rM 
 
 \^ 
 
 i\ Tlne'Bi 
 
 tLroovne caLTn 
 
 %°r 
 
 t^'% 
 
 Tl 
 
 Jivly - October iTT?. 
 
Qass /:. 2 -jj^ 
 Book X) Y^y 
 
i 
 
-n "^ 13 A- 1 
 
 THE 
 
 BUROOYNE CAMPAiaN. 
 
 OF 
 
 JULY-OCTOBER, 1777 
 
 BY 
 
 y 
 
 J. WATTS DE PEYSTER, 
 
 BREVET MAJOE-GENEEAL S.N.Y. 
 
 REPRINTED FROM "THE UNITED SERVICE," OCTOBER, 1883. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA: 
 
 L. K. HAMEKSLY & CO. 
 188 3. 
 

'^ ' 
 
 THE BURGOYNE CAMPAIGN, 
 
 yULY-OCTOBER, 7777. 
 
 " Qui n'avance pas, recule!" — Michelet. 
 " Whoever ceases to advance, loses ground." 
 
 The result of about forty years' critical examination of history has led, 
 step by step, to the inevitable conclusion that if "history is philosophy" 
 or experience " teaching by examples," very little is generally known, if 
 afc all clearly developed, of the methods by which the great problems 
 of human progress have been solved. A recent writer of ability — or 
 so considered, it is to be supposed, because he is so extensively quoted — 
 observes, " The philosophy of history undervalues the work of individ- 
 ual persons. It attributes political and spiritual changes to invisible 
 forces operating in the heart of society, regarding the human actors as 
 no more than ciphers." He is right. Individuals are undervalued. 
 God operates and achieves miracles through individuals, justifying the 
 remark that genius is the manifestation of the direct action of God, 
 Deity, upon men through a man. 
 
 The great diJEficulty in arriving at a correct judgment lies in the 
 fact that merit in this world is gauged by success, whereas the greatest 
 merit has, as the rule, been a failure so far as contemporaneous recog- 
 nition and reward is concerned. Some of the men who have exercised 
 the greatest influence on human progress perished of misery or by fire, 
 and their mutilated or charred corpses served, simply, as steps for some 
 audacious charlatan to mount to celebrity and fortune.^ 
 
 ^ The examples of unrewarded merit in all ages are not only multitudinous, but 
 exquisitely painful to contemplate and record. For instance, consider the follow- 
 ing: 
 
 "The history of the recovery of the Iranian alphabet and literature forms a 
 chapter of almost romantic interest in the arid annals of philology. In the middle 
 of the last century a portion of the Avesta was attached by an iron chain to a wall 
 of the Bodleian, and was regarded as a mysterious treasure of which the key was lost. 
 Fired with the ambition of unlocking the secret of Zoroaster, Anquetil Duperron, 
 then a mere lad studying in Paris, enlisted as a common soldier with the object of 
 reaching India. Landing at Pondicherry, he mastered Persian and Sanskrit, and 
 thus equipped for his enterprise, he succeeded after years of hardship and adven- 
 tures in reaching Surat, the goal of his hopes, where, worming himself into the con- 
 fidence of the Paris priests, he obtained from them the key to their ancient alphabet 
 and language, and copies of their sacred books, hitherto guarded with the utmost jeal- 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
4 THE BURGOYNE CAMPAIGN. 
 
 intended for the statue of Schuyler would not be vacant for an hour, 
 because the descendant of every Whig New Yorker, man, woman, and 
 child, who profited by Schuyler's address and determination would 
 flock to contribute to place the grandest effigy of the real hero of Sara- 
 toga, Philip Schuyler, in its appropriate station. 
 
 There is another aspect under which Schuyler must be considered. 
 
 Just as the Consul Varro, after the catastrophe of Cannae, just so 
 Schuyler after the fall of Ticonderoga and defeats following, almost 
 equivalent in their effect at the time to the catastrophe on the Aufidus, 
 the American General like the Roman Consul — "did not despair of the 
 republic." JSTo parity of circumstances, in regard to the peril from 
 Burgoyne, existed after Gates arrived, as there was before. The charm 
 of British and Hessian invincibility had been completely dispelled. 
 Burgoyne had displayed himself in his true character — inertion. 
 
 To the west, Fort Stanwix ; to the east, Hoosic — misnamed Ben- 
 nington — had occurred before Gates appeared. The fact was now 
 patent that Americans might conquer. The preparations for defense 
 were complete. The tide was on the turn and Schuyler about, to place 
 his foot within the threshold of the Temple of Immortality (as Wash- 
 ington — to whom alone he was second — had done the previous winter) 
 when Fate arrested his ascent and thrust him aside and down, pushing 
 forward into his place Gates, who possessed as few attributes of a 
 grand leader and soldier as any who figured in any important position 
 in the Continental Armies. 
 
 The writer's race have reason to withhold such applause from Schuy- 
 ler, but it must be given, for it is Truth. If the Revolution was justi- 
 fiable, which many think it was not, Schuyler is entitled to a position 
 next to Washington in the regards of the American people, certainly of 
 those of the State of New York. 
 
 When Horatio Gates, the hero of an intrigue, met Burgoyne to re- 
 ceive his surrender, he uttered a compliment which may have been the 
 pink of politeness, but was entirely without truth. He said, " I shall 
 always be ready to testify that it [the surrender] has not been through 
 any fault of your Excellency." To admit that the failure of Bur- 
 goyne was no fault of that general individually was a flattery too 
 gross to be admissible, except from one who, if not permeated with self- 
 conceit, must have appreciated how little he had to do with the success 
 which sealed his opponent's fate. 
 
 Now let us go into a concise consideration of the events of this 
 campaign, and in the first place let any one truly interested in the sub- 
 ject seek to discover why Burgoyne became so prominent. 
 
 If any officer living deserved the place conceded to Burgoyne it was 
 Carleton. He alone had saved Canada in 1775-76. He possessed 
 every qualification which was necessary to the operations of 1777, in 
 
THE BURGOYNE CAMPAIGN. 5 
 
 all of which Burgoyne was deficient. With very small means he had 
 accomplished very great results. To talk about bravery or courage as 
 the grandest quality of a general is folly. Bulls are brave, but the 
 skill of the matador laughs brute bravery to scorn. A bull-dog is 
 brave, but he is very easily disposed of by common-sense dexterity. 
 Bravery without discretion in a general almost realizes the words of 
 the proverb about a woman and a jewel in the unclean animal's nose. 
 A general to be great must resemble a chain of large and little links ; 
 some extremely great and some extremely small. In many cases the 
 lack of one of the most diminutive of the links is as fatal as the rup- 
 ture or absence of one of the greatest. Burgoyne's chain was one 
 destitute of many links of different sizes, each, however, indispensable 
 to military success. 
 
 His campaign was a tissue of blunders almost unredeemed by a 
 single creditable stroke due to his own generalship. 
 
 To begin. He took Ticonderoga. The excessive value set upon 
 this position, in, upon, around, and against which so many millions had 
 been wasted by France and England and the Colonies, was one of the 
 popular errors of the day. The estimate set on it was like that of 
 Halleck in regard to Harper's Ferry, a delusion and a snare. Its 
 possession decided nothing, because " the valley of decision" was not 
 there. This was shown in 1755 and 1759. The Bible contains more 
 common-sense truths in concrete language than almost all the rest of 
 the books together. " Awake, O sword, smite the shepherd, and the 
 sheep shall be scattered." Quebec was the shepherd for the French 
 in Canada. Wolfe took it (Quebec), and the fall of its dependencies 
 was simply a question of time. Ticonderoga was relinquished imme- 
 diately when menaced by Amherst. 
 
 [Quebec was invested in the latter part of June, 1759, by Wolfe; 
 Fort Niagara fell 24th July, Ticonderoga, 27th (30th ?), and Crown 
 Point, 1st August. The great battle on the Plains of Abraham took 
 place 23d September, 1759, where literally a single volley at thirty or 
 forty yards blew the French dominion and military prestige in America 
 to the wdnds forever.] 
 
 Another piece of physical and n^ental blindness ! If Ticonderoga 
 was the key to Lake Champlain, Sugar [Loaf] Hill, eight hundred 
 feet high, or Mount Defiance — not Mount Hope,^ — as General Phillips 
 
 ^ To demonstrate how little trustworthy ordinary histories are, consider the 
 conflicting statements in regard to " Mount Hope" and " Mount Defiance."' Lossing 
 (F. B. A. R., i. 134, 2, 3) saj's Frazer gave to the former, — about nine hundred and 
 nine yards northwest of latter, — 4th July, ,1777, the title it bears. Stone says it was 
 so named by Abercrombie in 1756. Trumbull (26th June, 1776) calls the elevation 
 " Mouiit Hope," and also alludes to " Mount Defiance," writing of a year before 
 Frazer or Phillips saw them, although Carrington (B. A. R., 308) states that General 
 Phillips promptly occupied the hill, giving it the name of " Mount Hope;" and again 
 (309), by the morning of 5th July, a British force crowned the summit of Sugar Loaf 
 
6 THE BURGOYNE CAMPAIGN. 
 
 named it — was the key to Ticonderoga. Phillips, Burgoyne's chief of 
 artillery, saw this at a glance. They say that American officers had pre- 
 viously discovered the truth of this, understood the danger, and knew 
 that guns could be got up on the height. Their advice was treated very 
 much in the same way as the counsels of Captain Dugald Dalgetty to 
 Sir Duncan Campbell, as to the necessity of a "sconce" on an elevation 
 which commanded his castle of Ardenvohr. Some thirty years ago the 
 writer was visiting a foreign fortress upon which very large amounts 
 had been expended, and being acquainted with the range of American 
 Columbiads or Bomfords, pointed out two heights to which such heavy 
 pieces could easily be hoisted, which would render the works, below, 
 untenable in a few hours. The general, " a mighty man of valor," 
 first questioned the range of the guns. When this was shown to be 
 incontestable, he was so much annoyed he would not listen to another 
 word on the subject, stating that the government had spent so much 
 in rendering the place as they thought impregnable, they would ap- 
 propriate no more even to rectify an engineering error. A subsequent 
 visit to the same spot showed that the commanding positions were still 
 unoccupied, and the place at the mercy of an enemy that could get pos- 
 session of them, so that the money squandered on the defenses had 
 been lavished in vain. The neglect of Gage to fortify Dorchester 
 Heights, and the occupation of them by Thomas, compelled the British 
 to evacuate Boston, and, just so, when Phillips got his guns upon 
 Sugar [Loaf] Hill, 4th July, 1777, the Americans had to abandon 
 Ticonderoga incontinently. 
 
 This operation of John Thomas, M.D., Major-General Continental 
 Army, was very much like the capture of Fort Eguilette upon the 
 advice of Napoleon Bonaparte, 17th December, 1793. Thomas was 
 an officer of great promise, and evinced more real military compre- 
 hension than almost any other of the Whig commanders at the time. 
 
 Hill, which was promptly dignified by its occupants with the name of " Fort Defi- 
 ance." Burgoj'-ne, in "A State of the Expedition," Appendix XX., mentioned 
 " Mount Hope" as a well-known title, taken possession of by Erazer, 3d July, and 
 the occupation of "Sugar Hill" upon the recommendation of Lieutenant Twiss, 
 "the commanding engineer" (XXI.), but says nothing about naming it " 'Fort' or 
 Mount Defiance." W. L. Stone, in his " Burgoyne Campaign" (16), says, "Frazer 
 named Mount Hope," but mentioned nothing about Phillips giving the title to 
 " Mount Defiance." These are matters of little importance [mere distentions of 
 loords). No one recognized that "Mount Defiance" was the key to Ticonderoga 
 and made it a fact until Lieutenant Twiss demonstrated it out to General Phillips, 
 and between them they made it the fatal fact. And yet Colonel Trumbull 
 (30-32) pointed out in June, 1776, that it could be occupied, "since it was obvious 
 to all that there could be no difficulty in driving up a loaded carriage." Except in 
 the case of Schuyler, a study of this campaign of 1777 reminds the critic of what 
 Frederic the Great said about the operations of the Turks and the Eussians, "That 
 it was the one-eyed fighting the blind." Still, except in rare cases, is not this re- 
 mark applicable to most wars ? It certainly applied to many campaigns of the war 
 to put down the " Slaveholders' Kebellion." 
 
THE BVRGOYNE CAMPAIGN. 7 
 
 Popular delusion ascribes to Washington the credit due to pretty much 
 everybody else, — as, for instance, the perception of the importance of 
 Dorchester Heights, — but closer critics ascribe the whole merit of the 
 conception and execution to John Thomas. 
 
 Now let us look at the time-table, or " Itinerary of General Bur- 
 goyne." He was master of Ticonderoga on the 6th July, and of the 
 Lake next day. On the same date Frazer routed the Americans at 
 Hubbardtown. According to Gordon, New England regiments be- 
 haved so outrageously that St. Clair " had to dismiss them from the 
 army with disgrace." On the 12th July, St. Clair joined Schuyler at 
 Fort Edward, sixteen miles from Skenesborough, now Whitehall, and 
 on the 18th there were not over four thousand four hundred regulars 
 and militia present. On the 27th, Schuyler had only two thousand 
 seven hundred Continental troops and less than fifteen hundred militia. 
 At this time Burgoyne had seven thousand effectives, rank and file, 
 A 1, first class, besides Provincials and Indians flushed with victory 
 and with success of every kind. 
 
 Of Schuyler's regulars, one-third were negroes, boys, and men too 
 aged for field, or indeed any other service ; in a manner naked, without 
 blankets, ill armed, and very deficient in accoutrements. "Too many 
 of our officers," wrote Schuyler, " would be a disgrace to the most 
 contemptible troops that were ever collected ; and had so little sense of 
 honor that cashiering them seems no punishment. They have stood by 
 and suffered the most scandalous depredations to be committed on the 
 poor, distressed, ruined, and flying inhabitants." He had also about 
 fifteen hundred militia. 
 
 George III. was not only an excellent king, with the very best of 
 characters, as the astute Franklin admitted, but a monarch endowed 
 with the highest kind of common sense. He advised Burgoyne, after 
 he had captured Ticonderoga, to cross over to Lake George, ascend that 
 sheet of water, resume the march at Fort William Henry, or rather 
 Fort George, and follow the excellent old military road {strada buonis- 
 sima, says the Italian Castiglione, i. 161) to Fort Edward. Phillips 
 took his route with the heavier impedimenta (Carrington, 313). 
 
 Let us see what Gordon says to this route : 
 
 " Had the British commander returned from Whitehall immediately 
 to Ty, and advanced from thence in the most expeditious manner, with 
 a few light field-pieces, instead of suffering any delay, in order to his 
 dragging along with him a heavy train of artillery, he might have been 
 at Albany by the time he got to Hudson's River [30tli July]. Your 
 correspondent, the fifth of October, the last year breakfasted with Gen- 
 eral Gates at Ty; sailed in company up Lake George (about thirty- 
 five miles long), with their horses in batteaus, landed, stayed awhile, 
 and reached Fort Edward (about nine miles from Fort George) at 
 night a little after eight. From Ty to Lake George is rather more 
 
8 THE BURGOYNE CAMPAIGN. 
 
 than two miles. The two small schooners on the lake could have made 
 no long resistance against a brigade of gunboats. Fort George was 
 well adapted to keep oflP Indians and small parties : but not to stop the 
 royal army. The Americans there, instead of defending the fort, or 
 opposing the landing of the army, would undoubtedly have retreated, 
 to General Schuyler at Fort Edward." 
 
 If ordinary travelers could breakfast at Ticonderoga, with their 
 horses ascend Lake George in bateaux, and sup at 8 p.m. of the same 
 day at Fort Edward on the Hudson, an array of ten thousand men as 
 well equipped and supplied as that of Burgoyne could have been re- 
 assembled at old Ty by the 10th July; could have been transported 
 to Fort George^ by the 12th, and having left their heavy guns and all 
 but their light artillery and indispensable materials there or at Ty, in 
 depot, witii a sufficient guard, could have reached Fort Edward on 
 the evening of the 13th July. From this point to Albany is about 
 fifty miles. With six to ten days' rations and an extra supply of am- 
 munition sufficient for a battle of that period, Burgoyne could have 
 swept Schuyler out of his path with ease, and, allowing one day's de- 
 lay for a fight, could have occupied Albany on the 16th July, even 
 conceding that he lost several days, which would not have been neces- 
 sary, because as yet the country was full of food of every kind. At 
 Ticonderoga enough provisions of all sorts were captured to furnish 
 rations for Burgoyne's army for a month, and at Skenesborough (White- 
 
 3 Forts William Henry and George. — These forts have been so often con- 
 founded that a few words of explanation may be necessary to make the matter 
 clear. Exactly at the upper or southern extremity of Lake George is the station 
 and dock of the " Lake George Branch" of the Delaware and Hudson Canal Kail- 
 road," which " Branch" follows, as a rule, the stage-route which preceded it just 
 as the latter about succeeded the excellent "old military road" constructed as early 
 as the first French wars. To the west of the station and to the south of the 
 present magnificent " Lake House" are the vestiges of Fort William Henr^', which 
 was constructed by Sir William Johnson after his victory in 1755 ; destroyed 
 in 1757 at the time of the massacre permitted by Montcalm, — a catastrophe which 
 Webb at Fort Edward could have prevented had he not pusillanimously re- 
 fused to march to the relief of Fort William Henry. Only a year or two ago skel- 
 etons, balls, fragments of shell, etc., were dug out of one of the mounds which 
 originally constituted a portion of the enciente. Directly to the south-by-east of 
 it, bej'ond a little trout-brook called West Creek, which twists into the lake, and 
 not as much as a mile away, are the ruins of Fort George, and a little south of that 
 again stood a small work called Fort Gage, — of this scarcely a vestige is discerni- 
 ble, — named after the general who commanded at Boston when the Eevolution 
 broke out, and until forced to evacuate the place. In 1755, General William John- 
 son won the first decided victory over the French at this point, and for it was made 
 a Baronet. His son, Sir John, the victor of Oriskanj', although only a stripling of 
 thirteen years, was with his father, and behaved remarkably well. The monument 
 commemorating the fall of Colonel Williams is visible on an elevation to the west, 
 from the railroad which passes close by Bloody Pond, into which the bodies of those 
 who fell with that officer were thrown. Every inch of the country for several miles 
 south of the Lake House is historic ground and ought to be fertile, it has been so 
 often drenched with blood and fattened with corpses. 
 
THE BURGOYNE CAMPAIGN. 9 
 
 hall) large quantities of food and the means of preparing it were 
 wantonly destroyed, it might be said, through sheer stupidity, by the 
 victors completing the work of the vanquished, a destruction which it 
 was the former's interest to prevent and arrest. 
 
 Meanwhile, at the very time when the British troops stood most in 
 need of necessaries, — 19th August, — when Burgoyne was at the Duer 
 House (Fort Miller), what does Lieutenant Hadden's Journal reveal ? — 
 that at this moment the General commanding was profiting by the very 
 transportation which he complains of as being so deficient, to bring for- 
 ward his own comforts to the extent of thirty wagons. From the 
 Burgoyne " Orderly-Book" the document is missing which this Journal 
 of Hadden supplies, and that voucher, evidently torn out, is repro- 
 duced by General Horatio Rogers. " Major-General Phillips" (reads 
 the missing Order of the 19th) "has heard with the utmost astonishment 
 that notwithstanding his most serious and jiositive orders of the IQth in- 
 stant, that no carts were to be used for any purpose whatever but the 
 transport of provisions, unless by particular orders from the Com- 
 mander-in-chief, as expressed in the order, there are this day above thirty 
 carts on the road laden with baggage, said to be their Lieutenant- 
 General's." 
 
 Are any comments necessary in connection with Lossing's intima- 
 tions, most cruel but criminal if true (F. B. A. R., i. 44.) ? Madame 
 Riedesel's language, as well as that of the " Brunswick Journal" (W. 
 L. S.'s " Burgoyne Campaign," 87, 88), and of Foublanque's admis- 
 sions and explanations, — " qui s'exeuse s'accuse," — what judgment is 
 too severe ? Let critics who would condemn this view examine and 
 compare these and other authorities, and declare if this article does not 
 arrive at a righteous judgment. Tliink of how many thousands lost 
 their all and expiated their loyalty and paid the " last full measure of 
 devotion," by exile, ruin, or death, through the selfishness and soldierly 
 shortcomings of the man to whom at the crisis of two worlds the 
 interests of a great nation were confided ! 
 
 Moreover, if Burgoyne had pushed on to Albany forthwith, the 
 Americans would not have dared to defend the Mohawk Valley, be- 
 cause it is universally acknowledged that " the Burgoyne scare was 
 upon the whole country." 
 
 Consequently there would have been no attempt made at a defense 
 of Fort Stanwix, and by the 5th August, St. Leger, Sir John John- 
 son, and Brandt would have been up with their Regulars, Rangers, 
 and Indians ; and the Loyalists or Tories would have rushed to arms 
 by thousands. Sir William Howe did not sail from New York for 
 the Chesapeake until the 23d July ; and thus, between them, the 
 British generals would have been masters of the situation. The New 
 England Colonies would thus have been severed from the Middle and 
 Southern, according to the plan of the great German strategist and tac- 
 
10 THE BURGOYNE CAMPAIGN. 
 
 tician, Von Bulow, and other military experts; the French would 
 not have entered into an alliance with the revolted but defeated and 
 splintered Colonies, much less the Spaniards; and the game of Inde- 
 pendence would have been up. 
 
 It is perfectly well known that if Clive, the conqueror of India, 
 had been alive, he would have been the British Commander-in-chief in 
 America at this crisis, and he was not the man to let the grass grow 
 under his feet, as did Gage, Howe, and Clinton ; in fact, all except 
 Cornwallis. Clive was energy, ability, constancy, courage incarnate, 
 and his campaigns in India are prodigies to show what manhood can 
 inspire and effect. Nicholson, who fell at Delhi in 1857, was a man 
 of Clive's type; and H. Bosworth Smith, in his "Life of Lord Law- 
 rence," quotes the following letter : 
 
 " Pray only reflect on the whole history of India. Where have we failed when 
 we acted vigorously ? Where have we succeeded when guided hy timid coujisels ? Clive 
 with twelve hundred men foii.ght at Plassey, in opposition to the advice of his leading 
 officers, beat forty thousand men, and conquered Bengal. Monson retreated from the 
 Chumbul, and before he gained Agra his army was disorganized, and partially an- 
 nihilated. Look at the Cabul catastrophe. It might have been averted by resolute 
 and bold action. . . . The Punjab Irregulars are marching down in the highest 
 spirits, proud to be trusted, and, eager to show their supei-iority over the regular 
 troops, ready to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Europeans. But if, on their 
 arrival, they find the Europeans behind breastworks, they will begin to think that 
 the game is up." 
 
 How troops can march when excited by victory or incited by an 
 intrepid leader worthy to lead brave men, remember Blucher's orders, 
 example, and achievements from the Katzbach — on through so many 
 terrible months, 1813-15 — to Waterloo ; Crawford's hastening the light 
 division eighty miles in about thirty hours (Cust, ii. 2, 272-73) to Tala- 
 vera, 1809 ; Sherman hurrying from Chattanooga to relieve Kuoxville 
 in 1863; the pursuit of Lee from Petersburg to Appomattox Court- 
 House in 1865, and a, thousand other examples, throughout all time, of 
 the triumphs of military celerity. Marshal Count Saxe, high authority, 
 said that a victorious army could hunt a routed army, such as was the 
 American on the Hudson, in July, 1777, by rattling peas in bladders. 
 It is well known that the sound of the Prussian drum, beaten by a 
 tired-out boy, held up on horseback, kept the French flying after 
 Waterloo. It is not necessary, however, to go out of the American 
 lines to find an example of prompt and quick marching. In October, 
 1777, buoyant in spirit with the results of Freeman's Farm and Bemis' 
 Heights, the news that the English were coming up the Hudson found 
 the Americans in far different heart than when the same enemy had 
 been advancing down the river two months previous. The marching 
 of two New Hampshire regiments, ordered off towards Albany, shows 
 what could have been done by the British if they had been imbued 
 with a like energy and enthusiasm. 
 
THE BURGOYNE CAMPAIGN. 11 
 
 As a perfect parallel, or rather contrast, to Burgoyne's neglect of 
 opportunities and Humphreys's employment or utilization of them, con- 
 sider what the latter actually accomplished — 3d-9th April, 1865. 
 Humphreys had the Second (or, more properly, combined Second and 
 Third) Corps; of these the Third Division, not over five thousand ef- 
 fective men, comprised all that remained of " the old fighting Third 
 Corps, as we understand it." The combined Second and Third Corps 
 started out in pursuit of Lee, Monday, 2d-3d April, building bridges 
 and roads, without which labors the columns could neither have ad- 
 vanced nor the supplies have been brought forward. On the 5th, 
 this corps had reached Jetersville, and on the 6th, Humphreys dis- 
 covered Lee retreating hurriedly, and at once started, view-halloo, in 
 pursuit. 
 
 His troops were on the move from 6 a.m. till dark, advancing and 
 fighting over fourteen miles in line of battle. By night they had been 
 victorious in six engagements, the second a hard fight, the sixth and 
 last a " heavy battle." These are facts, if maps and reports and dis- 
 patches are worth anything as proofs. On the 7th, the combined 
 Second and Third Corps started between starlight and sunrise (5.32 
 A.M.), went directly for the enemy, struck him, first, at High Bridge, 
 and, afterwards^ at Cumberland Church, upon the Heights of Farm- 
 ville, and fought him at both places unassisted, ancl did all the fight- 
 ing of any account — and some very hard fighting — of this day. On 
 the 8th, Humphreys marched about twenty-five miles from Cumber- 
 land Church, the scene of the last pitched battle of the " Army of the 
 Potomac" and the " Army of Northern Virginia," and would have 
 marched on more if his supply-train had been brought forward in 
 time. His leading troops did not go into camp till midnight, and 
 some of them did not reach their halting-place until 4 a.m. of the 
 9th. ^ 
 
 On the 9th, by 12 m. Humphreys was "bunk up" against Lee's 
 rear, or east front, under Lougstreet, " and was only prevented from 
 almost annihilating this force by the truce." About 4 p.m. he received 
 assurance that Lee had surrendered. 
 
 To recapitulate, from Petersburg to Appomattox Court-House is 
 about one hundred miles, and all the marching and teaming had to be 
 done on Virginian roads, which in bad w^eather are almost bottomless. 
 From Ticonderoga to Washington is about the same distance, one hun- 
 dred miles. Between seventy and eighty of these an army can enjoy 
 facilities of water transport. So far as mere distance was concerned, 
 Burgoyne and Humphreys were on a par; as to the fighting during the 
 advance, Humphreys overcame ten times more severe work and perils 
 than those which the British commander could possibly have had to 
 encounter. No comparison can be instituted as to the armies under 
 Schuyler and Gates and that under Lee. The former were prin- 
 
12 THE BURGOYNE CAMPAIGN. 
 
 cipally militia, the latter veterans, just as good as troops can be made 
 or the world has seen.^ 
 
 When people undertake to judge Burgoyne, do not allow them to 
 bring forward the eulogistic or excusatory volumes of Englishmen, 
 written to make the best of a bad case, or of Americans, equally 
 anxious to make their own triumph the more glorious by exalting the 
 character and doings of a chief over whom the victory was won. In- 
 stead of those obsolete narratives produced by unmilitary people and 
 
 * Having submitted my views of Burgoyne's want of go and push to one of our 
 generals most distinguished for pluck, dash, tenacity, — in fact, all the qualities 
 which enter into the composition of a " real captain," i.e., soldier and general, — the 
 following is his replj', 30th July, 1883 : 
 
 " The body of troops you mention, ten thousand men with thirty guns, with 
 ammunition, subsistence and ambulance trains and medical wagons, such as are 
 essential in our wooded and sparsely-settled country, should not, at the very most, 
 stretch out a greater distance than what you mention : that is, five miles, and might 
 be limited to three. The roads are supposed to be as you say, ordinarily good country 
 roads. They could easily get over eighteen miles a day. In pursuit from Peters- 
 burg to Appomattox Court-House, which distance you put about one hundred miles 
 (which is sufficiently correct), we [combined Second and Third Corps] were delayed 
 the first day out (the 3d April) materially b}^ the necessity of bridging streams that 
 were not fordable. On the 4th I made but a short march owing to the cav[alry] 
 coming in on the road and having precedence ; my troops were put to working on 
 the roads while the cavalry stopped us, to insure the trains following. We had but 
 very few wagons with us : only some ammunition, ambulance, and surgical wagons. 
 
 " I fought over fourteen miles on the 6th of April, having marched four miles 
 at least before coming in contact with the enemy. Then to cross Flat Creek, built 
 two bridges over it, and repaired the road-bridge before I could get at the enemy. 
 
 " On the 7th, marched some twelve miles to Heights of Farmville, in pursuit, 
 encountering the whole of Lee's force there at 1 o'clock, p.m. 
 
 "On the 8th, marched twenty-six miles, halting at midnight. 
 
 " On the 9th, by mid-day was up with Lee at Appomattox. 
 
 " By looking at Appendix L [xii. Scribner's Military Series], you will find the 
 Second Corps, on the 31st March, had eighteen thousand five hundred and seven 
 enlisted men of infantry present for duty equipped. Lost in action during the op- 
 erations, about two thousand ; straggled or fell out, between one and two thousand. 
 [This makes the contrast much stronger against Burgoyne.] I see the number of 
 guns is put down at seventy, four of which were mortars, and therefore were not 
 taken with us on the march. We had therefore eleven batteries, or sixty-six guns. 
 I do not recollect the number of wagons that belonged to the corps, and I could 
 only get at it by diving into a great mass of papers. With the exception of the 
 fighting trains, the trains followed us at some considerable distance. 
 
 " From Fredericksburg to Gettysburg [Third Corps] there were so many halts 
 for two, three, or more days, that they can give no average per day. 
 
 "The Sixth Corps marched over thirty miles continuously, getting up to Get- 
 tysburg in the afternoon of the 2d July.* 
 
 "The Second Division, Third Corps, marched from Kappahannock Kiver (part 
 of it were covering railroad crossing of that river) evening of 14th June, 1863, and 
 reached Manassas Junction night of 15th, a march of twentj^-nine miles, — 15th an 
 excessively oppressive day. 
 
 " Again, on the 25th June, marched twenty-five miles to mouth of Monocacy, 
 part of it in night under a heavy rain on the canal tow-path." 
 
 * Sedgwick says thirty m'les. 
 
THE BUROOYNE CAMPAIGN. 13 
 
 rehashed and revamped by such writers as Bancroft, who, with great 
 reputations, wrote history as lawyers draw up special pleas, and know 
 nothing of war except the romantic or novelistic phases of it. If 
 truthful history is to be written, it must be done under different lights, 
 from different sources, and from other books than those which have 
 been generally accepted in the United States as trustworthy stories of 
 the Revolution, unless all such have been thoroughly sifted and com- 
 pared. Burgoyne was unfit for his place, as was Howe, as Gage had 
 been, as Clinton was to be. Carleton and Cornwallis never had a 
 show. Washington and Schuyler were fit for their places. 
 
 Again, to go back, Burgoyne did not leave Skenesborough (White- 
 hall) until the 23d July, nor Fort Edward until the 13th August. 
 Mark these dates! This delay enabled Schuyler to block the route be- 
 tween Lake Champlain and the Hudson to the north and send Arnold 
 to the relief of Fort Stanwix to the west, in extreme peril through the 
 slaughterous defeat of Herkimer by Sir John Johnson, on the 6th 
 August. Arnold's approach and the outrageous misconduct of the 
 Indians compelled St. Leger to decamp at noon of the 22d August, 
 while Burgoyne was still at Fort Miller, about ten miles below Fort 
 Edward and three miles above Schuylerville, where he crossed the 
 Hudson to his own " Caudine Forks." 
 
 Again, Schuyler was not superseded by Gates until the 19th 
 August, while Burgoyne was still at Fort Miller, whence he sent his 
 Germans to their destruction at Hoosic, or, as Stark himself styles it, 
 Walloomscock,® in a letter detailing the stealing of his horse by his own 
 men, — not Bennington. 
 
 In the detachment of his Germans to their discomfiture at Hoosic, 
 Burgoyne demonstra!ted how utterly unfit he was for the command he 
 exercised, and also how entirely deficient he was equally in his estimate 
 and comprehension of men. It was just exactly such a blunder as was 
 
 * The loss of Stark's horse, while he was engaged in a reconnoissance on foot 
 during the action, is recorded by Professor Butler, who publishes it as having found 
 the advertisement in an old file of the Hartford Cottrant^ of date October 7, 1777. 
 It is as follows : 
 
 (From the Connecticut Courant, Tuesday, October 7, 1777.) 
 
 ' "TWENTY DOLLARS REWARD. 
 
 " Stole from me the subscriber, from Walloomscock, in the time of action, the 
 16th of August last, a brown mare, five years old, had a star on her forehead. Also 
 a doeskin seated saddle, blue housing trim'd with white, and a curbed bridle. It is 
 earnestly requested that all committees of safety and others in authority, to exert 
 themselves to recover said thief and mare, so that he may be brought to justice, and 
 the mare brought to me ; and the person, whoever he be, shall receive the above re- 
 ward for both, and for the mare alone one-half of that sum. How scandalous, how 
 disgraceful and ignominious must it appear to all friendly and generous souls to 
 have such sly, artful, designing villains enter into the field in the time of action in 
 order to pillage, pilfer, and plunder from their brethren when engaged in battle. 
 
 " John Stark, B. D. G. 
 " Bennington, 11th Sept., 1777." 
 
14 THE BURGOYNE CAMPAIGN. 
 
 made in the selection of the troops intended to profit by the explosion 
 of the mine before Petersburg, in 1864. 
 
 There is no use of dilating upon that ! 
 
 Recent revelations confirm the worst that was originally surmised 
 or charged. If Burgoyne had undertaken to pick out, man by man, 
 from those under arms, the most unequal to solve the problem he had 
 in hand, he could not have blundered more fearfully nor more fatally 
 to himself. Why did he not send Frazer, " the gallant General Frazer 
 [who] was the directing soul of the British troops in action," with his 
 elegant Light Infantry, than whom, at this time, there were none better 
 in the world ? nor could a better leader be found for the " Light Bobs" 
 than the capable, experienced, and intrepid Frazer himself. Even 
 as it was, in spite of all the stupidity manifested, the Americans, vic- 
 torious over Baum, fell to plundering, as they afterwards did at Eutaw 
 Springs, and at other places, and as the rebels did at Shiloh and at 
 Cedar Creek, and on other occasions, and lost sight of the grand prize, 
 victory. It was touch and go at Hoosic after all. Breyman came 
 up, was winning back all that was lost, when in stepped Warner with 
 his Continentals or regulars. New Yorkers as well as New Englanders, 
 and the victory first won, then almost thrown away, became assured. 
 
 There is no benefit in following out this series of blunders, except 
 to say that down to the 16th October Burgoyne's case was by no 
 means desperate. Let his friends assert it as loudly and vehemently as 
 they may or can, Gates was looking over his shoulder and casting wist- 
 ful glances towards his bridge of boats and the rear, even after the 
 success which Arnold, against his will and intention, won for him on 
 the 7th October. It is all very well for those who wish to rehabili- 
 tate Gates with ink on paper, — be tlie inciting cause whatever it may, 
 — he was one of the popular humbugs of the Revolution. He cooked 
 and got his gruel at Camden. The "good and gallant" Cornwall is 
 who settled his hash there would have done it just as handsomely at 
 Saratoga, had the victim of Clinton, in Yorktovvn in 1781, been on 
 the Hudson in 1777. Burgoyne was bad enough with his conceit and 
 self-indulgence, but Sir William Howe was worse with his " impru- 
 dence" (Fonblanque, 223) and indolence, and Sir Henry Clinton with 
 his nervousness, and he, again, and Yaughan with their perfunctory 
 hesitations. Gordon tells the story as well as anybody who has at- 
 tempted it, and he cannot be improved upon. 
 
 " "We now enter upon the relation of the measures pursued by the British below 
 Albany. You have been told what were the sentiments of General Putnam, on the 
 9th [October], as to their sailing up to within sixteen miles of the American camp, 
 before removed from the neighborhood of Stillwater. Sir H. Clinton, however, in- 
 stead of pushing up the river, intrusted the business to Sir James Wallace and Gen- 
 eral Vaughan. The latter had under him three thousand six hundred men. Sir 
 James commanded a flying squadron of light frigates, accompanied with the neces- 
 sary appendage of barges, batteaus, and boats for landing the troops, and all other 
 
THE BURGOYNE CAMPAIGN. 15 
 
 movements. By the 13th [October] they reached Kingston alias ^sopus, a fine 
 village as you would call it ; but on this side the Atlantic, a good town. Upon 
 Vaughan's landing the troops, the Americans, being too weak to make resistance, 
 abandoned their battery of three guns after spiking them. They left the town im- 
 mediately for their own safety, without firing from the houses upon the British. 
 Vaughan, however, was told that Burgoyne had actually surrendered ; and the 
 town was doomed to the flames. The whole was reduced to ashes, and not a house 
 left standing. The American Governor Clinton was a tame sjpectator of the bar- 
 barity, but only for want of a sufiicient force to attack the enemy. This seemingly 
 revengeful devastation was productive of a pathetic but severe letter from General 
 Gates (then in the height of victory) to General Vaughan. The latter with a flood- 
 tide might have reached Albany in four hours : there was no force to have hindered 
 him. When he burnt Livingston's Upper Mills [between Barrytown and Tivoli], 
 had he proceeded to Albany and burnt the American stores, Gates, as he himself 
 has declared, must have retreated into New England. The royalists may justly 
 remark upon the occasion, ' Why a delay was made of seven days after Clinton 
 had taken the forts we are ignorant of. The Highland forts were taken the 6th Oc- 
 tober ; ^sopus was burnt the 13th; Burgoyne's convention was signed the 17lh. 
 There was no force to oppose even open boats on the river ; whj^ then did not the 
 boats proceed immediately to Albany ? Had Clinton gone forward, Burgoj^ne's 
 army had been saved. Putnam could not have crossed to Albany. The army amused 
 themselves with burning ^'Esopus, and the houses of individuals on the river 's-bank.' 
 While the British were manoeuvring in and about the North Eiver, doing mischief 
 to individuals, without serving their own cause in the least. General Gates had 
 express upon express, urging him to send down troops to oppose the enemy. On 
 the 14th he wrote to Governor Clinton : — ' I have ordered the commanding oflScer at 
 Fort Schuyler to send Van Schaak's regiment without delay to Albany, — desired 
 Brigadier-General Gransevoort to repair to that city, and take the command of all 
 the troops that may assemble there, — and have sent down the two ^Esopus regiments, 
 the Tryon County militia, and most of the militia of Albanj^ County.' But he 
 would not weaken his hold of BurgojMie by any detachment of Continentals from 
 his own army, or of New England militia. The New York State militia, that re- 
 paired to the governor to assist the inhabitants, did as much mischief as the enemy, 
 the burning of houses and other buildings excepted, jl^^lt is too much the case of 
 all militia, that when they march to the assistance of their countrymen against a 
 common enemy, they do the former a great deal of damage. The laxness of their 
 discipline and their unreasonable claims of indulgences from those whom they are 
 to protect, make them expensive and disagreeable guests."' 
 
 In this connection it may be found interesting to insert the copy of 
 a letter which the writer found among the papers of his grandfather, 
 who was a captain in the New York Royal Volunteers, or King's 
 Third American Regiment, which was the first to enter Fort Mont- 
 gomery on the 6th of October, 1777, when Clinton started up the 
 Hudson to demonstrate in favor of Burgoyne. As the writer has 
 never seen it in print, it may prove valuable as well as interesting. 
 
 Indorsed: " Gen'l Putnam's Letter of Sept. 16, 1777, with accounts from the 
 Southward. 
 
 " On public Service. 
 To 
 
 His Excellency Gov'r Clinton, 
 at 
 Kingston, 
 
 by Express." 
 Countersigned on outside : 
 "Israel Putnam." 
 
16 THE BURGOYNE CAMPAIGN. 
 
 " Peeks Kill, Sept. 16, 1777. 
 "Dear Sir, — 
 
 " Your Favour of 13th I have been dulj^ honoured with ; am greatly obliged to 
 you for the assistance you have ordered from the militia. I will take particular 
 care that they shall be Supplied with provision and Ammunition. 
 
 " The Enemy's numbers in and about Hackensack, by the be.st information I 
 have been able to obtain, are between 4 and five thousand ; part came from Staten 
 Island, through Elizabeth Town & Newark toward sison [us on ?], and three or four 
 thousand crossed from Spiten divel Creek to Fort Lee. I am well assured that they 
 have lately received a reinforcement at N. York, and this is further Confirmed by 
 a deserter who belongs to Col. Bradly's Regt., taken at Danburj after enlisted with 
 the Enemy, & came from the bridge with the party that came to Fort Lee ; — he says 
 they told him ten thousand recruits were arrived at York ; — that the party which 
 came to fort Lee were not many of them from the bridge ; — their numbers four or 
 five thousand ; — had deserted at Soubriskey's [Zabriskey's?] Mills, between Paramus 
 and Hackensack, where they lay when he left them ; — & had Collected many Cattle 
 and horses. 
 
 "Col. Burr, I am informed, Surprised their Picquet last night, killed Sixteen, 
 mortallj'^ wounded seven, and took the remainder. 
 
 " I have wrote to Connecticut for the militia of that State to be Speedily Sent 
 down. 
 
 " Inclosed is a hand-bill containing an acc't of the action to the Southward, 
 Since the receipt of which I have received a letter from Major Putnam, who was at 
 Philadelphia, informing that Gen'l Washington, with his army, had retired this 
 side the School kill, & meant to make a stand there. Gen'l How was busied ye 
 12th and 13th burying his Dead ; — that we had about one thousand killed and 
 wounded ; — and it's believed the Enemy have lost double that number ; — on the 13th 
 the Enemy were filing off to the left to gain Sweed's ford 15 miles above Philadel- 
 phia. — Gen'l Washington Sent a body of Troops to Oppose them. Assailants Gen- 
 erally have an infinite advantage over those who act only on the defensive ; — it's my 
 Opinion, & 'I think the Oj^inion is Supported by our own Experience, that we shall 
 always be beat untill we learn or venture to attack. 
 
 " Gen'l Parsons, with his Brigade, & Col. Ludington, with his detachment from 
 the militia, are at Whiteplains, where they are necessary and serve a double pur- 
 pose, — to Cover that part of the Country from the ravages of the Enemy, & are as 
 great or greater Security to this post lying between us and them than if they were 
 at this post; they will git the first notice of the Enemy's Motions, & Can retire 
 here or harrass them, as shall be Judged best. Col. Brinkerhoff has applied to me 
 in behalf of his Eeg't. I have Ordered the whole to hold themselves in readiness, 
 — and one-third to come in at present. 
 
 "With particular respect and Esteem, I have the Hon'' to be your Excellency's 
 Obed't humble Ser't. 
 
 "Israel Putnam. 
 "His Excellency Gov Clintox." 
 
 To use the words that Shakspeare puts into the mouth of " melan- 
 choly Jaques," — 
 
 " Last scene of all. 
 That ends this strange, eventful history, 
 In second childishness," 
 
 as to military comprehension of circumstances, contemplate Burgoyne 
 holding " high festival" in the Schuyler mansion, — burned to the ground 
 next morning, — at the junction of the outlet of Saratoga Lake, Fish 
 Kill, and the Hudson, while his faithful subordinates and troops were 
 
THE BURGOYNE CAMPAIGN. 17 
 
 victims to the elements and the American round-shot and bullets. The 
 deluges from the clouds were not more pitiless than the iron and leaden 
 hail poured in by the encompassing enemy. With his sweetheart, Bur- 
 goyne was having a joyous time and wasting the hours, when the last 
 chance of escape vouchsafed like a rift in the rack of the storm, — the 
 brief interval of sunshine — was gradually closing up again to end on 
 "the field yf the grounded arms," on the opposite shore, at the point 
 which was the site of the old Fort Hardy. War in those days for the 
 professional officer was not the grim reality that our poor fellows found 
 it in the Rebellion and still recognize it on the Plains. 
 
 If Burgoyne was " Burgoyned" as was Stanhope at Brihiaega, in 
 1710, or Dupont at Baylen, in 1808, or Pemberton at Vicksburg, in 
 1863, and the embryo of the independence of these United States 
 ushered into being, and the Stars and Stripes, " Old Glory," flung to 
 the winds at Saratoga, the British general was " Burgoyned," in 1777, 
 on the one hand by his own faults and errors, and on the other by the 
 prescience, constancy, patriotism, and capacity of Philip Schuyler. 
 
 " And through the centuries let a people's voice 
 
 In full acclaim, 
 
 A people's voice, 
 Attest the great [New Yorker's] claim, 
 With honor, honor, honor to him, 
 
 Eternal honor to his name I" 
 
/k-f^ 
 
A r 1 
 
 wv 
 
 m 
 
 f'W^ LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
 V ^x- 
 
 011 801 995 7 
 
 . -< V. 
 
 
 S^v-.', 
 
 .J^' 
 
 .V>;:t^ 
 
 -^r'-^i 
 
 ^■^-^' 
 
 i^fe-^ ^■.,%:--