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AN ADDRESS 
 
 DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 
 
 THE STATE OF TENNESSEE 
 
 THEIR CONSTITUENTS. 
 
 WASHINGTON : 
 BLAIR AND RIVES, PRI^TjRS. 
 
 1841. 
 

CIRCULAR LETTER 
 
 Aaron V. Brown, Cave Johnson, Hopkins L. Turney, Julius W. Blackwell^ 
 Abraham McCleUaji^ and Harvy M. Waiierson, to their constituents, jjj 
 
 Fellow- Citizens : Before this reaches you, the term of our service 
 as your representatives in Congress will have expired. In laying down 
 the high and responsible trust which was bestowed upon us with a gen- 
 erous confidence, we should not feel that we had discharged our whole 
 duty if we failed to furnish you Avith the means of thoroughly scrutiniz- 
 ing the principles which have guided us. We were indebted to your 
 2ealous devotion to democratic republicanism for the distinguished honor 
 we have enjoyed of representing you in the councils of the nation. Feel- 
 ing conscious that the same devotion to democracy has actuated us in the 
 discharge of our duties, which animated you in conferring the trust, our 
 earnest wish now is to satisfy you that your confidence has not been 
 abused. 
 
 m 
 
 ECONOMY IN THE PUBLIC EXPENDITURES. 
 
 At the head of republican virtues, we place a strict economy in the 
 expenditure of the public money. A departure from this principle is ne- 
 cessaril}'' followed by corruption, and oppressive taxation. Extravagance 
 can be indulged and sustained only by high taxes, and is always accom- 
 panied by corruption. Our Government was designed to be plain, simple, 
 and cheap in its administration : making the least possible exactions upon 
 the people for its support, and leaving the free energies of honest industry 
 as little trammelled as practicable. By this golden rule we are willing to 
 be judged ; and by it we shall, in turn, judge those who are soon to be in 
 power in the Government. 
 
 In the late political struggle, in which thepublic was so deeply agitated, 
 the subject of expenditures occupied a conspicuous place. The opponents 
 of the then administration knew that the American people are justly sen- 
 sitive on the subject of extravagant expenditures of the public money, 
 and they spared no pains to fix upon that administration the sin of waste- 
 fulness in its management of the revenue. If the public mind had been in 
 a less excited state, it would not have been forgotten that, during the whole 
 time when so much extravagance was alleged to exist, the taxes were re- 
 gularly and constantly diminishing by operation of law ; and that no 
 more money was exacted from the people than Congress deemed neces- 
 sary for an economical administration of the Government. Now that the 
 excitement has subsided, we can appeal, with confidence, to your dispas- 
 sionate judgments for a calm investigation of this charge. Extravagance 
 in the Government can take place in but one of two ways : the appropri- 
 ations of money by Congress may be extravagant, because they are made 
 for improper objects ; or, the application of money appropriated may be 
 extravagant, because those who direct its application may do it exiruva^ 
 
gantly. For the application of appropriations, the Executive, or the sub- 
 ordinate officers under him, are alone responsible. In justification of the 
 President, it is due to him that we state that the appropriations for the 
 years complained of, greatly exceeded his annual estimates and recommen- 
 dations. In 1838, his estimates amounted to $22,735,249 ; but Congress", 
 against his urgent advice, appropriated, by the laws which it passed, the 
 sum of $39,455,438. In 1839, he estimated the necessary expenditures at 
 $23,509,089; Congress appropriated $37,614,936. For these appropria- 
 tions over the estimates. Congress alone is responsible. The President 
 could do no more than furnish the estimates, and recomniend that they should 
 not be exceeded ; and it is remarkable that the very party who afterwards 
 denounced the President for his extravagance, were themselves mostly 
 to blame, for voting for and passing these large appropriations. We 
 state the fact from the journals of Congress, that, of the $75,822,601, (the 
 amount of appropriations for 1838 and 1839,) the sum of $65,700,873 was 
 passed without a division, or a call for the ayes and noes. If none of thai; 
 party was sufficiently opposed to that amount to call for the ayes and noes, 
 it is with poor grace that they can come forward now and object to it. Of 
 the remaining $10,121,728, only $2,382,318 were voted against by the 
 Tennessee members opposed to the administration; leaving them justly 
 chargeable with the sum of $73,440,283, against which they cannot pre- 
 tend to have been opposed — at least sufficiently opposed to induce them 
 even to call for the ayes and noes. Of the large appropriations of those 
 years, M^e do not doubt that there were many which ought not to have been 
 passed by Congress. But we aver it from the records, that the opposition 
 members, generally, voted more uniformly for large appropriations than 
 the democratic members did. Even the " splendid furniture of the marble 
 palace" (as it has been called) was voted for, so far as the journals show, 
 by every member of that party which lately set up such high pretensions 
 to economy. 
 
 Whilst we make this reference to the appropriations of the last Con- 
 gress, in justification of the friends of the administration, we have no 
 difficulty in submitting the appropriations of the present Congress to the 
 severest scrutiny. When Mr. Van Buren assumed the duties of Presi- 
 dent, he found the expenditures of the Government run up, from various 
 causes, to a very large amount. In his first, and in each subsequent 
 message, his recommendations to Congress to curtail and retrench the 
 expenditures were urgent and unceasing. In reference to his exertions 
 on this subject, and their success, we invite you to read the following 
 extract from his message of December, 1840 : 
 
 " But, to change a system operating upon so large a surface, and applicable to such nume- 
 rous and diversified interests and otjjects, was more than the work of a day. The aiftentioa 
 of every department of the Government was immediately, and in good faith, directed to that 
 end ; and has been so continued to the present moment. The estimates and appropriations for 
 the year 1838 (the iirst over which I had any control) were somewhat diminished. The ex- 
 penditures of 1839 were reduced six millions of dollars. Those of 1840, exclusive of disburse- 
 ments for public debt and trust claims, will probably not exceed twenty-two and a half rail- 
 lions; being between two and three millions less than those of the preceding year, and nine 
 or ten millions less than those of 1837." 
 
 We are thus able to show you a reduction, in the last two years, of 
 'Hine or ten millions in the expenditures. Indeed, we believe we can 
 safely assert that the expenditures for 1840, which did not exceed the 
 
sum of $22,489,349, have entirely escaped censure ; and we are entirely 
 certain that they will stand the most rigid test of economy. We are 
 gratified that it has been our fortune to co-operate with the Chief Magis- 
 trate in the work of retrenchment which he commenced upon his en- 
 trance into office ; and that we have succeeded so effectually, that none 
 now pretend to deny that the expenditures are within reasonable limits. 
 We sincerely trust that the party now coming into power may be able to 
 acquit themselves with equal success. But in this hope we fear we shall 
 be disappointed. The signs of the times indicate any thing else than 
 rigid economy. The principles already avowed by their leaders in Con- 
 gress are at war with economy. Low taxes alone can insure low expen- 
 ditures ; yet we see the party about to come into power preparing the way 
 for higher taxes. If you have read the debates of the present session of 
 Congress, you have been astonished to find that, instead of complaining 
 that we have been appropriating too much money, the complaint row 
 made is that we have appropriated too little. Instead, now, of being held 
 up as wasteful spendthrifts, we are denounced as niggardly and parsi- 
 monious in our appropriations — as " sailing too close to the wind." 
 
 TREASURY NOTES. 
 
 It was the fortune of Mr. Van Buren to assume the duties of President 
 at a time when the excesses in banking, and the abuses of our bank credit 
 system, had reached their utmost limit. A revulsion in the monetary 
 affairs of the country was inevitable, and its occurrence was hastened by 
 the execution of the depositeact of 1836, under which nearly twenty-eight 
 millions of the public revenue were withdrawn from tlie channels of trade, 
 in which it was invested by the deposite banks, and distributed amongst 
 the States. Within about sixty days after Mr. Van Buren's inauguration, 
 the explosion took place, and the banks suspended specie payments. The 
 deposite banks shared the common fate, which made, to a great extent, 
 unavailable the principal part of the public money then on hand. In this 
 state of things, Mr. Van Buren convened Congress in September, 1837, to 
 provide the means of enabling the Government to meet its debts. Its 
 means were ample, but they were withheld by the suspended banks. A 
 resort to a loan of money was inevitable ;. and the only question open was, 
 as to the shape in which the money should be borrowed — whether by 
 putting the bonds of the Government in market, and selling them for 
 gold and silver; or, by executing her notes payable at a short date, and 
 offering these to her creditors as the evidences of the existing debts, and 
 subject to be redeemed in specie so soon as the suspended means of the 
 Treasury should become available. The latter course was adopted as the 
 most convenient, and as being least likely to terminate in a national debt. 
 The continuance of many of the causes which rendered the measure 
 necessary in the first place, has induced Congress, from session to session, 
 to continue the policy. The policy of resorting to Treasury notes has 
 no connexion, either directly or indirectly, with t!ic independent treas- 
 ury system. The former was a temporary expedient, rendered necessary 
 by the urgent wants of the Government, and was provided for by a sepa- 
 rate and distinct act of Congress, and must cease when the necessities of 
 the Government cease ; the latter was designed to dissolve forever the 
 
e 
 
 connexion between the Treasury and the banks, and to become the per- 
 fftanent policy of the country. 
 
 A NATIONAL DEBT. 
 
 The final payment of our national debt was one of those important 
 events which marked the administration of Andrew Jackson. In this re- 
 spect, our Government enjoys a proud distinction. It stands alone, as the 
 only Government, which, having fully and faithfully discharged all its 
 obligations to its creditors, has also relieved itself entirely from debt. Op- 
 position to a national debt we regard as an essential principle in a repub- 
 lican creed. The election of General Jackson, in 1828, saved the country 
 from that curse of federalism. It is a fact, which deserves to be kept in 
 constant remembrance, that, during the first session of Congress after his 
 election, bills were reported proposing roads, canals, and other internal 
 improvements, the construction of which was estimated to cost one hun- 
 dred millions of dollars ; and that there were memorials praying for the 
 construction of others, estimated at the same cost. By the exercise of the 
 veto power on the Maysville road bill, General Jackson defeated the whole 
 system, saved the corrupting expenditure of two hundred millions of dol- 
 lars, and averted from his country an immense national debt. Since that 
 period, the same republican opposition to a national debt has characterized 
 the whole policy of the two late administrations. But, unfortunately, as 
 we believe, the State Legislatures have not profited by the example. They 
 have gone on contracting public debts, until they are now estimated to 
 have outstanding bonds to the amount of two hundred millions of dollars ; 
 exacting, animally, an interest of twelve millions of dollars from the in- 
 dustrious labor of the country. That there exists, with, some, a fixed pur- 
 pose to make this debt of the States, in some shape, a debt of the General 
 Government, we cannot doubt. That a direct proposition to assume the 
 State debts will be made, at least in any very short period, we do not be- 
 lieve ; but that it will be made in an indirect manner — in the shape of a 
 withdrawal of the land revenue from the Treasury, and its appropriation 
 to the payment of these debts — we have no doubt. This proposition we 
 will discuss in another part of this letter. We refer to it now, merely to 
 show that a national debt, against which the republican party have con- 
 stantly warred, is likely to become a part of the policy of that party which 
 is just coming into power. 
 
 Whilst we thus congratulate you upon the fact that this administration, 
 like that which preceded it, leaves the Government without a national 
 debt, we are aware that there are not wanting those who have labored to 
 create the impression that the Government is largely in debt. In their es- 
 timates of this debt, they differ from seven to forty millions; and, when 
 they specify the items of indebtedness, it turns out that they include the 
 fourth instalment of the surplus revenue, the claims for French spoliations 
 before 1800, and other such claims, amounting in all to about nineteen 
 millions. 'Fhere is not the slightest pretext for charging any one of these 
 as a debt upon the Government. 
 
 THE INDEPENDENT TREASURY SYSTEM. 
 
 This has been the great leading measure of the present administration. 
 From the friends of banks as depositories of the public moneys it has en- 
 
T 
 
 ■countered the most violent opposition. Those institutions had so long^ 
 enjoyed the use of the money collected from the people, that they seemed 
 to regard the proposition to withhold it from them as an infringement of 
 their rights. They have struggled to regain it, with a zeal which, in our 
 opinion, added no little to the excitement of the late political struggle. 
 The limits of a circular letter will not allow us to discuss, at full length, 
 the merits of this important measure. We must be content to present to 
 you only some of the more prominent considerations connected with the 
 subject. 
 
 The whole system consists simply in this : The moneys collected from 
 the tariff and from the sales of lands, after 1843, are to be received in spe- 
 cie ; and, when collected, they are to be kept and paid out by the agents 
 of the Government in payment of the debts of the Government. And if 
 any of the agents use or lend the moneys, they subject themselves to pen- 
 itentiary punishment. It differs from the system which heretofore exist- 
 ed, in two leading particulars : in dispensing with the receipt of bank-pa- 
 per into the Treasury, and in withholding from the banks the use of the 
 public moneys. 
 
 We deny that there is either justice or safety in allowing the banks to 
 loan and make profit on the revenue of the country. The revenue is paid, 
 by the people upon the merchandise which they buy from the merchants ; 
 and, when it goes into the Treasury, it is the money of the whole people. 
 Under the former system, this money was placed by the Government in 
 one or more banks, and permission was given to those banks to loan it 
 out, in discounting notes and buying bills of exchange; and the profits 
 thus made by trading upon the money of the people went entirely into the 
 pockets of the few wealthy men who owned the banks. To enable our- 
 selves to understand the extent and magnitude of this boon to the stock- 
 holders of deposite banks, we have examined the public records, and find 
 that, during the last eight years when the United States Bank was the 
 depository of the public revenue, there was collected from the people, by 
 the tariff, over two hundred and thirty millions of dollars — making twenty- 
 nine millions each year. This immense amount of money was placed by 
 the Government in the United States Bank, and implied permission given 
 to bank upon it. That bank treated this money as its capital, and dis- 
 counted and traded upon it in the same manner. By way of showing to 
 you the amount of profits made by this trading on the public money, we 
 state, that, in a late report of the Secretary of the Treasury, he estimates 
 the profits of the banks at 12 per centum per annum. These statements, 
 which we have taken from the records of the country, will enable you to 
 form some estimate of the immense profits which the owners of banks 
 have made by the use of the people's money. You can also see how 
 strong an inducement the owners of banks have had to resist the inde- 
 pendent treasury system, and how deep an interest they had in the late 
 political struggle. You can judge whether those men, who could make 
 millions by banking on the people's money, would be likely to embark in 
 the canvass, and bring their moneyed power to bear on the public mind. 
 Can that system of policy be safe to the liberties of the people, and the 
 purity of our institutions, which holds out such powerful temptations to 
 enlist the moneyed power of the country in our elections? We beg of you 
 to remember that it is not only by the free and liberal use of their money 
 .that bankers can operate on public sentiment, through hired presses and 
 
8 
 
 their innumerable publications ; but that they possess the uncontrolledv 
 power of raising or sinking the prices of property, of producing plenty or. 
 scarcity of currency, and of creating prosperity or of producing pressure,, 
 Tuin, and bankruptcy. We leave you to judge whether these strong in- 
 ducements have not called into active exertion these powerful energies of. 
 bankers in the late excited canvass. The public money was the high 
 prize held out to bankers as the inducement to exertion. Having shown 
 you the magnitude of the prize, and the extent of the powers of these in- 
 stitutions, we leave you to determine, from your own knowledge of the. 
 nature of their interests, whether their powers were exerted or not. 
 
 But there is another point of view in which the policy, formerly ob- 
 tained, of giving the public money to the banks for their use, is unsafe to 
 the Government. Whenever the revenue is placed in banks, it is entirely 
 beyond the control of the Government. The whole machinery of our 
 great system is dependent upon the will or the caprice of irresponsible bank 
 directors. They have but to close their doors and suspend, to jeopardize, 
 all the operations of Government. Can it be either safe or wise in the 
 Government to make itself completely dependent upon the will of banks? 
 Ought that system to be revived, which may at any moment involve the 
 Government in so much difficulty? The suspension of 1837 taught us a- 
 lesson on this subject, which ought never to be forgotten. With nearly 
 thirty millions of dollars in the banks, by one simultaneous movement 
 the Government was cut off from its whole revenue, and left standing" 
 without a dollar to pay its debts. 
 
 There is another objection to the former policy of giving to the banks 
 the use of the public money, which cannot be too carefully examined. It 
 will at once occur to you, that the larger the amount of revenue placed in 
 the banks each year is, the larger must be the profits of the banks. Their 
 interest, then, is, that the amount of revenue collected from the people 
 should be as large as possible. Hence it would be natural for the bankers- 
 to favor any policy of the Government which would increase the taxes- 
 Just as the taxes are raised, the profits of those banks which may have 
 the right of trading on the taxes must be increased. This policy naturally 
 and inevitably enlists the whole banking power of the country in favor of 
 high taxes. But, so soon as this right of trading on the taxes is taken 
 away, and the taxes of the General Government are collected in specie,, 
 and kept by the agents of the Government, it becomes at once the inter- 
 est of the banks to have as little specie, and, consequently, as little taxes 
 as possible collected. They fall, naturally, on the side of the tax-payers^ 
 because their interest carries them to that side. We submit to your own 
 judgment to determine the influence which a national bank, Avith a capi- 
 tal of one hundred millions of dollars, heading, leading, and controlling 
 nine hundred banks, scattered through every State, could exert in favor 
 of the high tax, or, which is the same thing, the high tariff policy. 
 
 Another serious objection to the former policy of depositing the public 
 moneys in banks, is its increase of Executive power and patronage. It 
 is a truth which cannot be too often repeated, that the Executive in our 
 Government is clothed with extensive powers, and that there is a constant 
 tendency in our system to an increase of these powers. Whatever meas- 
 ure, therefore, will limit or diminish power and patronage, merits a favor- 
 able consideration. Those banks selected by a President as the favored 
 depositories of the revenue, Avhether they be national or State banks, be- 
 
9 
 
 come naturally the fa«t friends and allies of the Executive. Every stock- 
 holder is interested to lend to the President his support, and to gratify hiS' 
 wishes, because the act of the President, in selecting the bank, has ena- 
 bled its stockholders to increase largely their bank profits. Every director 
 has the same interest, because he is also a stockholder. Every president^ 
 cashier, teller, and clerk, is similarly interested ; because the greater the 
 profits of the bank, the better able arc the stockholders to give them 
 high salaries. But not only are the stockholders, presidents, directors, 
 cashiers, tellers, and clerks of favored deposite banks, interested to follow 
 the will of a President, as individuals, in electioneering and voting, but 
 they are interested to conform the policy and operations of the bank to the 
 will of the President. If an expansion or a contraction will subserve thj6 
 views of the President, they are interested to retain his favor by following 
 his suggestions. To understand the full extent and danger of this branch 
 of Executive patronage, you must remember that this immense army of 
 bank-owners and officers are scattered through every State, and that they 
 are the wealthy men of the country residing about the towns, and having 
 the greatest facilities for operating on public sentiment. The President, 
 located at Washington, in the centre of this system, has but to signify his 
 will, and he has tens of thousands of the most wealthy and influential 
 men in the several States interested directly to take the field in his behalf 
 If the public money is in a United States bank, then, besides his army of 
 stockholders and bank officers, he possesses the power to inteiest the 
 great central head of the bank system in his favor, and, through its 
 agency, to give control and direction to the combined bank-power of th& 
 nation. In proposing the independent treasury system, Mr. Van Buren 
 proposed to relinquish these vast sources of patronage and power. In- 
 stead of the thousands of bank-owners and officers, he proposed that all 
 the duties of collecting, keeping, and paying out the public money, should 
 he perfo .ned by the existing officers of the Government, with the addition 
 of about half a dozen. Yet, he has been denounced as a tyrant, grasping 
 after increase of powers ! If increased power was his object, he ought to 
 have proposed the old bank -deposite system. 
 
 The independent treasury system is sometimes said to be a union of 
 the purse and sword in the hands of the President. The sword, is the 
 power to raise armies and declare war ; the purse, is the power to raise 
 the means, by taxation, to support armies and carry on war. Neither of 
 these powers belongs to the President. But what more control has the 
 President over the public money under the independent treasury system, 
 than under the bank-depositc system? We answer, empliatically, none. 
 Under the bank-deposite system, the public money is placed in banks, to 
 the credit of the Treasurer of tlie United States, an ofiicer appointed and 
 removed at the pleasure of the President. Under the independent treas- 
 ury system, the money is in the hands of the public officer, subject to the 
 order of the same Treasurer. It is just as easy for the President, by 
 threats of removal, to induce the Treasurer to draw his order on a bank, 
 as on the public oflicer. The order of the Treasurer, in either case, is all 
 that the President requires to procure the money he may desire improperly 
 to obtain. The bank could no more inquire for what such an order was 
 drawn, or withhold its payment, than could the public officer. 
 
 These are some of the objections to the former policy of collecting the 
 taxes, and giving them to banks to trade upon. In our estimation, they 
 
10 
 
 have so much force, that it becomes our solemn duty to seek some other 
 mode of collecting, keeping, and paying out the public money. The 
 simplest mode would be to have officers of the Government to collect the 
 revenue, to keep it safely until needed, and then to pay it out to those having 
 claims upon the Government. This was the plan which was adopted by 
 our patriotic forefathers when the Government went into operation; it 
 was the plan approved by George Washington, afterwards sanctioned by 
 Thomas Jefferson ; and it is the same plan which Mr. Van Buren proposed 
 in 1837, and which is now known as the independent-treasury system. 
 It is called the independent treasury system, because it is a system under 
 which the Treasury of the country is independent of the banks. They 
 may expand or contract — they may suspend or fail — and, under this inde- 
 pendent system, the Treasury is always safe, and the public moneys are 
 always within the reach of the Government. 
 
 The independent-treasury system, so far from being new, or an untried 
 experiment, is nothing more than an enlargement of the provisions of the 
 law of 1789, approved by General Washington. Under both laws, the 
 tariff duties are required to be paid in specie ; and, under botii, the money 
 of the Government is collected, kept, and paid out by oflicers appointed by 
 the Government. Surely, if this system merited one-tenth of the abuse 
 which has been heaped upon it by partisans, it would never have been 
 adopted by the pure patriots of the Revolution, and approved by the Father 
 of his Country. 
 
 It is objected to by some as being a treasury bank ; but it has no one 
 feature of a bank. It loans no money, it issues no paper, it discounts no 
 note, it has no directors. In fine, it has no one feature of a bank. We 
 know that, amidst the misrepresentations which this system has under- 
 gone, it has been charged with issuing Treasury notes. This is wholly 
 untrue. It has never had the slightest connexion with the issuance of 
 the Treasury notes. We have already directed your attention to the sub- 
 ject of Treasury notes. 
 
 But the objection most harped upon by designing partisans, is, that the 
 independent-treasury system makes one currency for the people and 
 another for office-holders. If there is any truth in tliis, then General 
 Washington sanctioned a law which made one currency for the people, 
 and another for office-holders. The law which he sanctioned in 1789 re- 
 quired all the taxes to be paid in specie. But there is no truth in the 
 charge. The independent-treasury system makes no currency, either for 
 the people or for office-holders. It was never designed to make any. It 
 collects the currency which the constitution made, and it pays out the 
 same. Every man in the community has the right to do the same. But, 
 in all candor, we ask whether any one is prepared to contend that the 
 Government ought to receive and pay out the depreciated bank-paper of 
 broken or suspended banks to our revolutionary soldiers, or to those of 
 our later wars, or to our gallant tars who have borne our flag in every sea 
 and climate? So long as the banks pay specie, it is as easy to pay specie 
 to the Government as bank-paper. When the banks suspend, and the 
 people choose to receive their depreciated paper, is that any reason why 
 the Government should do the same? 
 
 But, on this subject, we maintain that an important fact is overlooked. 
 A large portion of the tariff-taxes is paid into the Treasury by foreigners, 
 who import their goods into our country. For what kind of money do 
 
II 
 
 they sell their goods? Every body knows that their sales are for gold and 
 silver, and all the money they carry away is taken in specie. Is it a 
 hardship for the foreign importer to be required to pay his tariff-tax in the 
 same kind of money that he sells his goods for, and takes from the coun- 
 try? And when the Government has collected the specie from foreigners, 
 is it to be demanded that she shall not pay it in payment of her debts? 
 
 But our limits forbid us to pursue this subject further. Giving to the 
 objections to the independent-treasury system their full force, we earnestly 
 ^sic if they do not fall infinitely short of the objections to the bank-depos- 
 ite system? But to show how untenable are the objections to this great 
 measure, we conclude by adducing the authority of the Hon. John Bell. 
 In his speech made in Congress in 1840, on this subject, he said: 
 
 " I propose, first, to point out the objections to this bill, supposing it to be administered and 
 carried into execution in good faith, according to its fair and obvious provisions, and in accord- 
 ance, also, with the interpretation which its principal supporters in Congress have given it. 
 The abuses it is liable tu, I shall remark upon separateh'. 
 
 " And in this view of this f;imous scheme of a sub-t'reasury, (that k, if it shall be honestly- 
 administered,) I am compelled to say, that, in my judgmeni, it is one of the most innocent and 
 lamblike inventions of the age. It can do neither any great good nor any great harm to tk" 
 great interests of either trade, agricvUiire, or 77uiiiufuc',urcs. It can only prove injurious and 
 ■€mbarrassing to the Government itself, in the management of its fiscal affairs." 
 
 ***************** 
 
 " In this view of it, let us now see what possible etfect this sub-treasury can have upon the 
 condition of the currency, or upon the general course of trade. The President assures us, in 
 his message, that it is not expected or intended that there shall ever be more than five millions 
 of a surplus in the Treasury, under its operation, at any one time. This is to be the maximum 
 accumulation in gold and "silver. Nay, he gives us the example of last year to show that it 
 will be generally much les.s — say a million and a half, or half a million. The idea of the plan 
 is, that more ihan five millions of specie will never be required for the use of the Treasury or 
 the Government at any one time. The payments from the Treasury, it is expected, will, in 
 each month or quarter of the year, be so nearly equal in amount to the payments into it, or that 
 one will so keep pace with the other, as never to withdraw from the circulation of the country 
 or the banks a greater sum at any time. Therefore, five millions of specie, in active circula- 
 tion between the Government, its debtors and creditors, it is confidently stated, will answer all 
 th> ublic demands. Hence it is argued by the friends of this measure, that neither the com- 
 merce of the country nor the banks can be materially affected by it. I agree with them perfectly 
 in this ricw of the subject. The tphole project will turn out a mere hmnbug — neither doing any 
 good ncrr much /uirm." 
 
 Experience is said to be the surest test of truth. Judging by this 
 standard, the independent treasury — which has now been for some time 
 in operation, with no defalcations or failures of any kind — can safely chal- 
 lenge a superiority over all other modes of collecting, keeping, and dis- 
 bursing the public moneys. 
 
 THE NEW JERSEY ELECTION. 
 
 This case attracted too much attention, whilst it was under examination, 
 to be omitted in the present address. It is true that, after the false clamor 
 which was raised on the occasion had been fully exposed by the evi- 
 dence, a strong inclination was manifested to permit the whole matter to 
 die away and be forgotten. But the attempt was too bold and flagitious 
 on the rights of the people of that State, and too dangerous in its example 
 to the other portions of the country, to allow us to pass over it in silence. 
 The New Jersey election was held at the times and places, and in the 
 manner, appointed by law. The judges, inspectors, and clerks, were all 
 at their post. The people came forward, and voted according to their 
 own wishes ; and then retired to their homes, leaving it to the proper offi- 
 cers to make the returns agreeably to law. Wherever any dispute arose 
 
12 
 
 in the progress of the election, the judges and inspectors heard the evi- 
 dence, decided the legaHty or illegahty of the vote, and admitted or reject- 
 ed it accordingly. The law required the returns to be made from the dif- 
 ferent townships to the clerks of the counties in which they were situated, 
 and by them to be returned to the Governor, who was to grant certificates 
 or commissions " to those who might receive the highest number of votes." 
 He was authorized to commission no other person whatsoever than such 
 as had received the highest number of votes. When the returns came in 
 from the townships to the clerks, they gave copies of them, in many in- 
 stances, to private persons, and to printers of newspapers, showing that 
 the democratic candidates had been elected by majorities ranging from 
 one to two hundred votes. The public mind became settled and com- 
 posed, under the conviction that such had been the result. 
 
 In a short time, however, an unusual number of the leaders of the op- 
 posite party were known to be assembled from different points of the 
 State, at Newark, a few days before the final returns were to be made by 
 the clerks to the Governor. Soon after that, it began to be whispered 
 about that it was not yet altogether certain that the democratic candidates 
 would be commissioned ; that some of the clerks might not consider it 
 their duty to return to the Governor all the votes returned from the town- 
 ship to them, and thereby the democratic candidates might be defeated. 
 In a few days the secret was disclosed that the clerks from the counties 
 of Middlesex and Cumberland had taken it on themselves to throw away 
 the votes of two townships, (South Amboy and Millville,) by leaving blanks 
 in their returns for those townships in which the democratic candidates 
 had received overwhelming majorities. The facts were proved on the 
 clerks, and made known to the Governor; but nothing could induce him 
 lo send (as the law required him to do) for more full and perfect returns. 
 Nothing that could be said seemed of any avail. He took the returns, 
 false and fraudulent as they Avere, and made out his commissions, and 
 handed them to the defeated candidates accordingly. 
 
 The only excuse for such strange conduct was, that, if he had done- 
 wrong, Congress could disregard his certificate, and give the seats to the 
 opposite claimants. Congress finally did so, just as he had predicted ; 
 and now a great clamor has been raised against the democratic party for 
 having set aside tliis gross fraud, practised by the Governor of New Jersey 
 and his privy council, on the dearest rights of the people of tliat ancient 
 and gallant State. Congress did and ought to set aside a fraud when 
 practised by a Governor, as soon as if practised by the most subordinate 
 officer. It has been said that we dishonored the broad seal of the State. 
 That broad seal was dishonored the moment it was used to cover a false 
 return, and thereby to cheat and defraud that very people whose rights^ 
 and liberties it was meant to confirm and maintain. The records of the- 
 people were made, by the decision of the House, stronger than the seal 
 of the Governor ; and the purity and freedom of the ballot-box were prefer- 
 red to the forms and ceremonies of official usurpation. 
 
 On the first day of the session, both parlies presented themselves, 
 claiming to be sworn in as members. One party stood on the Governor's- 
 certificate, and the other relied on the poll-books actually kept at the elec- 
 tions, to show that the Governor had certified what was not true, and 
 that tJier/, in fact, received the highest number of votes cast at the elec- 
 tion. Congress, or rather the House of Representatives, not willing to- 
 
13 
 
 arrest all other business, ordered both parties to stand aside for the pre- 
 sent, and referred the whole case to the Committee of Elections. The 
 committee took it up, and soon ascertained, beyond all doubt ^ that Messrs. 
 Dickerson, Vroom, and their associates, had received the highest number 
 of votes ; which was all that the laws of New Jersey required, in order to 
 have entitled them to the commissions of the Governor. Indeed, the writ- 
 ten pleadings of the opposition claimants clearly admitted the fact. In 
 saying that the committee ascertained that these gentlemen received the 
 highest number of votes, we mean to say, of lawful votes ; for the whole 
 committee (whigs and democrats) solemnly voted that all the votes re- 
 ceived, and passed by the judges and inspectors, were to be regarded, in 
 law, as lawful votes, so far as Ave were then engaged on that preliminary 
 question. Now, we aver that the committee never did report on any 
 other than lawful votes ; nor on any votes which the whigs themselves 
 had not pronounced lawful, as above set forth. This fact ought to sink 
 deep into the public mind. It dissipates and destroys all the false ideas 
 which have been held out to the people on this part of the subject. It 
 may be asked, if the committee was not desired to report on unlawful 
 votes as well as lawful ones, why did the democratic party in the House 
 vote against inserting the word " lawful" into the resolution? This is 
 susceptible of easy explanation. The committee had been out nearly two 
 months, and had made no report. The opposition newspapers and letter- 
 writers and orators were constantly complaining, " why do you not let in 
 one party or the other temporarily, so that New Jersey might have some 
 voice in what was doing in the House, and leave the final right to the 
 ultimate decision of the committee and of the House?" This was con- 
 stantly said and written ; whilst that party, in the committee, with the aid 
 of the chairman, was the whole and sole cause why this was not done. 
 They had not only prevented a preliminary report, showing who had re- 
 ceived the highest number of votes, but had given to the whig claimants 
 two months more to traverse the whole State of New Jersey, to see if they 
 could not disprove some of the votes given in at the election ; but which, 
 until such proof was obtained, were obliged to stand, by their own deci- 
 sions, as lawful ones. The democratic party of the House was disposed 
 not to keep the State in that condition for two months more ; whilst their 
 opponents, on whom the whole blame should have fallen, were unjustly 
 misrepresenting and abusing them for what they themselves had perpe- 
 trated. Hence it was, that, when the resolution was introduced requiring 
 the committee to report, forthwith, who received the greatest number of 
 votes, (meaning, of course, the votes cast in the election ; every one of 
 ■which the whigs of the committee had voted to be lawful, as above ex- 
 plained,) the whole whig party became opposed to the resolution, because 
 they were making political capital out of the delay. They wanted no 
 preliminary report, unless it were in favor of their own men ; and would 
 submit to no temporary filling of the vacant seats from New Jersey, unless 
 their own favorites were to be the incumbents. But they knew it would 
 not do to oppose the resolution directly and openly, for that would open 
 the eyes of the public at once. Hence they sought to defeat the resolu- 
 tion, by introducing the word lavfxd before the word votes. This they 
 thought would stave off the report until the expiration of the two months 
 which they had allowed for taking testimony; during all which time 
 
14 
 
 they would have the benefit of all the clamor which they could unjustly 
 raise for the delay. 
 
 The democratic party, knowing their object to be </e/at/ for political effect, 
 and knowing that the whole committee (whigs and democrats) had de- 
 termined all the voies before them to be " lawful votes " in every prelim- 
 inary inquiry, could see no necessity for the insertion of that word Imofvl. 
 They could not report any unlawful votes, because the testimony to show 
 them such was not yet taken ; and because, as we have before stated, every 
 whig in the committee had voted that the votes polled at the election 
 were to be regarded as lawful until the contrary was proven. It was all 
 a trick and device for party purposes ; and the democrats knew it to be 
 such, and therefore voted against it as unnecessary. To show that the 
 motion was made for mere party opposition, after the word " lawful " was 
 inserted, all the opposition party voted against the resolution, and the 
 democratic party for it. Now, why did the democratic party vote for 
 the resolution after the word " lawful " was inserted ? It was because 
 they kneiD it did not alter the real meaning of the resolution. They saw 
 that the word " forthwith " was still retained in it, and that the proviso that 
 nothing contained in the resolution should be so construed as to prevent 
 the said committee from prosecuting their inquiries ^hen in progress, in 
 New Jersey, as to the unlawfulness of any of the votes cast in the elec- 
 tion, would still preserve the original meaning and object of the resolution. 
 With this proviso, it was plain — perfectly plain — what the House wished 
 and intended. Now, we assert before the world, that in the report which 
 was made, not one single unlawful vote was counted, and not one single 
 vote which the whig members of the committee had not themselves 
 voted was to be regarded as lawful. We proceed to state further, (what 
 ought never to be forgotten in this case,) that when the two months 
 were out, the parties returned with their testimony; several hundred votes 
 were contested; the committee labored day and night; and, after all, it 
 turned out that moi-e unlavful votes had been given to the whig than to 
 the democratic candidates. In short, the whole case proved a bold and 
 impudent conspiracy against the purity of the ballot-box, and a settled 
 design tq overturn and disregard the rights of the people of New Jersey. 
 We took sides with the people; we maintained their just rights, against 
 those who would have trampled them into the dust. We look back now 
 with just pride to the course we pursued in all the stages of the Ne.wr 
 Jersey case. 
 
 THE TENNESSEE LAND BILL, 
 
 This great measure has at last been accomplished. In 1824, the Le- 
 gislature memorialized Congress earnestly on the subject. That memo- 
 rial was prepared by the present Executive of the State, with great ability; 
 and the subject has been pending before Congress ever smce. From 
 1825 to 1838, it was contended for in the form of a donation to the State ; 
 but without success. In the winter of 18o8-'39, it was asked for in the 
 form of a cession to the State, whilst the proceeds- were to be returned to 
 the national Treasury. In the winter ofUS39-'40, so great was the jeal- 
 ousy of the old against the new States, on the subject of the public land 
 lying within their limits, that it was deemed advisable to put the propo- 
 sition in the form of a mere agency ^ on the part of the State, in disposing 
 
15 
 
 of these lands. In this form, it is now the law of the land. It secures 
 to the occupants their homes at twelve and a half cents per acre ; it brings 
 all the other lands subsequently into entry at the same moderate price, for 
 a limited period, and then at any price the Legislature may determine on. 
 The holders of North Carolina warrants are to have, for one year after the 
 first session of the Legislature, the privilege of locating their warrants, 
 not interfering with the occupants; and all warrants not so entered may, 
 if presented within a limited term, be satisfied out of the proceeds of the 
 sale, at the rate of twelve and a half cents per acre. We congratulate the 
 whole State on its passage. In a few years, all legislation about our pub- 
 lic lands, so fruitful of expense, and so often interrupting the harmony 
 which should ever exist between our State and North Carolina, will now 
 be terminated ; all the lands within our limits, fit for appropriation, will 
 have ripened into full titles ; and the accruing receipts into the Treasury 
 from their taxation must be very considerable. Individuals, living either 
 in or out of the counties, have now an opportunity to become freeholders 
 on the most moderate terms ; and such as chance to live near or adjoining 
 these lands, can take them up at cheap rates for cultivation, pasture- 
 grounds, water-power, or range. To the occupants, who reside on these 
 lands, and whose toil and labor have given them their chief value, the law 
 must be peculiarly acceptable. Congress has at last done them justice^ 
 and done it with a generosity which ought not and will not soon be for- 
 gotten. We have all zealously labored to accomplish this great object ; 
 and all now congratulate you on the happy result. The majority in the 
 House was very great; but such were the arguments and speeches of our 
 two honorable Senators, Messrs. Anderson and Nicholson, in that body, 
 that they obtained for it there almost a unanimous vote. 
 
 Having directed your attention to some of the most prominent measures 
 which have marked the administration of Mr. Van Buren, we now pass 
 on to a discussion of that system of policy which is to be pursued by the 
 new administration. The occurrences of the present session of Congress 
 have developed, beyond controversy, what that system of policy will be. 
 We have heard the leading members of the Harrison party avow, time 
 after time, in debate, that the measures to be proposed and adopted under 
 the new administration are — 
 
 1. A national bank ; 
 
 2. A distribution of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands ; 
 
 3. An increase of the tariff; and 
 
 4. A law to punish officers for interfering in elections. 
 
 On no one of these measures are the friends of General Harrison in 
 Congress united. We have heard Harrison members of Congress dis- 
 tinctly denounce a national bank, a distribution of land revenue, an in- 
 crease of the tariff; and, on the gag-bill, they have never shown any thing 
 like unanimity. Yet, notwithstanding this diversity of sentiment, they 
 did unite in elevating to the presidency a man, about whose political sen- 
 timents tiiere is even yet great room for controversy. But whilst this di- 
 versity exists in the ranks of tlie Harrison party, there is no question but 
 that the largo majority of that party are in favor of the measures above 
 dcsigiiatod, and that that majority will make them the distinct })olicy of 
 the new administration. 
 
 The first remark which strikes us as important and singular, is, that 
 
16 
 
 there is no one of these measures which is not deemed unconstitutional 
 by a large portion of our countrymen. No one of them comes plainly 
 within the delegated powers of Congress. No one of them can be adopt- 
 ed without resorting to the federal mode of construing the constitution. 
 ■These remarks are applicable to all of the proposed measures. We must, 
 necessarily, be brief in our remarks on each separate measure. 
 
 A NATIONAL BANK. 
 
 The system of banking, which has always existed in our country, is 
 radically defective. Its efiects upon the morals and happiness of the peo- 
 ple have proved eminently disastrous. At the bottom of all its defects, we 
 place the power which they enjoy, of creating and circulating a paper cur- 
 rency, as a substitute y and not as a representative ^ of gold and silver. So 
 long as banks issue only as much paper as they have specie on hand, no 
 great evil can arise. In that case, the bank paper is a representative of 
 specie. But the moment this limit is exceeded, and banks commence is- 
 suing their paper to an amount beyond their specie, the dangers commence. 
 A few authentic facts, derived from a late report of the Treasury Depart- 
 ment, will place the dangers of this unrestricted power of our banks in its 
 true light. In that report, under the head " Aggregate of losses since 
 1789, to the people, through the existence of banks, and the use of bank 
 jDa/?er," we find the following to be the results of careful investigation: 
 
 Summary. 
 
 1. Losses by bank failures . . . . ^108,885,721 
 
 2. Losses by suspensions of specie payments, and the 
 
 consequent depreciation on their notes - - 95,000,000 
 
 3. Losses by fluctuations in bank currency, affecting 
 
 prices, extravagance in living, sacrifices of property, 
 
 &c.,&c. ------ 150,000,000 
 
 353,885,721 
 
 Here is exhibited an estimated loss of three hundred and fifty-three 
 millions of dollars to the people ; the whole of which has grown out of 
 the dangerous power given to banks, to create as well as to /oan currency. 
 It is to this same defect that the expansions and contractions of the 
 banks, and the consequent fluctuations and uncertainty in the prices of 
 property and of labor, are attributable. So long as banks exercise this 
 unrestricted power, it will be vain in us to calculate upon any uniformity 
 or stability in the currency, or the value of property. The most eflectual 
 remedy, which, in our judgment, promises to operate as an important 
 check to this evil, is a bankrupt law, applicable to all stock banks, whether 
 chartered by the States or the General Government. This measure would 
 provide, that, whenever such a bank should refuse to redeem its notes 
 in specie, in such manner as was required by its charter, its aff'airs 
 should be wound up, in such time and manner as would be fair and just 
 to debtors and creditors. By the constitution, Congress is authorized to 
 pass uniform bankrupt laws ; and under this power, we believe a law may 
 be made applicable to stock banks, which would restrain their excessive 
 issues of paper. 
 
17 
 
 We admit tliat a uniform cnrrency — by which we mean, one that will 
 pass at par in every portion of our country — is an object much desired ; 
 but, at the same time, we insist that a stable currency — by which we mean 
 one uniform in quantity as well as quality — is much more desirable. If 
 the issues of banks can be checked, and their paper be kept convertible 
 at all times into specie, the great mass of the country suffer no inconveni- 
 ence or loss. We know of no other power m Cuuf^rcss^ to control the ex- 
 cesses of bank issues, and to secure a stable paper ci\rrency, but that of ap- 
 plying to banks, owned by individuals, the provisions of a bankrupt law. 
 
 We are aware that a very large portion of the friends of General Harri- 
 son entertain the opinion that a national bank Avould furnish the best 
 remedy for the evils of which we have spoken. To this subject, in its 
 several bearings, we will now call your attention. 
 
 We deem it unfortunate that we are unable to inform you, with entire 
 certainty, of the precise plan of the bank which the friends of General 
 Harrison design to impose upon the country. Its capital will doubtless 
 be as much as fifty millions, and probably as much as one hundred mii- 
 Uons of dollars. Of this capital, we have no doubt that a very large por- 
 tion will be set apart for individual subscribers. 
 
 The first great difficulty which suggests itself, is, in relation to the source 
 from whence the specie is to be derived to put such a bank into opera- 
 tion. No one will think of establishing a national bank, except on a specie 
 basis. If the bank is to have a capital of no more than fifty millions, we 
 ask you to retlect how this amount is to be procured. It is estimated that 
 there is now in the United States about eighty millions of specie. To 
 found a national bank, would require two-thirds of all the gold and silver 
 of the country. What effect would this have upon the State banks, and 
 upon the existing embarrassments of die times? Will any one deny that 
 the consequence to the banks and to the country would be disastrous? la 
 a speech of the Hon. Henry A. Wise, delivered in the House of Repre- 
 sentatives on the 27th of January, 1841, and published in the National 
 Intelligencer, in opposing the policy of an early establishment of a national 
 bank, he uses tliis emphatic language: 
 
 " There never was a time when the resumption of specie-payments, or 
 the creation of a national bank, did not produce contraction and pressure v 
 and there never will be. What would both at once not do?" 
 
 This is the authority of one of the acknowledged leaders of the Harri- 
 son party in the House of Representatives ; and the sentiment is literally 
 true. Where, then, is the relief, which was so liberally promised to the 
 people, which was to follow the election of General Harrison, and the cre- 
 ation of a national bank ? 
 
 But we may be told that a national bank may be created by borrowing 
 the specie. Where can it be borrowed ? And if it could be borrowed at all, 
 are we prepared to make a national debt of fifty or a hundred millions of 
 dollars to foreign capitalists? The people of the United States are not yet 
 prepared to abandon their old republican hostility to a great national debt^ 
 and to become dependent upon some foreign Government. These are dif- 
 ficidties which meet us at the very threshold of the subject; and we have 
 heard no" suggestion which removes ihein. But- suppose it possible that 
 they may be removed, and that Mr. Wise is v/rong in asserting that a bank 
 caiuiot be created v,^ithout aggravating the embarra;.smcnts ofthc country : 
 the next inquiry which arises, is, whether such an institution would pro- 
 
18 
 
 vide for the country a stable and uniform currency? So far as its own 
 notes would constitute a part of the currency, we admit that, on account of 
 its immense capital, and its credit, derived from its connexion with the 
 Government, they might be nearer of par value throughout the country 
 than those of any other bank. J?ut the notes of such a banic would con- 
 stitute only V. portion of the whole currency of the country. lu large com- 
 mercial transactions, and in the transmission of funds from one point to 
 another, the notes of a national bank wo^dd constitute the currency; but 
 in the ten thousand smaller branches of trade, the notes of State banks 
 iWould necessarily still be the currency. To make a national bank whose 
 notes fill the large channels of trade, is only to provide a currency for the 
 rich traders and the otlice-holders ; whilst the small dealers are left to use 
 the inferior currency issued by State banks, unless the creation of a na- 
 tional bank will regulate and elevate State 'bank pjper to a por with its 
 own notes. The only possible way in which a national bank can regu- 
 late State banks, and keep their paper equal to its own, must be by re- 
 straining them in the amount of their issues, and keeping them in a con- 
 dition always to redeem their notes with specie. How vast must be the 
 powers of an institution which can curb and restrain the cupidity of nine 
 hundred banks, Avith capitals amounting to five hundred millions of dol- 
 lars ! The very idea of erecting an institution with such tremendous 
 powers, is enough to make every lover of liberty shudder for the safety of 
 his country. Yet the whole virtue of a national bank consists in its pos- 
 sessing such powers. Without them, it is upon a level v/ith the State 
 banks, only adding so much more to the evils already existing. 
 
 But, conceding to a national bank the power to regulate and control the 
 policy of State banks: we ask you to reflect how little of your boasted free- 
 dom is left beyond its powers. Are you not aware that the value of all 
 your property is regulated by the quantity of the currency in circulation ? 
 Do 3^ou not know that the price of your produce, the products of your labor, 
 is also regulated by the amount of circulating medium in the country? In 
 1835-'(3, your property and your produce bore a high value; and that was 
 the consequence of the abundance of circulating currenc5^ Now, the 
 value of your property and of your produce is sunk much below its value 
 in those years; and this has been produced by the reduction of the amount 
 of currency. A. national bank possesses the power to regulate the amount 
 of currency at its will and pleasure ; of course, then, it has the power to 
 regulate the value of your property and the price of your labor, at its own 
 pleasure. The sun may shine propitiously upon your fields — the rains of 
 heaven may fall in liberal showers — your labors maybe rewarded with an 
 abundant harvest; but still it may rot in your barns for want of a price, at 
 the discretion of this omnipotent institution, which determines the value 
 of all your sweat and toil. But this is not all : it can regulate the cur- 
 rency ; it can make it abundant; it raises the price of property ; the flood- 
 gates of speculation are lifted ; you are tempted to use your credit in pur- 
 chasing property ; you are in debt, and expect to pay from the prceeds of 
 your labor. The bank changes its policy ; the currency is contracted; the 
 price of property falls ; the contraction continues ; your property still falls ; 
 your debt falls due ; and, to pay it, the very bread is sold from your wife 
 and children. How much of liberty is left worth preserving, we again ask 
 you, with an institution in our country possessing such powers, wielded 
 by a few wealthy merchants and capitalists of the north, residing far dis- 
 
19 
 
 tant from the great body of the people, and possessing no sympathies in 
 common with them ? 
 
 But sliall we be told that our fears are unfounded ; and that such a bank, 
 though it lias the power, will merely exercise it to an extent beneficial to 
 the country/ We might as well be told that a despotism was the best 
 form of government, because the king, though ho has urdimited powers, 
 will only exercise them lor tlie good of his subjects. We prefer neither 
 to trust the goodness of a despot, nor the patriotism of a national bank! 
 Who are to be the owners of this bank? who its directors? Are they to 
 be your friends? or are they to be responsible to you for their conduct? 
 Why will they take the stock ? Will it be merely to benefit the country, 
 by regulating the currency ? or will it be to increase their already over- 
 grown wealth ? You have not to be told that capitalists take stock in 
 banks to make money; and that, whatever policy will make them the 
 most money, will best suit their patriotism. Judge \Yhite was right 
 when he said, in opposing a national bank, that the stockholders would 
 pursue their own interest in managing it; that, when their interest dic- 
 tated, they Avould make money plenty; and, when they could make most 
 by it, they would make money scarce. The nature and interests of indi- 
 vidual State banks are precisely the same with those of a national bank. 
 We have had sad experience wit'i the management of the former — we 
 have been ruined by them. Why should we expect more wisdom or 
 more patriotism from a national bank, which dificrs from such individual 
 State banks mainly in its greater capacity to do mischief? 
 
 We have said that a national bank, if it possesses power enough to regu- 
 late the currency, possesses necessarily the power to regulate the value of 
 your property. But this is not the whole danger. The city of London 
 is the great centre of the commercial world ; and the Bank of London is 
 the great engine througii which Great Britain exercises her power over 
 commerce. Wherever the paper system of banking exists, tlie Bank of 
 London is the real head of the system. The commercial history of Great 
 Britain and the United Slates shows the fact, that our banking institutions 
 have at all times pursued the policy pointed out by the example of.British 
 banks. Expansions and contractions have taken place in the two coun- 
 tries at the same periods. The sympathy existing between these institu- 
 tions in the two countries, is intimate and close. We see this in the fact, 
 that whenever there is an abundance or a scarcity of bank paper in one 
 country, there is a like abundance or scarcity in the other. This connex- 
 ion amounts to a state of dependence^ on the part of our banking system, 
 upon that of England. The Bank of England regulates tiie currency of 
 Great Britain; it is a national institution, and is the model alter which 
 we are to copy. In regulating the currency, it fixes, with the absolute 
 will of a despot, the price of property and of labor in that country. 
 Hence, it fixes, too, the price of all imports into that kingdom; and., 
 among other imports, our cotton, and other productions of our country. 
 We look to the Liverpool market to ascertain the value of our cotton at 
 any given period. To make our dependence still more complete, the- 
 Bank of Great Britain now needs a central institution in this country,, 
 through which she can operate. For many years, she has had such an 
 institution in the United States Bank. Let us erect another, and it be- 
 comes at once an arm of British power, through which the Dank of 
 J:ingland can, with case, control and regulate our currency, and the value 
 
20 
 
 of our property, to suit the wishes and interests of her own capitalists. 
 The very independence of our country is involved in this question of a 
 national batik. Our condition bee -mes almost as humiliating as if we. 
 were but British colonies, by subniiuing to the erection of an institution 
 which completes the chain of our dependence. We can escape this de- 
 graded condition, by assuming the regulation of our currency through our 
 own laws ; subjecting our State banks to regulations and terms which 
 will make them adapt their circulation to a specie standard— that standard 
 which can alone save us from the British bank-paper standard. 
 
 We have insisted that a national bank, from its very nature, will be 
 governed by the interest of its stockholders, in its mode of regulating State 
 banks. We now maintain that we are sustained in this position by the 
 history of the national Bank of England and the late national Bank of the 
 United States. The whole history of both these national institutions has 
 been marked by successive periodical expansions and contractions of the 
 currency, attended by the necessary consequences of high and low prices, 
 fictitious prosperity, and grinding adversity. However these institutions 
 may have succeeded in keeping their own notes at par, they failed utterly 
 to secure steadiness and stability in the value of property. We assert, that 
 no five successive years can be named, during the existence of the late 
 United States Bank, in which there was not a revulsion in the monetary 
 affairs of the country, accompanied by corresponding pressure and hard 
 times. The bank commenced operations in 1817, and in 1819, '20, and 
 '21, the whole country was full of bankruptcy and distress, produced, as 
 Judge White asserted in the Senate, by the policy of the bank. In 1824, 
 Mr. Clay described the condition of the country as full of wretchedness 
 and misery. In 1827-'8, you will remember that there was another pe- 
 riod of hard times. In 1834, the same scenes were renewed. The United 
 States Bank was at that period struggling to force a recharter from Con- 
 gress. It had attempted to secure its renewal, in 1832, by liberal accom- 
 modations. It succeeded in Congress, but was defeated by the Roman 
 firmness of Andrew .Tackson. He saw that the bank was contesting the 
 point of supremacy with the Government ; that its powers of corruption 
 were boldly brought into exercise. He saw it squandering its means in 
 buying up friends to aid it in the struggle. He was satisfied that it was 
 no longer a safe depository of the public moneys, and he caused them to 
 be removed. This was the death blow to tliat corrupt and corrupting in- 
 stitution. By the aid of the public money, it was waging a war upon the 
 very independence of the Government. Having failed to conquer the 
 Government, its corruption was directed to tlie Legislature of Pennsylva- 
 nia; and there it succeeded. Its distinguished president then declared 
 that.its charter was better, and the institution stronger, than when it was a 
 national institution. It was chartered by the 1 legislature, with the j?ame 
 name, the same directors, the same stockholders, and the same capital. It 
 went on in its high career of speculating in politics, in stocks, and in cot- 
 ton; making every shift, and resorting to every device, to maintam its credit 
 and hide its rottenness. But the exposure has at length taken place ; and 
 that institution — once so powerful and arrogant that it dared to measure 
 arms with the Hero of New Orleans ; that was so rich, that it squandered 
 its millions on favorite politicians— that institution has sunk into utter 
 dis<'-race and bankruptcy. We rejoice that General Jackson lias lived to 
 sec°his cv/n sagacity, in pronouncing the institution unsound and unsafe. 
 
21 
 
 fully illustrated. To all intents and purposes, this experiment of a national 
 bank has utterly failed; and the only excuse that can be offered by its 
 friends is, the miserable pretext that it was no longer a national institution. 
 We have had an opportunity of testing the correctness of the opinion, 
 that a national bank will not, if it can, regulate the currency issued by 
 State banks, in another way. The Secretary of the Treasury, during the 
 present session of Congress, was required to ascertain and report the prices 
 of State bank paper at Philadelphia, each year, from 1824 to 1836. He 
 procured the information, and made his report; and, upon examination of 
 its details, we find that the fact is clearly established, that the United 
 States Bank did not have the happy effect of producing aiiy thing like 
 uniformity in the State bank jiaper. Taking the highest and loM'^est 
 prices of Tennessee bank paper during each year, and the result is as fol- 
 lows : 
 
 lS-21. 1825. I82il. 1827. 1828. 1829. 1830. 
 
 30 dis. 15 a 20 d. 20 a 10 d. T a 10 d. 10 a 9 d. a 10 d. 7A- d. 
 
 1831. 1832. 1833. 1831. IS'IS. 183G. 
 
 7^ a 5 d. 5 dis. 5 a 3 d. o dis. 5 dis. 3 a 6 d. 
 
 This report shows a similar state of facts in reference to the prices of all 
 other State bank notes. 
 
 With mercantile men, the great argument in favor of a national bank is, 
 its capacity to regulate and keep down excha)iges. By the rate of ex- 
 change, we mean the cost of transporting specie fiomone point to another. 
 If a merchant in Nashville owes a thousand dollars in Philadelphia, and 
 lias the money in specie, he will be willing to pay for a check on Phila- 
 delphia just as high a premium as it -will cost him to send his specie. 
 The premium which he pays for the check is the exchange. So long as 
 State bank paper is redeemable in specie, and the rate of exchange is left 
 to be fixed by the fair competition of trade, exchange may be had at the 
 same rate with specie. State bank notes, or national bank paper. But the 
 misfortune is, that ever since the establishment of the United States 
 Bank, in 1817, the business of exchange has been monopolized by the 
 banks, and the competition of trade in exchange has been broken up. 
 This monopoly was enjoyed by the United States Bank, and it became 
 one of its chief sources of profit. Prior to tlie establishment of that bank, 
 buying bills of exchange made no part of the legitimate business of our 
 banks. That branch of trade was left free, to be regulated by the compe- 
 tition of capital. Our mercantile friends deceive themselves and others 
 from looking at the single fact,'that the United States Bank, during its 
 existence at Nashville, furnislied checks on Philadelphia at a very low 
 rate. But they fail to look at the whole operation and its consequences. 
 The United States Bank at Nashville had no funds at Philadelphia on 
 which to check. It was therefore necessary for it to supply the means of 
 paying their checks at Philadelphia. To do this, it resorted to the pur- 
 chase of bills of exchange on New (-)rleans, and other southern points. 
 This was the origin of the system of bill operations — this the beginning of 
 that commission -merchant system, which has proved so heavy a curse to 
 our State. Bills of exchange were first drawn on cotton, or other prod- 
 uce shipped to New Orleans. It was a profitable operation to the bank ; 
 and if it furnished checks on the east at a low rate, it was sure to make a 
 
22 
 
 good profit by its operations in southern bills of exchange. But it soon 
 became a mode of borrowing money from the bank, by those who had no 
 produce to ship ; and as it was more profitable to the bank than discount- 
 ing notes, it was indulged to an excess ; the consequences of which are 
 even now seriously felt in our State. To the United States Bank, and 
 its great kindness in fnrnishing eastern excliange so low, are we indebted 
 for that destructive and ruinous system of drawing and redrawing bills of 
 exchange, which has proved so heavy a curse to our State. 
 
 Without pursuing this part of tlie argument further, we have no hesi- 
 tation in saying, that, to a people jealous of their rights and liberties, the 
 political power of a national bank ought to be a conclusive objection. In 
 the late contest, the advocates of General Harrison inculcated the doctrine 
 that no change could make our condition worse. If our liberties are worth 
 preserving, then this sentiment deserves marked condemnation. If it is 
 better for us to be the degraded dependents of British insolence and op- 
 pression, than the high born sons of American freedom, then is the senti- 
 ment of the Harrison partisans true. If it is our interest to surrender the 
 freedom of thought, and the high prerogative of voting, into the hands of 
 a President wielding the powers of a national bank, then we should tamely 
 submit, and consent to wear the yoke which would so well become our 
 servile necks. But we deny and repudiate the doctrine, and we appeal to 
 yoii to join us in putting the seal of reprobation upon it forever. If a 
 national bank is created, it must owe its success to a party triumph ; it 
 must be a party machine, and the close ally of " the powers that be." To 
 the full extent of its immense powers, it becomes a branch of patronage 
 to the federal head. It will act in concert with those who gave it being; 
 with them, it will fight the political battles of the country, and struggle 
 to perpetuate the ascendancy of its party. To what extent, and with what 
 success, such an engine can exert an influence in the party struggles of 
 the country, we need not undertake to calculate. Surely, if it can control 
 a thousand State banks, its powers on the public mind must be tremen- 
 dous. What President v/ould ever dare to cross its will? Such an iron- 
 nerved patriot as Andrew Jackson miglit venture to dispute its sovereign 
 power; but we have no hope of seeing the presidency again filled by a 
 man who would dare to encounter such an adversary ! The President will 
 ultimately be fiirced to succumb to the bank, and become the mere reflector 
 of Its will. VYe ask you v/ith calmness and deliberation to reflect upon 
 the dangers to public liberty from such an institution, in all its aspects; 
 and then determine whether you are prepared to hazard so much for any 
 supposed benefits that such a bank could confer. 
 
 To the people of Tennessee, the question of a national bank possesses 
 peculiar interest. We have embarked in a State bank, in which we have 
 vested the sacred common-school fund ; and to sustain which, we have 
 incurred a debt, and pledged our unsullied faith. To create a national 
 bank, is to jeopardize our own institution, and run the risk of having it de- 
 stroyed, and our people burdened with taxation, to save our credit from 
 disgrace. 
 
 If we had no remedy to propose, in lieu of a national bnnk, to correct 
 the evils of our banking system, we should be less surprised that any 
 portion of our fellow-citizens should advocate such an institution. We 
 now present another, and, in every respect, a bel^ter and safer remedy. 
 We present the proposition to subject the stock-bank corporations to the 
 
23, 
 
 operation of a bankrupt law, and we express our confident belief, that, if 
 a national bank is not immediately chartered, our remedy will, at no remote 
 day, be adopted. 
 
 In conclusion, allow us to press strongly on your minds the fact, that 
 if Congress can make a bank at all, it can make it for a hundred years 
 as easy as for one year ; and, when made, though its charter be for a cen- 
 tury of years, according to the prevailing doctrines of most of those who 
 support and adv^ocate such a bank, no power nor revolution can pull it 
 down. All that we apprehend from it may occur, and the Avliole country 
 may heap curses upon it ; but, according to their doctrine, it must stand. 
 This is the doctrine of those who are for chartering sucli a bank. Shall 
 we tie up the hands of the people, and erect a power supreme above them? 
 Ijet these things be well considered before you make up your minds to 
 such a fearful alternative. 
 
 DISTUIBUTION OF LAND REVENUE AND THE TARIFF. 
 
 The proposition to distribute amongst the States the proceeds of the pub- 
 lic lands, has long been a favorite measure wiili Mr. Clay, of Kentucky. 
 It was originally suggested as the means of getting clear of a surplus in the 
 Treasury, which was apprehended under the belief that the high tariff' of 
 1S28 could not be so reduced immediately as to avoid a surplus. But it is 
 now proposed under wholly different circumstances. The tariff has been 
 brought down, until it produces, togetlier with the sales of lands, barely a 
 sufficiency to meet the most economical expenditures of the Government. 
 In this condition of the Treasury, it is now proposed to withdraw from the 
 revenue, which is barely sufficient for the purposes of the Government, five 
 millions of dollars annually, to be distributed amongst the State Legislatures. 
 We pronounce it one of the boldest grasps after power, and one of the most 
 reckless assaults upon the independence of the States, that was ever made. 
 It is but the deceptive beginning of the revival of the old American system. 
 A bribe of five millions of dollars is held out to the States, to induce them 
 to submit without murmur to the collection of five millions more by an in- 
 crease of tlie tariff; and to make the delusion still more complete, the tariff 
 is pretended to be applied only to luxuries. Mr. Clay, himself, at the pres- 
 ent session, was compelled to admit, that if his bill passed, it would render it 
 necessary to resort to a tariff to supply the deficiency. But, that the real 
 design is to revive the iiigh tariff policy, we will show by the words of Mr. 
 Wise, one of the leaders of the Harrison party in the House of Representa- 
 tives, taken from the same speech to whicii we have already referred. He 
 said : " I say, 1 see a disposition now to prepare the way for a future tariff 
 ' and distribution ; and if an extra session is to be called, that future is not far 
 distant.-' He then proceeded to adduce ten distinct signs indicating the 
 policy of a tariff. 
 
 The proposition to supply the deficier.cy by a tariff on luxuries, is a mere 
 shift to escape the odium of reviving the tariff policy. A tariff on wines 
 and silks, is a tax upon the produce sent to France in exchange for her 
 wines and silks. If the rich pay the tariff, because they use wines and silks, 
 they get it back from the labor'of the people upon which they live. This 
 new tariff may begin with wine and silk, but it will end with sugar, coffee, 
 salt, iron, and all the other necessaries. W'e say to those gentlemen who 
 
24 
 
 are for a tariff on luxuries, We are prepared to go with you to tax wines 
 and silks; but. we want you to go along' with us, at the same time, in reducing 
 the tax on salt, iron, and other necessaries of life. For every dollar they 
 will agree to take ofl' from the necessaries, we are willing to add one, or ■ 
 even more, if it be needed as revenue merely, under an economical adminis- 
 tration of the Government, on luxuries, until they have taxed luxuries to 
 their hearts' content. 
 
 But how does the interest of Tennessee stand on this question of dis- 
 tributing the land reveinie ? Mr. Clay proposes to deduct from the five 
 millions derived from lands, twelve and a half per cent. — amounting to 
 $625,000 — and to give it to the States where the lands he. In this, Ten- 
 nessee has no share, although she has managed and disposed of all the 
 public lands in her limits, at her own expense, and without any compensa- 
 tion. Deducting this handsome gift to some seven or eight States, he 
 proposes to distribute the balance (making .$4,365,000) amongst the twenty- 
 six States, in proportion to their population. By this ratio, Tennessee 
 would receive about i|^2 18,000. To supply this five millions taken from 
 the Treasury, he proposes to impose a lariff; and, of course, Tennessee 
 will pay her proportion, according to her population. Instead of paying 
 back her proportion of the .^4,375,000, she must pay back her proportion 
 of the $5,000,000, and the cost of its collection, which would be about 
 $350,000 more. Instead of paying back $218,000 each year, she must 
 pay back $267,000 each year — giving nearly $50,000 annually for the use 
 of $218,000, which is about 25 or 30 per cent, per annum ! This is the 
 liberal, just, and equitable proposition made to you, to buy your acquies- 
 cence in the revival of the American system ! 
 
 But you will naturally ask, why do the Harrison party desire to " distrib- 
 ute a deficiency?" in the language of Mr. Wise. We can only give you 
 the reason assigned by Mr. Clay and his friends, in their speeches at the 
 present session. They said that the States were in debt, and this distribu- 
 tion would enable them to pay some of the interest on their debts ! It is, 
 then, a deceptive proposition — to tax the people of the whole country, to pay 
 the debts of those States which are unable promptly to pay their own debtSc 
 We feel justified in predicting that it will terminate in a high tariff and an 
 assumption of the State debts, with a national debt of two hundred mil- 
 lions. This is the system of policy in prospect, which is now in its first 
 stage. 
 
 THE GAG BILL. 
 
 This famous measure— the genuine kinsman of the old sedition law of 
 John Adams — was brought forward again by General Harrison's attorney 
 general, (Mr. Crittenden,) at the present session of Congress. When pre- 
 sented on former occasions, it subjected any ofhcer, who dared to express 
 his opinions in elections, to trial in court, and severe punishment. But 
 just at this time, when General Harrison is about taking the executive 
 chair, the measure was made to assume a new shape. To give it more 
 plausibility, and make the bitter pill more palatable, it was made to con- 
 nect with it the sanction of Mr. Jefferson's policy in reference to his offi- 
 cers. But now it provides no trial ! The proposition, as now brought for- 
 ward, and as it is liereafter to be pressed, is, to make it the duty of the Presi- 
 dent (upon his own discretion, to be sure) to remove all officers whoshalV 
 
ft5 
 
 in his opinion, have attempted to influence votes in an election, by persua- 
 sion or argument. Besides being an assault upon the constitutional right 
 of speech, and the freedom of the press, it is a bold attempt to legalize the 
 doctrine of " proscription for opinion's sake," so much denounced by the 
 very party which now proposes to give it the sanction of law. It was but 
 an effort to sanction and justify in advance, by a vote of Congress, the 
 proscription which is soon expected to take place. 
 
 Having gone briefly over the avowed system of policy which is to be pur- 
 sued by the ruling portion of the new administration, we will, in conclu- 
 ding, address your attention to a few other topics of deep interest to the 
 country. 
 
 FEDERALISM OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 We understand federalism to be, the increase of power in the General 
 Government ; an encroachment on the reserved rights of the States and of 
 the people ; a forced mode of construing the constitution, which draws with- 
 in its pale ungranted powers. Whether these things be done by Congress 
 or the President, it is federalism — it is, in one word, a leaning towards mon- 
 archy. By this rule, the present administration challenges scrutiny; and 
 by this same rule, the coming-in administration is to be judged. We shall 
 not revive the question as to the federalism of General Harrison. Since he 
 has declined the exercise of his own constitutional opinions in arresting the 
 unconstitutional legislation of Congress, the danger of federalism lies chiefly 
 in Congress. The vigilant eye of jealousy is to be kept fixed upon that 
 body for the next four years. 
 
 We have already remarked, that, not one of the measures chalked out for 
 consummation by the new administration, is free from constitutional diffi- 
 culties. We now say, that there is not one of them that does not tend di- 
 rectly to an increase of federal power. The bank — the distribution of land 
 revenue — the tariff — the gag-bill — we ask you to examine them, one by one, 
 with reference to the power which they are calculated to add to the Federal 
 Government, either in its legislative or executive branches. Combine them 
 together, and view them all in operation ; and then determine how far our 
 system of government will be removed from a practical monarchy. That 
 the whole Harrison party are united in favor of these measures, we do not 
 pretend ; but we lay them down as constituting the system of policy which 
 is maintained by the predominant portion of that party — as the system of 
 measures which receives the approbation of the new cabinet. To our 
 minds, these measures fix conclusively the federal character of the new ad- 
 ministration. But it is a good rule "to judge men by the company they 
 keep." During the last war, federalists were abundant, and a great portion 
 of them still live, and are now becoming prominent in the Harrison party. 
 Ot that immense host of federalists which embarrassed the administration 
 of Mr. Madison, and threw constant obstacles in the way of the vigorous 
 prosecution of the war, how very few can be found in the democratic ranks — 
 how very many in the Harrison ranks ! Our opponents meet this allega- 
 tion, by designating some few of our friends, whom they charge as having 
 been federalists — such as Wall, Buchanan, and Williams. The two first 
 were the kind of federalists that shouldered their muskets and served their 
 country in the last war. The third, so far as we have learned, was never 
 exposed to the charge, except in having supported the election of John 
 
26 
 
 duincy Adams. Whilst all three of them, by co-operating many years 
 with the repubHcan party, have given the highest proof of the soundness 
 of their conversion to the democratic faith. But, how stands the account 
 with the Harrison party? Where are all the living members of the Hart- 
 ford convention, and the prominent opponents of the last war? We an- 
 swer, in the Harrison ranks ! We state further, (hat, for every one in the 
 democratic party who ever was a federalist, there are at least one hundred 
 who always have been, and still are federalists, on the opposite side. Why 
 are they now active and prominent in the Harrison party? The answer 
 is plain : they believe and expect their own doctrines are to be brought into 
 practice in the new administration. But we will turn next to 
 
 THE CABINET. 
 
 In reference to General Harrison's cabinet, we should present to you a 
 short biographical sketch of each member, if our limits would allow. This 
 we cannot do ; and we regret it the more, because their past political histo- 
 ries, as well as their present political opinions, furnish the most conclusive 
 proof of the federal character of the new administration. If there is any 
 one of them who ever accorded with the people of Tennessee (Mr. Bell 
 alone excepted) in her repubhcan creed, we have wholly misunderstood 
 their past and present positions. With the exception above stated, they 
 were the uniform supporters of John Q.. Adams's administration, and as uni- 
 form in their opposition to that of Cieneral Jackson. To that administra- 
 tion, which obtained power against the will of the people, and pursued a 
 line of policy for which it was indignantly banished h*om the administra- 
 tion of its affairs, these confidential advisers and counsellors of the new ad- 
 ministration were ardently devoted. The political character of Daniel 
 Webster, who is to fill the first office, and stand nearest to the President, 
 deserves a more particular investigation. Of his federalism, no friend or 
 enemy has ever expressed one solitary doubt. It has all the marks of an- 
 tiquity and uniformity which the most incredulous could demand. Al- 
 though not a member of Congress when the last war was declared, yet he 
 came in at the next session, denouncing Mr. Madison's administration as 
 " weak and wicked," and opposing the prosecution of the war at every step. 
 Some of us have examined the journals of Congress during that period, 
 and find that he voted against " a bill for assessing and collecting taxes to 
 sustain the war ;" against " a bill to punish traitors and spies ;" against 
 '•a bill to enlist troops during the war ;" against " a bill raising five regi- 
 ments ;" against "a bill calling out the militia to execute the laws and re- 
 pel invasion ;" against " a bill providing revenue to maintain public credit ;" 
 against " a bill callmg on the States for their quotas of militia to defend the 
 frontiers;" against "a bill to provide for the expenses of the war;" and 
 against "a bill to provide for rebuilding the capitol and pubhc offices, 
 which had been burnt by the enemy." In continuation of that same feder- 
 al spirit which he manifested during the whole of the second war of inde- 
 pendence, this same man afterwards declared that he would not vote for 
 an appropriation which General Jackson had recommended, in anticipation 
 of a war with France, even if the enemy should be battering down the walls 
 of the capitol ! — a sentiment so unpatriotic, that it extorted from one of his 
 colleagues of the other House the solemn declaration, " that the man who 
 could utter such a sentiment had but to take one more step, and that was — 
 
27 
 
 lo join the cneniy.''^ We give the substance, and nearly the words, of Mr. 
 Webster and Mr. Adams on that celebrated occasion. Here was federalism 
 in its worst forms — federalism that shocked and astonished even John 
 Q,uincy Adams himself; and yet this man, with all these records speaking 
 so loudly against him, is now called on to be the fn-ime minister and con- 
 fidential adviser of the new administration ! Would Thomas Jefferson — 
 would James Madison, or any other of our republican Presidents — ever 
 have thought of making such a selection? No, never ; and we warn our 
 countrymen against those coming events whose dark shadows have been 
 cast before them. Mr. Granger is the same man who was run for the Vice 
 Presidency in 1836, and who has been, and still is, generally regarded as 
 an abolitionist. Mr. Badger is understood to have been a uniform and 
 avowed federalist at all times. Of Mr. Bell and Mr. Crittenden, we need 
 say no more than that they are the authors of the notorious modern sedi- 
 tion bills, usually called gag bills, of which you have so often heard, and 
 ito which you have so repeatedly expressed your decided disapprobation. 
 
 THE LATE ELECTION. 
 
 Tiie late contest for the Presidency was characterized by a degree of ex- 
 citen.ent which has no parallel ni our history, unless it is in the great strug- 
 gle of 1800. On no other occasion have such exertions been made, and on 
 none have such means been resorted to, as were practised in some portions 
 of the country by those opposed to the democratic candidate. Of the means 
 used by our opponents in our own State, we have nothing to say ; they are 
 as \\ell known to you as they can be to us. But we will speak of the vio- 
 lent and disgraceful frauds which have been brought fully lo light in some 
 of the large eastern cities. It is no longer a matter doubted, that immense 
 sums of money were freely used in buying votes, and in transporting aban- 
 doned outcasls from city to city to give illegal votes. To you, who prize 
 so dearly the high privileges of the elective franchise, it will appear shock- 
 ing t! at men can be found abandoned enough to resort to such means, and 
 still more astoiniding that others should be found base enough to accept 
 the bribes and perpetrate the frauds. Such, however, is the fact — and a de- 
 plorable fact it is; and we regret to see that, instead of holding up the 
 guiltyv wretches to scorn and reprobation, some of that party which had 
 such aid are shielding and protecting them. 
 
 The late election was marked by another circumstance, no less to be la- 
 mented. We refer to the interference of foreign capitalists, and their stock- 
 jobbing transactions based upon the event of our elections. That a deep 
 anxiety was felt in Great Britain for the success of General Harrison, ad- 
 mits of no doubt. The policy expected to be pursued by his party, in the 
 event of his election, was deemed favorable to British interests. The es- 
 tablishment of a national bank would complete our commercial dependence 
 upon that country. Her capitalists held the bonds of the States for two 
 hundred millions of dollars, which were greatly depreciated in value. The 
 iriends of Mr. Van Burcn had openly repudiated the idea of assuming those 
 debts by the General Government, whilst some of the leading Harrison jour- 
 nals had openly advocated the assumption. From the election of Mr. Van 
 Buren, no hope could be entertained of their assumption ; whilst from that 
 of General Harrison, there was a hope. The powerful incentives of inter- 
 est, then, would naturally enlist British feehng in favor of the election of 
 
28 
 
 General Harrison ; and the same motives would naturally induce her capi- 
 talists to lend their aid, in any way in their power, to effect that object. 
 
 That we may not seem to be dealing in mere conjectures, we will call 
 your attention to a few of the evidences furnished by the British newspa- 
 pers and letters, going to show that British capitalists regarded the electioa 
 of General Harrison as premising to advance British interests : 
 
 The London Morning Post, of the 3d June, 1840, contains this sentiment • 
 
 " By the election of General Harrison, the whig candidate, and the rejection of Mr. Van 
 Buren, the return of the Government to a sound and rational system of banking will follow, as 
 a matter of course ; and possibly the United States Bank may once more find itself under the 
 protection of a proper charter." 
 
 The Liverpool Standard, of the 4th of September, 1840, held the follow- 
 ing language : 
 
 " At present, Great Britain exercises a powerful influence over the social, political, and fis- 
 cal affairs of the United States. The dependence of Vie planters in the South, and the commer-*- 
 cial men in the North, upon the Brithh viarket, necessarily superinduces a desire for peace on 
 their part, while it gives this country a large amount of control over the public decisions of 
 those bodies. The ultra republicans of the States do not relish this control. They see that it 
 imposes a barrier against the working out of their democratical principles." 
 
 These are the sentiments of Great Britain, ;is expressed through two of 
 her leading journals. In a letter from Free, Huth, & Co., bankers in Eng- 
 land, to John Smith, president of the Bank of Missouri, dated London, June 
 3, 1840, the following language is held : 
 
 " The attention of our capitalists, and others engaged in American affairs, is now turned to 
 your internal politics; and if the prospects of your Presidential election, held out by the last 
 accounts, should be realized, this circumstance will contribute more than any other to restore 
 general confidence." 
 
 Other letters, speaking a still stronger and more intelligible language, 
 were received from Englnnd during the spring and summer of 1840, and 
 published in some of the journals of this country, the authenticity of which 
 we have never heard disputed down to this time. We have room for but 
 one ; to which we call your special attention. It is dated London, April I, 
 1840 ; and is as follows : 
 
 " Dear Sir : You, I know, will be astonished when I inform you that our capitalists are more 
 concerned about the decision of the States in regard to your next President, than you are — judg- 
 ing from the tenor of your fa.st letter. The policy pursued by the democratic party of your 
 country, and sustained by the Government at Washington, is alarmingly disadvantageous to the 
 rich capitalists of this country. 
 
 " The capitalists — I mean the ' money-lenders' — are also alarmed ; for, as the banking system 
 will be brought almost to a stand-stilj, there will be no call on them for loans ; and the loss of 
 borrowers will put an end to the streams of wealth which have so long flowed into tRis country 
 from America, in the shape of interest-money. And this alarms the Government also : for it 
 is the policy of Great Britain, as all men know, to keep America, and indeed all other coun- 
 tries, in debt to her, that she may make them tributary to and dependent on her; and it is a 
 common baast here, that the United States, though 'free and independent,' are nevertheless as 
 much colonies of Great Britain as ever they were ; and that though they make their own laws, 
 yet that Great Britain has something to say about that business also, because she has such a 
 vast amount of money in the States that she can always have a parly in her interest there, 
 strong enough to keep things nearly as she wishes them to be. It was thought, a ■« hile ago, that 
 the plan proposed bv Messrs. Baring & Co., which received the sanction of the leaders of the 
 •whig party of the United States, but was anticipated in your national Senate, by the democratic 
 portion thereof, before it could be brought forward by the whig members as a public measure, 
 would be adopted, and that the American Government would take upon itself the responsibility 
 of paying those debts ; but now there is no hope." 
 
 A letter dated at London, July 28, 1840, expresses a strong belief, growing out of a conver- 
 sation Avith an American merchant friendly to Harrison, ' that persons in this country [Eng- 
 land,] interested in American securities, have already contributed and forwarded to America a 
 large amount of money, to be used in the coming election in aid of the party opposed to Presi- 
 dent Van Burea : and that a much larger amount will follow, if it can be used with effect.' " 
 
29 
 
 From these evidences, which are but a small portion of the mass of testimo- 
 ny that might be adduced, we regard it as a fair inference, that British cap- 
 italists felt a deep interest in our late elections, and that they were made a 
 stock jobbing transaction in London. Whether their interests induced them 
 to send their gold to this country, or to subscribe a portion of what was 
 already here, to be used in buying votes, and circulating publications in 
 favor of Genera! Harrison's election, is a question about which every man 
 must form his own opinions l>om the facts which were presented. We all 
 know that immense amounts of money were expended in the election, for 
 various purposes; and if it was all furnished by contributions levied on the 
 citizens of our own country, then it must have been a severe tax. 
 
 But it is worthy of particular remark, tliat, previous to our late election, 
 the celebrated abolition " world's convention" was held in l^ondon. In that 
 convention a large amount of money is known to have been raised, to be 
 used in the United States in advancing the abolition cause. That the 
 money was brought to this country, and expended, none will doubt who has 
 witnessed the vast number of abolition newspapers, pamphlets, and docu- 
 ments, issued and circulated, without charge, over a great portion of the 
 United States ; and when it is known that, with few exceptions, the aboli- 
 tionists CO operated with the friends of General Harrison in his election, it 
 is altogether probable that Harrison's party had the benefit of this money 
 in their election. It will be remembered, that oil the celebrated central exe- 
 cutive committee at Washington, composed of nine members of Congress, 
 the abolitionists were represented by tliree members — Leverett Salionstall, 
 Truman Smith, and John C. Clark — all known abolitionists ; and that this 
 committee nuist have expended large sutTis of money in preparing, and 
 printing, and circulating electioneering documents. 
 
 From such facts as we have stated, we feel warranted in the conclusion 
 that foreiijn capitalists did interfere in our elections. Of the extent of their 
 influence in operating on the election, we give no opinion. It is sufficient 
 for us that such an interference took place ; and we bring it to your atten- 
 tion, because we regard it as an assault upon our mdependence, which ought 
 to arouse every freeman to renewed vigilance in guarding our sacred rights. 
 
 In the late election we see nothing to cause the friends of democracy to 
 despair of the republic ; but we do see much to excite them to renewed ex- 
 ertions to maintain their cherished principles. The people are essentially 
 democratic, and we have no fears but that the triumph of our opponents 
 will be short and inglorious. Kven now, the signs are ominous of their 
 speedy prostration. They have but to develop fully their schemes of fed- 
 eral power, to call forth the united energies of the nation for their expul- 
 sion from power. 
 
 In a spirit of candor, we may be permitted now to ask you what the coun- 
 try has gained by the election of General Harrison ? A party which has 
 long since forfeited the confidence of the people is placed in power. Are 
 there any indications that their power will be used more to your satisfiic- 
 tion than it was during the eight years of the two Adams's adiniiiistraiions ? 
 Is there any thing in the character of General Harrison which furnishes a 
 guaranty ol better times? Does he possi:: s that wisdom in council, and firm- 
 ness in action, which will enable him to^comprclicnd the vast interests of 
 this great Government ; to devise a new and better system of measures, 
 and carry them into operation? Are his counsellors men in whose devo- 
 tion to the countrj'-, and in whose sound republican principles, you hav« 
 
30 
 
 such confidence as dispels all apprehensions for the future? Is the system 
 of measures which they propose in accordance with your long-cherished 
 opinions of good government ? If there is no cause of danger, why have 
 we seen distmguished southern men, heretofore acting with them, and stand- 
 ing high in their confidence — men whose interests are peculiarly iden- 
 tified with yours — already showing strong signs of disaffection? Do you 
 believe that such men as Wise, Mallory, Garland, and Alford, would so- 
 soon have been found betraying uneasiness, if they did not see that there 
 was danger ahead? If these distinguished men of the triumphant party 
 thus manifest their fears, may we not, without prejudging the administra- 
 tion, express our apprehensions, and appeal to you to keep a vigilant eye 
 upon the policy of those coming into power? If we shall be disappointed 
 in our anticipations, and should find that the Government is administered 
 on democratic principles, we should not hesitate to give it our support. In 
 like manner, we doubt not that, if those of you who aided in the election of 
 General Harrison should find him bringing forward and sustaining fede» 
 ral measures, you would withdraw from him your supjiort. 
 
 Enough has already transpired to satisfy us that many of you who voted 
 for General Harrison must be disappointed in your expectations. You were 
 induced to beheve that the friends of General Harrison would sanction 
 and revive the doctrines of the Jackson party in 1828 ; but you already 
 see that the whole cabinet, with one exception, is made up of men who- 
 opposed those principles, opposed the election of General Jackson, and op- 
 posed his whole administration. You were told that General Harrison 
 would abstain from appointing members of Congress to office. You see 
 already that four out of the six members of his cabinet are taken from Con- 
 gress ; and in a short time you will probably see others promoted to high 
 executive olfices. You were told that men would not be proscribed from 
 office for opinion's sake by General Harrison. If you could see, in this 
 city, the army of importunate applicants for office, now here, you would 
 have little hope that this promise would be kept. You were told that the 
 election of General Harrison would restore confidence, revive commerce,, 
 and produce immediate prosperity. You now see the condition of the 
 country, and what prospect there is for the fulfilment of this promise. We 
 ask that you will look at these things, and not suffer yourselves to rely too 
 confidently on those flatteritig promises which were made so profusely. 
 Whilst we ask this of you, we are prepared ourselves to judge the adminis- 
 tration by its acts, and to award praise or censure as the one or the other 
 may be merited. 
 
 In conclusion, we tender to you our grateful thanks for the confidence 
 you have heretofore reposed in us, and assure you that if, on any occa- 
 sion, v/e have failed to practise on the true principles of republicanism, it: 
 has been an error in our judgments, which none can be more inclined to* 
 condemn, than we to deplore. 
 
 We are, very respectfully, your obedient servants, 
 
 AARON V. BROWN. 
 CAVE JOHNSON, 
 HOPKINS L. TURNEY, 
 JULIUS W. BLACK WELL, 
 ABRAHAM McCLELLAN, 
 HARVY M. WATTERSON. 
 Washington City, March 1, 1841. 
 
SS W V 
 

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