, hoping that time would bring a solution 
 of the difficulty. It was a policy of misplaced caution, 
 of waiting upon events rather than attempting to 
 control their course. Bute was also anxious to avoid 
 an immediate declaration of war. The enlargement 
 of the area of hostilities would render a pacification 
 more difficult, and as long as England continued at war, 
 the services of Pitt seemed indispensable. War with 
 Spain would therefore tend to delay the execution of the 
 design to restore the personal power of the crown; and 
 therefore resort must be had to diplomacy to avert the 
 threatened evil. Neither Newcastle nor Bute desired to 
 neglect the question of the relations existing between 
 France and Spain ; but they deprecated hasty action, and 
 sought to unravel the Grordian knot by means of diplomacy, 
 rather than to cut it by an immediate declaration of war. 
 
 The cleavage of opinion on this question between Pitt 
 and the majority of the ministers became clear at the 
 cabinet meeting on September 18th. Pitt advised that 
 1 Add. MS. 32928, f. 187, f. 193. 
 
TIIE FALL OF PITT 73 
 
 Lord Bristol, the English, ambassador at the court of 
 Spain, should be instructed to inform the Spanish govern- 
 ment that it was the intention of the English king "to 
 take forthwith such necessary and timely measures as 
 Grod has put into his hands for the defence of the realm." 
 In order to avoid ambiguity and misconception, he had 
 committed his speech to writing, and this is the document 
 generally known as the " advice in writing." So daring 
 and high-handed a policy found no supporter in the 
 cabinet except Temple. The other ministers were adverse 
 to what was nothing short of a declaration of war. They 
 advised that Bristol should be instructed to ask a full and 
 clear explanation from the Spanish government of its 
 conduct ; and should support the demand by the intimation 
 that, if no satisfactory answer was returned, a breach of 
 diplomatic relations would probably follow 1 . When the 
 council was over, Bute drew Pitt apart, and pressed him 
 to withdraw the paper he had read, or at least to refrain 
 from giving it to the king, as he had threatened to do. 
 Pitt, however, was obdurate, and stubbornly refused to 
 listen to the arguments of those who disagreed with 
 him 2 . 
 
 He staked his reputation upon the correctness of his 
 opinion, and time was to prove him right. He saw that 
 those who favoured a resort to diplomacy were but taking 
 a longer road to the same end ; and that delay would be 
 more profitable to Spain than to England. He might well 
 think it possible for him to bend his colleagues to his will 
 by a threat of resignation. The war with France still 
 continued ; and the ministers might naturally hesitate to 
 drive from power the man who had raised England to a 
 pinnacle of glory she had not attained for many years. 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32928, f. 225, f. 227, f. 233, f. 259. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32928, f. 259. 
 
74 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 The cry would be raised that the great war minister had 
 been sacrificed by his colleagues, blind to the grandeur of 
 his schemes ; and Bute regarded the resignation of Pitt as 
 an evil to be averted 1 . Yet there was the other side to 
 the picture. If Pitt was indispensable because there was 
 war with France, a war with Spain would render him 
 even more so. His power would be more firmly established 
 than ever, and he would enjoy the position of a dictator of 
 the destinies of England. 
 
 A crisis had suddenly arisen for which Bute was not 
 prepared ; and his policy betrays signs of confusion. He 
 aimed at maintaining peaceful relations with Spain, and 
 retaining Pitt in office : it was an attempt to reconcile 
 irreconcilables. Pitt had refused to listen to the argu- 
 ments of Bute ; but there was still a hope that he would 
 give way, as he had done on a former occasion, to the 
 united opinion of his colleagues. It was probably for 
 this purpose that Newcastle, Devonshire, Mansfield, and 
 Bate met at Devonshire House on September 19th 2 . But 
 Pitt had taken up a position from which he did not intend 
 to retreat; and, when the cabinet met on September 21st, 
 he was found to be as resolute as ever 3 . Bute discovered 
 that a middle course was not practicable, and, forced to 
 select one of two unpleasant alternatives, chose to drive 
 Pitt from power rather than embark upon a war with 
 Spain 4 . The die had been cast, and Pitt's fate was sealed. 
 Thwarted by his colleagues, he could not look for support 
 
 i Add. MS. 32928, f. 259. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32928, f. 259 ; Lord Hardwicke was unable to be present 
 on account of the death of his wife. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32928, f. 303 : Rockingham Memoirs, i. 37—40. 
 
 4 It is possible that Bute may have been influenced by a letter from 
 Stanley, which arrived on September 21st, and spoke more hopefully of 
 the prospect of peace with France. See Hunt's Political History of 
 England, 1760—1801, p. 29. 
 
THE FALL OF PITT 75 
 
 to the court. The king shewed himself actively hostile 
 to the minister whom he had formerly supported against 
 Newcastle. He declined to accept the "advice in writing 1 ," 
 and refused to abandon all hope of peace with France 2 . 
 A few days later, it was reported that the king was more 
 offended than ever with Pitt, and wished to be rid of 
 him 3 . 
 
 The toils were closing round the man who had once 
 domineered alike over the cabinet and the court. He 
 attempted to convince his colleagues, but found them as 
 obstinately rooted in their opinions as he was in his. It 
 was in vain that he laid stress upon an intercepted letter 
 from Grimaldi, which stated that Choiseul had been 
 willing to make the settlement of the Spanish grievances 
 against England a necessary preliminary to the conclusion 
 of peace between the latter country and France 4 . This 
 additional piece of evidence of the close connection 
 between the two countries was disregarded by those who 
 had made up their minds that war with Spain should be 
 the last resource of baffled diplomacy 5 . Matters were 
 brought to a crisis by the return of Stanley, who arrived 
 in England on the last day of September. He brought no 
 news, and definite action could no longer be postponed. 
 It was necessary that instructions should be sent to Lord 
 Bristol, and the question decided whether England should 
 be involved in a struggle with a new antagonist or be 
 deprived of the services of her greatest statesman. 
 
 The cabinet met on Friday, October 2nd 6 . Ten 
 ministers were present, and the proceedings opened by 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32928, f. 303 ; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 37—40. 
 
 2 Rockingham. Memoirs, i. 40 — 42. 3 Ibid., i. 43 — 44. 
 
 4 Chatham Correspondence, n. 141 — 4. 
 
 5 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 43 — 44. 
 
 6 Add. MS. 32929, f. 18 (E. H. R., Jan. 1906) ; Add. MS. 35870, 
 f. 310 {E. H. R., April 1906). 
 
76 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 Pitt explaining the business which had called them 
 together. He declared himself to be of the same opinion 
 as before, and referred to the recently intercepted letter 
 from Grimaldi as supporting the resolution he had formed 
 from the first 1 . All the ministers joined in the discussion ; 
 but, except by Lord Temple, not one word was spoken in 
 favour of Pitt. By some, a war with Spain was declared 
 to be impracticable : by others, it was denounced as un- 
 justifiable. Bute argued that an intolerable strain would 
 be placed upon the resources of England, prevented as she 
 was from abandoning any part of the existing contest, and 
 Lord Anson roundly declared that the English navy was 
 not in a fit condition to meet the fleets of Spain. Pitt and 
 Temple stood alone. The latter, stating his opinion once 
 again, left the council chamber. Pitt made a farewell 
 speech. He declared that he would be responsible for 
 nothing that he did not direct, and intimated his inten- 
 tion of resigning office. No resolution was come to upon 
 the instructions to be given to Lord Bristol : all that was 
 determined was that reinforcements should be sent to 
 admiral Saunders, in case the Spaniards began hostilities. 
 After the meeting, there could be no doubt that Pitt 
 would shortly tender his resignation. A blind belief in 
 the possibility of maintaining peace with Spain, a dread 
 of enlarging the area of hostilities, and jealousy of his 
 pre-eminence, had all contributed to drive him from 
 power. He did not fall a victim to a court intrigue, nor 
 was his overthrow a triumph for the crown. Events had 
 shaped themselves in a way which had not been foreseen j 
 and the expulsion of Pitt from office, before peace had 
 
 1 In the account given by Newcastle (Add. MS. 32929, f. 18), the 
 date of Grimaldi's letter is given as August 13th : this is obviously 
 a slip for September 13th. In Hardwicke's version (Add MS. 35870, 
 f. 310) the date is stated correctly. 
 
THE FALL OF PITT 77 
 
 been concluded with France, was not part of the original 
 programme of the court. Bute had been driven into' 
 a course of action which he did not approve, in order to 
 avoid a greater evil 1 . He was able with perfect sincerity 
 to regret the loss of his great colleague, as the administra- 
 tion, bereft of the one member implicitly trusted by the 
 nation, was sure to be jealously scrutinised; and he himself 
 would be held responsible for the dismissal of Pitt, and for 
 any misfortunes which might follow. Bute was embarking 
 upon an unknown sea, and might well shrink from the 
 prospect. He had failed to attain the end for which he had 
 striven, and had been obliged to do what he could rather 
 than what he would. Unpopular with the people of 
 England, he was left to conduct a war and conclude a 
 peace ; and, in the discharge of these duties, it would be 
 only too easy to add fuel to the flames of popular hatred, 
 and enable Pitt to pose as the champion of the people 
 against the mismanagement of the king and his Scotch 
 favourite. 
 
 But, if the resignation of Pitt was unfortunate for the 
 success of the designs which Bute had most at heart,, 
 Newcastle, though he did not know it, was the real 
 victim. Since the accession of George III, Newcastle had 
 pursued a policy for which he was to suffer in after years. 
 Fretting under what he thought the tyranny of Pitt, he 
 had gladly allied with the court against him. Bute had 
 used the old statesman as a pawn in the game : and now 
 that Pitt had gone, Newcastle was useless. He was left 
 at the disposal of the king to do with him as he pleased. 
 Politically, he had signed his own death warrant, and 
 was quickly to reap the reward of his treachery and lack 
 of foresight. 
 
 1 Adolphus' History of England, i., Appendix, p. 572. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE. 
 
 The position of the administration after the cabinet 
 meeting on October 2nd was far from secure. It was not 
 a moment of triumph for Lord Bute. He had seen his 
 plans miscarry; and if he had gained a victory, it was 
 one which might prove more disastrous than a defeat. 
 Entangled in the net of his own diplomacy, he had been 
 obliged to force Pitt into resignation, before he had suc- 
 ceeded in making peace with France, and in the midst 
 of negotiations with Spain only too likely to precipitate a 
 quarrel with that power. He found himself supreme in the 
 administration under conditions which he had not and 
 would not have chosen. He had gone too far, and yet not 
 far enough, on the path which the king had commanded 
 him to tread, to seek for safety in retreat. The mark of 
 popular hatred, he must seize the reins of power which 
 had fallen from the hands of Pitt, and guide the destinies 
 of a nation which neither liked nor trusted him. Few 
 men have occupied a more unenviable position. Judged 
 and condemned before he had been tried, he was embarked 
 upon an enterprise which seemed fated to end in failure. 
 If he pursued a conciliatory foreign policy, and succeeded 
 in concluding peace with France and placating Spain, the 
 cry would be raised that the honour and glory of England 
 were betrayed by a Scotch favourite who, conscious of 
 his own incapacity, was willing to make any sacrifice in 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 79 
 
 order to rid himself of a burden which he could not 
 sustain. If, in order to win the approval of the people, he 
 engaged in warlike undertakings, it would at once be said 
 that the greatest war minister, ever known in the annals of 
 English history, was without a seat in the administration 
 at a time when his advice was most needed. When the 
 many and overwhelming difficulties under which Bute 
 was obliged to work are remembered, his failure is not 
 so surprising as his partial success. When he resigned 
 office in the spring of 1763, he had incurred the hatred of 
 the people to a greater degree than any minister since 
 Strafford. No crime was too great to attribute to him; 
 and the dislike of the nation pursued him even in his 
 retirement. Yet he had succeeded in bringing the long 
 war to a conclusion ; and had thus attained one end for 
 which he had endured the distasteful burden of official 
 life. If he failed in his great project of winning the 
 national support for the crown, his want of success was 
 due far more to the position he occupied as the king's 
 favourite than to the policy he pursued. He struggled 
 against circumstances too strong to be overcome except 
 by consummate genius ; and that he did not possess. 
 
 The first task to be performed, after the stormy meeting 
 on October 2nd, was the selection of Pitt's successor; and 
 the choice was not easy to make. If a nonentity in 
 politics or a creature of the court was appointed to fill the 
 vacant place, the prestige of the ministry, which would 
 inevitably be affected by the loss of its greatest member, 
 would be still further diminished. Yet if merit and ability 
 were sought for and acquired, Bute might discover that 
 he had endangered his own predominance in the cabinet, 
 and created a Frankenstein to his own destruction. Each 
 extreme had its own peculiar dangers, and the problem 
 was rendered more difficult of solution by the jealousy 
 
80 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 with which Newcastle regarded Bute's growing power. 
 Though Newcastle and Bute had allied together to thwart 
 the aggressive designs of Pitt, neither friendship nor 
 confidence existed between them. Their very success 
 made further union impossible. Now that Pitt could no 
 longer force his will upon his colleagues, Newcastle was 
 free to indulge his jealousy of Bute, and the latter could 
 give rein to the contempt he felt for the veteran statesman 
 who had allowed himself to be used as a pawn in a game 
 which he did not understand 1 . This very real though still 
 decently draped hostility between the two ministers accen- 
 tuated the difficulty of choosing a new secretary of state. 
 If a friend of Newcastle was chosen, Bute would find it 
 difficult to control the decisions of the cabinet; and if 
 the new minister was an ally and follower of Lord Bute, 
 Newcastle might discover that he had lost more than he 
 had gained by the retirement of Pitt. 
 
 It was necessary, however, to decide upon a new secre- 
 tary of state without undue loss of time ; and the ministers 
 did not wait for Pitt to resign to discuss the candidates 
 for the succession. Amongst those mentioned was Henry 
 Fox. As far as ability went, Fox had every claim to 
 consideration. He had once been Pitt's friendly rival, 
 and had shown himself worthy of his great antagonist. 
 He was known to be of a daring and defiant disposition, 
 ready in debate, and undismayed in the face of adversity. 
 But, lacking the moral qualities, and that lofty disregard 
 of wealth which adorned his rival, Fox, at the critical 
 moment of his career, had abandoned the path of glory 
 and toil, and " sold his reputation for a song." He received 
 the punishment that he deserved. He earned the reputa- 
 tion of an unscrupulous and treacherous politician; and 
 
 1 For Bute's opinion of Newcastle, see Grenville Papers, i. 395 — 
 397. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 81 
 
 few men in public life were so distrusted and disliked. 
 His many admirable qualities, his devotion as a husband, 
 his affection as a father, were forgotten or ignored by 
 those who knew and feared him as a politician. New- 
 castle, who had felt the lash of his tongue, stood in awe of 
 him ; and had no wish to have him as a colleague. Bute 
 was prepared to favour his claims to office, but not 
 inclined to press the point in face of Newcastle's opposition 1 . 
 He recognised the danger of such an appointment. The 
 contrast between Pitt with his contempt of personal profit, 
 and Fox with his passion for the accumulation of wealth, 
 could not fail to strike the most sluggish intellect. Bute 
 neither wished nor could afford so scornfully to disregard 
 public opinion. To replace the most popular by the most 
 unpopular statesman in England, in order to secure Fox's 
 valuable assistance, was an experiment too daring to be 
 safe 2 . He might be equally useful, and far less dangerous, 
 in a more secret and subordinate capacity. 
 
 If it was not possible to give Fox the seals because of 
 the evil reputation he had earned, the same objection 
 could not be urged against the Duke of Bedford. The 
 leader of a party, the members of which were regarded as 
 among the most rapacious politicians of their time, he was 
 free from the faults which disfigured his followers ; and, if 
 not a distinguished, was at least an honourable politician. 
 He had held high office during the reign of the late king, 
 and could not be charged with lack of political experience. 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32928, f. 362 (E. H. R., January 1906). 
 
 2 Ibid. Andrew Stone, the friend of the Duke of Newcastle, re- 
 marked "that tho' he wished Mr Fox very well, he seldom saw him, and 
 had a friendship for him, yet he would declare his opinion very clearly 
 that the going from the most popular man (Mr Pitt) to the most un- 
 popular man in England (Mr Fox) would give such an advantage to 
 Mr Pitt as to put it out of Mr Fox's power ' to be of any service on this 
 occasion.' " Add. MS. 32928, f. 362. 
 
 w. 6 
 
82 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 At the moment, he was far more in sympathy with New- 
 castle than Bute. Passionately in favour of peace, he 
 had, in company with Newcastle, pressed for concessions 
 to be made to France, only to find himself overruled by 
 Pitt and Bute. If he was created secretary of state, 
 Newcastle's position in the cabinet would be materially 
 strengthened, and Bute might be saddled with a trouble- 
 some colleague. Bedford would be certain to oppose the 
 adoption of an aggressive attitude towards Spain: and 
 though Bute declared himself willing to waive any objec- 
 tions he might have, it is unlikely that he would have 
 consented to an appointment which would have furnished 
 Newcastle with an ally, and endangered his own supremacy 1 . 
 Fox being ineligible on account of his unpopularity, 
 and Bedford on account of his opinions, it seemed prob- 
 able that the vacant post would fall by default to George 
 Grenville. Few objections could be raised to such an 
 appointment. He had already attained a prominent 
 position in political life; and, though connected by 
 marriage with Pitt, had gained a mild notoriety by daring 
 to oppose his powerful kinsman 2 . On the accession of 
 George III, he had thrown in his lot with Lord Bute, 
 though curiously enough it was not Bute but Newcastle 
 who wished him to be given the seals 3 . Bute would 
 have preferred to have Grenville as chancellor of the 
 exchequer 4 , but Newcastle, who had no wish to have a 
 friend of Bute as a colleague on the treasury board, 
 strongly objected, and the project was abandoned. Gren- 
 ville was asked to accept the secretaryship of state, and 
 refused the offer. He had set his heart, not on high 
 administrative office, but on becoming speaker of the 
 
 i Add. MS. 32928, f. 362 (E. H. R., January 1906). 
 
 2 Add. MS. 35352, f. 157. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32928, f. 362 (E. H. R., January 1906). 4 Ibid. 
 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 83 
 
 house of commons. His legal turn of mind, his grasp of 
 detail, and his intimate acquaintance with parliamentary 
 law and practice, admirably qualified him for the post 
 which he coveted ; and it was in an evil moment for his 
 reputation that he agreed to forswear his ambition. But, 
 though he consented to abandon the hope of becoming 
 speaker, he steadily refused to accept the office of 
 secretary of state. He professed to feel a delicacy in 
 succeeding his brother-in-law, and remained deaf to all 
 the arguments used to persuade him to avail himself of an 
 opportunity which might not come again. But, though 
 unwilling to take upon himself the task which Pitt had 
 abandoned, he was not unready to come to the assistance 
 of the ministers. It was agreed that, retaining his office 
 of treasurer of the navy, he should be summoned to all 
 the meetings of the cabinet, and be entrusted with the 
 management of the house of commons. 
 
 The ministers had failed to find a suitable successor to 
 Pitt; and were obliged to resort for a candidate to the 
 second rank of politicians. The seals, which Grrenville 
 had refused, were accepted by Lord Egremont. The new 
 secretary of state had never played a prominent part in 
 public life; and his appointment was not likely to increase 
 the prestige of the administration. Possessed of little 
 capacity, he acts but a shadowy part in the history of his 
 time, impressing his contemporaries as little as he has 
 interested posterity. The brother-in-law of George Gren- 
 ville, he would be likely to follow the latter's lead, and 
 support Bute rather than Newcastle. Thus, by chance 
 or by design, Bute had contrived, through the reconsti- 
 tution of the administration, materially to strengthen his 
 position in the cabinet 1 . He might count upon the 
 
 1 Newcastle believed that Bute never intended Grenville to be secre- 
 tary of state, and that the appointment of Lord Egremont had been 
 
 6—2 
 
84 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 assistance of Egremont and of Grrenville who, as manager 
 of the house of commons, would wield no inconsiderable 
 power. Indeed the danger was that he might become too 
 powerful. It would come within his province to use the 
 means of bribery and corruption, which lay so ready to 
 the hands of a minister in the eighteenth century, to gain 
 and keep a majority for the administration in the lower 
 house; and politicians, like dogs, were apt to become most 
 closely attached to those who supplied their wants. If 
 allowed to enjoy the usual degree of power allotted to 
 the manager of the house of commons, Grrenville might 
 easily acquire an authority which would threaten that of 
 Bute and the king ; and it was to safeguard against this 
 danger that his duties were limited and defined. In the 
 words of Newcastle, Grrenville was " to have the conduct 
 of the house of commons in the manner my brother had, 
 when he was paymaster general, and Mr Sandys chan- 
 cellor of the exchequer 1 ." Towards the end of 1762, 
 Grrenville complained of the difficulty he experienced in 
 conducting the business of the house of commons with 
 such restricted powers 2 ; and there can be little doubt that 
 the limitations imposed on his' authority were designed to 
 retain the dispensation of patronage in the hands of the 
 king. Men were not to be allowed to forget, as they had 
 forgotten in the past, that the court was the source of all 
 promotion. 
 
 decided upon at a meeting at Lord Granville's house on the evening of 
 October 2nd. Until further evidence is forthcoming, it is impossible to 
 attach much weight to Newcastle's suspicions on this point ; but it is 
 worth while to note that it was Lord Granville who advised Egremont to 
 accept the offer of the secretaryship of state (Add. MS. 32929, f. 56: 
 Hist. MSS. Comm., 6th Report, Appendix, p. 316). 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32929, f. 152. This refers to the administration formed 
 after the fall of Walpole from power. 
 
 2 Grenville Papers, i. 482—485. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 85 
 
 Lord Temple accompanied Pitt into retirement, but a 
 new lord privy seal was not appointed till two months 
 had elapsed. The office was of minor importance, and 
 the delay, though possibly a cause of inconvenience, did 
 not seriously hamper the transaction of official business. 
 Newcastle fretted at Bute's procrastination, and pressed 
 the claims of Lord Hardwicke. The latter was offered 
 but refused the vacant office 1 which was finally given to 
 the Duke of Bedford. It has been suggested by a writer, 
 whose opinion has every claim to consideration, that the 
 offer to Lord Hardwicke was a mere act of formal polite- 
 ness, not meant to be taken seriously; and that, though 
 it had always been intended that Bedford should be 
 Temple's successor, his appointment was delayed until the 
 diplomatic relations between England and Spain had 
 become so strained as to render war inevitable, and thus 
 the danger averted of Newcastle and Bedford uniting to 
 prevent a conflict between the two countries 2 . It cannot 
 be said that any inherent improbability attaches to this 
 view; but it would seem that further evidence is necessary 
 before it can rank higher than a plausible and possible 
 theory. Lord Hardwicke, though he held no office, had 
 the right of attending the cabinet council and would not 
 increase his influence by becoming lord privy seal. 
 The Duke of Bedford, also without office, had also been in 
 the habit of attending the cabinet meetings ; and the office 
 of lord privy seal, though of great dignity, was of little 
 political importance; and did not apparently confer the 
 right of being summoned to that inner cabinet at which 
 the most important affairs were discussed 3 . But to what- 
 ever cause the delay in the appointment of Bedford may 
 
 1 Harris' Life of Hardwicke, in. 269. 
 
 2 von Euville's William Pitt, Graf von Chatham, in. 23. 
 
 3 Walpole's Memoirs of the reign of George III, n. 255, note 3. 
 
86 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 be due, whether to accident or design, it is at least 
 certain that Bute had conferred office upon one ready 
 to assist him in bringing the war with France to a con- 
 clusion. 
 
 The administration was thus reconstructed far more 
 in the interest of Bute than of Newcastle. The former 
 would not apparently have to fear the opposition of his new 
 colleagues ; but, if secure in that respect, he did not enjoy 
 immunity from other dangers. Pitt, though he had been 
 driven into resignation, still threatened the safety of his 
 former associates. Great was the popular outcry at the 
 news of his fall. Bute was forced to confess that the 
 storm ran high in the city, always distinguished by its 
 loyalty to the "great commoner 1 "; and certain of the 
 directors of the Bank of England had not minced their 
 words in speaking of those who had outvoted but not out- 
 argued the greatest member of the administration 2 . If 
 Pitt had chosen to go into opposition, he could have 
 played the part of a demagogue with terrible effect. It 
 was within his power to lead and organise the ever rising 
 opposition in the nation to the Scotch favourite who stood 
 between the king and his people; and there must have 
 been many who thought that the man, who had gained a 
 reputation in early life by reckless opposition to Sir 
 Robert Walpole, would not decline the opportunity thus 
 offered him. The prospect was sufficiently serious to 
 alarm the most experienced and cool-headed politician. 
 Embittered by the frustration of his plans, and supported 
 by the people, Pitt might prove far more formidable in 
 opposition than he had ever been in power. Realising the 
 danger, Bute attempted to avert it by depriving Pitt of 
 popular support. The nation might think less of the hero 
 who, though he had preferred to abandon office rather 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32929, f. 74. 2 Add. MS. 32929, f. 113. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 87 
 
 than continue in an administration which he could not 
 guide, was willing to partake of the bounty of the crown; 
 and Pitt fell into the trap prepared for him. He refused 
 the governorship of Canada, for which residence was not 
 to be necessary ; but accepted a peerage for his wife and 
 a pension for himself; and the news was quickly published 
 in the gazette, with the express purpose of diminishing 
 his popularity 1 . 
 
 The trick had an overwhelming, if temporary, success. 
 The new peeress was quickly nicknamed Lady Cheat'em ; 
 and it was rumoured that the city was preparing to burn 
 its former idol in effigy. Men, who took little or no 
 interest in politics, were overwhelmed with distress on 
 hearing the news. The poet Gray refused at first to 
 believe that Pitt had sunk so low, and afterwards attri- 
 buted his incredulity to an insufficient acquaintance with 
 the writings of St Thomas a Kempis, "who knew mankind 
 so much better than I 2 ." The Duke of Devonshire con- 
 cluded that Pitt had sold himself to the court 3 ; and those, 
 who had believed that amongst the politicians of the time 
 there was at least one righteous man, acknowledged them- 
 selves mistaken, and confessed that Pitt was as willing to 
 be bought as his contemporaries, and only differed from 
 them in demanding a higher price. Such an outcry may 
 well seem irrational at the present day; but it was not 
 altogether devoid of justification. Amply as Pitt had 
 deserved all that the king could offer, his conduct was 
 open to misconstruction. Men had not yet learned to 
 discriminate between the king and his ministers, and to 
 oppose the administration was to oppose the court 4 . This 
 belief, fostered by the previous two reigns in which 
 opposition to the government might be interpreted as 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32929, f. 143. 2 Gray's Works (Mitford), in. 265. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32929, f. 326. * Ibid. 
 
88 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 support of the exiled Stuarts, was still alive ; and nothing 
 in the new reign had yet happened to encourage the idea 
 that it was possible to oppose the ministry of the day 
 and yet remain a faithful supporter of the crown. If, 
 therefore, most men thought that Pitt had sold his free- 
 dom of action and liberty of speech in return for material 
 comfort, they can be forgiven for their mistake. But it 
 is not necessary to pardon Pitt for an act which involved 
 no guilt. He accepted what the crown had to give, not 
 as a bribe for what he was to do, but as a reward for 
 what he had actually done; and did so with an easy 
 conscience because he had determined to work in the 
 future, as in the past, to promote the best interests of the 
 nation, and, consequently, to render loyal service to the 
 king. 
 
 The very success of Bute's stratagem was to be the 
 cause of its failure. The tide of public opinion was 
 running so strongly against Pitt that it was necessary for 
 him to stem it. He wrote, and permitted the publication 
 of, a letter in which he declared that the royal favours 
 bestowed upon him had been infamously traduced as 
 "a bargain for my forsaking the public 1 ." His unsup- 
 ported word was sufficient to dispel the storm which had 
 so suddenly gathered, and to regain for him his place in 
 the affections of the people. It was now known that he 
 had not sold himself for a "handful of silver"; and that 
 one man still existed who would not barter his convictions 
 for a peerage and a pension. Bute had struck in the dark, 
 and the blow recoiled upon the striker. He had failed to 
 deprive Pitt of the national support which constituted his 
 strength, and had only succeeded in increasing his own 
 unpopularity. 
 
 Pitt, however, was not the danger to the administration 
 1 Chatham Correspondence, n. 158 — 159. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 89 
 
 that Bute imagined. He is not to be numbered amongst 
 those politicians "resolved to ruin or to rule the state"; 
 and was far too patriotic to sacrifice the welfare of the 
 country to his own aggrandisement. Time had curbed 
 the faults of his youth, and he shrank from needlessly 
 thwarting the government engaged upon a difficult task 1 . 
 He had no intention of throwing himself into factious 
 and headlong opposition. But, if he was ready to support 
 the ministers when he approved their measures, no man 
 was less prepared to make a servile submission. He chose 
 the part of the independent critic, awarding praise and 
 blame where he thought they were deserved, and to Bute 
 the prospect could not fail to be unpleasant. Careful as 
 he might be, he knew that, if he was to carry his designs 
 to a successful conclusion, he must do much that would 
 cause offence to Pitt ; and the latter would not be behind- 
 hand in denunciation. If the danger was less than Bute 
 imagined, it was yet by no means inconsiderable. Pitt 
 might stand alone or at the head of a party; but, in either 
 case, he would prove himself a formidable antagonist, and 
 play the part of Abudah's hag to the administration. 
 There was no minister fit to defend himself and his 
 colleagues against the thunder of the great orator. 
 G-renville, the leader in the house of commons, would be 
 of little use in such an emergency. A tedious and 
 pedantic debater, he would only serve to point the con- 
 trast between himself and the most inspiring speaker of 
 
 1 He informed Hardwicke that " he did not know how much he should 
 attend parliament. The supplies he would support to the utmost, both 
 publickly and privately, as well of men and ships as of money. He 
 did not intend to give any disturbance to administration, but if the 
 causes of his quitting should be misrepresented or should be fallen upon, 
 he should be obliged to set them in a true light and justify himself." 
 Add. MS. 32929, f. 227. 
 
90 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 the day. There was only one man fit to be put up in 
 parliamentary combat with Pitt, and that was Henry Fox. 
 He was ready to place himself at Bute's disposal. As 
 paymaster general he had found it easy to amass the 
 wealth that he coveted, and now wished to gain the 
 honours which the crown could confer. He desired a 
 peerage for his wife ; and, though the request was refused, 
 he pledged himself to support the administration, to speak 
 or keep silent in the house of commons as he thought 
 best, and, binding himself to Bute, undertook to enter 
 into no engagements with anyone else 1 . 
 
 In securing the support of Fox, Bute had reckoned 
 without George Grenville. The latter, who had refused 
 to have any business transactions with Fox, was deeply 
 chagrined when he heard of the arrangement into which 
 Bute had entered 2 . His predominance in the house of 
 commons would be seriously endangered by the new 
 recruit, and he began to meditate abandoning the task 
 which he had undertaken. Bute could not afford to drive 
 Grenville to despair. He needed him as the representative 
 of the ministry in the house of commons, and as an ally 
 in the struggle which was certain to take place, sooner or 
 later, with Newcastle. However valuable the assistance 
 that Fox could render, the loss of Grenville would be too 
 high a price to pay for it ; and, to placate the latter, Fox 
 was instructed to refrain from taking part in debate 3 . Bute 
 may have regretted that he was unable to make full use 
 of the very great abilities which Fox possessed; but it 
 
 i Add. MS. 32929, f. 227, f. 279 ; Add. MS. 32930, f. 104 ; Fitz- 
 maurice's Life of Shelburne, i. 112 — 117. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32930, f. 104 ; Grenville Papers, i. 414—415. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32930, f. 176, f. 220. This prohibition must not be 
 taken too literally: it could only mean that Fox was not to play too 
 prominent a part in debate. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 91 
 
 was at least a gain that they could not be used against 
 him. He had succeeded in securing the support of one 
 of the foremost politicians of the day, and avoided the 
 odium which he would have incurred by f giving Fox a 
 ministerial office. 
 
 Stress has been laid upon the various ministerial 
 changes effected at this time because they were to exercise 
 a decided influence upon the subsequent course of events. 
 Bute was now in a stronger position than he had occupied 
 before the fall of Pitt, and was ready to deal with those 
 questions of foreign policy which called for settlement. 
 Amongst these, the relations between England and Spain 
 were, perhaps, of the most pressing importance. Instruc- 
 tions had to be sent to Lord Bristol who could hardly be 
 allowed to remain ignorant any longer of the opinion of 
 the cabinet. The administration, however, was not unani- 
 mous on this question; and Bute and Newcastle found 
 themselves in opposite camps. The former had been 
 opposed to an instant declaration of war as advised by 
 Pitt, but he fully realised the danger of a close union 
 between the two Bourbon powers, and desired that the 
 Spanish government should be called upon to explain the 
 nature of the treaty it had concluded with France. He 
 was not unmindful that such a demand might provoke a 
 war, and was willing to run that risk, rather than continue 
 any longer in a state of uncertainty. He was anxious 
 that no colour should be given to the charge that vigour 
 and efficiency had left the administration with Pitt. It 
 was better that England should be called upon to face a 
 new enemy than the impression given that the ministers 
 were sacrificing the honour of the country to a craven 
 desire for peace. It was necessary, unless Bute wished to 
 drive Pitt headlong into opposition, to pursue a bold and 
 energetic policy; and teach Englishmen at home and 
 
92 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 foreigners abroad that the national greatness did not 
 depend upon a single man 1 . 
 
 Newcastle, who perhaps did not see as far, was in 
 favour of the adoption of a more conciliatory policy. He 
 was adverse to any step being taken likely to provoke 
 Spain into taking up arms. He wished instructions to be 
 sent to Lord Bristol, but desired them to be of a character 
 least likely to arouse the animosity of Spain 2 . He feared 
 a war with Spain, not only because he was pacifically 
 inclined, but also for a reason which does not appear on 
 the surface. He had cause to suspect that Bute was in 
 favour of abandoning the war in Grermany, of withdraw- 
 ing the English troops from that country, and devoting the 
 energies of the nation to the struggle with France on the 
 sea and in the new world 3 . To such a policy Newcastle 
 was strongly opposed ; and he was not destitute of argu- 
 ments in support of his case. The withdrawal of the 
 English troops from Grermany could hardly be justified, 
 except on the plea of necessity. If it could be shown 
 that the resources of England were no longer equal to 
 the demands made upon her, the abandonment of the 
 continental war might be excused ; and this plea could be 
 urged, with greater effect and less danger of refutation, if 
 England was compelled to embark upon a war with Spain, 
 and thus impose upon herself an additional financial 
 burden. It would probably be unjust to believe, as New- 
 castle did, that Bute was anxious for war with Spain in 
 order to abandon hostilities on the continent with a better 
 grace. He was impelled by other reasons to adopt a 
 defiant attitude towards Spain. Yet it is true to say that 
 
 1 Bute to Lord Melcombe, Oct. 8th, 1761 (Adolphus' History of 
 England, i., Appendix, p. 572). 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32929, f. 115. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32929, f. 262. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 93 
 
 he regarded the continental war with little favour, and 
 would be willing to abandon it if a favourable opportunity 
 arose. During the reign of George II, the opposition 
 had often denounced the sacrifice of English to German 
 interests, and argued that, if a German elector was not 
 king of England, English troops would not be seen 
 fighting on the continent, and English money would not 
 be spent in subsidising petty German princes. A few 
 months after the accession of George III, a clever pam- 
 phlet had appeared, reiterating these views, and pointing 
 out that, whereas the struggle with France on the sea, in 
 America, and in India, served English interests, the con- 
 tinental war constituted a drain upon her resources, and 
 gave no compensating advantage 1 . These opinions were 
 shared by Bute who had made no secret of his dislike of 
 the sacrifice of English to German interests. If an 
 abandonment of the continental struggle was likely to 
 be popular in England, Bute would be ready to carry 
 it out; but, if it would probably provoke the hostility 
 of Pitt and the nation, he might prefer to sink his own 
 opinions, and continue a policy of which he did not 
 approve. 
 
 The German war remained, however, at present in the 
 background, and men's minds were occupied with the 
 Spanish question. In opposing Bute on that point, New- 
 castle was at a disadvantage; for the former was supported 
 in his opinion by Grenville and Egremont. The arrival 
 of a reassuring despatch from Lord Bristol on October 
 20th wrought no change in the design which Bute had 
 formed. Newcastle learnt that, without his advice being 
 sought, Egremont had been instructed by the king to 
 order Lord Bristol to inform Wall, the Spanish minister, 
 that England was willing to settle amicably her dispute 
 1 Mauduit's Considerations on the Gennan War, 1760. 
 
94 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 with Spain, provided that the latter country "made it 
 appear to the king that there was nothing offensive con- 
 tained in the last treaty with Paris." This was to ask 
 more than Wall could perform, and would oblige him, 
 either to refuse the request, and thus confirm the worst 
 suspicions of the English ministers, or reveal the truth 
 that the family compact was expressly framed against 
 the interests of England, and thus justify an immediate 
 declaration of war. Bitterly as Newcastle might object 
 to a policy which he regarded as unnecessarily provocative, 
 he was powerless to prevent it. The instructions were 
 discussed at a ministerial meeting on October 23rd, at 
 which only Bute, Hardwicke, Newcastle, Egremont and 
 Grenville were present 1 . With no supporter but Hard- 
 wicke, Newcastle found himself outvoted 2 . Three weeks 
 before, Pitt, in a similar position, had preserved his 
 dignity by resignation: Newcastle, to whom official life 
 had become a second nature, clung to office. He pro- 
 tested against the administration pursuing a line of conduct 
 which could only end in war ; and, in answer to his pro- 
 tests, another meeting of ministers was summoned, which 
 Lord Mansfield was asked to attend 3 . Bute was suf- 
 ficiently powerful to be able to afford to indulge Newcastle. 
 The second meeting was a useless formality, though it 
 was perhaps then that Lord Hardwicke succeeded in 
 obtaining a slight modification of the instructions 4 . As 
 they were finally sent, Lord Bristol was instructed to 
 press for a communication of the family compact; but, 
 if the demand was refused, he was to be permitted to 
 accept the Spanish king's solemn assurance as to the 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32929, f- 421. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32929, f. 470, f. 472. Add. MS. 32930, f. 8. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32930, f. 220. 
 
 4 Ibid. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 95 
 
 innocent nature of the treaty, provided that the assurance 
 was given in writing 1 . 
 
 The die had been cast, and war between the two 
 countries was now inevitable. The Spanish government 
 might seek to gain time by delay ; but, sooner or later, it 
 would be compelled to throw off the mask, and avow its 
 hostility to England. No fault can be found with Bute's 
 policy, save that, by resorting to diplomacy, he gave to 
 the enemy time in which to strengthen themselves for the 
 coming struggle. He had prevailed against the opposition 
 of Newcastle; and was ready to face parliament which 
 had been summoned to meet early in November. 
 
 The parliamentary session passed off quietly. There 
 was no organised opposition to the administration ; and if 
 the attitude adopted by Pitt was independent, it was at 
 least not hostile. Even if he had chosen to lead an attack 
 upon his former colleagues, his task would not have been 
 easy. There was a lull in domestic politics. At the present 
 day, no ministry could pass through a parliamentary 
 session without bringing forward several contentious 
 measures which would allow the opposition ample oppor- 
 tunity for criticism and condemnation. In the early years 
 of the reign of Greorge III, the servants of the crown 
 were occupied more with administration than legislation, 
 and were not supposed to have fallen short of their duty 
 if they had failed to make important additions to the 
 statute book. Conscious of his own unpopularity, Bute 
 was not inclined to add to his burdens the weight of law- 
 making, and if his administration lay open to attack, it 
 was only in regard to the foreign policy which it pursued. 
 Those who wished to oppose the government, and to dis- 
 credit it in order to glorify Pitt, were prepared to ask for 
 the documents, relating to the negotiations between 
 1 Parliamentary History, xv. 1152 — 1157. 
 
96 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 England and Spain, to be laid before the house of com- 
 mons. The motives which inspired such a request were 
 obvious. If it was complied with, the house would be 
 given the opportunity of criticising the ministers for 
 their opposition to Pitt who would be likely to seize the 
 occasion to explain his conduct to a larger audience than 
 a cabinet council. The danger was doubtless great, but 
 the strength of the government, and the weakness of its 
 opponents, lay in the extravagant nature of the demand ; 
 for Spain might justly be deeply offended if the confi- 
 dential documents of an incomplete negotiation were 
 published to the world. Though much might be urged in 
 favour of the publication of the papers, though it might 
 be said that, in refusing to reveal the information on which 
 they had formed their opinions, the ministers admitted 
 the weakness of their case, it cannot be said that they 
 acted rashly in declining to accede to the request 1 . 
 The proposal for the Spanish papers to be submitted to 
 the house of commons was moved on December 11th, 
 and rejected without a division. Grenville spoke against 
 the motion, "arguing that it was of the most dangerous 
 consequence, whilst a negotiation might be depending, to 
 call for papers, as it would tend to loosen all confidence 
 from foreign powers." Pitt took part in the debate, 
 speaking against the ministers who, however, carried 
 the day 2 . 
 
 The Spanish question was not the only danger which 
 had threatened the administration : there was also the 
 
 1 Grenville had at first been in favour of laying some of the papers 
 before the house of commons, but this was strongly opposed by Bute. 
 At a cabinet council on November 10th, the ministers were divided on 
 the question ; and it was arranged that Grenville should take the opinion 
 of the principal men in the house of commons (Add. MS. 32930, f. 374, 
 f. 423, f. 427, f. 431, f. 433 ; Grenville Papers, i. 416). 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32932, f. 141 ; Walpole's Memoirs, i. 88, ff. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 97 
 
 question of the war in Germany. The foreign estimates 
 had to be submitted to the house of commons ; and New- 
 castle feared that they would be found not to include the 
 necessary supplies for the continental war. He knew that 
 Grenville was in favour of retrenchment, and suspected 
 Bute of being of the same opinion. But he underrated 
 Bute's wisdom and caution. However much the latter 
 might sympathise with Grenville, he was not prepared to 
 call up the world in arms against him. War with Spain 
 had not yet been declared, and no sufficient excuse existed 
 for abandoning the continent. To propose the withdrawal 
 of the English troops from Germany would be to play 
 into Pitt's hands, and give him a legitimate grievance 
 against the government. Bute was willing to wait until 
 he saw his way clearer ; and Newcastle rejoiced to find 
 that the war in Germany was still to continue 1 . Yet the 
 debate in the house of commons on the foreign estimates 
 gave him food for reflection. If it was of little import- 
 ance that Bigby and Delaval argued against the German 
 war, it was of great moment that George Grenville dis- 
 played almost equal hostility. Though he deprecated the 
 abandonment of the continent as involving the desertion 
 of those we had promised to support, he argued against the 
 utility of the war to England. " Did the war in Germany," 
 he asked, " beat the French fleet ? No, Sir Edward Hawke. 
 Did the war in Germany take and preserve and recover 
 Quebec ? No, but fleets and armies." Proceeding in this 
 vein, Grenville contrived, simultaneously, to support the 
 administration and to justify the opposition 2 . 
 
 This was bad enough, but worse was to come. When 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32930, f. 374 ; Add. MS. 32931, f. 59, f. 147, f. 195, 
 f. 197. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32932, f. 78 ; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 71—79 ; Walpole's 
 Memoirs, i. 79—83. 
 
 w. 7 
 
98 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 the debate was resumed on the following day, a new 
 opponent of the German war arose. This was Colonel 
 Barre, until then unknown in politics. The new speaker, 
 however, displayed none of that timidity which is supposed 
 to sit well upon a parliamentary novice. With incredible 
 bad taste, smacking more of the camp than the town, he 
 abused the late king for the favour he had shown to his 
 German dominions; and described Pitt as an abandoned 
 and profligate minister, ready to trim his sails to any 
 favouring breeze. He roundly denounced the German 
 war, though he was willing to allow it to continue for 
 a year longer, not for any useful purpose that it served, 
 but as an evil to be endured, a legacy from those who had 
 betrayed the country in the past 1 . His hearers were 
 astounded by the audacity of the attack upon the popular 
 hero ; and Barre rose to parliamentary fame in one bound. 
 Nor did he prevail by the power of mere vulgar abuse 
 alone: his utterance was distinguished by genuine elo- 
 quence; and he showed himself endowed with gifts, 
 destined to cause him to shine in debate. But his speech 
 had an importance greater than can be attached to any 
 display of mere oratory. He had been brought into 
 parliament by Lord Shelburne 2 who was known to be in 
 the confidence of Bute, and opposed to the Grerman war 3 . 
 Those who knew these facts might well invest Barre's 
 speech with a significance which it did not appear on the 
 surface to possess. It seemed not improbable that he had 
 but voiced the opinions which Bute held and did not dare 
 to avow; and, though the estimates were voted, and 
 the Grerman war continued, Newcastle lamented the 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32932, f. 78, see also f. 109 ; Walpole's Memoirs, 
 i. 85—88. 
 
 2 Chatham Correspondence, n. 170 (extract from the Mitchell MSS.). 
 s Add. MS. 32931, f. 51. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 99 
 
 attitude adopted by what he termed "the favourite 
 part of the administration 1 ." 
 
 When parliament rose for the Christmas holidays, Bute 
 could feel that he had tided over a difficult time success- 
 fully. He had refrained from giving Pitt an excuse for 
 going into violent opposition, but, at the same time, he 
 had encouraged the belief that England's interests were 
 served, not by the struggle on the continent, but by the 
 contest on the sea. He had averted the danger of the 
 house of commons being constituted the judge between 
 himself and Pitt on the Spanish question ; and it is only 
 fair to admit that it was largely by his skill and caution 
 that a quiet session had been secured. But while parlia- 
 ment had been sitting, news had come from Lord Bristol 
 which boded ill for the maintenance of peace between 
 Spain and England. On November 14th, the ministers 
 learnt that Wall had refused to answer the English 
 inquiries. Lord Bristol was again instructed to press for 
 an answer, but there could have been little hope that the 
 Spanish government would retreat from the position it 
 had taken up, and even Newcastle began to talk of pre- 
 paring for a war which seemed inevitable 2 . All hope 
 vanished on Christmas Eve, when a further despatch from 
 Bristol arrived in England. Wall had again refused 
 either to communicate the treaty with France, or to give 
 an assurance of its pacific character ; and had informed the 
 English ambassador that he could leave the country as 
 soon as he liked. A few days before the arrival of 
 Bristol's despatch, Fuentes, the Spanish ambassador in 
 England, had presented a memorial, consisting, for the 
 most part, of abuse of Pitt. 
 
 The attitude of Wall rendered anything but war 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32932, f. 149 ; Walpole's Letters, v. 151—153. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32931, f. 51. 
 
 7—2 
 
100 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 between the two countries impossible. He had thrown 
 down the glove, and it was for the English ministers to 
 pick it up. With the exception of Newcastle and Hard- 
 wicke, they were ready enough to accept the challenge 
 thus thrown out. The cabinet was summoned to meet on 
 December 26th 1 . A draft of an answer to Fuentes' 
 memorial, and of a declaration of war, were laid before the 
 assembled ministers ; and Newcastle, not allowing for the 
 brevity of the interval between the arrival of Bristol's 
 despatch and the meeting of the cabinet, was aggrieved 
 because these documents had not been previously sub- 
 mitted to him. Even Pitt, he sorrowfully declared, had 
 been wont to do as much 2 . He suspected that everything 
 had been arranged between the two secretaries of state 
 and Grenville before the meeting 3 ; and it is possible that 
 his suspicions were well founded. But he was powerless 
 to do anything but complain; and, by remaining in the 
 administration, gave a tacit consent to a policy which he 
 did not approve. On January 2nd, the cabinet decided to 
 declare war, and, at another meeting a few days later, it 
 was agreed to attack Havannah 4 . 
 
 The declaration of war with Spain is not an unimport- 
 ant incident in the history of the administration which 
 Bute controlled 5 . He had not been driven into hostilities 
 against his will : conscious of the risk he ran, he had 
 entered upon a course of diplomacy which had resulted in 
 a breach between the two countries 6 . He had solved the 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32932, f. 347. 
 
 2 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 102. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32932, f. 362, f. 419. 
 
 4 Add. MS. 32933, f. 36 ; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 87. 
 
 5 Though Bute did not become first lord of the treasury until 
 Newcastle left office in May 1762, he was the leading figure in the 
 administration from the time of Pitt's resignation. 
 
 6 von Ruville's William Pitt, Graf von Chatham, in. 33 — 36. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 101 
 
 Spanish question by war, and was now free to turn his 
 attention to the struggle on the continent. The contest 
 with Spain threatened to prove expensive, for it was likely 
 that Portugal would be invaded; and Bute had encour- 
 aged the idea that England would come to the assistance 
 of her ancient ally 1 . The resources of the country might 
 not be equal to the additional strain imposed upon it, 
 unless some relief was given; and the way of obtaining 
 that relief had already been shown. Bute told Newcastle 
 that the German war must be abandoned 2 , and supported 
 his opinion by arguments at a cabinet council on January 
 6th 3 . Yet he did not desire to act with precipitation, 
 and, though he might confide his opinion to his colleagues, 
 he did not want to publish it to the world; and it was 
 against his wishes that the Duke of Bedford introduced 
 a motion against the German war in the house of lords 4 . 
 
 Indeed, the question was far more complicated than 
 Bedford, perhaps, realised. England might justify the 
 withdrawal of her troops from Germany by the plea of 
 necessity, but her ally, Frederick the Great, of Prussia, 
 left to bear the full brunt of the French attack, might 
 regard such caution as perilously akin to treachery. 
 Since the outbreak of the war, Frederick had been 
 struggling against a coalition which threatened to over- 
 whelm him. The limited resources of the Prussian state 
 had been strained to breaking point, and the withdrawal 
 of the English troops might well render it hopeless for 
 him to continue to contend against difficulties which 
 would have proved insuperable to most of his contem- 
 poraries. These considerations would have been sufficient 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32932, f. 362, f. 419 ; Add. MS. 32933, f. 33. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32933, f. 33. s Add. MS. 32933, f. 179. 
 
 4 Bedford Correspondence, in. 72 ; Fitzmaurice's Life of Shelburne, 
 i. 127. 
 
102 PERSONAL .AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 to make Bute pause; but the question was further com- 
 plicated by the fact that Frederick the Great was in 
 receipt of a subsidy from England. The treaty, under 
 which the subsidy had been paid, had recently expired ; 
 and negotiations had already been begun for its renewal. 
 It would be quite possible for England to withdraw her 
 troops from Germany, and yet continue to render financial 
 assistance to Prussia 1 ; and, after many conferences between 
 Bute and the Prussian ministers in England, it had been 
 arranged that, though the treaty should not be renewed 
 between the two countries, Frederick should receive, at 
 the hands of the English parliament, the same pecuniary 
 assistance as had been granted to him in former years 2 . 
 It is clear, therefore, that Bute was pursuing a policy 
 of extreme caution. Anxious as he might be to give 
 England peace, willing as he was to withdraw from the 
 continental struggle, he consented to continue the subsidy 
 to Prussia, and seemed in favour of delaying, for a time at 
 least, the abandonment of the German war. Frederick 
 had every reason to be grateful to Pitt. 
 
 The situation was fundamentally changed, and Bute's 
 policy with it, by the death of the czarina of Russia, 
 Elizabeth, in January 1762, and the accession of Peter III. 
 The new czar, though he was to reign but a few months, 
 exercised a potent influence upon the politics of Europe, 
 and the course of events in England. He was known to 
 be an enthusiastic and fanatical admirer of Frederick the 
 Great, and his accession rendered it highly probable that 
 Prussia might find in her most dangerous antagonist her 
 warmest and most valuable ally. When every prospect 
 looked dark, and hope had nearly vanished, the un- 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32929, f. 262. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32931, f. 165 ; Add. MS. 32932, f. 278 ; Add. MS. 32933, 
 f. 106. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 103 
 
 expected happened, and rewarded the man who had 
 struggled against adversity. The brightness of the dawn 
 was in proportion to the darkness of the night. An 
 alliance between Russia and Prussia might quickly be 
 brought about ; and Frederick, who, but a few days before, 
 had been in the depths of despair, could anticipate a 
 triumphant issue to the severest struggle which his country 
 had ever been called upon to undergo. 
 
 The death of the czarina could not be without 
 influence upon the relations between England and Prussia. 
 A state, which had been dependent upon English support 
 for its very existence, was about to conclude a most 
 valuable alliance; and Bute can hardly be blamed for 
 thinking that the situation was sufficiently changed to 
 justify a revision of the subsidy question. He had 
 promised the subsidy at a time when Prussia was 
 threatened by destruction. It was to be given, not to 
 enable Prussia to pursue a policy of aggression and con- 
 quest, but to save her from extinction. The czarina's 
 death had wrought a fundamental change, and whereas, 
 before that event, Frederick had no choice, unless he was 
 willing to confess himself defeated, but to continue the 
 struggle against almost impossible odds, he had now the 
 option of either prolonging the war with Russian assist- 
 ance, or utilising his accession of strength to make peace 
 with his enemies at the first favourable opportunity. It is 
 not surprising that Bute favoured the adoption by Frede- 
 rick of the latter alternative. If Prussia withdrew from 
 the war, England would be relieved of a burden which 
 she had borne for many years. The war had been fought 
 for the possession of Silesia, and if Austria, intimidated 
 by the change in Russian policy, was willing to allow 
 Frederick to retain his ill-gotten conquest, the king of 
 Prussia could lay down his arms, conscious that he had 
 
104 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 preserved the integrity of his dominions, and proved his 
 genius as a general. Such arguments, though they might 
 appeal strongly to Bute and certain of his colleagues, 
 carried little conviction to the mind of Frederick the Great. 
 He had tasted the bitterness of defeat, and had known 
 the agony of despair. He had seen his country laid waste, 
 and his capital in the possession of the enemy. He had 
 not provoked the contest which had come near to com- 
 passing his destruction; and, if he had been the first to 
 take up arms, it had only been in self-defence against 
 those who had conspired to overthrow him. Salvation 
 had come at the moment when it was least expected, and 
 he would have been more or less than human, and some- 
 thing very different from what he actually was, if he had 
 not wished to revenge himself upon his foes, robbed of 
 their hour of triumph. Allied with Kussia, he might 
 inflict upon the hated Austrian power a measure of the 
 suffering his country had had to endure ; and, in addition 
 to regaining all that he had lost, acquire further 
 conquests. 
 
 Bute found himself placed in an awkward position. 
 He had no wish to furnish Frederick with the means of 
 indefinitely prolonging the war; and yet, if the promised 
 subsidy was withheld, he would lay himself open to the 
 charge of a breach of faith. It was obvious that English 
 interests would not be served by the annihilation of the 
 Austrian power; and it would appear that the altered 
 circumstances, if they did not permit of the withholding 
 of the subsidy, at least justified the imposition of con- 
 ditions for its payment. Bute was determined that if 
 Frederick received money from England, it should not be 
 used to prolong war, but to facilitate the conclusion of 
 peace. He instructed Mitchell, the English ambassador 
 at Berlin, to inform the Prussian king that the English 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 105 
 
 government regarded the death of the czarina as favouring 
 a general pacification, and did not intend to utilise it to 
 continue the war 1 . This was a hint which Frederick 
 did not wish to take. He was not ready to sacrifice the 
 opportunity which chance had given him, and turned 
 a deaf ear to the blandishments of Bute. In a letter to 
 George III, which reached its destination towards the end 
 of February, he talked of prolonging the war, never so 
 much as hinted at peace, and declared that Prussia and 
 England had now an opportunity, which might never 
 occur again, of crushing the enemies who had threatened 
 their safety. In a private letter which, unfortunately for 
 the writer, was intercepted and seen by those for whom it 
 was not intended, he spoke disparagingly of the English 
 ministers, and suggested Bedlam as a suitable refuge for 
 them 2 . 
 
 The most charitable and generous of men are not apt 
 to be prejudiced in favour of those who think meanly of 
 their intelligence ; and the unlucky reference to Bedlam 
 would not plead in Frederick's favour with Bute. Nor 
 would the conduct of the Prussian ministers in England. 
 As if demanding the payment of a debt, rather than 
 asking for a gift, they told Bute "that, as their master 
 was willing to take the subsidy, £670,000, in the way 
 which it had been offered to him, they hoped and 
 expected that it would be immediately voted. They must 
 have an oui or a non 3 ." They received their answer a 
 few days later, being told by Bute that the subsidy would 
 be paid directly their master informed the English govern- 
 ment of the action he proposed to take in regard to a 
 general pacification. "Le roi," wrote the secretary of 
 state, " souhaiteroit que le secours, qu'il voudroit prefer 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32934, f. 195. 2 Add. MS. 32935, f. 9. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32935, f. 9. 
 
106 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 a ce prince, dut plutot aider a la conclusion de la paix qu'a 
 la continuation de la guerre 1 ." 
 
 The minatory attitude of the Prussian ministers must 
 have strengthened Bute in his resolution not to pay the 
 subsidy unless Frederick showed greater compliance with 
 the wishes of the English administration. Even New- 
 castle began to waver in his support of Prussia, and might 
 have consented to refuse the subsidy, if it had not been 
 for the influence of Lord Hardwicke 2 . Ugly rumours 
 began to circulate that Russia and Prussia were about to 
 begin a war upon Denmark 3 , and news arrived from St 
 Petersburg that the new czar was fanatically in favour 
 of Frederick the Great. The hopes of those who had 
 believed in the possibility of winning Russia to the 
 side of England vanished in the light of this intelligence 4 . 
 Frederick himself fanned the flame by declaring, in a 
 letter to Greorge III, that the war would not end until the 
 empress had begun to fear for the safety of her hereditary 
 dominions 5 . The English answer could no longer be 
 delayed, and Bute determined to strike. On April 12th, 
 he informed Newcastle that he had made up his mind to 
 refuse the subsidy 6 ; and the question was finally settled 
 at a cabinet meeting on April 30th. Only Newcastle, 
 Hardwicke, and Devonshire spoke in favour of continuing 
 
 1 Adolphus' History of England, i., Appendix, pp. 577 — 578. 
 
 2 On February 25, 1762, in a letter to Hardwicke, Newcastle remarks, 
 "If we could, with honor and safety, save £670,000, it would be a great 
 thing for us, and perhaps prevent great difficulties at the end of the 
 year." In his reply Hardwicke points out that he does not think that 
 "this subsidy can finally be refused, consistently with the king's honour" ; 
 and Newcastle confesses himself convinced. Add. MS. 32935, f. 74, 
 f. 76, f. 89. See also f. 9. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32936, f. 443, f. 453. 
 
 4 Grenville Papers, i. 420 — 422. 
 
 5 Adolphus' History of England, i., Appendix, pp. 578 — 579. 
 « Add. MS. 32937, f. 85. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 107 
 
 the payment ; Bute, Egremont, Grenville, the lord chan- 
 cellor, and Lord Ligonier all argued for refusing it, and 
 they carried the day. Mansfield, with characteristic 
 caution, remained silent. Newcastle and his followers 
 found themselves outvoted; and it was decided to with- 
 hold financial assistance from Prussia 1 . 
 
 For his conduct in regard to this question, Bute has 
 often been charged with bad faith. He stands accused of 
 having broken a pledge which he had given, of having 
 encouraged the king of Prussia to believe that he would 
 receive the subsidy, and then withholding it. The accusa- 
 tion is true, but it is not just. The subsidy had been 
 promised at a time when Frederick seemed at the end of 
 his resources. Surrounded by enemies, he could not hope 
 for peace unless he was willing to sacrifice his legitimate 
 ambition, and allow Prussia to be hurled from the height 
 to which he and his ancestors had raised it. If Bute and 
 his colleagues had refused to pay the subsidy unless 
 Frederick, when hard pressed on all sides, had consented 
 to make peace, they would stand guilty of having 
 attempted to force an ally to submit to terms humiliating 
 to himself and destructive to his country. But this they 
 did not do. It was only after the change in the policy of 
 the Russian government had rescued Frederick from the 
 slough of despond, and enabled him, either to continue the 
 war with every hope of success, or conclude an honourable 
 peace with his enemies, that Bute refused to pay the 
 subsidy unless Frederick showed himself willing to bring 
 the war to a conclusion. This is the degree of his iniquity. 
 Misunderstanding and false suspicion existed on both 
 sides ; but the English minister can hardly be blamed for 
 seizing what he thought to be a favourable opportunity of 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32937, f. 450 ; Add. MS. 32938, f. 26, f. 50, f. 239; Bedford 
 Correspondence, in. 75 — 77. 
 
108 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 refusing to assist Frederick to prolong the contest in 
 order to satisfy the ambition of Prussia. The subsidy, it 
 is true, had been pledged, but the circumstances had 
 changed; and to demand the fulfilment of a promise, 
 when the circumstances, in which it had been made, had 
 totally altered, was rather to adhere to the letter of the 
 bond than to fulfil the spirit. 
 
 The settlement of the subsidy question left Bute free 
 to deal with affairs in Germany. Since the outbreak of 
 war with Spain, he had made no secret of his opinion on 
 that question, and, early in April, had told Newcastle that 
 he was determined to withdraw the English troops from 
 the continent 1 . But to put such a policy into practice 
 would be to court a danger which might imperil the safety 
 of the administration. Pitt, who would be certain to dis- 
 approve of the refusal of the Prussian subsidy, might be 
 driven into violent hostility to the government if the 
 continental war was abandoned by England. If the Eng- 
 lish troops were withdrawn at the same time that the 
 subsidy was withheld, the impression might be given that 
 Bute was actuated, not by a desire to promote the interests 
 of England, but by animosity against the king of Prussia. 
 Nor could the measure be now justified on the plea of 
 financial necessity ; for, against the additional expenditure 
 due to the war with Spain, must be set the economy 
 effected by the refusal of the subsidy. Bute hesitated to 
 adopt a policy which would evoke the opposition of Pitt, 
 and for which excuse was lacking. He sought safety in 
 compromise. If it was too dangerous to abandon the 
 German war altogether, it was possible to reduce the 
 expenditure upon it. Such a policy would be far less 
 open to criticism, for it might be defended as an attempt 
 to secure both efficiency and economy; and Bute, who 
 1 Add. MS. 32937, f. 85. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 109 
 
 realised the insecurity of his own position, and always 
 preferred the path of safety, determined to adopt it. 
 When, therefore, Newcastle asked that the house of 
 commons should be requested to vote two million pounds, 
 one half of which was to be allotted to the assistance 
 of Portugal, and the remainder devoted to the war in 
 Germany, he was informed that a vote of one million 
 would be sufficient for both purposes 1 . The king had 
 declared his approval of this policy of economy 2 ; and 
 Newcastle discovered the majority of his colleagues 
 ranged against him. It was in vain that Lord Barrington, 
 the chancellor of the exchequer, endeavoured to con- 
 vince Grenville that a vote of one million would not be 
 sufficient 3 . It was in vain that Lord Mansfield, who 
 on this point agreed with Newcastle, argued with Bute 4 . 
 The decree had gone forth, and there was to be no 
 drawing back. 
 
 The time had come for Newcastle to retire from the 
 administration. His influence had been waning ever since 
 the accession of George III. No longer able to dispense 
 patronage as had been his wont, he had seen his powers 
 
 1 Dr von Ruville states that Newcastle included the Prussian subsidy 
 in the sum of two million pounds which he demanded (William Pitt y 
 Graf von Chatham, in. 64). It appears, however, that Newcastle had 
 made up his mind to the refusal of the Prussian subsidy, and wished to 
 utilise the saving thus effected by devoting more money to the German 
 war. On May 2nd, in a letter to Lord Mansfield, he says, " I have desired 
 my Lord Barrington to attend you, and he will explain the whole, the 
 necessity of having another million, that is one million for Portugal and 
 Spain (the new war) and the usual million vote of credit; for though 
 there will be a saving by their refusal of the Prussian subsidy, that does 
 not give the treasury any money, and if some method is not found 
 to raise a sum a little exceeding that subsidy, for our new additional 
 expence from our war with Spain, and the defence of Portugal, we can't 
 go on." Add. MS. 32938, f. 18. 
 
 2 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 108 — 109. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32938, f. 12. 4 Add. MS. 32938, f. 47. 
 
110 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 restricted and curtailed, and authority passing to those 
 who enjoyed the support of the court. He had submitted 
 to the declaration of war upon Spain, and to the refusal of 
 the Prussian subsidy; but the breaking point had now 
 been reached. He had always been jealous of any inter- 
 ference in the treasury which he had come to regard as 
 his own preserve; and, fearing that a breach had been 
 made in the very citadel of his power, he determined upon 
 resignation. On May 7th he informed Bute that he did 
 not intend to remain in office, thwarting the measures 
 adopted by the majority of his colleagues, and therefore 
 proposed to direct Barrington to move the vote for one 
 million and no more 1 . Five days later the vote was carried 
 in the house of commons' 2 ; and Newcastle's fate was 
 sealed. On May 14th he visited the king, who received 
 him with scant courtesy 3 ; and on May 24th formally 
 resigned his office. Thus fell one of the most typical 
 whigs of the eighteenth century. If he was not a great 
 statesman, he had at least been a fairly successful one ; 
 and, though revelling in petty details and the sordid side 
 of politics, was not the absolutely worthless creature he 
 has been represented. A few days before he resigned, he 
 informed Lord Rockingham of the step he was about to 
 take, and then added, characteristically enough, "If you or 
 the marchioness have any jobs which I can do, before I 
 go out, let me know them immediately 4 ." His exit was not 
 destitute of a certain dignity. He refused the pension 
 which the king pressed upon him; and since he had 
 considerably reduced his own fortune in the service of 
 the state, he might well have availed himself of the royal 
 bounty. Grown grey in public life, and defeated by his 
 
 i Add. MS. 32938, f. 105. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32938, f. 185 ; Walpole's Memoirs, i. 127—132. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32938, f. 262. 4 Add. MS. 32938, f. 260. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 111 
 
 youthful sovereign, Newcastle might have taken the op- 
 portunity of withdrawing from the parliamentary struggle, 
 and enjoying his well earned leisure; and it is to his credit 
 that, when there was little to hope for, he continued to fight 
 for the principles which he had professed when in power. 
 There can be little doubt that Bute was willing to rid 
 himself of Newcastle, and intended to drive him into 
 resignation. He had always despised the old duke ; and, 
 now that the latter had served his turn, was prepared to 
 throw him over. The ground of attack had been skilfully 
 chosen. If Newcastle had resigned rather than sanction 
 the withdrawal of the troops from Germany, he might 
 have posed as a patriot, and been welcomed as an ally by 
 Pitt 1 ; but Bute had avoided this danger by allowing the 
 war to continue while reducing the expenditure. Yet 
 he could not have been unmindful of the possibility of an 
 alliance between Pitt and Newcastle. To Mansfield and 
 Devonshire he might deride the prospect of Newcastle 
 proving a danger to the administration, and, with a cynical 
 appreciation of the motive force in eighteenth century 
 politics, talk of " the loaves and fishes," and declare that 
 "a young king would find friends 2 "; but this did not 
 prevent both him and his master attempting to gain a 
 pledge from Newcastle that he would continue to support 
 the government 3 . The duke was not to be snared, and 
 refused to limit his freedom of action by giving a promise 
 of support, though he declared that, whether he was in or 
 out of office, he would always endeavour to facilitate the 
 conclusion of peace 4 . 
 
 1 Newcastle believed that Bute suspected him of championing the 
 ■war in Germany for the purpose of winning Pitt's support. Add. MS. 
 32937, f. 85. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32938, f. 262. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32938, f. 262, f . 381 : Rockingham Memoirs, i. 114—115. 
 
 4 Add. MS. 32938, f. 105. 
 
112 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 The fall of Newcastle necessitated a reorganisation of 
 the administration. It was a foregone conclusion that 
 Bute would succeed to the office of first lord of the 
 treasury, and Grenville become secretary of state. The 
 latter could claim the promotion which he had refused a 
 few months earlier ; but, though the king and Bute were 
 willing to have Grenville as secretary of state, it was 
 only on the condition that his brother-in-law, Lord Egre- 
 mont, should vacate the office he then held. They foresaw 
 that two secretaries of state, closely connected by 
 marriage, might combine to thwart the will of the first 
 minister ; and, as Grenville andEgremont in the negotiation 
 with France, which had already begun, displayed an 
 inclination to adopt a different line of action from that 
 favoured by Bute 1 , the suspicion was not devoid of 
 foundation. 
 
 Bute was probably right in thinking that progress. 
 
 would be facilitated, and the chance of friction diminished, 
 
 if Lord Egremont could be removed from the inner 
 
 cabinet; and it was suggested that he should resign the 
 
 secretaryship of state, and take the office of lord 
 
 lieutenant of Ireland. It is possible that Lord Halifax 
 
 was intended to take his place in the cabinet 2 ; but the 
 
 scheme was frustrated by the opposition of Grenville. 
 
 The man who had refused promotion, rather than succeed 
 
 one brother-in-law, was not likely to allow another to be 
 
 sacrificed ; and the king and Bute had to abandon their 
 
 plan. When, however, Lord Anson, the first lord of the 
 
 admiralty, died in the following June, his office, which 
 
 carried with it a seat in the inner cabinet 3 , was given to 
 
 Lord Halifax. The latter had little to recommend him, 
 
 but Sir Francis Dashwood, who succeeded Barrington as 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32935, f. 149. 2 Add. MS. 32938, f. 381. 
 
 3 Walpole's Memoirs, n. 255, note 3. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 113 
 
 chancellor of the exchequer, had certainly less. In a 
 by no means puritanical age, he was notorious for his 
 profligacy ; and it was reserved for a king, who honourably 
 distinguished himself from his predecessors by the purity 
 of his private life, to choose a chancellor of the exchequer 
 from among the members of a hell-fire club. But it 
 was not Dashwood's immorality so much as his ignorance 
 of finance that unfitted him for the office for which he 
 had been selected. Probably that ignorance has been 
 exaggerated by his enemies ; but it stands on record that 
 the cyder tax, imposed in 1763, owed its origin to the fact 
 that the chancellor of the exchequer was incapable of 
 understanding the details of a linen tax sufficiently to 
 explain them to the house of commons 1 . 
 
 The reconstruction of the administration may be said 
 to mark the triumph of the crown. In less than two 
 years, Newcastle, in spite of his political influence, and 
 Pitt, in spite of his popularity, had been driven from 
 office ; and Bute had risen from groom of the stole to be 
 first lord of the treasury. He had gathered new men 
 around him, and rid the king of those who had tyrannised 
 over his grandfather, and had hoped to tyrannise over 
 him. Newcastle, Hard wi eke 2 and Legge were no longer 
 the advisers of the crown ; and it had been made abund- 
 antly clear that promotion came from the court, and was 
 not to be won by service, however faithful, to the whig 
 party. Yet, though the oligarchy had been overthrown, 
 the battle was not yet over ; and, if much had been gained, 
 much had been also lost. In the struggle with the 
 whigs, the ground had been prepared for the growth of 
 an opposition party which might endanger the success of 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32948, f. 92 ; Fitzmaurice's Life of Shelburne, i. 186. 
 
 2 Hardwicke ceased to attend cabinet councils when Newcastle re- 
 signed. 
 
 w. 8 
 
114 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 the king's designs. The nation, which had not loved 
 Newcastle, had learnt to hate Bute ; and the minister's un- 
 popularity was reflected upon the king. The greatest and 
 most difficult task of all had still to be accomplished — the 
 conclusion of peace with France. It had been with the 
 object of bringing the war to a conclusion that Bute had 
 taken upon himself so many burdens ; and the work lay 
 still unfinished. In the face of a hostile nation always 
 ready to judge him at his worst, with colleagues who 
 showed themselves more ready to criticise than to obey, he 
 embarked upon the undertaking before which all his other 
 work seems trivial and merely preparatory. 
 
 It will be remembered that Stanley was recalled from 
 France in September 1761 ; and the attempt to bring the 
 war to an end abandoned for the moment. But the 
 ministers were not prepared to relinquish all hope of 
 peace; and were ready to renew the negotiations at the 
 first favourable opportunity 1 . In December, 1761, a 
 kinsman of Choiseul chanced to be in England, and had 
 interviews with the secretaries of state and also with 
 Newcastle, who remarked that his visitor " must be duller 
 than generally Frenchmen are, if he don't understand 
 us 2 ." The ground for future action thus prepared, de 
 Brielle, the Sardinian ambassador at Paris, was com- 
 missioned, apparently soon after the above conversation, 
 to inform Choiseul that the English ministers were willing 
 to discuss terms of peace with France 3 . Choiseul received 
 this communication with caution, and his answer dis- 
 appointed those who had built their hopes on his pacific 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32931, f. 51. Corbett's England in the Seven Years' 
 War, ii. 285. See the same work for a valuable and interesting account 
 of the negotiations with France. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32931, f. 388. 
 
 3 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 97 — 99. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 115 
 
 inclinations 1 . He complained that the English overtures 
 were too vague ; and stated that France could not move 
 in the matter without Spain. He suggested that the 
 English ministers should send a secret envoy to France, 
 who should carry on, simultaneously, negotiations with 
 both France and Spain ; or that they should provide the 
 Count de Viry with a memoir of the terms of peace they 
 were willing to grant, and receive in return the French 
 proposals 2 . 
 
 To despatch a secret envoy to negotiate with Choiseul 
 might doubtless have been the most effective means of 
 bringing about a good understanding between the two 
 countries, but circumstances rendered it impossible 3 ; and 
 the other alternative stated by Choiseul was adopted. 
 Bute sketched out to Viry the terms he would be willing 
 to offer 4 . They were generous enough, and lay open to 
 attack for yielding too much. Bute, however, had spoken 
 as a private man: it was Egremont who was entrusted 
 with the task of communicating in writing to the Count 
 de Yiry the terms approved by the English ministers. 
 His letter was submitted to those of his colleagues 
 acquainted with the secret 5 . It was agreed to allow the 
 French the right of fishing in the gulf of St Lawrence 
 and off Newfoundland, and they were to be permitted to 
 hold the islands of St Pierre and Miquelon. G-oree was 
 
 1 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 99—100 ; Add. MS. 32935, f. 169, f. 172. 
 
 2 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 97—99 ; Add. MS. 32934, f. 121. 
 
 3 Choiseul had stipulated that, if an envoy was sent to France, he 
 must he prepared to deal with Spain through the French government ; 
 and Viry had informed Bute that Choiseul was not likely to give way on 
 that point. Bute himself was in favour of a separate negotiation with 
 Spain ; but even had he been willing to make this concession to France, 
 he would probably have been obliged to face the opposition of Egremont 
 and Grenville. Add. MS. 32935, f. 249. 
 
 4 Add. MS. 32935, f. 249. 5 Add. MS. 32936, f. 9. 
 
 8—2 
 
116 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 also to be surrendered to France; and it was stipulated 
 that in Germany neither power was to continue to aid 
 her allies after the conclusion of peace, except by granting 
 financial assistance 1 . 
 
 Up to this point the negotiation with France had been 
 kept a profound secret. Only a few ministers knew what 
 was going on, and the question had never been discussed 
 at a full cabinet council 2 . Newcastle and Hardwicke, as 
 earnest advocates of peace, had been allowed to know all, 
 and had played an active part in the secret councils which 
 met to debate the question ; but the Duke of Bedford had 
 been kept in the dark 3 , and Lord Mansfield and the Duke of 
 Cumberland were only told a part of the truth 4 . The time 
 had now come to throw off the mask. The cabinet council 
 met on March 29th, 1762, and, as though no previous 
 steps had been taken, agreed to renew the negotiation 
 with France 5 . The secretary of state was instructed to 
 write to the Due de Choiseul suggesting that the two 
 countries should exchange ministers, and that the last 
 memorial of each country, in the negotiations which had 
 been broken off in the previous September, should be 
 taken as the base of the discussion. At a later meeting 
 a clause was added expressing the desire of the English 
 government to make a similar communication to Spain 6 . 
 Choiseul returned a favourable reply 7 . Though he again 
 stated that France could not make peace without Spain, he 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32936, f. 1. 2 Add. MS. 32935, f. 330. 
 
 s Add. MS. 32936, f. 9. 
 
 ^ Add. MS. 32935, f. 390; Add. MS. 32936, f. 186. 
 
 5 Hist. MSS. Coram. Weston Underwood M8S., p. 449. 
 
 6 The idea had been to make a separate offer to Spain, but Egremont, 
 who had originally been in favour of this proposal, changed his mind 
 and the project was abandoned. Hist. MSS. Comm. Weston Underwood 
 MSS., p. 449 ; Add. MS. 32936, f. 234, f. 418, f. 420. 
 
 7 Add. MS. 32937, f. 111. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 117 
 
 seemed hopeful that the latter country would be willing 
 to come to terms. In addition to what England had 
 agreed to surrender by her last memorial in the previous 
 negotiation, Choiseul demanded the cession of Martinique 
 which had only recently been conquered. The loss of 
 that island had been a serious blow to the French power 
 in the West Indies and a corresponding gain to England ; 
 and, if Choiseul was unwilling to submit to such a serious 
 loss, the English ministers might legitimately refuse to 
 surrender so important a conquest. 
 
 The cabinet met on April 23rd to frame a reply to 
 Choiseul's letter. The discussion, as might be expected, 
 centred round the demand for the cession of Martinique. 
 If the ministers consented to surrender the island, they 
 might lay themselves open to the charge of pusillanimity, 
 and encourage the French government to press for 
 further concessions; and it was agreed that Martinique 
 could only be given back to the French if England was 
 allowed to retain either Guadeloupe or Louisiana 1 . This 
 decision was arrived at against the will of Newcastle 2 
 who feared that Choiseul might regard the price demanded 
 for Martinique as excessive. His mortification, however, 
 was of short duration, for, when the cabinet met again to 
 come to a final decision, Bute had changed his mind, and 
 was in sympathy with him. Bute argued that to ask for 
 Guadeloupe or Louisiana in return for Martinique was to 
 ask too much, that France would never agree to such 
 terms; and he proposed that the administration should 
 agree to surrender Martinique in return for the cession of 
 the neutral islands 3 and Grenada 4 . In making this pro- 
 posal, Bute could feel sure of the support of Newcastle, 
 
 i Add. MS. 32937, f. 341. 2 Add< Mg- 32937, f, 324, f. 349. 
 
 3 Tobago, St Lucia, Dominica, and St Vincent. 
 
 4 Bedford Correspondence, ill. 75 — 77. 
 
118 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 Hardwicke, and Devonshire, and of the opposition of 
 Grrenville and Egremont. Even Bedford, the fanatical 
 lover of peace, thought that the offer erred on the side of 
 generosity \ But Bute was able to prevail by the assistance 
 of those who, in their anxiety for peace, feared to take 
 any step which might provoke Choiseul to break off the 
 negotiation ; and his proposal was agreed to by the cabinet 
 when it met on April 20th 2 , and embodied in a despatch 
 dated the day following 3 . 
 
 This was the last communication to France which 
 Newcastle was to assist in framing. A few days after he 
 had lent his support to Bute against Grrenville, the blow 
 fell which compelled him to abandon office. He had been 
 the champion of peace as long as he had remained a 
 member of the ministry; and, before many months had 
 passed, he was to suffer for the part he had played. His. 
 withdrawal from the administration left Bute far more 
 dependent upon the support of Grenville and Egremont \ 
 and accentuated the difficulties of his task. Not until 
 he had concluded peace with France could he lay 
 down the burden of office, of which he would fain be 
 rid ; and, though nearing the goal of his ambition, could 
 not yet count with confidence upon success. Much might 
 happen to check and hinder him in his course. Choiseul 
 might prove himself unconciliatory ; and Bute's attempts to 
 placate him by concessions might be thwarted by the oppo- 
 sition of the two secretaries of state. The outlook was dark 
 and stormy; and the inexperienced minister might well 
 be alarmed at the magnitude of the work he had undertaken. 
 
 Choiseul's answer to the English terms arrived early 
 
 1 Bedford Correspondence, in. 77, 78. 
 
 2 Bedford Correspondence, in. 75 — 77. It is probable that Grenville 
 was absent from this cabinet meeting. Grenville Papers, i. 450. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32938, f. 3. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 119 
 
 in June; but the cabinet did not meet until June 21st 1 . 
 Accepting all that had been conceded, Choiseul refused 
 to surrender St Lucia, one of the neutral islands 2 . This 
 new demand on the part of the French government might 
 easily endanger the success of the negotiations. The 
 compensation for the surrender of Martinique had only 
 been fixed after some hesitation, and had been due to 
 Bute supported by Newcastle and his friends. The 
 ministers might well hesitate to reduce the compensation, 
 for what guarantee was there that Choiseul would not 
 proceed to demand still further concessions. Amongst 
 those summoned to the cabinet meeting on June 21st were 
 Lord Melcombe and Lord Mansfield 3 . The French pro- 
 posals were not favourably received by the assembled 
 ministers. The Duke of Bedford, true to the policy which 
 he had always pursued, advocated the surrender of St 
 Lucia, but found himself unsupported by his colleagues. 
 Lord Egremont declared the answer of the French court 
 to be unreasonable and captious; and his opinion was 
 echoed by Lord Mansfield. No record survives of an 
 expression of opinion by Grrenville on this occasion; but 
 it is certain that he was in favour of retaining St Lucia 4 . 
 Lord Melcombe, remarking with some spirit that "he 
 might be beaten into a peace but would not be kicked 
 into it," argued that the limit of concession had been 
 reached when it had been agreed to surrender Martinique, 
 Guadeloupe, and Mariegalante to France. Bute de- 
 livered himself with caution and reserve. He agreed 
 that a firm but polite answer should be given, but argued 
 "that if there was any one demand, when France had 
 reduced it to that point, then it would be fit to determine 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32939, f. 264 ; Add. MS. 32940, f. 6. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32939, f. 264. 3 Add. MS. 32940, f. 24. 
 4 Grenville Papers, i. 450. 
 
120 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 whether the council would advise his Majesty to continue 
 the war for that one object, and then, and not till then, 
 he would state the powers and faculty of this country for 
 the consideration of that question 1 ." The meeting ad- 
 journed to re-assemble three days later 2 ; but, from the 
 surviving records, it is abundantly clear that the general 
 opinion of the ministers was against any further con- 
 cessions to France 3 . 
 
 The outlook was not hopeful. For some weeks the 
 English government refused to give way on the point in 
 dispute, but failed to persuade Choiseul to withdraw his 
 demand 4 . Nor was the situation bettered by the attitude 
 taken up by Spain. Acting on Choiseul's advice, the 
 administration had made direct overtures for peace to 
 that country 5 , and an answer arrived early in July 6 . It 
 gave little satisfaction. The reply of the Spanish govern- 
 ment was considered to be insolent and overbearing ; and 
 thus from both France and Spain there seemed little to 
 expect in the way of concession or compromise. The 
 situation was critical in the extreme. Spain had returned 
 an answer which might justly be considered as insolent; 
 and Choiseul insisted upon a demand which the English 
 ministers were not inclined to fulfil. Bute began to see 
 the hope of peace vanishing before his eyes; and deter- 
 mined that the time had come to give way. Peace with 
 France and Spain could only be bought at a price, and 
 St Lucia was the price that would: have to be paid 7 . 
 
 i Add. MS. 34713, f. 106. 2 Add. MS. 32940, f. 112. 
 
 3 In conversation with Lord Mansfield, Newcastle learnt " that there 
 was not at present the least probability of peace ; that the answers from 
 France were all verbiage, full of chichane, and even departed or 
 chichaned upon points which had been before agreed to." Ibid. 
 
 * Add. MS. 32941, f. 18. 
 
 5 Add. MS. 32938, f. 304. 6 Grenville Papers, i. 462, 463. 
 
 7 Bedford Correspondence, in. 88 — 91. 
 
, THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 121 
 
 When a courier arrived on July 24th, bringing letters 
 from Ohoiseul, Bute is reported to have declared that 
 peace was made 1 . The French terms were reported to 
 be most favourable 2 , and the cabinet was summoned to 
 meet on July 26th. 
 
 It might be thought, judging by the favourable 
 estimate Bute had formed of Choiseul's offer, that the 
 latter had receded from his position, and agreed to the 
 English demands. This was not the case. While asking 
 that the two courts should exchange representatives, he 
 still insisted upon the surrender of St Lucia. But, and 
 this was the secret of Bute's satisfaction, he had changed 
 his attitude towards Spain. Up to this time Choiseul had 
 always asserted that France could never make peace 
 without Spain ; but now, according to Bute, he appeared 
 less solicitous of the interests of the ally of France ; and 
 had declared that, if Spain refused to make peace, she 
 must submit to coercion at the hands of England 3 . Bute 
 seemed to see light where all before had been darkness ; 
 and, when he met the ministers in council on July 26th, 
 he must have thought himself a bearer of good tidings. 
 The time had come when it was possible to separate the 
 two Bourbon countries ; and the opportunity must not be 
 lost. Peace with France could be won by the cession of 
 St Lucia ; and then Spain, deprived of its powerful ally, 
 would lie at the mercy of England. He therefore pressed 
 his colleagues to neglect the question of Spain for the 
 moment, and, taking the advantage which fate had given 
 them, accept the French proposals. His arguments de- 
 servedly encountered opposition. Their validity depended 
 upon the supposition that Choiseul, whatever he might 
 
 1 Life and Letters of Lady Sarah Lennox, i. 69. 
 
 2 Ibid. ; Add. MS. 32941, f. 48. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32941, f. 84. 
 
122 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 have said, would be willing, or even able, to leave Spain to 
 be crushed by the power of England. There was little 
 evidence for this belief. The family compact had but 
 recently been made, and it was extremely unlikely that 
 France would cynically break her faith so solemnly pledged. 
 Spain had taken up arms, confident of the support of 
 France ; and, if now deserted by her ally, and left alone 
 to face the attack of England, her doom was sealed. 
 When Bute unfolded his plan to the cabinet, he found not 
 a single supporter. More lonely than Pitt on a former 
 occasion, he stood absolutely alone. He was fiercely 
 assaulted on all sides; and the old lord president, Granville, 
 with some of the fire of his youth, bitterly accused him of 
 being the dupe of France ; and declared that he himself 
 would never agree to a peace in which Spain was not 
 included 1 . 
 
 No decision was come to, and a further meeting was 
 held two days later. Bute had the wisdom to see that he 
 could never carry his original proposal; and, when the 
 ministers assembled on July 28th, he proposed that the 
 royal consent should be given to the French propositions, 
 
 1 Bute's disappointment can be gauged from a letter which he wrote 
 to Egremont after the cabinet council on July 26th: "I am not 
 ashamed," he wrote, " to own that I write tbis letter with a heavy heart, 
 convinced in my own mind of two important truths — the one that peace 
 was in our power, the other that we are about to lose an opportunity we 
 shall scarce recover again. I am satisfied the French are as sick of the 
 war as we could be, and that by management everything we desired 
 relative to Spain would have come about, whereas now we expect in vain, 
 that France should thus openly abandon her ally, a different thing from 
 doing it in a course of negotiation. Possessing these ideas, you will not 
 be surprised, my dear Lord, if the situation I have just been in, single 
 and alone, alarms me ; I feel most sensibly that I am, from the 
 king's known goodness to me, to stand at mark for the long train of 
 calamities that the continuation of this war brings in my view." Add. 
 MS. 36797, f. 6. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 123 
 
 that the Duke of Bedford should be sent to France, and 
 that the latter country should endeavour to persuade 
 Spain to be a party to the treaty ; but, if her efforts failed 
 to be successful, she should pledge herself not to assist 
 Spain in the war with England 1 . This was agreed to by 
 all the ministers present. The administration had thus 
 consented to restore St Lucia, and this marks the triumph 
 of Bute over Greorge Grenville. On the other hand, Bute 
 had tasted the bitterness of defeat. He had stood alone 
 in the cabinet, opposed by those who, if it had not been 
 for him, would have never been in a position to thwart 
 him. He had been obliged to modify his policy in regard 
 to Spain, and to assent to a demand being made of 
 France which could not be fulfilled without a violation of 
 the family compact. At this point in the negotiation 
 the deciding word lay with Spain : it rested with her 
 either to prolong or conclude the war. If she maintained 
 a truculent and defiant attitude, Choiseul would be placed 
 between the horns of a dilemma, compelled either to 
 continue a disastrous war, or break faith with an ally. 
 It was to Choiseul's interest, having secured possession of 
 St Lucia, to win over the Spanish government to the side 
 of peace. Whether the defiant attitude of Spain had 
 been adopted with that end in view or not, it had at least 
 served the purpose of rendering England more ready to 
 comply with the demands of France. It was known in 
 London by the middle of August that Choiseul had agreed 
 to the English terms, and was about to send a messenger 
 to Spain to exhort that country to peace 2 . The exhorta- 
 tions of Choiseul were not without effect ; before the end 
 of the month a favourable answer had come from Spain, 
 
 1 For these two cabinet meetings, see Add. MS. 33000, f. 95 ; Add. 
 MS. 32941, f. 68, f. 185, f. 203 ; Add. MS. 34713, f. 110. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32941, f. 249. 
 
124 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 and it had been arranged that Grimaldi should be given 
 full powers to treat with the Duke of Bedford 1 . 
 
 A difficult crisis had been tided over; and nothing 
 more remained to be done but despatch the representa- 
 tives of the respective countries. The Duke of Bedford 
 left for France early in September; and, on the twelfth 
 day of the same month, the Due de Mvernois, the 
 accredited agent of the French government, arrived in 
 England 2 . The appointment of the Duke of Bedford was 
 open to adverse criticism. One so biassed in favour of 
 peace might easily concede too much to the enemy. Nor 
 was he by disposition or temperament suited for the 
 delicate work of diplomacy. Hardwicke, who knew him 
 well, and who had sat with him at many cabinet councils, 
 thought that, despite his passion for peace, no man was 
 more likely to take offence on some immaterial point, and 
 break off the negotiation in a moment of passion. "In 
 another light," wrote Hardwicke, " no man is more likely 
 to take a disgust at instructions that may be sent to him ; 
 or at the ministers differing in opinion from him ; or not 
 agreeing to everything his Grace shall propose. I am 
 sure I should not wish to be the secretary of state to 
 have the correspondence with him. In that case, instead 
 of attaching the Duke of Bedford to Lord Bute, the very 
 reverse may happen ; and it may make an eternal breach 
 between them 3 ." It is difficult to realise that these words 
 were written a month before Bedford left England; for 
 few prophecies have been so literally fulfilled. 
 
 It is probable that Bute was responsible for the 
 appointment of Bedford. Neither of the secretaries 
 of state had any confidence in him ; and it was re- 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32942, f. 86, f. 91, f. 122, f. 142, f. 145. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32942, f. 240. 3 Add. MS. 32941, f. 122. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 125 
 
 ported that Egremont hated him 1 . They were not 
 long in giving a practical illustration of their hostility. 
 Shortly after Bedford had left England, his independent 
 authority was limited by the ministers who decided that 
 the preliminaries of peace must be approved by the king 
 before being signed 2 . The Duke, naturally enough, 
 resented this restriction of his authority; nor was he 
 pacified by being told that the action of the ministers had 
 been inspired by a desire to lighten the weight of his 
 responsibility 3 . He suspected Egremont and Grrenville 
 as the authors of the unfriendly act, and thought that 
 they had either prevailed against Bute, or won him over 
 to their way of thinking 4 . It was not a happy beginning, 
 and the Duke of Bedford was to learn how many are the 
 difficulties which beset the path of a diplomatist. However 
 anxious Choiseul might be for peace, he was not prepared 
 for an unconditional surrender; and even Bedford, the 
 most yielding of diplomatists, was dissatisfied with the 
 terms offered by the French court 5 . Choiseul afterwards 
 consented to abandon the demands to which Bedford took 
 objection 6 ; and the ultimatum was despatched to England. 
 The terms, thus offered, were in many points identical with 
 the preliminaries of peace approved by parliament. The 
 territory of the Prussian king was to be evacuated by the 
 French who were to have the right of fishing in the gulf 
 of St Lawrence and off Newfoundland, and to be given 
 the islands of St Pierre and Miquelon. But in two 
 particulars there was a fundamental difference between 
 these terms and the preliminaries. There was no guarantee 
 that the French fishing boats would keep at a certain 
 distance from the English coasts; and there was no 
 
 1 Bedford Correspondence, in. 128. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 116. :i Ibid., p. 117. 4 Ibid., p. 127. 
 
 5 Hist. MSS. Comm. Weston Underwood MSS., p. 344. 
 
 6 Ibid., p. 222. 
 
126 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 compensation offered for the surrender of the important 
 possession of Havannah recently conquered from Spain 1 . 
 
 Bute professed himself satisfied with the terms offered 
 by Choiseul; and found himself, in consequence, in direct 
 conflict with his two secretaries of state. G-renville 
 declared that he would never sign a peace which did not 
 allow of compensation being given for the surrender of 
 Havannah ; and Lord Egremont was of the same opinion 2 . 
 The standard of revolt was raised within the administra- 
 tion; and Grrenville talked of summoning Newcastle, 
 Devonshire, and Hardwicke to attend the cabinet council 3 . 
 The situation was threatening in the extreme. As first 
 minister, Bute could hardly submit to the dictation of his 
 colleagues. He had already once suffered defeat at the 
 hands of his subordinates ; and, if he was to allow himself 
 to be outvoted again, he might lose all influence in the 
 administration. Yet his opponents were stronger than 
 he was. In asking compensation for the restoration of 
 Havannah, they were certain of popular support which, 
 apart from everything else, would be readily given to the 
 men who dared to stand up against the hated favourite. 
 Detested by the nation and opposed by his colleagues, 
 Bute seemed about to lose the fruits of all his labours: 
 the olive branch extended by Choiseul threatened to 
 prove a sword of division and destruction. 
 
 At this crisis of his fortunes, he displayed a capacity 
 for decisive action, with which he is not often credited. 
 A meeting of the cabinet had been fixed for October 4th ; 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32943, f. 28. The French ultimatum arrived in England 
 on September 28th : the fall of Havannah was known the day following. 
 See Add. MS. 32943, f. 28, note by Newcastle ; Bedford Correspondence, 
 in. 130, 131. 
 
 2 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 128—132 ; Bedford Correspondence, in. 
 125—131. 
 
 3 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 128 — 132. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 127 
 
 and, before that day, the two secretaries of state had to 
 be schooled into submission. The royal authority was to 
 be used to overawe the two unruly ministers. "The 
 king," said Bute to Rigby, " would be obeyed, and would 
 talk to his two secretaries upon their obedience 1 ." But, 
 though harangued by their sovereign, neither Grrenville 
 nor Egremont would abandon their convictions 2 . They 
 persisted in their demand that compensation should be 
 exacted for the surrender of Havannah; and would not 
 be likely to give way, strengthened by the knowledge 
 that not a single councillor was willing to support Bute 3 . 
 The king had failed to bend his secretaries to his will; 
 and Bute had no other means of coercion. He was quite 
 prepared to demand compensation for Havannah 4 ; but 
 shrank from doing so at the dictation of his colleagues. 
 If he was to make a concession, he must, at the same time, 
 give a forcible illustration of his predominance; for, as 
 Fox truly remarked, " it was impossible for Lord Bute to 
 hold it, when he could not govern his own people 5 ." Time 
 was necessary for him in which to execute such a project; 
 and it was essential to avoid affording G-renville and 
 Egremont an opportunity of voicing their opinions and 
 leading the attack upon the first minister. This was 
 easily done : the cabinet council, which had been summoned 
 for October 4th, never met 6 . 
 
 The rock of offence was George Grenville. Since the 
 fall of Newcastle, he had led the opposition in the cabinet 7 . 
 
 1 Bedford Correspondence, in. 128. 
 
 2 Ibid., pp. 131—133. s Ibid. 
 
 4 Ibid. On September 30th the king told Cumberland that he was 
 for some equivalent for Havannah. Add. MS. 32943, f. 28. 
 
 5 Add. MS. 32943, f. 28. 
 
 6 On October 10th Lord Halifax informed Newcastle that there had 
 not been a council for three weeks. Add. MS. 32943, f. 140. 
 
 7 On July 26th, 1762, Bute wrote, " I scorn to dwell on, nor will I 
 
128 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 Far abler than his brother-in-law, Egremont, he was, in 
 consequence, the more dangerous; and it was supposed 
 to be due to his influence that Egremont had adopted a 
 hostile attitude towards the Duke of Bedford 1 . By his 
 action in the Havannah question, Grrenville had filled up 
 the cup of his iniquity ; and Bute determined to deprive 
 him of the secretaryship of state and of the management 
 of the house of commons. Grrenville's successor was to 
 be Henry Fox. By this arrangement, Bute hoped to 
 strengthen his position in the cabinet, and facilitate the 
 conclusion of peace. Fox was not chosen at random. 
 That daring politician was known not to be burdened 
 with either scruples or convictions, and he had already 
 enlisted under the banner of the court. He was aware of 
 the dissensions in the ministry 2 , and if he was told, as he 
 said, that " Mr Grrenville would no longer continue in the 
 station he was in 3 ," it is incredible that he believed it. 
 He refused, however, to become secretary of state, and 
 contented himself with a seat in the cabinet and the 
 management of the house of commons. The seals, which 
 Fox refused, were given to Lord Halifax, whose place at 
 the admiralty was taken by Grenville who thus retained 
 his seat in the inner cabinet. 
 
 It would seem that Bute had been driven to this 
 reorganisation of the administration by Grenville himself. 
 In Fox he had gained an ally who would be of assistance, 
 not only in the cabinet, but also in parliament. The 
 first lord of the treasury had asserted his supremacy in 
 no indecisive manner: at the moment that his power 
 
 think on Mr Grenville's dissenting from me in word, look, and manner 
 through the whole examination of the preliminaries." Add. MS. 
 36797, f. 6. 
 
 1 Bedford Correspondence, in. 140 — 142. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32943, f. 28 ; Rockingham Memoirs, I. 128—132. 
 
 3 Hist. MSS. Comm., 12th Report, Appendix v. p. 360. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 129 
 
 was threatened, he had initiated and carried through a 
 ministerial revolution of no small magnitude. He was 
 now the master of his administration, and, if Grenville still 
 remained to oppose, there was now Fox to defend. The 
 element of mystery is that Grenville should have consented 
 to remain in the cabinet. He had been treated with 
 small courtesy. If Fox had been willing to become 
 secretary of state, Grenville might have been obliged, 
 if he wished to retain a place in the administration, to 
 take his old post of treasurer of the navy. It is clear 
 that he was profoundly dissatisfied with the treatment he 
 had suffered 1 ; and yet he consented to continue the 
 colleague of the man who had inflicted the insult. There 
 is no mystery in the fact that Bute was willing for him to 
 remain, for he would not be anxious to add Grenville to 
 the opponents of the administration; but that the latter 
 should consent to serve the man who had wronged him is 
 far more inexplicable. The motives of men's actions, 
 hidden as they often are from contemporaries, are seldom 
 revealed to posterity ; and our knowledge of the characters 
 of actors in the past is frequently too scanty to enable us 
 to sit in judgment upon them. In consenting to remain 
 in office, Grenville may have been influenced by a desire 
 to continue to act as a check upon Bute's pacific ten- 
 dencies; but it is also possible that, knowing as he did 
 that Bute would not be likely to continue long in power, 
 he had an eye upon the succession, and thought to 
 purchase promotion by enduring humiliation 2 . 
 
 There is no doubt that the admission of Fox into the 
 cabinet, and the relative degradation of George Grenville, 
 facilitated the conclusion of peace. From this point 
 events progressed smoothly. The Duke of Bedford was 
 
 1 Grenville Papers, i. 451, 482—485. 
 
 2 Grenville Papers, i. 482 — 485. 
 
130 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 informed that compensation would be demanded for the 
 surrender of Havannah l , and on October 22nd the cabinet 
 met to consider the final terms of peace 2 . Three days 
 later, another meeting was held 3 , after which Bigby and 
 a messenger left for France, carrying with them the 
 English answer, and a despatch authorising the Duke of 
 Bedford to give his formal consent to terms of peace 4 . 
 On November 3rd the preliminaries of peace between 
 France, Spain, and England were signed. 
 
 Thus Bute had triumphed in the face of difficulties 
 which might have proved insuperable to many a man 
 with a greater name in the political world. He had 
 struggled and prevailed against the divisions in his 
 cabinet and the opposition of his colleagues. With no 
 support, except that which the king gave him, he had 
 successfully asserted his own supremacy ; and, by timely 
 concessions, averted the disruption of his administration. 
 But the danger was not yet over. The preliminaries of 
 peace had been signed, but they were to be submitted to 
 parliament for approval; and no one could tell what 
 might then happen. Bute was hated by the people, and 
 Fox was certainly far from popular. The cry might be 
 raised that England was undone by a Scotch favourite 
 and a profligate politician; and the treaty subjected to a 
 searching and hostile criticism. A party might arise, 
 strong in the support of the nation, and bitterly an- 
 tagonistic to the ministry. Triumphant as Bute had been, 
 his very success had swelled the number of his foes, and 
 sown the seeds of a parliamentary opposition. Pitt would 
 
 1 Grenville Papers, i. 480 — 481. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32943, f. 386 ; Add. MS. 32944, f. 1. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32944, f. 16. This meeting was summoned to consider 
 despatches from Bedford which arrived on October 23rd. Add. MS. 32944, 
 f.79. 
 
 * Add. MS. 32944, f. 93, f. 206. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 131 
 
 not be likely to be silent when the preliminaries of peace, 
 which conceded far more than he had ever been willing 
 to grant, were discussed, and none could tell the effect of 
 his utterance, or measure the popular excitement it would 
 arouse. Newcastle, if an opportunity arose, would not be 
 inclined to spare the man who had expelled him from the 
 cabinet. Though he had fallen from his high estate, and 
 was no longer the political power he had once been, he 
 still reckoned upon finding supporters. He counted upon 
 the assistance of those whom he had enriched in former 
 days with pensions, bribes, and sinecure places ; and, if he 
 allowed for some of his friends deserting to the banner 
 of the court, he thought to find a sufficient number of 
 faithful followers to form a party which could not be 
 despised 1 . He had preserved his liberty by refusing to 
 pledge himself to support the administration 2 ; and, in 
 whatever course of action he chose to adopt, he would 
 be assisted by his friends, Hardwicke and Devonshire, 
 who had retired from the cabinet with him, though the 
 Duke of Devonshire still retained his office of lord 
 chamberlain 3 . 
 
 Bute had accomplished one part of his work, and he 
 had now to prepare to meet parliament. The ministers 
 were certain to be attacked; and it was necessary to 
 strengthen the cabinet. It was more easily said than 
 done. When Charles Townshend was offered the secretary- 
 ship of the plantations, he refused it on the grounds that 
 
 1 During the autumn of 1762, Newcastle compiled several estimates 
 of his probable parliamentary strength. They show that he had formed 
 an exaggerated conception of the number of his supporters in both 
 houses. Add. MS. 33000, f. 113, f. 118, f. 153. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32938, f. 262, f. 381 ; Add. MS. 32939, f. 264 ; Rockingham 
 Memoirs, i. 114 — 115. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32938, f. 239 ; Add. MS. 32939, f. 383, f. 407 ; Fitz- 
 maurice's Life of Lord Shelburne, i. 136, 137. 
 
 9—2 
 
132 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 he did not wish to be connected with a cabinet in which 
 Fox had a place 1 . Lord Waldegrave was approached, but 
 declined to take office because he was not prepared to 
 separate himself from the Duke of Cumberland 2 . But 
 the greatest danger of all lay in the possibility that Pitt 
 and Newcastle would unite in a joint attack upon the 
 ministry. There were, doubtless, obstacles in the way of 
 such an alliance, for Pitt might find it hard to forgive 
 what he had suffered at the hands of the man who had 
 once been his colleague. He was reported to have said 
 that he would never unite with Newcastle 3 , and the Duke 
 of Devonshire, who possessed great influence amongst the 
 whigs, was opposed to such an union, at least for the 
 present 4 . But Bute, who realised the danger, was anxious 
 to do too much rather than too little ; and was willing to 
 take Newcastle back into the administration, and so widen 
 the breach between him and Pitt 5 . During the summer, 
 the Sardinian ambassador, Viry, had informed Newcastle 
 that Bute was anxious to bestow a mark of his regard 
 upon him, and, not long afterwards, Bute told Hardwicke 
 that he was ready to give Newcastle office 6 . In August 
 Lord Lyttelton was employed to tempt Newcastle and 
 Hardwicke to return to the administration 7 . Some weeks 
 later, Henry Fox wrote to the Duke of Devonshire, 
 inviting him, with Newcastle and Hardwicke, to return 
 to their "places at court and council, and restore peace 
 
 1 Chatham Correspondence, n. 181 — 183. Charles Townshend still 
 retained his office of secretary at war. 
 
 2 Walpole's Memoirs, i. 155, 156. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32941, f. 18, f. 36. * Add. MS. 32940, f. 227. 
 
 5 It is possible that Bute was also mindful of the fact that Newcastle 
 was a steady supporter of peace, and would therefore be of assistance in 
 resisting George Grenville. 
 
 6 Add. MS. 32941, f. 18 ; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 118. 
 
 7 Add. MS. 32941, f. 370. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 133 
 
 and tranquillity to a people that are at present mad 1 ." 
 A personal appeal was made to Newcastle by Halifax 
 who pressed him to return to the council "in or out of 
 employment 2 ." Newcastle politely refused the offer, but 
 Devonshire took the opportunity of upbraiding Fox, 
 whose alliance with Bute, he declared, would tend rather 
 to increase than diminish the vigour of the opposition 3 . 
 
 The whig leaders have been so often charged with an 
 indecent hunger of office, and there is so much justification 
 for the accusation, that it is refreshing to find them 
 displaying such fortitude under a torrent of temptations. 
 But their very virtues were to recoil upon their own 
 heads. Bute had failed to win them to his side : they had 
 rejected with contumely the olive branch which he had 
 extended. They could not be left to gather a party 
 of supporters, and embark upon a career of opposition 
 which might bring them into office and overthrow the 
 ministry. They had refused peace, and, therefore, must 
 be given war. It was not for nothing that the ministry 
 was represented by Fox in the house of commons. Un- 
 likely to be affected by scruples or considerations of 
 honour, he was ready to buy success if it could not be 
 earned. Stories, only too likely to be true, are told of 
 vast sums expended in the purchase of votes, and a party 
 was bought to support the preliminaries of peace when 
 they should be submitted to parliament. Nor was resort 
 had to bribery alone : the king expressed, in no hesitating 
 manner, his dislike of the whig leaders. On October 28th 
 the Duke of Devonshire went to court, in order to resign 
 his office of lord chamberlain. The king refused to see 
 him, and when Devonshire inquired with whom he should 
 leave his staff, the message was sent back that he would 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32943, f. 214. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32943, f. 260, f. 274. 3 Add. MS. 32943, f. 214. 
 
134 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 receive his orders. Not waiting for these instructions, 
 the duke at once went to Lord Egremont, and left with 
 him the insignia of his office 1 . 
 
 It was necessary to justify such insulting conduct : 
 and the royal displeasure was said to be due to Devonshire's 
 refusal to attend the cabinet council when summoned to 
 do so. The Duke had ceased to be present at cabinet 
 meetings when Newcastle retired; and his absence was 
 sanctioned by the king 2 . He was, therefore, greatly 
 surprised when, on October 3rd, he received a summons 
 to attend a cabinet council shortly to be held to consider 
 the final terms of peace 3 . He begged to be excused from 
 obeying the command, on the ground that his long absence 
 from such meetings precluded him from giving an opinion 
 on a matter of such importance 4 ; and it would seem that 
 his plea was valid. Nor does it appear to have given 
 offence. It is more than likely that Devonshire had been 
 summoned, not in order to place him in an awkward 
 position and compel him to refuse to comply with a royal 
 demand, but with a view of placating Grenville. In reply 
 to the latter's threat to summon Newcastle, Hardwicke 
 and Devonshire, Bute had answered that the first two 
 were not eligible and the last would not come 5 , and it is, 
 therefore, probable that Devonshire was summoned in the 
 confident belief that he would not attend 6 . If by refusing 
 he had incurred the anger of the king, it is difficult to 
 understand the subsequent offer made to him of a place 
 
 1 Grafton's Autobiography, pp. 21, 22 ; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 135, 
 136; Add. MS. 32944, f. 110. 
 
 2 Hist. MSS. Comm., 12th Report, Appendix, v, p. 275 ; Add. MS. 
 32944, f. 266. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32943, f. 48. 4 Ibid. 
 
 5 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 128 — 132. 
 
 6 This at least was Newcastle's view. Add. MS. 32943, f. 90. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 135 
 
 iii the cabinet 1 j and therefore, though his refusal to obey 
 the summons might serve as an excuse for the king's 
 behaviour, the cause must be looked for elsewhere. The 
 rock of offence was probably the letter which Devonshire 
 had written to Fox, denouncing him for his alliance with 
 Bute, and declaring such an union more likely to fan 
 than quench the flames of opposition 2 . Such a declaration 
 was indiscreet, to say the least ; and it was not till he had 
 received this ultimatum that Fox informed the Duke of 
 Cumberland that the king was offended and Bute alarmed 
 at Devonshire's refusal to attend the council 3 . It would 
 seem, therefore, that the king and his confidential minister, 
 dismayed at the rising tide of opposition, determined 
 to take the first step, and declare war upon their 
 opponents. 
 
 And as a declaration of war it was taken. One of the 
 whig leaders had been grossly insulted by his sovereign ; 
 and his friends and followers were forced to choose be- 
 tween him and the king. If most of the peerage kissed 
 the rod 4 , there were some, at least, who preferred their 
 principles to their places. Lord John Cavendish followed 
 his brother into exile, and Lord Bessborough promptly 
 resigned the office of postmaster. A few days later, 
 their example was followed by the youthful Marquis of 
 Rockingham. Unintimidated by these expressions of dis- 
 approval, and mistaking blind obstinacy for heroic 
 resolution, the king took a step which Bute had not 
 advised and Fox did not approve 5 . On November 3rd he 
 struck out the Duke of Devonshire's name from the list 
 of members of the privy council 6 . 
 
 Attacked so openly by the court, it behoved the 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32943, f. 214. 2 Ibid. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32943, f. 303. 4 Walpole's Memoirs, i. 160. 
 
 5 Shelburne's Life, i. 176—179. 6 Add. MS. 32944, f. 266. 
 
136 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 whigs to look to their arms. Parliament, which was 
 shortly to meet, would see the struggle begin in earnest. 
 Fox was busy, dispensing bribes and purchasing a majority; 
 and the whigs were committed to what might appear to 
 be a lost cause. In going into opposition they laid 
 themselves open to the charge of being disappointed 
 placemen ; and their past career would give colour to the 
 accusation. They could not hope to prevail against the 
 purchased majority of the court; and their only chance 
 of success lay in acting as the champions of a public 
 opinion which was not represented in parliament. Yet, 
 much as the nation might dislike Bute and his hirelings, 
 it was not prepared to give its confidence to the whigs. 
 The support of the people was given to Pitt. His services 
 in the past had not been forgotten, and men looked to 
 him for the future. It was he, and not the whigs, who 
 could voice the national opposition to the policy pursued 
 by Bute ; and only by uniting with him could Newcastle 
 and his followers hope to be triumphant. Bute had 
 foreseen the danger of such a coalition, and had striven to 
 avert it. He had failed to win back Newcastle into the 
 service of the crown ; and it remained for Pitt to decide 
 whether he should lend the lustre of his name to those 
 who had once been his colleagues, and were now ready to 
 be his followers. 
 
 As early as September, 1762, Newcastle and Hard- 
 wicke perceived how materially the opposition would be 
 strengthened by the accession of Pitt 1 ; but the obstacles 
 in the way were many. The great commoner had much 
 to forgive before he could enter upon an alliance with 
 Newcastle who had betrayed him in the past, and might, 
 therefore, betray him in the future ; nor could Newcastle, 
 who had played the traitor to Pitt, feel that he had yet 
 1 Harris' Life of Hardioicke, in. 311 — 314. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 137 
 
 been pardoned by the victim of his treachery 1 . Moreover, 
 Pitt had already declared against embarking upon a 
 regular course of opposition 2 , and might well refuse to 
 alter his conduct in order to assist Newcastle. But behind 
 the merely personal dislike and distrust of Newcastle, 
 there lay a greater obstacle. If an opposition was 
 formed, it would be bound to attack the preliminaries of 
 peace when submitted to parliament; and Pitt would 
 not be behindhand in the assault. All that Bute had 
 allowed to France, in excess of what had been granted in 
 the negotiations in 1761, would be adversely criticised by 
 him. He would spare no concession which he regarded 
 as unnecessary ; and would not be likely to extend much 
 toleration to those who were unwilling or unable to go as 
 far as he did. The hands of Newcastle and Hardwicke 
 were far more tied. Unless they were prepared to endure 
 the charge of the grossest inconsistency, they would be 
 compelled to restrict their criticism to those concessions 
 which had been granted since they left the cabinet. 
 Decency forbade them to attack that which they had 
 formerly advised; and thus, on a question, second to none 
 in importance, they found themselves separated by a deep 
 gulf from an indispensable ally. 
 
 Great as these obstacles were, Newcastle did not 
 abandon hope of persuading Pitt to join the opposition. 
 From fear that the latter might refuse any offer made by 
 Newcastle personally, the Duke of Cumberland was chosen 
 to play the part of mediator. The choice was wise. 
 Cumberland was in the intimate confidence of the whig 
 party 3 ; and Pitt was reported to have spoken warmly in 
 
 1 "If he has any resentment to anybody, I am still persuaded it is 
 primarily to me," wrote Newcastle in October, 1762. Add. MS. 32943, 
 f. 332. 2 See p. 89. 
 
 3 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 124 — 127. 
 
138 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 his favour 1 . A royal duke, however, could hardly begin 
 negotiations with a prominent politician; and it was 
 arranged that Pitt should be informed that Cumberland 
 was willing to give him his opinions on the political 
 situation, should he desire to hear them 2 . This plan was 
 executed through the agency of Thomas Walpole and 
 JSTuthall; and, in conversation with these two men and 
 with Cumberland, Pitt declared himself 3 . He left no 
 doubt of his hostility towards Bute. Again and again he 
 repeated his objections to what he called the favourite's 
 "transcendency of power." He referred to the early 
 days of the reign when he had protested against the 
 proposal that Bute should be given high office; and 
 declared that nothing that had happened since had caused 
 him to alter his opinion. The preliminaries of peace he 
 violently condemned, and referred with no little bitterness 
 to the treatment which the Duke of Devonshire had 
 suffered. Yet, though he held these opinions, and was 
 thus in partial sympathy with the whigs, he refused to 
 contemplate an alliance with them. He described himself 
 as a whig and a believer in the principles of the revolution; 
 but confessed himself under obligations to the tories who 
 had supported him in the past, and refused to concur 
 in any measures of proscription. He elected to stand 
 alone, and though he disclaimed any animosity towards 
 Newcastle, he admitted that he did not wish to see him 
 again at the head of an administration. 
 
 Thus Pitt rejected the offer made him; and, in so 
 doing, helped to establish Bute in power. If he had 
 been willing to overcome his prejudices, and modify his 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32944, f. 206. 
 
 2 Ibid. ; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 148, 149. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32944, f. 277 ; Add. MS. 32945, f. 83 ; Rockingham 
 Memoirs, i. 149 — 151. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 139 
 
 attack upon the preliminaries of peace, an alliance might 
 have been formed, which would have proved decisive for 
 the future history of the country. Memories of the 
 coalition of 1757 would have been evoked by such an 
 union, and the court would have been faced by a party 
 which depended for its strength, not upon parliament, but 
 upon the nation. A divided opposition would never be 
 able to effect anything against an administration which, 
 whatever were its faults, at least presented an united 
 front to its enemies. Pitt chose to stand isolated from 
 those who were ready to enlist under his banner. He 
 would attack the peace, and would gain the applause of 
 the people, incensed by the idea that France had been 
 treated too mercifully 1 ; and the whigs, fighting in the 
 same battle, and on the same side, would stand outnumbered 
 in parliament and unconsidered by the nation. 
 
 It is beyond doubt that by the peace, which was so 
 bitterly attacked, many valuable gains had been acquired 
 for this country. Canada with its dependencies, Senegal, 
 Grenada, Dominica, St Vincent, and Tobago were now 
 English possessions; and Minorca, which had been cap- 
 tured by the French, was restored. The English allies 
 in Germany, with the exception of the king of Prussia, 
 were to receive back those parts of their dominions in the 
 possession of the French; and Spain agreed to abandon 
 her claim to fish off the coasts of Newfoundland, and 
 undertook to cede Florida to England in return for the 
 restoration of Havannah. Yet, substantial as these 
 acquisitions were, it was argued that they had been 
 purchased at too high a price. The French had been 
 
 1 Walpole's Letters, v. 271 — 274 ; Bedford Correspondence, in. 152. 
 Charles Townshend was not in sympathy with the outcry against the 
 ministers. He called the peace "a damned good one." Add. MS. 32945, 
 f. 83. 
 
140 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 granted the right of fishing in the gulf of St Lawrence as 
 well as off Newfoundland ; and the islands of St Pierre 
 and Miquelon had been ceded to them as shelters for their 
 fishing vessels. England restored her important conquests 
 of Guadeloupe, St Lucia, and Belleisle; and though 
 Florida had been ceded by Spain, this was declared to be 
 insufficient compensation for the surrender of such a 
 valuable conquest as Havannah. More serious than any 
 charge of failing to secure the maximum advantage for 
 England, the ministers were accused of treacherously- 
 deserting the cause of the king of Prussia. The pre- 
 liminaries had drawn a distinction between that prince 
 and the other German allies of England, for whereas the 
 French were called upon to restore the lands they had 
 conquered from the latter, they were only asked to 
 evacuate the Prussian territory they occupied, thus leaving 
 it open whether the lands in question were to fall to the 
 Austrians or the Prussians. As a matter of fact, Prussia 
 and Austria concluded peace a few days after the Peace 
 of Paris had been signed, and Frederick regained the 
 territory that the French had conquered ; but this cannot 
 be held to clear the framers of the preliminaries from 
 the taint of treachery 1 . 
 
 Whether Bute was justified or not in concluding peace 
 upon such terms 2 , he and his colleagues were certain to 
 be attacked in parliament for their action. If everybody 
 else remained silent, Pitt would stand forward in de- 
 nunciation. But he would not stand alone, for the whigs 
 
 1 It would appear that some offer was made to restore the conquered 
 territory, to the king of Prussia ; but it is possible that this was not 
 done until peace between Austria and Prussia was certain. Hist. MSS. 
 Comm., 13th Report, Appendix, vn, p. 132. 
 
 2 It is worth noting that even Pitt only committed himself to the 
 statement that the war could have been continued for one year longer. 
 Add. MS. 32945, f. 83. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 141 
 
 were bound to follow in his wake, even against the 
 inclinations of their leaders. Both Hardwicke and New- 
 castle doubted the wisdom of attacking the preliminaries 1 , 
 but they were left with no other alternative. To pursue 
 a policy of inaction would not only widen the breach 
 between themselves and Pitt, but serve to discourage 
 their own followers who would tend to desert to the 
 administration unless they were led into battle. To stand 
 on the defensive is as harassing to politicians as to soldiers; 
 and it might be better to fight a losing battle than not 
 fight at all. The principal members of the whig party 
 met at Newcastle House on December 3rd to decide upon 
 a plan of campaign 2 . Amongst those present was Charles 
 Yorke, a son of Lord Hardwicke, and attorney-general. 
 They met in no spirit of triumph. The failure to conclude 
 an alliance with Pitt had dashed their spirits ; and, which- 
 ever way they turned, failure confronted them. They 
 stood on the eve of the battle, dispirited and disunited. 
 Newcastle, who had by this time made up his mind and 
 determined to take the plunge, pressed for the opposition 
 to attack those parts of the peace most open to criticism, 
 and then move to adjourn. Though warmly supported 
 by Devonshire and Rockingham, his proposal was not 
 sympathetically received by the others present. Hard- 
 wicke only grudgingly assented to the plan, saying that, 
 if Newcastle insisted upon it, he would support it as well 
 as he could. 
 
 This was not a happy omen for the future; and the 
 whigs looked forward to certain defeat. The parliamentary 
 battle over the preliminaries of peace was fought on 
 December 9th and the day following. In the upper house, 
 Newcastle, Hardwicke, and Grafton spoke in condemnation 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32945, f. 166, f. 176, f. 196. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 33000, f. 200. 
 
142 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 of the preliminaries, which, were approved, however, 
 without a division. In the house of commons, Pitt made 
 a speech which lasted more than three hours. He was 
 vehement in denunciation, and, if words could have 
 destroyed, the ministers would not have survived his 
 condemnation of their action. But he held out no helping 
 hand to the whig party. He took his stand as an 
 independent critic, unconnected with any faction; and 
 went out of his way to declare himself a single man 1 . 
 Nor did he refrain from censuring those parts of the 
 peace which had been agreed upon before Newcastle left 
 the cabinet 2 . Applauded by the mob as he left the house, 
 he departed having done nothing to assist those who 
 were struggling in the same cause as himself. While he 
 had displayed his hostility to Bute and his colleagues, he 
 had avoided any demonstration of friendship with New- 
 castle. Nor was Pitt's speech the only unfortunate event. 
 The attorney-general, though he had been present at the 
 meeting of the whig leaders, left the house on the first 
 day without either voting or speaking; and his elder 
 brother, Lord Royston, voted with the government. On 
 the day following, Charles Yorke ventured a mild criticism 
 of the preliminaries, but neutralised any effect his utter- 
 ance might have had by saying that, though he could not 
 vote for the address, he did not intend to vote against it 3 . 
 Newcastle believed that the conduct of the attorney- 
 general and his brother was responsible for the loss of 
 many votes to the opposition 4 . 
 
 1 Grenville Papers, n. 21, 22. 
 
 2 He condemned the surrender of Miquelon, Martinique, and St Lucia. 
 The latter island had not been surrendered to France when Newcastle 
 resigned his ministerial office. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32945, f. 266, f. 312 ; Hist. MSS. Comm. Lothian MSS., 
 p. 245. 
 
 4 Add. MS. 32945, f. 312. For an account of the debates on 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 143 
 
 The administration had won a substantial victory, and 
 could afford to congratulate themselves upon the overthrow 
 of their opponents. On the first day, only sixty-five votes 
 had been given in the house of commons against the 
 peace, and the minority fell to sixty-three when the 
 address was voted on the following day. It was Bute's 
 hour of triumph. The work, which he had set out to do, 
 was almost accomplished. By the aid of Fox, he had 
 carried the peace through parliament ; and the opposition 
 had been routed in the first pitched battle. Unfortunately, 
 Bute permitted himself to abuse the victory he had gained, 
 by allowing a systematic persecution of his opponents to 
 be set on foot, without being able even to plead necessity 
 as his excuse. After what had happened, it was impossible 
 to regard the whigs as formidable opponents, and to make 
 them suffer was, merely, to satisfy a lust for revenge, such 
 as prompts the slaughter of prisoners when the battle is 
 over. 
 
 It was apparently Fox who suggested that punishment 
 should be meted out to those who had dared to oppose 
 the peace 1 . But retribution was to fall, not only on the 
 leaders, but also on their dependents. Men who held 
 offices under the crown, given to them by Newcastle or 
 his friends, were now to be turned out, not for what they 
 themselves had done, but for the sins of their patrons. 
 Fox's suggestion was acted upon without delay; and a 
 political persecution set on foot, which spared neither 
 great nor small. Newcastle, Grafton and Rockingham 
 were dismissed from their lord lieutenancies, dragging 
 with them in their fall many who had done nothing to 
 deserve so hard a fate. Old servants and dependents, 
 
 December 9th and 10th, see Parliamentary History, xv. ; Grafton's 
 Autobiography, pp. 23, 24; Walpole's Memoirs, i. 176, seq. 
 1 Shelburne's Life, i. 179, 180. 
 
144 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 who had retired and been preferred to very small places, 
 were rigorously hunted out and deprived of their live- 
 lihood 1 . Newcastle pathetically confessed that his heart 
 was almost broken by the cruelties inflicted upon "poor 
 innocent men, in order to be revenged on me 2 ." Impartial 
 observers were shocked by the systematic rigour and 
 comprehensive character of the persecution ; and, though 
 excuses were made, as excuses will always be made for 
 every act of iniquity 3 , no arguments could blind men to 
 the fact that innocent men had been called upon to suffer 
 for no sufficient reason. 
 
 Great as was the crime, the blunder was greater still. 
 Left to itself, the opposition might have died in its birth, 
 as indeed it was rumoured that it had 4 ; but, like many 
 a religious sect, it gained fresh life from suffering. It 
 was not the time for those who stood in the same con- 
 demnation to waste their energy in bickering; and 
 the mutual recriminations, which so often follow failure, 
 were hushed in face of the common peril. The breach 
 between Newcastle and Hardwicke, caused by the be- 
 haviour of the latter's sons when the preliminaries 
 were before parliament 5 , was quickly healed; and the 
 ex-chancellor declared that the constitution itself was 
 in danger 6 . Nor was Pitt indifferent to passing events, 
 for, on Christmas Day, the important news reached 
 Newcastle that the great commoner was deeply offended 
 by what had happened, and, though still unwilling to 
 unite with Newcastle, was ready, in the words of the 
 latter, " to act in the house of commons with us upon all 
 
 1 Walpole's Memoirs, i. 184 — 185. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32945, f. 312. 
 
 3 Bedford Correspondence, in. 185 — 188. 
 
 * Walpole's Letters, v. 287—288. 
 
 * Add. MS. 32945, f. 312, f. 323. 6 Add. MS. 32945, f. 335. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 145 
 
 great occasions 1 ." Thus, by his folly, Bute had succeeded 
 in drawing Pitt and Newcastle nearer together. 
 
 Severe as the defeat had been, the whig party had not 
 been destroyed. A serious rebuff had been suffered and 
 a great humiliation endured, but the future was not 
 without hope 2 . And out of evil had come good; for, 
 shocked by the ruthlessness of Bute, Pitt was more in- 
 clined to be friendly with those who had been so severely 
 punished. Eumours were afloat of divisions and dissensions 
 in the ministry. It was said that Bute had grown jealous 
 of the power and predominance acquired by Fox, that 
 George Grrenville intended to resign, and that his example 
 would be quickly followed by Egremont 3 . It was also 
 reported that difficulties had arisen over converting the 
 preliminaries into a final treaty of peace, that Egremont 
 and Grenville were again opposing Bute, and that 
 Lord Egmont, though only joint-postmaster, had been 
 summoned to a cabinet meeting, in order that he might 
 support the first minister against his opponents 4 . What- 
 ever truth there might be in these reports, the negotiations 
 with France had gone too far to be seriously endangered ; 
 and, by the beginning of February, 1763, Bute knew that 
 the final treaty between England, France, and Spain 
 would soon be signed, and that peace would shortly be 
 concluded between Prussia and Austria 5 . On February 10th 
 the Peace of Paris was signed, and Bute had accomplished 
 his task. 
 
 While the ministers had been thus engaged, the whigs 
 had been quiescent but not idle. Withdrawn into their 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32945, f. 362. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32945, f. 289, f. 335 ; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 152, 153. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32945, f. 335, f. 435, f. 460. 
 
 * Add. MS. 32933, f. 73. This letter is misdated by a year. Add. 
 MS. 32946, f. 141, f. 153, f. 159. 
 
 5 Hist. MSS. Comm. 13th Report, Appendix, vn, p. 132. 
 W. 10 
 
146 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 camp, they were preparing for the next sally, and 
 endeavouring to win Pitt over to their side. His more 
 friendly attitude had spurred Newcastle to renewed efforts. 
 He asked both Devonshire and Rockingham to visit Pitt, 
 without whom, he confessed, nothing could be done 1 . 
 Thinking that he might stand in the way of a reconcilia- 
 tion, Newcastle was willing to promise that he would not 
 again take office under the crown 2 ; and this act of 
 renunciation may be taken as a proof of his sincerity. 
 But Pitt remained obdurate, and refused to be won. 
 Though ready to attend parliament "upon any national 
 or constitutional points/' he steadily refused to enter into 
 direct opposition. He declared that he desired to have 
 nothing to do with Lord Bute, but deprecated any 
 proscription of the tories 3 . Newcastle and Devonshire 
 thought that Pitt feared to go into opposition lest he 
 should risk the loss of his pension 4 ; but it is possible to 
 explain his conduct on less ignoble grounds. Newcastle 
 represented the principles of party government. The 
 opposition, which he directed, was to fight as a party, and 
 to prevail as a party. It must present an united front to 
 the enemy; and differences of opinion within its ranks 
 must not be tolerated, or, at least, must be concealed. 
 Pitt was not prepared to bow his head to the yoke. He 
 distrusted Newcastle, and preferred to deal with questions, 
 as they arose, on their merits; and was not willing to 
 pledge himself to oppose every measure introduced by a 
 tory statesman. He desired, as fervently as Newcastle, to 
 drive Bute from power, not because he was a tory, but 
 because he was inefficient. 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32946, f. 249, f. 259. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32946, f. 266, f. 317. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32946, f. 317, f. 329 ; Add. MS. 32947, f. 21. 
 
 4 Add. MS. 32946, f. 317, f. 329. 
 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 147 
 
 Pitt was soon to give an illustration of his independent 
 position and his freedom from party restrictions. Now 
 that the war had come to an end, it was necessary to 
 place the army upon a peace footing; and this question 
 came before parliament early in March. Newcastle and 
 his followers considered the ministerial proposals ob- 
 jectionable in every way 1 ; but it was known that Pitt 
 held an opposite opinion, and intended to support the 
 ministers in parliament 2 . Caution was necessary. If 
 Newcastle carried out his original idea, and put up Legge 
 to attack the ministry, offence might be given to Pitt; 
 and, in order to avoid this, Legge was instructed to " state 
 his own private thoughts, but, out of deference to Mr Pitt, 
 give them up to him 3 ." We do not know whether this 
 plan was executed or not, but we have Newcastle's word 
 that, though Pitt declared himself vehemently in favour 
 of the ministerial measure, the opposition avoided giving 
 him any cause for offence 4 . 
 
 The debate on the army had taken place on March 4th. 
 Three days later, Pitt delivered a violent attack 
 upon the cyder bill, and, in the course of his speech, 
 insulted George G-renville 5 . On the following day, he 
 dined at Devonshire House, in the company of Newcastle, 
 Rockingham, and Hardwicke 6 . Over that meeting hangs 
 a cloud of mystery which will probably never be dispelled. 
 It was understood by contemporaries to have a political 
 significance 7 , and, on March 9th, Lord Temple informed 
 Newcastle " that what he had been about unsuccessfully 
 for six months, viz. the bringing Mr Pitt and us together, 
 
 1 Walpole's Memoirs, i. 193 seq. 2 Add. MS. 32947, f. 163. 
 3 Ibid. 4 Add. MS. 32947, f. 182. 
 
 5 Parliamentary History, xv. 1307 — 1309 ; Bedford Correspondence, 
 in. 218—220 ; Walpole's Memoirs, i. 198. 
 
 6 Harris' Hardwicke, in. 335. 
 
 7 Bedford Correspondence, in. 218 — 220. 
 
 10—2 
 
148 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 is now come about as it were of itself : that nothing 
 could be better 1 ." Rigby noted the cheerful faces of the 
 whigs "since they put themselves under Pitt's manage- 
 ment 2 "; and, two months after the dinner at Devonshire 
 House, Newcastle said " all of us, Mr Pitt and my Lord 
 Temple included, will act a firm part, be inseparable from 
 each other j and never give in to any administration 
 which is not founded and has its basis upon the whigs 
 and the true friends of the protestant succession 3 ." 
 
 It would, therefore, seem that Pitt had drawn nearer 
 to the whigs, and had agreed to conclude some sort of 
 an alliance with them. We know nothing of the terms of 
 the compact, and it is probable that Newcastle believed 
 Pitt to have committed himself more deeply to the oppo- 
 sition than he actually had. Nor is it easy to know what 
 decided Pitt to throw in his lot with the whigs at this 
 particular juncture. It is possible that the conclusion 
 of the Peace of Paris, by removing a question from the 
 sphere of politics on which Newcastle and Pitt were not in 
 agreement, facilitated the union ; and Newcastle's declara- 
 tion, that he would not again take an important ministerial 
 office, may also have contributed to the same end 4 . The 
 nature of the alliance remains unknown. It is clear that 
 Newcastle and his friends imagined that they had secured 
 the support of Pitt, and believed that he was willing to 
 embark upon a career of opposition, and storm the royal 
 closet at the point of the sword ; but it is more than likely 
 that they had formed exaggerated hopes. Ready as 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32947, f. 216. 2 Bedford Correspondence, m. 219. 
 
 s Add. MS. 32948, f. 291. 
 
 4 In October, 1763, Newcastle wrote to Cumberland : " You know, sir, 
 better than anybody, the pains which I have taken to unite us with 
 Mr Pitt. I made a public declaration at first that no consideration 
 should ever make me come into the treasury again." Add. MS. 32952, 
 f. 119. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 149 
 
 he might be to unite with the whigs in opposing the 
 cyder tax, it is unlikely that he would deny the principles 
 which he had so recently laid down, and enter upon a 
 formal opposition to the government. It not infrequently 
 happens that one party in a contract imagines himself to 
 have gained more than he actually has; and it is not 
 improbable that, whilst Newcastle believed that Pitt had 
 become completely identified with the opposition, Pitt 
 regarded himself rather as an independent ally. 
 
 But, when all allowances have been made, it remains 
 certain that Pitt was on more friendly and intimate terms 
 with the whigs than he had been for many months past ; 
 and it is, therefore, not surprising to find the opposition 
 displaying renewed energy and spirit. The cyder bill 
 offered a convenient point for attack. This measure had 
 provoked popular discontent, especially in the cyder 
 counties; and its passage through the lower house was 
 contested by the opposition, if not with success, at least 
 with credit and vigour. On the first reading in the 
 house of commons on March 17th, the minority numbered 
 eighty-eight to the hundred and eighty-four of the govern- 
 ment ' ; but, when the bill was in committee, an amendment, 
 proposing that the tax should fall on the buyers and not 
 on the makers of cyder, was only lost by sixty-nine votes 2 . 
 
 When the bill had been passed by the commons, it 
 was doubtful whether it should be opposed in the house 
 of lords. It is very unusual for the upper house to divide 
 upon a money bill; but the occasion might be held to 
 justify a resort to extraordinary expedients. Those, who 
 were known as the cyder lords, declared their intention of 
 continuing the opposition 3 . Newcastle and Cumberland 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32947, f. 236. 2 Add. MS. 32947, f. 265. 
 
 3 These cyder lords were Lord Foley, Lord Ward, Lord Oxford, Lord 
 Lyttelton, Lord Suffolk, and Lord Fortescue (Add. MS. 32947, f. 313). 
 
150 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 thought that the bill should be allowed to pass through the 
 upper house unopposed 1 ; but the former was influenced by 
 his friends 2 , and by Pitt, to sanction a course of conduct 
 which he did not approve. Pitt was anxious for the 
 attack to continue, and for a protest to be signed by the 
 peers who dissented from the measure 3 ; but the Duke of 
 Cumberland was of an exactly opposite opinion. Newcastle 
 could not afford to offend either Cumberland or Pitt ; but 
 it was difficult to see how he could please them both. He 
 attempted to find safety in a middle course. The cyder 
 bill was opposed in the upper house, and the leaders of 
 the opposition took part in the debate; but to the two 
 protests, which were drawn up, only three signatures were 
 appended 4 . Both Temple and Pitt were aggrieved that 
 the protests had not been more widely signed 5 ; and the 
 abstention of the whig leaders had not been accidental. 
 To please Pitt, Newcastle and his supporters had attacked 
 the bill in the upper house : to please Cumberland, they 
 had refrained from signing the protests. No ill conse- 
 quences apparently resulted from this policy of compromise. 
 Cumberland explained his principles of objection to Pitt, 
 and Grafton contrived to pacify Lord Temple; so that 
 Newcastle could say with truth that he was very happy 
 "at the manner in which we have finished our conduct 
 this session 6 ." Indeed, he had cause for self-congratulation ; 
 for the end had been better than the beginning. The 
 ministry had not been overthrown, but the opposition had 
 succeeded in establishing friendly relations with Pitt, and 
 could look forward with hope to the future. 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32947, f. 319, f. 327. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32947, f. 319. 3 Add. MS. 32947, f. 317. 
 
 4 The first protest was signed by Foley, Oxford and Willoughby de 
 Broke ; the second by Temple, Bolton and Fortescue. 
 
 5 Add. MS. 32947, f. 359. 
 
 « Add. MS. 32947, f. 361 ; Add. MS. 32948, f. 3. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 151 
 
 In the meantime the political situation had been 
 changed by an incident which few could have foreseen 
 — Bute had decided to abandon office. As early as 
 March 11th, Fox was aware of his leader's determination 1 ; 
 and, when the news was published to the world a few weeks 
 later, many explanations were given of conduct so inex- 
 plicable. It was said that Bute had been driven to resign by 
 the popular outcry against the cyder bill ; but it is difficult 
 to believe this, seeing that he must have determined upon 
 resignation either shortly before, or directly after, the in- 
 troduction of that measure. Moreover, the man, who had 
 braved the people's indignation against the Peace of Paris, 
 might be expected to stand his ground over the cyder bilL 
 It has also been suggested that his position was rendered 
 untenable by the alliance between Pitt and Newcastle; 
 but it is equally difficult to accept this view, seeing that 
 only three days elapsed between the earliest date, at 
 which that alliance could have been concluded, and the 
 day on which Fox learnt Bute's intention. It is far more 
 likely that Bute spoke the truth when he said that he had 
 taken office in order to bring the war to a conclusion, and 
 had always intended to retire when that task was accom- 
 plished. He had accepted office unwillingly; and his 
 experience had not been so fortunate as to cause him to 
 forget his earlier prejudices. He had been thwarted, 
 contradicted, and outvoted in his own cabinet 2 . He had 
 
 1 Fitzmaurice's Shelburne, i. 186. 
 
 2 "What treatment," wrote Bute on April 8th, "have I not met 
 with. I allude not to the mere vulgar clamor against me; no, I speak 
 of the interior of government. As a minister of this country, I have 
 seen myself single in a cabinet formed by my own hand. I have very 
 lately been left alone unsupported by any one man in government, tho' 
 opposed to the most violent attacks of the enemy ; and that in parliament, 
 defending the measure of the year ; and only assisted by two of my own 
 faithful friends." Add. MS. 36797, f. 42. 
 
152 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 fallen foul of Grenville, and was probably jealous of the 
 influence and power acquired by Fox. His haughty and 
 pedantic manners had stood in the way of his making 
 friends. He had earned the hatred of the people, and 
 was the target of every pamphleteer and scribbler who 
 wished to attack the government. As long as he remained 
 in power, the king, his master, could never hope to gain 
 the affection of his people; and therefore, now that he 
 had done his work, it was time for him to go 1 . Pitt was 
 probably right when he remarked, on hearing the news, 
 " I think it rather sudden than surprising : Lord Bute's 
 undertaking seeming to me the matter of astonishment, 
 not his lordship's departing from it 2 ." 
 
 But, though Bute had determined to resign the burden 
 of office, he did not intend to make way for those who 
 had opposed him. The system of government, which he 
 had erected, must continue unchanged; and he would 
 have preferred to have remained at the head of the 
 administration, rather than allow the king to fall back 
 into the slavery from which he had rescued him. There 
 must be no interregnum, and, when the world heard that 
 Bute had resigned, it must also learn who was his 
 successor. A place in the administration was offered to 
 Pitt, and refused 3 ; and Henry Fox was tempted with the 
 offer of the post of first lord of the treasury. Fox was 
 willing enough to take up the burden which Bute was 
 preparing to lay down; but his wife pressed him to 
 
 1 Von Ruville's William Pitt, Graf von Chatham, in. 117, 118. 
 "A bad constitution and a want of resolution make him inadequate to 
 a first situation which he gave up after he had fought the battle, and 
 obtained the victory." Add. MS. 22358, f. 22. See also Duten's Memoirs 
 of a Traveller (1806), n. 34. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32948, f. 84. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32949, f. 191 ; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 169. Pitt believed 
 that, if he had accepted the offer, Bute would not have resigned. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 153 
 
 decline, and conjugal affection triumphed over political 
 ambition 1 . Fox's refusal necessitated the prize being 
 given to G-eorge G-renville. It was only with great 
 reluctance that Fox agreed to this arrangement 2 , nor is 
 it likely that the choice was entirely approved by Bute. 
 Grrenville had shown himself obstinate and pertinacious; 
 and had cause to remember the treatment he had suffered 
 at Bute's hands 3 . But there was no one else to fill the 
 vacant place. Fox and Pitt had declined, for different 
 reasons, to fill the breach, and Grenville prevailed through 
 the lack of eligible rivals. His claims were too great to 
 be neglected. When called upon by the king, he had 
 foregone his ambition of becoming speaker, to take upon 
 himself the burden of managing the house of commons, 
 and, though he had done much to cause offence, Bute had 
 no option but to appoint him his successor. If he had 
 been passed over, it is not improbable that the opposition 
 would have received a new recruit. 
 
 Yet, if Grenville was to become first minister, and he 
 was willing enough to take the post, substantial alterations 
 must be made in the administration. His past had not 
 been so blameless as to render it safe to give him 
 unrestricted power; and, therefore, Fox suggested that 
 Shelburne, who was attached to Bute, should be made 
 secretary of state in place of Lord Egremont who should 
 be given the office of lord president of the council, then 
 vacant by Lord Granville's death. In order to win the 
 support of the Duke of Bedford for the reconstructed 
 administration, Lord Gower, a member of the party 
 known as the " Bloomsbury gang," was to be given the 
 
 1 Fitzmaurice's Shelburne, i. 194 — 196. 
 
 2 Fitzmaurice's Shelburne, i. 196 — 199. 
 
 3 Newcastle thought him unsuitable both "as to his ability, and as 
 to his submissive temper." Add. MS. 32948, f. 48. 
 
154 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 admiralty 1 . To these proposals objection was taken by 
 Grenville. He probably resented not being allowed to 
 form the administration which he was to lead 2 ; and 
 protested against the substitution of Shelburne for Egre- 
 mont as secretary of state 3 . Bute, chagrined at Grenville's 
 conduct, hinted that, if he could not accept the stipulated 
 conditions, the treasury might be bestowed elsewhere 4 ; 
 but this was an empty threat, and Egremont was allowed 
 to retain his office. Shelburne was willing to be omitted 
 from the administration altogether, but this Bute would 
 not sanction 5 ; and he was given the office of first 
 commissioner of trade. The admiralty, which Charles 
 Townshend might have had but for his folly, was given 
 to Lord Sandwich 6 . The Duke of Bedford was offered 
 the post of lord president of the council, but declined to 
 become a member of an administration formed on so 
 narrow a basis. Either not understanding the designs of 
 the king, or understanding them only too well, he advised 
 that the whig leaders should be asked to take office 7 ; 
 but war had been declared against the opposition, and 
 Bute stated that the king intended "never upon any 
 account to suffer those ministers of the late reign, who 
 have attempted to fetter and enslave him, ever to come 
 into his service while he lives to hold the sceptre 8 ." 
 
 The resignation of Bute, and the reconstruction of the 
 ministry under the leadership of Grenville, opens a new 
 epoch in the reign of George III. Looking back upon 
 the course of events since the day that he had succeeded 
 
 1 Fitzmaurice's Shelburne, i. 196 — 199. 
 
 2 Grenville Papers, n. 38—40. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid., n. 32, 33. 
 5 Ibid. ii. 40, 41. 6 Walpole's Memoirs, i. 209, 210. 
 
 7 Bedford Correspondence, m. 227 — 230. It was reported that 
 Egremont and Halifax also believed that the administration should be 
 widened. Add. MS. 32948, f. 54. 
 
 8 Bedford Correspondence, in. 224. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF BUTE 155 
 
 his grandfather, the king could contemplate with pleasure 
 and gratification the work he had accomplished. The 
 war had been brought to an end, and the whigs had been 
 driven from office. Bute had triumphed over the enemies 
 of the new system, and those, who had dared to oppose 
 the king's favourite, had met with condign punishment. 
 The royal authority had once more become a political force 
 of no mean importance, and the men, who had tyrannised 
 over George II, found themselves subjected to the tyranny 
 of his grandson. The relative ease, with which this had 
 been accomplished, was doubtless due, in a large measure, 
 to the intimate relations existing between Bute and the 
 king. Genuinely attached to his master, Bute had no 
 ambition save to serve what he thought to be the interests 
 of the crown ; and, as long as he remained at the head 
 of the administration, the king was able effectively to 
 influence and control the decisions of his ministers. Yet, 
 great as the success had been, there was one fatal flaw. 
 Bute had succeeded in much that he had undertaken, but 
 he had completely failed to win the favour of the people. 
 Disliked and distrusted from the beginning, the popular 
 detestation of him had steadily increased in volume, and, 
 as long as he remained in the service of the crown, the 
 king would find the nation arrayed against him. Bute 
 must now retire, in order that the stigma of unpopu- 
 larity, attaching to the court, might be removed, and it, 
 therefore, became necessary to make a new arrangement 
 which would present difficulties of its own. It had been 
 comparatively easy for the king to exercise a controlling 
 influence over the cabinet as long as Bute remained the 
 guiding spirit of that body, but, if his place was taken by 
 one who regarded the king as a master and not as a 
 friend, George III might discover how much he owed his 
 earlier success to the peculiar relations existing between 
 himself and his favourite. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE GRENVILLE MINISTEY. 
 
 When George III consented to appoint Grenville to be 
 Bute's successor, it was not with the intention of sur- 
 rendering himself into the hands of his new prime minister. 
 The latter had not been allowed an unfettered choice in 
 the selection of his colleagues ; nor could he natter himself 
 that he possessed the confidence of the crown in the 
 measure that it had been given to his predecessor. Bute, 
 though he had retired from office, continued to be the 
 king's trusted adviser, and intended to rule England from 
 the royal closet. He had abandoned the political arena, 
 but had not divested himself of his power, and was to play 
 the part of a maker and unmaker of ministers 1 . Though 
 he left London shortly after his resignation, he soon 
 returned ; and, early in June, Lord Rockingham was 
 approached by a friend who told him that the favourite 
 had taken a dislike to the ministers, and was anxious to 
 know whether Pitt and the whigs would come into office 2 / 
 It is true that, a little earlier, Lord Egremont declared that 
 
 1 "Wishing one moment to return to office but the next afraid to 
 take it, he considers every minister as his rival, and the moment he 
 suspects him of standing fair for the favour of his master, it becomes 
 immediately his object to remove him." Dated September, 1765. Add. 
 MS. 22358, f. 22. 
 
 2 Add MS. 32949, f. 52, f. 70. 
 
THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 157 
 
 lie had discovered no trace of Bute's influence, and was 
 prepared to take strong measures upon so doing 1 ; but 
 Newcastle was probably nearer the truth in his surmise 
 that the ministers only held their power on sufferance, 
 and that the late prime minister was the master of the 
 situation 2 . This was the new experiment rendered 
 necessary by Bute's retirement. Compelled to employ 
 those whom he did not trust, the king gave his confidence 
 to the man without a place in the administration. 
 Grrenville and his colleagues were reduced to the in- 
 significant position of stop-gaps. They were to be allowed 
 to remain in office as long as they continued to obey the 
 king, and until more suitable successors could be found. 
 The shadow of Bute still rested upon them ; and, if they 
 struck for independence, it was more than likely that they 
 would find themselves driven from power. 
 
 In any circumstances, succeeding as he did a prime 
 minister who had been the friend as well as the adviser 
 of the king, Grrenville would have had a difficult part to 
 play; and neither by training nor by temperament was 
 he adapted for a delicate situation. Stiff and arrogant in 
 demeanour, touchy of his dignity, and fond of the exercise 
 of power, he was not equipped by nature to act a diplo- 
 matic role. Unduly conscious of his own integrity, he 
 could neither be conciliatory nor ingratiating; and he 
 was the last man who would submit to possess the form 
 without the substance of power. Yet, anxious as he might 
 be to gain ascendency over the king and Bute, his chance 
 of doing so seemed remote. He could not turn for strength 
 to the support of the people. Pitt was still regarded as 
 the only man capable of guiding the destinies of the 
 country, and Grenville's administration was generally 
 
 1 Harris' Life of Hardwicke, in. 350 — 353.; 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32949, f. 338. 
 
158 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 considered to be doomed to a speedy destruction 1 . Nor 
 could he count upon the loyalty of all his colleagues. 
 Sherburne, who held the office of first commissioner of 
 trade, would be likely to sympathise with Bute rather 
 than with Grenville ; and, doubtless because his prejudices 
 in favour of the favourite were well known, he found 
 himself treated with neglect by his fellow ministers, and 
 meditated resignation 2 . Thus, unsupported alike by the 
 crown and by the people, the ministry presented many 
 points of attack, and might be expected to succumb to 
 the first assault, from whatever quarter it was delivered. 
 It is one of the many instances of the fallaciousness of 
 political prophecy that Grrenville, whose destruction seemed 
 so imminent, was to continue in power for more than two 
 years. 
 
 Parliament had risen on April 19th, and was not to 
 meet again until the following autumn. Till then, the 
 ministry could count upon immunity from attack by the 
 opposition ; but, in the early years of the reign of George 
 III, administrations were more often destroyed by court 
 intrigues than parliamentary defeats, and, unless Grenville 
 could secure the good- will of the king, it was not unlikely 
 that, when the autumn came, another than he would be 
 found sitting on the treasury bench. It is possible that it 
 was in the hope of pleasing the king that the ministers 
 waged war upon John Wilkes, for it was known that 
 George III was deeply offended by Wilkes' attack upon 
 the king's speech at the close of the last session of 
 parliament. If they could have foreseen the consequences 
 of a step, seemingly so trivial, they might well have 
 hesitated before beginning a contest which was to exercise 
 a disturbing influence upon English politics for many 
 
 1 Walpole's Letters, v. 312—315 ; Add. MS. 32948, f. 291. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32949, f. 5, f. 338 ; Fitzmaurice's Shelburne, i. 275—277. 
 
THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 159 
 
 years to come, and enable a profligate adventurer to pose 
 as a champion of freedom. Yet, severely as their subse- 
 quent conduct may be censured, they can hardly be 
 blamed for failing to discern that the suppression of a 
 scurrilous opposition writer would produce a ferment of 
 popular excitement, and constitute the principal question 
 of debate during one session of parliament. 
 
 Of Wilkes' private character, probably the less said 
 the better. The companion of Sandwich and Dashwood 
 in their leisure hours, and a distinguished member of that 
 brotherhood, which had its headquarters at Medenham 
 Abbey, and indulged in orgies both obscene and profane, 
 he moved in a society which cultivated vice as an art. 
 But he was not merely a debauched man of fashion, nor 
 did indulgence in his vicious propensities entirely destroy 
 his nobler qualities. He was both brave and generous; 
 and his social tact and charm of manner were sufficient to 
 overcome the stubborn prejudice of Dr Johnson, and to 
 win the approval of Gibbon. Possessed of a brilliant if not 
 always decorous wit, he was the author of one of the most 
 amusing and least delicate repartees in the English 
 language 1 . In politics he was in sympathy with the whig 
 opposition, and had been active in the attack upon Lord 
 Bute and the Scotch. Though possessed of a seat in 
 parliament, he had taken little part in debate ; and it was 
 in his paper, The North Briton, that he delivered his most 
 savage blows against the court and the favourite. It was 
 in this journal that the attack upon the royal speech, at 
 the close of the parliamentary session, had appeared. The 
 king had described the Peace of Paris as " honourable to 
 my crown, and beneficial to my people," and had laid stress 
 
 1 The repartee in question has also been credited to Mirabeau and 
 Foote, the actor. See Lord Brougham's Statesmen of the time of George III 
 (1855), i. 431 ; Duten's Memoirs of a Traveller (1806), v. 26. 
 
160 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 upon the "happy effects which the several allies of my 
 crown have derived from this salutary measure." Wilkes 
 seized the opportunity thus given him. Carefully stating 
 the constitutional doctrine that the king's speech must be 
 considered as the composition of his ministers, he de- 
 scribed it as ". the most abandoned instance of ministerial 
 effrontery, not to be paralleled in the annals of this 
 country." He expressed regret that the king had given 
 the sanction of his name to such mendacious statements, 
 and asserted that Prussia had not been assisted but 
 betrayed by the peace between England and France. 
 The Judas was Bute. " In vain will such a minister," 
 wrote Wilkes, " or the foul dregs of his power, the tools 
 of corruption and despotism, preach up in the speech 
 that spirit of concord, and that obedience to the laws, 
 which is essential to good order. They have sent the 
 spirit of discord through the land, and I will prophesy 
 that it will never be extinguished but by the extinction 
 of their power." 
 
 These were bold words, and, according to the custom 
 of the time, the ministers were justified in proceeding 
 against the man who had uttered them. They could 
 support their action by many precedents, and to leave an 
 attack of such virulence unpunished might easily be 
 construed as weakness. Moreover, if, by the prosecution 
 of an infamous and scurrilous pamphleteer, the good-will 
 of the king could be acquired, a double end might be 
 attained — a troublesome opposition writer would be 
 suppressed, and the ministers' tenure of office rendered 
 more secure. Therefore, three days after the offending 
 number of the North Briton had been published, a general 
 warrant was issued by Lord Halifax, authorising the arrest 
 of the authors, printers and publishers of the journal, and 
 the seizure of their papers. A large number of persons 
 
THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 161 
 
 were arrested under this warrant, and amongst them 
 Wilkes. He was taken before the secretaries of state, 
 and committed a close prisoner to the Tower. In this 
 matter, the ministers had not acted blindly or in ignorance. 
 They were well aware that the arrest of Wilkes would 
 raise the question of the parliamentary privilege of free- 
 dom from arrest ; and, before apprehending him, they had 
 consulted the attorney and solicitor general who gave the 
 opinion that parliamentary privilege did not cover seditious 
 libel. The attorney general, Charles Yorke, before giving 
 his written opinion to the ministers, had submitted it to his 
 father, by whom it was approved 1 ; and that Lord Hard- 
 wicke, with no interest to serve, and certainly with no 
 inclination to smooth the way for the ministers, sanctioned 
 the step that they were about to take, may serve to 
 show that expert legal opinion was not all on one side. 
 But, though it is possible to defend the ministers for 
 arresting Wilkes, it is impossible to excuse many of their 
 subsequent actions. Wilkes was closely imprisoned in the 
 Tower, and the Duke of Grafton and Lord Temple were 
 refused admission to him. The latter moved for a writ of 
 habeas corpus in the court of common pleas, over which 
 Pratt presided ; and it is worthy of note that, in so doing, 
 he pursued an unusual course. " Such a writ," John 
 Yorke informed his brother, " has not been moved in that 
 court since the reign of Charles II 2 ." Temple had not 
 acted without reason. Pratt was his friend, and intimate 
 
 1 "The privilege," wrote Lord Hardwicke to his son, "has been 
 variously laid down, sometimes with an exception of treason, felony, 
 and breach of the peace ; and sometimes of treason, felony, and 
 sureties of the peace. But your report is agreeable to the report made 
 by Sir Thomas Lee in Mr Onslow's case, which you will find entered in 
 the Journal, 20 May, 1675 : Printed Journals, ix. 342." Add. MS. 35353, 
 f. 316 ; see also Add. MS. 35428, f. 1. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 35374, f. 200. 
 
 w. 11 
 
162 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 with Pitt ; and the supporters of Wilkes preferred that he 
 should be tried by Pratt in the common pleas, rather than 
 by Mansfield in the king's bench. Thus, from the outset, 
 politics were mingled with law to the detriment of both. 
 
 On account of something very like chicanery and sharp 
 practice on the part of the ministers, it was found necessary 
 to issue a second writ of habeas corpus to secure the 
 appearance of Wilkes. On May 3rd he was brought to 
 the court of common pleas to stand his trial. He was the 
 hero of the hour, and the popular excitement, in the 
 opinion of one who was present, was comparable to that 
 displayed at the trial of the seven bishops 1 . The city had 
 enthusiastically espoused his cause, and the court was 
 thronged with his supporters 2 . Pratt deferred judgment 
 till May 6th, when he discharged the prisoner on the ground 
 that parliamentary privilege covered every offence save 
 treason, felony, and a breach of the peace ; and a seditious 
 libel, though it might cause the peace to be broken, was 
 not in itself an actual violation of it. The decision was 
 greeted with loud applause. The ministry had suffered a 
 serious and humiliating rebuff, and Wilkes was now 
 doubly dangerous. The discomfort he had endured was a 
 small price to pay for the popularity he had gained. He 
 was now able to pose as the victim of oppression and 
 the champion of freedom; and his native insolence and 
 audacity were stimulated by the knowledge that he had 
 the support of the people. The ministers would have 
 acted wisely in neglecting him ; but, as they had already 
 deeply committed themselves, they resolved to take further 
 measures. Against the advice of Charles Yorke 3 , a 
 prosecution was begun against Wilkes in the court of 
 king's bench; but the latter, standing upon his parlia- 
 
 1 Add. MS. 35353, f. 325. 2 Ibid. 35374, f. 200. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 35430, f. 214 ; Ibid. 35353, f. 327 ; Ibid. 32949, f. 5. 
 
THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 163 
 
 mentary privilege refused to appear. This attempt to 
 overrule Pratt's judgment served no useful purpose, and 
 only contributed to show the vindictiveness of the ministers 
 against the man whom they could have most effectively 
 injured by treating him with indifference. Nor was 
 Wilkes allowed to suffer alone: Lord Temple, who had 
 stood forward as his friend and patron, was summarily 
 dismissed from the lord lieutenancy of Buckingham- 
 shire 1 . 
 
 Wilkes and his fellow victims had been arrested under 
 a general warrant, an expedient of doubtful legality, 
 which, in the opinion of Hardwicke, was justified at least 
 by precedent 2 . Those, who had been arrested, began 
 actions against the messengers who had apprehended 
 them ; and Pratt, in his judicial capacity, declared general 
 warrants to be illegal. These two questions — the extent 
 of parliamentary privilege and the use of general 
 warrants — were to be warmly debated when parliament 
 met in the autumn ; and it might appear, at first sight, 
 that Wilkes had provided the opposition with formidable 
 weapons of attack. The ministers stood convicted of a 
 violation of the law of the land and a breach of one of 
 the most cherished privileges of parliament. The victim 
 of their animosity had risen to the dignity of a popular 
 hero ; and it would seem that the folly of the administra- 
 tion had turned to the advantage of the opposition. This, 
 however, is only partly true. Wilkes was to prove a 
 source of discord amongst those who ought to have stood 
 
 1 Grenville Papers, n. 55. 
 
 2 "I return your grace enclosed the copy of the first warrant, which, 
 whatever objections there may be to it, I believe is the form, which has 
 often been made use of in the office ; perhaps in your grace's own time. 
 My lord chief justice Pratt might probably not be acquainted with it, 
 for I do not remember there was any prosecution for a libell (sic), whilst 
 he was attorney general." Add. MS. 32948, f. 199. 
 
 11—2 
 
164 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 united against the government; and the evil that he 
 wrought was not confined to the circle of his enemies. The 
 innocent were to suffer as well as the guilty, and it would 
 have been better for the whigs if he had never endured 
 martyrdom in the cause of freedom. 
 
 Newcastle and his followers had based their hopes of 
 success upon the support and co-operation of Pitt. They 
 had learnt that without him they could achieve nothing 
 of any consequence; and, at the very moment when he 
 seemed to stand most aloof, he had established friendly 
 relations with the whig party. What Newcastle had 
 schemed and striven for seemed accomplished, and the 
 opposition now numbered the popular hero in its ranks. 
 Pitt, embracing those whom he had formerly shunned, 
 declared that "he had the honour to be united with 
 several great whig lords who, incidentally, passed under 
 the description of the Duke of Newcastle's friends, and 
 were the main pillars of the whig party. That he was a 
 whig, and meant to act upon whig principles 1 ." Such a 
 declaration might well cause joy in the opposition camp, 
 but it was easy to build too much upon it. Though willing 
 to work with the whigs, and boasting of his union with 
 them, Pitt was not prepared to sacrifice his right to an 
 independent opinion, or inclined to compromise, merely 
 for the sake of preserving political union. Though he 
 thought that it was essential for the stability of the 
 government that the king should give office to those who 
 had served his grandfather, and stood by the Hanoverian 
 succession, he did not wish to assist in a party triumph, 
 or lend a hand in the proscription of all tories. He had 
 joined the opposition, but it was on his own terms; and, 
 between him and Newcastle, lay a difference of political 
 
 1 Harris' Hardwiche, in. 361 ; see also Add. MS. 32948, f. 341 ; Ibid. 
 32949, f. 1, f. 338 ; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 169. 
 
THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 165 
 
 opinion which would render harmonious co-operation no 
 slight difficulty. 
 
 Newcastle knew that he had not yet fulfilled his task. 
 Having secured Pitt, it was necessary to keep him; but 
 that would not be easy to do. It would be well, as New- 
 castle saw, that the opposition should agree upon a policy 
 which Pitt approved 1 , but such a policy had still to be 
 discovered. The prosecution of Wilkes, which might 
 have afforded an opportunity of a general attack upon 
 the ministry, promoted discord rather than union in the 
 opposition. Pitt, who asserted that the privileges of 
 parliament had been violated by the arrest of Wilkes, was 
 aggrieved by the support that Hardwicke had given to the 
 attorney general; and declared that " he would never ally 
 himself with so-called whigs who were willing to surrender 
 the liberty of the subject and the freedom of the press 2 ." 
 Against Charles Yorke he was particularly prejudiced. 
 Yorke had offended by supporting and approving the 
 prosecution of Wilkes ; but the cause of Pitt's dislike lay 
 deeper than that. As a distinguished lawyer, and the son 
 of a famous chancellor, it was not unnaturally Charles 
 Yorke's ambition to occupy the seat which his father had 
 adorned, and Lord Hardwicke, a fond and affectionate 
 parent, was equally anxious to see his son gain the 
 greatest prize of the legal profession. Newcastle was, 
 undoubtedly, willing enough to satisfy the ambition of the 
 son of his old friend ; but Pitt had made up his mind that 
 Pratt should be chancellor before Yorke 3 , and was not 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32948, f. 99. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32950, f. 65. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32950, f. 65. " Mr Pitt then entered further into his 
 own grievance, and his apprehension of playing a solo with my Lord 
 Temple.... He said to me, if I am so necessary as you all tell me I am, 
 why should there be any difficulty in giving me proper support in the 
 formation of the ministry and council. If I am in this desperate situa- 
 
166 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 likely to give way to the arguments of Newcastle or 
 Hardwicke. 
 
 Such were the difficulties which had to be overcome 
 before the alliance between Pitt and the Newcastle party 
 was firmly cemented ; but, even if an understanding had 
 been reached on these points, all would not be accomplished. 
 The sacrifice of Yorke's ambitions and of Hardwicke's 
 reputation as a lawyer would be unavailing if Pitt refused 
 to sanction or arrange any definite plan of opposition. 
 Newcastle, with the insight of an old parliamentary 
 warrior, saw that without a programme the opposition 
 would quickly be wrecked : a banner must be raised, 
 round which men could rally. "Talking at large," he 
 shrewdly remarked, "will no longer do": Pitt must 
 be brought to the point, and forced to declare what 
 measures he would support, and what measures he would 
 oppose 1 . 
 
 It was never easy to bring Pitt to the point, and 
 Newcastle was unable to do it. He had two conferences 
 with Pitt in the early part of August, and confessed him- 
 self disappointed in the result 2 . Pitt was friendly enough, 
 and showed no wish to sever his connection with the whig 
 party ; but he talked in a tone of despair, and lamented the 
 impossibility of achieving anything against the opposition 
 of the crown. He raised objections to the idea of Charles 
 Yorke becoming chancellor, asserted his difference of 
 opinion with Lord Hardwicke, and hinted at a dislike of 
 the influence exercised by the Duke of Cumberland over 
 
 tion to answer for everything, is it unnatural in me to desire that the 
 great seal may he put into the hands of a friend of mine, especially 
 when that friend was attorney general, and is now lord chief justice of 
 the common pleas, which gives him the rank over everybody ? " New- 
 castle to Devonshire, August 11th, 1763. Ibid. 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32949, f. 386. 
 
 2 Ibid. 32950, f. 65. 
 
THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 167 
 
 the whig party 1 . He seemed to fear that he and Temple 
 might enter npon a course of opposition, only to be 
 deserted by their allies at the critical moment. Newcastle 
 learnt nothing of the line of action that Pitt would take, 
 and failed to gain the programme of opposition that he 
 wanted. 
 
 Thus matters stood in the month of August 1763. The 
 situation was dangerous, but it was certainly far from 
 hopeless. Newcastle never wavered in his conviction that 
 the co-operation of Pitt was essential to the success of the 
 opposition 2 ; and, if the latter's objections to Hardwicke 
 and Yorke could be overcome, and his prejudice against 
 an organised opposition removed, all might yet go 
 smoothly. Neither the king nor the ministers were un- 
 mindful of the dangers that confronted them. The ad- 
 ministration was narrow and confined, and the popularity, 
 which might have been acquired by the retirement of 
 Bute, had been forfeited by the prosecution of Wilkes. 
 The court and cabinet might easily succumb to an united 
 attack of the opposition led by Pitt, and the king obliged 
 to submit to terms dictated by his victorious enemies. 
 Real as the danger was, it appeared possible to escape 
 it. It was within the power of the crown to use the arts 
 of political seduction, and break up the opposition by con- 
 ferring office upon its leading members. It was an age 
 when party ties sat lightly upon men; and it is to the 
 credit of Pitt and the whigs that the king failed. It shows 
 that their union, as far as it went, was real, that, however 
 divided they might be in opinion, they were ready to 
 
 1 He complained that Cumberland favoured an alliance with Austria 
 in preference to an alliance with Prussia. Newcastle assured him that 
 Cumberland was in favour of England being connected with both 
 countries. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32950, f. 162. 
 
168 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 stand by one another when it came to treating with the 
 crown. 
 
 The first member of the opposition to receive an offer 
 from the court was Lord Hardwicke. Approving as he 
 did of the arrest of Wilkes, and having a son a member of 
 the administration, it might be thought that he would not 
 be unwilling to accept office. He was visited on May 13th 
 by Lord Egremont who hinted at a ministerial office, but 
 made it perfectly clear that the offer was to Hardwicke 
 alone. Pitt and Temple had offended the king too deeply 
 to be easily forgiven, and Newcastle was almost equally 
 objectionable 1 . Though Hardwicke refused to desert his 
 friends, he was again visited by Egremont a month later ; 
 but on this occasion the latter was far more vague in his 
 conversation, and, apparently, far less anxious for success. 
 The difference in the tone adopted by the secretary of 
 state may have been due to the fact that he regarded the 
 enterprise as hopeless, but it is also possible that, in sound- 
 ing Hardwicke, he was not acting in accordance with 
 his own wishes or those of his colleagues, but executing 
 the orders of the king. Bute was probably anxious to 
 strengthen the administration, and diminish the influence 
 of Grrenville and Egremont 2 ; and it is at least certain that 
 when the latter visited Hardwicke for the third time on 
 August 1st, to offer him the presidency of the council, it 
 was against his own will, and in obedience to the royal 
 commands 3 . This third attempt met with no greater 
 success than its predecessors. Though the promise was 
 made that Newcastle should be given one of the great court 
 offices, nothing was said about Pitt, and the intention was 
 clearly to exclude him. Hardwicke was too experienced 
 a politician to fall into the trap prepared for him; and, 
 
 1 Harris' Hardwicke, in. 350—353, 369. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32949, f. 70. 3 Grenville Papers, n. 191. 
 
THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 169 
 
 though he did not mention Pitt's name, he made it 
 perfectly plain that neither Newcastle nor he would take 
 office without him 1 . 
 
 Trifling and futile as these negotiations may appear, 
 their importance is not inconsiderable. They show that 
 the king was dissatisfied with his administration as it 
 was; and, though his endeavours to win the support of 
 Hardwicke had ended in failure, they had not been 
 uninstructive. George III had acquired information which 
 would influence his future actions. He now knew that it 
 was impossible to gain either Newcastle or Hardwicke 
 without Pitt, but he did not yet know that it was im- 
 possible to gain Pitt without Newcastle. He was deter- 
 mined to effect some alteration in the administration. He 
 had grown weary of the ministers who had mistaken the 
 conditions upon which they had come into power. Their 
 claim to be independent of Bute, who had allotted to them 
 the posts which they occupied, was not to be tolerated. 
 Moreover, as the ministry was unpopular in the country, 
 and threatened by what might prove to be a formidable 
 opposition, it is not surprising that the king thought of 
 transforming it. But his search for recruits had not been 
 successful, and if he was to drive out his present ministers, 
 leaving himself at the mercy of the whig party, his last 
 state might be worse than the first. If he fretted under 
 the rule of George Grenville, he was not likely to enjoy 
 greater freedom under a coalition ministry of Pitt and 
 Newcastle. He seemed driven into a course from which 
 escape was impossible, and spent the month of August in 
 trying, with Bute's assistance, to find a way out of a 
 difficulty which was largely of his own making. 
 
 The king and his favourite could not expect any 
 
 1 Grenville Papers, n. 191 ; Harris' Hardwicke, in. 369 — 372 ; Add. 
 MS. 32950, f. 1, f. 16, f. 43. 
 
170 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 assistance in this task from the ministers. Grenville and 
 his colleagues left them to follow their own devices, in the 
 hope that, failing to form an administration in accordance 
 with their wishes, and fearing to entrust the crown to the 
 opposition party, they would return to them humble and 
 contrite 1 . There was one traitor in the cabinet, and that 
 was Shelburne. True to the role for which he had been 
 cast, he' was willing to serve the court against his col- 
 leagues, and it was to him that the king turned for help. 
 Newcastle and Hardwicke had excluded themselves by 
 their own act from the royal consideration ; and negotia- 
 tions were begun with Bedford and Pitt. This was either 
 a desperate venture or a leap in the dark. Bedford was 
 prepared to join the administration, and ready to serve 
 with Pitt; but he was violently hostile to Bute, and 
 refused to take office unless the latter was banished from 
 the court and political life. In proscribing Bute, Bedford 
 proscribed himself. It was Grenville's great offence that 
 he objected to the political influence exercised by the 
 favourite, and the Duke of Bedford, by showing that he 
 was in sympathy with Grrenville on this point, rendered 
 himself ineligible for office. But if Bedford objected to 
 Bute, Pitt objected to Bedford. The latter had been 
 closely connected with the Peace of Paris, and Pitt refused 
 to sit at council with the man who had signed so nefarious 
 a treaty 2 . Nor was Bedford alone condemned: Lord 
 
 1 Grenville Papers, n. 83—88. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32951, f. 192 ; Fitzmaurice's Shelburne, i. 288. Bedford 
 was not informed at the time that Pitt had objected to him, the latter's 
 refusal being attributed to his connection with the whig party, though 
 apparently this was not mentioned. (Bedford Correspondence, in. 236, 
 237 ; Fitzmaurice's Shelburne, i. 287.) For a general account of the 
 negotiations, see Fitzmaurice's Shelburne, i. 283 — 288 ; Grenville Papers, 
 n. 90—92, 204, 205; Bedford Correspondence, in. 236—240; Add. MS. 
 32950, f. 65 ; Ibid. 32951, f. 192. 
 
THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 171 
 
 Grower and Lord Sandwich, who would be certain to be 
 given office in an administration influenced by Bedford, 
 were equally proscribed. 
 
 Failure had again attended the efforts of the king, 
 but he had acquired additional information which he 
 could put to an useful purpose. The Duke of Bedford was 
 now out of the question, and thus the obstacle, which had 
 stood in the way of Pitt's acceptance, was removed. He 
 might now be willing to give a more favourable hearing 
 to an offer from the king, but it still remained uncertain 
 what conditions he would impose. There was a danger 
 that he would demand, as the sine qua non of his 
 acceptance, that the leading members of the opposition 
 should be given places in the cabinet and ministry. The 
 king must have been aware by this time of the intimate 
 relations between Pitt and the whigs; but the silence, 
 which Pitt had maintained on this point, may have given 
 birth to the hope that it was possible to separate him 
 from his allies. The king found himself in a position 
 from which advance or retreat was almost equally 
 dangerous. To abandon the intention of changing the 
 administration would be a confession of failure, and only 
 serve to establish the authority of Grenville over the 
 crown. To appeal once more to Pitt would be venture- 
 some and dangerous, and might result in the return of 
 the latter to power at the head of an united party, pledged 
 to diminish the royal authority, and to undo the work 
 which had been achieved since the beginning of the 
 reign. Against the certain evil of continuing to endure 
 George Grenville, the king had to weigh the dangers 
 involved in an appeal to Pitt. Called upon to make a 
 decision, which could not fail to have important results, he 
 had every excuse for hesitation; and when on August 21st 
 he told Grenville that he did not wish to change his 
 
172 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 ministry but rather to strengthen it, he may have been 
 speaking in absolute sincerity 1 . 
 
 But on that very day Lord Egremont died, and, by 
 his death, precipitated a political crisis, thus accomplishing 
 more than he had ever performed in his lifetime. It was 
 impossible for the cabinet to continue to exist in a maimed 
 and crippled condition, without a president of the council 2 , 
 and with only one secretary of state. It was imperative 
 that new ministers should be appointed, but, if Grrenville 
 was allowed to nominate them, his hold upon the govern- 
 ment would be materially strengthened, and the royal 
 authority sensibly restricted. It was better to run many 
 •risks than to submit to the tyranny of Grrenville ; and, 
 unable to look for help elsewhere, the king, at this crisis 
 of his fortunes, turned for assistance to Pitt. 
 
 The great commoner seemed to command the situation, 
 but no one could say how he would use the advantage 
 he possessed. He stood in alliance with Newcastle and 
 Hardwicke who had been faithful to him when they had 
 been approached by the king; and he was not likely to 
 be so callously indifferent to party ties as to be unmindful 
 of his whig friends. But how far that loyalty would 
 carry him, whether it would compel him to demand the 
 construction of a purely whig administration which would 
 place the monarchy once more in leading strings, could 
 not be known until he had declared himself. The happiest 
 solution would be a compromise, by which Pitt satisfied 
 the most pressing claims of his political allies, and the 
 king escaped the danger of being handed over a prisoner 
 to the whig oligarchy, flushed with triumph and burning 
 for revenge. It was in the hope that some such arrange- 
 
 1 Grenville Papers, n. 193. 
 
 2 Lord Granville, the president of the council, had died in the previous 
 January. 
 
THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 173 
 
 merit would be found possible, that the king took up the 
 negotiation 1 . On the evening of August 25th Bute and 
 Pitt spent three hours in conversation together; but of 
 what passed we know nothing 2 . Pitt, however, must have 
 made a favourable impression, for the king summoned 
 him to an audience on August 27th. 
 
 The conversation between the king and Pitt on 
 August 27th was followed by another, two days later. 
 The accounts of these meetings, which have survived, were 
 all compiled after the second interview ; and, therefore, 
 it is not improbable that events have been transposed 3 . 
 This is unfortunate, inasmuch as it increases the difficulty 
 of assigning a cause for the failure of the negotiation; 
 but it would seem reasonable to imagine that the most 
 important questions were discussed at the first meeting. 
 Called upon to take office, Pitt was not prepared to desert 
 Newcastle and his followers. He assured the king that 
 he could only come into his service accompanied by the 
 representatives of "the great whig families and persons 
 which had been driven from his majesty's council and 
 service, which it would be for his interest to restore 4 ." 
 Hardwicke was to be lord president 5 , the Duke of Devon- 
 shire to be restored to his former post of lord chamberlain 6 , 
 Newcastle to receive the privy seal 7 , and Lord Rockingham 
 
 1 Grenville Papers, n. 195, 196. 
 
 2 Pitt asserted that he clearly explained to Bute his opinions, both in 
 regard to the distribution of offices and the policy to be pursued ; but the 
 latter always denied this (Grenville Papers, ir. 195). 
 
 3 It is true that the king saw Grenville on Sunday, August 28th, and 
 gave him a general account of what had happened on the previous day ; 
 but Grenville did not learn any particulars until Monday evening 
 (Grenville Papers, n. 197, note). 
 
 4 Harris' Hardwicke, in. 378 ; Add. MS. 32950, f. 251, f. 321. 
 
 5 Harris' Hardwicke, in. 375. 
 
 6 Add. MS. 32951, f. 101. 
 
 7 Ibid. 32951, f. 301. 
 
174 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 to be first lord of the admiralty 1 . Either Albemarle or 
 Lord Grranby was to be placed at the head of the army 2 , 
 and Pitt and Charles Townshend were to be secretaries of 
 state 3 . In such an administration, the whig party would 
 be well represented, and Pitt might feel that, having 
 done his duty towards his allies, he could afford to indulge 
 his own inclinations, and consider the prejudices of the 
 king. When the latter asked that Oswald and Elliot, 
 two of Bute's earliest supporters, should be allowed to 
 retain their places in the administration, Pitt gave a low 
 bow to signify his assent, and further agreed that Welbore 
 Ellis should again have the post of vice-treasurer of 
 Ireland 4 . It was, doubtless, equally pleasing to the king 
 that Lord Shelburne was to be allowed to retain his place 
 at the board of trade 5 . 
 
 The retention of Lord Shelburne, and the admission of 
 certain of Bute's supporters into the subordinate offices, 
 serve to show that Pitt did not see absolutely eye to eye 
 with his whig friends. He had acted consistently with 
 his declaration that the great political families should 
 be well represented in any ministry, but he was not 
 anxious to make himself the hero of a party victory, or 
 preclude men from serving the crown because of their 
 political connections. But, though friendship with Bute 
 was not to be a bar to a place in the administration, and 
 a party was not to be proscribed as the tories had been at 
 the time of the Hanoverian succession, Pitt was deter- 
 mined that all those who had participated in the making 
 of the Peace of Paris should be excluded from high 
 ministerial office. He bluntly told the king that he 
 "never could or would act with any minister who had 
 a hand" in the peace 6 . By this declaration, Halifax, 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32950, f. 312. 2 Ibid. 32951, f. 192. ? Ibid. i. 301. 
 4 Ibid. f. 101, f. 192. 5 Ibid. f. 301. 6 Ibid. f. 192. 
 
THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 1 75 
 
 Bute, Bedford, and G-renville were excluded from the 
 effective cabinet 1 . Against the Duke of Bedford, Pitt 
 displayed a special animus, for when the king asked that 
 the duke might be given some office, though not a 
 ministerial one, the request was refused without hesitation 2 . 
 He also declined to serve with Lord Mansfield, and re- 
 quired that Pratt should be created a peer, and given 
 a seat in the cabinet council 3 . 
 
 In regard to the measures which Pitt proposed to 
 support, should he again take office, our information is 
 more scanty. He was not in favour of the destruction 
 but rather of the amendment and preservation of the 
 recent treaty with France; and was anxious to curb 
 the predominance of the Bourbon powers in Europe by 
 an alliance between England and Prussia 4 . He did not, 
 as far as we know, touch upon domestic politics in his 
 conversation with the king, an omission which obviated 
 the danger of a disagreement over the question of Wilkes. 
 Amidst much that is doubtful, it is at least certain that, 
 when Pitt left the king on August 27th, he felt confident 
 of success. He visited Newcastle on the following day, 
 and letters were despatched, summoning the whig leaders 
 to town 5 . The hopes of Newcastle and his followers ran 
 high : it seemed that, once more, they were to enjoy the 
 delights of office, and prevail over those who had striven 
 to banish them from political life. Disillusionment and 
 disappointment were speedily to follow. When Pitt 
 visited the king on Monday, August 29th, he encountered 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32951, f. 192. Pitt was apparently willing to allow either 
 Grenville or Halifax to have the office of paymaster of the forces, but 
 this post did not confer the right of sitting in the inner cabinet (Add. 
 MS. 32951, f. 301 ; Harris' Hardwicke, in. 375—382). 
 
 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. ; Add. MS. 32952, f. 1. 
 
 4 Harris' Hardwicke, in. 375 — 382 ; Grenville Papers, n. 197 — 201. 
 
 5 Add. MS. 32950, f. 251 ; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 171. 
 
176 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 a reception very different from that which he had 
 expected 1 . The interview was brief and far less satis- 
 factory 2 . The king had changed his mind since Saturday: 
 what he had then been ready to yield, he was now un- 
 willing to grant. He did not so much state particular 
 objections as display a spirit of general opposition; and 
 brought the interview to an end by abruptly remarking 
 "Well Mr Pitt, I see this won't do. My honour is 
 concerned, and I must support it 3 ." 
 
 Thus, when everything seemed to promise success, the 
 negotiation was broken off, and men have wondered till 
 the present time as to the cause of failure. The cloud 
 of mystery, which invests the transactions of these few 
 days, will never, probably, be absolutely dispelled. It is 
 certain that both the king and Pitt were anxious to come 
 to an understanding. The former had every inducement 
 to yield, as far as possible, to Pitt's demands. He was 
 on bad terms with his ministers, and had taken in hand 
 the transformation of the administration against their 
 will. Should failure attend his efforts, he would be more 
 helpless than he had ever been before, and G-renville 
 would be in a position from which he could dictate to his 
 sovereign. That Pitt was willing and anxious to take 
 office cannot be doubted. Inspired by no selfish lust 
 of power, he was desirous of coming to the rescue of the 
 country which he thought to be falling from that proud 
 preeminence, to which he had raised her. He was willing 
 to forget the many slights and insults he had suffered, 
 and serve once more the king who had driven him from 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32950, f. 298. 
 
 2 Pitt described the meeting as lasting about an hour ; Hardwicke 
 gave the time as nearly two hours (Harris' Hardwicke, in. 375 — 382 ; 
 Add. MS. 32950, f. 298). 
 
 3 Harris' Hardwicke, in. 380. 
 
THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 177 
 
 his council. This eagerness in both Pitt and the king, 
 to arrive at a common understanding, adds to the difficulty 
 of accounting for their failure to do so. Different and 
 conflicting causes have been assigned for what seems so 
 inexplicable, but, in the various accounts of the negotiation 
 which have survived, it is easier to be certain of what 
 is false than of what is true. It has been said that the 
 negotiation failed because, at his second interview with 
 the king, Pitt materially increased his demands, and the 
 former found himself unable to grant what was asked. 
 This statement, though it rests upon the unsupported 
 word of George III 1 , is sufficiently plausible to deserve 
 discussion. On the day between his two meetings with 
 the king, Pitt had been with the Duke of Newcastle, and 
 it could easily be believed that the latter had induced 
 him to make demands, on behalf of the whig party, which 
 the king could not possibly fulfil. But there is no 
 evidence that Newcastle was guilty of this blunder, and 
 it is extremely unlikely thafc Pitt would have allowed 
 himself to be influenced by a man whom he may 
 occasionally have tolerated, but never could have liked. 
 Moreover, on the same day that Pitt was with Newcastle, 
 the king told Grrenville that he had decided to break off the 
 negotiation 2 , and therefore, if Pitt showed himself more 
 exacting on the following day, it could only have served 
 to confirm the king in a decision which he had already 
 taken. 
 
 It has also been said that the king was offended by 
 the demand that the new administration must be pre- 
 dominantly whig 3 . It was rumoured that when he learnt 
 that those, whom he had treated so badly, were to be his 
 ministers once again, he shrank from entrusting power to 
 
 1 Grenville Papers, n. 201. 2 Ibid. 197—201. 
 
 3 Ibid. 197—201. 
 
 12 
 
178 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 men who had so much to forgive, and so little reason 
 to be forgiving. It has been plausibly argued that the 
 formation of a whig ministry would undo all that 
 George III and Bute had so laboriously achieved. The 
 crown would once more be divested of all authority which 
 would be transferred to the hands of the whig oligarchy. 
 Once again, the principles of party government would 
 be enforced; and the king obliged to choose as his 
 servants only those whom Newcastle and his followers 
 approved. No one would deny that G-eorge III was 
 unwilling to put himself in the situation in which his 
 grandfather had been at the close of his reign; but it 
 may fairly be argued that the administration, as Pitt had 
 sketched it, though predominantly, was not to be ex- 
 clusively whig. Though all who had assisted to make 
 the Peace of Paris were denied ministerial office, no 
 proscription was placed upon the tories as a party. There 
 was to be no rout of Bute's friends, no counterblast to 
 the attack upon the opposition in the autumn of 1762 H 
 Neither Charles Townshend nor Pitt can be described 
 as representative of the whig oligarchy, but they were 
 to be the secretaries of state in the new administration; 
 and, though Newcastle, Hardwicke and Devonshire were 
 to be given office, the king had not objected to receiving 
 them again in his service 2 . It would be to the interest of 
 Pitt to represent that his loyalty to his whig allies had 
 been the cause of his undoing, but that he never did. 
 " He never insinuated/' wrote Newcastle, "that his 
 negotiation miscarried, or that the difficulty arose, from 
 any objection made to any of the persons who were named 
 to his majesty 3 ." 
 
 1 Pitt ' ' insisted only upon ten in the house of commons who had 
 been turned out." (Add. MS. 32951, f. 192.) 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32951, f. 192. » Ibid. 
 
 
THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 179 
 
 According to another theory, the rock of offence was 
 the nomination of Lord Temple as first lord of the 
 treasury. This was a story busily circulated by the 
 followers of Grrenville 1 , and was likely enough to be 
 readily believed. The king had no cause to love Temple 
 who had caused great offence by his patronage of Wilkes, 
 but, however credible the story may superficially appear, 
 it does not stand the test of investigation. Pitt declared 
 that it was the king who suggested Lord Temple for the 
 treasury 2 ; and there is no reason to doubt his word. He 
 had no interest to serve in misrepresenting the king 
 in this particular; and greater importance must be 
 attached to his statement than to what was at best but 
 a rumour. 
 
 In the face of so much confusion and so many contra- 
 dictions, it is impossible to do more than advance a theory 
 to account for the failure of the negotiation. A few days 
 after his interviews with the king, Pitt informed Hardwicke 
 that he could not understand the mishap 3 , but, some time 
 later, he expressed the opinion that the responsibility 
 rested with Bute 4 . From another source, Newcastle 
 learnt that the king had refused to come to terms with 
 Pitt because the latter declined to defend the peace and 
 Bute 5 ; and, according to Grrenville, the favourite became 
 frightened at the consequences of Pitt's return to power, 
 and had brought pressure to bear upon the king to break 
 off the negotiation 6 . Thus both Pitt and Grrenville agreed 
 in believing that Bute had played an influential and 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32952, f. 1. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32951, f. 301 ; Ibid. 32952, f. 1 ; Harris' Hardwicke, in. 
 375—382. 
 
 3 Harris' Hardwicke, in. 375—382. 
 
 i Add. MS. 32951, f. 192. 5 Ibid. f. 94. 
 
 6 Grenville Papers, u. 197—201. 
 
 12—2 
 
180 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 decisive part, and there is some reason to think that they 
 were correct in their surmise. Bute had genuine cause 
 for alarm. Pitt had displayed a very strong animus 
 against the peace, and had refused to admit into the 
 inner cabinet any man who had helped to make what 
 he regarded as a shameful treaty. It may be said that 
 Bute, inasmuch as he had retired from the ministry, and 
 was not prepared to take office again, would be unaffected 
 by this proscription; but this is not exactly true. If 
 Pitt's demands were fulfilled, a ministry would be formed, 
 the effective portion of which consisted of those who had 
 no share in making the peace with France. There was 
 a real danger that the accession of Pitt to power might 
 encourage a popular and parliamentary attack upon the 
 men who were commonly supposed to have sacrificed the 
 country ; and he certainly would not lift a hand to save 
 them from destruction. The days, when Bolingbroke and 
 Oxford had trembled for their heads, were not so very 
 distant, and Bute was not prepared to place himself in 
 a similar predicament. He had no illusions as to the 
 hatred he had incurred, or the mercy he might expect, 
 and he was not guilty of exaggerated alarm if he felt 
 that, with Pitt in power, he could no longer count upon 
 safety in England. To save his favourite from the danger 
 which threatened him, George III threw away the oppor- 
 tunity of giving the country a settled government by 
 restoring to office the greatest statesman of his age. The 
 greatness of England was weighed in the balance against 
 the security of a Scotch nobleman, and was found 
 wanting. 
 
 It may be urged against the truth of this theory that 
 the king had known for many months past what Pitt 
 thought of the peace; and that the latter, in the course 
 of his conversations with the king, displayed no greater 
 
THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 181 
 
 antagonism to that measure than he had shown on 
 previous occasions. This is doubtless true, but the ground 
 of Bute's alarm was not Pitt's hostility to the peace, but 
 his refusal to give any of those, who had taken part in 
 making it, a ministerial office. An inner cabinet would be 
 constructed, of which no member could be accused of 
 having sacrificed the welfare of England : and, therefore, 
 the ministers would be able to allow a parliamentary 
 inquiry with perfect safety. It is difficult to understand 
 why the king pressed the claims of the Duke of Bedford, 
 who had so recently displayed animosity against the 
 favourite, except it was done to insure that one member 
 of the administration, if not of the cabinet, should be 
 a partner with Bute in guilt. 
 
 It may also be objected that to reject Pitt, and to turn 
 again to George Grrenville, would by no means better 
 Bute's position. The Scotch earl had sinned too deeply to 
 be forgiven by Grrenville, amongst whose virtues cannot be 
 numbered generosity. It was certain that the triumph of 
 Grrenville would mean a sensible diminution of Bute's 
 political influence; but it would also be a safeguard 
 against a parliamentary inquiry into the Peace of Paris. 
 In the eyes of the law, Grrenville was partly responsible for 
 the treaty with France; and, as long as he remained in 
 power, Bute could count upon security. The tide of 
 popular indignation against the treaty would certainly 
 subside as time went on, and the attention of men was 
 directed elsewhere ; and the king would not be obliged 
 always to endure Greorge Grrenville for fear of greater 
 evils. When the memories of the peace had faded in 
 men's minds, the king's day of emancipation would have 
 come 1 . 
 
 1 In a document, dated " about 1766," an account is given of the 
 negotiation which supports the theory advanced in the text. " Mr Gr. G. 
 
182 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 If this theory be correct, and it cannot be stated as 
 more than a theory, George III and Bute arrived at a 
 momentous decision on Sunday, August 28th. If Pitt was 
 allowed to form an administration, Bute might be called 
 upon to meet a parliamentary inquiry into his conduct, 
 and if Grenville was continued in power, the favourite's 
 political influence would be destroyed. A statesman, 
 willing to put his fate to the touch, would have chosen the 
 first alternative : Bute ingloriously adopted the second. 
 He allowed the man, against whom he had schemed and 
 intrigued, to triumph j and the doom, he might have 
 counted upon, was quick to come 1 . One of the first 
 
 was made first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer, 
 April 16th, 1763, by the Earl of Bute's influence. In less than one month 
 after his appointment to these offices, he gave umbrage to the Earl of 
 Bute who had placed him in this high station. The Earl's jealousy was 
 increased by an indiscreet letter which he received from Sir John Phillips, 
 who delivered it as his opinion that Mr G. would abridge his influence. 
 Lord Bute complained to one of his particular friends that Mr G. had 
 proscribed him, and his conduct proved that he wished to remove him. 
 In the month of August, 1763, Lord Bute advised the king to change his 
 ministers, and recommended to his M — y to send for Mr Pitt who was 
 very violent against all those who were concerned in making the peace, 
 and insisted upon excluding them from H.M.'s service. The conference 
 between the king and Mr Pitt was reported to Lord B., who was at a loss 
 to form an administration, and upon advising with Sir Gilbert Elliot and 
 Mr Jenkinson, he wrote a line to the king, wherein he said that, upon 
 consulting two of his best friends, he thought it would be for his service 
 to continue Mr G. in his employment. Whereupon the k. sent for 
 Mr G. and gave him the strongest assurances of his protection ; but 
 Lord B. certainly intended his dismission whenever a favourable occasion 
 should offer. Mr G. would in all probability have been dismissed from 
 his employment upon the close of the session in the spring of the year 
 1764, had it not been necessary for him to continue in office till the 
 affairs relative to the North Britain and Wilkes were determined, and, as 
 this was an unpopular business, Lord B. had no objection to its falling 
 upon Mr G." (Add. MS. 34713, f. 277.) 
 
 1 There is a piece of evidence, which, as it does not fit in with the 
 theory stated above, ought to be mentioned. About the middle of 
 
THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 183 
 
 demands that Grenville made, when he learnt that he was 
 to be continued in office, was that the secret influence, as 
 he termed it, should cease; and the king, understanding 
 the allusion, assured him that Bute had " desired to retire 
 absolutely from all business whatsoever, that he would 
 absent himself from the king for a time, ' till an adminis- 
 tration, firmly established, should leave no room for 
 jealousy against him 1 .'" 
 
 Thus the main result of the tangled negotiations, which 
 had occupied the month of August, was to establish 
 Grenville in office more firmly than ever. For the sake of 
 the man he liked, the king had agreed to tolerate the man 
 he detested ; and Grenville had the ball at his feet. Lord 
 .Shelburne, who had been a thorn in the side of his 
 v colleagues, and had represented Bute in the cabinet, 
 determined to retire from office. Involved as he had been 
 m the recent negotiations, no other course lay open to 
 lim; and, if the king resented his resignation, it could 
 only have been because he was unwilling to see another 
 office placed at the disposal of the ministers 2 . Shelburne's 
 example wa s followed by Lord Mansfield who asked to be 
 excused from further attendance at the cabinet council 3 . 
 New members had to be chosen to fill the gaps caused by 
 death and resignation ; and it was not likely that the 
 king would be able to influence the selection. The field of 
 
 October, 1763, Elliot told Grenville that, on the morning of Monday, 
 August 29th, Bute sent a message to Pitt, saying that if the latter would 
 abandon the idea of giving the treasury to Temple, the negotiation 
 might yet succeed (Grenville Papers, n. 201, 202). This story is not 
 supported from any other source, and, before it can be accepted, some 
 means must be found for discrediting Pitt's emphatic declaration that it 
 was the king who proposed Lord Temple. 
 
 1 Grenville Papers, n. 201. 
 
 2 Grenville Papers, u. 203 ; Fitzmaurice's Shelburne, i. 296—298. 
 
 3 Grenville Papers, n. 205. 
 
184 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 choice had been narrowed by recent events. Pitt, the 
 whig opposition, and the followers of Bute were now out 
 of the question ; and the Bedford faction saw its political 
 value enhanced by the lack of eligible candidates. The 
 banishment of Bute removed an obstacle from Bedford' £ 
 path. There was no longer any reason for him to remain 
 in retirement, and he consented to take the office of lord 
 president of the council. His follower, Lord Sandwich, 
 was promoted from the office of first lord of the admiralty 
 to be secretary of state; and the post he vacated was 
 given to Lord Egmont. Lord Shelburne was replaced at 
 the board of trade by Lord Hillsborough who was destine 
 to play a prominent and unenviable part in the unhap^ 
 quarrel with the American colonies 1 . 
 
 It is open to question whether the ministry had gai 
 any access of strength by the reorganisation. By . 
 nation it was no more respected than before ; and i' 
 funds, which had begun to rise on the rumour that I l\ 
 was going to take office, continued to fall 2 . Nor were the 
 new members of the administration likely to add to its 
 popularity or dignity. The Peace of Paris hung like a 
 mill-stone round Bedford's neck; and the character of 
 Sandwich has been depicted in savage colours by Gray in 
 an immortal lampoon. Lack of harmony and union pre- 
 vailed among the ministers as of old. Power was in the 
 hands of Grrenville, Halifax, Sandwich and Bedford, the 
 last two being members of that political faction which 
 earned and deserved an unenviable notoriety as " The 
 Bloomsbury gang." No sooner had Bedford taken office 
 than he raised the question of the distribution of the 
 
 i Grenville Papers, n. 108—112, 115—117, 206; Bedford Corre- 
 spondence, in. 238. 
 
 2 P.R.O., Foreign State Papers, Miscellaneous, 30th September, 1763; 
 Grenville Papers, n. 132 — 134. 
 
THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 185 
 
 government patronage. Though willing that the disposal 
 of the offices belonging to the house of commons should 
 be left entirely to G-renville, he urged that " to others, the 
 rest of the king's ministers should also recommend," a 
 suggestion to which Grrenville was not willing to agree. 
 An appeal was made to the king who privately informed 
 Grrenville that he would only act upon his recommenda- 
 tions, an understanding which was, naturally, not revealed 
 to the other ministers 1 . In the hope, perhaps, of maintain- 
 ing the divisions in the cabinet, the king gave Grrenville 
 every assurance of support against the intrigues of his 
 colleagues 2 ; and he needed all the assistance he could get. 
 Early in November, Lord Halifax frankly admitted the 
 perilous position of the administration, divided as it was, 
 and surrounded by so many dangers 3 . Indeed, the king 
 could afford to indulge a contemptuous toleration of the 
 man he disliked. Grrenville was not in a position from 
 which he could threaten the crown, and it was well to 
 keep him in office, for there was work for him to do. 
 Wilkes must be destroyed, and the opposition humbled ; 
 and fate had chosen Grrenville to attempt the accomplish- 
 ment of these tasks. 
 
 While an administration, discredited at home, dis- 
 regarded abroad, and weakened by intrigue and dissension, 
 maintained itself in power because the king had failed to 
 form a ministry which would suit his purpose better, the 
 opposition was preparing for the struggle which would 
 begin when parliament met. The whig leaders still 
 adhered to their conviction that success was unobtainable 
 unless Pitt joined in the attack upon the government 4 : he 
 was the indispensable man, without whom nothing could 
 
 1 Grrenville Papers, n. 206, 207. 2 Grenville Papers, n. 209. 
 
 3 Grenville Papers, n. 219. 
 
 4 Add. MS. 32951, f. 101, f. 331. 
 
186 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 be done. Yet, valuable as his assistance would be, the 
 whigs could not afford to abandon opposition in order to 
 obtain it. The stimulus, that comes from fighting, was 
 necessary in order to hold the party together. An 
 opposition, which did nothing, which remained silent in 
 the face of a triumphant administration, would not be 
 likely to win supporters, or keep those it had already 
 gained. Pitt must be persuaded to declare a policy, and 
 raise a standard round which men might rally. His allies 
 were prepared to excuse him from frequent attendance at 
 parliament, and ready to make allowances for his ill- 
 health; but there must be no misconception of his true 
 position, and all men must know that he was the leader of 
 the party opposed to the court 1 . 
 
 Strenuous efforts were made to induce Pitt to play such 
 a part. Newcastle, Cumberland, and Devonshire en- 
 deavoured in turn to convince him, bnt in vain. He 
 could not bring himself to approve an organised opposition 
 to the government of the day: such a policy seemed to 
 him to partake of the nature of faction. He did not 
 believe that an opposition party was an essential part of 
 the machinery of constitutional government; and shrank 
 from opposing the ministers in and out of season. He was 
 ready to attack the government upon certain points of 
 great importance, such as the questions of parliamentary 
 privilege and foreign policy; but to minor matters he 
 professed himself indifferent ; and, were the opposition to 
 make these subjects of debate, it must be done without 
 his assistance 2 . He was ready to fight a series of. duels, 
 but was not prepared to carry on a campaign ; and it was 
 in vain that his allies attempted to shake him in his 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32951, f. 1 ; Ibid. 35428, f. 64. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32951, f. 101, f. 192, f. 311, f. 395, f. 403 ; Ibid. 32952, 
 f. 147. 
 
THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 187 
 
 determination. He refused to attend the meetings or the 
 dinners of the opposition party 1 ; and, as the time for the 
 meeting of parliament came near, he seemed to draw 
 further apart from the whig leaders. A last attempt to 
 induce him to place himself at the head of the opposition 
 was made by the Duke of Devonshire 2 , but it met with no 
 greater success than those which had preceded it ; and 
 the whigs were left bemoaning the loss of one who could 
 have given them victory, and upon whom they had built 
 all their hopes. Charles Townshend was not the only 
 member of the party who was angry with the man who 
 had deserted them in their hour of need. 
 
 When Pitt declared against opposition, the whigs 
 thought that they detected the cause of his reluctance. 
 His conversations with the king in August had left their 
 mark upon him. He had failed to form an administration, 
 and was probably chagrined at his failure 3 ; but he con- 
 soled himself by believing that he had made an agreeable 
 impression upon the king. It was in vain that his allies 
 assured him that he was the most unpopular man at 
 court 4 . He refused to be shaken in his conviction, and 
 though, but a few weeks before, he had thought of him- 
 self as a political outcast, he was now confident that he 
 had secured the goodwill of the crown. The whigs believed 
 that he feared to embark upon a career of opposition lest 
 he should forfeit the royal favour so recently acquired. 
 This view of his conduct has found support from a 
 distinguished writer 5 , but it would appear to be based 
 upon a misunderstanding of Pitt's real objections to an 
 organised assault upon the government. It has already 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32952, f. 166. 2 Add. MS. 32952, f. 272, f. 340. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32951, f. 8, f. 14. 
 
 4 Add. MS. 32951, f. 14, f. 101 ; Ibid. 32952, f. 166, f. 184. 
 
 5 Dr A. von Ruville, William Pitt, Graf von Chatham, in. 150 ff . 
 
188 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 been seen that he was prepared to attack the administra- 
 tion on those questions which he considered of sufficient 
 importance to justify opposition, and he was found to be 
 true to his word. His defence of parliamentary privilege, 
 and his attack upon general warrants, were not likely 
 to prejudice the king in his favour; and it cannot be 
 shown that he was prepared to sacrifice a single conviction 
 for the sake of securing the approval of the crown. More- 
 over, before he had seen the king in August, and while he 
 still regarded himself as disliked at court, he had displayed 
 an aversion to a formal opposition 1 ; and, therefore, the 
 impression made upon him by his interviews with the 
 king, though it possibly served to induce him to continue 
 a line of policy upon which he was already determined, 
 cannot be said to have done more. It was no petty desire 
 for promotion that drew Pitt apart from his allies, but a 
 fundamental difference of constitutional opinion. The 
 whigs held the modern view of the functions of an 
 opposition. They believed it to be their duty to obtain 
 admission into the service of the crown as soon as possible ; 
 and, to attain this end, they must succeed in gaining the 
 confidence of parliament and discrediting the administra- 
 tion. For this reason, all the actions of the ministers in 
 power must be subjected to hostile criticism, their virtues 
 minimised, and their defects exaggerated ; nor might any 
 slackness be shown in the attack until the enemy was 
 overthrown 2 . They valued the strength which comes of 
 cohesion, and realised that they would not succeed unless 
 they stood before the world as an united party, pledged to 
 the maintenance of the same principles. To such a policy 
 Pitt could not agree. He appreciated the need of strong 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32950, f. 65. 
 
 2 Bolingbroke shared this conception of the duties of an opposition. 
 Sichel's Bolingbroke and his Times : The Sequel, p. 259. 
 
THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 189 
 
 government, and could not consent to be for ever thwart- 
 ing an administration, thus hampering it in the execution 
 of the task which it had to perform. This seemed to him 
 to be factious. He was always ready to condemn the 
 ministers when he thought they acted wrongly; but he 
 could not consent to be for ever harassing and hindering 
 them. He refused to associate himself with the whigs 
 because they desired him to render it impossible for the 
 ministers to govern. To such a scheme, the success of 
 which would imperil the safety of the state, he declined 
 to be a party. An impassable gulf separated him from 
 those who wished to be his followers ; and the whigs were 
 compelled to meet parliament and the ministers without 
 the leader they had chosen. 
 
 Their hopes, which had risen so high, seemed dashed to 
 the ground, and worse was to follow. If Pitt would not 
 be a leader, he might still remain an ally ; but even this 
 was by no means certain. Charles Yorke was to provide 
 a cause for embarrassment and division. In response to 
 pressure from Newcastle, he had resigned his office in the 
 administration, and joined the opposition. He took this 
 step reluctantly, and after much hesitation. In his fare- 
 well interview with the king, he burst into tears; and 
 seldom has an opposition received a more unwilling 
 recruit 1 . It may also be said that seldom has an op- 
 position received a more dangerous ally. Yorke had set 
 his heart upon becoming lord chancellor, and he had not 
 abandoned his ambition in deserting the court. But he 
 knew that Pitt had determined to place Pratt upon the 
 woolsack, and, therefore, regarded the former as his enemy 2 . 
 Moreover, he had committed himself on the question of 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32951, f. 249; Ibid. 32952, f. 51; Grenville Papers, n. 
 218, 219. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 35430, f. 212 ; Ibid. 32952, f. 147. 
 
190 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 parliamentary privilege, and, though he had abandoned the 
 ministry, still adhered to the views he had expressed when 
 attorney general. It is difficult to exaggerate the serious- 
 ness of this difference of opinion. Pitt had already made up 
 his mind to attack the ministers for their conduct to Wilkes, 
 and the whigs found themselves obliged to determine 
 whether they would support him or Charles Yorke. Be- 
 sides Hardwicke, who might naturally be expected to be in 
 sympathy with his son, both the Duke of Devonshire and 
 Charles Townshend agreed with Yorke 1 . Newcastle, 
 fearful of offending Pitt, and yet influenced by his friends, 
 could not make up his mind, and while the Duke of 
 Cumberland thought that a question, on which there was 
 so much divergence, ought to be avoided, Lord Rocking- 
 ham believed that the duty of the opposition was to 
 support its most recent ally 2 . There is something to be 
 said for Pitt's opinion that it would have been better for 
 the opposition if Charles Yorke had never joined it 3 . 
 
 Thus, if the administration was weak and divided, the 
 opposition found itself in an equally distressed condition. 
 Parliament was to meet on November 15th, and the 
 ministers had strained every nerve to secure an impressive 
 majority. It was reported that bribes had been lavishly 
 distributed, and that one member of the lower house had 
 been summoned back from Patisbon in order to swell the 
 government majority 4 . The ministers contemplated a 
 triumphant session, and expected to reduce the opposition 
 to silence before the end of the year 5 . But hope was not 
 
 » Add. MS. 32952, f. 97, f. 195. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32952, f. 119, f. 166, f. 195. 
 
 s Add. MS. 32952, f. 147, f. 166. 
 
 4 P.R.O., Foreign State Papers, Miscellaneous, October 28th and 
 November 22nd, 1763. 
 
 6 P.R.O., Foreign State Papers, Miscellaneous, October 21st, 1763 ; 
 Add. MS. 32952, f. 51. 
 
THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 191 
 
 dead in the hearts of all the whigs. Newcastle believed 
 that he could count upon one hundred and forty votes 
 in the house of commons, and that the number would 
 increase as the session continued 1 . The ministers were 
 certain to possess a majority at the opening of parliament, 
 but they were known to be unpopular with the nation, 
 and an opposition, which presented a bold front to the 
 enemy, might easily gain recruits. But, with Pitt refusing 
 to lead, and differences of opinion destroying the harmony 
 of the whig camp, the outlook was far from promising; 
 and it was in no spirit of triumph that the whigs prepared 
 to meet the administration. 
 
 When parliament assembled on November 15th, the 
 campaign against Wilkes was immediately begun in both 
 houses. When he had been arrested, his papers had been 
 seized, and amongst them had been discovered an obscene 
 parody of Pope's Essay on Man, and a blasphemous para- 
 phrase of the Veni Creator. Extracts from these works 
 were read to an astonished house of lords by Lord 
 Sandwich, whose motion, that they should be declared 
 blasphemous and indecent, was unanimously carried. To 
 the Essay on Woman had been appended notes, in imitation 
 of those by Warburton, Bishop of Gloucester, to Pope's 
 poem; and the upper house agreed that this was a 
 violation of its privileges. It is impossible to doubt 
 that the ministerial attack upon these shameless pro- 
 ductions was inspired, not by a desire to safeguard the 
 interests of public morality, but by an intention to dis- 
 credit a political opponent. Offensive as the Essay on 
 Woman may have been, only a few copies had been 
 printed, and it had never been intended to circulate 
 beyond the small circle of Wilkes' friends. The means, 
 
 1 P.E.O., Foreign State Papers, Miscellaneous, November 4th, Novem- 
 ber 11th, 1763. 
 
192 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 by which the ministers had obtained a copy, were very 
 questionable ; and the spectacle of Sandwich, as the 
 scourger of vice and the champion of virtue, was more likely 
 to cause amusement than edification. Yet the ministers 
 had succeeded in discrediting Wilkes to a certain degree. 
 He, who had been hailed as a martyr for liberty, was 
 shown to be but of ordinary clay, and capable of amusing 
 his leisure moments by the production of indecent litera- 
 ture. It was not an age of squeamish virtue or restrictive 
 prejudices; but there must have been many who, though 
 they would have supported the man who attacked and 
 libelled the government, might hesitate to countenance 
 the author of an indecent poem. The opposition in the 
 upper house, unaware of the discovery made by the 
 ministers, was taken by surprise, and found themselves in 
 a position which they could not defend ; and, though they 
 rallied slightly when the address to the crown was voted, 
 there was no doubt that the government had been 
 victorious in the first encounter 1 . 
 
 A more fiercely contested but equally disastrous battle 
 for the opposition was fought in the house of commons. 
 The debate continued until the early hours of the morning. 
 Much time had been wasted, and many speeches made, 
 before George Grenville was able to read the king's 
 message requesting the commons to consider the case of 
 Wilkes. In former days, the lower house had often defied 
 the crown in defence of its own members, but now, in 
 obedience to the royal will, it voted No. 45 North 
 Briton a scandalous and seditious libel, tending to foment 
 traitorous insurrections. An amendment, to omit the con- 
 cluding words of the motion, was lost by a large majority. 
 
 1 P.R.O., Foreign State Papers, Miscellaneous, November 15th, 
 November 18th, 1763 ; Walpole's Memoirs, 1 — 245 seq. ; Walpole's 
 Letters, v. 384 — 391 ; Pari. History, xv. 
 
THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 193 
 
 The big battalions were on the side of the ministers, but 
 the opposition, though weak, had fought stubbornly, and 
 had gained an important recruit in General Conway, the 
 brother of Lord Hertford. The defeat was of little conse- 
 quence for it had been foreseen and discounted: it was 
 of far greater moment that, at the very opening of the 
 parliamentary campaign, the opposition had failed to act 
 as an united body. All the members of Lord Hardwicke's 
 family supported the administration, and Pitt openly 
 attacked Charles Yorke for his interpretation of the law 
 of parliamentary privilege 1 . The great commoner adopted 
 the same detached attitude on the day following, when the 
 address was voted, going out of his way to denounce the 
 party system as the ruin of the country, and describing 
 himself as standing single and alone. A contemporary 
 reckoned that this speech was worth fifty thousand pounds 
 to the ministers ; and this estimate was, perhaps, not un- 
 duly large 2 . Those, who had wavered as to which party 
 to serve, would not be inclined to throw in their lot with 
 the whigs, seeing that Pitt had so publicly dissociated 
 himself from them; and it must be admitted that the 
 ministers had every encouragement to continue their 
 attack upon Wilkes. 
 
 That unfortunate victim of the royal hatred was now 
 confined to his room by a wound received in a duel with 
 Martin, one of the many whom he had insulted in the 
 pages of the North Briton. In consequence of this, the 
 further discussion of his case was postponed to November 
 
 1 P.R.O., Foreign State Papers Miscellaneous, Nov. 18th, 1763 ; 
 Grenville Papers, n. 162, 223 ; Hist. MSS. Comm. Lothian MSS., pp. 247, 
 248 ; Walpole's Letters, v. 384—391 ; Walpole's Memoirs, i. 249 seq. ; 
 Pari. History, zv. 
 
 2 Grenville Papers, n. 164, 165, 223—225; Hist. MSS. Comm. 
 Lothian MSS., pp. 247, 248. 
 
 w. 13 
 
194 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 23rd ; but, when the house of commons assembled on that 
 day, it was discovered that Wilkes was still unable to 
 attend. It, therefore, became necessary to decide whether 
 there should be a further postponement. The opposition 
 pressed for delay, and presented an united front to the 
 enemy. When the house divided, the ministers had a 
 majority, but the three sons of Lord Hardwicke were in 
 the minority with Pitt, and, according to an eye-witness, 
 the latter' s "look and gesture of joy was the most re- 
 markable thing in the world 1 ." The opposition had been 
 outvoted, but it had succeeded in reducing the usual 
 ministerial majority by fifty, and Charles Yorke had 
 spoken and voted with Pitt 2 . Great were the rejoicings 
 amongst the whigs ; but the time for union had not yet 
 come. When, on the day following, the house voted that 
 parliamentary privilege did not cover seditious libel, and 
 thus left Wilkes to the mercy of the courts of law, the 
 cleavage of opinion in the opposition appeared in a more 
 aggravated form than ever. Charles Yorke made a 
 violent speech in support of the motion, and was answered 
 by Pitt who, leaning upon crutches, and swathed in 
 flannel, spoke for nearly two hours. Conway voted 
 against the government, but the ministers secured a 
 substantial triumph; and it was agreed to communicate 
 the resolution to the upper house at a conference 3 . No 
 opposition was to be expected from the peers who agreed 
 to the resolution of the commons on November 29th 4 . 
 
 1 Grenville Papers, n. 228 ; Add. MS. 32953, f. 16. 
 
 2 Walpole's Letters, v. 397—401 ; Grenville Papers, n. 228 ; Walpole's 
 Memoirs, i. 258, 259. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32953, f. 35; P.R.O., Foreign State Papers Miscellaneous, 
 Nov. 25th, 1763 ; Grenville Papers, ii. 229; Walpole's Letters, v. 397 — 401, 
 411 — 415 ; Walpole's Memoirs, i. 259 seq. ; Pari. History, xv. 
 
 4 Grenville Papers, n. 230 ; Walpole's Memoirs, i. 261 seq. ; Walpole's 
 Letters, v. 401 — 404 ; Pari. History, xv. 
 
 
THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 195 
 
 Thus, before the end of November, the administration 
 had accomplished the most important part of its work, 
 and the expulsion of Wilkes from the house of commons, 
 which took place on January 19th, 1764, was only the 
 logical outcome of all that had gone before. The whigs 
 had been routed and discredited ; and their disgrace was 
 not that they had failed to save a popular hero, but that 
 they had omitted to settle their differences before entering 
 upon the fray. Torn asunder by internal dissensions, they 
 had been rendered impotent for decisive action. Charles 
 Yorke and Pitt had openly opposed one another ; and 
 Newcastle had refused to sign the protest of the peers 
 against the limitation of parliamentary privilege because 
 of his friendship with Hardwicke 1 . The Duke of Devon- 
 shire, disgusted by Pitt's conduct, threatened to retire 
 from political life unless the latter mended his behaviour 2 ; 
 Charles Townshend and Lord Temple were not on friendly 
 terms, and Charles Yorke, supported by his family, still 
 cherished designs upon the chancellorship 3 . Thus some- 
 thing very much like the confusion after the rout pre- 
 vailed in the camp of the opposition. The Wilkes case 
 had proved a very apple of discord, and the ministers 
 acted wisely in prolonging the discussion of that question 4 . 
 The whigs would not recover the ground they had lost 
 until they had discovered a point of attack upon which 
 
 1 "There was a meeting yesterday at the Duke of Devonshire's to 
 consider about protesting. The Duke of Devonshire and I found that 
 they were all for it. My Lord Temple produced a draught, which, to do 
 him justice, was originally less liable to objection than I imagined it 
 
 would be After that, I stated my own present and former situation : 
 
 the valuable connections which I had, and wish and desire that, on that 
 account, their lordships would feel so much for me, that they would 
 approve of my declining to sign any protest upon this occasion." New- 
 castle to Charles Yorke, December 1st, 1763 (Add. MS. 32953, f. 145). 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32954, f. 15. 3 Add. MS. 32954, f. 62, f. 233. 
 4 Add. MS. 32954, f. 123. 
 
 13—2 
 
196 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 they all were agreed, and which Pitt approved 1 . At 
 one time Newcastle contemplated elevating the private 
 character of Lord Sandwich to the dignity of a party 
 question ; and those, curious in the manners and morals of 
 the eighteenth century, may regret that this scheme was 
 never executed 2 . Bearing in affectionate remembrance 
 the successful attack upon the cyder tax, the opposition 
 attempted to renew the onslaught on that obnoxious 
 imposition ; but its efforts had no other consequence than 
 the appointment of a committee to suggest means for im- 
 proving that measure 3 . Salvation was to come, however, 
 and a triumph to be enjoyed, all the greater because of 
 the previous humiliation. 
 
 On the first day of the session, Wilkes had been 
 prepared to complain of the breach of parliamentary 
 privilege he had suffered in his person, but an opportunity 
 had not been given him ; and, now that he was expelled 
 from the house, and obliged to flee the country, there 
 were members of the opposition ready to undertake the 
 task for him. The ministry, unable to refuse the request, 
 agreed to allow the complaint to be heard on February 
 13th, and the opposition determined to seize the op- 
 portunity to raise the question of general warrants. This 
 was, undoubtedly, a master stroke of policy. General 
 warrants, though their use could be supported by recent 
 precedents, had always been regarded as dubious ex- 
 pedients, and Pratt had lately declared them to be illegal. 
 In face of this judicial decision, the ministers could hardly 
 justify the means they had taken to arrest Wilkes ; but, 
 on the other hand, they could hardly be expected to 
 confess publicly that they had broken the law. Thus, 
 placed between the horns of a dilemma, they were called 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32954, f. 76. 2 Add. MS. 32954, f. 62. 
 
 3 Walpole's Letters, v. 437—446, 449—454. 
 
THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 197 
 
 upon to meet the attack of an united opposition. For the 
 great discovery had been made and an article of faith 
 revealed to which Pitt and the whigs could equally 
 subscribe. The former was known to be enthusiastic in 
 his opposition to general warrants, and Charles Yorke 
 was of the same mind. The schism, which had been pro- 
 ductive of so much harm, seemed about to be healed ; and, 
 though it remained uncertain how Charles Townshend 
 would act, this was of little consequence, inasmuch as 
 his frivolity and waywardness had deprived him of all 
 weight 1 . 
 
 The opposition was rallied -for the fight, and steps 
 were taken to secure a large attendance 2 . The principal 
 men of the whig party met to decide upon a course of 
 action, and a motion was framed and agreed upon 3 . The 
 debate on February 13th proved, however, uneventful. 
 More than four hours were occupied in taking evidence 
 of the use of general warrants since the revolution; 
 but, in spite of the tediousness of the subject, the house 
 remained full until a comparatively late hour. When, 
 at half past ten o'clock, Lord Frederick Campbell moved 
 the adjournment, his motion was rejected by nearly three 
 hundred and fifty votes. But no sooner had it been 
 decided to continue the debate than the members began 
 to troop out in search of refreshment; and, as it was use- 
 less to harangue half-empty benches, the house adjourned 
 shortly before midnight 4 . The debate was resumed on 
 the following day, and continued without interruption 
 until seven o'clock on the morning of Wednesday, Feb- 
 ruary 15th. Evidence continued to be taken until past 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32955, f. 434, f. 448. 2 Add. MS. 32955, f. 434. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32955, f. 448. 
 
 4 Add. MS. 32955, f. 456, f. 458, f. 460, f. 462; Walpole's Memoirs, I. 
 286, 287. 
 
198 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 midnight; and a new day had already begun when 
 Sir William Meredith rose to introduce the resolution 
 upon which the opposition had agreed. He moved that 
 general warrants were illegal, and that their use against 
 members of parliament constituted a breach of privilege. 
 Round these two points the battle raged until seven 
 o'clock in the morning. As the hours passed by, weari- 
 ness began to tell upon the members, and Charles Yorke 
 moved that the house should adjourn. To this the 
 ministers were willing enough to agree, provided that a 
 motion discharging the complaint against those impli- 
 cated in the arrest of Wilkes should be put immediately 
 after the adjournment had been voted. The opposition, 
 however, desired that both questions should be adjourned, 
 and a motion to that effect was only lost by ten votes. 
 A supporter of the administration then moved to dis- 
 charge the complaint of breach of privilege, and was 
 answered by Pitt who broke into a panegyric on liberty. 
 A second motion for adjournment was then made by 
 the opposition, and was lost by twenty-four votes. This 
 ended the contest: the question for discharging the 
 complaint was immediately put, and carried without a 
 division 1 . 
 
 As the jaded members streamed out into the cold grey 
 light of a winter's morning, they must have pondered 
 over the scene through which they had just passed. 
 Never before had the ministry been pressed so hard, or 
 the opposition come so near to victory. Men, who had 
 consistently supported the administration, had voted with 
 the whigs, and Newcastle believed that the ministers 
 would have had a narrower majority still, if some of his 
 supporters had not been prevented from attending the 
 
 1 Grenville Papers, n. 261 — 264, 490, 491 ; Walpole's Letters, vi. 
 1—12 ; Walpole's Memoirs, i. 287 seq. 
 
THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 199 
 
 debate 1 . But the joy, which prevailed in the whig 
 camp, was not due only to the temporary increase in 
 their numerical strength: it was a source of far deeper 
 satisfaction that Pitt, Charles Yorke, and Charles Towns- 
 hend had fought side by side in the battle. The divi- 
 sions, which had crippled the action of the opposition, 
 seemed healed; and a victory might still be won 2 . The 
 motion condemning general warrants had been ad- 
 journed till Friday, February 17th; and the winning of 
 a few more supporters might mean a whig triumph. 
 Men's hopes and fears ran high; and in the city, which 
 was enthusiastic for Wilkes and liberty, elaborate pre- 
 parations were made for a bonfire and illuminations, 
 should the ministry be defeated 3 . 
 
 The debate, which began on Friday, February 17th, 
 lasted until close upon six o'clock on the following morn- 
 ing. Much time was spent in proposing amendments to 
 Meredith's resolution; and two or three hours had been 
 occupied in this fashion before the contest really opened 
 by Norton, the attorney general, moving to adjourn the 
 question for four months. With needless offensiveness 
 and uncommon brutality, he declared that, were he 
 a judge, he would treat a resolution of the house of 
 commons upon a point of law with as much respect as 
 he would treat the opinion of a drunken porter. He 
 was answered by Yorke who explained in self-defence 
 that he had never seen the warrant issued against 
 Wilkes, until after it had been executed. Both Charles 
 Townshend and Pitt joined in the debate, though the 
 latter was ill and suffering; and, when the house divided, 
 the opposition numbered two hundred and eighteen, and 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32956, f. 7. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32956, f. 7, f. 83. 
 
 3 Walpole's Letters, vi. 1—12. 
 
200 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 the ministerialists two hundred and thirty-two 1 . This 
 was a triumphant close to a week of triumphs and lengthy- 
 sittings. The ministers, accustomed to majorities in three 
 figures, found themselves carrying divisions by thirties and 
 twenties and sometimes less. Those, upon whom they had 
 been accustomed to rely, had deserted them at the critical 
 moment; and, discredited in reputation and diminished in 
 strength, they were threatened by an united opposition, 
 full of hope and vigour. Pitt, pining for further battle, 
 was emphatic in his approval of Charles Yorke, and 
 declared that no proposal must be made "which could 
 either renew former points in which we might have dif- 
 fered amongst ourselves, or bring on any point in which 
 we could possibly differ now 2 ." 
 
 When everything promised so well, it is not a little 
 surprising that nothing was done. Pitt was anxious for 
 the struggle to continue, and there could be no doubt 
 that now was the time for the opposition to press the 
 onslaught home. Yet the days passed by, and the 
 ministry continued to enjoy immunity from attack; and, 
 when parliament rose on April 19th, Grenville and his 
 colleagues were left in possession of the field. The tide 
 had not been taken at the flood, and by their inaction 
 the whigs had strengthened Grrenville's position, and 
 enabled him to recover the ground that he had lost. 
 As chancellor of the exchequer he introduced the budget 
 on March 9th, and won the hearts of the country gentle- 
 men who loudly applauded the man who was able to pay 
 off debts without imposing new taxes 3 . Politicians have 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32956, f. 19, f. 21, f. 37; Grenville Papers, n. 266, 267; 
 Walpole's Letters, vi. 1 — 12. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32956, f. 83, f. 103. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32957, f. 230. "However absurd this nattering incense 
 is," wrote Newcastle to Legge, "Mr Grenville has certainly, for this 
 
THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 201 
 
 proverbially fickle memories, and, when nothing was done 
 to thwart or hinder the administration, when the leaders 
 of the opposition were conspicuous by their absence, and 
 appeared to have withdrawn from the contest in the hour 
 of victory, men tended to minimise the importance of 
 the encounter over general warrants, and to rally to those 
 who, even if they had been hard pressed, had not been 
 defeated. 
 
 Few would deny that it was a tactical blunder on the 
 part of the opposition to remain inactive; but any other 
 course of action presented serious difficulties. There were 
 some who were adverse to making any fresh attack upon 
 the ministry so late in the session 1 , and those, who thought 
 differently, found it extremely difficult to discover a 
 suitable point of assault 2 . Nor were these the only 
 obstacles in the path of united action. Pitt had en- 
 dured that week of lengthy sittings at the cost of much 
 bodily suffering; and, when the struggle was over, he 
 took to his bed 3 . For some days Charles Yorke was 
 secluded by the death of his father, Lord Hardwicke. 
 This event had been long expected, and, as Hardwicke lay 
 dying, preparations were made for the election of a new 
 high steward of the university of Cambridge. The court 
 candidate was Lord Sandwich, the secretary of state, 
 but there was a large party in the university in favour 
 of Hardwicke's son and successor, Lord Royston. Hard- 
 wicke died on March 6th, and the contest at Cambridge 
 began in earnest. It was carried on with all that vigour 
 and resource so often displayed in university politics. 
 
 time, gained some credit by his performance, owing entirely to the 
 absence of those who could and would have exposed the falseness or 
 futility of every part of his propositions or assertions." Ibid. 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32957, f. 230. 2 Add. MS. 32957, f. 239. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32956, f. 74; Walpole's Letters, vi. 20—23, 28—31. 
 
202 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 The members of a learned society are commonly supposed 
 to be detached from the world, and ignorant of the ways 
 of men; but, on this occasion at least, they showed them- 
 selves a match for politicians, and, though their learning 
 may have been small, their artifice was great. New- 
 castle, as chancellor of the university, threw himself into 
 the fight, believing that, in helping to defeat Sandwich, 
 he was assisting to destroy the administration. The 
 battle, which should have been fought in parliament, was 
 transferred to Cambridge, and when Charles Townshend 
 ought to have been attacking Grenville's budget, he was 
 winning the votes of members of the senate 1 . 
 
 Thus various circumstances combined to render the 
 opposition inactive ; and the ministers were able to finish 
 the session free from serious molestation. Nor did they 
 model their conduct upon their enemies and remain idle. 
 "Without delay they set to work to break up the ranks of 
 their opponents. It was rumoured that overtures had 
 been made to Lord George Sackville who had played 
 a prominent part in the opposition to general warrants 2 ; 
 and the Duke of Bedford approached the new Lord 
 Hardwicke and his brother, Charles Yorke. Hardwicke 
 showed himself inclined to come to terms with the court, 
 and Charles Townshend, realising that he was a younger 
 brother, and how little there was to be gained in oppo- 
 sition, was not unwilling to be reconciled to George 
 Grenville 3 . Thus it may be said that the session closed 
 upon a drawn battle. The administration had escaped 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32957, f. 5, f. 87. See Appendix n. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32956, f. 168. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 35361, f. 95. With commendable frankness, Townshend 
 informed the Duke of Devonshire "that he was a younger brother, and 
 if nothing was to be made out of opposition, or no active measures 
 pursued, he would lie by this summer, and consider himself at liberty 
 to take what part would be most convenient to him." Ibid. 
 
THE GRENVILLE MINISTRY 203 
 
 defeat, but the whigs had shown how formidable they 
 could be, when united amongst themselves and led by 
 Pitt. If the latter remained firm in his intention to 
 play a leading part in politics, and nothing happened to 
 alienate him from the whigs, the next session might see 
 the efforts of the opposition crowned with success. 
 
 But, for the time being, punishment and disgrace 
 constituted the lot of those who had dared to oppose the 
 court. Because Shelburne had voted against the limita- 
 tion of parliamentary privilege, he was dismissed from 
 his post of aide-de-camp to the king, and a similar fate 
 befell Barre and Calcraft. But the greatest offender of 
 all was Conway. A lord of the bedchamber and an 
 officer in the army, he had acted with the opposition 
 throughout the session, and was consequently deprived 
 of both his posts. He was spared until parliament had 
 risen, but this clemency, if so it can be called, was due,, 
 not to the king who fretted at the delay, but to Grenville 
 who feared to offend Conway's friends and relations 1 . To* 
 deprive men of office in the army, because of their actions, 
 in parliament, was a violation of the privilege of freedom 
 of speech, though not without precedent in the previous 
 reign; and, when such were the penalties inflicted upon 
 those who refused to take their orders from the court,, 
 it is not surprising that the opposition found it difficult 
 both to gain and keep adherents. 
 
 1 Grenville Papers, 11. 162, 230, 231. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE. 
 
 PARLIAMENT did not meet again until the following 
 January: and, therefore, the hostilities between the 
 ministry and the opposition ceased for a while. But in 
 politics, as in war, an armistice may be as decisive as a 
 campaign; and it was imperative for both parties in the 
 contest to employ the time, thus given, in preparing for 
 the struggle which seemed certain to be renewed when 
 parliament re-assembled. 
 
 At the close of the last session the ministers had lived 
 with the fear of disaster before their eyes; and, though 
 they had managed to survive, the glory of the battle lay 
 with those who had suffered defeat. The whigs had failed 
 to carry the day, but they had come far nearer to victory 
 than had ever been expected, and had fought in the cause 
 dear to the heart of Pitt. Never, since the opposition had 
 first beenformed,had it seemed so united and so formidable. 
 The old causes of dissensions appeared to have been de- 
 stroyed or forgotten; and the administration might well 
 be called upon to endure the assaults of a party, burning 
 to revenge the indignities it had suffered, elated by the 
 hope of victory, and led by the most popular politician of 
 the day. There must have been many who expected the 
 next parliamentary session to be decisive of the fate of 
 the ministry. It was to be so, but not in the way which 
 had been anticipated. G-renville and his colleagues were 
 
THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 205 
 
 to be driven from office by the king and not by the 
 whigs. An administration was to be formed in which 
 Pitt had no place, and to which he refused his confidence, 
 though composed of those who had acted with him in 
 opposition. The downfall of Grenville and the formation 
 of the Rockingham administration was a royal and not 
 a whig triumph ; and the history of England might have 
 been different if Grenville's place had been taken by Pitt 
 supported by the whig party. To understand how it was 
 that this did not happen, it is necessary to know the inner 
 history of the opposition after the month of April, 1764. 
 
 To keep the party together, and to establish intimate 
 and confidential relations with Pitt, were the tasks to 
 which Newcastle and his friends addressed themselves. 
 The strength of the opposition must be maintained, and, 
 if possible, increased. In the interval of peace, the excite- 
 ment, born of the contest, must be preserved. Neither the 
 ministers nor the public must be allowed to forget that 
 the opposition still existed, ready to renew the struggle 
 with the administration at a fitting opportunity. But, in 
 addition to all this, it was necessary for the whigs to 
 decide upon a programme of attack; and this was by far 
 the most difficult part of their work. They had come near 
 to triumph in the last session because they had chosen to 
 harass the ministry upon the question of general warrants : 
 and better ground could hardly have been selected. But 
 their success had been due far less to their own strength 
 than to the popularity of the cause which they had 
 espoused, and to the active part played by Pitt. It would 
 not be easy to discover another question presenting the 
 same facilities for attack; and, yet without one, the oppo- 
 sition might only too easily slip back into that slough of 
 despond from which it had but lately emerged. Though 
 Charles Townshend had many faults he did not lack 
 
206 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 political insight; and he saw, perhaps more clearly than 
 his contemporaries, how perilous was the position of the 
 whigs. He tried to convince Newcastle that, when the 
 parliament met again, the opposition would be found to 
 have lost in strength, inasmuch as there would be "no 
 general warrants to arraign, no extraordinary measures, 
 and no grounds of debate but the army, the navy, and 
 the several disputable speculations which may occur 
 about the state of the debt and the condition of public 
 credit 1 ." 
 
 The warning was timely, nor was it passed by un- 
 heeded. When the whig leaders met at Olaremont, early 
 in May, 1764, a programme of opposition was drawn up 
 and unanimously approved. It was arranged that, when 
 parliament reassembled, the opposition, in addition to 
 reviving the question of general warrants, should attack 
 the administration for dismissing military officers for 
 votes given in parliament; and criticise the foreign and 
 financial policy of the government 2 . 
 
 Doubtless it was wise of the whigs to constitute them- 
 selves the champions of the parliamentary privilege of 
 freedom of speech, seeing that Pitt was known to be 
 angry at Conway's dismissal 3 ; but it is more open to 
 •doubt whether they were well advised to revive the 
 subject of general warrants. Popular as that question 
 had been when first introduced by the opposition, a 
 revival could hardly be attended with equal success. It 
 might be said that the whigs were more anxious to over- 
 throw the government than to safeguard the constitution; 
 and those, who had deserted the administration when the 
 question was first mooted, might be found supporting the 
 government when it was revived. Nor did an attack 
 
 1 Phillimore's Life of Lord Lyttelton, n. 654 ; Add. MS. 32958, f. 248. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32958, f. 307. 3 Phillimore's Lyttelton, n. 653. 
 
THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 207 
 
 upon the financial and foreign policy of the ministry 
 give much hope of success. Finance is peculiarly the 
 province of the specialist, and men will always tend to 
 vote with the party, they usually support, on questions 
 which they cannot understand. Moreover, the foreign 
 policy of the government, save to those who, like Pitt, 
 saw in France the never ceasing enemy of England, and 
 in Prussia our natural ally, was not so glaringly incom- 
 petent as to be profoundly unpopular. England might 
 have declined from the proud position she occupied during 
 the seven years' war, and her relations with Prussia might 
 he lacking in harmony: but she was at least not involved 
 in a continental struggle, and was given time to recover 
 from the exhaustion produced by her recent exertions. 
 The country was by no means prepared to enter upon 
 another contest with France; and it was felt that, if the 
 glory of England was due to the enterprise and energy 
 of Pitt, her salvation was owing to the restraint and 
 economy of Grrenville 1 . 
 
 The opposition programme had thus several obvious 
 defects, and was not likely to inspire those, who had 
 undertaken to carry it out, with the hope of success. 
 Men, who had lately been so full of joy, now began 
 to talk in a tone of despair. It was not only Charles 
 Townshend who began to weary of dwelling in a politi- 
 cal wilderness ; even the Dukes of Newcastle and Devon- 
 shire thought of an union with the Duke of Bedford and 
 his party 2 . It was of little use that the whigs should 
 meet at the club, which they had founded, and drink 
 toasts to the success of the party; for not by such means 
 would the ministers be driven from office: "a huzza at 
 Wildman's once a week," as Newcastle truly remarked, 
 
 1 Hist. MSS. Comm. 12th Report, Appendix, ix. p. 340. 
 4 Add. MS. 32960, f. 235. 
 
208 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 "will not do alone, though a very good thing 1 ." But 
 the real evil was not an imperfect programme but the 
 lack of union. In September, 1764, Lord Barrington 
 described the minority as having "neither abilities nor 
 union 2 ," and, though ability may not have been lacking, 
 union certainly was. The old evil had reappeared again; 
 and the root of the evil was Pitt. Upon him the whigs 
 had built their hopes. They had confessed that they 
 could do nothing without him. They had failed in their 
 opposition to the Peace of Paris largely because Pitt 
 had refused to cooperate with them: and, for the same 
 reason, they had not succeeded in protecting Wilkes 
 against the animosity of the ministers, or in safeguarding 
 the parliamentary privilege of freedom from arrest. Then 
 had come the happy moment when Pitt threw in his lot 
 with them in the attack on general warrants, and had 
 seemingly become reconciled to Charles Yorke. He had 
 gone still further, and had declared with emphasis that 
 the differences of opinion, which had so weakened the 
 opposition in the past, must not be allowed to render it 
 impotent in the future 3 . He pressed for the attack to 
 continue, and seemed anxious to welcome as colleagues 
 those whom he had formerly repulsed. Yet, in a few 
 months, almost in a few weeks, he had completely changed. 
 He now talked in a despairing and desponding fashion, 
 declared against opposition, and announced his intention 
 of rarely attending parliament during the next session. 
 He stated that he would never force himself upon the 
 king, but, if his services were desired, he would be ready 
 to take office. He displayed a violent dislike of Charles 
 Yorke and Charles Townshend, though, apparently,. 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32960, f. 332. 
 
 2 Hist. MSS. Comm. Lothian MSS. p. 252. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32956, f. 83, f. 103. 
 
THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 209 
 
 amicably disposed towards the other whig leaders, and, 
 as he expressly said, would only come into employment 
 "supported by all the great families which have ever 
 distinguished themselves in the cause of liberty and the 
 Revolution 1 ." 
 
 Pitt had not, therefore, yet broken with the whigs, 
 and Newcastle still believed that he would never take 
 office without them 2 . But he was no longer willing to 
 unite with them in opposition; and, as so often before, 
 they were to be left to fight their battles alone, while the 
 one man, with whose assistance they could not dispense, 
 either absented himself from parliament or followed an 
 independent and often opposite line of policy. It soon 
 became known that Pitt was not likely to oppose the 
 government 3 ; and the news must have been welcome to 
 the king and his ministers. Pitt withdrew from the con- 
 test at the time when he was most needed, and by his 
 action deprived the opposition of that element of strength 
 which might have enabled it to prevail against the grow- 
 ing power of the crown. For the subsequent misfortunes, 
 which befell the country, he cannot escape his share of 
 responsibility; and the triumph of the king was due in a 
 measure to the course he adopted. 
 
 It is by no means easy to discuss the motives which 
 inspired his conduct. He had certain grievances, but they 
 were hardly of sufficient importance to justify his with- 
 drawal from the opposition at the critical moment of its 
 career. He apparently objected to the cessation of hostili- 
 ties which had marked the close of the last session, and 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32961, f. 186; see also Add. MS. 32959, f. 42, f. 306; 
 Add. MS. 32960, f. 17; Add. MS. 32961, f. 186, f. 308; Add. MS. 32962, 
 f. 48. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32961, f. 291. 
 
 3 Hist. MSS. Comm. Lothian MSS. p. 252. 
 
 W. 14 
 
210 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 which was partly due to the Cambridge contest *; but he 
 laid greater stress upon the fact that, when Grenville had 
 introduced his budget, adverse comments had been made 
 upon the English military operations in Germany during 
 the seven years' war, and not a member of the opposition 
 had taken up the challenge 2 . He was to repeat this 
 complaint at a later date; and the reiteration may be 
 taken as evidence that the grievance was deep-seated 
 and not a mere trivial excuse thrown off to justify an 
 action inspired by other motives. There can be no doubt 
 that he was unduly suspicious of the good faith of the 
 whigs, especially in regard to questions in any way con- 
 nected with foreign policy; and the omission on the part 
 of the opposition to defend the German war from the 
 aspersions cast upon it by Grenville, would be sufficient to 
 arouse his latent distrust of Newcastle and his followers, 
 and revive his dislike of the party system. Again and 
 again he had declared that he would not take the closet 
 by storm, and that he wished to concern himself with 
 measures not with men. In moments of excitement, 
 such as during the attack upon general warrants, he 
 seemed willing to belie his words, and to embark upon 
 a regular course of opposition to the administration; but, 
 when the crisis had passed, he reverted to his original 
 opinions, and shunned what he thought to be the factious 
 scheming of Newcastle and his associates. Though he 
 was ready to choose his colleagues from amongst the 
 whig party, if called upon by the king to form an ad- 
 ministration, he was not prepared to place himself at the 
 head of a faction pledged to thwart and hinder the 
 ministry. 
 
 The irreparable breach had not yet come, and all that 
 was known was that Pitt no longer took part in the 
 1 Add. MS. 32958, f. 226. 2 Add. MS. 32960, f. 17. 
 
THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 211 
 
 counsels of the opposition, and was unlikely to oppose the 
 government when parliament met again. Nor was this 
 the only disappointment which befell the whig party. 
 It soon became known that both Charles Yorke and 
 Charles Townshend were uncertain in their allegiance. 
 The former was in a far from enviable position. His 
 brief reconciliation with Pitt had come to an abrupt end 1 , 
 for he had given the latter new cause for offence by his 
 patronage of Dr Hay who had unfortunately distinguished 
 himself, during the last parliamentary session, by making 
 a violent attack upon the common council of the city of 
 London : " a nest of hornets," as Walpole sagaciously 
 remarked, " that I do not see the prudence of attacking 2 ." 
 As it was in the city that Pitt numbered his warmest 
 supporters, he was bitterly offended with Hay for assault- 
 ing the stronghold of his influence, but he was probably 
 angrier with Yorke for espousing the cause of such a 
 man 3 . Newcastle was also chagrined by the behaviour 
 of the son of his old friend; and Yorke found that he had 
 little to expect from those for whom he had sacrificed his 
 place in the administration. He had already refused 
 to pledge himself to take an active part in opposing the 
 government 4 ; and it seemed likely that he would seize the 
 first opportunity, that offered itself, to establish friendly 
 relations with Grrenville, and enter once more into the 
 service of the king. Nor was Charles Townshend more 
 certain in his adherence. Before parliament had risen, 
 he had made overtures to G-renville 5 , and a contempo- 
 rary described him, aptly enough, as playing the part of 
 harlequin 6 . Ambitious in his own fashion, volatile, un- 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32961, f. 291, f. 308. 
 
 2 Walpole's Letters, vi. 31—34. 3 Add. MS. 32962, f. 48. 
 4 Add. MS. 32958, f. 307. 5 Grenville Papers, n. 501. 
 
 6 Hist. MSS. Comm. 12th Report, Appendix, ix. p. 340. 
 
 14—2 
 
212 PERSONAL AND PAETY GOVERNMENT 
 
 certain, and scantily provided with political convictions 
 he was the least likely of all men to continue a member 
 of a decaying minority. He needed the stimulus of suc- 
 cess to spur him to laborious endeavour; and, in the days 
 of their misfortune, the whigs were not likely to number 
 him in their ranks 1 . 
 
 The outlook was black enough, but it was to grow 
 darker still. The Duke of Cumberland, the constant 
 adviser of the opposition, was in favour of disregarding 
 Pitt altogether. It was known that the Duke of Bedford 
 was on bad terms with his fellow ministers, and had 
 ceased to be a regular attendant at cabinet councils : 
 and Cumberland suggested that the whigs should throw 
 over the man who had proved himself so intractable, and 
 conclude an alliance with the Duke of Bedford and his 
 party. Such a step was too bold for the prudent states- 
 manship of Newcastle who feared that Pitt might take 
 his revenge for such treatment by forming an alliance 
 with Bute 2 . Perilous as was the situation of the oppo- 
 sition, and valuable as the assistance would be that 
 Bedford could give, Newcastle still clung to the belief 
 that, when the battle was begun again, Pitt would be 
 found fighting foremost in the field. He refused to be 
 persuaded by Cumberland, and in September, 1764, de- 
 clared himself to "be as eager, as ever I was, to get 
 Mr Pitt to take an active part at the head of us 3 /' He 
 was to be undeceived, and by Pitt himself, who in 
 October, 1764, definitely broke with the whig party. New- 
 castle had learnt that the parliamentary representatives 
 in the counties of Cornwall and Devonshire were willing 
 
 1 Townshend was also offended because his pamphlet "A Defence of 
 the Minority," was but coldly received by the party whom it was written 
 to justify. Add. MS. 32962, f. 129. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32960, f. 349, f. 361. 3 Add. MS. 32962, f. 48. 
 
THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 213 
 
 to support the opposition party if it would undertake to 
 press for the removal of the cyder tax 1 ; and though this 
 scheme was but coldly received by the whig leaders 2 , it 
 was submitted to Pitt for his opinion. The latter seized 
 the opportunity to declare his independence of the oppo- 
 sition. He refused to give his views upon the plan sub- 
 mitted to him by Newcastle, and described himself as 
 standing single, attached to no party, and determined to 
 act "under the obligation of principles, not by the force 
 of any particular bargains." He again referred to the 
 action of the opposition in allowing the attacks upon 
 the German war to pass unchallenged, and pointedly 
 remarked that, after such treatment, he had little mind to 
 begin "the world again upon a new centre of union 3 ." 
 It was the letter of an angry and a disappointed man, 
 determined to associate no longer with those whom he 
 thought had treated him badly; and his description of 
 himself as " a man standing single, and daring to appeal 
 to his country at large upon the soundness of his prin- 
 ciples and the rectitude of his conduct 4 " was hardly 
 needed to inform the whigs that they could no longer 
 look to him as a leader or even as an ally. The break 
 was complete, and Pitt had definitely repudiated the 
 opposition. It was clear that his advice could no longer 
 be taken, nor his assistance expected. The indispensable 
 man had once more declared himself a free lance; and 
 the whigs were obliged to pursue their way without him, 
 trusting that their policy would be such as he would 
 approve, and occasionally support 5 . But at the best it 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32962, f. 329. 2 Add. MS. 32963, f. 19, f. 50. 
 
 3 Chatham Correspondence, n. 296. 4 Ibid. 
 
 5 Add. MS. 32962, f. 30, f. 366; Add. MS. 32963, f. 50, f. 122, f. 243, 
 f. 364, f. 375; Add. MS. 32964, f. 109. The Duke of Cumberland was 
 in favour of the opposition definitely repudiating Pitt, and, that this was 
 not done, was partly due to Newcastle's influence. 
 
214 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 was but a sorry prospect, for the loss of Pitt was not the 
 only blow which the opposition had suffered. Charles 
 Townshend was treating with Grrenville for the succession 
 to the remunerative office of paymaster general 1 , and 
 Charles Yorke had once more enlisted under the king, 
 taking no office, but being gratified by a patent of pre- 
 cedency which gave him rank between the attorney and 
 solicitor general 2 . It is not surprising that, confronted 
 with these defections, Cumberland began to despair o£ 
 continuing the contest, and that even Newcastle lost all 
 hope of success. The whig cause seemed doomed, and 
 if the ministers were called upon to face an opposition 
 when parliament met, this was due, not to the leaders of 
 the party, but to a few energetic spirits who refused to 
 abandon hope, and determined to fight the battle to the 
 end. Both Cumberland and Newcastle were inclined to 
 abandon the struggle against overwhelming odds 3 ; and 
 the ministers had little cause to fear the attacks of the 
 remnant who refused either to surrender or retreat. 
 
 Thus the parliamentary session, which began on 
 January 10th, 1765, promised to be tame and uneventful. 
 As a matter of fact, the unexpected was to happen, and 
 Grrenville was to fall from power at the time when he 
 seemed to have least to fear from his enemies. Too great 
 a stress should not be laid upon the lack of union and 
 cordiality in the cabinet, for that was no new feature; 
 and, though often divided in opinion 4 , the ministers were 
 always ready to unite against a common enemy. Their 
 weakness was that they were only maintained in power 
 
 1 Grenville Papers, n. 465, 466. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 35428, f. 1; Add. MS. 32963, f. 405; Add. MS. 32964, 
 f. 5, f. 287; Grenville Papers, n. 467—473, 523—532. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32963, f. 364, f. 391; Add. MS. 32964, f. 93, f. 109. 
 
 4 Grenville Papers, n. 502, 504, 510—515; Hist. MSS. Comm. 
 Stopford Sackville MSS. i. 61, 97. 
 
THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 215 
 
 by the will of the king. He had supported them against 
 the attacks of the opposition, and in spite of their un- 
 popularity with the country; and they had served his 
 purpose, for through them he had avenged himself upon 
 Wilkes. It would seem that they had now fulfilled their 
 mission. The king had endured and made use of G-ren- 
 ville, but he had never liked him, and would not hesitate 
 to overthrow him if a suitable successor could be found. 
 Before Grrenville had been in office many weeks, the king 
 had attempted to replace him by Pitt. The attempt had 
 failed; and for eighteen months Grrenville had continued 
 in power because the king feared to surrender himself to 
 the mercy of the whig party and the great commoner. 
 The political situation, however, had now changed. The 
 king had nothing to dread from a weakened and dis- 
 credited opposition; and was, therefore, willing to take 
 into his service those who had learnt the folly of strug- 
 gling against the power of the crown. Grrenville, now 
 that he no longer stood between the court and disaster, 
 discovered that the royal support was not given so freely 
 as in the past, and that, whereas the king had formerly 
 been friendly and cordial, he was now cold and embar- 
 rassed. Moreover, many of those, who passed by the name 
 of Lord Bute's friends, often abstained from speaking or 
 voting when the ministry was attacked. Sometimes, active 
 opposition took the place of indifference, and, early in the 
 session, the prime minister complained to the king of the 
 difficulties under which he was obliged to carry on the 
 government 1 . Walpole, an acute though prejudiced poli- 
 tician, prophesied that the session would see the close of 
 Grenville's reign 2 . 
 
 Thus the ministry was endangered by the court and 
 
 1 Grenville Papers, in. 112, 114—116; Walpole's Letters, vi. 172—176. 
 
 2 Walpole's Letters, vi. 176—181. 
 
216 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 not by the opposition which had reached the lowest ebb of 
 its fortunes. It is probable that the Duke of Cumberland 
 abandoned, for the time being, his role of confidential 
 adviser to the whig party, and Newcastle, in despair at 
 the course events were taking, attended the house of 
 lords as little as possible \ Those, that were left to con- 
 tinue the battle, fought valiantly, but their efforts only 
 served to display their weakness. In accordance with 
 the programme, which had been agreed upon many 
 months before, Sir William Meredith moved in the house 
 of commons that the use of general warrants in cases of 
 libel was illegal; but the debate, though protracted, 
 was of no service to the opposition. Pitt was not present, 
 though the motion had been postponed in order that he 
 might be able to attend; and Charles Yorke, departing 
 from his bold attitude of the previous year, spoke with so 
 much caution and reserve that his speech was of little 
 value except to the government. Desertion and disaster 
 had thinned the ranks of the party which had once come 
 so near to victory on this very question; and an amend- 
 ment, which destroyed the original motion, was carried by 
 a majority of thirty-nine votes. "To be beaten on such 
 a question," wrote George Onslow who had been present 
 at the debate, "is too serious — I am sick and tired and 
 shocked 2 /' 
 
 If the opposition had failed to gain credit by attack- 
 ing general warrants, it was not likely that it would be 
 more successful in any other venture. Those, who had 
 led and directed the attacks upon the ministry in former 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32966, f. 82. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32965, f. 318. See also Add. MS. 32965, f. 311, f. 313, 
 f. 314, f. 316, f. 320; Walpole's Memoirs, n. 37 seq.; Walpole's Letters, vi. 
 185—187; Grenville Papers, in. 4—6; Hist. MSS. Comm. Weston 
 Underwood MSS. p. 382; Parliamentary History, xvi. 
 
THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 217 
 
 sessions, had either joined the enemy or withdrawn from 
 the contest; and, like sheep without a shepherd, the rem- 
 nant of a once respectable party was left undirected and 
 unadvised 1 . Opportunities were missed because they were 
 not seen; and Grenville, trusting in his predominance in 
 parliament, was able to sow the seed which produced the 
 revolt of the American colonies. He had already given 
 notice in the previous year that he intended to raise a 
 revenue in America ; and when on February 6th he 
 introduced the stamp bill in the house of commons, it 
 was in accordance with a carefully thought out policy 2 . 
 He knew that several of the American assemblies had 
 passed resolutions against the right of the English parlia- 
 ment to levy an internal tax upon the colonies, and it was 
 with the deliberate purpose of establishing that right 
 that Grenville brought forward his measure 3 . Ignorance 
 of American feeling cannot, therefore, be pleaded in his 
 
 1 "I find it is thought... that the bill which Mr Townshend opposed, 
 might have been thrown out if it had been better managed. But there 
 is no care taken in either house to apprize our friends of what is to come 
 on, or what is desired of them.. . .1 am sorry to tell you that your opposition 
 is in very low esteem here at Bath," Newcastle to Onslow. Add. MS. 
 32966, f. 79. 
 
 2 It is important to note, however, that Grenville cannot claim the 
 honour or dishonour of having originated the idea of imposing stamp 
 duties upon the American colonists. In a pamphlet, written by Henry 
 M'Culloh, an experienced colonial official, and submitted to Lord Bute 
 in 1761, great stress was laid upon the necessity of establishing "proper 
 funds in America, by a stamp duty on vellum and paper." There is ample 
 evidence to show that M'Culloh's suggestion was very carefully considered 
 by the ministers. Among the Hardwicke papers is a document, dated 
 October 10th, 1763, containing a list of the articles to be included in 
 a stamp act, and endorsed "10th October, 1763, was presented to 
 Mr Greenvill (sic), who approved it." See Our Concerns in America 
 by Henry M'Culloh; with an introduction by William A. Shaw. See 
 also Grenville Papers, n. 373, n. 1. 
 
 3 Hist. MSS. Coram. Weston Underwood MSS. p. 382. 
 
218 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 favour, nor would he have been inclined to shelter him- 
 self behind that excuse. He stood his stand upon what 
 he thought to be sound law, and in the name of a prin- 
 ciple defied the resistance of a nation. But he does not 
 stand alone in his guilt, for in the debate on February 6th 
 he found himself supported by Charles Townshend and 
 many of the opposition. Barre was almost the only one 
 who raised his voice in protest, and the ministry had a 
 triumphant majority of nigh upon two hundred 1 . Pitt, 
 alone, could have stayed Grenville's triumphant course, 
 and constructed a formidable party out of what was now 
 but the wreck of an opposition. But he refused to come 
 out of the retirement to which he had condemned himself. 
 In earlier days he had often attended the house, wrapped 
 in flannel and supported on crutches; but the energy and 
 spirit on behalf of liberty, which had formerly raised him 
 from the bed of sickness, no longer animated him. He 
 despaired of the opposition, and disapproved its tactics. 
 Though no one had been more violent in denouncing 
 general warrants, he now objected to the revival of that 
 question 2 ; and though no .one had excelled him as a 
 champion of parliamentary privilege when it had been 
 violated in the person of Wilkes, he now appeared un- 
 willing to take an active part in attacking the ministry 
 for dismissing Conway from his military command 3 . To 
 G-renville's proposal to tax America he took objection, and 
 was aggrieved because that measure had met with such 
 scanty resistance 4 . Lord Rockingham, who visited him 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32965, f. 346; Walpole's Memoirs, n. 56; Walpole's 
 Letters, vi. 187 — 191 ; Parliamentary History, xvi. 
 
 2 Walpole's Memoirs, n. 48. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32966, f. 39; Walpole's Memoirs, n. 48. 
 
 4 "I saw my Lord Rockingham this morning, whose account of 
 Mr Pitt I think so disagreeable a one that... I shall not be much displeased 
 if he stays away on the military question...! find he still harps upon the 
 
THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 219 
 
 about this time, came to the conclusion that Pitt would 
 never more unite with the whig party in opposition 1 . 
 He preferred to live in seclusion, waiting until he was 
 summoned by the king to take office 2 . There was nothing 
 mean or ignoble in such an attitude ; but it was fraught 
 with disastrous consequences for the whig party and, 
 indeed, for England. 
 
 While Pitt had been living in retirement, and Gren- 
 ville had been pursuing his triumphant and disastrous 
 course in parliament, the king had suffered the first 
 attack of that insanity which was to recur in a more 
 aggravated form in later years. On his recovery, he 
 instructed his ministers to prepare a regency bill which 
 should provide for the event of a minor succeeding to the 
 throne. The regency act of the previous reign was to 
 be taken as a model, except that no restriction was to 
 be placed on the king's right of nominating the regent.. 
 This important reservation of power to the crown was 
 open to serious objections, and was not approved by the 
 ministers; but they agreed at a cabinet meeting that 
 the bill should give the king the right of nominating as 
 regent "the queen or any other person of the royal family 
 usually residing in Great Britain " ; and George III 
 acquiesced in this immaterial limitation of his original 
 proposal 3 . Grenville and his colleagues had thus com- 
 plied with the royal wishes, but it was against their own 
 convictions ; and the prime minister had warned the king 
 of the difficulties that might ensue 4 . The latter remained 
 
 nonsense and falsehood of his being given up on the subject of the German 
 war last year, and is not without his complaints of the American tax 
 being not sufficiently objected to this year." Onslow to Newcastle, March 
 19th, 1765. Add. MS. 32966, f. 69. 
 i Add. MS. 32966, f. 69. 
 
 2 Ibid, and Fitzmaurice's Shelburne, i. 323, 324. 
 
 3 Grenville Papers, m. 15, 16, 125. 4 Grenville Papers, in. 127, 128. 
 
220 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 unshaken in his determination. It was not likely that he 
 would be touched by the remonstrances of his servants, 
 for he had already decided to cut short their tenure of 
 power. He intended to rid himself of advisers whom 
 he had already endured too long for his happiness and 
 peace of mind; and this resolution existed before the 
 ministers had given the king legitimate cause of offence 
 by their conduct over the regency bill. During the second 
 week of April, the Earl of Northumberland, acting as the 
 representative of the crown, informed the Duke of Cumber- 
 land that the king was weary of his ministers, and desired 
 to change them directly the regency bill had been passed 
 by parliament. Cumberland wisely refused to begin a 
 negotiation while the fate of an important measure was 
 still in suspense, nor would he be encouraged to under- 
 take the arduous task of forming an administration by 
 learning that Bute must be given a cabinet office 1 . 
 Northumberland's mission was productive of no result, 
 but it has an interest inasmuch as it shows that the king 
 was anxious to rid himself of Grenville, and was willing 
 to extend a friendly hand to the whig party in the hour 
 of its defeat. 
 
 But he was prepared to wait a little longer, and had 
 resolved that, before the Grenville ministry was dismissed, 
 the regency bill should have been converted into a 
 statute. The story of the passage of that bill through 
 the two houses of parliament has often been told. When 
 the measure was introduced into the house of lords, 
 debate centred round the clause under which the king 
 was to have the right of nominating as regent any member 
 of the royal family, and attention called to the fact that 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32966, f. 275. See also Rockingham Memoirs, 1. 185—190. 
 Newcastle's Narrative of the changes in the ministry 1765 — 1767 (edited 
 by Miss Mary Bateson), pp. 1 — 7. 
 
THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 221 
 
 the royal family had never been subjected to legal defi- 
 nition, which, though a point of little importance in itself, 
 was invested with considerable interest for the politicians 
 of the period. If the Princess of Wales was to be 
 regarded as a member of the royal family, she might 
 become regent on the death of her son, and serve as a 
 cloak for the power of Bute. The doubt once raised, it 
 was necessary to settle it; and it was with the royal 
 permission that Lord Halifax proposed and carried an 
 amendment by which the regency was limited to the 
 queen and those descendants of the late king, usually 
 resident in England. Thus the bill, as passed by the 
 upper house, excluded the Princess of Wales from the 
 regency. 
 
 Men were naturally astonished that the king should 
 have allowed a slight to be put on his mother, with whom 
 he had always lived on friendly and affectionate terms. 
 His conduct has been variously explained: and while 
 some, attributing to him a machiavellian cunning, think 
 that he was ready to allow the princess to be insulted in 
 order that he might have a legitimate grievance against 
 his ministers, others incline to believe that he gave his 
 consent to Halifax's amendment without fully understand- 
 ing its meaning. It is by no means improbable that he 
 acted under the influence of fear. He had good cause 
 to know how unpopular his mother and Lord Bute were; 
 and might with justice dread to furnish an excuse for 
 a further outcry against them. He naturally shrank 
 from making the princess a subject of parliamentary 
 debate; and, intimidated perhaps by the gloomy fore- 
 bodings of his ministers, decided to impose an indignity 
 upon her, rather than allow an insult to be inflicted by 
 others. But he had no sooner taken the step than he 
 repented of it. He had branded his mother as unfit for 
 
222 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 the discharge of a responsible duty, and proclaimed 
 himself to the world as lacking in filial respect; but, 
 fortunately, the mistake was not irretrievable. What 
 had been settled by the house of lords, could be altered 
 by the house of commons, and the king appealed to 
 Grenville to arrange for the insertion of the princess' 
 name in the bill during its passage through the lower 
 house. Grrenville was not inclined to obey. He had no 
 wish to help in the establishment of Bute's power, nor 
 was he prepared to inform the world that Lord Halifax 
 had either misunderstood or deceived his master. Re- 
 buffed by his prime minister, the king turned for help to 
 Lord Northington who, willing to act against his col- 
 leagues with whom he was in disagreement, arranged 
 that a member of the house of commons, known to be in 
 the confidence of the Princess of Wales, should propose 
 the insertion of her name in the bill. The motion was 
 carried without a division, and, on the final reading of 
 the bill in the lower house, only thirty-seven members 
 voted against the princess being qualified to become 
 regent. 
 
 The task, for which Grrenville had been retained in 
 power, was thus accomplished, and no sooner had the 
 regency bill been passed by the house of commons, than 
 the king set to work to bring about a change of ministry. 
 ~No one could be surprised that he was anxious to rid 
 himself of those who had induced him to inflict an insult 
 upon his mother; and, as any opposition worthy of the 
 name had ceased to exist, it was impossible to contend 
 that he had been driven to dismiss his ministers at the 
 command of parliament or the nation. G-renville and his 
 colleagues fell in the hey-day of their parliamentary 
 power, and their destruction was due to the king. No 
 better time could have been chosen. The whigs were 
 
THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 223 
 
 disheartened, divided, and ineffective. Without a defi- 
 nite political programme, living politically from hand to 
 mouth, they would, if called upon to take office, owe their 
 return to power to their failure and not to their success. 
 Pitt's position was but little better. Drawing himself 
 apart from those who had been, and were still, willing to 
 accept him as a leader, he had absented himself for many 
 weeks from parliament, and lived in gloomy retirement 
 at Hayes. He had definitely abandoned opposition; and 
 it was as true of him, as it was of the whigs, that only by 
 the king could he be restored to office. 
 
 Thus George III had little cause to be afraid of those 
 who at one time threatened to take the cabinet by storm. 
 Probably aware that Pitt was no longer on intimate 
 terms with Newcastle and his followers, he was prepared to 
 form an administration in which Pitt and the whig party 
 were both represented. Acting again on behalf of the 
 crown, Lord Northumberland visited Cumberland on 
 May 13th, and informed him that the king desired to 
 form a ministry to include Pitt, Lord Temple, and the 
 great whig families. Only a few persons were named 
 for office, among whom, however, was Northumberland 
 himself, who was to be at the head of the treasury. 
 Cumberland was willing enough, now that the fate of the 
 regency bill had been settled, to undertake the task thus 
 imposed upon him. He would be naturally anxious that 
 his whig friends should be once more restored to power; 
 and, though having little sympathy with Pitt, he probably 
 perceived the necessity of including him in the ministry. 
 For a week he was endeavouring to carry the king's 
 wishes to a successful conclusion. No difficulty was ex- 
 perienced with the whigs, and, if it had rested with them 
 alone, an administration would have been quickly formed. 
 But they feared to act without Pitt; and, unless the 
 
224 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 latter could be won, Cumberland was doomed to labour 
 in vain. It was here that the difficulty came. Pitt and 
 his brother-in-law, Temple, remained deaf to all arguments 
 and persuasion. They refused to come into the service 
 of the crown, and Cumberland was obliged to confess to 
 failure: the king was once more frustrated in the attempt 
 to rid himself of the ministers of whom he had long been 
 weary. 
 
 Thus another opportunity of giving the country a. 
 stable government was lost, and the culprit on this occa- 
 sion was Pitt. His conduct is not easy of explanation. 
 Both he and Temple stipulated as conditions of their 
 taking office that those officers in the army, who had 
 been dismissed from their posts because of the way they 
 had voted in parliament, should be restored, that steps, 
 should be taken to declare the illegality of general 
 warrants, and that alliances should be made with Russia 
 and Prussia in order to check the power of France and 
 Spain on the continent. Comprehensive as these demands 
 were, they were not refused by Cumberland. The first two 
 were fully accepted, and, if the king did not bind himself 
 to a change in foreign policy, he agreed to it if Pitt, after 
 taking office, continued to think it desirable 1 . Newcastle 
 believed that these demands were not responsible for the 
 failure of the negotiation, and it is not likely that Cum- 
 berland would have journeyed to Hayes unless he had 
 gained the royal consent to conditions, the fulfilment of 
 which Pitt had already declared to be essential to his 
 acceptance of office. It has also been suggested that 
 both Pitt and Temple were influenced by fear of Bute. 
 The negotiations with Cumberland had been first opened 
 by Northumberland whose son had married a daughter of 
 
 1 Grafton's Autobiography, p. 45; Newcastle's Narrative, p. 14. 
 For an opposite view, see Grenville Papers, in. 226. 
 
THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 225 
 
 the great Scotch earl; and Northumberland had origi- 
 nally been named for the office of first lord of the treasury. 
 No administration, which included Northumberland in an 
 important office, could be counted as safe from Bute's 
 influence, and if Pitt and Temple feared this danger, they 
 had ample excuse. Yet everything was done to allay the 
 alarm which had thus been aroused. The idea of giving 
 the treasury to Northumberland was at once abandoned 
 when it was found to encounter opposition; and Cumber- 
 land undertook that neither Bute nor his brother Mackenzie 
 should be allowed to interfere in the affairs of Scotland. 
 He also promised, as a pledge of the sincerity of the king's 
 intentions, that a certain number of those, who were 
 known to be attached to Bute and to regard him as their 
 leader, should be removed from their posts. More could 
 hardly have been done to reassure Pitt and Temple on 
 this delicate point, and if they still continued to feel alarm, 
 this must be ascribed to prejudice rather than to reason. 
 It is probable that Temple was the more violent of the 
 two. Pitt had always objected to the furious attack to 
 which Bute had been subjected, but Temple was a poli- 
 tician only too likely to be swayed by blind passion and 
 personal animosity. His influence over Pitt may have 
 possibly induced the latter to disbelieve Cumberland's 
 assurances, and it is clear that from the outset Temple 
 was opposed to giving serious consideration to the royal 
 proposals, and was surprised to find his brother-in-law 
 so willing to take office 1 . Yet, however much weight one 
 may attach to the influence that Temple was able to 
 exercise, it is impossible to believe that Pitt blindly fol- 
 lowed him against his own convictions. It is also equally 
 
 1 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 194, 195; Grafton's Autobiography, p. 45: 
 Add. MS. 32966, f. 420. 
 
 w. 15 
 
226 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 difficult to believe that Pitt was obsessed by a fear of 
 Bute; and it is necessary to account for his refusal by 
 some more sufficient reason. 
 
 The key to the puzzle may possibly be found to lie in 
 the relations between Pitt and the whig party. He had 
 definitely repudiated the party system which had become 
 an essential feature of the whig creed, and had with- 
 drawn into retirement rather than continue to fight as an 
 ally of those who practised and advocated a principle 
 of which he heartily disapproved. Refusing absolutely to 
 advise them or share in their counsels, he stood apart, 
 solitary and independent. In these circumstances he 
 might well feel disinclined to take office in an administra- 
 tion which was to be formed in accordance with Cumber- 
 land's advice 1 . It is clear that the negotiation had been 
 conducted in a manner of which he could not approve. 
 Instead of appealing directly to him, the king had turned 
 to Cumberland who naturally consulted with his whig 
 friends. Newcastle, Rockingham, and their followers had 
 been actively engaged in discussing arrangements before 
 Pitt had ever been approached, and the latter could not but 
 feel that, though included in the negotiation, he had not 
 been called upon to play the leading part. A negotiation 
 conducted in such a manner would be likely to result in 
 the construction of a whig administration; and in such 
 Pitt did not desire either to lead or to serve. It mattered 
 little to him that the proposal to place Northumberland 
 at the head of the treasury should be dropped, if that 
 office was to be given to Rockingham or some other 
 member of Newcastle's following. Pitt would not be 
 satisfied unless that post was held by Lord Temple, an 
 ally of his own, and not a follower of Newcastle 2 . When 
 
 1 Newcastle's Narrative, p. 10. 
 
 2 Apparently Cumberland intended to make Pitt understand that 
 
THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 227 
 
 all was over, and Cumberland had abandoned his task, 
 Pitt informed a friend that he had never been offered 
 carte blanche, and that it had never been intended that 
 it should be his administration 1 . He meant probably that 
 it was to be a whig ministry, and not one of his making; 
 and, what is more significant still, he hinted to his friend, 
 James Grenville, "an impossibility of ever being with 
 the Duke of Newcastle and his immediate friends 2 ." It 
 would seem, therefore, reasonable to believe that Pitt did 
 not object to any particular details, but to the principle 
 upon which the negotiation was conducted. He had 
 definitely broken with the whigs when in opposition, and 
 was not willing to unite with them in an administration 3 . 
 The bitter personal animosity, which he afterwards felt 
 against Newcastle, does not appear to have been in exist- 
 ence; and he was willing enough to enlist individual 
 whigs under his banner 4 , provided that they foreswore 
 allegiance to the party to which they belonged. It was 
 of the nature of a tragedy that this fundamental differ- 
 ence of opinion separated Pitt from those who could not 
 stand without him. He may have been right in thinking 
 that he could save the country, but he was wrong in 
 believing that he could dispense with the support of the 
 whig party. An opportunity was to be given him to put 
 his principles into practice ; and he encountered disaster 
 and failure. Limited in outlook as Newcastle often was, 
 his political insight, clearer than that of Pitt, enabled 
 him to see that a ministry, lacking any common bond of 
 
 Lord Temple was to have the treasury, but did not succeed in doing so. 
 Newcastle's Narrative, p. 19. 
 
 1 Grafton's Autobiography, p. 51. 
 
 2 Grafton's Autobiography, pp. 79, 80. 
 
 3 Von Ruville's William Pitt, Graf von Chatham, in. 160 ff . 
 
 4 Grafton's Autobiography, pp. 51, 52. 
 
 15—2 
 
228 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 union, lay at the mercy of the king, and was certain to 
 meet with an untimely fate whenever it presumed to 
 thwart the wishes of the crown 1 . 
 
 The negotiation having failed, the king was left in an 
 unenviable position. He had not been able to gain the 
 assistance either of Pitt or the whigs; and it was not 
 likely that help could be obtained from any other quarter. 
 Lord Lyttelton was asked to step into the breach, but he 
 wisely refused to undertake a task which would have 
 almost certainly proved beyond his capacity 2 . Cumberland 
 made a final attempt to win Pitt, and Lord Temple was 
 sent with a message to Hayes; but, like another famous 
 ruler, the king did not wait for an answer 3 , and, abandon- 
 ing all hope, threw himself upon the mercy of Grenville. 
 It was the second time that he had failed to rid himself 
 of that minister, and again Grrenville enjoyed his hour of 
 triumph. It was for him and his colleagues to state the 
 conditions upon which they would consent to remain in 
 the service of the crown. They knew that they no longer 
 possessed the confidence of the king who had vainly 
 endeavoured to find others to take their place; and, 
 smarting under the affront which had been put upon 
 them, they determined to make the fullest use of their 
 victory. They abused the advantage they possessed. They 
 scouted the idea of magnanimity, and, by the conditions 
 which they imposed, rendered themselves more hateful to 
 the crown than ever. If they could not be blamed for 
 demanding that Bute's influence should cease, they cer- 
 tainly committed a grave blunder in forcing the king to 
 
 1 For a general account of this negotiation, see Grafton's Auto- 
 biography, pp. 40—52; Grenville Papers, in. 37—40, 170—173, 225, 226; 
 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 191 — 203 ; Newcastle's Narrative, pp. 3 — 15. 
 
 2 Grenville Papers, in. 227 ; Grafton's Autobiography, p. 47. 
 
 3 Newcastle's Narrative, pp. 19, 20 ; Hist. MSS. Comm. 12th Report, 
 Appendix, ix. p. 255 ; Phillimore's Lyttelton, n. 676. 
 
THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 229 
 
 dismiss Mackenzie from the office of privy seal of Scot- 
 land. The latter had been promised security of tenure, 
 and the king was compelled to break his word at the 
 dictation of his ministers. He complied with the de- 
 mand, but the breach between him and his servants was 
 widened in consequence; for he was not the man to 
 forgive anyone for compelling him to act in a manner 
 unworthy of his honour. Another victim of the mini- 
 sterial hatred was Henry Fox, now Lord Holland, who 
 was deprived of his office of paymaster general. Few 
 outside his own domestic circle could have regretted his 
 fall. Men had not yet forgiven him for his conduct during 
 the time that he had managed the house of commons; 
 and he found few supporters in the hour of his adversity. 
 He had sacrificed his ambition and his principles for 
 the sake of money; and was deservedly distrusted and 
 despised, even by those who had made use of him. He 
 had clung to the office of paymaster for the sake of 
 the wealth that it brought; and it is not likely that the 
 king was unwilling to deprive him of it. His place was 
 taken by Charles Townshend who had long been angling 
 for the remunerative pos^\ and, by accepting it, finally 
 broke with the opposition . 
 
 It is hardly conceivab -■ that the king regarded this 
 settlement as permanent. He had become the slave of 
 his own servants, and had been forced to consent to 
 conditions which would have been rightly considered as 
 humiliating by the meanest of his subjects. His grand- 
 father, whom he had been taught to regard as far too 
 subservient to his ministers, had never been subjected to 
 such tyranny ; and if he felt compelled to give way for a 
 season, it was only that he might gain time to prepare to 
 
 1 Grenville Papers, in. 38, 40, 41, 176 — 190; Bedford Correspondence, 
 in. 278—281 ; Add. MS. 34713, f. 239. 
 
230 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 strike another blow. Grrenville and his colleagues had 
 been guilty of a fatal mistake. Instead of propitiating 
 the king, and trying to win his confidence by kindness,, 
 they had so wantonly insulted and humiliated him that 
 no possible evil in the future could be worse than the 
 degradation which he had already endured. He had,, 
 therefore, every excuse for attempting to undo what had 
 been done : and if the ministers believed that he was 
 willing to submit to the defeat which he had suffered and 
 cease to intrigue against them, they showed themselves, 
 strangely ignorant of the limits of human and royal 
 endurance. The outlook for the king was dark, but it 
 was certainly not hopeless. He had gained some advantage 
 by his recent negotiation, for he was now on friendly 
 terms with his uncle, the Duke of Cumberland, and the 
 whig party 1 . The past, if not forgotten, had at least been 
 forgiven ; and the king knew that the whigs were willing 
 to take office if the assistance of Pitt could be secured- 
 Thus everything depended upon the latter. If he would 
 consent to form a ministry, Grrenville could be dismissed, 
 and the king rescued from a state bordering on subjec- 
 tion. " The Duke's place, I think," wrote Newcastle, " is 
 to behave so to Mr Pitt that before the next session he 
 may come in cordially, and accept that what he has now 
 refused V 
 
 Barely more than a fortnight after these words were 
 written, another negotiation with Pitt had been begun- 
 The king had not scrupled to show his dislike of his 
 
 1 Cumberland informed Newcastle that he "had received a very kind 
 message from the king; and I believe it is intended on both sides to keep 
 up the present intimacy and confidence between them; if so, and that 
 our friends are thoroughly and cordially united amongst themselves, all 
 will do well." Newcastle to Rockingham, June 1st, 1765. Add. MS. 
 32967, f. 3. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32967, f. 3. 
 
THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 231 
 
 ministers, and had been lectured by the Duke of Bedford 
 " for not giving his confidence to those in whom he had 
 vested his authority." The president of the council had 
 spoken with emphasis, and had assured the king that if 
 he found himself unable to confide in his servants, it 
 became him to find others to succeed them 1 . Knowing 
 that he certainly could not confide in his ministers, and 
 ready to interpret Bedford's words in their widest sense, 
 the king was not slow to act upon the hint which had 
 thus been inadvertently given 2 ; and a few days after 
 this conversation, he was planning with the Duke of 
 Cumberland a negotiation with Pitt 3 . This was to under- 
 take an enterprise of no little daring; and whichever 
 way events turned, retreat would be impossible. If Pitt 
 continued obstinate, or if for any other cause the negotia- 
 tion failed, the king could not fall back upon the assistance 
 of Grenville. Twice he had publicly attempted to rid 
 himself of that minister, and he could not afford to confess 
 to failure a third time. If Pitt refused to come into office, 
 the king would be compelled to construct a cabinet without 
 him. The fall of the Grenville ministry was certain : all 
 that remained in doubt was the character of the adminis- 
 tration which would succeed it. 
 
 The negotiation, which had been carried on in the 
 previous May, had been opened by an offer to the whigs 
 who had been treated with independently of Pitt. This 
 time a different method was adopted. Instead of appealing 
 to the whigs, whom he knew to be ready to come to his 
 assistance, the king agreed to ask Pitt to come and see 
 him. Newcastle and his friends were thus excluded from 
 the negotiation, and their chance of obtaining office would 
 
 1 Grenville Papers, in. 194; Bedford Correspondence, in. 286 — 288. 
 
 2 Grenville Papers, in. 211—216. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32967, f. 48; Newcastle's Narrative, p. 22. 
 
232 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 depend upon the goodwill of Pitt. The latter could no 
 longer complain that he was asked to preside in a cabinet 
 which was not of his own making; and, therefore, the 
 grievance, which may have prevented him from accepting 
 the previous offer, no longer existed. It is difficult to say 
 whether this innovation was due to the king or the Duke 
 of Cumberland 1 ; but whoever was responsible could claim 
 the credit of a successful move. Pitt visited the king 
 twice, and on both occasions George III showed himself 
 compliant and anxious to come to terms 2 . He agreed 
 that general warrants should be condemned, that Pratt 
 should be made lord chancellor, that officers in the army, 
 who had been dismissed for votes given in parliament, 
 should be restored ancLthat an alliance should be formed 
 with Russia and Prussia if it were found to be practicable 3 . 
 After the second meeting, which took place on Saturday, 
 June 22nd, it was generally understood that Pitt had 
 consented to take office 4 . 
 
 Up to this point the king had met with a success 
 greater, perhaps, than he had anticipated. Pitt had 
 shown himself willing to accept office, and had only 
 asked for what the king had found himself able to grant. 
 But Newcastle was by no means so happy at the course 
 of the negotiation. He had not been consulted by Pitt, 
 and depended for this information upon the Duke of 
 Cumberland and Lord Albemarle who was in Cumberland's 
 confidence. It must have been clear to the meanest in- 
 telligence that, though individual whigs might be given 
 
 1 Newcastle's Narrative, p. 22; Add. MS. 32967, f. 48; Grenville 
 Papers, in. 52 — 54, 202; Harris' Hardwicke, in. 445 ff. 
 
 2 The king was apparently more ready to comply with Pitt's demands 
 at the second meeting than at the first. Grenville Papers, in. 60, 61. 
 
 3 Grafton's Autobiography, pp. 53, 83 — 86 ; Grenville Papers, in. 
 60, 61; Newcastle's Narrative, p. 23. 
 
 4 Add. MS. 32967, f. 103. 
 
THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 233 
 
 office, the administration was not to be representative of 
 the whig party. Newcastle knew that if he chose he 
 could be lord president of the council ' ; but it would be 
 little comfort to him, much as he might wish for power, to 
 sit in a cabinet which he had not assisted to construct. 
 He did not disguise his chagrin from his friends, and 
 informed Lord Ashburnham that, if Pitt formed an ad- 
 ministration, it would be in a way " not agreeable to us, 
 or to the public, or I should think to himself V He was 
 probably correct in his surmise as far as it affected him- 
 self and his party. Pitt, being given a free hand, was 
 evidently determined to choose his colleagues, not because 
 of their political connections, but on account of their 
 fitness for the work which he intended them to perform ; 
 and it may be because he had this freedom of selection 
 that he was willing to take office. Otherwise, it is difficult 
 to understand why he showed himself so obstinate in May, 
 and so compliant in June. On both occasions the king 
 had given his consent to the demands which Pitt made, 
 though in June he probably received fuller assurances of 
 the royal intention to follow the policy which he approved. 
 The difference in this particular can hardly be held to 
 account for the change in his attitude; and it would 
 appear far more probable that it was due to the exclusion 
 of Newcastle from the negotiation. If in May Pitt had 
 been summoned to visit the king, and allowed to nominate 
 his colleagues, Grrenville might have fallen from office 
 a month earlier than he actually did. 
 
 Yet, when all seemed settled, a change was to come 
 over the scene, which set the king once more adrift with- 
 out a ministry in which he could confide. Pitt had deter- 
 mined that Temple should be first lord of the treasury; 
 but, greatly to his surprise, the latter refused to take that 
 
 1 Newcastle's Narrative, p. 23. 2 Add. MS. 32967 June 21st, 1765. 
 
234 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 office or indeed any other. Argument and persuasion 
 were tried but with no effect. Though Temple knew that 
 Pitt would not take office without him, he remained firm 
 in his resolution, and Pitt was obliged to inform the king 
 that he must decline the task of forming a ministry. 
 The unexpected had happened, and what had been so 
 nearly achieved had to be begun all over again. 
 
 Two problems present themselves in connection with 
 this incident. It is not at all clear why Temple refused 
 to come into the service of the crown, and why Pitt 
 declined to form an administration without him. Temple's 
 conduct has been variously explained, and, probably, 
 no completely satisfactory solution will ever be offered. 
 It is likely that he was influenced by more than one 
 motive, and would perhaps have found it difficult him- 
 self to state the various causes of his refusal. Of a 
 jealous and intriguing disposition, he was possibly pro- 
 voked at the predominant part which Pitt had played 
 in the negotiations; and considered himself to be of 
 sufficient importance to have been consulted before every- 
 thing had been arranged. He was certainly angry at 
 the consideration shown to the followers of Lord Bute 1 ; 
 and it is not out of the question that he believed the 
 ministry, as Pitt had formed it, to be doomed to failure. 
 He certainly told the king that he was induced to refuse 
 the offer, which had been made, because of the difficulty 
 of forming a proper plan in regard to the house of 
 commons 2 . Pitt did not propose to attend parliament 
 regularly, pleading his health as an excuse 3 ; and Temple 
 might justly feel that, in his leader's absence, the ministry 
 might easily be overcome by a joint attack of the 
 
 1 Phillimore's Lyttelton, n. 676; Grenville Papers, in. 64. 
 
 2 Grenville Papers, in. 200, 201 ; Newcastle's Narrative, p. 24. 
 
 3 Phillimore's Lyttelton, n. 676; Newcastle's Narrative, p. 24. 
 
THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 235 
 
 members of the whig opposition, who had not been 
 given office, and the supporters of the previous ministry. 
 But Temple did not act from this motive alone : and he 
 was loud in proclaiming that he was influenced by reasons 
 of too delicate a nature to be revealed. He was commonly 
 understood to refer to his recent reconciliation with his 
 brother, Greorge Grenville; but he always denied this 
 interpretation of his words, and asserted that the recon- 
 ciliation was of a purely private character, and destitute 
 of any political significance 1 . Thus the matter stands: the 
 knowledge, which Temple denied to his contemporaries,, 
 has not been revealed to posterity; and his action still 
 awaits an explanation. 
 
 Interesting as it may be to speculate upon the cause 
 of Temple's refusal, it is of far greater importance to 
 understand its effect upon Pitt. It is not a little surpris- 
 ing to find him definitely abandoning the task of forming 
 a ministry on learning that Temple was determined not. 
 to take office. The latter, though an active politician, 
 had not risen to great eminence in the political world and,, 
 if it had not been for his wealth, his rank, and his kinship 
 with Pitt, would have been comparatively unknown. In 
 the administration, as it had existed at the beginning of 
 the reign, he had only occupied the unimportant post of 
 lord privy seal; and would have been held in little 
 consideration by his colleagues if he had not been known 
 to be a satellite of his brother-in-law. Thus he was of 
 little weight, and if Pitt deemed his services essential in 
 1765, it was not on account of his political influence. Nor 
 is it probable that Pitt was moved by considerations of a 
 more sentimental character. Temple had been his friend 
 for many years, and had rendered him financial assistance ; 
 but he could hardly be accused of ingratitude if, after 
 1 Phillimore's Lyttelton, n. 676. 
 
236 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 Temple had declined to come into office, he consented to 
 form an administration without him. Nor was Pitt likely 
 to sacrifice everything for a friend however dear. He 
 realised more clearly than many of his contemporaries his 
 duty to his country and his king. He saw, and perhaps 
 exaggerated, the evils of his time, and regarded the rule 
 of Grrenville as pregnant with disaster for the state ; and 
 if, holding such opinions, he refused to remedy the evils 
 which he saw, and to guard against the dangers which he 
 feared, lest he might be suspected of ingratitude to a 
 relation, he would have been guilty of misplaced chivalry 
 little short of criminal. His action must have been 
 dictated by worthier motives, and if he refused to take 
 office without Temple, it was because he considered his 
 aid to be essential to the success of his schemes. In- 
 considerable as he was, Temple was, for the time being, 
 indispensable. He must be given the treasury because 
 there was no one else who could be placed there with 
 safety 1 . If that office was filled by Newcastle, the whig 
 party would be given a position of authority in the 
 administration. The Marquis of Rockingham was equally 
 
 1 ' ' My Lord Temple, in his audience of the king, absolutely declined 
 coming into his majesty's service, for private reasons which he could not 
 disclose to anybody; but the publick one he gave was that, in the bad 
 state of Mr Pitt's health, as he (Lord Temple) was not in the house of 
 commons himself, it might frequently happen that Mr Pitt could not be 
 there ; that he could not be sure of Mr Pitt's assistance in the house of 
 commons, when perhaps he should be most in need of it ; and that he 
 had no other person in the house of commons upon whom he could 
 entirely depend.... 
 
 "Mr Pitt has been with the king since, and, as I hear, extremely 
 laments and blames my Lord Temple's refusal;... as his ill state of health 
 would frequently prevent him from attending his majesty, he should, 
 if my Lord Temple was not in his majesty's service, not have one person 
 whom he could trust to convey to his majesty his thoughts upon any 
 occasion wherein he might think his majesty's service is concerned." 
 Newcastle's Narrative, p. 24. 
 
THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 237 
 
 ineligible, for lie was closely allied with Newcastle : and 
 the Duke of Grraf ton, though attached to Pitt who thought 
 highly of his capacity, was an ardent member of the 
 opposition party, and too much in sympathy with the 
 whigs to be suitable. Chance had raised Temple to a 
 position from which he could afford to dictate terms. 
 Pitt was aware that his declining health would no longer 
 allow him to take an active part in business ; and if power 
 in the cabinet was not to fall into the hands of the whigs, 
 who would use it to strengthen their position as a party, 
 there must at least be one member of the administration, 
 holding high office, whom he could entirely trust, and 
 who was connected with no political faction but with 
 himself alone. Temple was the only man who could 
 satisfy these conditions; and when he refused to take 
 office, Pitt was obliged to abandon the hope of coming 
 into power. This was the price he was called upon to pay 
 for his determination not to preside over a cabinet re- 
 presentative of the whig party ; and he paid it. Willing 
 and even anxious as he was to take office, he preferred to 
 remain in retirement rather than form an administration 
 of which he did not approve. He had staked everything 
 upon the support of Temple, and that had failed him ; he 
 had been felled by a blow which he had not expected, 
 and against which he had not guarded. 
 
 Once more the king found himself in a dangerous 
 situation, and had good cause to reflect upon the difficulties 
 which beset a constitutional monarch who plays an active 
 part in politics. He had failed to attain the success which 
 had been so nearly in his grasp, and once more found 
 himself embarked upon a stormy sea, uncertain of any 
 harbour of refuge. When he intrigued against G-renville, 
 he had entered upon the conflict unprepared for emer- 
 gencies, and discovered to his cost that it is easier to 
 
238 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 destroy than to create. But lie had gone too far to be 
 able to retreat. It was impossible for him, unless he was 
 willing to surrender all power, to ask his present ministers 
 to continue in office; and he had no alternative but to 
 seek assistance from Newcastle and the whigs. He would 
 be saved from suffering further indignities if they 
 consented to serve him, and thus, when all other help had 
 failed, he turned to those whom he had formerly punished 
 and proscribed. It was by no means certain that they 
 would be prepared to come to the rescue of the king. 
 They might be, and apparently were, willing to forget old 
 grievances, for they were anxious to return to power ; but 
 they had only recently ref used to form a ministry without 
 the assistance of Pitt, and might still adhere to the opinion 
 they had then expressed. Moreover, they still feared 
 the influence which Lord Bute was supposed to exercise 
 over the king ; and it was likely that they would demand 
 some material assurances upon this point. 
 
 The negotiation with the whigs was conducted by the 
 Duke of Cumberland, and, though carried to a successful 
 conclusion, came once or twice near to failure. A certain 
 number of Newcastle's supporters were strongly opposed 
 to the idea of forming an administration without Pitt, and 
 the Duke of Cumberland, who was inclined to share this 
 view, was only persuaded to persevere in the task, which 
 he had undertaken, by the exhortations of Newcastle 1 . 
 It had also been agreed at a meeting of the whig party 
 on June 30th to request the king to remove the more 
 important of Lord Bute's friends from the offices they 
 held, and, also, not to restore Mackenzie to the post of 
 which Grrenville had deprived him 2 ; but these demands 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32967, f. 186; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 218—220; New- 
 castle's Narrative, p. 26. 
 
 2 Pitt had been willing to allow several of Lord Bute's friends to retain 
 
THE FALL OF GEORGE GRENVILLE 239 
 
 were only partially complied with, and the Duke of 
 Newcastle was aggrieved by the imperfect fulfilment of 
 the conditions which he and his friends had all agreed 
 must be assented to before they could take office 1 . But 
 both parties to the negotiations were too anxious to come 
 to an understanding to permit of failure, and Newcastle 
 and his followers once more found themselves in office. 
 Driven into a corner, fearing to offend the king by 
 refusing to come to his assistance, and disheartened by 
 their fruitless efforts in opposition, they took their fate 
 into their hands, and came into power without Pitt. 
 
 their offices, and had been anxious that Mackenzie should again be given 
 the post of privy seal of Scotland, only stipulating that this office should 
 be treated as a sinecure and divested of all authority. Rockingham 
 Memoirs, i. 213, 214. 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32967, f. 186, f. 220; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 218—220; 
 Lord Despenser was removed, and Mackenzie was not restored, but Lord 
 Litchfield was left in the enjoyment of his office. 
 

 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY. 
 
 THE ministerial revolution, which took place in July, 
 1765, constitutes a landmark in the reign of George III. 
 Five years had passed since the king had come to the 
 throne and set to work to regain for the crown the 
 authority it had lost. He had achieved much. He had 
 been able to dispense with the services of Pitt, and had 
 succeeded in driving Newcastle from office. In alliance 
 with Bute, he had freed the country from a lengthy 
 and exhausting contest ; and had compelled Wilkes, the 
 popular hero of the hour, to eat the bread of exile. No 
 man could now afford to despise or to neglect the royal 
 power. While yet a young man, and within a few years 
 of his accession George III had materially increased and 
 extended the influence of the crown. But, though his 
 efforts had been attended with a considerable measure of 
 success, his career had not been unchequered by failure 
 and disappointment. He had failed to gain the approval 
 of the nation, and could not claim to play the part which 
 Bolingbroke had designed for a truly constitutional 
 monarch. Nor had he found his ministers always willing 
 to submit to his will. As long as Bute remained in office, 
 the relation between the king and the first minister had 
 been friendly and harmonious; but, when the favourite 
 was succeeded by G-renville, G-eorge III was not slow to 
 discover how much he had profited by the friendship of 
 
THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 241 
 
 Bute. The most violent whig could not have been more 
 objectionable to the king than George Grenville and his 
 colleagues. They had forced him to break his word, and 
 had not scrupled to lecture him upon his conduct. He 
 found himself subjected to humiliations such as his grand- 
 father had never endured, and on three separate occasions 
 he appealed to Pitt for deliverance from a tyranny which 
 threatened to become intolerable. When all hope had 
 vanished, and it seemed likely that he would be obliged 
 to surrender himself once more to the tender mercies of 
 Grenville, he was rescued by those whom he had driven 
 from his service, and overwhelmed with indignities and 
 insults. Newcastle and his friends once more found 
 themselves in the service of the crown. Their work lay 
 ready to their hand. A powerful whig administration at 
 this particular juncture could not have failed to exercise 
 a decisive influence upon the course of events. Chastened 
 by recent adversity, and bearing in hourly remembrance 
 what he had suffered, the king might have refrained from 
 intriguing against a ministry strong enough to defend 
 itself. The strained relations between England and the 
 American provinces called for instant measures to be 
 taken, if worse disasters were to be averted; and if the 
 new ministers succeeded in pacifying the provoked 
 colonists without sacrificing the dignity and prestige of 
 the mother country, they would acquire a popularity 
 at home which would go far towards rendering them free 
 from intrigues at court or attacks in parliament. 
 
 Unfortunately, however, the administration was not 
 capable of accomplishing the work it had undertaken. 
 Disregarded by the nation, which still centred its affection 
 on Pitt, the whigs had conquered by their weakness and 
 not by their strength. They had not fought their way 
 into the cabinet, and their fortunes had never stood at so 
 w. 16 
 
242 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 low an ebb as when they were called upon by the king 
 to take office. Death and desertion had thinned their 
 ranks and depressed their spirits. Repudiated by Pitt, 
 it was only after much hesitation that they decided 
 to obey the king and form an administration. Conscious 
 that they possessed but a scanty following in parlia- 
 ment, they knew that they would depend upon the 
 support of those who voted with any government as long 
 as it was approved by the king: a sorry position for 
 men who believed in the principles of party government 
 and in restricting the authority of the crown. A modern 
 ministry in similar circumstances would appeal to the 
 country; but recourse to a general election did not com- 
 mend itself to the whigs, knowing, as they did, that it 
 would do little to improve their position unless they were 
 allowed to make use of the influence of the crown 1 . It 
 was unlikely that the king would permit his ministers to 
 wield in their own interests such a valuable weapon of 
 corruption; and it was probably wiser for them to continue 
 the parliament, as it was, than to appeal to the country on 
 their own merits. The greater safety lay in a policy of 
 inaction, but it was clear that the king would have no 
 cause to fear those whom he could always thwart by 
 rallying the placemen in defence of the throne. 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32969, f. 390. "I admit," wrote Newcastle to Lord 
 Albemarle, "that the administration may have a considerable majority 
 in both houses : but that majority must be made up of their enemies, 
 creatures of the two last administrations, and such as are influenced 
 only by their employments and their interest. Such a majority will last 
 no longer than they find the administration carries everything clearly 
 and roundly. The moment there is the least check, they return to their 
 vomit; and vote according to their conveniences (if they have any) or 
 at least consistently with their manner of voting during this reign." 
 Newcastle, however, was strongly of the opinion that it would be unwise 
 to have a general election if the ministers were not allowed to make use 
 Of the influence of the crown in all places. Add. MS. 32969, f. 392. 
 
THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 243 
 
 Thus it seems that the ministers were embarked upon 
 a forlorn hope ; and they were but ill qualified for success 
 in such a hazardous enterprise. By taking the office of 
 first lord of the treasury, the Marquis of Rockingham 
 placed himself at the head of the administration 1 . Young, 
 wealthy, and neither a time-server nor desirous of political 
 distinction, he was generally liked and respected for his 
 many good qualities. But even his most fervent admirers 
 have never contended that he was adapted by nature to 
 be a leader of men or a champion of a lost cause. Nor 
 can the charm of his private character be held to com- 
 pensate for his lack of political ability. Shy and retiring 
 by disposition, a poor speaker, and rarely taking part in 
 debate, he was the pilot who shunned rather than weathered 
 the storm. He was not in any sense a great man ; and if 
 his colleagues had been men of commanding ability, it is 
 not likely that he would have been more than the figure 
 liead of the administration 2 . Unfortunately for him and 
 for the country, his companions in the cabinet were, for 
 the most part, youthful and inexperienced politicians. 
 The two secretaries of state were General Conway and 
 
 1 "The putting my Lord Rockingham at the head of the treasury, 
 and thereby the making him first minister, was done without my 
 immediate knowledge, but very much with my approbation, for I profess 
 to you, now, he is the person in all England I wish there." (Newcastle's 
 Narrative, p. 36.) 
 
 2 Lord Rockingham's secretary was Edmund Burke; and it is not 
 easy to estimate the latter's political influence. In June, 1766, Lord 
 Buckinghamshire wrote to Grenville, "Lord Albemarle and Mr Bourk 
 (I think that is the name not of Lord Rockingham's right hand but of 
 both his hands) evidently direct the wires which move our political 
 puppets there... Mr Bourk, descended from a garret to the head of our 
 administration, is a metaphysician, a man of learning and imagination, 
 a garret is a very proper situation for those who mean to read the stars, 
 but the springs, which decide upon the fate of nations, lay nearer the 
 earth." Add. MS. 22358, f. 35. 
 
 16—2 
 
244 PEKSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 the Duke of Grafton. The former had suffered for his 
 political opinions, and was to prove himself the ablest 
 member of the cabinet ; but he was seriously deficient in 
 personal charm, and, though capable of inspiring con- 
 fidence, was not likely to gain popularity 1 . The Duke 
 of Grafton had been an active and enthusiastic member 
 of the whig opposition but he was not of the stuff of 
 which great statesmen are made, and was lacking in 
 political experience. Like Rockingham, he was happier 
 on Newmarket heath than in the house of lords ; and his 
 private life was not free from scandal. Earlier in his 
 political career, he had attached himself to Pitt who 
 formed a high opinion of his ability; and he had only 
 consented to take office under Rockingham on the condition 
 that directly Pitt should express a wish to join the ad- 
 ministration he should be allowed to do so. Thus from 
 the outset an important member of the government was 
 divided in his allegiance, and acknowledged as his leader 
 one who had no place in the ministry. 
 
 The most experienced member of the cabinet was, 
 undoubtedly, the Duke of Newcastle. True to the pledge 
 he had given, the old whig leader contented himself with 
 the office of privy seal, to which, however, the ecclesiastical 
 patronage of the crown was annexed 2 . Newcastle was 
 now an old man, and incurred the fate of those who 
 outlive their age. Times had changed, and those who 
 had known him in the heyday of his power were either 
 dead or pursuing an opposite path. The administration, 
 of which he now found himself a member, was largely 
 composed of men who had been boys at school when he 
 
 1 Walpole's Memoirs, 11. 148 ff. 
 
 2 It has been said that this was done at Newcastle's own request, but 
 the arrangement appears to have been suggested by the king. Add. MS. 
 32968, f. 264; Newcastle's Narrative, p. 33. 
 
THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 245 
 
 was already a leading politician. He was a relic of an old 
 world ; and, though capable of the self-denial involved in 
 the acceptance of a subordinate office, was not enough of 
 a stoic to bear with equanimity the neglect which would 
 be certain to follow the loss of his influence. But New- 
 castle was certainly not the only element of weakness in 
 the administration. William Dowdeswell, the chancellor 
 of the exchequer, was a dull though painstaking politician, 
 and little is known of Lord Winchelsea, the lord president 
 of the council. Lord Northington continued as lord 
 chancellor, and would be as likely to be as disloyal to 
 Buckingham as he had been to Grenville ; Lord Egmont 
 remained at the admiralty, and Lord Barrington was 
 appointed secretary at war. 
 
 The inclusion of Northington, Egmont, and Barrington 
 in an administration, supposed to be representative of 
 whig principles, has been commonly attributed to the 
 influence of the king. Lord Northington certainly had 
 no love for the whig party, and frankly avowed his 
 intention of thwarting and hindering his new colleagues 1 ; 
 but it is open to doubt whether he owed his inclusion in 
 the cabinet solely to the royal favour. It is by no means 
 unlikely, strange as it may seem, that the whigs were 
 willing, and even anxious, to continue Northington in the 
 office which he had occupied under Grenville. If a new 
 lord chancellor was appointed, the choice would lie be- 
 tween Pratt and Charles Yorke ; and it would not be easy 
 to decide between their rival claims. Weighty political 
 interests would be involved in the selection. If Yorke 
 was chosen, Pitt would be deeply offended; and if, in 
 order to please the latter, Pratt was promoted to the 
 woolsack, Charles Yorke and his family would probably 
 vent their disappointment by going into opposition. A 
 1 Grenville Papers, in. 210. 
 
246 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 middle course was consequently adopted. Northington 
 was continued as chancellor, Pratt was created a peer, 
 and Charles Yorke, gratified by the royal promise that 
 he should be created lord chancellor within a year ', was 
 persuaded to accept his former office of attorney-general. 
 This arrangement was attended by all the dangers of a 
 compromise. The ministers might congratulate themselves 
 upon avoiding an immediate evil, and averting the danger 
 of offending Pitt ; but they could hardly be blind to the 
 fact that Northington would always be their enemy. If 
 their hands had been free, if they had not been a in the 
 fell clutch of circumstance," they might have hesitated, 
 even at the risk of offending the king, before allowing 
 such a veteran intriguer to continue in office. 
 
 If Egmont and Barrington were less dangerous than 
 Northington, they believed as little as he did in the 
 theories of Newcastle and his friends. Lord Egmont had 
 been a leading member of the Leicester House party, 
 and Barrington, as has been already remarked, adhered 
 to the principle that the first duty of a minister was 
 obedience to the crown. The king was doubtless well 
 pleased that they should be given office, but it is open 
 to question whether the royal wishes would have been 
 considered if more suitable candidates could have been 
 discovered. It is certain that many of the leading 
 politicians of the day were unwilling to risk their reputa- 
 tion by joining a ministry which appeared doomed to 
 disaster. Charles Townshend, who was happy enough as 
 paymaster general, refused to become either chancellor of 
 
 1 Add. MS. 35428, f. 1. Amongst the Hardwicke Papers is a document, 
 dated July 4th, 1765, containing an account by Charles Yorke of a con- 
 versation with the king. According to Yorke, "the king declared that 
 he was resolved to give him the great seal in less than a twelvemonth 
 (everything on this subject said with earnestness)." Add. MS. 35428, 
 f. 94. 
 
THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 247 
 
 the exchequer or secretary of state ; and Hardwicke, 
 Lyttelton and Shelburne were equally reluctant to throw 
 in their lot with what seemed a lost cause 1 . Repeating 
 the lesson that Pitt had taught him, Shelburne declared 
 that "measures and not men" would be the rule of his 
 conduct; and Rockingham quickly learned how difficult 
 it is to persuade men to incur the risk of failure. 
 
 It cannot be denied that those, who believed the 
 ministers incapable of fulfilling the task they had 
 undertaken, were substantially correct in their opinion. 
 Rockingham and Grafton had still to prove their capacity 
 as statesmen, and nothing that Newcastle could do would 
 destroy the reputation for incapacity which his enemies 
 had fastened upon him. It seemed as if inexperience had 
 linked hands with inefficiency, and the union did not 
 promise success. The ministers, themselves, were conscious 
 of their own weakness. They knew that they had been 
 chosen neither by parliament nor by the people but by 
 the king; and that they depended upon him for the 
 extent and duration of their power. This was but little 
 removed from a state of subservience. If they continued 
 as they had begun, they would either have to violate the 
 principles they professed, or face the prospect of being 
 driven from office the first time they dared to thwart the 
 royal will. It needed no great insight to perceive that 
 if they were to accomplish the work for which they 
 had taken office, and repair the evil which their pre- 
 decessors had wrought, they must find some other basis 
 for their power than the approval of the court. In 
 office, as in opposition, they found that they needed the 
 assistance of Pitt. Though he had withdrawn into retire- 
 ment, he remained the national hero, and was still regarded 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32967, f. 193; Grenville Papers, in. 67—72; Rockingham 
 Memoirs, i. 234—236. 
 
248 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 as the one man capable of bringing peace to a distracted 
 country. The new ministers were confronted by the fact 
 that the confidence of the people would be withheld from 
 any administration of which Pitt was not a member, or 
 to which at least he did not give his approval 1 . 
 
 No one has ever doubted that the whig leaders were 
 genuinely anxious for his assistance. They had hesitated 
 to act without him, and would probably have refused to 
 come into office unless they had felt confident that he 
 would soon throw in his lot with them. From the outset 
 they sought to please him, and no one was more zealous 
 in this cause than Newcastle, For this reason Pratt was 
 promoted to the peerage as Lord Camden, and negotiations 
 begun for an alliance with Prussia 2 ; but it was all in 
 vain. At one time Rockingham believed that Pitt was 
 favourably inclined towards the ministry 3 , but rumours 
 to an opposite effect soon began to circulate, and were 
 eagerly credited 4 . When the Duke of Grafton appealed 
 to Pitt to declare his opinions, the latter returned an 
 answer characteristically vague. He blew neither hot 
 nor cold. He neither approved nor condemned the 
 ministry, and disclaimed all responsibility for a cabinet 
 which he had not assisted to construct. He hinted at 
 an objection to the Duke of Newcastle, declaring that 
 he could hardly be expected to give his confidence to an 
 
 1 "Here," wrote Lord Chesterfield to his son in July 1765, "is a new 
 political arch almost built, but of materials of so different a nature, and 
 without a keystone, that it does not, in my opinion, indicate either strength 
 or duration. It will certainly require repairs, and a keystone, next winter ; 
 and that keystone will and must necessarily be Mr Pitt." (Chesterfield's 
 Letters, edited by John Bradshaw, in. 1322.) 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32967, f. 354 ; Add. MS. 32968, f. 166, f. 212. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32967, f. 234. 
 
 4 Hist. MSS. Comm. Stopford Sackville MS. i. 100—102; Grenville 
 Papers, in. 78, 79, 85; Bedford Correspondence, in. 315 — 317. 
 
THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 249 
 
 administration in which that statesman had a seat 1 . 
 Short of actual denunciation, nothing could have been 
 less hopeful than this utterance. The objection to the 
 party system, which had prevented Pitt from uniting 
 cordially with the whigs against Bute and Grrenville, still 
 dictated his policy. The cabinet had been formed on a 
 plan of which he could not approve because the selection 
 of members had been influenced largely by their political 
 connections. He credited Newcastle, whom he distrusted 
 as the greatest exponent of the party system, with more 
 influence than he actually possessed, and saw in him the 
 guiding spirit of the administration. It was no personal 
 objections, no petty feelings of jealousy, but a difference 
 of principle that divided Pitt from those who were so 
 anxious for his assistance. 
 
 Fortunately for their peace of mind, the ministers still 
 remained in happy ignorance of the ground of Pitt's 
 reluctance to extend to them his approval. They lived in 
 hope that one day he would consent to cover them with 
 the lustre of his name. And indeed they had need of all 
 the encouragement they could gain. The future was 
 dark and uncertain, and from the beginning things began 
 to go awry. Newcastle discovered to his vexation that 
 a subordinate position has its drawbacks as well as its ad- 
 vantages, and that youth is often wanting in the respect 
 which age always claims as its due. He found himself 
 neglected by his colleagues who omitted to inform him 
 of what he thought he ought to know; and complained 
 bitterly of the treatment he suffered at the hands of men 
 young enough to be his children 2 . Nor was Newcastle 
 the only discontented member of the administration. 
 Lord Egmont was known not to approve of an alliance 
 
 1 Grafton's Autobiography, pp. 58 — 59. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32969, f. 201, f. 246; Add. MS. 32971, f. 177. 
 
250 PERSONAL AND PAETY GOVERNMENT 
 
 with Prussia, and no reliance could be placed on a political 
 adventurer like Northington. The pillar of strength, to 
 which the ministers clung, was the Duke of Cumberland. 
 Unfortunately, he was now waning in health and crippled 
 by disease. Fate had not dealt kindly with him. In 
 the course of a long life he had suffered much sadness 
 and many disappointments. Successful in his campaign 
 against the Jacobites, he had acquired a reputation as a 
 general which he speedily lost by his failure in the seven 
 years' war. By his treatment of the Scotch rebels, he had 
 earned a name for cruelty which was remembered long 
 after men had forgotten that he had saved England from 
 a great disaster. After the death of his elder brother, it 
 was commonly thought that he was scheming to supplant 
 his nephew on the throne ; and during the early years of 
 his reign, George III was not on friendly terms with his 
 uncle whom he distrusted as a supporter of the opposition. 
 When, however, Cumberland rescued the king from the 
 tyranny of Grenville, he was once more taken into favour 
 at court; and was, therefore, in a position to play the 
 part of mediator between the crown and the Rockingham 
 administration, should occasion arise. Nor was it by any 
 means unlikely that the ministers would have need of his 
 services. There was work to be done, especially in regard 
 to the American colonies, which might easily provoke a mis- 
 understanding between the king and his servants ; and at 
 such a crisis, Cumberland could have rendered invaluable 
 assistance. He frequently attended cabinet councils 1 , 
 and might have succeeded in guiding the administration 
 through many dangerous channels; but death took him 
 when he was most needed. He died suddenly on the last 
 day of October, 1765, and the whigs lost a friend whom 
 they could ill afford to spare. 
 
 1 Grafton's Autobiography, p. 55. 
 
THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 251 
 
 The immediate effect of Cumberland's death was to 
 weaken the administration, and to render Pitt's assistance 
 all the more necessary. As the ministers were now less 
 certain of the support of the court, it was incumbent upon 
 them to endeavour to win the approval of the nation. 
 Newcastle has often been accused of gross selfishness and 
 base treachery ; but, on this occasion at least, his conduct 
 must satisfy the most captious of his critics. He saw the 
 opportunity, and was anxious to take it, even to his own 
 undoing. Though fully aware that Pitt bore him no good 
 will, he was ready to sacrifice himself for the cause he 
 had at heart. He understood that the assistance of Pitt 
 was more indispensable than ever, and urged that a 
 message should be sent to him, believing that all would 
 go well if the world could be convinced that Pitt approved 
 of the administration. It would be enough if he consented 
 to accept a peerage at the hands of the ministers 1 . The 
 king and Rockingham agreed to the proposal, and it was 
 arranged that Grafton, who would be likely to receive a 
 favourable hearing, should open the negotiation. It is 
 possible that the young duke might have found his task 
 unexpectedly easy. A few days after Cumberland's death, 
 Pitt, writing to Thomas Walpole, mentioned that " those 
 who with me have stood by the cause of liberty and the 
 national honour upon true revolution principles, will 
 never find me against them till they fall off and do not 
 act up to those principles 2 ." Walpole, understanding this 
 message to mean that Pitt was prepared to join the 
 administration, communicated the important passages in 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32971, f. 289. "Your grace," wrote Newcastle to Grafton, 
 "knows Mr Pitt's disposition towards me too well to imagine that I can 
 have any view in this with regard to myself. I mean only the king's 
 service, the quiet and satisfaction of the nation, and the ease and success 
 of his majesty's present ministers." Ibid. 
 
 2 Chatham Correspondence, n. 328 — 330. 
 
252 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 the letter to Rockingham, and informed Pitt of what he 
 had done. If Walpole was correct in his interpretation, 
 the ministry could not have chosen a better time at which 
 to make an overture ; and Newcastle was greatly disgusted 
 to learn that his scheme had been abandoned. He at 
 least was not to blame for any ill effects that followed. 
 
 It is impossible to dogmatise on Pitt's inclinations at 
 this moment, and Rockingham may have been right in 
 thinking that an exaggerated importance had been 
 attached to a stray remark ; but, when all deductions are 
 made, it must be admitted that the ministers failed to 
 avail themselves of what might have proved to be a 
 favourable opportunity. It is not improbable that Pitt 
 was offended by the independent attitude adopted by 
 them ; and, if this was the case, it would account for the 
 increased hostility he displayed towards Newcastle. The 
 old duke was made the scapegoat for an offence of which 
 he was entirely guiltless 1 . 
 
 It is in vain to speculate upon the cause of Rocking- 
 ham's reluctance to approach Pitt. Youthful, and of a 
 sanguine temperament, he may easily have underrated 
 the difficulties which confronted him, and imagined that 
 an appeal to the great commoner would be construed as 
 a sign of weakness. Nor was it only in this particular 
 that the ministers, or at least some of them, appeared 
 prepared to run the risk of alienating the man whom they 
 wished to have as an ally. The idea of a treaty with 
 Prussia was abandoned 2 , and the office of vice-treasurer 
 of Ireland was conferred upon Lord G-eorge Sackville. 
 Pitt had neither forgotten nor forgiven Sackville's be- 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32971, f. 289, f. 341; Add. MS. 32972, f. 21, f. 60, f. 95; 
 Add. MS. 32973, f. 230, f. 244 ; Chatham Correspondence, n. 333, 342, 343, 
 345, 346. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32972, f. 126. 
 
THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 253 
 
 haviour at the battle of Minden ; and his promotion to a 
 place in the administration would be counted as a new- 
 offence committed by the ministers. Not Newcastle, but 
 Rockingham, Grafton, and Conway were responsible for 
 this unfortunate exercise of ministerial patronage ; and it 
 is to their discredit that they refused to listen to the advice 
 of one who was older and, on this occasion at least, wiser 
 than they were 1 . Thus Rockingham and his colleagues 
 stand convicted of pursuing a policy only too likely to 
 arouse the anger of the man whom they should have 
 sought to please. Little more than four months had 
 elapsed since they had taken office ; but during that time 
 they had lost a valuable ally at court, and had succeeded 
 in widening the breach between themselves and Pitt. 
 In the eyes of the public the administration appeared no 
 more stable than it did at the beginning of its career ; and 
 it is not surprising that both North and Barre refused 
 places in a ministry which seemed doomed to a speedy 
 destruction 2 . 
 
 The outlook was all the more serious inasmuch as bad 
 news was coming from America. The glove, which 
 G-renville had thrown down, had been quickly taken up 
 by the colonists ; and the stamp act had been met with a 
 storm of opposition. The first step had been taken along 
 the road which was to lead to the most disastrous war 
 waged by England during: the 18th century. In spite of 
 the restrictions imposed iii the interests of the mother- 
 country, trade and industry had generally flourished 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32972, f. 93, f. 100, f. 126. "I own," writes Newcastle to 
 Rockingham on December 1st, ' f I am very doubtful what effect Lord 
 George's accession will have; with our own friends certainly a bad one. 
 But what I lament the most, I am afraid it will quite alienate Mr Pitt ; 
 and I know our good friend Jemmy Grenville...I dread this of Lord George 
 Sackville, I am sure you do the same." Add. MS. 32972, f. 95. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32972, f. 95. 
 
254 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 throughout the plantations; and the conditions of life 
 were such as to foster a spirit of independence and a 
 resentment of interference. The colonists were in no 
 mood to suffer what they considered a new and un- 
 justifiable imposition; and Grrenville, who, at the worst 
 was guilty of legal pedantry and lack of statesmanship, 
 presented himself to their imaginations as a dark and 
 brooding tyrant intent upon destroying liberty wherever 
 he found it. The Virginian house of burgesses declared 
 against the stamp act on the ground that it violated the 
 principle of no taxation without representation. In Boston 
 and other towns serious riots broke out. The new stamps 
 were seized and destroyed, and those commissioned to put 
 the act into execution, discharged their duties at the peril 
 of their lives. An assembly, which styled itself a congress 
 of the committee of the several houses of representatives 
 of the British colonies, met at New York, and passed a 
 resolution that the stamp act tended to subvert the rights 
 and liberties of the colonists 1 , and from Massachusetts 
 Bay and Rhode Island came petitions to the king and 
 parliament asking for the repeal of the obnoxious tax 2 . 
 
 It was impossible for any statesman to avoid recog- 
 nising the serious character of the opposition which had 
 thus been aroused by Grenville's ill-judged measure. 
 The discontent, which had been evoked, was not confined 
 to a single province; and the mother country found 
 itself threatened by what might prove to be a national 
 resistance. By his assertion of the rights of parliament 
 over the colonists, Grrenville had sown the seeds of revo- 
 lution in a soil prepared for their reception; and those, 
 who succeeded him in office, had to solve a difficulty 
 which was not of their own making. It was a task 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32971, f. 113. 2 Add. MS. 32971, f. 116, f. 120. • 
 
THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 255 
 
 which might have taxed the strength and discretion of 
 the most efficient administration. 
 
 The problem was by no means easy of solntion. The 
 right of parliament to levy an internal tax in America 
 had been definitely asserted and as definitely repudiated ; 
 and the ministers had to discover the proper course to 
 pursue towards those who refused to acknowledge the 
 supremacy of the mother country. It was a question 
 not for lawyers but for statesmen to decide. If the 
 English government, disregarding the complaints of the 
 colonists, insisted upon the enforcement of the act, it 
 might be necessary to have recourse to the sword. 
 England might prevail in the struggle, but it would 
 be at the cost of a legacy of hatred and bitterness which 
 would take many years to eradicate. But an opposite 
 line of policy was not without serious disadvantages. It 
 is always easy to mistake conciliation for weakness. If 
 the stamp act was repealed in answer to the complaints 
 of the colonists, further concessions might be demanded 
 from the mother country. Encouraged by their success, 
 the Americans might seek to free their trade from the 
 restrictions imposed by England; and, by gradual en- 
 croachment, presume on the conciliatory spirit of the 
 government until their demand for independence became 
 irresistible. Thus the problem, winch confronted the 
 ministers, was one of no small difficulty. Whatever solu- 
 tion was adopted, it would be certain to meet with hostile 
 criticism. G-renville, who had the legal cast of mind, and 
 could not understand that it is not always expedient to 
 enforce a right, could be counted upon to oppose the 
 repeal or modification of his measure ; and he would have 
 the support of his brother, Lord Temple, who in this 
 particular was in agreement with him. It was also 
 likely that many would oppose any modification of the 
 
256 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 stamp act, regarding such a policy as a concession to 
 rebellion and the establishment of a dangerous precedent. 
 On the other hand, Pitt had already declared his dis- *\ 
 approval of the act, and if the ministers determined to 
 uphold it, they must forswear all hope of ever persuading 
 him to throw in his lot with them. Thus many factors 
 had to be taken into consideration before it was possible 
 to arrive at a decision. It might be wise to restore peace 
 in America and to purchase the support of Pitt ; but it J 
 would be at the risk of arousing the opposition of a 
 powerful party in parliament and, perhaps, of offending 
 the king. The arguments in favour of opposite policies 
 were too evenly balanced for a decision to be easy. 
 
 Parliament was summoned to meet early in January, 
 1766 ', and it was foreseen that the American question 
 would be the most important subject of debate. The 
 ministers were not united on a policy; the crisis, which 
 had thus suddenly arisen, found them unprepared. Some 
 were in favour of a total repeal of the act; others pre- 
 ferred modification. When the cabinet met on December 
 27th, there was a clear divergence of opinion. There 
 was a general agreement to assert the legislative rights 
 of parliament over the colonies by means of a declaratory 
 act; but they could not determine whether the stamp 
 act should be repealed or only modified 2 . The question 
 was far too important to be left thus undecided; and 
 the ministers turned to Pitt for advice and assistance. 
 Thomas Townshend was sent to Bath to learn Pitt's 
 views on the American question, and to invite him to 
 
 1 Parliament had met on Dec. 17th, 1765, but only to be prorogued 
 to the following January. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32973, f. 3, f. 11 ; Adolphus' History of England, i. 197, 
 198. It is interesting to note that Newcastle, who was not present at this 
 cabinet meeting, was opposed to the idea of a declaratory act. Add. MS. 
 32973, f. 25. 
 
THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 257 
 
 join the administration 1 . It was unfortunate that this 
 appeal for assistance had not been made earlier; for 
 when it came it found Pitt in no compliant humour. 
 Chagrined perhaps because he had not been approached 
 before, he refused to express an opinion on the American 
 question, save to the king or parliament; and, though 
 professing willingness to take office under the crown and 
 to serve with Rockingham, Conway, and Grafton, he 
 demanded, as a condition of his acceptance, that Newcastle 
 should be excluded from the ministry, and that the 
 treasury should be offered to Lord Temple. If, however, 
 Temple still declined to take that office, Pitt was willing 
 that Rockingham should retain it 2 . 
 
 These were hard terms for the ministers to digest, 
 and both Newcastle and Rockingham had cause for 
 offence. The latter could not but be vexed at being 
 called upon to make way for Temple, and upon New- 
 castle fell the whole weight of Pitt's anger and distrust. 
 It was not a conciliatory answer to a friendly overture, 
 and it is difficult to censure Rockingham for refusing 
 to submit to conditions so imperiously dictated. Yet in 
 so doing he was guilty of a blunder. It was worth 
 making a great sacrifice in order to gain the assistance 
 which Pitt alone could give; and the loss of Newcastle 
 would have been but a trifling price to pay. Nor was 
 the latter unwilling to play the role of victim to political 
 necessity. Rising above himself, he proved, by his con- 
 duct at this crisis, that a long course of corrupting others 
 had not destroyed the nobler elements in his composition. 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32973, f. 11, f. 55 ; Grafton's Autobiography, pp. 62, 63. 
 Grafton asserts that Pitt was asked to place himself at the head of the 
 administration ; but this statement is not supported by either Newcastle 
 or Rockingham. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32973, f. 55. 
 
 w. 17 
 
258 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 He was ready and even anxious to retire from the 
 administration, rather than stand in the way of Pitt's 
 return to power 1 , and it was Rockingham who refused 
 to submit to the will of the great commoner. Grafton 
 and Conway desired that the king should invite Pitt to 
 confer with him; but the prime minister firmly and 
 successfully opposed the idea of making any further con- 
 cessions to the man who had so grossly insulted those 
 who bore him only good- will. His influence prevailed : 
 no message was sent to Pitt, but it remained undetermined 
 whether, should he attend parliament, the king would 
 grant him an audience after a levee 2 . 
 
 Grafton was aggrieved at this decision. He had only 
 taken office on the understanding that Pitt should be 
 allowed to join the ministry when he liked; and he felt 
 that the pledge had not been fulfilled. An opportunity 
 had been lost, and Grafton began to think of severing 
 his connection with men who had failed to keep their 
 word. Conway, though less prejudiced in favour of Pitt, 
 was also of the opinion that a serious blunder had been 
 made. Rockingham, however, refused to listen to the 
 advice of his secretaries of state; but his determination 
 to persevere in an undertaking, which to others seemed 
 hopeless, must not be attributed to a mean desire to 
 retain office at all cost. Though often lacking in under- 
 
 1 "I immediately sent my good friend, Mr White, yesterday to my 
 Lord Rockingham, to acquaint his Lordship, as I intend to do to-morrow 
 the king, that I have ever been so much of opinion that it was for the 
 service of his majesty and the nation that Mr Pitt should be employed, 
 tbat I could not suffer myself to be the avowed obstacle to it; and that 
 I therefore desired to resign my employment to remove that obstacle." 
 Newcastle to Page, January 7th, 1766. Add. MS. 32973, f. 55. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32973, f. 55, f. 100, f. 104, f. 117; Rockingham Memoirs, 
 i. 262 — 268 ; Newcastle's Narrative, pp. 43 — 47 ; Grafton's Autobiography, 
 pp. 62, 63. 
 
THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 259 
 
 standing, he was not of that order of politicians who 
 think solely of their own advantage. He was only too 
 likely to minimise the dangers which threatened him, 
 and rashly to believe himself secure of the support of 
 the court 1 . Moreover, his pride may justly have been 
 wounded by Pitt's demands. He had not striven for 
 high office, and was not consumed by political ambition ; 
 but he might well feel hurt at being asked to make way 
 for a statesman of such little eminence as Temple. He 
 might find it difficult to remain a member of an adminis- 
 tration which had suffered a fundamental change, and 
 assumed a different complexion 2 ; yet, though acting in 
 no ungenerous spirit, he stands convicted of a serious 
 error of judgment. He misread the signs of the times 
 which really left him no alternative but to accept Pitt 
 on his own terms. By appealing to Caesar, and then 
 refusing to take the Caesarian answer, the administration 
 had struck a blow at its own power ; it had confessed its 
 weakness and displayed its obstinacy. 
 
 It was, therefore, in no spirit of triumph that the 
 ministers met parliament when it assembled on January 
 14th. In his speech from the throne, the king specially 
 commended the troubles in the colonies to the attention 
 of the two houses. Pitt was present, and took a prominent 
 part in the debate which followed the king's speech. As 
 he rose to address the house, all eyes were turned on the 
 man who, though without office, was more powerful than 
 any minister. When he seemed about to conclude, loud 
 cries encouraged him to continue. He did not condescend 
 to tell his hearers what they would have liked to hear. 
 He espoused an unpopular cause, and proclaimed himself 
 the champion of American freedom. He denounced the 
 stamp act as inexpedient and illegal. He denied that 
 1 Add. MS. 32973, f. 21. 2 Add. MS. 32973, f. 55. 
 
 17—2 
 
260 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 parliament had the right of levying an internal tax on 
 America; and not only excused but congratulated the 
 colonists upon their resistance. " I rejoice," he exclaimed 
 in a phrase which was to become famous, " that America 
 has resisted." Turning to the ministers, he expressed his 
 approval of them, but refused to give them his confidence : 
 " confidence," he remarked with bitter emphasis, " is a 
 plant of slow growth in an aged bosom." He was careful 
 to describe himself as unconnected and unconsulted ; and 
 if his words gladdened the hearts of the Americans, they 
 must have depressed the spirits of members of the 
 administration. He had gone out of his way to strike 
 a blow at the ministers; and by publicly withholding 
 his confidence had confirmed what before had only been 
 a rumour. Men now knew that Pitt was in no way con- 
 nected with the administration, and drew their conclusions 
 accordingly. 
 
 Rockingham was wise enough to understand that an 
 effort must be made to counteract the baneful influence 
 of a few words spoken in debate. Pitt must be persuaded 
 to undo the evil he had wrought, by consenting to join 
 the administration. Another attempt must be made to 
 gain his assistance; and, in one respect, there was a greater 
 prospect of success than before. In the debate in the 
 upper house on January 14th, Temple had roundly 
 declared in favour of the stamp act ; and it was possible 
 that this might prejudice Pitt against him 1 . Grafton 
 visited Pitt on January 16th, and two days later the 
 same nobleman and Rockingham conveyed a message to 
 him from the king. He was requested to say whether 
 he would consent to take office, and whether he still 
 desired that Lord Temple should be given an opportunity 
 of joining the administration. The answer could have 
 1 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 270, 271. 
 
THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 261 
 
 been little pleasing to Rockingham, differing as it did 
 but slightly from that returned on the previous occa- 
 sion. Pitt declared himself ready to serve the king in 
 a ministerial capacity, and to act with Rockingham, 
 Conway, and Grafton; but he again demanded that New- 
 castle should be excluded from the administration, and 
 Temple allowed to take office if he wished to do so. 
 Moreover, the ministry was to be subjected to changes 
 and alterations which, however much the fact was dis- 
 guised, would probably amount to a dissolution of the 
 existing cabinet 1 . 
 
 Such a reply, unwelcome as it was, might have been 
 expected. Prepared to come to the assistance of his king 
 and his country, Pitt did not intend either to lead or 
 serve in an administration which was not of his own 
 making. His influence must predominate in the govern- 
 ment, and Newcastle must be banished because it was 
 wrongly imagined that, whatever place he occupied in 
 the cabinet, he would always tend to lead rather than 
 to follow 2 . It may be true that Pitt was justified in 
 formulating such terms, but it is not surprising that 
 Rockingham was loath to accept them. Few men are 
 willing to make a public confession of failure ; and 
 Rockingham had also to think of those who had acted 
 with him in opposition, and were now his colleagues in' 
 the cabinet. If he sacrificed them in order to fulfil Pitt's 
 demands, he would run the risk of being accused of 
 
 i Add. MS. 32973, f. 148, f. 158, f. 180, f. 194; Grafton's Auto- 
 biography, p. 64 ff. ; Chatham Correspondence, n. 371. Grafton's 
 account differs in certain particulars from that given by Rockingham 
 (Add. MS. 32973, f. 194). The former states that Pitt was willing that 
 no offer should be made to Lord Temple ; but it is difficult to believe this 
 statement, seeing that Pitt, when called upon to come into office six 
 months later, was quite prepared to have Temple as a colleague. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32973, f. 237. 
 
262 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 treachery towards those who, whatever their short- 
 comings, had at least always loyally supported him. 
 Yet, whatever blame attaches to the refusal of Pitt's 
 terms, must rest not on Rockingham but on George III. 
 The king, had he chosen to do so, could have sent for 
 Pitt, and instructed him to form an administration in 
 accordance with the conditions he had formulated. This 
 he was not willing to do; and, having heard Pitt's 
 answer, decided to discontinue the negotiation 1 . Such 
 conduct is difficult to explain if it be believed that the 
 king was fretting under the rule of the whigs. But of 
 such discontent there is no trace. The ministers had not 
 yet come into conflict with the royal will ; and their very 
 weakness and lack of popular support commended them 
 to the king. He might fare far worse with Pitt in power, 
 and had little need to anticipate danger from those who 
 would be unlikely to find either defenders or sympathisers 
 if attacked by the court. 
 
 Thus the second attempt to gain the support of Pitt 
 had failed ; but the ministers, enlightened by his speech 
 in parliament, were aware of his views on the American 
 question. Now that he had spoken, they were prepared 
 to act. At a meeting at Lord Rockingham's house on 
 January 17th, it was decided to repeal the stamp act, and 
 to introduce a declaratory bill, asserting the rights of par- 
 liament over the colonies 2 . This was an attempt to solve 
 the difficulty by a compromise, and had all the defects 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32973, f. 194, f. 224, f. 237; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 
 271, 272. 
 
 2 "Charles Townshend and General Conway, Dowdeswell, and the 
 Duke of Grafton were here this evening. The ideas we join in are nearly 
 what I talked of to you this morning, that is — a declaratory act in general 
 terms, — afterwards to proceed to considerations of trade, etc., and finally 
 determination on the stamp act, i.e. a repeal." Rockingham to Charles 
 Yorke (endorsed 17th January, 1766). Add. MS. 35430, f. 31. 
 
THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 263 
 
 of timid statesmanship. In deciding upon a policy of 
 repeal, the ministers must have been greatly influenced 
 by Pitt's opinion. It was the only course open to them, 
 unless they were prepared to drive him into violent 
 opposition. If, stopping half-way, they had advocated 
 the modification rather than the repeal of the act, they 
 would find both Grrenville and Pitt against them; and 
 it was therefore wiser to proceed further. Yet there 
 would be many who would regard the policy of repeal 
 as an unworthy concession to rebellion; and the king, 
 though prepared to see the stamp act removed from the 
 statute book, was anxious that the rights of the mother 
 country over the colonies should be definitely asserted 1 . 
 Thus the declaratory act was an attempt to propitiate 
 those who would only grudgingly consent to a policy 
 of which they did not approve. Pitt might well be 
 offended, for he had denounced the stamp act not only 
 as unjust but illegal; and it was to spare his suscepti- 
 bilities that, though the declaratory act asserted the 
 authority of the king and parliament over the colonies 
 in all matters, no mention was made of the power of 
 taxation 2 . It was not a strong position for men to take 
 up who were responsible for the destinies of the nation. 
 Rockingham was alarmed at the prospect of the parlia- 
 mentary opposition which might be evoked by concessions 
 to America 3 ; and sought to avert the danger by a measure 
 which was to prove a rock of offence to Pitt 4 . Much 
 
 1 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 271, 272. 
 
 2 Charles Yorke was opposed to this omission. Add. MS. 35430, f. 37. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 35430, f. 37. 
 
 4 In defence of Rockingham it should be stated that from a con- 
 versation with Pitt on Tuesday, January 21st, he gained the impression 
 that the latter was not violently opposed to a declaratory act. " As 
 to the affair," wrote Rockingham, " Mr Pitt declared strongly for the 
 repeal of the stamp act ; but as to the other parts of the question, the 
 
264 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 would depend upon the attitude adopted by the king. 
 He had unwillingly consented to the repeal of the stamp 
 act, regarding the concession as a necessary evil. Were 
 he to find that his ministers had exaggerated the neces- 
 sity, he might easily come to believe that he had been 
 tricked by them. Thus on all sides danger threatened 
 the administration. Ominous signs of parliamentary 
 opposition soon began to appear. On the last day of 
 January the government was run close in the house of 
 commons on the trifling question of a Scotch petition. 
 The tories and the friends of Lord Bute voted against 
 the ministry which only prevailed by a scanty majority 1 . 
 A few days later the opposition carried a question against 
 the government in the house of lords. Bute and his 
 followers openly attacked the king's servants, and the 
 favourite made no secret of his intention to oppose the 
 repeal of the stamp act 2 . 
 
 The danger, which thus threatened the ministers, was 
 far too serious to be neglected with safety. Grafton, 
 weary of existence in a cabinet without Pitt, advocated 
 that the administration should be dissolved ; but he failed 
 to persuade his colleagues to take so final a step 3 . They 
 endeavoured to protect themselves under the shield of 
 the court, trumpeting abroad that the king approved 
 of the repeal of the stamp act. They could not have 
 pursued a more disastrous course. The king had assented 
 to the policy of his ministers, but he had not approved 
 it. He would have preferred the stamp act to be 
 
 asserting the right of the parliament, Mr Pitt did not seem so strong as 
 he was the other day in his speech." Add. MS. 32973, f. 237. 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32973, f. 321 ; Walpole's Memoirs, u. 196. 
 
 2 Grenville Papers, in. 357 — 359; Newcastle's Narrative, pp. 47 ff . ; 
 Hist. MSS. Comm. Stopford Sackville MSS., i. 106—108; Chesterfield's 
 Letters (edited by Bradshaw), in. 1334, 1335. 
 
 3 Newcastle's Narrative, p. 47. 
 
THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 265 
 
 modified, and had only consented to its repeal when he 
 was informed that there was no alternative between that 
 and enforcement. He had concealed his preference for 
 modification as he had promised to support his ministers 1 ; 
 but when he learnt that his name was being used to 
 influence men's political opinions, he threw off the 
 restraint which he had imposed upon himself. He in- 
 formed Lord Strange that he would prefer modification 
 to repeal, and Strange published the news abroad 2 . 
 When charged by Rockingham with going back upon 
 his word, he justified himself by asserting that he had 
 only consented to the repeal of the act, because he was 
 given to understand that it was impossible to modify it 3 . 
 
 The confusion had been caused more by misunder- 
 standing than duplicity. The ministers had failed to 
 grasp that the royal consent was only conditional, and 
 the king had not troubled to make his meaning sufficiently 
 clear. The incident is important, inasmuch as it is the 
 first serious breach between the king and the administra- 
 tion. The ministers had staked everything upon the 
 support of the court; and that appeared about to fail 
 them. They found themselves compelled "to carry on 
 a great public measure against the king's declared 
 sentiments, and with a great number of his servants 
 acting against them 4 ." Estranged from Pitt, and held in 
 little account by the nation, they found themselves more 
 isolated and helpless than ever. They had built their 
 house upon the sands, and discovered the insecurity of 
 the foundations when the first storm arose. 
 
 If for a time they prevailed in parliament, it was only 
 
 1 Grenville Papers, in. 353. 2 Grenville Papers, in. 362. 
 
 3 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 300, 301. 
 
 * Conway to Lord Hertford, February 12th, 1766 ; quoted in Hunt's 
 Political History of England, 1760—1801, p. 71. 
 
266 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 by dint of hard fighting; and their success was not 
 unchequered by failure. It was necessary for them to 
 be prepared to meet the criticism of Pitt, as well as 
 encounter the opposition of their habitual opponents. On 
 January 27th a petition from a body, styling itself the 
 American congress, was presented to the house of commons 
 which refused to accept it. This was in conformity with 
 the wishes of the ministers, but Pitt seized the occasion to 
 declare once more that the Americans were justified in 
 their resistance to a tyrannical act which violated the 
 original contract between the sovereign power and the 
 colonists 1 . When on February 3rd Conway introduced 
 the resolution " that Great Britain had, hath, and ought 
 to have full right and power to bind the Americans in all 
 cases whatsoever," he found himself opposed by Pitt who 
 bitterly reflected, the day after the battle, that the 
 commons had assented to "England's right to do what 
 the treasury pleases with three millions of freemen 2 ." 
 Nor was it only Pitt's opposition that the ministers were 
 called upon to face. In the course of one week they 
 suffered two defeats in the upper house; and though in 
 the house of commons they succeeded in holding their 
 own against their enemies, the outlook was sufficiently 
 serious 3 . As far at least as the house of lords was 
 concerned, there was every sign that the repeal of the 
 stamp act would encounter a fierce opposition, and only 
 those, who have never known what it is to flinch before 
 danger, can censure Rockingham for thinking of resigna- 
 
 1 Hist. MSS. Comm. Stopford Sackville MSS., i. 105, 106 ; Rocking- 
 ham Memoirs, i. 290, 291. 
 
 2 Grenville Papers, m. 357 ; Chatham Correspondence, in. 363 — 370 : 
 the letter in the Chatham correspondence is misdated. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 35374, f. 284; Hist. MSS. Comm. Stopford Sackville 
 MSS., i. 106, 108 ; Grenville Papers, in. 357 — 359 ; Newcastle's Narrative, 
 pp. 47, 51; Chatham Correspondence, n. 375 — 377. 
 
THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 267 
 
 tion 1 . He now knew that he would have to encounter the 
 attack of the solid phalanx of placemen who thought to 
 please the king by opposing his servants ; and in his hour 
 of need he again turned to Pitt for assistance. 
 
 No greater success was to attend these new overtures 
 than those which had preceded them. Lord Shelburne 
 was selected to act as intermediary, and Rockingham 
 frankly confessed to him how necessary it was for the 
 administration to establish friendly relations with Pitt. 
 The latter, however, proved himself as intractable as 
 before. He refused to take office at the hand of Rocking- 
 ham, preferring to wait until he received the king's 
 command to form an administration. To a message 
 through Nuthall, asking him to frame a plan of a 
 ministry, and then discuss it with Rockingham and the 
 two secretaries of state, a similar answer was returned; 
 only at the king's request would Pitt consent to express 
 his sentiments : and Rockingham refused to carry a 
 message from the court 2 . That would be equivalent to 
 his own resignation and the dissolution of the cabinet 
 over which he presided. Between him and Pitt lay a 
 difference of principle which could neither be neglected 
 nor reconciled. It was not the policy but the composition 
 of the cabinet that was at stake. Rockingham was the 
 champion, and Pitt the opponent, of the party system, 
 and neither would give way in the struggle. The youthful 
 prime minister was confronted by a choice between two 
 grim alternatives. He must either abandon his post and 
 confess to failure before he had suffered defeat, or 
 continue to strive against apparently overwhelmingly 
 odds. It is to his credit that he chose the nobler if the 
 
 1 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 303. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32974, f. 417 ; Fitzmaurice's Shelburne, i. 379—382 ; 
 Chatham Correspondence, n. 397 — 402; Rockingham Memoirs, i. 311 — 313. 
 
268 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 more hazardous course. As Pitt refused his assistance, 
 except on terms too humiliating to be accepted, Rocking- 
 ham took his fate into his hands, and continued the battle 
 unaided. 
 
 On Friday, February 21st, Conway moved for leave to 
 bring in a bill to repeal the stamp act 1 . He enlarged 
 upon the damage inflicted by that measure upon English 
 merchants trading with America ; and the excited crowd, 
 largely composed of men interested in American trade, 
 which thronged the passages and gathered in the lobbies 
 of the house, proved that Conway was speaking the truth 
 and not having resort to a rhetorical device. The debate 
 continued for many hours, and it was not until a new day 
 had dawned that the motion was carried by a majority of 
 one hundred and eight. It is unnecessary to follow in 
 detail the passage of either the repeal bill or the declaratory 
 act through the two houses. In spite of the opposition of 
 a host of placemen 2 , both measures were carried; and the 
 ministers enjoyed a triumph, the greater because it was 
 unexpected. Their success is somewhat surprising, con- 
 sidering the difficulties they encountered; and it is open 
 to doubt whether the king was so actively antagonistic 
 to the repeal of the stamp act as has been often assumed. 
 Save for his remark to Lord Strange, there is no proof 
 that he intrigued against his ministers ; and it may have 
 been due to the moderation of the crown that the govern- 
 ment was not pushed harder than it actually was 3 . 
 
 1 Walpole's Memoirs, n. 210, 211. 
 
 2 For a list of the placemen who voted against repeal in hoth houses, 
 see Appendix in. 
 
 3 "The repeal was carried in both houses by the ministers against 
 the king's declared inclinations, which is a case that has seldom 
 happened, and I believe seldom will happen. Lord Bute's conduct has 
 been, through all this affair, extremely irresolute and undecided." 
 Chesterfield's Letters (edited by Bradshaw), in. 1336. 
 
THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 269 
 
 The king was wise in his generation. By thwarting 
 the repeal bill, he might have added to his unpopularity 
 with the nation; and he did not have to fear, as a result 
 of his inactivity, an increase in the popularity of the 
 administration. The gratitude of the people was given 
 not to the ministers but to Pitt. It was he who received 
 the laurels of victory. He had never wavered in his 
 opposition to the stamp act, and had declared for repeal 
 when the cabinet was too divided in opinion to be able to 
 formulate a policy. He reaped the reward of his con- 
 sistency. The whigs had borne the brunt of the battle, 
 but he acquired the glory 1 . The great measure had been 
 carried, but the administration had gained neither in 
 strength nor reputation. 
 
 The ministers could not conceal from themselves that 
 they had failed in office as they had failed in opposition. 
 They had not succeeded in gaining the approval of the 
 nation, or in retaining the support of the court ; and shat- 
 tered were the hopes which they had cherished of Pitt's 
 assistance. The king refused to punish the placemen who 
 had voted against the repeal bill ; and thus all, who were 
 anxious to oppose the government, knew that they could 
 do so with impunity. Perhaps because they realised how 
 short was the time at their disposal, Rockingham and 
 his colleagues were not sparing of their energy. The 
 remainder of the parliamentary session was not wasted. 
 General warrants were declared illegal, and the obnoxious 
 cyder tax repealed ; but, beneficial as these measures may 
 have been, they failed to add to the prestige of the 
 government. In the panegyric which he pronounced 
 upon the ministers after their fall from power, Burke 
 laid stress upon their legislative activity, and proudly 
 
 1 Newcastle's Narrative, pp. 75, 76 ; Hist. MSS. Comm. Round 
 MS8. 14th Report, Appendix, ix, p. 298. 
 
270 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 asserted that they had left " their king and their country 
 in a much better condition than they found them 1 ." This 
 is undoubtedly true, but it was not correct to say, as 
 Burke did, that the Rockingham administration was 
 <( supported by the confidence of the nation." It was 
 because they were lacking in this, that they found them- 
 selves unable to overcome the various forces opposed to 
 them. 
 
 The end did not, however, come suddenly: it was 
 heralded by a long drawn-out agony. The Duke of 
 Grafton, who had so long talked of resignation, executed 
 his threat at the end of April. For many months he had 
 continued in office under protest. He had only consented 
 to join the administration on the understanding that Pitt 
 should be allowed to take his place in it directly he 
 desired to do so ; and he was aggrieved that this condition 
 had not been fulfilled. In order to induce him to remain, 
 a final, but equally unsuccessful, attempt was made to 
 win Pitt. The ministers could have had little hope of 
 .success attending these overtures, but the negotiation 
 has an interest, since it afforded Pitt an opportunity to 
 speak out more clearly than he had ever done before. 
 He revealed the reason of his antipathy to the Rocking- 
 ham administration which, he declared, must be remodelled 
 on non-party lines. The best and ablest members of all 
 parties must be summoned to serve the king, and the 
 value of men estimated, not by their political connections, 
 but by their ability to promote the glory and prosperity 
 of England 2 . 
 
 The resignation of Grafton was the beginning of the 
 end, and when, from his place in the house of lords, the 
 former secretary of state declared that he had left the 
 
 1 Short Account of a late Short Administration. 
 
 2 Newcastle's Narrative, pp. 57, 58. 
 
THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 271 
 
 administration because, in his opinion, it lacked "authority, 
 dignity and extension 1 ," he revealed to the public gaze 
 the skeleton in the ministerial cupboard. The ministers 
 might have prolonged their tenure of official life by an 
 alliance with Lord Bute and his party ; but they shrank 
 from so ignoble a surrender of the principles which they 
 had maintained in opposition 2 . Newcastle advised that 
 the parliamentary session should be concluded as soon as 
 possible, and measures taken to placate the placemen 3 ; but 
 such a makeshift policy was powerless to avert the doom 
 which threatened them. Nor were their chances of 
 survival increased by the appointment of the Duke of 
 Richmond as Grafton's successor. The vacant post had 
 been offered to Lord Hardwicke and his brother, Charles 
 Yorke ; but the former, though he agreed to take a seat 
 in the cabinet without office, was unwilling to become 
 secretary of state, and Charles Yorke was not to be 
 diverted from the goal of his ambition 4 . The appointment 
 of Richmond was not pleasing to the king who declared 
 that he had been forced by Rockingham to approve it 5 ; nor 
 was the new secretary of state likely to be of much assistance 
 to his colleagues. He had had little political experience, 
 and it is worthy of remark that Horace Walpole favoured 
 the appointment on the strange ground that Richmond 
 was likely to give way to his native indolence if not given 
 employment 6 . Yet, if the selection of Richmond was a 
 
 1 Chatham Correspondence, n. 421; Grenville Papers, in. 242. 
 
 2 Newcastle's Narrative, p. 60; Walpole's Memoirs, n. 228, 229. 
 s Add. MS. 32975, f. 72. 
 
 4 Add. MS. 35428, f. 22 ; Add. MS. 32975, f. 254 ; Rockingham 
 Memoirs, i. 330, 331, 333 ; Grenville Papers, in. 240. 
 
 5 Add. MS. 32975, f. 254. 
 
 6 Walpole's Memoirs, n. 229. Lord Buckinghamshire remarked in a 
 letter to Grenville: "Apropos to the Duke of Richmond, as the whig 
 administration, thinking it necessary always to have a secretary of 
 
272 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 mistake, it was one of little account, seeing that the 
 ministers were rapidly passing beyond all hope of re- 
 demption. If they continued to survive for a few weeks 
 longer, it was only because they were sufficiently weak to 
 be tolerated with safety. The king remained in command 
 of the situation, and was able to refuse the requests of his 
 servants with impunity. He declined to create new peers 
 at their bidding, or to remove those who attacked them 
 in parliament 1 . It was clear to all men that the end 
 could not be far off. Buckingham may have blundered 
 when he omitted to secure the consent of parliament to 
 a provision for the king's younger brothers 2 , but it is not 
 to this mistake that he owed his downfall. Though the 
 administration had only been in existence for a year, it 
 displayed all the symptoms of old age and decay. Even 
 its admirers did not wish it to survive. When a false 
 rumour was spread that the king had sent for Pitt, Lord 
 Albemarle, a staunch supporter of the whig party, rejoiced 
 that his friends had been relieved from an impossible 
 situation 3 . The death blow came early in July. At a 
 cabinet meeting at the end of June, the lord chancellor 
 quarrelled with the ministers, and declared his intention 
 of ceasing to attend the cabinet 4 . He informed the king 
 that he desired to resign his office. In an interview with 
 Rockingham, George III laid stress upon the gravity of 
 the situation, and remarked that he must seriously consider 
 the proper course to be taken 5 . By the following day he 
 had decided upon a line of action, and summoned Pitt 
 
 state of the race of Charles II (for what other motives could determine 
 them) have appointed His Grace to succeed the Duke of Grafton, the 
 Duke of St Albans is next heir to the seals, and we may yet live to see 
 them in the hands of the Duke of Cleveland." Add. MS. 22358, f. 35. 
 
 1 Rockingham Memoirs, i. 347 ; Grenville Papers, in. 253. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 35428, f. 22. « Add. MS. 32975, f. 414. 
 * Rockingham Memoirs, i. 350. 5 Add. MS. 32976, f. 19. 
 
THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 273 
 
 to visit him. The decisive step had been taken, and the 
 Rockingham administration had ceased to exist. 
 
 The element of tragedy in the history of this whig 
 ministry is that, with the best intentions in the world, it 
 failed because it deserved to fail. Since it had first come 
 into being, it had waned rather than waxed in strength. 
 It had sought salvation by works, and discovered, to its 
 dismay, that nothing it could do would gain for it the 
 faith which alone could justify it in the eyes of the nation. 
 It is true that it had not been favoured by circumstances. 
 The death of Cumberland had been a heavy blow, and 
 the ministers had not foreseen the attitude which Pitt 
 would adopt. They had, moreover, alienated the sympathy 
 of the king, and thus deprived of the very prop of their 
 power, the essential weakness of the ministry could no 
 longer be concealed. It suffered the fate which is marked 
 out for all who depend for their strength upon external 
 assistance. Rockingham and his companions had em- 
 barked upon a noble and difficult undertaking, and they 
 had failed to achieve success. It is true that they had 
 initiated and passed measures likely to benefit the country 
 and restore harmonious relations between England and 
 her American colonies ; but they had not fulfilled their first 
 and greatest duty, that of keeping themselves in power. 
 The country needed a powerful and stable administration, 
 and Rockingham was unable to give it what it needed. He 
 could do nothing without Pitt, and the latter persistently 
 refused his assistance or protection. 
 
 The fall of the whigs, and the accession of Pitt to 
 power, closes and begins an epoch in the reign of George III. 
 Six years had passed since the king had ascended the 
 throne, an untried and inexperienced boy, and within 
 that short time he had succeeded in making the authority 
 of the crown more of a reality than it had been since the 
 w. 18 
 
274 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 death of Queen Anne. With marked courage he had 
 entered upon a contest with the most popular statesman 
 and the most successful party manager of the day, and 
 had emerged victorious ; but his triumph had only been 
 obtained after a sharp struggle, the issue of which some- 
 times seemed uncertain. Driven from office, Newcastle 
 and his friends had upheld in opposition those principles 
 of party government to which they owed their success in 
 the past; and although the battle had been fierce and 
 intense, the king possessed the inestimable advantage of 
 being able to turn against his opponents the very weapons 
 they had used in the days of their predominance. It says 
 much for Newcastle's political insight that he understood, 
 more clearly than any of his associates, that, unable to 
 bribe and corrupt as had been their wont, the whigs must 
 attack the government in the name of the nation, and 
 prevail against the crown by becoming the popular party. 
 In order to attain this end, it was necessary that Pitt 
 should become a member of the opposition, or at least 
 extend to it his approval; and by July, 1766, it was 
 evident to all men that the great commoner had 
 definitely abandoned all belief in the party system. 
 Henceforward it was vain for the whigs to look to him 
 for any assistance. He had decided against the principles 
 which they professed, and proved his faith by forming an 
 administration which Burke aptly compared to a piece of 
 uncemented tessellated pavement. The national hero of 
 the day had declared himself on the side of the crown; 
 and if Newcastle mourned the loss of an indispensable 
 ally, the king could congratulate himself upon the ac- 
 quisition of a most valuable recruit. 
 
 Thus the period ends in a royal triumph and a whig 
 defeat. The principles of party government, repudiated 
 by Pitt, and discredited by the downfall of the Rockingham 
 
THE ROCKINGHAM MINISTRY 275 
 
 administration, seemed about to fall into the oblivion 
 which engulfs effete political ideas. George II had been 
 avenged by his grandson, and the power, granted by the 
 revolution settlement, restored to the monarchy. From 
 1766 until the fall of Lord North in 1782, it was the 
 king who governed in the name of his servants. Largely 
 responsible for the policy which resulted in the outbreak 
 of the war of American independence, playing an active 
 and predominant part in the unconstitutional crusade 
 against Wilkes, George III, though successful, gave an 
 instructive lesson in the evils of personal government. 
 
 The royal industry, disastrous as it was in many 
 respects, was not wholly unproductive of good results, 
 inasmuch as it enabled men to understand that the party 
 system was not a mere mechanical contrivance, by means 
 of which a few men ruled the country, but an essential 
 part of the political machinery for restraining the authority 
 of the crown. Many years after his death Newcastle was 
 justified by the son of the man who had refused him 
 assistance in the hour of need. In his relations with the 
 duke, Pitt was guilty of a grave political blunder. During 
 the early years of the reign it had been within his power 
 to render the whig party an effective force, and he had 
 refused to do so; and it is in accordance with the usual 
 irony of history that the man, who had assisted to win 
 Canada, contributed towards losing the American colonies. 
 He united with his sovereign to destroy the party 
 system; and the disastrous events of the years, which 
 elapsed between the fall of Rockingham and the fall of 
 North, were to show that Newcastle was right and Pitt 
 was wrong. 
 
 18—2 
 
APPENDIX I. 
 
 WILLIAM PITT AND HIS LATEST BIOGRAPHER. 
 
 All students of the eighteenth century owe a deep debt 
 of gratitude to Dr von Ruville for his masterly biography 
 of one of the greatest figures of that period ; but we feel 
 sure that the learned author would be the last to ask 
 that we should accept his conclusions without examination 
 or criticism. It is impossible to dispute Dr von Ruville' s 
 impartiality or freedom from prejudice; but it is open 
 to question whether some of the theories he propounds 
 do not rest on too slender a basis of fact. His judgment 
 of Pitt's character does not err on the side of generosity, 
 and it is somewhat startling to English readers to find 
 that statesman depicted as a vulgar fortune-hunter. 
 Few great men have had mc T, i glaring defects and more 
 obvious failings; but, until ne appearance of Dr von 
 Ruville's work, it was always elieved that Pitt, whatever 
 his faults, was never influent d by sordid motives or the 
 desire for money. As is v> 11 known, he received at 
 different times valuable leg cies from the Duchess of 
 Marlborough and Sir Willia Pynsent; but it has been 
 reserved for his most recer . biographer to discover a 
 sinister interest attaching t( these bequests. Divesting 
 these gifts of their apparent innocence, he reveals them 
 as the price paid to Pitt for acting against his convictions j 
 and with the ruthlessness of the scientific historian, 
 sacrifices the honour of his hero in order to establish his 
 
WILLIAM PITT AND HIS LATEST BIOGRAPHER 277 
 
 wisdom. The charge cannot be passed by without exami- 
 nation. If the accusation can be proved, Pitt's reputation 
 for integrity is destroyed. He stands no higher than his 
 contemporaries, and indeed lower, for they at least did 
 not conceal their vices under the cloak of disinterested 
 ambition. 
 
 By the will of the Duchess of Marlborough, who died 
 in October, 1744, Pitt inherited ten thousand pounds, and, 
 in addition received reversionary rights of great value. 
 The generosity of the duchess probably had its spring 
 in her hatred of Walpole. That minister had wronged 
 her in the days of his power, and she was glad to reward 
 the man who had dared to oppose him, and had suffered 
 for his temerity. As she had made no secret of her 
 intentions, the legacy did not come as a surprise either 
 to Pitt or to the world 1 . The fact that the duchess had 
 allowed her benevolent designs to be known before her 
 death is not unimportant, inasmuch as it rendered it 
 possible for Pitt's policy to ;be influenced by the prospect 
 of a substantial legacy. $uch an influence, however, 
 must be carefully discriminated from the effect produced 
 upon Pitt by his accession of wealth after the duchess' 
 death. In the one case h* would be dependent upon the 
 whim of a tyrannical and ( aged woman : in the other he 
 would be more completer his own master than ever 
 before in his career. 
 
 It will be convenient i^o consider first the attitude 
 adopted by Pitt after thaadeath of the duchess. Until 
 this time a comparatively ; poor man, he had inherited, 
 if not a fortune, at least a substantial sum of money, and 
 might be expected to adopt a more independent line of 
 action than hitherto. If at this period he is found to 
 have changed his opinion in any important particular, 
 1 Grenville Papers, i. 32. 
 
278 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 an obvious case for inquiry exists; but the investigator 
 would do well to bear in mind the deceitfulness of the 
 maxim — post hoc, ergo propter hoc. It seems that a few 
 weeks before the death of his benefactress, Pitt had taken 
 part in negotiations with the Pelhams whom he had 
 consented to join without making any conditions as to 
 measures. After the death of the duchess, however, he 
 changed his opinion, and refused to contemplate the 
 possibility of an union with the Pelhams whom, he 
 denounced as worthless and useless. It would be easy, 
 as Bolingbroke did 1 , to conclude at once that with his 
 increase in wealth Pitt had lost all desire to take office, 
 but such a conclusion would certainly not be beyond 
 all dispute. It is well to remember that Pitt was the 
 least consistent of politicians, and the most prone to take 
 offence; and if we attribute his unwillingness to take 
 office solely to the legacy, we may be assigning a single 
 cause to an event which, as a matter of fact, had several. 
 Yet, even if we allow that Bolingbroke was right in 
 his surmise, Pitt's admirers have no need to blush for 
 him. Enriched by the benevolence of the Duchess of 
 Marlborough, he could now afford to take a more inde- 
 pendent line, and stand oat for better terms; but this 
 cannot be taken to prove that, when Pitt consented to 
 a union with the Pelhams, he was acting against his 
 convictions. Politicians, like other men, are often not 
 free agents, and have to put up with what they can get, 
 rather than continue a struggle for the unobtainable; 
 and the greatest infamy that can be urged against Pitt 
 is that he took full advantage of the independence con- 
 ferred upon him by an admirer's kindness. If this be 
 counted a disgrace, the honour of many statesmen will 
 be in peril. 
 
 1 Marchmont Papers, i. 70 — 75. 
 
WILLIAM PITT AND HIS LATEST BIOGRAPHER 279 
 
 Whether Pitt was influenced or not by his increased 
 financial independence may remain a point in dispute, 
 but it is far more serious when he is accused by Dr von 
 Ruville of having deliberately framed his policy so as 
 to ensure receiving the legacy. This is to reduce the 
 greatest statesman of his age to the rank of those needy 
 adventurers who are willing, for the sake of gain, to 
 sacrifice everything except their own advantage, and 
 everybody except themselves. If the accusation can 
 be proved, then Horace Walpole was right when he 
 cynically remarked that countries were usually saved 
 by the worst men in them. There is, however, ground 
 for believing the cruel charge to be baseless; and the 
 particular actions of Pitt, which appear so suspicious to 
 his biographer, are capable of a more innocent inter- 
 pretation. 
 
 Dr von Ruville has great difficulty in understanding 
 the animus with which Pitt pursued Walpole after the 
 latter' s .fall from power; and suggests that when he 
 called for the punishment of the man who had betrayed 
 and corrupted England, he was thinking more of the 
 Duchess of Marlborough than of the welfare and honour 
 of the country. It may be questioned, however, whether 
 the difficulty involved in Pitt's conduct in this crisis exists 
 anywhere but in his biographer's imagination. Fierce 
 and bitter as was the attack on Walpole, personal in 
 its tone and vindictive in its arguments, it must be 
 admitted that it was eminently characteristic. The man 
 who could insult his brother-in-law in the house of 
 commons, and wield all the thunder of his eloquence 
 against the Duke of Newcastle, was not likely to spare 
 the minister who appeared to him to have betrayed the 
 country. Few statesmen have been more the victim of 
 unreasoning prejudice, and to Pitt, Walpole was the 
 
280 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 enemy not only to be overthrown but to be destroyed. 
 If Pitt had been moderate and restrained, if he had 
 practised a machiavellian cunning, and concealed his 
 hostility under the cloak of friendship, some explanation 
 might have been necessary, but that he should be unfair, 
 vindictive, personal, and violent, presents no difficulty. 
 It did not need the stimulus of a promised inheritance 
 to induce him to pour out the vials of his wrath upon 
 a man whom he thought had acted wrongly. 
 
 The attack on Walpole is, however, the minor count 
 in Dr von Ruville's charge against Pitt; and the more 
 important instance of the latter's supposed duplicity 
 must now be examined. In the summer of 1744, the 
 Pelhams, desirous of compelling the king to dismiss 
 Carteret, negotiated with the opposition. They found 
 their enemies divided in opinion. Lord Cobham refused 
 to lend his assistance to the ministers, except on specific 
 conditions, whereas Pitt and Chesterfield were in favour 
 of an unconditional union with the administration. In 
 this incident Dr von Ruville again detects the mark of 
 the cloven hoof. In opposition Pitt had been foremost 
 in calling for that measure of reform which would put 
 an end to the prevailing system of corruption ; and yet, 
 at the critical moment, we find him abandoning his pro- 
 fessions, and willing to unite with the Pelhams without 
 even stipulating for a place bill. If we follow Dr von 
 Ruville, we must at once attribute this inconsistency to 
 the legacy which was being dangled before him. But 
 difficult as it may be to account for the change of front, 
 it is more difficult to attribute it to a desire to please the 
 Duchess of Marlborough. Henry Pelham and his brother 
 were under the protection of the Earl of Orford, and were 
 therefore not likely to be pleasing to the latter's deadly 
 enemy. Dr von Ruville perceives this obstacle in his 
 
WILLIAM PITT AND HIS LATEST BIOGRAPHER 281 
 
 path, and attempts to overcome it by explaining that 
 inasmuch as Chesterfield, who had much influence with 
 the duchess, had consented to unite with the Pelhams, 
 Pitt was obliged to follow suit. This argument, ingenious 
 as it is, does not carry conviction. Because Chesterfield 
 had committed himself to a policy which might reason- 
 ably be a cause of offence to the duchess, it is not 
 apparent why Pitt should have done the same, and 
 though one may deplore his readiness to sanction a 
 system of government which he had so justifiably 
 attacked, it is unnecessary to attribute his conduct to 
 the meanest motive. 
 
 If there is little evidence to prove that the Duchess 
 of Marlborough had in any way bought Pitt, there is 
 less to show that his policy, at a later stage of his career, 
 was at all influenced by the prospect of the Pynsent 
 inheritance. Sir William Pynsent, a west-country baronet 
 of eccentric tastes, was a stout whig and an eager oppo- 
 nent of the Peace of Paris. On his death in January, 
 1765, it was discovered that he had left the bulk of his 
 fortune to Pitt. With an ingenuity, which dispenses with 
 any proof, Dr von Ruville argues that the animosity 
 displayed by Pitt against the Peace of Paris, and those 
 who assisted to make it, can only be explained by a desire 
 to please Sir William Pynsent, and acquire the valuable 
 inheritance. One serious objection at least must be over- 
 come before this theory can be accepted. There is abso- 
 lutely nothing to show that Pitt was aware of Pynsent's 
 design. He was not acquainted with him, and it is 
 difficult to treat with becoming seriousness the argument 
 that Pitt must have known of the legacy, because " Sir 
 William scheint aus seinem herzen durchaus keine Mor- 
 dergrube gemacht zu haben. Sein offenbar cholerisches 
 Temperament liess das kaum zu." In reply to this 
 
282 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 contention it might be urged with some force that, 
 if Pynsent was likely to reveal his intentions to Pitt, 
 he was equally likely to reveal it to others; and yet, 
 when the news of the legacy was published, the world, 
 as well as the legatee, was surprised. 
 
 This, however, is not the only line of argument 
 employed by Dr von E-uville. He endeavours to drive 
 us between the horns of a cruel dilemma. He argues 
 that unless we are willing to accept his suggestion that 
 Pitt's opposition to the Peace of Paris was influenced by 
 sordid and unworthy motives, we are left without any 
 adequate explanation of his conduct. This is only 
 another way of saying that we must convict Pitt of 
 either baseness or madness. The dilemma, however, is 
 of Dr von Kuville's own creation. Doubtless it would be 
 very difficult to explain or justify Pitt's opposition to 
 the Peace of Paris, if that treaty was, as Dr von Puville 
 describes it, the most glorious ever concluded by England. 
 Such an estimate may well be considered extravagant, 
 even by those who consider the peace to have been 
 unfairly censured. Grlorious, inasmuch as it ended a most 
 successful war, and added wide dominions to the British 
 Empire, the attack upon the treaty was not due simply 
 to the spirit of party and factious opposition. Pitt may 
 have gone further than many of his contemporaries, but 
 he was not alone in thinking that a great opportunity 
 had been lost by faulty diplomacy and undue precipita- 
 tion. This, surely, would be enough to account for his 
 hostility. Statesman enough to see that the peace, having 
 been made, must be maintained, he could not forgive 
 those who had helped to bring it about; and until 
 Dr von Puville produces further evidence, he must excuse 
 us from believing that Pitt was the hired bully of Sir 
 William Pynsent. 
 
WILLIAM PITT AND HIS LATEST BIOGRAPHER 283 
 
 It is always easier to make charges against character 
 than to refute them; but there is a sound principle in 
 English law which attributes innocence until guilt is 
 proved. And Pitt has every right to claim the protection 
 afforded by this canon of justice. The verdict of history 
 is in substantial agreement with the opinion of contempo- 
 raries. Pitt had many enemies who were willing to 
 accuse him of much, but they never charged him with 
 being base; and, if permitted to hear the judgment 
 passed upon him by Dr von Ruville, he might appeal 
 to his career as a whole in refutation of the charge. 
 
APPENDIX II. 
 
 THE ELECTION OF A HIGH STEWARD OF THE UNI- 
 VERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE IN THE YEAR 1764. 
 
 The internal affairs of an university, though always 
 of immediate and absorbing interest to those intimately 
 concerned with them, do not often attract the attention 
 of statesmen and men of the world. The academic poli- 
 tician is generally condemned to play his part upon a 
 narrow stage and before a scanty audience. Preoccupied 
 with issues, the importance of which escapes the per- 
 ception of the ordinary man, he is unable to win a name 
 amongst those who move in a different environment to 
 himself; and both his skill in securing victory, and his 
 fortitude in enduring defeat, are rarely appreciated be- 
 yond the confines of his university. This is not, however, 
 always the case. It sometimes happens that an academic 
 contest arouses enthusiasm in the non-academic mind; 
 and those who have conquered and been vanquished in 
 obscurity, are for once allowed to display their prowess 
 to the world at large. Such an opportunity came in the 
 year, 1764, when the office of high steward of the uni- 
 versity of Cambridge fell vacant through the death of 
 the first Earl of Hardwicke. For the space of a few 
 weeks, Cambridge became a centre of attraction to many 
 who, though not enamoured of learning or its devotees, 
 were anxious to strike a blow at their political opponents. 
 
 The two candidates for the vacant post were the 
 
THE ELECTION OF A HIGH STEWARD 285 
 
 new Lord Hardwicke and the Earl of Sandwich. The 
 former might justly aspire to high office in a learned 
 society. Possessed of studious tastes, and unblown upon 
 by the breath of scandal, he formed a striking contrast 
 to his rival, the Earl of Sandwich, who was justly 
 considered one of the most abandoned and profligate 
 characters of the period. It is difficult to imagine a vice 
 which would not have attracted him, or an infamy which 
 he would not have perpetrated. As licentious as Wilkes, 
 he lacked the latter' s many redeeming qualities; and 
 when that sordid champion of freedom was denounced 
 by Sandwich in the house of lords, the world was more 
 amused than astonished. Fearing neither God nor man, 
 he pursued with undiminished vigour his vicious pleasures, 
 until death put an end to his debauchery. He lived 
 in an age which was by no means squeamish, but few 
 men have been more mercilessly pilloried by their con- 
 temporaries for the excesses of their private life. Gray 
 in The Cambridge Courtship, and Churchill in The 
 Candidate, drew pictures which, even if only partly true, 
 would suffice to stamp Sandwich as a monstrous libertine ; 
 and their testimony, though doubtless inspired by political 
 hostility, is too well supported from other sources to be 
 lightly disregarded. 
 
 If Lord Hardwicke, however, could assert a superiority 
 in morality to his rival, the latter was far more ex- 
 perienced in public life. During part of the reign of 
 George II, Sandwich had been first lord of the admiralty, 
 and had assisted in settling the preliminaries of peace at 
 Aix-la-Chapelle. In September, 1763, he had become 
 secretary of state in Grenville's ministry; and it was, 
 therefore, as no unknown man that he appeared before 
 the university of Cambridge. He was able to match 
 his political experience against the secluded life and 
 
286 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 studious habits of the second Lord Hardwicke; and if 
 the latter could claim to be more in sympathy with the 
 academic mind, Sandwich could point to his reputation 
 as an industrious and not inefficient administrator. 
 
 It is not likely, however, that the competition between 
 these two men for the office of high steward would have 
 awakened much enthusiasm, save in the university itself, 
 if it had not been that one was secretary of state, and 
 the other the son of one of the leaders of the whig 
 opposition. It was the candidates, rather than the office 
 which they sought, that aroused men's interest. If 
 Sandwich succeeded in being elected high steward, the 
 king and his ministers would gain a notable triumph in 
 a university which, with Newcastle as chancellor, had 
 always been regarded as a stronghold of the opposition. 
 It was this consideration which induced the whigs to 
 neglect the parliamentary warfare, and concentrate their 
 attention upon the contest at Cambridge. They believed 
 it to be their duty to repel the ministerial intruder, and 
 to strike a resounding blow at the prestige of the king's 
 administration. It was inevitable that Newcastle should 
 play an active part in such a struggle. He was prepared 
 to strain every nerve to achieve victory for the son of 
 his old friend, and for the party whose destinies he 
 guided; and, doubtless, conscientiously thought that, in 
 so doing, he was serving the country as faithfully as if 
 he had been engaged in supervising the parliamentary 
 combat. He knew that he was fighting the same enemy 
 at Cambridge as he had fought at Westminster; and 
 could salve his conscience with the reflection that it was 
 his opponents who had chosen the new ground for the 
 encounter. 
 
 It was of vital importance that no time should be lost. 
 The old Lord Hardwicke died on March 6th, but his life 
 
THE ELECTION OF A HIGH STEWARD 287 
 
 had been despaired of many days before the end came, 
 and canvassing had begun before his death. Lord 
 K-oyston 1 might well feel reluctant to appear too eager 
 to succeed his father in his various dignities, but his 
 rival had less reason for delicacy, and was not likely to 
 refrain from action for fear of committing a breach of 
 good taste. The secretary of state was the first in the 
 field 2 . No sooner was Lord Hardwicke dead than 
 Sandwich's supporters began to arrive in Cambridge 3 ; 
 and, by wasting no time, he was apparently more success- 
 ful than his antagonist in enlisting the sympathy of the 
 non-resident members of the university. Speedy action 
 on the part of the whigs was necessary if the battle was 
 not to be lost at the outset; and in response to a hint 
 from Newcastle, Charles Townshend left London for 
 Cambridge on March 8th 4 . It is true that he could be 
 ill spared from the house of commons, where he might 
 have rendered invaluable service in contesting Grenville's 
 budget; but, always ready for a new excitement, it is 
 likely that he was by no means unwilling to embark 
 upon an enterprise which possessed the attraction of 
 novelty. 
 
 In fairness to Townshend, however, it should be said 
 that he faithfully discharged the duties imposed upon 
 him, throwing himself with ardour into the new field 
 of operations, and labouring assiduously to win votes 
 for Hardwicke. He was soon able to report satisfactory 
 progress 5 , and Newcastle had good reason to be satisfied 
 
 1 The title borne by the eldest son of Lord Hardwicke. 
 
 2 In a pamphlet entitled "An Address to the Members of the Senate " 
 (1764) reference is made to " the indecent use made of a lingering illness 
 previous to the death of our late most worthy high steward." 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32957, f. 123. 4 Add. MS. 32956, f. 248, f. 254. 
 5 Add. MS. 32956, f. 310. 
 
288 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 with the exertion of his nephew. About the middle of 
 March, his place was taken by Thomas Townshend, and 
 Charles departed from the university, to return again 
 before the end of the month 1 . "The coming of the two 
 Mr Townshends," wrote the master of St John's, "has. 
 had a good effect, and done great service to your cause 2 ." 
 Successful they may have been, but the methods 
 employed, though typical of the men and the period, 
 would not commend themselves to university politicians, 
 at the present day. To a certain Mr Hill of St John's,, 
 Newcastle wrote, " Though I have not the honour to be 
 personally known to you, as I had the pleasure to con- 
 tribute to your obtaining the degree of master of arts in 
 our university, I take the liberty to ask the favor (sic) of 
 you to give that vote to the present Earl of Hardwicke 3 ." 
 It was arranged that Mr Mease, fellow of St John's, and 
 curate at Halesworth in Suffolk, should be approached 
 by Sir Joshua Vanneck from whom he had hopes of 
 advancement in the church 4 . Mr Fogarve, of the same 
 college, undertook to give his vote for Lord Sandwich 
 in return for a Whitehall preachership ; but he was wise 
 in his generation, and discreetly refused to be content 
 with civil promises 5 . Mr Carr, a member of the caput, 
 had obtained a valuable living through the influence of 
 Lord Rockingham and the Archbishop of York; and his 
 indebtedness to these two magnates was not forgotten by 
 those working in Hardwicke's interests 6 . Mr Barton was 
 to be compelled to vote for Hardwicke because his mother 
 was pensioned by Lady Gainsborough 7 ; and Mr Bennet 
 was " much embarrassed " when a certain name was 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32956, f. 414 ; Add. MS. 32957, f. 310. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32957, f. 34. 3 Add. MS. 32956, f. 316. 
 4 Add. MS. 32956, f. 393. 5 Add. MS. 32957, f. 123. 
 6 Add. MS. 32957, f. 153. ? Add. MS. 32957, f. 165. 
 
THE ELECTION OF A HIGH STEWARD 289 
 
 mentioned to him 1 . Thus any weapon of intimidation 
 or persuasion which came to hand was used ; and Thomas 
 Townshend waxed indignant at the idea that the Bishop 
 of Exeter might not be able to prevent his chaplain from 
 voting at the election 2 . 
 
 In a letter to the Duke of Newcastle, Charles Towns- 
 hend gave an interesting account of his labours. "Our 
 friend, the Bishop of Lincoln," he wrote, " arrived in the 
 afternoon, and we instantly canvassed his college, and 
 called together upon one or two gentlemen of St John's, 
 Lincolnshire gentlemen whom I thought open to explicit 
 solicitation, and likely to be influenced by the visit, 
 civility, and kind assurances of their own bishop, in 
 opposition to the loose though positive promises of our 
 liberal adversary. Fogarve of St John's was one whom 
 I have good hopes we shall get, but Gunning is more 
 reserved, and I wish the Bishop of Ely may not have 
 wrote too slightly to him. He should both repeat and 
 enforce the application, for Gunning is not engaged. 
 Dr Powell will try him again this day. Mr Browne, 
 minor canon of Rochester, waits Lord Ravensworth's 
 directions, and will be with us upon that application. 
 I think I have made an impression upon Dr Collignon 
 who stands, even in the present list, marked against us. . . . 
 Pemberton of Peterhouse declared to me yesterday after 
 long expostulation. He is a pretty young man. I have 
 this morning gained ground with Ewin, and I will venture 
 to say he will go with us....Longmire of Peterhouse is 
 shy, but the master thinks him sure. He is the more 
 material as he is a proctor, his colleague against us, and 
 the manner of taking the votes exceptionable, and too 
 open to all sorts of inaccuracy 3 ." 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32957, f. 149. 2 Add. MS. 32957, f. 149. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32956, f. 357. 
 
 w. 19 
 
290 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 Thus the game was played ; and men, accustomed to 
 lead quiet secluded lives, suddenly found themselves 
 cajoled and threatened by eager politicians and great 
 nobles. Much had undoubtedly been done to improve 
 Hardwicke's prospects; but Sandwich still retained an 
 advantage in respect of the non-resident voters, and 
 might succeed in carrying the day by their aid. The 
 whigs were ready enough to bring up their supporters 
 from London and elsewhere, but time was fighting against 
 them. The election had been fixed for March 22nd, and 
 the day was close at hand. It was in vain that Newcastle 
 petitioned for a delay of a week : the vice-chancellor, 
 though in sympathy with Hardwicke, refused to comply 
 with the demand 1 . It is probable that no alteration 
 would have been made, had it not been for the indiscreet 
 action of certain of Sandwich's followers. In their 
 anxiety to thwart their opponents as much as possible, 
 they over-reached themselves, and contrived to furnish 
 the vice-chancellor with an excuse for postponing the 
 day of the election. 
 
 As at present, masters of arts, who removed their 
 names from the register of the university, lost the right 
 of voting in the senate, but it was possible for them, 
 by replacing their names, to recover the privilege. To 
 obviate abuses, which might possibly arise in connection 
 with this practice, it was expressly provided that an 
 interval of three months must elapse, after the date of 
 re-admission, before the right of voting could be exer- 
 cised 2 . It had, apparently, never been definitely decided 
 whether these three months were to be reckoned by the 
 moon or by the calendar ; and, taking advantage of this 
 ambiguity, Dr Smith, master of Trinity, and an ardent 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32956, f. 314, f. 369. 
 
 2 A longer interval, namely 180 days, is now demanded. 
 
THE ELECTION OF A HIGH STEWARD 291 
 
 supporter of Sandwich, presented a memorial to the vice- 
 chancellor, in which he contended that " no person re- 
 admitted after December 22nd had the right of voting 
 in the senate on March 22nd," inasmuch as "the space 
 of time from December 22nd to March 22nd, being equal 
 to the months of December, January, and February 
 added together, or of January, February, and March 
 added together, contains three calendar months 1 ." 
 
 If Dr Smith was right in his contention, Lord 
 Hardwicke's followers had been guilty of a miscalcula- 
 tion which might have serious consequences. Reckoning 
 the three months, required by statute, according to the 
 moon, they had counted upon using the votes of all their 
 friends re-admitted before December 30th. Between the 
 latter date and December 22nd there had been twenty- 
 two re-admissions, thirteen of whom were supporters of 
 Hardwicke, and nine followers of Sandwich 2 . Thus the 
 point raised by the master of Trinity was of something 
 more than academic interest. If his interpretation of 
 the statute was upheld, Hardwicke would be the loser; 
 and if the question was left unsettled, the validity of 
 twenty-two votes would be open to dispute. It was of 
 material advantage to the whigs, at this crisis of their 
 fortunes, that they numbered the vice-chancellor amongst 
 their friends. Throwing his scruples to the winds, he 
 frankly acted as a partisan; and, on the advice of 
 Hardwicke's party, postponed the election to March 30th 3 . 
 By this he did more than cut the ground from under the 
 feet of the master of Trinity; he gave Newcastle and 
 his friends time to win votes amongst the non-resident 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32957, f. 61. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32956, f. 260. No mark is attached to the name of 
 George Onslow, but it seems fair to include him amongst the supporters 
 of Hardwicke. 3 Add. MS. 32957, f. 57, f. 95. 
 
 19—2 
 
292 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 members of the senate. It is not surprising that Sandwich 
 was deeply chagrined by such conduct. He had every- 
 thing to lose, and nothing to gain, by delay ; and displayed 
 his vexation by threatening the vice-chancellor with legal 
 proceedings 1 . 
 
 It would be easy, however, to exaggerate the im- 
 portance of this incident. Sandwich had suffered a 
 rebuff, but he still remained a very formidable antagonist. 
 Neither party could look forward to a triumphant issue 
 with any degree of certainty. University opinion was 
 closely divided on the merits of the rival candidates; 
 and it was clear that, whoever carried the day, would 
 only do so by a narrow majority 2 . Moreover the existing 
 constitution of the university increased the difficulty of 
 a reliable forecast. The high steward was appointed by 
 a grace which had first to be passed by the caput, a small 
 body consisting of the vice-chancellor and five other 
 members. The powers of this assembly were by no means 
 inconsiderable, inasmuch as any individual member of 
 it had the right of absolute veto 3 . If passed by the 
 caput, the grace would be submitted to the senate which 
 was divided into two houses, known as the regents and 
 non-regents. All masters of arts for the first five years 
 after taking their degree were regents, after which time 
 they became non-regents. The consent of each house 
 was necessary to the passing of a grace; and this pro- 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32957, f. 137. 
 
 ' 2 The majority of heads of houses were supporters of Hardwicke ; 
 and of the colleges, while Trinity, King's, Pembroke, Caius, and St 
 Catharine's were strongholds of the Sandwich party, Queens', Corpus, 
 Clare, and Peterhouse were mainly in Hardwicke's interest. Add. MS. 
 32957, f . 5, f. 53, f. 205 ; Add. MS. 32958, f. 60, f. 68, f. 70, f. 72, f. 74, 
 f. 76, f. 80, f. 82. 
 
 3 Wordsworth's Social Life at the English Universities in the Eighteenth 
 Century, pp. 38, 39. 
 
THE ELECTION OF A HIGH STEWARD 293 
 
 vision enabled the junior members of the university often 
 to offer effective opposition to their seniors. A doctor 
 enjoyed the privilege of voting in either house, except for 
 the first two years after taking his doctor's degree, during 
 which period he was a member of the regents' house 1 . 
 
 Those working in Lord Hardwicke's interests were 
 prolific in producing statements purporting to show the 
 numerical strength of the two parties 2 ; but the value 
 of these accounts is very much open to question. All 
 prophecies, as to the probable result, were vitiated by the 
 element of uncertainty which it was impossible to elimi- 
 nate. A certain proportion of the voters preserved a 
 discreet silence, refusing to commit themselves definitely 
 to either party; and these were the men who, by de- 
 claring themselves at the last moment, might turn the 
 balance in one direction or the other. It was, moreover, 
 extremely difficult to foretell the number of non-residents 
 who would vote on the day of the election; and the 
 unexpected arrival of Castley from the Isle of Man 
 caused the master of Jesus to have the most gloomy 
 forebodings 3 . Nothing was beyond doubt, save that it 
 would be a close encounter and a fight to the finish. 
 
 If a certain number of the senior members of the 
 university were reticent in expressing their opinions, 
 their example was not followed by the undergraduates 
 who displayed a lively interest in the struggle which was 
 going on in their midst. Without a vote in the senate, 
 they were unable to influence the course of events, but 
 
 1 "You know," wrote Lord Sandwich in 1764, "there are many 
 doctors who are only regents" (Add. MS. 32957, f. 184). Dr Warren 
 described himself as a member of the regents' house " as two years are 
 not quite elapsed since I was admitted doctor " (Add. MS. 32957, f. 31). 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32956, f. 271, f. 321, f. 442 ; Add. MS. 32957, f. 1, f. 83, 
 f. Ill, f. 165, f. 276. 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32957, f. 165. 
 
294 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 were willing enough to seize an opportunity for riot and 
 disorder. They were, for the most part, warmly in 
 favour of Lord Hardwicke, and showed little mercy to 
 the most eminent supporters of his rival. On the night 
 of March 15th there was a riot in King's, the under- 
 graduates gathering round the provost's lodge, and 
 raising the cry "Bring out your daughters, Jemmy 
 Twitcher is come 1 ." The scholars and pensioners of 
 Trinity were bitterly opposed to their master for his 
 support of Lord Sandwich; and there was a reasonable 
 fear that a serious riot might break out on the day of 
 the election. Constables were planted in the streets 
 leading to the senate house, and every precaution taken ; 
 for, as an observer informed Newcastle, "the spirit of 
 the young men on this occasion... was very remarkable, 
 so that there was just reason to fear that they might 
 proceed to extremities against some particular persons 2 ." 
 Whatever disturbance there was, however, occurred 
 inside and not outside the senate house. The grace for 
 the appointment of Lord Hardwicke as high steward 
 having been safely steered through the caput, was sub- 
 mitted to the senate on March 30th. It passed the non- 
 regents' house by a narrow majority of two; but when 
 the votes of the regents were added up, it was discovered 
 that the two proctors disagreed. Longmire, the senior 
 proctor, counted 108 placets for the grace and 107 non- 
 placets, but this order was exactly reversed by Foster, 
 the junior proctor, according to whose reckoning the 
 grace was non-placeted by one vote. The confusion 
 appears to have arisen through a blunder by Foster. 
 When everyone had voted except Longmire, an equal 
 number of placets and non-placets, namely 107, stood 
 recorded on each proctor's list. Longmire then voted 
 1 Add. MS. 32957, f. 193. 2 Add. MS. 32957, f. 396. 
 
THE ELECTION OF A HIGH STEWARD 295 
 
 placet and recorded his vote on his list; but, either by 
 accident or design, he was marked by Foster as having 
 non-placeted the grace. 
 
 The conflicting lists were presented by the esquire 
 bedell to the vice-chancellor who at once commanded 
 the two proctors to appear before him. In the meantime 
 Longmire and Foster had altered their lists, so as to make 
 it appear that an equal number of placets and non-placets 
 had been given 1 . Addressing them from the chair, the 
 vice-chancellor inquired whether they could declare the 
 grace approved or rejected, instructing them, if they 
 found themselves unable to give a definite answer, to 
 hold a second scrutiny. At once three doctors, supporters 
 of Sandwich, arose, and loudly called upon the junior 
 proctor to answer no questions, to refuse a second scrutiny, 
 and to adhere to his declaration that the number of votes 
 was equal. A scene of general confusion followed, in 
 the midst of which was heard a hammering on the door 
 of the senate house. The provost of King's called the 
 attention of the vice-chancellor to the noise, and declared 
 it to come from the master of Trinity seeking admission. 
 Fearing perhaps that he might be insulted and misused 
 by the undergraduates of his college 2 , Dr Smith had 
 refrained from appearing in the senate house, much to 
 the annoyance of his allies who, when they heard the' 
 knocking, concluded that he had repented at the eleventh 
 hour. If their surmise was correct, he had chosen his 
 time well : his vote in a second scrutiny might decide the 
 question in favour of Sandwich. 
 
 This point was quickly seen by the members of the 
 
 1 This was an arithmetical impossibility, inasmuch as it was never 
 denied that the number of placets and non-placets given by the regents 
 amounted in all to 215. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32957, f. 396. 
 
296 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 senate. The provost of King's demanded that the master 
 of Trinity should be admitted, and was opposed by the 
 master of Magdalene who argued, with some force, that 
 " the mistake, which was made amongst the numbers 
 then present, was not to be rectified by the admittance 
 of a new vote 1 ." Either convinced by this argument, 
 or influenced by his sympathy with Hardwicke, the vice- 
 chancellor ordered that the doors should not be opened; 
 but no sooner had the decree gone forth, than the futility 
 of the discussion was revealed. It was discovered that 
 the knocking proceeded from a messenger who had come 
 to say that the master of Trinity would do anything for 
 Lord Sandwich, except imperil his life for him. 
 
 This incident was but an interlude in a day of con- 
 fusion and anarchy. When it was understood that 
 Dr Smith did not seek admission, the discussion reverted 
 to the question of the second scrutiny. The master of 
 Trinity Hall argued that constitutional practice demanded 
 a second scrutiny, and the vice-chancellor was of the 
 same opinion. What followed may be best described 
 in the words of a contemporary. " Silence was ordered. 
 Mr Bennet, notary public, was summoned to attend that 
 he might take notice what questions were asked, and 
 of the replys (sic). The question put to the senior proctor 
 was, ' Will you declare placet or non-placet ? ' ' No, I 
 cannot.' ' Will you proceed to a second scrutiny ? ' 
 ' Yes, with all my heart.' The like questions were put 
 to the junior proctor who answered to the first as the 
 senior proctor had done; to the other, that he would 
 go to no second scrutiny. Then the vice-chancellor gave 
 him a monition so to do ; which he refusing to obey, the 
 vice-chancellor dissolved the congregation 2 ." 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32957, f. 394. 
 
 2 Add. MS. 32957, f. 394, see also f. 310, f. 312. 
 
THE ELECTION OF A HIGH STEWARD 297 
 
 This was but a barren result for the hard work which 
 had preceded the election. Both parties had cause for 
 dissatisfaction, for it still remained open to question 
 which of the two candidates, if either, had been elected. 
 When first approached for his opinion, Charles Yorke 
 argued that the dissolution of the congregation, before 
 any declaration had been made, annulled all the pro- 
 ceedings, and that nothing remained but to hold a second 
 election 1 . Newcastle, however, was bitterly opposed to 
 such a course of action, and it is not likely that Sandwich 
 was prepared to begin the struggle all over again. But, 
 if a second election was out of the question, no alternative 
 remained but an appeal to the courts of law. This might 
 appear to be an equally hazardous enterprise, but Lord 
 Hardwicke and his followers were encouraged to hope 
 for a successful issue by a lucky discovery made by the 
 Bishop of Norwich. Apparently a certain Mr Pitt, who 
 had given his vote in the regents' house against Lord 
 Hardwicke, had done so illegally, being a non-regent. He 
 had taken his degree as master of arts on July 18th, 1758, 
 "from which day," wrote the Bishop of Norwich, "his 
 regency takes its reckoning, not from the subsequent 
 commencement 1759. Persons who go out by mandate, 
 as he did, are created immediately, and their creation 
 makes their commencement as the Bishop of Lincoln can 
 inform your grace 2 ." 
 
 The case was brought before the court of king's bench 
 in the spring of 1765, and decided in Hardwicke's favour, 
 Pitt's vote being disallowed. Thus ended the contest 
 which had continued for more than a year, and which 
 may be said to have profited neither party. The triumph 
 of Hardwicke was too belated to be of substantial ad- 
 vantage to the whig opposition, and Sandwich had gained 
 1 Add. MS. 32957, f. 466. 2 Add. MS. 32958, f. 23. 
 
298 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 nothing by his incursion into unfamiliar territory. By 
 the time that the matter was submitted to the court of 
 king's bench, a good deal of the interest had evaporated ; 
 but when the contest was at its height, feeling had run 
 high in the university. The calm of academic life was 
 rudely broken, men's passions were aroused by the mimic 
 warfare; and one of the greatest of the Cambridge 
 colleges was the scene of a struggle which, being the 
 outcome of the greater contest, may not unfittingly be 
 related here. 
 
 On April 5th, 1764, Lord Sandwich arrived in Cam- 
 bridge from Hinchingbrooke, and was invited to dine in 
 the hall of Trinity on the following day. The passions, 
 aroused by the events of the previous weeks, had by no 
 means yet subsided ; and it is significant that the master 
 of Trinity took the precaution of inquiring of the fellows 
 of the college whether they intended "to entertain his 
 lordship genteelly 1 ." It may be surmised that he was 
 satisfied with the answer they gave; but he would have 
 been wiser to secure the good behaviour of the junior 
 members of the college. The scholars and pensioners, 
 ardent partisans of Hardwicke to a man, determined to 
 signify their disapproval of the action of their elders, 
 and on the day that Lord Sandwich was a guest at the 
 high table, only one undergraduate condescended to dine 
 in hall 2 . No more effective demonstration of hostility 
 could have been devised. The long empty benches told 
 their own tale; and the presence of a single under- 
 graduate served to point the absence of the rest. 
 
 It would doubtless have been wiser to pass by such 
 conduct in silence, but the master considered, and with 
 some justice, that a gross insult had been inflicted upon 
 his guest and himself. He determined upon the punish- 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32958, f, 7. 2 Add. MS. 32958, f. 15, f. 21. 
 
THE ELECTION OF A HIGH STEWARD 299 
 
 ment of the offenders, and the course he pursued can 
 be best gathered from a letter written by the Rev. James 
 Backhouse 1 , a fellow of the college, to the Duke of New- 
 castle. "The kind concern," wrote Backhouse, "your 
 lordship was pleased to express for the difficulties we 
 have now to struggle with in Trinity college, induces me 
 to trouble you with a sketch of our proceedings since 
 my last. On Friday last, when Davis, Meredith, and 
 Newbon (our friends in the present cause) were out of 
 college, the master, having previously converted Powell 
 and Place, summoned the seniors to confirm the sentence 
 he had drawn up for the undergraduates, which, at last, 
 after a sort he effected. But when the sentence came 
 to be put into execution, only four of the whole number 
 of lads could be prevailed upon to sign the admonition. 
 What the consequences of this will be I know not ; but 
 the great man declares that no vacant scholarship shall 
 be filled up this year, and the young men, fearing the 
 worst, are many of them looking out for a refuge else- 
 where. Mr Brockett was of the seniority, and, I need 
 scarce tell your lordship, most violent in his counsels. 
 The next day he declared in a public coffee house that 
 now the sword was drawn in Trinity college, it should 
 never be sheathed whilst there was one left standing in 
 the field. To give your lordship a specimen of the 
 master's behaviour at the meeting, I mention the follow- 
 ing circumstance, viz. — when he was pressed to a non 
 plus about the true sense and meaning of a clause in the 
 statute, de pona (sic) majorum criminum 2 , he commanded 
 
 1 For an account of Backhouse, see Gunning's Reminiscences of 
 Cambridge, u. 113, 114. 
 
 2 The statute ran as follows: "Nihil est quod magis homines ad 
 delinquendum incitet, quam impunitas ; et propterea statuimus et 
 ordinamus, ut si quis Sociorum aut Discipulorum, aliorumve intra 
 
300 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 
 me in a magisterial strain to be silent, alledging (sic) this 
 reason for it, tliat the interpretation of the statutes 
 belonged to the master alone, and the seniors had 
 nothing to do with it 1 ." 
 
 Thus one of the consequences of the contest for the 
 office of high steward was open war in Trinity. The 
 master was in opposition to a certain section of the 
 fellows, and to nearly all the undergraduates. By dint 
 of something like chicanery 2 , he had obtained the consent 
 of the seniority to a high-handed measure of authority. 
 The document, which the undergraduates were called 
 upon to sign, ran as follows : " It being notorious that 
 not one of the scholars of the house, and but one of the 
 
 collegium vitam degentium, haereseos, autprobabilissuspicionishaereseos 
 aut simoniae, aut impiae et perversae, alieujus opinionis aut dogmatis, 
 aut laesae majestatis, aut pertinaciae, aut perjurii, furti notabilis, 
 homicidii voluntarii, stupri, adulterii, incestus, raptionis injuriosae, ac 
 violentae percussionis Socii cujusquam, aut Discipuli, aut Pensionarii, 
 aut Sisatoris, aut Subsisatoris, couvictus fit, aut vulnus grave cuipiam ex 
 praedictis inflexerit, aut si magistrum ejusve vicarium aut officiarium, 
 octove Seniorum quempiam, vel leviter percusserit ; quinetiam si portas 
 collegii furtim reseraverit, aut conjurationes vel insidias contra Collegium 
 comparaverit, vel seditiones in collegio aliquando excitaverit, aut damnum 
 grave ei intulerit, aut per alios haec fieri aliquando procuraverit, aut 
 dedecus infamiamve Collegio inusserit, aut coram Magistro, ejusve 
 Vicario, et octo Senioribus se vel haec omnia praedicta crimina, vel 
 singula eorum admississe eonfessus fuerit, aut eorumdem idoneis testibus 
 convictus, Magistri et majoris partis octo Seniorum consensu, sine ulla 
 monitione collegio omnino privetur. 
 
 Minorum autem criminum poena, de qua in Statutis nulla fit mentio, 
 judicio Magistri, aut ejus Vicarii et octo Seniorum, semper relinquatur. " 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32958, f. 382. 
 
 2 "The four seniors who concurred with the master (whose con- 
 currence made a majority) were Dr Walker, Mr Powell, Mr Place, 
 Mr Brockett. The master availed himself of the absence of Dr Davis 
 and Mr Newbon : for, by their going out of college, Place and Brockett 
 came into the number of the eight resident seniors." Add. MS. 32958, 
 f. 429. 
 
THE ELECTION OF A HIGH STEWARD 301 
 
 pensioners, did appear in the college hall on Friday, the 
 6th April last, when by invitation from the master and 
 seniors, the Earl of Sandwich, Lord Townshend, and 
 Lord Carysf ort were entertained there : We, whose 
 names are underwritten, do confess, that being then in 
 commons we did knowingly and wilfully conspire to be 
 absent from the hall, as above mentioned, in open 
 contempt and defiance of all decency, discipline, and 
 government : and having thus debased ourselves, and 
 dishonoured the college by branding it with disgrace 
 and infamy, we confess we have incurred the penalty 
 of expulsion by the 38th statute, De poena majorum 
 criminum et minorum; and do receive from our governours 
 (sic) this admonition in order to expulsion, instead of 
 expulsion itself, which we have justly deserved 1 ." 
 
 Only four undergraduates, all of them pensioners, 
 were at first found willing to admit their fault, and sign 
 the confession imposed upon them. The remainder, 
 encouraged by their number, and by the support they 
 received 2 , raised the flag of rebellion, and preferred to 
 run the risk of expulsion rather than allow that they 
 had acted wrongly. Yet, resolute as they were, they 
 found an equal determination in the master and those 
 of the seniors who were in sympathy with him. An end 
 would be put to discipline if authority could be flouted 
 with impunity ; and the time was not suitable for 
 half-measures. The prophecy, which Mr Brockett had 
 
 1 See Admission Book, Trinity College, Cambridge. A copy of the 
 admonition is to be found amongst the Newcastle Papers, Add. MS. 
 32958, f. 383. 
 
 2 "I wish you would consider," wrote Newcastle to Charles Yorke, 
 "whether those meritorious young men of Trinity can have any relief 
 from these acts of oppression in the master. I hear the other colleges 
 are determined to take them in the handsomest manner, if they are 
 expelled their own college" (Add. MS. 32958, f. 476). 
 
302 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 delivered in a public coffee house, seemed in the course 
 of fulfilment. The seniority met on the morning of 
 May 14th, and further measures of reprisal were carried. 
 It was decreed that "none of the pensioners, who will 
 not subscribe the admonition to-morrow evening after 
 chapel, shall be permitted to offer himself a candidate 
 for scholarships " ; but, as this would only affect a certain 
 section of the undergraduates, it was agreed to leave the 
 punishment of the scholars and other pensioners for future 
 consideration 1 . 
 
 The penalty thus imposed was undoubtedly very 
 severe. A Trinity scholarship was, and still remains, 
 a much coveted honour; and, by the decision of the 
 seniority, many were precluded from the satisfaction of 
 their legitimate ambition, unless prepared to confess to 
 a fault of which they did not feel themselves guilty. In 
 defence of the action of the master and seniors, it might 
 be argued that the college was justified in refusing to 
 allow those, who had resisted its authority, to compete 
 for its emoluments ; but this argument would apply with 
 far less force to the undergraduates who, on the strength 
 of being elected to a Westminster scholarship in the 
 previous year, had already come into residence, but now 
 found themselves denied admission into their scholarships 
 unless they signed the admonition 2 . The legality of such 
 a proceeding was very questionable, and the father of 
 one of the boys concerned threatened to take legal pro- 
 ceedings against the master 3 . 
 
 It is to the credit of the college that an overwhelming 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32958, f. 386. 
 
 2 "The consequence of this I believe will be," wrote Backhouse, 
 ' ' that the last year's Westminsters will be excluded from their scholar- 
 ships" (Add. MS. 32958, f. 386). 
 
 3 Add. MS. 32959, f. 118. 
 
THE ELECTION OF A HIGH STEWARD 303 
 
 proportion of the undergraduates refused to be intimidated 
 "by the tyrannical threats of the master and seniority. 
 Originally only four signatures had been appended to 
 the admonition, and it was not until a little later that 
 James Carrington, thinking perhaps that, if Paris was 
 worth a mass, a Trinity scholarship was some com- 
 pensation for humiliation, submitted and signed the 
 document 1 . His example was not followed by any of 
 the other rebels ; and thus only five, out of the whole 
 number of undergraduates then in residence, were found 
 willing to confess that they had done wrong in refusing 
 to dine in hall on the day that Lord Sandwich honoured 
 the high table by his presence. Confronted with such 
 strenuous resistance, the authorities pursued the wisest 
 course under the circumstances, and abandoned the 
 struggle which ought never to have been begun 2 . In 
 the Admission Book of the college, there is an entry, 
 dated June 23rd, 1764, which states that " in order to 
 restore tranquillity and time for study, the master and 
 seniors have pardoned all the offenders in the case above 
 mentioned, or any way relating to it, even those who 
 refused to sign the admonition"; but it is not without 
 interest, or altogether devoid of significance, that amongst 
 the ten candidates who were awarded scholarships in 
 that year, are to be found the five who had signed the 
 admonition. 
 
 Some apology is perhaps needed for dwelling at 
 length upon a topic of very limited interest; and it 
 was by way of an apology that the story was relegated 
 
 1 Add. MS. 32958, f. 386 ; Admission Book, p. 446. 
 
 2 On May 26th Newcastle was informed that "it is thought at 
 Cambridge that he (i.e. the master) will not do anything more" (Add. 
 MS. 32959, f. 118); James Backhouse was also of the opinion "that the 
 master is sick of his persecutions" (Add. MS. 32959, f. 150). 
 
304 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 to the obscurity of an appendix. No one would contend 
 that the internal affairs of Cambridge or Trinity are of 
 great importance, but it is possible that they may prove 
 of interest to those who, versed in the university politics 
 of the present day, will find in the struggle between 
 Hardwicke and Sandwich both a parallel and a contrast. 
 
APPENDIX III. 
 
 Amongst the Newcastle papers in the British museum 
 is an interesting list of the placemen in both houses who 
 voted against the repeal of the stamp act. To the name 
 of each man is appended the office that he held; and 
 the document gives a vivid illustration of the strength 
 of the party of "king's friends/' and the power which 
 George III possessed to control the decisions of the house 
 of commons. 
 
 ADDITIONAL MSS. 33001, April 26, 1766 
 Placemen who voted against the Repeal 
 
 Lord Barrington 
 Lord Bateman 
 Lord R. Bertie 
 William Blakiston 
 Hon. Robert Brudenell 
 Hon. John Burgoyne 
 
 Hon. Charles Cadogan 
 James Campbell 
 Sir James Douglas 
 Archibald Douglas 
 Jeremiah Dyson 
 John Eames 
 Sir G. Elliot 
 Simon Fanshaw 
 Lord Adam Gordon 
 Marquis of Granby 
 
 Secretary at War 
 
 Master of the Buckhounds 
 
 Lord of the Bedchamber 
 
 Solicitor General to the Queen 
 
 Vice Chamberlain to the Queen 
 
 Colonel of the 16th Regiment of 
 
 Dragoons 
 Surveyor of the Gardens 
 Governor of Stirling Castle 
 Admiral of the White 
 Colonel of Dragoons 
 Commissioner of Trade 
 Master in Chancery 
 Treasurer of the Chambers 
 Comptroller of the Green Cloth 
 Colonel of Foot 
 Master of the Ordnance 
 
 20 
 
306 
 
 PERSONAL AND PARTY GOVERNMENT 
 
 Thomas Gilbert 
 David Graeme 
 John Hamilton 
 
 William Gerard Hamilton 
 Eliab Harvey 
 Edward Harvey 
 Frank Holbouin 
 Marquis of Lome 
 John Ross Mackye 
 Alexander Mackay 
 Lord Robert Manners 
 John Manners 
 R. H. Thomas Millar 
 Thomas Moore Molineux 
 
 H. Arch Montgomery 
 John Morton 
 John Mostyn 
 Edmund Nugent 
 R. H. James Oswald 
 Earl of Panmure 
 Sir George Pococke 
 George Rice 
 John Lockhart Ross 
 Lord George Sackville 
 Sir John Sebright 
 Henry Seymour 
 Lord Charles Spencer 
 Hans Stanley 
 Sir Simeon Stuart 
 Lord Strange 
 Thomas Thoroton 
 Edward Thurlowe 
 Henry Wauchope 
 Lord Warkworth 
 Alexander Wedderburn 
 Thomas Worsley 
 
 Comptroller of the Household 
 
 Secretary to the Queen 
 
 Master of the King's works in 
 
 Scotland 
 Chancellor of Exchequer in Ireland 
 King's Counsel 
 Colonel of Light Horse 
 Admiral of the Red 
 Colonel of Foot 
 Paymaster of the Ordnance 
 Colonel of Foot 
 Colonel of Dragoons 
 Housekeeper at Whitehall 
 Lord Advocate 
 Captain in the 3rd Regiment of Foot 
 
 Guards 
 Ranger of S. James and Hyde Park 
 Chief Justice of Chester 
 Colonel of Dragoons 
 Groom of Bedchamber 
 Vice Treasurer of Ireland 
 Colonel of Foot 
 Admiral of the Blue 
 Lord of Trade 
 Captain in the Navy 
 Vice Treasurer of Ireland 
 Colonel of Foot 
 Groom of the Bedchamber 
 Verdurer of Whichwood Forest 
 Governor of Isle of Wight 
 Chamberlain of the Exchequer 
 Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancashire 
 Secretary to the Master of the Ordnance 
 King's Counsel 
 Deputy Privy Purse 
 Aide-de-camp to the King 
 King's Counsel 
 Surveyor of Board of Works 
 
PLACEMEN AND REPEAL OF THE STAMP ACT 
 
 307 
 
 April 17, 1766 
 Lords having places who voted against the Repeal 
 
 Earl of Pembroke 
 
 Earl of Denbigh 
 
 Earl of Litchfield 
 
 Earl of Coventry 
 
 Earl Ferrers 
 
 Earl Waldegrave 
 
 Earl Orford 
 
 Earl of Buckinghamshire 
 
 Earl of Oxford 
 
 Earl Harcourt 
 
 Earl of Darlington 
 
 Earl Talbot 
 
 Viscount Townshend 
 
 Earl of Sutherland 
 
 Earl of Eothes 
 
 Earl of Eglintoun 
 Earl of Loudon 
 Earl of March 
 Lord Cathcart 
 
 Colonel of Dragoons 
 
 Master of Fox Hounds 
 
 Captain of the Band of Pensioners 
 
 Lord of Bedchamber 
 
 Captain in the Navy 
 
 Colonel of Dragoons 
 
 Banger of S. James and Hyde Park 
 
 Lord of the Bedchamber 
 
 Lord of the Bedchamber 
 
 Lord Chamberlain to the Queen 
 
 Master of the Jewel Office 
 
 Lord Steward 
 
 General of the Ordnance 
 
 Aide-de-camp to the King 
 
 Colonel of 3rd Regiment of Foot 
 
 Guards 
 Lord of the Bedchamber 
 Colonel of Foot 
 Lord of the Bedchamber 
 First Commissioner of Police in 
 
 Scotland 
 
 20—2 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Act, cyder, 147, 149, 150, 149 n. 3, 
 196, 212, 213; repeal of, 269; 
 declaratory, 256 and n. 2, 262 
 and n. 2, 263, 268; declaring 
 the rights and liberties of the 
 subject, 3 ; excise, 27 ; Jew 
 naturalization, 27 ; militia, 24 ; 
 mutiny, 3 ; regency, 219-222 ; 
 stamp, 217, 218 ; resistance to, 
 in America, 253-255 ; considera- 
 tion of, by the Rockingham 
 ministry, 255, 256; parliament- 
 ary debate upon, 259, 260; 
 decision to repeal, 262 and 
 n. 2, 263; repeal of, 268, 305- 
 307 
 
 Advice in writing, 73; refused by 
 the king, 75 
 
 Aix - la - chapelle, treaty of, 68, 
 285 
 
 Albemarle, Earl of, see George 
 Keppel 
 
 America, annihilation of English 
 force in, 15 ; and the stamp act, 
 217, 241, 253-255, 266; war 
 with, 275; see also 250 
 
 Andover, parliamentary election at, 
 in 1761, 38 
 
 Anne, Queen, 3, 6, 7, 9, 274 
 
 Anson, George, first Lord Anson, 
 first Lord of the admiralty, 37 ; 
 opposed to war with Spain in 
 1761, 72, 76; death, 112 
 
 Ashburnham, John, second Earl of 
 Ashburnham, 233 
 
 Augsburg, proposed congress at, 
 49 and n. 2, 50, 54 
 
 Austria, relations with France in 
 1761, 47-49, 60, 61 
 
 Backhouse, James, fellow of Trinity 
 college, Cambridge, 299 and n. 1, 
 302 n. 2, 303 n. 2 
 
 Barre\ Isaac, attacks German war 
 and Pitt, 98 ; dismissed from his 
 military post in 1763, 203; op- 
 poses stamp act, 218; refuses a 
 place in Rockingham ministry, 
 253 
 
 Barrington, William Wildman, 
 second Viscount Barrington, 
 chancellor of the exchequer in 
 1761, 32; his political opinions, 
 32, 246 ; relations with New- 
 castle, 32, 109 ; resigns chancel- 
 lorship of the exchequer, 112, 
 113 ; secretary at war under 
 Rockingham, 245; reasons for 
 selecting him, 246 ; see also 208 
 
 Barton, Mr, of the university of 
 Cambridge, 288 
 
 Bath, 256 
 
 Beauclerk, George, third Duke of 
 St Albans, 271 n. 6 
 
 Bedford, Duke of, see John Russell 
 
 Belleisle, meditated attack upon, 
 24, 51 ; fall of, 53 ; restoration 
 of, to France, 140 
 
 Bennet, John, of Clare college, 
 Cambridge, 288 
 
 Bessborough, Earl of, see William 
 Ponsonby 
 
 Bloomsbury gang, nickname of the 
 Duke of Bedford's party, 13, 153, 
 184 
 
 Bolingbroke, Viscount, see Henry 
 St John 
 
 Boroughs, rotten, and treasury, 4 
 
 Boscawen, Hugh, second Viscount 
 Falmouth, electioneering in- 
 fluence in Cornwall, 4 n. 1 
 
 Boston, riots in, against the stamp 
 act, 254 
 
 Brielle, Solar de, 114 
 
 Bristol, Earl of, see George William 
 Hervey 
 
INDEX 
 
 309 
 
 Briton, the North, 159, 160 ; voted 
 a libel, 192, 193 
 
 Brockett, Laurence, fellow of 
 Trinity college, Cambridge, and 
 regius professor of modern his- 
 tory, 299, 300 n. 2, 301 
 
 Browne, Mr, minor canon of 
 Eochester, 289 
 
 Burke, Edmund, influence over 
 Bockingham administration, 243 
 n. 2; panegyric upon Bocking- 
 ham ministry, 269, 270 ; opinion 
 of Pitt's administration of 1766, 
 274 
 
 Bussy, Comte de, instructions of, 
 48 n. 2 ; arrives in England, 51; 
 relations with English ministers, 
 52, 53, 64, 65 ; meeting with Pitt, 
 65 and n. 4 
 
 Bute, Earl of, see John Stuart 
 
 Bute's friends, nickname of a poli- 
 tical party, 215, 238 and n. 2 ; 
 oppose the Bockingham ministry, 
 264 ; possibility of alliance with 
 Bockingham ministry, 271 
 
 Cabinet, outer and inner, 31, 33, 
 34, 85; independence of crown, 
 8, 9; dispensation of patronage 
 by, 7, 8 
 
 Calcraft, John, 203 
 
 Candidate, The, 285 
 
 Cambridge Courtship, The, 285 
 
 Cambridge, university of, election 
 of high steward of, in 1764, 201, 
 202, 210, 284-298 
 
 Cambridge university, vice-chan- 
 cellor of, see William Elliston 
 
 Camden, Earl of, see Charles Pratt 
 
 Canada, conquest of, 19 ; and peace 
 negotiations in 1761, 54, 55, 58 ; 
 governorship of, offered to Pitt, 
 87; see also 139 
 
 Cape Breton, and peace negotia- 
 tions in 1761, 54, 55, 58, 60, 62 
 
 Caput, the, 288, 292, 294 
 
 Carr, Mr, of the university of 
 Cambridge, 288 
 
 Carrington, James, 303 
 
 Carteret, John, Lord, Earl Gran- 
 ville, and the Pelhams, 280 ; 
 
 dismissed by George II, 4 ; de- 
 nounced by Pitt, 16 ; opposes 
 Pitt in peace negotiations of 
 1761, 56; advises Lord Egre- 
 mont to accept the office of 
 secretary of state, 83 n. 1; and 
 peace negotiations in 1762, 122 ; 
 his death, 153 
 
 Caryl, Lynford, master of Jesus 
 college, Cambridge, 293 
 
 Carysfort, Lord, see John Proby 
 
 Castley, Mr, 293 
 
 Cavendish, Lord John, 135 
 
 Cavendish, William, fourth Duke 
 of Devonshire, his character and 
 political opinions, 13 ; first lord 
 of the treasury, 16, 18 ; consents 
 to Bute becoming secretary of 
 state in 1761, 36; attitude to- 
 wards peace negotiations in 1761, 
 44, 61, 62 ; threatens to dis- 
 continue attendance at cabinet 
 council in 1761, 66 ; reconciles 
 Newcastle and Bute in 1761, 67 ; 
 and Pitt's pension, 87 ; and 
 Prussian subsidy, 107; and peace 
 negotiations in 1762, 118; in- 
 vited to return to the adminis- 
 tration, 132, 133; dismissed by 
 the king, 133-135, 138; his 
 opinion of Pitt, 146, 195 ; and 
 negotiations between Pitt and 
 the king in August, 1763, 173, 
 178 ; see also 74, 186, 187, 190, 
 207 
 
 Charles II, 161 
 
 Chesterfield, Earl of, see Philip 
 Dormer Stanhope 
 
 Choiseul, Due de, and peace nego- 
 tiations in 1761, 47, 48, 53-55, 
 58, 64 ; his policy of duplicity, 
 63, 64 ; pledged to support 
 Spanish interests, 68, 69; and 
 peace negotiations, 1761-63, 114- 
 126 
 
 Churchill, Charles, 285 
 
 Churchill, John, first Duke of 
 Marlborough, 18 
 
 Churchill, Sarah, and legacy to 
 Pitt, 276-281; her hatred of 
 Walpole, 277, 281 
 
310 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Clare hall, Cambridge, 292 n. 2 
 
 Cobham, Viscount, see Eichard 
 Temple 
 
 Collignon, Dr Charles, of Trinity 
 college, Cambridge, 289 
 
 Commons, house of, see Parlia- 
 ment 
 
 Compact, family, 61, 70, 71, 94, 
 122, 123 
 
 Conway, Francis Seymour, first 
 Marquis of Hertford, 193 
 
 Conway, Henry, unites with oppo- 
 sition, 193, 194, 203 ; deprived 
 of military post, 203, 206, 218 ; 
 secretary of state in Kockingham 
 administration, 243, 244 ; and 
 promotion of Lord George Sack- 
 ville, 253 ; and appeal to Pitt in 
 December, 1765, 256-259; and 
 the appeal to Pitt in January, 
 1766, 261 ; and the decision to 
 repeal tbe stamp act, and intro- 
 duce declaratory bill, 262 n. 2 ; 
 his parliamentary resolution on 
 February 3rd, 1766,266; and the 
 repeal of the stamp act, 268 
 
 Cornwall, electioneering influence 
 of the crown in, 4 and n. 1 ; 
 opposition to cyder tax in, 212, 
 213 
 
 Corpus Christi college, Cambridge, 
 292 n. 2 
 
 Crown, influence of Revolution and 
 Hanoverian succession upon, 2, 
 3-6, 7-9 ; patronage of, 3, 5, 6 
 
 Cumberland, Duke of, negotiations 
 with Pitt, 137, 138, 186 ; opinion 
 on opposition to cyder tax in 
 house of lords, 149, 150; in 
 favour of disregarding Pitt and 
 concluding an alliance with the 
 Duke of Bedford, 212, 213 n. 5; 
 despairs of opposition, 214, 216 ; 
 and negotiations for change of 
 ministry in April, 1765, 220 ; in 
 May, 1765, 223-228; in June, 
 1765, 231-233; and formation 
 of Rockingham administration, 
 238, 239; dependence of Rock- 
 ingham administration upon, 
 250 ; his death, ibid. ; effect upon 
 
 the ministry, 251, 273; see also 
 116, 132, 166, 167 n. 1, 230 n. 1 
 Cyder tax, see under Act 
 
 Dashwood, Sir Francis, succeeds 
 Lord Barrington as chancellor of 
 the exchequer, 112, 113; and 
 John Wilkes, 159; see also 939 
 n. 1 
 
 Davis, Henry, fellow of Trinity 
 college, Cambridge, 299, 300 
 n. 2 
 
 Declaratory act, see under Act 
 
 Delaval, Sir Francis Blake, opposes 
 German war, 97 
 
 Despenser, Lord, see Sir Francis 
 Dashwood 
 
 Devonshire, Duke of, see William 
 Cavendish 
 
 Devonshire, opposition to cyder 
 tax in, 212, 213 
 
 Dispensing power, 3 
 
 Dodington, George Bubb, first Lord 
 Melcombe, and the Weymouth 
 election, 39 ; summoned to at- 
 tend a cabinet council, 119 
 
 Dominica, capture of, 61 ; and pre- 
 liminaries of peace, 139 
 
 Dowdeswell, William, chancellor 
 of the exchequer in Rocking- 
 ham administration, 245 ; and 
 decision to repeal stamp act and 
 introduce declaratory bill, 262 
 n. 2 
 
 Drummond, Robert Hay, arch- 
 bishop of York, 288 
 
 Dunk, George Montagu, second 
 Earl of Halifax, opposes Pitt in 
 peace negotiations in 1761, 56 ; 
 first lord of the admiralty, 1762, 
 112 ; secretary of state, 1762, 
 128 ; offers place in cabinet to 
 Newcastle, 1762, 133 ; issues 
 general warrant, 160 ; proscribed 
 by Pitt, 174 ; and regency act, 
 221, 222 ; see also 154 n. 7, 184, 
 185 
 
 Dunkirk, 56, 58, 62, 68 
 
 Egmont, Earl of, see John Per- 
 ceval 
 
INDEX 
 
 311 
 
 Egremont, Earl of, see Charles 
 Wyudham 
 
 Election, general, of 1761, 37-41 ; 
 possibility of a general election 
 in 1765, 242 n. 1 
 
 Elizabeth, Czarina of Russia, death 
 of, 102-104 
 
 Elliot, Sir Gilbert, 174, 181 n. 1, 
 182 n. 1 
 
 Ellis, Welbore, 174 
 
 Elliston, William, vice-chancellor 
 of the university of Cambridge, 
 and master of Sidney Sussex 
 college, 290-292, 295, 296 
 
 Ely, bishop of, see Matthias Maw- 
 son 
 
 Ewin, Mr, 289 
 
 Excise bill, see under Act 
 
 Exeter, bishop of, see Frederick 
 Keppel 
 
 Falmouth, Viscount, see Hugh 
 Boscawen 
 
 Family compact, 61, 70, 71, 94, 
 122, 123 
 
 Finch, Edward, 41 n. 3 
 
 Finch, Daniel, eighth Earl of Win- 
 chelsea, appointed lord president 
 of the council in Rockingham's 
 ministry, 245 
 
 Fitzmaurice, William, second Earl 
 of Shelburne, opposed to German 
 war, 98; named for secretary- 
 ship of state in 1763, 153; ap- 
 pointed first commissioner of 
 trade in 1763, 154; relations 
 with his colleagues in Grenville's 
 ministry, 170 ; resignation of, 
 183; dismissed from post of 
 aide-de-camp to the king, 203 ; 
 refuses to take office in Rocking- 
 ham ministry, 247 ; influence of 
 Pitt over, 247 ; and negotiations 
 between Rockingham and Pitt 
 in Feb. 1766, 267; see also 
 174 
 
 Fitzroy, Augustus Henry, third 
 Duke of Grafton, opposes pre- 
 liminaries of peace, 141, 142 ; 
 dismissed from his lord-lieu- 
 tenancy in 1762, 143 ; and cyder 
 
 tax, 150 ; and John Wilkes, 161 ; 
 Pitt's high opinion of, 237, 244 ; 
 secretary of state in Rockingham 
 administration, 244, 247 ; con- 
 ditions upon which he took office, 
 ibid. ; appeals to Pitt to declare 
 his opinion of Rockingham 
 ministry, 248 ; arranged that he 
 should visit Pitt after Cumber- 
 land's death, 251 ; and promotion 
 of Lord George SackviUe, 253 ; 
 and appeal to Pitt in December, 
 
 1765, 256-259, and 257 n. 1; and 
 the appeal to Pitt in January, 
 
 1766, 260, 261; and decision to 
 repeal stamp act, and introduce 
 declaratory bill, 262 n. 2; favours 
 dissolution of ministry, 264 ; 
 resignation of, 270 ; speech after 
 resignation, 270, 271 ; his suc- 
 cessor, 271 
 
 Florida, ceded to England by Spain, 
 139, 140 
 
 Fogarve, Mr, of St John's college, 
 Cambridge, 288, 289 
 
 Foster, Mr, junior proctor of the 
 university of Cambridge, 294-296 
 
 Fox, Henry, first Lord Holland, 
 secretary of state in 1755, 15 ; 
 abandons Newcastle, 16; views 
 on George Ill's popularity, 28 ; 
 testifies to Bute's influence, 34; 
 suggested as Pitt's successor in 
 secretaryship of state, 80, 81 ; 
 his evil political reputation, 81, 
 130 ; alliance with Bute in 1761, 
 90, 91 ; undertakes management 
 of house of commons in 1762, 
 128 ; his use of bribery and cor- 
 ruption, 133, 136 ; his attack 
 upon the whig party in 1762, 
 143; reported that Bute was 
 jealous of him, 145; and Bute's 
 resignation iu 1763, 151-153 ; 
 offered first lordship of the 
 treasury, 152, 153 ; dismissed 
 from office of paymaster-general, 
 229 ; see also 132 
 
 France, outbreak of war with, 15 ; 
 negotiations for peace with, in 
 1761, 43-69 ; negotiations for 
 
312 
 
 INDEX 
 
 peace with, in 1761-63, 114-130, 
 139, 140, 145 
 
 Frederick the Great , King of Prussia, 
 and peace negotiations in 1761, 
 52, 62, 68; and English subsidy, 
 101-108 ; and preliminaries of 
 peace, 139, 140 and n. 1 ; see also 
 under Prussia 
 
 Fuentes, Comte de, Spanish am- 
 bassador in England, 60 n. 1, 
 
 Gainsborough, Lady, see Diana 
 Noel 
 
 Galitzin, Prince, Russian ambas- 
 sador in England, 49 
 
 George I, 7, 9 
 
 George II, restricted powers of, 9 ; 
 his German tastes, 28; opposed 
 to militia bill, 24 
 
 George III, character of, 1, 2 ; 
 political education and views, 2, 
 19-23, 26 n. 1 ; attitude towards 
 peace negotiations in 1761, 29, 
 30, 45-47; his design for con- 
 trolling parliament, 25, 26 ; his 
 success at general election of 
 1761, 37-41 ; relations with Pitt 
 and Newcastle at beginning of 
 reign, 24 and n. 2, 41, 42; exer- 
 cise of patronage, 41, 42; his 
 popularity, 27-29 ; his speech at 
 first privy council, 41; and at 
 opening of parliament, 41 ; his 
 hostility to Legge, 31, 32, 38; 
 refuses to accept the "advice in 
 writing," 75; his situation after 
 Bute's resignation, 154, 155 ; 
 relations with the Grenville 
 ministry, 156-158, 214-216, 228- 
 230 ; his hostility to Wilkes, 158 ; 
 negotiations with Pitt and the 
 whigs in 1763, 167-183 ; and the 
 regency bill, 219-222 ; negotia- 
 tions with Pitt and the whigs in 
 May, 1765,222-228; negotiations 
 with Pitt in June, 1765, 230-237 ; 
 and formation of Rockingham 
 administration, 237-239 ; his 
 situation in July, 1765, 240, 
 241; power over Rockingham 
 
 ministry, 247, 248; and the 
 appeal to Pitt in January, 1766, 
 262 ; attitude towards Rocking- 
 ham ministry, 262; and the 
 repeal of the stamp act, 264, 
 265, 268 and n. 3, 269 ; refuses 
 to punish those who voted against 
 the Rockingham ministry, 269, 
 272 ; disapproves of Richmond's 
 appointment as secretary of state, 
 271 ; refuses to create new peers, 
 272 ; summons Pitt to form a 
 ministry, 272; his position in 
 1766, 273-275 
 
 German war, opposition to, 92, 93, 
 96-99 
 
 Gibbon, Edward, and Wilkes, 159 
 
 Gloucester, bishop of, see William 
 Warburton 
 
 Gonville and Caius college, Cam- 
 bridge, 292 n. 2 
 
 Goree, and peace negotiations in 
 1761, 54, 58, 64 ; in 1762, 116 
 
 Gower, Earl, see Granville Leveson- 
 Gower 
 
 Grafton, Duke of, see Augustus 
 Henry Fitzroy 
 
 Granby, Marquis of, see John 
 Manners 
 
 Granville, Earl, see John, Lord 
 Carteret 
 
 Gray, Thomas, 87, 184, 285 
 
 Green, John, bishop of Lincoln, 
 289, 297 
 
 Grenada, and peace negotiations 
 in 1762, 117 
 
 Gunning, Francis, of St John's 
 college, Cambridge, 289 
 
 Grenville, George, 90 ; not in 
 sympathy with Pitt, 31, 82; 
 promoted to rank of cabinet 
 councillor, 31 ; refuses secre- 
 taryship of state, but undertakes 
 management of bouse of com- 
 mons, 82, 83 ; limitation of his 
 powers, 84 ; his oratory, 89 ; 
 offended with Bute on account 
 of Fox, 90, 91 ; and negotiations 
 with Spain after Pitt's fall, 92, 
 93, 95 ; opposed to German war, 
 97 ; and Prussian subsidy, 107 ; 
 
INDEX 
 
 313 
 
 secretary of state in May, 1762, 
 112 ; opposes Bute in the peace 
 negotiations, 112, 118-123, 126, 
 127, 145, 152; deprived of 
 secretaryship of state, 126-128 ; 
 continues in cabinet, 128, 129 ; 
 rumour that he intends to resign, 
 145 ; insulted by Pitt, 147 ; 
 succeeds Bute as first lord of 
 the treasury, 153, 154 ; his 
 restricted authority, 153, 154, 
 156, 157 ; weakness of his 
 ministry, 157, 158 ; and negotia- 
 tions between the king and the 
 whigs in August, 1763, 170, 
 173 n. 2, 175 and n. 1, 177, 179, 
 181-183, 181 n. 1; reconstruc- 
 tion of his administration, 183, 
 184 ; divisions in his minis- 
 try, 184, 185 ; his situation at 
 close of the parliamentary 
 session, 1763-1764, 200 and 
 n. 3, 201, 202, 203, 207; his 
 budget of 1764, 200, 210, 287 ; 
 situation at beginning of parlia- 
 mentary session, 1764-1765, 
 214-216; and stamp act, 217 
 and n. 2, 218 ; and regency 
 bill, 219-222; his treatment of 
 the king in May and June, 1765, 
 228-230 ; reconciliation with 
 Lord Temple, 235; fall of his 
 ministry, 237-239; and the 
 repeal of the stamp act, 263 
 Grenville, James, 227, 253 n. 1 
 Grenville-Temple, Kichard, Earl 
 Temple, related to Pitt, 17 ; and 
 peace negotiations in 1761, 56 ; 
 favours war with Spain, 69, 72, 
 73, 76 ; resignation of, 85 ; and 
 cyder tax, 150 n. 4 ; and John 
 Wilkes, 161, 179; dismissed 
 from lord lieutenancy, 163 ; and 
 negotiations for change of minis- 
 try in August, 1763, 179, 182 
 n. 1 ; and negotiations for 
 change of ministry in May and 
 June, 1765, 223-228, 226 n. 2, 
 233-237, 236 n. 1; reconcilia- 
 tion with George Grenville, 235 ; 
 approves of stamp act, 255 ; 
 
 suggested as first lord of the 
 treasury by Pitt in Dec. 1765, 
 257-259 ; defends the stamp act 
 in house of lords, 260 ; and the 
 negotiations between Pitt and 
 the ministers in January 1766, 
 260, 261 and n. 1 ; see also 147, 
 148, 167 
 
 Grimaldi, Marquis, Spanish am- 
 bassador in France, 60 n. 1, 
 70, 75 
 
 Guadeloupe, and peace negotiations 
 in, 1761, 54, 58; in 1762, 117, 
 119, 140 
 
 Hales worth, 288 
 
 Halifax, Earl of, see George 
 Montagu Dunk 
 
 Hanoverian succession, effect of, 
 upon royal power, 7-9 
 
 Hardwicke, first Earl of, see Philip 
 Yorke 
 
 Hardwicke, second Earl of, see 
 Philip Yorke 
 
 Harley, Bobert, first Earl of Oxford, 
 180 
 
 Havannah, proposed attack upon, 
 100 ; and peace negotiations of 
 1762, 126-128, 130; surrender 
 of, by preliminaries of peace, 
 139, 140 
 
 Havrineour, French ambassador 
 in Sweden, 63 
 
 Hay, Dr George, 211 
 
 Hayes, 223, 224, 228 
 
 Henley, Bobert, first Earl of North- 
 ington, his characterand political 
 opinions, 31 and n. 2; appointed 
 lord chancellor, 30 ; opposes 
 Prussian subsidy, 107 ; and 
 regency bill, 222 ; continued as 
 lord chancellor under Bocking- 
 ham, 245 ; reasons for his con- 
 tinuance, 245, 246 ; opposed to 
 his colleagues, 245, 250 ; quarrels 
 with them, 272 
 
 Hertford, Marquis of, see Francis 
 Seymour Conway 
 
 Hervey, George William, second 
 Earl of Bristol, 73, 76, 93, 
 99 
 
 20—5 
 
314 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Hesse, Landgrave of, ally of Eng- 
 land during the seven years' 
 war, 50 
 
 Hinchingbrooke, 298 
 
 Hill, Samuel, of St John's college, 
 Cambridge, 288 
 
 Hill, Wills, first Earl of Hills- 
 borough, 184 
 
 Hillsborough, Earl of, see Wills 
 Hill 
 
 Holland, Lord, see Henry Fox 
 
 India, overthrow of French power 
 in, 19 
 
 Jacobites, Bolingbroke's relations 
 
 with, 20 
 Jesus college, Cambridge, master 
 
 of, see Lynford Caryl 
 Jenkinson, Charles, 31, 181 n. 1 
 Jew naturalization act, see under 
 
 Act 
 Johnson, Dr, dislike of Scotch, 
 
 29 ; and Wilkes, 159 
 Judges, independence of tenure, 3 
 
 Keppel, George, third Earl of 
 Albemarle, 174, 232, 242 n. 1 ; 
 influence over Buckingham 
 administration, 243 ; welcomes 
 the news of the fall of the 
 Bockingham ministry, 272 
 
 Keppel, Frederick, bishop of 
 Exeter, 289 
 
 King's college, Cambridge, 291 n. 
 2, 294; provost of, see John 
 Sumner 
 
 Legge, Henry Bilson, dismissed 
 from chancellorship of the ex- 
 chequer, 31, 32, 113 ; king's 
 hostility to, 32, 38 ; see also 147 
 
 Leicester House, 31, 32, 246 
 
 Lennox, Charles, third Duke of 
 Bichmond and Lennox, succeeds 
 the Duke of Grafton as secre- 
 tary of state in 1766, 271 and 
 n. 6 
 
 Leveson-Gower, Granville, second 
 Earl Gower, member of Bedford 
 party, 13, 14, 153 ; sug 
 
 for the admiralty, 154 ; pro- 
 scribed by Pitt in 1763, 171 
 
 Liddell, Henry, first Lord Bavens- 
 worth, 289 
 
 Ligonier, Viscount, 107 
 
 Longmire, Daniel, of Peterhouse, 
 Cambridge, 289, 294, 295, 296 
 
 Louis XIV, 18 
 
 Louisiana, and peace negotiations 
 in 1762, 117 
 
 Lyttelton, George, first Lord 
 Lyttelton, 132, 228; refuses to 
 take office in Bockingham minis- 
 try, 247 
 
 Mackenzie, James Stuart, dis- 
 missed from office of privy seal 
 
 of Scotland, 228, 229 ; see also 
 
 238 and n. 2 
 Magdalene college, Cambridge, 
 
 master of, see George Sandby 
 Manners, John, Marquis of Granby, 
 
 174 
 Mansfield, Earl of, see William 
 
 Murray 
 Mariegalante, and peace negotia- 
 tions in 1761, 58 ; in 1762, 119 
 Marlborough, Duke of, see John 
 
 Churchill 
 Marlborough, Duchess of, see 
 
 Sarah Churchill 
 Martin, Samuel, secretary of the 
 
 treasury, his duel with Wilkes, 
 
 193 
 Martinique, and peace negotiations 
 
 in 1762, 117, 119 
 Massachusetts Bay, petitions 
 
 against stamp act, 254 
 Mawson, Matthias, bishop of Ely, 
 
 289 
 M'Culloh, Henry, and the stamp 
 
 act, 217, n. 2 
 Mease, Michael Oliver, fellow of 
 
 St John's college, Cambridge, 
 
 288 
 Medenham Abbey, 159 
 Melcombe, Lord, see George Bubb 
 
 Dodington 
 Meredith Moore, fellow of Trinity 
 
 college, Cambridge, 299, 300 
 
 n. 2 
 
INDEX 
 
 315 
 
 Meredith, Sir William, 198, 216 
 
 Militia bill, disliked by George II 
 and Newcastle, 24 
 
 Minden, Lord George Sackville 
 and battle of, 253 
 
 Minorca, capture of, by French, 
 15 ; and peace negotiations in 
 1761, 54, 55 ; and preliminaries 
 of peace, 139 
 
 Miquelon, 115, 125, 140 
 
 Mitchell, Sir Andrew, English 
 ambassador in Prussia, 104 
 
 Montagu, John, fourth Earl of 
 Sandwich, member of Bedford 
 party, his character, 13, 14, 196, 
 285 ; first lord of the admiralty, 
 154 ; relations with Wilkes, 159 ; 
 attacks Wilkes in house of lords, 
 191, 192 ; proscribed by Pitt in 
 1763, 171 ; appointed secretary 
 of state in 1763, 184 ; candidate 
 for office of high steward of 
 university of Cambridge, 201, 
 285-298; and Trinity college, 
 298, 301 
 
 Murray, William, first Earl of 
 Mansfield, 74, 107, 109, 162 ; 
 and peace negotiations in 1762, 
 116, 119 ; retires from cabinet, 
 183 
 
 Mutiny act, see under Act 
 
 Newbon, Kichard, fellow of Trinity 
 
 college, Cambridge, 299, 300 
 
 n. 2 
 Newcastle, Duke of, see under 
 
 Thomas Pelham-Holles 
 Neweome, John, master of St 
 
 John's college, Cambridge, 288 
 Newfoundland, fisheries of, and 
 
 peace negotiations in 1761, 54- 
 
 62, 68; in 1762, 115, 125, 139, 
 
 140 
 New York, congress at, 254 
 Nivernois, Due de, 124 
 Noel, Diana, Lady Gainsborough, 
 
 288 
 Non-regents, house of, 292, 294 
 North, Lord, 26 n. 1 ; refuses a 
 
 place in Rockingham ministry, 
 
 253 ; his fall, 275 
 
 Northington, Earl of, see Robert 
 Henley 
 
 Northumberland, Earl of, see Hugh 
 Smithson Percy 
 
 Norton, Sir Fletcher, . attorney- 
 general, 199 
 
 Norwich, bishop of, see Philip 
 Young 
 
 Nova Scotia, and peace negotia- 
 tions in 1761, 54 
 
 Nuthall, Thomas, 138, 267 
 
 Onslow, George, 216, 291 n. 2 
 Orford, Earl of, see Sir Robert 
 
 Walpole 
 Oswald, James, 174 
 Oxford, Earl of, see Robert Harley 
 
 Paris, peace of, see Peace 
 
 Parliament, effect of Revolution 
 upon, 3-7 ; influence of public 
 opinion upon, 15, 16, 18, 22, 27; 
 royal and ministerial influence 
 upon, 4-6, 7, 18, 25, 26, 190; 
 and general election of 1761, 30, 
 37, 40, 41 ; privilege of freedom 
 from arrest, 160-164, 189-195, 
 208 ; privilege of freedom of 
 speech, 203, 206 
 
 Patriot king, Bolingbroke's, 20-22, 
 240 
 
 Peace, negotiations for, in 1761, 
 43-77 ; prospect of success, 43- 
 48 ; in 1762-1763, 114-127, 129, 
 130, 139, 140 ; preliminaries of, 
 signed, 130; of Paris signed, 
 145, 148 ; debated in parliament, 
 40, 141, 142; attacked by Wilkes, 
 159, 160 ; see also 151, 170, 174, 
 175, 178, 179, 180, 181, 184, 
 208, 281, 282 
 
 Pelham, Henry, 10, 12; effect of 
 his death, 15 ; see also 280 
 
 Pelham-Holles, Thomas, first Duke 
 of Newcastle, his character and 
 political opinions, 9-12 ; his 
 parliamentary power, 15, 18 ; 
 interference in elections, 25 and 
 n. 1 ; his rise to supremacy after 
 fall of Walpole, 14, 15 ; resigns 
 in 1756, 16 ; relations with Pitt 
 
316 
 
 INDEX 
 
 in coalition ministry of 1757, 18, 
 23, 24, 36, 42 ; and Bute's ap- 
 pointment as secretary of state, 
 36, 37 ; adverse to Legge's dis- 
 missal, 31, 32 ; and general 
 election of 1761, 37-40, 39 
 n. 1 ; against war with Spain, 
 69-77 ; and peace negotiations 
 in 1761, 24, 44, 50, 55-69; 
 alliance with Bute in 1761, 45- 
 47, 66-68 ; threatens to retire 
 in 1761, 66 ; situation after fall 
 of Pitt, 77 ; and the appointment 
 of Pitt's successor, 78-83 ; and 
 negotiations with Spain after 
 Pitt's fall, 91-95, 100 ; and the 
 German war, 92, 93, 96-99, 101, 
 108, 109 ; and Prussian subsidy, 
 106, 107 ; and peace negotiations 
 in 1762, 114-118; resignation of, 
 in 1762, 109-111; his efforts to 
 win Pitt at the beginning of 
 1763, 145-149; his opinion of 
 Pitt's refusal to attack Bute's 
 administration, 146; and cyder 
 tax, 149, 150 ; his relations with 
 Pitt during 1763, 164-167, 186- 
 190 ; his views on Grenville's 
 ministry, 153 n. 3, 157 ; and 
 the negotiations with the king 
 in August, 1763, 168, 169, 170, 
 173, 175, 178, 179 ; his estimate 
 of his political strength in the 
 autumn of 1763, 190, 191; re- 
 fuses to sign protest against 
 limitation of parliamentary 
 privilege, 195 and n. 1 ; and 
 the debate on general warrants, 
 198 ; and the opposition 1764- 
 1765, 205-209, 212, 214, 216, 
 217 n. 1 ; and the negotiation 
 with the king in May, 1765, 
 222-228 ; and negotiation be- 
 tween Pitt and the king in June, 
 1765, 231-233 ; and the forma- 
 tion of Bockingham ministry, 
 238, 239, 243 n. 1 ; his views 
 on the parliamentary strength 
 of Bockingham ministry, 242 
 n. 1 ; and on advisability of a 
 general election in 1765, ibid. ; 
 
 accepts office of lord privy seal, 
 244 and n. 2 ; anxiety to gain 
 the support of Pitt for Bocking- 
 ham ministry, 248, 249 ; dis- 
 contented with his position in 
 Bockingham cabinet, 249; presses 
 for overtures to be made to Pitt 
 after Cumberland's death, 251 
 and n. 1, 252 ; not responsible 
 for promotion of Lord George 
 Sackville, 253 and n. 1; opposed 
 to declaratory act, 256 n. 2 ; 
 and appeal to Pitt in December, 
 
 1765, 256-259, 257 n. 1; 
 his willingness to resign, 257, 
 258 and n. 1 ; and the nego- 
 tiation with Pitt in January, 
 
 1766, 261; advises that the 
 parliamentary session should be 
 brought to an end, 271 ; his 
 political principles justified by 
 the younger Pitt, 275 ; and 
 the election of high steward of 
 the university of Cambridge, 
 202, 286-298 ' 
 
 Pemberton, Andrew, of Peter house, 
 Cambridge, 289 
 
 Pembroke college, Cambridge, 292 
 n. 2 
 
 Perceval, John, second Earl of 
 Egmont, joint postmaster, 145 ; 
 first lord of the admiralty, 184 ; 
 continued under Bockingham, 
 245 ; reasons for his continu- 
 ance, 246 ; disapproves of the 
 projected alliance with Prussia, 
 249, 250 
 
 Percy, Hugh Smithson, second 
 Earl of Northumberland, carries 
 on negotiation with Cumberland 
 in April, 1765, 220; in May, 
 1765, 223-226; named as first 
 lord of the treasury, 225 
 
 Peter III, Czar of Bussia, accession 
 of, 102 ; his importance, 102, 
 103 
 
 Peterhouse college, Cambridge, 
 289, 292 n. 2 
 
 Phillips, Sir John, 181 n. 1 
 
 Pitt, William, his character and 
 political opinions, 16, 17, 276- 
 
INDEX 
 
 317 
 
 283 ; paymaster of the forces, 
 17 ; his negotiations with the 
 Pelhams in 1744, 277-281 ; his 
 animus against Walpole, 279, 
 280; secretary of state in ad- 
 ministration of 1756, 16, 18 ; 
 dismissed, 18; his popularity, 
 17-19, 25-27, 29 and n. 1, 30, 
 157, 241, 247, 248; and victories 
 of the seven years' war, 19 ; 
 relations with Newcastle in 
 coalition ministry of 1757, 18, 
 23, 24, 36, 42 ; opposed to Bute 
 becoming secretary of state, 35, 
 36 ; and peace negotiations in 
 1761, 24, 44, 45, 49, 50, 51, 52, 
 55-62, 59 n. 1, 65-69 ; favours 
 war with Spain, 69-77 ; his fall 
 in October, 1761, 77-79 ; popular 
 feeling about his resignation, 
 
 86, 87 ; accepts royal bounty, 
 
 87, 88 ; his attitude towards the 
 administration in autumn of 
 1761, 89 and n. 1; and Prussian 
 subsidy, 108 ; and German war, 
 108, 210, 213, 218 n. 4; his 
 relations with the whig opposi- 
 tion to preliminaries of peace, 
 132,136-138,140-142; relations 
 with the whig opposition from 
 the end of 1762 to October, 1764, 
 144-149, 164-167, 185-190, 200, 
 204-206, 208-210 ; opposes pre- 
 liminaries of peace in parlia- 
 ment, 141, 142 ; and opposition 
 to cyder tax in house of lords, 
 150 ; and Bute's resignation, 
 152 and n. 3 ; relations with 
 Charles Yorke, 165-167, 199, 
 200, 208, 211 ; and negotiations 
 with the king in August, 1763, 
 167, 169-183, 187, 188; his 
 views on party government, 186, 
 189, 226-228 ; and John Wilkes, 
 165, 190, 193-195, 218; and 
 parliamentary debates on general 
 warrants, 197-200, 216, 218, 
 224 ; his breach with the whig 
 party in October, 1764, 212, 
 213, 218, 219, 223 ; and the 
 stamp act, 218 ; and negotiation 
 
 with king in May, 1765, 222- 
 228; in June, 1765, 230-237; 
 his views on the value of an 
 alliance with Prussia and 
 Kussia, 167 n. 1, 175, 224, 
 232 ; his attitude towards the 
 Rockingham ministry in the 
 summer of 1765, 242, 248, 249 ; 
 his high opinion of Grafton, 
 237, 244; efforts of Rocking- 
 ham ministry to placate him, 
 245, 246, 248 ; attitude towards 
 Newcastle during Rockingham 
 ministry, 248, 249, 251 n. 1, 
 257, 258, 261 ; expresses his 
 views on the situation after 
 Cumberland's death, 251, 252 ; 
 dislike of Lord George Sackville, 
 252, 253; appealed to for his 
 opinion on the stamp act and 
 asked to join the administration, 
 December, 1765, 256-259, 257 
 n. 1 ; attacks the stamp act in 
 parliament, 259, 260 ; asked to 
 join the administration in 
 January, 1766, 260-262 ; and 
 the declaratory bill, 263, and 
 n. 4, 266 ; and overtures from 
 Rockingham in February, 1766, 
 267, 268; acquires popularity by 
 repeal of the stamp act, 269 ; 
 last overtures to him, 270, 271 ; 
 summoned by the king to form 
 an administration, 272, 273 ; his 
 failure as a politician, 275 
 
 Place, Marwood, fellow of Trinity 
 college, Cambridge, 299, 300 
 n. 2 
 
 Placemen, opposition of, to Rock- 
 ingham ministry, 265, 267, 268, 
 269, 305-307 
 
 Pondicherry, capture of, 61 
 
 Ponsonby, William, second Earl 
 of Bessborough, 135 
 
 Pope Alexander, 21 n. 1 ; his Essay 
 on Man, 191 
 
 Powell, John, fellow of Trinity 
 college, Cambridge, 289, 299, 
 300 n. 2 
 
 Pratt, Charles, first Earl Camden, 
 and John Wilkes, 161-163 ; and 
 
318 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Pitt, 165 and n. 3, 189 ; named 
 for lord chancellor in June, 
 1765, 232 ; created a peer on 
 formation of Rockingham minis- 
 try, 246, 248 
 Princess of Wales, see Wales 
 Proby, John, Lord Carysfort, 301 
 Proctor, the junior, of the univer- 
 sity of Cambridge, see Foster; 
 the senior, see Daniel Longmire 
 Prussia, 167 n. 1, 175, 207, 224, 
 232; projected alliance with, by 
 Rockingham ministry, 248 ; 
 abandoned, 252 ; see also under 
 Frederick the Great 
 Pynsent, Sir William, and legacy 
 to Pitt, 276, 281, 282 
 
 Queens' college, Cambridge, 292 n. 2 
 
 Ratisbon, 190 
 
 Ravensworth, Lord, see Henry 
 Liddell 
 
 Regency act, see under Act 
 
 Regents, house of, 292, 293, 294 
 
 Revolution of 1688, effect on royal 
 power, 2, 3 ; families, 9 
 
 Rhode Island, petitions against 
 stamp act, 254 
 
 Richmond, Duke of, see Charles 
 Lennox 
 
 Rigby, Richard, member of Bedford 
 party, his character, 13, 14 ; 
 opposes German war, 97 ; see 
 also 127, 130, 148 
 
 Rights, Bill of, see under Act 
 
 Rockingham, Marquis of, see 
 Charles Watson-Wentworth 
 
 Russia, death of Czarina of, 102- 
 104 ; Pitt's views on alliance 
 with, 224, 232 
 
 Russell, Francis, Marquis of Tavi- 
 stock, 39 n. 2 
 
 Russell, John, fourth Duke of Bed- 
 ford, character and political 
 opinions, 13 ; relations with 
 Newcastle during reign of 
 George II, 10, 13, 14 ; and peace 
 negotiations in 1761, 44, 56, 59, 
 61, 62 ; threatens to cease 
 attendance at cabinet council 
 
 in 1761, 66, 67 ; discussed as 
 possible successor of Pitt, 81, 
 82 ; given the office of lord privy 
 seal, 85; opposed to German 
 war, 101 ; and peace negotiations 
 in 1762-1763, 116, 118, 119, 
 123-126, 129, 130 ; Hardwicke's 
 estimate of, 124 ; declines lord 
 presidency of the council, 154; 
 and negotiations for change of 
 ministry in August, 1763, 170, 
 171, 181 ; proscribed by Pitt, 
 170, 175 ; accepts presidency of 
 the council, 184; relations with 
 his colleagues in the cabinet, 
 184, 185, 212; and the king 
 in June, 1765, 231 ; see also 
 202, 207, 212 
 
 Sackville,Lord George, and general 
 warrants, 202 ; created vice- 
 treasurer of Ireland, 252 ; Pitt's 
 dislike of, 252, 253 
 
 St Albans, Duke of, see George 
 Beauclerk 
 
 St Catharine's college, Cambridge, 
 292 n. 2 
 
 St John, Henry, first Viscount 
 Bolingbroke, opposition to Wal- 
 pole, 20 ; political philosophy 
 of, 20-22, 188 n. 2; opinion 
 of Pitt, 278 ; see also, 180, 240 
 
 St John's college, 289 ; master of, 
 see John Newcome 
 
 St Lawrence, fishing rights in 
 gulf of, 55-57, 67, 68, 115, 125 
 
 St Lucia, and peace negotiations 
 in 1762, 119-124 ; restored to 
 France, 140 
 
 St Pierre, and peace negotiations 
 in 1762, 115, 125, 140 
 
 St Vincent, and peace negotiations 
 of 1762, 139 
 
 Sandby, George, master of Magda- 
 lene college, Cambridge, 296 
 
 Sandwich, Earl of, see John 
 Montagu 
 
 Sandys, Samuel, chancellor of the 
 exchequer in 1742, 84 
 
 Saunders, admiral, 76 
 
 Scotch, unpopularity of, 28, 29 
 
INDEX 
 
 319 
 
 Senegal, and peace negotiations in 
 1761, 58 ; and preliminaries of 
 peace, 139 
 Shelburne, Earl of, see William 
 Fitzmaurice 
 
 Sidney Sussex college, Cambridge, 
 master of, see William Elliston 
 
 Simpson, Sir Edward, master of 
 Trinity hall, 296 
 
 Smith, Kobert, master of Trinity 
 college, Cambridge, 290, 291, 
 295, 296, 298-303 
 
 South Sea Company, 27 
 
 Spain, at war with England in 
 1739, 27 ; relations with France 
 in 1761, 48, 49, 58-60, 63, 64; 
 points in dispute with England, 
 48 ; relations with England be- 
 fore the fall of Pitt, 69-76; 
 after fall of Pitt, 93-96, 99, 100 ; 
 declaration of war with, 100 ; 
 influence upon negotiations be- 
 tween England and France in 
 1761, 68, 69 ; and negotiations 
 for peace, 1762, 115, 117, 120-126 
 
 Spencer, Charles, third Earl of 
 Sunderland, 9 
 
 Stamp act, see under Act 
 
 Stanhope, James, first Earl of 
 Stanhope, 9 
 
 Stanhope, Philip Dormer, fourth 
 Earl of Chesterfield, 280, 281 
 
 Stanley, Hans, appointed to conduct 
 the peace negotiations in France, 
 1761, 51 ; his instructions, 51, 
 52 ; relations with, and opinion 
 of Choiseul, 53, 58 ; summoned 
 to return, 69, 114 ; arrives in 
 England, 75 ; see also 70 
 
 Stanley, James Smith, Lord 
 Strange, and the repeal of the 
 stamp act, 265, 268 
 
 Steward, High, of the university 
 of Cambridge, see under Cam- 
 bridge 
 
 Strange, Lord, see James Smith 
 Stanley 
 
 Stuart, John, third Earl of Bute, 
 his character, 33-35 ; and 
 George Ill's education, 19 ; 
 unpopularity of, 28, 29, 114, 
 
 130, 221 ; introduction into 
 the cabinet, 32, 33-35; com- 
 poses king's speech to first meet- 
 ing of the privy council, 41 ; 
 adds to the king's speech to 
 parliament, 41 ; and Lord Henley, 
 30, 31 ; and peace negotiations 
 in 1761, 45-47, 55-60, 61-64, 
 65-69 ; becomes secretary of 
 state, 34-37 ; alliance with New- 
 castle in 1761, 45-47, 66-68; 
 opinion of Newcastle, 80 and 
 n. 1 ; alliance with Pitt in 
 1761, 62 and n. 4 ; resignation 
 of Pitt, 74-79 ; negotiations with 
 Spain after Pitt's fall, 91-96, 
 100, 101 ; endeavours to under- 
 mine Pitt's popularity, 86-88 ; 
 fear of provoking Pitt's hostility, 
 91, 99 ; attitude towards German 
 war, 92, 93, 96-99, 101, 102, 
 108, 109 ; and Prussian subsidy, 
 101-108; his jealousy of Fox, 
 145 ; and Newcastle's resigna- 
 tion, 111 ; first lord of the 
 treasury, 112 ; and negotiations 
 for peace with France in 1762— 
 1763, 114-127; endeavours to 
 conciliate Newcastle and his fol- 
 lowers, 132, 133; his resignation, 
 151-155, 151 n. 2, 152 n. 1, 167 ; 
 and formation of Grenville's 
 ministry, 152-154 ; results of his 
 administration, 154, 155 ; atti- 
 tude towards Grenville's min- 
 istry, 156 and n. 1, 157, 168; 
 and negotiation between king 
 and opposition in August, 1763,. 
 169, 171, 173 and n. 2, 175, 179- 
 183 ; his retirement from court, 
 183 ; and negotiations for change 
 of ministry in 1765, 220, 224; 
 opposed to repeal of stamp act* 
 264 
 
 Sudbury, borough of, and general 
 election of, 1761, 38 
 
 Sumner, John, provost of King's 
 college, Cambridge, 295, 296 
 
 Sunderland, Earl of, see Charles. 
 Spencer 
 
 Suspending power, 3 
 
320 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Tavistock, Marquis of, see Francis 
 Russell 
 
 Temple, Richard, Viscount Cob- 
 ham, 280 
 
 Tobago, and peace negotiations of 
 1762, 139 
 
 Townshend, Charles, second Vis- 
 count Townshend, 9 
 
 Townshend, Charles, secretary at 
 war, 32 ; relations with New- 
 castle, 32 and n. 4 ; offered 
 secretaryship of plantations, 131 ; 
 opinion of peace of Paris, 139 
 n. 1 ; and the formation of 
 Grenville's ministry, 154 ; and 
 negotiations for a change of 
 ministry in August, 1763, 174 ; 
 disgusted with Pitt, 187; despairs 
 of opposition, 202 and n. 3 ; 
 and parliamentary debates on 
 general warrants, 197, 199 ; and 
 contested election of high steward 
 of Cambridge university, 102, 
 287-289 ; supports stamp act, 
 218 ; paymaster general, 229 ; 
 refuses to become chancellor of 
 the exchequer or secretary of 
 state in Rockingham ministry, 
 246, 247 ; and decision to repeal 
 the stamp act and introduce 
 declaratory bill, 262 n. 2 ; see 
 also 178, 190, 202 and n. 3, 
 205, 206, 207, 208, 211, 212 
 n. 1, 214, 217 n 1 
 
 Townshend, George, first Marquis 
 Townshend, 301 
 
 Townshend, Thomas, sent with 
 overtures to Pitt, 256 ; and con- 
 tested election of high steward of 
 the university of Cambridge, 288 
 
 Trinity college, Cambridge, 292 
 n. 2, 294, 298-304 
 
 Trinity college, Cambridge, master 
 of, see Robert Smith 
 
 Trinity hall, master of, see Sir 
 Edward Simpson 
 
 Twitcher, Jemmy, nickname of 
 Lord Sandwich, 294 
 
 University of Cambridge, see under 
 Cambridge 
 
 Uti possidetis, principle of, in 
 peace negotiations of 1761, 51 ; 
 abandonment of, 54 
 
 Utrecht, treaty of, 44, 54, 56, 58, 69 
 
 Vanneck, Sir Joshua, 288 
 
 Veni Creator, Wilkes' paraphrase 
 of, 191 
 
 Virginia, house of burgesses of, 
 protests against stamp act, 254 
 
 Viry, Comte de, Sardinian ambas- 
 sador in England, 35, 36, 115, 
 132 
 
 Waldegrave, James, second Earl 
 Waldegrave, opinion of George 
 III, 1 ; and of Lord Bute and 
 the Princess of Wales, 28 n. 3 ; 
 invited to join the administration 
 in 1762, 132 
 
 Wales, Princess of, influence of, 19 ; 
 unpopularity of, 28, 221 ; and 
 regency bill, 221, 222 
 
 Walker, Dr, fellow of Trinity 
 college, Cambridge, 300 n. 2 
 
 Wall, Richard, General, Spanish 
 minister, 93, 99 
 
 Walmoden, Amalie, first Countess 
 of Yarmouth, 41 n. 3 
 
 Walpole, Horace, views on patent 
 places, 5 ; prophesies the fall 
 of the Grenville ministry, 215 ; 
 favours the appointment of Duke 
 of Richmond as secretary of 
 state, 271 ; see also 211, 279 
 
 Walpole, Sir Robert, first Earl of 
 Orford, position in cabinet, 9 ; 
 and excise bill, 27; Pitt's animus 
 against, 279, 280 ; see also 16, 
 86, 280 
 
 Walpole, Thomas, 138 ; in com- 
 munication with Pitt in Novem- 
 ber, 1765, 251, 252 
 
 Warburton, William, bishop of 
 Gloucester, 191 
 
 Warrant, general, issued against 
 Wilkes, 160 ; declared illegal by 
 Pratt, 163, 196 ; parliamentary 
 debates upon, 196-200, 216*; 
 declared illegal by parliament, 
 269 ; see also 206, 232 
 
INDEX 
 
 321 
 
 Warren, Dr, 293 
 
 Watson- Wentworth, Charles,second 
 Marquis of Bockingham, his 
 character and political ability, 
 243 ; Newcastle's letter to, 110 ; 
 dismissed from lord lieutenancy, 
 143 ; resigns his place in the 
 bedchamber, 135 ; and negotia- 
 tions for a change of ministry 
 in August, 1763, 173, 174 ; and 
 negotiations in May and June, 
 1765, 226, 236 ; takes the office 
 of first lord of the treasury, 243 
 and n. 1 ; weakness of his 
 ministry, 241, 242, 247, 248, 264, 
 266, 269, 270 ; efforts to placate 
 Pitt, 245, 246, 248 ; dependence 
 upon Pitt, 247, 248 and n. 1; 
 and proposed overtures to Pitt 
 after Cumberland's death, 251, 
 252 ; and promotion of Lord 
 George Sackville, 253 ; division 
 of opinion in his ministry over 
 the stamp act, 255, 256 ; appeal 
 to Pitt in December, 1765, 256- 
 259, 257 n. 1 ; reasons for re- 
 fusing to accept Pitt's terms, 
 258, 259 ; his further appeal to 
 Pitt in January, 1766, 260-262 ; 
 decision to repeal stamp act 
 and introduce declaratory bill, 
 262 and n. 2, 263 ; meditates 
 resignation, 267 ; fresh overtures 
 to Pitt in February, 1766, 267, 
 268 ; effect of the repeal of stamp 
 act upon his ministry, 269; 
 failure to secure parliamentary 
 approval of provision for king's 
 younger brothers, 272 ; fall of his 
 administration, 273; and election 
 of high steward of university of 
 Cambridge, 288 ; see also 147, 
 156, 190, 218 n. 4 
 
 Weymouth, election at, in 1761, 39 
 
 Wildman's club, 207 
 
 Wilkes, John, character of, 159 ; 
 dislike of the Scotch, 29, 159; 
 attack on king's speech, 158-160 ; 
 legal proceedings against, 160- 
 163 ; and the whig opposition, 
 163-166 ; parliamentary pro- 
 
 ceedings against, 191, 192-195 : 
 his Essay on Woman, 191, 192 ; 
 see also 175, 179, 185, 190, 199, 
 215, 218, 240, 275, 285 
 
 William III, 3 
 
 Winchelsea, Earl of, see Daniel 
 Finch 
 
 Wyndham, Charles, second Earl of 
 Egremont, succeeds Pitt as secre- 
 tary of state in October, 1761, 
 83 ; and negotiations with Spain 
 in 1761, 93, 94 ; opposes Prussian 
 subsidy, 107; opposes Bute in 
 peace negotiations, 118-127 ; 
 attempts to induce him to resign 
 in 1762, 112 ; rumoured resigna- 
 tion of, 145 ; proposal to remove 
 him from secretaryship of state 
 on Bute's resignation, 153, 154 ; 
 negotiates with Lord Hard- 
 wicke in 1763, 168, 169; his 
 death, 172; see also 134, 154 
 n. 7, 156 
 
 Yarmouth, Countess of, see Amalie 
 Walmoden 
 
 York, Archbishop of, see Bobert 
 Hay Drummond 
 
 Yorke, Charles, refuses to vote 
 against the preliminaries of peace, 
 142 ; and John Wilkes, 161, 162 ; 
 relations with Pitt, 165, 166, 
 167, 199, 200, 208, 211 ; resigns 
 the post of attorney-general and 
 joins the opposition, 189, 190 ; 
 and Wilkes' case in parliament, 
 193-195; and parliamentary de- 
 bates on general warrants, 197- 
 200, 216 ; approached by the 
 court, 202 ; breach with the 
 opposition, 211, 214 ; appointed 
 attorney-general in Bockingham 
 ministry, 245, 246 ; promised 
 the lord chancellorship by the 
 king, 246 and n. ] ; and the 
 declaratory act, 263 n. 2 ; re- 
 fuses the secretaryship of state 
 in 1766, 271; and election of 
 high steward of the university 
 of Cambridge, 297, 301 n. 2 
 
 Yorke, John, 161 
 
322 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Yorke, Philip, first Earl of Hard- 
 wicke, character and political 
 opinions of, 12 ; offered presi- 
 dency of the council by Lord 
 Bute, 34 n. 1 ; consents to Bute 
 becoming secretary of state, 36 ; 
 and peace negotiations in 1761, 
 44, 56 ; and in 1762, 118, 124 ; 
 offered the privy seal, 85; attends 
 cabinet council without office, 
 85 ; ceases to attend cabinet 
 council, 113, n. 2 ; and negotia- 
 tions with Spain after Pitt's fall, 
 94, 100 ; invited to return to 
 the cabinet in 1762, 132 ; opposes 
 preliminaries of peace, 136, 137, 
 140-142 ; opinion on parlia- 
 mentary privilege of freedom 
 from arrest, 161 and n. 1, 168 ; 
 opinion on legality of general 
 
 warrants, 163 and n. 2 ; and 
 negotiations with the king in 
 1763, 168, 169, 173, 178, 179; 
 his death, 201, 284, 286, 287 ; see 
 also 41, 147, 167 
 
 Yorke, Philip, second Earl of Hard- 
 wicke, supports preliminaries of 
 peace, 142 ; and Wilkes' case in 
 parliament, 193,194; acandidate 
 for the post of high steward of 
 the university of Cambridge, 201, 
 285-298 ; approached by the 
 court in 1764, 202 ; refuses to 
 take office in Rockingham min- 
 istry, 247 ; refuses secretaryship 
 of state, 271 ; takes a seat in 
 the cabinet without office, 271 
 
 Young Philip, bishop of Norwich, 
 297 
 
 3^77-2 
 
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