E340 .C15 F4 i o LIBRARY OF CONGRtSb 00DQ507fi20^ ^ ..*'-''^. ^S\ .0^ \ vN^ v-> <^<^' J' ^x. ^o ^ '>^ ^... ' • • * .\^ ... "v^ -J^' .. ^ .<'' *v, ,V-' ' v^. ' V .-.^ ♦ • o. /T\ P-Tl <• *>* <*0' ■^■' Jo \\VSrVy//y'7 ^ ' ' ^ A V- - " - < 1 IW BEPLT TO PATRICK HENRY. 0BlaI5ALLT rUBLISHBD IK TBE HXTIOSXL UTTELLIOXRCER. ^ TO T2f£ EDITORS. Onslow's respects to Messrs. Gales & Sea- ton, and again requests th» indulgence of being heard through their paper. He encloses two numbers in reply to Patrick Henry's last num- ber, and he would be gratified with an early in- sertion. Onslow sensibly feels the prompt attention ofr Messrs. Gales & Seaton to his former commu- nication. Fairness required that it should have appeared in the Journal, through which the at- tack was made. He did not anticipate that a calm and argumentative defence of the second officer of the Government, on a subject so deep- ly interesting to the People of the United States as every inquiry must be, which touches on so vital a point in our system, as the freedom of debate, would be excluded from a place in the Journal. Yet, so it was ; and he now more deep- ly feels the injustice, since Patrick Henry, avail- ing himself of that exclusion, has replied ia the same paper — not to his arguments in their real character, but as unfairly represented by him- self. Whether the course in-licates a sincere desire to arrive at truth on a subject which has excited much interest, or feeling* of a political or personal hostility, the American People must judge. ONSLOW, Ijr HEPLT TO PATIUCK HENEY. No. 1. V— ^ "I H 2 ^ IF rumor may be credited, I may be pvoud in having; ▼ou as an antagonist ; and if I were actuated by a senti- ment of vanity, much of my reply would be devoted to tracing the strong, but, perhaps, accidental analogy, between the style of your numbers and some of our public documents. But truth, and not the gratification of vanity, is my object ; and thouijh the pride of victo- ry would be swelled in proportion to the high standing of an opponent, I shall, without stopping to inquire into the question of authorship, proceed directly to the point at issue. If you have failed in your argument, you have at least succeeded in giving the question a new and inter- esting aspect. You have abandoned the rules and usa- ges of the Senate, as the source of the Vice President's authority, as the presiding officer of the Senate. You contend, that the disputed right is derived directly from the Constitution, and that the Vice President's authori- ty is wholly independent of the -will of the Senate, which can neither give, nor take it away. It is not my wish to misstate ynur arguments in the slightest degree, and, to avoid the possibility of misrepresentation, you, shall speak for yourself. Spurning the authority of the Senate, you scornfully observ- : " With tlie eas;. as- '' surance of a man stating a conceded postulate, h(Ons- " low) says — ' After all, the power of the Vice Presi- " dent must depend upon the rules and usages of the " ??ena(e* — a pnstulate not only false in its principle, " but *hic!i, if Till , wi>ul() not siis'ain the cause to whose " aiil it o invoked Unless the Constitution ofthe Unit- " eil States was subj-c'ed to some military constmc- " tion, the power uf the \'ice President, in pr siding "ov.rtlie Senate, rests on deep- r, holir-r f )Und.itinns, •• tlia fi y rules or iisaj^-s which that body ma\ adopt. "\Vhatsu\s the Constitution? ' The Vice President " of the Un t,d States shall be President of the Senate, " but shall :iave no vote unless they be equally divided.' " • The Sena'e shall choose th ir own offir<-rs, and also *• a President pro tempore, in the absence ofthe V'ice *' President, or when he shall exercise the office of Pre- " sident of the United^tates.'— (Const. U. S. Art 1. " Sec- .3.) It is here nrtade the duty of the Vice Fre- " sident to preside over the Senate, under the sole re- " striciion of having no vote, exce[)t in a given case " the right of the Senate to choose their I'rtsident " is confined to two contingencies ; his powers, uiter "beii.gso chosen, are identiral witti those of the Pre- "sident set over theno by the Constitution, and any *' abritlgment of those powers by the Senate would "be a palpable infraction of that Constitution. Now " Sir, w hat is the imp Tt of the term • to preside,* *' in relation to a deliberative assembly ? Can any " sophistry devise a plausible definition of it, whiclj " wou d exclude the power of preserving order ? In " appointing an officer to preside over the Senate, the " People surely intended, not to erect an empty pageant, " but to accomplish some useiul object : and when, in " another part of the Constitution, they authorize each " House ' to determine the rules of its proceedings,' " they do not authorize it to adopt rules depriving tny of- *' fice created by the Constitution, of powers belonging, " ex vi (ermiui, to that office. If the plainest,or most pro- " found man in the community were nsked what powers "lie supposed to be inherent in the presiding officer of «' either Hoi;-,e of Congress, he would instantly enume- " rate, first, the power of preserving order in its deli- " beralions ; next, that of collecting the sense of its " members on any question submitted to their decision; " and thirdly, that of authenticating, by his signature, " their leg sbtive acts. 1 have before said, and I regret " that 1 ani obliged to repeat a truism, that ' the right •' to call to order is a necessary consequence ofthe povv- " erof preserving order;' aiul that 'unless a deliberative " body, acting within the sphere of its competence, " expressly restrict this power and this right, no restric- "tior. on them can then be supposed.' Ir. divesting the 5 " President set over them by the People, of any powef '• which lie had received, either expressly or impliedly, •• from the People, the Senate, i isiead ot ' acting with- " in the sphere of their competence,' would act usurp- " in.Gfly, and unconstitutionally — they would nullify the " connexion which the People had established between ♦* themselves and their President ; th y would reduce " themseves to the monstrous spectacle of a body with- " out a head,and their I'resid-.'nt to the equally monstrous •• spectacle of ahead without a body ; and tiieir violent •' act, while it would be disobeyed as illegal, would be " contemned as ridiculous. But, in truth, the Senate " have never thus forgotten their allegiance to the Con- ♦' stitution." There can be no mistake as to the source, or the na- ture of the power, according to your conception. You tell HS plainly, that it rests " on a deeper, holier foun- dation" than the ndesofthe Senate— that it is -'inhe- rent in the Vice President, and that, as presiding offi- cer, he possesses it e.r vi termini ; thai an attempt to di- vest, and, of course to modily the power, ' by the Se- nate, would be to act' usurpingly, and unconstitution- all\ ," and that " such violent ad would be disobeyed as illegal, and contemned as ridiculous." These are, at least, lofty grounds, and, if they can be maintained, t)ere is an end of the cimtroversy. It would be absurd to go further. An incpiiry into the rules and usages of the Senate, after sucli grounds are occupied, becomes ridiculous, and much more so, an inquiry into those of the Houses of Parliiiment : tor surely if it is beyond the power of the Senate to give op withhold the right, it must stand on an elevition far above parliamentary rules or usages ; and I was there- Tore not a littl surprized to find, tlia , after so bold an assertion, more than four fifths of your long and elabo* rate essay was devoted to a learned and critical inquiry into tlie e very rules and usages. There can be but one explanation of so strange an inconsis!cn:y ; but that a very satisfactory one. You lack confidence in your own position ; and well might y u : for, sur-l), power So despo'ic and dang rous, so inconsistent with the first principles of liberty, aad every sound view of the Constitution, was never attempted to be es- tablished on argunien's so imbecile and absurd ; to which no intellect, however badly organized, could yield assent, unless associated with fei lings leaning strongly to the side of power. That such are your feeling's, no one who reads your essay c^n "Joubt. None of your sympathies are on the demoecat."' jc side of our institutions. If a question can be made asto where power is lo'li^-ed, itreijuires but little saga- city to perceive, that you will be found on the side which will place it in the fewest and least responsible liands. You perceive perfection only in the political arrangenfient, which, with simplicity and energy, gives power to a single will. It is not, then, at all siirprizing, that you should seize on that portion of tlie Coiistitu- tion which appoints the Vice President to be Fresidt-nt of the Senate ; and timtyou should quote it at large, and dwell on it at length, as the source of high and unconlroU able power in that officer; while you have but slightly and casually adverted to another section in the same article, which clothes theSenate with the power 'of determining the rules of their proccedings.punishing its members for disorderly conduct, and with the concurrence of two thirds, of expelling a member." — (See Art. 1. Sec. 5.) Had your predilections for the unity and irresponsibility of power been less strong, you could not have failed to see, that the point of view in vvhicli you have thought proper to place the question, made it one of relative power between the Senate and its presiding officer. You place the Vice President on one side, and tlie Senate on the other ; and the more you augment the constitutional power ot the former, as the presiding offi- cer, just in the same proportion, you diminish tlie pow- er of the latter. What is gained to the one, is lost to the other ; and, in this competition of power, >oa were hound to present tiill^ and fairly, both tides. This }ou have not do'ie, and consequentl), you have fallen, rot only into gro^s bm dangerous errors. You set out by asserting thut the very object of the appointment of the ^■ice President as Presidcn of the Senate was, to preserve order, and that he has all the powers ex vi termini, (>ect;ss;ir> to the attainment of ih- end fur wlncli he was appointed. Having gained this point, you make your next step, that the right of e forcmg order in- volves that of calling to order, and that again involves ihevery power in ques ion, which the Vice President declined to exercPbC You then ilraw two corrollane* ; ihhi the power h Id by the Vice President being der'V- ed direct from the (Jon titut on, s held indepe' dendy of the Senate, and is, consequeitly, beyond thiir on- trol or pariicij.alion ; and that, as the Vice President alone pjissesses it, he, and he alone, is responsible for order and decorum. Such isy"ur ■iimm..ry h gic, w ;ch y-'ii accompany with so much abuse of Mr. Calhoun, for not ciiliiiig the p; wt , which you h.-ve, as _\o'i sup- poic, cltaily proven that he possesses by the Uonstitu J* i tion, into active cncrpy, by correcting; and controlling, at his s()lf will and jileasiire, tlie licentious and imperti- nent debates of the Senators. Let us now turn the same mode of reasoning on the side of the Senate, and you will perceive thot it :ipplies, with intimte more force, thouj^h you have nut thought it deservinfj of notice. The Con^titnt.on has vested the Senate with the rigfht of dttermininfj the rules of it^i proceedings, and of punishing members for disorderly conduct, which may extf nd even to expulsion. l he great object of giving the power to establish rules, is to preserve order. The onU edectual means of preserving order is to prescribe bv rule-;, what shall be a violation of order, and to en- force the same by adequate punisnment. The "Senate alone has these powers b> the Const tutiun ; consequent- ly, the Senate alone has tlie right of enforcing order; and. consequently, whatevtr right tlie Vice President possesses over order, must be derived from the Senate; and, Iheret re, he can exercise no power in adopting rules or enforcing them, but what has been delegated to him by the Senate, and only to the extent, both in manner and mutter, to which tne power has been dele- gated. The particular power in quettion not having been delegated, cannot be exercised b} the Vice Pre- sident, and, consequenily, he is not responsible. l>o you not perceive the irresistible force with which your own mode of reasoning applies to the substantial consti- tutional powers of the Senate, and how partial and ab- surd your arguments in favor of tlie infiretl constitu- tional power of its presiding ofhctr must a|)p. ar in con- trast witli it P As absurd as it now ap|>ears, it shall be, if possible, infinitely more so, before 1 have closed this part ot the invest gat on. W.th the same picddection, your assumptions are all on the side ot uncontrolled and unlimit -d power. With- out |>r. of, or r ven an attempt at it, jou assume, that tlie power in contr^versv is inlitrent in the Vice President, and that he possesses it, ex vi termini, as presiding offi- cer of the Senate. Now I, who have certainly as .nuch rifihl t« assume as yourself, deny that he possesses any such pi.wer, and, wl.at maj perhaps startle a mmd organ- ized hk } urs, 1 atlirni that, as a presiding ■ fficer, he has no inheient [ji w r whatever, unless th t of doing wh.ttlie Senate ma) pre>cribe by its rules, be such a powei. Th re aie, indeed, inhertnt powers, but ihey are in the bodt/, and n(.t in the officei: He is a mere .igent to execute tne wid ct the loi uier. He can exer- cise no power wliicU be does not bold by delegation, either express or implied. He stands in the same re- lati n to tlifr bi)ily, or asst-mbly o\er which lie presides» til ta mag'istrute in a iii>iis of power thought ii monstrous, that all of the powtrs of ru'ers should bf derived from so low and tilth) a source as the Ptopk winim thej gowrn. "A deeper and holier foundation ' of power was sought, and that was prorlainied to be in the "inherent" divine "right of rulers ;" and, as their powers were thus shown to be independent of the will of the Pei.ple, it followed, that any attempt on ihpir part 'o divest rulers of power, would be an act of ''such violence as would be disobey- ed as illegal and contemned as ridiculous." I might trace the analogy between jour language and principles and those of the advocate of despotic power in all ages and countries much ttirther, but I deem it not necessary either to weaken or refute your arguments. A more direct a d decisive reply may be gi\en. An inherent power is one that belongs essentially to the office, and is in its ratu e inseparable from it. To divest the office of it would be to change its nature. It would be no longer the same office. It is, then, a power wholly in- dependent of the circumstances how the office may be created or Hlled. or in what particidar manner its func- tions may he exercised, if, then, the power belongs to the Vice President inher ntl\, as pr* siding officer ol the Senat-, it is because it is essentially attached to the mere function of presiding in a deliberative assembl>, and oonsequently belongs to all presiding officer) over such assemblies : for it would be absurd to assert that it i^ in- herent in hiti) as I resident of the Senate, a d then make it depend on the circumstance, that he holds his ap- pointment to preside i th. Senate by the Cffis:itjitioTi. The high power, then, which you attribute to the Vice Presde t, muit belong, if your argument be correct, to the Speaker of the House of Commons, to the L rd Ch.ancellor, as presiding officer of the House of Lords, *o the Sjieaker of the House of Ui presentativ s, and those of our State Lcgibh.tures. They must not o- ly possess the power, but n.ust h hi it independently of the will ot the bodies over wldch they preside; which can neither give nor take it away, nor modify the mode ot exercising it, nor control its operation. These conse- quences, absurd ;is they appear to be, are legitimately drawn fr m yonr premi.si s Now, " out 01 tume own raoiitb I will condemn thee;" by your own aiithnrities ri'i shall be refuted. To prove that the \'ice President pis^ess-^s th.s piiwf r, you have labored to estab'iih the fact that the Sprak- r of the House ot Commons holi's and exercisps U, and in proof of which you have tittd many cases from JeH'ersoii's Manual. It IS true that he has, at least to a certain extent; but bow has he uc(iu red it ? This i> the important inquiry in the point of view in which we are now co-'uideriig the ques'ion. Is it inherent, or is it deltgated ? If the former, I acknowledge that yourarpiimcnt.from analogy, in favor i«f tile inherent pov r of the ir e Hresid nt,w uld ha»e muc > forct; bu ,if the latter, it must utterly f^ii: tor, if delegated,)! clearly establishes the fact, that llie power is :n the bo'ly, a d not in x^e presidinff officer,- a^td, conse- quently, nat inherent in tlie Vice President, as you af- firm. The instances that you huve cited shall decide the point. What say 'he casrs? "On the 14th of *• April, 1604, rule conceived, ''Tiiat, if any man speuk " impertinently, or beside the question in hind, it •* stands with the orders c^f the Hou-ie for the Speaker "to interrupt him; and to show tlie pleasure of the ''House, whether they will further hear Inm." "On " the I7th of April, 1604, agreed for a general rule, if " any superfluous motion or tedious speech be offered " in the House, the party is to be directed and ordered "by Mr. S, eaker." "On the 19th of May, 1604, Sir *' Wdliam Paddy entering in'n a long speech, a rvle *' agreed, that if any man speak n.'t 'o the ma ter in " question, the Speaker is to moderate. So it is said " on t le 2'J of Mny, 1610, when a mem'ier made what " seemed a'l impertinent '^peech, and there was much *' hissing and spitting," " that it was conceived for a rule, "that Mr. Speaker may stay impertinent bpeech-s." — *' O I the 10th of November, 1640, it was declared, that ♦• when a bus ness is begun and in debate, if any man *' rise to speak to a new business, any member may, " oMt Mr Speaker ough^ to, interrupt him." See Hat- sell's Precedents, vol. 2 I, 3d edition. Uo you not notice, thai in every cas ', the power was delega'ed by the House ; that the language is, " rule conceived," "it was agreed to as general rule," " rule agre d," &c., &c., and this too in relation to the verj, power in question, according to your oivn she~ving ? Thus it is esablished, beyond controversy, that, in the House of Commons, the piweris really in the body, and not in tbe pr -siding ofRcer. It, to this decided proof that the power has been dele- gated to the Speaker of the House of Commons, and 10 is, consequently, not Inherent, we add- that it is confer- red on tiie Speaker of the House of Representatives, (see I'Jth rule,) by an express rule of the House, and that the Lord Chancellor, as presiding officer in the House of Lords, possesses it not i it u r ex officio or by dele^Tition, as slmll be shown hereafter, your monstrous and slavish doctrine that it is an inherent power, will be complttely overthrown, and you are Icit without the possibility of escape. Should you iitenipt t' extricate yourself, by endea- voring to sho*, that, under our Constitution, the rela- %\\e powers of the Vice President and the Senate are diflerent frona those of t'le Speaker and the House of Commons ; and t lat, though the latter nr.ay ho d the power by delegation from the body, th-it the V ce Pre- side nt may possess it by a different and higher ten .re ; it would, at least, prove ttiat you cede the point that it is not inhereiit, and also that it cannot be deduced from an- alogy between the p^ivers of tlie two presiding offioer.e, which )'ou have so mucli relied on in another pait of your essay. But this shall not avail you. The door is already closed in that direction. It has been, I trust, conclusively proved, tliat the Constitution, so f.-r from countenancing the idea of the power being inherent In fhe Vice President, gives it t ) tlie Senate, by the stroi'g- est implication, in conferring the express right of estab- lishing its own rules, and punishing for disorderly con- duct. If you are not yet convinced, additional argu- ments are not wanting, which, though they may not extoit an acknowledgment of your error, will thorough- ly convince you of it. You have overlooked the most obvious and best estab- lished rules of construe tion What are the facts ? The Const. t'ltion has designated the Vice President as Presi- dent of the Senate, and has also clotaed that body with the right of determining tlie rules of its proceedings. It is cbvious that the simple int nf.on of the framers of that instrument was to annex to the office of Vice Presi- dent th:it of President of the Senate, without intending to d fine the extent or the limit of his power in that characi r, an>l in like manner it was the intention to confer on the Senatt simply the pow-r of enacting its own lules of proceeding, wlttiout reference t i the pow- ers, such as they may be, that had been conferred on tlieir presiding officer. I he exte. t of pow< r, as betwen the two, becomes a qu' stion of construction. No'>, the first rule of construction, in sucli cases, is the known usage and praciice of Parliamentary bodies ; and, as tUoiie ot the Uriiisb PHrliamcnt were the best kuowa to 11 the framers of the Constitution, it cantiot be doubted that, in diten' initipf what an- the relative powers of the Vice Prfsident and the Senate, they ought to ppLvail. Under this view, as between the Vice President and Senate, the hotter possesses the s:ime power in deter- mining its ndes tliat is possessed by the H ousas of Par- liament, Without being restricted in the slightest degree by the fact, thai the \-ce President, under the Consti- tution, is President of the body, saving only the right of adopting such rules as api.l> to the appointment or election of a presiding officer, which the Senate would have possessed, if the Constitution had not provided a Pres (lent of tlie bodj ; and, as I have pr -^ed fron your own cases, that the parfc 'br power in quesion, mccn^ trovertibly belongs to the House, it follows, necessarily, according to established rules of eons ruction, that tbe Senate also pvissesses it. You have overlooked these obvious truths by affixing too high an id a to the powers of tlie presiding officer in preserving orde-. According to your conception, the Ho..s • is nothing and the nfficr every thing, on points of order. Nothing can be more erroneous. The power you attribute to him has never been possessed by the Presivlent, or Speaker, in any deliberative assembly ; no, not even bv delegation from h" body itself. The right of preserving order must depend on the power of enforcing it, or of punishing for a breach of ortler — a right inhere-nt in the House alone, and never, in any instance, delegated to ttie Chair. Our Constitution confines this right to each House of Congress, by pro- viding " that 111 y may punish for disorderly conduct;''' a power which tney neiiht^r have deUgaied nor ca>i da- legate to the presiding officer. What, then, is the right of preserving order, belonging to the Vice President, which you have so pompously announced, and for not enforcing which, according to your conception, you and your associates have denounced Mr. Calhoun almost as a traitor to his country .' It is simplv ih. rig, it of calling to order, in the atrictt literal meanincr, and so far from being derived from the right of preserving ord r as you ab-urd'y suppose, it is not even connected with it. The riglii of presei-ving- arder depend$ on the right of enforcing it, uv the ri^ht of punithmentfor breaches of order, always possessed by the body but never, either by delegation or otherwise, by the Chair. It is notorious that the Chair cannot enforce its calls to order. The body alone can, but that only on its decisions, and not on that of the presiding officer. It is thus maniteit, tiie high right of preserving order. to which you make the right of calling to order incideu- tal, belongs especially to the Senate, and not to the Vice FresiJ-nt ; and if your arguini*nt be correct the Incident must fullow the right, and, consequently, it is the rip^ht and duty of a Sena'or to call to order for dis- orderly conduct. So cle«r is the proposition, that, if the member called to order by the Chair, for disorderly conduct, chooses to per'-ist, the presding officer has no other rf-nriedy but to repeat hit call, or throw himtelf^ for the enforcement of it, onthe Senate. Thisfeebleness of the Chair, in queitions of order, txjjlains why there has al- ways been sue!' indisposition to call to ordr, even when it is ma''e the express duty, by rule, as in the House of Beprcbentatives, and t e House of Common* in Eng. land. 1 housands of instanct s night be cited to eatab- lish the truth of this remark, both there and here — in- stances in which all tliat h-is been said and uttered by Mr. Randolph is nothing, but in which the Speaker waited for the interference of soire of the members, io order to preserve order. Such was the case in the re- cent occuirence in th-* House of Commons, when Mr. Hume made an attack on th • Bish"p of London and the Lord C'hancell r, both of which, as members of the House of Lords, were und; r the protection of positive rules; yet, no one, even there, had the assurance to throw the respo'isibility on the presiding officer. The partizans of power in our country have the honor of Itading in these new and dangerous attacks on the free- dom ol debate. Some men of honest intention have fallen into the error about the right of the Vice President o pre« serve order, independently of the Senate, because the Judges or, as they express it, the presiding officer in the courts of justice, posess the rig',.t. A moment's reflection will shew t e fallacy. There is not the least analogy between the rights and duties of a Judge ijnd those of a presidin^i officer in a deliberative ass'-n.bly. The analogy is altog ther thi other way. It is b; twecH the Court and the House. In fact, the latter is o'ten called a court, and there is a very s'rict resemblance in tlie point und r consideration, between what may be called a parliamentary court und a court of jus- tice. Thty both have the right of CbU>ing their decisr>n to be respected, and order and decoi-un. to be observed in their presence, or by punishing those who offend. But who ever heard of the Speaker or V ce President punish ng for disord rly conduct.' T he utmost power they can exeroise over disorderly conduct, even in the lobby I gallery, is t.- cause it to be suppressed, for the timct by the Serjeant at Armsi Enough has been said, th' ugh the subject is far from being' exhsusted, tn demonstriite, that yeur views of the relai've powers and duties nf the Vice President and the Senate, in reaion to the point in qutsiioo, are wholly enont-ous. I' remains to be shown tha' your 'pinions (for arguments they cannot be called) are dangerous to our liberty, and that they are in cmHict with the first principles of our GoTeniment. 1 do not attribute to vou, or '.hose with whom you are associated, any deep- laid des Rn against public liberty. Sucli an a'tenint, as flagitious as it may be, requires a «a« o are ca- pable of forming a correct estimate oF the value of free- dom, and the best means 'jf preserving it. Agimst this palla<'ium of liberty your blow • are ainaed ; and. to do y(.u justi^-.e, it must be ackn'> • ledge', if the energy be not tiTea»,the direction is not des itule of skill. If vou could succeed in est'.b ishing tiie po nts whicUyuu iab >r, that ine Vicr- Prsident holds a pow^r over f.e freedom ot dTba'e, under ih right of preserving order, beyond tiie w II or control of ^he Senate ; and that, OH>equen ly, be al )ne is responsible for what might be considered an un iue exercise 'ftiie freedom of speech in debate, a snl'd f u idation would iie Uid, from which, in time, this grea" barrier against despo'ic power would be bat- teretl down. It is eagv to see that the scheme takes the po*ei if protectmgtbs, tiie first ofitsrighs, whol- ly t of ih hafids of ia<; Se :a!e, and places its custody in tne hands of a single indivi lual.and he in no d-.-grec rc- spoi'si'il". to the b^i.ly over whch 'hi- hgh power is t> be exerciS'-d; thus efl'^;c^ually desroying the key stone of freedom, responsibility, andintro !u:ing into a vi al part of our system, uncontrolled, or, what is the same thing, despi»t c power; which, biing deri»ed, by your thejry, from the Constitution, and being. *pplicable to all poi'its of order, neccssanjy would vest in the Vice President 2 14 alone, an indenendent and absolute power, that would draw into t'le vcr'vex of iiis autliority an ui rimite 1 con- trol over 'he free ^m • f deba'.e. Varkthe coos quences ! If t'le Vice Pres'd-ni should bf l-insf to the sam>. party or ni'er'.st w hich brougtu the Prisideiit into piwer, or if he be depef^dent en hii for liis p :li'ic'i! s andi g or adv'anccme- t, you vrill virtually place the control over the freedom of debate in the hands of the Kxectitive. ^ YoM tl us inirod'jce /Ae President, a« it were, into I he Chnmber of the Senate, and place him virtually over the de- liberation of the body, ivith powers to restrain discussion, and shield his conduct from i>ivesti^ation Ltt us. for initarce, tupyos , that ti e prebei t Chief Magistrate sboiil>i be re-elected, aud 'hai the p^rty which s.jpi-orts him should succeed, as in all probability f ey Wi uld in thit c vc;it, in eltciin^ also their Vice President, cuu it be doubted that the ru es for the restraint of the free- dom 'if debate in the Senate, which hae been insisted on openly by the pnrty during the last winer, wou! 1 be re uc-d t'> p ac ice, throue^h a subservi-n' Vic- Presi- den ? And wh'dt arc th"Se rules ? One of the lea^lrg ones, to al'-eit to n-i olh<"r, is, thiitthr conduct of the Kx cutiv . as a co-ordinal'.- branch of iiiat G "ernmi.nt, cann the called in ques ion, by a Sei ator in d-^at- , at leas , so f m V rel tes ti imneach^'le (;ff?n es ; and of course an attempt to discuss 'he conduct of the President in such cases, would be disorderly, and render the Senator liable to be punished, e^.eii to expulsion. Wt-.-.il wou'.f be till ■ irise'.jueiice ? I he Senate would spttdily si^.k in- to a bi'riy to register the decrees of the I'nsidt-iv, and si. g Hosanna? in his urane, and be as degraded as the Itomai S- na-PjU'der Nero. U'l" le us SMppose the orp">ite state of things, in which th' Vic - Pres den' chouses to pursu. a c urse iniJe; eiiutnt of the will o- >hc Ex-cu(iv. , an', in- fctead of issuming so da Reruns »n cx':rci3 ot pow- er he ^h'uKi indiil>;e, (for i -dulj^ence it must be calvd, if tl:o\ve ■ by hi* c^un r> ) iha" Ir. ed"ni of de- bat , «hc;. exists in < th r deibt-rative usteinblies. \V. a will ifi-n fojow ? P.-ec.selv 'hut which has rccur- leU the litit *iut^r. Most • xagg rate<' and false acci u its would c--er wher bi pri'pap t d by hirelings o( pw- er, of tliT >lii.'hest occurrence in 'he -jenaie. T'le pub- lic ind giia 101 wmlJ he roust-d at the supposed disor- der ai".d !nd-o«>runr., and the *ho'e w )ul 1 •>'• artfully di- rt cted a^jaiiiH. tn • Vice Ppcside"t n order to prostrate llis n pilM lO". ; an ' hn- hi offi rr, v itho '* pa'.rOisjiffc or power, or even the rijht of defending himsef, would 15 be the larpet aga'nst which tlie whole fjrcc antl palroiv 8gL ot t' 11 (imernm^nt would l>e directed. F-;* men woiM have the firmness tn encointcr tlsng'er si 're- mendous; snd the pracical result, in the Ion,T nn., must be a subservient yielding to the Executive will ON 5 LOW. No. n. V-- ^. /^^l Havinp; now establisheil, I may venture to sav beyond the possibility of reasonable contro- versy, that the idea of an inherent rigiit in tlie Vicf President, independent of, and beyond, the will of the Senate, to control the freedom of de- bate, is neither sanctioned by the Constitution, nor justified by the relation between tlie body and its presidios; officer, and that it is subversive of the right of free discussion, and consequently dan{2;erous to liberty, I nn^ht here fairly rest tlie qucstiun. To you, at li*ast, who treat with scorn the rules and usage of the Senate as the source of the power of the Vice President, all further inquiry is fairly closed. But, as manj, who may agree with you in the conclusion, may treat with con- tempt your high strained conception of the origin of the power under investigation, it will not be improper to ascertain whether it has been confer- red on the "V^ice President by any act of the Se- nate, express or implied, the only source whence the power can be fairly derived. In this view of the subject, the simple inquiry is, Has tlie Se- nate conferred the power .■' [t has been fully es- tablished, that they alone possess it, and, conse- quenil\', from the Senate only can it be de- rived. VN'e then affirm, that the Senate has not conferreil the po\\er. The assertion of tlic ne- gative in suth cases, is sufficient to throw the bi;rthen of proof on tho^e who hold the afiirma- tive. I call on you, then, or any of your asso- ciates, to point out the rulo, or the usaje of the Senate, by which the power has been cotiferrcd. None such has, or can be designated. If a simi- 16 ]ar question be asked as to the power of the Speak r of the H' use of Representatives, how easy wouhl be the reply. The 19th rule, which expressly gives the power to him, would be iin- mfdiafely quoted ; and if that were supposed to be doubtful, the jiiurnals of the Htiuse would be held up as containing innumerable instances of the actual excercise of the power. No such an- swer can be given, wlun we turn to the power of the Vice President. The rules are niute, and thejournals "f the Senate silent What means this strikii'g difterence, but that, on this p(»int, there is a difference in fact betve' n the power of the Speaker, and of the Vice President ? — A difference which has been always understood and acted on ; and when to this we add, tliatthe rules of 'e two Houses in regard to the power are strikingly different ; that, while those of the Re- presentatives expressly delegate the power to the Speaker, those of the Senate, by strong implica- tion, withhold it from ihe Vice President, little room can be left for doubt. Compare, in this view, the 19th rule of the House, and the 7ih of the Senate. The former says, *' If any member, by spe;iking, or otherwise, transgress the rules of the House, the Speaker shall, or any member may, call to order ; in which case the member so called to order, shall immediately sit down, unless permitted to explain ; and the House shall, if appealed to, decide on the case without debate ; if there be no appeal, the decision of the Chair shall be submitted to. If the decision be in favor ef the member called to order, he shall beat liberty to proceed; if otherwise, he will not be permitted to proceed without leave of the House ; and if the case require it, he shall be lia'jle to the censure of the House." The rule of the Senate, on the contrary, provides, " H the member shall be called to order for words spoken, theexceptiunable words shall immediately be tak- en down in writing, that the President may be bet- n tcr enableil to judge of the matter." These are the corresijoniliiig rules of the two Houses, and can any impartial mind contend, that similar powers arc intended to be conferred by them on the Speaker and Vice President ? Or will it be insisted on that tlie difference in the phraseology is accidental, when it is known that they have often been revised on the reports of committees, who would not fail to compare th^ rules of the two Houses on correspondinj; subjects ? Under such circumstances, it is impossible that it could be intended to confer the same power by such dif- ference of phraseolofjy ; or that the withholding of the power in question from the Vice President was unintentional. This rational construction is greatly strengthened, when we advert to the different relations which the two oilicers bear to their respective Houses. The Speaker is chosen by the House of Representatives, and is conse- quently directly responsible to the body, and his decision, by the rules, may be appealed from to th House. The Vice President, on the contrary, is placed in the chair by the Constitution, is not responsible to the Senate, and his decision is without appeal. Need we look further for the reason of so essential a variation in the rules con- ferring power on their respective presiding o.Ti- cers r It is a remarkable fact, that the same difference exists in the relation between the pre- siding oflicers of the two House? of the British Parliament, and the bodies over which they re- spectively preside. In the Commons, the Speak- er is chosen as in our House of Representatives, and is, consequently, in like manner responsible; on the contrary, in the House of Lords, the Chan- cellor presides ex otficio, in like manner as the Vice President in the senate, and is, in like manner, irresponsible to the body. Now it is no less remarkable, that the Speaker possesses the power in (jufstion, wliile it is perfectly certain, that the Lord Chancellor docs not. Like cause, 2» 18 hke eff*-' t ; dissimilar cause, dissimilar cftect. Vou, sir, have, it is true, made a puny effort to draw a distinction between the mode in which the Vice President and the Lord Chancellor are app tinted ; and have also feebly denied that the latter has not the power of callin* to order Both of these efforts show the desperation of your causi*. What does it signify by whom an ex officio officer is appointed, if not by the body ? There can be but one material point, and that without reference to the mode of appointment ; is he, or is he not, responsible to the House ? If the for- mer, there is good cause for the delegation of the power ; for power exercised b\ responsible agents is substantially exercised by the principal ; while by irresponsible agents it is the power of him by whom it is exercised. Nor is your effort to show that the Chancellor has the power, less unhappy. You have cited but one instance, and that really renders you ridiculous. The Lord Chancellor, as is well known, has the right of speaking; and you most absurdly cite the commencement of a speech of one of the chancellors, in which he states, that he would call back the attention of the Lords to the question at issue, as an instance of ex. rcising the power of calling to order, as presiding officer, for departure from the ques- tion I Thougli you ha^e signally failed to prove your position, you have not less completely esta- blished the fact, that your integrity is not above a resort to trick, where argument fails. Nor is this the only instance of subterfuge. You made a sin>ilar effort lo do away th^- authority of the venerable Jeffers.'n. He has left on record that he considered his pnw.T as presiding officer of the Senate, as the power of tnnpiraiie, or what is the same thing, an appellate power. In order to break the force of this authority, you have denied the plain and iiivari..ble meanitig of the wonl, aiid at- tempted to affix one to it, which it nev.r bears. You say, that its Uaual uieauiug is syuonyuiuus 19 with " office," •• authorii>," or 'Hhe act of deter- mining," an.! '.hat it is only in its technical sense, th;tt n convys tK«. idea ot an appeliut- powt-r ! Can it be u.ikno-.vn to y«.u, tliat no word in the lan<»ua;ie more invariably has at'ached to it the idea ot'decision by appeal, an?! tha» tho»e is not an instance of its beli.*; used h) a..} respectable au- thtirity in tlie sense which you state to be its Bsual moaning ? It only remains to consider the cases that you have cited from the M. nual, t(i prove that the Speaker of the House of Commons possess- es the power in question ; by whic'i yu would infer that it belongs also to the Vice President. A very strange deduction by one who believes that the power originates in the Constitution, and that it neither ciin be given or taken away by the authority of the Senate itself. After asserting that it has " deeper and holier founda- ticns than the rules and usages of the Senate," there is soniethirg more than ridiculous, that you at last seek for the power in thi- rules and usages of MiP Mouse of Commons ! But let such incon- si*? ency pass. You h,ive indeed established the fact, that th • Speaker has the power, but you ha^e overlooked the material circunistance, as I have shown fr'-m your oun cases, that he possess- e? it by positive rules of th" House. You might as well have shown, that the Sj^'aker of the IL.use of Reprcsen'atives possesses it, and then in< rred that th*- Vice President does also: for h' . too, holds the power by positive rules of the bt'ly, which makes the analogy as strong in the one case as the other. Butyou wouhl have it understood, that the rules of Pat litment have been adopted by the Senate. Ml- such thing. I challenge you to cite a cin- gle rule or act of the Senate that gives coun'eo- ancv to it. Finally, you tell us, tliat Mr J Her- so^ has cited thcs rules as being part (»f tin rules and usages of the Senate. AdmiUir g for a mo- 20 uient that Mr. JefTerson had cited them as such, still, a \ery important question vs'oiild arise, how came they to be tlie rulf-s of the Senate ? The Constitution provides, that the Senate shall de- termine the rules of its proccdinjis; now, if that b.ulv has not by any rule adopted the rules of the British Pirliament, by what process of rcasoa could they be construed to be the rules of the Senitte ? That the Senate his not adopted the rules of Parliament is certain ; and [ confess I am not a liitle curious to see the pr'cpss of rea- soning bv which Ihcy are made the rules of the Senate, wiihoui udop'tiin. Is there not a striking analoi^y between this and the question, whether the common law is a part of the laws of the Union? We know that they have been decided by the highest judicial authority not to be ; and, it seems to nie, the arjj;uments, which would be applicable to the one, would be equally so to the other question. That the rules and usages of Parliament may be referred to, to illustrate the rules ofeitlier liouse of Congress, is quite a dis- tinct proposiuo I, and may be readily admitted. Aiguments ma^^ be drawn from any source calcu- lated to illustrate, but that is wholly ditlerent from giving to the rules of another body a bind- ing force on the Senate, without ever having been recognized as its rules, This is a subject of deep and grave importance; but, as it is not ne- cessary to my purpose, I decline entering on it. It is sullkient, at present, to deny that Mr. Jef- ferson has cited the rules of the Parliament re- ferred to by you as tliose of the Senate. Oii the contrary, they are expressly cited as the rules of the British House of Commons, withcmt stating them to be obligatory on tlie Senate. He has notoriously cited many of the rules of that body, whieh are wh )lly dissimilar from the usages of the Senate. But you cite Mr. JeilV'Son's opin- ion, in vvhich he savs, " The v">enate have accord- ingly formed some rules for its government," SI (they have been much enlarged since) " but these goifiji; only to a few cases, they have referred to the dt'cisiun of the Presiili-nt without debate or appeal all questions of order arising under their own rules, or where there is none. ThiH places under the discretion of th Presidea. Mr. Jt^fferson, na the contrary, says, that in cases of omission, the sound discretion of the President is the rule;* and such has been the practice; and from which it has followed, that usages of the Senate are very dif- ferent from the Parli iment, whicli could not be, if the latter were aflopted, where there were no pof the Senate? And, secondly, whe- ther the practice of the House of Lords, or that of the Commons, ouj^ht, in this particular, to pre- vail ? Bith of those points have already been in- cidentally considered, and a single remark will now suffice. Whether we regard the nature of the power, or the principles of our system of go- vernment, there can be no doubt ihat the decision ought to be against the practice of the H use of Commons, and in favor of that of the House of Lords. It may not be improper to notice an opinion, which, if I mistake not, has, in no small degree, contributed to the error r.hich exists as to the decision of the Vice President. There are many who are far from ag;reeing with your absurd and dangt'T'ius positions, as to the i'lherent pow- ers of the Vice President over the freedom of de- bat<', but who have, I thi'ik, a vague conception that he has the right in dispute, as presiding offi- cer, but a right subordinate to, and dependent on, the Senate. They concede to the Senate the right of determining their rules, and that this riglit comprehends that of determining what is or what is not disorderly conduct, and how the same shall be noticed, or inhibited; but thcv have an idea that the ex oflicio duty of the Vice President to regulate the proceedings of the Senate accord- ing to their own rules, extends to cases of the freedom of debate. The amount of the argumeut, as far as I can understand it, is, that, where there is a rule of the Senate, the Vice President has, ox ollicio, the power of regulating the proceed- 13 ings of the Senate by it, without any express au- thority in the nile to that t-ft* ci. All this may- be fairly coiut^ded, but it »asefl awa>. 1 have nnw foni| leted what may be considered the invistigi'.tuMi d the sutject ; l>ut there are Still several of your remarks that require notice 24 You liave not only attacked the decision of Mr. Calhiinti, but you have impugned his motives With licentious severity. The corrupt are the most disposed to attribute corruption, and your unprovoked and unjustifiable attack on Mr. C's motives sptfdk as little in favor of your heart as your arirumi-n^s do of your head. Fortunately for the Vice President, his general character for virtue and patriotiMn shield him from the impu- tation ot such gross abuse of power, from such im()uri' motives, as you attribute to him. He could not decide differently from what he did, without being at war with the principles which have ever governed him. It is well knowti to all acquainted with him, publicly or privately, that the maxim which he holds in the highest venera- tion, and which he regards as the foundation of our whole system of government, is, that power should be controlled by the body over which it is exercised, and that, without such responsibi ity, all delegated power would speedily become cor- rupt. Whether he is wrong in giving too high an estimate to this favorite maxim, is immaterial. It is, and long has been, his ; and could not f-iil in having great influence in the decision, \ hich you have so seriously assaulted. Had his princi- ples been like yours, as illustrated inyourKssay, it is possible he might have taken a different view of the subject ; but, as he has decided in conformity to principles long fixed in his mind, there is something malignant in the extreme, to attribute his decision to motives of personal en- mi'y. You not only attack Mr. C's motives for this decision, but also his motive for the consti- tution of the Committee of Foreign Relations. — You think it a crime in him, that the venerable and patriotic Macon should be placed at (he head of theCommillee. I will neither defnti him nor the other members of the Connmttee. They need no defence ; but 1 cannot but leoiark, that the election of Mr. Macou President pro tern, of the 25 Senate, is a singular comment on your malig- nant attack on the Vice President. It would have been iinpossiblt; that you should steer clear ofthe cant of your party, and we accord- in;>;ly have a prolusion ol' vaj^ue cliar<;es about Mr. Calhoun's ambition, 'l he lowest and most mer- cenary hireling:; can easily coin such charj^es; and while they deal in tlie general, without a single specification, it is utterly impossible to meet or refute them; but, fortunately, they go for notiiins; with the wise and virtuous, saving only that, oa the part of those who make them, they evince an envious, morbid mind, which, having no real ground of attack, indulges in vague unmeaning abuse. It is highly honorable to Mr. C. that, in the midst of so much political, enmity, his per- sonal and public character stands free from all but one specific charge ; which is, that he has in- clined, in his present station, /oo tn'ich against Ins tli'u pC'i'fV, and tQO much in favor of th^ iuf «/i'- mf-ble right of the freedom oj debute. That he has been iwdefatigable in the discharge of his du- ty ; that he has been courteous to the members, and prompt and intelligent, all acknowledge. ]Sot a moment was he absent from his post dur- ing a long and laborious session, and often remain- ed in the chair, without leaving it, from 8 to i.2 hours. He has, however, committed one unpar- '. .blesin, which blots out all. He did not Mop Mr Randolph. This is the head and front of his offending. And who is Mr. Randolph? Is he, or his manners, a stranger in our national councils ? For more than a quarter of a centu- ry he has been a member of Congress, and, dur- ing the whole time, his character has remained unchanged. Highly talented, eloquent, severe, and eccentric ; always wandering from the ques- tion, but often uttering wisdom worthy of a Ba- con, and wit that would notdiscredit a Sheridan, every Spi^aker had freely indulged him in his peculiar manner, and that without responsibility 3 2(i or censure ; and none more freely than the pre- sent S cretary of State, while he presided in the House of Ileprest-ntativi's. He is elected, with a kiiowted^^e of all this, by the ancient and re- uown -d Commonwealth of Virj^inia, and takes his seat in the Senate. An immediate outcry is made against the Vice President for permitting him, who had been so long permitted, by so many Speakers, to exercise his usual freedom of discussion; thou;;li in no icspects were his attacks on the Administration freer than what they had been on ihose of Mr. JetVerson, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Monroe. Who can doubt, if Mr. Cjlhoun had yiehled to this clamor, that the whole current would have turned, and that he would then have been more severely denounced for what would have been called his tyranny and usurpation, than he has been for refusing; to interfere wiili ihe freedom of debate r His authority would have been denied, and prcpe.-ly ilcnied ; the fact, that Mr.R.had been permitted by all other presid- ing officers, for so long a time, to speak without restraint, woy.ld have been dwelt on ; and the injustice done to the Senator, and the insult of- fered to the State that sent him, would have beea painted in the most lively colors. These consi- derations, wc are satisfied, had no weight with the Vice President. Those who know him, know that no man is more regardless of consequenccs.ia the discharge of his duty ; but that the attack on l)im is personal, in order to sliake his political standing, and prostrate his character, is clearly evinced bv every circumstance : and, with this object, that he would have been assaulted, act as he might, is most certain. It is for rhe American People to determine, whether this conspiracy against a public servant, whose only fault is, that he has chosen the side of liberty, rather than of power, and whose highest crime consists in a re- verential regard for the freedom of debate, shali succeed. ONSLOW. 37 The fu'lowiriff obsei-vutions cniuprise the Dcdsion of tJie Vice President on the subject which ffuvc rise to the fire- ceding Ussiiiis, delivered at the conclusion of the Debate. The VICK PRESIDENT rose, and said he trusted that the Seiiat- would indulge him in making a few observa- tions b» fore he resumed his seat, as th< debate on the subject juAt decided liad rel..tion necessarily to the du- tie>* of t'li Chair. No one, mor than myself, said the Vice Prksi dent, can be more deeply impn ssed • itii the great tint , that the preservation of rigiUs d'pends, mainly, on their ex- ercise. That luition deservt d to conquer tiie world, wliich called its army exercitus; and so will thf n;it on disserve th. t t li'ieity shall be immortal, which lays tht- founda- tion of its system of Government on th- great principles, tl.atno power ought to be del gated which can be fairly- exercised by tile con-^tituent body, «nd that none ought ever to be df legated but to responsible agents Tliese have been my maxims through the whole of my political life, and 1 should be inconsistent with mys> If if I did not give my entire assent t th« principles on which the rales in question have been rescinded. I trust, said he, that it never will be the ambition of him, whose lot it is now to occupy this Chair, to enlarge its powers. My tin.'b'ti'in, I hope, pursues a different direction- not to enlarge powers but to discharge, W'th industry, fidt-lity, und firmness, tiie d' ties which may be imposed on me. Thus feeling, I shall witness, with pleasure, the resump- tion o all the powers which can t>e propi-rly exercised by the Senate, hb they will be then placed, where alone rhey can be with perfi cts f ty. From tlie dir< ction which the dcb:.te in some d-^gree, look, as well as from what has been said without these walls, it becomes, on this occasion, proper that I should St .tr, for the information of this body, tht- construction that the c:'air has put on t'le 6th and 7th rules of the Se- nate. Thoy are in the following words : '• When a member shall be called to order, he shall "sit down, until the l'residt;nt shall have determined " whether he is in order or not ; and every question of " order shall be decided by the l'rr is called to nr hair will not be found unpre- pared to discliarg'- its only function s in such a case — that of decidin}^ on the point of order subniitt d. U hat the opinion of t'u- prebidinp officer is in relation to the fr etiom of debate, int'iis bod\, it will bt- time tod-clare, when a qu stion may be presented ; bu', such as it i?» it wdl b ■ firmly, and, 1 tni^t I may a d. fearlessly ...ain- tained. But, 1 rej 'ice th.t the rules of the Sen.^te, on a [) .ii t so impoitiii:t, gave to the Chair no original pow- er,Hnd tiiat .t can exercise no control tdl called on by the Senate its^ If. It w as right in itself, h<: said, in strict i on- formity to the principles which had guided the Senate in t.> "vote y st taken — tict so high a pp.wer shouhl be plac-d oi ly in the ru>tody of the b d^; .; The Vict 1'RK-^ siDKST said he prided himself on hs connection with tue Senate ; but t was impossible that he should forge ttlut th t connect on was created b_\ the operation of the • on- St tution. In discharging his duty in this seat, t would be unpardonable in him not to recollect, tliat He was placed in the Chair, not by the voice of the Senate, but by that of tlie People ; and that to them, and not tuis body, he was u!ti iiutely responsible- Standing in the r< lation he di 1 to the Sen.te, he had laid it down as un invariable rule, to assume no power m tlu- least degree doubtful; and to coiifine liimself to a just but firm exercise of the P' wers clea Iv delegatedjli con. lusion he tendcrr^d to tl e Senate his sincere acknowledgments that in re- scinding the rule, suc'.i d- ileal regard had been paid to his feeli igs in the debate. An. pie ju-,tice h.td been done to th. indu-try and fidelits with which he had ho- nestly attempted t') disciiarge his aniuous duties. — Deeming himself calleil on by the debate tiiat had taken place, to say t us much in explanation, he beg^^d the intlulgcme of the Senate for having dune bo; and re* umed his seat. NoTB. — The numbers of " PATniCR He:«ht" will be found in the National Journal uf the Ist of Aiay, und the 7th of June, ISJo. f: 89 fy I > ^^% % '^_ 7- ' -^.J^ / '^ "-< ."^ o - . . '^^ aV .0' '^, -.^- -^ *- °o s" ^ . ' • o. ■"»i^ •^ . , ^ •^^ ¥. 'ir 1^ !.'>-' So-. ^o. 0' .^ ' <^, r^ ^^ ""^^ ' >^''' ^\^ \^ *- c ;'o " ^^^ '^> o « • A <^> ..'* ^ ■» :ti* V, V °<. -> '-■^^^^'^ .0' "^^'"cTo^ V .^^'^., " v^ .-"^^ o 0' •^ GriinlvOjc. P^. . , ■^.4,^^. 0^_ t'' ■^^ ♦ 6. ^ .i>°- -X -r- -^o "^♦..^^ -^^