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 1 —4 
 

 LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 
 
 Full Text of the Suppressed Document Written by 
 
 the Man Who Was German Ambassador in 
 
 London When the War Began 
 
 Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador to Great Britain at 
 the outbreak of the war, is the author of a secret memorandum entitled 
 " My London Mission, 1012-1914," which was intended only for his pri- 
 vate family archives, but which became public in March, 1918, creating 
 a profound sensation in Germany. 
 The document was written in 1916 
 at the Prince's country seat in Sile- 
 sia. It relates Lichnowsky's ex- 
 periences as intermediary between 
 the German and British Govern- 
 ments during the crucial period 
 leading up to the war, and its his- 
 torical importance is due largely 
 to its revelations of Germany's ac- 
 tions in precipitating the crisis. 
 Through channels described else- 
 where in these pages, a copy 
 of Lichnowsky's memorandum 
 reached a newspaper in Stockholm, 
 the Politiken, which published it 
 in part. Other parts appeared in 
 Berlin and Munich newspapers. 
 The various parts were assembled 
 by The New York Times and by 
 the Current History Magazine of 
 The New York Times Co., and the 
 memorandum is herewith presented 
 in its entirety, along with the full 
 text of the reply made by Herr von Jagow, who was German Foreign 
 Minister at the time. The corroborative evidence of Dr. Muehlon, former 
 Krupp Director, with other matter, is also presented. Prince Lichnow- 
 sky was deprived of his rank when his memorandum became public. 
 On April 27 the Prussian upper house decided to grant the request of 
 the First State Attorney of District Court No. 1 of Berlin, authorizing 
 him to begin criminal proceedings against the Prince " for infringing 
 the secrecy of documents officially intrusted to him." Prince Lich- 
 
 PRINCE LICHNOWSKY 
 
 
II. 
 
 THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 
 
 nowsky in the meantime is virtually a prisoner on his estate in Silesia. 
 Captain Beerfelde, a member of the German General Staff, who was 
 concerned in giving publicity to the Prince's memorandum, was arrested 
 early in April on the charge that in aiding in the distribution of these 
 documents he had been guilty of treason. 
 
 Text of the Memorandum 
 
 Kuchelna, 16 August, 1916. 
 
 BARON MARSCHALL died in Sep- 
 tember, 1912, having held his post 
 in London for a few months only. 
 His appointment, which was due 
 mainly to his age and the plotting of a 
 younger man to get to London, was one 
 of the many mistakes made by our For- 
 eign Office. In spite of his imposing per- 
 sonality and great reputation, he was too 
 old and tired to be able to adapt himself 
 to a purely foreign and Anglo-Saxon 
 milieu. He was more of a bureaucrat 
 and a lawyer than a diplomat or states- 
 man. He set to work to convince Eng- 
 lishmen of the harmless character of our 
 fleet, and naturally succeeded in strength- 
 ening an entirely opposite impression. 
 
 To my great surprise I was offered the 
 post in October. After many years' 
 work I had withdrawn to the country, as 
 no suitable post had been found for me, 
 and I spent my time on my farm and in 
 my garden, on horseback and in the 
 fields, but I read industriously and pub- 
 lished occasional political articles. Thus 
 eight years passed, and thirteen since I 
 had left Vienna as Ambassador. That 
 was actually my last political employ- 
 ment. I do not know to whom my ap- 
 pointment in London was due. At all 
 events, not to his Majesty, as I did not 
 belong to his immediate set, although he 
 was always gracious to me. I know by 
 experience that his candidates were fre- 
 quently successfully opposed. As a mat- 
 ter of fact, Herr von Kiderlen-Wachter 
 wanted to send Baron von Stumm to Lon- 
 don. He met me at once with undis- 
 guised ill-will, and tried to frighten me 
 by rudeness. Herr von Bethmann Holl- 
 weg was amiable to me, and had visited 
 me shortly before at Gratz. I am, there- 
 fore, inclined to think that they settled 
 on me, as no other candidate was avail- 
 able. Had Baron von Marschall not 
 
 died, it is unlikely that I should have 
 been dug out any more than in previous 
 years. The moment was obviously fa- 
 vorable for an attempt to come to a bet- 
 ter understanding with England. 
 
 THE MOROCCO QUESTION 
 
 Our obscure policy in Morocco had re- 
 peatedly caused distrust of our peaceful 
 intention, or, at least, had raised doubts 
 as to whether we knew what we wanted 
 or whether our intention was to keep 
 Europe in a state of suspense and, on 
 occasion, to humiliate the French. An 
 Austrian colleague, who was a long time 
 in Paris, said to me : " The French had 
 begun to forget la revanche. You have 
 regularly reminded them of it by tramp- 
 ing on their toes." After we had declined 
 Delcasse's offer to come to an agree- 
 ment regarding Morocco, and then sol- 
 emnly declared that we had no political 
 interest there — an attitude which agreed 
 with Bismarckian political conditions — 
 we suddenly discovered in Abdul Aziz a 
 Kruger Number Two. To him also, as to 
 the Boers, we promised the protection of 
 the mighty German Empire, and with the 
 same result. Both manifestations con- 
 cluded, as they were bound to conclude, 
 with a retraction, if we were not pre- 
 pared to start a world war. The pitiable 
 conference of Algeciras could alter noth- 
 ing, and still less cause Delcasse's fall. 
 Our attitude furthered the Russo-Japa- 
 nese and Russo-British rapprochement. 
 In face of " the German peril " all other 
 considerations faded into the background. 
 The possibility of another Franco-Ger- 
 man war had been patent, and, as had 
 not been the case in 1870, such a war 
 could not leave out Russia or England. 
 
 The valuelessness of the Triple Al- 
 liance had already been demonstrated 
 at Algeciras, and, immediately after- 
 ward, the equal worthlessness of the 
 
LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 
 
 agreements made there when the Sul- 
 tanate fell to pieces, which was, of 
 course, unavoidable. Meanwhile, the be- 
 lief was spreading among the Russian 
 people that our foreign policy was weak 
 and was breaking down under " encircle- 
 ment," and that cowardly surrender fol- 
 lowed on haughty gestures. It is to the 
 credit of von Kiderlen-Wachter, though 
 otherwise overrated as a statesman, that 
 he cleared up the Moroccan situation and 
 adapted himself to circumstances which 
 could not be altered. Whether the world 
 had to be upset by the Agadir coup is a 
 question I do not touch. This event was 
 hailed with joy in Germany, but in Eng- 
 land caused all the more uneasiness in 
 that the British Government waited in 
 vain for three weeks for a statement of 
 our intentions. Mr. Lloyd George's Man- 
 sion House speech, intended to warn us, 
 was a consequence. Before Delcasse's 
 fall and before the Algeciras conference 
 we could have obtained harbors and 
 bases on the West Coast, but that was 
 no longer possible. 
 
 ENGLAND SOUGHT AGREEMENT 
 
 When I came to London in November, 
 1912, people had become easier about the 
 question of Morocco, especially since an 
 agreement had been reached with France 
 and Berlin. Lord Haldane's mission had 
 failed, it is true, as we demanded promises 
 of neutrality instead of contenting our- 
 selves with a treaty which would insure 
 us against a British attack or any attack 
 with British support. Sir Edward Grey 
 had not, meanwhile, given up the idea of 
 coming to an understanding with us, and 
 made such an attempt first on economic 
 and colonial grounds. Through the 
 agency of that qualified and expert Coun- 
 cilor of Embassy, von Kuhlmann, an ex- 
 change of opinions had taken place with 
 regard to the renewal of the Portuguese 
 colonial treaty and the Bagdad Railway, 
 which thus carried out the unexpected 
 aim of dividing into spheres of interest 
 both the above-mentioned colonies and 
 Asia Minor. The British statesman, old 
 points in dispute both with France and 
 Russia having been settled, wished to 
 come to a similar agreement with us. 
 His intention was not to isolate us but 
 
 to make us in so far as possible partners 
 in a working concern. Just as he had 
 succeeded in bridging Franco-British and 
 Russo-British difficulties, so he wished 
 as far as possible to remove German- 
 British difficulties, and by a network 
 of treaties — which would finally include 
 an agreement on the miserable fleet ques- 
 tion — to secure the peace of the world, 
 as our earlier policy had lent itself to a 
 co-operation with the Entente, which con- 
 tained a mutual assurance against the 
 danger of war. 
 
 GREY'S DESIRES 
 
 This was Sir Edward Grey's program 
 in his own words : " Without infringing 
 on the existing friendly relations with 
 France and Russia, which in themselves 
 contained no aggressive elements, and no 
 binding obligations for England; to seek 
 to achieve a more friendly rapproche- 
 ment with Germany, and to bring the 
 two group's nearer together." 
 
 In England, as with us, there were 
 two opinions, that of the optimists, who 
 believed in an understanding, and that of 
 the pessimists, who considered war in- 
 evitable sooner or later. Among the 
 former were Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward 
 Grey, Lord Haldane, and most of the 
 Ministers in the Radical Cabinet, as well 
 as leading Liberal organs, such as The 
 Westminster Gazette, The Manchester 
 Guardian, and The Daily Chronicle. To 
 the pessimists belong especially Conser- 
 vative politicians like Mr. Balfour, who 
 repeatedly made his meaning clear to 
 me; leading soldiers such as Lord Rob- 
 erts, who insisted on the necessity of 
 conscription, and on " the writing on the 
 wall," and, further, the Northcliffe press, 
 and that leading English journalist, Mr. 
 Garvin of The Observer. During my 
 term of office they abstained from all 
 attacks and took up, personally and po- 
 litically, a friendly attitude. Our naval 
 policy and our attitude in the years 1905, 
 1908, and 1911 had, nevertheless, caused 
 them to think that it might one day come 
 to war. Just as with us, the former are 
 now dubbed shortsighted and simple- 
 minded, while the latter are regarded as 
 the true prophets. 
 
 The first Balkan war led to the collapse 
 
IV. 
 
 THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 
 
 of Turkey and with it the defeat of our 
 policy, which had been identified with 
 Turkey for many years. Since the salva- 
 tion of Turkey in Europe was no longer 
 feasible, only two possibilities for settling 
 the question remained. Either we de- 
 clared we had no longer any interest in 
 the definition of boundaries in the Bal- 
 kan Peninsula, and left the settlement of 
 the question to the Balkan peoples them- 
 selves, or we supported our allies and 
 carried out a Triple Alliance policy in the 
 East, thereby giving up the role of 
 mediator. 
 
 I urged the former course from the 
 beginning, but the German Foreign Office 
 very much preferred the latter. The chief 
 question was Albania. Our allies desired 
 the establishment of an independent 
 State of Albania, as Austria would not 
 allow Serbia to reach the Adriatic, and 
 Italy did not wish the Greeks to reach 
 Valona or even the territory north of 
 Corfu. On the other hand, Russia, as is 
 known, favored Serbian, and France 
 Greek, desires. My advice was now to 
 consider the question as outside the 
 alliance, and to support neither Austrian 
 nor Italian wishes. Without our support 
 the establishment of Albania, whose in- 
 capability of existence might have been 
 foreseen, was an impossibility. Serbia 
 would have pushed forward to the coast; 
 then the present world war would have 
 been avoided. France and Italy would 
 have remained definitely divided as to 
 Greece, and the Italians, had they not 
 wished to fight France alone, would have 
 been obliged to consent to the expansion 
 of Greece to the district north of Durazzo. 
 The greater part of civilized Albania is 
 Greek. The southern towns are entirely 
 Greek, and, at the time of the conference 
 of Ambassadors, deputations from the 
 larger towns came to London to carry 
 through the annexation to Greece. 
 
 In Greece today whole groups are 
 Albanian, and the so-called Greek na- 
 tional dress is of Albanian origin. The 
 amalgamation of the preponderating 
 Orthodox and Islamic Albanians with 
 the Greek State was, therefore, the best 
 solution and the most natural, if one 
 leaves out of account Scutari and the 
 northern part of Serbia and Montenegro. 
 
 His Majesty was also in favor of this 
 solution on dynastic grounds. When I 
 encouraged the monarch by letter to this 
 effect, I received violent reproaches from 
 the Chancellor for supporting Austria's 
 opponents, and he forbade all such inter- 
 ference in the future, and even direct 
 correspondence. We had eventually, 
 however, to abandon the tradition of car- 
 rying out the Triple Alliance policy in 
 the East and to acknowledge our mis- 
 take, which consisted in identifying our- 
 selves with the Turks in the south and 
 the Austro-Magyars in the north; for the 
 continuance of that policy, which we 
 began at the Congress in Berlin and sub- 
 sequently carried on zealously, was bound 
 in time, should the necessary skill in 
 conducting it fail, to lead to a collision 
 with Russia and a world war. 
 
 TURKEY, RUSSIA, ITALY 
 
 Instead of uniting with Russia on the 
 basis of the independence of the Sultan, 
 whom the Russians also did not wish to 
 drive out of Constantinople, and confin- 
 ing ourselves to economic interests in the 
 East, while at the same time refraining 
 from all military and political interfer- 
 ence and being satisfied with a division 
 of Asia Minor into spheres of interest, 
 the goal of our political ambition was to 
 dominate in the Bosporus. In Russia, 
 therefore, the opinion arose that the way 
 to Constantinople and to the Mediter- 
 ranean lay through Berlin. Instead of 
 encouraging a powerful development in 
 the Balkan States, which were once free 
 and are very different from the Rus- 
 sians, of which fact we have already had 
 experience, we placed ourselves on the 
 side of the Turkish and Magyar oppres- 
 sors. The dire mistake of our Triple 
 Alliance and our Eastern policies, which 
 drove Russia — our natural friend and 
 best neighbor — into the arms of France 
 and England, and kept her from her 
 policy of Asiatic expansion, was the more 
 evident, as a Franco-Russian attack, the 
 only hypothesis justifying a Triple Al- 
 liance policy, had to be eliminated from 
 our calculations. 
 
 As to the value of the alliance with 
 Italy, one word only. Italy needs our 
 money and our tourists after the war, 
 
L1CHN0W SKY'S MEMORANDUM 
 
 with or without our alliance. That our 
 alliance would go by the board in the 
 event of war was to be foreseen. The 
 alliance, consequently, was worthless. 
 
 Austria, however, needed our protec- 
 tion both in war and peace, and had no 
 other point d'appui. This dependence on 
 us is based on political, national, and 
 economic grounds, and is all the greater 
 in proportion to the intimacy of our re- 
 lations with Russia. This was proved in 
 the Bosnian crisis. Since Count Beust, 
 no Vienna Minister had been so self-con- 
 scious with us as Count Aehrenthal was 
 during the last years of his life. Under 
 the influence of a properly conducted 
 German policy which would keep us in 
 touch with Russia, Austria-Hungary is 
 our vassal, and is tied to us even with- 
 out an alliance and without reciprocal 
 services; under the influence of a mis- 
 guided policy, however, we are tied to 
 Austria-Hungary. An alliance would 
 therefore be purposeless. 
 
 I know Austria far too well not to 
 know that a return to the policy of Count 
 Felix Schwarzenberg or to that of Count 
 Moritz Esterhazy was unthinkable. Lit- 
 tle as the Slavs living there love us, they 
 wish just as little for a return to the 
 German Kaiserdom, even with a Haps- 
 burg-Lorraine at its head. They are 
 striving for an internal Austrian feder- 
 ation on a national basis, a condition 
 which is even less likely of realization 
 within the German Empire than under 
 the Double Eagle. Austro-Germans look 
 on Berlin as the centre of German power 
 and Kultur, and they know that Austria 
 can never be a leading power. They de- 
 sire as close a connection as possible 
 with the empire, but not to the extent 
 of an anti-German policy. 
 
 BALKAN QUARRELS 
 
 Since the seventies the conditions have 
 changed fundamentally in Austria, and 
 also, perhaps, in Bavaria. Just as here 
 a return to Pan-German particularism 
 and the old Bavarian policy is not to 
 be feared, so there a revival of the policy 
 of Prince Kaunitz and Prince Schwarzen- 
 berg is not to be contemplated. But by a 
 constitutional union with Austria, which 
 even without Galicia and Dalmatia is 
 
 inhabited at least to the extent of one- 
 half by non-Germans, our interests would 
 suffer; while, on the other hand, by the 
 subordination of our policy to the point 
 of view of Vienna and Budapest, we 
 should have to " epouser les querelles de 
 l'Autriche." 
 
 We, therefore, had no need to heed 
 the desires of our allies. They were 
 not only unnecessary but dangerous, in- 
 asmuch as they would lead to a collision 
 with Russia if we looked at Eastern ques- 
 tions through Austrian eyes. The trans- 
 formation of our alliance with its single 
 original purpose into a complete alliance, 
 involving a complexity of common inter- 
 ests, was calculated to call forth the 
 very state of things which the constitu- 
 tional negotiations were designed to pre- 
 vent, namely, war. Such a policy of al- 
 liances would, moreover, entail the loss 
 of the sympathies of the young, strong, 
 and growing communities in the Balkan 
 Peninsula, which were ready to turn to 
 us and open their market to us. The 
 contrast between dynastic and demo- 
 cratic ideas had to be given clear ex- 
 pression, and, as usual, we stood on the 
 wrong side. King Carol told one of our 
 representatives that he had made an al- 
 liance with us on condition that we re- 
 tained control of affairs, but that if that 
 control passed to Austria it would en- 
 tirely change the basis of affairs, and 
 under those conditions he could no longer 
 participate. Matters stood in the same 
 position in Serbia, where against our 
 own economic interests we were sup- 
 porting an Austrian policy of strangu- 
 lation. 
 
 BACKED WRONG HORSES 
 
 We had always backed horses which, it 
 was evident, would lose, such as Kruger, 
 Abdul Aziz, Abdul Hamid, Wilhelm of 
 Wied, and finally — and this was the most 
 miserable mistake of all — Count Berch- 
 told. 
 
 Shortly after my arrival in London, 
 in 1912, Sir Edward Grey proposed an 
 informal exchange of views in order to 
 prevent a European war developing out 
 of the Balkan war, since, at the outbreak 
 of that war, we had unfortunately de- 
 clined the proposal of the French Gov- 
 
VI. 
 
 THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 
 
 eminent to join in a declaration of dis- 
 interestedness and impartiality on the 
 part of the powers. The British statesman 
 maintained from the beginning that 
 England had no interest in Albania, and 
 would, therefore, not go to war on the 
 subject. In his role of " honest broker " 
 he would confine his efforts to mediation 
 and an attempt to smooth away difficul- 
 ties between the two groups. He, there- 
 fore, by no means placed himself on the 
 side of the Entente Powers, and during 
 the negotiations, which lasted about eight 
 months, he lent his good- will and power- 
 ful influence toward the establishment of 
 an understanding. Instead of adopting 
 the English point of view, we accepted 
 that dictated to us by Vienna. Count 
 Mensdorff led the Triple Alliance in Lon- 
 don and I was his second. 
 
 GREY ALWAYS CONCILIATORY 
 
 My duty was to support his proposals. 
 The clever and experienced Count Szog- 
 yenyi was at the helm in Berlin. His 
 refrain was " casus foederis," and when 
 once I dared to doubt the justice of this 
 phrase I was seriously warned against 
 Austrophobism. Referring to my father, 
 it was even said that I had in- 
 herited it. On every point, including 
 Albania, the Serbian harbors in the Ad- 
 riatic, Scutari, and in the definition of 
 the Albanian frontiers, we were on the 
 side of Austria and Italy, while Sir 
 Edward Grey hardly ever took the French 
 or Russian point of view. On the con- 
 trary, he nearly always took our part 
 in order to give no pretext for war — 
 which was afterward brought about by a 
 dead Archduke. It was with his help 
 that King Nicholas was induced to leave 
 Scutari. Otherwise there would have 
 been war over this matter, as we should 
 never have dared to ask " our allies " to 
 make concessions. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey conducted the nego- 
 tiations with care, calm, and tact. When 
 a question threatened to become involved 
 he proposed a formula which met the 
 case and always secured consent. He 
 acquired the full confidence of all the 
 representatives. 
 
 Once again we had successfully with- 
 stood one of the niany threats against 
 
 the strength characterizing our policy. 
 Russia had been obliged to give way to 
 us all along the line, as she never got an 
 opportunity to advance Serbian wishes. 
 Albania was set up as an Austrian vassal 
 State, and Serbia was driven away from 
 the sea. The conference was thus a fresh 
 humiliation for Russia. 
 
 As in 1878 and 1908, we had opposed 
 the Russian program without German 
 interests being brought into play. Bis- 
 marck had to minimize the mistake of the 
 Congress by a secret treaty, and his at- 
 titude in the Battenberg question — the 
 downward incline being taken by us in 
 the Bosnian question — was followed up 
 in London, and was not given up, with 
 the result that it led to the abyss. 
 
 The dissatisfaction then prevalent in 
 Russia was given vent to during the 
 London Conference by an attack in the 
 Russian press on my Russian colleague 
 and on Russian diplomacy. 
 
 His German origin and Catholic faith, 
 his reputation as a friend of Germany, 
 and the accident that he was related both 
 to Count Mensdorff and to myself were 
 all made use of by dissatisfied parties. 
 Although not a particularly important 
 personality, Count Benckendorff pos- 
 sessed many qualities of a good diplomat 
 — tact, worldly knowledge, experience, an 
 agreeable personality, and a natural eye 
 for men and things. He sought always 
 to avoid provocative attitudes, and was 
 supported by the attitude of England 
 and France. 
 
 I once said : " The feeling in Russia is 
 very anti-German." He replied : " There 
 are also many strong influential pro- 
 German circles there. But the people 
 generally are an ti- Austrian." 
 
 It only remains to be added that our 
 exaggerated Austrophilism is not exact- 
 ly likely to break up the Entente and 
 turn Russia's attention to her Asiatic 
 interests. 
 
 PRE-WAR DIPLOMACY 
 
 [The next passages, which had formerly 
 been suppressed by the Swedish Government, 
 appeared in the Politiken of Stockholm on 
 March 26:] 
 
 At the same time (1913) the Balkan 
 Conference met in London, and I had the 
 opportunity of meeting the leading men 
 
LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 
 
 VII. 
 
 of the Balkan States. The most im- 
 portant personage among them was M. 
 Venizelos. He was anything but anti- 
 German, and particularly prized the 
 Order of the Red Eagle, which he even 
 wore at the French Embassy. With his 
 winning amiability and savoir faire he 
 could always win sympathy. 
 
 Next to him a great role was played 
 by Daneff, the then Bulgarian Prime 
 Minister and Count Berchtold's confidant. 
 He gave the impression of being a 
 capable and energetic man, and even the 
 influence of his friends at Vienna and 
 Budapest, at which he sometimes laughed, 
 was attributable to the fact that he had 
 let himself be drawn into the second 
 Balkan war and had declined Russian 
 intervention. 
 
 M. Take Jonescu was often in Lon- 
 don, too, and visited me regularly. I 
 had known him since the time when I was 
 Secretary at Bucharest. He was also 
 one of Herr von Kiderlen-Wachter's 
 friends. His aim in London was to secure 
 concessions for Rumania by negotiations 
 with M. Daneff. In this he was sup- 
 ported by the most capable Rumanian 
 Minister, M. Misu. That these negotia- 
 tions were stranded by the Bulgarian op- 
 position is known. Count Berchtold — and 
 naturally we with him — was entirely on 
 the side of Bulgaria; otherwise we should 
 have succeeded by pressure on M. Daneff 
 in obtaining the desired satisfaction for 
 the Rumanians and have bound Rumania 
 to us, as she was by Austria's attitude 
 in the second Balkan war, while after- 
 ward she was estranged from the Central 
 Powers. 
 
 AUSTRIA'S PRESTIGE INJURED 
 
 Bulgaria's defeat in the second Balkan 
 war and Serbia's victory, as well as the 
 Rumanian advance, naturally constituted 
 a reproach to Austria. The idea of equal- 
 izing this by military intervention in 
 Serbia seems to have gained ground 
 rapidly in Vienna. This is proved by 
 the Italian disclosure, and it may be 
 presumed that the Marquis di San Giu- 
 liano, who described the plan as a " peri- 
 colossissima adventura," (an extremely 
 risky adventure,) saved us from a Euro- 
 pean war as far back as the Summer of 
 
 1912. Intimate as Russo-Italian rela- 
 tions were, the aspiration of Vienna must 
 have been known in St. Petersburg. In 
 any event, M. Take Jonescu told me that 
 M. Sazonoff had said in Constanza that 
 an attack on Serbia on the part of Aus- 
 tria meant war with Russia. 
 
 In the Spring of 19.14 one of my Secre- 
 taries, on returning from leave in Vi- 
 enna, said that Herr von Tschirschky 
 [German Ambassador in Vienna] had 
 declared that war must soon come. But 
 as I was always kept in the dark regard- 
 ing important things, I considered his 
 pessimism unfounded. 
 
 Ever since the peace of Bucharest it 
 seems to have been the opinion in Vienna 
 that the revision of this treaty should be 
 undertaken independently, and only a 
 favorable opportunity was awaited. The 
 statesmen in Vienna and Bucharest 
 could naturally count upon our support. 
 This they knew, for already they had 
 been reproached several times for their 
 slackness. Berlin even insisted on the 
 " rehabilitation " of Austria. 
 
 ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS 
 
 . When I returned to London in De- 
 cember, 1913, after a long holiday, the 
 Liman von Sanders question had led to 
 our relations with Russia becoming acute. 
 Sir Edward Grey called my attention 
 with some uneasiness to the consequent 
 unrest in St. Petersburg, saying: " I 
 have never seen them so excited." Berlin 
 instructed me to beg the Minister to 
 urge calm in St. Petersburg and help to 
 solve the difficulty. Sir Edward was 
 quite willing, and his intervention con- 
 tributed not inconsiderably to smoothing 
 matters over. My good relations with 
 Sir Edward and his great influence in 
 St. Petersburg served in a like manner 
 on several occasions when it was a ques- 
 tion of carrying through something of 
 which our representative there was com- 
 pletely incapable. 
 
 During the critical days of July, 1914, 
 Sir Edward said to me : " If ever you 
 want something done in St. Petersburg 
 you come to me regularly, but if ever I 
 appeal for your influence in Vienna you 
 refuse your support." The good and de- 
 pendable relations I was fortunate in 
 
VIII. 
 
 THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 
 
 making not only in society and among 
 influential people, such as Sir Edward 
 Grey and Mr. Asquith, but also with 
 others at public dinners, had brought 
 about a noticeable improvement in our 
 relations with England. Sir Edward de- 
 voted himself honestly to further this 
 rapprochement, and his intentions were 
 especially noticeable in two questions — 
 the Colonial Treaty and the treaty re- 
 garding the Bagdad Railway. 
 
 THE AFRICAN AGREEMENT 
 
 [This portion is translated from the Muen- 
 chener Neueste Nachrichten.] 
 
 In the year 1898 a secret treaty had 
 been signed by Count Hatzfeldt [then 
 German Ambassador in London] and Mr. 
 Balfour, which divided the Portuguese 
 colonies in Africa into economic-political 
 spheres of interest between us and Eng- 
 land. As the Portuguese Government 
 possessed neither the power nor the 
 means to open up or adequately to ad- 
 minister its extensive possessions, the 
 Portuguese Government had already at 
 an earlier date thought of selling these 
 possessions and thereby putting their 
 finances in order. 
 
 Between us and England an agreement 
 had been reached which defined the in- 
 terests of the two parties and which was 
 of all the greater value because Portugal, 
 as is well known, is completely dependent 
 upon England. This treaty was no doubt 
 to secure outwardly the integrity and in- 
 dependence of the Portuguese Empire, 
 and it only expressed the intention of 
 giving financial and economic assistance 
 to the Portuguese. Consequently it did 
 not, according to the text, conflict with 
 the old Anglo-Portuguese alliance, dat- 
 ing from the fifteenth century, which was 
 last renewed under Charles II. and which 
 guaranteed the territories of the two par- 
 ties. Nevertheless, at the instance of 
 the Marquis Soveral, who presumably 
 was not ignorant of the Anglo-German 
 agreement, a new treaty — the so-called 
 Windsor treaty — which confirmed the 
 old agreements, was concluded in 1899 
 between England and Portugal. 
 
 ENGLAND'S GENEROUS ATTITUDE 
 
 The object of the negotiations be- 
 tween us and England, which had begun 
 
 before by arrival, was to alter and amend 
 our treaty of 1898, which contained many 
 impossible features — for example, with 
 regard to the geographical delimitation. 
 Thanks to the conciliatory attitude of 
 the British Government, I succeeded in 
 giving to the new treaty a form which 
 entirely accorded with our wishes and in- 
 terests. All Angola, as far as the 20th 
 degree of longitude, was allotted to us, 
 so that we reached the Congo territory 
 from the south. Moreover, the valuable 
 islands of San Thome and Principe, 
 which lie north of the equator, and there- 
 fore really belonged to the French sphere 
 of interest, were allotted to us — a fact 
 which caused my French colleague to 
 make lively, although vain, representa- 
 tions. Further, we obtained the northern 
 part of Mozambique; the frontier was 
 formed by the Likungo. 
 
 The British Government showed the 
 utmost readiness to meet out interests 
 and wishes. Sir Edward Grey intended 
 to prove his good-will to us, but he also 
 desired to promote our colonial develop- 
 ment, because England hoped to divert 
 Germany's development of strength from 
 the North Sea and Western Europe to 
 the world-sea and Africa. " We don't 
 want to grudge Germany her colonial 
 development," a member of the Cabinet 
 said to me. 
 
 THE CONGO STATE 
 
 Originally, at the British suggestion, 
 the Congo State was to be included in 
 the treaty, which would have given us a 
 right of pre-emption and a possibility of 
 economic penetration in the Congo State. 
 But we refused this offer, out of alleged 
 respect for Belgian sensibilities! Per- 
 haps the idea was to economize our suc- 
 cesses? With regard also to the prac- 
 tical realization of the real but unex- 
 pressed object of the treaty — the actual 
 partition at a later date of the Portu- 
 guese colonial possessions — the new for- 
 mulation showed considerable advantages 
 and progress as compared with the old. 
 Thus the treaty contemplated circum- 
 stances which would enable us to enter 
 the territories ascribed to us, for the 
 protection of our interests. 
 
 These conditional clauses were so wide 
 
LICHNOW SKY'S MEMORANDUM 
 
 IX. 
 
 that it was really left to us to decide 
 when really " vital " interests were con- 
 cerned, so that, in view of the complete 
 dependence of Portugal upon England 
 we merely needed to go on cultivating 
 our relations with England in order, later 
 on, with English assent, to realize our 
 mutual intentions. 
 
 The sincerity of the English Govern- 
 ment in its effort to respect our rights 
 was proved by the fact that Sir Edward 
 Grey, before ever the treaty was com- 
 pleted or signed, called our attention to 
 English men of business who were seek- 
 ing opportunities to invest capital in the 
 territories allotted to us by the new 
 treaty, and who desired British support. 
 In doing so he remarked that the under- 
 takings in question belonged to our 
 sphere of interest. 
 
 WILHELMSTRASSE INTRIGUES 
 
 The treaty was practically complete 
 at the time of the King's visit to Berlin 
 in May, 1913. A conversation then took 
 place in Berlin under the Presidency of 
 the Imperial Chancellor, (Herr von Beth- 
 mann Hollweg,) in which I took part, 
 and at which special wishes were laid 
 down. On my return to London I suc- 
 ceeded, with the help of my Counselor of 
 Embassy, von Kuhlmann, who was work- 
 ing upon the details of the treaty with 
 Mr. Parker, in putting through our last 
 proposals also. It was possible for the 
 whole treaty to be initialed by Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey and myself in August, 1913, 
 before I went on leave. Now, however, 
 new difficulties were to arise, which pre- 
 vented the signature, and it was only a 
 year later, shortly before the outbreak 
 of war, that I was able to obtain author- 
 ization for the final settlement. Signa- 
 ture, however, never took place. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey was willing to sign 
 only if the treaty was published, together 
 with the two treaties of 1898 and 1899; 
 England has no other secret treaties, and 
 it is contrary to her existing principles 
 that she should conceal binding agree- 
 ments. He said, however, that he was 
 ready to take account of our wishes con- 
 cerning the time and manner of publica- 
 tion, provided that publication took place 
 within one year, at latest, after the sig- 
 
 nature. In the [Berlin] Foreign Office, 
 however, where my London successes 
 aroused increasing dissatisfaction, and 
 where an influential personage, [the 
 reference is apparently to Herr von 
 Stumm,] who played the part of Herr 
 von Holstein, was claiming the London 
 Embassy for himself, it was stated that 
 the publication would imperil our inter- 
 ests in the colonies, because the Portu- 
 guese would show their gratitude by 
 giving us no more concessions. The ac- 
 curacy of this excuse is illuminated by 
 the fact that the old treaty was most 
 probably just as much long known to 
 the Portuguese as our new agreements 
 must have been, in view of the intimacy 
 of relations between Portugal and Eng- 
 land; it was illuminated also by the 
 fact that, in view of the influence which 
 England possesses at Lisbon, the Por- 
 tuguese Government is completely power- 
 less in face of an Anglo-German under- 
 standing. 
 
 WRECKING THE TREATY 
 
 Consequently, it was necessary to find 
 another excuse for wrecking the treaty. 
 It was said that the publication of the 
 Windsor Treaty, which was concluded 
 in the time of Prince Hohenlohe, and 
 which was merely a renewal of the treaty 
 of Charles II., which had never lapsed, 
 might imperil the position of Herr von 
 Bethmann Hollweg, as being a proof of 
 British hypocrisy and perfidy! On this 
 I pointed out that the preamble to our 
 treaties said exactly the same thing as 
 the Windsor Treaty and other similar 
 treaties — namely, that we desired to pro- 
 tect the sovereign rights of Portugal and 
 the integrity of its possessions! 
 
 In spite of repeated conversations with 
 Sir Edward Grey, in which the Minister 
 made ever fresh proposals concerning 
 publication, the [Berlin] Foreign Office 
 remained obstinate, and finally agreed 
 with Sir Edward Goschen [British Am- 
 bassador in Berlin] that everything 
 should remain as it was before. So the 
 treaty, which gave us extraordinary ad- 
 vantages, the result of more than one 
 year's work, had collapsed because it 
 would have been a public success for me. 
 
 When in the Spring of 1914 I happened, 
 
THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 
 
 at a dinner in the embassy, at which Mr. 
 Harcourt [then Colonial Secretary] was 
 present, to mention the matter, the Co- 
 lonial Secretary said that he was embar- 
 rassed and did not know how to behave. 
 He said that the present state of affairs 
 was intolerable, because he [Mr. Har- 
 court] wanted to respect our rights, but, 
 on the other hand, was in doubt as to 
 whether he should follow the old treaty 
 or the new. He said that it was there- 
 fore extremely desirable to clear matters 
 up, and to bring to a conclusion an affair 
 which had been hanging on for so long. 
 
 "A DISASTROUS MISTAKE" 
 
 When I reported to this effect I re- 
 ceived a rude and excited order, telling 
 me to refrain from any further interfer- 
 ence in the matter. 
 
 I now regret that I did not go to Ber- 
 lin in order to offer his Majesty my 
 resignation, and that I still did not lose 
 my belief in the possibility of an agree- 
 ment between me and the leading [Ger- 
 man] personages. That was a disas- 
 trous mistake, which was to be tragical- 
 ly avenged some months later. 
 
 Slight though was the extent to which 
 I then still possessed the good-will of the 
 Imperial Chancellor — because he feared 
 that I was aiming at his office — I must 
 do him the justice to say that at the end 
 of June, 1914, in our last conversation 
 before the outbreak of war, he gave his 
 consent to the signature and publication. 
 Nevertheless, it required further repeat- 
 ed suggestions on my part, which were 
 supported by Dr. Solf, [German Colonial 
 Secretary,] in order at last to obtain 
 official consent at the end of July. Then 
 the Serbian crisis was already threaten- 
 ing the peace of Europe, and so the com- 
 pletion of the treaty had to be postponed. 
 The treaty is now one of the victims of 
 the war. 
 
 BAGDAD RAILWAY TREATY 
 
 [This portion is translated from the Stock- 
 holm Politiken o'f March 26.] 
 
 At the same time, while the African 
 agreement was under discussion, I was 
 negotiating, with the effective co-opera- 
 tion of Herr von Kiihlmann, the so-called 
 Bagdad Railway Treaty. This aimed, in 
 
 fact, at the division of Asia Minor into 
 spheres of interest, although this expres- 
 sion was carefully avoided in considera- 
 tion of the Sultan's rights. Sir Edward 
 Grey declared repeatedly that there was 
 no agreement between England and 
 France aiming at a division of Asia 
 Minor. 
 
 In the presence of the Turkish repre- 
 sentative, Hakki Pasha, all economic 
 questions in connection with the German 
 treaty were settled mainly in accordance 
 with the wishes Of the Ottoman Bank. 
 The greatest concession Sir Edward Grey 
 made me personally was the continuation 
 of the line to Basra. We had not insisted 
 on this terminus in order to establish 
 connection with Alexandretta. Hitherto 
 Bagdad had been the terminus of the line. 
 The shipping on the Shatt el Arab was to 
 be in the hands of an international com- 
 mission. We also obtained a share in 
 the harbor works at Basra, and even 
 acquired shipping rights on the Tigris, 
 hitherto the monopoly of the firm of 
 Lynch. 
 
 By this treaty the whole of Meso- 
 potamia up to Basra became our zone of 
 interest, whereby the whole British 
 rights, the question of shipping on the 
 Tigris, and the Wilcox establishments 
 were left untouched, as well as all the 
 district of Bagdad and the Anatolian 
 railways. 
 
 The British economic territories in- 
 cluded the coasts of the Persian Gulf 
 and the Smyrna-Aidin railway, the 
 French Syria, and the Russian Armenia. 
 Had both treaties been concluded and 
 published, an agreement would have 
 been reached with England which would 
 have finally ended all doubt of the pos- 
 sibility of an Anglo-German co-opera- 
 tion. 
 
 GERMAN NAVAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
 Most difficult of all, there remained 
 the question of the fleet. It was never 
 quite rightly judged. The creation of 
 a mighty fleet on the other shore of 
 the North Sea and the simultaneous de- 
 velopment of the Continent's most impor- 
 tant military power into its most impor- 
 tant naval power had at least to be rec- 
 ognized by England as uncomfortable. 
 
LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 
 
 XI. 
 
 This presumably cannot be doubted. To 
 maintain the necessary lead and not to 
 become dependent, to preserve the su- 
 premacy of the sea, which Britain must 
 have in order not to go down, she had to 
 undertake preparations and expenses 
 which weighed heavily on the taxpayer. 
 A threat against the British world posi- 
 tion was made in that our policy allowed 
 the possibility of warlike development to 
 appear. This possibility was obviously 
 near during the Morocco crisis and the 
 Bosnian question. 
 
 People had become reconciled to our 
 fleet in its definite strength. Obviously 
 it was not welcome to the British and 
 constituted one of the motives, but neither 
 the only nor the most important motive, 
 for England's joining hands with Russia 
 and France. On account of our fleet 
 alone, however, England would have 
 drawn the sword as little as on account 
 of our trade, which it is pretended called 
 forth her jealousy and ultimately brought 
 about war. 
 
 From the beginning I adopted the 
 standpoint that in spite of the fleet it 
 would be possible to come to a friendly 
 understanding and rapproachement if 
 we did not propose new votes of credit, 
 and, above all, if we carried out an indis- 
 putable peace policy. I also avoided all 
 mention of the fleet, and between me and 
 Sir Edward Grey the word was never ut- 
 tered. Sir Edward Grey declared on one 
 occasion at a Cabinet meeting: "The 
 present German Ambassador has never 
 mentioned the fleet to me." 
 
 UNDERSTANDING POSSIBLE 
 
 During my term of office the then 
 First Lord, Mr. Churchill, raised the 
 question of a so-called naval holiday, 
 and proposed, for financial reasons as 
 much as on account of the pacifist incli- 
 nations of his party, a one year's pause 
 in armaments. Officially the suggestion 
 was not supported by Sir Edward Grey. 
 He never spoke of it to me, but Mr. 
 Churchill spoke to me on repeated occa- 
 sions. 
 
 I am convinced that his initiative was 
 honest, cunning in general not being 
 part of the Englishman's constitution. It 
 would have been a great success for Mr. 
 
 Churchill to secure economies for the 
 country and to lighten the burden of ar- 
 mament, which was weighing heavily 
 on the people. 
 
 I maintain that it would have been dif- 
 ficult to support his intention. How 
 about the workmen employed for this 
 purpose? How about the technical per- 
 sonnel? Our naval program was set- 
 tled, and it would be difficult to alter 
 it. Nor, on the other hand, did we in- 
 tend exceeding it. But he pointed out 
 that the means spent on portentous ar- 
 maments could equally be used for other 
 purposes. I maintain that such expen- 
 diture would have benefited home indus- 
 tries. 
 
 NO TRADE JEALOUSY 
 
 I also succeeded, in conversation with 
 Sir William Tyrrell, Sir Edward Grey's 
 private secretary, in keeping away from 
 that subject without raising suspicion, al- 
 though it came up in Parliament, and 
 in preventing the Government's proposal 
 from being made. But it was Mr. 
 Churchill's and the Government's favor- 
 ite idea that by supporting his initiative 
 in the matter of large ships we should 
 give proof of our good-will and consid- 
 erably strengthen and increase the ten- 
 dency on the part of the Government to 
 get in closer contact with us. But, as I 
 have said, it was possible in spite of our 
 fleet and without naval holidays to come 
 to an understanding. 
 
 In that spirit I had carried out my 
 mission from the beginning, and had 
 even succeeded in realizing my program 
 when the war broke out and destroyed 
 everything. 
 
 Trade jealousy, so much talked about 
 among us, rests on faulty judgment of 
 circumstances. It is a fact that Ger- 
 many's progress as a trading country 
 after the war of 1870 and during the 
 following decades threatened the inter- 
 ests of British trade circles, constituting 
 a form of monopoly with its industry 
 and export houses. But the growing in- 
 terchange of merchandise with Germany, 
 which was first on the list of all Euro- 
 pean exporting countries, a fact I al- 
 ways referred to in my public speeches, 
 had allowed the desire to mature to pre- 
 
XII. 
 
 THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 
 
 serve good relations with England's best 
 client and business friend, and had grad- 
 ually suppressed all other thoughts and 
 motives. The Englishman, as a matter 
 of fact, adapts himself to circumstances 
 and does not tilt against windmills. In 
 commercial circles I found the greatest 
 good-will and desire to further our com- 
 mon economic interests. 
 
 AMIABLY RECEIVED 
 
 In other circles I had a most amiable 
 reception, and enjoyed the cordial good- 
 will of the Court, society, and the Gov- 
 ernment. No one there interested him- 
 self in the Russian, Italian, Austrian, or 
 even the French representative, in spite 
 of the imposing personality and political 
 success of the last named. Only the Ger- 
 man and American Ambassadors at- 
 tracted public attention. 
 
 In order to get in touch with the most 
 important business circles I accepted in- 
 vitations from the United Chambers of 
 Commerce, the London and Bradford 
 Chambers, and those of the great cities 
 of Newcastle and Liverpool. I had a 
 hearty reception everywhere. Glasgow 
 and Edinburgh had also invited me, and I 
 promised them visits. People who did 
 not understand English conditions and 
 did not appreciate the value of public 
 dinners, and others who disliked my suc- 
 cess, reproached me with having done 
 harm by my speeches. I, on the con- 
 trary, believe that my public appearances 
 and my discussion of common economic 
 interests contributed considerably toward 
 the improvement of conditions, apart 
 from the fact that it would have been 
 impolitic and impolite to refuse invita- 
 tions. 
 
 In other circles I had a most amiable 
 reception and enjoyed the cordial good- 
 will of the Court, society, and the Gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 INFLUENCE OF THE CROWN 
 
 The King, very amiable and well mean- 
 ing and possessed of sound understand- 
 ing and common sense, was invariably 
 well disposed toward me and desired hon- 
 estly to facilitate my mission. In spite 
 of the small amount of power which the 
 British Constitution gives the Crown, the 
 
 King can, by virtue of his position, 
 greatly influence the tone both of so- 
 ciety and the Government. The Crown 
 is the apex of society from which the 
 tone emanates. Society, which is over- 
 whelmingly Unionist, is largely occupied 
 by ladies connected with politics. It is 
 represented in the Lords and the Com- 
 mons, consequently also in the Cabinet. 
 The Englishman either belongs to so- 
 ciety or ought to belong to it. His aim 
 is, and always will be, to be a dis- 
 tinguished man and a gentleman, and 
 even men of modest origin, such as" Mr. 
 Asquith, prefer to be in society, with its 
 elegant women. 
 
 POLITICS AND SOCIETY 
 
 British gentlemen of both parties en- 
 joy the same education, go to the same 
 colleges and university, and engage in 
 the same sports — golf, cricket, lawn 
 tennis, and polo. All have played cricket 
 and football in their youth, all have the 
 same habits, and all spend the week-end. 
 in the country. No social cleavage di- 
 vides the parties, only political cleavage. 
 To some extent of late years the poli- 
 ticians in the two camps have avoided 
 one another in society. Not even on the 
 ground of a neutral mission could the 
 two camps be amalgamated, for since 
 the Home Rule and Veto bills the Union- 
 ists have despised the Radicals. A few 
 months after my arrival the King and 
 Queen dined with me, and Lord London- 
 derry left the house after dinner in order 
 not to be together with Sir Edward Grey. 
 But there is no opposition from differ- 
 ence in caste and education as in France. 
 There are not two worlds, but the same 
 world, and their opinion of a foreigner 
 is common and not without influence on 
 his political standing, whether a Lans- 
 downe or an Asquith is at the helm. 
 
 The difference of caste no longer ex- 
 ists in England since the time of the 
 Stuarts and since the Whig oligarchy 
 (in contradistinction to the Tory county 
 families) allowed the bourgeoisie in the 
 towns to rise in society. There is greater 
 difference in political opinions on consti- 
 tutional or Church questions than on 
 financial or political questions. Aristo- 
 crats who have joined the popular party, 
 
LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 
 
 XIII. 
 
 Radicals such as Grey, Churchill, Har- 
 court, and Crewe, are most hated by the 
 Unionist aristocracy. None of these gen- 
 tlemen have I ever met in great aristo- 
 cratic houses, only in the houses of party 
 friends. 
 
 We were received in London with open 
 arms and both parties outdid one another 
 in amiability. 
 
 It would be a mistake to undervalue 
 social connections in view of the close 
 connection in England between society 
 and politics, even though the majority of 
 the upper ten thousand are in opposition 
 to the Government. Between an Asquith 
 and a Devonshire there is no such deep 
 cleft as between a Briand and a Due de 
 Doudeauville, for example. In times of 
 political tension they do not foregather. 
 They belong to two separate social 
 groups, but are part of the same society, 
 if on different levels, the centre of which 
 is the Court. They have friends and 
 habits in common, they are often related 
 or connected. A phenomenon like Lloyd 
 George, a man of the people, a small so- 
 licitor and a self-made man, is an ex- 
 ception. Even John Burns, a Socialist 
 Labor leader and a self-taught man, 
 seeks society relations. On the ground 
 of a general striving to be considered 
 gentlemen of social weight and position 
 such men must not be undervalued. 
 
 In no place, consequently, is an en- 
 voy's social circle of greater consequence 
 than in England. A hospitable house 
 with friendly guests is worth more than 
 the profoundest scientific knowledge, 
 and a learned man of insignificant ap- 
 pearance and too small means would, in 
 spite of all his learning, acquire no in- 
 fluence. The Briton hates a bore and a 
 pedant. He loves a good fellow. 
 
 SIR EDWARD GREY'S SOCIALISM 
 
 Sir Edward Grey's influence in all 
 questions of foreign policy was almost 
 unlimited. True, he used to say on im- 
 portant occasions: " I must lay that be- 
 fore the Cabinet"; but it is equally true 
 that the latter invariably took his view. 
 Although he did not know foreign coun- 
 tries and, with the exception of one short 
 visit to Paris, had never left England, 
 he was closely informed on all important 
 
 questions, owing to many years' Parlia- 
 mentary experience and natural grasp. 
 He understood French without speaking 
 it. Elected at an early age to Parlia- 
 ment, he began immediately to occupy 
 himself with foreign affairs. Parlia- 
 mentary Under Secretary of State at the 
 Foreign Office under Lord Rosebery, he 
 became in 1906 Secretary of State under 
 Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and 
 filled the post for ten years. 
 
 Sprung from an old North of England 
 family of landowners, from whom the 
 statesman, Earl Grey, is also descended, 
 he joined the left wing of his party and 
 sympathized with the Socialists and 
 pacifists. He can be called a Socialist 
 in the ideal sense, for he applied his 
 theories even in private life, which is 
 characterized by great simplicity and 
 unpretentiousness, although he is pos- 
 sessed of considerable means. All dis- 
 play is foreign to him. He had a small 
 residence in London and never gave din- 
 ners, except officially, at the Foreign 
 Office on the King's birthday. 
 
 SIMPLE MODE OF LIFE 
 
 If, exceptionally, he asked a few 
 guests to his house, it was to a simple 
 dinner or luncheon in a small circle with 
 parlor maids for service. The week-ends 
 he spent regularly in the country, like 
 his colleagues, but not at large country 
 house parties. He lives mostly in his 
 cottage in the New Forest, taking long 
 walks, and is passionately fond of nature 
 and ornithology. Or he journeyed to 
 his property in the north and tamed 
 squirrels. In his youth he was a noted 
 cricket and tennis player. His chief 
 sport is now salmon and trout fishing in 
 the Scotch lakes with Lord Glenconner, 
 Mr. Asquith's brother-in-law. Once, 
 when spending his week-ends with Lord 
 Glenconner, he came thirty miles on a 
 bicycle and returned in the same way. 
 His simple, upright manner insured him 
 the esteem even of his opponents, who 
 were more easily to be found in home 
 than in foreign political circles. 
 
 Lies and intrigue were foreign to his 
 nature. His wife, whom he loved and 
 from whom he was never separated, died 
 as the result of an accident to the car- 
 
XIV. 
 
 THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 
 
 riage driven by him. As is known, one 
 brother was killed by a lion. 
 
 Wordsworth was his favorite poet, and 
 he could quote him by the hour. His 
 British calm did not lack a sense of 
 humor. When breakfasting with us and 
 the children and he heard their German 
 conversation, he would say, " I cannot 
 help admiring the way they talk Ger- 
 man," and laughed at his joke. This is 
 the man who was called " the Liar 
 Grey " and the " originator of the world 
 war." 
 
 ASQUITH AND HIS FAMILY 
 
 Asquith is a man of quite different 
 mold. A jovial, sociable fellow, a friend 
 of the ladies, especially young and beau- 
 tiful ones, he loves cheery surroundings 
 and a good cook, and is supported by a 
 cheery young wife. He was formerly a 
 well-known lawyer, with a large income 
 and many years' Parliamentary experi- 
 ence. Later he was known as a Minister 
 under Gladstone, a pacifist like his friend 
 Grey, and friendly to an understanding 
 with Germany. He treated all questions 
 with an experienced business man's calm 
 and certainty, and enjoyed good health 
 and excellent nerves, steeled by assidu- 
 ous golf. 
 
 His daughters went to a German 
 boarding school and speak fluent German. 
 We quickly became good friends with 
 him and his family, and were guests at 
 his little house on the Thames. 
 
 He only rarely occupied himself with 
 foreign affairs. When important ques- 
 tions cropped up, with him lay the ulti- 
 mate decision. During the critical days 
 of July Asquith often came to warn us, 
 and he was ultimately in despair over 
 the tragic turn of events. On Aug. 2, 
 when I saw Asquith in order to make a 
 final attempt, he was completely broken, 
 and, although quite calm, tears ran down 
 his face. 
 
 NICOLSON AND TYRRELL 
 
 Sir Arthur Nicolson and Sir William 
 Tyrrell had the greatest influence in the 
 Foreign Office. The former was not our 
 friend, but his attitude toward me was 
 consistently correct and obliging. Our 
 personal relations were of the best. 
 Neither did he wish for war, but when 
 
 we [moved?] against France he un- 
 doubtedly worked for immediate inter- 
 vention. He was the confidant of my 
 French colleague, and was in constant 
 touch with him, and was destined to suc- 
 ceed Lord Bertie in Paris. As is known, 
 Sir Arthur was formerly Ambassador in 
 St. Petersburg, and had concluded the 
 treaty of 1907 which enabled Russia to 
 turn again to the West and the Near 
 East. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey's private secretary, 
 Sir William Tyrrell, had far greater in- 
 fluence than the Permanent Under Sec- 
 retary of State. This unusually intelli- 
 gent man had been at a school in Ger- 
 many, and had then entered the Diplo- 
 matic Service, but he was abroad only a 
 short time. At first he belonged to the 
 modern anti-German school of young 
 English diplomats, but later he became 
 a determined supporter of an understand- 
 ing. To this aim and object he even in- 
 fluenced Sir Edward Grey, with whom 
 he was very intimate. After the out- 
 break of war he left the department, and 
 went to the Home Office, probably in 
 consequence of criticism of him for his 
 Germanophile leanings. 
 
 CABALS AGAINST LICHNOWSKY 
 
 The rage of certain gentlemen over my 
 success in London and the position I had 
 achieved was indescribable. Schemes 
 were set on foot to impede my carrying 
 out my duties, I was left in complete 
 ignorance of most important things, and 
 had to confine myself to sending in un- 
 important and dull reports. Secret re- 
 ports from agents about things of which 
 I could know nothing without spies and 
 necessary funds were never available for 
 me, and it was only in the last days of 
 July, 1914, that I heard accidentally from 
 the Naval Attache of the secret Anglo- 
 French agreement for joint action of the 
 two fleets in case of war. Soon after my 
 arrival I became convinced that in no 
 circumstances need we fear a British 
 attack or British support of a foreign 
 attack, but that under all conditions Eng- 
 land would protect France. I advanced 
 this opinion in repeated reports with de- 
 tailed reasoning and insistence, but with- 
 out gaining credence, although Lord Hal- 
 
LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 
 
 xv. 
 
 dane's refusing of the formula of neutral- 
 ity and England's attitude during the 
 Morocco crisis were clear indications. In 
 addition, the above-mentioned secret 
 agreements were known to the depart- 
 ment. I repeatedly urged that England, 
 as a commercial State, would suffer 
 greatly in any war between the European 
 great powers, and would therefore pre- 
 vent such a war by all available means; 
 but, on the other hand, in the interest of 
 the European balance of power, and to 
 prevent Germany's overlordship, would 
 never tolerate the weakening or destruc- 
 tion of France. Lord Haldane told me 
 this shortly after my arrival. All in- 
 fluential people spoke in the same way. 
 
 THE ARCHDUKE'S DEATH 
 
 At the end of June I went to Kiel by 
 the royal orders a few weeks after I had 
 received the honorary degree of Doctor 
 at Oxford, an honor no German Ambas- 
 sador since Herr von Bunsen had re- 
 ceived. On board the Meteor we re- 
 ceived the news of the death of the Arch- 
 duke, the heir to the throne. His Majes- 
 ty complained that his attempts to win 
 the noble Archduke over to his ideas 
 were thereby rendered fruitless. How 
 far plans for an active policy against 
 Serbia had already been made at Kono- 
 pischt I am not in a position to judge. 
 As I was not informed about intentions 
 and events in Vienna I attached no fur- 
 ther importance to the matter. I could 
 only observe that the feeling of relief 
 outweighed the other feelings of the Aus- 
 trian aristocrats. One of the guests on 
 board the Meteor was the Austrian Count 
 Felix Thun. In spite of glorious weather 
 seasickness had kept him to his cabin. 
 After receiving the news he became well. 
 Shock or joy had cured him. 
 
 On reaching Berlin I visited the Chan- 
 cellor, and said I considered the situa- 
 tion of our foreign policy very satisfac- 
 tory, as we were on better terms with 
 England than we had been for a long 
 time. In France a pacifist Government 
 was at the helm. Herr von Bethmann 
 Hollweg did not seem to share my opti- 
 mism, and complained of the Russian 
 armaments. I tried to calm him, and 
 pointed out especially that Russia had 
 
 absolutely no interest in attacking us, 
 and that such an attack would not re- 
 ceive Anglo-French support, as both 
 countries, England and France, desired 
 peace. Then I called on Dr. Zimmer- 
 mann, who represented von Jagow, and 
 learned from him that Russia was about 
 to mobilize 900,000 new troops. From 
 his manner of speaking he was evidently 
 annoyed with Russia, who was every- 
 where in our way. There was also the 
 question of the difficulties of commercial 
 politics. Of course, I was not told that 
 General von Moltke was working eagerly 
 for war. But I learned that Herr von 
 Tschirschky had received a rebuff for 
 having reported that he had advised 
 moderation in Vienna toward Serbia. 
 
 AUSTRIA'S WAR PLOT 
 
 On my return journey from Silesia I 
 only remained a few hours in Berlin, but 
 I heard there that Austria intended to 
 take steps against Serbia to put an end 
 to this intolerable situation. Unfor- 
 tunately I undervalued the importance 
 of the information. I thought nothing 
 would come of it, and that it would be 
 easy to settle the matter if Russia threat- 
 ened. I now regret that I did not stop 
 in Berlin, and at once declare that I could 
 not agree to such a policy. 
 
 I have since learned that the inquiries 
 and appeals from Vienna won uncon- 
 ditional assent from all the influential 
 men at a decisive consultation at Pots- 
 dam on July 5, with the comment that it 
 would not matter if war with Russia re- 
 sulted. This is what was stated, any- 
 how, in the Austrian protocol which 
 Count Mensdorff received in London. 
 Shortly afterward Herr von Jagow ar- 
 rived in Vienna to discuss the whole 
 question with Count Berchtold. 
 
 Subsequently, I received instructions 
 to work to obtain a friendly attitude on 
 the part of the English press, if Austria 
 dealt Serbia a deathblow, and by my in- 
 fluence to prevent so far as possible 
 public opinion from becoming opposed to 
 Austria. Remembering England's atti- 
 tude during the annexation crisis, when 
 public opinion sympathized with Serbian 
 rights to Bosnia, and her kindly favoring 
 of national movements in the time of 
 
XVI. 
 
 THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 
 
 Lord Byron and that of Garibaldi, one 
 thing and another indicated so strongly 
 the improbability of British support of 
 the proposed punitive expedition against 
 the Archduke's murderers, that I felt 
 bound to issue a serious warning. I also 
 sent a warning against the whole project, 
 which I characterized as adventurous and 
 dangerous, and advised moderation being 
 urged on the Austrians, as I did not 
 believe in the localization of the conflict. 
 
 JAGOW'S MISTAKEN BLUFF 
 
 Herr von Jagow answered that Russia 
 was not ready, that there would be some 
 fuss, but that the more firmly we held 
 to Austria the sooner would Russia give 
 way. Austria, he said, had already ac- 
 cused us of flabbiness, (flaumacherei,) 
 and so we must not get into a mess. 
 Opinion in Russia, he added, was becom- 
 ing more and more pro-German, so we 
 must just take the risks. In view of this 
 attitude, which, as I subsequently found 
 out, was the result of Count Pourtales's 
 reports that Russia would in no circum- 
 stances move, and caused us to urge 
 Count Berchtold to the greatest possible 
 energy, I hoped for salvation in English 
 intervention, as I knew Sir Edward 
 Grey's influence with St. Petersburg in 
 the direction of peace could prevail. I 
 availed myself, therefore, of my good 
 relations with the British Foreign Min- 
 ister to beg him confidentially to advise 
 moderation on the part of Russia in case 
 Austria, as appeared probable, should de- 
 mand satisfaction from the Serbians. 
 
 In the beginning the attitude of the 
 English press toward the Austrians was 
 quiet and friendly, as the murder was 
 condemned. Little by little, however, 
 voices increased in number insisting 
 that, however necessary the punishment 
 of a crime might be, no elaboration of 
 it for a political purpose could be justi- 
 fied. Austria was urgently called upon 
 to act with moderation. The whole world 
 outside Berlin and Vienna understood 
 that it meant war, and world war. The 
 British fleet, which happened to be as- 
 sembled for review, was not demobilized. 
 
 The Serbian answer corresponded with 
 British efforts, for actually M. Pashitch 
 had accepted all but two points, about 
 
 which he was prepared to negotiate. Had 
 England and Russia wanted war in order 
 to fall upon us, a hint to Belgrade would 
 have been given, and the unspeakable 
 note would have remained unanswered. 
 Sir Edward Grey went through the Ser- 
 bian answer with me, and pointed out the 
 conciliatory attitude of the Belgrade Gov- 
 ernment. We even discussed his proposal 
 for intervention, which should insure an 
 interpretation of these two points ac- 
 ceptable to both parties. With Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey presiding, M. Cambon, the 
 Marquis Imperiali, and I were to meet, 
 and it would have been easy to find an 
 acceptable form for the points under dis- 
 cussion, which were mainly concerned 
 with the part to be taken by Austrian of- 
 ficials in the inquiries at Belgrade. With 
 good- will all could have been cleared up in 
 two or three sittings, and a simple 
 acknowledgment of the British proposal 
 would have brought about a detente and 
 further improved our relations with Eng- 
 land. I therefore urged it forcibly, as 
 otherwise a world war stood at our 
 gates. 
 
 In vain. It would be, I was told, wound- 
 ing to Austria's dignity, nor would we 
 mix ourselves up in that Serbian matter. 
 We left it to our allies. I was to work 
 for the localization of the conflict. It 
 naturally only needed a hint from Berlin 
 to induce Count Berchtold to content him- 
 self with a diplomatic success and put 
 up with the Serbian reply. But this hint 
 was not given. On the contrary, we 
 pressed for war. What a fine success it 
 would have been! 
 
 INTOLERABLE CONDITIONS 
 
 After our refusal Sir Edward asked us 
 to come forward with a proposal of our 
 own. We insisted upon war. I could get 
 no other answer [from Berlin] than that 
 it was an enormous " concession " on the 
 part of Austria to contemplate no an- 
 nexation of territory. - 
 
 Thereupon Sir Edward justly pointed 
 out that even without annexations of ter- 
 ritory a country can be humiliated and 
 subjected, and that Russia would regard 
 this as a humiliation which she would not 
 stand. 
 
 The impression became ever stronger 
 
LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 
 
 XVII. 
 
 that we desired war in all circumstances. 
 Otherwise our attitude in a question 
 which, after all, did not directly concern 
 us was unintelligible. The urgent ap- 
 peals and definite declarations of M. 
 Sazonoff, [Russian Foreign Minister,] 
 later on the positively humble telegrams 
 of the Czar, the repeated proposals of 
 Sir Edward, the warnings of San Giuli- 
 ano [Italian Foreign Minister] and of 
 Bollati, [Italian Ambassador in Berlin,] 
 my urgent advice — all were of no use, 
 for Berlin went on insisting that Serbia 
 must be massacred. 
 
 The more I pressed, the less willing 
 they were to alter their course, if only 
 because I was not to have the success 
 of saving peace in the company of Sir 
 Edward Grey. 
 
 So Grey on July 29 resolved upon his 
 well-known warning. I replied that I had 
 always reported that we should have to 
 reckon upon English hostility if it came 
 to war with France. The Minister said to 
 me repeatedly: " If war breaks out it 
 will be the greatest catastrophe the 
 world has ever seen." 
 
 GREY STILL SOUGHT PEACE 
 
 After that events moved rapidly. When 
 Count Berchtold, who hitherto had play- 
 ed the strong man on instructions from 
 Berlin, at last decided to change his 
 course, we answered the Russian mobil- 
 ization — after Russia had for a whole 
 week negotiated and waited in vain — 
 with our ultimatum and declaration of 
 war. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey still looked for new 
 ways of escape. In the morning of Aug. 
 1, Sir W. Tyrrell came to me to say that 
 his chief still hoped to find a way out. 
 Should we remain neutral if France did 
 the same? I understood him to mean 
 that we should then be ready to spare 
 France, but his meaning was that we 
 should remain absolutely neutral— neu- 
 tral therefore even toward Russia. That 
 was the well-known misunderstanding. 
 Sir Edward had given me an appoint- 
 ment for the afternoon, but as he was 
 then at a meeting of the Cabinet, he 
 called me up on the telephone, after Sir 
 W. Tyrrell had hurried straight to him. 
 But in the afternoon he spoke no longer 
 
 of anything but Belgian neutrality, and 
 of the possibility that we and France 
 should face one another armed, without 
 attacking one another. 
 
 Thus there was no proposal whatever, 
 but a question without any obligation, 
 because our conversation, as I have al- 
 ready explained, was to take place soon 
 afterward. In Berlin, however — without 
 waiting for the conversation — this news 
 was used as the foundation for a far- 
 reaching act. Then came Poincare's let- 
 ter, Bonar Law's letter, and the telegram 
 from the King of the Belgians. The hes- 
 itating members of the Cabinet were con- 
 verted, with the exception of three mem- 
 bers, who resigned. 
 
 PEACE HOPES DESTROYED 
 
 Up to the last moment I had hoped 
 for a waiting attitude on the part of 
 England. My French colleague also felt 
 himself by no means secure, as I learned 
 from a private source. As late as Aug. 
 1 the King replied evasively to the 
 French President. But in the telegram 
 from Berlin, which announced the threat- 
 ening danger of war, England was al- 
 ready mentioned as an opponent. In 
 Berlin, therefore, one already reckoned 
 upon war with England. 
 
 Before my departure Sir Edward Grey 
 received me on Aug. 5 at his house. I 
 had gone there at his desire. He was 
 deeply moved. He said to me that he 
 would always be ready to mediate, and, 
 " We don't want to crush Germany." 
 Unfortunately, this confidential conver- 
 sation was published. Thereby Herr von 
 Bethmann Hollweg destroyed the last 
 possibility of reaching peace via England. 
 
 Our departure was thoroughly digni- 
 fied and calm. Before we left, the King 
 had sent his equerry, Sir E. Ponsonby, 
 to me, to express his regret at my de- 
 parture and that he could not see me 
 personally. Princess Louise wrote to me 
 that the whole family lamented our go- 
 ing. Mrs. Asquith and other friends 
 came to the embassy to say good-bye. 
 
 A special train took us to Harwich, 
 where a guard of honor was drawn up 
 for me. I was treated like a departing 
 sovereign. Thus ended my London mis- 
 sion. It was wrecked, not by the perfidy 
 
XVIII. 
 
 THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 
 
 of the British, but by the perfidy of our 
 policy. 
 
 At the railway station in London 
 Count Mensdorff [Austrian Ambassa- 
 dor] appeared with his staff. He was 
 cheerful, and gave me to understand 
 that perhaps he would remain in London. 
 But to the English he said that it was 
 not Austria, but we, who had wanted 
 the war. 
 
 A BITTER RETROSPECT 
 
 When now, after two years, I realize 
 everything in retrospect, I say to myself 
 that I realized too late that there was no 
 place for me in a system which for years 
 has lived only on tradition and routine, 
 and which tolerates only representatives 
 who report what one wants to read. Ab- 
 sence of prejudice and an independent 
 judgment are combated, want of ability 
 and of character are extolled and es- 
 teemed, but successes arouse hostility and 
 uneasiness. 
 
 I had abandoned opposition to, our mad 
 Triple Alliance policy, because I saw 
 that it was useless and that my warnings 
 were represented as Austrophobia and an 
 idee fixe. In a policy which is not mere 
 gymnastics, or playing with documents, 
 but the conduct of the business of the 
 firm, there is no such thing as likes and 
 dislikes ; there is nothing but the interest 
 of the community; but a policy which is 
 based merely upon Austrians, Magyars, 
 and Turks must end in hostility to Rus- 
 sia, and ultimately lead to a catastrophe. 
 
 In spite of former aberrations, every- 
 thing was still possible in July, 1914. 
 Agreement with England had been 
 reached. We should have had to send 
 to Petersburg a representative who, at 
 any rate, reached the average standard 
 of political ability, and we should have 
 had to give Russia the certainty that 
 we desired neither to dominate the 
 Straits nor to throttle the Serbs. M. Sa- 
 zonoff was saying to us: " Lachez l'Au- 
 triche et nous lacherons les Francais," 
 and M. Cambon [French Ambassador in 
 Berlin] said to Herr von Jagow: " Vous 
 n'avez [pas] besoin de suivre l'Autriche 
 partout." 
 
 We needed neither alliances nor wars, 
 but merely treaties which would protect 
 
 us and others, and which would guarantee 
 us an economic development for which 
 there had been no precedent in history. 
 And if Russia had been relieved of trouble 
 in the west, she would have been able to 
 turn again to the east, and then the 
 Anglo-Russian antagonism would have 
 arisen automatically without our inter- 
 ference — and the Russo-Japanese antag- 
 onism no less than the Anglo-Russian. 
 
 We could also have approached the 
 question of limitation of armaments, 
 and should have had no further need to 
 bother about the confusions of Austria. 
 Austria-Hungary would then become the 
 vassal of the German Empire — without 
 an alliance, and, above all, without senti- 
 mental services on our part, leading ulti- 
 mately to war for the liberation of Poland 
 and the destruction of Serbia, although 
 German interests demanded exactly the 
 contrary. 
 
 I had to support in London a policy 
 which I knew to be fallacious. I was 
 punished for it, for it was a sin against 
 the Holy Ghost. 
 
 ARRIVAL AT BERLIN 
 
 On my arrival in Berlin I saw at once 
 that I was to be made the scapegoat for 
 the catastrophe of which our Government 
 had made itself guilty in opposition to 
 my advice and my warnings. 
 
 The report was persistently circulated 
 by official quarters that I had let myself 
 be deceived by Sir Edward Grey, because 
 if he had not wanted war Russia would 
 not have mobilized. Count Pourtales, 
 whose reports could be relied upon, was 
 to be spared, if only because of his 
 family connections. He was said to have 
 behaved " splendidly," and he was en- 
 thusiastically praised, while I was all the 
 more sharply blamed. 
 
 " What has Russia got to do with Ser- 
 bia? " this statesman said to me after 
 eight years of official activity in Peters- 
 burg. It was made out that the whole 
 business was a perfidious British^ trick 
 which I had not understood. In the For- 
 eign Office I was told that in 1916 it 
 would in any case have cjome to war. But 
 then Russia would have been " ready," 
 and so it was better now. 
 
 As appears from all official publica- 
 
LICHNOW SKY'S MEMORANDUM 
 
 XIX. 
 
 tions, without the facts being contro- 
 verted by our own White Book, which, 
 owing to its poverty and gaps, constitutes 
 a grave self-accusation: 
 
 1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to 
 attack Serbia, although no German inter- 
 est was involved, and the danger of a 
 world war must have been known to us 
 — whether we knew the text of the ulti- 
 matum is a question of complete indif- 
 ference. 
 
 2. In the days between July 23 and 
 July 30, 1914, when M. Sazonoff em- 
 phatically declared that Russia could not 
 tolerate an attack upon Serbia, we re- 
 jected the British proposals of mediation, 
 although Serbia, under Russian and Brit- 
 ish pressure, had accepted almost the 
 whole ultimatum, and although an agree- 
 ment about the two points in question 
 could easily have been reached, and 
 Count Berchtold was even ready to sat- 
 isfy himself with the Serbian reply. 
 
 3. On July 30, when Count Berchtold 
 wanted to give way, we, without Austria 
 having been attacked, replied to Russia's 
 mere mobilization by sending an ulti- 
 matum to Petersburg, and on July 31 we 
 declared war on the Russians, although 
 the Czar had pledged his word that as 
 long as negotiations continued not a man 
 should march — so that we deliberately 
 destroyed the possibility of a peaceful 
 settlement. 
 
 In view- of these indisputable facts, it 
 is not surprising that the whole civilized 
 world outside Germany attributes to us 
 the sole guilt for the world war. 
 
 GERMANY'S WAR SPIRIT 
 
 Is it not intelligible that our enemies 
 declare that they will not rest until a 
 system is destroyed which constitutes a 
 permanent threatening of our neighbors ? 
 Must they not otherwise fear that in a 
 few years they will again have to take 
 up arms, and again see their provinces 
 overrun and their towns and villages de- 
 stroyed? Were these people not right 
 who prophesied that the spirit of 
 Treitschke and Bernhardi dominated the 
 German people — the spirit which glorifies 
 war as an aim in itself and does not 
 abhor it as an evil; that among us it 
 is still the feudal knights and Junkers 
 
 and the caste of warriors who rule and 
 who fix our ideals and our values — not 
 the civilian gentleman; that the love of 
 dueling, which inspires our youth at the 
 universities, lives on in those who guide 
 the fortunes of the people? Had not 
 the events at Zabern and the Parlia- 
 mentary debates on that case shown for- 
 eign countries how civil rights and free- 
 doms are valued among us, when ques- 
 tions of military power are on the other 
 side? 
 
 Cramb, a historian who has since died, 
 an admirer of Germany, put the German 
 point of view into the words of 
 Euphorion : 
 
 Traumt Ihr den Friedenstag? 
 Traume, wer traumen mag ! 
 Krieg ist das Losungswort! 
 Sieg, und so klingt es fort. 
 
 Militarism, really a school for the na- 
 tion and an instrument of policy, makes 
 policy into the instrument of military 
 power, if the patriarchal absolutism of a 
 soldier-kingdom renders possible an at- 
 titude which would not be permitted by 
 a democracy which had disengaged itself 
 from military- junker influences. 
 
 That is what our enemies think, and 
 that is what they are bound to think, 
 when they see that, in spite of capitalis- 
 tic industrialization, and in spite of so- 
 cialistic organization, the living, as Fried- 
 rich Nietzsche says, are still governed 
 by the dead. The principal war aim of 
 our enemies, the democratization of Ger- 
 many, will be achieved. 
 
 JEOPARDIZING THE FUTURE 
 
 Today, after two years of the war, 
 there can be no further doubt that we 
 cannot hope for an unconditional victory 
 over Russians, English, French, Italians, 
 Rumanians, and Americans, and that we 
 cannot reckon upon the overthrow of our 
 enemies. But we can reach a compro- 
 mised peace only upon the basis of the 
 evacuation of the occupied territories, the 
 possession of which in any case signifies 
 for us a burden and weakness and the 
 peril of new wars. Consequently, every- 
 thing should be avoided which hinders a 
 change of course on the part of those 
 enemy groups which might perhaps still 
 be won over to the idea of compromise — 
 the British Radicals and the Russian 
 
XX. 
 
 THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 
 
 Reactionaries. Even from this point of 
 view our Polish project is just as objec- 
 tionable as any interference with Belgian 
 rights, or the execution of British citi- 
 zens — to say nothing of the mad sub- 
 marine war scheme. 
 
 Our future lies upon the water. True, 
 but it therefore does not lie in Poland 
 and Belgium, in France and Serbia. That 
 is a reversion to the Holy Roman Em- 
 pire, to the aberrations of the Hohen- 
 staufens and Hapsburgs. It is the policy 
 of the Plantagenets, not the policy of 
 Drake and Raleigh, Nelson and Rhodes. 
 
 RUINOUS RESULTS 
 
 Triple Alliance policy is a relapse into 
 the past, a revolt from the future, from 
 imperialism, from world policy. Central 
 Europe is mediaevalism ; Berlin-Bagdad 
 is a cul de sac, and not a road into the 
 open, to unlimited possibilities, and to the 
 world mission of the German people. 
 
 I am no enemy of Austria, or Hungary, 
 or Italy, or Serbia, or any other State; I 
 am only an enemy of the Triple Alliance 
 policy, which was bound to divert us from 
 our aims, and to bring us on to the slop- 
 ing plane of Continental policy. It was 
 not German policy, but Austrian dynas- 
 tic policy. The Austrians had accus- 
 tomed themselves to regard the alliance 
 as a shield, under whose protection they 
 could make excursions at pleasure into 
 the East. 
 
 And what result have we to expect 
 
 from the struggle of peoples? The 
 United States of Africa will be British, 
 like the United States of America, of 
 Australia, and of Oceania, and the Latin 
 States of Europe, as I said years ago, 
 will fall into the same relationship to 
 the United Kingdom as the Latin sisters 
 of America to the United States. They 
 will be dominated by the Anglo-Saxon; 
 France, exhausted by the war, will link 
 herself still more closely to Great Brit- 
 ain. In the long run, Spain also will not 
 resist. 
 
 In Asia, the Russian and Japanese will 
 expand their borders and their customs, 
 and the south will remain to the British. 
 
 The world will belong to the Anglo- 
 Saxon, the Russian, and the Japanese, 
 and the German will remain alone with 
 Austria and Hungary. His sphere of 
 power will be that of thought and of 
 trade, not that of the bureaucrats and 
 the soldiers. The German appeared too 
 late, and the world war has destroyed 
 the last possibility of catching up the 
 lost ground, of founding a colonial em- 
 pire. 
 
 For we shall not supplant the sons of 
 Japheth; the program of the great 
 Rhodes, who saw the salvation of man- 
 kind in British expansion and British 
 imperialism, will be realized. 
 Tu reg-ere imperio populos Romano, memento. 
 Hae tibi erunt artes : pacisque imponere 
 
 morem, 
 Parcere subjectis et debellare s\iperbos. 
 
 Krupp Director Confirms Prince 
 Lichnowsky's Indictment 
 
 COINCIDENT with the publication in 
 Germany of the famous memoran- 
 dum of Prince Lichnowsky squarely 
 putting the blame for the outbreak of the 
 world war upon the Kaiser and the Ger- 
 man militarists, there also appeared in 
 circular form in Germany a letter writ- 
 ten by a certain Dr. Muhlon, a former 
 member of the Krupp Directorate now 
 living in Switzerland, corroborating the 
 charges made by the Prince. The Muhlon 
 letter was briefly referred to in an offi- 
 cial dispatch from Switzerland received 
 
 in Washington on March 29 as having 
 produced an animated discussion 
 throughout the empire. 
 
 A copy of the Leipziger Volkszeitung 
 of March 20 tells how, in a discussion of 
 the Lichnowsky and Muhlon memoranda 
 before the Main Committee of the Reichs- 
 tag on March 16, Vice Chancellor von 
 Payer tried to minimize the value of Dr. 
 Miihlon's statements by asserting that 
 the former Krupp Director was a sick, 
 nervous man. who no doubt did not intend 
 to injure his country's cause, but who 
 
LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 
 
 XXI. 
 
 was hardly responsible for his actions be- 
 cause of his many nervous breakdowns. 
 Later, the Berliner Tageblatt printed the 
 text of Dr. Miihlon's letter, which was 
 evidently written before the resignation 
 of Dr. Karl Helfferich as Vice Chancel- 
 lor last November. As translated by The 
 London Times, Dr. Miihlon's memoran- 
 dum reads: 
 
 TALK WITH HELFFERICH 
 
 "In the middle of July, 1914, I had, 
 as I frequently had, a conversation with 
 Dr. Helfferich, then Director of the 
 Deutsche Bank in Berlin, and now Vice 
 Chancellor. The Deutsche Bank had 
 adopted a negative attitude toward cer- 
 tain large transactions in Bulgaria and 
 Turkey, in which the firm of Krupp, for 
 business reasons — delivery of war mate- 
 rial — had a lively interest. As one of 
 the reasons to justify the attitude of 
 the Deutsche Bank, Dr. Helfferich 
 finally gave me the following reason: 
 
 " The political situation has become very 
 menacing. The Deutsche Bank must in 
 any case wait before entering into any 
 further engagements abroad, The Aus- 
 trians have just been with the Kaiser. 
 In a week's time Vienna will send a very 
 severe ultimatum to Serbia, with a very 
 short interval for the answer. The ulti- 
 matum will contain demands such as 
 punishment of a number of officers, dis- 
 solution of political associations, criminal 
 investigation in Serbia by Austrian offi- 
 cials, and, in fact, a whole series of 
 definite satisfactions will be demanded at 
 once ; otherwise Austria-Hungary will 
 declare war on Serbia. 
 
 " Dr. Helfferich added that the Kaiser 
 had expressed his decided approval of 
 this procedure on the part of Austria- 
 Hungary. He had said that he regarded 
 a conflict with Serbia as an internal af- 
 fair between these two countries, in 
 which he would permit no other State to 
 interfere. If Russia mobilized, he would 
 mobilize also. But in his case mobiliza- 
 tion meant immediate war. This time 
 there would be no oscillation. Helfferich 
 said that the Austrians were extremely 
 well satisfied at this determined attitude 
 on the part of the Kaiser. 
 
 " When I thereupon said to Dr. Helf- 
 ferich that this uncanny communication 
 converted my fears of a world war, 
 which were already strong, into abso- 
 
 lute certainty, he replied that it cer- 
 tainly looked like that. But perhaps 
 France and Russia would reconsider the 
 matter. In any case, the Serbs deserved 
 a lesson which they would remember. 
 This was the first intimation that I had 
 received about the Kaiser's discussions 
 with our allies. I knew Dr. Helfferich's 
 particularly intimate relations with 
 the personages who were sure to be ini- 
 tiated, and I knew that his communica- 
 tion was trustworthy. 
 
 KAISER FOR WAR 
 
 " After my return from Berlin I in- 
 formed Herr Krupp von Bohlen and Hal- 
 bach, one of whose Directors I then was 
 at Essen. Dr. Helfferich had given me 
 permission and at that time the intention 
 was to make him a Director of Krupps. 
 Herr von Bohlen seemed disturbed that 
 Dr. Helfferich was in possession of such 
 information, and he made a remark to 
 the effect that the Government people 
 can never keep their mouths shut. He 
 then told me the following. He said 
 that he had himself been with the Kaiser 
 in the last few days. The Kaiser had 
 spoken to him also of his conversation 
 with the Austrians, and of its result; 
 but he had described the matter as so se- 
 cret that he [Krupp] would not even 
 have dared to inform his own Directors. 
 As, however, I already knew, he could 
 tell me that Helfferich's statements were 
 accurate. Indeed, Helfferich seemed to 
 know more details than he did. He said 
 that the situation was really very seri- 
 ous. The Kaiser had told him that he 
 would declare war immediately if Rus- 
 sia mobilized, and that this time people 
 would see that he did not turn about. 
 The Kaiser's repeated insistence that 
 this time nobody would be able to accuse 
 him of indecision had, he said, been al- 
 most comic in its effect. 
 
 GERMAN DUPLICITY 
 
 " On the very day indicated to me by 
 Helfferich the Austrian ultimatum to 
 Serbia appeared. At this time I was 
 again in Berlin, and I told Helfferich 
 that I regarded the tone and contents 
 of the ultimatum as simply monstrous. 
 Dr. Helfferich, however, said that the 
 
XXII. 
 
 THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 
 
 note only had that ring in the German 
 translation. He had seen the ultimatum 
 in French, and in French it really could 
 not be regarded as overdone. On this 
 occasion Helfferich also said to me that 
 the Kaiser had gone on his northern 
 cruise only as a ' blind '; he had not ar- 
 ranged the cruise on the usual extensive 
 scale, but was remaining close at hand 
 and keeping in constant touch. Now one 
 must simply wait and see what would 
 happen. The Austrians, who, of course, 
 did not expect the ultimatum to be ac- 
 cepted, were really acting rapidly before 
 the other powers could find time to 
 interfere. The Deutsche Bank had 
 already made its arrangements, so as to 
 be prepared for all eventualities. For 
 example, it was no longer paying out the 
 gold which came in. That could easily be 
 done without attracting notice, and the 
 amount day by day reached considerable 
 sums. 
 
 " Immediately after the Vienna ulti- 
 matum to Serbia the German Govern- 
 ment issued declarations to the effect 
 that Austria-Hungary had acted all alone, 
 without Germany's previous knowledge. 
 When one attempted to reconcile these 
 declarations with the events mentioned 
 above, the only possible explanation was 
 that the Kaiser had tied himself down 
 without inviting the co-operation of his 
 Government, and that, in the conversa- 
 tions with the Austrians, the Germans 
 took care not to agree upon the text of 
 the ultimatum. For I have already shown 
 that the contents of the ultimatum were 
 pretty accurately known in Germany. 
 
 " Herr Krupp von Bohlen, with whom 
 I spoke about these German declarations 
 — which, at any rate in their effect, were 
 lies — was also by no means edified. For, 
 as he said, Germany ought not, in such a 
 tremendous affair, to have given a blank 
 check to a State like Austria; and it was 
 the duty of the leading statesmen to de- 
 mand, both of the Kaiser and of our al- 
 lies, that the Austrian claims and the ul- 
 timatum to Serbia should be discussed in 
 minute detail and definitely decided upon, 
 and also that we should decide upon the 
 precise program of our further proceed- 
 ings. He said that, whatever point of 
 view one took, we ought not to give our- 
 
 selves into the hands of the Austrians 
 and expose ourselves to eventualities 
 which had not been reckoned out in ad- 
 vance. One ought to have connected ap- 
 propriate conditions with our obligations. 
 In short, Herr von Bohlen regarded the 
 German denial of previous knowledge, if 
 there was any trace of truth in it, as an 
 offense against the elementary princi- 
 ples of diplomacy; and he told me that 
 he intended to speak in this sense to 
 Herr von Jagow, then Foreign Secretary, 
 who was a special friend of his. 
 
 GERMAN GOVERNMENT BLAMED 
 
 " As a result of this conversation Herr 
 von Bohlen told me that Herr von Jagow 
 stuck firmly to his assertion that he had 
 had nothing to do with the text of the 
 Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, and that 
 Germany had never made any such de- 
 mands. In reply to the objection that this 
 was inconceivable, Herr von Jagow re- 
 plied that he, as a diplomatist, had 
 naturally thought of making such a de- 
 mand. When, however, Herr von Jagow 
 was occupying himself with the matter 
 and was called in, the Kaiser had so 
 committed himself that it was too late 
 for any procedure according to diplo- 
 matic custom, and there was nothing 
 more to be done. The situation was such 
 that it would have been impossible to 
 intervene with drafting proposals. In the 
 end, he [Jagow] had thought that non- 
 interference would have its advantages — 
 namely, the good impression which could 
 be made in Petersburg and Paris with the 
 German declaration that Germany had 
 not co-operated in the preparation of the 
 Vienna ultimatum." 
 
 A REMARKABLE LETTER 
 
 Herr Muhlon authorized the Humanite, 
 a Paris Socialist paper, through its 
 Swiss correspondent, to publish the fol- 
 lowing remarkable letter which he ad- 
 dressed from Berne, on May 7, 1917, to 
 Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, then Im- 
 perial Chancellor: 
 
 " However great the number and 
 weight of the mistakes accumulated on 
 the German side since the beginning of 
 the war, I nevertheless persisted for a 
 long time in the belief that a belated 
 
LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 
 
 XXIII. 
 
 foresight would at last dawn upon the 
 minds of our Directors. It was with this 
 hope that I put myself to a certain ex- 
 tent at your disposal, in order to col- 
 laborate with you in Rumania, and that I 
 indicated to you that I was disposed to 
 help in Switzerland, where I am living at 
 present, if the object of our efforts was 
 to be rapprochement of the enemy par- 
 ties. That I was, and that I remain, 
 hostile to any activity other than recon- 
 ciliation and restoration I proved soon 
 after the opening of hostilities by the 
 definite resignation of my Directorship 
 of Krupps' works. 
 
 " But since the first days of 1917 I 
 have abandoned all hope as regards the 
 present Directors of Germany. Our offer 
 of peace without indication of our war 
 aims, the accentuation of the submarine 
 war, the deportations of Belgians, the 
 systematic destruction in France, and 
 the torpedoing of English hospital ships 
 have so degraded the Governors of the 
 German Empire that I am profoundly 
 convinced that they are disqualified for- 
 ever for the elaboration and conclusion 
 of a sincere and just agreement. The 
 personalities may change, but they can- 
 not remain the representatives of the 
 German cause. 
 
 " The German people will not be able 
 to repair the grievous crimes committed 
 
 gainst its own present and future, and 
 against that of Europe and the whole 
 human race until it is represented by 
 different men with a different mentality. 
 To tell the truth, it is mere justice that 
 its reputation throughout the whole 
 world is as bad as it is. The triumph 
 of its methods — the methods by which 
 it has hitherto conducted the war both 
 militarily and politically — would consti- 
 tute a defeat for the ideas and the su- 
 preme hopes of mankind. One has only 
 to imagi^- that a people exhausted, de- 
 moralized, or hating violence, should con- 
 sent to a peace with a Government 
 which has conducted such a war, in order 
 to understand how the general level and 
 the chances of life of the peoples would 
 remain black and deceptive. 
 
 " As a man and as a German who 
 desires nothing but the welfare of the 
 deceived and tortured German people, I 
 turn away definitely from the present 
 representatives of the German regime. 
 And I have only one wish — that all inde- 
 pendent men may do the same and that 
 many Germans may understand and act. 
 
 " In view of the fact that it is im- 
 possible for me at present to make any 
 manifestation before German public 
 opinion, I have thought it to be my abso- 
 lute duty to inform your Excellency of 
 my point of view." 
 
 Reichstag Debate on Lichnowsky 
 
 THE Main Committee of the Reichstag 
 dealt with Prince Lichnowsky' s memo- 
 randum on March 16. Herr von Payer, 
 Vice Chancellor, stated that Prince Lich- 
 nowsky himself on March 15 made a state- 
 ment to the Imperial Chancellor, in which he 
 said : 
 
 " Your Excellency knows that the purely 
 private notes which I wrote down in the 
 Summer of 1916 found their way into wider 
 circles by an unprecedented breach of confi- 
 dence. It was mainly a question of subject- 
 ive considerations about our entire foreign 
 policy since the Berlin Congress. I perceived 
 in the policy hitherto pursued of repelling- (in 
 der seitherigen Abkehr) Russia and in the 
 extension of the policy of alliances to Oriental 
 questions the real roots of the world war. I 
 then submitted our Morocco naval policy to 
 a brief examination. My London mission 
 could at the same time not remain out of 
 
 consideration, especially as I felt the need in 
 regard to the future and with a view to my 
 own justification of noting the details of my 
 experiences and impressions there before they 
 vanished from my memory. These notes 
 were intended in a certain degree only for 
 family archives, and I wrote them down 
 without documentary material or notes from 
 the period of my official activity. I consid- 
 ered I might show them, on the assurance of 
 absolute secrecy, to a very few politicial 
 friends in whose judgment as well as trust- 
 worthiness I had equal confidence." 
 
 Lichnowsky Resigns Rank 
 
 Prince Lichnowsky then described in his 
 letter how the memorandum, owing to an in- 
 discretion, got into circulation, and finally 
 expressed lively regret at such an extremely 
 vexatious incident. 
 
 Herr von Payer said that Prince Lichnow- 
 
XXIV. 
 
 THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 
 
 sky had meanwhile tendered his resignation 
 of his present rank, which had been accepted, 
 and as he had doubtless no bad intention, 
 but had simply been guilty of imprudence, 
 no fui'ther steps would be taken against him. 
 The Vice Chancellor proceeded : 
 
 " Some assertions in his documents must, 
 however, be contradicted, especially his as- 
 sertions about political events in the last 
 months preceding the war. Prince Lichnow- 
 sky was not of his own knowledge acquainted 
 with these events, but he apparently received 
 from a third, and wrongly informed quarter, 
 inaccurate information. The key to the mis- 
 takes and false conclusions may also be the 
 Prince's overestimation of his own services, 
 which are accompanied by hatred against 
 those who do not recognize his achievements 
 as he expected. The entire memorandum, is 
 penetrated by a striking veneration for for- 
 eign diplomats, especially the British, who 
 are described in a truly affectionate manner, 
 and, on the other hand, by an equally strik- 
 ing irritation against almost all German 
 statesmen. The result was that the Prince 
 frequently regarded Germany's most zealous 
 enemy as her best friend because they were 
 personally on good terms with him. 
 
 " The fact that, as he admits, he attached 
 at first no great importance to the assassina- 
 tion of the heir to the Austrian throne, and 
 was displeased that the situation- was judged 
 otherwise in Berlin, makes it plain that the 
 Prince had no clear judgment for the events 
 that followed and their import." 
 
 The Vice Chancellor then characterized as 
 false all Prince Lichnowsky's assertions 
 about General von Moltke's urging war at 
 the Potsdam Crown Council" of June 5, 1914, 
 and the dispatch of the Austrian protocol on 
 " this alleged Crown Council " to Count 
 Mensdorff, containing the postscript that it 
 would be no great harm even if war with 
 Russia arose out of it. 
 
 Payer's Defense 
 
 Herr von Payer also denied the statement 
 that the then Foreign Secretary was in 
 Vienna in 1914, as well as the statement that 
 Count von Pourtales, the German Ambassa- 
 dor in Petrograd, had reported that Russia 
 would in no circumstances move. The Suk- 
 homlinoff trial had shown how unfounded 
 were Prince Lichnowsky's reproaches against 
 Germany for replying to the Russian mobili- 
 zation by an ultimatum and a declaration of 
 war. It was also false to assert that the 
 German Government rejected all Great Brit- 
 ain's mediation proposals. Lord Grey's last 
 mediation proposal was very urgently sup- 
 ported in Vienna by Berlin. The aim of the 
 memorandum was obvious. It was to show 
 the reader how much better and more intelli- 
 gent Prince Lichnowsky's policy was, and 
 how he could have assured the peace of the 
 empire if his advice had been followed. 
 The Vice Chancellor continued : 
 " Nobody will reproach the Prince with this 
 belief in himself. He was also free to make 
 
 notes about events, and his attitude toward 
 them, but he should then have considered it 
 a duty that his views should not have be- 
 come known to the public, and, no matter 
 how small his circle of readers was, it was 
 his duty to state nothing contradicting facts 
 which he knew. As things now are, the 
 memorandum will cause enough harm among 
 malevolent and superficial people. The mem- 
 orandum has no historical value whatever." 
 Referring to a manifolded copy of a letter 
 from Dr. Miihlon, who is at present in Switz- 
 erland, and at the outbreak of war was on 
 Krupps' Board of Directors, Herr von Payer 
 said that the letter related to the utterances 
 of two highly placed gentlemen from which 
 he drew the conclusion that the German Gov- 
 ernment in July, 1914, lacked a desire for 
 peace. Both these gentlemen had stated in 
 writing that Dr. Miihlon had suffered from 
 nerves, and he (Herr von Payer) also took 
 the view that his statements were those of a 
 man of diseased mind. 
 
 In the discussion that followed, Herr 
 Scheidemann said that the Socialist Party 
 regarded imperialism as the fundamental 
 cause of the war. Prince Lichnowsky's 
 memorandum, in which he attempted to put 
 the blame for the war on Germany, could, 
 in his opinion, only make an impression on 
 so-called out-and-out pacifists. 
 
 Herr Muller-Meiningen said that, notwith- 
 standing what Dr. Miihlon and Prince Lich- 
 nowsky had said, he was absolutely con- 
 vinced that the overwhelming majority of 
 the German people, the Chancellor, and the 
 representatives of the Foreign Office, and, 
 above all, the German Emperor, always de- 
 sired peace. 
 
 Herr Stresemann expressed a desire to see 
 the last White Book supplemented. Prince 
 Lichnowsky's memorandum could not be 
 taken seriously. 
 
 Herr von Payer, intervening, said that the 
 question as to whether criminal or disciplin- 
 ary action might be taken against Prince 
 Lichnowsky was considered by the Imperial 
 Department of Justice. The result was that, 
 on various legal grounds, neither a prosecu- 
 tion of the Prince for diplomatic high trea- 
 son in the sense of Paragraph 92 of the Penal 
 Code, nor proceedings under Paragraph 89 or 
 Paragraph 353, the so-called Arnim para- 
 graph, would have offered any chance of 
 success. After the Prince's retirement, there 
 was no longer any question of disciplinary 
 proceedings against him. The Prince has 
 been prohibited by the Foreign Office from 
 publishing articles in the press. 
 
 Lichnowsky's " Optimism " 
 
 Herr von Stumm, Under Secretary for For- 
 eign Affairs, replying to a question as to 
 who was responsible for Prince Lichnowsky's 
 appointment in London-, said that the ap- 
 pointment was made by the Kaiser, in agree- 
 ment with the responsible Imperial Chan- 
 cellor. While in London the Prince had de- 
 
LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 
 
 XXV. 
 
 voted himself zealously to his task. His 
 views, it was true, had frequently not agreed 
 with those of the German Foreign Office. 
 That was especially the case regarding his 
 strong optimism in reference to German- 
 English relations. When his hopes aiming at 
 a German-English understanding were de- 
 stroyed by the war, the Prince returned to 
 Germany greatly excited, and even then did 
 not restrain his criticism of Germany's pol- 
 icy. 
 
 Herr von Stumm continued : 
 
 " His excitement increased owing to attacks 
 against him in the German press. All these 
 circumstances must be taken into considera- 
 tion when gauging the value of his memoran- 
 dum. It was unjustifiable to draw conclu- 
 sions from it regarding the Ambassador's 
 activity in London and blame the Govern- 
 ment for it. Regarding the German White 
 Book, the Under Secretary admitted that it 
 was not very voluminous, but it had to be 
 compiled quickly, so as to present to the 
 Reichstag at the opening a clear picture of 
 the question of guilt. The Blue Books of 
 other States, it was true, were much more 
 voluminous. The German White Book, how- 
 ever, differed from them in so far to its ad- 
 vantage as it contained no falsification. A 
 new edition of the German White Book is in 
 preparation." 
 
 Dr. Payer then discussed the revelations of 
 Dr. Muhlon, at present in Switzerland. Dr. 
 Muhlon, an ex-Director of Krupps, had made 
 a statement according to which he had a 
 conference with two exalted personages in 
 
 the latter half of July, 1914, from which it ap- 
 peared that it was not the intention of the 
 German Government to maintain peace. The 
 Vice Chancellor alleged that Dr. Muhlon was 
 suffering from neurasthenia at the time, and 
 that no importance could be attached to his 
 revelations, since the two gentlemen referred 
 to had denied making the statements attrib- 
 uted to them. 
 
 In the subsequent discussion disapproval 
 of Prince Lichnowsky's attitude was ex- 
 pressed, but some speakers urged the need 
 for the reorganization of Germany's Diplo- 
 matic Service. 
 
 According to the report of the debate pub- 
 lished in the Neues Wiener Journal, Her/ von 
 Payer himself acknowledged that prior to the 
 war German diplomacy had made some bad 
 blunders, and that reform was urgently 
 needed. Herr Miiller (Progressive) sharply 
 criticised Herr von Flotow, who was German 
 Ambassador in Rome at the beginning of the 
 war, and charged him with having declared 
 to the Marquis di San Giuliano, then Italian 
 Foreign Minister, that there existed for Italy 
 no casus foederis. Prince Billow also came 
 in for severe criticism. 
 
 A bill indicting Prince Lichnowsky for trea- 
 son has been introduced into the Reichstag 
 and is still pending at this writing. A dis- 
 patch from Geneva on April 21 stated that 
 he was virtually a prisoner in his chateau in 
 Silesia. According to the Diisseldorfer Tage- 
 blatt the Prince was under police surveillance 
 because of the discovery of a plan for his 
 escape to Switzerland. 
 
 Comments of German Publicists 
 
 IMMEDIATELY following the sending out 
 by the semi-official Wolff Telegraph Bu- 
 reau on March 19 of an account of the 
 discussion in the Main Committee of the 
 Reichstag on March 16 of the Lichnowsky 
 memorandum, together with excerpts from 
 that document, the editorial writers of the 
 German newspapers began emptying vials of 
 wrath upon the head of the former Ambassa- 
 dor in London. With the exception of the 
 Socialists and a few Liberal newspapers, the 
 press was practically a unit in condemning 
 the Prince for his " treasonable and indis- 
 creet acts " and in asserting that, although 
 his " revelations " might be welcomed with 
 shouts of joy in the allied countries, they 
 would have no serious effect upon the fight- 
 ing spirit of the German Nation. 
 
 In trying to explain what prompted Prince 
 Lichnowsky to wite his memorandum for 
 " the family archives," nearly all the Ger- 
 man editors lay great stress upon his alleged 
 personal vanity and his resentment at seeing 
 his efforts toward strengthening the bonds 
 between England and Germany made a grim 
 joke by the outbreak of the world war. The 
 
 Prince is also called a simple-minded person, 
 completely taken in by the deceptive courtesy 
 of the British diplomats and possessing none 
 of the qualifications necessary to make him 
 a profitable representative of the Kaiser at 
 the Court of St. James's. All through the 
 comments, from extreme Pan-German to so- 
 cialistic, runs a vein of sarcastic criticism of 
 the peculiar " ability " shown by the Ger- 
 man Foreign Office in picking its Ambassa- 
 dors. 
 
 All the Pan-German and annexationist 
 papers take occasion to link up Prince Lich- 
 nowsky with Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, the 
 former Imperial Chancellor, and make the 
 latter responsible for the appointment of the 
 " pacifist " Prince. In doing this they renew 
 all their old charges of weakness and pacif- 
 ism against the ex-Chancellor, and intimate 
 that he may be the next German formerly 
 occupying a high place in the Government to 
 write memoranda for his family archives. 
 Some of the papers did not wait to write 
 regular editorials about the memorandum, 
 but interlarded their reports of the meeting 
 of the Reichstag Committee with sarcastic 
 
XXVI. 
 
 THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 
 
 comment and explanations. This was notably 
 the case with the Vossische Zeitung, the lead- 
 ing exponent of reconciliation with Russia at 
 the expense of Great Britain. 
 
 Reventlow Furious 
 
 Although it has since been cabled that the 
 Imperial Government was considering taking 
 action against Prince Lichnowsky, and that 
 Captain Beerfelde, a member of the German 
 General Staff, was under arrest for hav- 
 ing aided in the distribution of manifolded 
 copies of the memorandum, there was no 
 general demand in the German press for the 
 trial of the Prince on a charge of high trea- 
 son. The exceptions were a few extreme 
 Pan-German organs, led by Count zu Revent- 
 low's Deutsche Tageszeitung. On the other 
 hand, a few of the Socialist and Liberal 
 papers cautiously remarked that, after all, 
 although what the Prince said about the re- 
 sponsibility for the war was altogether too 
 pro-Entente, it might help the movement in 
 Germany for a negotiated peace. 
 
 Count zu Reventlow' s article in the 
 Deutsche Tageszeitung read, in part, as fol- 
 lows : 
 
 " When a former Ambassador, and an ex- 
 perienced diplomat and official besides, writes 
 an article and gives it to some one else in 
 these times, there is, in our opinion, no ex- 
 cuse. It is a case of high treason, and it 
 makes little difference if here one might per- 
 haps admit the view of its being high treason 
 through negligence, because certainly no 
 former diplomat and official ought to allow 
 himself to be so negligent, and, furthermore, 
 he must have known the great danger of his 
 action, which, as has been said, was ex- 
 clusively meant to be to his personal interest. 
 Therefore, we cannot very well understand 
 for what reasons the proper steps have not 
 been taken already against Prince Lichnow- 
 sky. We use the characterization ' high trea- 
 son ' after due deliberation. 
 
 " Prince Lichnowsky should not have al- 
 lowed a single piece of his article to have left 
 his hands, for he was very well able to judge 
 that its publication outside of the German 
 Empire was bound to have the effect of a 
 treasonable act. The German cause will not 
 be made any worse because a former diplo- 
 mat, completely enchanted by English ways 
 and never in touch with the essence of the 
 English policy, places himself on the side of 
 the enemies of the German Empire." 
 
 The Kolnische Volkszeitung, the organ of 
 the annexationist faction of the Centre Party, 
 concluded its editorial thus : 
 
 " One thing must be emphasized, Lieb- 
 knecht, Dittmann, and other traitors have 
 been jailed because of their high treason. 
 Lichnowsky wanted to show to the whole 
 world with his memorandum that Germany 
 had sought, wanted, and begun the war be- 
 cause some persons did not wish to have him, 
 Prince Lichnowsky,, enjoy the success of the 
 Anglo-German friendship. And, in so doing, 
 
 Lichnowsky furnished our enemies with 
 weapons, worked to our enemies' advantage. 
 In time of war this is treason. The excuse 
 that the fourteen copies that he had pre- 
 pared were written only for his friends is 
 ridiculous. Teodor Wolff of the Berliner 
 Tageblatt is known to be one of Lichnow- 
 sky's most intimate friends. Who knows 
 who the others may be ! If a Social Democrat 
 or an anarchist writes an inciting pamphlet 
 in the form of a memorandum and doesn't 
 distribute it himself, but has his friends do it, 
 is he then exempt from punishment? If a 
 person commits high treason and does not 
 circulate the document himself, but lets oth- 
 ers do it, or at least does not take precau- 
 tions to see that it is not distributed, does he 
 go free? The German people will hardly un- 
 derstand the decision of the Imperial De- 
 partment of Justice as just rendered in 
 favor of Lichnowsky. Even at the last ses- 
 sion of the Prussian House of Lords Prince 
 Lichnowsky sat beside his friend Dernburg. 
 Will he appear in the House of Lords 
 again? " 
 
 Germania Waxed Sarcastic 
 
 Germania, speaking for the so-called mod- 
 erate section of the Centre Party, called the 
 Lichnowsky case " one of the most disturbing 
 political events that we have experienced in 
 the course of the war," and hoped that the 
 courts would still have a chance to decide as 
 to the Prince's guilt. The newspaper com- 
 ment was, in general, spiced with much sar- 
 castic comparison, of the Lichnowsky case 
 with the cases of Dr. Karl Liebknecht and 
 Deputy Wilhelm Dittmann, and many re- 
 marks were passed regarding the difference 
 between the treatment accorded to a member 
 of the Prussian nobility and that suf- 
 fered by commoners and representatives 
 of the German working class. The Berliner 
 Lokal-Anzeiger, in ending its comment as to 
 the paeans of joy with which the enemy 
 press would be sure to welcome the publication 
 of the Lichnowsky indictment, added the fol- 
 lowing item of news : 
 
 " We learn on good authority, in the mat- 
 ter of the distribution of the Lichnowsky 
 pamphlet, that in the beginning of February 
 the police succeeded in seizing 2,000 copies of 
 this pamphlet which the Neues Vaterland So- 
 ciety had had sent to it from South Germany 
 through its business manager, Else Bruck. 
 She, together with Henke, a bookseller, was 
 placed under charges, but was acquitted by 
 the court-martial, presumably because the 
 court was not able to foresee the far-reach- 
 ing result of the document." 
 
 Under the heading " The Blind Argus " the 
 Bremer Nachrichten opined that the man who 
 should have been using a thousand eyes in 
 London in the interest of Germany was blind, 
 and it referred to the. Lichnowsky case as 
 " the most gloomy chapter in the history of 
 German diplomacy." 
 
 Prince Lfchnowsky's aversion to the old 
 

 LICHNOW SKY'S MEMORANDUM 
 
 XXVII. 
 
 Triple Alliance drew much caustic criticism, 
 especially from the Pan German press, and 
 excerpts from the semi-official Vienna Frem- 
 denblatt and other Austrian papers, indig- 
 nantly repudiating the Prince's charge that 
 the Dual Monarchy had always regarded 
 Germany as a shield under which it could 
 make raids upon the Near East and other- 
 wise stir up trouble, were eagerly reprinted 
 in Germany. 
 
 The Berlin Vorwarts, speaking for the pro- 
 Government Socialists, said : 
 
 " The Ambassador returned with the feel- 
 ing of a man who had seen his lifework 
 knocked to pieces. No doubt he felt at that 
 time not very different from us German So- 
 cialists who had also worked for reconcilia- 
 tion with Prance and England and how, in 
 the face of the unchained elemental forces, 
 had to recognize our impotence with gnashing 
 of teeth. In Germany, Prince Lichnowsky, 
 who had believed in the possibility of agree- 
 ment as every toiler must believe in his 
 work, was greeted with the scorn of the Pan- 
 Germans, who asserted that he had allowed 
 himself to be softsoaped by the English 
 
 and had never recognized their real inten- 
 tions." * * * 
 
 " And who can deny that this pamphlet 
 casts a deep shadow upon the German for- 
 eign policy before the war? They can say 
 that everything that Lichnowsky writes is the 
 result of a diseased imagination and that all 
 is distorted and badly drawn. But this would 
 merely mean that the most important Am- 
 bassadorial post' that Germany had at her 
 disposal was occupied by a fool and a block- 
 head. So, if one wishes to spare the German 
 policy this compromising implication, the only 
 thing to do is to take the memorandum and 
 its author seriously and argue the points with 
 him in an expert manner." 
 
 The Vorwarts concluded its comment by 
 saying that, no matter how the war started, 
 the German people were now determined to 
 see that Germany was not defeated, but if 
 Prince Liehnowsky's article would help the 
 people of Germany to adopt a more con- 
 ciliatory attitude toward England, and thus 
 hasten a negotiated peace, it was worth 
 reading. Comment of other Socialist papers 
 was along the same lines. 
 
 Von Jagow's Two Replies to Lichnowsky 
 
 PRACTICALLY coincident with the giv- 
 ing out for publication on March 19, 
 through the semi-official "Wolff Tele- 
 graph Bureau, of an account of a discussion 
 in the Main Committee of the Reichstag of 
 the memorandum of the former Ambassador 
 at London, together with substantial ex- 
 cerpts from the main chapters of his work, 
 the German Government got in touch with 
 Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State for For- 
 eign Affairs when the war began, and asked 
 him to write an article calculated to counter- 
 act the effect of the Lichnowsky revelations. 
 Herr von Jagow hastened to accede to this 
 request, but he merely made matters worse 
 for the German Government by practically 
 admitting the correctness of Prince Lieh- 
 nowsky's assertion that England did not 
 want war and that Berlin was aware of this. 
 Copies of German newspapers received here 
 show that, while the journals of all factions 
 were practically of one mind in reproaching 
 the German Foreign Office for its lack of 
 diplomatic ability, the Pan-German and mil- 
 itarist organs laid special stress upon the 
 implication in the von Jagow article that 
 Germany might have been willing to drop 
 its alliance with Austria if it could have been 
 sure of contracting one with England, and 
 the Liberal and Socialist papers declared 
 that it was no use insisting any longer that 
 Great Britain was guilty of the wholesale 
 bloodshed of the world war, and that now 
 nothing really stood in the way of moving 
 for a peace by agreement. 
 These comments were so sharp on both 
 
 sides that Herr von Jagow was soon moved 
 to write another article defending his reply 
 to Prince Lichnowsky and arguing that his 
 statements regarding the Triple Alliance 
 could by no means be interpreted as meaning 
 that he would have been willing to abandon 
 Austria-Hungary in favor of Great Britain. 
 In this article, which was first printed in 
 the Miinchener Neueste Nachrichten, von 
 Jagow says he cannot understand how these 
 statements can be taken to mean that he 
 was an opponent of the alliance with Aus- 
 tria and was considering a choice between 
 Austria and England. He proceeds to defend 
 his own policy by reference to the fact that 
 Bismarck was not content with the Triple 
 Alliance on the one hand, and the famous 
 " Reinsurance Treaty " with Russia on the 
 other hand, but in 1887 deliberately promoted 
 agreements between Austria-Hungary, Italy, 
 and England, with the object of " bringing 
 England into a closer relationship to the 
 Central European league and making her 
 share its burdens." Bismarck's policy re- 
 lieved Germany of some of her obligations, 
 because " Austria-Hungary, supported by 
 Italy and England, held the balance against 
 Russia." 
 
 Then, as The London Times points out, 
 carefully avoiding the history of the present 
 Kaiser's reversal of Bismarck's policy and 
 abandonment of the " Reinsurance Treaty " 
 with Russia, von Jagow defends his at- 
 tempts to make British policy serve Ger- 
 many's purposes. It was " because of the 
 isolation of the Triple Alliance, which had 
 
XXVIII. 
 
 THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 
 
 come about in th i course of years," that von 
 Jagow " pursued a rapprochement with Eng- 
 land." He did so, " not with any idea of 
 putting England in the place of Austria- 
 Hungary, but in order, by disposing of the 
 Anglo-German antagonism, to move England 
 to a different orientation of her policy." 
 Germany " could not count upon Italy," and 
 wanted other assistance in upholding Aus- 
 tria-Hungary in the Balkans against Rus- 
 sia. Herr von Jagow proceeds : 
 
 " The combination of England would have 
 relieved us of the necessity of taking our 
 stand alone, when the case arose, for Aus- 
 tria-Hungary against Russia. As was ef- 
 fected by the agreements of 1887, a part of 
 our obligations would have been laid upon 
 other shoulders. It is in this sense that I 
 spoke of the possibility of the loosening and 
 the dissolution of old unions which no longer 
 satisfy all the conditions. 
 
 " The alliance with Austria-Hungary was 
 the cornerstone of Bismarckian policy, and 
 that it had to remain. The expansion of the 
 alliance into the Triple Alliance, by taking in 
 Italy, was a means of supplementing the 
 Central European grouping of the powers ; 
 it was an ' auxiliary structure,' by means 
 of which Bismarck aimed at a further guar- 
 antee of peace, especially as he intended 
 thereby to check Italy's Irredentist policy. 
 Threads then ran to England via Italy. These 
 threads gave way later, and this caused 
 a considerable change in the attitude of 
 Italy. 
 
 Friendly to England 
 
 " A friendly attitude on the part of Eng- 
 land toward the Triple Alliance— what Pro- 
 fessor Hermann Oncken calls the moral ex- 
 tension of the Triple Alliance over the Chan- 
 nel — was the aim of our policy, and in this 
 we were sure of the complete accord of our 
 allies. I never thought that the agreements 
 about Bagdad and the colonies would mean 
 an immediate alteration of England's course 
 in European policy. These agreements were 
 to prepare the way for this change of course. 
 
 I was under no illusions about the difficulties 
 which would still have to be oyercome. But 
 difficulties, and even resistance on the part 
 of public opinion in one's own country, can- 
 not prevent us from following a road that 
 is seen to be right. The league between Ger- 
 many and Austria-Hungary, supported by 
 friendship with England, would have created 
 a peace bloc of unassailable strength. The 
 increasing Irredentism of Italy, her friction 
 with Austria on the Adriatic, and the Russo- 
 phile and also Irredentist tendencies of Ru- 
 mania, would have lost their importance. 
 Then, in given circumstances, the Triple Alli- 
 ance treaty might have been modified. The 
 union with England would also have secured 
 us against Russian aggression, and the obli- 
 gations imposed upon us by our alliance 
 would thereby have been diminished. 
 
 " The road to this goal was long. The calm 
 development was crossed by the Serajevo 
 murders, and in the fateful hour of August, 
 1914, the English Government — instead of 
 keeping peace — preferred to join in the war 
 against us. The English Government has 
 probably since then been assailed by serious 
 doubts as to whether its choice was right. 
 In any case, it assumed a considerable share 
 of the guilt for the bloodshed in Europe." 
 
 Herr von Jagow then denies that his scheme 
 was inevitably doomed to failure, saying that 
 the policy of England is more liable to adap- 
 tation and alteration than the policy of any 
 other country, and that " more far-seeing 
 statesmen than those who were intrusted with 
 the fortunes of the Island Empire in 1914 — 
 think only of the Pitts, Disraelis, and Salis- 
 burys— held other views about the orientation 
 of England toward Germany and Russia." 
 
 " As matters stand today, attempts to ar- 
 rive at clearness about the respective parts 
 played by our enemies at the outbreak of the 
 war, and about the greater or less degrees 
 of guilt belonging to each of them, can have 
 only a historical value. England has made 
 the cause of our enemies her own, and so she 
 also shall be made to feel how Germany de- 
 fends herself against her enemies." 
 
 Full Text of von Jagow's First Reply 
 
 [Copyrig-hted] 
 
 Herr von Jagow's first reply to Prince 
 Lichnowsky , which was printed in the Nord- 
 deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung March 23, fol- 
 lows : 
 
 SO far as it is possible, in general, I 
 shall refrain from taking up the state- 
 ments concerning the policy obtaining 
 before my administration of the Foreign 
 Office. 
 
 " I should like to make the following re- 
 marks about the individual points in the 
 article : 
 
 "When I was named State Secretary in 
 January, 1913, I regarded a German-English 
 rapprochement as desirable and also be- 
 lieved an agreement attainable on the points 
 where our interests touched or crossed each 
 other. At all events, I wanted to try to 
 work in this sense. A principal point for us 
 was the Mesopotamia- Asia Minor question — 
 the so-called Bagdad policy — as this had be- 
 come for us a question of prestige. If Eng- 
 land wanted to force us out there it certainly 
 appeared to me that a conflict could hardly 
 
LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 
 
 XXIX. 
 
 be avoided. In Berlin I began, as soon as it 
 was possible to do so, to negotiate over the 
 Bagdad Railroad. "We found a favorable 
 disposition on the part of the English Gov- 
 ernment, and the result was the agreement 
 that was almost complete when the world 
 war broke out. 
 
 Colonial Questions 
 
 " At the same time the negotiations over 
 the Portuguese colonies that had been begun 
 by Count Metternich, (as German Ambassa- 
 dor at London,) continued by Baron Mar- 
 schall, and reopened by Prince Lichnowsky 
 were under way. I intended to carve the 
 way later for further negotiations regarding 
 other — for example, East Asiatic — problems, 
 when what was in my opinion the most im- 
 portant problem, that of the Bagdad Railroad, 
 should be settled, and an atmosphere of more 
 confidence thus created. I also left the naval 
 problem aside, as it would have been diffi- 
 cult to reach an early agreement over 
 that matter, after past experiences. 
 
 " I can pass over the development of the 
 Albanian problem, as it occurred before my 
 term of office began. In general, however, 
 I would like to remark that such far-reach- 
 ing disinterestedness in Balkan questions as 
 Prince (Lichnowsky proposes does not seem 
 possible to me. It would have contradicted 
 the essential part of the alliance if we had 
 completely ignored really vital interests of 
 our ally. We, too, had demanded that Aus- 
 tria stand by us at Algeciras, and at that 
 time Italy's attitude had caused serious re- 
 sentment among us. Russia, although she 
 had no interest at all in Morocco, also stood 
 by France. Finally, it was our task, as the 
 third member of the alliance, to support such 
 measures as would render possible a settle- 
 ment of the divergent interests of our allies 
 and avoid a conflict between them. 
 
 " It further appeared impossible to me not 
 to pursue a ' triple alliance policy ' in mat- 
 ters where the interests of the allied powers 
 touched each other. Then Italy would have 
 been driven entirely into line with the En- 
 tente in questions of the Orient, and Austria 
 handed over to the mercy of Russia, and the 
 Triple Alliance would thus have really gone 
 to pieces. And we, too, would not have been 
 able to look after our interests in the 
 Orient, if we did not have some support. 
 And even Prince Lichnowsky does not deny 
 that we had to represent great economic in- 
 terests right there. But today economic in- 
 terests are no longer to be separated from 
 political interests. 
 
 " That the people ' in Petrograd wanted 
 to see the Sultan independent ' is an asser- 
 tion that Prince Lichnowsky will hardly be 
 able to prove ; it would contradict every tra- 
 dition of Russian policy. If we, furthermore, 
 had not had at our command the influence 
 at Constantinople founded by Baron Mar- 
 schall, it would hardly have been possible 
 
 for us to defend our economic interests 
 in Turkey in the desired way. 
 
 Russia and Germany 
 
 " When Prince Lichnowsky further asserts 
 that we only ' drove Russia, our natural 
 friend and best neighbor, into the arms of 
 France and England through our Oriental 
 and Balkan policy ' he is in conflict with the 
 historical facts. Only because Prince Gort- 
 schakoff [Russian Premier] was guiding Rus- 
 sian policy toward a rapprochement with a 
 France lusting for revenge was Prince Bis- 
 marck induced to enter into the alliance with 
 Austria-Hungary ; through the alliance with 
 Rumania he barred an advance of Russia 
 toward the south. Prince Lichnowsky con- 
 demns the basic principles o'f Bismarck's 
 policy. Our attempts to draw closer to Rus- 
 sia went to pieces— Bjorki proves it— or re- 
 mained ineffective, like the so-called Pots- 
 dam agreement. Also, Russia was not al- 
 ways our ' best neighbor.' Under Queen 
 Elizabeth, as at present, she strove for pos- 
 session of East Prussia to extend her Baltic 
 coasts and to insure her domination of the 
 Baltic. The Petrograd ' window ' has gradu- 
 ally widened, so as to take in Esthonia, 
 Livonia, Courland, and Finland and reach 
 after Aland. Poland was arranged to be a 
 field over which to send troops against us. 
 Pan-Slavism, which was dominating the Rus- 
 sian policy to an ever greater degree, had 
 positive anti-German tendencies. 
 
 " And we did not force Russia to drop ' her 
 policy of Asiatic expansion,' but only tried to 
 defend ourselves against her encroachments 
 in European policy and her encircling of our 
 Austro-Hungarian ally. 
 
 Grey Conciliatory 
 
 " Just as little as Sir Edward Grey [Brit- 
 ish Foreign Secretary] did we want war to 
 come over Albania. Therefore, in spite of 
 our unhappy experience at Algeciras, we 
 agreed to a conference. The credit of an 
 ' attitude of mediation ' at the conference 
 should not be denied Sir Edward Grey ; but 
 that he ' by no means placed himself on the 
 side of the Entente ' is, however, surely 
 saying rather too much. Certainly he often 
 advised yielding in Petrograd (as we did in 
 Vienna) and found ' formulas of agreement,' 
 but in dealing with the other side he repre- 
 sented the Entente, because he, no less than 
 ourselves, neither would, nor could, aban- 
 don his associates. That we, on the other 
 hand, ' without exception, represented the 
 standpoint dictated to us from Vienna ' is 
 absolutely false. We, like England, played 
 a mediatory role, and also in Vienna coun- 
 seled far more yielding and moderation 
 than Prince Lichnowsky appears to know 
 about, or even to suggest. And then 
 Vienna made several far-reaching conces- 
 sions, (Dibra, Djakowa.) If Prince Lich- 
 nowsky, who always wanted to be wiser 
 than the Foreign Office, and who apparently 
 
XXX. 
 
 THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 
 
 allowed himself to be strongly influenced 
 by the Entente statesmen, did not know 
 this, he surely ought not to make any false 
 assertions now ! If, to be sure, the degree 
 of yielding that was necessary was reached 
 in Vienna, we also naturally had to repre- 
 sent the Austrian standpoint at the confer- 
 ence. Ambassador Szogyeni himself was 
 not one of the extremists ; in Vienna they 
 were by no means always satisfied with 
 his attitude. That the Ambassador, with 
 whom I was negotiating almost every day, 
 constantly sounded the refrain of casus foe- 
 deris is entirely unknown to me. It cer- 
 tainly is true that Prince Lichnowsky for 
 some time past had not been counted as a 
 friend of Austria in Vienna. Still com- 
 plaints about him came to my ears oftener 
 from the side of Marquis San Giuliano [Ital- 
 ian Foreign Minister] than from the side of 
 Count Berchtold, [Austro-Hungarian Foreign 
 Minister. ] 
 
 " King Nicholas's seizure of Scutari con- 
 stituted a mockery of the entire conference 
 and a snub to all the powers taking part 
 in it. 
 
 " Russia was by no means obliged ' to give 
 way to us all along the line ' ; on the con- 
 trary, she ' advanced the wishes of Serbia ' 
 in several ways, Serbia even receiving some 
 cities and strips of territory that could have 
 been regarded as purely Albanian or prepon- 
 deratingly so. Prince Lichnowsky says that 
 ' the course of the conference was a fresh 
 humiliation for the self-consciousness of Rus- 
 sia ' and that there was a feeling of resent- 
 ment in Russia on that account. It cannot 
 be the task of our policy to satisfy all the 
 unjustified demands of the exaggerated self- 
 consciousness of a power by no means friend- 
 ly to us, at the. cost of our ally. Russia has 
 no vital interests on the Adriatic, but our 
 ally certainly has. If we, as Prince Lichnow- 
 sky seems to wish, had flatly taken the same 
 stand as Russia, the result would have been 
 a humiliation for Austria-Hungary and thus 
 a weakening of our group. Prince Lichnow- 
 sky seems only anxious that Russia be not 
 humiliated ; a humiliation of Austria is ap- 
 parently a matter of indifference to him. 
 
 The "Wily" Venizelos 
 
 " When Prince Lichnowsky says that our 
 ' Austrophilie ' was not adapted to ' promote 
 Russia's interests in Asia,' I don't exactly 
 understand what this means. Following a 
 disastrous diversion toward Bast Asia— in the 
 Japanese war we had favored Russia without 
 even being thanked for it ! — Russia again took 
 up her policy directed toward the European 
 Orient (the Balkans and Constantinople) with 
 renewed impulse, (the Balkan Alliance, Buch- 
 lau, Iswolsky, &c.) [Iswolsky retired as Rus- 
 sian Foreign Minister after Germany forced 
 the Czar to repudiate his Serbian policy in 
 1909.] 
 
 " Venizelos, the cunning Cretan with the 
 ' Ribbon of the Order of the Red Eagle,' evi- 
 dently knew how to throw a little sand into 
 
 the eyes of our Ambassador. He, in contrast 
 to King Constantine and Theototy, always 
 was pro-Entente. His present attitude re- 
 veals his feelings as clearly as can be. Herr 
 Danef, however, was entirely inclined toward 
 Petrograd. 
 
 " That Count Berchtold displayed certain 
 inclinations toward Bulgaria also in its dif- 
 ferences with Rumania is true ; that we ' nat- 
 urally went with him ' is, however, entirely 
 false. With our support, King Carol had the 
 satisfaction of the Bucharest peace. [Ended 
 second Balkan war.] If, therefore, in the 
 case of the Bucharest peace, in which we 
 favored the wishes and interests of Rumania, 
 which was allied to us, our policy deviated 
 somewhat from that of Vienna, the Austro- 
 Hungarian Cabinet certainly did not believe — 
 as Prince Lichnowsky asserts — that it ' could 
 count upon our support in case of its re- 
 vision.' That Marquis San Giuliano ' is said 
 to have warned us already in the Summer 
 of 1913 from becoming involved in a world 
 war,' because at that time in Austria ' the 
 thought of a campaign against Serbia " had 
 found entrance, is entirely unknown to me. 
 Just as little do I know that Herr von 
 Tschirschky — who certainly was rather pes- 
 simistic by nature — is said to have declared 
 in the Spring of 1914 that there soon would 
 be war. Therefore, I was just as ignorant 
 of the ' important happenings ' that Prince 
 Lichnowsky here suspects as he was himself! 
 Such events as the English visit to Paris — 
 Sir Edward Grey's first to the Continent — 
 surely must have been known to the Am- 
 bassador, and we informed him about the 
 secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement; to be 
 sure, he did not want to believe it ! 
 
 " In the matter of Liman von Sander, 
 [German reorganizer of the Turkish Army,] 
 we made a far-reaching concession to Russia 
 by renouncing the General's power of com- 
 mand over Constantinople. I will admit that 
 this point of the agreement over the military 
 mission was not opportune politically. 
 
 " When Prince Lichnowsky boasts of hav- 
 ing succeeded in giving the treaty a form 
 corresponding to our wishes, this credit must 
 not be denied him, although it certainly re- 
 quired strong pressure on several occasions 
 to induce him to represent some of our de- 
 sires with more emphasis. 
 
 " When Prince Lichnowsky says that he 
 received the authorization definitely to con- 
 clude the treaty, after he previously asserts 
 that ' the treaty was consequently dropped,' 
 this contains a contradiction which we may* 
 let the Prince straighten out. Lichnowsky' s 
 assertion, however, that we delayed publica- 
 tion because the treaty would have been ' a 
 public success ' for him that we begrudged 
 him, is an unheard-of insinuation that can 
 only be explained through his self-centred 
 conception of things. The treaty would have 
 lost its practical and moral effect— one of its 
 main objects was to create a good atmos- 
 phere between us and England — if its publi- 
 cation had been greeted with violent attacks 
 
LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 
 
 XXXI. 
 
 upon ' perfidious Albion ' in our Anglophobe 
 press and in our Parliament. And there is no 
 doubt that, in view of our internal posi- 
 tion at that time, this is what the simultane- 
 ous publication of the so-called "Windsor 
 Treaty would have caused. And the howl 
 about English perfidy that the internal con- 
 tradiction between the text of the Windsor 
 Treaty and our treaty would doubtless have 
 called forth would hardly have been stilled 
 in the minds of our public through the as- 
 surance of English bona fides. 
 
 " Untenable " Charges 
 
 " With justified precaution, we intended to 
 allow the publication to be made only at the 
 proper moment, when the danger of disap- 
 proving criticism was no longer so acute, if 
 possible simultaneously with the announce- 
 ment of the Bagdad Treaty, which also was 
 on the point of being concluded. The fact 
 that two great agreements had been con- 
 cluded between us and England would doubt- 
 less have materially favored their reception 
 and made it easier to overlook the aesthetic 
 defects of the Portuguese agreement. It was 
 consideration for the effect of the agreement 
 — with which we wanted to improve our re- 
 lations with England, not to generate more 
 trouble — that caused our hesitation. 
 
 "It is correct that— although in a sec- 
 ondary degree — consideration was also taken 
 of the efforts just then being made to obtain 
 economic interests in the Portuguese colonies, 
 which the publication of the agreement would 
 naturally have made more difficult to real- 
 ize. These conditions Prince Lichnowsky 
 may not have been able to perceive fully 
 from London, but he should have trusted in 
 our objective judgment and acquiesced in it, 
 instead of replacing his lack of understand- 
 ing with suspicions and the interjection of 
 personal motives. He certainly would have 
 found our arguments understood by the Eng- 
 lish statesmen themselves. 
 
 " The Ambassador's speeches aroused con- 
 siderable adverse sentiment in this country. 
 It was necessary for the creation of a better 
 atmosphere, in which alone the rapproche- 
 ment being worked for could flourish, that 
 confidence in our English policy and in our 
 London Ambassador be spread also among 
 our people at home. Prince Lichnowsky, 
 otherwise so susceptible to public opinion, 
 did not take this motive sufficiently into 
 account, for he saw everything only through 
 his London spectacles. The charges against 
 the attitude of the Foreign Office are too 
 untenable to be bothered with. I would only 
 like to point out that Prince Lichnowsky 
 was not left in ignorance regarding the 
 ' most important things,' in so far as they 
 were of value to his mission. On the con- 
 trary, I gave the Ambassador much more 
 general information than used to be the 
 custom. My own experiences as Ambassa- 
 dor induced me to do so. But with Lich- 
 nowsky there was the inclination to rely 
 
 more upon his own impressions and judg- 
 ment than upon the information and advice 
 of the Central Office. To be sure, I did not 
 always have either the motive or the au- 
 thority to impart the sources of our news. 
 Here there were quite definite considerations, 
 particularly anxiety regarding the compro- 
 mising of our sources. The Prince's mem- 
 orandum furnishes the best justification for 
 the caution exercised in this regard. 
 
 Defense of Archduke 
 
 " It is not true that in the Foreign Office 
 the reports that England would protect 
 France under all circumstances were not 
 believed. 
 
 " At Knopischt, on the occasion of the 
 visit of his Majesty the Kaiser to the Arch- 
 duke heir apparent, no plan of an active 
 policy against Serbia was laid down. Arch- 
 duke Franz Ferdinand was not at all the 
 champion of a policy leading to war for 
 which he has often been taken. During the 
 London conference he advised moderation and 
 the avoidance of war. 
 
 " Prince Lichnowsky's ' optimism ' was 
 hardly justified, as he has probably con- 
 vinced himself since through the revelations 
 of the Sukhomlinoff trial. Besides, the secret 
 Anglo-Russian naval agreement (of which, 
 as said before, he was informed) should have 
 made him more skeptical. Unfortunately, the 
 suspicion voiced by the Imperial Chancellor 
 and the Under Secretary of State was well 
 grounded. How does this agree with the 
 assertion that we, relying upon the reports of 
 Count Pourtales that ' Russia would not move 
 under any circumstances,' had not thought 
 of the possibility of a war? Furthermore, so 
 far as I can recollect, Count Pourtales [Ger- 
 man Ambassador at St. Petersburg] never 
 made such reports. 
 
 Blame for Russia 
 
 " That Austria-Hungary wished to proceed 
 against the constant provocations stirred up 
 by Russia, (Herr von Hartwig,) which 
 reached their climax in the outrage of Sera- 
 jevo, we had to recognize as justified. In spite 
 of all the former settlements- and avoidances 
 of menacing conflicts, Russia did not abandon 
 her policy, which aimed at the complete 
 exclusion of the Austrian influence (and 
 naturally ours also) from the Balkans. The 
 Russian agents, inspired by Petrograd, con- 
 tinued their incitement. It was a question 
 of the prestige and the existence of the 
 Danube Monarchy. It must either put up 
 with the Russo-Serbian machinations, or com- 
 mand a quos ego, even at the risk of war. 
 We could not leave our ally in the lurch. Had 
 the intention been to exclude the ultima ratio 
 of the war in general, the alliance should not 
 have been concluded. Besides, it was plain 
 that the Russian military preparations, (for 
 instance, the extension of the railroads and 
 forts in Poland,) for which a France lusting 
 for revenge had lent the money and which 
 would have been completed in a few years, 
 
XXXII. 
 
 THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 
 
 were directed principally against us. But 
 despite all this, despite the fact that the ag- 
 gressive tendency of the Russian policy was 
 becoming more evident from day to day, the 
 idea of a preventive war was far removed 
 from us. We only decided to declare war on 
 Russia in the face of the Russian mobiliza- 
 tion and to prevent a Russian invasion. 
 
 " I have not the letters exchanged with the 
 Prince at hand — it was a matter of private 
 letters. Lichnowsky pleaded for the aban- 
 donment of Austria. I replied, so far as I 
 remember, that we, aside from our treaty ob- 
 ligation, could not sacrifice our ally for the 
 uncertain friendship of England. If we 
 abandoned our only reliable ally later we 
 would stand entirely isolated, face to face 
 with the Entente. It is likely that I also 
 wrote that ' Russia was constantly becoming 
 more anti-German ' and that we must ' just 
 risk it.' Furthermore, it is possible that I, 
 in order to steel Lichnowsky's nerves a lit- 
 tle and to prevent him from exposing his 
 views also in London, may also have written 
 that there would probably be some ' bluster ' ; 
 that ' the more firmly we stood by Austria 
 the sooner Russia would yield.' I have said 
 already that our policy was not based upon 
 alleged reports excluding war ; certainly at 
 that time I still thought war could be avoid- 
 ed, but, like all of us, I was fully aware of 
 the very serious danger. 
 
 " We could not agree to the English pro- 
 posal of a conference of Ambassadors, for it 
 would doubtless have led to a serious diplo- 
 matic defeat. For Italy, too, was pro-Serb 
 and, with her Balkan interests, stood rather 
 opposed to Austria. The ' intimacy of the 
 Russo-Italian relations ' is admitted by 
 Prince Lichnowsky himself. The best and 
 only feasible way of escape was a localiza- 
 tion of the conflict and an understanding be- 
 tween Vienna and Petrograd. We worked 
 toward that end with all our energy. That 
 we ' insisted upon ' the war is an unheard-of 
 assertion which is sufficiently invalidated by 
 the telegrams of his Majesty the Kaiser to 
 the Czar and to King George, published in 
 the White Books— Prince Lichnowsky only 
 cares to tell about ' the really humble tele- 
 gram of the Czar '—as well as the instruction 
 we sent to Vienna. The worst caricature is 
 formed by the sentence : 
 
 " ' When Count Berchtold finally decided 
 to come around we answered the Russian 
 mobilization, after Russia had vainly nego- 
 tiated and waited a whole week, with the ulti- 
 matum and the declaration of war.' 
 
 [In quoting Lichnowsky, Herr von Jagow 
 omits the former's statement that Count 
 Berchtold " hitherto had played the strong 
 man on instructions from Berlin."] 
 
 " Wrong " Conclusions 
 
 " Should we, perhaps, have waited until 
 the mobilized Russian Army was streaming 
 over our borders? The reading of the 
 Sukhomlinov trial has probably given even 
 Prince Lichnowsky a feeling of ' Oh si 
 
 tacuisses! ' On July 5 I was absent from 
 Berlin. The declaration that I was ' shortly 
 thereafter in Vienna ' ' in order to talk 
 everything over with Count Berchtold ' is 
 false. I returned to Berlin on July 6 from 
 my honeymoon trip and did not leave there 
 until Aug. 15, on the occasion of the shift- 
 ing of the Great Headquarters. As Secre- 
 tary of State I was only once in Vienna be- 
 fore the war, in the Spring of 1913. 
 
 " Prince Lichnowsky lightly passed over 
 the matter of the confusing dispatch that 
 he sent us on Aug. 1 — at present I am not 
 in possession of the exact wording— as a 
 ' misunderstanding' and even seems to want 
 to reproach us because ' in Berlin the news, 
 without first waiting for the conversation, 
 was made the basis of a far-reaching ac- 
 tion.' The question of war with England 
 was a matter of minutes, and immediately 
 after the arrival of the dispatch it was de- 
 cided to make an eleventh-hour attempt to 
 avoid war with France and England. His 
 Majesty sent the well-known telegram to 
 King George. The contents of the Lich- 
 nowsky dispatch could not have been under- 
 stood any other way than we understood it. 
 
 " Objectively taken, the statement of 
 Prince Lichnowsky presents such an abun- 
 dance of inaccuracies and distortions that 
 it is hardly a wonder that his conclusions 
 are also entirely wrong. The reproach that 
 we sent an ultimatum on July 30 to Petro- 
 grad merely because of the mobilization of 
 Russia and on July 31 declared war upon 
 the Russians, although the Czar had pledged 
 his word that not a man should march so 
 long as negotiations were under way, thus 
 willfully destroying the possibility of a 
 peaceful adjustment, has really a grotesque 
 effect. In concluding, the statement seems 
 almost to identify itself with the standpoint 
 of our enemies. 
 
 " When the Ambassador makes the accu- 
 sation that our policy identified itself ' with 
 Turks and Austro-Magyars ' and ' subjected 
 itself to the viewpoints of Vienna and Buda- 
 pest,' he may be suitably answered that he 
 saw things only through London spectacles 
 and from the narrow point of view of his 
 desired rapprochement with England a tout 
 prix. He also appears to have forgotten 
 completely that the Entente was formed 
 much more against us than against Austria. 
 
 " I, too, pursued a policy which aimed at 
 an understanding with England, because I 
 was of the opinion that this was the only 
 way for us to escape ' from the unfavorable 
 position in which we were placed by the un- 
 equal division of strength and the weakness 
 of the Triple Alliance.. But Russia and 
 France insisted upon war. We were obli- 
 gated through our treaty with Austria, and 
 our position as a great power was also 
 threatened— hie Rhodus, hie salta. But Eng- 
 land, that was not allfed in the same way 
 with Russia and that had received far-reach- 
 ing assurances from us regarding the sparing 
 of France and Belgium, seized the sword. 
 
LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 
 
 XXXIII. 
 
 " In saying- this, I by no means share the 
 opinion prevalent among us today that Eng- 
 land laid all the mines for the outbreak of 
 the war ; on the contrary, I believe in Sir 
 Edward Grey's love of peace and in his 
 earnest wish to arrive at an agreement with 
 us. But he had allowed himself to become 
 entangled too far in the net of the Franco- 
 Russian policy ; he no longer found the way 
 out, and he did not prevent the world war — 
 something that he could have done. Neither 
 was the war popular with the English people ; 
 Belgium had to serve as a battle cry. 
 
 " ' Political marriages for life and death ' 
 are, as Prince Lichnowsky says, not possible 
 in international unions. But neither is iso- 
 lation, under the present condition of affairs 
 in Europe. The history of Europe consists 
 of coalitions that sometimes have led to the 
 avoidance of warlike outbreaks and sometimes 
 to violent clashes. A loosening and dissolv- 
 ing of old alliances that no longer correspond 
 to all conditions is only in order when new 
 constellations are attainable. This was the 
 object of the policy of a rapprochement with 
 England. So long as this policy did not 
 offer reliable guarantees we could not aban- 
 don the old guarantees — even with their 
 obligations. 
 
 " The Morocco policy had led to a political 
 defeat. In the Bosnian crisis this had been 
 luckily avoided, the same as at the London 
 Conference. A fresh diminution of our 
 prestige was not endurable for our position 
 in Europe and in the world. The prosperity 
 of States, their political and economic suc- 
 cesses, are based upon the prestige that they 
 enjoy in the world. 
 
 " The personal attacks contained in the 
 work, the unheard-of calumnies and slan- 
 ders of others, condemn themselves. The 
 ever -recurring suspicion that everything 
 happened only because it was not desired to 
 allow him, Lichnowsky, any successes 
 speaks of wounded self-love, of disappointed 
 hopes for personal successes, and has a pain- 
 ful effect. 
 
 " In closing, let us draw attention here to 
 what Hermann Oncken has also quoted in 
 his work, ' The Old and New Central Eu- 
 rope,' the memorandum of Prince Bismarck 
 of the year 1879, in which the idea is devel- 
 oped that the German Empire must never 
 dare allow a situation in which it would 
 remain isolated on the European Continent 
 between Russia and France, side by side with 
 a defeated Austria-Hungary that had been 
 left in the lurch by Germany." 
 
 German Comments om von Jagow's Views 
 
 IN commenting upon Herr von Jagow's re- 
 ply to Prince Lichnowsky, Georg Bern- 
 hard, editor in chief of the Vossische 
 Zeitung, took occasion to re-emphasize his 
 favorite theory of a rapprochement with 
 Russia so as to enable Germany to reduce 
 Great Britain to the level of a second-class 
 power. In a long article, printed on March 
 31, Herr Bernhard asserted that Prince Lich- 
 nowsky had been by no means alone in his 
 policy of seeking agreement with England 
 as Herr von Jagow himself had admitted, and 
 that the German Foreign Office had seemed 
 obsessed with the idea that it was a ques- 
 tion of a choice between Austria and Eng- 
 land, when, in reality, if the diplomats had 
 wanted to pursue a good German policy and 
 at the same time be of service to Austria, 
 they should have made it a question of Rus- 
 sia or England and tried to establish good 
 relations with the former under all circum- 
 stances. After quoting von Jagow's remark 
 about the inadvisability of abandoning old 
 alliances until new constellations were at- 
 tainable, Herr Bernhard said: 
 
 " We Shall not go into the question here 
 if, during this war, which strains all the 
 forces of the alliance to the utmost, a for- 
 mer German Secretary of State should have 
 written such sentences. It is incomprehen- 
 sible how they came from the pen of a sen- 
 sible man — and Herr von Jagow is such a 
 one. And it is still more incomprehensible 
 how they were able to escape the attention 
 
 of the Foreign Office. Fortunately, they 
 can no longer do any harm now, as through 
 our deeds we have demonstrated our loyalty 
 to the Austrians and Hungarians better than 
 it can be done by any amount of talk." 
 
 In an earlier editorial Herr Bernhard re- 
 ferred as follows to von Jagow's admission 
 that he did not believe that England had laid 
 all the mines leading to the world war: 
 
 " In spite of all experiences, therefore, 
 here is another — almost official — attempt 
 made to represent the war as merely the re- 
 sult of the aggressive desires of France and 
 Russia. As if France (through whose pop- 
 ulation went a shudder of fear as it saw 
 itself on the edge of the abyss of war) would 
 ever have dared to go to war without know- 
 ing that England stood back of her ! And 
 were Edward's trips to Paris without any 
 effect upon our diplomats? Has it not also 
 finally become sufficiently well known 
 through the reports of the Belgian Ambas- 
 sador how France repeatedly tried to escape 
 from the alliance, but was always again 
 forced into the net by Nicolson, [former 
 British Under Secretary for Foreign Af- 
 fairs,] through Edward? The Imperial Chan- 
 cellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, himself ad- 
 mitted in the Reichstag the harmful role of 
 King Edward. Only he, as probably did 
 Herr von Jagow also, thought that Edward's 
 death put an end to the policy of encircling. 
 But this policy of encircling— and here 
 is where the mistake entailing seri- 
 
XXXIV. 
 
 THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 
 
 ous consequences is made by our diplomats — 
 was not at all merely a personal favorite 
 idea of Edward "VII., but the continuation 
 of the traditional English policy toward the 
 strongest Continental power." 
 
 Herr Bernhard then asserted that England 
 desired the publication of the proposed An- 
 glo-German treaty regarding the division of 
 the Portuguese colonies into spheres of eco- 
 nomic interests so as to make Portugal's 
 eventual support of the Entente all the 
 surer, and continued : 
 
 Thanks for Hindenburg 
 
 " And Lichnowsky wanted to fall into this 
 trap set by England. It was avoided by the 
 Foreign Office more through instinct than 
 sagacity. And these diplomats have guided 
 Germany's destiny before and during the 
 war ! Let us give the warmest thanks to 
 Hindenburg because his sword has now, it is 
 to be hoped, put an end once for all to the 
 continued spinning of plans by such and 
 similar diplomats even during the war." 
 
 Teodor Wolff, editor in chief of the Ber- 
 liner Tageblatt, probably the leading organ 
 of the German business elements and liberal 
 politicians who were opposed to the war from 
 the beginning, and who still hope for a nego- 
 tiated peace that will facilitate an early 
 resumption of trade relations' with Great 
 Britain and the rest of the allies, expressed 
 the hope that the " battle of minds will 
 finally create a clearer atmosphere," and 
 then remarked : 
 
 " Only quite incidentally would I like to 
 allow myself to direct the attention of Herr 
 von Jagow to an erroneous expression that 
 appears twice in his reply. Herr von Jagow 
 writes : ' "We informed him [Lichnowsky] of 
 the secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement,' 
 and in another place : ' The secret Anglo- 
 Russian naval agreement might also have 
 made him a little more skeptical.' Only the 
 day before, on Saturday, it was said in an 
 article of the Norddeutshe Allgemeine Zei- 
 tung, also directed against Lichnowsky : 
 ' Negotiations were pending with Russia over 
 a naval agreement that the Prince character- 
 istically passes over in silence.' In reality, 
 although hasty historians also speak with- 
 out further ceremony of a treaty, it is mani- 
 fest that no Anglo-Russian agreement exist- 
 ed; there was merely a Russian proposal, 
 and the most that can be said is that ' nego- 
 tiations were pending.' * * * 
 
 " His [von Jagow's] remark, 'It is not true 
 that the Foreign Office did not believe the 
 reports that England would protect France 
 under all circumstances,' is in contradiction 
 with the well-known report of the then Eng- 
 lish Ambassador, Goschen, which describes 
 into what surprise and consternation Herr 
 von Bethmann and Herr von Jagow were 
 thrown by the news of the English declara- 
 tion of war." 
 
 In beginning his comment upon von Jagow, 
 
 Herr Wolff threw a little more light upon 
 the way in which Prince Lichnowsky's mem- 
 orandum " for the family archives " got into 
 more or less general secret circulation in 
 Germany before it was printed by the Swed- 
 ish Socialist paper Politiken last March, and 
 also described the character of Captain 
 Beerfelde, the member of the German Gen- 
 eral Staff who, according to some cabled 
 reports, is to be tried for his part in distrib- 
 uting copies of the memorandum. 
 
 Herr Wolff said that Prince Lichnowsky 
 had had five or six copies made, of which he 
 had sent one to Wolff, one to Albert Ballin, 
 head of the Hamburg- American line, and 
 another to Arthur von Gwinner, head of 
 the Deutsche Bank. All of these persons 
 carefully hid the " dangerous gift " in the 
 deepest recesses of their writing desks, but 
 a fourth copy went astray and got into 
 hands for which it had not been intended, 
 and from these hands passed into those of 
 still another individual. Then the editor 
 wrote : 
 
 How Manuscript Became Public 
 
 " I made the acquaintance some years be- 
 fore the war of the officer who obtained the 
 memorandum 'on loan,' and sent copies of 
 it to State officials and politicians. He be- 
 longs to an old noble family, was treated 
 with sympathy by General von Moltke, the 
 Chief of the General Staff, occupied himself 
 enthusiastically with religious philosophy or 
 theosophy, and was a thoroughly manly but 
 mystic person. * * * After hard war ex- 
 periences, he felt the longing to serve the 
 dictates of peace with complete devotion, and 
 he surrendered himself to a pacifism which 
 is absolutely incompatible with the uniform. 
 
 " Late one evening he visited me in a state 
 of great excitement, and told me that he had 
 manifolded a memorandum by Prince Lich- 
 nowsky which had been lent to him, and that, 
 without asking the author, he had sent it 
 to the ' leading men.' It was impossible to 
 convince him by any logic or on any grounds 
 of reason that his action was wrong, sense- 
 less, and harmful. He was a Marquis Posa, 
 or, still more, a Horatius Codes, who, out 
 of love for Rome or for mankind, sprang 
 into the abyss." 
 
 The Berlin Vorwarts, the leading organ of 
 the pro-Government Socialists, began its ed- 
 itorial on the von Jagow reply by remarking 
 that the article of the former State Secre- 
 tary for Foreign Affairs was hardly cal- 
 culated to convince the reader that Prince 
 Lichnowsky's self-esteem was the only thing 
 that had had a " painful effect " upon the 
 German people in July; 1914, and since that 
 time. It then said that " Herr von Jagow 
 agrees with Lichnowsky upon the decisive 
 point!" quoted what von Jagow had said 
 about his desire for an Anglo-German rap- 
 prochement, and continued : 
 
 " These words show mat, in 1913, the Wil- 
 helmstrasse and the London Embassy were 
 in the complete harmony of common beliefs 
 
LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 
 
 XXXV. 
 
 and intentions. Herr von Jagow, exactly like 
 Lichnowsky, exactly like Bethmann, and ex- 
 actly like Wilhelm II., believed in the possi- 
 bility of creating ' an atmosphere of confi- 
 dence,' as Jagow says, between Germany and 
 England, through a series of agreements, of 
 which those regarding the Bagdad Railroad 
 and Africa were to have been the first." 
 
 Vorwarts then proceeded to point out that 
 the Albanian crisis had strengthened this 
 faith instead of weakening it, took up von 
 Jagow's reasons for Germany's refusal to 
 have the proposed Anglo-German agreement 
 on the Portuguese African colonies published, 
 and exclaimed : 
 
 " What a fear of Tirpitz ! A disturbing of 
 the new relations through his intrigues and 
 the howling of his jingo press was to be 
 avoided through an affectation of secrecy. 
 But three weeks later the war with England 
 was here and the Pan-German sheets wel- 
 comed ' the longed-for day ! ' What had hap- 
 pened in the meantime? Of course, ' perfid- 
 ious Albion ' (even Jagow puts quotation 
 marks on these words) had in the meantime 
 thrown off the mask and revealed her per- 
 fidy ! Let's hear what — after Lichnowsky — 
 Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State for For- 
 eign Affairs in July, 1914, has to say 
 about it! " 
 
 Then Vorwarts quoted Jagow's description 
 of how the war began, and went on : 
 
 " All that remains of the accusations 
 against the English Government is that it 
 did not prevent the world war, ' although it 
 could have done so.' Now Herr von Jagow 
 also did not prevent the world war, but he 
 must certainly be acquitted of the charge 
 that he could have prevented it. He really 
 could not, and so an emphatic statement of 
 inability is the best excuse for him and his 
 fellow-disputants. 
 
 " Let us establish the facts. England did 
 not desire the war; she merely did not pre- 
 vent it. The war was not popular in Eng- 
 land ; it also was not popular in Russia and 
 France. But it has become popular. The 
 whole world — right away across the Atlantic 
 and the Pacific — is united in hatred against 
 us. We, however, have for almost four years 
 been inoculated with the view that ' England 
 laid all the mines which caused the war ' — 
 a view which the Secretary of State, in ac- 
 cordance with the evidence of the Ambassa- 
 dor, has now declared to be false ! It is, 
 however, by this false view that the whole 
 war policy of the German Empire has been 
 directed— from the declaration of unrestrict- 
 ed submarine warfare, which brought us 
 war with America, down to those Chancellor 
 speeches which say that Belgium must not 
 again become England's area of military con- 
 centration. 
 
 " If all the parties concerned were con- 
 vinced that the belief in England's guilt is a 
 fiction, why did they feed this belief, and 
 why did they pursue a policy which was 
 based upon it? They ought rather to have 
 appointed to the Chancellorship Tirpitz, who, 
 perhaps, believes what he says. Instead of 
 that, a policy of fear of Tirpitz has been 
 pursued. Sometimes a policy against Tirpitz 
 has been attempted, but it has always been 
 reversed at decisive moments, out of fear of 
 the nationalistic terror. 
 
 " This fear was, perhaps, not entirely un- 
 founded, for agitation is unscrupulous. The 
 older ones among us still remember very 
 well ' an Englishwoman ' who was very un- 
 popular in many circles, but this English- 
 woman was the mother of the German 
 Kaiser. No doubt there was no more con- 
 venient method for the Government to guard 
 the dynasty than for it to take part in, or 
 at least to tolerate, the agitation against 
 the English. This was the only way of pre- 
 venting the agitation from turning ultimately 
 against the wearer of the German imperial 
 crown. But ought such intimate considera- 
 tions to have been permitted to play a part 
 when the fate of the nations was at stake? 
 
 " Let us put an end to this ! At this 
 moment we are in a battle which may be 
 decisive and which is going in favor of the 
 empire. But even after this battle we shall 
 possess neither the possibility nor the moral 
 right to treat our opponent according to the 
 principle of ' With thumbs in his eyes and 
 knee on his breast.' Even after the greatest 
 military successes there exists the necessity 
 for political negotiation. It will be easier 
 for us to enter into this negotiation after 
 the poisonous fog of the war lies shall have 
 lifted. Now that Herr von Jagow has 
 cleared up the role played by England at the 
 beginning of the war, there is nothing in the 
 way of the fulfillment of the promise made 
 by Bethmann to ' make good the wrong com- 
 mitted against Belgium ' ! 
 
 " If it is perhaps true chat everything Wil- 
 helm II., Bethmann, von Jagow, and Lich- 
 nowsky thought was true up to three weeks 
 before the outbreak of the war was false, 
 then let the mistake be acknowledged and 
 the conservative Pan-Germans be put openly 
 in the Government, so that they, both within 
 and without, may complete the work of a 
 peace by force. But if this is neither de- 
 sirable nor possible, then there is nothing 
 left to do but to take a decided step ahead. 
 For the German people cannot be satisfied 
 with the methods of governing exercised 
 before and during the war. * * * The Ger- 
 man people can only endure after the war as 
 a peace-loving nation that governs itself." 
 
Lichnowsky's Testimony as to Germany's 
 Long Plotting for Domination 
 
 By H. Charles Woods, F. R. G. S. 
 
 TO a Britisher who has followed the trend 
 of events in the Near East, and who 
 has witnessed the gradual development 
 of German intrigues in that area, there has 
 never been published a document so im- 
 portant and so condemnatory of Germany as 
 the disclosures of Prince Lichnowsky. 
 
 On the one hand, the memorandum of the 
 Kaiser's ex-Ambassador in London proves 
 from an authoritative enemy pen that, prac- 
 tically ever since the Russo-Turkish war of 
 1877-78, and particularly from the time of 
 the accession of the present Emperor to the 
 throne in 1S88, the Germans have carefully 
 prepared the way for the present war, and 
 that during this period they have consistently 
 turned their attention toward the East and 
 toward the development of the Mitteleuropa 
 scheme. And on the other side it indicates, 
 if indeed any indication were still required, 
 that the so-called rivalry existing between 
 England and Germany prior to the war 
 arose not from any desire on the part of 
 Great Britain to stand in the way of the 
 development of legitimate German interests 
 in the Balkans and in Asia Minor, but from 
 the unwillingness of the Government, of Ber- 
 lin to agree to any reasonable settlement of 
 the many all-important questions connected 
 with these regions. 
 
 Although for years the Germans had been 
 intriguing against the Triple Entente, Prince 
 Lichnowsky, a man possessed of personally 
 friendly feelings for England, was sent to 
 London in order to camouflage the real 
 designs of the enemy and to secure repre- 
 sentation by a diplomatist who was intended 
 to make good, and who, in fact, did make 
 a high position for himself in British official 
 and social circles. The appointment itself 
 raises two interesting questions. In the first 
 place, while this is not stated in the memo- 
 randum, it is clear that, whereas Baron 
 Marschall von Bieberstein was definitely in- 
 structed to endeavor to make friends with 
 England and to detach her from France and 
 Russia, or, if this were impossible, to bring 
 about war at a convenient time for Germany, 
 Prince Lichnowsky' s task was somewhat dif- 
 ferent. Kept at least more or less in the 
 dark as to German objects, the Ambassador, 
 who arrived in London when the Morocco 
 crisis of 1911 was considered at an end, in- 
 stead of being intrusted with the dual ob- 
 jects of his predecessor, was clearly told to do, 
 and did in fact do, his utmost to establish 
 friendly relations with England. The Berlin 
 Government, on the other hand, this time 
 maintained in its .own hands the larger 
 question of the making of war at what it 
 
 believed, happily wrongly, to be a convenient 
 time for the Central Empires. In the second 
 place, although this, too, is not explained, 
 various references made by Prince Lichnow- 
 sky leave little doubt in the mind of the 
 reader who knows the situation existing at 
 the German Embassy prior to the outbreak 
 of war that the Ambassador himself was 
 aware that von Kiihlmann — the Councilor of 
 Embassy— was, in fact, the representative of 
 Pan-Germanism, in England, and that to this 
 very able and expert intriguer was" left the 
 work of trying to develop a situation which, 
 in peace or in war, would be favorable to 
 the ruler and to the class whose views he 
 voiced. 
 
 Phases of German Policy 
 
 To come down to the real subject of this 
 article— the proof provided by Prince Lich- 
 nowsky' s disclosures of the long existence 
 of the German Mitteleuropa scheme and of 
 the fact that Germany, and not Austria, made 
 ihis war, largely with the object of pushing 
 through her designs in the East— I propose 
 to divide my remarks in such a way as to 
 show that the development of this scheme 
 passed through three phases and in each case 
 to take what may be called a text from the 
 document under discussion. 
 
 The first phase lasted from the Congress 
 of Berlin of 1878, when Prince Lichnowsky 
 says that Germany began the Triple Al- 
 liance policy, and more definitely from the 
 accession of the present Emperor to the 
 throne in 1888 until the Balkan wars. While 
 in using these expressions the ex- Ambassador 
 does not refer only to this period, he says : 
 " The goal of our political ambition was to 
 dominate in the Bosporus," and " instead 
 of encouraging a powerful development in 
 the Balkan States, we placed ourselves on 
 the side of the Turkish and Magyar op- 
 pressors." 
 
 These words contain in essence and in tabu- 
 lated form an explanation (from the pen of 
 a German whose personal and official posi- 
 tions enabled him to know the truth) of the 
 events which were in progress during this 
 period— events the full importance of which 
 has often been refuted and denied by those 
 who refused to see that from the first the 
 Kaiser was obsessed by a desire for domina- 
 tion from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. 
 Indeed, from the moment of his accession 
 the sentiments and views of the German 
 ruler became markedly apparent, for one 
 year later his Majesty paid the first of his 
 carpet-bagging visits to Constantinople— a 
 visit more or less connected with the then 
 
LICHNOWSKY'S MEMORANDUM 
 
 XXXVII. 
 
 recent grabbing- of Haidar Pasha-Ismid rail- 
 way—now the first section of the Bagdad 
 line— by the Germans, and with the pro- 
 longation of that line to Angora as a German 
 concern, concessions secured by Mr. Kaula, 
 acting on behalf of German interests in 1SSS. 
 
 Preparing for Pan-German Project 
 
 Before and particularly after the appoint- 
 ment of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, 
 who had then been a personal friend of the 
 Kaiser for many years, the enemy had been 
 carefully preparing the way for the realiza- 
 tion of his Pan-German dreams in the Near 
 and Middle East. Although so far as the 
 Balkan States were concerned, up to the out- 
 break of the war the Kaiser endeavored to 
 screen his intentions behind a nominally 
 Austrian program, for years he had really 
 been making ready his ground for the pres- 
 ent occasion by military, political, and eco- 
 nomic penetration and by diplomatic intrigues 
 destined to bring about a favorable situation 
 for Germany when the propitious moment for 
 action arrived. The power of von der Goltz 
 Pasha, who introduced the present military 
 system into Turkey in 1886, and of his pupils 
 was gradually increased until the Ottoman 
 Army was finally placed completely under 
 Germanic control. 
 
 The Young Turkish revolution of 1908, 
 which at first seemed destined greatly to 
 minimize German power at Constantinople, 
 really resulted in an opposite effect. Thus in 
 spite of the effective support of England for 
 Turkey during the Bosnian and Bulgarian 
 crises of 1908 and 1909, a gradual reaction 
 subsequently set in. This was due in part to 
 the cleverness and regardlessness of von Bie- 
 berstein, and in part to the circumstances 
 arising out of the policy adopted by the 
 Young Turks. For instance, while the Ger- 
 mans ignored the necessity for reforms in 
 the Ottoman Empire so long as the Turks 
 favored a Teutonic program, it was impos- 
 sible for the British Government or the Brit- 
 ish public to look with favor upon a regime 
 which worked to maintain the privileged po- 
 sition of Moslems throughout the empire, 
 which did nothing to punish those who insti- 
 gated the massacre of the Armenians of 
 Cilicia in 1909, and which was intent upon 
 disturbing the status quo in the Persian Gulf, 
 and upon changing the status of Egypt to the 
 Turkish advantage. 
 
 The Turco-German Entente 
 
 Such indeed became the position that even 
 the Turco-Italfan war, which might have 
 been expected to shake the confidence of the 
 Ottoman Government in the bona fides of 
 Italy's then ally, did not seriously disturb the 
 intimate relations which were gradually de- 
 veloping between Berlin and Constantinople. 
 Here again enemy intrigues were to the fore, 
 for in addition to Austria's ol jecting to the 
 inauguration of any Italian operations in 
 the Balkans, the German Government, when 
 the position of its representat've in Constan- 
 
 tinople had become seriously compromised 
 as a result of the Italian annexation of 
 Tripoli, which he could not prevent, sud- 
 denly found it convenient to transfer von 
 Bieberstein to London and to replace him by 
 another, perhaps less able, but certainly none 
 the less successful in retaining a grasp over 
 everything which took place in the Ottoman 
 capital. 
 
 Before and particularly after the accession 
 of the Kaiser to the throne, the Germans 
 gradually furthered their program by a sys- 
 tem of railway penetration in the East. In 
 the late '60s Baron Hirsch secured a con- 
 cession for the construction of lines from 
 Constantinople to what was then the north- 
 western frontier of Eastern Rumelia, and 
 from Saloniki to Mitrovitza, with a branch 
 to Ristovatz on the then Serbian frontier. 
 At first these lines were under French in- 
 fluence, but they subsequently became largely 
 an Austrian undertaking, and considerably 
 later the Deutsche Bank secured a predom- 
 inating proportion of the capital, thus turn- 
 ing them practically into a German concern. 
 In Asia Minor the British, who were origi- 
 nally responsible for the construction of rail- 
 ways, were gradually ousted, until, with the 
 signature of the Bagdad Railway agreement 
 in 1903, the Germans dominated not only 
 that line, but also occupied a position in 
 which, on the one hand, they had secured 
 control of many of its feeders, and, on the 
 other, they had jeopardized the future de- 
 velopment and even the actual prosperity of 
 those not already in the*r possession. 
 
 Fruits of the Balkan Wars 
 
 This (brings us up to the second phase in 
 the development of Pan-Germanism in the 
 East — the period of the Balkan wars — to- 
 ward two aspects of which, as Prince Lich- 
 nowsky says, the Central Powers devoted 
 their attention. " Two possibilities for set- 
 tling the question remained." Either Ger- 
 many left the Near Eastern problem to the 
 peoples themselves or she supported he>r 
 allies " and carried out a Triple Alliance pol- 
 icy in the East, thereby giving up the role 
 of mediator." Once more, in the words of 
 the Prince himself, " The German Foreign 
 Office very much preferred the latter," and 
 as a result supported Austria on the one 
 hand in her desire for the establishment of 
 an independent Albania, and on the other in 
 her successful attempts to draw Bulgaria 
 into the second war and to prevent that coun- 
 try from providing the concessions which at 
 that time would have satisfied Rumania. 
 
 So far as the first of these questions — that 
 connected with Albania — is concerned, while 
 the ex-Ambassador admits the policy of Aus- 
 tria was actuated by the fact that she 
 " would not allow Serbia to reach the Adri- 
 atic," the actual creation of Albania was jus- 
 tified by the existence of the Albanians as 
 a nationality and by their desire for inde- 
 pendent government. Indeed, that the regime 
 inaugurated by the great powers on the east 
 
XXXVIII. 
 
 THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 
 
 of the Adriatic, and particularly the Govern- 
 ment of "William of Wied, proved an utter 
 failure, was due not so much to what Prince 
 Lichnowsky describes as the " incapacity of 
 existence " of Albania as to the attitude of 
 the Central Powers, and especially to that 
 of Austria, who, having- brought the new 
 State into being, at once worked for unrest 
 and for discord in the hope of being aible to 
 step in to put the house in order when the 
 propitious moment arrived. 
 
 Promoting Balkan Discord 
 
 The second direction in which the enemy 
 devoted his energy was an even larger, more 
 German and more far-reaching one. " The 
 first Balkan war led to the collapse of Tur- 
 key and with it the defeat of our policy, 
 which has been identified with Turkey for 
 many years," says the memorandum. This 
 at one time seemed destined to carry with 
 it results entirely disadvantageous to Ger- 
 many. Thus, if the four States, Bulgaria, 
 Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia, who fought 
 in the first war had continued on good terms 
 with one another, the whole balance of 
 power in Europe would almost certainly have 
 been changed. Instead of the Ottoman Em- 
 pire, which prior to the outbreak of these 
 hostilities was held by competent authorities 
 to be able to provide a vast army, then cal- 
 culated to number approximately 1,225,000 
 men, there would have sprung up a friendly 
 group of countries which in the near future 
 could easily have placed in the field a con- 
 bined army approximately amounting to a"t 
 least 1,000,000, all told. As the interests of 
 such a confederation, which would probably 
 have been joined by Rumania, would have 
 been on the side of the Triple Entente, the 
 Central Powers at once realized that its 
 formation or its continued existence would 
 mean for them not only the loss of the whole 
 of Turkey, but also the gain for their ene- 
 mies of four or five allies, most of whom 
 had already proved their power in war. 
 
 The Kaiser was not then prepared to make 
 war, for his fleet was not ready, his Zeppe- 
 lins were not perfect, and the enlargement 
 of his Kiel Canal was not complete. While 
 supporting Austria and at the same time 
 exerting restraining influence with her, 
 Germany therefore then contented herself 
 by creating a favorable situation for the fu- 
 ture. Thus, the Kaiser, acting still through 
 the- mouthpiece of Vienna, encouraged the 
 rivalry which existed between Bulgaria and 
 her former allies — a rivalry which ended in 
 the second Balkan war. 
 
 That war, and particularly the fatal Treaty 
 of Bucharest, was temporarily " a reproach 
 
 to Austria," but in the long run it was a 
 trump card for Germany in that it led not 
 to a settlement, but simply to the holding in 
 suspense of the numerous Near Eastern ques- 
 tions which had been the means of shaking 
 the European concert to its very foundation. 
 Indeed, that war, together with nominal set- 
 tlement of the Aegean Islands question, 
 which left Turkey and Greece on the most 
 strained terms, and the entirely unjustifiable 
 shutting off of Serbia from the Adriatic 
 coast left the Near East then still Europe's 
 greatest danger zone. In short, these events 
 created situations as a result of which Ger- 
 many would be able to bring about war at 
 almost any moment and as a consequence of 
 which the Balkan States were so divided in 
 policy that there would be nothing seriously 
 to bar an enemy push toward the East. 
 
 German Power in Turkey 
 
 Between the Balkan wars and the out- 
 break of the European conflagration, but as 
 part of the former period, there occurred two 
 events of far-reaching significance. The first, 
 which is mentioned by Prince Lichnowsky, 
 was the appointment of General Liman von 
 Sanders practically as Commander in Chief of 
 the Turkish Army— an appointment which 
 Mr. Morgenthau rightly tells us constituted a 
 diplomatic triumph for Germany. When coup- 
 led with the fact that Enver Pasha — an out- 
 and-out pro-German — became Minister of 
 War about the same time, the military result 
 of this appointment was an enormous im- 
 provement in the efficiency of the Ottoman 
 Army. Its political significance, on the other 
 hand, was due to the fact that it carried with 
 it a far-reaching increase of Pan-German in- 
 fluence at Constantinople. 
 
 The second event in progress during the 
 interval of peace was connected with the 
 Aegean Islands question. Germany, having 
 first utilized her diplomatic influence in 
 favor of Turkey, later on encouraged the 
 Government of that country in its continued 
 protests against the decision upon that ques- 
 tion arrived at by the great powers. Not 
 content, however, with this, the Kaiser, who 
 has now adopted the policy of deportation in 
 Belgium, in Poland, and in Serbia, definitely 
 encouraged the Turks in a like measure in 
 regard to the Greeks of Asia Minor in order 
 to be rid of a hostile and Christian popula- 
 tion when the time for action arrived. That 
 this encouragement was given was always 
 apparent to those who followed the course 
 of events in 1914, but that it was admitted 
 by a German Admiral to Mr. Morgenthau 
 constitutes a condemnation the damning- 
 nature of which it is difficult to exaggerate. 
 
Prince Lichnowsky as Seen by a Friend 
 
 By Baroness Souiny 
 
 KARL MAX LICHNOWSKY, sixth Prince 
 of the Princedom of Gratz, Austria, 
 and Kuchelna, Prussia, officer of the 
 highest orders, with a permanent seat in the 
 Prussian House of Lords, is practically a 
 prisoner in his castle, as a result of his out- 
 spoken denunciation of German responsibility 
 for the war. 
 
 I first met Prince Lichnowsky in Flor- 
 ence, in a little antiquity shop. He had his 
 back turned to me and was deeply engrossed 
 in studying a couple of vases. The store- 
 keeper, a fantastic old Italian, gesticulated 
 violently, his tongue raging like a whirlwind 
 to convince his client of the value of the 
 bargain he was about to close. He asked 800 
 lire for the vases. Neither of them noticed 
 my presence, and when the Italian stopped 
 his eloquence the other began, in a broken 
 voice and in broken Italian, to fight the price, 
 which was much too high. 
 
 I was anxious to see the man's face, after 
 having studied the unusual lines of his head 
 and his fine nervous hands. At last he 
 turned around, and I looked straight into 
 deep gray eyes which, interested only in his 
 purchase, looked through me without seeing 
 me. Both talked at the top of their voices; 
 the storekeeper swore and jumped into the air 
 several times, while the other rubbed his 
 hands, his eyes still on the vases, which he 
 was nearly ready to buy. 
 
 I was highly amused and interested, so I 
 took a close view of one of the vases, turn- 
 it around the better to inspect it. Evidently 
 the gentleman disliked this intensely, and, 
 as if protecting the vases which were so 
 nearly his, he stretched out his hands to 
 them. " It is not worth while," I said in 
 French to him. "It is cheap stuff, although 
 the color is a good imitation." He looked 
 aghast at me, and the storekeeper fumed 
 restlessly when another person entered the 
 little shop, who proved to be a mutual ac- 
 quaintance of mine and of the buyer. After 
 he had examined the vases the newcomer 
 asked the storekeeper why he was trying to 
 cheat his friend Prince Lichnowsky with a 
 Renaissance imitation. The old man stroked 
 his little white beard in embarrassment, and, 
 then, smiling whimsically, apologized for 
 having taken the Prince for an Englishman. 
 
 The incident was closed, and the three of 
 us left the store to walk through the Giardino 
 Boboli. The Prince was still absorbed in his 
 mistake in believing the vases to be genuine. 
 
 " "We live too far from the really fine 
 things in life," he said, thoughtfully. " We 
 live our life too superficially; we permit 
 ourselves to spend our time in ridiculous 
 office work, Which they call diplomacy or 
 politics. Offices are the ruin of political and 
 diplomatic talents ; one is born for such a 
 thing, not made." 
 
 Only after I knew him better did I under- 
 stand this temperamental remark. At the 
 time I took it for the discontent of a man 
 whose stomach was weak. I understood 
 that he had left the Diplomatic Service, 
 which had taken him down to one of the 
 Balkan States, at the time when Herr von 
 Biilow, later Chancellor Prince Biilow, was 
 Ambassador there. 
 
 Thanks to Lichnowsky, I entered the won- 
 derful salon of von Biilow's wife, who is an 
 Italian, known throughout Italy as " Donna 
 Laura." Lichnowsky belonged to the inti- 
 mates of this circle, never complaining of the 
 insignificant position which Prince Biilow 
 gave him so long as he had the privilege of 
 association with these high-spirited people 
 who helped him to grasp the profoundest 
 meaning of State ideas. 
 
 To understand what made Lichnowsky so 
 different from the Prussian Junkers needs 
 only a simple explanation. He was not a 
 Prussian, nor even a German. He was ut- 
 terly Slavic, descended from the Bohemian 
 Lichnowskys, who, since the fourteenth cent- 
 ury, when Bohemia was a centre of Euro- 
 pean culture, had their estates in the Czech 
 part of Silesia, which Frederick the Great, 
 in the Seven Years' War, stole from Austria. 
 It was remarkable what a distinctive at- 
 mosphere his home breathed, although it was 
 only in an indifferent apartment house in the 
 Tiergarten Street. When at a visitor's ap- 
 proach the hall door flew open, as if touched 
 by a magic wand, a footman stood at each 
 wing like a sentinel. In the little dining 
 room, with a footman behind each guest at 
 the table, the Prince had served the most de- 
 licious luncheons and dinners. The prepara- 
 tions for the meal he considered of great im- 
 portance, and at the table he noted his crit- 
 icisms in a little book placed beside his plate. 
 It was a culinary joy to eat with Prince 
 Lichnowsky, but the food never interfered 
 with the intense conversation inspired by the 
 Prince and kept going by his comments. 
 
 In his amazing revelations the Prince sar- 
 castically remarked that he did not belong 
 to the inner circle of the Kaiser. I had to 
 smile, remembering his conversations breath- 
 ing his revolt against junkerdom, narrow- 
 mindedness, and all the faded ideas preached 
 at the castle of his Majesty, which under- 
 mine all modern and original movements in 
 art and literature. Painters like Liebermann 
 and originators of new theatrical ideas like 
 Reinhardt belonged to the Lichnowsky circle, 
 and there was no modern thought, no ideas 
 of a free genius, which were not deeply dis- 
 cussed in Prince Lichnowsky's house. 
 
 To the great surprise of his friends, Prince 
 Lichnowsky married in August, 1904. His 
 friends at first feared that the unique, re- 
 fined, and intellectual circle would cease to 
 
XL. 
 
 THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY 
 
 be, but they soon found their fears to be 
 groundless. The Prince had found the right 
 wife. Mechtilde, Countess Arco, was fresh 
 as a rose in body and in spirit. She was 
 reared in happy Munich, where aristocracy 
 was no barrier to developing in a wholesome 
 and Bohemian way. This marriage was ar- 
 ranged by Prince Karl's mother, who was 
 anxious that the Lichnowsky line should not 
 be extinguished with her only son. It turned 
 out to be the happiest combination of spirits, 
 and the family tree was continued in two 
 fine boys and a golden-curled girl. 
 
 More than ever Prince Lichnowsky retired 
 from the political horizon without any ten- 
 dency to live in the good graces of his 
 Majesty the Kaiser. He was utterly bored 
 with his inherited duties, and he was more 
 interested in the sharp political sarcasms of 
 a Maximilian Harden than in the political 
 and diplomatic blunders committed in the 
 Reichstag. 
 
 With all his liberal ideas he was an aristo- 
 crat. Though strikingly ugly, this was com- 
 pletely forgotten when he spoke and smiled. 
 He was small and almost deformed, with 
 feet too big, with a grave and heavy car- 
 riage, his hands always clasped behind him, 
 and with the excited, high-pitched voice of a 
 boy. 
 
 So he sat aside for many years — waiting 
 for a big job, as he always said. Whenever 
 an embassy was vacant, the name of Lich- 
 nowsky came up, only to vanish. His ap- 
 pointment was always postponed, for he was 
 not liked on account of his independent 
 spirit and modern ideas. 
 
 There was the greatest difference between 
 his two estates at Kuchelna in Prussia and 
 Gratz in Austria, especially in their -spirit. 
 Gratz still breathed the easy-going, refined 
 taste of his artistic and musical ancestors. In 
 the castle is a room where Beethoven wrote 
 many of his immortal works ; the piano was 
 left untouched as Beethoven had closed it. 
 Those who know the life of Beethoven know 
 that it was a Prince Lichnowsky, the present 
 Prince's grandfather, who was one of the 
 truest and most devoted patrons of the great 
 and unhappy composer. Beethoven dedica- 
 ted one of his sonatas to him. 
 
 No wonder that Beethoven was inspired in 
 the wonderful gardens of Gratz, those endless 
 alleys with blossoming horse chestnuts and 
 sweet-perfumed linden trees, with myste- 
 rious high woods behind the lawns, where in 
 the dim light of the first dusk the deer gazed 
 unafraid over the fences. All was wonder 
 and romance around the old castle, and un- 
 bounded hospitality was offered to the guests. 
 All was gay and happy there. The servants 
 came from families which had served the 
 
 family for centuries. In the guest rooms 
 there was a placard asking the guests not 
 to tip the servants. 
 
 The Prince was a thorough farmer — he 
 kneW all about cattle, grain, sugar beets, 
 and how to make his estate self-supporting 
 and even money-making. 
 
 It was a wonderful free community which 
 always surrounded the Prince in Gratz. In 
 the library of the castle there were the 
 liveliest discussions, a free interchange of 
 ideas. 
 
 It was different at Kuchelna. This was the 
 place of the Prince's black thoughts; here the 
 inhabitants of the village looked sullen and 
 subjugated. They never belonged in their 
 hearts to the cold Prussian domination. Here 
 the Prince had to perform his social duties, 
 to give hunting parties arranged for the 
 German aristocracy, his neighbors. To these 
 he had to invite the Court people. 
 
 When the day came when he was needed 
 Prince Lichnowsky was well prepared for the 
 responsibility of the London Ambassadorship. 
 Nominated by the Court party as a temporary 
 man, he was greeted by the younger set of 
 politicians with great expectations. He had 
 been trained by the best minds and influenced 
 by the most liberal men, and later he proved 
 to his teachers that he had not only under- 
 stood them, but had developed in his own 
 way practical ideas which were far ahead 
 of all gray theories. 
 
 No wonder that he loved England and tnat 
 the English understood him. When he says 
 in his revelations that the Kaiser did not 
 wish him to improve the relations between 
 England and Germany and envied him his 
 personal success, it is not vanity which 
 prompts the statement, but a deep under- 
 standing of the fact that the Kaiser would 
 not have his relations with England changed 
 unless he himself could accomplish it. Since 
 all the world knew of the antipathy of King 
 Edward for him, the Kaiser wished, through 
 realizing his ambition, to show that King 
 Edward's dislike was personal and unjust 
 and that the English people had no hard 
 feeling toward him. 
 
 The last time I saw Prince Lichnowsky was 
 in Berlin. He was on a vacation from Lon- 
 don and on his way home. Then the war 
 came, catching so many of us in a country 
 friendly and hospitable yesterday— hard and 
 merciless today. Lichnowsky returned from 
 England and met hostility. He felt that he 
 had never belonged to the German race. His 
 flaming " I Accuse " was poured forth from 
 his oppressed soul. He could not wait for 
 history to justify him and to condemn the 
 Kaiser and his helpers before all mankind 
 for all eternity. 
 
The World of 1914 is dead and gone forever. We 
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