i i ■ fb ! .51 ' 1 I .F5 ' TI CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG LIBRARY OF CONGRESS THE U. S "n^ineer Scho^. iorary REC OCT "6 1924 Washington •arraoks, a, C CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE CADETS OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY/WEST POINT, N. Y. By COLONEL G. J. FIEBEGER Professor of Engineering U. S. M. A. [engineer SCHOOL LIBRARY BUILDING 270 FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA £ai h 3 - JUN i 5 Copy, _ .195 c D SB CD z 1 1 . i ( isi m.inv el Its horses in llie ( 'haneel lorsv i 1 1<> Campaign, Was • II III III" I I'llH'IIHls. The Department <>/ H ash in gton comprised the District of Columbia with the national capital, Washington. Most of the troops of this department were the Infantry and artillery permanently attached to the line of Ports which surrounded the capital The onlj available field troops were A.bercrom bio's ;iikI Crawford's divisions of Infantry, and Stahel's dl visum of cavalry, about 13,000 in all, which Pormed a cover Injj Porce i" protect the capital Prom raiding parties. A her crombie's division was composed of Stannard's Vermont brigade, Hay's New Vork t>rigade, and Fossenden's Maine brigade; Crawford's division eon sis ted of three brigades of Pennsylvania troops; Stahel's cavalry division was made n|> et* i hree brigades The Middle Department comprisef Mary land, Pennsylvania and West Virginia, lis troops, which Termed i ho \ 1 1 1 corps, were widely scattered and had differ- ent duties to perforin, Kelley's division \*\' si\ brigades, nbout 12,000 men, w;i^ ( barged v iih the Immediate protection of the Raltimore and Ohio railroad from Harper's Perrj to Grafton, For this purpose two brigades were strongly in- trenched ai Harper's Perry, one was posted at Martinsburg, "•>< v ai Komney, one ai Cumberland and one at Grafton, Mil roy's division, of 0,000 men, was at Winchester [tconsisted of three brigades ami was pushed to the front and Intrenched to observe the Confederates in the Shenandoah Va llcy ; Beam mon's division of two brigade , 1.000 men, va at Charleston, \\ < t Virginia, on the Kanawha river, where ii protected that state from invasion ;nif Baltimore; Averell'n independent brigade guarded the Balti* more and Ohio railroad from Grafton to the Ohio river. The Department <>j I irginia comprised that portion of southeastern Virginia which wwt held bj LJnion troop li- troop belonged to the IV, VII and IX corp The [V army corpi had one division, of about 5,000 men, under General Gordon ;it West Point on i\\<' Sfork river and the other, of about the rength, under the corp* command er, General Keyes, at Sforktown, One di ision of Ui<- VII corp* and one of the IX corps, about L8,000 men, the whole under General Peck, were at Suffolk, Virginia, south of the James, where they had recently successfully frustrated the attempt of General Longstreet to capture thai place. The Department of North Car oVma comprised the coa territory of that state occupied by Union troop-. The main body of the XVI 1 1 corps, which occupied this depart ment, was at Newberne, X. ( '. The Department of the South comprised the coastal ter« ritory of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida occupied by t'nioii troops. 'I'Ik- X corps, which occupied this department, 8 was distributed by divisions in the coastal islands between Charleston and the mouth of the Savannah river. Comparison. — If the situation is viewed as a whole, it is apparent, that while the Union troops had the advan- tage of numbers, the Confederates were better disposed for concerted action and mutual support. The South. — The railroad running south from Freder- icksburg to Savannah, via Richmorid, Wilmington and Charleston, and the railroads running east and west from Richmond, permitted the Southern troops to be concentrated at any point in the theater of war which might be momen- tarily threatened. These roads enabled the authorities to withdraw troops from any department in which active op- erations were temporarily suspended and send them to the Army of Northern Virginia. The supreme direction of military affairs was vested in the President of the Confederate States, Mr. Davis, a sol- dier by training and experience. Under him were only three independent commanders. General Lee, General Beauregard, and Major General Sam Jones, all educated and experienced soldiers. General Lee, who commanded not only the Army of Northern Virginia but also all the troops assigned to the de- fense of the capital, was fortunate in possessing the complete confidence of the civil authorities, the army, and the people of the Confederate states. This confidence he had well earned by the able manner in which he had conducted his military operations since June, 1862, when he first assumed command. It was the President who insisted on his assuming and re- taining command of the departments of Richmond and of North Carolina, and be would have added the department of South Carolina had General Lee been willing to accept it. Mr. Davis appreciated the disadvantages of divided control. General Lee, however, was unwilling- to assume the responsi- bility for the conduct of affairs in departments to which he could not devote his entire attention. A compromise was therefore arrived at by which General Lee was consulted about all operations in the East which could even remotely affect him, and the operations of the Army of Northern Vir- ginia were made of primary importance in the conduct of military affairs. On May 31st, 1863, General Lee was in command of over 106,000 effectives, or about seventy-eight per cent, of the Confederate force in the east, and had 71,000, or fifty-four per cent., in the Army of Northern Virginia and in Imboden's command. This was increased to 80,000, or fifty-nine per cent., before the opening of the campaign. The North. — The sea, with its limited means of trans- portation, was the only route by which troops could be sent to, or withdrawn from, the Union departments of Virginia, North Carolina, and the South. These troops, could not, therefore, be quickly concentrated to take advantage of any weakness in the Confederate position, such as that created by the withdrawal of the Army of Northern Virginia from the front of Richmond, nor could they be quickly sent to rein- force the Army of the Potomac. In the general scheme of operations these forces merely assisted in the blockade of the coast and deprived the Confederate field armies of the troops retained by the coastal states for their own defense. In the North, neither the President nor the Secretary of War were soldiers by education. Their principal adviser was General Halleck, the commander in chief of all the 10 armies, who had had but little experience in conducting mili- tary operations and had not the genius of General Lee. There were too many independent commands in the same territory. This deprived the Army of the Potomac of many men who should have been in its ranks. In the three de- partments commanded by Generals Sehenck, Heintzleman, and Dix, there were more men than in the Army of the Po- tomac itself: at least one. half of these men would have been far more serviceable if united with that Army. In the middle department, the troops of General Milroy at Winchester and those of General Kelley at Harper's Ferry were of no particular value. They were unable to prevent invasion of Maryland, as will be seen later, nor could they effectually protect the Baltimore and Ohio railroad from raiding- parties. In the Department of Washington, a covering force was unnecessary since by his instructions, the commander of the Army of the Potomac was to perform this duty. During the campaign most of these troops were incorporated with the Army of the Potomac. While it was necessary to hold Fortress Monroe and Norfolk, the whole of General Dix's command was not nec- essary for this purpose. As auxiliary lines of operation, neither the line from Fortress Monroe to White House, nor that from Norfolk through Suffolk proved of any value dur- ing the Civil War. Of the total number of troops in the East at this time, only forty-three per cent, were in the Army of the Potomac. 11 CHAPTER II. CONFEDERATE PLANS. An offensive movement by the Army of Northern Vir- ginia was at this time almost forced on the Confederate au- thorities. On the Mississippi river, General Pemberton was in- rested in Vicksburg by a superior force under General Grant, -and it was apparent to those in authority that it was only a question of weeks when Pemberton must surrender. At Port Hudson, a short distance south of Vicksburg, General Gardner was similarly invested by General Banks. When these two places fell, the banks of the Mississippi, from the Ohio to the Gulf, would fall into the possession of the Union troops; Arkansas, Texas and Louisiana would then be separated from the Confederate states east of that river. This would be a serious blow to the Confederate cause both at home and abroad, and a brilliant counter-stroke at some other point in the theater of war was desirable to counteract its effects. The forces in the Departments of Tennessee and of South Carolina had been so depleted in the attempt to form a relieving army for Vicksburg, that neither General Bragg in Tennessee, nor General Beauregard in South Carolina could be expected to make this counter-stroke. General D. H. Hill In North Carolina was also reduced to the defensive because of the forces drawn from his department to reinforce the 12 Army of Northern Virginia and cover Richmond from an attack along the north bank of the James. The task of making this counter-stroke therefore fell on the Army of Northern Virginia, which had just been thor- oughly reorganized and recruited and was in the highest state of efficiency. There were still other reasons for an offensive movement. The Confederate authorities found themselves short of food supplies and had great difficulty in filling the requisi- tions of the armies. No relief from this situation could be expected until the coming harvest, except by an invasion of the rich farm lands of Maryland and Pennsylvania. The numerical strength of the Army of the Potomac was decreasing daily, due to the mustering out of the two-years men from New York who had volunteered in the spring of 1861, and the nine-months' militia from Pennsylvania and New Jersey who entered the service under the call of August, 1862. This army reached its minimum strength on June 20th, before the troops of other departments were united with it; it then numbered 89,000 men present for duty. The Union troops in southeastern Virginia were giving the Confederate authorities some uneasiness about the safety of Richmond and it was thought that they would be drawn to Washington if that capital were threatened. That General Lee was in favor of such a movement is shown by his correspondence. On June 8th he wrote to the Secretary of War as follows: "As far as I can judge, there is nothing to be gained by this army remaining quietly on the defensive, which it must do unless it can be reinforced. I am aware that there is diffi- 13 culty and hazard in taking the aggressive with so large an army in its front, intrenched behind a river, where it cannot be advantageously attacked. .Unless it can be drawn out in a position to be assailed, it will take its own time to prepare and strengthen itself to renew its advance on Kichmond, and force this army back within the intrenchments of that city. This may result in any event ; still, I think it is worth a trial to prevent such a catastrophe. Still, if the Department thinks best to remain on the defensive, and guard, as far as possible, all the avenues of approach, and await the time of the enemy, I am ready to adopt this course. I think our southern coast might be held during the sickly season by local troops, aided by a small organized force, and the preda- tory excursions of the enemy be repressed. This would give us an active force in the field with which we might hope to make some impression on the enemy, both on our northern and western frontiers. Unless this can be done, I see little hope of accomplishing anything of importance. All our military preparations and organizations should be pressed forward with the greatest vigor, and every exertion made to obtain some material advantage in this campaign." (W. r. No. 45, p. 868.) On June 25th, when his army was north of the Potomac river, in further development of this plan, he wrote to Presi- dent Davis as follows: "You will see that the apprehension for the safety of Washington and their OAvn territory has aroused the Federal Government and the people to great exertions, and it is in- cumbent upon us to call forth all our energies. In addition to the 100,000 troops called for by President Lincoln to de- 14 fend the frontier of Pennsylvania, you will see that he is con- centrating- other organized forces in Maryland. It is stated in the papers that they are all being withdrawn from Suffolk [Virginia], and according to General Buckner's report, Burnside and his corps are recalled from Kentucky.* It is reasonable to suppose that this would be the case if their apprehensions were once aroused. "I think this should liberate the troops in the Carolinas, and enable Generals Buckner and Bragg to accomplish some- thing in Ohio. It is plain that if all the Federal Army is con- centrated upon this, it will result in our accomplishing noth- ing, and being compelled to return to Virginia. If the plan that I suggested the other day, of organizing an army, even in effigy, under General Beauregard at Culpeper Court House, can be carried into effect, much relief will be afforded. If even the brigades in Virginia and North Carolina, which Generals [I). H.] Hill and Elzey think cannot be spared, were ordered there at once, and General Beauregard were sent there, if he had to return to South Carolina, it would do more to protect both states from marauding expeditions of the enemy than anything else. "I have not sufficient troops to maintain my communi- cations, and, therefore, have to abandon them. I think I can throw General Hooker's army across the Potomac and draw troops from the south, embarrassing their plan of campaign in a measure, if I can do nothing more and have to return. "I still hope that all things will end well for us at Vicks- burg. At any rate, every effort should be made to bring about that result.'' (W. R. No. 45. p. 930.) One division of Burnside's corps was sent to Vicksburg at this time. 15 General Lee further explains the objects of his plan of campaign in the report he submitted at its close: "The position occupied by the enemy opposite Fred- ricksburg being one in which he could not be attacked to ad- vantage, it was determined to draw him from it. The exe- cution of this project embraced the relief of the Shenandoah Valley from the troops that had occupied the lower part of it during the winter and spring, and, if practicable, the trans- fer of the centre of hostilities north of the Potomac. It was thought that the corresponding movements on the part of the enemy, to which those contemplated by us would probably give rise, might offer a fair opportunity to strike a blow at the army then commanded by General Hooker and that in any event that army would be compelled to leave Virginia and, possibly, to draw to its support troops designed to oper- ate against other parts of the country. In this way it Avas supposed that the enemy's plan of campaign for the summer would be broken up and part of the season of active opera- tions be consumed in the formation of new combinations and the preparations they would require. In addition to these advantages, it was hoped that other valuable results might be attained by military success. Actuated by these and other important considerations, that may hereafter be presented, the movement began June 3rd." (W. R. No. 44, p. 305.) General Lee also recognized the fact that the South could hardly hope to succeed in a prolonged struggle with the united North. In a letter to President Davis, June 10, 18G3, just before starting north, he writes: "We should not therefore conceal from ourselves that our resources in men are constantly diminishing, and the 16 disproportion in this respect between us and- our enemies, if they continue united in their efforts to subjugate us, is con- stantly augmenting." ■ (W. R. No. 45, p. 880.) In this letter he advocates the encouragement of the peace party in the North by a discontinuance of speeches and newspaper articles in the South rejecting the terms of peace proposed by that party. He hoped to make his invasion of the North another argument for those members of the peace party who declared that the South could never be subdued. In his circular order, directing that no supplies should be taken in the North except on regular requisition payable by the Confed- erate government, he also sought to avoid unnecessarily irri- tating the inhabitants of the invaded country, and to make the establishment (if a permanent government in the South of material interest to them. (W. R. No. 45. p. 912.) 17 CHAPTER III. THE OPPOSING ARMIES. Army <>f Northern Virginia. — At the opening of the Gettysburg campaign, June 1, 1863, the Army of Northern Virginia had been under the command of General Robert E. Lee for one year. In that period it took part in the seven days' battles about Richmond, and in the campaigns and bat- tles of Manassas, Antietam, Fredericksburg and Chancel- lorsville. The almost uniform success of its operations raised the morale of the entire army to the highest pitch and caused both officers and men to feel absolute confidence in their commander. • Notwithstanding the active operations of the year, the organization of the army had greatly changed since the army was hastily organized in front of Richmond. In the cam- paigns following the Peninsular campaign, Generals Long- street and Jackson each commanded half the army; after Antietam, their commands were made army corps and both officers were promoted to the grade of lieutenant-general. Finding, however, that a corps of 30,000 men was too large to be conveniently handled, after the death of Jackson in May, 1^863, General Lee formed his army into three corps. Upon his recommendation, the commands of the second and third corps were given to Major Generals Ewell and A. P. Hill, who were promoted to the grade of lieutenant-general. Both had commanded divisions in Jackson's corps, and the former was chosen bv Jackson to succeed him. 18 Each of the three corps was composed of three divisions ; a new division was made by uniting two of the six brigades of A. P. Hill's old division w T ith the brigades of Pettigrew and Davis sent about May 31st from the departments of Richmond and North Carolina. Each of the nine divisions was composed of four brigades. All of the brigades had been reorganized so that, as far as possible, each was composed of troops from the same state. Each brigade was formed of four or five regiments of ten companies each. On entering the service the strength of a regiment was about 1,000 men; as it had no depot bat- talion or company, its strength was rapidly diminished in active service. Each division was commanded by a major general ; each brigade by a brigadier general, if possible from the same state as his command. The artillery of the army had, since the autumn of 1861 r been under the control of Brigadier General William N. Pen- dleton. In front of Richmond the batteries, other than those of the reserve artillery of the army, were distributed among the brigades. From that period to Chancellorsville they were distributed among the divisions; in addition, in Long- street's corps, there were two battalions of corps artillery. In the reorganization just before the Gettysburg campaign, the artillery reserve was broken up; one battalion of four batteries of four guns each was assigned to each division, and two similar battalions were assigned as corps artillery. The prescribed number of guns to each of the three corps was therefore eighty; this number was slightly exceeded, as the actual number with the army was two hundred and fifty- 19 one. Of these twelve were 20-pounder siege rifles, two were Whitworth rifles, twenty-six were howitzers, and the re- mainder 3-inch rifles and 12-poimder smooth bore Napoleons in about equal numbers. Although the batteries were attached to the divisions and army corps, the chief of artillery was responsible for the care and maintenance of his arm and supervised its em- ployment on the battle-field. In this he was assisted by the chiefs of the corps artillery. The cavalry of the army had, since the autumn of 1861, been under the command of Major General J. E. B. Stuart; it constituted an independent unit of the army. It had grad- ually grown from a brigade in the Peninsula campaign, to a division of three brigades in the Chancellorsville campaign. Just before the Gettysburg campaign General Lee still fur- ther strengthened it by adding to it the brigades of Generals A. G. Jenkins and W. E. Jones, which had been operating in the Shenandoah Valley, and that of General B. H. Robert- son from North Carolina. To the cavalry division was attached a battalion of horse artillery of 24 guns, one battery for each brigade. The actual strength of the army was approximately as follows, only the officers, and the enlisted men under arms, or effectives, being counted : Infantry, Mfey 31 59,44S W. R. No. 40, p. 845 Infantry joining after May 31st — Pettigrew's brigade (four regiments) 2,948 W. R. No. 26, p. 1086 Davis' brigade 2,414 W. R. No. 26, p. 1086 25th and 31st Va 700 W. R. No. 40, pp. 714, 716 Total .- 65,510 20 Infantry detached between May 31st and July 1st — 13th and 58th Va., and 54th N. C left by Early at Winchester (approx.) 1,200 W. R. No. 44, p. 464 Corse's brigade, Pickett's division, left near Hanover Station, Va 1,462 W. R. No. 49, p. 765 E well's losses at Winchester 230 W. R. No. 44, p. 335 Total 2.892 Total infantry at time of battle 62,61S Artillery with army corps (thirteen battal- ions reported) 4,702 W. R. No. 40, p. S46 Alexander's and Garnett's battalions (esti- mated ) 724 Total 5.426 Early's loss at Winchester 22 Total artillery at time of battle 5,404 Total guns at time of battle with army corps 251 W. R. No. 49. p. 637 Cavalry — The brigades of Fitz Lee. Cham- bliss, Hampton, Jones and Robertson, .May 31st 10,292 W. R. No. 40, p. 846 Jenkins' brigade 1,600 W. R. No. 44, p. 547 Total 11.S92 Detached and watching Harper's Ferry dur- ing invasion 12th Va. Cav 400 (estimated) 11,492 Casualties at Brandy Station, killed, wound- ed and missing 485 Same in Loudoun Valley 510 Same at Hanover, etc 117 Total 1,112 Total Stuart's Cavalry Division north of Potomac on day of battle 10,380 Imboden's command 2.100 Battles and Leaders, Vol. 3, p. 422. Maryland Line, found by Ewell near Win- chester and taken with him. about 600 W. R. No. 40, p. 602 21 TOTAL EFFECTIVES. INCLUDING OFFICERS. Infantry 62,618 Army of Northern Virginia — Artillery 5,404 Cavalry 10,380 78,402 Maryland Line incorporated in Ewell's corps 600 79,002 Imboden's command 2,100 81,102 All the organizations above given were on the field of Gettysburg on July 3, and, with the exception of the cavalry brigades of Jones and Robertson and Imboden's command, (5,000 effectives), took part in the battle on one of the three days. Before reaching the field the Confederate army lost an unknown number of men by sickness, straggling and deser- tion. This number cannot be estimated even approximately. Army of the Potomac. — The Army of the Potomac; as constituted in the Gettysburg campaign, was composed main- ly of the forces which had operated with General McClellan on the Peninsula, and General Pope in Northern Virginia. The two armies were united in September, 18G2, and together took part in the Antietam campaign under General McClel- lan, in the Fredericksburg campaign under General Burn- side, and in the Chancellorsville campaign under General Hooker. The battle of Gettysburg was fought under still another commander, General Meade. Until General Hooker took command in January, 1863, the general organization of the army remained as established by General McClellan iu the Peninsula campaign. The army was organized into army corps and an artillery reserve; in 22 the later campaigns two corps were united to form a grand division. The enlisted strength, present for duty, of the army corps, averaged about 12,000 men, which was about two-thirds of its enrolled strength. ( >f the seven corps, which now formed the army, the II, III, V, and VI corps, had been with McClellan on the Peninsula; the I, XI and XII corps had formed Pope's Army of Virginia. General Hooker abolished the grand divisions and re- organized both the artillery and cavalry. The division consisted wholly of infantry; when it was separated from its corps, one or more batteries of corps ar- tillery were assigned to it. The brigade and regimental organizations were as in the (Confederate service. Until the latter part of May, 1863, the batteries of artil- lery assigned to the army corps were generally distributed as divisional artillery; few of the corps had corps artillery. After the battle of Chancellorsville, the divisional artillery was abolished and corps artillery substituted for it. To each corps was assigned a brigade of artillery. The normal strength of a brigade was five batteries of six guns each, or thirty guns to each corps. The artillery reserve of the army was organized and commanded by Brigadier General H. J. Hunt, who in the Antietam campaign became Chief of the Artillery of tin 1 army. The artillery reserve was composed of five brigades of four or five batteries each, and had one hundred and fourteen guns. The actual number of guns with the army, not counting those with the cavalry, was three hundred and twenty. Of the guns of the corps artil- lery, one-half were 3-inch rifles and one-half were 12-pounder Napoleon smooth bores. Of the gnus of the artillery reserve, 23 eight were 4 1 ..-inch siege rifles, which, however, did not reach the battlefield of Gettysburg, two were howitzers, and the remainder were 3-inch rifles and 12-pounder Napoleons in equal numbers. In the Fredericksburg campaign, the cavalry was dis- tributed among the grand divisions, one or two brigades to each grand division. Before the battle of Chancellorsville, General Hooker united all the cavalry into a corps of three divisions of two or three brigades each. General Stoneman was assigned to command the cavalry corps. After Chan- cellorsville, he was succeeded by General Pleasanton. It was reorganized by General Pleasanton into two divisions of three brigades each. A few days before the battle of Get- tysburg, StaheFs division of cavalry was transferred from the Department of Washington to the Army of the Potomac and became the third division of the cavalry corps. General Kilpatrick was placed in command of this division, which was reorganized into two brigades and Generals Custer and Farnsworth were promoted to command them. To the cavalry corps were attached two brigades of artillery, each having five horse batteries of six rifled 3-inch guns. On May 31, at the opening of the campaign, the strength of the seven army corps, the cavalry corps and the artillery reserve was. (w. R. No. 40, p. 574.) Present for Duty. Seven army corps 86,690 Cavalry corps 10,192 Artillery reserve 3,898 Total 100,780 24 On June 30th the strength of the Army was (W. R. No. 43, p. 151) : Present for Duty Equipped. Infantry 77,208 Cavalry corps 14,973 present for duty, number equipped Artillery reserve 3,898 not stated. Cavalry with army corps 258 (estimated) Stannard's Vermont brig 2,000 joined on evening of July 1st.) Lockwood's Maryland brig 1,500 (estimated) joined July 2d. 99,837 Of the infantry all the organizations were on the field or in its immediate vicinity on July 3. Of the cavalry not more than five of the. eight brigades were on the field at any one time. All of the artillery was on the field July 3, ex- cept two batteries of siege artillery. Before reaching the field, the Union Army also lost an unknown number through sickness and straggling. This number, although it cannot be even approximately estimated, was probably large, as the army marched rapidly for several days before the battle in rainy weather and in the heat of the latter days of June. As the march was in a friendly coun- try, the Union stragglers were in no danger of capture as were those of the Confederate army. Although the aggregate strength of the seven corps, had not changed materially between May 31 and June 30, the composition and organization of some of the corps had great- ly changed, due to the expiration of the terms of service of many of the regiments. During the progress of the cam- paign, the deficiencies created by the withdrawal of these troops were made up by reinforcements from the Department of Washington and from the Middle Department, Of these reinforcements, Stannard's Vermont brigade was attached 25 to the I corps; Hay's or Willard's brigade was attached to the II corps; Crawford's division of two brigades was at- tached to the V corps; and Lockwood's brigade was attached to the XII corps. The cavalry corps was reinforced by the addition of StaheFs cavalry, a few days before the battle. The artillery reserve was decreased during this period. The aggregate strength of the infantry of the Union army present for duty, according to the returns, exceeded that of the corresponding units of the Confederate army, by about 15,000 men, which was about the strength of the in- fantry of the VI corps. Comparison. — If the history and organization of the two armies is studied, it will appear that the Confederate army was the superior in all respects save numbers and equipment. i General Lee had commanded an army in live separate campaigns, and in more than twice as many important bat- tles. General Hooker had commanded in a single campaign and battle, and General Meade was to be in supreme com- mand only three days before ho was to tight his first battle. General Lee had the absolute confidence of his superi- ors and was free to operate as he saw fit. Both officers and men of his army were confident of success under his guid- ance, and he had confidence in the ability and hearty support of every officer and man of his army. Nearly all the gen- eral officers had been promoted on his recommendation. General Hooker, having been unsuccessful in his one campaign, had not the confidence of his superiors, and there- fore his suggestions and plans did not, as a rule, meet with 26 cordial approval. His unsuccessful campaign of Chancel- lorsville must have caused both officers and men to distrust his ability to maneuver and fight his army. While General Meade was given all the support possible by his superiors, his lack of experience made him hesitate to utilize his authority to its fullest extent. It led him to trust too much in the judgment of the corps commanders. He had not complete confidence in the ability of some of his principal assistants, and, because of his lack of experience and confidence in his own judgment, he did not create in all his subordinates confidence in himself. The corps and division commanders of both armies were, as a rule, officers who had attained these commands only after successful service as brigade commanders; in the Con- federate army all except one, General Rodes, were graduates of the U. S. Military Academy and had served in the regular army; in the Union army one of the corps and about one- third of the division commanders had entered the service from civil life as colonels of volunteers. Nearly all the older graduates had seen service in the Mexican war. The ratio of officers to men was greater in the Confed- erate army than in the Union; according to the last returns before the battle the ratio of officers to men present for duty was .089 in the Confederate army, and .068 in the Union army. This ratio is an important factor in the value of an army when the officers have had a year's experience in the field, as had most of the officers of both armies. The Confederate army corps and divisions were larger and more important units than those in the Union army. Their commanders had therefore greater power and respon- 27 ••sibility. This was emphasized by giving the corps command- ers the grade of lieutenant-general, and the division com- manders that of major-general. In the Union army a major- general commanded the entire army, and officers of the same rank commanded corps and divisions; brigadier-generals commanded divisions and brigades. The clear lines of de- markation in the Confederate commanders undoubtedly made it easier for all commanders to control their subordi- nates. The organization of the Confederate artillery was al- most ideal. The chief of artillery had absolute control of its equipment and employment on the field, while it was so divided that each corps and division had its own unit. Its ammunition and equipment were much inferior to those of the artillery of the Union army. In the Union army the duties of the chief of artillery were not definitely fixed. The only guns in his absolute control were those of the artillery reserve. While at times extremely valuable, as a rule its guns were not so available as those of the corps artillery. The cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia had beeu, as an independent unit, under the personal charge of Gene- ral J. E. B. Stuart from the beginning of the war. In the Union army it was not united into a single unit until Febru- ary, 1863. It was still inexperienced as an independent unit, and it will be observed that General Hooker always gave it an infantry support when he sent it against General Stuart's cavalry. The Confederate army had in the Gettysburg campaign fewer raw troops and fewer newly organized brigades and divisions than its adversary ; this was a distinct advantage. If the differences of the two armies are fairly weighed 28 it is not too much to say that the chances of success in the campaign about to be opened were in favor of General Lee,, notwithstanding his numerical inferiority. 29 CHAPTER IV. OPERATIONS FROM JUNE 1ST TO THE MORNING OF JULY 1ST. MOVEMENT OF LONGSTREET AND EWELL TO CULPEPER. On June 1, 1863, the main body Of the Army of North- ern Virginia lav on the south bank of the Rappahannock river, with headquarters at Fredericksburg. Stuart's cav- alry division was at Culpeper, where five brigades were as- sembled. The divisions of Hood and Pickett, of Longstreet's corps, which had recently returned from southern Virginia, were not with the main army; Hood was at Verdiersville, southeast of Culpeper, and Pickett was near Hanover Junc- tion with Pettigrew's brigade of Heth's division. The main body of the Union army lay on the north bank of the Rappahannock and along the railroad to Acquia Creek with headquarters at Falmouth. The cavalry corps was as- sembled at Bealeton, on the Orange and Alexandria railroad, north of Culpeper. On June 2 General Lee was informed that the Union troops had evacuated West Point on the York river and no longer threatened to advance on Richmond. He at once ordered the concentration of Ewell's corps and the divisions of Hood and McLaws of Longstreet's corps, at Culpeper. Hill's corps was left to hold Fredericksburg, and Pickett was ordered to join the army as soon as he was satisfied that his presence near Hanover Junction was no longer required. 30 On June 7 General Lee, having reached Oulpeper in person, issued orders to the cavalry forces of Generals Jen- kins and Imboden to prepare the way for his advance into the Shenandoah Valley. General Jenkins was ordered to move down the Shenan- doah valley at least as far as Strasburg and Front Royal, and there await the arrival of the infantry. In the meantime he was to obtain all possible information as to strength and position of the different Union posts in the lower valley. (W. R. No. 45, p. 865.) General Imboden was to move from the upper Shenan- doah valley into the South Potomac valley and engage the attention of the forces in and around Romney. He was to collect cattle for the main army and, if possible, by destroy- ing bridges, to interrupt railway communication between Cumberland and Martinsburg. (W. R. 45, p. 865.) While awaiting the execution of his preliminary orders, General Lee reviewed Stuart's cavalry corps on the plains about Brandy Station. BATTLE OF BBANDY STATION OB FLEETWOOD. The withdrawal of EwelPs forces from the Fredericks- burg lines and their movement westward having been re- ported by the Union pickets, General Hooker ordered the cavalry corps to make a reconnaissance in the direction of Culpeper where it was reported that Stuart had united his cavalry. Two brigades, each composed of 1,500 infantry and a battery of horse artillery, were to accompany the cavalry. 31 Stuart, who was preparing for an offensive movement instead of anticipating an attack on himself, had only one brigade along the river. Jones' brigade was picketing the river about Beverly Ford. Of the other brigades Fitz Lee was further up the river, and W. H. F. Lee, Hampton and Robertson were near Brandy Station. Early in the morning of June 9, Buford with his own division, the reserve brigade, and one brigade of infantry moved to Beverly Ford. It was a foggy morning and Jones' pickets were taken by surprise. The Confederates were be- ing driven slowly back when Stuart came to Jones' assist- ance with W. H. F. Lee, Hampton and Fitz Lee. He stop- ped Buford's advance but could not drive him back as Bu- ford was supported by infantry well posted. In the meantime Gregg with two divisions and a brigade of infantry crossed without opposition at Kelly's Ford. He sent the third division on the direct road towards Culpeper; with his own division he marched towards Brandy Station; the infantry he sent northward on a road nearer the river than the one followed by the cavalry. He found Robertson alone at Brandy Station and drove him out. Stuart now came to Robertson's assistance with W. H. F. Lee and Jones. After desperate fighting with charge and counter charge, Gregg was obliged to fall back on his infantry. As Buford had been slowly pushing the cavalry in his front and ad- vancing on the station, Gregg now found himself on Buford's left flank. Together they checked Stuart's advance until 5 p. M v when they were ordered to withdraw across the river. The third division of the Union cavalry corps met with a single Confederate regiment on the Culpeper road, which was 32 easily brushed aside; it however took no further part in the day's operations and was withdrawn to the river with the other divisions. The forces engaged on this day were about 10,000 Con- federate cavalry, and 10,000 Union cavalry and infantry. The reconnaissance had been successful in developing the strength of the Confederate cavalry and had also shown that they were supported by infantry. Rodes' division of Ewell's corps was sent by General Lee to Stuart's assistance and arrived at Brandy Station just at the close of the engage- ment, but too late to take an active part in it. In the cavalry tight at Brandy Station General W. H. F Lee was severely wounded and Colonel Chambliss succeeded to the command of his brigade. CAPTURE OF WINCHESTER. On the following day, June 10, before the Union army could profit by the knowledge obtained and frustrate his movement, Ewell was ordered to march on Winchester via Front Royal and there, if possible, capture the division of Major General Milroy. Winchester, in the Shenandoah valley, was not occu- pied by Union forces after its evacuation in the Antietam campaign until January, 1863, when Brigadier General Mil- roy was sent there. Although General Halleck had giveu repeated instructions that this town was not to be occupied in force and its troops were to be withdrawn promptly when- ever threatened by superior numbers, nevertheless, it was gradually converted into a base for operations in the Shen- 33 andoah valley, by the formation of a weak entrenched camp and by the increase of its garrison to a division of three brigades, (W. R. No. 31, p. 947; No. 40, pps. 132, 317, 453.) Finally on June 10, when he learned of the concentra- tion oi' the Confederate forces at Culpeper, General Halleck ordered the immediate evacuation of Winchester. This order was sent to General Milroy by General Schenck, chief of staff, but afterwards, on General Milroy's representa- tions, was in effect rescinded by General Schenck ; in view, however, of an expected attack, the brigade which had occupied Berryville was ordered to Winchester. (W. R. No. 4~5, p. 50.) Ewell reached Cedarville, just beyond Front Royal, on the evening of June 12 and was there joined by Jenkins' cavalry. From the information given him, he decided to send Rodes' division with Jenkins' cavalry, on the 13th, to capture the brigade at Berryville, and then have Rodes push on and capture the post at Martinsburg. Early's division was to move to Newtown and thence to Winchester on the Strasburg road, while Johnson's division was to move on the direct road from Cedarville. The force under General Rodes moved on Berryville and while making dispositions to surround it, found that the Union forces had retreated, leaving only a small rear guard. Rodes followed the retreating force to Summit Point on the railroad, where the Union brigade had turned off towards Winchester; he there bivouacked for the night after a march of twenty miles. He attempted to report to General Ewell for further orders, but was unable to do so; therefore, in pur- 34 suance of his original orders, on the morning of June 14 he marched on Martinsburg and reached that town late in the afternoon after a long march. The garrison of that post having orders to retreat if menaced by superior forces, made its escape during the night. The cavalry was pursued by Jenkins as far as Williamsport, but the infantry escaped un- observed to Shepherdstown. Generals Early and Johnson, marching on Winchester on the 13th, met the main force under General Milroy north of Kernstown and from that point drove him to his fortified positions just south of Winchester. On the morning of the 14th, finding the positions south of Winchester too strong to warrant an assault. General Early was directed to make a retrograde and turning movement with three of his brigades and assault the fortifications north and west of the town. To conceal his design, Gordon's brigade Avas left south of Winchester and Johnson's division threatened the lines east of the town. Early reached his point of attack without be- ing discovered, and having prepared the way with twenty guns carried the works in his front by assault. It was now dark and too late to attack the other works in the line of de- fense. That night Milroy decided to retreat on Harper's Ferry. This movement was anticipated by General Ewell, who sent three brigades of Johnson's division to prevent his escape. Johnson reached the Martinsburg road at a point five miles north-east of the town, with two of his brigades, some time after midnight. Just at that moment the head of the retreat- ing troops reached the same point. The opposing troops fought in the early dawn and the Confederates were about 35 to be overwhelmed when the opportune arrival of Johnson's third brigade, which had been accidentally left behind, turned the tide. The Union retreat then became a rout, in which about 4,000 men, 23 guns, and 300 wagons were cap- tured. The remainder of Milroy's force reached the Poto- mac either at Harper's Ferry or at Hancock. Rodes' divi- sion was too far from the lines of retreat to intercept either of the columns. Leaving three of Early's regiments to guard the pris- oners, Ewell moved to the Potomac, where Rodes crossed at Williamsport on the 15th, and on the 19th moved to Hagers- town ; on the 18th Johnson crossed at Sharpsburg, and on the same day Early moved to Shepherdstowu. In these posi- tions they remained until the arrival of Hill's corps. ACTION TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT TO MEET THE INVASION OF NORTHERN STATES. In view of a probable invasion of Pennsylvania, on June 10th, President Lincoln formed two new departments: that of the Susquehanna, with headquarters at Harrisburg, un- der General Couch, then commanding the II corps; and that of the Monongahela with headquarters at Pittsburg under General W. F. H. Brooks. (W. R. No. 45, p. 55.) On June 15, when the news of the disaster at Win- chester was received in Washington, the President issued a call for 100,000 militia to be furnished by the threatened states, Pennsylvania, Maryland, West Virginia and Ohio, aud had letters written to the Governor of New York asking for 20,000 men, and to the governors of the other states ask- 36 ing for such regiments as could be furnished at once. (W. R. No. 45, p. 136.) On June 24th, the Middle Department was divided into two parts: the part west of the Shenandoah Valley became the Department of West Virginia, under General B. F. Kelley. (W. R. No. 45, p. 299.) RETROGRADE MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. As soon as General Hooker became aware of the flank movement of the Confederate army, he wrote to the President suggesting that he be allowed to attack the force left at Fredericksburg, should it develop that Lee was dividing his army to make an offensive movement. He was advised by both the President and General Halleck not to move across the Rappahannock. Again, on June 10th, he requested per- mission to move on Richmond. This was also refused and he was directed to make his movements conform to those of General Lee, attacking him whenever possible, (w. R. No. 43, pp. 31-35.) On the 11th of June therefore he began to withdraw from the Rappahannock and concentrate along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad near Manassas Junction, en route for the Potomac near Leesburg. On June 15, the I, III, V and XI corps were already at Manassas Junction. The other corps were on their right and rear marching on Fairfax Court House. The cavalry corps had remained at and near Warrenton to cover this move- ment, and on the 15th and 16th joined the other corps about Manassas Junction. On the 17th, the V corps was ordered to Gum Springs, near the Little River turnpike northwest of 3? Manassas; to coyer this movement Gregg's division of cav- alry was ordered to Aldie. CONCENTRATION OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY NEAR THE POTOMAC. When General Lee learned of the withdrawal of Hooker from the Rappahannock, he ordered Hill to move to Cul- peper and thence to Winchester, and Longstreet to move along the east slope of the Bine Ridge mountains from Oul- peper northward to Ashby and Snicker gaps. The exposed flanks of Longstreet and Hill were to be covered by Stuart's cavalry. Hill, being entirely protected and having free roads, left Fredericksburg on the 14th of June and reached the Potomac, at Shepherdstown, June 23. Longstreet moved northward on the lGth, as soon as Hill's leading division was at hand, and on the 19th he halted with Hood's division in Snicker Gap, McLaw's di- vision in Ashby Gap, and Pickett's in the mountain passes between the other two divisions. In this movement Fitz Lee's cavalry brigade formed his advance guard as far as the Manassas Gap railroad and the brigades of Chambliss and Robertson formed his flank guard. Hampton was left on the Rappahannock to protect Hill, and Jones was between Hampton and Robertson. CAVALRY ENGAGEMENTS IN LOUDOUN VALLEY. On the 17th of June, after escorting Longstreet's corps to the passes of the Blue Ridge mountains, Fitz Lee's cavalry 38 brigade moved eastward towards Aldie Gap in the Bull Run mountains. On the same day Gregg's cavalry division, after escorting the V corps to Gum Springs, moved west- ward through Aldie Gap to ascertain the position of the enemy. The two forces met just west of Aldie, where the brigades of Fitz Lee aud Kilpatrick had a spirited encounter. On the approach of Gregg's remaining brigades, Lee retired. On the following day the brigades of Chambliss and Robertson having arrived, they were posted on the road lead- ing from Aldie to Ashby Gap and about six miles from the former place. Fitz Lee was posted to their left and rear. On the 19th, when Jones' brigade arrived, it relieved Fitz L( e's brigade, which was then moved to the road from Aldie to Snicker Gap. On the 20th, Hampton's brigade arrived and was attached to the right wing. There was some skirmishing between the two cavalry commands at Middleburg June IS and 19 on the Ashby Gap road, but no serious movement was made until June 21. On June 21 Pleasanton was authorized to attack the cav- alry in his front and to ascertain what Confederate force was east of the Blue Ridge mountains. In this attack he was to be supported by the V corps, which bad been ordered to Aldie. On the 21st, therefore, with Gregg's cavalry di- vision and Barnes' division of the V corps on the Ashby Gap road, and with Buford's cavalry division on his right, Pleas- anton moved against Stuart and drove him from his in- trenched position at Upperville into the Blue Ridge passes. In the defense of these passes Stuart's command was tem- porarily relieved by Longstreet's infantry. Only Vincent's 39 brigade of the V corps was actively engaged in this move- ment. On the 22nd, Pleasanton's command returned to Aldie, where he remained with the V corps until the 26th, when he moved to Leesburg. Stuart's cavalry returned to the valley between the Bull Run and the Blue Ridge mountains, where he remained until the 25th. CONFEDERATE ADVANCE FROM THE POTOMAC. As it was apparent, on the 22nd of June, that the Union army had no intention of advancing across the Loudoun Val- ley, General Lee issued the orders for the advance of his army into Pennsylvania. On June 23 Ewell's corps moved northward. His orders were to move to the Susquehanna, collecting supplies on the way, and to seize Harrisburg if he could. (W. R. No. 45, p. 914.) Ewell's main body, consisting of most of Jenkins' cavalry and the infantry divisions of Rodes and Johnson, marched through Hagerstown, Greencastle and Chambersburg, to Car- lisle, which they reached June 27. His left flank was pro- tected by Steuart's infantry brigade with the Maryland Line, which moved from Greencastle to Chambersburg, via McConnellsburg, and his right flank by Early's division with one of Jenkins' regiments, the 17th Va. cavalry, which moved through Boonsborough and Waynesborough to Green- wood on the Chambersburg-Gettysburg road east of Fay- etteville. The march was a slow one, because of the flanking columns and because of the collection of supplies in a hostile country. From Carlisle, Jenkins' cavalry was sent to ±0 reconnoitre the defenses of Harrisburg, and on the morning of June 29 Ewell was preparing to move against it with his infantry, when he received orders to move towards Gettys- burg. Early's division, on reaching Greenwood, turned east- ward through the South mountains. Gordon's brigade, with White's battalion of Jones' cavalry brigade, moved di- rectly on Gettysburg, aud the other brigades, with the 17th Va. regiment of Jenkins' cavalry, moved to Mummasburg. From Mummasburg Hays' brigade was sent to Gettysburg. The right wing of Early's division then moved on the turn- pike to York, the cavalry going to Hanover Junction, while his left wing moved by the country roads through Hunters- town and Berlin. The division reached York on June 28 and Gordon was at once sent to seize the bridge over the Susquehanna at Columbia. In this he was unsuccessful, as the bridge was burned by the local troops. Early's division was encamped around York, collecting supplies and destroy- ing the railroad, when on June 2!) its commander received orders to join his corps near Cashtown. Hill's corps crossed the Potomac on the 24th of June and inarched through Hagerstown and Chambersburg to Fayetteville, where it arrived June 27. On the 29th, Heth's division was sent across the South mountains to Cashtown. Long-street's corps crossed the Potomac on the 25th and 26th of June and reached Chambersburg on the 27th. On the 29th, the divisions of McLaws and Hood were sent to Greenwood, just beyond Fayetteville; Law's brigade of 41 Hood's division was posted as an outpost at New Guilford on the road to Fairfield. General Imboden, who had carried out his preliminary instructions and had destroyed many of the bridges, block- houses and water tanks along the Baltimore and Ohio rail- road, was ordered to keep on the left flank of EwelPs corps and gather information and collect supplies. (W. R. No. 45, pp. 905 and 924.) He therefore assembled his force at Hancock on the Potomac, where General Lee's courier found him on June 29. On General Stuart's cavalry, General Lee depended for information of the movements of the Army of the Poto- mac. He was therefore directed to cross the Potomac with three brigades as soon as their services could be spared from the defense of the Blue Ridge passes. He was directed to place himself on E well's right flank and was informed that one of Ewell's columns would probably march to Emmits- burg. (W. R. No. 45, p. 913.) General Stuart, it appears, had proposed a plan by which he was to move through Hopewell Gap and reach the Potomac by moving around the rear and right flank of the Union army. This plan was referred to by General Lono-- street in transmitting General Lee's order to General Stuart and in his letter to General Lee informing him of its trans- mittal. The movement met the approval of General Long- street, (W. R. No. 45, p. 915.) General Lee finally gave General Stuart permission to move by the route which seemed best to General Stuart. He, however, added that if the L T nion army was not moving northward, he advised him to move into the Shenandoah val- 42 ley on the night of the 23rd, cross the Potomac at Sheperds- town and move toward Frederick, Maryland. (W. R. No. 45, p. 923.) Acting under the discretionary orders thus given him, on June 24 General Stuart assembled the brigades of Fitz Lee, Chambliss and Hampton on the Manassas Gap railroad, a short distance west of Thoroughfare Gap. His original in- tention was to move through Hopewell Gap, north of Thor- oughfare Gap, and thence through Gum Springs to Seneca Falls. However, at this time the Union forces were too far south to permit it. In Aldie Gap were the V and cavalry corps; in Thoroughfare Gap and Gainesville was the II corps; at Bristoe station, south of Manassas and Centerville, was the VI corps. Not knowing fully the position of the Union forces, Stuart went through a gap just south of Thor- oughfare Gap early in the morning of June 25 and shortly ran into the II corps. The whole day was spent in recon- noitering the Union forces and in a useless engagement with them. On the 26th he marched by Brentsville to a point on the Occoquan River below its junction with the Bull Run. On the following day, June 27, he made a long march and that night crossed the Potomac at Powser's ford. On June 2S, finding that the entire Union army was at and near Freder- ick, he marched northward through Rockville to Brooksville. Near Rockville he captured a train of more than one hun- dred and twenty-five wagons, which he took with him. On the night of June 29, when the other commanders had re- ceived orders to march on Gettysburg, he had just reached Union Mills, half way between Westminster and Littlestown. The cavalry brigades of Robertson and Jones were left 43 by Stuart to guard the passes in the Blue Ridge mountains as long as the Union army was in their front. When that army crossed the Potomac, General Robertson, who was in command, was to withdraw beyond the Shenandoah River, cross the Potomac and place himself on the right and rear of the Confederate army. One battalion of Jones' brigade had been attached to Ewell's corps and a regiment was on picket duty near Harper's Ferry. Robertson's brigade and the three remaining regiments of Jones' brigade were assembled at Berryville on June 29, preparatory to crossing the Poto- mac and joining the army, when they received orders to march to Gettysburg. CONCENTRATION OF THE UNION ARMY AT FREDERICK, MARYLAND. On June 17 the Union army began its movement north- ward from Manassas for the Potomac near Leesburg, Vir- ginia, where bridges were to be constructed for its crossing. This movement was covered by the II corps at Thorough- fare Gap and the V and cavalry corps at Aldie Gap. On the 25th of June the Union army began crossing the Potomac and moving towards Frederick. It was preceded by StahePs cavalry division of the Department of Washing- ton, which had been sent from Fairfax Court House for this purpose. On June 26 the cavalry corps, which formed the rear guard, left Aldie and marched to Leesburg. On June 28 the entire army was concentrated in a, cir- cular area whose diameter is twenty miles and whose center is Frederick. On the night of June 27-2S, General Hooker was, at his own request, relieved from the command of the 44 army. He- stated that he submitted his resignation because the forces commanded by him were inadequate to meet his adversary and also cover Washington and Harper's Ferry as required by his instructions. He had just previously recom- mended the abandonment of Harper's Ferry and the rein- forcement of his army by its large garrison. This recom- mendation had been disapproved. (W. R. No. 43, p. 60.) General George G. Meade, commander of the V army corps, Avas appointed by President Lincoln to succeed General Hooker : lie assumed command on the morning of June 28. His instructions were to maneuver and light in such a way as to cover Washington and Baltimore. He was placed in com- mand of all forces in his sphere of operations, including those of Harper's Ferry, and was authorized to remove from, or assign to, the command of any part of his army, any officer whom he saw lit, (W. R. No. 43, pp. 61, 62, 63.) In pursuance of his orders and from definite information that the corps of Ewell, Hill and Longstreet had marched north of Hagerstown, he decided to move his army to the line Emmitsburg-Hanover, covering Baltimore and Washington. Westminster, Maryland, was made his new base. On the 29th of June, Buford with two brigades of his cavalry division, marched from Middletown, west of Fred- erick, through Boonsborough towards Fairfield; his third brigade was sent to Mechanicstown. Gregg's cavalry di- vision marched from Bidgeville, on Parr's Ridge east of Frederick, to New Windsor on the road to Westminster; Kil- patrick's cavalry division marched from Frederick to Littles- town, where it was joined by the 5th and 6th Michigan regi- 45 ments, which were returning from a reconnaissance to Get- tysburg which they reached June 28. On ttte-^ame-day, the I and XI corps moved to Emniits- burg; the III to Taneytown; the II to Union v4+le near West- minster; the V to Liberty in rear of the II; the XII to Bruce- ville in rear of the III, and the VI to New Windsor on the road to Westminster. THE ORDER FOR THE CONCENTRATION OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY AT GETTYSBURG. On the night of June 28, General Lee learned from a spy that the Union army was around Frederick. This was his first intimation that the Army of the Potomac was north of the Fotomac River. He had assumed that General Stuart would precede the Union army across the river and give him due notice of that fact. To prevent the Union commander from moving still further westward and intercepting his communications he decided to concentrate his army east of the South mountains, either at Cashtown or Gettysburg. Orders to this effect were therefore sent to General Ewell and General Robertson, and orders were sent to General Im- boden to move to Chambersburg and relieve General Pickett of the charge of that town and the trains. POSITIONS OF THE ARMIES ON THE NIGHT OF JUNE 29. By the evening of June 29, these orders reached all the separate Confederate commanders, except Stuart. The mili- tary situation was then as follows: Of the nine infantry divisions of the Confederate army, one was at York ; two at 46 Carlisle; one at Chambersburg ; four near Fayetteville ; and one at Cashtown. Stuart, with three cavalry brigades, was at Union Mills en route for Littlestown ; Robertson, with two cavalry brigades, was at Berryville in the Shenandoah val- ley, and Imboden was at Hancock on the Potomac river. Of the Union forces, Buford with two cavalry brigades was moving on Fairfield and Gettysburg; Gregg's cavalry division was moving on Westminster; and Kilpatrick's di- vision was at Littlestown en route for Hanover. The in- fantry corps were assembled on the Eminitsburg-Taneytown- Westminster road. POSITIONS OF THE ARMIES ON THE NIGHT OF JUNE 30. The movements of each army on June 30 conformed to its general plan of operations. The Confederate army corps moved towards Cashtown and Gettysburg, and the Union army corps deployed on the general line Emmitsburg-Hanover. As Buford was advancing towards Fairfield he discov- ered that the town was in the possession of the Confederates. Not wishing his presence to be known, he turned eastward until he reached the Emmitsburg-Gettysburg road and upon that marched to Gettysburg, which he reached at 11 a.m. At the same hour Pettigrew's brigade of Heth's division had just reached the outskirts of the town on its march from Cash- town for supplies. Before the two commands came into actual conflict Pet- ti grew wi tin 1 row to Cashtown and reported the presence of Union cavalry at Gettysburg. Buford took possession of the 47 town and posted his pickets so as to watch all the roads from the Fairfield road on his left, to the York road on his right. Beyond the picket line, in all directions, he sent reconnoiter- ing patrols. Gamble's brigade, which was on the left of the line, was between the town and W illoughby Run and between the Fair- field and Cashtown roads. Its picket line was on a ridge just west of the creek and an advanced picket of the 8th Illinois cavalry was on a ridge nearly a mile and a half west of Wil- loughby Run. Devin's brigade was north of the town. On the night of June 29-30, Stuart, who was at Union Mills, learned that the Union troops had just inarched into Littlestown. On the morning of the 30th therefore, he marched to Hanover to avoid them. As his advance guard marched into that town it encountered Kilpatrick's rear guard which was just passing through it. Although outnum- bering Kilpatrick, Stuart was hampered by the long wagon train he had captured and was desirous of avoiding an en- gagement which would still further delay him. He there- fore turned eastward, made a forced march, and reached Dover on the morning of July 1. On the night of the 30th, the positions of the opposing forces were as follows : At Heidlersburg, north of Gettysburg, was General Ewell with Rodes' division, and three miles cast of that town, was Early's division. At Cashtown were the divisions of Heth and Pender of Hill's corps. Across the mountains, in the vicinity of Fayetteville, were the divisions of Anderson, McLaws and Hood. Johnson's division was on the Carlisle- Chambersburg road about five miles from the latter place. 48 Pickett's division was still at Ckambersburg. Stuart's cav- alry was making a night march between Jefferson and Dover, Penn. ; Robertson was near Martinsburg, Va. ; and Imboden near McConnellsburg, Penn. The main line of the Union army was composed of Mer- ritt's cavalry brigade at Mechanicstown ; the I corps at Marsh Run, midway between Emmitsburg and Gettysburg; the XI corps at Emmitsburg; the III corps a short dis- tance east of Emmitsburg, on the Taneytown road; the XII corps at Littlestown; the V corps at Union Mills; and the VI corps near Manchester. The II corps was in the second line at Unionvffle west of Westminster. Buford, with two cavalry brigades, was at . Gettysburg ; Kilpatrick's division was at Hanover; Gregg's cavalry division had two brigades at Westminster and one at New Windsor, Md. 49 CHAPTER V. BATTLE OF JULY 1. MOVEMENTS PRECEDING THE BATTLE. It was not the intention of either of the army command- ers to begin a decisive battle on this day. Confederate Army. — Of his nine infantry divisions, General Lee had only four east of the South mountains, and these were not concentrated. All of the other divisions were still west of the mountains, echeloned along the single road all must use to pass this barrier. As Imboden had not ar- rived, Pickett was still guarding the army trains. Of his cavalry, General Lee had a single brigade with his army; of Stuart's position he had no knowledge whatever and Robert- son was still far in the rear. Of the position of the Union army he knew only that Pettigrew had seen some cavalry entering Gettysburg. No new orders were therefore given for July 1; the corps commanders were allowed to complete the concentration and were informed that no general en- gagement was desired until the army was concentrated. General Lee remained with General Longstreet until noon, when Long-street's corps began to cross the mountains. The Confederate point of concentration having been shifted" by General Hill from Cashtown to Gettysburg, on the evening of June 30 he ordered the division of Heth to be fol- lowed by that of Pender to move to Gettysburg, and that of Anderson to cross the mountains to Cashtown. He also sent >0 Ewell word that he was going through Cashtown to Gettys- burg. Early in the morning Heth started for Gettysburg, ac- companied by one battalion of the corps artillery in place of his own. Pender, who was bivouacked some distance in his rear, did not move until an hour or two later, and was fol- lowed by the other battalion of corps artillery. On the morning of July 1, General Ewell started with Rodes' division to march directly from Heidlersburg to Cash- town ; before he reached Middletown he was met by General Hill's messenger and therefore moved from Middletown to- wards Gettysburg. General Early was ordered by General Ewell to move southward until he reached the Hunterstown- Mummashurg road and thence move west to Cashtown. He was moving on the Heidlersburg-Gettysburg road southward when lie was overtaken by a message from General Ewell to move to Gettysburg. General Johnson, with Ewell's corps trains, was leaving the Carlisle-Chambersburg road about five miles north of Chambersburg and marching on a cross road for Fayetteville. On the morning of July 1, General Long-street was pre- paring to move aeross the mountains with the division of McLaws and Hood as soon as the road was clear; Pickett was to join them east of the mountains as soon as relieved by Imboden, who was expected that day. Union Army. — General Meade's orders for the move- ments on July 1 were issued before he knew definitely of the withdrawal of the Confederate forces from York and Car- lisle. Although he took the precaution to have all the un- necessary trains stmt to the rear and the armv readv for bat- 51 tie, he did not intend that the movements ordered should in- volve any of his army corps in an engagement with the enemy. His orders were, the I corps to Gettysburg; the XI to supporting distance from the I corps; the 111 corps to Eni- mitsburg; the XII corps to Two Taverns, five miles from Gettysburg on the Littlestown road; the II corps to Taney- town; and the V corps to Hanover. The VI corps was to remain at Manchester. After issuing these orders, he learned that Carlisle and York were being evacuated and that the Confederate army was being concentrated probably to make a sudden descent niton him. The point of concentration could not be accu- rately fixed, but he thought it would be somewhere on the road from Chambersburg to York, through Cashtown and Mummasburg. As his army was deployed over a long line, it was neces- sary for him to concentrate for battle either in advance of his present position or in rear of it. Acting upon the hy- pothesis that Reynolds might be attacked by the enemy and compelled to fall back, he selected a line along Pipe Creek between Middleburg and Manchester, and sent a circular to his corps commanders to study the roads by which it would be necessary for them to move in order to concentrate there. (TV. R. Xo. 45, p. 458.) He also wrote to General Reynolds giving him an outline of the military situation and asking his views as to the ad- visability of concentrating the army in the vicinity of Get- tysburg, in view of the information given him in General Meade's letter, and the knowledge General Reynolds had of the nature of the country, etc. He informed General Rey- 52 nolds that the orders for July 1 were issued before the evacu- ation of Carlisle and York were known. ' w R No - 45 - p- 460 •) Having great confidence in the ability and judgment of General Reynolds, he had placed him in command of the III and XI corps in addition to his own. with instructions " to make such dispositions and give such orders as urcu in- stances may require." (W. r. No. 45, p. 414.) General Reynolds ordered the XI corps to follow his own to Gettysburg; all the other corps moved according to the orders of the day. At 8 a.m. on July 1, Wadsworth's division of the 1 corps, which was bivouacked on the Emmitsburg-Gettysburg road near the Marsh Creek bridge, with Hall's battery of ar- tillery, moved towards Gettysburg. General Reynolds rode with it. The second division, which was bivouacked on a road running from the Marsh Creek bridge to Fairfield, and the third division, which was in rear of the first division, started about !> :30 A.M. The XI corps started from Emmits- burg some time after 8 a.m.; Barlow's division moved by the direct road, but the other divisions being encamped east of the town moved by a country road which entered the Gettys- burg-Taneytown road about five miles south of Gettysburg. Neither the Confederate nor the Union movements were made either with haste or with extreme caution ; the rains of the preceding day had made the roads difficult and neither side was expecting to meet the enemy in force. General Hill assumed that Gettysburg was held by a small cavalry force, which could readily be brushed aside by Heth's division. General Reynolds assumed that no enemy could be met en route, since Buford held Gettysburg. 53 As no other troops received orders or requests to move to Gettysburg iu time, the only troops engaged in the battle of July 1 were the Confederate infantry divisions of Heth, Pender, Rodes and Early, seventeen brigades, and the Union corps of Reynolds and Howard, assisted by Buford's cav- alry, twelve infantry aud two cavalry brigades. BATTLEFIELD OF JULY 1. The field upon which the opposiug forces met on this day lies north and west of the town of Gettysburg and is limited on the east and west by two insignificant streams called Rock Creek and Willoughby Run. It is limited on the south by the Hanover, and the Fairfield or Hagerstoton road, and is traversed by the roads running to Cashtown, Mummasburg, Middletown, Carlisle, Heidlersburg and York. About a half mile west of the town is a ridge, running due north and south, which forms the divide between the two streams. At its extreme north end, where, in the reports of the battle it is called Oak Hill or Oak Ridge, it rises one hundred and twenty feet above the creeks; opposite the town, where it is called Seminar)/ Ridge, it rises to a height of only sixty feet. Its eastern slope is quite steep; its west- ern very gentle. Between Rock Creek and this ridge is a level plain, ris- ing only twenty feet above the creek. Its only elevation is Barlow's Knoll, near the Rock Creek crossing of the Heid- lersburg road. This knoll rises about thirty feet above the level of the plain and is connected with Seminary Ridge by a low divide. 54 The field, between Seminary Ridge and Willoughby Run, is traversed by two intermediate ridges, both radiating from » >ak Hill. The first ridge, west of Seminary Ridge, which may be called Reynolds Ridge, since it is now followed by Reynolds Avenue, crosses the Fairfield road a half mile west of Seminary Ridge. North of the Cashtown road, the depres- sion between this and Seminary Ridge is hardly perceptible, but at the Fairfield road the bottom of the depression is fifteen feet below Reynolds Ridge, and thirty-five feet below Seminary Ridge. lief ween Reynolds Ridge and Willoughby Run and about three hundred and fifty yards from the former is McPherson Ridge, now followed by Stone and Bnford A renins. This ridge is pierced by Bender's /'urine north of the Cashtown road and terminates in the McPherson Woods, about a quar- ter of a mile south of that road. The depression between tins and Reynolds Ridge is a shallow one. The Maryland ami Western Railroad, at the time of the battle graded but not completed, runs nearly parallel to and about a hundred yards north of the Cashtown road. It tra- versed all the ridges above described in cuts four to six feet deep. The field was generally open, but scattered over it were groves of small extent. The most notable of these were the McPherson Woods, a grove two hundred yards wide, extend- ing from Willoughby Run to Reynolds Ridge; Shead's Grove, covering the west slope of Oak Ridge from the railroad northward; and the Seminary Grove, between the Cashtown and Fairfield roads. In rear of the position and the town, near the junction 00 of the roads from Emmitsburg, Taneytown and Two Tav- erns, is Cemetery Hill.- This elevation commands the plain north of it by about one hundred feet and the ridge at the Seminary building by about fifty feet. Since it commanded all the roads by which the I and XI corps could retreat or be reinforced, it was the true key-point of the position." heth's attack on the MORNING OF JULY 1. On the morning of July 1, as Heth passed the Marsh Creek bridge on the Cashtown road, he encountered the ad- vanced picket of the 8th Illinois, which tired the first shot of the battle. As the Confederates were seen advancing, by the main picket line on the ridge west of YVilloughby Run, Gamble's cavalry brigade, which was south of the Cashtown road, was at once deployed along Reynolds and McPherson ridges from the railroad towards the Fairfield road. Calefs horse battery was posted along Ins line; two guns on the right of the Cashtown road, two on the left, all on McPher- son Ridge, and two still further to the left, beyond McPher- son's woods. Devin's brigade was north of Bender's Ravine. It was Buford's intention to hold Gettysburg until he was compelled to retire or ordered to do so. He knew that the 1 corps was on its way to Gettysburg and not far distant. When General Heth encountered the advanced picket line near the Marsh Creek bridge, he deployed Archer's brigade, which was in advance, on the south side of the Cash- town road, and Davis' brigade, which followed it. on the north side. By this advance line the Union pickets were gradu- ally driven back until the main Union line east of Willough- 56 by Run was encountered. Then the artillery was ordered to the front to silence Calefs battery, and Archer and Davis prepared to attack the cavalry's line of battle. It was probably nearly 11 a.m. when the two Confed- erate brigades waited near Willoughby Run for the artillery to silence Calefs guns before attacking the line on McPlier- son Ridge. At this time Wadsworth's division was approach- ing Gettysburg. Upon hearing that Buford was attacked, General Rey- nolds rode at once to the field and ordered Wadsworth's division to march over Seminary Ridge and go to the support of the cavalry. Davis' brigade was probably crossing the creek, when Wadsworth approached the field from the Seminary. Cutler's brigade, being in advance, was sent with Hall's battery to check the advance of the Confederates north of McPherson's Woods. Hall's battery came in position on the north side of the Cashtown road near Calefs right platoon and the bri- gade line was formed by placing two regiments on his left and three north of the railroad. Meredith's brigade of Wads- worth's division was sent against Archer's brigade, which was just emerging from McPherson's Woods as it arrived. Four of Meredith's regiments charged and drove Archer back into the creek where he with a number of his men were captured; the other regiment of Meredith's brigade was held in reserve. General Reynolds was killed in the Mc- Pherson Woods by one of Archer's men and the command of the corps fell to General Doubleday. Davis was at first more successful than Archer; he com- pelled two regiments of the right wing of Cutler's brigade, 57 not fully deployed, to fall back to Seminary Ridge and nearly captured Hall's battery before it could retire. However, as he was advancing over Reynolds Ridge, with two regiments north and one south of the railroad, he was attacked in flank by Meredith's reserve regiment and the two regiments of Cutlers left wing. His right regiment was driven into the railroad cut where a large part of it was captured. The other regiments of Davis' brigade thereupon retired across Wil- loughby Run. This was probably about twelve o'clock and about the time the other brigades of the 1 corps were reach- ing the field. AYhen the cavalry was relieved by the infantry it was withdrawn to the rear and then posted on the left flank of the line. Calef's battery was withdrawn to Seminary Ridge and enfiladed the railroad cut, but upon Davis' retreat, re- turned for a short time to McPherson Ridge. Although Heth had the brigades of Pettigrew and Brockenbrough in reserve he did not employ them to support Archer and Davis because, as he says in his report, his operation was simply an armed ree< mnaissance. INTERVAL BETWEEN MORNING AND AFTERNOON ENGAGEMENTS. After the defeat of Archer and Davis, the Union line was rectified by General Doubleday. Meredith's brigade was deployed along Reynolds Ridge in rear of the McPherson woods with a skirmish line in WT Cutler was deployed along the same ridge north of the railroad, the gap between the two brigades was filled by Stone's brigade, which had come up about the end of the engagement and advanced to Mc- Pherson Ridge. Meredith's line was prolonged to the left 58 by Rowley's brigade, which also arrived towards the end of the engagement, having marched from Marsh Creek bridge f his position and the advantages of the Emmitsburg road ridge, General Sickles rode to General Meade's headquarters to request General Meade either to examine the ground in front of the III corps himself or to send his chief engineer, General Warren. Unfortunately General Meade did not anticipate an at- tack on his left and did not feel that either he or Warren could go. However, at that moment General Hunt, chief of artillery, came in, and he was requested by General Meade 81 • to accompany Sickles" It was 11 a.m. when the two officers rode towards the Peach Orchard to examine Sickles' pro- posed line. General Hunt was impressed by the favorable position it would give the enemy if abandoned to him, but also by the difficulties attendant on its occupation by the III corps. He saw that the right flank of the III corps would be in the air and that its front would be too long for its effective strength. He also noted the woods on Snyder's Ridge in front of the Peach Orchard and suggested that a reconnoitering party be sent into them. It was this party that met Wilcox about noon. General Hunt would not take the responsibility of authorizing General Sickles to move to his proposed line, but said he would report the matter to General Meade. While awaiting the orders he hoped and expected to receive, Gen- eral Sickles advanced Humphreys' division beyond Plum Run and deployed it in three lines, one brigade in each. As Anderson was now in force in the woods in his front, it was apparent to General Sickles that he must either occupy the Emmitsburg road ridge at once or abandon all hope of occupying it, as the Confederates would soon drive back his skirmish line. Believing he would be sustained in his action he therefore advanced his whole line. Ward's brigade of Birney's division was advanced to Devil's Den and the woods to its right, and a battery was placed on the Den. De Trobriand's brigade was advanced to the Loop and the woods in that vicinity. Graham's brigade was advanced to Peach Orchard cross roads. As Birney's line was loug, he was given Burling's brigade of Humphreys' division as a reserve. The movement was completed by ad- 82 vancing Humphreys' division to the Emmitsburg road. Along the Emmitsburg road were placed three batteries of artillery, and a fourth was placed along the Wheatfleld road east of the cross roads. The general line of the III corps is now marked by Sickles Avenue. The troops had just reached their new positions when Longstreet's artillery appeared in their front. General Meade was not aware of this movement of the III corps, since General Hunt had reported to him that he had advised General Sickles not to move his troops unless au- thorized by General Meade. A meeting of the corps com- manders was ordered for the afternoon of July 2 in anticipation of the arrival of General Sedgwick with the VI corps. General Meade had already ordered the V corps to move to the left of the line to make way for tin 1 VI corps. As General Sickles approached General Meade's headquar- ters, Longstreet's artillery opened fire. lie at once returned to his corps and was followed by General Meade. The latter appreciated the impossibility of withdrawing the III corps under tire and therefore confined himself to reinforcing it. General Sykes was ordered to support Sickles with the V corps and Caldwell's division of the II corps. When at about 6 p.m.. the whole advance line gave way, he ordered up the XII corps. General Hunt was directed to assist Sickles with artil- lery and at once sent forward McGilvery's brigade, of which two batteries were posted in the Peach Orchard, and two on the Wheatfleld road to its right and rear facing south. THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK. General Lee, whose headquarters were at the Seminary, 83 had not reeonnoitered the field of attack since morning. He was under the impression that the main Union line lay along the EmmitsbuTg road. His plan was therefore to form Long- street's divisions across this road beyond the Union left flank and then sweep forward along the road. Although the con- ditions were found by Longstreet, who had personal charge of the attack, to differ somewhat from those upon which the movement was based, he did not feel justified in changing the plans already made. After the preliminary artillery at- tack, the brigades were to move forward in echelon from right to left and then each face to the left and move parallel to the Emmitsburg road. The artillery opened about 4 p.m. and immediately there- after Law's brigade moved forward; the movement was car- ried along very slowly to the left, which did not move until about 6 p.m. Law's brigade, followed by Robertson's, moved through the open fields in front of the extreme right of the Confeder- ate line south of Devil's Den. At Devil's Den the left two- regiments of Robertson's brigade became involved with the troops behind a stone wall in the woods at its foot, while the others moved on with Law's brigade to attack Little Round Top. About 4 p.m. General Warren, who had accompanied General Meade to Sickles' position, ascended Little Round Top, which was then unoccupied by troops, and caught the reflection of the bayonets of Hood's division as it was pre- paring to move. Being impressed by the importance of the hill, he at once hurried off to meet the advancing V corps and secured Vincent's brigade for its protection. Later when 84 the next division arrived, Weed's brigade and Hazlett's bat- ten were sent to the same position. Vincent was hardly in position when Law's column attacked the hill in front and on the left flank; desperate fighting here continued until dark, but the Confederates were continually repulsed. After dark some regiments of Vincent's and Fisher's brigades seized and occupied Big Round Top. At Little Round Top both of the brigade commanders, Vincent and Weed, and the battery commander, Hazlett, were killed. Robertson, with his two left regiments, encountered a vastly superior force at Devil's Den and several times sent back for assistance. At last the brigades of Anderson and Benning came to his relief. This force drove Ward's brigade from the hill and captured most of the guns. Kershaw's brigade moved from its position in line di- rectly on the Loop, occupied by De Trobriand's brigade. In moving forward, however, it received the fire of some Union troops in the Peach Orchard and from the batteries along the Wheal held road. This diverted his left regiments to their left and he reached the knoll too weak to carry it and was driven hack. Some time later Semmes' brigade came up on his right and Wofford's on his left and together they carried the Loop. The Confederates now had a continuous line extending from Devil's Den diagonally to the Wheat- field road. This line now wheeled gradually to the right and ended the day by an unsuccessful assault on Little Round Top and the ridge to its north. (Battles and Leaders, Vol. Ill page 331 ) Long-street's artillery having silenced that of the III corps, about 6 P.M. Barksdale's brigade moved over the field to 85 the north of the cross roads and carried all before him until he /cached Plum Run. This advance was participated in bv the brigades of Wilcox, (Perry and Wright on his left. With the exception of Wright's brigade, all of these brigades were stopped near Plum Run ; Wright's brigade carried the main Union line in its front, but having no support was compelled to retire. THE DEFENSE. The III corps fought desperately before falling back: General Sickles was severely wounded early in the fight and General Meade ordered General Hancock to assume command of the II and III corps. The Union reserves were sent in wherever weakness was developed in the Union line. The first and second brigades of Barnes' division of the V corps were sent to reinforce de Trobriand's brigade at The Loop; the first and second brigades of Ayres' division of regulars of the V corps were sent to reinforce Ward's brigade and cover the gorge between Devil's Den and Little Round Top; Cald- well's division of the II corps was pushed into the Wheat- field between the two. All of these troops were, however, compelled to fall back when the brigades of Barksdale, Wilcox, (Perry; and Wright turned their right. • s Willard's brigade, which was in the second line of the II corps on the afternoon of July 2, was moved to the left of the line and there made a countercharge on Barksdale's command to recapture some guns in his rear. He encoun- tered Barksdale's brigade in the underbrush along Plum Run; Barksdale was killed and his brigade was driven back towards the Eminitsburg road. In this movement Willard was also killed. 86 From Harrow's brigade, which was also in the seeouc line of the II corps, two regiments were sent about two linn tired yards in front of the general line to protect the right flank of the III corps; the other regiments were moved to the left to protect the batteries left uncovered by Caldwell's withdrawal from the main line. It was one of these regi- ments, the 1st Minnesota, which was selected by General Hancock to make a countercharge on Wilcox's brigade as it was emerging from the underbrush along Plum Run near the close of the battle; the percentage of loss suffered by this regiment in this charge and upon the following day was greater than that of any other Union regiment engaged in the battle. Farther to the left, towards the close of the day, counter- charges were made by Crawford's division of the A' corps and later about dark by Lockwood's brigade of the XII corps. When the fighting closed for the day the bri- gades of Hood's division held an advanced line along the slope of Big Round Top midway between its summit and Plum Run. McLaws' division held the woods from Devil's Den to the AA'lieatfield road. Longstreet's artillery had ad- vanced to the Emmitsburg road. The Union line was that now marked by Hancock, Sedgwick and Sykes avenues and was that occupied on July 3. ewell's attack. Ewell's corps was to attack simultaneously with Long- street's. It was difficult for this corps to act as a unit, as it 87 >\as separated into three parts by the town and by Rock Creek. As a result the three divisions acted independently. When he heard Longstreet's guns, Johnson established his divisional artillery upon Benner's Hill and opened fire upon Culp's Hill. These batteries, being exposed to the con- centrated fire of the Union guns on Culp's and Cemetery Hills, at ranges of one thousand and one thousand four hun- dred yards, suffered severely and were eventually withdrawn. The infantry was then formed for the attack parallel to the YJ&nk Road and was about moving forward when Gregg's cavalry brigades attacked Walker's pickets on the Hanover road; Walker's brigade was therefore detached to meet him. The brigades of Steuart, Nichols and Jones, however, con- /\ tinned on. When the III corps was about to fall back, General Sloeum was ordered to send the XII corps to its relief. Not wishing to abandon Culp's Hill while threatened by Johnson, General Sloeum retained Greene's brigade which was posted on its summit. All the other brigades of the XII corps aban- doned their trenches to go +o the point of attack. Only Lockwood's brigade, however, reached that point in time to take part in the action. Some time after the XII corps was withdrawn, the bri- gades of Steuart, Nichols and Jones, of Johnson's division, crossed Rock Creek and took possession of the vacated trenches. Only when they attempted to ascend Culp's Hill did they meet with any opposition. Here General Greene's brigade was protected by a breastwork of stones and logs and was able to hold this important position. Aid was sent him by the troops on his left. It was dark when the Confederates 88 crossed Kock Creek and it was 10 p.m. when lighting ceased at this part of the line. Although Johnson's men were close to the ammunition train of the Union army near the Balti- more road they were unaware of this fact. When the different brigades of the XII corps returned to their original positions during the night, they found the Confederates occupying the line from Culp's Hill to Spang- ler*s Spring; they therefore bivouacked in the vicinity and waited for daylight to drive the Confederates back across the creek. To the east of the town, Early had the brigades of Hays and Hoke. in the first line and that of Gordon, which had re- turned to the town, in the second; Smith's brigade was still diit on the York Road. Early was ordered to attack Ceme- tery Hill when Johnson attacked Culp's Hill. He moved for- ward about dusk and drove the XI corps infantry from the stone wall on the slope of I he hill and Hays penetrated the batteries on the crest. The attack had by this time become so disorganized that the Confederate troops were easily driven out by troops sent from the left. In this attack Col. Avery, who commanded Hojke's brigade in this campaign, was killed. When Rodes saw the commotion in the Union line caused by the withdrawal of troops and batteries to go to the left, he decided to attack and so notified Early. However, before IJodes could reach the enemy's line, it was necessary for him to withdraw his troops from the town, deploy on a new line parallel to the Emmitsburg road, and then advance over a long distance His line had not reached the Emmits- burg road when he heard of Early's defeat, As it was get- 89 l ting dark lie decided thefore to defer his attack and await orders. To be ready for an attack in the morning, he biv- ouacked his troops along a sunken road parallel to the Em- mitsburg road and 600 yards from it. COUNCIL OF WAR. Being impressed probably by the insecurity of his flanks as well as by his losses, General .Meade called for a council of his corps commanders on the night of July 2-3. At this council the following propositions were voted on : 1st — Shall the army remain in its present position or retire to another nearer its base? 2nd — If it remains, shall it attack the enemy or await the attack of the enemy 3rd — If it awaits attack, how long should it await such attack? After some discussion the corps commanders unani- mously voted to remain and await an attack for at least one day. It was therefore decided to strengthen the position for defense and on the following morning await attack by Gen- eral Lee. 90 CHAPTER VIII. BATTLE OF JULY 3. POSITIONS. Union Line. — On the morning of July 3, the Union line extended from a point east of Rock Creek on the right, to a point beyond Big Round Top on the left. On the extreme right, across Rock Creek, north of the Baltimore road, was Neill's brigade of the \\ corps, along what is now Neill Avenue. Encircling the Confederate trenches along Culp's Hill ridge was the XII corps with Shaler's brigade of the VI corps. The corps artillery occupied Power's Hill and other commanding positions along the line. The positions of the XI corps, the first and second divisions of the I corps, and the second and third divisions of the II corps were as on the preceding day. To the left of the second division of the II corps was the third division of the I corps. The reserve artillery was next in line, its center opposite the School House Road ; intrenched in its rear was the first division of the II corps. To its left were two brigades of the VI corps. The V corps extended the line to Big- Round Top, and two brigades of the VI corps, along what is now Wright Avenue, protected the left flank. The III corps and the remaining brigades of the VI corps were in reserve. The artillery was posted along the line, wherever a good position could be found. On the left flank, forming a line from Willoughby Run to Big Round Top, were Merritt's 91 and Farnsworth's cavalry brigades, under Kilpatrick. On the right flank, extending from Wolf Hill or Brinkerhoff Ridge to White's G^eek, along the Hanover road, were the cavalry brigades of Irvin Gregg, Mcintosh and Custer under General D. McM. Gregg. Confederate Line. — On the morning of July 3, Jen- kins' cavalry brigade was east of Brinkerhoff Ridge between the Hanover and York roads. This brigade relieved the in- fantry brigades of Smith and Walker, which were sent to Johnson. Stuart's cavalry was approaching the field from Jenkins' rear. Johnson was holding the trenches along Gulp's ridge, which he had captured ; he had been reinforced by the brigades of Walker and Smith from his rear, and by those of Daniel and O'Neal from Rlodes' second line. The brigades of Hoke and Hays occupied the town, while Gor- don's brigade occupied the ground between the town and Rock Creek. The brigades of Doles, Iverson and Ramseur, of Rodes' division, and those of Perrin and Thomas, of Pender's divis- ion, held the sunken road in the valley extending from the town parallel to the Emmitsburg road. The divisions of McLaws and Hood held the line south of the Wheatfield road, extending over Devil's Den to the slopes of Big Round Top and thence westward to Willoughby Run. Along Seminary Ridge between Thomas' brigade on the left and McLaws' division on the right, were being assembled the divisions of Heth and Pickett in the first line, supported 92 by the brigades of Lane, Scales, W right, (Perry) and Wilcox in the second line. Influenced by his successes of the previous days General Lee decided to make another effort to pierce the Union line. The attack was to be made simultaneously by Johnson, who had been reinforced by the three brigades of Daniel, O'Neal and Smith, and by the brigades that were being assembled under Longstreet along Seminary Ridge. Before his troops were ready to attack, however, John- son was himself attacked by General Slocum. ATTACK OF THE XII CORPS. At daylight the batteries of the XI 1 corps, which had taken up commanding positions enveloping the Confederate position en Culp's Ridge, opened fire. To this fire Johnson's command could make no reply, since he had no positions upon which he could establish batteries. The artillery fire was followed by an infantry attack, in which Shaler's brigade of the VI corps also participated. Though John- son made desperate efforts to hold his position, he was com- pelled to retire and about 11 a.m. retreated to the position from which he had advanced the preceding day. The XII then reoccupied its trenches. ATTACK ON CEMETERY RIDGE. Early in the morning the Confederate infantry and artillery began moving in place for the proposed attack on Cemetery Ridge. The center of attack selected by General Lee was a salient in the line of the IT corps, marked by an 93 umbrella-shaped clump of trees between the brigades of Webb and Hall of Gibbon's division. A line joining this with the salient angle of Spangler's grove on Seminary Ridge separated the artillery of Longstreet and Hill, and the divis- ions of Heth and Pickett. Both Generals Lee and Longstreet viewed the final charge from positions near this line. Extending northward from the Peach Orchard cross roads, along Emmitsburg road ridge, Colonel Alexander, Longstreet's chief of artillery, placed seventy-five guns. Ex- tending southward from the Fairfield road along Seminary Ridge General Hill had fifty-eight guns and in addition five more on the left of Longstreet's artillery. To oppose these one hundred and thirty-eight guns and sweep the field over which the attack was to be made, the II corps had twenty- six guns, the artillery reserve thirty-nine guns, and a rifled battery of six guns on Little Round Top; in all seventy-one guns. General Hunt, however, had many batteries in reserve. The average distance between the opposing lines was about three-quarters of a mile. Pickett moved his command to the field and placed them in and about Spangler's grove. Heth's division was moved to the field and place 1 along Seminary Ridge from Spangler's grove northward to the grove in rear of the right flank of Rodes' advanced line in the valley. The formation for the attack is thus described by General Longstreet: "Orders w r ere given to Major General Pickett to form his line under the best cover that he could get from the enemy's batteries and so that the assaulting column would arrive at the salient of the enemy's position. General Pickett's line to be the guide and to attack the line of the enemv's defenses. 94 General Pettigrew, in command of Heth's division, moving on the same line as General Pickett, was to assault the sal- ient at the same moment. Pickett's division was arranged with tAvo brigades in the front line, supported by his third brigade. Wilcox's brigade was ordered to move in rear of Pickett's right flank to protect it from any force the enemy might send against it. "Heth's division, under the command of General Petti- grew, was arranged in two lines, and these were supported by part of General Pender's division, under General Trimble." At 1 p.m. the signa] guns for the artillery bombardment were fired and at once the Confederate artillery opened fire. The instructions of General Hunt to the Union artillery were to fire slowly and deliberately in reply and not to waste ammunition. These instructions were followed by the artil- lery reserve, but in the II corps, to save bis infantry from loss and demoralization, General Hancock directed his chief of artillery to reply vigorously. To Colonel Alexander, General Longstreet had assigned the responsibility of deciding the moment when the infantry was to advance. It was about 1:30 p.m. wheu Alexander decided to give the order, lest his ammunition run too low to support the attack. Five minutes later the II corps artillery ceased firing because it had exhausted all its long range ammunition, and the artillery reserve ceased, to keep its ammunition for the infantry assault which was expected. A few minutes later Alexander urged Pickett to hurry, and the latter riding to General Longstreet to have the order con- firmed, moved to the attack. When the order was given, 95 Pickett had formed his division in front of the grove, in the ravines and along the fences north and south of the Spangler house. Each brigade was in line; Garnett on the left, Kemper on the right, and Armistead in rear. Moving toward the point of attack they formed three long lines which could be enfiladed from the position of the artillery reserve. Along the front of attack and about a hundred yards in front of the crest of Cemetery Ridge is a low stone wall pro- longed to the south by a rail fence. In rear of this wall and fence from right to left were the brigades of Webb, Hall and Harrow, each with one regiment behind the crest in rear. Along the stone wall were some of the guns of the II corps waiting to receive the charge with canister, while on the crest in rear were some fresh batteries of the artillery re- serve which had replaced those of the II corps. To the right of Webb but two hundred and fifty feet to his rear was another stone wall parallel to the front which protected Smyth's brigade; Willard's was in his rear. A battery in Ziegler's grove on Smyth's right swept his front. All of the attacking troops moved towards Webb and Hall except the brigades of Davis and Brockenbrough, who attacked Smyth. As the attacking troops converged on this small front, the brigades intermingled and it was a mass of mixed units led by General Armistead, which finally swept over the wall along AYebb's front. Nearly all of these men were killed or captured by the Union reserves in rear, or by Hall's and Har- row's men on the flanks. Seeing that Pickett's column would strike the line on his right, Stannard formed two of his regiments in front and 96 perpendicular to the general line and took Pickett in flank. He captured three regimental flags and many prisoners. Davis and Brokenbrough were repulsed by Smyth before they reached his wall. Pickett's three divisions according to the returns num- bered about 5,000 men ; of these 1,389 were killed or wounded, and 1,499 were captured. Among the killed were two of his brigade commanders, Garnett and Armistead, and among the severely wounded, was the third, Kemper. The six brig- ades of Heth and Pender having lost severely on July 1, it is impossible to give their losses or numbers accurately; they probably arrived on the field of Gettysburg with over 10,000 men. Capt. Young of the 26th X. C. reports that Heth's division reached the field of Gettysburg with about 8,000 ef- fectives and en the evening of -Inly 3, had but 1,500 or 1,600 men. His own regiment of Pettigrew's brigade was reduced from 800 to 210 on the afternoon of July 1, and to 80 men fit for duty on -Inly 3. A major was left to command the brig- ade and the regiment was commanded by the only captain til for duty. (W. R. Xo. 44, p. 645.) General Trimble, who commanded Pender's brigades, the latter officer having been wounded, was captured in the assault. , The brigades of Wilcox, (Perry) and Wright moved out after Pickett. Those of Wilcox and (Pbrr$ moved towards the position of the artillery reserve ; they reached Plum Run, but being subjected to a severe artillery fire and being threat- ened by a flank attack of Stannard's brigade, fell back to their original positions. Wright's brigade advanced only a short distance when it was recalled by General Longstreet. 97 After the repulse, the lines were re-formed behind tho artillery. There was no counter-attack and the day was closed by an armed reconnaissance by some brigades of the V and VI corps which advanced along the Wheatfield road to the Em- mitsburg road, driving back the Confederate troops in their front. CAVALRY OPERATIONS ON JULY 3. OPERATIONS <>X THE IMo\ RIGHT FLANK. Union Cavalry. — At noon on July 2, the brigades of Mcintosh and Irvin Gregg of General D. McM. Gregg's cav- alry division, reached a point on the Hanover road about three miles east of Rock Creek, where the Low Dutch, or ■Salem Church road connects the York, Hanover and Balti- more roads. At this time a regiment of the V corps was on outpost duty on Brinkerhoff Ridge. At 3 p.m. this regiment was relieved by the cavalry and joined its corps. The Con- federate outpost on the Hanover road at Brinckerhoff 's Ridge was a regiment of Walker's brigade of Johnson's division. At G p.m. a reconnoitering squad of fifty men was sent forward by the cavalry to develop the Confederate strength. This led to an engagement between the Confederate infantry and some squadrons of dismounted cavalry on the ridge near the Howard house, west of Cress' Run. As Walker's regi- ment was repulsed, he reinforced it with his whole brigade and was therefore absent that night from tin 1 attack of Gulp's Hill. At 10 p.m. the cavalry retired to the Baltimore road at White's Run. a mile east of Rock Creek. ys The orders for July 3, were for Gregg's division to move back to the Hanover road to protect the right Hank of the army, and Kilpatriek's division, which bivouacked that night at Two Taverns, to replace Buford on the left flank. By mis- take, Custer's brigade of Kilpatrick's division moved up the Low Dutch road to the Hanover road. Until noon, Custer remained in the vicinity of the cross- roads with outpost squadrons about a mile and a half north of it, on both the Low Dutch road and the intersecting road connecting the Low Dutch with the York road. Gregg's bri- gade was massed about a quarter of a mile south of the Han- over road and about the same distance west of Cress' Rum He had established a skirmish line extending from the Han- over road in front, westward to Wolf Hill where it connected with that (if Neill's brigade of the V I corps. Mcintosh's bri- gade was massed along the Low Dutch road about a half mile behind Custer. Two of his regiments, the 1st Pennsyl- vania and the 1st Massachusetts, were absent on detached duty. He had been reinforced by a company of Maryland cavalry and a platoon of two guns of the 3rd Pa. heavy artillery picked up in the march to the field. About noon General D. McM. Gregg received a copy of a message from General Howard to General Meade informing the latter that a large cavalry force was seen marching to- wards the right flank of the Union army. At the same time General Gregg also received an order from General Pleasan- ton to send Custer's brigade to Kilpatrick as originally ordered. To comply with the latter order Mcintosh's brigade was directed to relieve Custer, which it at once proceeded to do. 99 Mcintosh replaced Custer's squadrons in the woods at the cross roads by the 1st New Jersey, and placed his other two regiments, the 1st Maryland and 3rd Pennsylvania, south of or in rear of these woods. Custer assembled his brigade and prepared to move off the field. Confederate Cavalry. — Stuart's cavalry reached the vicinity of Gettysburg on the morning of July 3, where he was joined by Jenkins' brigade. He spent some hours in resting his horses and men, in issuing ammunition, etc. ; then, with the brigades of Cham bliss and Jenkins, he moved over to the York road and along the intersecting road towards the Low Dutch road. He knew from his map that the road he was following would enable him to reach the Baltimore road, only four miles distant, at a point two miles east of Rock Creek. He would thus be in rear of the enemy and on his line of communications; the very point from which he could make a diversion in favor of General Lee. As he reached the bend of the intersecting road at the Stallsmith farm, lie halted his column behind the woods and rode into the field to scan the country. He saw that the country was open and sloped gradually southward. None of the Union cavalry was in sight; Gregg's brigade was concealed by the woods and ridge on Stuart's right, Mcintosh by the woods at the forks of the road, and Custer by distance and minor obstruc- tions on the field. Jenkins and Chambliss were placed in the woods and a messenger was sent to bring up Lee and Hampton. The Battle Field. — The field upon which Stuart's cav- alry met that of Gregg is about three miles east of Bock Creek and lies in the northwest ano-le of the Hanover and Low 100 Dutch roads. Its western boundary is Cress' ridge, which extends from Granite Hill on the York road to the Hanover road at Cress' house; its elevation, where it crosses the road by which Stuart advanced, is about one hundred feet higher than its elevation at the Hanover road or at the Hanover- Low Dutch crossroads. The field is traversed by the intersecting- road upon which Stuart advanced and by a private road further south running- east and west near the Rummel house. The east branch of Cress' Run, called Little's Run, rises near this road and flows parallel to and a mile west of the Low Dutch road. A wood, about four hundred yards long and two hun- dred yards wide, extends from the intersecting road on which the Confederates reached the field, southward along the ridge. This is the wood in which the Confederates were concealed. Another wood about four hundred yards square was in the southwest angle of the Low Dutch road and its intersecting road. In these woods rested the right flank of the Union line. Otherwise the ground was open, but divided into fields by si one and rail fences, which had to be thrown down for mounted maneuvers. The Lott house is a half mile from the Hanover road and about three hundred yards west of the Low Dutch road. The Rummel house with its large frame barn is about a mile from the Hanover road and about three hundred yards south of the woods in which the Confederates were concealed. The Cavalry Fight. — (About 2 p.m., immediately after reaching the angle of the road, Jenkins' brigade took posses- sion of the Rummel place and Chambliss was put in the woods on his left. When Mcintosh observed the troops at 101 the Rummel place he sent the 1st New Jersey dismounted to develop their strength. Jenkins met this movement, which he soon observed, by sending his dismounted troops to oc- cup}' the line of fence along Little's Run. Mcintosh sent a part of the 3rd Pennsylvania to reinforce the 1st New Jersey and the remainder to occupy the woods vacated by the 1st New Jersey. He also sent word to General D. McM. Gregg that he could not alone hold the enemy with his three regiments. The latter thereupon ordered General Ir- vin Gregg to move to the Low Dutch road, and ordered Custer to remain and support Mcintosh until further orders. Upon reaching the field itself and seeing Lee and Hampton appear, he ordered Mcintosh's third regiment, the 1st Mary- land, to occupy the woods in its front and protect his right flank. Along Little's Run the Confederate line was strength- ened by Chambliss and the line was prolonged to the left by skirmishers sent to the front by Hampton and Lee when they reached the field. The attacking line was strengthened on the left by the 5th Michigan and on the right by a squadron of the 6th Michigan. The attack was aided by Pennington's and Randol's batteries near the Hanover-Low Dutch cross roads, which soon silenced the Confederate battery which ap- peared in front of the woods north of Rummel's. At length Jenkins' troops, who had only ten rounds of ammunition, were compelled to retire and the Union line ad- vanced to the creek. Shortly thereafter the Union line re- tired for the same reason and was pursued by two of Cham- bliss' regiments, the 9th and 13th Va., one mounted and the 102 other dismounted. This was the beginning of the mounted action. The 7th Michigan mounted was sent to protect the right flank of the retreating troops and encountered Chambliss' regiment in the northwest corner of the field containing the Lott house; there the two regiments fought over a stone and rail fence. While thus engaged, the 1st Virginia, one of General Fitz Lee's regiments, charged down on the right of the 7th Michigan and two of Hampton's regiments, the 1st N. C. and the Jeff. Davis' legion, on its front and left. The 7th Michigan fell back and the 1st Virginia almost reached (luster's platoon of artillery in rear of the Lott house, when it was forced to retire. Hampton's regiments were met by the fire of Pennington's artillery and were charged in flank by the 5th Michigan. They were also forced back. This was followed by the final charge of the remaining regiments of Fitz Lee's and Hampton's brigades, save a regi- ment of each held in reserve. This attack, made in column of squadrons, was met first by the artillery and then by the last regiment of Custer's brigade, the 1st Michigan, under his personal leadership. The column was charged in flank by the squadrons of the 1st New Jersey and 3rd Penn- sylvania, which had fought dismounted in the earlier part of the engagement and were now again mounted ; and also by such scattered troopers as could be collected by General Mc- intosh himself. These successive shocks caused the Confed- erates to fall back to their original positions and at 5 P.M. the fight was over. In this last attack General Hampton was seriously wounded. Immediately after the fight the Union picket line was 103 re-established along the line of Little's Run, which had been the scene of the dismounted fighting, and the Confederate line was established at Rummers and in the woods to the north. Irvin Gregg's brigade was not engaged in the fight, but was held in reserve along the Low Dutch road south of the Hanover road. That night Stuart retired to the west of Gettysburg and Custer joined Kilpa trick. CAVALRY OPERATIONS ON THE UNION LEFT FLANK. On the morning of July 3, General Kilpatrick with Farns worth's brigade of cavalry moved from Two Taverns to the fields southwest of Big Round Top and being joined by Merritt's brigade of Buford's division formed a line extend- ing from Plum Run to Wjilloughby Run. The right of the line rested on a wooded knoll, covered with boulders, which is separated from Big Round Top by Plum Run gorge. Farnsworth's brigade held this knoll and a line extending a short distance to the left; Merritt prolonged his line to Wil- loughby Run. One battery of artillery was on the wooded knoll and another near the Emmitsburg road. To meet this flanking movement, General Law, who now commanded Hood's division, sent the 1st Texas of Robert- son's brigade to form a line across the valley from Plum Run to Snyder's Ridge; this regiment intrenched itself behind the stone fences and boulders at the foot of the wooded knoll occupied by Farnsworth. Anderson's brigade was also with- drawn from the front line and sent to prolong the line of the 104 ' 1st Texas to Willoughby Run. The brigades of Robertson and Law lay behind stone walls, which they had thrown up on the face of Big Round Top parallel to Plum Run. Hood's artillery was along Snyder's Ridge behind this line. The only operations of note on this flank were the mounted charges made by different units of Farnsworth's brigade, in the last of which the brigade commander was killed. The field covered by these charges was limited on the south by the wooded knoll, on the east by the Confederate in- trenched line along Big Round Top, on the north by the stone fence below Devil's Den and on the west by the Confederate line on Snyder's Ridge. East of Plum Run the slopes of Big Round Top are wooded and covered with boulders, with the exception of a small cleared field on the wood road connect- ing Big Round Top with the Emmitsburg road. West of Plum Run the Held is open, but divided into several small tracts by stone and rail fences. It was also swept by the fire of the batteries on Snyder's Ridge. In this open field are two houses with outbuildings. In all the charges the mounted troops were formed to the left and rear of the wooded knoll and moved to its left. About 5 p.m. General Kilpatrick decided to strike in rear the brigades of Law and Robertson and thus make a diversion in favor of the Union infantry in their front. He first ordered the 1st West Virginia to charge the 1st Texas infantry and clear the way. Farnsworth, with the two squadrons of the 1st Vermont, was then to charge Law and Robertson. The 1st West Virginia charged the 1st Texas and oierced 105 it* . lines, but as the Confederate regiment was protected by walls and fences little damage was done. Immediately thereafter the first squadron (four troops) of the 1st Ver- mont rode along the north slope of the wooded knoll and straight across the fields to the wood road north of the house near Plum Run. At the road the squadron turned to the right and crossed the run, where it was re-formed near the cleared field. The third squadron led by Farnsworth in person, followed the first, but skirted the north slope of the wooded knoll, crossed Plum Run and rode along the Confed- erate line on the slope of Big Round Top as far as the wall south of Devil's Den ; here the squadron divided, some of the troops riding straight across the open fields to the point of starting, while Farnsworth, with others, rode back along the Confederate line to the cleared field near which the first squadron was rallied; here he was killed. The first squadron charged through the cleared field and then turned to the right and rode through the gorge between Big Round Top and the wooded knoll. Two of the Confederate regiments, one of Law's rejn- ments east of Plum Run and one of Anderson's west of Plum Run, left their trenches and moved to the edge of the woods to take the charging columns in flank. No movement was made by the Union infantry on Big Round Top during these charges, because the field of opera- tions was not visible from the infantrv line. 106 CASUALTIES IN BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. The losses in the three days' battle are as follows (W. R. No. 43. p. 173.) Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total 3231 2162 6059 II ' 797 3194 3029 378 589 4369 III ' 593 4211 V ' 365 1611 211 2187 VI ' 27 185 1922 30 1510 242 XI ' 369 3801 XII ' 204 812 60 1082 Cavalry ' 91 354 407 852 Artillery reserve 43 187 12 242 Totals 3155 14525 5365 23045 (W. R. No. 44. p. 338.) Longstreet's corps 910 4339 Ewell's " 809 3823 Hill's " 837 4407 Cavalry " 36 140 2290 7539 1305 5937 1491 6735 64 240 Totals 2592 12709 5150 20451 The number of prisoners taken, wounded or unwounded in the field by the Union army was 12,227 The greatest numerical losses by brigades in the Union , Buford and Kilpatrick with six brigades of cavalry were at Boonsborough and it was agreed between them that Kilpatrick with his three brigades should go to Hagerstown and delay the advance of the Con- federate army, while Buford marched to Williamsport to capture the trains. Stuart was at Smithsburg on the morn- ing of July 6, where he was joined by the brigades of Robert- son and Jones. That morning he set out for Hagerstown and found Farnsworth's brigade of Kilpatrick's division in pos- session of the town and Huey's brigade in support. Believ- ing this to be a covering force and that the main force was 112 attacking the trains at Williamsport, Stuart attacked vigor- ously with all his cavalry, aided by Iverson's brigade of in- fantry. He drove Farnsworth's brigade back on the Boons- borough road and Huey's on the Williamsport road. It was the noise of Stuart's guns in their rear that caused Buford and Custer to retire from Imboden's front before piercing his lines. That night Buford and Kilpatrick were again in Boonsborough, and Stuart's cavalry, now joined by the brigades of Fitz Lee and Hampton, was posted along the Antietam. On the morning of July 7, Stuart strengthened his line by securing Wofford's infantry brigade from Longstreet; this was posted on tire road from Boonsborough to Williamsport in rear of the cavalry. Anderson's brigade of Hood's divi- sion was ;il this time on the Antietam at Funkstown. On July 9 and 10 there were also indecisive engage- ments on the Boonsborough-Hagerstown roads in which An- derson's dtrrskm of Longstreet's corps took part. On the 10 th the infantry intrenched line was established between Bagerstown and the Potomac river and the cavalry was withdrawn from the front and placed on the left flank. The Infantry. — The Confederate infantry started for Williamsport on the night of July 4 and on the night of July 5 Hill bivouacked at Waynesborongh, Longstreet in Mon- terey Pass, and Ewell at Fairfield. E well's rear guard was attacked by the VI corps. The night of July 6, Longstreet was two miles beyond Hagerstown, Hill at Hagerstown, and Ewell beyond Mon- terey Pass. On July 7 Ewell reached Hagerstown. 113 As soon as General Meade learned that the Confederate army was withdrawing from Gettysburg, he decided that a direct pursuit through the passes of the South mountains would be impracticable; if he found that General Lee was really retreating, he proposed to move the Union army paral- lel to the Hagerstown road, through the passes west of Frederick. He therefore ordered General French, who was stationed at Frederick with some of the troops Avithdrawn from Harper's Ferry, to occupy these passes at once. Jul}- 5 was spent by General Meade in ascertaining the position and intentions of the Confederate army as well as in the care of the wounded and the dead of both armies. Irvin Gregg's brigade on the right reconnoitered as far as Hunterstown; the XI corps advanced one brigade into Get- tysburg; the VI corps pursued the retreating Confederate army as far as Fairfield. From the information obtained on this day, General Meade decided that the Confederate army was really retreat- ing to the Potomac instead of simply retiring to the passes of the South mountains. He therefore ordered all his corps to march for the passes west of Frederick, leaving only one brigade of the VI corps, with Mcintosh's cavalry brigade, to follow the Confederate army along the Fairfield road. On July 9 the V and VI corps were across the mountains at Boonsborpugh, and the II and XII corps were at Rohrers- ville at the base of the mountains due east of Shepherdstown ; all the other corps were in close supporting distance. As the bridge over the Potomac at Falling Waters was still un- finished and the river unfordable, upon the approach of these corps, the Confederate army deployed on a line extending 114 from the Potomac river a short distance below Falling Waters northward to a point one mile due west of Hagers- town. This line was thoroughly intrenched and well de- fended by artillery; Longstreet held the right, Hill, the cen- ter, and Ewell, the left. The cavalry was in rear of Eweli. On July 12, the entire Union army was deployed and in- trenched on a line extending from Funkstown, on the Antie- tam, to a point on the Hagerstown-Sharpsburg road opposite the Confederate right flank. The right wing was composed of the XI, I and VI corps, the left wing of the V, II and XII corps; the III corps was in reserve. Kilpatrick's cavalry was on the right flank, Buford's on the left, and Gregg in reserve. ►Since* reaching the river the army had been rein- forced by the four brigades of French's ills Uion. The Union army also had a reserve composed of three brigades of New York and Pennsylvania militia, which had been assembled by General Couch for the defense of Harris- burg. On the retreat of the Confederate army, these brigades took the field as a division, commanded by General W' k F. Smith. On July 12 he was a short distance northeast of Hagerstown. On the night of July 12-13, General Meade called a council of war and submitted to his corps commanders the question of the advisability of assaulting the Confederate lines on the following day, July 13. The commanders in favor of attacking were Generals Wadsworth and Howard; those opposed, were Generals Hays, French, Sykes, Sedgwick and Slocum. It was therefore decided to defer the assault. On July 13 the bridge at Falling Waters was finished' and the river at Williamsport reached the fording stage. 115 General Lee now decided to retire into Virginia, as it was difficult to subsist his army, and he feared the Union army would be greatly reinforced before making an assault. He directed the infantry and artillery to withdraw from the trenches immediately after dark and the cavalry to replace them. Longstreet was ordered to cross at once over the bridge at Falling Waters, live miles in his rear, and Hill ami the cavalry along his front were ordered to follow him. Ewell and the rest of the cavalry were directed to ford the river at Williamsport. The 13th of July was overcast and misty and the night following dark and stormy. This made it easy to withdraw the Confederate army without attracting the attention of the Union troops, but made it difficult for the troops to move rapidly. At 5 p.m. the artillery was started to the rear and imme- diately after dark Longstreet's infantry followed. During the night the bridge was broken by the heavily loaded wagons and for two hours communication was interrupted; it was therefore 9 A.M. on the 14th before Longstreet's corps was across. He was at once followed by two squadrons of caval- ry which had been left to cover Hill's rear, but by mistake crossed the river ahead of him. EwelFs corps moved to Williamsport after dark and there forded the river after midnight, The artillery ammu- nition chests and one brigade were taken across in boats. The crossing was completed at 8 a.m. on the 14th. With the exception of the two cavalry squadrons mentioned above, Stuart's cavalry crossed at Williamsport with Ewell. On the morning of July 14, Kilpatrick moved forward 116 and finding the Confederate lines evacuated pushed on to Williamsport only to find Ewell and Stuart on the Virginia side. He then moved down to Falling Waters. HilFs divisions marched all night in the rain in the order Anderson, Pender, Heth. In the morning Heth posted his division in line on the hills about two miles from the bridge to check the pursuers, while the artillery and trains were crossing. Pender's division was his reserve. About 11 a.m.. after the artillery, trains, and Anderson's divisions had crossed, Heth was ordered to send Pender's division to the bridge. He was also directed to hold his line with one brigade, and to direct the others to follow Pender's division. About this time Kilpatrick appeared in his front. An advance guard of Custer's brigade consisting of about fifty mounted troopers at once charged the Confederate line. This movement deceived the Confederates, who thought this body must be a troop of their own rear guard cavalry. The Con- federate infantry therefore delayed firing upon them until the cavalry was almost upon the Confederate line. The Con- federates had only two men killed by this charge, but one of them was General Pettigrew ; t wo-thirds of the Union cavalry were killed. This was followed by an advance of one of Custer's regiments dismounted; he was driven back by Brockenbrough, whose brigade thus became detached from the division. At this moment Buford appeared on the field and moved his dismounted cavalry to turn Heth's right flank and intercept his retreat. Heth was about to call up Pen- der's brigades to meet this movement when he was ordered to retreat at once. He sent one brigade to form a line a quarter of a mile 117 nearer the bridge, and then retired his other brigades through it ; by repeating this operation he reached the bridge. Brock- enbrough's brigade was too much involved to withdraw easily when the order was given, and therefore left on the field three regimental colors and a number of prisoners. Hill's corps was also obliged to abandon two guns and a large number of stragglers who had been overcome by the fatigue of the night march in a rainstorm. It is probable, however, that the total losses on this day did not exceed one thousand. At 1 p.m., the Confederate army being on the Virginia shore, the bridge was cut loose, and General Lee's offensive campaign was over. 118 CHAPTER IX. COMMENT ON GETTYSBURG. ( ( >NFEDERATE OPERATIONS. Though the battle of Chancellorsville, fought iu the early days of May, L863, was a Confederate victory, it did not materially improve the condition of affairs in Virginia. A week later the armies of the Potomac and of Northern Vir- ginia were in the same relative positions they had occupied before the battle. The Army of Northern Virginia was rendered more con- fident by its success in that campaign, and its faith in its commander was even stronger than ever-. The army had, however, suffered an irreparable loss in the death of its most brilliant corps commander, General Thomas J. Jackson. Y\ nile the Army of the Potomac had lost some of its con- fidence in the ability of its commander, it had by no means lost confidence in its own fighting powers. The corps that had been but little engaged were eager to meet their adver- saries at once. Before resuming the offensive, however, it was necessary to remount the cavalry, and to reorganize the infantry brigades that were daily losing regiments whose terms of service had expired. ( leneral Lee was no doubt extremely gratified by the out- come of the Chancellorsville campaign, yet he was well aware that the victory had been won by taking such chances as he would be unwilling to risk again. When he divided his army in the presence of overwhelming odds, he ran great 119 risk of being destroyed in detail. His success was due largely to the genius of General Jackson and to the errors of his adversary. Now that Jackson was no more and his adver- sary had learned the true use of cavalry, it was improbable that there would be a second Chancellorsville surprise. He felt confident that if General Hooker was left undis- turbed on the north bank of the Rappahannock, the regi- ments he was daily losing would soon be replaced and when his army was thoroughly reorganized he would again assume the offensive. Profiting by his numerical strength and the errors of his previous campaign, it was fair to assume that this time he would be successful and force Lee to retire to the North Anna. General Lee was too great a commander to willingly as- sume a passive role, when he had an opportunity of striking a blow. He knew that ultimate success must go to him ayIio can assume and maintain the offensive. He determined there- fore to recruit his army to its maximum possible strength at once and open the new campaign before General Hooker had had time to reorganize. He withdrew the divisions of Hood and Pickett from southern Virginia and ordered them to re- join the army. He reinforced his infantry by the brigades of Pettigrew and Davis from southern Virginia and North Carolina, as well as by two regiments from western Virginia. His cavalry he reinforced by the brigade of Robertson from North Carolina and that of Jenkins from western Virginia. General Lee was able to withdraw troops from southern Vir- ginia because at this time the IX corps was ordered from southern Virginia to Kentucky. While Lee's plan of operations was somewhat like that 120 of Hooker in his Chancellorsville campaign, it was designed to be much more decisive in its results. Hooker planned only to force Lee to retire from the line of the Rappahan- nock ; the latter proposed to compel Hooker not only to give up the line of the Rappahannock, but to retire behind the Potomac. General Lee's plan was to accomplish this result, if possible, without a battle and to tight only at some point north of the Potomac river. Without wholly uncovering the main road to Richmond, he proposed to assemble his army at Oulpeper and from that point to hurl against Winchester a force which should not only capture the division which Mil'roy had incautiously assembled there, but should in addi- tion so threaten the northern states that the authorities would hasten to recall Hooker from the Rappahannock and direct him to defend the capital. The Army of Northern Virginia could then be assembled on the Totomac, march into Pennsylvania and draw Hooker far north of his base. At some point in that state it was hoped that Hooker could be decisively defeated in battle. Secrecy and celerity were necessary to the accomplishment of this plan. The reorganization of the Army of Northern Virginia was completed towards the end of May, 1863, but Lee's ad- vance was delayed a few days by the sudden appearance of a Union force in the vicinity of White House, on the Pamunkey river. To ascertain its meaning, both Pickett and Petti- grew were halted, on their march northward, in the vicinity of Hanover Junction. Being convinced that the movement was not a serious one. on June 2 Pickett and Pettigrew were ordered to join their corps and the campaign began. Dwell and Longstreet withdrew quietly from the trenches 121 behind Fredericksburg and moved to Culpeper Court House, where Stuart, with five of his cavalry brigades, was awaiting them. Hill's corps was left in the trenches to hold the direct line to Richmond, until Hooker retired from his front. From these instructions, it is evident that General Lee did not expect Hill to be seriously attacked. He hoped that Hooker would remain in ignorance of his movements until Winchester was assailed and captured; he was satisfied that this attack would cause Hooker to receive orders to retire at once to protect Washington. On the evening of June 9th, General Lee knew that the presence of Ewell's infantry at Brandy Station would lead General Hooker to suspect that the Confederate army was divided and might be defeated in detail either by an attack on Fredericksburg or an attack on Culpeper. It required courage, therefore, to adhere to his original plan and on the morning of the 10th send Ewell's corps to Winchester. Win- chester is fifty miles from Culpeper, and the latter is thirty miles from Fredericksburg. General Lee was undoubtedly much relieved, when on June 12th he learned from his out- posts that the Union army had abandoned the Rappahannock and was moving northward. His general plan was now suc- cessfully inaugurated. Ewell's operations at Winchester were not so successful as they should have been, due to his failure to entirely sur- round that town. Had Rodes moved from Berryville to- wards Winchester and cut off communications between that town and the Potomac, Milroy and his whole command would have been captured. Ewell's orders to Rodes may have been in compliance with instructions to appear on the Potomac 122 as soon as possible, and may have been simply due to an error of judgment. Rodes, himself, should have moved on Winchester without orders, since he knew that General Lee was anxious to capture Milroy. The movement of the Confederate army from the Rappa- hannock to the Potomac, with its marching flank covered by Stuart's cavalry, was an extremely well conducted march. Having a cavalry screen between them and the enemy and the possession of the roads on both sides of the Blue Ridge mountains, the infantry made the march in a surprisingly short time. The first and the most serious error in the conduct of the campaign, was made when General Stuart was author- ized to pass around the Union army and cross the Potomac river between that army and Washington. This error seems to have arisen as follows: From his "War Reminiscences," we learn that Colonel Mosby, the famous partisan leader of Virginia, was near Middleburg, Virginia, June 10, 1863, organizing the first company of his battalion. On that day he crossed the Bull Run mountains and marched across country for Seneca Falls on the Potomac, where the follow- ing morning he surprised a body of Union troops and took many prisoners. He then returned to Middleburg and there awaited General Stuart, to whom on June 17th he described his exploit. Impressed by Mosby's story, it is probable that sometime between the 17th and 22nd, Stuart suggested to General Lee that the cavalry cross the Potomac at the same point. On the morning of June 22, General Stuart reported by better to General Lee that the Union troops were retiring 123 to Aldie Gap. As this indicated that Hooker had no in- tention of advancing in force across the London Valley, it pointed to a movement towards the Potomac and it was high time that Lee moved into Maryland. On receipt of Stuart's note, General Lee directed Longstreet, whose head- quarters were near his own, to withdraw his troops from the Blue Ridge mountains and prepare to follow the other corps. Recurring to the suggestion of General Stuart, he discussed the matter with General Longstreet and finally decided to let Longstreet decide the point of crossing when he was in a position to dispense with the protection afforded by Stuart. Both generals interpreted Stuart's suggestion as a proposi- tion to pass around the rear of the Union army. Longstreet, in "Manassas to Appomattox," says that he, Longstreet, was to decide whether Stuart was to cross the Potomac above or below the Union army. As a result of that interview, there followed this cor- respondence : Headquarters, June 22nd, 1863. Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, Commanding Cavalry. General, I have just received your note of 7.45 this morning to General Longstreet. I judge the efforts of the enemy yesterday were to arrest our progress and as- certain our whereabouts. Perhaps he is satisfied. Do you know where he is and what he is doing? I fear he will steal a march on us, and get across the Potomac be- fore we are aware. If you find that he is moving north- ward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other 124 three into Maryland, and take position on General Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with him,, guard his flank, keep him informed of the enemy's move- ments, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army. One column of General Ewell's army will probably move toward the Susquehanna by the Emmits- burg route; another by Chambersburg. Accounts from him last night state that there was no enemy west of Frederick. A cavalry force (about 100) guarded the Monocacy Bridge, which was barricaded. You will, of course, take charge of (A. G. ) Jenkins' brigade, and give him necessary instructions. All supplies taken in Mary- land must be by authorized staff officers for their re- spective departments — by no one else. They will be paid for, or receipts for the same given to the owners. I send you a general order on this subject, which I wish you to see is strictly complied with. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, R. E. Lee, General. (W. R. No. 45, p. 913.) Headquarters, June 22, 1863—7.30 p.m. General E. E. Lee, Commanding, and so forth. General : Yours of 4 o'clock- this afternoon is re- ceived. I have forwarded your letter to General Stuart, with the suggestion that he pass by the enemy's rear if 125 he thinks that he may get through. We have nothing of the enemy to-day. Most respectfully, James Longstreet, Lieutenant-General, Commanding. (W. R. No. 45, p. 915.) Headquarters, Millwood, June 22, 1863—7 p.m. Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, Commanding Cavalry. General Lee has inclosed to me this letter for you (of same date), to be forwarded to you, provided you can be spared from my front, and provided that I think that you can move across the Potomac without disclos- ing our plans. He speaks of your leaving, via Hope- well Gap, and passing by the rear of the enemy. If you can get through by that route, I think that you will be less likely to indicate what our plans are than if you should cross by passing to our rear. I forward the let- ter of instructions with these suggestions. Please advise me of the condition of affairs before you leave, and order General Hampton — whom I sup- pose you will leave here in command — to report to me at Millwood, either by letter or in person, as may be most agreeable to him. Most respectfully, James Longstreet, Lieutenant-General. N. B. — I think that your passage of the Potomac by our rear at the present moment will, in a measure. 126 disclose our plans. You had better not leave us, there- fore, unless you can take the proposed route in rear of the enemy. (W. R. No. 45, p. 915.) As General Lee's letter made no mention of Stuart's proposed plan approved by Longstreet, but laid great stress on the necessity of his reaching the Potomac as soon as pos- sible, Stuart was somewhat in doubt as to the best route to follow. Colonel Mosby, being in Stuart's camp that night, the latter sent for him to get his views. Mosby urged that the shortest practicable line to the Potomac was the line Gum Springs-Seneca Falls, through the Union army. The Union corps being widely separated, he contended that the movement could be easily made. En route much damage could be done to the Union trains and the communications between the Union army and the capital could be severed. Mosby says this was the plan Stuart adopted, and that he was to meet Stuart at Gum Springs, to conduct his advance guard. After the interview, General Stuart sent a messen- ger to General Lee and the following night received this reply : Headquarters, Army of Northern Virginia, June 23, 1863—5 p.m. Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, Commanding Cavalry. General: Your notes of 9 and 10.30 a.m. to-day have just been received. As regards to the purchase of to- bacco for your men, supposing that Confederate money will not be taken, I am willing for your commissaries 127 or quartermasters to purchase this tobacco and let the men get it from them, but I can have nothing seized by the men. If General Hooker's army remains inactive, you can leave two brigades to watch him, and withdraw with the three others, but should he not appear to be moving northward, I think you had better withdraw to this side of the mountain to-morrow night, cross at Shepherds- town next day, and moveover Fredericktown. You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops, col- lect information, provisions, and so forth. Give instructions to the commander of the brigades left behind, to watch the flank and rear of the army, and (in the event of the enemy leaving their front), retire from the mountains west of the Shenandoah, leaving sufficient pickets to guard the passes, and bringing everything clean along the valley, closing up on the rear of the army. As regards the movements of the two brigades of the enemy moving toward Warrenton, the commander of the brigades to be left in the mountains must do what he can to counteract them, but I think that the sooner that you cross into Maryland, after to-morrow, the bet- ter. The movements of Ewell's corps are as stated in my former letter. Hill's first division will reach the 128 Potomac to-day, and Longstreet will follow to-morrow. Be watchful and circumspect in all your movements. I am, very respectfully and truly, yours R. E. Lee, General. (VV. R. No. 45, p. 923.) It is difficult to understand General Stuart's reasons for his movement. On June 22nd he knew that General Lee considered it of the greatest importance that he should place himself on Swell's right flank. There were three courses open to him to accomplish this result. The first was to go down the Loudoun valley and either cross the river east of Harpers Ferry, or traverse the mountains near Charlestown and the Potomac west of Harper's Ferry. The time neces- sary to make this movement could have been accurately cal- culated, as the routes were practically unobstructed. The second, was to ride around the Union army. As he had not ascertained the position of the rear corps of that army, he could not tell in advance how long his route would be or where he could cross the Potomac. It was certain to be a plunge in the dark. The third was to ride through the Union army, as advised by Colonel Mosby. This is probably what he intended to do, as it was the shortest line to the Potomac. This was certainly a hazardous operation with as large a force as a cavalry division. It is probable that he was fortu- nate in finding his route obstructed before he had penetrated the Union lines. Mosby, who went to Gum Springs to meet him, found himself in the midst of the Union army and found it difficult to escape. AYhile General Lee no doubt deeply regretted that he 129 had acceded to Stuart's plan, he can hardly be blamed for au- thorizing- a plan approved by Generals Longstreet and Stuart, •especially after he himself had so clearly indicated to the latter that haste was necessary and he must select a route •over which he could march without delay. The result of Stuart's action was far reaching. From the time Lee crossed the river into hostile territory, he had no reliable information of the movements of the Union army. The two brigades left by Stuart in the mountains, were prac- tically useless in the absence of their division commander. On the night of June 30th, when they should have been with the advance guard at Cashtown, Penn., they were at Mar- tinsburg, Virginia, two days in rear. When General Ewell was directed to cross the Potomac Tiver he was instructed to inform the inhabitants that his movement to Hagerstown was for the purpose of enveloping Harper's Ferry. By this ruse General Lee hoped to have this garrison withdrawn, as it menaced his communications. It is not altogether clear what General Lee expected to accomplish in Pennsylvania besides drawing Hooker north of the Potomac and gathering supplies for his army. On •June 22nd he wrote to General Ewell as follows: Headquarters, June 22, 1863. Lieut. Gen. R. S. Ewell. General : Your letter of 6 p.m. yesterday has been received. If you are ready to move, you can do so. I think your best course will be toward the Susquehanna, taking the routes by Emmitsburg, Chambersburg and McConnellsburg. Your trains had better be, as far as 130 possible, kept on the center route. You must get com- mand of your cavalry, and use it in gathering supplies, obtaining information, and protecting your flanks. If necessary send a staff officer to remain with General Jenkins. It will depend upon the quality of supplies obtained in that country whether the rest of the army can follow. There may be enough for your command, but none for the others. Every exertion should, there- fore, be made to locate and secure them. Beef we can drive with us, but bread we cannot carry, and must se- cure it in the country. I send you copies of a general order on this subject, which I think is based on rectitude and sound policy, and the spirit of which I wish you to see enforced in your command. I am much gratified at the success which has attended your movements, and feel assured, if they are conducted with the same energy and cir- cumspection, it will continue. Your progress and di- rection will, of course, depend upon the development of circumstances. If Harrisburg comes within your means, capture it. General A. P. Hill arrived yesterday in the vicinity of Berryville. I shall move him on to-day if possible. Saturday, Longstreet withdrew from the Blue Ridge. Yesterday the enemy pressed our cavalry so hard with infantry and cavalry on the Upperville road that McLaws' division had to be sent back to hold Ash- by 's Gap. I have not yet heard from there this morn- ing. General Stuart could not ascertain whether it was intended for a real advance toward the Valley or to ascertain our position. 131 The pontoons will reach Martinsburg to-day, and will be laid at the point you suggest, 4 or 5 miles below Williamsport, if found suitable. I have not counter- manded your order withdrawing the cavalry from Charlestown. I will write you again if I receive in- formation affecting your movements. Trusting in the guidance of a merciful God, and invoking His protection for your corps, I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, R. E. LEE, General. (W. R. No. 45, p. 914.) From this it would appear that EwelFs movement was intended mainly to gather supplies for the army in and near the Cumberland Valley. He was directed to take Harris- burg, if it proved to be a feasible task. General Lee's move- ment against Hooker was to be planned later, after he learned from the cavalry the exact position of Hooker's army. From Longstreet's writings it appears that Lee hoped to maneuver so as to place himself between the Union army and Wash- ington, and thus compel Hooker to attack him in position. In his own report, General Lee says that Early was sent to York to cause the Union army to drift in that direction, away from his own line of communications. He was without information of the position of Hooker's army from the morning of June 22, when Stuart reported rieasanton retreating, until June 28, when he learned from Longstreet's spy that the Union army was around Frederick. He then felt it incumbent upon himself to cross the moun- tains to draw Hooker away from Frederick. Had he known 132 that the Union army was under orders to move toward York on the morning of the 29th, this movement would havt been unnecessary. The Union army was now moving in the direction he- had designed it should move when Early was sent to York. His natural maneuver was not to interfere with that movement, but to concentrate quietly and move towards Washington by Fairfield and Emmitsburg, or by some other route even farther south. He would then place himself on the flank or in rear of the Union army, with his communications secure and could either attack his enemy in flank or rear, or await attack in a favorable position. Longstreet's spy left the Union army a few hours too sood to bring General Lee this valuable information. Although the movement of General Lee's army to Gettys- burg was forced upon him, it produced a condition of affairs which might have been fatal to the Union army had General Lee known the true situation of that army. On the afternoon of July 1, the I and XI Union corps, the smallest of the army, found themselves in a very critical position. South of the Cashtown road, in the fields west of Seminary Ridge, were the three brigades of Stone, Meredith and Rowley. Their only supports were the artillery of the I corps on the ridge in their rear, and the cavalry brigade of Gamble to their left and rear in the valley behind Seminary Ridge. In their front were the eight brigades of the divisions of Heth and Pender of Hill's corps. At the north end of Seminary Ridge, widely separated from its left wing, were the three brigades of Baxter, Paul and Cutler forming the right wing of the I corps. In their • 133 jront were the brigades of O'Neal, Iverson, Danie] and Ramseur of Rodes' division of Ewell's corps. In the low ground, north of the town, far in rear of the right flank of the I corps, were four brigades of the XI corps. On their right and rear was Devin's cavalry brigade; in their front was Doles' brigade of Rodes 1 division, and coming down the Heidlersburg road to turn their right, were the four brigades of Early's division. The general reserve of the whole line consisted of two brigades of the XI corps, which were with the commander of the field, General Howard, on Cemetery Hill. All that was necessary to give the Confederates a de- cisive victory was a commander on the field who could see the entire situation. While Rodes was fighting a delaying action witli the troops in his front, a vigorous attack could have been made on Rowley, Meredith and Stone and at the same time their left flank could have been turned. In this attack the whole of Hill's force, eight brigades, could have been employed, since Anderson's division was close behind. Had these troops attacked, as they and others did on the 2nd and 3rd of July, they could hardly have failed to de- stroy the three small brigades in their front. Having cap- tured the ridge at the Seminary, they would have been in a position to cut off the retreat of the right wing of the I corps and the advanced brigades of the XI corps. The position of the latter could, in the meantime, have been turned by Early. As the Union troops had but a single line of retreat, that up Cemetery Hill, it is fair to presume that the two corps would have been almost annihilated by the superiority of position and numbers of the Confederate forces engaged. If these 134 two corps could have been destroyed, General Lee woul; have been in an excellent condition to meet the reniainin 1 corps of the Union army. The failure of the Confederates to profit by their ad- vantages on this day may be attributed to a single cause, defective information. General Lee did not expect a battle this day and did not reach the field until the afternoon fight was begun, too late to change any of the dispositions for attack even had he desired to do so. West of the town, General Hill, who commanded in the critical part of the field, was unaware of the importance of Seminary Hill, since the ridge concealed from him the town and the position of the XI corps. He therefore made very defective tactical dispo- sitions foT its capture. So badly were these made in fact that instead of engaging with his eight brigades the entire attention of Doubleday's three, one of these latter, Stone's brigade, had time to turn its attention to Rodes' division and make a Hank attack on Daniel's brigade. The result was that Seminary Hill was not captured until the rest of the Union troops were re-forming on Cemetery Hill. Had Hill carried Seminary Hill early in the afternoon, General Lee won hi have had an opportunity of directing operations from that point, where he would have seen the precarious position of the other Union troops on the line. When General Lee reached Seminary Ridge, the battle seems to have been practically over. Hill's troops were rest- ing on the ridge. Ewell's men were in the town, and the Union troops were re-forming on Cemetery Hill. Lee saw at a glance that the battle was not won unless Cemetery Hill 135 •was also taken, and he at once sent word to Ewell to take it if he felt able to do so. Ewell reported that his troops were worn out with marching and fighting and that he was unable to bring his artillery to bear on the Union line. He would therefore postpone the attack until Johnson's division arrived. It is possible that Ewell was wrong in making this decision, but he was probably right. It would have taken him some time to re-form his troops, who must have been in considerable confusion; he would then have been obliged to advance without artillery support against a strong position. It is possible that before he was ready to move, the XII corps would have reached the field. The opportunity of taking the hill was lost when the Union troops were not vigorously pursued in their retreat by all the troops of both Ewell and Hill. The opportunity of fighting a battle under favorable conditions, one of the objects for which he had moved north of the Potomac, came to General Lee on July 1, but he was ignorant of that fact until it was too late. He was destined not to have another. After the battle of July 1, from the cupola of the col- lege. General Lee carefully examined the Union position upon Cemetery Hill. He then decided that it would be too strong to assault on the morrow. He therefore directed General Ewell to move to the west of the town and take his position on the right of Hill's corps. From the report of General Pendleton, his chief of artillery, who had made an examina- tion of the ground along this front, he decided that an attack could be made from this direction. This attack he hoped 136 to make, with the divisions of McLaws, Hood, Anderson and Johnson, before the Union army was united; all of these divisions were arriving 011 the field and had not been pre- viously engaged. The order for the movement of Ewell's corps was, how- ever, countermanded at the request of the corps commander. Early in the evening of July 1, two of Ewell's staff officers had ascended Gulp's Hill and found it unoccupied. Having reported this at headquarters, Ewell asked permission to occupy this hill early in the morning with Johnson's di- vision and thus compel the Union troops to evacuate Ceme- tery Hill. He would thus accomplish what Gfeneral Lee had requested him to accomplish by assault the night before. This plan would have been eminently successful had the Union army not been marching that night for Gettysburg, and had not the commander on Cemetery Hill realized the necessity of occupying ('nip's Hill. During the night John- son learned from an intercepted messenger that Sykes' V corps was coming along the nanover road, and from a re- connoitering party that Gulp's Hill was occupied by some Union infantry. The information thus received deterred him from acting without further orders. Before the wishes of Generals Ewell and Lee could be ascertained, morning broke and it was too late to move Ewell's corps, as first pro- posed. He was therefore left in a position from which he was obliged to attack without artillery support, and with his wings separated by the town, so that concerted action along his line was impossible. His partial success, on July 2, was due wholly to an error made by the Union commander, and not to any virtue in his own position. 137 • Would the attack on the Union left wing have been suc- cessful on July 2, had Ewell moved as General Lee first di- rected? This is extremely doubtful, for the Union right flank would then have rested on Cemetery Hill and the XII and V corps would have extended the line to the Round Tops. General Meade would have given more attention to the left of the line, which could have been made safe. It would, however, have placed General Lee in a posi- tion to shift his line of communication to the Emmitsburg road and maneuver about the left flank of the Union army and thus compel Meade to evacuate the lines of Gettysburg. This would have been the great advantage secured by the shifting of E well's corps. It has been said that the battle of July 2 was not a more decided success because of the failure of Longstreet to attack at daylight. That General Lee desired to attack as soon as possible on the 2nd, is only natural, for he knew that the other Union corps must be marching towards Get- tysburg. That he expected an attack at daylight seems hardly plausible. On July 1, only a single officer of his army, General Pendleton, had examined this part of the field and he was hampered by the presence of Buford's cavalry. Before any disposition for attack could be made, it would be necessary for General Lee and his staff to examine the ground. Time was also necessary to move the troops, who were encamped along the Cashtown road, into position. The evidence of the records is clear that General Anderson, who was to connect Longstreet and Pender and support Long- street's attack, was not in position until noon. As no criti- cism has ever been made of Anderson's movements, it would 138 appear that he moved as rapidly as was expected, and fhe attack could not have been made before noon. It was de- layed from noon until 4 p.m. by the officers sent from head- quarters to guide Longstreet's divisions from the Cashtown road to the l#t of Anderson's position. Being more or less ignorant of the topography of the country, they delayed the movement in their endeavor to reach the position without exposing the troops to the Union signal station on Little Round Top. Had Longstreet been able to attack an hour or two earlier, he would have found the III corps changing po- sition and less able to resist his assaults than at 4 p.m. When General Lee decided to renew the battle on July 3, he probably assumed that a combined effort of Generals Pick- ett and Johnson would pierce the Union line, weakened by the demoralization caused by the Confederate victories of July 1 and 2. He probably also counted on Stuart to assist in this effort. Had he been able to view the situation as it really was, he would not have ordered the attack, since Johnson was certain to be defeated. It is difficult to under- stand why the divisions of Pickett and Heth were allowed to advance after Johnson's defeat. In addition to advancing over open fields exposed to artillery fire, when they reached their goal, they were almost certain to meet a vastly superior force of infantry. The position occupied by the Confederate army on July 2 and 3 was undoubtedly a bad one. With fewer troops than General Meade, General Lee occupied a longer line, which was nearly etery where commanded by the Union posi- tion and was interrupted by the town of Gettysburg. It offered no good points from which an attack could be made. 139 Such success as Lee had was due almost wholly to the absence of cavalry on the Union left flank on July 2, which enabled Longstreet and Anderson to concentrate in front of that flank without the knowledge of General Meade. The whole situation on the left would have been- changed, had Meade known in the morning that Anderson and Longstreet were advancing towards his left. It is difficult to imagine a more discouraging situation than that in which General Lee found himself between the 4th and 14th of July. Decisively repulsed in battle and compelled to retreat, his communications were suddenly sev- ered by the destruction of his only bridge and by the floods at the fords. Yet it is clear, that never once through these trying days, did the commander or his men show any sign of demoralization. On the contrary, it is certain, they would have welcomed an attack on their intrenched lines about Falling Waters. Union Operations. To attack the fraction of the Confederate army in his front, as soon as he ascertained that the Confederate army was divided, was a most natural plan for General Hooker to suggest to the President, and it was equally natural for General Halleck to reply that if either fraction was to be attacked, it should be the one which crossed the Rappahan- nock rather than the one left in the trenches at Fredericks- burg. General Hooker knew where he would find Hill's corps, but the corps moving towards Culpeper were not' so easily brought to battle. The President and General Hal- 140 leek on the other hand remembered the depression through- out the North produced by Lee's invasion of Maryland and Jackson's Shenandoah Valley operations, and could not consent to a movement which did not conform to Hooker's general orders of "covering Washington and Harper's Ferry." Neither plan was wrong, but of the two that of General Halleck was the safer. Hill might have declined to await Hooker in his trenches and marched at once to join Lee by the shortest practicable route. With the Confederate army on the Potomac, a movement on Richmond, as General Hooker proposed, was one to which the Northern people would never have given their consent. The retrograde movement of General Hooker from the Rappahannock to Frederick was well executed in all its de- tails. The excellent employment of cavalry is especially to be commended. When he reached Frederick, General Hooker was natu- rally much embarrassed. His orders were to cover Wash- ington and Harper's Ferry and also to seek the Confederate army and attack it. The Confederate army, being reported at York, Carlisle and Chambersburg, it was manifestly impos- sible to carry out all these instructions, and as he was not allowed to abandon Harper's Ferry and absorb its garrison into his army, he submitted his resignation. When relieved, General Hooker was planning a move- ment northward with his flanks on opposite sides of the South Mountains. His left column was to be composed of the XII corps, strengthened by the Harper's Ferry garrison, and was to move up the Cumberland valley on Lee's line of 141 communication. As Lee ordered his concentration east of the mountains and practically abandoned his communica- tions, General Hooker would thus have run the risk of having his right wing destroyed before the left wing crossed the mountains. General Meade's plan of operations was a safer one, since there were no mountain passes between his wings. If there was any error in General Meade's advance from Frederick, it was in advancing with too great a front. It would have been better, from a tactical point of view, to move the VI corps to Hanover rather than to Manchester. It is possible, however, that this would have been too great a concentration for convenience of supply. That he real- ized the disadvantages of his extended front is evident from his selection of the Pipe Creek line, to which his forces could retire should either wing suddenly meet an over- whelming force. It was a wise provision, for which he has received more criticism than praise. General Meade also realized that General Lee's most probable move would be to turn his left flank. He there- fore placed three corps on this flank and combined them in a single command under his most trusted corps commander. He cautioned him to reconnoiter carefully the ground about Emmitsburg in view of a possible battle there. General Meade intended to advance cautiously, for he realized that he was facing a commander of great genius, and that the result of the campaign would be of the utmost importance to the North and to the South. While he did not shun a battle he did not care to engage in one in which General Lee had any advantage, through position or numbers. In spite of all his precautions and through no apparent 142 error of any commander, his left wing was drawn into the battle of July 1, in which the chances were all against it. General Buford reached Gettysburg about noon of June 30 and at once sent patrols along all the roads, to ascertain the position of the Confederate troops. He reported late that night that he believed all of Hill's corps was at Cash- town, that Rodes was reported coming from Carlisle, and that rumor said that some troops were coming from York. There was nothing in the information received by General Reynolds from General Buford that should have led Reynolds to act otherwise than he did. He moved on Gettysburg in accordance with his previous orders, taking the precaution to have the XI corps close at hand. The position of the Union army was not an unfavorable one, while Heth and Rodes were alone on the field; but when Pender and Early appeared on the two flanks the posi- tion of the Union forces was rendered extremely hazardous. At 1 o'clock, as soon as General Howard knew that Rodes was in the vicinity, he sent word to the commanders of the III and XII corps that he was engaged. These corps were, however, unable to reach the field until the battle was over. Had he known that Pender and Early were so near, he would probably have withdrawn the whole command to Cemetery Hill before the afternoon engagement. Had he sent word to General Slocum as soon as he reached the field in the morning, the latter would have been on the field in the early afternoon. The head of Slocum T s corps was at Two Taverns, five miles from Gettysburg, at 11 a. m. When General Meade sent Hancock to inspect the field of Gettysburg, he did not know that the III and XII corps had H3 been notified and were on their way to assist General How- ard. He probably thought that the main battle was to be fought on Pipe Creek and that it was advisable for him to remain where he had established his headquarters for the day. Had he known that these corps were moving towards Gettysburg, he would probably have gone there in person. In the course of the afternoon, however, it became evident that the battle must be fought at Gettysburg, and he ac- cordingly sent his orders to the V and VI corps and moved up to the field. When General Meade arrived on the field of Gettysburg, he was impressed by its defects. It was a position which could easily be turned, as General Hancock had said in his re- port, and presented a very narrow front to the troops of Ewell and Hill whom he saw on the north, stretched from Seminary Kidge on the west to Benners Hill on the east. Johnson was encamped along the Hanover road in close proximity to his main line of communications, the Baltimore pike. lie natu- rally wanted to drive Johnson from this position, and early in the morning of July 2 directed that an attack be made by the XII and V corps as soon as the latter should come up. It was because of this proposed movement that he failed to critically examine the position of his left wing. There were two serious errors made on July 2 which con- tributed greatly to such success as the Confederates won — the removal of Buford's cavalry from the field, and the with- drawal of most of the XII corps from its trenches. General Pleasanton seems to have had the same idea as General Meade, that the left flank of the Union army would be safe as soon as the III corps readied the field. He there- 144 fore ordered Buford to move off the field and go to West- minster to guard the trains. Had Buford been on the field, all the movements of Anderson and Longstreet would have been discovered as soon as made. Had Longstreet's move- ment been known in time, the left wing of the Union army could have been strengthened to resist it, by the use of the V corps. When Barksdale, Wilcox, Perry and Wright's brigades followed the retreating line of the III corps about 6 p.m., two divisions of the V and one of the II had already been thrown into line to support the III Corps. As reserves, Gen- eral Meade had but one division of the V corps left. As the VI corps was just coming up and he did not know to what ex- tent he could rely upon it for assistance, he sent for the XII corps. As it turned out this additional force was un- necessary and was not employed. The absence of the XII corps from its trenches enabled Johnson to get a foothold on the slopes of Culp's Hill. Only the stubborn resistance of Greene's brigade, which was retained at General Slocum's request, prevented Johnson from securing the position which had been Ewell's objective since the preceding evening. Although the movement of General Sickles' corps to its position in advance of the general line was not contemplated by General Meade, it was probably a fortunate move, as it gave the warning which should have been given by the cav- alry and broke up Longstreet's attack before it reached the main line. As the foreground, over which Longstreet ad- vanced against Little Bound Top, was broken and wooded, it would have been difficult, if not absolutely impossible, for the III corps alone to have stopped Longstreet's corps, had it 145 reached Devil's Den and the ground in its vicinity, intact. The ground was quite different from that over which the charge was made the following day and was not easily swept by either infantry or artillery fire. The disposition of the Union army on July 3 was an ideal one for passive defense. It's flanks were well protected by cavalry, its infantry and artillery were well distributed, and stone walls were thrown up wherever the material on the site permitted it ; as on the Round Tops and Culp's Hill. Not knowing at what point General Lee would launch his next attack, General Meade distributed the VI corps along the line wherever he thought it needed strengthening, and therefore had no organized reserve ready to follow the re- treating troops after Pickett's charge. To have moved for- ward with his main line without previous preparation, and have led to confusion, and the advance would have probably been stopped by the line of Longstreet's guns, even though the Confederate batteries had exhausted much of their am- munition. The operations of the cavalry on the right flank of the Union army on July 1, 2 and 3 were extremely well con- ducted. It was fortunate that Custer made the mistake of moving to the right flank of the army on the 3rd, instead of going to the left flank where he was expected. The operations on the left flank were not so successful. On the 2nd Buford received the unfortunate orders which led to his absence at a critical time; and on the 3rd Kilpatrick made an ill-judged attack which caused the loss of many of his men without the possibility of its affecting the Confed- erate infantry concealed by woods and stone fences. 146 General Meade has been much criticised for allowing the Confederate army to cross the Potomac without vigorously attacking it. This criticism does not seem to be just, for the following reasons: General Lee had the shortest line to Williamsport and Falling Waters, and had it not been for the flood in the river and the destruction of his pontoon bridge, would have been across the river long before General Meade could have overtaken him. It would have been impossible for any force to effect much on his direct line of retreat, since his line lay through a mountain pass where the pursuer could be read- ily stopped. General Meade made undoubtedly the right move when he launched his cavalry in pursuit and followed with his infantry via Frederick and the passes nearer the river than those followed by General Lee. The records show that the cavalry began to move for Frederick on July 4, and on the same day the infantry moved from Frederick to seize the passes through the mountains. The movement of the in- fantry from the battlefield began the following day. On the evening of July 12 the Union army, reinforced by the Harper's Ferry garrison, was in front of the Confeder- ate intrenched line, which extended from the vicinity of Hagerstown to the river. That night General Meade called a meeting of his corps commanders and requested their opinions as to the advisability of an attack. Of the seven corps commanders, five considered that the chances of suc- cess were not sufficient to warrant the risk of losing the moral and material effect of Gettysburg. They believed that the main object of the campaign was to drive the Confederate army out of the Northern states, and that that object should 147 be gained without running any unnecessary risk. Without an assault it was certain that Lee would cross the river; if the assault failed, he would probably renew his invasion. Under the circumstances, General Meade could hardly be blamed for accepting the judgment of such generals as Slocum, Sedgwick and Sykes. Those who at the time criticised General Meade's action, assumed that the Confederate army was demoralized and out of ammunition, and that an assault must have resulted in the annihilation of the Confederate army. We now know that the Army of Northern Virginia was well supplied with ammunition, and instead of dreading an assault, was eager to have the opportunity of repulsing one. In view of Spott- sylvania and Cold Harbor, it is probable that the assault would have been repulsed. If the assault had been repulsed, the losses would have been great, and this would have done much to neutralize the moral effects of Gettysburg and Vicksburg. L 6> MEADE, GEORGE GORDON. Born in Spain, 1815. Graduate U. S- M. A., 1835. Second lieutenant of artillery, 1835-1836. Resigned. Re-entered service as lieutenant of topographical engineers. First lieutenant, 1851 ; cap- tain, 1856; major, 1862; brigadier general, 1863; major general, 1864. Brevet- ted first lieutenant for conduct in battle of Monterey, Mexican war. Brigadier general of volunteers, August 31, 1861 ; major general of volunteers, Novem- ber 29, 1862-1864. On surveys and engineering duties, 1836-1861. At battles of Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, and Monterey, and at the siege of Vera Cruz in Mexican war, 1846-1847. Comnnnded brigade in Peninsula cam- paign, taking part in battles of Mechanicsville, Gaines' Mills, and Glendale, and later in battle of Manassas. Commander of a division, September to December, 1862. Engaged in battles of South Mountain and Antietam. Corps commander, December, 1862- June, 1863. Engaged in battles of Freder- icksburg and Chancellorsville. Commander of Army of the Potomac, 1863- 1865. Engaged in all the operations of that army beginning with Gettysburg, 1863, and terminating with Appomattox, .'865. After the war in corrmand of various military departments and divisions. Died 1872. 148 REYNOLDS, JOHN F. Born in Pennsylvania, 1820. Graduate U. S. M. A., 1841. Second lieutenant of artillery, 1841 ; first lieutenant, 1846; cap- tain, 1855 ; lieutenant colonel of infantry, 1861 ; colonel of infantry, 1863. Brevetted captain for conduct in battle of Monterej, and captain for con- duct in battle of Buena Vista, in Mexican War. Brigadier general of volun- teers, August 20, 1861 ; major general of volunteers, November 29, 1862. On artillery duty, 1841-1861. At defence of Fort Brown and in battles of Mon- terery and Buena Vista in Mexican war. Commanded brigade in Peninsula campaign of 1862, being engaged in battles of Mechanicsville, Gaines' Mills, and Glendale. Commander of division in battle of Manassas, and of Penn- sylvania state militia during Antietam campaign. Corps commander, Nov- ember, 1862-July, 1863, and as such engaged in battles of Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg. Killed at Gettysburg, July 1, 1863. HANCOCK, WINFIELD S. Born in Pennsylvania, 1824. Graduate U. S. M. A., 1844; second lieutenant of infantry, 1844; first lieutenant, 1853; captain, quartermaster's department, 1855; major, 1863; brigadier general, 1864; major general, 1866. Brevetted first lieutenant for conduct in battles of Contreras and Cherubusco, Mexican War. Brevetted major general, U. S. A., for conduct in battle of Spottsylvania. Brigadier general of volun- teers, September 23, 1861 ; major general of volunteers, November 29, 1862. On infantry duty, 1844-1855. In engagements at Plan del Rio, San Antonio, Cherubusco, Molino del Rey, and City of Mexico, in Mexican War. On quartermaster duty on the frontier 1855-1861. As brigade commander in Peninsula campaign in engagements at Yorktown, Williamsburg, Gelding's Farm, Savage Station, White Oak Swamp, and in Maryland campaign at Antietam. Division commander in the campaigns and battles of Fredericks- burg and Chancellorsville. Corps commander and as such engaged in all the operations of the Army of the Potomac from Chancellorsville to Petersburg, except when temporarily absent because of wound received at Gettysburg. November, 1864, to February, 1865, organizing corps of veterans. After the war in command of various military departments and divisions. Died 1886. SICKLES, DANIEL E. Born in New York City, 1825. Member of state and national legislature, 1857-1861. Colonel of regular infantry, 1866; retired with rank of major general, 1869. Colonel of New York volunteers, 1861 ; brigadier general of volunteers, 1861 ; major general of volunteers, 1863; mustered out, 1868. Brigade commander before Richmond, T862; di- vision commander at Fredericksburg; corps commander at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. Lost a leg at Gettysburg. On special mission to South America in 1865. Since retirement has filled various legislative and execu- tive offices. SYKES, GEORGE. Born at Dover, Delaware. October 9, 1822. Gradu- ate U. S. M. A., 1842; lieutenant of infantry, 1842-1855; major, 1855-1861; lieutenant colonel, 1863; colonel, 1868. Brigadier general of volunteers, Sep- tember 28, 1861 ; major general of volunteers, November 29, 1862. Brevetted 149 captain for conduct in battle of Cerro Gordo, Mex. Served in Florida (In- dian wars) ; on frontier duty in the south and south-west; in Texas; in the Mexican war; and again on frontier. Served in Bull Run campaign; divis- ion commander in the Peninsula, at Manassas, Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville ; corps commander at Gettysburg and in the subsequent campaigns of the Army of the Potomac. Later again on frontier and gar- rison duty. Died February 18, 1880. SEDGWICK, JOHN. Born September 13, 1813, at Cornwall, Connecti- cut. Graduate U. S. M. A., 1837; artillery officer until 1855, when appointed a major of cavalry. Brigadier general of volunteers, August 31, 1861 ; major general, July 4, 1862. Brevetted captain for conduct in battles of Contreras and Cherubusco; major, for conduct in battle of Chapultepec, Mex. Served in the Florida war, on the western and Canadian frontiers, and throughout the Mexican War in the artillery; and in Indian wars in the cavalry. Divis- ion commander in the Peninsula compaign until wounded, June 30, 1862; rejoined and again wounded at Antietam; corps commander at Chancellors- ville and Spottsylvania. Killed at Spottsylvania C H., May 9, 1864. HOWARD, OLIVER O. Born in Maine, November 8, 1830. Graduate U. S. M. A., 1854; lieutenant of ordnance, 1854-1861; resigned June 7, 1861 ; brigadier general, December 21, 1864; major general, March 19, 1886. Col- onel of Maine Volunteers, June 4, 1861 ; brigad'er general of volunteers, Sep- tember 3, 1861 ; major general of volunteers, November 29, 1862. Before the war served at various arsenals, in the Florida Indian troubles, and as instruc- tor in mathematics at the U. S. M. A. Commanded a brigade at Bull Run, commanded XI Corps at Chancellorsville, Gettysburg and in Sherman's ad- vance on Atlanta. Became commander of the Army of the Tennessee, July, 1864, and served as such in the operations of Sherman's army to the close of the war. After the war commanded various territorial departments and divisions and served a tour of duty as superintendent U. S. M. A. SLOCUM, HENRY W. Born in New York. Graduate U. S. M. A., 1852; resigned as lieutenant of artillery, October 31, 1856; after volunteer service declined a regular commission as colonel. Colonel of New York volunteers, May 21, 1861 ; brigadier general of volunteers, August 9, 1861 ; major general of volunteers, July 4, 1862; resigned. September 16, 1865. Commanded his regiment at the first Bull Run; division commander in the Peninsula and at Antietam; corps commander at Chancellorsville, Gettys- burg and thereafter. After the war returned to New York and re entered public life, serving as congressman, etc., until his death in 1894. PLEASANTON, ALFRED. Born in D. C. Graduate U. S. M. A., 1844; lieutenant of cavalry till March, 1855; captam of cavalry, 1855-1862; major of cavalry, 1862-1868, when he resigned after having declined a commission as lieutenant colonel of infantry ; restored to the retired list by act of Con- gress in October, 1888. Brigadier general of volunteers, July 16, 1862; major 150 general of volunteers, June 22, 1863. Brevetted first lieutenant for conduct in battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, Mex. In his early career served on the frontier, in the Mexican war, and in various Indian expeditions; during the early days of the war was on recruiting and mustering duty; com- manded a cavalry division at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville and the cavalry corps thereafter until March. 1864, when he was sent to the west in charge of operations in Missouri and Kansas. After leaving the army occu- pied various public and private civil positions. LEE, ROBERT E. Born in Virginia, -,£07. Graduate U. S. M. A., 1829; engineer officer through grades to include captain until March 3, 1855, when appointed a lieutenant colonel of cavalry; colonel of cavalry, March 16, 1861 ; resigned, April 25, 1861. Brevetted major for conduct in battle of Cerro Gordo, Mex. ; lieut. -colonel for conduct in battles of Contreras and Cheru- busco ; colonel for conduct in battle of Chapultepec, Mex. Brigadier general in the Confederate service, May 14, 1861 ; general, June 4, 1861 ; general-in- chief, January 31, 1865. As engineer officer in regular service was engaged in the civil duties of his corps, in the Mexican war, and as superintendent, U. S. M. A. ; as cavalry officer in the regular service was engaged in frontier Indian duties, department commander, etc. As confederate officer was in command in West Virginia in the autumn of 1861 ; of the defences of the coast of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida in the Spring of 1862; and after June 1, 1862, commanded' the Army of Northern Virginia until the close of the war. After the war was President of Washington College, Lex- ington, Va., until his death in 1870. LONGSTREET, JAMES. Born in South Carolina. Graduate U. S. M. A., 1842; infantry officer of grades to include captain, until July 19, 1858, when appointed major and paymaster; resigned June 1, 1861. Brevetted captain for conduct in battles of Contreras and Cherubusco; major, for con- duct at battle of Chapultepec, Mex. Lieutenant colonel of confederate in- fantry, March 16, 1861 ; brigadier general, June 17, 1861 ; major general, October 7, 1861 ; lieutenant general, October 9, 1862. In U. S. service was- engaged in frontier, garrison, Mexican war, and similar service. In con- federate service, brigade commander at Bull Run; division commander on the Peninsula ; commanded a wing, or corps at Manassas and thereafter throughout the operations of the Army of Northern Virginia until the end of 1863, when he was placed in command of the department of East Ten- nessee; later again a corps commander in the Army of Northern Virginia. After the war engaged in commercial pursuits and held various state and federal positions in Louisiana and Georgia until his death in 1904. EWELL, R. S. Born in the District of Columbia. Graduate U. S. M. A., 1840; cavalry officer in various grades to include captain, until his resigna- tion, May 7, 1861. Brevetted captain for conduct in battles of Contreras and Cherubusco, Mex. Lieutenant colonel of confederate cavalry, March 16, 1861 ; brigadier general, June 17, 1861 ; major general, January 24, 1862; 151 lieutenant general, Ma}' 23, 1863. In the federal service engaged in frontier, garrison, recruiting and other special and routine duties and in the Mexican war. In confederate service, brigade commander at Bull Run, division com- mander in Jackson's Shenandoah Valley campaign, and later around Richmond in the Peninsula campaign ; also at the battle of Manassas, where he lost a leg; corps commander from Gettysburg until end of 1864, when assigned to the command of the Department of Richmond, which he retained until the end of the war. After the war was a farmer in Tennessee until his death in 1872. HILL, A. P. Born in Virginia. Graduate U. S. M. A., 1847; served as lieutenant of artillery until his resignation on March 1, 1861. Colonel of con- federate infantry, 1861 ; brigadier general. February 22, 1862; major general, May 26, 1862 ; lieutenant general, May 24, 1863. While in U. S. service, took part in Mexican war, and was on frontier and garrison duty and scientific duty in Washington. In the confederate service, regimental commander at Bull Run; brigade and division commander in the Peninsula; division com- mander at Manassas, Antietam, and Fredericksburg; division and corps com- mander at Chancellorsville, and corps commander thereafter until killed at Petersburg, April 2, 1865. STUART, J. E. B. Born in Virginia. Graduate U. S. M. A., 1854; lieutenant and captain of cavalry until Iris resignation, May 14, 1861. Cap- tain confederate cavalry, March 16, 1861 (later colonel) ; brigadier general, September 24, 1861 ; major general, July 25, 1862. On frontier, garrison and similar duties in Federal service. Commanded a regiment of cavalry at Bull Run; commanded the brigade of cavalry in the Peninsula in 1862, and entire cavalry, or the cavalry division of the Army of Northern Virginia in all of its subsequent operations until mortally wounded at Yellow Tavern, Va., May 10, 1864. Army of the Potomac. Commander-in-Chief — Major General George G. Meade (19-1835). Chief of Staff — 'Major General Daniel Butterfield. Chief of Artillery — Brig. General Henry J. Hunt (19-1839) Chief of Engineers — Brig. General Gouverneur K. Warren (2-1850). CORPS. DIVISIONS. REGIMENTS. en C tn ^■ n <" 7 IS ,

, (22-1847) Provost Guard 1st Colonel William S. Tilton. 2d Colonel Jacob B. Sweitzer. 3d Colonel Strong Vincent. 1st Colonel Hannibal Day. (22-1823) 2d Colonel Sidney Burbank. (17-1829) 3d Brig. General Stephen Weed. (27-1854) 1 REGIMENTS. 3d Brig. General Samuel W. Crawford is>t Colonel William McCandless. ^ 3d Colonel Joseph W. Fisher. Artillery, Captain Aueustus P. Martin. 12th New York, Cos. D & ; 17th Penn. Cavalry, Cos. E 1 8th Massachusetts 22d 1st Michigan 1 1 8th Pennsylvania 9th Massachusetts 32d 4th Michigan 62d Pennsylvania 20th Maine 16th Michigan 44th New York 83d Pennsylvania S. 3d U. 4 th 6th 1 2th 14th 2d U. S. 7th " 10th " nth " 17th " (6 cos. (4 " (5 " (8 « (8 " (6 cos. (4 " (6 " (7 " 140th New York 146th 91st Pennsylvania I55th 1st Pennsylvania Reserves*) ( 2nd 6th 13th 5th Pennsylvania Reserves 9th 10th nth 12th '\g cos. 3d Mass. Light Battery C 1st New York Light Battery 1st Ohio Battery L 5th U. S. Battery D 5th U. S. Battery I CORPS. BRIGADES. REGIMENTS. f ist Maj. General David B. Birney. I— i rt EG 2d Brig. General Andrew A. Hum- phreys. (13-1831.) f ist Brig. General Charles K. Graham. 2d Brig. General J. H. I-Jobart Ward. 3d Colonel P. Regis de Trobriand ist Brig. General Tosep'h B. Carr. 2d Colonel Wm. R. Brewster. 3d Colonel George C. Burling. Artillery, Captain George E. Randolph. 57th Pennsylvania (8 cos.) 63d 68th 105th 114th " 141st 20th Indiana 3d Maine 4th 86th New York 124th " 99th Pennsylvania ist U.S. Sharpshooters (Berdan) 2d " " 8 cos. 17th Maine 3d Michigan 5th 40th New York 110th Pennsylvania (6 cos.) ist Massachusetts nth 1 6th 1 2th New Hampshire nth New Jersey 26th Pennsylvania 84th (train guard) 70th New York 71st 72d 73d 74th 1 20th 2d New Hampshire 5th New Jersey 6th 7th 8th 115th Pennsylvania 2d New Jersey Light Battery ist New York Light Bat. D 4th " " ist Rhode Island Light Bat. E 4th U. S. Battery K ^ # * S Fold-out Placeholde This fold-out is being digitized, and will b future date. \ CORPS. DIVISIONS. REGIMENTS. 2* 1st Brig. General Horatio G. Wright. (2-1841) 2d Brig. General Albion P. Howe. (8-1841) -I 3d Maj. General John Newton. (2-1842) Headq'rs Guard f Frovost Guard 1st Brig. General A. T. A. Torbert. (21-1855) < 2d Brig. General Joseph J. Bartlett. 3d Brig. General David A. Russell. (38-1845) 2d Colonel Lewis A. Grant. 3d Brig. General Thomas H. Neill. (27-1847) 1st Brig. General Alexander Shaler. 2d Colonel J Henry L. Eustis. (1-1842) 3d Brig. General Frank Wheaton. Artillery, Colonel Chas. H. Tompkins. 1st New Jersey Cavalry, Co. 1st Penn. Cavalry, Co. H 4th New Jersey (3 cos.) 1st New Jersey 2d 3d 15th 5th Maine 121st New York 95th Pennsylvania 96th 6th Maine 49th Pennsylvania (4 cos.) 119th Pennsylvania 5th Wisconsin 2d Vermont 3d 4th 5th 6th 7th Maine (6 cos.) 33d New York (detachment) 43d 49th 77th 6rst Pennsylvania 65th New York 67th I22d 23d Pennsylvania 82d 7th Massachusetts 10th 37th " 2d Rhode Island 62d New York 93d Pennsylvania 98th I02d I39th 1st Mass. Light Battery A 1st New York Light Battery 3d " " , 1st Rhode Island Light Bat. C 1st Rhode Island Light Bat. C 2d U. S. Battery D 2d U. S. Battery G 5th U. S. Battery F (train guard] )RPS. DIVISIONS. REGIMENTS. 1st Brig. General Francis C. Barlow. Headq'rs Guard f ist Colonel Leopold Von Gilsa. 2d Brig. General Adelbert Ames. (5-i86i) f iO 2d Brig. General Adolph Von Steinwehr 3d Maj. General Carl Schurz. ist Colonel Charles R. Coster. 2d Colonel Orland< Smith. ist Brig. General Alex. Schimmelfennn? •2d Colonel W. Krzyzanowski. Artillery, Major Thomas W. Ostoorn. ist Indiana Cav. (cos. I & K) 8th New York Infantry (1 co.) 41s* New York (9 cos.) 54th 68th 153d Pennsylvania 17th Connecticut 25 Ohio 75th " 107th " 134th New York I54'th 27th Pennsylvania 73d 33d Massachusetts 136th New York 55th Ohio 73d " 82d Illinois 45 th New York 157th 6is't Ohio 74th Pennsylvania 58th New York 119th 82d Ohio 75th Pennsylvania 29 th Wisconsin ist New York Light Bat. I 13th New York Light Battery ist Ohio Light Batt-ry K ist Ohio Light Battery I 4th U. S. Battery G (Wilkison) ^ at * * Fold -out Placeholde This fold-out is being digitized, and will b future date. \ CORPS. DIVISIONS. ERIGADES. REGIMENTS. S.2 XX ist Brig. General Alpheus S. Williams. 2d Brig. General John W. Geary. Headq'rs Guard ist Colonel Archibald L. McDougal 2d Brig. General Henry H. Lockwood. (Joined July 2d) (22-1836) iotlh Maine (battalion) 5th Connecticut 20th 3d Maryland 123d New York I45th 46th Pennsylvania [Brig; ist Maryland Potomac Honii 1st Maryland Eastern Shore 150th New York 3d Brig. General Thomas H. Ruger. (3-1854) 27th Indiana 2d Massachusetts 13th New Jersey 107th New York 3d Wisconsin ist Colonel Charles Candy. 5th Ohio 7th 29th " 66th " 28th Pennsylvania 147th Pennsylvania (8 cos.) 2d Colonel George A. Cobham. Jr. 29th Pennsylvania 109th " 1 nth 3d Brig. General George S. Greene (2-1823) 60th New York 78th ioed " i37th 149th " Artillery, Lieut. Edw. D. Muhlenberg. ist New York Light Bat M Pennsylvania Light Battery 4th U. S. Battery F 5th U. S. Battery K CORPS. DIVISIONS. r ist Brig. General John Buford. (16-1848) 2d Brig. General David Mc M. Greee (8-18SS) 3d Brig. General Judson Kilpatrick. (17-1861) Horse Artillery. BRIGADES. REGIMENTS. f ist Colonel 8th Illinois William Gamble 12th " (4 oos.) 3d Indiana (6 cos.) 8th New York 2d Colonel 6th New York Thomas C. Devin. 9th 17th Pennsylvania 3d West Virginia (2 cos.) Reserve, Brig. Gen'l 6th Penn. Wesley Merritt. ist U. S. (22-1860) 2d " 5 th " 6th " Headq'rs Guard ist Ohio, Co. A ist Colonel ist Maryland (n cos.) John B. Mcintosh. Purnell Legion, Md., Co. A ist Massachusetts 1st New Jersey ist Pennsylvania 3d 3d Heavy Artillery Section Battery H 2d Colonel Pen nock Hnev. 3d Colonel J Irvin Gregg. Headq'rs Guard ist Brig. General Elon J. Farnswotth. < 2d Brig. General George A. Custer. (34-i86i) I ist Captain Jas. M. Robertson. 2d Captain John C. Tidball. (11-1848) 2d New York 4th 6th Ohio (10 cos.) 8th Pennsylvania (At Vestminster during bat.> ist Maine 10th New York 4th Pennsylvania 16th ist Ohio, Co. C 5th New York 18th Pennsylvania ist Vermont ist West Virginia (10 cos.) ist Michigan 5th 6th 7th (10 cos ) Qth Michigan Battery 6th New York 2d U. S. Battery B, L and M 4th U. S. B-ttery E ist U. S. Batteries E, G & K 2d " " A (Cale . 3d «■ " C ^ # * s Fold-out Placeholde This fold-out is being digitized, and will b future date. CORPS. DIVISIONS. BRIGADES. REGIMENTS. Headq'rs Guard 32d Massachusetts, Inf. Co. K Artillery Reserve, Brig. General Robert O. Tyler (22-1853.) rst Regular 1st U. S. Battery H Capt. Dunbar R. Ran 2d " F and '.'< som. 4th " C 5th U. S. Battery C 1st Volunteer 5th Mass. Light Battery E Lt. Col. Freeman Mc 9th " Gilvery. 15th New York Light Batte| Pcnn. Light Batteries C & j| 2d Volunteer 1st Conn. Heavy Battery I: Capt. Elijah D. Taft. 1st Conn. Heavy Battery M 2d Connecticut Light Batter| 5th New York Light Batte( 3d Volunteer Capt. James F. ington. 1st New Hampshire Light '.': Hunt- Is t Ohio Light Battery H 1 st Penn. Light Battery F & West Virginia Light Batterj 4fch Volunteer Capt. Robert H. Fitz- hugh. Train Guard Maj. Charles Ewing. 6fch Maine Light Battery Maryland Light Battery A 1st New Jersey Light Battel 1 st N. Y. Light Battery G S| 4th N. J. Infantry (7 cos.)(| Not engaged. Army of Northern Virginia. Commander in Chief, General Robert E. Lee (2-1829.) Chief of Artillery, Brigadier General William N. Pendleton (5-1830.) REGIMENTS. Brig. General J. B. Kershaw Brig. General Wm. Barksdale. Major General Bn S- General Lafayette McLaws. \ p - J- Semrnes. (48-1842) Brig. General W. T. Wofford. Colonel H. C. Cabell. Major General George E. Pickett. (59-1846) I Brig. General R. B. Garnett. (29-1841) Brig. General J. L. Kemper. Brig. General L. A. Armistead. Ma j or James Dearing. 2d South Carolina 3d 7tn 8th 15th 3d South Carolina Battalion 13th Mississippi 17th 18th 2ISt 10th Georgia 50th 5ist 53d 16th Georgia 1 8th 24th " Cobb's Legion, Ga. Phillip's Legion, Ga. Pulaski. Ga., Battery 1st N. Carolina Battery A Troup, Ga., Battery 1st Richmond Howitzers 8th Virginia 18th 19th 28tih 56th rst Virginia 3d 7th nth 24th " 9th Virginia 14th " 38th " 53rd 57th Fauquier Battery Hampden Battery Richmond Fayette Battery Virginia Battery \ Fold-out Placehold( This fold-out is being digitized, and will t future date. CORPS. DIVISIONS. REGIMENTS. O "S £ 22 1 35 3 Major General John B. Hood. (44- 1853 ^ Corps Artillery, Colonel J. B. Walton. 1 Brig. General E. M. Law. Brig. General J. B. Robertson. Brig. General Geo. T. Anderson. Brig. General H. L. Benning. Major M. W. Henry. Colonel E. P. Alexander. Major B. F. Eshleman. 4th Alabama 15th 44th 47 th 48th 3d Arkansas 1st Texas 4th 5th " 7th Georgia 8th 9th nth 59th 2d Georgia 15th 17th 20th " Branch, N. C, Battery German, S. C. Battery Palmetto, S. C, Battery Rowan, N. C, Battery Ashland, Va., Battery Bedford, Va.. Battery Brooks, S. C. Battery Madison, La. Battery Virginia Battery ginia Battery Washington Artillery (4 batteries') CORPS DIVISIONS BRIGADES REGIMENTS ' Brig. General Sth Louisiana f Harry T. Hays. 6th 7th 8th 9th " Brig. General 31st Virginia William Smith. 49th ?2d Hoke's Brigade 6th N. Carolina < Col. Isaac E. Avery. 2ISt 57th Brig. General 13th Georgia J. B. Gordon. 26th " Major General 31st 38th " 60th Jubal A. Early. (18-1837) 61st Lt. Colonel Charlottesville Battery H. P. Jones. Courtnev Battery Louisiana Battery 1- Staunton BatUrv ut. Gem Ewell. -1840) Brig. General ist Maryland Battalion George H. Steuart. i«t N. Carolina ■3*3 (37-1848) 3d 10th Virginia J« 23d l—l 37th " Brig. General 2d Virginia James A. Walker. 4th " 5th 27th Major General Edward Johnson. 33d (32-1838) 1 Nichol's Brigade rst Louisiana < Col. J. M. Williams. 2d TOth I4th 15* Brig. General 21 st Virginia John M. Jones. 25th " (39-1841) 42d 44th " 48th 50th Major ist Man-land Battery J. W. Latimer. Allegheny Battery Chesapeake Battery Lee Battery Fold-out Placeholck This fold-out is being digitized, and will b future date. DIVISIONS BRIGADES REGIMENTS V > O J Pi Major General R. E. Rodes. Corps Artillery, Colonel J. T. Brown. 1 Brie:. General Junius Daniel. Brig. General Alfred Iverson. Brie;. General George Doles. Brig. General S. D. Ramseur. (14-1860) Colonel E. A. O'Neal. T.ieut. Colonel Thomas H. Carter. Captain Willis J. Dance. Lieut. Colonel William Nelson. 32d N Carolina 43d M 45 th U 53d " 2d Ba 5th N. Carolina 12th M 20th tt 23d « 4th Georgia 12th tt 2ISt tt 44th It 2d N. Carolina 4th tt 14th " 30th tt 3d Alabama 5th tt 6th tt 12th tt 26th (i Battalion Jefferson Davis Battery King William Battery Morris Battery Orange Battery 2d Richmond Howitzers 3d Powhatan Battery Rockbridge Battery Salem Battery Amherst Battery Fluvanna Battery Georgia Battery COKPS. DIVISIONS. BRIGADES. REGIMENTS. Major General R. H. Anderson. (40-1842) <3SU a> a> 7 »— I O M Major General Henry Heth. (38-1847) ( Brig. General Cadmus M. Wilcox. (54-1846) Brig. General A. R. Wright Brig. General William Mahone. Perry's Brigade Col. David Lang. Brig. General Carnot Posey. Major John Lane Brig. General J. J. Pettigrew. Colonel J. M. Brockenbrough. Brig. General James J. Archer. Brig. General Joseph R. Davis. Lieut. Colonel John J. Garnett. 8 th Alabama 9th 10th " nth " 14th " 3d Georgia 22d 48th " 2d Battalion 6th Virginia 12th 16th 41st " 61st 2d Florida 5th 8th 12th Mississippi 16th 19th 48th Co. A, Sumter Artillery* Co. B Co. C nth N. Carolina 26th 47th 52d 40th Virginia 47th 55th 22d " Battalion 5th Alabama Battalion 13th " 1st Tennessee 7 th 14th 2d Mississippi nth 42d " 55th N. Carolina Donaldsonville Battery Huger Battery Lewis Battery Norfolk Blues Battery Fold-out Placeholck This fold-out is being digitized, and will b future date. CORPS DIVISIONS BRIGADES REGIMENTS f r Colonel 1st S. Carolina Abner Perrin. 12th 13 th 14th " 1st " Rifles Brig. General 7th N. Carolina James H. Lane. 18th 28th 33d 37th Major General Brig. General 14th Georgia William D Pender. Edward L. Thomas. 35th (19-1854) 45th " :=! 49th HX -, Brig. General 13th N. Carolina S3 i-m co 0} *% w A. M. Scales. 16th 22d " o ►* 34th 3-9 38th J< Major Albermarle Batterv William T. Pogue. Charlotte Battery- Madison Battery Virginia Battery Major Danville Battery D. G Mcintosh'. Hardaway Battery 2d Rockbridge Battery Corps Artillery, Virginia Battery Colonel ^ R. L. Walker. Major Crenshaw Battery i W. J. Pegram. : Fredericksburg Battery Letcher Battery PeeDee Battery Puree 1 ! Battery DIVISIONS. REGIMENTS. 6 Maj. General J. E. B. Stuart. (13-1854) Independent Cavalry. f Brig. General Wade Hampton. Brig. General Beverly Robertson. (25-1849) Brig. General Fitz Lee. (45-1856) Brig. General A. G. Jenkins. Brig. General William E. Jones. (10-1848) Brig. General W. H. F. Lee. Colonel J. R. Chambliss, Jr. (31-1853) Horse Artillery Maj. R. F. Beckham. (6-1859) Brig. General J. D. Imboden. 1st North Carolina 1st South Carolina 2d Cobb's Ga. Legion Jeff Davis Legion Phillips Ga. Legion 4th North Carolina 5th " 1st Maryland Battalion* 1st Virginia 2d 3d 4th 5th " 14th Virginia 16th 17th 34th Va. Battalion 36th Jackson's Battery 6th Virginia 7th nth 2d N. Carolina 9th Virginia 10th " 13th Breathed's Va. Battery Chew's Va. Battery McGregor's Va. Battery Moorman's Va. Battery Griffin's Md. Battery Hart's S. C. Battery i8Ch Va. Cavalry 62d Va. Infantry (mtd.) Va. Partisan Rangers Virginia Battery * With Ewell's Corps. Fold-out Placeholck This fold-out is being digitized, and will t future date. v — From "MAINE AT GETTYSBURG." ii K'^/PIVJICK BATTLE. OF GETTYSBURG Jul)/ 2nd 1863 SECOND DAY. Confederate , From "MAINE AT GETTYSBURG." From -MAINE AT GETTYSBURG." From-MAINE AT GETTYSBURG"