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CAMPAIGNS 
 
 ARMY OF THE POTOMAC 
 
 A CRITICAL HISTORY OF OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA 
 
 MARYLAND AND PENNSYLVANIA FROM THE 
 
 COMMENCEMENT TO THE CLOSE 
 
 OF THE WAR 
 
 1861-1865 
 
 WILLIAM SWINTON 
 
 AUTHOR OF "decisive BATTLES OF THE WAR," "OUTLINES OF THE 
 WOBLD'S HI6TOKT," ETC. 
 
 ,0%. ... .y 
 
 REVISION AND RE-ISSUE 
 
 NEW YORK 
 CHARLES SCRIBISrEIl'S SONS 
 
 1882 
 
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 Mo 
 
 ■'c 
 
 Copyright by 
 
 CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 
 
 18S2 
 
 Trow's 
 
 Printing and Bookbinding Company 
 
 20I to 213 East Tivelfth Street 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
From the PRINCE DE JOINVILLE (Fran9ois d'Orleans). 
 
 I firmly believe that your book will live as a true and able record of one of the most 
 gigantic and stubborn military efforts. . . . For me, whose fortune it was to be as- 
 sociated with the infancy of the Army of the Potomac, and who spent so many hapjiy 
 days in the field with her, I have read with emotion the long account of her deeds, 
 trials, suffering, and final success, so feelingly told ; and I thank you for the satis- 
 faction I experienced. 
 
 From HON. WM. H. SEWARD. 
 
 It is a great subject yovi undertook in writing the history of the Army of the 
 Potomac. But I knew your ability and candor so well as to feel assured you would 
 treat the great theme as it deserved. In this I have not been disajipointcd, for I dis- 
 cern the vastly different character of your excellent and judicially considered History 
 from the great mass of ephemeral productions on the subject. 
 
 From PROF. D. H. MAHAN, late Professor of Engineering at West Point. 
 
 Mr. William Swinton, in his work, " Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac," 
 has not only shown himself the worthy Polybius of that army, but has placed him- 
 self on a level with our best modern lay military historians. 
 
 From HENRY WARD BEECHER. 
 
 If any one will know the mechanism and anatomy of battle, let him read our 
 American Napier, William Swinton. 
 
 From MAJOR-GENERAL W. S. HANCOCK. 
 
 I have read your "History of the Army of the Potomac," and consider it the most 
 valuable addition to the miUtary criticism of the War that has yet appeared in 
 print. By one who has been so long identified with that army as myself it can readily 
 be perceived that you have endeavored to write the truth. I may add that I believe 
 the Army of the Potomac has been fortunate in its historian, and that your array of 
 facts will not hereafter be surpassed in accuracy. 
 
 From MAJOR-GENERAL W. B. FRANKLIN. 
 
 It tells the story nearly as it is believed to-day by the honest actors in the scenes 
 and incidents which it narrates. It is a matter of astonishment to me that you have 
 been able to make so impartial an account. 
 
 From MAJOR-GENERAL D. N. COUCH. 
 
 You have put forth a truthful record — a new era in American military writers. 
 " You need not fear what man can do to you." 
 
 From JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 The fairest and most careful of the Northern writers on the war. 
 
 From ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS. 
 
 Theexciting scenes and stirring events of the battle-fields have been quite graphically 
 described by many writers, but by none so far, as I have seen, with greater ability or 
 more impartiality than by IVIr. William Swinton in his two works. . . . Upon the 
 whole I regard these two works from his pen as the best and most accurate chronicle 
 of the military operations which he undertook to describe that I have met with from 
 any quarter. 
 
NOTE TO THE REISSUE. 
 
 This history of tlie defeats and the triumphs of that great 
 army which, for fom- years, maintained in Virginia the cause 
 of the Union against the chief armed force of Secession was 
 first published in 1866. 
 
 Though meeting a favorable reception from most of those 
 best qualified to judge of its deserts, the book, through a mis- 
 hap of publication, ere long disappeared from " the market," 
 and for more than a decade it has been practically unprocur- 
 able. Still there has been all the while a demand for it suffi- 
 cient to indicate that it was not yet quite ready to go into 
 Time's " wallet for oblivion " ; and recently things have so 
 shaped themselves that it is now possible, under favorable cir- 
 cumstances, to make resuscitation of the " Army of the 
 Potomac." 
 
 In preparing the book for reissue I have taken occasion to 
 make correction of a considerable number of minor faults of 
 matter and manner, and in the Appendix will be found some 
 addenda for which the foot-notes did not afford space. 
 
 While engaged in the revision, I have read most of the 
 authoritative works bearing on the history of the Army of the 
 
2 NOTE TO THE REISSUE. 
 
 Potomac wliich have appeared since 1866. It is no small 
 satisfaction to find many of my conclusions confirmed by his- 
 torians of greater ability, writing nnder more favorable oppor- 
 tunities of information and criticism. It was my chief aim 
 (as stated in the Preface) to present " army- verdicts," and 
 it is pleasant to find after sixteen years a very general acqui- 
 escence in the justness of these verdicts. And I may add that, 
 had I the " Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac " to make 
 over again, though I hope I should bring to the expression of 
 its judgments more balance and moderation, the judgments 
 themselves would not be materially modified. The picture 
 might differ in coloring; the drawing would remain in its 
 chief lines the same. W. S. 
 
 Brooklyn, October, 1883. i 
 
PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION. 
 
 It is not without diffidence tliat I give to the world a vohiine in 
 eluding within its single self the history of events so vast and com- 
 plicated, so little understood and so greatly misunderstood, as 
 those that filled up the momentous four years during which the 
 chief armies of the North and the South fought the war of secession 
 to an. issue upon the soil of Virginia. Yet, I should not have at- 
 tempted the task, had I not been met both by an inward prompting 
 in the desire to speak truly of actions and men whereof there has 
 been hitherto little else than false witness, and by outward solici- 
 tations, in the possession of such a mass of documentary material 
 as it seldom falls to the writer of contemporaneous history to 
 obtain. 
 
 While the Army of the Potomac was yet in the field, there were 
 many who, believing that I would in time make fitter record of the 
 doings and sufierings of that army than was possible in the brief 
 chronicles which it was my duty to prepare for the press, began 
 even then to furnish me with oral and written information. And 
 no sooner had the war closed, and it was known that I had ad- 
 
4, PREFACE. 
 
 dressed myself to this work in earnest, than, from all sides, reports, 
 dispatches, and memorials poured in upon me. It soon came about 
 that, respecting every important action of the Army of the Potomac, 
 there were brought to my hand, not only the manuscript oflBcial re- 
 ports of its corps, division, and brigade commanders, but, for the 
 illustration of its inner life and history, a prodigious mass of me- 
 moirs, private note-books, dispatches, letter-books, etc. In addition, 
 I have had the benefit of the memory and judgment of most of the 
 chief officers ; and, both from these and others, have had so many 
 proofs of their kindly solicitude that nothing which could be of 
 use to me should be wanting, that I have been led to believe they 
 did not regard me as entirely unworthy to record the history of 
 their army. 
 
 For the elucidation of the deeds of the Army of Northern Vir- 
 ginia, the mighty rival of the Army of the Potomac, my sources of 
 information have been scarcely less ample. These embrace the 
 complete " Eeports of the Army of Northern Virginia," and many 
 manuscript reports and documents kindly forwarded to me. I have 
 also had the advantage of full conversations with most of the chief 
 commanders of the Confederate army ; and I think the result cannot 
 fail to appear in the explanation of many things hitherto wrongly 
 interpreted, many things hitherto wholly incomprehensible. 
 
 I have seldom needed to refer for the corroboration of statements 
 to what I personally saw ; and indeed the individual knowledge of 
 any one man respecting such actions as were waged in Virginia, is 
 necessarily slight. But that which has been of such use that with- 
 out^it the history of the Army of the Potomac never could have been 
 written, is the power, gained by personal experience in the field, of 
 
PREFACE. 5 
 
 testing the truth of written evidence by a referenc«» to the actual 
 conditions under which warfare was made in Virginia, Nor is it ot 
 less value to have known the private judgments upon events of that 
 great body of instructed officers that adorned the Army of the Po- 
 tomac. As these judgments took shape from the deeds themselves 
 under the very circumstances of their performance, I hold them to 
 be sounder than any that are hereafter likely to be rendered. 
 Hence I have garnered these with care, endeavoring to make this a 
 record of the arwy-verdicts on men and things. It will be safe to 
 presume tnat whatever is of worth in this book has this origin. 
 
 It is probable that the estimates here rendered of the successive 
 commanders of the Army of the Potomac, may in some cases be 
 found to run counter to, and in other cases to be a reversal of, popu- 
 lar estimates. I must say, in justice to myself, that if some com- 
 manders are here exalted above the place they have hitherto held 
 in popular esteem, and others brought down to a lower place, 
 it is because I dared not judge one commander by one standard, 
 and another by another. Whatever criticism I have made on men 
 has resulted from the reference of their actions to the test of those 
 simple principles to which almost all great military questions may 
 be reduced. Those, therefore, who would impugn these judgments 
 must in justice first impugn the reasoning on which they are 
 founded. 
 
 I desire to call attention to the maps and plans, which, though 
 on a small scale, are entirely reliable. They have been prepared 
 with great care, by Colonel W. H. Paine, of the engineer staff of 
 the Army of the Potomac. I particularly instance those illustra- 
 tive of Grant's campaign from the Rapidan to Petersburg. The 
 
(5 PREFACE. 
 
 lines of works marked thereon are derived from the govermnent 
 surveys, and the angles indicated are correct. They will prove 
 highly interesting and instructive to military students. 
 
 To a distinguished officer I owe a special acknowledgment for 
 the invaluable gift of the unpublished consolidated monthly returns 
 of the Confederate army from the commencement to the close of 
 the war. 
 
 The notes in support of the text are made very ample, especially 
 touching all disputed points. As, with a few well-known excep- 
 tions, the sources of information are entirely manuscript, it has not 
 been thought necessary to state this fact in each individual case. 
 
 W. S. 
 jMfiW foKK, April, 1866. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 I. 
 
 Paire 
 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC IN HISTORY 13 
 
 II. 
 
 THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN 26 
 
 I. War in Embryo 26 
 
 n. McClellan in Western Virginia 34 
 
 III. 
 
 THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON 60 
 
 I. Organization of tlie Army of the Potomac 60 
 
 II. Plans of Campaign 68 
 
 IV. 
 
 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 99 
 
 I. Before Yorktown 99 
 
 II. From Yorktown to the Chickahominy 113 
 
 III. Confederate Strategy on the Chickahominy and in the Valley of 
 
 the Shenandoah 131 
 
 IV. The Battle of Fair Oaks 138 
 
 V. The Seven Days' Retreat 140 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 V. 
 
 Page 
 
 POPE'S CAMPAIGN m NORTHERN" VIRGIFIA 167 
 
 I. Removal of the Army from the Peninsula 167 
 
 II. Pope's Retrograde Movement ^. 175 
 
 in. Jackson's Flank March , 177 
 
 IV. The Second Battle of Manassas 182 
 
 V. Exit Pope 193 
 
 VI 
 
 THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN 194 
 
 I. MancEuvres Previous to Antietam 194 
 
 IL The Battle of Antietam 208 
 
 m. Close of McQeUan's Career 225 
 
 vn. 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK 230 
 
 I. Change of Base to Fredericksburg 230 
 
 II. The Battle of Fredericksburg 238 
 
 in. Abortive Movements on the Rappahannock 255 
 
 VIII. 
 
 THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN 267 
 
 I. The Army under Hooker 267 
 
 n. The Passage of the Rappahannock 270 
 
 m. At Chancellorsville— Friday 276 
 
 IV. Jackson's Flank March — Saturday 283 
 
 V. Sunday's Action at Chancellorsville 293 
 
 VI. The Storming of the Heights 296 
 
 VII. The Coup de Orace 299 
 
 VIII. Observations on the Battle of Chancellorsville 303 
 
CONTENTS. y 
 
 IX. 
 
 Page 
 
 THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN -.- 308 
 
 I. Theory of the Confederate Invasion 308 
 
 II. Manoeuvres to Disengage Hooker 312 
 
 III. Hooker's Retrograde Movement 316 
 
 IV. Across the Border 320 
 
 V. Concentration on Gettysburg 325 
 
 VI. Gettysburg— First Day 828 
 
 VII. Gettysburg— Second Day 843 
 
 Vin. Gettysburg— Third Day 356 
 
 IX. The Confederate Retreat 366 
 
 X. 
 
 CAMPAIGN OF MANCEUVRES 373 
 
 I. The March to the Rapidan 373 
 
 II. The Flank March on Centreville 376 
 
 m. Mine Run 390 
 
 IV. The Army in Winter-quarters 898 
 
 XI. 
 
 GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN 402 
 
 I. Combinations of the Spring Campaign 402 
 
 II. The Battle of the Wilderness 413 
 
 HI. The Lines of Spottsylvania 440 
 
 IV. Co-operative Movements on the James and in the Shenandoah Val- 
 ley 460 
 
 V. From Spottsylvania to the Chickahominy 470 
 
 VI. The Battle of Cold Harbor 481 
 
 Vn. Observations on the Overland Campaign 489 
 
 XII. 
 
 THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 497 
 
 I. The Change of Base 497 
 
 II. The Army before Petersburg 507 
 
 III. The Lines of Petersburg 515 
 
10 CONTENTS. 
 
 IV. The Mine Fiasco 518 
 
 V. Lee's Diversion 535 
 
 VI. Summer and Autumn Operations against Petersburg and Richmond. 529 
 
 VII. Observations on the Siege of Petersburg 5.'i0 
 
 Vin. Sheridan's Operations in the VaUey 554 
 
 XIII. 
 
 THE FINAL OAMPAIGN" 565 
 
 I. The Circle of the Hunt 565 
 
 II. Lee's Initiative 573 
 
 III. The Annies Unleashed 578 
 
 IV. Five Forks and Petersburg 596 
 
 V. The Retreat and Pursuit 604 
 
 VI Closing Scenes , 614 
 
 Appendix, G25 
 
 Ineex. • 645 
 
MAPS AND SKETCHES. 
 
 Page 
 
 ' Map of BuU Run (opposite) 46 
 
 • Map of the Peninsula " 100 
 
 Sketch of the Siege of Yorktown 101 
 
 Sketch of the Siege of Williamsburg 113 
 
 Sketch of Fair Oaks 132 
 
 Sketch of Gaines' Mill 149 
 
 Sketch of Malvern Hill 160 
 
 V Map of Pope's Campaign (opposite) 176 
 
 Sketch of Manoeuvres on Antietam 199 
 
 i Map of Antietam (opposite) 208 
 
 ' Map of Fredericksburg " 2S8 
 
 ; Map of ChanceUorsville " 276 
 
 Sketch of MancBuvres on Gettysburg 325 
 
 • Map of Gettysburg, first and third days (opposite) 328 
 
 ' Map of Gettysburg, second day " 342 
 
 Map of the Wilderness - • • " 414 
 
 / Map of Spottsylvania " 442 
 
 / Map of North Anna . " 472 
 
 -/ Map of Cold Harbor " 484 
 
 1/ Map of Country around Petersburg and Richmond " 508 
 
 I Map of Final Operations " 578 
 
 , Map of Lee's Retreat and Grant's Pursuit " 608 
 
 POETBAITS. 
 
 LlEUTENAKT-GENEBAIi U. S. GrAJST. 
 
 Major-General G. B. McClellan. Major-General A, E. Burnside. 
 
 MaJOE-GENEKAI, J. HOOKEB. MAJOR-QENERAIi G. Q. MEADE. 
 
CAMPAIGNS 
 
 ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC IN HISTORY. 
 
 So soon as the passionate rushing to arms that succeeded 
 the bombardment and fall of Fort Sumter had indicated that 
 a great war was upon the sundered sections of the American 
 Union, it became manifest that Virginia was marked out as 
 the principal theatre of the impending conflict. The tidings 
 of what had happened in the harbor of Charleston found that 
 State assembled at Richmond in high debate on the question 
 of Secession ; and then whatever there was in its councils of 
 what men called " Unionism" or conservatism was hushed, 
 and in wild tumult Virginia was voted out of the Union and 
 into the Confederacy. 
 
 This, Vkginia voted on the 16th of April, 1861 ; but from 
 her eyes was hid what else she voted — to wit, a war destined 
 to redden all her streams, to desolate her fertile fields, to cut 
 off the flower of her young men, and to leave her at its 
 close prostate and impoverished. 
 
 When Virginia linked her destiny with the Confederacy, 
 those Avho controlled the Secession revolution signified their 
 appreciation of the accession of that ancient and powerful 
 (Commonwealth by transferring to her chief city the capital of 
 
14 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 the Confederate government ; and whereas that government 
 had borne the name " provisional" at Montgomery, at Rich- 
 mond it assumed to itself the style and title of " permanent." 
 Thus marked out as a seat of war by virtue of being the 
 administrative centre of the insurgent power, Virginia was 
 furthermore marked out as the main seat of war by her 
 geographical relations as a frontier State. For upon her 
 secession the Potomac, her northern boundary, became, for all 
 the region between the Atlantic and the Alleghanies, the 
 dividing Hne betwixt those " points of mighty opposites," the 
 North and the South, — names which, hitherto of no more than 
 political import, now assumed the new and dread significance 
 of belligerent Powers. 
 
 Thus, by her will and by fate, Virginia became the Flanders of 
 the war. And abeady, from the moment the events in Charles- 
 ton harbor made war flagrant, armed men, in troops and bat- 
 talions, hurried forward, from the North and fi'om the South, 
 to her borders. An equal fire animated both sections. Pres- 
 ident Lincoln called for seventy-five thousand men ; Mr. Davis, 
 for a hundred thousand, — armies of a proportion never before 
 seen on the Western continent. Yet such was the spontaneous 
 alacrity with which on each side the summons was obeyed, 
 that within the space of a few weeks, these limits were greatly 
 overpassed, and an additional call for a half million men on 
 the part of the North, and a levy en masse on the part of the 
 South, met a like response. Then by that new agent of trans- 
 portation which has revolutionized military operations no less 
 than the movements of commerce, the volunteers M'ere quickly 
 conveyed to Virginia from points so distant and divergent 
 as to strike the imagination with wonder. It is estimated 
 that for many weeks after the first call for troops, armed 
 men arrived in Kichmond, from all parts of the South 
 at the rate of from fifteen hundred to two thousand daily; 
 and the multitude poured forth from the populous North was 
 not less, but greater. From the loyal States, the pomt of 
 concentration was Washington, where for a time the gather- 
 ing force held a simply defensive attitude : then bursting the 
 
THE AKMY OF THE POTOMAC IN HISTORY. 15 
 
 harrier of the Potomac, it launclied itseK upon that soil wliich 
 the men of Virginia fondly named " sacred," and the history 
 of the Army of the Potomac began. 
 
 I design in this volume to record, as far as may now be. 
 done, what that Army did and suffered in ten campaigns and 
 two-score battles, in Virgmia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. 
 This history, if adequately made, must be the history also of 
 much the larger part of that gigantic war that, originating in 
 the secession of eleven States fi-om the Federal Union, ended, 
 after four years, in the estabhshment of that Union on a last- 
 ing basis. Por though this conflict assumed contmental pro- 
 portions and raged around a circumference of many thousand 
 miles, it was observed that its head and front ever remained 
 in that stretch of territory between the Potomac and the 
 James, and between the Blue Ridge and Chesapeake Bay. 
 Here, from the start, each belligerent, as by common consent, 
 concentrated its richest resources ; here, throughout the 
 struggle, each continued to sustain its greatest armies, under 
 its ablest commanders : and never for a day did it lose its 
 mihtary primacy in the eyes of either party to the conflict. 
 It is estimated that out of the haK million men who met death, 
 and the two miUion who suffered wound in the war — the losses 
 of both sides, and the casualties of all the battles and sieges 
 over the whole continental field of action, being included — 
 above one-half this appalling aggregate belongs to the Army 
 of the Potomac and its adversary. These losses are the sum- 
 ming up of a series of campaigns and battles as grand in their 
 proportions as any on record, waged with a remorseless 
 energy, wrought out with all the resources that modern art 
 has devised to make war deadly, and fought under peculiar 
 conditions, upon a theatre peculiar in its character. That 
 theatre is Virginia — a colossal canvas whereon moving masses 
 and the forms of wrestling armies appear. 
 
 The history of the War for the Union would set forth that 
 majestic exhibition of power by which a free people, without 
 military traditions, created great armies, waged a national 
 
16 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF TPIE POTOMAC. 
 
 war, and subdued an internal revolt of a magnitude without 
 parallel. The scope of this volume is more restricted, and 
 embraces the story of one alone of these armies, though the 
 main one. 
 
 I shall have to trace how this force arose, and its first essays 
 and failures ; how it grew into the shape and substance of an 
 army ; and how it then entered upon campaig-ns bloody, in- 
 decisive, and protracted. 
 
 I shall have to show how this army, losing again and again 
 the component parts of its structure, — thinned by death, and 
 wounds, and wasting disease, and filled up again and again by 
 the unquenched patriotism of the people, — ^never lost its indi- 
 vidual being, but remained the Army of the Potomac still ; 
 and I shall have to follow those changing phases that 
 the life of an army, not less than the life of an individual, 
 undergoes. 
 
 I shall have to celebrate the unswerving loyalty of this 
 army, that, ofttimes when the bond of military cohesion failed, 
 held it, " nnshaked of motion," to a duty self-imposed. 
 
 I shall have to follow it through a checkered experience, in 
 a tale commingled of great misfortunes, great follies, and 
 great glories ; but from first to last it will appear, that amid 
 many buffets of fortune, through " winter and rough weather," 
 the Army of the Potomac never gave up, but made a good 
 fight, and finally reached the goal. 
 
 Nor can there fail to arise the image of that other Army 
 that was the adversary of the Army of the Potomac- — and 
 which who can ever forget that once looked upon it ? — that 
 array of " tattered uniforms and bright muskets" — that body 
 of incomparable infantry, the Army of Northern Virginia — 
 which for four years carried the Eevolt on its bayonets, 
 opposing a constant front to the mighty concentration of 
 power brought against it ; which, receiving terrible blows, did 
 not fail to give the like ; and which, vital in all its parts, died 
 only with its annihilation. 
 
 Of this drama there wHl be no other hero than the Army of 
 the Potomac itself ; for it would seem that in this war of the 
 
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC IN HISTORY, 17 
 
 people it was decreed there should arise no imperial pres- 
 ence to become the central figure and cynosure of men's eyes. 
 Napoleon, in an outburst of haughty eloquence, exclaims 
 that in the great armies of history the Commander was every 
 thing. " It was not," says he, " the Roman army that con- 
 quered Gaul, but Cgesar ; it was not the Carthaginian army 
 that made Rome tremble at her gates, but Hannibal ; it was 
 not the Macedonian army that marched to the Indus, but 
 Alexander ; it was not the Prussian army that defended Prus- 
 sia for seven years against the three most powerful S^ ates oi 
 Europe, but Frederick." This proud apotheosis has no appli- 
 cation for the Army of the Potomac. And one must think 
 — seeing it never had a great, and generally had mediocre 
 commanders — it was that it might be said, that whatever it 
 won it owed not to genius, but bought with its blood. 
 
 I must now add, that it would be to fail to draw some of the 
 most important lessons furnished by the history of the army 
 whose deeds form the subject-matter of this volume, if I 
 should fail to set forth the relations of that army with the 
 central authority at Washington. The conduct of a war under 
 a popular government introduces new conditions into the 
 estabUshed military system and traditions, and greatly com- 
 plicates the duties of the commander. Now the history of the 
 Secession war affords a new and enlarged exhibition of the be- 
 havior of a representative executive suddenly charged with 
 the direction of great military affairs. While a sense of justice 
 will suggest the exercise of much lenience in the judgment of 
 an Administration called to a difficult task, it is none the less 
 incumbent on the historian to point out errors and follies that 
 cost much. 
 
 In the campaigns of the Army of the Potomac there is pre- 
 sented a remarkable unity, both as regards the theatre of 
 operations and the objective of operations. The theatre was 
 Virginia ; the objective, Richmond. The first military aspira- 
 tion of the North expressed itself in the vehement cry, " On 
 to Richmond :" and when, after many battles and campaigns, 
 
 2 
 
18 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 — more than tlie wisest foresaw, — llicliinond fell, the structure 
 of the Confederacy' fell with it. 
 
 But though the sphere of action is in the main bounded by 
 the geographical limits of the State of Virginia, it resulted 
 from the fact of the war assuming twice on the part of the 
 insurgent force an aggressive character, that its area must be 
 extended so as to include a part of the territory of the contig 
 uous S^.ates of Maryland and Pennsylvania. This circum 
 stance does not destroy, however, the unity of the zone within 
 which the armies of the Potomac and of Northern Yirginia 
 operated. The battles of Antietam and Gettysburg — the two 
 actions out of the limits of Yirginia — were fought in the nar- 
 row salient of a great triangle, having the southern boundary 
 line of Virginia as its base, the Shenandoah and Cumberland 
 valleys as its western side, and the Susquehanna River and 
 Chesapeake Bay as its eastern side. From its apex, this tri- 
 angle measures seven hundred and fifty miles on its mountain- 
 side, and about three hundred miles on its eastern side, with 
 five hundred miles on its base line. 
 
 Now if it be considered that within this comparatively 
 restricted space, tw^o great armies manoeuvred and fought 
 during the protracted period of four years, and that for all 
 that time, though surging backwards and forwards, each main- 
 tained its essential vantage-gi'ound, there will arise the in- 
 ference, either that the operations were conducted with little 
 vigor, or else that there must have been some peculiar condi- 
 tions that shut out victory from sooner declaring itseK on the 
 one side or the other. 
 
 But the former supposition is excluded by the palpable evi- 
 dence, notorious to all the world, of the long record of bloody 
 battles, and the terrible aggregate of losses sustained, in this 
 conflict of Americans with Americans. 
 
 It results therefore that we must seek in the alternative the 
 explanation of a historic fact seemingly so unaccountable. I 
 shall briefly set forth some of the leading elements that enter 
 into this problem as it stands related to the theatre of opera- 
 tions in Virginia arid the conditions of warfare upon that 
 
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC IN HISTORY. 19 
 
 theatre. A proper appreciation of these conditions will lielp 
 to explain the many bloody but indecisive battles that char- 
 acterized the Virginia campaigns, and must modify the con- 
 clusions of those who, fi'om a distance, vainly seek to apply 
 European principles and precedents to warfare in a region 
 affording hardly one element of legitimate comparison. 
 
 From the Potomac, as base, to Richmond, on the left bank 
 of the James, as objective, the distance is one hundred and ten 
 miles ; and it is to be noted, first of all, that in this zone an 
 army upon the defensive has its operations facilitated, while 
 an army assuming the oJBfensive has its operations rendered 
 difficult, from the fact that the watershed being towards the 
 coast, all the rivers cross any line of manoeuvre against Rich- 
 mond. These rivers are : the Occoquan, formed by the union 
 of Bull Run and Cedar Run ; the Rappahannock, swelled by 
 the converging tides of the Rapidan and Hedgman rivers ; 
 the Mattapony, which results from the confluence of four 
 streams, named the Mat, the Ta, the Po, and the Ny ; the 
 Pamunkey, formed by the union of the North and South 
 Anna ; and the Chickahominy, which has its embouchure in 
 the James. The Confederates found eligible hnes of defence 
 along these rivers, which the}^ used to great advantage, from 
 the time when, at the opening of the war, Beauregard formed 
 his array along Bull Run, to when, almost four years there- 
 after, Lee disputed with Grant the passage of the Chick- 
 ahominy, and compelled the Union commander to seek a new 
 base south of the James. 
 
 The mountain system of Virginia is thrown off on the 
 western flank of the theatl'e of operations, where the Blue 
 Ridge forms, with that parallel ridge called successively the 
 Clinch, Middle, and Shenandoah mountains, the picturesque 
 and fertile Valley of the Shenandoah. This valley, from its 
 direction north and south, and its peculiar topogTaphical 
 relations, is an eminently aggressive line for a hostile force 
 moving northward to cross the Potomac into Maryland, either 
 with the view of penetrating Pennsylvania or of manoeuvi'ing 
 
20 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC- 
 
 towards Washington. It was by this Kne tliat Lee issued upon 
 the soil of the loyal States on the occasion of both the Con- 
 federate invasions — to wit, the Maryland invasion of 1862, and 
 the Pennsylvania invasion of 1863. This circumstance com- 
 pelled, throughout the war, the constant presence of a con- 
 siderable army to guard the dehoiuhc of this gi-eat valley and 
 the passes of the Blue Eidge ; and the Shenandoah region 
 was the scene of a series of operations having an intimate 
 relation with those of the main theatre. 
 
 Tliis, in general terms, may be defined as the territory be- 
 tween the Blue Ridge and Chesapeake Bay, and between the 
 Potomac and the James. 
 
 This region has, as its characteristic feature, a dense forest 
 of oak and pine, with occasional clearings — rarely extensive 
 enough, however, to prevent the riflemen concealed in their 
 margins from covering the whole opening with their fire. 
 The roads are few, bad, and form so many defiles ; and it was, 
 throughout the war, commonly necessary for the axeman to 
 precede the artillerist, to hew for him a path. It is rare, in 
 all this tract of country, to find a field in which cavahy can 
 have any legitimate play ; and it frequently happened that, 
 owing to the density of the forest, not even artillery could be 
 employed. 
 
 It is easy to see that under these circumstances military 
 operations must assume many pectdiarities ; and, it is to be 
 added, these were much in favor of the defensive. The abun- 
 dance of wood afforded such facility for the construction of 
 breastworks and abatis, that, dui-ing all the late years of the 
 Virginia campaigns, actions were invariably waged behind 
 and about hastily improvised ramparts of earth and logs, with 
 which every hundred yards gained was instantly intrenched. 
 Under cover of these rude yet strong " coigns of vantage," — • 
 with the infantry protected by a parapet, and equipped with the 
 improved arms — with rifled artillery sweeping a front of two or 
 three thousand yards, and this front obstructed by "slashings," 
 — the army on the defensive might await, with comparative 
 security, the approach of lines of battle that were almost fore- 
 
THE AEMT OF THE POTOMAC IN HISTORY. 21 
 
 doomed to repulse. If, peradventure, di-iven from one line, 
 the enemy could, with the greatest ease, take up another, and 
 another. A campaign thus became a kind of rough siege ; 
 and in this state of facts, even victory was generally fruitless, 
 because pursuit was impossible. The task of the commander 
 increased in difficulty in the same proportion. Shut out fi-om 
 sight, and often even from hearing, the general on the field of 
 battle was constrained to work in a manner blindfold, and 
 compelled to rely on the firmness of his troops till couriers 
 should arrive to bring tidings of the fight. 
 
 But the obstructions that beset American warfare are not 
 confined to these distinguishing features of the terrain; for 
 the difficulty of any extended operation became gi-eatly en- 
 hanced by the question of subsistence, on which the mobility 
 of an army so largely depends. There are two maxims that 
 forcibly set forth the bearing of the commissariat on wars of 
 invasion : the first is the saying of Frederick the Great, that 
 " an army, like a serj)ent, moves on its belly ;" the second is 
 the declaration of Caesar, that " war must support war." The 
 former of these maxims asserts the absolute dependence of 
 military operations on the means of feeding the operating 
 army ; the latter, that this dependence should be simplified 
 by drawing supphes fi'om the country in which the troops act. 
 But while it is no less true in America than elsewhere that 
 " an army, like a serpent, moves on its belly," the actual con- 
 dition did not permit of carrying out the admonition to " make 
 war support war." In the densely populated countries of 
 Europe, it is easy, from the resources of the country, to sub- 
 sist an army of a hundred thousand men ; and Napoleon, 
 while operating in the basins of the Bhine and Danube, and 
 in the rich granaries of Belgium, Italy, and Swabia, constantly 
 supported by requisitions much greater numbers. But in 
 proportion as the population becomes thin, the productive 
 forces decrease, and local sources of supply for an army de- 
 chne or disajjpear altogether. What is possible in Germany, 
 therefore, is impracticable in Poland, Eussia, or America. In 
 Virginia, no dependence whatever could be placed on procur- 
 
 \ 
 
22 CAJMPAIGNS OF THE AESIY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 ing local subsistence. The area of manoeuvre was, therefore, 
 circumscribed by the amount of rations that could be carried 
 on the persons of the soldiers and in wagons, which in Vir- 
 ginia was not more than sufficient for from ten to sixteen 
 days ; while its transport necessitated immense trains of 
 two, three, and four thousand wagons — an overgrown mass 
 of impedimenta that made rapidity of movement almost impos- 
 sible, and constantly bound in the commander to " saucy doubts 
 and fears." Indeed, what alone made operations over the im- 
 mense tracts of country overrun by the Union armies prac- 
 ticable was, first, that new agency in warfare, the raiboad ; 
 and, secondly, the command of the seaboard by the North. 
 
 Now taking into account this cardinal maxim of American 
 warfare, that an army operating over a lar^^e tract of country 
 must pivot either on a raih'oad or a river, it appears that fi'om 
 Washington as a base, a force advancing against Richmond 
 by the overland route, and ha\-ing at the same time to cover 
 Washington, is restricted to two hues of manoeuvre : 1. The 
 hue of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad ; 2. The Hue of 
 the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. Each of these 
 hues was repeatedly essayed during the Virginia campaigns — 
 the former by Pope and Meade ; the latter by Burnside and 
 Hooker. Touching the merits of these lines, experience con- 
 firmed what theory would have indicated : that the line of 
 the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, though an eminently de- 
 fensive line as regards Washington, is hardly aggressive ; and 
 beyond the Rapidan involves so many complex considerations 
 that no commander was ever able, on this line, to push an 
 advance south of that river. The Fredericksburg route is an 
 aggressive line as regards Richmond, though it is surrounded 
 with many difficulties. It is not, however, a good defensive 
 line as regards Washington ; and experience has shown that 
 an army operating by that Hue, and having also to cover 
 Washington, may readily be dislodged from it and forced to 
 attempt to regain the Orange and Alexandria line by a simple 
 menace against the latter. And this fact suggests the reflec- 
 tion that railroads in war, though affording great facilities for 
 
THE AKJMY OF THE POTOMAC IN HISTORY. 23 
 
 transport, and permitting tlie execution of operations that, 
 without this resource, would be impracticable, have their own 
 peculiar drawbacks, and require the detachment of a consider- 
 able part of the active force for their protection against hos- 
 tile raids. 
 
 But it may be said that the possession by the North of the 
 whole Virginia seaboard gave many other secondary bases 
 and lines of operation, free from the objections above men- 
 tioned. This is undoubtedly true ; yet the statement must be 
 taken with the limitations that belong to it. The most im- 
 portant of these lines are the Peninsula between the York 
 and James rivers, and the route by the south side of the 
 James. The former was adopted by General McClellan in 
 the spring of 1862, and the latter was eventually taken up by 
 General Grant in the summer of 1864, after having, in a re- 
 markable campaign, crossed every possible line of operation 
 against Kichmond. But it is manifest that Kichmond could be 
 operated against fi'om the coast only by an army that was in 
 condition to leave Washington out of the question. The 
 secession of Yirginia made the Potomac the dividing hne 
 between two warring powers; and the unfortunate location 
 of the national capital on the banks of that river, and on an 
 exposed frontier, profoundly affected the character of military 
 operations in Yirgmia, and, during the first three years of 
 the war, caused a subordination of aU strategic combinations 
 to the protection of Washington. Saving the time when 
 McClellan moved to the Peninsula, and Grant swung across 
 the James Eiver, the Ai-my of the Potomac was never allowed 
 to " uncover" Washington. Now, in the former case, the first 
 menace by Lee foreshadowing a northward movement caused 
 the withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula ; and, in the 
 latter instance, a small raiding column, detached by way of 
 the Shenandoah Valley into Maryland, compelled General 
 Grant to part with two of his corps to protect the national 
 capital, and, for the time, almost suspended active operations 
 before Petersburg. 
 
 It remains now to add that the gigantic war whose prin- 
 
24 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARIMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 cipal field was Virginia was one that, from its very nature, 
 threw the burden of the offensive on the side of the North. 
 For, as the National Government undertook to subdue the 
 insurrection of the Southern States, it rested with it to strike, 
 and with the South to parry. But it soon became apparent 
 that the task was very different from that involved in the 
 quelling of an ordinary rebellion, and that the conflict had, 
 from the unanimity of hostile sentiment at the South, the vast 
 extent of territory in insurrection, and the mighty force in 
 arms, all the character of a war waged between two powerful 
 nations. Now, of all the forms that war may assume, that is 
 the most formidable which is denominated a "National War," 
 the nature of which is thus powerfully depicted by the great- 
 est of military theorists : " The difficulties in the path of an 
 army in National wars are very great, and render the mission 
 of the general conducting them very arduous. The invader 
 has only an army ; his adversaries have an army and a 
 people wholly, or almost wholly, in arms — a people making 
 means of resistance out of every thing, each individual of 
 whom conspires against the common enemy ; so that even 
 the non-combatants have an interest in his ruin, and accel- 
 erate it by every means in their power. He holds scarcely 
 any groiind but that upon which he encamps ; and, outside 
 the limits of his camp, every thing is hostile, and multiplies a 
 thousandfold the difficulties he meets at every step. These 
 obstacles become almost insurmountable, when the country is 
 difficult. Each armed inhabitant knows the smallest paths 
 and their connections ; he finds everywhere a relative or 
 friend who aids him. The commander also knows the coun- 
 try, and, learning immediately the slightest movement on the 
 part of the invader, can adopt the best measures to defeat 
 his projects ; while the latter, without information of their 
 movements, and not in a condition to send out detachments to 
 gain it, having no resource but in his bayonets, and certain of 
 safety only in the concentration of his columns, is Hke a blind 
 man^ — his combinations are failures; and when, after the 
 )uost carefully concerted movements and the most rapid and 
 
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC IN HISTORY". 25 
 
 fatiguing marches, he thinks he is about to accomplish his 
 aim and deal a terrible blow, he finds no sign of the enemy 
 but his camp-fires ; so that, while, like Don Quixote, he is 
 attacking windmills, his adversary is on his line of communi- 
 cations, destroys the detachments left to guard it, surprises 
 his convoys and depots, and carries on a war so disastrous 
 for the invader that he must incvitahhj yield after a tiyne." 
 
 It needs not to tell any one who has followed the history of 
 the Virginia campaigns, that ever}^ " sling and arrow " thiis 
 graphically shown to assail an army penetrating a hostile 
 country in which the population as well as the army enters 
 into the belligerency, did harass the Ai'niy of the Potomac. 
 Yet it is not possible that any, save such as have had actual 
 experience of command, can measure aright the obstructions 
 of every nature that hedged military operations in a country 
 unknown and unmapped, filled with a population ready to 
 convey to the enemy information of every movement, and 
 eager to cut a telegraph-wire or throw a railroad-train from 
 its track. The Confederates, waging war on that theory that 
 is named the " defensive with offensive returns," attempted, in 
 two memorable campaigns, an operation of invasion ; but the 
 decisive failure that attended both, may stand as an example 
 of the difficulties that constantly beset the Union army. 
 
 If, notwithstanding these difiiculties, the Army of the Po- 
 tomac at length succeeded in destroying its opponent, — thus 
 disproving the dictum of General Jomini, who, in the j^assage 
 I have just quoted, asserts that in such a task the invader 
 "must inevitably yield after a time," — it would, appear to be 
 a reasonable inference that the means by which this end was 
 brought about must be notable, and that the army that 
 accomplished this result may be worthy of a larger fame than 
 the world has yet accorded it. 
 
26 CAMPAIGNS OF TlIE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 n. 
 
 THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 
 
 I. 
 
 WAR IN EMBRYO. 
 
 By the express terms of tlie ordinance of secession, passed 
 by the Virginia Convention on the I7th of April, 1861, the 
 decree that was to Hnk the fortunes of that State with the Con- 
 federacy became valid only on being ratified by the popular 
 vote, appointed to be given on the fourth Thursday of May. 
 The Administration at Washington respectmg this provision, 
 awaited the action of the people before advancing its armed 
 force to " repossess the places and property" of the Federal 
 Government. 
 
 But it was soon manifest that this stipulation was destmed 
 to be a nulHty in face of the swift-advancing reahties of war. 
 Virginia immediately threw herself into an attitude of defence. 
 Governor Letcher issued a proclamation calling out the 
 militia of the State, and Colonel Eobert E. Lee was appointed 
 major-general and commander of the " Vii'ginia forces." 
 More than this : the Convention having, on the 21th of 
 April, decreed that pending the popular vote on the question 
 of secession, " military operations, offensive and defensive, in 
 Virginia, should be imder the chief control and direction of 
 the President of the Confederate States," Confederate troops, 
 from South Carohna and the States of the Gulf, were rapidly 
 thrown forward into Virginia. Meantime, the United States 
 arsenal at Harper's Ferry had been evacuated and partially 
 destroyed by the commander of the post ; and the United 
 States navy-yard at Norfollc had been abandoned by the 
 
THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 27 
 
 Federal officer in command, and several men-of-war, with a 
 vast accumulation of war material, were there destroyed. 
 8ave from the fortress that guards the entrance of James 
 Piiver, the Federal flag floated nowhere within the boundaries 
 of the " Old Dominion." 
 
 The Confederates, with much energy, pushed forward prep- 
 arations for the defence of Ykginia ; and the middle of the 
 month of May reveals the growing outlines of a definite mili- 
 tary policy. This policy, however, so far as it touched the 
 distribution of force, seems to have been shaped rather by the 
 Austrian principle of covering every thing, than by dnj well- 
 considered combination of positions. The Peninsula between 
 the James and the York rivers was held by a Confederate 
 force of about two thousand men, under Colonel J. B. Ma- 
 gruder, who took position near Hampton, where he confronted 
 the Federal force at Fortress Monroe, which had lately been 
 placed under command of Major-General B. F. Butler. The 
 defence of the highland region of Western Virginia had 
 been assumed by General Lee, commander-in-chief of the 
 State forces, who had dispatched to that section Colonel Por- 
 terfield, with instructions to raise a local volunteer force — not 
 a promising undertaking among the hardy. Union-loving 
 moimtaineers — and hold the hne of the Baltimore and Ohio 
 Kaih'oad, the direct line of communication with the States 
 west of the Alleghanies. 
 
 Between these outlying members was placed the main body 
 of the Confederate force, in two camps — the one located at 
 Manassas Junction, twenty-seven miles southwest from Alex- 
 andria, (and the point of intersection of the great Southern 
 raiboad route between Washington and Pachmond and the 
 Manassas Gap Eailroad, leading to the Valley of the Shenan- 
 doah) ; the other posted at the outlet of this valley, at 
 Harper's Ferry. The force assembled and assembling at the 
 former of these camps was at first under the orders of Gen- 
 ( ral Bonham, of South Carohna ; but before the close of May, 
 the obvious importance of the position, as confronting any 
 direct advance from Washington, caused the Confederate 
 
28 CAJVIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 authorities to assign to its command the man enjoying the 
 first military rejjutation in the South. This man was General 
 Beauregard, and the region of country under his control was 
 named the " Department of the Potomac." 
 
 The body of troops collected at Harper's Ferry, and which, 
 at the close of the month of May, consisted of nine regiments 
 and tAvo battahons of infantry, four companies of artillery, 
 and about three hundred troopers,* had been formed under 
 the hand of a man, then of no name, but destined to become 
 one of the foremost figures of the war — Colonel Thomas 
 Jonathan Jackson, better known in the world's bead-roll of 
 fame as " Stonewall Jackson." A lieutenant of artillery in 
 the United States service during the Mexican war, he had at 
 its close retired to a professorship in the Yirginia Military 
 Institute, beyond whose walls he was quite unknown, and 
 within which he was marked only for his personal eccentrici- 
 ties, stern puritanism, and inflexible discipline. Upon the 
 secession of Virginia, Professor Jackson resigned his chair, 
 and being appointed by Governor Letcher to a colonelcy in 
 the Virginia line, he was immediately sent forward to com- 
 mand the Confederate troops at Harper's Perry. About the 
 time, however, that Bonham was replaced by Beauregard, 
 the command of the force at Harper's Perry, which bore the 
 style of the "Army of the Shenandoah," was committed to 
 the hands of General J. E. Johnston ; and Colonel Jackson, 
 assigned a subordinate command under that able soldier, de- 
 voted himself to moulding into form and stamping with the 
 qualities of his own genius that famous " Stonewall brigade," 
 whose battle-flag led the van in that series of audacious 
 enterprises that afterwards rendered the Valley of the Shen- 
 andoah historic ground. General Johnston's other sub- 
 ordinates were men of scarcely inferior ability to Jackson. 
 Colonel A. P. Hill, subsequently one of Lee's ablest lieu- 
 tenants, was at the head of another of his brigades ; Pendle- 
 ton was chief of artillery ; and his few squadrons of Virginia 
 
 * Report of General J. E. Jolinston. 
 
THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 29 
 
 horsemen were under command of Colonel J. E. B. Stuart, 
 whom even then Johnston styled " the indefatigable," and 
 who was also destined to a greater fame. 
 
 Thus far, the Hne of the Potomac had not been crossed. 
 The soil of Virginia, which her inhabitants loved proudly to 
 style "sacred," had felt the tread of no invading force. 
 Popular notions hardly went beyond simply defending the 
 capital ; and not only many men who were supposed to be 
 skilled in the calendar of state, but even the shepherds of 
 the people, still flattered themselves with the hope that there 
 would be no war — that all that was needed to quell the 
 " rebolHon" was an imposing display of force.* Meanwhile, 
 volunteers, burdening all the railways that, from the North 
 and East and "West, converge on Washington, continued to 
 accumulate on the Potomac. The insurrection that for a 
 time had threatened to involve Maryland, and had broken 
 out in open attack upon the first Federal troops that passed 
 through Baltimore, had been subdued by the firm pohcy of 
 the Administration, and direct raihoad communication be- 
 tween the national capital and the North, for a time inter- 
 rupted, had now been restored. By the middle of May, 
 between forty and fifty regiments were encamped about 
 Washington ; and, at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, a large 
 force was accumulating under General Patterson, which by its 
 position menaced Harper's Ferry. The presidential call had 
 been for seventy -five thousand volunteers for a term of three 
 months ; but through the persuasion of General Scott, who 
 well knew that it was no three months' affair the Govern- 
 ment had on its hands, a supplementary call for forty thou- 
 sand men, to serve for three years or the war was made. 
 An increase of the force of the Regular army was also ordered. 
 These troops were raised with the greatest alacrity, and each 
 
 * " It was a favorite notion with a large class of Northern politicians (and 
 the people too) that nothing but an imposing display of force was necessary to 
 cj'ush the rebellion." General Barnard : The C. S A and the Battle of Bull 
 Ruii,p. 4i 
 
30 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 State soon so greatly outran its assigned quota, tliat energetic 
 measures had to be taken to stop recruiting, until Congress, 
 having assembled in extra session on the 4th of July, au- 
 thorized a levy of Five Hundred Thousand Men. Meantime, 
 the frontier had not been passed ; and the pickets lounging 
 at the bridges that span the Potomac from Washington to 
 the Virginia shore, and the gray -uniformed videttes on the 
 southern bank, observed each other without any hostile mean- 
 ing in their opposing eyes. 
 
 But when the day came that the popular vote on the ques- 
 tion of secession was taken, the war, which had thus far 
 " drifted," took definite shape. Though there were yet no tid- 
 ings what the vote had been, there was, nevertheless, no room 
 for illusion as to its scope and purport ; and that night, the 
 night of the 23d of May, the van of the " grand army" passed 
 the Potomac, After midnight, fifteen thousand troops were 
 transferred by the Long Bridge, by the Aqueduct, and by steam- 
 ers to Alexandria, situate on the right bank of the Potomac, 
 and four or five miles below Washington. The city of Alex- 
 andria, and the Heights of Arlington, opposite Washington, 
 with the intermediate connecting points, were seized without 
 opposition. A few troopers, that held the town as an outpost 
 of the force at Manassas, were captured ; the remainder gal- 
 loped off to bear the weighty tidings. The bloodless initia- 
 tion of operations was beclouded by bvit one event, the mur- 
 der of the young Colonel Ellsworth, of the Fire Zouaves, who 
 was shot by a citizen witliin a hotel of the town of Alexandria, 
 while bearing away a Confederate flag, which he had hauled 
 down from the cupola of the building. Powerful earthworks, 
 as tetes-de-pont to the Long Bridge and Aqueduct, were imme- 
 diately constnicted by the engineers ; and forts were laid out 
 to cover the approaches to Alexandria and Arlington. These 
 formed the initiation of the system of "Defences of Washing- 
 ton."* The active force south of the Potomac was placed 
 under the command of Brigadier-General L-vin McDowell, 
 
 * Barnard : Report of Engineer Operations, p. 9. 
 
THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 31 
 
 aud held a position threatening advance against the Confed- 
 erates at Manassas, by the line of the Orange and Alexandria 
 Railroad. Leaving it for the present in that attitude, I must 
 now detail a series of initial operations in other parts of the 
 theatre of war in Virginia. 
 
 The first of these operations is the affair, or, as it was at 
 the time named, the hattle, of Big Bethel, — an affair which, in- 
 significant in itself, had a considerable moral effect in elating 
 the Southern troops, and a correspondingly depressing effect 
 upon the people of the North. This expedition, which is as 
 remarkable for the crudity of its conception as for the blun- 
 ders that marked its execution, was devised by General But- 
 ler for the purpose of capturing the Confederate posts at 
 Little and Big Bethel, a few miles up the Peninsula from 
 Fortress Monroe. The execution of the project was intrusted 
 to one General Pierce, who, as it appears, had never been 
 mustered into the United States service, and had no right to 
 any command. The advance was made in two columns — the 
 regiment of Duryea's Zouaves, followed by the Third New 
 York Volunteers, under Colonel Townsend, on the right, by 
 way of Hampton ; and Bendix's New York regiment and a 
 Vermont battalion on the left, by way of Newport News. 
 The movement was begun during the night of the 9th of June, 
 and it was designed to surprise the enemy before daylight 
 next morning. The marches of the two columns were based 
 on the showing of an old and incorrect map ; and as from this 
 the troops that had to move from Newport News were three 
 miles nearer the point aimed at than the other column, it was 
 arranged that they should start an hour after the others. The 
 true state of the case, however, was, that they were four miles 
 further ; and just before daybreak the rear regiment of the 
 left column, under Colonel Bendix, and the rear regiment of 
 the right column, under Colonel Townsend (which had foh 
 lowed Duryea's regiment at an interval of two hours), met a 
 a junction of roads near Little Bethel ; and the former, mis- 
 taking the latter for an enemy, opened a fusillade, by which 
 Townsend's regiment suffered a loss of twenty-nine in killed 
 
32 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 and wounded before the contretemps was discovered.* The 
 snemy at Little Bethel, getting the alarm, took flight, and the 
 » expedition then advanced on Big Bethel. This position, as 
 it appears, was occupied as an outpost of Magruder's main 
 body at Yorktown, and was held by a force of eleven hundred 
 North Carolina and Virginia troops, under Colonel D. H. Hill, 
 then in command of the First North Carolina regiment. t The 
 position was rather advantageous for defence, being covered 
 by a swampy creek, and further strengthened by some guns 
 placed under cover. It was liable, however, to be easily 
 turned by the right. General Pierce displayed a great in- 
 competence in his dispositions ; but it happened that there 
 was one man there who saw the course of action suited 
 to the case. Lieutenant-Colonel Warren suggested that a 
 ' regiment should be sent round on each side to take the posi- 
 tion in flank, and when these became engaged, those in front, 
 lying in shelter in a wood, should attack. This operation, if 
 carried out, would probably have been successful. But the 
 regiment that was to make the movement on the enemy's 
 right, instead of being directed by a detour through the 
 woods, was advanced right across an open field, in front of 
 the position, whereby it became exposed to an artillery fire. 
 It happened, too, that the left company became separated 
 from the rest of the regiment by a thicket ; and Colonel 
 Townsend not being aware of this, and seeing the ghstening 
 of bayonets in the woods, concluded the enemy was outflank- 
 ing him, and so fell back to his first position. The regiment 
 that had gone round on the other flank found itself in a difii- 
 cult situation, where being exposed to pretty severe fire, it was 
 found hard to bring the men up ; and Major Winthrop, aid to 
 General Butler, a young man of superior culture and promise, 
 
 * Lieutenant-Colonel, afterwards Major-General, Warren, at that time 
 attached to Duryea's Zouaves, states in his evidence before the War Commirtee 
 that " the two regiments, when they arrived on the ground, finding things not 
 at all as they had been instructed, were justified in firing on each other." 
 Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. iii., p. 384. 
 
 t Hill ; Report of Big Bethel. 
 
THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 33 
 
 was killed wliile rallying the troops to the assault. Lieuten- 
 ant Greble, of the regular artillery, who had handled his guns 
 very skilfully and caused the enemy to withdraw a battery 
 posted to command the road leading to Bethel, was also 
 killed ; and the aggregate loss was found to be about a hun- 
 dred men. General Pierce then ordered a retreat, and the 
 regiments marched off as on parade. Colonel Warren, who 
 alone protested against the retreat, voluntarily remained on 
 the ground, and together with Dr. Winslow, of his regiment, 
 brought off the wounded. While he yet remained on the 
 ground, the Confederates abandoned the position ; and the 
 reason for this step assigned by Colonel Hill is, that he feared 
 re-enforcements would be sent up from Fortress Monroe.* 
 The affair of Big Bethel really proved nothing, except that an 
 attempt, involving failure in its very conception, had failed. 
 Yet it was magnified as a great victory by the South ; was 
 put forth as a test of what was called " relative manhood ;" 
 and produced throughout the North a deep feeling of mortifi- 
 cation and humiliation. t 
 
 This feeling was kept aUve by a trivial fiasco which occurred 
 shortly after in General McDowell's department. General 
 Schenck had been ordered to make a reconnoissance up the 
 Loudon and Alexandria Eailroad to Leesburg ; and setting 
 out with a few hundred troops, upon a train of cars, he pro- 
 ceeded upon that novel kind of reconnoissance. The excur- 
 sion was made uninterruptedly until the train neared Vienna, 
 thirteen miles from Alexandria, when, turning a curve, it was 
 suddenly opened upon by two guns planted near the track, the 
 fire killing and wounding some twenty men. The troops 
 immediately sprang from the cars and took to the woods ; and 
 the engineer having detached the locomotive, made all speed 
 to Alexandria, leaving the excursionists to get back as best 
 
 * Hill : Report of Big Bethel. 
 
 t Colonel Hill, in a bombastic report published at the time, spoke of repuls- 
 ing "desperate assaults," and pursuing "till the retreat became a rout,"' etc, 
 etc. ; while he himself was retiring without any reason whatever. This fus- 
 tian found ready credence at the South. 
 
 3 
 
34 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 might be, and the cars to be burnt by the enemy. The hos- 
 tile force consisted of a small scouting party under Colonel 
 Gregg, and did not pursue in the least. The adverse guns were, 
 like those of Big Bethel, immediately set down as a " masked 
 battery," — a phantom of the imagination that played a really 
 considerable part during the early stages of the war.* 
 
 But the discouragement caused by these lapses was destined 
 soon to disappear under the influence of a series of very dif- 
 ferent operations in "Western Yirginia, from whose mountains 
 was flashed the first gleam of positive victory upon the Union 
 arms. 
 
 II. 
 McCLELLAN IN WEST VIRGINIA. 
 
 It has been seen, in an earlier part of this narrative, that 
 the defence of Western Virginia, on the side of the Confed- 
 erates, had been undertaken by General Lee, who had dis- 
 patched Colonel Porterfield to that region, for the purpose of 
 raising there a local force. The object of this, it is probable, 
 was not so much to undertake offensive operations across the 
 Ohio Eiver, as to coerce the loyal inhabitants into the seces- 
 sion movement.t 
 
 * This " masked battery" theory was given by General Schenck in explana- 
 tion of the affair at Vienna, touching which he says, in his dispatch of the time 
 to General Scott : " We were fired upon by raking masked batteries of, I think, 
 three guns, with shell, round-shot, and grape," etc. It would be difficult to say 
 how much, and for how long a time, this absurd fiction of " masked batteries" 
 affected operations ; but it is certain that it had no inconsiderable influence. A 
 curious illustration of this is given by General McDowell, in his evidence touch- 
 ing the battle of Bull Run. " The march," says he, " was slow, — one reason 
 being, that since the affairs at Vienna and Big Bethel, a fear of ' masked bat- 
 teries' caused hesitation in regard to advance upon points concerning which 
 tJiere was a want of information." Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. ii., 
 p. 4. So true to human nature is the maxim, " Omneignotum pro magnifico !" 
 
 f The correctness of this view of the aim of the Confederates in West Vir 
 ginia is fully confirmed by captured dispatches from General Lee to Colonel 
 Porterfield. 
 
THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 35 
 
 Now about tlie middle of May, the States of Ohio, In- 
 diana, and Illinois had been formed into a department named 
 the Department of the Ohio, and its control had by General 
 Scott been intrusted to General George B. McClellan, for- 
 merly of the Corps of Engineers in the regular army, who hav- 
 ing a short time previously been made major-general of the 
 Ohio contingent under the three months' call, was now raised 
 to the same rank in the regular army. His command being 
 bounded on one side by the Ohio Eiver, McCleUan's attention 
 was naturally attracted to the events passing on the other 
 side of the frontier, within the Hmits of West Yirginia. Find- 
 ing the position of the Confederates both oppressive to the 
 loyal inhabitants and menacing in a miUtary point of view, 
 General McClellan, about the end of May, without instructions 
 from Washington, threw over a force to the Virginia side of 
 the Ohio ; and hearing of a secession camp at Phillippi, he 
 ordered it to be broken up. The movement to this end was 
 imder way, when Porterlield, becoming aware of it, abandoned 
 his position. McClellan having determined to occupy the 
 whole region, had his Ohio regiments, as they were in succes- 
 sion equipped, transferred to the Virginia side. But the Con- 
 federates were indisposed to give np this mountain fastness ; 
 and accordingly, to meet the Union occupation, strong re- 
 enforcements, to the amount of six thousand men, were directed 
 upon Western Virginia, and the command given to General 
 Garnett, an old officer of the regular army. Garnett took up 
 advantageous positions at Laurel Hill, a westward-facing 
 sentinel of the Alleghany range, where he held command of 
 the great road from Wheeling to Staunton, — the main high- 
 way of communications for the region west of the AUeghanies 
 with that to the east of that mountain-wall, — and began a 
 system of very active and very annoying partisan operations. 
 In the course of a month General McCleUan had on foot a 
 considerable army, and he then determined to take the field 
 against Garnett's force. The theatre of operations was that 
 portion of Western Virginia contained between the Ohio and 
 Cheat rivers in one direction, and the Baltimore and Ohio 
 
36 CAMP.VIGNS OF THE AR]MT OF THE POTOJMAC. 
 
 Raili'oad and Great Kanawha and Gauley rivers in the other. 
 The affluents of the Monongahela and the two Kanawhas 
 divide this region into a number of narrow valleys, separated 
 hj rough and difficult hUls, which rise into true mountains as 
 they approach the heads of the Little Kanawha and the west 
 fork of the Monongahela. The country here becomes alpine 
 in its character. The roads practicable for wagons are few, 
 narrow, and difficult. As cultivation is generally confined to 
 the valleys, and the mountain-sides are obstructed by rocks 
 and a dense growth of timber and underbrush, it is difficult 
 even for skirmishers to move across the country, and it is not 
 possible for troops and trains to march elsewhere than on 
 the narrow roads. Positions suitable for handling artillery 
 are rare, and cavalry is useful in that district only to con- 
 vey intelligence. The resources of the country are incon- 
 siderable.* 
 
 These characteristics of ground, which are the common 
 characteristics of mountain regions, give to mountain warfare 
 certain principles particular to it, and different from those 
 that obtain in military operations in the plain. Thus moun- 
 tain warfare readily admits of combined marches, which can 
 seldom be employed in the plain. Such marches offer, in 
 highland regions, no real danger, since the enemy is unable 
 to throw himself between the columns : it is therefore suffi- 
 cient that each column be strong enough to defend the valley 
 in which it operates.! But the facihty of the tactical defence 
 of highlands renders it necessary for the assailant to seek to 
 dislodge the enemy by manoeu\Tes rather than direct attack : 
 in other words, he should manoeuvre offensively while he 
 fights defensively ; or, as Napoleon sums up the theory in one 
 pregnant sentence, " the genius of mountain warfare consists 
 in occupying camp on the flanks or on the rear of the enemy, 
 
 * McClellan : Campaigns in Western Virginia, p. 25. 
 
 f Vial : Cours d'Art et d'Histoire Militaires, vol. ii., p. 82. On this feature of 
 mountain warfare, see also McDougall : Modern Warfare and Modern Artillery, 
 p. 356. 
 
THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 37 
 
 SO as to leave him only the alternative of evacuating his posi- 
 tion without fighting, or of issuing to attack."* 
 
 I make this exposition of the theory of mountain warfare, 
 because, as will presently appear, the operations of General 
 McClellan in Western Virginia afford a very happy apphca- 
 tion of all the cardinal principles here laid down. The main 
 turnpike fi'om Staunton to Wheeling, which is the great high- 
 way across the mountains, was held by Garnett in an in- 
 trenched position, at Laurel Hill. This road, which here 
 runs nearly southward, was his direct and natural line of 
 retreat, and if cut off from that, his only chance of escape 
 was by difficult roads over the mountains, eastward. Five 
 miles below Garnett's main position at Laurel Hill, a road 
 fi'om the west passes through this spur at a defile known as 
 Eich Mountain, and strikes the main road. To guard this 
 approach against any menace directed upon his line of re- 
 treat, Garnett had placed here his second in command, 
 Colonel Pegram, with a force of about one thousand men. 
 McClellan, whose line of march was from the west, from the 
 dii'ection of the Ohio River, determined to dislodge Garnett 
 and Pegram by striking their main line of retreat below the 
 position held by the latter. Then, to make the operation de- 
 cisive, he resolved to direct another column from the north to 
 seize the only other avenue of escape, and thus, if possible, 
 capture or destroy the whole adverse force. t 
 
 With the main column of two brigades, under Brigadier 
 Generals Scheich and Eosecrans, the afterwards illustrious 
 commander of the Army of the Cumberland and victor of 
 Stone Eiver, General McClellan moved from the west, by way 
 of Clarksburg to Buchanon (July 2), twenty miles west of 
 the hostile position. From here, several divergent expedi- 
 
 * As authority on this same point, see aJso Dufour, Strategy and Tactics, p. 
 261 ; Jomini : Art of War, p. 168 ; Vial : Cours d'Art, etc., vol. ii., p. 83. 
 
 ■j- In a letter to Lieutenant-Qeneral Scott, communicating his proposed plan 
 of operations, McClellan adroitly put it that he should seek to " repeat the 
 manceum'e at Gerro Gordo." 
 
38 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMT OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 tionary columns were sent out to mislead tlie enemy. Anotliei 
 column, composed of the brigade of General Morris, held 
 position at Phillippi, about the same distance north of the 
 enemy's stronghold, as General McClellan, at Buchanon, 
 with his other two brigades, was west of it. The 7th of 
 July, Morris was du'ected to advance southward to a position 
 within a mile and a haK of Garnett's camp at Laurel Hill, and 
 by strong demonstrations give the enemy the impression that 
 the main attack was to be made by him. The 8th, Mc- 
 Clellan, with the brigades of Kosecrans and Scheich, moved 
 eastward from Buchanon, and on the following afternoon 
 came within two miles of Pegram's position at Kich Moun- 
 tain. Having reconnoitred it, he resolved, mstead of making 
 a direct attack, to hold one of his brigades in fi'ont, while he 
 sent Kosecrans by a detour by the right and southward, to 
 lay hold of the enemy's main line of retreat, the turnpike, and 
 then take Pegram's position in the rear. Setting out early in 
 the morning, Eosecrans moved partly by mountain bridle- 
 paths, and partly through rough and trackless woods and 
 thickets of laurel. It rained incessantly. By noon he had 
 gained Pegram's rear ; but the latter, having captured a dra- 
 goon carrying dispatches from the Union commander, became 
 aware of the plan, and effecting a partial change of front, 
 posted a force of six hundred men and three guns to hold the 
 crest of the mountain in his rear, while with the remainder he 
 confronted the force McClellan held in his front. After a sharp 
 fusilade, Kosecrans carried the crest, driving the defenders 
 in upon Pegram's intrenchments ; but against this force h( 
 did not push his advance, and as McClellan, awaiting the 
 sounds of his musketry before joining in with a front attack 
 heard none, the day passed by. During the night, Pegram 
 evacuated his position, and attempted to join Garnett's main 
 body, five miles north. After a day's wandering through the 
 woods, being surrounded, he was compelled to surrender with 
 six hundred men, the few remaining hundreds escaping. 
 Meantime, Garnett, alarmed at the forces gathering around 
 him on all sides, also abandoned his position at Laurel HilL 
 
THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 39 
 
 But, attempting with about four thousand men to make good 
 his escape southward, he found McClellan already graspmg 
 his Une of retreat, and he then fled eastward over the moun- 
 tauis. Being \agorously pursued, he was twice brought to * 
 stand and severely handled ; but forces that the Union com- 
 mander had directed to move from the north and east to 
 intercept the flying enemy, did not act with sufiicient prompt- 
 ness,* so that the operation was not as decisive as it other- 
 wise must have been. The last stand made by Garnett was 
 at Carrick's Ford, at the passage of the Cheat Eiver, where 
 he was attacked by the advance of General Morris's brigadet 
 on the 13th, driven in disorder, losing all his guns and bag- 
 gage, and General Garnett himself, while gallantly striving to 
 rally his rear-guard, was killed. This ended the brief and 
 brilliant campaign in the mountains, and General McClellan 
 was able to telegraph to Washington as its result the capture 
 of a thousand prisoners, with all the enemy's stores, baggage, 
 and artillery, and the complete disraption of the hostile force. 
 " Secession," he added, "is killed in this country." 
 
 The result of this miniature campaign was most inspiriting 
 to the people of the North, and had an effect far beyond its 
 intrinsic importance, just as had in another way the fiascos of 
 Big Bethel and Vienna. It is the moral influence of small 
 successes and small defeats, that in the first stages of a war 
 makes their importance and forms the real measure of their 
 value. All great commanders have understood this well. The 
 campaign in West Virginia was conducted agreeably to mili- 
 tary principles, — a characteristic that did not belong to other 
 operations thus far ; and its execution, as well as the fact that 
 it was undertaken by General McClellan of his own motion, 
 and without countenance from Washington, stamped him as a 
 man of superior abihty. 
 
 * McClellan : Campaign in Western Virginia, p. 34. 
 
 f This attack was made by the Fourteenth Ohio, the Seventh and Ninth 
 Indiana, and a section of Barnett's battery. 
 
40 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AEMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 III. 
 
 THE BATTLE OF BULL EUN. 
 
 When in a national crisis the thoughts of men, and even 
 the poKcj of the Government are in that condition which is 
 expressed by the term drifting, wonderful is the effect of a 
 phrase that crystallizes the floating and half-formed senti- 
 ments of the people into a definite theory. Such a phrase, 
 about the time reached by this narrative, arose in the North, 
 Thus far, no well-defined military poHcy guided the conduct 
 of the war. The series of small outlying operations ah-eady 
 sketched were, with the exception of those in West Virginia, 
 crude in conception, undertaken at haphazard, and aimed at 
 no definite result. But when Congress assembled in extra 
 session, on the 4th of July, the effervescent enthusiasm of the 
 country found expression in a phrase that, as it perfectly em- 
 bodied the poj)ular sentiment, was presently echoed through- 
 out the whole North. This phrase was, " On to Richmond." 
 
 Now, in such popular cries there is alwaj's a certain element 
 of the ideal ; and hence we may suppose that this one did not 
 so much imply a Uteral movement " on to Bichmond," as it 
 expressed with emphasis and in definite shape the conviction 
 of the popular mind that immediate action should be taken 
 against the rebellious force that had ensconced itself in the 
 Manassas stronghold, only a few miles in front of the Federal 
 capital. No doubt there were many that actually believed the 
 Union force might not only drive the enemy from Manassas, 
 but really follow " on to Richmond." It need hardly be said, 
 however, that an overland march to Richmond by the force 
 then assembled at Washington would have been an impossi- 
 bility, even had there been no enemy to oppose the adven- 
 ture. The people, conscious of great earnestness and en- 
 thusiasm, were unconscious either of the nature of the task 
 they had set themselves to do, or the nature of the means 
 
THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 41 
 
 Deeded to carry it through. They knew that the rebels were 
 at Manassas. They saw around Washington an imposing 
 martial array, which they fondly named the " Grand Army of 
 the United States ;" and they could not understand what, 
 after almost three months of jDreparation, could possibly 
 hinder the advance of that army against the confi'onting 
 enemy, and even on to the capital seat of the rebellion.* 
 
 The veteran soldier who, burdened with years and the 
 infirmities of nature, remaixied at the head of the United 
 States army, and to whom, by consequence, it fell to direct 
 the mihtary councils at Washington, was ill-fitted to grapple 
 with the tremendous problem forced upon him. General 
 Scott knew well war and war's needs. He knew that the 
 imposing array of patriotic citizens who, dressed and armed 
 to represent soldiers, lay around Washington, was but the 
 simulacnim of an arrmj ; that to this mass were wholly want- 
 ing the organization, discipline, experience, whatever, in fact, 
 goes to the fashioning of that most complex of living organ- 
 isms. But it was little that he should know this, when those 
 in power, who knew it not and would not know it, were 
 determined to act as if it were not. Indeed he had himself to 
 assume that it was not, and proceed in the work of forming a 
 plan of campaign for immediate action. Now, a plan of cam- 
 paign General Scott could well devise ; for he was a man that 
 knew generalship and grand war ; had himself plucked laurels 
 on the field of battle before the present generation of men 
 was born ; and long years ago, in Europe, had discussed the 
 highest jjrinciples of the military art with the great marshals 
 of Napoleon. But all this only served to separate him and 
 his views and plans the more hopelessly from those with 
 whom he had to deal. He was oj)posed to what he called " a 
 
 * " The country could not understand, ignorant as it was of war and war's 
 requirements, how it could possibly be true that, after three months of prepa- 
 ration and of parade, an army of thirty thousand men should be still utterly 
 unfit to move thirty miles against a series of earthworks held by no more than 
 an equal number of men." Hurlbut : McClellan and the Conduct of the Wai', 
 page 103. 
 
42 CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARIVHT OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 little war by piecemeal." He was averse to fighting at all in 
 Virginia, which he did not regard as a theatre for decisive 
 action, and thought that the Union army should strike its 
 first blow in the basin of the Mississippi. But what were 
 such views to the ardent congressmen and cabinet councillors 
 to whom Beauregard's blazon at Manassas was the picador's 
 flag to the infuriate bidl ? They prevailed. General Scott has 
 confessed it : his moral firmness gave way under the joressure 
 of an Administration that was in turn goaded almost to frenzy 
 by a press and people demanding action at all hazards. 
 
 There was, therefore, to be an advance of the army in front 
 of Washington ; and early in July the duty of planning and 
 executing a movement against Beauregard at Manassas de- 
 volved upon General McDowell, who, since the transfer of the 
 Union force into Virginia, had been put in command of the 
 column of active operation south of the Potomac, and of the 
 Department of Northeastern Virginia. This column numbered 
 about thirty thousand men. 
 
 The ofiicer to whom it thus fell to lead the main army to 
 its first field was a man of no mean capacity as a soldier. 
 Of the staff of the old regular army, McDowell was distin- 
 guished for his fine professional acquirements ; and having 
 studied the theory of war and seen European armies, he was, 
 of the small body of trained soldiers, perhaps the man best 
 quaUfied for the command. That he had never commanded 
 any considerable body of men on the actual field was a draw- 
 back shared by every other officer in the service. 
 
 General McDowell knew perfectly well the kind of mate- 
 rial with which he had to work, and its greenness and 
 unfitness to take the field ; and he did his best to improve it. 
 This he might readily have done, had he had to grapple 
 merely with this work ; but his main struggle was elsewhere : 
 and he has left a picture, half pathetic and half ludicrous, of 
 his unavailing plea for a little common sense with those 
 whose ardor was only equalled by their ignorance. " I 
 wanted," says he, " very much a little time — all of us wanted 
 it. We did not have a bit of it." To his plea of the 
 
THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 43 
 
 "greenness" of his troops, tlie answer, more specious than 
 well taken, was constantly returned — " You are green, it is 
 true ; but they are green also : you are all green alike."* 
 
 So far from having time to mould his army, many of his 
 regiments were brought across the Potomac at the last 
 moment, without his even seeing them, and without being 
 even brigaded. He had, therefore, no opportunity to test his 
 machinery — to move it round and see whether it would work 
 smoothly or not ; and such was the feeling, that when, on one 
 occasion, McDowell had a body of eight regiments re\iewed 
 together, he was censured for " trying to make a show."t 
 Even the special circumstance that should have caused de- 
 lay, — to wit, the fact that a large part of the best, that is, the 
 best-armed, drilled, officered, and disciplined troops in fi'ont 
 of Washington consisted of three months' volunteers whose 
 term of service was about to expire, — was an incentive to 
 precipitate action. These troops had fulfilled the duty for 
 which they were called out, which was to assure the safety of 
 the national capital ; their presence had given time to 
 organize a force for the war ; Congress had authorized a call 
 for five hundred thousand three years' volunteers, and these 
 were thronging to the Potomac. It is certainly easy to see 
 that the dictate of prudence was this : not to attempt to 
 employ the three months' men in active operations, but to 
 organize and mobilize, from the three-year troops, an ade- 
 quate army for the field. Other counsels prevailed, and the 
 army with which McDowell took the field was an army 
 without organization, or a staff, or a commissariat, or an 
 organized artillery.^ The wonder, indeed, is not that he 
 
 * Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 38. t Ibid. 
 
 X " Being tete-(l-tete with McDowell, I saw him do things of detail which, in 
 any even half-way organized army, belong to the specialty of a chief of the 
 Btaflf. .... McDowell received his corps in the most chaotic state. Almost 
 with his own hands he organized, or rather put together, the artillery. 
 Brigades are scarcely formed ; the commanders of brigades do not know theii 
 commands, and the soldiers do not know their generals." Gurowski : Diary. 
 1861-:3, p. 61. Mr. Russell (My Diary North and South, pp. 424-5) makes 
 some striking statements to the same purpose. 
 
44 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 should not have done more, but that he did so much ; and 
 the spirit of forbearance and alacrity with which he entered 
 upon and carried through his trying task, entitles him to great 
 credit. 
 
 In entering upon the special problem assigned him, it was 
 not possible for General McDowell to avoid taking into 
 account not only his immediate enemy at Manassas, but 
 whatever other hostile forces, distributed over the theatre of 
 war in Virginia, might influence the fortunes of his projected 
 expedition. The occupation of Manassas had been recom- 
 mended to the Confederates, fi'om the very fact that it was 
 the centre of the railroad system of Northern Virginia — at 
 the junction of the great southern railroad route connecting 
 Washington with Eichmond, and the Manassas Gap Eailroad 
 leading to the Valley of the Shenandoah. The former 
 highway connected Beauregard with the forces on the Penin- 
 sula and at Eichmond (distant by raiboad about seventy-five 
 miles) ; the latter, with the army under Johnston, in the 
 Shenandoah Valley (distant by raih-oad about seventy miles). 
 The Confederates, in fact, held a line interior to the 
 forces of Butler, McDowell, and Patterson — respectively at 
 Fortress Monroe, in front of Washington, and on the Upper 
 Potomac. This distribution of the Union armies was a fault 
 to which General McDowell was quite ahve ; but he had 
 assurances from the lieutenant-general that the enemy on the 
 Peninsula should be occupied by General Butler, and that 
 Johnston's forces in the Shenandoah Valley should be held 
 there by General Patterson. On expressing his fears in 
 regard to Johnston, a few days before the opening of the 
 campaign, General McDowell was assured by General Scott 
 that, "if Johnston joined Beauregard, he should have Pat- 
 terson on his heels."* 
 
 With this understanding, McDowell projected a plan of 
 operations against Manassas, which was substantially to 
 
 * For more on the same subject, see McDowell's testimony : Report on the 
 Conduct of the War. 
 
THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 45 
 
 advance by Fairfax Courthouse, there make a sudden move- 
 ment to the left, and, crossing the Occoquan just below the 
 junction of that stream with Bull Run (thus turning Beaure- 
 gard's right), strike at the enemy's railroad communications. 
 This project was submitted to the cabinet and agreed to, and 
 the 9th of July was fixed as the day when the army should 
 move. Owing, however, to the deficiency of transportation 
 and supplies, the advance was not begun till a week later. 
 
 With the view of giving effect to that part of the military 
 programme which provided that Johnston's force in the Shen- 
 andoah Valley should be neutralized, General Patterson was, 
 on the 2d of July, again ordered across the Potomac from 
 Maryland. He made the passage of the river at Williams- 
 port, and took position at Martmsburg. Johnston then held 
 post near Winchester with a force of about eight thousand 
 men.* The specific duty assigned to Patterson was, in view 
 of the impending battle in front of Washington, to defeat 
 Johnston or prevent his making a junction with Beauregard 
 at Manassas. For this purpose, the force of twelve thousand 
 men with which General Patterson had crossed the Poto- 
 mac was augmented to an effective of about eighteen thou- 
 sand.! Now, from the relative position of the contending 
 forces, it is evident that the only method of accompHshing 
 the latter purpose, to wit, preventing Johnston from re-enfor- 
 cing Beauregard, was to adopt the former course — namely, to 
 attack Johnston. If 'Patterson, therefore, was not in condi- 
 tion to do this, his force should immediately have been with- 
 drawn to the front of Washington and united with McDowell's. 
 General Scott expected Patterson to attack Johnston,:]: but he 
 gave no imperative order to do so ; and Patterson, who 
 though more than doubly outnumbering his opj)onent, fancied 
 Johnston had " at least forty thousand men," and that the 
 
 * This estimate I derive from General Jolmston himself. 
 
 f Patterson : Campaigns in the Valley of the Shenandoah, p. 63. 
 
 X" I have certainly been expecting you to beat the enemy ; if not, to hear 
 that you had felt him strongly, or at least had occupied him by threats ajid 
 demonstrations." Dispatch from General Scott, July 18th. 
 
4(3 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 wily enemy " had a trap set somewhere' for liim,* feared either 
 to demonstrate or attack. His conduct was certainly feeble ; 
 and his marches and countermarches, made far from the 
 enemy, were ridiculous. At Martinsburg his position was a 
 false one, where, instead of threatening the enemy, the enemy 
 threatened him. At length, when informed that the army in 
 front of Washington was actually under way, he (July 15th) 
 advanced his force fi'om Martinsburg to Bunker's Hill, from 
 which point he, on the 17th, fell off upon Charlestown, near 
 Harper's Ferry, and Johnston was left free to move to form a 
 junction with Beauregard! This was precisely what John- 
 ston now found occasion to do. As wiU presently appear, 
 McDowell's reconnoitring parties appeared in front of Bull 
 Run on the 18th of July. On the same day a message reached 
 Johnston from Beauregard : " If you wish to help me, now is 
 the time." Johnston promptly availed himself of the oppor- 
 tunity to escape unmolested. Making a rapid flank march 
 by way of Ashby's Gap, he took cars on the Manassas Gap 
 Eaih'oad at Piedmont, and joined Beauregard with his ad- 
 vance brigades on Saturday, the 20th. What part they 
 played in the coming battle will presently appear. 
 
 General McDowell moved his army from the banks of the 
 Potomac on the afternoon of July 16th. The movable column 
 consisted of four divisions— the First Division, under General 
 Tyler ; the Second, under General Hunter ; the Third, under 
 General Heintzelman ; the Fifth, under Colonel Miles. The 
 Fourth Division, under General Runyon, was left in the works 
 on the south bank of the Potomac. These divisions made an 
 
 * Patterson : Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah, 
 
 p. 57. 
 
 General Johnston, i> tonversation with the writer touching this point, made 
 a ludicrous comment on Patterson's statement of his numbers. On my mention- 
 ing to him that Patterson, in a Narrative recently published, had put down 
 the Confederate strength at forty thousand, General Johnston laughingly ex- 
 claimed : " Why, if he had really thought that I had forty thousand, or half 
 that number, sooner than have crossed the Potomac he would have thrown 
 himself headlong into it." 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 Union Troops. 
 
 U Ktyes 
 6. Snerinaii 
 c Frrm/cUn 
 (i./Ion-a7Yl 
 
 e . micoc 
 
 f. Porter- 
 (/. SehenAc 
 
 tired, tbr "Campaigns of the Army offJif fblontac. 
 
 Con/i'derate Troops. 
 
 First R-liist Positions 
 /. f. Cocke 
 ^. X". liiirtoiL 
 3 3' Kiran^ 
 
 S. .i'Jarkso/i 
 
 0. 0' JSoti/iuni 
 
 8. H'Early 
 
 S 9- StuaJ-fA-Cfw. 
 
 to. mEtrell 
 
 ft. tt'Lo'KfKfi'e^t 
 
 /^. t'^'U ft. Jones- 
 
 t3. tS'HadfyrdiCav. 
 
THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 47' 
 
 aggregate of about thirty-five thousand men. They moved in 
 four cohimns : one by the turnpike ; one by the lateral country 
 roads on the right ; one on the left of the railroad ; and 
 another between the turnpike and railroad, following what is 
 known as the " Braddock" road.* It was known that Fairfax 
 Courthouse was held as an outpost by a brigade of South 
 Carolina troops, and the three right columns were directed to 
 co-operate on that point with the view of capturing this force ; 
 but on entering the place, at three o'clock on the afternoon of 
 the 17th, it was found abandoned. General McDowell had 
 hoped to have his columns concentrated at CentreviUe that 
 night, but the troops being unused to march, did not arrive 
 till the following day. As it was, however, the march was 
 really made with a good deal of rapidity. From CentreviUe, 
 General McDowell proceeded to push out reconnoissances, 
 with a view to the projected manoeuvre by his left ; but ex- 
 amination soon proved the impracticability of the ground for 
 this purpose. Moreover, the character of General McDowell's 
 move was revealed to Beauregard by an affair which tlie weak 
 ambition of a division commander brought on that afternoon 
 at Blackburn's Ford, on Bull Eun. General Tyler had been 
 ordered with his division to occupy CentreviUe, and thence 
 " observe the roads to Bull Run," but was cautioned " not to 
 bring on any engagement."t In obedience to this he pushed 
 a brigade forward to Blackburn's Ford, which proved to be 
 about the centre of Beauregard's true defensive Une along 
 Bull Run. Reaching the heights on the northern side of the 
 stream, he opened an artillery fire with two twenty-pounder 
 rifle-guns, which had the effect of first developing and after- 
 wards silencing the enemy's battery near the ford. Thus far 
 he had not exceeded his instructions ; but he had the impres- 
 sion that the enemy would run whenever seriously menaced ; 
 and he declared that " the great man of the war would be the 
 
 * So called from its having been made by that general on his memorabla 
 march to Fort Duquesne, in 1754, which terminated in his disastrous defeat 
 and death. 
 
 f McDowell's order : Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 46. 
 
48 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 man that got to Manassas, and lie meant to go tlirongh tha'i 
 niglit."-^ His notion of the method of executing this project 
 ,was to file his brigade down to the stream, di'aw it up parallel 
 to the other shore, and open an unmeaning fusillade.f "While 
 eno-aged in this foolery, a force crossed the stream from the 
 other side, and striking his left flank (the Twelfth New York), 
 disrupted it completely. This admonished General Tyler to 
 defer his intended visit to Manassas that night, and he with- 
 drew. The loss was inconsiderable, but the effect on the 
 morale of the raw troops was bad. 
 
 In consequence of the abandonment of the plan of opera- 
 tion on the Confederate right, the next two days (July 19th 
 and 20th) were spent by the engineers in reconnoitring and 
 determining how and where the attack should be made. It 
 was found that there was a good ford over Bull Kun at Sud- 
 ley Spring, two miles above the point where the direct road 
 fi-om Centreville to Warrenton crosses Bull Eun by the Stone 
 Bridge. It was also found that this ford was unguarded by 
 the enemy, and that above that point the stream was almost 
 everywhere easily passable. On these data was based the 
 plan of attack, which was as follows : The Fifth Division 
 (Miles) to remain in reserve at Centreville, and to make with 
 one of its brigades, added to Eichardson's brigade of Tyler's 
 division, a false attack at Blackburn's Ford ; the First Divi- 
 sion (Tyler) to move by the turnpike up to the Stone Bridge 
 at daybreak, threaten that point, and, at the proper time, to 
 carry it or cross if uncovered from above. Meantime, the 
 principal column, consisting of the two divisions of Hunter 
 and Heintzelman, of about twelve thousand men, was to 
 diverge from the turnpike to the right a mile beyond Centre- 
 ville, and, by a detour, reach Sudley Ford ; thence, descending 
 the right bank of Bull Eun, it would take the defences of the 
 Stone Bridge in reverse. The united force would then give 
 
 * My authority for tliis statement is Colonel Alexander, of the Corps of 
 Engineers, then engineer on Tyler's staff, 
 f Barnard : The Battle of Bull Eun, p. 49. 
 
THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 49 
 
 battle, strike at the enemy's railroad communications, or act 
 otherwise as circumstances might dictate.* It was an excel- 
 lent plan of battle. 
 
 The execution of this plan was set on foot three hours after 
 midnight of the 20th, when the troops, breaking camp at 
 Centreville, launched on their novel adventure, and, in a dewy 
 moonlight night, took up the march destined to bring them 
 into presence of the enemy. The divisions had been ordered 
 to march at half-past two a. m., with the view of getting on 
 the gi'ound early in the morning of the 21st. Tyler's division 
 had the advance on the main road from Centreville ; and, as 
 the tw^o divisions under Hunter and Heintzelman, to w^hich 
 was intrusted the turning movement, had to follow on this 
 road up to the point where they were to diverge to the right, 
 it was especially urgent that no obstruction should bar their 
 march. Nevertheless, there was delay in getting Tyler's 
 division out of camp and on to the road, and delay in its ad- 
 vance, which, of course, retarded the turniag column. Then 
 the road over which Hunter and Heiatzelman had to pass 
 ^vas found to be longer than was expected ; so that, instead of 
 getting into position by six in the morning, it was, as will 
 subsequently appear, nine before this column debouched on 
 the southern side of Bull Eun, at Sudley's Spring. Tyler, 
 meanwhile, had pushed on, and, by six, drew up his division 
 in front of Stone Bridge, where he opened an artillery fire on 
 the enemy on the opposite side of Bull Run. 
 
 While the columns of McDowell were thus under way, 
 events of equal moment were passing within the Confederate 
 camp. General Johnston in person had joined Beauregard 
 dm-ing the night of the 20th (his troops, however, not having 
 yet arrived), and, being the ranking officer, he assumed com- 
 mand of all the Confederate forces. Nevertheless, as Beau- 
 regard knew his ground, the plans he had formed were 
 adopted, and Jolmston directed their execution under him. 
 This plan contemplated an offensive movement before 
 
 * McDowell : Order of BatUe. 
 
 4 
 
50 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 McDowell should be able to strike ; but, as a body of five 
 thousand troops of Johnston's force, that were expected to 
 arrive during the night from the Shenandoah Yalley, did not 
 reach the ground till some hours later, other dispositions had 
 to be made.* 
 
 Beauregard, in stationing his forces, had committed the 
 error of treating the line of Bull Run as a real defensive line 
 that could be passed only at the fords ; and hence he had 
 stationed his brigades at these several fords — the brigades of 
 Ewell and Holmes, at Union Mills Ford, forming his right ; 
 the brigades of Jones and Early, at McLean's Ford ; the 
 brigades of Longstreet and Jackson, at Blackburn's Ford ; 
 and Bonham's brigade, at Mitchell's Ford. Other commands 
 were in reserve and between these forces, while Colonel 
 Evans, with a demi-brigade, held Stone Bridge, which formed 
 the Confederate left. Meantime, he had neglected to note 
 that on his left, from Sudley Springs up. Bull Run could be 
 passed anywhere. When, therefore, at six o'clock of the 
 morning of the 21st, Beauregard learned from Colonel Evans 
 that a Federal force (which was the head of Tyler's column) 
 had drawn up opposite Stone Bridge, he assumed the attack 
 would be made there — that is, against his left. He was 
 ignorant that the real menace was a turning movement to 
 take his whole line in the rear. Beauregard's military in- 
 spirations were, however, always essentially aggressive ; and, 
 on learning the appearance of the hostile force at Stone 
 Bridge (being still unaware of the flanking operation in exe- 
 cution above), he resolved to assume the offensive to reheve 
 his left. He judged the most effective method of accomplish- 
 ing this, to be a counter move by his right and centre on 
 the Union flank and rear at Centreville ; and with this view 
 orders were dispatched to General Ewell, whose brigade 
 formed the right of the Confederate line at Union Mills Ford, 
 to begin the movement, which was to be followed up by the 
 brigades of Jones, at McLean's Ford ; Longstreet, at Black- 
 
 * Beauregard : Report of the Battle of Manassas. 
 
THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 5] 
 
 burn's Ford; and Bonham, at Mitclieirs Ford.* I nmst add 
 here a fact whicli is an evidence that the staff-organization of 
 the Confederate Army was, at this time, little better than that 
 of the Union Army — these orders did not reach their destina- 
 tion for four hours after the time they were sent ; and this, 
 as will presently appear, gave a very peculiar turn to the 
 whole earlier part of the battle. 
 
 Meanwhile, the force of Tyler had deployed in front of 
 Stone Bridge, and a scattering skirmish fire was opened be- 
 tween his troops and those of Evans on the opposite side 
 of Bull Kun. This served as an excellent mask for the 
 column executing the turning move, as it occupied the atten- 
 tion of the force behind Stone Bridge for a couple of hours — 
 that is, till about half-past eight. But, about that time, 
 Evans becoming satisfied of the counterfeit character of the 
 demonstrations on his front, and persuaded of an attempt to 
 turn his left flank,t changed front, and marched towards 
 Sudley Springs, leaving a skirmish line to observe for the 
 while the Federal force opposite the Stone Bridge. Thus it 
 was that the opposing forces were mo"sdng to meet each other ; 
 and when, towards ten o'clock, the head of Hunter's column, 
 having passed to the right bank of Bull Eun, by way of Sud- 
 ley Ford, and advanced for a mile through a thick wood, de- 
 bouched into the open country beyond, the gray-jackets could 
 be descried already drawn up in line of battle. Colonel 
 Evans, with his demi-brigade, had taken up a position west 
 of the Warrenton road, almost at right angles to Bull Kun, 
 and considerably in advance of the ridge on which the main 
 Confederate hne was afterwards drawn. 
 
 Had now, at the first encounter, a moderate degree of skill 
 or energy marked the conduct of the Union commander 
 present on the field, there is httle doubt that success was at 
 this moment in the hands of General McDowell, who deserved 
 
 * " By such a movement," adds Beauregard, " I confidently expected to 
 achieve a complete victory for my country by 12 o'clock M." Report of the 
 Battle of Manassas. 
 
 f Beauregard : Report of the Battle of Manassas. 
 
52 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 success for the excellence of his generalship. A powerful 
 body was, bj a flank movement, planted on the southern side 
 of Bull Run, and Beauregard's defensive line was taken in 
 reverse. It is true this part of the plan should have reached 
 this stage of development by six o'clock in the morning, and 
 it was now ten ; but this was not enough to jeopardize the 
 success of the scheme, for Beauregard was ignorant of what 
 had taken place. It is also true that Colonel Evans, divining 
 the move, had effected his change of front to meet the 
 Federal advance ; but his entire force consisted of but nine 
 weak companies, and Hunter had twelve thousand men. 
 
 But there was present neither the skiU nor the energy to 
 take advantage of these circumstances ; and the manner in 
 which the troops were brought up affords a striking illustra- 
 tion of the then greenness of even the foremost officers of the 
 army. In place of making proper dispositions in a line of 
 battle, General Hunter caused a feeble fusilade to be opened 
 from the head of the column ; and Colonel Burnside's Rhode 
 Island regiments, thrown in alone, were speedily cut up. 
 This wasted an hour. To aid Burnside's hard-pressed com- 
 mand, the brigade of Colonel A. Porter was ordered up and 
 deployed on his right, and Sykes' battalion of Regulars re- 
 lieved him on the left. A serious advance of this line soon 
 began to press the handful of Confederates back ; but Evans 
 was speedily re-enforced by portions of the brigades of Col- 
 onels Bee and Barton, who were at hand near the Stone 
 Bridge, and, by these united forces, a fresh stand was made 
 on a position still west of Young's Branch. But the increas- 
 ing pressure of the Union line, strengthened now by the ad- 
 dition of portions of Heintzelman's division coming in on the 
 left, compelled the Confederates to yield ground, and they 
 were presently forced back sufficiently to allow Tyler's force 
 near Stone Bridge to commence crossing to the south side 
 and join in the combat. 
 
 Commanding one of Tyler's brigades was one Colonel W. T. 
 Sherman, afterwards of some repute in the world as the man 
 who led the armies that marched from Chattanooga to 
 
THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 53 
 
 Atlanta, and from Atlanta to the sea. This officer, who dis- 
 played even in the war's infancy something of that same mil- 
 itary talent that, developed by experience, made him among 
 the foremost of Union commanders, had discovered, while re- 
 connoitring in the morning, an unknown ford, half a mile 
 above the Stone Bridge.* Being ordered to cross Bull Kun 
 to the assistance of the forces on the other side, he was en- 
 abled to do so by this ford long before the Stone Bridge was 
 uncovered for the passage. Keyes' brigade of the same divi- 
 sion followed, and both succeeded in making a junction with 
 the force engaged. This done, the whole advanced, and drove 
 the enemy back across Young's Branch and over the Warren- 
 ton road and up the slopes on the other side. The Confeder- 
 ates went back in much disorder, and were only rallied on an 
 elevated ridge or table-land beyond Young's Branch.t 
 
 While these events, in the prelude of the battle, were going 
 on, Beauregard and Johnston, from their headquarters, near 
 the centre of the line, marked the outburst of battle on their 
 left flank, and listened eagerly and anxiously for similar 
 sounds from the direction of Centreville, resulting from the 
 prescribed counter-attack in that quarter by the Confederate 
 rio-ht. " To my profound disappointment," adds the Con- 
 federate commander, " I learned, just about the time that the 
 force on the left had been driven back by the advance of the 
 Federals, that my order to General Ewell had miscarried." 
 Jud^nng it too late for the effective execution of the contem- 
 plated move, Beauregard found himself, as he states, " forced 
 to depend on new combinations to meet the enemy on the 
 field upon which he had chosen to give us battle."^ Leaving 
 Ewell, Jones, Longstreet, and Bonham at their positions along 
 
 * " Early in the day, when reconnoitring the ground, I liad seen a horse- 
 man descend from a bluff to the bank, cross the stream, and show himself in 
 the open field. Inferring we could cross," etc. Sherman : Report of Bull Run. 
 
 f The disorder that pervaded the Southern force at this time is freely 
 acknowledged by General Johnston, whose official report is marked by a 
 candor not observable in that of Beauregard. 
 
 X Report of the Battle of Manassas. 
 
54: CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 the lower fords to make demonstrations against the Federal 
 forces opposite and prevent their going to re-enforce Mc- 
 Dowell's right, the reserves, consisting of Holmes' two regi- 
 ments and a battery, Early's brigade, and two of Bonham's 
 regiments and a battery, were immediately ordered up to 
 support the Confederate left flank, now so seriously imperilled. 
 Jackson, who with his brigade of five regiments had been 
 in reserve not far from the Stone Bridge, went up just at 
 the time that Evans, and Bee, and Barton, who had been 
 holding the advance position, had given way, and were at- 
 tempting to rally and reform their troops on the plateau.* 
 At this juncture, Beauregard and Johnston reached the field, 
 and it required their best personal efforts to hold the men to 
 their work. This accomplished, Beauregard took command 
 on the field, while Johnston went to the rear to hurry up re- 
 enforcements from his army arriving from the Valley. 
 
 The Confederates had now been forced back a mile 
 and a half, and the Union force had cleared its front com- 
 pletely across the Warrenton road ; the Stone Bridge was 
 uncovered, and McDowell drew up his Hue on the crest gained, 
 with Heintzelman's division (brigades of Wilcox and How- 
 ard) on the right, supported by part of Porter's brigade and 
 the cavalry under Palmer, and Franklin's brigade of Heintzel- 
 man's division ; Sherman's brigade of Tyler's division in the 
 centre ; and Keyes' brigade of Tyler's division on the left. 
 Beauregard reformed his forces on the plateau beyond. His 
 line of battle consisted of about six thousand five hundred 
 men, thirteen pieces of artillery, and two companies of Stuart's 
 cavahy. 
 
 The definitive possession of this plateau now became the 
 
 * He came not a moment too soon. Bee approaching Jackson, and pointing 
 to the mingled remnants of his own command, and the shattered brigades of 
 Barton and Evans huddled up in the woods, exclaimed, " General, they are 
 beating us back." " Sir, we'll give them the bayonet," replied Jackson ; and 
 Bee, rushing back to his troops, rallied them with the words : " There is Jack 
 son, standing like a done wall; let us determine to die here, and we will 
 conquer." 
 
THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 
 
 bi) 
 
 prize eagerly contested by the opposing force. This height is 
 on three sides inclosed by small water-courses, which empty 
 into Bull Eun Avithin a few yards of each other, and half a 
 mile to the south of Stone Bridge. Rising to an elevation of 
 quite one hundred feet above the level of Bull Run at the 
 bridge, it falls off on these sides to the level of the inclosing 
 streams in slopes wliich are gentle, but furrowed by ravines of 
 irregular direction and length, and shaded with clumps and 
 patches of young pines and oaks. The general direction of 
 the crest of the plateau is oblique to the course of Bull Run. 
 Around its eastern and southern brow an almost unbroken 
 fi-iuge of second-growth pines gave excellent shelter to the 
 Southern sharp-shooters. To the west, adjoining the fields, 
 directly across the crest, on both sides of the Sudley road, ex- 
 tends a broad belt of oaks, in which, during the battle, regi- 
 ments of both armies met and contended for the mastery. 
 
 Having obtained possession of the ridge, the main effort 
 of the Union forces was made to work round and envelop the 
 left flank of the Confederate line. This was a manoeuvre 
 which promised well, but, unfortunately, the army was 
 hardly in a condition to execute it ; for, worn out in the hot 
 day's work, it had already lost its cohesion, and errors were 
 committed of which the Confederates speedily took advan- 
 tage. The batteries of Griffin and Ricketts, which had 
 played a brilliant part during the conflict, had been ordered 
 by General McDowell to the top of the ridge on the right, so 
 as to take advantage of the success gained. These batteries 
 were supported by the Fire Zouaves and Marines, while the 
 Fourteenth New York regiment was directed into a skirt of 
 wood on the right, to protect that flank. The quick eye of 
 Jackson, who held position in front, saw the exposed position 
 and feeble support of Griffin's battery, and he threw forward 
 the Thirty-third Virginia to take it. Nor till they emerged 
 from the skirt of woods, not a thousand yards distant, was 
 the danger known ; and when Griffin was about to open on 
 them, the chief of artillery. Major Barry, restrained him from 
 so doing, conceiving they were the Fourteenth New York, 
 
56 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOilAC. 
 
 that had been thrown into the woods on the right in support. 
 Jackson's men made a dash on the battery, and the sup- 
 ports giving way, took possession of the guns, many of 
 the cannoniers being shot down and the horses killed. 
 Fresh forces were, however, brought up, the Confederates 
 were driven back, and the guns retaken. Beauregard then 
 advanced the right of his line in an attempt to recover 
 the plateau and the guns. This effort was partially suc- 
 cessful, but it was met by a fresh rally of the Union forces ; 
 and thus the tide of battle repeatedly surged backwards and 
 forwards, with varying success to each combatant. Finally, 
 towards three in the afternoon, a fi'esh accession of force 
 having arrived from the incoming troops of Johnston, Beau- 
 regard made a determined effort to recover the disputed 
 plateau. The attack was vigorously made, and swept back 
 the Union forces from the whole open ground — the batteries 
 of Griffin and Kicketts being again and finally captured. 
 Still, the Union Hne, though shaken and giving ground, 
 did not yield the field. A fresh effort was even made 
 to extend the right so as to envelop the Confederate left. 
 While this movement was in execution, the brigade of 
 Early, the rear of the army of the Shenandoah, reached 
 the field from Manassas Junction, and coming in on 
 the Union right flank (exposed and badly placed),* deter- 
 mined the action. Many of the regiments, especially on that 
 wing, were ah-eady badly used up, and had lost their organ- 
 ization. The fire from the fresh arrivals doubled up this 
 flank and drove it back in a confusion which, presently, 
 involved the whole line, extending even to the left, which had 
 hitherto shown more consistency, and was even advancing. 
 The whole force was thrown back in disorder, across and 
 over the ridge, and over Young's Branch, and, in extreme 
 confusion, made in all available directions towards Bull Bun. 
 Every effort was made to rally the troops, even beyond the 
 
 * " The enemy's new formation exposed tis right flank more even than 
 the previous one. ' Johnston : Report of the Battle of Manassas. 
 
THE TUREE MONTHS' CAMPAIGN. 57 
 
 reacli of fire, but in vain. The battalion of Regulars, alone 
 justifying the traditions of military discipUne, made a brief 
 stand on the margin of the ridge, to allow the volunteers to 
 reach the Warrenton road. But the troops were rapidly 
 reaching that condition when it escapes the power of man to 
 hold them : there was running through them that mysterious 
 terror which the Greeks ascribed to the presence of Pan. 
 
 " The retreat," says McDowell, " soon became a rout, and 
 this presently degenerated into a panic." The troops fled 
 across Bull Run ; and once on the road, the diiferent bodies 
 coming together, and without ofiicers, became intermingled, 
 and all organization was lost ; while army trains and artillery 
 blocking the road, produced a hideous debase. At the same 
 time. Colonel Miles, who commanded the division of reserves, 
 and to whom was intrusted the duty of holding the Centreville 
 ridge from Centreville up to Blackburn's Ford, withdrew his 
 troops from these positions, uncovering the passage of the 
 stream to the Confederates, and exposing the whole retreating 
 mass to capture or destruction, — a fate which was averted by the 
 arrival of General McDowell, who ordered back Miles' troops 
 to their position, and by the inactivity of the Confederates. 
 Nothing Uke systematic pursuit was made, although a small 
 party of cavalry followed the retreat as far as Cub Eun. By 
 sundown, most of the army was safe behind the Centreville 
 ridge. There was, however, no question of halting there ; for 
 the condition of the army and the absence of supplies left no 
 alternative but to fall back ; and during the night the army 
 made its way to the Potomac. The retreat was marked by 
 great disorder, all semblance of military organization being 
 lost. Many did not even stop on reaching the camps south 
 of the Potomac, but fled by the bridges and ferries to Wash- 
 ington. Tliis, however, was at length stopped by Colonel 
 Sherman, who posted strong guards at the points of passage. 
 
 The Confederate loss in this action was 1852, of whom 269 
 were killed and 1438 wounded. The Union loss must have 
 been nealry 4000; the prisoners, well and wounded, left in 
 Beauregard's hands, numbered 1460. 
 
58 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AEMT OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 It is hardly necessary to seek any explanation of the events 
 of Bull Run, other than what arises from the consideration of 
 the simple fact that the battle was fought at all. McDowell's 
 plan of battle was well-considered, and even bold ; but the 
 faults of execution were innumerable. Owing to the absence 
 of any thing like a staff, the attack was made in a most frag- 
 mentary way, without order or ensemUe. Since the close of 
 the war, the writer of these pages has had with General 
 Johnston a very full conversation on this action ; and on the 
 question of the general management of the battle of Manas- 
 sas, he spoke as follows: "The key-point was a flat, bare 
 crest. It w^as here that the Federals made their attacks. 
 But they were made by a brigade at a time. The position 
 was really hardly tenable, and had an attack been made in 
 force, with double line of battle— such as any major-general 
 in the United States service would now make — we could not 
 have held it half an hour, for they would have enveloped us 
 on both flanks." 
 
 So far as regards the mere physical fact of fixjMing, which 
 was at the time the all-important question, there was noth- 
 ing of w^hich the Union soldiers had to be ashamed — they 
 stood up to it with the blood of their race. The fault lay in 
 the inherently vicious organization of the force — in the great 
 number of miserable subordinate officers, which in turn was 
 the natural result of the method of raising regiments. Yet, 
 with aU the faults, the action was for a time almost a success, 
 which shows that the Confederates were really in not much 
 better condition. Their chief point of advantage was in the 
 better class of officers created by their system. Nevertheless, 
 the victory long hung in the balance, and might readily have 
 declared itself on either side.* At the close of the action, the 
 
 * General Jordan, chief of staflf to Beauregard, informs me that while con- 
 ducting Jefferson Davis up to the battle-ground from Manassas Junction 
 during the progress of the action, and just a short time before the giving way 
 of the Union lines, such were the streams of stragglers and skulkers pouring to 
 the Southern rear, that Mr. Davis fancied Beauregard had been completely 
 beaten. Observing the fact that each even slightly wounded man was ea- 
 
THE THREE MONTHS' CAMPAKiN. 59 
 
 Southerners were hardly less demoralized than their oi^po- 
 nents, so that the idea of pursuit was not to be entertained. 
 On this point, again, the testimony of General Johnston is of 
 the highest value. " In our condition," said he, " pursuit 
 could not be thought of ; for we were almost as much dis- 
 organized by our victory as the Federals by their defeat. 
 Next day, many, supposing the war was over, actually went 
 home. A party of our soldiers, hearing that a fi-iend lay 
 wounded twenty miles off, would start out to go and see him ; 
 or that another acquaintance was dead, and they would go 
 and bury him. Our men had in a larger degree the instinct 
 of personal liberty than those of the North ; and it was found 
 very difficult to subordinate their personal will to the needs 
 of military discipline." * 
 
 Both sides, in fact, had much to learn ; and it is the fact 
 that the battle of Bull Run was the first great lesson which 
 the two armies received, that makes the events which trans- 
 pired on the plains of Manassas that July Sunday, forever 
 memorable in the history of the War. 
 
 corted by two or tliree comrades, Mr. Davis exclaimed to Jordan, " Battles are 
 not won where several unhurt men are seen carrying off each wounded soldier !" 
 * General Johnston in his official report says : " The war department has 
 already been informed of all the causes that prevented pursuit, some of which 
 only are proper to be communicated." I suppose, what is stated above, which I 
 had from General Johnston's own lips, supplies the rest. 
 
60 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 in. 
 
 THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINCtTON. 
 
 July, 1861— March, 1862. 
 
 I. 
 ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 When the army that so lately had gone forth with such 
 high hopes returned from Manassas shattered and discom- 
 fited to the banks of the Potomac, wise men saw there was 
 that had suffered worse defeat than the army — it was the 
 system under which Bull Kun had been fought and lost. The 
 lesson was a severe one ; but if it was needed to demonstrate 
 the legitimate result of the crude experimeutalism under which 
 the war had been conducted, — when campaigns were planned 
 by ignorant politicians, and battles, precipitated by the 
 pressure of sanguine journahsts, were fought by raw three 
 months' levies, — the price paid was perhaps not too high. 
 The Bull Kun experiment taught the country it was a real war 
 it had undertaken, and that success could only be hoped for 
 by a strict conformity to mihtary principles. 
 
 The spirit in which the country rose to meet the emergency 
 showed that it had benefited by the experience ; and if before 
 Bull Run the public mind had been in a mood to require just 
 such a stern lesson for reproof and correction and instruction, 
 it soon appeared that there was in it a temper to rise above the 
 worst lapses and failures. For then was seen that which again 
 and again throughout the war has been seen — a spectacle 
 
V 
 
 'y^pf^u/.^ 
 
THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. Gl 
 
 marvellous and majestic, when the nation, stirred to its depths, 
 uprose to meet the crisis that was upon it. Something of the 
 kind had been seen at the uprising that followed the assault 
 on Fort Sumter. But that was a manifestation less deep and 
 earnest than the swift, stern, almost savage vigor with which 
 the men of the North, wounded in the instinct of self-love as 
 well as in the sentiment of patriotism, arose to assert their 
 manhood, impugned by the humiliations of Bull Run. The 
 crisis was one fitted to test the mettle of the nation ; for had it 
 then shown the least supineness or hesitation, its doom had 
 been sealed. In a fortnight the terms of service of the sev- 
 enty-five thousand volunteers would have expired ; and the 
 Southern army, flushed with victory and doubled in material 
 strength, would have found the capital of the United States an 
 easy prey. 
 
 The nation ^rang spontaneously to arms. With incredible 
 rapidity new battahons were formed and forwarded to Wash- 
 ington ; and by the time the term of service of the provisional 
 troojjs had expired, their number had been more than re- 
 placed by fi'esh levies enlisted for three years or the war. 
 
 What the country could give — men, material, money — that 
 it gave lavishly, far outrunning the calls of the Government ; 
 but what it could not give was precisely what was most 
 urgently needed to vitalize these sinews of war, — to wit, ade- 
 quate leadership, and that soul of armies, the mind of a great 
 commander. For this the nation, keenly alive to its need, 
 could only breathe passionate aspirations. 
 
 General McDowell vacated the command of the army with- 
 out forfeiting the respect of his countrymen ; for, while he 
 had lost a battle, there was an instinctive consciousness that 
 he had been the victim of circumstances rather than of any 
 miscarriage of his own. And now there could be no doubt 
 regarding his successor ; for the general and consenting voice 
 of the North pointed to the young general who had just con- 
 cluded his campaign in the mountains of West Virginia as 
 the desired leader of the army. General McClellan, accord- 
 ingly, was summoned to Washington the day after Bull Rim. 
 
62 CAT»fPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 and placed iu command of the disorganized forces that had 
 returned from that untoward campaign, and of the rapidly 
 arriving regiments which the " populous North" was pouring 
 down fi-om all directions to Washington. Out of these 
 elements, an army was, first of all, to be fashioned. 
 
 General McClellan brought to his high trust proofs of 
 talent which, though not sufficient to show him a proper 
 captain of a great army, were yet enough to inspire the best 
 hopes of him. He had served with distinction in Mexico, had 
 studied war in Europe, was in the flower of his youth, and, 
 above all, had just finished a campaign that, by its success 
 amidst general failure elsewhere, seemed to furnish at once 
 the prestige and prophecy of victory. 
 
 The young chieftain threw himself with the utmost ardor 
 and energy into the work of moulding into form an army ade- 
 quate for the nation's needs. It was a colossal task ; for it 
 was necessary not merely to buUd up an army, but to make 
 the model on which the army should be built. The military 
 traditions of the United States, confined to the single cam- 
 paign in Mexico, afforded no groundwork for the organization 
 of such a military establishment as was now demanded for 
 the portentous task before the country. The regular army 
 kept on foot previous to the war was limited by law to 
 under twenty thousand men. But its whole internal organism 
 had been disrupted by secession, and it did not even form a 
 cadre on which it was possible to build. 
 
 The force around Washington, of which General McClellan 
 assumed command on the 27th of July, numbered about fifty 
 thousand infantry, less than a thousand cavalry, six hundred 
 and fifty artillerymen, with nine imperfect field-batteries of 
 thirty pieces. It still retained the provisional brigade-organi- 
 zation given it by McDowell ; but the utter collapse that 
 followed Bull Run had made it rather a mob than an army. 
 Desertions had become alarmingly numerous, and the streets 
 of Washington were crowded with straggling ofiicers and men 
 absent from their stations without authority, and indicating 
 by their behavior an utter want of discipline and organiza- 
 
THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. 63 
 
 tion.* To correct these abuses a stringent system of military 
 police was ai once adopted, and this measure was fullowed by 
 an immediate improvement in the morale of the troops. The 
 root of the exil, however, lay deeper — lay in the really \icious 
 system governing the primary organization of regiments and 
 the appointment of their officers.t Though General McClel- 
 lan was imable to strike at this, he endeavored, as far as 
 might be, to remedy its results ; and Congress having passed 
 a bill authorizing the President to dispense with the services 
 of inefficient officers, the Army of the Potomac was soon 
 weeded of several hundred worthless wearers of shoulder- 
 straps4 
 
 The problem of the best organization to be given a newly 
 formed army, is one that to this day has received no final 
 solution ; and whatever principle be adopted, the origi- 
 nal organization will be apt to require modification very 
 soon after entering upon a campaign. The division, com- 
 posed of two or more brigades, is, however, a permanent 
 unit : and General McClellan, after the regiments had been 
 
 * McClellan : Report, p. 9. 
 
 f Prince de Joinville : The Army of the Potomac, p. 17 ; Lecomte : Guerre 
 des Etats-Unis, p. 55. 
 
 In just views regarding this, as regarding most other matters relating to 
 the war, the people were much in advance of the Government ; and one of the 
 most curious instances of this is a formal memorial at this time addressed to 
 the President by " property holders of New York," regarding the system of 
 oflBcering regiments. This paper, marked by the soundest good sense, was 
 published in the New York journals of August 1, 1861. " They complain," 
 says the memorial, " that a suitable supervision has not been extended by Gov- 
 ernment to the officering of the volunteer forces ; that the principle of alloA%ing 
 companies to choose their own officers, or officers their own colonels, is fatal to 
 military discipline : that political, local, and personal interests have had far 
 too much sway in the selection of officers ; that undue laxity prevails in the 
 control of volunteer officers by their military superiors ; and that an ill-grounded 
 apprehensicjn of local or political censure has prevented the proper authorities 
 from removing incompetent commanders, and from placing in responsible 
 military positions those most capable of filling them, without regard to any 
 thing but their qualifications," etc., etc. 
 
 J After the institution of the qualifying examination, three hundred and ten 
 officers were dismissed, or their resignations accepted, within eight months. 
 
64 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 organized into brigades of four regiments each, and the bri- 
 gades had been somewhat disciphned and instructed, formed 
 •divisions of three brigades each.* But, in armies of above 
 sixty thousand men, it has been common, since the time of 
 Napoleon, to create from the assemblage of two or more divi- 
 sions the higher unit of the corps d'armee. As a theoretical 
 principle of organization, General McClellan was in favor of 
 the formation of corps ; but he wished to defer its practical 
 application until his division commanders should, by actual 
 experience in the field, acquire the requisite training to fit 
 them for commands so important, and until he should have 
 learned who of his divisional officers merited this high trust.f 
 There was much to justify this course, for there are few men 
 able to command a body of thirty thousand men ;:t^ and it is 
 worthy of note that it was not till the Army of Northern "Vir- 
 ginia had seen eighteen months of service that those at the 
 head of military affairs in Richmond organized corps. § This 
 hesitation, however, proved unfortunate for McClellan him- 
 self ; for, several months afterwards, and just as he was about 
 moving to the Peninsula, the President divided the Army of 
 the Potomac into four corps, and assigned to their command 
 men whom General McClellan would not have chosen ; 
 whereas, had he created corps at first, he might have made 
 his own selection.il 
 
 It next became necessary to create adequate artillery and 
 engineer establishments, to organize the cavalry arm, and to 
 
 * McClellan : Report, p. 11. 
 
 t Ibid., p. 53. 
 
 X " An armp corj)S rarely contains more than thirty thousand men, and often 
 lower, even among nations who have the greatest number of troops. Such a 
 command is a great burden, and few men are capable of managing it credita- 
 bly." Dufour: Strategy and Tactics, p. 81. 
 
 § The corps organization was created in the Confederate service immediately 
 after the battle of Antietam. 
 
 II General Hooker cannot be regarded as a partisan of General McClellan , 
 yet I have often heard him say that it would have been impossible for General 
 McClellan to have succeeded with such corps commanders as he had on the 
 Peninsula. 
 
THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. 65 
 
 pro\'ide for the administrative service of tlio quartermaster, 
 ordnance, commissary, and medical departments. 
 
 The task of forming au artillery establishment was facili- 
 tated by the fact that the country possessed in the regular 
 service a body of accomplished and energetic artillery officers.* 
 As basis of organization it was decided to form field-batteries 
 of six guns (never less than four guns, and the guns of 
 each battery to be of uniform cahbre) ;t and these were 
 assigned to divisions, not to brigades, in the proportion of 
 four batteries to each division ; one of which was to be a bat- 
 tery of Regulars, and the captain of the Eegular battery was in 
 each case appointed commandant of the artillery of the divi- 
 sion. In addition, it was determined to create an artillery 
 reserve of a hundred guns and a siege-train of fifty pieces. 
 This work was pushed forward with so much energy, that 
 whereas, when General McClellan took command of the army, 
 the entire artillery establishment consisted of nine imperfectly 
 equipped batteries of thirty guns, before it took ihe field this 
 service had reached the colossal proportions of ninety-two 
 batteries of five hundred and twenty guns, served by twelve 
 thousand five hundred men, and in full readiness for active 
 field-duty.:}: 
 
 With equal energy the formation of the engineer establish- 
 ment was entered upon ; and this included not only the train- 
 ing of engineer companies and the Corps of Topographical 
 Engineers, but the organization of engineer and bridge-trains 
 and equipage adequate for an army of first-class proportions. 
 At the same time, the entire system of the defences of Wash- 
 ington, both for the northern and southern side of the Po- 
 
 * The duty of organizing this arm was confided to Major (afterwards Brig- 
 adier-General) Barry, chief of artillery. 
 
 f " It was decided that the proportion of rifled guus should be one-third, 
 and of smooth-bores two-thirds — that the rifled guns should be restricted to the 
 system of the United States ordnance department and of Parrott, and the 
 smooth-bores to be exclusively the light twelve-pounder or Napoleon gun." — 
 Barry : Report of Artillery Operations, p. 106. 
 
 X Report of the Engineer and Artillery Operations of the Army of thf 
 Potomac, pp. lOG-109. 
 
 5 
 
60 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 tomac, was planned and carried into execution." Washing- 
 ton, in fact, assumed the aspect of a fortified capital, with a 
 system of defences so formidable that the enemy at no time 
 througliout the war attemj)ted seriously to assail that city.f 
 
 Such is but a faint setting forth of the manifold activities 
 evoked and directed towards the creation of the Army of the 
 Potomac by its new commander. It was a season of faithful, 
 fruitful work, amid which that army grew into shape and sub- 
 stance. And with such surprising energy was the work of 
 organization pushed forward, that whereas General McClellan 
 in July came into command of a collection of raw, dispirited, 
 and disorganized regiments, without commissariat or quarter- 
 master depai'tments, and unfitted either to march or fight, he 
 had around him at the end of three months a hundred thou- 
 sand men, trained and disciplined, organized and equipped, 
 animated by the highest spirit, and deserving the fond name 
 of The Grand Army of the Potomac. And certainly, if there 
 are portions of McClellan's subsequent mihtary career that 
 are open to animadversion, he yet challenges from all im- 
 partial minds the credit due this mighty performance.:!^ 
 
 Looking at the work he then initiated, in the only light in 
 which we can rightly appreciate it —as it stands related to 
 
 * These works were planned and executed by Major (afterwards Major- 
 General) Barnard, cliief-engineer of the Army of the Potomac. 
 
 f The theory of the system of defences of Washington is that upon which 
 the works of Torres Vedras were based — the occupation of commanding points 
 within cannon-range of each other by field-forts, the fire of which shall sweep 
 all the approaches, a connection being formed by infantry parapets easily im- 
 provised. The line, as it encircles the capital on both sides of the Potomac, 
 has a development of thirty-three miles. As to the value of this system of 
 defences for the safeguard of Washington, that is a vast, complex, and difficult 
 question, not to be entered on here. It has been very severely criticised by 
 Colonel Lecomte in his work, " Campagne de Virginie et de Maryland en 
 1863 ;" and to these animadversions a warm rejoinder has been made by Gen- 
 eral Barnard in " The Peninsular Campaign and its Antecedents." 
 
 j; History will not refuse to affirm of tliis work the judgment pronounced by 
 General McClellan himself: " The creation of such an army in so short a time 
 from nothing, will hereafter be regarded as one of the highest glories of the 
 itdministration and the nation." 
 
p 
 
 THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. C7 
 
 what "went before, and what came after it — it is manifest that 
 what gives it significance is that it represents science dis- 
 placing scioHsm, the untutored enthusiasm of a nation unused 
 to war, taught by a bitter experience to yiekl itself to the 
 cunning hand of discipline — that power which Carnot calls " the 
 glory of the soldier and the strength of armies."* If the Army 
 of the Potomac afterwards performed deeds worthy to live in 
 history, it is in no small degree due to the fact that the 
 groundwork of victory was laid deep and broad in that early 
 period of stern tutelage, when it learnt the apprenticeship of 
 war. If other generals, the successors of McClellan, were 
 able to achieve more decisive results than he, it was, again, in 
 no small degree, because they had ready to hand the perfect 
 instrument which he had fashioned. f 
 
 * " It is military discipline that is the glory of the soldier and the strength 
 of armies, for it is the foremost act of its devotion, and the most assured pledge 
 of -vdctory (le plus grand aete de son dewuement et le gage le plus assure de la 
 victoire). It is by it that all wills unite in one, and all partial forces conspire to 
 wards one end." Carnot : De la Defense des Places Fortes, p. 505. 
 
 f " Had there been no McClellan," I have often heard General Meade say, 
 " there could have been no Grant ; for the army made no essential improvement 
 under any of his successors." It was common throughout the war to ascribe 
 a high degree of discipline to the Confederate army — even higher than that of 
 the Army of the Potomac. But the revelations of the actual condition of that 
 army since the close of the war do not justify this assertion. On the contrary, 
 they show that the discipline of the Army of Northern Virginia was never 
 equal to that of the Army of the Potomac, though in fire and elan it was su- 
 perior. " I could always rely on my army," said General Lee, at the time he 
 surrendered its remnant at Appomattox Courthouse — " I could always rely on 
 my army for fighting ; but its discipline was poor." At the time of the Mary- 
 land invasion, Lee lost above twenty-five thousand men from his effective 
 strength by straggling, and he exclaimed with tears, " My army is ruined by 
 straggling !" Nothing could better illustrate the high state of discipline of the 
 Army of the Potomac, than its conduct in such retreats as that on the Pen- 
 insula and in the Pope campaign, and in such incessant fighting as the Rapidan 
 campaign of 1864. 
 
68 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 n. 
 
 PLANS OF CAMPAIGNS. 
 
 Three montlis of varied and fruitful activity thus passed, 
 and tlie close of autumn found around Washington an army 
 both formidable in numbers and respectable in efficiency. 
 There then arose the problem of putting it in motion ; and 
 this problem involved two questions — ivhen to strike, and 
 where? The latter was a question that concerned the 
 general-in-chief ; but the former was one that profoundly 
 touched the people, who, as the sustainers of the war, 
 *' thronged in and made their voice heard, and became par- 
 takers of the counsels of state."* 
 
 During that period in which the army was being formed 
 public remained silent. And there was in this silence some- 
 thing almost pathetic ; for, knowing that an undue urgency 
 for action, expressed through the public prints, had precipi- 
 tated the disastrous campaign that ended in Bull Kun, men 
 sought to make amends by a sedulous refraining from the like 
 again. General McClellan was left free to work his will ; 
 and, being strong in the trust of the country, he was "master 
 of the situation :" no monarch could be more so. 
 
 Yet it was manifest that this confidence was in pledge of 
 early and energetic action on the part of the commander ; for 
 the country had too much at stake, and the passions and 
 interests of men were too closely bound up with a speedy 
 suppression of the insm-rection, to brook a Fabian pohcy. 
 General McClellan had, in a public speech at the time he 
 assumed command of the Army of the Potomac, promised 
 that the war should be " short, sharp, and decisive." This 
 
 * Tliis is the striking expression employed by Mr. Kinglake in describing 
 tlie influence of English public sentiment in enforcing the War of the 
 Crimea. 
 
THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. 69 
 
 w'RS the very key-note on which all the motions of pubhii 
 sentiment tiu'ned. It was, therefore, in the highest degree 
 important for him to seize the first opportunity to justify, by 
 some palpable proof, that confidence which the country had 
 spontaneously extended to him. There was too little mod- 
 eration, too httle stability in the public judgment, to make it 
 possible that this condition of things should long continue. 
 The faith that had been freely bestowed would presently dis- 
 appear, unless contirined by deeds. 
 
 A commander who, under a popular government, is in- 
 trusted with the conduct of a war, has to shape his acts not 
 alone according to abstract military dictates, but must take 
 into account considerations of a political and moral order as 
 well. For the wishes, impulses, prejudices, ignorances even 
 of his countrymen, enter as really into the problem with which 
 he has to deal as the character of his enemy or the hnes 
 of military operation. A captain who is also king, may act 
 in quite difierent wise from a captain responsible to a Cabinet 
 or Congress, What a Caesar or a Napoleon might do, could 
 not be imitated by a Wellington or a Eugene ; and the history 
 of the latter illustrious commander, and his equally illustrious 
 colleague — Marlborough — shows, strikingly, how that even the 
 victor of Blenheim and KamiHes had to conform the inspira- 
 tions of his mihtary genius to the dull wits of a Dutch 
 States-General. McClellan, who had as yet done nothing to 
 prove himseK either a Wellington or a Eugene, should have 
 made the lightest jDossible draft on the indulgence of the people. 
 
 There is httle or no doubt that, thus far. General 
 McClellan had formed no other theory regarding the employ- 
 ment of the Army of the Potomac, than that which was 
 common throughout the country ; which, compendiously 
 stated, was to make a direct attack on the enemy in fit-ont of 
 Washington, and to make this attack as soon as possible.* 
 
 * Though General McClellan used to keep his own counsel, yet General 
 McDowell tells me he was wont, in their rides over the country south of tlie 
 Potomac, to point out towards the flank of Manassas and say, " We shail 
 strike tJiem trtere." 
 
70 CA]VIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 All his plans at this period contemplated a general advance 
 from Washington as early as the month of November ; and, 
 looking back to the middle of October, it appears from 
 General McClellan's own statement that he had at that time 
 upwards of one hundred and fifty thousand men under his 
 command, out of which, after deducting the forces to be 
 employed in garrisoning Washington, Baltimore, and Annap- 
 olis, and those assigned for guarding the hue of the Potomac, 
 he was able to place in the field a column for active operations 
 of above seventy -five thousand men.* 
 
 But about the time he had designed putting the army in 
 motion, General McClellan found himself, by his appoint- 
 ment as general-in-chief, charged not only with the direc- 
 tion of the Army of the Potomac but of all the other armies 
 in the field. He then began to change his views regarding 
 the line and method of operating against the enemy in Yir- 
 ginia ; and this led him to the adoption of a policy that 
 caused a delay of all active operations, lasting throughout 
 the whole winter and continuing till March, 1862, when the 
 movement to the Peninsula was begun.f This inactivity, by 
 
 * McCleUan : Eeport, p. 7. 
 
 f It would appear that it was during the month of November that General 
 McClellan first began to change his purpose of operating against the enemy in 
 front of Washington, and determined to assail Richmond from the coast. The 
 earliest recorded intimation of this change of purpose appears in a reply by 
 General McClellan to a memorandum drawn up by President Lincoln, suggest- 
 ing a movement on Manassas. This paper, with many others relating to his 
 own personal correspondence with General McClellan, was given the writer by 
 the late President during the summer of 1864. It is marked in Mr. Lin- 
 coln's hand as having been made " about the 1st of December, 1861." 
 
 " K it were determined to make a forward movement of the Army of the 
 Potomac, without awaiting further increase of numbers, or better drill and dis- 
 cipline, how long would it i-equire to actually get in motion ? 
 
 " [Answer in pencil by McClellan : ' If bridge trains ready, by December 15 
 — probably 25th.'] 
 
 " After leaving all that would be necessary, how many troops could join 
 the movement from southwest of the river ? 
 
 " [Answer in pencil, ' 71,000.'] 
 
 " How many from northwest of it ? 
 
THE ARMY BEFORE WASIIINQTON. 71 
 
 whatever military considerations it may Lave been justified 
 to General McClellan's own mind, was certainly very unfor- 
 tunate ; and, as it had afterwards an important bearing on 
 that commander's relations to the Administration, and has 
 since given rise to miicli antagonism of opinion, it will be 
 proper to consider briefly both the reasons which are thought 
 to justify and those which are thought to condemn it. 
 
 The points of defence of the inactivity of the Army of the 
 Potomac during the winter of 1861-2 may aU be included in 
 this summary : the yet imperfect organization, equipment^ 
 
 " [Answer in pencil, ' 33,000.'] 
 
 " Suppose, then, that of those southwest of the river [supplied in pencil, 
 ' 50,000'] move forward aud menace the enemy at Centreville ? 
 
 •' The remainder of the movable force on that side move rapidly to the 
 crossing of the Occoquan by the road from Alexandria towards Richmond ; 
 there to be joined by the whole movable force from northeast of the river, hav- 
 ing landed from the Potomac just below the mouth of the Occoquan, move by 
 land up the south side of that stream, to the crossing point named ; then the 
 whole move together, by the road thence to Brentville, and beyond, to the rail- 
 road just south of its crossing of Broad Run, a strong detachment of cavalry 
 having gone rapidly ahead to destroy the railroad-bridges south and north of 
 the point. 
 
 " K the crossing of the Occoquan by those from above be resisted, those 
 landing from the Potomac below to take the resisting force of the enemy in 
 rear ; or, if laud ing from the Potomac be resisted, those crossing the Occoquan 
 from above to take that resisting force in rear. Both points will probably not 
 be successfully resisted at the same time. The force in front of Centreville, if , 
 pressed too hardly, should fight back into the intrenchments behind them. 
 Armed vessels and transports should remain at the Potomac landing to cover 
 a possible retreat." 
 
 The following reply is in General McClellan's handwriting, dated Wash- 
 ington, December 10, and marked "confidential :" 
 
 " I inclose the paper you left with me — filled as you requested. In arri\ang 
 at the numbers given, I have left the minimum numbers in garrison and 
 observation. 
 
 " Information recently [received] leads me to believe that the enemy would 
 
 meet us in front with equal forces nearly — and I have now my mind actually 
 
 turned toicards another "plan of campaign that I do not think at all ariticipated 
 
 by the enemy, nor by many of our own people, 
 
 "George B. McClellan." 
 
 The " other plan of campaign," here foreshadowed, is of course no other than 
 the coast movement. 
 
72 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 aud discipline of the army ; the inadequacy of its force ; the 
 difficulty of winter campaigning in Virginia ; and the neces- 
 sity of a simultaneous movement throughout the entire 
 theatre of war. Some of these points are well taken, while 
 others will not stand a critical examination. 
 
 It is true that the army, though composed of material of 
 uncommon excellence, was necessarily green and had the 
 imperfections incident to improvised armaments ; and, no 
 doubt, it was in much better condition to move in April, 
 1862, than it could have been in November or December, 
 1861. But, assuredly. General McClellan over-estimates the 
 then condition of his opponent's army, when, in his report, 
 he speaks of its superior discipline, drill, and equipment. 
 There is now overwhelming evidence to show that, previously 
 at least to the organization of the permanent Confederate 
 Army in April, 1862, nothing could exceed the laxity of dis- 
 cipline, demoralization of temper, and inferiority in arms, 
 equipment, and means of transport that marked the Southern 
 force. It is true, also, that General McClellan was never 
 able to obtain quite the colossal force he had called for — a 
 movable column of one hundred and fifty thousand men, to- 
 gether with garrisons for Washington, Baltimore, etc., and 
 corps of observation for the fine of the Potomac, making the 
 enormous aggregate of two hundred and forty thousand men. 
 But it should be considered that this demand was based on 
 the theory set forth by General McClellan himself, that the 
 enemy had, in October, "a force on the Potomac not less 
 than one hundred and fifty thousand strong, well drilled and 
 equipped ;" whereas it is certain that General Johnston's 
 entire force barely exceeded one-third that number.* 
 
 * Several months ago General Johnston stated verbally to me that his recol- 
 lection of the maximum of his strength during this period was 54,000. Since 
 then, however, I have obtained in manuscript the consolidated monthly re- 
 ports of the Confederate armies. Johnston's strength, October 31, 1861, was 
 44,131 present for duty (present and absent 66,243) ; December 31st it was 
 62,113 present for duty (present and absent 98,088) ; February 28, 1862, it wag 
 47,617 (i>resent and absent 84,225). 
 
THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. 73 
 
 It is also true that military operations in a Virginia wintei 
 and ou a Virginia soil are attended with great difficulties ; and 
 no military student will, after the experience of the war, say 
 that it would have been practicable for General McClellan at 
 that season to undertake a grand operation, such as a cam- 
 paign against Richmond. But it was quite possible to have 
 made a special operation of the nature of a movement against 
 Johnston at Manassas. Had Johnston stood, a battle with 
 good prospect of success might have been delivered. But had 
 he, as there was great likehhood he would do, and as it is now 
 certain he would have done, fallen back from Manassas to the 
 line of tlie Bapidan, his compulsory retirement would have 
 been esteemed a positive victory to the Union arms.* And, 
 even had it been accounted impracticable to undertake a 
 movement against Manassas, there were still many incidental 
 
 * General McClellan liimself, in discussing the relative merits of a direct ad- 
 vance against tlie enemy at Manassas and a change of base to some point on 
 the lower Chesapeake, makes certain admissions that, considering the circum- 
 stances of the case, might well have decided him to take the former course. 
 He admits that an attack on the Confederate right flank by the line of the 
 Occoquan would, if successful, "prevent the junction of the enemy's right with 
 liis centre," affording the opportunity of destroying the former ; would " remove 
 the obstructions to the navigation of the Potomac ;" would " reduce the length 
 of wagon transportation," and would " strike directly at his main railway com- 
 munication." Now assuming the successful execution of this plan, what would 
 have been the result ? General McClellan himself sliall answer : 
 
 " Assuming the success of this operation and the defeat of the enemy as cer- 
 tain, the question at once arises as to the importance of the results gained. I 
 tliink these results would be confined to the possession of the field of battle, 
 the evacuation of the line of the upper Potomac by the enemy, and the moral 
 eflect of the victory ; important results, it is true, but not decisive of the war, 
 nor securing the destruction of the enemy's main army, for he could fall back 
 upon other positions, and fight us again and again, should the condition of his 
 troops permit." 
 
 A tactical victory in the field, the compulsory retreat of the enemy from his 
 cherished ]iosition, the relief of the blockade of the Potomac, and the " moral 
 effect of the victory," with the losses, disasters, and demoralization therefrom 
 resulting all of which General McClellan admits were within his grasp by 
 the movement indicated — were surely well worth the effort. True, the operation 
 would not have been " decisive of the war,"— for such was the grand but some- 
 what vague and, as has since appeared, misjudged ambition that possessed him. 
 
74 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 operations* that were perfectly feasible, and which, while 
 valuable in themselves, would have had the effect to satisfy 
 the country and consolidate the confidence of the people and 
 the Administration in General McClellan. 
 
 And it is precisely in this regard that General McClellan 
 showed himself deficient in certain qualities of mind indis- 
 pensable for one who has to deal with the larger questions of 
 war. If, as a soldier, he was right in wishing to postpone 
 grand military operations till spring, when the times and 
 seasons and circumstances should all favor ; when his army, 
 strengthened in numbers and tempered by discipline, would 
 be fit for the field ; when the full preparation of the other 
 armies would enable him to enter on large combinations, he 
 certainly showed a lack of that kind of political savoir /aire 
 and knowledge of human nature necessary to a great com- 
 mander, in remaining perfectly inactive. It was for him to 
 consider whether the increase in numbers and improvement in 
 discipline likely to accrue to his army in the mean time would 
 at all compensate for that loss of confidence, that popular impa- 
 tience, that political obstruction, which were certain to arise, 
 and which actually did arise. For so soon as the period of 
 reorganization had passed, the pubHc and the Administration 
 became naturally anxious to see the imposing army of a hun- 
 dred and fifty thousand men that had gTOwn up on the banks 
 of the Potomac turned to some account. And this anxiety 
 presently grew into an impatience, which at length broke out 
 in loud clamor that at once embarrassed the Government and 
 marred the harmonious relations between it and the com- 
 mander of the army. 
 
 It happened, too, that during this period there occurred a 
 series of untoward events that made a deep impression on 
 the people of the North, and tended both to grieve patriotic 
 men and stir up a bitter opposition to the commander held 
 responsible for them. The most important of these were the 
 
 * Among these General Barnard mentions the capture of Norfolk. The 
 Peninsular Campaign, p. 12. 
 
THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINQTON. 75 
 
 blockade of the Potomac and the disaster at Ball's Bluff, of 
 which events I must give a brief account. 
 
 Shortly after the battle of Bull Eun, the Confederates ad- 
 vanced their outposts from Centreville and Fairfax Court- 
 house forward as far as Munson's Hill, and almost to the 
 banks of the Potomac, — a move that was of no military value, 
 but which gave them the prestige of flaunting their flag within 
 view of the capitol of the nation. They then proceeded to 
 erect batteries at different points on the Yirginia side of the 
 Potomac, with the view of obstructing the navigation of the 
 river. So successfully was this work performed, that early in 
 October the flag-officer of the Potomac flotilla officially re- 
 ported the water highway by which a large part of the sup- 
 plies for the army around Washington was brought forward 
 from the North to be effectually closed.* This event, the 
 actual blockade of the capital, produced throughout the 
 country a deep feeling of mortification and humiliation, and 
 caUed forth bitter complaints against the Government. A 
 proposition was made to destroy these batteries by an assault- 
 ing force sent from the Maryland side of the river ; but the 
 enterprise was abandoned in consequence of an adverse report 
 from General Barnard, chief -engineer, t Meanwhile, the com- 
 mander was unwilling to undertake the destruction of the 
 batteries by the only method that promised success — to wit, 
 a movement by the right bank of the Potomac, — for the reason 
 that it would bring on a general engagement. 
 
 The affair of Ball's Bluff was of a kind to affect still more 
 powerfully the popular imagination ; for, while in itseK a 
 lamentable disaster, it seemed to reveal a strange looseness 
 and want of responsibility in. the conduct of military affairs. 
 It appears that on the 19th of October, General McCall was 
 ordered to make, with his division, a movement on Draines- 
 ville, for the purpose of covering reconnoissances in all direc- 
 tions to be made the following day. These reconnoissances 
 
 * Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 8. 
 \ McClellan : Report, p 50. 
 
76 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC 
 
 were successfully accomplished on the 20tli ; and General Mc- 
 Clellan, anticipating that this demonstration would hare the 
 effect of inducing the enemy to abandon Leesburg, directed 
 General Stone, whose division of observation was guarding 
 the left bank of the Potomac above Washington, with head- 
 quarters at PoolesviUe, to " keep a good lookout upon Lees- 
 burg," and suggested " a slight demonstration" as hkely to 
 have the effect of moving the enemy at that point. Accord- 
 ingly, on the afternoon of the 20th, Gorman's brigade was 
 sent to Edward's Ferry to make a display of force, and the 
 Fifteenth Massachusetts regiment, under Colonel Devens, was 
 sent to Harrison's Island, from which place a small scouting 
 party was about dark sent across by Ball's Bluff, to the Yir- 
 ginia side, and ordered to push out towards Leesburg and 
 report the position of the enemy. The reconnoitring party 
 having returned, bringing report of a small encampment of 
 the enemy within a mile of Leesburg, Colonel Devens was 
 ordered by General Stone to cross five companies of his regi- 
 ment to the Virginia shore, and advancing under cover of the 
 night to the enemy's camp, to destroy it at daybreak, and, after 
 making observation of the country, to return. The report 
 touching the enemy's encampment proved to be a mistake ; 
 but Colonel Devens found a wood in which he concealed his 
 men, and proceeded to examine the space between that and 
 Leesburg. About eight o clock, however, finding his position 
 discovered, he retired to the Bluff, but presently returned to- 
 wards Leesburg, and occupied the ground till towards one 
 o'clock ; when on being attacked by a regiment of the enemy, 
 he again fell back to a field in front of the bluff, where the 
 main action afterwards took place, and where was posted a 
 small supporting force under Colonel Lee. Meantime, in 
 tlie morning, General Stone had assigned to Colonel Bakei 
 the command of the right wmg at Ball's Bluff, giving him a 
 discretionary order either to retire the small force on the Vir- 
 ginia side, or to re-enforce it from his own brigade. Colonel 
 Baker determined on the latter course, and succeeded in ferry- 
 ing over about a thousand men of his command. These 
 
THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. 77 
 
 he united to the conjmands of Colonel Devens, wlio had mean- 
 while retired to the bluff, and of Colonel Lee ; and with this 
 force of aboiit one thousand eight hundred men formed hne 
 of battle in the field at the top of the bluff, where, about half- 
 past two in the afternoon, he began to receive the attack of 
 the enemy. The Southern force was composed of four regi- 
 ments, under command of Colonel Evans, who with his brigade 
 had been holding post at Leesburg. Finding that the small 
 Union force, which had been easily driven back fi-om its ad- 
 vance towards Leesburg, was constantly being re-enforced by 
 the fresh troops which Baker was bringing across the river, 
 Evans ordered a general attack. The action continued for 
 two hours ; the Confederates assaulting impetuously, and the 
 Union force stoutly resisting, though losing ground. In the 
 midst of the contest the commanding officer. Colonel Baker, 
 was killed ; and shortly afterwards the line, receiving a severe 
 fire on the left flank, retreated in disorder down the bluff 
 towards the river. Here, towards dusk, an appalling scene 
 ensued. The troops swarmed down the steep bluff, pursued 
 by the yelling Southerners, who shot and bayoneted them as 
 they ran. The means of transportation had been very in- 
 adequate ; the one flat-boat was soon swamped, the lifeboat 
 drifted down the stream, and the couple of skiffs which made 
 up the total were soon lost. Many were shot while in the 
 water ; many were drowned ; many surrendered ; others suc- 
 ceeded in swimming to the island. Not haK of those who Avent 
 over returned. 
 
 This lamentable affair discouraged the people of the North 
 as much as it elated the Southerners.* Its entire history 
 affords a striking exemphfication of the looseness of military 
 conduct and relations at that time. In venturing on the 
 undertaking. General Stone proceeded on the supposition that 
 General McCall, who, as General McCleUan informed him, 
 
 * In the hot and suspicious temper of the hour, the gravest charges were 
 brought against the commanding officer, who some time afterwards was placed 
 in arrest and confined to Fort Lafayette. From these charges a calmer survey 
 of the events completely exonerates General Stone. 
 
JS CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 had occupied Dramesville on the 20th, and was to " send out 
 reconnoissances in all directions," still remained there ; yet 
 McCall was withdrawn the following morning, when Stone 
 sent the force across the river, without the latter's being in- 
 formed of the fact. Again, though General McClellan did not 
 order the expedition across the river, yet on being informed of 
 the crossing during the day, he congratulated General Stone, 
 thereby inferentially approving it.* Stone's plan of opera- 
 tions lacked definite purpose : it was neither a feint nor a 
 serious attack. He seems to have left Colonel Baker in mis- 
 understanding as to the co-operation of the force at Edward's 
 Ferry ; and the conduct of Colonel Baker, — a high-spirited 
 and patriotic man, who had quitted his seat in the United 
 States Senate to take the field, — was without military skiU or 
 discretion. 
 
 These events could not fail to have a deeply depressing 
 effect on the public mind. It is vain to argue that the coun- 
 try should have subordinated its wishes to abstract military 
 necessities. Nor is it strange, as month after month passed 
 by in inaction, with the capital of the nation under blockade, 
 the foreign relations of the United States menacing war. 
 Secession gaining prestige day by day, while an army of por- 
 tentous strength lay as under a spell, that the deepest soUci- 
 tude should have overcome the hearts of men ; that the timid 
 should have begun to despair, and the proudest to hang their 
 heads with shame. These things came back upon the Admin- 
 istration in a pressure daily growing more and more oppres- 
 sive ; and when, towards the close of that gloomy year, the 
 commander of the Army of the Potomac being then sick, 
 President Lincoln called in several of the general officers to 
 counsel with him, he declared, in his sad, homely way, that " if 
 something could not soon be done, the hottom looidd he out of 
 the tvhole. affair, t 
 
 This exposition of the condition of the public mind is due 
 
 * Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. ii., p. 489. 
 \ McDowell : Manuscript Minutes of Council of War. 
 
THE ARMY BEFORE WASIITNGTON. 79 
 
 here ; bei^ause, if we sliall not be able to hold the Administra- 
 tion blameless in its dealings with General MeClellan, a jnst 
 verdict will at the same time not omit to estimate how severe 
 a demand that officer — unwisely, as we must think — made on 
 the country and the Government. 
 
 I now pass to the exposition of the cause that produced this 
 long and unfortunate inaction, and which will be found in the 
 already noted change of the plan of operations. There is 
 little doubt that, at the period to which this recital has 
 extended — namely, the close of the year 1861 — General Me- 
 Clellan had fully resolved upon acting against the enemy by a 
 flank movement by water instead of assailing him by direct 
 attack ; and as the adoption of the former course had a most 
 important bearing on the relations between the Executive and 
 the general-in-chief, I shall enter with some detail into the 
 origin and development of that plan of campaign that removed 
 the Army of the Potomac from the front of Washington to the 
 Peninsula. 
 
 The first formal discussion of a movement to the Lower 
 Chesapeake seems to have taken place at a series of war-coun- 
 cils held at Washington early in January, 1862. It appears 
 that at this time President Lincoln, troubled in spirit at the 
 condition of public affairs, and further distressed at the sick- 
 ness of General MeClellan, summoned the attendance of two 
 division commanders, to counsel with himseK and the mem- 
 bers of the cabinet as to the propriety of commencing active 
 operations with the Army of the Potomac. These officers 
 were Generals McDowell and Franklin. The former officer 
 committed to writing the substance of what passed at these 
 interviews, and the following is a transcript of his manuscript 
 minutes : 
 
 " Jantjaet 10, 1862. — At dinner at Ai'lington, Ya. Eeceived a note from 
 the Assistant-Secretary of War, saying the President wished to «ee me that 
 evening, at eight o'clock, if I could safely leave my post. Soon after I re- 
 ceived a note from Quartermaster-General Meigs, marked 'private and con- 
 fidential,' saving tlie President wished to see me. 
 
80 cajMpaigns of the army of the potomac. 
 
 *'Kepaired to the President's house at eight o'clock p. m. Found the 
 President alone. Was taken into the small room in the northeast corner. 
 Soon after we were joined by Bi-igadier-General Franklin, the Secretary of 
 State, Governor Seward, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Assistant- 
 Secretary of War. The President was greatly disturbed at the state of 
 affairs. Spoke of the exhausted condition of the treasury ; of the loss of 
 public credit ; of the Jacobinism of Congress ;* of the delicate condition of 
 our foreign relations; of the bad news he had received from the West, par- 
 ticularly as contained in a letter from General Halleck on the state of affairs 
 in Missouri ; of the want of co-operation between Generals Halleck and 
 Buell; but more than all, the sickness of General McOlellan. 
 
 " The President said he was in great distress, and as he had been to General 
 McCleUan's house, and the general did not ask to see him ; and as he must 
 talk to somebody, he had sent for General Franklin and myself to obtain our 
 opinion as to the possibility of soon commencing active operations with the 
 Army of the Potomac. 
 
 " To use bis own expression, ' If something was not soon done, the bottom 
 would be out of the whole affair ; and if General McClellan did not want to 
 use the army, he would like to borrow it, provided he could see how it 
 could be made to do something.' 
 
 "The Secretary of State stated the substance of some information he con- 
 sidered reliable as to the strength of the forces on the other side, which he 
 had obtained from an Englishman from Fort Monroe, Kichmond, Manassas, 
 and Centreville, which was to the effect, that the enemy had twenty thou- 
 sand men under Huger, at Norfolk ; thirty thousand at Centreville ; and in 
 all in our front, an effective force, capable of being brought up at short no- 
 tice, of about one hundred and three thousand men — men not suffering, but 
 well shod, clothed, and fed. In answer to the question from the President, 
 what could soon be done with the army, I replied that the question as to 
 the rcken must be preceded by the one as to the how and the ichere. That 
 substantially I would organize the army into four army corps, placing the 
 five divisions on the Washington side on the right bank. Place three of 
 these corps to the front — the right at Vienna or its vitinity, the left beyond 
 Fairfax Station, the centre beyond Fairfax Courthouse, and connect the lat- 
 
 * General McDowell's manuscript was submitted by the present writer to 
 President Lincoln, during the summer of 1864, and he indorsed its entire con- 
 tents as a true report of these war-councils, with the exception of the above 
 phrase, " the Jacobinism of Congress." His autograph indorsement on the 
 manuscript states that he had no recollection of using such an expression. It 
 may be supposed that the phrase expresses the impression produced on Mc- 
 Dowell's mind by Mr. Lincoln's words, though his precise language may have 
 been different. • 
 
THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. 81 
 
 ter place with the Orange and Alexandria Railroad by a railroad now par- 
 tially thrown x;p. This would enable us to supply these corps without the 
 use of horses;, except to distribute what was brought up by rail, and to act 
 upon the enemy without reference to the bad state of country roads. 
 
 " The railroads all lead to the enemy's po:^ition ; by acting upon them in 
 force, besieging his strongholds if necessary, or getting between them if pos- 
 sible, or making the attempt to do so and pressing his left, 1 thought we 
 should in the first place cause him to bring up all his forces and mass them 
 on the flank most pressed, the left; and possibly, I thought probably, wo 
 should again get them out of their works and bring on a general engage- 
 ment on favorable terms to us ; at all events keeping him fully occupied and 
 harrowed. The Fourth Corps, in connection with a force of heavy guns 
 afloat, would operate on his right flank beyond the^Occoquan, get behind 
 the batteries on the Potomac ; take Aquia, which being supported by the 
 Third Corps over the Occoquan it could safely attempt, and then move on 
 the railroad from Manassas to the Rappahannock, having a large cavalry 
 force to destroy bridges. I thought by the use of one hundred and thirty 
 thousand men thus employed, and the great facilities which the railroads 
 gave us, and the compact position we should occupy, we must succeed by 
 repeated blows in crushing out the force in our front, even if it were equal 
 in numbers and strength. Ihe road by the Fairfax Courthouse to Centre- 
 ville would give us the means to bring up siege-mortars and siege materials ; 
 and even if we could not accomplish the object immediately, by making the 
 campaign one of positions instead of one of manoeuvres, to do so eventually 
 and without risk. That this saving of wagon transportation should be 
 efifected at once by connecting the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad with the 
 Alexandria roads, by running a road over the Long Bridge. That when all 
 this could be commenced, I could better tell when I knew something more 
 definite as to the general condition of the army. 
 
 "General Franklin being asked, said he was in ignorance of many things 
 necessary to an opinion on the subject, knowing only as to his own division, 
 which was ready for the field. As to the plan of operations, on being asked 
 by the President if he had ever thought what he would do with this army if 
 he had it, he replied that he had, and that it was his judgment that it should 
 be taken, what could be spared from the duty of protecting the capital^ to 
 Torh Eiter to oijerate on Richmond. The question then came up as to the 
 means at hand of transporting a large part of the army by water. The As- 
 sistant Secretary of "War said the means had been fully taxed to provide 
 transportation for twelve thousand men. After some further conversation, 
 and in reference to our ignorance of the actual condition of the army, the 
 President wished we should come together the next night at eight o'clock, 
 and that General Franklin and I should meet in the mean time, obtain such 
 farther information as we might need, and to do so from the staff of the 
 
 6 
 
82 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AEMT OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 headquarters of the Army of the Potomac. Immediate orders were to he 
 given to make the railroad over Long Bridge. 
 
 " Jantjary 11. — Held a meeting with General Franklin, in the morning, at 
 the Treasury Building, and discussed the question of the operations which, 
 in our judgment, were best under existing circumstances — as season, present 
 position of the forces, present condition of the country — to be undertaken 
 before going into the matter as to when those operations could be set on 
 foot. I urged that we should now find fortifications in York Eiver which 
 would require a movement in that direction to be preceded by a naval force 
 of heavy guns to clear them out, as well as the works at "West Point. That 
 Richmond was now fortified; that we could not hope to carry it by a simple 
 march after a successful engagement ; that we should be obliged to take a 
 siege-train with us. That all this would take time, which would be im- 
 proved by the enemy to mass his forces in our front, and we should find 
 that we had not escaped any of the difficulties we have now before this po- 
 sition ; but simply lost time and money to find those difficulties when we 
 should not have so strong a base to operate from, nor so many facilities, nor 
 so large a force as we have here, nor, in proportion, so small a one to over- 
 come. That the war now had got to be one of positions, till we should 
 penetrate the line of the enemy. That to overcome him in front, or cut his 
 communication with the South, would, by its moral as well as physical efiect, 
 prostrate the enemy, and enable us to undertake any future operations with 
 ease, and certainty of success; but that in order of time, as of importance, 
 the first thing to be done was to overcome this army in our front, which is 
 beleaguering our capital, blockading the river, and covering us day by day 
 with the reproach of impotence, and lowering us in the eyes of foreign 
 nations, and our people both North and South ; and that nothing but what 
 is necessary for this purpose should go elsewhere. 
 
 "General Franklin suggested whether Governor Chase, in view of what 
 we were charged to do, might not be at liberty to tell us where General 
 Burnside's expedition had gone ? I went and asked him. He told me that, 
 under the circumstances, he felt he ought to do so ; and said it was destined 
 for Newbern, N. C, by the way of Hatteras Inlet and Pamlico Sound, to 
 operate on Raleigh or Beaufort, or either of them. That General McClellan 
 had, by direction of the President, acquainted him with his plans, which was 
 to go with a large force of this Army of the Potomac to Urbanna or Tappa- 
 hannock, on the Rappahannock, and then with his bridge-train move directly 
 to Richmond. On further consultation with General Franklin, it was agreed 
 that our inquiries were to be directed to both cases of going from our pres- 
 ent position, and of removing the large part of the force to another base 
 further South. A question was raised by General Franklin, whether in de- 
 ference to General McClellan we should not inform him of the duty we were* 
 ordered to perform. I said the order I received was marked private and 
 
THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. 83 
 
 confidential ; and as they carae from the President, our commandcr-in-cliief, 
 I conceived, as a common superior to Geaeral McClellan and both of us, it 
 was for the President to say this, and not us. That I would consult the 
 Secretary of the Treasury, who was at hand, and could tell us what was tlie 
 riiie in the cabinet in such matters. The secretary was of opinion that the 
 matter lay entirely with the President. We went to Colonel Kingsbury, 
 chief of ordnance of the Army of the Potomac, Brigadier-General Van 
 "Viiet, chief quartermaster, and Major Shlras, commissary of subsistence, 
 and obtained all the information desired. Met at the President's in the 
 evening at eight o'clock. Present, the same as on the first day, with 
 the addition of the Postmaster-General, Judge Blair, who came in after 
 the meeting had begun the discussion. I read a paper containing both 
 General Franklin's and my own views, General Franklin agreeing with 
 me — in view of time, etc., required to take this army to another base — 
 that operations could best now be undertaken from the present base, 
 substantially as proposed. The Postmaster-General opposed the plan, and 
 was for having the army, or as much of it as could be spared, go to York 
 Eiver or Fortress Monroe, either to operate against Richmond, or to Suffolk 
 and cut ofl[' Norfolk ; that being in his judgment the point (Fortress Mon- 
 roe or York) from which to make a decisive blow. That the plan of going 
 to the front from this position was Bull Run over again. That it was stra- 
 tegically defective, as was the effort last July. As then, we would have the 
 operations upon exterior lines. That it involved too much risk. That there 
 was not so much difBculty as had been supposed in removing the army down 
 the Chesapeake. That only from the Lower Chesapeake could any thing de- 
 cisive result against the army at Manassas. That to drive them from their 
 present position, by operating from our present base, would only force them 
 to another behind the one they now occupy, and we should have all our 
 work to do over again. Mr. Sewai-d thought if we only had a victory 
 over them it would answer, whether obtained at Manassas or further 
 south. Governor Chase replied iu general terms to Judge Blair, to 
 the effect that the moral power of a victory over the enemy, in his present 
 position, would be as great as one elsewhere, all else equal ; and the danger 
 lay in the probability that we should find, after losing time and millions, 
 that we should have as many difiiculties to overcome below as we now 
 have above. The President wished to have General Meigs in consultation 
 on the subject of providing water transportation, and desired General 
 Franklin and myself to see him in the morning, and meet again at three 
 o'clock p. M. the next day. 
 
 "January 12. — Met General Franklin at General Meigs'. Conversed with 
 him on the subject of our mission at his own house. I expressed my views 
 to General Meigs, who agreed with me in the main as to concentrating 
 our efforts against the enemy in front by moving against him from our 
 
84 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 present position. As to the time in which he could assenihle water transpor- 
 tation for thirty thousand men, he thought in about from four to six weeks. 
 Met at the President's. General Meigs mentioned the time in which he 
 could assemble the transports as a month to six weeks. The general subject 
 of operations from the present base was again discussed, General Meigs 
 agreeing that it was best to do so, and to concentrate our forces for the 
 purpose. The President and Mr. Seward said that General McClellan had 
 been out to see the President, and was looking quite well, and that now, 
 as he was able to assume the charge of the army, the President would 
 drop any further proceedings with us. The general drift of the conversa- 
 tion was as to the propriety of moving the army further south, and as 
 to the destination of Burnside's expedition. The Postmaster-General said 
 that if it was the intention to fight it out here (Manassas), then we ought to 
 concentrate. It was suggested and urged somewhat on the President to 
 countermand, or have General McOleUan countermand General Burnside's 
 expedition, and bring up at Aquia. The President was, however, exceed- 
 ingly averse from interfering, saying he disliked exceedingly to stop a thing 
 long since planned, just as it was ready to strike. Nothing was done but 
 to appoint another meeting the next day, at eleven o'clock, when we were 
 to meet General McClellan and again discuss the question of the movement 
 to be made, etc., etc. 
 
 "Monday, JAmiAET 13.— Went to the President's with the Secretary of 
 Treasury. Present, the President, Governor Chase, Governor Seward, 
 Postmaster-General, General McClellan, General Meigs, General Franklin, 
 and myself, and, I think, the Assistant Secretary of War. The President, 
 pointing to a map, asked me to go over the plan I had before spoken to 
 him of. He at the same time made a brief explanation of how he came to 
 bring General Franklin and General McDowell before him. I mentioned in 
 as brief terms as possible what General Franklin and I had done under 
 the President's order, what our investigations had been directed upon, 
 and what were our conclusions as to going to the front from our present 
 base, in the way I have heretofore stated, referring also to a transfer 
 of a part of the army to another base further south. That we had been in- 
 formed that the latter movement could not be commenced under a month 
 to six weeks, and that a movement to the front could be undertaken in 
 aU of three weeks. General Franklin dissented only as to the time I 
 mentioned for beginning operations in the front, not thinking we could 
 get the roads in order by that time. I added, commence operations in all of 
 three weeks ; to which he assented. I concluded my remarks by saying 
 something apologetic in explanation of the position in which we were. To 
 which General McClellan replied somewhat coldly, if not curtly — 'You are 
 entitled to have any opinion you please 1' No discussion was entered into 
 bj him whatevei', the above being the only remark he made. General 
 
THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. 85 
 
 Fi-anklin said that, in giving his opinion as to going to York River, ho did it 
 knowing that it was in the direction of Genera) MeOlellan's plan. I said 
 that I had acted entirely in the dark. General Meigs spoke of his agency 
 in having us called in by the President. The President then asked what 
 and when any thing could be done, again going over somewhat the same 
 ground he had done with General Franklin and myself. General McClellan 
 said the case was so clear a blind man could see it, and then spoke of the 
 difficulty of ascertaining what force he could count upon ; that he did not 
 know whether he could let General Butler go to Ship Island, or whether he 
 could re-enforce Burnside. Much conversation ensued, of rather a general 
 character, as to the discrepancy between the number of men paid for and 
 the number effective. The Secretary of the Treasury then put a direct 
 question to General McClellan to the effect as to what he intended doing 
 with his army, and when he intended doing it ? After a long silence, Gen- 
 eral McClellan answered that the movement in Kentucky was to precede any 
 one from this place, and that that movement might now be forced ; that he 
 had directed General Buell if he could not hire wagons for his transporta- 
 tion, that he must take them. After another pause he said he must say he 
 was very unwilling to develop his plans, always believing that in military 
 matters the fewer persons who were knowing to them the better; that he 
 would tell them if he Avas ordered to do so. The President then asked him 
 if he counted upon any particular time; he did not ask what that time was, 
 but had he in his own mind any particidar time fixed when a movement 
 could be commenced. He rephed he had. Then, rejoined the President^ I 
 will adjourn this meeting." 
 
 It need hardly be said that the plan of campaign that 
 General McClellan had in his mind, and which he was un- 
 w^illing to disclose in presence of his subordinates and an un- 
 mihtary council, was the project of attacking Eiehmond by 
 the low^er Chesapeake. A few days afterwards he fully de- 
 veloped this plan in a letter to the President, and the result 
 was that the President disapproved it and by an order issued 
 on the 31st of January, substituted one of his own.* This 
 order was as follows : 
 
 Special War Order, No. 1. 
 
 ExEcrrrvE Mansion, Washington, January 31, 1862. 
 Ordered, Tliat all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after 
 pro\'iding safely for the defence of Washington, be formed into an expedi- 
 
 * McaeUan : Report, p. 42 
 
86 CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARMT OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 tion for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the 
 railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction, all details 
 to be in the discretion of the commandei*-in-chief, and the expedition to 
 move before or on the 22d day of Februai*y next. 
 
 Abraham Lincoln, 
 
 The operation here indicated is that of a flanking move- 
 ment on the enemy's position at Manassas. Now, it is due to 
 add that in thus disapproving the plan of operations of Gen- 
 eral McClellan and substituting one of his own, there is con- 
 clusive evidence to show that the President was moved less 
 by any consideration of the relative strategic merits of the 
 two plans of campaign, than by the question of time in regard 
 to the commencement of active operations. With him this 
 was the controlling circumstance ; for the anxiety on the 
 part of the Administration for an immediate movement of the 
 Army of the Potomac had become what General McClellan 
 calls " excessive ;"^ and four days before the order of the 
 31st January, dictating a movement of the Army of the Poto- 
 mac against Manassas, the President had decreed that " a 
 general movement of the land and naval forces of the United 
 States against the insurgent forces should be made on the 
 22d day of February."! It is obvious, therefore, that the 
 
 * " About the middle of January, 1863, upon recovering from a severe illness, 
 I found that excessive anxiety for an immediate movement of the Army of the 
 Potomac had taken possession of the minds of the Administration." McClellan's 
 Report, p. 43. 
 
 f This order, styled " President's General War Order, No. 1," was issued on 
 the 37th of January, without consultation with General McClellan (Report, 
 p. 43). It is as follows : 
 
 ExEOUTiVE Mansion, Washington, January 27, 1862. 
 
 Ordered, That the 33d day of February, 18G3, be the day for a general move- 
 ment of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent 
 forces. That especially the army at and about Fortress Monroe, the Army of 
 th.e Potomac, the Army of Western Virginia, the army near Mumfordsville, 
 Kentucky, the army and flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf ot 
 Mexico, be ready to move on that day. 
 
 That aU other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, 
 
THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. 87 
 
 President, having categorically ordered a general movement 
 of all the armies to be made on the 22d of February, was 
 forced to the next step of prescribing for the operations of the 
 Ai'my of the Potomac a plan of campaign which could be 
 undertaken at the time fixed. It was impossible that McClel- 
 lan's project could be initiated at the appointed period ; for 
 not only was it necessary to put in execution the difficult task 
 of moving the army and all its material to the designated 
 point on the Lower Chesapeake, but it was necessary first of 
 all to provide the vast amount of water transportation need- 
 ful for so colossal an enterprise. Hence the order for a dkect 
 movement on Manassas. Upon the receipt of this order, 
 General McClellan lost no time in seeing the President and 
 requesting to know whether this order was to be regarded as 
 final, and whether he could be permitted to submit in writing 
 his objection to the plan of the Executive and his reasons for 
 preferring his own. Permission was accoi;ded, and on the 
 3d of February the general-in-chief submitted, in a paper to 
 the Secretary of War, an elaborate discussion of the two 
 plans of campaign.* Wbether from the force of reasoning 
 of the paper, or from other and extrinsic considerations,! the 
 result was that the President rescinded his order for the 
 movement on Manassas; and on the 27thL of February the 
 War Department instructed its agents to procure at once the 
 
 obey existing orders for fhe time, and be ready to obey additional orders when 
 duly given. 
 
 That the beads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of 
 tbe Navy, with all tbeir subordinates, and the general-in-chief, with all other 
 commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, vnll severally be held 
 to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order. 
 
 Abraham: Ltncolk. 
 
 * Report, pp. 43-48. 
 
 f Mr. Raymond, editor of the New York Times, who had the best means of 
 knowing the secrets of the Presidential mind, remarks : " The President was 
 by no means convinced by General McClellan's reasoning ; but in consequence 
 of his steady resistance and unwillingness to enter upon the execution of any 
 other plan, he assented," etc. History of the Administration of President Lin- 
 coln, p. 225. 
 
88 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AEMT OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 necessary steamers and sailing-craft to transport the Army of 
 the Potomac to its new field of operations. 
 
 Even after this step had been taken, however, the Presi- 
 dent, convinced against his will, retained his aversion to the 
 proposed movement. He repeatedly expressed his dissatis- 
 faction at the project of removing the army from Washing- 
 ton, and preferred that an operation should be made for 
 opening the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad by a movement 
 across the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, and another for the 
 destruction of the enemy's batteries on the Potomac. Gen- 
 eral McClellan seems to have been able to overcome these 
 objections by a recital of the same considerations he had pre- 
 viously presented ; but, on the 8th of March, the President 
 returned w^itli renewed vigor to his old position, and urged 
 him to submit his project of campaign to a council of his 
 division commanders. The meeting was accordingly held the 
 same day. The commanding general laid before his officers 
 the inquiry, whether it were advisable to shift the base of 
 operations. The plan of a change of base to the lower Chesa- 
 peake was approved by eight out of the twelve generals 
 present. 
 
 Impressed by the emphasis of the approval which General 
 McClellan's plan received in the adhesion thereto of two to 
 one of the chief officers of the army, the President, never- 
 theless, saw fit to bind the execution of the plan, which he 
 could now do no less than approve, by several embarrassing 
 restrictions, contained in two important war-orders issued on 
 the 8th of March. The first of these orders directed the 
 organization of the Army of the Potomac into four corps, and 
 nominated four generals to their command. These officers 
 were not of General McClellan's selection, while their ap- 
 pointment excluded certain other officers upon whom he had 
 fixed for corps commanders.* The second of these orders 
 
 * The officers nominated to the command of the corps into which the 
 Army of the Potomac was divided were, Generals Keyes, Sumner, Heintzel- 
 man, and McDowell. The latter was well fitted for the command by hi? 
 ability, but the relations between him and the commander were not cordial. 
 
THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. 89 
 
 prescribed tlie conditions upon which a change of base wotild 
 be allowed, and is in the following terms : 
 
 General War Order, No. 3. 
 
 Executive Mansion, Washington, March 8, 1862. 
 
 Ordered^ That no change of the base of operations of the Army of the 
 Potomac shall be made without leaving in and about Washington such a 
 force as, in the opinion of the general-in-chief and the commanders of 
 army corps, shall leave said citj entirely secure. 
 
 That no more than two army corps (about fifty thousand troops) of said 
 Army of the Potomac shall be moved en route for a new base of operations, 
 until the navigation of the Potomac from "Washington to the Chesapeake 
 Bay shall be freed from the enemy's batteries and other obstructions, or 
 until the President shall hereafter give express permission. 
 
 That any movement as aforesaid, en route for a new base of operations, 
 which may be ordered by the general-in-chief, and which may be intended 
 to move upon the Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as 
 early as the 18th of March ; and the general-in-chief shall be responsible 
 that it so moves as early as that day. 
 
 Ordered^ That the army and navy co-operate in an immediate effort to 
 capture the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac between Washington and 
 the Chesapeake Bay. Ajbeaham Lincoln. 
 
 L. Thomas, Adjutant General. 
 
 It is easy to see what must have been the result of this 
 fatal indecision, vacillation, and want of harmony between the 
 Administration and the chief of the army ; but it happened 
 that this clash of opinion was suddenly interrupted by an 
 event that made a complete change in the military situation. 
 This event was no less than the sudden evacuation of Manas- 
 
 General Sumner was the ideal of a soldier ; but he had few of the qualities 
 that make a general. The others do not call for any analysis. I have, in a 
 previous part of this volume (p. 64), set forth the views of General McClellan 
 touching the organization of corps ; and, as there remarked, his failure to make 
 appointments to these commands at the time he was all-powerful resulted in 
 is having forced upon him as lieutenants men he did not wish in that capacity. 
 It would appear, from a curious piece of history detailed in the Journal of the 
 Committee on the Conduct of the War, that it was through the pressure of the 
 members of that committee, and of the new Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, 
 that corps were at this time formed ; and, indeed, by them, as a species of 
 Anlic Council, that all the larger war-questions were determined, i 
 
 t 
 
90 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 sas by the Confederate Army, and its retirement behind the 
 line of the EajDpahannock. General Johnston, who, a con- 
 siderable time previously, had formed the design of retiring 
 nearer his base, had for two weeks been preparing the 
 evacuation by the quiet removal of the army-stores and war- 
 material ; and when he finally withdrew his army from 
 Manassas, on the 8th of March, so skilfully was the enter- 
 prise managed, that the first intimation thereof gained by the 
 Union forces was from the smoke of the burning huts, fired 
 by the Confederates on their retirement ! With a view rather 
 of giving the troops some experience on the march and biv- 
 ouac than for the purpose of pursuit, General McClellan 
 ordered a forward movement of the army towards Centreville 
 the next day, and immediately dispatched two regiments of 
 cavalry under Colonel Averill to Manassas. A few days after- 
 wards, a large body of cavalry, with some infantry, under 
 command of General Stoneman, was sent along the Orange 
 and Alexandria Railroad to determine the position of the 
 enemy, and, if possible, force his rear across the Kappahan- 
 nock; but the roads were in such condition that, finding it 
 impossible to subsist his men, Stoneman was forced to return 
 after reaching Cedar Run. It was found that the enemy had 
 destroyed aU the bridges. This expedition was followed by a 
 strong reconnoissance of Howard's division of Sumner's corps 
 to the Rappahannock, and, under cover of this mask, the main 
 body of the Union army was moved back to the vicinity of Alex- 
 andria. Johnston, who had retired behind the Rappahannock, 
 finding on survey that the Rapidan afforded a better line, moved 
 his army thither, and placed it in position on that river.* 
 
 The Confederate abandonment of Manassas necessitated 
 several changes in the projected campaign. In his proposed 
 scheme of transferring his army to the lower Chesapeake, 
 General McClellan's favorite point for the new base of opera- 
 tions had been Urbana on the Rappahannock. But this en- 
 
 * I derive these facts toucliing the evacuation of Manassas from General 
 Jolmston himself. 
 
THE AKMY BEFORE WASHINtrTON. 91 
 
 terprise, which had for its object to cut off the retreat of the 
 Confederates on Richmond, of course became impossible after 
 they had retired behind the Rappahannock. There now re- 
 mained the move to the Peninsula, — a move which he had 
 considered in his general plan, but which he regarded as less 
 brilliant and promising less decisive results. This project 
 was submitted to a council of the corps commanders while at 
 Fau-fax Courthouse, on the 13th of March, and by them it 
 was unanimously approved, provided the Merrimac (which a 
 few days before had made its destructive raid on the vessels 
 in Hampton Roads, and was now at Norfolk) could be neu- 
 tralized ; that means of transport for the army were at hand ; 
 that a naval force could be obtained to aid in silencing the 
 enemy's batteries on the York River ; and that sufficient force 
 should be left to cover Washington, to give an entire feeling 
 of security. The proceedings of this council were submitted 
 to the President, by whom they were approved, upon con- 
 dition that Washington should be made entirely safe, and 
 Manassas Junction occupied in sufficient force to prevent its 
 repossession by the enemy. 
 
 General McClellan immediately began his preparations in 
 accordance with these instructions. The duty of covering 
 the line of the Potomac and Washington he assigned to 
 General Banks, commanding the Fifth Corps, and at this 
 time holding the Shenandoah Valley. General Banks was 
 ordered to post the bulk of his command, well intrenched, at 
 Manassas ; from thence to repair the Manassas Gap Railroad 
 to Strasburg — to be held by a force intrenched, — thus re- 
 opening communication with the Shenandoah Valley : this 
 general line to be held with cavalry well to the front.* Just 
 as General Banks was about to move his corps to Manassas, 
 however, there occurred a series of events that compelled 
 him to retain the greater part of his force in the Shenandoah 
 Valley. At the time of the evacuation of Manassas by the 
 enemy, Stonewall Jackson, with his division of about eight 
 
 * Instructions to General Banks : Report, p. GO. 
 
92 CAI^IPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 thousand men, was posted at Winchester — the Union troops 
 occupying Charlestown ; but on the advance of General 
 Banks' force, on the 12th of March, he retreated ; and, pur- 
 sued by the division of Shields , retired twenty miles south of 
 Strasburg. Under cover of this advance, the first division of 
 Banks' corps was, on the 20th, put en route for Manassas, and 
 Shields fell back to Winchester. Jackson, informed probably 
 of the withdrawal of the troops from the Valley, but exagger- 
 ating its extent, returned upon his steps, and, on the 
 afternoon of the 23d, attacked Shields near Winchester. 
 Jackson met a severe repulse, after which he made his way 
 southward. This affair caused General Banks to return him- 
 self, as also to recall the division then on the march for 
 Manassas ; and after this, events so shaped themselves, that 
 Banks' command was retained in the Shenandoah Valley, and 
 General Wadsworth was placed in command of the forces for 
 the protection of the national capital. 
 
 To provide for the security of Washington was General 
 McClellan's next care, and for this purpose he left behind a 
 force of above seventy thousand men, with one hundred and 
 nine pieces of hght artillery. These troops were not, it is 
 true, all concentrated at Washington, but they were all avail- 
 able for its defence.* 
 
 Meantime, the task of collecting water transportation, and 
 embarking the troops for the proposed expedition, was being 
 pushed forward with the utmost energy. Unhappily, how- 
 ever, while every thing seemed to be under way, certain 
 occurrences took place that marred the auspicious circum- 
 stances that should have attended the expedition. 
 
 * The troops left beliind by General McClellan were as follows : 
 
 In garrison and in front of Washington 18,000 
 
 At Warren ton 7,780 
 
 At Manassas 10,859 
 
 In the Shenandoah Valley 35,467 
 
 On the lower Potomac 1,350 
 
 In all 73,456 
 
THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. 93 
 
 Upon the evacuation of Manassas, General McClellan, who 
 had, since the retirement of Lieutenant-General Scott in the 
 preceding November, exercised the functions of general-in- 
 chief, was reHeved fi-om the control of the armies in the field, 
 and relegated to the command of the Army of the Potomac. 
 At the same time, the troops in "Western Virginia were placed 
 under General Fremont, who was assigned to what was called 
 the " Mountain Department." Now, a few days before he 
 sailed for Fortress Monroe, General McClellan had been in- 
 formed by the President that a strong " pressure" had been 
 brought to bear at Washington to procure the detachment of 
 Blenker's division of ten thousand men from the Army of the 
 Potomac, in order that it might be added to the force under 
 General Fremont. The President, apparently fully alive to 
 the impoUcy of depriving him of so considerable a body of 
 men, on whom he had relied in forming his plan of 
 campaign, assured General McClellan that he had decided to 
 aUow the division to remain ; nevertheless, the very day 
 before that officer left Alexandria, he received a note from 
 the President, stating that he had been constrained, by the 
 severity of the pressure, to order the division of Blenker to 
 Fremont.* It will, moreover, presently appear, that scarcely 
 had the army landed on the Peninsula, when, notwith- 
 standing the President's emphatic assurances that no more 
 troops should be detached from McCleUan's command, the 
 whole of McDowell's corps, whose arrival he was impatiently 
 awaiting, for the purpose of making with it a turning move- 
 ment on Yorktown, was taken from him, and General 
 McDowell with his troops assigned to the new department of 
 the Eappahannock. The reason assigned for this measure 
 was, that General McClellan had not left behind a sufficient 
 force for the protection of the capital. The result of this ac*» 
 will presently appear. 
 
 It is impossible to review the series of events here recorded 
 
 * Report, p. 63. 
 
94 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 ■without a deep sense of pain and humiliation. A sufficient 
 time has since elapsed to permit those who have at heart 
 rather the vindication of historic truth than the partisan sup- 
 port of either side, to see that grave faults were committed 
 both by the Administration and by General McClellan. 
 While we are bound to believe that each was moved by 
 the sincere desire to bring the war to a successful issue, each 
 did much to frustrate the very object they had mutually at 
 heart. 
 
 On the part of the Administration, a definite plan of cam- 
 paign should have been promptly adopted and vigorously 
 executed. When McClellan presented his scheme of a change 
 of base to the lower Chesapeake, the project should either 
 have been frankly approved or frankly disapproved. The 
 plan was meritorious, and promised brilliant and decisive 
 results. 
 
 But the President first disapproved it, on the ground that it 
 would require too long a time to be put into execution. 
 
 He then approved it ; but for almost a month withheld the 
 order to provide water transportation to carry the plan into 
 effect. 
 
 Having at length taken this step, and while the costly prep- 
 arations were, by his own order, in the full course of execu- 
 tion, he renewed all his old objections to removing the army 
 from the front of Washington, and required that the question 
 should be submitted to a council of McClellan's generals. 
 
 These officers having approved the project, the Executive 
 once more assented ; but tied up his approval with the foolish 
 restriction that not more than one-half the army should be 
 taken away, until the enemy's batteries were destroyed, — an 
 enterprise which would have involved a movement of the 
 whole army, and which was, besides, certain to be the blood- 
 less fruit of the execution of the general plan. 
 
 Again, when the evacuation of Manassas had so far neces- 
 sitated a change of plan, that it was determined to seek a new 
 base of operations at Fortress Monroe, and the council of 
 corps commanders, to whom the President had referred the 
 
THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. 95 
 
 dedsion of tlie question, liad approved it on certain conditions 
 as to the safety of Washington, etc., the President further 
 embarrassed the operation by insisting on the presence of a 
 large force at Manassas, — a measure not dictated by any sound 
 military consideration. 
 
 From a still weaker motion, he ordered the detachment of 
 Blenker's division from the command of McClellan, and trans- 
 ferred it to General Fremont. 
 
 And finally, moved by morbidly recurring fears for the se- 
 curity of the capital, no sooner had McClellan left for his new 
 field of operations, than the President further stripped him of 
 the powerful corj)S of McDowell, to retain it in front of Wash- 
 ington. 
 
 The secret of much of this conduct, were one disposed here 
 to seek it, would doubtless be found in a " pressure" of the 
 same kind and coming from the same source as that the 
 President urged to General McClellan in excuse for depriving 
 him of Blenker's troops. There had already sprung up at 
 Washington a group of men, cherishing a violent hostility to 
 General McClellan on account of his so-called " conservative" 
 poHcy. Uninstructed in war, these men were yet influential, 
 persistent, and had the ear of the President ; but while it is 
 easy to understand the ascendency which they gained over a 
 character like that of Mr. Lincoln, the concession is unfor- 
 tunate for his reputation as a statesman. 
 
 General McClellan should either have been removed from 
 command, or he should have been allowed to work out his 
 own plans of campaign, receiving that " confidence and cordial 
 support" promised him by the President when he assumed 
 command, and "without which," as Mr. Lincoln justly added, 
 "he could not wdtli so full efiiciency serve the country." It is 
 a jealous function that of mihtary command, and, as the 
 whole history of war teaches, can only be effectively exercised 
 when accompanied with an entire freedom of action on the 
 part of the commander, and cordial co-operation and stipport 
 on the part of the Government. If there be any sure lesson 
 taught by the military experience of nations, it is that when 
 
96 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 extrinsic influences, wlietlier from councils, or congresses, oi 
 war-offices, intrude into the direction of military affairs, all 
 hope of success is gone. History has chosen to express it? 
 views of this kind of interference in the contumely with which 
 it has covered the Austrian Aulic Council ; but the Auhc Coun- 
 cil was composed at least of military men. Of what was the 
 American council composed ? True, it was inevitable that, in 
 a war such as that which fell upon the United States, con- 
 siderations of a kind that may be called political should have 
 a great part to play ; and the determination of the poHcy of 
 the war was certainly a question that came within the prov- 
 ince of statesmanship, and which, when adopted in the coun- 
 cils of the Government, the commander in the field was bound 
 to adhere to and carry out. But beyond this, and in the 
 sphere of the actual conduct of the war, the general must be 
 head and supreme. " In my judgment," says the greatest of 
 theoretical writers on the art of war, discussing the part taken 
 by the Aulic Council of Vienna in directing the operations of 
 the Austrian armies, " the only duty which such a council can 
 safely undertake is that of advising as to the adoption of a 
 general plan of operations. Of course, I do not mean by this 
 a plan which is to embrace the whole course of a campaign, 
 tie down the generals to that course, and so inevitably lead to 
 their being beaten. I mean a plan which shall determine the 
 objects of a campaign ; decide whether offensive or defensive 
 operations shall be undertaken, and fix the amount of material 
 means which may be relied upon in the first instance for the 
 opening of the enterprise, and then for the possible reserves 
 in case of invasion. It cannot be denied that all these things 
 may be, and even should be, discussed in a council of govern- 
 ment made up of generals and of ministers ; but here the ac- 
 tion of such a council should stop ; for if it pretends to say to 
 a commander-in-chief not only that he shall march on Vienna 
 or Paris, but also in what way he is to manoeuvre to reach 
 those points, the unfortunate commander-in-chief will certainly 
 be beaten, and the whole responsibihty of his reverses wiU rest 
 upon those who, two hundred miles off from the enemy, pre- 
 
THE ARMY BEFORE WASHINGTON. 97 
 
 tend to direct an army which it is difficult enough to handle 
 when actually in the field."* 
 
 On the other hand, it is to be admitted that General 
 McClellan, too, committed grave faults. He had already put 
 the jjatience of the public and the Administration to a severe 
 strain by his six months' inactivity ; and in proposing to 
 remove his army fi'om the fi'ont of Washington, he made 
 another and peculiarly heavy draft upon their confidence. In 
 this he again exposed himself to the criticism ah-eady made 
 respecting his deficiency in those statesmanlike qualities that 
 enter into the composition of a great general. Granting that 
 the lower Chesapeake was the time line of approach to Kich- 
 mond, 3'et fijiding the project of a removal of the army from 
 the front of Washington so peculiarly repugnant to the wishes 
 and convictions of the President and his councillors as to 
 have suggested grave doubts as to the possibility of his 
 obtaining a cordial support in its execution, he should have 
 considered with himseH whether he could follow the wishes 
 of his superiors by operating against the enemy at Manassas ; 
 and if not, he should have resigned. " A general," says Napo- 
 leon, in one of his fine ruHngs regarding what may be called 
 the ethics of war, " is culpable who undertakes the execution 
 of a plan which he considers faulty. It is his duty to repre- 
 sent his reasons, to insist upon a change of plan ; in short, to 
 give in his resignation rather than allow himseK to be made 
 the instrument of his army's ruin." But the case before 
 General McClellan was in nowise of the nature contemplated 
 in this dictum. For the scheme of an advance against Ma- 
 nassas carmot be called "faulty," or of a kind to hazard the 
 ruin of the army. It was a question of a choice of plans. 
 Different plans of campaign may be each correct, and yet 
 difier in boldness and brilhancy ; and the bolder and more 
 brilliant plan may often have to give way to one more feasi- 
 ble or more opportune. The determination of this in any 
 given case is a problem in the higher generalship. Had 
 
 * Jomini : Precis de TArt de la Guerre, vol. ii., p. 47. 
 7 
 
98 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AKMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 General McClellan brought a juster estimate to the question 
 both of what it was possible for him to do and what it was 
 necessary for him to do, he might have avoided these pain- 
 ful entanglements, from the discussion of which I gladlv 
 escape to follow the steps of that master-stroke by which the 
 army was lifted from "Washington and planted on the Pen- 
 insula, and the checkered progress of the campaign on the 
 new theatre of war. 
 
THE PENINSULAK CAMPAIGN. 99 
 
 IV. 
 
 THE PENINSULAR CAMPAiaN. 
 
 Mauch— August, 1862. 
 
 I. 
 
 BEFORE YORKTOWN. 
 
 To take up an army of over one hundred thousand men, 
 transport it and all its immense material by water, and plant 
 it down on a new theatre of action nearly two hundred miles 
 distant, is an enterprise the details of which must be studied 
 ere its colossal magnitude can be adequately apprehended.* 
 It was an imdertaking eminently characteristic of the Ameri- 
 can genius, and of a people distinguished above all others for 
 the ease with which it executes great material enterprises — 
 a people rich in resources and in the faculty of creating re- 
 sources. Yet, when one reflects that at the time the order 
 was given to provide transportation for the army to the 
 Peninsula,— the 27th of February 1862— this had first of 
 aU to be created ; and when one learns that in a little over a 
 month from that date there had been chartered and assem- 
 
 * Perhaps the best light in which such an operation maybe read is furnished 
 in Napoleon's elaborate Notes on his intended invasion of Great Britain in 1805, 
 when he proposed to transport an army of one hundred and fifty thousand 
 men in four thousand vessels from Boulogne to the English coast. As a mili- 
 tary operation, there is, of course, no comparison to be made, because the 
 Army of the Potomac had at Fortress Monroe an assured base in advance. It 
 is simply as a matenal enterprise that there is a similarity. These notes are- 
 given in the collection of Memoirs dictated to Montholon and Gourgaud (His- 
 torical Miscellanies, vol. ii., pp. 373, et seq.) 
 
100 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OP THE POTOMAC. 
 
 bled no fewer than four hundred steamers and sailing-craft, 
 and that upon them had been transported from Alexandi-ia 
 and "Washington to Fortress Monroe an army of one hundred 
 and twenty-one thousand five hundred men, fourteen thou- 
 sand five hundred and ninety-two animals, forty-four bat- 
 teries, and the wagons and ambulances, ponton-traias, tele- 
 graph materials, and enormous equipage required for an army 
 of such magnitude, and that all this was done with the loss of 
 but eight mules and nine barges (the cargoes of which were 
 saved), an intelligent verdict must certainly second the 
 assertion of the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. Tucker, 
 whose administrative talent, in concert with General McClel- 
 lan, dii-ected this vast undertaking, that " for economy and 
 celerity of movement, this expedition is without a parallel on 
 record." A European critic calls it "the stride of a giant" — 
 and it well deserves that characterization. 
 
 The van of the grand army was led by Hamilton's — after- 
 wards Kearney's — division of the Third Corps (Heintzel- 
 man's), which embarked for Fortress Monroe on the 17th of 
 March. It was followed by Porter's division on the 22d, and 
 the other divisions took their departure as rapidly as 
 transports could be supplied. General McClellan reached 
 Fortress Monroe on the 2d of April, and by that time there 
 had arrived five divisions of infantry, three regiments of 
 cavalry, the artillery division, and artillery reserve — making 
 in all fifty-eight thousand men and one hundred guns. This 
 force was at once put in motion in the direction of York- 
 town, in front of which the remainder of the army joined as 
 it arrived. 
 
 The region known as " the Peninsula," on which the army 
 thus found itseK planted, is an isthmus formed by the York 
 and the James rivers, which rising in the heart of Virginia, 
 and running in a southeasterly direction, empty into Chesa- 
 peake Bay. It is from seven to fifteen miles wide and fifty 
 miles long. The country is low and flat, in some places 
 marshy, and generally wooded. The York Eiver is formed 
 by the confluence of the Mattapony and Pamunkey, which 
 
THE PENmSULAK CAMPAIGN. 
 
 101 
 
 unite at West Point. Kiclimond, the objective of tlie opera- 
 tions of the Army of the Potomac, is on the left bank of the 
 James, at the head of navigation, and by land is distant 
 seventy-five miles fi-om Fortress Monroe. 
 
 From Fortress Monroe the advance was made in two 
 columns — General Keyes with the Fourth Corps (divisions of 
 Couch and Smith) formed the left ; and General Heintzelman 
 with the Third Corps (divisions of Fitz-John Porter and 
 Hamilton, with Averill's cavalry) and Sedgwick's division of 
 the Second Corps, the right. At the very outset the roads 
 were found nearly impracticable, the season being unusually 
 wet. No resistance of moment was met on the march ; but 
 on the afternoon of the 5th of April the advance of each 
 
 SKETCH OF THE LINES OF TORKTOWN". 
 
 column was brought to a halt— the right in front of Yorktown 
 and the left by the enemy's works at Lee's Mill. These ob- I 
 structions formed part of the general defensive line of 
 
102 CAISIPAIGNS OF THE AEMT OF THE POTO^NIAC. 
 
 the "Warwick Eiver, which General Magruder had taken up, 
 and which stretched across the isthmus from the York to the 
 James, an extent of thirteen and a half miles. The Con- 
 federate left was formed by the fort at Yorktown, the water 
 batteries of which, wdth the guns at Gloucester Point, on the 
 opposite bank of the York, barred the passage of that river ; 
 the right, by the works on Mulberry Island, which were pro- 
 longed to the James. Warwick River, running nearly across 
 the Peninsula from river to river, and emptying into the 
 James, heads within a mile of Yorktown. Its sources were 
 commanded by the guns of that fort, and its fords had been 
 destroyed by dams defended by detached redoubts, the ap- 
 proaches to which were through dense forests and swamps. 
 Very imperfect or inaccurate information existed regarding 
 the topography of the country at the time of the arrival of 
 the army, and the true character of the position had to be 
 developed by reconnoissances made under fire. 
 
 The Confederate defence of the peninsular approach to 
 Richmond had, almost since the beginning of the war, been 
 committed to a small force, named the Army of the Peninsula, 
 under General Magruder. When the Army of the Poto- 
 mac landed at Fortress Monroe, this force numbered about 
 eleven thousand men. At Norfolk was an independent bod}- 
 of about eight thousand men under General Huger. The 
 iron-plated Merrimac, mistress of Hampton Roads, barred 
 the mouth of the James, the direct water-line to Richmond. 
 
 So soon as his antagonist's movement had become fully 
 developed. General Johnston put his army in motion from 
 the Rapidan towards Richmond, where for a time he kept it 
 in hand. The Confederate leader did not expect to hold the 
 Peninsula ; for both he and General Lee, who then held the 
 position of chief of staff to Mr. Davis, pronounced it unten- 
 able. Soon after the advent of the Union army, General 
 Johnston went down to Yorktown, examined its Hne of de- 
 fences, and urged the mihtary authorities at Richmond to 
 withdraw the force fi"om the Peninsula. Assuming that the 
 Federal commander would, with the aid of the navy, reduce 
 
THE PENENSULAE CAMPAIGN. 103 
 
 tlie fort at Yorktown, thus opening up the York Eiver, and, 
 by means of his numerous fleet of transports, pass rapidly to 
 the liead of the Peninsula, Johnston regarded the capture of 
 any force remaining thereon as almost certain. The works at 
 Yorktown he found very defective (though the position was 
 naturally strong) ; for, owing to the paucity of engineers, re- 
 sulting from the employment of so many of this class of ofl&- 
 cers in other arms, they had been constructed under the 
 direction of civil and railroad engineers. In this state of 
 facts. General Johnston wished to withdraw every thing from 
 the Peninsula, effect a general concentration of all available 
 forces around Kichmond, and there deHver decisive battle.* 
 These views were, however, overruled, and it was determined 
 to hold Yorktown at least until Huger should have dis- 
 mantled the fortifications at Norfolk, destroyed the naval 
 estabhshment, and evacuated the seaboard, — a step that was 
 now felt to be a mihtary necessity. To carry out this policy, 
 in view of which it was determined to hold the lines of York- 
 town as long as practicable, re-enforcements were from time 
 to time sent forward from the army at Kichmond, and soon 
 afterwards General Johnston went down and personally took 
 command. 
 
 In his plans for forcing the enemy's defences, there were 
 two auxiharies on which General McClellan had confidently 
 counted, and with these he expected to make short work of 
 the operation of carrying Yorktown. The first of these aux- 
 iliaries was the navy, by the aid of whose powerful armament 
 he designed to demolish the water-batteries at Yorktown and 
 Gloucester Point, and then push a force upon West Point, 
 at the head of the York Eiver, thus turning the line of de- 
 fences on the Warwick. But, upon applying to Flag-Officer 
 Goldsborough for the co-operation of the navy, he was in- 
 
 > * This exposition of tlie views and counsels of General Johnston I derive 
 from himself. It is noteworthy that McClellan expected to do precisely what 
 his antagonist assumed he would do — reduce Yorktown by the aid of the navy, 
 and give general battle before Richmond. 
 
X04 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 formed bj that officer that no naval force could be spared for 
 that pnrjDOse, since he regarded the works as too strong for his 
 available vessels.* 
 
 The second project was to land a heavy force in the rear 
 of Gloucester Point, turning Yorktown by that method, and 
 opening up the York Eiver. This task lie had assigned to 
 McDowell's corps, which was to be the last to embark at 
 Alexandria, and which should execute this operation in case 
 the army found itself brought to a halt by the peninsular de- 
 fences. But on the very day on which the army arrived be- 
 fore Yorktown, General McClellan was met by an order f of 
 the President, to which reference has already been made, de- 
 taching McDowell's corps from his command, and retaining it 
 in front of Washington. 
 
 That this measure was faulty in principle and very un- 
 fortunate in its results, can now be readily acknowledged 
 without imputing any really unworthy motive to President 
 Lincoln. When Mr. Lincoln saw the Army of the Potomac 
 carried away in ships out of his sight, and learnt that hardly 
 twenty thousand men had been left in the works of Washing- 
 ton (though above thrice that number was within call), it is 
 not difficult to understand how he should have become ner- 
 vous as to the safety of the national capital, and, so feeling, 
 should have retained the corps of McDowell to guard it. In 
 this he acted from what may be called the common-sense 
 view of the matter. But in war, as in the domain of science, 
 the truth often transcends, and even contradicts, common 
 sense. It required more than common sense, it required the 
 
 * McClellan : Report, p. 79. It is due to say, that Commodore Goldsborough 
 proffered the co-operation of a naval force, provided Gloucester Point should be 
 first turned by the army. Report on the Conduct of the War, p. 632. 
 
 f This order, dated April 4, and received April 5, is as follows : 
 
 " Adjutant-General's Office, April 4, 1S62. 
 
 " By direction of the President, General McDowell's army corps has been 
 detached from the force under your immediate command, and the general is 
 ordered to report to the Secretary of War, Letter by mail. 
 
 "E. Thomas, Adjutant-General. 
 
 ''(teneral McClellan." 
 
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 105 
 
 intuition of the trne secret of war, to know tliat the twentj- 
 five thousand men under General McDowell would realh' avail 
 more for the defence of the capital, if added to the Army of 
 the Potomac on the Peninsula, thus enabling that army to 
 push vigorously its offensive intent, than if actually held in 
 front of Washington. This Mr. Lincoln neither knew nor 
 could be expected to know ; and it is precisely because the 
 principles that govern military affaii'S are peculiar and of a 
 professional nature, that the interference of civilians in the 
 war-councils of a nation must commonly be disastrous. The 
 President, who found himself by virtue of his office made 
 commander-in-chief of all the forces of the United States, and 
 who had, since the supersedure of McClellan as general-in- 
 chief, assumed a species of general direction of the war, had 
 passed his life in the arena of politics ; and he brought the 
 habits of a politician to affairs in which, unfortunately, their 
 intrusion can only result in a confusion of all just relations. 
 This antagonism between the maxims that govern pohtics 
 and those that govern military affairs, is strikingly illustrated 
 in a sentence of one of Mr. Lincoln's dispatches to General 
 McClellan about this time. Keferring to McClellan's repeated 
 requests that McDowell's force should be sent him, the Presi- 
 dent says : " I shall aid you all I can consistently ivith imj view 
 of due regard to all points^ * Nothing could be more in- 
 genuous than this avowal of the policy of an equable distribu- 
 tion of favors. But however discreet the course may be iu 
 politics, it is fatal in war, and is precisely that once-honored 
 Austrian principle of " coveiing everything, by w^hich one 
 really covers nothing." War is partial and imperious, and in 
 place of having " regard to all points," it neglects many points 
 to accumulate all on the decisive point. The decisive point in 
 the case under discussion was assuredly with the Army of the 
 Potomac confronting the main force of the enemy. The proof 
 of this was not long in declaring itself. 
 
 Thus deprived of the two auxiliaries on which he had 
 
 * McClellan : Report, p. 106. 
 
lOG CAMPAIGNS OF THE AmiY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 counted, General McClellan judged that tliere remained but 
 one alternative — either to break the Confederate lines of the 
 Peninsula, if a weak spot could be found, or to undertake 
 systematic operations against Yorktown, of the nature of a 
 siege. Such a weak spot it was indeed thought had been 
 discovered about the centre of the line, near Lee's Mill, where 
 there was a dam covered by a battery ; and with the view of 
 determining the actual strength of this position, General W. 
 F. Smith, commanding the Second Division of the Fourth 
 Corps, was ordered to push a strong reconnoissance over the 
 Warwick at that point. Under cover of a heavy artillery fire 
 frpm eighteen guns, under Captain Ayres, four companies of 
 Vermont troops passed the creek, by wading breast-deep, and 
 carried the rifle-trenches held by the Confederates as an ad- 
 vanced line. Here they were re-enforced by eight additional 
 companies. The enemy, upon being driven from the front 
 line, retired to a redoubt in the rear, and there receiving a 
 re-enforcement, made a counter-charge on the handful of 
 Union troops, who were driven across the creek, after holding 
 the rifle-pits for an hour, entirely unsupported. Many were 
 killed and wounded in recrossing the stream.* No subsequent 
 attempt was made to break the Confederate line. 
 
 It now remained to undertake the siege of the uninvested 
 fortifications of Yorktown, — a task to which the army at once 
 settled down. Depots were established at Shipping Point, to 
 which place supphes were brought direct by water; and 
 indeed it was necessary to avoid land transportation as much 
 as possible, — the roads being so few and so bad as to 
 necessitate the construction of an immense amount of cor- 
 duroy highway. The first parallel was opened at about a 
 mile from Yorktown ; and under its protection, batteries were 
 established almost simultaneously along the whole front, ex- 
 tending fi'om York Eiver on the right to the Warwick on the 
 left, along a cord of about one mile in length. In all, fourteen 
 batteries and three redoubts, fully armed, and including some 
 
 * Magruder'B Official Report : Confederate Reports of Battles, p. 615. 
 
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 107 
 
 imusnally liea\y metal, such as one-hundred and two- 
 hundrcd-pounders, were erected to operate in the reduction 
 of the earth-works. The batteries as completed were, with a 
 single exception,* not allowed to open, as it was believed that 
 the return fire would interfere with the labor on other works. 
 It was preferred to wait till the preparations should be com- 
 plete, and then open a simultaneous and overwhelming bom- 
 bardment. This period would have been reached by the 6th 
 of May at latest. The artillery and engineer officers judged 
 that a very few hours' fire would compel the surrender or 
 evacuation of the works ; but, to their great chagrin, no 
 opportunity was afforded to bring this professional opinion 
 to the practical test ; for it was discovered on the 4th of 
 May that the Confederates had evacuated Yorktown.f The 
 retreat had been managed with the same masterly skill that 
 marked the evacuation of Manassas ; and the Army of the 
 Potomac, cheated of its anticipated brilliant passage at arms, 
 came into possession only of the deserted works and some 
 threescore and ten siege-guns, that the Confederates had 
 been obliged to leave as the price of their immolested 
 retreat. 
 
 In the preceding outline of the siege of Yorktown, I have 
 confined myself to a simple recital of events. It is well 
 
 * The exception was in the case of what was called Battery No. 1, which 
 on one occasion opened on the wharf at Yorktown to prevent the enemy's 
 receiving artillery stores. 
 
 \ " The ease with which the two-hundred and one-hundred-pounders were 
 worked, the extraordinary accuracy of their fire, and the since ascertained 
 effects produced upon the enemy by it, force upon me the conviction that the 
 fire of guns of similar calibre and power, combined with the cross- vertical fire of 
 the thirteen and ten-inch seacoast mortars, would have compelled the enemy to 
 surrender or abandon his works in less than twelve hours." Barry : Report of 
 Artillery Operations, Siege of Yorktown, p. 134. This opinion is not justified 
 by subsequent experience in the war, for the rude improvised earthworks of 
 the Confederates showed an ability to sustain an indefinite pounding. General 
 Johnston's evacuation of Yorktown seems to have been prompted by a like ex- 
 aggeration of the probable effect of a bombardment. 
 
108 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 known, however, tliat no portion of General McClellan's mili- 
 tary career lias given rise to a greater amount of criticism, or 
 criticism founded less on the intrinsic merits of the case. 
 
 The judgment passed on the operations before Yorktown 
 will turn on the view taken of the question whether the siege 
 should have been made at all, or whether the Confederate posi- 
 tion should not have been either broken or turned. 
 
 It has already been stated that the latter course — to wit, 
 the turning of Yorktown — was General McClellan's original 
 plan. To this duty McDowell's corps was assigned ; but on 
 the very day he arrived before Yorktown he received the 
 order detaching McDowell's force from his command. The 
 effect of this measure is set forth with much emphasis by 
 General McClellan. " To me," says he, " the blow was most 
 discouraging. It frustrated all my plans for impending 
 operations. It fell when I was too deeply committed to with- 
 draw. It left me incapable of continuing operations which 
 had been begun. It compelled the adoption of another, a 
 different and less effective plan of campaign. It made rapid 
 and brilhant operations impossible. It was a fatal error." 
 There will probably be no question as to the merits of the 
 proposed movement by which it was designed to turn 
 Gloucester Point and open up the York Kiver; and the 
 verdict will be equally clear as to the ill-judged policy — to put 
 it at the mildest — which, at such a moment, took out of the 
 commander's hand a corps destined for a duty so important. 
 But it is not entirely clear that " rapid and brilliant opera- 
 tions" were not still feasible. General McClellan before he 
 began the siege had with him a force of eighty thousand 
 men ; and it may be queried whether he could not from this 
 force have still detached a corps of twenty-five thousand men 
 to execute the movement designed for McDowell. The hold- 
 ing of his line in front of Yorktown — a line of seven or eight 
 miles — would, to make it secure against offensive action 
 on the enemy's part, require about forty thousand men. Now, 
 the detachment of a column of twenty-five thousand would 
 still have left him fifty-five thousand men. Moreover, one 
 
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 109 
 
 division of McDowell's corps — that of Franklin, eleven 
 thousand strong — did actually reach McClellan while the 
 siege was in progress, and he held it on shipboard with the 
 view of intrusting to it the task which the entire corps of 
 McDowell had originally been expected to perform. Subse- 
 quently, however, he concluded that it was unequal to the 
 work. But, re-enforced by another division, might it not have 
 been sufficient ? In proof of this it may be pointed out that, 
 on the retreat of Johnston from Yorktown, Frankhn's divi- 
 sion* alone was assigned to a similar and equally difficult 
 duty — to move on the flank of the Confederate army by way 
 of West Pomt. 
 
 The question now remains, whether an attempt should have 
 been made to break the enemy's lines. The total force under 
 Magruder at the time of the arrival of the Army of the Poto- 
 mac before his position was, according to Magruder's own 
 testimony, eleven thousand men. More than half this force, 
 however, was on garrison duty. " I was compelled," says he, 
 " to place in Gloucester Point, Yorktown, and Mulberry Island, 
 fixed garrisons, amounting to six thousand men. So that it 
 will be seen that the balance of my line, embracing a length of 
 thirteen miles, was defended by about five thousand men."t 
 It appears that General Magruder fully expected, after the 
 preUminary reconnoissances, that a serious attack would be 
 made ; and in this expectation his men slept in the trenches 
 and under arms. " To my surprise," he adds, " he [McClel- 
 lan] permitted day after day to pass without an assault. In 
 a few days, the object of his delay was apparent. In every 
 du"ection in front of our lines, through the intervening woods, 
 and along the open fields, earthworks began to appear. 
 Through the energetic action of the Government, re-enforce- 
 ments began to pour in, and each hour the Army of the 
 Peninsula grew stronger and stronger, until anxiety passed 
 fi'om my mind as to the result of an attack upon us."| 
 
 * Franklin's division reached the Peninsula on the 22d of AprU. 
 f Magruder's OflScial Report : Confederate Reports of Battles, p.' 516. 
 t Ibid., p. 517. 
 
110 CAJVIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 It is possible, however — and there is a considerable volume 
 of e-\ddeuce bearing upon this point — that General McClel- 
 lan, during all the earher portion of the month before York- 
 town, had it in his mind, even without McDowell's corps, to 
 undertake the decisive turning movement by the north side 
 of the York. In this event, it would not only be in the dhec- 
 tion of his plan to make no attack, but it would play into his 
 hands that his opponent should accumulate his forces on the 
 Peninsula. Yet this halting between two opinions had the 
 result that, when he had abandoned the purpose of making 
 the turning movement, it had become too late for him to 
 make a direct attack — " all anxiety" as to the result of which 
 had by that time " passed from the mind" of his opponent. 
 From subsequent evidence, it would appear that a movement, 
 not with the view of assaulting the fortifications of Yorktown 
 (that would have been a bloody enterprise), but of breaking 
 the hne of the Warwick, thus investing Yorktown, if not com- 
 pelling its immediate evacuation, was an operation holding 
 out a reasonable promise of success.* 
 
 * General Heintzelman, in his evidence before the Committee on the Con- 
 duct of the War, states it as his impression that, had he been allowed, he could 
 have carried the line of the Warwick, " I think," says he, " if I had been 
 permitted when I first landed on the Peninsula to advance, I could have isolated 
 the troops in Yorktown, and the place would have fallen in a few days ; but 
 my orders were very stringent not to make any demonstration. I supposed, 
 when I first got there, that we could force the enemy's lines at about Wynn's 
 Mills, isolate Yorktown, so as to prevent the enemy from re-enforcing it, when 
 it would have fallen in the course of a little while." Report on the Conduct of 
 the War, vol. i., p. 347. 
 
 General McClellan, however, expressed a contrary opinion : 
 
 " Question. In your opinion could Heintzelman have captured Yorktown 
 by a rapid movement immediately upon his landing upon the Peninsula ? 
 
 "Answer. No; I do not think he would have done it. When we did ad- 
 vance, we found the enemy intrenched and in strong force wherever we ap- 
 proached." Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 429. 
 
 General Barnard, who was chief-engineer of the army on the Peninsula, has, 
 in his work on the Peninsular Campaign, stated with much emphasis, that 
 McClellan should have assaulted ; but this opinion apres coup is somewhat 
 damaged by the fsict that he, at the time, gave a professional judgment against 
 assault. 
 
THE PENINSULAE CAMPAIGN. HI 
 
 It was not, indeed, a certain operation, for the impracticable 
 character of the country made the handling of troops very 
 difficult; but vigorous measures were at the time so urgent 
 that a considerable risk might well have been run. It was 
 certain that the enemy would improve all the time allowed 
 him to prepare new fortifications before Kichmond, and as- 
 semble all his scattered forces for the defence of his capital. 
 But just in proportion as time was valuable to him was the 
 obligation imposed on General McClellan of not allowing him 
 this time. It is now known that the Confederate govern- 
 ment made good use of the month of grace allowed it by the 
 siege of Yorktown ; for not only were vigorous military meas- 
 ures taken, but at this very period the Confederate CongTess 
 passed the first conscription act, which gave Mr. Davis abso- 
 lute control of the military resources of the South, 
 
 The proper method of meeting this was to have re-enforced 
 the Army of the Potomac and organized reserves. But this 
 was far fi-om the views of those who controlled the war- 
 councils at Washington ; and the President, who had for the 
 time being taken into his own hands the functions of general- 
 in-chief, gave one constant mot d'ordre — "take Yorktown," 
 — a command that reminds one of the story in Spanish his- 
 tory which runs in this wise : " When the reports of these mat- 
 ters reached Philip IV., he was disposed to entertaid some 
 prejudice against his general, and took on himself to give his 
 own direction for the war, without consulting Spinola. His 
 majesty directed that Breda should be besieged, and when it 
 was represented that it was needful to make many prepara- 
 tions for an operation of that magnitude, the king sat down 
 and wrote this laconic order to his general : ' Marquis, take 
 Breda. I, the King' (Yo, el Eey)." 
 
 If Yorktown was at length taken without a combat and 
 without blood, it was not without severe and exhausting 
 labors in the siege. The victory, though apparently barren, 
 was really more substantial than it seemed ; and had General 
 Johnston, in place of becoming alarmed at the preparations 
 against him, determined to fight it out on the line of the 
 
112 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Warwick, there is little doubt that he might have prolonged 
 the siege. 
 
 Meantime the morale of the Union army was excellent ; and 
 the road to Richmond being now opened, the troops turned 
 their faces hopefully towards the capital of the Confederacy. 
 
 II. 
 
 FROM YORKTOWN TO THE CHICKAHOMINY. 
 
 Upon the discovery of Johnston's withdrawal from York- 
 town, all the available cavalry, together with four batteries of 
 horse-artillery, under General Stoneman, was ordered in pur- 
 suit. The divisions of Hooker and Smith were at the same 
 time sent forward in support, and afterwards the divisions of 
 Kearney, Couch, and Casey were put in motion. General 
 Sumner, the officer second in rank in the Ai'my of the 
 Potomac, was ordered to the front to take charge of opera- 
 tions, while General McClellan remained behind at Yorktown 
 to arrange for the departure of Franklin's division by water 
 to West Point. By this move it was expected to force the 
 Confederates to abandon whatever works they might have on 
 the Peninsvila below that point. 
 
 Stoneman met little opposition till he reached the enemy's 
 prepared position in front of WilHamsburg, twelve miles from 
 Yorktown. The Peninsula here contracts, and the approach- 
 ing heads of two tributaries of the York and James rivers 
 form a kind of narrow isthmus upon which the two roads 
 leading from Yorktown to WilHamsburg unite. Commanding 
 the dehouche was an extensive work with a bastion front, 
 named Fort Magruder, and, to the right and left, on the pro- 
 longation of the line, were twelve other redoubts and epaul- 
 ments for field-guns. These works had been prepared by the 
 Confederates many months before. 
 
 Now, this position, though a strong one so long as its 
 flanks were secured by the closing of the rivers on either 
 side, was one which evidently General Johnston had no in- 
 
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 
 
 113 
 
 tention of occupying ; for, by the opening up of the York, the 
 line of AVilliamsburg was exposed to be immediately turned. 
 The Confederate army had, in fact, passed through Williams- 
 burg towards the Chickahominy, and only a rear-guard re- 
 
 HfLF WI[Y HCiim\m 
 
 SKETCH OF THE FIELD OF WILLIAMSBUBG. 
 
 A. Hooker's division. 
 
 B. Part of Couch's division. 
 
 C. Smitli's division. 
 
 v. E. Works occupied by Haneock's brigade. 
 
 mained to cover the trains. When, however, Stoneman, on 
 the afternoon of the 4th, drew up in front of the redoubts, 
 Johnston, seeing pursuit to be serious, brought back troops 
 into the works ; and thus, by a kind of accident, there ensued 
 on the morrow the bloody encounter known as the battle of 
 Williamsburg. 
 
 Stoneman, on his arrival in front of Williamsburg, had a 
 passage at arms with the Confederate cavalry ; but, finding 
 the position too strong to carry, he stood on the defensive, 
 awaiting the arrival of the infantry. Now, such was the con- 
 fusion that attended this hurried march, that by the time 
 
114 CAJMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Sumner could get up his advance divisions and make disposi- 
 tions for attack, darkness ensued, and tlie men bivouacked in 
 the woods. During the night a heavy rain came on, render- 
 ing the roads almost impassable. 
 
 In the morning, Hooker's division had taken position on 
 the left, and Smith's on the right ; the other divisions had 
 not yet come up. The attack was opened by General Hooker 
 in front of Fort Magruder. Having cleared the space in his 
 front, he advanced two batteries* to within seven hundred 
 yards of the fort, and, by nine o'clock, silenced its fire. But 
 now the enemy began to develop strongly on his left,t and, as 
 re-enforcements arrived, made a series of determined attacks 
 with the view of turning that flank. These attacks were 
 made with constantly increasing pressure, and bore heavily 
 on Hooker. That officer had taken care to open communica- 
 tion with the Yorktown road, on which fresh troops were to 
 come up ; yet, notwithstanding the repeated requests made 
 by him for the assistance he sorely needed, none came.:}: He 
 was therefore compelled to engage the enemy during the 
 whole day ; and, between three and four o'clock, his ammuni- 
 tion began to give out, so that some of his shattered brigades 
 were forced to confront the enemy with no other cartridges 
 than those they gathered from the boxes of their fallen com- 
 rades.§ At length, between iouv and five o'clock, Kearney's 
 division, which had been ordered in the morning to go to the 
 support of Hooker, but had met great delay in passing the 
 masses of troops and trains that obstructed the single deep 
 muddy defile, arrived. Learning the condition of Hooker's 
 men, Kearney took up his division at the double-quick, at- 
 
 * Batteries of Webber and Bramlial. 
 
 f Held at first by Patterson's New Jersey brigade, and then re-enforced. 
 
 l It is due to mention, however, that, about one o'clock, Peck's brigade 
 came up and took position on Hooker's right, and, being re-enforced by 
 Devin's brigade, held the centre of the Union line with much firmness against 
 several attacks. Couch : Report. 
 
 § Hooker : Report of Williamsburg. During the action, five guns of Web- 
 ber's battery (its support being withdrawn for service on the left) fell into the 
 hands of the enemy. 
 
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 115 
 
 tacked spiritedly, re-establislied the line, and enabled Hooker's 
 worn-out troops to withdraw. Hooker lost one thousand 
 seven hundred men. 
 
 While, during the morning, the fight thus waxed hot in 
 front of Fort Magruder, the troops on the right, composed 
 exclusively of General Smith's division, had not engaged 
 the enemy; but towards noon, Sumner ordered General 
 Smith to send one of his brigades to occupy a redoubt on the 
 extreme right, said to be evacuated by the enemy. For this 
 purpose. Hancock's brigade was selected." Making a wide 
 detour to the right, which brought him within sight of the 
 York River, Hancock passed Cub Dam Creek on an old mill- 
 bridge, and took possession of the work indicated, which he 
 found unoccupied. Twelve hundred yards in advance, another 
 redoubt was discovered in the same condition, and this also 
 he quietly took possession of. 
 
 The position which, through the carelessness of the Con- 
 federates,t Hancock had thus seized, proved to be a very 
 important one, having a crest and natural glacis on either 
 side, and entirely commanding the plain between it and Fort 
 Magruder. He had in fact debouched on the flank and rear 
 of the Confederate line of defence. On reconnoitring what 
 lay beyond, there were found to be two more redoubts between 
 the position and the fort. These seemed to be occupied by 
 
 * Davidson's brigade was also under Hancock's command at this time, and 
 he detailed for the movement, from his own brigade, the Fifth Wisconsin, 
 Forty-ninth Pennsylvania, and Sixth Maine ; and from Davidson's brigade, the 
 Seventh Maine and Thirty-third New York volmiteers. To these were attached 
 Lieutenant Crowen's New York battery of six guns. Hancock's Official Report. 
 
 f General Johnston, in conversation with the writer, stated that neither 
 liimself nor any of his oflBcers was even aware of the existence of these redoubts 
 on the extreme left of the Confederate position, — the line of works having been 
 prepared long before under General Magruder. The first intimation he had of 
 their existence was when Hill brought bim report that the enemy was in occu- 
 pation of an unknown redoubt on the left, and asked permission to drive him 
 off. Johnston told him to do so, but to "act with caution." Accordingly, Hill 
 detiiched troops imder General Early, who led the misuccessful attack after- 
 wards made on Hancock, 
 
11(3 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 at least some force. Hancock put liis battery into position to 
 play upon these works, and a few shells and the fire of the 
 skirmishers proved sutficient to drive the Confederates from 
 their cover ; bnt he did not deem it prudent to occupy them, 
 until re-enforcements should arrive. 
 
 It was not till now that the Confederate commander, whose 
 attention had been absorbed in the attack of Hooker on his 
 right, became aware of this menacing movement on his left ; 
 but being apprised of the danger, he immediately took meas- 
 ures to meet it. Now it happened that precisely at this 
 juncture, Hancock, instead of receiving the re-enforcements 
 he had repeatedly and urgently sent for, got a message from 
 General Bumner, instructing him to fall back to his first posi- 
 tion.* Hancock, appreciating the commanding importance of 
 his position, delayed doing so as long as possible. But about 
 five o'clock, seeing that the Confederates were in motion on 
 his front, that they had reoccupied the two redoubts from • 
 which they were last driven, and that they were threatening 
 both his flanks, he retired his troops behind the crest. Here 
 he formed his line with about one thousand six hundred 
 men, being determined to remain. Waiting till the advancing 
 enemy got below the rise of the hill, and within thii'ty paces, 
 he ordered a general charge. This was executed in a very 
 spirited manner : a few of the enemy who had approached 
 nearest were bayoneted ;t the rest broke and fled in all di- 
 rections, and the Confederate flanking force, finding their 
 centre routed, also beat a hasty retreat.^ Shortly after the 
 action was decided. General Smith, by order of General Mc- 
 Clellan, who had reached the front and appreciated the posi- 
 tion secured by Hancock, brought up strong re-enforcements. 
 At the same time the firing ceased in front of Fort Magruder, 
 and the troops, wet, weary, and hungiy, rested on their arms. 
 But Williamsburg was really won, for Hancock held the key 
 
 * Hancock : Report of Williamsburg, 
 f This fact is vouched for by oilicial evidence. 
 
 X The Confederate loss v?as heavy, numbering over five hundred ; Hancock's 
 total loss was one bun'dred and twenty-nine. 
 
THE PENINSULAR CiUklPAIGN. 117 
 
 of the position ; and during the night, Longstreet retired to 
 join the body of Johnston's army, now rapidly marching to- 
 wards the Chickahominy.* 
 
 While the action before Williamsburg was going on, Gen- 
 eral Franklin was embarking his division for the purpose of 
 ascending the York Eiver by water. This was accomphshed 
 on the following day, and on the morning of the 7th he had 
 completed the disembarkation of his division opposite West 
 Point, on the right bank of the Pamunkey, a short distance 
 above where that river empties into the York. But on at- 
 tempting to advance, Franklin was met by the Confederate 
 division of Whiting, whose presence, and a spirited attack of 
 Hood's Texas brigade, served to hold Franklin in check. 
 
 The operations here described, constituting the pursuit of 
 the Confederates (which really ended at Williamsburg), are 
 open to criticism. The pursuit was made on two lines, by 
 land and by water, and Johnston skilfully disposed his eche- 
 lons to meet both advances. The move by water, which was 
 the most promising, since it menaced the enemy's flank, was 
 not made in sufficient force, and presented merely the char- 
 acter of a detachment on the Confederate rear, — a species of 
 operation which is seldom successful. Besides, it started too 
 late and arrived too late.t It could be of no avail, unless 
 supported by the whole army coming from Williamsburg. :j: 
 But there was no assurance that this could be, for the exist- 
 ence of the defences of Williamsburg, where the Confederates 
 were sure, if need be, to make a stand, was knov/n.§ 
 
 * " At half-past three, A. M., of the 6th, the pickets reported that the enemy 
 appeared to be evacuating the works in front. At sunrise, tliese strong works 
 were in the possession of my division, and Heintzelman's corps subsequently 
 moved out and occupied Williamsburg." Couch : Report of Williamsburg. 
 
 I The Confederates evacuated Yorktown on the night of May 3-4. Frank- 
 lin's division had just been disembarked from the transports, so that re-em 
 barkation was necessary, and it did not start till the morning of the 6t]i, and 
 did not make the lauding near White House till the morning of the 7th. 
 
 :}: Schalk : Campaigns of 1862-3, p. 169. 
 
 § Barnard : Report of Engineer Operations, p. 63. 
 
118 CA^ifPAIQNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Tlie action at Williamsburg was very unfortunate, though 
 General McClellan cannot be held responsible for it, unless 
 he may be blamed for remaining behind at Yorktown to 
 superintend the getting off of Franklm's expedition. But to 
 blame him for this would be hardly warrantable. He was 
 within easy communication with the advance, which was 
 placed under orders of his lieutenant. General Sumner ; and he 
 had a right to suppose that he would be kept informed of every 
 thing of importance occurring in the front. Yet he was left 
 entirely unaware, till the afternoon, that any thing but a triv- 
 ial affair of the rear-guard had taken place. Sumner, that 
 model of a soldier though not of a general, had too much the 
 fire of the vieiix sahreur to allow his head to work coolly and 
 clearly in situations where that temper of mind was most 
 needed ; and his conduct of affaii'S at Williamsburg was 
 marked by great confusion. So contradictory were his or- 
 ders, that with thirty thousand men within three or four miles 
 of the position, the division of Hooker was left to bear alone 
 the brunt of successive severe attacks ; and the result was the 
 loss of above two thousand men,* without any corresponding 
 gain. Hooker's fight was really quite unnecessary ; for the 
 difficult obstacles against which he had to contend might 
 have been easily turned by the right. This w^as actually done 
 at last by the flank movement of General Hancock, who, with 
 slight loss, determined the issue. 
 
 On the retreat of the Confederates from Williamsburg, the 
 Army of the Potomac was pushed forward as rapidly as the 
 wi-etched condition of the roads would permit, on a hne paral- 
 lel with the York and Pamunkey ; and on the 16th of May 
 headquarters and the advance divisions reached White House, 
 at the head of navigation of the latter stream. From that 
 point the York Kiver Raikoad runs due west to Eichmond, 
 distant eighteen miles. Great depots were estabhshed at 
 
 * The precise loss was two thousand two hundred and twenty-eight killed, 
 wounded, and missing. 
 
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 119 
 
 White House, to wliicli supplies were brought by water, and 
 the cohimns moved forward on the line of the York River and 
 Richmond Railroad ; which, repaired as the army proceeded, 
 became its line of communication Avith tho base at White 
 House. Thus the divisions advanced till they reached the 
 Chickahomiuy, and by the 21st they were posted in echelon 
 along the left or north bank of that stream, destined soon to 
 become the scene of stirring events.* 
 
 The consummate strategist that had directed the skilful 
 withdrawal from Yorktown and checked the advance of the 
 Union columns at Williamsburg now proceeded to gather the 
 Confederate forces around the lines of Richmond. In the 
 exposition I have already given of Johnston's plan of opera- 
 tions to meet the advance of the Union arm}^ against Rich- 
 mond, it has been indicated that it was his fixed purpose to 
 refuse battle until his opponent should approach that city. 
 Having now retu'ed behind the line of the Chickahominy, he 
 proceeded to urge upon the Richmond administration the 
 policy of an immediate concentration of all available forces at 
 that point, as affording the best means for a true defence of 
 Richmond by a vigorous assumption of the offensive at the 
 proper moment. Johnston found fully as much difficulty in 
 impressing his views upon the cabinet at Richmond, as IMc- 
 
 * It will thus appear that it required two weeks for the march of faftv miles 
 from White House to the Chickahominy. Regarded as a pursuit of tht^ ene- 
 my, this was certainly tardy. But the nature of McClellan's operation can 
 hardly be so defined. His ultimate aim was directed against Richmond, and 
 he expected that McDowell's corps would make a junction with him. His opera- 
 tions were necessarily of a somewhat methodical character, and he was forced to 
 open up a new base, and form depots of supplies. Besides, the roads were bad 
 beyond all precedent. This tardiness has not escaped the censure of the Com- 
 mittee on the Conduct of the War, who, without admitting any mitigating 
 circumstances, thus deliver verdict : " The distance between Williamsburg and 
 the line of operations on the Chickahomiay was from forty to fifty miles, and 
 the army was about two weeks in moving that distance." (Report on the Con- 
 duct of the War, vol. i , p. 20.) But perhaps military men may be disposed to 
 dispute the justness of the judgment of a body of strategists wich whom ibe 
 Chickahominy figures as a ''line of operations !" 
 
120 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AEMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Clellan did in impressing his on the cabinet at Washington. 
 Nevertheless, in accordance with his counsels, the abandon- 
 ment of Norfolk was ordered ; and General Huger, after de- 
 stroying the dockyards and removing the stores, evacuated 
 that place on the 10th of May, and withdrew its garrison to 
 unite with the army in front of Richmond. On the next day 
 it was occupied by a Union force, led by General Wool, from 
 Fortress Monroe. One important consequence of the evacua- 
 tion of Norfolk was the destruction of the Merrimac, which 
 vessel proving to have too great a draft of water to proceed 
 up the James to Richmond, was on the following day blown 
 up by order of her commander. Commodore Tatnall. This at 
 once opened the river to the advance of the Union gunboats ; 
 and immediately afterwards a fleet, composed of the Monitor, 
 Galena, Aroostook, Port Royal, and Naugatuck, under Com- 
 modore Rodgers, ascended the James, with the view of open- 
 ing the water highway to Richmond. Within twelve miles of 
 the city, however, the vessels were arrested by the guns of 
 Fort Darling, on Drury's Bluff, and after a four hours' en- 
 gagement, in which the Galena received severe damage, and 
 the one-hundred-pounder Parrott on the Naugatuck was 
 burst, the fleet was compelled to withdraw. 
 
 It w^as not these events, however, that determined Mc- 
 Clellan's line of advance on Richmond by the York rather 
 than by the James ; for the former course had already been 
 dictated to him by antecedent circumstances. Before the 
 destruction of the Merrimac had opened the opportunity of 
 swinging across to the James, the armj was already well 
 en route by the York and Pamunkey, under injunctions to 
 push forward on that line for the purpose of uniting with a 
 column under McDowell, which was about to move from 
 Fredericksburg towards Richmond. As this circumstance 
 exercised a controlhng influence on the camjDaign, and power- 
 fully aflected its character and results, I shall enter into its 
 exposition at some length in the succeeding chapter. 
 
THE PENINSULAli CAMPAIGN. 121 
 
 III. 
 
 CONFEDERATE STRATEGY ON THE CHICKAHOMINY AND 
 IN THE VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 
 
 The brilliant historian of the war in the Spanish Peninsula 
 lays down the maxim that "military operations are so 
 dependent upon accidental circumstances, that, to justly cen- 
 sure, it should always be shown that an unsuccessful general 
 has violated the received maxims and established principles 
 of war." * Now as General McCleUan's offensive movement 
 towards Eichmond really ended with the establishment of his 
 army on the Chickahominy, and as the narrative of events to 
 follow will show the enemy in an offensive attitude, and the 
 army whose proper role was the aggressive reduced to the 
 defensive, and finally compelled to retreat, it will be in place 
 to follow attentively the course and causes of action with the 
 view to discover whether the untoward events that befell the 
 Union arms be traceable to any departure fi'om those "estab- 
 hshed principles of war," the violation of which furnishes a 
 just ground of censui"e. 
 
 Upon McCleUan's arrival on the Chickahominy, there were 
 two objects which he had to keep in view : to secure a firm 
 footing on the Richmond side of that stream with the view 
 of carrying out the primal purpose of the campaign, and at 
 the same time to so dispose his forces as to insure the junc- 
 tion of McDowell's column from Fredericksburg with the 
 force before Richmond. The former purpose was accom- 
 pHshed by throwing the left wing of the Army of the Potomac 
 across the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge, which the Con- 
 federates had left uncovered. Casey's division of Keyes' 
 corps crossed on the 20th of May, and occupied the opposite 
 
 * Napier : History of tte Peninsular "War, vol. i., p. 8. 
 
122 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARilT OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 heights. Heintzelman's corps was then thrown foi-ward in 
 support, and Bottom's Bridge was immediately rebuilt. 
 
 To secure the second object, McClellan extended his right 
 wing well northward, and on the 24th carried the village of 
 Mcchanicsville, forcing the enemy across the Chickahominy 
 at the MechauicsvLlle Bridge which the Confederates after 
 crossing destroyed. He then awaited the march of McDowell 
 to join him, in order to initiate operations against Richmond. 
 I must now turn aside to show in what manner the object of 
 this movement was baulked by the skill of the Confederates 
 and the folly of those who controlled the operations of the 
 Union armies. 
 
 At the time the Army of the Potomac was toiling pain- 
 fully up the Peninsula towards Richmond, the remaining 
 forces in Northern Virginia presented the extraordinary 
 spectacle of three distinct armies, planted on three separate 
 lines of operations, under three independent commanders. 
 The highland region of "West Virginia had been formed into 
 the " Mountain Department" under command of General 
 Fremont ; the Valley of the Shenandoah constituted the 
 " Department of the Shenandoah" under General Banks ; 
 and the region covered by the direct lines of approach to 
 Washington had been erected into the " Department of the 
 Rappahannock," and assigned to General McDowell at the 
 time his corps was detached from the Army of the Potomac. 
 About the period reached by the narrative of events on 
 the Peninsula, these armies were distributed as follows : 
 General Fremont with a force of fifteen thousand men at 
 Franklin, General Banks with a force of about sixteen 
 thousand men at Strasburg, and General McDowell with a 
 force of thirty thousand men at Fredericksburg on the 
 Rappahannock. It need hardly be said that this arrange- 
 ment, the hke of which has not been seen since Napoleon 
 scandalized the Austrians by destroying in succession half a 
 dozen of their armies distributed after precisely this fashion — 
 nor indeed was ever seen before, save in periods of the 
 echpse of all military judgment — was in violation of the true 
 
THE PENINSULAE CAMPAIGN. 123 
 
 principles of war. One hardly wishes to inquire by whose 
 crude and fatuitous inspiration these things were done ; but 
 such was the spectacle presented by the Union forces in 
 Virginia : the main army abeady held in check on the Chicka- 
 hominy, and these detached columns inviting destruction in 
 detail. Not to have taken advantage of such an opportunity 
 would have shown General Johnston to be a tyro in his 
 trade. 
 
 It came about, after the commencement of active opera- 
 tions on the Peninsula had drawn towards Kichmond the main 
 force of the Confederates and reheved the fi'ont of Washing- 
 ton from the pressure of their presence, that the Administra- 
 tion, growing more easy touching the safety of the capital, 
 determined, in response to General McClellan's oft-repeated 
 appeals for re-enforcements, to send forward McDowell's 
 corps, — not, indeed, as he desired, to re-enforce him by water, 
 but to advance overland to attack Kichmond in co-operation 
 with the Army of the Potomac. To this end, the division of 
 Shields was detached from the command of General Banks in 
 the Shenandoah Valley, and given to General McDowell ; and 
 this addition brought the latter's force up to forty-one thou- 
 sand men and one hundred guns. General McClellan had 
 received official notification of this intended movement ; and 
 on the march from Williamsburg to the Chickahominy, as has 
 been shown, he threw his right wing well forward, so as to 
 insure the junction of McDowell's force, when it should move 
 forward fi"om Fredericksburg.* After numerous delays, the 
 time of advance of this column was at length fixed for the 
 26th of May, a date closely coincident with the arrival of the 
 Army of the Potomac on the Chickahominy. The head of 
 McDowell's column had already been pushed eight miles 
 
 * It should not be forgotten that this was the controlling consideration in 
 the choice by General McClellan of the line of advance by the Pamiinkey, 
 instead of swinging his army across to the James immediately alter the battle 
 of Williamsburg and the destruction of the Merrimac immediately thereon, — 
 a course the adoption of which would, in all probability, have altered the entiru 
 character of the campaign. 
 
124 CAIVIPAIGNS OF THE AJiMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 south of Fredericksburg ; and McClellan, to clear all opposi- 
 tion from his path, sent forward Porter's corps to Hanover 
 Junction, where he had a sharj) encounter with a force of the 
 enemy under General Branch, whom he repulsed with a loss 
 of two hundred killed and seven hundred prisoners, and estab- 
 lished the right of the Army of the Potomac within fifteen 
 miles, or one march, of McDowell's van. McDowell was 
 eager to advance, and McClellan was equally anxious for 
 his arrival, when there happened an event which frustrated 
 this plan and all the hopes that had been based thereon. 
 This event was the iiTuption of Stonewall Jackson in the 
 Shenandoah Yalley. The keen-eyed soldier at the head of the 
 main Confederate army, discerning the intended junction 
 between McDowell and McClellan, quickly seized his oppor- 
 tunity, and intrusted the execution of a bold coup to that vig- 
 orous lieutenant who had already made the Valley ring with 
 his exploits. 
 
 Jackson, on retii'ing from his last raid in the Shenandoah 
 Valley, which had ended in his repulse by Shields at Win- 
 chester (March 27), had retreated up the Valley by way of 
 Harrisonburg, and turning to the Blue Ridge, took up a 
 position between the south fork of the Shenandoah and Swift 
 llun Gap. Here he was retained by Johnston, after the main 
 body of the Confederate army had been drawn in towards 
 Richmond. Jackson was joined by Ewell's division fr-om 
 Gordonsville on the oOth April, and at the same time he 
 received the further accession of the two brigades of General 
 Edward Johnson, who had held an independent command in 
 Southwest Vfrginia. This raised his force to about fifteen 
 thousand men. Banks' force, reduced by the detachment of 
 Shields' division, sent to General McDowell, to about five 
 thousand men, was posted at Harrisonbui'g. Fremont was at 
 Franklin, across the mountains ; but one of his brigades, 
 under Milroy, had burst beyond the limits of the Mountain 
 DejDartment, and seemed to be moving to make a junction with 
 Banks, with the design, as Jackson thought, of advancing on 
 Staunton. Jackson determined to attack these forces in 
 
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 125 
 
 detail. Accordingly, he posted Ewell so as to hold Banks in 
 check, whilst he himself moved to Staunton. From here he 
 threw forward five brigades, under General Edward Johnson 
 (May 7), to attack Mih'oy. The latter retreated to his moun- 
 tain fastness, and took position at a point named McDowell, 
 where, re-enforced by the brigade of Schenck, he engaged 
 Johnson, but was forced to retire on Fremont's main body at 
 Franklin. Having thus throTVTi oflf Milroy eccentrically from 
 communication with Banks, Jackson returned (May 14) to 
 destroy the force under that officer. But during Jackson's 
 pursuit of Milroy, Banks, discovering his danger, had retired 
 to Strasburg, followed by Ewell. Jackson therefore followed 
 also, and at New Market he formed a junction with Ewell. 
 Instead of marching direct on Strasburg, however, Jackson 
 diverged on a line to the eastward by way of Luray Valley, 
 and moved on Front Royal, with the view of cutting off Banks' 
 retreat from Strasburg, interposing between him and re- 
 enforcements, and compelling his suiTender. The 23d he 
 entered Front Boyal, capturing the garrison of seven hundred 
 men there under Colonel Kenly ; and thence he moved to 
 Middletown by a road to the right of the main Valley road, 
 hoping there to cut off Banks. But the latter was too quick 
 for him : so that when he reached Middletown, he struck only 
 the rear of the retreating Union column. Banks, with his 
 small force, ofi'ered such resistance as he could to the 
 advance of Jackson, and took position on the heights 
 of Winchester (May 24), where he gave fight, till, being as- 
 sailed on both flanks, he retired hastily to the north bank of 
 the Potomac (May 25), making a march of fifty-three miles in 
 forty-eight hours. Jackson continued the pursuit as far as 
 Halltown, within two miles of Harper's Ferry, where he 
 remained till the 30th, when, finding heavy forces converging 
 on his rear, he began a retrograde movement up the Valley. 
 
 The tidings of Jackson's apparition at Winchester on the 
 24th, and his subsequent advance to Harper's Ferry, fell like 
 a thunderbolt on the war-council at Washington. The order 
 for McDowell's advance from Fredericksburg, to unite with 
 
126 CAiMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 McClellan, was instantly countermanded ; and he was dii'ected 
 to put twenty thousand men in motion at once for the Shen- 
 andoah Valley, by the line of the Manassas Gap Eailroad * 
 McDowell obeyed, but, to use his own language, "with a 
 heavy heart," for he knew, what any man capable of survey- 
 ing the situation with a soldier's eye must have known, that 
 the movement ordered was not only most futile in itself, but 
 certain to paralyze the operations of the main army and fi'us- 
 trate that campaign against Richmond on the issue of which 
 hung the fortune of the war. In vain he pointed out that it 
 was impossible for him either to succor Banks or co-operate 
 with Fremont ; that his line of advance from Fredericksburg 
 to Front Eoyal was much longer than the enemy's line of re- 
 treat ; that it would take him a week or ten days to reach the 
 Yalley, and that by this time the occasion for his services 
 would have passed by. In vain General McClellan urged the 
 real motive of the raid — to prevent re-enforcements from 
 reaching him. Deaf to all sounds of reason, the war-council 
 at Washington, like the Dutch States-General, of whom 
 Prince Eugene said, that " always interfering, they were al- 
 ways dying with fear," t heard only the reverberations of the 
 guns of the redoubtable Jackson. To head off Jackson, if 
 possible to catch Jackson, seemed now the one important 
 thing ; and the result of the cogitations of the "Washington 
 strategists was the preparation of what the President called a 
 " trap" for Jackson — a " trap" for the wily fox who was mas- 
 ter of every gap and gorge in the Valley ! Now this pretty 
 scheme involved the converging movements of Fremont from 
 
 * Dispatch from President Lincoln : Report on the Conduct of the War, 
 vol. i., p. 274. 
 
 f Tliis expression of Prince Eugene is used by him in a passage of his 
 Memoires, descriptive of an event curiously analogous to that to which the 
 above text has relation : " Marlborough," says he, " sent me vt^ord that Ber- 
 wick having re-enforced the duke of Burgundy, the army, which was now a 
 hundred and twenty thousand strong, had marched to the assistance of Lisle. 
 The deputies from the States-General, always interfenng, and alimys dying 
 with fear, demanded of me a re-enforcement for him," etc.— Memoirs of Prince 
 VjUgene, p. 106. 
 
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 127 
 
 the west, and McDowell from the east, upon Strasburg. The 
 two columns moved rapidly ; they had almost effected a junc- 
 tion on the 3Lst; but that very day Jackson, falling back 
 from Harper's Ferry, slipped between the two, and made 
 good his retreat up the Valley, leaving his opponents to follow 
 in a long and fruitless chase, all the time a day behind 
 him. 
 
 The pursuers did their best : they pushed on, Fremont fol- 
 lowing in the path of Jackson up the Valley of the Shenan- 
 doah ; while McDowell sent forward Shields' division by the 
 lateral Luray Valley, with a view to head him off when he 
 should attempt to break through the gaps of the Blue Kidge. 
 Jackson reached Harrisonburg on the 5th of June ; Fremont 
 the next day. There Jackson diverged eastward to cross the 
 Shenandoah at Port Kepubhc, the only point where there was 
 a bridge. Shields was moving up the east side of the river, 
 was close at hand, and might prevent his crossing, or might 
 form a junction with Fremont. Both results were to be pre- 
 vented. Jackson threw forward his own division to Port Ee- 
 pubhc (June 7) to cover the bridge ; and left EweU's division 
 five miles back on the road on which Fremont was following— 
 the road from Harrisonburg to Port Kepublic. Next day Fre- 
 mont attacked EweU's five brigades, with the view of turning 
 his right and gettmg through to the bridge at Port Kepublic 
 to make a junction with Shields. At the same time Shields 
 attacked the bridge on the east side, to make a junction with 
 Fremont. The result was that Ewell repulsed Fremont, while 
 Jackson held Shields in check. Early next morning, drawing 
 in Ewell and concentrating his forces, Jackson threw himself 
 across the river, burned the bridge to prevent Fremont from 
 following ; fell upon Shields' advance, consisting of two bri- 
 gades under General Tyler, and repulsed him, capturing his 
 artillery. The former of these affairs figures in history as the 
 battle of Cross Keys, and the latter as the battle of Port Re- 
 pub. ic. 
 
 In this exciting month's campaign, Jackson made great 
 captures of stores and prisoners; but this was not its chief 
 
128 CAIklPAIGNS OF THE AEMT OF THE POTOIMAC. 
 
 result. Without gaining a single tactical victory lie had jei 
 achieved a great strategic victory, for by skilfully manoeuvring 
 .fifteen thousand men he succeeded in neutralizing a force of 
 sixty thousand. It is perhaps not too much to say that he 
 saved Richmond ; for when McClellan, in expectation that Mc- 
 Dowell might still be allowed to come and join him, threw 
 forward his right wing, under Porter, to Hanover Coiirthouse, 
 on the 26th of June, the echoes of his cannon bore to those in 
 Kichmond who knew the situation of the two Union armies 
 the knell of the capital of the Confederacy." McDowell never 
 went forward — was never allowed, eager though he was, to go 
 forward. Well-intentioned though we must believe the mo- 
 tives to have been of those who counselled the course that led 
 to the consequences thus delineated, the historian must not 
 fail to point out the folly of an act that will remain an im- 
 pressive illustration of what is to be expected when men vio- 
 late the established principles of war. 
 
 IV. 
 THE BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. 
 
 It is easy to see the perilous position in which the events 
 just recited placed the Army of the Potomac. Had McClellan 
 been free immediately after the battle of WilHamsburg, when 
 the destruction of the Merrimac opened up the James Eiver 
 as a highway of suppHes, to transfer his army to that line, it 
 is easy to see that he would have avoided those dangers of 
 the other line whereof the enemy finally took such energetic 
 advantage. I have already set forth the circumstances that 
 dictated his advance by the line of the York and the 
 Pamunkey — to wit, the expected march of McDowell's 
 column from Fredericksburg for the purpose of joining the 
 Army of the Potomac — and I have detailed the events 
 whereby that column was prevented from making its antici- 
 
 * Prince de Joinville : The Army of the Potomac, p. 112, note 
 
THE PENINSULAE CAMPAIGN. 129 
 
 pated march. Now, it was almost simultaneous with the 
 establishment of the base at White House that McDowell's 
 column was turned aside from its contemplated co-operation 
 with the Army of the Potomac, and diverted to the Shenan- 
 doah Valley. Knowing this fact, General McClellan knew 
 that the hope of further re-enforcements was vain, and it was 
 incumbent on him to act vigorously with his proper force. 
 He knew that the presence of Jackson's corps in the Shenan- 
 doah Valley neutrahzed a force of fifteen thousand men that 
 was certain to be brought against him if he should delay. 
 Besides, he was making an offensive movement in which 
 vigorous action was above all requisite ; for when once the 
 offensive has been assumed, it must be sustained to the last 
 extremity. Yet, having reached the Chickahominy, he 
 assumed an almost passive attitude, with his army, too, cut 
 in twain by that tickle and difficult stream. 
 
 Now, though a position a clieval on a river is not one which 
 a general willingly assumes, it is frequently a necessity, and 
 in that case he spans the stream with numerous bridges.* It 
 was necessary for General McClellan to pass the Chicka- 
 hominy because it crossed his hue of manoeuvi'e against 
 Richmond ; and it was also necessary for him to leave a force 
 on the eastern side to cover his communications with his 
 base at the White House ; but this is not a situation in 
 which one would assume a passive attitude with few and very 
 imperfect connections between the divided wings. The passage 
 of the Chickahominy was made by Casey's division at Bot- 
 tom's Bridge on the 20th of May, and by the 25th the corps 
 of Keyes and Heintzelman were established on the right 
 bank. Meantime, the corps of Sumner, Porter, and Frank- 
 lin remained on the left bank. By the 28th, Sumner had 
 constructed two bridgesf for the passage of his corps ; but 
 
 * " If a stream divide a position at right angles, it should be spanned with 
 \ as many bridges as would enable troops and guns to pass from one side to the 
 other, as if no such feature existed." General McDougall : Modern Warfare 
 and Modern Artillery, p. 107. 
 
 f Known as " Sumner's Upper Bridge" and " Sumner's Lower Bridge." 
 
130 CARfPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 up to the time when the Confederate commander assumed 
 the initiative on the 31st, no provision was made for the 
 crossing of the right wing, and the re-enforcement of that 
 wing by the left involved a detour of twenty-three miles, — 
 a distance quite too gi-eat for the possibihty of re-enforcement 
 in the fierce emergency of battle. Materials for three 
 bridges* to be used m the passage of the right wing were 
 indeed prepared, and by the 28th of Mayt these bridges were 
 all ready to be laid. But, meantime, they were not laid, and 
 the two wings were suffered to remain separated by the 
 Chickahominy, and without adequate means of communica- 
 tion. 
 
 The Chickahominy rises in the highlands northwest of 
 Eichmond, and enveloping it on the north and east, emp- 
 ties into the James many miles below that city, and after 
 describing around it almost the quadrant of a circle. In 
 itself this river does not form any considerable barrier to the 
 advance of an army ; but with its accessories it constitutes one 
 of the most formidable mihtary obstacles imaginable. The 
 stream flows through a belt of heavily timbered swamp. The 
 tops of the trees rise just about to the level of the crests of 
 the highlands bordering the bottom, thus perfectly screening 
 from view the bottom-lands and slopes of the highlands on the 
 enemy's side. Through this belt of swamp the stream flows 
 sometimes in a single channel, more frequently divided into 
 several, and when but a foot or two above its summer level, 
 overspreads the whole swamp. The bottom-lands between 
 the swamp and the highlands, in width from three-quarters of 
 a mile to a mile and a quarter, are little elevated at their 
 margin above the swamp, so that a rise of the stream by a 
 
 * These bridges were the " New Bridge" and two other bridges, the one 
 half a mile above and the other half a mile below. 
 
 f " So far as engineering preparations were concerned, the army could have 
 been thrown over as early as the 28th of May, Sumner uniting his corps with 
 those of Heintzelman and Keyes, and taking the enemy's position at New 
 Bridge in flank and rear. Thus attacked, the enemy could have made no 
 formidable resistance to the passage of our right wing." Barnard : Eeport 
 of Engineer Operations, p. 21. 
 
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 131 
 
 few feet, overflows large areas of these bottoms, and even 
 when not overflowed they are spongy and impracticable for 
 cavalry and artillery.* 
 
 In this state of facts, McClellan's disposition of his army 
 must be considered a grave fault, and inaction in such a situ- 
 ation was in the highest degree dangerous. " A general," 
 says the Archduke Charles, " must suppose that his opponent 
 will do against him whatever he ought to do." Now, for 
 Johnston to omit to strike one or the other of these exposed 
 wings, was to neglect that principle which forms the whole 
 secret of war — to be superior to your enemy at the point of 
 collision : it was, in fact, to neglect a unique opportunity of 
 delivering a decisive blow. 
 
 The Confederate commander was not the man to let slip 
 such an opportunity ; and, as soon as reconnoissances had 
 fully developed the position of that portion of the Union 
 army which lay on the Eichmond side of the Chickahomy, he 
 determined to act. It was a situation in which, by bringing 
 two-thirds of his own force to bear against one-third of the 
 Union force, he might hope not merely to defeat but to de- 
 stroy the exposed wing. By the 30th of May he had formed 
 his resolution, and he immediately made preparations for 
 carrying it into effect on the following day.t During the 
 
 * Barnard : Report of Engineer Operations, pp. 18, 19. 
 
 f It is commonly supposed that it was the freshet in the Chickahominy, 
 caused by the storm of the night of the 30th, that prompted General Johnston 
 to attack ; but he had fully resolved to strike before the storm came on, on the 
 mere chances of the situation of the Union army. The storm did not come on 
 till the night of the 30th, and the following extract from the oflBcial report of 
 Major-General D. H. Hill will show that General Johnston had made disposi- 
 tions for the attack as early as noon of that day : " These reconnoissances (of 
 Hill's brigade commanders) satisfied me that the enemy was not in force on 
 the Charles City road, but was on the Williamsburg road, and that he had 
 fortified himself about the Seven Pines. The fact was further established, that 
 the whole of Keyes' corps had crossed the Chickahominy. These facts I com- 
 municated to General Johnston about noon on Friday, dOth of May. I received 
 a prompt answer from him, that, being satisfied by my report of the presence 
 ol the enemy in force in my immediate front, he had resolved to attack them." 
 OMciaJ Reports of Battles. Richmond, 1804. 
 
132 
 
 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AEMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 niglit of tlie 30tli, there came a storm of unwonted violence ; 
 and this circumstance, while it would embarrass the execu- 
 tion of Johnston's proposed plan, at the same time gave 
 that general the hope of making the operation still more 
 complete from the situation in which it would place his op- 
 ponent. 
 
 The reconnoissances of the Confederates had disclosed the 
 fact that Casey's division of Keyes' corps held an advanced 
 
 '""'♦NwSl'fAIROAKSSTA. /" 
 
 SKETCH OP THE FIELD OF FAIR OAKS. 
 
 position on the Williamsburg road, three-quarters of a mile 
 beyond the point known as Seven Pines and about six miles 
 from Richmond. Couch's division of the same corps was 
 stationed at Seven Pines, on both sides of the "Williamsburg 
 road and along the Nine-mile road, his right resting at Fair 
 Oaks Station, on the Eichmond and York River Railroad. 
 Of the two divisions of Heintzelman's corps, that of Kear- 
 ney was on the Williamsburg road and the raikoad, three- 
 quarters of a mile in advance of Savage Station; and that 
 
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 133 
 
 of Hooker was guarding the approaches of the White Oak 
 Swamp. 
 
 In this state of facts, Johnston made the following disposi- 
 tions for attack : Hill (D. H.), who had been covering the 
 Williamsburg and Charles City road, was directed to move 
 his division, supported by the division of Longstreet, out on 
 the WiUiamsburg road, but not to move till Huger's division, 
 whieli was to move out on the Charles City road, should re- 
 lieve him. Huger's duty was to strike the left flank of the 
 Union force which Hill and Longstreet should engage in 
 fi-ont. G. W. Smith, with his division, was to advance on the 
 right flank of the Union force, to the junction of the New 
 Bridge road with the Nine-mile road, there to be in readiness 
 either to fall on Keyes' right or to cover Longstreet's left.* 
 The divisions were to move at daybreak ; but the wretched 
 condition of the roads, resulting from the storm, greatly re- 
 tarded the movement of the troops. Hill, Longstreet, and 
 Smith, indeed, were in position by eight o'clock ; but not so 
 Huger. For hour after hour, Longstreet and Hill awaited in 
 vain the signal-gun that was to announce Huger's arrival in his 
 proper position. At length, at ten o'clock, Hillf went forward 
 on the WiUiamsburg road,:j: and presently struck Casey's divi- 
 sion. The advance position beyond Seven Pines, held by that 
 officer, was defended by a redoubt, rifle-pit, and abatis ; but, 
 at this time, these works were only in process of construction, 
 and the troops were, indeed, engaged at this work when the 
 attack was made.§ The pickets were quickly driven in, and 
 
 * Johnston : Reporl of Seven Pines : Confederate Reports of Battles, Rich- 
 mond, 1864. 
 
 f Hill was acting under Longstreet's orders during the day. 
 
 X Hill's Report : Official Reports of Battles. Richmond, 1864. 
 
 § The attack was not, however, a surprise, for the movement of the 
 enemy's troops had been observed for several hours before. It appears, more- 
 over, that about half-past ten an aid-de-camp of General Johnston was cap- 
 tured by the pickets of General Naglee. His presence so near the hues, and 
 his " very evident emotion" when a few shots were fired in front of Casey's 
 headquarters (Keyes' Report), caused increased vigilance, and the troops were 
 fffdered to be under arms at eleven o'clock. 
 
134 CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 the more so that a regiment* sent forward to support the 
 picket-hue gave way without making much if any resistance. 
 The first blow fell upon Naglee'st brigade, which held a posi- 
 tion in advance of the redoubt, where it made a good fight 
 and held the enemy in check for a considerable time, and 
 then retired and fought with the rest of the division in the 
 redoubt and rifle-pits — the force being strengthened by Peck's 
 brigade sent forward by General Couch. The Confederates ad- 
 vanced in close columns, and suffered severely from the fire of 
 the batteries in front of and in the redoubt. Presently, how- 
 ever, one of theu' brigades, which had been sent round on the 
 left of Casey, gained the rear of the redoubt. :|: When, there- 
 fore, a severe flank fire was opened by the force that had made 
 this detour, the division crumbled away, the guns in the redoubt 
 and a portion of those of the battery in front were captured,§ 
 
 * The One Hundred and Third Pennsylvania. See McClellan's Report. 
 p. 108. But for a statement that this regiment did better than had been re- 
 ported, see testimony of General Casey, in Report on the Conduct of the War, 
 vol. i., p. 445. 
 
 + In addition to Naglee's brigade, the position of which is given above, the 
 other two brigades of Casey's division were posted as follows : General Wes- 
 sel's brigade in the rifle-pits, and General Palmer's in rear of Wessel's. Of the 
 artillery, one battery was in advance with Naglee ; one in rear of the rifle-pits 
 to the right of the redoubt ; a third in rear of the redoubt ; and a fourth, un- 
 harnessed, in the redoubt. 
 
 Ij. General Johnston's account of the manner in which Casey's position was 
 carried is as follows : " Hill's brave troops, admirably commanded and gal- 
 lantly led, forced their way through the abatis, which formed the enemy's 
 external defences, and stormed their intrenchments by a determined and irre 
 sistible rush. Such was the manner in which the enemy's first line was car 
 ried." (Johnston: Ofiicial Report.) But tMs does not give an accurate repre- 
 sentation of the case. Hill, who was in command of the attacking columns, 
 says: "General Rains Iiad now gained the rear of the Yankee redoiM, and 
 opened fire on the infantry posted in the woods. I now noticed commotion in 
 the camps and redoubts, and indications of evacuating the position. Rodes 
 took skilful advantage of this commotion, and moved up his brigade in beauti- 
 ful order, and took possession of the redoubts and rifle-pits." OflBcial Reports 
 of Battles. Richmond, 1864. 
 
 § Among those wlio fell in the redoubt were. Colonel G. D. Bailey, Major 
 Van Valkenberg, and Adjutant Ramsay, all of the First New York Artillery. 
 
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 135 
 
 and sucli of tlie troops as held together were brought to a 
 stand at General Couch's position at Seven Pines.'^' 
 
 Early in the action, General Keyes, whose troops were those 
 upon whom the attack had thus far fallen, finding he was 
 being hard pushed, had sent to General Heintzelnian, who 
 commanded the whole left wing of the army, and whose two 
 divisions were close at hand, to send him aid. But the mes- 
 sage was both delayed in reaching that ollicer,t and when he 
 sent forward re-enforcements, they were, through some misun- 
 derstanding, very tardy in reaching the fi'out ; so that it was 
 past four o'clock when Kearney, with his foremost brigade,:]: 
 arrived at the position where Couch's troops and the wreck of 
 Casey's division were struggling to hold their own.§ Berry's 
 brigade was immediately thrown into the woods on the left, 
 where his rifles commanded the left of the camp and works 
 occupied by Casey in the morning, and now held by the 
 enemy. 
 
 Meantime, though the divisions of Longstreet and Hill had 
 thus for three hours been vigorously pushing forward on the 
 Williamsburg road, the column of G. W. Smith, to which was 
 intrusted the important flanking oj^eration already indicated 
 in Johnston's original plan, had not yet moved. The Confed- 
 erate commander had placed himself with this column ; but 
 failing to hear the musketry of Longstreet and Hill, |1 he 
 waited till four o'clock, when, learning how these generals had 
 been engaged, he immediately threw forward Smith's com- 
 mand. Thus it happened that when Casey had been driven 
 back to Couch's line at the Seven Pines, and the latter with two 
 regiments of his division had advanced to relieve the pressure 
 on Casey's flank by an attack of the hostile left, he was met 
 
 * " On my arrival at the second line, I succeeded in rallying a portion of 
 my division." — Casey's Report. 
 
 t He received it at two p. M. — Heintzelman's Report. 
 
 :j: Berry's brigade. 
 
 § Hooker's division did not reach the ground till the action was decideo. 
 
 I " Owing to some peculiar condition of the atmosphere, the sound of thw 
 musketry did not reach us." — Johnston : Report of Seven Pines. 
 
]36 CA]\IPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 by large masses of the enemy bursting out on his right bj the 
 rear of the Nine-mile road, and another heavy column moving 
 towards Fair Oaks Station. This was Smith's column, which 
 had at length got fahly to work. Couch, who had been re- 
 enforced by two additional regiments, made fight, but was 
 overpowered and. thrown off eccentrically to the right, — the 
 enemy penetrating between the force with which Couch was 
 executing this manoeuvre and the main body of his division.* 
 And now, between five and six o'clock, it seemed that the 
 wdiole left wing of the army across the Chickahominy was 
 doomed ; for not only was Couch bisected, but the brigades of 
 Berry and Jameson, of Kearney's division, which had gone 
 up on the left, were thrown back by the enemy on White Oak 
 Swamp, only regaining the main body under cover of night ; 
 and the centre was struggling with indifferent success to hold 
 its own, after being driven from two positions. But just at 
 this crisis, when the fate of the day was trembling in the 
 balance, the action was determined by the sudden apparition 
 of a column from the north bank of the Chickahominy. 
 
 Upon first learning the state of affairs on the left wing, 
 McClellan sent orders to General Sumner, who held the centre 
 of the general line of the army, on the north side of the 
 Chickahominy, and about six miles from the scene of action, 
 to hold his corps in readiness to move. But as soon as the 
 sounds of battle from the west side of the Chickahominy 
 reached!" him, Sumner, divining the situation, had, with that 
 soldierly instinct that characterized him, put his corps under 
 arms, and marched it out of camp ; so that when, at two 
 o'clock, he was ordered to cross his command without delay, 
 and proceed to the support of Heintzelman, no time was lost. 
 
 * " In twenty minutes, tlie enemy had passed over the road leading to my 
 centre, cutting me off from the rest of the division." — Couch : Report of 
 Fair Oaks. 
 
 f " Genei-al Sumner, as soon as he heard tlie firing, and without waiting 
 for orders, liad pui liis troops under arms and marched them out of camji, thus 
 saving an hour or so, wliich was of great service to us." Heintzelmau's testi- 
 mony in Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 351. 
 
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 137 
 
 For the passage of tlie Chickaliominy there were, at that 
 time, only Bottom's Bridge, the raikoad-bridge, and two 
 bridges built by Sumner himself intermediate between the 
 two above mentioned. But to reach the battle-field that day 
 by Bottom's Bridge or the railroad-bridge was out of the 
 question; his sole reliance, therefore, was on his own two 
 bridges. Now, however, a new and dire difl&culty presented 
 itseH : the lower bridge had been carried away by the freshet ; 
 the upper one was half adrift. When the head of Sumner's 
 column, composed of Sedgwick's division, reached it, the 
 rough logs forming the corduroy approaches over the swamp 
 were mostly afloat, and were only kept from drifting off by 
 the stumps of trees to which they were fastened. The por- 
 tion over the body of the stream was suspended from the 
 trunks of trees by ropes, on the doubtful staunchness of 
 which depended the possibility of making the passage. 
 
 "The possibility of crossing," says Colonel Alexander of 
 the engineers, " was doubted by all present, including General 
 Sumner himself. As the sohd column of infantry entered upon 
 the bridge, it swayed to and fro to the angry flood below or 
 the living freight above, settling down and grasping the sohd 
 stumps by which it was made secure, as the line advanced. 
 Once filled with men, however, it was safe tUl the corps had 
 crossed ; it then soon became impassable."* 
 
 Sumner, debouching from the bridge with Sedgwick's divi- 
 sion (Eichardson's division did not arrive till about sunset), 
 pushed impetuously forward through the deep mud, guided 
 only by the firing. To move the artillery was found impossi- 
 ble. t At about six o'clock the head of Sedgwick's column:]: 
 deployed into line in the rear of Fair Oaks, in a position 
 where Couch, when separated fi'om the main body, had taken 
 his stand to oppose the enemy's advance. They were no 
 more than in time ; for at that moment Smith's troops, 
 
 * " The Peninsular Campaign :'' Atlantic Monthly, March, 1864. 
 f Lieutenant Kirby, Company I, First United States Artillery, by fairi] 
 carrying his gmis to firmer ground, succeeded in getting up his battery. 
 I Formed by Gorman's brigade. 
 
138 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 lia\dng been gotten well in hand under the personal direction 
 of General Johnston, moved forward, opening a heavy fusillade 
 upon the hne. They made several determined charges, but 
 were each time repulsed with great loss by the steady fire of 
 the infantry and the excellent practice of the batteries.* 
 After sustaining the enemy's fire for a considerable time, 
 General Sumner ordered five regimentst to make a charge 
 with the bayonet into the woods occupied by the enemy. 
 This operation was handsomely executed, and resulted in 
 driving back the Confederates in confusion. Thus, when all 
 was lost, Sumner's soldierly promptitude saved the day, as 
 Moreau, flying to the assistance of Napoleon when hard 
 pressed by the Austrians in Italy, chained victory to the stand- 
 ards of the French. " O Moreau !" exclaimed that illustrious 
 war-minister Carnot, on hearing of this ; " oh, my dear Fabius, 
 how great you were in that circumstance ! how superior to 
 the wretched rivalries of generals, which so often cause the 
 best-laid enterprises to miscarry !"| The brave old Sumner 
 now sleeps in a soldier's grave ; but that one act of heroic 
 duty must embalm his memory in the hearts of his country- 
 men. 
 
 In this bloody encounter the Confederates lost nearly seven 
 thousand men, and the Union army upwards of five thousand. 
 But a severer loss befell the Confederates than is expressed 
 even in this heavy aggregate ; for the able chief of the Ai-my 
 of Northern Virginia was struck down with a severe hurt. 
 The command, for the time being, devolved on General G. W. 
 Smith ; but the failure to make good the purpose of the 
 attack, the heavy losses already sufi'ered, and the disabhng of 
 
 * McClellan : Report, p. 110. General Johnston simply says: "The 
 strength of the enemy's position enabled liim to hold it till dark." 
 
 f The Thii-ty-fourth New York, Colonel Sinter ; Eighty-second New York, 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Hudson ; Fifteenth Massachusetts, Lieutenant-Colonel Kim 
 ball ; Twentieth Massachusetts, Colonel Lee ; Seventh Micliigan, Major Richard- 
 son — the three former of General Gorman's brigade, the latter two of General 
 Dana's brigade. 
 
 ■j^ Alison : Plistory of Europe, vol. iii., p. 827. 
 
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 139 
 
 General Jolmston, cletGrminetl General Smitli to retii'e his 
 forces. Preparations for witlidraAval were actively pushed 
 forward during the night ; but through some accidental cii"- 
 cumstances, a portion of Sumner's line having become en- 
 gaged on the morning of the 1st of June, there ensued a 
 rencounter of some severity, which lasted for two or three 
 hours. It ended, however, after some brisk sallies, in the 
 withdrawal of the entire Confederate force to the lines 
 around Eichmoud. The Union troops were immediately 
 pushed forward, and occupied the positions held previous to 
 the action.* 
 
 * Tlirougli one of those odd freaks that sometimes overtake the record of 
 military events, the history of the operation of the 1st of June has been made 
 to assume a magnitude altogether beyond its real proportions. There are on 
 record official reports and official testimony that would make one believe that 
 the action on the morning following Fair Oaks assimied the volume of a battle — 
 and a battle, too, if one were to credit the oft-recurring " bayonet charges," and 
 attacks in solid column, of little less than first-class magnitude. There is little 
 doubt, however, that these details are largely, if not altogether apochryphal. 
 There was, indeed, a rencounter on the morning of the 1st, but it was the result 
 not of a plan and purpose of aggressive action on the part of the Confederates, 
 but an incident in the withdrawal of the enemy from the Union front. Gen- 
 eral Johnston has frequently expressed to the writer his amazement at the 
 swelling bulk assumed by the " skirmish" of the 1st. Though not present, 
 having been removed to Richmond after his hurt. General Johnston yet knew 
 by constant reports from the field what was going on, and asserts that nothing 
 more severe than an affair of the rear-guard took place. In his official rej^ort, 
 General Johnston simply says: "Major-General Smith was prevented from re- 
 suming his attack on the enemy's position next morning by the discovery of 
 strong intrenchments not seen on the previous evening. On the morning of 
 Jime 1st the enemy attacked the brigade of General Pickett, which was sup 
 ported by that of General Pryor. The attack was vigorously repelled by these 
 two brigades, the brunt of the fight falling on General Pickett. This was the 
 last demonstration made by the enemy. In the evening oiu iVM'^ -juietly 
 returned to their own camps.' 
 
140 CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 V. 
 
 THE SEVEN DAYS' RETREAT. 
 
 The attitude of the army during the month succeeding the 
 action of Fair Oaks was not imposing. It was seemingly a 
 body that had lost its momentum ; and the troops, sweltering 
 through all that hot month amid the unwholesome swamps of 
 the Chickahominy, sank in energy. McClellan's position was 
 a trying one : he realized the full necessity of action ; but he 
 also realized better than any of his contemporaries the enor- 
 mous difficulty of the task laid upon him. Feeling deeply 
 the need of new accessions to his strength, in order to permit 
 him to carry out his plans, ahd seeing almost as large a force 
 as he had to confront the enemy with scattered in unmili- 
 tary positions throughout Virginia, he was naturally urgent 
 that they should be forwarded from where they were useless 
 to where they might be so advantageously employed. 
 
 Yet the situation was not one that permitted inaction ; for 
 the position of the army astride a fickle river, and the ex- 
 perience already had of the danger to which that division of 
 its strength exposed it, should have been a sufficient admoni- 
 tion of the necessity of a change. The fundamental vice was 
 the direction of McClellan's line of communications almost 
 on the prolongation of his front of operations. Pivoting on 
 the York Eiver Raih-oad, and drawing his supplies from Wliite 
 House, it became absolutely necessary for him to hold a large 
 part of his effective strength on the left bank of the Chicka- 
 hominy for the protection of that line, — a situation that at 
 once prevented his using his whole force, and exposed him to 
 attack in detail. This false position might have been recti- 
 fied in two ways : 1. By a change of base to the James, which 
 would have given a line of manoeuvre against Richmond, en- 
 tirely free from the objections inherent in that by the York, 
 
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 141 
 
 and whereon lie would have had choice either of moving 
 against Richmond by the north bank of the James, or, by a 
 transfer to the south side, of operating against its communica- 
 tions, which was altogether the bolder and more decisive 
 method ; 2. By the transfer of the whole force to the right 
 bank of the Ohickahominy, abandoning the hne of the York, 
 and then making a prompt advance against Richmond, with 
 the advantage that, if unsuccessful in the battle against the 
 adverse force, the line of the James might be taken up. The 
 latter was the preferable course, as it avoided the ill moral ef- 
 fect that might be expected to attend a change of base wnthout 
 a battle. But either would have been better than inaction, 
 which, in the actual situation, was more hazardous than the 
 boldest procedare, and was an eminent example of that kind 
 of false prudence that is often the greatest rashness. 
 
 General McClellan knew that the adoption of the one 
 course or the other was necessary ; but unfortunately the 
 case was one presenting an alternative, and it was the nature 
 of that commander's mind to so balance between conflict- 
 ing views, to so let " I dare not wait upon I would," that he 
 was apt to hesitate even in conjunctures wherein the worst 
 course was preferable to doing nothing. To whatever sub- 
 tile cause, deep seated in the structure of his mind — to 
 whatever excess of lymph in his blood this may have been 
 due — it certainly marred his eminent capacity as a soldier. 
 There is something painful and at the same time almost 
 ludicrous in the evidence, found in his official dispatches, of 
 this ever-about-to-do non-performance. On the day succeed- 
 ing the action of Fair Oaks, the 2d of June, he wrote : "I only 
 wait for the river to fall to cross with the rest of the force and 
 make a general attack. Should I find them holding firm in a 
 very strong position, I may wait for what troops I can bring 
 up fi'om Fort Monroe." On the 7th of June : " I shall be in 
 perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the 
 moment that McCall reaches here, and the ground wiR admit 
 the passage of artillery." McCall's division (of McDowell's 
 force) arrived on the 12th and 13th, which increased his 
 
14:2 CAJSIPAIGNS OF THE AEMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 effectire to one liundrcd and fifteen thousand men.* On the 
 16th he wrote : " I hope two days more will make the ground 
 practicable. I shall advance as soon as the bridges are com- 
 pleted and the ground fit for artillery to move." On the 18th : 
 " A general engagement may take place any hour." On the 
 25th : " The action will probably occur to-morrow, or within a 
 short time," — and so on and on in the like tenor, until the time 
 when the enemy cut short the endless debate by seizing the 
 initiative. Now it cannot be said that the obstacles indicated 
 were not real difticulties in the way of an advance ; that 
 the successive conditions precedent of action were not well 
 taken, and based on sound military reasoning. "Wliat Gen- 
 eral McClellan should have seen, however, is that his proper 
 course of action was determined not by these circumstances 
 at aU, but was dictated by the necessity of extricating himself 
 from a situation intrinsically false. This became only too 
 soon manifest. 
 
 When the hurt that General Johnston had received at Fair 
 Oaks was seen to be one that must long keep him out of the 
 field, General Robert E. Lee was nominated to succeed him in 
 the command of the Army of Northern Virginia. Of this sol- 
 dier, destined to so large a fame, men had at this time to judge 
 by promise rather than by proof. General Lee's actual experi- 
 ence in the field had been confined to a trivial campaign in 
 the mountains of Western Virginia, in which he had been in a 
 remarkable manner foiled by General Rosecrans ; and this, 
 with his reflective habits and cautious temper, promised a 
 commander of the Fabian mould. Yet there is nothing in 
 which one may more readily judge wrongly than in the at- 
 tempt to prognosticate from the plane of every-day experience 
 
 * The rolls of tlie Army of the Potomac showed on the 26th of June the 
 following figures : Total aggregate of present and absent, one hundred and 
 fifty-six thousand eight hundred and thirty-eight ; aggregate absent, twenty- 
 nine thousand five hundred and eleven ; aggregate on special duty, sick, etc , 
 twelve thousand two hundred and twenty-five ; aggregate present for duty, one 
 hundred and fifteen thousand one hundred and two. Official Records : Adjutant 
 General's Office. 
 
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 143 
 
 the behavior of a man placed in command of an army. Lee, 
 whose characteristic trait was caution, marked the commence- 
 ment of his career by a stroJce brilliant in its boldness. 
 
 It has been seen that in General Johnston's theory of ac- 
 tion for the defence of Eichmond, he judged that the course 
 best suited to the circumstances was to draw in around the 
 Confederate capital, concentrate there all the available re- 
 sources of the South, and then fall with crushing weight upon 
 the Union army, divided by the Chickahominy. Accidental 
 circumstances had made the blow which he delivered ineffect- 
 ual. General Lee determined to continue the same line of 
 action ; and this he was enabled to carry out under more favor- 
 able auspices. Johnston's views touching the necessity of a 
 powerful gathering of force at Eichmond fell comparatively 
 unheeded ; but his successor had better fortune, and having 
 decided to assume the offensive, he was able to draw in the 
 Confederate detachments scattered along the coast and 
 throughout Virginia, and by this means raise his effective to 
 near one hundred thousand men. Lee's policy of concentration 
 included the withdrawal of Jackson's force from the Valley of 
 the Shenandoah, — and a withdrawal so secret, that its first 
 announcement should be the blow struck. Before commencing 
 operations, however, he sent Stuart, with a body of fifteen 
 hundred Virginia troopers, to make the circuit of the Union 
 army, by a swoop around its rear. This having been success- 
 fully accomphshed about the middle of June, Lee was ready, 
 with the knowledge thus gained, to strike. 
 
 To mask Jackson's intended withdrawal from the Valley, 
 General Lee detached a division from the force around Eich- 
 mond (the division of Whiting) and sent it to join Jackson. 
 This was done ostentatiously, and m such a way that it should 
 become Imown to General McClellan ; Lee judging that the 
 intelligence of this movement would give his antagonist the 
 impression of a revival of operations in the Shenandoah re- 
 gion. If there was, as seemed likely, a renewed intention of 
 sending forward McDowell's army to join McClellan, a fresh 
 appeal to the fears of the administration for the safety of 
 
144 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Washington was the shrewdly chosen means of again divert- 
 ing that force. 
 
 When this had had its intended effect, Jackson, with his 
 whole command, now raised to about twenty-five thousand 
 men, was ordered to march rapidly and secretly in the direc- 
 tion of Richmond. He set out from the vicinity of Port Re- 
 public (where he had remained since the termination of the 
 Valley campaign) on the 17th of June, and moving by way of 
 Gordonsville and the line of the Virginia Central Railroad, 
 pushed his advance so vigorously that on the 25th he struck 
 Ashland, on the Fredericksburg Raikoad, twelve miles from 
 Richmond. With such skill did Jackson manage his march, 
 that not General McCleUan, nor yet Banks, nor Fremont, nor 
 McDowell, knew aught of it ;* and when, on the 25th, Jack- 
 son had reached Ashland, and was within striking distance of 
 the right wing of the Army of the Potomac, McClellan, ab- 
 sorbed in his proposed operations on the Richmond side of 
 the Chickahominy, was that very day advancing his pickets 
 on the Williamsburg road, preparatory to a general forward 
 movement in that direction. Jackson had now reached a 
 point where the other Confederate columns could begin the 
 parts assigned to them. 
 
 Lee's plan contemplated that as soon as Jackson, by his 
 manoeuvres on the north bank of the Chickahominy, should 
 have uncovered the passage of the stream at Meadow and 
 Mechanicsville bridges, the divisions on the south bank should 
 cross and join Jackson's column, when the whole army should 
 sweep down the north side of the Chickahominy, towards the 
 York River, laying hold of McClellan's communications with 
 Wliite House.t 
 
 The only interference with this plan was caused by a day's 
 delay in Jackson's movement whereby it occurred that 
 
 * A deserter from Jackson's force came into the Union lines on tlie 34tli, 
 and stated tliat Jackson was moving from Gordonsville, along the line of the 
 Virginia Central Railroad, to strike the right of the Army of the Potomac ; bat 
 his story was not credited. 
 
 f Lee : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 6. 
 
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 145 
 
 when, on tlic afternoon of the 2Gth, General A. P. Hill, after 
 crossing the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge and driving 
 away the small force* in observation at Mechanicsville (thus 
 enabling the divisions of Longstreet and D. H. Hill to cross at 
 Mechanicsville Bridge and join him), attempted to proceed in 
 the movement down the north bank of the Chickahominy, the 
 columns were brought to a halt by a part of the corps of 
 ritz-John Porter, which held an intrenched position on the 
 left bank of Beaver Dam Creek, a small tributary of the Chick- 
 ahominy. The position was a strong one, the left bank of the 
 creek being high and almost perpendicular, and the approach 
 being over open fields, swept by artillery fire and obstructed 
 by abatis. This position was held by the brigades of Rey- 
 nolds and Seymour ; but when the Confederates showed a 
 determination to force the passage. General Porter called up 
 the remainder of his corps, consisting of Meade's brigade and 
 the division of Morell. The Mechanicsville road, on which 
 the Confederate divisions, under General Longstreet, moved 
 to make the passage of Beaver Dam Creek, turns when near 
 the creek and runs nearly parallel to it, thus causing an ad- 
 vancing force to present a flank. The Pederal troops were 
 concealed by earthworks commanding this road ; and, reserv- 
 ing their fire until the head of the Confederate column was 
 nearly across the ravine, they opened a terribly destructive 
 volley in the face and on the flank of the advancing force : the 
 survivors fled, and no additional attempt was made to force 
 the passage that night ; but brisk firing was continued till 
 nine o'clock. t The enemy lost between three and four thou- 
 sand men, while the Union loss was quite inconsiderable.^ 
 
 * The force here consisted of a regiment and a battery. 
 
 f Porter : Eeport of Mechanicsville. This statement is fully borne out by 
 \jee : " After sustaining a destructive fire of musketry and artillery, at short 
 range, the troops," says he, " were withdrawn." Reports of the Army of North- 
 ern Virginia, vol. i., p. 9. 
 
 X I derive this statement of the heavy Confederate loss from General Long- 
 street himself. It does not appear in the official reports, and is much larger 
 than had hitherto been supposed. 
 
 10 
 
146 CAJSIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 The attempt was renewed at daAvn of the following morning, 
 with equally ill success ; but while the Confederates were 
 thus engaged, Jackson passed Beaver Dam Creek above and 
 turned the position. 
 
 By the night of the 26th of June, the intelligence which 
 McClellan received from his outposts left no doubt of Jack- 
 son's ajiproach, and, divining now the true nature of Lee's 
 move, he resolved to withdraw his right wing under Gen- 
 eral Porter from its position at Beaver Dam, where it was 
 too far from the main body and too much " in the air." The 
 answer to the question, what should be done with the right 
 wing, would determine the entire situation. 
 
 The disclosure of Lee's bold initiative made action indis- 
 pensable. Three courses were open to McClellan : 1. To 
 effect a concentration of the whole army on the north side 
 of the Chickahominy, and there deliver general battle ; 2. To 
 effect a concentration on the south bank, and march directly 
 for Bichmond ; 3. To transfer the right wing to the south 
 bank, and make a change of base to the James River. 
 
 The first plan was not conformable to military principles ; 
 for Lee already laid hold of McClelJan's communications with 
 White House, and the Confederate force on the Richmond 
 side of the Chickahominy imperilled his line of retreat to the 
 James River. To have given general battle on the north 
 bank would, therefore, have been to risk his army without an 
 assured line of retreat.* 
 
 The second project, that of making a counter-move 
 on Richmond, would have been correct and at the same 
 time very bold and brilliant. Such an operation has 
 several illustrious precedents, of which one of the best 
 known and most striking is Turenne's counter to Monte- 
 
 * This is somethino; which even Napoleon was unwilling to do. Discnss- 
 ing the lines of conduct open to him after crossing the Alps into Italy, he 
 says : " Of these three courses, the first — to march upon Turin — was contrary 
 to the true principles of war, as the French icotdd run the risk of fighting 
 vyithout having a certain retreat, Fort Bard not being then taken." Gour- 
 gaud and Montholon : Memoirs of Napoleon, vol. i., p. 276. 
 
TIIE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 147 
 
 cucnli in 1675. Montecuculi, commanding the Imperial 
 army, after a series of beautiful manoeuvres, began to 
 cross the Ehine at Strasburg for the purpose of falling upon 
 the French force ; but Turenne, nothing disconcerted, threw 
 a bridge over the river three miles below Strasburg, and, 
 transferring his whole army to German ground, compelled 
 Montecuculi to make a hasty return. There is httle doubt 
 that a direct march of the whole army on Kichmond on the 
 morning of the 27th, would have had the effect to recall Lee to 
 the defence of his own communications and the Confederate 
 capital, which was defended by only twenty-five thousand 
 men.'^ McClellan held the direct crossings of the Chicka- 
 hominy on the south bank, while the Confederate bridges 
 w^ere destroyed, and Lee would have been compelled to make 
 a detour of at least a day to rejoin the force in front of 
 Kichmond. Wliy, therefore, did not General McClellan exe- 
 cute this operation ? He answers this question by a reference 
 to the limited quantity of supplies on hand ; but this can- 
 not be accepted as valid, for the army had at this time 
 rations for many days, and large stores had eventually to be 
 burnt previous to the retreat. The real reason is, that the 
 operation overleaped by its boldness the methodical genius 
 of the Union commander. 
 
 It resulted, therefore, that he adopted the alternative of a 
 change of base to the James Kiver. In deciding upon this 
 plan, which was judicious if not brilliant, and which was 
 executed in a manner to reflect high credit on the army and 
 its commander, the only sacrifice made by General McClellan 
 — and indeed it was no inconsiderable one — was that he 
 did on compulsion what he might have done before from 
 
 * General Magruder, who had command of the Confederate forces on the 
 right bank of the Chickahominy, says : " I considered the situation of our 
 army as extre7nely critical and perilous. The larger part of it was on the 
 opposite side of the Chickahominy, the bridges had been all destroyed, but 
 one was rebuilt, and there were but twenty-five thousand men between his - 
 McClellan "s— army of one hundred thousand men and Richmond." Reports o( 
 the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 191. 
 
148 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 choice — what, indeed, he appears to have intended to do, but 
 what, halting as that general so often did in the perilous 
 half-way-house between the offensive and the defensive, 
 never was done ; thus turning awry the current of an enter- 
 prise of great pith and moment and losing the name of action. 
 
 In determining to withdraw Porter's corps to the south 
 bank of the Chickahominy and effect with his united army a 
 change of base to the James Eiver, General McClellan took a 
 preliminary step which, though seemingly dictated by the ne- 
 cessities of his difficult situation, enabled the Confederates to 
 inflict a heavy blow on that corps, and beclouded the com- 
 mencement of the retrograde movement by a severe disaster to 
 the Union arms. It appeared that an immediate withdrawal 
 of the right wing over the Chickahominy after Jackson had 
 turned its position on Beaver Dam Creek would expose the 
 rear of the army, placed as between two fires,* and enable 
 Jackson by moving direct on the lower bridges of the Chicka- 
 hominy, and even on Malvern Hill, to interrupt the movement 
 to the James River. He resolved, therefore, to engage Jack- 
 son with Porter's corps, re-enforced by whatever troops might 
 be available from the south bank of the Chickahominy, in 
 order to cover the withdrawal of the trains and hea\^ guns 
 and to gain time for arrangements looking to the change of 
 base to the James. It was indeed an unhappy plight in which 
 the commander found himseK placed, — condemned either to 
 hazard the safety of his whole army, or doom a portion of it 
 to almost assured destruction. For it was not, as he con- 
 ceived, with Jackson alone that Porter would have to deal, 
 but with more than two-thirds of the entire Confederate army, 
 with Jackson, and Longstreet, and the two Hills : it was in 
 fact twenty-seven thousand against sixty thousand, — an over- 
 weight of opposition that lent to the task assigned to Porter 
 almost the character of a forlorn hope. 
 
 In execution of this design, the greater part of the heavy 
 guns and wagons were removed from Beaver Dam to the 
 
 * McClellan : Report, p. 125. 
 
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 
 
 149 
 
 south bank of tlie Chickahommj during the night of the 26th ; 
 and shortly before dayHght the deHcate operation of with- 
 drawing the troops to the position where it was determined to 
 make the new stand, w^as commenced and skilfully and suc- 
 cessfully executed ; for, though the Confederates followed 
 closely, skirmishing, yet Porter was able to take up his new 
 position before they appeared in force in his front. The rear 
 was handsomely covered by Seymour's brigade and the horse 
 batteries of Eobertson and Tidball. 
 
 SKETCH OF THE FIELD OF GAESTES' MILL. 
 
 The position on the north bank of the Chickahominy taken 
 up for resistance, was w^ell chosen, on a range of heights be- 
 tween Cold Harbor and the Chickahominy. The line of battle 
 formed the arc of a circle, covering the approaches to the 
 bridges which connected the right wing with the troops on the 
 south side of the river. The left (Morell's division) rested on 
 a wooded bluff, which rose abruptly fi'om a deep ravine lead- 
 ing down to the Chickahominy ; the right (Sykes' division of 
 Eegulars) posted in woods and clearings, extended to the rear 
 
150 CAJNIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 of Cold Harbor. The ground, generally open in front, was 
 bounded on the side of the Confederate approach by a wood 
 with dense and tangled undergrowth and traversed by a 
 sluQgish stream. McCall's division was formed in a second 
 line.* This field was destined to a historic character ; for two 
 years afterwards, General Grant, in his campaign fi-om the 
 Eapidan to Richmond, delivered a bloody battle on the same 
 ground. Yet between the circumstances of the two battles, 
 there was one point of difterence ; and it is a point of difference 
 that epitomizes the whole progress of the war from 1862 to 
 1864. By the time Lee found himself on the defensive along 
 the Chickahominy, a long experience had taught the enor- 
 mous advantage of those rude breastworks of logs and earth, 
 which the troops of both armies had acquired such a marvel- 
 lous facihty in constructing. But in the earlier action the art 
 of preparing defensive positions was yet in its infancy, and 
 the ground on which Porter disposed his force — a position 
 that in two hours' vigorous use of the axe and spade might 
 have been rendered impregnable — remained guarded by little 
 more than the naked valor of the troops. 
 
 The dispositions had hardly been made, when at two o'clock 
 General A. P. Hill, who had the advance of Lee's column, swung 
 round by New Cold Harbor, and advanced his division to the 
 attack. Jackson, who was to form the left of the Confederate 
 line, had not yet come up, and Longstreet was held back un- 
 til Jackson's arrival on the left should compel an extension of 
 the Federal line. Hill, accordingly, attacked alone ; but he 
 gained no advantage, for after piercing the line at one point, 
 he was repulsed and forced to yield ground, his troops being 
 di'iven back in great disorder and with heavy loss.f To re- 
 
 * Reynolds' brigade was jested on tlae extreme right to cover the approaches 
 from Cold Harbor and Dispatch Station to Sumner's Bridge. 
 
 f Even a stronger statement than that above made would be justified by 
 the Confederate official reports. Thus General Whiting says : " Men were 
 leaving the field in every direction and in great disorder ; two regiments, one 
 from South Carolina and one from Louisiana, were actually marching back 
 from the fire. Men were skulking from the front in a shamefvd manner." Re- 
 
THE PENINSULAE CAMPAiaN. 151 
 
 lieve Hill, the Confederate commautler now ordered Long- 
 street, who held the right of the Confederate hne, to make a 
 feint on the left of the Union position ; but Longstreet soon 
 discovered that, owing to the strength of this point, the feint 
 to be effective would have to be converted into a real attack.* 
 While dispositions for this were in progress, Jackson's corps 
 together with D. H. Hill's division arrived ; and when disposi- 
 tions had been completed, a general advance fi'om right to 
 left was made at six o'clock. Previous to this. General 
 Porter, finding liimseK hard pressed, had called for re-enforce- 
 ments, and in response. General McClellan, at half-past three, 
 sent him Slocum's division of Franklin's corps, which increased 
 his force to thirty-five thousand men. It 's\'as evident, how- 
 ever, that, beyond this, Porter could expect Httle or no aid, for 
 the troops on the south bank of the Chickahominy had at the 
 same time their attention fully engaged by the demonstrations 
 of Magruder, who by energetic handhng of his troops, making 
 a great show and movement and clatter, held the corps com- 
 manders on the south side, to whom McClellan appealed for 
 aid in behalf of Porter, so fully occupied that they declared 
 they could with safety spare none.^ And thus it happened 
 that, while on the north side of the Chickahominy thirty thou- 
 sand Union troops were being assailed by seventy thousand 
 Confederates, twenty-five thousand Confederates on the south 
 side held in check sixty thousand Union troops ! 
 
 When, therefore, Lee, with all his divisions in hand, made 
 a general advance, it was with an overwhelming weight and 
 
 ports of tlae Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 154. General Lee explains 
 this by the statement that " most of these men had never been under fire tUI 
 the day before." (Ibid., p. 8.) This furnishes an additional proof that Lee had 
 been re-enforced by troops from the coast. 
 
 * " I found I must drive the enemy by direct assault, or abandon the 
 idea of making the diversion. From the urgent nature of the message from 
 the commanding general, I determined to change the feint into an attack." 
 Report of Longstreet : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol i., p. 124. 
 
 f Sumner proffered two brigades, if General McClellan was billing he should 
 Intrust the defence of his position to his front line alone. 
 
152 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 pressure. The riglit^ held its ground with much stubborn- 
 ness, repulsing every attack. The left, too, fought stoutly, 
 but was at length broken by a determined charge, led by 
 Hood's Texan troops. This, however, would not have sufficed 
 to entail any great disaster ; and Porter was withdrawing his 
 infantry under cover of the fire of fifty guns, when the artil- 
 lery on the height on the left was thrown into great confusion 
 by a mass of cavalry rushing back from the front ; and the 
 batteries, being without support, retired in haste, overrunning 
 the infantry, and throwing the whole mass into most admired 
 disorder. The explanation of this is as follows. The cavaby 
 had been directed to keep below the hill, and under no cir- 
 cumstances to appear on the crest, but to operate in the bot- 
 tom land against the enemy's flank : nevertheless its com- 
 mander. General Philip St. George Cook, doubtless misin- 
 formed, ordered it to charge between the infantry and artillery 
 upon the enemy on the left, who had not yet emerged from 
 the woods.t This charge, executed in the face of a withering 
 fire, resulted, of course, in the cavalry's being thrown back in 
 confusion ; and the bewildered horses, regardless of the efforts 
 of the riders, wheeled about, and dashmg through the bat- 
 teries, convinced the gunners that they were charged by the 
 enemy. Jackson, following up, carried the height on the left 
 by an impetuous rush of Longstreet's and Whiting's divisions, 
 capturing fourteen pieces of artillery ; and the Union division 
 under Morell, which held that wing, was driven back to the 
 woods on the banks of the Chickahominy,| The right con- 
 
 * The right wing was held by Sykes' division of Regulars and Gr iffin 's bri- 
 gade, and was subsequently re-enforced by Bartlett's brigade of Slocum's 
 division. 
 
 f Porter : Report of Gaines' Mill. 
 
 :]: Stonewall Jackson, in his official report of the battle of Gaines' Mill, gives 
 the following spirited description of the decisive charge by Hood's and Law's 
 brigades of Whiting's division, which resulted in carrying the fortified crest on 
 the Union left : " Dashing on with unfaltering step in face of those murderous 
 discharges of canister and musketry, General Hood and Colonel Law, at the 
 head of their respective brigades, rushed to the charge with a yell. Moving 
 down a precipitous ravine, leaping ditch and stream, clambering up a difficult 
 
THE PENINSULAE CA^IPAIGN. 153 
 
 tinned to maiutain its ground against the attacks of Ewell's 
 and D. H. Hill's divisions ; but the key-pomt being carried, 
 retreat was compulsory. This was attended with much con- 
 fusion, and the stragglers were thronging to the bridge, when 
 French's and Meagher's brigades, sent across from the south 
 side of the river by General Sumner, appeared, and under 
 cover of their firm line the shattered troops were finally ralhed 
 and reformed. Yet, if alone on that small re-enforcement 
 had depended the safety of that terribly shattered wing, hope 
 would have been slender indeed ; but the growing darkness, 
 the disorder which fines of battle necessarily suffer in charging 
 over thickly wooded ground, and the severe punishment the 
 Confederates had received, prevented Lee from pushing his 
 victory to the dreadful extremity to which that routed force, 
 with a river at its back, was exposed. Thus, when friendly 
 night — so often awaited with such passionate longing by 
 ^vTCcked armies and distraught commanders — shut down on 
 the dark and bloody thickets of the Chickahominy, the worn 
 and weary troops were silently drawn over to the south bank, 
 and at six of the morning the rear-guard of Eegulars crossed 
 and destroyed the bridge behind them. The losses numbered 
 many thousands on each side, but no precise aggregate is 
 known. ^' 
 
 AVith the transfer of the right wing to the south side of the 
 Chickahominy, the Ai'my of the Potomac turned its back on 
 the Confederate capital and all the high hopes the advance 
 had inspired. It was no longer a question of taking Eich- 
 
 ascent, and exposed to an incessant and deadly fire from tlie intrencliments, 
 these brave and determined men pressed forward, driving the enemy from his 
 well-selected and fortified position. In this charge — In which upwards of a 
 thousand men fell, killed and wounded, and in which fom-teen pieces of artil- 
 lery and nearly a regiment were captured — the Fourth Texas, under the lead 
 of General Hood, was the first to pierce the stronghold and seize the guns." — 
 Eeports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 133. 
 
 * No estimates whatever are given either by General McClellan or General 
 Porter. Jackson states his loss at three thousand two hundred and eighty- 
 four ; and in the same proportion for the other corps, it would put the Confed- 
 erate casualties at above ten thousand. 
 
154 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 moncl, but of making good the retreat to the James, with a 
 victorious enemy in the rear. McClellan had still, however, a 
 certain advantage of his opponent : he had a determinate 
 course of action resolved on during the night of the 27th, and 
 ah'eady in process of execution ; while Lee remained still in 
 doubt as to his adversary's design. Ho saw that McClellan 
 might stni throw his imited force to the north side of the 
 Chickahomiu}' and give battle to preserve his communications 
 by the White House ; and he saw that, holding the lower 
 bridges of the Chickahominy, he might retreat down the 
 Peninsula over the same route by which Johnston retreated 
 ap tlie Peninsula. In either case, it was necessary to hold his 
 entire force in hand on the north side of the river. Yet Mc- 
 Clellan had adopted neither of these courses, but one different 
 from either, and which his adversary had not divined. And 
 thus it happened that when, on the day after the battle of the 
 Chickahominy^Sunday, the 28th of June — Lee threw forward 
 Ewell's division and Stuart's cavalry corps to seize the York 
 Piver Paih'oad, he discovered he had been anticipated ; for 
 the line of supphes by the York Eiver Railroad had been 
 already abandoned two days before, the water-transportation 
 had been ordered round to the James Piver, the vast suj^plies 
 had been run across to the south side of the Chickahominy, 
 and the enemy on his arrival found nothing save the burning 
 piles in which the remnant of stores it had been impossible to 
 carry off were being consumed. In fact, the army was rapidly 
 m motion for the James Piver ; and so skiKully was the retreat 
 masked by the troops holding the Une of works on the Rich- 
 mond side of the Chickahominy, that Magruder and Huger, 
 who had been charged with the duty of watching closely the 
 movements of the Union force, were quite unaware of what 
 was going on. " Late in the afternoon (of the 28th) the 
 enemy's works," says General Lee, " were reported to be fully 
 manned. The strength of these fortifications prevented Gen- 
 erals Huger and Magruder from discovering what was passing 
 in their front." It was night, in fact, before the movement 
 was disclosed ; and next morning (29th), before Longstreet 
 
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 155 
 
 and Hill and Jackson could be sent across to the south side of 
 the Cliickahominy, and, with Huger and Magruder, put in 
 ]mrsuit, McClellan had gained twenty-four hours^ — hours of 
 infinite price in the execution of his delicate and difficult 
 enterprise. 
 
 The line of retreat to the James passes across White Oak 
 Swamp, and the difficulty of the passage for the retreating 
 army with its enormous trains was, at least, partially compen- 
 sated by the barrier it opposed to reconnoissances and flank 
 attacks by the pursuing foe. Keyes' corps, which had been 
 holding a position on the margin of White Oak Swamp, 
 naturally took the advance, and, traversing this region, had 
 by noon of the 28th seized strong positions on the opposite 
 side to cover the passage of the troops and impedimenta. 
 Then followed the long train of five thousand wagons, with 
 a herd of twenty-five hundred beef-cattle, all of which had to 
 traverse the morass by the one narrow defile. It was success- 
 fully accomplished, however, and, during the same night, 
 Porter's corps headed towards the James. Meanwhile, to 
 allow the trains to get well on their way, Sumner's corps and 
 Heintzelman's corps and Smith's division of Franklin's corps 
 were ordered to remain on the Richmond side of the White 
 Oak Swamp during the whole of the 29tli and until dark, in a 
 position covering the roads from Richmond, and covering also 
 Savage Station on the railroad. 
 
 Upon learning definitely the withdrawal of the army, Lee, 
 on the morning of the 29th, put his columns in motion in pur- 
 suit. Magruder and Huger were ordered to follow up on the 
 Williamsburg and Charles City roads, while Longstreet and 
 A. P. Hill were to cross the Chickahominy at New Bridge, 
 and move by flank routes near the James, so as to intercept 
 the retreat ; and Jackson, making the passage at Grape-vine 
 Bridge, was to sweep down the south bank of the Chicka- 
 hominy. 
 
 Now, when Sumner, on the morning of the 29th, learnt that 
 the enemy was recrossing the Chickahominy and advancing 
 in the direction of Savage Station, he moved his corps from 
 
15G CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 the position it bad held at Allen's farm to that place, uniting 
 there with Smith's division of Franklin's corps. Heintzelman, 
 who held ])osition on the left of Sumner, had been ordered 
 to hold the Williamsburg road ; but, when Sumner shifted his 
 force on to Savage Station, Heintzelman fell back entii-ely 
 and crossed "White Oak Swamp. Thus, when Magruder 
 pushed forward on the WiUiamsbiu'g road, he found, in con- 
 sequence of Heintzelman's withdrawal, no force to oppose ; 
 and Sumner, who was not aware of Heintzelman's retirement, 
 was surprised to find the enemy debouching on his front at 
 Savage Station. Such were the circumstances that, on the 
 afternoon of the 29th, brought on the action known as the 
 battle of Savage Station, — an action that forms the second of 
 the series of blows dealt by Lee on the retreating army in 
 its arduous passage to the James. 
 
 Magruder attacked in front with characteristic impetuosity, 
 about four in the afternoon, momentarily expecting that 
 Jackson, whose route led to the flank and rear of Savage 
 Station, would arrive to decide the action. But Jackson was 
 delayed nearly all day by the rebuilding of the bridge over 
 the Chickahominy, and did not get up, and Sumner held his 
 own with the stubbornness that marked tliat soldier ; so 
 that Magrudei, assailing his position in successive charges 
 till dark, met only bloody repulses. Thus, stout Sumner 
 stood at bay, while, thanks to the barrier he opposed, the 
 mighty caravan of artillery and wagons and ambulances 
 moved swiftly, silently through the melancholy woods and 
 wilds, all day and all night, without challenge or encounter, 
 on its winding way to the James. During the night, the rear- 
 guard also withdrew across White Oak Swamp.'-^' 
 
 By the morning of the 30th, the army, with all its belong- 
 ings, had crossed White Oak Swamp, and debouched into the 
 region looking out towards the James ; the artiUery-parks 
 
 * By orders from General McClellan, Sumner was under the sad necessity of 
 leaving behind at Savage Station the general hospital, containing twenty -five 
 hundred sick and wounded men. 
 
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 157 
 
 had gained Malvern Hill, and the van of the army had 
 already reached the river, the sight of which was greeted 
 with something of the joy with which the Ten Thousand, re- 
 turning fi-om the expedition immortaUzed by Xenophon, 
 hailed the Sea. 
 
 The Confederate pursuit was made in two columns. Jack- 
 son, with five divisions, pressed on the heels of the retreat- 
 ing army by way of White Oak Swamp; while Longstreet, 
 with a like force, making a detour by the roads skirting the 
 James Eiver, hurried forward with the view to cut off the 
 column from its march. But, as long as the two Confederate 
 columns were thus jDlaced, it is obvious that they were hope- 
 lessly separated, and the retreatmg army had less to fear 
 from their partial blows. Just as soon, however, as Jackson 
 should emerge from White Oak Swamp, he would come in 
 immediate communication with the force under Longstreet, 
 and the whole of Lee's army would then be united. To pre- 
 vent this junction, so as to make time for the ongoing of the 
 menaced and jealously guarded trains, became now the prime 
 object. And this necessity it was that gave rise to the next 
 serious encounter, known as the battle of Glendale or New- 
 market cross-roads. 
 
 By noon of the 30th, Jackson reached the Wliite Oak 
 Swamp ; but he found the bridge destroyed, and on attempt- 
 ing to pass by the ordinary place of crossing, the head of his 
 column was met by a severe artillery fire from batteries on 
 the other side. He then essayed to force the passage ; but 
 each attempt was met with such determined opposition* that, 
 obstructed in his design, he was compelled to give over. 
 Meantime, the column of Longstreet, whose line of march 
 flanked the swamp and gave free motion, was pushing rap- 
 idly forward on the Long Bridge or New Market road, which 
 runs at right angles to the Quaker road, on which the army 
 and its trains were hurrying towards the James. At the very 
 
 * The crossing was held by General Franklin, with the divisions of Smith 
 and Richardson and Naglee's brigade. Captain Ayres directed the artillery. 
 
158 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 time Jackson was arrested at White Oak Swamp, Long- 
 street had arrived within a mile of the point of intersection 
 of these two roads. Should he be able to seize it, the army 
 wonld be cut in twain. But Longstreet found this important 
 point already covered, and if gained it would be at the price 
 of a battle. The force at the point of contact was McCall's 
 division of Pennsylvania Eeserves, formed at right angles 
 across the New Market road, in front of, and parallel to, the 
 Quaker road.* Sumner was at some distance to the left, and 
 somewhat retired ; Hooker was on Sumner's left, and some- 
 what advanced ; Kearney was to the right of McCall. The 
 brunt of the attack, however, fell upon McCall's division. In 
 the Confederate line the division of Longstreet held the right, 
 and that of A. P. Hill the left. Longstreet opened the attack 
 at about three o'clock, by a threatening movement on McCall's 
 left, which was met by a change of front on that flank, in 
 which position a severe fight was maintained for two hours, 
 the Confederates making ineffectual attempts to force the po- 
 sition. At the same time the batteries on the centre and 
 right became the aim of determined assaults, which were 
 repeatedly repulsed ; till finally Eandol's battery was captured 
 by a fierce charge made by two regimentsf advancing in 
 wedge shape, without order, but with trailed arms. Eushing 
 up to the muzzles of the guns, they pistoled or bayoneted the 
 cannoniers. The greater part of the supporting regiment 
 fled ; but those who remained made a savage hand to hand 
 and bayonet fight over the guns,^ which were finally yielded 
 
 * McCall's disposition was as follows : Meade's brigade on the right, Sey 
 mour's on the left, and Simmons' (Reynolds') in reserve. Randol's (Regular) 
 battery in front of the line on the right, Cooper's and Kern's opposite the cen- 
 tre, and Dietrich's and Kennerheim's (twenty-pounder Parrotts) on the left. 
 
 \ These regiments were the Fifty-fifth and Sixtieth Virginia. 
 
 :{: "The Sixtieth Virginia crossed bayonets with the enemy, who obstinately 
 contested the possession of these gims." Report of General A. P.' Hill : Reports 
 of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 177. 
 
 General McCall is more magniloquent in his account : " Bayonets were crossed 
 and locked in tlie struggle ; bayonet wounds were freely given and received. 
 I saw skulls crushed by the heavy blow of the butt of the musket ; and in 
 
THE PENINSULAK CAMPAIGN. 159 
 
 to the enemy. Meantime, a renewed attempt on the left shat- 
 tered and doubled up that flank, held by Seymour's brigade ; 
 and the enemy following up, drove the routed troops between 
 Sumner and Hooker, till, penetrating too far, he was caught 
 himself on the flank by Hooker's fire, and, driven across Sum- 
 ner's front, was thrown against McCall's centre, which, with 
 the right, had remained comparatively firm. An advance by 
 Kearney ard Hooker now regained a portion of the lost 
 ground, and repulsed all further attacks. Darkness coming 
 on, ended the action. 
 
 "^liile these events were passing at Glendale, Jackson, de- 
 tained by the vigorous opposition he met on the other side of 
 White Oak Swamp, could only hear the tell-tale guns : he 
 was impotent to help.* Thus it was that McClellan, holding 
 paralyzed, as it were, the powerful corps of Jackson with his 
 right hand, with his left was free to deal blows at the force 
 menacing his flanks. The action at Glendale insured the in- 
 tegrity of the army, imperilled till that hour. During the 
 night the troops that had checked Jackson and repulsed 
 Longstreet silently withdrew, and when Lee was next able to 
 strike it was at a united army, strongly posted on the heights 
 of Malvern, with assured communication with its new base on 
 the James. 
 
 On the following morning (July 1st) Lee had his whole 
 force concentrated at the battle-field of New Market cross- 
 roads : but he could not fail even then to reahze that, though 
 the pursuit might be continued, it was under circumstances 
 that made the hope of any decided success now very distant. 
 
 stort, tlie desperate thrusts and parries of a life and death encounter, proving 
 indeed that Qreek had met Greek when the Alabama hoys fell vpon the sons of 
 Pennsylvania:' McCall's Report: Pennsylvania Reserves in the Peninsula, 
 pamphlet, p. 5. 
 
 * " A heavy cannonading in front announced the engagement of General 
 Longstreet at Frazier's farm, and made me eager to press forward , but the 
 marshy character of the soil, the destruction of the bridge over the marsh and 
 creek, and the strong position of the enemy for defending the passage, pre- 
 vented my advancing till the following morning." Jackson's Report : Reports 
 of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 134. 
 
160 
 
 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Still it remained to try the issue of a general battle between 
 the two united armies. The Confederate columns were ac- 
 cordingly put in motion on the morning of the 1st of July, 
 Jackson's corps leading. A march of a few miles brought the 
 pursuers again in contact with the army, which was found 
 occupying a commanding ridge, extending obliquely across 
 
 ,UNION ^ccunafRATt 
 
 SKETCH OF MALVERN HILL. 
 
 the line of march, in advance of Malvern Hill. In front of 
 this strong position the ground was open, varying in width 
 from a quarter to half a mile, sloping gradually from the 
 crest, and giving a free field of fire. The approaches were 
 over a broken and thickly wooded country, traversed nearly 
 throughout its whole extent by a swamp passable at but few 
 places, and difiicult at those.* On this admirable position 
 General McClellan had concentrated his army, prepared to 
 receive final battle. 
 
 Lee's Eeport : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 13. 
 
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. ICl 
 
 Tlie left and centre were posted on Malvern Hill, an ele- 
 vated plateau about a mile and a half by tliree-fourths of a mile 
 in area ; the right was " refused," curving backward through 
 a wooded region towards a point below Haxall's Landing, on 
 James Eiver. Judging from the obvious Unes of attack that 
 the main effort would be made agamst his left, General Mc- 
 Clellan posted on Malvern Hill heavy masses of infantry and 
 artillery. Porter's corps held the left, and the artillery of his 
 two divisions, with the artillery reserve, gave a concentrated 
 fire of sixty guns. Couch's division was placed on the right 
 of Porter ; next came Kearney and Hooker ; next, Sedgwick 
 and Kichardson ; next. Smith and Slocum ; then the remamder 
 of Keyes' corps, extending by a backward curve nearly to the 
 river. While the left was massed, the right was more de- 
 ployed, its fi-ont covered by slashings. The gunboats in the 
 James Eiver protected the left flank.* 
 
 L6e formed his line with Jackson's divisionsf on the left, 
 and those under Magruder and Huger on the right. A. P. 
 Hill and Longstreet were held in reserve to the left, and took 
 no part in the engagement. | Owing to ignorance of the 
 
 ■ * McClellan's Report, p. 138. 
 
 f Divisions of Jackson, Ewell, Wliiting, and D. H. Hill. 
 
 I General McClellan, mistaking the movements of these two divisions, fell 
 into an erroneous apprehension regarding the part they played in the battle. 
 In his Report (p. 139) he says : "About two o'clock a column of the enemy was 
 observed moving towards our right. Arrangements were at once made to 
 meet the anticipated attack in that quarter ; but tliough the column was long, 
 occupying two hours in passing, it disappeared, and was not again heard of. 
 The presumption is that it retired by the rear, and participated in the attaric 
 Afterwards made on our left." This was the column of Longstreet and A. P. 
 Hill, getting into its position in reserve on the Confederate left ; but, as above 
 stated, it took no part in the action. During the battle, the observed mov& 
 men+, of this column gave McClellan great concern for his right, as he con- 
 ceived it was making a detour with the view to fall upon that flank ; and this 
 caused him to remain on his right. " My apprehensions," he says, " wer<^ 
 for the extreme right. I felt no concern for the left and centre." — Report 
 on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 437. Such troublesome errors are the 
 necessary result of the nature of such a theatre of war as that on which the 
 two armies were operating. 
 
162 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 country on the part of tlie Confederates, and the difficulty ol 
 the ground, the line was not formed until late in the after- 
 noon, though a brisk artillery duel was kept up, and about 
 three o'clock a single brigade (Anderson's, of D. H. Hill's 
 division) attacked Couch's front and was repulsed." As 
 McClellan expected, Lee's purpose was to force the plateau 
 of Malvern on the left. With this view he had massed Jack- 
 son's force and the troops under Huger and Magruder well 
 on his right, being resolved to carry the heights by storm. 
 Previously to the attack, the Confederate commander issued 
 an order stating that positions were selected from which his 
 artillery could silence that of his opponent, and as soon as 
 that was done, Armistead's brigade of Huger's division would 
 advance with a shout and carry the battery immediately in 
 his fi'ont. This shout was to be the signal for a general ad- 
 vance, and all the troops were then io rush forward with 
 fixed bayonets. Now towards six o'clock, General D. H. Hill, 
 commanding one of Jackson's divisions, heard what he took 
 to be the signal. " While conversing with my brigade com- 
 manders," says he, " shouting was heard on our right, followed 
 by the roar of musketry. We all agreed this was the signal 
 determined upon, and I ordered my division to advance. 
 This, as near as I could judge, was about an hour and a half 
 before sundown. "f But whether the others did not hear 
 what Hill heard, or whether what they heard was not taken 
 for the signal, no advance by them was made ; so that when 
 Hill went forward, it was alone. Neither Whiting on the left, 
 nor Magruder or Huger on the right, moved forward an inch. 
 Hill's point of attack was directly against the crest of Malvern, 
 bristling with cannon. " Tier after tier of batteries," says he, 
 " were gi-imly visible on the plateau, rising in the form of an 
 amphitheatre." In such cases, where cannoniers stand to 
 
 * This repulse was determined by the excellent practice of Kingsbury's 
 battery, together with the steady fire of the Tenth Massachusetts and a charge 
 of the Thirty-sixth New York — the latter regiment capturing the colors of the 
 Fourteenth North Carolina in a hand-to-hand conflict. 
 
 f Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 186. 
 
THE PENINSULAH CAMPAIGN. 16$ 
 
 their guns, and faitliful hands grasp the rifle, it is easy to 
 predict the result. Every assault met a bloody repulse. The 
 promised artillery aid was not rendered : the few batteries 
 used were beaten in detail.* Afterwards, Magruder and 
 Huger attacked, but it was without order or ensemble, a bri- 
 gade, or even a regiment, being thrown forward at a time. 
 Each, in succession, met a like reception from the steady lines 
 of infantry and the concentrated fire from the artillery re- 
 serve, under its able commander. Colonel Hunt. The attacks 
 fell mainly on Porter on the left, and on Couch ; and the suc- 
 cess of the day was in a large degree due to the skill and 
 coolness of the latter, who, as holding the hottest part of the 
 Union line, was gradually re-enforced by the brigades of 
 Caldwell, Sickles, Meagher, and several of Porter's, till he came 
 to command the whole left centre, displaying in his conduct of 
 the battle a high ordeirof generalship. 
 
 Night closed on the combatants still fighting, the oppos- 
 ing forces being distinguishable only by the lurid lines of fire. 
 Thus till near nine o'clock, when the fire, slackening gradually, 
 died out altogether, and only an occasional shot from the 
 batteries broke the silence that pervaded the bloody field. 
 The repulse of the Confederates was most complete, and en- 
 tailed a loss of five thousand men, while the Union loss was 
 not above one-third that number. Lee never before nor since 
 that action dehvered a battle so ill-judged in conception, 
 or so faulty in its details of execution. It was as bad as the 
 worst blunders ever committed on the Union side ; but he 
 profited by the experiment, and never repeated it. 
 
 * "Instead of ordering up one or two hundred pieces of artillery to play on 
 the Yankees, a single battery was ordered up and knocked to pieces in a few 
 minutes ; one or two others shared the same fate of being beaten in detail. 
 Tlie firing from our batteries was of the most farcical character." — Report of 
 General D H. Hill : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i.. p. 186. 
 General Lee says : " The obstacles presented by the woods and swamps made it 
 Impracticable to bring up a sufficient amount of artillery to oppose successfully 
 the extraordinary force of that arm employed by the enemy."— Ibid., p. 12 
 See also report of General Pendleton, Chief of Artillery, Ibid., p. 227. 
 
164 CMIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Victorious tliougli the Army of the Potomac was on the 
 field of Malvern, the position was not one that could be held ; 
 for the army was under the imperious necessity of reaching 
 its supplies. During the night, accordingly, the troops were 
 withdrawn to Harrison's Bar, on the James. Colonel Averill, 
 with a regiment of cavalry, a brigade of regular infantry, and 
 a battery, covered the rear. Lee threw forward Stuart (who 
 with his troopers had been absent during the whole pursuit 
 on an expedition to White House and the lower fords of 
 the Chickahominy, and only rejoined the army after the battle 
 of Malvern), and followed up with columns of infantry ; bat 
 finding that McClellan had taken up a strong position, he 
 retired on the 8th of July, and took his army back to Rich- 
 mond. 
 
 Thus ended the memorable peninsular campaign, which, in 
 the brief interval of three months, had seen the Army of the 
 Potomac force its way through siege and battle to within 
 sight of the spires of Richmond, only to reel back in the 
 deadly clinch of a seven days' combat to the James River. 
 
 Viewed with reference to its aim — the capture of Rich- 
 mond — the campaign was a failure, as were so many subse- 
 quent campaigns having the same object in view. The 
 judgments of men, accordingly, have turned rather on the 
 result than on the causes that produced it. The theory of 
 the campaign, primarily offensive, from necessity changed 
 into the defensive. The theory of the Confederates, primarily 
 defensive, was skilfully converted into the offensive. Thus 
 the prestige remained with the Confederates ; and the faults 
 of Lee's offensive receive as Httle attention as the merits of 
 McClellan's defensive. For, in an unsuccessful campaign, the 
 slightest fault is accounted mortal. Men regard only the ill 
 that has happened, and not the worse that might have hap- 
 pened had it not been prevented. In a fortunate issue, how- 
 ever, the eyes of the public, dazzled by the glitter of a 
 brilliant achievement, are bhnd both to the faults of what has 
 been gained and to the failure to gain much besides. Lee 
 
THE PENINSULAE CAMPAIGN. 1G5 
 
 himself, conscious of the skilful manner in which his antago- 
 nist parried his blows, attempts to explain the failure to 
 achieve a more decisive result by the enumeration of obstruc- 
 tions which, as they beset McClellan himself, can hardly 
 be considered a valid explanation. "Under ordinary cir- 
 cumstances," says he, "the Federal army should have 
 been destroyed. Its escape was due to the causes already 
 stated. Prominent among these is the want of correct and 
 timely information. This fact, attributable chiefly to the 
 character of the country, enabled General McClellan skilfully 
 to conceal his retreat, and to add much to the obstructions 
 with which nature had beset our pursuing columns."* 
 
 The losses of the campaign were, on the Union side, 
 15,249; on the Confederate side, above 19,000. The blows 
 dealt by each were not less severe than the blows received by 
 each. In a military setise, Richmond's danger was really 
 greater when, after its retreat, the Ai-my of the Potomac 
 based itseK on the James, than when it stood astride the 
 Chickahominy. Yet, so potent is the sway that general re- 
 sults have over the imaginations of men, that, while the raising 
 of the siege was the occasion to Jefferson Davis for a pro- 
 clamation of thanksgiving, and thrilled the whole South with 
 joy, the North was stunned with grief and despair at the 
 thought that the army that was the brave pillar of its hopes 
 was thus struck down. 
 
 It is true these moral results count for much in war, and 
 the historian must not fail duly to note and weigh them. 
 Yet if, anticipating the spirit of a historical judgment, wo 
 essay to estimate the events of the war by their intrinsic 
 value, we shaU not fail to see something meritorious, as well 
 as something blameworthy, in this unsuccessful campaign. 
 For the commander to have extricated his army from a diffi- 
 cult situation, in which circumstances quite as much as his 
 own fault had placed it, and, ia presence of a powerful, skilful, 
 and determined adversary, to have transferred it to a position 
 
 * Lee : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 14. 
 
166 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC 
 
 whence it could act with effect, was of itself a notable achieve- 
 ment. For the army to have fought through such a campaign 
 was creditable, and its close found inexperienced troops trans- 
 formed into veteran soldiers. And, if alone from the appeal 
 which great sufferings and great sacrifices always make to a 
 generous people, the story of that eventful march and arduous 
 retreat, when, weary and hungTy and foot-sore, the army 
 marched by night and fought by day through a whole week 
 of toil, and never gave up, but made a good fight and reached 
 the goal, cannot fail to live in grateful remembrance. 
 
POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 167 
 
 V. 
 
 POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRaiNIA. 
 
 August, 1863. 
 
 REMOVAL OF THE ARMY FROM THE PENINSULA. 
 
 It will have appeared from the exposition of the motives 
 that prompted the change of base, that, in transferring the 
 Army of the Potomac to the James River, the fundamental 
 idea of its commander was to secure a line of operations 
 whereby, with a refreshed and re-enforced army, a new earn • 
 paign, under more promising auspices, might be undertaken. 
 The position of the armj^, at once threatening the communi- 
 cations of Richmond and enabling it to spring on the rear of 
 the Confederate force should it attempt an aggressive move- 
 ment northward, seemed the most advantageous possible, 
 whether for offensive operations or for insuring the safety of 
 the national capital. General McClellan brought back to 
 Harrison's Landing between eighty-five thousand and ninety 
 thousand men ; and his view was, that all the resources at 
 the command of the Government should be at once for- 
 warded to him. Having the James River now open as a line 
 of supphes, he had formed the bold design of transferring the 
 Army of the Potomac to the south bank of that river, and 
 operating against the communications of Richmond by way 
 of Petersburg,* 
 
 * That this was General McClellan's purpose is vouched for by no less aB 
 authority than General Halleck, who, in a memorandum of a visit to the head- 
 quarters of the Army of the Potomac, at Harrison's Landing, on the 25th of 
 
168 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 There ajjpears to have been at first an intention on the part 
 of the Administration to adopt this judicious course ; but a 
 train of events, jjartlj the work of man and partly the effect 
 of circumstances, presently arose, that not only frustrated this 
 design, but removed tlie army wholly from the Peninsula, 
 and transferred the theatre of operations to the fi'ont of 
 Washington and then to the soil of the loyal States. What 
 these events were I shall now set forth. 
 
 Just before the commencement of Lee's offensive operations, 
 the military councils at Washington, taught a lesson by the 
 events of Jackson's campaign in the Shenandoah Yalley, had 
 gathered together the disjointed fag-ends of armies in Northern 
 Virginia under McDowell and Banks and Fremont, and had 
 consolidated them into the "Ai"my of Virginia," which was 
 intrusted to the command of Major-General John Pope.* 
 That officer brought with him fi-om the West, where he had 
 held command under General Halleck, the reputation for a 
 species of aggressive energy that was supposed to characterize 
 the Western style of warfare, in contradistinction to the me- 
 thodical campaigning of the East,t and he signahzed his advent 
 
 July, 1862, says : " I stated to him [McClellau] that the object of my visit was 
 to ascertain from him his views and wishes in regard to future operations. He 
 said that he proposed to cross the James River at that point [Harrison's Land- 
 ing. General Grant, two years afterwards, crossed a few miles beiow], attack 
 Petersburg, and cut off the enemy's communications hy that route South, mak- 
 ing no further demonstration, for the present, against Richmond. I stated to 
 him very frankly my views in regard to the danger and impractieaiility of the 
 plan," etc. (Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 454.) It would ap- 
 pear that General Grant had less respect for General Halleck's views of " the 
 danger and impracticability of the plan," seeing that two years afterwards he 
 adopted that precise plan, and took Richmond and destroyed Lee by it ! Nor 
 caxi it be said that circumstances, so far as regards the defence of Washington, 
 differed in the one case from those in the other — excepting that they were such 
 as to warrant the adoption of the plan by General McClellan much more than 
 by General Grant — for in 1862 there were ten men left behind for the defence 
 of Washington to one in 1864. 
 
 * The appointment of General Pope to the command of the " Army of Vir- 
 ginia" bears date the 26th of June, the day before the battle of Gaines' Mill. 
 
 f This supposed distinction between the Western and Eastern mode of mak- 
 uig war is thus expressed in Pope's address to his army : " I have come to you 
 
POPE'S CAMPAIGN LN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. It 9 
 
 to command by the promulgation of a pseudo-Napoleonic pro- 
 clamation, in which he expressed his contempt for " certam 
 phrases he found much in vogue, such as bases of supplies, 
 and lines of retreat," — phrases which he enjoined his army to 
 discard as unworthy of soldiers destined to follow the leader- 
 ship of one who had never seen any thing but the " backs of 
 his enemies." Underneath all its bombastic nonsense. Pope's 
 proclamation contained one grain of sense, which was the 
 rebuke it gave the ignorant use of mihtary terms common at 
 the North ; and though there was an execrable want of taste 
 in the pointed satire dii'ected at McClellan's methodical tac- 
 tics, there is no doubt that the declaration of a more vigorous 
 war-pohcy quite met the views of the mass of the people. 
 
 In assigning Pope to the command of the "Ai-my of 
 Virginia," although his first duty was to cover Washington, 
 yet his ultimate object and avowed purpose was to take Eich- 
 mond by an overland advance ; and he had charmed the ears 
 of the members of the Committee on the Conduct of the War 
 by his facile expositions of the manner in which he meant to 
 " he off on the Hanks of the rebels," and even — had he only 
 such an army as McClellan's — march straight to New Orleans!* 
 Before General Pope could set out in the execution of this de- 
 sign, however, there occurred the series of events ctdminating 
 in the retreat of the Army of the Potomac. 
 
 No sooner had this taken place, than the powerful faction 
 opposed to McClellan and his plan of campaign, united 
 in bringing to bear on the President a weighty "pressure" 
 for the removal of the Ai'my of the Potomac from the Pen- 
 
 from the West, where we have always seen the backs of the enemies — from an 
 army whose business it lias been to seek the adversary, and to heat him when 
 found; whose policy has been attack and not defence. I presume I have been 
 called here to pursue the same system." 
 
 * " Question. Suppose that you had the army that was here on the 1st day 
 of March last, do you suppose you would find any obstacle to prevent your 
 marching from here to New Orleans ? 
 
 "Pope. 1 should suppose not." Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., 
 p. 282. 
 
170 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 insulci. Among the strongest in urging tins measure was 
 General Poj^e, who, as soon as the intelligence of McClellan's 
 retreat to the James River was received, began to play upon 
 the fears of the Administration touching the safety of Wash- 
 ington. To the President he expressed the opinion that Mc- 
 Clellan's suppUes would certainly be cut off;* pointed out that 
 co-operation between the Army of Virginia and the Army of 
 the Potomac, in their then situations, was next to impossible ; 
 and strongly urged the recall of McClellan's force to the front 
 of Washington.'!- 
 
 It happened, too, that at this crisis those who were urging 
 these views received a powerful re-enforcement in the per- 
 son of General Halleck, who had about this time been re- 
 called from his Western field of operations and placed in 
 supreme command of all the armies in the field by his ap- 
 pointment to the office of genera 1-in-chief, — an office Avhich, to 
 the incalculable obstruction of the conduct of the war and the 
 intolerable annoyance of every general commanding the Axmy 
 of the Potomac, he continued to hold till "pushed from his 
 stool" by the elevation, two years afterwards, of General Grant 
 to the lieutenant-generalship. 
 
 General Halleck added his strident voice in favor of the 
 withdrawal of the army from the Peninsula, although, owing 
 to a sincere anxiety now cherished by Mr. Lincoln that Gen- 
 eral McClellan should be allowed his " own way," he was not 
 at first able to make the order imperative. The President, in 
 response to General McClellan's appeals for re-enforcements 
 to enable him to renew operations against Richmond, had 
 promised him an addition to his strength of twenty thousand 
 men, to be drawn from Burnside's command in North Caro- 
 lina and Hunter's command in South Carolina. With this 
 re-enforcement, McClellan expressed his readiness to renew 
 operations, and he had proceeded to make a reconnoissance in 
 force with the divisions of Hooker and Sedgwick, who ad- 
 
 * Report on tlie Conduct of tlie War, vol. i., p. 379. 
 f Ibid., p. 279. 
 
POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 171 
 
 vanced and reoccupied Malvern, when lie was met by a tele- 
 gram from the new general-in-chief, dated August 3d, oidering 
 him to withdraw the entire army from the Peninsula to Aquia 
 Creek, there to make a junction with Pope. After an urgent 
 appeal from this order, General McClellan proceeded to carry 
 out his instructions. 
 
 The judgment of the act that removed the Army of the 
 Potomac from the Peninsula must turn on the one fact, 
 whether or not it was really designed to re-enforce that army. 
 If it was not designed to re-enforce it to an effective that 
 would enable it to immediately recommence active operations, 
 then undoubtedly the wisest course was to withdraw it from 
 the Peninsula ; for a concentration of the divided forces was 
 so prime a necessity, that if a junction of the two armies 
 was not to be allowed on the James, a junction in front of 
 Washington was preferable to their continued isolation, — a 
 situation in which neither could operate with much effect.* 
 
 If, however, there had been on the part of the Administra- 
 tion any intention of giving effect to the views of General 
 McClellan, by furnishing such accessions to his strength as 
 would permit his moving upon Eichmond, the army should 
 assuredly have remained on the line of the James. 
 
 Now, it is a curious circumstance, that at this time there 
 was another person full as anxious as General Halleck to 
 have the Army of the Potomac leave the Peninsula. That 
 person was General Lee. And if there be any force in that 
 military maxim, which admonishes " never to do what the 
 
 * There is another consideration that prompted certain oflBcers of the army 
 to urge the removal of the army from the Peninsula, if it was not to be re-en- 
 forced ; and that is the unhealthy situation in which the army would find itself 
 lying in inaction amid the swamps of the James during the hot months of 
 August and September. This was the reason why several of the officers of the 
 Army of the Potomac— among them Generals Franklin and Newton— ex- 
 pressed to President Lincoln, during a visit he made to McClellan's camp 
 ia July, 1862, an opinion in favor of withdrawing the army from the Penin- 
 sula. I make this statement on the authority of the officers named. If re- 
 enforcements were to be expected, they were altogether in favor of remaining 
 
172 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 enemy wants you to do," this notable coincidence should 
 raise grave suspicions touching the wisdom of a measui'e in 
 which the opposing chiefs were in such entire harmony. 
 
 To dislodge the army from its threatening position on the 
 James, Lee determined to menace its communications ; and 
 with this view he moved a force to the south bank of the 
 James, seized a position immediately opposite Harrison's 
 Landing, placed forty-three guns in position, and on the 31st 
 of July opened fire on the shipping.* This did httle damage, 
 however, and on the following morning General McClellan 
 threw a force across the river, seized the position — Coggin's 
 Point — fortified it, and was never troubled more. But little 
 did the Confederate commander dream, when he was thus 
 laboring to cause McClellan to withdraw, that the general-in- 
 chief of the United States army was co-operating to the same 
 end. Moreover, it happened that, while General Halleck 
 was willing to remove the army from the Peninsula before 
 Lee made any effort with the same view, a certain measure 
 taken by the Confederate commander with an entirely different 
 aim, greatly expedited the withdrawal. For the just apj^re- 
 ciation of this it will be necessary to glance a moment at 
 General Pope's contemporaneous operations in Northern Yir- 
 ginia. 
 
 Upon assuming command of the Army of Virginia, General 
 Pope, whose miHtary conduct was considerably sounder than 
 his mihtary principles, had concentrated his scattered com- 
 mands into one body in front of Washington, and throwTi it 
 forward along the line of the Orange and Alexandria Eail- 
 road, in the direction of Gordonsville and Charlottesville. 
 His force numbered near fifty thousand men. As the seizure 
 of the points named would tap the Confederate communica- 
 
 * General Lee's own evidence leaves no doubt regarding the object of this 
 operation : " In order to keep McClellan stationary, or, if possible, to cause 
 him to withdraw, General D. H. Hill, commanding south of James River 
 was directed to threaten his communications by seizing favorable positions 
 below Westover, from which to attack the transports in the river." Lee's 
 Report : Reports of the Operations of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 15. 
 
POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. I73 
 
 tions yviih Southwestern Virginia, Lee, to meet Pope's ad- 
 vance, sent forward General Jackson, witli his own and 
 Ewell's divisions, towards Gordonsville. Jackson reached 
 that place on the 19th of July ; but fi-om what he learned of 
 Pope's strength he feared to risk offensive operations and 
 called for re-enforcements.* Lee then increased his force by 
 General A. P. Hill's division, which joined Jackson on the 2d 
 of August. At that time Pope's army was along the turnpike 
 from Culpepper to Sperryville, near the Blue Kidge — his left 
 at Culpepper ; while with the cavalry brigades of Buford and 
 Bayard he observed the line of the Bapidan. 
 
 The 7th and 8th of August, Jackson crossed the Kapidan, 
 and moved towards Culpepper. Pope met this by throwing 
 forward Banks' corps to a position eight miles south of Cul- 
 pepper, near Cedar Mountain, where a severe action ensued on 
 the 9th between Banks' corps and the three divisions under 
 Jackson. Banks, with much spuit, assumed the offensive, 
 although doubly outnumbered, and attacked Jackson's right, 
 under General Ewell. He then fell with much impetuosity 
 upon his left, turned that flank, and poured a destructive fire 
 into his rear, which caused the Confederate centre and nearly 
 the whole hne to give way in confusion. The assailants were, 
 however, considerably broken in moving through the woods ; 
 and Jackson, receiving an accession of fresh troops, was able 
 to check Banks, and finally force him back. The latter re- 
 tired a short distance, but again took up position : so that 
 when Jackson, under the impression of having gained a vic- 
 tory, attempted to follow up with the view of making Culpep- 
 per, he found himseK checked. He remained in front of 
 Banks until the night of the 11th, and then being apprehen- 
 sive of being again attacked, he retreated to Gordonsville. 
 The Confederate loss was about thirteen hundred ; the Union 
 loss about eighteen hundred.f 
 
 * Jackson's Report : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 3. 
 
 f It is proper to add here that the above too brief statement of Banks' at- 
 tack of Jackson is based on the official report of Jackson himself, and is there- 
 fore not likely to be over-colored. " W^hilst the Federal attack upon Early waa 
 
174 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 The encounter between Jackson and Banks raised in tlie 
 mind of General Halleck the liveliest apprehensions touching 
 the safety of Washington, and he sent General McClellan 
 urgent orders to hasten the removal of his army. The sick, 
 to the number of ten thousand, had already been sliipped ; 
 then followed Burnside's corps (eleven thousand strong), 
 which had been brought from North Carolina for the purpose 
 of re-enforcing the Ai-my of the Potomac, but was not allowed 
 to debark, and was sent forward to Aquia Creek and thence 
 to Fredericksburg. McClellan then put his whole army in 
 motion, marched back from Harrison's Landing to Fortress 
 Monroe, and thence, by successive shipments, forwarded it to 
 Aquia Creek and Alexandria. 
 
 Not till this movement had been fully disclosed did General 
 Lee form the resolve of striking northward. The column de- 
 tached under Jackson to operate against Pope was no larger 
 than that he had had in his previous campaign, and was infe- 
 rior in numbers to Pope's force ; and the menacing position 
 held by General McClellan while at Harrison's Landing had 
 retarded Lee from sending any additional troops to Jackson.* 
 But now that he was being relieved from the pressure of Mc- 
 Clellan's presence, there was nothing to prevent his moving 
 
 in progress," says Jackson, " the main body of the Federal infantry moved 
 down from the woods, through the corn and wheat fields, and fell with great 
 vigor upon our extreme left ; and by the force of superior numbers, bearing 
 down all opposition, turned it and poured a destructive fire into its rear. 
 Campbell's brigade fell back in disorder. The enemy pushing forward, and 
 the left flank of A. G. Taliaferro's brigade being by these movements exposed 
 to a flank fire, feU back, as did also the left of Early's line. General W. B. 
 Taliaferro's division (Jackson's old division) becoming exposed, they were with- 
 drawn." — Jackson's Report of Cedar Moimtain : Reports of the Army of North 
 ern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 5. These are the words in Avhich a general is apt to 
 describe a serious defeat, and they justify a higher estimate of General Banks' 
 conduct than his countrymen have yet accorded him. 
 
 * On this point General Lee says : " Jackson, on reaching Gordonsville, ascer- 
 tained that the force under General Pope was superior to his own, but the un- 
 certainty that then surrounded the designs of General McClellan, rendered it 
 inexpedient to re-enforce him from the a/rmy at Richmond." — Lee : Reports of 
 the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 15. 
 
POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 175 
 
 forward his entire army to destroy Pope, and lie instantly 
 took measures accordingly.* Thus it was that at the very 
 moment McClellan was turning an unwilling back on Rich- 
 mond and leaving the course open to his mighty rival, Lee 
 was putting his columns in motion towards the Potomac. I 
 shall accordingly leave for a while the army undergoing the 
 laborious process of transfer by water, and trace that fierce 
 outburst of battle that swept from the Blue Eidge to the fore- 
 ground of Washington. 
 
 II. 
 
 POPE'S RETPtOGRADE MOVEMENT. 
 
 After the action of Cedar Mountain, Jackson retired to 
 Gordonsville, fearing an attack from Pope's superior force.t 
 The 15tli of August he was joined at that place by the van 
 of Lee's army, composed of Longstreet's division, two 
 brigades under Hood, and Stuart's cavalry. Pope advanced 
 his line, resting his left (Reno's corps of Burnside's army) 
 on the Rapidan near Raccoon Ford ; his centre (McDowell's 
 corps) on Cedar Mountain, and his right (Sigel's corps) on 
 Robertson's River, a branch of the Rapidan. Banks was 
 posted at Culpepper. 
 
 On the arrival of Longstreet, Jackson advanced from Gor- 
 donsville to the Rapidan, waited till the 20th of August for 
 Longstreet to come up, when they crossed at Raccoon and 
 Somerville fords. 
 
 * Nothing could be clearer than the evidence of General Lee on this point 
 " The corps of General Burnside," says he, " had reached Fredericksburg, and 
 apart of General McGlellan^'s army was believed to have left Westooer [Harri- 
 son's Landing] to unite with Pope. It therefore seemed that active operatioi 
 on the James were no longer contemplated, and that the most effectuid way to 
 relieve Richmond from any danger of attack from that quarter would he to re- 
 enforce General Jackson, and adcance upon General Pope." — Lee : Reports of 
 the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 18.- Veracious prophecy, showing 
 that insight which is one of the highest marks of generalship ! 
 
 \ Jackson's Roport : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia vol. ii., p 7. 
 
176 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Learning the approach of this force, Pope on the 18th 
 and 19th drew his army back behind the Rappahannock, his 
 deft at Kelly's Ford, and his right three miles above Rappa- 
 hannock Station. This was a judicious measure on the part 
 of General Pope ; but it was not carrying out his own prin- 
 ciples. In expounding before the war committee, a month 
 before this time, what he proposed doing, he held the follow- 
 ing language : " By lying off on their flanks, if they should 
 have only forty thousand or fifty thousand men, I could whip 
 them. If they should have seventy thousand or eighty 
 thousand men, I would attack their flanks, and force them, in 
 order to get rid of me, to follow me out into the moun- 
 tains, which would be what you would want, I should suppose. 
 They would not march on Washington, with me lying with 
 such a force as that on theu- flanks."* Now, though the force 
 which Lee had at this time did not exceed the smallest of 
 these hypothetical numbers, and the force with which Pope 
 proposed this operation had been increased by the addition 
 of Reno's command, he did not attempt to carry it out, 
 finding Lee, perhaps, less impressed than he should have 
 been with the apparition of Pope " lying off on his flanks." 
 
 Pope having withdrawn behind the Rappahannock, Lee ad- 
 vanced his army to that stream, but finding that the Union 
 commander covered the fords in force, he left Longstreet 
 opposite these, to mask a turning movement by Jackson on 
 Pope's right, by way of Warrenton.f Jackson accordingly 
 ascended the Rappahannock by the south bank, and crossed 
 the head of his column (Early's brigade) at Sulphur or 
 Warrenton Springs on the 22d August. But that day a 
 severe storm rendered the river impassable, and Early was 
 compelled to recross the Rappahannock, which he did the 
 following night on an improvised bridge. "While these 
 manoeuvres were under way, Stuart with fifteen hundred 
 horsemen, made an expedition to cut the railroad communica- 
 
 * Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 278. 
 
 |- Lee's Report : Reports of the Armj of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 19. 
 
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POPE'S CAMPAIGN m NOKTHERN VIRGINIA. 177 
 
 tions in rear of Pope's army. Stuart succeeded in reaching 
 Catlett's Station in the dead of an exceedingly dark night, 
 fired the camp and captured three hundred prisoners, with 
 Pope's official papers and his baggage. He failed, however, to 
 burn the railroad-bridge, and does not seem to have been 
 aware that Pope's entire army train was parked there.* 
 
 III. 
 
 JACKSON'S FLANK MARCH. 
 
 The movement of Jackson up the south bank of the Eappa- 
 hannock to turn Pope's right was met by a corresponding 
 movement of Pope up the Eappahannock on the north bank, 
 so that on the 24th, Sigel and Banks and Keno occupied Sul- 
 phur Springs, and Jackson's main body lay on the opposite 
 side of the stream ; but on the 25th, Jackson, striking out 
 still further to his left by Amissville, crossed the upper 
 fHappahannock — here called the Hedgeman River — at Hen- 
 son's Mill, turned Pope's right, and moving by Orleans, 
 bivouacked at Salem, after a forced march of thirty-five miles. 
 Next day (26th) Jackson continued the advance. Diverging 
 eastward at Salem, he crossed the Bull Eun Mountain 
 through Thoroughfare Gap, and passing Gainesville, he, at 
 sunset, reached Bristoe Station on the Orange and Alexandria 
 Eaih-oad. This he proceeded to destroy, while he at the 
 same time dispatched Stuart with his cavalry and a force of 
 infantry to Manassas Junction, seven miles nearer Washing- 
 ton. Here Stuart took several hundred prisoners, eight 
 guns, and immense supplies of commissary and quarter- 
 master's stores. Jackson's instructions from his chief had 
 
 \ 
 
 * Tliis enterprise to the rear of his army must have given Pope an occa- 
 sion to realize the truth of his own maxim, that " disaster and shame lurk in 
 the rear." 
 
 13 
 
178 CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 been to " throw his command between Washington City and 
 the army of General Pope and. to break up his railroad com- 
 mimications with the Federal capital." * That energetic 
 Ueutenant had carried them out to the letter. It is now time 
 to look to Pope's movements. 
 
 "While Jackson's column was executing this flank move- 
 ment to the rear of Pope, Lee retained Longstreet's command 
 in his front to divert his attention, and learning that Pope 
 was about to receive re-enforcements from McClellan, he 
 ordered forward the remainder of his army from Kichmond.t 
 Nevertheless, the stealthy march of Jackson did not pass un- 
 noted by the Union commander, who received very precise 
 information respecting his movement northward, though he 
 was unable to divine its aim.| Bewildered by his antagonist's 
 manoeuvres. Pope made a series of ridiculous tentatives ; but 
 finally, on the 26th, he determined to fall back from the Rap- 
 pahannock nearer to Washington. During the day he learned 
 that Jackson was already on his rear at Manassas, and had 
 cut his railway communications with Washington ! 
 
 It must be admitted the situation was a difficult one, but 
 it was one that afforded a vigorous commander opportunity 
 for a decisive blow. Lee had in fact committed an act of un- 
 wonted rashness, and voluntarily placed himself in such a 
 position that when Jackson had reached Bristoe Station and 
 Manassas, Longstreet, with the van of the main column, mov- 
 ing by the same route taken by that officer, was still distant 
 two marches. Pope was therefore left free to place himself 
 between the two, and beat them in detail. Such a piece of 
 
 * Jackson's Report: Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., 
 p. 92. 
 
 f This force consisted of D. H. Hill's and McLaws' divisions, two brigades 
 under General Walker, and Hampton's cavalry brigade. 
 
 X The information was derived from Colonel J. S. Clark, of the staff of Gen- 
 eral Banks. That officer remained all day in a perilous position within sight 
 of Jackson's moving column, and counted its force, which he found to be thirty- 
 eix regiments of infantry, with the proper proportion of batteries and a con- 
 Biderable cavalry force. 
 
POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. I79 
 
 temerity is only justifiable wlien a general lias a gi-eat and 
 well-grounded contempt for his adversary. 
 
 Pope was at this time in a condition to undertake a bold 
 stroke ; for lie had already been re-enforced by a considerable 
 body of the Army of the Potomac arriving from the Peninsula. 
 Reynolds' division of Pennsylvania Reserves had joined him 
 at Rappahannock Station on the 23d ; the corps of Porter 
 and Heintzelman at Warrenton Junction, on the 26th and 
 27th; and the remainder of the Army of the Potomac (corps 
 of Sumner and PrankHn) was en route from Alexandria. 
 
 The measures taken by Pope to meet the new turn of affairs 
 showed an appreciation of the line of action suited to the cir- 
 cumstances ; but he was incapable of carrying it out, for he 
 had completely lost his head. The obvious move was to 
 throw forward his left so as to seize the road by which Long- 
 street would advance to join Jackson. With this view, he, on 
 the morning of the 27th, directed General McDowell, with his 
 own and Sigel's corps and the division of Reynolds, upon 
 Gainesville, — a movement that would plant that powerful 
 force of forty thousand men on the road by which Lee's main 
 column, moving through Thoroughfare Gap, must advance to 
 join Jackson. This force was to be supported by Reno's 
 corps and Kearney's division of Heintzelman's corps, which 
 were directed on Greenwich, while he moved with Hooker's 
 division along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad towards 
 Manassas Junction. Porter's corps (when reHeved at Warren- 
 ton Junction by Banks, who was to remain at that point, 
 covering the trains and repairing the railroad) was also 
 directed upon Gainesville. These dispositions were not only 
 correct — they were brilhant. The lame and impotent sequel 
 is now to be seen. 
 
 The main or interposing column under McDowell was to 
 reach its assigned position at Gainesville and Greenwich that 
 night, the 27th. This was successfully accomplished. At the 
 same time. Pope, with Hooker's command, moved along the 
 railroad to come up with Jackson at Bristoe Station. Near 
 that place Hooker, late in the afternoon, came up with a Con- 
 
180 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AKMT OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 federate force under Ewell, whom Jackson had that morning 
 left there, while he, with his other divisions, pushed forward to 
 Manassas Junction. A brisk engagement ensued, but Ewell, 
 finding himself unable to maintain his ground, withdrew across 
 Broad Eun, under orders from Jackson, and joined the latter 
 at Manassas Junction. Thinking that the engagement might 
 be renewed in the morning at Bristoe Station, Pope instructed 
 General Porter to move up from Warrenton Junction at one 
 A. M., and be at Bristoe by dawn of the 28th. Porter was 
 not able to start till three o'clock, owing to the darkness of 
 the night and the obstruction of the road, and did not reach 
 Bristoe till between eight and nine o'clock. As it happened, 
 however, there was no immediate occasion for him, as Ewell 
 had, during the night, moved forward to rejoin Jackson at 
 Manassas Junction. 
 
 And now, as it appeared on the morning of the 28th, there 
 was no escape for Jackson ; and Pope boldly proclaimed it.* 
 Jackson was at Manassas Junction; a powerful force was 
 coming up in his rear. McDowell, at Gainesville, with forty 
 thousand men, interposed between him and Lee, the remain- 
 der of whose force was still west of the Bull Eun Mountains, 
 distant a full day's march. But fortune and the errors of his 
 adversary favored Jackson ; and at the very time he seemed 
 to be nearing the crisis of his fate, events were occurring that 
 were destined to extricate him fi-om his seemingly perilous 
 position. 
 
 When, on the night of the 27th, Pope learnt that Jackson 
 was in the vicinity of Manassas, he directed McDowell, with 
 all his force, to take up the march early on the morning of the 
 28th, and move eastward from Gainesville and Greenwich 
 upon Manassas Junction, following the Hue of the Manassas 
 Gap Eailroad ; while he ordered Hooker and Kearney and 
 Porter to advance northward from Bristoe Station upon the 
 same place. From Gainesville to Manassas Junction the dis- 
 
 * "If you will march promptly and rapidly at the earliest dawn upon 
 Manassas Junction, we shall bag the whole crowd." — Pope's order of 27th to 
 General McDowell : Report, p. 41 
 
POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 181 
 
 tance is fifteen miles ; from Bristoe Station, it is eight miles ; 
 and from Manassas Junction west to Thoroughfare Gap, 
 where Lee must debouch through the Bull Kun Mountains to 
 tmite with Jackson, is twenty miles. 
 
 This move was a great error. Pope's left (McDowell's col- 
 umn) was his strategic flank, and should have been thrown 
 forward, rather then retired ; for in withdrawing from the 
 line of the Warrenton turnpike to Manassas Junction, he 
 permitted Jackson, by a move fi-om Manassas Junction to 
 the north of the turnpike, to do precisely what he should at 
 all hazards have been prevented from doing — namely, to put 
 himself in the way of a junction with the main body of Lee's 
 army. Could Jackson, indeed, have been induced to remain 
 at Manassas Junction for the convenience of Pope, that gen- 
 eral's strategy would have worked to a charm ; but Jackson 
 was fully alive to the peril of his position, and while Pope 
 thought he was in the act of " bagging" Jackson, Jackson was 
 giving Pope the slip. The details are as follows : During 
 the night of the 27th and morning of the 28th Jackson moved 
 his force fi-om Manassas, by the Sudley Springs road, across 
 to the Warrenton turnpike ; crossing which, he gained 
 the high timber-land north and west of Groveton, in the 
 vicmity of the battle-field of the 21st July, 1861. ^Iien, 
 therefore, Pope, with the divisions of Hooker and Kearney 
 and Eeno, reached Manassas Junction, about noon of the 
 2Sth, he found that Jackson had already gone ! Pope then 
 tried to correct his error by calling back McDowell's column 
 from its march towards Manassas Junction and directing it on 
 Centreville, to which point he also ordered forward Hooker, 
 Kearney, and Keno, and afterwards Porter. But much time had 
 been lost; the columns on the march towards Manassas had 
 been forced to take other roads than those indicated for them ; 
 and it was late in the afternoon when McDowell, with one divi- 
 sion of his whole command (King's), regained the Warrenton 
 turnpike and headed towards Centreville. Now Jackson, as al- 
 ready seen, had taken position on the north side of the turnpike, 
 near Groveton ; so that on the approach of Kmg's column, it 
 
1S2 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARISIT OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 unwittingly jDresented a flank to Jackson, who assailed it furi- 
 ously. Jackson attacked with two divisions (the Stonewall 
 division, then under General Taliaferro, and Ewell's division), 
 while the fight was sustained on the Union side by King's 
 division alone. The behavior of his troops w^as exceedingly 
 creditable, and they maintained their ground with what Jack- 
 son styles " obstinate determination." The loss on both sides 
 was severe, and on the part of the Confederates included Gen- 
 erals Ewell and Taliaferro, both of whom were severely wounded 
 — the former losing a leg. Unfortunately, during the night, 
 King withdrew his command to Manassas, leaving the "War- 
 renton turnpike available for Jackson's withdrawal or Long- 
 street's advance. That same night, too, Gen. Ricketts (whom 
 McDowell had detached with his division to dispute the pass- 
 age of Thoroughfare Gap with Longstreet) also withdrew to 
 Manassas. Thus affairs went from bad to worse. 
 
 IV. 
 
 THE SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 
 
 By the morning of the 29th, General Pope had learnt the 
 real position of the adversary who had hitherto so adroitly 
 eluded him ; but his troops had become so scattered by his 
 contradictory orders, that it could hardly be said he had an 
 army at all. Sigel and Reynolds had, however, turned up 
 near Groveton ; and Pope directed them to develop the posi- 
 tion of the enemy,* while he sought to get his remaining 
 forces in hand. Reno's corps, and Heintzelman with his two 
 divisions under Hooker and Kearney, were ordered to coun- 
 termarch from Centreville ; while Porter, with his corps and 
 King's division of McDowell's command, was directed to 
 
 * General Pope, in his official report (p. 20), states that the attack by Sigel 
 ■was for the purpose of " bringing Jackson to a stand, if it loere possible to do so," 
 thus intimating that Jackson was moving off. There does not seem to have been 
 any occasion for this solicitude. 
 
POPE'S CAJyiPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 183 
 
 advance on Gainesville, a position it had been more easy to 
 abandon the day before than to regain now. 
 
 Jackson continued to hold his vantage-ground upon the 
 highlands northwest of Groveton ; and as he now commanded 
 the Warrenton road, by which Lee was moving to join him, 
 and had intelligence that his chief was close at hand, he had 
 ceased to fear the result of an encounter with Pope. Jackson 
 disposed his troops along the cut of an unfinished raih'oad,* 
 with his right resting on the Warrenton turnpike, and his left 
 near Sudley Mill, The mass of his troops were sheltered in 
 dense woods behind the railroad cut and embankment, which 
 formed a ready-made parapet. 
 
 General Sigel, as ordered, attacked in the morning, pushing 
 forward his line under a warm fire, under which he suffered 
 severely ; and, towards noon, he was Joined by Keno's com- 
 mand and the divisions of Hooker and Kearney, Meanwhile, 
 Porter, in the morning, moved forward from Manassas Junc- 
 tion to turn Jackson's right by an advance on Gainesville. 
 
 Had the position of the Confederates been as Pope im- 
 agined, the latter move should have been decisive, and must 
 have seriously jeopardized Jackson's safety. But, while 
 Porter's column was yet in motion, and before it could reach 
 Jackson's flank, the van of Lee's main body began to reach 
 the field from Thoroughfare Gap, La fact, by ten in the 
 morning, Longstreet had come up, and, taking position on 
 Jackson's right, drew an extension of the Confederate Kne 
 across the Warrenton turnpike and the Manassas Gap Bail- 
 road, thus covering all the Hnes of approach by which the 
 column of Porter might advance towards Gainesville, Upon 
 
 * " My troops on this day were distributed along and in the vicinity of the cut 
 of an unfinished railroad (intended as a part of the track to connect the Manassas 
 road directly AAith Alexandria), stretching from the Warrenton turnpike in the 
 direction of Sudley Mill. It was mainly along the unfinished excavation of this 
 unfinished road that my line of battle was formed on the 29 th : Jackson's division, 
 under Brigadier-General Starke, on the right ; Ewell's division, tinder Briga- 
 dier-General Lawton, in the centre ; and Hill's division on the left " — Jackson's 
 Report : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 95. 
 
184 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 finding himself thus estopped, Porter was proceeding to form 
 his hne when he was overtaken by General McDowell, under 
 whose orders the former then came. The precise tenor of the 
 instructions which, at this moment, McDowell gave Porter 
 is a point in dispute, — McDowell asserting that he ordered 
 Porter to move against the enemy, and Porter claiming that 
 McDowell directed him to remain where he was. However 
 this may be, McDowell took King's division, which belonged 
 to his own corps, from under Porter, and, uniting it with Kick- 
 ett's division (also of McDowell's corps), headed his column 
 northward to the battle-field near Groveton, where he arrived 
 late in the afternoon. Porter held his command for the rest of 
 the day in the position taken up, — Morell's division being de- 
 ployed and in contact with the enemy ; the other divisions 
 massed. 
 
 Thus it w^as that, by contradictory orders and the useless 
 marches and counter-marches they involved. Pope's oppor- 
 tunity was thrown away, and instead of fighting Jackson's 
 corps alone, it was the entire army of Lee with which he had 
 to deal, — this, too, with his forces very much out of position, 
 and he himself ignorant both of his own situation and that of 
 the enemy. When, towards noon. Pope, commg from Cen- 
 treville, reached the field near Groveton, he found the situa- 
 tion as follows : Heintzelman's two divisions, under Hooker 
 and Kearney, on the right, in front and west of the Sudley 
 Springs road; Pieno and Sigel holding the centre, — Sigel's 
 line being extended a short distance south of the Warrenton 
 turnpike ; Eeynolds with his division on the left. But the 
 commander was ignorant of the whereabouts of both Porter 
 and McDowell, and he knew not that Longstreet had joined 
 Jackson ! The troops had been considerably cut up by tlie 
 brisk skirmishing that had been kept up all the morning. An 
 artillery duel had also been waged all the forenoon between 
 the opposing lines ; but it was at long range and of no efi'ect. 
 
 The position of the troops in front of Jackson's intrenched 
 line was one that promised very little success for a direct 
 attack, and especially for a partial attack. Nevertheless, at 
 
POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 185 
 
 three o'clock, Pope ordered Hooker to assault. Tlie attempt 
 was so unpromising that that officer remonstrated against it ; 
 but the order being imperative, he made a very determined 
 attack with his division. The action was especially brilliant 
 on the part of Grover's brigade, which, advancing with the 
 bayonet, succeeded in penetrating between the two extreme 
 left brigades of Jackson's line,* and got possession of the rail- 
 road embankment which, by a savage hand-to-hand fight, it 
 held for some time, till driven back by the arrival of re- 
 enforcements to the Confederate left.t Too late for imited 
 action, Kearney was sent to Hooker's assistance, and he also 
 suffered repulse. 
 
 Meanwhile, Pope had learnt the position of Porter's com- 
 mand, and, at half-past four in the afternoon, sent orders to 
 that officer to assail the enemy's right flank and rear, — Pope 
 erroneously believing the right flank of Jackson, near Grove- 
 ton, to be the right of the Confederate line. Towards six, 
 when he thought Porter should be coming into action, he 
 directed Heintzelman and Reno to assault the enemy's left. 
 The attack was made with vigor, especially by Kearney, who 
 struck Jackson's left under Hill, at a moment when the Con- 
 federates had almost exhausted their ammunition.:]: Doubling 
 up Hill's flank on his centre, Kearney seized the railroad em- 
 bankment and that part of the field of battle. " This," as 
 Kearney says, " presaged a victory for us all. Still," he goes 
 on to observe, " our force was too light. The enemy brought 
 up rapidly heavy reserves, so that our further progress was 
 impeded." § In fact, Kearney was compelled to fall back 
 
 * These were the brigades of Gregg and Thomas. — Jackson : Report, p. 95. 
 
 f Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 252. 
 
 X " The enemy prepared for a last and determined attempt. Their serried 
 masses, overwhelming superiority of numbers [absurd exaggeration common 
 to both sides], and bold bearing [it was Kearney], made the chance of victory 
 to tremble in the balance ; my own division, exhausted by seven hours unre- 
 mitted fighting, had hardly one round per man remaining, and was weakened 
 in all tilings save its unconquerable spirit." — Report of General A. P. HUl : 
 Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 125. 
 
 § Kearney's Report : Report of General Pope, p. 79. 
 
186 CAMPAIGNS OP THE AEMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 altogether from tlie railroad, and the "presage of victory" 
 was turned to naught.* 
 
 Turning now to the left, where Porter was to have assailed the 
 Confederate right, it appears that the order which Pope sent 
 at half-past four, did not reach Porter till about dusk. He 
 then made dispositions for attack, but it was too late. It is, 
 however, more than doubtful that even had the order been 
 received in time, any thing but repulse would have resulted 
 from its execution. Porter was reduced to the necessity of 
 making a direct attack in front ; for there was no opportunity 
 of making a turning movement, seeing that, contrary to Pope's 
 opinion, he had then, and had had since noon, Longstreet's 
 entire corps before him.f So as firing now died away in the 
 
 * The Confederate re-enforcements, of which Kearney speaks, consisted of 
 the brigades of Early and Lawton. (See Report of General A. P. Hill : Re- 
 ports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 125.) General Early says, in 
 his report : " My brigade and the Eighth Louisiana advanced upon the enemy 
 through a field, and drove him from the woods and out of the railroad-cut, 
 crossing the latter and following in pursuit several hundred yards beyond." — 
 Ibid., p. 184. 
 
 f As the view above taken of the action of that part of the " Second BuU 
 Run," fought on the 39th of August, diflfers in some important particulars from 
 previous accounts, and especially from the official report of General Pope, I 
 shall here substantiate by Confederate ofiicial records the truth of such points 
 of difference as are of moment. The question foremost in interest has relation 
 to the time at which Longstreet's corps joined Jackson. General Pope re- 
 peatedly states that this did not take place till " about sunset" (see Pope's Of- 
 ficial Report, p. 21) ; and it is on this ground that he and the court-martial that 
 tried General Porter based their condemnation of that ofiicer for not turning 
 Jackson's right. Says Pope : " I believe — in fact, I am positive — that at five 
 o'clock in the afternoon of the 29th, General Porter had in his front no consid- 
 erable body of the enemy. I believed then, as I am very sure now, that it was 
 easily practicable for him to have turned the right flank of Jackson, and to 
 have fallen upon his rear ; that if he had done so, we should have gained a de- 
 cisive victory over the army xmder Jackson before Tie could Jiave been joined hy 
 any of the forces of Longstreet" (Pope's Report, p. 22.) Now this assertion ia 
 traversed by the positive evidence of the oflBcial reports of several of the gen- 
 erals under Longstreet's command, who show conclusively that Longstreet 
 pined Jackson as early as noon. Says Longstreet himself: "Early on the 
 '^dth the columns were united, and the advance, to join General Jackson, was 
 resumed. The noise of battle was heard before we reached Gainesville. The 
 
POPES CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 187 
 
 darkling woods on the right, a pause was put for the day to 
 the chaos and confusion of this mismanaged battle, in which 
 many thousand men had fallen on the Union side. 
 
 It would have been judicious for General Pope, in the then 
 condition of his army, to have that night withdrawn across 
 Bull Kun and taken position at Centreville, or even within the 
 fortifications of Washington. By doing so he would have 
 united with the corps of Franklin and Sumner, then between 
 
 march was quickened to tlie extent of our capacity. The excitement of battle 
 seemed to give new life and strength to our jaded men, and the head of my 
 column soon reached a position in rear of the enemy's left flank." (Reports of 
 the Army of Northern "Virginia, vol. ii., p. 8.) See also Hood. (Ibid., p. 209.) 
 But General D. R. Jones, who commanded the rear division of Longstreet's 
 corps is still more explicit. " Early on the morning of the 29th, I took up the 
 march in the direction of the old battle-ground of Manasses, whence heavy 
 firing was heard. Arriving on the ground about noon, my command was sta- 
 tioned on the extreme right of our line," etc. (Ibid., p. 217.) This would appear 
 to settle the time of arrival of Longstreet ; and 1 shall now show that before 
 Porter came up from Manassas, Longstreet had taken up such a position as to 
 bar his advance towards Gainesville. On this head Longstreet's own testi- 
 mony wiU suffice, and it is as complete as could be desired. After giving his 
 dispositions for his connection with Jackson's right, he states that " Hood's di- 
 vision was deployed on the right and left of the Warrenton turnpike, at right 
 angles with it. General D. R. Jones' division was placed upon the Manassas 
 Gap Bail road, to the right, and in echelon with regard to the three last bri- 
 gades." (Ibid., pp. 81, 82.) Now it is quite obvious that this disposition covered 
 Porter's whole front, and that it barred his approach to Gainesville. Any at- 
 tack by Porter would therefore necessarily be made in front. When he re- 
 ceived Pope's order to attack the enemy's right and turn his rear, Morell's di- 
 vision was already deployed in front of Longstreet, and it was near dark when 
 the order came to hand. Probably there is no military man who will now say 
 that the operation indicated by Pope was at that time possible. General Por- 
 ter many months subsequent to these events, and after having in the mean- 
 while had command of the forces for the defence of the capital, and been at 
 the head of his coi-ps at the battle of Antietam, was arraigned before a court- 
 martial at Washington, and dismissed the service of the United States, for al- 
 leged disobedience to the above orders of Pope. I do not constitute myself the 
 chamxjion of General Porter, or of any other officer ; but having become pos- 
 sessed of the Confederate official reports, and having been struck with the new 
 light thrown on these events by the imconscious testimony given above by the 
 Confederate generals, I should have viohited the first duty of a historian had I 
 suppressed these facts. 
 
188 CAIMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Washington and Centreville, whereas at Manassas Lee was sure 
 to receive fresh accessions of force, while Pope could hope for 
 none. The army was much cut up ; thousands had straggled 
 from their commands ; the troops had had little to eat for two 
 days previously ; the artillery and cavalry horses had been 
 in harness and saddled continually for ten daj's. 
 
 With untimely obstinacy, Pope determined to remain and 
 again try the issue of battle. To utilize Porter's corps, he 
 dreAv it over from the isolated position it had held the pre- 
 vious day to the Warrenton road, on which he pivoted, dis- 
 posing his line in the form of a Y reversed — Reynolds' com- 
 mand forming the left leg, and Porter, Sigel, and Pveno the 
 right, with Heintzelman's two divisions holding the extreme 
 right. Lee retained the same relative position he had held 
 the day before — Longstreet on the right, and Jackson on the 
 left ; but he drew back his left considerably, abandoning dur- 
 ing the night some of the ground he had held on that flank. 
 
 Now, by one of those curious conjunctures which sometimes 
 occur in battle, it so was that the oj^posing commanders had 
 that day formed each the same resolution : Pope had deter- 
 mined to attack Lee's left flank, and Lee had determined to 
 attack Pope's left flank. And thus it came about that when 
 Heintzelman pushed forward to feel the enemy's left, the re- 
 fusal of that flank by Lee, and his withdrawal of troops to 
 his right for the purpose of making his contemplated attack 
 on Pope's left, gave the impression that the Confederates were 
 retreating up the Warrenton turnpike towards Gainesville. 
 This impression was further strengthened by the report of a 
 wounded Confederate soldier who fell into the hands of the 
 Union pickets, and reported that he had heard his comrades 
 say that "Jackson was retiring to unite with Longstreet." 
 Now this statement was quite correct in the sense in which 
 Lee's manoeuvres have already been presented — that is, as a 
 tactical change of Jackson's position on the left to re-enforce 
 Longstreet on the right. But Pope, who had not that day 
 been to the front, accepted the story as indicating a real fall- 
 ing back, and telegraphed to Washington that the enemy was 
 
POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 189 
 
 "retreating to the mountains," — a dispatch which, flashed 
 throughout the land, gave the people a few hours, at least, of 
 unmixed pleasure. 
 
 To take advantage of the supposed " retreat" of Lee, Pope 
 ordered McDowell with three corps — Porter's in the ad- 
 vance — to follow up rajjidly on the Warrenton turnjjike, and 
 "press the enemy vigorously during the whole day." But 
 no sooner were the troops put in motion to make this pur^ 
 suit of a supposed flying foe, than the Confederates, hither- 
 to concealed in the forest in front of Porter, uncovered 
 themselves, and opened a heavy fire from their numerous 
 artillery;* and while King's division was being formed 
 on Porter's right in order to press an attack, clouds of 
 dust on the extreme left showed that the enemy was moving 
 to turn the Union line in that direction ; and that, instead 
 of retiring, he was in the full tide of an offensive move- 
 ment. To meet this manoeuvre, General McDowell detached 
 Reynolds' command from the left of Porter's force north of 
 the Warrenton turnpike, and directed it on a position south 
 of that road to check this menace. The Warrenton turnpike, 
 which intersects the Manassas battle-field, runs westward up 
 the valley of the little rivulet of Young's Branch. From the 
 stream the ground rises on both sides, in some places quite 
 into hills. The Sudley Springs road, on crossing the stream 
 at right angles, passes directly over one of these hills, just 
 south of the Warrenton turnpike ; and this hill has on it a de- 
 tached road with fields stretching back away from it some 
 hundreds of yards to the forest. This is the hill whereon what 
 is known as the " Heniy House" stood. To the west of it is 
 another hill — the Bald Hill, so called — which is in fact a rise 
 lying between the roads, and making about the same angle 
 
 * " As soon as Butterfield's brigade advanced up the hill, there was great 
 commotion among the rebel forces, and the whole side of the hill and edges of 
 the woods swarmed with men before unseen. The effect was not unlike flush- 
 ing a covey of quail. The enemy fell back to the line of the railroad, and took 
 shelter in the cut and behind the embankment."— Warren : Report of tlje 
 Second Battle of Manassas. 
 
190 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 with each, and running back to the forest. Between the two 
 hills is a brook, a tributary of Young's Branch. Upon the 
 latter hill General McDowell directed JReynolds' division and 
 a portion of Rickett's command, so as to check the flank ma- 
 noeuvre tliat menaced seizure of the Warrenton turnpike, which 
 was the line of reti-eat of the whole armv. 
 
 The occupation of this position was judicious on the part of 
 General McDowell ; but the detachment of Reynolds from 
 Porter's left for that purpose had an unfortunate result ;* for 
 it exposed the key-point of Porter's line. Colonel G. K. War- 
 ren, who then commanded one of Porter's brigades, seeing 
 the imminence of the danger, at once, and without waiting for 
 orders, moved forward with his small but brave brigade of 
 about a thousand men,t and occupied the important jDosition 
 abandoned by Reynolds ; Porter then, as well to sustain War- 
 ren, as to fulfil his orders of pursuit, his column of attack 
 being formed, made a vigorous assault on the Confederate 
 position ; but beyond driving back the advanced line so as to 
 develop the Confederate array as formed behind the railroad 
 embankment, he was able to accompKsh nothing. Line after 
 line was swept away by the enemy's artillery and infantry fire, 
 and so destructive was its effect that Porter's troops finally 
 were compelled to withdraw. Porter's attack had been di- 
 rected against Jackson ; but Longstreet, on Jackson's right, 
 found a commanding point of ground, whence he could rake 
 the assaulting columns with an enfilading fire of artillery. 
 " From an eminence near by," says that officer, " one portion 
 of the enemy's masses, attacking General Jackson, were imme- 
 diately within my view, and in easy range of batteries in that 
 position. It gave me an advantage I had not expected to 
 have, and I made haste to use it. Two batteries were ordered 
 for the purpose, and one placed in position immediately and 
 opened. Just as this fire began, I received a message from 
 
 * Sigel's corps should have been taken in place of Reynolds' division, oi 
 anybody else rather than Reynolds. ; 
 
 f Warren's command consisted of the Fifth and Tenth New York Volun- 
 teers. 
 
POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. IQI 
 
 the commanding general, informing me of General Jacison's 
 condition and his wants. As it was evident that the attack 
 against General Jackson could not be continued ten minutes 
 under the fire of these batteries, I made no movement with 
 my troops. Before the second battery could be placed in po- 
 sition the enemy began to retire, and in less than ten minutes 
 the ranks were broken, and that portion of his army put to 
 flight."" Warren occupying the important point he had 
 seized, held on stoutly and against a fearful loss till all the 
 rest of Porter's troops had been retired, and only withdrew 
 when the enemy had advanced so close as to fire in the very 
 faces of his men. 
 
 Such was the situation of affairs at five o'clock in the after- 
 noon : Porter's troops, fearfully cut up in repeated assaults 
 of a position which it was hopeless to attempt to carry, were 
 retiring from the field. Jackson immediately took up the 
 pursuit, and was joined by a general advance of the whole 
 Confederate line — Longstreet extending his right so as, if 
 possible, to cut off the retreat of the Union forces. By an 
 impetuous rush, Longstreet carried the " Bald Hill," held by 
 Reynolds and Eicketts ; and it then became doubtful whether 
 even the " Henry House Hill" could be maintained so as to 
 cover the retreat of the army over Bull Ptun, for Longstreet 
 had thrown around his right so as to menace that position. 
 This, however, was happily provided for by the firmness of 
 some battalions of Begulars, which held the ground until re- 
 lieved by the brigades of Meade and Seymour and other 
 troops, that maintained the position and permitted the with- 
 drawal of the army. Under cover of the darkness the wea- 
 ried troops retired across Bull Run, by the stone bridge, and 
 took position on the heights of Centreville. Owing to the ob- 
 scurity of the night, and the uncertainty of the fords of Bull 
 Run, Lee attempted no pursuit.t 
 
 * Longstreet : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 83. 
 
 f " The obscurity of the night, and the uncertainty of the fords of BnU 
 Run, rendered it necessary to suspend operations until morning." Jjee's He 
 port : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 25. 
 
192 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 EXIT POPE. 
 
 At Centreville, Pope united witli the corps of Franklin 
 and Sumner, and he remained there during the whole of the 
 31st. But Lee had not yet given up the pursuit. Leaving 
 Longstreet on the battle-field, he sent Jackson by a detour on 
 Pope's right, to strike the Little Kiver turnpike, and by that 
 route to Fairfax Courthouse, to intercept, if possible. Pope's 
 retreat to Washington. Jackson's march was much retarded 
 by a heavy storm that commenced the day before and still 
 continued. Pope, meantime, feU back to positions covering 
 Fairfax Courthouse and Germantown ; and on the evening of 
 the 1st of September, Jackson struck his right posted at Ox 
 Hill, near Germantown. He immediately engaged the Union 
 force with Hill's and E well's divisions in the midst of a cold 
 and drenching rain. The attack fell upon Keno, Hooker, a 
 part of McDowell, and Kearney. A firm front was main- 
 tained tiU Stevens' division of Keno's corps, owing to the ex- 
 haustion of its ammunition, and the death of its general, Avas 
 forced back in disorder. To repair this break, Kearney, with 
 the promptitude that marked him, sent forward Birney's 
 brigade of his own division ; and presently, aU aglow with 
 zeal, brought up a battery which he placed in position. But 
 there still remained a gap on Birney's right, caused by the 
 retirement of Stevens' division. This Birney pointed out to 
 Kearney, and that gallant soldier, dashing forward to recon- 
 noitre the ground, unwittingly rode into the enemy's lines and 
 was killed. In his death, the army lost the hving ideal of a 
 soldier — a preiix chevalier, in whom there were mixed the 
 quahties of chivalry and gallantry as strong as ever beat 
 beneath the mailed coat of an olden knight. Like Desaix, 
 whom Napoleon characterized as " the man most worthy to 
 
POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 19|J 
 
 be Lis lieutenant," Kearney died opposing a heroic breast to 
 disaster. 
 
 On the following day, September 2d, the army was, by 
 order of General Halleck, drawn back within the lines of 
 Washington, and Lee, abandoning direct pursuit, began to 
 turn his eyes towards the north of the Potomac. 
 
 Within the fortifications of Washington the army now 
 rested from the labors, fatigues, and privations of this trying 
 campaign, in which, from the Eapidan to the front of the 
 capital, it had fought and retreated, and retreated and fought. 
 It had passed through an experience calculated to dislocate 
 the structure of most armies ; and if it reached the lines of 
 Washington in any military order whatsoever, it was because 
 the individual patriotism of the rank and file suppHed a bond 
 of cohesion when the bond of military discipline failed. 
 Of the losses in killed and wounded during this campaign, 
 no official record is found ; but the Confederate commander 
 claims the capture of nine thousand prisoners, thirty pieces of 
 artillery, and upwards of twenty thousand stands of arms in 
 the engagement on the plains of Manassas alone. Untold 
 thousands had straggled from their commands during the re- 
 treat. 
 
 As for Pope, it is hardly possible to feel for him less than 
 pity, in spite of the bombastic pretensions with which he set 
 out. The record ah-eady given does not justify the assertion 
 that he was not obeyed by his subordinates ; but it cannot be 
 denied that the estimate of his character held by the officers 
 under his command was not of a kind to elicit that hearty 
 and zealous co-operation needed for the effective conduct of 
 great military operations. He had the misfortune to be of 
 all men the most disbelieved. General Pope took the first 
 opportunity on his return to Washington to vacate the com- 
 mand ; the Army of Yirginia passed out of existence, and its 
 corps, were united with the Array of the Potomac. 
 
 18 
 
]94 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AKMT OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 YI. 
 
 THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 
 
 September— OcTOBEE, 1862. 
 
 I. 
 
 MANCEUVEES PREVIOUS TO ANTIETAM. 
 
 When Lee put his columns in motion from Richmond, it 
 was with no intent of entering upon a campaign of invasion 
 across the great river that formed the dividing line between 
 the warring powers. But who can foretell the results that 
 may spring from the simplest act in that complex interplay of 
 cause and effect we name war ? A secondary operation, hav- 
 ing in view merely to hold Pope in check, had effected not only 
 H its primal aim, but the infinitely more important result of dis- 
 lodging the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula. Thus 
 relieved of all care touching Richmond, Lee was free to 
 assume a real offensive for the purpose not merely of check- 
 ing but of crushing Pope. The success of the campaign 
 had been remarkable. From the front of Richmond the thea- 
 tre of operations had been transferred to the front of Wash- 
 ington ; the Union armies had been reduced to a humiliating 
 defensive, and the rich harvests of the Shenandoah Yalley 
 and Northern Virginia were the prize of the victors. To 
 crown and consolidate these conquests, Lee now determined 
 to cross the frontier into Maryland. 
 
 The prospective advantages of such a transfer of the 
 theatre of war to the north of the Potomac seemed strongly 
 to invite it ; for, in addition to the telling blows Lee might 
 
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 195 
 
 hope to inflict in the demoralized condition of the Union 
 army, and the prestige that the enterprise would lend the 
 Confederate cause abroad, it was judged that the presence of 
 the hostile force would detain McClellan on the frontier long 
 enough to render an invasion of Virginia during the ap- 
 proaching winter difficult, if not impracticable.* 
 
 Yet, if the enterprise had promised only such military gain, 
 it is doubtful whether the Kichmond government would have 
 undertaken a project involving the renunciation of the proved 
 advantages of their proper defensive ; but it seemed, in ad- 
 dition, to hold out certain ulterior inducements, which were 
 none the less alluring for being somewhat vague. The theory 
 of the invasion assumed that the presence of the Confederate 
 army in Maryland would induce an immediate rising among 
 the citizens of that State for what General Lee calls " the re- 
 covery of their liberties." If it did not prompt an armed 
 insurrection, it was, at least, expected that the people of 
 Maryland would assume such an attitude as would seriously 
 embarrass the Government and necessitate the retention of 
 a great part of its military force for the purpose of prevent- 
 ing anticipated risings. By this means it was believed that it 
 would be difficult for the Union authorities to apply a concen- 
 trated efl'ort to the expulsion of the invading force.f 
 
 Without the prospect of some such incidental and ulterior 
 advantages as these, the enterprise would hardly have been 
 undertaken; for, not only was it perilous in itself, but the 
 Confederate army was not properly equipped for invasion : it 
 lacked much of the material of war and was feeble in trans- 
 portation, while the troops were so wretchedly clothed and 
 
 * Lee: Eeport of tlie Maryland Campaign, in Reports of the Army ol 
 Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 27. 
 
 f General Lee's statement on this head is somewhat vague; but it can 
 hardly mean any thing else than what is indicated above : " The condition of 
 Maryland encouraged the belief that the presence of our army, however in- 
 ferior to that of the enemy, would induce tJie WasJimgton Government to retain 
 all its amilable force to provide against contingencies which its course toward* 
 the people of that State gave it reason to a/pprehend." — Ibid. 
 
196 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 shod that little else could be claimed for them than what 
 Tilly boasted of his followers — that they were an army of 
 " ragged soldiers and bright muskets." * 
 
 Plausible though this anticipation of a secessionist uprising 
 in Maryland seemed, it rested on a false basis and was not 
 more emphatically belied by experience than it was con- 
 demned by sound reasoning before the fact. Nevertheless, 
 misled by this illusion, Lee turned the heads of his columns 
 away from the direction of Washington, which he never seems 
 to have dreamed of assailing directly, and put them in motion 
 towards Leesburg. Between the 4th and 7th of September 
 the whole Confederate army crossed the Potomac by the fords 
 near that place, and encamped in the vicinity of Frederick, 
 where the standard of revolt was formally raised, and the 
 people of Maryland invited by proclamation of General Lee 
 to join the Confederate force. But it soon became manifest 
 that the expectation of practical assistance from the Mary- 
 landers was destined to grievous disappointment ; and the 
 ragged and shoeless soldiers who entered the State chanting 
 the song in which Maryland was made passionately to invoke 
 Southern aid against Northern despotism found, instead of the 
 rapturous reception they had anticipated, cold indifference 
 or ill-concealed hostility. Of the citizens of Maryland a large 
 number (and notably the population of the western counties) 
 were really loyal, a considerable number indifferent, and a 
 smaller number bitterly secessionist. But to permit the seces- 
 sionists to move at all, it was necessary that Lee should first 
 of all demonstrate his ability to remain in the State by over- 
 throwing the powerful Union force that was moving to meet 
 him ; while the lukewarm, whom the romance of the invasion 
 might have allured, were repelled by the wretchedness, the 
 rags, and the shocking filth of the " army of hberation." 
 
 * " Thousands of the troops," says Lee, " were destitute of shoes." — Re- 
 ports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 27. " Never," says General 
 Jones, who commanded Jackson's old " Stonewall" division, " had the army 
 been so dirty, ragged, and ill provided for, as on this march." — Ibid., vol. ii., 
 p. 221. 
 
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 197 
 
 In the dark hour when the shattered battalions that sur- 
 vived Pope's campaign returned to Washington, General Mc- 
 Clellan, at the request of the President, resumed command of 
 the Army of the Potomac, with the addition thereto of Burn- 
 side's command and the corps composing the late Army of 
 Virginia. Whatever may have been the estimate of McClel- 
 lan's military capacity at this time Itfeld by the President, or 
 General Halleck, or Mr. Secretary Stanton, or the Committee 
 on the Conduct of the War, there appears to have been no 
 one to gainsay the propriety of the appointment or dispute 
 the mao-ic of his name with the soldiers he had led. McClel- 
 lan's reappearance at the head of affairs had the most bene- 
 ficial effect on the army, whose morale immediately underwent 
 an astonishing change. The heterogeneous mass made up of 
 the aggregation of the remnants of the two armies, and the 
 garrison of Washington, was reorganized into a compact 
 body — a work that had mostly to be done while the army was 
 on the march f and as soon as it became known that Lee had 
 crossed the Potomac, McCleUan moved towards Frederick to 
 meet him. The advance was made by five parallel roads, and 
 the columns were so disposed as to cover both Washington 
 and Baltimore ; for the left flank rested on the Potomac, and 
 the right on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. The right 
 wing consisted of the First and Ninth corps, under General 
 Burnside ; the centre, of the Second and Twelfth corps, under 
 General Sumner ; and the left wing, of the Sixth Corps, under 
 General Franklin.t 
 
 * " Like the rest of the army, the artillery may be said to have been organ- 
 ized on the march and in the intervals of conflict." — Hunt : Report of Artillery 
 Operations of the Maryland Campaign. 
 
 f The First Corps (McDowell's old command) had been placed under Gen- 
 eral Hooker. The Ninth Corps, of Burnside's old force, was under General 
 Reno. Sumner continued to command his own (Second) corps, and also con- 
 trolled the Twelfth (Banks' old command), which was placed under General 
 Mansfield, a veteran soldier, but who had not thus far been in the field. The 
 Sixth Corps, under General Franklin, embraced the divisions of Smith (W. F.), 
 Slocum, and Couch. Porter's did not leave Washington until the 12th of 
 September, and rejoined the army at Antietam. General H. J. Himt, who had 
 
198 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 The uncertainty at first overhanging Lee's intentions caused 
 the advance from "Washington to be made with much ckcum- 
 spection ; and it might, perhaps, be fairly chargeable with 
 tardiness, were there not on record repeated dispatches of the 
 time from the general-in-chief, charging McClellan with too 
 great a precipitancy of movement for the safety of the capi- 
 tal. The van of the army entered Frederick on the 12th 
 of September, after a brisk skirmish at the outskirts of the 
 town with the Confederate troopers left behind as a rear- 
 guard. It was found that the main body of Lee's army had 
 passed out of Frederick two days before, heading westward 
 towards Harper's Ferry. 
 
 It is now necessary, for a just appreciation of the events of 
 the Maryland campaign, that I should give an outline of the 
 plan of operations which the Confederate commander had 
 marked out for himself. This plan was simple, but highly 
 meritorious. Lee did not propose to make any dii'ect move- 
 ment against Washington or Baltimore with the Union army 
 between him and these points, but aimed so to manoeuvre as 
 to cause McCleUan to uncover them. With this view, he de- 
 signed, first of all, to move into Western Maryland and estab- 
 hsh his communications with Richmond through the Shenan- 
 doah Valley. Then, by a northward movement, menacing 
 Pennsylvania by the Cumberland Valley, he hoped to draw 
 the Union army so far towards the Susquehanna as to afford 
 him either an opportunity of seizing Baltimore or Washington, 
 or of deahng a damaging blow at the army far from its base 
 of supphes. His first movement from Frederick was, there- 
 fore, towards the western side of that mountain range which, 
 named the Blue Bidge south of the Potomac, and the South 
 Mountain range north of the Potomac, forms the eastern 
 wall of the Shenandoah and Cumberland valleys — the former 
 
 been in command of the reserve artillery on the Peninsula, relieved General 
 Barry as chief of artillery, and remained in that position till the close of the 
 war. General Plpasonton commanded the cavalry division. The army with 
 which McClellan set out on the Maryland campaign, made an aggregate of 
 eighty-five thousand men, of all arms. 
 
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 
 
 199 
 
 his line of communications with Richmond and the latter 
 liis line of manoeuvre towards Pennsylvania. 
 
 
 SCALE OF MILES 
 1 } ? 
 
 POINT OF ROCKS 
 
 SKETCH OP MANCEUVRES ON ANTIETAM. 
 
 Now, at the time Lee crossed the Potomac, the Federal 
 post at Harper's Ferry, commanding the debouclie of the 
 Shenandoah Valley, was held by a garrison of about nine 
 thousand men, under Colonel D. H. Miles, while a force of 
 twenty -five hundred men, under General White, did outpost 
 duty at Martinsburg and Winchester. These troops received 
 orders direct from General Halleck. 
 
 Lee had assumed that his advance on Frederick would 
 cause the immediate evacuation of Harper's Ferry* by the 
 
 * " It had been supposed that the advance upon Frederick would lead to the 
 evacuation of Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, thus opening the line of com- 
 munication through the Valley." — Lee's Report : Reports of the Army of North- 
 ern Virginia, vol. i., p. 28. 
 
200 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Union force, because that position, important as against a 
 menace by way of the Shenandoah Valley, became utterly 
 useless now that the Confederates were actually in Maryland ; 
 and the garrison, while subserving no piu'pose, was in immi- 
 nent danger of capture. In this anticipation, Lee had pro- 
 ceeded solely on a correct mihtary appreciation of what ought 
 to have been done ; and indeed General McClellan, who had 
 no control over this force, urged the evacuation of the post 
 the moment he learned Lee was across the Potomac. But 
 it was the whim of General Halleck to regard Harper's 
 Ferry as a point.per se and in any event of the first import- 
 ance to be held ; and he would listen to no proposition looking 
 to its abandonment. It is a rAnarkable illustration of the 
 mighty part played in war by what is called accident that 
 this gross act of folly which, as might have been expected, 
 resulted in the capture of the entire garrison of Harper's 
 Ferry, was, nevertheless, as will presently appear, a main 
 cause of the ultimate failure of the Confederate invasion. 
 
 Finding that, contrary to his expectation. Harper's Ferry 
 was not evacuated, it became necessary for Lee to dislodge 
 that force before concentrating his army west of the moun- 
 tains, and to this duty Jackson, with his own three divisions, 
 the two divisions of McLaws, and the division of Walker, was 
 assigned. Jackson was to proceed by way of Sharpsburg, 
 crossing the Potomac above Harper's Ferry, and, investing it 
 by the rear ; McLaws was to move by way of Middletown on 
 the direct route to the ferry, and seize the hills on the Mary- 
 land side known as Maryland Heights ; Walker was to cross 
 the Potomac below Harper's Ferry and take j)ossession of the 
 Loudon Heights. The advance was begun on the 10th : the 
 several commanders were all to be at their assigned positions 
 by the night of the 12th, cause the surrender by the following 
 morning, and immediately rejoin the remainder of the army, 
 with which Lee was to move to Boonsboro' or Hagerstown. 
 
 Up to the time of Lee's leaving Frederick, McClellan's 
 advance had been so tardy as to justify the Confederate com- 
 mander in the belief that the reduction of Harper's Ferry 
 
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 201 
 
 would be accomplished and his columns again concentrated 
 before he would be called upon to meet the Union army. 
 But this expectation was disappointed, and all Lee's plans for 
 ulterior operations in Maryland were thwarted by a piece of 
 good fortune that befell General McClellan at this time. 
 There accidentally fell into the hands of the Union com- 
 mander on the day of his arrival at Frederick a copy of Lee's 
 official order for the above movements of his troops, whereby 
 his whole plan was betrayed to his antagonist. Bistructed 
 of the project of his rival, McClellan immediately ordered a 
 rapid movement towards Harper's Ferry ; and Lee, unaware 
 of what had happened, suddenly found the Union army press- 
 ing forward with an unwonted rapidity that threatened to 
 disconcert all his plans. On the afternoon of the 13th, be- 
 fore Lee had received any word from Jackson, Stuart, who 
 with his troopers was covering the Confederate rear, reported 
 McClellan approaching the passes of South Mountain, and it 
 became evident that if he were allowed to force these, he 
 would be in position to strike Lee's divided columns, reheve 
 the garrison at Harper's Ferry, and put a disastrous termi- 
 nation to the Confederate campaign. Lee had not intended 
 to oppose any resistance to the passage of the South Moun- 
 tain, and had already moved to Boonsboro' and Hagerstown 
 to await Jackson's operations. But when the news of McClel- 
 lan's approach reached him, he instantly ordered Hill's divi- 
 sion back from Boonsboro' to guard the South Mountain 
 passes, and instructed Longstreet to countermarch from Ha- 
 gerstown to Hill's support. 
 
 McClellan, by his knowledge of Lee's movements, was so 
 perfectly master of the situation, and the stake was so great 
 as to authorize, indeed to demand, the very boldest action on 
 his part. He knew the imperilled condition of the garrison at 
 Harper's Ferry, w^hich had by this time been placed under his 
 control, and though its investment was the result of that ab- 
 surd poUcy that, against his protest and in violation of sound 
 miHtary principle, had retained it in an untenable position, 
 still he was bound to do his utmost to reheve it. McCleUan 
 
202 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 acted with energy but not witli the impetuosity called for. 
 If he had thrown forward his army with the Yigor used by 
 Jackson in his advance on Harper's Ferry, the passes of South 
 Mountain would have been carried before the evening of the 
 13th, at which time they were very feebly guarded, and then 
 debouching into Pleasant Valley, the Union commander 
 might next morning have fallen upon the rear of McLaws at 
 Maryland Heights, and relieved Harper's Ferry, which did 
 not surrender till the morning of the 15th. But he did not 
 arrive at South Mountain until the morning of the 14th; 
 and by that time the Confederates, forewarned of his ap- 
 proach, had recalled a considerable force to dispute the pas- 
 sage. 
 
 The hne of advance of the Union right and centre con- 
 ducted across South Mountain by Turner's Gap, that of the 
 left by Crampton's Gap, six miles to the southward. Frank- 
 lin's corps was moving towards the latter ; and Burnside's 
 command (the corps of Beno and Hooker) had the advance 
 by the former. The Confederate defence of Crampton's Pass 
 was left to McLaws, who was engaged in the investment of 
 Harper's Ferry from the side of Maryland Heights; but 
 Turner's Pass, as commanding the debouche of the main high- 
 way from Frederick westward, was committed to the com- 
 bined commands of Hill and Longstreet. This pass is a deep 
 gorge in the mountains, the crests of which on each side rise*to 
 the height of one thousand feet. The gap itself is unassailable ; 
 but there is a practicable road over the crest to the right of 
 the pass, and another to the left. The key-point of the whole 
 position is a rocky and precipitous peak which dominates the 
 ridge to the right of the pass. With a considerable force 
 this position is very defensible ; but when the advance of the 
 Union force reached the mountain, on the morning of the 
 14th, it was guarded only by D. H. Hill's division of five 
 thousand men. Beno's corps arrived near the pass early in 
 the forenoon ; but that officer directed all his efforts to the 
 assault of the crest on the left — the key-point being over- 
 looked. After a sharp fight Beno succeeded in dislodg- 
 
TBE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 203 
 
 iiig the Confederate brigade opposed to him, and estab- 
 Hshed his troops on the first ridge, but was unable to 
 push beyond.* The commanding importance of the ground 
 to the right of the pass soon developed itself, however, 
 and on the arrival of Hooker's corps in the middle of the 
 afternoon, he was directed to assault that position. By this 
 time Hill had been re-enforced by two divisions of Long- 
 street. The ridge to the north of the turnpike is divided into 
 a double crest by a ravine, and Hooker put in Meade's divi- 
 sion on the right, and Hatch's on the left ; Eickett's division 
 being held in reserve. The ground is very difficult for the 
 movement of troops, the hill-side being steep and rocky ; but 
 the advance was made with much spirit — the Hght-footed 
 skirmishers leaping and springing up the slopes and ledges with 
 the nimbleness of the coney. It was found that, owing to the 
 precipitous figure of the mountain sides, the hostile artillery 
 did Httle hurt ; but the Confederate riflemen, fighting behind 
 rocks and trees and stone walls, opposed a persistent re- 
 sistance. They were, however, forced back, step by step ; and 
 by dark, Hooker's troops had carried the crest on the right 
 of the gap. Now, as simultaneous with this. Gibbon with his 
 brigade had worked his way by the main road well up 
 towards the top of the pass, and as Keno's corps had gained 
 a firm foothold on the crest to the left of the pass, it seemed 
 that the position was carried ; and though it was by this 
 time too dark to push through to the western side of the 
 mountain, yet the whole army was up, and with the position 
 secured would in the morning force an issue by its own press- 
 ure. Yet these successes were not gained without a heavy 
 sacrifice. Fifteen hundred men were killed and wounded in 
 this severe struggle, and among those who fell was General 
 Keno, commander of the Ninth Corps, an able and respected 
 
 * The Confederate brigade opposed to Reno was under General Garland, 
 who was killed early in the action. " Garland's brigade," says General Hill, 
 " was much demoralized by Ms fall, and the rough handling it had received ; 
 and had the Yankees pressed vigorously forward, the road might have been 
 gained." — Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 113. 
 
204 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AKMT OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 officer. The Confederate loss was above three thousand men, 
 whereof fifteen hundred were prisoners. 
 
 The action at South Mountain deservedly figures as a bril- 
 liant afi'air ; and the only adverse comment that may be made 
 thereon will turn on the tardiness in commencing the attack ; 
 for, with a more vigorous condiict on the part of General 
 Burnside, he might have forced the pass during the forenoon, 
 while yet defended only by Hill's small force ; and notwith- 
 standing the previous delay, this would still have put Mc- 
 Clellan in position to succor Harper's Ferry. 
 
 During the contest at Turner's Gap, Franklin was strug- 
 gling to force the passage of the ridge at Crampton's Pass, de- 
 fended by a part of the force of McLaws, who was then en- 
 gaged in the investment of Harper's Ferry.* The position 
 here was similar to that at Turner's Gap, and the operations 
 were of a like kind. Forming his troops with Slocum's di- 
 vision on the right of the road and Smith's on the left, 
 Franklin advanced his line, driving the Confederates from 
 their position at the base of the mountain, where they were 
 protected by a stone wall, and forced them back up the slope 
 of the mountain to near its summit, where, after an action of 
 three hours, the crest was carried.t Four hundred prisoners, 
 seven hundred stand of arms, one piece of artillery, and three 
 colors were captured in this spirited action. Franklin's total 
 loss was five hundred and thirty-two, and the corps rested on 
 its arms, with its advance thrown forward into Pleasant 
 Valley. During the night, the Confederates at Turner's Gap 
 
 * Crampton's Pass debouches into Pleasant Valley directly in the rear of 
 and but five miles from Maryland Heights, opposite Harper's Ferry. McLaws 
 on learning the approach of the Union force, and seeing the danger of this attack 
 in his rear, sent back General Cobb, with three brigades, instructing him to 
 hold Crampton's Pass until the work at Harper's Ferry should be completed, 
 " even if he lost his last man in doing it." McLaws' Report : Reports of the 
 Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 165. 
 
 f Slocum's line, on the right, formed of Bartlett's andTorbett'a brigades, sup- 
 ported by Newton, carried the crest. Smith's line, formed of Brooks' and Irwin's 
 brigades, was disposed for the protection of Slocum's flank, and charged up the 
 mountain simultaneously. The brunt of the action fell upon Bartlett's command. 
 
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 205 
 
 withdrew, and the Union right and centre in the morning 
 passed through to the west side of the mountain. 
 
 If not too late, McClellan was now in a position to succor 
 the garrison at Harper's Ferry, whose situation was one of 
 almost tragic interest.* But by a hapless conjuncture, on 
 the very morning that the army broke through the South 
 Mountain, and was in position to relieve the beleaguered 
 force, it was surrendered by its commandei-. I shall briefly 
 detail the circumstances under which this took place. 
 
 Lea\ing Frederick on the 10th, Jackson made a very rapid 
 march by way of Middletown, Boonsboro', and Williamsport, 
 and on the following day crossed the Potomac into Vir- 
 ginia, at a ford near the latter place. Disposing his forces so 
 that there shoiild be no escape for the garrison from that 
 side, he moved down towards Harper's Ferry. On his ap- 
 proach. General White wdth the garrison of Martinsburg 
 evacuated that place, and retired to Harper's Ferry, the rear 
 of which, at Bolivar Heights, Jackson reached on the 13th, 
 and immediately proceeded to put himseK in communication 
 with Walker and McLaws, who were respectively to co-op • 
 erate in the investment from Loudon and Maryland heights. 
 Walker was already in position on Loudon Heights, and 
 McLaws was working his w-ay up Maryland Heights. The 
 latter position is the key-point to Harper's Ferry, as a brief 
 description will show. 
 
 The Elk Eidge, running north and south across parts of 
 Maryland and Virginia, is rifted in twain by the Potomac, 
 and the cleavage leaves on each side a bold and lofty abut- 
 ment of rock. Maryland Heights is the name given the steep 
 on the north bank, and Loudon Heights the steep on the 
 south bank. Between Loudon Heights and Harper's Ferry 
 the Shenandoah breaks into the Potomac, and to the rear of 
 
 * To convey to Colonel Miles tlie information that the army was coming to 
 his relief, lie sent repeated couriers to run the gauntlet of the investing lines, 
 and all along the march he fired signal guns to announce the progress of hia 
 approach. 
 
206 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 the ferry is a less bold ridge, named Bolivar Heights, which 
 falls off in graceful undulations southward into the Yalley 
 of the Shenandoah. The picturesque httle village of Har- 
 per's Ferry hes nestling in the basin formed by these three 
 heights, which tower into an almost Alpine sublimity. A line 
 drawn from any one mountain-top to either of the others must 
 be two miles in stretch; yet rifle-cannon crowning these 
 heights can easily throw their projectiles from each to other — 
 a sort of Titanic game of bowls which Mars and cloud-com- 
 pelling Jove might carry on in sportive mood. But the 
 Maryland Height is the Saul of the triad of giant mountains, 
 and far o'ertops its fellows. Of course, it completely com- 
 mands Harper's Ferry, into which a plunging fire even of 
 musketry can be had from it. "While therefore Harper's 
 Ferry is itself the merest m.ihtary trap, lying as it does at 
 the bottom of this rocky funnel, yet the Maryland Height is 
 a strong position, and if its rearward slope were held by a 
 determined even though small force, it would be very hard 
 and hazardous to assail. 
 
 Colonel Miles, in the distribution of his command, had 
 posted on Maryland Heights a force under Colonel Ford, re- 
 taining the bulk of his troops in Harper's Ferry. This was 
 a faulty disposition. He should have evacuated the latter 
 place, and transferred his whole force to Maryland Heights, 
 which he could readily have held till McClellan came up. 
 Under his instructions from General Halleck, he was bound, 
 however, to hold Harper's Ferry to the last extremity, and, 
 interpreting this order literally as applying to the town itself, 
 he refused to take this step when urged to it by his sub- 
 ordinates. But what was worse, Ford, after opposing a very 
 feeble and unskilful resistance to McLaws' attack on the 
 13th, retired to Harper's Ferry, spiking his guns and top- 
 pling them down the declivity. Thus Maryland Heights 
 was abandoned altogether. McLaws succeeded in dragging 
 some pieces up the rugged steep, and Jackson and Walker 
 being already in position, the investment of Harper's Ferry 
 was by the morning of the 14th complete. The Bolivar and 
 
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 207 
 
 LoTidon lieights were crowned with artillery during the day, 
 and at dawn of the IStli the three cooperating forces opened 
 fii-e upon the garrison. They were already doomed men ; and 
 in two hours or less the white flag was raised in token of sur- 
 I'ender. 
 
 The actual surrender was inade by General White, Colonel 
 Miles having been mortally wounded in the operations attend- 
 ing the reduction of the place. 
 
 Jackson received the capitulation of eleven thousand men, 
 and came into possession of seventy-three pieces of artillery, 
 thii'teen thousand small-arms, and a large quantity of mili- 
 tary stores. But leaving the details to be arranged by his 
 lieutenant, General Hill (A. P.), the swift-footed Jackson turned 
 his back on the prize he had secured, and headed towards 
 Maryland to unite with Lee, who was eagerly awaiting his 
 arrival at SharjDsburg. 
 
 The successful lodgment McClellan had gained on the crest 
 of South Mountain by the night of the 14th admonished Lee 
 that he might no longer hope to hold Turner's Pass. He 
 therefore withdrew Longstreet and D. H. Hill across Pleasant 
 Valley and over Elk Ridge into the yalley beyond — the valley 
 of the Antietam. In the morning McClellan passed through 
 his right and centre and took position at Boonsboro'. Mean- 
 time, Franklin, having the night previously swept away the 
 adverse force, passed through Crampton's Pass and debouched 
 into Pleasant Yalley in the rear of McLaws. This seemed a 
 favorable opportunity to destroy that force, which was isolated 
 from all the rest of Lee's army ; but, appreciating his danger, 
 the Confederate officer, in the morning, withdrew all his force 
 from Maryland Heights, with the exception of a single regi- 
 ment, and formed his troops in battle order across Pleasant 
 Valley to resist any sudden attack, and before Franklin could 
 make his dispositions to strike, the garrison at Harper's Ferry 
 had surrendered. This left free exit for McLaws, who skil 
 fully retired down the Valley towards the Potomac, which he 
 repassed at Harper's Ferry, and by a detour by way of Shep- 
 herdstown joined Lee at Sharpsburg. 
 
208 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Upon tlie retirement of the Confederates on the morning of 
 the 15th, McClellan pushed forward his whole army in pur- 
 suit ; but after a few miles' march, the heads of the columns 
 were brought to a sudden halt at Antietam Creek, a rivulet 
 that, running obliquely to the course of the Potomac, empties 
 into it six miles above Harper's Ferry. On the heights 
 crowning the west bank of this stream, Lee, with what force 
 he had in hand, took his stand to oppose McClellan's pursuit, 
 and form a point of concentration for his scattered columns. 
 
 n. 
 
 THE BATTLE OP ANTIETAM. 
 
 Whatever ulterior purposes Lee may have had touching 
 the prosecution of the Maryland invasion, affairs had so 
 worked together that it had become now absolutely necessary 
 for him to stand and give battle. Whether he designed aban- 
 doning the aggressive and repassing the Potomac, or pur- 
 posed manoeuvring by the line of Western Maryland towards 
 Pennsylvania, he was obliged first of all to take up a position 
 on which he might unite his divided forces, closely pressed by 
 the advancing Union columns, and receive the attack of his 
 antagonist. The circumstances were such that a battle would 
 necessarily decide the issue of the invasion. 
 
 It was late in the afternoon of the 15th when the Army of 
 the Potomac drew up on the left bank of Antietam Creek, 
 on the opposite side of which the Confederate infantry was 
 seen ostentatiously displayed. The day passed in observa- 
 tion of the position, and next morning that portion of the 
 Confederate force that had been engaged in the investment 
 of Harper's Ferry rejoined Lee. The Confederate com- 
 mander formed his troops on a line stretched across the 
 angle formed by the Potomac and Antietam ; and as the Poto- 
 mac here makes a sharp curve, Lee was able to rest both 
 
MAP OF THE 
 
 ©ATTLi @r Tm& A\NJ T I iTA\MJ 
 
 FoTigKt Sept. 16 & 17th 1862 . 
 
 E/ynued fbr'Cwnpauins of the Amu/ ofthe. Potomac ' 
 . Scale of MiZes. „ 
 
 L^nion Troops 
 
 Confederate Troops. 
 
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 209 
 
 flanks on that stream, while his fi'ont was covered by the 
 Antietam, The Confederate line was drawn in front of the 
 town of Sharpsburg — Longstreet's command being placed on 
 the right of the road from Sharpsburg to Boonsboro', and 
 D. H. Hill's command on the left. From Sharpsburg a turn- 
 pike runs northward across the Potomac to Hagerstown, fi'om 
 which direction the position might be turned ; and to guard 
 against this, Hood's two brigades were placed on the left. 
 Jackson's command was placed in reserve near the left. The 
 16th saw the whole Confederate force concentrated at Sharps- 
 burg, except the divisions of McLaws, Anderson, and A. P. 
 Hill, which had not yet returned from Harper's Ferry. So 
 greatly had the Confederate army become reduced by its pre- 
 vious losses and by straggling, that Lee was unable to count, 
 above forty thousand bayonets. 
 
 In this vicinity, the Antietam is crossed by four stone 
 bridsres ; but three of these were covered bv the hostile front, 
 and so guarded as to forbid the hope of forcing a direct 
 passage. McClcllan therefore determined to throw his right 
 across the creek by an upper and unguarded bridge, beyond 
 the Confederate left flank, and when this manoeuvre should 
 have shaken the enemy, the centre and left were to carry the 
 bridges in their front. Porter's corps was posted on the left 
 of the turnpike, opposite Bridge No. 2 ; Burnside's Ninth 
 Corps on the Rohrersville and Sharpsburg turnpike, directly 
 in front of Bridge No. 3. The turning movement was iur 
 trusted to Hooker's corps, to be followed by Sumner's two 
 corps. The examination of the ground, and the posting of 
 troops, and of artillery to silence the fire of the enemy's guns 
 on the opposite side of the Antietam, occupied the hours of 
 the 16th till the afternoon, — a lively artillery duel being, 
 meanwhile, waged between the opposing batteries.* Then, 
 
 * The Union batteries were tliose of Taft, Langner, Von Kleizer, and 
 Weaver, placed on the ridge on the east side of the Antietam, between the 
 turnpike bridge and the house occupied as general headquarters (Pry's). 
 The practice of these batteries was excellent, and their superiority over the 
 
 14 
 
210 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 towards tlio middle of tlie afternoon, Hooker's corps was put 
 in motion, and crossed the stream at the upper bridge and 
 ford, out of range of the hostile fire. Advancing through the 
 woods, Hooker soon struck the left flank of the Confederate 
 line, held by Hood's two brigades. Lee had anticipated a 
 menace on that flank, and had made his dispositions 
 accordingly, — Hood's brigades forming a crotchet on the Con- 
 federate left.* It was towards dusk when the troops of 
 Hooker and Hood met ; and after a smart skirmish between 
 the Confederates and the division of Pennsylvania Reserves 
 under General Meade, the opj)osing forces rested on their 
 arms for the night, both occupying a skirt of woods which 
 forms the eastern and northern inclosure of a considerable 
 clearing on both sides of the Hagerstown road. 
 
 This movement across the Antietam on the 16th was of no 
 advantage : it was made too late in the day to accomplish 
 any thing, and it served to disclose to Lee his antagonist's 
 purpose. The Confederate commander made no change in 
 his dispositions, save to order Jackson, who lay in reserve in 
 the rear of the left, to substitute a couple of his brigades in 
 the room of Hood's worn-out command. General McClellan 
 strengthened the turning column by directing Sumner to 
 throw over, during the night, the Twelfth Corps under 
 General Mansfield to the supj)ort of Hooker ; and he ordered 
 Sumner to hold his own corps (the Second) in readiness to 
 cross early in the morning. 
 
 At the first dawn of the 17th the combat was opened by 
 Hooker, who assailed the Confederate left, now held by 
 
 Confederate artillery was soon apparent. Of tliis there is a very frank con- 
 fession in the Report of General D. H. Hill : " An artillery duel between the 
 Washington (New Orleans) Artillery and the Yankee batteries across the 
 Antietam on the 16th was the most melancholy farce in the war. They 
 could not cope with the Yankee guns." — Reports of the Army of Northern 
 Virginia, vol. ii., p. 119. 
 
 * " In anticipation of a movement to turn the line of Antietam, Hood's two 
 brigades had been transferred from the right to the left, and posted between 
 D. H. Hill and the Hagerstown road." — Lee : Reports of the Army of Northern 
 Virginia, vol. i., p. 33. 
 
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 211 
 
 Jackson's force. The ground on which the battle opened was 
 the same field on which the action continued to be waged 
 during the day ; and it has already been indicated in that 
 opening extending to the east and west of the Hagerstown 
 road bounded on each side by woods. In the fringe of forest 
 on the eastern side of the road, Hooker had the previous 
 evening effected a lodgment, though morning found the Con- 
 federate riflemen still clinging to its margin, while the main 
 force of Jackson lay in the low timbered ground on the west 
 side of the road,* where the Confederate troops were pretty 
 well protected by outcropping ledges of rock. But though it 
 had this tactical advantage for the defence, the position was 
 really untenable ; for it was completely commanded and seen 
 in reverse by high ground a little to the right of where 
 Hooker formed his line of battle. This height was the key- 
 point of all that part of the field, and had it been occupied by 
 Union batteries, as it should have been, the low timbered 
 ground around the Dunker church where Jackson's line lay 
 could not have been held fifteen minutes. It is a noteworthy 
 fact, tha*fc neither General Hooker, nor General Sumner who 
 followed him in command on this part of the field, at all 
 appreciated the supreme importance of this point.f The 
 former, beginning the combat, opened a direct attack with 
 the view of carrying the Hagerstown road and the woods on 
 the west side of it ; and this continued to be the aim of all 
 the subsequent attacks, which were made very much in detail, 
 and thus lost the effective character they might have had 
 with more comprehensive dispositions. 
 
 Hooker formed his corps of fourteen thousand men, with 
 Doubleday's division on the right, Meade's in the centre, and 
 Kicketts' on the left. Jackson opposed him with two divi- 
 sions, Ewell's division being advanced to command the open 
 ground, while the Stonewall division lay in reserve in the 
 
 * This road will be noted, in the accompanying sketch, as that on the mar- 
 gin of which stands what is known as the " Dunker church." 
 
 f It is equally remarkable that its importance was overlooked by the Con 
 federates until several hours after the action opened. 
 
212 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 woodland on the west side of the Hagerstown road. His en- 
 tire force present numbered four thousand men — a great dis- 
 proportion of numbers.* After an hour's bloody "bush- 
 whacking," Hooker's troops succeeded in clearing the hither 
 woods of the three Confederate brigades, which retired in 
 disorder across the open fields, with a loss of half their re- 
 duced numbers.t The Union batteries on the opposite bank 
 of the Antietam had secured an enfilade fire on Jackson's ad- 
 vanced and reserve line, and, together with the batteries in 
 front, inflicted severe loss on the enemy. Hooker then ad- 
 vanced his centre under Meade to seize the Hagerstown road 
 and the woods beyond. In attempting to execute this move- 
 ment, the troops came under a very severe fire fi'om Jackson's 
 reserve division, which, joined by the two brigades of Hood 
 
 * Incredible thoiigh tliis return of the strength of Jackson's two divisions 
 may appear, it is vouched for by oflScial evidence. So reduced had his num- 
 bers become by the heavy losses of the campaign, and by the great straggling 
 that attended the march through Maryland, that Jackson's old (Stonewall) 
 division numbered but ono thousand six hundred men. General J. R. Jones, 
 who commanded this division at Antietam, says of it : " The division was re 
 duced to the numbers of a small brigade, and, at the beginning of the fight, 
 numbered not over one thousand six hundred men." — Reports of the Army of 
 Northern Virginia, vol. ii., pp. 223, 223. Of the number of the three brigades of 
 Ewell's division holding the advanced line, General Early, who, at a subse 
 quent part of the day, came into command of it, reports as follows : Lawton's 
 brigade, one thousand one hundred and fifty ; Hayes' brigade, five hundred and 
 fifty ; Walker's brigade, seven hundred. This would make a total for the two 
 divisions of four thousand men — the number above given. 
 
 f " The terrible nature of the conflict in which these brigades had been en- 
 gaged, and the steadiness with which they maintained their ]?osition, is shown 
 by the losses they sustained. They did not retire fi'om the field until General 
 Lawton (commanding division) had been wounded and borne from the field ; 
 Colonel Douglas, commanding Lawton's brigade, had been killed ; and the 
 brigade had sustained a loss of five hundred and fiftj'-four killed and wounded 
 out of one thousand one hundred and fift}', losing five regimental commanders 
 out of six. Hayes' brigade had sustained a loss of three hundred and twenty- 
 three out of five hundred and fifty, including every regimental commander and 
 all of his staff; and Colonel Walker and one of his staff had been disabled, and 
 the brigade he was commanding had sustained a loss of two hundred and 
 twenty-eight out of less than seven hiandred jjresent, including three out of foul 
 regimental commanders." — Ibid., pp. 190, 191. 
 
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 213 
 
 that had moved up in support, issued from the woods, and 
 threw back Meade's line, which was much broken. At tho 
 same time, Ricketts' division on the left became hotly en- 
 gaged with three brigades of HiU's division, which were at 
 this time closed up on the right of Jackson in support ; and 
 Hooker's right division, under Doubleday, was held in check 
 by the fire of several batteries of Stuart's horse-artillery 
 posted on commanding ground on his right and front. 
 
 Hooker had suffered severely by the enemy's fire ; but, 
 worse still, had lost nearly haK his effective force by strag- 
 gling.* In this state of facts, his offensive power was com- 
 pletely gone ; and, at seven o'clock, Mansfield's corjos, which 
 had crossed the Antietam during the night and lay in reserve 
 a mile to the rear, was ordered up to support and relieve 
 Hooker's trooj)S. Of this corps, the first division, under Gen- 
 eral Wilhams, took position on the right, and the second, 
 under General Greene, on the left. During the deployment, 
 that veteran soldier. General Mansfield, fell mortally wounded. 
 The command of the corps fell to General Yv'illiams, and the 
 division of the latter to General Crawford, who, with his own 
 and Gordon's brigade, made an advance across the open field, 
 and succeeded iu seizing a point of woods on the west side of 
 the Hagerstown road. At the same time, Greene's division 
 on the left was able to clear its front, and crossed into the left 
 of the Dunker church. Yet the holding of the positions was 
 attended with heavy loss ; the troops, reduced to the attempt 
 to hold theu" own, began to waver and break, and General 
 Hooker was being carried from the field severely wounded, 
 when, opportunely, towards nine o'clock, General Sumner 
 with his o^vn corps reached the field.f 
 
 * McCleUan : Report ; Meade : Report. 
 
 f Of tlae extraordinary statement respecting tliis part of tlie battle made by 
 General Hooker, in liis evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the 
 War, it must be said, at least, that it is not justified by facts : "At that time 
 [nine o'clock]," says he, "my troops were in the finest spirit: they had 
 whipped Jackson, and compelled the enemy to fly, throwing away their arms, 
 their banners, and saving themselves as best they could." (Report, vol. i., p, 
 
214 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 The battle liad now declared itself with great obstinacy be- 
 tween the Union right and Confederate left Avithout having 
 burst forth on any other part of the line. The action was 
 fought very much in detail by both sides— each, as from time 
 to time re-enforcements reached it, being able to claim a 
 partial success. Hooker, after driving one of Jackson's divi- 
 sions, was in turn forced back by the other ; and Mansfield's 
 corps, having caused this to retreat, found itself overmastered 
 by the fresh battalions of Hood.* The combat, though very 
 murderous to each side, had been quite indecisive. It v>^as in 
 this situation of affairs that Sumner's force reached the 
 ground; and it seemed at first that this preponderance of 
 weight thrown into the Union scale would give it the victory. 
 The troops of Jackson and Hood had been so severely pun- 
 ished as to leave little available fight in them ; so that, when 
 Sumner threw Sedgwick's divisions on his right across the 
 open field into the woods opposite — the woods in which 
 Crawford had been fighting — he easily drove the shattered 
 Confederate troops before him, and held definitive possession 
 of the woods around the Dunker church. At the same time, 
 Sumner advanced French's division on what had hitherto 
 been the left, and Richardson's division still further to the 
 left to oppose the Confederate centre under Hill. Eichardson 
 
 681.) Now not only is this contradicted by the facts above recited, and which 
 are derived from the reports of both sides ; but General Sumner, wlio at the 
 time spoken of by General Hooker reached the field, says : " On going upon 
 the field I found that General Hooker's corps had been dispersed and routed. 
 I passed him some distance in the rear, where he had been carried wounded, 
 but I saw nothing of his corps at all as I was advancing with my command on 
 the field. I sent one of my staff-ofiicers to find where they were, and General 
 Ricketts, the only officer we could find, stated that he could not raise three 
 hundred men of the corps." Sumner : Evidence on Antietam, vol. i., p. 368. 
 
 * General Sumner afterwards held the following language in regard to 
 these partial attacks : " I have always believed that, instead of sending these 
 troops into that action in driblets, had General McClellan authorized me to 
 march these forty thousand on the left flank of the enemy, we could not have 
 failed to throw them right back in front of the other divisions of our army 
 on the left."— Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 368. 
 
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 215 
 
 had got handsomely to work, and French had cleared his 
 front, when disaster again fell on the fatal right. At the 
 moment that Sedgwick appeared to grasp victory in his 
 hands, and the troops of Jackson and Hood were retiring in 
 disorder,* two Confederate divisions, under McLaws and 
 Walker, taken from the Confederate right, reached the field 
 on the left, and immediately turned the fortunes of the day.t 
 A considerable interval had been left between Sumner's right 
 division under Sedgwick and his centre division under French. 
 Through this the enemy penetrated, enveloping Sedgwick's 
 left flank, and, pressing heavily at the same time on his front, 
 forced him out of the woods on the west side of the Hagers- 
 town road, and back across the open field and into the woods 
 on the east side of the road — the original position held in the 
 morning. I The Confederates, content with dislodging the 
 Union troops, made no attempt to follow up their advantage, 
 but retii'ed to tlieir original position also. 
 
 "We must now look a little to Sumner's other divisions — to 
 French and Richardson on his centre and left. When the 
 pressui-e on Sedgwick became the hardest, Sumner sent 
 orders to French to attack, as a diversion in favor of the 
 former. French obeyed, with the brigades of Kimball and 
 
 * Jackson admits ttat his troops had " fallen back some distance to the 
 rear" (Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 104) ; but the re- 
 ports of the commanders that came upon the ground to take the place of his 
 troops give this " falling back" the character of a disorderly rout. 
 
 f The fact that it was the oncoming of these divisions that decided the 
 action on Sumner's right is plainly marked by the time of their arrival, which 
 is put down in aU the Confederate reports at ten o'clock. Sumner's corps had 
 arrived at nine. 
 
 X Of this attack, McLaws says : " The troops were immediately engaged, 
 driving the enemy before them in magnificent style, at all points, sweeping the 
 woods with perfect ease. They were driven not only through the woods, but 
 over a field in front of the woods, and over two high fences beyond, and into 
 another body of woods over half a mile distant from the commencement of the 
 fight."— Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 170. See also 
 reports of his brigade commanders — Semnes, Ibid., p. 349 ; Barksdale, p. 351 ,• 
 Kershaw, p. 353. 
 
216 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Weber, and succeeded in forcing back tlie enemy to a sunken 
 road which runs almost at right angles with the Hagerstown 
 road. This position was held bj the division of T>. H, Hill, 
 three of whose brigades had been advanced to assist Jackson 
 in his morning attacks ; and it was these that were assailed 
 by French and driven back in disorder to the sunken road.* 
 Uniting here with the other brigades of Hill, they received 
 the attacks both of French and of Richardson's division to 
 his left. 
 
 The latter division was composed of the brigades of 
 Meagher, Caldwell, and Brooke. Meagher first attacked, and 
 fought his way to the possession of a crest overlooking the 
 sunken road in which Hill's hne was posted. After sustaining 
 a severe musketry fire, by which it lost severely, this brigade, 
 its ammunition being expended, was relieved by the brigade 
 of Caldwell — the former breaking by companies to the rear, 
 and the latter by companies to the fi-ont. Caldwell immedi- 
 ately became engaged in a very determined combat, and was 
 supported by part of Brooke's brigade, the rest of the latter 
 being posted on the right to thwart an effort on the part of 
 the enemy to flank in that direction. The action here was of 
 a very animated nature ; for Hill, being re-enforced by the 
 division of Anderson,t assumed a vigorous offensive, and en- 
 deavored to seize a piece of high groiuid on the Union left, 
 
 * Tliese brigades were respectively those of Colquitt, Ripley, and McRae ; 
 and General Hill mentions the following curious circumstance as the cause of 
 the repulse that befell them : " The men advanced with alacrity, secured a 
 good position, and were fighting bravely, when Captain Thompson, Fifth North 
 Carolina, cried out, ' They are flanking us !' This cry spread like an electric 
 shock along the ranks, bringing up vivid recollections of the flank fire at South 
 Mountain. In a moment they broke and fell to the rear. Efibrts were made 
 to rally them in the bed of an oki road, nearly at right angles to the Hagers- 
 town pike, and which had been their position previous to the advance." — Re 
 ports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 115. 
 
 f " In the mean time. General R. H. Anderson reported to me with some 
 three or four thousand men as re-enforcements to my command. I directed 
 him to form immediately behind my men." — Hill : Reports of the Army of 
 Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 116. 
 
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 217 
 
 with tlie view of turning that flank. This manoeuvre was, 
 however, frustrated by the skill and promptitude of Colonel 
 Cross of the Fifth New Hampshire (Caldwell's brigade), who, 
 detecting the danger, moved his regiment towards the men- 
 aced point. Between his command and the Confederate force 
 there then ensued a spirited contest— each endeavoring to 
 reach the high ground, and both dehvering their fire as they 
 marched in parallel lines by the flank.* The race was won 
 by Cross. The effort to flank on the right was handsomely 
 checked by Brooke, French, and Barlow— the latter of whom, 
 changing fi'ont with his two regiments obhquely to the right, 
 poui-ed in a rapid fire, compelling the surrender of three 
 hundred prisoners with two standards. A vigorous direct 
 attack was then made, and the troops succeeded in carrying 
 the sunken road and the position, in advance, around what is 
 known as Piper's House, wdiich, being a defensible building, 
 formed, with its surroundings, the citadel of the enemy's 
 strength at this part of the line. The enemy was so much 
 disorganized in this repulse that only a iew hundred men 
 w^ere ralhed on a crest near the Hagerstown road. This shght 
 array formed the whole Confederate centre ; and there is httle 
 doubt that a more energetic following up of the success 
 gained would have carried this position and fatally divided 
 Lee's wings.f The few Confederates showed a very bold 
 front, however, and, deceived by this, Eichardson contented 
 
 * Report of Eicliardson's division. (This report is made by General Han- 
 cock, who Avas assigned to the command on the field- of Antietam— General 
 Eichardson having been mortally wounded during the forenoon.) 
 
 f This inference is strongly j ustified by the evidence of the Confederate re- 
 ports. General Hill says: "There were no troops near to hold the centre 
 except a few himdred rallied from various brigades. The Yankees crossed the 
 old road, which we had occupied in the morning, and occupied an orchard and 
 cornfield in advance of it. Affairs looked very critical. They had now got 
 witliin a few hundred yards of the hill which commanded Sliarpsburg and our 
 rear. I was satisfied, however, that the Yankees were so demoralized that a 
 single regiment of fresh men could drive the whole of them in our front across 
 the Antietam. I got up about two hundred men, who said that they were will- 
 ing to advance to the attack if I would lead them. We met, however, with a 
 
218 CAJMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOiMAC. 
 
 himself Avitli taking up a position to hold what was abeady 
 won. 
 
 Three out of the six corps of the Army of the Potomac, 
 and they the strongest, had thus been drawn into the seeth- 
 ing vortex of action on the right ; and each in succession, 
 while exacting heavy damage of the enemy, had been so pun- 
 ished as to lose all offensive energy ; so that noon found them 
 simply holding their own. Porter with his small reserve 
 corps, numbering some fifteen thousand men, held the centre, 
 while Burnside remained inactive on the left, not having yet 
 passed the Antietam.* Now, between twelve and one o'clock, 
 Franldin with two divisions of his corps, under Slocum and 
 W. P. Smith (Couch remaining behind to occupy Maryland 
 Heights), reached the field of battle, from where the action at 
 Crampton's Pass had left him. General McClellan had de- 
 signed retaining Franklin on the east side of the Antietam, 
 to operate on either flank or on the centre, as cu'cumstances 
 might require. But by the- time he neared the field, the 
 strong opposition developed by the attacks of Hooker and 
 Sumner rendered it necessary for him to be immediately 
 pushed over the creek to the assistance of the right, f The 
 arrival of Pranklin was opportune, for Lee had now accu- 
 mulated so heavily on his left, and the repulse of Sumner's 
 right under Sedgwick had been so easily effected, that the 
 enemy began to show a disposition to resume the offensive — 
 directing his efforts against that still loose-jointed portion of 
 Sumner's harness, between his right and centre. General 
 
 warm reception, and the little command was broken and dispersed. Colonel 
 Iverson had gathered up about two hundred men, and I sent them to the right 
 to attack the Yankees in flank. They drove theiu back a short distance, but, 
 in turn, were repulsed. These two attacks, however, had a most happy effect. 
 The Yankees were completely deceived by their boldness, and induced to be- 
 lieve that there was a large force in our centre." — Reports of the Army of 
 Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 117. 
 
 ■* The left of Sumner's command was sustained by Pleasonton's cavalry di- 
 vision and the horse batteries, to whose support most of Sykes' division 
 (Porter's corps) in the afternoon crossed the Antietam 
 
 f McClellan : Report, pp. 385, 386. 
 
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 219 
 
 Smith, with quick perception of the needs of the case, of his 
 own accord filled up this interval with a part of his division ; 
 and his third brigade, under Colonel Irwin, charged forward 
 with much impetuosity, and drove back the advance until 
 abreast the Dunker church. Though Irwin could not hold 
 what he had wrested from the Confederates, his boldness, 
 seconded by another charge made soon after by the Seventh 
 Maine Regiment alone, served to queU the enemy's aggressive 
 ardor. Franklin then formed the rest of his available force 
 in a column of assault, with the intent to make another effort 
 to gain the enemy's stronghold in the rocky woodland west 
 of the Hagerstown turnpike — the woods Hooker had striven 
 for, and Sumner had snatched and lost. But Sumner having 
 command on the right, now intervened to postpone further 
 operations on that flank, as he judged the repulse of the only 
 remaining corps available for attack would peril the safety of 
 the whole army.* 
 
 It is now necessary to look to the other end of the Union 
 line, held by the Ninth Corps under Burnside. This force 
 lay massed behind the heights on the east bank of the 
 Antietam, and opposite the Confederate right, which it was 
 designed he should assail after forcing the passage of the 
 Antietam by the lower stone-bridge. The part assigned to 
 General Burnside was of the highest importance, for a 
 successful attack by him upon the Confederate right would, 
 by carrjdng the Sharpsburg crest, force Lee from his line of 
 retreat by way of Shepherdstown. General McClellan, ap- 
 preciating the full effect of an attack by his left, directed 
 Burnside early in the morning to hold his troops in readinessf 
 to assault the bridge in his front. Then, at eight o'clock, on 
 learning how much opposition had been developed by Hooker, 
 he ordered Burnside to carry the bridge, gain possession of 
 
 * Franklin : Report of Antietam. 
 
 f "Early on the morning of the 17th, I ordered General Burnside to form 
 Jiis troops and hold them in readiness to assault the bridge in his front and to 
 await farther orders." — McClellan : Report, p. 389. 
 
220 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 the lieiglits, and advance along their crest upon SharpsLurg,* 
 as a diversion in favor of the right. Burnside's tentatives 
 were frivolous in their character ; and hour after hour went 
 by, during which the need of his assistance became more and 
 more imperative, and McClellan's commands more and more 
 urgent. Five hours, in fact, passed, and the action on the 
 right had been concluded in such manner as has been seen, 
 before the work that should have been done in the morning 
 was accompKshed. Encouraged by the ease with which the 
 left of the Union force was held in check, Lee was free to 
 remove two-thirds of the right wing under Longstreet — 
 namely, the divisions of McLaws and Walker — and this force 
 he applied at the point of actual conflict on his left, where, 
 as has already been seen, the arrival of these divisions served 
 to check Sumner in his career of victory, and hurl back Sedg- 
 wick. This step the Confederate commander never would 
 have ventured on had there been any vigor displayed on the 
 part of the confronting force ; yet this heavy detachment 
 having been made from the hostile right, should have ren- 
 dered the task assigned to General Burnside one of com- 
 parative ease, for it left on that entire wing but a single hos- 
 tile division of twenty-five hundred men under General Jones, 
 and the force actually present to dispute the passage of the 
 bridge did not exceed four hundred. t Nevertheless, it was 
 one o'clock, and after the action on the right had been deter- 
 mined, before a passage was effected ; and this being done, 
 two hours passed before the attack of the crest was made.:}: 
 
 * McClellan : Report, p. 390. 
 
 f These statements, surprising tliougli they may seem, are not made at 
 random, but rest on a sure basis of oflBcial evidence. General. Jones, who 
 commanded the entire riglit, says : " Wlien it is known that on that morning 
 my whole command of six brigades, comprised only two thousand four hun- 
 dred and thirt}^ men, the enormous dis£)arity of force Avith which I contended 
 can be seen." — Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 219. 
 The force covering the bridge-head consisted of two regiments under General 
 Toombs, numbering four hundred and three men. — Ibid. 
 
 :): " Though the bridge and upper ford were thus left open to the enemy, he 
 moved with such extreme caution and slowness, that he lost nearly two hours 
 
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 221 
 
 This was successfully executed at tliree o'clock, the Shai-ps- 
 burg ridge being carried and a Confederate battery that had 
 been delivering an annoying fire, captured. It was one of the 
 many unfortunate results of the long delay in this operation 
 on the left that just as this success was gained, the division of 
 A. P. Hill, which Jackson had left behind to receive the sur- 
 render of Harper's Ferry, reached the field from that place by 
 way of Shei^herdstown,* and uniting his own re-enforcement 
 of two thousand ment with the troops of Jones that had been 
 broken through in the attack, he assumed the ofiensive, 
 recaptured the battery, and drove back Burnside over all the 
 ground gained, and to the shelter of the bluff bordering the 
 Antietam. This closed the action on the left, and as that on 
 the right had been suspended, the battle ceased for the day. 
 It was found that the losses on the Union side made an ag- 
 gi-egate in killed and wounded of twelve thousand five hun- 
 dred men ; while the Confederate loss proves to have been 
 above eight thousand.:!: 
 
 in crossing and getting into action on our side of tlie river ; about wliich 
 time General A. P. Hill's division arrived from Harper's Ferry."— Toombs' 
 Report : Ibid., p. 324. 
 
 * Tbis conjuncture is obtained by a comparison of the time of tlie attack 
 and of the arrival of Hill. The assault was made about three o'clock, and 
 Hill began to arrive about half-past two. " The head of my column arrived 
 upon the battle-field of Sharpsburg, a distance of seventeen miles, at half-past 
 two, and, reporting in person to General Lee, he directed me to take position 
 on our right."— Hill : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 128. 
 
 f " The three brigades of my division actively engaged did not number 
 over two thousand men, and these, with the help of my splendid batteries, 
 drove back Burnside's corps of fifteen thousand men."— Hill : Ibid., p. 129. 
 It appears, however, from Toombs' Report (Ibid., p. 325), that his brigade also 
 aided in this counter-attack. 
 
 X I give this only as an approximate estimate. General Lee gives his ag- 
 gregate loss in killed and wounded in the Maryland campaign as ten thousand 
 two hundred and ninety-one. As the killed and wounded in all the other ac- 
 tions save Antietam were not above two thousand two hundred and ninety- 
 one, it leaves about eight thousand for the casualties of that battle. General 
 McClellan states that about two thousand seven hundred of the Confederate 
 dead were buried ; and taking this as a basis, and counting the usual propor- 
 
222 CAIMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 The morning of tlie 18th brought with it the gi'ave question 
 for McClellan whether to renew the attack or to defer it, 
 even with the risk of Lee's retirement. After anxious cle- 
 Hberation, he resolved to defer attack* during the 18th, with 
 the determination, however, to renew it on the 19th, if 
 re-enforcements, expected from Washington, should arrive. 
 But during the night of the 18th, Lee withdrew across the 
 Potomac, and by morning he stood again with his army on 
 the soil of Virginia. This inactivity of McClellan after An- 
 tietam, has been made the theme for so much animadversion, 
 that it may be proper to set forth briefly the facts that 
 should guide criticism in this case. 
 
 It should first of all be borne in mind that the action at 
 Antietam, though a victory in its results, seeing that it so 
 crippled Lee's force as to put an end to the invasion, was 
 tactically a drawn battle— a battle m which McClellan had 
 suffered as much as he had inflicted. In such cases, it re- 
 quires in the commander a high order of moral courage to 
 renew battle. An ordinary general, overwhelmed with his 
 own losses, the sum and details of which forcibly strike his 
 mind, and powerfully appeal to his sensibihties, is apt to lose 
 sight of those equal, or perhaps greater, suffered by the 
 enemy; and hence indecision, timidity, and consequent in- 
 action. What McClellan knew was that the battle had cost 
 the terrible sacrifice of over twelve thousand men ; that two 
 of his corps were completely shattered, and that his oldest 
 generals counselled a cessation of operations. He did not 
 know, what is now a matter of historic certainty, that the 
 Confederate army was by this time frightfiiUy disorganized 
 and almost at the end of its supplies both of food and am- 
 munition. The general situation was, moreover, such as to 
 inspire a circumspect pohcy on the part of McCleUan ; for 
 Virginia had been lost, and Maryland was invaded, and his 
 
 tion of five woiinded to one killed, the aggregate would be very much in excess 
 of General Lee's statement. But it is needless to sound deeper in this sea o/ 
 blood. 
 
 * McClellan's Report, p. 211. 
 
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 223 
 
 army Wcas all that stood between Lee and Washington, Balti- 
 more, and Philadelphia. 
 
 The conduct of a commander should be judged from the 
 facts actually known to him ; and these were the facts known 
 to General McClellan. Nevertheless, I make bold to say 
 (and in doing so I think I am seconded by the opinion of a 
 majority of the ablest officers then in the army*), that Gen- 
 eral McClellan should have renewed the attack on the morn- 
 ing of the 18th. This opinion is grounded in two reasons— 
 the one, general in its nature ; the other, specific and tactical. 
 
 If it is possible to imagine a conjuncture of circumstances 
 that would authorize a general to act d Voutrance and with- 
 out too nice a calculation of risks, it is when confronting an 
 enemy who, having moved far from his base, has crossed the 
 frontier, and being foiled in his plan of invasion, is seeking 
 to make good his retreat. This was the situation of Lee. 
 He was removed a very great distance from his base ; his plan 
 of campaign had been baulked; his army, reduced to half 
 the effective of that of his opponent, was in a condition of 
 great demoralization, and he had a difficult river at his back. 
 McClellan stood on his base, with every thing at his hand, 
 and his troops, doing battle on loyal soil, fought with a verve 
 and moral force they never had in Yirginia and could be 
 called on for unwonted exertion. 
 
 But in addition to these considerations there is a special 
 reason that promised a more successful result of an attack on 
 the 18th than that which had attended the action of the 17th. 
 The battle-field was by this time better understood; and 
 notably General McClellan had had his attention directed to 
 that commanding ground on the right, before mentioned, 
 which formed the key-point of the field ; but which, strange 
 to say, ,had been overlooked the day before. It was proposed 
 to seize this point with a part of Frankhn's corps ; and had 
 
 * I may here say that this opinion is shared hy General Franklin, an officer 
 distinguished for the maturity of his military judgments. He, at the time 
 urged a renewal of the attack on the morning of the 18th. 
 
224 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 this been done, Jackson's position would have been wholly 
 untenable. Besides, Burnside held the dehouche of the bridge 
 on the extreme left, and threatened the Confederate right; 
 and Porter's corps was fresh — having been in reserve the day 
 previous. If these considerations may be regarded as over- 
 ruling the reasons that prompted McClellan to postpone at- 
 tack, then his conduct must be looked upon as an error. 
 
 The Confederate campaign in Maryland lasted precisely 
 two weeks. Its failure was signal. Designed as an invasion, 
 it degenerated into a raid. Aiming to raise the standard of 
 revolt in Maryland, and rally the citizens of that State around 
 the secession cause, it resulted in the almost complete dis- 
 ruption of that army itself. Instead of the flocks of recruits 
 he had expected, Lee was doomed to the mortification of 
 seeing his force disintegrating so rapidly as to threaten its 
 utter dissolution, and he confessed with anguish that his 
 array was " ruined by straggling." * Having, therefore, lost 
 all illusion respecting co-operation in Maryland, on which 
 he had counted so confidently, it is not probable that Lee 
 w^ould have sought to push the invasion far, even had its 
 military incidents turned out better for him ; but from the 
 moment he set foot across the Potomac circumstances so 
 shaped themselves as to thwart his designs. The retention of 
 the garrison at Harper's Perry compelled him to turn aside 
 
 * The Confederate reports are replete witli evidence of the enormous strag- 
 gling that attended the Maryland campaign. Says Lee : " The arduous service 
 in which our troops had been engaged, their great privations of rest and food, 
 and the long marches without shoes over mountain roads, had greatly reduced 
 our ranks before the action began. These causes had compelled thousands of 
 Irave men to ahsent themselves, and many more had done so from unworthy mo- 
 tives. This great battle was fought by less than forty thousand men on our 
 side." — Report, p. 35. Says Hill : " Had all our stragglers been up, McClellan's 
 army would have been completely crushed or annihilated. Thotisands of thiev- 
 ish poltroons had kept away from sheer coicardice. The straggler is generally 
 a tliief, and always a coward, lost to all sense of shame : he can only be kept in 
 the ranks by a strict and sanguinary discipline." — Reports of Maryland Cam- 
 paign, vol. ii., p. 119. 
 
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 225 
 
 and reduce tliat place. This required the presence of his 
 whole army to cover the operation; and before it was com- 
 pleted, McOlellan had come up and forced him into a corner, 
 so that he never was able to carry out his original design of 
 taking up a position in Western Maryland, whence to threaten 
 Pennsjlvania. Crippled at Autietam, he was fain to cross 
 the Potomac, and seek in Vii'ginia the opportunity to gather 
 up the fi-agments of his shattered strength ; for lie had no 
 longer the army with which the campaign was begun. More 
 than thirty thousand men of the seventy thousand with which 
 he set out from Richmond, were already dead or liors de 
 combat. The remainder were in a sorry plight. Both armies 
 in fact felt the need of some repose ; and, glad to be fi-eed 
 from each other's presence,* they rested on their arms — the 
 Confederates in the Shenandoah Valley, in the vicinity of 
 Winchester, and the Army of the Potomac near the scene of 
 its late exploits, amid the picturesque hills and vales of 
 Southwestern Maryland. 
 
 III. 
 CLOSE OF McCLELLAN'S CAREER. 
 
 The movement from Washington into Maryland to meet 
 Lee's invasion, was defensive in its purf)ose, though it as- 
 sumed the character of a defensive-offensive campaign. Now 
 that this had been accompHshed and Lee driven across 
 the fi'ontier, it remained to organize on an adequate scale the 
 means of a renewal of grand offensive operations directed at 
 the Confederate army and towards Richmond. The comple- 
 tion of this work, including the furnishing of transportation, 
 clothing, supplies, etc., required upwards of a month, and 
 
 * Oa the retreat of Lee, a not very judicious pursuit into Virginia was made 
 by a part of Porter's corps, but tlie pursuing column was soon driven back 
 across the Potomac with considerable loss, 
 
 15 
 
226 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 during tliis period no military movement occnn-ed, with the 
 exception of a raid into Pennsylvania by Stuart. About the 
 middle of October, that enterprising officer, with twelve or 
 fifteen hundred troopers, crossed the Potomac above Williams- 
 port, passed through Maryland, penetrated Pennsylvania, 
 occupied Chambersburg, where he burnt considerable govern- 
 ment stores, and after making the entire circuit of the Union 
 army, recrossed the Potomac below the mouth of the Monoc- 
 acy. He was all the way closely pursued by Pleasonton with 
 eight hundred cavalry, but though that officer marched 
 seventy-eight miles in twenty-four hours, he was unable to 
 intercept or overtake his fast-riding rival. 
 
 On the recrossing of the Potomac by Lee after Antietam, 
 McClellan hastened to seize the dehoucJiS of the Shenandoah 
 Valley, by the possession of Harper's Ferry. Two corps 
 were posted in its vicinity, and the Potomac and Shenandoah 
 sjDanned by ponton-bridges. At first McClellan contemplated 
 pushing his advance against Lee directly down the Shenan- 
 doah Yalley, as he found that, by the adoption of the hne 
 east of the Blue Eidge, his antagonist, finding the door open, 
 would again cross to Maryland. But this danger being re- 
 moved by the oncoming of the season of high-water in the 
 Potomac, McClellan determined to operate by the east side of 
 the Blue Kidge, and on the 26th his advance crossed the 
 Potomac by a ponton-bridge at Berhn, five miles below Har- 
 per's Ferry. By the 2d November the entire army had 
 crossed at that point. Advancing due southward towards 
 Warrenton, he masked the movement by guarding the passes 
 of the Blue Ridge, and by threatening to issue through these, 
 he compelled Lee to retain Jackson in the Yalley. With 
 such success was this movement managed, that on reaching 
 Warrenton on the 9th, while Lee had sent half of his army 
 forward to Culpepper to oppose McClellan's advance in that 
 direction, the other half was still west of the Blue Pddge, 
 scattered up and down the Yalley, and separated from the 
 other moiety by at least two days' march. McClellan's next 
 projected move was to strike across obliquely westward and 
 
THE MAETLAND CAMPAIGN. 227 
 
 interpose between the severed divisions of the Confederate 
 force ; but this step he was prevented from taking by his 
 sudden removal from the command of the Army of the 
 Potomac, while on the march to Warrenton. Late on the 
 night of November 7th, amidst a heavy snow-storm, General 
 Buckingham, arriving post-haste from Washington, reached 
 the tent of General McClellan at Rectortown. He was the 
 bearer of the following dispatch, which he handed to General 
 McCleUan ; 
 
 General Orders, No. 182, 
 
 W' AR Department, Adjutant- General's Office, 
 Washington, November 5, 1862. 
 
 By direction of the President of the United States, it is ordered that 
 
 Major-General McClellan be relieved from the command of the Army of the 
 
 Potomac, and that Major-General Burnside take the command of that 
 
 army. 
 
 By order of the Secretary of War. 
 
 E. D. TowNSEND, 
 
 Assistant Adjutant-General. 
 
 It chanced that General Burnside was at the moment with 
 him in his tent. Opening the dispatch and reading it, with- 
 out a change of countenance or of voice, McCleUan passed 
 over the paper to his successor, saying, as he did so : " Well,. 
 Burnside, you are to command the army." * 
 
 Thus ended the career of McClellan as head of the Army of 
 the Potomac — an army which he had first fashioned, and then 
 led in its maiden but checkered experience, tiU it became 
 a mighty host, formed to war, and baptized in fierce battles 
 and renowned campaigns. From the exposition I have given 
 of the relations which had grown up between him and those 
 who controlled the war-councils at Washington, it will have 
 appeared that, were these relations to continue, it would have 
 been better to have even before this removed McCleUan — 
 better for himself, and better for the country. This, indeed, 
 
 * Hurlbut : McClellan and the Ck)nduct of the Wax. 
 
228 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 was practically done, when, on the return from the Peninsula, 
 his trooj)s were sent forward to join Pope ; but the disastrous 
 termination of that campaign prompted the recall of McClel- 
 lan as the only man who could make the army efficient for 
 the trying emergency. Having accomj)lished his work of 
 expeUiug Lee from Maryland, he entered, after a brief repose, 
 on a new campaign of invasion ; and it was in the midst of 
 this, and on the eve of a decisive blow, that he was suddenly 
 removed. The moment chosen was an inopportune and an 
 ungracious one ; for never had McClellan acted with such 
 vigor and rapidity — never had he shown so much confidence 
 in himself or the army in him. And it is a notable fact that 
 not only was the whole body of the army — rank and file as 
 well as officers — enthusiastic in their afifection for his person, 
 but that the very general appointed as his successor was the 
 strongest opponent of his removal. 
 
 The military character of McClellan wiU not be difficult to 
 define, however much it is yet obscured by mahcious detrac- 
 tion on the one hand, or bhnd admiration on the other. 
 He was assuredly not a great general ; for he had the pedan- 
 try of war rather than the inspiration of war. His talent 
 was eminently that of the cabinet ; and his proper place was 
 in Washington, where he should have remained as general-in- 
 chief. Here his ability to plan campaigns and form large 
 strategic combinations, which was remarkable, would have had 
 full scope ; and he would have been considerate and helpful 
 to those in the field. But his power as a tactician was much in- 
 ferior to his talent as a strategist, and he executed less boldly 
 than he conceived : not appearing to know well those counters 
 with which a commander must work — time, place, and circum- 
 stance. Yet he was improving in this regard, and was like 
 Turenne, of whom Napoleon said that he was the only exam- 
 ple of a general who grew bolder as he grew older. 
 
 To General McClellan personally it was a misfortune thai 
 he became so prominent a figure at the commencement of the 
 contest ; for it was inevitable that the first leaders should be 
 sacrificed to the nation's ignorance of war. Taking this into 
 
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 229 
 
 account, estimating both what he accomplished and what he 
 failed to accomplish, in the actual circumstances of his per- 
 formance, I have endeavored in the critique of his campaigns 
 to strike a just balance between McClellan and history. Of 
 him it may be said, that if he does not belong to that fore- 
 most category of commanders made up of those who have 
 alw^ays been successful, and including but a few illustrious 
 names, neither does he rank with that numerous class who 
 have ruined their armies without fighting. He ranges with 
 that middle category of meritorious commanders, who, Uke 
 Sertorius, Wallenstein, and William of Orange, generally un- 
 fortunate in war, yet were, in the words of Marmont, " never 
 destroyed nor discouraged, but were always able to ojppose a 
 menacing front, and make the enemy pay dear for what he 
 gained." 
 
230 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 vn. 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK 
 
 November, 1862— J an cart, 1863. 
 
 CHANGE OF BASE TO FREDERICKSBURG. 
 
 To tlie general on whose shoulders was placed at this 
 crisis the weighty burden of the conduct of the Army of the 
 Potomac, the great responsibihty came unsought and unde- 
 sired. Cherishing a high respect for McClellan's military 
 talent, and bound to him by the ties of an intimate affection, 
 General Burnside naturally shrank fBom superseding a com- 
 mander whom he unfeignedly regarded as his superior in 
 ability. The manly frankness with which Burnside laid bare 
 at once his feelings towards his late chief and his own sense 
 of inadequacy for so great a trust was creditable to him, and 
 absolved him in advance from responsibilities haM the weight 
 of which at least was assumed by those who thrust the baton 
 into his unwilling hands.* To the pubhc his modest shrink- 
 
 * General Burnside in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct 
 of the War makes a very frank statement of his opinion touching his own 
 Ttnfitness for the command of the army. " After getting over my surprise, the 
 shock, etc., I told General Buckingham [the officer who brought the order from 
 "Washington assigning him to the command] that it was a matter that 
 required very serious thought ; that I did not want the command ; that it had 
 been offered to me twice before, and I did not feel that I could take it. * * I 
 told them [his staff] what my views were with reference to my ability to 
 exercise such a command, which views were those I had always unreservedly 
 
I'l/i^lyl^-^cC^ 
 
THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 231 
 
 Lag and solicitude appeared the sign of a noble nature, 
 wronging itseK in its proper estimate, and it was judged that 
 he was a man of such temper that the exercise of great trusts 
 would presently bring him a sense of confidence and power. 
 And, indeed, severely just though Burnside's judgment oi his 
 own capacity afterwards proved, there was at the moment no 
 man who seemed so well fitted to succeed McClellan. Of the 
 other corps commanders of the Army of the Potomac, no one 
 had yet proved his capacity in the exercise of independent 
 command. But Burnside, as chief of the North Carolina ex- 
 pedition, brought the prestige of a successful campaign, and 
 it was kno-R-n that he had energy, perseverance, and above 
 all, a high degi-ee of patriotic zeal. Frank, manly, and 
 generous in character, he was beloved by his own corps, and 
 respected by the army generally. To the troops he was 
 recommended as the friend and admirer of McClellan ; and in 
 this regard, as representing a legitimate succession rather 
 than the usurpation of a successful rival, he seemed the man 
 of all others best fitted to smooth over the perilous hiatus 
 supervening on the lapse from power of a commander who 
 was the idol of the army. 
 
 Upon assuming command of the army, General Burnside 
 made at Warrenton a halt of ten days, during which time he 
 endeavored to get the reins into his hands, and he carried 
 into execution a purpose he had formed of consolidating the 
 six corps of the Army of the Potomac into three Grand Divi- 
 sions of two corps each* — the Eight Grand Division being 
 
 expressed — that I was not competent to command such a large army as this. 
 I had said the same over and over again to the President and Secretary of 
 War ; and also, that if things could be satisfactorily arranged with General 
 McClellan, I thought he could command the Army of the Potomac better than 
 any other general in it." — Report on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 650. 
 
 * The Right Grand Division was composed of the Second Corps under 
 General Couch and the Ninth Corps under General Wilcox. The Centre 
 Grand Division, of the Third Corps under General Stoneman and the Filtli 
 Corps under General Butterfield. The Left Grand Division, of the First Corpe 
 onder General Reynolds and the Sixth Corps under General W. F. Smith. 
 
•232 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 placed under General Sumner, the Centre Grand Division 
 under General Hooker, and the Left Grand Division under 
 General Franklin. 
 
 It need hardly be said that this protracted delay at the 
 moment the army was manoeuvring to fight a great battle, 
 however necessary General Burnside may have deemed it,* 
 was likely seriously to jeopardize the opportunity presented 
 by the scattered condition of Lee's forces when the army 
 reached Warrenton. At that time the ' Confederate right, 
 under Longstreet, was near Culpepper, and the left, under 
 Jackson, in the Shenandoah Valley — the two wings being 
 sej)arated by two marches ; and it had been General 
 McClellan's intent, by a rapid advance on Gordonsville, to 
 interpose between Lee's divided forces. But this was not a 
 matter that touched Burnside's plan ; for he had already 
 resolved to abandon offensive action on that line, and was 
 determined to make a change of base to Fredericksburg on 
 the Rappahannock. 
 
 It would be difficult to explain this determination on any 
 sound military principle ; for while the destruction of the hos- 
 tile army was, in the very nature of things, the prime aim 
 and object of the campaign. General Burnside tui'ned his back 
 on that army, and set out upon a seemingly aimless adven- 
 ture to the Rappahannock, whither, in fact, Lee had to run in 
 search of him. If it be said that Richmond was General 
 Burnside's objective point, and that, regarding this rather 
 than the hostile force, he chose the Fredericksburg line as 
 one presenting fewer difiiculties than that on which the army 
 was moving (the Hne of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad), 
 the reply is, that an advance against Richmond was, at this 
 season, impracticable by any line ; but a single march would 
 
 * In a like case, wlien the army ■was manoeuvring to meet Lee's invasion oi 
 Pennsylvania, General Meade being nominated to succeed General Hooker, 
 put the troops in motion without an hour's delay — the columns moTing on as 
 it no change had taken place. There were no circumstances that made the 
 task easier in his case than in that of Burnside. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 233 
 
 liave put him in position to give decisive battle under circum- 
 stances eminently advantageous to him.* 
 
 Military history is a repository of the brightest inspirations 
 of genius and the wildest excesses of folly. It is therefore 
 difficult for a general to commit a blunder so gross but that it 
 can be matched by a precedent.. Burnside's change of line 
 of manoeuvre from one on which he had a positive objective— 
 to wit, Lee's army — to Fredericksburg, where he had no ob- 
 jective at all, is paralleled by Dumourier's conduct in Holland 
 in 1793, respecting which Jomini remarks, that he " foolishly 
 abandoned the pursuit of the allies in order to transfer the 
 theatre from the centre to the extreme left of the general 
 field."t But such instances are for the warning, rather than 
 the imitation of commanders. 
 
 The project of changing the hne of operations to Freder- 
 icksburg was not approved at Washington, but it was assented 
 to ;| and on the 15th of November, General Burnside put his 
 columns in motion from Warrenton. In the march towards' 
 Fredericksburg, it was determined that the army shoidd 
 
 * General Burnside, on coming into command of the army, drew up a plan 
 of operations, -wliicli bears date, Warrenton, November 9, 1802, and is ad- 
 dressed to the general-in-chief. In this paper, urging the adoption of the 
 Fredericksburg route, he states his intention of making " a movement upon 
 Richmond from that point ;" but the statement is made vaguely, and he post- 
 pones giving " the details of the movement" tiU some time " hereafter." In 
 point of fact. General Burnside had not matured any definite plan of action, for 
 the reason that he hoped to be able to postpone operations till the spring. He 
 did not favor operating against Richmond by the overland route, but had his 
 mind turned towards a repetition of McClellan's movement to the Peninsula ; 
 and in determining to march to Fredericksburg he cherished the hope of being 
 able to winter there upon an easy base of supplies, and in the spring embark- 
 ing his army for the James River. How he could have counted on being allowed 
 to carry out a plan so adverse to the wishes of the Administration, and involv- 
 ing what the public temper could not be expected to brook, the inaction ol 
 the army for the winter, I do not undertake to say. I derive these revelations 
 of General Burnside's motives and purposes from the corps-commander then 
 most intimate in his confidence. 
 
 t Art of War, p. 106, 
 
 t Halleck : Report of Military Operations, 1862-3. 
 
234 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 move bj the north bank of the Rappahannock to Falmouth, 
 where by a ponton-bridge, the boats for which were to be 
 forwarded from Washington, it would cross to Fredericksburg 
 and seize the bluffs on the sjiuth bank. It had been also de- 
 signed to march a force by the south side of the Rappahan- 
 nock to anticipate the possession of the heights, but this 
 was not done. Sumner's Grand Di^dsion led the van, and 
 on the afternoon of the 17th it reached Falmouth, opposite 
 Fredericksburg. The town was at this time occupied by a 
 regiment of Virginia cavalry, four companies of Mississippi 
 infantry, and one light battery. Wlien the head of Sumner's 
 column reached the river these gans opened upon it from the 
 heights above Fredericksburg, but they were in a few minutes 
 silenced by a Union battery. The Rappahannock was at this 
 time fordable at several points near Fredericksburg, and 
 Sumner was exceedingly anxious to cross and take possession 
 of the town and the heights in its rear, but was prevented 
 ■from doing so by instructions from General Burnside.* The 
 
 * Sumner : Report of Operations on tlie Rappahannock. In his evidence 
 before the Congressional Committee, General Sumner says : " My orders were 
 not to cross. But the temptation was strong to go over and take those guns 
 the enemy had left. That same night I sent a note to General Burnside, asking 
 if I should take Fredericksburg in the morning, should I be able to find a 
 practicable ford, which, by the way, I knew when I wrote the note I could 
 find. The general replied that he did not think it addsable to occupy Freder- 
 icksburg until his conwmnications were established," etc. — Report, p. 657. 
 
 From the above it will be seen how erroneous is the statement of General 
 Lee, who, in his oflBcial report, says : " The advance of General Sumner reached 
 Falmouth on the afternoon of the 17th, and attempted to cross the Rappahxm 
 nock, but was driven back by Colonel Ball, with the Fifteenth Virginia Cavalry, 
 four companies of Mississippi infantry, and Lewis's light battery." — Report ol 
 Movements on the Rappahannock, p. 38. In point of fact, the only engage- 
 ment was a brief artillery duel between the Confederate battery above men- 
 tioned and Petitt's battery of ten-pounder Parrotts. The writer stood beside 
 this battery at the time, and can testify that Petitt in fifteen minutes, by hia 
 exccillent shots, caused the Confederate gunners to leave their guns ; and the 
 pieces were only dragged off by the men crawling up and attaching prolongea 
 to them. General Lee's statement is almost too absurd to require serious 
 reply. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 235 
 
 folloTving days, 19tli and 20tli, Hooker's and Franklin's gi'and 
 divisions reached the Rappahannock, near which the entire 
 Union army was now concentrated. 
 
 At the time the army began its march from "Warrenton, 
 Longstreet's corps was at Culpepper Courthouse, and Jack- 
 son's corps (with the exception of one division that had been 
 transferred to the east side of the Blue Ridge) was still in the 
 Shenandoah YaUey. In this situation, nothing can be ima- 
 gined easier than for Lee, by a simple manoeuvre towards 
 Warrenton, to have quickly recalled Burnside from his march 
 towards Fredericksburg. The line of the Orange and Alex- 
 andria Baih-oad is the real defensive line for Washington ; 
 and experience has proved that a hostile force might always, 
 by a mere menace directed against that hne, compel the 
 Union army to seek its recovery. General Lee either felt 
 himself to be not in condition to attempt any offensive enter- 
 prise at this time, or he was prevented from doing so by 
 instructions from Richmond ; for he adopted the less brilHant 
 alternative of planting himseK directly in the path of the 
 Union army.* As soon as Burnside's intention of moving 
 towards Fredericksburg was fuUy disclosed, Jackson's corps 
 was directed on Orange Courthouse, and Longstreet was in- 
 structed to march fi'om Culpepper Courthouse on Fredericks- 
 burg, which point his van reached two days after Sumner's 
 arrival at Falmouth. A few days afterwards, Jackson's corps 
 also was called up to the Rappahannock, which Lee assumed 
 as his new defensive Hne.f 
 
 ^Tiatever may have been General Burnside's purpose in 
 this transfer of the army, he could hardly have anticipated 
 the result to which it conducted; for having voluntarily 
 moved away from the hostile force, that much more than any 
 geographical point was the proper objective of his efforts, he 
 
 * " It is not always by taking position in the direct path of an enemy that 
 his advance is opposed ; but sometimes points may be occupied on the fiauk 
 with much advantage, so as to threaten his line of operations, if he ventures to 
 pass." — Dufour : Strategy and Tactics, p. 41. 
 
 f Lee : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 38. 
 
236 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARSIY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 cliose a new route to Biclimond only to find his antagonist 
 confronting him thereon ! 
 
 It was now even questionable whether he would be able to 
 obtain possession ' of Fredericksburg. The passage of the 
 Rappahannock was no longer the simple problem it had been 
 when Sumner first drew up at Falmouth ; for the rapidly ar- 
 riving forces of Lee, gathering in strength on the menacing 
 heights opposite, showed that the passage of the Rappahan- 
 nock would cost a great battle. Nor was there at hand the 
 means of making the crossing ; for by a blunder, the respon- 
 sibiUty of which seems to be divided equally between General 
 Halleck and General Burnside himself, no ponton-train had 
 reached the army; and when, a week afterwards, it arrived, 
 Lee's whole army had arrived also. Lee distributed his 
 corps along the south bank of the river, and began the 
 rapid construction of defences along the crest of hills in rear 
 of Fredericksburg, extending from the river about a mile and 
 a half above the town to the Fredericksburg and Richmond 
 Railroad, three miles below the town," Day by day, new 
 earthwork epaulemenls for the protection of artillery made 
 their appearance on the Fredericksburg ridge, tUl, at the end 
 of a few weeks, its terraced heights, crowned with the formi- 
 dable enginery of war, presented an inferno of fire into which 
 no man nor army would willingly venture. 
 
 Nevertheless, action was imperative ; and as soon as Burn- 
 side had established his base at Aquia Creek, and connected 
 it with his front of operations by the restoration of the rail- 
 road, preparations were begun for a crossing of the Rappa- 
 hannock. Now, from the situation of the opposing forces, 
 this operation obviously resolved itself into the alternative of 
 forcing a direct passage at Fredericksburg, or of making a 
 turning movement on one or the other of the Confederate 
 flanks. The formidable character of the Fredericksburg de- 
 fences, plainly visible from the north bank, seemed to pre- 
 clude the former plan. A turning* operation on the Con- 
 
 * Lee : Report of Operations on the Rappahaimock, p. 39. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 237 
 
 federate riglit, by a movement down the Rappahannock, was 
 therefore discussed, and it was at first determined to make 
 the passage at Skeuker's Neck, twelve miles below Falmouth. 
 But the preparations for this move were discovered by the 
 enemy, who concentrated below to meet the threatened ad- 
 vance, and the purpose was abandoned.* 
 
 There remained the operation against the Confederate left 
 by a movement up the Rappahannock. This plan does not, 
 however, appear to have been entertained at this time, not- 
 withstanding that it was what seemed to be dictated by sound 
 military considerations. As a tactical operation, it was easier 
 than to make the passage below Fredericksburg,! and it gave 
 the direction of attack on Lee's left, which was his strategic 
 flank ; for the manoeuvre, if successful, would throw the en- 
 emy back towards the coast. But there were other consider- 
 ations that determined Burnside's plan. It was discovered 
 that the preparations that had been made to cross at Skenk- 
 er's Neck had so engaged Lee's attention, that he continued 
 to hold a considerable force near that point ; and Burnside 
 judged that by making a direct crossing at Fredericksburg, 
 he might surprise Lee thus divided. It will be conceded that 
 if this purpose could have been successfully executed, the 
 result would have been eminently advantageous ; but it is far 
 from clear how its successful execution could have been 
 reasonably expected. The passage of a river by a great 
 
 * " On the 3d of December, my division was sent to Port Royal, a few miles 
 below Skenker's Neck, to prevent the crossing of the Yankees at or near that 
 point." — General D. H. Hill : Report of Operations on the Rappahannock. 
 Up to the time of the battle of Fredericksburg, Longstreet's command held the 
 heights at the town ; Hill remained at Port Royal, and the rest of Jackson's 
 corps " was so disposed as to support Hill or Longstreet, as occasion might re- 
 quire." — Lee : Report of Fredericksburg, p. 38. Hill on the 5th succeeded in 
 driving off several Union gunboats that attempted to ascend the Rappahannock 
 towards Fredericksburg. 
 
 f The Rappahannock below Fredericksburg increases rapidly in width, and 
 at the first available point below Skinker's Neck would require one thousand 
 feet of bridging, whereas above Banks' Ford from two to three hundred i\'A 
 would suffice. — Warren : Report of Engineer Operations on the Rappahannock 
 
238 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 army, observed by a watchful opponent, is not an operation 
 of the nature of a coup de main; and unless the enemy could 
 neither see nor act, it was manifest he might concentrate his 
 force as rapidly as the assailant could defile on the south- 
 ern bank. Now this remote contingency of a surprise was 
 the sole recommendation of the operation ; for, otherwise, the 
 attack of the fortified position behind Fredericksburg was 
 not of a kind to be voluntarily undertaken. It was certainly a 
 slender chance on which to hazard the issue of a great battle : 
 but Burnside boldly accepted the risk. The 10th of December 
 found the preliminary preparations completed, and it was 
 determined to force the passage of the Eappahannock the 
 following day. 
 
 II. 
 
 THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURa. 
 
 Viewed as a tactical operation, the passage of the Rappa- 
 hannock at Fredericksburg presented no formidable diffi- 
 culties ; and, indeed, the configuration of the ground is such 
 that it is not in the power of an enemy occupying the south 
 side to prevent it. On both banks of the stream, and parallel 
 with its course, there runs a well-defined crest of hills ; but 
 that on the northern side, named the Stafford Heights, ap- 
 proaches close to the river's margin and commands the oppo- 
 site side, where the heights stand at a distance of from three- 
 quarters of a mile to a mile and a half from the bank. Union 
 artillery could therefore control the intermediate plain, and it 
 was beHeved that it could neutralize the efforts of the enemy 
 to oppose the construction of bridges. But the thought of 
 what must come after the crossing was one to give pause to 
 every reflecting mind. 
 
 During the night of the lOlh, under direction of Chief-of- 
 Artillery Hunt, the Stafford Heights were crowned by a power- 
 
Map of tlip 
 
 DEC. 13 th. 1862 
 
 References: 
 ^== • . . -- l/mon Ti'oopx . 
 k. Meade s /iu-t/ie.'if adifincp 
 
 B. Gibbon's 
 
 C. Frencli . Hfuicock * Ha\s'arcL. „ , y y- u-^j. a .-^ p. 
 
 Erigmyrjl /or tiunpaiffus or tneArmf of me^ritloiiiae 
 
 • - - Cori/eftefiitp Titxips. 
 
 a C/itirrif of '/'renib/er's Brig . 
 b LciH'P^s 
 
THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 239 
 
 ful artillery force, consisting of twenty-nine batteries ol one 
 hundred and forty-seven guns, destined to reply to the enemy's 
 batteries, to control his movements on the plain, to command 
 the town, and to protect and cover the crossing. At the same 
 time, the troops were moved forward to positions immediately 
 behind the ridge, and the ponton-trains were draAvn down to 
 the river's brink. It had been determined to span the stream 
 by five ponton-bridges — three directly opposite the city, and 
 two a couple of miles below. On the former, Sumner's and 
 Hooker's Grand Divisions were to cross, while Franklin's 
 Grand Division was to make the j^assage by the lower bridge. 
 
 Before dawn of the morning of the 11th, the boats were un- 
 shipped from the teams at the river's brink ; and, swiftly and 
 silently, the engineer troops proceeded to their work, amid 
 a dense fog that filled the valley and water-margins, and 
 through which the moving bridge-builders appeared as spec- 
 tral forms. But no sooner did the artificers attempt to begin 
 the construction of the bridges than they were met by volleys 
 of musketry at short range from the riflemen posted oj^posite, 
 behind the stone houses and walls of the river-street of Fred- 
 ericksburg ; and instantly the double report of a piece of 
 ordnance boomed out on the dawn. This was the signal-gun 
 that summoned the scattered Confederate corps to assemble 
 for the long-expected attack.* 
 
 Aware, from the configuration of the ground, that he could 
 not hope to prevent the passage of the stream, Lee made his 
 dispositions to resist the advance after crossing. t He,4iow- 
 
 * " The artificers had but got fairly to work when the firing of two guns from 
 one of the enemy's batteries announced that we were discovered. They were, 
 doubtless, signal-guns." — W. Swinton : Correspondence of New York Times, 
 December 13, 18G2. General Longstreet says: "At three o'clock, our signal- 
 guns gave notice of the enemy's approach. The troops, being at their different 
 camp-grounds, were formed immediately, and marched to their positions along 
 the line." — Confederate Reports of Fredericksburg, p. 428. 
 
 f " The plain of Fredericksburg is so completely commanded by the StaflFord 
 Heights that no eflFectual opposition could be made to the construction of 
 bridges or the passage of the river. Our position was therefore selected with a 
 view to resist the enemy's advance after crossing." — Lee : Report of the Batde 
 of Fredericksburg, p. 39. 
 
240 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 ever, caused a couple of regiments of Mississippi riflemen to 
 be j)osted behind tlie stone walls of the river-street of Fred- 
 ericksburg, to resist, as long as might" be, the construction of 
 the bridges. An unexpected success attended their efforts. 
 At the point assigned for Franklin's crossing, two miles below 
 the town, there was no such protection for the sharp-shooters, 
 and they were therefore covered by rifle-trenches near the 
 river's brink. But Franklin soon succeeded in dislodging 
 this force, and by noon two bridges were available for the 
 passage. 
 
 The attempt to cofistruct the bridges opposite the town, 
 however, met a different fate ; for the keen- eyed marksmen 
 opposed so vigorous an opposition to the laying of the pon- 
 tons that the little band of engineers, murderously thinned, 
 was presently compelled to slacken work, and then cease 
 altogether.* Several hours passed in renewed but unavailing 
 efforts, and it became clear that nothing could be done until 
 the sharp-shooters were dislodged from their lurking-places. 
 To accomplish this, Burnside, at ten o'clock, gave the com- 
 mand to concentrate the fire of all the artillery on the city and 
 batter it down. On this there opened from the massive con- 
 centration of artillery a terrific bombardment that was kept 
 up for above an hour. Each gun fired fifty rounds, and I 
 know not how many hundred tons of iron were thrown into 
 the town. Of the effect of this, however, nothing could be 
 seen, for the city was still enveloped in mist ; but presently a 
 dense pillar of smoke, defining itself on the background of fog, 
 showed that the town had been fired by the shells ; and at 
 noon the curtain rolled up, and it was seen that Fredericks- 
 burg was in flames at several points. Appalling though the 
 bombardment was as a spectacle, it was of very slight military 
 
 * Two regiments of Hancock's division, sent to cover the working parties 
 engaged in building tlie bridge directly opposite Fredericksburg, soon lost from 
 their thin ranks one hundred and fifty men. — Hancock : Report of Fredericks- 
 burg. These regiments were, the Fifty-Seventh New York, Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Chapman, and the Sixty-Sixth New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Bull, of Zook's 
 brigade, Hancock's division. Couch's corps. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN ON THE R.VPPAHANNOCK. 24] 
 
 advantage ;* the hostile force lay out of range behind the liills 
 in rear of the town, and the artillerists were unable to give 
 sufficient depression to their guns to reach the river-front of 
 the city, along which the marksmen were posted, and the con- 
 flagration did not extend but died out. 
 
 During the thick of the bombardment, a fresh attempt was 
 made to complete the one half-finished bridge opposite the 
 town ; but this too failed. The day was wearing away, and 
 affairs were at a dead-lock. In this state of facts, the chief 
 of artillery, Brigadier-General Hunt, an officer of a remark- 
 ably clear judgment, made a suggestion that proved the fit 
 thing to be done. He proposed that a party should be sent 
 across the river in the open ponton-boats, and that after dis- 
 lodging or capturing the opposing force, the bridges should 
 be rapidly completed. The Seventh Michigan Eegiment and 
 the Nineteenth and Twentieth Massachusetts regiments of 
 Howard's division volunteered for this perilous enterprise.f 
 
 Ten ponton-boats were lying on the brink of the river 
 waiting to be added to the haK-finished bridge. Bushing 
 down the steep bank, the party found shelter behind these 
 and behind the piles of planking destined for the covering of 
 the bridge ; and in this situation they acted for fifteen or 
 twenty minutes as sharp-shooters, to hold in check the South- 
 ern tirailleurs opposite, while the boats were pushed into the 
 stream. This being accomplished, the men quickly sought 
 the boats, pushed off, and the oarsmen pulling lustily, they in 
 a few minutes, notwithstanding the severe fire by which 
 several were killed or wounded, came under cover of the 
 opposite bluff. Other boats followed, and so soon as an 
 adequate number of men were assembled on the Southern 
 
 * It has, indeed, seldom been found that such bombardments of towns are 
 of any avail, and, as Camot observes, they are generally adopted only when 
 real means are lacking. " Les bombardemens sont en general beaucoup moins 
 8 craindxe qu'on ne le pense ordinairement. On les employe lorsqu'ou 
 manque de moyens reels."— De la Defense des Places Fortes: Bibliotheque 
 Militaire, tome v., p. 52'6. 
 
 f Couch's Report of Fredericksburg. 
 
242 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 side, they rushed up the steep bank, when the Confederate 
 marksmen, seeing the new turn of affairs, emerged from 
 cellar, rifle-pit, and stone wall, and scampered off up the 
 streets of the town; but upwards of a hundred of them 
 were captured. The buildings that had afforded shelter for 
 the sharp-shooters were taken possession of, and the ponton- 
 bridges were in a few minutes completed. 
 
 Thus by a simple stroke of genius was accomplished what 
 the powerful enginery of a hundred guns had failed to effect. 
 The affair was gallantly executed, and the army, assembled on 
 the northern bank, spectators of this piece of heroism, paid 
 the brave fellows the rich tribute of soldiers' cheers. 
 
 That evening Howard's division of Couch's coi-ps crossed 
 the river and occupied Fredericksburg, having a sharp skir- 
 mish in the upper streets of the town ; and the next day, under 
 cover of a fog, the other divisions of Couch's corjDS, and the 
 Ninth Corps under General Wilcox (thus including the entire 
 Bight Grand Division under Sumner), passed to the south side 
 of the Rajjpahannock. At the same time, Franklin crossed 
 several divisions of his command by the bridges he had con- 
 structed below. The Centre Grand Division under Hooker 
 was still held on the north bank of the river. The whole of 
 the 12th of December was consumed in passing over the 
 columns and reconnoitring the Confederate position. The 
 troops lay on their arms for the night under that December 
 sky: then dawned the morning of Saturday, the 13th, and 
 this was to be the day of the battle. 
 
 Eight -and-forty hours had now passed since that signal 
 gun, booming out on the dawn, sounded the note of concen- 
 tration for the Confederate forces. Longstreet's corps was 
 abeady at Fredericksburg ; Jackson held the stretch of river 
 below — his right at a remove of eighteen miles. But he had 
 had abundant time to caU in his scattered divisions, and the 
 morning of the 13th found the entire Confederate army in 
 position.* Whatever hope of a successful issue attached to 
 
 * " Early on the morning of the 13th, Ewell's division under General 
 
THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 243 
 
 General Burnside's plan of attack rested on the hypothesis 
 that the crossing of the Eappahannock at Fredericksburg 
 could be made a surprise."' But this expectation had been 
 grievously disappointed, and it would have been a judicious 
 measure then to have made other dispositions ;t for the naked 
 enterprise, stripped of this hope, was of a very desperate 
 character. A brief description of the terrain will serve to 
 prove this. 
 
 The battle-field of Fredericksburg presents the character 
 of a broken plain stretching back from the southern margin 
 of the Eappahannock from six hundred yards to two miles, 
 at which distance it rises into a bold ridge that forms a 
 sHght angle with the river, and is itself dominated by an 
 elevated plateau. This ridge is, from Falmouth down to 
 where it touches Massaponax Creek about six miles long, and 
 this was the vantage-ground of the Confederates which they 
 had strengthened with earthworks and crowned with artillery. 
 In rear of the town the plain is traversed by a canal, at right 
 angles with which run two roads leading up to the heights, :|: 
 which rise abruptly at the distance of a few hundred yards. 
 
 Early, and the division of D. H. Hill, arrived after a severe niglit's marcli from 
 their respective encampments in the vicinity of Buckner's Neck and Port 
 Royal— the troops of Hill being from fifteen to eighteen miles distant from 
 the point to which they veere ordered." — Jackson : Report of Fredericksburg 
 in Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 434. 
 
 * " I decided to cross here because I felt satisfied that they did not e7:pect us 
 to cross here, but down below." — Burnside's Evidence : Report on the Conduct 
 of the War, vol. i., p. 653. 
 
 f A commander of any fertility of resource might readily have devised 
 modifications of the plan adapted to the altered state of affairs. I shall men- 
 tion one move that would have been promising. The passage of the river at 
 Fredericksburg was made for a real attack. Burnside might have converted 
 it into a feint ; he might have made threatening demonstrations of attack 
 with Sumner's command, and meanwhile, he might have thrown Hooker's 
 two corps up by Banks' or United States Ford, to execute a turning movemeu 
 on Lee's left. Hooker could have been strengthened almost indefinitely, and it 
 is difficult to see why this operation should have failed of success. 
 
 I The road to the right leads from Fredericksburg to Culpepper ; that to 
 the left, named the " Telegraph Road," from Fredericksburg to Richmond. 
 
244 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 This position formed the left of the Confederate line, and 
 here Lee disposed Longstreet's corps. It was these heights 
 that the right of the Union army under Sumner was destined 
 to assail. The left of the Union line composed of the Grand 
 Division of Franklin was, as already stated, two miles below 
 Fredericksburg. The plain here stretches to a width of two 
 miles, and is scolloped by spurs of hills, less elevated than 
 those in the rear of the town and clothed with dark pines 
 and leafless oaks. This position, forming the right of the 
 Confederate line, was held by Jackson's corps ; Stuart, with 
 two brigades of cavalry and his horse artillery, formed the 
 extreme right extending to Massaponax Creek.* 
 
 The nature of the ground manifestly indicated that the 
 main attack should be made by Franklin on the left ; for the 
 field there affords ample space for deployment out of hostile 
 range, whereas the plain in the rear of Fredericksburg, re- 
 stricted in extent and cut up by ditches, fences, and a canal, 
 caused every movement to be made under fire, presented no 
 opportunity for manoeuvre, and compelled a direct attack on 
 the terraced heights, whose frowning works looked down in 
 grim irony on all attempt at assault. 
 
 In the framing of his plan of battle. General Burnside con- 
 formed to the obvious conditions of the problem before him, 
 and caused it to be understood that General Franldin, who, 
 in addition to his own two corps, had now with him one of 
 Hooker's corps — that is, about one-haK the whole army — 
 should make the main attack from the left, and that upon his 
 success should be conditioned the assault of the heights in 
 rear of the town by Sumner. Such, at least, was the plan of 
 action as understood by his lieutenants, who were to carry it 
 into execution. When, however, on the morning of the 13th, 
 the commanders of the two bodies on the left and right. Gen- 
 erals FrankUn and Sumner, received their instructions, it was 
 found that having framed one plan of battle. General Burnside 
 had determined to fight on another. I must add that the dis- 
 
 * Lee's Report : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. i., p. 40. 
 
THE CAilPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 245 
 
 positions were such that it would be difficult to imagine any 
 worse suited to the circumstances. 
 
 Franklin, in place of an effective attack, was directed to 
 make a partial operation of the nature of a reconnoissance in 
 force, sending " one division, at least, to seize, if possible, the 
 heights near Hamilton's Crossing, and taking care to keep it 
 well supported and its line of retreat open," while he was to 
 hold the rest of his command " in position for a rapid move- 
 ment down the old Eichmond road."* General Sumner's 
 instructions were of a like tenor : he was to " form a column 
 of a di\Tision for the purpose of pushing in the direction of the 
 telegraph and plankroads, for the purpose of seizing the 
 heights in rear of the town," and " hold another division in 
 readiness to support in advance of this movement."t 
 
 General Burnside's plan thus contemplated two isolated 
 attacks by fractional forces, each of one or at most two divi- 
 sions, one on the right and the other on the left. Such par- 
 tial attacks seldom succeed, and directed against such a citadel 
 of streugtli as the Confederate position at Fredericksburg, 
 
 * For the full text of the order from Burnside to Franklin, see Report on 
 the Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 701. 
 
 On receipt of this order by Franklin, at half-past seven of the morning of 
 the 13th, it was bo different from what he had expected — so different from what 
 General Burnside had given him reason to expect the night before — that he 
 consulted with his two corps-commanders, General Reynolds and Smith, and 
 they concluded from its terms that it meant there should be simply an armed 
 reconnoissance with a single division, especially as the main point of the order, 
 twice -referred to, was that the command should be "kept in readiness for a 
 rapid movement along the old Richmond rood."— Franklin's testimony : Report 
 on the Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 708. 
 
 1 have in my possession a copy of an elaborate statement on this point by 
 General W. F. Smith, sworn to by him before a magistrate. In this he says . 
 " General Franklin showed the order immediately to General Reynolds and 
 myself, and the conclusion of all of us waa that General Burnside had deter- 
 mined not to adopt the plan of making the attack in force from the left. No 
 one differed in what was intended by the order." 
 
 \ I derive this statement of General Sumner's instructions from Couch's 
 Report of the Battle of Fredericksburg, in which Burnside's orders to Sumnei 
 are given. 
 
246 CAJIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 such feeble sallies were simply ludicrous. Not a man in the 
 ranks but felt the hopelessness of the undertaking.* 
 
 The morning of the 13th found the sun strugghng with a 
 thick haze that enveloped Fredericksburg and overhung the 
 circumjacent valley, delaying operation for some hours.f 
 But towards ten o'clock the lifting fog revealed the left of the 
 army, under Franklin, spread out on the plain, and showed 
 the gleaming bayonets of a column advancing to the attack. 
 I shall first detail the operations on the left and then return 
 to Sumner's force, which remained yet in the town. 
 
 In obedience to his instructions, Franklin threw forward 
 Meade's division, supported by Gibbon's division on the right, 
 with Doubleday's in reserve for any emergency. Meade ad- 
 vanced across the plain, but had not proceeded far before he 
 was compelled to stop and silence a battery that Stuart had 
 posted on the Port Eoyal road, and which had a flank fire on' 
 his left. This done, he pushed on, his line preceded by a 
 cloud of skirmishers, and his batteries vigorously shelling the 
 heights and woods in his front. This caused considerable loss 
 to Hill, who held Jackson's advanced hue iX t)ut the Confed- 
 erates concealed in the woods made no reply from artillery or 
 infantry, until Meade arrived within point-blank range, when, 
 suddenly opening, shell and canister were poured in from the 
 long silent Confederate batteries. Yet this did not stay him ; 
 
 * That it may appear this is not a judgment penned apres coup, I add 
 the following, written by the author of this volume on the field : " It was with 
 pain and alarm I found this morning a general want of confidence and gloomy 
 forebodings among oflBcers whose sound judgment I had learned to trust. . The 
 plan of attacking the rebel stronghold directly in front would, it was feared, 
 prove a most hazardous enterprise. It was doubted that the co-operation of 
 the right and left could be effective. ' The chess-board,' said Napoleon, in 
 1813, 'is dreadfully confused {embrouille). There is but I that see through 
 it.' We aU felt the application of the first part of this saying to our case. 
 But did we feel equally confident that there was in our case an ' I' that saw 
 through itr'— W. Swinton : Correspondence of N. Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1863. 
 
 •f- " The dense fog in the twilight concealed the enemy from view ; but his 
 commands, ' Forward, guide centre, march !' were distinctly heard at different 
 points near my right." — Longstreet : Report of Fredericksburg. 
 
 i Hill's Report : Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 464. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 247 
 
 and tlie line advanced so boldly that the three Confederate 
 batteries posted in advance of the railroad had to be hastily 
 withdraAvn. 
 
 The division of Hill which held Jackson's advanced line was 
 thus disposed: the brigades of Archer, Lane, and Pender 
 from right to left, with Gregg's in rear of the interval between 
 Archer and Lane, and Thomas's in rear of that between Lane 
 and Pender. Meade pushed forward his line impetuously, 
 drove back Lane through the woods, and then, wedging in be- 
 tween Lane and the brigade on his right (Archer's) swept back 
 the right flank of the one and the left flank of the other, cap- 
 turing above two hundred prisoners and several standards, 
 crossed the railroad, pushed up the crest, and reached Gregg's 
 position on a new military road which Lee had made for the 
 purpose of establishing direct connection between his two 
 wings, and behind which Jackson's second line was posted.* 
 
 And now was seen the farcical character of Burnside's order 
 of attack, by which a single division of five thousand men was 
 assigned the work of fifty thousand. For, in assaults of this 
 kind, there comes a moment of supreme importance, when the 
 attacking column, having carried the enemy's first line, must 
 assure its victory by a decisive blow, or be driven back by the 
 hostile reserves and lose the fruit of all its toil. In this 
 moment of intoxication and peril, the attacking Hne, confused 
 and disintegrated by its advance, must be instantly supported 
 by a fresh body, to consolidate and crown the victory, or else 
 the enemy rallies and repels the victors. 
 
 Such was precisely the result that happened to Meade ; for 
 no sooner had he penetrated to the military road behind 
 which the Confederate second line lay, than he was met by a 
 fire for which he was not at all prepared. " The advancing 
 
 * The importance of this road has been greatly exaggerated by General 
 Bumside : it was made merely for convenience of transportation, and was in 
 no sense a key-point. Meade's attack was certainly made in a spirited manner, 
 but its success has also been much over-estimated. The dispositions and force 
 of the Confederates plainly show that nothing could have resulted even bad 
 Franklin's entire Grand Division been put in. 
 
248 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 columns of the enemy," says General Hill,* " liad encountered 
 an obstacle in the military road which they Kttle expected — 
 Gregg's brigade of South Carolinians stood in the way." It 
 appears that the advancing Federals were mistaken for a 
 body of Confederate troops, and Gregg would not allow his men 
 to open on them. When their true character was revealed, 
 the brigade poured a withering fire into the faces of Meade's 
 men ; and, at that moment, Early's division — one of the two 
 divisions of Jackson's second line — swept forward at the 
 double-quick, and instantly turned the tide.f Exposed to fire 
 on both flanks, Meade was forced to draw back, losing 
 severely in the process ; and the disaster would have been 
 much greater had not supports been at hand. General Frank- 
 lin, giving a liberal interpretation to Burnside's prescription of 
 " one division at least" for the column of attack, had put in not 
 only Meade's division but Gibbon's division and Doubleday's 
 division, making the whole of Reynolds' corps. Doubleday, 
 early in the attack, was turned off to the left to meet a menace 
 by the enemy from that direction ; but Gibbon advanced on the 
 right of Meade, and, though he did not push on as far as the 
 latter, he helped stem the hostile return, and assisted in the 
 withdrawal of Meade's shattered line.:|: In addition to these 
 two divisions. General Frankhn ordered forward Birney's divi- 
 sion of Stoneman's corj)S ; and Birney arrived in such time 
 that, when the troops of Meade and Gibbon were broken and 
 flying in confusion, he presented a firm line that checked the 
 Confederate pursuit.§ Meade's loss was very heavy — ^upwards 
 
 * Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 463. 
 
 f I learn from Colonel Marshall of the staff of General Lee, that General 
 Gregg was killed on the military road while beating down the muskets of his 
 men to prevent them firing into what he supposed was a body of Confederate 
 troops. 
 
 :j: Meade : Report of Fredericksburg. 
 
 § " As I advanced with my command to the crest of the hill, I foimd 
 Meade's entire command — two divisions — in utter confusion, and flying in all 
 directions without order from the field. At General Meade's request I tried to 
 atop the rout with my command, and deployed two regiments to try to stop 
 the fugitives ; but it was useless — they went right through us. The enemy 
 
THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 249 
 
 of forty j)er cent, of his whole command ; and the aggregate 
 loss in Reynolds' corps was upwards of four thousand men. 
 
 At the time the attack on the left was fully developed, 
 Sumner, on the right, was instructed to assail the height back 
 of Fredericksburg. He also was ordered to make the attack 
 with a single division, supported by another. Of the two 
 corps composing Sumner's Grand Di^dsion, Couch's (Second) 
 corps occupied the town, and Wilcox's (Ninth) held the inter- 
 val between the left of Couch and the right of Franklin's 
 command. The attack, therefore, fell to the lot of Couch ; 
 and, in accordance with instructions, he ordered forward 
 French's division from the town at noon, to be followed and 
 supported by Hancock's division.* 
 
 French, debouching from the town, moved out on the plank 
 and telegraph roads, and, crossing the canal, found a rise of 
 ground, under cover of which he deployed his troops in 
 column of attack with brigade front.f Hancock's division 
 followed and joined the advance of French.:}: Even while 
 moving through the town, and marching by the flank, the 
 troops were exposed to a very severe fire from the enemy's 
 
 pursued them closely with great slaughter, as they fled from the field. The 
 pui-suit was so close that they came within fifty yards of my guns. I think it 
 was Early's division," etc. — Testimony of General Birney : Report on the Con- 
 duct of the War, vol. i., p. 705. General Meade's own report, as well as the 
 Confederate reports, agree substantially with this account. See Hill's Report : 
 Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 462 ; Early's Report : 
 Ibid., p. 469. Birney's statement, regarding the pursuing column being that of 
 Early, is curiously corroborated by the oflBcial report of the latter, in which he 
 states that his division " was compelled to fall back from the pursuit by a 
 large column on its right flank, which proved to be Birney's didsioii," etc — 
 Ibid., p. 470. 
 
 * Couch: Report of Fredericksburg. 
 
 f " General Kimball's brigade was in front, and by its subsequent conduct 
 showed itself worthy to lead. It was followed in succession by the brigades of 
 Colonel J. W. Andrews, First Delaware, and Colonel Palmer, One Hundred 
 and Eighth New York." — Couch : Report of Fredericksburg. 
 
 t Hancock's formation was the same as that of French : " brigade front with 
 intervals of two hundred paces — the brigades in the order of Zook, Meagher, 
 and Caldwell." — Hancock: Report of Fredericksburg. 
 
250 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AEMY OP THE POTOMAC. 
 
 batteries on tlie heights, against whicli it soon became im- 
 possible for the numerous Union artillery on the north bank 
 of the Rappahannock to direct its fire, seeing that the missiles 
 presently began to play havoc with the columns advancing 
 over the plain.* 
 
 Longstreet, who held the position in the rear of Fredericks- 
 burg, forming the Confederate left, had taken up as his ad- 
 vance line the stone wall and rifle-trenches along the telegraph 
 road, at the foot of Marye's Heights ; and here he posted a 
 brigade, afterwards re-enforced by another brigade. t But 
 the whole plain was swept by a direct and converging fire 
 fi-om the numerous batteries on the semicircular crest above, 
 and behind this lay the heavy Confederate reserves — un- 
 needed, as it proved, for a few men were enough to do the 
 bloody work. Under orders, nothing was left but to assail 
 this position ; so French first was thrown forward from the 
 rise of ground, where he had formed, towards the foot of the 
 heights. No sooner had this division burst out on the plain, 
 than from the batteries above came a fi-ightful fire — cross 
 showers of shot and shell opening great gaps in the ranks ; 
 but " closing up," the ever-thinning hues pressed on, and had 
 passed over a great part of the interval, when met by volleys 
 of musketry at short range. They fell back, shattered and 
 broken, with a loss of near half their number, amid shouts 
 and yells from the enemy. Close behind French came up 
 Hancock, and, being joined by such portions of French's 
 command as still preserved their formation, his three bri- 
 gades vahantly advanced under the same terrific fire, passed 
 
 * " Our artillery being in position, opened fire as soon as the masses be 
 came dense enough to warrant it. This fire was very destructive and demoral- 
 izing in its effects, and frequently made gaps in the enemy's ranks that could 
 be seen at the distance of a mile." — Longstreet : Report of Fredericksburg. 
 
 f This position was first held by the brigade of R. R. Cobb, re-enforced in 
 the afternoon by Kershaw's brigade, both of McLaws' division ; and this small 
 force, not exceeding seventeen hundred men, was all that was found necessary 
 to repulse the numerous assaults made by the Union columns. — McLaws : Re- 
 ports of the Army of Northern Virginia, vol. ii., p. 445. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 251 
 
 the point French had reached, and like those that went before 
 them, M'ere forced back after little more than fifteen im- 
 mortal minutes. Of the five thousand men Hancock led into 
 action, more than two thousand fell in that charge ; and it 
 was found that the bravest of these had thrown up their 
 hands and lay dead within five-and-twenty paces of the stone 
 wall.* To relieve Hancock's and French's hard-pressed bat- 
 talions, Howard's division now came up, and Sturgis' and 
 Getty's divisions of the Ninth Corps advanced on Couch's 
 left, and made several attacks in support of the brave troops 
 of the Second Corps, who could not advance and would not 
 retire ; but all these could do was to hold a line well ad- 
 vanced on the plain under a continual murderous fire of ar- 
 tillery. 
 
 It is hardly to be supposed that General Burnside had con- 
 templated the bloody sequence to which he was committing 
 himself when first he ordered a division to assail the heights 
 of Fredericksburg ; but having failed in the first assault, and 
 then in the second and third, there grew up in his mind some- 
 thing which those around him saw to be akin to desperation. 
 Riding down from his headquarterst to the bank of the Rap- 
 pahannock, he walked restlessly up and down, and gazing 
 over at the heights across the river, exclaimed vehemently, 
 " That crest must be carried to-night."| Already, however, 
 every thing had been thrown in, except Hooker, and he was 
 now ordered over the river. 
 
 Crossing with three of his divisions. Hooker went forward, 
 reconnoitred the ground, consulted with those who had pre- 
 
 * Hancock took five thousand and six men into action, and Ms loss, num- 
 bered two thousand and thirteen men, of whom one hundred and fifty-sis were 
 commissioned oflBcers. The losses in some of the regiments were of a severity 
 seldom seen in any battle, no matter how prolonged. " These were veteran 
 regiments," says Hancock, " led by able and tried commanders." — Report ol 
 Fredericksburg. 
 
 f At the " Phillips House," a mile or so back from the river. 
 
 :{: These statements are made from the personal knowledge of the writer, in 
 whose presence what is related occurred. 
 
252 CAJVIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 ceded him in action, saw that the case was hopeless, and 
 went to beg Burnside to cease the attack. But Burnside in- 
 sisted.* Couch had abeady thrown forward two batteries to 
 within one hundred and fifty yards of the enemy's works, and 
 endeavored to make a breach large enough for the entrance 
 of a forlorn hope. After a vigorous cannonading, without 
 any perceptible effect, Humphrey's division was formed in 
 column of assault and ordered in. They were directed to 
 make the assault with empty muskets, for there was no time 
 there to load and fire.f 
 
 When the word was given, the men moved forward with 
 great impetuosity, and advanced to nearly the same point Han- 
 cock had previously reached, close up to the stone wall : they 
 advanced, in fact, over a space the traversing of which by any 
 column would result in the destruction of half its numbers, 
 when they were thrown swiftly back, leaving behind seven- 
 teen hundred of the four thousand that had gone forward.:}: 
 What else might have followed in the commander's then 
 mood of mind, it is impossible to say ; but it was already late 
 when Hooker's attack was begun, and night now dropped its 
 curtain on a tragic scene, that might be fitly written only in 
 the blood of the thousands of brave men who lay dead or 
 moaning in agony worse than death on the plains of Freder- 
 icksburg. 
 
 So decisive was the action of the day that it is difiicult to 
 see how there could be any question touching the propriety 
 of recrossing the Eajopahannock. This course was earnestly 
 urged by the chief commanders ; but General Burnside judged 
 
 * " I had the matter so much at heart that I put spurs to my horse, and rode 
 over myself, and tried to dissuade General Burnside from making the attack. 
 Be insisted on its being done."— Hooker's testimony : Report on the Conduct of 
 the War, vol. i., p. 668. 
 
 •f- Hooker : Report of Fredericksburg. 
 
 J There is an almost savage irony in the manner in which General Hooker 
 states the result of this attack. " Finding," says he, " that I had lost as many 
 men as my orders required me to lose, I suspended the attack."— Report on the 
 Conduct of the War, vol. i., p. 668. 
 
THE CAIVIPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 253 
 
 otlierwise, and determined to renew the assault on tlie 
 morrow. The form this determination took was an evidence 
 that he had lost that mental equipoise essential for a com- 
 mander in the difl&cult situation in which he found Jiimself. 
 He resolved to form the Ninth Corps (which he had himself 
 formerly commanded) in a column of attack by regiments, 
 and lead it in person to the assault of the heights. All the 
 preparations had been completed, and the attack was about 
 to be made when, moved by the urgent entreaties of Gen- 
 eral Sumner, Burnside desisted from his purpose. The 
 troops, however, still lay on their arms during Sunday, the 
 14th, and Monday, the 15th, of December, and, during the 
 night, in the midst of a violent storm, the army was with- 
 drawn to the north side of the Eappahannock, General Lee, 
 unaware of the extent of the disaster the Union army had 
 suffered, hourly expecting a renewal of the attack, and deem- 
 ing it inexpedient to expose his troops to the fire of the 
 batteries on the north bank, refrained during all this time 
 fi'om assuming the offensive,* and the withdrawal eluded his 
 knowledge. 
 
 The loss on the Union side was twelve thousand three hun- 
 dred and twenty-one, killed, wounded, and missing ;t and on 
 the part of the Confederates, it was five thousand three hun- 
 dred and nine, kiUed, wounded, and missing.:}: 
 
 There is little need for comment on this battle, or for other 
 reflection than must spontaneously arise from the simple 
 recital of its incidents. Such slaughters stand condemned in 
 the common voice of mankind, which justly holds a com- 
 
 * Lee : Report of Fredericksburg in Reports of the Army of Northern 
 Virginia, vol. i., p. 43. 
 
 f Halleck : Report of Military Operations for 1863. General Halleck adds 
 that a good many of the Union " missing" afterwards turned up. 
 
 ^ This aggregate I make up from the returns of the two corps of Lee's army 
 —the First (Longstreet's) losing three thousand four hundred and fifteen, and 
 the Second (Jackson's) one thousand eight hundred and ninety-four. Confed- 
 erate Reports of Fredericksburg. 
 
254 ca:mpaigns op the aemy of the potomac 
 
 mander accountable for the useless sacrifice of liuman life. 
 There are occasions when, as at Thermopylae, a general is 
 doomed to the tragic fate of immolating himself and his 
 army ; but such cases are rare and exceptional. It was not 
 necessary for General Burnside, in a problem that admitted 
 of very many solutions, to give to his army the character of a 
 forlorn hope, in the assault of positions chosen, long-prepared, 
 and impregnable, when he was free by manoeuvres to select 
 his own field of battle. 
 
 But even with the choice made of a direct attack of the 
 fortified ridge, the plan of battle — if such fatuitous devise- 
 ment as has seldom been seen can be called a ylan — was 
 exceedingly faulty. The conditions of attack and defence, 
 and the nature of the position already set forth, dictated that 
 the principal operation should be made from the left, where 
 Franklin held one-half the army in hand. It is true that 
 General Burnside, at a period subsequent to the battle, 
 asserted that this was his purpose, and endeavored to fasten 
 the responsibility of the disaster on General Franklin's 
 alleged failure to make an adequate attack. But judging by 
 the orders in which General Burnside's original intent and 
 will are revealed, rather than by the inspirations of after- 
 thought, it is manifest that, if he designed to make the main 
 attack from the left, he at least made no provisions for giving 
 effect to this intention. It would appear from his own state- 
 ment, that he made his theory of battle to hinge on a con- 
 tingency which he used no adequate means to bring about, 
 unless it be thought that two isolated attacks on the for- 
 tified stronghold of the Confederates, made by a single 
 division each, were adequate means to this end, and af- 
 Torded a reasonable hope of carrying the position. That 
 they were wholly inadequate was proved by the terrible 
 experiences of the day, both on the right and the left ; 
 and the preliminary attacks having failed, as they must, I 
 can only account for the tragic sequence, on the supposition 
 I have already stated, that, distraught and demented with 
 the failure. General Burnside continued in sheer despera- 
 
THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 255 
 
 tion to throw in division after division, to foredoomed de- 
 struction. 
 
 But while this may explain, it will not justify General 
 Burnside's conduct. It would have been well for him had 
 the failure of the first assaults, and the disclosures they made 
 of the strength and position of the enemy, given him 
 pause in their repetition. When General Warren at Mine 
 Bun, after viewing the enemy's line, which, like that at Fred- 
 ericksburg, was manifestly impregnable, declined to throw 
 away the lives that had been placed in his charge, preferring 
 with a noble sense of honor and duty to sacrifice himself 
 rather than his command, that instinct of right which is never 
 absent in a generous people, appreciated the motive and 
 applauded the act. 
 
 Had General Burnside followed the like prompting, he 
 would have saved his name from association with a slaughter 
 the most bloody and the most useless of the war. 
 
 III. 
 
 ABORTIVE MOVEMENTS ON THE EAPPAHANNOCK. 
 
 In tracing the development of military operations as they 
 stand related to the army that was the agent of their execu- 
 tion, it is important to mark not only the army's condition of 
 material strength and weU-being, but those moral transforma- 
 tions with which, in so large a degree, its efficiency as a living 
 organism is bound up. 
 
 Nothing is more difficult than to indicate, in precise terms, 
 that blending of qualities, passions, prejudices, and illusions, 
 that at any given time make up what is expressively called 
 the morale of an army. Like the imponderable forces of 
 physical philosophy, 1t is inappreciable by material weight 
 and measure. Yet, if difficult of analysis, it does not fail to 
 make itself felt as a palpable power ; and the foremost master 
 
256 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 of war attempted to convej Lis sense of its potency by the 
 expression that in military affairs, " the moral is to the physi- 
 •cal as three to one." 
 
 That the morale of the Army of the Potomac became 
 seriously impaired after the disaster at Fredericksburg was 
 only too manifest. Indeed it would be impossible to imagine 
 a graver or gloomier, a more sombre or unmusical body of 
 men than the Army of the Potomac a month after the battle. 
 And as the days went by, despondency, discontent, and all 
 evil inspirations, with their natural consequence, desertion, 
 seemed to increase rather than to diminish, until, for the first 
 time, the Army of the Potomac could be said to be really 
 demoralized.* 
 
 The cause of all this could not be concealed ; it was the 
 lack of confidence in General Burnside — a sentiment that was 
 universal throughout the army. Troops who have by experi- 
 ence learned what war is, become severe critics. It is a mis- 
 take to suppose that soldiers, and especially such soldiers as 
 composed the American army, are lavish of their Hves ; they 
 are chary of their lives, and are never what newspaper jargon 
 constantly represented them to be — "eager for the fray." 
 " The soldier," says Marmont, " acquires the faculty of dis- 
 criminating how and when he will be able, by offering his Hfe 
 as a sacrifice, to make the best jDOSsible use of it." But when 
 the time comes that he discovers in his commander that which 
 will make this rich offering vain, from that moment begin to 
 work those malign influences that disintegrate and destroy 
 the morale of armies. General Burnside had brought his 
 army to that unhappy pass that, with much regard for his 
 person and character, it distrusted and feared his leadership ; 
 while the general officers had Httle belief in or respect for his 
 
 * The form which this demoralization assumed was aptly expressed by 
 General Sumner, in his official testimony before the Committee on the Conduct 
 of the War touching the battle and the condition of the army as a general 
 spirit of " croaking." " It is difficult," said he, " to describe the state of the 
 army in other way than by saying there is a great deal too much croaking— 
 there is not sufficient confidence." 
 
THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 257 
 
 military plans. It is easy to sec liow fatal to the success of 
 any military operations must have been this state of affairs ; 
 and this received striking illustration in the two attempted 
 movements which fill up the remainder of General Burnside's 
 career as commander of the Army of the Potomac. The first 
 of these movements was undertaken a fortnight after the bat- 
 tle of Fredericksburg, towards the close of December. Gen- 
 eral Burnside had determined to cross the Rappahannock 
 seven miles below Fredericksburg, with a view to turn the 
 Confederate position, and in connection with this operation 
 he resolved to send a cavalry expedition to the rear of Lee's 
 army for the purpose of cutting the raihoad communications 
 of the Confederates. Now the raiding column had actually 
 got under way, and the whole army was in readiness for an 
 immediate move, when, on the 30th of December, General 
 Burnside received a dispatch fi^om President Lincoln instruct- 
 ing him not to enter on active operations without letting the 
 President know of it. Surprised at this message. General 
 Burnside recalled the cavaby expedition, and proceeded per- 
 sonally to Washington to ascertain the cause of the presiden- 
 tial prohibition. On seeing Mr. Lincoln, he was informed by 
 him that certain general officers of the Army of the Potomac 
 had come up to see him, and had represented that the army 
 was on the eve of another movement ; that all the prehminary 
 arrangements were made, and that they, and every prominent 
 officer in the army, were satisfied, if the movement was 
 entered upon, it would result in disaster. In consequence of 
 this condition of facts, the President, without prohibiting a 
 move, judged that any large enterprise, at that time, would 
 be injudicious ; and General Burnside retui'ned to his head- 
 quarters amazed at the revelation of the state of feeling in the 
 army that was notorious to every one in it save the com- 
 mander himself. 
 
 The position in which that officer now found himseK was 
 as false as it was humihating ; and was one that neither his 
 own sense of honor, nor the Government's sense of the public 
 welfare, should have permitted him to occupy. He had lost 
 
 17 
 
258 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF TBE POTOMAC. 
 
 the confidence of the army ; he was unable to obtain the 
 sanction of the general-in-chief to any proposition for a move- 
 ment, and at the same time the country looked to him for 
 action. In this unhappy situation, General Burnside's con- 
 duct was marked by a self-sacrificing and patriotic spirit ; 
 but he was utterly helpless to extricate himseK from the coil 
 that enveloped him. At length, as the be-all and the end-all 
 of his hopes, he resolved to again try the fortune of battle, in 
 the expectation that if successful it would rehabilitate him in 
 the confidence of the army. 
 
 Unfortunately, success was already too necessary to him, 
 and he made too much contingent upon it ; for if success was 
 needful as the means of recovering the confidence of the 
 army, this very confidence was itseK indisjDensable as a con- 
 dition of success. 
 
 The point at which General Burnside resolved this time to 
 essay the passage of the Rappahannock was Banks' Ford (not 
 then fordable), about six miles above Fredericksburg. As, 
 however, the enemy had a force in observation at aU the 
 practicable crossings of the Eappahannock, and as there was 
 no possibility of making preparations for the passage at any 
 one point with such secrecy that he should not become aware 
 of it, it was resolved to make feints of crossing at several 
 distinct points, both above and below Fredericksburg, and 
 thus mask the real intent. Accordingly, new roads were cut 
 through the w^oods to afi'ord readier access to the fords, bat- 
 teries w^ere planted, rifle-trenches were formed, and cavalry 
 demonstrations made along the Hue ; and these manifesta- 
 tions were made impartially at a variety of points. 
 
 The weather and roads had been in excellent condition 
 since the late battle, and on the 19th of January, 1863, the 
 columns were put in motion with such secrecy as could be 
 observed. The Grand Divisions of Franklin and Hooker 
 ascended the river by parallel roads, and at night encamped 
 in the woods at convenient distance fi'om the fords. Couch's 
 corps was moved below Fredericksburg to make demonstra- 
 tions there, and the reserve corps under Sigel, which had 
 
THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 259 
 
 been united witli tlie Army of the Potomac, was assigned 
 the duty of guarding the line of the river and the commu- 
 nications of the army. Preparations for crossing were pushed 
 on during the 20th, positions for artillery were selected, the 
 guns were brought up, the pontons were within reach a short 
 distance back from the river, and it was determined to make 
 the passage on the following morning. 
 
 But during the night a terrible storm came on, and then 
 each man felt that the move was ended. It was a wild 
 Walpurgis night, such as Goethe paints in the Faust. Yet 
 there was bra^-B work done during its hours, for the guns were 
 hauled painfully up the heights and placed in their positions, 
 and the pontons were drawn down nearer to the river. But 
 it was aheady seen to be a hopeless task ; for the clayey 
 roads and fields, under the influence of the rain, had become 
 bad beyond all former experience, and by daylight, when the 
 boats should all have been on the banks ready to slide down 
 into the water, but fifteen had been gotten up — ^not enough 
 for one bridge, and five were wanted. Moreover, the night 
 operations had not escaped the notice of the wary enemy, 
 and by morning Lee had massed his army to meet the men- 
 aced crossing. 
 
 In this state of facts, when aU the conditions on which it 
 was expected to make a successful passage had been baullved, 
 it would have been judicious in General Burnside to have 
 promptly abandoned an operation that was now hopeless. 
 But it was a characteristic of that general's mind (a char- 
 acteristic that might be good or bad according to the 
 direction it took), never to turn back when he had once 
 put his hand to the plough ; and it had already more than 
 once been seen that the more hopeless the enterprise 
 the greater his pertinacity. The night's rain had made 
 deplorable havoc with the roads;* but herculean efforts 
 
 * The nature of the upper geologic deposits of this region affords unequalled 
 elements for bad roads, for it is a soil out of which, when it rains, the bottom 
 drops, and yet which is so tenacious that extrication from its clutch is next to 
 impossible. 
 
260 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OP THE POTOMAC. 
 
 were made to bring pontons enough into position to luild a 
 bridge or two withal. Double and triple teams of horses and 
 mtdes were harnessed to each boat ; but it was in vain. Long 
 stout ropes were then attached to the teams and a hundred 
 and fifty men put to the task on each. The efi'ort was but 
 little more successful. Floundering through the mire for a 
 few feet, the gang of Liliputians with their huge-ribbed 
 Gulliver, were forced to give over, breathless. Night arrived, 
 but the pontons could not be got up, and the enemy's pickets, 
 discovering what was going on, jocularly shouted out their 
 intention to " come over to-morrow and help build the 
 bridges." 
 
 Morning dawned upon another day of rain and storm. 
 The ground had gone from bad to w^orse, and now showed 
 such a spectacle as might be' presented by the elemental 
 wrecks of another Deluge. An indescribable chaos of pon- 
 tons, vehicles, and artillery encumbered all the roads — supply- 
 wagons upset by the road-side, guns stalled in the mud, 
 ammunition-trains mired by the w^ay, and hundreds of horses 
 and mules buried in the liquid muck. The army, in fact, was 
 embargoed : it was no longer a question of how to go forward 
 — ^it was a question of how to get back. The three-days' 
 rations brought on the persons of the men were exhausted, 
 and the supp'ly-trains could not be moved up. To aid the 
 return all the available force was put to work to corduroy the 
 rotten roads. Nest morning the army floundered and stag- 
 gered back to the old camps, and so ended a movement that 
 will always live in the recollection of the army as the " Mud 
 March," and which remains a striking exemplification of the 
 enormous difficulties incident to winter campaigning in 
 Yirginia. 
 
 The failure of this movement is sufficiently accounted for 
 by those " slings and arrows of outrageous fortune" the effect 
 of which I have endeavored to portray ; and the commander 
 was certainly justified in suspending it, and recalhng the army 
 to its quarters, when the operation was seen to be hopeless. 
 But General Burnside had fancied that he discovered another 
 
THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 261 
 
 and deeper cause, that, aside fi-om the interference of the 
 weather, would have baulked his projected campaign. This 
 cause was a lack of confidence in him which he believed to be 
 entertained by the leading officers of the army. Among these 
 officers were Generals FrankHn and Hooker, respectively com- 
 manders of Grand Divisions ; and his first act on the return 
 of the expedition was to prepare an order dismissing from 
 the service of the United States Generals Hooker, Brooks, 
 Cochrane, and Newton, and reheving from their commands in 
 the Army of the Potomac, Generals Franklin, "W. F. Smith, 
 Sturgis, Ferrero, and Colonel Taylor. Upon this order he 
 resolved to make issue with the Government ; and he immedi- 
 ately took this paper to Washington, demanding of the Presi- 
 dent its approval or the acceptance of his resignation. It was 
 not asserted by General Burnside that the officers named had 
 been guilty of any derehction of duty, but simply that they 
 lacked confidence in him as commander. This charge was 
 probably true ; but, as this issue involved the alternative of 
 relieving nearly the whole body of the officers of the army or 
 of relieving General Burnside himself, the President was com- 
 pelled to refuse to sanction the order. General Burnside's 
 resignation was accepted; and General Hooker, the officer 
 whose name stood in the order as head and front of all the 
 offending, and who, by its terms, was dismissed the service of 
 the United States, was by the President placed in command 
 in his stead. 
 
 General Burnside's career as head of the Army of the 
 Potomac was as unfortunate as it was brief; and there is 
 much in its circumstances and in his character to inspire a 
 lenient judgment. His elevation to the command was un- 
 sought by him ; for, with a good sense that was creditable to 
 him, he knew and proclaimed his unfitness for the trust. It 
 was right to try him, because it was impossible to tell whether 
 his own gauge of his fitness was correct, or whether he wronged 
 himseK by a seK-distrust that he might soon surmount. 
 When, however, the trial had proved the absolute justness of 
 
202 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARJVIT OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 his measure of his own incapacity (and there can be no doubt 
 that this was fully j)^'^"^®^^ ^7 ^^® events of the battle of Fred- 
 ericksbui-g), they must be held accountable for the conse- 
 quences who retained him in a position which his own judg- 
 ment, now fortified by the general verdict of the army, 
 pronounced him unequal to fill. His retention after this, if 
 there be any fidelity in the portrayal I have presented of the 
 condition of the army, imperilled not only its efiiciency but its 
 existence. Desertions were going on at the rate of about 
 two himdred a day, and the ofl&cial rolls at the time he 
 was relieved showed an absence from the Army of the Poto- 
 mac of above eighty thousand men — " absent from causes 
 unknown."* 
 
 I must here add that, while the superior officers had little 
 respect for Burnside's military plans, they, nevertheless, did 
 not allow their personal views to influence in the least their 
 conduct. And it is the more important to state this con- 
 viction with emphasis, because it was commonly believed 
 throughout the country that General Burnside, especially in 
 the last operation attempted, failed to receive from his sub- 
 ordinates that hearty co-operation absolutely necessary to the 
 success of any mihtary enterprise.f It is not unHkely that 
 General Burnside himself had the same suspicion ; for, though 
 he did not put it forth, yet it is hardly to be supposed that 
 he would have demanded the dismissal of the officers named 
 in his expurgatorial index on the mere ground of their ab- 
 stract mihtary views — for it is vain for any commander to ex- 
 pect to control these. General Burnside was, and would have 
 been, obeyed in the execution of all his plans of operation ; 
 
 * Report on the Conduct of tlie War, second series, vol. i., p. 112. 
 
 f It was one of the traits of the public temper during the war to be in con- 
 stant suspicion of disaffection and disloyalty on the part of officers. Yet, if 
 there be one characteristic of that period more remarkable than another, it is 
 the absence of these things. And, in this regard, it strikingly contrasts with 
 the common experience of nations at war ; for even Napoleon, wielding im- 
 perial power, found it next to impossible to subordinate the individual wills of 
 bis lieutenants. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 263 
 
 for there was that loyal alacrity among the officers that would 
 have prompted this in any circumstances of personal relation. 
 If, however, he was unable to command the homage of their 
 intellectual approval, that was his own misfortune.* 
 
 * It may be observed that many of the leading officers of the Army of the 
 Potomac were not in favor of operating by the Fredericksburg line. The fol- 
 lowing correspondence between Generals Franklin and Smith and President 
 Lincoln has relation to this question. It is of great interest and has not before 
 
 been published. 
 
 Headquaktebs Lekt Grand Division, 
 December 21, 1862. 
 
 To THE President : 
 
 The imdersigned, holding important commands in the Army of the Poto- 
 mac, impressed with a belief that a plan of operations of this army may be 
 devised which will be crowned with success, and that the plan of campaign 
 which has already been commenced, cannot possibly be successful, i:)resent with 
 diffidence the following views for consideration. Whether the plan proposed 
 be adopted or not, they consider it their duty to present these views, thinking 
 that perhaps they may be suggestive to some other military mind in discuss- 
 ing plans for the future operations of our armies in the East. 
 
 I. — We believe that the plan of campaign already commenced will not be 
 successful for the following reasons, viz. : 
 
 1. The distance from this point to Pdchmond is sixty-one miles. 
 
 It will be necessary to keep open our communications with Aquia Creek 
 Landing from all points of this route. To effect this, the presence of large 
 bodies of troops on the road will be necessary at many points. The result of 
 making these detachments would be, that the enemy will attack them, inter- 
 rupt the communications, and the army will be obliged to return to drive him 
 away. 
 
 If the railroad be rebuilt as the army marches, it will be destroyed at 
 important points by the enemy. 
 
 If we do not depend upon the railroad, but upon wagon transportation, the 
 trains will be so enormous that a great deal of the strength of the army will 
 be required to guard them, and the troops will be so separated by the trains, 
 and the roads so blocked by them, that the advance and rear of the army could 
 not be within supporting distance of each other. 
 
 2. It is in the power of the enemy at many points on this route to post 
 himself strongly and defy us. The whole strength of our army may not be 
 sufficient to drive him away ; and even were he driven away at great sacrifice 
 of blood on our part, the result would not be decisive. The losses to him in hia 
 strong positions would be comparatively slight, while ours will be enormous. 
 
 II. — In our opinion, any plan of campaign to be successful should possess 
 the following requisites, viz. : 
 
2G4 CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 It was not possible to continue a condition of affairs that 
 neutralized the best forces of the army, and the President 
 wisely relieved General Burnside from a position deeply 
 
 1. All of the troops available in the East should be massed. 
 
 2. They should approach as near to Richmond as possible without an en- 
 gagement. 
 
 3. The line of communication should be absolutely free from danger of 
 interruption. 
 
 A campaign on the James River enables us to fulfil all these conditions 
 more absolutely than any other, for, 
 
 1. On the James River our troops from both North and South can be con- 
 centrated more rapidly than they can be at any other point. 
 
 2. They can be brought to points within twenty miles of Richmond with- 
 out the risk of an engagement. 
 
 3. The communication by the James River can be kept up by the assist- 
 ance of the navy, without the slightest danger of interruption. 
 
 Some of the details of tliis plan are the following : 
 
 We premise that by concentrating our troops in the East, we will be able 
 to raise two hundred and fifty thousand men. 
 
 Let them be landed on both sides of the James River as near Richmond as 
 possible, one hundred and fifty thousand on the north bank, and one hundred 
 thousand or more on the south bank. All of them to carry three days' pro- 
 visions on their persons and one hundred rounds of ammunition, without any 
 other baggage than blankets, and shelter-tents, and a pair of socks, and a pair 
 of drawers. Let it be understood that every third day a corps or grand 
 division is provisioned from the river. If this arrangement be practicable 
 (and we think it is), we get rid of all baggage, provision, and infantry ammu- 
 nition wagons, and the only vehicles will be the artillery and its ammunition 
 wagons and the ambulances. The mobility of the army caused by .carrying 
 out these views will be more like that of an immense partisan'corps than a 
 modern army. 
 
 The two armies marching up the banks may meet the enemy on or near 
 the river. By means of pontons kept afloat, and towed so as to be reached at 
 any point, one army can in a few hours cross to assist the other. It is hardly 
 supposable that the enemy can have force enough to withstand the shock of 
 two such bodies. 
 
 If the enemy declines to fight on the river, the army on the south bank, or 
 a portion of it, will take possession of the railroads running south from Rich- 
 mond, while the remainder will proceed to the investment or attack upon, 
 Richmond, according to circumstances. 
 
 ^^'hether the investment of Richmond leads to the destruction or capture 
 of the enemy's army or not, it certainly will lead to the capture of the rebel 
 
THE CiytfPAIGN ON THE RAPPAHANKOCK. 265 
 
 humiliating to any man of honor. He lapsed from the great- 
 ness thrust upon him without forfeiting the respect of the 
 
 capital, and the war will be on a better footing than it is now or has any 
 present prospect of being. 
 
 The troops available for the movement are : the Army of the Potomac, the 
 troops in Florida, South Carolina, and North Carolina, with the exception of 
 those necessary to hold the places now occupied, the regiments now in process 
 of organization, and those who are on extra duty and furlough, deserters, and 
 stragglers. 
 
 The number of these last is enormou?, and the most stringent measures 
 must be taken to collect them — no excuse should be received for absence. 
 
 Some of the troops in Western Virginia might also be detached. 
 
 The transports should consist of ordinary steamers and large ferrv-boats 
 and barges. The ferry-boats may become of the greatest use in transporting 
 troops across the James River. 
 
 With the details of the movement we do not trouble you. Should the 
 general idea bo adopted, these can be thoroughly digested and worked out by 
 the generals and their staffs to whom the execution of the plan is committed. 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servants, 
 
 W. B. Franklin, Major-General. 
 W. F. Smith, Major-General. 
 
 Executive Mansion, Washington, December 22, 1862. 
 Major-General Franklin and Major-General Smith: 
 
 Yours of the 21st, suggesting a plan of operations for the Army of the 
 Potomac, is received. I have hastily read the plan and shall yet try to give it 
 more deliberate consideration, with the aid of military men. Meanwhile, let 
 me say it seems to me to present the old questions of preference between the 
 line of the Peninsula and the line you are now upon. The difficulties you 
 point out pertaining to the Fredericksburg line are obvious and palpable. 
 But now, as heretofore, if you go to the James River, a large part of the army 
 must remain on or near the Fredericksburg line to protect Washington. It 
 is the old difficulty. 
 
 When I saw General Franklin at Harrison's Landing on James River, last 
 July, I cannot be mistaken in saying that he distinctly advised the bringing of 
 the army away from there. Yours, very truly, 
 
 A. Lincoln. 
 
 Headquarters Left Grand Division, December 26, 1862, 
 To THE President: 
 
 I respectfully acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22d iust. In 
 arguing the propriety of a campaign on the James River, we supposed Wash- 
 ington to be garrisoned sufficiently, and the Potomac impassable except by 
 bridges. The fortification of Harper's Ferry is another important requisite. 
 
266 CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 country for his zeal and patriotism ; but he left behind him no 
 illusions respecting his capacity for the command of an army. 
 
 These matters were considered as of course, and did not enter into our discus- 
 sion of the two plans of campaign. I presume that you are right in supposing 
 that I advised tlie withdrawal of the army from James River in July last. I 
 think that under the same circumstances I would give the same advice. The 
 army was debilitated by what it had already gone through, was in an un- 
 healthy position, its sick list was enormous, and there was a prospect that we 
 would have to remain in that position during the two worst months — August 
 and September. The effect of this would have been to ruin the army in 
 health. Circumstances are very different now. The army is in good health, 
 and the best mouths of the year are before us. 
 
 Very reBpectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 W. B. Frai^klin, Major-QeneraL 
 

 
 -ZMj * oj, KS.JUdl d Sims. JTtz^ Yir 
 
THE CHANCELLORSVILIJ: CAilPAIGN. 267 
 
 YIII. 
 
 THE CHINCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 
 
 April— May, 1863. 
 
 I. 
 
 THE ARMY UNDER HOOKER. 
 
 In an army composed of citizens of a free country who 
 have taken up arms from patriotic motives in a war they con- 
 sider just, there is a perennial spring of moral renovation. 
 Such armies have constantly exhibited an astonishing endu- 
 rance, and, possessing a bond of cohesion superior to disci- 
 phne, have shown their power to withstand shocks that would 
 dislocate the structure of other military organizations. 
 
 The Army of the Potomac was of this kind. Driven hither 
 and thither by continual buffets of fortune ; losing its strengih 
 in unavailing efforts ; changing its leaders, and yet finding no 
 dehverance ; misunderstood and unappreciated by the people 
 whose battles it was fighting — it was not wonderful that it 
 had lost in spirit. Yet, notwithstanding the untoward for- 
 tunes the Army of the Potomac had suffered, it could hardly 
 be said to be really demoralized, for its heart was still in the 
 war ; it never failed to respond to any demand made upon it, 
 and it was ever ready to renew its courage at the first ray of 
 hope. 
 
 Such a day-spring came with the appointment of General 
 Hooker to the chief command, and under his influence the 
 tone of the army underweiit a change that would appear 
 astonishing, had not its elastic vitality been so often proved. 
 
268 CAIklPAIGNS OF THE AEMT OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Hooker's measures of reform were judicious : lie cut away the 
 root of many evils; stojjped desertion and its causes;" did 
 away witli the nuisance of the " Grand Division" organization ; 
 infused vitality through the staff and administrative service ; 
 gave distinctive badges to the different corps ;* instituted a 
 system of furloughs ; consohdated the cavahy under able 
 leaders, and soon enabled it not only to stand upon an equahty 
 with, but to assert its superiority over, the Yirginia horsemen 
 of Stuart.f 
 
 These things proved General Hooker to be an able adminis- 
 trative officer, but they did not prove him to be a competent 
 commander for a great army ; and whatever anticipation might 
 be formed touching this had to be drawn from his previous 
 career as a corps-commander, in which he had won the repu- 
 tation of being what is called a " dashing" officer, and earned 
 the sobriquet of "Fighting Joe." He had gained a great 
 popularity both in the army and throughout the country — a 
 result to which his fine soldierly appearance and frank man- 
 ners had much contributed; nor was this diminished by a 
 
 * Tlae germ of tlie badge designation was the happy thought of General 
 Kearney, who, at Fair Oaks, ordered the soldiers of his division to sew a piece 
 of red flannel to their caps, so that he could recognize them in the tumult of 
 hattle. Hooker developed the idea into a system of immense utility, and hence- 
 forth the diiferent corps and divisions could always be distinguished by the red, 
 white, or blue trefoil, cross, lozenge, star, etc. 
 
 f The cavalry of the army had hitherto had no organization whatever as a 
 corps. It was organized by brigades or divisions and scattered among the 
 grand division commanders. From the time of its consolidation it was able to 
 act in its legitimate line, and underwent a great improvement. On the 16th 
 of March, Hooker sent out an expedition of sis mounted regiments and a bat- 
 tery, under General Averill, to engage the Confederate cavalry on Lee's left, hold- 
 ing position near Kelly's Ford. Forcing the passage of the Rappahannock at 
 Kelly's Ford, on the morning of the 17th, by a spirited dash, in which twenty- 
 four of the enemy were captured, Averill pushed forward, driving the enemy 
 before liim for four miles south of the river, when he became engaged with the 
 Confederate cavalry brigade of Fitz Hugh Lee. A very brilliant passage at 
 arms here ensued, both sides repeatedly charging with the sabre. Nothing^ 
 decisive resulted ; but the Union cavalry were much encouraged by the ex- 
 ploit. Averill's loss was eighty-four ; that of the Confederates one hundred 
 and seventy,— Fitz Lee : Report of KelleysviUe. 
 
THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 269 
 
 habit ho had of self-assextion, which, however, proved Httle, 
 since it may be either the manifestation of impotent conceit, 
 or the proud utterance of conscious power. Hooker had 
 shown himself a pitiless critic of his predecessors in command : 
 he was now to be tried in an ordeal whence no man had yet 
 escaped unscathed. 
 
 The new commander judiciously resolved to defer all grand 
 military operations during the wet season, and the first three 
 months after he assumed command were well spent in re- 
 habilitating the army. The ranks were filled up by the return 
 of absentees ; the discipline and instruction of the troops were 
 energetically continued, and the close of April found the Army 
 of the Potomac in a high degree of efficiency in all arms.* It 
 numbered one hundred and twenty thousand ment (infantry 
 and artillery), with a body of twelve thousand weU-equipped 
 cavalry,! and a powerful artillery force of above four hundred 
 guns.§ It was divided into seven corps — the First Corps 
 under General Keynolds ; the Second under General Couch ; 
 the Third under General Sickles ; the Fifth under General 
 Meade ; the Sixth under General Sedgwick ; the Eleventh under 
 General Howard ; and the Twelfth under- General Slocum.ll 
 
 Lee's force was greatly interior to that of his opponent ; for 
 
 * It was not without trutli that Hooker, at this time, in his grandiose style, 
 named it " the finest army on the planet." 
 
 f This estimate is approximate ; the data are as follows : The effective of the 
 Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth corps was put by General Hooker, just before 
 Chancellorsville, at forty-four thousand six hundred and sixty-one. — Report 
 on the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. i., p. 120. The effective of the 
 Sixth Corps is given by General Sedgwick (ibid., p. 95) as twenty-two thou- 
 sand ; and the effective of the First and Third corps, by the same authority, 
 was thirty-five thousand. There remains the Second Corps, to which, if we 
 give a minimum of eighteen thousand, there wiU result the aggregate of one 
 hundred and nineteen thousand six hundred and sixty-one. 
 
 j;. Pleasonton : Official Returns, May 27th. 
 
 § Hunt : Report of Artillery Operations. 
 
 I Generals Franklin and Sumner both retired from the Army of the Poto- 
 mac after the change of commander. The latter was assigned to a command 
 in the West, but died soon afterwards at his home in New York, lamented by 
 the army and the country as the bravest of soldiers and purest of men. 
 
270 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AEMT OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 relying on the strength of the hne of the Eappahannock, he 
 had, in February, detached two di^dsions, under Longstreet, 
 to operate south of the James River,* and the remainder did 
 not exceed an effective of fifty-five thousand men.f ■ Hooker, 
 therefore, was in a situation to attempt a bold enterprise, and 
 the close of April found him ready to cross the Rappahan- 
 nock and give battle. 
 
 II. 
 
 THE PASSAGE OF THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 
 
 The opposing armies had so long faced each other on the 
 banks of the Rappahannock, that it may well be supposed 
 there remained no point in the problem of the attack or de- 
 fence of that hne that had not been thoroughly considered. 
 Since the battle of Fredericksburg and the subsequent at- 
 tempts to pass the Rappahannock, Lee had made such dis- 
 positions as to guard all the available crossings of that 
 stream. At the time the operations resulting in the battle of 
 Chancellorsville began, he occupied in force the heights south 
 of the Rappahannock from Skenker's Creek to United States 
 Ford (a distance of about twenty-five miles), having continu- 
 ous lines of infantry parapets throughoiit, and his troops so 
 disposed as to be readily concentrated on any given point. 
 Interspersed along these lines of intrenchments were battery- 
 epaulements, advantageously located, for sweeping the hill- 
 slopes and bottom-lands over w^hich an assailing force would 
 have to march — the crests of the main hills being from three- 
 quarters of a mile to a mile and a half from the river's mar- 
 
 * " General Longstreet, -ndth two divisions of his corps, was detached for 
 Bervice south of James River in February, and did not rejoin the army imtil 
 after the battle of Chancellorsville." — Lee: Report of Chancellorsville, p. 5. 
 
 f The rolls of Lee's army showed, the 31st of March, 18G3, a force of 60,308. 
 But at the battle of Chancellorsville, the reports of the subordinates make 16 
 fully ten thousand less. 
 
THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 271 
 
 gin.* To gain the immediate banks opposite the centre of 
 the enemy's Hne was, however, practicable in several places 
 where the high ground on the north side approached the 
 stream and enabled artillery to command it ; but the prospect 
 of then gaining a footing on the heights was, from past expe- 
 rience, hopeless. The Confederate right flank was so dis- 
 posed that Lee was secure against attack in that direction ; 
 while above his left, at United States Ford, the junction of 
 the Eapidan with the Rappahannock involved the passage of 
 the foi-mer also in any attempt to turn that flank. Indeed, 
 the execution of a movement to turn the Confederate left by 
 the Union army, at such a distance from its base, and with 
 heavy ponton and artillery trains, and in face of means of in- 
 formation such as Lee had at his command, seemed very un- 
 likely, and he gave himself very httle concern about it. 
 
 Difficult as was the problem in all its aspects, and debarred 
 as Hooker was fi'om making a direct attack, the most prom- 
 ising enterprise was nevertheless an operation against Lee's 
 left. This, after much cogitation, Hooker resolved to execute, 
 and he formed a very bold plan of operation. He determined 
 to make his main movement against the enemy's left by a 
 strong column, that by a wide detour up the Eappahannock 
 to Kelly's Ford (twenty-seven miles above Fredericksbm-g) 
 should pass round Lee's flank to Chancellorsville ; while he 
 resolved to mask this turning operation by forcing the Rappa- 
 hannock near Fredericksburg with a considerable body, and 
 ostentatiously threatenmg direct attack. He expected that 
 the successful execution of the turning operation would have 
 the effect to cause Lee to abandon his defences along the 
 Rappahannock, when battle might be given with great ad- 
 vantage. In co-operation with this attack, he prepared a 
 powerful cavalry column of ten thousand sabres, destined to 
 operate simultaneously on Lee's railroad communication with 
 Richmond. 
 
 * Warren : Report of Engineer Operations connected with the Battle of 
 Chancellorsville. 
 
272 C.UIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 The turning column was composed of three corps — the 
 Fifth (Meade), the Eleventh (Howard), and the Twelfth 
 (Slocum). Marching on the morning of Monday, April 27, 
 this force reached the vicinity of Kellj^'s Ford on the follow- 
 ing day. During the night of the 28th, and next morning, 
 the passage of the Eappahannock was made at Kelly's Ford 
 on a canvas ponton-bridge, laid with but slight opposition 
 from a small observing force ; and the three corps, being 
 divided into two colurflns, moving on parallel roads, took up 
 the line of march towards Chancellorsville, to reach which it 
 was necessary first to cross the Kapidan. The right column 
 (Eleventh and Twelfth corps) struck the Rapidan at Ger- 
 manna Ford,* the left column (Fifth Corps) at Ely's Ford. 
 The stream proved to be barely fordable ; but celerity of 
 movement being an object of the first importance, it was im- 
 mediately resolved to cross the troops by wading — an arduous 
 and somewhat dangerous feat ; for the stream is rapid, and 
 even at the fords came up to the shoulder. The men, how- 
 ever, plunged in — the greater part stripping and carrying 
 their clothes and cartridge-boxes on their bayonets — and amid 
 shouts and scenes of Homeric laughter and gayety waded 
 through the water, which reached to their arm-pits. Such as 
 were carried away by the current were caught by a cavalry 
 picket stationed below. After dark (the crossing being con- 
 tinued all night) huge bonfires were kindled, and by the aid 
 of the lurid light thus cast over the wild scene, the troops 
 filed over the river, and next morning all were across. The 
 soldiers were in the highest spirits ; for, acute judges of mili- 
 tary movements as the rank and file always are, they knew 
 that the march they had made was one of those pregnant 
 marches that are in themselves victories : so they gayly 
 headed toAvards Chancellorsville, which was the assigned 
 point of concentration and which they reached in the after- 
 noon of the 30th. 
 
 *■ At this ford, a party of Confederates were found engaged in rebuilding the 
 bridge ; but by a wtll-executed movement most of them were captured. 
 
THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 273 
 
 TTliile the three corps, whose movements I have indicated, 
 had passed far up the Kappahannock to Kelly's Ford, the 
 Second Corps under General Couch had moved no further 
 than United States Ford, where it was directed to remain on 
 the north bank of the Eappahannock till the turning column 
 sweeping down the south bank should have uncovered United 
 States Ford, when it was to cross and move also to Chancel- 
 lorsville. This object was, of course, accomplished the mo- 
 ment the Eapidan was crossed; and the same afternoon, 
 Couch threw a ponton-bridge over the Eappahannock, and 
 marched on Chancellor sville, at which point the four corps 
 bivouacked that night (Thursday, April 30). The same night. 
 General Hooker removed his headquarters to Chancellors- 
 ville. " He had secured a position which took in reverse Lee's 
 entire fortified line, and he held in his hand a puissant force 
 of fifty thousand men. 
 
 The remarkable success attending this movement, of which 
 Lee did not become aware till the Eappahannock had been 
 crossed, was the result of a secrecy and a celerity of march 
 new in the Army of the Potomac. To have marched a column 
 of fifty thousand men, laden with sixty pounds of baggage, 
 and encumbered with artillery and trains, thirty-seven miles 
 in two days ; to have bridged and crossed two streams, guarded 
 by a vigilant enemy, with the loss of half-a-dozen men, one 
 wagon, and two mules, is an achievement which has few paral- 
 lels, and which well deserves to rank with Prince Eugene's 
 famous passage of the Adige. 
 
 In securing this result, important service was rendered by 
 the skilful manner in which the flank march was masked by 
 General Sedgwick, under whom had been placed for the exe- 
 cution of this duty the First Corps (Eeynolds) and the Third 
 Corps (Sickles), in addition to his own Sixth Corps. As soon 
 as the column destined to make the turning movement was 
 well under way, Sedgwick was ordered to cross the river in 
 the vicinity of Fredericksburg for the purpose of making a 
 
 * This place consisted of a single large brick house. 
 18 
 
274 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 direct demonstration. Accordingly, before dawn of the 29tli, 
 while the flanking force was passing the Rappahannock thirty 
 miles above, ponton-boats, borne noiselessly on men's shoul- 
 ders, were launched three miles below the town, near the point 
 at which Franklin had made his crossing on the occasion of 
 the battle of Fredericksburg. In these a party passed to the 
 south bank, capturing the small force in observation. Two 
 bridges were then constructed, and two divisions thrown 
 across. This menace immediately engaged the attention of 
 the Confederates, who promptly began intrenching their en- 
 tire front, as fearing a direct attack.* Demonstrations as 
 though with that intent were made during the 29th and 30th, 
 and as, by the night of the 30th, the feint had subserved its 
 purpose, and a lodgment had been gained at Chancellorsville, 
 
 * There was much in what was visible to the Confederates of Sedgwick's 
 operation to inspire them with the belief that Hooker was preparing his main 
 attack at that point ; and an accidental circumstance, the details of which are 
 given below, tended greatly to confirm this impression. Being a spectator of 
 Sedgwick's operations, I at the time interpreted certain movements as a ruse 
 dc guerre, designed to give the enemy an exaggerated notion of the strength 
 of the force present at that point, whereas they were the necessary result of an 
 entirely different operation ; and I elaborated this point with some fulness in a 
 letter on the battle of Chancellorsville in the New York Times. What was 
 there stated has already passed into history ; and Colonel MacDougaU, an Eng- 
 lish military writer of repute, following that account (without credit given, 
 however), thus writes : 
 
 "The four remaining divisions of these two corps [SedgT\'ick's and Rey- 
 nolds'] remained on the north bank, and an ingenious rnse was practised to 
 deceive the enemy into the belief that the greater part of the Northern army 
 was there massed with the intention of crossing. It is to be noted that, from 
 the configuration of the ground, the enemy could not see the bridges, neither 
 could they see the four divisions on the north bank, which were behind the 
 fringe of hills aforesaid. These troops were then put in motion, and, mounting 
 the ridge, which, sloping both ways, served as a screen, marched along the top 
 in full view of the Confederates, and then dipped down out of sight towards the 
 bridges. Instead of crossing these, however, they turned back through a gully 
 round the rear of the ridge, round again on the top, and again disappeared 
 from sight to play the same game — ^just the same evolution as is practised by 
 the ' brave army' on the stage of a theatre, and with the same intent of deceiv- 
 ing the spectators as to their numbers. The like stage effect was practised by 
 the artillery and wagon-trains, until the Confederates had seen defile before 
 
THE CHANCELLOESVILLE CAMPAIGN. 275 
 
 Sickles' corps was directed to join the force at tliat point — 
 Sedgwick, with two corps, meanwhile remaining below to 
 await developments on the right. 
 
 The success that had crowned these operations, which, as 
 they were executed out of sight of the enemy, may be called 
 the strategy of the movement, inspired the army with the 
 highest hopes and greatly elated the commander. On reach- 
 ing Chancellorsville on Thursday night, he issued an order to 
 the troops, in which he announced that "the enemy must 
 either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defences 
 and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruc- 
 tion awaits him." This boast, so much in the style of Hooker, 
 was amphfied by the whole tenor of his conversation. " The 
 rebel army," said he, " is now the legitimate property of the 
 Army of the Potomac. They may as well pack up their 
 haversacks and make for Eichmond ; and I shall be after 
 them," etc., etc.* And, indeed, there was much in the aspect 
 of afiairs to justify jubilant expectations ; for, of the two lines 
 
 them a force whicli they might well conclude to be the whole Northern army." 
 — MacDougall : Modem Warfare and Modern Artillery, pp. 334, 335. 
 
 The following note from Major-General McMahon explains the real purpose 
 of the operation misinterpreted by me : 
 
 New York, January, 1866. 
 Mt dear Sir — The movement of troops under General Sedgwick, to which 
 our conversation referred, was not for the purpose of deceiving the enemy into 
 the belief that we were re-enforcing the left wing, although such probably was 
 its effect. 
 
 The movements consisted of the withdrawal of Reynolds' corps from the 
 lower crossing, which was effected without attracting the attention of the enemy ; 
 and the transfer of one division of the Sixth Corps from the upper to the lower 
 bridges, to hold the position abandoned by the First Corps. The march of this 
 division was so ordered that only its arrival at the lower bridges could be seen 
 by the enemy. It was a necessary movement, made so by the departure of the 
 Firert Corps for Chancellorsville, and not a stratagem. Of course, in this as in 
 aU similar movements, advantage was taken of the nature of the ground, to 
 conceal our intention from the enemy as far as it was practicable. 
 Very respectfully, etc., 
 
 M. T. McMahon, 
 Late Chief of Staff to Major-General Sedgwick. 
 W. SwiNTON, Esq. 
 * These observations were made in presence of the writer. 
 
276 CAIVIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 of retreat open to Lee, Hooker already laid hold of that by 
 Gordonsville, and threatened that by Richmond. The former 
 he could not take up ; and, if he chose the latter, he would 
 have Hooker with five corps on his flank, and Sedgwick 
 with two corps pressing his rear. The bright promise of 
 these initial operations was beclouded by but one fact — the 
 cavalry column which was to cross the Rappahannock on the 
 right of the infantry, and cut Lee's communications at the 
 same time that the infantry was operating on his army, had 
 been so delayed by the rise of the river that it did not cross 
 the Rappahannock till the morning of the 29th, and had thus 
 far made very insufficient progress. 
 
 But, instead of " ingloriously flying," Lee preferred to 
 " come out of his defences" and give battle to Hooker ; and, 
 unhappily for that general, the circumstances under which he 
 chose to receive battle, in place of insuring Lee's " certain 
 destruction," as he had vaunted, resulted in the disastrous 
 termination of a campaign thus brilliantly opened. Now, as 
 these circumstances furnish the key to the right apprecia- 
 tion of the whole action, I shall, in the succeeding chapter, 
 set them forth with some fulness of detail. 
 
 Til. 
 
 AT CHANCELLORSVILLE— FRIDAY. 
 
 When, on Thursday night. Hooker had concentrated his 
 four corps at Chancellorsville, the real character of the move- 
 ment, which, up to that point, had been so admirably con- 
 cealed from his antagonist, became fully disclosed. The 
 Confederate leader saw that the demonstrations near Fred- 
 ericksburg that had engaged his attention were but a mask, 
 and that the turn of afi'airs called for the promptest action. 
 Lee, with instant perception of the situation, now seized the 
 masses of his force, and with the grasp of a Titan swung 
 them into position as a giant might fling a mighty stone from 
 
Map of the 
 
 r,A\fTtli,©>r/C'HLAJ€iUi©)RWIllt-lLi . f„ 
 
 ^IL29tli.TO ^ 
 Scale ofMi/fs 
 
 FROM APRIL29tli.TO MAY 5th. 1863.^** g.,. 
 
 Rjii^er'etices . 
 = = i^nivn Linef! 
 — - Cortfederate - 
 
THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 277 
 
 a sling.* One division and one brigade — the division of 
 Early and the brigade of Barksdale — were intrusted with the 
 duty of holding the heights of Fredericksburg ; and, at mid- 
 night of Thursday, Jackson and McLaws, and the rest of his 
 divisions, recalled from Fredericksbm-g, and from far below 
 Fredericksburg, were put in motion towards Chancellors ville 
 to meet Hooker with a fi'ont of opposition, before he should 
 be able, by advancing fi'om Chancellorsville, to seize the 
 direct Confederate communications with Richmond. 
 
 If the Confederate commander was able to efiect this pur- 
 pose, it was because the Union commander allowed him so to 
 do ; and this voluntary act on the part of the latter devolves 
 upon him the responsibility for all the consequences flowing 
 therefi'om. 
 
 Chancellors\-iUe, where Hooker had drawn up his forces, 
 hes ten miles west and south of Fredericksburg, with which 
 it is connected by two excellent roads — the one macadamized, 
 the other planked. It stands in the midst of a region extend- 
 ing for several miles south of the Eapidan and westward as 
 far as Mine Eun, localized, in common parlance, as "the 
 "Wilderness" — a region covered with dense woods and thickets 
 of black-jack oak and scrub-pines, and than which it is im- 
 possible to conceive a field more unfavorable for the move- 
 ments of a grand army. But, advancing fi'om Chancellorsville 
 towards Fredericksburg, the country becomes more open and 
 clear as you approach the latter place, and affords a fine field 
 for the use of aU arms. 
 
 Now, there is evidence that General Hooker did not originally 
 design to allow himself to be shut up in this tangled thicket ; 
 and, on Friday morning, May 1st, he began to push forward 
 his columns to gain the open country beyond the bounds of the 
 Wilderness. The two roads running from ChanceUorsviUe to 
 
 * " The enemy in our front [Sedgwick], near Frederickeburg, continued in- 
 active ; and it was now apparent that the main attack would be made upon 
 our flank and rear. It was, therefore, determined to leave sufficient troops to 
 hold our lines, and, with the main body of the army, to give battle to the ap 
 proacliing column."— Lee : Report of Chancellorsville, p. 7. 
 
278 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Fredericksburg (the plankroad on the riglit and the turnpike 
 on the left) unite near Tabernacle Church, about midway 
 between the former two places ; and to the left of the turn- 
 pike there runs a river road leading along the Rappahannock 
 to Banks' Ford. On the latter road two divisions of Meade's 
 corps were pushed out, while on the turnpike Sykes' division 
 of the same corps was thrown forward, and Slocum's corps 
 was given the same direction on the plankroad. This was a 
 movement to take up a Hne of battle about two and a half 
 miles in fi*ont, preparatory to a simultaneous advance along 
 the whole line, set down for two o'clock in the afternoon.* I 
 shall trace briefly the experience of each column. 
 
 The left column, composed of the divisions of Griffin and 
 Humphreys, moved out on the river road for five miles, and 
 came within sight of Banks' Ford, without encountering any 
 opposition. 
 
 The centre column, made up of the division of Sykes, sup- 
 ported by the division of Hancock, advanced on the turnpike, 
 and on gaining the first of a series of ridges that cross the 
 roads between Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, somewhat 
 over a mile in advance of the former place, the mounted men 
 in front were met and driven in by the enemy. This small 
 force resisted handsomely, riding up and firing almost in the 
 faces of the Eleventh Virginia Infantry, which formed the 
 enemy's advance. Thereupon, General Sykes moved forward 
 in double-quick time, attacked the opposing force, and drove 
 it back till, at noon, he had gained the position assigned 
 him.t 
 
 The column on the right, composed of Slocum's entire 
 corps, pushed out on the plankroad in the same general du'ec- 
 tion with the two other columns, and gained a point as far 
 advanced as the others without meeting any opposition of 
 moment. 
 
 * Hooker's Circular Order, May 1 : Report of the Conduct of tlie War, 
 second series, vol. i., p. 124. 
 
 f Warren : Report of Operations connected with the Chancellorsville Cam. 
 paign. 
 
THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN 279 
 
 The position secured by this movement of Friday forenoon 
 was a ridge of some elevation, perfectly commanding Chan- 
 cellorsville, out of the Wilderness, and giving the debouche 
 into the open country in rear of Fredericksburg, while the 
 left column had practically uncovered Banks' Ford, thus 
 shortening by twelve miles the communication between the 
 main force on the Chancellorsville line, and the two corps 
 near Fredericksburg under Sedgwick. That a position aflbrd- 
 ing such advantages — a position which Lee was then exert- 
 ing all his efforts to secure — wonld be held at all hazards, 
 and the possession insured by a general advance of the whole 
 force, was what was naturally expected ; yet, strange to say, 
 just at this moment the three columns received orders from 
 the commandmg general to withdraw back to Chancellors- 
 ville. "With mingled amazement and incredulity, this com- 
 mand was received by the officers, who sent to beg Hooker to 
 allow the army to push on and hold the front thus gained.* 
 It was urged in the warmest terms that the occupation 
 of that fine position would uncover Banks' Ford, thus, a-s 
 I have said, giving easy communication with Sedgwick ; that 
 it secured the dominating heights which, if not held, would 
 instantly be seized to his great disadvantage by his antagonist ; 
 that it would take the army beyond the densely wooded 
 region in which manoeuvring was impossible, and that it 
 would enable it to command the open country on the 
 posterior slope of the Fredericksburg heights soon to be 
 carried by Sedgwick. It was in vain that these considera- 
 tions, whose supreme importance must be apparent from a 
 
 * " The ground on which I had posted Hancock in support of Sykes, was 
 about one and a half miles from Chancellorsville, and commanded it. Upon 
 receiving orders from General Hooker to come in, I sent Major Burt to him 
 urging that, on account of the great advantages of that position, it should be 
 held at all hazards. The reply was, to return at once. General Warren also 
 went in person and urged the necessity of holding on." — Couch : Report of 
 Chancellorsville. For confirmation of the same, see Warren : Report ; Hum- 
 phreys : Evidence on Chancellorsville ; Report of the Conduct of the War, 
 second series, vol. i., p 63. 
 
280 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 moment's glance at the topography of the region, were urged 
 by his ablest advisers. Hooker had assumed the defensive 
 and was waiting for the enemy to attack him " on ground of 
 his OAvn selection." From that moment he flung away the 
 initiative with all its mighty gains and far-reaching hopes. 
 
 It is difficult to account for a line of action so faulty in a 
 conjuncture of circumstances in which the fitting course was 
 so manifestly marked out. Having studied the case at the 
 time when a spectator of these events, I have returned to its 
 examination in the Hght of the whole body of evidence since 
 develojjed, and the riddle remains still unsolved. Till he met 
 the enemy, Hooker showed a master-grasp of the elements of 
 war, but the moment he confronted his antagonist, he seemed 
 to suffer collapse of all his powers, and after this his conduct, 
 with the exception of one or two momentary flashes of talent, 
 was marked by an incomprehensible feebleness and faulti- 
 ness ; for in each crisis, his action was not only bad — it was, 
 with a fatal infelicity, the worst that could have been adopted. 
 It is probable that Hooker never expected that Lee would 
 turn to meet him on that line, but tliat, disconcerted by the 
 suddenness and success of the primal stroke, he would beat a 
 hasty retreat southward towards Kichmond. When, on the 
 contrary, he found his antagonist making a rapid change of 
 front and hurrying forward to accept the gage of battle in 
 the Wilderness, the general whose first stride had been that 
 of a giant, shrunk to the proportions of a dwarf. 
 
 The columns that had advanced so handsomely towards 
 Fredericksburg returned to Chancellorsville ; and having 
 shown that this was a position relatively inferior to that 
 which had been gained, it remains to add that it was abso- 
 lutely a bad j)osition. It had been taken up by tired troops, 
 towards the close of the previous day, without any prospect 
 of fighting a pitched battle upon it ; it had several command- 
 ing positions in its front for the enemy to occupy, and the 
 thicket was so dense as not only to rule out of use the cavalry 
 and artillery arms, but to make the movements of infantry 
 very difficult, indeed almost impossible except by traihng 
 
THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 281 
 
 muskets. If it be added that any line drawn thereon would 
 throw the right flank " m the au%" while the woods would 
 form a perfect screen for any hostile movements of the 
 enemy, the military disadvantages of the locahty will be fully 
 appreciated. 
 
 The withdi-awal of the column that had moved out on the 
 right, and that which had moved out on the left, was made 
 without difficulty, though the Confederates followed up with 
 some show of force ; but the retirement of Sykes, who had 
 the centre, was an operation of more deHcacy, for he had met 
 a considerable body of the enemy, and had gained his posi- 
 tion by a smart tight which cost him seventy men ; and now 
 the constantly arriving forces of the Confederates began to 
 overlap both his flanks. Hancock's division, however, had 
 moved up to Sykes' support, and, under cover of his line, 
 Sykes was retired, and then Hancock also withdrew, and the 
 enemy followed up, skirmishing, closing, and firmg artillery 
 fi-om the crest, which Sykes had been ordered to abandon.* 
 
 The force that had been met in this series of simultaneous 
 reconnoissances was the van of Jackson's command, which, 
 on the disclosure to Lee of the real character of Hooker's 
 move, had been recalled from the direction of Fredericksburg, 
 and after marching all Thursday night and Friday morning, 
 had just arrived on the ground. On finding tlie Union force 
 returning from its advance, Lee pushed forward the heads of 
 his columns rapidly and deployed in fi'ont of Hooker's posi- 
 tion at Chancellorsville. 
 
 Hooker disposed his line of battle, running east and west, 
 along the Fredericksburg and Orange Courthouse plankroad, 
 on which, at the point of intersection of that road with the 
 road fi-om Fredericksburg to United States Ford, stands the 
 Chancellor House— that is, ChanceUors\alle. Chancellorsville 
 is placed in the middle of a clearing some three hundred 
 yards in extent, and all around are the thickets of the Wilder- 
 ness. The Une of battle, as formed on Friday evening, was 
 
 * Hancock : Report of Chancellorsville. 
 
282 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 about five miles in extent, stretching from a sliort distance 
 east of Cliancellorsyille (where the left wing was somewhat 
 refused), westward, in front of the Orange plankroad for about 
 three miles, when the right flank bent sharply back in a de- 
 fensive crotchet. Meade's corps (Fifth), with one division of 
 Couch's (Second), formed the left ; Slocum's corps (Twelfth), 
 and one division of Sickles' (Third), the centre ; and Howard's 
 (Eleventh) the right. The other divisions were held in re- 
 serve. As General Hooker had concluded to fight a defensive 
 battle, trees were felled in front of the line to form abatis, 
 and rifle-pits were thrown up ; and during the whole night 
 the woods resounded with the strokes of a thousand Con- 
 federate axe-men engaged at the same work. 
 
 Next morning (Saturday, May 2d) Hooker stood on the 
 defensive awaiting battle, and it seemed at first that his oppo- 
 nent had been beguiled into playing into his hands by making 
 a direct attack ; for the Confederates began early to make 
 threatening demonstrations. First they felt Couch's line, but 
 it proved to be well intrenched ; then they assailed Slocum's 
 fi'ont, moving down on the plankroad, and throwing shells 
 into the clearing at the Chancellor House, where Hooker's 
 headquarters were estabhshed and the wagons were parked ;* 
 afterwards they menaced the Hne still further to the right, 
 and these operations they kept up at intervals during the 
 whole day. But Lee had quite another object in view : he 
 knew too well the risks of a direct attack with a force so in- 
 ferior in numbers as he could dispose of; and while he en- 
 gaged Hooker's attention with these fi'ont demonstrations, 
 he was putting into execution a bold move such as he may 
 have learned, in his mihtary studies, from Frederick the 
 Great. I shall in the following section indicate the nature of 
 this operation, and detail the manner of its execution. 
 
 * "In the morning about six or seven, tlie enemy opened his artillery 
 from our left on the open field in front of the Cliancellorsville House, and drove 
 out all our wagons and every thing that was loose into position." — Warren's 
 Report. 
 
THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 283 
 
 IV. 
 
 JACKSON'S FLANK MARCH— SATURDAY. 
 
 False as was the situation in which the Union commander 
 had placed his force in causing it to assume a defensive atti- 
 tude at a moment when offensive action promised so much, 
 Lee was, nevertheless, environed with peril. Strategically 
 Hooker's position was a menacing one ; tactically, it was un- 
 assailable by a front attack. In this dilemma Lee determined 
 on a move which, considering the inferiority of his force, must 
 be accounted astonishingly bold. He resolved by a flank 
 march to assail Hooker's right and rear, with a view of doub- 
 ling up that flank, taking his hne in reverse, and seizing his 
 communications with United States Ford. 
 
 This suggestion was, it is said, made to Lee in council during 
 Friday night by Stonewall Jackson, who having, in his inde- 
 pendent operations in the Valley, practised with great success 
 the like manoeuvre, now burned to execute, on a grander 
 scale, one of these sudden and mortal blows. The plan, 
 though full of risk, was immediately adopted by Lee, and, as 
 a matter of course, its execution committed to his daring 
 lieutenant, who was destined, in the climax of his power, to 
 end his career in the world and the world's wars in this 
 supreme exhibition of military genius. 
 
 The force with which Jackson was to make this movement 
 consisted of his own three divisions, numbering about twenty- 
 two thousand men. Of the Confederate force on the Chan- 
 cellorsville hne there then remained only the two divisions of 
 McLaws and Anderson. These Lee retained in hand to hold 
 Hooker in check. 
 
 No man knew better than Jackson the enormous importance 
 of secrecy in the execution of such a design as that he took 
 in hand on Saturday morning ; and he had often repeated to 
 his staff a saying, that was to him a fundamental axiom of 
 war — "Mystery, mystery is the secret of success." Nothing 
 
284 CA]\IPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Avas omitted to secure this indispensable requisite in the task 
 he had undertaken. Hooker's attention was to be engaged 
 and the naovement masked by energetic demonstrations of 
 front attack to be made bv Lee. Then, as the woods were 
 thick and nearly impenetrable, Jackson hoped that, bj taking 
 a road some distance to the south of ChancellorsviUe, he would 
 be able to pass unobserved ; yet he took care, in addition, to 
 throw out Fitz-Lee's brigade of cavalry on the right of his 
 column to screen his perilous flank march across the whole of 
 Hooker's front. Diverging westward from the Fredericksburg 
 plankroad, Jackson pursued his march by a forest-path a 
 couple of miles south of, and parallel with, the Orange plank- 
 road, on which the Union force was planted ; and, after pass- 
 ing the point known as the "Furnace," struck somewhat south 
 by west into the Brock road, and thence north vvard to seize 
 the Orange plankroad and turn Hooker's right flank. 
 
 This movement, skilfully masked as it was, was not made 
 with such secrecy but that those who held the front of the 
 Union line saw that something was going on. And more espe- 
 cially, in passing over a hill near the " Furnace," the column 
 plainly disclosed itself to General Sickles, who held a posi- 
 tion Avithin sight of that point. Now, it happened that the 
 road along which Jackson's column was filing there bends 
 somewhat southward, so that, though the movement was dis- 
 covered, it was misinterpreted as a retreat towards Richmond 
 on the part of Lee ; or, if the idea suggested itself that it 
 might be a movement to tiirn the right, it was still judged, on 
 the whole, to be a retreat. With the view of determining this, 
 but yet more under the conviction that Lee was withdrawing, 
 Sickles was sent out with two divisions to reconnoitre and 
 attack him.* At about three o'clock in the afternoon, he ad- 
 
 * General Hooker, in his evidence on the battle of Chancellorsville, insinu- 
 ates that he was all the time aware of the true character of Jackson's move, 
 and that he made adequate preparations to meet a flank attack ; but he, at the 
 time, gave a very difierent view to General Sedgwick, to whom he wrote, on 
 Saturday afternoon, as follows : '' We know the enemy is flying, trying to save 
 his trains ; two of Sickles' divisions are among them." 
 
THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 285 
 
 vanced through the Wilderness for a mile and a half, or two 
 miles, reached the road on which Jackson had moved, struck 
 the rear of his column, and began to take prisoners. Elated 
 by his success, the result of which he communicated to 
 Hooker, General Sickles asked for re-enforcements ; and, at 
 his request, Pleasonton's cavalry and two brigades of in- 
 fantry were sent him. As one of these brigades was taken 
 from the Twelfth Corps, and the other from the Eleventh 
 Corps,* holding the right of the general line, it is hardly to 
 be supposed that Hooker would have made the detachment 
 had he thought that ilank was to be attacked. 
 
 While this manoeuvi'e, under a false lead, was going on, 
 Jackson was getting into position for his meditated blow. He 
 had already reached the Orange plankroad, on which the 
 Union Kne was drawn, and near the point at which it is 
 crossed by the road from Germanna Ford ; but, ascending a 
 hill in the vicinity, he saw that disposition of the Union force 
 by which its right flank was thrown sharply back in a crochet, 
 extending northward and at right angles with the general 
 line, which ran east and west. He, therefore, perceived that 
 he would have to move further to his left, and further to the 
 north, and, in order to strike the rear of Hooker's defensive 
 position, would have to reach the old turnpike which runs 
 parallel with and north of the plankroad.f Turning, there- 
 fore, after a rapid reconnoitring glance, to one of his aids, he 
 instantly said, '• Tell my column to cross that road"| (mean- 
 ing, thereby, the plankroad, so as to move up and strike the 
 old turnpike). 
 
 Reaching the turnpike about five o'clock, Jackson saw the 
 Union hue in reverse, and had only to advance in order to 
 
 * Williamson's brigade, of Slocum's corps, and Barlow's brigade, of 
 Howard's corps. — Sickles' Evidence : Report on the Conduct of the War, second 
 series, vol. i., p. n. 
 
 f The " old turnpike" may, roughly speaking, be said to be parallel with 
 the plankroad, though it really joins near Dondall's tavern, about two and a 
 half mUes west of Chancellorsville. 
 
 I Cooke's Life of Stonewall Jackson, p. 351. 
 
2S6 CAISIPAIGNS OF THE AEMY OP THE POTOMAC. 
 
 crown his perilous operation witli complete success. The 
 right of the Union line was, as before stated, held by the 
 Eleventh Corps, under General Howard ;* and, while the 
 major part of this corps formed line of battle along the plank- 
 road, and faced southward, the extreme right brigadef was 
 " refused," and made to face westward, from which direction, 
 towards six o'clock, Jackson burst out with resistless impetu- 
 osity. The dispositions to meet such an attack were utterly 
 inadequate. The right brigade, after two or three hasty 
 rounds, was forced back ; and the next brigade to the left 
 (McLean's), surprised on its flank, broke and fled. The route 
 of retreat of these troops, and that of some artillery caissons 
 that were at the same time galloped off the ground, was down 
 the road on which the entire balance of the corps was posted ; 
 so that the confused mass overran the next division^ to the 
 left, which was compelled to give way before the enemy even 
 reached its position.§ Bushbeck, holding with his brigade 
 the extreme left of the Eleventh Corps, made a good fight, 
 and only retired after both his flanks were turned, and then 
 in good order.ll But the result was, that the whole corps was 
 
 * Sigel's old corps ; Howard had very recently taken command. 
 
 f Gilsa's brigade of Devens' division. 
 
 J Schurz's division. 
 
 § Schimmelt'ennig's brigade, of Schurz's division, made a rapid change 
 of front to the west, and resisted the advance of the enemy for an hour or 
 upwards. 
 
 II The rout of the Eleventh Corps was bad enough without the exag- 
 gerated coloring in which it has been painted. Much was said in the news- 
 paper accounts of the time regarding the " cowardly Dutchmen," and the fact 
 that this corps was supposed to be made up of German elements was empha- 
 sized as lending additional opprobrium to the affair ; yet, " of the eleven thou- 
 sand five hvmdred men composing the Eleventh Corps, but four thousand five 
 hundred were Germans." — The Eleventh Corps and the Battle of Chancellors- 
 ville. Pamphlet, New York, 1863. 
 
 The disi)osition of the corps to meet such an attack was excessively defective ; 
 and, in so far as the rout was owing to this circumstance, the author of this 
 disposition must assume the responsibility. General Warren, in his evidence 
 before the Congressional committee, propounds a theory of his own touching 
 the disaster, which he attributes to the fact that the ambulances, ammunition- 
 wagons, pack -mule train, and even beef-cattle, had actually been allowed to come 
 
THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 287 
 
 soon in utter rout. It was now seven o'clock, and growing 
 dark ; but Jackson had seized the breastworks, had taken the 
 whole line in reverse, pushed forward to within half a mile of 
 headquarters, and now proceeded to make preparations for 
 follo\nng up his success by a blow that should be decisive. 
 
 The situation at this moment was extremely critical, for 
 the Eleventh Corps having been brushed away, it was abso- 
 lutely necessary to form a new Hne, and it was difficult to see 
 whence the troops were to be drawn ; for just at that moment 
 Lee was making a vigorous front attack on Hooker's left and 
 centre, formed by Couch's and Slocum's corps. Hancock's 
 front especially was assailed Tvith great impetuosity ; but the 
 attacking column was held in check in the most intrepid man- 
 ner by Hancock's sku-mish line under Colonel Miles.* 
 
 The open plain around Chancellorsville now presented such 
 a spectacle as a simoom sweeping over the desert might 
 make. Through the dusk of nightfall, a rushing whirlwind 
 of men and artillery and wagons swept down the road, and 
 
 up on the line of battle of the Eleventh Corps ; and that, when the fighting be- 
 gan, all these, as a matter of course, ran away, greatly increasing the con- 
 fusion. — Report on the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. i., p. 45. 
 
 * Amid much that is dastardly at Chancellorsville, the conduct of this 
 young but gallant and skilful officer shines forth with a brilliant lustre. Being 
 intrusted with the charge of the skirmish line covering Hancock's front, he so 
 disposed his thin line, well intrenched, that the Confederates, though making 
 repeated charges in columns, on Saturday and Sunday, were never able to 
 reach Hancock's liue of battle. " On the 2d of May," says Hancock, " the enemy 
 frequently opened with artillery from the heights towards Fredericksburg, and 
 from those on my right, and with infantry assaulted my advanced line of rifle- 
 pits, but was always handsomely repulsed by the troops on duty there, consist- 
 ing of the Fifty-seventh, Sixty-fourth, and Sixty-sixth New York Volunteers, 
 and detachments from the Fitty-second New York, Second Delaware, and One 
 Hundred and Forty-eighth Pennsylvania Volunteers, under Colonel N. A. Miles. 
 During the sharp contest of that day, the enemy were never able to reach my 
 line of battle, so strongly and successfully did Colonel Miles contest the 
 ground." — Report of Cliancellorsville. Colonel Miles was on Sunday morning 
 wounded severely, and it was supposed fatally ; but he afterwards recovered 
 to share the glories of his corps to the close of the war, and he rose to tl « rank 
 o(' major-general. 
 
288 CAilPAIGNS OF THE AEMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 past headquarters, and on towards the fords of the Rappa- 
 hannock ; and it was in vain that the staff opposed theii 
 , persons and drawn sabres to the panic-stricken fugitives. 
 But it chanced that at this moment, General Pleasonton, who 
 had gone out with his cavahry to re-enforce Sickles, was re- 
 turning, and on learning the giving way of the right wing, he 
 moved forAvard rapidly, sent his horsemen on the charge into 
 the woods, and, bringing into position his own battery of 
 horse artillery, and such guns, twenty-two in all, as he could 
 collect, he poured double charges of canister into the advan- 
 cing line. Hooker, too, flaming out with the old fire of battle, 
 called for his own old division, the darling child of his crea- 
 tion, now under General Berry, and shouted to its com- 
 mander : " Throw your men into the breach — receive the 
 enemy on your bayonets — don't fire a shot — they can't see 
 you!"* Berry's division, unaffected by the flying crowd 
 streaming past it, hastened forward at the double-quick, in 
 the most perfect order, with fixed bayonets, and took position 
 on a crest at the western end of the clearing around Chan- 
 cellorsville. Here General AVarren with Berry's men, and 
 the artillery of the Twelfth Corps, under Captain Best, and 
 Hay's brigade of the Second Corps, formed a line to check the 
 enemy in front, while Pleasonton and Sickles assailed his 
 right flank ; and fifty pieces of artillery, vomiting their mis- 
 siles in wild curves of fire athwart the night-sky, poured swift 
 destruction into the Confederate ranks. Thus the torrent 
 was stemmed. But, more than all, an unseen hand had struck 
 down the head and front of all this hostile menace. Jackson 
 had received a mortal hurt. 
 
 On seeing the success that attended the first blow, Jack- 
 son, quick to perceive the immense consequences that might 
 be drawn from this victory, proceeded to make dispositions 
 to press on at once, extending his left so as to cut ofl 
 Hooker from United States Ford. To relieve Bodes' division 
 
 * Correspondence of William Swinton in tlie New York Times, May 5 
 1863. 
 
THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 289 
 
 wliicli had made tlie attack, he sent forward A. P. Hill's 
 division ; and being intensely anxious to learn the true posi- 
 tion of his antagonist, he personally went forward through 
 the dark woods, and with a portion of his staff rode out 
 beyond his own lines to reconnoitre the ground, instructing 
 the troops not to fire, " unless cavalry approached from the 
 direction of the enemy." * Finishing his examination of the 
 ground, he turned back with his staff to re-enter his own lines ; 
 but in the darkness, his troops, mistaking, as it is supposed, 
 the party for a body of Federal cavaby on the charge, fired a 
 volley which killed and wounded several of his staff, and 
 pierced Jackson with three bullets. On being removed to 
 the rear, his arm was amputated, and he seemed in the way 
 of recovery, but pneumonia supervening, he exjDired at the 
 end of a week. As the dying Napoleon is recorded to have 
 miirmured, ^'Tete d'armee" so Jackson, his unconscious mind 
 still busy with the mighty blow he was executing when 
 wounded, breathed out his life in the order, "A. P. Hill, 
 prepare for action !"t 
 
 Thus died Stonewall Jackson, the ablest of Lee's heuten- 
 ants. Jackson was essentially an executive officer, and in 
 this sphere he was incomparable. Devoid of high mental 
 parts, and destitute of that power of planning and combina- 
 tion, and of that calm, broad, military intellect, which distin- 
 guished General Lee, whom he regarded with a childlike 
 reverence, and whose designs he loved to carry out, he had 
 yet those elements of character that, above all else, inspire 
 troops. A fanatic in rehgion, fully beheving he was destined 
 by Heaven to beat his enemy whenever he encountered him, 
 
 * Life of General Jackson, by an Ex-Cadet (Richmond, 1864), p. 183. The 
 same circumstance is detailed in Cooke : Life of Jackson, p. 253. 
 
 f Cooke : Life of Jackson, p. 270. Life of Jackson, by an Ex-Cadet, p. 190. 
 During bis iUness, Jackson, speaking of the attack he had made, said with a 
 glow of martial ardor : " If I had not been wounded, I would have cut the 
 enemy off from the road to United States Ford ; we would have had them en- 
 tirely surrounded, and they would have been obliged to surrender or cut their 
 way out — they had no other alternative." 
 
 19 
 
290 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOJNIAC. 
 
 he infused something of his own fervent faith into his men, 
 and at the time of his death had trained a corps, whose at- 
 tacks in column were unique and irresistible ; and it was 
 noticed that Lee ventured upon no strokes of audacity after 
 Jackson had passed away. 
 
 The operation of Jackson, resulting in the doubling up of 
 Hooker's right, made important changes in the line indispen- 
 sable : so during the night a new front was formed on that 
 flank, with Sickles and Berry, The Eleventh Corps was for 
 the time out of the fight ; but Reynolds' corps, which had up 
 to this time been operating with Sedgwick on the left, below 
 Fredericksburg, arrived that evening, and with its firm metal 
 more than supplied the temporary loss. No idea was enter- 
 tained of retreating ; and if Lee did not retire, it was evident 
 that the morrow must bring with it a terrible struggle. But 
 before detailing the events of Sunday, as the action becomes 
 then more complicated, and flames out in a double battle, 
 it will be necessary to indicate what had been passing with 
 that portion of the army under Sedgwick, and to point out 
 the relations between these two parts of one and the same 
 drama. 
 
 It was not until after Friday's developments near Chan- 
 cellorsville, when the reconnoitring columns that went out 
 towards Fredericksburg had met the enemy, and had been 
 recalled, and Lee followed up and drew his lines around 
 Chancellorsville, that Hooker became convinced that Lee was 
 not minded to fall back. Seeing this, he, on Saturday morn- 
 ing, withdrew Reynolds' corps also from the force under 
 Sedgwick, and it reached Chancellorsville late that night. 
 This left Sedgwick with only his own (Sixth) corps ; but it was 
 a powerful corps, numbering some twenty-two thousand 
 men.* 
 
 Now, it is a question which will present itseK to the military 
 
 * In addition to tins. Gibbon's division of Coucb's corps held Falmouth, ' 
 and observed the river and the north side of Banks' Ford. 
 
THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 291 
 
 student, wliether it would not have been better, the moment 
 a lodgment was gained at Chancellorsville, on Thursday, to 
 have at once brought the three corps under Sedgwick up to 
 that point and united the army. Their presence below Fred- 
 ericksburg, while the turning operation was in execution, was 
 correct ; but after that purpose was accompHshed, the three 
 corps near Fredericksburg, and the four corps at Chancellors- 
 ville, presented the character of a divided army, separated 
 from each other by twenty miles, a river to be twice passed, 
 and the enemy between the two parts. And especially when 
 Friday's developments had proved that Lee would not re- 
 treat but offer battle at Chancellorsville was such a junction 
 desirable. Nor was this necessity lessened, but rather greatly 
 heightened by the fact that Hooker's order to withdraw from 
 the advanced position gained on Friday, by forfeiting pos- 
 session of Banks' Ford (the tenure of which would have 
 practically brought the two parts of his army together), de- 
 finitively severed Sedgwick from the force at Chancellorsville, 
 and made a junction possible only on one of two conditions : 
 firstly, a detour by the north bank of the Rappahannock, 
 making the passage at United States Ford — but this was one 
 entire day's march ; secondly, by a direct march of Sedgwick 
 from Fredericksburg to Chancellorsville, with Lee interposing 
 between him and Hooker. 
 
 Now when, on Saturday night, the disruption of the right 
 wing had given a blow to all his hopes, and seriously im- 
 perilled his army. Hooker resolved to adopt the latter course, 
 and with a view to relieve the pressure that was upon him, 
 sent, late at night, orders to Sedgwick to put himself in 
 motion immediately, occupy Fredericksburg, seize its heights, 
 gain the plankroad from that place to Chancellorsville, and 
 move out to join the main body, destroying any force ho 
 might meet, and reaching his assigned position by daylight 
 the next morning. This was precisely one of those movements 
 which, according as they are wrought out, may be either the 
 height of wisdom or the height of folly. Its successful 
 accomplishment certainly promised very brilliant results. 
 
292 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMT OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 It is easy to see how seriously Lee's safety would be com- 
 promised, if, while engaged with Hooker in front, he should 
 suddenly find a powerful force assailing his rear, and grasp- 
 ing already his direct line of communications with Kichmond. 
 But if, on the other hand, Lee should be able by any slack- 
 ness on the part of his opponent, to engage him in front 
 with a part of his force, while he should turn round swiftly to 
 assail the isolated moving column, it is obvious that he would 
 be able to repulse or destroy that column, and then, by a 
 vigorous return, meet or attack his antagonist's main body. 
 For the successful execution of this plan not only was Sedg- 
 wick bound to the most energetic action, but Hooker also was 
 engaged by every consideration of honor and duty to so act 
 as to make the dangerous task he had assigned to Sedgwick 
 possible. And now premising that Sedgwick, immediately on 
 receipt of the order at eleven o'clock of Saturday night, 
 put his force in motion from its position three miles below 
 Fredericksburg and moved forward to effect a junction with 
 the main body, I shall return to the recital of events at Chan- 
 cellorsville at the time the action burst forth anew on Sunday 
 morning. 
 
 V. 
 
 SUNDAY'S ACTION AT CHANCELLORSVILLE 
 
 When, some hours before dawn of Sunday, Lee received 
 word of the wounding of Jackson, the messenger who con- 
 veyed to him the tidings, added that it had been Jackson's 
 intent, had he been spared, " to have pressed the enemy on 
 Sunday." " These people shall be pressed to-day !" ex- 
 claimed Lee, with deep emotion.* 
 
 Stuart had succeeded for the time being to Jackson's com- 
 mand, and forming the corps in three lines, he advanced it at 
 
 * Life of Jackson, by an Ex-Cadet, p. 185. 
 
THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. ^OS 
 
 daylight to the attack, with the battle-cry, " Charge, and 
 remember JachsonT* Swinging round his right so as to bring 
 it perpendicular with the plankroad, he seized the crest which 
 had the day before been occupied by the left of the Eleventh 
 Corps, got thu'ty pieces of artillery rapidly into position 
 thereon, and opened a heavy fire on the plain around the 
 Chancellor House." t 
 
 The attitude of Hooker had not now even the pretence of 
 ah offensive character. The line he held, however, on Sunday 
 morning, still covered the angle of roads at the Chancel- 
 lorsville House. Sickles' corps, and Berry's division of 
 Slocum's corps, and French's division of Couch's corps 
 formed the right, and faced westward to meet Stuart's attack, 
 while the rest of Slocum's corps and Hancock's division of 
 Couch's corps formed the centre and left and covered the two 
 roads from Chancellorsville to Fredericksburg to meet any 
 assault from the remainder of Lee's army, while part of Han- 
 cock was thrown back, facing eastward, so as to guard the 
 communications with United States Ford. The corps-com- 
 manders saw that it was only a question of saving what 
 they could of the army's honor, for the army was without a 
 head. J During the night the engineers had traced out a new 
 line three-quarters of a mile to the rear of Chancellorsville, 
 
 * Life of Jackson, by an Ex-Cadet, p. 187. 
 
 f Stuart's Report of the Battle of Chancellorsville, p. 18. " In course of 
 the morning, the corps on our right was pushed in, enabling the enemy to con- 
 centrate his artillery fire on Chancellorsville with effect." — Couch's Report. 
 This swinging round of Stuart's right was made under the following cir- 
 cumstances. It wUl be remembered that Sickles, from the movement he 
 had made on Saturday afternoon to attack the rear of Jackson's corps, reached 
 a position on the right flank of that corps ; but a little before daybreak. Sickles 
 was ordered to retire from that position to his place in the new line. It was 
 when the withdrawal had been nearly accomplished that Stuart advanced his 
 right, and in so doing engaged Sickles' rear, consisting of the brigade of Gra- 
 ham, who manoeuvred his command with address and made good his escape. — 
 
 X When Slocum, after fighting long and hard, sent to inquire if other 
 movements were being made that might relieve him, or if he might expect re- 
 enforcements and ammunition. Hooker replied, that he could not make soldiers 
 or ammunition. This, too, when two corps lay idle I 
 
294 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 towards the river, and covering the roads to United States 
 and Ely's fords. To this line Hooker had resolved to retire, 
 and he seemed to be incapable of other resolve. 
 
 Sickles and Berry and French made good fight at their 
 position, receiving Stuart's impetuous attacks ; but the result 
 was that, after a severe struggle. Sickles was forced from hif 
 front line. Carroll, with a few regiments of French's division, 
 assailed Stuart's left flank, and threw it into much confusion, 
 capturing several hundred prisoners,* but that flank being re- 
 enforcjed, Stuart pressed back French in turn, and his right 
 renewed the attack on Sickles.t 
 
 While Stuart was thus bearing down on the right wing, 
 Lee with his remaining divisions attacked the centre and 
 left under Slocum and Hancock, He threw forward Ander- 
 son's division on the plankroad connecting Fredericksburg 
 and Chancellorsville to attack Slocum, and assailed Hancock 
 with McLaws' division. The latter was repulsed in the 
 most brilliant manner by the skirmish line of Hancock's divi- 
 sion ; but Anderson pressed hard on Slocum, and throw- 
 ing round his left, succeeded in making a connection with 
 Stuart by a thin Hne. This done, Lee advanced his whole 
 line, when Sickles and Slocum were forced back. The line 
 melted away and the whole front ajDpeared to pass out, and 
 Hancock, with a portion of Slocum's corps under General 
 Geary, alone held the extreme point of the line on the side of 
 the Chancellorsville House towards the enemy.:]: Drawing back 
 
 * " French drove tlie enemy, taking about three hundred prisoners and 
 recaptui'ing a regiment of one of the corps in the hands of the rebels." — 
 Couch : Report of Chancellorsville. 
 
 f " In the mean time the enemy was pressing our left with infantry, and 
 all the re-enforcements I could obtain were sent there." — Stuart : Report of 
 Chancellorsville, p. 18. 
 
 X Hancock's testimony : Report on the Conduct of the War, second series, 
 vol. i., p. 67. Geary, however, went out some time before Hancock, who 
 remained till the last. It is proper to state that Sickles' ammunition had 
 become exhausted, and no re-enforcements were sent him, notwithstanding 
 that Meade and Reynolds were both disengaged. Sickles, with the bayonet 
 alone, repelled several successive assaults, and Mott's New Jersey brigade ol 
 
THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 295 
 
 to the Chancellor House, a struggle was made for a time at 
 the angle of roads ; but the line soon began to waver. De- 
 tecting this, the Confederates sprang forward, and at ten 
 o'clock seized Chancellorsville.* 
 
 A short time before the action thus culminated, General 
 Hooker was thrown down by the concussion of a shot that 
 struck one of the pillars of the Chancellor House, on the bal- 
 cony of which he was standing. This prostrated him for a 
 brief period, and he instructed General Couch to superintend 
 the withdrawal of the troops to the new line in rear, which 
 had been prepared and fortified during the previous night. 
 This line had the form of a redan thrown forw^ard in the angle 
 between the Rapidan and the Rappahannock — the right flank 
 resting on the former, and the left on the latter stream. The 
 corps of Meade and Reynolds, which had held position on the 
 right in reserve, and had, strange to say, not been called into 
 action during the terrible struggle of the morning, were formed 
 on the new line, where they were joined by the rest of the 
 army falling back from Chancellorsville. Lee, gathering up 
 his forces, was about to renew the attack on this fi-esh posi- 
 tion, when his upraised arm was suddenly arrested by tidings 
 of great purport from Fredericksburg.f 
 
 Sickles' corps alone captured seven or eight colors from the enemy's second line 
 and took several hmidred prisoners. 
 
 * " Artillery was pushed forward to the crest, sharp-shooters were posted in 
 a house in advance, and in a few minutes Chancellorsville was ours (ten o'clock, 
 A.M.)" — Stuart: Report, p. 18. Lee states the same time. — Report, p. 10. 
 Most of the Union reports make it eleven o'clock. 
 
 •)- " Our preparations were j ust completed, when further operations were 
 arrested by intelligence received from Fredericksburg." — Lee's Report, p. 10 
 
296 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 VI. 
 THE STORMING OF THE HEIGHTS. 
 
 It was towards midniglit of Saturday when Sedgwick re- 
 ceived his orders to move through Fredericksburg and pro- 
 ceed towards Chancellorsville to unite with the main body. 
 This command found him holding his position on the south 
 bank of the Eappahannock, three miles below Fredericksburg. 
 He immediately put his corps in motion by the flank, and 
 proceeded to the town, skirmishing sharply with the enemy 
 all the way up— the Confederate force faUing back slowly.* 
 Some hours before dawn of Sunday, Sedgwick occupied Fred- 
 ericksburg, but a small force thrown forward before dayhght 
 to seize the enemy's works behind the town was immediately 
 repulsed. Gibbon's division of Couch's corps, which had been 
 holding Falmouth, then crossed to join him. 
 
 For the defence of Fredericksburg, General Lee had left 
 behind Early's division of four brigades and Barksdale's bri- 
 gade of McLaws' division.t Barksdale occupied the heights 
 immediately in rear of the town, includmg Marye's Hill and 
 the stone wall at its base, famous in the story of Burnside's 
 attack. Early's own division held the Confederate right 
 below the town. Three companies of the Washington Artil- 
 lery occupied the crest, and as soon as Sedgwick's movement 
 was disclosed, on Sunday morning. Early sent Hays' brigade 
 to re-enforce Barksdale. As it had required scarcely more 
 than this force to repulse Burnside's successive columns ol 
 attack on the 13th of December, Barksdale had probably little 
 doubt of his abihty to give a like reception to those now 
 threatening assault. 
 
 * Sedgwick : Report of Fredericksburg Heights. 
 
 f In addition to this force, the Confederate General Wilcox, who, with his 
 brigade, had been holding position at Banks' Ford, moved up to join Barksdale, 
 but arrived too late to take part in the action, though he played a part in the 
 afterpiece. 
 
THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 297 
 
 Sedgwick's first efforts were of a tentative nature. Howe's 
 division, occupying the left of his line, made an eifort against 
 the Confederate right with a view to turn the heights. It had 
 no serious character, however, and was not successful.* Gib- 
 bon's division, on the right of Sedgwick, then essayed to move 
 round the left of the Confederate position ; but this was foiled 
 by the canal covering that entire flank. A partial attack in 
 fi'ont was not more successful. Every action has these pe- 
 riods of prelude, from which the proper course at length dis- 
 closes itseK. That which now presented itself as best suited 
 to the cii'cumstances, and promising the best results, w^as to 
 form a powerful assaulting column and carry Marye's Heights 
 by storm. 
 
 The preliminary endeavors and the preparations for attack 
 had consumed considerable time, and it was towards eleven 
 o'clock when it began. Two columns were formed from New- 
 ton's division — the right column of four regiments, and the left 
 column of two regiments — and on the left of this a line of 
 battle of four regiments was thrown out. The columns moved 
 on the plankroad and to the right of it du*ectly up the heights. 
 The line of battle advanced on the left of the road on the 
 double-quick against the rifle-pits, neither halting nor firing a 
 shot until they had driven the enemy from their lower line of 
 works along the stone wall at the base of Marye's Hill. In the 
 mean time the storming parties had rushed forward to the 
 crest and carried the works in rear of the rifle-pits, capturing 
 the guns and many himdred prisoners.! The assault was 
 executed "vsdth great gallantry, under a very severe fire that 
 cost Sedgwick a thousand men ; and the Confederates made a 
 savage hand-to-hand fight on the crest and over the guns. 
 
 * " The enemy made a demonstration against tlie extreme right, which 
 was easily repulsed by General Early." — Lee : Eeport of Chancellorsville, p. 11. 
 
 f " A large portion of the Eighteenth Mississippi Regiment and a part of 
 the Twenty-first were taken prisoners, and a company of the Washington 
 Artillery, with its guns, were captured." — Report of General Early, p. 34. The 
 Sixth Maine, of the light brigade under Colonel Burnham, was the first to plant 
 its colors on the works. 
 
298 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AB.MY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 As, simultaneous with these events, Howe's divisiou on the 
 left carried the crest below Fredericksburg, capturing a num- 
 ber of prisoners and five guns, the whole ridgo wajs now in 
 Sedgwick's possession. Early's troops retreated southward 
 over the telegraph road, leaving the plankroad from Freder- 
 icksburg to Chancellorsville open to an advance of Sedgwick. 
 This the latter proceeded with all haste to set on foot. 
 
 Such was the startHng intelligence that, in the climax of 
 his triumph, reached General Lee, who suddenly found him- 
 self summoned to meet this new and unexpected menace. 
 The course adopted by Lee in this emergency was precisely 
 the course prescribed by the highest principles of war — the 
 principles on which Caesar, and Gustavus, and Frederick 
 fought battles ; but it was a course very bold — unusually bold 
 for the cautious and methodical mind of the Confederate 
 commander. Relying on the repulse Hooker had received 
 to hold him inactive, Lee instantly countermarched from 
 Hooker's front a force sufficient, in conjunction with the 
 troops under Early, to check or destroy Sedgwick. Wilcox's 
 brigade, which had been held at Banks' Ford, was already in 
 position to meet him ; and in addition, Lee forwarded the 
 brigade of Mahone of Anderson's di\dsion and the brigades 
 of Kershaw, Wofford, and Semmes under General McLaws.* 
 These, with the five brigades of Early, who was in position 
 to place himseH on Sedgwick's rear, he judged adequate to 
 the work. While, therefore, this force was countermarching 
 from Chancellorsville towards Fredericksburg, Sedgwick was 
 advancing from Fredericksburg towards Chancellorsville ; and 
 it happened that the heads of the columns came together 
 just about midway — at Salem Heights, near the junction of 
 the plankroad and the turnpike. It was now towards four 
 o'clock in the afternoon. One of the Confederate brigades, 
 under Wilcox, aheady held the crest at Salem Chapel, and 
 McLaws was proceeding to form his brigades on his right 
 and left ; but Sedgwick threw forward Brooks' division, sup- 
 
 * Lee : Report of Chancellorsville, p. 13. 
 
THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 299 
 
 porting it with Newton's division on the right, and, advancing, 
 gained the crest after a sharp conflict.* This was a momen- 
 tary triumph, for he was soon pushed slowly back through 
 the woods. The falling back was covered, and the advance 
 of the enemy checked by the excellent firing of the batteries 
 under Colonel Tompkins.f Sedgwick, in fact, was checked. 
 His loss was severe, and with that suffered in carrying the 
 heights of Fredericksburg, brought the total up to five thou- 
 sand men.:]: Such was the situation in which night foimd 
 this column. 
 
 VII. 
 
 THE COUP DE GRACE. 
 
 Monday, May 4th, found both armies, and the opposing 
 halves of each army, in a curious dead-lock. Hooker had 
 assumed a strictly defensive attitude in his new line. Lee 
 felt unable to attack with less than his whole force, which 
 could not be concentrated until he was relieved of the danger 
 that menaced his rear in the person of Sedgwick.§ Sedgwick, 
 on the other hand, while able to hold his own, was unable 
 to advance in face of the opposition he encountered. This 
 was now not lessened but rather increased, for General Early 
 
 * Sedgwick's Eeport. 
 
 f " The advance of the enemy was checked by the splendid firing of our 
 batteries — Williston's, Rigby's, and Parsons'." — Sedgwick's Report. The Con- 
 federate General McLaws testifies to the excellence of the artillery service : 
 " The batteries of the enemy were admirably served, and played over 
 the whole ground." — Report of the Battle of Chancellorsville, p. 30. 
 
 |: " My strength yesterday was twenty -two thousand men ; I do not know 
 my losses, but they were large — probably five thousand men." — Dispatch from 
 Sedgwick to Hooker, May 4th : Report on the Conduct of the War, second 
 series, vol. i., p. 109. The precise loss was four thousand nine hundred and 
 twenty-five kiUed, wounded, and missing. — Sedgwick's Report. 
 
 § " In the mean time the enemy had so strengthened his position near 
 Chancellorsville, that it was deemed inexpedient to assail it with less than our 
 whole force, which could not be concentrated until we were relieved from the 
 danger that menaced our rear." — Lee : Report, p. 13. 
 
300 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 on Monday morning retook the heights of Fredericksburg, 
 thus cutting oE Sedgwick from communication with that 
 place, and enveloping him on three sides. 
 
 To cut this knot, Lee resolved to further re-enforce the 
 troops opposed to Sedgwick and drive him across the Eappa- 
 liannock, thus ehminating from the problem one important 
 factor. Accordingly, on Monday morning Anderson was 
 directed to j)roceed with his remaining three brigades to join 
 McLaws.* Reaching Salem Heights about noon, he threw his 
 force around on Sedgwick's left, with the view of cutting his 
 command off from the river. The Confederates, however, met 
 considerable delay in getting into position, and the attack 
 w^as not begun till six o'clock, when it was made with great 
 impetuosity — Sedgwick resisting with the utmost stubborn- 
 ness, but forced to yield ground, especially on the left. Hap- 
 pily, darkness soon ensued to prevent the enemy's following 
 up his advantage, and, under cover of night, Sedgwick safely 
 withdrew his corps across the Eappahannock at Banks' Ford, 
 where a ponton-bridge had been laid the day before. 
 
 Thus it was that Lee on Tuesday morning (May 5th) saw 
 himself reHeved from this menace in his rear ; and having 
 now but a single foe to cope with, he promptly recalled the 
 divisions of McLaws and Anderson, united them with his 
 main force at Chancellors ville, and resolved to give the 
 remaining section of the Union army the coup de grace. Prep- 
 arations were made during the afternoon and evening to as- 
 sail Hooker's position at dayhght the following morning (Wed- 
 nesday, May 6th). When daybreak, however, came, and the 
 Confederate skirmishers advanced, it was found that the army 
 had, during the night, withdrawn across the Rappahannock. 
 
 Hooker had determined, on Monday night, to recross the 
 river ; but when the question was submitted to the judgment 
 of his corps-commanders, it was found that a majority of 
 those present were in favor of an advance rather than a with- 
 drawal. Hooker, however, had lost all stomach for fight. 
 
 * Lee : Report of Cliancellorsville, y. 12, 
 
THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 301 
 
 Accordingly on Tuesday, the engineers were instructed to 
 prepare a new line near the river to cover the crossing, and 
 for this purpose they constructed a continuous cover and 
 abatis, from the Eappahannock at Scott's Dam around to 
 the mouth of Hunting Creek on the Bapidan, a distance of 
 three miles. During the afternoon a heavy rain set in which 
 Listed till late at night. 
 
 The movement to recross was begun by the artillery at 
 dark of Tuesday, and was suddenly interrupted by a rise in 
 the Rappahannock so great as to submerge the banks at the 
 end of the bridges, which the current threatened to sweep 
 away — a consummation most devoutly wished by many of 
 the leading officers of the army, who were bitterly opposed 
 to recrossing the river. But fate willed otherwise, and in the 
 midst of a night as gloomy as the mood of the army, the 
 troops filed across to the north bank. 
 
 The losses in the battle of Chancellorsville can be stated 
 with accuracy. On the side of the Confederates, they made 
 an aggregate of ten thousand two hundred and eighty-one.* 
 On the Union side, they were seventeen thousand one hun- 
 dred and ninety-sevent killed, wounded, and missing. The 
 army left behind its killed, its wounded, fourteen pieces of 
 artillery, and twenty thousand stand of arms. 
 
 It remains now to glance a moment at the operations of 
 the cavalry column under Stoneman. As this was a powerful 
 corps, numbering some ten thousand sabres, and as its move- 
 ment was intended to precede by a fortnight the commence- 
 ment of operations by the army, very important results were 
 expected from it. But the cavalry was delayed a long time by 
 the swollen condition of the upper Rappahannock, so that it 
 did not cross till the time the infantry made the passage, 
 April 29. Hooker then divided the command into two 
 
 * Lee : Report of Chancellorsville, p. 131. 
 
 t Report on the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. i., p. 143. Of this 
 number Lee claims five thousand prisoners, besides the wounded. He also 
 claims the prize of seventeen standards, nineteen thousand and five hundred 
 stand of arms, and much ammunition. — Lee : Report of Chancellorsville, p. 15. 
 
302 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 columns, sending one, under General Averill, to move to 
 Louisa Courthouse, threaten Gordonsville, and engage the 
 Confederate mounted force, while the other, under General 
 Buford, should break up the Kichmond and Fredericksburg 
 Eailroad, destroying its bridges, etc. 
 
 The only mounted force the Confederates could oppose to 
 these columns was a small brigade of two regiments under 
 General W. H. F. Lee.* That ofl&cer fell back before the 
 Union cavalry, which advanced on Louisa Courthouse, and 
 proceeded to destroy the Yirginia Central road. Stoneman 
 divided Buford's force into six bodies, throwing them out in 
 all directions ; but the important line of communications by 
 the Fredericksburg and Eichmond Eailroad was not struck 
 till the 3d of May, and the damage done it was very slight.f 
 This is sufficiently shown by the fact that on the 5th the cars 
 conveyed to Eichmond the Confederate wounded and the 
 Union prisoners:}: captured in the battle of ChancellorsvUle. 
 The raid had, undoubtedly, the effect to alarm the country 
 through which the columns moved, and much property was 
 destroyed ; but its miHtary result, as bearing on the main 
 operation, was quite insignificant. 
 
 * Report of General R. E. Lee on the Battle of Cliancellorsville, p. 15 ; Re- 
 port of General Stuart, p. 38 ; Report of General W. H. F. Lee, p. 49. 
 
 f " The damage done to the railroad was small and soon repaired, and the 
 James River Canal was saved from injury." — Report of General Lee, p. 15. 
 
 I Hooker's testimony : Report on the Conduct of the War, second series, 
 vol. i., p. 140. 
 
THE CHANCELLORSVILLE TAMPAIGN. 303 
 
 VIII. 
 OBSERVATIONS ON THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE. 
 
 The simple recital I have made of the operations attending 
 the battle of Chancellorsville will have served to reveal the 
 extraordinary character of that action, which, opening with an 
 exhibition of grand tactics marked by masterly skill, sank 
 into conduct so feeble and faulty, as to be almost beneath 
 criticism. 
 
 1. It is in war as in Hfe : a single false step often involves 
 an endless train of swift-succeeding misfortune. This false 
 step in the conduct of Hooker was that, having started out to 
 fight an offensive battle, he reduced himself, at the very mo- 
 ment when action was above all imperative, to a perilous 
 defensive. The strategic operation of crossing the Eappa- 
 hannock merits all the praise it has received. It was ac- 
 complished with complete success, and resulted in placing at 
 Chancellorsville on the night of Thursday, April 30, four corps, 
 in a position on the rear of the left of the Confederate de- 
 fensive line, with Lee's forces scattered down the Rappahan- 
 nock, a distance of five-and-twenty miles. All the enemy 
 between Hooker and Fredericksburg was a mere handful of 
 a division. Then was the moment for a bold initiative on 
 the part of Hooker. Then was the time for vigorous impulse 
 and fiery action before his opponent recovered himself. By 
 what prompting of chivalrous generosity, rare in war — and 
 ecUpsing forever the conduct of the commander of the Eng- 
 lish Guards, who at Fontenoy insisted on the French deliver- 
 ing the first fire — was it that in this situation he voluntarily 
 resigned aU the advantage of the surprise, and allowed Lee 
 forty-eight hours to concentrate against him ? 
 
 2. That delay at Chancellorsville from Thursday afternoon 
 till Saturday afternoon undid all that had been accomplished. 
 
304: CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 It is true that the Wilderness is a region unfavorable fo? 
 manoeuvring a large army ; but it was as bad for Lee as for 
 Hooker, and the latter is estopped from availing himself of 
 this excuse by his own order, in which he declared it to be 
 " ground of his own selection." Besides, this objection 
 wholly disappears in face of the fact that the reconnoissances 
 of Friday, May 1st, showed he might have pushed out beyond 
 the woods, thus uncovering Banks' Ford, reducing the line of 
 communications by twelve miles, and practically uniting both 
 his wings. To the "special wonder" of all the commanders, 
 he relinquished the fine position then gained, and stood on 
 the defensive in the Wilderness. 
 
 3. But for a defensive battle the disposition of his army was 
 faulty — the ground being commanded in front, and the right 
 flank thrown out " in the air," whereas it might have been se- 
 curely rested on the Kapidan. This afforded Lee his opportu- 
 nity, and with consummate address, and a marvellous bold- 
 ness, considering the disparity of his force, he on Saturday 
 morning set on foot the execution of Jackson's flank march 
 to attack the Union right. This is an operation usually 
 condemned in war ; but the conditions justified it, seeing 
 that Jackson was able to mask his movement, and success 
 crowned it. 
 
 4. During the whole of Saturday, while Jackson was exe- 
 cuting his flank march, the Confederate commander held 
 Hooker's fifty thousand men with the division of Anderson 
 and part of McLaws — eight brigades, or twelve thousand 
 men. Not a motion of ofience was made by Hooker all this 
 time. 
 
 5. After the disaster to the Eleventh Corps on Saturday 
 night. Hooker made every thing to hinge on Sedgwick's ad- 
 vance to join him, which was to make the greater contingent 
 on the lesser. His orders to Sedgwick, sent at ten o'clock of 
 Saturday night, and received about midnight, were to move up 
 from his position below Fredericksburg, take the heights, and 
 move out by the plankroad towards Chancellorsville, distant 
 fourteen miles. This move would, under the circumstances. 
 
THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN. 305 
 
 liave been an impossibility, even had no enemy interposed. 
 Sedgwick, after a gallant assault in which he suffered heavy 
 loss, carried the Fredericksburg heights on Sunday forenoon ; 
 and he then moved out to obey Hooker's instructions to fall 
 upon Lee's rear at Chancellorsville, but was stopped by the 
 enemy at Salem Heights. 
 
 6. But meanwhile, on Sunday morning Hooker had been 
 driven back at Chancellorsville. Moreover, the operations 
 ending in the giving ground of the army at Chancellorsville 
 were over live hours before Sedgwick attacked Salem Heights. 
 It is therefore evident, that unless the Sixth Corps could, 
 single-handed, fight all the force brought against it, the sole 
 object of taking the heights of Fredericksburg, or uncovering 
 Banks' Ford, was to hold a position from which the army 
 might debouch. Therefore the attack on Salem Heights was 
 mere waste of men ; and if those heights had been taken, the 
 Sixth Corps never could have extricated itself. Sedgwick 
 should not have been called forward from Fredericksburg, be- 
 cause to abandon the possession of the heights was to give up 
 a positive gain for a remote possibility. If, however, Sedgwick 
 was to be expected to make a junction with the force at 
 Chancellorsville, Hooker was committed by every considera- 
 tion of honor and duty to so act as to make the junction 
 possible. Yet he did not make the slightest effort as a diver- 
 sion in Sedgwick's favor ; but allowed Lee to countermarch at 
 pleasure from his front a force sufficient to first check and 
 then overwhelm Sedgwick. General Hooker lays the blame 
 of the disaster at Chancellorsville to Sedgwick's failure to 
 join him on Sunday morning. "In my judgment," says he, 
 " General Sedgwick did not obey the spirit of my order, and 
 made no sufficient effort to obey it. His movement was 
 delayed so long that the enemy discovered his intentions ; 
 and when that was done, he was necessarily delayed in the 
 further execution of the order." * This is a cruel charge to 
 bring against a commander now beyond the reach of de- 
 
 * Hooker's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. 
 
 20 
 
306 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 traction ; wliose brilliant exploit in carrying tlie Fredericks- 
 burg heights and his subsequent fortitude in a trying situa- 
 tion, shine out as the one reHeying brightness amid the gloom 
 of that hapless battle. 
 
 7. From the time when, at noon of Sunday, Hooker was 
 driven from the hue at Chancellorsville, to his new line in the 
 rear, he remained perfectly passive. Was aU fight out of 
 him ? Had the disaster to the Eleventh Corps, which nobody 
 in the army regarded as of any moment (that corps hardly 
 being accounted as belonging to the Army of the Potomac), 
 so paralyzed him that he could do nothing ? Yet the disrup- 
 tion of the Eleventh Corps had been more than made up by 
 .the arrival of Keynolds' corps (First) on Saturday night ; and 
 ia the decisive action of Sunday, he employed little more 
 than half his force — neither Reynolds nor Meade being 
 allowed to go into action, though eager to do so. Hooker 
 allowed a position to be lost when he had more men at hand 
 that did not draw trigger than Lee had in his entire army ! 
 
 8. It was Monday evening before Sedgvdck was attacked ; 
 and the whole interval from noon of Sunday, when the 
 action of Chancellorsville ceased, till six o'clock on Monday 
 evening — thirty hours — was available to re-enforce Sedgwick, 
 which might readily have been done on a short line via 
 United States and Banks' fords. Yet no attempt was made 
 to do so. Lee made good use of this time in re-enforcing the 
 wing opposed to Sedgwick, so that he was able at night to 
 drive the Sixth Corps across the river after a severe action, 
 in which Sedgwick's guns booming out like signals of distress 
 w^ere heard at Chancellorsville. Indeed, such was Hooker's 
 delusion (to use the mildest term) regarding the situation, 
 that on Sunday afternoon, at the time Sedgwick was com- 
 pletely enveloped, he sent word to that officer stating that he 
 (Hooker) " had driven the enemy, and all it wanted was for 
 him (Sedgwick) to come up and complete Lee's destruction !" 
 
 9. Even after Sedgwick had withdrawn across the Rappa- 
 hannock at Banks' Ford on Monday, Hooker might have re- 
 mained indefinitely on the third line he had caused to be 
 
THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CA^IPAIGN. 307 
 
 prepared. It was of impregnable strength — ^both flanks rest- 
 ing on the river ; and the army could here have repelled all 
 assaults. The whole army wished this; and a successful 
 action, ending in Lee's repulse, would have saved the morale 
 and pride of the troops. It has been said that the storm of 
 May 5th, which caused a rise in the Kappahannock, and en- 
 dangered the suppHes of the army, was a motive for retreat. 
 But the order to retire was given twelve hours before any 
 rain and during a cloudless sky. 
 
 10. Not the Army of the Potomac was beaten at Chancel- 
 lorsville, but its commander ; and General Hooker's conduct 
 inflicted a very severe blow to his reputation. The officers 
 despised his generalship, and the rank and file were puzzled 
 at the result of a battle in which they had been foiled without 
 bemg fought, and caused to retreat without the consciousness 
 of having been beaten. 
 
308 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OP THE POTOMAC 
 
 IX. 
 
 THE GETTYSBFRa CAMPAIGN. 
 
 Jinra— July, 1863. 
 
 I. 
 
 THEORY OF THE CONFEDERATE INVASION. 
 
 In the minds of that group of able and sagacious men that 
 at Bichmond controlled the course of the mighty experiment 
 of war, there had early grown up a theory of military conduct 
 that was undoubtedly the best adapted to the circumstances, 
 and, indeed, is the only theory on which a defensive war can 
 be maintained with any hope of success. 
 
 It is now generally conceded that a Power that either vol- 
 untarily or by compulsion allows itseK to be reduced to a 
 purely defensive attitude is -certain to be compelled, sooner or 
 later, to succumb. On the other hand, military history affords 
 many memorable illustrations of the marvellous results that 
 may be accomplished by nations that, forced to the defensive 
 by the superiority of the assailant, are yet able at the oppor- 
 tune moment to assume the offensive, and inflict blows as 
 weU as receive them. It was by acting on this principle that 
 Frederick the Great, in that everlasting model of a defensive 
 campaign, the Seven Years' AYar, was able to make head 
 against the seemingly overwhelming combination brought 
 against him ; and that Napoleon, in 1814, in that other bright 
 exemplar of the defence of a country by boldly taking the 
 offensive, was able to confront the invading Allies, and at 
 length make them pay so dearly for the capture of his 
 capital. 
 
^^-^^it^. V/ '^^^Itxu^oU 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 309 
 
 Such was the principle of action early adopted by the Con- 
 federate leaders ; and the course of this narrative has already 
 set forth the bold and successful manner in which it was more 
 than once carried out. It was in accordance with this policy 
 that General Johnston, after falling back from Yorktown to 
 the front of Richmond, turned upon McClellan astride the 
 Chickahominy, and dealt him a blow which but for accidental 
 circumstances should have terminated the campaign — a result 
 that, indeed, was accompHshed, when Lee, continuing the 
 conception of Johnston, seized the initiative and hurled the 
 Union army back to the James River. And it was in following 
 out the same line of action that he was able, by threatening 
 the flanks and rear of Pope, to drive back that general to the 
 fortifications of Washington, and transfer the theatre of war 
 to the trans-Potomac region. 
 
 It seemed that an opportunity for a new and bolder offen- 
 sive than had yet been attempted now presented itself. 
 Twice the Army of the Potomac had crossed the Rappahan- 
 nock, and on each occasion it had been driven back in disas- 
 ter. Fredericksburg and ChanceUorsviUe had raised the 
 morale of Lee's army to the highest pitch. While the expe- 
 rience of these battles had inspirited the Southern troops, it 
 had given General Lee himself a sense of confidence and 
 power he had not before felt. And now to this fact of the 
 moral condition of the Confederate army, so favorable to bold 
 enterprises, was added another incentive, in its condition of 
 material strength. The diminution of Hooker's force by the 
 extensive out-mustering of short-term troops* was well known ; 
 
 * Tho regiments thus mustered out of service by the expiration of their term 
 were among the fruits of that hap-hazard hand-to-mouth policy of enlistment 
 that governed the military administration throughout the war. The two 
 years troops had been enrolled for that period at a time when all were eager to 
 be enlisted " for the war ;" and the nine-months' men were from the improvised 
 levies which the Secretary of War, in his panic at Jackson's razzia in the She- 
 nandoah Valley in July, 1862, had called out at that time. It is needless to 
 remark that their term of service expired just about the time they became 
 somewhat seasoned to war. 
 
310 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AEMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 aud to this relative increase of Lee's army was now added a 
 positive increase bj a large force of conscripts, and a more 
 important re-enforcement by the two divisions of Longstreet's 
 corjDS, which, having been operating south of James River at 
 the time of the battle of Chancellorsville, were immediately 
 thereafter recalled to take part in the meditated movement. If 
 Hooker's force of infantry was at this time reduced, as he de- 
 clares, to an eflfective of eighty thousand men,* there was now 
 less disproportion between the two armies than generally ob- 
 tained, for at the end of May, Lee's force had reached an ag- 
 gregate of sixty-eight thousand infantry and a considerable 
 body of cavalry.t The Confederate army had, moreover, been 
 lately mobilized and increased in efficiency by its reorganiza- 
 tion into three co7-ps d'armee, under Generals Longstreet, Hill, 
 and Ewell — tliree able, energetic, and trusted lieutenants. In 
 respect of transportation, equijDment, and clothing, though 
 not in respect of supplies, the Southern force in Yu'ginia was 
 in better condition than at any previous time. And if its 
 commissariat was deficient, the rich granaries of the North 
 lay open — the inviting spoils of a successful blow.| 
 
 * Letter from General Hooker to President Lincoln, May 13, 1863 : " My 
 marching force of infantry is cut down to about eighty thousand men." The 
 cavalry corps which, on Hooker's entrance into command, liad been rendered 
 stronger and more effective than ever before, was much reduced by the severe 
 service to which it had been put. General Pleasonton, who succeeded General 
 Stoneman in the command of the cavalry, gives its effective, at the end of May, 
 at four thousand six hundred and seventy-seven horses — one-thii"d its strength 
 by the March report. — Report of General Pleasonton, May 27th. 
 
 f This is the number present for duty the 31st of May : it was precisely 
 06,353 ; the aggregate present was 88,754. I learn from General Longstreet 
 that General Lee, when at Chambersburg, estimated that his force when con- 
 centrated would reach a trifle over 70,000 men. General Lonsr-street added, 
 Ihat the Army of Northern Virginia was at this time in condition to under- 
 take any thing. 
 
 I There is no doubt that the condition of Lee's commissariat at this time 
 had considerable to do with the invasion. General Longstreet told me a story 
 to this point, the authenticity of which, however, he did not vouch for. Shortly 
 before the movement, it seems, General Lee sent to Richmond a requisition for 
 a certain amount of rations. The Commissary-General Northrup indorsed oa 
 it : "If General Lee wishes rations, let him seek them in Pennsylvania I" 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 3H 
 
 Thus prompted, the Confederate leaders resolved upon a 
 movement that should not only have the effect of causing the 
 Ai-my of the Potomac to loose its hold upon the Eappahan- 
 nock, but should initiate a campaign of invasion on the soil 
 of the loyal States. And it is proper to point out here that in 
 coming to this determination, those who controlled the war- 
 councils at Richmond would seem to have been influenced 
 rather by the excited condition of the army and the South, 
 than by a just appreciation of their proper defensive policy. 
 This not only did not exclude, but it invited the seizing of favor- 
 able opportunities to throw back the Army of the Potomac 
 from its aggressive advances into Virginia, and, if possible, 
 force it across the Potomac. But to convert these offensive 
 returns into out-and-out invasion was to overleap their true 
 poHcy and enter upon an enterprise uncertain, perilous, and 
 costly. The experience of the Maryland campaign of the 
 previous year might already have made this manifest ; and 
 hence it would appear that the Eichmond leaders, in resolving 
 to push the aggression into Pennsylvania, took counsel not so 
 much from prudence as from the clamors of the Hotspurs of 
 the South, who, fretting at the defensive attitude held by Lee 
 during the past twelve months, now burned to see the theatre 
 of war transferred to Northern soil.* The close of May found 
 the army ready to launch on this seductive but fatal adven- 
 ture. 
 
 * The vague flying rumors and the significant intimations of the Southern 
 press had given Hooker reason to anticipate some hostile movement on the 
 part of Lee, and on the 28th of May he communicated this conviction to Wash- 
 ington. " You may rest assured," said he, " that important movements are 
 being made. . . . I am in doubt as to the direction he [Lee] will take, but 
 probably the one of last year, however desperate it may appear." — Dispatch 
 from Hooker to Secretary Stanton. 
 
312 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AKMT OF THE POTOMAG 
 
 II. 
 MANOEUVRES TO DISENGAGE HOOKER. 
 
 In execution of tliis project the first object witli Lee was to 
 disengage Hooker from the Eappahannock, and with this 
 view secret movements were begun on the 3d of June. Mc- 
 Laws' division, of Longstreet's corps, that day left Fredericks- 
 burg for Culpepper Courthouse, and at the same time Hood's 
 division, of Longstreet's corps, which, since its arrival from 
 Richmond, had been encamped on the Eapidan, marched 
 to the same place. On the 4th and 5th E well's corps was 
 given the same direction. Meanwhile, the corps of A. P. 
 Hill was left to occupy the lines of Fredericksburg.* 
 
 Made aware of some movement in the enemy's camp, but 
 unable to determine its precise nature. Hooker, with the view 
 of a closer reconnoissance, threw Sedgwick's corps, on the 6th, 
 across the Rappahannock at Franklin's Crossing ; but as Hill 
 remained in position to mask the march of the other corps, 
 aU that Sedgwick discovered was that the enemy was in force. 
 Lee, therefore, did not interrupt the march of Longstreet and 
 Ewell towards Culpepper, which place they reached on the 
 8th. t Hooker was stiU in ignorance of Lee's purpose, which 
 was at length disclosed in the following manner. 
 
 Stuart's cavalry had already been concentrated at Culpepper 
 some time before the commencement of the main movement ; 
 and the knowledge of this fact, which seemed to indicate some 
 hostile intent, determined Hooker to send his whole cavalry 
 corps to break up Stuart's camp.:]: Accordingly, on the 9th, 
 
 * Lee : Report of the Gettysburg Campaign. 
 
 t Ibid. 
 
 X " As the accumulation of the heavy rebel force of cavalry about Culpepper 
 may mean mischief, I am determined, if practicable, to break it up in its incipi- 
 rincy. 1 shall send all my cavalry against them, stiffened by about three thou- 
 sand iii fantry." — Dispatch of General Hooker to General Halleck, June 6th. 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 313 
 
 General Pleasonton, with two divisions of cavalry under 
 Buford and Gregg, supported by two picked brigades of in- 
 fantry under Kussell and Ames, crossed the Eappahannock 
 at Kelly's and Beverley's fords, to move by converging roads 
 on Culpepper. But Stuart, having abeady moved forward 
 from Culpepper to Brandy Station, en route to form the ad- 
 vance and cover the flank of the main movement, a rencounter 
 took place soon after the Union cavalry passed the river. 
 
 Crossing at Beverley's Ford, and advancing through the 
 woodland, Buford immediately encountered a Confederate bri- 
 gade under General Jones, which, after a considerable com- 
 bat,* he drove back for a couple of miles, when he found 
 himself checked by the arrival of the brigades of W. H. F. Lee 
 and Wade Hampton to the support of Jones. Hereupon 
 severe fighting followed ; but presently Stuart was compelled 
 to draw off to face a menace by another force threatening his 
 rear.f This threat came from the column under Gregg, 
 which had crossed at Kelly's Ford, and advanced towards 
 Brandy Station, its progress being disputed by a Confederate 
 brigade under General Robertson. Pushing on towards 
 Brandy Station, a spirited passage at arms took place for the 
 possession of the heights, which were at length carried by 
 Gregg. Stuart having withdrawn the main portion of the 
 three brigades from Buford's front, then approached quickly, 
 and a determined combat ensued. Considerable loss occurred 
 on both sides, and finally Gregg, finding that the other col- 
 umn had not been able to move up to make a junction with 
 him, fell back towards his right and rear and united with the 
 division under Buford, whereupon General Pleasonton retired 
 his command across the Kappahannock. This engagement 
 between the entire mounted force of the opposing armies was 
 an interesting one, because it was of the few encounters on a 
 
 * In this action. Colonel B. F. Davis, of the Eighth New York Cavalry, was 
 killed. Colonel Davis was a gallant oflBcer, and during the investment of Colo- 
 nel Miles at Harper's Ferry cut his way through Jackson's lines, saving hia 
 force and capturing a portion of Longstreet's trains. 
 
 f General Stuart : Report of the Battle of Fleetwood. 
 
314 CAlVIPAiaNS OP THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 large scale in which the cavahy fought in legitimate cavahy 
 style ; for the troopers commonly dismounted and used their 
 carbines — a circumstance that ordinarily made these affairs 
 quite insignificant and indecisive. The loss was between five 
 and six hundred on each side.* 
 
 This engagement had the important result of developing at 
 once Lee's presence at Culpepper and his design of invasion, 
 disclosures of both of which facts were found in captured cor- 
 resjDondence. To meet this menace, Hooker advanced his 
 right up the Rappahannock, throwing forward the Third 
 Corps, on the 11th, to Eappahannock Station and Beverley, 
 while the cavalry observed the upper forks of the river. But 
 while Hooker had his attention thus directed towards Cul- 
 pepper and to guarding the line of the Kappahannock, with 
 the view to prevent a crossing of that stream by the enemy, 
 — who, it was supposed, would follow the same line of ma- 
 noeuvre adopted in the advance during the preceding summer 
 against Pope, — Lee had taken another leap in advance, and 
 thrust forward his left into the Shenandoah Yalley. Leaving 
 Hill's corps still in the position at Fredericksburg, and Long- 
 street's corps at Culpepper, Ewell's corps was, on the 10th, 
 put in motion westward and northward, avoiding the Rappa- 
 hannock altogether till he reached the Blue Ridge, through 
 which he passed at Chester Gap. Then striking Front Royal, 
 he crossed the Shenandoah River, and burst into the Valley. 
 Advancing rapidly towards Winchester, he arrived before that 
 place on the evening of the 13th, after an advance from Cul- 
 pepper of seventy miles in three days. 
 
 Such was the startling intelligence that now reached 
 Hooker, who still lay on the Rappahannock ; and action, 
 prompt and vigorous, was seen to be instantly necessary. A 
 glance at the map will reveal the extraordinary situation of 
 the Confederate force at this time. On the 13th of June, with 
 the Army of the Potomac yet lying on the Rappahannock, 
 Lee's Une of battle was stretched out over an interval of up- 
 
 * General W. H. F. Lee was among the wounded. 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 315 
 
 wards of a liundred miles : for liis right (Hill's corps) still 
 held the lines of Fredericksburg ; his centre (Longstreet's 
 corps) lay at Culpepper ; and his left (Ewell's corps) was at 
 the mouth of the Shenandoah Valley ! 
 
 Now, it will doubtless not be difficult for any one capable 
 of looking at the map of Northern Vu-ginia with a military 
 eye, to base on these data a plan of action which it may be 
 supposed would be the plan of action suited to the cu'cum- 
 stances. But it would be altogether unjust to judge what 
 General Hooker did, or what he failed to do, by the simf)le 
 results of mihtary reasoning ; for in the relations which he 
 held to the central military authority at Washington — an 
 authority to which his own views were completely subordi- 
 nated — he had neither the freedom of willing nor of acting. 
 
 It would appear obvious that in the audacious situation 
 of Lee's army (and this very boldness would seem to imply a 
 gTeat contemj)t for his opponent), the proper place for 
 Hooker to strike was at that exposed rear of his long line 
 formed by Hill's corps ; for it is as sure an inference as any 
 inference in war can be, that a force of, say, two or three 
 corps, thrown across the Rappahannock at Banks' or United 
 States ford, could interpose itself between Hill (at Fredericks- 
 burg) and Longstreet (at Culpepper). And if the movement 
 did not insure Hill's destruction (which it ought to do, in 
 vigorous hands), his jeopardized situation would certainly 
 recall Lee's other forces to his support. This interruption 
 of the plan of invasion would be its ending. 
 
 It is an interesting fact that precisely this method of action 
 was suggested by General Hooker a short time before he 
 became aware of Lee's actual movement,* and authority for 
 its execution was asked in case the Confederate force should 
 move northward.t To this most judicious suggestion two 
 rephes, or rather two forms of the same reply — for the opinion 
 W£iS Halleck's — were returned. The one was fi'om the Pres- 
 
 * Dispatcli from Hooker to Halleck. 
 t Report on tte Conduct of tlae War, second series, vol. i., p. 153. 
 
316 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OP THE POTOMAC. 
 
 ident, disapproving the project, and couclied in that quaint 
 imagery which Mr. Lincoha was wont to employ in the expres- 
 sion of his thoughts on the gravest subjects. " If Lee," said 
 he, "should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg, tempting 
 you to fall upon it, he would fight you in intrenchments,* and 
 have you at disadvantage ; and so, man for man, worst you 
 at that point, while his main force would in some way be get- 
 ting an advantage of you northward. In a word, I would not 
 take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox 
 jumijed half over a fence, and liable to be torn by dogs front and 
 rear, iviihoid a fair chance to gore one way or to kick tJie other." f 
 The other reply was from General HaUeck, and it expressed, 
 in solemn mihtary jargon, the same opinion so pungently 
 conveyed by the President ;J but suggested an operation 
 against the "flank of the moving column" — a suggestion 
 that is nothing better than a mask, for General Halleck must 
 have known such an operation to be perfectly impracticable, 
 if Hooker was to have any observance of his express instruc- 
 tions to cover Washington.! 
 
 III. 
 
 HOOKER'S RETROGRADE MOVEMENT. 
 
 Thus prevented from taking the only step that would have 
 given him the initiative, Hooker was fain to fall back on the 
 interior line towards Washington, taking positions defensive 
 
 * Nothing easier than to turn the Fredericksburg defences by Banks' or 
 United States ford. 
 
 f Dispatch from President Lincoln to General Hooker, June 5. 
 
 :}: Dispatch from General Halleck to General Hooker : Report on the Conduct 
 of the War, second Series, vol. i., p. 154. 
 
 § Any possible movement by Hooker, in execution of this suggestion, would 
 have uncovered his right, and given General Lee precisely the opening for 
 Buch a dash on Washiagton which the report of that general shows he was 
 warily watching. 
 
THE GETTTSBURQ CAlVrPAIGN. 317 
 
 as regards the capital, and which would enable him to await 
 the development of Lee's designs. Upon learning the move- 
 ment of the enemy into the Shenandoah Valley, Hooker, on 
 the 13th, broke up his camps along the Rappahannock, and 
 moved rapidly on the direct route towards Washington, fol- 
 lowing and covering the line of the Orange and Alexandria 
 Railroad. The first move was to Bealton, "Warrenton, and 
 Catlett's Station, on the 13th and 14th ; next to Fairfax Sta- 
 tion and Manassas, on the 15th and 16th. Here he re- 
 mained several days, while awaiting the disclosure of a series 
 of movements which Lee was then making, and to the expo- 
 sition of which I now return. 
 
 When on the 13th Hill, holding the lines of Fredericks- 
 burg, saw the Union army disappear behind the Stafford 
 hiUs, he knew that that for which he had remained behind 
 was accomphshed, and he then took up his line of march 
 towards Culpepper, where Longstreet's corps still held posi- 
 tion. Meantime, Ewell was making his Jackson-like swoop 
 into the Valley. General Jenkins with his cavalry-brigade 
 had been ordered to advance towards Winchester, in co- 
 operation with Ewell, and Imboden with his troopers had 
 been thrown out in the direction of Romney, to cover the 
 movement on Winchester, and prevent its garrison from re- 
 ceiving re-enforcements from the troops on the line of the 
 Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Both these officers were in 
 position when EweU reached the Valley. On crossing the 
 Shenandoah River near Front Royal, Ewell detached Rodes' 
 division to Berryville, to cut off communication between 
 Winchester and the Potomac, while vnth. the divisions of 
 Early and Johnson he advanced directly upon that Federal 
 post, driving MUroy into his works around the town on the 
 13th. The following night, Mih'oy abandoned his position, 
 but his force being intercepted, a good part of it was cap- 
 tured in the confused meUe. As, at the same time, General 
 Rodes took Berryville with seven hundred prisoners, and the 
 garrison at Harper's Ferry withdrew to Maryland Heights, 
 the VaUey was now cleared of all Union force. 
 
318 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARIklT OF THE POTOMAC 
 
 In this exploit Ewell captured over four thousand prisoners, 
 twenty-nine pieces of artillery, and large stores. Miboy with 
 a handful of men escaped across the Potomac. His defence 
 of the post intrusted to his care was infamously feeble, and 
 the worst of that long train of misconduct that made the 
 Valley of the Shenandoah to be called the " Valley of Hu- 
 miHation." 
 
 Turning back to the other two corps of Lee's army, it ap- 
 pears that on Hill's advance from Fredericksburg to Cul- 
 pepper, Longstreet, who had been retained at the latter place, 
 was pushed northward ; but instead of following the route of 
 Ewell, he moved along the eastern side of the Blue Eidge, 
 taking position at Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. This served 
 as a cover to Hill, who slipped through behind Longstreet 
 into the Shenandoah Valley, and took position at Winchester, 
 while, at the same time, it served as a lure to draw Hooker 
 from his base.* 
 
 During the progress of these movements. Hooker, being de- 
 termined not to be drawn into a manoeuvre that would expose 
 his right, continued to hold position in the vicinity of Fairfax 
 and Manassas, covering the approaches to Washington, while 
 the cavalry under Pleasonton was thrown out to feel towards 
 the passes of the Blue Ridge. Here Longstreet's corps con- 
 tinued still to hold post, while his whole front was secured by 
 Stuart's troopers. At Aldie, the opposing cavalry had, on the 
 17th, a rencounter, which partly developed Lee's position to 
 Hooker, who then felt forward cautiously, sending the TweKth 
 Corps to Leesburg, the Fifth to Aldie, and the Second to 
 Thoroughfare Gap. Pleasonton, meanwhile, followed up 
 Stuart, driving him on the 20th through Middleburg, and on 
 the '21st through Upperville and beyond. But Hooker did 
 not continue a movement which he felt to be compromising. 
 
 * General Lee in liis report explicitly declares this to have been his purpose. 
 " With a view to draw him [Hooker] further from his base, etc., Longstreet ad 
 vanced along the east side of the Blue Ridge, occupying Ashby's and Snicker'a 
 Gap .... It seemed to be the purpose of General Hooker to take a position 
 which would enable him to cover the approaches to Washington City." 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 319 
 
 Meantime, Lee seemed to be master of the situation. He 
 held strong positions in the Shenandoah Valley where he was 
 ready to welcome battle from his opponent, should he ad- 
 vance, while he was free to cut loose a raiding column into 
 Maryland and Pennsylvania. The longer Hooker remained 
 on the south bank of the Potomac, the freer would be the 
 scope of the foraging forces, and when he should cross to the 
 north side, Lee, relieved fi'om the danger to his communica- 
 tions, would be able to pass to the north bank also, which 
 was altogether in the line of his plan of invasion. 
 
 In pursuance of this purpose, as soon as HiU and Long- 
 street had reheved Ewell in the Valley, that general with the 
 van of the invading columns passed, on the 22d, into Mary- 
 land, while Imboden's cavalry was thrown out westward, and 
 effectually destroyed the great lines of communication by the 
 Baltimore and Ohio Eailroad, and the Chesapeake and Ohio 
 Canal. Jenkins' troopers had already preceded Ewell's ad- 
 vance by a week, and had penetrated Pennsylvania as far as 
 Chambersburg, throwing the whole north country into a 
 wild blaze of excitement. After gathering in much cattle and 
 horses, which he headed towards the Potomac, Jenkins 
 turned back to join Swell's force, which, after crossing the 
 Potomac, on the 22d, at Williamsport and Shepherdstown, 
 moved by two columns on Hagerstown, and thence, crossing 
 the boundary into Pennsylvania, passed up the Cumberland 
 Valley, reaching Chambersburg on the following day. The 
 whole region of "Western Pennsylvania up to the Susque- 
 hannali was now open to Ewell, free to come and to go, 
 without any other fear than that which might be inspired by 
 the not very formidable aspect of the Pennsylvania militia.* 
 
 * Forewarned of the designs of the invading army, the War Department 
 had detached General Couch from the command of the Second Corps of the 
 Army of the Potomac, and assigned him, on the 11th of June, to the Depart- 
 ment of the Susquehanna, with his headquarters at Harrisburg, the capital of 
 Pennsylvania. General Brooks was at the same time appointed to the com- 
 mand of t)ie Department of the Monongahela, with his headquarters at Pitta- 
 burgh. But commanders without troops to command cannot be considered very 
 
320 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 He had, therefore, free scope for an extensive commerce 
 in horses and cattle, vast herds of which he sent southward, 
 while for the subsistence of his troops he levied subsidies from 
 the population of the country. Thousands of Pennsylvania 
 farmers, panic-stricken, hastened with their cattle and house- 
 hold goods to the north of the Susquehanna. From Cham- 
 bersburg, Ewell moved northward, sending Rodes' division to 
 Carlisle, while Early's division, moving to the east side of the 
 South Mountain ridge, passed by way of Gettysburg to York, 
 and thence to Wrightsville on the Susquehanna — the militia 
 retiring and destroying the splendid bridge over the river at 
 Columbia. 
 
 IV. 
 
 ACROSS THE BORDER. 
 
 However galling the intelligence of the ravaging of Penn- 
 sylvania may have been, General Hooker at least felt himself 
 powerless to help, for it was impossible for him to pass to the 
 north side of the Potomac until his opponent's purpose should 
 be more fully disclosed. It was not, therefore, until he 
 learned that the remaining corps of Lee were passing into 
 Maryland that he also crossed the river. The corps of Long- 
 street and Hill made the passage of the Potomac at Williams- 
 port and Shepherdstown on the 24th and 25th, and followed 
 the path of Ewell into Pennsylvania. 
 
 The entire army of the Potomac then crossed on the 25th 
 and 26th at Edwards' Ferry, and made a movement of con- 
 centration on Frederick — a position from which Hooker might 
 
 formidable barriers to an invasion ; and though Governor Curtin issued procla- 
 mations and General Couch calls, the response was neither prompt nor enthu- 
 siastic, and when at length a few thousand men had been raised, and New 
 York had sent forward some of her militia regiments, these oflBcers did not find 
 It practicable to carry their views of defence beyond the line of the Susque- 
 hanna. 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 321 
 
 either debouch through the South Mountain passes to plant 
 himself ujDon Lee's line of retreat, or moving northward on 
 the eastern side of the mountains, follow Lee's movement in 
 the direction of the Susquehanna. 
 
 The former course is of the two the bolder and more deci- 
 sive move, and though there is no proof that is conclusive re- 
 specting which of these courses General Hooker designed to 
 adopt, there is yet evidence that he purposed making, at 
 least, a strong demonstration on Lee's line of communications. 
 With this view he threw out his left well westward to Middle- 
 town, and ordered the Twelfth Corps, under General Slocum, 
 to march to Harper's Ferry. Here Slocum was to be joined 
 by the garrison of that post, eleven thousand strong, under 
 General French, and the united force was to menace the 
 Confederate rear by a movement towards Chambersburg. 
 Unhappily, this project traversed the pet crotchet of General 
 Halleck respecting Harper's Ferry, and thence began griefs 
 for Hooker, and an imbroglio more and more involved till it 
 resulted in his supersedure from command at the critical mo- 
 ment when the two armies were manoeuvring towards a col- 
 lision the weightiest of the war. The circumstances under 
 which this took place are as foUoAvs. 
 
 At the time Lee's advance was set on foot, the distribution 
 of the Union forces showed the same vicious amorcellemeni 
 under independent commanders that had marked the worst 
 period of 1862. General Heintzelman commanded the De- 
 partment of Washington, with a force of about thirty-six 
 thousand men ;* General Schenck controlled the Middle De- 
 partment, east of Cumberland, including the garrisons at 
 Harper's Ferry, Winchester, etc. ; while General Dix, -oith a 
 considerable force, lay for some purpose inconceivable on the 
 Peninsula. Now, about the time Hooker crossed the Potomac, 
 the general-in-chief, awakening at length to the fatal folly of 
 this untimely waste of valuable force, placed the troops of 
 
 * General Heintzelman's tri-monthly report for June 10, showed tliirty-six 
 thousand six hundred and forty men. 
 
 21 
 
322 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Generals Heintzelman and Sclienck under his control. But 
 it was soon proved that this control was rather in name than 
 in reality ; for when he attempted to fit out from these de- 
 partments a column of fifteen thousand men to move on Fred- 
 erick, he found himself estopped bj General Halleck's fears 
 touching the safety of Washington — a circumstance for which 
 General Hooker conceived he provided sufficiently by the 
 presence of the Army of the Potomac covering the capital ; 
 and when, after advancing on Frederick, he had planned the 
 movement on the rear of Lee, and for that purpose had 
 dh'ected the temporary abandonment of Harper's Ferr}^, with 
 the view of uniting its garrison of eleven thousand m.en under 
 General French with the column of General Slocum destined 
 to make the proposed movement, he asked General Halleck, 
 on the 26th of June, " if there was any reason why Maryland 
 Heights should not be abandoned after the removal of the 
 public stores and property," he was met by the following 
 reply from the general-in-chief : " Maryland Heights have 
 always been regarded as an important point to be held by us, 
 and much expense and labor incurred in fortifying them. I can- 
 not approve their abandonment except in case of absolute ne- 
 cessity.''* It was in vain that General Hooker urged in 
 rejoinder of this fatuitous objection that Harper's Ferry 
 was, under the circumstances, a point of no importance ; that 
 it defended no ford of the Potomac ; that its fortifications 
 would remain after the troops were withdrawn ; nor was there 
 the slightest probability that the enemy would take possession 
 of them, and that, therefore, the ten thousand men that re- 
 mained there useless, should be marched to a point where 
 they could be of service, f 
 
 * Telegram from General Halleck to General Hooker, June 27 : Report on 
 the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. i., p. 292. 
 f The text of General Hooker's dispatch is as follows : 
 
 Sandy Hook, June 27, 1865 
 Major-Qkneral Halleck, Oeneral-in-cMef : 
 
 I have received your telegram in regard to Harper's Ferry. I find ten 
 thousand men here in condition to take the field. Here they are of no earthly 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 323 
 
 Against stupidity, sings Schiller, gods and men fight in 
 vain. 
 
 Finding himself deprived of that freedom of action on 
 which, in so large a degree, the success of military opera- 
 tions depends, General Hooker requested, on the 27th of June, 
 to be relieved fi'om the command of the Army of the Poto- 
 mac ; and early the following morning, a messenger reached 
 Frederick from Washington with an order appointing Major- 
 General G. G. Meade, commanding the Fifth Army Corps, in 
 his stead. 
 
 Provoking as was the behavior of General Halleck, the 
 conduct of General Hooker cannot be accounted noble or 
 high-minded. A truly lofty sense of duty would have dic- 
 tated much long-suffering, in a conjuncture of circumstances 
 amid which the success of the campaign might be seriously 
 compromised by the sudden change of commanders. Yet it 
 was fortunate for the Union cause at this crisis, that the 
 choice of the Government for the commander of the Ai'my of 
 the Potomac fell upon one who proved fitted for the high 
 trust ; and fortunate, too, that that oft-displayed steadfast- 
 ness of the army, " unshaked of motion " and committed to the 
 death to a duty self-imposed, rendered such transitions, else- 
 where dangerous, here safe and easy. Meade put his hand 
 to his work in a quiet, practical, business-like way ; and it 
 was remarked that his undemonstrative temper, and the 
 aspect he wore of a scholar rather than a soldier, were 
 no drawback to the confidence of the troops, who had learned 
 from the experience of his predecessor, that high-flown 
 
 accoiint. They cannot defend a ford of the river ; and as far as Harper's Ferry 
 is concerned, tJiere is nothing in it. As for the fortifications, the work of the 
 troops, they remain when the troops are withdrawn. No enemy will ever take 
 possession of it for them. This is my opinion. All the public property could 
 have been secured to-night, and the troops marched to where they could have 
 been of some service. Now, they are but a bait for the rebels should they re 
 turn. I beg that this may be presented to the Secretary of War, and his ex 
 cellency the President. 
 
 Joseph Hookek, Major-GeneraL 
 
324 CA]MPAIQNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 promise is often associated with very disproportionate per- 
 formance. Without being what is called a popular officer, 
 General Meade was much respected by his comrades in arms. 
 He was known in the army as one who had grown up with it, 
 whose advancement was due to merit, and who had shown a 
 special steadfastness in many trying hours. The command 
 of the Army of the Potomac was put into his hand without 
 any lets or hindrances, the President expressly waiving all 
 the powers of the Executive and the Constitution, so as to 
 enable General Meade to make, untrammelled, the best dis- 
 positions for the emergency. 
 
 Immediately the columns moved on as if no change had 
 occurred. 
 
 CONCENTRATION ON GETTYSBURG. 
 
 At the time General Meade took command, the army was 
 lying around and near Frederick — its left at Middletown ; 
 and all he knew touching the enemy was, that Lee, after 
 crossing the Potomac, had marched up the Cumberland Yal- 
 ley, and that Ewell's coi'ps occupied York and Carhsle, and 
 threatened the passage of the Susquehanna at Columbia and 
 HaiTisburg. 
 
 In this state of facts, Meade adopted the only course then 
 considered by him practicable, which was to move his army 
 by the inner line from Frederick towards Harrisburg, con- 
 tinuing the movement until he should meet Lee, or make him 
 loose his hold on the Susquehanna. 
 
 He therefore put his army in motion on the morning of the 
 29th, taking a course due northward, and keeping east of the 
 South Mountain range. The army moved in three columns, 
 covering, as it advanced, the lines of approach to Baltimore 
 and Washington. The First and Eleventh corps were 
 directed on Eramettsburg ; the Third and Twelfth on Taney- 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 
 
 33n 
 
 town ; the Second on Frizzlelmrg ; the Fifth to Union, and thf 
 Sixth to Windsor. 
 
 Now, on the very day that Meade began to move north- 
 ward, Lee, apprised of those previous mancEuvres that 
 seemed to threaten an irruption into the Cumberland Valley 
 (a step which would imperil his communications with the Po- 
 tomac), discovered it would be necessary to do something to 
 check this menace 
 
 At this time Longstreet and Hill were at 
 
 I i/iambersbuTy 
 
 ghT. 
 
 'ffanoven ' 
 Junction J. 
 
 Ba<;er^ov/i^^. 
 
 ^ Stmnctsbura ■'^} -iiy 
 
 Mechanics T.:(i 
 
 (/ as kBoo 
 
 
 SKETCH OP MANCEUVRES ON GETTYSBCRG. 
 
 Chambersburg, Ewell was at York and Carlisle, and Lee was 
 just on the point of moving his whole force northward to 
 cross the Susquehanna and strike Harrisburg ;* when, learn- 
 mg the ah'eady mentioned menace, he resolved to concentrate 
 on the east side of the South Mountain range as a diversion 
 
 ■* " Preparations were now made to advance upon Harrisburg ; but on the 
 night of the 28th information was received from a scout that the Federal 
 army, having crossed the Potomac, was advancing nortliward, and that the 
 head of the coliunn had reached South Moimtain. As our communications 
 
326 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 in favor of his line of retreat, touching which he was Justifi- 
 ably nervous. Accordingly, instead of directing Longstreet 
 and Hill to join Ewell on the intended invasion, he ordered 
 them to march from Chambersburg, defiling through the 
 South Mountain range, towards Gettysburg, distant twenty 
 miles eastward ; and he instructed Ewell to countermarch 
 from York and Carlisle on the same point. These move- 
 ments were begun on the morning of Monday, the 29th of 
 June. 
 
 It was not until the night of the 30th, after the army had 
 made two marches, that General Meade betame satisfied that 
 Lee, apprised of his movement, had loosed his hold on the 
 Susquehanna and was concentrating his forces east of the 
 South Mountain to meet him. But when and where the shock 
 of battle, which was now seen to be imminent, would take 
 place it was impossible to tell. Under these circumstances, 
 he set about to select a position on w^hich, by a rapid 
 movement of concentration, he might be prepared to receive 
 battle on advantageous terms. With this view, the general 
 line of Pipe Creek, on the dividing ridge between the Mono- 
 cacy and the waters running into the Chesapeake Bay, was 
 selected as a favorable position, though its ultimate adoption 
 was held contingent on developments that might arise. 
 Accordingly, orders were issued on the night of the 30th for 
 the movements of the different corps oil the following day : the 
 Sixth Corps, forming the right wing of the army, was ordered 
 to Manchester in rear of Pipe Creek ; headquarters and the 
 Second Corps to Taneytown ; the Twelfth and Fifth corps, 
 forming the centre, were directed on Two Taverns and Han- 
 over, somewhat in advance of Pipe Creek ; while the left wing, 
 formed of the First, Third,* and Eleventh corps under General 
 Reynolds, as it was closest to the line of march of the enemy, 
 was thro^vTi forward to Gettysburg, towards which, as it hap- 
 pened, Lee was then heading. 
 
 with the Potomac were thus menaced, it was resolved to prevent his farther 
 progress in that direction by concentrating our army on the east side of thf» 
 mountains." — Lee : Report of the Gettysburg Campaign. 
 
THE QETTYSBURQ CAMPAIGN. 327 
 
 Strategically, the position at Gettysburg was of supreme 
 importance to Lee ; for it was the first point in his eastward 
 march across the South Mountain that gave command of 
 direct lines of retreat towards the Potomac : but it was not of 
 the same moment to Meade, especially if a defensive rather 
 than an offensive battle was to be fought ; and the topo- 
 gi-aphical features of Gettysburg, that make it so advanta- 
 geous for the defence, were then wholly unknown to him. 
 While, therefore, the left wing, under Reynolds, was thus 
 thrown forward in advance of the rest of the army as far as 
 Gettysburg, it was not with any predetermined purpose of 
 taking up position there ; but rather to serve as a mask while 
 the line of Pipe Creek was assumed. 
 
 But while, in war, commanders propose, fate or accident 
 (so-called) often disposes ; and at the time these movements 
 were in execution, events were occurring that were to lift the 
 obscure and insignificant hamlet of Gettysburg into a historic 
 immortality as the scene of the mightiest encounter of modern 
 days. 
 
 While the army was marching northward, Buford's division 
 of cavalry was thrown out well on the left flank ; and moving 
 from near Middleburg on the 29th of June, it occupied Gettys- 
 burg at noon of the following day — the day before Reynolds 
 was directed on that point. Passing through Gettysburg, 
 Buford pushed out in reconnoissances west and north, over 
 the routes on which it was supposed Lee's army was moving. 
 Now, Lee had that morning put his columns in motion towards 
 Gettysburg — Hill and Longstreet moving due eastward from 
 Chambersburg and Fayetteville, and Ewell southward from 
 Carlisle. Hill's corps had the advance on the great road 
 from Chambersburg to Baltimore, which passes through Get- 
 tysburg. The march was made with much deliberation : so 
 that night found only two divisions through the South Moun- 
 tain ; while the remaining division and Longstreet^s corps 
 remained west of the mountaijis. The advance divisions of 
 Hill's command bivouacked, on the night of the 30th June, 
 within six or seven miles of Gettysburg ; while Ewell, march- 
 
328 CAMPMGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 ing on a line perpendicular with the route of HiU and Long- 
 street, encamped at Heildersburg, distant nine miles. Of the 
 Union force, Buford's cavalry division alone was at Gettys- 
 burg that night ; and Reynolds, with the First and Eleventh 
 corps, bivouacked on the right bank of Marsh Creek, distant 
 four miles, under orders to make Gettysburg the next morn- 
 ing. The corps of Sickles (Third) and Slocum (Twelfth) were 
 within call. The remaining corps were further oflf. 
 
 It is easy to see, from the relative situations of the hostile 
 armies, that unless one or the other should fall back, a battle 
 was inevitable in the vicinity of Gettysburg. But these facts 
 were unknown to both the opposing commanders ; and I shall 
 in the next chapter relate how, contrary to the expectations of 
 each, the action was precipitated. 
 
 VI. 
 
 GETTYSBURG— FIRST DAY. 
 
 On the morning of Wednesday, the 1st of July, the two 
 Confederate columns continued their march towards Gettys- 
 burg ; and Buford, holding position on the Chambersburg 
 road, by which Hill and Longstreet were advancing, suddenly 
 found himself engaged, a little past nine in the morning, with 
 Hill's van, about a mile west of the town. As he knew that 
 Reynolds was moving up to join him, he made dispositions to 
 retard the enemy, holding back Hill's column by skilful de- 
 ployments and the use of his horse-artillery. Reynolds, who 
 (with his own First Corps and the Eleventh Corps, under Gen- 
 eral Howard) was then en route from his place of bivouac at 
 Marsh Creek, hearing Buford' % guns, pressed forward with all 
 haste. At ten o'clock he came upon the field with the leading 
 division of the First Corps, under General Wadsworth. While 
 
MAP OF THE BATT LE 
 
 OF 
 
 .vfion'i//f/ Ihgitioiur hfld 
 JULY l"2?&3'? J863. 
 
 Cnion Litu-A'. 
 
 CanfMerdte ■■ 
 
 Settle of J Mile 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 329 
 
 yet forming line, "Wadswortli's troops were assailed ; and tliey 
 had to be thrown quickly into battle array under fire. 
 
 Looking westward from Gettysburg the horizon of vision is 
 bounded at a distance of ten miles by the mountain range 
 known as the South Mountain, which running north and 
 south forms the eastern wall of the Cumberland Valley. When 
 the force which folded and raised up the strata that form the 
 South Mountain was in action, it produced fissures in the 
 strata of red shale which cover the surface of this region of 
 country, permitting the fused material from beneath to rise 
 and fill them on cooling with trap-dykes or greenstone and 
 syenitic greenstone. The rock, being for the most part very 
 hard, remained as the axes and crests of hills and ridges 
 when the softer shale in the intervening spaces was excavated 
 by great water- currents into valleys and plains.* These 
 ridges run in a direction nearly parallel with the South Moun- 
 tain range, and give a rolHng and diversified surface to the 
 landscape. The town of Gettysburg nestles at the base of 
 one of these ranges. At the distance of half a mile to the 
 west of the town is another ridge, called, from the theological 
 seminary that stands thereon. Seminary Ridge, and a mile 
 further west run two other parallel swells of gTound separated 
 by Willoughby Eun. It was in the plain between these two 
 latter ridges, the westernmost of which was occupied by the 
 Confederates and the nearer by the Union troops, that the 
 action of July 1st opened ; for Buford's deployments had suc- 
 ceeded in detaining the hostile column on the farther side of 
 the run till Wadswortli's division came on the ground. As 
 this force arrived, Reynolds hurried its two brigades into 
 action, placing Cutler's brigade, with the battery of Hall — 
 the only battery in the division — on the right and left of the 
 Chambersburg road and across an old railroad grading (part 
 of it in deep cut and part in embankment) near by and par- 
 allel with the road ; while he directed General Doubleday 
 
 * Professor Jacobs : " Later Rambles over tbe Field of Gettysburg ;" United 
 States Service Magazine, 1864. 
 
 V 
 
330 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AEMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 who had reached the ground with the van of the infantry, 
 to move the other brigade, usually called the " Iron Brigade," 
 under General Meredith, to the left of the road to occupy a 
 piece of woods skirting Willoughby Run, across which and 
 into the woods the Confederate right was at the same time 
 pushing. Only the advanced division of Hill's corps, under 
 Heth, had yet come up, so that the opening combat which 
 might fitly be called the battle of Willoughby's Run, was 
 engaged between one division on each side. Heth, with his 
 four brigades, attacked simultaneously the two brigades of 
 Wadsworth's division under Generals Meredith and Cutler. 
 The latter was assailed by Davis's Mississipj)i brigade, and 
 with such success, that the three right regiments found them- 
 selves flanked, whereupon they were withdrawn over the 
 Seminary Ridge, leaving the battery unsupported. Mean- 
 while, the skirmishers of Cutler's other two regiments (the 
 Fourteenth Brooklyn, under Colonel Fowler, and the Ninety- 
 fifth New York, under Colonel Biddle) were disputing with 
 the Confederate brigade of Archer the passage of Willoughby 
 Run, and skirmishing in a skirt of woods along the brook 
 with such as had crossed. At this moment, the " Iron Bri- 
 gade" opportunely swept down from the left, struck the flank 
 of the Confederate brigade, and captured several hundred 
 that had already crossed, including the commander, Brigadier- 
 General Archer.* The dispositions at this point were made 
 by General Reynolds in person ; and it was at the moment 
 when, after urging on his men with animating words, he saw 
 this successful charge under way, and turned to leave the 
 woods, that he was struck with a rifle-shot that caused almost 
 instant death — a grievous loss to the Army of the Potomac, 
 one of whose most distinguished and best-beloved officers he 
 was ; one whom, by the steady growth of the highest military 
 qualities, the general voice of the whole army had marked out 
 for the largest fame. 
 
 * This movement was led by the Second Wisconsin, mider Colonel Fair- 
 child, supported by the remainder of the Iron Brigade. 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 331 
 
 In tlius engaging with the enemy, Keynolds has been 
 charged with rashness in prematurely precipitating a battle. 
 But wrongly ; for rashness was not a fault of that officer, as 
 all who know his character are well aware ; and though he 
 had no orders to bring on a general action (being, indeed, 
 under instructions to fall back on the proposed hue of Pipe 
 Creek), he was necessarily drawn into this engagement in aid 
 of Buford's hard-pressed cavalry. His real motives, whatever 
 they were, remain buried with him : but it is more than prob- 
 able that, in hastening forward the head of his column to the 
 plain beyond the town, his quick military eye had taken in 
 at a glance the figure of that rocky bulwark around Gettys- 
 burg as a vantage point where the army could most favorably 
 receive battle, and in going out to oppose a front of resist- 
 ance to the near-approaching enemy, and allow the army 
 time to concentrate at Gettysburg, he knew he was doing 
 what General Meade, who reposed the highest confidence in 
 his judgment, would quite approve. 
 
 While these events were passing on the left of Wads- 
 worth's force, the retirement of Cutler's right left Hall's bat- 
 tery unsupported ; and it was in imminent peril of capture, 
 when the Fourteenth Brooklyn and the Ninety-fifth New 
 York, joined by the Sixth Wisconsin, under Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Dawes, made a change of front, and charged to the 
 relief of the guns. This manoeuvre was so well managed that 
 Davis's two Mississippi regiments, having sought shelter in 
 the railroad cut, were there surrounded and compelled to sur- 
 render with their battle-flags. Upon this, that part of Cut- 
 ler's command that had previously fallen back, having in the 
 mean time been reformed, returned and united with the three 
 regiments engaged in this spirited affair, when the force was 
 moved still further to the right to meet the extension of the 
 enemy's lines in that direction. 
 
 By the time these initial successes were gained, the combat, 
 bursting out anew, was increased in volume by the arrival of 
 fresh forces on each side. On the Union side, the two re- 
 maining divisions of the First Corps, under Generals Row- 
 
332 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 ley* and Eobinson, readied the ground. The former division 
 was immediately thrown in to sustain the now hard-pressed 
 left, and was precipitated into close action. The men were 
 in the highest sj)irits, as was shown by their behavior, and 
 by one incident among others. One of the brigades of this 
 division, under command of Colonel Roy Stone, had been as- 
 signed to a position where it came under a heavy artillery 
 fire ; and as the troops took their post, Colonel Stone re- 
 marked, "We have come to stay." This went quickly through 
 the brigade, the men adojDting it as a watchword — " We have 
 come to stay." And a very large part of them never left that 
 ground, t 
 
 Meantime, Robinson's division remained for awhile in re- 
 serve on the Seminary Ridge ; but almost simultaneously 
 with the arrival of these re-enforcements, the advance divi- 
 sion of Swell's corps, under General Rodes, came in from the 
 direction of Carlisle, and, swinging round under cover and un- 
 perceived, seized a position menacing the right of the Union 
 Une. This brought a heavy pressure to bear on that flank, 
 held by Cutler's command, and to relieve it Robinson's divi- 
 sion was moved forward from the Seminary. First, Baxter's 
 brigade of this division took position on the right of Cutler, 
 resting its right on the Mummasburg Road, and then, as the 
 needs became more urgent, Baxter's command relieved Cut- 
 ler, and the brigade of General Paul was brought up on Bax- 
 ter's right. These troops opposed a vigorous resistance to 
 Rodes' attack, and early in the action, by a skilful movement, 
 captured three North Carolina regiments under General 
 Iverson. 
 
 With this series of successes the combat opened ; but it was 
 destined soon to be beclouded by an untoward sequel. Thus 
 far the action had been sustained on the Union side by the 
 First Corps alone, and on the Confederate side by the advance 
 
 * This officer commanded Doubleday's division, the latter officer being, for 
 the time, in command of the corps. 
 
 t Testimony of General Doubleday : Report on the Conduct of the War 
 vol. i., p. 307. 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 333 
 
 divisions of the corps of Hill and Ewell. But new actors now 
 appeared on tlie stage. Hill was re-enforced by another di\a- 
 sion under General Pender, and towards one o'clock the 
 Eleventh Corps came up — General Howard having arrived 
 some time before and by virtue of his rank assumed com- 
 mand of the field. General Howard left a division- in reserve 
 on Cemetery Hill, and placed the divisions of Schuri^f and 
 Barlow to the right of the First Corps, on a prolongation of 
 its general line, and covering the approaches to Gettysburg 
 from the north and northwest. Almost simultaneously with 
 the forming of the Eleventh Corps, a fresh division of Ewell's 
 corps, under General Early, arrived from the direction of 
 York and took position on Barlow's front. 
 
 It has been seen how, by fresh arrivals, the Union line was 
 gi-adually extended, till now it made a \nde curve of several 
 miles around the west and north of the town. In this dispo- 
 sition of his troops General Howard fell into an error that 
 has been common throughout the war — the error of attempt- 
 ing to cover too much ground, by which it comes about that 
 these long lines are everywhere weak, and that in attempting 
 to cover every thing one really covers nothing. It would 
 have been a disposition much better suited to 'the nature of 
 the ground had General Howard massed a heavy force of his 
 newly arrived coi-ps on the right of the First Corps, where the 
 line ended in Eobinson's division— sweeping the plain to the 
 north by its fire, in place of attempting to hold the whole 
 stretch by a line thinly drawn out. 
 
 This faulty placing of the force had a powerful influence on 
 the result that followed ; and taken in connection with another 
 circumstance, accounts quite as much as the alleged misbe- 
 havior of some of the troops for the disastrous sequel. The 
 circumstance to which I have made reference is this. When 
 Eodes threw forward his division to connect with the left of 
 Hill's troops, he secured a commanding position on an ele- 
 
 * Steinwelir's division. 
 
 f This division was, for the time being, under General Schimmelpfenig, 
 Schurz commanding tlie corps. 
 
334 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 vated ridge known as Oak Hill, situate between tlie Mum- 
 masburg and Carlisle roads. This position was tlie key-point 
 of tlie entire field, and gave Kodes an advantageous point 
 of attack on the centre of the line as now drawn ; or rather, 
 as the corps did not connect, on the right flank of the First 
 Corps and the left flank of the Eleventh Corps. The efi'ect of 
 j;his was soon seen. It required but a slight pressure for 
 Early to throw back the right division, under Barlow, who 
 found it impossible to hold his command to their work, and 
 who was himself left on the field severely wounded. And 
 when, towards three o'clock, a general advance was made by 
 the Confederates, Rodes speedily broke through the Union 
 centre, carrying away the right of the Eirst Corps and the left 
 of the Eleventh, and, entering the interval between them, 
 disrupted the whole line. The troops fell back in much 
 disorder into Gettysburg. At the same time the right of the 
 First Corps, giving way, also retreated to the town, where 
 they became entangled with the disordered mass. Early, 
 launching forward, captured above five thousand prisoners.* 
 The left of the First alone drew back in some order, mak- 
 ing a stand on Seminary Ridge until the artillery and ambu- 
 lances had been withdrawn, and then fell back behind the 
 town. 
 
 At the time the confused throng was pouring through Get- 
 tysburg, General Hancock arrived on the ground. He had 
 not brought with him his tried Second Corps, but had ridden 
 forward from Taneytown under orders from General Meade, on 
 learning the death of Reynolds, to assume command and use 
 discretionary power either to retain the force at Gettysburg, 
 or retire it to the proposed line on Pipe Creek. General 
 Hancock was instructed to examine the ground, and if he 
 found the position under the circumstances a better one than 
 that contemplated, he should so advise the commander, and 
 the army would be ordered up. But on his arrival he found 
 a more pressing duty forced upon him ; for it was clear that 
 
 * Lee : Report of Gettysburg, MS. 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 335 
 
 if the flight of the shattered masses of the First and 
 Eleventh corps was not stayed, a great disaster must follow. 
 The sole niiclens of stability was presented by a single bri- 
 gade of Steinwehr's division which General Howard, on arriv- 
 ing, had left in reserve on Cemetery Hill, and the cavalry of 
 Buford, which, deployed on the plain to the left of the town, 
 and in front of the ridge, presented a bold and firm front. 
 Everywhere else was confusion, and the enemy coming on. 
 
 In such an emergency it is the personal qualities of the 
 commander alone that tell. If, happily, there is in him that 
 mysterious but potent magnetism that calms, subdues, and in- 
 spires, there results one of those sudden moral transformations 
 that are among the marvels of the phenomena of battle. 
 This quahty Hancock possesses in a high degree, and his 
 appearance soon restored order out of seemingly hopeless 
 confusion — a confusion which Howard, an efficient officer, but 
 of a rather negative nature, had not been able to quell. Nor, 
 fortunately, could there be any question as to the right posi- 
 tion to be taken up, for nature had already traced it out in a 
 bold relief of rock. On the ridge of Gettysburg — the ridge 
 Reynolds had mentally marked as he impetuously hurried 
 forward to buffet the advancing enemy, and which, by the 
 rich sacrifice of his life, he purchased for the possession of 
 the army and for the possession of history forever— -Han- 
 cock disposed the remnants of the two corps. 
 
 The Gettysburg ridge is an irregular, interrupted Hne of 
 heights and hiUs running due south from the town of Gettys- 
 burg. At the town the ridge bends back, eastward and 
 southward, in a crotchet formed by Cemetery and Gulps' hills. 
 The former is so called from the burying-place of the town 
 situate thereon. It commands the positions available for the 
 enemy on the north and northwest. The latter forming the 
 right knob of the line is in rough and rocky ground, much 
 wooded and very unfavorable to the use of artillery. Along 
 its eastern base runs Rock Creek, one of the tributaries of the 
 Monocacy. From Cemetery Hill the line runs southward for 
 about three miles, in a well-defined ridge, which may 
 
336 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 properly be termed Cemetery Ridge, and which terminates, at 
 that distance, in a high, rocky, and wooded peak named 
 Round Top, the less elevated portion near where the crest 
 rises into Round Top being termed Little Round Top,* a rough 
 and bald spur of the former. The broken character of the 
 ground in front of the southern flank of the line renders it 
 also unfavorable to the use of artillery. The general position 
 is thus about four miles in extent ; but while Cemetery 
 and Cidps' hills require the formation of a line of battle to 
 face northward, the direction of Cemetery Ridge (north 
 and south) causes the line to front westward. The crest, 
 mainly in cultivated fields, but with occasional fringes of 
 woods, has, throughout, a good slope to the rear, affording 
 excellent cover for the reserves and trains. To the west, the 
 ridge falls off in a cultivated and undulating valley, which it 
 commands, and at the distance of a mile or less is a parallel 
 crest which has already been marked as Seminary Ridge, 
 and which the Confederates occupied during the succeeding 
 battle. In the valley between these two ridges the ground 
 rises into an intermediate swell of land, along which runs the 
 Emmettsburg road. 
 
 Such was the ground destined to form the scene of the 
 approaching shock of the two armies ; and on which Han- 
 cock, assisted by Generals Howard, Warren, and Buford, 
 now disposed his preliminary line of battle. Cemetery Hill 
 was already partially held by Howard's troops. On the right 
 of these, and occupying the important position of Culps' Hill, 
 was placed Wadsworth's division of the First Corps, and his 
 line completely commanded the approaches from the town of 
 Gettysburg, now held by EweU. The remaining two divisions 
 of the First Corps under General Doubleday were posted on 
 the left of the Eleventh, along Cemetery Ridge ; and Geary's 
 division of the Twelfth Corps (Slocum) Just then arriving, was 
 ordered by Hancock to the high ground on the left. Towards 
 six o'clock, the remaining division of that Corps came up, 
 
 * This spur appears on the map of Colonel Batchelder, as Weed's Hill. 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 337 
 
 having been urgently summoned by General Howard during 
 the afternoon. The command, thereupon, devolved on Gen- 
 eral Slocum ; and Hancock, having ordered all the trains to 
 the rear, so as not to interfere with any movement of troops 
 that might be ordered, returned to headquarters at Taney- 
 town, where General Meade still remained. 
 
 General Hancock reported that the position at Gettysburg 
 was a very strong one, and advantageous for a defensive 
 battle, having for its only disadvantage that it might be 
 turned : in fact, Hancock's representations were such that 
 General Meade instantly gave orders for the forward move- 
 ment and concentration of all the corps on Gettysburg, and 
 he advanced his headquarters to that point, reaching it at one 
 o'clock of the morning of the 2d. The Third Corps (Sickles) 
 had early in the day been summoned up by General Howard. 
 Its van reached Gettysburg at sunset of the 1st, and was 
 joined by the remainder of the corps during the night and 
 following morning. The Second Corps, having only to make 
 the march of thirteen miles from Taney town, arrived in the 
 vicinity when General Hancock was on his way back, and 
 was by him placed in position two miles in rear of the tow^l 
 to cover the flank and communications. The Fifth Corps 
 (Sykes), when ordered forward, was at Union Mills, dis- 
 tant twenty-three miles ; but by a night-march might reach 
 the ground early in the morning. The Sixth Corps, forming 
 the right wing of the army as it moved, was furthest off, 
 being at Manchester, thirty-six miles from Gettysburg; but 
 the known character of General Sedgwick gave assurance that 
 all the resources of skUl and zeal would be employed to bring 
 it up at the earliest possible moment. 
 
 The important action of Wednesday, opening with success, 
 followed by repulse, and ending in the occupation of the ridge 
 of Gettysburg, was, as has been seen, fought by only the ad- 
 vanced portion of the two armies : by the First and Eleventh 
 corps on the Union side, and on the Confederate side by the 
 divisions of Heth and Pender of Hill's corps, and the divisions 
 of Early and Fvodes of Ewell's corps. As it has been seen 
 
 22 
 
338 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 that the columns of Hill and Longstreet moved from Cham- 
 bersburg and Fajetteville towards Gettysburg on the morn- 
 ing of the 29tli, and as the distance is not above twenty miles, 
 it is evident that the march was conducted much more slowly 
 than was usual with Lee, and this he attributes to his igno- 
 rance of the movements of his antagonist — an ignorance due 
 to the absence of Stuart's cavalry, the vigilant ejes of the 
 Confederate commander.* 
 
 From the exposition already given it will have appeared 
 that by the encounter of Wednesday, the opposing armies 
 were precipitated into general conflict sooner than the chief 
 commanders on each side expected ; but when Lee, on the 
 one hand, and Meade, on the other, reached the front late at 
 night, they found themselves by the events of the day already 
 committed to battle, and rapid concentration at Gettysburg 
 became imperative. Having shown Meade's dispositions to 
 this end, it remains to add that Lee also sent urgent orders 
 to his remaining divisions to hasten their march. Meantime, 
 Ewell was instructed to carry Cemetery Hill if he found it 
 practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arri- 
 val of the other divisions of the army. He decided to await 
 the arrival of Johnston's division ; but as that officer did not 
 arrive till a late hour, and in the mean time it was found that 
 
 * Tht3 absence of Stuart happened in tliis manner : When Lee crossed the 
 Potomac from the Shenandoah Valley, Stuart was left on the east side of the 
 Blue Ridge, under instructions to harass Hooker as much as possible in cross- 
 ing the Potomac, and then pass into Maryland, either east or west of the Blue 
 Ridge, and take position on the right of the advancing column. This would 
 have put him in his proper place to watch the Union cavalry thrown out on 
 the left of the Army of the Potomac. Stuart, however, finding himself unable 
 to impede the passage of the Potomac, advanced eastward as far as Fairfax 
 Courthouse, and then crossed the Potomac at Seneca. But Hooker having 
 crossed above, Stuart found the entire Union army interposed between him and 
 Lee, so that he was compelled to make a wide detour on the exterior line : 
 marching by way of Westminster, he advanced to Carlisle, but did not reach 
 that point till the 1st of July, the day after Ewell had left for Gettysburg, tc 
 which point he was then immediately summoned by Lee, who had during all 
 these movements been deprived of the important services of his cavalry. 
 
THE GETTYSBUEQ CAMPAIGN. 339 
 
 the Union force had fully occupied the heights, it was resolved 
 not to attack until the arrival of Longstreet, two of whose 
 divisions, those of Hood and McLaws, had encamped within 
 three miles of Gettysburg. Hill's remaining division under 
 Anderson reached the ground soon after the close of the en- 
 gagement. 
 
 Nevertheless, to neither of the opposing chiefs could the 
 situation, as it presented itself on their arrival that night, be 
 either encouraging or satisfactory. General Meade found 
 affairs pressing to a culmination, and the rolls of the First 
 and Eleventh corps showed as the result of an encounter 
 which in its general relations was but a reconnoissance in 
 force, the formidable loss of near ten thousand men ! He 
 did not know but that Lee had his whole force massed in 
 front of him, while his own army was much scattered, and a 
 part distant by a full day's march.* Yet the position 
 seemed favorable, and above all it secured to him the advan- 
 tage of the defensive, forcing upon his antagonist all the 
 perils of attack.f Dropping at once, therefore, as now ob- 
 solete, all previous contingent plans looking to other lines of 
 defence, he had the moment he learnt the nature of the posi- 
 tion given orders for the rapid concentration of the whole 
 army at Gettysburg. 
 
 To Lee, on the other hand, though the action of the 1st 
 had been on the whole favorable, yet the situation in which 
 he found himself was very different from what he desired. It 
 must be borne in mind that Lee's sudden movement to the 
 east side of the South Mountain range, just at the moment he 
 was heading his columns to cross the Susquehanna and ad- 
 
 * The two corps furthest off were the Fifth and Sixth, the former of which 
 was distant twenty-three, and the latter upwards of thirty miles. 
 
 f General Meade makes no secret of his strong desire, at the time, to secure 
 the advantage of the defensive. " It was my desire," says he in his testimony 
 before the War Committee (Report, p. 439), " to fight a defensive rather than an 
 offensive battle, for the reason that I was satisfied my chances of success were 
 greater in a defensive battle than in an offensive one ; and I knew the moment- 
 ous consequences dependent upon the result of tliat." 
 
340 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 vance on Harrisburg, was solely prompted by the menace to 
 his communications with the Potomac resulting from the ma- 
 noeuvres of his antagonist. It was, therefore, with the view 
 of checking the latter that Lee threw his forces to the east 
 side of the mountain : but in doing so, he was far from 
 expecting or desiring to take upon himself the risk of a general 
 battle, at a point so distant from his base. He was willing to 
 do so only in case he should, by manoeuvring, secure the advan- ^ 
 tage of the defensive, or some special opening for a blow, 
 should his opponent make a false move. Indeed, in enter- 
 ing upon the campaign, General Lee expressly promised his 
 corps-commanders that he wonld not assume a tactical offensive, 
 but force his antagonist to attack him. Having, however, 
 gotten a taste of blood in the considerable success of the first 
 day, the Confederate commander seems to have lost that 
 equipoise in which his faculties commonly moved, and he 
 determined to give battle.* 
 
 In adopting this course he committed a grave error, as 
 the event proved, and judging from a merely military point 
 of view ; but this is not the first case in which it has been 
 seen that other considerations than those of a, purely mili- 
 tary order enter into the complex problem of war. General 
 Lee states as his main motive for giving battle, the diffi- 
 culty that would have been experienced in withdrawing 
 through the mountains with his large trains — an excuse that 
 can hardly be considered valid. A considerable part of the 
 trains had not been advanced to the east of the mountains, 
 and he could readily have withdrawn all under cover of his 
 line of battle ; and then retired his army by the same routes — 
 the Cashtown and Fairfield roads — over which he ultimately 
 retreated. Besides, there was open another and still bolder 
 move. Longstreet, holding the right of the Confederate line, 
 
 * Tliis, and subsequent revelations of the purposes and sentiments of Lee, I 
 derive from General Longstreet, who, in a full and free conversation with the 
 writer, after the close of the war, threw much light on the motives and conduct 
 oi Lee during this campaign. 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 341 
 
 had one flank securely posted on the Emmettsburg road, so 
 that he was really between the Army of the Potomac and 
 Wasliington ; and by marching towards Frederick could 
 undoubtedly have manoeuvi'ed Meade out of the Gettysburg 
 position. This operation General Longstreet, who foreboded 
 the worst from an attack on the army in position, and was 
 anxious to hold Gen'jral Lee to his promise, begged in vain to 
 be allowed to execute.* 
 
 What really compelled Lee, contrary to his original intent 
 and promise, to give battle, was the animus and inspiration of 
 the invasion ; for, to the end, such were the " exsufflicate and 
 blown surmises" of the army, and such Avas the contempt of its 
 opponent engendered by Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, 
 that there was not in his ranks a barefoot soldier in tattered 
 gray but believed Lee would lead him and the Confederate 
 army into Baltimore and Washington, if not into Philadelphia 
 and New York.t To have withdrawn, therefore, without a 
 battle, though materially easy, was morally impossible; for 
 to have recrossed the Potomac without a blow, and abandoned 
 the invasion on which such towering hopes had been built, 
 would have been a shock beyond endurance to his army and 
 the South. Such were the causes that, imder providential 
 ordainment, resulted in the mighty shock of arms that hurled 
 the invading force from the soil of the loyal States, and dealt 
 the army of Lee a blow from which it never afterwards recov- 
 ered. To the events of this action I now return. 
 
 By morning of the 2d of July the entire Union army, saving 
 the corps of Sedgwick, had reached Gettysburg; and the 
 whole Southern force, with the exception of Pickett's division 
 of Lougstreet's corps, had come up. 
 
 * The officer named is my autliority for this statement. 
 
 \ Colonel Freemantle, of the British service, who was with the Confederate 
 arn«y during the battle of Gettysburg, thus testifies-to this feeling : " The staff- 
 officers (on the night of the 1st) spoke of the battle as a certainty ; and the 
 universal feeling in the army was one of profound contempt for an enemy 
 whom they have beaten so constantly, and under so many disadvantages." — 
 Three Months in the Confederate States, p. 356. 
 
342 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AKMT OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Meade, following the natural line of defence, disposed hia 
 forces as follows : The Eleventh Corps (Howard) retained its 
 position on Cemetery Hill, where it was supported by Robin- 
 sou's and Doubleday's divisions of the First Corps (Newton) 
 on its right was placed Wadsworth's division of the same 
 corps, which together with the Twelfth (Slocum) held the 
 right of the whole army, on Culps' Hill ; the Second (Han- 
 cock) and Third (Sickles) corps occupied the crest of Ceme- 
 tery Ridge — the former connecting with the left of the 
 Eleventh, and the latter (which formed the left of the line) 
 connecting with the left of the Second. The Fifth Corps 
 (Sykes) was held in reserve on the right. 
 
 Lee placed his troops along the Seminary Ridge, separated 
 from the Cemetery Ridge by an interval of about a mile, and 
 inclosing it with a wider curve. Longstreet, with the divisions 
 of Hood and McLaws, held the right, facing Round Top and 
 a good part of Cemetery Ridge, on which Sickles and Han- 
 cock were placed. Hill's three divisions continued the line 
 from the left of Longstreet round the Seminary Ridge, and 
 fronted, therefore, the remainder of Cemetery Ridge. Ewell, 
 with his three divisions, held from the Seminary through the 
 town ; and sweeping round the base of Cemetery Hill, termi- 
 nated the left of the hostile line in front of Culps' Hill, occu- 
 pied by Slocum's corps, which formed the Union right. The 
 Confederate line was about five miles in stretch, and was in 
 great part well concealed by a fringe of woods. Both sides 
 placed in position a powerful artillery force. 
 
 VII. 
 GETTYSBURG— THE SECOND DAY. 
 
 When morning revealed to Lee the position of the Vnion 
 army drawn up on that ridge of rocks, he must have keenly 
 reaUzed all the perils of the attack ; for upon a like position 
 held by him at Fredericksburg he had seen the army under 
 
MAP OF THE BATTLE or 
 
 showing Fnsiti'oris /ifM 
 
 JU LY 2° 1863 
 
 Prepared by ColW.H. Payrle. 
 
 for "Campaigns of the. Army oTUu Polonum 
 
 K^. Position orr^ipifid sucvpssircly bi/ == 
 Genl-1 Barrjes, ralHireli .Avers g- Cmwrord. 
 
 Union Lirws. 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 343 
 
 Biirnside dasli itself to pieces, in liigh but impotent valor. 
 But the excited condition of his army, in which he still 
 shared, would not allow him to pause. He therefore pro- 
 ceeded with his dispositions for attack ; yet it was four 
 o'clock in the afternoon before these were completed. The 
 Union troops, meanwhile, made good use of the time, and 
 improvised for themselves cover behind breastworks and stone 
 walls. Early in the morning, EweU's deployment of his left 
 aroimd the base of Gulps' Hill attracted attention, and raised 
 the belief that the enemy would attack that point. General 
 Meade therefore proposed to assume the initiative there, 
 allowing General Slocum to attack with his own and two 
 additional corps ; but that officer having reported the ground 
 very unfavorable, the purpose was given up.* About two 
 o'clock the Sixth Corps, under General Sedgwick, arrived, 
 having made a march of thirty-five miles in twenty hours. 
 On the arrival of Sedgwick, General Meade directed Sykes' 
 corps (Fifth), that had been in reserve on the right, to move 
 over and be in reserve on the left. 
 
 The result of the Confederate reconnoissances was to fix 
 upon the ground opposite Longstreet — that is, the left and 
 left centre, held by Sickles' corps — as the most practicable 
 point of attack. That portion of the Union front was placed 
 in a very anomalous position ; and this fact, which presently 
 became the pivotal fact of the Confederate attack, was the 
 result of a train of events that befell in this wise. 
 
 In the original ordainment of the line of battle, Sickles' 
 corps (Third) had been instructed to take position on the left 
 of Hancock, on the same general line, which would draw it 
 along the prolongation of Cemetery Ridge towards the Round 
 Top. Now, the ridge is, at this point, not very well defined, 
 
 * The attack was designed to be made by Slocum's o-vvn corps and the Fiftli 
 Corps, together -n-ith the Sixth, as soon as it should arrive. But at ten, orders 
 were sent to attack without the Sixth Corps ; and it was then that General 
 Slocum reported adversely to it. General Warren, chief-engineer, who at the 
 time went to examine the position, also reported an attack from the right unad- 
 visable. — Report on the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. i., p. 438. 
 
344 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 for the ground in front falls off into a considerable hollow. 
 But at the distance of some four or five hundred yards in 
 advance, it rises into that intermediate crest along which runs 
 the Emmettsburg road. General Sickles, thinking it desirable 
 to occupy this advanced position — which he conceived would, 
 if held by the enemy, make his own ground untenable — 
 assumed the responsibility of pushing his front forward to 
 that point. 
 
 The motive that prompted General Sickles to this course 
 was laudable enough, yet the step itself was faulty : for though 
 to a superficial examination the aspect of this advanced 
 position seems advantageous, it is not really so ; and pro- 
 longed to the left, it is seen to be positively disadvantageous. 
 It affords no resting-place for the left flank, which can be 
 protected only by refusing that wing and throwing it back 
 through low ground, towards Kound Top ; but this, in turn, 
 presents the danger of exposing a saHent in a position which, 
 if carried, would give the enemy the key-point to the whole 
 advanced line.* 
 
 * The point where two lines meet in an angle must always he weak for de- 
 fence. This truth is recognized as one of the leading principles of the science 
 of fortification, where the lines which meet in an angle are represented by 
 ramparts or parapets, because there must always be a certain space, more or 
 less great in proportion to the greater or smaller acuteness of the angle, which 
 is undefended by the direct fire of the lines. The same applies to lines formed 
 by troops, whose fire and general resistance can only be effective when they 
 act perpendicular, or nearly so, to the direction of the lines. There is another 
 mathematical truth which applies to the case of troops, and which is thus 
 stated by Colonel MacDougall : " Where two lines representing mechanical 
 forces meet in a point, the single line or force which is capable of counteracting 
 them, called their equivalent, is always less than the sum of the two lines ; 
 and the direction of this equivalent is that of the diagonal produced of the 
 parallelogram supposed to be formed on these two lines, hy acting in a con^ 
 trary sense." (MacDougall : Modern Warfare and Modem Artillery, p. 145) 
 There is yet another serious evil attaching to an angle presented by a line on 
 a field of battle — the enemy may place guns so as to enfilade one or both of the 
 faces. When, therefore, circumstances render such a formation unavoidable, 
 the angle should be covered by ground inaccessible to the enemy by nature ot 
 rendered so by art. But neither was this position taken up by General Sicklea 
 unavoidable, nor was it strengthened by artificial defences. 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 345 
 
 General Sickles' disposition of his troops had precisely this 
 character, and was as follows : his right division, under Gen- 
 eral Humphreys, was thrown forward several hundred yards 
 in advance of Hancock's left, and disposed along the Em- 
 msttsburg road. On Humphreys' left, the prolongation of 
 the same line was continued to the left by Graham's brigade 
 of Birney's division, as far as the " Peach Orchard," Avhere, 
 leaving the ridge, the remainder of Birney's division, made up 
 of the brigades of De Trobriand and Ward, was refused, and 
 stretched obliquely back through a low ground of woods, a 
 wheat-field and woods, towards Bound Top, in front of 
 which, in a rocky ravine, the left flank rested. This brouglit 
 the salient at the peach orchard, which was therefore the 
 key-point of Sickles' rather weak hue. On this obtruding 
 member, Lee determined to make his attack ; for, as he states, 
 " it appeared that if the position held by it could be carried, 
 its possession would give facilities for assailing and carrying 
 the more elevated ground and crest beyond." 
 
 This eccentricity in the placing of Sickles' corps did not 
 become known to General Meade until about four o'clock, 
 when he arrived personally on that part of the field; and 
 though he then saw the danger to which that corps exposed 
 itself, it was thought to be too late to correct the error ; for 
 just at that moment, Longstreet, under cover of a powerful 
 artillery fire, opened his attack, and all that remained for 
 General Meade was to support Sickles as far as could be done 
 in the emergency. Longstreet first advanced his right divi- 
 sion under Hood, so that the attack fell upon that part of 
 Sickles' corps which stretched back fi'om the peach orchard 
 to the Bound Tops— that is, upon the brigades of De Tro- 
 briand and Ward; and while sharply assaihng this front, 
 Hood at the same time thrust his right unperceived between 
 the extreme left of Sickles and Bound Top. The extraordi- 
 nary danger to which this menace exposed not merely the 
 force of Sickles, but the whole army, wiU be obvious when 
 it is remembered that the possession of this point would have 
 taken the entire line in reverse. This result seemed at this 
 
346 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 moment imminent, for Little Round Top was quite unoccupied. 
 Had Hood known its nakedness, and, massing his wliole divi- 
 sion on the force that had outflanked Sickles' left, joushed 
 boldly for its rockj summit, he would have grasped in his 
 hand the key of the battle-ground, and Gettysburg might 
 have been one of those fields that decide the issues of wars. 
 
 Fortunately, at the time Hood made his attack. General 
 Warren, chief-engineer, happened to reach Little Round 
 Top. The summit of this hill had been used as a signal 
 station, and at the moment of his arrival, the signal-ofiicers 
 suddenly seeing that the enemy had penetrated between 
 Round Top and the left of Sickles' line and was approach- 
 ing their position, were folding up their flags to leave ; 
 but Warren, commanding them to continue waving them, 
 so as to make at least a show on the hill, hastened to seek 
 some force wherewith to occupy this important point. It 
 happened at this pregnant moment that the head of Sykes' 
 column, which had been ordered over to the left, reached this 
 vicinity, and the leadmg division of this corps, under General 
 Barnes, was then passing out to re-enforce Sickles. General 
 Warren assumed the responsibility of detaching from this 
 force the brigade of Vincent, and this he hurried up to hold 
 the position, while Hazlitt's battery was by enormous labor 
 dragged and lifted by hand up the rocky brow of the hill 
 and planted on its summit. As these events followed in quick 
 succession, it resulted that while that part of Hood's force 
 that had penetrated to the left of the line was approaching 
 the front slope of the Little Round Top, which in a few mo- 
 ments would have been seized by it, other claimants were 
 hurrying up its rear. Vincent's men, thrown forward at 
 the pas de course, and without time to load, reached the crest 
 just as Hood's Texans, advancing in column and without 
 skirmishers, were running to gain it. 
 
 Little Round Top — the prize so eagerly coveted by both 
 combatants — is a bold and rocky spur of the lofty and 
 peaked hill Round Top. It is impossible to conceive a 
 scene of greater wildness and desolation than is presented by 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 347 
 
 its bare and mottled figure, up-piled with gi-anite ledges and 
 masses of rock, and strewn with mighty boulders, that might 
 be the debris of some antique combat of the Titans. 
 
 Here there ensued one of those mortal struggles rare in 
 war, when the hostile forces, clenching in close contest, illus- 
 trate whatever there is of savage and terrible in battle. Vin- 
 cent's brigade, composed of the Sixteenth Michigan (Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Welsh), the Forty-fourth New York (Colonel 
 Eice), the Eighty-thii-d Pennsylvania (Captain Woodward), 
 and the Twentieth Maine (Colonel Chamberlain), coming 
 quickly into position, engaged Hood's troops in a hand-to- 
 hand conflict, in which bayonets were crossed and muskets 
 clubbed ; and officers, seizing the rifles dropped from dead 
 hands, joined in the fray. After half an hour of this des- 
 perate Avork, the position was secured. Meantime, Weed's 
 brigade of Ayres' division of the Fifth Corps* took post on 
 Vincent's right on Little Bound Top. Hood's men, how- 
 ever, clung fast to the rocky glen at the base of the hill, and 
 working their way up the ravine between the Bound Tops, 
 succeeded in turning the left flank. The ammunition of Vin- 
 cent's troops was already exhausted. It therefore became 
 necessary to use the steel, and the enemy was driven fi'om 
 this point by a charge with the bayonet by Colonel Chamber- 
 lain's Maine Begiment. Yet this rocky bulwark was not 
 secured without a heavy sacrifice. Colonel Vincent, who 
 had so heroically met the first shock, laid down his hfe in 
 defence of the position ; O'Bourke and the much-beloved 
 General Weed were killed ; Hazhtt, who commanded the bat- 
 tery, also fell at his perilous post ;t and among the ledges of 
 rocks lay many hundred dead soldiers in blue.| 
 
 * The One Hundred and Fortieth New York, of this brigade, had gone up 
 simultaneously with Hazlitfs battery, and participated in the engagement. 
 
 \ Hazlitt was bending over the prostrate form of his commander. General 
 Weed, and receiving his last words and sighs, when a bullet threw him prone 
 and inanimate on the body of his comrade in glory and in death. 
 
 X Towards dark, after Chamberlain's charge, Fisher's brigade of the Penn 
 sylvania Reserves re-enforced Vincent's troops ; and later at night Chamberlain'H 
 regiment, supported by two of Fisher's regiments, occupied Round Top proper 
 
348 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 It has been seen that, at the same iime Hood thrust his 
 right through the interval between Sickles' left flank and 
 Round Top, and entered upon the contest for the possession 
 of that point, he also assailed the portion of the Third Corps 
 line held by Birney's division. In this attack he was 
 joined by Longstreet's other division under General McLaws, 
 so that this effort was directed against the entu'e left and 
 centre of the Thu-d Corps, from its left flank near Bound Top, 
 forward to the saHent in the peach orchard on the Emmetts- 
 burg road. But it hapjoened that Longstreet's line as formed 
 did not cover the entke front of Sickles' corps (for Hood's 
 point of attack was quite to the Confederate right, and Long- 
 street had only McLaws' division in addition), and it failed to 
 cover it by about the front held by the right division under 
 General Humphreys. Where Longstreet's hne terminated, 
 however, the prolongation towards the Union right was con- 
 tinued by Hill's corps, so that Humphreys had part of that 
 corps in his fi'ont. But Hill's duty was, while Longstreet 
 attacked, to make demonstrations and only assault in case of 
 a good opportunit3\ Thus it came about, that, when Long- 
 street, after the development of Hood's attack, advanced 
 McLaws' division on the left of Hood, the brunt of the as- 
 sault fell upon Sickles' centre and left under Birney ; Hum- 
 l^hreys' division being for the time unassailed. 
 
 The onset of Hood and McLaws upon Birney's front was 
 made with great vigor, compelling General Sickles immediately 
 to call for re-enforcements ; and it was in response to this re- 
 quest that General Barnes' division of the Fifth Corps had been 
 thrown out in support at the time General Warren detached 
 from this division the brigade of Vincent to hold Little Bound 
 Top. Its other two brigades, under Colonels Tilton and 
 Sweitzer, hastened to the support of Birney's hard-pressed 
 troops on the advanced line ; and General Humphreys, who 
 held the right of the Third Corps, but had not yet been 
 attacked, sent one of his own brigades under Colonel Burling 
 to still further help. 
 
 The heaviest pressure of the hostile attack fell upon that 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN 349 
 
 exposed portion of tlie line where it made an angle at the 
 peach orchard, and this point of Sickles' line was held by 
 eight regiments belonging to Birney's and Hnmphrey's divi- 
 sions. The assault was made by McLaws' left, supported by 
 Anderson's division ; ard thougli it was disputed by the 
 Union regiments with very great stubbornness, the position 
 was at length carried, and the key-point remained in the 
 enemy's hands. 
 
 Now certainly, if not before, was seen the faultiness of the 
 advanced line ; for the enemy having burst through the cen- 
 tre, was free to penetrate the interval and assail in detail 
 the disrupted forces right and left. To meet this menace, 
 that portion of the line which was to the right of the peach 
 orchard — that is, Humphreys' division and Graham's bri- 
 gade — swung back its exposed left, thus making a change of 
 front to face southward instead of westward, and the batteries 
 on the forward crest under Major McGilvray were retired firing. 
 That portion of the hue which was to the left of the peach 
 orchard — namely, the brigades of Tilton and Sweitzer, that 
 had been sent out to re-enforce Birney — being now not only 
 assailed in front but having its right flank exposed, fell back ; 
 and this also involved Birney's front. 
 
 It is rare that a field of battle displays, in a more striking 
 manner than was here presented, the influence of key-points 
 in determining tactical results. The possession of the peach 
 orchard enabled the enemy to meet and repulse a succession 
 of attacks, and the history of the action on the left presents 
 an extraordinary series of efforts to maintain ground now 
 become untenable — one re-enforcement after another being 
 thrown forward only to be driven back in a whirling vortex 
 of advancing and retiring lines. 
 
 The original front of Birney had already gone out and dis- 
 appeared, and Barnes' two brigades sent forward in support 
 had been repulsed. Hereupon Caldwell's division was de- 
 tached from Hancock's front and ordered in to check the hos- 
 tile advance. The disputed ground had come to be an inter- 
 mediate position of woods and wheat-field between Sickles' lost 
 
350 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 front and the Eound Tops, in the rear now securely held. 
 Caldwell advanced with his left skirting Little Round Top, 
 and pushing forward into the wheat-field engaged the enemy 
 i with the brigades of Cross and Kelly. This line was much 
 cut up, and Colonel E. E. Cross, of the Fifth New Hamp- 
 shire (commanding the First brigade), whose intrepid bear- 
 ing had so often been exhibited on the field of battle, was 
 killed. To relieve these troops, General Caldwell then ad- 
 vanced his second line, made up of the brigades of Brooke 
 and Zook. The latter was mortally wounded while carrying 
 his troops into action. Brooke led his command forward with 
 much gallantry, and after an exceedingly stubborn fight, drove 
 the enemy from under cover of the woods, and from a position 
 of great natural strength along the rocky bottom of a creek at 
 its margin.* But this success, notwithstanding that Sweitzer's 
 brigade was again advanced to assist the attack, was tempo- 
 rary. Hood had already carried the whole of the position 
 originally held by the left of the Third Corps ; and to hold 
 him in check at that point. General Ayres, with two brigades 
 of the Regulars of the Fifth Corps, moved forward. Caldwell 
 experienced the same fate as those that had gone before ; for 
 the Confederates, penetrating the wide interval made by the 
 disruption of Sickles' centre at the peach orchard, enveloped 
 his right, and penetrated almost to his rear. This quickly 
 forced Caldwell back, after the frightful sacrifice of one-haK 
 his division. Then the enemy, breaking out through the 
 woods on the right, hurled Sweitzer back ; and the division of 
 Regulars, under General Ayres, being struck on its right and 
 rear, fought its way with great gallantry and heavy loss 
 through the enemy to its original line of battle. I shall leave 
 now the recital of the manner in which he was finally 
 checked, and take up the thread of events on the right of the 
 Third Corps, where Humphreys yet clung with one of his 
 flanks to his advanced position. 
 
 It has been seen that when Sickles' hne was cut in twain by 
 
 * Colonel Brooke was wouDded in this action. 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CA]\rPAIQN. 351 
 
 the carrying of the peach orchard, Humphreys, joined by the 
 brigade of Graham, swung back his left so as to make a 
 change of front, and with his riglit still held on to the crest on 
 the Emmettsburg road. For a considerable time, while the 
 contest raged to his left, he was not assailed, and the enemy 
 only made demonstrations of attack ; but when finally the 
 whole left and the troops that had moved to its support were 
 thrown back, the hostile force poured through the interval 
 and advanced to strike Humphreys, whose left was greatly 
 exposed, and whose right was thrown much out of position. 
 To support that flank, General Hancock sent forward two 
 regiments fi-om Gibbon's division (the Fifteenth Massachu- 
 setts, under Colonel Ward, and the Eighty-second New York, 
 under Colonel Huston), and to cover the gap on the left, he 
 detached Willard's brigade from Hays' division ;* but at this 
 moment Hill, converting his demonstrations into a real attack, 
 pressed upon Humplireys, who was forced to fall back. In 
 the midst of this action General Sickles was severely wounded, 
 losing a leg. General Hancock hereupon took direction of 
 the Third Corps (now under General Birney) ir addition to his 
 own. 
 
 The attack on Humphreys was so sudden and severe, that 
 two additional regiments (the Nineteenth Massachusetts, 
 under Colonel Devereux, and the Forty-second New York, 
 under Colonel Mallon), which Hancock had sent out to his 
 assistance, finding that Humphreys was retiring, could only 
 get quickly into line of battle, deliver a few volleys at the 
 advancing enemy, and then retire with a considerable loss. 
 The enemy pushed them so closely that a number of the Con- 
 federates, eagerly pressing forward, fell prisoners into the 
 hands of those they were pursuing. Humphreys, in retiring 
 his men, which he refrained from doing until not only pressed 
 upon by the enemy, but until ordered back, felt the import- 
 ance of yielding stubbornly and slowly ; for under the circum- 
 stances, he judged that if a rapid backward movement were 
 
 * Colonel Willard was killed in this action. 
 
352 CAMPMGXS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 made, it would be difficult to rally the men upon the new line. 
 Yet this imposed obstinacy cost the terrible sacrifice of half 
 his small division. What of its remains was collected on the 
 original line was the debris of many regiments — hardly more 
 than an ordinary battalion, though with many colors.'^ Three 
 guns of one of its batteries had been left on the field, owing 
 to its heavy losses in horses and cannoniers. And now the 
 enemy began to surge against the base of the crest, and it be- 
 came urgently necessary to form a bulwark of men to resist 
 his oncoming. This was not an easy task, for the action, as 
 it rolled on, had fully involved Sykes' corps on the left, and a 
 large part of the Second Corps had been thrown in to aid the 
 Third at different points, and was shockingly cut up. 
 
 With all that could be done the front was still only patclml, 
 and wherever the head of a column could be thrust through, 
 the enemy was quick to do so. Thus Hancock, in riding 
 along the hne, suddenly met a force of the enemy, which hav- 
 ing, unobserved, approached very close to the line, under 
 cover of a fringe of undergrowth, was about to pass through 
 an unprotected interval. Opportunely, the First Minnesota Re- 
 giment came up at this moment, and, making an exceedingly 
 spirited charge, drove it back in disorder, capturing its colors. 
 The line being, however, still incomplete, Stannard's brigade 
 was brought up, and General Meade led forward in person a 
 part of the Twelfth Corps, consisting of two regiments of 
 Lockwood's Maryland brigade, which were placed further to 
 the left. This was enough, for the enemy's efforts were now 
 little more than the frantic sallies of an exhausted wrestler, 
 A terrible price had been exacted for the success he had won : 
 General Barksdale, the impetuous leader of the boldest at- 
 tack, was mortally hurt, and lay within the Union lines, and 
 many other Confederate officers were killed and wounded. 
 When, therefore, Hancock ordered a counter-charge, the en- 
 emy easily gave way. This was made by the portions of the 
 different corps that had come up to the assistance ; and Hum- 
 
 * Hancock: Report of Gettysburg. 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 353 
 
 plireys' little band joined in, and had the satisfaction to re- 
 take and bring back its lost guns. A new line was then 
 formed by Doubleday's and Robinson's divisions of the First 
 Corps, and by troops from the TweKth Corps, brought up by 
 General WilHams.* 
 
 Thus, at dusk, ended the action on the left centre, and at 
 the same time the complicated action on the left, whose ebb 
 and flow I have already described, was brought to a close. 
 It has been seen how line after line was swept back, and how 
 the enemy, following on the heels of the troops of Ayres last 
 engaged, debouched from the woods in front of Little Round 
 Top. Thus far, the success of Longstreet had indeed been 
 considerable ; but it had no decisive character, and until this 
 crest and spur should be carried, he could claim no substantial 
 victory ; for the position wrested from Sickles was one intrin- 
 sically false, and though the successive attacks of Barnes and 
 Caldwell and Ayres had been repulsed, yet the advantage was 
 gained at a heavy cost to the Confederates. When, therefore, 
 debouching from the woods, they suddenly saw across a nar- 
 row swale the beetling sides of Little Round Top crowned 
 with troops and artillery, and the figure of a battle array de- 
 fined on the bold crest to the right, t their line was visibly 
 shaken. At this moment six regiments of the division of 
 Pennsylvania Reserves, moving down the ridge, rapidly ad- 
 vanced under the personal leadership of General Crawford. 
 This sally was enough to determine the action; for seeing 
 attack to be hopeless, and in turn assailed themselves, the 
 Confederates, after a sharp but brief contest for the reten- 
 tion of a stone wall occupied by them, hastily recoiled to the 
 woods beyond the wheat-field, the opposite margins of which 
 were that night held by the combatants. 
 
 * It had been intended that Geary's division (with the exception of Greene's 
 brigade) should also re-enforce the left ; but this division missed its way. Gen- 
 eral Williams was temporarily in command of the Twelfth C!orps, Slocum hav- 
 ing charge of the whole right wing. 
 
 ■j Bartlett's and Wheaton's brigades, of the Sixth Corps, had just taken 
 position on this crest. 
 
 23 
 
354 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, 
 
 Such was the main current of the action as it fell on the 
 left and left centre of the army, and it was fought by Long- 
 street's corps and a part of Anderson's division of Hill's 
 corps. Now the plan of battle contemplated that, while 
 Longstreet attacked, Ewell should make vigorous demonstra- 
 tions against the forces on Cemetery and Culi:)'s hills, to pre- 
 vent re-enforcements being drawn from that flank to increase 
 the opposition to be encountered in the real assault against 
 the Union left. For some reason, however, Ewell's demon- 
 strations were much delayed, and it was sunset before he 
 got 10 work. Then, opening up with a fire of artillery from 
 a knoll in front of Cemetery Hill, he followed it by a powerful 
 infantry attack with the divisions of Early and Johnson — the 
 former on Cemetery Hill, the latter on Culp's Hill. As Early's 
 columns defiled from the town, they came under the fire of 
 Stevens' battery at eight hundred yards ; but, wheeling into 
 line, they pushed up the hill, and as their front became un- 
 masked, ^11 the guns that could be brought to bear upon them 
 (some twenty in number), were opened upon them, first with 
 shrapnel, then with canister, and with excellent effect, for their 
 left and centre were beaten back. But the right, working its 
 way up under cover of the houses and undulating ground, 
 pushed completely through Wiedrich's battery into Ricketts' 
 battery. The cannoniers of both batteries stood well to their 
 guns, and when no longer able to hold them, fought with 
 handspikes, rammers, and even stones.* Howard's troops 
 were considerably shaken by the assault ; but the firmness of 
 the artUlery and the opportune arrival of Carroll's brigade of 
 the Second Corps, voluntarily sent by General Hancock on 
 hearing the firing, repulsed the attack and saved the day.f 
 
 But Ewell's efforts did not end here ; for at the same time 
 this attack was made, he threw his left division, under Gen- 
 eral Johnson, up the ravine formed by Eock Creek, and 
 
 * Hunt : Report of Artillery at Gettysburg. 
 
 f " Ewell had directed Rodes' division to attack in concert with Early, cov- 
 ering liis right. When the time came to attack, Rodes not having his troops 
 in position, was unprepared to cooperate with Early." — Lee's Report, MS. 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAlfPAIGN. 3o5 
 
 Btriick the extreme right of the Union position on Culp'y Hill. 
 If Ewell's delay had thwarted the original intention of pro- 
 renting re-enforcements being sent from the right to buffet 
 Longstreet's attack, it at least gave him the opportunity to 
 make his demonstration, when at length made, really effective ; 
 for such heavy detachments had been taken fi-om the Twelfth 
 Corps to re-enforce the left during the operations of the after- 
 noon, that there remained of this corps but a single brigade, 
 under General Greene, drawn out in a thin line, with the divi- 
 sion of Wadsworth on its left. The brunt of the attack fell 
 upon Greene, who, re-enforced by parts of Wadsworth's 
 troops, maintained his own position with great firmness, but 
 Ewell's left penetrated without opposition the vacated breast- 
 works on the furthest right, and this foothold within tho 
 Union lines he held during the night. 
 
 Thus closed the second day's action, and the result was 
 such that the Confederate commander, beheving he would 
 be able ultimately to carry the position, resolved to renew 
 attack on the morrow. It must be admitted that the events 
 of the day seemed to justify this belief. Longstreet had 
 carried the whole front on which the Third Corps had 
 been drawn ; Ewell's left was thrust within the breastworks 
 on the right, in a position which, if held by him, would enable 
 him to take Meade's entire line in reverse, and the Union loss 
 in the two days' combat had akeady reached the fi'ightful 
 aggregate of upwards of twenty thousand men. But Lee's 
 inference, though specious, was unwarranted. The position 
 carried from Sickles at such costly price to the assailants 
 was no part of the real line as' drawn on the crest of hills 
 south of Gettysburg. This, intact throughout, remained yet 
 to be assailed ; and such was the confidence felt by the corps- 
 commanders in their ability to maintain this position, that 
 notwithstanding the partial reverses of the day, and tho 
 heavy loss sustained, when they came together that night 
 there was a unanimous determination to fight it out at Get- 
 tysburg — a sentiment which was quite in accord with General 
 Meade's own conviction. 
 
356 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 GETTYSBURG— THE THIRD DAY. 
 
 Lee's plan of attack of tlie previous day had been directed 
 against both flanks of the Union position, but, as I have shown, 
 though the whole of the advanced line on the left had been 
 carried, this only brought Longstreet abreast a more formida- 
 ble front drawn on the original line. Ewell, however, still 
 maintained his foothold within the breastworks on Gulp's 
 Hill; and this lodgment inside of the works on the right 
 shaped the determination of the first plan of attack for the 
 third day. "General Ewell," says Lee, "had carried some 
 of the strong positions which he assailed, and the result was 
 such as to lead to the belief that he would ultimately be able 
 to dislodge the enemy."* 
 
 With this view, Johnson's force, hugging closely Gulps* 
 Hill, was considerably strengthened ; but before preparations 
 could be made for an attack, Meade assumed the offensive 
 and drove back the intrusive force. During the night a 
 powerful artillery was accumulated against the point entered 
 by the enemy, and at four o'clock opened a heavy fire. Mean- 
 while, the troops of the Twelfth Gorps returned from the 
 left, and the divisions of "WiUiams and Geary, aided by 
 Shaler's brigade of the Sixth Gorps, entered upon a severe 
 struggle to regain the lost portion of the line. After four 
 hours' close contest, it was carried by a charge of Geary's 
 division, the original line on Gulp's Hill was re-established 
 and the right flank made secure. Being thus thwarted in his 
 plan of attack on the right — a plan which, besides, would 
 have been difficult of execution, owing to the vsdde separation 
 of the Gonfederate wings— General Lee altered his determina- 
 tion and resolved to assault the centre of the Union position. 
 In this he seems to have aimed to imitate Wagram. 
 
 * Lee Report of Gettysburg. 
 
THE GETTTSBURQ CAMPAIGN. 357 
 
 riiat some weighty design was in preparation by tlio enemy 
 was tlirougliout the morning evident ; for after the struggle 
 had ceased on the right there was for soma hours a deep 
 silence. During all this time the Confederates were placing 
 in position heavy masses of artillery. Lee, less sanguine 
 than the day before, knew well that his only hope lay in his 
 ability, first of all, to sweep resistance from the slopes before 
 the assaulting columns moved forward. By noon a hundred 
 and forty-five guns were in position along the ridge occupied 
 by Longstreet and Hill. At one o'clock the ominous silence 
 was broken by a terrific outburst from this massive concen- 
 tration of the enginery of war. Ample means for a reply in 
 kind were at hand ; for General Hunt, the chief of artillery, 
 had crowned the ridge along the left and left centre, on which 
 it was manifest the attack was to fall, with eighty guns — a 
 number not as great as that of the enemy, but it was all 
 that could be made effective in the more restricted space' 
 occupied by the army.* Withholding the fire until the first 
 hostile outburst had spent itself. General Hunt then ordered 
 the batteries to open ; and thus from ridge to ridge was kept 
 up for near two hours a Titanic combat of artillery that caused 
 the sohd fabric of the hills to labor and shake, and filled the 
 air with fire and smoke and the mad clamor of two hundred 
 guns. During this outburst the troops crouched behind such 
 sHght cover as they could find ; but the musket was tightly 
 grasped, for each man knew well what was to follow — knew 
 that this storm was but the prelude to a less noisy, yet more 
 deadly shock of infantry. When, therefore, after the duel had 
 
 * In tlie cemetery were placed Dilger's, Bancroft's, Eakin's, Wheeler's, 
 Hill's, and Taft's batteries, under Major Osborne. On the left of the cemetery 
 the batteries of the Second Corps, under Captain Hazard— namely, those of 
 Woodruff, Arnold, Cushing, Brown, and Rorty. Next on the left was 
 Thomas's battery, and on his left Major McGilvray's command, consisting of 
 Thompson's, Phillips', Hart's, Sterling's, Ranks', Dow's, and Ames' of the re- 
 serve artillery, to which was added Cooper's battery of the First Corps. On 
 the extreme left, Gibbs' and Rittenhouse's (late Hazlitt's) batteries. As batter- 
 ies expended their ammimition, they were replaced by batteries of the artillerv 
 reserve, sent forward by its efficient chief, Colona' R. O. Tyler. 
 
358 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 continued for near two liours, the cliief of artillery, finding 
 liis ammunition running low,* and that it was unsafe to bring 
 up loads of it from the rear (for many caissons and limbers 
 had been exploded), directed that the firing should be gradu- 
 ally stopped : the enemy also slackened fire, and immediately 
 the Confederate columns of attack were seen forming on the 
 edge of the woods that cover the Seminary Eidge. 
 
 As Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps had reached the 
 ground during the morning, and as Longstreet wished to use 
 the divisions of Hood and McLaws in covering his right, it 
 was appointed to lead the van.t Pickett formed his divi- 
 sion in double line of battle, with Kemper's and Gamett's 
 brigades in front and Armistead's brigade supporting ; while 
 on the right of Pickett was one brigade of Hill's corps, un- 
 der General Wilcox, formed in column by battalions ; and on 
 his left, Heth's division (also of Hill's corps), under General 
 Pettigrew. The attacking force numbered about fifteen thou- 
 sand men, and it advanced over the intervening space of near 
 a mile in such compact and imposing order, that, whether 
 friend or foe, none who saw it could refrain from admiration 
 of its magnificent array. The hostile line, as it advanced, 
 covered a front of not more than two of the reduced and 
 incomplete divisions of the Second Corps, numbering, it may 
 be, some six thousand men. While crossing the plain, it 
 received a severe fire of artillery, which, however, did not 
 delay for a moment its determined advance ; so that the 
 column pressing on, came within musketry range — ^the troops 
 evincing a striking disposition to withhold their fire until it 
 could be delivered with deadly effect. The first opposition it 
 received was from two regiments of Stannard's Vermont 
 
 "' Report of Artillery Operations. 
 
 t The absence of Pickett's division the day before made General Long- 
 street very loth to make the attack, but Lee, tliinking the Union force waa 
 not all up, would not wait. Longstreet urged in reply that this advantage (or 
 8ii]pj)osed advantage, for the Union force was all up) was countervailed by the 
 fact that he was not all up either : but the Confederate commander was not 
 minded to delay. My authority is again General Longstreet. 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 359 
 
 brigade of the First Corps, wliich had been posted in a small 
 grove to the left of the Second Corps in front of and at a con- 
 siderable angle with the main line. These regiments opened 
 upon the right flank of the enemy's advancing lines, which 
 received also an oblique fire from eight batteries under Major 
 McGilvray. This caused the Confederate troops on that flank 
 to double in a little towards their left, but it did not stay 
 their onward progress. As, during the passage of the enemy 
 across the intervening plain, the rifled guns had fired away 
 all their canister, they were withdrawn or left on the ground 
 inactive, to await the issue of the impending shock between 
 the two masses of infantry — a shock momentarily expected, 
 for the assailants approached steadily, while the Union force 
 held itself braced to receive the impact. When at length the 
 hostile lines had approached to between two and three hundred 
 yards, the divisions of Hays and Gibbon of the Second Corps 
 opened a destructive fire, and repeated it in rapid succession. 
 
 This sally had the efi'ect to instantly reveal the unequal 
 metal of the assaulting mass, and proved what of it was iron 
 and what clay. It happened that the division on the left of 
 Pickett, under command of General Pettigrew, was, in con- 
 siderable part, made up of North Carolina troops compara- 
 tively green. To animate them, they had been told that they 
 would meet only the Pennsylvania militia. But when, ap- 
 proaching the slope, they received the feu d'enfer from Hays' 
 line, there ran through their ranks a cry, the effect of which was 
 like to that which thrilled a Greek army when it was said that 
 the god Pan was among them — " The Army of the Potomac !" 
 
 Thus suddenly undeceived in regard to their opponents, 
 Pettigrew's troops broke in disorder, leaving two thousand 
 prisoners and fifteen colors in the hands of Hays' division. 
 Now, as Wilcox's brigade had not advanced, Pickett's divi- 
 sion remained alone a solid lance-head of Virginia troops,, 
 tempered in the fire of battle. SoUtary,this division, buffet- 
 ing the fierce volleys that met it, rushed up the crest of 
 Cemetery Ridge, and such was the momentum of its assault 
 that it fairly thrust itself within Hancock's line. 
 
360 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 It happened tliat the full strength of this attack fell upon 
 "Webb's brigade of three regiments. This brigade had been 
 disjjosed in two lines : two of its regiments, the Sixty -ninth 
 and Seventj^-first Pennsylvania, posted behind a low stone wall 
 and slight breastwork hastily constructed by them, while the 
 remaining regiment (the Seventy-second Pennsylvania) lay 
 behind the crest some sixty paces to the rear, and so placed 
 as to fire over the heads of those in front. When the swift 
 advancing and yelling array of Pickett's force had, notwith- 
 standing the volleys it met, approached close up to the stone 
 wall, many of those behind it seeing their fire to be now 
 vain, abandoned the position ; and the Confederates, detect- 
 ing this wavering, rushed over the breastworks. General 
 Armistead leading, and crowned the stone wall with their 
 standards. The moment was certainly as critical as can well 
 be conceived ; but happily, the regiments that had been hold- 
 ing the front line did not, on falUng back, do so in panic : so 
 that by the personal bravery of General Webb and his offi- 
 cers, they were immediately rallied and reformed on the 
 remainder of the brigade, which held the second line behind 
 the crest, and Hancock, who had the day before turned the 
 fortunes of the battle in a similar emergency, again displayed 
 those quahties of cool a23preciation and quick action that had 
 proved him one of the foremost commanders on the actual 
 field of battle, and instantly drew together troops to make a 
 bulwark against any further advance of the now exultant 
 enemy. 
 
 As the hostile front of attack was quite narrow, it left Han- 
 cock's left wing unassailed. From there he drew over the 
 brigades of Hall and Harrow ;* and Colonel Devereux, com- 
 manding the Nineteenth Massachusetts Regiment, anxious to 
 be in the right place, apphed for permission to move his 
 regiment to the front — a request gladly granted by Hancock, 
 
 * One Hundred and Fifty-first Pennsylvania and Twentieth New York 
 State Militia, botli under Gates of Doubleday's division, Firet Corps, partici- 
 pated. 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 3(J1 
 
 who also gave Mallon's Forty-second New York Eegiment 
 the same direction ; while Colonel Stannard moved two re- 
 giments of his Vermont brigade to strike the enemy on the 
 right flank. These movements were quickly executed, but 
 not without confusion, owing to many men leaving their ranks 
 to fire at the enemy from the breastworks. When the new 
 line was formed, it was found that the situation was very 
 peculiar ; for the men of all brigades, while individually firm, 
 had in some measure lost their regimental organization — a 
 confusion that arose from the honorable ambition of indi- 
 vidual commanders to promptly cover the point penetrated by 
 the enem3^ The essential thing was secured, however — the 
 breach was covered, and in such force that, in regular forma- 
 tion, the liae would have stood four ranks deep. 
 
 It will be remembered that the brigade of Stannard held 
 an advanced po'nt on Hancock's left. As the assaulting 
 column passed his right to strike Webb, he moved to the 
 right, changed front forward, and opened a very savage fire 
 on the enemy's flank. At the same time, the colors of the 
 different regiments were advanced in defiance of the long line 
 of battle-flags presented by the Confederates, and the men 
 pressing firmly after them engaged in a brief and determined 
 combat and utterly overthrew the foe. ^Tiatsoever valor 
 could do to T\T:est victory from the jaws of hell, that it must 
 be conceded the troops of Pickett had done ; but now, seeing 
 themselves in a desperate strait, they flung themselves on the 
 ground to escape the hot fire and threw up their hands in 
 token of surrender, while the remnant sought safety in fiight. 
 Twenty-five hundred prisoners and twelve battle-flags were 
 taken at this pohit, which brought the aggregate of Han- 
 cock's captures up to four thousand five hundred prisoners 
 and twenty-seven standards. The Confederate loss in killed 
 and wounded was exceedingly severe. Of the three brigade 
 commanders of Pickett's division, Garnett was killed, Ai*mi- 
 stead fell fatally wounded within the Union lines, and Kemper 
 was borne off severely hurt. In addition, it left behind four- 
 teen of its field-officers, and only a single one of that rank 
 
3fi2 CAIklPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 escaped unhurt, while of its rank and file three-fourths were 
 dead or captives. Pettigrew's division, also, though it had 
 faltered earlier, was much cut up and lost many ojQficers, besides 
 heavily in killed, wounded, and j)risoners. But this illustrious 
 victory was not purchased without severe price paid ; and 
 this was sadly attested in the thousands of dead and wounded 
 that lay on the plain. The loss in officers was again especially 
 heavy ; and among the wounded were Generals Gibbon and 
 Hancock ; but the latter did not leave the field till he learned 
 the tidings of the discomfiture of the enemy. 
 
 After the repulse of Pickett's assault, Wilcox's command, 
 that had been on the right but failed to move forward, ad- 
 vanced by itself to the attack, and came to within a few hun- 
 di'ed yards of Hancock's hne ; but in passing over the plain 
 it met severe artillery fire, and Stannard detached a force* 
 which took it in flank and rear, capturing several hundred 
 prisoners : the rest fled.t This ended the combat, though 
 towards dusk General Crawford advanced across the wheat- 
 field into the woods and took several hundred prisoners 
 and a large number of arms. During the action, the cavalry 
 had been operating on the flanks, Kilpatrick's division on the 
 left, and Gregg's division on the right. Both divisions dis- 
 played much gallantry and suffered heavy loss.t 
 
 When the shattered columns of attack returned to their 
 
 * The Sixteenth Vermont, supported bj a detachment of the Fourteenth 
 Vermont. 
 
 f It had not been designed that Wilcox should attack, but simply cover, the 
 right flank of Pickett's assaulting column. But he did not move forward with 
 snfBcient promptness to eflect the former purpose, and when Pickett had been 
 repulsed, he made a foolish and isolated attack. Thus, in the first instance, he 
 did not move forward enough, and in the second he moved too far. 
 
 J The scope of this work does not permit the recital of the details of the nu- 
 merous cavalry affairs; but I cannot forbear to mention the very spirited 
 attack on Hood's right by the brigades of Farnesworth and Merritt, operating 
 on the left flank of the army. Farnesworth, with the First Vermont and First 
 Virginia Cavalry, cleared a fence in his front, sabred the enemy behind it, and 
 then rushed on the second line and up to the muzzles of the guns, where most 
 of them fell, and their gallant leader at their head. 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 363 
 
 lines on Seminary Eidge, it was clear to Lee that the attempt 
 to break through the Union position was hopeless. Tho 
 troops went back much disrupted, and it was only by the en- 
 ergetic, personal exertions of Longstreet and of Lee that they 
 were rallied and re-formed. It is said that a counter-attack 
 by the Union forces was much feared at this moment ; and it 
 is possible that had General Meade been aware of the extent 
 of the damage he had inflicted on his opponent, and the ex- 
 treme disorder of the moment, as also that the Confederate 
 ammunition had run very low, an immediate advance b}' the 
 left might have converted the repulse into a rout. But it 
 must be borne in mind that he did not then know these things, 
 and all he did know favored a cautious policy. For his own 
 loss was terrible, the different corps were much intermingled, 
 and to have quitted his defences would have exposed him to 
 a repulse similar to that the enemy had just received ; and as 
 — with the exception of a few brigades of Sedgwick's corps — 
 there were no reserves, attack must have been made by 
 already exhausted troops.* 
 
 With Lee there now remained only the alternative of re- 
 
 * So far as I am aware, the only important witness on the Ckjnfederate side 
 in favor of attack at this time, is Colonel Fremantle of the British ser\-ica. 
 Kefei-ring to the situation after Pickett's repulse, he says : " It is difficult to 
 exaggerate the critical state of aflfairs as they appeared about this time. If 
 the enemy, or their general, had shown any enterprise, there is no saying what 
 might have happened. General Lee and his oflBcers were evidently fuUy im- 
 pressed with a sense of the situation." But the sequel seems to belie this ; for 
 he immediately remarks : " Yet there was much less noise, fuss, or confusion 
 of orders than at an ordinary field-day ; the men as they were rallied in the 
 ■woods, were brought up in detachments, and lay down quietly and coolly in 
 the positions assigned them." — Three Months in the Confederate States, pp. 
 269-270. A very different view of the probable success of an assault at this 
 time is given by Captain Eoss, of the Austrian service, vpho also witnessed the 
 battle from the Confederate side. " The enemy," says he, " made no attempt 
 to follow up their advantage, and it is well for them they did not. I see that 
 a General Butterfield, in evidence given before some Federal committee, blamea 
 General Meade for not attacking Lee's right after the repulse, imagining that 
 enormous captures of guns and other great successes would have been the re- 
 sult. It was, however, well for the Federals that General Meade did not do so 
 
364 CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 treat ; and bitter as this alternative was — seeing that it in- 
 volved the abandonment of the scheme of invasion and all 
 the high hopes built thereon — it was imperative, for the posi- 
 tion he had to assail was one agamst which he might,dash 
 his army to pieces, but against which he could now hope for 
 no success. Yet he did not begin an immediate retreat, but 
 waited the whole of the following day, during which he was 
 withdrawing his trains and disposing his army for a retro- 
 grade movement. And it is the most striking proof that could 
 be given of the confidence Lee still had in his troops, that 
 during that whole 4th of July he was in a mood to invite 
 rather than dread an attack. Retiring his left from around 
 the base of Gulp's Hill and from the town of Gettysburg, 
 which was reoccupied by Howard's troops during the fore- 
 noon, a strong line of works was thrown up from the Semi- 
 nary northwestward, and covering the Mummasburg and 
 Chambersburg roads, while another line was formed on the 
 right flank, perpendicular with their general front, and ex- 
 tending back to Marsh Creek. Here, while employed in the 
 work of sending off their wounded, burying their dead, etc., 
 the Confederates stood at bay, hopeless of venturing another 
 attack, yet quite willing to be attacked. 
 
 But this was not in the line of General Meade's intent, for 
 having gained a victory, and being certain of the necessity 
 that was upon his antagonist of making a retreat, he was in 
 no mood to jeopard an assured success by any rash adven- 
 
 for he would have found McLaws and Hood's divisions there perfectly ready 
 and willing to give him a much hotter reception than he would have liked." 
 — Cities and Camps of the Confederate States, p. 65. On the Union side, many 
 of the generals present have testified before the Committee on the Conduct of 
 the War, in favor of attack. See Report, second series, vol. 1., passim. 
 
 But since the above text was written, I have become convinced from testimony 
 more weighty than any given above— to wit, the testimony of General Long- 
 street himself— that attack would have resulted disastrously. " I had," said 
 that officer to the writer, " Hood and McLaws, who had not been engaged ; I 
 had a heavy force of artillery ; I should have liked nothing better than to have 
 been attacked, and have no doubt I should have given those who tried as bad a 
 reception as Pickett received." 
 
THE GETTTSBURa CAMPAIGN. 3G5 
 
 ture. Accordingly, nothing was done save to make some 
 demonstrations of a rather feeble character, and the day was 
 passed in attentions to the wounded and burying tlie dead, 
 while holding the army in hand for pursuit. That night Lee 
 began to retire by the Chambersburg and Fairfield roads, 
 which leading westward from Gettysburg, pass through the 
 South Mountain range into the Cumberland Yalley at a dis- 
 tance of seven miles from each other. As a severe storm 
 had come on during the afternoon and continued during the 
 night, the roads were rendered very bad ; so that the retreat 
 was made painfully and slowly, and the rear of the column 
 did not leave its position near Gettysburg until after day- 
 light of the 5th, General Meade, as soon as he was satisfied 
 that the enemy had actually withdrawn, took measures to fol- 
 low up the retreat. 
 
 When it became possible to take account of the losses of 
 this great battle, it was found that on the Union side they 
 incladed two thousand eight hundred and thirty-foiir killed, 
 thirteen thousand seven hundred and thirty-three wounded, 
 and six thousand six hundred and forty-three missing, mak- 
 ing an aggregate of twenty-three thousand one hundred and 
 ninety.* On the side of the Confederates, they were sup- 
 posed to be near thirty thousand, whereof nearly fourteen 
 thousand were prisoners.! 
 
 * Official Records of the War Department. 
 
 f This is simply an approximate estimate, as no report of tlie Confederate 
 casualties was ever made public. " It is not," says General Lee, " in my 
 power to give a correct statement of our casualties, which were severe." Lee : 
 Report of Gettysburg. The number of prisoners captured by the Anny of the 
 Potomac, aa by official returns, was thirteen thousand six hundred and twenty 
 one. (Meade : Report of Gettysburg). 1 believe that the above estimate of 
 thirty thousand for Lee's total loss will not prove to be in excess of the truth. 
 Lee's infantry present for duty on the Slat May was <58,353 ; and on July 
 31st it was 41,135— the diflFerence being 27,217. 
 
366 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 IX. 
 
 THE CONFEDERATE RETREAT. 
 
 Tlie retreat of Lee, wliicli became definitively known on 
 the morning of Sunday, July 5, brought with it the important 
 question of pursuit. 
 
 Now, there were two lines by which the Confederates might 
 be followed up : the one was a direct pursuit by the same 
 routes over which they had retreated, pressing them down the 
 Cumberland Valley ; the other, a flank march by the east side 
 of the South Mountains, defiling by the Boonsboro' passes, 
 with the view to head off the enemy or take him in flank. 
 The former had the recommendation of being the shorter line 
 — the distance to the Potomac (at Williamsport) being in this 
 case about forty miles ; and by the latter Hne, nearly eighty. 
 The only disadvantage attending it arose fi'om the fact that 
 the enemy might hold the debouches of the mountains with a 
 rear-guard, while making good his escape with his main body 
 and trains. General Meade appears to have been in some 
 doubt as to the proper method of action ; but on the morning 
 of the 5th, he sent a column in dii'ect pursuit. He ordered 
 Sedgwick's Sixth Corps (then the freshest in the army) to fol- 
 low up the enemy on the Fairfield road, while he dispatched 
 a cavah-y force to press the retreating Confederates on the 
 Chambersburg road. Sedgwick that evening overtook the 
 rear of the Confederate column at a distance of ten miles, 
 where the Fairfield road breaks through a pass in the South 
 Mountain range. This position was found to be very de- 
 fensible ; but there was no occasion to attack it, for another 
 course had, meanwhile, been determined on, and Sedgwick 
 was recalled. 
 
 Instead of pursuing the enemy by the direct route over 
 which he had retreated, General Meade judged it better to 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN, 367 
 
 make a flank march by Midtlletown and the lower passes of 
 the South Mountain. To this end, General French, who with 
 seven thousand men had since the evacuation of Harper's 
 Ferry been occupying Frederick, was directed to seize these 
 passes in advance and repossess himself of Harper's Ferry. 
 Both these duties were fulfilled by General French, who also 
 sent out a cavahy force that penetrated as far as Williamsport, 
 and destroyed there a Confederate ponton-bridge across the 
 Potomac. Then the army was put in motion by the east side 
 of the South Mountains. On July 6th a large part of the 
 army moved from Gettysburg towards Emmettsburg, and the 
 remainder the following day. July 7th, the headquarters were 
 at Frederick. The 8tli, they were at Middletown, and nearly 
 all the army was concentrated in the neighborhood of that 
 place and South Mountain. The 9th, headquarters were at 
 South Mountain House, and the advance of the army at 
 Boonsboro' and Eohrersville. The 10th, headquarters w^ere 
 moved to Antietam Creek : the left of the line crossed the 
 creek, and the right of the line moved up near Funkstown. 
 Tlie 11th, the engineers put a new bridge over the Antietam 
 Creek ; the left of the line advanced to Fairplay and Jones' 
 cross-roads, while the right remained nearly stationary. The 
 13th, Meade had his forces in fi-ont of the position taken up 
 by Lee to cover the passage of the Potomac. 
 
 The above data will suffice to show that the pursuit was 
 conducted with an excessive circumspection; and Lee, hav- 
 ing reached the river six days before, had had time to select 
 and fortify a strong position. Indeed, the Confederate army 
 might have effected an vmmolested escape into Virginia, had 
 it not been for the fact that the great rains had so sw^oUen 
 the Potomac as to make it impassable by the ford at Wil- 
 liamsport,* and that the ponton-bridge at Falling Waters had 
 "been destroyed by General French. This perilous circum- 
 
 * " The Potomac was found to be so much swollen by the rains that had 
 fallen almost incessantly since our entrance into Maryland, as to be unfordable." 
 - -Lee : Report of Campaign in Pennsylvania. 
 
368 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AEMT OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 stance compelled Lee to take up a defensive position "where 
 he might stand at bay, while his communications were being 
 re-estabhshed. 
 
 As the event proved, it would probably have been a better 
 course to have pushed the pursuit by the direct line, as ap- 
 pears to hav^ been at first intended when Sedgwick, on the 
 5th, was thrown forward on the Fairfield road. The obstruc- 
 tions which Lee could have placed in the defiles of the South 
 Mountains cannot be considered- as presenting any serious 
 difficulty; for General Smith with a division of militia had 
 moved forward from the Susquehanna, on the 3d, into the 
 Cumberland Valley, and on the 5th he seized and held a pass 
 in the South Mountains, a few miles above that through 
 which the Confederate force passed. By this the whole army 
 might readily have defiled through the South Mountains to fall 
 on Lee's flank and rear.* If nothing had been accomplished 
 by this means, the retreat of Lee would still have been fol- 
 lowed so closely, that coming to the Potomac, and having an 
 impassable river in his rear, his situation would have been 
 one of the very gravest peril. 
 
 It cannot be said that General Meade was not alive to the 
 importance of striking Lee a blow before he should be able 
 to make good his retreat. But he was tardy in realizing the 
 severity of the damage he had inflicted on his opponent, and 
 the distance the army was compelled to march by the line 
 adopted (double that by the Cumberland Yalley), together 
 with the slowness of the march (in part necessitated by the 
 bad condition of the roads owing to the severe storm), re- 
 sulted in Lee's being able to take up a position on the 
 Potomac ; and having reached this point three days before 
 
 * " On Saturday (5th), I held the most northern pass, through which, by 
 rapid marching, Meade might have cut off the enemy's rear-guard in the other 
 passes, if they had tried to hold them. Moreover, on July the 6th {the day 
 Meade moved), I held the broad turnpike pass to Chambersburg, through 
 which he might have marched his entire army in two days, if all the othel 
 passes had been held." — Private letter from General W. F. Smith. 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 369 
 
 the Union army got up, lie had time to put it in a strong con- 
 dition of defence. 
 
 Tliis coign of vantage was on the ridge of Marsh Creek, 
 and formed a powerful kind of tete-de-ponf , covering the pas- 
 sage of the Potomac at Williamsport. If it was designed to 
 attack this position, it should have been done the moment 
 the army arrived before it, on the 12th, But the day and 
 the morrow passed in timid councils. On the 13th, at a formal 
 consultation of the corps-commanders, the majority of the 
 general-officers voted against an attack, as it was thought the 
 position was too formidable by nature and art to afford any 
 prospect of a successful assault. Nevertheless, on the night 
 of the 13tli, General Meade determined to next morning take 
 the offensive. But when, on the morning of the 14th, the 
 troops moved forward, it was discovered that the Confederate 
 army had passed the Potomac. The Confederate engineers 
 had succeeded in improvising a ponton-bridge, and by the 
 aid of this and the ford at Williauisport* (the Potomac hav- 
 ing, meanwhile, fallen sufficiently to admit of passage), Lee 
 withdrew the remnant of his force with great skill and com- 
 plete success. 
 
 It will probably always remain one of those questions 
 about which men will differ — whether General Meade should 
 have attacked or refrained from attacking Lee at Williams- 
 port. The adverse opinion of the corps-commanders Avill 
 probably not be allowed to count for much, seeing it has 
 passed into a notorious maxim that " councils of war never 
 fight." And it may fairly be said that as General Meade de- 
 termined to attack on the 14th, against the opinion of his 
 
 * " Part of the ponton-bridge was recovered, and new boats built, so that, 
 by the 13th, a good bridge was thrown over the river at Falling Waters. Our 
 preparations being completed, and the river, though still deep, being prouounc«id 
 fordable, the army commenced to withdraw to the south side on the night of 
 the l.Sth. Ewell's corps forded the river at Williamsport, those of Longstreet 
 and Hill crossed upon the bridge." — Lee : Report of the Invasion of Pennsyl- 
 vania. 
 
 24 
 
370 CAJklPAIGNS OF THE AEMT OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 lieutenants, it would have been well had he done so on the 
 12th, without consulting their oj^inion. No new element was, 
 in the interval, introduced into the problem, exceptmg that 
 the strengthening of the position by the enemy rendered at- 
 tack on the 14th much more difficult than it was on the 12th, 
 and the delay would, therefore, appear to have resulted from 
 hesitation and indecision in the mind of the commander, 
 which imder the circumstances must be accounted an error. 
 
 The problem, whether Lee should have been attacked in 
 the position he had taken up, is one of a tactical nature, re- 
 qumng for its solution special and professional knowledge. 
 It is, therefore, one of those questions regarding which public 
 opinion is necessarily worthless. On the other hand, the 
 emphasis with which the corps-commanders pronounced 
 against assault, should carry with it great weight ; and my 
 own investigations lead strongly to the conclusion that Meade 
 was right, in the relative situations of the opposing forces, in 
 not attacking. 
 
 But the question whether or not General Meade should 
 have attacked at Williamsport, is really not the proper point 
 at issue. It is one of a larger scope, and turns on the 
 whole history of Lee's retreat and Meade's pursuit. The 
 principles already laid down as those that should guide 
 criticism on McClellan's conduct after Antietam, aj^ply with 
 equal and even greater force to Meade's conduct after 
 Gettysburg. That an army that had moved so far from 
 its base, as that of Lee ; that had crossed the frontier ; 
 that had been defeated in a great battle of three days du- 
 ration, in which it suffered immense loss ; that then sought 
 safety in flight only to find itself barred at the frontier by 
 the rise of the Potomac (as though Providence fought with 
 the Union army), should have been either destroyed or hope- 
 lessly crippled, appears indisputable. The Army of the Po- 
 tomac, though it also had suffered severe loss, was in the 
 highest state of morale, and was eager to give its opponent 
 the covp de grace. It was powerful in numbers, and had been 
 btrengthened by the addition of eleven thousand men under 
 
THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 371 
 
 General Freiicli, by a militia division under General Smith, 
 and by considerable ro-enforcements forwarded from Wash- 
 ington and Baltimore by the Government, whose officers, 
 raised for a moment above that paltry policy that commonly 
 controlled their military views, were eager to put into the 
 hands of General Meade every thing needed to assure the 
 devoutly desired consummation of the destruction of Lee, who 
 could not bring into battle array above forty thousand men of 
 all arms. It will be hard ever to persuade the mass of men 
 that this was not within the compass of a vigorous stroke.* 
 
 Descending, now, to the question of details : as I have pro- 
 nounced both in favor of the most vigorous aggressive action 
 of General Meade, and against an attack in the position in 
 which he found himself at Wilhamsport, I must reconcile this 
 seeming discrepancy, by saying that Lee's position on the 
 ridge of Marsh Creek might have been turned. By throwing 
 his right forward to the Conecocheaque, Meade would have 
 removed his army from the difficult region of woods and hills 
 in which it found itself, and in which all the advantages of 
 position were greatly in favor of the Confederates ; and he 
 would have placed it in a country where he would have had 
 the commanding heights down to the river. He would then 
 have overlapped the Confederate left, which was thrown out 
 in the air. To guard against any menace of Lee towards 
 Washington, the South Mountain passes might have been held 
 by the cavalry. In this position Meade would have attacked 
 with as many advantages in his favor, as there were in the 
 other disadvantages against him. But even had the army 
 attacked and been repulsed, General Meade would have been 
 forgiven ; for in war it is often better to have fought and lost, 
 than never to have fought at all. It will always remain a strik- 
 ing instance of the controlling influence exercised in this war 
 by defensive positions, that the two decisive points of this great 
 campaign were mainly determined by the simple incident of 
 
 * " The fruit seemed so ripe, so ready for plucking," said President Lincoln 
 to General Meade, soon after, " that it was very hard to lose it " 
 
372 CAISIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 securing the defensive. It was in large part the mere holding 
 the position at Gettysburg — the strategic key to the region 
 south of the Susquehanna — that gained for the Union army 
 the battle and the campaign; but when Lee, after terrible 
 losses, found himself compelled to abandon the invasion, and 
 seek safety in retreat, it was by taking up a strong vantage 
 ground on the ridge of Marsh Creek that he was able, in a 
 most difficult situation, to show so imposing a front of oj)po- 
 sition as to secure for his army safe exit from Maryland into 
 Virginia. 
 
 Thus was baulked and brought to naught the scheme of 
 Confederate invasion, an invasion undertaken by an army 
 powerful in numbers and in the prestige of victory, and aim- 
 ing at the boldest quarry — the conquest of peace on the soil 
 of the loyal States. That it was a mistake, is not difficult to 
 recognize in the light of the result ; but, as I have already 
 pointed out, it was an error in its inception, for it was an en- 
 terprise that overstepped the Hmits of that fitting theory of 
 military policy that generally governed the Confederate war- 
 councils, and committed Lee to all the perils and losses of an 
 invasion, without any adequate recompense, and even without 
 any well- determined military object. 
 
 The expulsion of the invaders freed the North from a great 
 dread ; and though there were those that were dissatisfied at 
 the incomplete termination of the campaign, the country was 
 not loth to recognize that there had been wrought out for it 
 a great dehverance by the valor of the Army of the Potomac. 
 For once, that sorely tried, long-suflfering army had the freely- 
 given boon of a nation's gratitude. 
 
 Note. — I am indebted to Colonel J. B. Batchelder, author of the well-known 
 and beautifully accurate isometrical drawing of the battlefield of Gettysburg, 
 for a careful revision of the tactical details of the action at Gettysbtirg, and for 
 many explanations given on the ground. 
 
A CAMPAIGN OF MANGEUVRES. 373 
 
 X. 
 
 A CAMPAI&N OF MANCEUVRES. 
 
 July, 1863— March, 1804. 
 
 I. 
 THE MARCH TO THE RAPIDAN. 
 
 The safe retreat of Lee from Maryland into Virginia im- 
 posed upon General Meade the necessity of an immediate 
 pursuit. This he undertook with a promptitude that was 
 very creditable, considering the trying campaign that had just 
 closed. 
 
 On recrossing the Potomac, Lee fell back into the Shenan- 
 doah Valley, placing his force on the line of Opequan Creek — 
 the same position he had held during the autumn after his 
 retreat from Antietam. 
 
 Meade's plan of advance into Virginia was confessedly 
 modelled on that of McClellan in November, 1862 ; and it was 
 probably the best that could have been adopted. As a prob- 
 lem in that branch of the art of war which is named logistics, 
 or the supplying of armies, it was not considered practicable 
 to subsist a force of the magnitude of the Aj-my of the Poto- 
 mac by the means available in a direct advance up the She- 
 nandoah Valley. It remained, therefore, to march by the 
 route of the Loudon Valley ; and by hugging the Blue Kidge 
 closely, Meade hoped, by vigorous action, to bring the Con- 
 
374 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 federate force to battle under advantageous conditions before 
 it should break through the mountains.* 
 
 The army crossed the Potomac on ponton-bridges at Ham- 
 per's Ferry and Berlin on the 17th and 18th July, and followed 
 southAvard, skirting the Blue Ridge ; while Lee, conforming to 
 this manoeuvre, fell back up the Shenandoah Valley. The 
 movement of Meade was made with much vigor — indeed with 
 so much vigor that, on reaching Union, on the 20th of June, 
 he was compelled to halt a day, lest iDy further advance he 
 should dangerously uncover his right ; but even with this 
 delay, the army, on reaching Manassas Gap on the 22d, was 
 so well up with the enemy, that it gained that point while the 
 long Confederate column was still passing on the other side 
 of the mountains. This, therefore, seemed an excellent open- 
 ing for a flank attack, and it was fuEy appreciated by Meade, 
 who directed five corps on Manassas Gap — the Third Corps, 
 now under command of General French, being in advance. 
 The selection of the leader for an enterprise demanding the 
 most energetic quahties of mind — seeing that it was necessary 
 to force Lee to battle under circumstances in which he would 
 naturally wdsh to avoid it — was very unfortunate ; and by his 
 mismanagement General French succeeded in depriving the 
 army of one of the few really advantageous opportunities it ever 
 had to strike a decisive blow. A slight observing force had 
 been left at the Gap, but this was expelled, and the corps passed 
 through on the evening of the 22d, prepared to advance on 
 Front Boyal in the morning. But, on moving forward to 
 strike the enemy's line of retreat, the corps-commander acted 
 with such feebleness,! as to allow the rear-guard to delay him 
 
 * No demonstration was made in the Valley of the Shenandoah other 
 than that of a body of cavalry under Gregg, which retired after an indecisive 
 engagement with the Confederate cavalry under General Fitz Hugh Lee at 
 Shepherdstown. 
 
 •j- General Warren, in his evidence before the War Committee, states that 
 General French "made a very feeble attack, idth one hiigade only, and wasted 
 the whole day." He adds, that General Meade " was more disappointed in 
 that result than in any thing that had happened." — Report on the Conduct of 
 the War, second series, vol. i., pp. 381, 382. 
 
A CAMPAIGN OF MANOEUVRES. 375 
 
 the whole day, so that it was evening before he penetrated to 
 the Confederate line of battle at Front Eoyal. Next morning, 
 when Meade hoped to give battle, Lee had made good his 
 retreat.* Upon this, as nothing was now to be hoped from 
 the movement on hand, the march was conducted leisurely 
 towards the Rappahannock, and Lee retired to the vicinity o» 
 Culpepper. 
 
 Li this position a considerable period of repose followed ; 
 and this inaction was imposed not more by the necessity of 
 resting and recruiting the army, than because both sides found 
 it necessary to draw detachments from the armies in Virginia 
 for other needs. From the army of Meade a considerable 
 body was taken to send to South Carolina, and a large force 
 withdrawn to dispatch to New York for the purpose of en- 
 forcing the draft, the attempted execution of which, some 
 time before, had given rise to extensive riots in that city. On 
 the other hand, the severe pressure that Eosecrans was bring- 
 ing to bear upon the central army of the Confederacy under 
 General Bragg, in Tennessee, prompted the detachment from 
 Lee's army of the corps of Lougstreet, for the purpose of 
 throwing it into the scale as a make-weight against the Union 
 force. This withdrawal took place early in September, and 
 necessarily reduced the Confederates to a purely defensive 
 attitude in Virginia. Soon afterwards, General Meade be- 
 came aware of Longstreet's departure, and he then sent his 
 cavalry across the Rappahannock, drove the enemy over the 
 Rapidan, and subsequently followed with his whole force, 
 occupying Culpepper and the regions between the Rappa- 
 hannock and the Rapidan, the latter river now becoming the 
 
 * " As the FederalB continued to advance along the eastern slope of the moun- 
 tains, apparently with the purpose of cutting us off from the railroad, Long- 
 street was ordered on the 19th of July to proceed to Culpepper Courthouse by 
 way of Front Royal. He succeeded in passing part of his command over the 
 Shenandoah in time to prevent the occupation of Manassas and Chester Gaps 
 by the enemy. As soon as a ponton-bridge could be laid down, the rest of his 
 corps crossed and marched through Chester Gap to Culpepper, where they ar 
 rived on the 24th. He was followed by Hill's corps. Ewell reached Front Roya] 
 the 23d, and encamped near Madison Courtliouse the 29th." — Lee : Report. 
 
376 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC 
 
 dividing line between the opposing armies. As the position 
 held by Lee on the south bank of the Rapidan was a very 
 advantageous one, Meade's projects of advance turned to- 
 wards a flanking movement ; but just at the time he had 
 matured a plan of operations, he was informed from Wash 
 ington that it was found necessary to still farther weaken the 
 Army of the Potomac by the withdrawal of two corps to for- 
 ward to Tennessee, in which section of the theatre of war the 
 military situation had been seriously compromised by Eose- 
 crans' defeat at Chickamauga — a defeat to which the force 
 sent from Virginia under Longstreet had in no small degree 
 contributed. The corps taken were the Eleventh and Twelfth, 
 and they were put under the command of General Hooker. 
 This, in turn, reduced Meade to a strict defensive ; for though 
 he received some accessions to his numbers from the draft, 
 yet these added little to his real strength, the conscripts being 
 raw and unrehable, and large numbers deserted at the first op- 
 portunity. It was evident, therefore, that he could undertake 
 no considerable operation imtil the return of the troops sent to 
 New York. But when, towards the middle of October, these 
 finally came back, and General Meade was about to initiate 
 an offensive movement, he found himself suddenly thrown 
 once more on the defensive by the bold initiative of Lee, in 
 an operation the events of which I shall now relate. 
 
 II. 
 
 THE FLANK MARCH ON CENTREVILLE. 
 
 Made aware of the heavy deduction of force from the Army 
 of the Potomac, but exaggerating probably its extent, Lee 
 early in October determined on an offensive movement that 
 should have the effect of driving Meade back from the 
 line of the Rapidan. With this object he resolved to move 
 around his opponent's right flank, and endeavor to interpose 
 
A CAMPAIGN OF MANOEUVRES. 377 
 
 between him and Washington.* He counted that if he 
 should be able in this situation to seriously cripple Meade, it 
 would exhaust the season of active operations and detain the 
 Army of the Potomac on the frontier for the winter, during 
 which time it would be possible for Lee to still fiu'ther re-en- 
 force from his own command the heavily pressed Confederate 
 Army of the West. 
 
 In execution of this plan, Lee crossed the Eapidan on 
 Friday, October 9th, and taldng "circuitous and concealed 
 roads," t passed by way of Madison Courthouse quite to 
 Meade's right. Stuart, with Hampton's cavah-y division, 
 moved on the right of the column, while Fitz Hugh Lee's 
 cavalry division, with a detachment of infantry, was left to 
 hold the lines south of the Rapidan and mask the turning 
 movement. 
 
 The first positive intimation which General Meade had 
 of Lee's intention was an attack made upon his advance 
 posts on the right at James City, held by a portion of Kil- 
 patrick's cavaby division and some infantry of the Thu'd 
 Corps. This force was driven in by Stuart on the 10th, and 
 fell back on Culpepper ; and it being then clear to Meade that 
 his right was abeady turned, he that night sent back his 
 trains, and at two o'clock on the morning of the 11th, began 
 a retrograde movement across the Bappahannock. The 
 march was accomplished during that day, and by afternoon the 
 army was across the river. 
 
 Lee with his main body neared Culpe})per on the 11th 
 to find that the whole army had moved behind the Rappa- 
 hannock some hours before. He then halted his array dur- 
 ing the rest of the 11th, while Stuart pressed the rear of 
 
 * I learn from General Longstreet that Lee at this time frequently spoke of 
 an operation that should " swap Queens ;" that is, he thought of marching 
 direct upon and capturing Washington, giving up the attempt to cover Rich- 
 mond. But Mr. Davis would never consent to this war a I'outrance ; and, 
 l)eside8, the Army of Northern Virginia was at this time too much reduced 
 from its late losses to authorize so audacious an enterprise. 
 
 \ Lee : Report of Fall Operations in Virginia. 
 
378 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Meade's column, which was covered by the cavahy under 
 Pleasonfcon. 
 
 Buford's division of troopers had crossed the Rapidan at 
 Germanna Ford on the night of the 10th, after the Confeder- 
 ates had begun their movement, but was met on the morning 
 of the 11th by Fitz Hugh Lee's horsemen ; whereupon Buford, 
 falHng back over the Ilaj)idan, united at Brandy Station with 
 Pleasonton's main body of cavahry, and then followed the 
 army across the Kappahannock. 
 
 On the following morning, Monday, October 12th, Gen. Lee 
 advanced his columns ; but finding that Meade had been too 
 quick for him, and that his first turning movement had failed, 
 owing to the rapid retreat of his opponent, he determined, in- 
 stead of following up Meade by the direct hne of his retreat, 
 to make a new flank movement by routes to the west, " with 
 the design," as he says in his report, " of reaching the Orange 
 and Alexandria railroad north of the Rappahannock, and in- 
 terrupting the retreat of the enemy." This operation had 
 very near been successful, owing to the uncertainty of General 
 Meade as to his antagonist's real purpose, and the false 
 movements resulting therefrom. 
 
 Having jjut the Rappahannock between himself and Lee, 
 Meade conceived that his retreat might have been premature, 
 especially as he was informed on the morning of the 12th that 
 Lee was near Culpepper C.H, and it was uncertain whether he 
 intended to do more. Accordingly, that afternoon the main 
 body of the army, consisting of the Second, Fifth, and Sixth 
 corps, with Buford's cavalry division, was countermarched to 
 the south bank of the Rappahannock to proceed back towards 
 Culpepper. General Meade designed to give battle if Lee was 
 reaUy there. But, as has been seen, the latter had that morn- 
 ing again advanced to plant himself by a circuitous turning 
 movement on Meade's line of retreat towards "Washington. 
 Thus was presented the curious contretemps, that while on the 
 12th the main body of the army was marching southward to 
 meet Lee at Culpepper, Lee was moving rapidly northward 
 on parallel roads to lay hold of Meade's communications! 
 
A CAMPxVIGX OF MAN(EUVRES. 379 
 
 But of this mistake, which if prolonged much longer might 
 have proved fatal to Meade, he had that afternoon convincing 
 proof in an event which fell out in this wise. 
 
 While the three corps named had been sent on the counter- 
 march towards Culpepper, the Third Corps under General 
 French had been left to guard the hne of the Kappahannock, 
 and took position at Freeman's Ford, while the cavalry 
 division of General Gregg watched the passage of the Upper 
 Rappahannock at Sulphur or Warrenton Sj^rings. Now Lee, 
 continuing his northward march, on the afternoon of the 12th 
 struck Sulphur Springs, and there crossed his columns to the 
 north bank of the Rappahannock ; so that Gregg found him- 
 self assailed by the van of the enemy advancing towards War- 
 renton, and was driven off after having been somesvhat se- 
 verely handled. Of course, on receiving this inteUigence from 
 Gregg, the real nature of Lee's movement was instantly dis- 
 closed to Meade, who sent an immediate order recalling the 
 three corps from their untimely move on Culpepper. This 
 order found these corps in bivouac on the road to Culpepper, 
 and reached them towards midnight of Monday, when they at 
 once began a rapid retrograde movement to the north of the 
 Rappahannock. 
 
 It is easy to see that from this misunderstanding not only 
 was the general retrograde movement to meet the Confederate 
 advance seriously compromised, but the Third Corps, remaining 
 alone on the north bank of the Rappahannock, was thrown 
 quite out of position and exposed to destruction by an over- 
 whelming force. But Lee, unaware of the true state of 
 affairs, did not turn aside to molest that isolated force, but 
 continued his northward movement, and by a night march of 
 the three corps, the different corps of the Army of the Potomac 
 were, on the morning of Tuesday the 13th, again concentrated 
 on the north bank of the Rappahannock. 
 
 As on the morning of the 13th the opposing forces were 
 both on the north side of the Rappahannock, there ensued 
 between the two armies a close race — Lee aiming, by a flank 
 march, to strike in on Meade's line of retreat by the Orange 
 
380 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC 
 
 and Alexandria Eailroad, and Meade determined to check- 
 mate him by a rapid retrograde movement. The latter, during 
 that day, fell back along the line of the railroad, and Lee, 
 continuing his advance fi-om Sulphur Springs by parallel 
 routes to the west, struck "Warrenton in the afternoon. Here 
 he halted during the rest of that day to supply the troops with 
 jarovisions.* 
 
 Lee's plan now was to advance from Warrenton in two col- 
 umns — the left column (the corps of Hill) to move northward 
 by the Warrenton turnpike to New Baltimore, and then strike 
 due eastward to lay hold of the railroad at Bristoe Station ; 
 the right column (the corps of Ewell) to advance by roads to 
 the east of the route of Hill, passing by Auburn and Green- 
 wich, and uniting with Hill at Bristoe Station. 
 
 This project was j)ut in execution on the morning of the 
 14th ; but whether Lee would be able to make good his in- 
 tent of reaching Bristoe before his antagonist, would, of 
 course, depend on the activity of the latter. Meade, with the 
 uncertainty of what Lee was about, had the interior line ; Lee, 
 with a definite purpose and clear line of conduct, had the 
 exterior and longer route to pursue. Anticipating the sequel 
 so far as to say that Meade beat Lee in the race, passing 
 Bristoe with nearly his whole force before Hill and* Ewell 
 were able to strike his line of retreat at that point, it remains 
 to describe some interesting compKcations that arose out of 
 the proximity in which the two armies were manoeuvring. 
 
 In the retrograde movement of the Union army, on the 
 13th, it was appointed that the Second Corps under General 
 Warren should, after halting at Fayetteville until the Third 
 Corps under General French was withdrawn, cover the rear 
 of the army ; and its route was directed to be by way of Au- 
 burn to Catlett's Station, and thence northward along the line 
 of the Orange and Alexandria Kaiboad. In this duty, Kil- 
 patrick's division of cavalry was to co-operate. 
 
 Now, on the evening of the 13th, when Lee reached War- 
 
 * Lee's Report. 
 
A CAMPAIGN OF MANOEUVRES. 381 
 
 renton, Warren readied Auburn, distant only five miles to the 
 east, and there he bivouacked with his corps on the south 
 side of Cedar Run. To cover his rear from attack from tlie 
 direction of Warrenton, where Lee was that night (unknown 
 to, but not unsuspected by Warren), Caldwell's division with 
 three batteries* was placed on the heights of Cedar Run, 
 Before daw^n of the 14th, while the head of Warren's column 
 was under way crossing Cedar Run, Caldwell's troops lit 
 camp fires on the hill-top to cook breakfast ; and in this duty 
 they were engaged when most unexpectedly a battery opened 
 upon them from their rear and directly on the road prescribed 
 for the movement of Warren's column towards Catlett's Sta- 
 tion.f This attack, sufficiently bewildering to those upon 
 whom it fell, will readily be understood in the light of the 
 following rather amusing incident. 
 
 Stuart with the Confederate cavalry had the day previous 
 met the head of French's column, and, being forced back, re- 
 tired towards Catlett's Station. But on Sykes' corps moving 
 up the raih'oad, Stuart found himself enclosed between the 
 two main Union columns, and bivouacked within two miles of 
 General Meade's headquarters and not more than four hun- 
 dred yards from where Caldwell's division was encamped, 
 sending messengers through the Union lines to notify his 
 friends of his situation. When Caldwell's men lit their fires, 
 Stuart opened on them. Unseen himself in the valley, veiled 
 by mist and the gray morning light, he had yet a plain vieAV 
 of the Union force on the illuminated hill-tops, and for a few 
 minutes, till the troops could be moved to the opposite side of 
 the hill under cover, the fire from the Confederate battery told 
 with fatal effect. | Having thus paid his compliments, the 
 dashing sabreur escaped by moving to the rear around the 
 Union rear-guard. 
 
 But no sooner had Caldwell moved to cover on the opposite 
 
 * The batteries of Captains Ricketts, Arnold, and Ames, 
 f Warren's Report. 
 
 X A remarkable example of this destructive effect was furnished by one of 
 the sheUs which killed seven men. 
 
382 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARUIT OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 side of tlie liill than his command was opened on from that 
 side also, the fire coming from the direction of the Warrenton 
 road. The source of this new attack -will be readily under- 
 stood from the already mentioned intentions of Lee ; for it 
 has been seen that from Warrenton Ewell's column was to 
 proceed by way of Auburn on Greenwich, and having moved 
 very early in the morning, it was his advance that struck 
 Warren's force.* The moment was now a critical one for 
 Warren, for his advance division under General Hays, which 
 had crossed to the north side of Cedar Run, found itself 
 opposed by a hostile force at the same time that Caldwell's 
 division, on the south side, was fired upon, and the corps 
 appeared to be surrounded and its retreat cut off.f But the 
 actual condition of things was not as bad as appeared. Little 
 more than the mere van of Ewell's column, and that mainly 
 cavalry, had yet come up : the crossing of Cedar Run was 
 not interrupted ; Hays, who was on the north side, having 
 thrown out a couple of regiments, repulsed the enemy, and 
 cleared the route over which the corps was to advance ;:|: and 
 finally, when the head of Ewell's main column came up, it 
 was held in check by skilful deployments of cavalry and in- 
 fantry and the practice of the batteries, till the rest of War- 
 
 * Lee : Report of Summer Operations of 1863 ; Warren : Report of Opera- 
 tions. 
 
 f " Attacked thus on every side, with my command separated by a con- 
 siderable stream, encumbered with a wagon-train, in the vicinity of the whole 
 force of the enemy, and whom the sound of actual conflict had already assured 
 of my position, to halt was to await annihilation, and to move as ]irescribed 
 carried me along routes in a valley commanded by the heights on each side." 
 Warren : Report of Operations. 
 
 X These regiments were the One Hundred and Twenty-sixth New York, 
 under Lieutenant-Colonel Bull, supported by the Twelfth New Jersey Volun- 
 teers ; and General Hays, in his oflacial report, gives the following account of 
 this spirited affair : " I moved forward the entire regiment of the One Hundred 
 and Twenty-sixth New York, supported by the Twelfth New Jersey. In a 
 short time our force came in contact with the rebels. It was short, but very 
 decisive. The rebel cavalry, led by Colonel Thomas RufBn, charged furiously 
 upon the deployed One Hundred and Twenty-sixth, and were most gallantly 
 repulsed with the loss of their leader, who was mortally wounded." 
 
A CAMPAIGN OF MAN(Em'RES. 383 
 
 ren's force liad crossed Cedar Eiin, when he continued 
 his prescribed march — Caldwell's division covering the re- 
 treat, and closely skirmishing with the enemy.* Ewell did 
 not follow up directly on the rear of Warren's column, for his 
 prescribed course took him to the left to move by Greenwich 
 and join Hill.t 
 
 Meantime, the whole army was pressing on along the rail- 
 road towards Centreville, the point of concentration, where 
 General Meade had resolved to halt and give battle. Warren, 
 as has been seen, brought up the rear. 
 
 As Lee's purpose was to strike Bristoe Station before 
 Meade should have passed that point, he pressed the advance 
 of Hill and Ewell. Wlien Hill, however, after moving east- 
 ward from New Baltimore, in the afternoon approached 
 Bristoe, the whole army, with the exception of Warren's 
 corps, had got beyond that point, and as the head of his 
 column came up, the Fifth Corps, under General Sykes, had 
 just crossed Broad Kun. On seeing this, Hill threw out a 
 line of battle to attack the rear of that corps, when suddenly 
 he found his attention called off by the apparition at that 
 moment of Warren, who, after engaging Ewell at Auburn 
 in the manner indicated, had advanced rapidlj' along the 
 railroad, and reached Bristoe Station only to encounter HiU. 
 
 Warren's position was again a critical one ; for, instead of 
 finding Bristoe Station held by the Fifth Corps, as had been 
 
 * The escape was so narrow, that, as reported by Colonel Brooke (who com- 
 manded the rear brigade of Caldwell's division, and to whose skilful manoeuv- 
 ring the successful withdrawal was in no small degree due), "the enemy suc- 
 ceeded in throwing a column of infantry across the road, and cutting off the 
 Fifty-seventh New York Volunteers. Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman, command- 
 ing the regiment, proved himself equal to the emergency, and by promptly 
 •noving to the right by a slight detour, succeeded in rejoining the column wth 
 rat slight loss. I held the enemy at bay on my left and front by fighting him 
 sharply with my flankers and skirmishers, and finally drove him by my firo 
 into the woods on my left." 
 
 f According to General Lee's report, Ewell " drove back the rear-guard oi 
 che enemy, and rapidly pursued it." Bat the extent of the pursuit has been 
 recorded above. 
 
354: CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 indicated to him in General Meade's orders, he discovered 
 that he was there alone, in the immediate vicinity of the 
 whole army of Lee, and found himself suddenly assailed while 
 marching by the flank. But Warren was equal to the occa- 
 sion, and by a remarkable vigor of action not only extricated 
 his command from a perilous situation, but inflicted a severe 
 blow to the Confederates. This action, known as the battle 
 of Bristoe, I shall briefly detail. 
 
 As the head of the column of the Second Corps approached. 
 Hill threw forward a line of battle towards the raih-oad ; but 
 Warren knew the locahty with the critical knowledge of an 
 engineer, and forming Webb's division on the right along the 
 embankment near Broad Eun, he ordered Hays' division to 
 run for the railroad cut, invisible from the position of both 
 opposing generals. This it quickly did, and the point was 
 reached just in time to meet HiU's advancing line of battle, 
 which, receiving a severe fire from the troops covered by the 
 cut and embankment, and raked by the fire of Bicketts' bat- 
 tery, fell back with heavy loss. Warren immediately ad- 
 vanced a thin line in pursuit, and secured four hundred and 
 fifty prisoners, two standards, and five pieces of artillery. 
 The attack fell mainly on the First and Third brigades of 
 General Webb's division — the former commanded by Colonel 
 Heath, and the latter by General Mallon, an accomplished 
 and patriotic ofiicer who was killed in the action — and on the 
 Third Brigade of General Hays' division, commanded by Gen- 
 eral Owen. The division of General Caldwell, which had 
 formed the rear-guard, came up for a mile or two on the run, 
 and took position on the left of Hays ; but the action had 
 already been decided. Warren's loss was comparatively 
 slight. 
 
 Effectual as was the check which Warren had given Hill, 
 the position of the former was not one in which he could re- 
 main, while, at the same time, it was difficult to withdraw. 
 And now his situation became more dangerous ; for just as 
 towards sunset the combat closed, EweU's corps, which had 
 
A CAMPAIGN OF MANffiU'^TlES. 385 
 
 pursued bj-roads between tlie columns of Warren and Hill, 
 came up, and this brought the entire force of Lee in front of 
 the Second Corps. Nevertheless, before Lee could make dis- 
 l)ositions for attack, night came on, and, under its friendly 
 cover, Warren retired, and next morning joined the main body 
 of the army massed at Centreville.* 
 
 Meade was now strongly posted on the heights of Centre- 
 viUe, and if compelled to fall back from there, would do so 
 into the fortifications of Washington. As no additional turn- 
 ing movement could be of any avail, Lee pushed his advance 
 no further. His intention had been to gain Meade's rear, and 
 as this was now completely foiled, he was not minded to essay 
 assault on the army in position. Resolving, however, not to 
 have made an utterly useless campaign, he threw forward a 
 thin line as far as Bull Eun, and thus masking his design, he 
 proceeded to destroy the Orange and Alexandria Railroad 
 from that point southward to Warrenton Junction. Having 
 effectually accomphshed that ob]ect,t he, on the 18th, began a 
 retrograde movement. 
 
 Meade commenced pursuit on the following day,+ but with- 
 out overtaking Lee ; and in this movement there occurred no 
 rencounter of a more serious character than the wonted inde- 
 cisive cavalry combats. Stuart, with his two divisions of 
 horse, covered the retrograde movement, and during the en- 
 tire march was constantly engaged in skirmishes with the 
 Union cavalry. One of these affairs was of some import- 
 ance. While on the advance towards Warrenton, on the 
 19th, Kilpatrick's division skirmished warmly with Hamp- 
 
 * General Lee states that Hill's attack was made by two brigades, and ex- 
 tenuates the result by stating that the assault was " against greatly superior 
 numbers." But Hill's own Report shows that he had two divismis on the field. 
 Warren met their attack with little over three thousand men. 
 
 f Lee's Report. 
 
 f This delay in following up was owing to the fact that since the army had 
 crossed to the north side, that stream had become much swollen by heavy 
 rains ; and previous to that, not anticipating that the ponton-bridges would be 
 needed, they had been sent with the other trains some eight or ten miles to the 
 rear. 
 
 25 
 
1-^86 C.UIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTO:\IAC. 
 
 ton's division up to Buckland Mills, at the crossing of Broad 
 Eun, on the south bank of which Hampton took post, lender 
 the personal dii'ection of Stuart, who here planned a skilful 
 manoeu-\Te to defeat his opponent. Kilpatrick having forced 
 the crossing by turning the flank of Hampton, Stuart fell 
 back slowly towards Warrenton with the view of permitting 
 Fitz Lee's cavalry division to come up from Aiiburn and 
 attack the Union cavalry in flank and rear. This plan was 
 carried out with some success. Fitz Lee arriving just below 
 Buckland surprised Kilpatrick's force on the flank, and Stuart, 
 hearing Fitz Lee's guns, pressed vigorously in front with 
 Hampton's division. A stubborn resistance was offered, but 
 a charge au fond, finally forced Kilpatrick's command to give 
 way, and he retreated in some confusion.* Lee retired be- 
 hind the Rappahannock. 
 
 The Army of the Potomac being pushed forward as far as 
 Warrenton, General Meade was compelled to halt there to 
 await the repairing of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. 
 This work, undertaken vdth much energy, was accomplished 
 early in November ; and on the 7th, the whole army continued 
 the advance towards the Rappahannock in two columns. Gen- 
 eral French had command of the left wing, composed of the 
 First, Second, and Third corps, and General Sedgwick had 
 command of the right wing, composed of the Fifth and Sixth 
 corps. The left column was directed to cross the Rappahan- 
 nock at Kelly's Ford, and the right column at Rappahannock 
 Station. Lee held position south of the Rappahannock, in 
 the vicinity of Culpepper, with outposts at Kelly's Ford on the 
 south bank, and at Rappahannock Station on the north bank. 
 The Third Corps under Birney had the advance on Kelly's 
 Ford, and on reaching that point, Birney crossed over a divi- 
 sion by wading, without waiting for the laying of the ponton- 
 bridges, and advancing an attacking party, composed of Ber- 
 
 * Stuart says, " great confusion." " I pursued them from three miles of 
 Warrenton to Buckland, the horses at full speed the whole distance, the enemy 
 retreating in great confusion."— Stuart's Report. But the reports of Custer and 
 Kilpatrick are naturally not so frank as to avow this. 
 
A CAMPAIGN OF MAN(EUVRES. 387 
 
 dan's Sharp-shooters, the Fortieth New York, the First and 
 Twentieth Indiana, the Third and Fifth Michigan, and the 
 One Hundred and Tenth Pennsylvania regiments, can-ied the 
 rifle-pits and captured five hundred prisoners. The enemy 
 was prevented from strengthening the force in the works 
 by the fire of batteries on the heights on the north side, 
 which swept the plain on the southern bank. Birney's loss 
 was trivial. 
 
 While the left column was thus passing at Kelly's Ford, 
 the right wing was forcing a crossing against more formida- 
 ble obstacles. The Confederates occupied a series of works 
 on the north bank of the river at Eappahannock Station, 
 which had been built some time before by the Union troops, 
 and consisted of a fort, two redoubts, and several lines of 
 rifle-trenches. These works were held by two thousand men 
 belonging to Early's division of Ewell's corps. Commanding 
 positions to the rear of the fort having been gained, heavy 
 batteries were planted thereon, and a flerce cannonade opened 
 between the opposing forces. Just before dark, a storming 
 party was formed of Eussell's and Upton's brigades of the 
 Sixth Corps, and the works were carried by a very brilliant 
 coup de main. Over fifteen hundred prisoners, four guns, and 
 eight standards were here taken. Sedgwick's loss was about 
 three hundred in killed and wounded. 
 
 This brilliant opening of the campaign should have insured 
 a decisive operation ; and it is probable that, if a rapid ad- 
 vance had been made either towards Culpepper or to the 
 south of it by Stevensburg, the Confederate army, which lay 
 in winter-quarters in echelon from Kelly's Ford to the west of 
 Culpepper, might have been cut in two. But the army having 
 crossed on the night of the 7th and morning of the 8th, 
 the whole of that day was wasted in useless and uncertain 
 movements,* and Lee, not courting battle, availed himself of 
 the opportunity that night to withdraw again across the 
 
 * On this point, see Birney'a testimony : Eeport on the CJonduct of the War. 
 second series, vol. i., p. 373 ; Warren's testimony : Ibid., p. 38S. 
 
388 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Eapidan. Meade then advanced and took up position be- 
 tween the Rappahannock and the Eapidan, which was nearly 
 the same ground he held before his retreat. 
 
 This campaign may be regarded from two points of view, 
 and from each is susceptible of a different critique. Consid- 
 ered as a movement to meet Lee's advance, it was perfectly 
 successful, and its conduct highly creditable. Lee's line of 
 manoeuvre was, it is true, exterior to that of Meade, and as it 
 was necessary for him to pursue circuitous routes in order to 
 effect his turning movements, this imposed on the former con- 
 siderably greater marching. Yet he had a clear object in view, 
 whereas his antagonist was necessarily delayed by ignorance 
 of his opponent's real design. The very success of Lee's plan 
 depended on being pushed impetuously. Nevertheless, he de- 
 layed at Madison Courthouse, which thwarted the success of 
 his first flank movement ; and he delayed again at Warrenton, 
 which baulked that of his second. But even in "\dew of these 
 halts, which General Lee partly explains on the ground that 
 they were necessary in order to supply the troops, the opera- 
 tions of the 14th were not conducted with much vigor. Ewell 
 allowed himseK to be detained by the rear-guard, at Auburn, 
 fi'om early in the morning till noon ; and from Greenwich he 
 took a blind track across the fields, which he found very difii- 
 cult, and which gave him much delay, thus preventing his 
 junction with Hill at Bristoe until too late. Nor was Hill's 
 march made with much more expedition ; for notwithstanding 
 that his route to Bristoe was but four miles longer than that 
 of Warren, and that the latter was delayed for several hours 
 by his rencounter with Ewell at Auburn, he reached the de- 
 cisive point as soon as Hill. Warren's conduct throughout 
 these operations was excellent, and a model of the execution 
 of the duties of a rear- guard. 
 
 But if, on the other hand, we look upon General Meade's 
 line of duty as calling essentially for offensive action, hia 
 course in this retrograde movement is open to another order 
 of criticism. 
 
A CAMPAIGN OF MANCEUYRES. 389 
 
 It is due to observe that General Meade not only did not 
 wish to avoid battle, but he v/as really anxious to precipitate 
 decisive action, provided, always, he could fight on advanta- 
 geous terms. Yet he appears to have overpassed several 
 excellent openings for a bold initiative. It would have been 
 interesting to see the result of a determination that, overleap- 
 ing a too pedantic view of the nature and uses of lines of 
 communication, would have tried the experiment of holding 
 the army in a favorable position and allowed Lee to continue 
 his turning movements. There is little doubt that if Meade 
 had held fast either at Culpepper or at Warrenton, Lee 
 would not have ventured beyond those points, for his oppo- 
 nent would then have been on Ms communications, to whose 
 endangered safety he would have presently been recalled. 
 Lee's conduct throughout shows how diffident he was in re- 
 gard to this point — feehug his way, and afraid to move until 
 he had first started Meade, which was the very way of defeat- 
 ing the object he had in view, if he really wished to interpose 
 between the Army of the Potomac and Washington — a pur- 
 pose which, under the cu'cumstances, was only to be accom- 
 pHshed by the iitmost audacity of movement. 
 
 There is another opportunity of which General Meade 
 might have availed himself, and which I shall point out. 
 When, on the 12th, the Second, Fifth, and Sixth corps had 
 been sent back across the Eappahannock under a false lead, 
 these corps were in position, by a move to the right, to fall 
 upon the rear of Lee's column in crossing at Sulphur Springs. 
 This would have been a bold move, and would have been as 
 effective as a retrograde movement in reheving French on the 
 north bank of the Eappahannock. But it would have been 
 somewhat hazardous; for Lee might have disputed, with a 
 part of his force, the passage of the ^stham fork of the 
 Rappahannock, and moved with the rest to overwhelm the 
 Third Corps at Freeman's Ford. It is quite hkely that Gen- 
 eral Meade, who was exceedingly anxious to bring on a bat- 
 tle, would have made some of the moves indicated, had ho 
 receivf^d prompter intelligence of his opponent's moveme!::s. 
 
390 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE PUTOMAt:.. 
 
 But he was excessively ill-informed by liis cavalry, and in 
 each case learned the enemy's position only when it had 
 already become too late to act upon it. 
 
 The line of manoeuvre adopted by General Lee in this 
 campaign was the same as that used by him in the previous 
 summer against Pope's army. But the result was very dif- 
 ferent : and this arose from two causes. Lee had now neither 
 a lieutenant capable of making such a flank march as that 
 of Jackson on Manassas, nor such an opponent as Pope ; for, 
 if Meade's action was not brilliant, he at least did not lose his 
 head. As a whole, the campaign added no laurels to either 
 army ; yet it was none the less attended with much toil and 
 suffering — sleepless nights and severe marches and manifold 
 trying exposures. But this is a part of the history of the 
 army, of which those who did not bear the heat and burden 
 of the day can never know much. 
 
 III. 
 
 MINE RUN. 
 
 Judging from the experience of such military operations as 
 had been attempted during previous years at the season now 
 reached, it might have been inferred that the army could do 
 nothing better than go into winter-quarters and await the 
 coming spring before entering upon a new campaign. But 
 General Meade felt that the condition of the public mind 
 would hardly brook delay ; and being himself very eager for 
 action, he anxiously watched a favorable opportunity to 
 deliver battle. Such an opportunity he thought he saw 
 towards the end of November ; and he then planned an opera- 
 tion known as the "Mine Eun move" — an operation which 
 deserved better success than it met. 
 
 It was ascertained that Lee, while resting the right of his 
 
A CAMPAIGN OF MANCEUVRES. 391 
 
 army on the Bapidan near Morton's Ford, had left the lower 
 fords of the river at Ely's, Culpepper Mine, Germanna and 
 Jacobs' mills uncovered, and depended for the defence of 
 that flank upon a line of intrenchments which he had con- 
 structed perpendicular to the river and extending along the 
 left bank of a small tributary of the Eapidan named Mine 
 Kun, which flows almost at right angles \nth the former 
 stream, and empties into it at Morton's Ford. Kelying for 
 the security of his right upon that line, Lee had placed his 
 force in cantonments covering a wide extent of country ; so 
 that while Ewell's corps held position from Morton's Ford to 
 Orange Courthouse, Hill's corps was distributed from south 
 of that point along the railroad to near Charlottesville, with 
 an interval of several miles between the two corps. 
 
 This wide separation of his opponent's forces gave Meade 
 the hope that, by crossing the Rapidan at the lower fords, 
 turning the Confederate right, and advancing quickly towards 
 Orange Courthouse by the plank and turnpike roads that 
 connect that place with Fredericksburg, he might be able to 
 interpose between the two hostile bodies under EweU and 
 BQll, and destroy them in detail. 
 
 This plan, different from the kind of operations ordinarily 
 attempted in Yii'ginia, was well suited to the cu'cumstances. 
 It was based upon a precise mathematical calculation of the 
 elements of time and space, of the kind for which Napoleon 
 was so famous, and depended absolutely for its success on a 
 rigorous execution of all the foreordained movements in the 
 foreordained time and way. Thus planning, Meade attempted 
 the bold coup cVessaye of cutting entirely loose from his 
 base of supplies, and, providing his troops with ten days' 
 rations, he left his trains on the north side of the Rapidan, 
 relying on the meditated success to open up new lines of 
 communication. 
 
 The movement was begun at dawn of the 26th of November, 
 and the order of march was as follows. The Fifth Corps, fol- 
 lowed by the First Corps, was to cross the Rapidan at 
 Culpepper Mine Ford and proceed to Parker's Store, on the 
 
392 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 plankroad to Orange Courthouse. The Second Corps was to 
 cross at Germanna Ford, and proceed out on the turnpike 
 (which runs parallel with the plankroad) to Kobertson's 
 Tavern. To this point also the Third Corps, crossing at 
 Jacobs' Mill Ford, and followed by the Sixth Corps, was to 
 march by other routes, and there make a junction with the 
 Second Corps. With the left thus at Parker's Store and the 
 right at Robertson's Tavern, the army would be in close com- 
 munication on parallel roads, and by advancing westward to- 
 wards Orange Courthouse would turn the line of the Mine 
 Hun defences, which it was known did not extend as far south 
 as to cross the turnpike and plankroads. As the distance of 
 the several corps from their encampments to the assigned 
 points of concentration was under twenty miles. General 
 Meade reasonably assumed that marching early on the 26th, 
 each corps-commander would be able to make the march 
 inside of thu^ty-four hours, or, at most, by noon of the 
 27th. It remains to relate how this well-devised and meri- 
 torious plan was baulked by circumstances that, though 
 seemingly trivial to those uninstructed in war, are yet the 
 very elements that in a large degree assure success or entail 
 failure. 
 
 The first of these delays was occasioned by the tardiness of 
 movement of the Third Corps under General French, which 
 having a greater distance to march than the other corps, yet 
 did not reach its assigned point for the crossing of the 
 Eapidan until three hours after the other corjDS had arrived. 
 This caused a delay to the whole army of the time named ; for, 
 not knowing what he should encounter on the other side, 
 General Meade was unwilling to allow the other corps to 
 oross until the Third was up. A second obstacle was the 
 result of an unpardonable blunder on the j)art of the engi- 
 neers in imderestimating the width of the Eapidan, so that 
 the ponton-bridges it was designed to throw across that 
 stream were too short, and trestle-work and temporary means 
 had to be provided to increase their length. In addition, 
 another cause of delay resulted from the very precipitous 
 
A CAMPAIGN OF MANOEUVRES. 
 
 393 
 
 banks of the Rapidan, which rendered the passage of the ar- 
 tillery and ti-ains tedious and difficult The effect of these 
 several cu'cumstances was that the armj, instead of making 
 the passage of the river early in the day, was not across 
 until the following morning. Twenty-four hours had passed, 
 and only half the distance was made. 
 
 Early on the morning of the 27th, the corps were again in 
 motion, and, under imperative orders from General Meade, 
 
 SKETCH OF M»IE EUN. 
 
 they pushed forward with greater rapidity. The Second Corps, 
 under General "Warren, reached its designated point at Eohert- 
 son's Tavern, about one o'clock, and meeting a force of the 
 enemy, immediately began to develop its strength and position 
 by a brisk skirmish fire. It will be remembered that, accord- 
 ing to the plan, this corps was here to have been joined by the 
 Thkd Corps, and it was not allowed to make a serious attack 
 
394 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 until General Frencli should arrive. But that officer had 
 fallen into a series of luckless mishaps, by which it happened 
 that soon after crossing the Rai:)idan at Jacobs' Mill, he took 
 the wrong road to reach Robertson's Tavern, falling upon a 
 route too much to the right, which brought it against John- 
 son's division of Ewell's corps. With this force it had a brisk 
 brush, and by the time it could extricate itself, get on the 
 right road, and open communications with Robertson's Tavern, 
 it was night. 
 
 Meanwliile, the intention was fully disclosed, and Lee, as 
 may be supposed, was not inactive. Hill's corps, which had 
 been scattered far south of Orange Courthouse, was called 
 up ; EweU was withdrawn from his advanced position on 
 which he had checked French and confronted Warren, and 
 the whole Confederate force concentrated on the line of Mine 
 Run, to bar progress beyond that point. 
 
 Had the original intention of march been carried out, this 
 line would not have opposed a barrier to Meade's advance ; 
 for though Mine Run crosses the two roads on which the 
 army was to advance towards Orange Courthouse, yet its 
 defences did not stretch as far southward as these two rOads 
 — the right being, in fact, at Bartlett's MiUs, on Mine Ruu^ 
 and thence up to the Rapidan. But, by the disclosure of 
 Meade's purpose, Lee was able to extend his line so as to 
 cover these roads, and the nature of the ground and the im- 
 provised works that might be thrown up in the course of four- 
 and-twenty hours, would render the position a very powerful 
 one. 
 
 The Confederate line wa^ drawn along a prominent ridge 
 or series of heights, extending north and south for six or eight 
 miles. This series of hills formed aU the angles of a complete 
 fortification, and comprised the essential elements of a fort- 
 ress. The centre of the line presented four or five well- 
 defined facings of unequal length, occupying a space of more 
 than three thousand yards, with such angles of defence that 
 the fire of the enemy was able to enfilade every avenue of 
 approach, while his right and left flanks were not less strongly 
 
A CAMPAIGN OB^ MANOEUVRES. 395 
 
 protected. Stretching immediately in the rear and on tlie 
 flanks of this position was a dense forest of heavy timber, 
 while some twelve himdred yards in front was Mine Kun — 
 a stream of no great width, but difficult for infantry to 
 cross from the marshy ground and dense undergrowth of 
 stunted timber with which it was fi'equently flanked on either 
 side, as well as from the abrupt nature of its banks. In addi- 
 tion to these natural defences, the enemy quickly felled in 
 front of a large extent of his position a thick growth of pine 
 as an abatis, and hastily constructed trenches and breast- 
 works for infantry. The position was, in fact, exceedingly 
 formidable. 
 
 This is what the army presently found out, when, being at 
 length concentrated, it pushed forward on the following morn- 
 ing, the 28th — the enemy having during the night abandoned 
 his advanced position — and after a short march of two or 
 three miles found itself brought up against the line of Mine 
 Kun. Upon reaching this point the troops were immediately 
 put into position, and reconnoissances were made with the 
 view of ascertaining a point of attack.* At the same time 
 that these reconnoissances were made, General Warren, with 
 the Second Corps, strengthened by a division of the Sixth 
 Corps, was sent to move upon the enemy's right ; find out 
 how far south his line extended, and, if possible, outflank and 
 turn him. In these tentative efi'orts passed the 28th of No- 
 vember. 
 
 Next day, Warren, having moved southward to the Cathar- 
 pia Eoad, completed his observation of the Confederate right, 
 and announced the conditions as favorable for an attack 
 from that point. At the same time, Sedgwick, having care- 
 fully examined the Confederate left, reported that there was a 
 point there which he thought weak and assailable. General 
 
 * " In order to secure an efiBcient and active reconnoissance, orders were 
 given to every corps-commander to prepare himself to attack the enemy in his 
 immediate front, and to examine critically, and to ascertain, as early as ha 
 possibly could, where would be the best place to attack the enemy." — Meade's 
 evidence : Report on the Conduct of the War. p. 345. 
 
396 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OP THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Meade accordingly resolved to make attack on both wings, 
 and for the purpose of strengthening the force with which 
 Warren was to operate on the left, he detached from the 
 corps of French two divisions which were sent to the former, 
 which made Warren's force some twenty-six thousand men. 
 Sedgwick, with his Sixth Corps, supported by the Fifth, 
 would operate on the right. French, with the remaining 
 division of his command and two divisions of the First Corps, 
 under Newton, would hold an interval of four miles between 
 the right and left ; and as this centre would be weak, it was 
 assigned a role of simple observation. Dispositions in accord- 
 ance with this plan were not comjDleted until late on Sunday, 
 the 29th ; so it was resolved to make the attack next morn- 
 ing, and it was appointed that after a heavy artillery fire, 
 Warren, on the left, should open the attack at eight o'clock, 
 and that an hour after he was engaged, Sedgwick should 
 assault on the right.* 
 
 Early on Monday morning the army was under arms, impa- 
 tiently awaiting the signal-gun. At last, the sound of Sedg- 
 wick's cannon came rolhng along the line, when the entire 
 artillery of the right and centre opened upon the works of the 
 enemy. But not an echo from Warren on the left ! The 
 explanation of this silence soon came in intelligence brought 
 by an aid-de-camp. A close observation of the enemy's 
 position by dawn revealed a very different state of facts than 
 was presented the previous evening. t The presence of War- 
 ren's troops had attracted Lee's attention to his right, and 
 during the night he had powerfully strengthened that flank 
 by artillery in position and by infantry behind breastworks 
 and abatis. Looking at the position vdth the critical eye of 
 an engineer, but not without those lofty inspirations of cour- 
 
 * This disposition was based on the hope that as Warren's attack was to 
 be the main one, his opening first would cause the Confederates to weaken 
 their left, opposed to Sedgwick, and thus afford him a favorable opportunity. 
 
 f It happened frequently during the war that dispositions were made dur- 
 ing the day for attack the following morning. Attacks thus planned in 8d 
 vance generally Mled, as might be expected. 
 
A CAMPAIGN OF MANCEUVRES. 397 
 
 age that o'erleap the cold dictates of mathematical calcula- 
 tion, AVarren saw that the task was hopeless ; and so seeing, 
 he resolved to sacrifice himself rather than his command. He 
 assumed the responsibihtj of suspending the attack. 
 
 His verdict was that of his soldiers — a verdict pronounced 
 not in spoken words, but in a circumstance more potent than 
 words, and full of a touching pathos. 
 
 The time has not been seen when the Army of the Potomac 
 shrank from any call of duty ; but an unparalleled experi- 
 ence in war, joined to a great intelhgence in the rank and file, 
 had taught these men what, by heroic courage, might be done, 
 and what was beyond the bounds of human possibility. Eec- 
 ognizing that the task now before them was of the character 
 of a forlorn hope, knowing well that no man could here count 
 on escaping death, the soldiers, without sign of shrinking from 
 the sacrifice, were seen quietly pinning on the breast of their 
 blouses of blue, slips of paper on which each had \^Titten his 
 name ! 
 
 That this judgment of General Warren and of his troops 
 was correct. General Meade became himself convinced on 
 riding over to the left and viewing the position. It was, in fact, 
 even more formidable than the hne of the Eapidan, which it 
 had been considered impracticable to assail by a front attack. 
 The only possible opportunity of now continuing the enter- 
 prise was by moving still further to the left, and by manoeu- 
 vring on Lee's right, endeavor to force him out of his intrenched 
 line. But, under the circumstances, with the uncertainties of 
 a Virginia December, this was hardly to be seriously con- 
 sidered. The entire plan had been conditioned on a quick 
 operation that would uncover direct communications with the 
 Eapidan. The trains, therefore, had been left on the north 
 bank, and the troops furnished with a limited number of 
 rations, now nearly exhausted. In this state of facts, griev- 
 ous and galling though it was to permit the campaign to 
 come to such abortive issue. General Meade felt there was 
 no alternative. He, therefore, durmg the following night, 
 
398 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 withdrew the army across the Eapidan, and it resumed its old 
 camps.* Lee did not follow up in the least. 
 
 IV. 
 THE ARMY IN WINTEE QUARTERS. 
 
 The movement on Mine Eun terminated for the season grand 
 military operations in Virginia, and the army established itself 
 in winter cantonments for the next three months. During 
 this period the dignity of dulness was disturbed only by one 
 or two cavalry expeditions, planned with the ambitious aim 
 of capturing Bichmond by a sudden dash. The first of these 
 schemes, which had the merit of boldness in conception if 
 not in execution, was devised by General Butler, then com- 
 manding the Department of Virginia and North Carolina. 
 Believing that Richmond had been stripped of its garrison for 
 the purpose of strengthening the Confederate force operating 
 in North Carolina under General Pickett, General Butler 
 formed the design of swooping down on the Confederate cap- 
 ital with a cavaky raid by way of New Kent Courthouse on 
 the Peninsula. As a " diversion" in favor of this enterprise, 
 the Army of the Potomac was to make a demonstration across 
 the Kapidan. The raiding column, under command of Briga- 
 dier-General Wistar, left New Kent Courthouse on the 5th of 
 February, and reached the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge 
 
 *■ It would have been a move well adapted to tlie circumstances had General 
 Meade, on seeing his plan of operations frustrated, advanced on Fredericksburg 
 instead of falling back to his old line across the Rapidan. This would have had 
 the character of an offensive movement, and would have saved the morale of 
 the army and the confidence of the country, both of which were rudely shaken 
 by these frequent fruitless operations. But here General Meade was met by 
 previous prescriptions from General Halleck, not to make any change of base. 
 This absurd piece of pedantry prevented what would have been an excellent 
 measure. From General Meade I learn that he would assuredly have made 
 this move, had he been free to do so. 
 
A CAMPAIGN OF MANCEUVRES. 399 
 
 on the following day. The 7th, in obedience to orders from 
 "Washington, General Sedgwick, temporarily commanding the 
 Army of the Potomac in the absence of General Meade, 
 threw Kilpatrick's cavalry division across the Rapidan at 
 Ely's Ford, and Merritt's division at Bamett's Ford, while, at 
 a point between, two divisions of the Second Corps made the 
 passage at Germanna Ford by wading. The Confederates 
 held their positions, and considerable skirmishing took place 
 during the day. The troops remained on the south bank 
 until the time fixed for the termination of General Butler's 
 movement, when they were withdrawn. The raiding scheme 
 resulted in notliing. General Wistar found Bottom's Bridge 
 blockaded, and after reconnoitring the position, he returned. 
 He does not appear to have lost any thing ; but the troops of 
 the Army of the Potomac, that had the luck to be engaged in 
 the " diversion," suffered a sacrifice of two hundved and fifty 
 men. 
 
 A few weeks later a bold expedition was fitted out with the 
 view of releasing the large body of Union prisoners held at 
 Richmond, the accounts of whose ill-treatment had excited 
 profound sympathy throughout the North. This enterprise 
 was under command of General Kilpatrick, with some three 
 or four thousand cavahy, seconded by Colonel Dahlgren, a 
 young officer of extraordinary dash and daring. It set out 
 on the 28th of February, after Sedgwick's corps and Custer's 
 cavalry had made a demonstration on Lee's left. Crossing 
 the Rapidan at Ely's Ford, beyond the Confederate right 
 flank, the force marched thence to Spottsylvania Courthouse. 
 Here Colonel Dahlgren, -Rath five hundred picked men, as- 
 suming the most daring part of the expedition, diverged from 
 the main body and pushed forward by way of Frederickshall 
 toM^ards the James River. The column under General Kil- 
 patrick at the same time moved rapidly southward, and on 
 the following night, the 29th, struck the Vii-ginia Central 
 Railroad at Beaver Dam Station, whence parties were sent 
 out to damage the road. While engaged in this work, a 
 train of troops arrived fi'om the direction of Richmond ; but 
 
400 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 after some skirmishing these retired. Another party was 
 dispatched to destroy the bridge of the Fredericksburg and 
 Richmond Raih'oad across the South Anna — a purpose that 
 was foiled by the presence of a small observing force. The 
 main column then advanced with insignificant opposition, and 
 on the forenoon of the following day, March 1st, reined up 
 before the fortifications of Eichmond. The swoop had been 
 so sudden that the troopers passed unopposed within the 
 outer hue of redoubts ; but the Confederates having, mean- 
 while, brought up some forces, Kilpatrick found himself 
 arrested before the second line by opposition he could not 
 break through. In the mean time, Colonel Dahlgren, with 
 his isolated party, had moved southward from Trederickshall, 
 after destroying the depot, till he struck the James River, 
 where he did considerable damage to the canal, etc. A 
 native of the country had undertaken to lead the party to a 
 ford not far from Richmond, but through ignorance or treachery 
 he missed his way, and conducted the column to near Gooch- 
 land Courthouse, a full day's march from the intended point. 
 The guide was hanged on the nearest tree, and Dahlgren 
 moved down the course of the river towards Richmond, in 
 front of which he arrived late on March 1st. But in the 
 interim, General Kilpatrick, having been estopj^ed in front of 
 the fortifications, |and hearing nothing of Dahlgren's column, 
 became fearful as to his safety, and decided to fall back down 
 the Peninsula, which he did in face of considerable opposi- 
 tion. 
 
 Dahlgren was thus completely isolated from the main body, 
 while the country around him, now thoroughly aroused, was 
 alive with parties of armed citizens and militia. During the 
 night of the 3d, while on the retreat. Colonel Dahlgren, with 
 a hundred horsemen, became separated from the rest of his 
 command, and falling into an ambush, he was killed, with 
 some of his men, the rest surrendering. The other jjortion 
 succeeded in making a junction with Kilpatrick's column, 
 which returned to the Army of the Potomac by way of Fort- 
 ress Monroe. 
 
A CAMPAIGN OF MAN(EUVRES. 401 
 
 These outlying operations, whicli were indeed of a rather 
 Quixotic character, very slightly affected the main current of 
 the war, whose issue, it was clearly seen, must await new and 
 weightier trials of strength by the two great armies. As all 
 the grounds of inference led to the belief that the spring cam- 
 paign must be decisive of the war, both armies, as by consent, 
 settled down in winter cantonments, to recuperate from the 
 wear and tear of the trying season of 1863, and renew their 
 strength for the impending shock of arms. Lee held the 
 south bank of the Eapidan, his forces being distributed from 
 the river along the railroad to Orange Courthouse and Gor- 
 donsville. The Army of the Potomac established itself along 
 the Orange and Alexandria Kailroad from the Kapidan back 
 to the Eappahannock. The ranks of both armies were re- 
 plenished by conscripts, and drills, inspections, and reviews 
 were energetically pushed forward within the opposing camps. 
 Thus the months of winter glided by, till vernal grasses and 
 flowers came to festoon the graves on battle-fields over which 
 the contending hosts had wrestled for three years. 
 
 Then, upstarting, the armies faced each other along the 
 lines of the Eapidan. 
 
402 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARISIY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 XI. 
 
 GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 
 
 May— Juke, 1864. 
 
 I. 
 
 COMBINATIONS OP THE SPRING CAMPAiaN. 
 
 If one should seek to discover the cause of the indecisive 
 character of the Virginia campaigns, and why it was that for 
 three years the Army of the Potomac, after each advance 
 towards Eichmond, was doomed to see itself driven back in 
 discomfiture, it might be thought that a sufficient explanation 
 was furnished in the consideration of the inherent difficulty 
 of the task, arising from the near equality of its adversary in 
 hiaterial strength, and the advantage the Confederates en- 
 joyed in fighting defensively on such a theatre as Virginia. 
 But to these weighty reasons must be added another, of a 
 larger scope, and having relation to the general conduct of 
 the war. Justice to the Army of the Potomac demands that 
 this should here be stated, especially as the campaign on 
 which I am about to enter will, happily, show the army under 
 new auspices as regards this particular. 
 
 In Virginia, the Army of the Potomac had not only to combat 
 the main army of the South, but an army that, by means of the 
 interior lines held by the Confederates, might be continually 
 strengthened from the forces in the western zone, unless these 
 should be under such constant pressure as to prevent their 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 403 
 
 diminution. To the Confederates, Virginia bore the character 
 of a fortress thrust forward on the flank of the theatre of war „ 
 and such was their estimate of its importance, that they were 
 always ready to make ahnost any sacrifice elsewhere to insure 
 its tenure. 
 
 In this they were greatly favored by the false and waste- 
 ful mihtary policy of the North, between whose two gi-eat 
 armies in the East and the West there had hitherto been such 
 lack of combination of effort, that the Army of the Potomac 
 and the Army of the West had commonly found themselves 
 in their extremest crises at the moment when the other, re- 
 duced to inaction, left the Confederates free to concentre 
 rapidly on the vital point. Since the time when, for a brief 
 period, McClellan had exercised the functions of general-in- 
 chief — a period during which he had opportunity to outUne, but 
 not to execute, a comprehensive system of operations — an in- 
 credible incoherence prevailed in the general conduct of the 
 war. For three years there was presented the lamentable 
 spectacle of three or four independent armies, acting on 
 various lines of operations, and working not only with no 
 unity of purpose, but frequently at cross-purposes ; w^hile in 
 the military councils at Washington there ruled alternately 
 an uninstructed enthusiasm and a purblind pedantry. 
 
 At the period already reached in this narrative, the con- 
 viction had become general throughout the North that this 
 crude experimentahsm was seriously jeoparding all hope of 
 a successful issue of the war. This prompted the nomination 
 of Major-General Grant to the grade of lieutenant-general— 
 in which rank he was confirmed by the Senate on the 2d 
 March ; and on the 10th, a special order of President Lincoln 
 assigned him to the command of all the " armies of the United 
 States." 
 
 The elevation of General Grant to the lieutenant-general- 
 ship gave perfect satisfaction throughout the North — a senti- 
 ment arising not more from the conviction that it put the 
 conduct of the war on a sound footing, than from the high 
 estimate held by the public of General Grant's military tal- 
 
404 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 eut. The country had long ago awaked from its early dream 
 of a coming "Napoleon," and there was no danger of its 
 cherishing any such delusion respecting General Grant ; but 
 it saw in him a steadfast, pertinacious commander, one who 
 faithfully represented the practical, patient, persevering ge- 
 nius of the North. As it was his happy fortune to reach the 
 high office of general-in-chief at a time when the Administra 
 tion and the people, instructed somewkat in war and war's 
 needs, were prepared to give him an intelligent support, he 
 was at once able, with all the resources of the country at his 
 call, with a milUon men in the field, and a generous and 
 patriotic people at his back, to enter upon a comprehensive 
 system of combined operations. Moreover, the instrument 
 with which he had to work was one highly tempered and 
 brought to a fine and hard edge. The troops had become, by 
 the experience of service, thoroughly inured to w^ar. They 
 could march, manoeuvre, and fight. The armies, in fact, were 
 real armies, and were, therefore, prepared to execute opera- 
 tions that at an earlier period would have been utterly im- 
 practicable. 
 
 The lieutenant-general was committed by the whole bent 
 of his nature to vigorous action ; and, upon taking into his 
 hand the baton, he resolved upon a gigantic aggressive system 
 that should embrace simultaneous blows throughout the whole 
 continental theatre of war. His theory of action looked to 
 the employment of the maximum of force against the armies 
 of the Confederates, to such a direction of this power as 
 would engage the entire force of the enemy at one and the 
 same time, and to delivering a series of heavy and uninter- 
 rupted blows in the style of what the Duke of Wellington 
 used to call " hard pounding," and of what General Grant has 
 designated as " continuous hammering." 
 
 The armed force of the Confederacy was at this time mainly 
 included in the two great armies of Johnston and Lee — the for- 
 mer occupying an intrenched position at Dalton, Georgia, the 
 latter ensconced within the lines of the Rapidan. These bodies 
 were still almost as powerful in numbers as any the South 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 405 
 
 had ever had in the field. Their intrinsic weakness lay in the 
 fact that those reservoirs of strength from which armies must 
 constantly draw to repair the never-ceasing waste of war were 
 well-nigh exhausted ; that the sustaining power of the Con- 
 federacy, — the moral energy of the people — had so declined, 
 that what remained of arms-bearing population in the South 
 evaded rather than courted service in the field. Still, the 
 existing armies presented a formidable and unabashed front, 
 and by skilful conduct they might yet hope to do much. 
 
 The immediate command of all the armies west of the Alle- 
 ghany mountains, and east of the Mississippi River, was com- 
 mitted to Major-General W. T. Sherman, who was intrusted 
 with the duty of acting against Johnston's force by a cam- 
 paign ha\dng as its objective pbint Atlanta, the great railroad 
 centre of the middle zone. The lieutenant-general then es- 
 tablished his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, 
 from where he designed to exercise general supervision of the 
 movements of alt the armies. 
 
 This act was of itself a recognition of that primacy of inter- 
 est and importance which belonged to that army, but which 
 appeared, for a time, to have passed from it to its more for- 
 tunate rival in the western theatre of operations. General 
 Grant saw that the task assigned the Army of the Potomac 
 was no less momentous now than ever ; for it still confronted, 
 in Virginia, the foremost army of the Confederacy, under the 
 Confederacy's foremost military leader. After three years of 
 colossal combat, that army, the head and front of all the hos- 
 tile offending, still continued to cover Richmond— a point 
 which had been the first objective of the army's efforts, and. 
 which, though originally of no marked military importance, 
 had come to acquire the kind of value that attaches to a 
 national capital. Bearing on its bayonets the fate of the 
 Confederacy, the Army of Northern Virginia stood erect and 
 defiant, defending Richmond— threatening Washington. No 
 man but knew that so long as it held the field, the Confederacy 
 had lease of Hfe, 
 
 It was the destruction of this force that General Grant now 
 
406 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 undertook to accomplish, by the double agency of direct 
 attack, and by engaging all the remaining forces of the ene- 
 my available for its re-enforcement. Having provided for the 
 latter in instructions to his lieutenants, he fixed his headquar- 
 ters at Culpepper Courthouse during the last days of March, 
 and sat down to study the difficult chess-board of Virginia. 
 His opponent was that same veteran player who had check- 
 mated so many antagonists — Eobert E. Lee. 
 
 Thus were brought face to face those Two whom, by com- 
 mon consent, the North and the South regarded as its own 
 and its antagonist's ablest military leader. It was natural 
 that a surpassing interest should attach to the portentous 
 game of war to which these rivals prepared to address them- 
 selves. From the moment the nature of the coming cam- 
 paign disclosed itself, the sounding notes of preparation and 
 the energetic concentration of force in Virginia, made it mani- 
 fest that it was no ordinary passage at arms in which the 
 contending hosts were to meet; but a remorseless Hfe and 
 death struggle. Grant was fully resolved, by rapid and re- 
 morseless blows, to crush that army which, spite of the many 
 shocks it had received in past years, seemed yet invulnerable. 
 But Lee knew well the matchless temper of the instrument he 
 wielded, and though he saw the superior heft of his antago- 
 nist's arm, and read that in his eye which showed the com- 
 bat must be mortal, he did not lose heart of hope that by 
 a stubborn defensive and quick returns of offence he might 
 still hold his own. 
 
 Li entering upon the problem of framing a plan of cam- 
 paign against Richmond and the covering force, there was 
 one question that could not fail to present itself to General 
 Grant, and it is one of a higher order than any mere point of 
 grand tactics. It has relation to the choice of a line of opera- 
 tion against Richmond as between that of the "overland 
 route" and a transfer of the army to the Peninsula, or the 
 south side of the James Eiver. 
 
 The former of these methods had been repeatedly essayed 
 during the past three years — by Burnside and Hooker on the 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 407 
 
 Fredericksburg route; by Pope and Bleade by tho Orange 
 and Alexandria Eailroad. Uniform ill-success had attended 
 each attempted advance, and the many repulses the Army of 
 the Potomac had met on that line had marked it witli a bloody 
 condemnation.* The distance to Eichmond by this route, 
 from any front held along the Eappahannock or Eapidan, is 
 between sixty and seventy miles. This necessarily involves 
 communications excessively long and difficult to maintain for 
 an army dependent for its supphes on its wagons, while the 
 march must be made in a region full of the finest defensive 
 positions. Whether the movement be made by the Freder- 
 icksburg or by the Orange and Alexandria Eailroad — the onlj 
 two lines of manoeuvres available in the overland route- 
 peculiar dijQficulties beset it on each. But assuming these to 
 be severally overpassed, the successful execution of the 
 long march only results in bringing the army abreast the 
 fortifications of Eichmond, within which the defending force, 
 with its communications south and west all open and intact, 
 might stand an indefinite siege. In other words, the aggres- 
 sive army is brought to a dead-lock ; and if it be attempted to 
 undo this by shifting to the south side of the James Eiver, 
 with the view of operating against Eichmond's communica- 
 tions, the transfer is made at the expense of the one advan- 
 tage of the overland route (namely, that it covers the national 
 capital), and the same line of operations is taken up, after 
 enormous cost, that might have been assumed at first, with- 
 out any sacrifice whatever. If the army, therefore, is strong 
 enough, and so placed by the presence of such a garrison and 
 covering force for the defence of Washington as to leave that 
 city out of the question, there would seem to be every advan- 
 tage in taking up, at the start, a line of operations that obvi- 
 ates the peculiar difficulties of the overland route. 
 
 * I speak here of the opinion of the army ; for what is called public opin- 
 ion was much divided. The fact, however, that the views of those at home 
 were mainly influenced by extrinsic and political considerations (the supporters 
 of McClellan condemning and his opponents favoring the overland route), 
 makes public opinion hardly worth discussion. 
 
408 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Now, it is an interesting fact that, at the time the problem 
 of the Virginia campaign first came before the mind of Gen- 
 eral Grant in a definitive shape (which was shortly before he 
 came East, and while he was still a major-general), he was so 
 strongly impressed with the weight of the considerations ad- 
 verse to the adoption of the overland route, that he com- 
 mitted himseK to a very decided expression of opinion against 
 it, and, in an official communication addressed to Washington, 
 urged a coast movement south of the James River. General 
 Grant argued that, as there was at hand a sufficiency of troops 
 to form two armies equal each in strength to the single force 
 of Lee, "Washington, that vexatious element, should be elimi- 
 nated fi'om the problem, by assigning to it a defending army 
 capable of making it quite secure ; and that the other army, 
 formed into a powerful column of active operations, should be 
 transferred to a point on the seaboard, there to act against 
 the communications of Richmond. 
 
 Without seeking to draw any inference favorable to this 
 plan from the experience of the other plan of campaign 
 actually adopted by the lieutenant-general, there are sufficient 
 reasons to authorize the assertion that it was of the two much 
 the preferable method. In a country so favorable to defen- 
 sive warfare as is Virginia, the true theory of action for the 
 party upon whom is placed the burden of the ofi'ensive, is, 
 while acting on the aggressive strategically, to seek to secure 
 the advantage of a tactical defensive — that is, to so threaten 
 the vital lines of the enemy as to compel him to fight for 
 their tenure or recovery. As regards Richmond, an opera- 
 tion from the coast by the James or south of it, is the 
 only method in which an army can be speedily, effectively, 
 and without loss, applied in the realization of this principle. 
 This fact is sufficient to determine its immense advantage 
 over the overland movement. 
 
 By what inspiration of his own, or by what influence oi 
 others, it was that General Grant renounced a plan of cam- 
 paign thus recommended by soundest mihtary reasoning, and 
 which, while he was yet at the West, he had himself strongly 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 409 
 
 urged, it needs not liere to inquire. But when lie established 
 himself in Yirginia, and prepared to begin operations, he 
 changed his views and adopted a kind of mixed plan of cam- 
 paign, by which it was proposed to act ^ith the main column 
 on the overland route from the Rapidan to the James, but, at 
 the same time, secure, by an independent force, some of the 
 recognized advantages of a flank menace on the communica- 
 tions of Eichmond. The latter operation was intrusted to 
 General B. F. Butler, who, with an army of about thirty 
 thousand men, was to ascend the James Eiver from Fortress 
 Monroe ; establish himself in an intrenched position near City 
 Point, whence he was to operate against Richmond, or its 
 communications, or invest that city from the south side, or be 
 in position to effect a junction with the Army of the Potomac 
 coming down from the north. Butler's force consisted of two 
 corps, respectively under Generals Gillmore and W. F. Smith. 
 In addition to this co-operative column, General Grant organ- 
 ized an auxiliary force to threaten the westward communica- 
 tions of Pvichmond. General Sigel, who held a considerable 
 army for the protection of West Virginia and the frontiers 
 of Maryland and Pennsylvania, was instructed to form his 
 forces into two columns — the one, of ten thousand strong, 
 under General Crook, to move for the Kanawha and operate 
 against the Yirginia and East Tennessee Railroad ; the other, 
 seven thousand strong, under Sigel in person, to advance as 
 far as possible up the Shenandoah Yalley, with the view to 
 compel Lee to make detachments fi'om his main force to meet 
 this menace against his westward lines of supply. 
 
 This was one of those combinations that are more specious 
 in theory than successful in practice ; for such outlying col- 
 umns, moving against an enemy holding interior lines, are 
 very liable to be beaten in detail, or, at least, to have their 
 efforts neutralized, and made of no avail." 
 
 * The combination of action of these three columns formed a concentric 
 operation which may be either good or moist pernicious according to circum- 
 stances. Touching this point, General Grant makes an absolute statement of 
 principle which can only be true under certain circumstances. " Generally 
 
410 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AmiY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 It is probable, however, that General Grant's main reliance 
 was upon the Army of the Potomac, which, powerful in num- 
 bers, and in a high state of efficiency, discipline, and morale, 
 had never been better fitted to take the field. At the time 
 General Grant came to Vii'ginia, it was reorganized into three 
 corps — the Second, under Major-General Winfield Scott Han- 
 cock, the Fifth, under Major-General Gouverneur K. Warren, 
 and the Sixth, under Major-General John Sedgwick.* The 
 
 speaking," says lie, " concentration can be practically effected by armies mov- 
 ing to the interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have to 
 guard." — Instructions to General Butler: Report of Operations, page four. 
 Now while this principle is true under certain conditions, it is very wide of the 
 mark as above formulated. Concentric operations are good in two cases : 
 1. When they tend to cc«icentrate a scattered army upon a point where it wiU 
 be sure to arrive before the enemy ; 2. When they direct to the same end the 
 efforts of columns which are in no danger of being beaten separately by a 
 stronger enemy. Jomini justly observes: "Une ligne d'operations double, 
 centre les parties d'une armee ennemie plus rapprochees, sera toujours funeste, 
 a forces egales, si I'ennemi profite des avantages de sa position, et manoeuvre 
 avec rapidite dans I'interieur de la sienne." — Jomini : Histoire des Guerres do 
 Frederic II., vol. i., p. 293. 
 
 Now the point of concentration of the three columns, respectively under 
 Meade, Butler, and Sigel, was Richmond ; and from the interior lines held by 
 the Confederates, the latter could unite much more rapidly on this point than 
 could the Union forces. In this regard, therefore, this combination lacked the 
 first condition under which a concentric operation is judicious ; and, as there 
 was danger that the outlying forces might be overwhelmed by superior num- 
 bers, it violated also the second condition. 
 
 * In the reorganization of the Army of the Potomac, the Second, Fifth, and 
 Sixth corps were consolidated into two divisions. The first and second divi 
 Bions of the Third Corps were transferred to the Second Corps, preserving their 
 badges and distinctive marks. The third division of the Third Corps was 
 transferred permanently to the Sixth Corps. The three divisions forming the 
 old First Corps, consolidated into two divisions, were transferred to the Fifth 
 Corps, preserving their badges and distinctive marks. The reorganized army 
 ihen stood as follows : 
 
 Fifth Coeps. 
 
 First Division, Brigadier-General Charles Griffin. 
 First Brigade, Brigadier-General James Barnes. 
 Second Brigade, Brigadier-General J. J. Bartlett. 
 Third Brigade, Brigadier-General R. B. Ayres 
 
GRANTS OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 411 
 
 command of the army remained under General Meade, who 
 had proved himself to be an excellent tactician. 
 
 The three corps-commanders were men of a high order of 
 abihtj, though of very diverse types of character. Hancock 
 
 Second Division, Brigadier-General J. C, Robinson. 
 First Brigade, Colonel Leonard. , 
 
 Second Brigade, Brigadier-General Henry Baxter. 
 Third Brigade, Colonel Dennison. 
 
 Third Division, Brigadier-General S. W. Crawford. 
 First Brigade, Colonel W. McCandless. 
 Second Brigade, Colonel J. W. Fisher. 
 
 Fourth Division, Brigadier-General J. S. Wadsworth. 
 
 First Brigade, Brigadier-General L, Cutler. 
 
 Second Brigade, Brigadier-General J. C. Rice. 
 
 Third Brigade, Colonel Roy Stone. 
 Inspector-General and Chief of Stalf Lieut.-Colonel H. C. Bankhead. 
 Chief of Artillery, Colonel C. S. Wainwright. 
 
 Second Coeps. 
 
 First Division, Brigadier-General F. C. Barlow 
 
 First Brigade, Colonel N. A. Miles. 
 
 Second Brigade, Colonel T. A. Smythe. 
 
 Third Brigade, Colonel R. Frank. 
 
 Fourth Brigade, Colonel J. R. Brooke. 
 Second Division, Brigadier-General John Gibbon. 
 
 First Brigade, Brigadier-General A. S. Webb. 
 
 Second Brigade, Brigadier-General J. P. Owens. 
 
 Third Brigade, Colonel S. S. Carroll. 
 
 Third Division, Major-General D 5. Birney. 
 
 First Brigade, Brigadier-General J. H. Ward. 
 
 Second Brigade, Brigadier-General A. Hays. 
 Fourth Division, Brigadier-General J. B. Carr. 
 
 First Brigade, Brigadier-General G. Mott. 
 
 Second Brigade, Colonel W. R. Brewster. 
 Inspector-General and Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-Colonel C, H. Morgan 
 Chief of ArtiUery, Colonel J. C. TidbaB. 
 
 Sixth Cokps. 
 
 ■Rrst Division, Brigadier-General H. G. Wright. 
 First Brigade, Brigadier-General A. T. A. Torbert. 
 Second Brigade, Colonel E. Upton. 
 
412 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 may be characterized as the ideal of a soldier : gifted with a 
 magnetic presence and a superb personal gallantry, he was 
 one of those lordly leaders who, upon the actual field of battle, 
 rule the hearts of troops with a potent and irresistible mastery. 
 Warren, young in the command of a corps, owed his promotion 
 to the signal proofs of ability he had given, first as a briga- 
 dier, then as chief-engineer of the army, and latterly as the 
 temporary commander of the Second Corps. Of a subtle, an- 
 alytic intellect, endowed with an eminent talent for details, 
 the clearest mihtary coup d'oeil, and a fiery concentrated en- 
 ergy, he promised to take the first rank as a commander. 
 Sedgwick, long the honored chief of the Sixth Corps, was the 
 exemplar of steadfast soldierly obedience to duty : singularly 
 gentle and child-hke in character, he was scarcely more be- 
 loved in his own command than throughout the army. 
 
 A fit leader for the cavalry corps had long been wanting. 
 This desideratum was fully filled by the appointment of 
 Major-General P. H. Sheridan. Although his experience had 
 been confined to that of a divisional general of infantry in 
 the West, enough was known of his character to justify the 
 nomination, and his first campaign left no doubt of his pre- 
 eminent fitness for the command. 
 
 The staff organization of the Army of the Potomac re- 
 mained unchanged. Brigadier-General H. J. Hunt continued 
 to be the efficient chief of artillery ; Major James C. Duane 
 was chief-engineer, and Brigadier-General Eufus IngaUs, 
 
 Third Brigade, Colonel H. Burnham. 
 
 Fourth Brigade, Brigadier-General A. Shaler. 
 Second Division, Brigadier-General G. W. Getty. 
 
 Fil-st Brigade, Brigadier-General F. Wheaton. 
 
 Second Brigade, Colonel L. A. Grant. 
 
 Third Brigade, Brigadier-General T. H. Neill. 
 
 Fourth Brigade, Brigadier-General A. L. Eustis. 
 Third Division, Brigadier-General H. Prince. 
 
 First Brigade, Brigadier-General W. H. Morris. 
 
 Second Brigade, Brigadier-General D. A. Russell. 
 Inspector-General and Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-Colonel M T. McMahon 
 Chief of Artillery, Colonel C. H. Tompkins. 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 413 
 
 facile princeps of quartermasters, remained at the bead of that 
 great department of administrative service so long under his 
 charge. 
 
 This much for the Ai-mj of the Potomac. It should be 
 added, that about the time it began active operations, it 
 was re-enforced bj the Ninth Corps under General Burn- 
 side, who, however, commanded it independently of Gen- 
 eral Meade. This corps had lately returned from its cam- 
 paign in East Tennessee, and rendezvoused at Aunapohs, 
 where it had recruited its ranks and received the addition of 
 a division of colored troops. All doubt as to its destination 
 was dispelled at the end of April, when it was called to 
 "Washington, and thence marched to the Eapidan to make a 
 junction with the Army of the Potomac. The united strength 
 of the four corps gave Grant a movable column of about 
 one hundred and forty thousand men of all arms. The rolls 
 of Lee's army showed a force, present for duty, of nfty-two 
 thousand six hundred and twenty-six men — foot, horse, and 
 artillery. 
 
 The 3d of May the order went forth that the army should 
 that night launch forth on its great adventure. The campaign 
 thus initiated — a campaign unsurpassed by any on record, in 
 the elements that make war grand, terrible, and bloody — will 
 form the subject-matter of the succeeding chapters. 
 
 II. 
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 
 
 The defensive line for many months occupied by the Con- 
 federates along the bluffs that skirt the south bank of the 
 Rapidan was so strong by nature and art that a direct attack 
 was out of the question. Lee as little feared as Grant de- 
 signed such an attack, and both the defensive preparations 
 of the former, and the offensive preparations of the latter, 
 contemplated a turning movement upon the right or the left 
 
414 CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 flank of the Confederate line. It only remained to choose 
 the direction to be given the advance — whether by the right 
 or the left. 
 
 , The views of General Grant strongly favored an operation 
 against Lee's left, crossing the Rapidan above that flank. 
 This plan was recommended by the consideration that an ad- 
 vance by this line would cover the communications with 
 Washington against any contingency of a counter-move 
 northward by Lee, and force him du-ectly back towards Rich- 
 mond. It was, however, attended with the serious dilB&culty 
 that the duration of the campaign would be limited by the 
 amount of rations that could be carried with the army, since 
 it would be impracticable to keep up a line of supplies in an 
 advance by that route. This objection was of sufficient weight 
 to determine the adoption of the other alternative, which was 
 to cross the Rapidan by the lower fords and turn Lee's right. 
 
 Quitting the camps in which it had lain during the winter, 
 the army moved at midnight of the 3d of May. The advance 
 to the Rapidan was made in two columns : the right column, 
 made up of the corps of Warren and Sedgwick, to cross at 
 Germanna Ford ; the left column, consisting of Hancock's 
 corps, at Ely's Ford, six miles below. 
 
 Warren's corps, forming the advance of the right column, 
 marched from the vicinity of Culpepper, and, preceded by 
 Wilson's cavalry division, reached Germanna Ford at six 
 o'clock of the morning of Thursday, the 4:th ; and as soon as 
 the bridge was laid, began the passage, which was completed 
 by one o'clock. During the afternoon, Sedgwick's corps fol- 
 lowed across, and encamped for the night near the river. War- 
 ren, advancing some miles southward from the Rapidan, biv- 
 ouacked at Old Wilderness Tavern at the point of intersec- 
 tion of the plankroad from the Germanna Ford with the 
 turnpike from Orange Courthouse to Fredericksburg. On the 
 latter road, Wilson's division of cavaby was, in the afternoon, 
 thrown out towards Robertson's Tavern to watch the direc- 
 tions whence any hostile menace might be expected. The 
 left column, consisting of Hancock's corps, moved from its 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 415 
 
 encampment near Stevensbiirg, and advanced to Ely's Ford,* 
 preceded by Gregg's division of cavalry. Wlien the corps 
 reached the Rapidan the cavalry was well across, and had the 
 canvas ponton-bridge nearly laid. This work being soon 
 completed, the infantry made the passage and pushed forward 
 to Chancellorsville, which place it reached at nine in the 
 morning of the 4th, the cavalry being thrown out towards 
 Fredericksburg and Todd's Tavern. At Chancellorsville, 
 Hancock's troops rested for the remainder of the day, await- 
 ing the passage of the heavier column on the right. The 
 troops bivouacked for the night on Hooker's old battle- 
 ground. 
 
 Thus the morning of Thursday, the 5th of May, found a 
 hundred thousand men across the Rapidan. The barrier that 
 had so long divided the opposing armies was passed, and 
 with the mingled emotions which grand and novel enterprises 
 stir in men's breasts, the troops looked out, hopefully, yet 
 conscious that a terrible struggle was before them, into a 
 region yet untrodden by the hostile armies, but soon to be- 
 come historic by a fierce grapple of armed hosts and bloody 
 battles in many tangled woods. 
 
 Lee had offered no opposition to the passage of the 
 Rapidan. His right was turned. "Was this to be considered 
 a great success? The answer will depend on the line of 
 action marked out for himseK by General Lee. 
 
 In the defence of rivers, military art presents several dis- 
 tinct hnes of conduct. 1. The general on the defensive may 
 permit the crossing of a part of the assailing force, and then, 
 by destroying the means of passage, seek to overwhelm the 
 isolated fraction.t 2. He may oppose directly the passage of 
 the hostile army, or, by occupying advantageous positions, 
 
 * General Grant, in his official report (p. G), inadvertently states that the 
 Second Corps crossed at United States Ford ; but Ely's Ford was the point d 
 passage. 
 
 f The conduct of the Archduke Charles at Essling, is a good esample oJ 
 this. See Vial : Cours d'Art et d'Histoire Militaixes, vol. ii., p. 92. 
 
416 CAJSIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 prevent it from deploying.* 3. He may allow the enemy to 
 make the passage entirely unobstnicted, but fall upon him 
 after crossing. In this case he simply observes the line of 
 the river, and holds his masses distributed at convenient 
 points within supporting distance. 
 
 This last method was that adopted by General Lee ; and, 
 as the line to be defended was long, and it was uncertain 
 whether Grant would eSsay a turning movement on his left to- 
 wards Gordonsville, or on his right by the lower fords, he had 
 along the river merely a force in observation, while his main 
 rhasses were positioned in echelon from the Eapidan near 
 Somerville Ford to Gordonsville — Longstreet's corps being 
 posted near the latter place. Hill's in the vicinity of Orange 
 Courthouse, and Swell's thence up to and along the Rapidan, 
 the right of the Confederate line resting near Raccoon Ford. 
 It is obvious, therefore, that though the successful passage of 
 the Eapidan by the army with its enormous train of four 
 thousand wagons was a matter of congratulation, it was no 
 proof that a severe struggle was not imminent.! 
 
 * A striking illustration of this mode of action is presented in the conduct 
 of Vendome in disputing the passage of the Adda by Prince Eugene in 1805. 
 It is thus described by Dufour : " Eugene had gained a march upon Vendome 
 and was attempting to throw a bridge across the Adda at a very favorable spot. 
 Vendome came up as soon as he could, and arrived before the bridge was com- 
 pleted. He tried to arrest the work of the pontoniers, but in vain. The 
 ground was so well swept by the artillery of Eugene that he could not get near 
 enough to injure the workmen. Still, the passage of the river must be pre- 
 vented. Vendome put his army to work upon a trench and parapet, surround- 
 ing the ground occupied by the imperialists after crossing. They were finished 
 nearly as soon as the bridges. Eugene deemed the passage of the river im- 
 practicable and ordered a retreat." — Dufour : Strategy and Tactics, p. 252. 
 
 f Lieutenant-General Grant, touching this point, uses language which' 
 shows that he regarded the passage of the Rapidan as a very important 
 achievement. " This," says he, " I regarded as a great success, and it removed 
 from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained, that of cross- 
 ing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably-com- 
 manded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through a hostile 
 country and protected." — Grant : Report of Operations of 1864-5, p.' 6. But 
 the trouble in regard to the trains really began when the army reached the 
 Wilderness, being there shut up in the restricted triangle between the Rapidan 
 •nd Rappahannock. 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 417 
 
 The line of march of the Army of the Potomac, after 
 crossing the Eapidan, led through that region known as the 
 Wilderness, which extends a considerable distance southward 
 from the river, and westward as far as Mine Run. It was 
 along its gloomy margin that the bloody battle of Chancel- 
 lorsville had been fought a twelvemonth before. Now General 
 Grant did not expect to be brought to quarters in this diffi- 
 cult country, and the direction given the columns when the 
 march was resumed on the morning of Thursday, May 5th, 
 was such as would have carried them quite beyond the 
 bounds of the Wilderness region.* He counted that the 
 Confederate right being turned by the successful passage of 
 theE-apidan, he would be able to mask his march through the 
 Wilderness, and then by a rapid advance towards Gordons- 
 ville, plant himself between the Confederate army and Rich- 
 mond. 
 
 To foil his adversary's design was Lee's first aim. The 
 plan he formed to effect this is one of the boldest and most 
 
 * The following extract from the order of inarch for May 5th will show the 
 line of advance contemplated by General Grant, and the points the corps were 
 that day to peach,- had not the movement been interrupted by Lee : 
 
 " Headquaktees Aemt of the Potomac, 
 Mny 4. lSfi4— 6 p. m. 
 
 " The following movements are ordered for the 5th May, 1864 : 1st. Major- 
 General Sheridan, commanding cavalry corps, will move with Gregg's and Tor- 
 bert's divisions against the enemy's cavalry in the direction of Hamilton'? 
 crossing. General Wilson, with the third cavalry division, will move at 
 five A. M. to Craig's Meeting-honse on the Cathai-pin road. He will keep out 
 parties on the Orange Courthouse pike and plankroad, the Catharpin road, 
 Pammikey road (road to Orange Springs), and in the direction of Trojman's 
 Store and Andrews' Store or Good Hope Church. 2d. Major-General Hancock, 
 commanding Second Corps, will move at five A. M. to Shady Grove Church and 
 extend his right towards the Fifth Corps at Parker's Store, od. Major-General 
 Warren, commanding Fifth Corps, will move at five A. M. to Parker's Store on 
 the Orange Courthouse plankroad, and extend his right towards the Sixth 
 Corps at Old Wilderness Tavern. 4th. Major-General Sedgsvlck, commanding 
 Sixth Corps, will move to Old Wilderness Tavern on the Orange Courthonse 
 pike as soon as the road is clear. * * * 
 
 " By command of Major-Genekal Meadb." 
 37 
 
418 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THIil PGTOiMAC. 
 
 skilfiil conceptions of that officer. Instead of falling bact, 
 on finding his flank turned, he took a strategic offensive, 
 directed a rapid concentration of his forces to meet Grant, 
 and aimed to shut Grant up in the Wilderness. 
 
 From Orange Courthouse, which was the centre of Lee's 
 position, two parallel roads (the Orange and Fredericksburg 
 plankroad and turnpike) run eastward and strike Grant's line 
 of march at right angles. By directing his forces rapidly 
 forward on these routes, Lee would fall upon the army on the 
 march and compel battle in the "Wilderness, where he hoped 
 to lure his antagonist into tangled labyrinths of confusion and 
 disaster. This region, well known to him, was to his antago- 
 nist pure terra incognita. Li its thick chaperal, through which 
 no artillery could play, Grant's masses would lose their force 
 of impact, while the Confederate marksmen, with an almost 
 Lidian skill in woodcraft, could lie unseen in their gxay array 
 amid those dun woods and deal death to the assailants. 
 Being apprised, therefore, on the morning of the 4th, that the 
 Army of the Potomac had begun the passage of the Ea.pidan, 
 he promptly directed his forces forward to meet it by the 
 routes I have indicated. The mean distance of the corps from 
 their camps to where they would strike the army was about 
 twenty miles. Ewell's corps was thrown forward on the old 
 turnpike, and HiU's on the plankroad. Thus, while the Army 
 of the Potomac was, throughout the 4th, defiling to the south 
 bank of the Eapidan, the Army of Northern Virginia, making 
 a rapid change of front, hurried forward to meet its rival 
 with a front of opposition before it should have time, by a 
 march beyond the Wilderness, to lay hold of the Confederate 
 communications with Kichmond.* That night the van of the 
 
 * " The enemy crossed the Eapidan at Ely's and Germanna fords. Two 
 tjorps of this army moved to oppose him — Ewell's by the old turnpike, and 
 Hill's by the plankroad. They arrived this morning (May 5th), in close prox- 
 bnity to the enemy's line of march." — Lee : Dispatch of May o, 1864. Long- 
 street's corps, which formed the extreme left of the Confederate line, was 
 further ofiF than the others, being near Gordonsville ; but it also was or 
 dered up 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 419 
 
 hostile armies bivouacked, unsuspecting, very close to eacli 
 other — Warren's corps at Wilderness Tavern, situate at the 
 junction of the Germ anna Ford plank with the Orange and 
 Fredericksburg turnpike ; EweU's corps on the latter road, 
 within three miles of Warren's position. 
 
 Early next morning — the morning of the 5th of May — the 
 Union columns set out to resume the onward march — the left 
 column, under Hancock, being directed from Chancellorsville 
 on Shady Grove Church, and the right column, led by War- 
 ren's corps, from Wilderness Tavern to Parker's Store, on the 
 Orange and Fredericksburg plankroad. Warren's command 
 was next to the enemy, and as the opening of the battle of the 
 Wilderness took shape from Warren's movements, it wiU be 
 necessary to describe these in detaih 
 
 The proximity of the Confederates, the position of whose 
 advance has been indicated above, was not at all known.* 
 But to guard against any approach by the Orange turnpike, 
 Warren threw out the division of Griffin on that road to guard 
 against any irruption of the enemy into the route upon which 
 Sedgwick's corps, which followed the Fifth, was yet to move 
 from Germanna Ford ; while he set the van of his column, 
 composed of the division of Crawford, in motion by a wood 
 road to gain Parker's Store. 
 
 Now EweU also continued his eastward march e'arly that 
 morning on the turnpike, so that presently the skirmishers of 
 Griffin's division, which had been thrown forward on that 
 road, were driven in. Moreover, no sooner had Crawford's 
 force neared Parker's Store than the troopers in his front, 
 which had already occupied that point early in the morning, 
 were met running back ; and on sending forward a reconnoi- 
 tring force, it was found that a column of the enemy was press- 
 
 * This ignorance of tlie enemy's position was partly due to the fact thai 
 Wilson's division of cavalry, which had, on the afternoon of the 4th, moved 
 out on the turnpike nearly to Robertson's Tavern, was withdrawn that evening, 
 and proceeded on a scout to Parker's store on the plankroad. Therefore no 
 feelers were out on the route by which EweU waa advancing. 
 
420 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 ing forward on the plankroad also.* It will be sufficiently 
 clear what this force w^as when it is remembered that Lee had 
 dispatched Hill's corps on this road, and the enemy encoun- 
 tered by Griffin was the van of Ewell's column, which, as 
 already seen, had bivouacked the night before within three 
 miles of Wilderness Tavern. These developments, of course, 
 necessitated a cessation in the prescribed movement of Gen- 
 eral Warren, who found himself called upon to meet an imme- 
 diate and pressing emergency. 
 
 Such vras the situation of affairs when, on the morning of 
 Thursday, May 5th, Generals Grant and Meade reached Old 
 Wilderness Tavern. Neither of these commanders, however, 
 believed that aught but a small force was in front of Warren 
 to mask the Conffederate retreat, as it was not deemed possi- 
 ble that Lee, after his defensive line had been turned, could 
 have acted with such boldness as to launch forward his army 
 in an offensive sally. It was, therefore, at once resolved to 
 brush away or capture this force ; but as this determination 
 was formed under a very erroneous apprehension of the actual 
 situation, the means em2:»loyed were inadequate to the task.f 
 
 The main development of opposition having come from 
 the force that showed itself against Griffin on the turnpike, 
 an attack was ordered at that point — ^Wadsworth's division 
 
 * " Led the advance of the Fifth Corps at five A. M., with orders to proceed 
 to Parker's Store. Received the following instruction from General Warren ; 
 • Throw out a skirmish line well to your left and rear facing the plankroad, so 
 that the enemy cannot get on your flank or rear without your knowing it. 
 General Getty is now moving up the plankroad towards your left. If you 
 hear firing in that direction it will be his.' Took the wood road from the 
 Lacy House, and pushed on till reaching the open space about one mile from 
 Parker's Store. The cavalry had become engaged with the enemy, who 
 pressed them so hard that they sent back for support. I deployed the Buck- 
 tails at once to the front, and they advanced just in time to resist an attack of 
 infantry that had just arrived. Took up position, and at twenty minutes past 
 eight A. M. received an order from General Warren, stating that the movement 
 had been suspended and that Oriflfin and Wadsworth would attack on the 
 turnpike."— Crawford : Notes on the Battle of the Wilderness. 
 
 f As direct testimony to this state of feeling on the part of the commanding 
 general, I extract from my note-book the following memorandum made on the 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 421 
 
 (al8o of Warren's corps) being disposed in line on tlie left of 
 Griffin, and the division of Robinson in support. Crawford's 
 morement towards Parker's Store, which had already been 
 arrested by the enemy, was now formally susj^ended. One of 
 its brigades (that of McCandless) was sent to act on the left of 
 Wadsworth's command, and the remainder of the division 
 was afterwards withdrawn — the enemy following up and firing 
 into the rear of the column. 
 
 With this force an impetuous attack was at noon made on 
 the enemy on the turnpike. The brunt of this assault fell to 
 the lot o"f Griffin's division, of which Ayres' brigade was 
 formed on the right, and Bartlett's the left of the Orange 
 turnpike. These succeeded in carrying every thing in their 
 front ; and with dispositions better suited to the circum- 
 stances, EweU's corps (only the van of which had yet reached 
 the ground) should have been crushed.* But as the attack 
 
 spot : " May 5th ; rode with Grant, Meade, and the staff to Old Wilderness 
 Tavern ; found Warren's corps in position there, and Sedgwick coming up. 
 At eight o'clock, while on the way, a message came that the enemy were ad- 
 vancing on us by the turnpike. Griffin's division out on that road. At nine 
 A. M., General Meade said to Warren, Sedgwick, and others standing by; 
 ' They [the enemy] have left a division to fool us here, while they concentrate 
 and prepare a position towards the North Anna ; and what I icant is to pre- 
 vent those fellows from getting hack to Mine Run.' " 
 
 * From officers of Ewell's corps engaged in this action, I learn tlie follow- 
 ing particulars. 
 
 When the first onset was made by the Fiftli Corps, Johnson's division 
 alone held the position. Jones' brigade, formed across the turnpike, was 
 swept back by the force of the assault, and his troops fell back much broken. 
 It was, however, immediately replaced by Stewart's brigade, and almost simul- 
 taneously with the first signs of weakness in Johnson's hne, Rodes' division 
 arrived, took position on its right, and, by a firm counter-attack, drove the 
 Union troops back. It is very clear from the confession of the disorder result- 
 ing from the first attack of the Union force that, had adequate preparations 
 been made, EweU's corps might have been overwhelmed. I may remark that 
 General Warren urged a just view of the situation— setting forth that if, as 
 was believed at headquarters, there was but a rear-guard in his front, the 
 attack could but little affect the great campaign on which the army was enter- 
 ing ; but if the Confederates were present in force, time should be aUowed to 
 form a really weighty attack. But immediate action, with such means as were 
 at hand, had been determined upon. 
 
422 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF IHE POTOMAC 
 
 was ordered under the impression that only a rear-gnard of 
 the enemy was present, the dispositions made were very far 
 from being adapted to the actual situation. 
 
 Recovering from its momentary repulse, the van of EweU's 
 force re-formed on a wooded acchvity a short distance in the 
 rear, and there being joined by the remainder of the corps, 
 the Confederates were soon in position not only to withstand 
 the shock of Warren's onset, but to assume the offensive. It 
 had been designed that the right of Warren's line should be 
 sustained by the left of the Sixth Corps, the division of Wright 
 forming the connection ; but, owing to the thickness of the 
 woods, that officer was unable to get up to Warren's su]3port 
 in time, and this left the right of the latter exposed. Against 
 this naked flank the Confederates made a vigorous attack 
 upon Ayres' brigade of Regulars, and this giving way, Bart- 
 lett's brigade also was beaten back.* Two guns that had 
 been advanced on the turnpike to take advantage of the first 
 success, their horses being killed, were left between the lines, 
 and fell into the hands of the enemy.f On the left of Griffin, 
 Wadsworth's division advanced simultaneous with it to the 
 attack; but there was no connection between the two, and 
 the troops of the latter in their passage through the dei^ie 
 thicket, having taken a somewhat false direction, unwittingly 
 exposed their left flank to a destructive fire from the enemy, 
 which threw them back in some confusion. | The brigade of 
 
 * " Moved at noon with Ayres' Regulars on the right. Attacked the enemy 
 on my front and drove him. The Regulars gave way, which exposed our 
 right flank, and rendered retreat necessary by the brigade. This could not be 
 effected across the ground by which we advanced, and I brought out the com- 
 mand by a detour through the woods to the left, in rear of the enemy." — Bart- 
 .ett : Notes on the Battle of the Wilderness. 
 
 f Meade : Report of the Battle of the Wilderness. 
 
 X The cause of Wadsworth's repulse affords a curious illustration of the 
 difBculties that beset the movement of troops in such a region as the Wilder 
 ness. General Warren gave Wadsworth his direction by a point of the com- 
 pass, there being no other guide in such a thicket. His course was to be due 
 west from the Lacy House, which would have brought him to the left of GriflBn 
 and on a prolongation of his line. But Wadsworth started facing northwest 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 403 
 
 Crawford's division (that of McCaiidless), which was tcj tho 
 left of "Wadsworth, occupied an isolated position, and being 
 nearly surrounded, it was easily driven from the field, with 
 the loss of almost two whole regiments. Thus all the ground 
 gained was given up, but the Confederates did not follow, and 
 Warren assumed a new Hue somewhat in rear, but still in 
 front of Old Wilderness Tavern and across the Orange turnpike. 
 Such were the initial operations of the battle of the Wilder- 
 ness. The opening was not auspicious. It gave Warren's 
 corps a very severe shock, entailing upon it a loss of above 
 three thousand men. The result left no doubt respecting the 
 presence of the enemy in force, and early in the day, when 
 the serious opposition encountered by the Fifth Corps made 
 this manifest. General Grant, suspending the previou^y or- 
 dained marches of the corps, made dispositions to accept Lee's 
 gage of battle. The Sixth Corps being directly in rear of the 
 Fifth, was ready to take post on Warren's right. But Han- 
 cock's column, which was moving considerably to the left, and 
 had that morning marched southward fi-om Chancellorsville, 
 was quite out of position for a battle in the Wilderness. In- 
 structions were therefore sent recalling it to unite with the 
 main body by a movement up the Brock road to its intersec- 
 tion with the Orange plankroad. This order was received by 
 Hancock at eleven o'clock, and the countermarch immediately 
 begun. He was then distant about ten miles.* 
 
 instead of going due west. Now Ewell's line was at right angles with the 
 turnpike, so that by the time Wadsworth's line of battle passed the Higerson 
 House [see map] it had come almost to face the turnpike directly, and the first 
 fire of the enemy came square upon its flank. The thick woods prevented any 
 change on the spot, and by running back, the men did about the best thing 
 they could. 
 
 "* " At five A. M. on the 5th May, the Second Corps moved towards its designat- 
 ed position at Shady Grove Church, taking the road by the Furnace and Tald's 
 Tavern. My advance was about two miles beyond Todd's Tavern, when, at nina 
 A. M., I received a dispatch from the major-general commanding the Army of 
 the Potomac to halt at the tavern, as the enemy had been discovered in some 
 force on the Wilderness pike. Two liom-s later I was directed to move my 
 command up on the Brock road to its intersection with the Orange plankroad." 
 — Hancock : Report of The Battle of the Wilderness. 
 
424 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 It will be borne in mind that the Confederate corps of Hill 
 was hurrying forward on the Orange plankroad, and that the 
 van of Warren's force which had gone out towards Parker's 
 Store in the morning had seen this column filing rapidly down 
 that road. Four miles east of Parker's Store the plankroad 
 is intersected by the Brock road, which runs southward to 
 Spottsylvania Courthouse, and on which Hancock was moving 
 up to join the main body of the army. It is obvious, there- 
 fore, that this junction of road was a strategic point of the 
 first importance, and if Hill should be able to seize it, he 
 would interpose effectually between the two Union columns. 
 Discerning this danger, General Meade, early in the day, 
 directed a division of the Sixth Corps, under General Getty, to 
 hold stoutly this position until Hancock's junction could be 
 effected. "While the latter was still far off, Getty had begun 
 to feel the presence of the enemy, and hour by hour it gvexr 
 more heavy upon him. But he held his post immovably, and 
 towards three o'clock in the afternoon, the welcome cheer of 
 Hancock's approaching troops was heard. Then the position 
 was secure, and the Second Corps, hurrying forward as rap- 
 idly as the narrow defiles of the forest would permit, was dis- 
 posed in double line of battle along and in front of the Brock 
 road, facing Hill's line drawn up across the Orange plank- 
 road.* To make the tenure of the position certain, in case 
 the enemy should assault, as seemed likely, substantial lines 
 of breastworks were immediately constructed by Hancock's 
 troops ; but before these were entirely completed he received 
 orders to advance upon Hill and drive him back on the plank- 
 road beyond Parker's Store. 
 
 * Bimey's division, which led the van of Hancock's corps, first joined Getty, 
 and -was posted on the right soon after the divisions of Gibbon, Mott, and Bar- 
 low ccme up, and were placed on the left ; Barlow's division (with the exception 
 of Frank's brigade, which was stationed at the junction of the Brock road with 
 the road to the Catharpin furnace) formed the left of the line, and was thrown 
 forward on some high, cleared ground in front of the Brock road, where, as the 
 only available place in the dense, environing forest, Hancock massed his ar 
 tillery. 
 
GRANTS OVERLAM) CAMPAIGN 425 
 
 The sitiiation of the opposing forces was now peculiar 
 enough. Warren had engaged Ewell on the turnpike with 
 such result as has already been seen, and Hancock now pre- 
 pared to attack Hill on the plankroad ; but there was no con- 
 nection whatever either between the two Federal or the two 
 Confederate columns. Each combat, in fact, had the charac- 
 ter of an action in a defile, and had very slight bearing the 
 one on the other. 
 
 A little past four o'clock, the attack on Hill was opened by 
 Getty's command. His troops encountered the enemy in a 
 line of battle, not intrenched, about three hundred paces in 
 front of the Brock road, and immediately became hotly en- 
 gaged. But as it was soon manifest that the Confederates 
 were present in heavy force, Hancock advanced his own corps. 
 The fight at once grew very fierce, the oj)posing forces being 
 exceedingly close and the musketry continuous and deadly 
 along the whole fine. Hancock attacked with the utmost vigor 
 in what Lee justly calls " repeated and desperate assaults ;"* 
 but the Confederates, seeking what cover the ground afforded, 
 
 * " The enemy subsequently concentrated against General Hill, who, with his 
 own and Wilcox's divisions, successfully resisted the repeated and desperate as- 
 saults." — Lee : Dispatch, May 5. 
 
 From General Hancock's official report I extract the following details of this 
 action : 
 
 " At a quarter past four P. M. General Getty moved forward on the right and left 
 of the Orange plankroad, having received direct orders from General Meade to 
 commence the attack without waiting for me. Finding that General Getty had 
 met the enemy in great force, I ordered General Birney to advance his com- 
 mand (his own and Mott's divisions) to support the movement of Getty at once. 
 Although the formation I had directed to be made before carrying out my in- 
 structions to advance was not yet completed, General Bimey immediately 
 moved forward on General Getty's right and left — one section of Ricketts' bat- 
 tery. Company F, First Pennsylvania Artillery, moving down the plankroad just 
 in rear of the infantry. The fight became very fierce at once, tlie lines of bat- 
 tle were exceedingly close, the musketry continuous and deadly along the entire 
 line. Half-past four P. M., Carroll's brigade of Gibbon's division advanced to the 
 support of Getty's right, on the right of the plank road ; and a few minutes 
 later, Owen's brigade of Gibbon's division was also ordered into action in sup- 
 port of General Getty on the right and left of the Orange plankroad. During 
 this contest, the Irish Brigade, commanded by Colonel Smythe of the Second Del- 
 
426 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OP THE POTOMAC. 
 
 and hidden by the forest, met the advancing Knes with such 
 well-dehvered and murderous volleys that Hancock was every 
 time checked. Mott's division gave way, and Brigadier-Gen- 
 eral Alexander Hays, in going to repair the break in the line. 
 was shot dead while gallantly leading his command in the 
 thickest of the fight.* 
 
 The heary- firing borne to the ears of Generals Grant and 
 Meade at the Old Wilderness Tavern, attested the severity of 
 the work that was going on at this important junction of 
 roads. It was judged that the pressure on Hancock might be 
 relieved by sending a force from Warren's corps to strike 
 southward through the forest and fall u^^on the flank and rear 
 of Hill. Wadsworth's division and the brigade of Baxter 
 were accordingly dispatched late in the afternoon to execute 
 this movement. But great difficulty was experienced by these 
 troops in making their way through the thicket, and it was 
 dark by the time Wadsworth got his force in position to ap- 
 ply it in the manner directed. His troops lay on their arms 
 during the night where darkness found them, which was in 
 contact with the skirmishers on Hill's left flank — a situation 
 in which Wadsworth might attack with much advantage the 
 following morning.t 
 
 aware Volunteers, and Colonel Brooke, Fourth Brigade, both of Barlow's divi- 
 sion, Second Corps, attacked the enemy vigorously on his right and drove his 
 line for some distance. The Irish Brigade was heavily engaged, and although 
 four-fifths of its numbers were recruits, it behaved with great steadiness and 
 gallantry, losing largely in kiUed and wounded. The section of Kicketts' bat- 
 tery which moved down the plankroad when Birney and Getty attacked, suf- 
 fered severely in men and horses. It was captured at one time during the 
 fight, but was retaken by detachments from the Fourteenth Indiana and 
 Eighth Ohio Volunteers of Carroll's brigade. It was then withdrawn, and re- 
 placed by a section of Dow's Sixth Maine battery." 
 
 * Meade : Report of the Rapidan Campaign. 
 
 f The column under command of General Wadsworth moved about four o'clock. 
 After entering the woods southeast of the Lacy House, line of battle was formed. 
 After proceeding half a mile the skirmish line of the enemy was driven in and 
 steadily pushed until it was too dark to see, when the troops halted in line ni 
 battle for the night. The line had gradually swung round so as to be facing 
 more nearly south, between Widow Tap's [see map] and the Brock road — the. 
 left being perhaps half a mile from the Brock road. 
 
GRANTS OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 427 
 
 Hancock continued liis unavailing efforts to drive Hill till 
 eight o'clock, when night shutting down on the darkUng woods 
 ended the struggle. The combatants lay on their arms, mutu- 
 ally exhausted after the fierce wrestle ; and many corpses lay 
 in the tangled brakes and bushes, evidences of the bloody 
 work done that day. 
 
 The action of the 5th of May was not so much a battle as 
 the fierce grapple of two mighty wrestlers suddenly meeting. 
 But it had determined that there should be a battle, and it 
 had drawn the relative positions of the combatants. The 
 moving Union columns, almost surprised in flagrante delicto, 
 had succeeded in making a junction ; and if it had been Lee's 
 purpose to interpose between them, he was foiled in this. The 
 antagonist armies and their commanders were in the highest 
 mettle, both were filled with aggressive ardor, and the proof 
 of this was that each determined to attack on the morrow. 
 Yet each felt that in the encounter there would be need of all 
 his strength, and whatever corps of each had not yet come up 
 were urgently ordered forward. On the Union side all had 
 ah'eady arrived, saving the Ninth Corps under General Burn- 
 side, who had been instructed to hold position on the Orange 
 and Alexandria Railroad for twenty-four hours after the army 
 had crossed the Rapidan. This corps was at once summoned 
 to the front, and early on the morning of the 6th, after a rapid 
 and arduous march, it reached the field and took position in 
 the interval between Warren's corj^s on the turnpike and Han- 
 cock's on the plankroad. The Union line of battle, as formed 
 by dawn of the 6th, was therefore in the order of Sedgwick on 
 the right next Warren, and Burnside and Hancock on the 
 left. It ran north and south, faced westward, and was in 
 extent about five miles. 
 
 On the side of the Confederates, Longstreet's corps, which 
 at the opening of the campaign had to march up from Gor- 
 donsville (distant forty miles), had not been up to participate 
 in the action of the 5th ; but that night it bivouacked not far 
 off, and its presence early in the impending battle was 
 
428 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 assiu-ed. Lee maintained tlie same ground he had held the 
 day before — ^Ewell on the left across the turnpike, and Hill 
 on the right across the plankroad ; but whereas, on that day, 
 owing to the suddenness with which they were precipitated 
 into action, there had been no connection between them, they 
 now extended to meet each other and form a continuous 
 fi'ont. It was appointed that Longstreet on his arrival should 
 come upon the right flank of Hill's corps. 
 
 The field where the first rencounter of the armies had 
 taken place, and where it was now decreed the battle should 
 be fought, was that region known as " The Wilderness." I 
 have already touched on some of the characteristic features 
 of this region in the recital of the action of the 5th ; but it is 
 necessary that these should be full}^ realized in order to gain 
 a just appreciation of this singular and terrible combat. It 
 is impossible to conceive a field worse adapted to the move- 
 ments of a grand army. The whole face of the country is 
 thickly wooded, with only an occasional opening, and inter- 
 sected by a few narrow wood-roads. But the woods of the 
 Wilderness have not the ordinary features of a forest. The 
 region rests on a belt of mineral rocks, and, for above a hun- 
 dred years, extensive mining has here been carried on.* To 
 
 * Tlie mines of this region were first worked in the early part of the last 
 eentury by Alexander Spottswood, then governor of Vitginia. Colonel Byrd, 
 in his " Progress of the Mines," published in 1732, gives many interesting de- 
 tails of this region, from which it appears that Germanna, now known only as 
 a ford, was once a place of some celebrity. " This famous town [Germanna] 
 consists of Colonel Spottswood 's enchanted castle on one side of the street and 
 a baker's dozen of ruinous tenements on the other, where so many German 
 families had dwelt some years ago ; but are now removed ten miles higher, in 
 the fork of the Rappahannock, to land of their own. In the evening the 
 noble colonel came home Irom his mines. I let him understand that besides 
 the pleasure of paying him a visit, I came to be instructed by so great a master 
 m the mystery of making iron, wherein he had led the way, and was the 
 Tubal Cain of Virginia. He corrected me a little there, by assuring me that he 
 was not only the first in this country, but the first in North America, who had 
 erected a regular furnace." Another writer, of a still earlier period, thus 
 speaks : " Beyond Colonel Spottswood's furnace, above the Falls of Rappahan- 
 nock River, within view of the vast mountains, he has founded a town called 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN 429 
 
 feed the mines the timber of the country for many miles 
 around liad been cut down, and in its place there had arisen 
 a dense undergrowth of loAv-limbed and scraggy pines, stiff 
 and bristling chinkapins, scrub-oaks, and hazel. It is a 
 region of gloom and the shadow of death. Manoeuvring here 
 was necessarily out of the question, and only Indian tactics 
 told. The troops could only receive direction by a point of 
 the compass ; for not only were the lines of battle entirely 
 hidden from the sight of the commander, but no officer could 
 see ten files on each side of him. Artillery was wholly ruled 
 out of use ; the massive concentration of three hundred guns 
 stood silent, and only an occasional piece or section could 
 be brought into play in the road-sides. Cavalry was stiU 
 more useless. But in that horrid thicket there lurked two 
 hundred thousand men, and through it lurid fires played ; and, 
 though no array of battle could be seen, there came out of its 
 depths the crackle and roll of musketry like the noisy boiling 
 of some hell-caldron that told the dread story of death. Such 
 was the field of the battle of the Wilderness ; and General 
 Grant appointed that at five o'clock of the morning the fight 
 should be renewed. Combinations or grand tactics there 
 were none ; the order of battle was simple, and was to all the 
 corps — Attack along the whole hne. 
 
 It is a striking proof of the aggressive determination ani- 
 mating both commanders, that Lee, also, that morning had 
 resolved upon assuming the offensive. His plan was to 
 dehver an overwhelming blow on the left of the Union army 
 — a point well chosen, since this was Grant's strategic flank, 
 the carrying of which would force him back against the 
 Eapidan. It was, however, impossible to strike this blow ef- 
 fectively until Longstreet's corps, which had not yet arrived, 
 
 Germanna, from some Germans sent over by Queen Anne. Beyond this is 
 seated the colony of Germans of Palatines, with allowance of good quantity of 
 rich land, who thrive very well and live happily, and entertain generously." 
 Hugh Jones : " Present Condition of Virginia," 1724. The latter syllable of 
 the name S-pottswood, latinized forms with the former part the name of th« 
 county of Spottsy]vania^ 
 
430 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 should come up. To distract attention, therefore, Lee re- 
 solved to make a threatening demonstration against the 
 Union right. Thus it came about, that fifteen minutes before 
 the time appointed by Grant for the general attack, a sudden 
 outburst of musketry from the direction of Sedgwick an- 
 nounced that Lee was beforehand with him in offensive pur- 
 poses. 
 
 The attack was made upon Seymour's brigade on the ex- 
 treme right, involved the whole of Ricketts' division, and then 
 Wright's. But, as has been seen, it had no seriovis character, 
 and was not pushed with much vigor ; so that Sedgwick not 
 only yielded no ground, but was able to push his front for- 
 ward a few hundred yards. At the same time, Warren and 
 Hancock joined in the general attack. But as the left was 
 the point at which, as by common consent, the fiercest dis- 
 pute took place, I shall first of all set forth the sequence of 
 events on that flank. 
 
 When, at five o'clock, Hancock opened his attack by an 
 advance of his two right divisions under Birney, together 
 with Getty's command,* and pushed forward on the right and 
 left of the Orange plankroad, the onset was made with such 
 vigor, and Lee was yet so weak on that flank, owing to the 
 non-arrival of Longstreet,t that, for a time, it seemed as 
 though a great victory would then be snatched. At the same 
 time that Hancock opened a direct attack, Wadswortli's divi- 
 sion,| which had the evening before secured a position to assail 
 Hill's flank, took up the action, and fought its way across that 
 part of the Second Corps posted on the right of the plank- 
 
 * The brigades of Owen and Carroll of Gibbon's division supported. 
 
 f It would appear, also, that even Hill's corps was not all up ; for Anderson's 
 division had been left behind to guard certain fords of the Rapidan, and did 
 not arrive for some hours. 
 
 J " During the night I sent instructions to General Wadsworth to form Ms 
 line northeast and southwest, and go straight through. Precisely at the hour 
 the fighting began. Wadsworth fought his way entirely across the Second 
 Oorps front to the south side of the plankroad, and wheeling round coni- 
 nipnced driving the enemy up the plankroad." — Warren : Notes on the Battle 
 of the Wilderness. 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 431 
 
 road. The combined attack orerpowered the Confederates, 
 and after an hour's severe contest, the whole hostile front was 
 carried, and Hill's divisions under Wilcox and Heth were 
 driven for a mile and a half through the woods under heavy 
 loss and back on the trains and artillery and the Confederate 
 headquarters.* But here, whether the significance of the suc- 
 cess was not understood, or because further advance was 
 rendered impossible, owing to the disintegration of Hancock's 
 line in advancing so far through the thickets, a halt was cried, 
 and a readjustment of the line made. This pause, as will 
 presently appear, forfeited all the gain ; for, at the height of 
 Hill's confused retreat, Anderson's division, soon followed by 
 the head of Longstreet's column, came on the ground. When, 
 therefore, about nine o'clock, after an interval of two hours, 
 taken up in the rehabilitation of the line, Hancock, who had 
 been re-enforced by Stevenson's division of the Ninth Corps, 
 in addition to Wadsworth's division, resumed the advance, he 
 met a bitter opposition, and though furious fighting took 
 place, he gained no more headway.f 
 
 That it was Longstreet that thus met him, General Han- 
 cock did not, at this time, know. Indeed, Longstreet's attack 
 had been anticipated in a very different direction ; and the 
 manner in which this expectation influenced Hancock's dispo- 
 sitions is a striking illustration of the kind of agencies that 
 effect the issue of battles. It was known during the night that 
 Longstreet's corps, v/hich had not heen in the previous day's 
 action, was marching up from the direction of Orange Court- 
 house, to reach the field by a route that would strike Han- 
 cock's left flank and rear. That officer was cautioned officially 
 
 * I use here no stronger language than that employed by General Long- 
 street, in a description he gave the writer of the situation of affairs at the mo- 
 ment of his arrival. 
 
 ■j- The advance was made by Birney's and Mott's divisions, and Webb's, Car- 
 roll's, and Owen's brigades of Gibbon's division, all of the Second Corps, together 
 with Stevenson's division of the Ninth and Wadsworth's of the Fifth. Hancock 
 had been so strengthened that now he had with him nearly one-half tlifi 
 •UTuy. 
 
482 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 to beAvare of tliis.* It was with tlie view to provide against 
 this menace that, in attacking in the morning, Hancock ad- 
 vanced only his right divisions, and allowed his left, under 
 Gibbon, to remain on the original line on the Brock road ; sc 
 that, in throwing forward his right, he pivoted on his left, and, 
 with that flank, clung to the road on which it was expected 
 Longstreet would come up. Now, at the time Hancock began 
 his attack, Longstreet was really making the movement indi- 
 cated ; but the assault was executed with such energy, and so 
 completely disrupted Hill, that Lee found it necessary to re- 
 call Longstreet from his flank march, and bring him forward 
 to meet the more pressing necessity in front. Hancock, how- 
 ever, unaware of this, still looked nervously to his left ; and 
 though, after the successful advance of his right, he directed 
 General Gibbon to advance with Barlow's division, and press 
 the enemy's right, the approach of Longstreet's corps on the 
 flank gave such constant apprehension, that Gibbon advanced 
 only one brigade (that of Colonel Frank), which, after an ob- 
 stinate resistance, succeeded in forming connection with the 
 left of the advanced line.f This apprehension was, through- 
 out the forenoon, constantly revived and strengthened by 
 various incidents that befell. Thus, about eight o'clock, an 
 outburst of fight was heard considerably to the left, where 
 Sheridan, with a division of horse, had engaged the enemy ; 
 but, instead of his encountering Longstreet, as Hancock sup- 
 posed, it turned out to be Stuart's cavalry he had met. 
 Some time after this, there came in a report that infantry 
 was moving up on the Brock road from the direction of 
 Todd's Tavern, about two miles from Hancock's left ; and as 
 
 * Hancock : Report of the Battle of the Wilderness. 
 
 f " I do not know why my order to attack with Barlow's division was not 
 more fully carried out ; but it was probably owing to the apprehended ap. 
 proach of Longstreet's corps on my left about that time. But had my left 
 advanced, as directed by me in several orders, I believe the overthrow of the 
 enemy would have been assured. At all events, an attack on the enemy's 
 right by the troops of Barlow's division would have prevented the turning of 
 the left of Mott's division, which occurred later in the day." — Hancock's Report. 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 433 
 
 he knew lie bad no infantry in tliat quarter, he again supposed 
 it to be Longstreet, and took measures to meet him.-' But 
 the reported cohimn of infantry proved to be a body of sev- 
 eral hundred Union convalescents, who had come to the front 
 by way of Chancellorsville, and were now following the route 
 of the Second Corps around by Todd's Tavern. Thus it was 
 that the suspicion, continually reawakened, that Longstreet 
 was moving to turn Hancock's left flank, resulted in para- 
 lyzing a large number of his best troojDs — troops that would 
 otherwise have gone into action at the time when the disrup- 
 tion of Hill's force opened a rare opportunity for a decisive 
 blow. 
 
 The contest that signaUzed Longstreet's arrival on Han- 
 cock's front, and restored the integrity of the shattered Con- 
 federate right, now died away ; and for some hours, up to 
 nearly noon, there was a lull. During this time, Longstreet's 
 troops continued to arrive ; and when, at length, his line had 
 acquired breadth and weight by the incoming force, it was 
 advanced, and Hancock's troops, which had first halted, now 
 began to feel a heavy pressure. The attack first fell on the 
 left of the advanced Hne, held by the brigade of Frank. This 
 force Longstreet's troops fairly overran ; and, brushing it 
 away, they struck the left of Mott's division, which was, ia 
 turn, swept back in confusion ; and though Hancock endeav- 
 ored, by swinging back his left, and forming hue along the 
 plankroad, to secure the advanced position still held by his 
 right, it was found impossible to do so, and he had to content 
 himself with rallying and re-forming the troops on the original 
 line, along the Brock road, from which they had advanced in 
 the morning. Wadsworth, on the right of Hancock, opposed 
 the most heroic efforts to the onset of the enemy ; but after 
 several ineffectual charges, his troops broke into the retreat ; 
 and while striving to rally them, that patriotic and high- 
 
 * Brooke's brigade, of Barlow's division, was sent out on the Brock road to 
 the extreme left, where a strong breastwork was constructed across the road, 
 and Leasure's brigade, of the Ninth Corps, and Eustis' brigade, of the Sixth 
 Corps, were held ready to support. 
 
434 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 souled gentleman and brave soldier received a bullet in his 
 head, and died within the enemy's lines the following day. 
 
 But in the very fury and tempest of the Confederate onset 
 the advance was of a sudden stayed by a cause at the moment 
 unknown. This afterwards proved to have been the fall of 
 the head of this attack. 
 
 Longstreet had made his dispositions for a decisive blow ; 
 for while advancing one force in front, he sent another to 
 move round Hancock's left and lay hold of the Brock road. 
 At the time the Union troops were giving ground, and the 
 Confederates were pushing on, that officer, with his staff, rode 
 forward in fi'ont of his column ; when suddenly confrontmg a 
 portion of his own flanking force, the cavalcade was mistaken 
 for a party of Union horsemen, and received a volley under 
 which Longstreet fell, severely wounded.* General Lee then 
 took formal charge of that part of the field ; but it was four 
 hours — that is, about four o'clock of the afternoon — before 
 he could get things in hand to carry out the intent of his 
 lieutenant. Before detaihng the sequel of events at the left, 
 it will, however, be proper to glance rapidly at what had 
 meanwhile taken place on the centre and right of the field. 
 
 The opening of the combat on the right, under Sedgwick, 
 has been already seen ; and the history of what subsequently 
 passed here can only be told in the heavy losses sustained by 
 the Sixth Corps, in unavailing attempts to carry intrenched 
 positions. On Sedgwick's left was Warren's corps, placed to 
 the right and left of the Orange turnpike ; but as Hancock's 
 needs had compelled the detachment to his assistance of two 
 divisions of the Fifth Corps, the remaining two divisions 
 (Griffin's and Crawford's) held a simply defensive attitude. 
 
 * General Longstreet stated to the writer tliat lie saw they were his own 
 men, but in vain shouted to them to cease firing. He also expressed, with great 
 emphasis, his opinion of the decisive blow he would have inflicted had he not 
 been wounded. " I thought," said he, " that we had another Bull Run on you, 
 for I had made my dispositions to seize the Brock road." But on my pointing 
 out that Hancock's left had not advanced, but remained on the original line 
 covering that road, he admitted that that altered the complexion of affairs. 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND COMPAIGN. 435 
 
 Severe skirmisliing took place throughout the day ; but the 
 enemy in front was found to be well intrenched, and no im- 
 pression was made on his position. 
 
 In the action of the previous day, there had existed a con- 
 siderable interval between Warren's corps on the turnpike 
 and Hancock's corps on the plankroad. It was designed that 
 Burnside's command should advance through this opening ; 
 and the point on which his attack was directed gave high 
 hopes of a successful issue. Advancing through the woods in 
 the morning, the enemy was encountered on a wooded crest 
 near the plankroad. An attack on this position was not 
 thought advisable, and the corps was moved further to the 
 left. It was not till afternoon, and subsequent to Hancock's 
 repulse, that it became engaged with the enemy. No decisive 
 result followed, and towards evening Burnside feU back and 
 intrenched. * 
 
 The long lull that had followed the successful attack of 
 Longstreet upon Hancock gave the latter time to thoroughly 
 re-establish his position, now strengthened by fresh troops 
 sent to him by General Meade. His immediate front was 
 cleared by a well-executed movement made by a brigade 
 under Colonel Leasure, across its whole extent from left to 
 rightjt and he was prepared to meet the enemy, who, how- 
 
 * Leasure's brigade belonged to the Ninth Corps, and held position towards 
 the left of Hancock's line, under the immediate command of General Gibbon. 
 Under orders from Hancock, Colonel Leasure formed his command at right 
 angles with Hancock's front : his right, at about one hundred paces from the 
 breastworks, swept across the whole front of Mott's and Birney's divisions, 
 and crossed the Orange plankroad to the right of Hancock's line, encountering 
 in his progress what he supposed to be a brigade of the enemy, which fell back 
 in disorder without engaging him. 
 
 f " The head of the column passed the Lacy House at daybreak. Nothing 
 was encountered until reaching the field this side of Wilderness Run ; here 
 the flankers on the right became engaged with the enemy's skirmishers. As 
 soon as the head of the column emerged into the field, a rebel battery at 
 Tuning's opened on them. Some fifty shots were fired, but no one was hun. 
 The column halted : a strong skirmish line advanced across the run, up the 
 slope covered with thick pines ; and as soon as they showed themselves in the 
 edge of Tuning's field, they received a musketry fire and fell back. Per- 
 
436 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 ever, made no demonstration until four o'clock in the after- 
 noon. At that hour, Lee, having gotten well in hand the 
 troops of Longstreet and Hill, made an impetuous assault 
 upon Hancock's intrenched position, pressing up to within less 
 than a hundred yards of his front line. Here the Confeder- 
 ates halted, and continued a long and uninterrupted fire of 
 musketry, which, however, had little effect on the troops be- 
 hind their substantial breastwork of logs, whence they deliv- 
 ered a sharp fusillade ; and the repulse of the Confederate attack 
 would have been easy, but for an accident here occurring. In 
 fi'ont of the left of the line a fire had, during the afternoon, 
 sprung up in the woods, and at the time of the attack this had 
 communicated to the log breastworks on that part of the line. 
 At this critical moment they became a mass of flame, which 
 it was found impossible to subdue, and which extended for 
 many hundred yards to the right and left. The intense heat 
 and the smoke, which was driven by the wind directly in the 
 faces of the men, prevented them, or portions of the yet unin- 
 jured line, from firing over the parapet. The enemy, taking 
 advantage of this, swept forward ; a considerable body of the 
 troops in the first line gave way, and retreated in great disor- 
 
 haps one division of the Ninth Corps was deployed in line of battle on the 
 left of the road in the hollow. A long consultation now ensued between Gen- 
 erals Burnside and Park, and Colonel Comstock. No one liked the idea of 
 taking the hill by assault. * * * tj^q ^^^^ ^^ entertained that 
 General Crawford was to advance and join on the right of the Ninth Corps ; 
 but I explained that if Crawford advanced at all, he would close on the right of 
 Griffin, and advance up the pike away from the Ninth Corps. More than an 
 hour was lost doing nothing, while the firing over by Wadsworth grew very 
 heavy. They finally concluded to abandon this route, and move further to the 
 left, aiming at a point half-way between Tuning's and Tap's. The corps be- 
 came engaged there about noon, with no decisive result, and fell back towards 
 e\'ening and intrenched." — Notes of a Staff" OlBcer. 
 
 Regarding the anticipated effect of Burnside's movements. General Hancock 
 uses the following language : 
 
 " I am not aware Avhat movements were made by General Burnside near 
 Parker's Store, on the morning of the 6th ; but I experienced no relief from the 
 attack I was informed he would make across my front— a movement long and 
 Bnxioiisly waited for." 
 
GRANTS OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 437 
 
 der towards Cliancellorsville, and tbo enemy, pressing into tlio 
 breastworks, crowned it with their standards. Yet the victory 
 was short-hved ; it was only the more adventurous that h-ad 
 penetrated the breastworks (inside of which, indeed, a few 
 were killed), and these were quickly driven out by a forward 
 rush of Carroll's brigade. Lee then abandoned the attack, in 
 which he had suffered a considerable loss. 
 
 This closed the main action of the day ; but just before 
 dark, Ewell moved a considerable force around the right flank 
 of the wing held by Ricketts' division of the Sixth Corps, and, 
 in conjunction with a demonstration in front, succeeded in 
 forcing this division back in considerable confusion, making 
 prisoners of Brigadier-Generals Seymour and Shaler, and a 
 considerable number of men. The attack produced a good 
 deal of alarm ; but the break was soon repaired, and darkness 
 prevented the Confederates following up the success of this 
 sally. 
 
 When the dawn of the third day (Saturday, May 7th) came 
 to light up the dark hollows of the Wilderness, neither army 
 showed any disposition to take the offensive. The terrible 
 conflict of the past two days had left both combatants bleed- 
 ing and exhausted, and the events of the 7th were confined to 
 a severe but indecisive combat between the opposing cavalry 
 at Todd's Tavern. 
 
 The heavy losses Lee had suffered in the battle, in which 
 he had acted on the aggressive quite as much as his antago- 
 nist, admonished a more cautious conduct ; and though he was 
 wiUing to be assailed, he dared not venture further attack. 
 When, therefore, the skirmish line was thrown forward on the 
 morning of the 7th, the Confederates were found standing at 
 bay behind their intrenchments.* 
 
 * General Grant appears to have drawn an inference from Lee's remaining 
 behind Ms iutrenchments on the morning of the 7th, which facts do not justify. 
 " From this," says he, '' it was evident to my mind that the two days' fighting 
 had satisfied him of his inability to further maintain the contest in the open 
 field, notwithstanding his advantage of ix)sition."— Report of Operations, p. 6 
 
438 CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 But the like reasons made Grant equally little minded to 
 renew tlie assault. Yet the sit^^ation was such, that it was 
 necessary either to go forward or to go backward. 
 
 Had General Grant chosen to adopt the latter course, he 
 would not have been without precedents. But this step was 
 not only unbefitting his position — it was altogether con- 
 trary to his bent of mind. There is much in that com- 
 mander's temper that recalls that old marshal w^hom his 
 soldiers named " Marshal Forwarts ;" and as Blucher, in the 
 great campaign in France, that ended in the capitulation of 
 Napoleon, would hear of nothing but marching straight on 
 Paris, so Grant, his eyes fixed immovably on Kichmond as the 
 goal of aU his efforts, the prize he resolved to seize, through 
 whatever seas of blood he might have to wade, pronounced 
 the magisterial w^ord, " Forward !" When darkness came, 
 the columns began their march for Spottsylvania. 
 
 The battle of the Wilderness is scarcely to be judged as an 
 ordinary battle. It will happen in the course as in the begin- 
 ning of every war, that there occur actions in which ulterior 
 purposes, and the combinations of a mihtary programme 
 play very little part ; but which are simply trials of strength. 
 The battle of the Wilderness was such a mortal combat — a 
 combat in which the adversaries aimed each, respectively, at a 
 result that should be decisive : Lee to crush the campaign in 
 its inception, by driving the Army of the Potomac across the 
 Kapidan ; Grant to destroy Lee, 
 
 Out of this fierce determination came a close and deadly 
 grapple of the two armies — a battle terrible and indescribable 
 
 It is not entirely clear what tlae lieutenant-general means by " maintaining 
 the contest in the open field." During the two days' battle, both armies pivoted 
 on intrenchments covering their entire front. From these, one side or the 
 other sallied forth to attack his adversary, who endeavored to receive the at- 
 tack from behind his breastworks. Lee attacked Grant's force behind in- 
 trenched lines, quite as much as Grant attacked Lee's force behind intrenched 
 lines. The real conclusion at which hoth commanders had arrived was, that 
 farther assault on these lines was hopeless, 
 
GllANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 439 
 
 in those gloomy woods. There is sometliing horrible, yet fas- 
 cinating, in the mystery shrouding this strangest of battles 
 ever fought — a battle which no man could see, and whose 
 progress could only be foUow^ed by the ear, as the sharj) and 
 crackling volleys of musketry, and the alternate Union cheer 
 and Confederate yell told how the fight surged and swelled. 
 The battle continued two days ; yet such was the mettle of 
 each combatant that it decided nothing. It was in every 
 respect a drawn battle ; and its only result appeared in the 
 tens of thousands of dead and wounded in blue and gray that 
 lay in the thick woods. The Union loss exceeded fifteen 
 thousand, and tlie Southern loss was about eight thousand.* 
 
 That this result was a grievous disappointment to General 
 Grant will be readily understood, if account be taken of the 
 expectation with which he set out upon the campaign. Gen- 
 eral Grant at this time shared an opinion commonly enter- 
 tained in that part of the country where his own successes 
 had been won — the opinion that the Army of the Potomac 
 had never been fought to the uttermost. This belief was, per- 
 haps, natural under the circumstances ; for there was much 
 that, to one at a distance, where the peculiar nature of the 
 task given the xVrmy of the Potomac to do was little under- 
 stood, might inspire this belief. Nevertheless it was fallacious. 
 
 Sharing this view. General Grant hoped at one blow to 
 finish the troublesome, and seemingly invulnerable, adver- 
 sary. And to achieve this end, he made little account of 
 those arts that accomplish results by the direction and combi- 
 
 * This estimate of loss is inferential respecting both sides. The tabular 
 statement of casualties in the Army of the Potomac, embodied in the report of 
 General Meade, gives an aggregate of twenty-nine thousand four hundred and 
 ten killed, wounded, and missing, for the whole period between the 5th and 
 12th of May. But as the losses in the actions subsequent to the Wilderness, 
 and previous to the 12th of May (which was the date of the main battle at 
 Spottsylvania Courthouse), were probably not much over ten thousand, the 
 aggregate of casualties in the Wilderness might perhaps be safely carried 
 ap to nearer twenty thousand. In estimating Lee's losses at eight thousand, 
 I proceed on the basis of the aggregate of Confederate casualties during the en- 
 tire campaign. 
 
440 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 nation of forces ; for at this period he avowedly (despised 
 manoeuvring.* His reliance was exclusively on the applica- 
 tion of bnite masses, in rapid and remorseless blows, or, as 
 he has himself phrased it, in " hammering continuously." It 
 soon appeared, however, that the hammer would itself break 
 on the anvil ; and, taught a lesson by this, he was thereafter 
 more disposed to accept whatever aid the resources of strategy 
 afford. Great results, indeed, are seldom won save by the 
 employment of both agencies. A well-considered offensive is 
 never incompatible with so manoeuvring as to secure advan- 
 tageous conditions to strike ; and the commander who at- 
 tempts to renounce these is seldom long in having a costly 
 proof of his error. 
 
 Disappointed though he was in the result of the battle, 
 General Grant was, nevertheless, not dismayed nor cast down ; 
 but, seizing the masses of his force, he launched them forward 
 to new trials of fortune. 
 
 III. 
 
 THE LINES OF SPOTTSYLVANIA. 
 
 The determination of General Grant to move southward 
 from the Wilderness was formed early on Saturday, the 7th. 
 His purpose was, to plant himself between Lee's army and 
 Richmond, by a movement vipon Spottsylvania Courthouse, 
 
 * I trust the reader will understand that I do not make this statement at 
 random. It is founded on the testimony of the highest authority, and I may 
 mention an incident that corroborates this statement. Shortly before the 
 opening of the Rapidan campaign, General Meade, in conversation with the 
 lieutenant-general, was telling him that he proposed to manoeuvre thus and 
 so ; whereupon General Grant stopped him at the word " manoeuvre," and said, 
 "Oh! I never mauceuvre." This characteristic utterance, which the suavity of 
 biographers might readily pass over in silence, cannot be omitted here ; 
 for it is the proof of a frame of mind that essentially influenced the com- 
 plexion of the campaign. The battle of the Wilderness can hardly be un- 
 derstood, save as the act of a commander who " never manoeuvred." It was re- 
 marked that he was not so unwilling to avail himself thereafter of this resource. 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 44X 
 
 fifteen miles southeast of the battle-field of the Wilderness. 
 The march of the infantry was not to be begun until after 
 nightfall ; but it was necessary to make earher disposition of 
 the immense trains ; and for this purj^ose, they were with- 
 drawn from the battle-field in the middle of the afternoon, 
 and sent to Chancellorsville, there to park for the night. 
 This movement of the trains apprised the enemy of Grant's 
 withdrawal, but not of his objective ; and it was by a mere 
 accident that a Confederate corps marched towards Spottsyl- 
 vania that night.* 
 
 The direct route to Spottsylvania Courthouse is by the 
 Brock road, via Todd's Tavern. On this road, the Fifth 
 Corps, under General Warren, was to take the advance, and, 
 by a rapid march, seize Spottsylvania Courthouse. Han- 
 cock's corps was to follow on the same line, while the corps 
 of Sedgwick and Burnside were to move on an exterior route, 
 by way of Chancellor sviUe.t The route of march of Lee, in 
 
 * The accident befell in tliis wise. Lee seeing that Grant was moving off 
 somewhere, but not knowing whether towards Fredericksburg or Spottsylva- 
 nia, instructed Anderson, now commanding Longstreet's corps, to draw out his 
 corps from the breastworks and camp it in readiness to move to Spottsylvania 
 i/i the morning. Anderson not being able to find a good place to bivouac (the 
 woods being on fire), legan the march that night, about ten o'clock. 
 
 t The following order of march will assist those who desire to study the 
 logiBtics of this movement : 
 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac, May 7, 3 p. m. 
 The following movements are ordered for to-day and to-night : 
 1st. The trains of the Sixth Corps authorized to accompany the troops will 
 be moved, at four o'clock P. M., to Chancellorsville, and park on the left of the 
 road, and held ready to follow the Sixth Corps during the night march. 
 
 2d. The trains of the Fifth Corps authorized to accompany the troops will 
 be moved, at five o'clock p. M., to Chancellorsville, following the trains of the 
 Sixth Corps, and parking with them, and held ready to follow those trains in 
 the movement to-night. 
 
 3d. The trains of the Second Corps authorized to accompany the troops will 
 be moved, at six o'clock P. M., to Chancellorsville, and park on the right of the 
 I road, and held ready to move at the same hour with the other trains, by way of 
 ! Furnace's, to Todd's Tavern, keeping clear of the Brock road, which will bo 
 I used by the troops. 
 j 4th. Corps-commanders will send escorts with these trains. 
 
 6th. The Reserve Artillery wiU move at seven o'clock, by way of ChanceV 
 
442 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 order to foil his antagonist's design of planting himself T)e- 
 tween the Confederate army and Richmond, was by the road 
 from Parker's Store to Spottsylvania Courthouse, which runs 
 parallel with the Brock road, and a few miles west thereof. 
 The distance in each case is about equal.* 
 
 The vital interest of this turning movement centred in the 
 
 lorsville, Aldrich's, and Piney Branch Church, to the intersection of the road 
 from Piney Branch Church to Spottsylvania Courthouse, and the road from 
 Alsop's to Block House, and park to the rear of the last-named road, so as to 
 give room for the Sixth Corps. 
 
 6th. At half-past eight P. M., Major-General Warren, commanding Fifth 
 Corps, will move to Spottsylvania Courthouse, by way of Brock road and 
 Todd's Tavern. 
 
 7th. At eight and a half o'clock P. M., Major-General Sedgwick, command- 
 ing Sixth Corps, will move, by the pike and plankroad, to Chancellorsville, 
 when he will be joined by the authorized trains of his own corps and those of 
 the Fifth Corps ; thence, by way of Aldrich's and Piney Branch Church, to 
 Spottsylvania Courthouse, and the road from Alsop's to Block House. The 
 trains of Fifth Corps will then join the corps at Spottsylvania Courthouse. 
 
 8th. Major-General Hancock, commanding Second Corps, will move to 
 Todd's Tavern, by the Brock road, following Fifth CorjDs closely. 
 
 9th. Headquarters during the movement will be along the route of the Fifth 
 and Second corps, and at the close of the movement, near the Sixth. 
 
 10th. The pickets of the Fifth and Sixth corps will be withdrawn at one 
 o'clock A. M., and those of the Second at two A. M., and mil follow the routes of 
 their respective corps. 
 
 11th. The cavalry now under the command of Colonel Hammond will be 
 left by General Sedgwick at the Old Wilderness Tavern, and upon being in- 
 formed by General Hancock of the withdrawal of this corps and pickets, will 
 follow that corps. 
 
 12th. Corps-commanders will see that the movements are made with punc- 
 tuality and promptitude. 
 
 13th. Major-General Sheridan, commanding cavalry corps, will have a suf- 
 ficient force, on the approaches from the right, to keep the corps-commanders ad- 
 vised in time of the appearance of the enemy. 
 
 14th. It is understood that General Burnside's command wUl follow th« 
 Sixth Corps. 
 
 By command of Major-General Meade. 
 
 * General Grant (Report, p. 7) states, that "the enemy having become ap- 
 prised of our movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach thero 
 first." But if there be any difference in the distance of the routes travelled by 
 the rival armies, that of Lee was rather the longer. 
 
PLANoF THE BATTLE 
 AND LINES 
 
 Spottsylvania 
 Courthouse 
 
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GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 443 
 
 marcli of Warren to seize Spottsylvania Courthouse. But 
 though that officer threw the utmost ardor into the execution 
 of this purpose, it was, by causes now to be mentioned, first 
 retarded and finally foiled. 
 
 The advance of Warren's corps was begun at nine P. m. of 
 the 7th. Reaching Todd's Tavern, he was delayed for an 
 hour and a half by the cavahy escort of General Meade block- 
 ing the way. On advancing two miles beyond that point, at 
 about three A. M. of the 8th, he was again detained by the 
 cavalry division of General Merritt, which had the day before, 
 and up to a late hour of the night, been engaged in fighting 
 and driving the cavahy of Stuart, who had been sent by Lee 
 to hold the Brock road, and who still barred further ad- 
 vance.* Merritt, after two or three hours of ineffectual effort, 
 gave way to Warren, who advanced to clear his omti path. It 
 was by this time broad daylight. A couple of brigades of the 
 advance division, under Robinson, were deployed in line of 
 battle, while the remainder of the corps followed in column. 
 Numerous barricades obstructed the road, and considerable 
 loss occiu'red in removing these, several pioneers being kiUed 
 and wounded while chopping. Finally, at eight A. m. of the 
 8th, the column emerged from the w^oods into a clearing, 
 two miles north of Spottsylvania Courthouse.f Beyond this 
 are woods again, and then the ground rises into the Spottsyl- 
 vania Ridge. 
 
 Forming in line, Robinson's division advanced over thn 
 plain. Thus far, only Stuart's dismounted troopers had been 
 encountered, and no other opposition was anticipated; but 
 when half-way across the field, and on the point of rising the 
 
 * '< At nine P. M., the army began to move towards Spottsylvania Coui-t- 
 house, the Fifth Corps having the advance on the Brock road. We were de- 
 layed about an hour and a half by the cavalry escort of General Meade, and on 
 reaching a point two miles beyond Todd's Tavern, were retarded about three 
 hours by Merrill's cavalry endeavoring to clear the way for us. They gave it 
 up about six A. M. (Slaj 8th), and got out of our way."— Warren : Notes on the 
 Hapidan Campaign. 
 
 t This clearing will be noted on the accompanying map as that marked 
 " Alsop'd." 
 
444 CAISIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 crest, the troops were met by a savage musketry fire from in- 
 fantry. Owing to their severe experiences in the Wilderness, 
 and the night march, without rest, the men were in an ex- 
 cited and almost frightened condition, and the tendency to 
 stampede was so great, that General Warren had been com- 
 pelled to go in front of the leading brigade. When, there- 
 fore, they received a fire in front from the redoubtable foe 
 they had left in the Wilderness, the line wavered and fell 
 back in some confusion. General Eobinson was, at the same 
 time, severely wounded, which left the troops without their 
 commander at a critical moment, and they were with some 
 difficulty rallied and re-formed in the woods back of the open 
 plain. Griffin's division, which advanced on the right of Rob- 
 inson, soon afterwards received the same fire, with a like re- 
 sult.* During this episode, Crawford's division had come up. 
 It succeeded in driving the Confederates out of the woods on 
 Griffin's left ;t and Wadsworth's division (under General Cut- 
 
 * It will be observed on the map tbat the road forks at Alsop's. Robinson 
 took to the left, and Griffin to the right ; the latter, forming Bartlett's brigade 
 in line of battle in a ravine below Alsop's, advanced, with Ayres' and Sweitzer's 
 brigades on the road. Of Bartlett's brigade, the Eighty-third Pennsylvania 
 and Forty-fourth New York formed the first line, and the First Michigan and 
 Eighteenth Massachusetts the second. " The Eighty-third Pennsylvania fought 
 hand to hand with the Confederates, and pulled prisoners out of the works, and 
 brought them to the rear ; but the enemy, seeing no supports coming up, got a 
 flank fire on my right, from the fact of Robinson's division not pushing up in 
 line. The enemy attacking at the same time in front caused me to abandon 
 my position, and fall back of the second line, which was then formed, with 
 Colonel Sweitzer's brigade on the left, and General Ayres' on the right." — Bart 
 lett : Notes on the Rapidan Campaign. 
 
 " It so happened that Ayres' men in the road had good cover, the road be- 
 ing sunken about three feet below the level. They held their ground, thus 
 affording a rallying point for Bartlett's men ; and in a short time the line was 
 re-established, through the personal exertions of Generals Griffin, Ayres, and 
 Bartlett. They advanced a little way further, and held the line our corps oc- 
 supied while north of Spottsylvania." — Notes of a StaflF-Officer. 
 
 f Crawford double-quicked into the woods, and drove the enemy entirely 
 back, the Confederates leaving their dead and wounded on the field. " The 
 enemy encountered at this point was Barksdale's Mississippi brigade ; and 
 prisoners taken said they had travelled aU night to hurry in there, and that the 
 divisions of McLaws and Anderson were right behind." — Crawford : Notes on 
 the Rapidan Campaign. 
 
GRANT S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 445 
 
 ler) also arriving, drove them out of the woods on his right. A 
 line for the whole corps was then taken up, very close to the 
 enemy, and the troops fell to intrenching of their own accord. 
 The force encoimtered before Spottsylvania Courtliouse was 
 the head of Longstreet's column, which, having left the Wil- 
 derness battle-field almost simultaneously with Warren's setting 
 out, had hurried forward towards the threatened point, and, 
 being favored by the delays that had befallen Warren, reached 
 it in time to bar further progress. It is probable that a vig- 
 orous attack by an adequate force, any time during that day, 
 would have carried the position ; for the Confederate army 
 was but in process of arrival, and the defences, being such as 
 were improvised on the spot, were not formidable. But there 
 were various causes that prevented this. The task was too 
 much for the Fifth Corps alone ; and when, in the afternoon, 
 Sedgwick came up with the Sixth Corps, and took command 
 of the field, there v/as much delay in determining the disposi- 
 tions for attack. Moreover, Hancock's corps, which followed 
 Warren's route from the Wilderness, and was designed to be 
 \\athin supporting distance, was, owing to the occupation of 
 the road by other troops, halted in the morning, midway of 
 the march, at Todd's Tavern ; and, later, events so shaped 
 themselves, that Hancock was detained all day at Todd's 
 Tavern by General Meade, to meet an anticipated attempt of 
 Lee to fall upon the rear of the Union column.* 
 
 * At Todds Tavern, the Brock road is intersected by a road (the Catharpin 
 road) that connects the routes on which the rival armies were moving ; and as 
 hostile parties made their appearance close to the Union line of march, this 
 caused General Meade to retain Hancock's division all day at Todd's Tavern, 
 though one division (that of Gibbon) was in the afternoon sent forward towards 
 Spottsy] vania Courthouse. To observe the Catharpin road against any hostile 
 approach, Miles' brigade of Hancock's corps, with a brigade of Gregg's cavalry 
 and a battery of artillery, moved out in the afternoon, and took up a position 
 within a mile of Corbyn's Bridge. This Miles held, meeting only an artillery 
 fire, till he was recalled, late in the afternoon. While retiring, he was assailed 
 by Mahone's division of Hill's corps ; but Miles, with much skiU, repulsed tluj 
 attack. It would probably have sufficed to retain only a small masking force, 
 such as that of Miles. In this case Hancock would have been able to push on 
 to the critical front. His retention at Todd's Tavern was very unfortunate, and 
 
446 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OP THE POTOMAC. 
 
 To return to the front of operations. Sedgwick lia\'ing joined 
 Warren with a part of his corps, resolved, late in the after- 
 noon, to assault the position with such force as was available. 
 But much time was lost, and it was evening before any thing 
 was done. A partial attack was then made bj a New Jersey 
 brigade,* but it resulted in nothing. An advance was, how- 
 ev-er, made soon afterwards by Crawford's division, with better 
 fortune. It happened that a body of troops belonging to 
 Ewell's corps was marching in by the flank, and coming un- 
 expectedly upon Crawford's force, it was driven back for a 
 mile in confusion, losing a hundred prisoners and a flag. 
 Had the attack been made in stronger force, as was first in- 
 tended, the best results might have been espected.f 
 
 The operations of the day left the Confederates in posses- 
 sion of Spottsylvania Courthouse. Lee, in fact, had succeeded 
 in planting his army across Grant's line of march ; and having 
 drawn upon the Spottsylvania Eidge a bulwark of defence, he 
 was able, for twelve days, to hold the Army of the Potomac 
 in check, and exact another heavy dole of blood. 
 
 The army was all brought into position on a line in front of 
 Spottsylvania on the following day, Monday, the 9th, and the 
 cavalry under Sheridan was dispatched on a grand raid to cut 
 Lee's railroad communications. Sedgwick's corps took post 
 on the left of Warren, and Burnside's on the left of Sedg- 
 wick, forming the left of the army. Hancock came up from 
 Todd's Tavern, and, moving to the right, took position on 
 high ground overlooking the valley of the River Po, which, 
 circhng southward of Spottsylvania Courthouse, heads north- 
 ward to the west of that place. Hancock formed the right of 
 
 must be accounted ratlier timid generalship ; for the army, having been cut 
 loose from the Wilderness, should have been pushed to Spottsylvania with the 
 utmost vigor. The situation was such as to present quite as much danger to 
 the head of the column as to its rear ; and had Warren gained Spottsylvania 
 Courthouse, his position, with nothing within supporting distance, would have 
 been very critical. 
 
 * This brigade belonged to Neill's division of the Sixth Corps. 
 
 t Notes of a Staflf-Officer. 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 4_t7 
 
 tlie army. Aside from the movements to take up position, the 
 day was passed in quiet. The Confederate sharp-shooters 
 were, however, very active, and early in the day their deadly 
 aim brought down an illustrious victim in the person of Gen- 
 eral Sedgwick, the beloved chief of the Sixth Corps, who was 
 shot while standing in the breastworks along his line, and 
 almost instantly expired. The loss of this lion-hearted sol- 
 dier caused the profoundest grief among his comrades, and 
 throughout the army, which felt it could better have afforded 
 to sacrifice the best division. General Wright succeeded to 
 the command. 
 
 During the afternoon a Confederate wagon-train was ob- 
 served filing along the road leading into Spottsylvania oppo- 
 site Hancock's position. That officer was directed to make a 
 movement across the Po, partly with the hope of capturing 
 some of the train. Accordingly, towards evening of the 9th, 
 the Second Corps forced a crossing of the stream, the south 
 bank of which was observed by but a small force. The pas- 
 sage was effected with entire success, in face of many diffi- 
 culties of ground ; but night came on before the movement 
 could be brought to a head. Next morning, the 10th, Han- 
 cock pushed forward the development of his operation, and, 
 at the same time, bridged the stream at the points at which 
 his force had crossed. The Confederate train had aU been 
 safely retired within Spottsylvania Courthouse ; so that the 
 continuance of the enterprise was without any very well- 
 defined object. The Po, at Hancock's point of passage, 
 runs nearly eastward ; but near Spottsylvania Courthouse 
 it turns sharply southward. It therefore once more crossed 
 his hno of advance ;* and it was observed that the enemy 
 was in force behind intrenchments on Its eastern bank, 
 covering the approaches to Spottsj'lvania Courthouse. The 
 Po is here crossed by a wooden bridge two miles west of the 
 courthouse. But the passage was not practicable, as all 
 
 * Hancock, after crossing the Po, struck what is called the Block House 
 road, which crosses the Po on a covered bridge two mUeB west of Spottsjlvania. 
 
448 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 access was commanded by tlie enemy. Hancock, however, 
 succeeded in throwing Brooke's brigade across the stream 
 some distance above, and was proceeding to develop the ene- 
 my's strength, when suddenly the movement was suspended 
 by General Meade. While Hancock's movement was in prog- 
 ress that morning, it had been determined to make an attack 
 on the enemy on Warren's front and on that of the Sixth Corps, 
 and General Hancock was ordered to withdraw two divisions 
 from the south side of the Po, to assist the proposed assault. 
 
 In obedience to this order, the divisions of Gibbon and 
 Birney were retired, the rear of the latter being assailed in 
 the act. There then remained only the division of Barlow, 
 and as the enemy at this moment showed a disposition to 
 attack, Hancock was instructed to withdraw this also. 
 
 The order was given just as Barlow's sldrmishers were 
 being driven in, at two p. m. The operation immediately 
 became one of great delicacy ; for after, by skilful disposi- 
 tions, two brigades of the division had been withdrawn from 
 the front, the enemy, encouraged by what he deemed a forced 
 retreat, made a very vigorous assault on the two remaining 
 brigades, under Colonels Brooke and Brown. He, however, 
 met so deadly and determined a fire from these fine brigades 
 that he was repulsed with heavy loss. During the heat of the 
 contest the woods in the rear of the troops, and between them 
 and the river, took fire ; and in the midst of these appalling 
 perils, with a fierce foe in its front, and a burning forest in its 
 rear, the force, after checking the advance of the enemy bv 
 several stubborn stands, was retired across the Po. This was 
 not accomphshed without heavy loss, and many of the wound- 
 ed perished in the flames.* The remarkable coolness and 
 steadiness of the men ulone saved them from a great disaster. 
 One gun, the first ever lost by the Second Corps, had to be 
 abandoned in consequence of being sunk in a marsh. 
 Miles' brigade crossed last, taking up the ponton-bridge and 
 destroying the other. 
 
 * Hancock : Report of Spottsylvania. 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 449 
 
 This affair, tliough illustrating the steady valor of the 
 troops, was an unfortunate one in every respect. It was 
 undertaken without any very well-defined military object, and 
 abandoned under circumstances unfavorable to the spirit of 
 the troops, and highly encouraging to the enemy.* 
 
 The point against which the attack (to assist in which the 
 Second Corps had been retired across the Po) was designed 
 to be made, was a hill held by the enemy in front of Warren's 
 line.t This was, perhaps, the most formidable point along the 
 enemy's whole front. Its densely wooded crest was crowned 
 by earthworks, while the approach, which was swept by artil- 
 lery and musketry fire, was rendered more difficult and haz- 
 ardous by a heavy growth of low cedars, mostly dead, the 
 long bayonet-like branches of which, interlaced and pointing 
 in all directions, presented an almost impassable barrier to the 
 advance of a Hne of battle. | 
 
 The attack of this position had abeady been essayed during 
 the day by troops both of the Second and Fifth corps, and 
 with most unpromising results.§ When Hancock's divisions 
 joined the Fifth, an assault was made by the troops of both 
 corps at five o'clock; but it met a very bloody repulse. 
 The men struggled bravely against an impossible task, 
 
 * This action was regarded by the Confederates as so considerable a victory 
 that General Heth (commanding a division of Hill's corps), who directed it, 
 issued thereon a congratulatory order, which was indorsed by General Lee. 
 Upon this point General Hancock remarks : " Had not Barlow's fine division, 
 then in full strength, received imperative orders to withdraw, Heth's division 
 would have had no cause for congratulation." — Report of the Second Epoch of 
 the Rapid an Campaign. 
 
 f This point, known as Laurel Hill, will be noted on the accompanying map. 
 
 I Hancock : Report of Operations. 
 
 § Of the Second Corps, the brigades of Webb and Carroll of Gibbon's di\'i- 
 sion, had at eleven A. M. engaged in an attack of this position, in which they 
 suffered severe loss. At three P. M. the divisions ot Crawford and Cutler oi 
 Warren's corps had also essayed a preliminary assault in order to gain room to 
 form the lines of battle far enough forward for the main attack appointed for 
 five o'clock, when Hancock's divisions should join in. But they also failed in 
 this object and were repulsed with heavy sacrifice. 
 
450 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 and even entered the enemy's breastworks at one or two 
 points ; but they soon wavered and fell back in confusion 
 and great slaughter. Notwithstanding the disastrous upshot 
 of this assault, the experience of which had taught the troops 
 that the work assigned them was really hopeless,* a second 
 charge was ordered an hour after the failure of the first. 
 The repulse of this was even more complete than that of the 
 former effort ; and the loss in the two attacks was between 
 five and six thousand, while it is doubtfiil whether the enemy 
 lost as many hundreds. Among the killed was Brigadier- 
 General Rice of the Fifth Corps, distinguished for his in 
 trepid bearing on many fields. 
 
 On the left of Warren an assault by part of the Sixth 
 Corps met with more success. Upton's brigade, in a vigor- 
 ous charge, carried the enemy's first line of intrenchments, 
 capturing nine hundred prisoners and several guns. But 
 as this operation was unsupported the advantage could 
 not be maintained, and after nightfall Upton withdrew, leav- 
 ing the captured guns behind, t 
 
 In these operations before the lines of Spottsylvania, Gen- 
 eral Grant had carried out with much fidelity, but very indif- 
 ferent success, his own principle of hammering continuously. 
 Better resvdts, however, at length rewarded his persevering 
 efforts under sounder combinations. 
 
 Thus far the attacks had been mainly directed against Lee's 
 left. It was now resolved to make a sudden sally against 
 
 * Tliis conclusion the men had really formed, and this was precisely one of 
 those cases in which the troops, thus \iewing the task given them to do, showed 
 a nervous wavering and a behavior very unlike that which was common with 
 them. " Ward's brigade," says General Hancock, " retired in disorder, until 
 rallied by my own staff and that of General Birney." " Birney's men," writes a 
 staff-ofBcer, " in fact became scared and ran back a quarter of a mile behind 
 some old breastworks." It is only those who know little of the motives which 
 influence troops thct would mistake such conduct for pusillanimity. 
 
 t General Meade attributes the failure of this operation to the fact that Up 
 ton was not supported, as had been designed he should be, by Motfs division 
 of the Second Corps on his left.— Report of the Rapidan Campaign. 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 451 
 
 his right centre, where it was thought a favorable point of 
 attack presented itself. Hancock's corps was selected for 
 this operation, which was to be supported by the rest of 
 the army. The 11th was passed in preparation for this, 
 and, after dark, the Second Corps was moved over from 
 the right to near the point decided on for the assault. The 
 night was dark and stormy, and Hancock's troops quietly 
 and promptly took position within twelve hundred yards 
 of the position they were to storm — a position of which 
 little or nothing was known.* The direction of advance 
 was determined by the compass. Hancock disposed his 
 troops as follows : Barlow's division in two lines of masses — 
 Brooke's and Miles' brigades in the first line. Brown's and 
 Smythe's brigades in the second line, each regiment forming 
 double column on the centre ; Birney formed in two de- 
 ployed lines on Barlow's right; Mott's division supported 
 Bimey, and Gibbon's division was held in reserve. 
 
 At half-past four o'clock of Thursday morning, May the 12th, 
 as soon as the faint dawn struggling through a fog gave 
 sufficient light to see the direction of advance, Hancock 
 moved forward. Barlow's division, formed on cleared 
 ground extending up to the enemy's hues, advanced at quick 
 time for several hundred yards — his heavy column without 
 firing a shot marching over the Confederate pickets. When 
 half-way towards the hostile line, the men broke forth into a 
 ringing cheer, and spontaneously taking the double-quick, 
 rolled like a resistless wave into the enemy's works, tearing 
 away with their hands what abatis there was in front of the 
 
 * The point to which Hancock's corps moved during the night of the 11th 
 and where it formed for the assault, will be noted on the accompanying map as 
 the " Brown house." From this point to the enemy's lines, some twelve or fif- 
 teen hundred yards, the ground ascends sharply and was thickly wooded, with 
 the exception of a clearing about four hundred yards in width, extending up to 
 the Confederate works in front of the " Landrum house" [see map], curving to 
 the right as it approaches the enemy's position. The direction of advance wa« 
 ascertained only by a line, determined by compass, from Brown's house to a 
 large white house known to be inside the enemy's lines ["McCool's houae"- 
 see map]. Such was warfare in Virginia I 
 
452 CA^IPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 intrenchments, and spite of a desperate but brief defence car- 
 ried the line at all points. Birney's division on Barlow's 
 right, moving through the woods, went over the works almost 
 simultaneously with Barlow's men. Inside the intrenchments 
 there ensued a savage hand-to-hand combat with the bayonet 
 and clubbed muskets ; but it was of short duration, and re- 
 sulted in the capture of near four thousand prisoners, com- 
 prising almost the whole of Johnson's division of Ewell's 
 corps (including General Johnson), twenty pieces of artillery, 
 and thirty colors. The remainder of the force fled to the rear 
 in great confusion.* 
 
 It happened that the storming column struck the line of 
 works at the point where it formed a saUent ; so that, having 
 burst open this angle, Hancock had driven in a wedge be- 
 tween the right and centre of the enemy, and was in position 
 to rift asunder the formidable structure in which the Confed- 
 erate army lay ensconced. But though the tactical disposi- 
 tions to carry the works were admirable, little provision had 
 been made looking to that critical moment that comes after 
 an assault, when the victory must either be assured by a deci- 
 sive blow or risk a lapse of all the gain. Flushed with their 
 success, the troops that had made the assault could not be 
 restrained after the capture of the intrenchments, but pushed 
 the flying enemy through the forest towards Spottsylvania 
 Courthouse. Now at the distance of half a mile they came 
 up against a fresh line of breastworks ; but it was without 
 order or ensemhle, and the momentum of the assault had been 
 so broken that on arriving in front of the new line the troops 
 halted.t Here the Confederates quickly rallied on their re- 
 
 * Hancock : Report of the Second Epoch of the Campaign of 1864. 
 
 f The precise nature of this second line is somewhat difficult to determine. 
 It is certain that a second line had been laid out but not completed. John- 
 son's artillery had been taken back to this line the day before ; but, becoming 
 apprehensive of attack, that officer before daylight ordered it to return. It had 
 just got back, but only two pieces were unlimbered when Hancock's attack was 
 made. But what really stopped Hancock's column was that no adequate prep- 
 aration had been made to follow up the success, and because the fire and enthu- 
 siasm of the troops were not sustained ; for when this feeling is kept up great 
 resiJts can be plucked even without orderly tactical dispositions. 
 
gkant'S overland campaign. 453 
 
 86rves, and assuming the offensive, threw back their pursuers 
 on the captured line ; but Hancock's men, forming on the 
 right and left of the angle of works, resisted the attempt to 
 dislodge them from the position won. Yet its tenure de- 
 manded aU the force that could be brought up, for the Con- 
 federates, re-enforced by heavy masses, began an impetuous 
 assault to retake the lost line : so that it was opportune that 
 at this moment the Sixth Corps reached the ground and re- 
 lieved the Second Corps from the salient to the right.* 
 Hancock then formed on the left of the angle. 
 
 The weight of the pressure brought to bear by Lee for the 
 recapture of the lost hue led to the inference that the concen- 
 tration against the Second and the Sixth corps must be at the 
 expense of a reduction of force in front of the rest of the army 
 —that is, against Burnside on the left, and against Warren on 
 the right — and at eight o'clock these officers were ordered to 
 make a general attack, both to' take advantage of the sup- 
 posed diminution of the force in their front, and to relieve 
 Hancock and Wright. The assault was made as directed, but 
 produced no impression, though it resulted in very heavy loss 
 of hfe. Seeing, at length, that nothing could be hoped from 
 this, two of Warren's divisions (those of Cutler and Griffin) 
 were detached and sent to aid the Second and Sixth corps, 
 where the angle of works continued to be the prize hotly con- 
 tended for. Lee seemed to be determined to retake, at any 
 cost, the line wrested from him, and throughout the day 
 made not less than five heavy assaults, each of which was in 
 succession repulsed by the troops of the different corps now 
 concentrated at the point assailed. 
 
 Of all the struggles of the war this was perhaps the fiercest 
 and most deadly. Frequently, throughout the conflict, so 
 close was the contest that the rival standards were planted on 
 opposite sides of the breastworks. The enemy's most savage 
 sallies were directed to retake the famous salient which was 
 
 * The Sixth Corps came up at six A. M. ; its arrival was timely, and the ser- 
 vice it performed during the day was of the first importance. 
 
454 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 now become an angle of death, and presented a spectacle 
 gliastlj and terrible. On the Confederate side of the works 
 lay many corpses of those who had been bayoneted by Han- 
 cock's men when they first leaped the intrenchments. To 
 these were constantly added the bravest of those who, in the 
 assaults to recapture the position, fell at the margin of the 
 works, till the ground was literally covered with piles of dead, 
 and the woods in front of the salient were one hideous Gol- 
 gotha.* 
 
 At midnight, after twenty hours of combat, Lee drew back 
 his bleeding lines, and reformed them on his interior position. 
 The loss on the Union side this day was above eight thousand,t 
 and on the Confederate side it must also have been great. 
 But Hancock's success had an excellent moral effect on the 
 army, and was worth all it cost. 
 
 Thus the lines of SpottsyTvania remained still intact, and 
 General Grant, who might easily have turned the position and 
 manoeuvred his antagonist out of it, seemed bent on carrying 
 it by direct attack. Accordingly, during the succeeding 
 week, various movements of corps were made from flank to 
 flank, in the endeavor to find a spot where the lines could be 
 broken.^ These attempts were skilfully met at every point, 
 
 * I am aware that the language above used may resemble exaggeration ; 
 but I speak of that which I personally saw. In the vicious phraseology com- 
 monly employed by those who undertake to describe military operations, and 
 especially by those who never witnessed a battle-field, " piles of dead" figure 
 much more frequently than they exist in the reality. The phrase is here no 
 figure of speech, as can be attested by thousands who witnessed the ghastly 
 scene. It may be stated that the musketry fire has had the effect to kill the 
 whole forest within its range, and there is at Washington the trunk of a tree 
 eighteen inches in diameter, which was actually cut in two by the bullets. 
 
 f The precise loss in tliis battle is unknown ; but from the 12th to the 21st 
 May it was by oflScial returns ten thousand three himdred and eighty-one. 
 The casualties subsequent to the action of the 12th were, however, in all like- 
 lihood not above ten thousand. 
 
 I No mere general statement can give any idea of the enormous amount 
 •f labor, suffering, and privation that befell the troops in these continual shift- 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 455 
 
 — the Confederates extending tlieir line to correspond with 
 the shiftings of the army ; so that wherever attack was es- 
 sayed, the enemy bristled out in breastworks, and every 
 partial assault made was repulsed. Day by day Grant con- 
 
 ings of the corps from point to point of the long line. I shall in this note in • 
 dicate some details of the action from day to day. 
 
 May 13th. — The battle of the 12th having ended in Lee's retirement to an 
 inner and shorter line, it was resolved to attempt to turn his right flank. 
 With this view, the Fifth Corps, during the night of the 13th, was ordered to 
 march from its position on the extreme right, take post on the extreme left, to 
 the left of Burnside's corps, and assault in conjunction with that corps at four 
 A. M. on the 14th. The march was begun at ten p. M. The wet weather had, 
 however, badly broken up the roads ; and the night being one of Egyptian dark- 
 ness, the move was made with immense difficulty. The route of march was 
 past the Landrum House [see map] to the Ny River, which had to be waded. 
 Across the Ny the route followed no road, but traversed the fields and a piece 
 of woods where a track had been cut. Here, midway of the journey, a dense 
 fog arose and covered the ground, so that not even the numerous fires that had 
 been built to guide the column could be seen. The men, exhausted with 
 wading through the mud knee deep and in the darkness, fell asleep all along 
 the way. In addition to this, the locality where the troojjs were to take posi- 
 tion was quite unknown ; and at broad daylight, when the head of the column 
 got to the left of Burnside's corps near the Fredericksburg turnpike [see map], 
 the only troops on hand with which to execute the meditated assault were 
 twelve hundred fagged-out men of Griffin's division. It was seven o'clock be- 
 fore General Cutler got thirteen hundred of his men together. 
 
 May 14th. — Skirmishing commenced at six a. m. Off to the soutlieast of 
 the Beverly House was a high Mil — the Jet House [see map], which completely 
 commanded Warren's position. It appeared, however, to be occupied only by 
 a few of the enemy's cavalry ; so a small force of Regulars under Lieutenant 
 ' Colonel Otis was sent to take it. The troopers retired, and Otis commenced to 
 intrench around the house ; and while doing so, Upton's brigade of the Sixth 
 Corps — that corps having followed the route of the Fifth — relieved him. Be- 
 fore Upton was fairly established, a large force of the enemy's infantry moved 
 against him, coming from the Courthouse. They made him clear out pell-mell, 
 and were near catching General Meade, who had come upon the ground. The 
 remainder of the Sixth Corps now came up and massed around the Anderson 
 House [see map] . In the afternoon this important position was retaken, or re- 
 occupied (it being doubtful whether the enemy had not abandoned it), by 
 Ayres' brigade, Fifth Corps, in conjunction with troops of Neill's division, 
 Sixth Corps. 
 
 May 15th and 16th. — The withdi-awal of the Fifth and Sixth corps from 
 the right of the Second to make this movement on the left, caused the Second 
 
456 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 tinned to throw out towards the left, in the hope of overlap- 
 ping and breaking in the Confederate right flank : so that 
 from occupying, as the army did on its arrival, a line extend- 
 ing four or five miles to the northwest of Spottsylvania Court- 
 Corps to be the right of the whole line. But on the 15th an additional refusal 
 of that flank was made — Hancock being directed to transfer the divisions of 
 Barlow and Gibbon to the Fredericksburg road. Meanwhile, Birney's division 
 remained covering the right of Burnside's corps, and was the right of the 
 army. 
 
 For the other corps, the day passed in getting things in order, collecting 
 stragglers, cutting roads, and constant skirmishing. At this time also a 
 new base was opened at Aquia Creek, whither the sick and wounded were 
 sent, and whence supplies and forage, much needed by the army, were drawn. 
 
 May 17th. — Hancock received orders to move his command back to the 
 works he had captured on the 12th, and attack the enemy at daylight on the 
 18th in the intrenchments he then held in front of that position. The Sixth 
 Corps was directed to form on Hancock's right and assail the enemy's line at 
 the same hour. The Ninth Corps was also to participate. The movement 
 commenced at dark of the 17th. The withdrawal of these corps left Warren 
 holding almost the entire front of the army. The night march was a very 
 arduous one. 
 
 May 18th. — Before daylight of the 18th the troops were in position for an 
 assault. It had been the intention to catch the enemy napping ; but he had at 
 least one eye open, and was covered by acres of impenetrable slashings. 
 
 At four A. M. the divisions of Gibbon and Barlow moved forward to the as- 
 sault in lines of brigades. The artillery was posted in the first line of works, 
 firing during the action over the troops in front. Birney's division and Tyler's 
 division of foot-artiUerists, which had recently joined the army, were in 
 reserve. The Confederates held a strong line of intrenchments about half a 
 mile in front of, and parallel to, the works Hancock had stormed on the 12th 
 Their position was concealed by the forest, and protected by the heaviest kind 
 of abatis. As the troops moved forward, they encountered a severe fire oi 
 musketry and artillery, which completely swept the approaches, making great 
 havoc in their ranks. They pressed forward, however, until they arrived at 
 the edge of the abatis, which, with the heavy fire, arrested their progress. 
 Many gallant attempts were made to penetrate the enemy's line, but without 
 success. The Corcoran Legion of Gibbon's division was particularly marked 
 on this occasion, and its losses were very heavy. At ten A. M., finding attack 
 to be hopeless, operations were suspended by General Meade. During the 
 morning, the batteries were opened along the entire line, the enemy scarcely 
 replying. The only apparent effect was to drive them under cover of their 
 breastworks. Immense waste of ammunition — result nil. 
 
 May 19th. — During the night of the 18th, Barlow's, Birney's, and Gib- 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. do 7 
 
 house it liad at the end of ten days assumed a position ahnost 
 due east of that place, the left resting at a distance of four 
 miles at Massaponax Church. 
 
 After twelve days of effort, the carrying of the position 
 was seen to be hopeless ; and General Grant, abandoning 
 the attempt, resolved by a turning operation to disengage Lee 
 from a position seen to be unassailable. Preparations for 
 this movement were begun on the afternoon of the 19tli ; but 
 the enemy observing these, retarded its execution by a bold 
 demonstration against the Union right. It happened that 
 this flank was held by a division of foot artillerists, under 
 General Tyler, posted in an important position, covering the 
 road from Spottsylvania to Fredericksburg, which was the 
 army's main line of communication with its base at the latter 
 point. Ewell crossed the Ny River above the right flank, 
 and moving down, seized the Fredericksburg road and laid 
 hands on an ammunition train coming up. Tyler promptly 
 met this attack and succeeded in driving the enemy from the 
 road and into the woods beyond. The foot artillerists had 
 not before been in battle, but it was found that once under 
 fire, they displayed an audacity surpassing even the old 
 troops. In these murderous wood-fights, the veterans had 
 learned to employ all the Indian devices that afford shelter to 
 the person ; but these green battahons, unused to this kind of 
 craft, pushed boldly on, firing furiously. Their loss was heavy, 
 but the honor of the enemy's repulse belongs to them. 
 Shortly afterwards, troops of the Second and Fifth corps 
 
 bon's divisions of the Second Corps moved to tlie vicinity of Anderson's Mills 
 on the Ny [see map]. Tyler's division remained at tlie Fredericksburg road 
 near the Hairris House [see map]. The assigned position was taken up by 
 Hancock on the morning of the 19th, when he received orders to be ready to 
 move at dark in the direction of Bowling Green. Preparations for this were 
 under way, when, in the afternoon, Ewell attacked Tyler in the manuer and 
 with the results described in the text above. At the same time the Second 
 Corps moved, the Ninth T'orps also marched to the left and took post on the 
 left of the Sixth Corps. In aid of Ewell's attack, Hill made a demonstrar 
 tion on the Fifth Corps, but without effect. 
 
 May 20th. — The turning movement and southward inarch begin. 
 
458 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 coming to their assistance, pursued the fugitives up tlirough 
 the valley of the Po, and made prisoners of several hundred 
 Confederates that had scattered through the woods. This 
 attack somewhat disconcerted the contemplated movement, 
 and delayed it till the folloAving night, May 20th, when the 
 army, moving by the left, once more took up its march to- 
 wards Eichmond. 
 
 Before the lines of Spottsylvania the Army of the Potomac 
 had for twelve days and nights engaged in a fierce wrestle, in 
 which it had done all that valor may do to carry a position 
 by nature and art impregnable. 
 
 In this contest, unparalleled in its continuous fury, and 
 swelling to the proportions of a campaign, language is inade- 
 quate to convey an impression of the labors, fatigues, and 
 sufferings of the troops, who fought by day only to march by 
 night, from point to point of the long line, and renew the 
 light on the morrow. Above forty thousand men had already 
 fallen in the bloody encounters of the Wilderness and Spott- 
 sylvania,* and the exhausted army began to lose its spirit. It 
 was with joy, therefore, that it at length turned its back upon 
 the lines of Spottsylvania. 
 
 Before proceeding to follow the Army of the Potomac in its 
 southward march from Spottsylvania Courthouse, it will be 
 proper to glance briefly at the operations of the cavalry under 
 Sheridan during its raid on Lee's communications. This col- 
 umn, consisting of portions of the three divisions of Merritt, 
 Wilson, and Gregg,t cut loose from the Army of the Potomac 
 
 * By the official returns, the casualties from the 5th to the l?th of May 
 were twenty-niue thousand four hundred and ten ; and from the 12th to the 
 21st of May (at which time the army moved from Spottsylvania), they were 
 ten thousand three hundred and eighty-one — making an aggregate of thirty- 
 nine thousand seven hundred and ninety-one. — Meade : Report of the Rapidan 
 Campaign. But to this must be added the casualties of Burnside's corps, not 
 then in the Army of the Potomac. Of these I have no returns. 
 
 f The dismounted men and those with worn and jaded animals were or- 
 dered to remain and guard the trains. These constituted nearly one-half of 
 the corps. 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 459 
 
 on the 9tli of May, with orders to engage the enemy's cavalry, 
 and after destroying the Fredericksburg and Central rail- 
 roads, to threaten Richmond and eventually communicate with 
 and draw supphes fi'om Butler's force on the James River.* 
 
 To mask the march the first move was towards Fredericks- 
 burg, near which, turning southward to the right, the column 
 thrust itself inside the enemy's lines. The clouds of tell-tale 
 dust, miles in length, soon informed Stuart, however, of its 
 presence, and he dispatched a force in pursuit. But the rear 
 being skilfully covered, the blows directed thereat did not 
 retard Sheridan's progress. Reaching the crossing of the 
 North Anna on the following day, he captured Beaver Dam 
 Station on the Central Railroad, destroying ten miles of the 
 track, two locomotives, three trains of cars, and a million and 
 a half of rations. Here also he recaptured four hundred Union 
 prisoners on their way to captivity in Richmond. At this 
 point he was attacked by the enemy in flank and rear, but 
 his loss was inconsiderable, and this aftair did not serve to 
 impede his progress. The South Anna was crossed at Ground- 
 squirrel Bridge ; Ashland Station was captured at daylight of 
 the 11th, and the depot, six miles of the road, a train, and a 
 large quantity of stores were destroyed. After this, Sheridan 
 resumed the march towards Richmond. 
 
 To meet this advance, Stuart had succeeded by a detour in 
 interposing himself between the assailants and the Confeder- 
 ate capital, and had massed all his available cavalry at Yel- 
 len Tasrern, a few miles north of Richmond. Here Sheridan 
 immediately attacked him on the 11th, and after an obstinate 
 contest gained possession of the turnpike, driving the Confed- 
 erate force back towards Ashland and across the North Fork 
 of the Chickahominy. In this passage at arms between the 
 two ablest cavalry leaders of the rival armies. General J. E. 
 B. Stuart, whose dashing exploits fill a brilhant page in the 
 history of the war, was killed. 
 
 Pursuing his advantage gained at YeUow Tavern, Sheridan 
 
 * Meade : Report of the Rapidan Campaign. 
 
460 CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 made a bold dash upon the outer defences of Eichmond. 
 The first line, feebly defended, was carried — Custer's brigade 
 capturing a section of artillery and a hundred prisoners. 
 The second Hne, however, was too strong to be assailed, being 
 thoroughly commanded by redoubts and bastioned works, and 
 as the garrison raUied for the defence Sheridan retired towards 
 the Chickahominy. Crossing at Meadow Bridge he drove the 
 enemy from his front, and repulsed an attack on his rear 
 by Confederate infantry from the city. After destroying the 
 raih'oad-bridge over the Chickahominy, Sheridan moved to 
 Haxall's Landing, which he reached on the 14th of May 
 Here he remained three days to refit, when he returned by 
 way of Baltimore Store, White House, and Hanover Court- 
 house, rejoining the Army of the Potomac, the 25th of May, 
 on the Pamimkey. 
 
 IV. 
 
 CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENTS ON THE JAMES AND IN 
 THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. 
 
 Thus far in the campaign, the course of tliis narrative has 
 followed the main action as waged between the two mighty 
 adversaries in tide-water Yii'ginia. It is now necedlary to 
 interrupt for a time this recital, and trace the development of 
 the movements co-operative under Butler and Sigel, on the 
 banks of the James Biver and in the Valley of the Shenan- 
 doah. This I shall only do so far as may be necessary to set 
 forth their relations with the general system of operations. 
 
 The force under General Butler was assembled at Yorktown 
 and at Gloucester Point, on the opposite side of the York 
 River, during the month of April. It was composed of the 
 Eighteenth Corps, under General W. F. Smith, and the Tenth 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 461 
 
 Corps," which General Q. A. GiUmore had lately brought from 
 the coast of South Carolina. General Butler had in addition 
 a division of horse, under General Kautz ; this division was, 
 at this time, at Norfolk and Portsmouth. The strength of 
 the army was somewhat above thirty thousand of all arms. 
 
 At Yorktown, Butler was in position to move by land up the 
 Peninsula in the direction of Kichmond ; to use the line of 
 the York River for an advance similar to that of McClellan, 
 in 186-2, or to take up the line of the James and threaten the 
 Confederate capital from the south side. The last w^as the 
 move actually intended, but the real destination of this column 
 was kept secret; and feints of striking in both the other 
 directions were made. The 1st of May, Butler dispatched a 
 detachment of his force (Henry's brigade of Turner's divi- 
 sion) by water to West Point, at the head of the York, and at 
 the same time he sent a force of eighteen hundred cavalry to 
 move, by way of West Point, across the Peninsula, attract 
 the attention of the enemy towards Richmond, and then make 
 a junction with his main body when it should have reached 
 its destination. Kautz, with his mounted division, was in- 
 structed to move northward from Suffolk to the south side. 
 
 During the night of May 4th, the same day the Army of 
 the Potomac crossed the Rapidan, the entire command of 
 Butler embarked on transports, dropped down the York, 
 passed Fortress Monroe, and, entering the James, ascended 
 that river, convoyed by a fleet of gunboats. The following 
 afternoon a landing was effected on the south side of the 
 James— one detachment at City Point, another at Port Pow- 
 hatan, a feAV miles below ; but the main body a mile or two 
 above City Point, at Bermuda Hundred, a neck of land formed 
 by the sinuous course of the James and Appomattox. The 
 point of debarkation was between Petersburg and Richmond 
 — ten miles north of the former and twenty miles south of 
 
 * The Tenth Corps was composed of three divisions under Brigadier-Gen- 
 erals Terry, Ames, and Turner ; the Eighteenth Corps, of two divisions of 
 white troops, under Brigadier-Generals Brooks and Weitzel, and a division of 
 colored troops, under Brigadier-General Hinks. 
 
462 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ABM\ OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 I 
 
 the latter place. The landing was a complete surprise, and 
 was made without molestation. Indeed, the Confederate 
 force about Petersburg and Richmond was at this time very- 
 trivial. 
 
 General Butler's instructions from General Grant pre- 
 scribed Richmond as his objective point ; but his operations 
 were to be contingent upon the results achieved by the Army 
 of the Potomac. The programme drawn up by the lieutenant- 
 general for Butler's governance is indeed vague, and in some 
 respects contradictory, and it is difficult to tell precisely what 
 was expected of that officer. He was commanded first of all 
 to intrench at City Point, which would indicate rather a 
 defensive than an offensive purpose. Further instructions 
 ordered him to move against Richmond by the south bank 
 of the James, capturing it if possible, and if not, investing it 
 on the south side so as to have his left resting on the James 
 above Richmond. It is, however, clearly set forth in papers 
 not embodied by General Grant in his official report, that But- 
 ler's action was to hinge on General Grant's own success ; that 
 he expected, after decisive action, either to defeat Lee or drive 
 him into the intrenchments at Richmond ; that he would then 
 approach the Confederate capital from the direction of the 
 north and west, and, swinging across the James, make a junc- 
 tion with Butler, whose signal for action was to be Grant's 
 guns thundering on the north side. But, as Grant's guns 
 were never heard thundering on the north side, it is a 
 matter of less surprise that Butler also was foiled in his 
 part. Moreover, I shall attempt to show that there was, 
 in any event, very little likelihood that the James River 
 column would meet what seem to have been General Grant's 
 expectations. 
 
 An advance against Richmond by the south bank of the 
 James placed that great river between the city and the assail- 
 ants, and the defence of the points of passage could readily be 
 maintained by the local garrison until strengthened to with- 
 stand attack. It is, however, unnecessary to discuss this prob- 
 lem in detail, as it is hardly possible that General Grant ever 
 
GT} ANT'S OVERLAND CAMl'ATGN. 4G3 
 
 really expected General Butler to ccqifnre Richmond. Equally 
 remote was the possibility of investing it from the south bank of 
 the James, where the ground is a low, open plain. But there 
 is another circumstance that greatly complicates any operation 
 on that line, whether directed against Richmond immediately, or 
 with a view to invest it from the south side, or with the object 
 of holding a dehouche for the Army of the Potomac above 
 that city. This is the dangerous exposure of its rear and 
 communications which the operating column must make. It 
 is hardly to be supposed that, in framing a plan of opei-a- 
 tions for the James River column, there could be failure to 
 note the certainty of the approach of adverse masses from 
 the south ; for the withdrawal of Gillmore's force fi-om South 
 Carolina left Beauregard free to hurry forward with a con- 
 siderable army to Richmond, the danger to which was appa- 
 rent the moment Butler landed on the south side of the 
 James River. It is marvellous how it could have been ex- 
 pected that in this event Butler's army could have maintained 
 a position above Richmond when not only its rear must have 
 been so greatly exposed, but its line of communications, with 
 its depot at Bermuda Hundred, must have been quite uncov- 
 ered to the enemy. 
 
 In the actual situation the only effective service that But- 
 ler's force could render towards the execution of the general 
 plan was to secure a lodgment on the south side of the James 
 River, below Richmond, in case the Army of the Potomac 
 should need to be transferred thither. This purpose might 
 best of all have been attained by another operation, which, 
 while serving this end, would have had the most important 
 bearings on the general object of the campaign. This is to 
 have immediately seized Petersburg, which, as the strategic 
 key to Richmond, would probably have been decisive of the 
 fall of that city. Had Petersburg been taken at this time, it 
 is probable that Lee, abandoning as vain the attempt to 
 defend the Confederate capital, would have fallen off on the 
 Lynchburg or Danville hne. But even had Lee attempted, 
 by throwing himseK upon Butler, to recover Petersburg, the 
 
464 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 James Biver column was sufficiently powerful to have main- 
 tained alone the defence of the line of the Appomattox 
 against any force the Confederates could spare to bring 
 against it. It will now be seen how speedy was the punish- 
 ment that befell dispositions originally faulty. 
 
 The debarkation of "the force was completed by the 6th. 
 As the instructions of General Grant were first of all to 
 intrench, the construction of a defensive front across the nar- 
 row neck of Bermuda Hundred was immediately begun. 
 This line was drawn within three miles of the Richmond and 
 Petersburg Railroad, the destruction of wliich engaged But- 
 ler's first attention. The same day a brigade moved out to 
 this road, which it struck near Walthal Junction. A small 
 force of the enemy was encountered, and after a brisk skir- 
 mish the brigade returned. 
 
 Thus far there had been no indication of any considerable 
 body of the enemy in the vicinit}', but that night the van of 
 Beauregard's army, drawn from Charleston, Savannah, and 
 Florida, reached Petersburg. When, therefore, on the morn- 
 ing of the 7th, a column of five brigades moved out to destroy 
 the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, the enemy was foimd 
 in a position covering that road, from Walthal Junction north 
 to Chester station. Brooks attacked and drove this force 
 from its vantage ground; but rallying, it pushed back his 
 right, and finally both parties withdrew. 
 
 On the morning of the 9th, another advance was made to 
 the railroad. Here a force was left facing in the direction of 
 Richmond, while the remainder turned southward, towards 
 Petersburg. The enemy was soon met and driven, skirmish- 
 ing, to Swift Creek (three miles from Petersburg), on the 
 right bank of which he occupied a strong line of earthworks. 
 Having meanwhile effectually destroyed the railroad, Butler 
 designed next day crossing Swift Creek and crowding the 
 enemy into Petersburg ; but that night he received from 
 Washington such accounts of Lee's being " in fuU retreat to 
 Richmond," that he resolved to turn northward, in order to 
 aid in the investment of the Confederate capital. 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 4G5 
 
 Two clays afterwards a general advance was made in the 
 direction of Kiclimond. Whatever force of the enemy was 
 encountered was pressed back until dark, when the Confed- 
 erates took position on the left bank of Proctor's Creek. 
 Next morning (13th) the enemy withdrew from the creek to 
 an intrenched Hne in the rear. This line, if adequately held, 
 would have been difficult to carry by assault; but General 
 Gillmore succeeded in turning it, and held its extreme right. 
 The possession of this line, however, only revealed the enemy 
 holding an interior line of works, with a bastion sahent on an 
 eminence completely commanding the position gained. The 
 flanks fell back on the Confederates' left to the James Eiver 
 and Drury's Bluff, and on their right extended in a north- 
 westerly direction beyond any point visible. The prong or 
 arm of the works which General Gillmore had turned ran 
 into this second line at the bastion sahent before mentioned. 
 Butler's force was much strung out, and an assault ordered 
 for the next morning had to be abandoned for the want of 
 available troops to form a column. It was then determined 
 to attack on the morning of the 16th. 
 
 The night of the 15th every thing was still. A thin 
 film of clouds slightly obscured the sky, but it was not so 
 heavy as to interfere seriously with the moonlight, and the 
 heavens gave no token of what was presently to be seen. 
 Before dawn a dense fog, arising from the margin of the 
 James, overspread the whole face of the country with so 
 opaque a pall that a horseman was not visible at a distance of 
 ten yards. In the thick of this, and before dawn, the sleeping 
 camp was suddenly aroused by a savage outburst of musketry 
 and artillery fire along the whole line. Beauregard had taken 
 advantage of the fog, and had begun the execution of a plan 
 of offensive action which, under the circumstances, threatened 
 fatal results to the Union force. Butler's force was disposed 
 along a front excessively extended, and though General Smith 
 endeavored to reach as far as possible by drawing out his 
 corps in one thin line, there was still a fuU mile and a half of 
 open, undulating country between his right flank and the 
 
 30 
 
466 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OP THE POTOMAC. 
 
 James. This great stretcli was observed by nothing more than 
 one hundred and fifty colored cavalry. Beauregard's dis- 
 positions to attack were well suited to the circumstances, and 
 contemplated a simultaneous onset in front with a thrusting 
 forward of the flanking column, to gain the rear of the Union 
 line by the unguarded interval on its right flank. To make 
 his stroke still more sure, the Confederate commander, while 
 moving up with his main force from Petersburg to Butler's 
 front, had left one of his divisions, under General Whiting, in 
 position at a point on the Petersburg and Richmond Rail- 
 road, a considerable distance to the rear of the left of But- 
 ler's force. To this division was assigned the duty of 
 moving directly forward simultaneously with the attack in 
 front, and laying hold of the Union line of retreat. Nothing 
 ■eould be more complete than the plan, but its execution 
 was very far from filling the measure of Beauregard's expec- 
 tations. 
 
 The right of Smith's line, where the shock of the turning 
 column was first felt, was held by Heckman's brigade. This 
 was quite overwhelmed by the suddenness of the blow, and 
 as the enemy was then entirely in rear of the right fiank, a 
 great disaster seemed imminent. It happened fortunately, 
 however, that the night before General Butler had assigned 
 three regiments of Ames' division of Gillmore's corps to 
 General Smith as a reserve to his line. One of these regi- 
 ments, the One Hundred and Twelfth New York, happily 
 arrived at this critical juncture, and, being joined by the 
 Ninth Maine Regiment, the two met the Confederates at a 
 point where the transverse road on which they were moving 
 forward crosses the road running back to Bermuda Hundred. 
 This latter road the enemy were aiming to seize, when the 
 purpose was foiled by the stubborn resistance of the two 
 regiments above named. It is probable that the resistance 
 here encountered gave the Confederate commander the im- 
 pression that he had been mistaken in his notion of the 
 Union disi^ositions, and caused him to believe that the Union 
 right, instead of resting where it really did, was thrown back 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CA]NfPATGN. 407 
 
 en echelon. Thus disconcerted and confused in the thick fog, 
 the Confederate turning cohiran withdrew. 
 
 While this flanking operation was in execution, Beauregard 
 assailed energetically the front of Smith's line, held by the 
 divisions of Brooks and "Weitzel. But so far from gaining 
 any success here, he met a severe repulse. This was in a large 
 measure due to a novel and ingenious device of General Smith, 
 who had caused his men a day or two before to wind a large 
 amount of telegraph wire (here found) around the stumps of 
 trees, arid thus cover their front. When, therefore, the Con- 
 federates ran forward to the assault, not perceiving the wire 
 in the fog, they were tripped violently and shot as snared 
 game by the Union marksmen. 
 
 Finding that the Union force was inexpugnable by a front 
 attack, Beauregard set on foot a repetition of his turning 
 move in heavier force against the right flank, this time made 
 further to the right. The position was really untenable by 
 the force at General Smith's disposal against a serious effort 
 in that direction, for the Confederates had but to swdng their 
 left well round in order to attain a lateral road leading directly 
 back to Bermuda Hundred. Accordingly, on learning this 
 new turning movement — which threatened the trains, the 
 communications, and even the depot on the James, which had 
 been left but feebly defended — General Smith ordered a retire- 
 ment of his line to a position in the rear, where he could 
 better cover what was of value behind him. 
 
 While these things were passing on Smith's front, GUl- 
 more's corps on the left had been less engaged. His right, 
 indeed, felt the shock of the same attacks that were made 
 upon Smith, but his left was entirely unassailed. This 
 was due to the inexplicable inaction of General Whiting, 
 whose position threatened directly the main line of re- 
 treat by the turnpike. Beauregard's instructions to him to 
 attack were entirely disobeyed, and he made no motion what- 
 ever. In this condition of affairs it would have been fortu- 
 nate had Gillmore's left been swung forward, for this move- 
 ment would not only have reKeved the pressure on Smith, 
 
468 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 but would hare taken Beauregard's line in reverse. When 
 Smith's corps was withdrawn, General Gillmore conformed 
 to the movement. The whole force was then by General Butler 
 withdrawn within the lines at Bermuda Hundred. The Con- 
 federate loss in this action was about three thousand, and the 
 Union loss nearly four thousand. Beauregard followed up 
 leisurely, and threw up a defensive hne confronting Butler's 
 intrenchments. 
 
 It was certainly very unfortunate that Butler allowed him- 
 self to be thrown back into the cul-de-sac of Bermuda Hun- 
 dred, where, if he was secure against attack, he was also 
 powerless for offensive operations against Richmond — being, 
 as he himself said at the time, bottled up and hermetically 
 sealed. It was still open to him, however, to pass to the 
 south bank of the Appomattox and seize Petersburg — the 
 most important stroke he could possibly have executed. This 
 soon became apparent to Butler, and he had made all his 
 preparations to move on that place, when he was ordered by 
 General Grant to detach the major part of his force to the 
 assistance of the Army of the Potomac, which was then 
 approaching the Chickahominy. 
 
 The expeditionary force in the Shenandoah Valley and 
 West Virginia was divided into two columns — one under 
 Crook, consisting of a force of infantry and a division of 
 cavalry under General AveriD, to move by the Kanawha to 
 operate against the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad ; 
 the other, under Sigel, to advance as far as possible up the 
 Virginia Valley. Both movements began the 1st of May. 
 
 Sigel moved up the Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy at 
 Newmarket on the 15th, and, after a severe engagement, was 
 defeated, with considerable loss, and retired behind Cedar 
 Creek. Sigel was then superseded by General Hunter, who 
 immediately took up the offensive under instructions from 
 General Grant to move on Staunton and destroy the railroad 
 thence towards Charlotteville. If he could reach the latter 
 place, and thence move on Lynchburg, he was to do so. 
 
GR^iNT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 4G9 
 
 Hunter encountered tlie Confederates the 5tli of June, at 
 Piedmont, and, after an action of several hours, defeated 
 them, capturing fifteen hundred prisoners and three pieces of 
 artillery. This result is attributable to the fact that Lee had 
 ventured on detaching Breckinridge's division from the force 
 in the valley to join the army confronting Grant. The 8th of 
 the same month. Hunter formed a junction with Crook and 
 Averill at Staunton, from which place he moved towards 
 Lynchburg, by way of Lexington. Arriving before Lynch- 
 burg, it was found to be well defended ; and, as Himter 
 learned that re-enforcements to the Confederates were arriving 
 by railroad from Lee's army, while his own supphes of ammu- 
 nition were nearly exhausted, he determined to return. But 
 this he judged too perilous by the route over which he had 
 advanced, seeing that the enemy, by means of the Yirginia 
 Central Eailroad, might rapidly throw forces in his rear. 
 He thought it better, therefore, to rethe by the line of the 
 Kanawha. His supphes had nearly given out; but it 
 was confidently expected that great store would be found 
 at Meadow Bridge, five or six marches from Lynchburg, 
 where a half-million rations had been left a few days before 
 by Crook and Averill, under guard of two Ohio regiments 
 of hundred days' men. These troops, however, w^ere stam- 
 peded by a contemptible handful of guerrillas, and, after 
 burning about half the stores, carried off the remamder. 
 The return of Hunter's column by way of the Alpine and 
 almost impracticable region of West Virginia was attended 
 with great privations; but he succeeded in bringing it 
 through. The eccentric Hue of retreat taken up put him for 
 several weeks out of all relation with mihtary operations, and 
 entirely uncovered the frontier of the loyal States. Aside 
 from great material damage inflicted on the enemy by the 
 destruction of foundries, factories, and mills, Hunter's opera- 
 tions had no sensible influence on the campaign in Vhginia. 
 
 Both co-operative columns being thus disposed of, it is now 
 time to return to the Ai-my of the Potomac. 
 
470 Cyj!kIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 V. 
 
 FROM SPOTTSYLVANIA TO THE CHICK AHOMINY. 
 
 Tlie experience of tlie twelve days before Spottsylvania 
 brought the conyiction to every man in the army that the 
 position, as defended, was, in truth, impregnable. Of this 
 even General Grant, anxious as he was to give Lee a crushing 
 blow, was at length convinced. Then, as in the Wilderness, 
 he began a movement to turn the position by a flank march. 
 This is an operation usually accounted very hazardous in the 
 presence of a vigilant enemy. Nevertheless, it was conducted 
 with great precision and skill and complete success. First of 
 all, Hancock's corps, taken from the right of the army, moved 
 on the night of the 20th May, behind the cover of the remain- 
 ing corps, eastward to Massaponax Church. Thence, heading 
 southward, and preceded by Torbett's cavalry division, Han- 
 cock, on the following day, pushed his advance to Milford 
 Station, on the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, 
 seventeen miles south of his point of starting. The cavalry 
 in advance, with much address, dislodged a hostile force hold- 
 ing the bridge across the Mattapony near this point,* and 
 Hancock threw his left over that stream at Bowling Green. In 
 this position it bivouacked on the night of the 21st, and here 
 also the Second Corps remained till the morning of the 23d, 
 while other movements about to be described were under way. 
 
 This turning movement, jealously guarded as it was, did 
 not pass unobserved by the wary enemy. Now, it is well 
 
 * It happened that a Confederate brigade, under Kemper, on its way from 
 Richmond to Spottsylvania to re-enforce Lee, had reached tliis point and tkken 
 up a position on the right bank of the Mattapony — a position exceedingly 
 Btrong against an attempt to cross that stream in force. The cavalry showed 
 much skill and pluck in dislodging the enemy from this position, and captured 
 Bixty-six prisoners. But more important stUl, it secured the bridge. 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 471 
 
 known that a flank march in presence of the hostile army 
 aifords unusual opportunity of striking a blow, and a vigorous 
 commander will not willingly let slip such an occasion of 
 taking the ofiensive, either by falUng upon that portion 
 ah-eady on the march, or by attacking the portion that re- 
 mains behind. It can hardly be suiDposed that it was any 
 thing but Lee's weakness that prevented his adopting this 
 course ; for, although made aware of Grant's initiative, he, 
 instead of acting on the aggressive, adopted the course of 
 faUing back on parallel roads nearer to Richmond, with the 
 intention, however, of again interposing his army across 
 Grant's line of march. Accordingly, at midnight on the 20th, 
 the same night on which Hancock set out, Long-street's corps 
 was headed southward, and another grand race between the 
 two armies, similar to that from the Wilderness to Spottsyl- 
 vania, was begun. But as Lee's front at Spottsylvania gave 
 him command of the best and direct route leading southward 
 (namely, the telegraph road, with the roads converging on 
 and radiating therefrom), and as it was necessary for the 
 Army of the Potomac, on its delicate flank march, to take 
 circuitous routes well eastward, it was, from the start, proba- 
 ble that Lee would gain on his adversary. 
 
 Hancock had begun the movement on the night of the 20th. 
 On the morning of the 21st Warren's coi^ps followed. Lee 
 met this by sending Ewell's corps after Longstreet's. There 
 then remained within the Hues of Spottsylvania, Burnside's 
 and Wright's corps on the Union side, and Hill's corf)S on the 
 Confederate side. Burnside left that afternoon. Wright, 
 with the Sixth Corps, prepared to follow. Hill then fancying 
 it to be a good opportunity to assume the ofiensive, made a 
 sally on Wright's fi'ont, and opened an attack, which, however, 
 was easily repulsed.* During the night the Sixth Corps with- 
 
 * Hill committed an error in making tlie attack in front ; for had he crossed 
 the Ny above, he would have struck the right flank of the Sixth Corps, uncov- 
 ered by the withdrawal of Warren, and would have had a very effective enfila- 
 ding fire. As it was, he succeeded in breaking Wright's line at one place ; but 
 a heavy artillery fire checked his advance. 
 
472 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AKMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 drew ; Hill did the same, and the works of Spottsylvania, 
 ceasing to be the objects either of attack or defence, remained 
 as parts of the series of parallels that along the whole route 
 of the contending armies, from the Eapidan to the James, 
 stand monuments of the most desperate campaign in his- 
 tory. 
 
 The two armies once fairly on the march, their operations 
 belong to the domain of strategy, which deals with the move- 
 ments of armies out of sight of each other. Neither in- 
 deed, seems to have sought to deal the other a blow while 
 on the march, and both headed, as for a common goal, to- 
 wards the North Anna. Two marches brought the rival 
 forces once more close to each other. 
 
 The region between Spottsylvania and the North Anna, 
 through which the advance conducted, is fair and fertile — • 
 the face of the country, beautifully undulating, is nowhere 
 bold, and the river-bottoms have many large and fine planta- 
 tions, which were at this time under cultivation. It was in- 
 deed virgin ground over which the army advanced, showing 
 none of those desolating traces of war that marked all Vir- 
 ginia north of the Rapidan. Here were fields with sprouting 
 wheat and growing corn and luxuriant clover ; lowing herds 
 and the perfume of blossoms, and the song of summer birds ; 
 homesteads of the Virginia planter (every thing on a large 
 and generous scale), and great ancestral elms, dating back to 
 the time before our forefathers learned to be rebels. Coming 
 as the army so lately did from where the tread of hostile 
 feet for three years had made the country bare and barren 
 as a threshing-floor, the region through which it now passed 
 seemed a very Ai'aby the Blest. 
 
 The advances of the 21st and 22d brought the different 
 corps, which had moved on parallel roads at supporting dis- 
 tance, within a few miles of the North Anna Eiver. Re- 
 suming the march on the morning of Monday, May 23d, the 
 army in a few hours reached the northern bank of that 
 stream. But it was only to descry its old enemy planted on 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 473 
 
 tlie opposite side i* The problem then passed from the domain 
 of strategy into the tactical question of forcing the passage of 
 the river — an operation always delicate and difficult when vig- 
 orously resisted. And that it would be vigorously resisted 
 there Avas every promise ; for if Lee purposed making a stand 
 between the North and South Anna, he would naturally seek 
 to gain all the time possible in order to establish himself well 
 in his new position. Moreover, the North Anna covers the 
 Vii-ginia Central Eailroad (here but fi-om one to three miles 
 south of the river), by which re-enforcements were coming to 
 him from the Valley of the Shenandoah. 
 
 The lines on which the army had pushed its advance 
 brought the columns to the North Anna, near the point at 
 which the Fredericksburg and Eichmond Kailroad crosses 
 that stream. The left column under Hancock, indeed, struck 
 it at the railroad, and at a point one mile above where the 
 telegraph road from Fredericksburg to Richmond crosses the 
 North Anna on a wooden bridge : the right column, under 
 Warren, four miles higher up, at Jericho Ford. By a con- 
 trary fortune, Warren was able to effect the passage without 
 any resistance, but was savagely assailed on the other side ; 
 while Hancock had to fight on the north bank for a crossing. 
 
 When AVarren's column reached the North Anna at Jericho 
 Ford, the Confederate commander, absorbed in guarding the 
 points of passage opposite his right, either unwittingly neg- 
 lected, or did not heed the crossing above ; so that on War- 
 ren's arrival at Jericho Ford, no enemy was observed on the 
 southern bank — a circumstance of which advantage was at 
 once taken. The river has here very precipitous banks and a 
 rocky bed ; and Jericho Ford is a ford in name rather than in 
 reality. Nevertheless, the head of Warren's column, the 
 brigade of Bartlett, accoutred as it was, plunged into the 
 stream breast deep, waded across, and, forming line of battle 
 on the opposite side, covered the building of a ponton-bridge. 
 
 * " The enemy was seen iu large force marching in column on the opposite 
 bank, evidently en route- from Spottsylvania." — Hancock's Report. 
 
474 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 This being quickly done, the whole of the corps crossed early 
 in the afternoon. Line of battle was formed with Cutler's 
 division on the right, Griffin's division in the centre, and 
 Crawford's division on the left. Then pushing out several hun- 
 dred yards, the corps took position on the hither side of a 
 piece of woods that lies between the river and the Virginia 
 Central Eailroad, distant a mile and a half. Nothing more 
 than a heavy skkmish line was at first met, the only Confeder- 
 ate force at the moment present being a single brigade of 
 Wilcox's divison of Hill's corps, under command of Colonel 
 Brown. But this was soon re-enforced by the three other bri- 
 gades of the division,* and by Heth's division. Warren's hne 
 was just about to begin intrenching itself in the position 
 taken uj), when, a little past five o'clock, Griffin, holding the 
 centre, was furiously assailed by the force above meutioied, 
 which suddenly developed double lines of battle. Griffin 
 effectually repulsed the attack, and with such loss to the 
 assailants, that the Confederate commander, while continuing 
 to hold three brigades on Griffin's front, detached the brigade 
 under Brown to make an assault in flank.f Marching in 
 column up the railroad for some distance, that brigade 
 wheeled by right into Hne of battle, and fell upon Cutler's 
 division, which was just getting into position on the right of 
 Griffin. Cutler's left giving way, the whole division was 
 thrown into much confusion. This uncovered Griffin's right ; 
 but the danger was avoided by refusing that flank somewhat, 
 and at the same time Bartlett's brigade hurried forward and 
 re-estabHshed the line. In the execution of this manoeuvre, 
 there occurred one of those odd rencounters which occasion- 
 ally happen in the complicated action of battle. One oi 
 Bartlett's regiments (the Eighty-third Pennsylvania, undei 
 Lieutenant-Colonel McCoy), in marching up by the flank, ran 
 plump against Brown's column, which was moving to follow 
 
 * The brigades of Scales, Gordon, and Thomas. 
 
 f The manner of execution of this movement I had on the spot froa 
 Colonel Brown himself, who. as will be seen, was in a few minutes taker 
 prisoner. 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 475 
 
 up its first advantage against the right. It was one of those 
 critical situations which a moment will decide — the decision, 
 in fact, depending on gaining the advantage of the first vol- 
 ley. With quick self-possession, McCoy wheeled his forward 
 companies into line, and secured the first fire. One of 
 McCoy's men seized the Confederate commander by the 
 collar and dragged him in, and the Eighty-third poured into 
 the flank and rear of the hostile brigade a volley whicli sent 
 it back in disorder through the woods. The repulse of the 
 enemy at all points on Warren's front was now complete, and 
 nearly a thousand prisoners were taken. Warren's entire 
 loss was not above three hundred and fifty in killed and 
 wounded. 
 
 I pass now from Warren on the right to Hancock on the 
 left, where that officer had to carry the passage of the river 
 against considerable opposition. Hancock's point of pas- 
 sage, as already seen, was the Chesterfield or County Bridge, 
 a mile above the railroad crossing of the North Anna. Here 
 the Confederates had constructed a tete-de-pont on a tongue 
 of land formed by Long Creek and the North Anna. Cover- 
 ing the bridge on the north side was an extended redan, witli 
 a wet ditch in front, the gorge being commanded by rifle- 
 trenches in the rear. On the southern bank, which dominates 
 the northern, was a similar work.* The tongue of land to be 
 overpassed in carrying the bridge-head was a bare and 
 barren plain several hundred yards in width, ascending 
 sharply towards the enemy's position, which, as it turned out, 
 was held by a part of McLaws' division of Longstreet's 
 corps. Birney's division of Hancock's corps was assigned 
 the duty of carrying the work and bridge. To cover the storm- 
 ing party, Colonel Tidball, chief of artillery of the corps, 
 placed in position three sections, which rephed with efl^'ect to 
 the enemy's fire. An hour before sundown, the assault was 
 made by the brigades of Pierce and Egan, that, under a 
 
 * These works were built tlie year previous, about the time of the battle o» 
 Chancellorsville. 
 
476 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 heavy fire, swept across the open plain at double-quick. As 
 the menacing line approached close to the work, the garri- 
 son fled precipitately, and the men, making a foothold in the 
 parapet with their bayonets, clambered over it and planted 
 their colors on the redan. Thirty men of the defending force, 
 unable to escape, were captured in the ditch. The affair was 
 exceedingly spirited, and cost less than a hundred and fifty 
 men. The enemy made several attempts to burn the bridge 
 during the night, but these were frustrated by the vigilance 
 and good conduct of the troops. 
 
 On the following morning it was found that the Confeder- 
 ates had abandoned their advanced works on the southern 
 bank of the river. Hancock's corps then crossed by the 
 bridge. At the same time the Sixth Corps made the passage 
 on the right at the same point at which Warren's corps had 
 defiled the previous evening. 
 
 It will have been noted that the point at which the left 
 column under Hancock crossed the North Anna, is separated 
 from the point at which the right column under Warren had 
 made the passage by an interval of four miles. From 
 this circumstance there resulted a very peculiar formation of 
 the Confederate line ; and from this a train of events that 
 baulked the attempt to push the advance across the South 
 Anna, and finally compelled General Grant to abandon the 
 attempt, recross the North Anna, and take up a wholly differ- 
 ent line of march. I shall endeavor to make this intelligible. 
 
 While Lee, after the passage of Hancock on the left, threw 
 his right wing back from the North Anna, and on the passage 
 of Warren on the right threw back his left wing, he con- 
 tinued to cHng with his centre to the river ; so that, as I have 
 said, his army took up a very remarkable line in the form of 
 an obtuse-angled triangle, with the vertex thrust out on the 
 North Anna, his right flank refused on the Hanover marshes, 
 and his left flank thrown back and resting on Little River. 
 Hancock's corps was abreast one face of this triangle ; War- 
 ren's and Wright's corps were abreast the other face. Now, 
 when Burnside attempted to throw his command across the 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 477 
 
 North Anna at a transit intermediate between the points 
 of passage of Hancock and Warren, his advance division, 
 under General Crittenden, suffered very severely in the opera- 
 tion. Moreover, when "Warren attempted to extend his line by 
 sending down Crawford's division from the riglit to connect 
 with Crittenden, this force also was assailed, and with consid- 
 erable difficulty made its way back. Then the Confederates 
 interposing, cut off connection between Hancock's and "War- 
 ren's corps, and therefore between the two wings of the army. 
 The game of war seldom presents a more effectual check- 
 mate than was here given by Lee ; for after Grant had made 
 the brilhantly successful passage of the North Anna, the 
 Confederate commander, thrvistiug his centre between the two 
 wmgs of the Army of the Potomac, put his antagonist at 
 enormous disadvantage, and compelled him, for the re- 
 enforcement of one or the other wing, to make a double pas- 
 sage of the river. The more the position of Lee was 
 examined, the more unpromising attack was seen to be ; and 
 after passing the two foUowing days in reconnoissances, and 
 in destroying some miles of the Virginia Central Railroad, 
 General Grant determined to withdraw across the North 
 Anna and take up a new line of advance.* 
 
 The withdrawal from the North Anna was begun at dark of 
 the 26tli of May, when the Second, Fifth, and Sixth corps re- 
 tired by different bridges to the north bank. It was designed 
 to make the movement secretly, and this purpose was suc- 
 cessfully accompHshed. Not a picket shot was fired, and no 
 sound broke on the midnight air save the low nimble of the 
 artillery and wagons, and the tread of armed men as they 
 moved across the bridges. It was near dayhght before the 
 rear of the long columns had filed across. The army then 
 headed eastward and southward to cross the Pamunkey. 
 
 * General Grant's statement of the situation is vague, and is in the following 
 words : " Finding the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger than either 
 of his previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the 26th to the north hank of 
 the North Anna." Report, p. 9. 
 
478 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 The Sixth Corps led the van, followed by the Fifth and Ninth 
 corps. The Second Corps held position till the morning of 
 the 27th, when it covered the rear. 
 
 From the North Anna the line of march of the army made 
 a wide circuit eastward and then southward to pass the 
 Pamunkey. This river is formed by the confluence of the 
 North and South Anna ; and the Pamunkey in turn uniting 
 with the Mattapony, forms the York Eiver, emptying into 
 Chesapeake Bay. Thus the successful passage of the Pa- 
 munkey Avould not only dislodge Lee from the lines of the 
 North and South Anna, but would bring the army in com- 
 munication with a new and excellent water-base. While the 
 army was at Spottsylvania Courthouse it had used Fredericks- 
 burg as a depot ; when it moved to the North Anna, the base 
 was shifted to Port Koyal on the Rappahannock. Cutting 
 loose from this, it had "White House as a depot. 
 
 The Sixth Corps, preceded by two divisions of cavahy under 
 Sheridan, had the advance on the night of the 26th ; and on 
 the morning of the 27th, after a beautifully executed march 
 of twenty-two miles, the head of the column struck the Pa- 
 munkey at Hanovertown. Nothing was present but a small 
 mounted force in observation : this was readily dispersed or 
 captured. The Sixth Corps thereupon made the passage, 
 uncovered the fords, and took position to await the arrival 
 of the remaining corps of the army. These continued their 
 march during the day, and on the morning of the 28th the 
 Fifth and Ninth corps had joined the van on the south side 
 of the Pamunkey. The Second Corps bringing up the rear, 
 retired from the North Anna on the morning of the 27th, and 
 on the same afternoon made the passage at a ford four miles 
 above Hanovertown. The whole army was thus across the 
 Pamunkey ; and the routes to White House, at the head of 
 York Eiver, being opened up, the army was put in commu- 
 nication with the ample supplies floated by the waters of 
 Chesapeake Bay. 
 
 Grant's new turning movement was met by a corresponding 
 retrograde movement on the part of Lee, and as he feU back 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 479 
 
 on a direct line less than half the distance of the great detour 
 made by the Army of the Potomac, it was not remarkable 
 that, on crossing the Pamunkey, the Confederate force was 
 again encountered, ready to accept the gage of battle. Lee 
 assumed a position in advance of the Chickahominy, cov- 
 ering the Virginia Central and Fredericksburg and Pich- 
 mond railroads. His line of battle, as thus formed, faced 
 northeastward. This front of opposition compelled disposi- 
 tions to dislodge the Confederate force before essaying the 
 passage of the Chickahominy. The cavahy was immediately 
 pushed out on the Hanover road, and at a point known as 
 Hawes' Shop, the brigades of Davies, Gregg, and Custer be- 
 came warmly engaged, on the afternoon of the 28th, with the 
 Confederate cavalry under Fitz Hugh Lee and Hampton. 
 The troopers, as usual, dismounted, and for several hours 
 fought with great obstinacy, and unusually large loss — Sheri- 
 dan losing upwards of four hundred, and the Confederates 
 nearly double that number. The combat ended, however, in 
 Sheridan's retaining possession of this important junction of 
 roads, which enabled the entire line of the army to be throA\Ti 
 forward in advance of Hawes' Shop. The Confederates re- 
 tired behind the Tolopotomy. 
 
 The region in which the army was now operating revived 
 many reminiscences in the minds of those who had made the 
 Peninsular Campaign under McClellan ; for it was at Hawes' 
 Shop that the extreme right of the army then rested, and here 
 that Stuart, in moving from Hanover Courthouse to make his 
 famous raid, first struck McClellan's outposts. Gaines' Mill 
 and Mechanicsville were within an hour's ride ; Fair Oaks 
 could be reached in a two hours' trot; Kichmond was ten 
 miles off, and to those within that city the morning air daily 
 wafted the booming of hostile guns. 
 
 Meantime, where Lee had taken up his real vantage ground 
 was uncertain, and, with the view of developing his position, 
 strong reconnoissances by all the corps were next day thrown 
 forward : the Sixth Corps was directed on Hanover Courthouse; 
 the Second Corps on the road from Hawes' Shop towards 
 
480 CAftrPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 the same point ; the Fifth Corps towards Shady Grove Church, 
 and the Ninth Corps to be in position to support either the 
 Second or Fifth.* "Wright, with the Sixth Corps, passed 
 ftround the Confederate left, and succeeded in reaching Hano- 
 ver Courthouse ; but it was not long before Hancock and 
 "Warren were brought to a halt. Hancock, advancing towards 
 Hanover Courthouse, was suddenly arrested at Tolopotomy 
 Creek, an affluent of the Pamunkey, on the south bank of 
 which the enemy was found strongly intrenched. The stub- 
 born resistance encountei'ed CDmpelled Hancock to bring up 
 the rest of his corps, and next day the Ninth Corps was 
 formed on his left ; and the Sixth closing in to the left, was 
 placed on his right, with the design of forcing the position. 
 Heavy skirmishing took place ; but, though Hancock suc- 
 ceeded in carrying an advanced hne, the mam position, 
 strongly intrenched and covered by marshy ground, was 
 found to be entirely too formidable to assail, t Warren, on 
 the left, experienced a like check in his advance towards 
 Shady Grove Church, on the road to which, and at the point 
 where the main branch of the Toloj)otomy crosses that road, 
 the enemy was found in line of battle. It was ascertained 
 that the whole of Ewell's corps held position at Shady Grove 
 Church, and as the enemy soon afterwards appeared to be 
 threatening to move round by the Mechanicsville pike and 
 turn Warren's left, Crawford directed one of his brigades 
 to the left to cover that road. This brigade of the Eeserves, 
 under Colonel Hardin, had hardly reached the vicinity of 
 Bethesda Church, on the Mechanicsville pike, when Rodes' 
 division of Ewell's corps, moving by that road, assailed it 
 furiously on the flank. After maintaining the unequal contest 
 for a few minutes, the brigade fell back to the Shady Grove 
 road with the enemy in pursuit. Here, however, the Confed- 
 erates were held in check by the excellent practice of a bat- 
 tery, and at this moment General Crawford brought up tho 
 
 * General Meade : Order, May 29tk. 
 f Hancock's Report. 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN 48 J 
 
 remainder of the Reserves. With these, and the brigade of 
 Colonel Kitching, Crawford took up a good position, and 
 gave an effectual repulse to a very impetuous assault by 
 Rodes. The left was then extended so as to cover the 
 Mechanicsville pike at dark. 
 
 These reconnoissances showed Lee to be in a very strong 
 position covering the approaches to the Chickahominy, the 
 forcing of which it was now clear must cost a great battle. 
 
 VI. 
 THE BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR. 
 
 Tlie Chickahominy may be regarded as a wet ditch in front 
 of the outer fortifications of Richmond. It was therefore ab- 
 solutely necessary, for further advance upon the line t Liken up 
 by General Grant, to force the passage of this stream. But 
 it was clear from the development of the enemy's strength 
 that the effort to carry a direct crossing where the two armies 
 faced each other, had little promise of success. It was ac- 
 cordingly judged advisable to extend towards the left and 
 endeavor to pass the Chickahominy below by a movement 
 by Cold Harbor. This place, which, as the point of con- 
 vergence of all the roads leading whether to Richmond or 
 to White House (now the depot of supplies of the army), 
 was to be considered as a strategic point of the first import- 
 ance, had been secured after a brisk action by Sheridan's cav- 
 alry on the afternoon of the 31st. The same night the Sixth 
 Corps was detached from the extreme right of the army and 
 directed on Cold Harbor, towards Avhich also a body of troops 
 from Butler's command was then en route. On this point ex- 
 planation may be necessary. 
 
 Finding that Butler, after his retirement within the cul-de- 
 sac of Bermuda Hundred, could readily hold his narrow front 
 with a fractional force, General Grant ordered him to form 
 
 31 
 
482 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 all that could be spared into a movable column and forward 
 it to make a junction with the Ai'my of the Potomac. Ac- 
 cordingly, on the 29th of May, a force of sixteen thousand 
 men, under General W. F. Smith, made up of four divisions 
 taken from the Tenth and Eighteenth corps, was embarked 
 on transports in the James River, and after passing down the 
 James, and ascending the York and Pamunkey, debarked at 
 White House on the following day. Here General Smith 
 received orders from the headquarters of General Grant to 
 move his command to New Castle, on the south side of the 
 Pamimkey.* It will be observed that a movement on that 
 point must throw Smith completely out of position in relation 
 to the Ai'my of the Potomac, then fronting the Chickahominy 
 — a fact that was sufficiently evident to that officer on his 
 arrival there, on the night of the 31st, after a long and fa- 
 tiguing march. It was not, however, till the following morn- 
 ing that he learned from an officer of General Grant's staff 
 that his orders had been wrongly w^orded — that instead of New 
 Castle it was New Cold Harbor he was designed to reach, and 
 that in consequence he had made an unnecessary march of ten 
 or fifteen miles. Upon this. General Smith countermarched 
 his column, and on the afternoon of that day (June 1st) 
 reached Cold Harbor, where the Sixth Corps, detached, as 
 already seen, from the right of the Army of the Potomac, had 
 just anived. At Cold Harbor General Smith was met with 
 orders fi-om General Meade, to take position on the right ©f 
 the Sixth Corps and co-operate with it in an immediate 
 attack, t 
 
 Now, as soon as the Sixth Corps was withdrawn from the 
 right of the army, Lee, detecting the procedure, and sus- 
 
 * General Smith's lleport : Order from General Grant, dated Hanovertown 
 May 28th. 
 
 \ The precise terms of the order to General Smith were quite peculiar ; for 
 he was commanded to "hold the road from Cold Harbor to Bethesda Church" 
 (Warren's position), and " co-operate with the Sixth Corps in an attack." As 
 General Smith's force was insufficient even to fill this space of several miles., 
 he abandoned the attempt to comply ■with the first part of his instructions 
 and resolved to execute the second — that is, attack. 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 483 
 
 pecting its object, met this manoeuvre by withdrawing Long- 
 street's corps from his own left, and directing it towards 
 Cold Harbor, to cover there any attempt to force the passage 
 of the Chickahominy : so that when Wright and Smith ar- 
 rived, it was no longer the slight force encountered by Sheri- 
 dan that they were to meet. The enemy was descried in 
 force holding position behind Cold Harbor in a thick wood, 
 to reach which it Avas necessary to traverse an open field 
 several hundred yards in width. Dispositions being com- 
 pleted towards four o'clock in the afternoon, the assault was 
 made very spiritedly, the troops advancing over the open 
 space under a very severe fire. Both the left of Smith's line 
 and the right of the Sixth Corps succeeded in carrying the 
 first line of rifle-trenches, capturing between them six hun- 
 dred prisoners. It was, however, found quite impracticable 
 to carry the second line, and the troops rested on their arms 
 for the night, after dispositions to secure what had been 
 gained. The casualties in this action were severe, being up- 
 wards of two thousand men in the two corps. 
 
 Great as was the loss in this action it secured the posses- 
 sion of Cold Harbor, which it was indispensable to hold ; for 
 General Grant had determined there to force the passage of 
 the Chickahominy, and compel Lee to retire within the in- 
 trenchments of Eichmond. Hancock's corps, which, since 
 the withdrawal of the Sixth Corps from the line of the Tolo- 
 potomy, formed the right of the army, was ordered that night 
 from its jDOsition, and directed on Cold Harbor, to take posi- 
 tion on the left of the Sixth Corps. Warren's corps continued 
 near Bethesda Church, and though holding a line exces- 
 sively long (nearly four miles in extent), there was still an 
 interval between his left and Smith's right. To close this 
 gap, Warren was directed by General Meade to extend his 
 left, while Burnside's command was to retire altogether from 
 its place on the right of the line, and mass on the right and 
 rear of Warren. When Burnside, during the afternoon of 
 the 2d, was in the act of executing this movement, the ene- 
 my, detecting it, followed up with a line of battle, drove Burn- 
 
484 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 side's skirmish line through a swamp, capturing many, and 
 then penetrating betAveen Warren's Hne of battle and liis skir- 
 mish line, cut off and took prisoners about four hundred men. 
 This sudden attack of course put an end to Warren's contem- 
 plated extension to the left, and compelled him to act on the 
 defensive at once, to avert any positive disaster. The enemy's 
 sally was, however, not made with much vigor, and was 
 readily repidsed by Bartlett's brigade. Dispositions were 
 then made by the Fifth and Ninth corps for the battle which 
 was determined on for the morrow. 
 
 Cold Harbor, where Generals Grant and Meade established 
 their headquarters for the impending passage at arms, is no 
 harbor, as the name might imply, for it is quite inland ;* nor 
 is it even a centre of population, nor so much as a collection of 
 farm-houses, but a mere locality, having aU its importance 
 from the convergence of roads there. Behind it runs the 
 Chickahominy, and the map will reveal that we are here again 
 on classic ground ; for it was here that the battle of Gaines' 
 MOl, the first of the series of actions in McClellan's retrograde 
 movement across the Peninsula, was fought. As the hnes 
 were now drawn, however, there was this difference, that the 
 relative situations of the combatants were quite reversed — Lee 
 holding McClellan's position and Grant Lee's. 
 
 Lee disposed his force on the hither side of the Chicka- 
 hominy, in an excellent position for defence, having the front 
 of approach obstructed by thickets and cut up by marshes. 
 The Union force was drawn up in the order already given — 
 Hancock's corps on the left ; then the Sixth Corps ; then 
 Smith's command ; then Warren and Burnside on the right. 
 The left rested across the Dispatch Station road, the right on 
 Tolopotomy Creek. . Sheridan with two divisions of horse 
 
 * Many interpretations of Cold or Coal Harbor have been given. It has 
 been suggested that the proper form is " Cool Arbor" — a designation which its 
 shady coverts might justify. But it would appear that " Cold Harbor" is a 
 common name for many places along the travelled roads in England, and 
 means simply, " shelter without fire," 
 
GRANT'S 07ERLAND CAMPAIGN. 485 
 
 held tlic lower crossings of tlie Chickahominj an J covereil 
 the roads to White Honse. The other cavalry division under 
 Wilson took post on the right flank. The manner of attack 
 ordered was of the kind already so often made in the cours<». 
 of this campaign — a general assault along the whole front of 
 six miles, to be made at half-past four in the morning. 
 
 Next morning, with the first gray light of dawn strugghng 
 through the clouds, the preparations began : from behind the 
 rude parapets there was an upstarting, a springing to arms, 
 the muffled commands of officers forming the line. The 
 attack was ordered at half-past four, and it may have been 
 five minutes after that, or it may have been ten minutes, but it 
 certainly was not later than forty-five minutes past four, when 
 the whole line was in motion, and the dark hollows between 
 the armies were lit up with the fires of death. 
 
 It took hardly more than ten minutes of the figment men 
 call time to decide the battle. There was along the whole line 
 a rush — the spectacle of impregnable works — a bloody loss 
 — then a sullen falling back, and the action was deckled. 
 Conceive of this in the large, and we shall then be able to 
 descend to some of the points of action as they individualize 
 themselves along the line. 
 
 Hancock held the left of the whole army. His attack was 
 made by the division o1 Barlow on the left and Gibbon on 
 the right, with Birney supporting. Barlow, formed in two 
 lines, advanced, and found the enemy strongly posted in a 
 sunken road in front of his works. From this, after a severe 
 struggle, the enemy was dislodged and followed into his works, 
 w^here several hundred prisoners, a color, and three guns were 
 taken. Thfe guns were immediately turned upon the enemy, 
 forcing him to retreat in confusion from that part of the line. 
 But this partial success was speedily turned into a reverse ; 
 for not only did Barlow's second Hue fail to come up to the 
 prompt support of the first,* but the enemy, speedily re- 
 enforced, forced Barlow's troops out of the captured works. 
 
 * Hancock : Report of Cold Harbor. 
 
486 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 They fell bacli, but not to their original position : to a posi- 
 tion far in advance of that from which they had moved for- 
 ward, and but from thirty to seventy-five yards from the 
 enemy, where, taking advantage of the ground, they covered 
 themselves in an astonishingly short time. 
 
 Gibbon's advance was simultaneous with Barlow's ; but in 
 moving forward, he came upon one of the swamps of the 
 Chickahominy, which widened as the line neared the enemy's 
 intrenchments. This separated his command ; but the troops, 
 at a fearful sacrifice, advanced close up to the works. Some 
 for a moment entered them. Colonel McMahon, with a part 
 of his regiment, separated by the swamp from the rest of his 
 brigade, reached the parapet, planted on it his colors, but 
 fell covered with many wounds, and expired in the enemy's 
 hands, losing his colors with honor. The gallant Colonels 
 Porter, Mori'is, McKeen, and Haskell were killed, and General 
 Tyler was wounded. Yet Gibbon's troops, too, clung tena- 
 ciously to the ground gained ; and some remained so close to 
 the hostUe works, that the men could only be reached by cov- 
 ered ways. In less than an hour Hancock's loss was above 
 three thousand. 
 
 The story of the advance of the Sixth Corps on the right of 
 Hancock, and that of Smith on the right of the Sixth, is of a 
 like tenor. Every assault was immediately repulsed most dis- 
 astrously ; and to retain possession of an advanced position, 
 more or less close to the enemy's line, was the utmost that 
 could be done. 
 
 To the right the Fifth Corps was strong out in a line so 
 thin and extended, that beyond holding its own, it was hope- 
 less for that corps to attempt to do more. The Ninth Corps 
 made no attack at the hour ordered ; but General Burnside 
 got two of his divisions round in position to assail the enemy's 
 left flank, and by noon had one brigade posted across the 
 eastern end of the Shady Grove road. This force warmly 
 engaged the enemy. The batteries of the corps worked suf- 
 ficiently far round to the right to make the Confederate posi- 
 tion at that point very difficult to hold ; and by afternoon 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAlSfPAIQN. 187 
 
 General Burnside was prepared to assail the enemy's left 
 Long before that time, however, the action had been sus- 
 pended. 
 
 The action was decided, as I have said, in an incredibly 
 brief time in the morning's assault. But, rapidly as the 
 result was reached, it was decisive ; for the consciousness of 
 every man pronounced further assault hopeless. The troops 
 went forward as far as the example of their officers could 
 carry them :* nor was it possible to urge them bej^ond ; for 
 there they knew lay only death, without even the chance of 
 victory. The completeness with which this judgment had 
 been reached by the whole army was strikingly illustrated by 
 an incident that occurred during the forenoon. Some hours 
 after the failure of the first assault. General Meade sent in- 
 structions to each corps- commander to renew the attack with- 
 out reference to the troops on his right or left. The order 
 was issued through these officers to their subordinate com- 
 manders, and from them descended through the wonted chan- 
 nels ; but no man stirred, and the immobile lines pronounced 
 a verdict, silent, yet emphatic, against further slaughter. The 
 loss on the Union side in this sanguinary action was over 
 thirteen thousand, while on the part of the Confederates, it is 
 doubtful whether it reached that many hundreds. 
 
 In criticism of the action of Cold Harbor it must be said, 
 that it is difficult to see how battles can be won on the princi- 
 ple here adopted. If to be superior to youi- adversary at the 
 actual point of contact be a cardinal maxim of war, it is not 
 easy to discover on what ground success can be hoped fi-om 
 such general assaults along a line of many mUes, and conse- 
 quei.tly everywhere weak, made by corps-commanders inde- 
 pendently of each other, and directed against positions which 
 have not been reconnoitred, over most unequal conditions of 
 
 * TMs phrase, " asfwr as the example of their officers could carry them," I 
 take from the Report of General Hancock. It is true of the whole army, and 
 to those who witnessed that terrible slaughter, will have an almost pathetic 
 significance. 
 
488 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 terrain, and at a uniform and precise moment fixed for all bj 
 the watch. If this rude and primitive array sufficed, one 
 might forget all that experience has taught and genius de- 
 vised of the means by which success is snatched on the 
 field of battle — one might forget that there are key-points 
 on every field — that it is the aim of the commander to de- 
 termine this point on his actual front, and then by massing 
 heavily against it, by concentrating his force into a focus of 
 fiery energy, instead of dissipating it in indefinite space, to 
 seize such master-ground as may give the opening for a deci- 
 sive blow. 
 
 The bloody experiment at Cold Harbor, far from disprov- 
 ing this principle of action, signally confirmed it ; for while 
 the assault along the whole line everywhere failed, there 
 was at least one tactical point on the field which, had dis- 
 positions suited to the occasion been made, might have 
 been seized, and a path to success opened. This point was 
 a bald height opposite the Union left, named Watt's HiU, 
 dominating the whole ground, and covering the angle of 
 the dispatch road. Along this ridge, on which Lee's right 
 rested, the Confederate line formed a salient, and in front of 
 it was the sunken road from which Hancock's left division 
 dislodged the enemy, and then, by an impetuous rush, carried, 
 and for a moment held the works beyond. But so little con- 
 sideration had been given in advance to the dispositions of 
 attack, that it was not till after its blood-bought victory had 
 been snatched from that slender force, that the supreme im- 
 portance of this position was appreciated. B}^ this time 
 the position had been re-enforced by the enemy, and the 
 opportune moment was of course lost ; but had a heavy 
 force at first been massed against that point, it might not 
 only have been held, but the entire hostile line would then 
 have been taken in reverse. 
 
 After the failure of the first assault, renewal of the attack 
 was seen to be so void of all show of success, that at half-past 
 one o'clock in the afternoon, ofi'ensive operations were for- 
 mally suspended, and the corps-commanders were ordered to 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAJVIPAIGN. 489 
 
 mtrencli their advanced positions. Next day siege operations 
 were begun, with a ^dew to carry the defences of the Chicka- 
 hominy by regular approaches. But this work also, at the 
 end of a few days, ceased, and General Grant determined to 
 change his Hne of operations to the south side of the James 
 Eiver. The circumstances under which this determination 
 was made, and the manner in which it was carried into execu- 
 tion, will be detailed in the succeeding campaign. 
 
 VII. 
 OBSERVATIONS ON THE OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 
 
 The course of this narrative has already set forth the series 
 of operations, remarkable in the history of warfare, by which, 
 in one pregnant month, the Army of the Potomac fought its 
 way to the Chickahominy. 
 
 The campaign indeed resembled less ordinary campaigns 
 than a kind of running siege. From the Rapidan to the 
 Chickahominy the face of the country was covered with the 
 intrenched lines, within which these "points of mighty op- 
 posites," the Armies of the Potomac and of Northern Vir- 
 ginia, had waged a succession of deadly conflicts. At every 
 advance, Lee was able to meet his adversary with a front of 
 opposition, and within his improvised strongholds exact a 
 heavy price in blood. And although the illustrious valor o^ 
 the Army of the Potomac more than once plucked victor} 
 from the jaws of hell, and bayoneted an unyielding enemy in 
 the very enceinte of his citadel, the Union commander was 
 never able to crush his opponent, who, thrown again and 
 again in the mighty wrestle, each time rose quickly to his 
 feet. Foiled in the effort to force a direct issue. Genera] 
 Grant, at the end of each combat, initiated a movement to 
 turn the hostile front ; and these flanking operations were 
 executed with much address — throwing the Confederates sue- 
 
490 CAJkfPATGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 cessively out of the positions at the Wilderness, before Spott- 
 sylvania, on the North Anna, and along the Pamunkey. 
 Thus, by battles and marches, the army, in thirty days and 
 thirty nights, reached the Chickahominy. 
 
 Now, it will be observed that each of these turning move- 
 ments, up to the Chickahominy, brought the army nearer at 
 each leap to the objective of all its efforts, Richmond. But, 
 once before the Chickahominy, the series of flanking opera- 
 tions was exhausted ; for any additional move by the left 
 would throw the army not towards, but away from Richmond. 
 If, therefore, it was designed to push the advance by the line 
 on which the army was now acting, and on which General 
 Grant had declared he would " fight it out, if it took all 
 summer," * it was absolutely necessary to force the passage 
 of the Chickahominy. The result of the battle of Cold 
 Harbor, fought on the 3d of May, was to show that this line 
 could not be carried by a coup de main. 
 
 But as the alternative was either to force a crossing of this 
 stream or abandon that line of operations altogether. General 
 Grant's first impulse after the disastrous upshot of the action 
 at Cold Harbor, was to order the initiation of siege opera- 
 tions, with the view to carry the position by regular ap- 
 proaches. It was not long, however, before the unpromising 
 aspect of the result that would follow even a successful issue 
 on the Chickahominy gave pause to this purpose, and finally 
 led to the adoption of an altogether new line of mana3uvre. 
 
 In the discussion of the " overland route," with which the 
 recital of this campaign opened, I have shown that any ad- 
 vance on that line ends in the siege of the uninvested fortifi- 
 cations of Richmond, within which the defending army, with 
 all its lines of communication open, might remain indefinitely. 
 It was no doubt from the perception of the altogether inde- 
 cisive nature of this result that General Grant, after ten days 
 passed along the Chickahominy, resolved to execute another 
 
 * " I propose to fight it out on this line, if it takes all summer." — Dispatch 
 of May 11, 1864. 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN 
 
 491 
 
 flank movemefnt, which should throw the army to the south 
 side of the James Elver. Now, as this change of base ended 
 the operations on the " overland route," it would seem also to 
 challenge a judgment on the merits of that enterprise, con- 
 sidered as a whole. 
 
 It has been seen that General Grant himself originally 
 preferred to the overland march an operation against the 
 communications of Richmond by a transfer of the army to a 
 point on the coast. The results thus far accomplished on the 
 former line would appear to justify his primal choice. 
 
 As the overland campaign was unsuccessful either in the 
 destruction of Lee's army or the capture of Richmond, and 
 as that line of operations was at length abandoned, the gross 
 result would seem to be confined to whatever loss, material 
 and moral, had been caused the opposing army. But it is not 
 possible to measure aright this loss, unless it be considered 
 in its relations with the cost at which it was purchased. 
 
 In this regard, it must be considered, the balance was very 
 much in favor of the enemy. Grant's loss in the series of 
 actions from the Wilderness to the Chickahominy reached 
 the enormous aggregate of sixty thousand men put Jiors du 
 combat" — a number greater than the entire strength of Lee's 
 
 * I append a tabular statement of casualties in the Army of the Potomac in 
 the battles of the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North Anna, and Cold Harbor. 
 
 Battles. 
 
 Dates. 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Missinff. 
 
 Ajrirre- 
 Sifute. 
 
 Officers 
 
 Enlisted 
 men. 
 
 Officers 
 
 Enlisted 
 men. 
 
 Officers 
 
 Enlisted 
 men. 
 
 Wilderness. . 
 Spottsylvania 
 Nortli Anna . 
 Cold Harbor . 
 
 Mav 5 to 12. 
 May 12 to 21. 
 May 21 to 31. 
 Jut'ie 1 to 10. 
 
 269 
 
 114 
 
 12 
 
 144 
 
 3,019 
 
 2,032 
 
 138 
 
 1,561 
 
 1,017 
 
 259 
 
 67 
 
 421 
 
 18,261 
 7,697 
 1,063 
 8,621 
 
 177 
 
 31 
 
 3 
 
 51 
 
 6,667 
 248 
 324 
 
 2,855 
 
 29,410 
 
 10,881 
 
 1,607 
 
 13,153 
 
 53'J 
 
 6,750 
 
 1,764 
 
 35,642 
 
 262 
 
 9,594 
 
 .M.5.5i; 
 
 But to this must be added the casualties of the Ninth Corps, which, up to 
 the battle of Cold Harbor, was independent of Meade's command. Counting 
 these at five thousand, or less than one-half the average of the other corps, we 
 obtain an aggregate of above sixty thousand men. It wall be observed that 
 the loss in officers was especially severe, reaching in all three thousand. 
 These were generally the flower of the officers of the Army of the Potomac, 
 the bravest of the brave men whose loss to the army was irreparable. 
 
492 CMIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 army at tlie opening of tlie campaign. He had inflicted on 
 Lee a loss of twenty thousand — the ratio being one to three. '^ 
 The Confederates, elated at the skilful manner in which they 
 had constantly been thrust between Eichmond and the Union 
 army, and conscious of the terrible price in blood they had 
 exacted from the latter, were in high spirit, and the morale 
 of Lee's army was never better than after the battle of Cold 
 Harbor-t 
 
 It is not often in war that a belligerent is in condition to 
 aflford a sacrifice thus disproportionate ; nor can results thus 
 achieved be accounted the proof and procedure of a high 
 order of generalship. I shall endeavor to show this by a 
 recurrence to those simple principles to which great mihtary 
 questions may almost always be reduced. 
 
 * In stating the casualties of the Confederate army at twenty thousand, I 
 place the aggregate somewliat higher than that obtained from the Confederate 
 sources of information to which I have had access. General Lee's adjutant-gen- 
 eral, in conversation with the writer, gave eighteen thousand as his impression of 
 the loss. This number corresponds remarkably with that derived from a com 
 parison of the force with which Lee opened the campaign and that present after 
 the battle of Cold Harbor. The former was fifty-two thousand six hundred and 
 twenty-six, and on May 31 it was forty-four thousand two hundred and forty- 
 seven, the difference being somewhat above eight thousand. But meanwhile 
 Lee had received accessions to his strength — seven thousand men under 
 Pickett, from Petersburg, and two thousand under Breckenridge, from the 
 Valley. This would make his loss, up to Cold Harbor, seventeen thousand ; 
 and adding one thousand for the casualties of that battle (an over-estimate), 
 we obtain an aggregate of eighteen thousand. 
 
 t I have until lately taken a different view of the condition of Lee's army 
 at this time, inferring that the severe strain to which it had been constantly 
 subjected, must have shaken its morale. In first vn-iting touching this part of the 
 campaign, I used the following language : " There was one result of a purely 
 moral order that sprang from this campaign that had, without doubt, a con- 
 siderable influence on its issue. The very relentlessness with which General 
 Grant dealt his blows, and sacrificed lives to deal these blows, assumed at 
 length to the enemy the aspect of a remorseless fate ; taught him that there 
 was a hand at his throat that never would unloose its grasp, and shook him in 
 advance with anticipated doom." In holding a different opinion of the con- 
 dition of the Army of Northern Virginia at this time, I ground the statement 
 on the unanimous and emphatic testimony of oflScers of that army 
 
GRANTS OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 493 
 
 Having determined to advance upon Richmond bj an over- 
 land march, it depended on General Grant's own will to give 
 his operations what character he pleased. This, at least, was 
 true after the battle of the Wilderness, which was an inevita- 
 ble action, determined less by strategic or tactical considera- 
 tions than by the moral condition of the opposing armies and 
 their commanders. 
 
 Whatever was done after that should have been done to 
 accomphsh the ultimate result aimed at. This, however, was 
 of a double nature — to destroy Lee's army, and to capture 
 "Richmond, covered by that army. The latter could only be 
 effected by a carefully considered combination and direction 
 of force. When the hostile army had succeeded in ensconcing 
 itseK within such intrenched lines as those of Spottsylvania, 
 the North Anna, and the Chickahominy, the chances of deal- 
 ing an effective blow were meagre indeed ; while assaults, 
 under such circumstances, were attended with a sacrifice of 
 life enormous on the part of the assailants, and slight on the 
 part of the defenders. The only possible result to be gained 
 by such attacks was, therefore, the forcing of the enemy from 
 his position. 
 
 But this might have been done without loss by a simple 
 turning movement, and the principles of war admonish the 
 use of this means in preference to an attack in front, in every 
 case where, by this means, a position may be carried.* More- 
 over, this was the means by which, eventually, after a heavy 
 waste of life, the enemy was dislodged from these lines. It 
 results that such assaults were vain ; and the campaign on the 
 
 * This {ffinciple in military art is too well established to require that it 
 should be fortified by authority : but Napoleon, in a criticism on the conduct 
 of Tureune in the campaign of 1655, sets forth the action of that general in a 
 statement of principles so different from those followed by General Grant, that 
 I cannot avoid citing it here. " Turenne," says he, " constantly observed the 
 two maxims: 1st, Never attack a position in front, when you can obtain it by 
 turning it ; 2d, Avoid doing what the enemy wishes, and that simply because 
 he does wish it. Shun the field of battle wliich he has reconnoitred and stud 
 led, and more particularly that in which he has fortified and intrenched him 
 bdlf." — Montholon and Gourgaud : Memoirs of Napoleon, vol. iii., p. 95. 
 
i94 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 overland route must be accounted a failure in this regard : 
 that so far from accomplishing the result aimed at — to wit, the 
 capture of Richmond and the destruction of Lee's force — the 
 army began to work efficiently towards that end only when 
 it left this line of operations, and took up a new one south of 
 the James River. 
 
 General Grant has summed up his theory of action in a 
 single phrase — to " hammer continuously ;" and his conduct 
 in this campaign ranks him with that class of generals who 
 have been named Thor-strikers. But the mind of a great 
 commander never moved on that principle alone, though the 
 greatest have at times shown a fondness for the employment 
 of brute masses in direct attacks, as was the case with Napo- 
 leon in 1812, in a partial echpse of his genius.* The result of 
 such assaults as that of Spottsylvania Courthouse and at Cold 
 Harbor, in the latter of which the Army of the Potomac lost 
 at least twenty men to Lee's one, presents the redudio ad ab- 
 surdum of the theory of "hammering." And besides, General 
 Grant's best successes were accomplished only when, departing 
 from his own principle, he manoeuvred as well as attacked. 
 
 It may indeed be said that, as the resources of the Con- 
 federacy were well-nigh exhausted, while those of the North 
 were still ample, a continuance of even such unequal exchange 
 of life as was made in this campaign would finally result in 
 the destruction of the enemy. But this assertion omits the 
 important consideration that war is sustained quite as much 
 by the moral energy of a peo23le as by its material resources, 
 and that the former must be active to bring out and make 
 available the latter. It has not unfrequently occurred that, 
 with abundant resources, a nation has failed in war by the 
 sapping of the animating principle in the minds of its citizens. 
 For armies are things visible and formal, circumscribed by 
 
 * " In 1812, a decided taste for direct attacks began to manifest itself in him 
 •—a taste for the pleasure of emi^loying force, and a kind of disdain for the con- 
 currence of art and skilful combinations. He conquered at the Moskwa, bui 
 with immense losses and vmimportant results." — Marmont : Spirit of Military 
 Institutions, p. 186. 
 
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN. 405 
 
 time and space ; but tlie soul of war is a power unseen, 
 bound up witli the interests, convictions, passions of men. 
 Now, so gloomy was tlie military outlook after the action on 
 the Chickahominy, and to such a degree by consequence had 
 the moral spring of the public mind become relaxed, that 
 there was at this time great danger of a collapse of the war. 
 The history of this conflict truthfully written will show this.* 
 Had not success elsewhere come to brighten the horizon, it 
 would have been difficult to have raised new forces to recruit 
 the Ai'my of the Potomac, which, shaken in its structure, its 
 valor quenched in blood, and thousands of its ablest officers 
 killed and wounded, was the Army of the Potomac no more. 
 
 It would be interesting to institute a detailed comparison 
 between the overland campaign towards Kichmond and the 
 campaign of Sherman towards Atlanta. These operations 
 were parallel ; but the conduct of the commanders was very 
 difi'erent. General Sherman, rarely assaulting, treated each 
 position taken up by Johnston as a fortress ; and by intrench- 
 ing in front of his opponent's works, he was able both to cover 
 his own Hues and gradually accumulate on a flank a force so 
 menacing to his antagonist's communications as to compel him 
 to abandon each successive stronghold. Thus, by repeated 
 leaps in advance, and with comparatively little loss, he reached 
 his goal, Atlanta, t 
 
 General Grant also effected turning movements of the same 
 kind ; but these were rarely undertaken until after a frightful 
 sacrifice of Ufe in the attempt to force a direct issue. What- 
 ever adverse criticism history may make on this campaign will 
 probably turn mainly on the question of the utility of these 
 
 * Tlie archives of tte State Department, when one day made public, will 
 show how deeply the Government was affected by the want of military success. 
 and to what resolutions the Executive had in consequence come. 
 
 f General Johnston, whose very words, in conversation with the writer, are 
 employed above, added a significant statement. He said he believed, at the 
 beginning of the campaign, that he could beat Sherman ; and, &aid he, " / 
 know I should have beaten Mm, ?iad he made such assaults on me us Qenerai 
 Qrant did on Lee." 
 
496 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 attacks, and on the tactical execution of tlie operations, wliich 
 was often much inferior to the conception. The flank marches 
 were conducted with great skill, and the movements of the col- 
 umns, wdth a constantly shifting base, present a study highly 
 interesting and instructive to those who concern themselves 
 with the larger questions of war. 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 497 
 
 xn. 
 
 THE SIEGE OF PETERSEUEG. 
 
 Jdne, 1864— March, 1865. 
 
 I. 
 THE CHANGE OF BASE. 
 
 The determination of General Grant to transfer the army, 
 by a flank marcli, to the south side of the James Eiver, in- 
 volved considerations of a wholly different order from those 
 concerned in the repeated turning movements which he had 
 made to dislodge Lee from the intrenched positions held by 
 him. These were simply manoeuvres of grand tactics, delicate 
 indeed in their nature, but they did not carry the army away 
 from its line of operations, nor from the defensive line as re- 
 gards Washington, which it aU the time covered. The reso- 
 lution to cross the James necessitated the total abandonment 
 of that system of action which aimed, while operating against 
 the enemy offensively, to directly defend the national capital. 
 
 Now, although in the defence of places, it is frequently more 
 efficacious to assume a line of operation that seems to aban- 
 don the point to be guarded and deliver it up to the enemy, 
 than to place one's self directly in front of it, it must be 
 borne in mind that General Grant was acting under an Ad- 
 ministration that was not only incapable of appreciating 
 such considerations, which indeed belong to the higher part 
 of war, but an Administration that was, from political mo- 
 tives, strongly opposed to a removal of the army from the 
 
 33 
 
4d8 CAMPAIGInS OiV THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 overland line of advance against Riclimond. Moreover, the 
 operation was in itself one of great delicacy, a change of 
 base being pronounced by the foremost master of war " the 
 ablest manoeuvre taught by military art," * 
 
 General Grant manifested as much moral firmness in 
 adopting a line of action which, adverse though it was to the 
 wishes of his Government, he felt to be prescribed by the 
 highest military considerations, as he showed ability in 
 executing this difficult operation. The measure itself was not 
 only entirely conformable to the true princij)les of war, but 
 its execution reflects high credit on the commander, and 
 merits the closest study. 
 
 Immediately after the battle of Cold Harbor, the Ninth 
 Corps, then holding the extreme right of the line, had been 
 withdrawn from its position and posted between the Fifth 
 Corps, which then became the right of the line, and the 
 Eighteenth. On the 6th, the Fifth Corps was retired and 
 massed in rear of the centre. The Ninth Corps then became 
 again the right of the line. On the 7th, the Second Corps, 
 then forming the left of the line, being stretched to the 
 Chickahominy, the Fifth was transferred to that flank to 
 ■extend it as far as Dispatch Station on the York Biver Rail- 
 road. At this date, two divisions of cavalry under Sheridan 
 were sent to destroy more efi'ectually the Central Railroad. 
 
 By the gradual refusal of the right flank and development 
 of the left, the army was placed within an easy march of the 
 lower crossings of the Chickahominy — Warren's corps being 
 but ten miles from Long Bridge. On the night of the 12th of 
 June the movement to the James was begun. 
 
 Warren, preceded by Wilson's cavalry division, took the 
 lead, seized , the crossing of the Chickahominy at Long 
 Bridge, and made dispositions to mask the movement of the 
 army. Hancock's corps then followed the Fifth, and marched 
 to Wilcox's Landing on the left bank of the James. The corps 
 of Wright and ^Burnside, by an exterior route, crossed at 
 
 * Napoleon : Memoirs, vol. iii., p. 203. 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 490 
 
 Jones' Bridge and marched to Charles City, on the James. 
 Smith's command marched to White House, where it took 
 transports and returned to Bermuda Hundred by water. The 
 trains made the passage of the Chichahominy by a bridge at 
 Coles' Ferry. 
 
 The march of fifty-five miles across the Peninsula was 
 made in two days, and with perfect success. It was covered 
 fi'om the enemy's observation by a skilful feint made by 
 Warren, who threatened direct advance on Richmond by the 
 route of White Oak Swamp. After crossing the Chicka- 
 hominy at Long Bridge, Warren threw Crawford's division 
 forward on the New Market road, while Wilson's cavalry divi- 
 sion, taking the advance, drove the enemy's mounted force 
 across White Oak Swamp. Warren lay in this vicinity 
 during the day, covering all the routes by which the enemy 
 might come down from Bichmond to observe or disturb the 
 movement ; and under cover of his array, the whole army 
 marched towards the James. 
 
 Lee, of course, discovered the withdrawal on the morning 
 of the 13th. He, however, made no attempt to follow up, but 
 retired towards Bichmond. During the afternoon, a body of 
 infantry came down the New Market road ; but finding War- 
 ren's force in line of battle, it made no attack, contenting it- 
 self with intrenching in plain sight. It is probable that this 
 menace by Warren deceived Lee as to Grant's actual purpose, 
 and caused him to anticipate a direct advance on Bichmond 
 by the river routes. But, meantime, the army had reached 
 the James below Harrison's Landing, and was prepared to 
 pass to the south side. Here a considerable delay was 
 caused by the non-arrival of the ponton-bridges ; * but means 
 of transport being at hand, Hancock's corps was ferried 
 
 * It turned out that the ponton-bridge for the wagon-train over the 
 Chickahominy at Coles' Ferry was too short by half its length ; so that the 
 army ponton-train was sent to piece it out. By this means a day was lost ; and 
 rather than run the very remote risk of losing a wagon-train, the commander 
 ran the very positive risk of losing Petersburg. 
 
500 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 across at Wilcox's Landing, and landed on tlie south bank 
 at Windmill Point. During the night of the 14th, the pon- 
 ton-bridge was laid across the James at Douthard's, a 
 short distance below Hancock's point of passage,* By noon 
 of the 16th the whole army was on the south side of the 
 James. 
 
 While the Army of the Potomac was thus making the over- 
 land march across the Peninsula, General Smith's command 
 had returned to Bermuda Hundred, whence it proceeded upon 
 an operation that had an important bearing on the campaign. 
 
 Upon debarking at Bermuda Hundred during the night of 
 the 14th, Smith's column was by General Butler put in mo- 
 tion to seize Petersburg, an abortive attempt to capture which 
 had been made a few days before by a part of his force.f The 
 possession of this place as a point d'appui for the ulterior oper- 
 ations of the Army of the Potomac was of prime importance. 
 Being joined by the cavahy division of Kautz and the divi- 
 sion of colored troops under Hinks, Smith's force, during the 
 night of the 14th, passed to the south side of the Appomattox 
 on a ponton-bridge, and pushed forward, on the morning of 
 the 15th, towards Petersburg, distant seven miles. The ad- 
 vance was made in three columns — Kautz, with the cavalry, 
 
 * This bridge was a notable achievement in ponton engineering, being over 
 two thousand feet in length, and the channel boats anchored in thirteen fath- 
 oms of water. It was begun during the forenoon of the 14th and was com- 
 pleted by midnight. The site for the bridge was selected and the approaches 
 prepared by Brigadier-General Weitzel, chief-engineer Department of Virginia 
 and North Carolina ; and the bridge was laid under direction of Brigadier- 
 General Benham. 
 
 f This attempt was made on the 10th of May, two days before the Army 
 of the Potomac began its change of base. The expedition was made by an 
 infantry force under General Gillmore, and a cavalry force under General 
 Kautz. The cavalry carried the works on the south side, and penetrated well 
 in towards the town, but was forced to retire. General Gillmore, finding the 
 ■works which he approached very strong, and deeming an assault impracticable, 
 returned to Bermuda Hundred without attempting one. — Grant: Report of 
 Operations, p. 10. 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBUEG. 501 
 
 to threaten the line of fortifications near the Norfolk and 
 Petersburg Railroad, and at the same time protect the left 
 flank of the infantry ; Hinks' division, in rear of Kautz, tc 
 take position across the Jordan's Point road, as near as possi- 
 ble to the enemy's works ; Brooks' division to follow Hinks, 
 and take position on his right ; Martindale's division, on the 
 extreme right, to proceed, by the river-road, and strike the 
 City Point Eailroad.* 
 
 After an advance of two miles, the cavalry struck a line of 
 rifle -trenches, near the City Point Eailroad, defended by in- 
 fantry and armed with a light battery. Upon this, Kautz 
 was withdrawn to the left, and the colored division thrown 
 forward to carry the line — a duty that was executed in a 
 spirited manner, and one gun captured. This unexpected 
 affair delayed the column until about nine A. M. No fur- 
 ther obstacle was encountered, and after a march of a couple 
 of miles, the force brought up in front of the fortifications 
 enveloping Petersburg from the south. It was noon before 
 all the troops could be brought up.t 
 
 On reconnoitring the position, it was found to be defended 
 
 * Smith : Report of Operations against Petersburg, 
 
 f It may be observed that this statement of the time of the arrival of the col- 
 mnn before the fortifications of Petersburg is at variance with the statement of 
 General Grant, who asserts that General Smith " confronted the enemy's pickets 
 near Petersburg before daylight." — Report, p. 13. The statement above made 
 is based on the official reports of General Smith and his division commanders. 
 Without inquiring too curiously in regard to this matter, it is enough to say, 
 that the assertion of the lieutenant-general is not in conformity with a series 
 of established facts in regard to the sequence of events on the morning of the 
 15th. Thus, it was some time after daylight before the column began to move 
 from its point of passage of the Appomattox at Broadway. It was then 
 brought to a halt by the line of rifle-pits already mentioned, and it was after 
 nine o'clock before it got under way again. It is probably this line of rifle-pits 
 that the lieutenant-general means when he speaks of " confronting the enemy 
 near Petersburg." Moreover, this affair caused a further delay ; for the carrying 
 of these trenches had thrown General Hinks out of his assigned position on the 
 left, and as he knew the country better than any one present, it was necessary 
 to halt the column until he could move by the flank to his place. The head 
 of the colimin arrived before the Petersburg fortifications between ten and 
 eleven, but it was three before the force was up and deployed, in position. 
 
502 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 bj a strong line of redans, and connected, though incom- 
 pletely, by very formidable rifle-pits ; while the approach was 
 over a broad low valley perfectly swept by the artillery of the 
 works, and cut up by ditches and ravines. In the centre the 
 line formed a salient, covered by a powerful profiled work, 
 heavily flanked by earthworks and rifle-trenches e?i echelon. 
 
 General Smith had been informed that the fortifications 
 were such that "cavalry could ride over them" — a repre- 
 sentation that did not turn out to be justified by experience ; 
 for Kautz, who, with his mounted division, essayed to work 
 his way round on the left, found himself completely estopped 
 by a heavy fire, and in front the approaches were discovered 
 to be so covered by the play of artillery from the works, that 
 from every point on which Smith attempted to place batteries 
 to silence the enemy's fire the guns were speedily driven off.* 
 It could not be detected that any heavy force of infantry was 
 manning the fortification ; but it was not judged probable 
 that so considerable an artillery force would be there without 
 sujDport. 
 
 After surveying the ground and making his dispositions, 
 which consumed all the afternoon, General Smith, thinking that 
 the assault of the works by a column would, from the fire of 
 the enemy's guns, cost too great a sacrifice, determined to try 
 a heavy line of skirmishers. Accordingly, towards seven 
 p. M.,t a cloud of tirailleurs was advanced from the divisions 
 
 * " Wherever I went on the line, I found a heavy cross-fire of artillery from 
 the enemy. The few artillery positions I could find I tried to get our guns to 
 open from ; but they were always driven in by the superior fire of artillery 
 iiom earthworks." — Smith : Report of Operations before Petersburg. 
 
 f The determination to attack in the manner above described was formed 
 by General Smith at five r. M., but a delay of above an hour occurred here, owing 
 to the fact tiiat " the chief of artillery had, upon his own responsibility, taken 
 his guns to the rear, and unhitched the horses to water." — Smith : Report of 
 Operations before Petersburg. Now, as an interval of five or six hours had 
 passed between the time of Smith's arrival and his resolution to assault, it 
 may be a point of inquiry what he was doing during this time. General Grant 
 makes this delay the ground of implied censure. " For some reason that I 
 have never been able to satisfactorily understand," says he, " General Smith 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 50S 
 
 of Hinks, on the left, Brooks in the centre, and Martindale on 
 
 the right (the rest of whose command awaited in line of battle 
 to follow up any success), and, under a sharp infantry tire, 
 carried the line. Brooks captured the works on the salient, 
 with several hundred prisoners and four guns, which, double- 
 shotted with canister, had been kept in waiting for the ex- 
 pected column of assault. Hinks on the left, and Martindale 
 on the right, followed up the success, the colored troops 
 carrying four of the redoubts with their artillery. 
 
 Thus auspiciously Opened the operations on the south side 
 of the James ; the lines of Petersburg — defended, as it proved, 
 by an inconsiderable force, and by local mihtia made up of 
 boys and old men of the town — were carried. But as it was 
 almost dark when the operations I have described closed, the 
 troo23S rested on their arms in the works gained, without the 
 possession either of Petersburg or the hue of the Appomattox 
 — an event whence sprang a long Iliad of woes. 
 
 During the day on which these events in front of Peters- 
 bui'g were occurring, the Army of the Potomac still continued 
 the laborious process of filing across the James, and at the 
 same time Lee was passing his army to the south side above, 
 near Drury's Bluff. By the morning of the 15th, however, the 
 same morning on which Smith moved towards Petersburg, 
 Hancock's corps had been all ferried to the south side of the 
 James, and it would have been a simple matter to have directed 
 that corps on Petersburg, to unite with Smith's command. 
 Had this been done, Petersburg and the line of the Appomattox 
 
 did not get ready to assault the enemy's main line until near sundown." Now, 
 although this censure partially rests on the ground that General Smith reached 
 the position " before daylight" — an assertion traversed by the fact that he did 
 not arrive until noon — there may still remain a residue of blame. General 
 Smith might possibly have assaulted several hours before he actually did, had. 
 he chosen to take the risk of attacking without reconnoissance. It is likely' 
 3nough that Sheridan, had he been present, instead of Smith, would have 
 done so. But this involves no foundation for a charge of dereliction of duty — 
 it is only a question of choice between two diflFerent methods of action — the 
 method which, taking great risks, may either lose greatly or greatly gain, and 
 that which works by methodical procedure. 
 
504 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 would have been in possession of the Union force before night. 
 The circumstance bj which it failed to be done forms one of 
 the most curious episodes in the conduct of this campaign. 
 
 It would seem as though General Grant expected that Pe- 
 tersburg would fall an easy prey to Butler's force ; for he left 
 both General Meade and General Hancock wdiolly unaware 
 of his design to secure the captui-e of that place. Hancock 
 was directed to remain at the point at which he had crossed 
 till rations, which General Butler was to send, should be 
 received and issued, and then to march in the direction of 
 Petersburg, and "take tqj a position tvhere the City Point Rail- 
 road crosses Harrisons Creek." After waiting till about ten 
 o'clock in the forenoon, and finding that the expected rations 
 did not arrive, he ordered the forward march of his column 
 towards his assigned position on Harrison's Creek — a position 
 which was marked on a map furnished him from headquar- 
 ters, and on which it was located at about four miles from 
 Petersburg, and between that place and City Point. As it 
 proved, however, the map was utterly incorrect, and Harri- 
 son's Creek, instead of being at the locality indicated on the 
 map, was miles away, and actually inside the enemy's lines. 
 
 At length, at half-past five in the afternoon, while pushing 
 forward to reach this mythical objective, Hancock received a 
 dispatch from General Grant, directing him to use all haste in 
 getting up to the assistance of General Smith, who, as the 
 paper stated, had attacked Petersburg* and carried the outer 
 works in front of that place. 
 
 * As the circumstances attending the non-capture of Petersburg are likely 
 to give rise to much discussion, I shall here set forth with more particularity 
 of detail such facts as concern the march of Hancock's column. The waiting 
 for rations, which caused a delay of several hours during the morning of the 
 15th, cannot be regarded as having any important bearing on the question, 
 seeing that General Hancock would not have waited had he known that Peters- 
 burg was to have been attacked. The column was put in motion at half-past 
 ten A. M., and the distance from Windmill Point, whence Hancock's corps 
 started, is about twenty miles. Birney's division had the advance on the Prince 
 George Courthouse road, while Barlow's division moved by the Old Court- 
 house road. The leading division was conducted on the former road by the 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 505 
 
 This order, whicli was the first intimation General Hancocli 
 had received that Petersburg was to be attacked that day, or 
 that General Smith was operating against it,* met him when 
 he was some miles distant from Petersburg. He immediately 
 hastened forward his command, but was unable to join Gen- 
 eral Smith till after the attack had been made ; and, although 
 
 chief of staff to General Hancock, who was furnished witli a map cm which the 
 position to be reached behind Harrisons Creek was marked. But the map 
 proved to be utterly worthless — the only roads laid down on it being widely 
 out of the way. The staff-officer, however, bestirred himself to obtain infor- 
 mation of the country from negro guides, and this being commuuicated to 
 General Hancock, he judged that the speediest way to get to the position hb 
 was directed to occupy would be to turn the head of the column from the Prince 
 George Courthouse road towards Old Courthouse, then by a cross-road get 
 behind Harrison's Creek. Accordingly, Birney's and Gibbon's divisions were 
 turned to the right, leaving the Prince George Courthouse road within six miles 
 of Petersburg before three P. M. At half-past five P. M., as the column neared 
 Old Courthouse, the dispatch from General Grant, directing the march to join 
 Smith, was received. Fortunately, this came to hand just as the head of Bir- 
 ney's division was passing a country road leading directly towards Petersburg, 
 and the column (Birney's and Gibbon's troops) was turned in that direction, 
 arriving at Smith's position as the assault was over. No time had been lost on 
 the march during the day, and the circumstance of Hancock's non-arrival at 
 an earlier hour is due exclusively to the fact that he was not directed on Peters- 
 burg, and had no intimation, until between five and six P. M., that it was to be 
 attacked. Had he been so informed, he could readily have joined Smith early 
 in the afternoon, by marching directly towards Petersburg. The best hours of 
 the day were spent in marching by an incorrect map, in search of a designated 
 position which, as it was not in existence as described, could naturally not be 
 found. With these facts, which are of official authenticity, it will not be 
 difficult to judge who is responsible for the non-capture of Petersburg. As 
 Lieutenant^General Grant states that he "threw forward the Army of the 
 Potomac, by divisions, as rapidly as could be done" (Report, p. 12), and as the 
 manner in which he threw it forward is sufficiently manifest in the fact 
 .hat neither General Meade nor General Hancock knew that Petersburg was 
 to be attacked even, I leave the reconciliation of this discrepancy to those better 
 equipped for the task. 
 
 * " I desire to say here that the messages from Lieutenant-General Grant, 
 and from General Smith, which I received between five and six P. M. on the 
 15th, were the first and only intimation I had that Petersburg was to be 
 attacked that day. Up to that hour I had not been notified from any source that 
 I was expected to assist General Smith in assaulting that city."— Hancock 
 Eeport of the Fifth Epoch of the Campaign of 1864. 
 
506 CMIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 he then proffered his troops to General Smith, that officer had 
 determined to suspend operations for the night, judging it 
 wiser to hold securely what had been won, than, by attempt- 
 ing to reach the bridges, to risk the loss of all the gain.* 
 
 Whether General Smith, in thus acting, did ill or well, may 
 be a question ; but there can be no question as to who is 
 really responsible for the failure to take Petersburg. This is 
 no other than the lieutenant-general himself, t Yet, as the 
 event proved, it was fortunate it was not taken. The resolu- 
 tion on the part of the Confederates to try out the issue of the 
 war there, gave the Union army an excellent Hne of operations 
 on an easy base ; whereas, had Petersburg fallen, Lee would 
 have retired from Richmond to the interior, thus greatly com- 
 plicating matters. 
 
 During the night of the 15th, the van of Lee's army reached 
 the town, and men of a very different mettle from the crude 
 soldiers to whom its defence had been intrusted silently 
 deployed in line of battle. In the morning it was found 
 that a new line of works had been thrown up around the 
 town, defended by a large force already present, which was 
 constantly re-enforced by the rapidly arriving Confederate 
 corps. It was soon manifest that the " Cockade City," which 
 the day before was the open prize of the first captor, would 
 demand for its possession a battle or a siege. As the event 
 
 * It will probably always remain one of tbose questions respecting which, 
 men's opinions will differ, whether General Smith did well or ill in not pushing 
 into Petersburg, and seizing the bridges of the Appomattox. His conduct was 
 shaped by considerations thus stated in his official report: "We had thaa 
 broken through the strong line of rebel works, but heavy darkness was upon 
 us, and I had heard some hours before that Lee's army was rapidly crossing at 
 Drury's Bluff. I deemed it wiser to hold what we had, than, by attempting to 
 reach the bridges, to lose what we had gained and have the troops meet with a 
 jlisaster. I knew, also, that some portion of the Army of the Potomac waH 
 coming to aid us, and therefore tlie troops were placed so as to occupy the com- 
 manding positions and wait for daylight." — Smith : Report of Operations before 
 Petersburg. 
 
 f There is on file in the archives of the army a paper bearing this indorse- 
 ment, by General Meade : "Had General Hancock or myself known that Peters- 
 iurg teas to he attacked, Petersburg would have fallen." 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. ,107 
 
 proved, Grant was compelled to sit down before it in formal 
 beleaguerment, and it was not till after tlie lapse of near a 
 twelvemonth that, in the last act of the eventful drama of the 
 war, Petersburg fell. 
 
 II. 
 THE ARMY BEFORE PETERSBURG. 
 
 In its strategic relations to Eichmond, Petersburg may be 
 defined as a fortress thrust forward on the flank of the 
 Confederate capital. The great lines of supply for an army 
 covering Eichmond — the Lynchburg Eailroad, James Eiver Ca- 
 nal, and Danville Eailroad — run into that city fi'om a westerly 
 and southwesterly direction. But Petersburg, securely held, 
 easily holds off at arm's-length any force threatening the com- 
 munications of the Confederate capital. It is distant twenty- 
 two miles south from Eichmond, with which city it is con- 
 nected by the Petersburg and Eichmond Eailroad, while by 
 means of the Lynchburg Eailroad it taps the great Danville 
 line, and from the south it receives the "Weldon and the Nor- 
 folk railroads. In case it should lose the two latter, as would 
 be Hkely if assailed by a force following the line of operations 
 of the Union army, there remained the two former, which 
 fi'om their situation are almost unassailable. 
 
 Invested with this value, Petersburg could not fail to be a 
 possession coveted with equal eagerness by each combatant. 
 This was indeed the case: Grant had designed to seize it 
 before the Confederate army could join the meagre local force 
 left for its defence ; and Lee, as soon as the transfer of the 
 Ai-my of the Potomac to the south side of the James had 
 plainly declared his rival's purpose, drew his columns also to 
 the south bank and hui-ried them forward to Petersburg, 
 where they began to arrive during the hours of darkness that 
 followed the assault on the evening of the 15th of Jime. 
 
608 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AEMT OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 How nearly Petersburg then fell a prize to Smith's coup de 
 main has already been seen. But night sufficed to throw into 
 the city a Confederate force so considerable as to insure that 
 its capture would cost a severe struggle. 
 
 The morning of the 16th found on the Union side present 
 before Petersburg no more than the two corps of Smith and 
 Hancock : the remaining corps were distant several hours' 
 march. The centre of the line of redans enveloping the city 
 from the south had been penetrated the night before, and 
 the positions then gained were securely held by the Union 
 force. But the Confederates clung tenaciously to a hastily 
 improvised line close in the rear of the lost point ; and this 
 on its left flank ran into portions of the original system of 
 earthworks that remained still in the enemy's hands. 
 
 But although by the morning of the 16th Lee had succeed- 
 ed in throwing into Petersburg a considerable body of troops, 
 it was outnumbered by the Union force present, while the 
 latter was also in position to be re-enforced more rapidly 
 than the Confederates. The situation, therefore, was not 
 even yet of a nature to forbid the hope of securing Peters- 
 burg, or at least securing all the commanding ground before 
 the heavy Confederate re-enforcements should arrive. Gen- 
 eral Hancock, to whom, in the absence of Generals Grant or 
 Meade, the command of the field fell, was fully alive to the 
 importance of so doing, and he had the night before instructed 
 his division officers. Generals Birney and Gibbon, that aU 
 such ground between their positions and the Appomattox 
 should be attacked and taken at or before daylight.* These 
 instructions were not promptly complied with, nor indeed did 
 the effiirts of these officers possess any serious character. 
 This forfeited the one opportunity that remained ; and when, 
 later in the morning, reconnoissances were pushed forward, it 
 was found the enemy had secured the commanding positions 
 and greatly strengthened his line at all important points.f 
 
 * Hancock : Report of the Fifth Epoch of the Campaign of 1864. 
 f Among these dominating points was the high ground at the position 
 which will be found marked on the accompanying map as the " Avery House." 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG, 509 
 
 Meantime, Hancock was admonished by General Meade to 
 refrain fr'om attack until the remaining corps of the Army of 
 the Potomac should have arrived. Of these, the Ninth 
 reached the front at noon, and the Fifth at dusk. An assault 
 was ordered to be made about four p. m. by Hancock and 
 Burnside — Smith on the right to demonstrate merely. At the 
 appointed time the assault was made by Hancock, supported 
 by two brigades of the Ninth on his left. The advance 
 was spirited and forcible, and resulted, after a close strug- 
 gle in which the troops suffered heavily, in driving the en- 
 emy back some distance along the whole line.* The severe 
 fighting ceased at dark, though during the night the Confed- 
 erates made several ineffectual sallies to regain the lost 
 ground. The same day an advance was made by Butler's 
 force from Bermuda Hundred for the purpose of destroying 
 the Petersburg and Eichmond Kailroad ; but after reaching 
 this point it was compelled to withdraw, in consequence of the 
 pressure of a heavy Confederate column advancing towards 
 Petersburg from the direction of Kichmond.t 
 
 Here there were a large redoubt and rifle-trenclies that had been empty early 
 in the morning ; but these the delay permitted the Confederates soon to oc- 
 cupy. It should be mentioned, however, tliat when an advance was at length 
 made in the morning, Egan's brigade of Birney's division attacked and carried 
 in a very spirited manner a small redoubt occupied by the enemy opposite 
 Birney's left. 
 
 * The enemy succeeded in holding this temporary line until the completion 
 of the line on " Cemetery Hill." When Hancock advanced the next day, the 
 Confederates retired over " Hare's Hill." 
 
 f The urgency for troops at Petersburg had caused the withdrawal of the 
 main Confederate force from Butler's front at Bermuda Hundred. Butler then 
 threw forward Terry's command, which advancing found that the Richmond 
 and Petersburg Railroad had been left quite uncovered. It ai^pears that Gen- 
 eral Lee's orders were that the troops in front of Butler should not be with- 
 drawn till Longstreet's column, en route towards Petersburg, should arrive to 
 relieve it. But instead of waiting the arrival of Longstreet, they withdrew on 
 the morning of the 16th. One part of Terry's force accordingly proceeded to 
 destroy the track, while the other was moved up the turnpike in the direction 
 of Richmond. The latter, however, had not advanced far when it encountered 
 the head of a hostile column hastening down from Richmond towards Peters- 
 burg, whereupon Terry withdrew to Bermuda Hundred. 
 
 e 
 
510 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Tlie attack was renewed by Hancock and Burnside on tke 
 morning of the 17th. The former succeeded in taking some 
 important ground on his front.* The attack of the latter was 
 directed against a part of the enemy's original line of works 
 that had not yet been carried, and resulted in the capture of 
 a redoubt, four guns, and several hundred prisoners.f In the 
 afternoon the Ninth Corps made another attack, in which Bar- 
 low's division of the Second Corps participated, losing heavily 
 in killed, wounded, and prisoners. | After heavy fighting, and 
 the failure of two attacks, Burnside succeeded in getting 
 across a part of the enemy's line ; but his left was pressed 
 very hard and continually ground away, so that finally his 
 line was at right angles across the enemy's. Crawford's divi- 
 sion of Warren's corps was then put in on the left in support. 
 It was already near dusk, and Crawford's troops became be- 
 wildered in the ravines, but advanced nevertheless, and his 
 right went into the enemy's lines, capturing a number of pris- 
 oners and the flag of an Alabama regiment. The enemy had 
 during the day made several sorties and sallies to regain the 
 positions taken, and after dark leaped the breastwork Burn- 
 side had captured and drove him out. The loss during the 
 day was heavy — numbering about four thousand men. Theso 
 attacks had, however, established an integi-al line for the 
 army.§ 
 
 This result being accompHshed, a general assault of the 
 enemy's j)osition was ordered for the morning of the 18th. 
 When, however, the skirmishers moved forward, it was found 
 that the enemy had abandoned the temporary line held by 
 him, giving up what works remained of the original system of 
 intrenchments, and had taken up a new and systematic line, 
 
 * This was the hill on which the Hare House stood, and on which Fort 
 Steadman was afterwards erected. 
 
 f Meade : Report of the Campaign of 1864. 
 
 J Hancock : Report of the Fifth Epoch of the Campaign of 1864. 
 
 § In the evening Smith's corps was relieved by troops of the Sixth Corps, 
 and crossed the Appomattox to rejoin Butler's force at Bermuda Hundred. 
 Martindale's division of his command, however, could not be withdrawn to 
 advantage, and so continued to hold the extreme right. 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 511 
 
 drawn on commanding ground closer around Petersburg.* 
 This required new dispositions, and the general assault was 
 deferred till three o'clock in the afternoon. When made, it 
 was a complete repulse at every point, and was attended with 
 another mournful loss of life.t 
 
 The constant inspiration of these attacks had been the 
 behef that Petersburg could be carried before Lee succeeded 
 in yet bringing up the whole of his troops. The result con- 
 vinced General Grant that this hope was now vain, and that 
 further attack was equally so. The troops were therefore 
 ordered to begin intrenching a systematic line. A few days' 
 labor brought this into such condition that the front could be 
 held by a part of the army, allowing the rest to be cut loose for 
 manoeuvres to the left. Accordingly, on the 21st, the Second 
 and Sixth corps were dispatched on that flank to effect a 
 closer envelopment of Petersburg on the South side. The 
 Second Corps, having the lead, proceeded westward to the 
 Jerusalem plankroad, which runs southward from Petersburg, 
 nearly midway between the Norfolk and the "Weldon railroads. 
 After some skirmishing it established itself in a position on 
 the west side of that road, connecting with Griffin's division 
 of the Fifth Corps, which held post on the east side. During 
 the night, the Sixth Corps coming up, extended to the left 
 and rear of the Second Corps, and the cavalry divisions of 
 Wilson and Kautz were sent to cut the Weldon and South- 
 side railroads. 
 
 It had been designed to extend the left of the infantry by 
 means of the Sixth Corps to the Weldon Eailroad ; but as the 
 
 * " On advancing, it waB found that the enemy during the night had re 
 tired to a line about a mile nearer the city— the one he now occupies."— Meade . 
 Report of the Campaign of 1864. (Made November, 1864). 
 
 f " About noon an unsuccessful assault was made by Gibbon's division, 
 Second Corps. Martindale's advance was successful in occupying the enemy's 
 skirmish line and making some prisoners. General Birney, temporarily com- 
 manding the Second Corps, then organized a formidable column, and about six 
 p. M. made an attack, but without success. Later in the day, attacks were 
 made by the Fifth and Ninth corps, with no better results."— Meade : Report 
 of the Campaign of 1864. 
 
512 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AEMY OP THE POTOMAC. 
 
 indication of this purpose instantly developed very menacing 
 demonstrations on the part of the enemy, the movement to the 
 railroad was suspended, and General Birney, who at this time 
 commanded the Second Corps, during a temporary disability 
 of General Hancock,* was ordered to swing forward the left of 
 the Second Corps, so as to envelop the right flank of the ene- 
 my's works. This movement, made by the divisions of Mott 
 and Barlow (pivoting on the right division under Gibbon, which 
 was already in close contact with the enemy), was executed 
 without reference to the Sixth Corps, and, of course, carried 
 the Second away from that corps, leaving, as the former ad- 
 vanced, a wide and widening gap between the two. The opera- 
 tion had nearly been completed, Mott's division had secured 
 its position on the left of Gibbon, and was intrenching itself, 
 and Barlow's division was coming into place on the left of 
 Mott, when a force of the enemy, composed of part of Hill's 
 corps, advancing in column by brigades, penetrated the inter- 
 val between the left of the Second and the right of the Sixth 
 corps. The shock was soon felt on the flanks of both these 
 corps, but especially on the left of the Second. Barlow's divi- 
 sion, rolled up Hke a scroll, recoUed in disorder, losing several 
 hundred prisoners. Mott, on his right, fell back, but not 
 without a hke loss ; and the enemy, still pressing diagonally 
 across the front of the corps, struck Gibbon's now exposed left 
 flank and rear, swept off and captured several entire regiments 
 and a battery, and carried Gibbon's intrenchments — the rest 
 of the original line of the Second Corps remainiag intact. 
 
 The shattered corps was reformed on its original hne, when 
 the enemy made a brisk attack on Miles' brigade, but was 
 easily repulsed. The Confederates, however, held the in- 
 trenchments taken from Gibbon until they had removed the 
 captured guns, only a feeble effort being made to retake them. 
 They then withdrew as suddenly as they had made their 
 swoop, carrying with them twenty-five hundred prisoners, and 
 many standards. The disaster was due no less to the lack of 
 spirit displayed by the troops than to the unwise order for 
 
 * Caused by the outbreaking of a wound received at Gettysburg. 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 513 
 
 the advance of the two corps. The Sixth Corps also lost sev- 
 eral hundred prisoners. Thus this operation, which had been 
 designed against the enemy's communications by the Wcldon 
 Railroad, resulted simply in a considerable extension of the 
 line of the army to the left. The additional ground occupied 
 gave no advantages whatever, and the operation could not 
 be considered a gain in any respect. 
 
 The co-operative cavalry expedition under Generals Wilson 
 and Kautz met with more success. Striking the Weldon 
 Railroad at Reams' Station, the force destroyed the depot 
 and several miles of the track. The columns then proceeded 
 to the Southside Raih-oad — Wilson's division reaching it 
 about fifteen miles from Petersburg and destroying it thence 
 to Nottoway Station, where he met General W. H. F. Lee's 
 division of cavalry, and, 9,fter a sharp conflict, defeated him. 
 Kautz reached Burkesville, the junction of the Southside and 
 Danville railroads, on the afternoon of the 23d. At this 
 point he damaged the track considerably, and then moved to 
 Meherrin Station, where he formed a junction with Wilson's 
 column on the 24th. The two then destroyed the road as far 
 as Roanoke Bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles. Further 
 progress, however, was impeded by the enemy, who was found 
 in force and could not be dislodged. In returning, Wilson 
 met, on the evening of the 28th, the enemy's cavalry, massed 
 at the Weldon Railroad crossing of Stoney Creek, where he 
 had a severe engagement. He then made a detour by his 
 left, and endeavored to reach Reams' Station, presuming it to 
 be in possession of the Union force ; but he here encountered 
 not only the Confederate cavalry but a hostile infantry. 
 Being largely outnumbered, he was overwhelmed and forced 
 to retire, with the loss of his trains and artillery and a con- 
 siderable number of prisoners.* He succeeded in crossing 
 the Nottoway, however, and escaped within the Union Hues 
 
 * " In the various conflicts with the enemy's cavalry, in their late expedition 
 against the railroads, besides their killed and wounded left on the field, one 
 thousand prisoners, thirteen pieces of artillery, and thirty wagons and ambu- 
 lances were taken." — Lee : Dispatch of July Ist. 
 
 33 
 
5H CAMPAIGNS OF THE AKMY OF THE POTOMAC 
 
 hj their left and rear witli the remnant of his shattered 
 force. The first intimation General Meade had of Wilson's 
 situation, was in intelligence brought by one of his aids, who 
 cut his way through from Reams' Station. The Sixth Corps 
 was immediately sent thither, and Sheridan ordered up with 
 the cavalry ; but before they could reach that point the affair 
 was over and the enemy had withdrawn. 
 
 Such raids on the communications of the enemy had 
 frequently been made by both armies, and generally with im- 
 punity ; but the disastrous upshot of this expedition showed 
 that such detached columns operating far from the main body 
 must always be in a perilous situation, if there be vigilance 
 and vigor on the part of the antagonist. The present raid had 
 inflicted considerable damage to the Confederate communica- 
 tions ; but it was soon repaired, and it is doubtful whether 
 the temporary advantage gained over the enemy more than 
 balanced the losses in men and material suffered by the expe- 
 ditionary force. 
 
 Two weeks of exhausting effort thus passed ; but the lines 
 of Petersburg had withstood all the shocks they had received. 
 There now remained no hope of caiTying the city by assault. 
 Indeed, the Union army, terribly shaken as Avell in spirit as 
 in material substance, by the repeated attacks on intrenched 
 positions it had been called on to make, was in a very unfit 
 moral condition to undertake any new enterprise of that 
 character. 
 
 In these prehminary operations against Petersburg, which 
 may be brought together under the definition of the " period of 
 assaults," though no large action had taken place, the rolls of 
 the army showed a loss of fifteen thousand men. Lee had, 
 with much address, taken advantage of every opportunity 
 afforded him to thrust his rapier through the somewhat loose- 
 jointed harness of his antagonist. Though he had struck no 
 vital blow, he had yet drawn blood, inflicted many smarts, 
 and gained time to draw around Petersburg a system of do- 
 fences that bade defiance to assault. 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 615 
 
 III. 
 
 THE LINES OF PETERSBURG. 
 
 It required no clearer demonstration than that already 
 given in the unpromising results of the several assaults made 
 against the Confederate lines, to show that the difficult prob- 
 lem of the capture of Petersburg had passed beyond that 
 stage at which success might be hoped from expedients, par- 
 tial efforts, and coups de main. The task was one of the first 
 magnitude, in which an auspicious issue was only to be ex- 
 pected from systematic operations and a well-considered com- 
 bination of effort. This wiU be manifest from a brief descrip- 
 tion of the relative situation of the opposing armies. 
 
 Growing in strength day by day, the Confederate line of 
 defence had, by the beginning of July, become so formidable 
 that assault was pronounced impracticable by the chiefs of 
 artillery and of engineers.* This line consisted of a chain of 
 redans, connected by infantry parapets of a powerful profile, 
 while the approaches were completely obstructed by abatis, 
 stakes, and entanglements. Beginning at the south bank of 
 the Appomattox, it enveloped Petersburg on the east and 
 south, stretching westward beyond the furthest reach of the 
 left flank of the Union army. A continuation of the same 
 system to the north side of the Appomattox protected the 
 city and the Petersburg and Eichmond railroad against attack 
 from the direction of the fi'ont held by Butler's force at 
 Bermuda Hundi-ed. The defence of Bichmond was provided 
 for by its own chain of fortifications. 
 
 The attitude assumed by Grant before Petersburg was 
 somewhat pecuHar. As the Union Hues were drawn, the de- 
 fending force was not under siege, investment, or blockade ; 
 
 * Report of an Examination of the Enemy's Lines, July 6th, by General 
 Hunt, chief of artillery, and Major Duane, chief-engineer. 
 
516 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARxVIF OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 for its lines of communication were all open. Petersburg, in 
 fact, was in the same situation as Sebastopol, when belea- 
 guered bj the Allies in the so-called siege — a term not ap- 
 plicable to the kind of operation practised in both these cases. 
 This is of a character novel and modern, and may be better 
 described as a partial investment, or an attitude of uritching. 
 There were, however, several manoeuvres and operations open 
 to the Union commander. 
 
 1. The first of these was a move resulting from that pecu- 
 liar strategic relation of the contending armies by which, 
 while Richmond was the ultimate objective of attack and 
 point of defence, the actual struggle was waged before Peters- 
 burg, on the south side of the James, and twenty-two miles 
 distant from the Confederate capital, situate on the north 
 side of that river. A lodgment for the Union force on the 
 north side of the James had early been secured by General 
 Butler at Deep Bottom, only ten miles south of Richmond. 
 Here a force under Foster held an intrenched camp, and com- 
 munication with Bermuda Hundred was established by means 
 of a ponton-bridge. Thus it was always practicable for Gen- 
 eral Grant, by a movement to the north bank of the James, 
 to threaten Richmond by its direct approaches. These were, 
 however, " observed" by General Lee, who, by ponton- 
 bridges across the James, near Drury's Bluff, a few miles 
 below Richmond, preserved his interior lines, and held the 
 means of rapidly re-enforcing either wing. Yet, since General 
 Grant could at any time take the initiative, it was always in 
 his power to outrun any immediate action of his opponent. 
 
 2. The next course open to the Union commander was to 
 operate against the railroad lines that fed Lee's army at 
 Petersburg. These lead into that city from the south and 
 west. They could be acted against, either by a gradual 
 extension of the left flank, or by cutting loose a column of 
 active operations powerful enough to meet any force the 
 enemy might bring to meet the menace. The Weldon Rail- 
 road was within the scope of the former course, and, as will 
 presently appear, it was soon afterwards seized and held, 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 517 
 
 and the left flank of the army extended to insure its tenure. 
 The main Hues of supply by the Southside and the Danville 
 roads were, however, well covered by Lee's army. The dis- 
 tance from the position of the army before Petersburg to the 
 nearest point at which the Southside Raih-oad could be 
 struck is from ten to fifteen miles, and to Burkesville — which, 
 as the junction of the Southside and the Danville roads, is the 
 strategic key to all the Confederate communications of Peters- 
 burg and Richmond — the distance is near forty miles. These, 
 therefore, could not be reached by any extension of the Union 
 intrenched line to the left, without dangerously weakening the 
 front covering Grant's depot at City Point ; but they could 
 be operated against by a column able to cut itseK loose from 
 its base. 
 
 3. In the relative situations of the opposing armies, the line 
 to be guarded by Lee was between thirty and forty miles, 
 running from southwest of Petersburg to northeast of Rich- 
 mond. There was, accordingly, open to General Grant a 
 a gi-eat variety of tactical combinations, compelling, on the 
 part of the Confederates, continued motion to the greatest 
 distances from flank to flank, and visiting concentration on 
 one flank by a sudden blow on the other. There also re- 
 remained the contingency of a good opening for direct as- 
 sault, in case the Confederates should reduce the force within 
 their lines of defence to meet these manoeuvres. 
 
 In order to hold the actual fi'ont with a fractional force, 
 and relieve as large a part of the army as possible for a col- 
 umn of active operations, the construction of a powerful Hne 
 of redoubts was pushed forward, and a series of heavy bat- 
 teries was placed in position to cover an assault, in case a 
 suitable opening therefor should present itself. By the close 
 of July, a system of earthworks covering the front then held 
 by the army had been constructed and armed. Grant was 
 then in position either to undertake direct assault or operate 
 on the flanks of the Confederate line. 
 
518 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AKMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 IV. 
 
 THE MINE FIASCO. 
 
 As soon as the system of works had been completed, it was 
 determined to make an assault on the enemy's position on 
 Burnside's front, and it was resolved to work into the plan the 
 explosion of a mine which that officer had prepared. 
 
 This enterprise had been undertaken some weeks previously 
 by Burnside of his own motion, and was allowed to proceed 
 rather by sufferance than sanction. Having at first excited 
 only ridicule, the mine, now that it was finished, began to 
 receive more serious consideration, and it was resolved to 
 bring it into play in the proposed plan of assault. Burnside 
 occupied a position very close to and within a hundred and 
 fifty yards of the enemy's line,"" which happened there to form 
 an angle, that was covered by a fort. It was under this fort 
 that the mine had been run. The location of the mine did 
 not promise well, the fort to be destroyed being in a re-entrant 
 of the enemy's hne, and therefore exposed to an enfilading 
 and reverse fire right and left.f Still, it was seen that if the 
 crest of the ridge behind the fort, and distant from it by only 
 four hundred yards, could be carried, it would secure the 
 most important results, carrying with it Petersburg, and 
 probably a large part of the enemy's artillery and infantry.:}: 
 
 About the time fixed for the assault, which was the morning 
 of the 30th of July, there happened a conjuncture of events 
 that promised a happy bearing on the result. Four days before 
 
 * This was the position secured by GriflSn's division, of Warren's corps, in 
 the attack of the 18th of June. 
 
 f For proof of the disadvantageous location of the mine, see Meade's Re 
 port ; Meade's testimony before the Court of Inquiry. — Report of the Conduct 
 <rf the War, p. 125. Testimony of the chief-engineer. — Ibid. 
 
 :]: Meade's testimony. — Ibid., p. 136. 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 519 
 
 —that is, on tlie 26th of July— an expeditionary force under 
 General Hancock, consisting of the Second Corps with two 
 divisions of Sheridan's cavalry, had been sent to operate to- 
 wards Eichmond by the north side of the James. Hancocl< 
 crossed at Deep Bottom on the night of the 26th, with in- 
 structions to proceed rapidly to Chapin's Bluff, where Lee 
 had estabHshed ponton-bridges, that were his means of com- 
 munication between the two parts of his army. Hancock was 
 to prevent Confederate re-enforcements from being sent to 
 the north side of the James, while Sheridan with his cavalry 
 was to proceed to the Virginia Central Eaih'oad, to operate 
 towards Eichmond, the works of which being thinly held 
 were supposed to be open to a surprise.* As wiU presently 
 appear, however, there were circumstances that thwarted the 
 execution of this part of the plan. 
 
 Foster's lodgment at Deep Bottom had caused Lee to send 
 a body of troops to observe him. This force held position 
 on his immediate front, and had already made one or two 
 unsuccessful salUes to dislodge him. Hancock determmed, 
 next morning, to disengage this force by a turning movement 
 by the right, while Foster threatened it in front. The oper- 
 ation was successfully accomphshed, and the skirmish line 
 of Miles' brigade, of Barlow's division,! by a weU-executed 
 manoeuvre, captured four guns. The enemy held this front 
 weakly ; and, when thus assailed, retired a short distance to 
 another line of works, behind Bailey's Creek, where he effect- 
 ually barred Hancock's approach to Chapin's Bluff. This 
 position seemed so formidable that Hancock preferred to 
 ilank it. The cavahy, meanwhile, moved to the right, and, by 
 one or two spirited charges, gained possession of some high, 
 open ground, which it was hoped might enable it to get in 
 the rear of the enemy's line. Night came on, however, before 
 any thing was accomphshed, and the movement bemg now 
 
 ""* Hancock : Report of the Expedition to Deep Bottom. , ^. , , ,, . , 
 
 + The skirmish line was composed of the One Hundred and E.ghty-third 
 Pennsylvania. Twenty-eighth Massachusetts, and Twenty-sixth Michigan, uu- 
 der Colonel J. C. Lynch. 
 
520 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 fully disclosed, Lee drew to this point a very heavy force from 
 Petersburg. In the morning he assumed the offensive, drove 
 back Sheridan from his advance on the New Market and Long 
 Bridge roads, and, though that officer was able, by dismount- 
 ing his troopers, to check and finally didve off his assailants, it 
 became obvious that his proposed expedition was baulked. 
 
 During the 28th and following day, Hancock held a simply 
 defensive attitude, Lee meanwhile concentrating so heavily 
 against him that he finally had drawn to the north bank of 
 the James five of the eight divisions of the Confederate army. 
 Of this circumstance General Grant determined to take advan- 
 tage ; for, though the direct purpose of the move had failed, 
 it had yet caused Lee so materially to weaken his force in 
 front of Petersburg as to afford an excellent opportunity for 
 the assault, which it was designed to make on Burnside's 
 front. Hancock's move, therefore, assumed the character of 
 a feint ; and the expeditionary force was ordered that night 
 to withdraw secretly from its position on the north side of the 
 James, and return to the lines of Petersburg, to participate in 
 the attack of the following morning. 
 
 It will have appeared, from the outUne already given of the 
 proposed assault, that it was an operation essentially of the 
 nature of a coup de main. It involved the explosion of the 
 mine, through the breach formed by which an assaulting 
 column would then push forward to sweep the hostile line 
 right and left, and crown the crest of the ridge. Thus the 
 whole momentum of the action and the entire promise of the 
 result centred in the corps to which the duty of assault was 
 assigned. 
 
 In this state of facts, it would seem to be the dictate of 
 prudence, and certainly has been the invariable practice of 
 the great commanders, to select for the storming column the 
 elite of the army — a rule that does not seem to have been 
 followed in this case. It happened that the Ninth Army 
 Corps, under General Burnside, held the front from which the 
 assault was to be made. With no purpose of undertaking the 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 521 
 
 ungracious task of comparison, but with the simple desire of 
 stating a matter of fact essential to the correct appreciation 
 of the action and its result, it is due to say that that corps 
 could not be considered the elite corps of the army. The old 
 Ninth, than which there never was better, had been reduced 
 by long and varied service to a mere nucleus, with which had 
 been agglomerated (not/used) a mass of new, heterogeneous, 
 and inferior material. The first division was largely made 
 up of foot- artillerists and dismounted cavahy, and the fourth 
 division was composed exclusively of Blacks. To such an 
 extent had the morale of the Ninth Coi-ps become impaired, 
 that its inspecting officer a short time before the assault de- 
 clared the three White divisions to be in so bad a condition 
 that the division of Blacks was to be preferred for the duty. 
 
 If, in view of this circumstance, it be asked why another 
 selection was not made, an answer does not readily present 
 itself. There is, however, in Carnot's work, De la Defence 
 des Places Fortes, a remarkable passage that closely touches 
 this matter. " The reasons why our assaults occasionally fail," 
 says he, " are, in my opinion, various. In the first place, it is 
 a rule that the troops immediately on duty, or near the spot, 
 generally storm or do whatever service may be required. 
 These troops may be most unfit for it, and by this mode 
 the good old custom is done away of employmg grena- 
 diers or chosen men for occasions of difficulty. There are no 
 troops in the world that can be taken indiscriminately for 
 brilliant services, and undoubtedly none more so than for 
 storming works. Besides, the officer to whom the command 
 falls may be very unfit for the particular service." 
 
 But, what is even more extraordinary than the selection 
 itself, is the mode in which the selection was made. General 
 Grant refused to permit the black division to be chosen for 
 the assaulting column, and it remained to appoint one of 
 the three divisions of white troops. General Burnside then 
 resolved to determine the choice by casting lots— or, as 
 General Grant has expressed it, by " pulling straws or tossmg 
 coppers." The lot fell to the first division, under command of 
 
522 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Brigadier-General Ledlie. With such a mode of deterniiniiig 
 siich a question, need it be wondered that an elfish fate turned 
 up of all the divisions the poorest — a division fitted neither in 
 respect of its composition nor its commander for the glorious 
 but exacting duty assigned it. 
 
 The hour for the explosion of the mine wds fixed at half- 
 past four in the morning of the 30th. At that hour the match 
 was applied, but, owing to the defective fuse employed, the 
 mine failed to explode. After waiting some time, a commis- 
 sioned and a non-commissioned officer^' volunteered for the 
 perilous duty of entering the mine and ascertaining the cause 
 of the failure. The fuse being rehghted, the mine exj)loded 
 at forty-two minutes past four in the morning. A solid mass 
 of earth, through which the exploding powder blazed hke 
 lightning playing in a bank of clouds, arose slowly some two 
 hundred feet into the air, and, hanging visibly for a few 
 seconds, it subsided, and a heavy cloud of black smoke fioated 
 ofl'. The explosion of the mine was the signal for a simul- 
 taneous outburst of artillery fire from the various batteries. 
 This had the effect of soon silencing the enemy's guns.f The 
 leading division under Ledlie then advanced to the charge. 
 The 'place d'armes was, however, very restricted : no proper de- 
 houdds had been prepared for the assaulting column,:]; and the 
 advance was made slowly and stragghngly. 
 
 * Lieutenant Jacob Douty and Sergeant Henry Rees, of the Forty-eighth 
 Pennsylvania Regiment. 
 
 f " On the morning of the SOtli, as soon as the mine exploded, our fire 
 opened along the whole line. The firing was from each piece slow, deliberate, 
 and careful, partaking of the nature of target practice, and was very efiective. 
 The enemy's guns in i'ront of the Fifth Corps were soon silenced, and his fire 
 in front of the Ninth Corps confined to a battery on the hill behind the mine, 
 and to one gun from another work south of the mine, which could not ba 
 effectually reached." — Hunt : Report of Artillery Operations. 
 
 X On this point Lieutenant-General Grant says : " I am satisfied that he 
 [General Burnside] did not make the deboucJiement that he was ordered to 
 make. I kno\v that as well as I know any thing that 1 cannot exactly swear 
 to." — Report on the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. i., p. 110. General 
 Meade says : " There was a high parapet iu front of our lines, an abatis, and 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 523 
 
 On reaching the site of the fort, it was found to have been 
 converted bj the explosion into a huge crater one hundred 
 and fifty feet long, sixty feet wide, and from twenty-five to 
 thirty deep. Here the assaulting column sought shelter, 
 though there was nothing to prevent its rushing forward and 
 crowning the crest ; for the enemy, paralyzed by the explo- 
 sion, remained inactive for above half an hour. Portions of 
 the other two divisions, under Generals Potter and Wilcox, 
 then advanced, but they also huddled into the crater, or sought 
 cover behind the breastworks, which had been vacated by 
 the enemy for two or three hundred yards to the right and 
 left of the mine. Here the troops of the several divisions be- 
 coming mixed up : a scene of disorder and confusion com- 
 menced, which seems to have continued to the end of the 
 operations.* 
 
 In the mean time the enemy, rallying from the confusion in- 
 cident to the explosion, began forming his infantry in a ravine 
 to the right, and planting his artillery both on the right and 
 left of the crater. Seeing this, one of the division command- 
 ers. General Potter, made a praiseworthy efi'ort to extricate 
 himseK from the disgraceful coil, and charged towards the 
 crest ; but, owing to want of support, he was compelled to fall 
 back. It was now seven a. m., more than two hours after Led- 
 lie occupied the crater, yet he made no advance himself, and 
 obstructed the efibrts of other officers. In this state of facts, 
 the more troops that were thrown in, the worse Avas the con- 
 fusion ; yet General Burnside threw forward the black divi- 
 sion to essay an assault. Passing beyond the crater, the 
 colored troops made an advance towards the crest, when, en- 
 countering a fire of artillery and infantry, they retired in great 
 disorder through the troops in the crater, and back to the 
 
 other obstacles to keep tlie enemy from us. Those obstacles should have been 
 removed to enable our troops to move out promptly. There was but a small 
 opening made, by which the Ninth Corps, fifteen thousand men, moved out by 
 the flank." — Ibid., p. 35. See also the testimony of Major Duane, Ibid., p. 99 
 Warren, Ibid., p. 83. 
 
 * Meade : Report of the Battle of Petersburg 
 
52il: CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 original lines.* After the repulse of the colored division, all 
 semblance of offensive efforts ceased ; Blacks and Whites tum- 
 bled pell-mell into the hollow of the exploded earthworks- 
 a slaughter-pen in which shells and bombs, rained from the 
 enemy's lines, did fearful havoc.f Failing to advance, it soon 
 proved almost equally diflS.cult to retreat, though parties of 
 tens and twenties, crawHng out, ran back as best they could. 
 The enemy then made a sally towards the crater, but was 
 repulsed. A second assault, however, shook the disjointed 
 structure of the hapless mass, which, without head or direc- 
 tion, obeyed the instinct of sauve qui iieut. Above four thou- 
 sand were killed or captured. Thus ended what General 
 Grant justly called " this miserable affair," in which, if success 
 promised results of the first importance, it would be difficult 
 to say that the preparations were of a character to insure 
 success.:]: 
 
 * " A part of the colored division was deflected to the right, and charged and 
 captured a portion of the enemy's line, with a stand of colors and some pris- 
 oners." — Burnside : Report of the Battle of Petersburg. 
 
 f The most destructive fire came from a gun in a work south of the mine, 
 which was covered from the Union batteries by a fringe of trees on their front, 
 that the chief of artillery had required should be felled. " This work having 
 been delayed by the Ninth Corps until the night of the 29th, it was then ob- 
 jected to by General Burnside that the noise of chopping would alarm the 
 enemy." — Hunt : Report of Siege Operations. 
 
 X The report of the Congressional Investigating Committee finds that the 
 failui'e of the assault was due to the following causes : 1. The fact that the 
 charge was led by white, instead of black troops. This is stated by the com- 
 mittee to be " the first and great cause of disaster." 2. The fact that General 
 Meade directed that the assaulting column should push at once for the crest of 
 Cemetery Hill, instead of first clearing the enemy's lines to the right and left 
 of the mine. This is a ridiculous charge ; for the order to crown the crest 
 involved, in its execution, the clearing of the enemy's lines right and left, as 
 much as an order to General Burnside to pass through a door would presup- 
 pose his opening the door. 
 
 A very different verdict was, however, pronounced by a military court of in 
 quiry instituted soon after the failure. This court was composed of Generals 
 Hancock, Ayres, and Miles, and its finding is as follows : 
 
 " The causes of failure are — 
 
 " 1. The injudicious formation of the troops in going forward, the movement 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 52^ 
 
 IV. 
 LEE'S DIVERSION. 
 
 In tlie threatening attitude maintained by Grant, there was 
 one move open to Lee that promised, for a time at least, to 
 relieve the pressure on his beleaguered Hnes. This was to 
 make a diversion in favor of his own army by such a menace 
 against Washington as would compel Grant to part with so 
 much of the Ai-my of the Potomac that offensive operations 
 against Petersburg must cease. This measure was now 
 adopted by Lee. 
 
 The execution of this project was facilitated not only by the 
 fact that the position of the Army of the Potomac south of the 
 
 being mainly by flank, instead of extended front. General Meade's order indi- 
 cated that columns of assault should be employed to take Cemetery Hill, and 
 the proper passages should be prepared for those columns. It is the opinion of 
 the court, that there were no proper columns of assault. The troops should 
 have been formed in the open ground in front of the point of attack, parallel to 
 the line of the enemy's works. The evidence shows that one or more columns 
 might have passed over at and to the left of the crater, without any previous 
 preparation of the ground. 
 
 " 2. The halting of the troops in the crater, instead of going forward to the 
 crest, when there was no fire of any consequence from the enemy. 
 
 " 3. No proper employment of engineer officers and working parties, and of 
 materials and tools for their use, ia the Ninth (.'orps. 
 
 " 4. That some parts of the assaulting columns were not properly led. 
 " 5. The want of a competent common head at the scene of the assault, to 
 direct affairs as occurrences should demand. 
 
 " Had not failure ensued from the above causes, and the crest been gained, the 
 success might have been jeoparded by the failure to have prepared in season 
 proper and adequate debouches through the Ninth Corps lines for troops, and 
 especially for field artillery, as ordered by Major-General Meade."— Report on 
 the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. i., p. 215. 
 
 Neither of these verdicts, however, reaches the root of the evil. If the 
 reader will study carefully the passage I have quoted from Carnot, in its appli- 
 cation to the character of the troops that made the assault, he will have the 
 r-«l cause of the failure. All the rest followed from that primal evil. 
 
526 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAH 
 
 I James completely uncovered Wasliington ; but the direct line 
 of march by the Shenandoah Valley had been left open to the 
 advance of a hostile force by General Hunter, who, after his 
 defeat before Lynchburg, had taken up an eccentric line of 
 retreat by way of Western Virginia. The effect of this was 
 completely to uncover the frontier of the loyal States. 
 
 The force detached by Lee for this expedition consisted of 
 a body of twelve thousand men under General Early, Fol- 
 lowing the beaten track of invasion, Early marched rapidly 
 down the Shenandoah Valley, arriving before Martinsburg the 
 3d of July. Sigel, who held post there with a small force, 
 at once retreated across the Potomac at Shepherdstown. 
 General Weber, in command at Harper's Ferry, evacuated the 
 town and retired to Maryland Heights. Hunter, who had 
 made a toilsome march through the Alpine region of Western 
 Virginia, experienced great delays in transporting his troops 
 to Harper's Ferry, owing to the lowness of the river and the 
 breaking of the railroad in several places. He was therefore 
 not in position to check the irruption of the enemy into Mary- 
 land, and the Confederates, the way being thus open, passed 
 the Potomac, and marching by way of Hagerstown, on the 
 7th, reached Frederick — a central point whence they might 
 threaten both Baltimore and Washington. 
 
 The only force at hand with which to dispute Early's ad- 
 vance was a body of a few thousand foot artillerists, hundred 
 days' men and invalids under General Wallace, then in com- 
 mand at Baltimore. But on learning the irruption of the 
 enemy across the Potomac, General Grant detached the Sixth 
 Corps from the Army of the Potomac and forwarded it by 
 transports to Washington. It happened, too, at this juncture, 
 that the Nineteenth Corps under General Emory, which had 
 been ordered from New Orleans after the failure of the Red 
 River expedition, had just arrived in Hampton Roads. With- 
 out debarking it was sent to follow the Sixth. The advance 
 division of the Sixth Corps under General Ricketts having 
 arrived. General Wallace, with that added to his own hetero- 
 geneous force, moved forward to meet Early, and took posi- 
 
THE SIEGE OP PETERSBURG. 527 
 
 tion on the Monocacy. Here he received battle on the 8th, 
 and though he was discomfited, the stand he made gained 
 time that was of infinite yahie. Wallace fell back on Balti- 
 more, and the route to Washington being clear. Early at once 
 pushed forward in that direction — sending towards Baltimore 
 a cavalry force that destroyed a long stretch of the Northern 
 Central Eailroad and burnt the viaduct of the Baltimore and 
 Ohio Kailroad, thus effectually cutting off communication with 
 the North and securing the Confederate rear. 
 
 Advancing by the great highway from Frederick to George- 
 town, his column on the 9th reached Eockville, fourteen 
 miles from the Federal capital. Bivouacking here, it next 
 day resumed the march, and on the morning of the 11th, 
 Early's van reined up before the fortifications covering the 
 northern approaches to Washington. By afternoon the Con- 
 federate infantry had come up, and showed a strong line in 
 front of Fort Stevens. Early had then an opportunity to 
 dash into the city, the works being very slightly defended. 
 The hope at headquarters that the capital could be saved from 
 capture was very slender. But his conduct was feeble, and 
 during the day the Sixth Corps arrived, and was soon followed 
 by the Nineteenth. 
 
 After this, no one of sound nerves had any fears for the 
 safety of Washington. The Confederates stiU held their posi- 
 tion during the 12th, and that afternoon warm skirmishing 
 took place, though without vigor on the part of the enemy. 
 A brigade of the Sixth Corps made a sally from the lines and 
 fell upon and drove the enemy for a mile, suffering a loss of 
 near three hundred in killed and wounded, but inflicting 
 heavier damage on the enemy. That night Early withdrew 
 his force and retired across the Potomac at Edward's Ferry, 
 taking with him much booty, but little glory. Next day 
 General Wright began pursuit, but did not overtake the ene- 
 my till he reached the Shenandoah Valley. After a smart 
 skirmish at Snicker's Ferry, Early beat a retreat southward. 
 The Sixth Corps was then drawn back to Washington, but as 
 shortly afterwards the Confederates showed signs of repeat- 
 
528 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 ing the invasion, it was, with the Nineteenth Corps, returned 
 to the Shenandoah Valley. Here General Sheridan soon 
 afterwards took command, and opened a brilliant campaign, 
 to the details of which I shall shortly return. 
 
 Id this enterprise. General Lee founded his expectations 
 less on what might be accomplished directly by the expe- 
 ditionary force, than on the effect he supposed this menace to 
 Washington would have on the army beleaguering Petersburg. 
 He reasoned that as General Grant was a man who believed 
 in overwhelming numbers, he would find himseK, after the de- 
 tachment of a sufficient force to meet the column of invasion, 
 so reduced in strength that he would remove his remaining 
 corps altogether from Petersburg.* The siege would thus be 
 raised and Richmond relieved. 
 
 But Lee's reasoning was falsified by the fact. The oppor- 
 tune arrival of the Nineteenth Corps from New Orleans en- 
 abled Grant to provide a sufficient force to meet Early by the 
 detachment of a single corps, the loss of which had no sensi- 
 ble influence on operations against Petersburg, There is 
 little doubt that at an earlier period of the war the result 
 would have been very different and would have fully met Lee's 
 expectations. As it was, it required all General Grant's 
 moral firmness to withstand the severe pressure brought upon 
 him by the Administration to remove his army from the 
 James River to the front of Washington. The persistency 
 which has been often pointed out as that commander's dis- 
 tinguishing trait was never so happily illustrated. 
 
 * I derive this statement of General Lee's views from Colonel Marshall, of 
 the staff of the Confederate commander. 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 529 
 
 VI. 
 
 SUMMER AND AUTUMN OPERATIONS AGAINST 
 PETERSBURG AND RICHMOND. 
 
 Having already set fortli the bounds within which manoeu- 
 vres were practicable for the army before Petersburg, it re- 
 mains to describe a series of operations within these limits, 
 executed during the remaining months of summer and autumn. 
 They present a remarkable illustration of the vigor and skiU 
 that marked both the attack and defence of that city. The 
 recital will bring this narrative up to the close of the cam- 
 paign of 1864. 
 
 The Movement to Deep Bottom. — The first of these oper- 
 ations was a repetition of the manoeuvre to the north bank of 
 the James Biver. The expedition was again under the com- 
 mand of General Hancock, to whom were given, in addition 
 to his own corps, the Tenth Corps (now under General Bir- 
 ney) and the cavalry division of General Gregg. The move- 
 ment was begun on the 12th of August. As it was not possi- 
 ble long to conceal its real character, it was resolved to throw 
 the enemy off the scent by the embarkation of the expe- 
 ditionary force on transports at City Point, and the promulga- 
 tion of the idea that it was about to start for Washington. 
 During the night of the 12th, the fleet steamed up stream, and 
 the troops were next morning landed at Deep .Bottom, where 
 General Foster continued to hold an intrenched camp.* 
 Much difficulty was experienced in the debarkation, which 
 
 * The artillery had been previously sent across the Appomattox, by way of 
 Point of Rocks, and parked under concealment within General Butler's lines. 
 It was then taken to the north side of the James when the infantry had 
 debarked. 
 
 84 
 
530 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 was not completed until nine o'clock of the morning of the 
 13th — a tardiness not auspicious of a successful result,* 
 
 Hancock moved out bj the New Market and Malvern Hill 
 roads, encountering little opposition until reaching Bailey's 
 Creek, the point at which his previous advance had been 
 arrested. Here Mott's division fronted the enemy's intrenched 
 line, while Barlow, with two divisions, numbering nearly ten 
 thousand men, was sent to assault on the right, with instruc- 
 tions that, when the position was carried, he should move to 
 his left and uncover Mott's front, when the whole line would 
 advance. The duty assigned to Barlow was of the nature of 
 a detached operation, but he unfortunately tried to keep up 
 his connection with Mott's right, which strung his force out 
 in a thin line, and left him nothing wherewith to form a 
 storming column. Late in the day he made, with a single 
 brigade, an attack that was rather feebly executed,t so that 
 night found the Confederates still in possession of the in- 
 trenched line. On General Birney's fi'ont, on the other side 
 of Bailey's Creek, some success was gained for the enemy, 
 having weakened that part of the hue to oppose Barlow, 
 General Bkney was able, with slight loss, to break through a 
 portion of the hostile front, and captured four guns. 
 
 Whatever prospect of success originally attended this opera- 
 tion had been based on the fact that the Confederates were 
 weak on the north side of the James — the whole force being 
 believed to be not above eight thousand men.:}: But the design 
 
 * It was supposed that Hancock's troops could be readily landed by running 
 the boats along shore, and throwing out gang-planks. But it was found that 
 the boats could not be run near enough to the shore to effect this purpose, ana 
 the difficulty was materially increased by the outrunning tide. Moreover, 
 many of the transports were ill-adapted to this use. Throughout all these 
 operations great inconvenience arose from the lack of a few light-draught river 
 steamers. 
 
 t The inadequate character of Barlow's attacks General Hancock attributes 
 to " the large number of new men in his command, and the small number of 
 experienced officers." — Report of Operations at Deep Bottom. 
 
 I " An estimate of General Butler's was furnished me. putting the enemy e 
 strength north of the James at eight thousand five hundred men." — Hancock -. 
 Report of Operations at Deep Bottom. 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 531 
 
 being now fully disclosed, Lee rapidly re- enforced to meet 
 this menace, and sviccess was already very problem aticol. 
 New dispositions were, however, made on the 14th. On the 
 following day General Birney was directed to find the enemy's 
 left flank and turn it, Gregg's cavalry covering the movement 
 on the right ; but he did not conduct his operations sufiiciently 
 to the left, and nothing w&s accomplished that day. On the 
 morning of the 16th, Birney* made a direct attack, with the 
 division of Terry, and succeeded in carrying the line, cap- 
 turing three colors and two or three hundred prisoners ; but 
 the enemy soon rallied and recovered the position. 
 
 In connection with Birney's operation, Gregg's mounted 
 division, and an infantry brigade under General Miles, 
 were sent to operate on the Charles City road. Gregg's 
 advance was spirited, and he succeeded in driving the 
 enemy before him for a considerable distance — the Confeder- 
 ate General Chambliss being killed in the skirmish. Fresh 
 forces during the afternoon assailed Gregg, however, who 
 retired, fighting, to Deep Creek, across which he was after- 
 wards driven. In Birney's front the enemy showed so 
 strong a force that a renewal of the attack was deemed 
 impracticable. 
 
 During the night of the 16th a fleet of steamers was sent 
 from City Point to Deep Bottom, returning at four A. M. on 
 the following morning — the object being to convey the impres- 
 sion to the enemy that the expeditionary force was withdraw- 
 ing, and induce him to come out of his works and attack. 
 This ruse was not successful. 
 
 * During the night the gi-eater part of General Birney's command was 
 massed in rear of the position occupied by General Barlow. The line from the 
 New Market and Malvern Hill road, at a point designated on the map as the 
 " Potteries," to the extreme right, was held by a thin skirmish line only. One 
 of General Mott's best brigades, under Colonel Cmig (One Hundred and Fifth 
 Pennsylvania Volunteers), was sent to General Birney. The remainder of 
 Mott's division was massed in rear of his picket-line, except a small force left 
 at the " Potteries." Gibbon's division (temporarily under Colonel Smythe) 
 was also massed in rear of the skirmish line, and Barlow's division was con 
 centrated near the fork of the Darby and Long Bridge roads. 
 
532 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 The four succeeding days passed in unimportant recon- 
 noissances, though on the afternoon of the 18th the Confed- 
 erates made a sally against a part of Bimey's line. After a 
 fight of thirty minutes they were repulsed, with considerable 
 loss. General Miles, with two brigades, participated, attack- 
 ing the enemy on his left flank. At dark of the 20th, Han- 
 cock returned, by way of Bermuda Hundred, to his old camp 
 before Petersburg. The Union loss in this operation exceeded 
 fifteen hundred men.* Much had been expected from it, but 
 the results were trivial. 
 
 To THE Weldon Eaileoad. — If the movement to the north 
 side of the James had failed to accomplish the object con- 
 templated, it had at least compelled Lee to detach a consid- 
 erable force from the lines of Petersburg. Advantage was, 
 accordingly, taken of this fact to strike out on the left flank, 
 which now rested within three miles of the Weldon Kailroad. 
 This, as one of the chief lines of communication for the 
 Confederate army, presented a tempting prize. 
 
 This operation was intrusted to General Warren, who 
 began its execution on the morning of the 18th, while Han- 
 cock remained yet on the north side of the James. No more 
 than slight opposition was encountered on the march, and 
 early in the forenoon, Warren established himself on the rail- 
 road. Leaving Griffin's division to guard the point seized, 
 and observe the avenues of approach from the south and 
 west, the advance was continued northward along the rail- 
 road. After proceeding a mile towards Petersburg, the enemy 
 was found in line of battle, showing a firm disposition to 
 contest further progress.'!' In the afternoon, when Warren 
 attempted to renew his advance, witli Crawford's division on 
 the right, and Ayres' on the left, the Confederates took the 
 offensive against the latter. 
 
 The attack of the enemy came from the left, from the 
 
 * Hancock's loss in Ms own corps was nine hundred and fifteen. In the 
 Tenth Corps and cavalry it is unknown. 
 
 f Warren : Report of Operations on the Weldon Railroad. 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 533 
 
 Vauglian road, the location of wliicli at that point was un- 
 known to the Union officers. It first fell upon the Maryland 
 brigade, which was marching by the flank to cover Ayres' 
 left. The result was that m a few minutes this brigade gave 
 way, thus compelling Ayres' left to fall back, and stopping the 
 advance on the right. About two hundred of the Marylauders 
 were taken prisoners : the remainder retired under cover of 
 the Fifteenth New York Heavy Ai'tillery, which, standing 
 firmly, poured rapid volleys into the enemy, driving him 
 speedily back. This action cost a loss of a thousand men, 
 killed, wounded, and prisoners. But it still left Warren in 
 possession of the prize — the Weldon Railroad. Here he im- 
 mediately began intrenching a position. 
 
 The possession of this hue was not to Lee a matter of vital 
 importance, but still of very great importance.* He, there- 
 fore, determined at all hazards to dislodge the intruding 
 force. 
 
 The body of Confederates met by Warren had not ex- 
 ceeded a division ; but Lee immediately strengthened it by 
 powerful re-enforcements, and on the following afternoon 
 (the 19th), made a sudden irruption on the right flank of the 
 Union position. General Warren had directed Brigadier- 
 General Bragg to establish, by means of his brigade, a con- 
 nection of skirmishers on the shortest liue between the right 
 of his corps and the left of the army then resting across the 
 Jerusalem plankroad. This order General Bragg did not 
 execute, but took up another liue a mile or more to the rear.t 
 On learning this error. General Warren instructed the brig- 
 
 * General Lee, from the time of first reaching Petersburg, never expected to 
 be able long to hold the Weldon Railroad ; and four days after his arrival, he 
 sent a warning to the Richmond authorities to prepare to supply his army by 
 the Danville line alone. The reply was, that they hoped he would do all he 
 could to hold the Weldon road. To this he answered, that of course he woidd 
 do all he could to hold it, but that he had little faith in his ability to do so. 
 The failure of the Confederate authorities to make any provisions in accordance 
 with his admonition was probably the cause of the desperate assaults he msda 
 to dislodge Warren. 
 
 •}• Warren : Report of Operations on the Weldon Railroad. 
 
534 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 adier to correct it ; but before tliis could be done, tlie enemj 
 broke through this picket-line with heayy fire in column of 
 fours, left in front. "Warren's flank was now turned, and the 
 Confederates, in rear of Crawford's line, swept rapidly down 
 to "Warren's left. Great confusion was produced by the men 
 on the front line hastily retiring and masking the fire of those 
 on the second line ; so that the whole of Crawford's division 
 was compelled to fall back, as was also the right of Ayres'. 
 Twenty-five hundred prisoners fell into the hands of the 
 enemy, and among them General J. Hays, one of "Warren's 
 brigade commanders. The troops, however, still clung to 
 their vantage-ground on the railroad. 
 
 In the midst of the action, the commands of "Wilcox and 
 "White of the Ninth Corps (about two thousand in all), oppor- 
 tunely came up ; whereupon, Warren, his own lines being re- 
 formed, pushed forward and regained the ground lost. The 
 enemy, in great confusion, rapidly fell back to his intrench- 
 ments, after a success which, though brilliant in itseK, totally 
 failed to ace )mplish the designed object. 
 
 Being satisfied that the position which he held was one that 
 the enemy would make renewed efforts to regain, "Warren 
 made dispositions of his lines favorable for artillery de- 
 fence, and then awaited attack. He was not mistaken 
 in this anticipation ; for, on the morning of the 21st, the 
 Confederates opened with some thirty pieces of artillery, 
 crossing their fire at right angles over "Warren's position. 
 After an hour's practice of this nature they advanced to 
 attack in front, and at the same time endeavored, with a turn- 
 ing force, to reach the left flank. The attack in front was, 
 however, easily repulsed, and Warren having previously dis- 
 posed his left flank en echelon, the turning force suddenly met 
 a severe fire, under which it fell back in great disorder — five 
 hundred being taken prisoners.* The day's work was a clear 
 
 * This turning movement was made hy a South Carolina brigade imdei 
 General Haygood, and the incidents of the attack are thus given by General 
 Warren : " General Haygood's brigade struck a part of our line where the 
 troops were in echelon ; they found themselves almost surrounded, and every 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 535 
 
 victory, acliievecl with trivial loss.* Warren soon rendered 
 liis position unassailable, and Lee was compelled to see this 
 important line of supplies cut off. The loss sustained by 
 Warren in these actions for the possession of the Weldon 
 Railroad, reached an aggregate of four thousand four hundred 
 and fifty-five killed, wounded, and missing.f 
 
 The Action at Reams' Station. — It will be remembered 
 that at the time Warren moved out, Hancock was operating 
 on the north bank of the James River. Having, meanwhile, 
 returned to the hues before Petersburg on the morning of the 
 21st, after a very fatiguing march, he was ordered to the left, 
 in rear of the position held by Warren. This was accom- 
 plished the same afternoon, and the troops passed the next 
 two days in destroying the Weldon Railroad, moving south- 
 ward and tearing up the track as far as Reams' Station. The 
 cavalry meanwhile operated on the left towards Dinwiddle 
 Courthouse. From Reams' Station, the troops proceeded, on 
 the 24th, to continue the work of destruction for three miles 
 further southward, after which they were withdrawn to the 
 iutrenchments. As Hancock's instructions were to break up 
 the raih'oad as far as Rowanty Creek, eight miles south of 
 Reams', he once more dispatched part of his corps, on the 
 25th, to perform this duty. The division to which this work 
 was this day assigned (that of Gibbon), had, however, hardly 
 left its intrenchmeuts when the cavalry, which was thrown 
 out in the direction of any hostile approach, reported the 
 enemy advancing. As the Confederates showed a strong 
 
 one, thinking they had surrendered, ceased firing. Troops immediately ad- 
 vanced to bring them in, when their officers commenced firing, and Captain 
 Daly, provost-marshal of the Fourth Division, was shot by General Haygood, 
 In the mixed condition of our men and the enemy, our line could not fire, and 
 many of the enemy escaped."— Warren : Report of Operations on the Weldon 
 Railroad. 
 
 * The actual loss was three hundred and two ; the enemy's must have been 
 thrice or four times that number, for Warren's men buried two hundred and 
 eleven of the Confederate dead. 
 
 f Warren : Report of Operations on the Weldon Railroad. 
 
536 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 force of cavalry and infantry, Hancock withdrew Gibbon's 
 division within the intrenchments at Keams' Station, placing 
 it on the left of the First Division, at this time under the com- 
 mand of General Miles. These two small divisions numbered 
 but six thousand men. 
 
 The first Confederate attack was made at two p. m. in heavy 
 force, and fell upon Miles' division on the right. This was 
 speedily repulsed. A second and more vigorous assault fol- 
 lowed at a brief interval and was hkewise repulsed, some of 
 the enemy faUing within a few yards of the intrenchments. It 
 should be here observed that the line of breastworks at 
 Reams' Station had been constructed by another corps some 
 time before, and was very faultily located — a fact that made 
 the defence difficult, and materially contributed to the disaster 
 that now befell Hancock. 
 
 The repulse of the enemy in the previous charges had been 
 so severe, and attended with so heavy a loss, that there was 
 hesitation in renewing the assault. General A. P. Hill, who 
 commanded the Confederate corps on the ground, was, how- 
 ever, resolved to carry the position, and he ordered the divi- 
 sion of Heth to do so at all hazards. To cover this attack 
 the Confederates concentrated a powerful artOlery fire on the 
 position, and, from the faulty location of the breastwork, it 
 took Hancock's line in reverse, considerably demorahzing his 
 troops. The bombardment was promptly followed by the 
 advance of a storming column, which, by an impetuous 
 rush, succeeded in breaking through Miles' line. Most of the 
 command gave way in confusion, and it was found impossible 
 to repair the break, for the only reserve present was a brigade 
 of Gibbon's division under Colonel Rugg, and this could 
 neither be made to go forward nor to fire.* The Confederates 
 then sprang upon the artillery, and the batteries of McKnight, 
 Perrin, and Sleeper had to be surrendered, after being bril- 
 liantly served. 
 
 On the occurrence of this disaster, General Hancock ordered 
 
 * Hancock : Report of Reams' Station. 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 537 
 
 forward the division of Gibbon to retake the position and 
 guns. The order was responded to very feebly by the troops, 
 who fell back to their breastwork after receiving a slight fire. 
 By the loss of this part of the line, the remainder of Gibbon's 
 division was exposed to an attack in flank and rear : so that 
 the troops were compelled to occupy the reverse side of the 
 line of intrenchments. The outlook was certainly very criti- 
 cal, and but for the obstinate bravery of Miles' division, and 
 the fine behavior of that ofl&cer himself, it had been very ill 
 for the Union force. Miles, however, succeeded in rallying a 
 portion of the Sixty-first New York, and forming it at right 
 angles to the breastwork, arrested the progress of the Con- 
 federates, retook McKnight's guns, and recovered a consider- 
 able part of the lost line. The behavior of most of the other 
 troops was despicable. 
 
 The enemy's dismounted cavalry now made an attack 
 against the left. Though not executed with much vigor, it 
 was resisted with still less by Gibbon's division, which was 
 driven fi'om its breastworks. The Confederates, elated at 
 their easy success, pressed on with loud cheers, when they 
 were met by a heavy flank fire from the dismounted Union 
 cavahy, that, occupying the extreme left, behaved in a man- 
 ner that contrasted more than favorably with the conduct of 
 most of the infantry. This summarily checked their advance. 
 When, however, the troopers found themselves a second time 
 assailed, and now by infantry, they were unable to maintain 
 their position, and were, therefore, retu'ed to a new line in 
 the rear, where the troops had been rallied. 
 
 It is wonderful, and indeed incomprehensible, that the com- 
 manding general, informed as he was of Hancock's situation, 
 should not have taken prompt measures for his relief. The 
 distance from Keams' Station to Warren's position was but 
 four miles by a broad, open road, with a telegraph Ime be- 
 tween the two. Yet the re-enforcements forwarded to Han- 
 cock—to wit, Mott's division of his own corps and Wilcox's 
 division of the Ninth corps— were ordered to take up theii 
 march by the plankroad, the distance by which was above 
 
638 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 double tliat of the direct and open route along the railroad. 
 Several circumstances occurred to add additional delay to the 
 arrival of these troops ; but it is certain that in any event they 
 would not have reached Hancock in time to be of service.* 
 
 Thus affairs stood when night fell, and Hancock then with- 
 drew from Reams' Station. It afterwards proved that the 
 Confederates abandoned the field about the same hour. 
 Hancock's loss in this action was twenty-four hundred killed, 
 wounded, and missing, out of his small command of eight 
 thousand infantry and cavalry. Of this number, seventeen 
 hundred were prisoners. The loss on the part of the Con- 
 federates is known to have been also very severe ; but the 
 precise number is unknown. t 
 
 * The circumstances above referred to as causing delay are thus detailed by 
 Hancock : As soon as I knew that Wilcox's division had been ordered down 
 the plankroad, I dispatched a staff-officer to conduct it up. About 5 o'clock a 
 staff-officer from General Mott reported the arrival of seventeen hundred men 
 of Mott's division at the forks of the road where the Reams' Station road leaves 
 the plankroad. These troops would have been immediately ordered up ; but 
 the staff-officer stated that before he could possibly get back with the order 
 Wilcox's division would have passed, so that nothing would be gained. Orders, 
 therefore, were given to Colonel McAllister, commanding the force of Mott's 
 division, to hold well down the plankroad, in anticipation of any attempt of the 
 enemy's cavalry to pass to our rear. An order was also sent to him to arrest 
 all stragglers and form them into regiments. This order, it appears, was handed 
 by the orderly bearing it to General Wilcox, who, not observing the address to 
 Colonel McAllister, opened the order, and thinking it addressed to him, de- 
 ployed a part of his division to arrest and form the stragglers from the battle- 
 field. How much delay Avas caused by this error is not known ; but it is known 
 that the division, in any event, would not have arrived in time to be of service." 
 — Report of Reams' Station. 
 
 f Authority for some of the statements in the above account of the action 
 at Reams' Station, is derived from a letter from General Hancock to the writer, 
 detailing the substance of a conversation had by that officer with the Confed- 
 erate General Heth, who commanded a division in the battle. I extract the 
 following : " Heth would not say positively how many troops they had at 
 Reams' Station, but acknowledges to a very heavy force of infantry and caval- 
 ry. He was surprised at learning the smallness of our force. After they had 
 been repulsed in the third charge upon our works. General Hill sent for Hetlj 
 and told him that he must carry the position, which they certainly did very 
 handsomely by a fourth assault. He admits their losses to have been verj 
 severe in killed and wounded." 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 539 
 
 Movement by the Left. — The hold gained by Warren on 
 the Weldon Raih'oad was permanently retained, and a line of 
 redoubts formed connecting his position with the old left of 
 the army, on the Jerusalem plankroad. No further move- 
 ment of consequence, beyond reconnoissances, was made till 
 the end of September, when General Grant, being resolved 
 to push operations on Butler's front, north of the James 
 Eiver, directed a demonstration to be made on the left, with 
 the view of preventing the transfer of re-enforcements to the 
 troops opposed to Butler.* For this purpose General War- 
 ren, with two divisions of the Fifth Corps, and General Parke, 
 with two divisions of the Ninth, moved from the left towards 
 Poplar Spring Church and Peeble's Farm. Gregg's division 
 of cavalry, at the same time, moved further to the left and 
 rear. One of Warren's divisions, under General Griffin, 
 found the Confederates intrenched on Peeble's Farm, and at- 
 tacking, carried a redoubt and a line of rifle-pits, taking one 
 gun and about a hundred prisoners. At the same time his 
 other division, under General Ayres, carried a small work on 
 the Squirrel Level road. In the afternoon, Parke, moving on 
 Warren's left, towards the Boydton road, was fiercely assailed, 
 and forced back in disorder. Griffin's division, however, 
 came to his support, and the enemy was then checked and 
 repulsed. 
 
 Early next morning, Gregg met the enemy's cavalry and 
 forced it back. At the same time Mott's division of Han- 
 cock's corps was withdrawn from the lines and sent to 
 re-enforce Parke ; but it did not reach the ground in time to 
 be of service. During the afternoon Gregg was heavily 
 attacked on the Duncan road, where he was guarding the left 
 and rear ; but repulsed the enemy, with considerable loss. 
 
 The 2d of October the whole force advanced, but found the 
 enemy had withdrawn to his main intrenchments. A position 
 was then taken up, and the necessary works laid out to extend 
 the Federal intrenched line to the position gamed.t The loss 
 in this action was above twenty-five hundred. 
 
 * Meade : Report of Campaign of 1864. f Meade : Report of Operations. 
 
540 CAMPAIGNS OP THE AEMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 During thepe occurrences on the extreme left, General But- 
 ler had been operating with the Army of the James against 
 the fortifications of Richmond. Crossing, on the night of the 
 8th of September, to the north side of the James Eiver, with 
 the corps of Birney and Ord, Butler next morning advanced 
 and carried the very strong fortifications and intrenchments 
 below Chapin's farm, known as Fort Harrison, capturing fif- 
 teen pieces of artillery and the New Market road, with the 
 works defending it.* This success was followed np by an as- 
 sault upon Fort Gilmer, immediately in front of the Chapin's 
 farm fortifications, in which the assailants were repulsed, with 
 a loss of about three hundred men. The position being one 
 very menacing to Richmond, General Butler made dispositions 
 to hold it permanently. The Confederates endeavored, in 
 several determined assaults, to dislodge him ; but he was 
 able to repulse these attacks, and make the enemy pay dearly 
 therefor. 
 
 Turning Movement against Petersburg. — It was now ap- 
 proaching the season when, practicable roads and weather 
 being no longer to be counted upon, active operations on a 
 large scale must necessarily be suspended. Before setthng 
 down to winter-quarters, however, General Grant deter- 
 mined to strike one vigorous blow for the capture of Peters- 
 burg. The plan was to find the extreme right of the enemy's 
 intrenched line, and by turning it, march upon and lay hold 
 of the Southside Railroad, which was Lee's principal commu- 
 nication. The expeditionary force consisted of the major 
 part of the three corps of the army, leaving behind from each 
 only a sufficient force to hold the lines in fi'ont of Petersburg. 
 
 At this period the left flank of the Union line rested at a 
 point about two miles west of the Weldon Railroad ; three 
 miles west of this point one strikes the Boydton plankroad, 
 which runs northeastward into Petersburg. This road, since 
 the loss of the Weldon Railroad, had assumed such import- 
 
 * Grant : Report of Operations. 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 541 
 
 ance to Lee that lie had prolonged the right of his intrenched 
 line, covering that road for some distance below the point 
 where it crosses Hatcher's Eun. These defences protected, 
 also, the Southside Railroad, which at this point runs parallel 
 with the Boydton plankroad, and two miles distant there- 
 fi'om. 
 
 In the assignment of duty to the respective corps, the Ninth 
 Corps, supported by that of Warren, was to attack vigorously 
 the extreme right of the enemy's intrenched line, while Han- 
 cock should cross to the west side of Hatcher's Eun, by a swing- 
 ing movement, gain the Boydton plankroad and advance to 
 seize the Southside Eailroad. The execution of this plan was 
 begun early on the morning of the 27th. Proceeding westward 
 two or three miles, the Ninth and Fifth corps, at nine A. M., 
 struck the right of the Confederate intrenched line, which was 
 found to rest on the east bank of Hatcher's Eun. The Ninth 
 Corps, under General Parke, was on the right, and Warren's 
 corps on the left. If Parke should carry the position, he was 
 to follow up the enemy closely, turning towards the right. 
 AVarren was to support the attack in case of success ; but if the 
 Ninth Corps should fail to break the enemy's hue, he was to 
 cross Hatcher's Eun and endeavor to turn the enemy's right, 
 by recrossing at the first practicable point above the Boydton 
 plankroad. It was very soon found impracticable to force the 
 enemy's position by a direct attack, and Warren then set on foot 
 the turning movement; but before further following events 
 here, it is necessary to detail the operations of the detached 
 column of Hancock, whose part in the plan of action has been 
 above indicated. 
 
 Hancock marched by the Vaughan road, which runs west- 
 ward a considerable distance south of the line on which 
 Parke and Warren were acting. Having forced the crossing 
 of Hatcher's Eun, disputed by a small body of the enemy on 
 its west bank, he advanced northwestward, by the way of 
 Dabney's Mill, and gained the Boydton planki'oad. Thence 
 he was to proceed to the crossing at WTiite Oak bridge two 
 miles above, and after a further march of four miles strike the 
 
542 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OP THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Soutliside Railroad in rear of the enemy's extreme rigliL 
 Hancock's left was covered by Gregg's cavalry division. The 
 crossing of Hatcher's Run at Burgess's Mill was found to be 
 observed by merely a small force of tlie enemy, and wishing 
 to mask his march, he was proceeding to drive it across the 
 run, when, at one P. M., he received orders from General Meade 
 to halt on the Boydton plankroad — an order prompted by the 
 want of success attending General Parke's direct attack. 
 
 It has been seen that, on the failure of the Ninth Corps to 
 force the enemy's line in its front, Warren set on foot a turn- 
 ing movement. That officer was directed to send one of his 
 divisions across Hatcher's Run, place its right flank on the run, 
 and then move up its course. It was supposed this measure 
 would serve the double purpose of supporting Hancock's 
 right flank and turning the position in front of the rest of War- 
 ren's corps and of the Ninth Corps. When, by a flank attack, 
 the force in front of these corps should be forced to abandon 
 its position, they were also to cross to the west side ol 
 Hatcher's Run. The division assigned by Warren to this 
 duty was Crawford's, strengthened by one brigade of Ayres'. 
 Crawford crossed Hatcher's Run at Armstrong's Mill, about 
 noon, and proceeded up the stream in the manner indicated. 
 It will now be understood that the order to Hancock to halt 
 on the Boydton plankroad was prompted by the desire that 
 Crawford should move up to his suj)port, and open the way 
 for the forces to the same ; for Hancock's position at Bur- 
 gess's Mill, on the Boydton plankroad, isolated him by five or 
 six miles and by Hatcher's Run from Warren and Parke, and 
 raised fears as to his safety. Circumstances now to be de- 
 tailed, however, prevented the junction of these forces, and 
 finally ended prematurely an expedition from which the 
 largest results had been hoped. 
 
 Crawford's march up the west bank of Hatcher's Run 
 proved to be one of great difficulty, the country being densely 
 wooded and nearly impracticable. Great numbers of the 
 men became lost — in fact, whole regiments losing all idea of 
 where to find the rest of the division. After two or three 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 543 
 
 hours^ of toilsome effort, he had advanced so far np the Run 
 as to be directly on the right flank of the intrenched line 
 opposed to the rest of the Fifth Corps and Ninth Corps. 
 This line was, however, on the opposite side of the stream, 
 and before crossing to assail the enemy, General Warren or- 
 dered cessation of operations, until he should consult with 
 General Meade, for the country proved to be entirely different 
 fi'om the representations of the imperfect . map. From the 
 position where Crawford lay on the west side of Hatcher's 
 Run, to that held by Hancock up this stream, at Burgess's 
 Mill, the distance was not above a mile ; but, owing to the 
 difficult nature of the country, it was long before these re- 
 spective forces found out the location of each other, and in 
 the mean time affairs culminated by an attack of the Confed- 
 erates on Hancock. 
 
 Hancock, on being instructed to halt at Burgess's Mill, was 
 also informed that Crawford's division was feeling its way 
 up the west bank of the Eun, and he was desired to assist 
 in making the connection by extending his right. Accord- 
 ingly, General Egan (then commanding Gibbon's division of 
 Hancock's corps), deployed two of his brigades to the right of 
 the Boydton plankroad, and subsequently deployed two regi- 
 ments as far as they would reach to the right. It was at 
 one time reported that the connection with Crawford Avas 
 made ; but this report was erroneous, and it was afterwards 
 found that Crawford was full three-fourths of a mile from 
 Hancock's right. 
 
 While these occurrences were passing, Lee had resolved to 
 assume the offensive, and fall upon the force west of Hatcher's 
 Run, which, isolated from that on the east side, presented a 
 favorable opportunity for a blow. The force detached to 
 execute this stroke consisted of the gi-eater part of Hill's 
 corps. It appears that it was Lee's original design to cross 
 Hatcher's Run above Burgess's MiU, and attack Hancock's left 
 flank ; but as that officer had carried the bridge over the mill- 
 dam before the Confederates were ready for their movement, 
 and as Lee feared the Union force would cross and take the 
 
544 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 heights on the opposite side of the stream, the Confederate 
 commander determined to move across Hatcher's Run at once, 
 and assail Hancock's right. Hill accordingly crossed, and, 
 as it happened, his point of passage brought him directly in 
 the interval between Hancock and Crawford. But of this 
 circumstance he was not at all aware, owing to the densely 
 wooded character of the country. The Confederate infantry 
 passed close to Crawford's skirmishers, and followed a path 
 through the woods until thej were near Hancock's position, 
 when they deployed, and, about four p. m., suddenly fell upon 
 Mott's division of Hancock's corps. Most of the troops were 
 disposed so as to meet an attack from quite a different direc- 
 tion, so that the outbuist of the enemy was on their rear, 
 and the presence of the Confederates was first announced by 
 volleys of musketry. Peirce's brigade of Mott's division at 
 this point gave way, one section of artillery was captured, and 
 affairs appeared as critical as can well be conceived. Han- 
 cock immediately ordered Egan to change front, and move to 
 resist the adverse mass ; but that officer, with true soldierly in- 
 stinct, had already done that of his own motion, and was 
 moving rapidly to attack the force in his rear. It is probable 
 that the Confederates did not precisely comprehend the situa- 
 tion, for on emerging into the open space around the Boyd- 
 ton x^lankroad, they pushed rapidly across that road, and, 
 facing southward, commenced firing. 
 
 Egan swept down upon the flanks of the enemy with 
 Smythe's and "Willett's brigades of his own division, and Mc- 
 Allister's brigade of Mott's division, while De Trobriand's bri- 
 gade and Kerwin's brigade of dismounted cavalry formed on 
 the west side of the road, and advanced at the same time. 
 The forward rush of Egan's men was irresistible, and the 
 Confederates were driven from the field with the loss of two 
 colors, and nearly a thousand prisoners. The two captured 
 guns were retaken. The enemy made for the woods in con- 
 fusion, and retired by the same route on which they had 
 advanced. Several hundred of them strayed into Crawford's 
 line, and were taken. An advance of the force under that 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 545 
 
 officer at this time, must have been decisive of the action, 
 driving the enemy into Hatcher's Run.* No such advance 
 was ordered, however, as it was thought that Ayres' divi- 
 sion couhl reach Hancock more readily than Crawford, there 
 being no known road between these two. Darkness was 
 so near at hand when Ayres moved that he halted for the 
 night at Armstrong's Mill, and consequently did not reach 
 Hancock.f 
 
 * " The Confederate General Hetli stated that he was greatly alarmed after 
 he had crossed the run to attack us, lest Crawford should advance upon his 
 left flank, and said that had Crawford made such an advance, his (Heth's) com- 
 mand must have heen driven into the stream, and dispersed or captured." — 
 Private letter from General Hancock. 
 
 f As tlie above narrative recounts a series of rather complicated events, I 
 add the following from the oflacial report of General Warren: "I ordered 
 Crawford to halt his line and get in good order, and press the enemy with his 
 skirmishers, while I went to consult with General Meade, who, I supposed, 
 was with General Hancock. When near the place of the latter, I was told 
 by Major Riddle that General Meade had returned to Armstrong's MiU, and I 
 proceeded to that point as rapidly as possible. Soon after reaching him we 
 learned that the enemy had come in between Hancock and Crawford, and 
 attacked the former with great violence. The commanding general immedi- 
 ately directed me to send General Crawford to his support, but he assenting to 
 my suggestion that General Ayres could more readily be got there, I directed 
 General Ayres to move at once. Darkness was so near at hand that he was 
 halted at Armstrong's Mill. The attack on General Hancock must have 
 occurred while I was near General Crawford, and yet in the woods the sound 
 of musketry did not reach us. There was besides no road known to ua 
 leading directly to General Hancock, and that same woods, for two or threo 
 miles, was certain to prevent his arriving for any contemplated emergency. 
 What would have added still greater delay to communicating with General 
 Crawford supervened by the rebels getting in on the road by which we com- 
 municated between him and myself. The enemy became so bewildered in 
 these woods that upwards of two hundred of them strayed into General Craw- 
 ford's line and were captured. Some of these men, before being taken, cai> 
 tured three of our ambulances a mile in the rear of General Crawford. Six o^ 
 them captured Captain Cope, of my stafif ; but finding themselves in our lines, 
 gave up to him, and he brought them in. Major Bingham, of General Han- 
 cock's staff, on his way to General Crawford, was captured by them, but made 
 his escape ; and three officers of my staff, in attempting to avoid the road thus 
 infested by the enemy, became lost in coming from General Crawford's to me, 
 and had to stay out all night in the woods."— Warren : Report of Operationa 
 
 at Hatcher's Run. 
 
 35 
 
546 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Almost simultaneously with this attack, the ConfecleratQ 
 cavalry (five brigades under Hampton) assailed Hancock's 
 left and rear, held by Gregg's mounted division. This force 
 was so heavily pressed, that Hancock was obliged to send 
 General Gregg all of his force that he had used in meeting 
 the attack in front. The action was kept up here till some 
 time after dark, Gregg was able to maintain his ground, and 
 the Confederates gained no success. 
 
 Hancock's loss in this encounter was fifteen hundred men, 
 which was less than that of the enemy. The action was 
 highly creditable to his skill and the good conduct of the 
 troops. Aside from the praise due to Hancock for the man- 
 ner in which he had met this sudden attack on his iso- 
 lated position, nothing can be said in favor of the expedition 
 £ls a whole. It resulted in total failure, which was partly the 
 result of misfortune, but mainly the result of faults in the 
 original plan. The experience of this operation furnished a 
 fair test of what may be expected from the like dispositions. 
 
 After the repulse Hancock had given the force that assailed 
 him, he was reluctant to leave the field that night ; but as his 
 troops had nearly exhausted their ammunition, and as there 
 was Uttle prospect that a fresh supply or re-enforcements 
 ■could reach him in time for an attack in the morning, the 
 withdrawal was begun at ten p. m.'-" This appears to have 
 
 * " Between eix and seven P. M. I received a dispatch from General Hum 
 plireys, stating that Ajres division of the Fifth Corps had been ordered to my 
 support, but had halted at Armstrong's Mill, which was as far as it could be able 
 to get. The dispatch also authorized me to withdraw that night if 1 thought 
 proper ; but stated that if I could attack successfully in the morning, with the 
 aid of Ayres' and Crawford's divisions, the major-general commanding desired 
 me to do so. Tliough these re-enforcements were offered to me, the question 
 of their getting to me in time, and of getting ammunition up in time to have 
 my own command effective in the morning, was left for me to decide ; and I 
 understood that, if the principal part of the fighting in the morning would ba 
 tlirown upon these re-enforcements, it was not desired that they should bo 
 ordered up. They would at least have been called upon to do the fighting 
 untU my own command could have replenished their ammunition, which I was 
 quite certain would not be in time to resist attack at an early hour in the 
 morning. Reluctant as I was to leave the field, and by so doing lose some of 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 547 
 
 been a very fortunate decision, for during tlie niglit, tlie Con- 
 federates massed at the position where the fighting ceased 
 fifteen thousand infantry and Hampton's cavahy, with which 
 they had intended to assail Hancock at daylight of the 28th.'* 
 Next morning the whole force returned to the lines before 
 Petersburg. 
 
 New Movement to the Left. — From this time forward the 
 operations in front of Petersburg and Eichmond, until the 
 spring campaign of 1865, were mainly confined to the de- 
 fence and extension of the hnes, which were pushed westward 
 as far as Hatcher's Run. The extension of the lines was pre- 
 ceded by a new movement to the left, which was very similar, 
 in its general aspects to that above recounted. This opera- 
 tion had the same object as the October movement, which 
 was to turn the enemy's right and seize the Southside Rail- 
 road. It was undertaken by the Fifth Corps, the Second 
 Corps, now under General Humphreys,t and Gregg's division of 
 cavalry, and its execution was begun on the 5th of February. 
 For several days preceding that date, a heavy bombardment 
 was kept up from aU the batteries before Petersburg, for the 
 purpose of engaging the enemy's attention. The designated 
 troops then moved out — Gregg's division taking the advance 
 by the Jerusalem plankroad to Eeams' Station, and masking 
 the movements of the infantry. The plan of operations con- 
 templated that the Second Corps should move directly on the 
 right of the Confederate intrenched line at Hatcher's Eun, 
 while the Fifth marched around its right. 
 
 the fruits of my victory, I felt compelled to order a withdrawal rather than 
 risk a disaster by awaiting attack in the morning only partially prepared." 
 —Hancock : Report of Operations on the Boydton Plankroad. 
 
 * " The Confederate General Heth stated to me that they remained all 
 right in the position they held when the fighting ceased on the evening of the 
 87th, and during the night massed fifteen thousand infantry, and Hampton's 
 cavalry, with which they intended to have advanced upon us at daylight of 
 the 28th."— Private Letter from General Hancock. 
 
 t General Hancock had some time before been ordered North to raise the 
 new First Corps, and he never returned to his old command. 
 
648 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 From Reams' Station tlie cavalry moved westward, carried 
 the crossing of Rowanty Creek after a brisk skirmish, and 
 marched rapidly on Dinwiddle Courthouse. The Fifth Corps 
 also passed to the west side of the creek and moved on its ap- 
 pointed route. Meantime Humphreys, with the Second and 
 Third divisions of the Second Corps, marched down the 
 Yaughan road to where it crosses Hatcher's Eun. The Con- 
 federate intrenchments on the opposite bank were not strongly 
 manned ; the stream was, however, so obstructed that the 
 cavalry were driven back in an attempt to cross it ; but De 
 Trobriand's brigade easily carried the passage with a skirmish 
 line. Before reaching Hatcher's Run, Humphrey's second 
 division under General Smythe was turned abruptly to the 
 right on a path leading northeasterly towards Armstrong's 
 Mill. Advancing about three-fourths of a mile, the enemy 
 was found intrenched in strong force, and nothing was done 
 save to form connection between the two divisions of the 
 Second Corps. In the afternoon the Confederates made a 
 furious assault on Smythe's position, endeavoring to turn his 
 right flank. This attempt was frustrated by the firmness of 
 his troops, aided by McAllister's brigade of Mott's division, 
 which held the extreme right. These maintained their ground 
 with the utmost stubbornness and repulsed repeated attacks 
 that were continued till dark. 
 
 Next day the Fifth Corps, which had moved up the west 
 bank of Hatcher's Run, was brought into connection with the 
 Second Corps ; and Gregg's cavalry, which had, meanwhile, 
 returned from Dinwiddle, took position to cover the left of 
 the infantry. Warren then threw forward his left, under 
 Crawford, towards the Boydton plankroad. That officer 
 advanced as far as Dabney's, whence he drove a force of Con- 
 federates under General Pegram. But the Confederates, 
 having meanwhile found out where the exposed flank of this 
 turning column lay, put in practice the usual and always suc- 
 cessful tactics. A considerable force was sent by a detour by 
 the Vaughan road to take Crawford's division in the rear, and 
 cut off his retreat ; while at the same time they opened an 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 549 
 
 attack in front. This flanking force first fell upon Gregg's 
 cavalry, wliich was driven back to Hatcher's Bun. Such a 
 movement on the part of the enemy had been anticipated, 
 and to strengthen Crawford, Ayres' division was ordered up 
 to his support. But, while moving in column, that division 
 was attacked and driven back, and then Crawford's division 
 was repulsed in confusion and with heavy loss. Wheaton's 
 division of the Sixth Corps, which had also been sent 
 forward to re-enforce the left, only arrived in time to take 
 part in the general discomfiture. The Hne of retreat was 
 towards the position held by the Second Corps on Hatcher's 
 Run. The Confederates, elated with their easy victory, 
 followed up vigorously and dashed out into an open space in 
 front of that corps. Here, however, they were met by a 
 sharp fire from Humphrey's troops, who had intrenched 
 themselves, and the enemy ceasing the attack, hastily retired. 
 The Union loss in these operations was about two thousand, 
 of which the larger part fell on Crawford's division. The 
 Confederate loss is stated to have been near a thousand, and 
 included General John Pegram, who was killed. 
 
 The action of the 6th put an end to the contemplated 
 advance towards the Southside Railroad, and the only result 
 gained was to prolong the left of the Union line westward to 
 Hatcher's Run. 
 
 "Waeren's Operations on the Weldon Road. — After the 
 action of February, winter operations were confined to expe- 
 ditions for the purpose of crippling the Confederate lines of 
 supply. Of these operations, the most important and exten- 
 sive was that made by General Warren for the complete 
 destruction of the Weldon Railroad. This road, though the 
 Union hues were long ago planted across it, was still of con- 
 siderable service to the Confederates, who were able to use it 
 up to within a few miles of the Union position, and from the 
 point of stoppage suppHes were hauled by wagon. Warren's 
 expedition was to completely break up this line for a distance 
 of twenty- five miles southward. The force consisted of the 
 
550 CAJVIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Fifth Corps, Mott's division of the Second Corps, and Gregg's 
 mounted division. Setting out on the 7th of December, with 
 four days' rations, the troops moved southward, and that 
 night reached Nottoway. The raiboad- bridge over this 
 stream was destroyed by General Gregg. Next day the 
 march was renewed to Jewett's Station, to which point the 
 raih'oad-track was torn up from the Nottoway. The work of 
 destruction was resumed early on the morning of the 9th, by 
 forming line of battle on the railroad, each division destroying 
 all on its fi'ont, and then moving to the left alternately. A force 
 of the enemy was encountered, but was driven by Gregg 
 across the Meherrin Eiver. At Hicksford, on the south side 
 of this stream, the Confederates had three forts or batteries, 
 armed with artillery, and connected by rifle-pits, and manned 
 by a considerable body ; so that it was impracticable to force 
 a crossing at that point. As the attempt to turn the position 
 would occasion at least two days longer time than that for 
 which the expedition was provisioned, General Warren re- 
 solved to return. The railroad destruction was carried over 
 a distance of eighteen or twenty miles, and was very com- 
 plete. The return was made with the same success. The 
 entire distance travelled was about a hundred mUes in the 
 six days. The loss was trivial. 
 
 Subsequent occurrences during this period call for no special 
 mention. The army settled itself in winter-quarters to await 
 the season for the opening of the spring campaign. 
 
 VII. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS ON THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 
 
 Regarded as a whole, the operations I have brought to- 
 gether under the designation of the Siege of Petersburg, form 
 a fi'uitful study. From the extent of time they cover, the 
 energy ^vith which they were prosecuted, and the skilful man- 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 551 
 
 ner in which they were met by the defeuding army, they are 
 remarkable in the history of modern warfare. 
 
 The characteristic of these operations is the progressive 
 development of the intrenched Union line to the left. Start- 
 ing from the position directly east of Petersburg taken up 
 by the Ai-my of the Potomac on its first arrival in June, the 
 lines of contravallation were gradually extended south and 
 southwest of the town, till at last they stretched from the 
 Appomattox to Hatcher's Eun, a distance of fifteen miles. 
 
 This extension was less designed than accidental. It grew 
 out of a series of manoeuvres by the left, of which manoeuvres 
 the original purpose was in each case to turn the right of the 
 Confederate system of defences, and lay hold of the South- 
 side Kaih'oad. Criticism should, therefore, first be directed 
 to these operations regarded in the light of their original 
 intent, rather than from the point of view of the incidental 
 result arising therefrom. 
 
 In their most general relations, these operations are to 
 be looked upon as a swinging movement of the left pivot- 
 ing on the right. The intrenched lines before Petersburg 
 were strcjiigly held, and on these as a point d'appui, it was 
 attempted to throw the left against and around the Confed- 
 erate right. But these manoeuvres had several characteristics 
 that invariably robbed them of the success hoped from them : 
 the pivotal force was generally stronger than the body to 
 which was assigned the turning movement, and by reducing the 
 garrison of his defences to the minimum, Lee was able to ac- 
 cumulate on the menaced pomt a force sufficient to meet, and 
 almost always to repulse, the body threatening his communi- 
 cations. Moreover, these movements were invariably made 
 in extended lines, which had the inevitable result to expose a 
 flank. This system the enemy soon learnt so well, that his 
 invariable plan was to attack the flank as soon as it was ex- 
 posed. The region of country southwest of Petersburg in 
 which these operations were conducted was highly favorable 
 to the Confederates, being densely wooded, intersected with 
 Bwamps, and possessing few roads ; and they had a great ad- 
 
552 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 vantage m their minute knowledge of the topography of the 
 country, which was nearly terra incognita to the Union com- 
 mander. The success of the Confederate tactics was won- 
 derful ; each movement, saving that to the Weldon Railroad, 
 which was conducted on a different principle, ending in a 
 check, generally accompanied by one or more thousand pris- 
 oners. The aggregate of captures made by the enemy in these 
 successive swoops is astonishing. But notwithstanding the 
 many costly proofs received of the fatality attending these 
 unlimited extensions, the type of operation was adhered to 
 with a constancy only accountable on the supposition that the 
 Union commander was enamored of it. 
 
 These turning movements, though in each foiled as regards 
 their primal object, always resulted in a further prolongation 
 of the intrenched line to the left. It remains to ask, was this 
 extension of fi'ont a real gain ? The answer wiU depend on 
 whether it was a front of offence or defence. If of the latter, 
 it cannot be considered a gain, for in the part assigned the 
 Army of the Potomac it was nothing if not offensive. But 
 beyond the Weldon Railroad the extension to the left carried 
 Grant no nearer Lee's line of communications, the Southside 
 Raih-oad — in fact, rather away from it, for Lee, by thrusting 
 his right southward along the Boydton plankroad, caused the 
 Union intrenched line to rim in the contrary direction to that 
 of the Southside Railroad. It may indeed be said that the 
 prolongation of the Union line caused Lee to extend also, 
 which was, pari passu, to weaken himself. But it is doubtful 
 whether the advantage in this process was to the Union side. 
 Lee always took the risk of holding his works with a force 
 greatly inferior to that his antagonist was willing to employ : 
 so that, proportionately, Grant could cut loose no heavier a 
 turning column than with much shorter lines. 
 
 In the object General Grant had in view, which was the 
 capture of Petersburg, there would appear to be, theoretically, 
 two modes in which this might have been accompHshed. The 
 first is by a system of regular approaches from the points 
 most favorable. These were the site of Fort Sedgwick, and 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 55,q 
 
 the position held by BurusiJe at the time of the mine affair. 
 From these points two saps might have been run, and in the 
 course of a month, with well-led storming columns, there is 
 every likeUhood that the Confederate line might have been 
 carried. 
 
 The second method is more bold. It is to have aban- 
 doned for a time the attempt to hold the loug intrenched hnes 
 and the connections with the depot at City Point, and moved 
 out the whole army against Lee's railroad communications. 
 This would have compelled him to leave his defences and 
 fight a battle in the open field, or to have evacuated Peters- 
 burg and Eichniond. The immediate recovery of his railroad 
 communications would have been an absolute necessity to 
 Lee, for so bad was the conduct of the Confederate commis- 
 sariat and transport system that he was never able to accu- 
 mulate even one day's supplies ahead — a fact well known to 
 the Union commander. This line of action would have been 
 a realization of that cardinal principle in American warfare 
 which teaches that it should be the aim of the general on the 
 offensive to so threaten the enemy's vital Unes as to compel 
 him to fight for their recovery. General Grant's great pre- 
 ponderance in numbers would have made the contingency of 
 his being beaten in such a fight a very remote one. It is true 
 that this plan would not have been without hazard, and would 
 have demanded proportionate skiU and vigor in its execution ; 
 but if successful, it would have been decisive. 
 
 The proposed operation would have resembled the manoeu- 
 vre by which General Sherman compelled the evacuation of 
 Atlanta. That, also, was not without danger, though it is to 
 be remembered that Sherman's opponent was infinitely infe- 
 rior to the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia. 
 
654 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 VIII. 
 SHERIDAN'S OPERATIONS IN TEE VALLEY. 
 
 Before proceeding to recount the history of the final cam- 
 paign of the Army of the Potomac, it will be necessary to 
 describe briefly the summer and autumn operations in the 
 Shenandoah Valley, as they have an important bearing on the 
 events that are to follow. 
 
 In the relative situations of the contending armies in Vir- 
 ginia, the operations in the Shenandoah Valley had always 
 exercised a powerful influence on the main current of action. 
 From the peculiar geographical relations of that Valley in a 
 mihtary point of view, it was always open to a detached force 
 to make incursions across the frontier of the loyal States, 
 whether for the purpose of plunder or of a diversion in favor 
 of the main Confederate army, by a menace against Wash- 
 ington. At the same time, the line of the Blue Ridge per- 
 fectly covered its communications with Richmond and Lee's 
 army. From this circumstance, the Confederates had always 
 oeen able, with astonishingly small bodies of cavalry and in- 
 fantry, to retain a powerful Federal force for the protection 
 of the frontier of Maryland and Pennsylvania. In several 
 critical situations the Shenandoah column had, by vigorous 
 demonstrations, paralyzed the Army of the Potomac, by call- 
 ing away therefrom so considerable a force as to compel a 
 surcease of operations on the main line. 
 
 Belying on the oft-proved effect of such threats, Lee, as 
 soon as he found himself under beleaguerment at Petersburg, 
 nad detached the column of Early to menace the Federal 
 capital. It has already been seen that the result did not 
 correspond with his wishes ; for Grant, parting only with a 
 sufficiency of force to protect Washington, continued to hold 
 Lee with an unrelaxitig grip. 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 555 
 
 But although the direct object of the Confederate menace 
 had failed, it nevertheless met so considerable a measure of 
 success that even after Early had retired to the Valley of the 
 Shenandoah, he was there able to take up so threatening an 
 attitude that it was found impossible to return the Sixth and 
 Nineteenth corps to the Ai-my of the Potomac. No sooner 
 was this attempted, than Early was again across the border — 
 his cavalry penetrating Pennsylvania as far as the town of 
 Chambersburg, which they laid in ashes. Upon this, the 
 Sixth Corps, which had been retired to .Washington en 
 route for the James, was returned to Harper's Ferry, to 
 unite with the Nineteenth Corps and the Federal forces of 
 West Virginia in an effort to clear the VaUey of the Shenan- 
 doah. 
 
 The distribution of the Union force in the region of North- 
 ern and West Virginia, and along the frontier of the loyal 
 States, was at this time as Httle conformable to miHtary prin- 
 ciples as it had been in the worst period of 1862. Washington 
 and Baltimore, and the country adjacent, formed the Depart- 
 ment of Washington ; Eastern and Central Pennsylvania and 
 Northern Maryland, the Department of the Susquehamia ; 
 Northwestern Virginia and Western Pennsylvania, the Depart- 
 ment of West Virginia ; and the region of the Shenandoah, and 
 eastward to the Bull Eun Mountains, the Middle Department. 
 These several mihtary baihwicks were under control of inde- 
 pendent military commanders, whose petty jealousies and 
 want of harmony of action enabled the Confederates, with a 
 force ridiculously inferior, to pluck at any time cheap laurels. 
 
 Happily the conduct of the war was now under one military 
 head, so that General Grant could at will end this costly and 
 disgraceful poHcy. The events of July showed the urgent 
 need of unity of command in Northern Virginia, and the Heu- 
 tenant-general, in August, consolidated these four depart- 
 ments into one, named the Middle Mihtary Division, under 
 General Hunter. That officer, however, before entering on 
 the proposed campaign, expressed a willingness to be re- 
 lieved, and General P. H. Sheridan, who had been transferred 
 
556 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 from the Army of the Potomac to the command of the forces 
 in the field under Hunter, was appointed in his stead. The 
 selection was a fortunate one. An excellent strategist, of 
 sound military views, and a wary, enterprising, and aggres- 
 sive temper, General Sheridan was of all others the man 
 best fitted for the peculiar command intrusted to him. To 
 the column of active operation under his command, consist- 
 ing of the Sixth and Niaeteenth corps and the infantry and 
 cavalry of West Virginia, under Generals Crook and Averill, 
 were added two divisions of cavaby from the Army of the 
 Potomac, under Torbert and Wilson. This gave him an 
 effective in the field of forty thousand men, whereof ten 
 thousand consisted of excellent cavalry — an arm for the use 
 of which the Shenandoah region affords a fine field. 
 
 General Sheridan was appointed to the command on the 7th 
 of August, and his operations during that month and the fore 
 part of September were mainly confined to manoeuvres hav- 
 ing for their object to prevent the Confederates from gaining 
 the rich harvests of the Shenandoah Valley. But after once 
 or twice driving Early southward to Strasburg, he each time 
 returned on his path towards Harper's Ferry. General Grant 
 had hesitated in allowing Sheridan to take a real initiative, 
 as defeat would lay open to the enemy the States of Maryland 
 and Pennsylvania before another army could be interposed to 
 check him. Finding, however, while on a personal visit to 
 General Sheridan, in the month of September, that that ofiicer 
 expressed great confidence of success, he authorized him to 
 attack. 
 
 At this time the Confederate force held the west bank of 
 Opequan Creek, covering Winchester; and the Union force 
 lay in front of BerryvUle, twenty miles south of Harper's 
 Ferry. The situation of the opposing armies was pecuHar : 
 each threatened the communications of the other, and either 
 could bring on a battle at any time. 
 
 It would appear that General Early had designed assuming 
 the offensive; for, leaving one division of infantry and Fitz 
 Hugh Lee's cavalry to cover Winchester, he had thrown the 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 557 
 
 hvXk of his army well forward by his left to Bunker Hill, twelve 
 miles north of "Winchester. From this point he, on the 18th, 
 advanced a reconnoitring force as far as Martinsburg, twelve 
 miles further to the north. Sheridan, whose position at Berry- 
 ville was twelve miles east of Winchester, being well content 
 with his antagonist's manoeuvre, advanced towards Winches- 
 ter early on the morning of the 19th, expecting to catch his 
 opponent va. flagrante delicto. 
 
 Wilson's cavahy division, having the advance on the Win- 
 chester and Berryville turnpike, at dawn carried the Confed- 
 erate intrenched skirmish line on the west bank of the Ope- 
 quan. This stream runs northward at a distance of four miles 
 east of Winchester. The way being thus opened, the infantry 
 column, the Sixth Corps in the van, crossed at the ford and 
 took position within two miles of Winchester. The direction 
 of Sheridan's advance brought his attack full upon Early's 
 isolated right, which, but for a vexatious delay, might readily 
 have been overwhelmed, while the main Confederate force 
 was still ten miles off at Bunker Hill. This delay, which 
 consumed two hours in the march of the Nineteenth Corps, 
 was caused by the obstruction of the Winchester and Berry- 
 ville turnpike by the wagon-trains of the Sixth Corps and 
 of Wilson's cavalry division. This delay, which was much 
 regretted by Gen. Emory, enabled Early to hurry his force 
 southward from Bunker Hill in time to meet the attack. 
 Sheridan formed his hue of battle with the Sixth Corps on 
 the left, covered on that flank by Wilson's cavalry division, 
 the Nineteenth Corps in the centre, and the Kanawha in- 
 fantry on the right. The latter flank was covered by Merritt's 
 division of cavalry. Averill's division of cavaby, which had 
 pressed down on the retreating Confederates from the dii-ec- 
 tion of Bunker Hill, succeeded in closing in on the Union 
 right. This, therefore, brought two powerful divisions of 
 horse on the right of the Federal line, which had a develop- 
 ment of about four miles, enveloping Winchester from the 
 north and east. Early's left rested on a series of detached 
 and fortified hills to the northwest of the town. It is due to 
 
558 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 state that there was a great disparity in the numbers engaged 
 — Early's force consisting of eight thousand five hundred mus- 
 kets and three thousand sabres,* while Sheridan's strength 
 was thrice that of the aggregate Confederate force. 
 
 Sheridan's preponderance in horse enabled him to extend 
 far beyond and overlap the Confederate left, and when, after 
 several hours of indecisive fighting between the infantry, a 
 general advance was, at four p. m., made by the whole line, 
 the cavalry, by an impetuous charge, carried the fortified 
 heights : the Confederates, pressed heavily in front by the 
 infantry, and on the right by Wilson's cavalry, broke in con- 
 fusion, retiring from the field and through Winchester, with 
 the Union forces in pursuit. Night, however, prevented Sher- 
 idan from following up the victory, among the trophies of 
 which were two thousand five hundred prisoners, five pieces 
 of artillery, and nine battle-flags. Among the Confederate 
 officers killed were Generals Kodes and Godwin. The Union 
 loss was also severe, and included that intrepid soldier. Gen- 
 eral D. A. Russell (commanding a division of the Sixth Corps), 
 who was killed. 
 
 After his defeat at Winchester, Early did not pause in his 
 southward retreat till he reached Fisher's Hill, near Stras- 
 burg, thirty miles south of Wincliester. This is a. very defen- 
 sible position, commanding the deboucJie of the narrow Stras- 
 burg valley between the north fork of the Shenandoah Eiver 
 and the North Mountain. On these obstacles Early rested 
 
 * The authority for this statement of the Confederate force, is a letter written 
 by General Early from Havana, and published in December, 1865. In this 
 letter that officer says: "At the battle of Winchester, or Opequan, as it is 
 called by General Grant, my effective strength was about eight thousand five 
 hundred muskets, three battalions of artillery, and less than three thousand 
 cavalry.'* 
 
 The Confederate cavalry of the Valley, consisting of two divisions imder Fitz 
 Hugh Lee and Lomax, was at this time in a miserable condition, materially 
 and morally. " Our horses," says a letter from a Confederate officer of this 
 force, " had been fed on nothing but hay for some time, and were quite weak ; 
 and want of discipline had greatly demoralized the men." 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 559 
 
 his flank. In front of this position Sheridan arrived on the 
 morning of the 22d, and formed his force for a direct attack, 
 while he sent Torbert with two divisions of cavah-y by the 
 parallel Luray valley, to gain New Market, twenty miles in 
 Early's rear. After mucli manoeuvring, and several ineffectual 
 efforts to force the position, an attack of cavalry was made 
 from the right. Under cover of this mask a corps of infantry 
 was moved to that flank, and by an impetuous assault carried 
 the Confederate left resting on the North Mountain. A gen- 
 eral attack in front then disrupted Early's whole line, and the 
 Confederates retired in great disorder, leaving behind sixteen 
 pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners. 
 
 The success at Fisher's Hill was greatly influenced by the 
 fact that at the time the attack was made. Early was about 
 retiring from the position, owing to his fears of an irruption 
 on his line of communications by the Union cavalry column 
 moving through Luray valley. This fear was, however, ground- 
 less ; for this powerful body was held in check all day by a 
 much inferior force of Confederate cavalry at Milford.* 
 
 Early's retreat was not stayed until he reached the lower 
 passes of the Blue Eidge, whither he retired M'ith a loss of 
 half his army. Sheridan, after pushing the pursuit as far as 
 Staunton, and operating destructively against the Virginia 
 Central Eailroad, returned and took position behind Cedar 
 Creek near Strasburg. Previously to abandoning the country 
 
 * The defence at tliis point was made by a small division of Confederate 
 cavalry under General Wickliam, and an oflficer of that command thus writes 
 concerning the affair of the 22d : 
 
 " At Milford, with such fortifications as we could throw up, we fought all 
 day Thursday (the 22d). At one time Torbert flanked us with three regiments. 
 We did not allow this to stampede us like the army at Fisher's Hill ; but Col- 
 onel Mumford, withdrawing several squadrons from the centre under a galling 
 fire, went over to the right, and by resorting to a little strategy, repulsed the 
 flanking column and restored our lines. At night Torbert retired, declaring 
 that our position was impregnable. Some idea can be formed of the value of 
 this victory when it is known that, bad we run off", it would liave let Torbert 
 into Newmarket twelve hours before Early could have gotten back there with 
 his army. This must have resulted in the annihilation of the latter beyond a 
 possibility of a doubt." 
 
560 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 south of Strasburg, it was laid waste bj the destruction of all 
 barns, grain, forage, farming implements, and mills. The 
 desolation of the Palatinate by Turenne was not more com- 
 plete.* 
 
 On the withdrawal of Sheridan, Early, after a brief respite, 
 and being re-enforced by Kershaw's division of infantry and 
 six hundred cavalry from Lee's army, again marched north- 
 ward down the Valley, and once more ensconced himself at 
 Fisher's Hill. Sheridan continued to hold position on the 
 north bank of Cedar Creek. Nothing more important than 
 cavalry combats, mostly favorable to the Federal arms, took 
 place, until the 19th of October, when Early assumed a bold 
 offensive that was near giving him a victory as complete as 
 the defeat he had suffered. 
 
 * General Sheridan's dispatcli reciting the destruction of the Shenandoah 
 Valley is in the following words : " In moving back to this point, the whole coun- 
 try, from the Blue Ridge to the North Mountain, has been made entirely unten- 
 able for a rebel army. I have destroyed over two thousand barns filled ^^dth 
 wheat and hay and farming implements ; over seventy mills filled with flour and 
 wheat ; have driven in front of the army over four thousand head of stock, and 
 have killed and issued to the troops not less than three thousand sheep. Tliia 
 destruction embraces the Luray valley and the Little Fort valley, as well as the 
 main valley." This dread bulletin recites acts some of which are indefensible. 
 The destruction of the crops, provision, and forage was allowable ; for this 
 deprived the enemy of immediate subsistence, and operated to the end to in- 
 duce him to surrender. But the burning of the mills and farming implements 
 cannot be justified, for that was to inflict vengeance upon the country for 
 many years to come. It may indeed be said that the desolation of the Shenan- 
 doah Valley was a special measure designed to cover the frontier of the loyal 
 States from invasion ; but this, though plausible, is not a suflBcient reason. 
 I have cited above the destruction of the Palatinate, and the case is quite in 
 point, both in respect to the act itself and the verdict history will pronounce 
 thereon. " When," says a legal writer of the highest authority, " the French 
 armies desolated with fire and sword the Palatinate in 1674, and again in 
 1689, there was a general outcry throughout Europe against such a mode of 
 carrying on war ; and when the French minister Louvois alleged that the 
 object in view was to cover the French frontier against the invasion of the 
 enemy, the advantage which France derived from the act was universally held 
 to be inadequate to the suflering inflicted, and the act itself to be therefore 
 unjustifiable." — Twiss : Law of Nations, vol. i., p. 125. See also Vattel, L. iii., 
 e. 9, g 166. 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG. 561 
 
 At this time the Union force was stationed as follows : the 
 infantry line ran along the east bank of Cedar Creek behind 
 intrenchments drawn on rising and rolling ground — Crook's 
 (Eighth) corps on the left ; Emory's (Nineteenth) in the cen- 
 tre, and the Sixth Corps, for the time under Kicketts, on the 
 right. The latter corps was posted somewhat in rear and in 
 reserve. The cavalry divisions of Custer and Merritt guarded 
 the right flank ; that of Averill (at this time under Powell) 
 guarded the left, and picketed the whole line of the North Fork 
 of the Shenandoah from Cedar Creek to Front Koyal. The 
 army was, at this time, temporarily under the command of 
 General Wright — Sheridan being absent at Washington. 
 
 The position held by the Union force was too formidable to 
 invite open attack, and Early's only opportunity was to make 
 a surprise. This that officer now determined on, and its exe- 
 cution was begun during the night of the 18-1 9th October. 
 Soon after midnight. Early, having made his dispositions at 
 Fisher's Hill, moved forward in demonstrations against the 
 Union right, whence the sounds of musketry announced a 
 nght on the picket-line. But this was merely a feint — the real 
 attack was to fall on the left. One column was marched 
 southeasterly from Strasburg, a short distance along the Ma- 
 nassas Gap Eailroad, so as to pass beyond the furthest de- 
 velopment of the Union left flank, while another massed 
 silently behind the picket-line for a direct attack. The flank- 
 ing column then turned northerly on a path that crosses the 
 North Fork of the Shenandoah, by a ford about a mile to the 
 east of the junction of Cedar Creek with that stream. Before 
 daw-n it was across the ford, and being favored by a heavy 
 fog, had attained, unperceived, the rear of the left flank of the 
 Union force, formed by Crook's corps. This position gained, 
 the Confederates closed in upon and captured the Union 
 pickets, and rushed into the camp — the troops awaking 
 only to find themselves prisoners. To rally the men in their 
 bewilderment was impossible, and Crook's corps, being thor- 
 oughly broken up, fled in disorder, leaving many guns in the 
 
 hands of the enemy. 
 
 36 
 
5G2 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 As soon aa this flank attack was developed, Early, with liis 
 other column, eraergcd from behind the hills west of Cedai 
 Creek, and crossing that stream, struck directly the troops on 
 the right of Crook. This served to complete the disaster, and 
 the whole Union left and centre became a confused mass, 
 against which the Confederates directed the captured artillery 
 (eighteen guns), while the flanking force swept forward to the 
 main turnpike. 
 
 Such was the scene on which the light of day dawned. 
 The only force not yet involved in the enemy's onset was the 
 Sixth Corps, which by its position was somewhat in rear. 
 With this General Ricketts quickly executed a change of front, 
 throwing it forward at right angles to its former position, 
 and firmly withstood the enemy's shock. Its chief service 
 was, however, to cover the general retreat which Wright now 
 ordered, as the only practicable means of reuniting his force. 
 TJiis was executed with such order as might be under the 
 circumstances, and as the enemy pressed the left most vigor- 
 ously, wedging in as ttiough in the endeavor to cut off the 
 Union force from its line of retreat to Winchester, the cavalry 
 divisions of Merritt and Custer were transferred to that flank. 
 At length, when Middletown, the first village north of Stras- 
 burg and about five miles from that place, was reached, line 
 of battle was formed and a stand made to dispute the further 
 advance of the enemy. But it was obvious that there was 
 still too little cohesion in the mass, and as the Confederates 
 threatened to overlap the left flank, the Union line again fell 
 back, and the enemy gained Middletown. Now, however, the 
 pursuit began to lose its vigor, and, at the first good position 
 between Middletown and Newtown, Wright was able to rally 
 and reform the trooj)S, form a compact line, and prepare either 
 to resist further attack or himself resume the offensive. 
 
 It was at this time, about half-past ten A. m., that General 
 Sheridan arrived upon the field from Winchester, where he had 
 slept the previous night. Hearing the distant sounds of battle 
 Tolling up from the south, Sheridan rode post to the front, 
 v^liere arriving, his electric manner had on the troops a very 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURQ. 5G3 
 
 inspiriting effect.* General Wright had already brought order 
 out of confusion and made dispositions for attack. Tlie-se were 
 left unchanged by Sheridan, except that Custer's cavfilry 
 division was transferred to its place on the right flank. A 
 counter-charge was begun at three o'clock in the afternoon. 
 Notwithstanding the success of the morning, or rather by rea- 
 son of that success conjoined with bad discipline, the Confed- 
 erates were at this time in a very unfit moral condition to resist 
 attack, for a large part of Early's force, in the intoxication of 
 success, had abandoned their colors and taken to plundering 
 the abandoned Federal camps.t The refluent wave was as 
 resistless as the Confederate surge had been ; the enemy was 
 driven out of Middletown and beyond, and pressed upon back 
 to Cedar Creek. The retreat soon became a rout, in which the 
 Confederates abandoned much material. The Union infantry 
 halted %vithin their old camps ; but the cavahy, forcing the 
 passage of Cedar Creek, hung on the flanks and rear of the 
 enemy and followed beyond Strasburg till night put an end to 
 the pursuit. Early succeeded in halting his force for the 
 night at Fisher's Hill, and next morning continued his retreat 
 southward. In the pursuit all the captured guns were 
 
 * The dramatic incidents attending tlie arrival of Sheridan have perhaps 
 caused General Wright to receive less credit than he really deserves. The 
 disaster was over by the time Sheridan arrived ; a compact line of battle was 
 formed, and Wright was on the point of opening the oflfeiosive. Wright certainly 
 had not the style of doing things possessed by Sheridan, but no one who knows 
 the steady qualities of that officer's mind can doubt that he would have himself 
 retrieved whatever his troops had lost of honor. 
 
 f General Early, in an address made to his army subsequent to this action, 
 held the following language : " Had you remained steadfast to your duty and 
 your colors, the victory would have been one of the most brilliant and decisive 
 of the war. But many of you, including some commissioned officers, yielding 
 to a disgraceful propensity for plunder, deserted your colors to appropriate to 
 yourselves the abandoned property of the enemy ; and subsequently, those 
 who had previously remained at their posts, seeing their ranks thinned by the 
 absence of the plunderers, when the enemy, late in the afternoon, with his 
 shattered columns, made but a feeble effort to retrieve the fortunes of the day 
 yielded to a needless panic, and fled the field in confusion, thereby convertmg 
 a splendid victory into a disaster." 
 
564 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AEMT OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 retaken and twenty-three in addition. The captures included, 
 besides, near fifteen hundred prisoners, which fully made up 
 for those lost by the Union force in the morning. 
 
 With this defeat of Early, all operations of moment in the 
 Valley of the Shenandoah forever ended. The complete 
 destruction of forage in this region rendered it impossible for 
 the Confederates to sustain there any considerable body of 
 cavalry. The prestige won by Sheridan enabled General 
 Grant to recall the Sixth Corps to the Army of the Potomac, 
 and to take away two of Sheridan's mounted divisions. Soon 
 afterwards most of Early's infantry returned to rejoin the 
 main Confederate force at Petersburg. 
 
 In this stirring campaign of two months' duration, Sheri- 
 dan's operations, characterized by great vigor, were crowned 
 with complete success. It is indeed to be borne in mind that 
 the credit awarded to warhke exploits is to be measured by 
 the obstacles overcome, and that Sheridan certainly had a 
 very great preponderance of force. Nevertheless, the clean- 
 ness with which the work was done, the energy of the execu- 
 tion, the completeness of the solution of a long-time vexatious 
 problem, are all very admirable. Sheridan's operations were 
 characterized not so much, as has been supposed, by any 
 originaHty of method, as by a just appreciation of the proper 
 manner of combining the two arms of infantry and cavalry. 
 He constantly used his powerful body of horse, which under 
 his disciphned hand attained a high degi-ee of perfection, as 
 an impenetrable mask behind which he screened the execution 
 of manoeuvres of infantry columns hurled with a weighty mo- 
 mentum on one of the enemy's flanks. 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. ggg 
 
 xni. 
 THE FINAL ClMPAiaN 
 
 March— April 9, 1865. 
 
 THE CIRCLE OF THE HUNT. 
 
 The time lias now come when it is no longer possible to 
 consider the Army of the Potomac apart from that colossal 
 combination of force that, pressing from aU sides on the 
 structure of the Confederacy, finally bore it to the ground. 
 
 That this army cannot rightly be viewed independently of 
 the co-operative forces throughout the general theatre of war, is 
 made apparent by the single fact that during the winter months 
 succeeding the close of the campaign of 1864, so far from its 
 being any longer a desirable object to capture Petersburg and 
 Richmond, Grant's efforts were mainly directed to restraining 
 the Confederates from voluntarily giving up to him those 
 strongholds that, having been for four years the prize so eagerly 
 coveted, were now the possession most of all to be shunned. 
 How this was and must have been so, wiU become manifest 
 from a brief glance at the relations which the gigantic vigor 
 of Sherman had established between his own army and the 
 opposing forces in Virginia. 
 
 The communications on which Lee's army depended, not 
 only for the maintenance of its interior lines with the remain- 
 ing forces of the Confederacy in the Southwest, but for its 
 supplies of food and ammunition, ran through the Carolinas 
 
566 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 and the seaboard States and radiated over the great produc- 
 tive territory of the central zone. 
 
 By the capture of Atlanta, gained in the midsummer of 
 1864, Sherman grasped one of the main ganglia of the South- 
 ern railroad system. This was a loss terrible indeed to the 
 Confederates, and narrowing the sphere of their activit}'" and 
 their means of intercommunication, yet not so deadly but that 
 they might still, by the judicious use of such force as they 
 had, oppose a menacing fi'ont and greatly prolong the war. 
 
 But whatever opportunity was then afforded the Confeder- 
 ates of thus acting, was thrown away, with that species of mad- 
 ness with which the gods are said to inspire those whom they 
 would destroy, when Hood, at this time in command of the 
 Confederate army of the West, quitting his proper defensive, 
 was directed to make his ill-judged and disastrous aggressive 
 movement into Tennessee. What would have been a thorn 
 in the side of an inferior man, was to Sherman an oppor- 
 tunity, and with one of those inspirations such as are possible 
 only to military minds of the first order, he determined to 
 offer a counter to Hood's initiative by laying hold of and 
 advancing along those interior lines voluntarily abandoned to 
 him by his antagonist. Sherman's march assumes the aspect 
 of a great swinging movement, the pivot of which was the 
 army before Petersburg. But it was a swinging movement 
 described on a radius of half a continent — one of those colossal 
 enterprises whereof there are few examples in military his- 
 tory, and which fill up tlie measure of the imagination with 
 the shapes of all that is vast and grandiose in war. 
 
 From Atlanta Sherman advanced, destroying the Southern 
 railroads, foundries, mills, workshops, and warehouses, to 
 Savannah on the sea. That city was reached the 21st of De- 
 cember, after a march of above three hundred miles, in four- 
 and-twenty days. It was now open to General Grant to unite 
 Sherman's army with the army before Petersburg either by 
 water or by an advance of Sherman through the seaboard 
 States. The latter course was determined on as the more 
 decisive in its character, and its execution begun on the 1st 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIQN. 5O7 
 
 of February, 1865, when Slierman crossed the Savannah into 
 South Carolina. 
 
 When Hood's crushing defeat by Thomas before Nashville 
 had made an end of the campaign that Mr. Davis had pro- 
 jected as the means of throwing Slierman back out of Georgia 
 in a "Moscow retreat," and when it was seen that Sherman, 
 heading his columns northward towards Yirginia, approached 
 like an irresistible fate, sweeping a wide swathe of desolation 
 through the centre of the South, the Eichmond authorities, 
 awaking to a sense of their fatal folly and goaded by the 
 clamors of an alarmed and frenzied people, sought a measure 
 of amelioration for the shattered fortunes of the Confederacy 
 by the reappointment of General Johnston to the command 
 of the forces opposing Sherman. 
 
 But it was already too late. Johnston did all he could ; 
 and all he did was judicious : but he could only stay for a 
 time a result seen to be inevitable. Withdrawing the garri- 
 sons of the seaboard cities, and uniting thereto the corps 
 lately under Beauregard and the remnants of Hood's army, 
 which with much address he succeeded in bringing to a junc- 
 tion with the troops confronting Sherman, he prepared to 
 oppose such a resistance as was possible to the onward march 
 of his formidable antagonist, Johnston had on paper a nu- 
 merous army ; but, in effect, it was not, all told, above twenty 
 thousand strong ; while the troops were in such condition of 
 'morale as may be imagined of men who had alread}^ been 
 driven through two States into the forests of North Carolina. 
 In this state of facts it was vain for Johnston to attempt an 
 aggressive policy, unless indeed he should find an opportunity 
 of striking a blow at a detached fragment. But his antagonist 
 carried too much art into his dispositions of his columns of 
 march to present such an opening, and the one stroke at Beu- 
 tonville (a partial and unimportant success), was all the of^-n- 
 sive essayed by Johnston. 
 
 The Confederate commander was, moreover, in a tryiug 
 dilemma : in order to keep open the Danville line, by which a 
 junction of the forces of Lee and Johnston might be made, it 
 
568 CAMPAIGNS OF TEE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 was necessary for him to constantly refuse his left and manoeu- 
 vre by his right. But this was to uncover the path by which 
 Sherman might advance to unite with Grant. As this result, 
 however, could not long be prevented, Johnston chose the 
 former course and fell back in the direction of Raleigh, which 
 was a judicious measure, since a junction of the two Con- 
 federate armies was now the governing desideratum. Press- 
 ing forward his advance, Sherman, the 23d of March, reached 
 Goldsborough, North Carohna, where he united with the 
 Federal columns that had moved out from Newbern and Wil- 
 mington. His course to Petersburg was then clear — the dis- 
 tance a hundred and fifty miles in a northerly direction. No 
 immediate start, however, was made from Goldsborough, as 
 well for the reason that his army had to be refitted as that 
 General Grant feared if Sherman should then move any fur- 
 ther on liis way, Lee would abandon Petersburg and Rich- 
 mond. This, as I have already intimated, was the thing now 
 least desired, for the conditions were not such as to permit of 
 an effective pursuit, and Grant, like Phocion, desired to have 
 an army fitted for a long race — a race, the goal of which was 
 the destruction of his adversary. 
 
 While fi'om the direction of the south Sherman thus drew 
 from the mountains to the sea a wall of bayonets that im- 
 prisoned the enemy between himself and the Army of the 
 Potomac, Grant directed Sheridan to make a new raid, with a 
 view to severing all the remaining communications of the Con- 
 federates — a necessary step in that plan of encircling and en- 
 closing Lee which the lieutenant-general had devised as the 
 prehminary to his premeditated blow. 
 
 Moving from Winchester the 27th of February, Sheridan 
 galloped up the Yalley of Virginia. With his superb column 
 of ten thousand sabres, he little recked of any enemy he was 
 likely to encounter. Early, indeed, still hovered about the 
 Valley that had been so fatal to him ; but what of force re- 
 mained with him was but the shreds and patches of an army, 
 numbering, perhaps, twenty-five hundred men. Foiling by his 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 569 
 
 rapid advance an attempt to destroy the bridge over tlie Mid- 
 dle Fork of the Shenandoah at Mount Crawford, Sheridan en- 
 tered Staunton the 2d of March and then moved to Waynes- 
 boro, where Early had taken position to dispute the dehouche 
 of the Blue Eidge. Charging upon this scratch of an army 
 without taking the trouble of making a reconnoissance even, 
 Sheridan broke it in pieces, capturing two-thirds of it, with 
 most of its artillery trains and colors. Then, defihng by the 
 passes of the Blue Kidge, he stnick Charlottesville, where he 
 remained two days, destroying the railroa<l towards Richmond 
 and Lynchburg, including the two large bridges over the 
 north and south forks of the Eivanna River. He had now 
 moved so far away that it was necessary for him to await the 
 arrival of his trains. 
 
 Sheridan's instructions prescribed that he should gain 
 Lyjichburg on the south bank of the James. From that point 
 he was to effectually break up those main branches of Lee's 
 communications, the Lynchburg Raikoad and James River 
 Canal, after which he was to strike southward through Vir- 
 ginia to the Westward of Danville and join Sherman. But 
 while awaiting at Charlottesville the arrival of his trains, the 
 James River became so swollen by heavy rains as to be im- 
 passable. Nowise disconcerted by this untoward fortune, 
 but with an admn-able fertility of resource, he determined 
 to abandon the purpose of capturing Lynchbm'g, and in 
 the mean time to operate against the canal, and then, if 
 possible, effect a crossing of the James between Lynchburg 
 and Richmond. The former design was very completely car- 
 ried out, but he was unable to pass the James, as the Con- 
 federates destroyed all the bridges. 
 
 Thus cabined and confined, there was for Sheridan but one 
 alternative, either to go back whence he had come, or strike 
 a base at "^^Tiite House and thence effect a junction Avith 
 the army before Petersburg. With characteristic daring 
 he adopted the latter course, and this resolve, though it 
 baulked Grant's original intent, led to a result every way 
 better. 
 
570 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARI«f OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 After complfitiiig the destruction of the canal, he coucon- 
 trated his whole force at Columbia, and thence rounding the 
 left of Lee's army, and putting the Pamunkey between him 
 and the Confederate force, Sheridan proceeded towards the 
 York, breaking up en route all the railroad tracks and bridges. 
 The 19th of March he reached AVhite House, whither an in- 
 fantry force and supplies had been forwarded to him. After 
 resting and refitting here, Sheridan, on the 24th, moved across 
 the Peninsula to James River, and passing to the south bank 
 at Jones' Landing, he, two days afterwards, joined the army 
 before Petersburg. 
 
 The cu'cle of the hunt was now complete. The leashed 
 dogs of war lay ready for the spring, whenever the meditative 
 soldier who sat silent in his wooden hut at City Point should 
 sound the " laissez aUer^ 
 
 That the campaign about to be opened could have but one 
 result — to wit, the destruction of the Confederate armies — was 
 not now doubtful ; and discerning men at the South jjlainly 
 read the omens of doom. It was not alone that an over- 
 whelming weight of physical power, represented by a million 
 men in arms, threatened to overwhelm the insurgent armies, 
 or that the great extent of territory overrun by the Union 
 forces had torn asunder the fabric of the Confederacy ; but 
 secret causes of disturbance in the moral order had corrupted 
 the life-blood of the revolt. It is such metaphysical influ- 
 ences that govern the issues of war — influences httle under- 
 stood by the superficial annalists who attempt to explain by 
 material causes the secrets of an art so vast, subtle, and com- 
 plex as to be almost beyond the reach of man's mind— influ- 
 ences, whose sovereign power was marked by the greatest of 
 commanders in the aphorism, that in war the moral is to the 
 physical as three to one. 
 
 When in a revolution the time arrives that the people sep- 
 arate themselves from the cause of their leaders, that cause 
 speedily falls to the ground. This was the pass to which the 
 Confederate States had come. It was not precisely that the 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN, 57 1 
 
 people of the South had ceased to desire the triumph of seces- 
 sion ; but they had ceased any longer to be (capable of those 
 efforts failing which success is out of the question. It will be 
 for the philosophical historian, unravelUng the intricate web 
 of cause and effect, to trace the reasons of this decline in the 
 moral energ}^ of the South : it is enough here to mark the re- 
 sult as it influenced the fortunes of the armies in the field. 
 
 General Grant, during the winter of 1864, expressed in a 
 strong figui-e the belief that the fighting population of the 
 Confederacy was exhausted. " They have," said he, " robbed 
 the cradle and the gi-ave." But this statement overshot the 
 reality. The South did not so much lack men as the men 
 lacked interest in the war. The conscription then became 
 odious, and evasion universal, whUe those who wished to es- 
 cape military service readily found those at home wilUng to 
 open their ranks, let them slip through, and close up behind 
 them. It finally came about that men enough to form three 
 armies of the strength of Lee's lay perdx, beyond the jDower 
 of recovery of the Richmond authorities. To this must be 
 added the fact that a prodigious number of Confederate troops 
 — probably as many as were in the ranks of both Lee and 
 Johnston — were, during the last eighteen months of the war, 
 kept out of the field by being retained as prisoners at the 
 North under a fixed determination 01 General Grant not to 
 exchange them — a measure that was certainly an effectual 
 agency in the lieutenant-general's avowed plan of " hammer- 
 ing continuously against the armed force of the enemy and 
 his resources until by mere attrition, if by no other way, 
 there should be nothing left to him." 
 
 While the conscription system had thus hopelessly broken 
 down, the collapse of the Confederate commissariat was 
 equally complete. And here, again, it was not that the South 
 lacked resources, for the granaries of that vast and fertile ter- 
 ritory bulged with great store of corn ; but mal-administra- 
 tion rendered these riches as vain as if the South had been a 
 Sahara. That great department of administrative service 
 charged with the feeding of the troops, was presided over by 
 
572 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 a man of such notorious ignorance and incompetence, that au- 
 thentic records show the armies in the field to have been half 
 the time bordering on starvation. The daily ration for the 
 army defending Petersburg, during all the last winter of the 
 war, was a pound of flour and a quarter of a pound of meat. 
 But even this so frequently failed that it was only the pro- 
 digious vigor of Lee that enabled the troops in the trenches 
 to receive even that meagre dole of food.* 
 
 If the moral spring of the insurrection had become thus re- 
 laxed, it is not wonderful that the armies also had sunk in 
 energy. The glory of arms at length ceased to support men 
 against sutferings, privations, and fatigues that, while hard to 
 bear in themselves, were unmitigated by any hope of a suc- 
 cessful issue. The consequence of this was soon seen in such 
 an increase of desertion that the two main armies of the Con- 
 federacy showed four men on their rolls to one in the ranks. 
 At the opening of the spring campaign. General Lee had, on 
 
 * General Johnston, soon after the close of the war, stated to me that he re- 
 garded these two causes — the condition of the Confederate commissariat and 
 the abuses of the conscription system— as amply adequate to accoimt for the 
 failure of the South. I shall here record a few of his pregnant observations on 
 both these subjects. " In regard to the raising of troops," said he, " that was 
 done in the worst possible manner — namely, by conscription, by the Confeder- 
 ate government. Instead of determining the number of troops wanted, and ap- 
 portioning to each State its proper quota, wholesale impressments were made 
 by the machinery of a central government. Each State had its own oflBcers 
 vrith which it could have raised the troops ; and being of the localities, they, 
 of course, knew every man and boy in the place, and avoidance or evasion 
 would have been difficult. But by the system adopted, this perfect agency was 
 not called into play at all. Finally, it resulted that it required as many men 
 to enforce the conscription as it was expected to raise by its operation. Then 
 ensued evasion : those who wished to shrink service, or aid others to do so, 
 opened their ranks, allowed them to slip through and close up behind. Sup- 
 plies, also, instead of being honestly raised, were impressed by a band of com- 
 missaries and quartermasters, who only paid one-half the market value. As 
 might have been expected, this was enough to prevent their getting any thing. 
 These they took by force, and did it with the greatest injustice. You can im- 
 agine what disorganization of labor and what discontent this produced. The 
 mismanagement of the Confederate executive in these two regards was enough 
 to ruin the cause." 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 573 
 
 paper, one hundred and sixty thousand men, but in reality 
 less than fifty thousand, from which, if there be deducted the 
 troops on detached duty, it will appear that he had forty 
 thousand men with which to defend forty miles of intrench- 
 ments. 
 
 These were the forlorn hope of the rebellion. Corralled 
 between the two great Union armies, in the restricted space 
 between the James and the Neuse and the Alleghanies and 
 the Atlantic, it was manifest that the end was near. It only 
 remains to show how in the last wrestle these men comported 
 themselves, and how when they at last broke down under a 
 burden too heavy to bear, the fabric of the revolt which they 
 had for four years upheld on their bayonets, fell with a crash 
 that resounded through the world. 
 
 n. 
 
 LEE'S INITIATIVE. 
 
 The glories of spring-tide that adorned the hills and vales 
 of beautiful Virginia, and made her woods vocal with the 
 song of birds, brought no vernal promise to the sad army of 
 wearied and half-famished men that lay in the trenches of 
 Petersburg. They knew that the sun that thawed the fi'ost 
 from the roads did but make paths on which the adversary, 
 with whom they could no longer hope to cope, would move 
 to their destruction. There was one consoHng reflection to 
 them, however : the end was near. And, after all their fatigues 
 and privations, even this was welcome. Yet it was an army 
 of high mettle and of great traditions, and it could not do 
 otherwise than prepare to go down with honor. 
 
 In the situation in which Lee found himself there was but 
 one course open to him whereby he might hope to prolong 
 the contest. This was to abandon the e£fort to defend Kich- 
 mond and retire to an interior line, either in the direction of 
 
574 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Lynchburg or Danville, where uniting with the forces of 
 Johnston he might, by maintaining a defensive system, cause 
 the Union army to undertake a long and costly campaign. 
 This would indeed have been to give up the Confederate capi- 
 tal, but with a re -enforcement of twenty thousand men Lee 
 could have shown that the capital was at his headquarters. 
 
 Now, waiving the ethical question of the rightfulness or 
 wrongfulness of the cause whereof Lee was the mihtary head, 
 it was manifestly his duty as a soldier to maintain the struggle 
 as long as possible. The turns of fortune in war are 
 infinitely various, and many an army has come out of a 
 seemingly desperate strait triumphant. A Southern writer 
 has indeed averred that Lee intended to surrender before 
 evacuating Richmond. If so, he was guilty of the murder of 
 every one of his soldiers that fell after that intent was formed. 
 But it is not by the standard of such men's pusillanimous 
 instincts that the soul of a great commander is to be judged. 
 Lee, beyond a doubt, never meant to surrender until he was 
 compelled to surrender. 
 
 It is now certain that at this time the Confederate com- 
 mander had fully resolved to adopt the course of evacuating 
 Petersburg and Richmond and effecting a junction with the 
 forces of Johnston on the Danville line. Preparations for the 
 intended movement were begun early in the month of March : 
 Johnston was to refuse his left if Sherman advanced ; flat- 
 boats were collected for bridging the affluents of the Roan- 
 oke ; rations were to be accumulated at Amelia Courthouse, 
 and the line of retreat and columns of march were arranged. 
 Before he could put this purpose into execution, however, it 
 was necessary for Lee to assume the offensive against Grant 
 — not so much in obedience to the rule of art that prescribes 
 a vigorous stroke of offence as the best mask for a withdrawal, 
 but for a special reason which it is important here to indicate 
 because it has not hitherto been understood. 
 
 In the plan of retreat which Lee had marked out for his 
 army he did not purpose moving by the north bank of the 
 Appomattox, but by the south side, which is much the shorter 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 575 
 
 line to Amelia Courthouse, wliicli was the point of concentra- 
 tion of his columns on the Danville raih'oad. The direct route 
 to that place is by what is known as the Cox road, which 
 leaves Petersburg above the Bojdton plankroad and runs 
 due west, following the line of the Appomattox. But by the 
 gradual extension of the left of the Army of the Potomac 
 towards the Boydton planki'oad, the flank of the Union line 
 approached so near the Cox road as to make Lee's withdrawal 
 thereby a very perilous operation. He resolved, therefore, 
 to strike a sudden blow, and to give this blow such a direc- 
 tion that it would be necessary for Grant to withdraw his 
 left, which would completely relieve Lee's proposed line of 
 retreat. This object he supposed would be best realized by 
 striking the contrary flank fi'om that on which he wished 
 the effect to be produced. Accordingl}^ he planned to break 
 through the right of the Union line hard by where that flank 
 rested on the Appomattox east of Petersburg. Special con- 
 siderations of a topographical character indicated Fort 
 Steadman as the most advantageous point of attack. 
 
 The project of assaulting the Union front at all was bold. 
 The Army of the Potomac lay ensconced in its lines of coi-- 
 travallation. A cordon of redoubts of a powerful profile an i 
 armed with the heaviest metal, studded this line. Infantry 
 parapets, amplj^ manned, stretched fi-om work to work. Cov- 
 ering the fronts of approach were labyrinthine acres of 
 abatis, while all the apphances of ditches, entanglements, and 
 dicvaux de /rise lent their aid to make defence sure and as- 
 sault folly. But plans in war are sometimes successful on 
 account of their very boldness ; and Lee's purpose was to 
 seize Fort Steadman and the neighboring works, crown the 
 commanding ground in rear of this part of the Federal line 
 and lay hold of the military railway to City Point. If Grant 
 turned to fight him in this position, he was prepared to receive 
 battle, but if Grant should make a detour toAvards City Point 
 to recover his communications, the Confederate commander 
 designed, instead of awaiting attack, to withdraw immediately. 
 In any event, Lee counted that the blow struck at Grant's 
 
576 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 right would cause the retirement of his left flank, where was 
 the greater accumulation of force, and that thus the Cox road 
 would be rendered entirely free. The morning of the 25tli of 
 March was appointed for the attack. It was to be made by 
 two divisions under Gordon ; but to render it as forcible as 
 possible, all the additional troops available (about twenty 
 thousand men) were disposed ready to support it. 
 
 The opj)osing lines were, at the locality of Fort Steadman, 
 very close — that work being on a considerable salient : so that 
 the interval was not above one hundred and fifty yards. This 
 part of the line was garnished by troops of the Ninth Corps. 
 In the gray dawn the Confederate column of attack, having 
 previously formed, moved out noiselessly from the works. 
 The space to be overpassed being not great, a rush of a few 
 moments brought the Confederates to the Union intrench- 
 ments, which must have been guarded with little vigilance ; 
 for Fort Steadman was surprised and taken by a coup de main. 
 Of the garrison of the Fort, which was the Fourteenth New 
 York foot-artillerists, many were taken prisoners and the rest 
 fled. The Third brigade of the First division of the Ninth 
 Corps met a similar fate. The guns of the captured redoubt 
 were immediately turned by the Confederates on the neigh- 
 boring works, and in consequence batteries Nine, Ten, and 
 Eleven, on its flanks, were abandoned by the Union troops and 
 occupied by the enemy. 
 
 Thus far the triumph ; but it was destined to be short- 
 lived. To rift open the system of Union works it was neces- 
 sary that the wedge thus entered should be driven home ; or, 
 in other words, it was needful that the storming-party should 
 be followed up and sustained by a powerful column to pass 
 beyond and seize the commanding crest in rear of the Federal 
 line. Till this was done nothing was gained ; for in the sys- 
 tem of fortification on which the Federal line was constructed, 
 a partial break in the line was not an irretrievable loss — each 
 work being so well commanded by those on its flanks that to 
 make any one point tenable by an enemy every thing on ita 
 right and left must be cleared. 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. r^^j 
 
 It is well known that there was great dereliction of duty on 
 the part of the supporting columns ; for Gordon's attack was 
 loft almost wholly unsupported, notwithstanding that Leo liad 
 massed in the vicinity all his available force. Those who had 
 gone forward then made a fecblo attempt against Fort Has- 
 call, the work next on the loft of Fort Steadman. They could, 
 however, make no impression on this ; and no sooner had 
 they rallied on Fort Steadman than they found themselves 
 not only subjected to a terrible artillery fire, but in turn as- 
 sailed by the troops of the Ninth Corps brought forward to 
 meet the emergency. The counter-assault was made by 
 Hartranft's division ; and it now needed little to determine 
 the Confederates to retire. Yet to withdraw was less easy 
 than it had been to advance, for the lines of retreat were so 
 covered by the cross-fire of artillery directed from all the ad- 
 jacent works that the Confederates found themselves corralled 
 in the narrow space between the two lines, and about two 
 thousand preferred to give themselves up as prisoners rather 
 than brave the deadly perils of the rain of fire. 
 
 The primal stroke had, indeed, been brilliant, but not being 
 pushed to a conclusion, it left no solid advantage to the ene- 
 my, while it entailed a loss that could be ill afi'orded by Lee. 
 This embraced not alone the captures above noted, but a 
 heavy sacrifice in killed and wounded — probably not less than 
 twenty-five hundred, which was the aggregate of the Union 
 casualties. 
 
 Nor was this affair unaccompanied by some positive mih- 
 tary advantages to the Union side. Employing that manoeu- 
 vi'e which in fencing is known as the riposte or parry and 
 thrust, General Meade threw forward the whole line of the 
 Sixth and Second corps, which were to the left of the Ninth, 
 and the troops succeeded in wresting from the Confederates 
 their strongly-intrenched picket-line, which gave ground that 
 was of value in the subsequent assaults. 
 
 Admirably as Lee's plan was laid, admirably as it was 
 adapted to effect the desired end of relieving the pressure upon 
 his right, the failure of the execution was most signal. This 
 
 %1 
 
578 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 is easy to account for. The Army of Northern Virginia was 
 no longer capable of the efforts required in carrying out such 
 an enterprise, and it must have been with a pang that Lee 
 felt that arm of strength, so long obedient to his will, fail now 
 to follow the motions of his spirit. 
 
 Ill 
 
 THE ARMIES UNLEASHED. 
 
 Lee's act of offence neither retarded nor precipitated the 
 catastrophe, for Grant haying forefixed the 29th of March 
 as the day on which he would open the campaign, held firmly 
 to his intent, pushing forward meanwhile his preparations for 
 the grand movement. 
 
 To exhibit in its details the plan of operations devised by 
 the lieutenant-general, I give, in the accompanying note, the 
 text of the order then drawn up.* It will be noted that in its 
 
 * " City Point, Va., March 24, 1865. 
 
 " GENEEAli : — On the 29tli instant the armies operating against Riclimond 
 will be moved by our left for the double purpose of turning the enemy out of 
 his present position around Petersburg, and to insure the success of the cavalry 
 under General Sheridan, which will start at the same time, in its efforts to 
 reach and destroy the Southside and Danville railroads. Two corps of the 
 Army of the Potomac will be moved at first in two columns, taking the two 
 roads crossing Hatcher's Run nearest where the present line held by us strikes 
 that stream, both moving towards Dinwiddle Courthouse. 
 
 " The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now under 
 General Davies, will move at the same time by the "Weldon road and the 
 Jerusalem plankroad, turning west from the latter before crossing the Notto- 
 way, and west with the whole column before reaching Stony Creek. General 
 Sheridan will then move independently, under other instructions which will 
 be given him. All dismounted cavalry belonging to the Army of the Potomac, 
 and the dismounted cavalry from the Middle Military Division not required for 
 guarding property belonging to their arm of service, will report to Brigadier- 
 General Benham, to be added to the defences of City Point. Major-Gen<.'ra] 
 Parke wiU be left in command of aU the army left for holding the lines about 
 
THE PINAL CAMPAIGN. 579 
 
 distinguishing features this phm was a repetition of that 
 which had so often been essayed by Grant. It repeated the 
 prevailing characteristic of a left turning column pivoting on 
 
 Petersburg and City Point, subject, of course, to orders from the commander of 
 the Army of the Potomac. The Ninth Army Corps will be left intact to hold 
 the present line of works, so long as the whole line now occupied by us is held. 
 If, however, the troops to the left of the Ninth Corps are withdrawn, then the 
 left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the jwsition held by the 
 army prior to the capture of the Weldon road. All troops to the left of the 
 Ninth Corps wiU be held in readiness to move at the shortest notice by such 
 route as may be designated when the order is given. 
 
 " General Ord will detach three divisions, two white and one colored, or so 
 much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for the present 
 left of the Army of the Potomac. In the absence of further orders, or until 
 further orders are given, the white divisions will follow the loft column of the 
 Army of the Potomac, and the colored division the right column. During the 
 movement, Major-General Weitzel will be left in command of all the forces re- 
 maining behind from the Army of the James. 
 
 " The movement of troops from the Army of the James will commence on 
 the night of the 21st instant. General Ord will leave behind the minimum 
 number of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the absence of the main army. 
 A cavalry expedition from General Ord's command will also be started from 
 Suffolk, to leave there on Saturday, the 1st of April, under Colonel Sunmer, for 
 the purpose of cutting the railroad about Hicksford. This, if accomplished, 
 will have to be a surprise, and therefore from three to five hundred men will be 
 sufficient. They should, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be 
 spared from Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavahry crosses 
 the Blackwater. The crossing should probably be at Uniten. Should Colonel 
 Stimner succeed in reaching the Weldon road, he will be instructed to do all 
 the damage possible to the triangle of roads between Hicksford, \Yeldon, and 
 Gaston. The railroad-bridge at Weldon being fitted up for the passage of car- 
 riages, it might be practicable to destroy any accumulation of supplies the ene- 
 my^may have collected south of the Roanoke. All the troops will move with 
 four days' rations in haversacks, and eight days' in wagons. To avoid as much 
 hauling as possible, and to give the Army of the James the same number of 
 days' supply with the Army of the Potomac, General Ord will direct liis com- 
 missary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered at the terminus 
 of the road to fiU up in passing. Sixty rounds of ammunition per man will be 
 taken in wagons, and as much grain as the transportation on hand will carry, 
 after taking the specified amount of other supplies. The densely wooded 
 country in which the army has to operate making the use of much artillery im- 
 practicable, the amoimt taken with the army will be reduced to six or eight 
 guns to each division, at the option of the army commanders. 
 
 " All necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operation may 
 
580 CAJIPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 the right, directed against the Confederate right flank, and 
 accompanied by a cavahy expedition to cut the Confederate 
 railway communications. 
 
 But, though in form this operation closely resembled more 
 than one previously attempted movement, there were several 
 provisions of the execution that caused it to dijffer materi- 
 ally fi'om these, and gave it a much surer promise of success. 
 Former moves had commonly embraced two efforts, each 
 necessarily weak, directed the one against the Confederate 
 left, on the north side of the James; the other against the 
 
 be commenced at once. The reserves of the Ninth Corps should be massed as 
 much as possible. Whilst I would not now order an unconditional attack on 
 the enemy's line by them, they should be ready, and should make the attack, if 
 the enemy weakens his line in their front, without waiting for orders. In case 
 they carry the line, then the whole of the Ninth Corps could follow up, so as to 
 join or co-operate with the balance of the army. To prepare for this, the Ninth 
 Corps will have rations issued to them, sam-i as the balance of the army. Gen- 
 eral Weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at all practi- 
 cable to break through at any point, he will do so. A success north of the 
 James should be followed up with great promptness. An attack will not be 
 feasible unless it is found that the enemy has detached largely. In that case it 
 may be regarded as evident that the enemy are relying upon their local re- 
 serves principally for the defence of Richmond. Preparations may be made for 
 abandoning all the line north of the James, except inclosed works — only to be 
 abandoned, however, after a break is made in the lines of the enemy. 
 
 " By these instructions a large part of the armies operating against Rich- 
 mond is left behind. The enemy, knowing this, may, as an only chance, strip 
 their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope of advantage not being taken of 
 it, whilst they hurl every thing against the moving column, and return. It 
 cannot be impressed too strongly upon commanders of troops left in the trenches 
 not to allow this to occur without taking advantage of it. The very fact of the 
 enemy coming out to attack, if he does so, might be regarded as almost con- 
 clusive evidence of such a weakening of his lines. I would have it particularly 
 enjoined upon corps-commanders that, in case of an attack from the enemy, 
 those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding oflBcer of 
 the army to which they belong, but that they will move promptly, and notify 
 the commander of their action. I would also enjoin the same action on the 
 part of division commanders when other parts of their corps are engaged. In 
 like manner, I would urge the importance of following up a repulse of the 
 anemy. 
 
 " U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-Gen eral. 
 
 • Major-GenkraIiS Meade, Ord, and Sheridan." 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 581 
 
 Coufederate right, southwest of Petersburg. The present 
 operation was confined to one powerful eftbrt, dii'ected against 
 Lee's right and vuhierable flank. Former moves had pre- 
 sented the anomaly of a turning column pivoting on a force 
 stronger than itself. The present operation was made by a 
 turning column so weighty that it contingently embraced the 
 whole Army of the Potomac, with the exception of the Ninth 
 Corps, which alone was to be the pivot of the manoeuvre. 
 Moreover, to this column was to be added not only the import- 
 ant accession of Sheridan's cavalry, but nearly the whole of the 
 Army of the James, three divisions of which were to be trans- 
 ferred to the lines before Petersburg, leaving in the works 
 on the Richmond side of the river only a minimum force. 
 
 Sheridan, coming in fi'om his expedition, joined the army 
 before Petersburg on the 27th. The same day, General Ord, 
 at this time commanding the Army of the James, moved over 
 from the Eichmoud front to the lines before Petersburg. His 
 active force embraced two divisions of the Twenty-fourth 
 Corps, under General Gibbon; one di^^sion of the Twenty- 
 fifth Corps, under Brigadier-General Birney, and a small 
 division of cavahy, under Brigadier-General McKenzie. 
 These troops took position along the left of the intrenched 
 lines lately held by the Second and Fifth corps, which being 
 now relieved were foot-loose to manoeuvre by the left. The 
 movement was begun on the morning of the 29th of March, 
 as had been appointed.' 
 
 In order to attain the point against which the turning 
 column of infantry was directed, it was necessary to pass to 
 the west side of Hatcher's Eun. Breaking camp early on 
 the mornmg of the 29th, the corps of Warren and Hum- 
 phreys moved by the rear and left (that is, to the southwest), 
 so as to make the movement without observation. Hatcher's 
 Eun was passed without opposition of moment, and the two 
 corps, facing northward, advanced to effect the initial manoeu- 
 vre of the campaign.* 
 
 ♦ A reliable map of the region in which the movements to be described 
 
582 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 It is now proper to point out whither this advance tended, 
 and the developments that arose therefrom. 
 
 The right of Lee's intrenched hne, running southwestward 
 from Petersburg, crossed Hatcher's Run at the Boydton 
 plankroad. Thence it extended for a considerable distance 
 
 took place will be found opposite page 578. This will enable the reader to fol 
 low the details of the initial operations of the 29th of March, which I here add. 
 
 The Fifth Corps. — Warren moved at three A. m., and turning southwest- 
 ward crossed Rowantry Creek at a point a short distance below where that stream 
 is formed by the junction of Hatcher's and Gravelly runs. A few shots were 
 fired by the enemy's videttes, probably as an alarm signal, but no opposition 
 was made to the crossing. While a bridge for the veliicles was being laid, the 
 troops scrambled across on fallen trees and the wreck of a former bridge. 
 Warren's route then led westward by the stage-road. At a distance of four 
 miles from Hatcher's Run, the Quaker road runs northward from the stage-road 
 to the Boydton plankroad. Warren was directed to move up this road, which, 
 at a distance of two miles, crosses Gravelly Run. This stream could not be 
 readily forded, but the skirmish line succeeded in crossing, and drove off a 
 small force of the Confederates. A bridge was then laid and the northward 
 movement continued. 
 
 The Second Corps. — While Warren was making this wide detour, Hum- 
 phreys' corps had passed Hatcher's Run by the Vaughan road-crossing, four 
 miles above Warren's point of passage. Turning northward it followed the 
 run up-stream. This movement placed Humphreys' corps on the right of 
 Warren, and both corps pushed northward — the latter moving on the Quaker 
 road, the former through the woods between that road and Hatcher's Run. 
 But as Humphreys' advance was made in an extended line through very difB- 
 cult woods, the connection was made and broken continually. The enemy's 
 skirmishers were driven in, but no main line was encountered, and darkness 
 stayed further advance. 
 
 Sheridan's Cavalry. — Sheridan moved by way of Reams' Station and Ma- 
 lone's crossing on Rowantry Creek, where he had to construct a bridge. At 
 this point the cavalry encountered a Confederate cavalry picket, which was 
 driven to the left across Stony Creek, capturing a few prisoners, from whom 
 and from scouts it was learned that the Confederate cavalry was at Stony 
 Creek Depot on the Weldon Railroad, twelve miles to Sheridan's left and rear. 
 Believing that by pushing on to Dinwiddle Courthouse, he would compel the 
 Confederate cavalry to make a wide detour in order to rejoin Lee's right, he 
 continued the march from Malone's, where Custer's division was left to protect 
 the trains, to Dinwiddle Courthouse, distant twelve miles. This point was 
 reached at five P. M., after encountering only a small picket of the enemy. At 
 Dinwiddle, Sheridan bivouacked. 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 583 
 
 westward, parallel with Hatcher's Eim, and along what is 
 known as the White Oak road. This hne directly covered 
 Lee's main communication by the Southside Eailroad. Four 
 miles further to the west of the termination of this intrenched 
 front a detached line, running also along the White Oak road, 
 covered an important strategic point where several roads 
 from the north and south, converging on the White Oak road, 
 form what is known as the Five Forks. With this, however, 
 we have no immediate concern, as the advance of Warren 
 and Humphreys led not against this isolated position of the 
 enemy, but against the right flank of Leo's continuous hne. 
 
 The distance to be traversed by the turning column was not 
 great, but progress was toilsome and through a difficult coun- 
 try. When Warren, on the left, moving by the Quaker road, 
 had advanced to within about two miles of the Confederate 
 position, the resistance, which as thus far encountered had 
 been easily swept away by the skirmishers, became more 
 spirited, and the leading division under Griffin was assailed 
 by a line of battle. A warm action ensued, the brunt of 
 which was borne by Chamberlain's brigade. Griffin was able 
 to hold his own and repulse the Confederates, who left in his 
 hands a hundred prisoners and their dead and wounded. 
 The Union loss was about three hundred and seventy in 
 killed and wounded. After this, Warren jDressed on until he 
 drew the fire from the Confederate intrenched line on the 
 White Oak road. 
 
 Humphreys, on the right of Warren, continued his advance 
 through a dense forest and undergrowth. He had neared, 
 but not struck, the enemy's main line when darkness stayed 
 his further progress. 
 
 While afi'airs thus passed with the infantry, the column 
 of horse under Sheridan, sweeping a more adventurous radius, 
 was manoeuvring further to the left. That evening, after 
 slight opposition, Sheridan occupied Dinwiddie Courthouse, 
 six miles southwest of where the troops of Warren and Hum- 
 phreys lay on their arms. 
 
 Such was the situation of affairs on the night of the 29th. 
 
584 CAMPAIGNS OF THE AKMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 The Union line was unbroken from tbe Appomattox to Din- 
 widclie Courthouse, and was in the following order : Parke, 
 Wright, Ord, Humphrej^s, Warren, Sheridan. In the morn- 
 ing Sheridan was to cut loose from the army and start on a 
 distant expedition against the Southside and Danville rail- 
 roads. But the lieutenant-general now altered his plan with 
 respect to the cavalry. " I now feel," wrote General Grant 
 to Sheridan, at Dinwiddle, on the night of the 29th, " I now 
 feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before 
 going back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and 
 go after the enemy's roads at present. In the morning, push 
 around the enemy, and get on to his right rear. We will act 
 all together as one army here until it is seen what can be done 
 with the enemy." 
 
 If from some lofty tower of observation one could that 
 night have looked down into the adverse lines, there would 
 have been seen within the Confederate camp a strange stir, 
 and amid the darkness a noiseless activit}^ and the outlines of 
 moving masses ; but the explanation would not have been far 
 to seek, for the head of every column was turned weshcard. 
 
 Sudden as had been Grant's manoBuvre that day, it had not 
 escaped his antagonist's quick perception, and, knowing well 
 how and where the blow would fall, Lee was already hasten- 
 ing to interpose such a buckler of defence as would ward off 
 the stroke from that vital part against which it was plainly 
 directed. 
 
 The situation in which Lee now found himseK was almost 
 tragic ; and if even to the gods there be something pleasing 
 in the spectacle of a brave man struggling against fate, it will 
 not be unlawful, while according to the conduct of the Union 
 commander the admiration due the power and persistency that 
 marked it, to feel a Hke sentiment for the unfailing resource 
 with which the Confederate commander, hoping against hope, 
 comported himself in a desperate strait. 
 
 It was essential that Lee should secure the defence of his 
 right in so sohd a manner that the powerful column which 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 585 
 
 Grant had tlirust out by the left should not prevail against 
 those vital hnes whereon the Confederates depended for tludr 
 daily food. It was at the same time indispensable that he 
 should maintain the long intrenched line that covered Peters- 
 burg and Richmond, for his antagonist warily- watched all its 
 extent, if so be there might offer an opening to break through. 
 From his left, northeast of Eichmond, to his right, southwest 
 of Petersburg, there were thirty-five miles of breastwork 
 which it behooved Lee to guard, and all the force remaining 
 to him was thirty-seven thousand muskets, and a small body 
 of broken down horse ! But one resource remained — the 
 oft-tried resource of stripping his intrenched lines to the 
 uttermost, and with the force thus gathered rushing to the 
 menaced right with the view of checking — if possible, of beat- 
 ing back — the turning column. 
 
 At this time two divisions of Longstreet's corps giiarded 
 the lines of Eichmond, and Mahone's division of Hill's corps 
 the front of Bermuda Hundred. These Lee did not dare to 
 weaken, for, not so well informed as usual, he was not mas- 
 ter of all the bearings of the Union commander's opera- 
 tions. Unaware that Grant had akeady removed three of the 
 four divisions that had been confi-onting the Eichmond force, 
 Lee retained Longstreet where he was, but instructed his heu- 
 tenant to move to the Petersburg side as soon as he should 
 detect any weakening of the adverse Hnes. (Not till four days 
 afterwards, and when too late, did Longstreet detect how 
 feeble was the force opposed to him). On the Petersburg side 
 were the divisions of Wilcox, Pickett, Bushrod Johnson, and 
 the remnant of Ewell's corps, now under Gordon. Taking 
 from these corps all he dared— two divisions and three bri- 
 gades—he assembled a force of about fifteen thousand, and 
 with this he hurried to the protection of his menaced right. 
 He leff behind him six or seven thousand men in the Peters- 
 burg intrenchments ; but as these were strung out to garnish 
 nme miles of breastwork, they made little more than senti- 
 nels. To the force set foot-free, Lee added Fitz Lee's divi- 
 sion of cavalry, and during the night moved to the right to 
 
586 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OP THE POTOMAC. 
 
 take position within the lines in front of which the two Fed 
 eral corps had been arrested hj the darkness. 
 
 The morning of Thursday, the 30th, saw the Union force in 
 position, ready to strike. Lee was yet poorly prepared to 
 withstand a blow, though all night long his troops had been 
 filing to the right. But in this situation fortune intervened 
 in his behalf ; and Grant, who " felt like making an end of 
 it," found himself embargoed by adverse weather just when 
 all was ready for the stroke. During the night of the 29th a 
 heavy storm of rain fell, and this continued without cessation 
 during the 30th, so that the roads became almost impracticable 
 for wheels or hoofs, the swampy country in which the army 
 was operating was flooded, heavy details had to be sent to 
 assist the trains, which were nearly immovable in the mud, 
 and all aggressive action had to be suspended. Yet Lee's 
 infantry could tramp through the mire when wheeled A^ehicles 
 might not move, and the day's delay permitted the Confederate 
 commander to complete his dispositions. 
 
 Nothing was done on the Union side save to push up the 
 corps of Humj^hreys and Warren close in front of the Con- 
 federate line on the White Oak road and Hatcher's Eun : 
 Sheridan indeed dispatched a body of his cavahy towards 
 Five Forks, but the Confederates were found there in numbers 
 too strong to be dislodged by the force sent forward. It 
 therefore returned to Dinwiddle.'^ 
 
 * The following extracts, from the reports of Generals Warren, Humphreys, 
 and Sheridan, present the details of whatever was done by the Fifth and Sec- 
 ond corps, and the cavalry, ott the 30th of March : 
 
 The Fifth Cokps. — " It commenced raining in the night, and continued to 
 do so heavily all day on the 30th. During this day General Griffin's line was 
 advanced, with heavy skirmishing up the Boydton plankroad, so as to confine 
 the enemy, near Burgess's Mill, to his breastwork along the White Oak road. 
 A reconnoissance by General Ayres' division was also made as far west as where 
 the enemy's line along the White Oak road turned northward lo Hatcher's Run, 
 and our picket-line established near the White Oak Ridge. Finding, on per- 
 sonal examination, that though we could see the road, our pickets did not occu- 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 587 
 
 Friday, tlie 31st, saw the ground still so unfavorable to 
 Diovement that active operations were formally pretermitted 
 by General Grant. But while the Union commander thus pro- 
 posed, his opponent willed otherwise. It now remains to show 
 how, by the initiative of the Confederate commander, action 
 was precipitated : how, aggressive to the last, he fought to 
 repeat the bold stroke whereby he had foiled so many previous 
 
 py it, I directed this occupation to be made that evening." — Warren : Report 
 of Operations. 
 
 The Second Corps.—" At six a. m. on the 30th the advance was resumed, 
 Hays' division on the right being supported by Turner's division of the Twenty- 
 fourth Corps. The enemy was driven inside his intrenchments along Hatcher's 
 Kun and the White Oak road, this position being attained at about half-past 
 eight or nine A. M. The right of the corps (General Hays' right) rested on 
 Hatcher's Run, near the Crow House, and the enemy's redoubt in that vicinity. 
 Turner's division of the Twenty-fourth Corps took post along Hatcher's Run, 
 connecting with the old intrenchments which were occupied by the Twenty- 
 fourth Corps. The left of the corps connected with the Fifth Corps near the 
 Boydton plankroad, in the vicinity of Mrs. Ramie's. The Ime of battle was 
 extended in front of the enemy's intrenchments, and was pressed as closely to 
 them as practicable without assaulting. The left, on the Boydton plankroad, 
 was subsequently advanced in conjunction with the Fifth Corps, so as to in- 
 clude nearly the whole of the Dabney MiU road."-Humphreys : Report of 
 
 Operations. 
 
 Sheridan's Cavalry.-" Early on the morning of the 30th of March, I di- 
 rected General Merritt to send the first division, Brigadier-General Devin com- 
 manding, to gain possession of the Five Forks, or White Oak road, and directed 
 General Crook to send General Davies' brigade of his division to the support of 
 
 General Devin. 
 
 "Gregg's brigade, of Crook's division, was held on the Boydton plankroad, 
 and guarded the crossing of Stony Creek, forcing the enemy's cavalry that was 
 moving from Stony Creek depot to form a connection with the nght of their 
 army to make a wide detour, as I had anticipated, on the south side of Stony 
 Creek and west of Chamberlain's Bed-a very fatiguing march, in the bad 
 condition of the roads. A very heavy rain fell during this day, aggravaung 
 the swampy nature of the ground, and rendering the movement of troops al- 
 most impossible. General Merritt's reconnoissance developed the enemy n^ 
 .trong force on the White Oak road, in the vicinity of Five Forks, and here 
 uas some heavy skirmishing throughout the day."-Shendan : Report of Op- 
 srations. 
 
588 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 turning attempts. But, first of all, it is needful to describe 
 the precise position of Warren's corps, which held the left of 
 the Union line, and certain changes in its disposition that had 
 that morning taken place. Though these changes had not, as 
 has been supposed, any important bearing on Lee's action 
 (which had been predetermined), they are nevertheless neces- 
 sary to the just appreciation of what followed. 
 
 During the 30th Warren had held position, with the divisions 
 of Griffin and Crawford, on the Boydton plankroad, only the 
 division of Ayres being thrown forward to the west of it. But 
 at dayhght of the 31st, his right division under Grifiin was re- 
 lieved by the division of Miles of the Second Corps, so as to 
 permit a greater development to the left. Warren then moved 
 his entire corps to the westward of the Boydton plankroad, and 
 pushed it forward so that its pressure was directly upon the 
 extreme right of the Confederate intrenched line on the White 
 Oak road. The position of his corps was then in this wise : 
 Ayres' division thrown forward to within a few hundred yards 
 of the White Oak road; Crawford's division in rear of and 
 somewhat to the right of Ayres ; Grifiin's division in rear of 
 and somewhat to the right of Crawford. In case of any hos- 
 tile sally on the part of Lee, the position held by Warren was 
 one of great delicacy ; for as Sheridan was isolated from the 
 infantry by several miles, Warren formed the very left of the 
 Union line, and had to protect his own flank. 
 
 Thus placed, Warren made a disposition of his troops that 
 was perfectly conformable to correct principles, and one that 
 showed a much juster appreciation of the method of action 
 suited to such a situation than was manifested in the conven- 
 tional system in vogue. In spite of the many costly proofs 
 already received of the futility of long, thin, and consequently 
 everywhere weak lines of battle, upon the naked flanks of 
 which Lee had made a series of constantly successful swoops, 
 each new turning operation saw this error repeated. Warren, 
 however, discerning truly what had always been Lee's oppor- 
 tunity, in place of attempting to maintain a weakly extended 
 line from the left of Humphreys' corps, disposed his troops 
 
V 
 
 THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 589 
 
 in masses en echelon, so that they could meet attack from any 
 direction, and readily re-enforce any point assailed. To make 
 his position still more secure, Warren desired to throw for- 
 ward the skirmishers on his left to seize the Wliite Oak road, 
 beyond the termination of the Confederate intrenched line. 
 By this means he would observe closely the road by which 
 Lee. Avould move in any operation to strike Warren's flank. 
 He therefore ordered Ayres to advance a brigade from his 
 division and drive off the enemy from that road, or develop 
 in what force it was held. On communicating this order to 
 General Meade, Warren was dkected, if he found by his re- 
 connoissance that he could get possession of the White Oak 
 road, to do so, notwithstanding previous instructions to sus- 
 pend operations for the day.* 
 
 * " I beg leave to call attention to a statement in the report of General Grant, 
 which must have been made from erroneous information. ' On the morning of 
 the 31st, General Warren reported favorably to getting possession of the White 
 Oak road, and was directed to do so. To accomplish this, he moved with one 
 division, instead of his whole corps.' Now, strictly speaking, ' On the morning 
 of the 31st General Warren did not report favorably to getting possession of 
 the White Oak road, and was not directed to do so. Nor ' to accomplish this, 
 did he move with one division instead of his whole corps.' * * The operation 
 I directed was to secure a good position for our picket-line, and to develop with 
 what force the White Oak road, in General Ayres' vicinity, was held. ]My in- 
 structions to General Ayres were to advance his picket-line, using a brigade aa 
 support, if necessary. I informed General Meade of this, and he, in a dispatch 
 I received about eleven A. M., directed that, ' should you determine by your 
 reconnoissance that you can get possession of, and hold the White Oak road, 
 you are to do so, notwithstanding the orders to suspend operations.' 
 
 "Thus it appears that I did not move with a division, but with a reconnoi- 
 tring brigade, which reconnoissance it was necessary to make to ascertain where 
 to use the whole corps if it were to be all used. The order to take possession 
 of the road was contingent upon the result of the reconnoissance. It is also 
 evident that only in a very modified sense could I be said to have as yet re- 
 ported favorably to getting possession of the road. At most, I had but ex- 
 pressed my willingness to try, venturing a little on my own responsibility 
 to achieve a desired end, and ready to make every hazard, if ordered. 
 
 " Simultaneous mth this advance of General Ayres' picket-line, the enemy 
 attacked us in heavy force."— Warren : Report of Operations. 
 
590 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Hardly, however, was this reconnoissance begun by an ad- 
 vance of the brigade of Winthrop, at half -past ten a. m., than 
 a heavy attack fell upon Warren. 
 
 It was Lee's initiative. Often before had he broken up 
 these turning movements in their inception by falling heavily 
 on the exposed flank of the Union force. Once more he es 
 sayed the like blow, and, to give it all the weight possible, he 
 threw into it the bulk of the troops he had collected and formed 
 on his right. 
 
 The attack upon Warren was sudden, and burst out simul- 
 taneously both from the north and west. It was indeed near 
 attaining almost the wonted success, for Ayres' troops, finding 
 themselves enveloped in the thick woods, easily gave way, 
 falling back on Crawford, whose division, disorganized by the 
 fugitives, broke in turn. Happily the disposition Warren had 
 made of his force rendered this disruption far from irretriev- 
 able. No disaster had occurred, for the troops ran rather be- 
 cause they were bewildered by a sudden flank and rear attack 
 in a dense and swampy forest, than because they were forcibly 
 beaten back. When, however, they emerged into the clearer 
 ground in the rear, where Grifiin's division held post, they 
 were soon rallied. The good effect of the echelon arrangement 
 was now seen. Griffin maintained his ground immovably. 
 The Confederate onset was soon checked, and Warren, gather- 
 ing together his forces, prepared to make a counter-attack. 
 To assist this, General Humphreys promptly advanced Miles' 
 division on the right of Warren. While the Fifth Corps at- 
 tacked in front, Miles assailed the Confederate left flank. The 
 operations of both forces were spirited and forcible, and re- 
 sulted in repulsing the enemy at all points, and driving him 
 back to his old line on the White Oak road. In the Fifth 
 Corps, Chamberlain's brigade was especia,lly distinguished, 
 capturing nearly the whole of the Fifty-sixth Virginia regi- 
 ment, with its colors. Miles also took one flag and many 
 prisoners. Humphreys, with his remaining two divisions, at- 
 tempted also to carry the enemy's works covering the Boyd- 
 ton road crossing of the White Oak road and those on the 
 
THE PINAL CAMPAIGN. 591 
 
 west side of Hatcher's Eun ; but these efforts met no sue 
 
 cess. 
 
 To Lee paucity of numbers made economy of life so im- 
 perative a duty, that, though he was pushed by his temper and 
 the necessities of his situation to attempt an aggressive pohcy, 
 he knew well that he could only hope for such success as sud- 
 den swoops might bring, and that he was in no condition to 
 attempt a general offensive. Hence, when he found himself 
 foiled in the attack against the left of the infantry, he drew 
 back with but slight effort to resist the countercharge of 
 Warren, and sought some other favorable opening for a blow. 
 Such an opening was presented by the cavalry of Sheridan, 
 who, by manoeuvres now to be described, had gained a position 
 that was very menacing to Lee's right flank. 
 
 From the position of Sheridan at Dinwiddle Courthouse 
 the distance to the Five Forks was about eight miles due north ; 
 and from Five Forks the distance to Lee's intrenched line con- 
 fronting Warren and Humphreys was but four miles east. Hold- 
 ing Five Forks, one holds the strategic key that opens up the 
 whole region which Lee was now seeking to cover. Sheridan, 
 appreciating the immense importance of this point, deter- 
 mined, notwithstanding the obstruction to the movements 
 of cavalry caused by the storm that had overtaken the army, 
 and the consequent increase of operations, to secure its 
 possession. Nowise disconcerted by the failure of the attempt 
 of the previous day, he, on the morning of the 31st, directed 
 
 * The details of Humphreys' operations on the Slst are as follows : Miles, by 
 his advance, succeeded in occupying the White Oak road ; but the enemy's in- 
 trenchments here covered a strong position on the crest of a long slope, with 
 wide slashings in front and abatis covering the ditch, with artillery at short 
 intervals. De Trobiand's brigade of Mott's division was put into position to 
 strengthen Miles, and subsequently McAllister's brigade was extended to the 
 left to perfect the connection, Diiring the day General Mott made an attempt 
 fo carry the redoubts and intrenchments covering the Boydton road crossing, 
 but without success. General Hays likewise attempted to carry the Crow 
 House redoubt, but was prevented by the heavy slashing, which was impiiss- 
 able for any large number of troops. 
 
502 ■ CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Devin's division again towards Five Forks. Finding that this 
 body encountered a considerable opposition, he re-enforced it 
 with DaA^es' brigade of Crook's division, while Crook, with his 
 other two brigades, under Smith and Gregg, were ordered to 
 the left, and encountered a hostile cavalry force at Chamber- 
 lain's Creek, a httle west of Dinwiddle. With his two brigades 
 Crook held this body in check, and Devin and Davies moved 
 upon and seized Five Forks, which at the moment was guarded 
 by but a small force, the Confederate cavalry being mainly on 
 the west side of Chamberlain's Creek, and the infantry engaged 
 with Warren. 
 
 But the tenure of Five Forks was not to be long. Having 
 been foiled in the assault on Warren, Lee detached portions 
 of the two divisions of infantry under Pickett and Bushrod 
 Johnson, and moved them by the White Oak road westward to 
 Five Forks. These falling upon the Union cavalry there, drove 
 it out and back in confusion on Dinwiddle Courthouse. The 
 Confederates then pushed rapidly forward on the west side of 
 Chamberlain's Creek, but when they attempted to cross this, 
 in order to strike Dinwiddle Courthouse, they were foiled by 
 the stout resistance of Smith's brigade. They then effected a 
 crossing higher up the creek, and falling upon Da\des' brigade 
 forced it back against the left flank of Devin's division, thus 
 partially isolating all this force from Sheridan's main line at 
 Dinwiddle Courthouse, In order to unite it on this hne, Sheri- 
 dan directed it to make a detour by the Boydton plankroad. 
 The execution of this manoeuvre appeared to the Confederates 
 a forced retreat on the part of Devin, and, deceived by this, 
 they made a left wheel, and were proceeding to follow him up. 
 This tactical change caused the Confederates to present the 
 flank and rear of their line of battle to Sheridan's force at 
 Dinwiddle, whereupon, seizing the opportunity, he directed a 
 charge to be made with the brigades of Gregg and Gibbs. 
 This unlooked-for sally compelled the Confederates to face by 
 the rear rank and give up the movement against Devin, who 
 was thus enabled to rejoin the main body. Against this the 
 Confederates now advanced with all the force of cavalry and 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 593 
 
 infantry present. In numbers the assailants were not superior 
 to the Union cavahy, but they had an advantage in the range 
 of the fire-arms of their infantry. 
 
 Thus placed, Sheridan displayed rer}^ commendable pluck. 
 Having dismounted his troopers, he disposed them behind a 
 shght breastwork previously prepared, and here, from their 
 carbines, they poured so biting a fire into the ranks of the 
 assailants that they were repulsed in the attack, and darkness 
 prevented its renewal. The conduct of the men was certainly 
 excellent ; but it was a great relief when night intervened to 
 abridge the attack of the Confederates, for the cavalry had 
 been sorely handled in the action. 
 
 The tidings of Sheridan's situation received at headquarters 
 led to the belief that he could not maintain himself at Dinwid- 
 dle unless re-enforced, and such was the alarm in regard to the 
 safety of his force, that all dispositions became subordinated to 
 the forwarding of troops to his succor. For this purpose War- 
 ren was, at nine p. m. of the 31st, ordered to send a division to 
 Dinwiddle Courthouse by way of the Boydton plankroad ; and 
 two hours later, the concern about Sheridan growing mean- 
 while, he was directed to move with his two other divisions 
 by a road to the west, with the idea that he would strike the 
 rear of the Confederate force confronting Sheridan.""'" 
 
 * Previously to tWs — to wit, about five p. M., and before it became known 
 that Sheridan was being pressed by the enemy — Warren had been directed to 
 send a small force down the White Oak road to communicate with General 
 Sheridan. Warren accordingly dispatched Bartlett's brigade, which moved 
 across the country in a southwesterly direction, towards Sheridan's firing. 
 Bartlett forced his way, after brisk skirmishing, to Gravelly Eun, across which 
 a hostile body was driven ; but as it was much after dark before he completed 
 Ms dispositions, no further advance could be made that night. Wlien, how 
 ever, an hour or two later, intelligence was received of what had befallen 
 Sheridan, such was the alarm thereby inspired at headquarters, that it was 
 even determined to go so far as to sacrifice the advanced position gained by the 
 Fifth and Second corps. The following extract vrill show that General Warren 
 was himself the first to suggest that he should be allowed to move with hia 
 whole corps, and attack in rear the force confronting Sheridan : 
 
 38 
 
594 CAlVfPAlGNS OF THE ARISIY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Warren promptly dispatched Ayres' division, as the one that 
 could get under way most expeditiously ; and proceeded to 
 make arrangements to move with the other two divisions as 
 soon as practicable. Had the roads been unobstructed, the 
 march to Dinwiddie would not have occupied above four or 
 five hours. When, however, the project was formed of send- 
 ing Warren to succor Sheridan, there was one very important 
 fact which was not known at headquarters, but which was of 
 a nature to prevent any possibility of a force reaching Sheri- 
 dan that night. This was the fact that the bridge over Grav- 
 elly Eun, by the Boj'dton plankroad, was destroyed. It was, by 
 consequence, necessary for General Ayres to halt at the run 
 until an infantry bridge was built. This consumed till near 
 two A. M. of April 1st, when Ayres crossed his division and has- 
 tened towards Dinwiddie. 
 
 When the condition of the crossing of Gravelly Run became 
 knowTi to General Meade, that commander, believing that 
 Sheridan " could not maintain himself at Dinwiddie without 
 pe-enforcements," suggested (in a dispatch received by General 
 Warren at one A. m.) other methods by which the desired end 
 
 " At 8.40 p. M. I received by telegraph tlie following, marked ' Confidential,' 
 from General Webb, chief of staff, written 8.30 P. M. : ' The probability is, that 
 we will have to contract our lines to-night. You will be required to hold, if 
 possible, the Boydton plankroad and to Gravelly Kun. Humphreys and Ord 
 along the run. Be prepared to do this at short notice.' 
 
 " I regretted exceedingly to see this step foreshadowed ; for I feared it would 
 have the morale of giving a failure to our whole movement, as similar orders 
 had done on previous occasions. It would, besides, relieve the enemy in front 
 of Sheridan from the threatening attitude my position gave me. I therefore 
 sent the following by telegraph, at 8.40 p. m., to General Webb : ' The line 
 along the plankroad is very strong. One division, with my artillery, I think, 
 can hold it, if we are not threatened, south of Gravelly Run, east of the plank- 
 road. General Humphreys and my batteries, I think, could hold this securely, 
 and let me move down and ottnch the enemy at Dinvyiddie Courthouse on one 
 side, and Sheridan on the other. On account of Bartlett's position, they (the 
 enemy) will have to make a considerable detour to re-enforce their troops at 
 that point from the north. Unless General Sheridan has been too badly 
 handled, I think we have a chance for an open field-fight that should be made 
 use of " — Warren : Report of Operations of March 29, 30, and 31. 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 595 
 
 might be accomplished. They did not, however, meet the 
 real state of facts. He suggested that Warren should send 
 troops both by the Boydton plankroad and by the Quaker 
 road, further to the east, even if he should give up the medi- 
 tated rear attack. But the distance to Dinwiddie by the 
 Quaker road was above ten miles, and, at the advanced hour 
 of the night at which the dispatch was received, it would have 
 been impossible for the troops by that road to have reached 
 Dinwiddie before eight A. M., by which time they could be of 
 no use in holding tbat place. In this case the most direct 
 route for the rear attack would be down the plankroad, by 
 which Ayres' division was marching. SoHcitous as General 
 Warren was, therefore, of arriving for Sheridan's succor at the 
 earhest possible moment, he justly judged that the desired end 
 could be best attained by abiding the movements already be- 
 gun, holding, meantime, the two divisions of Griffin and Craw- 
 ford where they were, until he should hear that Ayres' division 
 had reached Dinwiddie. 
 
 In the midst of this general anxiety for Sheridan, that offi- 
 cer himself had ceased to feel any solicitude touching his situ- 
 ation ; for before midnight he knew that the enemy had with- 
 drawal all but a mask of force from his front. Lee, in fact, 
 could not afford to retain so considerable a body at Dinwiddie, 
 both because it was very much out of position for the defence 
 of the Confederate Hne on the White Oak road, and because 
 the force thus isolated was directly menaced by Warren. It 
 was, therefore, retired by Lee as soon as he could communicate 
 with it, which was about ten p. m. of the 31st, and it fell back 
 and took position at Five Forks, leaving only a cavalry picket, 
 which also withdrew as soon as assailed at dawn. It was, in 
 fact, seen hastily decamping by Ayres, when, at dayhght of 
 April 1st, he joined the cavalry. Sheridan followed up vig- 
 orously, putting his whole force in motion northward towards 
 Five Forks. Meantime, Warren withdrew his two other divi- 
 sions, which, marching directly across the country, joined the 
 cavalry midway between Dinwiddie Coui'thouse and Five Forks 
 at seven a. m., April 1st. 
 
596 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Full of doubts and fears as the night had been, morning 
 dispelled these noxious vapors. The event proved a happy 
 illustration of " All's well that ends well ;" for, thanks to the 
 good judgment of Warren m keeping his corj3s together, it 
 was now in position where it could best be applied conjointly 
 with the cavalry in a renewed effort against the Confederate 
 position at Five Forks. Towards that position Sheridan was 
 resolved to move, and in the operations that followed, Warren, 
 with the Fifth Corps, came under his orders. 
 
 IV. 
 
 FIVE FORKS AND PETERSBURG 
 
 The situation of the opposing forces on the moinkig of the 
 1st of April was somewhat peculiar. From the Appomattox 
 to Hatcher's Run the Confederate line was so meagerly gar- 
 nished with troops that there was but one man to every five 
 yards of front. Confronting this line were the Union corps of 
 Parke, Wright, Ord, and Humphreys. Bui the point of dis- 
 pute was nowhere along these locked lines ; and as, by times, 
 in olden battles, the whole array of two opposing armies 
 would stand still while one knight from each side engaged in 
 single combat, so it seemed to be now tacitly agreed that the 
 gage of battle was for the possession of the Five Forks — an 
 isolated position four miles to the west of the Federal left and 
 Confederate right. Hither Sheridan was moving, and here, 
 as for the defence of a point of vital value, Lee had accumu- 
 lated all the force he could spare. 
 
 In thus massing upon his right, Lee ran a great risk ; for 
 the Petersburg defences were left so inadequately defended, 
 that they were incapable of withstanding a serious attack. 
 But necessity left no alternative. It is worthy of note that 
 there was no imperative need of dehvering battle at Five 
 Forks, for Sheridan's manoeuvres by the left, together with the 
 pressure of the Second and Fifth corps, had had so fully 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 597 
 
 tne effect of drawing the Confederate strength to a head at 
 that flank, that it was open to the Union force to 'break di- 
 rectly through the Petersburg defences. Indeed, both Wright 
 and Ord, ascertaining from their reconnoissances the compara- 
 tive nakedness of the Confederate works, reported favorably 
 to assault on the 1st. But it was otherwise determined. There 
 is, however, no occasion to note, otherwise than as a contin- 
 gency of the situation, that the battle of Five Forks need not 
 necessarily have been fought in order to have gained the cap- 
 ture of Petersburg. That, nevertheless, it was fortunate it was 
 fought, will not be doubtful after the recital of the events of 
 that brilliant action. 
 
 Pressing forward his cavalry, Sheridan, by spirited charges, 
 drove the Confederates from two temporary lines, until, at two 
 p. M., April 1st, he had confined them within their works at 
 the Five Forks. The admirable method in which Sheridan 
 combined the operations of cavalry and infantry — using the 
 former as an impenetrable mask behind which he manoeuvred 
 with the latter — has abeady been seen in the history of the 
 Valley campaign. This combination was now to receive a new 
 and splendid illustration. 
 
 In pressing back the enemy into his works Sheridan had em- 
 ployed only his powerful body of horse, leaving the Fifth Corps 
 behind, at the point where it had joined the cavalry in the morn- 
 ing. Now, however, that the Confederates were confined within 
 the defences on the White Oak road, where they were closely 
 enveloped by his numerous squadrons, he directed General 
 Warren to bring forward the Fifth Corps, for the employment 
 of which he devised a beautiful tactical manoeuvre. He ordered 
 General Merritt, while holding the enemy in front with the cav- 
 alry, to demonstrate as though he aimed to turn the Confeder- 
 ate right, and he dii-ected Warren to form the infantry so that 
 its full pressure would fall directly on the enemy's left flank. 
 At the same time he sent McKenzie's division of cavalry, which 
 had joined him that day, to the White Oak road to cover the 
 right flank from anv hostile force moving westward from the di- 
 
598 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 rection of Petersburg. McKenzie executed his orders witb 
 skill and vigor, attacking a body of the enemy and di-iviug it to- 
 wards Petersburg, after which he countermarched and rejoined 
 Sheridan in time to participate in the action. 
 
 Warren formed his corps before moving forward. He dis- 
 posed Ayres' division on the left and Crawford's on the right, 
 with Griffin's in reserve behind the right. Each of the two 
 front divisions placed two brigades in fi*ont, each brigade in 
 two hnes of battle ; and the third brigade in two lines of bat- 
 tle behind the centre of the two front lines. Griffin's division 
 was posted in column of battalions in mass behind the right. 
 In moving, the lines were instructed to keep closed to the 
 left, and to preserve their direction in the woods by keeping 
 the sun, which was shining brightly, in the same position over 
 their left shoulders. The movement was to be forward to the 
 White Oak road, at a point beyond the enemy's left flank, 
 when the line was to swing round, pivoting on the left, and 
 having formed itself perpendicular to the White Oak road, it 
 was then to advance and fall upon the Confederate left flank. 
 
 Warren's dispositions being promptly completed by four 
 p. M., he immediately then advanced. A few minutes brought 
 the line to the White Oak road, distant about a thousand 
 yards, when it changed front so as to face westward instead 
 of northward. The Fifth Corps was now directly on the left 
 flank and rear of the Confederates, with a hne of battle 
 formed perpendicular to their position. The enemy had, 
 however, refused his left in a crotchet about a himdred 
 yards in length turned northward at right angles to his 
 main line, and covered by a strong breastwork screened 
 behind a dense undergrowth of pines. Thence northward 
 to Hatcher's Run, the Confederates pieced out the line 
 by a slim picket. Ayres' division being the pivot on which 
 Crawford's and Griffin's wheeled, efi'ected its change of front 
 first, and encountered the enemy's skirmishers in fi'ont of 
 the position at the crotchet. That division covered nearly 
 the whole of this refused line, so that Crawford and Ayres 
 outflanked it to the north. Or nearly so : Crawford's division, 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 599 
 
 indeed, in changing front, liaving occasion to pass over some 
 open ground, received on its left from this line a fire which 
 caused the division to oblique to the right, so as to keep the 
 protection of the woods and ridge while executing the ma- 
 noeuvre. Now, owing to this circumstance — to wit, that Craw- 
 ford's division on the right of Ayres, having to manoeuvre on 
 a more extended radius and being also thrown more to the 
 right to avoid the enemy's fire, was not able to change front 
 so rapidly — ^it came about that Ayres' right was for a time " in 
 air ;" and as it received the same fire that Crawford's left had 
 encountered, the troops on that flank became very unsteady, 
 and many broke to the rear. This difl&culty, however, was soon 
 remedied. Griffin's division was drawn in towards the left to 
 close up this interval, and Ayres' division assailing the enemy's 
 intrenched crotchet, carried it by an impetuous charge, in 
 which above a thousand prisoners and several battle-flags 
 were taken. Griflin then fell upon the rear of the enemy's 
 left, capturing the breastworks and fifteen hundred prisoners. 
 At the same time Crawford, who was moving further to the 
 right, advanced steadily in rear of the enemy's hue, driving 
 back the skirmishers all the way, and continually turning the 
 left of any force opposing Ayres and Griffin, till he attained 
 the Ford road, which runs directly northward fi'om the centre 
 of the Confederate rear, and thence across Hatcher's Run. The 
 outlet for the enemy's escape northward being thus closed, 
 Warren directed Crawford's line to swing round to face south- 
 ward and advance upon the reverse side of the enemy's line. 
 
 The Confederates were now completely entrapped. Held as 
 in a vice by the cavalry which enveloped then- whole front and 
 right, stung them with a biting fire, and charged at the signal 
 o± the musketry of the infantry, they now found a hne of bat- 
 tle sweeping down on their rear. Thus placed, they did all 
 that men may. Forming front both north and south, they 
 met with a desperate valor this double onset. But it was 
 vain. From the rear Warren swept down towards the White 
 Oak road, Crawford taking four guns ; and simultaneously the 
 cavalry from the front charged upon this road with resistless 
 
(JOO CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OP THE POTOMAC. 
 
 impetuosity. The whole centre was now carried, as the left 
 had been before, and the Confederates, pressed front, flank, 
 and rear, mostly threw down their arms. Having gained the 
 Wliite Oak road, Warren changed front again to the right and 
 advanced westward, thus constantly taking in flank and rear 
 whatever hostile force still continued to hold the right of the 
 Confederate line. This had originally been about three miles 
 in extent, but above two-thii'ds of it were now carried. Yet, 
 ■\dtal in all its parts, what of the two divisions remained stiU 
 continued the combat with unyielding mettle. Parrying the 
 thrusts of the cavalry from the front, this poor scratch of a force 
 threw back its left in a new and short crotchet so as to meet the 
 advance of Warren, who continued to press in at right angles 
 with the White Oak road. When the infantry, greatly elated 
 with their success, but somewhat disorganized by marching 
 and fighting so long in the woods, arrived before this new line, 
 they halted and opened an untimely fusillade, though there had 
 been orders not to halt. The ojQ&cers, indeed, urged their 
 men forward, but they continued to fire without advancing. 
 Seeing this hesitation, Warren dashed forward, calling to those 
 near him to follow. Inspired by his example, the color- 
 bearers and officers all along the front sprang out, and, with- 
 out more firing, the men charged at the pas de course, captur- 
 ing all that remained of the enemy. The history of the war 
 presents no equally splendid illustration of personal magnet- 
 ism. Warren led the van of the rushing lines ; his horse was fa- 
 tally shot within a few feet of the breastworks, and he himself 
 was in imminent peril, when a gallant officer. Colonel Eichard- 
 son of the Seventh Wisconsin, sprang between him and the 
 enemy, receiving a severe wound, but shielding from hurt the 
 person of his loved commander. 
 
 A charge of the cavalry completed the rout, and the rem- 
 nants of the divisions of Pickett and Johnson fled westward 
 from Five Forks, pursued for many miles, and until long after 
 dark, by the mounted divisions of Merritt and McKenzie. The 
 trophies of the day included many colors and guns and above 
 five thousand prisoners, of which number three thousand two 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. GOl 
 
 hundred and forty -four were taken by tlie Fifth Corps. Bril- 
 liant as the victory was, it was won without great sacrifice of 
 Hfe, the losses of the cavalry being but a few hundred, and 
 those of the infantry six hundred and thirty-four killed and 
 wounded.* 
 
 No sooner had the sound of musketry died away at the 
 Five Forks, than from the multitudinous throats of all the 
 guns that studded Grant's Unes before Petersburg there 
 opened a prodigious clamor, and the darkness of night was 
 illumined by the lurid light of hundreds of bursting shells 
 and bombs. It was a psean to victory ; but still more a pre- 
 lude of what was yet to come. 
 
 The action at Five Forks had simplified, not solved the 
 problem. Lee's right, wrenched violently from his centre 
 — the troops captive or rushing wildly westward — would 
 trouble no more. But the Confederate lines encircling Pe- 
 tersburg from the Appomattox to Hatcher's Kun, were still 
 intact. This was Lee's centre in the general relations of all 
 the points he aimed to defend, whUe his left was the front that 
 covered Richmond from the Union force threatening assault 
 on the north side of the James. But as, strangely enough, 
 Longstreet, who commanded on the Eichmond side, had not 
 discovered how greatly the enemy in his front had been re- 
 duced, still retained two divisions on that side of the James, 
 the force immediately defending Petersburg was reduced to 
 two incomplete divisions. Upon this General Grant, on learn- 
 ing the success at Five Forks, ordered an attack to be made 
 by the corps of Wright, Parke, and Ord, the following morn- 
 
 * After the close of the action, General Sheridan, for some reason as yet un- 
 explained, relieved General Warren from duty, and assigned General Griffin to 
 the command of the Fifth Corps. In saying that this act is " as yet imex- 
 plained," it will hardly be interpreted in the sense that I am unaware of the 
 reasons stated by General Sheridan in his official report, but that these reasons 
 are wholly inadequate to justify that officer's conduct. It is needless here to 
 enter into the discussion of this painful question ; for General Warren has ex 
 liausted it in a brochure, lately published, under the title of " An Account of the 
 Fifth Army Corps at the Battle of Five Forks." 
 
602 CAMPAIGNS OF ThE -iRMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 iug. Being apprehensive, however, that Lee might during 
 the night withdraw this force and fall upon Sheridan in his 
 isolated position, he ordered Miles' division of Humphreys' 
 corps to his support, and commanded all the guns in the 
 Petersburg lines to be opened in a general bombardment. 
 This, beginning at nightfall of the 1st, was kept up till four 
 A. M. of the 2d April. 
 
 At earhest dawn of Sunday, the 2d, the assault was opened, 
 from the Appomattox to Hatcher's Eun, by the troops of 
 Parke, Wright, and Ord. Parke on the right, with the Ninth 
 Corps, carried the outer line of intrenchments ; but the posi- 
 tion of that corps confronted that portion of the Confederate 
 defences longest held and most strongly fortified, and after the 
 outer line had been penetrated, the Confederates were found 
 holding an inner cordon of works, from which Parke could not 
 force them. 
 
 Wright, with the Sixth Corps, next on the left of the Ninth, 
 assaulting at four A. m., carried every thing before him. Hav- 
 ing attained the Boydton plankroad, he swept to the left 
 down the Confederate intrenchments, capturing many guns 
 and several thousand prisoners. He was closely followed by 
 two divisions of Ord's command, and continued on until he 
 met the other division of Ord's that had succeeded in forcing 
 the lines near Hatcher's Kun, when the united forces swung 
 to the right and proceeded by the Boydton plankroad towards 
 Petersburg. 
 
 When these successes were reported, Humphreys, holding 
 the Union left to the west of Hatcher's Run, advanced with 
 two divisions of the Second Corps (the divisions of Hays and 
 Mott) and stormed and carried a redoubt in his front. Seeing 
 this lost, the Confederates abandoned this position, and Hum- 
 phreys moved up the Boydton plankroad and connected with 
 the left of the Sixth Corps. The other of Humphreys' divi- 
 sions, under Miles, pursued whatever debris of the enemy 
 remained west of Hatcher's Eun. This force retreated north- 
 ward to Sutherland Station, on the Southside Eaiboad, where 
 it was overtaken by Miles, who in a spirited charge dis- 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAiaN. 603 
 
 loilged and defeated it, taking two guns and six hundred 
 [)risoners. 
 
 On reaching the lines immediately around Petersburg, a 
 part of Ord's command, under General Gibbon, began an as- 
 sault with the view to break through to the city. The attack 
 was directed against Forts Gregg and Alexander, two strong, 
 inclosed works, the most sahent and commanding south of 
 Petersburg. The former of these redoubts was manned by 
 Harris's Mississippi Brigade, numbering two hundi'ed and fifty 
 men ; and this handful of skilled marksmen conducted the 
 defence with such intrepidity, that Gibbon's forces, surging 
 repeatedly against it, were each time thrown back. At lengtli, 
 at seven a. m., a renewed charge carried the work ; but not 
 till its two hundred and fifty defenders had been reduced to 
 thirty ; and it is calculated that each of these riflemen struck 
 down at least two assailants, for Gibbon's loss was above five 
 hundred men. The other fort found no such defenders, and 
 readily fell. This being accomplished, the Union line of in- 
 vestment was drawn close around the city. 
 
 The result of these operations was, that the Confederates, 
 having lost most of their outer system of defences, were 
 pressed back to a chain of works immediately around Peters- 
 burg. But as they had here a short and strong line, with 
 their left resting on the Appomattox on the east of Petersburg 
 and their right on the same river on the west side, they still 
 protected the city, and the Union force, weighty as it was, found 
 it impossible to dislodge them. Lee, indeed, was even able 
 to make, in the old style, an offensive sally or two, for about 
 ten A. M. a shglit re-enforcement came to him. Longstreet 
 having at length discovered that the force that for many days 
 had confronted him on the north side of the James was little 
 more than a mask, drew therefrom several of his brigades, 
 and at the hour named reached Petersburg, accompanied by 
 Benning's brigade of Field's division. This increase of his 
 force, shght though it was, together with the protracted resist- 
 ance offered by Fort Gregg, enabled Lee to estabhsh what of 
 force remained to him in such wise as would best avail for 
 
604 CAMPAIGNS OP THE ARifT OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 the defence of the city. General A. P. Hill then pushed for- 
 ward the division of Heth on the Confederate left, in an effort 
 to regain some commanding ground held by the Ninth Corps. 
 The attack was made with such vigor and pressed so heavily 
 ^ on that corps, that it was with difficulty it could maintain its 
 ground, and the garrison of the defences of Cit}' Point had 
 to be ordered up to its support. This may be accounted the 
 last blow struck by the Army of Northern Virginia while cov- 
 ering Richmond ; and it is noteworthy that in its execution 
 fell General A. P. Hill, who in all the operations that from 
 first to last filled up the four years' defence of the Confederate 
 capital, had borne a most distinguished part. 
 
 In thus maintaining a stubborn attitude of resistance at the 
 threshold of Petersburg, Lee had now but one thought, which 
 was to hold his ground until the oncoming of night should 
 enable him to put into execution the ulterior design he had 
 formed. This design was communicated to the Richmond 
 authorities in a message sent by Lee about eleven o'clock of 
 the forenoon of that same Sunday. It was received by Mr, 
 Davis while worshipping at the church of Saint Paul's ; and 
 those who, as he passed out, marked his countenance (on which 
 it seemed the burden of an additional score of years had in 
 a moment fallen), knew that message could bear nothing but 
 tidings of direful import. 
 
 It announced Lee's purpose of that night abandoning Peters- 
 burg and Richmond. 
 
 V. 
 
 THE EETREAT AND PURSUIT. 
 
 It may well be supposed that the purpose of the hardy 
 captain who designed to " make an end of it before going 
 back," was not relaxed, but rather intensified by the events 
 of the past two days ; and forecasting what must be the nexl 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 605 
 
 move of liis antagonist, Grant, on the night of the 2d, had 
 akeady begun his dispositions to checkmate him. 
 
 To Lee there was but one hne of retreat that led anywhere 
 but to destruction. This was up the Appomattox, parallel with 
 the Southside Eailroad, and westward to the Danville line. But 
 the Fifth Union Corps was already at Sutherland's Station on 
 the Southside Eailroad, ten miles west of Petersburg, and 
 Sheridan, with the cavahy, on the night of the 2d bivouacked 
 at Ford's, ten miles still further to the west. These moves 
 compelled Lee, at the outset, to make his retreat by the north 
 bank of the Appomattox, and threw him upon the exterior 
 line. 
 
 To the Union force set free for pursuit, in case that should 
 be the order, was added, on the night of the 2d, the Second 
 Corps under Humphreys, to whom was at the same time sent 
 a ponton-train. The Sixth and Ninth corps and Ord's com- 
 mand, meantime, held their close-drawn Unes of investment 
 around Petersburg, while from the north side of the James 
 Weitzel watched Eichmond. 
 
 But not all the wary eyes of peering pickets served to dis- 
 cover what was that night passing in the Confederate camp. 
 When the long twilight of that May-day Sunday had faded 
 out in the west, and deep darkness had settled down over the 
 sleeping Union host, a silent withdrawal was begun from the 
 whole Confederate front. The Petersburg force, retiring 
 noiselessly through the town, filed over to the north bank of 
 the Appomattox. Thence marching northward to Chester- 
 field Courthouse, midway between Petersburg and Eichmond, 
 it was joined by the division holding the front of Bermuda 
 Hundred. At the same time whatever force remained on the 
 Eichmond side was drawn in, and moved southward to Ches- 
 terfield Courthouse, when the whole Confederate army headed 
 westward. The evacuation was conducted with wonderful 
 address; and the march being pushed vigorously all night, 
 the Armv of Northern Virginia, now reduced to twenty-five 
 thousand men, had by dawn put sixteen miles between it and 
 Petersburg. 
 
606 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 It is said by those who were with the Confederate com- 
 mander, that his spirits were unusually light and cheerful on 
 the morning of the 3d. " I have got my army safe out of its 
 breastworks," said he, " and, in order to follow me, my enemy 
 must abandon his hues, and can derive no further benefit from 
 his railroads or the James River." What then might he now 
 reasonably hope for ? He could certainly not dream of the 
 triumph of his cause. That is not to be supposed. But he 
 might hope so to conduct affairs as to obtain advantageous 
 terms of peace for the Confederacy. And it is certain that he 
 did expect to effect a successful retreat — to escape entirely 
 fi'om the toils of his antagonist — to unite with the army under 
 Johnston, and then so to act as to elicit good overtures not 
 only for the capitulation of his army, but for the settlement 
 of a basis of peace, which, the Confederate government being 
 fugitive, he took it upon himself to negotiate should opportu- 
 nity be afforded. How this hope was dashed to the ground, 
 as well by unforeseen misfortunes that befell Lee as by 
 the prodigious vigor with which Grant pushed the pursuit, 
 will appear in the course of this narrative. It is now neces- 
 sary to look to the dispositions and movements of the Union 
 columns. 
 
 Wlien in the gray dawn of Monday, April 3d, the skirmish- 
 ers advanced from the lines before Petersburg, the city was 
 found to be evacuated. At the same time the Union force on 
 the lines confronting Richmond from the north side of the 
 James was startled by a clamorous uproar, and the sky was 
 seen to be lit up with a lurid glare. Surmising the meaning 
 of this direful blazon, General Weitzel threw forward a 
 cavalry party that, entering the city without let, planted its 
 guidons on the Capitol. 
 
 Thus Richmond fell ! Marvellous as had been the one year's 
 defence of the Confederate capital, its fall was not less strange. 
 Occupied, not captured, Richmond, to gain which such heca- 
 tombs of lives had been sacrificed, was at length given up by 
 the civil authorities to a body of forty troopers ! 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 607 
 
 The explanation of the portentous sounds and sights svas 
 soon learned. To the rear-guard, under Ewell, had been left 
 the last duty of blowing up the iron-clad vessels in the James 
 and the bridges across that river; audit was the noise of 
 the explosions that first announced to General Weitzel that 
 Eichmond was given up. But the Confederate ojfi&cials, in 
 addition to this work of destruction (which cannot be con- 
 demned on the score that it was not warranted by the rules 
 of war), adopted a measure shocking to every sense of 
 humanity. It appears that the warehouses of Eichmond 
 contained great store of government tobacco, and the cruel 
 and senseless order was given to fire these — as though it 
 were possible with impunity to play with the devouring 
 element! The flames, spreading to the neighboring build- 
 ings, soon involved a wide and widening area ; and, though 
 'the Union force, on its entry, labored to put out the fire 
 it could not be subdued until the heart of the city, including 
 all the business section, was laid in ashes. It was amid such 
 scenes that Eichmond fell, with the smoke of the torment of 
 the Confederacy ascending to heaven, while far away all that 
 remained of the Confederate army hastened beyond the 
 sunset. 
 
 But little did Grant reck of Eichmond ; and already, since 
 morning revealed the fiight of the Confederates, he had been 
 pressing to the uttermost the march of his columns. Pur- 
 sued and pursuers fared forth by parallel lines— Lee by the 
 north side of the Appomattox, Grant by the south bank. 
 Let us see whither led all this mad haste. 
 
 The Danville Eailroad, Lee's hue of retreat, runs southwest 
 from Eichmond, and is intersected by the Southside or Lynch- 
 burg Eailroad, which runs westward from Petersburg, at 
 Burkesville, which is fifty-eight miles from Eichmond by the 
 former road, and fifty-two miles fi'om Petersburg by the latter 
 road. Burkesville, therefore, was to Lee a strategic point of the 
 first importance, for if he should be anticipated in its posses- 
 sicm, he would be forced off the direct Danville hne, and 
 
608 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 could only recover it, if at all, by a great detour to the west. 
 This, accordingly, was his first objective. 
 
 The march of the Union forces was conducted by two 
 lines : the troops of the Ai'my of the James, under General 
 Ord, by the line of the Southside or Lynchburg Eailroad, 
 towards Burkesville, and Sheridan, with the cavalry and Fifth 
 Corps, followed by the Second and Sixth corps of the Army 
 of the Potomac, by routes near the Appomattox, to strike the 
 Danville Railroad north of Burkesville. 
 
 Lee's march led by the north bank of the Appomattox for 
 thirty miles west, when it was necessary to cross that stream 
 at Goode's bridge in order to strike the Danville road at 
 Amelia Courthouse, thirty-eight miles west of Richmond and 
 Petersburg. Pushing the advance vigorously during the 3d, 
 Lee next day reached Amelia Courthouse. Here a dire and 
 unlooked-for anguish befell him. 
 
 When Lee determined to abandon Petersburg and Rich- 
 mond, ho dispatched orders that large supplies of commis- 
 sary and quartermasters' stores should be sent forward from 
 Danville to Amelia Courthouse, there to await the arrival of 
 his columns. When, however, on Sunday afternoon, the 
 loaded train of cars reached Amelia Courthouse, the officer 
 in charge was met by an order from the Richmond authorities 
 to bring on the train to Richmond, it being the design to 
 use the cars in the transportation of the personel and prop- 
 erty of the Confederate government. Interpreting this order 
 in the sense that the train and its contents should be taken to 
 Richmond, the officer, without unloading the stores at Amelia 
 Courthouse, carried on cars, freight and all ; and the rations 
 on which Lee had depended for the subsistence of his army 
 were consumed in the general conflagration of Richmond ! 
 
 Such were the agonizing tidings that met the Confederate 
 commander on his arrival at Amelia Courthouse ; and one 
 can well imagine how, from that moment, all his hopes were 
 dashed to the ground. Lee had fairly counted, that as Grant 
 had, for the purpose of rapid pursuit, broken up his force into 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 609 
 
 several bodies, an opportunity would present itself to fall 
 upon these fractions in detail, should his retreat become seri- 
 ously endangered. But, to accomplish this, it was necessary 
 that he should have his whole army, now not much above twenty 
 thousand men, well in hand. This, in the absence of rations, 
 was no longer possible ; for, in order to keep life in what 
 force remained to him, it became incumbent on him to break 
 up a moiety of it into foraging parties. 
 
 At Amelia Courthouse, where Lee had arrived the morn- 
 ing of the 4th, he was compelled to remain during the whole 
 of that and the following day; and this forced delay gave 
 Sheridan, who, vdth the cavalry and the Fifth Corps, was 
 pushing the advance impetuously far in the van of the re- 
 mainder of the army, time to strike in upon the Confederate 
 line of retreat. This he did the afternoon of the 4th, at 
 Jetersville, on the Danville Eailroad, seven miles southwest 
 of Amelia Courthouse. 
 
 Thus headed off from the direct Hue of retreat, there was 
 for Lee but one alternative — to fall upon Sheridan's isolated 
 force in the attempt to overwhelm it and recover the Dan- 
 ville route, or, by doubhng on his track, take up an eccen- 
 tric and exterior line. But, in reality, the first course was, 
 under the circumstances, out of the question. Sheridan, in- 
 deed, has animadverted upon Lee's want of activity here. 
 " It seems to me," says he, " that this was the only chance 
 the Army of Northern Virginia had to save itself, which 
 might have been done had General Lee promptly attacked 
 and driven back the comparatively small force opposed to 
 him, and pursued his march to Burkesville Junction." * But 
 it is not clear what this distinguished officer means by a 
 " comparatively small force." Sheridan had with him at Jet- 
 ersville above eighteen thousand excellent cavalry and in- 
 fantry, well intrenched; while he himself reported Lee's 
 entire strength at Amelia Coui-thouse as twenty thousand; 
 and it has been seen that half of this force was broken up 
 
 • Sheridan : Report of Operations. 
 39 
 
GIO CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 into foraging parties. In fact, to attempt escape was all thai 
 now remained to Lee. 
 
 Late in the afternoon of the 5th, General Meade, with the 
 Second and Sixth corps of the Army of the Potomac, joined 
 Sheridan at Jetersville, where, expecting attack, he had held 
 his force intrenched since the previous day. Lee was still at 
 Amelia Courthouse. Meanwhile, Sheridan had been operat- 
 ing with his cavalry well to his left, to watch if Lee should 
 make any attempt to escape by that flank. On the morning 
 of the 5th, Brigadier-General Davies, with a mounted force, 
 advanced to Paine's Cross-roads, where he struck a train of 
 a hundred and eighty wagons, escorted by a body of Confed- 
 erate cavalry, which he defeated, destroying the wagons and 
 capturing five pieces of artillery and a number of prisoners. 
 Gregg's and Smith's brigades of the Second Cavalry Division 
 were sent out to support Davies, and some heavy fighting en- 
 sued — the Confederates ha\ang sent a considerable force of 
 infantry to cut off the latter ; but the attempt was thwarted. 
 
 The night of the 5th, Lee moved from Amelia. His only 
 hope now was to make a race to Farmville (west thirty -five 
 miles), there cross the Appomattox once more, and, by de- 
 stroying the bridges after him, escape into the mountains 
 beyond Lynchburg. When, therefore, on the morning of the 
 6th, the whole Army of the Potomac, which, the night pre- 
 vious, had been concentrated at Jetersville, moved northward 
 towards Amelia to give battle to the Confederates, it was 
 found that Lee had slipped past. The direction of the corps 
 was then changed : the Sixth Corps moved from the right to 
 the left ; the Second Corps was ordered to move by Deatons- 
 ville ; and the Fifth and Sixth corps to move in parallel direc- 
 tions on the right and left. As Lee was retreating by the 
 Deatonsville route, this disposition of the pursuing forces 
 placed one column in his rear on the same road by which he 
 was moving, a second column by a parallel route to the south, 
 and a third column by a parallel route to the north. Mean- 
 while, the Army of the James, which had been pushing its 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 611 
 
 march bj the line of the Lynchburg Raih'oad, had reached 
 Burkesville ; and on the morning of the 6th General Ord was 
 directed towards Farmville. In order, if possible, to reach 
 and destroy the bridges near that place, Ord sent forward a 
 light column, consisting of two regiments of infantry and a 
 squadron of cavalry, under Brigadier General Theodore Read. 
 This force met the head of Lee's column near Farmville, and 
 Read heroically attacked it in the effort to detain the Confed- 
 erate column until the main force should be able to make up 
 with it. That gallant officer sacrificed his life in the execu- 
 tion of this duty, and his command was overwhelmed ; but 
 the attack served the intended purpose, and so delayed the 
 movements of the enemy, that Ord had time to arrive with 
 the Army of the James. Upon this, the Confederate force 
 immediately intrenched itseK. 
 
 Sheridan, who had now with him only the cavalry, formed 
 the van of the column that was marching on the southern 
 parallel route ; and he was deploying all the resources of 
 an energy that seemed to grow hotter and hotter with the 
 chase, to head off the hunted prey. Near Deatonsville, that 
 same 6th, he struck in upon the Confederate wagon-train 
 escorted by a formidable force of infantry and cavalry. To 
 wrest this prize fi'om its guardians Sheridan made admirable 
 dispositions. He ordered Crook's division to attack the 
 train, and if the covering force proved too strong, one of the 
 divisions would, while Crook held fast to and pressed the 
 enemy, pass hir% and attack a point further on ; and this di- 
 vision was ordered to do the same, and so on alternately. 
 This method of action would, he judged, enable him finally 
 to strike some weak point. 
 
 This result was obtained just south of Sailor's Creek, a small 
 tributary of the Appomattox that, running northward, empties 
 into that stream a few miles east of Farmville. Custer's divi- 
 sion gained the road, and the divisions of Crook and Devin 
 coming up to its support, four hundred wagons were destroyed, 
 and sixteen pieces of artillery and many prisoners were cap- 
 tured. Ewell's corps, which was following behind the train, 
 
612 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OP THE POTOMAC. 
 
 was thus cut off from its line of retreat. To detain this force 
 as long as possible, so that the infantry might have time to 
 come up, was now Sheridan's desire, and with this view he or- 
 dered a mounted charge, which was executed in a very spirited 
 manner by one of his brigades under Colonel Stagg. 
 
 When the head of column of the Sixth Corps came in 
 sight the Confederates began retiring, whereupon Seymour's 
 division was directed to carry the road. This being done, 
 the Confederates fell back slowly, skirmishing and turning 
 with such sharp and sudden sallies of resistance, that a 
 halt had to be called to get up Wheaton's division of the 
 Sixth Corps. This took position on the left of Seymour, 
 whereupon a renewed advance was made, and the Confeder- 
 ates were driven until the lines of the Sixth Corps reached 
 Sailor's Creek. Then from the north bank could be descried 
 the cavalry on the high ground above the creek and south of 
 it, and the long lines of smoke from the burning wagons be- 
 yond. But even while thus environed, these men showed they 
 could still exact a price before yielding ; and when an advance 
 was made by a part of the Sixth Corps, they delivered so 
 deadly a fire that a portion of that veteran line bent and 
 broke under it. But the numbers were too unequal, too over- 
 whelming ; and when a simultaneous assault was made by 
 the Sixth Corps in fr^ont and the cavalry in flank and rear, 
 Ewell's troops, finding themselves surrounded, threw down 
 their arms in token of surrender. The captures included nearly 
 all that remained of the corps of that officer, pith Lieutenant- 
 General Ewell himself and four other general officers. 
 
 The decisive character of this result was largely due to the 
 energetic movements of the Second Corps, which, moving to 
 the right, had pressed the Confederates closely in a rear-guard 
 fight all day till night, when it had attained a position 
 near the mouth of Sailor's Creek. Here the Confederates 
 were so crowded upon, that a large train was captured and 
 many hundreds were taken prisoners. The trophies of the 
 Second Corps included, in addition several pieces, of artillery 
 and thirteen flags. 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 613 
 
 Lee, meanwhile, with the relics of his army, continued the 
 retreat during the night, and passed to the north bank of the 
 Appomattox by bridges near Farmville. 
 
 Such are the mere bald facts that, thus far, marked the re- 
 treat and pursuit. But it would need other colors in which 
 truly to paint that terrible race for life ; and one would have 
 to seek its like in what befell upon the snowy wastes of Mus- 
 covy in the winter of 1812. 
 
 The Confederates began the retreat with but one ration, 
 and when no supplies were met at Amelia Courthouse, they 
 were reduced to such scant store as could be collected from 
 the poor and almost exliausted region through which they 
 passed. This resource, moreover, grew more and more pre- 
 carious, for the area of the foragers was so restricted by the 
 clouds of enterprising Union cavalry, that they could collect 
 less and less. Those men were fortunate who had in their 
 pockets a few handfuls of corn which they might parch by the 
 wayside ; but many had naught wherewithal to assuage the 
 pangs of hunger save the buds and twigs of spring that, with 
 its exuberant bourgeon, seemed to mock the sere and deso- 
 late winter of their fortunes. The misery of the famished 
 troops during the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th of April, passes all 
 experience of military anguish since the retreat from the 
 banks of the Beresina. " Towards evening of the 5th," says 
 an eye-witness, " and all day long upon the 6th, hundreds 
 of men dropped fi'om exhaustion, and thousands let fall their 
 muskets from inability to carry them any further. The scenes 
 of the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th were of a nature w^hich can be 
 apprehended in its vivid reality only by men who are thor- 
 oughly familiar with the harrowing details of war." 
 
 While the sufferings of the men were thus severe, those of 
 the horses and mules were even keener ; for of forage there 
 was none, and the grass had not yet sprouted. Of course, in 
 this condition of the draught-animals the locomotion of the 
 trains and artillery could be but slow. Moreover, the long 
 lines of wagons, filling miles of the road, frequently cut in 
 
61i CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 upon the route of the infantry columns, delaying them foi 
 half a day at a time : so that, from this and other reasons, the 
 march had to be mainly conducted by night, which added the 
 want of rest to the sum of miseries accumulating fast and 
 faster on the hapless host of fugitives. Dark divisions, sink- 
 ing in the woods for a few hours' repose, would hear suddenly 
 the boom of hostile guns and the clatter of the hoofs of the 
 ubiquitous cavalry, and they had to up and hasten off as fast 
 as their wearied limbs would carry them. Thus pressed upon 
 on all sides, driven like sheep before prowling wolves, with 
 blazing wagons in front and rear, amid hunger, fatigue, and 
 sleeplessness, continuing day after day, they fared towards the 
 setting sun — 
 
 " Such resting found the soles of unblest feet I" 
 
 VI. 
 CLOSING SCENES. 
 
 When, on the night of the 6th, the Army of Northern Vir- 
 ginia had put the Appomattox between it and its pursuers, a 
 group of the chief officers met around the bivouac-fire to take 
 counsel together touching their fortunes. General Lee alone 
 was not of the number. 
 
 The result of the interchange of views was to reduce the 
 possibilities of the situation to three hues of conduct. 1. To 
 disband, allowing the troops to make theii- way as best they 
 might to some fixed rallying point. 2. To abandon the 
 trains and cut their way through the opposing Unes. 3. To 
 surrender. 
 
 But it was soon seen that, in reality, two of these courses 
 were excluded. To disband would be to give up all; for 
 there was little likelihood that the troops could ever be 
 rallied, while their dispersion over the country would neces- 
 sarily entaU unnumbered ills upon the inhabitants. To cut 
 their way through was more easy to talk about than to do ; 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 615 
 
 and even if they succeeded in effecting this purpose, the 
 army, without a train or artillery or materiel, would lose all 
 organization, and must starve. It resulted that there seemed 
 to be no alternative but surrender. This was the voice of the 
 council ; and General Pendleton was appointed to communi- 
 cate the conclusion to General Lee. 
 
 But the Confederate commander did not think such extrem- 
 ity was yet upon him ; or, rather, he did not think he could 
 with honor surrender until he should be compelled to surren- 
 der; and this had not yet been. Moreover, all dehberation 
 was cut short by an ominous outburst of sound which told 
 that the hunter was again upon the track of the hunted. 
 When the whole of the Confederate column had filed across the 
 Aj)pomattox, near Farmville, which was not till towards dawn 
 of the 7tli, the bridges were fired to prevent pursuit. But the 
 Second Corps, under Humphreys, taking up an early pursuit, 
 came up with the Confederates at High Bridge, six miles east 
 of Farmville. The rear-guard was overtaken just as it had fired 
 the wagon-road bridge, and as the second span of the railroad 
 bridge was burning ; but Humphreys succeeded in saving the 
 wagon-road bridge — a matter of great importance, as the Ap- 
 pomattox was unfordable. A considerable force of the Con- 
 federates was observed drawn up in a strong position on the 
 heights on the opposite bank to dispute the passage, while 
 the bridge was held by skirmishers. These were, however, 
 quickly driven off, and the Second Corps crossed. Barlow's 
 division leading. Artillery was put in position to cover an 
 attack ; but this was unnecessary, for the Confederate force 
 retired. A redoubt, forming the bridge-head on the south 
 bank, was blown up as the Union troops approached, eight 
 gTins being abandoned to the pursuers, as were also ten others 
 on the north bank. High Bridge was saved with the loss of 
 four spans. 
 
 Humphreys then took up the pursuit, with the division of 
 Miles and De Trobriand, on the Old Stage road leading to 
 Appomattox Courthouse, while Barlow's division was directed 
 on Farmville, distant three miles. Barlow found this place in 
 
616 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 possession of a considerable force of tlie enemy, that was 
 burning the bridges there, and covering a wagon-train moving 
 towards Lynchburg ; but on Barlow's approach it abandoned 
 the place, destroying one hundred and thirty wagons, and 
 rejoined the main body of Lee's army. 
 
 This Humphreys found intrenched in a strong position four 
 or five miles north of Farmville, covering the stage and plank 
 roads to Lynchburg. It proved to be too formidable for a 
 front attack — the ground being open and sloping up gradu- 
 ally to a crest about a thousand yards distant, which was cov- 
 ered with intrenchments and batteries. An attempt was then 
 made to take it in flank, but the Confederate flanks were 
 found to extend both on the right and left beyond the line of 
 Humphreys' divisions, and it became manifest that all that re- 
 mained of the Army of Northern Yirginia was present. Bar- 
 low's division was then ordered np. Meanwliile Humphreys, 
 having extended his right the length of one division, ordered 
 Miles to make an attack with three regiments ; but these met a 
 complete repulse, suffering the loss of above six hundred 
 in killed and wounded. It was too late to renew operations 
 when Barlow arrived, and during the night Lee again re- 
 treated. 
 
 While these events were in progress, Sheridan dispatched 
 two of his mounted divisions to Prince Edward Courthouse, 
 and a third, that of Crook, to FarmviUe. The bridges having 
 been burnt at this point, the horsemen crossed with great dif- 
 ficulty by wading ; though the Sixth Corps, which was moving 
 on the same line, was so delayed that it was not able to make 
 the passage until night. Crook struck a train on the north 
 side of Appomattox ; but it was too well defended by infantry ; 
 and after a sharp skirmish the cavalry was driven off. General 
 Gregg, commanding one of the brigades, being captured. 
 
 The night of the 7th General Lee received the following 
 communication : 
 
 Apuil 7, 1865. 
 (tIeneral : — The result of the last week must convince you of the hopeless- 
 ness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 617 
 
 struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the 
 responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender 
 of that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of Northern 
 Virginia. 
 
 U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-Qeneral. 
 General R. E. Lee. 
 
 It was at Farmville that General Grant wrote this message, 
 and he was prompted by the beUef that " General Lee's 
 chances of escape w^ere now utterly hopeless." Lee indited 
 his reply that same night, but before General Grant received 
 it, the Confederate commander had again put a long night's 
 march between his army and its pursuers. It was in these 
 words : 
 
 Generax, : — I have received your note of this date. Though not entertain 
 ing the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the 
 part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid use- 
 less effusion of blood, and, therefore, before considering your proposition, ask 
 the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender. 
 
 Egbert E. Lee, General. 
 
 Liectenant-Gener.vl U. S. Grant. 
 
 To this General Grant immediately replied : 
 
 April 8, 1865. 
 
 UENERAl, : — Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of the same date, 
 asking the condition on vyhich I will accept the surrender of the Army of 
 Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply, I would say that peace being 
 my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon, namely : that 
 the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again 
 against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will 
 meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you might name for tin; 
 same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging 
 definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Vir- 
 ginia wdll be received. 
 
 U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
 
 General R. E. Lee. 
 
 Meanwhile, Lee's night march of the 7th having again left 
 the Union forces considerably behind, it was necessary to 
 renew pursuit on the morning of the 8th. 
 
 The Second and Sixth corps of the Army of the Potomac 
 
618 CARrPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 moved bj the north bank of the Appomattox, while Sheridan 
 advanced bj the south bank, and, followed by Ord's command 
 and the Fifth Corps, struck out for Appomattox station on 
 the Lynchburg Eaih'oad. Lee's line of retreat was now by 
 the narrow neck of land betwixt the Appomattox and the 
 James. If its outlet towards Lynchburg was closed, all was 
 lost for Lee. Sheridan was hastening to close this outlet. 
 
 Desperate as the situation was, Lee, determined to put the 
 best face on matters, with a kind of grim humor, wrote, but 
 flying as he wrote : 
 
 April 8, 1865. 
 
 General : — I received at a late hour your note of to-day. In mine of yes- 
 terday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of Northern 
 Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be frank, / do not 
 think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this a/rmy ; but, as 
 the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desired to know 
 whether your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you 
 with a view to surrender the Army of Northern Virginia, but as far as your 
 proposal may eflfect the Confederate States forces iinder my command, and tend 
 to the restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten A. M., 
 to-morrow, on the old stage road to Richmond, between the picket lines of the 
 two armies. 
 
 R. E. Lee, General. 
 
 Lieutenant-General Grant. 
 
 This note Grant received about midnight, and next morning 
 he replied in these terms : 
 
 April 9, 1865. 
 
 General : — Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to treat 
 on the subject of peace : the meeting proposed for ten A. M. to-day could lead to 
 no good. I will state, however, general, that I am equally anxious for peace 
 with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling. The terms 
 upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the South laying down 
 their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human 
 lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. Seriously 
 hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, 
 I subscribe myself, &c., 
 
 U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
 
 General B. E. Lee. 
 
 But, before Lee received this, the time for parley had 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 619 
 
 passed. The evening of the 8th, after a march of above 
 thirty- miles, Sheridan reached Appomattox station on the 
 Lynchhtirg Raih-oad, five miles south of Appomattox Court- 
 house. The rear-guard of Lee's army had just arrived, and 
 four trains of cars, loaded with suppUes for the starving 
 Confederates, were approaching. Sheridan, by throwing a 
 force in rear of the trains, captured them, and then assailing 
 the vanguard, drove it back to Appomattox Courthouse. 
 Here he planted his force directly in front of Lee and on his 
 line of retreat, and resolved to hold fast for the night, knowing 
 that the Army of the James would join him in the morning, 
 whilst the Army of the Potomac would strike the rear of the 
 Confederates. 
 
 But one escape now remained to Lee, which was to cut his 
 way through Sheridan's lines, and this he attempted at dawoi. 
 The once proud array of the Army of Northern Virginia now 
 presented this sorry spectacle. A thin line of battle, made up 
 of Gordon's troops in front ; another scant line composed of 
 the wreck of Longstreet's corps in rear — in all about eight 
 thousand men. Between the two were the debris of the wag- 
 on-train and the gaunt figures of some thousands of unarmed 
 stragglers, too weak to carry their muskets. Lee sent orders 
 to Gordon to cut his way through at all hazards. This was 
 immediately begun with wonderful impetuosity, and the cav- 
 alry, that had dismounted to resist the attack, found itself 
 forced back. At this juncture Sheridan personally arrived 
 from Appomattox Station, whither he had been to hasten the 
 march of the Army of the James. That officer immediately 
 directed his troopers to fall back gradually, resisting the 
 enemy, so as to give the infantry time to come up and form 
 its lines. This was soon effected ; and the moment the Con- 
 federates caught sight of the advancing bayonets, they ceased 
 their pressure and began to give ground. Then Sheridan, 
 sounding the order to mount, dashed with his cavalry and 
 placed it on the enemy's left flank. He was just about to 
 charge on the trains and confused mass, when one bearing a 
 white flag emerged from the Confederate Imes with a letter 
 
620 CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 from General Lee, requesting a suspension of hostilities look- 
 ing to a surrender, and an interview with General Grant. 
 This meeting was had at a dwelling in Appomattox Court- 
 house, where the rival chieftains, sitting together at a deal 
 table, reduced to form the act that put out of existence the 
 Army of Northern Yirginia. The agreement was embodied 
 in the two following papers : 
 
 Appomattox Couethouse, Va., 
 April 9, 1865. 
 
 Generai. : — In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th 
 instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia 
 on the following terms — to wit : Rolls of all the officers and men to be made 
 in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me, the 
 other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. The offi- 
 cers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the United 
 States \mtil properly exchanged ; and each company or regimental commander 
 to sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and 
 public property to be packed and stacked, and turned over to the officers ap- 
 pointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms of the 
 officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man 
 will be allowed to return to his home, not to be distm^bed by United States au- 
 thority so long as they observe theii* paroles and the laws in force where they 
 may reside. 
 
 U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
 
 Geneeal R. E. Lkb. 
 
 Hbadqxiaetees Aemt of Nokthern Virginia, 
 April 9, IStf.i. 
 
 General :— I have received your letter of this date containing the terms ol 
 the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. As they 
 are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, 
 they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the 
 Btipulations into effect. 
 
 R. E. Lee, General 
 
 Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant. 
 
 These terms were, on the part of General Grant, liberal and 
 magnanimous ; and that officer displayed throughout the 
 transaction soldierly delicacy. 
 
 In the course of the afternoon, the result of this momentous 
 interview became known to both armies, and then all the in- 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 621 
 
 tense, yet strangely diverse emotions which the intelhgence 
 was calculated to evoke, broke out in manifestations that pass 
 all words of description. On the Union side there was joy 
 unmixed and unrestrained — the joy of men that had gone 
 through great tribulation, the joy of an army that, often un- 
 fortunate and ever unappreciated, saw at length unparalleled 
 labors crowned by illustrious success. On the Confederate 
 side there was a kind of joy, too — such sad joy as men feel 
 when a long agony is over. Yet there could not fail to be 
 deep anguish in their hearts ; and this burst forth when Gen- 
 eral Lee rode through the ranks. " Wliole hues of battle," 
 says an eye-witness, " rushed up to their beloved old chief, 
 and, choking with emotion, struggled with each other to wring 
 him once more by the hand. Men who had fouglit throughout 
 the war, and knew what the agony and humiliation of that mo- 
 ment must be to him, strove with a refinement of unselfishness 
 and tenderness which he alone could fvilly appreciate, to 
 lighten his burden and mitigate his pain. With tears pouring 
 down both cheeks. General Lee at length commanded voice 
 enough to say : ' Men, we have fought through the war to- 
 gether. I have done the best that I could for you.' Not an 
 eye that looked on that scene was dry." 
 
 As the armies were enemies no longer, there was no need of 
 martial array that night, nor fear of surprise, nor call to 
 arms ; but hostile devisement gave place to mutual helpfulness, 
 and the victors shared their rations with the famished van- 
 quished. In that supreme moment these men knew and re- 
 spected each other. If the one army drank the joy of victory, 
 and the other the bitter draught of defeat, it was a joy moder- 
 ated by the recollection of the cost at which it had been pur- 
 chased, and a defeat mollified by the consciousness of many 
 triumphs. If the victors could recall a Malvern Hill, an Antie- 
 tam, a Gettysburg, a Five Forks, the vanquished could recall a 
 Manassas, a Fredericksburg, a Chancellorsville, a Cold Har- 
 bor. If at length the army of Northern Virginia fell before 
 the massive power of the North, yet what vitality had it 
 shown ! How terrible had been the struggle ! How many 
 
(522 CAIVIPAIGNS OF THE AEMT OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 hundreds of thousands of brave men had fallen before that 
 result could be achieved ! And this is the glory of the Army 
 of the Potomac, that it brought to the ground the adversary 
 which had ever been the head and front of the revolt, and that 
 in crushing it, it quelled the rebellion. For so decisive upon 
 the issue of the war was the surrender of that army, that the 
 capitulation of all the other Confederate armies followed as a 
 corollary therefrom, and the structure of the Confederacy, 
 losing its key-stone, fell with a resounding crash. 
 
 Three days after the surrender, the Confederates marched 
 by divisions to a designated spot in the neighborhood of 
 Appomattox Courthouse, and there the troops stacked their 
 arms and deposited their accoutrements. Less than eight 
 thousand presented themselves with muskets in their hands ; 
 but the capitulation included, in addition, about eighteen thou- 
 sand unarmed. Paroles were then distributed to the men, and 
 the Army of Northern Virginia passed out of existence. 
 
 The Union troops then retraced their steps to Richmond, 
 whence they were soon afterwards transferred to Washington. 
 Here uniting with their illustrious sister-army of the West, 
 they passed in review before the President and his cabinet, 
 and the representatives of foreign powers, and an immense 
 concourse of citizens, who with great rejoicings welcomed 
 home the men whose valor had won the peace that now 
 reigned over all the land. When the pageant was ended, the 
 troops were mustered out of service, and the men, doflSng 
 the Union blue, were quietly reabsorbed into the body of 
 society. 
 
 Thus the Army of the Potomac — that mighty creation of 
 the patriotism of a free people, which for four years had 
 waged a struggle unparalleled in its continuous intensity — 
 ceased to be, closing its career in the world and the world's 
 wars by the happy re-establishment of the Union for which 
 it had fought. 
 
 What it belonged to me to say of this army is now com- 
 pleted. It is worthy of, and will doubtless find, a better his- 
 torian. Yet, inadequate as is the performance, I am con- 
 
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN. 623 
 
 scions of lifiving -uToiiglit with a laudable aim — to wit : to 
 speak tlie truth with candor, and to challenge for that army 
 the recognition which is justly its due, but which has not 
 yet been accorded it — the work it did and the circum- 
 stances under which it was done being both little under- 
 Btood. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 Page 58. Generalship at Bull Run. 
 
 My statement in regard to the tactical errors at Bull Run, in regard to 
 McDowell's attacking in fractions, is fully borne out by General Johnston, 
 who also adds some very frank avowals of error on his own part. 
 
 "The [Confederate] Army of the Potomac, exclusive of the garrison of the 
 intrenched position at Manassas Junction, amounted then to about nineteen 
 thousand men of all arms. A large proportion of it was not engaged in the 
 battle. This was a great fault on my part. When Bee's and Jackson's bri- 
 gades were ordered to the vicinity of the Stone Bridge, those of Holmes and 
 Early should have been moved to the left also, and placed in the interval on 
 Bonham's left, if not then, certainly at nine o'clock, when a Federal column 
 was seen turning our left ; and when it seemed certain that General Mc- 
 Dowell's great effort was to be made there, Bonham's, Longstreet's, Jones's, 
 and Ewell's brigades, leaving a few regiments and their cavalry to impose 
 on Miles's division, should have been hurried to the left to join in the battle. 
 
 " If the tactics of the Federals had been equal to their strategy, we should 
 have been beaten. If, instead of being brought into action in detail, their 
 troops had been formed in two lines with a proper reserve, and had assailed 
 Bee and Jackson in that order, the two Southern brigades must have been 
 swept from the field in a few minutes, or enveloped. General McDowell 
 would have made such a formation, probably, had he not greatly under-esti- 
 mated the strength of his enemy."— Gen. J. E. Johnston: "Narrative," 
 pages 56-57. 
 
 Page 59. Question op Pursuit after Bull Run. 
 
 On this question General Johnston and Mr. Davis have in late years fought 
 their battles over again, Mr. Davis stating that he was in favor of vigorous pur- 
 suit, and General Johnston not only reiterating his statement of the impossi- 
 bility of an effectual following up of the Federal army, but asserting that Mr. 
 Davis '■'■ gave no onlers, and expressed neitlier wish nor opinion on the subject, 
 that ever came to my kn/)wledge. " 
 
 Regarding the following-iip. General Johnston writes : " All the military con- 
 ditions, we knew, forbade an attempt on Washington. The Confederate army 
 was more disorganized by victory than that of the United States by defeat. 
 
626 APPENDIX. 
 
 . , . . Bei?ides this condition of our army the reasons for the conrse con- 
 demned by the non-comb<atant military critics were : 
 
 •'The unfitness of our raw troops for marching or assailing intrenchments. 
 
 "The want of the necessary supplies of food and ammunition, and meann 
 of transporting tliem. Until near August 10th, we never had rations for more 
 than two days, and sometimes none, nor half enough ammunition for a battle. 
 
 " The fortifications upon which skilful engineers had been engaged since 
 April, manned by at least fifty thousand Federal troops, half of whom had 
 not suffered defeat. 
 
 " The Potomac, a mile wide, bearing United States vessels of war, the heavy 
 guns of which commanded the wooden bridges and the Southern shore."— 
 Gen. J. E. Johnston : "Narrative," pages 60-61. 
 
 In regard to Mr. Davis's opinion of the propriety of pursuit. General John- 
 ston quotes, from Alfriend's "Life of Jefferson Davis," these statements: 
 "Mr. Davis was far from approving the inaction which followed Manassas. 
 He confidently expected a different use of the victory. . . . Indeed, be- 
 fore leaving Manassas, President Davis favored the most vigorous pursuit 
 practicable. And that he contemplated immediate activity as a sequel of 
 Manassas is a matter of indisputable record." 
 
 To these assertions General Johnston, as has been seen, gives a flat denial, 
 adding : " He (Davis) expressed none of the ' views ' and opinions ascribed to 
 him in the biography, and gave me no orders for movements of troops, and 
 discussed no matters concerning the army, except such as related to adminis- 
 tration. The fact that he gave no instructions in relation to the employment 
 of the army, nor orders to make an}- aggressive movement, nor even suggested 
 such, proves conclusively that he thought none expedient, and was satisfied 
 with the victory as it was." — Gen. J. E. Johnston : "Narrative," page 64. 
 
 It is now time to introduce Mr. Jefferson Davis himself, who in his "Rise 
 and Fall of the Confederate Government" (Vol. I., pp. 352-3), says: "At a 
 late hour of the night, I had a conference with Generals Johnston and Beau- 
 regard ; the Adjutant-General of the latter, Colonel Jordan, was present. . . . 
 When, after some preliminary conversation, I asked whether any troops had 
 been sent in pursuit of the enemy, I was answered in the negative. Upon 
 further inquiry as to what troops were in the best position for pursuit, and had 
 been least fatigued during the day. General Bonham's brigade was named. . . . 
 I at once dictated an order for immediate pursuit." 
 
 In corroboration of this, Mr. Davis quotes Adjutant-General Jordan as fol- 
 lows : " Mr. Davis with much animation asserted the necessity for an urgent 
 pursuit that night by Bonham," a statement which, however, it is diflicult to 
 reconcile with another in the same letter, namely: Mr. Davis did not "dis- 
 play the least disposition to interfere by opinion or authority touching what 
 the Confederate forces should or should not do." 
 
 It is no less puzzling to understand the following endorsement by General 
 Beaiiregard of Adjutant-General Jordan's letter from which the above extracts 
 are made : " The account given herewith by General Jordan of what occurred 
 there respecting further pursuit that night agrees with my own recollection." 
 
APPENDIX. 627 
 
 Pages 102-3. Genekal Johnston's Theory op Defending Richmond. 
 
 General Johnston gives empliatic corroboration of the statement licre made 
 that he did not believe in the policy of making a stand at Yorktown any 
 longer than would somewhat delay McClellan's advance, and in fact did nut 
 believe in the attempt to hold the Peninsula at all. He says: "I was con- 
 vinced that we could do no more on the Peninsula than delay General Mc- 
 Clellan's progress toward Richmond, and that, if he found our intrenchments 
 too strong to be carried certainly and soon, he could pass around them by 
 crossing York River. It seemed to me the more probable, however, that he 
 would open York River to his vessels by demolishing our water-batteries, and 
 passing us by water, unless tempted, by discovering the weakness of our un- 
 finished works between Yorktown and the head of the inundations, to force 
 his way through our line there." General Johnston also adds an interesting 
 statement of his views as to the proper campaign for the defence of Richmond. 
 
 " Instead of only delaying the Federal army in its approach, I projaosed that 
 it should be encountered in front of Richmond, by one quite as numerous, 
 formed by uniting there all the available forces of the Confederacy in North 
 Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, with those at Norfolk, on the Penin- 
 sula, and then near Richmond, including Smith's and Longstreet's divisions, 
 which had arrived. The great army thus formed, surprising that of the 
 United States by an attack when it was expecting to besiege Richmond would 
 be almost certain to win ; and the enemy, defeated a hundred miles from 
 Fort Monroe, their place of refuge, could scarcely escape destruction. Such a 
 victory woiild not only decide the campaign but the war, while the present 
 plan could produce no deci.sive result." — Gen. Johnston: "Narrative," 
 page 113. 
 
 It seems, however, that in stating that General Lee agreed with General 
 Johnston in pronouncing the peninsula untenable, I was in error. The latter 
 officer distinctly states that in a council of war held early in Aj^ril, General Lee 
 opposed the plan proposed. " He thought," srys Johnston, ' ' that the peninsula 
 had excellent fields of battle for a small army contending with a great one, 
 and that we should for that reason make the contest with McClellan's army 
 there. . . . The President, who previously had expressed no opinion on 
 the question, announced his decision in favor of General Lee's opinion " 
 (p. 115). 
 
 This statement of General Lee's views is confirmed by Mr. Davis ("Rise 
 and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. II., page 87). 
 
 General Johnston then adds: "The belief that events on the peninsula 
 would soon compel the Confederate government to adopt my method of op- 
 posing the Federal army, reconciled me somewhat to the necessity of obeying 
 the President's order " (p. 116). 
 
 Farther on (page 142), in narrating the events of Fair Oaks, where he was 
 wounded, and after which General Lee took command of the Confederate 
 army in Virginia, General Johnston remarks : " As soon as I had lost the com- 
 mand of the Army of Virginia by wounds in battle, my suggestion was adopted. 
 
628 APPENDIX. 
 
 In that way the largest Confederate army that ever fought was formed in the 
 month of June, by strengthening the forces near Richmond with troops from 
 North and South Carolina and Georgia." 
 
 One cannot refuse General Johnston this little chuckle at the practical vin- 
 dication of his plan. It may be worth noticing, in passing, that General John- 
 ston states that the additions to Lee's army in the interim between his taking 
 command and the operations attending the change of base (June 2t)th), 
 amounted, in the aggregate, to 53,000 men. But other Southern writers, in- 
 cluding Major Taylor, Colonel Marshall, and others, have each done his share 
 in reducing tliis number, till under the arithmetical manipulations of General 
 Early it dwindles to 23,000, and of Mr. Davis to 16,910. The sixteen in this 
 last total is probably an excess. But enough of such trifles. 
 
 Page 117. Franklin's Flank Movement ma West Point. 
 In the passage touching this matter some correction is required. I allow the 
 inference to be drawn that when Yorktown was evacuated, Franklin was or- 
 dered to land up the York River and attack Johnston's army in flank. It ap- 
 pears, however, that in reality he was ordered to land where he did, and send 
 back the transports immediately for more troops. The precise object of Frank- 
 lin's movement, of what was expected from it, and what resulted from it, will 
 ajipear from the following extract from a letter from General Franklin to the 
 present writer : " General McClellan did not order me to move into the interior 
 from West Point. On the contrary, after making a landing, I was to await the 
 arrival of Sedgwick's and Fitz John Porter's divisions. When attacked, the 
 morning after my landing was effected, I repulsed the attack, and was joined 
 the same day by Sedgwick, and the day after by Porter. Therefore, the state- 
 ment that I was held in check by the enemy is hardly correct. My picket line 
 was driven in, but, by repulsing the enemy, was re-established. When I left 
 Y'orktown for West Point I think General McClellan anticipated that the 
 enemy would make a heavier stand at Williamsburg, and therefore he intended 
 to concentrate a large turning force where I landed. We certainly were not 
 repulsed in the West Point fight, and that we were held in check by the 
 enemy is not the correct way to put it, because we had no intention to go for- 
 ward until joined by the troops I have named. I suppose I would have been 
 ordered to advance had not Johnston's main army got past the point where I 
 could have struck him before I was landed." 
 
 Page 118, General Sumner at Willtamsbttrg. 
 Since the date of original publication I have become convinced that in some 
 respects injustice is done to General Sumner in the account of the action at 
 Williamsburg. After the fall of Yorktown, General Sumner received an order 
 to go to the front and take command, without other instructions. He went on 
 with Smith's division, arriving at Williamsburg near night. He found that 
 Stoneman had attacked and failed, but that officer, Stoneman, insisted that it 
 was only a weak line of rifle-pits, and that he had no doubt the enemy had 
 gone. It appeared that General Heintzelman came up in the night with an 
 
APPENDIX. 629 
 
 order identical with General Sumner's to assume command. General Sumner 
 decided to get the troops up in hand to attack early in the morning. Keys re- 
 ceived positive verbal and written orders to have Casey's division there at 
 dawn, hut did not get it there till noon, allowing Kearney to pass him on the 
 road. Hooker came up and attacked without orders (from Sumner at least), 
 and the sound of his firing was the lirst intimation Sumner had of Hooker's 
 movements. Smith could not be withdrawn, but the first troops that came 
 up (Kearney's) were sent to Hooker. From these facts it would appear that 
 General Keys was to blame. 
 
 "While I think this statement due to the memory of General Sumner, there 
 does not appear to be anything to contravene my general verdict " that his 
 conduct of affairs at Williamsburg was marked by great confusion." 
 
 General J. E. Johnston says : " At ten o'clock, when the action had lasted 
 more than four hours, there seemed to be so little vigor in the enemy's con- 
 duct that I became convinced that it was a mere demonstration intended to 
 delay our march — that the Federal army might pass u,s by water. . . . .:\s the 
 Federal army, except Franklin's division had marched but nine miles to th*^ 
 field the day before, by two roads, one cannot understand why four or even 
 six divisions, if necessary, were not brought into action. The smallness of the 
 force engaged on this occasion greatly strengthened my suspicion that the 
 army itself was moving up York River in ti-ansports. " — Gen. J. E. Johxstox : 
 " Narrative," pages 120-124. 
 
 It was at Williamsburg that General Hooker won the sobriquet "Fighting 
 Joe,'' but he did so in the foolhardy and unauthorized attack which cost many 
 precious lives. 
 
 Pages 186, 187. GE^-ERAL Firz Johx Porter and General Pope. 
 
 To the Fitz John Porter question, as stated in the foot note to page 186, there 
 has been a long sequel. General Porter began to make efforts for a re-hearing 
 soon after the court-martial. He appealed to President Lincoln in I860, to 
 President Johnson in 1867, and to President Grant in 1869 and 1874. "My 
 appeals," says General Porter, " were never refused, but were never granted." 
 Finally, in June, 1878, a board was ordered to convene at West Point for the 
 purpose of examining into the case. This board consisted of Generals Scho- 
 field, Terry, and Getty. After a " very thorough examination of all the evi- 
 dence," it, in March, 1879, made a report from which I make the following 
 extracts : 
 
 " If the 4.30 order had been promptly delivered, a very grave responsibility 
 would have devolved upon General Porter. The order was based upon condi- 
 tions which were essentially erroneous, and upon expectations which could 
 not possibly be realized. 
 
 " It required an attack upon the enemy's flank or rear, which could not be 
 made, and that the attacking force keep closed on Reynolds, who was far to 
 the right and beyond reach. Yet it would have been too late to correct the 
 error and have the order modified. That order appeared to be part of a gen- 
 eral pLan. It must be executed promptly or not at all. If Porter had made 
 
630 APPKISTDIX. 
 
 not the imposs'ble attack which was ordered, but a direct attack upon the 
 enemy's right wing, would he have been blameless for the fruitless sacrilice of 
 his troops ? We believe not. It is a itell-eatablislied military r)uixim that a 
 co7'j)s c</)iimander is not justifiable in making an apparently hopeless attack in 
 chedience to an order from a superior wlio is not an the spot, and who is evidently 
 in. error in respect to the essential conditions upon loliicJi the order is based. The 
 duty of the corps commander in such a case is to make not a real attack, but a 
 strong demonstration, so as to prevent the enemy in his front from sending 
 reinforcements to other parts of his line. 
 
 " This is all that Porter would have been justifiable in doing, even ii he had 
 received the 4.30 order at 5 o'clock ; and such a demonstration, or even a real 
 attack made after 5 o'clock by Porter alone, could have had no beneficial effect 
 whatever upon the general result. It would not have diminished in the least 
 the resistance offered to the attacks made at other points that afternoon. The 
 display of troops made by Porter earlier in the afternoon had all the desired 
 and all possible beneficial effect. It caused Longstreet's reserve division to be 
 sent to his extreme right in front of Porter's position. There that division re- 
 mained xmtil about 6 o'clock — too late for it to take any effective part in the 
 operations at other points of the line. 
 
 "A powerful and well-sustained attack by the combined forces of Porter's 
 corps and King's division upon the enemy's right wing, if it had been com- 
 menced early in the afternoon, might have drawn to that part of the field so 
 large a part of Longstreet's force as to have given Pope some chance of success 
 against Jackson ; but an attack by Porter alone could have been but an ineffec- 
 tive blow, destructive only to the force that made it, and, followed by a coun- 
 ter-attack, disastrous to the Union army. Such an attack, under such circum- 
 stances, icould have been not only a great blunder, but, on the part of an intelli- 
 gent officer, it icould have been a great crime. 
 
 "What General Porter actually did do, although his situation was by no 
 means free from embarrassment and anxiety at the time, now seems to have 
 been only the simple, necessary action which an intelligent soldier had no 
 choice but to take. It is not possible that any court-martial could have con- 
 demned such conduct if it had been correctly understood. On the contrary, that 
 conduct was obedient, subordinate, faithful, and judicious. It saved the Union 
 army from disaster on the 29th of August. . . . Foi-timately that order 
 did not reach Porter until about sunset— too late for any attack to be made. 
 Any attack which Porter could have made at any time that afternoon must 
 necessarily have been fruitless of any good result. Porter^s faithful, subordi- 
 nate, and intelligent conduct that afternoon saved the Union army from the defeat 
 which would otherwise have res^dted that day from (he enemy^s more speedy con- 
 centration. The only seriously critical period of that campaign, viz., between 
 11 A.M. and sunset of August 29th, was thus safely passed. Porter had under- 
 stood and appreciated the military situation, and, so far as he had acted upon 
 his own judgment, his action had been wise and judicious. For the disaster 
 of the succeeding day he was in no degree responsible. Whoever else may 
 IwLve been responsible, it did not floiD from any action or inaction of his. . . . 
 
APPENDIX. 631 
 
 " General Porter was, in effect, condemned for not having taken any part 
 in his own battle. Sucli was the error upon wliich General Porter was pro- 
 nounced guilty of the most shameful crime known among soldiers. We be- 
 lieve not one among all the gallant soldiers on that bloody field was less deserving 
 of such condemnation tlum he. . . . Having thus given the reasons for our 
 conclusions, we have the honor to report, in accordance with the President's 
 order, that, in our opinion, justice requires at his hands such action as may 
 be necessary to annul and set aside the findings and sentence of the court- 
 martial in the case of Major-General Fitz Jolin Porter, and to restore him to 
 the positions of which that sentence deprived him — such restoration to take 
 effect from the date of his dismissal from the service." 
 
 The following letter from General Grant to President Arthur will be found 
 interesting in this connection : 
 
 New York, December 22, 1881. 
 The President, Washington, D.C. : 
 
 Dear Sir — At the request of General Fitz John Porter I have recently re- 
 viewed his trial and the testimony furnished before the Schofield court of in- 
 quiry, held in 1879, giving to the subject three full days of careful reading and 
 consideration and much thought in the intervening time. The reading of 
 the whole of this record has thoroughly convinced me that, for these nineteen 
 j^ars, I have been doing a gallant and efficient soldier a very great injiistice in 
 thought and sometimes in speech. I feel it incumbent upon me now to do 
 whatever lies in my power to remove from him and from his family the stain 
 upon his good name. I feel this the more incumbent upon me than I should 
 if I had been a corps commander only, or occupying any other command in 
 the army than the one which I did ; but, as general, I had it possibly in my 
 power to have obtained for him the hearing which he only got at a later day ; 
 and, as President, I certainly had the power to have ordered that hearing. In 
 Justification for my injustice to General Porter I can only state that, shortly 
 after the war closed, his defence was brought to my attention, but I read it in 
 connection with a sketch of the field where his offences were said to have been 
 committed, which I now see, since perfect maps have been made by tlie engi- 
 neers' department of the whole field, were totally incorrect as showing the 
 position of the two armies. I have read it in connection with statements 
 made on the other side against General Porter, and I am afraid, possibly, with 
 some little prejudice in the case, although General Porter was a man whom I 
 personally knew and liked before ; but I got the impression, with many others, 
 that there was a half-hearted support of General Pope in his campaigns, and 
 that General Porter, while possibly not more guilty than others, happened to 
 be placed in a position where he could be made responsible for his indiffer- 
 ence, and that the punishment was not a severe one for such an offence. I 
 am now convinced that he rendered faithful, efficient, and intelligent service, 
 and the fact that he was retained in command of a corps for months after his 
 oTences were said to have been committed is in his favor. What I would ask, 
 in General Porter's behalf, from you is that, if you can possibly give the time, 
 
632 APPENDIX. 
 
 you give the subject the same study and thought tliat I have given it, and 
 then act as your judgment may dictate. But, feeling that you will not have 
 the time for such an investigation (for it would take several days' time) I 
 would ask that the whole matter be laid before the attorney-general for his ex- 
 amination and opinion. Hoping that you will be able to do this much for an 
 oflScer who has suffered for nineteen years a punishment that never should be 
 inflicted upon any but the most guilty, I am very truly yours, 
 
 U. S. Grant. 
 
 I may be permitted to remark that when, in 1866, I came into possession of 
 the Confederate official reports, and felt it to be my duty to cite them in evi- 
 dence (General Porter had then never seen these Reports, nor had I ever seen 
 him), I was most unmercifully berated as a "copperhead" and friend of 
 traitors. But, " the whirligig of time brings in his revenges." 
 
 Page 201. Lee's Lost Order. 
 The following is the text of the order referred to : 
 
 SPEciAii Orders No. 191. 
 
 Headquarters Army op Northern ViRGnsriA, 
 September 9, 1862. 
 
 The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the Hagerstown road. 
 General Jackson's command will form the advance, and after passing Middle- 
 town, with such portion as he may select, take the route toward Sharpsbvirg, 
 cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and by Friday night take 
 possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and capture such of the 
 enemy as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape 
 from Harper's Ferry. 
 
 General Longstreet's command will pursue the same road as far as Boons- 
 boro, where it will halt with the reserve, supply, and baggage trains of the 
 army. 
 
 General McLaws, with his own division and that of General R. H. Ander- 
 son, will follow General Longstreet ; on reaching Middletown, he will take the 
 route to Harper's Ferry, and by Friday morning possess himself of the Mary- 
 land Heights, and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper's Ferry and 
 vicinity. 
 
 General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the object in which 
 he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford, ascend the right 
 bank to Lovettsville, take possession of Loudoun Heights, if practicable, by Fri- 
 day morning, Key's Ford on his left and the road between the end of the 
 mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, co- 
 operate with General McLaws and General Jackson in intercepting the retreat 
 of the enemy. 
 
 General D. H. Hill's division will form the rear-guard of the army, punsiaing 
 the road taken by the main body. The reserve artillery, ordnance, and sup- 
 ply trains, etc., will precede General Hill. 
 
APPENDIX. 633 
 
 General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands 
 of Generals Longstreet, Jacksou, and McLaws, and with the main body of 
 the cavalry will cover the route of the army and bring up all stragglers tliat 
 may have been left behind. 
 
 The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, after accom- 
 plishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main 
 body of the army at Boonsboro or Hagerstown. 
 
 Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes in the regimental 
 
 ordnance wagons, for use of the men at their encampments, to procure wood, 
 
 etc. 
 
 By command of General R. L. Lee. 
 
 R. H. Chilton, 
 
 Assistant Adjutant-Gemral. 
 
 Major-General D. H. Hill, 
 
 Commanding Division. 
 
 It seems that at this time General D. H. Hill's division had not been attached 
 to nor incorporated with either of the two wings of the army of Northern Vir- 
 ginia, so that in addition to the copies sent to corps commanders, one copy of 
 this order was sent to "General D. H. Hill, Commanding Division," directly 
 from Lee's headquarters. General Jackson also sent Hill a copy, regarding 
 Hill as in his command. It was one of these copies that fell into McClellan'a 
 hands. 
 
 Page 252. Humphreys' Charge on Marye Height. 
 
 The circumstances of Humphreys' assault deserve fuller mention than I 
 have made, for the charge was marked by a gallantry unsurpassed by any- 
 thing in the history of the war. General Palfrey, in his admirable mono- 
 graph on Fredericksburg (in Scribner's "Campaigns of the Civil War" series) 
 says: " Some of the very best fighting that was done at Fredericksburg was 
 done by the Third Division of the Fifth Corps. The division was com- 
 manded by General Humphreys, who was probably the best officer in the 
 Army of the Potomac that day. He was a thoroughly educated soldier, pos- 
 sessed of a quick eye and a clear head, and a man of fiery energy. That the 
 fighting his division did was so good was due to him." 
 
 I venture to extract from a private letter from General Humphreys to the 
 present writer, dated May 10, 1866, the following particulars, which give an 
 even more vivid picture of his assault than is found in his official report. 
 
 "I had just reached the edge of the town facing Marye Heights with my 
 division, when, at the urgent request of General Couch, I was authorized or 
 ordered to support his troops in front of the stone wall, who, he said, were 
 nearly out of ammunition, and would, if not supported, be forced back. 
 
 "This was a very great mistake. Had the enemy come out from the stone 
 wall we should have carried the position. I moved forward at once with my 
 division down the hill and across the ditch or canal, formed the leading bri- 
 gade in the ravine beyond the ditch about three or four hundred yards from 
 the stone wall, and advanced in line of battle to where Couch's men were 
 
634 APPENDIX. 
 
 lying behind a small fold iu the ground about one hundred and fifty yards or 
 less from the stone wall, the existence of which I knew nothing of until I got 
 there. I saw at once that there was nothing to be done but to try the bayonet, 
 which I attempted with this brigade, but could not carry the wall, chielly be- 
 cause my troops were thrown into disorder by the men lying, several ranks 
 deep, behind the little fold in the ground I have already mentioned. I had 
 ordered my other brigade to form iu the same ravine as it came up, and move 
 up to me, and now rode back toward it. It was at this time that I found the 
 artillery Hooker had put on the edge of the ravine, just in the very ground 
 my troops must pass over. I was obliged to go to every gun myself to put a 
 stop to their firing.' I then led forward my other brigade, which was thrown 
 into confusion by the masses of men lying down at the place I have already 
 mentioned, Jhe little fold in the ground. I had cautioned my troops about 
 these men, and told them not to mind them, but to run over them. But the 
 brigade was thrown into an uuwieldly mass in "going over or through them, 
 and the officers and men were mixed up so that the former lost all control of 
 the latter. Notwithstanding this the impetus with which they were moving 
 carried them close up to the wall, the right being actually on it, and the left 
 nearer to the wall than any other troops had reached, when some firing began 
 in the column or mass, which halted and turned slowly back. One minute 
 more and we should have been over the wall, which I am confident I should 
 have carried but for the disorder occasioned by the troops lying down whom I 
 was sent to support. If they liad been withdrawn before I moved forward a 
 different result would have followed. I tried to get them up to make them 
 charge with me, but could not stir them. I stopped their firing, however. 
 Every officer of my staff but one was dismounted, and his horse was badly 
 wounded. Pour of my staff were wounded. I lost two horses. So near was 
 I to carrying the wall and heights that the enemy were actually moving 
 their guns out of the batteries, and near our right they were beginning to 
 quit the wall. It was getting to be dark wlien the charge was over. It was 
 when I was returning to lead my last brigade to the charge that I received 
 messages for the first time from General Hooker and from General Butterfield, 
 
 1 The point is a small one, but it would seem that General Humphreys was deceived by Gen- 
 eral Hooker's report in the matter of the placing of the guns. That admirable officer, the late 
 Colonel C. H. Morgan, then on General Couch's staff, wrote me before his death : " Hooker re- 
 ported wrongly about those two batteries. Couch sent me down to examine the ground, and 
 afterward I put them in. One was Hazard's, the other Frank's New York." 
 
 The same writer adds the following in regard to General Couch's views respecting the point 
 of attack : " During the whole day Couch had been anxious to make an effort on his right, seeing 
 success in front was impracticable. But as fast as he made preparations for this his troops (How- 
 ard's) were called to the support of French and Hancock. When Hooker came on the field Gen- 
 eral Couch went to him and told him that he thought if success was possible it would be by an 
 attack on the right noarer the Taylor House. Hooker treated Couch with such coldness, not to 
 say contempt, that his sensitive and chivalric nature was deeply touched, and he rode away in 
 silence, going straight to the front, clear up to the little brick house, and farther to the front, I 
 think, than any horseman got that day and returned in safety. I knew his peculiarities well, 
 and believe he was indifferent to a courted death, being stung to the quick by Hooker's apparent 
 contempt of his suggestions." 
 
APPENDIX. 635 
 
 saying that General Burnside said the heights must be taken before night. I 
 sent them word I had tried the bayonet with one brigade, and was now going 
 to try it with the other. General Hooker and General Butterfield had re- 
 turned from General Burnside while I was occupied with my leading brigade, 
 .iiid the former mistook the charge of the second brigade for the charge of 
 my division, hence the error of his testimony. I went over the ground on 
 my march to Washington in May of last year, and found that the distances 
 were even less than those I gave in my official report of the part taken in the 
 battle by my division. The first brigade that charged was commanded by 
 Colonel Allabach, the second was commanded by Brigadier-General E. B. 
 Tyler." 
 
 Page 273. Hooker's Strategy at Chancellorsville. 
 
 From a statement made by General Lee to the writer at Lexington, Va. , In 
 1867, it appears that some deduction must be made from the credit given 
 General Hooker for the "secrecy " of the manoeuvres on Chancellorsville. "I 
 see," said General Lee, "that you give General Hooker credit for the secrecy 
 of his operations in crossing the river, and say I ' was surprised.' In most ca,ses 
 this talk of surprises is imaginative. General Stuart was a very vigilant officer, 
 and kept me thoroughly informed of every movement of the Federal forces. 
 But I could not act until Hooker had shown his hand, for I did not know 
 whether his manoeuvre was against Fredericksburg or against my communica- 
 tions. When, however, he reached Chancellorsville, I knew exactly the char- 
 acter of the operation, and, making a change of front, I went there and met 
 him. " 
 
 Page 355. Meade's Alleged Intei^ion to Retreat after the Combat 
 OP July 2, 1863. 
 
 "When the corps commanders came together that night, there was a 
 unanimous determination to fight it out at Gettysburg — a sentiment which 
 was quite in accord with General Meade's own conviction." 
 
 The latter part of this statement is contradicted by Major-General Abner 
 Doubleday, commanding the Third Division of the First Corps at Gettysburg, 
 
 in a volume entitled "Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," 1882. 
 
 General Doiibleday says : 
 
 "At night a council of war was held, in which it was unanimously voted to 
 stay and fight it out. Meade was displeased with the result, and, although he 
 acquiesced in the decision, he said angrily, ' Have it your own way, gentle- 
 men, but Gettysburg is no place to fight a battle in.' . . . There can be no 
 question tJuU at tJie council referred to General Meade did desire to retreat" 
 fpages 184, 183). 
 
 It is to be supposed that so grave a charge made by a subordinate against his 
 superior officer, and couched in terms so emphatic and unqualified, is sustained 
 by an array of testimony incontestable by its weight and volume. 
 
636 APPENDIX. 
 
 General Doubleday does not produce one scintilla of testimony in support of 
 his accusation, which, thus unsupported, assumes a very grave character in view 
 of the following emphatic denial by that high-minded soldier, General Meade: 
 " I utterly deny, under the full solemnity and sanctity of my oath, and in 
 the firm conviction that the day will come when the secrets of all men shall 
 be made known — I utterly deny ever having intended or thought, for one 
 instant, to withdraw that army, unless the military contingencies which the 
 future should develop during the coarse of the day might render it a matter 
 of necessity that the army should be withdrawn. I base this denial not only 
 upon my own assertion and my own veracity, but I shall also show to the 
 committee, from documentary evidence, the despatches and orders issued 
 by me at different periods during that day, that if I did intend any such 
 operation, I was at the same time doing things totally inconsistent with any 
 such intention." (Report of Committee on Conduct of the War, pages 350 and 
 436). 
 
 General Doubleday was not present at the council of corps commanders (not 
 being a corps commander), and from no corps commander who was present was 
 there ever testimony of aught in substantiation of General Doubleday's accusa- 
 tion. It is accordingly a matter of some curiosity to ascertain on whose authority 
 he ventured to assert that General Meade wanted to retreat after the battle of 
 July 2d. Let lis supply this omission by citing the witness, who, though un- 
 honored by mention on the part of General Doubleday, furnishes the sole tes- 
 timony on which that officer's momentous charge is based. This witness is 
 Major-General Daniel Butterfield, who, during the battle of Gettysburg, served 
 as chief-of-staff to General Meade. Before citing this officer's statement, how- 
 ever, the following fact should be borne in mind. General Butterfield had 
 served as chief-of-staff to General Hooker. When, on June 2Sth, General 
 Meade assumed command of the Army of the Potomac, he chose as his chief- 
 of-staff that ideal soldier, General A. A. Humphreys, who, however, expressed 
 a wish not to assume the position till after the coming battle. It may well be 
 that General Butterfield was apprised of the fact that he was to give place to 
 General Humphreys, which, in point of fact, he did a few days after the 
 battle. 
 
 In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, General 
 Butterfield said : " After the council had finished, General Meade arose from 
 the table and remarked that in his opinion Gettysburg was no place to fight a 
 battle ; but it was settled to remain there, and the council dispersed." 
 
 This, so far as appears, is the slender foundation on which General Double- 
 day bases the assertion, " There can be no question that at the council referred 
 to General Meade did desire to retreat." ' 
 
 ' It will be observed that even Butterfield's statement affords no ground for Doubleday's dec- 
 laration quoted above, bo that his accusation is left naked. It will also be observed by the curi- 
 ous reader that Doubleday's form of representing what Butterfield reported differs significantly 
 from the form of statement actually used by the latter officer. We are told by Doubleday that 
 Meade " said angrily," etc., and Butterfield's oratio obliqua is converted into a speech with 
 theatrical accessories. 
 
APPENDIX. 637 
 
 It is to be wished that General Doubleday had made this charge while its 
 subject was still alive.' 
 
 Pages 358-363. Pickett's Chauge at Gettysburg. 
 
 In connection with Pickett's attack, Colonel Taylor, in his "Four Years 
 with General Lee," makes against General Longstreet a serious charge, tlie 
 gravamen of which is that General Longstreet was instructed by General Lee 
 to support the assault of Pickett (strengthened on his left by Heth's division 
 and two brigades of Pender's) with his two other divisions, those of Hood 
 and McLaws (which constituted his right flank on and near the Emmetsburg 
 road), and that he failed to do so. 
 
 Colonel Taylor says (pp. 108-109): "General Lee then" [about 1 p.m., 
 July '3d] "had a conference with General Longstreet, and the mode of attack 
 and the troops to make it were thoroughly debated. I was present, and un- 
 derstood the arrangement to be that General Longstreet should endeavor to 
 force the enemy's lines in his front. That front was held by the divisions of 
 Hood and McLaws. To strengthen him for the undertaking, it was decided 
 to reinforce him by such troops as could be drawn from the centre. 
 It was designed originally that the two divisions last named, reinforced by 
 Fickett, should make the attack ; and it was only because of the apprehen- 
 sions of General Longstreet that his corps was not strong enough for the move- 
 ment that General Hill was called on to reinforce him. . . . The assault 
 was to have been made with a column of not less than two divisions, and the 
 remaining divisions were to have been moved forward in support of those in 
 advance. This was the result of the conference alluded to as understood by 
 me. . . . At a given signal the movement began, but the plan agreed on 
 was not carried out. . . . The divisions of Hood and McLaws (First 
 Corps) were passive spectators of the movement. . . . Was it designed to 
 throw these few brigades — originally, at the most, but two divisions — upon 
 the fortified stronghold of the enemy, while, full half a mile away, seven- 
 nintlis of the army in breathless suspense, in ardent admiration and fearful 
 anxiety, watched, but moved not ? I maintain that such was not the design 
 
 ■ We do not know whether the following extract from General Donbleday's testimony before 
 the Committee on the Conduct of the War will suggest any «nimus a.s entering into his estimate 
 of General Meade's conduct, but it is given for what it is worth. 
 
 " Question. Can you tell why, after that fight, General Howard and yourself were removed 
 from your command ? 
 
 " Answer. I was removed from the command of the First Corps. General Howard was not 
 removed from command of his corps, but was directed to obey General Hancock, who was hi3 
 junior, after the first day of the fight. 
 
 " Question.. Why was that? 
 
 "■ Ansioer. I think General Meade thought a couple of scapegoats were necessary ; in case the 
 next day's battle turned out unfavorably, he wished to mark his disapprobation of the first day's 
 fight. General Meade is in the habit of violatina: the organic law of the army to place his per- 
 sonal friends in power. There has always been a great deal of favoritism in the Army of the Po- 
 tomac. No man who is an anti-slavery man or an anti-McClellan man can expect decent treat. 
 mcnt in that army as at present constituted." (Page 311.) 
 
638 APPENDIX. 
 
 of the commanding general. Had the veteran divisions of Hood and McLawa 
 been moved forward, as was planned, in support of those of Pickett and Petti- 
 grew, ' not only would the latter division, in all probability, have gained the 
 enemy's works, as did that of Pickett, but these two would have been enabled, 
 with the aid of Hood and McLaws, to resist all efforts of the enemy to dis- 
 lodge them." 
 
 Under date of January 29, 1877, Colonel Taylor wrote to General Long- 
 street: "In regard to the third day's operations at Gettysburg, according to my 
 recollection, General Lee had a conference with you as to the attack to be 
 made that day, when it was determined that an assault should be made on 
 your front, by your corps, reinforced by Heth's division and two brigades of 
 Pender's. My re(5ollection is distinct in that aU, of your divisions were to take 
 part in the assault, and I never did understand why Hood and McLaws were 
 never ordered forward. Colonel Tenable agrees with me entirely in this par- 
 ticular." 
 
 To this General Longstreet replied, Febriaary 2, 1877: "In reply to your 
 inquiry for a statement in regard to the supposed orders of General Lee in 
 reference to the battle of the third day, I have only to say that General Lee 
 gave no orders for placing the divisions of McLaws and Hood in the column 
 of attack that day." 
 
 In a subsequent elaborate review of ' ' Lee in Pennsylvania, "in " Annals of 
 the War," General Longstreet adds : 
 
 "I may mention here that it has been absurdly said that General Lee or- 
 dered me to put Hood's and McLaws' Divisions in support of Pickett's assault. 
 General Lee never ordered any such thing.- After our troops were all ar- 
 ranged for assault, General Lee rode with me twice over the lines to see that 
 everything was arranged according to his wishes. He was told that we had 
 been more particular in giving the orders than ever before ; that the com- 
 manders had been sent for, and the point of attack had been carefully desig- 
 nated, and that the commanders had been directed to communicate to their 
 subordinates, and through them to every soldier in the command, the work 
 that was before them, so that they should nerve themselves for the attack, and 
 fully understand it. After leaving me, he again rode over the field once, if 
 not twice, so that there was really no room for misconstruction or misunder- 
 standing of his wishes. He could not have thought of giving any such an 
 order. Hood and McLaws were confronted by a largely superior force of the 
 enemy on the right of Pickett's attack. To have moved them to Pickett's 
 support would have disengaged treble their number of Federals, who would 
 
 1 " As they were ordered to do by General Lee, for I heard him give the orders when arranging 
 the fight, and called his attention to it long afterward, when there waa discussion about it. He 
 said, ' 1 know it ! I know it ! ' " — Colonel C. S. Venable. 
 
 2 In a foot-note General Longstreet writes: "Colonel Taylor says that General Lee, in his 
 presence, gave me orders to put Hood's and McLaws' Divisions in this column of attack. This 
 I deny, and do not suppose he will claim that any one else ' heard the order.' " It will be ob- 
 served that General Longstreet overlooks the important corroborative testimony of Colonel 
 Venable, also a member of General Lee's staff. 
 
APPENDIX. 639 
 
 have swooped down from tlicir rocky fastnesses against the flank of our at- 
 tacking column, and swept our army from the lield. A reference to any of 
 the maps of Gettysburg will show, from the position of the troops, that this 
 would have been the inevitable result. General Lee and myself never had 
 any deliberate conversation about Gettysburg. The subject was never 
 broached by either of us to the other. On one occasion it came up casually, 
 and he said to me (alluding to the charge of Pickett on the 3d), ' General, 
 why didn't you stop all that thing that day? ' I replied that I could not, 
 under the circumstances, assume such a responsibility, as no discretion had 
 been left me." 
 
 Pages 363-4. Lee's Resolution to Retreat. 
 
 The following interesting revelation of General Lee's mood of mind on the 
 night of the third day of the battle is given by General Imboden, to whom 
 General Lee intrusted the duty of transporting the Confederate wounded from 
 Gettysburg back to Virginia. 
 
 " When night closed upon the grand scene our army was repulsed. Silence 
 and gloom pervaded our camps. Wo knew that the day had gone against us, 
 but the extent of the disaster was not known except in high quarters. . . . 
 About eleven o'clock a horseman approached and delivered a message from 
 General Lee, that he wished to see me immediately. ... On reaching the 
 place indicated, a flickering, solitary candle, visible through the open front of 
 a common tent, showed where Generals Lee and (A. P.) Ilill were seated on 
 camp stools, with a county map spread i^pon their knees, and engaged in a 
 low and earnest conversation. They ceased speaking as I approached, and 
 after the ordinary salutations. General Lee directed me to go to his head- 
 quarters and wait for him. He did not return until about one o'clock, when 
 he came riding along at a slow walk and evidently wrapped in profound 
 thought. There was not even a sentinel on duty, and no one of his staff was 
 about. . . . The moon shone full upon his massive features, and revealed an 
 expression of sadness I had never seen upon that fine countenance before, in 
 any of the vicissitudes of the war through which he had passed. I remarked, 
 'General, this has been a hard day on you.' He looked up and replied 
 mournfully, ' Yes, it has been a sad, sad day for us. . . . We must return 
 to Virginia. ' " 
 
 Page 376. The Flank March on Centretille. 
 
 By General A. A. Humphreys, who was chief of staff of the Army of the 
 Potomac from July, 1863, to November, 1864, I am favored with the follow- 
 ing valuable notes on the interesting but complicated manoeuvres between 
 Generals Lee and Meade in October, 1863.' 
 
 " General Meade was contemplating a movement upon Lee by our right. 
 He and myself rode to Cedar Mountain on Friday, October 9th, to have a 
 better look at the country in the direction of a certain pass. We noticed the 
 
 > The map of Pope's campaij^n, opposite page 176, shows moet of the routes and poBitions. 
 
640 APPENDIX. 
 
 smoke of many camp fires about Madison Court House. We knew that a 
 movement of some kind was intended by General Lee, for a signal message of 
 the enemy to General Fitz Hugh Lee had been read, directing him to draw 
 three days' hard bread. ' Hard bread ' with Lee meant movement. We 
 took it to be a cavalry operation. We had not been long on the mountain 
 when information came from the Sixth Corps pickets tending to show that at 
 least some infantry was in motion, and before we left the mountain columns 
 of infantry as well as cavalry were across the upper Rapidan. Our cavalry 
 was thrown forward to ascertain the character of the movement. These, 
 toward Madison Court House, were supported by a division of infantry, but 
 it was not until Saturday evening, the lUth, that the true character of the 
 movement disclosed itself. Lee was, in our judgment, moving to Warrenton. 
 A large part of Lee's infantry was at that time on and across Hazel River, in 
 the vicinity of Turkey Hole Mountain. At that time the First, Fifth, and 
 Sixth Corps were near the Rapidan, the Third Corps was near Culpepper Court 
 House, and the Second Corps on Mountain Run (or Creek) not far from Stevens- 
 burg. Lee was as near to Warrenton as we were, perhaps nearer. The War- 
 renton pike and the railroad formed our line of communication with Wash- 
 ington. There were no parallel roads from the vicinity of Culpepper by 
 which the army could be moved and strike Lee in flank in the continuation 
 of his movement on Warrenton. There was but one road leading that way, 
 and had we attempted to move by that we should have found ourselves in the 
 rear, and pretty well in the rear of Lee. 
 
 "It was decided at once to move to Warrenton, and from that point move 
 forward to attack Lee, or force him to attack us. The orders were issued at 
 once, and the movement began. By Sunday afternoon the army was across 
 the Rappahannock en route to Warrenton. Gregg was sent up the Rappahan- 
 nock on Sunday toward Jefferson and Amissville across the roads Lee must 
 take to Warrenton, with orders to send the earliest intelligence of Lee to head- 
 quarters. So important did I deem it that Gregg should imderstand that it 
 was information of Lee's movements solely that he was after, that toward sun- 
 set I sent a staff officer to him with a despatch to that effect, enjoining upon 
 him the importance of the earliest information of the enemy. The staff officer 
 returned in the night, having delivered the despatch. 
 
 "Our cavalry under General Pleasonton had an affair with the enemy's cav- 
 alry near Culpepper Court House in the course of Sunday, but no infantry 
 appeared there. . . . From General Pleasonton's information and conver- 
 sation General Meade derived the impression that Lee had been probably mov- 
 ing on Culpepper Court House to fight us, instead of on Warrenton to get on 
 our line of communication, and force us to fight him on ground of his own 
 choosing. My conviction remained the same as it had been the night before. 
 In this state of uncertainty the movement of the troops to Warrenton the next 
 morning was suspended. Twelve o'clock of Monday the 12th passed, and not 
 a sound of shot in any direction had been heard nor one word from Gregg had 
 been received. 
 
 "It was at this time, between twelve and one o'clock of Monday, October 
 
APPENDIX. 641 
 
 12th, that General Meade finally decided to send the Fifth, Sixth, and Second 
 Corps back toward or to Culpepper Court House in search of the enemy. As 
 they advanced toward it our cavalry had some skirmishing with that of the 
 enemy, and some cannon shot were fired by them. The town was reached 
 about sunset, but Lee's army was not there. Not a sound of any kind had 
 been heard by us during Monday from the direction of Gregg, nor had one 
 word of information been received from him or any one else concerning Lee's 
 army. 
 
 " Near ten o'clock at night I received a despatcli from General Gregg, stating 
 that about noon he had encountered Lee's army near the Rappahannock mov- 
 ing toward Warrenton ; that after a severe contest he had been driven across 
 the Rappahannock, and was then at Fayetteville ; that Lee's army had been 
 crossing the river for several hours. Soon after this the pickets of the Third 
 Corps, the farthest up the river, began to be driven in by the enemy, who was 
 between us and Warrenton, and within a few miles of that town. General 
 Gregg stated verbally to me, at a subsequent day, that he had sent several mes- 
 sages to headquarters. None were received, nor was any explanation made as 
 to the cause of failure in his messengers to reach us. There must have been 
 a heavy cannonading going on about six miles from us, yet we did not hear a 
 sound. Forty guns, according to Gregg, were at one time at work. 
 
 " The army was at once got in motion, and by Tuesday evening the right of 
 the Third Corps was at Greenwich, the Second Corps at Auburn, the Fifth 
 Corps at Catlett's, the Sixth Corps on the railroad between Catlett's and Bris- 
 toe, and the First Corps near Bristoe. 
 
 "To determine what should next be done was the subject of long examination 
 and discussion by General Meade and myself. The area between Broad Run, 
 Cedar Run, the Warrenton Pike, and the railroad, was almost unknown to us. 
 So far as we knew the ground occupied by both armies, the advantage of 
 ground was all with the enemy. We could not fight on the pike and railroad 
 both, without subjecting the army to being overpowered on one or the other 
 flank, and if we did not hold these two roads and the intermediate ground, we 
 should be turned. We knew of no roads by which reserves or other disposa- 
 ble troops could be transferred rapidly from one point to the other. It was 
 concluded that the disadvantages of any position in the area mentioned were 
 too great to admit of its being adopted. 
 
 " The next position was beyond Broad Run, the right near Groveton, the left 
 near Manassas Junction. It was probable we could get into position here be- 
 fore the enemy could get on the ground. But we should have fought on the 
 old battlefield of Bull Run. That of itself was a grave objection to taking up 
 the position. We could without doubt take up the position of Centreville, 
 and for that the order was issued at a late hour of the night. General Sykes 
 with the Fifth Corps was across Broad Run at twelve o'clock on the 14th, when 
 General Meade and myself reached Bristol. He crossed above the bridge. 
 The Second Corps was to cross below. The general order for the movement 
 required the corps commanders to keep up constant communication with the 
 corps in front and rear of them, and mutually support each other. General 
 
642 APPENDIX. 
 
 Sykes was now directed not to move until the Second Corps came up, and 
 orders were sent forward to the Third Corps (in front or advance of the 
 Fifth), near Manassas Junction, to halt until the Fifth Corps began to move 
 again. It was expected that some force of the enemy would make its ap- 
 pearance at Bristoe, coming from Greenwich, on the road the Third Corps 
 had taken. 
 
 " When it was found Lee would not come forward to Centreville, and after 
 the army had one day's rest, orders were prepared for the forward movement, 
 but one of those heavy autumn rain-storms set in that flooded Bull Run so 
 that it was impassable, and our pontoon train had moved with the rest of the 
 trains to Fairfax Station, and the roads were blocked with trains coming for- 
 ward to the troops with supplies. Thus Lee had time to break up the railroad 
 between Bristoe and Warrenton Junction. That rain was one of Fortune's 
 favors to him." 
 
 Page 608. The Question of Lee's Supplies at Amelia Court House. 
 
 Jt will be seen that in the text weighty results are attributed to the failure 
 of General Lee to receive large supplies of commissary and quartermaster's 
 stores, which it is alleged he had ordered to be forwarded to Amelia Court 
 House. But from the statements of Mr. Davis it would appear that I was 
 misled by erroneous reports as to this matter. Mr. Davis quotes from General 
 I. M. St. John, Commissary-General of the Confederate Army, as follows: 
 "No calls, by letter or requisition, from the General commanding, or from 
 any other source, official or unofficial, had been received either by the Com- 
 missary-General or the Assistant Commissary-General; nor (as will be seen by 
 the appended letter of the Secretary of War) was any communication trans- 
 mitted through the department channels to the Bureau of Subsistence for the 
 collection of supplies at Amelia Court House." Mr. Davis also quotes General 
 John C. Breckenridge's letter to General St. John, as follows: "I have no 
 recollection of any communication from General Lee in regard to accumula- 
 tion of rations at Amelia Court House. . . . The second or third day after 
 the evacuation [of Richmond], I recollect you said to General Lee in my 
 presence that you had a large number of rations (I think eighty thousand) at a 
 convenient point on the railroad, and desired to know where you should place 
 them. The General replied that the military situation made it impossible to 
 answer. " 
 
 Mr. Davis makes citations from several other Confederate officials to the ef- 
 fect that no order to forward supplies to Amelia Court House was ever made, 
 or that, if made, it was never received ; but fully admits that the absence of 
 such supplies was a severe blow to the Confederate forces. "At Amelia 
 Court House Ewell's corps made a junction with Lee's army, but forced 
 marches with men, most of whom were untrained by previous campaigns, had 
 greatly reduced the number of Ewell's command, and the want of rations now 
 was impairing their efficiency" ("Rise and Fall of the Confederate Govern- 
 ment," Vol. II., page 6G3). 
 
APPENDIX. 643 
 
 Page 614. Closing Scenes. 
 
 Mr. Davis makes the following interesting statement in regard to the 
 views of General Lee previous to the surrender: "Lee had never con- 
 templated surrender. He had, long before, in language similar to that 
 employed by Washington during the Revolution, expressed to me the belief 
 that in the mountains of "Virginia he could carry on the war for twenty 
 years, and, in directing his march toward Lynchburg, it may well be that, 
 as an alternative, he hoped to reach those mountains, and, with the ad- 
 vantage which the topography would give, yet to baffle the hosts which were 
 following him. On the evening of the 8th General Lee decided, after confer- 
 ence with his corps commanders, that he would advance the next morning 
 beyond Appomattox Court House, and, if the force reported to be there should 
 prove to be only Sheridan's cavalry, to disperse it and continue the march 
 toward Lynchburg ; but, if infantry should be found in large force, the at- 
 tempt to break through it was not to be made, and the correspondence which 
 General Grant had initiated on the previous day should be reopened by a flag, 
 with propositions for an interview to arrange the terms of capitulation. Gor- 
 don, whose corps formed the rear-guard from Petersburg, and who had fought 
 daily for the protection of the trains, had now been transferred to the front 
 On the next morning, before daylight, Lee sent Colonel Venable, one of his 
 staff, to Gordon, commanding the advance, to learn his opinion as to the 
 chances of a successful attack, to which Gordon replied, ' My old corps is re- 
 duced to a frazzle, and, unless I am supported by Longstreet heavily, I do not 
 think we can do anything more.' When Colonel Venable returned with this 
 answer to General Lee, he said, ' Then there is nothing left me but to go and 
 see General Grant ' " (" Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. 
 n., pp. 656, 657). 
 
 The following additional particulars are given by Colonel Taylor, of General 
 Lee's staff : 
 
 "The returns from the various commanders made that morning showed an 
 aggregate of eight thousand muskets in line of battle. 
 
 " On the previous evening I became separated from General Lee in the exe- 
 cution of his orders, and did not rejoin him until the morning of the 9th. 
 After making my report the General said to me, ' Well, Colonel, what are we 
 to do ? ' In reply a fear was expressed that it would be necessary to abandon 
 the trains, which had already occasioned us such great embarrassment ; and 
 the hope was indulged that, relieved of this burden, the army could make 
 good its escape. ' Yes,' said the General, ' perhaps we could ; but I have had 
 a conference with these gentlemen around me, and they agree that the time 
 has come for capitulation.' 
 
 " ' Well, sir,' I said, ' I can only speak for myself ; to me any other fate is 
 preferable.' 
 
 " ' Such is my individual way of thinking,' interrupted the General. ' But,' 
 I immediately added, ' of course General, it is different with you. You have 
 to think of these brave men, and decide not only for yourself, but for them.' 
 
644 APPENDIX. 
 
 ' Yes,' he replied, ' it would be useless and therefore cruel to provoke further 
 effusion of blood, and I have agreed to meet General Grant with a view to 
 surrender'" ("Four Years with General Lee," pages 151, 152). 
 [ The narrative of events is thus continued by Mr. Davis : 
 
 " General Grant, in response to a communication under a white flag made 
 by General Lee, came to Appomattox, where a suitable room was procured for 
 their conference, and, the two Generals being seated at a small table. General 
 Lee opened the interview thus : ' General, I deem it due to proper candor and 
 frankness to say at the very beginning of this interview that I am not willing 
 even to discuss any terms of surrender inconsistent with the honor of my 
 army, which I am determined to maintain to the last.' General Grant re- 
 plied : ' I have no idea of proposing dishonorable terms, General, but I would 
 be glad if you would state what you consider honorable terms. ' General Lee 
 then briefly stated the terms upon which he would be willing to surrender. 
 Grant expressed himself as satisfied with them, and Lee requested that he 
 would formally reduce the propositions to writing " ("Rise and Fall of the 
 Confederate Government," Vol. II., pages 658, 659). 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Abatis, the use of, in battle, 20. 
 Alexandria, Va., captured by Federal 
 
 troops, 30. 
 Antietam, map of manceuvres on, 199 ; 
 the battle of, 208 ; the positions 
 of the two armies, 208 ; Lee's force 
 at, 209 ; the movement across the 
 Antietam on Lee's left flank, 209 ; 
 the desperate struggle between 
 McClellan's right and Lee's left, 
 212 ; Sumner's appearance before 
 the Confederate left, 213 ; Burnside 
 at the lower stone bridge, 219 ; the 
 operations on McClellan's left un- 
 der Burnside, 219 ; Franklin ar- 
 rives and re-enforces McClellan's 
 right, 219 ; McClellan's urgent or- 
 der to Burnside — the latter's de- 
 lay to advance on Lee's right, 220 ; 
 Burnside driven back by Confed- 
 erate re-enforcements, 221 ; the 
 losses of both armies, 221 ; Lee's 
 withdrawal to Virginia, 222 ; 
 McClellan's intentions as to re- 
 newed attack, 222. 
 Archduke Charles, the, on duties of a 
 
 general, 131. 
 Army of Northern Virginia — see Con- 
 federate army. 
 Army of the Potomac in History, 13 ; 
 its adversary, 16 ; organization of 
 the, 60 ; engineer establishment 
 of the, 65 ; artillery organization 
 of the, 6o ; brigade organization of 
 the, 65 ; strength and condition of, 
 on McClellan assuming command, 
 62 ; strength available for ad- 
 vance, 70 ; army corps, McClel- 
 lan's intentions, 64; first disposi- 
 tion of the, 27 ; first crossed into 
 Virginia, 30 ; Manassas campaign 
 — see Manassas ; inactivity during 
 winter of 1861-3, reasons ad- 
 
 vanced for, 71 ; comparative disci- 
 pline in 1861 and 1862, 72 ; organ- 
 ization into four corps by the Pres- 
 ident, 88 ; resumes its positions of 
 previous to battle of Fair Oaks, 
 139 ; strength, June 26, 1861, 142 ; 
 Gaines' Mills battle, 149; right 
 wing on the south bank of Chicka- 
 hominy River, 153 ; retreat to the 
 James commenced, 154 ; order of 
 march across White Oak Swamp, 
 155 ; concentrated at Malvern Hill 
 — the battle of, 160 ; withdraws 
 from Malvern Hill to Harrison's 
 Bar, 164 : its bravery and endur- 
 ance on the Peninsula, 166 ; num- 
 ber brought back to Harrison's 
 Landing, 167; ordered to with- 
 di'aw to Aquia Creek, 171 ; trans- 
 ferred to Aquia Creek and Alex- 
 andria, via Fortress Monroe, 174 ; 
 Army of Virginia absorbed into, 
 193 ; movement towards Frederick, 
 197 ; moves towards Harper's Fer- 
 ry, 201 ; arrives at South Moun- 
 tain, 202 ; at Antietam, 208 ; posi- 
 tion after battle of Antietam, 225 ; 
 reorganization of operations after 
 Antietam, 235 ; crossed the Poto- 
 mac into Virginia, 226 ; McClellan 
 removed and Burnside appointed 
 to command, 227 ; its change of 
 base to Fredericksburg, 330 ; reor- 
 ganized by Burnside into three 
 grand divisions, 231 ; moves from 
 Warrenton, 333 ; the battle of Fred- 
 ericksburg, 238 ; " mud march," 
 258 ; Hooker placed in command, 
 361 ; spirit of the officers under 
 Burnside, 862 ; ChanceUorsville 
 campaign, 267 ; cavalry. Hooker's 
 organization of the, 268 ; the 
 badge system and its value, 268 ; 
 
646 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 its strength before Chancellors- 
 ville, 269 ; passage of the Rappa- 
 hannock before Chancellors ville, 
 270; strength after Chancellors- 
 ville, 310 ; Meade appointed to com- 
 mand, 323 ; Hooker resigns com- 
 mand, 323 ; Gettysburg campaign, 
 320 ; campaign of manoeuvres, 
 373 ; Mine Run move, 398 ; in win- 
 ter-quarters, 398 ; overland cam- 
 paign, the, 402 ; reorganized into 
 three corps — Hancock, Sedgwick, 
 and Warren, 410 ; Sheridan ap- 
 pointed to command cavalry, 412 ; 
 before Petersburg, 507 ; ceases to 
 exist, 622. 
 
 Army of Virginia formed by McDow- 
 ell's, Fremont's, and Banks's ar- 
 mies, 168 ; absorbed into the Po- 
 tomac army, 193. 
 
 Auburn, Stuart bivouacks within Union 
 lines at, 381 ; Caldwell attacked in 
 rear at, 381. 
 
 Austrian Aulic council and its Wash- 
 ington prototype, 96. 
 
 Banks's (Department of the Shenan- 
 doah) position during McClellan's 
 advance, 122 ; at Strasburg with 
 16,000 men, 122 ; fights at, and 
 retreats from, Winchester to north 
 bank of Potomac, 125 ; General, at 
 battle of Cedar Mountain, 173. 
 
 Badge system of the Potomac army, its 
 origin and value, 268. 
 
 Baker, Colonel, death at battle of Ball's 
 Bluff, 77. 
 
 Ball's Bluff, the battle of, 75. 
 
 Barnard, General, on early ideas on 
 quelling the rebellion, 29 ; on as- 
 saulting Torktown, 110; on the 
 passage of the Chickahominy, 
 130. 
 
 Bethel, Butler, General, plan for cap- 
 ture of Big and Little, 31. 
 
 Big Bethel, the affair of, 31. 
 
 Birney, evidence on Meade's attack at 
 Fredericksburg, 248. 
 
 Blackburn's Ford, General Tyler's re- 
 pulse at, 48. 
 
 Blair, Postmaster-General, on advance 
 via York River, 83. 
 
 Blenker's division detached from Mc- 
 Clellan to join Fremont, 93. 
 
 Bolivar Heights, the position of, 206. 
 
 Bottom's Bridge, purpose of throvdng 
 Potomac army on Richmond side 
 of the Chickahominy, 121. 
 
 Boydton plankroad, action of, 543. 
 
 Braddock Road, origin of the name, 47. 
 
 Brandy Station, cavalry action at, 313. 
 
 Bristoe Station, Hooker's defeat of Ew- 
 ell at, 179 ; race of the two armies 
 for, 380 ; battle of, 383. 
 
 Buckland's MiUs, Kilpatrick'a cavalry 
 action at, 386. 
 
 Buford, General, at Gettysburg, 328. 
 
 Bull Run, battle of — see Manassas. 
 
 Bull Run tlie Second — see Manassas 
 No. 2. 
 
 Burgess's Mill — see Southside Railroad. 
 
 Burnside, General A. E., at Antietam 
 — see Antietam ; appointed to com- 
 mand Potomac army, 227 ; his 
 opinion of his unfitness for the 
 chief command, 230 ; change of 
 base to Fredericksburg considered, 
 232; his delay at Warrenton to 
 reorganize, 232 ; move to Freder- 
 icksburg, 233 ; intentions and 
 plan of operations via Freder- 
 icksburg, 233 ; opinion on direct 
 crossing at Fredericksburg, 237 ; 
 desperation at repeated failures, 
 251 ; instructions to wait orders 
 from the President, 257 ; contem- 
 plated attempt on Lee's rear, 257 ; 
 lost the confidence of the army, 
 258-261 ; his career as commander 
 of the Potomac army considered, 
 261 ; he resigns his command, 261 ; 
 spirit of his officers, 262 ; (Ninth) 
 corps joins Meade, 413 ; the Peters- 
 burg mine, 518. 
 
 Butler, General B. F., design of raid on 
 Richmond, 398 ; campaign on the 
 James — see James River. 
 
 Calls for troops by President Lincoln, 
 14, 29, 30. 
 
 Campaign of Manoeuvres, 373 ; of ma- 
 noeuvres criticised, 388. 
 
 Carnot on military discipline, 67 ; on 
 the bombardment of towns, 241 ; 
 on selection of troops for assault, 
 521. 
 
 Carrick's Ford, General Garnett de- 
 feated and killed — West Virginia 
 campaign ended, 39. 
 
 Cedar Creek, the battle of, 561 ; Gen- 
 eral Wright commanding in Sher- 
 dan's absence, 561 ; retreat of the 
 Union army beyond Middletown, 
 562 ; Sheridan arrives in front, 
 562 ; Early attacked in turn and 
 routed, 563 ; Early pursued be- 
 yond Strasburg, 563 ; Early re- 
 treats southward, 563 
 
INDEX. 
 
 647 
 
 Cedar Mountain, Jackson's report of, 
 174 ; battle of, 173. 
 
 Cedar Run, attack on Warren at, 382. 
 
 Cemetery Ridge, see Gettysburg, 336. 
 
 Centreville, Pope pauses at after Ma- 
 nassas No. 2, 192 ; the tlank march 
 on, 376 ; Meade strongly posted at, 
 385. 
 
 Chancellorsville, Hooker's plan of op- 
 erations against Lee's left, 271 ; 
 passage of Ely's Ford, 272 ; pas- 
 of Germanna Ford, 272 ; passage of 
 United States Ford, 273 ; Hooker 
 in reverse of Lee's position, 273 ; 
 Franklin's movement on Lee's 
 front to cover flank march, 274 ; 
 Hooker jubilant of success, 275 ; 
 topography of the field, 277 ; 
 Hooker commences pushing to- 
 wards open country near Fred- 
 ericksburg, 277 ; observations on 
 the battle, 303 ; Hooker's order to 
 abandon position gained towards 
 open Fredericksburg, 279 ; strat- 
 egic faults of the position, 280 ; 
 Hooker's incomprehensible col- 
 lapse on Lee's advance towards 
 him, 280 ; Hooker's line of battle, 
 281 ; Jackson's march on Hooker's 
 flank and rear — his force, 283 ; 
 Jackson's attack on Hooker's right 
 rear, 286 ; rout of the Eleventh 
 Corps — not half were Germans, 
 286 ; Jackson's pursuit of the de- 
 feated right checked, 288 ; Jack- 
 son's attempt to cut Hooker from 
 United States Ford, 289; Sedg- 
 wick's movement on Lee's rear, 
 292 ; Sedgwick met at Salem 
 Heights by a column from Chan- 
 cellorsville, 298 ; Hooker's forma- 
 tion on second day, 293 ; Chancel- 
 lorsville seized by the Confed- 
 erates, 295 ; Hooker prostrated by 
 concussion of a shot, 295 ; Fred- 
 ericksburg occupied by Sedgwick, 
 296 ; for Sedgwick's move on Fred- 
 ericksburg, see Fredericksburg, 
 296 ; countermarch of part of Lee's 
 army to re-enforce Early, 298 ; 
 Sedgwick checked — his losses, 299 ; 
 positions on the third day, 299 ; 
 Sedgwick's report of losses at, 
 299 ; Sedgwick attacked and cross- 
 es the Rappahannock, 300 ; Hooker 
 crossed to north bank of the Rap- 
 pahannock, 801 ; the lossea on 
 botli sides, 301. 
 
 Cheat River, see Carrick's Ford. 
 
 Chickahominy and Shenandoah Val- 
 ley's comparative strategy, 121. 
 
 Chickahominy River, McClellan posted 
 on north bank of, 119 ; McClellan'.s 
 object in cros.siiig Bottom's Rridge, 
 121 ; dates of McClellan's jiiis^-agc, 
 129; toi)ography of, 130; xMcClel- 
 lan's army separated by the, 130 ; 
 two methods of extrication open to 
 McClellan, 140 ; the, its relation 
 to Richmond defences, 481. 
 
 Cliickahominy Swamps, the anny 
 among, after Fair Oaks, 140. 
 
 Circle of the Hunt, 565. 
 
 Cold Harbor, the battle of, 481 ; suc- 
 cess of Wright and Smith, 483 ; 
 positions of the two armies, 484 ; 
 the Union army repulsed at every 
 point, 485 ; criticism on tactics of, 
 487 ; the losses at, 487. 
 
 Commissariat of armies, the importance 
 of, 21. 
 
 Committee on Conduct of the War, 
 pressure of, 89 ; on McClellan's 
 march from Williamsburg to the 
 Chickahominy, 119. 
 
 Confederacy, conscription act passed — 
 Mr. Davis holding absolute control 
 of Southern military resources, 
 111 ; Johnston and Lee's armies 
 the main armed force of, 404 ; the 
 failure of the conscription system, 
 571 ; weakened by Grant's refusal 
 to exchange prisoners, 571 ; com- 
 missariat, the collapse of the, 571 ; 
 fighting population Avas not ex- 
 hausted, but had lost interest, 571 ; 
 
 Confederate army, first disposition of 
 in Virginia, 27 ; want of discipline, 
 72 ; strength and positions of, 80 ; 
 for further of — see Lee. 
 
 Confederate generals, the earliest, 28. 
 
 Corps d'armee — see army corps, 64. 
 
 Crampton's Gap, Franklin's advance to, 
 202 ; the Confederate force at, 202 ; 
 the battle of, 204. 
 
 Cross Keys, the battle of, 127. 
 
 Culpepper, Longstreet left to occupy 
 during Ewell's Shenandoah VaUey 
 advance, 314 ; Lee's army at — 
 Meade countermarching on, 378. 
 
 Gulp's Hill — see Gettysburg. 
 
 Dabney's Mill — see Petersburg. 
 Dahlgren, Colonel, marches towards 
 
 Richmond — his defeat and death, 
 
 400. 
 Davis, Colonel B. F., death at Fleet 
 
 wood, 313. 
 
648 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Davis, Jefferson, at Manassas, 58. 
 Deep Bottom — see Petersburg. 
 Despondcnfv of tlie North at the clcee 
 
 on8()l"78. 
 Detached cohunns of the army inviting 
 
 destruction in detail, 122. 
 Dinwiddie Courthouse, Warren sends 
 
 re-enforcements to Sheridan, 593. 
 Dufour on army corps, 64 ; on passage 
 
 of the Adda by Prince Eugene, 416. 
 
 Early attacked before Fort Stevens, and 
 driven, 527 ; advances towards 
 Washington, 527 ; burned Balti- 
 more and Ohio Railroad viaduct, 
 527 ; retired across the Potomac, 
 527; expedition at Frederick, Ma- 
 ryland, viu Hagerstown, 526 ; op- 
 erations in the Shenandoah Valley, 
 554 ; at battle of Winchester, 556 : 
 at battle of Cedar Creek, 561 ; ad- 
 dress to army after his defeat at 
 Middletown, 568. 
 
 Ellsworth, Colonel, shot at Alexandria, 
 Virginia, 30. 
 
 Emmettsburg, see Gettysburg. 
 
 Ewell rejoined Jackson after defeat of 
 Bristoe Station, 180 ; advances into 
 Maryland and Pennsylvania, 319 ; 
 at Chambersburg, Carlisle, Get- 
 tysburg, and York, 320 ; at Mine 
 Kun, 391 ; his corps captured at 
 Sailor's Creek, 610. 
 
 Exterior line, the Federal, in Virginia, 
 44. 
 
 Fairfax Courthouse abandoned by Con- 
 federates, 47. 
 
 Fair Oaks, the battle of, 128 ; Confed- 
 erate report of — Johnston's reasons 
 for attack, 131 ; battle — map of, 
 182 ; positions of Union troops 
 near, 182 ; Casey's redoubt at Sev- 
 en Pines captured, 133 ; positions 
 of Casey's division, 134 ; Hill's at- 
 tack on Seven Pines' position not 
 a surprise, 133 ; Sumner ordered 
 to cross the Chickahominy to sup- 
 port Heintzelman, 186 ; Couch's 
 force bisected by G. W. Smith, 136 ; 
 Sumner reaches Couch in rear of, 
 137 ; Confederates finally driven 
 back by Sumner, 138 ; the fighting 
 next day skirmishing only, 139. 
 
 Final campaign, 1865, 565 ; Five Forks' 
 battle — see Five Forks and Retreat. 
 
 Fisher's Hill, Early's retreat to after 
 battle of Winchester, 558 ; the bat- 
 tle of, 559. 
 
 Five Forks, Sheridan's movement to 
 wards, 591 ; captured by Devin 
 and Davies, 591 ; Lee sends two 
 divisions to, 592 ; Union cavalry 
 driven to Dinwiddie Courthouse, 
 592 ; Lee's weakness discovered — 
 Sheridan puts his whole force in 
 motion, 594 ; Five Forks and Pe- 
 tersburg, 595 ; situation of the op- 
 posing forces, 595 ; Sheridan's feint 
 on Lee's right, and attack on left on 
 White Oak road, 596 ; the desper- 
 ate position of the Confederates, 
 598 ; remnant of Lee's troops at, 
 fled westward, 599 ; the battle 
 over — see now Petersburg, 600. 
 
 Fleetwood, cavalry action at, 313. 
 
 Fort Gilmer, Butler's unsuccessful as- 
 sault, 540. 
 
 Fort Magruder at Williamsburg, Vir- 
 ginia, 112. 
 
 Fort Steadman, Lee's object in attack- 
 ing, 575 ; surprised and taken by 
 coup de main, ,176 ; attacking col- 
 umns unsupported, 577 ; the as- 
 sault fails, and withdrawal impos- 
 sible, 577 ; two thousand Confed- 
 erates surrender — the losses on 
 both sides, 577 ; Meade captures 
 picket-lines on Lee's right, 577. 
 
 Franklin, Fremont at with fifteen 
 thousand men, 123. 
 
 Franklin, General, on operating on 
 Richmond via York River, 81 ; evi- 
 dence on Burnside's orders at 
 Fredericksburg, 245 ; reply to 
 President Lincoln's answer to him 
 and General Smith, 265. 
 
 Franklin's and Smith's letter to the 
 President proposing plan of cam- 
 paign, 263. 
 
 Frederick the Great, seven years' de- 
 fensive campaign, 308. 
 
 Fredericksburg and Richmond Rail- 
 road, line of advance towards Rich- 
 mond, 32 ; compared with others, 
 406. 
 
 Fredericksburg, the battle of, Burnside 
 reaches Falmouth, opposite, 234 ; 
 topography of the battle-field, 243 ; 
 town and heights, Burnside's omis- 
 sion to occupy, 334 ; Burnside's de- 
 lay, and Lee's arrival on south 
 bank of the Rappahannock, 236 ; 
 Lee's whole army arrived and in 
 position, 242 ; Burnside's designed 
 crossing at Skenker's Neck, on 
 Lee's right, 237 ; the possibilities 
 of crossing, 338; Burnside's pas 
 
INDEX. 
 
 649 
 
 sage effected, 242; Lee's sharp- 
 shooters in the town delay Burn- 
 side's crossing, 240 ; the towa 
 bombarded by Burnside, 240 ; the 
 advance passage of three regi- 
 ments, and flight of the Confeder- 
 ate sharp-shooters, 241 ; Jackson's 
 report on concentration at, 243 ; 
 Franklin's operations on the left, 
 246 ; Meade's temporary success 
 on the heights against Jackson, 
 247 ; military road at, small im- 
 portance of Meade's success on, 
 247 ; Sumner's operations on the 
 right, 249 : Longstreet's position on 
 the Confederate left, 250 ; French's 
 and Hancock's attack on Lee's left, 
 and terrible repulses, 250 ; Hooker 
 thrown forward, 252 ; Burnside's 
 desperate resolve to renew attack 
 next day, 252 ; the scene closed by 
 night, 252 ; Burnside framed one 
 plan, and fought on another, 244 ; 
 the losses of each army, 253 ; the 
 opposing forces at, 296 ; Sedgwick's 
 attack on Marye's Hill, 297 ; Con- 
 federate i)Osition taken — Sedgwick 
 advances towards ChancellorsviUe, 
 298 ; Hill left in position at, 314 ; 
 during ChancellorsviUe campaign 
 — see ChancellorsviUe. 
 
 Freemantle, Colonel, on Lee's critical 
 position after Gettysburg, 363. 
 
 Fremont, General, assigned to Moun- 
 tain Department of West Virginia, 
 93 ; (Mountain Department of West 
 Virginia) posifion during McClel- 
 lau's advance, 122. 
 
 Front Royal, Jackson's capture of gar- 
 rison, 125. 
 
 Gaines' Mill, map of battle of, 149 ; 
 Magruder occupies McClellan's at- 
 tention on south bank of Chicka- 
 hominy, 151 ; Porter overwhelmed, 
 and the retreat commenced, 152 ; 
 French and Meagher cover Por- 
 ter's retreat, 153 ; Porter's corps 
 crosses to McClellan at night, 153 ; 
 estimate of casualties, 153. 
 
 Gamett, General, Confederate com- 
 mander in West Virginia, 35. 
 
 Gettysburg campaign, the, 308 ; theory 
 of the Confederate invasion, 308 ; 
 Berry ville captured by Rodes, 317 ; 
 Blue Ridge, passes occupied by 
 Longstreet, 318; concentration of 
 the army upon, 324 ; Lee's army 
 countermarches towards, 326 ; ap- 
 
 proach of the two armies towards, 
 326 ; topography of tlie field, 329 ; 
 the first day — Buford engaged with 
 Hill's van, 328 ; error of covering 
 too much ground, 333 ; Howard, 
 General, faulty dispositions at Get- 
 tysburg, 333 ; the Union centre 
 pierced by Rodes — the troops fall 
 back through Gettysburg, 334 ; 
 Gettysburg Ridge, the position at, 
 335 ; Hancock arrests flight of 
 First and Eleventh corps, 335 ; 
 Hancock's line of battle on Ceme- 
 tery Hill and Ridge, 336 ; Meade 
 and Lee order up their entire 
 forces, 337 ; both armies concen- 
 trated on Gettysburg, 338 ; the first 
 day's results considered, 341 ; the 
 second day, 342 ; positions at com- 
 mencement of the second day, 342 ; 
 Sedgwick's (Sixth) corps arrives, 
 343 ; Sickles' position on Emmets- 
 burg road, 344 ; Longstreet's at- 
 tack on Sickles, 845 ; the fight for 
 Little Round Top, 346; Warren 
 saves the position at Little Round 
 Top, 340 ; Hood's attack on Bir- 
 ney's front, 348 ; the struggle for 
 the peach orchard, 349 ; close of 
 the action on the left, 354 ; EweU's 
 attack on the Union extreme right, 
 
 354 ; losses of the first two days, 
 
 355 ; the third day — Lee resolves 
 to attack on Gulps Hill, 356 ; 
 Meade's line on Gulp's Hill re- 
 gained, 356 ; the artillery combat 
 of the third day, 357 ; battery po- 
 sitions on tlie third day, 357 ; the 
 Confederate column of attack, 358 : 
 Pickett's assault on Cemetery 
 Ridge, 359 ; the panic of Petti- 
 grew's raw troops, 359 ; surrender 
 of Pickett's troops, 361 ; Wilcox's 
 attack on Hancock, and its failure, 
 ends the battle, 362 ; Lee's shat- 
 tered army returns to its lines on 
 Seminary Ridge, 363 ; Lee remains 
 a day at bay before retreating, 
 363 ; the retreat of Lee, 363 ; losses 
 on both sides, 363. 
 
 Glendale— see Newmarket Cross-roads. 
 
 Goldsborough, Admiral, and the navy 
 at Yorktown, 104. 
 
 Grant's overland campaign, 402 ; ap- 
 pointed to command all the ar- 
 mies, 403; his theory of action, 
 404 ; establishes headquarters with 
 the Potomac army, 405 ; on con- 
 centric operations, 410 ; orders foi 
 
650 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 advance beyond the Wilderness, 
 417 ; his opinion of manoeuvring, 
 440 ; his reason for withdrawing 
 from the Nortli Anna, 477 ; obser- 
 vations upon, 489 ; " I propose to 
 fight it out on this line," 490 ; his 
 theory of " hammering" consid- 
 ered, 494 ; on Smith's delay to at- 
 tack Petersburg, 503 ; failure to 
 notify Meade or Hancock of move- 
 ment on Petersburg, 504 ; was 
 responsible for non-capture of Pe- 
 tersburg, 506 ; at Petersburg, op- 
 portunities open to him, 516 ; 
 north of the James — feints on 
 Richmond possible, 516 ; order for 
 final operations, 578 ; character of 
 his final operations, 579 ; opera^ 
 tions delayed by rainstorm, 586 ; 
 correspondence with Lee on sur- 
 render, 615 ; see also Army of the 
 Potomac. 
 
 (iregg. Confederate general, manner of 
 his death at Fredericksburg, 248. 
 
 Oroveton — see Manassas, second battle 
 of 
 
 Halleck, General W. H., opinion on 
 McClellan's proposed crossing of 
 the James, 167 ; an intolerable ob- 
 struction and annoyance, 170 ; 
 urged the withdrawal from the 
 Peninsula, 170 ; whim to hold Har- 
 per's Ferry, 200 ; his interference 
 with Hooker's intended movements 
 on Lee's rear, 321 ; vicious distri- 
 bution of the Union army under 
 independent commanders, 321 ; re- 
 fusal to abandon Maryland Heights, 
 322. 
 
 Hancock, report on, at battle of Fred- 
 ericksburg, 251 ; at Gettysburg, 
 334 ; report of battle of the Wil- 
 derness, 423 ; details of battle of 
 the Wilderness, 425 ; report of fifth 
 epoch, campaign of 1864, 505 ; at 
 Reams' Station, 535 ; movement 
 towards Southside Railroad, 541 ; 
 report of operations on Boyd ton 
 plankroad, 546 ; leaves to organize 
 new First Corps, and never rejoins 
 his old command, 547. 
 
 Htnover Junction, Porter's defeat of 
 Branch at, 124. 
 
 Harper's Ferry, United States arsenal 
 abandoned in 1861, 26 ; topography 
 of, 206 ; the first Confederate camp 
 at, 28 ; Lee's advance against, 200 : 
 Jackson's movement towards, 205 ; 
 
 completely invested by Confeder 
 ate occupation of the heights 
 round, 206 ; surrendered by Gen- 
 eral Miles, 205 ; the surrender of 
 and death of Miles, 207 ; occupied 
 by McClellan, 226 ; see also Soatli 
 Mountain. 
 
 Heintzelman, General, evidence on 
 siege of Yorktown, 110. 
 
 Heth, Confederate General, on battle of 
 Hatcher's Run, 545. 
 
 Hill, A. P., on Kearney at Manassas 
 No. 2, 186 ; on the battle of An- 
 tietam, 220 ; marched to rejoin 
 Longstreet at Culpepper, 317 ; at 
 Mine Run, 391 ; death of, 603. 
 
 Hill, General D. H., bombastic report of 
 Big Bethel affair, 33 ; at the battle 
 of Malvern Hill, 162 ; on the battle 
 of Malvern Hill, 163; on battle of 
 Turner's Gap, 203. 
 
 Hooker, General, on McClellan's Penin- 
 sular corps commanders, 64 ; at bat- 
 tle of Williamsburg, 115; assault 
 on Jackson at Manassas No. 2, 
 185 ; wounded at Antietam, 213 ; 
 statement on battle of Antietam, 
 213 ; on battle of Fredericksburg, 
 252 ; placed in command of Poto- 
 mac army, 261 ; his reorganization 
 of the Potomac army, 267 ; his 
 popularity on assuming command, 
 268 ; at Chancellorsville (see also 
 Chancellorsville), 271 ; contradic- 
 tory evidence on Jackson's pur- 
 pose at Chancellorsville, 284 ; the 
 army without a head on Sunday 
 morning, 293 ; his Chancellorsville 
 campaign considered, 303 ; strength 
 of his army after Chancellorsville, 
 310 ; dispatch anticipating Lee's 
 intentions, 311 ; dispatch on Con- 
 federate movements on Culpepper, 
 313 ; dispositions to guard the Rap- 
 pahannock line, 314 ; plans on Lee's 
 invasion and opinions at Wash- 
 ington, 315 ; retrograde move- 
 ment towards Washington, 316 ; 
 the army concentrated at Fred- 
 erick, 320 ; plan of menacing Lee's 
 rear towards Chambersburg, 321 ; 
 dispatch to Halleck, urging aban- 
 donment of Harper's Ferry, 322 ; 
 resigns command of the army, 323. 
 
 Hunt, appointed chief of artillery, 197 
 plan of crossing Rappahannock, 
 241. 
 
 Hunter, General, operations in the She- 
 nandoah, 468 ; victory at Piedmont, 
 
INDEX. 
 
 651 
 
 and subsequent retreat, 469 ; suc- 
 ceeded by General Sheridan, 555. 
 
 Interior line, the Confederate, in Vir- 
 ginia, 44. 
 
 Jackson, General T. J. ("Stonewall"), 
 history of, 28 ; origin of the title 
 " Stonewall" at Manassas, 54 ; his 
 maxim, " mystery is the secret of 
 success," 283 ; position between the 
 Shenandoah and Swift Run Gap, 
 124 ; forces Banks from Winches- 
 ter to Hall town, and then moves 
 back up Shenandoah Valley, 
 125 ; captures Front Royal gar- 
 rison, and moves towards Banks 
 at Middletown, 125 ; holds Banks 
 with Swell's force, drives Milroy 
 upon Fremont, and turns back on 
 Banks, 125 ; McDowell ordered by 
 the administration to head off, 
 126 ; holds Shields in check — Ew- 
 ell repulses Fremont, 127 ; slips 
 between McDowell and Fremont, 
 converging on Strasburg, and es- 
 capes up the Valley, 127 ; reunites 
 with Ewell, and repulses Shields' 
 advance, 127; strategic victories 
 saved Richmond, 128 ; at Ashland, 
 on McClellan's right wing, 144; 
 withdrawal from Port Republic to 
 co-operate with Lee, 144; jjassed 
 Beaver Dam Creek, 146 ; descrip- 
 tion of Hood's charge at Gaines' 
 Mill, 152 ; detached towards Pope, 
 173; battle of Cedar Mountain, 
 and retreat to Gordonsville, 173 ; 
 crossed the Rapidan towards Pope, 
 175 ; position and force at Gor- 
 donsville, 175 ; flank march on 
 Pope's right, 177; at Manassas, 
 his perilous position, 180 ; cut off 
 from Lee by McDowell, 180 ; strat- 
 egy of his escape from Manassas, 
 181 ; position at Manassas, 184 ; 
 attack on Pope's right at Ox Hill, 
 192 ; movement towards Harper's 
 Ferry, 205 ; force at Antietam, 212 ; 
 march on Hooker's flank and rear 
 at Chancellorsvilie, 283 ; his death, 
 289; corps at Chancellorsvilie, 
 Stuart's report of, 293. 
 
 " Jacobinism of Congress," note on Mr. 
 Lincoln's phrase, 80. 
 
 James River open by fall of Norfolk, 
 120; Fort Darling, Union fleet 
 compelled to withdraw, 120 ; con- 
 sidered as a base line, 140 ; McClel- 
 
 lan adopts change of base to, 147 
 advance, merits of a, 408 ; Butler 'a 
 advance by, 409 ; Butler's cam- 
 paign on, 460 ; Ms force, 460 ; as- 
 cent of the river, 461 ; landing at 
 Bermuda Hundred, 461 ; Butler, 
 Grant's vague instructions on 
 James River campaign, 462 ; diffi- 
 culties of the campaign, 463 ; Rich- 
 mond and Petersburg Railroad, 
 attempts to capture, 464 ; Bermuda 
 Hundred, Butler forms intrenched 
 line, 464 ; Beauregard's operations 
 at Bermuda Hundred, 465 ; Gill- 
 more, General, at Bermuda Hun- 
 dred, 465 ; battle of Drury's Bluff" 
 465 ; losses of both armies at Ber 
 muda Hundred, 468 ; Butler s force 
 withdrawn within Bermuda Hun- 
 dred lines, 468 ; Bennuda Hun- 
 dred, General Smith's force ordered 
 from to Grant, 482 ; Grant's change 
 of base to south of, 498 ; Bermuda 
 Hundred, Smith's movement on 
 Petersburg, 500 ; Butler's occupa- 
 tion of Bermuda Hundred, 516. 
 
 Jericho Ford — see North Anna. 
 
 Jenkins' raid into Maryland and Penn- 
 sylvania, 319. 
 
 Johnstjn. General, estimate of forces, 
 72 ; army removed to the Rai^i- 
 dan, 90 ; takes command of York- 
 town defences, 103 ; on unknown 
 redoubts at Williamsburg, 115; 
 withdrawal behind the Chicka- 
 hominy, 119 ; account of Casey's 
 defeat "at Seven Pines (Fair Oaks), 
 134 ; woimded at Fair Oaks, 138 ; 
 theory of defence of Richmond, 
 143 ; on Grant's direct attacks on 
 Lee, 495 ; restored to command of 
 forces opposing Sherman — his 
 strength, 567 ; on the Confederate 
 commissariat and conscription, 
 572. 
 
 Jomini on the difficulties of an invad- 
 ing army, 24 ; on interference with 
 generals in the field, 96 ; on con- 
 centric operations, 410. 
 
 Jones, General, on the battle of An 
 tietam, 212. 
 
 Kearnevs assault at Manassas No. 2, 
 185. 
 
 Kearney, General, the death of, 192 ; 
 his origination of the badge sys- 
 tem, 268. 
 
 KeUey's Ford, the Union cavalry at, 
 268 ; cavalry action at, 886. 
 
662 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Kilpatrick's raid towards Richmond, 
 399. 
 
 Kinglake, Mr., on English public sen- 
 timent on the Crimean war, 68. 
 
 Laurel Hill, Virginia, Garnett's position 
 at, 35 ; McClellau's plan of attack, 
 37 ; abandoned by Gamett, 38 ; 
 see also Rich Mountain. 
 
 I^ee, General Robert E., appointed ma- 
 jor-general, and commander of the 
 Virginia forces, 26 ; defence of 
 West Virginia, 34 ; on the poor dis- 
 cipline of the army, 67 ; appointed 
 to Army of Northern Virginia, 
 143 ; withdraws Jackson from 
 Shenandoah Valley, 143 ; plan of 
 attack on the Chickahominy, 144 ; 
 concentrated at Newmarket Cross- 
 roads, 159 ; on the battle of Mal- 
 vern HiU, 163 ; after Malvern Hill 
 battle withdraws towards Rich- 
 mond, 164 ; fault in the Peninsular 
 campaign unnoticed, 165 ; wished 
 McCiellan out of the Peninsula, 
 171 ; Seven Days' battle — see Seven 
 Days ; opened fire on shipping at 
 Harrison's Landing from Coggin's 
 Point — is repulsed, 172 ; resolved 
 to strike northward on McClellan's 
 evacuation of the Peninsula, 174 ; 
 on advance on General Pope, 175 ; 
 unwonted rashness in front of 
 Pope — Long-street and Jackson 
 separated, 178 ; joins Jackson at 
 Manassas, 184 ; abandoned pursuit 
 of Pope, and turned to north of the 
 Potomac, 193 ; determined to cross 
 into Maryland, 194 ; purposes af- 
 ter campaign against Pope, 194 ; 
 crossed tlie Potomac towards Lees- 
 burg, 196 ; plan of Maryland cam- 
 paign, 198 ; advances towards Har- 
 per's Ferry, 198 ; plan of Harper's 
 Ferry movement fell into McClel- 
 lan's hands, 201 ; withdrew to An- 
 tietam Valley, 207 ; at Antietam — 
 see Antietam ; Maryland campaign 
 at an end, 224 ; position in the 
 Shenandoah Valley after Antietam, 
 225 ; army divided by McClellan's 
 combinations, 226 ; his erroneous 
 statement on Sumner at Freder- 
 icksburg, 244 ; arrives at Freder- 
 icksburg and fortifies the heights, 
 236 ; at Fredericksburg — see Fred- 
 ericksburg ; strength before Chan- 
 cellorsville, 269 ; army-roll on 
 March 31, 1863, 370; positions be- 
 
 fore battle of Chancellorsville, 370 ; 
 discovery of Hooker's purpose at 
 Chausellorsville, 276; Fredericks- 
 burg held, and main army pushed 
 towards Chancellorsville, 277 ; 
 army increased by conscripts ancl 
 Longstreet's divisions, 310 ; at bat- 
 tle of Chancellorsville — see Chan- 
 cellorsville ; strength of his army 
 after Chancellorsville, 310 ; com- 
 missariat — reasons for invading 
 Pennsylvania, 310 ; army reorgan- 
 ized into three corps, 310 ; force at 
 opening of Gettysburg campaign, 
 310 ; mano3uvres to disengage 
 Hooker from the Rappahannock, 
 313 ; Culpepper occupied by great 
 part of his army, 313 ; Shenan- 
 doah Valley advance — Winchester 
 reached by Ewell, 314; his right 
 at Fredericksburg, centre at Cul- 
 pepper, left at mouth of Shenan- 
 doah Valley, 315 ; on his effort 
 to draw Hooker from his base, 318 ; 
 whole army crossed into Pennsyl- 
 vania, 320 ; countermarch of his 
 army towards Gettysburg, 326; bat- 
 tle of Gettysburg — see Gettysburg ; 
 error in fighting at Gettysburg, and 
 his reasons therefor, 340 ; his re- 
 treat after Gettysburg, 366 ; crosses 
 the Potomac safely at Williams- 
 port, 369 ; retreats to Shenan- 
 doah Valley, 373 ; weakened by 
 detaching Longstreet to Teimes- 
 see, 375 ; position behind the 
 Rapidan, 376 ; at Culpepper, 378 ; 
 flanks Meade's right, who falls 
 back behind the Rappahannock, 
 377 ; swap queens (VVashington 
 for Richmond), 377 ; destroyed 
 Orange and Alexandria Railroad, 
 385 ; withdraws towards the Rap- 
 pahannock, 385 ; withdraws across 
 the Rapidan, 388 ; line of defences 
 at Mine Run, 391 ; his positions on 
 the Rapidan, 391, 416 ; method of 
 defence of the Rapidan, 410 ; strat- 
 egy to compel battle in the Wil- 
 derness, 418 ; retired behind the 
 Tolopotomy, 479 ; retrograded to- 
 wards the Pamunky, and tiiced 
 Grant in advance of the Chicka- 
 hominy, 479 ; morale of his army 
 after Cold Harbor, 492 ; losses dur- 
 ing Grant's overland campaign, 
 492 ; his army i^assing to soutli of 
 the James, near Drury's Bluff, 503 ; 
 real force on opening spring cam 
 
INDEX. 
 
 653 
 
 paign, 1865, 57:3; movement towards 
 junction witli Johnston on Danville 
 line, 574 ; never meant to surren- 
 der until compelled, 574 ; attack on 
 Fort Steadman — see Fort Stead- 
 man ; attack on Warren, on (irants 
 left, at Boydton plankroad, 590 ; 
 announces his purpose to abandon 
 Petersburg and Richmond, 60!> ; 
 hopes of escape, and junction with 
 Johnston, 605 ; final retreat — see 
 Retreat: correspondence with Grant 
 on surrender, 615 ; final surrender 
 of his army, 618. 
 
 Leesburg — see Ball's BlufiF. 
 
 Letcher, Governor, of Virginia, calls for 
 State militia, 26. 
 
 Lincoln, President, calls for troops, 14, 
 29, 30 ; correspondence with Mc- 
 Clellan on movement on Manassas, 
 70 ; despondent saying at the close 
 of 1861, 78 ; consultation vnth Gen- 
 erals McDowell and Franklin at 
 close of 1861, on a Peninsular cam- 
 paign, 79 ; would like to borrow 
 McClellan's army (1861), 80 ; spe- 
 cial order to advance to Manassas 
 Junction, 85 ; general order to 
 move on February 22d, 86 ; gen- 
 eral war order rescinded, and Low- 
 er Chesapeake route adopted, 87 ; 
 order on defence of Washington, 
 89 ; and the administration — policy 
 and errors of reviewed, 93 ; his 
 order recalling McDowell's corps 
 from McClellan's army, 104; Mc- 
 Dowell's recall to Washington — 
 politics and military affairs, 105 ; 
 reply to Generals Franklin and 
 Smith's proposed plan of campaign, 
 265 ; opinion on Hooker's plan of 
 isolating Hill and Longstreet, 315. 
 
 Little Round Top — see Gettysburg. _ 
 
 Longstreet on time of his re-enforcing 
 Jackson at Manassas No. 2, 186 ; 
 woxmded at the Wilderness, 434. 
 
 Loudon Heights, the position of, 205. 
 
 McCall, position at battle of Newmarket 
 Cross-roads, 158; on the fight for 
 the guns at Newmarket Cross- 
 roads, 158. 
 
 McClellan, General, in West Virginia, 
 34 ; intrusted with Department of 
 the Ohio, 35 ; placed in command of 
 the army, 62 ; credit to for forma- 
 tion of the grand army, 66 ; the en- 
 entire confidence of the country, 68 ; 
 plan of direct attack via Manassas, 
 
 69 ; correspondence with President 
 Lincoln on an advance, 70 ; change 
 of plan of advance — consequent 
 delay, 70 ; on merits of advance by 
 Manassas, 73 ; on merits of advance 
 by James River, 408 ; error of re- 
 maining inactive, 74 ; sickness at 
 close of 1861 — discussions by the 
 President, etc., in his absence, 79 ; 
 Peninsular campaign — see also 
 Peninsula; plan of attacking Rich- 
 mond by Lower Chesa])eake disap- 
 proved by the President, 85 ; de- 
 clined to explain his plans to the 
 President's meeting unless ordered, 
 85 ; report of merits of Chesa- 
 peake and Manassas advances — 
 Lower Chesapeake advance ap- 
 proved by eight of twelve generals, 
 87 ; relegated to Army of Potomac 
 instead of all the army, 93 ; hos- 
 tility to of Washington influential 
 men, 95 ; his faults of inactivity, 
 etc., considered, 97 ; opinion on as- 
 saulting Yorktown, 110 ; objects 
 on arrival at the Chickahominy, 
 121 ; passivity on reaching the 
 Chickahominy, 129 ; his position 
 astride the Chickahominy, 140 : 
 his nature to hesitate between al- 
 ternatives, 141 ; intentions after 
 battle of Fair Oaks, 142 ; the cours- 
 es open to, on Lee's approach, 146 ; 
 Seven Days' retreat — see Seven 
 Days ; adopts change of base to 
 James River, 147 ; error on posi- 
 tion of Hill and Longstreet at Mal- 
 vern Hill, 161 ; retreat a notable 
 achievement, 166 ; design to cross 
 the James, 167 , proposed crossing 
 of the James afterwards realized 
 by Grant, 168 ; promised re-enforce- 
 ments in the Peninsula, 170 ; or- 
 dered to join Pope at Aquia Creek, 
 171 ; advance towards Lee at Fred- 
 erick, 197 ; gains copy of Lee's 
 plan of Harper's Ferry advance, 
 
 201 ; arrived at South Mountain, 
 
 202 ; at Antietam — see Antietam ; 
 his inactivity after Antietam con- 
 sidered, 222 ; advance on Warren- 
 ton, 226 ; removed from command 
 in favor of Burnside, 227; the 
 close of his career, 225 ; his mili- 
 tary character considered, 228. 
 
 McDougall, General, on positions di- 
 vided by rivers, 129 ; on angles in 
 line of battle, 344. 
 
 McDowell, General, appointed to lead 
 
654 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 the Potomac army, 42 ; time for 
 preparation denied him, 42 ; with- 
 drew from conmiand, 61 ; sug- 
 gested advance towards Richmond, 
 80 ; corps detached from McClellau 
 to join in defence of Washington, 
 93 ; (Department of the Rappahan- 
 ; nock) position during McClellan's 
 
 advance, 122 ; at Fredericksburg 
 with 30,000 men, 122 ; ordered by 
 the administration to attack Rich- 
 mond in co-operaiion with McClel- 
 lan, 123 ; advance south of Fred- 
 ericksburg, 124 ; advance cleared 
 by Porter's corps of the Potomac 
 army, 124 ; ordered to the Shen- 
 andoah Valley, 126 ; Manassas 
 campaign — see Manassas. 
 
 McMahon, General, on Sedgwick's 
 movement before Chancellorsville, 
 275. 
 
 Magruder, Colonel J. B., position near 
 Hampton, 27 ; on Confederate po- 
 sition on Chickahominy right bank, 
 147. 
 
 Malvern HiU reached by McClellan's 
 artillery, 157 ; map of the battle- 
 field, 160 ; battle of, 160 ; position 
 of the armies, 161 ; Hill's advance 
 alone by misconception, 162 ; the 
 Confederates completely repulsed, 
 163 ; left flank protected by James 
 River gunboats, 164. 
 
 Manassas Junction, the first Confederate 
 camp at, 27 ; captures of prisoners 
 and supplies by Stuart, 177 ; ad- 
 vance against Jackson at, 181. 
 
 Manassas, the first battle of, 40 ; Mc- 
 Dowell, General, on fear of masked 
 batteries in Bull Run advance, 34 ; 
 popular ignorance on nature of 
 the war, 40 ; the battle of, in 1861, 
 40 ; McDowell's plan of operations 
 against, 44 ; Johnston's evacuation 
 of Winchester, and union with 
 Beauregard, 46 ; McDowell's army 
 moved from the Potomac towards, 
 46 ; McDowell's plan of attack, 
 48 ; Beauregard's lines of defence, 
 50 ; commencement of the battle, 
 51 ; the action of Stone Bridge, 52 ; 
 peril of Confederate left flank, 53 ; 
 retreat of the Union army, 56 ; 
 losses on both sides, 57 ; causes of 
 the Union defeat, 58 ; followed by 
 popular uprising, 60 ; evacuated 
 by Johnston, 89. 
 
 Manassas No. 2, Jackson's retreat from, 
 181; the second battle of, 182; 
 
 Pope's position at, 184 ; useless at 
 tacks on Confederate positions, 185 ; 
 close of first day's battle, 186 ; i)o- 
 sitions of second day, 188 ; Pope 
 and Lee's intended attack on each 
 other's left flank on second day, 
 188 ; Pope's belief of Lee's falling 
 back, 188 ; McDowell ordered on 
 Warrenton turnpike, 189 ; Porter's 
 assault on Warrenton turnpike, 
 190 ; Porter repulsed from War- 
 renton turnpike, 190. 
 
 Manassas Gap, General French's feeble 
 attack, 374 
 
 Marmont on discrimination of the sol- 
 dier, 256. 
 
 Marsh Creek — see Williamsport. 
 
 Maryland campaign, the, 194 ; Lee's 
 expected co-operation from citizens, 
 195 ; his disapjjointment, 196 ; 
 McClellan's reorganization of his 
 army, 197 ; Lee's plan of operations, 
 198 ; Frederick evacuated by Lee, 
 198 ; General Miles force at Har- 
 per's Ferry, 199 ; Lee's report on 
 straggling, 224 ; the close of, 224 ; 
 Autietam — see Antietam. 
 
 Maryland Heights occupied by Miles's 
 troops, 205 ; abandoned by Miles, 
 206. 
 
 Martinsburg and Winchester, General 
 White's force at, 199. 
 
 Masked battery fiction, influence of 
 the, 34. 
 
 Meade, General, on McClellan's creation 
 of the army, 67 ; on the battle of 
 Fredericksburg, 248 ; appointed to 
 command Potomac army, 322 ; 
 characteiistics of, and estimation 
 by the army, 323 ; position of the 
 army on his taking command, 324 ; 
 his desire to fight a defensive bat- 
 tle at Gettysburg, 341 ; circumspect 
 pursuit of Lee, 307 ; decides on at- 
 tacking Lee at ^^'illiamsport, 369 ; 
 Lee's escape at Williamsport con- 
 sidered, 369 ; advance into Vir- 
 ginia, 374 ; drives Lee across the 
 Rappahannock and Rapidan, 375 
 position on the Rapidan line, 
 
 376 ; falls back behind the Rappa- 
 hannock, his left being turned, 
 
 377 ; advances towards the Rappa- 
 hannock in pursuit of Lee, b85 ; 
 crossed the Rappahannock — the 
 Confederate position, 387 ; back be- 
 tween the Rappahannock and Rap- 
 idan, 388 ; the Mine Run move, 
 390; plan of operations in Miua 
 
INDEX. 
 
 655 
 
 Run move, 391 ; pedantic orders 
 of Hallcck after Mine Run, 398 ; 
 army in winter-quarters, 398 ; his 
 strength on commencement of 
 overland campaign, 413. 
 
 Mechanicsville, McCiellan's object in 
 carrying, 122. 
 
 Meigs, General, on direct advance to- 
 wards Richmond, 84. 
 
 Merrimac, the, to be neutralized, 91 ; 
 the, destroyed by Confederate Com- 
 modore Tatuall, 120. 
 
 Middle Military Division, creation of 
 the, General Sheridan command- 
 ing, 555. 
 
 Miles, General, at Harper's Ferry, 199. 
 
 Miles, Colonel, brilliant service at Chan- 
 cellorsville, 287. 
 
 Mine Run move, the, 390; sketch of 
 the battle of, 393 ; Meade's plan to 
 interpose between Ewell and Hill, 
 391 ; Lee's position at, 391 ; cause 
 of delays of Meade's advance, 392; 
 delays of the Third Corps, 394; 
 the difficulties in crossing the Rap- 
 idan, 392 ; Lee gains time to con- 
 centrate, 394 ; Meade's plan of 
 attack, 396 ; Warren's intended 
 attack on Lee's right, 395 ; War- 
 ren's attack impossible, and failure 
 of the plan, 396 ; Warren's forlorn 
 hope fastening their names to their 
 coats, 397 ; Warren finds attack on 
 Lee's right hopeless, 397 ; Meade 
 withdraws his army, 397. 
 
 Morale of an army, what constitutes it, 
 255. 
 
 Moreau. a movement of compared with 
 Sumner's crossing of the Chicka- 
 hominy, 138. 
 
 Mountain warfare, characteristics of, 
 36. 
 
 Mud campaign. Banks' Ford, the cross- 
 ing prevented by a storm, 259. 
 
 Mustering out, haphazard policy of Gov- 
 ernment, 309. 
 
 Napier, Sir William, on judgment upon 
 unsuccessful generals, 121. 
 
 Napoleon, notes on invasion of Eng- 
 land, 99 ; on fighting without line 
 of retreat, 146; on the chessboard 
 of war, 246 ; on attacking positions 
 in front, 493 ; on changes of base, 
 498. 
 
 National wars, the difficulties in con- 
 ducting, 24. 
 
 Newmarket Cross-roads, battle of, its 
 object, 157 
 
 Newmarket, battle of, and defeat of 
 Sigel, 468. 
 
 Norfolk, General Huger evacuated, by 
 orders from Richmond, to which 
 garrison withdrew, 120; occupied 
 by General Wool, 120. 
 
 Norfolk Navy Yard, abandoned in 1861, 
 26. 
 
 North Anna, the two armies head for, 
 472 ; the Union army arrives on 
 north bank, and discovers Lee on 
 south bank, 473 ; Warren crossed 
 at Jericho Ford, and repulse of the 
 enemy, 473 ; Chesterfield Bridge 
 captured by Hancock, 475 ; extra- 
 ordinary position of Confederate 
 army at, 477 ; Grant's withdrawal 
 and start for the Pamunky, 477. 
 
 North, the, oflFensive thrown upon, 24. 
 
 Northern Virginia, position of the three 
 armies of, 122; Pope's campaign 
 (for fm'ther, see Pope), 167. 
 
 Officers, inefficiency of, property hold- 
 ers' memorial on, 63. 
 
 On to Richmond, influence of the phrase, 
 40. 
 
 Opening of the war — see three months' 
 campaign. 
 
 Opequan, battle of — see Winchester. 
 
 Orange and Alexandria Railroad — line 
 of advance towards Richmond, 22 ; 
 General Pope's position on — his 
 force, 172. 
 
 Organization of armies — the division 
 and the corps, 63. 
 
 Overland route to Richmond, of the 
 difficulties, 408 ; overland cam- 
 paign commenced, 414 ; overland 
 campaign, observations on, 489 ; 
 Cold Harbor — see Cold Harbor ; 
 Pamunky crossed by the army, 
 and communication secured with 
 Chesapeake Bay, 478 ; casualties 
 during the overland campaign, 
 491. 
 
 Patterson, General, feeble operations 
 against Winchester, 46 ; estimates 
 by, of Johnston's strength, 46. 
 
 Peach Orchard — see Gettysburg. 
 
 Peninsular campaign— Peninsula, de- 
 scription of the, 100 ; Peninsula, 
 unhealthiness of in August and 
 September, 171 ; discussions, before 
 adoption, between the President, 
 members of cabinet, and Generals 
 McDowell and Franklin, 79 ; Lower 
 Chesapeake advance approved by 
 
65Q 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 eight of twelve division command- 
 ers, 88 : decided upon under cer- 
 tain conditions, 91 ; McDowell's 
 corps and Blenker's division de- 
 taclied from by the President, 93 ; 
 Peninsula, transportation of the 
 army to the, 99 ; the army before 
 Yorktown (for siege of — see York- 
 town), 99 ; pursuit of Jolmston to 
 Williamsburg (for further — see 
 Williamsburg) 1 13 ; White House 
 reached. 118; Seven days' retreat 
 — see Seven days ; the close of 
 the, 164 ; reflections on its strat- 
 egy, 164; joy of the South and 
 grief of the North, 165 ; losses of, 
 165. 
 
 Peninsula, the, as a secondary base, 23. 
 
 Petersburg, the siege of, 497 ; import- 
 ance as point d'appui for the army, 
 500 ; its strategic relations to Kich- 
 mond, .507 ; two possible modes of 
 capture, 553 ; observations on the 
 siege, 550 ; manoeuvres by the left, 
 551 ; Grant's change of base to 
 south of the James, 497 ; Cole's 
 Ferry — the ponton delay, 499 ; the 
 fortifications of on Smith's arrival, 
 501 ; Grant's army all on south 
 side of the James, 500 ; Gill- 
 more's and Kautz's abortive at- 
 tempt to capture, 500 ; partial suc- 
 cess of Smith's forces, 503; non- 
 capture — circumstances of Han- 
 cock's march, 504 ; Hancock or- 
 dered to assist Smith before, 504 ; 
 Grant's expectation of easy cap- 
 ture by Smith, and failure to notify 
 Meade of intended attack, 504 ; 
 Lee's army arrived in, 506; 
 Meade's indorsement on non-cap- 
 ture of, 506 ; Smith's suspension 
 of operations for the night, 506 ; 
 Grant compelled to sit down before 
 it, 507 ; Petersburg and Richmond 
 Railroad, Terry's failure to destroy, 
 509 ; Hancock's and Burnside's as- 
 sault- the enemy di-iven on whole 
 line, 509 ; Hancock and Burnside's 
 renewed assault, 510 ; Grant com- 
 mences intrencliing a systematic 
 line, 511 ; Lee draws closer round 
 Petersburg, and repulses every new 
 assault, 511; Jerusalem plankroad — 
 Hil) strikes between Second and 
 Sixth corps, 512 ; Stoney Creek, 
 the battle of, 513 ; Reams' Station, 
 Wilson's defeat and escape, with 
 loss of trains and artillery, 513 ; 
 
 Nottoway Station, cavalry action 
 at, 513 ; Southside Railroad de- 
 stroyed to Nottoway Station by 
 Wilson and Kautz, 513 ; Weldon 
 Railroad destroyed at Reams' Sta- 
 tion by Wilson and Kautz, 513 ; 
 losses of preliminary operations, 
 514; the lines of both armies de- 
 scribed, 515 ; Deep Bottom, Han- 
 cock's expedition to, 519 ; Deep 
 Bottom, Hancock's secret return 
 to Petersburg lines, 520 ; Lee's 
 diversion against Baltimore and 
 Washington — see Early, 526 ; 
 Deep Bottom, Hancock's second 
 expedition, 529 ; summer and au- 
 tumn operations against Peters 
 burg and Richmond, 529 ; Weldon 
 Railroad, Warren's seizvire of dur- 
 ing Deep Bottom operations, 533 ; 
 Weldon Railroad, Warren's cap- 
 ture, and Confederate efforts to re- 
 take, 533 ; Peeble's Farm, move- 
 ment by the left, 539 ; turning 
 movement on Southside Railroad 
 (for further — see Southside Rail- 
 road), 540; Fort Harrison carried 
 by Butler, 540; Butler at battle 
 of Chapin's Farm, 540 ; Chapin'a 
 Farm, capture of Fort Harrison by 
 Butler, 540 ; Southside Railroad, 
 failure to force Confederate posi- 
 tion at Hatcher's Run, 541 ; South- 
 side Railroad — Lee, his extreme 
 line below Hatcher's Run, 541 ; 
 Southside Railroad and Boydtou 
 plankroad, importance of to Lee, 
 541 ; Southside Railroad, plan of 
 attack on Lee's right, 541 ; opera- 
 tions extending Grant's lines west- 
 ward to Hatcher's Run, 547 ; War- 
 ren's operations on the Weldon 
 road, 549 ; character of lines, 576 ; 
 Warren's and Humphreys' move 
 by the rear and left, 581 ; initial 
 operations of the 39th of March, 
 583 ; Lee's right, front position of, 
 582 ; Sheridan manoeuvring to the 
 left, 583 ; Dinwiddle Courthouso 
 occupied by Sheridan, 584 ; the 
 Union line from the Appomattox 
 to Dinwiddle Courthouse, 584 ; 
 Lee's strength and length of in 
 trenched line, 585 ; Longstreet re- 
 tained at north side of James 
 River, 585 ; White Oak road and 
 Hatcher's Run, the two armies at, 
 586 ; Humphreys' report of opera 
 tions of March 30, 1865, 587 ; Union 
 
INDEX. 
 
 657 
 
 left (Warren's), disposition of the, 
 588 ; Lee's centre and left still in- 
 tact. 600; Lee's centre assaulted 
 by Parke, Wright, and Ord, 601 ; 
 Confederates pressed back to chain 
 of works close around, 602 ; the 
 defence of Fort Gregg, 602 ; evac- 
 uated by Lee, 604; Lee's retreat 
 from, and pursuit of — see Hetnxit. 
 
 Petersburg mine fiasco, the, 518 ; Burn- 
 side's choice of assaulting column 
 by lot, 521 ; Burnside's corps, the 
 morale of before the assault, 521 ; 
 effect of the explosion, 523 ; Gen- 
 eral Ledlie's assault after the ex- 
 plosion, 522 ; the disaster at the 
 crater, 524 ; reports of Committee 
 on the Conduct of the War and 
 military court of inquiry, 524. 
 
 Piedmont, the battle of, 469. 
 
 Pipe ('reek — see Gettysburg. 
 
 Pleasonton's report of strength of cav- 
 alry after Chancellorsville, 310. 
 
 Po, the river — see Spottsylvania. 
 
 Pope, campaign in Northern Virginia, 
 167 ; placed in command of Army 
 of Virginia (McDowell, Banks, and 
 Fremont), 168 ; his military repu- 
 tation, 168 ; his bombastic non- 
 sense on assuming command, and 
 its popularity, 169 ; thought he 
 coutd march to New Orleans with 
 such an army as McClellan's, 169 ; 
 Cedar Mountain, the battle of, 
 173 ; retrograde movement, 175 ; 
 Jackson manojuvring to flank his 
 right, 176; Catlett's Station, Stu- 
 art's capture of camp and Pope's pa- 
 pers, 177 ; his right turned by Jack- 
 son, 177 ; on lying off on enemy's 
 flanks, 178 ; railway communica- 
 tions with Washington cut, 178 ; 
 his dispositions to attack Long- 
 street before uniting with Jackson, 
 179 ; Groveton, Jackson's position 
 at, and battle, 181 ; Jackson es- 
 capes from Manassas, 181 ; Porter's 
 advance to Gainsville stopped by 
 Lee's arrival, 183 ; arrives at Ma- 
 nassas, his position facing Jack- 
 eon, 184 ; forced from Manassas — 
 retires to Centreville, 191 ; Ox 
 HiU, the battle of, 193 ; falls back 
 to Fairfax Courthouse and Ger- 
 mantown, 192 ; campaign, losses 
 of, 193 ; withdraws within Wash- 
 ington lines, 193 ; resigned his 
 command, 193 ; campaign results 
 to the Confederates, 194. 
 
 Port Republic, the battle of, 127. 
 
 Porter on north bank of Chickahomiuy 
 River to engage Jackson, 148 ; the 
 doubtful order at Manassas No. 2, 
 186. 
 
 Potomac army — see Army. 
 
 Potomac River, the Confederate block- 
 ade of the, 75. 
 
 Prince Eugene on interference of the 
 States-General, 126. 
 
 Rapidan, the march to the, 373 ; Meado 
 falls back from behind Rappahan- 
 nock, 375 ; Lee withdraws across, 
 387 ; the, crossed by Meade, 415. 
 
 Rappahannock, abortive movements 
 upon the, 255. 
 
 Rapi)ahannock Station, the battle of, 
 387. 
 
 Raymond, Mr., on Mr. Lincoln's opinion 
 of McClellan's plan of advance, 87. 
 
 Reams' Station, Hancock's action at, 
 535 ; delay in re-enforcing Han- 
 cock, 537 ; Hancock's losses, 538 ; 
 Hancock's letter to author on the 
 battle, 538. 
 
 Retrt^at of the Army of Northern Vir- 
 ginia — Lee's only line of retreat, 
 603 ; the two Union lines of pur- 
 suit, 605 ; Danville line Lee's first 
 objective, 606 ; Lee reaches Amelia 
 Courthouse, 607 ; his expected ra- 
 tions had been sent to Richmond 
 and burned, 607 ; Sheridan's force 
 at Jettersville heading off Lee, 
 608 ; Meade joined Sheridan at 
 Jettersville, 608 ; Sailor's Creek, 
 Ewell's corps cut off, and surren- 
 dered, 610 ; Lee crossed the Appo- 
 mattox near Farmville, 611 ; star- 
 vation and fatigue of Lee's troops, 
 611; ultimo suspire, 612; Lee's 
 army overtaken at High Bridge by 
 Second Corps, 613 ; Farmville, 
 Grant's letter from, to Lee, 615 ; 
 Sheridan across Lee's line of re- 
 treat at Appomattox Courthouse, 
 
 617 ; Lee's attempt to cut through 
 Sheridan's lines at Appomattox 
 Courthouse, 617 ; Lee's surrender, 
 
 618 ; Lee's surrender, opening of 
 correspondence between Grant and 
 Lee, 618. 
 
 Reynolds, General, the death of, 330. 
 
 Rich Mountain, Pegram defeated by 
 Rosecrans, 38. 
 
 Richmond the objective point of the 
 war, 17 ; the lines of advance to- 
 wards in 1861, 22 ; what a direct 
 
658 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 inarch on would have effected, 147 ; 
 outer line of redoubts pierced by 
 Kilpatrick, 400 ; merits of plans of 
 advance discussed, 40G ; outer de- 
 fences penetrated by Sheridan, 
 460 ; entered by Union troops, 
 605. 
 
 Rivers of Virginia, system of the, 19. 
 
 Rivers, theories of defence of, 415. 
 
 Round Top — see Gettysburg. 
 
 Russell, W. H., on McDowell's army, 
 43. 
 
 Schenck, General, flight of liis recon- 
 noitering party near Vienna, Vir- 
 ginia, 33 ; on Vienna masked bat- 
 teries, 84. 
 
 Scott, Lieutenant-General, views and 
 plans of the war — how they were 
 overruled, 41 ; dispatch to General 
 Patterson on operations against 
 Johnston, 45. 
 
 Sedgwick, General, at Mine Eun, 395 ; 
 his death at Spottsylvania, 447; 
 see also Chancellorsville. 
 
 Seminary Ridge — see Gettysburg, 336. 
 
 Seven days' retreat, the, 140 ; Lee dis- 
 covers McGlellan's movement for 
 the James River, 154 ; commenced, 
 154 ; Lee commences pursuit, 155 ; 
 battle of Savage Station, 156 ; the 
 army debouches from White Oak 
 Swamp, 156 ; the two columns of 
 pursuit, 157 ; Newmarket Cross- 
 roads, battle of — its object, 157 ; 
 McClellan's artillery at Malvern 
 HiU, 157. 
 
 Seven Pines battle — see Fair Oaks. 
 
 Shady Grove, the battle of, 481. 
 
 Sheridan appointed to command cav- 
 alry of Potomac army, 412 ; raid 
 on Lee's communications, 458 ; op- 
 erations in Shenandoah Valley, 
 554 ; qualities as a commander, 
 556 ; battle of Winchester, 556 ; 
 his tactics with cavalry and in- 
 fantry, 564 ; raid up the Virginia 
 Valley — completes the circle of the 
 hunt, 568 ; report of operations, 
 March 30, 1865. 587 ; at battle of 
 Five Forks, 596. 
 
 Shenandoah Valley, topography of the, 
 19 ; General Banks retained in, 92 ; 
 and the Chickahominy — compar- 
 ative strategy, 121 ; Ewell's move- 
 ment into, 314 ; Ewell's captures, 
 318 ; Sheridan's operations sum- 
 mer and winter 1864, 554 ; its strat- 
 egic value to the Confederates, 
 
 554 ; Sixth Corps retained in, 554 • 
 Sheridan at Cedar Creek, 559 , 
 Early once more ensconced at Fish- 
 er's Hill, 560 ; desolation of the, by 
 Sheridan, 560 ; the battle of Cedar 
 Creek — see Cedar Creek, 561 ; all 
 operations ended in, 564 ; battle of 
 Winchester — see Winchester. 
 
 Sherman at Manassas (Stone Bridge), 
 53 ; given command at the West, 
 and against Johnston, 405 ; ad- 
 vance on Atlanta compared with 
 Grant's direct attack system, 495 ; 
 capture of Atlanta, 566 ; march 
 from Atlanta to Savannah, 566 ; 
 crossed the Savannah into South 
 Carolina, 566 ; reached Goldsboro, 
 North Carolina, 568. 
 
 Savage's Station, the battle of, 156. 
 
 Sigel, plan of his operations in Shenan- 
 doah Valley, etc., 409 ; operations 
 in the Shenandoah Valley, 468 ; 
 superseded by General Hunter, 
 468. 
 
 Smith, G. W., commanding Confed- 
 erates, xice Johnston, wounded, 138. 
 
 Smith, W. F., evidence on Burnside's 
 orders at Fredericksburg, 245 ; and 
 General Franklin's letter to the 
 President proposing plan of cam- 
 ]iaign, 263 ; report on Grant's or- 
 der at Cold Harbor, 482 ; reports 
 of his oj)erations against Petera- 
 burg, 501, 502, 506. 
 
 South Mountain, the battles of, 304 ; 
 Hill and Longstreet sent to hold 
 passes, 201 ; see also Harper's 
 Ferry. 
 
 Southside Railroad, Warren's turning 
 movement across Hatcher's Run, 
 542 ; Hancock's isolated position 
 on Boydton jjlankroad, 543 ; 
 Hancock withdraws across Hatch- 
 er's Run, 546 ; losses on both sides, 
 546. 
 
 Spottsylvania, Grant's purpose in seiz- 
 ing, 440 ; the march to — orders for, 
 441 ; Lee marches to, by Parkers' 
 store, 442 ; Warren's advance met 
 by Lougstreet's advance, 444 ; dis- 
 positions of the Union army, 446 ; 
 Lee at, and across Grant's line of 
 march, 446 ; Hancock's unfortu- 
 nate movement across the Po, 
 447 ; repeated disastrous repulses of 
 Second and Fifth corps at Laurel 
 Hill, 449 ; first line on Lee's right 
 carried -Ijy Upton, but abandoned, 
 , 450 ; Hancock's successful attack 
 
INDEX. 
 
 659 
 
 on Lee's riglit centre, 451 ; Grant's 
 endeavors to pierce Lee's lines dur- 
 ing next week, 4o4 ; Lee with- 
 drew to his interior position after 
 twenty hours' fighting to dislodge 
 Hancock, 454 : diary of attempts 
 to pierce Lee's line May 18th to 
 19th, 455 ; losses from May 5th to 
 21st, 458 ; the arm}^ moved by the 
 left towards Richmond, 458 ; to the 
 Chickahominy, 470 ; and the North 
 Anna — character of the region be- 
 tween, 472. 
 
 Spottswood mines, origin of the name 
 Spottsylvania, 428. 
 
 Staflford Heights — see Fredericksburg. 
 
 Steadman, Fort — see Fort Steadman. 
 
 Stone, General, defeated at Ball's Bluff, 
 76 ; exonerated from blame at 
 BaU's Bluff, 77. 
 
 Stoneman's raid on Virginia Central 
 Railroad, 302. 
 
 Straggling in tiie Confederate army in 
 Maryland campaign, 224. 
 
 Stuart's capture of Catlett's Station, 
 176 ; raid into Pennsylrania, 226 ; 
 succession to Jackson's command, 
 292 ; report of Jackson at battle of 
 Chancellorsville, 298 ; his absence 
 during movements on Gettysburg, 
 838 ; bivouacks within Union lines 
 at Auburn, 881 ; killed at Yellow 
 Tavern, Virginia, 459. 
 
 Subsistence — see Commissariat. 
 
 Sumner, General, in command of pur- 
 suit of Johnston, 112; at battle of 
 Williamsburg, 118 ; at battle of 
 Savage's Station, 156 ; report on 
 his desire to occupy Fredericks- 
 burg, 234 ; on the morale of the 
 army, 256. 
 
 Three months' campaign, the, in 1861, 
 26. 
 
 Tucker, Mr., Assistant Secretary of 
 War, directed, with General Mc- 
 Clellan, the transportation to the 
 Peninsula, 100. 
 
 Turner's Gap, McClellan's right and 
 centre at, 202 ; the Confederate 
 force at, 202 ; battle of, 203. 
 
 Turenne's counter to Montecuculi in 
 1675, 147. 
 
 Twiss on justifiable desolations by ar- 
 mies, 560. 
 
 Valley of Humiliation, the Shenandoah 
 
 Valley called, 318. 
 Virginia, her vote to secede, 13; the 
 
 theatre of the war, 13, 15, 18 ; river 
 and mountain defensive systems of, 
 19 ; preparations for war — Gov- 
 ernor Letcher's call for, 26; first 
 entered by the Federal army (for 
 further— see Manassiis and subse- 
 quent camimigns), 30 ; winter op- 
 erations, ditiiculties of, 78 ; see 
 also West Virginia. 
 
 Wadsworth, General, the death of at 
 the Wilderness, 434. 
 
 Wallace, stand before Early on the 
 Monocacy, 526. 
 
 Warren, General Q. K., evidence on 
 Big Bethel affair, 32 ; at Manassas 
 No. 2, 190 ; report of Manassas 
 battle No. 2, 189 ; evidence on dis- 
 aster to Eleventh Corps at Chan- 
 cellorsville, 286 ; at Cedar Kmi, 
 381 ; at battle of Bristoe, 883 ; at 
 Mine Run, 393-396 ; capture of 
 Wei don Railroad, 532 ; at move- 
 ment on Southside Railroad, 541 ; 
 report of operations at Hatcher's 
 Run, 545 ; report of operations of 
 March 30, 1865, 587 ; rei)ort on ef- 
 fort to gain the White Oak road, 
 589 ; bravery at battle of Five 
 Forks, 599 ; relieved from com- 
 mand by Sheridan, 599. 
 
 Washington, the defensive lines of, 23 
 the strategic protection of, 23 ; de- 
 fences, the system initiated, 30 
 system of defences formed, the 
 theory of, 65 ; popular anger at 
 Confederate blockade of the Poto- 
 mac, 75 ; President Lincoln's order 
 to retain sufficient force to secure, 
 89 ; Washington and Potomac line, 
 dispositions to defend, 91 ; General 
 Wadsworth placed in command of 
 defences, 92 ; number and positions 
 of covering force, 92 ; fears for 
 safety of — foment by General Pope, 
 170 ; Early's opportunity of enter- 
 ing, 527 ; action before Fort Ste- 
 vens, 527. 
 
 West Virginia, Confederate defence of 
 by General Lee, 34 ; topography 
 of McCleUan's operations, 35 ; cam- 
 paign closed by victory at Car- 
 rick's Ford, 39 ; see also Virginia 
 
 White House, General Franklin's dis 
 embarkation and check by John- 
 ston, 117 ; McClellan's base of sup- 
 plies established at, 118; White 
 House to the Chickahominy, Mc- 
 Clellan's march, 119. 
 
660 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Wilderness, the battle of the, 413 ; 
 Lee's dispositions to attack, 418 ; 
 Warren's battle with Ewell's 
 forces, 421 ; Hill's attempt to seize 
 the position at Brock road, 424 ; 
 Hancock s attack on HiU at Orange 
 plankroad, 425 ; Wadswortli sent 
 to attack Hill's flank and rear, 
 426 ; close of the preliminary bat- 
 tle of Warren and HiU, 427 ; to- 
 pography and character of the 
 field, 428 ; Lee's demonstration on 
 Union right, 430 ; Hancock drives 
 Hill back, 431 ; Longstreet arrives 
 and restores Hill's line, 431 ; Long- 
 street's attack on Hancock inter- 
 rupted by his fall, 433 ; Hancock 
 again assaulted by troops of Long- 
 street and Hill, 430 ; cavalry ae 
 tion, 437 ; the character and re- 
 sults of the battle considered, 438 ; 
 the losses on each side, 439. 
 
 Williamsburg, the battle of, 113 ; Han- 
 cock's capture of unknown works 
 on Confederate left and rear, 115; 
 battle of. Hooker's losses, 118. 
 
 Williamsport, Lee's withdrawal into 
 Virginia in front of Meade, 369. 
 
 Willoughby's Run, battle of, 330. 
 
 Wincliester, Johnston's position and 
 force, 45 ; battle of, between Banks 
 and Jackson, 125 ; Jackson de- 
 feated by General Shields, 92 ; 
 Ewell ai rives before, 314 ; aban- 
 doned by Milroy after infamously 
 feeble defence, 318 ; entered, 318 ; 
 occupied by Hill, 319 ; battle of, 
 556 ; Sheridan's and Early's dis- 
 positions, 556 ; battle of — strength 
 
 of the two armies, 558 ; Early re- 
 treats to fisher's Hill (see also 
 Slieridan), 558. 
 
 Winthrop, Major, killed at Bethel, 
 32. 
 
 Wistar's raid to Bottom's Bridge, 398. 
 
 Wright, General, at battle of Cedar 
 Creek, 561 ; credit due to at battlo 
 of Cedar Creek, 503. 
 
 Yellow Tavern, Sheridan's victory at, 
 459. 
 
 York River Railroad, supply line aban- 
 doned by McClullan, 154. 
 
 York and Pamunky rivers, McClellan 
 en route by, 120. 
 
 York River, Franklin's ascension of, in 
 pursuit of Johnston, 117. 
 
 Yorktown, McClellans advance arrived 
 at, and Lee's Mills, 101 ; descrip- 
 tion and map of Confederate posi- 
 tions, 101 ; McClellan's plans — the 
 navy and McDowell counted upon, 
 but unavailable, lOo ; re-enforced 
 and to be held by Confederates, 
 103 ; the siege of commenced, 106 ; 
 Lee 'si Mill, unsucces.sful attempt to 
 break Confederate lines, 100 ; siego 
 of, General Barry on — expected ef- 
 fects of artillery fire, 107 ; evacu- 
 ated by the Confederates, 107 ; 
 criticism upon McClellan's opera- 
 tions, 108 ; Magruder's small force, 
 and McClellan's delay of assault, 
 109 ; arrival of part of jMcDoweU'a 
 corps during siege, 109 ; McClel- 
 lan, Heintzelman, and Barnard'8 
 opinion on immediate assault, 110; 
 to the Chickahominy, 113. 
 
New York, October, 1882.] [743 & 745 Broad\ 
 
 Charles Scribner's Sons' Announcemer 
 of New and Forthcominor Books 
 for the Fall of i88a. 
 
 Gorea, tlie Hermit ITation. 
 
 By William Elliot Griffis, author of " The Mikado's Empire," and 
 of the Imperial University of Tokio, Japan, i vol., Svo, with nume 
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 Corea stands in much the same relation to the traveler that the region of 
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 The Beg'inning's of History, 
 
 According to the Bible and the Traditions of Oriental Peoples. From 
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CHARLES SCRIBSER'S SONS' NEW PUBLICATIONS. 
 
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 origin by which Israel was surrounded, and from the midst of which it came." 
 
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 History of the Cliristian Church. 
 
 By Philip Schaff, D.D. Vol. I. Apostolic Christianity. 8vo. $4.00. 
 
 The publication of Dr. Schaff's History of the Christian Church Avas begun 
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 " In the union of profound and exact learning with the gift of popular representation, Dr. 
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 STTinton's Army of the Potomac. 
 
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 from the commencement to the close of the war, 1861-5. By Willia.m' 
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CHARLES SCRiBNER'S SONS' NEW PUBLICATIONS. 3 
 
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 he will always be the leading figure of the war. All of this large circle, who knew 
 the confidential relations, the devoted study, and the authentic sources of informa- 
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 that it would be the only adequate life of their hero. 
 
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 lished material makes it a book indispensable to the military student. It is not 
 only a remarkable biography, but a history, written under advantages open to few 
 historians, of the most important Campaigns of the West. 
 
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 history of his life, and was furnished with all the necessary materials for his work. 
 He was also appointed by the Society of the Army of the Cumberland to prepare 
 the biography, which thus has the authoritative sanction and approval of those 
 interested in it and best qualified to judge of its authenticity and value. 
 
 Campaig'iis of the Civil "War. 
 
 Volume X. THE MARCH TO THE SEA— FRANKLIN AND 
 NASHVILLE. By the Hon. Jacob D. Cox, Ex-Governor of Ohio, late 
 Secretary of the Interior of the United States, Major-General U. S. V., 
 commanding Twenty-third Corps, etc. i vol., i2mo. With maps and 
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 General Cox — the most competent as well as the most graphic writer on the 
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 The next volume of this series will be Lieutenant F. V. Gigqwc's Mississippi. 
 
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS' NEW PUBLICATIONS. 
 
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 Criteria of Diverse Kinds of Truth. 
 
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 Essays Chiefly Philosophical. By Noah Porter, D.D., LL.D. i vol., 
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CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS' NEW PUBLICATIONS. 5 
 
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 liOg-ic and Life, with Otbez* Sermons. 
 
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 Bibliotlieca Theolog'ica. 
 
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 He-w Edition of tlie Works of tbe Late George P. 
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 LECTURES ON THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE. 
 
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CHARLES SCRIBNERS SONS' NEW PUBLICATIONS. 1 
 
 The Land of the Arabian Nig'lits. 
 
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 Age of Anne. 
 
 Frederick the Great. 
 
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THE CAMPAIGNS OF THE CIVIL WAR. 
 
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 ^^tT^^ ^^^^^^"^°^h Valley. (The Campaign of Sheridan.) By George 
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 ^^^'TT^^r^ 9^"?Pf ^^^^ °^ ^^^"* ^" Virginia. By Andrew A. Humphreys, 
 
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 VOLUMES OF THE SERIES ALREADY PUBLISHED. 
 
 I— The Outbreak of Rebellion. By John G. Nicolay, Esq., Private Secre- 
 tary to President Lincoln. 
 
 II.— From Fort Henry to Corinth. By the Hon. M. F. Force, Bri^r-Gen'! 
 
 nd Bvt. Major-Gen'l U. S. V., etc. ; Treasurer of the Society of the Army of Tennessee. 
 
 III.— The Peninsula. By Alexander S. Webb, Bvt. Major-Gen'l U S A • 
 
 Assistant Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, i86i-'62; afterward Chief of Staff, Army 
 01 the Potomac, etc. -' 
 
 IV.— The Army Under Pope. By John C. Ropes, Esq., of the Military Hi •,- 
 
 toncal Society of Massachuseits. 
 
 v.— The Antietam and Fredericksburg. By Francis Winthrop Palfrev 
 
 late Colonel 20th Mass. Infantry, Bvt. Brig.-Genl U. S. V. 
 
 VI.— Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. By Abner Doubleday, Bvt. Maior- 
 
 Gen'l U. S. A. and Major-Genl U. S. V., etc. 
 
 VII.— The Army of the Cumberland. By Henry M. Cist, Bvt. Brig.-Gen'l 
 U. S. ^•; A. A. G. on the staff of Major-Gen'l Rosecrans and the staff of Mator-Gen'i 
 Ihomas ; Secretary of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland. 
 
 IX.— Atlanta. By the Hon. Jacob D. Cox, Ex-Governor of Ohio, late Secretary of 
 the Interior of the United States ; Major-Gen'l U. S. V., commanding Twenty-third Corps, etc 
 
 X.— The March to the Sea— Franklin and Nashville. By the Hon. Jacob 
 
 D. Cox, Ex-Governor of Ohio, late Secretary of the Interior of the United States, Major. 
 Uen 1 U. S. v., commanding Twenty-third Corps, etc. 
 
 Each 1 vol., 12mo, tvith Maps and nans, $1,00, 
 
 SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENT. 
 
 It has been decided to publish, as a Supplemetary Volume to the Campaign Series, an exceedindv 
 va uab.e and complete " Statistical Record of the Civil War," compiled with the rrer.test care and 
 aceumcy from official sources, by Colonel Frederick Phisterer, late Captain U. S. Army 
 the nature of the volume, and its value to every student of the war history, may be raihered from 
 ^ome leadmg heads in the list of its contents, which includes the figures of the quotas and men actually 
 tumished by all States ; a hst of all organizations mustered into the U. S. service; the strength of the 
 army at various periods ; its organization m armies, corps, &c. ; the divisions of the country into 
 departments, iec. ; chronological hst of all engagements, with the losses in each ; tabulated staten:°nt3 
 ot all losses m the war, with the causes of death, &c. ; and full lists of ail general officers. 
 
 The volume will be in all respects uniform with others of the series. J^ r% m .««!d M ^ 
 
 CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, Publishers, 743 & 745 Broadway, New-York. 
 
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