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WEST POINT 
 
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WEST POINT 
 
 THE WAR. 
 
 DEDICATED BY A WESTERN OFFICER TO HIS EASTERN FELLOW-SOLDIERS. 
 
 ST. LOUIS, MO., MAECII, 1863, 
 
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 'l1 
 
THE WAR. 
 
 When President Lincoln issued his first call for 75,000 
 men, we read in the newspapers that the announcement of this 
 Proclamation was received by the rebel Congress — then sitting 
 at Montgomery — with shouts of laughter. Our indignation 
 was justifiable at the time, but experience soon taught us that 
 we had underrated the strength, harmonious unity and re- 
 sources of the South, and we now admit that they had reason 
 to smile at the pigmy army of 75,000 men, with which we 
 proposed to enforce the laws of the United States. After 
 discovering our mistake, a gigantic and patriotic North has, 
 for the last two years, poured out its wealth, men and immense 
 resources, at the many-headed Dragon ; and we are to-day, to 
 all practical purposes, no nearer the re-establishment of the 
 Union than when it first broke asunder. True, we are in pos- 
 session of more Southern soil than we could boast of two years 
 ago, but the armies and defenses of our enemy are as strong 
 and seemingly impregnable as ever, and our conquests have 
 merely increased the already enormous expenses of transpor- 
 tation and subsistence, without any adequate benefit what- 
 soever. 
 
 Obedience and discipline are the paramount duties of a 
 soldier, without which an army is but a powerless mob. The 
 Volunteers of the United States can boast of having practiced 
 these military virtues in a degree never before witnessed in 
 the world. It is a historical fact that the armies of the old 
 world owed their existence to a despotic rule, that reduced the 
 soldiery to a mere machinery of brutal force that had no voice 
 in the destinies of their respective nations, and to whom 
 patriotism meant nothing but military vain-glory. But the 
 soldiery of the United States is entirely difierently constituted. 
 
Our armies originated, not because our ruling powers so 
 wanted it, but because our rulers knew that the people so 
 wanted it, and our armies are the people itself, and every sol- 
 dier is a voting citizen. They fight, not to advance military 
 glory, nor to be the machinery of an artful diplomacy of whose 
 designs they know nothing, but they fight for their own self- 
 preservation, for their liberty and their homes, well knowing 
 that the success of the Southern rebellion would imperil these 
 treasures beyond redemption. 
 
 Hence it is proper — nay, even a sacred duty of the Volun- 
 teer — to combine military discipline and obedience with an 
 intelligent knowledge of the condition of national affairs, and 
 linked together with the military operations as these are, he is 
 bound to take notice of tlie manner in which these have been 
 conducted. And if in exercising a sound criticism in this 
 regard, he finds from deductions and experience that misman- 
 agement and stupidity have characterized all military move- 
 ments so far, and that the objects of this war are as distant 
 from their realization as ever, it is proper for the Volunteer to 
 enquire into the causes of this mismanagement, and to use all 
 his civil influence, through his friends at home and his repre- 
 sentatives in legislative halls, to correct existing evils and put 
 a stop to the continuous experimenting blunders. 
 
 II. 
 
 WEST POINT. 
 
 The armies of the East have but little connection with those 
 of the West. We hear of the exploits of each other through 
 the newspapers and official reports, but beyond this we have 
 as yet no means of exchanging ideas and ascertaining the 
 feelings and impressions in each. Being familiar with the 
 ruling sentiments in the Western armies — with which I have 
 been identified ever since the outbreak of the war — I send 
 these lines to our fellow-soldiers in the East in order to give 
 an expression to the views held here as to the causes of our 
 slow progress ; and if the same are felt to be true by our com- 
 
rades there, we ask their hearty co-operation in effecting the 
 necessary changes. If we are wrong in our views, let us know 
 where the blame is, and we will cheerfully aid in uprooting the 
 evil wherever it may be. 
 
 I only express an opinion generally held by all officers who 
 have had occasion to judge from experience, and whose parti- 
 cipation in this war was actuated by pure patriotism, when I 
 state, that the principal cause of all our disappointments and 
 delays can be distinctly traced to the influence of incompetent 
 or designing superior officers, whose only claims for the posi- 
 tion they occupy are derived from their accidental military 
 education at West Point. A military education is a great 
 advantage, and if the tuition received at West Point falls in 
 good ground, it will develop a commander who is entitled to 
 the preference in the government of military matters, and we 
 all must cheerfully submit to his preferment to the most 
 responsible positions. But an education at West Point does 
 not make a genius out of a dunce, nor does it create intelli- 
 gence out of stupidity. This rule holds good in all classes of 
 educational institutes. The study of theology does not of 
 itself make the student an efficient minister, nor does the 
 study of philosophy make him a philosopher. Science is one 
 thing and the application of it quite another. But, aside from 
 these general truths, there are some special reasons why the 
 pretentions of a West Point graduate at the present time 
 appear plainly preposterous. Let us limit ourselves to facts. 
 The regular officers of the present day, with the exception of 
 some from the older classes, have had very limited opportuni- 
 ties of gaining practical experience in military matters. Leav- 
 ing West Point, they have generally been assigned to duty on 
 the frontiers and at the forts, where the commands seldom 
 exceeded a few companies. Years have passed over their 
 heads in the outskirts of civilization, their sphere of action 
 being limited to the exercise of a monotonous routine. They 
 have been estranged from any part or participation in the 
 great national questions controling our destinies, and, from 
 
their peculiar education, have always and will always look 
 down upon our civil government and institutions as a neces- 
 sary evil at best. Moving from station to station, their lives 
 have generally been so unsettled, that but very few of them 
 have formed social ties, and there has been nothing to attach 
 them to the people from whence they sprung, except pleasures 
 and gratification of military pride. At the bombardment of 
 Fort Sumter, they were suddenly called upon to take a stand 
 either for or agaiust the country that educated them, and those 
 that were actuated only by ambition for military honor and 
 preferment, turned their faces to the South, for there was 
 reason to believe, for a while, that its experienced statesmen, 
 and great wealth, combined with their political power in the 
 North, would result in a speedy victory over and subjugation 
 of the North, and the distribution of military honors are with 
 the victors. Thus we lost the most energetic and daring 
 (because ambitious) of our of&cers, and the rest remained true 
 to our flag — some from pure patriotism and convictions, others 
 from accidental indifference, others from want of courage and 
 decision at the proper moment and afterwards awed by the 
 enthusiasm that possessed the rising people. 
 
 It was proper that those that remained true to the Union, 
 should occupy prominent positions in the great armies then 
 organizing. But it was equally proper that after the active 
 campaigns and military operations had brought the respective 
 qualifications to a practical test, nothing but demonstrated 
 merit or ability should entitle any soldier whatsoever, to pre- 
 ferment or increase his military authority. But here is the 
 evil of which we complain, here is the source of our delays 
 and disasters. It can be clearly demonstrated, that the 
 government of all our military affairs has been persistently 
 entrusted to men, who had no other claims to their position, 
 than the accidental fact of having graduated at West Point, 
 without having shown by practical experience any of those 
 great qualifications, which alone should entitle them to the 
 control. 
 
The nation rose as a man, men and means, and unlimited 
 resources were at the disposal of the Government. All the 
 nation asked in return was : bring this war to a speedy close, 
 crush the rebellion with boldness ; our life as a nation is at 
 stake ; strike ! and if you fail, call on us again ; drain us to 
 our last life-drop, but strike ! 
 
 But what is the practical answer: preparations and delay. 
 Our principal military commanders had a great deal to do 
 with long preparations; forgetting that while we gathered 
 strength in organizing and drilling, we gave our enemies the 
 same opportunities. And why should our West Point ofl&cer 
 be in a hurry about finishing the war ? Why should he be in a 
 hurry to this very day ? As stated above, he has no particular 
 respect for our peaceful persuits as industrious citizens. He 
 is not identified with our civil government. He has no family 
 that calls him back into their arms when the war is over. He 
 is now occupying a prominent military position that ceases with 
 the war, and the General to-day would in such an event, have 
 to relinquish his glory and pay, and retire to his insignificant 
 Lieutenantcy or Captainship in the regular army, when peace 
 is established. With the exception of a few that are actuated 
 by a pure patriotism, there is not a single consideration or 
 motive that generally actuate men, namely, ambition or 
 egotism, that would influence most of our regular officers in 
 desiring an early termination of this war, and to these our 
 destinies to be solved with the sword are entrusted. 
 
 HI. 
 
 H ALLEGE. 
 
 It must be apparent to every close observer, in reflecting on 
 the events of the last year, that a wonderfully pernicious and 
 tenacious eflTort has been made, in a secret and silent way, to 
 fill every important position in our military departments with 
 graduates from West Point. It has been done with a perfect 
 success, and every branch of the military organization is now 
 controlled by such. If merit or tried ability had been the 
 
8 
 
 guiding qualifications for such positions, nobody would find 
 fault; but it is clearly that such qualifications are entirely 
 secondary to the mere accidental fact of being a West Point 
 graduate. 
 
 There is hardly any doubt but that this efi'ort is the result 
 of a premeditated plan, long ago adopted by the prominent 
 officers of the regular army. Their great spokesman and hero 
 is now the General-in-chief of all the armies ; and if I find 
 occasion to concentrate my succeeding remarks on General 
 Halleck, it is not because he is deficient in ability or merit in 
 his proper sphere, but because he is the personification and 
 advocate of all those military pretensions that are simply based 
 on military education. 
 
 We of the West have had no opportunity of forming any 
 distinct opinion of the merits of the Generals in the East, nor 
 have our fellow-soldiers in the East had any intimate acquaint- 
 ance with our Western commanders. But General Halleck is 
 known to all of us, and it is therefore proper to examine his 
 career, especially as he is the representative of the officers of 
 the regular army. 
 
 Halleck superceded Fremont in the Western Department. 
 Order had to be established out of chaos, and with his excel- 
 lent administrative talent he went to work and systematized 
 his enormous command. Being an able engineer, he will never 
 fail to be a very effective officer in any branch of the military 
 departments where it depends on regulating or organizing the 
 complicated machinery of the military theatre. But as a Gene- 
 ral in the field, he will always prove a failure. As long as he 
 remained stationary in St. Louis, distributing his armies and 
 providing them with everythin'g requisite, and left his Generals 
 in the field to select their own opportunities for fighting, his 
 administration was a success. But it is a well-known fact 
 that the victories at Fort Donelson, Fort Henry and Pea 
 Ridge, came entirely unawares on Halleck — premature to all 
 of his calculations. He then left St. Louis and took the 
 field. The enemy was collected at Corinth, and as a true 
 
Engmeer Halleck went to digging, and was going to Corinth 
 by gradual approaches. Beauregard, to satisfy himself of Hal 
 leeks .ntenfons, attempted at different times to draw our" 
 arm s out m open battle, but of no avail. Satisfied of Ha, 
 
 P a "id nti :^ °'^° '" "" '''-' "^''"-^-'> ---^' 
 
 ine place and Halleck's operations in the field were at an enrl 
 He wa tuen called to the more important command a CM f 
 ot all the Armies of the United States A hn. ^ ! 
 
 rreo™' 'T'"" -'-"««^-' ^re:;:rier„rr:: 
 Tniw grwLL"::; ;^ 7: "="°^"'-^' ^-^ ^'-- -^ 
 
 «L wnaiever ot the plaas or movements of that c^m 
 
 ^yTt'tr^T' """" P""''"" ^»-Halle:rreai;" 
 oceupj ? He commands no army. He knows nothin. of the 
 
 plans of the campaign on the Potomac. It does seem°fh t 
 occupies a very comfortable position, i„ wl il , e ; ^ „' 
 reap the glory that any lucky General may eain ad to be 
 perfectly innocent of any disasters that may happel 
 I challenge an answer to the following questions: 
 
 fJn!';, ^'"7 ■'' ""' ""' """'"S^' "" *>>« ^"P^rior officers 
 
 fiom the regular army (with the exception of Rosecrans) wlo 
 
 dunng the campaigns of the last two years, has show at' 
 
 degree of supenor military genius? Who can point Z Z 
 
 man that has signalized himself by the planning and Le Leu 
 
 .on of stragetic movements, thus displaying the n etenr. 
 
 bene t of his scientific military education ? W, e, e fs e ' n 
 
 wo has displayed that quick energy, that dashe at fe „p " 
 
 mome t , an unsuspecting enemy and strikes terror Th" 
 
 n any of these respects have surpassed, nay, even equalledThe 
 feats of our most prominent volunteer ol^cers, and what ha! 
 any regu ar officer done that any volunteer of common ens 
 could not have done as well, if not better ? 
 
 2nd. Have you ever yet seen a regiment, brigade, division 
 or army, commanded by an officer of the regular arm. thTt in 
 drdl, d.sc,pline or effectiveness, surpassed any equal ^mmLd 
 
10 
 
 of a volunteer officer ? And if not, of what practical utility 
 has then the privileged education been, and why should it 
 entitle the recipient to any preference over volunteer officers ? 
 
 3rd. Have you ever met with an officer of the regular 
 army, whose heart and soul seemed imbued with the one 
 sublime purpose of pushing ahead and crushing the rebellion 
 as speedily as possible ? If you have met such, their numbers 
 are easily counted 5 but have you not found, as a general thing, 
 that the majority of those officers are remarkably fond of an 
 easy life, fond of the pleasures of the city, laying back on the 
 dignity of their position, and checking all energetic plans 01 
 their subalterns ? 
 
 4th. Can you explain why such a large proportion of the 
 regular officers are continually assigned to duty in the North- 
 ern States, on recruiting service, and as officers of the Com- 
 missary and Quartermaster's Departments, and why they are 
 so tenaciously holding on to the same the larger and more 
 responsible the post is ? Why is this done, when most of 
 these positions could be easily filled by practical responsible 
 business men from civil life, whilst the regular officer, who 
 received his military education at the public expense, might be 
 properly occupied in establishing camps of instruction and 
 impart their superior knowledge to schools of volunteer offi- 
 cers ? Would this not be their proper sphere even if they felt 
 any disinclination for taking part in the active campaign ? 
 
 5th. Why is it, then, that the administration of all military 
 departments are so entirely controlled by men whom the 
 experience of two long and eventful years has proven to be 
 deficient in those higher qualifications that are absolutely 
 requisite to the solution of the great national problem ? Or 
 are we like the Bourbons, always to learn and never to repent 
 and get wise ? 
 
 6th. By what secret influence does Halleck continue to 
 exercise the control of military affairs, when it is well known 
 that the best informed men in Washington, inside and outside 
 
11 
 
 of Congress, are strongly opposed to liini, and not a proof can 
 be given of any distinguished qualifications, except the par- 
 tiality for officers of the regular army, to retain him as com- 
 mander-in-chief? 
 
 It is unnecessary to cite names and instances. They are 
 within the reach of every officer of all armies. I shall only 
 mention, as an illustration of numerous cases, that the Senate 
 lately refused to confirm General Wright, commanding the 
 Department of the Ohio, as Major-General, " because his only 
 claims to this preferment arose from the fact that he is an old 
 friend and admirer of Halleck's." And yet General Wright 
 has commanded that Department for more than six months, 
 having been suddenly made a Major-General, and elevated 
 from obscurity for the occasion. 
 
 lY. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 The civil political dissensions in the North will never endan- 
 ger the existence of the Union. They are merely the natural 
 effects of the unsatisfactory manner in which the affairs of the 
 nation have been managed for the last year. Remove these 
 damaging causes — let the military departments be controlled 
 by men whose merits consist in their proven ability and patriot- 
 ism, no matter whether they have had a West Point, a Cam- 
 bridge, or a common school education, and life and energy 
 displayed by our rulers will arouse the fading patriotism and 
 make a unit of the nation. All it craves is progress and life. 
 But as long as our military movements are governed by luke- 
 warm men. who care more for castes and partizanship than for 
 the welfare of a free people, so long will our war remain as it 
 has been hitherto, a series of " strategic" experiments, and 
 our end will be ruin.