Ptfl-lb^ The College Course in the Prin ciples of Education DR. JOHN A. MacVANNEL Adjunct Professor of the Philosophy of Education in Teachers College, Columbia University, New York City. Reprinted from THE SCHOOL REVIEW A Journal of Secondary Education February 1906 Chicago THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS ipo6 The College Course in the Principles of Education DR. JOHN A. MacVANNEL Adjunct Professor ot" the Philosophy of Education in Teachers College, Columbia University, New York City. Reprinted from THE SCHOOL REl^IEW A Journal of Secondary Education February 1906 Chicago THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS ipo6 .\'='' LIBRARY of CONGRESS Two Copies Received MAR 31 1906 opyriirftl Entry CUSS^CG- XXc. No, COPY B. Copyright 1906 By The University of Chicago Published February 1906 Composed and Printed by The University of Chicago Press Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. Education as a subject for college and university study is in a condition which is at once beset with difficulties and at the same time hopeful in its possibilities. The difficulties arise from the com- plexity of the factors involved and the number of special scientific disciplines which must be called upon for methods and results. When the purpose of education could be settled by metaphysics , or its data and methods by psychology alone, the task of the theory of education was comparatively simple. But with the recognition and demand for biological, sociological, and physiological aspects, as well as for the reconstruction of the ethical and psychological aspects of the problem, the task is far more difficult. It is precisely this need of reconstructing, this demand for recognition of broader as- pects, which makes the situation full of interest and promise. It is this which should make the study of educational principles one of the most stimulating and broadening of subjects. It is just this which should give such deep significance to the work of education, as a whole, as to awaken first of all teachers, and through them the larger public, to its importance. It is just because the paper of Dr. MacVannel seems to me to be very suggestive of the broader as- pects of educational theory that I have asked the publishers of the School Review to reprint it for the use of my classes, and I feel con- fident that it will appeal to many others as it has to me, J.4MES H. Tufts. The University of Chicago. REPRINTED FROM THE SCHOOL REVIEW A JOURNAL OF SECONDARY EDUCATION VOLUME XIV ■ppRPFTAPV ^ r\r\(^ WHOLE NUMBER 2 rTLOrS-Ui^iXI, 1 yUO NUMBER 131 THE COLLEGE COURSE IN THE PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION' DR. JOHN A. MacVANNEL Adjunct Professor of the Philosophy of Education in Teachers College, Columbia University, New York City The rough notes offered in this paper will, it is hoped, furnish a working basis for a discussion of the topic : What should constitute a college course in the principles of education, its relation to cognate subjects, its limits, and the more important sources of material ? A course in the philosophy of education differs from one in the prin- ciples of education not so much in its materials as in its standpoint, and in its more persistent endeavor to indicate the organic unity as well as the possibility and implications of the educational process. It must be conceded at the outset that it is impossible to make an outhne of a course in educational theory, whether elementary or ad- vanced, without assuming a point of view in regard to the general problem and its method of treatment as a whole. On the one hand there are those who maintain that the study of education is valuable only in so far as it is amenable to scientific treatment — understanding by such treatment the quantitative study of education. On the other hand there are those who conceive its more fruitful study to consist in treating educational theory as an integral part of a wider phi- losophy of society, while not ignoring the necessities of scientific treat- ment. To the present writer this latter method commends itself as, 'These papers are printed for discussion by the Society of College Teachers of Education at a meeting to be held in Louisville, Ky., Februan," 28 and March i, 1906. 5 6 THE SCHOOL REVIEW on the whole, the more satisfactory, and indeed, if education is to be seen in its right relations in human experience, as the only one pos- sible in the long run. The hard and fast distinctions, however, so frequently made between science and philosophy cannot be perma- nent. Both aim at the organization of experience for the purpose of control — the single science within a narrow sphere, philosophy within the widest possible area. It seems reasonable to presuppose in col- lege seniors the capacity for a study of education in a philosophical spirit and yet in accordance with scientific method. In the second part of the present paper especially — the part which attempts to trace in outline the more important phases of the educa- tional problem and its possibilities in affording an elementary course in educational principles — it would be extremely difficult to find any- thing not already in some measure made common property through the writings of our educational leaders. This part undertakes to fur- nish a map of the country now being explored by these leaders — a rough outline of the general educational problem. It is at best a plan of action whose inherent logic is not as yet entirely satisfactory. Many possibilities are unprovided for, and there is much omitted which should appear in a complete outline of the subject. In many cases — for example, the question of the relation of theory to practice, to what extent education is a science, and so on — it has been omitted arbitrarily. Having come to some agreement concerning the general nature and content of educational theory, it may be possible to recog- nize somewhat more clearly the form a more precise statement of the problem must take, the lines along which a more adequate solution of the problem lies, the probable results which such an inquiry may attain. As a working hypothesis the present paper may suggest lines of criticism or of investigation to those who will make real contribu- tions to the subject. "What is education, and how are we to educate, either with a view to perfect training or to the best life?" The Greeks were the first to raise educational practice to clear consciousness, abstracting and generalizing its "idea" or principle, and thereby freeing it from the thraldom of mere habit and routine. In this way they attained COLLEGE COURSE IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION ii extended in their application and transformed in the h'ght of an enriched experience. So far as the present section is concerned, it remains only to direct attention to certain of the more prominent features of the outline of a course in the principles of education offered as a basis of discussion and criticism in the second part of this paper. In the outline itself the first place is given to the statement of problems rather than to their solution. There is a sense in which it is impossible to formu- late our problems, unless we are prepared with at least partial solu- tions. It may be admitted, also, that the accurate definition of a problem, in education as in philosophy, is a most important factor in its solution. Kant regarded complete definitions as the last result of philosophy. At any rate, it seems to be true, both in philosophy and in education, that results can mean little or nothing to those who have not first endeavored to understand the nature and apprf^ciate the value of the processes by which they were reached. In educa- tion especially, partly owing to the fact that it represents a need both universal and fundamental, and partly because its phenomena are, from one point of view, of the simplest and most familiar kind, there is grave danger at the present time of over-rating the importance of finding solutions to its problems, and under-rating the importance of seeking them. In working out a theory of education, the attempt must be made to co-ordinate all the elements 0} the problem in their organic unity. The presence or absence of such unity is one of the supreme tests of such a theory. So long as this is not done, one's view of educational theory must necessarily remain limited and im- poverished. In the somewhat fluctuating and yet progressive condi- tion of the theory of the present time, any attempt to bring the mani- fold elements of the problem into some kind of unity cannot be altogether valueless. Every such attempt, however, will have its defects, and but little more than a transient significance. I. As was suggested in a previous section, the study of educational theory has, until recent years, suffered from the lack of any clearly defined principle of method. Following the treatment offered in several of the more recent works in education, the present outline attempts to indicate in a schematic way how the educational process may be given a distinct and vital relationship to the facts of organic 12 THE SCHOOL REVIEW and social evolution. In so doing, it is assumed (a) that the educa- tional process and the general life-process are both subservient to the general law of evolution as the largest generalization yet made in scientific views of the world, and (6) that, as a fact of experience, the educational process is a part of the wider life-process. The inquiry thus becomes essentially this ; How does education come into being ? In the attempt to interpret the educational process in the light of the doctrine of evolution, emphasis is laid upon two facts: {a) the principle oj individuation according to which the movement of the evolutionary process takes place. In every process of develop- ment there are present the two interrelated and co-operating factors : the individual existence in which the development occurs, and the situation or environment which affords the stimuli or the conditions through which the development takes place. On the one side there is the organism with the capacity of response; on th; other there is the environment which provides the stimulus. The life-process, for the e\olutionist, is a process of adaptation, {h) Emphasis also is laid on the significance of the lengthening period of infancy which makes the process of adaptation possible. Education, accordingly, is fun- damentally the process of adapting an individual organism to a nat- ural and human environment, actual or ideal. As is suggested in the third section of this paper, to say that w^e accept the concept of evolution as a method of studying the world and human life may mean much or little. Its true significance can be realized only when the general doctrine is submitted to the interpre- tation put upon it by philosophy: in other words, when its results are brought into relation with the other elements of our experience. It would be going beyond the limits of an elementary course in the prin- ciples of education to direct attention to any but the more important implications of such interpretation; their significance, however, should be recognized in the content and organization of such a course. It is of fundamental importance for those who underlake the organiza- tion of a course in educational theory to recognize that evolution, strictly interpreted, is only a law or method according to which a par- ticular force or reality manifests itself; it does not attempt to furnish any information concerning the ultimate nature of that reality. Edu- cational theory, however, being normative in it'; character, implies COLLEGE COURSE IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION 13 an estimation of reality. Into it enter judgments 0} worth as well as judgments oj jact. Our idea of becoming (individual, social, cosmic, what not) must be finally determined by our conception of that existing reality which underlies the process. According to the usual proce- dure of the evolutionary method of study, the individual is not neces- sarily any more than the transitory resultant of physical processes. Science, of course, by the very nature of its procedure, presupposes a true objective reasonableness in the world of phenomena. Consist- ently, also, it recognizes in the latter the varied manifestation of one principle or energy. Some scientists, indeed, regard these phenomena as brought sufficiently within our ken as to see in them a progression toward a goal that is recognizable by human intelligence. But science, as such, is for the most part concerned with co-existences and sequences of phenomena; with the form rather than the matter, the method of behavior rather than the inner nature of the reality which lies back of the method. (See also section II, § 2, and section III.) 2. The outline, further, implies the conception of the unity of the educational process with the wider social process. It aims to suggest the parallelism between educational theory and the wider psychological, social, and philosophical theory of the period. It as- sumes that no theory, ethical, philosophical, educational, can be developed in isolation from other lines of intellectual activity, or understood when isolated from the human conditions which produce it. It is a matter of common knowledge, moreover, that there can- not be any adequate appreciation of the educational theories of the present without some understanding of the foundations of such theories in the needs and aspirations, the intellectual and social ten- dencies, of the past. To reach any definite conclusions in regard to fundamental tendencies in the present, a study is necessary of the previous conditions through which they passed in order to reach the present. For in any study involving personal and sccial progress there may be recognized certain well-defined conceptions formerly maintained, which, compared with the present, will indicate with a fair degree of security the line of future advances. In this is to be found sufficient reason why a course in the principles of education should be preceded by, or be parallel with, a course in the history of education. Any treatment of educational principles must be based 14 THE SCHOOL REVIEW upon the conception of education as a dynamic, growing process, a a part of the changing social situation ; thus its theory is in turn a func- tion of the wider intellectual and spiritual life of the particular period. 3. It would appear that the view of mind furnished by evolu- tionary idealism, according to which mind is not a mere product or epiphenomenon, nor a mere transcendental, spiritual substance which (so far as actual experience is concerned) is a pure abstraction, is the one of greatest service in educational theory. The facts of the educational process imply a conception of mind as a concrete specific activity constantly directed to the accomplishment of something, and not only the bearer of the experience process, but an efficient agent in its furtherance. In the light of all that is said in the outline con- cerning the place and significance of social theory, it is scarcely neces- sary to remark that psychological theory is but one of the sources of material of educational theory. 4. In accordance with the view of mind advanced in the preced- ing paragraph, it will not be difficult to recognize why in the outline the implications of the fact that the process of individual experience lies within the process of social hfe. Throughout the course of his personal development the individual is dependent on his social re- lationships. The self is a bi-polar unity, having within itself the terminal aspects of a unitary personal relation, the so-called ego and alter, the latter being also part of a common thought-and-action- content. Thus the individual is in society to the degree that society is in the individual. The social life or continuum, with its subsid- iary processes of differentiation and integration, is a life manifesting itself through a system of organs, and these organs, in coming to realize the community 0/ the social life, become social members or per- sons; and the social life becomes integrated and unified only in so far as its members become partakers of the social purpose and yield themselves up to the realization of that purpose. It thus becomes apparent how social theory, along with psychological theory, becomes the second great source of material for educational theory, since through a study of the social process are discerned the great lines of haman interest and activity, the nature of the social purpose, the latent possibilities of human life, in the realization of which educa- tion will more and more be consciously employed. COLLEGE COURSE IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION 15 5. Another element emphasized in the outHne is the necessity of what may be called a chart 0} civilization to any adequate statement of the subject-matter of the curriculum. Civilization represents the achieved culture of the race, its spiritual possessions. These posses- sions are the inheritance of the individual, becoming his own, how- ever, in a large and fruitful way only through education. The edu- cation of the individual is, therefore, the process of adjustment to or participation in the world of social relationships and in the fund of social experience, the ideals and methods, which those relationships conserve. In this conception of adjustment, of participation, of social interaction, as the essential element in the educational process, is found the unity of aim, of materials, and of method in education. . II In turning from this general statement of the place of education in college and university study to the problem of the actual " con- tent" of a college course in che principles of education, it must at once be admitted that any outline such as is here presented can but furnish mere words along the way. What is written in the second portion of this paper may (a) furnish a rough outhne of a course in the theory of education which may be loosened or tightened accord- ing to specific need; {h) help, with the aid of a little classification, to systematize to a degree our knowledge; and (c) furnish a basis for criticism. A college course in the principles of education is by no means identical with a thoroughgoing course in the philosophy of education, and yet the outline here suggested aims to view education in its wholeness, in a philosophical spirit and in accordance with scientific methods. It need not, of course, be added that the outline aims to present a method jor the organization 0} educational ideas rather than to increase the store oj injormation concerning them. The notes added, within parentheses, here and there may prove suggest- ive in some directions, and explicate the general line of thought; they are not intended to be exhaustive in any direction whatever. The outline is therefore provisional, at best a working hypothesis, a possible plan of action, to be justified by results, and is subject to both criticism and revision. 1 6 THE SCHOOL REVIEW PART I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF ED.UCATION I, THE STUDY OF EDUCATION AS A SCIENCE 1. The relation of theory to practice. — "Sound practice is sound theory unconscious of itself; sound theory is merely sound practice conscious of itself." "Action, in the fullest sense, would also be theory ; it would be doing with the full consciousness of what we are doing." The genetic relation between theory and practice. The function of theory to reconstruct and economize practice. The cul- tural value of the insight into the idea of education in its organic wholeness. (The technique of effective practice is ultimately dependent upon principles. Professional training in education should aim to give control of the principles or the intellectual methods involved in practice rather than the mere mastery of technique. It is a commonplace to say that reflection is an integral part of all worthy activity. Action in the highest sense includes theory. For an individual to trj' to understand any form of human activity does not necessarily separate him from that activity, making him a mere theorist; normally it should bring the activity home to him more vitally. It should enable him to perform the activity with clear consciousness of what he is doing. The study of facts does not imply separation from them. It means getting closer to them. In like manner, the study of education means its aims, methods, processes, consciously realized and brought home to intelligence.) 2. The nature and purpose of science. — The sentiment of ration- ality. Science {a) as knowledge, i. e., a body of systematized facts gained through certain methods; (&) as instrument of control, i. e., as a body of methods controlling our judgments concerning a particular group of facts; (c) as mediatory from one stage of experience to another. 3. The possibility of a science of education. — The so-called dis- tinction between the descriptive and the normative sciences. The field of education. The relation between the history of education and the theory of education. Consideration of the question: How far may a science in process of formation be a useful guide ? The quantitative study of education Because of the unity of intelligence, the method of securing control of experience in one field may assist in securing control in any other field. The sciences of physiology, psychology, and sociology in their relation to the science of education. COLLEGE COURSE IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION i-j (Science as a form of human activity arises within experience; the science of education arises within our experience in education, and is therefore a func- tion of educational practice. The question is often asked: Is there a science of education ? a question based upon a special interpretation of the meaning of science. It does not apf)ear that the search for a methodical treatment of edu- cation is to be abandoned, even though perfection has not been attained at this early stage. The science of education is Ihe method thus jar established oj con- trolling experience so far as it is concerned with the educational process. The theory of education should set forth, not a set of educational categories or principles independent of or isolated from one another, but an interrelated sys- tem " within which ever)' assertion entitles us to other assertions, and to which we are entitled only through other assertions." The science of education aims at securing the method by which the educational process may be increasingly con- trolled.) 4. The twofold aspect oj education as a science. — (a) The psycho- logical, and {h) the sociological. (A feature fundamental to the present outline is the conception of the organic unity of the individual and society. The study of the growth of consciousness, whether in the race or child, points to the conclusion that the real self is always a social self; that the nature of the individual is essentially social; in other words, the individual's relations to his fellows are not external attachments of his per- sonality, but the source of its inmost content and reality. The completely isolated individual, uninfluenced by social forces, does not exist as a fact of experience. The ])rocess of education, therefore, is conceived as essentially a process of social interaction between the two factors of the experience process, society and the indi- vidual.) 5. The science and the philosophy of education. (It may be noted in this connection that in a systematic and thorough-going treatment of the subject — by means of the regular college and graduate courses — two main divisions would be found — divisions, however, which are not separate, but rather stages in the movement of intelligence in its attempt to come to a conscious realization of the educational process in human experience: (a) the science, dealing with the main features ef the area which the subject comprises; (b) the philosophy, dealing with its boundaries, or its place in the territories of knowledge. The science, to a degree, isolates in order to organize; the philoso- phy unifies in order to adjust and interpret. The science of education, in other words, has to do with the theor}^ of education as isolated by itself; the philoso- phy, while presupposing the science, is the theory of the relations of education to other sciences and to the known world in general. Philosophy aims to combine the analytic movement of science and the synthetic impulse of art in one intel- lectual endeavor. In such a process the science inevitably undergoes partial transformation and reconstruction. At the present time, owing to the fact that 1 8 THE SCHOOL REVIEW education draws its materials from so many sciences, and owing to the remark- able development of these sciences in recent years, there has resulted a species of intellectual anarchy in educational theory. The single science, by itself, is frankly individualistic, and only unconsciously organic at best. On the one hand, the psychologist with educational leanings is apt to assert that his special discipline is the sole arbiter in educational theory; in other words, that educa- tional theory, in so far as it can be made scientific, is simply "applied psychology." The sociologist, on the other hand, whenever his inclination takes a practical turn, is equally determined that educational theory shall become a part of the more comprehensive science of society. It is not a question, however, of identity, or of subordination, but of co-operative and complementary service. The worker in the philosophy of education must accept with gratitude the aspects of truth brought to light by the sciences which it presupposes. He must be mindful, moreover, that it is not in its positive contribution to human knowledge, but rather in the organization of that knowledge, that the true justification of philo- sophic inquiry consists. With the advance of the sciences which his inquiries presuppose, his task still remains imperative — to regulate the proportion that the contributions of the different sciences may assume, to co-ordinate and interpret the new materials, to unify them not only with one another, but with the other aspects of man's experience, and thus to restore to him a view of the educational process as a whole which is comprehensive, articulated, and wherein the different factors have free play.) 6, The literature of education. II. THE PLACE OF EDUCATION IN HUMAN EXPERIENCE 1. The philosophical bases of educational theory. — (a) Evolution and (b) idealism. (Evolution and idealism are regarded by the writer as the most logical and satisfactory foundations of a theory of education. It is assumed that even in a college course in the principles of education some indication may be made of the more important implications for educational theory of these two doctrines. On the basis of the doctrine of evolution the relationship between the educational pro- cess and that of organic and social evolution may be briefly outlined, and the influence of the more important factors in the process of spiritual evolution may be indicated. On the other hand, the doctrine of idealism — the doctrine, namely, which maintains that any developing series can be understood only in the light of its highest term, that any ultimate or philosophic explanation must look to the end of the process— in this doctrine a standard of interpretation is afforded by which the ethical and educational significance of the processes and influences of civilization may be estimated.) 2. The doctrine of evolution as a scientific generalization and as a working hypothesis. COLLEGE COURSE IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION 19 (While keeping in mind the fact that the doctrine of evolution has not yet received its final philosophic form, and still awaits its final philosophic interpre- tation, a brief analysis of its content as a working hypothesis may be made in this connection. The concept of evolution implies (a) the intelligibility of the world, the possibility of establishing a correspondence between the course of nature and the mind of man,[between the system of things and the system of human thought; (6) the organic oneness of all things in spite of the great contrasts in the spheres of mechanism, chemism, organism, and spirit, and the genetic connection of these orders of existence; (c) that in the genetic process, or in the process of becoming, there is developed out of the previously familiar the qualitatively new; {d) that the emergence of the qualitatively new is by means of forces inherent in the co-operating elements of the process, which work according to fixed laws of varia- tion and under determinate conditions; (e) more particularly, that the course which any developing process follows is one of differentiation and integration; (/) that in every process of development there are present the two interrelated and co-operating factors: (i) the individual existence in which the development takes place, and (2) the situation or environment which affords the stimuli or the conditions through which the development takes place; (g) that in organic or social processes new formations or structures, whether vital, intellectual, or social, are to be regarded as instruments or methods of adjustment to specific environ- mental conditions.) 3. The idealistic interpretation of evolution. (For both evolution and idealism, the unity of the cosmos, in some sense, " is not so much a conclusion to be proved as an inevitable assumption." If we believe (a) in the unity of the cosmic process, and (ft) that there has been evolu- tion and not mere aimless change, then in our interpretation we are forced either (a) to deny the statement ex nihilo nihil fit, or (6) to " read back the nature of the latest consequent into the remotest antecedent." The idealist may therefore accept Tyndall's remark that matter contains within itself the " promise and potency of every form and quality of life," for the reason that the mind is the " outcome," and the " realization " of matter, and therefore affords the interpre- tation of the ultimate nature of the latter. It would appear to be of distinct advantage, therefore, to assume that the law of evolution has been the mode of operation whereby the physical, intellectual, and moral natures of man have come to be what they are. In thus making man completely subject to the evolution- ary law, we are admitting the method of evolution to be the absolutely universal method of creation whereof man in his whole being is the highest product; and what we gain from this conception is the right to interpret the entire process in the light of its end. In other words, the mechanical categories must give place to or be supplemented by the teleological, in our explanation of the process. The conclusion seems to be warranted, therefore, on the basis of an idealistic interpretation of the evolutionary process, that spirit and nature are not wholly alien and hostile, but necessary and complementary elements in a unitary spir- 20 THE SCHOOL REVIEW ilual process. Religion, art, science, philosophy, as well as the common things of our common life, confirm our natural belief that nature is not indifferent to our human life, its needs, and its purposes, and tend to establish what seems to be the central truth of idealism, that the world is in essence spiritual, and its goal the perfecting of the life of man.) 4. The doctrine of evolution, a means whereby the theory of educa- tion may be brought into relationship with the facts of the wider organic and social process. — The doctrine of the significance of the prolonga- tion of infancy as a factor in the evolution of man. Infancy as a period of adjustment. Elements in the educational process, (a) indi- viduality and plasticity, (b) environment (physical, social, cosmical; from the educational point of view essentially social) . Effects of the application of the doctrine of evolution to psychology and sociology. Types of education, (a) natural or spontaneous, (b) artificial or telic. Education as conscious evolution. (The notion of adjustment [conceived as dynamic, not static] expresses sufiS- ciently well for the present the essential nature of the educational process- This notion is developed more fully in later sections. Here it is enough to note (a) that the aim of education cannot be found outside the process itself. One purpose of education is the personal reahzation of his environment by the .individual; (5) that we must define more fully environment before we can indicate that which the individual is to realize or become adjusted to; (c) that "method" in educa- tion is fundamentally the mode of the individual's behavior in the realization of some phase of his environment. Herein we gain a point of view from which to recognize the unity of educational aim, of educational materials and of educa- tional methods.) III. THE AIM OF EDUCATION AS DETERMINED BY ITS MEANING 1. Interpretation and criticism of certain familiar educational cate- gories: — (a) information, (b) discipline, c) training, (d) efficiency, e) culture. The danger of fixed, or ready-made, definitions of education. 2. Interpretation and comparison of various statements of the educa- tional ideal. 3. The aim of education as determined by its meaning. — State- ment of the aim of education through an analysis of the educational process. The conception of adaptation or adjustment. The social purpose and the educational aim. Self-realization and the social aim in education. COLLEGE COURSE IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION 21 (Kant used] to say that the proper place for delinition was at the end of one's inquiries. From one point of view, a true statement of the aim of educa- tion can be made at the close rather than at the beginning of such an outline as the present. The purpose of the present section is therefore merely to indicate in a quite general way the line along which the statement of the educational aim must !ie. The fuller working out of this conception of adaptation or adjust- ment constitutes, in reality, the fuller exphcation of the educational aim as it is revealed in the meaning of education. The one fact which it is hoped will be made clear is the fact 0} the organic unity of the aim, means, and method 0} the educational process.) IV. THE PRESUPPOSITION OF EDUCATION: PERSONALITY AND ENVIRONMENT I. Personality as the pre-eminent reality m experience. — Self- activ- ity as the essence of personality. Stages in the development of self-conscious mind: (a) primitive sensibility, (b) subject-object con- sciousness, (c) self-consciousness. Mental development through self- activity. (In the second section, where the attempt was made to bring the educational process into harmcny with the life-process, it was found that the essential elements in the latter are (a) thing and (b) environment. As a fact of experience the educational process presupposes (a) a self or person that behaves, and (b) an environment in which it behaves. As will be indicated in a subsequent section, the emphasis must in many cases be on Junction rather than on self or environ- ment, agent or situation. It is impossible to consider the self apart from its environment, or, in turn, environment apart from the coefficient of environment. The difficulty with the so-called faculty psychology was that of taking Ihe mind as a completely equipped self-existing entity, afterward brought into contact with an environment. There was also, on the other hand, the tendency to go to the other extreme and maintain that the self in the beginning was practically nil, environment was self-existing, a sort of thing-in-itself, capable of generating mind in some way. The process of the individual life is a unitary thing, in which an ideal distinction may be made between the self and its environment, the agent and his sphere of action. It is a process of interaction, the factors of which are for purposes of examination separable, in reality inseparable. In the present section, however, the problem would be to give some consistent account of the nature of the two— self and environment— and their mutual relations. It may be briefly remarked, in passing, that the self has reaUty as a center of experience, of a particular thought-and-action content, the bearer of the con- crete life of an individual. The synthesis of knowledge and of conduct which composes that content arises from the self's own activity, and in its own degree expresses the soul's intrinsic character. The self, moreover, is no mere aggre- 22 THE SCHOOL REVIEW gate of parts capable of existing separately without losing their character. It is a systematized unity, the various members of which, appearing at various stages in its development, appear with a distinct place and function, each unintel- ligible apart from its function in that development.) 2. The nature of environment. — ^As relative to the specific nature of the individual. Not an unchanging form, but a changing process. Environment as the medium of self-realization. The environment of the human individual (from the eduational or ethical point of view) as essentially social. The connection between plasticity and the pos- sibility of the control of adjustment, in which education as a human institution consists. Adjustment implies {a) participation, or culture, (&) control, or efficiency. The first is the conservative aspect of education, making for order and continuity; the second, its progres- sive aspect, making for change or progress. In the human being, adjustment implies conformity of a self-conscious personahty to an environment which also is undergoing constant change. (On the basis of the community of nature between the self and its environ- ment — since they are the terminal aspects of one movement — the nature and possibihty of their mutual adjustment or interaction become intelligible. The self through its inherent activity is able to maintain itself in a. (social) medium that is not alien, but fundamentally of one kin with itself. Its activity — i. e., its adaptation through intelligence and will — is not a consequence of the self, but its essence. Moreover, not only is the self able to maintain itself in its environment through adaptation, but through the same process of adaptation to realize itself, for the reason that knowledge of and conformity to the social order which forms its environment is essentially the process through which the self is realized.) 3 Environment as '^civilization." — The basis of civilization in the molding of his environment by man in the interests of human life. Civilization as the progressive articulation and realization of human nature implies {a) science, as knowledge and as instrument of con- trol; {h) language; (c) art and literature; (d) social and political insti- tutions; (e) religion. (In the foregoing analysis— a merely tentative one— of the more persistent, dynamic, and cultural elements in civilization, it is assumed: (a) That the most satisfactory psychology of race-development is a psychology of action; man's ever- increasing wants rising into desires and his perpetual efforts to satisfy these wants. The history of man, then, the history of civiUzation, is the hi.story of human achievement, (b) That man's achievements in civilization are social achievements and have therefore been brought about by some form of social action and co-operation. The ultimate social fact, the second factor in civilization, is that COLLEGE COURSE IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION 23 of "men acting together" for the sake of interrelated ends, (c) That the ma- terial of human activity is nature. Civilization is ultimately possible because man and nature, activity and material, are not isolated entities, but rather phases of one spiritual movement or process. From the beginning man has been in some kind of functional relation to his environment. His life has presented itself to him as a series of problems to be solved, {d) That civilization in the largest sense represents the methods of the life-process, the tools of the mind invented by man in the course of his experience for the registration, organization, control, and perpetuation of his experience. It has thus a retrospective as well as pros- pective aspect. In civilization, therefore, as the organization of human life thus far attained, there are certain fundamental "methods" or norms which are inherent in its natural constitution, and which reproduce themselves in all its manifold forms. (e) That, in the brief analysis, made above, of these normative elements— science, language, art and literature, institutions, and religion— these must be continually viewed as interrelated aspects of a common social experience of activity; they are the general elements of civilization— elements which constitute the real existence of the concrete and organic unity of society. Each of these elements has its retro- spective and prospective reference; each represents a fundamental habit and accommodation in the life of the race. All together they are functional elements within the social process, mediating agencies in the communication or transmis- sion of experience, instrumental to the spiritual life of man. (/) That the evolu- tion in nature and civilization has its goal in the elevation and expansion of the personal life. It will, it is hoped, be made somewhat clearer how necessary to any adequate statement of the "Course of Study" is a chart of civilization— a morphological or psychological presentation of the great methods or norms according to which human experience has been organized, elevated, and expanded. Adequately to state what science, art, or religion means in the movement of the indJvidual's experience it is ultimately necessary to trace their significance in the movement of the spiritual experience of the race.) V. INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS IN THE EDUCATIONAL PROCESS 1. Education as a process of social transformation. — Informal and formal education. Two-fold aspects of the process, (a) participation in the experience of others and the gradual recognition of the value of social life; (6) the achievement of power on the part of the individual to express himself in social directions. 2. Society as a medium for the communication of experience. — Moral institutions as meeting points for the functional activity of the members of society. As (a) embodiments of a more or loss perma- Eent system of purposes,(6) centers for the transmission of experience, (c) instruments of social control. 24 THE SCHOOL REVIEW 3. The educational significance of the great human institutions. — {a) home, (h) school, (c) vocation, {d) state, (e) church. Interrelation and interdependence of the several moral institutions. (A fundamental need of the social mind of the present is such a disciplined social self -consciousness as will gradually express itself in more intelligent and more thoruugh-going methods of social intervention. There need not be any depreciation of the experience of the past, and no honest effort should be under- valued. Yet any creditable program for social betterment must be based on an adequate investigation and formulation of all the conditions of human wel- fare. There is real danger when any one of the so-called elements of the social -problem is attacked in isolation from the rest. Such an attempt may tend only to increase the popular sensitiveness and irritation. A social theory, issuing in a social method, is essential to any approximately adequate preparation for the study of the problem of social reconstruction. Only through .such study — a study in which all the elements are brought together in organic relation— is one enabled to see how social tendencies may be projected into coherent and tenable social ideals. In hke manner lack of clearness concerning the objects at which education should aim, the ways in which educational principles should be applied to the concrete problems of social life, and lack of correlation among the various educational factors in society, are responsible for many of the shortcomings which exist in present educational practice. Education has become the most important method of social intervention. It aims consciously to control the direction of the social process. As a method of social control in this larger sense, how- ever, it as yet remains largely empirical. It can become rational only when educational theory is made an organic part of the philosophy of society. The organic interdependence of the two must be recognized. Educational theory cannot be studied in abstraction from social theory. Moreover, since the theory of education is a part of a larger social theory, it may be well to indicate in brief outline a working conception of the term "society. " It will then be neces- sary to point out what society, on the one side, and what the individual, on the other, contribute to the educational process, how the two are organically related, and how society through institutions aims to perpetuate itself, to enlist the indi- vidual in its service and provide conditions suitable to his realization. First of all it is to be noted that society is not to be identified with the state, the government, the family; nor is it the mere aggregation or combination of these. Society or the social process is rather the organism of which "institutions" are the organs; the latter are functional elements in the larger functional whole. This notion of society as a process should be emphasized. As in the mental process experience is communicated and transmitted from one level to another, and the continuity thereby maintained, so in the social process there is the continual communication and transmission of experience from individual to individual. The conservation and transmission of experience alone render the continuance of society possible. Social experience is projected or embodied in Institutions, and institutions, there- COLLEGE COURSE IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION 25 fore, serve to link individuals to one another, and the generations each to each. The various institutions, then, may be defined as the objective methods 0} control which men working together I or the sake of interrelated ends have thus jar achieved. This transmission of experience takes place in every form of society, savage or civilized, the difference being that while in the former the activity is for the most part unreflective and instinctive, in the latter there emerges a more or less delib- erate intervention in the methods oj communication, distribution and transmission; and in its higher development as a human institution education becomes a specific agency in the general societary process for the systematic communication and transmission oj human experience.) PART TI. THE COURSE OF PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT VI. THE BODY AS THE INSTRUMENT OF THE MIND 1. The psycho-physical organism.— Yunctiondl relation between organs and environment. Structure and function of nervous system in organism. The junctional unit. 2. Principles aj development oj the psycho- physical organism. — Differentiation and integration of function. Gradual development of nervous system and body as instrument of the mind. Place of play, games, gymnastics in the organization oj the body. Habit and control. The dualism of mind and body teleological rather than ontological, (Concerning the relation between body and mind, the physical and the psychical, two well-defined types of theory may be noted: (a) the ontological, and {b) the teleological [or the evolutionary, strictly interpreted]. According to the first, mind and body are disparate and separable entities, each subject to growth and transformation apart from the other ; the second regards the body as the organ of, and instrumental to, the mind. The theory of the relation of body and mind assumed in the present outline is the teleological. As said above, it is assumed that the essence of being is one in kind and spiritual. Between mind and body there is no essential antagonism or opposition. The mind is no fixed entity separable from matter If we are to trust our experience, matter cannot be as foreign to consciousness as is ordinarily believed. If the analysis made in preceding sections be true, mind and matter, soul and body, are terminal aspects of a unitary, living, spiritual experience, organic throughout, and in which the so-called nervous system, body, or matter, is instrumental, the machinery oj its growth and oj its expanding lije. Many look upon the physical as some- thing set over against the spiritual, something that restricts, confines, enslaves. It is interesting to note that Plato, one of the first to indicate the spiritual sig- nificance of physical training, should in his metaphysics look upon body and 26 THE SCHOOL REVIEW mind as disparates, and yet in his theory of physical education he proceeded on the basis of the teleological conception of mind and body. For while the speaks of gymnastics for the body and music for the soul, he is nevertheless very care- ful to insist that fundamentally the soul and not the body is the object of gymnastics as well as of music. For Plato, in his theory of education, body and mind are not simply two opposites, on the same level. In making the body subordinate or instrumental to the mind, he makes it instriraiental to a comprehensive pur- pose in life, thus avoiding the one-sidedness which in the judgment of Aristotle made the physical training of many Greek states a failure. For both Plato and Aristotle the aim of physical education does not lie merely in physical training. Rather its significance, its spiritual quality, is found in its effect upon character. .Our problem is still the problem of Plato, "to blend music with gymnastic and apply them proportionately to the soul." According to the view expressed here, the physical with its senses and stimuli is the very means whereby we gain freedom. The child feeling the pain from the finger thrust into the flame, and thereby restraining itself afterward, is not limited by the bodily senses or its nervous system. Rather is its nervous system the very instrument through which its freedom is gained. Moreover, just as the body, and nature itself, are iiistrumeutal to the self, and no mere hindrance, in like manner is the machinery of institutions no mere hindrance, but the very medium of escape for the individual from the domination of mere instinct and impulse to conscious self-determination. No adequate statement of freedom as a ready-made faculty or power of mind can be given in a paragraph, if at all. Yet when we take the so-called physical and institutional life, not asm,ere external and antagonistic opposites, but rather from the teleological and instrumental point of view, we may realize more fully the significanee of the most apparent and the most fundamental fact in experience, namely, that the consciousness of self implies the consciousness of the not-self, and grows with it, and by means of it. Thus eonceiving the self and the world as the terminal aspects of a living organic reality or experience, and communicated to us [through consciousness] in insepa- rable correlation, we can regard neither one as a resultant of the other. Together they constitute a functional manifestation of a unity which is their common and absolute ground. What, then, is enforced in this section is the impossibility of conceiving a soul or mind in itself, a pre-existing entity, or of a matter in itself, a self-contained existence. Keeping by experience, we recognize that subject and object are never met by us apart. They are distinctions within a unity, but not different or antagonistic entities. And it scarcely need be remarked in pass- ing that the doctrine outlined above is neither materialism nor subjective ideal- ism. It is an attempt to construe teleologically the relation of mind and matter, without obliterating their differences nor reduchig one to the other; securing the reality of both in a life whose variety is unity and whose essence is spiritual. If it be granted (a) that there is an organic or instrumental relation between soul and body, psychosis and neurosis, (b) that our knowledge of the neurosis must be through the psychosis, and (c) that gymnastics or physical training is COLLEGE COURSE IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION 27 ultimately for the sake of the soul, it would appear that a knowledge of psychology of growth, of physical processes and mental imagery, would be of material assistance in comprehending the physical stimuli, through play, games, gymnastic exercises best suited to the harmonious upbuilding of the psychical life to which the physical is admittedly organic and instrumental. In other words, our knowl- edge of the genesis of mental life should, to a large extent, be regulative in our attempt to control the genesis of the physical life. According to the teleological view of the relation between mind and body, the educational purpose is growth of the consciousness of self, and the organization of the body for the utilization and control of environment, and thus the liberation of the self's latent energies. The nervous system, accordingly, is the instrument whose function is the co-ordi- nations of the adaptations necessary to the life and growth of the self. For the self, the nerv'ous system (a) manipulates environment to its purposes, (b) adjusts its organs for the sake of a more complete service. The two phases or the organization of the body as the instrument of the mind by means of the sensory and muscular system are (a) the process of differentiation and (b) integration. The one fundamental and exclusive function of the nervous system is therefore the co-ordination or integration of differentiated acts, sensory or motor, to a common end. Assuming, then, for the present the various epochs in psychologi- cal development during which this process of physical differention and integra- tion takes place, the charasteristically play period, for example, may be briefly noted in certain of its more prominent needs: (i) Play is fundamentally a psy- chological attitude, not an external activity; hence the need of psychological appreciation by the teacher. (2) Since the aim of physical development is differentiation and integration of the body as instrument of the soul, the neces- sity of selection and adaptation of such physical activities as will assist in giving the soul as complete possession as possible of its instrument. (3) A thorough study of the expression aspects of the various parts of the curriculum, in order to indicate more fully their expression values and suggest means whereby present practice in those parts may be improved.) VII. THE NATURE OF EXPERIENCE I. General fealures of conscious life. — Unity of experience. Con- tinuity of experience. Theory of mental elements. Activity as funda- mental features of the experience process. (Notwithstanding the remarkable development which has taken place in psychology in recent years, its positive contribution to the study of society and education has been somewhat meager. On the one hand, owing to the preval- ence of an individualistic method in psychology, the sociologist has received a very inconsiderable amount of assistance from his psychological studies, and very often indeed the individualistic tendency in psychological investigation has been carried over into the domain of sociology with an effect in certain instances little less than baneful. On the other hand, education has likewise profited but 28 THE SCHOOL REVIEW little from psychology. Here again the individualistic method in psychology has in many instances worked against, rather than in behalf of, sound educational theory. But, in addition to this, there is the fact that psychology has been "struc- tural," furnishing an anatomy of the adult consciousness, rather than genetic or functional, furnishing what might be called a physiology of the mind in the process of psychogenesis. It is with this psychogenetic process that education is for the most part concerned, and it will be readily seen that until psychological investigation becomes both social and functional or genetic in its method, edu- cation will receive from psychology little more than incidental assistance. In the present outline it is implied that for an interpretation of individual or social activities such as will be of most value in educational theory, recourse must be had to a functional or evolutionary psychology, according to which the psychical hfe, whether in the individual or society, is to be interpreted as a func- tion of the wider life-process. For a functional psychology the fundamental and central element of the psychical life is not sensation or idea, but an activity. Back of this unit of psychical activity — namely of the individual self, or of society — we cannot go. In each of these, however, in the individual and in society, the one universal activity is that of living, or the life-activity. As a con- crete reaUty, then, the individual or the social is revealed to us as a teleological process, a system of means and ends, the unity of which is found in the general end of control over the conditions of life. All minor activities within experi- ence are to be interpreted as partially or completely unified or harmonized activities within the larger process of life-activity or realization. The general position, then, of a functional psychology is that in determining what conscious- ness is, recourse must be had to an examination of what consciousness does. It attempts to escape the extreme positions of both {a) empiricism, according to which the mind is conceived as a product rather than a principle, and of (b) rationalism, which in one form or another conceives of the soul as a pre-existing, spiritual entity, endowed with capacities or faculties, prior to the exercise of such faculties or capacities, existing behind these as a kind of [transcendental] sub- stance or substratum, and before the objective world has as yet disturbed the pure unity of its essence. The view of evolutionary idealism is not that the mind is mere product or epiphenomenon, nor a mere transcendental spiritual sub- stance which [so far as actual experience is concerned] is a pure abstraction, but that it is a concrete specific activity constantly directed to the accomplish- ment of something, and not only the bearer of the experience process, but an efficient agent in its furtherance. From this general conception it follows: (a) That in the mental life, as an organic unity, consciousness cannot [without a complete departure from reality] be abstracted from its relations. Prior to and apart from objective experience, consciousness is an illusion. It will thus be apparent how necessary it is in the analysis of experience to keep in mind its organic unity; in other words, the organic relation between consciousness and its object, the agent and the situation or conditions in which the activity pro- ceeds. (6) That just as the life-process is a continuous co-ordination or COLLEGE COURSE IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION 29 functioning of the two elements, organism and environment [compare the act of breathing which is a functional co-ordination of the lungs as organ, and air, as environment], so the mental life is a continuous co-ordination or functioning of twoelements, self and environment. Herein we see the difficulty of the empirical and rationalistic position. Just as some biologists would identify function with organ alone, making environment purely external, or with environment alone, making the organ simply a product, so the empiricist would make the self a product and not a principle, while the rationalist would make the soul a prin- ciple existing prior to its contact with the objective world, and, at most, maintain- ing only incidental relations with the latter. On the other hand, the evolutionary view of mind maintains that the relation of consciousness or self to objective experience or environment is absolute and intrinsic. An isolated consciousness is no consciousness at all; it is a self-contradiction, (c) Since the mental life is not the outcome of a predetermined self upon an external environment, or of the adjustment of the self to a predetermined environment, neither t!ie self nor the environment is eternally fixed in itself, but both change in the movement of the life-process. In the functional movement of the mental life both the self and the environment are modified and determined. Both are essentially transitional, in a continual process of becoming. The self is real only in so far as it continues to act, to become, to progress, {d) Self-consciuusness is not a subsequeiit or higher growth of consciousness, but in rudimentary form at least is a quality of all consciousness. It is consciousness with the emphasis on the subject rather than the object, the agent rather than the situation.) 2. The place 0} knowledge in experience. (A brief note may serve to indicate the line of treatment of the ]:>lace of knowledge in e.vperience, from the point of view of a functional based upon a genetic psychology. All knowledge involves both percepts and concepts, sensa tions and ideas or their combination. These may be briefly discussed from the point of view of (j) origin, (6) content. Sensations: (a) The biologist maintains that the organs of sense had their origin in the problem of the life-process. Such variations as were of .=Jervice in the life struggle were selected; others, offering no positive contribution, were discarded. The sense-organs were thus in their origin organs of adjustment, methods of economy; through natural selection their increasing perfection meant more perf'ect adjustment, i.e., increasing self-mainte- nance on the part of those possessing them. Thus, biologically, the knowledge mediated by tlie sense-organs had its origin in the needs of the life-process, it was an instrument of control, in securing food or escaping danger, (b) In the child again, activities in the form of inherited instincts and impulses precede sensa tions. His characteristic is impulsiveness; he is essentially a motor being. The child's curiosity is preparatory to some activity, a prelude to behavior. It is ever in the interest of some experiment on the part of some bodily organ, usually the hand or mouth. For him the objects of his environment are the particular acti\ ilies which they suggest, and distinct sensations are the sensible news of his behavior. 30 THE SCHOOL REVIEW (c) In the adult consciousness, likewise, the sensation is a sign, and has significance only as part of a largerwhole. When do we have sensations ? Examine such experi- ences as taking the car, looking at your watch, the clock's ceasing to tick, walking over, an unaccustomed road, moving the ears, etc. It will be found in such experiences that sensations either regulate activity, or are signs within the experi- ence circuit, i. e., the retrospective reference; or, through their appeal to attention, they furnish the materials of a new problem, i. e., their prospective reference. Only a very brief statement of the nature of ideas can be made in this connection. The concept or the idea, as is true of sensation, has a retrospective as well as a prospectiv^e reference. It is {a) a register of past experiences, a habit, a method of ordering sensations. On the other hand, an idea embodies (6) a plan of action. Its function within experience is not only to organize experience, but to institute or furnish the method of future experience. Its function, therefore, is essentially mediatory, instrumental. Thus the definition of idea is in terms of its function, of its position in the movement of experience. It is the instrument of the growth of experience from the less rich and less definite to the richer and more definite forms. To illustrate, take the judgment, "The pencil is sharp." "Sharp" is an idea, but sharpness does not exist in reality; only as a quality, emphasized within, or abstracted from, experience. Why, then, fonii the idea or conce])t of that which does not exist ? Simply because the idea, so emphasized or abstracted, will furnish a sign, a plan, a method of future action. The. idea "sharp," then, is ultimately instrumental to a larger experience process, e.g.j that of writing. Ideas, then, in providing a method or plan of action made for economy within experience, enable us to anticipate, and thereby control future experiences. They are thus constructions of the past and of the future. Herein is their kinship with science. Ideas are plans of action. Laws of science are constructions of the past and future behavior of those realities with which man has to deal. Ideas arid sciences are thought-constructions for the registration and control of experience. Sensations, ideas, science, are thus seen to be regulati\e and mediatory in the conduct of life. From the point of view of a functional psychology all phases of psychical activity may be grouped about two fundamental types — habits and accommoda- tions. Activities once successfully performed tend to be selected, to persist, to become habits. Just as soon as experience becomes problematic, however, i. e., as soon as some break occurs in the adjustment process [consequent upon the failure of some habit in the individual, or of a custom or institution in social experience], thought, in the form of discrimination, attention, and association, emerges to secure a new accommodation, and thus repair the break in experience through the establishment of a new habit. So long as habit [individual, social, racial] suffices — in other words, so long as experience flows smoothly, there is no occasion for the exercise of thought, since there is no problem to solve, no sense of failure, and consequently no search for a better method — i. e., a better accom- modation or adjustment. From this point of view the function of thought is mediatory between experience and experience; in other words, between some COLLEGE COURSE IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION 31 habit experience, activity] which has failed to satisfy, and some new accommo- dation Twhich, if successful, will be selected and become habit] which will restore harmony to experience once more. Thought, then, as mediatory has a twofold aspect: {a) retrospective, i. e., interrogating our present habits, or modes of expe- rience leading to a consciousness of failure; {b) prospective, through conscious- ness of break in experience, searching for the new accommodation and the more harmonious and satisfying experience. Thought, then, arises within the experi- ence-process [whether in the individual or the race] out of activity, and is ulti- mately for the sake of activity. If experience or life were uniform, feelincr and mstmct would suffice for its continuance. If, however, there is to be progress withm experience, thought must emerge as doubt and as inquin'. It must bring order and control into experience; it must expedite the experience-process and ehmmate the waste entailed in mere instinct and feeling.) VIII. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXPERIENCE I. Experience as an organic w«//:v.— Experience as dynamic, and following, therefore, in its changes the processes of increasing differ- entiation and integration. Distinction between growth and develop- ment oi experience or of the mental hfe; {a) by mental growth we understand the expansion, an increase in the stock of our experience; {h) by mental development we understand the elaboration or recon- struction of experience into more complex form, and an increasing organization and control of it. In mental development are found the following characteristics: (a) an increase in the content of experi- ence; (&) an increasing complexity of mental processes; (c) an increas- ing faciUty and power among the various mental processes; {d) an increase in the organic unity and soHdarity of experience. 2. Main distinctions within the unity of experience.— Th^ dan^rer of hard and fast separations. Experienee as a teleological svstem"^ a system of means and ands. Habits and accommodations. 'Experi- ence as problematic. The emergence of sensation, idea, thought (as discrimination, attention, association). Interest and imagery. Obser- vation, comparison, judgment. Memory. The place and significance of feehng and emotion. From will to will. Will no separate faculty. Will as self-realization. 3. Epochs in the development of experience.— The continuity of inner experience. The child's equipment. The development of the child- mind. Stages of development. Phases of psychogenesis. Acquisition 32 THE SCHOOL REVIEW on the basis of inherited tendencies. Imitation, communication, expres- sion. Imagination. Play. Growth of sense of self . Growth of reflect- ive interest and attention. The signs and psychological effects of the period of adolescence. The development of experience due, not to a growth of separate faculties, but to an increasing complexity of activity and interest. Educational implications. 4. The forms of ideal construction. — Knowledge as idealization. Idealization as teleological. Knowledge as the technique of action: theory and practice. The fundamental forms of ideal construction .involved in the building up of experience: (a) the external world, (b) the self; or, more definitely, (a) perceptual construction, (b) scientific construction, (c) aesthetic construction, (d) ethical construction, (e) philosophical construction, (/) religious construction. (In a theory of education an attempt must be made to determine in some degree the nature of the bond or unitary principle which holds together the phenomena of consciousness as such. It must have some doctrine which will indicate the possibility of certain indubitable facts in education and ethics; e. g., continuity of experience, n'sponsibility, progress. It will be remembered, of course, that the nature of anything can be determined only in so far as it is found within experi- ence, and that only on the basis c)f what a thing does within experience can we form a conception of what it is. Now, i;i our conscious experience the uniting principle among its phenomena is revealed, not merely as imitary, but as one pos- sessed of a specific character, viz., a self or subject. It will thus be recognized that the ?tlf is a basal concept in education. The term might be used as identical with the totality of the experience -process in its unity and continuity — as includ ing both self-conscioubuess and consciousness of the object. Used in this sense, it is, as has been pointed out, essentially an organic uraiy. Or we may use it as a terminal aspect of the experience-process, with the emphasis on the agent rather than on the situation within that process. On the level of sensations we seem forced to regard the self as a principle of activity which manifests itself, as Herbart and Lotze would say, as an internal principle of reaction against that which would impair its individuality. This reaction is not to be conceived, however, so much an act of self-conservation as of self-realization, for the reason that [as has been pointed out in previous sections] the stimulus or environment is not a for- eign or alien something, to which the mind isj mechanically related, as though mind and matter were di.-;tinct entities instead of terminal aspects or phases of a unitary process of experience. According to the present doctrine, a self or person is no mere succession of states of consciousness. Within the self there is admit- tedly a stream of conscious states, but beneath this continuity of ideas the func- tional activity inherent in the experience process becomes the foundation for that permanence of selfhood which we attribute to a person — in a continuity of activities COLLEGE COURSE IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION 33 rather than of ideas, of instincts and habits rather than of any stream of conscious states. The self is real only in so far as it continues to act, to function, to become, to progress. In the self, therefore, is found a process returning upon itself in such a way as to retain its existing quality or individuality. While chan- ging, it is nevertheless permanent, remaining one, as it does, in its life-process, i. e., one in and through the unity and continuity of its activity — its character. A per- son, therefore, may be defined as a self-conscious subject, distinguishing itself from, yet realizing itself ir. and through, the objects it knows and the ends it chooses. Self-activity is the essence of personality. Through self -consciousness it can become its own critic; !. e., through taking the standpoint of the universal, the self, as an element within experience and as its bearer, or agent, can take up an attitude of approval or disapproval to the factors which have entered into the process. Man's life is progressive because the self-consciousness through which he returns upon himself is not an endowment, but a process. We may, there- fore, summarize our conception of a person thus: (a) self -active principle, creative in the objects it knows and the ends it chooses; {b) self -separative, orself-estranoin};; in other words, a person is never an exclusive self, but one whose progress con- sists in a continual transcendence of his exclusivenes?, and in a realization of him- self in and through that which seems at first to be set in opposition to him.) IX. THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT I. The social nature of individual experience. (In preceding sections it was noted how dependent is the individual on his social relationships. The self is bi-polar unity, containing within itself the ter- minal aspects of a unitary personal relation, the so-called ego and alter, the lat- ter being also part of a common thought- and action-content. Thus the individual is in society to the degree that society is in the individual. The indi- vidual soul is an existence, which appears and lives in the sociality of human beings. When we give attention to the social aspect of the course of per- sonal development, the individual is seen to be a social fact, the outcome of a social effort.^ The individual to begin with is an energy, of course, as en- dowed with inherent qualities and instincts, but these are made his own, are actualized only through an effort, through an action. The law or principle of this effort, of this actualization is sociality. In other words, the human soul is made only in the presence of other human souls which are themselves in turn only in the process of making. At first, therefore, we may insist on the reality of individual and social interaction, even though from the point of view of a truer idealism the idea of community should be substituted for that of inter- action. The social life or continuum with the subsidiary processes of differen- tiation and integration is a life manifesting itself through a system of organs, and these organs, in coming to realize the community of the social life, become social members or persons; and the social life becomes integrated and unified only in so far as its members become partakers of the social purpose and yield them- selves up to the realization of that purpose. 34 THE SCHOOL REVIEW It may be said, then, that the individual provides the "matter" [in the Aris- toteHan sense] of experience, while society provides the " form." The individual brings instincts and impulses; society brings " values " and typical activities. P2xperience in the individual is the outcome of these two " energies," namely, the qualities, impulsive and instinctive of the individual, and the stimuli, interpreta- tive and regulative, of society. It is a false antithesis, therefore, to isolate and contrast the individual and social aspects of experience. It will thus be recog- nized how in human society there go;s forward the process of differentiation and integration, the emergence of the individual, of the person, and yet his increasing consciousness of his own dependence upon the labors of others. The process of social evolution from one point of view is the result of one individual learning to perform some one function, which may enable another to give his attention to something else. Society is thus the body, or medium, in which this tendency to reciprocity, inherent in human nature, has become incarnated. Society thus im- plies a fundamental interdependence between its members, an increasing reac- tion of one upon another, as well as a continual interchange of services between them. There thus emerges a category constitutive and regulative in the social process — that of vicar iousness, in other words, the conception of the ultimate reality of society as conditioned by the just interchange of services among its members. Our present social order is stable to the degree in which it secures this just interchange of services among its members; it is insecure, or at least transitional, to the degree that we have as yet only partial interchange of ser- vices, and at times an out-and-out repudiation of social responsibilities on the part of some [or perhaps many] of its constituent members. Thus it will be seen how the many phases of the social situation may be analyzed in terms of the inadequate realization of vicariousness. In this idea of the interchange of ser- vices we find a category without the use of which we can take no step toward an adequate insight into or analysis of the social situation. For example, we know how during the past century in industrial life the man was in a large measure displaced by the machine. Production was enormously increased, and we may expect it to increase in the future more and more. There certainly is a sense in which, with the increase of productive power, the factor of individual capacity has decreased. It may be that the worker's position is in many respects better than before, and yet there may be more than a mere mone- tary division between rich and poor. The question rather is, What share does the worker have in what he produces ? What are the moral and spritual values for him in the work produced by him, but appropriated by another, who has neither the disposition nor the knowledge to give back to the worker some social, moral, or spiritual equivalent of his work ?) 2. The meaning of social membership. — Typical cunceptions of the relation of the individual to society: (a) the individualistic or monadistic, (b) the socialistic or monistic, (c) the duaHstic, (d) the organic. The latter view attempts to adjust the claims of the other COLLEGE COURSE IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION 35 three in a theory more conformable to the facts. It treats the indi- vidual as a junctional element in a larger junctional whole. Accord- ing to it the two factors, the individual and society, are regarded, not as two separate modes of being, but rather as two phases of one reahty, distinctions of function, of modes of operation within a unity. Within the unity there is relative independence of parts : yet the parts are what they are in virtue of their relation to the whole. In other words, apart from society the individual has no Hfe; his purposes can be reaHzed only by realizing the larger purposes of society. The presuppositions of such a view are {a) identity of interest between the individual and society; (6) the possibility of individual development (and hence education) lies in his increasing participa- tion in the social consciousness and in social activities. The ideal of society is one which the independent or joint efforts of its mem- bers as individuals, capable of thought and action, may help to reahze. The truth oj the individual lije, accordingly, is jound in a jully organ- ized, i. e,, moralized society; and oj society in a jully realized indi- vidual. (In th^ fragmentary notes furnished in this section an attempt is made merely to suggest some of the more important phases of social theory which would of necessity be discussed in an ordinary college course in educational principles. The fuller discussion of such material would necessarily be reserv^ed for courses of a more advanced nature in the philosophy of education.) 3. The characteristics oj the socialized individual. — {a) Moral in- sight, {h) virtuous disposition, (c) consistent action, {d) efficiency. Self-realization as a process in which the self {a) comes to be more completely defined, i. e., individualized; (&) but defined through membership in a larger unity. Education as necessary to the pro- duction of a person. 4. The process oj social control. — ( See also Section V.) Social order and unity. The grounds of social control. Experience in the individual the outcome of two "energies": (a) the qualities, impulsive, instinctive, deHberate, of the individual agent; {h) the stimtdi, as norms, convictions, methods, values, regulative and interpretative, of society. Means for the social control of indi- vidual development : (a) imitation and suggestion, {h) habituation, (c) instruction. The place of education in personal development. 36 THE SCHOOL REVIEW Conservatism and progress. Progress through individuals. The growth of individual freedom. PART III. EDUCATION IN THE SCHOOL X. THE SCHOOL AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION 1. Essential continuity of the educational process. — Reasons for lack of continuity in the organization of the school at the present time. Adjustment of motives underlying various types of school and various phases of school organization. 2. The school as a moral organism. — The school as a miniature community. The social function of the school. An embodiment of the social purpose. It simplifies existing social life. Presents a selected environment. The teacher as organizer of the com- munity life of the school. Respective functions of the several types of school in mediating the spiritual possessions of society to its members and assimilating them to the social purpose. The prob- lem of discipline in the school. School atmosphere and discipline. 3. The school as an instrument of social progress. — The social order. The ethical possibilities of the course of study. Apprecia- tion of the meaning of social membership. The development of the social consciousness. Not only must the school be an instru- ment of social order, it must also become more and more an instrument of social progress. Of course, at the present time the danger is lest it may become an instrument to individual success, rather than one of social order or social progress. Yet the prob- lem at present is to make the society of the school reflect that ideal toward which the wider social life is struggling. (The educational process is fundamentally a social process and is rendered possible through (a) the plasticity of the individual, and (6) a particular environ- ment. The control of this process of participation in social experience, as was indicated in a preceding section, is exercised by the various human institutions. The policy of conser/ing the social order by means of a system of education is practically as old as society itself. The school as a form of institutional life is t};e special instrument devised by society for maintaining the existing standard of civilization by conferring upon the individual its spiritual possessions, and thereby enabling him to become a bearer of the social purpose. As in the wider life of society, so in the school, the problem of education is the solution of the equation between the individual and society. The "social COLLEGE COURSE IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION 37 personality" seems to rej^resent the ideal. In other words, the offering of the individual to the educational process, or to society, is a capacity [at first in the form of mere impulse or instinct, of course], a power of action; in other words, himself as an organ or instrument; on the other hand, society's gift to the indi- vidual is (a) a method by which his impulses, instincts, etc., may be regulated and organized, and thereby his experience brought under control; {b) a worth, an interpretation, a significance, a value. Selfishness, of course, arises in the indi- vidual in so far as he regards any one of his powers or capacities as belonging to himself alone, and not as a medium for social functions; on the other hand, society treats the individual unjustly, causing his activity to become mechanical and deadening, when and where it withholds from him the (luickening and ex- panding influence of its spiritual possessions, in the way of science, art, and litera- ture. Thus the school, in society, must function in mediating the fund of spiritual values, interests, ideals, worths to the individual, and it must do this to the end that the individuals coming under its influence may be enabled to recognize — rather, to realize — the spiritual significance of their work. Education as a whole aims to saturate the activities and experiences of men and women with ideal values. Certain advantages and dangers in school education may be noted in passing. Advantages: (a) From the point of view of the state, it is a legiti- mate form of self-preservation, (b) Provision is made against the imperfection or contingency of private effort, (c) It provides a more complete social medium for the development of independence, emulation, leadership, than purely indi- vidual or private instruction, (d) It supplies the individual's first experience of public opinion and the reality of social judgment, justice, order, co-operation, fair play, etc. Dangers: (a) The danger that individuality may be submerged. (b) The danger in school education from overpressure in a broad sense, of quan- tity versus quality, (c) The danger of the school's becoming an aggressor against the legitimate function of other institutions — functions, indeed, which only the latter can adequately perform. The school is a miniature community. The education which goes on in the school partakes of the same general social character of all education. Its reality is relative to the reality of the social life found within the school. Its ideal is to vi^iden and deepen the social conscious- ness of its members.) XI. THE INTELLECTUAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SCHOOL I. The course of study and the method of instruction. — The error of making hard and fast distinction between subject-matter and method. Social experience as a spiritual organism. The course of study as representing that organism (the corporate or interrelated aspect). Method as the form of personal realization and penetra- tion of the intellectual order of the school (the individual or differ- ential aspect). Studies as modes of seLf-reaHzation involving y 38 THE SCHOOL REVIEW (a) instincts, interests, activities pointing to social life; (b) norms, interpretations, values conferred by society upon the individual. The two groups: (a) sciences, representing the processes (control) by which social life is sustained; (b) humanities, which interpret and determine the relative values (appreciation) of the various forms of social activity. The aim of instruction as mediating between the intellectual order of the school and the mind of the pupil in such a way that the latter may conform to its law, not as a matter of constraint, but as the natural expression of his own mind. (A very persistent conception of the relation of subject-matter to method may be stated thus. On the one hand, the subject-matter is classified and arranged as a pre-existing objective material, ready to be imported into the mind. Method, on the other hand, is regarded as a purely formal affair, an altogether psychological matter, as though the mind were self subsisting apart from its relations [or its environment], and had certain powers or modes of acting in and for itself. Just as for philosophic dualism there was an intrinsic separation between mind and matter, so in much of the modern discussion of the course of study, there is implied an intrinsic separation between mind and subject-matter. The relation of subject-matter and method thus becomes as diffi- cult of comprehension as the Cartesian dualism of matter and mind. If against the Cartesian view of mind it be maintained that the so-called subject [mind] and the so-called object [the world] are equally the differentiated aspects or results of a unitary process, we are inevitably forced to the conclusion that subject- matter and method are not completely isolable entities, but are fundamentally the terminal or differentiated aspects of the process of development of a unitary experienced) 2. The making of a course of study. — The course of study pre- sents two main problems : {a) the question of selection (differen- tiation), (&) the question of arrangement, (integration). A. Bases for the selection of school studies. — (a) Sociological. Social life as principle of unity. Does the study (as a group of facts or principles gathered together and systematized) embody some fundamental phase of social experience ? Does it represent a fundamental manifestation of or conviction in the spiritual life of the race ? What great human interest is fundamental ? (&) Psycho- logical. Individual activities as principle of unity. What part does the study play in helping the individual to interpret his crude experience and to control his powers with reference to social ends ? COLLEGE COURSE IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION 39 (The problem, then, of the course of study is in reality the problem of adjusting (a) the agent or person and {b) the demands and opportunities of his sphere of action. There is a sense in which the individual is the ultimate fac- tor in the movement of the educative experience. That is, in order to be edu- cational, facts, ideals, activities must not only be appropriated, but transformed into the knowledge, purpose, or activity of the individual. This, however, does not mean that education is the product of the individual alone. For the require- ments of the situation furnish the stimulus and control the response of the agent, and thus the direction of the movement of individual experience. In other words, in the determination of the course 0} study, not the interests and activities 0} the individual, but the ideals, the requirements, the activiti-is oj society constitute the final standard. On the other hand, it is to be kept in mind that subject-matter is not some- thing hard and fixed, external to the mind. The educational process is not the outcome of a mind with pre-formed faculties exercising upon external material, nor is it the adaptation of the mind to a material completely pre-determined. It is a process in which the organization of the material goes hand in hand with- the organization of a self or person [compare the distinction between the logical versus the psychulopjcal view of studies]. The constitutive and defining element in a study is the particular interest or impulse it represents in the organic unity of experience. Studies fundamentally represent constructions by the mind of the world within experience from particular points of view. They arise through the interests, attitudes, and tensions, in the process of self-maintenence and self- development. But they exist only in the process of the experience of individuals. As "educational" material, so called, studies have existence only in the experience of some individual. The individual as subject of the experience, as the one through whom the movement of experience takes place, is the ultimate center of differentiation and integration in which mental development consists. The soul at any stage is an organic whole, and analysis and synthesis [or differentiation and integration] are correlative elements in the one organic movement of experience. From this point of view, therefore, it must be maintained that the nature of the mind at its various levels is an indispensable element in the determination of the course of study. In other words, just as for the theory of knowledge, subject and object are but the terminal aspects of the unitary process, so the mind nj the individual with its attitudes, interests, instincts, on the one side, dinAstudies, on the other, are fundamentally the terminal aspects or limits of a unitary, educative experience-process. In the process of learning the two are organically united.) B. The problem oj arrangement. — As has been indicated above, there are the two problems, the one of differentiation, the other of arrangement: How, on the one hand, shall the power of differentita- tion of the unitary experience into its inherently important forms be secured, and how, on the other hand, shall the various materials 40 THE SCHOOL REVIEW presented be arranged with reference to each other, so that the differ- entiation may be furthered, and yet the unitary character of the learner's experience be maintained ? This is the so-called problem of correlation. Consideration of typical plans for the correlation of studies: (a) Herhartian theory of correlation by concentration; (b) correlation by co-ordination (Harris) ; (c) constructive activities of the child as center of correlation (Dewey). Principles to be observed, {a) unity, {b) continuity, (c) adaptation, {d) reinforcement. (.The essential element in the problem of correlation is the recognition of the psychological side of studies, i. e., the recognition or realization of, e. g., history or arithmetic from the child's point of view, what it is as a form or phase of living, present personal experience. Instead of assiiming differentiation and moving back- ward, we should assume the organic unity of social experience, or the interrelation of studies [studies intrinsically related, since social experience is unitary], and move forward with the child. The difficulty lies, it would appear, in substituting the adult's consciousness for the consciousness of the child. The problem is: How out of a given unitary experience [a circle of thought, as Herbart would say, with which the child comes to school], through working it over, remaking, utilizing, defining it, there gradually emerge the various studies. From this point of view, teacher and pupils co-operate in making the course of study. It may perhaps be worth while briefly to note some of the more important implications of the doctrine of the social nature of consiousness in the organiza- tion of the course of study: {a) The necessity of continuity between the informal education of the home and the more formal education of the school, (h) The experience of the child with its habits, interests, and activities forms the true center of correlation in the educational process, viewed from the psychological side. From the social point of v^iew, the principle is found in the typical social activities and interests, id) If social experience is unitary, it follows that in reality there is but one subject-matter, now emphasized from one point of view, and now from another, in accordance with the level of experience attained by the pupil, {d) Character must be developed and trained, not so much through special instruction, as in the entire society of the school, individuals, studies, method, discipline, atmosphere, {e) It is necessary to maintain organic connec- tions or balance between studies representing the facts or processes and those representing the ends or values of social life.) 3. The various studies as instruments of experience. — Studies as plans of action for the interpretation and control by the individual of his crude and unformed experience. Interpretation and control. The processes and ideals of social life. The sciences and the humanities. Their organic unity in the upbuilding of the personal experience of individuals. COLLEGE COURSE IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION 41 4. The method oj instruction. — The question of the relation of instruction to education, one with the question of the place of knowledge in experience. The nature of the learning process. The image as the medium of instruction. The aim of instruction: (a) correction, (b) organization, and (c) expansion, of experience. The function and conduct of the recitation. Examinations as (a) retro- spective, (b) prospective. The social possibilities of the recitation. XII. THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF EDUCATION 1. Types of school as selective agencies in social life. — The accepted divisions, primary, secondary, higher, a convenient classifi- cation for administrative purposes. Their interdependence. 2. The problem of school education in democratic society. — The question of administration of education and school supervision. The adjustment of education to contemporar}^ needs. Industrial education. Industry and art. Scholarship and service. The university and the professional training of teachers. 3. State interference in the education of the individual. — Federal and state control. Social and moral basis of state control in educa- tion. Limitations of state control. Education in the school and its relation to social and moral progress. Ill In the preceding section the question of the possible content of a college course in educational principles was given at least a tentative answer. It only remains to make a brief reference to the relation which such a course bears to more advanced courses in the phi- losophy of education. Philosophy has been named the mother of the sciences , and only by slow degrees has there grown up the family of the sciences. Now it is their fashion to dispute her authority in the household of knowledge. The future progress of both science and philosophy, however, will be through complementary service. Both deal with human experience. The various sciences differ not so much as deal- ing with different facts of experience, but rather as deahng with experience as a whole in so far as it can be studied from different 42 THE SCHOOL REVIEW points of view. Philosophy attempts to co-ordinate the results of the varit )us sciences, to introduce a principle of proportion, and to exhibit the organic unity of the experience process. Philosophy, therefore, is not a mere aggregate of the sciences, but that organism of thought or knowledge of which the various sciences are the organs. It does not aim so much to bring to light new facts as to reveal the signifi- cant connections of the facts brought to Hght by the various sciences. Philosophy gives significance to the sciences, while the sciences in turn vitalize and give concreteness to philosophy. In making use of the principle of proportion in its synthesis of the facts of science , philosophy in a sense becomes a critic of the sciences. Divide et im- pera is the motto of science, and the scientific specialist, finding an hypothesis suited to the explanation of the phenomena which he has examined, is under the continual temptation of making use of it as a measuring hne for higher, or, indeed, for all orders of, existence. This is perhaps one of the gravest dangers of contemporary science, the analogous application of accepted principles from one order of existence to another. An important function of philosophy must be to examine such a principle or hypothesis, understand it, and indi- cate . to what extent it affords an explanation of phenomena of another order, and wherein it fails. Philosophy is thus through its very criticism a synthesis of the sciences, but through a higher medium than the sciences themselves explicitly recognize. As a working hypothesis in educational theory the doctrine of evolution has become indispensable. There is an ever-increasing body of evidence that it points in a direction along which truth lies; and the justification of any hypothesis is found in the existence of facts inexplicable without it. It was maintained above, however, thai "its true significance can be realized only when the general doc- trine is submitted to the interpretation put upon it by philosophy; in other words, when its results are brought into relation with the other elements of our experience." In attempting a statement of the philosophic form which the doctrine of evolution would take when made basal in a philosophy of education, the following considera- tions at least would have to be reckoned with: {a) that the real is one with actual experience", that it is inteUigible and forms an inter- nally coherent system, and that with the evolutionist's notion of COLLEGE COURSE IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION 43 adaptation, according to which an individual purpose can be realized only through accommodation to certain definite conditions, is bound up a belief in the world as a systematic unity, and no mere chaos; (6) that, therefore, evolution is distinctly teleological in its outcome; (c) that the real or the absolute, since it is at least both intelligible and of significance for the realization of human purpose, is the liv- ing state of a being in whom is intelligence and consciousness of purpose; {d) that reality or the absolute, as immanent in all its mani- festations, is not aHke and equally present in all; {a) that fully to know the meaning of our individual experience would simply com- plete insight into the nature of reality as a whole; in other words, that complete knowledge of self and knowledge of reality are ulti- mately the same thing; (/) that, therefore, reality is spiritual, and that "the more that anything is spiritual, so much the more is it veritably real. ' ' It would appear, accordingly, that when the impli- cations of evolution are indicated, they are seen to be at one with philosophic idealism in its conception of the world as a system of reason. To know the world is progressively to construe it in terms of intelligence. A philosophy of education is founded on a theory of the proper conduct of life; and a rational theory of hfe must be based on an examination of the nature of man and his relation to the cosmos of which he forms a part ; in other words, on a conception of the nature of reality. The answer which an mdividual gives to the question. What is the good for man ? is ultimately determined by the view he takes of the general nature of rfality. Nor is the educational end an independent conception. In human life the judgment of value is inextricably bound up with the judgment of fact. A philosophy of ethics or of education is influenced by our estimation of reahty as truly as by our conception of mind. Our theory of education is ultimately one with our philosophy of life. It is difficult to imagine how the man who regards the ultimate reahty as mere blind force can consistently view the process of education in exactly the same light as the man who thinks of the world-process as the living ex- pression of a personal spirit, knowledge of whom and Hkeness to whom is conceived as man's supreme concern. It is only necessary to survey in retrospect the great epochs in history to realize how dif- 44 THE SCHOOL REVIEW ferent conceptions of the nature of ultimate reality have been par- alleled by ethical and educational ideals correspondingly diverse. The entire history of the religious, moral, and intellectual life of mankind bears witness to the organic connection between religious and moral practice, on the one hand, as between the philosophical, ethical, and educational theory, on the other. In its attempts, therefore, to furnish a rational account of any pro- cess of becoming, which forms the subject-matter of the evolutionary method of study, idealism seeks to gain validity for the process by a threefold interpretation: {a) from the point of view of its meta- physical ground; (b) from the point of view of the relation of the objective world to experience; (c) from the point of view of the evolutionary process as fundamentally teleological. What was said in the preceding paragraphs was put forward merely in the way of suggestions toward a working statement of the relation of a course in the principles of education to one in the philosophy of education. Just as the philosophic habit of thought is necessary to the complete appreciation of the achievement in any special line of enquiry, so a course in the philosophy of education should be the more complete realization of all that is implied in the college course in the principles of education. As in philosophy, so in education particular solutions will perish while the problems live on. While it is to be acknowledged that the final test of any study must be its effect upon our action, the conduct it will inspire, the degree to which it keeps the passion for humanity to the fore, it must be as freely acknowledged that the more valuable results of a theoretic study of education are not immediate; they are nevertheless quite as inevitable and far-reach- ing. With the increasing complexity of the spiritual life of man, the problem of education likewise becomes more complex. In this very fact the need of a theoretic study of its possibility and its significance becomes more manifest. Algernon Sidney held that there were but two things of vital importance — religion and politics. In its best sense, education is an integral part of both. In some future day education may take the ancient and honorable place once held by poHtics in the minds and hearts of citizens. To achieve and retain that position, the serious and reflective study of the COLLEGE COURSE IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION 45 problem of education — the study, which, according to Mr. Spencer, involves all other studies, and the study in M^hich the education of everyone should culminate — in its organic unity and continuity with the other great movements of the human spirit, must take the place of mere kindliness of heart, or the intellectual inertia which mistakes enthusiasm for insight and premature opinion for reasoned experience. DISCUSSION Frederick E. Bolton, head of Department of Education, State University of Iowa: In administering a college course in the principles of education, the great desideratum is to try to formulate a body of knowledge which will give undergraduate students an idea of the meaning of education and its problems, a knowledge of its processes, and especially the laws underlying 'all rational procedure. In so far as possible, it is desirable to present material which in a certain sense will be practical. Inasmuch as the majority of undergraduates who study education in a college department intend to go into the practical work of teaching, it is important to fortify them, as well' as possible in the brief time which they devote to the subject, concerning the best means of securing definite results in education. The majority are not so much interested in the science or the philosophy of education as they are in its practical problems. All courses in education should seek to deal with fundamental principles, and not dole out dogmatic statements of practical means and devices; but at the same time no principles should be considered with which the student cannot see some relation to the educative processes. They are not primarily concerned with the place of education among the sciences, nor with ontological and teleological meanings of education or of its laws. As I view it, the course in principles of education should be on a par with the course in principles of physics, or in principles of biology, principles of psychology, principles of political science, etc. Now, a course in the principles of any of these subjects attempts to set forth the main problems with which the science deals. Elementary courses attempt to select those principles which have frequent application in eveiyday life. The course in the principles of physics deals with elementary notions of matter motion and force, and everyday illustrations and problems are sought. It would seem to me that in a similar manner the college course in principles of education should seek elementary principles which will better enable the student to accomplish the purpose of education, namely to produce modifications in individuals and in society in harmony with the ideals and ends of education. Education is a process of adjusting individuals to their environment, natural and accidental, and the environment which is created through ideals held by society . and by individuals themselves. All education has to do with the development of the individual in accordance with his poten- 46 THE SCHOOL REVIEW tialities and the ideals of education which are set up. It is, if we may so term it, a practical'science, an appUed science, the same as engineering is an applied science. Engineering does not deal with ultimate theories of matter, force, and motion except as they are important in considering practical ends to be secured through the application of forces. I believe that I am in thorough accord with Dr. MacVannel as to what should be included in the ideal training of the teacher. From the outline I gather that nearly all of this training should be incorporated in the course in the principles of education. On the question of the distribution of the work I should differ, if I am correct in my interpretation of the outline. It is quite possible that a complete exposition of the topics mentioned in the outline would make a revision of my interpretation necessary. Much depends upon the proportionate place given to the several topics. In a course in the principles of education no complete treatment could certainly be given of all the topics mentioned. A cours'e in the principles of education should seek to include the founda- tions rather than to encompass all knowledge about education. It is rather an EinleMimg than an Encyklopadie. Professor MacVannel's outline appears to me encyclopaedic. The complete training of the ideal teacher ought to include all that he indicates and even more. I believe I am in full agreement with the out- line of topics except that the course in the principles must be limited. Professor MacVannel apparently includes child-study, educational psychology, methods of instruction, the course of study, educational organization and administration, the various studies as instruments of education, etc. In fact, the only subjects of education not included are the history of education and school law. He would also undoubtedly draw extensively upon the history 'of education in his search for educational principles and for examples to illustrate them. Although a complete and logical treatise on the principles of education might include a consideration of " the course of study and the method of instruction," "the making of a course of study," "the problem of the arrange- ment" of the course of study, "the various studies as instruments of experi- ence," "the organization and administration of education," etc., it is question- able, from a practical point of view, whether they should be given consideration in the undergraduate course. Mere passing notice would, at any rate, seem suf- ficient. Each topic of the scope of the foregoing is siifficient to form a course in itself, and the introductory course should do no more than define their relation to the general problem. In the principles of psychology the fields of abnormal psychology, comparative psychology, child psychology, adolescent psychology, etc., are defined and drawn upon for illustration, yet no separate chapters are devoted to them. In departments of political economy there are usually ele- mental courses designed as an introduction to the leading principles of economic science, but there are special courses in currency and banking, public finance, taxation, transportation, distribution of wealth, etc. Similarly in the college course in the principles of education, the work should COLLEGE COURSE IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION 47 be concentrated upon the fundamentals designed to introduce the student to the many special problems. The course of study, and the organization and adminis- tration of education, should be regarded as accessory rather than as funda- mental. IMankind was being educated in a fundamental sense of the term teons before schools were organized, and before special subjects were arranged or methods thought of in connection with them. The laws underlying processes of development and modification are what should occupy the attention of the student in this elemental survey. A study of the special means and agencies of education and forms of social organization should be given in other courses by special names. Secondary education, the kindergarten, administration and supervision, methods in special subjects, etc, each deserves attention as a distinct and separate course. Although in the main the topics indicated are such as should find place in courses in a department of education, yet certain sections are purely philosophi- cal in their nature. Of this character, mention may be made of Section VII on "The Nature of Experience." This is a problem of epistemology, and Professor MacVannel has not hesitated to go into a discussion of empiricism and rational- ism. This I beheve to belong to the domain of philosophy as such. Certain other sections, while less strikingly belonging to philosophy, are largely concerned with its specific problems. Of such a character Section VIII might be instanced. This section deals with the development of experience. He discusses such points as "experience as an organic unity," "distinction between growth and develop- ment of experience or of mental life," "increase in the content of experience," "increasing complexity of mental processes," and "increasing faciHty and power among the various mental processes," and the "increase in the organic unity and solidarity of experience," "experience as a teleological system," "experience as problematic," " the emergence of sensation, idea, thought, attention," etc. All of these belong either to psychology or to philosophy. Of course, every thoroughly trained teacher ought to have mastered these topics, but they are beyond the comprehension of the ordinary undergraduate. They would occupy an amount of time which could not be afforded them. According to Professor MacVannel's definition of the philosophy of educa- tion, there is little place for this subject in an undergraduate collegiate course in education. To be sure, every instructor ought to have come to philosophical ideas of education, but the ordinary undergraduate student is not mature enough to grasp their abstractions. Even if they were sufficiently mature, many have not studied philosophy as such, which should be a prerequisite. Desirable as it may be, it would seem to me impossible to attain. Personally it would not seem to be a serious departure from strict terminology to denominate the course in principles as a course in the philosophy of education. For a long time the term " natural philosophy " was in good repute. It signified not necessarily a metaphysical consideration, but the study of physical phenomena and their laws. Likewise we employ the term "political philosophy," without feeling restricted to the consideration of the nature of the state, but feel free to 48 THE SCHOOL REVIEW discuss phenomena, laws, and principles. Similarly, under "philosophy of edu- cation" may we not include a study of the meaning of education and the body of facts, laws, and principles which will enable us best to attain the most intelligent and far-reaching results in education ? With the limited time at my command, I hesitate to suggest the scope of work and the topics which T regard as essential in an undergraduate collegiate course in the principles of education. However, hoping that it will be borne in mind that what is given is merely suggestive, I shall make the attempt. It will be seen that many of the topics are included in Professor MacVannel's scheme. What I suggest indicates in a general way the course which I have been giving for some years in this subject. The first third of the year in the three-hour course is devoted to the biological aspects of education. In this section there is an attempt first to enlarge the notion of education, aiming to have it regarded as practically coincident with life and experience. Of course, there is the ideal side toward which individuals will strive, but the attempt is made to impress the student with the fact that every experience leaves its ineffaceable effect upon all organisms. In order to convey this idea, we begin with a discussion of the effects of experience upon simple animal and plant life, and the general modifications produced in the adjustment of such life to surroundings. Some familiar, non-technical facts in the evolution of plant and animal life are considered in their relation to the ques- tion of adaptation and adjustment. Due notice is taken of the facts of adjust- ment as manifested in such illustrations as the change'of the eyes of cave animals, gradual modifications of plant and animal life, the change of animals from sea life to land life, some of the retrogressions, etc. A general study of the gradual evolution of sense-organs and the nervous system is made, because these illustrate in an excellent way the gradual modifications produced by experience in the race. After this general survey, the subject of recapitulation is considered by means of lectures, and through (Jiscussion of such chapters as Drummond's "The Ascent of the Body," "The Scaffolding Left in the Body," " The Arrest of the Body," "The Dawn of Mind," and " The Evolution of Language." These discussions naturally lead to a consideration of the culture-epochs theory, the lengthening period of human infancy, and the importance of infancy in education. This in turn leads to a brief consideration of the periods of childhood, adolescence, and maturity, largely from a biological point of view. These are followed by a dis- cussion of such topics as instinct, heredity, from fundamental to accessory in growth, the brain as an organ of mind, some of the facts of psycho-physic cor- relation, and the reciprocal influence of mind and body upon each other. Before leaving this general field, thorough and designedly practical discussions of the importance of physical development and culture for education in general and for mental development, fatigue, habit, physical and mental hyg'ene, and play, are considered. The second section of the year is occupied with what some authors term educational psychology, and others term the psychological 'aspects of education. In this section the first topic considered is that of memory. It naturally grows COLLEGE COURSE IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION 49 out of the biological discussion of instinct, heredity, etc. Included in the subject of memory is that of association. Following this, we discuss imagination, imita- tion, training of the senses, apperception, formal discipline, feeling, volition, motor training, induction, and correlation. Periods of mental development and the specific topic of childhood and adolescence receive definite consideration, though more exhaustive treatment is reserved for a distinct course in child-study. The genetic point of view is emphasized throughout. Concerning the last section of the work I speak with still more diffidence. Just as sociology has not become a well-organized science by itself, so the course in social aspects of education has not thus far been well defined. I have been searching for some years for a working outline of topics for this section. Thus far I have not succeeded to my entire satisfaction. We group our work around such books as Button's Social Phases 0} Education, Butler's The Meaning of Education, Spencer's Education, Hanus' Educational Aims and Educational Values, Dewey's The School and Society, Henderson's Education and the Larger Life, McCunn's The Making of Character, etc. Throughout, an attempt is made to make the work as concrete as possible, and to show its relation to matters pertaining to the schoolroom, the home, and to the everyday conduct of the students themselves. Each topic, is treated with considerable thoroughness and detail. No endeavor is made to secure an abso- lutely systematic and ultra-logical system. The charge of being unsystematic and incomplete would not be resented. There is no desire for a system. As in the elementary stages of any subject, the first requisite is a body of fundamental facts. There is time enough later to evolve an all-inclusive and all-exclusive sys- tem. I am not aware that even " the doctors " have yet fully settled this question. The psychological order is the one sought. What is intelligible, full of Hving interest and of largest probable importance in the life and work of the student- teacher are the criteria applied in the selection of materials. The student ver- dict is given much weight in deciding. The experience of the last five years gives reasonable assurance that a course such as suggested has a definite place as undergraduate work in college. It has proved of apparently increasing importance in the State University of Iowa. Starting with twelve students in this course in 1900, the numbers have increased each year until now there are seventy taking the work. This course has drawn more students than those in methodology, high-school problems, or the history of education, and these latter have been taught by the same instructional force as the principles of education. The attitude of the students themselves leads me to feel that the facts which are dealt with are such as can be understood by the average juniors and seniors, and such as to enlist their interest in the work of education. We feel that they are stimulated to look at their work as teachers and at child-life in an entirely new way. Their work is not to be as mere dis- tributors of arithmetic or geography, but as promoters of the development of human beings freighted down with an ancient past, and who must grow toward ideals if they ever attain them. The testimony of graduates after entering the 5° THE SCHOOL REVIEW field of teaching is also encouraging, and leads us to feel that the students them- selves consider that they have laid hold of some guiding principles. Some radical changes in the way of elimination and extension have been made in the light of students' reactions toward various phases of the work. An increasing number who do not expect to become teachers also take the course. They seem to consider it as liberalizing and cultural as any branch of university instruction. They find in it an interpretation of much that has been meaningless in their own lives, in school activities, and in the life of society. Dr. H. H. PIorne, professor of philosophy in Dartmou^ College: These comments are based upon a careful reading of the paper in the typewritten out- line. They reveal probably the bias of the writer more than the nature of the sub- ject about which Dr. MacVannel is writing, and so they are themselves more subject to criticism than the original before me. There are three kinds of com- ments I should like to make upon the whole paper, viz., the strong points in general, the weak points in general, and certain weak points in particular. Upon the strong points in general I will not pause a tmie proportionate to their desert. I pause at all only that I may not seem unmindful of them in the critical part that is to follow. My excuse for pausing but briefly upon them is that no eulogy of mine could make them more effective than they appear in the body of the paper. Among these strong points in general are the deeply philosophi- cal tone pervading the whole, the earnest spirit of reflective inquiry concerning educational principles, the emphasis laid upon a fundamental unity in all educa- tional experience, a careful analysis of the elements of variety that enter into this unitary whole, and the recognition everywhere of the dynamic and func- tional as against the static, and isolated. These merits, in my view, incompar- ably outweigh any demerits to which I shall now refer at greater length. As to the weak points in general, it simply must be observed that "the defects of the qualities" of the paper are in evidence. There is a certain vagueness and abstractness about the paper as a whole; good theory, no doubt, one may feel, but what the bearing is does not always appear; the principles are theoretical rather than practical; the ideas are often not stated in complete sentences, par- ticularly in the latter part of the paper (e.g. Section XII p. 105); and the defiiu- tions are not obviously clear (e. g. of "method" on p. 35, viz.: "Method or the form of personal realization and penetration of the intellectual order of the school"); the first 80 per cent, of the paper, or the first two parts, might very well be called other things than the principles of education, such as, the philosophy of society, the philosophy of evolution, the philosophy of human experience, or even the philosophy of education. The sum of the criticism at this point is that the author has insisted that thinking should control as well as interpret experi- ence, but his own educational thinking here does not control educational experience; in short, the practical bearings are not shown. As to certain weak points in particular: "The science of education aims at securing the method by which the educational process may be increasingly con- COLLEGE COURSE IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION 51 trolled" (p. 81). The definition of the science of education is exclusively prac- tical, and as such is inconsistent with the definition of science as including "knowledge" given at the bottom of p. 80. "The twofold aspect of education as a science" (p. SoV In so far as edu- cation is of the body, other aspects than the "psychological" and "sociological" would come in. The definition of idealism (p. 82) is in exclusively teleological terms, whereas the ontological element should be included, as at the top of p. 84. To state, that the goal of the world is "the perfecting of the life of man" (p. 84; perhaps elevates man more than his position in the cosmos warrants. It is what Professor Royce calls "atrocious Philistinism." Man doubtless has a large place in the goal, but perhaps is not the goal itself. The heading and subheadings are not logical on p. 84, where III and (3) are identical. The use of the word "ontological" in the parentheses on p. 89 as an evident synon}Tn for "dualistic" is not happy. So the use of the word "psychological" in "Play is fundamentally a psycho- logical attitude," at the middle of p. 91 is, not the best perhaps. On pp. 92 the terms "genetic or functional" seem to be used synonymously, which is very misleading. On p. 95 the definition of "growth" is hardly to be distinguished from {a) under the account of "development^'. Concerning the use of the word "experience," on p. 95 et passim, it may be permitted to ask for a definition of experience, and an account of whose the experience as a totality is. " A self-active principle, creative in the objects it knows and the ends it chooses" (p. 97) looks like the "subjective idealism" which the author has rejected. The distinction between the sciences and the humanities, on p. 102, or that between control and appreciation, leads to the inquiry whether there is not an element of control in the humanities and of appreciation in the sciences, as Pro- fessor DeGarmo holds. I cannot conclude without referring to the attitude of Dr. MacVannel toward the self and its environment, " since they are the terminal aspects of one move- ment " (p. 90). This is the view I have been accustomed to present myself, but since the work of James, Dewey, Woodbridge, Schiller, Bawden, and the whole noble company of pragmatists, I suppose we are no longer justified in doing so without at least considering whether the consciousness is not a mid-term of rela- tion between beings, instead of an end-term. And as a last paragraph, since dynamism is such a thorough presupposition of the whole discussion, I cannot but ask for a defense of the reality of time. These last paragraphs emphasize the feeling I have that the whole paper is too theoretically philosophical for a college course in the principles of education. What college men want in a course in principles of education is first sound practice, and then only enough theory to understand it. 52 THE SCHOOL REVIEW John A. Bergsteom, professor of education, Indiana University: At the time of the preparation of this discussion only Part II of Professor MacVannel's paper, in outUne, was ready for distribution. This deals with the " College Course in the Principles of Education." Professor MacVannel does not set forth the general principles which should be observed in the formation of such a course; he presents instead a system of topics, which he believes should be taken up in the classroom in dealing with the subject, and adds suggestions as to the mode of treatment. For one who wishes, as does the present writer, to consider the general policy involved, it is therefore necessary to infer from the different topics and suggestions of the document what this policy may be; in other words, to treat the paper as if it were an historical source, though one cannot expect in this case the historian's usual immunity from correction by the author. One notes, in the first place, that the paper is written by a philosopher more Platonic than Aristotelian in his views and methods. Evolution and idealism are regarded as the foundations of the theory of education, but ideaUsm is the view- point. The truth of the evolutionary series is to be understood in the light of its highest, not its lowest, terms. " Mind is the realization of matter; " and " the world is in essence spiritual and its goal the perfecting of the life of man." In the next place, there is an almost Hegelian intolerance of the lack of rela- tion of certain opposites, which are conceived of as merely extremes of the sam.e set of connected facts and are brought into harmony from some higher point of view. Thus: " Mind and matter, soul and body, are terminal aspects of a unitary, living, spiritual experience," in which the lower ser\^es or should be made to serve the higher. "Just as for the theory of knowledge subject and object are but terminal aspects of a unitary process, so the mind of the individual, with its attitudes, interests, instincts, on the one side, and the studies, on the other, are fundamentally the terminal aspects or limits of a unitary, educative experience." "The individual is a functional element in a larger functional whole," namely: society; and " the individual and society are regarded, not as two separate modes of being, but rather as two phases of one reality, distinctions of functions, of modes of operation within a unity." Then, too, " subject-matter and method are but dififerentiated aspects of a unitary experience." These statements, together with other analogous considerations, serve to call needed attention to the fact of inner relationship of each pair of correlates, but by no means make the scientific study of the details and effective character of this relationship superfluous. In the third place, one notes that Professor MacVannel places a very high value on the philosophic work of systematization. " The theory of education should set forth not a set of educational categories or principles, independent or isolated one from another, but an interrelated system ; " " the philosophy of education is the theory of the relations of education to other sciences, and to the known world in general." COLLEGE COURSE IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION 53 When one reflects that it is only by the proper distribution in thought of the different factors in the field of education that their relative value is apparent, that one may thus be saved both from fads and from anachronisms, that the system stimulates to mental effort, especially in the direction of its own elaboration, and that it gives tone, force, and singleness of purpose, there are evidently urgent reasons for emphasizing it. Yet the emphasis implied, not simply in these state- ments but in others throughout the paper, is so great that it might lead to the obscuring of certain other valuable modes of thought. Such great values can be ascribed to a system only when it has grown up in connection with years of experience and of scientific study of educational facts. Should the systematiza- tion of educational concepts, particularly such as are developed from the view- point of philosophy, be attempted at an early stage — unless it be in simple language and as a mere preface — they may make little more than a verbal series, justifying Occam's theory of the flatus vocis. The comprehension of the topics may be so vague and lacking in vitality that, while the student can, for example, locate such a subject as method in the system, and know that it is "funda- mentally the mode of the individual's behavior in the realization of some phase of his environment," he may be so absorbed and satisfied with its location that he fails to work painstakingly at its different parts tUl theory and practice combine to make him expert in its use. Besides, many practical educational problems, which the aim Professor Mac- Vannel assigns to the science of education, as that of "securing the method by which the educational process may be increasingly controlled," would authorize us to keep in mind, are of a character to demand for solution a knowledge of current practice and a few practical rules; and still others require a high degree of technical knowledge of certain topics, as in the case of school hygiene. It is not often that the practitioner, if he knows a system, has time to consult it in all its parts, and perhaps still rarer that he does so. The possession of a large number of ready but unsystematized solutions for the multitude of practical problems that arise is certainly a valuable asset. However, to estimate the value of the system fairly, one must bear in mind that it may exert a slow but definite influence, which may extend even to these details ; yet the number of educators who in practice have acted contrary to their general theories is quite alarming to one who may wish to pin his faith to systems. Should attention to the general system be so preponderant, as in fact it sometimes is, that the special principles of certain departments in which the student wishes to labor are not mastered with sufficient enthusiasm or technical skill, the results will not be the best. In most subjects, in recent years, effort has been mainly directed, not toward systematization, but toward the investigation of special topics — a plan which, in the present state of development of the subjects, has been at least partly justified by results. Though the educational field is large and inviting for work of this kind, less has been done than in many another. A department with a large field of important facts is like a country with vast natural resources : it is sure to have a great future, if it develops them. The present revival of interest in philosophy, 54 THE SCHOOL REVIEW of which we have notable instances even among men concerned with natural science, suggests, however, that, even if comparative, inductive, specialized studies must be the daily task, systematization may also from time to time be profitable. We turn now to another aspect of Professor MacVannel's paper. The con- ceptions with which he maps out the pedagogical field are of the most recent. Not simply do we find a synthesis of evolution and idealism placed at the founda- tion of the structure, but many applicable concepts from functional and genetic psychology, sociology, and institutional study are introduced. All mental processes are said to be merely aspects of inner adaptations to outer con- ditions, the higher serving with increasing efiiciency the ends of action. Science is a method for the control of experience. " Civilization represents the tools of the mind invented by man in the course of his experience for the registration, organization, control, and perpetuation of his experience." " The possibility of individual development lies in his increasing participation in the social conscious- ness and in social activities." " Education is therefore essentially a process of social interaction between the two factors of the experience process, society and the individual ; " and " dynamic adjustment expresses sufficiently well the essen- tial nature of the educational process." "All phases of psychical activity may be grouped about two fundamental types, habits and accommodations." Much of the customary educational phraseology is either set aside for, or supplemented by, philosophical terms. Thus, the formation of a course is regarded as a double problem of selection and arrangement, or of differentiation and integration, of subjects. This predominance of the philosophic temper leads also to what seems to be an undue emphasis for educational purposes of certain philosophical aspects of the terms employed. Thus, in the discussion of the concept "self," more attention appears to be given to its unifying function, its relation to self-consciousness, and the not -self, than to the problem of its proper training and development. The scenery in Professor MacVannel's sketch of education is so new, and the strokes so large and detail-obliterating, that one might well question if any of the old pedagogical heroes who have dealt with the subject more or less directly would at first imagine, if awakened, that they had in view familiar territory. Even so late a writer as Bain would certainly wonder how things could change so much in the short period of thirty years. It is doubtless true that one of the chief ingredients of the great educational classics has been a better and more accurate representation in words of the highest ideals and forms of culture of the particular time in which they were written, as Spencer represents some aspects of evolutionary pedagogy, and Vives that of the Renaissance. The task of bringing to bear upon educational prob- lems the best suggestions of present thought is certainly a great and indispensable one, but there is a prerequisite to its successful execution by the student, namely, the comparative, historical study of solutions of the same problems previously attempted. This is not so merely because it is the custom of present-day scholarship to require such a treatment of its topics, or because the contemporary COLLEGE COURSE IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION 55 student has on all sides been trained in evolutionary modes of thought so that he learns better in this way, but because the scholar and student alike amass instances in the study of the history of educational ideals, methods, and con- ditions that enable them to build up genuine concepts on the basis of fact and to conceive plans of work, the precise value of which can to a considerable degree of accuracy be estimated from past experience. Moreover, past ideals and methods have usually not wholly disappeared; they persist either in their original form in more conservative institutions; or they have been somewhat transformed, yet not so much so but that there are present-day homologues. If the principles of education are to be studied so as to give an " increasing control " over educational affairs, then the study of educational principles incorporated in the ideals and work of men or institutions at different times, whose evolution and efficiency may to a considerable extent be ascertained, should have a very great value. In this way the chief stages in the evolution and the morphology of the different concepts and principles may best be ascertained. This aspect of the matter may be dealt with either independently in a course in the principles of education, or in connection with the history of education. Some believe, it is true, that in education as well as in philosophy the intro- duction of the historical method has destroyed creative speculation; that by it the scholar has taken the place of the system-making genius. This, if true, is not wholly a loss, and at any rate may be regarded as merely a temporary phase. Time is required for the mastery of the new point of view, and theories, and even systems, will surely be constructed in the future, more true and effective because of the corrective foundation given by the period of historical scholarship. For the solution of the problem as to when and how the principles of educa- tion should be taught in a college course, it will be of advantage to consider their mode of production, and the corresponding grades of validity and useful- ness. The actual concepts and principles possessed by the same person of different things, and by different persons of the same thing, vary enormously, and many classes and sub-classes could doubtless be made of them. These would range in grade from the more or less valid practical conclusions drawn by teachers from their own experience to the concepts elaborated by the most pains- taking scientific and philosophical study of the most gifted minds. A division into three classes, somewhat like the familiar Hegelian or Platonic, will serve the present purpose. In the first; are placed the usually ill-defined, often contra- dictory, but tenaciously held and applied, customary educational views and precepts, partly derived from experience and partly from desultory reading and hearsay. In the second are placed those which have developed out of, but beyond, those just mentioned by some years of laborious, comparative study, so that each concept and principle has as its foundation a sufficiently large and typical group of instances to make it clear and adequate. Moreover, they have been formed by personal work by the student, in accordance with the best available methods, so that he has both ability to continue their elaboration, and the disposition and skill to apply them to practical affairs. The training secured 56 THE SCHOOL REVIEW is sufficient for effective scientific or practical work in one or more of the different departments of education. By continuing the application of the historical and inductive, or scientific, method something more may be effected, and a third and higher grade of prin- ciple produced. For one thing, the concepts and principles of the different aspects of education, historical, psychological, and practical, can be more and more elaborated and perfected; but the effort may also be made to develop more comprehensive views, not independently of, but on the basis of, the scientific work so far done, so that the different parts of educational work may be adequately adjusted with regard to other parts, and the whole of education with regard to the social service it is to perform. This will result in what may be termed educational statesmanship, which will know what degree of emphasis to place upon different parts of pedagogical study, or what should be added or omitted; and, in the practical field, what should be undertaken both from the point of view of inner work and from that of outward propaganda to make education fulfill its function as nearly completely as possible. In general, univer- sity courses can give students such a training that they wUl be well advanced in the formation of the principles of the second type, and will have made an impor- tant beginning of those of the third; but both types of principles, especially the third, will need subsequent study and the test of experience. In the consideration of the problem, a difficulty is introduced by the fact that as far as the mental process is concerned, concepts and principles have a great range; and the most trival as well as the most profound may thus equally be called by the same name. Moreover, the studies of the highest questions may be introduced with persons of such immaturity, or lack of special preparation for the work, that the results at best may not be so good as those of the first-class, and, in fact, may be so nearly merely verbal, confused, and ineffective that they can hardly be called principles at all, at least when measured by the standard of efliciency. In the sense that Comenius would introduce "metaphysics" in the " Maternal School," the principles of education might well be begun in the kindergarten. In the sense that Plato uses the term "philosophy" and would have it studied, after a course in traditional subjects and science, at from thirty to thirty-five, courses in college and university can only give an extensive preparation in the science of education, with some beginning of its philosophy. There is still another difficulty: while definite and efficient conceptions of the highest principles cannot be obtained except through prolonged study, neverthe- less there may be dim anticipations years before, induced by reading, disscussion, and personal meditation. Such anticipations might by the untrained be easily mistaken for genuine science and philosophy. The topics proposed by Professor MacVannel are such as would in the main fall into the third group; and it is very important to consider by what stages of study and by what methods they are to be mastered. The entire course of pedagogical study may be said to have as its special purpose the building up of adequate concepts and principles with a view to COLLEGE COURSE IN PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION 57 scientific and practical efficiency; and the essential thing, in the first place, is not so much a course bearing the title "Principles of Education," as courses in which there may be a study by scientific methods of the data that make them possible. No department representing any great branch of knowledge could teach its principles in any other way, unless it meant by principles, not the fundamental and elaborated concepts of science, but merely its initial steps. The relation of such an introductory course of initial steps in the depart- ment of education to a course or courses for the teaching of the principles of education is a very important problem in department pedagogy. The character of the course will have much to do with the interest and progress of the student. As the student may enter the department with many traditional views, many per- sonal problems and many but vague notions of modern education, he has some foundation for his work; but he lacks technical psychological and pedagogical terms, and especially such methods of work and points of view as a systematic study of what he knows and can easily assimilate will give him. An introduc- tory course of from three to five periods a week for a year would prove of service to him. It would consist of a simple introductory survey of the chief characteristics and terminology of modern education, with the main historical outlines, and within range of the student's experience, interest, and personal use. There will also be some discussion of ideals of education, of methods of study and teaching, and of personal and school hygiene, and of educational psychology and practial ethics. Many of the topics listed in Professor MacVannel's paper would receive a preliminary treatment. This will, to be sure, be a study of the " Principles of Education," and in the old days might possibly have been mistaken for a substantial course in the subject. It is, of course, merely introductory, and should rather be given the name "Introduction to the Study of Education" than " Principles of Education," which would then be reserved for principles of a greater degree of elaboration. How- ever, by this means a beginning of the study of the principles of education may be made. This should be continued in the second year for about three periods a week by the study of the general history of education, chiefly from sources; and in the third by a comparative study of contemporary schools and school systems. In this study the principles of education will be taught in their historical setting and evolution, which will aid much in making them practical. These two courses shonld be studied, not simply by a review of the works of educational reformers, nor merely even by the study of educational facts in their relation to social, economic, and institutional conditions, which would, to be sure, do much to make them scientifically comprehensible, but as a study in educa- tional dynamics to bring out the effective practical value, personal and social, of the different elements of culture. Work in educational psychology should also be continued. While the study of the character of mental processes at different stages, the order of their development, and social interactions, is more particularly the end in view, the starting-point for a psychological study, alike for the alienist, the student 58 THE SCHOOL REVIEW of children, or the student of animal intelligence, is normal adult psychology, not so much in its intricate technical analysis as in its familiar, personal, and practi- cal aspects. Training in the psychological or pedagogical laboratory is in the same way a necessary technical preparation for investigations in genetic psychology. Possibly this might occupy the equivalent of three hours a week for a couple of years, running parallel with the two years devoted to historical and comparative pedagogy. We may suppose that during these three years some collateral courses will have been pursued by the student; that something in biology and paleontology may have been done to give an initial grasp of evolution in those fields, and also something in sociology, philosophy, and literature. In addition, he may have begun the reading of French and German educational literature, which, aside from the facts gained, will, by reason of differing and contrasting terminology, help to free him from bondage to verbal suggestion, and so aid in the formation of concepts. The student has the foundation for the study, observation, and practice of various lines of educational work as well as for further scientific training. But by the very nature of his work hitherto, he has dealt with separate aspects of education; for the highest efficiency either in the science of the subject or its practice, he must learn to organize his knowledge better, and bring what is pertinent from the several different departments of the subject to bear in the solution of the problems that come up. An advanced course in the principles and philosophy of education, conducted either by lecture or by recitation methods, might be an aid in the matter. If a course bearing this title is offered at all, it might be at this point. It should not so ranch, be classificatory as designed to make knowledge already largely acquired convertible into practice. The most efficient means to this end will probably be the preparation of work in the seminar and the investigation necessary for the final thesis. The relation of philosophical, sociological and psychological concepts to education, with which Professor MacVannel's paper so largely deals, would be among the best topics for the seminar, each, perhaps, for a year's work. We may imagine that the student will spend, according to his purpose, one to three or four years in these advanced lecture courses and seminary exercises, in observation and prac- tice, and in his investigation. In the consideration of this problem of the teaching of the concepts and principles of education, attention has been given especially to factors which promote their development and efficiency, that is, to the collection of data, the method and duration of study, and the influence of observation and practice; all of which determine, not only the adequacy of the concept as a means to action, but also its future development and usefulness. From this point of view, the entire course of educational training is involved. In general, I have endeavored to represent in this discussion what I conceive to be the scientific study of the principles of education as contrasted with a method too purely philosophic. This scientific point of view is at the same time that in which I believe. , 31 46oe LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 019 760 691 5#