^ LIBRARY OF CONGRESS DDDDbE13b37 A. SLAVEIIOLDING MALUM IN SE, INVARIABLY SINFUL. BY E. R. TYLER. : HARTFORD. PUBLISHED BY S. S. COWLES, NO. 7 ASYLUM STREET. MDCCCXXXIX. >0 J SLAVEHOLDING MALUM IN SE While the friends of the slave and of human rights are rapidly enrolling themselves as members of the American Anti-Slavery Society, and participating actively in its noble enterprize, regard- ing it as the only effective organization for relieving the country of slavery by peaceful measures ; not a few persons of respecta- bility and influence, withhold their support, on the ground that they cannot conscientiously pronounce all slaveholding to be sin- ful, and every slaveholder guilty. They object, not to the mea- sures of the Society, which they acknowledge are constitutional, but to this sentiment, which is affirmed to be one of its distinctive doctrines. Were we doubtful of its truth and practical utility^ we should refer these gentlemen to the Constitution of the Amer- ican Anti-Slavery Society, which declares the sinfulness of slavery in general terms, without asserting the absolute impossibiUty of innocently holding a slave in any conceivable case. Can the conscientious opponents of slavery as a system, hesitate to co-op- erate under such a Constitution with the conscientious opponents of all slaveholding ? We choose not, however, to urge their co-operation on this ground, it being our firm persuasion, that they may yet be convinced of the truth of this (at present) repulsive doctrine, and do much, by its recognition and acknowledgement, towards rectifying the public sentiment of the nation, and sev- ering the chains of slavery. To prove that slaveholding is invariably sinful, is, there- fore, the object of these pages. The design in view demands a definition of slavery, accurately distinguishing it from other kinds of servitude, with which it is apt to be confounded. False definitions arc the most fruitful source and strong support of error respecting the moral character of slaveholding. To one who considers slavery and servitude sy- nonymous terms, our proposition must appear sufficiently absurd to entitle us to public abhorrence and ridicule ; to abhorrence for broaching a sentiment so pernicious ; to ridicule for soberly de- fending a position so untenable. As however we do not recog- nize apprentices, minors and hired servants, as slaves, we are not chargeable with the supreme folly of denouncing these relations. To another, who includes under the term slavery, all involuntary servitude, it is not surprising, that our proposition should seem to need some qualification. The services which children, wards seamen and others, owe to their parents, guardians and employ- ers, may be unwillingly rendered, and yet justly exacted. A third, who may confine the word slavery to the single condition of one, who is changed, as far as human law can effect it, into a thing, a commodity, a mere article of traffic, may find no difficulty in ad- mitting the truth of our position, that slaveholding is invariably sinful. We thus see the necessity of planting ourselves on the true definition of slavery, if we would ascertain and publish cor- rect views of its moral nature. This is the more important, since learning and talent will still be tasked to prop its tottering repu- tation, and repel every assault upon it, by false definitions, artfully concealing the worst elements of the system, and introducing, to- gether with slavery itself, some innocent kind of servitude, lest the withering sentence should go forth : all slaveholding is sinful. DEFINITION. SLAVERY IS A DEPRIVATION OF PERSONAL OWNERSHIP. Enslaving men consists in reducing them to this state, or in making them the property of other persons. A slave is a person divested of the ownership of himself, and conveyed with all his powers of body and mind, to the absolute proprietorship of another. Slaveholding is detaining one in this condition, or keeping him subject to the laws of slavery ; and the detainer is the slaveholder. There are two slaveholding powers in all countries, where slavery exists by law ; the master, and the government or civil society. In some states, the master is left at liberty to set his slaves free, there being no laws against emancipation ; in others, slaves can be legally freed only liy the act of some court. In the former case, the government releases the slaves the moment the master declares them free ; in the latter case, the government may hold them in slavery, after their master has released them. No power can constitute or continue a man a slaveholder, with- out his. consent, and in defiance of his own act of manumission. By saying in good faith to his slaves : I now regard you as men, entitled equally with myself, to liberty ; I will never again enforce the laws of slavery against you ; I will give you a pass to leave the state, if you wish it ; I will make no attempt to recover you, if you quit my premises ; I will give you an equivalent for your labor, if you remain in my service — he ceases to be a slaveholder, though the government may still retain his freedmen in slavery. Laws against emancipation cannot prevent his ceasing at once to be a slaveholder ; they only prevent the slaves from being legally free after he has ceased to hold them. The government is then the only holder of the slaves, the only power that retains them in slavery ; the only agent responsible for their enslavement. The master, indeed, still shares with his fellow citizens in the responsi- bilities of the government, if the supreme power vests in the peo- ple, and is bound to use his influence against all unjust and unequal laws. He is, however, responsible only for his own acts. The refusal of the government to second his wishes and efforts, may have the effect to retain in slavery those whom he no longer re- tains in that condition ; but to this his responsibility does not extend. As he neither enslaves them himself, nor sanctions their enslavement, he is not a slaveholder. A slaveholding government is, therefore, one which authorizes individuals to deprive their fellow men of self-ownership ; and which may also enact, that persons so deprived, shall suffer the deprivation forever, any act of their reputed proprietors to the contrary notwithstanding. An individual slaveholder, is one, who holds or uses human beings as property ; who retains them in this condition ; who sub- jects them to the laws of slavery. Artificial persons, as corpora- tions, may also hold slaves. But whoever refuses to exercise the power of an owner, or to keep others in slavery ; whoever dis- claims the right and relinquishes the practice, is not a slave- holder, whatever he may have been, and however civil society 6 may interfere to nullify his acts. A man can no more be made u slaveholder by legislation, without his consent, than by the last will and testament of an individual. PROOF OF DEFINITION. First. The Greeks and Romans describe slavery in nearly the same language. Aristotle, the greatest of the ancient philosophers, calls a slave a " living instrument." See the article on Slavery in the Ameri- can Encyclopaedia. As the lower creation is given to man to be a mere minister to his pleasure and convenience, a mere instru- ment of his good, so, in the view of Aristotle, slaves were held, like cattle, as living instruments, as the mere property and ap- pendages of their masters. In Dr. Taylor's Elements of the Civil Law, (page 429) it is said of Roman slaves, that " they could be sold, transfered or pawned as goods or personal estate ; for goods they were, and as such were they esteemed." Secondly. The slave-codes of the United States contain in substance the same definition. The law of Louisiana, (Stroud, p. 22) declares a slave to be one, " who is in the power of a master, to whom he belongs. The master may sell him, dispose of his person, his industry and his labor ; he can do nothing, possess nothing, nor acquire any thing but what must belong to his master." In South Carolina, (Stroud, p. 23) slaves are "deemed, sold, taken, reputed and ad- judged in law to be chattels personal in the hands of their owners and possessors, and their executors, administrators and assigns, to all intents, constructions and purposes whatsoever." Thus, when the design is to define and establish the slaveholder's claim, the slave is described to be his absolute property ; not one in the power of a master, but one in the power of a master to whom he belongs ; not one who owes labor to another, but one who is him- self an article of property, to all intents, constructions and pur- poses whatsoever. Thirdly. The legislative act of any slaveholding country, pro- hibiting the holding of man asp)roperty, would be an abolition act; yet it would only reinstate in possession of themselves such as had previously been deprived of self-ownership. Fourthl)' . A title to property invests the owner with that iden- tical power over it, which a master possesses over his slave. What \vc own as property, we may sell. This a master may do with his slaves. To call a system of servitude, which denies tiie master the power of scUing his servant, slavery, \s believed to be a violation of language — a misapplication of the term. What we own as property, we may use without consulting the will of that property. This a master may do with his slaves. He would scorn the idea of asking them to do his pleasure. What we own as property we regard as owing obedience to no higher authority than our own. Such is the power of the slaveholder. His will is the supreme law of his slaves. To re- cognize them as moral beings, accountable to God for their char- acters and conduct, is inconsistent with their being the absolute property, the mere instruments of another. In all slaveholding countries, the master's interests have ever been held to be pri- mary and paramoimt ; and the slave's duties to God, to his own soul, to his family, to his neighbor, to his country, when in con- flict with these interests, have been treated with utter derision. What we own as property, we claim and possess in virtue of this title solely. So when a slaveholder arrests a fugitive slave, he asserts his claim to him, not as his wife, child, apprentice, or debtor, nor as a fugitive from justice, but as his property. He pretends to no other authority than that which ownership imparts. Is it not clear then, that slavery is the condition of one, whose entire property in himself has been transfered to another ? It may at first thought seem an objection to this argument, that the owners of brute animals may dispose of their lives, while slave- masters are generally prohibited by law, from depriving their slaves of life. There is, however, in fact, no restriction on the power of the slaveholder other than that which the laws of God and conscience impose. Whoever has the arbitrary power of dis- posing of all the time of another, of controlling his locomotion, of determining the amount of his labor, the quantity and quality of his food and clothing, and of fixing every thing which appertains to him, can, if he wishes, stop his breath with perfect impunity. It is believed that slaveholders have never felt themselves embar- rassed or restrained in any country, in the use of their slaves as absolute property. Nor should it be overlooked that other kinds of property, as brute animals, are protected by law, against wan- ton cruelty. Their owners are indeed allowed to dispose of their lives ; for this is a legitimate use of such property. To destroy an able bodied slave, on the other hand, is not a use ; it is a de- struction of property ; and as to disabled and worthless slaves, for- bidding the master to destroy them, and requiring him to support them, is only taxing his business ; it is like a bonus for the privilege of banking, which surely does not sift the chattel-principle from bank stock. Fifthly. No other definition of slavery embraces all who are slaves and no others. A definition which excludes any who are entirely bereft of prop- erty in themselves, involves the absurdity, that common and cor- rect usage forbids our calling him a slave who is held as a com- modity, or mere article of property. As persons in this condition are confessedly slaves, a definition to be correct, must include them. But can it include any others? What others? Not apprentices, not wards, not children, not seamen, not soldiers, not subjects, not any class of dependents or servants, of whom it may be said, that they own themselves. There can be no doubt that a correct defini- tion of slavery may be given in different terms from ours, but not one of less or greater comprehension. The same definition may be expressed in a great variety of forms. A deprivation of per- sonal ownership for instance, is the same as an entire deprivation of natural liberty. Slavery is a species of absolute despotism. A slaveholder is an arbitrary sovereign. And vice versa, a despot so absolute that he can dispose, as he pleases, of the time, labor, and person of his subject, may act the part of a slaveholder. Since^ however, in governments reputedly despotic, the sovereign, though not limited by law, is removed at a great distance from his sub- jects, is restrained by his fears and interests in the exercise of his arbitrary power, and especially, as the theory of all governments is the good of the governed, and, in the worst despotisms, the peo- ple as a body, are left in the possession of domestic and civil rights ; it is only in a qualified sense that they can be called slaves, and their sovereigns slaveholders. Were slavery, however, de- fined to be the condition of one who is entirely deprived of his natural liberty, or subjected to the arbitrary control of another ; the truth of the definition would lie in its identity with a depriva- tion of personal ownership. A despotism, which leaves its sub- 9 jectiii possession of himself, is not of that absolute kind, which is denominated slavery in the logical sense of the word. Wiiat usage sanctions calling him a slave, who possesses and uses his body, and mental powers, for the accomplishment of his own ends? That no definition, which is not in substance the same as ours, is correct, may appear more conclusively, by reference to the defi- nitions, which the apologists for slavery, in certain circumstances, or in the abstract, have fabricated. We have heard it said that one who owes labor to another is a slave. Then children, apprentices, and hired servants, during the term of their engagements, are slaves ! Some have defined slavery involuntary servitude. Then im- pressed seamen, and even reluctant jurors and militia-men, are slaves ! Some insist that uncompensated servitude is slavery. This is indeed a common element of the condition, but it is neither the whole of it, nor an essential part of it. Negro slavery is invaria- bly uncompe7isated servitude ; because, as the slave cannot legally hold property, it is impossible he should receive pay for his servi- ces. By allowing him to redeem himself, his master does not remunerate him for his labor ; he simply agrees to cease robbing him of his wages and of his person, after he shall have completed a specified amount of unrequited work. But it follows not that slavery cannot exist where wages are paid, nor that the robbery of wages, is the whole of slavery. Roman slaves could hold prop- erty, and therefore could receive compensation, at the discretion of their master ; while in other respects they were subject to his irresponsible control and disposal. Nor is it an unfrequent occur- rence for freemen to labor without remuneration. An innocent man may be condemned to hard labor in a State's prison. Is he, therefore, a slave ? A hired man may be defrauded out of his just wages. A. may compel B. to go a mile with him, and B. may go two miles, without compensation ; and yet not be a slave. A man may be forced to serve in the British Navy for twelve dollars a month, when he might earn greater wages at home. Is the Enghsh tar, therefore, a slave ? No. To create a slave requires something more than the robbery of things that perish in the using. The man himself must be stolen. The subjects of a despotic government are sometimes said to be slaves. They may or may not be such. An absolute autocrat 10 may divest his subjects of all rights, may make them mere tools, mere merchandize; yet in doing so, he would transcend his legiti- mate power ; for sovereignty was not confered on him, as a means of oppression, but for the defence of the people. The autocracy of the slaveholder, on the other hand, looks exclusively to his own good. To use his subject as a mere tool, without rights, is no abuse ; it is the legitimate use of his supremacy. The most abso- lute monarch transcends his legitimate power, w^hen he treats any of his subjects as absolute slaves ; while the real slaveholder is only acting appropriately. Some insist, that State's prison convicts are slaves, because they are confined at hard labor, and receive no compensation. But who is ignorant that whether their condition is the same as that of slaves or not, they have never borne this name ; and that the proposition, " all slaveholding is sinful," cannot be supposed to refer to them ? We find in the Christian Spectator, vol. vi. page 339, the fol- lowing definition : " Slavery is that artificial relation or civil constitution, by which one man is invested with a property in the labor of another, to whom, by virtue of that relation, he owes the duties of protection, support and government, and who owes him in return, obedience and submission." Apprentices are here described to be slaves ; for the appren- ticeship system ' is a civil constitution, by which one man, the master, is invested with a property in the labor of another, the apprentice, to whom, by virtue of that relation, the master owes the duties of protection, support and government, and who owes him in return, obedience and submission !' Indeed we know of no definition which excludes any who are the property of their masters, or includes any who are not their property, which does not involve an absurdity. The well known use of the term slavery, forbids its application, in a literal sense, to despotic governments, to imprisonment for crime, to the appren- ticeship, or to any of those forms of servitude, which reject the chattel principle. Sixthly. We will only add, that our definition corresponds precisely with the ordinary notions and language of men. How common is the complaint, that abolitionists demand of our 11 southern brethren, tlie surrender, not of their children, apprentices, or servants, but of their PiioPEirry. This, then, is tiie sense, in which we use, and ought to he under- stood to use, the term slavery, when we pronounce the practice, invariably sinful. How ungenerous and unjust, it is, in our oppo- nents, to deny the truth of this doctrine, and then rest their denial solely on definitions, which represent that to be slavery, which is not, and which is evidently not contained in our definition ! Many of them acknowledge that what we, for no mean reasons, say is slavery, and the whole of slavery, is invariably sinful ; and, at the same time, hold us up to public reprobation for maintaining a doctrine so untenable and uncharitable*. We hope for better things. Let them prove that a deprivation of personal owner- ship is not the condition of all slaves, and of no others ; or that such a deprivation is consistent with morality ; or else let them become our friends and coadjutors. That other kinds of servi- tude have sometimes been called slavery, by loose writers, and in the fervid language of poetry and eloquence, is perfectly compati- ble with the above definition, in which is given the ordinary, proper, logical sense of fhe word, and not its figurative signifi- cations. SLAVERY ESSENTIALLY UNLIKE OTHER KINDS OF SERVITUDE. A deprivation of self-ownership involves an annihilation of man's natural liberty, and a practical denial of his moral nature, degrading him from his proper rank to the condition of a thing ; and therefore slavery is clearly distinguishable from those condi- tions and relations, with which it is often confounded ; some of which are innocent, and indispensable to the well being and very ♦Christian Spectator for 1834, p. 337. Rp.view of Plielps' Lectures on Slavery and its Remedy. "This definition of slavery" (tiie same in substance as ours) "is a very compendious method of proving that the relation of the slaveholder to his slaves, is invariably, simply and inexcusably sinful. Our objection to it, is, that it is not a definition of all servitude," (Mr. Phelps intended to define only one species of servitude, viz. slavery.) "but only ofthat servitude"' (namely, slavery) "which implies sin on the part of the master. It was obviously framed with a view to the proposition : — All slaveholdijig is criminal. It was framed by a mind desirous of giving to its own positions a lair aspect, at least, of reason and consistency, and seeking a basis on which to construct the doctrine of immediate emancipation, a doctrine that shall make every master of slaves, in all conceivable circumstances, and without any possibility of expknation or defence, an oppressor, a manstealer, a pi- rate, an enemy of the human race." Here it is virtually conceded, that if our defi- nition is correct, all slaveholding is sinful, and the only objection urged against th« definition, is, " that it is not a definition of all servitude .'" 12 existence of civilized society. Yet as this confounding of things so radically different, is the source of many mistakes respecting the moral character of slavery ; it will be useful to set the dis- tinction between them in the light of our definition. Slavery denies two fundamental,immutable distinctions between persons and things ; which is not true of any other kind of servi- tude. The distinctions are these. A person has rights ; a thing has no rights. A person is a subject of moral obligation ; a thing is not. We will r.otice these in their order. 1. A person has rights; a thing has no rights. Self-ow- nership is an original endowment of every human being — the nu- cleus around which his other rights gather — the circumference within which they all lie. That every man is naturally the owner of himself — the proprietor of his body and mind — is one of those first tmths, which need no argument to establish, which unperverted minds universally acknowledge, which is recognized in the phrases, common to all languages, my limbs, my body, my mind. This is the only right, or comprehends all the rights, origi- nal to man, inherent in human nature, the birth-rights of our race. All other rights depend on this for their validity. Among them is the right to the term or time of one's life. This is a necessary incident to self-ownership ; for it is only in time, that one can em- ploy his powers of body and mind for the good of himself and others. Man has also a natural right to the proceeds of his labor and ingenuity. Tlie inventor of a machine is the natural owner of the invention ; it being the product of his industry, time and skill. On the same principle, if a person labors in the service of another, viz. to raise grain or manufacture cloth, he has a natural right to the same proportion of the grain or cloth, or its equivalent, which the value of his labor bears to the capital invested by his employer. These are some of the natural rights of man. The existence of such rights in a state of nature, none will dispute. Man may also acquire rights. Whether the entire catalogue can be innocently withheld from men, is not our present inquiry, it being our sole object to state a distinction between persons and things ; for which purpose we bring into view this acknowledged attribute of persons in a state of nature, ihe possession of rights. What is thus true of persons, is not true of things. As a thing is not the owner of itself, but the absolute property of another, it 13 has no rights ; its very being is designed for the good of its pro- prietor. A wild animal, roaming free in its native forests, is liable, without any infringement of right, to be slain by its fellow or by the arm of man. It may be said in a qualified, figurative sense, that brutes have, in the language of philosophers, imperfect rights ; as a right to humane treatment. But though a horse has a right to kind usage, it is only when such usage is compatible with the interests of man. His owner may whip him, overwork him, and even kill him for his own real interests, without infringing any right of the horse. This, then, is a wide and striking distinction between persons and things. A person has natural rights, and may acquire others ; a thing has no rights cither natural or acqui- red ; at least none which are not secondary to the interests of man, and hence improperly denominated rights. As the whole lower creation is a gilt of the Creator to man ; as we may right- fully use any of these inferior things as property ; it is impossible they should have any interests or claims, which can prevail against ours. They stand in a relation to us, analagous to that which we sustain to God. They are made for our pleasure, as we were made for His. Slavery is a practical oversight and denial of this grand dis- tinction ; regarding man as a mere thing so far as rights are con- cerned ; as the gift of God to another, and not the owner of him- self; as a proper instrument for the sole gratification of his mas- ter ; as one of the fish, or fowls, or beasts of the earth, which realize the highest capabilities of their nature and the noblest end of their existence, by becoming articles of property. 2. A person is a subject of moral obligation; a thing is not. Rights and duties are correlative terms. My possession of rights imposes on all others an obligation to respect them ; and I in turn am bound to respect their rights. Man sustains the relation of a subject to the government of God, and' the relations of parent, husband, child, neighbor, citizen, to his fellow creatures, each requi- ring specific services, which he cannot innocently neglect. The very reverse is true of things. They are incapable of recognizing the existence of rights and duties. They sustain no moral rela- tions whatever. Slavery disregards this distinction. By depri- ving man of the possession, control and use, of his own body, time and will, of his wife, children and property, it incapacitates him to discharge the obligations enjoined in the divine law. Whatever 14 duties he succeeds in performing, he performs in despite of slavery, wliich does its utmost to annihilate his free agency, by substituting the will of another in the place of his will. These two fundamental distinctions between persons and things, which slavery so utterly and unceremoniously overlooks, are recognized in other kinds of servitude. The rights of children, wards and apprentices are recognized, and their interests consulted, in the relation which they severally sustain to their parents, guardians and masters. They are not treated as mere things, but as persons having rights and owing obedience, as free agents, to the divine law. They own them- selves. The difference between their condition and that of the slave, is the same which exists between the natural state of a per- son and the natural state of a thing ; between proprietorship and property; between an owner and the thing owned ; between the possession of rights and an entire deprivation of them. A hired servant is regarded as the possessor of rights, as the owner of himself, as a moral being, as a man, and not as a thing. His labor is voluntary and compensated. The relation between him and his employer exists for their mutual benefit. He is him- self one of the contracting parties. Some, who arrogate to them- selves the reputation of good sense and discrimination, have ven- tured to call the laborers, in our factories, slaves, because they dare not neglect the business and disobey the orders of their employ- ers. But they are no more slaves than the merchant, who dares not offend his customers. Their employers are their customers — the purchasers of their labor. It is the fear of losing this market, and not a dread of the lash, which influences them. They dare not neglect the interests of their employers, on account of a per- sonal interest, which they have in the employment. They dare no be vicious, idle or unfaithful, for fear of being dismissed from a relation, in the continuance of which they are deeply interested. But the slave ! What urges him to fidelity in his unrequited, hope- less task ? The fear of punishment. Here is contrast enough, but no comparison. The one is actuated by the love of compensation, the hope of reward ; the other is moved, like an ox or a horse, by the fear of outrage and violence. The subjects of a despotic king are recognized as persons having rights, and not as mere things. They own themselves. This is not saying that a despotie, oppressive government is not an un- 15 righteous usurpation of autiiority. It is so ; yet it is not that spe- cific form of oppression, to which cuninion and correct usage applies the name, slaver}-. A deprivation of civil rights, as the elective iranchisc and eligi- biUty to office, is no denial of the distinctive attributes of a person. Such disfranchisement divests none of any natural rights, and sinks none in the least degree below the condition of man. Fe- males, minors, the free people of color in some states, and many other persons, have not the right of suffrage and are ineligible to office ; yet they are not treated as mere things, are not deprived of self-ovi^nership. There may be very great wrong in depriving some men of civil rights ; yet it is plainly distinguishable from an entire deprivation of rights, from making man a thing, the mere instrument of another. No mere restraint on the natural liberty of men can be construed into a denial of their personality. The object of law, in all cases, is to restrain the freedom of men. When we enter into society, it is by our mutual consent and for our mutual interest, that we submit to the restraints of impartial law on our freedom, lest free- dom itself should be no blessing, lest property, reputation and life, should all be lost in universal anarchy. A man thus restrained is not divested of the prerogatives of his nature ; is not treated as a thing. Mere compulsory servitude does not annihilate man's rights, and utterly deny his accountability to God. We may be sum- moned against our will, to serve on a jury, to do military duty, to remove nuisances, to educate our children : yet we are not thereby treated as things without rights ; for we have an interest in com- mon with our fellow citizens, in the administration of justice, in the defence of the country, and in all the wholesome regulations of civil society. We are not divested of our rights, but taxed for their protection. Mere cruelty, however atrocious, is not reducing man to a level with the brute, by an entire deprivation of his rights. The most shocking cruelties have been inflicted on freemen ; while the most abject slaves are sometimes attired in costly apparel and fed on the richest dainties of the land. They are clothed in silks, and indulged in luxurious idleness, merely to gratify the pride or the lusts of their masters. Mere cruelty can no more reduce a man 16 to the condition of a thing, than these indulgences can elevate him from it. Nor is the servitude of criminals, as of State's prison convicts, a denial of the two grand distinctions betv^^een persons and things. Having a common interest with others in the supremacy of law, they are punished for crime, not as mere things, but as persons possessing rights ; for their punishment consists in depriving them of a part, and a part only of their rights. They owe a debt to society, which they are bound to pay by bearing the just penalty of the law. But though they may be condemned to solitary con- finement and hard labor for life, in the service of the State ; it does not amount to a deprivation of personal ownership, to an entire divestiture of rights, to an annihilation of the distinction between persons and things. No one owns them ; no one may sell them. The government cannot transfer the entire control of them to another power, with the right to hold them, and dis- pose of them as mere things. No such right is ever asserted. They have legal security against any inflictions and deprivations not included expressly in the sentence of the law. Their children, born after their imprisonment, are free, showing that they are not, like cattle and slaves, considered mere things, the absolute prop- erty of others. They are recognized in most, if not all, the States of this confederacy, not as civilly dead, but as still sustaining in law, the various relations of life. A pardon would restore them at once, the owner to his property, the husband to his wife, the citizen to his political privileges ; to rights which they never for- feited, and which they ceased to enjoy only as an incident to their punishment. Depriving them of the liberty of locomotion, and of the avails of their labor, in just retribution for their crimes, is nei- ther an intentional nor actual denial of their personality, of their right to be treated as men, and not as things. An imprisoned debtor is deprived of locomotion and of his time ; but not o^ self- ownership ; not of all his rights. Compelling him to labor in jail for the liquidation of his debts, would not render him, even for the time being, the absolute property and instrument of his creditor. To suppose him such would imply, that every laborer, who owes services for wages paid in advance, and is forced to render them* is the property of his employer. Nor is there any essential differ- ence between the condition of a debtor, imprisoned at hard labor for the benefit of his creditor, and the condition of a convict, who is 17 forced in like manner to pay his debt to society. In neither case is man struck from existence as the possessor of riglits. We have here, however, a closer approximation to slavery than any other kind of servitude, which dispenses with the chattel principle as an element ; for \\ hile the two grand distinctions between per- sons and things arc neither denied nor overlooked in the punish- ment of the criminal ; yet he is divested of an unusually large share of his natural rights. SLAVEIIOLDING INVARIAtJLV SINFUL. This is the main question at issue. The preceding definition and explanations are given to guide us to a correct conclusion, on this important, practical point : Is slaveholding a malum in se, an act essentially, inherently, necessarily, invariably sinful ? An obvious distinction exists between mala in se, and inala per accidentia vel consequentia ; the former, actions wrong in them- selves, being essentially and invariably sinful ; the latter, actions made wrong hy circumstances, or certain evil conseqriences not necessary to them, being variable in their moral character. An action in itself right, may in some circumstances be wrong ; and therefore a change of circumstances may again make it right. Illustrations of this are familiar to every one. A single man is acquainted with two unmarried women. It is right for him to marry either of them. He marries one. Circum- stances have now changed, so that he cannot innocently marry the other. His wife dies. The circumstance which made it wrong for him to marry the other person is removed, and he can now lawfully marry her. It is in itself right to go from Hartford to New York, either by land or by water. But if you have promised to meet a friend in New York to-morrow, at so early an hour, that you cannot reach there in season except by water ; this circumstance would render it wrong to attempt the journey by land. Were you, however, to receive a letter, in the interim, from your friend, stating that it would be equally convenient for him, to meet you on a future day, affording you ample time for the journey, by either mode : this circumstance would aij-riin render it riafht for you to take the stage instead of the steamboat. It was not in itself wrong for Paul to eat meats offered to idols. It became wrong, when it appeared, that certain weak believers 3 18 would understand him to cat in honor of the idol, and be tempted by his example to practice idolatry. As the eating of such meats was wrong only on account of the presence of weak believers, it became right for the apostle again to eat in their absence. The circumstances of their presence and iceak faith made the act wrong ; a change in these circumstances would, therefore, render the act right. But it is otherwise with acts wrong in themselves ; which, as they are not made wrong by circumstances, can be right in no change of circumstances. Such, for instance, is blasphemy. It is wrong under all circumstances to blaspheme God : for blasphe- my is not made wrong by circumstances ; it is in itself wrong. Some deny this evident distinction between mala in se, and mala per consequentia, on the ground that the moral character of an action depends solely on the intention of the actor, and not in the least on the mode ox form of the act. A man knocks another down. If he does it with a malicious intention, he sins ; but if by accident, without design, or in righteous self-defence, he is guilt- less. In each case the form of the action is the same ; yet the moral character of the act is in one instance sinful, and in the other innocent, if not virtuous. This, it is averred, is true universally, the form of an action aftbrding no infallible criterion, by which to determine its moral nature. The inference is, that slaveholding may be right ; that it is improper to declare it sinful in all cases, since we cannot read the master's heart, and he may mean it for the exclusive good of the slave. The fallacy of this argument lies in the false assumption, that the intention of an actor can never be inferred from the mode or form of his action. So far from truth is this, that certain forms of action, when adopted by free agents, or in the exercise of free agency, are infallible tests and exponents of bad motives. Although blasphemy in the mouth of a maniac is no indication of a blasphe- ming mind, in the mouth of a free agent, it demonstrates a corrupt heart as the source of it. We cannot address the Supreme Being in terms of reproach with good intentions. The same is true of all those modes of action, which invariably and necessarily tend to the dishonor of God, to the detriment of his kingdom, to the viola- tion of justice ; as idolatry, adultery, lying and stealing. All those precepts of the Bible, which interdict certain modes of action, without indicating or admitting exceptions, are based on the as- 10 sumption, that actions of these forms are too evidently improper and pernicious to be adopted with riglit intentions. They are not proliibitions of blasphemous, adulterous, fraudulent, murderous intentions merely, but of certain modes of action in which the mind cannot act freely with other intentions. The repugnance of these modes of action to good morals is in many cases intuitive, and is always so on the surface of things as to be easily and cer- tainly ascertained b}' every honest inquirer ; by which the possi- bility of adopting them with honest intentions, is effectually pre- vented. No one can act virtuously in modes, which he is not satisfied, by faitliful inquiry, are lawful ; and he cannot be misled in his inquiries but by a heart which vitiates all the actions of man. We do not question that a slaveholder 'may think ho is holding slaves for their exclusive benefit. This may be the motive for holding them, of which he is most conscious. Other motives, how- ever, may give their moral coloring to his conduct. A sinful pre- judice against his slaves ; a contempt of then' powers ; a disregard of their rights as men ; an unwillingness to acknowledge at once his own wrong ; a fear of displeasing other slaveholders ; a selfish shrinking from the losses and inconveniences of immediate eman- cipation ; may indispose him to judge impartially respecting their interests. The state of the heart — the ultimate as well as the proximate motive — is to be considered in deciding the moral cha- racter of an action. Should a physician take the life of a patient, of whose recovery he despairs, impelled by a compassionate desire to relieve him from suffering, this motive would not sanctify the deed. The act would derive its character from the state of mind —the culpable disregard of human life — the contempt of God's law : Thou shalt not kill — in which it originated. So also, if a person should steal merely to relieve the wants of a suffering family, the motive, however benevolent and praiseworthy, would not justify him. The ultimate motive — the bad state of heart — which made hini willing to gratify his pity for an object of distress, by wronging another person, decides the character of his con- duct. Thus mala in se, or actions wrong in themselves, can never be perpetrated with virtuous intentions. Stealing and other acts of this class, cannot be changed into virtues, by springing from good motives. The wrong is too palpable. Slaveholding, we claim, belongs to this class of actions ; it is a malum in se, a sin independent of circumstances. The argument 20 in proof of this, we shall arrange under several distinct divisions, exhibiting it in various attitudes, for the purpose of affecting minds of every grade and construction. 1. Slaveholding in its ?ni.ldest form is an unwarrantable degra- dation ofliuman beings. Man is created in the image of God; made a little lower than the angels ; crowned with glory and honor ; placed on a throne to be lord and proprietor of the fish of the sea, the fowl of the air, and every living thing that moveth on the earth. He is formed to seek happiness, to discharge duties, to scatter blessings, in this elevated sphere of action. Slavery de- thrones him ; thrusts him down from his exalted state to a place among the brutes ; subjects him to a condition for which he was not made ; to which he is not adapted ; where he cannot act him- self; where nothinsf human is left free and unimpaired but a sus- ceptibility to suffering. Can governments ever innocently sanc- tion such an outrage ? Can individuals innocently commit it ? We think not. The declarations of the Bible, and in this case, the equally explicit voice of nature, teach that man was made to have dominion over the lower creation, not to fraternize with it. So evident is this that we must forget the manhood of the slave, before we can excuse the enslaver. Said the celebrated Montes- quieu : ' We must not admit that the Negro is a man, lest it should follow that we are not Christians.' This unwarrantable degradation of man from his original and proper rank in creation, to an article of property, to the place and uses of a thing, is not an acac?ewf of slavery ; it is the very essence of the thing; its cardinal principle ; that which must enter into a system of servitude to constitute it slavery ; that, without which there cannot be a slave. A deprivation of self-ownership — this is the unwarrantable degra- dation of man — and this is inseparable from slavery ; it is slavery itself; and hence every act of slaveholding is essentially sinful. Should any think this argument inconsistent with the right of punishing crime by imprisonment, since this is placing man in an unnatural condition, where he cannot discharge the ordinary du- ties of life ; we would refer them to this grand distinction between the two cases. While slavery pours contempt on the image of God, by pronouncing man a legitimate piece of property ; impris- onment for crime honors that image, by vindicating his violated rights : and while slavery removes man from his appropriate sphere of light, usefulness and enjoyment, to a land of darkness, 21 sterility and wo ; imprisonment for crime is a just measure of defence to society against the example and violence of a useless and unworthy member. Nor should it be overlooked, that the criminal loses by imprisonment,nothing hut his place in society — ho does not sink to the level of a thing — he is still regarded as a man. 2. Slavf/ioI(lin