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Epochs of History 
 
 EDITED BY 
 
 EDWARD E. MORRIS, M.A. 
 
 THE ERA 
 
 OF 
 
 THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR, 1618-1648. 
 S. R. GARDINER. 
 
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THE 
 
 Thirty Years' War 
 
 1618-1648 
 
 V 
 
 V 
 
 SAMUEL RAWSON GARDINER 
 
 Late Student -of Christ Church 
 
 Author of 'History 0/ England front the Accession of jfantes I. to ths 
 
 Disgrace of Justice Coke ' and 'Prince Charles and the 
 
 Spanish Marriage' 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS. 
 
 1887. 
 
THE 
 
 Thirty Years' War 
 
 1618-1648 
 
 A 
 
 V 
 
 SAMUEL RAWSON GARDINER 
 
 Late Student ■of Christ Church 
 
 author 0/ 'History of England from the Accession of jfames I. to ths 
 
 Disgrace of Justice Coke' and 'Prince Charles and the 
 
 Spanish Marriage ' 
 
 NEW YOEK: 
 CHAELES SCEIBNEE'S SONS, 
 
 1887. 
 
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 e>^\ 
 
 6« 
 
 <\ 
 
 If feaffite 
 
 n I 
 
PREFACE, 
 
 If the present work should appear to be written for 
 more advanced students than those for whom most 
 if not all the other books of the series are designed, 
 the nature of the subject must be pleaded in excuse. 
 The mere fact that it relat,^,exG^si^ely to Continental 
 history makes it unlikel3ii^at junior pupils would ap- 
 proach it in any shape, and it^is probably impossible 
 to make the very complicated relations between the 
 German states and other European nations interest- 
 ing to those who are for the first time, or almost the 
 first time, attempting to acquire historical knowledge. 
 Every history, to be a history, must have a unity of its 
 own, and here we have no unity of national life such 
 as that which is reflected in the institutions of Eng- 
 land and France, not even the unity of a great race of 
 sovereigns handing down the traditions of government 
 from one generation to another. The unity of the 
 subject which I have chosen must be sought in the 
 growth of the principle of religious toleration as it is 
 adopted or repelled by the institutions under which 
 Germany and France, the two principal nations with 
 which we are concerned, are living. Thus the history 
 
 V 
 
vi Preface. 
 
 of the period may be compared to a gigantic dissolving 
 view. As we enter upon it our minds are filled with 
 German men and things. But Germany fails to find 
 the solution of the problem before it. Gradually 
 France comes with increasing distinctness before us. 
 It succeeds where Germany had failed, and occupies 
 us more and more till it fills the whole field of action. 
 
 But though, as I have said, the present work is not 
 intended for young children, neither is it intended 
 for those who require the results of original research. 
 The data for a final judgment on the story are scat- 
 tered in so many repositories that the Germans them- 
 selves have now discovered that a complete investi- 
 gation into one or other of the sections into which the 
 war naturally falls, is sufficient work for any man. 
 There must surely, however, be many, as well in the 
 upper classes of schools as in more advanced life, who 
 would be glad to know at second hand what is the 
 result of recent inquiry in Germany into the causes of 
 the failure of the last attempt, before our own day, to 
 constitute a united German nation. The writer who 
 undertakes such a task encounters, with his eyes open, 
 all the hazards to which a second-hand narrative is 
 liable. His impressions are less sharp, and are ex- 
 posed to greater risk of error than those of one who 
 goes direct to the fountain head. He must be con- 
 tent to be the retailer rather than the manufacturer 
 of history, knowing that each kind of work has its use. 
 
 Not that the present book is a mere collection of 
 other men's words. If I have often adopted without 
 much change the narrative or opinions of German 
 
Preface. vii 
 
 writers, I have never said any thing which I have not 
 made my own, by passing it through my own mind. 
 To reproduce with mere paste and scissors passages 
 from the writings of men so opposed to one another 
 as Ranke, Gindely, Ritter, Opel, Hurter, Droysen, 
 Gfrdrer, Klopp, Fdrster, Villermont, Uetterodt, 
 Koch, and others, would be to bewilder, not to in- 
 struct. And in forming my own opinions I have had 
 the advantage not merely of being in the habit of 
 writing from original documents, but of having studied 
 at least some of the letters and State papers of the time. 
 I have thus, for example, been able, from my know- 
 ledge of the despatches of Sir Robert Anstruther, to 
 neglect Droysen 's elaborate argument that Christian 
 IV. took part in the war through jealousy of Gustavus 
 Adolphus \ and to speak, in opposition to Onno Klopp, 
 of the persistence of the Dukes of Mecklenouig m tae 
 support which they gave to the King of Denmark. 
 
 More valuable than the little additional knowledge 
 thus obtained is the insight into the feelings and 
 thoughts of the Catholic princes gained by a very 
 slight acquaintance with their own correspondence. 
 To start by trying to understand what a man appears 
 to himself, and only when that has been done, to try 
 him by the standard of the judgment of others, is in 
 my opinion the first canon of historical portraiture ; 
 and it is one which till very recent times has been 
 more neglected by writers on the Thirty Years' War 
 than by students of any other portion of history. 
 
 My teachers in Germany from whom I have bor- 
 rowed so freely, and according to the rules of the se- 
 
viii Preface. 
 
 » 
 
 ries, without acknowledgment in foot-notes, will, 1 
 hope, accept this little book, not as an attempt to do 
 that which they are so much better qualified to exe- 
 cute, but as an expression of the sympathy which an 
 Englishman cannot but feel for the misfortunes as 
 well as the achievements of his kindred on the Con- 
 tinent, and as an effort to tell something of the by- 
 gone fortunes of their race to those amongst his own 
 countrymen to whom, from youth or from circum- 
 stances of education, German literature is a sealed 
 book. 
 
 I have only to add that the dates are according to 
 the New Style. Ten days must be deducted to bring 
 them in accordance with those used at the tune iij 
 England. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Events in English History not noticed in the text, or only r^erred to 
 are j>rinted in Italics. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 CAUSES OF THE THIRTY YEARS* WAR. 
 
 Section I. — Political Institutions of Germany (1440-1517), 
 
 PAGB 
 
 National institutions of Germany defective ... I 
 
 (a) As regarded the Emperor i 
 
 (&) As regarded the great vassals .... 3 
 
 Attempts made to introduce order by giving a regular 
 
 form to the Diet 5 
 
 These, though only partially successful, are not altoge- 
 ther useless 6 
 
 Constitution of the Diet o 6 
 
 Section II. — Protestantism in Germany (i5i7-iS7o)« 
 
 Protestantism acceptable to the majority of the na- 
 tion, but rejected by the Emperor and the Diet . 8 
 
 The result is a civil vi^ar, resulting in a compromise, 
 called the Peace of Augsburg (1555). Its terms be- 
 ing ambiguous on some important points, give rise to 
 controversy 10 
 
 But as Protestantism is on the increase, the ambiguous 
 points are, at first, construed by the Protestants in 
 their own favour ii 
 
 ix 
 
X Contents. 
 
 PAGS 
 
 The main points at issue relate to the right of Protest- 
 ants to hold bishoprics, and to the right of Protestant 
 princes to secularize church lands . . . .12 
 
 Section III. — Reaction against Protestantism, (1570-1596). 
 
 Theological controversies are carried on with bitterness 
 amongst the Protestants ...... 13 
 
 The Catholics, accordingly, begin to gain ground . 14 
 
 And having the Emperor and Diet on their side, are 
 able to use force as w^ell as persuasion . » • 14 
 
 Want of any popular representation prevents any fair 
 settlement of the dispute IS 
 
 Section IV. — Three Parties and Three Leaders (1596-1612). 
 
 Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists are respectively 
 guided by Maximilian Duke of Bavaria, John George 
 Elector of Saxony, and Christian of Anhalt . . 15 
 
 Character and policy of Maximilian dangerous to the 
 Protestants ........ 15 
 
 The Protestants of the south more alive to the danger 
 than the Protestants of the north . . . .17 
 
 Spread of Calvinism, especially in the south, ac- 
 counted for by the greater danger from Catholic 
 States 17 
 
 Character and policy of Christian of Anhalt . , ,18 
 t6o3 Accession of James I. of England 
 1605 Gttnpowder Plot 
 
 1607 Donauworth occupied by Maximilian . . . .19 
 
 1608 Formation of the Protestant Union and the Catholic 
 
 League ......... 21 
 
 1609 The quarrel for the succession of Cleves does not result 
 
 in open war ........ 21 
 
 1612 John George fruitlessly attempts to mediate between the 
 
 Catholics and the Calvinists 2a 
 
 1613 Marriage of Frederick V., Elector Palatine, to Elixa- 
 beth, daughter of James I. of England 
 
Contents, xi 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE BOHEMIAN REVOLUTION. 
 
 Section I. — The House of Austria and its Subjects (1600-1618). 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Political and religious dissensions between the rulers 
 
 and their subjects ....... 24 
 
 1609 The Emperor Rudolph, as King of Bohemia, grants the 
 
 Royal Charter to Bohemia . . . . .25 
 
 1611 He is succeeded by Matthias in spite of the intrigues of 
 
 Christian of Anhalt ....... 26 
 
 Matthias evades the charter 27 
 
 1617 Ferdinand accepted by the Bohemian Diet as King by 
 
 hereditary right ........ 28 
 
 1618 The Protestant churches on ecclesiastical lands de- 
 
 clared illegal by the government of Matthias ; one at 
 Braunau shut up, one at Klostergrab pulled down . 29 
 
 Section II. — The Revolution at Prague {3Iarch-May 1618). 
 
 Mar. 5. Meeting of the Protestant Estates of Bohemia . . 29 
 May 23. Attack headed by Thurn upon the Regents at 
 Prague. Martinitz and Slawata thrown out of win- 
 dow. Beginning of the Thirty Years' War . . 30 
 Appointment of Thirty Directors as a Revolutionary 
 Government in Bohemia ...... 31 
 
 Section III. — The War in Bohemia {3Iay i6iS-Februari/ 1619). 
 
 Aug. 13. Bohemia invaded by the Emperor's general, Bucquoi. 
 The Bohemians look abroad for help. Mansfeld 
 brings troops to them. He besieges Pilsen, whilst 
 Thurn makes head against Bucquoi . . , .33 
 
 Nov. 21. Pilsen surrenders 34 
 
 Christian of Anhalt urges Frederick V., Elector Pala- 
 tine, to intervene on behalf of the Bohemians, and 
 asks the Duke of Savoy to help them . . -34 
 
 \6ig The Duke of Savoy talks of dividing the Austrian do- 
 
 Fcbo minions with Frederick 35 
 
Xil 
 
 Section IV. — Ferdinand on his Defence {MarcJi-Novemhef 
 
 1619). 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Mar, 20. Death of Matthias 36 
 
 June 5. Vienna besieged by Thurn. Ferdinand threatened 
 
 by a deputation from the Estate of Lower Austria 36 
 He is dehvered by a regiment of horse, and Thurn 
 
 raises the siege ....... 37 
 
 Aug. 28. Ferdinand II. elected Emperor . . . .38 
 
 Aug. 26. Frederick, Elector Palatine, elected King of Bohe- 
 mia, Ferdinand having been previously deposed . 38 
 Nov. 4. Frederick crowned at Prague 39 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 IMPERIALIST VICTORIES IN BOHEMIA AND THE PALATINATE. 
 
 Section I. — The Attach upon Frederick {November 
 iSig-January 1621). 
 
 1619 Maximilian of Bavaria prepares for war . . .39 
 Vienna fruitlessly attacked by Bethlen Gabor . . 40 
 Frederick finds no support in the Union . . .41 
 
 1620 The North German Princes agree to neutrality at 
 Mar. Miihlhausen 42 
 
 June 3. Spinola, the Spanish General, prepares to attack the 
 Palatinate, and the Union, being frightened, signs 
 the treaty of Ulm, by which it agrees to observe 
 neutrality towards the League . . . .42 
 
 June 23. Maximilian, with Tilly in command of his army, 
 enters Austria and compels the Austrian Estates to 
 submit, whilst Spinola reduces the Western Pala- 
 tinate , o o ...... 42 
 
 Maximilian joins Bucquoi, and enters Bohemia . 43 
 
 Sep. 28. Frederick, having failed to organize resistance, joins 
 
 the Bohemian army ...... 44 
 
 Nov. 8. Defeat of Frederick at the Battle of the White Hill, 
 1619 and submission of Bohemia to the Emperor . . 45 
 
 Jan. 22. Frederick put to the Ban of the Empire . . .4^ 
 
Contents. xiii 
 
 Section II. — The War in the Upper Palatinate (January- 
 October 1621). 
 
 PAGB 
 
 1621 Frederick does not abandon hope of regaining Bo- 
 Jan, hernia 47 
 
 Ap. 12. The Treaty of Mentz dissolves the Union . . .47 
 Bad character of Mansfeld's Army . . . .48 
 
 May. Mansfeld takes the offensive 49 
 
 Aug. Recommencement of the War in the Lower Palatinate 50 
 Oct. Mansfeld unable to hold out in the Upper Palatinate 50 
 Oct. 10. Signs an engagement to disband his forces, but escapes 
 
 with them to Alsace 50 
 
 Section III. — Frederick's Allies {October iSzi-lIay 1622). 
 
 1621 James I. of England proposes to take Mansfeld into 
 
 his pay, but he cannot agree with the House of 
 Commons, and is therefore in want of money . 50 
 
 1622 He then tries to obtain a settlement of the German 
 
 disputes with the aid of Spain . . . .51 
 May. A conference for the pacification of Germany held at 
 
 Brussels 52 
 
 Frederick prepares for War, with the help of Mans- 
 feld, the Margrave of Baden, and Christian of 
 Brunswick, the latter being a Protestant Adminis- 
 trator of the Bishopric of Halberstadt , . .53 
 
 He ravages the diocese of Paderbom , . .55 
 
 Section IV. — The Fight for the Lower Palatinate {April- 
 July 1622). 
 Ap. 12. Frederick joins Mansfeld. Tilly defeats the Mar- 
 ' May 6. grave of Baden at Wimpfen . • . . . -57 
 June. Frederick, hopeful of success, refuses to consent to a 
 
 treaty, and seizes the Landgrave of Darmstadt . 58 
 But is driven by Tilly to retreat . . . .59 
 )"une 30. Defeat of Christian of Brunswick at Hochst . . 59 
 July. Mansfeld abandons the Palatinate, and Frederick, 
 
 after taking refuge at Sedan, retires to the Hague . 60 
 
xiv Contents. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 MANSFELD AND CHRISTIAN IN NORTH GERMANY. 
 
 Section I, — Mansf eld's Ifarch into the Netherlands {July- 
 NoveTnber 1622), 
 
 PACK 
 
 1622 Tilly proceeds to reduce the fortified places in the 
 
 Lower Palatinate 60 
 
 1623 The Electorate transferred from Frederick to Maxi- 
 Feb. 13. milian 61 
 
 1622 Change of feeling in North Germany . . .61 
 Aug. Mansfeld and Christian establish themselves in Lor- 
 raine, and then try to cut their way through the 
 Spanish Netherlands to join the Duke . . .63 
 Aug. 28. Battle of Fleurus. Christian loses his arm . . 63 
 Nov. Mansfeld establishes himself in East Friesland . . 64 
 
 Section IL — Christian of Brunswick in Lower Saxony 
 {November 1622-August 1623). 
 
 1622 The Lower Saxon Circle urged by Tilly to join him 
 
 against Mansfeld, and by Christian of Brunswick to 
 
 join him against Tilly 64 
 
 1623, Feb, Warlike preparations of the Circle . . .65 
 Aug. 6. Christian expelled from the Circle, and defeated by 
 
 Tilly at Stadtlohn 66 
 
 Section III. — Danger of the Lower Saxon Circle {August- 
 December 1623). 
 
 1623 The North German Protestant Bishoprics in danger . 66 
 Aug. Alarm in the Lower Saxon Circle . . . .68 
 Dec. But nothing is done, and its troops are disbanded . 68 
 
 Section IV, — England and France ( October iSz^-August 1624). 
 
 Oct, Foreign Powers ready to interfere . . . .69 
 
 Return of the Prince of Wales from Madrid . . 70 
 
 1624 Divergence between the English House of Commons 
 Feb.-May. and James I. upon the mode of recovering the Pa- 
 latinate ,.,...,.. 70 
 
 Position of the Huguenots in France , • .7a 
 
Contents. xv 
 
 Section V. — Rise of Richelieu {August iSz^-Septemher 
 
 1625). 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Aug. Lewis XIII. makes Richelieu his chief minister. He 
 is divided between a desire to combat Spain and a 
 desire to reduce the Huguenots to submission . 72 
 Richeheu's position less strong than it afterwards 
 became. He has to make great allowances for the 
 King's humour . . 7^ 
 
 Dec. French attack upon the Spanish garrisons in the 
 
 Valtelline 
 
 75 
 
 1625 Failure of Mansfeld's expedition intended by James 
 
 Jan.-June to recover the Palatinate 76 
 
 Jan. Richelieu's plans for engaging more deeply in the 
 war frustrated by the rising of the Huguenots of 
 
 Rochelle 
 
 Sept. The Huguenot fleet is defeated, but Rochelle holds 
 
 out 
 
 77 
 
 77 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 INTERVENTION OF THE KING OF DENMARK. 
 
 Section I. — Christian IV. and Gustavus Adolphus (1624). 
 Character and position of Christian IV., King of 
 Denmark . . . . . . . .78 
 
 Genius of Gustavus Adolphus 79 
 
 Sketch of the earlier part of his reign , . .80 
 His interest in German affairs 8a 
 
 Section II. — English Diplomacy {August iGz^-July 1625). 
 
 1624 The Kings of Denmark and Sweden asked by James 
 Aug. I. to join him in recovering the Palatinate . . 84 
 
 1625 The English Government, thinking the demands of 
 Jan. Gustavus exorbitant, forms an alliance with Chris- 
 tian IV 85 
 
 June. Meeting of the first Parliament of Charles I. 
 
xvi Contents. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 June. Gustavus directs his forces against Poland . . 86 
 Mar. 27. Death of James I, Accession of Charles I. . ,86 
 July 18. Christian IV., at the head of the Circle of Lower 
 Saxony, enters upon war with the army of the 
 
 League commanded by Tilly 87 
 
 Aug. Dissolution of the first Parliament of Charles I. 
 
 Section III. — Wallenstein' s Armam,ent (July 1625- 
 February 1626). 
 
 The Emperor needs more forces . . . .87 
 Wallenstein offers to raise an army for him. Account 
 
 of Wallenstein 's early life . ... 89 
 
 The system by which the army is to be supported is 
 
 to be one of forced contributions . . . .90 
 Oppressive burdens laid thereby on the country . 91 
 Wallenstein enters the dioceses of Magdeburg and 
 Halberstadt, and lies quietly there during the win- 
 ter . * •92 
 
 1626, Feb. Failure of negotiations for peace . . , .93 
 
 Section TV.— Defeat of Mansfeld and Christian IV. 
 {February-August 1626). 
 
 1626 Numerical superiority on the side of the King of 
 Feb. Denmark, but the Imperialists are superior in other 
 
 respects 94 
 
 Failure of the supplies promised to Christian by 
 
 Charles I . 95 
 
 Feb. Meeting of the second Parliament of Charles I. — 
 Impeachment of Buckingham 
 Ap. 25. Mansfeld defeated by Wallenstein at the Bridge of 
 
 Dessau . « 96 
 
 June. Dissolution of the second Parliament of Charles I. 
 Aug. 27. Christian IV. defeated by Tilly at Lutter . . .97 
 Wallenstein pursues Mansfeld into Hungary . . 97 
 
Contents. xvii 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 STRALSUND AND ROCHELLE. 
 
 Section I. — Fresh Successes of Wallenstein {August 1626- 
 Octoher 1627). 
 
 PAGB 
 
 1626 Divergence between the League and Wallenstein . . 98 
 Nov. Wallenstein advocates religious equality and the pre- 
 dominance of the army 98 
 
 1627 He persuades Ferdinand to increase his army, and is 
 Jan. created Duke of Friedland, in spite of the growing 
 
 dissatisfaction with his proceedings . . . 100 
 May-Aug, The King of Denmark hopes to resist Tilly, but 
 Wallenstein returns from Hungary, and gains pos- 
 session of Silesia loi 
 
 Sept. 20. Defeat of the Margrave of Baden at Heiligen-hafen 102 
 Oct. Christian IV. flies to the Island of Fiinen, leaving 
 
 Jutland to Wallenstein ...... 102 
 
 Section II. — Resistance to Wallenstein in the Empire 
 {October xbzj-Fehruary 1628). 
 
 1627 Meeting of the Electors at Miihlhausen. They com- 
 Oct. plain of Wallenstein 103 
 
 1628 The commercial towns of North Germany jealous of 
 
 Wallenstein 105 
 
 Feb. The Emperor declares the Dukes of Mecklenburg to 
 
 have forfeited their lands and titles, and pledges the 
 
 territory to Wallenstein 106 
 
 Wallenstein tries in vain to gain over the Hanse 
 
 Towns 106 
 
 He attempts to establish himself on the coast of the 
 
 Baltic by getting possession of the towns . . 108 
 
 Section III. — The Siege of Stralsund {August-February 1628). 
 Feb. As Stralsund refuses to admit a garrison, it is at- 
 tacked by Wallenstein 's orders . . . . 108 
 May. It is succoured by Denmark and Sweden . . . 109 
 
 Aug. 3. The siege is raised • .110 
 
 B 
 
xviii Contents, 
 
 Section lY.— The Siege of Eochelle (1625-1628). 
 
 PAGB 
 
 1625 Richelieu would have made peace with the Hugue- 
 
 nots if he had been able 113 
 
 1626 An agreement is effected, but comes to nothing 
 
 through the jealoMsy of Charles I. .... 112 
 
 1627 War between France and England, Buckingham's 
 
 expedition to Rh§ 113 
 
 Nov. Richelieu besieges Rochelle . . . . .114 
 1628. Mar. Meeting of the third Parliament of Charles I. 
 May. Failure of an English fleet to succour Rochelle . 115 
 June. The Petition of Might granted 
 Aug. Murder of the Dvxke of Buckingham . . .113 
 
 Nov. I. Surrender of Rochelle 113 
 
 Contrast between France and Germany. Toleration 
 granted to the Huguenots iifi 
 
 CHAPTER Vn. 
 
 THE EDICT OF RESTITUTION. 
 
 Section I. — Oppression of the Protestants {March 
 iSzS-May 1629). 
 
 1628, Mar. Surrender of Stade to Tilly 117 
 
 1629, Jan. Wallenstein fails to take Gliickstadt . . .117 
 Mar. Dissolution of the third ParliaTnent of Charles I. 
 
 May 22. Peace of Lubeck between Christian IV. and the 
 
 Emperor 118 
 
 Wallenstein invested with the Duchy of Mecklen- 
 burg 118 
 
 1628 The Protestants oppressed in the South of Germany 119 
 1629, Mar. 29. Issue of the Edict of Restitution . . 120 
 
 Section H. — French Intervention in Italy (i 628-1 630). 
 1628 War in Italy for the succession to the Duchy of 
 
 Mantua 121 
 
 i6!29 Richelieu enters Italy, and compels the Spaniards to 
 Mar. raise the siege of Casale . . , , . 122 
 Rebellion of Rohan in the south of France , .123 
 
Contents. xix 
 
 PAGB 
 
 1629 Richelieu again enters Italy, seizes Pignerol and 
 
 Saluces, and again forces the Spaniards to raise the 
 siege of Casale 123 
 
 1630 Negotiations between France and Sweden . . 124 
 
 Section III. — Wallenstein deprived of his Command 
 {March iSzg-Septemher 1630). 
 
 1629 Wallenstein increases his forces .... 125 
 Jealousy between him and the Catholic Electors . 126 
 
 1630 Assembly at Ratisbon 127 
 
 July 3. It demands that Wallenstein be deprived of his 
 
 command 127 
 
 July 4. Landing of Gustavus Adolphus in Germany . . 128 
 
 Sept. Dismissal of Wallenstein 129 
 
 Tilly in command 130 
 
 Section IV. — The Swedes establish themselves on the Coast of the 
 Baltic {July 162,0-January 1631). 
 
 July. Discipline in the Swedish Army .... 130 
 The Duke of Pomerania submits to him, but the 
 Elector of Brandenburg declares himself neutral . 130 
 1651 The treaty of Barwalde between France and Sweden 132 
 
 Section V. — The Fall of Magdeburg {January-May 1631). 
 
 Jan. Success of Gustavus on the Baltic coast . . . 133 
 March. The Electors of Saxony hold a Protestant Assembly 
 
 at Leipzig 133 
 
 Tilly attacks the Swedes, but is driven to retreat . 134 
 Ap. 26. Treaty of Cherasco between France and the English 135 
 May 15. Convention between Gustavus and the Elector of 
 
 Brandenburg ........ 136 
 
 May 20. Magdeburg stormed, plundered, and burnt . . 136 
 The Emperor refuses to cancel the Edict of Restitu- 
 tion 137 
 
XX Contents. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE VICTORIES OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. 
 
 Section I, — Alliance between the Swedes and the Saxont 
 
 {June-September 163 1). 
 
 PAGB 
 
 June 21. Gustavus compels the Elector of Brandenburg to an 
 
 alliance 138 
 
 Tuly. Gustavus at the Camp of Werben .... 138 
 Aug. Tilly summons the Elector of Saxony to submit . 139 
 Sept. He attacks Saxony, upon which the Elector forms an 
 
 alliance with Gustavus 139 
 
 Gustavus joins the Saxons 140 
 
 Section II. — Battle of Breitenfeld {September 163 1). 
 
 Sept. 17. Victory of Gustavus over Tilly at Breitenfeld . . 141 
 
 Wallenstein's intrigues with Gustavus . . . 142 
 
 Wallenstein and Gustavus unlikely to agree . . 143 
 
 Political and military designs of Gustavus . . 144 
 
 He looks for a basis of operations on the Rhine . 146 
 
 Section III. — March of Gustavus into South Germany 
 {October iS^i-lfay 1632). 
 
 Oct. March of Gustavus to Mentz 148 
 
 1632 In spite of the objections of the French, he attacks 
 
 Bavaria 149 
 
 Ap. 14. Tilly defeated and mortally wounded at the passage 
 
 of the Lech 149 
 
 May 17. Gustavus enters Munich 150 
 
 Section IV. — Wallenstein's Restoration to command 
 {September id^i-June 1632). 
 Sept. Wallenstein breaks off all intercourse with Gustavus 151 
 Nov. Attempts to reconcile the Elector of Saxony with the 
 
 Emperor 152 
 
 Dec. Is reinstated temporarily in the command of the Im- 
 perial Army . , ..... . . . 153 
 
Contents. xxi 
 
 PAGB 
 
 1632 Character of that Army , . . , . .153 
 April. Wallenstein permanently appointed Commander . 155 
 May. Offers peace to the Saxons, and drives them out of 
 
 Bohemia 155 
 
 June. Gustavus does not approve of the terms of peace of- 
 fered by Wallenstein 156 
 
 Section V. — Struggle between Gnstavus and Wallenstein 
 [June-October 1632). 
 
 June. Gustavus and Wallenstein opposed to one another at 
 
 Nuremberg . . . . . . . . 157 
 
 . 159 
 , 160 
 . 160 
 . 160 
 
 Efforts of Gustavus to maintain discipline 
 Sept. 4. Fails to storm Wallenstein's lines 
 Sept. 18. Gustavus leaves Nuremberg . . , 
 Oct. Wallenstein marches into Saxony 
 
 Section Yl.—The Battle oj Lutzen [October-November 1632). 
 
 Oct, Gustavus follows Wallenstein into Saxony . . 161 
 
 Nov. 16. Battle of Lutzen 162 
 
 Death of Gustavus 163 
 
 Victory of the Swedes 164 
 
 Irreparable loss by the death of Gustavus to the Pro- 
 testants 164 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 THE DEATH OF WALLENSTEIN AND THE TREATY OF PRAGUE. 
 
 Section I. — French Influence in Germany {November 1632- 
 April 1633). 
 
 1633 Differences between Bemhard and Oxenstjerna . 166 
 Ap. 23. The League of Heilbronn signed .... 167 
 Firm establishment of Richelieu's authority in 
 
 France 168 
 
 Richelieu's interposition in German affairs . . 169 
 
xxii Contents. 
 
 Section II. — Wallenstein's Attempt to dictate Peace 
 {April-December 1633). 
 
 PAGS 
 
 1633 Wallenstein's peace negotiations with the Swedes 
 
 and Saxons 170 
 
 Oct. He drives the Saxons out of Silesia .... 172 
 
 . Nov. Ratisbon taken by Bernhard 173 
 
 Spanish opposition to a peace which would leave 
 Spain exposed to French attacks .... 173 
 Dec. Wallenstein thinks of making peace, whether the Em- 
 peror consents or not ...... 17S 
 
 Section III, — Resistance to Wallenstein's Plans 
 {January-February 1634). 
 
 1634 Onate, the Spanish Ambassador, persuades the Em- 
 Jan, peror that Wallenstein is a traitor .... 17S 
 
 Ferdinand determines to displace Wallenstein . . 176 
 Feb. 19. Wallenstein engages the Colonels to support him . 177 
 
 Section IV. — Assassination of Wallenstein {February 1634). 
 
 Feb. 18. Wallenstein declared a traitor 179 
 
 Feb. 21. The garrison of Prague declares against him . . 179 
 
 Feb. 24. Wallenstein at Eger 179 
 
 Feb. 25. He is assassinated ....... 181 
 
 Comparison between Gustavus and Wallenstein . 181 
 
 Section V. — Imperialist Victories and the Treaty of Prague 
 {February iG^^-May 1635). 
 
 1634 The King of Hungary reorganizes the imperial 
 Feb. army 181 
 
 Sept. 6. In conjunction with the Cardinal-Infant, he defeats 
 
 Bernhard at Nordlingen 183 
 
 Consequent necessity of an increased French inter- 
 vention 184 
 
 1635 Peace of Prague 184 
 
 May 30. It is not universally accepted 185 
 
 Miserable condition of Germany. Notes of an Eng- 
 lish traveller . . . . , . , .187 
 
Contents. xxiii 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 THE PREPONDERANCE OF FRANCE. 
 
 Section l.—Oipen Intervention of France {May 1635). 
 
 PAGB 
 
 1635 Protestantism not out of danger .... 189 
 
 May. Close alliance of some of the Princes with France . 190 
 
 Importance of the possession of Alsace and Lorraine 191 
 
 May 19. France declares war against Spain .... 192 
 
 Section II. — Spanish Successes {May iS^S-Decemher 1637). 
 
 1635 Failure of the French attack on the Spanish Nether- 
 
 lands 192 
 
 1636 Spanish invasion of France , , . . . 193 
 Oct. 4. Bauer's victory at Wittstock 194 
 
 1637 Death of Ferdinand II. Accession of Ferdinand 
 Feb. 15. Ill 194 
 
 Imperialist success in Germany . . , . 195 
 
 Section III. — The Struggle for Alsace {January iS^S-July 
 
 1639). 
 
 1638 Bemhard's victories in the Breisgau and Alsace . 195 
 July 8. Death of Bernhard ....... 196 
 
 Section IV. — French Successes {July iSsg-JDec. 1642). 
 
 French maritime successes 197 
 
 1639 Spanish fleet taking refuge in the Downs . . . 198 
 It is destroyed by the Dutch 198 
 
 1640 Insurrection of Catalonia 199 
 
 Nov. Independence of Portugal ..... 200 
 
 1641 Defeat of the Imperialists at Wolfenbuttel . . 201 
 
 1642 Defeat of the Imperialists at Kempten . . . 201 
 Aug. Charles I. sets up his standard. Beginning of the 
 
 English Civil War 
 Dec. 4. Death of Richeheu . 201 
 
xxiv Contents. 
 
 Section V. — Aims and, Character oj Richelieu {December 1642- 
 
 May 1643). 
 
 PAGB 
 
 Richelieu's domestic policy 201 
 
 Contrast between France and England . . . 203 
 
 Richelieu's foreign policy - 203 
 
 1643 Moderation of his aims 204 
 
 May 14. Death of Lewis XIII 205 
 
 Section VI. — More French Victories {May 1643-August 1645). 
 
 1643 Rule of Cardinal Mazarin 205 
 
 May 19. Enghien defeats the Spaniards at Rocroy . . . 206 
 
 The French kept in check in Germany . . . 207 
 
 1644 Enghien and Turenne. Battle of Freiburg . . 208 
 July. Battle of Marston Moor 
 
 1645, Aug. 3. Second Battle of Nordlingen .... 2o3 
 Mar. 6. Swedish victory at Jankow 209 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 THE END OF THE WAR. 
 
 Section I. — Turenne's Strategy {June iS^^-Octoher 1648). 
 
 1645 Negotiations for peace begun 209 
 
 June, Battle of JVaseby 
 
 Aims of the Emperor and the Duke of Bavaria . . 210 
 
 1646 Turenne outmanoeuvres the Imperialists . . . 212 
 
 1647, May-Sept. Truce between the French and the Bavarians 213 
 
 1648, May 17. Defeat of the Bavarians at Zusmarshausen . 213 
 
 Section II, — The Treaty of Westphalia {Oct. 1648). 
 
 1648 Terms of the peace 213 
 
 Oct. 24. How far was toleration effected by it . . . 214 
 General desire for peace 217 
 
Contefits. XXV 
 
 Section III. — Condition of Germany. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Debasing effects of the war 217 
 
 Decrease of the population 218 
 
 Moral and intellectual decadence .... 218 
 
 Disintegration of Germany 220 
 
 Protestantism saved, and with it the future culture of 
 Germany 220 
 
 Section IV. — Continuance of the War between France and 
 Spain (1648-1660). 
 
 1648 Recognition of the independence of the Dutch 
 
 Republic 221 
 
 1649 Execution of Charles I. 
 
 The Fronde 222 
 
 .223 
 . 223 
 . 224 
 
 . 22t 
 
 Continuance of the war with Spain . 
 Alliance between France and Cromwell 
 1660 Treaty of Pyrenees .... 
 French greatnesg based on Tolerance 
 Intolerance of Lewis XIV. and downfall of the 
 French monarchy ant 
 
THE 
 
 THIRTY YEARS' WAR, 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 CAUSES OF THE THIRTY YEARS* WAR. 
 
 Section I. — Political Institutions of Germany. 
 
 It was the misfortune of Germany in the sixteenth and 
 seventeenth centuries that, with most of the conditions 
 requisite for the formation of national unity, » ,^ 
 she had no really national institutions, national insti- 
 
 rx-ii 1 1 1 J tutions in 
 
 i here was an emperor, who looked some- Germany, 
 thing like an English king, and a Diet, or 
 General Assembly, which looked something like an 
 English Parliament, but the resemblance was far greater 
 in appearance than in reality. 
 
 The Emperor was chosen by three ecclesiastical 
 electors, the Archbishops of Mentz, Treves and Cologne, 
 and four lay electors, the Elector Palatine, 
 the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, l^j-or. ^ ™' 
 and the King of Bohemia. In theory he was 
 the successor of the Roman Emperors Julius and Con- 
 stantine, the ruler of the world, or of so much of it at 
 least as he could bring under his sway. More particu- 
 larly, he was the successor of Charles the Great and Otto 
 
2 Causes of the Thirty Years' War. 1440-15 17. 
 
 the Great, the lay head of Western Christendom. The 
 Emperor Sigismund, on his death-bed, had directed that 
 his body should lie in state for some days, that men might 
 see 'that the lord of all the world was dead.' 'We have 
 chosen your grace,' said the electors to Frederick III., 
 ' as head, protector, and governor of all Christendom.' 
 Yet it would be hard to find a single fragment of reality 
 corresponding to the magnificence of the claim. 
 
 As far, however, as the period now under review is 
 concerned, though the name of Emperor was retained, it 
 is unnecessary to trouble ourselves with the 
 man kingshfp! rights, real or imaginary, connected with the 
 imperial dignity. Charles the Great, before 
 the imperial crown was conferred on him, ruled as king, 
 by national assent or by conquest, over a great part of 
 Western Europe. When his dominions were divided 
 amongst his successors, the rule of those successors in 
 Germany or elsewhere had no necessary connexion with 
 the imperial crown. Henry the Fowler, one of the great- 
 est of the Kings of the Germans, was never an emperor 
 at all, and though, after the reign of his son Otto the 
 Great, the German kings claimed from the Pope the im- 
 perial crown as their right, they never failed also to re- 
 ceive a special German crown at Aachen [Azx-ta- Cha- 
 pelle] or at Frankfort as the symbol of their headship 
 over German lands and German men. 
 
 When, therefore, the writers of the i6th or 17th centU" 
 ries speak of the rights of the Emperor in Germany, they 
 
 , , really mean to speak of the rights of the Em- 
 
 §4. Its con- . 1 . . r^^ ■, ■ 
 
 nexion with peror m his capacity of German kmg, just as, 
 
 mpire. ^j^gj^ they speak of the Empire, they mean 
 what we call Germany, together with certain surround- 
 ing districts, such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, Lor- 
 raine, and Eastern Burgundy or Franche Comte, which 
 
i44o~i5^7- Political Institutions of Germany, 3 
 
 are not now, if Alsace and the newly-conquered part of 
 Lorraine be excepted, included under that name. In the 
 same way the mere fragments of feudal supremacy, and 
 th^ payment of feudal dues which the emperors claimed 
 in Italy, belonged to them, not as emperors, but simply 
 as Italian kings, and as wearers of the iron crown of 
 Lombardy, which, as the legends told, was formed of 
 nails taken from the Saviour's cross. 
 
 Not that it would be wise, even if it were possible, to 
 do otherwise than to follow the practice of contem- 
 poraries. The strange form. Emperor of 
 
 /- 1 1 • 1 1 -I ? 5- Some 
 
 Germany, by which, at a later period, men confusion 
 unfamiliar with Germany history strove to "^^^oi^^^^^e. 
 reconcile the old claims with something like the actual 
 fact, had not been yet invented. And, after all, the 
 confusions of history, the use of words and titles when 
 their meaning is changed, are so many tokens to remind 
 us of the unity of successive generations, and of the 
 impossibility of any one of them building anew without 
 regarding the foundations of their fathers. All that is 
 needed is to remember that the emperor of later times is 
 a personage whose rights and functions can be profitably 
 compared with those of Henry VIII. of England or 
 Lewis XIV. of France, not with Julius or Constantine 
 whose successor he professed himself to be. 
 
 * Take away the rights of the Emperor,' said a law 
 book of the fifteenth century, in language which would 
 have startled an old Roman legislator, ' and 
 who can say, "This house is mine, this vil- great 
 lage belongs to me?'" But the princes ''^'^^^* 
 and bishops, the counts and cities, who were glad enough 
 to plead on their own behalf that their lands were held 
 directly from the head of the Empire, took care to allow 
 him scarcely any real authority. This kingly dignity 
 
Causes of the Thirty Years' War. 1440-15 17. 
 
 which passed under the name of the Empire was indeed 
 very weak. It had never outgrown the needs of the 
 Middle Ages, and was still essentially a feudal kingship. 
 From circumstances which it would take too much space 
 to notice here, it had failed in placing itself at the head 
 of a national organization, and in becoming the guard- 
 ian of the rights of the tillers of the soil and the burghers 
 of the towns, who found no place in the ranks of the 
 feudal chivalry. 
 
 The immediate vassals of the Empire, in fact, were 
 almost independent sovereigns, like the Dukes of Nor- 
 mandy in the France of the tenth century, 
 independence. ^^ ^^ Dukes of Burgundy in the France of 
 the fifteenth century. They quarrelled and 
 made war with one another like the Kings of England 
 and France. Their own vassals, their own peasants, their 
 own towns could only reach the Emperor through them, 
 if anybody thought it worth while to reach him at all. 
 
 The prospect of reviving the German kingship which 
 was veiled under the august title of Emperor seemed far 
 distant at the beginning of the fifteenth cen- 
 of order.°^^^*^* tury. But whilst the Empire, in its old sense., 
 with its claims to universal dominion, was a 
 dream, this German kingship needed but wisdom in the 
 occupant of the throne to seize the national feeling, which 
 was certain sooner or later to call out for a national ruler, 
 in order to clothe itself in all the authority which was 
 needed for the maintenance of the unity and the safety 
 of the German people. That, when the time came, the 
 man to grasp the opportunity was not there, was the chief 
 amongst the causes of that unhappy tragedy of disunion 
 which culminated in the Thirty Years' War. 
 
 In the middle of the fifteenth century an effort was 
 made to introduce a system of regular assemblies, un- 
 
I440~i5^7- Political Institutions of Germany 5 
 der the name of a Diet, in order to stem the , 
 
 ? 9- Attempts 
 
 tide of anarchy. But it never entered mto to introduce 
 the mind of the wisest statesman living to 
 summon any general representation of the people. In 
 the old feudal assemblies no one had taken part who 
 was not an immediate vassal of the Empire, and the 
 Diet professed to be only a more regular organization of 
 the old feudal assemblies. 
 
 From the Diet, therefore, all subjects of the territorial 
 princes were rigorously excluded. Whatever their wishes 
 or opinions might be, they had neither part nor lot in 
 the counsels of the nation. There was nothing in the 
 Diet answering to those representatives of 
 English counties, men not great enough to i)iet,or gene- 
 assume the state of independent princes, nor of t^e^lm^pSre. 
 small enough to be content simply to regis- 
 ter without question the decrees of those in authority 
 who with us did more than any other class to cement 
 town and country, king and people together. Nor did 
 even the less powerful of the immediate vassals take 
 part in the meetings. Like the lesser barons of the early 
 Plantagenet reigns, they slipped out of a position to 
 which they seemed to have a right by the fact that they 
 held their few square miles of land as directly from the 
 Emperor as the Dukes of Bavaria or the Electors of 
 Saxony held the goodly principalities over which they 
 ruled. 
 
 Such a body was more like a congress of the repre- 
 sentatives of European sovereigns than an English Par- 
 liament. Each member came in his own i n. The 
 right. He might or might not speak the {{[["e^foAhe 
 sentiments of his subjects, and, even if he ■'-*'^*- 
 did, he naturally preferred deciding pretty much as he 
 pleased at home to allowing the question to be debated 
 
Causes of the Thirty Years'* War. 1440-1517,1 
 
 by an assembly of his equals. An Elector of Saxony, a ■ 
 Landgrave of Hesse, or an Archduke of Austria knew 
 that taxes were levied, armies trained, temporal and 
 spiritual wants provided for at his own court at Dresden, 
 at Cassel, or at Vienna, and he had no wish that it should 
 be otherwise. Nor was it easy, even when a prince had 
 made himself so obnoxious as to call down upon him- 
 self the condemnation of his fellows, to subject him to 
 punishment. He might, indeed, be put to the ban of 
 the Empire, a kind of secular excommunication. But if 
 he were powerful himself, and had powerful friends, it 
 might be difficult to put it in execution. It would be 
 necessary to levy war against him, and that war might 
 not be successful. 
 
 Still, at the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of 
 
 the sixteenth centuries some progress was made. An 
 
 Imperial Court [Reickskammergericht) came 
 
 sortoforder into existence, mainly nominated by the 
 
 established. • r ^.i. t' • j ^i. • j j. 
 
 prmces of the Empire, and authorized to 
 pronounce judgment upon cases arising between the 
 rulers of the various territories. In order to seci.;e the 
 better execution of the sentences of this court, Germany 
 was divided into circles, in each of which the princes 
 and cities who were entitled to a voice in the Diet of the 
 Empire were authorized to meet together and to levy 
 troops for the maintenance of order. 
 
 These princes, lay and ecclesiastical, together with the 
 
 cities holding immediately from the Empire, were called 
 
 ^, the Estates of the Empire. When they met 
 
 § 13. The . . ^ •' 
 
 three Houses m the general Diet they voted in three 
 
 of the Diet. i rr-i /= . -l j j- 
 
 houses. The first house was composed of 
 the seven Electors, though it was only at an Imperial 
 election that the number was complete. At all ordi- 
 nary meetings for legislation, or for the dispatch of busi- 
 
 II 
 
i44o~i5^7- Protestantism in Germany. 7 
 
 ness, the king of Bohemia was excluded, and six Electors 
 only appeared. The next house was the House of 
 Princes, comprising all those persons, lay or ecclesiasti- 
 cal, who had the right of sitting in the Diet. Lastly, 
 came the Free Imperial Cities, the only popular element 
 in the Diet. But they were treated as decidedly inferior 
 to the other two houses. When the Electors and the 
 Princes had agreed upon a proposition, then and not till 
 then it was submitted to the House of Cities. 
 
 The special risk attending such a constitution was that 
 it provided almost exclusively for the wants of the 
 princes and electors. In the Diet, in the circles, and in 
 the Imperial Court, the princes and electors ^ 14. The 
 exercised a preponderating, if not quite an ^uies too weak, 
 exclusive influence. In ordinary times there might be 
 no danger. But if extraordinary times arose, if any 
 great movement swept over the surface of the nation, it 
 might very well be that the nation would be on one side 
 and the princes and the electors on the other. And if 
 this were the case there would be great difficulty in 
 bringing the nation into harmony with its institutions. 
 In England the sovereign could alter a hostile majority 
 in the House of Lords by a fresh creation of peers, and 
 the constituencies could alter a hostile majority of the 
 House of Commons by a fresh election. In Germany 
 there was no House of Commons, and an emperor who 
 should try to create fresh princes out of the immediate 
 vassals who were too weak to be summoned to the Diet 
 would only render himself ridiculous by an attempt to 
 place in check the real possessors of power by the help 
 of those who had the mere appearance of it. 
 
 Section II. — Protestantism in Germany. 
 
 When, in the sixteenth century, Protestantism sud- 
 
 c 
 
8 Causes of the Thirty Years' War. 151 7-1552. 
 
 denly raised its head, the institutions of the 
 
 g I. The . -11 T- 
 
 German peo- Empire Were tried to the uttermost. For 
 Protestanxism ; the mass of the nation declared itself in 
 the Diet op- favour of change, and the Diet was so com- 
 
 Dosed to it. '^ ' 
 
 posed as to be hostile to change, as soon as 
 it appeared that it was likely to take the direction of 
 Lutheranism. In the Electoral House, indeed, the votes 
 of the three ecclesiastical electors were met by the votes 
 of the three lay electors. But in the House of Princes 
 there were thirty-eight ecclesiastical dignitaries and but 
 eighteen laymen. It was a body, in short, like the Eng- 
 lish House of Lords before the Reformation, and there 
 was no Henry VIII. to bring it into harmony with the 
 direction v/hich lay society was taking, by some act 
 equivalent to the dissolution of the monasteries, and the 
 consequent exclusion of the mitred abbots from their 
 seats in Parliament. To pass measures favourable to 
 Protestantism through such a house was simply impossi- 
 ble. Yet it can hardly be doubted that a really national 
 Parliament would have adopted Lutheranism, more or 
 less modified, as the religion of the nation. Before Pro- 
 testantism was fifty years old, in spite of all difficulties, 
 ninety per cent, of the population of Germany were Pro- 
 testant. 
 
 In default of national action in favor of Protestantism, 
 it was adopted and supported by most of the lay princes 
 
 , and electors. A new principle of disinte- 
 ? 2. Most of . , . , . ^ 
 
 the lay princes gration was thus introduced into Germany, 
 
 ^ "^ ^ ' as these princes were forced to act in op- 
 
 position to the views adopted by the Diet. 
 
 If the Diet was unlikely to play the part 
 
 peror Charles of an English Parliament, neither was the 
 
 Emperor likely to play the part of Henry 
 
 VIII. For the interests of Germany, Charles V., who 
 
1517-1552- Protestantism in Germany. 9 
 
 had been elected in 15 19, was weak where he ought 
 to have been strong, and strong where he ought to have 
 been weak. As Emperor, he was nothing. As feudal 
 sovereign and national ruler, he was very little. But he 
 was also a prince of the Empire, and as such he ruled 
 over the Austrian duchies and Tyrol. Further than this, 
 he was one of the most powerful sovereigns of Europe. 
 He was king of Spain, and of the Indies with all their 
 mines. In Italy, he disposed of Naples and the Mila- 
 nese. Sicily and Sardinia were his, and, under various 
 titles, he ruled over the fragments of the old Burgundian 
 inheritance, Franche Comte, and the seventeen pro- 
 vinces of the Netherlands. Such a man would influence 
 the progress of affairs in Germany with a weight out of 
 all proportion to his position in the German constitution. 
 And unhappily, with the power of a foreign sovereign, 
 he brought the mind of a foreigner. His mother's 
 Spanish blood beat in his veins, and he had the instinc- 
 tive aversion of a Spaniard to anything which savoured 
 of opposition to the doctrines of the Church. 'That 
 man,' he said, when he caught sight of Luther for the 
 first time, ' shall never make me a heretic' 
 
 Of this antagonism between the minority of the 
 princes backed by the majority of the nation, and the 
 majority of the princes backed by an Em- 1552. 
 
 peror who was also a foreign sovereign, Convention 
 civil war was the natural result. In the end, °^ Nassau. 
 the triumph of the Protestants was so far secured that 
 they forced their opponents in 1552 to yield to the Conven- 
 tion of Passau, by which it was arranged that a Diet should 
 be held as soon as possible for a general pacification. 
 
 That Diet, which was assembled at Augs- 1555. 
 
 burg in 1555, "^^t under remarkably fa- pel'ceof^ 
 vourable circumstances. Charles V., baffled ^"gsburg. 
 
lo Causes of the Thirty Years' War. ^555 
 
 and disappointed, had retired from the scene, and had 
 left behind him, as his representative, his more con- 
 cihatory brother Ferdinand, who was already King of 
 Hungary and Bohemia, and was his destined successor 
 in the German possessions of the House of Austria. 
 Both he and the leading men on either side were anxious 
 for peace, and were jealous of the influence which 
 Philip, the son of Charles V., and his successor in Spain, 
 Italy, and the Netherlands, might gain from a continu- 
 ance of the war. 
 
 There was little difficulty in arranging that the Pro- 
 testant princes, who, before the date of the Convention 
 , , ^ of Passau, had seized ecclesiastical property 
 
 g 6. Its terms. ' r r 7 
 
 within their own territories, either for their 
 
 own purposes or for the support of Protestant worship, 
 should no longer be subject to the law or authority of 
 the Catholic clergy. The real difficulty arose in pro- 
 viding for the future. With Protestantism as a growing 
 religion, the princes might be inclined to proceed further 
 with the secularizing of the Church property still left un- 
 touched within their own territories ; and besides this, 
 it was possible that even bishops or abbots themselves, 
 being princes of the Empire, might be inclined to aban- 
 don their religion, and to adopt Protestantism. 
 
 The first of these difficulties was left by the treaty in 
 some obscurity ; but, from the stress laid on the aban- 
 ? 7. Might donment by the Catholics of the lands se- 
 sefze'more^ cularized before the Convention of Passau, 
 lands ? j|. -yv^ould sccm that they might fairly urge 
 
 that they had never abandoned their claims to lands 
 which at that date had not been secularized. 
 
 The second difficulty led to long discussions. The 
 Protestants wished that any bishop or abbot who pleased 
 might be allowed to turn Protestant, and might then 
 
^S5S- Protestantisin in Germany. ii 
 
 establish Protestantism as the religion of § 8. Might 
 his subjects. The Catholics insisted that tics turn Pro'- 
 any bishop or abbot who changed his religion testants ? 
 should be compelled to vacate his post, and this view of 
 the case prevailed, under the name of the Ecclesiastical 
 Reservation. It was further agreed that the peace 
 should apply to the Lutheran Church alone, no other 
 confession having been as yet adopted by any of the 
 princes. 
 
 Such a peace, acceptable as it was at the time, was 
 pregnant with future evil. Owing its origin to a Diet in 
 which everything was arranged by the princes and 
 electors, it settled all questions as if nobody but princes 
 and electors had any interest in the matter. , ^ 
 
 •' go. Dangers 
 
 And, besides this, there was a most unstates- ofthe future. 
 manlike want of provision for future change. 
 The year 1552 was to give the line by which the religious 
 institutions of Germany were to be measured for all 
 time. There was nothing elastic about such legislation. 
 It did not, on the one hand, adopt the religion of the vast 
 majority as the established religion of the Empire. It 
 did not, on the other hand, adopt the principle of reli- 
 gious liberty. In thinking of themselves and their 
 rights, the princes had forgotten the German people. 
 
 The barriers set up against Protestantism were so 
 plainly artificial that they soon gave way. The princes 
 claimed the right of continuing to secularize 
 Church lands within their territories as inse- croachments 
 parable from their general right of providing "^p^^ Church 
 for the religion of their subjects. At all . 
 events they had might on their side. About a hundred 
 monasteries are said to have fallen victims in the Pala- 
 tinate alone, and an almost equal number, the gleanings 
 of a richer harvest which had been reaped before the 
 
Causes of the Thirty Years' War, 1555- 15 70. 
 
 Convention of Passau, were taken possession of in 
 Northern Germany. 
 
 The Ecclesiastical Reservation applied to a different 
 
 class of property, namely, to the bishoprics and abbeys 
 
 held immediately of the Empire. Here, too, 
 
 §11. The Ec- / 1 r 1- 
 
 ciesiastical the Protcstants found an excuse for evadmg 
 eserva ion. ^^ Treaty of Augsburg. The object of the 
 reservation, they argued, was not to keep the bishoprics 
 in Catholic hands, but to prevent quarrels arising be- 
 tween the bishops and their chapters. If, therefore, a 
 bishop elected as a Catholic chose to turn Protestant, he 
 must resign his see in order to avoid giving offence to 
 the Catholic chapter. But where a chapter, itself already 
 Protestant, elected a Protestant bishop, he might take 
 the see without hesitation, and hold it as long as he 
 lived. 
 
 In this way eight of the great northern bishoprics 
 soon came under Protestant rule. Not that the Protest- 
 ant occupant was in any real sense of the 
 word a bishop. He was simply an elected 
 prince, calling himself a bishop, or often 
 more modestly an administrator, and look- 
 ing after the temporal affairs of his dominions. 
 
 In some respects the arrangement was a good one. 
 The populations of these territories were mainly Protest- 
 ant, and they had no cause to complain. 
 Besides, if only a sufficient number of these 
 bishoprics could be gained to Protestantism, 
 the factitious majority in the Diet might be reversed, 
 and an assembly obtained more truly representing the 
 nation than that which was in existence. But it must be 
 acknowledged that the whole thing had an ugly look ; 
 and it is no wonder that Catholics pronounced these ad- 
 ministrators to be no bishops at all, and to have no right 
 
 ?i2. The 
 northern bish- 
 oprics Pro- 
 testant. 
 
 ? 13. Good and 
 bad side of the 
 arrangement. 
 
157 o~ 1595- R^ (Action against Protestantism. 13 
 
 to hold the bishops' lands, or to take their seat as bishops 
 in the Diet of the Empire. 
 
 Section III. — Reaction against Protestantism. 
 
 In course of time Protestantism, in its turn, exposed 
 itself to attack. Each petty court soon had its own 
 school of theologians, whose minds were „ ^, , . 
 
 g I. Tneologi- 
 
 dwarfed to the limits of the circle which they cai disputes 
 influenced with their logic and their elo- tesums/^' 
 quence. The healthful feeling which springs 
 from action on a large stage was wanting to them. 
 Bitterly wrangling with one another, they were eager to 
 call in the secular arm against their opponents. Seizing 
 the opportunity, the ncAvly-constituted order of Jesuits 
 stepped forward to bid silence in the name of the reno- 
 vated Papal Church, alone, as they urged, able to give 
 peace instead of strife, certainty instead of disputation. 
 The Protestants were taken at a disadvantage. The 
 enthusiasm of a national life, which repelled the Jesuits 
 in the England of the sixteenth century, and the enthu- 
 siasm of scientific knowledge which repels them in the 
 Germany of the nineteenth century, were alike wanting 
 to a Germany in which national life was a dream of the 
 past, and science a dream of the future. Luther had 
 long ago passed away from the world, Melanchthon's 
 last days were spent in hopeless protest against the evil 
 around him. 'For two reasons,' he said, as he lay upon 
 his death-bed, ' I desire to leave this life : First, that J 
 may enjoy the sight, which I long for, of the Son of God 
 and of the Church in Heaven. Next, that I may be set 
 free from the monstrous and implacable hatreds of the 
 theologians.* 
 
 In the face of a divided people, or self-seeking 
 princes, and of conflicting theories, the Jesuits made 
 
X4 Causes of the Thirty Years'' War, 15 70-1 5 9 6. 
 
 their way. Step by step the Catholic reac- 
 
 Catholics tion gained ground, not without compulsion, 
 
 e progress, -j^^^ ^^^ ^^^ without that moral force which 
 
 makes compulsion possible. The bishops and abbots 
 gave their subjects the choice between conversion and 
 exile. An attempt made by the Archbishop of Cologne 
 to marry and turn Protestant was too plainly in contradic- 
 tion to the Ecclesiastical Reservation to prosper, and 
 when the Protestant majority of the Chapter of Stras- 
 burg elected a Protestant bishop they were soon over- 
 powered. A Protestant Archbishop of Magdeburg offer- 
 ing to take his place amongst the princes of the Empire 
 at the Diet was refused admission, and though nothing 
 was done to dispossess him and the other northern ad- 
 ministrators of their sees, yet a slur had been cast upon 
 their title which they were anxious to efface. A few 
 years later a legal decision was obtained in the cases of 
 four monasteries secularized after the Convention of 
 Passau, and that decision was adverse to the claim of 
 the Protestants. 
 
 Out of these two disputes — ^the dispute about the Pro- 
 testant administrators and the dispute about the secular- 
 § 3. The dis- ized lands — the Thirty Years' War arose, 
 ledlinaliy^to The Catholic party stood upon the strict let- 
 
 war, 
 
 ter of the law, according, at least, to their 
 own interpretation, and asked that everything might be 
 replaced in the condition in which it was in 1552, the 
 date of the Convention of Passau. The Protestant view, 
 that consideration should be taken for changes, many 
 of which at the_ end of the sixteenth century were at 
 least a generation old, may or may not have been in 
 accordance with the law, but it was certainly in accord- 
 ance with the desires of the greater part of the popular 
 tion affected by them. 
 
1596-1607. T^ree Parties and Three Leaders. 15 
 
 There is every reason to believe that if Germany had 
 possessed anything hke a popular representation its 
 voice would have spoken in favour of some „ 
 
 . . - i \- JNopopu- 
 
 kind of compromise. There is no trace of lar represen- 
 any mutual hostility between the popula- 
 tions of the Catholic and Protestant districts apart from 
 their rulers. 
 
 Section IV. — Three Parties and Three Leaders. 
 
 Two men stood forward to personify the elements of 
 strife — Maximilian, the Catholic Duke of Bavaria, and the 
 Calvinist Prince Christian of Anhalt, whilst , ^, 
 
 i \. Ihe 
 
 the warmest advocate of peace was John leaders of 
 George, the Lutheran Elector of Saxony. ^^'^ ^^^' 
 
 Maximilian of Bavaria was the only lay prince of any 
 importance on the side of the Catholics. He had long 
 been known as a wise administrator of his own domin- 
 ions. No other ruler was provided with so , ,, . . 
 
 " . . . ? 2. Maximi- 
 
 well-nlled a treasury, or so disciplined an liaaofBava- 
 army. No other ruler was so capable of 
 forming designs which were likely to win the approba- 
 tion of others, or so patient in waiting till the proper time 
 arrived for their execution. ' What the Duke of Bava- 
 ria does,' said one of his most discerning opponents, 
 * has hands and feet.' His plans, when once they were 
 launched into the world, seemed to march forwards of 
 themselves to success. 
 
 Such a man was not likely to take up the wild theories 
 which were here and there springing up, of the duty of 
 uprooting Protestantism at all times and all a 3 His love 
 places, or to declare, as some were declar- of le&ahty. 
 ing, that the Peace of Augsburg was invalid because it 
 had never been confirmed by the Pope. To him the 
 Peace of Augsburg was the legal settlement by which all 
 
1 6 Causes of the Thirty Vears^ War. 15 96-1 60 7. 
 
 questions were to be tried. What he read there was 
 hostile to the Protestant administrators and the seculariz- 
 ing princes. Yet he did not propose to carry his views 
 into instant action. He would await his opportunity. 
 But he would do his best to be strong, in order that he 
 might not be found wanting when the opportunity ar- 
 rived, and, in spite of his enthusiasm for legal rights, it 
 was by no means unlikely that, if a difficult point arose, 
 he might be inclined to strain the law in his own favour. 
 Such an opponent, so moderate and yet so resolute, 
 was a far more dangerous enemy to the Protestants than 
 ^ ' the most blatant declaimer against their 
 
 g 4. Danger " 
 
 of the Protest- doctrines. Naturally, the Protestants re- 
 garded his views as entirely inadmissible. 
 They implied nothing less than the forcible conversion 
 of the thousands of Protestants who were inhabitants of 
 the administrators' dominions, and the occupation by 
 the Catholic clergy of points of vantage which would 
 serve them in their operations upon the surrounding dis- 
 tricts. It is true that the change, if effected would sim- 
 ply replace matters in the position which had been found 
 endurable in 1552. But that which could be borne when 
 the Catholics were weak and despondent might be an 
 intolerable menace when they were confident and ag- 
 gressive. 
 
 Resistance, therefore, became a duty, a duty to which 
 
 the princes were all the more likely to pay attention be- 
 
 ^ cause it coincided with their private interest. 
 
 g 5. JJanger , , '■ 
 
 of the Protest- In the bishopries and chapters they found 
 provision for their younger sons, from 
 which they would be cut off if Protestants were hereafter 
 to be excluded. 
 
 The only question was in what spirit the resistance 
 should be offered. The tie which bound the Empire to- 
 
1 5 96-1 607. Three Parties and Three Leaders, 17 
 
 gether was so loose, and resistance to law, § 6. Protest, 
 or what was thought to be law, was so like- north and 
 ly to lead to resistance to law in general, south, 
 that it was the more incumbent on the Protestants to 
 choose their ground well. And in Germany, at least, 
 there was not likely to be any hasty provocation to give 
 Maximilian an excuse for reclaiming the bishoprics. 
 Far removed from the danger, these northern Lutherans 
 found it difficult to conceive that there was any real dan- 
 ger at all. The states of the south, lying like a wedge 
 driven into the heart of European Catholicism, were 
 forced by their geographical position to be ever on the 
 alert. They knew that they were the advanced guard 
 of Protestantism. On the one flank was the Catholic 
 duchy of Bavaria, and the bishoprics of Wurzburg and 
 Bamberg. On the other flank were the ecclesiastical 
 electorates on the Rhine and the Moselle, the bishoprics 
 of Worms, Spires, and Strasburg, the Austrian lands in 
 Swabia and Alsace, and the long line of the Spanish 
 frontier in Tranche Comte and the Netherlands garri- 
 soned by the troops of the first military monarchy in 
 Europe. What wonder if men so endangered were in 
 haste to cut the knot which threatened to strangle them, 
 and to meet the enemy by flying in his face rather than 
 by awaiting the onslaught which they believed to be in- 
 evitable. 
 
 Under the influence of this feeling the princes of these 
 southern regions for the most part adopted a religion 
 very different from the courtly Lutheranism „ 
 
 2 7- bpread j 
 
 of the north. If Wiirtemberg continued of Calvinism. 
 Lutheran under the influence of the Univer- 
 sity of Tubingen, the rulers of the Palatinate, of Hesse 
 Cassel, of Baden-Durlach, of Zwei-Briicken, sought for 
 strength in the iron discipline of Calvinism, a form of 
 
i8 Causes of the Thirty Years* War. 1596-1607. 
 
 religion which always came into favour when there 
 was an immediate prospect of a death-struggle with 
 Rome. 
 
 Unhappily, German Calvinism differed from that of 
 Scotland and the Netherlands. Owing to its adoption 
 38 r 1 ^^ ^^ princes rather than by the people, it 
 character of failed in gaining that hardy growth which 
 Germany. made it invincible on its native soil. It had 
 
 less of the discipline of an army about it, 
 less resolute defiance, less strength altogether. And 
 whilst it was weaker it was more provocative. Excluded 
 from the benefits of the Peace of Augsburg, which knew 
 of no Protestant body except the Lutheran, the Calvin- 
 ists were apt to talk about the institutions of the Empire 
 in a manner so disparaging as to give offence to Luther- 
 ans and Catholics alike. 
 
 Of this Calvinist feeling Christian of Anhalt became 
 the impersonation. The leadership of the Calvinist 
 states in the beginning of the seventeenth 
 rick IV., century would naturally have devolved on 
 
 Palatine. ' Frederick IV., Elector Palatine. But Fred- 
 erick was an incapable drunkard, and his 
 councillors, with Christian at their head, were left to act 
 in his name. 
 
 Christian of Anhalt possessed a brain of inexhaustible 
 
 fertility. As soon as one plan which he had framed ap- 
 
 ^, . peared impracticable, he was ready with 
 
 § 10. Chris- ^ ^ T 1 • -1 
 
 tian of another. He was a born diplomatist, and 
 
 all the chief politicians of Europe were in- 
 timately known to him by report, whilst with many of 
 them he carried on a close personal intercourse. His 
 leading idea was that the maintenance of peace was 
 hopeless, and that either Protestantism must get rid of 
 the House of Austria, or the House of Austria would get 
 
1607. Three Parties and Three Leaders. 19 
 
 rid of Protestantism. Whether this were true or false, it 
 is certain that he committed the terrible fault of under- 
 estimating his enemy. Whilst Maximilian was drilling 
 soldiers and saving money, Christian was trusting to 
 mere diplomatic finesse. He had no idea of the tena- 
 city with which men will cling to institutions, however 
 rotten, till they feel sure that some other institutions will 
 be substituted for them, or of the strength which Maxi- 
 milian derived from the appearance of conservatism in 
 which his revolutionary designs were shrouded even 
 from his own observation. In order to give to Protes- 
 tantism that development which in Christian's eyes was 
 necessary to its safety, it would be needful to overthrow 
 the authority of the Emperor and of the Diet. And if 
 the Emperor and the Diet were overthrown, what had 
 Christian to offer to save Germany from anarchy ? If 
 his plan included, as there is little doubt that it did, the 
 seizure of the lands of the neighbouring bishops, and a 
 fresh secularization of ecclesiastical property, even Pro- 
 testant towns might begin to ask whether their turn 
 would not come next. A return to the old days of 
 private war and the law of the strongest would be 
 welcome to very few. 
 
 In 1607 an event occurred which raised the alarm of 
 the southern Protestants to fever heat. In the free city 
 
 of Donauworth the abbot of a monastery 
 
 1007. 
 
 saw fit to send out a procession to flaunt its I n. The 
 
 banners in the face of an almost entirely of Donau- 
 
 occupation 
 of Dor 
 worth. 
 
 Protestant population. Before the starting- 
 point was regained mud and stones were thrown, and 
 some of those who had taken part in the proceedings 
 were roughly handled. The Imperial Court [Rezck- 
 skammergerickt) y whose dlity it was to settle such quar- 
 rels, was out of working order in consequence of the 
 
20 Causes of the Thirty Years' War. 1608. 
 
 religious disputes ; but there was an Imperial Council 
 [Reichshofrath), consisting of nominees of the Emperor, 
 and professing to act out of the plenitude of imperial au- 
 thority. By this council Donauworth was put to the ban 
 of the Empire without due form of trial, and Maximilian 
 was appointed to execute the decree. He at once 
 marched a small army into the place, and, taking pos- 
 session of the town, declared his intention of retaining 
 his hold till his expenses had been paid, handing over 
 the parish church in the meanwhile to the Catholic 
 clergy. It had only been given over to Protestant wor- 
 ship after the date of the Convention of Passau, and 
 Maximilian could persuade himself that he was only 
 carrying out the law. 
 
 It was a flagrant case of religious aggression under 
 the name of the law. The knowledge that a partial 
 
 tribunal was ready to give effect to the com- 
 1608. , . - - 
 
 3 12. The plamts of Catholics at once threw the great 
 
 Protestant cities of the South — Nuremberg, 
 Ulm, and Strasburg into the arms of the neighbouring 
 princes of whom they had hitherto been jealous. Yet 
 there was much in the policy of those princes which 
 would hardly have reassured them. At the Diet of 1608 
 the representatives of the Elector Palatine were foremost 
 in demanding that the minority should not be bound by 
 the majority in questions of taxation or religion ; that is 
 to say, that they should not contribute to the common 
 defence unless they pleased, and that they should not 
 be subject to any regulation about ecclesiastical proper- 
 ty unless they pleased. Did this mean only that they 
 were to keep what they had got, or that they might take 
 more as soon as it was convenient ? The one was the 
 Protestant, the other the Catholic interpretation of their 
 theory. 
 
1609. Three Parties and Three Leaders, 21 
 
 On May 14, 1608, the Protestant Union, to which Lu- 
 therans and Calvinists were ahke admitted, came into 
 existence under the guidance of Christian , 
 
 g 13- rorma- 
 
 of Anhalt. It was mainly composed of the tion of the 
 
 r ^ IT • Union. 
 
 prmces and towns of the south, its ostensi- 
 ble purpose was for self-defence, and in this sense it was 
 accepted by most of those who took part in it. Its 
 leaders had very different views. 
 
 A Catholic League was at once formed under Maximi- 
 lian. It was composed of a large number of bishops 
 and abbots, who believed that the princes , 
 
 •^ . ? 14- rorma- 
 
 of the Union wished to annex their territo- tion of the 
 
 -_...., 1 -T- • • League. 
 
 ries. Maximilian s ability gave it a unity 
 of action which the Union never possessed. It, too, was 
 constituted for self-defence, but whether that word was 
 to include the resumption of the lands lost since the 
 Convention of Passau was a question probably left for 
 circumstances to decide. 
 
 Whatever the majority of the princes of the Union 
 may have meant, there can be no doubt ^ 15. Revoiu- 
 that Christian of Anhalt meant aggression. cTes^of the '^^' 
 He believed that the safety of Protestantism Union. 
 could not be secured without the overthrow of the Ger- 
 man branch of the House of Austria, and he was sanr 
 guine enough to fancy that an act which would call up 
 all Catholic Europe in arms against him was a very easy 
 undertaking. 
 
 Scarcely had the Union been formed when events 
 occurred which almost dragged Germany into war. In 
 the spring of 1609 the Duke of Cleves died. 
 The Elector of Brandenburg and the son of §16. The suc- 
 the Duke of Neuburg laid claim to the sue- cieves. 
 cession. On the plea that the Emperor had 
 the right to settle the point, a Catholic army advanced 
 
22 Causes of the Thii'ty Years'' War. 1612. 
 
 to take possession of the country. The two pretenders, 
 both of them Lutherans, made common cause against 
 the invaders. Henry IV. of France found 
 m the dispute a pretext tor commencmg his 
 long-meditated attack upon Spain and her alhes. But 
 his hfe was cut short by an assassin, and his widow only 
 thought of sending a small French force to join the 
 English and the Dutch in maintaining the claims of the 
 two princes, who were ready to unite for a time against 
 a third party. 
 
 It was not easy to bring the princes to an arrangement 
 for the future. One day the young Prince of Neuburg 
 proposed what seemed to him an excellent 
 gij. Vhe box way out of the difficulty. 'He was ready,' 
 on the ear. j^^ said, ' to marry the Elector's daughter, 
 if only he might have the territory.' JEnraged at the 
 impudence of the proposal, the Elector raised his hand 
 and boxed his young rival's ears. The blow had unex- 
 pected consequences. The injured prince renounced his 
 Protestantism, and invoked, as a good Catholic, the aid 
 of Spain and the League. The Elector passed from 
 Lutheranism to Calvinism, and took a more active part 
 than before in the affairs of the Union. That immediate 
 war in Germany did not result from the quarrel is proba- 
 bly the strongest possible evidence of the reluctance of 
 the German people to break the peace. 
 
 The third party, the German Lutherans, looked with 
 £qual abhorrence upon aggression on either side. Their 
 leader, John George, Elector of Saxony, stood 
 g 18. John aloof alike from Christian of Anhalt, and 
 toro?Saxony.' from Maximilian of Bavaria. He was at- 
 tached by the traditions of his house as well 
 as by his own character to the Empire and the House 
 of Austria. But he was anxious to obtain security for 
 
1 613. Three Parties a7id three Leaders. 23 
 
 his brother Protestants. He saw there must be a change ; 
 but he wisely desired to make the change as slight as 
 possible. In 1612, therefore, he proposed that the high- 
 est jurisdiction should still be retained by the Imperial 
 Council, but that the Council, though still nominated by 
 the Emperor, should contain an equal number of Catho- 
 lics and Protestants. Sentences such as that which had 
 deprived Donau worth of its civil rights would be in future 
 impossible. 
 
 Unhappily, John George had not the gift of ruling 
 men. He was a hard drinker and a bold huntsman, but 
 to convert his wishes into actual facts was „ 
 
 g 19. His 
 
 beyond his power. When he saw his plan weakness of 
 threatened with opposition on either side he 
 left it to take care of itself. In 161 3 a Diet met, and 
 broke up in confusion, leaving matters in such a state 
 that any spark might give rise to a general confla- 
 gration. 
 
 D 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE BOHEMIAN REVOLUTION. 
 
 Section I. — The House of Austria and its Subjects, 
 
 At the beginning of the seventeenth century the domi- 
 nions of the German branch of the House of Austria were 
 
 parcelled out amongst the various descen- 
 Austrian dants of Ferdinand I., the brother of Charles 
 
 V. The head of the family, the Emperor 
 Rudolph n., was Archduke of Austria — a name which in 
 those days was used simply to indicate the archduchy 
 itself, and not the group of territories which are at pre- 
 sent ruled over by the Austrian sovereign — and he was 
 also King of Bohemia and of Hungary. His brother 
 Maximilian governed Tyrol, and his cousin Ferdinand 
 ruled in Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola. 
 
 The main difficulty of government arose from the fact 
 that whilst every member of the family clung firmly to 
 
 the old creed, the greater part of the po- 
 
 \ 2. Aris- . . . 
 
 t'ocracy and pulation, excepting in Tyrol, had adopted 
 the new ; that is to say, that on the great 
 question of the day the subjects and the rulers had no 
 thoughts in common. And this difficulty was aggravated 
 by the further fact that Protestantism prospered mainly 
 from the support given to it by a powerful aristocracy, so 
 that political disagreement was added to the difference 
 in religion. Ferdinand had, indeed, contrived to put 
 down with a strong hand the exercise of Protestantism 
 in his own dominions so easily as almost to suggest the 
 inference that it had not taken very deep root in those 
 Alpine regions. But Rudolph was quite incapable of 
 24 
 
1609. The House of Austria and its Subjects. 25 
 
 following his example. If not absolutely insane, lie was 
 
 subject to sudden outbursts of temper, proceeding from 
 
 mental disease. 
 
 In 1606, a peace having been concluded with the 
 
 Turks, Rudolph fancied that his hands were at last free 
 
 to deal with his subjects as Ferdinand had ^ ^ 
 
 1606. 
 dealt with his. The result was a general § 3. Rudolph 
 
 uprising, and if Rudolph's brother Matthias ^ ^ '^' 
 
 had not placed himself at the head of the movement, in 
 
 order to save the interests of the family, some stranger 
 
 would probably have been selected as a rival to the 
 
 princes of the House of Austria. 
 
 In the end, two years later, Austria and Hungary were 
 assigned to Matthias, whilst Bohemia, Moravia and 
 Silesia were left to Rudolph for his lifetime. 
 
 The result of Rudolph's ill-advised energy was to 
 strengthen the hands of the Protestant nobility. In 
 Hungary the Turks were too near to make 
 it easy for Matthias to refuse concessions to 94. The 
 a people who might, at any time, throw ofBohemi'a^'^^'' 
 themselves into the arms of the enemy, and 
 in Austria he was driven, after some resistance, to agree 
 to a compromise. In Bohemia, in 1609, the Estates ex- 
 torted from Rudolph the Royal Charter {Majestdtsbrief) 
 which guaranteed freedom of conscience to every inha- 
 bitant of Bohemia, as long as he kept to certain recognised 
 creeds. Bnt freedom of conscience did not by any 
 means imply freedom of worship. A man might think 
 as he pleased, but the building of churches and the per- 
 formance of divine service were matters for the authori- 
 ties to decide upon. The only question was, who the 
 authorities were. 
 
 By the Royal Charter this authority was given over to 
 members of the Estates, that is to say, to about 1,400 of 
 
26 The Bohemian Revolution. 1609. 
 
 the feudal aristocracy and 42 towns. In an agreement 
 
 attached to the charter, a special exception was made for 
 
 ^ . . the royal domains. A Protestant landowner 
 
 g 5. Position 
 
 of the land- could and would prohibit the erection of a 
 Catholic church on his own lands, but the 
 king was not to have that privilege. On his domains 
 worship was to be free. 
 
 From this bondage, as he counted it, Rudolph strug- 
 gled to liberate himself. There was fresh violence, 
 
 «. T, , , , ending in 161 1 in Rudolph's dethronement 
 g 6. Rudolph . ^ ^ 
 
 tries to get in favour of Matthias, who thus became king 
 of Bohemia. The next year he died, and 
 Matthias succeeded him as Emperor also. 
 
 During all these troubles, Christian of Anhalt had 
 done all that he could to frustrate a peaceful settlement. 
 „ „, . . * When Hungary, Moravia, Austria, and 
 
 g 7. Christian _ o j ' 
 
 of Anhalt Silcsia are on our side,' he explained, be- 
 
 gcncral forc the Royal Charter had been granted, to 
 
 con usion. ^ diplomatist in his employment, ' the 
 
 House of Hapsburg will have no further strength to re- 
 sist us, except in Bohemia, Bavaria, and a few bishop- 
 rics. Speaking humanly, we shall be strong enough not 
 only to resist these, but to reform all the clergy, and 
 bring them into submission to our religion. The game 
 will begin in this fashion. As soon as Bavaria arms to 
 use compulsion against Austria,' (that is to say, against 
 the Austrian Protestants, who were at that time resisting 
 Matthias) ' we shall arm to attack Bavaria, and retake 
 Donauworth. In the same way, we shall get hold of 
 two or three bishops to supply us with money. Cer- 
 tainly, it seems that by proceeding dexterously we shall 
 give the law to all, and set up for rulers whom we will.' 
 For the time Christian was disappointed. The do- 
 minions of Matthias settled down into quietness. But 
 
i6i7- The House of Austria and its Subjects. 27 
 
 Matthias was preparing another opportunity for his an- 
 tagonist. Whether it would have been possible in those 
 days for a Catholic king to have kept a Protestant nation 
 in working order we cannot say. At all 
 events, Matthias did not give the experi- thias King of 
 
 -. .,,., .. - , Bohemia. 
 
 ment a fair trial. He did not, indeed, attack 
 the Royal Charter directly on the lands of the aristocracy. 
 But he did his best to undermine it on his own. The 
 Protestants of Braunau, on the lands of the Abbot of 
 Braunau and the Protestants of Klostergrab, on the 
 lands of the Archbishop of Prague, built churches for 
 themselves, the use of which was prohibited by the abbot 
 and the archbishop. A dispute immediately arose as to 
 the rights of ecclesiastical landowners, and it was ar- 
 gued on the Protestant side, that their lands were tech- 
 nically Crown lands, and that they had therefore no 
 right to close the churches. Matthias took the opposite 
 view. 
 
 On his own estates Matthias found means to evade 
 the charter. He appointed Catholic priests to Protes- 
 tant churches, and allowed measures to be ^ 
 
 g 9. He 
 
 taken to compel Protestants to attend the evades the 
 Catholic service. Yet for a long time the 
 Protestant nobility kept quiet. Matthias was old and 
 infirm, and when he died they would, as they supposed, 
 have an opportunity of choosing their next king, and it 
 was generally believed that the election would fall upon 
 a Protestant. The only question was whether the Elec- 
 tor Palatine or the Elector of Saxony would be chosen. 
 
 Suddenly, in 1617, the Bohemian Diet 
 was summoned. When the Estates of the ^g 
 
 kingdom met they were told that it was a I ^°- Ferdi- 
 
 ° •' nand pro- 
 
 mistake to suppose that the crown of Bo- posed as king 
 
 , . , . , of Bohemia. 
 
 hemia was elective. Evidence was pro- 
 
2 8 The Bohemiafi Revolution. 1617. 
 
 duced that for some time before the election of Matthias 
 the Estates had acknowledged the throne to be heredi- 
 tary, and the precedent of Matthias was to be set aside 
 as occurring in revolutionary times. Intimidation was 
 used to assist the argument, and men in the confidence 
 of the court whispered in the ears of those who refused 
 to be convinced that it was to be hoped that they had at 
 least two heads on their shoulders. 
 
 If ever there was a moment for resistance, if resist- 
 ance was to be made at all, it was this. The arguments 
 of the court were undoubtedly strong, but a 
 Bohemians skilful lawyer could easily have found tech- 
 Wm"arthef/ nicalities on the other side, and the real 
 king. evasion of the Royal Charter might have 
 
 been urged as a reason why the court had no right to 
 press technical arguments too closely. The danger was 
 all the greater as it was known that by the renunciation 
 of all intermediate heirs the hereditary right fell upon 
 Ferdinand of Styria, the man who had already stamped 
 Protestantism out in his own dominions. Yet, in spite 
 of this, the Diet did as it was bidden, and renounced the 
 right of election by acknowledging Ferdinand as their 
 hereditary king. 
 
 The new king was more of a devotee and less of a 
 statesman than Maximilian of Bavaria, his cousin on his 
 a 12. His mother's side. But their judgments of events 
 character. were formed on the same lines. Neither 
 
 of them were mere ordinary bigots, keeping no faith 
 with heretics. But they were both likely to be guided 
 in their interpretation of the law by that which they 
 conceived to be profitable to their church. Ferdinand 
 was personally brave ; but except when his course was 
 very clear before him, he was apt to let difficulties settle 
 themselves rather than come to a decision. 
 
1 01 8. The Revolution at Prague. 29 
 
 He had at once to consider whether he would swear 
 to the Royal Charter. He consulted the Jesuits, and 
 was told that, though it had been a sin to grant it, it 
 was no sin to accept it now that it was the law of the 
 land. As he walked in state to his coronation, he 
 turned to a nobleman who was by his side. „ 
 ' I am glad,' he said, ' that I have attained takes the 
 the Bohemian crown without any pangs of Royal 
 conscience.' He took the oath without C^^^"^^^- 
 further difficulty. 
 
 The Bohemians were not long in feeling the effects of 
 the change. Hitherto the hold of the House of Austria 
 upon the country had been limited to the life of one old 
 man. It had now, by the admission of the Diet itself, 
 fixed itself for ever upon Bohemia. The proceedings 
 against the Protestants on the royal domains assumed a 
 sharper character. The Braunau worshippers were 
 rigorously excluded from their church. The walls of 
 the new church of Klostergrab were actually levelled 
 with the ground. 
 
 Section H. — The Revolution at Prague. 
 The Bohemians had thus to resist in 1618, under every 
 disadvantage, the attack which they had done nothing 
 to meet in 16 17. Certain persons named 
 Defensors had, by law, the right of sum- §1. The 
 
 ■i y c . .• r Bohemians 
 
 monmg an assembly of representatives 01 petition 
 the Protestant Estates. Such an assembly ^^tthias. 
 met on March 5, and having prepared a petition to 
 Matthias, who was absent from the kingdom, adjourned 
 to May 21. 
 
 Long before the time of meeting came, an answer was 
 sent from Matthias justifying all that had been done, 
 and declaring the assembly illegal. It was believed at 
 
3© The Bohemian Revolution. 1618. 
 
 2 2. Reply of ^^® time, though incorrectly, that the answer 
 Matthias. -yva^g prepared by Slawata and Martinitz, 
 
 two members of the regency who had been notorious 
 for the vigour of their opposition to Protestantism. 
 
 In the Protestant assembly there was a knot of men, 
 headed by Count Henry of Thurn, which was bent on 
 the dethronement of Ferdinand. They re- 
 counseTsr"*^ solvcd to take advantage of the popular 
 feeling to effect the murder of the two re- 
 gents, and so to place an impassable gulf between the 
 nation and the king. 
 
 Accordingly, on the morning of May 23, the ' begin- 
 ning and cause,' as a contemporary calls it, ' of all the 
 ,, . coming evil,' the first day, though men as 
 
 \ 4. Marti- ° •' ° 
 
 nitz and Sla- yet knew it not, of thirty years of war, 
 aft of win^" Thurn sallied forth at the head of a band oi 
 ^^^- noblemen and their followers, all of them 
 
 with arms in their hands. Trooping into the room where 
 the regents were seated, they charged the obnoxious two 
 with being the authors of the king's reply. After a bitter 
 altercation both Martinitz and Slawata were dragged to 
 a window which overlooked the fosse below from a dizzy 
 height of some seventy feet. Martinitz, struggling 
 against his enemies, pleaded hard for a confessor. 
 ' Commend thy soul to God,' was the stern answer. 
 ' Shall we allow the Jesuit scoundrels to come here ? * 
 In an instant he was hurled out, crying, "Jesus, Mary! ' 
 ' Let us see," said some one mockingly, ' Whether his 
 Mary will help him." A moment later he added : " By 
 God, his Mary has helped him." Slawata followed, 
 and then the secretary Fabricius. By a wonderful pre- 
 servation, in which pious Catholics discerned the pro- 
 tecting hand of God, all three crawled away from the 
 spot without serious hurt. 
 
i6i8. ' The Revolution at Prague. 31 
 
 There are moments when the character of a nation or 
 party stands revealed as by a lis^htnin? , . . , 
 
 ^ ■'^.'='§5. A bad 
 
 flash, and this was one of them. It is not beginning, 
 in such a way as this that successful revolu- 
 tions are begun. 
 
 The first steps to constitute a new government were 
 easy. Thirty Directors were appointed, and the Jesuits 
 were expelled from Bohemia. The Diet met „ ^, 
 
 go. The re- 
 
 and ordered soldiers to be levied to form an volmionary 
 army. But to support this army money sovernmen . 
 would be needed, and the existing taxes were insuffi- 
 cient. A loan was accordingly thought of, and the 
 nobles resolved to request the towns to make up the 
 sum, they themselves contributing nothing. The pro- 
 ject falling dead upon the resistance of the towns, new 
 taxes were voted ; but no steps were taken to collect 
 them, and the army was left to depend in a great mea- 
 sure upon chance. 
 
 Would the princes of Germany come to the help of 
 the Directors ? John George of Saxony told them that 
 he deeply sympathized with them, but that , ^, 
 
 %1- The 
 
 rebellion was a serious matter. To one who Elector of 
 asked him what he meant to do, he replied, wtsi^eTfor 
 ' Help to put out the fire.' P^^^^- 
 
 There was more help for them at Heidelberg than at 
 Dresden. Frederick IV. had died in 1610, and his son, 
 the young Frederick V., looked up to Chris- 
 tian of Anhalt as the first statesman of his Elector Pala- 
 age. By his marriage with Elizabeth, the Jut\opes of 
 daughter of James I. of England, he had assistance. 
 contracted an alliance which gave him the appearance 
 rather than the reality of strength. He offered every 
 encouragement to the Bohemians, but for the time held 
 back from giving them actual assistance. 
 
32 The Bohemian Revolution, 1618. 
 
 Section III. — The War in Bohejnia. 
 
 The Directors were thus thrown on their own re- 
 sources. Ferdinand had secured his elec- 
 of war." '^^^ tion as king of Hungary, and, returning to 
 Vienna, had taken up the reins of govern- 
 ment in the name of Matthias. He had got together an 
 army of 14,000 men, under the command of Bucquoi, 
 an officer from the great school of mihtary art in the 
 Netherlands, and on August 13, the Bohemian frontier 
 was invaded. War could hardly be avoided by either 
 side. Budweis and Pilsen, two Catholic towns in Bo- 
 hemia, naturally clung to their sovereign, and as soon 
 as the Directors ordered an attack upon Budweis, the 
 troops of Matthias prepared to advance to its succour. 
 
 The Directors took alarm, and proposed to the Diet 
 
 that new taxes should be raised and not merely voted, 
 
 ^, „ and that, in addition to the army of regular 
 
 ^ 2. The Bo- •' ° 
 
 hemians vote soldicrs, there should be a general levy of a 
 ject'to paying large portion of the population. To the 
 taxes. levy the Diet consented without difficulty. 
 
 But before the day fixed for discussing the proposed 
 taxes arrived, the majority of the members deliberately 
 returned to their homes, and no new taxes were to be had. 
 This day, August 30, may fairly be taken as the date 
 of the political suicide of the Bohemian aristocracy. In 
 almost every country in Europe order was 
 are not likely maintained by concentrating the chief 
 o prosper. powcrs of the State in the hands of a single 
 governor, whether he were called king, duke, or elector. 
 To this rule there were exceptions in Venice, Switzer- 
 land, and the Netherlands, and by-and-by there would 
 be an exception on a grander scale in England. But 
 the peoples who formed these exceptions had proved 
 
i6iS. The War in Bohemia. ^^ 
 
 themselves worthy of the distinction, and there would be 
 no room in the world for men who had got rid of their 
 king without being able to establish order upon another 
 basis. 
 
 Still there were too many governments in Europe hos- 
 tile to the House of Austria to allow the Bo- | 4. Help 
 hemians to fall at once. Charles Em- f'^o^ Savoy. 
 manuel, Duke of Savoy, had just brought a war with 
 Spain to a close, but he had not become any better dis- 
 posed towards his late adversary. He accordingly en- 
 tered into an agreein^ftt=w4th;^he-4es4^ of the Union, 
 by which 2,000 me^Pl^'wto.lai^'feb^i.ii^e^ for his service 
 were to be placed at the disposal of the Bol^^mian Di- 
 rectors. \\<^ - ' 
 
 The commander ^ these troops was Coi^.jjErnest of 
 Mansfeld, an illegiHmate son of a famSus general in 
 the service of Spain. He had changed his g 5. Mans- 
 religion and deserted his king. He now ^^^'^• 
 put himself forward as a champion of Protestantism. 
 He was brave, active, and versatile, and was possessed 
 of those gifts which win the confidence of professional 
 soldiers. But he was already notorious for the readiness 
 with which he allowed his soldiers to support themselves 
 on the most unbridled pillage. An adventurer himself, 
 he was just the man to lead an army of adventurers. 
 
 Soon after his arrival in Bohemia, Mansfeld was em- 
 ployed in the siege of Pilsen, whilst Thurn was occupied 
 with holding Bucquoi in check. The failure g 6. A forced 
 in obtaining additional taxes had led the ^°^"- 
 Directors to adopt the simple expedient of levying a 
 forced loan from the few rich. 
 
 For a time this desperate expedient was successful. 
 The help offered to Ferdinand by Spain was not great, 
 and it was long in coming. The prudent Maximiliatt re • 
 
The Bohemian Revolution, 
 
 6/-). 
 
 \ 7. Success 
 
 of the Bo- 
 hemians. 
 
 fused to ruin himself by engaging in an ap- 
 parently hopeless cause. At last the Sile- 
 sians, who had hesitated long, threw in 
 their lot with their neighbours, and sent their troops to 
 their help early in November. Bucquoi was in full re- 
 treat to Budweis. On the 21st Pilsen surrendered to 
 Mansfeld. Further warfare was stopped as winter came 
 on — a terrible winter for the unhappy dwellers in 
 Southern Bohemia. Starving armies are not particular 
 in their methods of supplying their wants. Plunder, de- 
 vastation and reckless atrocities of every kind fell to the 
 lot of the doomed peasants, Bucquoi's Hungarians being 
 conspicuous for barbarity. 
 
 Meanwhile, Christian of Anhalt was luring on the 
 young Elector Palatine to more active intervention. The 
 Bohemian leaders had already begun to talk 
 of Christian of placing the crown on Frederick's head. 
 Frederick, anxious and undecided, consent- 
 ed on the one hand, at the Emperor's invitation, to join 
 the Duke of Bavaria and the Electors of Mentz and 
 Saxony in mediating an arangement, whilst, on the other 
 hand, he gave his assent to an embassy to Turin, the 
 object of which was to dazzle the Duke of Savoy with 
 the prospect of obtaining the imperial crown after the 
 death of Matthias, and to urge him to join in an attack 
 upon the German dominions of the House of Austria. 
 
 The path on which Frederick was entering was the 
 more evidently unsafe, as the Union, which met at Heil- 
 bronn in September, had shown great cool- 
 ness in the Bohemian cause. Christian of 
 Anhalt had not ventured even to hint at the 
 projects which he entertained. If he was afterwards de- 
 serted by the Union he could not say that its members 
 as a body had engaged to support him. 
 
 g 9. Coolness 
 
 of the 
 Union. 
 
1 619. Ferdinand on his Defence, 35 
 
 The Duke of Savoy, on the other hand, at least talked 
 as if the Austrian territories were at his feet. In August 
 1618 he had given his consent to the pro- 1619. 
 
 posed elevation of Frederick to the Bohe- ^^^^ ^slvoy 
 mian throne. In February 1619 he ex- gives hopes. 
 plained that he wished to have Bohemia for himself. 
 Frederick might be compensated with the Austrian lands 
 in Alsace and Swabia. He might, perhaps, have the 
 Archduchy of Austria too, or become King of Hungary. 
 If he wished to fall upon the bishops' lands, let him do it 
 quickly, before the Pope had time to interfere. This 
 sort of talk, wild as it was, delighted the little circle of 
 Frederick's confidants. The Margrave of Anspach, who, 
 as general of the army of the Union, was admitted into 
 the secret, was beyond measure pleased : ' We have now, ' 
 he said, ' the means of upsetting the world.' 
 
 For the present, these negotiations were veiled in 
 secresy. They engendered a confident „ 
 
 , . -^ , . , -^ ^ . T , 1 2 "• Conser- 
 
 levity, which was certain to shock that con- vative feeling 
 servative, peace-loving feeling which the 
 Bohemians had already done much to alienate. 
 
 Section IV. — Ferdinand on his Defence. 
 If the assistance of the Union was thus likely to do 
 more harm than good to the Bohemians, their hopes of 
 aid from other powers were still more delu- j i. The Bo- 
 sive. The Dutch, indeed, sent something, IraidTrom'' 
 and would willingly have sent more, but they fo^-eign powers. 
 had too many difficulties at home to be very profuse in 
 their offers. James of England told his son-in-law 
 plainly that he would have nothing to do with any en- 
 croachment upon the rights of others, and he had under- 
 taken at the instigation of Spain a formal mediation 
 between the Bohemians and their king — a mediation 
 
36 The Bohemian Revolution. 16 19. 
 
 which had been offered him merely in order to keep his 
 hands tied whilst others were arming. 
 
 On March 20, before the next campaign opened, 
 Matthias died. Ferdinand's renewed promises to respect 
 the Royal Charter — made doubtless under 
 upon vfemia, ^he reservation of putting his own interpreta- 
 tion upon the disputed points — were rejected 
 with scorn by the Directors. The sword was to decide 
 the quarrel. With the money received from the Dutch, 
 and with aid in money and munitions of war from Hei- 
 delberg, Thurn and Mansfeld were enabled to take the 
 field. The latter remained to watch Bucquoi, whilst the 
 former undertook to win the other territories, which had 
 hitherto submitted to Matthias, and had stood aloof from 
 the movement in Bohemia. Without much difficulty he 
 succeeded in revolutionizing Moravia, and he arrived on 
 June 5 under the walls of Vienna. Within was Ferdi- 
 nand himself, with a petty garrison of 300 men, and as 
 many volunteers as he could attach to his cause. Thurn 
 hoped that his partisans inside the cities would open the 
 gates to admit him. But he lost time in negotiations 
 with the Austrian nobility. The estates of the two terri- 
 tories of Upper and Lower Austria were to a great extent 
 Protestant, and they had refused to do homage to Fer- 
 dinand on the death of Matthias. The Lower Austrians 
 now sent a deputation to Vienna to demand permission 
 to form a confederation with the Bohemians, on terms 
 which would practically have converted the whole coun- 
 try, from the Styrian frontier to the borders of Silesia, 
 into a federal aristocratic republic. 
 
 In Ferdinand they had to do with a man who v/as 
 not to be overawed by personal danger. He knew well 
 that by yielding he would be giving a legal basis to a 
 system which he regarded as opposed to all law, human 
 
1 6 1 9 • Ferdin and on his Defe?ice. 3 7 
 
 and divine. Throwing himself before the 
 
 crucifix, he found strength for the conflict nand resists 
 
 into which he entered on behalf of his fami- onhe^Lower 
 
 ly, his church, and, as he firmly believed, ^uscnan 
 
 of his country and his God — strength none 
 
 the less real because the figure on the cross did not, as 
 
 men not long afterwards came fondly to believe, bow 
 
 its head towards the suppliant, or utter the consoling 
 
 words: ' Ferdinand, I will not forsake thee.' 
 
 To a deputation from the Austrian Estates he was firm 
 and unbending. They might threaten as they pleased, 
 but the confederation with Bohemia he would not sign. 
 Rougher and rougher grew the menaces addressed to 
 him. Some one, it is said, talked of de- 7 ^ Rescue 
 throning him and of educating his children ^^"ves. 
 in the Protestant religion. Suddenly the blare of a 
 trumpet was heard in the court below. A regiment of 
 horse had slipped in through a gate unguarded by 
 Thurn, and had hurried to Ferdinand's defence. The 
 deputation, lately so imperious, slunk away, glad enough 
 to escape punishment. 
 
 Little would so slight a reinforcement have availed if 
 Thurn had been capable of assaulting the city. But, un. 
 provided with stores of food or siege muni- g ^ r^-^^ 
 tions, he had counted on treason within, ^^^s^ raised. 
 Disappointed of his prey, he returned to Bohemia, to 
 find that Bucquoi had broken out of Budweis, and had 
 inflicted a serious defeat on Mansfeld. 
 
 Ferdinand did not linger at Vienna to dispute his 
 
 r'ghts with his Austrian subjects. The election of a new 
 
 Emperor was to take place at Frankfort, „ 
 
 J • r • 1 • 1 ?■ 6 The 
 
 and it was of importance to him to be on Imperial 
 
 the spot. To the German Protestants the ^ ^^ ^°"" 
 
 transfer of the Imperial crown to his head could not be 
 
38 The Bohemian Revolutioti, 161 9. 
 
 a matter of indifference. If he succeeded, as there 
 seemed every probabihty of his succeeding, in re-estab- 
 lishing his authority over Bohemia, he would weigh with 
 a far heavier weight than Matthias upon the disputes by 
 which Germany was distracted. The Elector Palatine 
 and his councillors had a thousand schemes for getting 
 rid of him, without fixing upon any. John George of 
 Saxony, in 1619 as in 161 2, had a definite plan to pro- 
 pose. Ferdinand, he said, was not in possession of 
 Bohemia, and could not, therefore, vote as King of Bo- 
 hemia at the election. The election must, therefore, be 
 postponed till the Bohemian question had been settled 
 by mediation. If only the three Protestant electors 
 could have been brought to agree to this course, an im- 
 mediate choice of Ferdinand would have been impossi- 
 ble. 
 
 Whatever might be the merits of the proposal itself, 
 
 it had the inestimable advantage of embarking the Lu- 
 
 ^ ,. therans of the North and the Calvinists of 
 
 ^ 7. Ferdi- 
 nand chosen the South in a common cause. But Frede- 
 mperor. ^vck. distrusted John George, and preferred 
 another plan of his own. John George lost his temper, 
 and voted unconditionally for Ferdinand. Frederick, 
 if he did not mean to be left alone in impotent isolation, 
 had nothing for it but to follow his example. He had 
 no other candidate seriously to propose ; and on August 
 28, 1619, Ferdinand was chosen by a unanimous vote. 
 He was now known as the Emperor Ferdinand II. 
 Two days before, another election had taken place at 
 Prague. The Bohemians, after deposing 
 rick elected Ferdinand from the throne, which in 16 17 
 Bohemia, they had acknowledged to be his, chose 
 
 Frederick to fill the vacant seat. 
 Would Frederick accept the perilous offer ? Opinions 
 
i620. The Attack upon Frederick. 39 
 
 round him were divided on the advisability of the step. 
 The princes of the Union, and even his own coun- 
 cillors, took opposite sides. In his own 
 family, his mother raised a voice of warn- accepts the 
 ing. His wife, Elizabeth of England, the 
 beautiful and high-spirited, urged him to the enterprise. 
 The poor young man himself was well-nigh distracted. 
 At last he found a consolation in the comfortable belief 
 that his election was the act of God. Amidst the tears 
 of the good people of Heidelberg he set out from the 
 proud castle, magnificent even now in its ruins as it 
 looks down upon the rushing stream of the Neckar. 
 ' He is carrying the Palatinate into Bohemia,' said his 
 sorrowing mother. On November 4 he was crowned at 
 Prague, and the last act of the Bohemian Revolution 
 was accomplished. 
 
 CHAPTER HI. 
 
 IMPERIALIST VICTORIES IN BOHEMIA AND THE 
 PALATINATE. 
 
 Section I. — The Attack upon Frederick. 
 
 The news of Frederick's acceptance of the Bohemian 
 crown sent a thrill of confidence through the ranks of 
 his opponents. ' That prince,' said the m • ' 
 
 Pope, * has cast himself into a fine laby- I'ian prepares 
 rinth.' 'He will only be a winter-king,' ^ 
 whispered the Jesuits to one another, certain that the 
 summer's campaign would see his pretensions at an end. 
 Up to that time the Bohemian cause stood upon its own 
 merits. But if one prince of the Empire was to be al- 
 lowed, on any pretext, to seize upon the territories of 
 another, what bulwark was there against a return of the 
 
 E 
 
40 Imperialist Victories in Bohemia, 1620. 
 
 old fist-right, or general anarchy ? Frederick had at- 
 tacked the foundations on which the institutions of his 
 time rested, without calling up anything to take their 
 place. 
 
 Maximilian saw more clearly than any one the mis- 
 
 take that had been committed. In an interview with 
 
 the new Emperor he engaofed to forsake his 
 
 3 2. Makes . . . & <-> 
 
 use of inaction. Hitherto he had kept quiet, be- 
 
 inistake^, ^ cause he knew well that the apparent ag- 
 gressor would have the general opinion of 
 the world against him. Now that the blunder had been 
 committed, he was ready to take advantage of it. At 
 the same time, he did not forget his own interests, and 
 he stipulated that, when all was over, Frederick's electo- 
 ral dignity — not necessarily his territory — should be 
 transferred to himself, and that he should retain Upper 
 Austria in pledge till his military expenses had been re- 
 paid. 
 
 The effect of the change from the passive endurance 
 of Ferdinand to the active vigour of Maximilian was 
 immediately perceptible. His first object 
 Gabor attacks was to gain over or neutralize the German 
 pj.Q^gg^g^j;^(-g^ ^^^ cvcuts lu thc East were 
 seconding him to a marvel. About one-fifth only of Hun- 
 gary was in Ferdinand's possession. The rest was about 
 equally divided between the Turks and Bethlen Gabor, 
 the Protestant Prince of Transylvania, a semi-barbarous 
 but energetic chieftain, who hoped, with Turkish sup- 
 port, to make himself master of all Hungary, if not of Aus- 
 tria as well. In the first days of November, his hordes, 
 in. friendly alliance with the Bohemians, were burning 
 and plundering round the v/alls of Vienna. But such 
 armies as his can only support themselves by continuous 
 success ; and Bethlen Gabor found the capture of Vienna 
 
i620. The Attack upon Frederick. 41 
 
 as hopeless in the winter as Thurn had found it in the 
 summer. Retiring eastwards, he left behind him a bit- 
 ter indignation against those who had abetted his pro- 
 ceedings, and who had not been ashamed, as their ad- 
 versaries declared, to plant the Crescent upon the ruins 
 of Christianity and civilization. 
 
 Such declamation, overstrained as it was, was not 
 without its effect. German Protestantism had no enthu- 
 siasm to spare for Frederick's enterprise in I 4. The 
 
 ^ ^ . Union refuses 
 
 Bohemia. At a meetmg of the Union at to support 
 Nliremberg, Frederick's cause found no Frederick. 
 support. Maximilian could well afford to leave the 
 Union to its own hesitation, and to think only of concili- 
 ating the Elector of Saxony and the North German 
 princes. 
 
 That John George should have taken serious alarm at 
 his rival's increase of power is not surprising. Not only 
 did it assail whatever shadow still remained 1620. 
 
 of the protecting institutions of the Empire, igreemenl of 
 but it did so in a way likely to be especially Muhihausen. 
 disagreeable at Dresden. The revolution at Prague did 
 not simply raise an otherwise powerless person into 
 Ferdinand's place. It gave the crown of Bohemia to a 
 man whose territories were already so extensive that if 
 he managed to consolidate his new dominion with them 
 he would unite in his hands a power which would be 
 unequalled in the Empire, and which would bring with 
 it the unheard-of accumulation of two votes upon one 
 person at imperial elections. John George would de- 
 scend from being one of the first of the German princes 
 to a mere second-rate position. 
 
 John George was not to be won for nothing. At an 
 assembly held at Miihlhausen in March 1620, the 
 League promised that they would never attempt to 
 
42 Imperialist Victories in Bohemia. 1620. 
 
 I 6. The ec- recover by force the lands of the Protestant 
 
 clssi3.stic3.1 
 
 lands held by administrators, or the secularized lands in 
 guaranteed the northern territories, as long as the 
 under condi- holders Continued to act as loyal subjects: 
 
 tions. ^ •' ' 
 
 and this promise was confirmed by the 
 Emperor. 
 
 That this engagement was not enough, later events 
 were to show. For the present it seemed satisfactory to 
 g 7. Spinola John Gcorge, and Maximilian was able to 
 attadc Ae° turn his attention to the actual preparations 
 Palatinate. ^qj- ^^ij.^ jj-^ May ordcrs had been issued 
 from Madrid to Spinola, the Spanish general in the 
 Netherlands, to make ready to march to the Emperor's 
 defence ; and on June 3 the frightened Union signed the 
 treaty of Ulm, by which they promised to observe neu- 
 trality towards the League, thus securing to Maximilian 
 freedom from attack in the rear during his march into 
 Bohemia. The Union, however, if it should be attacked, 
 was to be allowed to defend its own territories, including 
 the Palatinate. 
 
 At the head of Maximilian's army was the Walloon 
 Tilly, a man capable of inspiring confidence alike by the 
 ? 8. The probity of his character and by the posses- 
 
 mvasions. gj^j^ ^f eminent military capacity. On June 
 
 23 he crossed the Austrian frontier. On August 20 the 
 Estates of Upper Austria unconditionally bowed to Fer- 
 dinand as their lord and master. Lower Austria had 
 already submitted to its fate. About the same time 
 John George had entered Lusatia, and was besieging 
 Bautzen in Ferdinand's name. Spinola, too, had 
 marched along the Rhine, and had reached Mentz by 
 the end of August. 
 
 The army of the Union was drawn up to oppose the 
 Spaniards. But there was no harmony amongst the 
 
i62o. The Attack upon Frederick. 43 
 
 leaders ; no spirit in the troops. Falling ? 9- Spinoia 
 
 ' ^ ^ , ° subdues the 
 
 upon one town after another, Spinoia now Western 
 brought into his power nearly the whole of 
 that portion of the Palatinate which lay on the left bank 
 of the Rhine. The army of the Union retreated help- 
 lessly to Worms, waiting for what might happen next. 
 Maximilian was now ready to attack Bo- , 
 
 ' . g 10. Inva- 
 
 hemia. He soon effected a junction with sion of 
 Bucquoi. Frederick's position was deplor- 
 able. 
 
 At first he had been received at Prague with the 
 liveliest joy. When a son was born to him, who was 
 in after days to become the Prince Rupert § n. Grow- 
 of our English civil wars, every sign of re- lafity^of*^"' 
 joicing accompanied the child to the font. Fre'ierick, 
 But it was not long before Frederick's Lutheran subjects 
 were offended by his Calvinistic proceedings. In the 
 royal chapel pictures of the saints were ruthlessly torn 
 down from the walls, and the great crucifix, an object 
 of reverence to the Lutheran as well as the Catholic, was 
 tossed aside like a common log of wood. The treasures 
 of art which Rudolph II. had collected during his life of 
 seclusion were catalogued that they might be offered for 
 sale ; and it is said that many of them were carried off 
 by the officials entrusted with the duty. And besides 
 real grievances, there were others that were purely ima- 
 ginary. A story has been told which, whether true or 
 false, is a good illustration of the impracticable nature 
 of the Bohemian aristocracy. Frederick is said to have 
 convened some of them to council early in the morning 
 and to have received an answer that it was against their 
 privileges to get up so soon. 
 
 The Bohemians were not long in discovering that no 
 real strength had been brought to them by Frederick. 
 
44 Imperialist Victories in Bohemia. 1620. 
 
 \ 12. Frede- He had been set upon the throne, not foi 
 SengthTo the ^is personal qualities, but because he was 
 Bohemians. supposed to have good friends, and to be able 
 to prop up the falhng cause of Bohemia by aid from all 
 parts of Protestant Europe. But his friends gave him 
 little or no help, and he was himself looking tranquilly 
 on whilst the storm was gathering before his eyes. In 
 his ranks there was neither organization nor devotion. 
 Christian of Anhalt had been placed in command of the 
 army, but, though personally brave he did not inspire 
 confidence. The other generals were quarrelling about 
 precedence. New levies were ordered, but the men 
 either remained at home or took the earliest opportunity 
 to slink away. Those who remained, scantily provided 
 with the necessities of life, were on the verge of mutiny. 
 On September 28 Frederick joined the army. He 
 still cherished hope. Bethlen Gabor, who had deserted 
 his cause a few months before, had repented his defec- 
 tion, and was now coming to his aid. Sick- 
 
 g 13. March ' . . , , 
 
 of Tilly and ness was ragmg m the enemy s camp. Yet, 
 ucquoi. .^ spite of sickness, Tilly pressed on, taking 
 
 town after town, and choosing his positions too skilfully 
 to be compelled to fight unless it suited him. On the 
 morning of November 8 the Imperialists were close 
 upon Prague. The enemy was posted on the White 
 Hill, a rising ground of no great height outside the walls. 
 The Imperial army had been weakened by its suffer- 
 ings ; and Bucquoi still counselled delay. But Tilly 
 knew better, and urged an immediate advance. As the 
 commanders were disputing, a Dominican friar, who ac- 
 companied the armies, stepped forward. * Sons of the 
 church,' he said, * why do you hang back ? We ought 
 to march straight forward, for the Lord hath delivered 
 the enemy into our hands. We shall overcome them as 
 
i62o. The Attack upoti Fredej'ick, 45 
 
 sure as we are alive.* Then showing them a figure of 
 the Vhgin which had been defaced by Protestant 
 hands, * See here/ he said, ' what they have done. The 
 prayers of the Holy Virgin shall be yours. Trust in 
 God, and go boldly to the battle. He fights on your 
 side, and will give you the victory.* Before the fiery 
 utterances of the friar Bucquoi withdrew his opposition. 
 It was a Sunday morning, and the gospel of the day 
 contained the words, ' Render unto C^sar the things 
 that be Caesar's,' and the warriors of the „ ^, 
 
 Q 14. Ihe 
 
 Caesar at Vienna felt themselves mspired to battle of the 
 fulfil the Saviour's words. The task which 
 they had before them was more difficult in appearance 
 than in reality. Frederick was inside the city entertain- 
 ing two English ambassadors at dinner v/hilst the blow 
 was being struck. Some Hungarians on whom he chief- 
 ly relied set the example of flight, and the day was irre- 
 trievably lost. Frederick fled for his life through North 
 Germany, till he found a refuge at the Hague. 
 
 The reign of the Bohemian aristocracy was at an end. 
 Tilly, indeed, had mercifully given time to the leaders 
 to make their escape. But, blind in adver- „ 
 
 , . . ? IS- Sub- 
 
 sity as they had been m prosperity, they mission of 
 made no use of the opportunity. The chiefs ° ^^^^' 
 perished on the scaffold. Their lands were confiscated, 
 and a new German and Catholic nobility arose, which 
 owed its possessions to its sovereign, and which, even 
 if the Royal Charter had remained in existence, would 
 have entered into the privileges which allowed their 
 predecessors to convert the churches in their domains 
 to what use they pleased. But the Royal Charter was 
 declared to have been forfeited by rebellion, and the 
 Protestant churches in the towns and on the royal es- 
 tates had nothing to depend on but the will of the con- 
 
46 Imperialist Victories in Bohemia. 1620. 
 
 queror. The ministers of one great body, — the Bohe- 
 mian Brethren — were expelled at once. The Lutherans 
 were spared for a time. 
 
 Was it yet possible to keep the Bohemian war from 
 
 growing into a German one ? Ferdinand and Maximi- 
 
 , lian were hardly likely to stop of themselves 
 
 g 16. Frede- . , . ''. . r^ . t- -, 
 
 rick put to m their career of victory. To them Frede- 
 rick was a mere aggressor, on whom they 
 v/ere bound to inflict condign punishment. Would he 
 not, if he v/ere allowed to recover strength, play the 
 same game over again ? Besides, the expenses of the 
 war had been heavy. Ferdinand had been obliged to 
 leave Upper Austria in pledge with Maximilian till his 
 share of those expenses had been repaid to him. It 
 would be much pleasanter for both parties if Maximilian 
 could have a slice of the Palatinate instead. With this 
 and the promised transference of the electorate to Maxi- 
 milian, there would be some chance of securing order and 
 a due respect for the Catholic ecclesiastical lands. On 
 January 22, therefore, Frederick was solemnly put to the 
 ban, and his lands and dignities declared to be forfeited. 
 
 Whether Ferdinand was justified in doing this was 
 
 long a moot point. He had certainly promised at his 
 
 ^ election that he would not put anyone to the 
 
 g 17. Danger . , ^ ^ . 
 
 of the Pro- ban without giving him the benefit of a fair 
 trial. But he argued that this only applied 
 to one whose guilt was doubtful, and that Frederick's 
 guilt had been open and palpable. However this may 
 have been, something of far greater importance than a 
 legal or personal question was at issue. For Frederick 
 there was little sympathy in Germany ; but there was a 
 strong feeling that it would not do to allow a Protestant 
 country to fall into Catholic hands, both for its own sake 
 and for the sake of its Protestant neighbours. 
 
1 62 1. The War m the Upper Palatinate, 47 
 
 Section II. — The War in the Upper Palatinate. 
 
 If Frederick could only have made it clear that he had 
 really renounced all his pretensions to meddle with othef 
 people's lands he might possibly have ended 
 his days peaceably at Heidelberg. But he rick does not 
 could not give up his hopes of regaining his ^^^^ "^ °^^" 
 lost kingdom. One day he talked of peace; another 
 day he talked of war. When he was most peaceably in- 
 clined he would give up his claim if he could have an 
 amnesty for the past. But he would not first give up his 
 claim and then ask for an amnesty. 
 
 Even to this he had been driven half un- „ ^ 
 
 ^ 2. Fart taken 
 
 willingly by his father-in-law. The King by James of 
 of England charged himself with the office "^ ^^ 
 of a mediator, and fancied that it was unnecessary to 
 arm in the meantime. 
 
 The states of the Union were in great perplexity. 
 The Landgrave of Hesse Cassel was compelled by his 
 own subjects to come to terms with Spinola. „ _. , 
 
 . . - § 3- Dissolu- 
 
 The cities of Strasburg, Ulm, and Niirem- tionofthe 
 berg were the next to give way. On April 
 12 a treaty was signed at Mentz, by which the Union 
 dissolved itself, and engaged to withdraw its troops from 
 the Palatinate. On the other hand, Spinola promised to 
 suspend hostilities till May 14. 
 
 The danger to which the Palatinate was exposed, and 
 the hints let drop that the conquest of the Palatinate 
 might be followed by the transference of the „ 
 
 ° ^ . g 4. Chances 
 
 electorate, caused alarm in quarters by no tn Frederick's 
 means favourable to Frederick. John George 
 began to raise objections, and even the Catholic eccle-« 
 siastics were frightened at the prospects of the enlarge- 
 ment of the war, and at the risk of seeing many power':, 
 
48 Imperialist Victories m the Palatinate. 1621. 
 
 hitherto neutral, taking the part of the proscribed Elec 
 tor. 
 
 The claim kept up by Frederick to Bohemia was 
 
 something more than a claim to an empty title. He had 
 
 appointed Mansfeld to act there as his gene- 
 
 l 5. He still . ^ ^ 
 
 holds places in ral ; and, though Mansfeld had lost one post 
 emia. after another, at the end of April he still 
 
 held Tabor and V/ittingau in Frederick's name. 
 
 The appointment of Mansfeld v/as unfortunately in it- 
 self fatal to the chances of peace. Ever since the capture 
 of Pilsen, his troops, destitute of support, had been the 
 terror of the country they were called upon 
 feid's army. to defend. In those days, indeed, the most 
 disciplined army was often guilty of excesses 
 from which in our days the most depraved outcasts would 
 shrink. The soldiers, engaged merely for as long a 
 time as they happened to be wanted, passed from side 
 to side as the prospect of pay or booty allured them. 
 No tie of nationality bound the mercenary to the stan- 
 dard under which accident had placed him. He had 
 sold himself to his hirer for the time being, and he sought 
 his recompense in the gratification of every evil passion 
 of which human nature in its deepest degradation is 
 capable. 
 
 Yet, even in this terrible war, there was a difference 
 
 between one army and another. In an enemy's country 
 
 ^ , , all plundered alike. Tilly's Bavarians had 
 
 ^ 7. Soldiers 
 
 of the Thirty been guilty of horrible excesses in Bohemia. 
 But a commander like Tilly, who could pay 
 his soldiers, and could inspire them with confidence in 
 his generalship, had it in his power to preserve some 
 sort of discipline ; and if, as Tilly once told a complain- 
 ing official, his men were not nuns, they were at all 
 4jvents able to refrain on occasion from outrageous vil- 
 
i62i. The IVar in the Upper Palatinate. 49 
 
 lany. A commander like Mansfeld, who could not pay 
 his soldiers, must, of necessity, plunder wherever he 
 was. His movements would not be governed by mili- 
 tary or political reasons. As soon as his men had eaten 
 up one part of the country they must go to another, if 
 they were not to die of starvation. They obeyed, like 
 the elements, a law of their own, quite independent of 
 the wishes or needs of the sovereign whose interests they 
 were supposed to serve. 
 
 Before the end of May the breaking up of the army of 
 the Union sent fresh swarms of recruits to Mansfeld's 
 camp. He was soon at the head of a force „ 
 
 ^ , ? 8. Mans- 
 
 of 16,000 men in the Upper Palatinate. The feld takes the 
 
 onGiisivG 
 
 inhabitants suffered terribly, but he was 
 strong enough to maintain his position for a time. Nor 
 was he content with standing on the defensive. He 
 seized a post within the frontiers of Bohemia, and threat- 
 ened to harry the lands of the Bishop of Bamberg and 
 Wiirzburg if he did not withdraw his troops from the 
 army of the League. He then fell upon Leuchtenberg, 
 and carried off the Landgrave a prisoner to his camp. 
 
 The first attack of the Bavarians failed entirely. 
 Bethlen Gabor, too, was again moving in Hungary, had 
 slain Bucquoi, and was drivinsr the Empe- „ 
 
 ^ ' ^ \ ? 9. A truce 
 
 ror's army before him. Under these cir- impossible 
 cumstances, even Ferdinand seems to have 
 hesitated, and to have doubted whether he had not bet- 
 ter accept the English oiTer of mediation. Yet such was 
 the character of Mansfeld's army that it made mediation 
 impossible. It must attack somebody in order to exist. 
 
 Yet it was in the Lower, not in the Upper, Palatinate 
 that the first blow was struck. Sir Horace Vere, who 
 had gone out the year before, with a recri- ? 10. Vere in 
 
 r -r^ ,- , -, ^. the Lower 
 
 jnent of English volunteers, was now m Palatinate. 
 
Imperialist Victories in the Palatinate. 1621. 
 
 command for Frederick. But Frederick had neithei 
 money nor provisions to give him, and the sup- 
 plies of the Palatinate were almost exhausted. The 
 existing truce had been prolonged by the Spaniards. 
 But the lands of the Bishop of Spires lay temptingly near. 
 Salving his conscience by issuing the strictest orders 
 against pillage, he quartered some of his men upon them. 
 
 The whole Catholic party was roused to indignation. 
 \ II. War re- Cordova, left in command of the Spanish 
 in die Lower troops after Spinola's return to Brussels, de- 
 Palatinate. clared the truce to have been broken, and 
 commenced operations against Vere. 
 
 By this time Mansfeld's power of defending the 
 
 Upper Palatinate was at an end. The magistrates of the 
 
 towns were sick of his presence, and pre- 
 
 3 12. Mans- . ^ .... 
 
 feld driven fcrred commg to terms with Maximilian to 
 Upper submitting any longer to the extortions of 
 
 Palatinate. their master's army. Mansfeld, seeing how 
 matters stood, offered to sell himself and his troops to 
 the Emperor. But he had no real intention of carrying 
 out the bargain. On October 10 he signed an engage- 
 ment to disband his forces. Before the next sun arose he 
 had slipped away, and was in full march for Heidelberg. 
 Tilly followed hard upon his heels. But Mans- 
 feld did not stop to fight him. Throwing himself upon 
 Alsace, he seized upon Hagenau, and converted it into 
 a place of strength. 
 
 Section III. — Frederick's Allies. 
 The winter was coming on, and there would be time 
 for negotiations before another blow was struck. But to 
 § I. Proposal give negotiations a chance it was necessary 
 feid^into Eng- that Mansfeld's army should be fed, in order 
 ghsh pay. ^j^g^^ j^g might be able to keep quiet while 
 
 the diplomatists were disputing. James, therefore, wise- 
 
i622. Frederick^ s Allies. 51 
 
 ly proposed to provide a sum of money for this purpose. 
 But a quarrel with the House of Commons hurried on a 
 dissolution, and he was unable to raise money sufficient 
 for the purpose without a grant from Parliament. 
 
 James, poor and helpless, was thus compelled to fall 
 back upon the friendship of Spain, a friendship which he 
 hoped to knit more closely by a marriage § 2. England 
 between his son, the Prince of Wales, and a ^^^ ^v^^"^- 
 Spanish Infanta. The Spanish Government was anx- 
 ious, if possible, to avoid an extension of the war in Ger- 
 many. Though all the riches of the Indies were at its 
 disposal, that government was miserably poor. In a 
 land where industry, the source of wealth, was held in 
 dishonour, all the gold in the world was thrown away. 
 Scarcely able to pay the armies she maintained in time 
 of peace, Spain had now again to find money for the 
 war in the Netherlands. In 1621 the twelve years' truce 
 with the Dutch had come to an end, and Spinola's 
 armies in Brabant and Flanders could not live, like 
 Mansfeld's at the expense of the country, for fear of 
 throwing the whole of the obedient provinces, as they 
 were called, into the enemies' hands. If possible, there- 
 fore, that yawning gulf of the German war, which 
 threatened to swallow up so many millions of ducats, 
 must be closed. And yet how was it to be done ? The 
 great difficulty in the way of peace did not lie in Frede- 
 rick's pretensions. They could easily be swept aside. 
 The great difficulty lay in this — that the Catholics, hav- 
 ing already the institutions of the Empire in their hands, 
 were now also in possession of a successful army. How, 
 under such circumstances, was Protestantism, with which 
 so many tem.poral interests were bound up, to feel itself 
 secure ? And without giving security to Protestantism, 
 how could a permanent peace be obtained ? 
 
52 Imperialist Victories in the Palatmate. 1622. 
 
 To this problem the Spanish ministers did not care to 
 address themselves. They thought that it would be 
 s 3. Spanish enough to Satisfy personal interests. They 
 P^^^^- * offered James a larger portion with the In* 
 
 fanta than any other sovereign in Europe would have 
 given. They opposed tooth and nail the project for 
 transferring the Electorate to Maximilian, as likely to 
 lead to endless war. But into the heart of the great 
 question they dared not go, tied and bound as they were 
 by their devotion to the Church. Could not Frederick 
 and James, they asked, be bought off by the assurance 
 of the Palatinate to Frederick's heirs, on the simple con- 
 dition of his delivering up his eldest son to be educated 
 at Vienna? Though they said nothing whatever about 
 any change in the boy's religion, they undoubtedly 
 hoped that he would there learn to become a good 
 Catholic. 
 
 Such a policy was hopeless from the beginning. Fred- 
 erick had many faults. He was shallow and obstinate. 
 ?4. Frederick But he really did believe in his religion as 
 accedrto ^° firmly as any Spaniard in Madrid believed 
 them. jj^ j^^g. g^j^j j^ ^g^g certain that he would 
 
 never expose his children to the allurements of the 
 Jesuits of Vienna. 
 
 It was settled that a conference should be held at 
 Brussels, the capital of the Spanish Netherlands, first 
 ? 5. A con- to arrange terms for a suspension of arms, 
 
 ference to be j . i , , •■ r i 
 
 held at ^.nd. then to prepare the way tor a general 
 
 Brussels. peacc. The Spanish plan of pacification was 
 
 not yet announced. But Frederick can hardly be blamed 
 for suspecting that no good would come from diplomacy, 
 or for discerning that a few regiments on his side would 
 weigh more heavily in his favour than a million of words. 
 The only question for him to decide was the quarter 
 
1 62 2. Frederick^ s Allies. 53 
 
 in v/hich he should seek for strength. His weakness 
 had hitherto arisen from his confidence in ^ 6. Where 
 physical strength alone. To get together as ^ck to^expect 
 many thousand men as possible and to ^^ip? 
 launch them at the enemy had been his only policy, and 
 he had done nothing to conciliate the order-loving portion 
 of the population. The cities stood aloof from his cause. 
 The North German princes would have nothing to say 
 to him. If he could only have renounced his past, if he 
 could have acknowledged that all he had hitherto done 
 had been the fruitful root of disaster, if he could, with 
 noble self-renunciation, have entreated others to take up 
 the cause of German Protestantism, which in his hands 
 had suffered so deeply, then it is not impossible that 
 opinion, whilst opinion was still a power in Germany, 
 would have passed over to his side, and that the coming 
 mischief might yet have been averted. 
 
 But Frederick did not do this. If he had been capable 
 of doing it he must have been other than he was. In 
 1622, as in 161Q, the pupil of Christian of , ,^. 
 
 ■^ ^ ^ g 7. His pre- 
 
 Anhalt looked to the mere development of parations for 
 numerical strength, without regard to the 
 moral basis of force. 
 
 It must be acknowledged that if numbers could give 
 power, Frederick's prospects were never better than in 
 the spring of 1622. Mansfeld's army was § 8. Frede- 
 not, this time, to stand alone. In the south '^'''^'^ ''"'^^• 
 the Margrave of Baden-Durlach was arming in Frede- 
 rick's cause. In the north, Christian of Brunswick was 
 preparing to march to the aid of the Palatinate. Such 
 names as these call up at once before us the two -main 
 difficulties which would have remained in the way of 
 peace even if the question of the Palatinate could have 
 been laid aside. 
 
54 Imperialist Victories in the Palatinate. 1622. 
 
 The Margrave of Baden-Durlach had long been no- 
 
 1 9. The 
 M 
 
 torious for the skill with which he had found 
 Sl'argrave of cxcuses for appropriating ecclesiastical pro- 
 perty, and for defeating legal attempts to 
 embarrass him in his proceedings. 
 
 Christian of Brunswick was a younger brother of the 
 Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbiittel. By the influence of 
 1616. his family he secured in 161 6 his election to 
 
 tian'of "^" the bishopric or administratorship of Hal- 
 Brunswick, berstadt. The ceremonies observed at the 
 institution of the youth, who had nothing of the bishop 
 but the name, may well have seemed a degrading pro- 
 fanation in the eyes of a Catholic of that day. As he 
 entered the Cathedral the Te Deum was sung to the 
 pealing organ. He was led to the high altar amidst the 
 blaze of lighted candles. Then, whilst the choir sang 
 *0h Lord! save thy people,' the four eldest canons 
 placed him upon the altar. Subsequently he descended 
 and, kneeling with the canons before the altar, three 
 times intoned the words ' Oh Lord, save thy servant.' 
 Then he was placed again upon the altar whilst a hymn 
 of praise was sung. Lastly, he took his place opposite 
 the pulpit whilst the courtly preacher explained that 
 Christian's election had been in accordance with the ex- 
 press will of God. This,' he cried ^triumphantly, 'is the 
 bishop whom God himself has elected. This is the man 
 whom God has set as the ruler of the land.' 
 
 Christian's subsequent proceedings by no means cor- 
 responded with the expectations of his enthusiastic ad- 
 ^, . mirers. Like one who has been handed 
 
 g II. Chris- . 
 
 tian's fond- down to evil renown in early English his- 
 
 fighting. tory, he did nought bishoplike. He was 
 
 not even a good ruler of his domain. He 
 
 left his people to be misgoverned by officials, whilst he 
 
1 62 2. Frederick^ s Allies, 55 
 
 wandered about the world in quest of action. As brain- 
 less for all higher purposes as Murat, the young Bishop 
 was a born cavalry officer. He took to fighting for very 
 love of it, just as young men in more peaceful times take 
 to athletic sports. 
 
 And, if he was to. fight at all, there could be no ques- 
 tion on which side he would be found. There was a 
 certain heroism about him which made him , 
 
 g 12. Me 
 
 love to look upon himself as the champion takes up the 
 of high causes and the promoter of noble Elizabeth. 
 aims. To such an one it would seem to be 
 altogether debasing to hold his bishopric on the mere 
 tenure of the agreement of Miihlhausen, to be debarred 
 from taking the place due to him in the Diet of the Em- 
 pire, and to be told that if he was very loyal and very 
 obedient to the Emperor, no force would be employed to 
 wrest from him that part of the property of the Church 
 which he held through a system of iniquitous robbery. 
 Then, too, came a visit to the Hague, where the bright 
 eyes of his fair cousin the titular Queen of Bohemia 
 chained him for ever to her cause, a cause which might 
 soon become his own. For who could tell, when once 
 the Palatinate was lost, whether the agreement of Miihl- 
 hausen would be any longer regarded ? 
 
 In the summer of 1621 Christian levied a force with 
 which he marched into the Catholic bishopric of Pader- 
 born. The country was in the course of „ 
 forcible conversion by its bishop, and there ravages in 
 v/as still in it a strong Lutheran element, of Pader- 
 which would perhaps have answered the ^°'"°- 
 appeal of a leader who was less purely an adventurer. 
 But except in word, Catholic and Protestant were alike 
 to Christian, so long as money could be got to support 
 his army. Castles, towns, farmhouses were ransacked 
 
 F 
 
56 Imperialist Victories in the Palati-nate. 1622. 
 
 for the treasure of the rich, and the scanty hoard of the 
 poor. We need not be too hard on him if he tore dowr» 
 the silver shrine of a saint in the cathedral of Paderborn, 
 and melted it into coin bearing the legend : — ' The 
 friend of God and the enemy of the priests.' But it is 
 impossible to forget he was the enemy of the peasants 
 as well. Burning-masters appear among the regular 
 officers of his army ; and many a village, unable to 
 satisfy his demands, went up in flames, with its peaceful 
 industry ruined for ever. At last, satiated with plunder, 
 he turned southward to the support of Mansfeld. 
 
 Such were the commanders into whose hands the for- 
 tunes of German Protestantism had fallen. Mansfeld 
 told Vere plainly that whether there were a 
 
 ^ 14. Mans- n , 1 , 1 ■, 
 
 feld will not truce or not, he at least would not lay down 
 
 makepeace. ■■ • ■, ■. • j • ti :\ e 
 
 his arms unless he were mdemnmed for 
 his expenses by a slice out of the Austrian possession of 
 Alsace. 
 
 If the three armies of the Margrave of Baden, of 
 Christian of Brunswick, and of Mansfeld, could be 
 brought to co-operate, Tilly, even if supported by Cordo- 
 va's Spaniards, would be in a decided numerical inferiori- 
 ty. But he had the advantage of a central situation, of 
 commanding veteran troops by whom he was trusted, 
 „ , and above all of being able to march or re- 
 
 I 15. Tilly . . - . , ^ , . , 
 
 in the midst mam quict at his pleasure, as not being de- 
 mies? ^^^' pendent on mere pillage for his commis- 
 sariat. He was inspired, too, by a childlike 
 faith in the cause for which he was fighting as the cause 
 of order and religion against anarchy and vice. 
 
 Section IV. — The Fight for the Lower Palatinate. 
 By the middle of April the hostile armies were in 
 movement, converging upon the Palatinate, where the 
 
1 6 2 2 . The Fight for the Lower Palatinate. 5 7 
 
 fortresses of Heidelberg, Mannheim, and ? i. Frede- 
 Frankenthal were safe in Vere's keeping. ManifeMin 
 Frederick himself had joined Mansfeld's tLe Palatinate. 
 army in Alsace, and his first operations were attended 
 with success. Effecting a junction with the Margrave 
 of Baden he inflicted a severe check upon Tilly at Wies- 
 loch. The old Walloon retreated to Wimpfen, calling 
 Cordova to his aid, and he did not call in vain. Mans- 
 feld, on the other hand, and the Margrave could not 
 agree. Each had his own plan for the campaign, and 
 neither would give way to the other. Besides, there were 
 no means of feeding so large an army if it kept together. 
 Mansfeld marched away, leaving the Margrave to his 
 fate. 
 
 The battle of Wimpfen was the result. On May 6 
 Tilly and Cordova caught the Margrave alone, and de- 
 feated him completely. As soon as the ac- a 2. Battle of 
 tion was over, Cordova left the field to re- Wimpfen. 
 sist the progress of Mansfeld ; and Mansfeld, whose 
 men were almost starving, was unable to overcome seri- 
 ous resistance. There was nothing for it but a speedy 
 retreat to Alsace. 
 
 In the meantime the diplomatists had met at Brussels. 
 After some difficulties of form had been got over, Sir 
 Richard Weston, the representative of Eng- ^^^ 
 
 land, sent to ask Frederick to agree to a Congress at 
 truce. When the message reached him the 
 battle of Wimpfen had not been fought, and his hopes 
 were still high. A truce, he wrote to his father-in-law, 
 would be his utter ruin. The country was exhausted. 
 Unless his army lived by plunder it could not exist. A 
 few days later he was a beaten man. On May 13 he 
 gave way, and promised to agree to the truce. On the 
 28th all was again changed. He had learned that the 
 
58 Imperialist Victories in the Falatittate. 1622. 
 
 Margrave of Baden hoped to bring back his army into 
 the field. He knew that Christian of Brunswick was ap- 
 proaching from beyond the Main ; and he informed 
 Weston that he could do nothing to assist the negotia- 
 tions at Brussels. 
 
 On June i Frederick and Mansfeld marched out of 
 Mannheim to meet Christian. On their way they passed 
 g 4. Seizure by Darmstadt. The Landgrave was espe- 
 ^ave^f^"*^' c^^l^y obnoxious to them, as a Lutheran 
 Darmstadt. prince who had warmly adopted the Em- 
 peror's side. Love of peace, combined with pretensions 
 to lands in dispute with the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, 
 in which he hoped to be supported by Ferdinand, had 
 made him a bitter enemy of Mansfeld and his proceed- 
 ings ; and though it was not known at the time that he 
 was actually in receipt of a Spanish pension, Frederick 
 was not likely to attribute to other than interested mo- 
 tives a line of action which seemed so incomprehensi- 
 ble. 
 
 As soon as the troops reached Darmstadt, they com- 
 ^,, menced their usual work, ravaging the 
 
 § 5. Mansfeld , , • • rr ^ ^ ^ ^ 
 
 unable to pass country, and drivmg off the cattle. To the 
 Landgrave, who recommended submission 
 to the Emperor as the best way of recovering peace, 
 Frederick used high language. It was not in quest of 
 peace that he had come so far. The Landgrave had a 
 fortified post which commanded a passage over the 
 Main, and its possession would enable the army to join 
 Christian v;ithout difficulty. But the Landgrave was 
 firm ; and finding that a denial would not be taken, tried 
 to avoid his importunate guests by flight. He was over- 
 taken and brought back a prisoner. But even in this 
 plight he would give no orders for the surrender of the 
 post, and its commander resolutely refused to give it up 
 
i622. TJie Fight for the Lower Palatinate, 59 
 
 vvithout instructions. Before another passage could be 
 found, Tilly had received reinforcements, and Frede- 
 rick, carrying the Landgrave with him, was driven to re- 
 treat to Mannheim, not without loss. 
 
 Once more Frederick was ready to consent to the ces- 
 sation of arms proposed at Brussels. But Cordova and 
 Tilly were now of a different opinion. n a- 
 
 Christian, they knew, would soon be on the tionofMans- 
 Main, and they were resolved to crush him sarmy. 
 whilst he v/as still unaided. Lord Chichester, who had 
 come out to care for English interests in the Palatinate, 
 and who judged all that he saw with the eye of an ex- 
 perienced soldier, perceived clearly the causes of Frede- 
 rick's failure. ' I observe,' he wrote, ' so much of the 
 armies of the Margrave of Baden and of Count Mans- 
 feld, which I have seen, and of their ill discipline and 
 order, that I must conceive that kingdom and principali- 
 ty for which they shall fight to be in great danger and 
 hazard. The Duke of Brunswick's, it is said, is not 
 much better governed : and how can it be better or 
 otherwise where men are raised out of the scum of the 
 people by princes who have no dominion over them, 
 nor power, for want of pay, to punish them, nor means 
 to reward them, living only upon rapine and spoil as 
 they do, ? * 
 
 On June 20, the day before these words were written, 
 Tilly and Cordova had met with Christian at Hochst, and 
 though they did not prevent him from crossing the Main, 
 they inflicted on him such enormous losses a ^ gatUe of 
 that he joined Mansfeld with the mere frag- Hochst. 
 ments of his army. 
 
 Great was the consternation at Mannheim when the 
 truth was known. The Margrave of Baden at once 
 
6o Mansfeld and Christian in the North, 1623. 
 „ „ ,, abandoned his associates. Mansfeld and 
 
 \ 8. Mans- 
 feld abandons Christian, taking Frederick with them, re- 
 treated into Alsace, where Frederick form- 
 ally dismissed them from his service, and thus washed 
 his hands of all responsibility for their future proceed- 
 ings. 
 
 Retiring for a time to Sedan, he watched events as 
 
 they passed from that quiet retreat. ' Would to God,' 
 
 ^ , he wrote to his wife, ' that we possessed a 
 
 g 9. Frede- 
 rick goes back little corner of the earth where we could 
 
 ague. ^^^^ together in peace.' The destinies of 
 Germany and Europe had to be decided by clearer 
 heads and stronger wills than his. After a short delay 
 he found his way back to the Hague, to prove, as many 
 a wiser man had proved before him, how bitter a lot it is 
 to go up and down on the stairs which lead to the ante- 
 chambers of the great : to plead for help which never is 
 given, and to plan victories which never come. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 MANSFELD AND CHRISTIAN IN NORTH GERMANY. 
 
 Section. I. — Mansfeld" s March ijtto the Netherlands. 
 
 When once Tilly had got the better of , the armies in the 
 
 field, the reduction of the fortresses in the Palatinate was 
 
 merely a work of time. Heidelberg surren- 
 
 g I. Reduc- ■' ° 
 
 tionofthe dered on September 16. On November 8 
 Vere found Mannheim no longer tenable. 
 Frankenthal alone held out for a few months longer, and 
 was then given up to the Spaniards. 
 
 James still hoped that peace was possible, though the 
 conference at Brussels had broken up in September. In 
 
1623. Mansfeld' s March into the Netherlands. 61 
 
 the meanwhile, Ferdinand and Maximilian 
 were pushing on to the end which they had Catholics^ 
 long foreseen ; and an assembly of princes 
 was invited to meet at Hatisbon in November to assent 
 to the transference of the electorate to the Duke of Ba- 
 varia. 
 
 Constitutional opposition on the part of the Protestants 
 was impossible. In addition to the majority against them 
 amongst the princes, there was now, by the 
 mere fact of Frederick's exclusion, a major- ? 3. The Elec- 
 ity against them amongst the Electors, a re?^to^'^Mlx[-^ 
 majority which was all the more firmly es- "^'^^^^• 
 tablished when, on February 13, the transfer was sol- 
 emnly declared. Maximilian was to be Elector for his 
 lifetime. If any of Frederick's relations claimed that 
 the electorate ought rather to pass over to them, they 
 would be heard, and if their case appeared to be a good 
 one, they would receive what was due to them after 
 Maximilian's death. If, in the meanwhile, Frederick 
 chose to ask humbly for forgiveness, and to abandon 
 his claim to the electoral dignity, the Emperor would take 
 his request for the restitution of his lands into favourable 
 consideration. Against all this the Spanish ambassador 
 protested ; but the protest was evidently not meant to be 
 followed by action. 
 
 The question of peace or war now depended mainly on 
 the North German Protestants, Nobody doubted that, 
 if they could hit upon a united plan of action, , ^, ^, , 
 
 . g 4. Ihe Pvorth 
 
 and if they vigorously set to work to carry German Pro- 
 it out, they would bring an irresistible weight 
 to bear upon the points at issue. Unfortunately, however, 
 such uniformity of action was of all things most improba- 
 ble. John George, indeed, had more than once been 
 urged in different directions during the past years by 
 
62 Mansfeld and Clu'-istian in the North. 1623. 
 
 events as they successively arose. The invasion of the 
 Palatinate had shaken him in his friendship for the Em- 
 peror. Then had come the kidnapping of the Landgrave 
 of Darmstadt to give him a shock on the other side. 
 Later in the year the news that an excuse had been found 
 for driving the Lutheran clergy out of Bohemia had 
 deeply exasperated him, and his exasperation had been 
 increased by the transference of the electorate, by which 
 the Protestants were left in a hopeless minority in the 
 Electoral House. But the idea of making war upon the 
 Emperor, and unsettling what yet remained as a security 
 for peace, was altogether so displeasing to John George 
 that it is doubtful whether anything short of absolute ne- 
 cessity would have driven him to war. What he would 
 have liked would have been a solemn meeting, at which 
 he might have had the opportunity of advancing his 
 views. But if those views had been seriously opposed 
 he would hardly have drawn the sword to uphold 
 them. 
 
 If the only danger to be apprehended by the North 
 
 Germans had been the march of Tilly's army, it is not 
 
 unlikely that the war would here have come to an end. 
 
 , , , Ferdinand and Maximilian would doubtless 
 
 g 5. Mansfeld 
 
 and Christian have respcctcd the agreement of Miihlhau- 
 
 of Brunswick. ^ r\ i j i n i i 
 
 sen, and there would hardly have been 
 found sufficient determination in the northern princes to 
 induce them to arm for the recovery of the Palatinate. 
 But a new danger had arisen. Mansfeld and Christian 
 had not laid down their arms when Frederick dismissed 
 them in July, and so far from being ready to make sacri- 
 fices for peace, they were ready to make any sacrifices 
 for the sake of the continuance of the war. 
 
 It was not long before the adventurers were forced to 
 leave Alsace. They had eaten up everything that was 
 
1623. Mansfeld' s March into the Nethej-lands. ^7^ 
 
 to be eaten there, and the enemy was known' 
 to be on their track. Throwing themselves ^ 1622. 
 into Lorraine, they settled down for a time tabiish Them- 
 like a swarm of locusts upon that smiling ^^"^^s ^"^ Lo^. 
 
 ^ o rame. 
 
 land. But where were they to turn next ? 
 The French government hurried up reinforcements to 
 guard their frontier. That road, at all events, was 
 barred to them, and Christian, whose troops were in a 
 state of mutiny, tried in vain to lead them towards the 
 Lower Rhine, Whilst the leaders hardly knew what to 
 do, they received an invitation to place themselves for 
 three months at the disposal of the Dutch Republic. 
 
 Matters had not been going well with the Dutch since 
 the re-opening of the war in 1621. Their garrison at 
 Juliers had surrendered to Spinola in the 
 winter, and the great Spanish commander frieums" ^ ° 
 was now laying siege to Bergen-op-Zoom, 
 with every prospect of reducing it. To come to its relief 
 Mansfeld would have to march across the Spanish 
 Netherlands. On August 28 he found Cordova on his 
 way to Fleurus, as he had stood in his way in the Palati- 
 nate the year before. Worse than all, two of his own 
 regiments broke out into mutiny, refusing to fight unless 
 they were paid. At such a time Mansfeld was at his 
 best. He was a man of cool courage and infinite re- 
 source, and he rode up to the mutineers, entreating them 
 if they would not fight at least to look as if they meant 
 to fight. Then, with the rest of his force, he charged the 
 enemy. Christian seconded him bravely at the head of 
 his cavalry, fighting on in spite of a shot in his left arm. 
 Three horses were killed under him. The loss was 
 enormous on both sides, but Mansfeld gained his object, 
 and was able to pursue his v/ay in safety. 
 
 Christian's arm was amputated. He ordered that the 
 
64 Mafisfeld a7id Christian i?i the North. 1623. 
 
 operation should be performed to the sound of trumpets. 
 
 ' The arm that is left,' he said, * shall give 
 
 loses his ai-m^'^ ^^7 enemies enough to do.' He coined 
 
 money out of the silver he had taken from 
 
 the Spaniards, with the inscription ^Altera restat' 
 
 Bergen-op-Zoom was saved. Spinola raised the siege. 
 
 But Mansfeld's disorderly habits did not comport well 
 
 .,, with the regular discipline of the Dutch 
 
 I 9. Mansfeld ^ ^ 
 
 in Munsterand army. Those whoui he had served were 
 glad to be rid of him. In November he 
 was dismissed, and marched to seek his fortune in the 
 diocese of MQnster. But the enemy was too strong for 
 him there, and he turned his steps to East Friesland, a 
 land rich and fertile, easily fortified against attack, yet 
 perfectly helpless. There he- settled down to remain till 
 the stock of money and provisions which he was able 
 to wring from the inhabitants had been exhausted. 
 
 Section II. — Christian of Brunswick in Lower Saxony, 
 
 Here then was a new rock of offence, a new call for 
 
 the Emperor to interfere, if he was in any way to be re- 
 
 , ^.^ , . garded as the preserver of the peace of the 
 
 ?i. Difficulties ° , ^ . ^ . 
 
 of the Lower Empire. But a march of Tilly against an 
 
 Saxon circle. . . , - . , 
 
 enemy m East r riesland was not a simply 
 military operation. Not a few amongst the northern 
 princes doubted whether a victorious Catholic army 
 would respect the agreement of Miihlhausen. Christian 
 of Brunswick, of course, lost no time in favouring the 
 doubt. For, whatever else might be questionable there 
 was no question that the diocese of Halberstadt was no 
 longer secured by the provisions of that agreement. 
 Neither the League nor the Emperor had given any pro- 
 mise to those administrators who did not continue loyal 
 to the Emperor, and no one could for a moment contend 
 that Christian had ever shown a spark of loyalty. 
 
1623. Christian of Brunswick hi Lower Saxony. 65 
 
 On the one side was Christian, assuring those poor 
 princes that neutrahty was impossible, and 
 that it was their plain duty to fight for the \^^ -niiy 1^4" 
 bishoprics and Protestantism. On the other "^^^"^ ^° °pp°- 
 
 ^ _ _ site courses. 
 
 side was Tilly, equally assuring them that 
 neutrality was impossible, but asserting that it was their 
 plain duty to fight for their Emperor against Mansfeld 
 and brigandage. The princes felt that it was all very 
 hard. How desirable it would be if only the v/ar would 
 take some other direction, or if Tilly and Christian would 
 mutually exterminate one another, and rid them of the 
 difficulty of solving such terrible questions ! 
 
 But the question could not be disposed of. Halberstadt 
 was a member of the Lower Saxon circle, 
 one of those districts of which the princes gtadt i^dan^er. 
 and cities were legally bound together for 
 mutual defence. The Lower Saxon circle, therefore, 
 was placed between two fires. The Catholic troops were 
 gathering round them on the south. Mansfeld was issu- 
 ing forth from his fastness in East Friesland and threat- 
 ening to occupy the line of the Weser on the north. 
 
 In February the circle determined to levy troops and 
 prepare for war. But the preparations were 5 ^ Warlike 
 rather directed against Mansfeld than against preparations. 
 Tilly. If the Emperor could only have given satisfaction 
 about the bishoprics, he would have had no vassals more 
 loyal than the Lower Saxon princes. But in Ferdinand's 
 eyes to acknowledge more than had been acknowledged 
 at Miihlhausen would be to make himself partaker in 
 other men's sins. It would have been to acknowledge 
 that robbery might give a lawful title to possession. 
 
 Almost unavoidably the circle became further involved 
 in opposition to the Emperor. Christian's brother, 
 Frederick Ulric, the reigning Duke of Bruns- 
 
66 
 
 Mansfeld and Cliristian in the North. 1623. 
 
 ? '>. Christian wick-Wolfenbuttcl, was a weak and incom- 
 
 mvited to take 
 
 service under 
 his brother. 
 
 petent prince much under his mother's 
 guidance. Anxious to save her favourite 
 son, the dashing Christian, from destruction, the Duch- 
 ess persuaded the Duke to offer his brother a refuge in his 
 dominions. If he would bring his troops there, he and 
 they would be taken into the service of the Duke, a re- 
 spectable law-abiding prince, and time would be afforded 
 him to make his peace with the Emperor. 
 
 Christian at once accepted the offer, and entered into 
 negotiations with Ferdinand. But he had never any- 
 thought of really abandoning his adventur- 
 if Stldtlohn"^^ o^s Career. Young princes, eager for dis- 
 tinction, levied troops and gathered round 
 his standard. Every week the number of his followers 
 increased. At last the neighbouring states could bear it 
 no longer. The authorities of the circle told him plainly 
 to be gone. Reproaching them for their sluggishness in 
 thus abandoning the cause of the Gospel, he started for 
 the Dutch Netherlands, with Tilly following closely upon 
 him. On August 6 he was overtaken at Stadtlohn, within 
 a few hours' march of the frontier, behind which he would 
 have been in safety. His hastily levied recruits were no 
 match for Tilly's veterans. Of 20,000 men only 6,000 
 found their way across the border. 
 
 Section III. — Danger of the Lower Saxon Circle. 
 
 Christian's defeat, however disastrous, settled nothing. 
 Mansfeld was still in East Friesland. The princes of 
 
 Lower Saxony were still anxious about the 
 of\he bishoprics. Even if the agreement of Miihl- 
 
 bishoprics. hauscn were scrupulously observed, was it 
 
 so very certain that the bishoprics might 
 not be wrenched from them in another way than by 
 
1623. Danger of the Lower Saxo?i Circle. 67 
 
 force of arms ? The administrators held the sees simply 
 because they had been elected by the chapters, and if 
 only a Catholic majority could be obtained in a chaptei 
 the election at the next vacancy would be certain to fall 
 upon a Catholic. Often it happened that the Protestant 
 majority had taken care to perpetuate its power by 
 methods of very doubtful legality, and it would be open 
 to the Emperor to question those methods. It might 
 even come to pass that strict law might turn the majority 
 into a minority. Already, on April 18, the chapter of 
 Osnabriick had chosen a Catholic to succeed a Protest- 
 ant bishop, perhaps not altogether uninfluenced by the 
 near neighbourhood of a Catholic army. Christian of 
 Brunswick, certain that he would not be allowed to re- 
 tain his see, had formally given in his resignation, and 
 it was not impossible that with some manipulation the 
 chapter of Halberstadt might be induced to follow the 
 example of Osnabriick. The question of the bishoprics 
 had, no doubt, its low and petty side. It may be spoken 
 of simply as a question interesting to a handful of aristo- 
 cratic sinecurists, who had had the luck to reap the good 
 things of the old bishops without doing their work. But 
 this would be a very incomplete account of the matter. 
 Scattered as these bishoprics were over the surface of 
 North Germany, their restitution meant nothing less than 
 the occupation by the Emperor and his armies of points 
 of vantage over the whole of the north. No one who 
 casts his eyes over the map can doubt for an instant 
 that, v/ith these bishoprics open to the troops of the 
 League, or it might be even to the troops of the King of 
 Spain, the independence of the princes would have been 
 a thing of the past ; and it must never be forgotten that, 
 as matters stood, the cause of the independence of the 
 princes was inextricably bound up with the independ* 
 
6S Mansfeld and Christia7i in the North. 1623. 
 
 ence of Protestantism. If Ferdinand and Maximilian 
 had their way, German Protestantism would exist merely 
 upon sufferance ; and whatever they and the Jesuits 
 might say, German Protestantism was, in spite of all its 
 shortcomings, too noble a creed to exist on suffer- 
 ance. 
 
 Would the members of the circle of Lower Saxony be 
 
 strong enough to maintain their neutrality ? They sent 
 
 ambassadors to the Emperor, asking him to 
 
 Lower Saxon Settle the question of the bishoprics in their 
 
 Circle does 
 
 nothing. favour, and to John George to ask for his 
 
 support. The Emperor replied that he 
 would not go beyond the agreement of Miihlhausen. 
 John George gave them good advice, but nothing more. 
 And, worse than all, they were disunited amongst them- 
 selves. Princes and towns, after agreeing to support 
 troops for the common defence, had done their best to 
 evade their duties. As few men as possible had been 
 sent, and the money needed for their support was still 
 slower in coming in. As usual, unpaid men were more 
 dangerous to the country which they were called upon 
 to protect than to the enemy. The circle came to the 
 conclusion that it would be better to send the troops 
 home than to keep them under arms. By the beginning 
 of the new year. Lower Saxony was undefended, a 
 tempting prey to him who could first stretch out his 
 hand to take it. 
 
 It was the old story. With the Empire, the Diet and 
 the Church in the hands of mere partisans, there wa$ 
 , ^ nothing to remind men of their duty as citi- 
 
 g 3. Low state '^ _ _ 
 
 of public feel- zens of a great nation. Even the idea of 
 °^" being members of a circle was too high to 
 
 be seriously entertained. The cities strove to thrust the 
 burden of defence upon the princes, and the princes 
 
1624. England and France. 69 
 
 thrust it back upon the cities. The flood was rising 
 rapidly which was to swallow them all. 
 
 Section IV. — Engla7td and France. 
 In the spring of 1624 there was rest for a moment. 
 Mansfeld, having stripped East Friesland bare, drew 
 back into the Netherlands. The only army 
 
 •11 r 1 r 1 T ? ^- Foreign 
 
 Still on foot was the army of the League, powers ready 
 and if Germany had been an island in the "^^ ^^'^^^ "^' 
 middle of the Atlantic, exercising no influence upon 
 other powers and uninfluenced by them, the continuance 
 in arms of those troops might fairly be cited in evidence 
 that the Emperor and the League wished to push their 
 advantages still further, in spite of their assertions that 
 they wanted nothing more than assurance of peace. 
 
 But Germany was not an island. Around it lay a 
 multitude of powers with conflicting interests, but all 
 finding in her distractions a fair field for 
 
 1 • 1 • -r^ T 1 . § 2- Ferdi- 
 
 pursumg their own objects. Ferdinand, in nand's weak- 
 fact, had made himself just strong enough 
 to raise the jealousy of his neighbours, but not strong 
 enough to impose an impassible barrier to their attacks. 
 He had got on his side the legal and military elements 
 of success. He had put down all resistance. He had 
 frightened those who dreaded anarchy. But he had not 
 touched the national heart. He had taught men to 
 make it a mere matter of calculation whether a foreign 
 invasion was likely to do them more damage than the 
 success of their own Emperor. Whilst he aft^ected to 
 speak in the name of Germany, more than half of Ger- 
 many was neutral if not adverse in the straggle. 
 
 England, at last, was giving signs of warlike prepara- 
 tion. Prince Charles had paid a visit to Madrid in 
 hopes of bringing home a Spanish bride, and of 
 
70 Mansfeld and Christian in the North. 1624. 
 
 1623. regaining the Palatinate for his brother-in- 
 
 De^ween^^Eng- ^^.w. He had come back without a wife, 
 land and ^^j^^ with the prospect of getting back the 
 
 Palatinate as distant as ever. He had 
 learned what the Spanish plan was, that wonderful 
 scheme for educating Frederick's children at Vienna, 
 with all ostensible guarantees for keeping them in their 
 father's faith, which were, however, almost certain to 
 come to nothing when reduced to practice. And so he 
 came back angry with the Spaniards, and resolved to 
 urge his father to take up arms. In the spring of 1624 
 all negotiations between England and Spain were 
 brought to an end, and Parliament was discussing with 
 the king the best means of recovering the Palatinate. 
 
 In the English House of Commons there was but little 
 real knowledge of German affairs. The progress of the 
 
 Emperor and the League was of too recent 
 plans'"^ '^ a date to be thoroughly comprehended. 
 
 Men, remembering the days of Philip II., 
 were inclined to overestimate the power of Spain, and 
 to underestimate the power of the Emperor. They there- 
 fore fancied that it would be enough to attack Spain by 
 sea, and to send a few thousand soldiers to the aid of 
 the Dutch Republic. 
 
 James, if he was not prompt in action, at all events 
 knew better than this. He believed that the Imperial 
 
 power was now too firmly rooted in Germany 
 tion between to fall before anything short of a great Euro- 
 the House of pean Confederacy. From this the Commons 
 Corximons. shrunk. A war upon the continent would be 
 extremely expensive, and, after all, their wrath had been 
 directed against Spain, which had meddled with their 
 internal affairs, rather than against the Emperor, who 
 had never taken the slightest interest in English politics. 
 
1624. England and Frafice. 71 
 
 The utmost they would do was to accept the king's 
 statement that he would enter into negotiations with 
 other powers and would lay the results before them in 
 the winter. 
 
 James first applied to" France. He saw truly that the 
 moment the struggle in Germany developed into a Euro- 
 pean war the key to success would lie in the 
 hands of the French governmment. In that French 
 
 , . , r ^1 Government 
 
 great country, then as now, ideas 01 the and the 
 most opposite character were striving for the huguenots, 
 mastery. Old thoughts which had been abandoned in 
 England in the sixteenth century were at issue with new 
 thoughts which would hardly be adopted in England 
 before the eighteenth. In France as well as in England 
 and Germany, the question of the day was how religious 
 toleration could be granted without breaking up the 
 national unity. In England that unity was so strong that 
 no party in the state could yet be brought to acknow- 
 ledge that toleration should be granted at all. But for 
 that very reason the question was on the fair way to a 
 better settlement than it could have in France or Ger- 
 many. When the nation was once brought face to face 
 with the difficulty, men would ask, not whether one 
 religion should be established in Northumberland and 
 another in Cornwall, but what amount of religious liberty 
 was good for men as men all over England. In Ger- 
 many it could not be so. There the only question was 
 where the geographical frontier was to be drawn between 
 two religions. Neither those who wished to increase the 
 power of the princes, nor those who wished to increase 
 the power of the Emperor, were able to rise above the idea 
 of a local and geographical division. And to some 
 extent France was in the same condition. The Edict of 
 Nantes had recognised some hundreds of the country 
 
 G 
 
72 Mansfeld and Christian in the JVorth. 1624. 
 
 houses of the aristocracy, and certain cities and towns, 
 as places where the reformed religious doctrines might 
 be preached without interference. But in France the 
 ideal of national unity, though far weaker than it was in 
 England, was far stronger than it was in Germany. In 
 order to give security to the Protestant, or Huguenot 
 towns as they were called in France, they had been 
 allowed the right of garrisoning themselves, and of exclud- 
 ing the royal troops. They had thus maintained them- 
 selves as petty republics in the heart of France, practically 
 independent of the royal authority. 
 
 Section V. — Rise of Richelieu. 
 
 Such a state of things could not last. The idea in- 
 volved in the exaltation of the monarchy was the unity 
 2 1. of the nation. The idea involved in the 
 
 Lewis XIII, maintenance of these guarantees was its dis- 
 integration. Ever since the young king, Lewis XIII., 
 had been old enough to take an active part in affairs he 
 had been striving to establish his authority from one end 
 of the kingdom to the other. 
 
 The supremacy and greatness of the monarchy was 
 the thought in which he lived and moved. His intellect 
 was not of a high order, and he was not likely to origi- 
 nate statesmanlike projects, or to carry them out success- 
 fully to execution. But he was capable of appreciating 
 merit, and he would give his undivided confidence to 
 a 2. His ^^y ^^^^ who could do the thing which he 
 
 ideas. desired to have done, without himself ex- 
 
 actly knowing how to do it. 
 
 During the first years of his reign everything seemed 
 
 falling to pieces. As soon as his father's strong hand 
 
 was removed some of the nobility fell back 
 
 learsShi? i^^o half-independencc of the Crown, 
 
 reign. whilst Others submitted to it in considera- 
 
1624. Rise of Richelieu. 73 
 
 tion of receiving large pensions and high positions in 
 the state. To this Lewis was for the time obhged to 
 submit. But the privileges of the Huguenot towns 
 roused his indignation. It was not long before he levied 
 war upon them, determined to reduce them to submis- 
 sion to the royal authority. 
 
 All this foreboded a future for France not unlike the 
 future which appeared to be opening upon Germany. 
 There were too many signs that the estab- ^ ^ ^^^ 
 lishment of the king's authority over the intolerant 
 towns would be followed by the forcible es- court, 
 tablishment of his rehgion. There was a 
 large party at Court crying out with bigoted intolerance 
 against any attempt to treat the Huguenots with con- 
 sideration, and that cry found an echo in the mind of 
 the king. For he was himself a devout Catholic, and 
 nothing would have pleased him better than to see the 
 victories of his arms attended by the victories of the 
 Church to which he was attached. 
 
 If Lewis was not a Ferdinand, it was not because he 
 was a nobler or a better man, but because he had his eye 
 open to dangers from more quarters than ^ ^ ^^^^.^ 
 one. When the troubles in Germany first jealous of 
 broke out, French influence was exerted on 
 the side of the Emperor. French ambassadors had taken 
 part in the negotiations which preceded the treaty of 
 Ulm, and had thrown all their weight in the scale to se^ 
 cure the safety of Maximihan's march into Bohemia. 
 But in 1622 the conquest of the Palatinate brought other 
 thoughts into the mind of the King of France. His 
 monarchical authority was likely to suffer far more from 
 the victorious union between the two branches of the 
 House of Austria than from a few Huguenot towns. For 
 many a long year Spain had planted her standards not 
 
74 Mansfeld and Christian in the North. 1624. 
 
 only beyond the Pyrenees, but in Naples, Milan, 
 Franche Comte, and the Netherlands. Frankenthal 
 and the Western Palatinate were now garrisoned by her 
 troops, and behind those troops was the old shadowy 
 empire once more taking form and substance, and pre- 
 senting itself before the world as a power hereafter to be 
 counted with. In 1622, accordingly, Lewis made peace 
 with the Huguenots at iiome. In 1623 he sent some 
 slight aid to Mansfeld. In 1624 he called Richeheu to 
 his counsels. 
 
 It would be a mistake to suppose that the cool and 
 far-sighted Cardinal who was thus suddenly placed at 
 , , ^. , the head of the French ministry had it all 
 
 lieu's acces- his own way from the first. He had to take 
 power. into account the ebb and flow of feeling in 
 
 the Court and the country, and the ebb and 
 flow of feeling in Lewis himself. There was still with 
 Lewis the old anxiety to crush the Huguenots and to 
 make himself absolute master at home, alongside with 
 the new anxiety to shake off the superiority of the House 
 of Austria abroad. It was Richelieu's task to show him 
 how to satisfy both his longings ; how to strike down re- 
 bellion whilst welcoming religious liberty, and how, by 
 uniting Catholic and Protestant in willing obedience to 
 his throne, he might make himself feared abroad in pro- 
 portion as he was respected at home. 
 
 Richelieu's first idea was not altogether a successful 
 one. He encouraged Lewis to pursue the negotiation 
 which had been already commenced for a marriage be- 
 tween his sister and the Prince of Wales. At the wish 
 either of Lewis himself or of Richelieu the 
 
 g 7. Mar- 
 riage of marriage was hampered with conditions for 
 
 Maria. * the religious liberty of the English Catholics, 
 
 to which the prince, when he afterwards 
 
1624. Rise of RicheTleu. 75 
 
 came to the throne as Charles I., was unwilling or un- 
 able to give effect. These conditions were therefore the 
 beginning of an ill feeling between the two crowns, 
 which helped ultimately to bring about a state of war. 
 
 Nor were other causes of dispute wanting. James and 
 his son expected France to join them in an avowed 
 league for the recovery of the Palatinate. „ ^ . 
 
 1 . , ,. r ^ ?2- Foreign 
 
 But to this Lewis and Richelieu refused to policy of Lewis 
 consent. Lewis was proud of the name of 
 Catholic, and he was unwilling to engage in open war 
 with the declared champions of the Catholic cause. But 
 he was also King of France, and he was ready to satisfy 
 his conscience by refusing to join the league, though he 
 had no scruple in sending money to the support of 
 armies who were fighting for Protestantism. He agreed 
 to pay large subsidies to the Dutch, and to join the King 
 of England in promoting an expedition which was to 
 march under Mansfeld through France to Alsace, with 
 the object of attacking the Palatinate. At the same 
 time he was ready to carry on war in Italy. The Span- 
 iards had taken military possession of the Valtelline, a 
 valley through which lay the only secure military road 
 from their possessions in Italy to the Austrian lands in 
 Germany. Before the end of the year a French army 
 entered the valley and drove out the Spaniards with ease. 
 Mansfeld's expedition, on the other hand, never 
 reached Alsace at all. Before the troops of which it was 
 composed were ready to sail from England, Richelieu 
 had found an excuse for diverting its course. Spinola 
 had laid siege to Breda, and the Dutch were as anxiously 
 seeking for means to succour it as they had sought for 
 means to succour Bergen-op-Zoom when it 
 was besieged in 1622. The French averred 29- Mansfeld's 
 
 o expedition. 
 
 that Mansfeld would be far better employed 
 
76 Mansfeld and Christian in the North. 1625, 
 
 at Breda than in Alsace. At all events, they now de- 
 clined positively to allow him to pass through 
 France. 
 
 James grumbled and remonstrated in vain. At last, 
 
 after long delays, Mansfeld was allowed to sail for the 
 
 Dutch coast, with strict orders to march to 
 
 § icValiure. the Palatinate without going near Breda, 
 
 of the expedi- j^g j^g^^j yi\\h. him i2,ooo English foot, and 
 
 tion. ' ° ' 
 
 was to be accompanied by 2,000 French 
 horse under Christian of* Brunswick. No good came of 
 the expedition. James had consented to conditions ap- 
 pended to his son's marriage contract which he did not 
 venture to submit to discussion in the House of Com- 
 mons, and Parliament was not, therefore, allowed to 
 meet. Without help from Parliament the Exchequer 
 was almost empty, and James was unable to send money 
 with Mansfeld to pay his men. Upon their landing, the 
 poor fellows, pressed a few weeks before, and utterly 
 without military experience, found themselves destitute 
 of everything in a hard frost. Before long they were 
 dying like flies in winter. The help which they were at 
 last permitted to give could not save Breda from sur- 
 render, and the handful which remained were far too 
 few to cross the frontier into Germany. 
 
 Richelieu had hoped to signalize the year 1625 by a 
 larger effort than that of 1624. He had mastered the 
 Valtelline in alliance with Venice and Savoy, and 
 French troops were to help the Duke of Savoy to take 
 Genoa, a city which was in close friendship with Spain. 
 There was further talk of driving the Spaniards out of 
 the Duchy of Milan, and even intervention in Germany 
 was desired by Richelieu, though no decision had been 
 come to on the subject. In the midst of these thoughts 
 
1625. Rise of Richelieu. 7 7 
 
 he was suddenly reminded that he was not 
 completely master at home. The peace in"ofthe "^' 
 made with the Huo^uenots in 1622 had not French Hugue- 
 
 ° nots. 
 
 been fairly kept : royal officials had en- 
 croached upon their lands, and had failed to observe the 
 terms of the treaty. On a sudden, Soubise, a powerful 
 Huguenot nobleman with a fleet of his own, swooped 
 down upon some of the king's ships lying at Blavet, in 
 Brittany, and carried them off as his prize. Sailing to 
 Rochelle, he persuaded that great commercial city to 
 come to an understanding with him, and to declare for 
 open resistance to the king's authority. 
 
 If Richelieu intended seriously to take part in the 
 German war, this was cause enough for hesitation. 
 Cleverly availing himself of. the expecta- 
 tions formed of the French alliance in Eng- fupu'on to^"^" 
 land and Holland, he contrived to borrow Sln^^fo^r^inter- 
 ships from both those countries, and before Y,ening in 
 
 Germany. 
 
 the autumn was over Soubise was driven to 
 take refuge in England. But Rochelle and the Hugue- 
 nots on land were still unconquered, and Ferdinand was 
 safe for the moment from any considerable participation 
 of France in the German war. Whether Richelieu 
 would at any time be able to take up again the thread 
 of his plans depended in the first place upon his success 
 in suppressing rebellion, but quite as much upon the use 
 which he might make of victory if the event proved fa- 
 vourable to him. A tolerant France might make war with 
 some chances in its favour. A France composed of con- 
 querors and conquered, in which each party regarded 
 the other as evil-doers to be suppressed, not as erring 
 brothers to be argued with, would weigh lightly enough 
 in the scale of European politicSa 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 INTERVENTION OF THE KING OF DENMARK. 
 
 Section I. — Christian IV. and Gustavus Adolphus. 
 
 Whilst France was thus temporarily hindered from 
 taking part in German affairs, 9.nd whilst James and his 
 son were promising more than their poverty 
 mark and would allow them to perform, the rulers of 
 
 we en. Denmark and Sweden were watching with 
 
 increasing interest the tide of war as it rolled north- 
 wards. 
 
 Christian IV. of Denmark had every reason to look 
 with anxiety upon the future. As Duke of Holstein, he 
 I 2. Chris- was a member of the Lower Saxon circle, 
 tian IV. ^j^^ jjg -j^g^^ Xovi'g been doing his best to ex- 
 
 tend his influence over the coasts of the North Sea. By 
 his new fortifications at Gluckstadt he aimed at inter- 
 cepting the commerce of Hamburg, and his success in 
 procuring for one of his sons the Bishopric of Verden 
 and the coadjutorship and eventual succession to the 
 archbishopric of Bremen was doubtless specially grate- 
 ful to him on account of the position he thus acquired 
 on the Elbe and the Weser. The question of the Pro- 
 testant bishoprics was therefore a very important ques- 
 tion to him personally, and he was well aware that a 
 real national empire in Germany would make short work 
 with his attempts to establish his dominion over the 
 mouths of the German rivers. 
 
 His attention was not now called for the first time to 
 
 the progress of the war. Like all the Lutheran princes, 
 
 he had thoroughly disapproved of Frede- 
 
 l 3. His early ^ ^ ^\ _, , 
 
 interest in the rick's Bohemian enterprise. But when 
 ^^^' Frederick was a fugitive he had seen that a 
 
 78 
 
1624. Christian IV. and Gustavus Adolphus. 79 
 
 strong force was needed to stop the Emperor from a re- 
 taliation which would be ruinous to the Protestants, and 
 he had in the beginning of 1621 given a wiUing ear to 
 James's proposal for a joint armament in defence of the 
 Palatinate. Had the war been undertaken then, with 
 the character of moderation which James and Christian 
 would have been certain to impress upon it, the world 
 might perhaps have been spared the spectacle of Mans- 
 feld's plunderings, with their unhappy results. But 
 James came too soon to the conclusion that it was un- 
 necessary to arm till mediation had failed ; and Chris- 
 tian, auguring no good from such a course, drew back 
 and left the Palatinate to its fate. But the events which 
 followed had increased his anxiety, and in 1624 his mind 
 was distracted between his desire to check the growth 
 of the imperial power and his hesitation to act with 
 allies so vacillating and helpless as the Lower Saxon 
 princes were proving themselves to be. In his own 
 lands he had shown himself a good administrator and 
 able ruler. Whether he was possessed of sufficient mili- 
 tary capacity to cope with Tilly remained to be seen. 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, was a man of a 
 higher stamp. His is the one of the few names which 
 relieve the continental Protestantism of the % ^ Gustavus 
 seventeenth century from the charge of bar- Adolphus. 
 renness. Possessed of a high and brilliant imagination, 
 and of a temperament restless and indefatigable, to 
 which inaction was the sorest of trials, he was never 
 happier than when he was infusing his own glowing 
 spirit into the comrades of some perilous enterprise. 
 Christian of Brunswick was not more ready than he to 
 lead a charge or to conduct a storm. But he had, too, 
 that of which no thought ever entered the mind of Chris- 
 tian for an instant — ^the power of seeing facts in their in* 
 
8o Intervention of the King of Deitmark. 1611. 
 
 finite variety as they really were, and the self-restraint 
 with which he curbed in his struggling spirit and his 
 passionate longing for action whenever a calm survey of 
 the conditions around showed him that action was inex- 
 pedient. In all the pages of history there is probably no 
 man who leaves such an impression of that energy un- 
 der restraint, which is the truest mark of greatness in 
 human character as it is the source of all that is sublime 
 or lovely in nature or in art. 
 
 Such a man was certain not to be a mere enthusiast 
 embarking heedlessly in a Protestant crusade. Neither 
 § 5. His con- would he be careful for mere temporal or 
 land and political power, regardless of the higher in- 
 
 Russia. terests of his time. His first duty, and he 
 
 never forgot it, was to his country. When he came to 
 the throne, in 161 1, Sweden was overrun by Danish 
 armies, and in an almost desperate condition. In two 
 years he had wrested a peace from the invaders, under 
 conditions hard indeed, but which at least secured the 
 independence of Sweden. His next effort, an effort which 
 to the day of his death he never relaxed, was to bring into 
 his own hands the dominion of the Baltic. He drove 
 the Russians from its coasts. ' Now,' he said tri- 
 umphantly in 1617, 'this enemy cannot, without our per- 
 mission launch a single boat upon the Baltic' He had 
 another enemy more dangerous than Russia. Sigis- 
 mund. King of Poland, was his cousin, the son of his 
 father's elder brother, who had been driven from the 
 throne of Sweden for his attachment to the Catholic be- 
 lief. And so Gustavus was involved in the great ques- 
 tion which was agitating Europe. The bare legal right 
 which gave the whole of the seventeen provinces of the 
 Netherlands to Spain, which gave Bohemia to Ferdi- 
 nand, and the Protestant bishoprics and the secularized 
 
1617. Christian IV. and Gustavus Adolpkus. 81 
 
 lands to the Catholic clergy, gave also Sweden to Sigis- 
 mund. Was it strange if Gustavus stood forth to com- 
 bat this doctrine to the death, or if in his mind the 
 growth of the two branches of the House of Austria, by 
 whom this doctrine was maintained, became inextrica- 
 bly blended with the creed which that doctrine was to 
 favour ? Was it strange, too, if Protestantism and the 
 national right of each separate country to go its own way 
 untrammelled by such a doctrine appeared in his eyes, 
 as in his days for the most part they really were, but 
 two forms of the same spirit ? 
 
 The peace concluded by Gustavus with Russia in 1617 
 was accompanied by a fresh outbreak of the war with 
 Poland ; and this renewal of the contest with 
 the old rival of his house naturally drew the fjermlny ^'' '* 
 king's attention to affairs in Germany ; for 
 Ferdinand, now rising into power, was the brother-in- 
 iaw of Sigismund, and likely to give him what aid he 
 could in his Swedish enterprise. And Gustavus, too, was 
 not quite a foreigner in Germany. Through his mother 
 German blood ran in his veins, and when, in the summer 
 of 1618, he visited Berlin in secret, he was won by the 
 lovely face of the daughter of that energetic Elector of 
 Brandenburg who after boxing the ears of the rival can- 
 didate for the dukedom of Cleves had adopted the Gal- 
 vinist creed and had entered the Union. The death of 
 the Elector delayed the marriage, and it was not till 1620 
 that, on a second visit, Gustavus wrung a consent from 
 the new Elector, George William, whose weakness and 
 vacillation were to be a sore trial to the Swedish king in 
 after years. In strict incognito, Gustavus travelled as 
 far as Heidelberg, at a time when the Elector was far 
 away, in the midst of his short-lived splendour at Prague, 
 Gustavus learned something from that visit which 
 
82 Intervention of the King of Denmark. 1624. 
 
 he never forgot. He saw the rich luxuriance of that fair 
 Rhine valley, stretching away till the western hills are 
 but dimly visible in the blue distance, and which, com- 
 pared by Venetian travellers to the green Lombard 
 plain, must have caused strange sensations of wonder in 
 the wanderer from the cold and barren north. And he 
 saw another sight, too, which he never forgot — the wealth 
 and magnificence of the Rhenish prelates. ' If these 
 priests were subjects to the king my master' (he spoke 
 in the assumed character of a Swedish nobleman) ' he 
 would long ago have taught them that modesty, humility, 
 and obedience are the true characteristics of their pro- 
 fession.' 
 
 Plainly in this man there was something of Christian 
 of Anhalt, something of the desire to overthrow existing 
 
 institutions. But there was that in him 
 § 7. His 
 daring and which Christian of Anhalt was ignorant of — 
 
 the long and calm preparation for the crisis, 
 and the power of establishing a new order, if his life 
 should be prolonged, to take the place of the old which 
 was falling away. 
 
 Gustavus returned to carry on the war with Poland 
 9 8 Ren d ^ith renewed vigour. In 1621 Riga surren- 
 war with dered to him. The next year he concluded 
 
 a truce which gave him leisure to look about 
 
 him. 
 
 The year 1624 brought with it fresh alarm. The 
 
 empire, hostile to Sweden and the religion of Sweden, 
 
 . was growing terribly strong. Unlike Chris- 
 
 terest in the tian of Denmark, Gustavus had sympathized 
 
 with Frederick's Bohemian undertaking, al- 
 though he had expected but little from an enterprise 
 under Frederick's guidance. And now the tide of vic- 
 tory was running northward. An empire with a firm 
 
1624. Christian IV. and Gustavus Adolphus. 83 
 
 grasp on the shores of Mecklenburg and Pomerania 
 would soon call in question the Swedish dominion of the 
 Baltic. If this was to be the end, Gustavus had gained 
 but little by his victories over Russia and Poland. 
 
 It all sounds like mere selfishness, — Christian alarmed 
 for his family bishoprics, and his hold upon the Elbe and 
 the Weser; Gustavus providing against an , 
 
 ^ . . § lo- Charac- 
 
 attack upon his lordship m the Baltic. But ter of his 
 it does not follow that with both of them, and ^° '^^" 
 especially with Gustavus, the defence of the persecuted 
 Gospel was not a very real thing. Historians coolly 
 dissect a man's thoughts as they please, and label them 
 like specimens in a naturalist's cabinet. Such a thing, 
 they argue, was done for mere personal aggrandize- 
 ment ; such a thing for national objects ; such a thing 
 from high religious motives. In real life we may be sure 
 it was not so. As with Ferdinand and Maximilian, the 
 love of law and orderly government was indissolubly 
 blended with the desire to propagate the faith on which 
 their own spiritual life was based ; so it was with Gus 
 tavus. To extend the power of Sweden, to support the 
 princes of Germany against the Emperor's encroach- 
 ments, to give a firm and unassailable standing ground 
 to German Protestantism, were all to him parts of one 
 great work, scarcely even in thought to be separated 
 from one another. And, after all, let it never be for- 
 gotten that the unity which he attacked was the unity of 
 the Jesuit and the soldier. It had no national stand- 
 ing ground at all. The Germany of a future day, the 
 Germany of free intelligence and ordered discipline, 
 would have far more in common with the destroyer than 
 with the upholder of the hollow unity of the seven* 
 teenth century. 
 
84 Intervention of the King of Denmark. 1624, 
 
 Section II. — English Diplomacy. 
 
 In August 1624 two English ambassadors, Sir Robert 
 Anstruther and Sir James Spens, set out from London ; 
 1 1. English the first to the King of Denmark, the second 
 Sweden and to the King of Sweden. The object of the 
 Denmark. embassies was identical, to urge upon the 
 
 two kings the necessity of stirring themselves up to 
 take part in a war for the recovery of the Palatinate, and 
 for the re-establishment of the old condition of things in 
 Germany. 
 
 Christian hesitated only so far as to wish to be quite 
 
 sure that James was too much in earnest to turn back as 
 
 ^, he had turned back in 1 62 1. Anstruther was 
 
 00.. The 
 
 Danish to go round the circle of the princes of 
 
 answer. t c j r i i 
 
 Lower Saxony, and as soon as a favorable 
 report was received from them, and the impression made 
 by that report was strengthened by the news of Mansfeld's 
 preparations in England, Christian engaged to take part 
 in the war. 
 
 Gustavus was far more cautious. Never doubting for 
 
 a moment that the task before him was one of enormous 
 
 magnitude, he argued that it would not be 
 
 g 3. Fore- ° / ° 
 
 sight of Gus- too much if all who had reason to complain 
 of the House of Austria, from Bethlen 
 Gabor in the east to Lewis of France in the west, were to 
 join heart and soul in the great enterprise. With this 
 view he was already in close communication with his 
 brother-in-law, George William, the Elector of Branden- 
 burg, who for once in his life was eager for war, perhaps 
 because he had hardly reached to a full conception of 
 all that such a war implied. 
 
 Gustavus, too, had his own ideas about the way in 
 which the war was to be carried on. In the first place 
 there must be no divided command, and he himself 
 
1625. English Diplomacy. 85 
 
 must have the whole mihtary direction of the troops. 
 A certain number of men must be actually levied, and 
 a certain sum of money actually paid into a ^ jjis 
 his hands. To the mere promises which answer, 
 satisfied Christian he would not listen. And besides, two 
 ports, one on the Baltic, the other on the North Sea, must 
 be given over to him in order to secure his communica- 
 tions. Perhaps, however, the part of his scheme which 
 gives the greatest evidence of his prescience is that 
 which relates to France. Avoiding the rock upon which 
 the English government was splitting, he made no at- 
 tempt to force a Catholic sovereign like Lewis into 
 over-close union with the Protestant powers. Help from 
 France he would most willingly have if he could get it ; 
 but he argued that it would be better for the French 
 forces to find a sphere of action for themselves in South 
 Germany or Italy, far away from the regions in which 
 Gustavus himself hoped to operate at the head of a purely 
 Protestant army. 
 
 In January 1625 the answers of the two kings were 
 known in England. Of the 50,000 men demanded by 
 Gustavus, 17,000 were to be paid out of the 1625. 
 
 English exchequer. Till four months' pay idopts tv^^" 
 had been provided he would not stir. He, ^^^ish plan. 
 for his part, had no intention of being a second Mansfeld, 
 the leader of an army driven by sheer necessity to exist 
 upon pillage. 
 
 Christian's ideas were framed on a more moderate 
 scale. He thought that 30,000 men would be sufficient al- 
 together, and that 6,000 would be enough to „ , , 
 
 r ^ 1 1 r ? 6. Thinking 
 
 fall to the share of England. Both James it easier to 
 and Charles declared that if they must make tian^than "^" 
 a choice they preferred the Danish plan. Gustavus. 
 Even 6,000 men would cost them 30,000/. a month, and, 
 
86 Interveniion of the King of Denmark. 1625. 
 
 though the French marriage was settled, ParHament had 
 not yet been summoned to vote the subsidies on which 
 alone such an expenditure could be based. But they 
 did not yet understand that a choice was necessary. 
 They thought that Gustavus might still come in as an 
 auxiliary to the Danish armament. To this suggestion, 
 however, Gustavus turned a deaf ear. He had no con- 
 fidence in Christian, or in allies who had taken so scant 
 a measure of the difficulties before them. It was true, he 
 replied to a remonstrance from the English ambassador, 
 that he had asked for hard conditions. ' But,' he added, 
 • if anyone thinks it easy to make war upon the most 
 powerful potentate in Europe, and upon one, too, who 
 has the support of Spain and of so many of the German 
 princes, besides being supported, in a word, with the 
 whole strength of the Roman Catholic alliance ; and if 
 he also thinks it easy to bring into common action so 
 many minds, each having in view their own separate 
 object and to regain for their own masters so many lands 
 out of the power of those who tenaciously hold them, we 
 shall be quite willing to leave to him the glory of his 
 achievement, and all its accompanying advantages.' 
 
 With these words of bitter irony Gustavus turned away 
 
 for a time from the German war to fight out his own 
 
 quarrel with the King of Poland, a quarrel 
 
 I 7. Gustavus ^, . , , , , ,° , , • 
 
 attacks which he always held to be subservient to 
 
 the general interests in so far as it hindered 
 Sigismund from taking part in the larger conflict. 
 
 Christian's more sanguine ideas were soon to be put 
 to the test. In March James of England died, and two 
 1 8. Attempt months later Charles I. entered into an 
 fuim^hi?^ '° engagement to supply the king of Denmark 
 engagements. ^\^ 30,000/. a month, and scraped together 
 46,000/. to make a beginning. Mansfeld, it was ar- 
 
1625. Wallenstein' s A?nnament. 87 
 
 ranged, should abandon his hopeless attempt to reach 
 the Palatinate along the Rhine, and should convey the 
 remnants of his force by the sea to the assistance of 
 Christian. 
 
 After, all, however, the main point was the success or 
 failure of the king to gain support in Germany itself. 
 The circle of Lower Saxony, indeed, chose § 9. Com- 
 him for its military chief. But even then ^fX^SanLh 
 there was much division of opinion. With ^^'■• 
 the commercial classes in the towns war against the 
 Emperor was as yet decidedly unpopular. They were 
 tolerably well assured that they would reap no benefit 
 from any accession of strength to the princes, whilst the 
 danger from the Emperor was still in the future. But 
 they were not strong enough to carry the circle with them. 
 A centre of resistance was formed, which must be broken 
 down if the Emperor's pretensions were not to be abated. 
 On July 18 Tilly crossed the Weser into Lower Saxony, 
 and the Danish war began. 
 
 Section IIL — WallensteirC s Armament, 
 
 Would Tilly's force be sufficient to overcome the King 
 of Denmark and his foreign allies ? Ferdinand and his 
 ministers doubted it. In proportion as his Th f 
 
 power increased, the basis on which it rested peror's need 
 grew narrower. Of his allies of 1620 the ° ^"^^ ^ ' 
 League alone supported him still. Spain, exhausted for 
 the time with the siege of Breda, could do little for him, 
 and contented herself with forming clever plans for ca- 
 joling the Elector of Saxony, and with urging the Pope 
 to .flatter the Lutherans by declaring them to be far 
 better than the Calvinists. Of all such schemes as this 
 nothing satisfactory was likely to come. John George of 
 Saxony, indeed, refused to join in the King of Denmark's 
 
 H 
 
8S Intervention of the King of Demnark. 1625. 
 
 movement. He thought that the Lower Saxony princes 
 ought to have been content with the agreement of Miihl- 
 hausen, and that Frederick ought to have made his sub- 
 mission to the Emperor. But even in the eyes of John 
 George the Lower Saxon war was very different from the 
 Bohemian war. The Emperor's refusal to confirm perma- 
 nently the Protestant bishoprics had made it impossible for 
 any Protestant to give him more than a passive support. 
 And if the Emperor's friends were fewer, his enemies 
 were more numerous. Christian IV. was more formidable 
 than Frederick. Bethlen Gabor, who had 
 
 ? 2. His . . 
 
 numerous made pcace m 1622, was agam threatenmg 
 
 in the east ; and no one could say how soon 
 France might be drawn into the strife in the west. Fer- 
 dinand needed another army besides Tilly's. Yet his 
 treasury was so empty that he could not afford to pay a 
 single additional regiment. 
 
 Suddenly, in the midst of his difficulties, one of his own 
 subjects offered to take the burden on his shoulders. 
 §3. Wallen- Albert of Waldstein, commonly known as 
 stein's oflffr. Wallcnstcin, sprang from an impoverished 
 branch of one of the greatest of the families of the Bohe- 
 mian aristocracy. His parents were Lutheran, but 
 when, at the age of twelve, he was left an orphan, he 
 was placed under the care of an uncle, who attempted to 
 educate him in the strict school of the Bohemian Brother- 
 hood, a body better known in later times under the name 
 of Moravians, and distinguished, as they are now, for 
 their severe moral training. 
 
 The discipline of the brethren seems to have had 
 much the same influence upon the young nobleman that 
 §4. His the long sermons of the Scotch Presbyte- 
 
 earlyhfe. ^^^^ j^^^j ^^^^^ Charlcs 11. The boy found 
 
 his way to the Jesuits at Olmiitz, and adopted their religion, 
 
1625. Wallenstein! s Armament. 89 
 
 so far as he adopted any religion at all. His real faith 
 was in himself and in the revelations of astrology, that 
 mystic science which told him how the bright rulers of 
 the sky had marked him out for fame. For a young Pro- 
 testant of ability without wealth there was no room in 
 Bohemia under the shadow of the great houses. With 
 Ferdinand, as yet ruler only of his three hereditary 
 duchies, he found a soldier's welcome, and was not long 
 in displaying a soldier's capacity for war. To Wallen- 
 stein no path came amiss which led to fortune. A 
 wealthy marriage made him the owner of large estates. 
 When the revolution broke out he was colonel of one of 
 the regiments in the service of the Estates of Moravia. 
 The population and the soldiers were alike hostile to the 
 Emperor. Seizing the cash-box of the estates he rode 
 off, in spite of all opposition, to Vienna. Ferdinand re- 
 fused to accept booty acquired after the fashion of a 
 highwayman, and sent the money back to be used 
 against himself. The Moravians said openly that Wal- 
 lenstein was no gentleman. But the events which were 
 hurrying on brought his name into prominence in con- 
 nexion with more legitimate warfare, and he had become 
 famous for many a deed of skill and daring before 
 Frederick's banner sunk before the victors on the White 
 Hill. 
 
 Wallenstein was now in a position to profit by his 
 master's victory. Ferdinand was not a man of business. 
 In peace as in war he gladly left details to , 
 
 ^ . . 2 5- Offers to 
 
 others, and there were good pickings to be raise an 
 had out of the ruin of the defeated aristoc- ^^^^' 
 racy. Besides the lands which fell to Wallenstein's 
 share as a reward for his merit, he contrived to purchase 
 large estates at merely nominal prices. Before long he 
 was the richest landowner in Bohemia. He became 
 
9 o Intervention of the King of Denmark. 1625. 
 
 Prince of Friedland. And now, when Ferdinand's diffi- 
 culties were at their height, Wallenstein came forward 
 offering to raise an army at his own cost. The Emperor 
 needed not to trouble himself about its pay. Nor was it 
 to be fed by mere casual plunder. Wherever it was 
 cantoned the general would raise contributions from the 
 constituted authorities. Discipline would thus be main- 
 tained, and the evils upon which Mansfeld's projects had 
 been wrecked would be easily avoided. 
 
 Modern criticism has rejected the long accredited 
 story of Wallenstein' s assertion at this time that he 
 „ , ^, could find means to support an army of 
 
 g 0. 1 he 
 
 larger the 5o,ooo men, but not an army of 20,000. It 
 
 is certain that his original request was for 
 only 20,000. But the idea was sure to occur to him 
 sooner or later. Government by military force was the 
 f^ssence of his proposal, and for that purpose the larger 
 the number of his army the better. 
 
 The connexion between two men whose characters 
 
 differed so widely as those of Ferdinand and Wallenstein 
 
 ^ ,. was from first to last of a nature to excite 
 
 ? 7. Ferdi- 
 nand cannot curiosity. Yet, after all, it was only the natu- 
 
 "^^ "^^" ral result of Ferdinand's own methods of 
 
 government. The ruler who knows nothing beyond the 
 duty of putting the law in execution, whilst he shuts his 
 eyes to the real requirements of those for whom the law 
 ought to have been made, must in the end have recourse 
 to the sword to maintain him and his legality from de- 
 struction. 
 
 The substitution of contributions for pillage may have 
 
 seemed to Ferdinand a mode of having recourse to a 
 
 lesral, orderly way of making war. Unfortu- 
 
 g8. Wallen- *=,',.. ^ ^ . , . ., 
 
 stein's sys- natcly for hmi, it was not so. As the civil 
 ^^^' laws of the Empire gave him no right to raise 
 
1625. Wallenstei}{ s Arinament. 91 
 
 a penny for military purposes without the assent of the 
 Diet, and as, in the distracted condition of Germany, 
 the Diet was no longer available for the purpose, no one 
 was likely to regard money so raised as legal in any sense 
 at all. In fact, it could only be justified as Charles I. 
 justified the forced loan of 1626, as an act done out of 
 the plenitude of power inherent in the Crown, authorizing 
 him to provide in cases of emergency for the good of his 
 subjects. Ferdinand, in truth,had brought himself into 
 a position from which he could neither advance nor re- 
 treat with honour. If he did not accept Wallenstein's 
 services he would almost certainly be beaten. If he did 
 accept them, he would almost certainly raise a feeling 
 in Germany which would provoke a still stronger opposi- 
 tion than that which he had for the present to deal with. 
 For the contributions were to be raised by military 
 authority, with no check of control whatever from civil 
 officials. Even if the utmost moderation „ ,, , 
 
 g 9. Modera- 
 
 was used there was something utterly exas- tion impossible 
 perating to the peasant or the townsman in 
 having to pay over a greater or less share of his hoard- 
 ings to a colonel who had no civil authority to produce, 
 and who had no limit to his demands excepting in his 
 own conscience. Those who expected that moderation 
 would be used must have formed a very sanguine idea 
 of the influence of the events of the war upon ordinary 
 military character. 
 
 In point of fact, neither Wallenstein nor his soldiers 
 thought of moderation. With him there was just enough 
 of regularity to preserve the discipline he g 10. Wallen- 
 needed; just enough order to wring the ut- stem's army, 
 most possible amount of money out of the country. 
 'God help the land to which these men come,' was the 
 natural exclamation of a frightened official who watched 
 the troops march past him. 
 
92 Intervention of the King of DeiimaTk. 1625. 
 
 How was it then, if Wallenstein's system was no better 
 than Mansfeld's system more thoroughly organized, that 
 g II. Ex- he did not meet with Mansfeld's misfor- 
 
 ^aHenstein's tunes ? The true explanation doubtless is 
 success. \}i\2X he was able to avoid the cause of Mans- 
 
 feld's misfortunes. Mansfeld was a rolling stone from 
 the beginning. With troops supporting themselves by 
 plunder, he had to make head against armies in excellent 
 condition, and commanded by such generals as Tilly and 
 Cordova, before his own men had acquired the consist- 
 ency of a disciplined army. Wallenstein made up his 
 mind that it should not be so with him. He would lead 
 his new troops where there was much to be gained and 
 little to do. In due course of time they would learn to 
 have confidence in him as their leader, and would be 
 ready to march further under his orders. 
 
 In the autumn, Wallenstein entered the dioceses of 
 Magdeburg and Halberstadt, levying the means of sup- 
 l -L-2. Waiien- port for his army upon rich and poor. Nor 
 
 stein in the ^, . ^ri- ^e j-l- 
 
 autumn of Were the requirements of himself and his 
 1625. men like the modest requirements of Tilly. 
 
 With him every man was more highly paid. Splendid 
 equipments and magnificence of every kind were ne- 
 cessaries of life to the general and his officers, and the 
 example was quickly followed, so far as imitation was 
 possible, in the lower ranks of the army. To Tilly's 
 entreaties for aid Wallenstein turned a deaf ear, and left 
 him to carry on the war against the Danes as best he 
 could. He was doubtless wise in refusing to expose his 
 recruits so early to the fierce trial of battle. With him 
 everything was based on calculation. Even his luxury 
 and splendour would serve to fix upon him the eyes of 
 his soldiers, and to hold out to them another prospect 
 than that of the endless hardships, varied by an occa- 
 
1626. Wallenstein' s Armament. 93 
 
 sional debauch at the storming of a town, which was the 
 lot of those who followed Tilly. Yet Wallenstein never 
 allowed this luxury and splendour to stand in the way of 
 higher objects. He was himself a strategist of no mean 
 order. He had a keen eye for military capacity. He 
 never troubled himself to inquire what a man's religion 
 was if he thought he could render good service as a 
 soldier. There were generals in his army whose an- 
 cestry was as illustrious as that of any sovereign in 
 Europe, and generals who had no other title to eminence 
 than their skill and valour. High and low were equal 
 before his military code. Honours and rev/ards were 
 dispensed to the brave : his friendship was accorded to 
 those who had been distinguished for special acts of 
 daring. 
 
 It was a new power in Germany, a power which had no 
 connexion with the princes of the Empire, scarcely more 
 than a nominal connexion with the Em- „ ^^^ „ 
 
 g 13. Wallen- 
 
 peror himself. And the man who wielded stein not a 
 it was not even a German. By his birth he 
 was a Bohemian, of Slavonian race. The foremost men 
 of the war, Tilly, Wallenstein, Gustavus, were foreigners. 
 Germany had failed to produce either a statesman or a 
 warrior of the first rank. 
 
 During the winter, negotiations for peace were opened 
 at Brunswick. But they foundered on the old rock. The 
 Emperor and the League would grant the 1626. 
 
 terms of Miihlhausen and nothing more. It ^/JetS"'^"'^ 
 was against their consciences to grant a per- negotiations. 
 manent guarantee to the Protestant administrators, and • 
 to admit them to the full enjoyment of the privileges of 
 princes of the Empire. With this the Lower Saxon 
 princes refused to be contented. Amongst the means 
 by which the chapters had secured their Protestant cha- 
 
94 Intervention of the King of Demnark. 1626. 
 
 racter were some acts of formal and even of technical 
 illegality. Such acts might easily be made use of by the 
 Emperor and his council to effect an alteration in the 
 character of those bodies. The Emperor and his coun- 
 cil might possibly intend to be just, but somehow or an- 
 other they always contrived to decide disputed questions 
 in favour of their own partisans. On behalf of the reli- 
 gious and political institutions of Protestant Germany, 
 the King of Denmark and his allies refused to accept the 
 terms which had been offered them, and demanded that 
 Protestant territories should receive a legal and perma- 
 nent confirmation of their right to continue Protestant. 
 
 Section IV. — Defeat of Mansf eld and Christian IV. 
 
 When the campaign opened, in the spring of 1626, the 
 numbers at the disposal of the two belligerents were not 
 1 1. Campaign SO very unequal. Wallenstein's forces had 
 of 1626. been swelling far beyond his original reckon- 
 
 ing. He and Tilly together, it is said could command 
 the services of 70,000 men, whilst 60,000 were ready to 
 march against them. On Christian's side were fighting 
 Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick, and a nobler than 
 either, John Ernest of Saxe-Weimar, on whom, first of 
 German men, the idea had dawned of composing the 
 distractions of his fatherland by proclaiming a general 
 toleration. Bethlen Gabor was once more threatening 
 Vienna from the side of Hungary. Even the Protestant 
 peasants in Lower Austria had risen in defence of their 
 religion and their homes against the Bavarian garrisons 
 which guarded the land till their master's expenses 
 had been paid. 
 
 In other respects than numbers, however, the condi- 
 tions were most unequal. Tilly and Wallenstein both 
 
1626. Defeat of Mansfeld and Christian IV. 95 
 quartered their troops on the enemy's 
 
 T . . ■ 1-111 ? 2. Christian 
 
 country. In raising supphes they had no sus- iv. at a dis- 
 ceptibihties to consult, no friendly princes ^ ^^"^t^s^- 
 or cities to spare. Christian, on the other hand, was still 
 amongst his allies, and was forced, on pain of driving 
 them over to the Emperor, to show them every consid- 
 eration. And in the midst of these difficulties one source 
 of supply on which he had been justified in counting en- 
 tirely failed him. 
 
 Charles I. of England had engaged in the spring of 
 1625 to pay over to the King of Denmark 30,000/. a 
 month, reckoning that Parliament would enable him to 
 fulfil his promise. Parliament met in May, but it had 
 no confidence either in Charles or in his 1625. 
 
 favourite and adviser, the Duke of Bucking- f^e EngS °* 
 ham. A war carried on in Germany with supplies. 
 English money was most distasteful to the English feel- 
 ing. The session came to an end after a vote of a bare 
 140,000/,, to meet a war expenditure scarcely, if at all, 
 short of i,cyo,ooo/. a year. Still Charles persisted. In 
 the winter Buckingham went over to Holland and nego- 
 tiated the Treaty of the Hague, by which the Dutch were 
 to pay 5,000/. a month, and the English renewed their 
 obligation to pay the 30,000/. already promised to Chris- 
 tian IV. This time, it was thought, a fresh Parliament 
 would be ready to take up the king's engagement. But 
 the fresh Parliament proved more recalcitrant than its 
 predecessor. The sum of 46,000/. which had been sent 
 across the seas in May 1625 was the only representative 
 of Charles' promised support. 
 
 Christian of Denmark and his allies, therefore, were 
 to some extent in the position in which 1626. 
 
 Mansfeld had been in 1621 and 1622. If ?/the"DTSh 
 not utterly without resource, they were sadly ^^^y- 
 
9 6 Intervention of the Kmg of Denmark. 1626. 
 
 straitened, and were obliged to govern their movements 
 by the necessity of finding supplies rather than by mili- 
 tary calculations. 
 
 Mansfeld was the first to meet the enemy. For some 
 
 time he had been quartered beyond the Elbe, making 
 
 himself troublesome to the Liibeckers and 
 
 2 5. Mans- 
 feld in the the Elector of Brandenburg. But this could 
 
 not go on for ever. Wallenstein was in 
 
 front of him, and he must fight him, or leave him to join 
 
 Tilly against the king. 
 
 Wallenstein never, in his whole career, exposed his 
 
 men to a battle in the open field if he could help it ; and 
 
 least of all was he likely to do so whilst they were yet 
 
 untried. He seized upon the bridge of Dessau over the 
 
 Elbe, and, having fortified it strongly, waited for Mans- 
 
 „ , ^ feld to do his work. On April 7,^ Mansfeld 
 
 g6. Battle of , -, 
 
 the bridge of appeared. In vam he dashed his troops 
 against the entrenchments. Then, watch- 
 ing- a favourable opportunity, Wallenstein ordered a 
 charge. The enemy fled in confusion and the victory 
 was gained. 
 
 Not long after Mansfeld's defeat at the bridge of 
 Dessau, Christian of Brunswick died. The remaining 
 1 7. Mans- chiefs of the Danish party had a desperate 
 towa^rds^^*^ game to play. Mansfeld, reinforced by John 
 Hungary. Ernest of Weimar, was dispatched through 
 
 Silesia, to hold out a hand to Bethlen Gabor. Wallen- 
 stein followed in pursuit, after sending some of his regi- 
 ments to the assistance of Tilly. 
 
 What could Christian do in the face of the danger ? 
 The English subsidies did not come. To remain on the 
 ^ „ ^, defensive was to court starvation, with its 
 
 \ 8. The . . ' 
 
 battle of inevitable accompaniment, mutiny. Elated 
 
 by a slight success over the enemy, he made 
 
1626. Defeat of Mansf eld a7td Christian IV. 97 
 
 a dash at Thuringia, hoping to slip through into Bo- 
 hemia, and to combine with Bethlen Gabor and Mans- 
 feld in raising the old Protestant flag in the heart of the 
 Emperor's hereditary dominions. But Tilly was on the 
 v/atch. On August 27 he came up with the Danish army 
 at Lutter. The fight was fiercely contested. But before 
 it was decided a cry arose from some of the men in the 
 Danish ranks that they would fight no longer without 
 pay. Christian was driven from the field. In after days 
 he complained bitterly that if the King of England had 
 fulfilled his promises the battle would have ended other- 
 wise. 
 
 The soldiers lent by Wallenstein to Tilly had borne 
 them well in the fight. Wallenstein himself was far 
 away. Mansfeld had been welcomed by the Protestants 
 of Silesia, and when Wallenstein followed he found the 
 principal towns garrisoned by the enemy, a „ Mans- 
 By the time he reached Hungary Mansfeld ^^^^''^ ^^^'i^. 
 had joined Bethlen Gabor. Once more Wallenstein 
 pursued his old tactics. Taking up a strong position, he 
 left his opponents to do what they could. The events 
 showed that his calculations were well founded. Bethlen 
 Gabor had counted on help from the Turks. But the 
 Turks gave him no adequate assistance, and he did not 
 venture to repeat unaided the operation of the bridge of 
 Dessau, and to attack V/allenstein in his entrenchments. 
 He preferred making a truce, one of the conditions of 
 which was that Mansfeld should be expelled from Hun- 
 gary. On his way to Venice the great adventurer was 
 seized by a mortal disease. The unconquerable man, 
 like an old northern warrior, refused to die in a bed. 
 ' Raise me up,' he said to his friends, ' I am dying now.' 
 Propped up in an upright position in their arms, and gaz- 
 ing out upon the dawn, which was lighting up the hills 
 
f) 8 Stralsund and Rochelle. 1626. 
 
 with the first rays of morning, he passed away. ' Be 
 united, united,' he murmured with his last breath ; ' hold 
 out hke men.' His own absence from the scene would 
 perhaps remove one of the chief difficulties in the way of 
 union. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 STRALSUND AND ROCHELLE. 
 
 Section I. — Fresh Successes of Wallenstein. 
 
 Differences had already arisen between Wallenstein 
 and the League. It was understood that the defeat of 
 1626. the northern rebels would lead to confisca- 
 
 tions £°th?*^^" tions in the north, as the defeat of Frederick 
 north. jj3^(^ \^^ ^q confiscations in the south. To 
 
 part at least of the land of one of the defeated princes 
 the Elector of Mentz laid claim. Wallenstein wished to 
 have it all for George of Liineburg, who, Lutheran as he 
 was, had held high command in the imperial army. 
 
 The quarrel was more than a mere personal dispute. 
 
 The League wished to pursue the old policy of pushing 
 
 forward the interests of the Catholic clergy 
 
 §2. Wallen- . . . 
 
 stein ad- under cover of legality. Wallenstein wished 
 
 religious Catholic and Protestant, already united in 
 
 equality. j^jg ^j-jny^ ^ be equally united in the Em- 
 
 pire. Rebellion would then be the only punishable 
 crime ; loyalty, and especially the loyalty of his own of- 
 ficers, the only virtue to be rewarded. 
 
 Another question between the two pov/ers reached 
 almost as deeply. The League demanded that Wallen- 
 1 3. Comes stein should support his army upon supplies 
 into collision ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ Protestants alone. Wallen- 
 v-eague. stein asserted his right, as the Emperor's 
 
1626. Fresh Successes of Wallenstein. 99 
 
 general, to quarter his men where he would, and to levy 
 contributions for their maintenance even on the terri- 
 tories of the League. 
 
 For the first time for many a long year, a friendly voice 
 had been heard urging the Emperor in the only wise 
 direction. Ferdinand, turning aside from the i 4. Wallen- 
 promotion of a sectional policy, was, if he not found 
 would listen to Wallenstein, to place the unity "^i^y. 
 of the Empire above the interests of the princes, by rest- 
 ing it on the basis of religious equality. Unhappily that 
 advice was tendered to him by a man who could not 
 offer him security for the realization of so wise a policy. 
 To stand above parties it is necessary to obtain the con-, 
 fidence of a nation, and how could men have confidence 
 in Wallenstein ? Durable institutions may be guarded by 
 the sword. They cannot be founded by the sword. All 
 that was known of Wallenstein in Germany was that he 
 was master of an army more numerous and more oppres- 
 sive than that of Tilly. German unity, coming in the 
 shape of boundless contributions and extortions, and en- 
 forced by the example of starving peasants and burning 
 villages, was not likely to prove very attractive. 
 
 It is strange that the better part of Wallenstein's prO' 
 gramme did not repel Ferdinand at once. But Ferdi- 
 nand never made up his mind in a hurry § 5. Walien- 
 when there were difficulties on both sides, f^ince wkh 
 and he was accustomed to defer to the opi- Eggenberg. 
 nion of his chief minister, Eggenberg. In November 
 Wallenstein held a conference with that minister. Hq 
 unfolded all his scheme. He would increase his army, 
 if it were necessary, to 70,000 men. With such a force 
 he would be able to avoid a pitched battle, always dan- 
 gerous to troops not thoroughly inured to campaigning. 
 By the occupation of superior strategical points, he would 
 
I oo Strahimd and Rochelle. 1627. 
 
 be able to out-manoeuvre the enemy. And then Fer- 
 dinand would be master in Germany. The whole of the 
 Empire would be brought under contribution. There 
 would be submission at home, and abroad no power 
 would be strong enough to lay a finger upon the re-esta- 
 blished Empire. 
 
 Eggenberg was easily persuaded, and when Eggenberg 
 was won, Ferdinand was won. In January, Wallenstein 
 
 was created Duke of Friedland, a higher 
 1627. . . ° 
 
 g 6. Ferdi- title than that of Prince of Friedland, which 
 ports Wai- he already bore, in token of the Emperor's 
 lenstem. approbation. If only Wallenstein could 
 
 have shown Ferdinand the way to win the hearts of 
 Germans as readily as he showed him the way to over- 
 power their resistance, the history of Germany and of 
 Europe would have been changed. 
 
 The resistance of the Protestants to the institutions 
 
 of the Empire had hitherto failed. They had been weak 
 
 because there had been something revolu- 
 
 g 7. Prepon- , . 
 
 derance of tionary in all their proceedings. And now 
 
 Vv 3.1lGnstGin 
 
 those institutions, which up to this time had 
 been working harmoniously, were giving signs of break- 
 ing-up. There was a little rift in them which might any 
 day become wider. " Is the Emperor," asked Wallen- 
 stein, "to be a mere image which is never to move ?" 
 "It is not only the Empire," answered the representa- 
 tives of the League, " which is bound to the Emperor. 
 The Emperor is also bound to the Empire." There was 
 nothing to reconcile the opposing theories. The Em- 
 peror who claimed to be something had been the tool 
 of a few bishops ; he would be, if Wallenstein had his 
 way, the tool of a successful general. The Empire, in 
 the mouth of the representatives of the League, meant 
 not the populations of Germany, not even the true inter- 
 
1627- Fresh Successes of Wallenstein. loi 
 
 est of the princes, but simply the interest of the bishops 
 and their Church. 
 
 The time had not yet come for an open quarrel. The 
 enemy, though weakened, was still powerful. 
 Charles I., by dint of a forced loan, which campaign of 
 every Englishman except himself and his ^ ^''' 
 courtiers declared to be in violation of all constitutional 
 precedents, contrived to get some money into his exche- 
 quer, and Sir Charles Morgan was sent over to the King 
 of Denmark's aid with an army nominally of 6,000 men, 
 but which in reality never reached two-thirds of that 
 number. Thurn, the old hero of the revolution at Prague, 
 and the Margrave of Baden-Durlach, brought their ex- 
 perience, such as it was, to Christian's aid, and a younger 
 brother of John Ernest's, soon to be known to fame as 
 Bernhard of Weimar, was also to be found fighting under 
 his banners. Strong towns — ^Wolfenbiittel, Nordheim, 
 and Nienburg — still held out on his side, and peasants 
 and citizens were eager to free the land from the oppres- 
 sions of the soldiery and the yoke of the priests. 
 
 Once more the Protestants of the north looked anx- 
 iously to the east. But Bethlen Gabor did not stir. 
 Without Turkish help he could do nothing, , ^ , . 
 
 1 1 rr- 1 • 1 1 . ?9- Submis- 
 
 and the Turks, involved m a war with Per- sion of Beth- 
 sia, resolved to negotiate a peace with the 
 Emperor. When peace was agreed upon in September 
 Bethlen Gabor was powerless. 
 
 Wallenstein's hands were freed as soon as these nego- 
 tiations were opened. John Ernest of Weimar had died 
 the year before, but his lieutenants were still „ 
 
 § 10. Wal- 
 
 m possession of Silesia. In May, Wallen- lenstein in 
 stem sent Duke George of Liineburg to cut 
 off their retreat. In July, he was in Silesia himself. His 
 men were three to one of the enemy. Place after place 
 
I02 Stralsufid and Rochelle. 1627. 
 
 surrendered. Only once did he meet with an attempt at 
 resistance in the open field. Before the end of August 
 the whole of Silesia was in his hands. Fifty-five 
 standards were sent in triumph to Vienna. The Silesian 
 towns were set to ransom, and the money of the citi- 
 zens went to swell the military chest of the Emperor's 
 general. 
 
 When Silesia was lost Christian sought to avert de- 
 struction by offering terms of peace. But the two generals 
 would accept nothing less than the surrender of Holstein, 
 and to that Christian refused to accede. Wallenstein 
 ^ , and Tilly joined their forces to drive him 
 
 g II. Combat •' ■' 
 
 of Heiiigen- northwards before them. By this move^ 
 ment the Margrave of Baden was cut off 
 from the rest of the Danish army. Making his way to 
 the coast near Wismar, he had long to wait before trans- 
 ports arrived to carry him across the sea to join the King 
 of Denmark. Scarcely had he landed at Heiligenhafen 
 when a large body of imperialist troops arrived, and at 
 once commenced the attack. He himself and a few of 
 his principal officers escaped on ship-board. His men, 
 seeing themselves deserted, took service under Wallen- 
 stein, and seven of the best regiments in the Danish 
 army were lost to Christian. 
 
 Tilly found occupation for his men in the seige of the 
 strong places in Lower Saxony. Wallenstein 
 quest of**" undertook to follow up the King of Den- 
 
 aSd^jSiSid mark. Before the end of the year all 
 Schleswig and Jutland, with the exception 
 of two or three fortified towns, were in Wallenstein' s 
 hands. 
 
 A few sieges, and all, it seemed, would be over. Wal- 
 lenstein had begun to cherish the wildest plans. When 
 
i62 7.. Resistance to Wallenstein, 103 
 
 resistance had been put down in Germany, „ „, „ 
 he would place himself at the head of stein's 
 100,000 men and drive the Turks out of 
 Constantinople. Such dreams, however, were to remain 
 dreams. If Denmark had been beaten down, Tilly was 
 still there, and Tilly represented forces with which the 
 new military Empire was certain sooner or later to be 
 brought into collision. 
 
 Section II. — Resistance to Walletisteiii in the Empire. 
 
 In October, the electors in person, or by deputy, met 
 at Miihlhausen to take into consideration the condition 
 of the Empire. The Ecclesiastical electors 
 urged that the engagement given in 1620 to Assembly of 
 
 ^ 1 . • 1 Miihlhausen. 
 
 the Protestant admmistrators was no longer 
 valid. They had been told that they would not be dis- 
 possessed by force if they acted as loyal subjects. But 
 they had not been loyal subjects. They had joined the 
 King of Denmark in a war in which, with the aid of 
 foreign powers, he had attempted to dismember the Em- 
 pi-re. It was now time for justice to prevail, and for the 
 Church, so far as the Peace of Augsburg allowed, to come 
 by its own. To this reasoning the new Elector of Bava- 
 ria gave the whole weight of his authority, and even the 
 two Protestant electors did not venture to meet the argu- 
 ment by an open denial. The circle of Lower Saxony 
 had entered upon the war against the advice of John 
 George, and he held that the administrators were only 
 reaping the consequences of neglecting his counsel. 
 
 The Catholic electors felt themselves within reach of 
 the settlement which they had long proclaimed as the 
 object of their desires. They then pro- ^^^ 
 
 ceeded to kick away the ladder by which Catholic 
 
 , ,,■,.■,- 1-1 T- J Electors 
 
 they had climbed so high. It is not dero- complain of 
 gating from the merits of Tilly and his vete- Waiienstdn. 
 
 I 
 
1 04 Stralsund and Rochelle, 1627. 
 
 rans to say that without Wallenstein they would have 
 been unable to cope with the forces opposed to them. 
 Wallenstein' s army had driven Mansfeld back, had 
 hemmed in Bethlen Gabor, had recovered Silesia, had 
 contributed to the victory of Lutter, And yet that army 
 threatened to establish itself upon the ruins of the au- 
 thority of the princes and electors, and to set up a mili- 
 tary despotism of the most intolerable kind. Every- 
 where Wallenstein's recruiting officers were beating their 
 drums. Quiet episcopal cities in the south of Germany, 
 which hoped to have seen the last of their troubles when 
 Mansfeld vanished westward out of Alsace in 1622, found 
 themselves suddenly selected as a trysting-place for 
 some new regiment. Rough men poured in from every 
 direction to be armed, clothed, lodged, and fed at their 
 expense. The alarming doctrine that the army was to 
 support itself, that men were to be raised for the purpose 
 not of fighting the enemy, but of pressing contributions 
 out of friends caused universal consternation. Wallen- 
 stein's officers, too, had been heard to talk with military 
 frankness about pulling down princes and electors, and 
 making a real sovereign of the Emperor. 
 
 The voice of complaint swelled loudly. But those 
 
 who raised it did not see that their own policy was at 
 
 fault t that but for their refusal to yield on 
 
 3 "x Yet tney 
 
 cannot do the question of the bishoprics, there would 
 
 wit lout im. have been no need for Wallenstein's army 
 at all. What they were doing required the aid of over- 
 powering military force, and they were startled when he 
 who wielded the sword insisted on being their master. 
 For the present, therefore, the electors did not venture 
 on anything more than a gentle remonstrance with Wal- 
 lenstein, and a petition to the Emperor to remove the 
 abuses v/hich, as they well knew, were radically con- 
 nected with the new system. 
 
1628. Resistance to Wallenstein. 105 
 
 The dislike of the rule of the sword which was felt 
 amongst those for whom that sword had been drawn was 
 sure to be felt far more strongly in the Pro- ^^^^ 
 
 testant cities of North Germany. Up to § 4- The 
 
 . . commercial 
 
 Wallenstein's appearance the commercial towns of the 
 oligarchies by which those cities were go- ''°''^^- 
 verned, had shown themselves at the best but lukewarm 
 in the Protestant cause. The towns of the south had 
 been the first to desert the Union. The towns of the 
 north had been dragged half against their will into the 
 Danish war. To them the imperial sway was connected 
 by a tradition of centuries with support against the en- 
 croachments of the princes. But they had no traditions 
 in favour of an army Hving at free quarters amongst 
 them, of bullying colonels and hectoring soldiers. Mag- 
 deburg braved all the terrors of Wallenstein's anger 
 rather than admit a single company within its walls. 
 Hamburg declared itself ready to submit to the Emperor's 
 authority, but closed its gates against his army. And 
 though Magdeburg might be besieged when there was 
 leisure, Hamburg and the other maritime towns were less 
 easily to be gained. All-powerful on land, Wallenstein's 
 authority ended at low-water mark. The King of Den- 
 mark had fled to his islands. The King of Sweden was 
 master of the Baltic. If it was doubtful whether they could 
 set an army in battle array in Germany, at least they could 
 throw provisions and munitions of war into a besieged 
 seaport town„ If the Empire was to be secured, these sea- 
 ports must be brought under the Emperor's authority. 
 
 Here, therefore, in the midst of the danger 
 Wallenstein determined to plant himself gg. Wanen- 
 firmly, with the instinctive conviction that the ^^^^^^lH^' 
 post of danger is the post of power. The ""^^^^^^^ 
 two Dukes of Mecklenburg had steadily sup- burg. 
 
I o6 Strahuful ami Roche lie. 1628. 
 
 ported the King of Denmark in his struggle against the Em- 
 peror. In 1627, when most ofthe other states ceased to pay- 
 any contributions towards the war, they had continued 
 to fulfil their engagements, and though they now pro- 
 fessed their readiness to make their submission, it was 
 Wallenstein's interest to make the most of their treason, 
 and tlie least of their repentance. In February, 1628, 
 the Emperor, using the rights which he had claimed in 
 the case of the Elector Palatine, declared them to have 
 forfeited their lands and dignities, and placed the Duchies 
 in Wallenstein's hands as a pledge for the payment of 
 military expenses which still remained to be liquidated. 
 It was significant of the change of feeling in Germany 
 that the ecclesiastical electors, who had seen nothing 
 amiss in the deprivation of Frederick, had not a good 
 word to say for this concession to Wallenstein. 
 
 In Mecklenburg the imperial general had gained a 
 
 footing on the Baltic coast. But more than that was 
 
 needed if he was to be safe from attack. All 
 
 f 6. Nec:otia- . . , 
 
 tion with the through the wmter negotiations had been 
 
 Hanse Towns. . *" -.i ^i tt t^ ^-i 
 
 going on With the Hanse 1 owns, the mari- 
 time cities of the old commercial league, which had 
 once taken up a dominant position in the north, and 
 which, though shorn of its ancient glory, was still worth 
 courting by a power which aspired to rule in Gerpiany. 
 Reasons were not wanting to induce the Hanse Towns 
 to accept the Emperor's offers. There was something 
 very tempting in the notion of having the 
 
 \ 7. Wallen- •' . _ . . , . r 11 i i 
 
 stein's offers power of the imperial armies to lall back 
 tcmpung. upon in their conflicts with foreign states. 
 
 Hamburg especially had been the object of the jealousy 
 of these states, as the mart from whence the western 
 nations supplied themselves with the materials used in 
 ship-building. The King of Denmark had built Gliick- 
 
 I 
 
1628. Resistance to Wallenstein, 107 
 
 stadt, lower down the Elbe, in the hope of intercepting 
 so lucrative a trade. The King of England had block- 
 aded the river, and carried off Hamburg vessels which 
 he suspected of being freighted with timber and hemp 
 for the use of his enemies in Spain. 
 
 From the growth of a national authority in Germany, 
 therefore, the Hanse Towns would have had „ 
 
 . . . g 8. But they 
 
 everything to gain. But Ferdinand was are repelled 
 not, could not be really national. What he understand 
 had to offer was a special agreement with ^^^ p^^"* 
 Spain, which would have given them the monopoly of 
 the trade between Germany and the Spanish dominions. 
 Such a trade could only be supported by war. It was a 
 privilege which would bring with it a deadly conflict 
 with England and Holland, perhaps with Denmark and 
 Sweden as well. And the prospect was none the more 
 alluring because Wallenstein was to play the principal 
 part in the design. The general of the imperial forces 
 was appointed Admiral of the Baltic, and the Hanse 
 Towns were expected to find him a fleet. 
 
 What a prospect for a body of calculating traders. 
 The Spanish monopoly, under such circumstances, was 
 hardly to be recommended as a prudent in- 
 vestment. The Emperor's overtures were aedineto 
 politely declined. Wallenstein, when he ^ro^osj^'j'^ 
 heard of their answer, rated them soundly. 
 He had means, he said, to shut up their trade by land, 
 and to seize goods which they might import either from 
 England or the Netherlands. He would deal with them, 
 in short, as Napoleon was to deal with them two centu- 
 ries later. 
 
 Wallenstein's thoughts, however, were more imme- 
 diately directed to the towns on the Baltic. He had 
 
I o8 Stralsund and Roche lie. 1627. 
 
 1 10. Wailen- lon? been alarmed at the dangler which 
 
 stein and the ° ^ 
 
 Baltic towns, threatened him from Sweden. In Novem- 
 ber, 1627, he had entered into negotiations 
 with an adventurer who offered to set fire to the ships 
 in the Swedish harbours. But as the project had 
 broken down. there was nothing for it but to gain posses- 
 sion of the port towns on the Baltic coast, and to bar 
 them against the enemy. For no man could expect that 
 Gustavus would look on quietly, whilst a great military 
 power was forming on the southern coast of the Baltic. 
 
 Wismar was soon in Wallenstein's hands. The har- 
 bour of Rostock was blocked up by a line of sunken 
 ships. Though Boguslav, the Duke of Pomerania, pro- 
 mised to keep his long line of coast safe from attack, he 
 
 1 11. Growth was compelled to admit a strong imperialist 
 of his power. ^^^^^ within his territory. Everything 
 seemed to be succeeding as Wallenstein wished. 
 
 Section III. — The Siege of Stralsund. 
 One town alone held out. Stralsund was not a free 
 city of the Empire. But though it was nominally depen- 
 dent on the Duke of Pomerania it was prac- 
 
 § I. Stral- . . , J 
 
 sund holds tically its own mistress. The citizens had 
 no wish to put themselves forward in oppo- 
 sition to the Emperor, far less to assist a foreign power to 
 gain a footing in Germany. But they would never admit a 
 garrison of such troops as Wallenstein's within their walls. 
 Wallenstein would have all or nothing. He ordered 
 his commander in those parts, the Lutheran Arnim, to 
 enforce submission. " I will never," he 
 orders Ae wrote, " allow them to keep anything back 
 
 siege to be from me, lest others should be encouraged 
 
 commenced. " 
 
 to do the like." Arnim, already master of 
 Riigen, seized Danholm, a smaller island commanding 
 
1628. The Siege of Stralsund, 109 
 
 the mouth of the harbour. In February hostilities were 
 commenced. In March the citizens attacked the impe- 
 riaUsts in Danholm, and drove them out of the island. 
 
 It was Wallenstein's first check, and desperately did 
 he struggle to wipe out the disgrace. Every day the 
 spirit of the citizens was rising. There were ^ ^ Waiien- 
 old soldiers there, fugitives from the Danish stein's first 
 war, and peasants who had fled from their 
 desolated homes, and who had terrible tales to tell of 
 the wretchedness which followed in the track of Wal- 
 lenstein's soldiers. In April, all within the town bound 
 themselves by a solemn oath to defend their religion 
 and their liberty to the last drop of their blood, and to 
 admit no garrison within their walls. In the midst of 
 their resistance they still kept up some recollection of 
 their nationality, so far as any tie of nationality could still 
 be said to exist. The name of the Emperor was care- 
 fully avoided, but they professed attachment to the Em- 
 pire and its laws. 
 
 Practically, however, the shape in which the Empire 
 presented itself to them was that of Wallenstein's army, 
 and if they were to resist that army, the ^^ succour 
 Stralsunders must, whether they liked it or from Denmark 
 
 . . , 1 and Sweden. 
 
 not, make common cause with those who 
 were hostile to the Empire. In May a Danish embassy 
 appeared amongst them, and the King of Sweden sent a 
 present of gunpowder. When the siege was formally 
 opened, these overtures were followed by a succour of 
 armed men. Sweden and Denmark were working to- 
 gether to break up the new military Empire, and their 
 forlorn hope was thrown into Stralsund. 
 
 Wallenstein saw that the case was serious, and came 
 in person to the help of his lieutenant. According 
 to a doubtful story, he exclaimed, 'I will have 
 
no Stralsund and Rochelle. 1628. 
 
 § ■;. Waiien- Stralsund, even if it be fastened by chains 
 
 stein abandons . ^ 
 
 the siege. to heaven.' It IS certain that when a depu- 
 
 tation from the citizens pleaded with him that he would 
 abandon his demand that they should admit a garrison 
 within their walls, he drew his hand along the surface of 
 a table before him, and answered sternly, 'Your town 
 shall be made as flat as this.' But the problem of over- 
 coming the resistance of a fortress open to unlimited suc- 
 cours by sea is one of the most difficult in the whole art 
 of war. Still, however, there were fearful "odds in favour 
 of the besiegers. Without the walls Wallenstein had no 
 enemy to fear. He was himself Duke of Mecklenburg. 
 With the Elector of Brandenburg and the Duke of Po- 
 merania he was on friendly terms, and he had received 
 the support of the latter in his attempts upon the town. 
 Within the walls there was no certainty of ultimate suc- 
 cess. Those who had anything to lose placed their 
 property on shipboard. Many sent their wives and 
 daughters to seek a safe refuge in Sweden. But what- 
 ever doubts might arise the defenders of the town fought 
 sturdily on. Week after week passed away, and Stral- 
 sund was still untaken. Wallenstein lowered his terms. 
 He ceased to demand entrance for a garrison of his own 
 men. It would be enough, he now said, if the citizens 
 would entrust their walls to troops of their own ruler, the 
 Duke of Pomerania, and would in this manner tear them- 
 selves away from the connexion with foreign powers hos- 
 tile to the Emperor. And to this offer the governing 
 council of the town was ready to assent. But the gene- 
 ral body of the citizens rejected it utterly. They delibe- 
 rately preferred the alliance of the two foreign kings to 
 submission, however indirect, to the Emperor's authority. 
 Before this resolution, Wallenstein, with all his armies, 
 was powerless. On August 3 he raised the siege. 
 
1 6 2 3 . The Siege of Rochelle. 1 1 1 
 
 Wallenstein's failure was an event of incalculable im- 
 portance in the history of Germany. It was much that 
 one, and that not one of the first, towns of charac 
 
 the Empire should have beaten back the terofthe 
 tide of conquest. But it was more that the 
 resistance should have been attempted in a case which 
 sooner or later would be the cause of the great majority 
 of Germans. Ferdinand had floated to power because 
 he personified order as opposed to anarchy. The Stral- 
 sunders fought for the Protestant religion and freedom 
 from the presence of a garrison. Ferdinand's order 
 meant the rule of the priest, and the rule of the soldiers. 
 Slowly and unwillingly the citizens of Stralsund declared 
 for the presence of foreigners as better than such order 
 as this. 
 
 Section IV. — The Siege of Rochelle, 
 
 The tide was on the turn in Germany. But the tide 
 was not on the turn in France. There, too, a maritime 
 city, greater and wealthier than Stralsund, 
 and supported by fleets and armies from sund and 
 beyond the sea, was defending the cause of 
 Protestantism against the central government. Mainly 
 because in France the central government represented 
 something more than the rule of the priest and the 
 soldier, the resistance which was successful in Germany 
 was overpowered in France. 
 
 During the year 1625 the coolness between England 
 and France had been on the increase. The persecution 
 of the English Catholics by Charles, in con- 
 travention of his promises, had greatly ex- 1 2. England 
 asperated Lewis, and the seizure by the 
 English cruisers of numerous French vessels charged 
 with carrying on a contraband traffic with the Spanish 
 
/ 1 ^ Stralsund and Rochelle. 1626. 
 
 Netherlands had not contributed to calm his indignation. 
 Charles, on the other hand, regarded himself as the 
 natural protector of the French Protestants, and made 
 demands in their favour which only served to make 
 Lewis more resolved to refuse every concession. 
 
 Richelieu had therefore a hard part to play. He knew 
 perfectly well that the government had violated its en- 
 l Riche- gagements with the Huguenots, especially in 
 lieu would keeping up the fortifications of Fort Louis, a 
 
 have made , , . , , , 
 
 peace with work commandmg the entrance to the har- 
 ?o^s?f"he^" bour of Rochelle, which it had long ago 
 '^°"^'^- promised to pull down. If Richelieu had 
 
 had his way he would have pulled down the fort, and by 
 generous concessions to the Huguenots would have car- 
 ried them with him to the support of his foreign policy. 
 But such a policy, in appearance so rash, in reality so 
 wise, was not likely to be palatable to Lewis, and Riche- 
 lieu had to steer his way between the danger of offending 
 the king and the danger of lighting up still more vividly 
 the flames of civil war. In the course of the winter all 
 that could be done he did. Deputies of the Huguenot 
 towns appeared to negotiate a peace, with the support of 
 two English ambassadors. But they were instructed to 
 demand the demolition of the fort, and to this the king 
 steadily refused his consent. 
 
 The priests and the friends of the priests were 
 delighted at the prospect of another civil war. The 
 1626. assembled clergy commissioned one of their 
 
 a'^reenient number to offcr to the king a considerable 
 
 effected. 'SMvci of moncy for the suppression of rebel- 
 
 lion. The time was appointed for his audience, but 
 Richelieu contrived to put it off for a few hours longer, 
 and, by a representation of the dangers of the situation, 
 induced the Huguenot deputies, with the support of the 
 
1627. The Siege of Rochelle. 113 
 
 English ambassadors, to be satisfied with a loose verbal 
 promise from the king. When the clerical train swept 
 into the royal presence it was too late. The king had 
 already promised the Huguenot deputies that if they be- 
 haved as good subjects he would do for them more than 
 they could possibly expect. His ministers had already 
 assured them that these words pointed to the demolition 
 of the fort. 
 
 If a peace thus made was to be enduring, it would be 
 necessary to keep up for a long time the appearance of 
 
 its being a submission and not a peace. 
 TT 1- M T • • r ■, ■ ? 5- Inter- 
 
 Unhappily, the mtervention of the Kmg of vention of 
 
 England was not hkely to help to keep up ^^^""^^^ ^• 
 appearances. He urged Lewis to engage in the war in 
 Germany in the exact way and to the exact extent that 
 suited the English government, and he put himself osten- 
 tatiously forward as the protector of the Huguenots. 
 
 Such conduct awoke once more the susceptibilities of 
 Lewis. It was bad enough to be bearded by his own 
 subjects. But it was worse to be bearded ^5 Lewis 
 by a foreign sovereign. A group of Hugue- indignant. 
 not communities in the south of France supported in 
 practical independence by England v/ould be as insup- 
 portable to him as the resistance of the Hanse Towns 
 was two years later to Wallen stein. 
 
 Fort Louis, therefore, was not demolished. A peace 
 was patched up between France and Spain. Charles 
 grew more and more angry with Lewis for 
 deserting the common cause. Fresh seiz- ? 7. War 
 ures of French ships by English cruisers FrSicrand 
 came to exasperate the quarrel, and in the ^"a^^"^- 
 early months of 1627 war existed between the two na- 
 tions, in reality if not in name. In July a great English 
 fleet, with a land army on board, appeared off Rochelle, 
 
114 Stralsund and Rochelle, 1627. 
 
 under the command of Charles' favourite, Buckingham. 
 A landing was effected on the Isle of Rhe, and siege was 
 laid to the principal fort of the island. At last the gar- 
 rison was almost starved out, and the commander offered 
 to come the next morning into the English quarters to 
 treat for terms of surrender. That night a stiff easterly 
 breeze sprung up, and a French flotilla, heavily laden 
 with provisions, put off from the main land. Some of 
 the boats were taken, but most of them made their way 
 safely through the English guardships, and delivered 
 their precious store under the guns of the fort. Buck- 
 ingham lingered for some weeks longer. Every day the 
 besiegers swept the horizon in vain with their glasses, 
 looking for succour from England. But Charles, without 
 parliamentary support, was too poor to send off succours 
 hurriedly, and when they were at last ready a long con- 
 tinuance of westerly winds prevented them from leaving 
 the Channel. Before they could put to sea, a- French 
 force was landed on the island, and Buckingham, to save 
 himself from defeat, was forced to break up the siege and 
 to return home discomfited. 
 
 Richelieu and the king were now thoroughly of one 
 mind. The French city which could enter into an under- 
 ? 8. Siege of Standing with the foreigner must be reduced 
 Rochelle. ^q submission. An army of thirty thousand 
 
 men gathered round the walls, and on the land side the 
 town was as hopelessly blocked up as Stralsund. The 
 only question was whether it would be possible to cut off 
 the entrance of English supplies by sea. By the end of 
 November a commencement was made of the mole which 
 was to shut off Rochelle from all external help. Piles 
 were driven in with stones between them. Heavily laden 
 vessels were scuttled and sunk. Richelieu himself di- 
 rected the operations, this time with the full support of 
 
1628. The Siege of Roche lie. 115 
 
 the clergy, who poured their money lavishly into the 
 royal treasury. In May, 1628, the work, in spite of the 
 storms of winter, was almost completed. An English 
 fleet, which came up to the succour of the town, retired 
 without accomplishing anything. 
 
 Inside the town distress was rapidly growing unendur' 
 able. The mayor, Jean Guiton, was still the soul of the 
 resistance. But he had to struggle against § 9. in- 
 an increasing number who counselled sur- spondencyln 
 render. He did not venture to appear in ti^etown. 
 the streets without a pistol in his hand and half-a-dozen 
 stout guardians around him, 
 
 The only hope for Rochelle lay in the great armament 
 which was known to be prepared in England, and which 
 was to be conducted by Buckingham in § 10. Failure 
 
 rr-.! XT r r- X- J of the English 
 
 person. The House of Commons had pur- attempt to 
 chased the Petition of Right with large sub- succour it. 
 sidies, and Charles, for the first time in his reign, was 
 enabled to make an effort worthy of his dignity. But 
 the popular hatred found a representative in the mur- 
 derer Felton, and a knife struck home to the favourite's 
 heart put an end to his projects for ever. The dissatis- 
 faction which arrayed the English people against its 
 government had found its way into the naval service. 
 When the fleet arrived in September, under a new com- 
 mander, all was disorganization and confusion. It 
 returned to England without accomplishing a single 
 object for which it had been sent forth. 
 
 The surrender of Rochelle followed as a matter of 
 necessity. On November i the king entered 
 the conquered town in triumph. The inde- render of 
 pendence of French cities was at an end. 
 
 The different success of the two great sieges of the 
 year may partly be accounted for by the difference of 
 
1 1 6 Stralsimd and Rochelle. 1628. 
 
 vigour in the powers to which the threatened towns looked 
 for succour. Charles was very far from 
 
 g 12. Cause , ... , , 
 
 of Richelieu's being a Christian IV., much less a Gus- 
 tavus Adolphus; and if England at unity 
 with itself was stronger than Sweden, England distracted 
 by civil broils was weaker than Sweden. But there were 
 more serious reasons than these for Richelieu's victory 
 and Wallenstcin's failure. Richelieu represented what 
 Wallenstein did not — ^the authority of the state. His 
 armies were under the control of discipline ; and, even 
 if the taxation needed to support them pressed hardly 
 upon the poor, the pressure of the hardest taxation was 
 easy to be borne in comparison with a far lighter con- 
 tribution exacted at random by a hungry and rapacious 
 soldiery. If Richelieu had thus an advantage over 
 Wallenstein, he had a still greater advantage over Fer- 
 dinand and Maximilian. He had been able to isolate the 
 Rochcllese by making it clear to their fellow Huguenots 
 in the rest of France that no question of religion was at 
 stake. The Stralsunders fought with the knowledge that 
 their cause was the cause of the whole of Protestant 
 Germany. The Rochellcse knew that their resistance 
 had been tacitly repudiated by the whole of Protestant 
 France. 
 
 When Lewis appeared within the walls of Rochelle 
 
 he cancelled the privileges of the town, ordered its walls 
 
 T, ,. . to be pulled down and its churches to be 
 
 13. Religious . ^ 1 ^ 1 ,• 1 • -r. 
 
 liberty of the givcn ovcr to the Catholic worship. But 
 ugueno -. ui-idej- Richelicu's guidance he announced 
 his resolution to assure the Protestants a continuance of 
 the religious liberties granted by his father. No towns in 
 France should be garrisoned by troops other than the 
 king's. No authorities in France should give orders 
 independently of the king. But wherever a religion 
 
1628. oppression of the Protestants. 1 1 7 
 
 which was not that of the king had succeeded in esta- 
 blishing its power over men's minds no attempt should 
 be made to effect a change by force. Armed with such 
 a principle as this, France would soon be far stronger 
 than her neighbours. If Catholic and Huguenot could 
 come to regard one another as Frenchmen and nothing 
 else, what chance had foreign powers of resisting her? 
 She had already beaten back the attack of a divided 
 England. Would she not soon acquire a preponder- 
 ance over a divided Germany? It is time for us now to 
 ask what steps were being taken in Germany to meet 01 
 to increase the danger. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE EDICT OF RESTITUTION. 
 
 Section I.— Oppression of the Protestants. 
 It was not at Stralsund only that Wallenstein learned 
 that he could be successfully resisted. Stade had sur- 
 rendered with its English garrison to Tilly in 
 April, but Gliickstadt still held out. In vain ? i. Siege of 
 Wallenstein came in person to Tilly's aid. ^^^^^^^^• 
 The Danish cruisers kept the sea open. Wallenstein 
 was obliged to retire. In January, 1629, the works of the 
 besiegers were destroyed by a sally of the garrison. 
 
 Wallenstein, the great calculator, saw that peace with 
 Denmark was necessary. The Swedes and the Danes 
 were beginning to act together, and resist- 
 ance to one nation, if there must be re- 7^t^-^\,^ 
 sistance, would be easier than resistance to L-t'^^k^" 
 two. Much to his satisfaction he found 
 Christian not unwilling to hsten to the voice of his 
 charming. Just as the eagle eye of Gustavus descried 
 
Ii8 The Edict of Restitutio7i. 1629. 
 
 the first feeble beams of light on the horizon, the King 
 of Denmark, weary of misfortune and vexed at the pros- 
 pect of having to crave help from his old competitor of 
 Sweden, laid down his arms. On May 22, 1629, a treaty 
 of peace was signed at Liibeck. Christian received back 
 the whole of his hereditary possessions. In return he 
 resigned all claim to the bishoprics held by his family in 
 the Empire, and engaged to meddle no further with the 
 territorial arrangements of Lower Saxony. 
 
 If the Peace of Liibeck was really to be a source of 
 
 strength to Ferdinand it must be accompanied by some 
 
 such measures as those with which Richelieu 
 
 g 3. Neces- 
 sity of heal- was accompanying his victory at Rochelle. 
 ing measures, j^ ^_^^ ^^^ enough to have got rid of a 
 
 foreign enemy. Some means must be found to allay the 
 fears of the Germans themselves, which had found ex- 
 pression in the resistance of Stralsund. 
 
 That there was much to be done in this direction was 
 
 openly acknowledged by almost all who had been con- 
 
 ^ cerned in the imperialist successes. Maxi- 
 
 \ 4. Opposite 1 1 1 1 • 
 
 views as to miliaii and the League held that it was above 
 
 what measures n ,i • . ^ • ^i 
 
 are needed. ^11 thmgs necessary to restrain the excesses 
 of Wallenstein and his soldiers. Wallenstein 
 held that it was above all things necessary to restrain 
 the excessive demands of Maximilian and the clergy. 
 Ferdinand, the man in whose hands fortune had placed 
 the decision of the great question, probably stood alone 
 in thinking that it was possible to satisfy both the sol- 
 diers and the priests without weakening his hold on the 
 Empire. 
 
 The first act of Ferdinand after the signature of the 
 treaty was to invest Wallenstein formally with the Duchy 
 of Mecklenburg. Offence was thus given to those who 
 believed tliat the rights of territorial sovereignty had 
 
1629. oppression of the Protestants. 119 
 
 been unduly invaded, and who were jealous of the right 
 claimed by the Emperor to supersede by his own au- 
 thority a prince of the Empire in favour of a successful 
 soldier. 
 
 On the other side offence was given still more widely 
 to those who wished to maintain the rights of Protestant- 
 ism. Without wishing to enter upon a gene- , 
 
 ° ^ ° g 5. Ill treat- 
 
 ral persecution, Ferdinand was resolved to ment of the 
 allow no rights against his church to those 
 who could not conclusively prove to his own satisfaction 
 that those rights were under the guarantee of unassaila- 
 ble law. He had begun in his own hereditary dominions. 
 It is true that in Bohemia and Austria no tortures were 
 inflicted, no martyrs suffered either at the stake or on the 
 scaffold. But it was found that the stern, relentless pres- 
 sure of daily annoyance was sufficient for the purpose 
 of producing at least external conformity. By 1627 the 
 desired result had been obtained, and Protestantism 
 existed only as a proscribed religion. Then came the 
 turn of the Palatinate. For a time there had been no 
 open persecution. In 1625 Maximilian had written to 
 the governor of Heidelberg not to let any opportunity 
 slip, if he could find an excuse for turning out a Pro- 
 testant minister from his parish and replacing him by a 
 Catholic priest. In February, 1628, the Jesuits were able 
 to report that they had made 400 converts in Heidelberg 
 itself, and 1,200 in the neighbouring country districts. 
 Then came a further change. In March an agreement 
 was drawn up between Maximilian and Ferdinand. The 
 Emperor received back Upper Austria, and made over 
 to the Elector of Bavaria, in its stead, the Upper Palati- 
 nate and that part of the Lower Palatinate which lies on 
 the right bank of the Rhine. Maximilian held that by 
 this transfer he had acquired the full rights of a territo- 
 
 K 
 
I20 The Edict of Restitution. 1629, 
 
 rial prince, and that amongst these rights was that of dis' 
 posing of the rehgion of his new subjects. In June all 
 noblemen residing in the country were told that they 
 must either change their religion within two months or 
 go into exile. In September the order was extended to 
 the inhabitants generally. 
 
 The year 1628 was a year of alarm over all Protestant 
 South Germany. There at least Ferdinand 
 cities of South was ready to carry out the wishes expressed 
 ermany. ^^ ^^ Catholic electors at Miihlhausen the 
 
 year before. Whilst Maximilian was threatening the 
 Palatinate, imperial commissioners were passing through 
 the other territories and cities, taking account of churches 
 and church property which had come into Protestant 
 possession since the Convention of Passau. To the 
 wishes of the populations not the slightest attention was 
 paid. In Nordlingen, for instance, not a single Catholic 
 was to be found. Every church in the place was none 
 the less marked down for re-delivery to the Catholic 
 clergy. In some places to which the commissioners 
 came, Shylock-like, to claim their pound of flesh, they 
 demanded more even than the strict letter of the law 
 allowed them. Not content with restoring to the Catholic 
 worship churches which had with general consent been 
 in the hands of Protestants for half a century, they pro- 
 ceeded to compel the inhabitants of the towns to attend 
 the mass. 
 
 The success of these outrageous measures in the south 
 
 encouraged Ferdinand to pursue the same course in the 
 
 „, north. There he had to deal not merely 
 
 g 7. The 
 
 Edict of with scattered towns, or a few abbeys, but 
 
 with the great lay bishoprics, many of which 
 
 were extensive enough to form the domain of a duke 01 
 
 a landgrave. On March 29, 1629, before the Peace of 
 
 ^1 
 
1629. French InteTvention in Italy. 121 
 
 Liibeck was actually signed, he issued the fatal Edict of 
 Restitution. With a stroke of his pen, the two arch- 
 bishoprics of Magdeburg and Bremen, the twelve bishop- 
 rics of Minden, Verden, Halberstadt, Liibeck, Ratze- 
 burg, Misnia, Merseburg, Naumburg, Brandenburg, 
 Havelberg, Lebus, and Camin, with about a hundred and 
 twenty smaller ecclesiastical foundations, were restored 
 to the Catholic clergy. 
 
 The wheel had come full circle round since the day 
 when Christian of Anhalt had planned the great uprising 
 to sweep away the Catholic bishops and the 
 House of Austria. The House of Austria was weakness of 
 firmer in its seat than ever. The Catholic ^ mperor. 
 bishops were triumphant. But in the midst of their 
 triumph the enemies of the Empire were watching them 
 keenly, and judging that both they and the Emperor 
 were all the weaker for this grand vindication of legality. 
 
 Section II. — French Intervention in Italy. 
 
 In the north Gustavus had an eye not likely to be 
 deceived for the joints of Ferdinand's harness. In the 
 west Richelieu was preparing for the day g j_ Gustavus 
 when he too might aid in the overthrow of the ^"'^ Richelieu. 
 Colossus. It is true that his first thought was of Spain 
 and not of Germany. But he could hardly be brought 
 into collision with one branch of the House of Austria 
 without having sooner or later to deal with the other. 
 
 In Italy, the death of the Duke of Mantua and Mont- 
 ferrat without near heirs had given rise to fvar. The 
 next heir was a very distant relation, the 
 
 ^2. The 
 
 Duke of Nevers, whose family had long Mantuan 
 been naturalized in France. To Spain the 
 presence of a dependent of France so near her posses- 
 sions in the Milanese was in the highest de^Tee undesi' 
 
122 The Edict of Restitution. 1629. 
 
 rable, and she called upon Ferdinand to sequester the 
 territory till another way of disposing it could be found. 
 If in Germany before Ferdinand's election the rights of 
 the Emperors had been but a shadow, those which they 
 possessed in the old kingdom of Italy were but the 
 shadow of a shade. But whatever they were, Ferdinand 
 was the man to put them forth, and whilst Richelieu was 
 engaged at Rochelle, Spanish troops had overrun Man- 
 tua, and in conjunction with the Duke of Savoy, ready 
 now to seek his own interests by fighting for Spain, as in 
 earlier days to seek his own interests by fighting against 
 her, were besieging the Duke of Nevers in Casale, the 
 only fortress which remained to him„ 
 
 This intervention of the Spaniards in the Emperor's 
 
 name caused even greater indignation in Italy than their 
 
 intervention in the Palatinate had caused in Germany. 
 
 ^ ,. For in Germany the Emperor's name was in 
 
 \ 3. Italian ■ . ^ ^ 
 
 feeling against 1021 Still conncctcd with the idcas of law 
 mperor. ^^^ order. In Italy it reminded men of 
 nothing but foreign domination, a memory which was 
 none the less vivid when the Emperor used his au- 
 thority, whatever it might be, to support the real foreign 
 domination of the immediate present, the Spanish domi- 
 nation in Milan. The Italian princes took alarm. Venice 
 and the pope summoned France to their aid, and in 
 March, 1629, Richelieu, taking Lewis with him across 
 the snowy passes of the Alps, reduced the Duke of Savoy 
 to submission, and forced the Spaniards to raise the 
 siege of Casale. 
 
 Casale was the Stralsund of Italy. A power which 
 1 4. Check had ventured to clothe itself in the attributes 
 him*by ^"^ of a national authority , with cvcn Icss rcason 
 Richelieu. \}i\2.Vi in Germany, had found its limits. 
 Richelieu had the general feeling on his side. 
 
1629. French Intervention in Italy. 123 
 
 He did not venture to do more in Italy. The Duke 
 of Rohan, the brother of that Soubise who had begun the 
 war of Rochelle in 1625, had roused the „ „, , 
 
 ■^ ^ 5. Ihe last 
 
 Huguenots of Languedoc and the Cevennes Huguenot 
 
 _ , ■ . . , , . rebellion. 
 
 to a fresh attempt at resistance, halt Pro- 
 testant, half aristocratic. As if the Rochellese had not 
 sufficiently suffered for the mistake of calling in foreign 
 aid, Rohan followed their example, and was foolish 
 enough to ask for help from Spain. But the Spanish 
 troops came not to his aid. Richelieu hurried back from 
 Italy, made peace with England, and pitilessly crushed 
 the rebellion in the south. Once more the victory was 
 attended by the confirmation of the religious liberties of 
 the Huguenots. They might worship as they pleased, but 
 political independence they were not to have. 
 
 The French monarchy was stronger for external en- 
 terprise than ever. By crushing all resistance, it had no 
 longer to fear occupation for its energies at 
 home, and by its tolerance of religion it had ^f France.^ 
 rendered itself capable of accepting the ser- 
 vice of all its subjects, and it could offer its alliance to 
 Protestant states without fear of suffering a rebuff. 
 
 Richelieu was again able to turn his attention to Italy. 
 In the summer of 1629 an imperialist force of 20,000 
 men descended from the Alps and laid siege „ ^. , 
 
 ^ . ? 7- Riche- 
 
 to Mantua. Ferdinand, having established Heu and the 
 
 r^ r • J iT- i. i_ ij Imperialists 
 
 peace m Germany, lancied that he could jn itaiy. 
 take up again in Italy the work which had 
 been too great for Barbarossa. Spinola came to his aid 
 with an army of equal force, and recommenced the attack 
 upon Casale. In the spring of 1630 Richelieu was once 
 more in Italy. Cardinal as he was, he was placed in 
 command of the army. But instead of marching against 
 the Spaniards, he turned first upon the Duke of Savoy. 
 
124 TJie Edict of Restitution, 1630. 
 
 Seizing Pignerol and Saluces, he gained possession of 
 the Alpine passes. Then, with Piedmont at his feet, he 
 passed on to reheve Casale, and forced the Spanish be- 
 siegers to retreat. But Richeheu was prudent as well as 
 daring, and he left Mantua for the present in the hands 
 of Spain and the Emperor. 
 
 It was a hard thing to attack the united forces of 
 Spain and the Empire face to face. It might be easier to 
 a 8 State of support their enemies abroad, and to favour 
 Germany. dissensions at home. In the Netherlands, 
 
 the Dutch, encouraged by the diversion of the Italian 
 war, were at last taking the offensive, and entering upon 
 that aggressive warfare which ended by bringing the 
 whole of North Brabant under their authority. In the 
 north, Gustavus had concluded a peace with Poland, and 
 was making preparations for actual intervention in Ger- 
 many. In all this Richelieu was deeply interested. An 
 ambassador of Lewis was engaged in arranging with 
 Gustavus the terms on which France should assist him 
 in the attack upon the Empire which he already con- 
 templated. 
 
 Not that even Richelieu foresaw the possibility of the 
 magnificent results which were to follow from that enter- 
 . „. , prise. In 1630, as in 1624 and 1625, he would 
 
 lieu's expec- have preferred that a Protestant power 
 should not be too successful. He would 
 rather conquer with Sweden than not at all. But he 
 would rather conquer with the help of the League than 
 with the help of Sweden. Gustavus might be pushed on 
 to do his best. He would effect a diversion, and that 
 would be enough. 
 Section III. — Wallenstein deprived of his Command, 
 The long expected breach between the League and 
 the Emperor's general had come at last. Instead of re- 
 
1630. Wallenstein deprived of Command. 125 
 
 ducinff his forces after the Peace of Liibeck, I i-. Strong 
 
 *-* position or 
 
 Wallenstein had increased them. He was Wallenstein. 
 now at the head of 100,000 men. From a 
 military point of view no one could say it was too much. 
 He had Mantua to defend, the coasts of the North Sea 
 to watch, perhaps France to guard against, and that too 
 with all the princes and peoples of Germany exasperated 
 against him. Some efforts he made to curb the vio- 
 lence of his soldiers. But to restrain the monster he had 
 created was beyond his power. And if his soldiers bore 
 hard upon burgher and peasant, he himself treated 
 the princes with contemptuous scorn. He asked why 
 the electors and the other princes should not be treated 
 as the Bohemian nobles had been treated. The Estates 
 of the Empire had no more right to independence than 
 the Estates of the kingdom. It was time for the Empe- 
 ror to make himself master of Germany, as the kings of 
 France and Spain were masters of their own dominions. 
 All this made the electors above measure indignant. 
 "A new domination," they told Ferdinand, "has arisen 
 for the complete overthrow of the old and praiseworthy 
 constitution of the Empire." 
 
 A reconstruction of that old rotten edifice would have 
 done no harm. But its overthrow by military , 
 
 ^ § 2- What 
 
 violence was another matter. A new form could he 
 
 effect ' 
 
 of government, to be exercised by a soldier 
 
 with the help of soldiers, could never be found in justice, 
 
 For always formidable was the league 
 And partnership of free power and free will. 
 The way of ancient ordinances, though it winds. 
 Is yet no devious path. Straight forward goes 
 The lightning's path, and straight the fearful path 
 Of the cannon-ball. Direct it flies, and rapid, 
 Shattering that it may reach, and shattering what it reaches. 
 
 Schiller's Piccolotnini, act i. scene 4. 
 
126 The Edict of Restitution, 1630. 
 
 Even whilst he was defending the universality of op- 
 pression on the principle that it was but fair that all 
 estates should contribute to the common 
 partiality. defence, he was exhibiting in his own case an 
 
 extraordinary instance of partiality. Whilst 
 all Germany was subjected to contributions and ex- 
 actions, not a soldier was allowed to set foot on Wallen- 
 stein's own duchy of Mecklenburg. 
 
 And if the Catholic electors had good reason to com- 
 plain of Wallenstein, Wallenstein had also good reason 
 to complain of the electors. The process of 
 Edict of carrying out the Edict of Restitution was 
 
 Restitution . • .t_ i, ri.- • «<'-r'T- 
 
 carried out. mcreasmgthe number of his enemies. Ihe 
 Emperor," he said, "needed recruits, not 
 reforms." Ferdinand did not think so. He had per- 
 suaded the chapter of Halberstadt to elect a younger 
 son of his own as their bishop. He induced the chapter 
 of Magdeburg to depose their administrator, on the 
 ground that he had taken part in the Danish war. But, 
 in spite of the Edict of Restitution, the chapter of Magde- 
 burg refused to choose a Catholic bishop in his place, 
 and preferred a son of the Elector of Saxony. John 
 George was thereby brought by his family interests into 
 collision with the Edict of Restitution. 
 
 The city of Magdeburg had not been on good terms 
 
 with the chapter. Wallenstein offered to support its re- 
 
 ,- , sistance with the help of a garrison. But the 
 
 3 5. Magde- . . 
 
 burg refuses city refused, and Wallenstein, in the face of 
 the growing opposition, did not venture to 
 force it to accept his offer. 
 
 Of the fact of the growing opposition no one could be 
 doubtful. As to its causes there was much difference of 
 g 6. Growing Opinion. The priests ascribed it to the bar- 
 Waiienstein. barities of the soldiers. Wallenstein ascribed 
 
1630. Wallenstdn deprived of Co7nmand. 127 
 
 it to the violence of the priests, and especially to the 
 vigour with which they were attempting to reconvert the 
 inhabitants of the archbishopric of Bremen, which they 
 had recovered in virtue of the Edict of Restitution. 
 
 On every side the priests and their schemes were in 
 the way of Wallenstein's dazzling visions of a grand im- 
 perialist restoration. The Pope, as an Italian , 
 
 . . . y. 1- He talks 
 
 prince, had sympathized with France. " It of attacking 
 is a hundred years," said Wallenstein, ^ °^^' 
 "since Rome has been plundered, and it is richer now 
 than ever." 
 
 On July 3, 1630, Ferdinand assembled round him the 
 princes and electors at Ratisbon, in the hope of inducing 
 them to elect his son, the King of Hungary, 
 as King of the Romans, and therefore as his \i Ratfsbon/ 
 successor in the Empire. But to this project 
 the electors refused even to listen. All who attended 
 the assembly came with their minds full of the excesses 
 of Wallenstein's soldiery. The commissioners of that 
 very Duke of Pomerania who had served the imperial 
 cause so well in the siege of Stralsund, had a tale of dis- 
 tress to pour out before the princes. His master's sub- 
 jects, he said, had been driven to feed upon grass and 
 the leaves of trees. Cases had occurred in which starv- 
 ing wretches had maintained life by devouring human 
 flesh. A woman had even been known to feed upon her 
 own child. 
 
 Other tales were told, bad enough, if not quite so bad 
 as this, and the misery of the populations 1 9. The 
 gave support to the political grievances of of WaUenstein 
 their rulers. Ferdinand was plainly told demanded. 
 that the electors did not mean to be subjected to mili- 
 tary despotism. He must choose between them and 
 Wallenstein. 
 
128 The Edict of Restitution. 1630, 
 
 Behind the Catholic Electors was Richelieu himself. 
 
 Together with the recognized French ambassadors, the 
 
 Capuchin Father Joseph, Richelieu's trusted 
 
 ? 10. Riche- ^ 
 
 lieu'sin- Confidant, had come to Ratisbon, encoura- 
 
 ngues. ging the opposition to Wallenstein, and urg- 
 
 ing the electors to demand the neutrality of the Empire, 
 if a war broke out between France and Spain. 
 
 Unhappily for Germany, the policy of the electors was 
 
 purely conservative. There was nothing constructive 
 
 ^ ,. even in Maximilian, the greatest of them 
 
 \ II. Policy ° 
 
 of the all. The old loose relationship between the 
 
 princes and the Emperor was to be restored 
 whether it was adequate to the emergency or not. At the 
 very moment when he had every need of conciliating 
 opposition, he and his brother electors were refusing the 
 petition of the deputies of the Duke of Pomerania that 
 their masters might be allowed to keep possession of the 
 bishopric of Camin. 
 
 §12. Landing -^^ the moment when the offence was 
 of Gustavus. given, it was known at Ratisbon that Gus- 
 tavus Adolphus had landed on the coast of Pomerania. 
 Five years before Gustavus had refused to stir against 
 the Emperor without the aid of a powerful coalition. He 
 now ventured to throw himself alone into 
 
 g 13. Gus- 
 tavus comes the midst of Germany. He had no certainty 
 
 without allies. /- t- -l • j t.! t- i i 
 
 even of French aid. The French ambassa- 
 dor had offered him money, but had accompanied the 
 offer by conditions. Gustavus thrust aside both the money 
 and the conditions. If he went at all, he would go on 
 his own terms. 
 
 He knew well enough that the task before him, appa- 
 rently far harder than in 1625, was in reality far easier. 
 He saw that between the ecclesiastical Elec- 
 bopefulness. tors OH the one hand, and Wallenstein on 
 
1630. Wallenstein deprived of Co7nmand. 129 
 
 the other, the Protestant princes must cling to him for 
 safety. To one who suggested that even if he were vic- 
 torious the princes would seek to profit by his victory, he 
 answered, with the assurance of genius, 'If I am victo- 
 rious, they will be my prey.' 
 
 Events were working for him at Ratisbon. Before the 
 persistent demand of the electors for Wallenstein's dis- 
 missal Ferdinand was powerless. Even ^ ^^ ^.^_ 
 Wallenstein would not have been strong missal of 
 
 ^ Wallenstein. 
 
 enough to contend against the League, 
 backed by France, with a whole Protestant north burst- 
 ing into insurrection in his rear. But, in truth, neither 
 Ferdinand nor Wallenstein thought: of resistance. The 
 general, strong as his position was, at the head of the 
 most numerous and well-appointed army in Europe, 
 retired into private hfe without a murmur. He may, 
 perhaps, have calculated that it would not be long be- 
 fore he would be again needed. 
 
 That Ferdinand feh the blow keenly it is impossible 
 to doubt. He thought much of the main- ^ ^^ ^^^^.^ 
 tenance of the imperial dignity, and the up- nand's 
 
 ^ . position. 
 
 rising of the electors was m some sort an 
 uprising against himself. But the system which had 
 fallen was the system of Wallenstein rather than his own. 
 He had sanctioned the contributions and exactions, feebly 
 hoping that they were not so bad as they seemed, or that 
 if anything was wrong a little more energy on Wallen- 
 stein's part would set things straight. As to Wallen- 
 stein's idea of a revolutionary empire founded on the 
 ruins of the princes, Ferdinand would have been the 
 first to regard it with horror. His poUcy was in the main 
 far more in accordance with that of Maximilian than 
 with that of Wallenstein. 
 Wallenstein's dismissal was not the only sacrifice to 
 
130 The Edict of Restitution. 1630. 
 
 ? 17- Conces- wliicli Ferdinand was obliged to consent. 
 
 sions of Ferdi- . - .^ , ^ . .. . , 
 
 nand in Italy. He agreed to mvest the Duke 01 In e vers with 
 the Duchy of Mantua, hoping in return to se- 
 cure the neutrahty of France in his conflict with Sweden. 
 The result of that conflict depended mainly on the 
 attitude taken by the Protestants of the north, whom 
 § 18. Tilly Ferdinand, in combination with the Catholic 
 m command. elcctors, was doing his best to alienate. 
 Tilly was placed in command of the army which had 
 lately been Wallenstein's, as well as of his own. The 
 variety of habits and of feeling in the two armies did not 
 promise well for the future. But, numerically, Tilly was 
 far superior to Gustavus. 
 
 Section IV. — The Swedes establish themselves on 
 the Coast of the Baltic 
 
 Gustavus, on the other hand, commanded a force in- 
 ferior only in numbers. Thoroughly disciplined, it was 
 g I. The instinct with the spirit of its commander. It 
 
 Swedish army, shared his rcligious enthusiasm and his 
 devotion to the interests of his country. It had followed 
 him in many a hardly-won fight, and had never known 
 defeat under his orders. It believed with justice that his 
 genius for war was far greater than that of any comman- 
 der who was likely to be sent against him. 
 
 The first attempt of Gustavus to win over a prince of 
 the Empire to his side was made before Stettin, the capital 
 § 2. The Duke of the Duke of Pomerania. He insisted on 
 sabmiTs'^'to'^^^ a personal interview with the aged Boguslav, 
 Gustavus. |.j^g Y2.'sX of the old Wendish line. Boguslav 
 
 had ever been on good terms with the Emperor. He 
 had helped Wallenstein at Stralsund. But his deputies 
 had pleaded in vain at Ratisbon for his right to retain 
 
1630. The Swedes on the Baltic Coast. 131 
 
 the bishopric of Camin and for some amehoration of the 
 misery of his subjects. He now pleaded in person with 
 Gustavus to be allowed to remain neutral. Gustavus, 
 like Tilly in 1623, would hear nothing of neutrality. The 
 old man could hold out no longer. "Be it as you 
 wish, in God's name," he said. He begged the king to 
 be a father to him. " Nay," replied Gustavus, " I would 
 rather be your son." The inheritance of the childless 
 man would make an excellent bulwark for the defence 
 of the Baltic. 
 
 For some time longer Gustavus was busy in securing a 
 basis of operations along the coast by clearing Pomerania 
 and Mecklenburg of imperialist garrisons. , ^, 
 But, as yet, the northern princes were un- Elector of 
 willing to support him. In vain Gustavus prTfers^neu- 
 reasoned with the ambassador of his brother- traiuy. 
 in-law, the Elector of Brandenburg, who had come to 
 announce his master's neutrality. " It is time," he said, 
 " for his highness to open his eyes, and to rouse himself 
 from his ease, that his highness may no longer be in his 
 own land a lieutenant of the Emperor, nay, rather of the 
 Emperor's servant. He who makes a sheep of himself 
 is eaten by the wolf. His highness must be my friend 
 or enemy, when I come to his frontier. He must be hot 
 or cold. No third course will be allowed, be you sure of 
 that." The words were thrown away for the present. 
 There may have been something of mere cowardice in 
 the Elector's resistance to the overtures made to him. 
 Frederick had failed, and Christian had failed, and why 
 not Gustavus ? But there was something, too, of the old 
 German feeling remaining, of unwillingness to join with 
 the foreigner against the Empire. "To do so," said the 
 Brandenburg ambassador, "would be both dishonoura' 
 ble and disloyal." 
 
132 Tlie Edict of Restitution, 1631. 
 
 Gustavus had but to wait till Ferdinand's repeated 
 
 blunders made loyalty impossible even with the much- 
 
 enduring George William. Fortunately for 
 
 tiations^be-' Gustavus, he was now in a position in which 
 
 tween Sweden ^^ ^^g able to Wait a little. An attempt had 
 
 and ii ranee. ^ 
 
 been made in France to overthrow Riche- 
 lieu, in which the queen mother, Mary of Medici, had 
 taken a leading part. Richelieu, she warned her son, 
 was leading him to slight the interests of the Church. 
 But Lewis was unconvinced, and Mary of Medici found 
 that all political authority was in Richelieu's hands. 
 
 The complete success of the princes opposed to Wal- 
 lenstein had perhaps exceeded Richelieu's expectations. 
 
 ig^^ A balance of power between Wallenstein 
 
 T^ T'^^f ^^^ ^^® League would have served his pur- 
 
 Birwaide. pose better. But if Ferdinand was to be 
 
 strong, it did not matter to France whether the army 
 which gave him strength was commanded by Wallen- 
 stein or by Tilly. Richelieu, therefore, made up his mind 
 to grant subsidies to Gustavus without asking for the 
 conditions which had been refused in the preceding 
 spring. On January 23 the Treaty of Barwalde was 
 signed between France and Sweden. A large payment 
 of money was assured to Gustavus for five years. Gus- 
 tavus, on his part, engaged to respect the constitutions 
 of the Empire as they were before Ferdinand's victories, 
 and to leave untouched the Catholic religion wherever 
 he found it established. Out of the co-operation of Catho- 
 lic and Protestant states, a milder way of treating reli- 
 gious differences was already arising, just as the final 
 establishment of toleration in England grew out of the 
 co-operation between the Episcopal Church and the 
 Nonconformists. 
 
1 63 1. The Fall of Magdeburg. 133 
 
 Section V, — The Fall of Magdeburg. 
 Further successes marked the early months of 1631. 
 But till the two Protestant Electors could make up their 
 minds to throw in their lot with Gustavus, , ,, . 
 
 g I. Hesita- 
 
 nothing serious could be effected. John tionofthe 
 George felt that something ought to be done. Saxony. 
 All over North Germany the Protestants 
 were appealing to him to place himself at their head. 
 To say that he was vacillating and irresolute, born to 
 watch events rather than to control them, is only to say 
 that he had not changed his nature. But it must never 
 be forgotten that the decision before him was a very hard 
 one. In no sense could it be regarded otherwise than as 
 a choice between two evils. On the one side lay the pre- 
 ponderance of a hostile religion. On the other side lay 
 the abandonment of all hope of German unity, a unity 
 which was nothing to Gustavus, but which a German 
 Elector could not venture to disregard. It might be, 
 indeed, that a new and better system would arise on the 
 ruins of the old. But if Saxony were victorious with the 
 aid of Sweden, the destruction of the existing order was 
 certain, the establishment of a new one was problematical. 
 A great Protestant assembly held at Leipzig in March, 
 determined to make one more appeal to the Emperor. 
 If only he would withdraw that fatal Edict , ^, . 
 
 •' § 2. The As- 
 
 of Restitution, the Protestants of the north sembiy at 
 would willingly take their places as obedient 
 estates of the Empire. No foreign king should win them 
 from their allegiance, or induce them to break asunder 
 the last ties which bound them together to their head. 
 But this time the appeal was accompanied by a step in 
 the direction of active resistance. The Protestant estates 
 represented at Leipzig agreed to levy soldiers, in order 
 to be prepared for whatever might happen. 
 
134 7 he Edict of Restitution. 1631. 
 
 Time was pressing. The Treaty of Barwalde had 
 opened the eyes of Maximilian and the League to the 
 danger of procrastination. If they had en- 
 m the ndrth. tertained any hope that France would leave 
 them to contend with Gustavus alone, that 
 hope was now at an end. Tilly was despatched into the 
 north to combat the Swedish king. 
 
 Ferdinand had despised the danger from Gustavus. 
 
 "We have got a new little enemy," he said, laughing, 
 
 ^.„ , when he heard of the disembarkation of the 
 
 g 4. Tilly s 
 
 advance and Swcdcs. Tilly kncw better. He pressed 
 rapidly forward, hoping to thrust himself 
 between Gustavus in Pomerania and his lieutenant, 
 Horn, in Mecklenburg. If he succeeded, the invading 
 army would be cut in two, and liable to be defeated 
 in detail. Success at first attended his effort. On March 
 29, whilst the princes were debating at Leipzig, he took 
 New Brandenburg, cutting down the whole Swedish 
 garrison of 2,000 men. But Gustavus was too rapid for 
 him. Uniting his forces with those of Horn, he pre- 
 sented a bold front to the enemy, Tilly was driven back 
 upon the Elbe. The remaining fortresses on the Baltic, 
 and the important post of Frankfort on the Oder, gar- 
 risoned with eight imperialist regiments, fell into the 
 power of the conqueror, 
 
 A greater and more important city than Frankfort was 
 at stake. The citizens of Magdeburg had raised the 
 , Magde- Standard of independence without waiting 
 Durg. for leave from John George of Saxony. Gus- 
 
 tavus had sent a Swedish officer to conduct their defence. 
 But without the support of the Electors of Saxony and 
 Brandenburg, he durst not bring his army to their as- 
 sistance. 
 
 The imperialists were gathering thickly round Mag- 
 
1 63 1 . The Fall of Magdeburg. 135 
 
 deburg. On April 26 a treaty was signed at Cherasco, 
 between France and the Empire, which re- 
 stored peace in Italy, and set free the Em- |f cherasoo. 
 peror's troops beyond the Alps for service 
 in Germany. If Tilly saw matters still in a gloomy light, 
 his fiery lieutenant, Pappenheim, thought there was no 
 reason to despair. "This summer," he wrote, "we 
 can sweep our enemies before us. God give us grace 
 thereto." 
 
 As the siege went on, Gustavus, writing under his 
 enforced inaction, pleaded hard with the two Electors. 
 From the Elector of Brandenburg he de- 
 manded the right to occupy the two for- fion with the' 
 tresses of Kiistrin and Spandau. Hopes Bmndenburg 
 were held out to him of the surrender of 
 Kiistrin, but he was assured that Spandau should never 
 be his. Accompanied by a picked body of troops, he 
 marched straight upon Berlin. On May 13, outside the 
 city gates, he held a long conference with his brother-in- 
 law, the Elector. He argued in vain. To one of the 
 Dukes of Mecklenburg, who had accompanied him, he 
 spoke in bitter words. "I am marching," he said, 
 " upon Magdeburg, to deliver the city. If no one will 
 assist me, I will retreat at once. I will offer peace to 
 the Emperor, and go home to Stockholm. I know that 
 the Emperor will agree to my terms. But you Pro- 
 testants will have to answer at the day of judgment that 
 you would do nothing for the cause of God. In this 
 world, too, you will be punished. Magdeburg will be 
 taken, and, if I retire, you will have to look to your- 
 selves." The next day the conference was resumed. 
 From early morning till nine at night the Elector per- 
 sisted in his refusal. But the armed men who stood 
 behind Gustavus were the most powerful of arguments. 
 
 L 
 
136 7 he Edict of Restitution. 1631. 
 
 At last the Swedish king had his way. On the 15th the 
 gates of Spandau were thrown open to his troops. 
 
 But, if the Elector of Brandenburg had given way, the 
 
 Elector of Saxony was not to be moved. He had not 
 
 yet received an answer to his appeal to the 
 
 anc'eo/the' Emperor ; and till that arrived he would 
 
 Elector of enter into no alliance with a foreie^ner. Fur- 
 
 baxony. _ _ ^ 
 
 ther advance was impossible. Cut to the 
 heart by the refusal, Gustavus withdrew, leaving Mag- 
 deburg to its fate. 
 
 That fate was not long in coming. The city was 
 
 hardly in a state to make a desperate resistance. The 
 
 council had levied men to fight their battle. 
 
 ? 9. Storm- ^ 
 
 ing of Mag- But amongst the body of the townsmen there 
 were some who counselled submission, and 
 others who preferred taking their ease whilst the hired 
 soldiers were manning the walls. On May 20, Pappen- 
 heim stormed the city. In those days the sack of a town 
 taken by storm was claimed as a right by the soldiers, as 
 firmly by those of Gustavus as by those of Tilly and 
 Wallenstein. But a few weeks before, the Protestant 
 population of Frankfort had been exposed to the violence 
 and greed of the Swedish army, simply because they had 
 been unable to prevent the imperialists from defending 
 the place. But the sack of Magdeburg was accompanied 
 by circumstances of peculiar horror. Scarcely had the 
 first rush taken place over the walls when, either inten- 
 tionally or by accident, some of the houses were set on 
 fire. In the excitement of plunder or of terror no one 
 thought of stopping the progress of the flames. The 
 conquerors, angered by the thought that their booty was 
 being snatched away from before their eyes by an enemy 
 more irresistible than themselves, were inflamed almost 
 to madness. Few could meet that infuriated soldiery 
 
1 6 3 1 . The Fall of Magdeburg. 137 
 
 and live. Whilst every form of death, and of outrage 
 worse than death, was encountered in the streets, the 
 shrieks of the wretched victims were overpowered by the 
 roaring of the flames. In a few hours the great city, the 
 virgin fortress which had resisted Charles V. and Wallen- 
 stein, with the exception of the Cathedral and a few 
 houses around it, was reduced to a blackened ruin, be- 
 neath which lay the calcined bones of men, of tender 
 women, and of innocent babes. 
 
 For the horrors of that day Tilly was not personally 
 responsible. He would have hindered the storm if he 
 had been able. The tales which carried „ ^ „ . 
 
 g 10. Tilly s 
 
 through all Protestant Germany the evil part in the 
 deeds of the old warrior, and represented 
 him as hounding on his men to the wretched work, were 
 pure inventions. He had nothing to gain by the de- 
 struction of Magdeburg. He had everything to gain by 
 saving it as a basis of operations for his army. 
 
 But if Tilly was not responsible for the consequences 
 of the siege, he and his masters were responsible for the 
 policy which had made the siege possible. 
 That cathedral standing out from amidst the po"cy which 
 ruins of Magdeburg was but too apt a sym- |^gg^°J^^ 
 bol of the work which he and the League 
 had set themselves to do. That the rights of the clergy 
 and the church might be maintained, all the homes and 
 dwellings of men in Germany were to be laid waste, all 
 the social and political arrangements to which they had 
 attached themselves were to be dashed into ruin. 
 
 Even now Ferdinand was preparing his answer to the 
 
 last appeal of the faithful Protestant estates. 
 
 The Edict of Restitution he would maintain ? ^^j Ferdi- 
 nand refuses 
 
 to the uttermost. Of the armament of the to cancel the 
 
 , , . - Edict of 
 
 prmces he spoke in terms of contemptuous Restitution. 
 
138 Victories of Gustavus Adolphus. 1631. 
 
 arrogance. Let John George and his companions in ill- 
 doing dismiss their soldiers, and not presume to dictate 
 terms by force to the head of the Empire. Ferdinand 
 had declared the law as it was, and by the law he meant 
 to abide. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE VICTORIES OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. 
 
 Section I. — Alliance between the Swedes and the Saxons, 
 
 A GREAT fear fell upon the minds of all Protestant men. 
 
 The cities of the south, Augsburg and Nuremberg, which 
 
 had begun to protest against the execution 
 1631. . . . 
 
 § I. The camp of the edict, fell back into silence. In the 
 
 north, Gustavus, using terror to counteract 
 terror, planted his cannon before the walls of Berlin, and 
 wrung from his reluctant brother-in-law the renunciation 
 of his neutrality. But such friendship could last no 
 longer than the force which imposed it, and John George 
 could not be won so easily. William of Hesse Cassel 
 was the first of the German princes to come voluntarily 
 into the camp of Gustavus. Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar 
 came too, young as he was, full of military experience, 
 and full too of memories of his forefathers, the heroes of 
 that old Saxon line which had forfeited the Saxon Elec- 
 torate for the sake of the Gospel. But neither William 
 nor Bernhard could bring much more than their own 
 swords. Gustavus dared not take the offensive. Throw- 
 ing up an entrenched camp at Werben, where the Havel 
 joins the Elbe, he waited for Tilly, and repulsed an 
 attack made upon him. But what was such a victory 
 worth ? Hardships and disease were thinning his ranks, 
 and unless aid came, the end would be very near. 
 
1631. Alliance between Sweden and Saxony, 139 
 
 The aid which he needed was brought to him by the 
 blindness of Ferdinand. At last the results of the treaty 
 of Cherasco were making themselves felt. 2 ^ rj-jn 
 The troops from Italy had reached the north, reinforced. 
 and, in August, Tilly was at the head of 40,000 men. 
 With the reinforcements came orders from the Emperor. 
 The tame deflection of John George from the line of strict 
 obedience was no longer to be borne. Tilly must com- 
 pel him to lay down his arms, or to join in the war 
 against the foreign invasion. 
 
 These orders reached Tilly on August 18. On the 
 24th he sent a message to the Elector, ask- g 3. Sum- • 
 ing him by what right he was in arms against GeJl-geto'^ 
 the laws of the Empire. John George had ^^isarm. 
 some difficulty in finding an answer, but he refused to 
 dismiss his troops. 
 
 If Tilly had only let the Elector alone, he would pro- 
 bably have had nothing to fear from him for some time 
 to come. But Tilly knew no policy beyond 3 ^ Attacks 
 the letter of his instructions. He at once Saxony. 
 crossed the Saxon frontier. Pappenheim seized Merse- 
 burg. Tilly reduced Leipzig to surrender by the threat 
 that he would deal with the city worse than with Magde- 
 burg. The Elector, so long unwilling to draw the sword, 
 was beyond measure angry. He sent speedy couriers to 
 Gustavus, offering his alliance on any terms. 
 
 Gustavus did not wait for a second bidding. The wish 
 of his heart was at last accomplished. He put his forces 
 at once in motion, bringing the Elector of § 5. Union of 
 Brandenburg with him. The Saxon com- IndflTe"'^"' 
 mander was the Lutheran Arnim, the very Saxons. 
 man who had led Wallenstein's troops to the siege of 
 Stralsund. The Edict of Restitution had taught him that 
 Wallenstein's idea of a Germany united without respect 
 
140 Victories of Gustavus Adolphus. 1631. 
 
 for differences of religion was not to be realized under 
 Ferdinand. He had thrown up his post, and had sought 
 service with John George. Without being in any way 
 a man of commanding ability, he had much experience 
 in war. 
 
 The Saxon soldiers were a splendid sight. New 
 clothed and new armed, they had with them all the pomp 
 3 6. The 3,nd circumstance of glorious war. But they 
 
 Saxon troops, j-^^^^j \yA.^ no experience of fighting. They 
 were as raw as Wallenstein's troops had been when he 
 first entered the diocese of Halberstadt in 1625. 
 
 The Swedes were a rabble rout to look upon, at least 
 in the eyes of the inexperienced Saxons. Their new 
 allies laughed heartily at their uniforms, rag- 
 Swedish ged with long service and soiled with the 
 troops. ^\x'=\, of the camp and the bivouac. But the 
 war-worn men had confidence in their general, and their 
 general had confidence in them. 
 
 Such confidence was based on even better grounds 
 than the confidence of the veterans of the League in 
 Tilly. Tilly was simply an excellent com- 
 tavus as a mandcr of the old Spanish school. He had 
 
 commander. ^^^ j^.^ battles by his power of waiting till 
 he was superior in numbers. When the battles came they 
 were what are generally called soldiers' battles. The 
 close-packed columns won their way to victory by sheer 
 push of pike. But Gustavus, like all great commanders, 
 was an innovator in the art of war. To the heavy 
 masses of the enemy he opposed lightness and flexibility. 
 His cannon were more easily moved, his muskets more 
 easily handled. In rapidity of fire he was as superior to 
 the enemy as Frederick the Great with his iron ramrods 
 at Mollwitz, or Moltke with his needle-guns at Sadowa. 
 He had, too, a new method of drill. His troops were 
 
1631. The Battle of Breitenfeld. 141 
 
 drawn up three deep, and were capable of manoeuvering 
 vith a precision which might be looked for in vain from 
 the solid columns of the imperialists. 
 
 Section IL — The Battle of Breitenfeld. 
 
 On the morning of September 17 Swede and Saxon 
 were drawn up opposite Tilly's army, close to the village 
 of Breitenfeld, some five miles distant from 
 Leipzig. Gustavus had need of all his skill. Breitenfeld ° 
 Before long the mocking Saxons were flying 
 in headlong rout. The victors, unlike Rupert at Marston 
 Moor, checked themselves to take the Swedes in the 
 flanks. Then Gustavus coolly drew back two brigades 
 and presented a second front to the enemy. Outnum- 
 bered though he was, the result was never for a moment 
 doubtful. Cannon shot and musket ball tore asunder 
 the dense ranks of the imperialist army. Tilly's own 
 guns were wrenched from him and turned upon his in- 
 fantry. The unwieldy host staggered before the deft 
 blows of a more active antagonist. Leaving six thousand 
 of their number dying or dead upon the field, Tilly's 
 veterans, gathering round their aged leader, retreated 
 slowly from their first defeat, extorting the admiration 
 of their opponents by their steadiness and intrepidity. 
 
 The victory of Breitenfeld, or Leipzig — the battle bears 
 both names — was no common victory. It was the grave 
 of the Edict of Restitution, and of an effort 
 to establish a sectarian domination in the la! import- 
 guise of national unity. The bow, stretched ^?^® °^ "^^ 
 
 ° •' ' victory. 
 
 beyond endurance, had broken at last. 
 Since the battle on the White Hill, the Emperor, the 
 Imperial Council, the Imperial Diet, had declared them- 
 selves the only accredited organs of the national life. 
 Then had come a coolness between the Emperor and 
 
142 Victories of Gustavus Adolphus. 1631. 
 
 the leaders of the Diet. A good understanding had been 
 re-established by the dismissal of Wallenstein. But 
 neither Emperor nor Diet had seen fit to take account 
 of the feelings or wants of more than half the nation. 
 They, and they alone, represented legal authority. The 
 falsehood had now been dashed to the ground by Gus- 
 tavus. Breitenfeld was the Naseby of Germany. 
 
 Like Naseby, too, Breitenfeld had in it something of 
 more universal import. Naseby was the victory of dis- 
 ciplined intelligence over disorderly bravery. 
 of mtem-°^ Breitenfeld was the victory of disciplined 
 gence over intelligence over the stiff routine of the 
 
 routine. ° 
 
 Spanish tactics. Those tactics were, after 
 all, but the military expression of the religious and 
 political system in defence of which they were used. 
 Those solid columns just defeated were the types of what 
 human nature was to become under the Jesuit organiza- 
 tion. The individual was swallowed up in the mass. As 
 Tilly had borne down by the sheer weight of his veterans 
 adventurers like Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick, 
 so the renewed Catholic discipline had borne down the 
 wrangling theologians who had stepped into the places 
 of Luther and Melanchthon. But now an army had 
 arisen to prove that order and obedience were weak 
 unless they were supported by individual intelligence. 
 The success of the principle upon which its operations 
 were based could not be confined to mere fighting. It 
 would make its way in morals and politics, in literature 
 and science. 
 
 Great was the joy in Protestant Germany when the 
 news was told. The cities of the south prepared once 
 ? Wall more to resist their oppressors. All that was 
 
 stein's in- noblcst in France hailed the tidings with 
 
 Gustavus. acclamation. English Eliot, writing from 
 
1 63 1 . The Battle of Breitenfeld. 1 43 
 
 his prison in the Tower, could speak of Gustavus 
 as that person whom fortune and virtue had re- 
 served for the wonder of the world ! Even Wallenstein, 
 from his Bohemian retreat, uttered a cry of satisfaction. 
 For Wallenstein was already in communication with 
 Gustavus, who, Protestant as he was, was avenging him 
 upon the League which had assailed him and the Em- 
 peror who had abandoned him. He had offered to do 
 great things, if he could be trusted with a Swedish force 
 of 12,000 men. He was well pleased to hear of Tilly's 
 defeat. " If such a thing had happened to me," he said 
 to an emissary of Gustavus, " I would kill myself. But 
 it is a good thing for us." If only the King of Sweden 
 would trust him with men, he would soon bring together 
 the officers of his old army. He would divide the goods 
 of the Jesuits and their followers amongst the soldiers. 
 The greatest folly the Bohemians had committed, he 
 said, had been to throw Martinitz and Slawata out of 
 window instead of thrusting a sword through their bodies. 
 If his plan were accepted he would chase the Emperor 
 and the House of Austria over the Alps. But he hoped 
 Gustavus would not allow himself to be entangled too 
 far in the French alliances. 
 
 Wallenstein' s whole character was expressed in these 
 proposals, whether they were meant seriously or not. 
 Cut off from German ideas by his Bohemian 
 birth, he had no roots in Germany. The designs. 
 reverence which others felt for religious or 
 political institutions had no echo in his mind. As he 
 had been ready to overthrow princes and electors in the 
 Emperor's name, so he was now ready to overthrow the 
 Emperor in the name of the King of Sweden. Yet there 
 was withal a greatness about him which raised him 
 above such mere adventurers as Mansfeld. At the head 
 
144 Victories of Gustavus Adolphus. 1631. 
 
 of soldiers as uprooted as himself from all ties of home 
 or nationality, he alone, amongst the leaders of the war, 
 had embraced the two ideas which, if they had been 
 welcomed by the statesmen of the Empire, would have 
 saved Germany from intolerable evil. He wished for 
 union and strength against foreign invasion, and he 
 wished to found that union upon religious liberty. He 
 would have kept out Gustavus if he could. But if that 
 could not be done, he would join Gustavus in keeping 
 out the French. 
 
 Yet between Wallenstein and Gustavus it was im- 
 possible that there should be anything really in common. 
 Wallenstein was large-minded because he 
 sibility^of an was far removcd from the ordinary preju- 
 Tng St'ien dices of men. He was' no more affected by 
 Wallenstein their habits and thoughts than the course of 
 
 and Gustavus. i , i • • j 
 
 a balloon is affected by the precipices and 
 rivers below. Gustavus trod firmly upon his mother 
 earth. His Swedish country, his Lutheran religion, his 
 opposition to the House of Austria, were all very real to 
 him. His greatness was the greatness which rules the 
 world, the greatness of a man who, sharing the thoughts 
 and feelings of men, rises above them just far enough 
 to direct them, not too far to carry their sympathies with 
 him. 
 
 Such a man was not likely to be content with mere 
 military success. The vision of a soldier sovereignty to 
 be shared with Wallenstein had no charms 
 cal' plans of for him. If the Empire had fallen, it must 
 Gustavus. -j^^ replaced not by an army but by fresh in- 
 
 stitutions ; and those institutions, if they were to endure 
 at all, must be based as far as posssible on institutions 
 already existing. Protestant Germany must be freed 
 from oppression. It must be organized apart sufficiently 
 
1631. The Battle of Breitenfeld. 1 45 
 
 for its own defence. Such an organization, the Corpus 
 Evangelicorum, as he called it, like the North German 
 Confederation of 1866, might or might not spread into a 
 greater Germany of the future. It would need the sup< 
 port of Sweden and of France. It would not, indeed, 
 satisfy Wallenstein's military ambition, or the more 
 legitimate national longings of German patriots. But it 
 had the advantage of being attainable if anything was 
 attainable. It would form a certain bulwark against the 
 aggression of the CathoHc states without necessitating 
 any violent change in the existing territorial institutions. 
 If these were the views of Gustavus — and though he 
 never formally announced them to the world his whole 
 subsequent conduct gives reason to believe 
 that he had already entertained them — it miiitar^^ 
 becomes not so very hard to understand ^'^^^™^^- 
 why he decided upon marching upon the Rhine, and 
 despatching the Elector of Saxony to rouse Bohemia. 
 It is true that Oxenstjerna, the prudent Chancellor of 
 Sweden, wise after the event, used to declare that his 
 master had made a mistake, and later military historians, 
 fancying that Vienna was in the days of Gustavus what 
 it was in the days of Napoleon, have held that a march 
 upon Ferdinand's capital would have been as decisive 
 as a march upon the same capital in 1805 or 1809. But 
 the opinion of Gustavus is at least as good as that of 
 Oxenstjerna, and it is certain that in 1631 Vienna was 
 not, in the modern sense of the word, a capital city. If 
 we are to seek for a parallel at all, it was rather hke 
 Madrid in the Peninsular War. The King had resided 
 at Madrid.- The Emperor had resided at Vienna. But 
 neither Madrid in 1808 nor Vienna in 1631 formed the 
 centre of force. No administrative threads controlling 
 the military system stretched out from either. In the 
 
146 Victories of Gustavus Adolphus. 1631. 
 
 nineteenth century Napoleon or Wellington might be in 
 possession of Madrid and have no real hold of Spain. 
 In the seventeenth century, Ferdinand and Gustavus 
 might be in possession of Vienna and have no real hold 
 on Austria or Bohemia. Where an army was, there was 
 power ; and there would be an army wherever Wallen- 
 steiii, or some imitator of Wallenstein, might choose to 
 beat his drums. If Gustavus had penetrated to Vienna, 
 there was nothing to prevent a fresh army springing up 
 in his rear. 
 
 The real danger to be coped with was the military 
 
 system which Wallenstein had carried to perfection. 
 
 And, in turning to the Rhine, Gustavus 
 
 g 9. Neces- ' ^ . . _,^ „ 
 
 sity of find- showed his resolution not to imitate Wallen- 
 
 ing a basis ^ . , , t t • a. x, 
 
 for his opera- Stem s example. His army was to be an- 
 ^°°*- chored firmly to the enthusiasm of the Pro- 
 
 testant populations. There lay the Palatinate, to be 
 freed from the oppressor. There lay the commercial 
 cities Augsburg, Niiremberg, Ulm, and Strassburg, ready 
 to welcome enthusiastically the liberator who had set his 
 foot upon the Edict of Restitution ; and if in Bohemia 
 too there were Protestants to set free, they were not 
 Protestants on whom much dependence could be placed. 
 If past experience was to be trusted, the chances of or- 
 ganizing resistance would be greater amongst Germans 
 on the Rhine than amongst Slavonians on the Moldau. 
 For purposes of offence, too, there was much to induce 
 Gustavus to prefer the westward march. Thither Tilly 
 had retreated with only the semblance of an 
 resolves \o army still in the field. There, too, were the 
 march to the long: strins^ of ccclcsiastical territories, the 
 
 south-west. o & 
 
 Priest's Lane, as men called it, Wiirzburg, 
 Bamberg, Fulda, Cologne, Treves, Mentz, Worms, 
 Spires, the richest district in Germany, which had fur- 
 
1 63 1. Gustavus in South Germany, 147 
 
 nished men and money to the armies of the League, and 
 which were now to furnish at least money to Gustavus. 
 There Spain, with its garrisons on the left bank of the 
 Rhine, was to be driven back, and France to be con- 
 ciliated, whilst the foundations were laid of a policy 
 which would provide for order in Protestant Germany, so 
 as to enable Gustavus to fulfil in a new and better spirit 
 the work left undone by Christian of Anhalt. Was it 
 strange if the Swedish king thought that such work as 
 this would be better in his own hands than in those of 
 John George of Saxony ? 
 
 Section III. — March of Gustavus into South Germany. 
 The march of the victorious army was a triumphal 
 progress. On October 2, Gustavus was at Erfurt. On 
 the loth he entered Wiirzburg : eight days g i. March 
 later, the castle on its height beyond the of Gustavus ^ 
 
 o J upon the 
 
 Main was stormed after a fierce defence. Rhine. 
 Through all the north the priests were expelled from the 
 districts which had been assigned them by the Edict of 
 Restitution. Gustavus was bent upon carrying on repri- 
 sals upon them in their own homes. On December 16, 
 Oppenheim was stormed and its Spanish garrison put to 
 the sword. The Priest's Lane was defenceless. Gus- 
 tavus kept his Christmas at Mentz. His men, fresh from 
 the rough fare and hard quarters of the north, revelled 
 in the luxuries of the southern land, and drank deep 
 draughts of Rhenish wine from their helmets. 
 
 There is always a difficulty in conjecturing the inten- 
 tions of Gustavus. He did not, like Ferdinand, form 
 plans which were never to be chansred. He 
 
 ^ l-z. Gus- 
 
 did not, like Wallenstein, form plans which tavus at 
 he was ready to give up at a moment's no- 
 tice for others entirely different. The essence of his 
 
148 Vicfo7'ies of Gustavus Adolphus, 1631a 
 
 policy was doubtless the formation, under his own leader- 
 ship, of the Corpus Ev angelic oruni. What was to be 
 done with the ecclesiastical territories which broke up the 
 territorial continuity of South German Protestantism he 
 had, perhaps, not definitely decided. But everything 
 points to the conclusion that he wished to deal with them 
 as Wallenstein would have dealt with them, to parcel 
 them out amongst his officers and amongst the German 
 princes who had followed his banner. In doing so, he 
 would have given every security to the Catholic popula- 
 tion. Gustavus, at least in Germany, meddled with no 
 man's religion. In Sweden it was otherwise. There, 
 according to the popular saying, there was one king, one 
 religion, and one physician. 
 
 He placed the conquered territories in sure hands. 
 Mentz itself was com.mitted to the Chancellor Oxenst- 
 §3. The jerna. French ambassadors remonstrated 
 
 startled at with him roundly. Richelieu had hoped that, 
 
 his victories. jf ^j^g House of Austria were humbled, the 
 German ecclesiastics would have been left to enjoy their 
 dignities. The sudden uprising of a new power in Eu- 
 rope had taken the French politicians as completely by 
 surprise as the Prussian victories took their successors by 
 surprise in 1866. "It is high time," said Lewis, "to 
 place a limit to the progress of this Goth." Gustavus, 
 unable to refuse the French demands directly, laid down 
 conditions of peace with the League which made nego- 
 tiation hopeless. But the doubtful attitude of France 
 made it all the more necessary that he should place him- 
 self in even a stronger position than he was in already. 
 
 On March 31 he entered Niiremberg. As he rode 
 through the streets he was greeted with heartfelt acclama- 
 ?4. Cam- tions. Tears of joy streamed down the 
 Germany. cliccks of bearded men as they welcomed 
 
1 63 1. Gustavus in South Gerinany. 140 
 
 the deliverer from the north, whose ready jest and 
 beaming smile would have gone straight to the po- 
 pular heart even if his deserts had been less. The 
 picture of Gustavus was soon in every house, and a 
 learned citizen set to work at once to compose a pedigree 
 by which he proved to his own satisfaction that the 
 Swedish king was descended from the old hereditary 
 Burggraves of the town. In all that dreary war, Gus- 
 tavus was the one man who had reached the heart of the 
 nation, who had shown a capacity for giving them that 
 for which they looked to their Emperor and their princes, 
 their clergy and their soldiers, in vain. 
 
 Gustavus did not tarry long with his enthusiastic hosts. 
 On April 5 he was before Donauworth. Af- 
 ter a stout resistance the imperialists were tavus at^Do- 
 driven out. Once more a Protestant Easter "^""'^^'^^h. 
 was kept within the walls, and the ancient wrong was re^ 
 dressed. 
 
 On the 14th the Swedes found the passage of the Lech 
 guarded by Tilly. Every advantage appeared to be on 
 the side of the defenders. But Gustavus 
 
 1 1- i 1 ■ . . . , ? 6- The pas 
 
 Knew how to sweep their positions with a sage of the 
 terrible fire of artillery, and to cross the d4'tW '^^ 
 river in the very teeth of the enemy. In the "^''^y- 
 course of the battle Tilly was struck down, wounded 
 by a cannon shot above the knee. His friends mourn- 
 fully carried him away to Ingolstadt to die. His life's 
 work was at an end. If simplicity of character and readi- 
 ness to sacrifice his own personal interests be a title to 
 esteem, that esteem is but Tilly's due. To the higher 
 capacity of a statesman he laid no claim. Nor has he 
 any place amongst the masters of the art of war. He 
 was an excellent officer, knowing no other rule than the 
 orders of constituted authorities, no virtue higher than 
 
150 Victories of Gustavus Adolphus. 1631. 
 
 obedience. The order which he reverenced was an im- 
 possible one, and there was nothing left him but to die 
 for it. 
 
 The conqueror pushed on. In Augsburg he found a 
 city which had suffered much from the Commissions of 
 Resumption which had, in the south, preceded the Edict 
 \ 7. Gus- of Restitution. The Lutheran clergy had 
 Augsburg been driven from their pulpits ; the Lutheran 
 
 and Munich. councillors had been expelled from the town 
 hall. In the midst of the jubilant throng Gustavus felt 
 himself more strongly seated in the saddle. Hitherto he 
 had asked the magistrates of the recovered cities to swear 
 fidelity to him as long as the war lasted. At Augsburg 
 he demanded the oath of obedience as from subjects to a 
 sovereign. Gustavus was beginning to fancy that he 
 could do without France. 
 
 Then came the turn of Bavaria. As Gustavus rode 
 into Munich, Frederick, the exiled Elector Palatine, was 
 by his side, triumphing over the flight of his old enemy. 
 It was not the fault of Gustavus if Frederick was not 
 again ruling at Heidelberg. Gustavus had offered him 
 his ancestral territories on the condition that he would 
 allow Swedish garrisons to occupy his fortresses during 
 the war, and would give equal liberty to the Lutheran 
 and the Calvinist forms of worship. Against this latter 
 demand Frederick's narrow-hearted Calvinism steeled 
 itself, and when, not many months later, he was carried 
 off by a fever at Bacharach, he was still, through his own 
 fault, a homeless wanderer on the face of the earth. 
 
 At Munich Gustavus demanded a high contribution. 
 Discovering that Maximilian had buried a large number 
 a 8. Gustavus of guns in the arsenal, he had them dug up 
 at Munich. again by the Bavarian peasants, who were 
 glad enough to earn the money with which the foreign 
 
1 63 1. Wallensteiii^ s Restoration to Com77iand, 151 
 
 invader paid them for their labours. When this process 
 was over — waking up the dead, he merrily called it — he 
 prepared to leave the city with his booty. During his 
 stay he had kept good discipline, and took especial care 
 to prohibit any insult to the religion of the inhabitants.' 
 If, as may well have been the case, he was looking 
 beyond the Corpus Evangelicorum to the Empire itself, if 
 he thought it possible that the golden crown of Ferdinand 
 might rest next upon a Lutheran head, he was resolved 
 that religious liberty, not narrow orthodoxy, should be 
 the corner-stone on which that Empire should be built. 
 
 All Germany, except the hereditary dominions of the 
 House of Austria, was at his feet. And he , 
 
 9. 9- otrong 
 
 knew well that, as far as those dominions position of 
 were concerned, there was no strength to 
 resist him. Ferdinand had done enough to repress the 
 manifestation of feeling, nothing to organize it. He 
 would have been even more helpless to resist a serious 
 attack than he had been in 1619, and this time Bavaria 
 was as helpless as himself. Even John George, who had 
 fled hastily from the field of Breitenfeld, marched 
 through Bohemia without finding the slightest resistance. 
 His army entered Prague amidst almost universal en- 
 thusiasm. 
 
 Section IV. — Wallenstem^ s Restoration to Co7mnand. 
 
 Unless Ferdinand could find help elsewhere than in 
 his own subjects he was lost. Abroad he g i_ Ferdi- 
 could look to Spain. But Spain could not Jboutfo?^ 
 do very much under the eyes of Richelieu, help. 
 Some amount of money it could send, and some advice. 
 But that was all. 
 
 What that advice would be could hardly be doubted. 
 The dismissal of Wallenstein had been a check for 
 
 M 
 
152 Victories of Gustavus Adolphus, 1631. 
 
 ^'531. Spain. He had been willing to join Spain 
 
 Spaniards in a war with France. The electors had pre- 
 
 recommend -i j ■ . v • -.r. t- i. ^ j 
 
 the recall of vailed agamst him with r rench support, and 
 Wallenstem. ^^ treaty of Cherasco, by which the Ger- 
 man troops had been withdrawn from fight- 
 ing in support of the Spanish domination in Italy, had 
 been the result. Even before the battle of Breitenfeld 
 had been fought, the Spanish government had recom- 
 mended the reinstatement of Wallenstein, and the 
 Spaniards found a support in Eggenberg, Wallenstein's 
 old protector at court. 
 
 Soon after the battle of Breitenfeld, Wallenstein broke 
 
 off his intercourse with Gustavus. By that time it was 
 
 evident that in any alliance which Gustavus 
 
 stein as^h "' Hiight make he meant to occupy the first 
 
 rival of place himsclf. Even if this had been other- 
 
 Gustavus. ^ 
 
 wise, the moral character and the political 
 instincts of the two men were too diverse to make co- 
 operation possible between them. Gustavus was a king 
 as well as a soldier, and he hoped to base his military 
 power upon the political reconstruction of Protestant 
 Germany, perhaps even of the whole Empire. Wallen- 
 stein owed everything to the sword, and he wished to 
 bring all Germany under the empire of the sword. 
 
 The arrival of the Saxons in Bohemia inspired Wal- 
 lenstein with the hope of a new combination, which 
 would place the destinies of Germany in his 
 oftr?concm- hands. The reluctance with which John 
 ationwith George had abandoned the Emperor was 
 
 John George. » 
 
 well known. If only Ferdinand, taught by 
 experience, could be induced to sacrifice the Edict of 
 Restitution, might not the Saxons be won over from their 
 new allies? Wallenstein's former plans would be re- 
 alized, and united Germany, nominally under Ferdinand, 
 
1 63 1. Wallenstein^ s Restoration to Command. 153 
 
 in reality under his general, would rise to expel the 
 foreigner and to bar the door against the Frenchman 
 and the Swede. 
 
 In November, 1631, Wallenstein met his old lieute- 
 nant, Arnim, now the Saxon commander, to discuss the 
 chances of the future. In December, iust as „ 
 
 •' g 5. He is 
 
 Gustavus was approachmg the Rhme, he reinstated in 
 
 J • •. r -r^ 1 . '7 • the command. 
 
 received a visit irom ii^ggenberg, at Znaim. 
 Eggenberg had come expressly to persuade him to ac- 
 cept the command once more. Wallenstein gave his 
 consent, on condition that the ecclesiastical lands should 
 be left as they were before the Edict of Restitution. And 
 besides this he was to wield an authority such as no 
 general had ever claimed before. No army could be in- 
 troduced into the Empire excepting under his command. 
 To him alone was to belong the right of confiscation and 
 of pardon. As Gustavus was proposing to deal with the 
 ecclesiastical territories, so would Wallenstein deal with 
 the princes who refused to renounce their alliance with 
 the Swede. A new class of princes would arise, owing 
 their existence to him alone. As for his own claims, if 
 Mecklenburg could not be recovered, a princely territory 
 was to be found for him elsewhere. 
 
 After all it was not upon written documents that 
 Wallenstein' s power was founded. The army which he 
 gathered round him was no Austrian army 
 in any real sense of the word. It was the ftein's army" 
 army of Wallenstein — of the Duke of Fried- 
 land, as the soldiers loved to call him, thinking perhaps 
 that his duchy of Mecklenburg would prove but a transi- 
 tory possession. Its first expenses were met with the 
 help of Spanish subsidies. But after that it had to de- 
 pend on itself. Nor was it more than an accident that 
 it was levied and equipped in Bohemia. If Gustavus 
 
154 Victories of Gustavus Adolphus. 1631. 
 
 had been at Vienna instead of at Munich, the thousands 
 of stalwart men who trooped in at Wallenstein's bare 
 word would have gathered to any place where he had 
 set up his standards. Gustavus had to face the old evil 
 of the war, which had grown worse and worse from the 
 days of Mansfeld to those of Wallen stein, the evil of a 
 military force existing by itself and for itself. From far 
 distant shores men practised in arms came eagerly to the 
 summons ; from sunny Italy, from hardy Scotland, from 
 every German land between the Baltic and the Alps. 
 Protestant and Catholic were alike welcome there. The 
 great German poet has breathed the spirit of this hetero- 
 geneous force into one of its officers, himself a wanderer 
 from distant Ireland, ever prodigal of her blood in the 
 quarrels of others. "This vast and mighty host," he 
 says (Schiller, The Piccolomini, act i. sc. 2), 
 
 is all obedient 
 To Friedland's captains ; and its brave commanders. 
 Bred in one school, and nurtured with one milk, 
 Are all excited by one heart and soul. 
 They are strangers on the soil they tread. 
 The service is their only house and home. 
 No zeal inspires them for their country's cause, 
 For thousands like myself, were bom abroad ; 
 Nor care they for the Emperor, for one half. 
 Deserting other service, fled to ours. 
 Indifferent what their banner, whether 'twere 
 The Double Eagle, Lily, or the Lion ;* 
 Yet one sole man can rein this fiery host. 
 By equal rule, by equal love and fear, 
 Blending the many-nationed whole in one. 
 
 Was it, forsooth, the Emperor's majesty 
 That gave the army ready to his hand, 
 
 * That is to say, the standard of the Emperor, of France, or of 
 Sweden. 
 
1632. Wallensteifi' s Restoration to Command. 155 
 
 And only sought a leader for it ? No ! 
 The army then had no existence. He, 
 Friedland, it was who called it into being, 
 And gave it to his sovereign — ^but receiving 
 No army at his hand ; — nor did the Emperor 
 Give Wallenstein to us as General. No, 
 It was from Wallenstein we first received 
 The Emperor as our master and our sovereign ; 
 And he, he only, binds us to our banner. 
 
 Wallenstein at first accepted the command for three 
 months only. In April it was permanently 1632. 
 conferred on him. The Emperor was prac- lelves fJf" 
 tically set aside in favour of a dictator. powers. 
 
 Wallenstein turned first upon the Saxons. In one 
 
 hand he held the olive brancfh, in the other the sword. 
 
 On May 21st his emissary was offering peace 
 
 on the terms of the retractation of the Edict gaxons driven 
 
 of Restitution. On the 22d Wallenstein out of Bo- 
 hemia. 
 
 himself fell upon the Saxon garrison of 
 
 Prague, and forced it to surrender. It was a plain hint 
 
 to John George to make his mind up quickly. Before 
 
 long the Saxons had been driven out of the whole of 
 
 Bohemia. 
 
 John George loved peace dearly, and he had joined 
 Sweden sorely against his will. But he was ? 9. But John 
 a man of his word, and he had promised noTtrear' 
 Gustavus not to come to terms with the ^^°^^- 
 enemy without his consent. He forwarded Wallenstein's 
 propositions to Gustavus. 
 
 No man was so ready as Gustavus to change his 
 plans in all matters of secondary importance, as cir- 
 cumstances might require. In the face of , ^ 
 Wallenstein s armament and of the hesita- mands of 
 tions of the Saxon court, he at once aban- 
 
156 Victories of Gicstavus Adolphus. 1632. 
 
 doned all thought of asking that the Rhine bishoprics 
 should remain in his hands. He was ready to assent to 
 the solution of religious questions which satisfied Wal- 
 lenstein and John George. For himself, he expected the 
 cession of at least part of Pomerania, in order to protect 
 himself from a future naval attack proceeding from the 
 Baltic ports. The Elector of Brandenburg had claims 
 upon Pomerania ; but he might be satisfied with some 
 of the bishoprics which it had been agreed to leave in 
 Protestant hands. 
 
 Such terms would probably have met with opposition. 
 But the real point of difference lay elsewhere. Wallen- 
 
 stein would have restored the old unity of 
 Ability y^" the Empire, of which he hoped to be the 
 rcconciiing inspiring genius. Gustavus pressed for the 
 Wailenstein. formation of a separate Protestant league, if 
 
 not under his own guidance, at least in close 
 alliance with Sweden. Wailenstein asked for confidence 
 in himself and the Emperor. Gustavus had no confi- 
 dence in either. 
 
 John George wavered between the two. He, too, dis- 
 trusted Wailenstein. But he did not see that he must 
 ,^ . either accept the Empire, or help on its dis- 
 
 g 12. Hesita- . ^ . 
 
 tion of John solution, unlcss he wished to leave the future 
 eorge, ^^ Germany to chance. The imperial unity 
 
 of Wailenstein was something. The Corpus Evangeli- 
 coru7}t of Gustavus was something. The Protestant states, 
 loosely combined, were doomed to defeat and ruin. 
 
 Section V. — The Struggle between Gustavus and 
 Wailenstein. 
 
 Long before John George's answer could reach Gus- 
 tavus the war had blazed out afresh. The Swedish king 
 
1632. Gustavus and Wallenstein. 157 
 
 did not yet know how little reliance he could 
 
 place on the Elector for the realization of ^./opSST"* 
 
 his grand plan, when Wallenstein broke up ^ague of 
 
 ° "^ ^ cities. 
 
 from Bohemia, and directed his whole force 
 upon Nuremberg. Gustavus threw himself into the 
 town to defend it. Here, too, his head was busy with 
 the Corpus Evangelicorum. Whilst he was offering to 
 Saxony to abandon the ecclesiastical territories, he pro- 
 posed to the citizens of Nuremberg to lay the foundations 
 of a league in which the citizens alone should ally 
 themselves with him, leaving the princes to come in 
 afterwards if they would, whilst the ecclesiastical terri- 
 tories should remain in his own hands. There is nothing 
 really discrepant in the two schemes. The one was a 
 plan to be adopted only on condition of a final and per- 
 manent peace. The other was a plan for use as a weapon 
 of war. The noticeable thing is the persistent way in 
 which Gustavus returned again and again to the idea 
 of founding a political union as the basis of military 
 strength. 
 
 He was no more successful with the citizens of Nu- 
 remberg than with the Elector of Saxony. They repHed 
 
 that a matter of such importance should be 
 
 1 • 1-111 ^2. His pro- 
 
 treated m common by all the cities and posai unac- 
 
 princes interested. " In that case," he re- ^^p^^^^^- 
 plied, bitterly, "the Elector of Saxony will dispute for 
 half a year in whose name the summons to the meeting 
 ought to be issued. When the cities, too, send deputies, 
 they usually separate as they meet, discovering that 
 there is a defect in their instructions, and so refer every- 
 thing home again for further consideration, without 
 coming to any conclusion whatever." Can it be doubted 
 that the political incompetence of the Germans, caused 
 by their internal divisions and their long disuse of such 
 
158 Victories of Gustavus Adolphus. 1632, 
 
 institutions as would have enabled them to act in com^ 
 mon, was a thorn in the side of Gustavus, felt by him 
 more deeply than the appearance in the field, however 
 unexpected, of Wallenstein and his army ? 
 
 That army, however, must be met. Wallenstein had 
 60,000 men with him ; Gustavus but a third of the num- 
 § 3. Gustavus ber. The war had blazed up along the 
 stdn^f ^^''" Rhine from Alsace to Coblentz. Pappen- 
 Niiremberg. heim was fighting there, and the Spaniards 
 had sent troops of their own, and had summoned the 
 Duke of Lorraine to their aid. By-and-by it was seen 
 how rightly Gustavus had judged that France could not 
 afford to quarrel with him. Though he had dashed aside 
 Richelieu's favourite scheme of leaving the ecclesiastical 
 territories untouched, and had refused to single out the 
 House of Austria as the sole object of the war, Richelieu 
 could not fail to support him against Spanish troops. In 
 a few weeks the danger in his rear was at an end, and 
 the scattered detachments of the Swedish army were 
 hurrying to join their king at Niiremberg, 
 
 Gustavus was now ready for a battle. But a battle he 
 could not have. Wallenstein fell back upon his old 
 §4. Wallen- tactics of refusing battle, except when he 
 trenches Yi^iA a manifest superiority of numbers. He 
 
 himself. entrenched himself near Fiirth, to the north 
 
 of Niiremberg, on a commanding eminence overlooking 
 the whole plain around. For twelve miles his works 
 protected his newly-levied army. House, villages, ad- 
 vantages of the ground were everywhere utilized for 
 defence. 
 
 In the meanwhile, scarcity and pestilence were doing 
 their terrible work at Niiremberg. The country people 
 had flocked in for refuge, and the population was too 
 great to be easily supplied with food. Even in the army 
 
1632. GustaviLS and Wallenstein. 150 
 
 want besran to be felt. And with want came 
 
 . 25. Wants 
 
 the relaxation of that discipline upon which of the Swedish 
 Gustavus prided himself. He had large ^''"^y- 
 numbers of German troops in his army now, and a long 
 evil experience had taught Germans the habits of marau- 
 ders. 
 
 Gustavus was deeply irritated. Sending for the chief, 
 Germans in his service, he rated them 
 soundly. " His Majesty," says one who de- remonstrate!"* 
 scribed the scene, "was never before seen 
 in such a rage." 
 
 "You princes, counts, lords, and noblemen," he said, 
 "you are showing your disloyalty and wickedness on 
 your own fatherland, which you are ruining. 
 You colonels, and officers from the highest speech to the 
 to the lowest, it is you who steal and rob 
 every one, without making any exceptions. You plunder 
 your own brothers in the faith. You make me disgusted 
 with you ; and God my Creator be my witness that my 
 heart is filled with gall when I see any one of you be- 
 having so villanously. For you cause men to say openly, 
 'The king, our friend, does us more harm than our 
 enemies.' If you were real Christians you would con- 
 sider what I am doing for you, how I am spending my 
 life in your service. I have given up the treasures of my 
 crown for your sake, and have not had from your German 
 Empire enough to buy myself a bad suit of clothes with." 
 
 After this strain he went on : " Enter into your hearts," 
 he said, " and think how sad you are making me, so that 
 the tears stand in my eyes. You treat me 
 ill with your evil discipline ; I do not say plains bitterly 
 with your evil fighting, for in that you have ° ^^' . 
 behaved like honourable gentlemen, and for that I am 
 much obliged to you. I am so grieved for you that I am 
 
x6o Victories of Gustavus Adolphus. 1632. 
 
 vexed that I ever had anything to do with so stiff-necked 
 a nation. Well, then, take my warning to heart ; we will 
 soon show our enemies that we are honest men and 
 honourable gentlemen." 
 
 One day the king caught a corporal stealing cows. 
 „ ^ . , " My son," he said, as he delivered him over 
 
 g 9. Punishes ^ 
 
 plunderers. to the provost marshal, "it is better that I 
 should punish you, than that God should punish not only 
 you, but me and all of us for your sake." 
 
 Such a state of things could not last long. On Sep- 
 tember 3 Gustavus led his army to the shores of Wallen- 
 ^ ., stein's entrenchments; but though he made 
 
 g 10. Fails to . . IT 1 -ir 1 
 
 storm Waiien- some impression, the Imes were too skilful- 
 ly drawn, and too well defended, to be bro- 
 ken through. On the other hand, Gustavus was not a 
 Mansfeld, and Wallenstein did not venture, as at the 
 Bridge of Dessau, to follow up his successful defence by 
 an offensive movement. 
 
 Want of supplies made it impossible for Gustavus to 
 
 remain longer at Niiremberg. For the first time since he 
 
 landed in Germany he had failed in securing 
 
 2 II. Is obliged . _,^. , , , . , , 
 
 to march a victory. With drums beating and banners 
 
 ^^^^* flying, he marched away past Wallenstein's 
 
 encampment ; but the wary man was not to be enticed 
 to a combat. As soon as he was gone, Wallenstein 
 broke up his camp. But he knew too well where his 
 opponent's weakness lay to go in pursuit of Gustavus. 
 Throwing himself northwards, he established himself 
 firmly in Saxony, plundering and burning on every side. 
 If only he could work ruin enough, he might hope to 
 detach the Elector from his alliance with the Swedes. 
 g 12. Waiien- Gustavus could not choose but follow. 
 SvustnsS^' Wallenstein had hoped to establish himself 
 ^'"y- as firmly in Saxony as he had established 
 
1 032. The Battle of Liitzen. 161 
 
 himself at Fiirth. He would seize Torgau and Halle, to 
 make himself master of the passages over the Elbe and 
 Saale, whilst Erfurt and Naumburg would complete the 
 strength of his position. Gustavus might dash his head 
 against it as he pleased. Like Welhngton at Torres 
 Vedras, or Gustavus himself at Werben, he would meet 
 the attack of the enemy by estabhshing himself in a 
 carefully selected position of defence. 
 
 Section VI. — The Battle of Liitzen. 
 
 Wallenstein had succeeded at Nuremberg, but he was 
 not to succeed in Saxony. Gustavus was upon him be- 
 fore he had gained the positions he needed, g ^ Gustavus 
 Erfurt was saved from the imperialists, m Saxony. 
 Gustavus entered Naumburg to be adored as a saviour 
 by men flying from Wallenstein's barbarities. As he 
 passed through the streets the poor fugitives bent down 
 to kiss the hem of his garments. He would have resist- 
 ed them if he could. He feared lest God should punish 
 him for receiving honour above that which befitted a 
 mortal man. 
 
 The Saxon army was at Torgau, and that important 
 post was still guarded. Wallenstein lay at Liitzen. Even 
 there, shorn as he was of his expected ^ waiien- 
 strength, he threw up entrenchments, and stein believes 
 believed himself safe from attack. It was 
 now November, and he fancied that Gustavus, satisfied 
 with his success, would go, after the fashion of the time, 
 into winter quarters. 
 
 In Wallenstein's army, Pappenheim's dashing bravery 
 made him the idol of the soldiers, and gave a g. Pappen- 
 him an almost independent position. He ^P"^ leaves 
 begged to be allowed to attempt a diversion 
 on the Rhenish bishoprics. Wallenstein gave the re- 
 
i62 Victories of Gus\ ivus Adolphus. 1632. 
 
 quired permission, ordering him to seize Kalle on the 
 way. 
 
 It was a serious blunder to divide an army under the 
 eyes of Gustavus. Early on the morning of November 
 
 16 the Swedish king was in front of Wallen- 
 of the Stein's position at Lwtzen. He knew well 
 
 Gustavus that, if there was to be a battle at all, he 
 
 battfe *^^ must be the assailant. Wallenstein would 
 
 not stir. Behind ditche-^ und entrenchments, 
 ready armed, his heavy squares lay immovably, waiting 
 for the enemy, like the Russians ?*t the Alma or the 
 English at Waterloo. A fog lay thick upon the ground. 
 The Swedish army gathered early to their morning 
 prayer, summoned by the sounds of Luther's hymn 
 tune, " God is a strong tower," floating on the heavy air 
 from the brazen lips of a trumpet. The king himself 
 joined in the morning hymn, " Fear not, little flock." 
 Then, as if with forebodings of the coming slaughter, 
 others sung of " Jesus the Saviour, who was the con- 
 queror of death." Gustavus thrust aside the armour 
 which was offered him. Since he had received a wound, 
 not long before, he felt uncomfortable in it. Unpro- 
 tected, he mounted on his horse, and rode about the 
 ranks encouraging the men. 
 
 At eleven the mist cleared away, and the sun shone 
 out. The king gave his last orders to his generals. 
 
 Then, looking to heaven, "Now," ho said, 
 of the " m God s name, Jesus, give us to-day to 
 
 a^d ^' figbt for the honour of thy holy name." 
 
 ^5^^^°^'^® Then, waving his sword over his head, he 
 
 cried out, "Forwards!" The whole line 
 advanced, Gustavus riding at the head of the calvary av 
 the right. After a fierce struggle, the enemy's lines were 
 broken through everywhere. But Wallenstein was not 
 
1632. The Battle of Liltzen. 163 
 
 yet mastered. Bringing up his reserves, he drove back 
 the Swedish infantry in the centre. Gustavus, when he 
 heard the news, flew to the rescue. In all other affairs 
 of life he knew better than most men how to temper 
 daring with discretion. In the battle-field he flung pru- 
 dence to the winds. The horsemen, whom he had or- 
 dered to follow him, struggled in vain to keep up with 
 the long strides of their master's horse. The fog came 
 down thickly once more, and the king, left almost alone 
 in the darkness, dashed unawares into a regiment of the 
 enemy's cuirassiers. One shot passed through his 
 horse's neck. A second shattered his left arm. Turn- 
 ing round to ask one of those who still followed him to 
 help him out of the fight, a third shot struck him in the 
 back, and he fell heavily to the ground. A youth of 
 eighteen, who alone was left by his side, strove to lift 
 him up and to bear him off. But the wounded man 
 was too heavy for him. The cuirassiers rode up and 
 asked who was there. " I was the King of Sweden," 
 murmured the king, as the young man returned no 
 answer, and the horseman shot him through the head, 
 and put an end to his pain. 
 
 Bernard of Weimar took up the command. On the 
 other side Pappenheim, having received orders to return, 
 hurried back from Halle. But he brought , , ^ ^ 
 
 . ° 2 6. Defeat of 
 
 only his cavalry with him. It would be Wallenstein. 
 many hours before his foot could retrace their weary 
 steps. The Swedes, when they heard that their beloved 
 king had fallen, burnt with ardour to revenge him. A 
 terrible struggle ensued. Hour after hour the battle 
 swayed backwards and forwards. In one of the Swedish 
 regiments only one man out of six left the fight unhurt. 
 Pappenheim, the dashing and the brave, whose word 
 was ever for fight, the Bliicher of the seventeenth cen- 
 
164 Victories of Gustavus Adoiphus, 1632. 
 
 tury, was struck down. At the battle of the White Hill 
 he had lain long upon the field senseless from his 
 wounds, and had told those who were around him when 
 he awakened that he had come back from Purgatory. 
 This time there was no awakening for him. The infantry 
 which in his lifetime he had commanded so gallantly, 
 came up as the winter sun was setting. But they came 
 too late to retrieve the fight. Wallenstein, defeated at 
 last, gave orders for retreat. 
 
 The hand which alone could gather the results of 
 victory was lying powerless. The work of destruction 
 was practically complete. The Edict of Res- 
 of Gustavus titution was dead, and the Protestant ad- 
 rrepara . ministrators were again ruling in the north- 
 ern bishoprics. The Empire was practically dead, and 
 the princes and people of Germany, if they were looking 
 for order at all, must seek it under other forms than 
 those which had been imposed upon them in conse- 
 quence of the victories of Tilly and Wallenstein. It is 
 in vain to speculate whether Gustavus could have done 
 anything towards the work of reconstruction. Like 
 Cromwell, to whom, in many respects, he bore a close 
 resemblance, he had begun to discover that it was 
 harder to build than to destroy, and that it was easier to 
 keep sheep than to govern men. Perhaps even to him 
 the difficulties would have been insuperable. The 
 centrifugal force was too strong amongst the German 
 princes to make it easy to bind them together. He had 
 experienced this in Saxony. He had experienced it at 
 Niiremberg. To build up a Corpus Evangelicorum was 
 like weaving ropes of sand. 
 
 And Gustavus was not even more than half a German 
 by birth ; politically he was not a German at all. In his 
 own mind he could not help thinking first of Sweden. In 
 
1632. The Battle of Liltzen. 163 
 
 the minds of others the suspicion that he „ 
 
 . . § 8. What 
 
 was so thinking was certain to arise. He were his 
 
 clung firmly to his demand for Pomerania as p^^p*^^^^ 
 a bulwark for Sweden's interests in the Baltic. Next to 
 that came the Corpus Evangelicorum, the league of 
 German Protestant cities and princes to stand up against 
 the renewal of the overpowering tyranny of the Emperor. 
 If his scheme had been carried out Gustavus would have 
 been a nobler Napoleon, with a confederation, not ot the 
 Rhine, but of the Baltic, around him. For, stranger as 
 he was, he was bound by his religious sympathies to his 
 Protestant brethren in Germany. The words which he 
 spoke at Niiremberg to the princes, telling them how 
 well off he might be at home, were conceived in the 
 very spirit of the Homeric Achilles, when the hardness 
 of the work he had undertaken and the ingratitude of 
 men revealed itself to him. Like Achilles, he dearly 
 loved war, with its excitement and danger, for its own 
 sake. But he desired more than the glory of a con- 
 queror. The establishment of Protestantism in Europe 
 as a power safe from attack by reason of its own strength 
 was the cause for which he found it worth while to live, 
 and for which, besides and beyond the greatness of his 
 own Swedish nation, he was ready to die. It may be 
 that, after all, he was *' happy in the opportunity of his 
 death." 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE DEATH OF WALLENSTEIN AND THE TREATY OP 
 
 PRAGUE. 
 
 Section I. — French Infiuence in Germany. 
 
 In Germany, after the death of Gustavus at Liitzen, it 
 was as it was in Greece after the death of Epaminondas 
 
 at Mantinea. " There was more disturb- 
 g I. Bernhard ^nce and more dispute after the battle than 
 ^f Saxe Wei. ^^^f^j.^ j^ .. j^^ Sweden, Christina, the infant 
 
 daughter of Gustavus, succeeded peaceably 
 to her father's throne, and authority was exercised with- 
 out contradiction by the Chancellor Oxenstjerna. But, 
 wise and prudent as Oxenstjerna was, it was not in the 
 nature of things that he should be listened to as Gusta- 
 vus had been listened to. The- chiefs of the army, no 
 longer held in by a soldier's hand, threatened to assume 
 an almost independent position. Foremost of these was 
 the young Bernhard of Weimar, demanding, like Wal- 
 lenstein, a place among the princely houses of Ger- 
 many. In his person he hoped the glories of the elder 
 branch of the Saxon House would revive, and the dis- 
 grace inflicted upon it by Charles V. for its attachment 
 to the Protestant cause would be repaired. He claimed 
 the rewards of victory for those whose swords had 
 gained it, and payment for the soldiers, who during the 
 winter months following the victory at Liitzen had re- 
 ceived little or nothing. His own share was to be a new 
 i66 
 
1 63 1. French Influence in Germany. 167 
 
 duchy of Franconia, formed out of the united bishoprics 
 of Wiirzburg and Bamberg. Oxenstjerna was com- 
 pelled to admit his pretensions, and to confirm him in 
 his duchy. 
 
 The step was thus taken which Gustavus had un- 
 doubtedly contemplated, but which he had prudently 
 refrained from carrying into action. The 
 seizure of ecclesiastical lands in which the League of 
 population was Catholic was as great a bar- 
 rier to peace on the one side as the seizure of the Pro- 
 testant bishoprics in the north had been on the other. 
 There was, therefore, all the more necessity to be ready 
 for war. If a complete junction of all the Protestant 
 forces was not to be had, something at least was attaina- 
 ble. On April 23, 1633, the League of Heilbronn was 
 signed. The four circles of Swabia, Franconia, and the 
 Upper and Lower Rhine formed a union with Sweden 
 for mutual support. 
 
 It is not difficult to explain the defection of the Elec- 
 tor of Saxony. The seizure of a territory by military 
 violence had always been most obnoxious , ^ ^ 
 
 . . K 3- Defec- 
 
 to him. He had resisted it openly in the tionof 
 case of Frederick in Bohemia. He had re- ^^°"y- 
 sisted it, as far as he dared, in the case of Wallenstein 
 in Mecklenburg. He was not inclined to put up with it 
 in the case of Bernhard in Franconia. Nor could he 
 fail to see that with the prolongation of the war, the 
 chances of French intervention were considerably in- 
 creasing. 
 
 In 1 63 1 there had been a great effervescence of the 
 French feudal aristocracy against the royal authority. 
 But Richelieu stood firm. In March the 
 king's brother, Gaston Duke of Orleans, 1 4. French 
 fled from the country. In July his mother, ^° ^^^^' 
 
 N 
 
1 6 8 Wallenstei?i ' s Death : Treaty of Prague. 1632. 
 
 Mary of Medici, followed his example. But they had 
 no intention of abandoning their position. From their 
 exile in the Spanish Netherlands they formed a close 
 alliance with Spain, and carried on a thousand intrigues 
 with the nobility at home. The Cardinal smote right 
 and left with a heavy hand. Amongst his enemies were 
 the noblest names in France. The Duke of Guise shrank 
 from the conflict and retired to Italy to die far from 
 his native land. The keeper of the seals died in prison. 
 His kinsman, a marshal of France, perished? on the 
 scaffold. In the summer of the year 1632, whilst Gusta- 
 vus was conducting his last campaign, there was a great 
 rising in the south of France. Gaston himself came to 
 share in the glory or the disgrace of the rebellion. The 
 Duke of Montmorenci was the real leader of the enter- 
 prise. He was a bold and vigorous commander, the 
 Rupert of the French cavaliers. But his gay horsemen 
 dashed in vain against the serried ranks of the royal in- 
 fantry, and he expiated his fault upon the scaffold. 
 Gaston, helpless and low-minded as he was, could live 
 on, secure under an ignominious pardon. 
 
 It was not the highest form of political life which 
 
 Richelieu was establishing. For the free expression of 
 
 opinion, as a foundation of government, 
 
 ? 5. Riche- ^ . , , 1 -o 
 
 lieu did for France, m that day, was not prepared. But 
 that"ccuki be within the limits of possibility, Richelieu's 
 ^°"^- method of ruling was a magnificent spec- 
 
 tacle. He struck down a hundred petty despotisms 
 that he might exalt a single despotism in their place. 
 And if the despotism of the Crown was subject to all the 
 dangers and weaknesses by which sooner or later the 
 strength of all despotisms is eaten away, Richelieu suc- 
 ceeded for the time in gaining the co-operation of those 
 classes whose good will was worth conciliating. Under 
 
1632. French Lifluence in Germany. 169 
 
 him commerce and industry lifted up their heads, know- 
 ledge and literature smiled at last. Whilst Corneille 
 was creating the French drama, Descartes was seizing 
 the sceptre of the world of science. The first play of 
 the former appeared on the stage in 1629. Year by year 
 he rose in excellence, till in 1636 he produced the ' Cid ; ' 
 and from that time one masterpiece followed another in 
 rapid succession. Descartes published his first work in 
 Holland in 1637, in which he laid down those principles 
 of metaphysics which were to make his name famous 
 in Europe. 
 
 All this, however welcome to France, boded no good 
 to Germany. In the old struggles of the sixteenth cen- 
 tury. Catholic and Protestant each believed , , ^. , ,. 
 himself to be domg the best, not merely for and Ger- 
 his own country, but for the world in gene- ^^^^' 
 ral. Alva, with his countless executions in the Nether-^ 
 lands, honestly believed that the Netherlands as well as 
 Spain would be the better for the rude surgery. The 
 English volunteers, who charged home on a hundred 
 battle-fields in Europe, believed that they were benefit- 
 ing Europe, not England alone. It was time that all 
 this should cease, and that the long religious strife 
 should have its end. It was well that Richelieu should 
 stand forth to teach the world that there were objects 
 for a Catholic state to pursue better than slaughtering 
 Protestants. But the world was a long way, in the seven- 
 teenth century, from the knowledge that the good of one 
 nation is the good of all, and in putting off its religious 
 partisanship France became terribly hard and selfish in 
 its foreign policy. Gustavus had been half a German, 
 and had s^^mpathized deeply with Protestant Germany. 
 Richelieu had no sympathy with Protestantism, no sym- 
 pathy with German nationality. He doubtless had a 
 
i'jo WallensteirC s Death : Treaty of Prague. 1632. 
 
 general belief that the predominance of the House of 
 Austria was a common evil for all, but he cared chiefly 
 to see Germany too weak to support Spain. He accepted 
 the alliance of the League of Heilbronn, but he would 
 have been equally ready to accept the alliance of the 
 Elector of Bavaria if it would have served him as well 
 in his purpose of dividing Germany. 
 
 The plan of Gustavus might seem unsatisfactory to a 
 
 patriotic German, but it was undoubtedly conceived with 
 
 the intention of benefiting Germany. Riche- 
 
 ^ ?•■ ^^ u lieu had no thought of constituting any new 
 
 policy trench, ... o j 
 
 not European. Organization in Germany. He was already 
 aiming at the left bank of the Rhine. The 
 Elector of Treves, fearing Gustavus, and doubtful of the 
 power of Spain to protect him, had called in the French, 
 and had established them in his new fortress of Ehren- 
 breitstein, which looked down from its height upon the 
 low-lying buildings of Coblentz, and guarded the junction 
 of the Rhine and the Moselle. The Duke of Lorraine 
 had joined Spain, and had intrigued with Gaston. In 
 the summer of 1632 he had been compelled by a French 
 army to make his submission. The next year he moved 
 again, and the French again interfered, and wrested from 
 him his capital of Nancy. Richelieu treated the old 
 German frontier-land as having no rights against the 
 King of France. 
 
 Section II. — Wat/ens tern's Attempt to dictate Peace. 
 
 Already, before the League of Heilbronn was signed, 
 
 the Elector of Saxony was in negotiation with Wallen- 
 
 stein. In June peace was all but concluded 
 
 LgodaSns between them. The Edict of Restitution 
 
 with Wallen- ^^s to be Cancelled. A few places on the 
 
 stein. ^ 
 
 Baltic coast were to be ceded to Sv/eden, 
 
1633- WallensteifC s Attempt to dictate Peace. 171 
 
 and a portion at least of the Palatinate was to be restored 
 to the son of the Elector Frederick, whose death in the 
 preceding winter had removed one of the difficulties in, 
 the way of an agreement. The precise form in which 
 the restitution should take place, however, still remained 
 to be settled. 
 
 Such a peace would doubtless have been highly disa- 
 greeable to adventurers like Bernhard of Weimar, but it 
 would have given the Protestants of Germany all that they 
 could reasonably expect to gain, and would have given the 
 House of Austria one last chance of taking up the cham- 
 pionship of national interests against foreign aggression. 
 
 Such last chances, in real life, are seldom taken hold 
 of for any useful purpose. If Ferdinand had had it in 
 him to rise up in the position of a national , ^ 
 
 . , . . ? 2. Opposi- 
 
 ruler, he would have been m that position tion to Wal- 
 long before. His confessor, Father Lamor- 
 main, declared against the concessions which Wallen^ 
 stein advised, and the word of Father Lamormain had 
 always great weight with Ferdinand. 
 
 Even if Wallenstein had been single-minded he would 
 have had difficulty in meeting such opposition. But 
 Wallenstein was not single-minded. He 
 proposed to meet the difficulties which were aisapproba^ 
 made to the restitution of the Palatinate by '^'°" °^j^^^ 
 
 •' proceedings, 
 
 giving the Palatinate, largely increased by 
 neighbouring territories, to himself. He would thus have 
 a fair recompense for the loss of Mecklenburg, which he 
 could no longer hope to regain. He fancied that the solu- 
 tion would satisfy everybody. In fact, it displeased 
 everybody. Even the Spaniards, who had been on his 
 side in 1632 were alienated by it. They were especially 
 jealous of the rise of any strong power near the line of 
 march between Italy and the Spanish Netherlands. 
 
172 Walk nsteifC s Death. Treaty of Prague. 1633. 
 
 The greater the difficulties in Wallenstein's way the 
 more determined he was to overcome them. Regarding 
 himself, with some justification, as a power 
 stein and the in Germany, he fancied himself able to act 
 ^^ ^^' at the head of his army as if he were himself 
 
 the ruler of an independent state. If the Emperor 
 listened to Spain and his confessor in 1633 as he had 
 listened to Maximilian and his confessor in 1630, Wal- 
 lenstein might step forward and force upon him a wiser 
 policy. Before the end of August he had opened a com- 
 munication with Oxenstjerna, asking for his assistance 
 in effecting a reasonable compromise, whether the Em- 
 peror liked it or not. But he had forgotten that such a 
 proposal as this can only be accepted where there is 
 confidence in him who makes it. In Wallenstein — the 
 man of many schemes and many intrigues — no man had 
 any confidence whatever. Oxenstjerna cautiously re- 
 plied that if Wallenstein meant to join him against the 
 Emperor he had better be the first to begin the at- 
 tack. 
 
 Whether Wallenstein seriously meant at this time to 
 move against the emperor it is impossible to say. He 
 § 5. Was he m loved to enter upon plots in every direction 
 without binding himself to any ; but he was 
 plainly in a dangerous position. How could he impose 
 peace upon all parties when no single party trusted him ? 
 
 If he was not trusted, however, he might still make 
 
 himself feared. Throwing himself vigorously 
 
 ? 6. He attacks upon Silesia, he forced the Swedish g-arri- 
 
 the Saxons. ^ ° 
 
 sons to surrender, and, presenting himself 
 •apon the frontiers of Saxony, again offered peace to 
 the two northern electors. 
 
 But Wallenstein could not be everywhere. Whilst 
 the electors were still hesitating, Bernhard made a dash 
 
1633- Wallenstein! s Attempt to dictate Peace. 173 
 
 at Ratisbon, and firmly established himself I 7. Bernhard 
 in the city, within a little distance of the ^ ^ ^^ °^' 
 Austrian frontier. Wallenstein, turning sharply south- 
 ward, stood in the way of his further advance, but he 
 did nothing to recover the ground which had been lost. 
 He was himself weary of the war. In his first command 
 he had aimed at crushing out all opposition in the name 
 of the imperial authority. His judgment was too clear 
 to allow him to run the old course. He saw plainly 
 that strength was now to be gained only by allowing 
 each of the opposing forces their full weight. ' If the 
 Emperor,' he said, ' were to gain ten victories it would 
 do him no good. A single defeat would ruin him.' In 
 December he was back again in Bohemia. 
 
 It was a strange, Cassandra-like position, to be wiser 
 than all the world, and to be listened to by „ ,„ „ 
 
 rr \ r r .2 8. Wallen- 
 
 no one ; to suffer the fate of supreme mtel- stein's difficul- 
 ligence which touches no moral chord and 
 awakens no human sympathy. For many months the 
 hostile influences had been gaining strength at Vienna. 
 There were War-Office officials whose wishes Wallen- 
 stein systematically disregarded : Jesuits who objected 
 to peace with heretics at all ; friends of the Bavarian 
 Maximilian who thought that the country round Ratisbon 
 should have been better defended against the enemy ; 
 and Spaniards who were tired of hearing that all matters 
 of importance were to be settled by Wallenstein alone. 
 The Spanish opposition was growing daily. Spain 
 now looked to the German branch of the House of 
 Austria to make a fitting return for the 
 aid which she had rendered in 1620. if Spam!^^'^"" 
 Richelieu, having mastered Lorraine, was 
 pushing on towards Alsace, and if Spain had good rea- 
 sons for objecting to see Wallenstein established in the 
 
174 WallensteirC s Death : Treaty of Prague. 1633. 
 
 Palatinate, she had far better reasons for objecting to 
 see France established in Alsace. Yet for all these spe- 
 cial Spanish interests Wallenstein cared nothing. His 
 aim was to place himself at the head of a German na- 
 tional force, and to regard all questions simply from his 
 own point of view. If he wished to see the French out 
 of Alsace and Lorraine, he wished to see the Spaniards 
 out of Alsace and Lorraine as well. 
 
 And, as was often the case with Wallenstein, a per- 
 sonal difference arose by the side of the political differ- 
 ence. The Emperor's eldest son, Ferdinand, the King 
 of Hungary, was married to a Spanish In- 
 Cardinal fanta, the sister of Philip IV., who had once 
 been the promised bride of Charles I. ot 
 England. Her brother, another Ferdinand, usually 
 known from his rank in Church and State as the Cardi- 
 nal-Infant, had recently been appointed Governor of 
 the Spanish Netherlands, and was waiting in Italy for 
 assistance to enable him to conduct an army through 
 Germany to Brussels. That assistance Wallenstein re- 
 fused to give. The military reasons which he alleged 
 for his refusal may have been good enough, but they 
 had a dubious sound in Spanish ears. It looked as if 
 he was simply jealous of Spanish influence in Western 
 Germany. 
 
 Such were the influences which were brought to bear 
 
 upon the Emperor after Wallenstein's return from Ratis- 
 
 ^, bon in December. Ferdinand, as usual, 
 
 g n. The 
 
 Emperor's was distracted between the two courses pro- 
 posed. Was he to make the enormous con- 
 cessions to the Protestants involved in the plan of 
 Wallenstein ; or was he to fight it out with France and 
 the Protestants together according to the plan of Spain ? 
 To Wallenstein by this time the Emperor's resolutions 
 
i634- Resistance to Wallenstetn's Fla?is. ' 175 
 
 had become almost a matter of indifference. He had 
 resolved to force a reasonable peace upon Germany, 
 with the Emperor, if it might be so ; without him, if he 
 refused his support. 
 
 Wallenstein was well aware that his whole plan de- 
 pended on his hold over the army. In January he re- 
 ceived assurances from three of his princi- 
 pal generals, Piccolomini, Gallas, and Al- g 12. Wallen- 
 dringer, that they were ready to follow him ^fj^^yf"'^ ^^^ 
 wheresoever he might lead them, and he 
 was sanguine enough to take these assurances for faf 
 more than they were worth. Neither they nor he him- 
 self were aware to what lengths he would go in the end. 
 For the present it was a mere question of putting 
 pressure upon the Emperor to induce him to accept a 
 wise and beneficent peace. 
 
 Section III. — Resistance to Wallenstein' s Plans. 
 
 The Spanish ambassador, Onate, was ill at ease. 
 Wallenstein, he was convinced, was planning something 
 desperate. What it was he could hardly ^ ^^ osate's 
 guess; but he was sure that it was some- movements, 
 thing most prejudicial to the Catholic religion and the 
 united House of Austria. The worst was that Ferdi- 
 nand could not be persuaded that there was cause for 
 suspicion. " The sick man," said Ofiate, speaking of 
 the Emperor, " will die in my arms without my being 
 able to help him." 
 
 Such was Oiiate's feehngs toward the end of January. 
 Then came information that the case was worse than 
 even he had deemed possible. Wallenstei*i, ^ Belief at 
 he learned, had been intriguing with the Vienna that 
 
 . Wallenstein 
 
 Bohemian exiles, who had offered, with was a traitor. 
 Richelieu's consent, to place upon his head 
 
1 7^ Wallenstein' s Death : Treaty of Prague, 1634. 
 
 the crown of Bohemia, which had fourteen years before 
 been snatched from the unhappy Frederick. In all 
 this there was much exaggeration. Though Wallenstein 
 had listened to these overtures, it is almost certain that 
 he had not accepted them. But neither had he revealed 
 them to the government. It was his way to keep iiL his 
 hands the threads of many intrigues to be used or not to 
 be used as occasion might serve. 
 
 Oiiate, naturally enough, believed the worst. And for 
 
 him the worst was the best. He went triumphantly to 
 
 Eggenberg with his news, and then to Fer- 
 
 g 3. Onate ,°^ , ^^ . , 
 
 informs Ferdi- dmand. Commg alone, this statement 
 might perhaps have been received with 
 suspicion. Coming, as it did, after so many evidences 
 that the general had been acting in complete indepen- 
 dence of the government, it carried conviction with it. 
 
 Ferdinand had long been tossed backwards and for- 
 wards by opposing influences. He had given no answer 
 1 4. Decision to Wallenstcin's communication of the terms 
 agSns?"'^^'^'"^ of peace arranged with Saxony. The neces- 
 Waiienstein. gity of deciding, he said, would not allow 
 him to sleep. It was in his thoughts when he lay down 
 and when he arose. Prayers to God to enlighten the 
 mind of the Emperor had been offered in the churches of 
 Vienna. 
 
 All this hesitation was now at an end. Ferdinand 
 resolved to continue the war in alliance with Spain, and, 
 § 5. Deter- as a ncccssary preliminary, to remove Wal- 
 diip?acT^° lenstein from his generalship. But it was 
 Wallenstein. more easily said than done. A declaration 
 was drawn up releasing the army from its obedience to 
 Wallenstein, and provisionally appointing Gallas, who 
 had by this time given assurances of loyalty, to the chief 
 command. It was intended, if circumstances proved 
 
1634- Resistajice to Wallenstein^ s Plans. 177 
 
 favourable, to intrust the command ultimately to the 
 young King of Hungary. 
 
 The declaration was kept secret for many days. To 
 publish it would only be to provoke the rebellion which 
 was feared. The first thing to be done was 
 
 • • -, , §6. The 
 
 to gam over the prmcipal generals. In the Generals 
 beginning of February Piccolomini and Aid- gained over. 
 ringer expressed their readiness to obey the Emperor 
 rather than Wallenstein. Commanders of a secondary 
 rank would doubtless find their position more indepen- 
 dent under an inexperienced young man like the King 
 of Hungary than under the first living strategist. These 
 two generals agreed to make themselves masters of Wal- 
 lenstein's person and to bring him to Vienna to answer 
 the accusations of treason against him. 
 
 For Onate this was not enough. It would be easier, 
 he said, to kill the general than to carry him off. The 
 event proved that he was right. On Feb- 
 
 A 1 1 • 1 T^- ? . . ? 7- Attempt 
 
 ruary 7, Aldrmger and Piccolommi set off to seize 
 for Pilsen with the intention of capturing 
 Wallenstein. But they found the garrison faithful to its 
 general, and they did not even venture to make the 
 attempto 
 
 Wallenstein's success depended on his chance of 
 carrying with him the lower ranks of the army. On the 
 loth he summoned the colonels round him „ 
 
 J 11 ,1 ,1 1 ? 8. Wallen- 
 
 and assured them that he would stand se- stein at 
 curity for money which they had advanced ^ ^^'^' 
 in raising their regiments, the repayment of which had 
 been called in question. Having thus won them to a 
 favourable mood, he told them that it had been falsely 
 stated that he wished to change his religion and attack 
 the Emperor. On the contrary, he was anxious to con- 
 <;lude a peace which would benefit the Emperor and all 
 
lyS Wallenstein' s Death : Treaty of Prague. 1634. 
 
 who were concerned. As, however, certain persons at 
 Court had objected to it, he wished to ask the opinion of 
 the army on its terms. But he must first of all know 
 whether they were ready to support him, as he knew that 
 there was an intention to put a disgrace upon him. 
 
 It was not the first time that Wallenstein had appealed 
 to the colonels. A month before, when the news had 
 , ^, , come of the alienation of the Court, he had 
 
 g 9. i he colo- 
 nels engage to induced them to sign an acknowledgment 
 suppor im. ^^^ they would stand by him, from which 
 all reference to the possibility of his dismissal was ex- 
 pressly excluded. They now, on February 20, signed a 
 fresh agreement, in which they engaged to defend him 
 against the machinations of his enemies, upon his pro- 
 mising to undertake nothing against the Emperor or the 
 Catholic religion. 
 
 Section IV. — Assassination of Wallenstein. 
 
 Wallenstein thus hoped, with the help of the army, to 
 
 force the Emperor's hand, and to obtain his signature to 
 
 the peace. Of the co-operation of the Elec- 
 
 rison of Prague tor of Saxony he was was already secure ; 
 
 abandons him. ■, . .ii •• rT--L -l-lj 
 
 and smce the begmnmg of February he had 
 been pressing Oxenstjerna and Bernhard to come to his 
 aid. If all the armies in the field declared for peace, 
 Ferdinand would be compelled to abandon the Spaniards 
 and to accept the offered terms. Without some such 
 hazardous venture, Wallenstein would be checkmated by 
 ORate. The Spaniard had been unceasingly busy dur- 
 ing these weeks of intrigue. Spanish gold was provided 
 to content the colonels for their advances, and hopes of 
 promotion were scattered broadcast amongst them. 
 Two other of the principal generals had gone over to the 
 Court, and on February 18, the day before the meeting 
 
1634- Assassination of Wallenstein. 179 
 
 at Pilsen, a second declaration had been issued accusing 
 Wallenstein of treason, and formally depriving hirn of 
 the command. Wallenstein, before this declaration 
 reached him, had already appointed a meeting of large 
 masses of troops to take place on the White Hill before 
 Prague on the 21st, where he hoped to make his inten- 
 tions more generally known. But he had miscalculated 
 the devotion of the army to his person. The garrison 
 of Prague refused to obey his orders. Soldiers and citi- 
 zens alike declared for the Emperor. He was obliged 
 to retrace his steps. " I had peace in my hands," he 
 said. Then he added, " God is righteous," as if still 
 counting on the aid of Heaven in so good a work. 
 
 He did not yet despair. He ordered the colonels to 
 meet him at Eger, assuring them that all that he was 
 doing was for the Emperor's good. He had now at last 
 hopes of other assistance. Oxenstjerna, indeed, ever 
 cautious, still refused to do anything for him till he had 
 positively declared against the Emperor. „ ,, , 
 
 ^ J ^ *■ _ g 2. Under- 
 
 Bernhard, equally prudent for some time, standing with 
 
 had been carried away by the news, which 
 
 reached him on the 21st, of the meeting at Pilsen, and 
 
 the Emperor's denouncement of the general. Though 
 
 he was still suspicious, he moved in the direction of 
 
 Eger. 
 
 On the 24th Wallenstein entered Eger. In what pre- 
 cise way he meant to escape from the labyrinth in which 
 he was, or whether he had still any clear 
 conception of the course before him, it is arrival at 
 impossible to say. But Arnim was ex- ^^^' 
 pected at Eger, as well as Bernhard, and it may be that 
 Wallenstein fancied still that he could gather all the 
 armies of Germany into his hands, to defend the peace 
 which he was ready to make. The great scheme, how- 
 
i8o Wallenstein^ s Death : Treaty of Prague. 1634. 
 
 ever, whatever it was, was doomed to failure. Amongst 
 the officers who accompanied him was a Colonel Butler, 
 an Irish Catholic, who had no fancy for such dealings 
 with Swedish and Saxon heretics. Already he had re- 
 ceived orders from Piccolomini to bring in Wallenstein 
 dead or alive. No official instructions had been given 
 to Piccolomini. But the thought was certain to arise in 
 the minds of all who retained their loyalty to the Em- 
 peror. A general who attempts to force his sovereign to 
 a certain political course with the help of the enemy is 
 placed, by that very fact, beyond the pale of law. 
 
 The actual decision did not lie with Butler. The for- 
 tress was in the hands of two Scotch officers, Leslie and 
 Gordon. As Protestants, they might have 
 
 g 4. Wallen- ^ . . ^ ^ 
 
 stein's assassi- been expected to feel some sympathy with 
 Wallenstein. But the sentiment of military 
 honour prevailed. On the morning of the 25th they 
 were called upon by one of the general's confederates 
 to take orders from Wallenstein alone. " I have sworn 
 to obey the Emperor," answered Gordon, at last, "and 
 who shall release me from my oath?' " You, gentle- 
 men," was the reply, " are strangers in the Empire. 
 What have you to do with the Empire ? " Such argu- 
 ments were addressed to deaf ears. That afternoon 
 Butler, Leslie, and Gordon consulted together. Leslie, 
 usually a silent, reserved man, was the first to speak. 
 " Let us kill the traitors," he said. That evening Wallen- 
 stein's chief supporters were butchered at a banquet. 
 Then there was a short and sharp discussion whether 
 Wallen stein's life should be spared. Bernhard's troops 
 were known to be approaching, and the conspirators 
 dared not leave a chance of escape open. An Irish 
 captain, Devereux by name, was selected to do the deed. 
 Followed by a few soldiers, he burst into the room where 
 
1 634- Assassination of Wallenstein. i8i 
 
 Wallenstein was preparing for rest. " Scoundrel and 
 traitor," were the words which he flung at Devereux as 
 he entered. Then, stretching out his arms, he received 
 the fatal blow in his breast. The busy brain of the 
 great calculator was still forever. 
 
 The attempt to snatch at a wise and beneficent peace 
 by mingled force and intrigue had failed. Other generals 
 — Caesar, Cromwell, Napoleon — have sue- , ^ 
 
 2 5- Rea- 
 
 ceeded to supreme power with the support son of his 
 of an armed force. But they did so by 
 placing themselves at the head of the civil institutions of 
 their respective countries, and by making themselves 
 the organs of a strong national policy. Wallenstein 
 stood alone in attempting to guide the political destinies 
 of a people, while remaining a soldier and nothing 
 more. The plan was doomed to failure, and is only ex- 
 cusable on the ground that there were no national in- 
 stitutions at the head of which Wallenstein could place 
 himself; not even a chance of creating such institutions 
 afresh. 
 
 In spite of all his faults, Germany turns ever to Wal- 
 lenstein as she turns to no other amongst the leaders of 
 the Thirty Years' War. From amidst the 
 divisions and weaknesses of his native parison 
 country, a great poet enshrined his memory Oustavus 
 
 in a succession of noble dramas. Such ^"4 Wallen- 
 stein. 
 
 faithfulness is not without a reason. Gus- 
 tavus's was a higher nature than Wallenstein's. Some 
 of his work, at least the rescue of German Protestantism 
 from oppression, remained imperishable, whilst Wallen- 
 stein's military and political success vanished into noth- 
 ingness. But Gustavus was a hero not of Germany as a 
 nation, but of European Protestantism. His Corpus 
 Evangelicorum was at the best a choice of evils to a 
 
1 82 WallensteirC s Death : Treaty of Prague. 1634. 
 
 German. Wallenstein's wildest schemes, impossible of 
 execution as they were by military violence, were always 
 built upon the foundation of German unity. In the way 
 in which he walked that unity was doubtless unattain- 
 able. To combine devotion to Ferdinand with religious 
 liberty was as hopeless a conception as it was to burst 
 all bonds of political authority on the chance that a new 
 and better world would spring into being out of the dis- 
 cipline of the camp. But during the long dreary years 
 of confusion which were to follow, it was something to 
 think of the last supremely able man whose life had 
 been spent in battling against the great evils of the land, 
 against the spirit of religious intolerance, and the spirit 
 of division. 
 
 Section V. — Bnperialist Victories and the Treaty of 
 
 Prague. 
 
 For the moment, the House of Austria seemed to have 
 gained everything by the execution or the murder of Wal 
 lenstein, whichever we may choose to call it. The 
 army was reorganized and placed under the command 
 of the Emperor's son, the King of Hungary. The Car- 
 dinal-Infant, now eagerly welcomed, was preparing to 
 ^ join him through Tyrol. And while on the 
 
 g I. Cam- -^ o J 
 
 paignof one sidc there was union and resolution, 
 
 there was division and hesitation on the 
 other. The Elector of Saxony stood aloof from the 
 League of Heilbronn, weakly hoping that the terms of 
 peace which had been offered him by Wallenstein would 
 be confirmed by the Emperor now that Wallenstein was 
 gone. Even amongst those who remained under arms 
 there was no unity of purpose. Bernhard, the daring 
 and impetuous, was not of one mind with the cautious 
 Horn, who commanded the Swedish forces, and both 
 
i634« Imperialist Victories : Treaty of Prague. 183 
 
 agreed in thinking Oxenstjerna remiss because lie did 
 not supply them with more money than he was able to 
 provide. 
 
 As might have been expected under these circum- 
 stances, the imperials made rapid progress. Ratisbon, 
 the prize of Bernhard the year before, sur- „ _, 
 rendered to the king of Hungary in July. Battle of 
 Then Donauworth was stormed, and siege ""^ i^s^n. 
 was laid to Nordlingen. On September 2 the Cardinal- 
 Infant came up with 15,000 men. The enemy watched 
 the siege with a force far inferior in numbers. Bernhard 
 was eager to put all to the test of battle. Horn recom- 
 mended caution in vain. Against his better judgment 
 he consented to fight. On September 6 the attack was 
 made. By the end of the day Horn was a prisoner, 
 and Bernhard was in full retreat, leaving 10,000 of his 
 men dead upon the field, and 6,000 prisoners in the 
 hands of the enemy, whilst the imperialists lost only 
 1,200 men. 
 
 Since the day of Breitenfeld, three years before, there 
 had been no such battle fought as this of Nordlingen. 
 As Breitenfeld had recovered the Protestant bishoprics 
 of the north, Nordlingen recovered the Catholic bishop- 
 rics of the south. Bernhard's Duchy of Franconia dis- 
 appeared in a moment under the blow. Before the spring 
 of 1635 came, the whole of South Germany, 
 with the exception of one or two fortified ant results 
 posts, was in the hands of the imperial com- 
 manders. The Cardinal-Infant was able to pursue his 
 way to Brussels, with the assurance that he had done 
 a good stroke of work on the way. 
 
 The victories of mere force are never fruitful of good. 
 As it had been after the successes of Tilly in 1622, and 
 the successes of Wallenstein in 1626 and 1627, so it 
 
 o 
 
1 84 Wallenstem^ s Death : Treaty of Prague. 1635. 
 was now with the successes of the King of 
 
 2 4. French . , . . 
 
 intervention. Hungary in 1634 and 1635. The imperiahst 
 armies had gained victories, and had taken cities. But 
 the Emperor was none the nearer to the confidence of 
 Germans. An ahenated people, crushed by mihtary 
 force, served merely as a bait to tempt foreign aggression, 
 and to make the way easy before it. After 1622, the 
 King of Denmark had been called in. After 1627, an 
 appeal was made to the King of Sweden. After 1634, 
 Richelieu found his opportunity. The bonds between 
 France and the mutilated League of Heilbronn were 
 drawn more closely. German troops were to be taken 
 into French pay, and the empty coffers of the League 
 were filled with French livres. He who holds the purse 
 holds the sceptre, and the princes of Southern and 
 Western Germany, whether they wished it or not, were 
 reduced to the position of satellites revolving round the 
 central orb at Paris. 
 
 Nowhere was the disgrace of submitting to French in- 
 tervention felt so deeply as at Dresden. The battle of 
 Nordlingen had cut short any hopes which 
 Peace of John Gcorge might have entertained of ob- 
 
 Prague. taining that which Wallenstein would wil- 
 
 hngly have granted him. But, on the other hand, Fer- 
 dinand had learned something from experience. He 
 would allow the Edict of Restitution to fall, though he 
 was resolved not to make the sacrifice in so many words. 
 But he refused to replace the Empire in the condition 
 in which it had been before the war. The year 1627 was 
 to be chosen as the starting point for the new arrange- 
 ment. The greater part of the northern bishoprics would 
 thus be saved to Protestantism. But Halberstadt would 
 remain in the hands of a Catholic bishop, and the Pa- 
 latinate would be lost to Protestantism forever. Lusatia, 
 
1 635- Imperialist Victories : Treaty of Prague. 185 
 
 which had been held in the hands of the Elector of 
 Saxony for his expenses in the war of 1620, was to be 
 ceded to him permanently, and Protestantism in Silesia 
 was to be placed under the guarantee of the Emperor. 
 Finally, Lutheranism alone was still reckoned as the 
 privileged religion, so that Hesse Cassel and the other 
 Calvinist states gained no security at all. On May 30^ 
 1635, a treaty embodying these arrangements was signed 
 at Prague by the representatives of the Emperor and 
 the Elector of Saxony. It was intended not to be a 
 separate treaty, but to be the starting point of a general 
 pacification. Most of the princes and towns so accepted, 
 it, after more or less delay, and acknowledged the su- 
 premacy of the Emperor on its conditions. Yet it was 
 not in the nature of things that it should put an end to 
 the war. It was not an agreement which any one was 
 likely to be enthusiastic about. The ties which bound 
 Ferdinand to his Protestant subjects had been rudely 
 broken, and the solemn promise to forget and forgive 
 could not weld the nation into that unity of heart and spirit 
 which was needed to resist the foreigner. A Protestant 
 of the north might reasonably come to the conclusion 
 that the price to be paid to the Swede and the French- 
 man for the vindication of the rights of the southern 
 Protestants was too high to make it prudent for him to 
 continue the struggle against the Emperor. But it was 
 hardly likely that he would be inclined to fight very 
 vigorously for the Emperor on such terms. 
 
 If the treaty gave no great encouragement to anyone 
 who was comprehended by it, it threw still further into 
 the arms of the enemy those who were ex- g 6. it fails in 
 cepted from its benefits. The leading mem- Irafac^pf-^'^' 
 bers of the League of Heilbronn were ex- '^"^^• 
 cepted from the general amnesty, though hopes of better 
 
1 86 Wallenstein^ s Death : Tf-eaty of Prague. 1635. 
 
 treatment were held out to them if they made their sub- 
 mission. The Landgrave of Hesse Cassel was shut out 
 as a Calvinist. Besides such as nourished legitimate 
 grievances, there were others who, like Bernhard, were 
 bent upon carving out a fortune for themselves, or who 
 had so blended in their own minds consideration for the 
 public . good as to lose all sense of any distinction be- 
 tween the two. 
 
 There was no lack here of materials for a long and 
 terrible struggle. But there was no longer any noble 
 aim in view on either side. The ideal of 
 tion of the war" Ferdinand and Maximilian was gonc. The 
 Church was not to recover its lost property. 
 The Empire was not to recover its lost dignity. The ideal 
 of Gustavus of a Protestant political body was equally 
 gone. Even the ideal of Wallenstein, that unity might 
 be founded on an army, had vanished. From henceforth 
 French and Swedes on the one side, Austrians and Span- 
 iards on the other, were busily engaged in riving at the 
 corpse of the dead Empire. The great quarrel of princi- 
 ple had merged into a mere quarrel between the Houses 
 of Austria and Bourbon, in which the shred of principle 
 which still remained in the question of the rights of the 
 southern Protestants was almost entirely disregarded. 
 
 Horrible as the war had been from its commencement, 
 it was every day assuming a more horrible character. 
 On both sides all traces of discipline had vanished in the 
 dealings of the armies with the inhabitants of the coun- 
 tries in which they were quartered. Sol- 
 
 2 8 Condition j- . . j j i, t 
 
 of Germany. diers treated men and women as none but 
 the vilest of mankind would now treat 
 brute beasts. ' He who had money,' says a contempo- 
 rary, 'was their enemy. He who had none was tor- 
 tured because he had it not.' Outrages of unspeaka- 
 
1636, Imperialist Victories : Treaty of Prague. 187 
 
 ble atrocity were committed everywhere. Human be- 
 ings were driven naked into the streets, their flesh 
 pierced with needles, or cut to the bone with saws. 
 Others were scalded with boiling water, or hunted with 
 fierce dogs. The horrors of a town taken by storm 
 were repeated every day in the open country. Even 
 apart from its excesses, the war itself was terrible 
 enough. When Augsburg was besieged by the impe- 
 rialists, after their victory at Nordlingen, it contained an 
 industrious population of 70,000 souls. After a siege of 
 seven months, 10,000 living beings, wan and haggard 
 with famine, remained to open the gates to the conquer- 
 ors, and the great commercial city of the Fuggers dwin- 
 dled down into a country town. 
 
 How is it possible to bring such scenes before our eyes 
 in their ghastly reality ? Let us turn for the 
 moment to some notes taken by the com- g 9. Notes of 
 panion of an English ambassador who ^rawUcr^^ 
 passed through the country in 1636. As the 
 party were towed up the Rhine from Cologne, on the 
 track so well known to the modern tourist, they passed 
 " by many villages pillaged and shot down." Further 
 on, a French garrison was in Ehrenbreitstein, firing down 
 upon Coblentz, which had just been taken by the impe- 
 rialists. "They in the town, if they do but look out of 
 their windows, have a bullet presently presented at their 
 head." More to the south, things grew worse. At Bac- 
 harach, " the poor people are found dead with grass in 
 their mouths." At Riidesheim, many persons were 
 " praying where dead bones were in a little old house; 
 and here his Excellency gave some relief to the poor, 
 which were almost starved, as it appeared by the vio- 
 lence they used to get it from one another." At Mentz, 
 the ambassador was obliged to remain "on shipboard, 
 
i88 Wallenstei?t' 5 Death : Treaty of Prague. 1635. 
 
 for there was nothing to relieve us, since it was taken by 
 the King of Sweden, and miserably battered. . . . Here, 
 likewise, the poor people were almost starved, and those 
 that could relieve others before now humbly begged 
 to be relieved ; and after supper all had relief sent from 
 the ship ashore, at the sight of which they strove so vio- 
 lently that some of them fell into the Rhine, and were 
 like to have been drowned," Up the Main, again, " all 
 the towns, villages, and castles be battered, pillaged, or 
 burnt." After leaving Wiirzburg, the ambassador's train 
 came to plundered villages, and then to Neustadt, 
 "which hath been a fair city, though now pillaged and 
 burnt miserably." Poor children were " sitting at their 
 doors almost starved to death," his Excellency giving 
 them food and leaving money with their parents to 
 help them, if but for a time. In the Upper Palatinate, 
 they passed "by churches demolished to the ground, 
 and through woods in danger, understanding that Croats 
 were lying hereabout." Further on they stayed for din- 
 ner at a poor little village " which hath been pillaged 
 eight- and-twenty times in two years, and twice in one 
 day." And so on, and so on. The corner of the veil is 
 lifted up in the pages of the old book, and the rest is 
 left to the imagination to picture forth, as best it may, 
 the misery behind. After reading the sober narrative, 
 we shall perhaps not be inclined to be so very hard upon 
 the Elector of Saxony for making peace at Prague. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 THE PREPONDERANCE OF FRANCE. 
 
 Section I. — Open Intervention of France. 
 
 The peacemakers of Prague hoped to restore the Em- 
 pire to its old form. But this could not be. Things done 
 cannot pass away as though they had never 
 been. Ferdinand's attempt to gain a par- festandsm 
 tizan's advantage for his religion by avaihng "f^^i^ngen 
 himself of legal forms had given rise to a 
 general distrust. Nations and governments, like indi- 
 vidual men, are "tied and bound by the chain of their 
 sins," from which they can be freed only when a new 
 spirit is breathed into them. Unsatisfactory as the ter- 
 ritorial arrangements of the peace were, the entire ab- 
 sence of any constitutional reform in connexion with the 
 peace was more unsatisfactory still. The majority in the 
 two Upper Houses of the Diet was still Catholic ; the 
 Imperial Council was still altogether Catholic. It was 
 possible that the Diet and Council, under the teaching 
 of experience, might refrain from pushing their preten- 
 sions as far as they had pushed them before; but a 
 government which refrains from carrying out its princi- 
 ples from motives of prudence cannot inspire confidence. 
 A strong central power would never arise in such a way, 
 and a strong central power to defend Germany against 
 foreign invasion was the especial need of the hour. 
 In the failure of the Elector of Saxony to obtain some 
 
 189 
 
1 9© The Preponderance of France. 1635. 
 
 of the most reasonable of the Protestant demands lay the 
 _, best excuse of men like Bernhard of Saxe- 
 
 g 2. The 
 
 allies of Weimar and William of Hesse Cassel for 
 
 refusing the terms of accommodation of- 
 fered. Largely as personal ambition and greed of ter- 
 ritory found a place in the motives of these men, it is not 
 absolutely necessary 10 assert that their religious enthu- 
 siasm was nothing more than mere hypocrisy. They 
 raised the war-cry of "God with us" before rushing to 
 the storm of a city doomed to massacre and pilllage ; 
 they set apart days for prayer and devotion when battle 
 was at hand — veiling, perhaps, from their own eyes the 
 hideous misery which they were spreading around, in 
 contemplation of the loftiness of their aim : for, in all but 
 the most vile, there is a natural tendency to shrink from 
 contemplating the lower motives of action, and to fix the 
 eyes solely on the higher. But the ardour inspired by 
 a military career, and the mere love of fighting for its 
 own sake, must have counted for much ; and the refusal 
 to submit to a domination which had been so harshly 
 used soon grew into a restless disdain of all authority 
 whatever. The nobler motives which had imparted a 
 glow to the work of Tilly and Gustavus, and which even 
 lit up the profound selfishness of Wallenstein, flickered 
 and died away, till the fatal disruption of the Empire 
 was accomplished amidst the strivings and passions of 
 heartless and unprincipled men. 
 
 The work of riving Germany in pieces was not accom- 
 plished by Germans alone. As in nature a living or- 
 ganism which has become unhealthy and 
 intervention! corrupt is seized upon by the lower forms of 
 animal life, a nation divided amongst itself, 
 and devoid of a sense of life within it higher than the 
 aims of parties and individuals, becomes the prey of 
 
1 635- Open httervention of France. 191 
 
 neighbouring nations, which would not have ventured to 
 meddle with it in the days of its strength. The carcase 
 was there, and the eagles were gathered together. The 
 gathering of Wallenstein's army in 1632, the overthrow 
 of Wallenstein in 1634, had alike been made possible by 
 the free use of Spanish gold. The victory of Nordlingen 
 had been owing to the aid of Spanish troops; and the 
 aim of Spain was not the greatness or peace of Germany, 
 but at the best the greatness of the House of Austria in 
 Germany ; at the worst, the maintenance of the old sys- 
 tem of intolerance and unthinking obedience, which 
 had been the ruin of Germany. With Spain for an ally, 
 France was a necessary enemy. The strife for supreme 
 power between the two representative states of the old 
 system and the new could not long be delayed, and the 
 German parties would be dragged, consciously or uncon- 
 sciously, in their wake. If Bernhard became a tool of 
 Richelieu, Ferdinand became a tool of Spain. 
 
 In this phase of the war Protestantism and Catholicism, 
 tolerance and intolerance, ceased to be the immediate 
 objects of the strife. The possession of Al- , 
 
 •' ^ g 4. Alsace 
 
 sace and Lorraine rose into primary impor- andLor- 
 tance, not because, as in our own days, 
 Germany needed a bulwark against France, or France 
 needed a bulwark against Germany, but because Ger- 
 many was not strong enough to prevent these territories 
 from becoming the highway of intercourse between 
 Spain and the Spanish Netherlands. The command of 
 the sea was in the hands of the Dutch, and the valley 
 of the Upper Rhine was the artery through which the 
 life blood of the Spanish monarchy flowed. If Spain or 
 the Emperor, the friend of Spain, could hold that val- 
 ley, men and munitions of warfare would flow freely to 
 the Netherlands to support the Cardinal-Infant in his 
 
192 The Preponderance of France. 1635. 
 
 struggle with the Dutch. If Richeheu could lay his hand, 
 heavily upon it, he had seized his enemy by the throat, 
 and could choke him as he lay. 
 
 After the battle of Nordlingen, Richelieu's first demand 
 I 5. Riche- from Oxenstjema as the price of his assist- 
 fortressesin ance had been the strong places held by 
 Alsace. Swedish garrisons in Alsace. As soon as 
 
 he had them safely under his control, he felt himself 
 strong enough to declare war openly against Spain. 
 
 On May 19, eleven days before peace was agreed upon 
 at Prague, the declaration of war was delivered at Brus- 
 sels by a French herald. To the astonish- 
 between^'^ ment of all, France was able to place in the 
 s "^ain ^ ^^^ field what was then considered the enor- 
 mous number of 132,000 men. One army 
 was to drive the Spaniards out of the Milanese, and to 
 set free the Italian princes. Another was to defend 
 Lorraine whilst Bernhard crossed the Rhine and carried 
 on war in Germany, The main force was to be thrown 
 upon the Spanish Netherlands, and, after effecting a 
 junction with the Prince of Orange, was to strike directly 
 at Brussels. 
 
 Section II. — Spanish Successes. 
 
 Precisely in the most ambitious part of his programme 
 
 Richelieu failed most signally. The junction with the 
 
 ^ ., Dutch was effected without difficulty ; but 
 
 g I. Failure ■' 
 
 of the French the hoped-for instrument of success proved 
 Nether- the parent of disaster. Whatever Flemings 
 
 ^^"'^^' and Brabanters might think of Spain, they 
 
 soon made it plain that they would have nothing to 
 do with the Dutch. A national enthusiasm against Pro- 
 testant aggression from the north made defence easy, 
 and the French army had to return completely unsuc- 
 
1636. Spanish Successes. 193 
 
 cessful. Failure, too, was reported from other quarters. 
 The French armies had no experience of war on a large 
 scale, and no military leader of eminent ability had yet 
 appeared to command them. The Italian campaign 
 came to nothing, and it was only by a supreme effort of 
 military skill that Bernhard, driven to retreat, preserved 
 his army from complete destruction. 
 
 In 1636 France was invaded. The Cardinal-Infant 
 crossed the Somme, took Corbie, and advanced to the 
 banks of the Oise. All Paris was in com- , c- • 1. 
 
 {> 2. Spanish 
 
 motion. An immediate siege was expected, invasion of 
 and inquiry was anxiously made into the 
 state of the defences. Then Richelieu, coming out of his 
 seclusion, threw himself upon the nation. He appealed 
 to the great legal, ecclesiastical, and commercial cor- 
 porations of Paris, and he did not appeal in vain. 
 Money, voluntarily offered, came pouring into the trea- 
 sury for the payment of the troops. Those who had no 
 money gave themselves eagerly for military service. It 
 was remarked that Paris, so fanatically Catholic in the 
 days of St. Bartholomew and the League, entrusted its 
 defence to the Protestant marshal La Force, whose repu- 
 tation for integrity inspired universal confidence. 
 
 The resistance undertaken in such a spirit in Paris 
 was imitated by the other towns of the kingdom. Even 
 the nobility, jealous as they were of the .^ 
 
 Cardinal, forgot their grievances as an aris- vaders driven 
 tocracy in their duties as Frenchmen. 
 Their devotion was not put to the test of action. The 
 invaders, frightened at the unanimity opposed to them, 
 hesitated and turned back. In September, Lewis took 
 the field in person. In November he appeared before 
 Corbie ; and the last days of the year saw the fortress 
 again in the keeping of a French garrison. The war, 
 
194 The Preponderance of France. 1637. 
 
 which was devastating Germany, was averted from 
 France by the union produced by the mild tolerance of 
 Richelieu. 
 
 In Germany, too, affairs had taken a turn. The Elec- 
 tor of Saxony had hoped to drive the Swedes across the 
 sea ; but a victory gained on October 4, at Wittstock, by 
 a Battle of ^^ Swedish general, Baner, the ablest 
 Wittstock. of the successors of Gustavus, frustrated his 
 intentions. Henceforward North Germany was de- 
 livered over to a desolation with which even the misery 
 inflicted by Wallenstein affords no parallel. 
 
 Amidst these scenes of failure and misfortune the man 
 whose policy had been mainly responsible for the mise- 
 a s Death of ^^^^ ^^ ^^^ country closed his eyes for ever. 
 Ferdinand II. Qn February I $, 1637, Ferdinand 11. died 
 at Vienna. Shortly before his death the King of Hun- 
 gary had been elected King of the Romans, and he now, 
 by his father's death, became the Emperor Ferdinand 
 HI. 
 
 The new Emperor had no vices. He did not even 
 care, as his father did, for hunting and music. When 
 g 6. Ferdi- the battle of Nordlingen was won under his 
 nandiii. command he was praying in his tent whilst 
 
 his soldiers were fighting. He sometimes took upon 
 himself to give military orders, but the handwriting in 
 which they were conveyed was such an abominable 
 scrawl that they only served to enable his generals to ex- 
 cuse their defeats by the impossibility of reading their in- 
 structions. His great passion was for keeping strict ac- 
 counts. Even the Jesuits, it is said, found out that, de- 
 voted as he was to his religion, he had a sharp eye for 
 his expenditure. One day they complained that some 
 tolls bequeathed to them by his father had not been made 
 over to them, and represented the value of the legacy as 
 
1638. The Struggle for Alsace. 195 
 
 a mere trifle of 500 florins a year. The Emperor at once 
 gave them an order upon the treasury for the yearly 
 payment of the sum named, and took possession of 
 the tolls for the maintenance of th^ fortifications of 
 Vienna. The income thus obtained is said to have been 
 no less than 12,000 florins a year. 
 
 Such a man was not likely to rescue the Empire from 
 its miseries. The first year of his reign, however, was 
 marked by a gleam of good fortune. Baner g ^ cam- 
 lost all that he had gained at Wittstock, and P^^^n of 1637. 
 was driven back to the shores of the Baltic. On the 
 western frontier the imperialists were equally successful. 
 Wiirtemberg accepted the Peace of Prague, and sub- 
 mitted to the Emperor. A more general peace was 
 talked of. But till Alsace was secured to one side or the 
 other no peace was possible. 
 
 Section III. — The Struggle for Alsace, 
 
 The year 1638 was to decide the question. Bernhard 
 was looking to the Austrian lands in Alsace and the 
 
 Breisgau as a compensation for his lost , ^, 
 
 TIC • ? ^' ^^ 
 
 duchy of Franconia. In February he was capture of 
 
 besieging Rheinfelden. Driven off by the 
 imperialists on the 26th, he re-appeared unexpectedly on 
 March 3, taking the enemy by surprise. They had not 
 even sufficient powder with them to load their guns, and 
 the victory of Rheinfelden was the result. On the 24th 
 Rheinfelden itself surrendered. Freiburg followed its 
 example on April 22, and Bernhard proceeded to under- 
 take the siege of Breisach, the great fortress which do- 
 mineered over the whole valley of the Upper Rhirs 
 Small as his force was, he succeeded, by a series of rapid 
 movements, in beating off every attempt to introduce sup- 
 plies, and on December 19 he entered the place in triumph. 
 
196 Tlie Prepo7iderance of France. 1638. 
 
 The campaign of 1638 was the turning point in the 
 1 2. The Struggle between France and the united 
 
 tumhig point House of Austria. A vantage ground was 
 in the war. then won which was never lost 
 
 Bernhard himself, however, was loth to realize the 
 world-wide importance of the events in which he had 
 played his part. He fancied that he had been fighting 
 for his own, and he claimed the lands which he had 
 conquered for himself. He received the homage of the 
 ^ , , citizens of Breisach in his own name. He 
 
 g 3. iJernhard 
 
 wishes to keep Celebrated a Lutheran thanksgiving festival 
 in the cathedral. But the French Govern- 
 ment looked upon the rise of an independent German 
 principality in Alsace with as little pleasure as the 
 Spanish government had contemplated the prospect of 
 the establishment of Wallenstein in the Palatinate. They 
 ordered Bernhard to place his conquests under the orders 
 of the King of France. 
 
 Strange as it may seem, the man who had done so 
 ^ , much to tear in pieces the Empire believed, 
 
 g4. Refuses ^ . . , • , 
 
 to dismember in a sort of Way, in the Empire still. " I will 
 mpire. never suffer," he said, in reply to the French 
 demands, "that men can truly reproach me with being 
 the first to dismember the Empire." 
 
 The next year he crossed the Rhine with the most 
 brilliant expectations. Baner had recovered strength, 
 1 5. Death of ^-^^^ was pushing on through North Germany 
 Bernhard. jj^^-q Bohemia. Bernhard hoped that he too 
 
 might strike a blow which would force on a peace on his 
 own conditions. But his greatest achievement, the cap- 
 ture of Breisach, was also his last. A fatal disease seized 
 upon him when he had hardly entered upon die cam- 
 paign. On July 8, 1639, he died. 
 
 There was no longer any question of the ownership of 
 
1639- French Successes. 197 
 
 the fortresses in Alsace and the Breisgau. French gov- 
 ernors entered into possession. A French 
 
 §6. Alsace in 
 
 general took the command of Bernhard s French 
 army. For the ne^t two or three years Bern- p°^^^^^^°"- 
 hard's old troops fought up and down Germany in con- 
 junction with Baner, not without success, but without 
 any decisive victory. The French soldiers were becom- 
 ing, like the Germans, inured to war. The lands on the 
 Rhine were not easily to be wrenched out of the strong 
 hands which had grasped them. 
 
 Section IV. — French Successes. 
 
 Richelieu had other successes to count besides these 
 victories on the Rhine. In 1637 the Spaniards drove 
 out of Turin the Duchess-Regent Chris- ^^ state of 
 tina, the mother of the young Duke of ^^^^y- 
 Savoy. She was a sister of the King of France ; and, 
 even if that had not been the case, the enemy of Spain 
 was, in the nature of the case, the friend of France. 
 In 1640 she re-entered her capital with French assist- 
 ance. 
 
 At sea, too, where Spain, though unable to hold its 
 own against the Dutch, had long continued to be superior 
 to France, the supremacy of Spain was „ 
 
 ^ ■' ^ § 2. Maritime 
 
 coming to an end. During the whole course warfare. 
 of his ministry, Richelieu had paid special attention to 
 the encouragement of commerce and the formation of 
 a navy. Troops could no longer be despatched with 
 safety to Italy from the coasts of Spain. In 1638 a 
 French squadron burnt Spanish galleys in the Bay of 
 Biscay. 
 
 In 1639 a great Spanish fleet on its way to the Nether- 
 lands was strong enough to escape the French, who were 
 watching to intercept it. It saLed up the English Chan- 
 
198 The Preponderance of France. 1639. 
 
 nel with the not distant goal of the Flemisk 
 Spanish fleet ports almost in view. But the huge gal- 
 hi the leons were ill-manned and ill-found. They 
 
 Downs. ^ ■' 
 
 were still less able to resist the lighter, 
 well-equipped vessels of the Dutch fleet, which was 
 waiting to intercept them, than the Armada had been 
 able to resist Drake and Raleigh fifty-one years before. 
 The Spanish commander sought refuge in the Downs, 
 under the protection of the neutral flag of England. 
 
 The French ambassador pleaded hard with the king 
 of England to allow the Dutch to follow up their success. 
 
 The Spanish ambassador pleaded hard with 
 
 3 4. Destruc- , . ^ . , i i i i 
 
 tion of the him for protection to those who had taken 
 '^^^' refuge on his shores. Charles saw in the 
 
 occurrence an opportunity to make a bargain with one 
 side or the other. He offered to abandon the Spaniards 
 if the French would agree to restore his nephew, Charles 
 Lewis, the son of his sister Elizabeth, to his inheritance 
 in the Palatinate. He offered to protect the Spaniards 
 if Spain would pay him the large sum which he would 
 want for the armaments needed to bid defiance to 
 France. Richelieu had no intention of completing the 
 bargain offered to him. He deluded Charles with nego- 
 tiations, whilst the Dutch admiral treated the English 
 neutrality with scorn. He dashed amongst the tall 
 Spanish ships as they lay anchored in the Downs : some 
 he sank, some he set on fire. Eleven of the galleons 
 were soon destroyed. The remainder took advantage 
 of a thick fog, slipped across the Straits, and placed 
 themselves in safety under the guns of Dunkirk. Never 
 again did such a fleet as this venture to leave the Spanish 
 coast for the harbours of Flanders. The injury to Spain 
 went far beyond the actual loss. Coming, as the blow 
 did, within a few months after the surrender of Breisach, 
 
1639- French Successes, 199 
 
 it all but severed the connexion for military purposes 
 between Brussels and Madrid. 
 
 Charles at first took no umbrage at the insult. He 
 still hoped that Richelieu would forward his nephew's 
 interests, and he even expected that Charles , 
 Lewis would be placed by the King of and England. 
 France in command of the army which had been under 
 Bernhard's orders. But Richelieu was in no mood to 
 place a German at the head of these well-trained vete- 
 rans, and the proposal was definitively rejected. The 
 King of England, dissatisfied at this repulse, inclined 
 once more to the side of Spain. But Richelieu found a 
 way to prevent Spain from securing even what assistance 
 it was in the power of a king so unpopular as Charles to 
 render. It was easy to enter into communication with 
 Charles's domestic enemies. His troubles, indeed, were 
 mostly of his own making, and he would doubtless have 
 lost his throne whether Richelieu had stirred the fire or 
 not. But the French minister contributed all that was 
 in his power to make the confusion greater, and en- 
 couraged, as far as possible, the resistance which had 
 already broken out in Scotland, and which was threaten- 
 ing to break out in England. 
 
 The failure of 1636 had been fully redeemed. No 
 longer attacking any one of the masses of which the 
 Spanish monarchy was composed, Riche- 
 lieu placed his hands upon the lines of rection in 
 communication between them. He made 
 his presence felt not at Madrid, at Brussels, at Milan, or 
 at Naples, but in Alsace, in the Mediterranean, in the 
 English Channel. The effect was as complete as is the 
 effect of snapping the wire of a telegraph. At once the 
 Peninsula startled Europe by showing signs of dissolu- 
 tion. In 1639 the Catalonians had manfully defended 
 
 P 
 
200 The Preponderance of France. it54i. 
 
 Roussillon against a French invasion. In 1640 they 
 were prepared to fight with equal vigour. But the 
 Spanish Government, in its desperate straits, was not 
 content to leave them to combat in their own way, after 
 the irregular fashion which befitted mountaineers. Or- 
 ders were issued commanding all men capable of fighting 
 'to arm themselves for the war, all women to bear food 
 and supplies for the army on their backs. A royal edict 
 followed, threatening those who showed themselves re- 
 miss with imprisonment and the confiscation of their 
 goods. 
 
 The cord which bound the hearts of Spaniards to their 
 
 king was a strong one ; but it snapped at last. It was 
 
 not by threats that Richelieu had defended France in 
 
 1636. The old traditions of provincial independence 
 
 „ , were strong in Catalonia, and the Catalans 
 
 g 7. Break-up . - , 
 
 of the Spanish Were soon m full revolt. Who were they, to 
 monarc y. -^^ driven to the combat by menaces, as the 
 Persian slaves had been driven on at Thermopylae by 
 the blows of their masters' officers ? 
 
 Equally alarming was the news which reached Madrid 
 from the other side of the Peninsula. Ever since the 
 . , _ days of Philip II. Portugal had formed an 
 
 pendence of integral part of the Spanish monarchy. In 
 December 1640 Portugal renounced its alle- 
 giance, and reappeared amongst European States under 
 a sovereign of the House of Braganza. 
 
 Everything prospered in Richelieu's hands. In 1641 
 a fresh attempt was made by the partizans of Spain to 
 , _, .. raise France against him. The Count of 
 
 g 9. J? allure _ _ ° 
 
 of Soissons Soissons, a prince of the blood, placed him- 
 
 jn France. ,. , , i r • • t 
 
 self at the head of an impenalist army to 
 attack his native country. He succeeded" in defeating 
 the French forces sent to oppose him not far from Sedan. 
 
1641. Aims and Character of Richelieu. 201 
 
 But a chance shot passing through the brain of Soissons 
 made the victory a barren one. His troops, without the 
 support of his name, could not hope to rouse the coun- 
 try against Richeheu. They had become mere invaders, 
 and they were far too few to think of conquering France. 
 Equal success attended the PYench arms in Germany. 
 In 1641 Guebriant, with his German and Swedish army, 
 defeated the imperialists at Wolfenbiittel, in 
 the north. In 1642 he defeated them again Lu's last 
 at Kempten, in the south. In the same year ^^^* 
 Roussillon submitted to France. Nor was Richelieu 
 less fortunate at home. The conspiracy of a young 
 courtier, the last of the efforts of the aristocracy to 
 shake off the heavy rule of the Cardinal, was detected, 
 and expiated on the scaffold. Richelieu did not long 
 survive his latest triumph. He died on December 4 ,1642. 
 
 Section V. — Aims and Character of Richelieu. 
 Unlike Lewis XIV. and Napoleon, Richelieu counts 
 amongst those few French statesmen whose fortune 
 mounted with their lives. It is not difficult „ ^. , 
 
 ? I. Riche- 
 
 to discover the cause. As in Gustavus, love lieu's domes- 
 of action was tempered by extreme prudence ''*^ ^° ^'^^' 
 and caution. But in Richelieu these ingredients of char- 
 acter were mingled in different proportions. The love 
 of action was far less impetuous. The caution was far 
 stronger. No man had a keener eye to distinguish the 
 conditions of success, or was more ready to throw aside 
 the dearest schemes when he believed them to be ac- 
 companied by insuperable difficulties. Braver heart 
 never was. There was the highest courage in the con- 
 stancy with which he, an invalid tottering for years on 
 the brink of the grave, and supported by a king whose 
 health was as feeble as his own, faced the whole might 
 
202 The Preponderance of France. 1641. 
 
 of the aristocracy of France. If he was harsh and un- 
 pitying it was to the enemies of the nation, to the nobles 
 who trod under their feet the peasant and the serf, and 
 who counted the possession of power merely as the high- 
 road to the advancement of their private fortunes. The 
 establishmenj: of a strong monarchical power was, as 
 France was then constituted, the only chance for indus- 
 try and commerce to lift up their heads, for the peace- 
 able arts of life to develop themselves in security, for the 
 intellect of man to have free course, and for the poor to 
 be protected from oppression. 
 
 All this was in Richelieu's heart ; and some little of 
 this he accomplished. The work of many generations 
 was in this man's brain. Yet he never attempted to 
 do more than the work of his own. As Bacon sketched 
 out the lines within which science was to move in the 
 
 days of Newton and of Faraday, so Richelieu 
 signs only ^" sketched out the lines within which French 
 com lished^' Statesmanship was to move in the days of 
 
 Colbert and of Turgot, or in those of the 
 great Revolution itself. 
 
 " All things for the people, nothing by the people." 
 This maxim attributed to Napoleon embodied as well the 
 
 policy of Richelieu, In it are embalmed the 
 people ^ strength and weakness of French statesman- 
 nothing in ship. The late growth of the royal power 
 
 and the long continuance of aristocratic op- 
 pression threw the people helpless and speechless into 
 the arms of the monarchy. They were happy if some 
 one should prove strong enough to take up their cause 
 without putting them to the trouble or the risk of think- 
 ing and speaking for themselves. It is no blame to 
 Richelieu if, being a Frenchman of the seventeenth cen- 
 tury, he worked under the only conditions which 
 
1641. Aims ajid Character of Richelieu. 203 
 
 Frenchmen of the seventeenth century would admit. 
 We can well fancy that he would think with scorn and 
 contempt of the English Revolution, which was accom- 
 plishing itself under his eyes. Yet in the England of the 
 Civil War, men were learning not merely to be governed 
 well, but to know what good government was. It was 
 a greater thing for a nation to learn to choose good and 
 to refuse evil, even if the progress was slow, than to be 
 led blindfold with far more rapid steps. 
 
 Richelieu's foreign policy was guided by thes sdme 
 deep calculation as his home policy. If at home he 
 
 saw that France was greater than any faction, „ 
 
 . "^ . ? 4. His 
 
 he had not arrived at the far higher notion foreign 
 that Europe was greater than France, ex- p^^^^' 
 cepting so far as he saw in the system of intolerance 
 supported by Spain an evil to be combated for the sake 
 of others who were not Frenchmen. But there is no sign 
 that he really cared for the prosperity of other nations 
 when it was not coincident with the prosperity of France. 
 As it is for the present generation a matter of complete 
 indifference whether Breisach was to be garrisoned by 
 Frenchmen or imperialists, it would be needless for us, 
 if we regarded Richelieu's motives alone, to trouble 
 ourselves much with the later years of the Thirty Years' 
 War. 
 
 But it is not always by purity of motive only that the 
 world's progress advances. Richelieu, in order to make 
 France strong, needed help, and he had to „ 
 
 111 § 5- His sup- 
 
 look about for help where the greatest port of rising 
 
 amount of strength was to be found. An 
 
 ordinary man would have looked to the physical 
 
 strength of armies, as Wallenstein did, or to the ideal 
 
 strength of established institutions, as Ferdinand did. 
 
 Richelieu knew better. He saw that for him who knows 
 
204 ■ The Preponderance of Fi'ance. 1641. 
 
 how to use it there is no lever in the world like that of a 
 rising cause, for a rising cause embodies the growing 
 dissatisfaction of men with a long-established evil, which 
 they have learned to detest, but which they have not yet 
 learned to overthrow. 
 
 In England Richelieu was on the side of Parliament- 
 ary opposition to the crown. In Germany he was on 
 A d f ^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^ opposition of the princes 
 those causes against the Emperor. In Italy he was on 
 
 which were in ^, . , - , . , ., ,. ^ 
 
 themselves the Side of the independence 01 the states 
 ^ against Spain. In the Peninsula he was on 
 
 the side of the provinces against the monarchy. There 
 is not the slightest reason to suppose that he cared one 
 atom for any of those causes except so far as they might 
 promote his own ends. Yet in every case he selected 
 those causes by which the real wants of the several 
 countries were best expressed. 
 
 It is this which distinguishes Richelieu from those 
 
 who in later times have measured the foreign policy of 
 
 France by French interests alone. They have taken up 
 
 any cause which promised to weaken a 
 
 ? 7. Contrast '' • ■> • 
 
 between powcrful neighbour, Without considering 
 
 Richelieu and i , ,i .v t.! r j 
 
 later French what the causc was worth. They favoured 
 politicians. Italian division in i860, and German divi- 
 sion in 1870. Richelieu had a clearer insight into the 
 nature of things than that. There can be no doubt that 
 he would far rather have attacked Spain and Austria 
 through the instrumentality of the League than through 
 the instrumentality of Gustavus and the Protestants ; but 
 he saw that the future was with Gustavus and not with 
 the League. He sacrificed his wishes to his policy. He 
 coquetted with the League, but he supported Gustavus. 
 
 When once Richelieu had gained his point, he was 
 contented with his success. He never aspired to more 
 
1 643- More French Victories, 205 
 
 than he could accomplish : never struck, 
 excepting for a purpose : never dommeered no exorbitant 
 through the mere insolence of power. He ^^"^^' 
 took good care to get Alsace into his hands, and to 
 make himself master of the passes of the Alps by the 
 possession of Pignerol ; but he never dreamed of found- 
 ing, like Napoleon, a French Confederation of the 
 Rhine, or a French kingdom of Italy. His interference 
 with his neighbours was as little obtrusive as possible. 
 
 Richelieu was quickly followed to the grave by the 
 sovereign in whose name he had accom- 
 plished so much. Lewis XIII. died on the ? 9. Death of 
 
 ^1 r TV /r /■ Lewis XIII. 
 
 14th of May, 1643. 
 
 Section VI. — More French Victories. 
 His son and successor, Lewis XIV., was a mere child. 
 His widow, Anne of Austria, claimed the regency, and 
 forgot that she was the sister of the King of Spain and 
 the sister-in-law of the Emperor, in the thought that she 
 was the widow of one king of France and the mother of 
 
 another. Her minister was Cardinal Maza- 
 
 1643. 
 
 rin, an Italian, who had commended himself ? i. Rule of 
 to Richelieu by his capacity for business 
 and his complete independence of French party feeling. 
 If he was noted rather for cleverness than for strength 
 of character, he was at least anxious to carry out the 
 policy of his predecessor, and to maintain the predomi- 
 nance of the crown over aristocratic factions ; and for 
 some time Richelieu's policy seemed to carry success 
 with it through the impetus which he had given it. On 
 May 19 a victory came to establish the new authority of 
 the queen-regent, the first of a long series of French vic- 
 tories, which was unbroken till the days of Marlborough 
 and Blenheim. 
 
2o6 The Preponderance of France. 1643. 
 
 The Spaniards had crossed the frontier of the Nether- 
 lands, and were besieg'ing Rocroy. The command oi 
 ^, the French forces was held by the duke oi 
 
 6 2. Ihe . •' 
 
 Spaniards Enghicn, better known to the world by the 
 
 croy. title which he afterwards inherited from his 
 
 father, as the Prince of Conde. Next to 
 Gaston, Duke of Orleans, the late king's brother, he and 
 his father stood first in succession to the throne, and had, 
 for this reason, attached themselves to Richelieu when 
 he was opposed by the great bulk of the aristocracy. Those 
 who placed him at the head of the army probably ex- 
 pected that a prince so young and so inexperienced 
 would content himself with giving his name to the cam- 
 paign, and would leave the direction of the troops to 
 older heads. 
 The older heads, after reconnoitring the Spanish posi- 
 tion at Rocroy, advised Enghien not to 
 and Enghien. fig^^t. But there was a certain Gassion 
 among the officers, who had served under 
 Gustavus, and who had seen the solid legions of Tilly 
 break down before the swift blows of the Swedish king 
 at Breitenfeld. Gassion had learned to look upon that 
 close Spanish formation with contempt, and fie strove 
 hard to persuade Enghien to give orders for the attack, 
 and, truth to say, he had no very hard task. Enghien 
 was young and sanguine, and whether he had a genius 
 for war or not, he had at least a genius for battles. Al- 
 ready conscious of the skill with which he was to direct 
 the fortunes of many a well-fought field, he heartily 
 adopted the views laid before him by Gassion. 
 
 Rocroy was, so to speak, a second edition of Breiten- 
 feld, a victory gained by vigour and flexibility over solid 
 „ , ^ endurance. Unreasoning obedience once 
 
 ?4. Battle of ° , . n- 
 
 Rocroy. more gave way before disciplined mtelli- 
 
1 643- More French Victories. 207 
 
 gence. The Spanish masses stood with all the strength of 
 a mediaeval fortress. There was no manoeuvering power 
 in them. The French artillery ploughed its way through 
 the ranks, and the dashing charges of the infantry drove 
 the disaster home. The glories of the Spanish armies, 
 the glories which dated from the days of the Great Cap- 
 tain, were clouded for ever. Yet if victory was lost to 
 Spain, the cherished honour of the Spanish arms was 
 safe. Man by man the warriors fell in the ranks in which 
 they stood, like the English defenders of the banner of 
 Harold at Senlac. Their leader, the Count of Fuentes, 
 an old man worn with years and gout, and unable to stand, 
 was seated in an arm-chair to direct the battle within a 
 square composed of his veteran troops. Death found 
 him at his post. He had fought in the old wars of 
 Philip n. The last of a long heroic race of statesmen 
 and soldiers had bowed his head before the rising genius 
 of France. 
 
 Thionville was then besieged. It surrendered in 
 Ausrust. The cautious Richelieu had been , _ 
 
 ° g 5. Extension 
 
 contented to announce that he reserved all of the French 
 question of the ownership of his conquests 
 ^ill it should be finally determined by a treaty of peace. 
 After Rocroy, Mazarin had no such scruples. Thion- 
 ville was formally annexed to France. A medal was 
 struck on which Hope was borne in the hand of Vic- 
 tory, and on which was inscribed the legend, Prima 
 finiujn propagatic. 
 
 In Germany the campaign of 1643 was less successful. 
 Maximilian of Bavaria had put forth all his resources, 
 and his generals, the dashing John of Werth 
 and the prudent Mercy, of whom it was said f^jj Turenne. 
 that he knew the plans of the enemy as well 
 as if he had sat in their councils, were more than a 
 
2o8 The Preponderance of France. 1645. 
 
 1644. match for the French commanders. In 1644 
 
 they were opposed by a soldier of a quahty higher than 
 their own. Turenne was sent amongst them, but his 
 forces were too few to enable him to operate with suc- 
 cess. Freiburg in the Breisgau was taken before his 
 eyes. Breisach was threatened. Then Enghien came 
 with 10,000 men to assume the command over the head 
 of the modest soldier who had borne the weight of the 
 campaign. Proud of his last year's victory he despised 
 the counsel of Turenne, that it was better to out-manoeu- 
 vre the enemy than to fight him in an almost inaccessible 
 position. 
 
 The battle fought amongst the vineyards of Freiburg 
 was the bloodiest battle of a bloody war. For three days 
 
 Enghien led his men to the butchery. At last 
 Freiburg! ^ ° Mercy, Unable to provide food any longer for 
 
 his troops, effected his retreat. The French 
 
 reaped the prizes of a victory which they had not gained. 
 
 On the 3d of August, 1645, a second battle of Nord- 
 
 lingen was fought. It was almost a repetition of the 
 
 slaughter of Freiburg. As in the year before, 
 I z. Battle Turenne had been left to do the hard work 
 of Nordlin- ^^ ^^ opening of the campaign with inferior 
 
 forces, and had even suffered a check. 
 Once more Enghien came up, gay and dashing, at the 
 head of a reinforcement of picked men. Once more a 
 fearful butchery ensued. But that Mercy was slain 
 early in the fight, the day might have gone hard with 
 the French. As it was, they were able to claim a vic- 
 tory. The old German bands which had served under 
 Bernhard held out to the uttermost and compelled the 
 enemy to retreat. But the success was not lasting. The 
 imperialists received reinforcements, and the French 
 were driven back upon the Rhine. 
 
1 645' Turenne' s Strategy. 209 
 
 The same year had opened with splendid expectations 
 on the other side of the theatre of the war. The gouty 
 Swedish general, Torstenson. who had taken 
 up Baner's work in the north, burst suddenly of^jankow. 
 into Bohemia, and on the 6th of March in- 
 flicted a crushing defeat on the imperialists at Jankow. 
 He then harried Moravia, and pressed on to lay siege to 
 Vienna, as if to repair the fault which it was the fashion 
 to ascribe to Gustavus. But Vienna was unassailable, 
 and Torstenson, like Turenne, was driven to retreat. 
 He next tried to reduce Briinn. Failing in this he re- 
 turned to Bohemia, where, worn out with his maladies, 
 he delivered over the command to Wrangel, his ap- 
 pointed successor. 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 THE END OF THE WAR. 
 
 Section I. — Turenne' s Strategy, 
 
 At last the thought entered into men's minds that it was 
 time to put a stop to this purposeless misery and slaughter. 
 It was hopeless to think any longer of shak- ^^ 
 ing the strong grasp of France upon the ? i. Thoughts 
 Rhine ; and if Sweden had been foiled in ° p^^^^- 
 striking to the heart of the Austrian monarchy, she 
 could not be driven from the desolate wilderness which 
 now, by the evil work of men's hands, stretched from 
 the Baltic far away into the interior of Germany. Long 
 ago the disciplined force which Gustavus had brought 
 across the sea had melted away, and a Swedish army 
 was now like other armies — a mere collection of merce- 
 naries, without religion, without pity, and without remorse. 
 
2IO The End of the War. 1645. 
 
 Negotiations for peace were spoken of from time to 
 
 time, and preparations were at last made for a great 
 
 meeting of diplomatists. In order to prevent 
 
 I 2. Meeting ^ ^ , , . ^ . 
 
 of diploma- the usual quarrel about precedency it was 
 decided that some of the ambassadors should 
 hold their sittings at Osnabriick and others at Miinster, 
 an arrangement which was not likely to conduce to a 
 speedy settlement. The Emperor proved his sincerity 
 by sending his representative early enough to arrive at 
 Miinster in July, 1643, whilst the Swedish and French 
 ambassadors only made their appearance in the March 
 i6^^^ and April of the following year, and it was 
 1645. only in June, 1645, that the first formal pro- 
 position was handed in. 
 
 All who were concerned were in fact ready to make 
 
 peace, but they all wished it made on their own terms. 
 
 „ , Ferdinand III. was not bound by his father's 
 
 g 3. Jieluc- ■> 
 
 tanceofthe antecedents. The Edict of Restitution had 
 give'up'air been no work of his. Long before this he 
 that IS asked. j^^^^ bccn ready to give all reasonable satis- 
 faction to the Protestants. He had declared his readi- 
 ness to include Calvinists as well as Lutherans in the re- 
 ligious peace. He had offered to restore the Lower Pa- 
 latinate to Frederick's son, and he actually issued a gene- 
 ral amnesty to all who were still in arms ; but he shrank 
 from the demand that these arrangements of the Empire 
 should be treated of, not in the constitutional assemblies 
 of the Empire, but in a congress of European powers. 
 To do so would be to tear the last veil from the sad truth 
 that the Empire was a mere shadow, and that the states 
 of which it was composed had become practically in- 
 dependent sovereignties. And behind this degradation 
 lay another degradation, hardly less bitter to Ferdinand. 
 The proudest title of the great emperors of old had been 
 
1 645 • Turenne' s Strategy. 211 
 
 that of Increaser of the Empire. Was he to go down to 
 posterity with the title of Diminisher of the Empire ? And 
 yet it was beyond his power to loosen the hold of France 
 upon Alsace, or of Sweden upon Pomerania. 
 
 Nor was it only as Emperor that Ferdinand would feel 
 the loss of Alsace deeply. Together with the Breisgau it 
 formed one of territories of the House of , 
 
 §4. Espe- 
 
 Austria, but it was not his own. It was the ciaily the 
 inheritance of the children of his uncle Leo- "^^'^s^u. 
 pold, and he was loth to purchase peace for himself by 
 agreeing to the spoliation of his orphan nephews. 
 
 Maximilian of Bavaria viewed the question of peace 
 from another point of view. To him Alsace was noth- 
 ing, and he warmly recommended Ferdi- , 
 
 1 , . - , , /. ? 5- Aims of 
 
 nand to surrender it for the sake of peace, the Elector 
 If concessions were to be made at all, he ° ^vana. 
 preferred making them to Catholic France rather than 
 to the Protestants in the Empire, and he was convinced 
 that if Alsace remained under French rule, the motive 
 which had led France to support the Protestants would 
 lose its chief weight. But besides these general con- 
 siderations, Maximilian, like Ferdinand, had a special 
 interest of his own. He was resolved, come what might, 
 to retain at least the Upper Palatinate, and he trusted 
 to be seconded in his resolve by the good offices of 
 France. 
 
 The position of Maximilian was thus something like 
 that of John George of Saxony in 1632. He and his 
 chief ally were both ready for peace, but 
 his ally stood out for higher terms than he campaign of 
 was prepared to demand. And as in 1632 ^ "^ ' 
 Wallenstein saw in the comparative moderation of the 
 Elector of Saxony only a reason for driving him by 
 force to separate his cause from that of Gustavus, so in 
 
212 The End of ih-e War. 1646. 
 
 1646 the French government resolved to fall upon Ba- 
 varia, and to force the elector to separate his cause from 
 that of Ferdinand. 
 
 The year before, the Elector of Saxony, crushed and 
 
 ruined by the Swedes, had consented to a separate truce, 
 
 and now Turenne was commissioned to do 
 
 out-mknffiu^^ the Same with Bavaria. In August he 
 
 vres the effected a junction on the Lahn with Wran- 
 
 Bavanans. -^ 
 
 gel and the Swedes, and if Enghien had 
 been there, history would doubtless have had to tell of 
 another butchery as resultless as those of Freiburg and 
 Ndrdlingen. But Enghien was far away in Flanders, 
 laying siege to Dunkirk, and Turenne, for the first time 
 at the head of a superior force, was about to teach the 
 world a lesson in the art of war. Whilst the enemy was 
 preparing for the expected attack by entrenching his 
 position, the united French and Swedish armies slipped 
 past them and marched straight for the heart of Bavaria, 
 where an enemy had not been seen since Bernhard had 
 been chased out in 1634, That one day, as Turenne 
 truly said, altered the whole face of affairs. Everywhere 
 the roads were open. Provisions were plentiful. The 
 population was in the enjoyment of the blessings of 
 peace. Turenne and Wrangel crossed the Danube 
 without difficulty. Schorndorf, Wiirzburg, Nordlingen, 
 Donauworth made no resistance to them. It was not 
 till they came to Augsburg that they met with opposition. 
 The enemy had time to come up. But there v/as no 
 unanimity in the councils of the enemy. The Bavarian 
 generals wanted to defend Bavaria. The imperialist 
 generals wanted to defend the still remaining Austrian 
 possessions in Swabia. The invaders were allowed to 
 accomplish their purpose. They arrived at the gates of 
 Munich before the citizens knew what had become of 
 
1 6 4-8. The Treaty of Westphalia. 213 
 
 their master's army. With grim purpose Turenne and 
 Wrangel set themselves to make desolate the Bavarian 
 plain, so that it might be rendered incapable of support- 
 ing a Bavarian army. Maximilian was reduced to straits 
 such as he had not known since the time when Tilly fell 
 at the passage of the Lech. Sorely against his will he 
 signed, in May, 1647, a separate truce with the enemy. 
 The truce did not last long. In September Maxi- 
 milian was once more on the Emperor's side. Bavaria 
 paid dearly for the elector's defection. All ,g t t 
 that had been spared a year before fell a struggles of 
 sacrifice to new devastation. The last great 
 battle of the war was fought at Zusmarshausen on May 
 17, 1648. The Bavarians were defeated and the work 
 of the destroyer went on yet for a while unchecked. In 
 Bohemia half of Prague fell into the hands of the Swedes, 
 and the Emperor was left unaided to bear up in the un- 
 equal fight. 
 
 Section II. — The Treaty of Westphalia, 
 Ferdinand could resist no longer. On the 24th of 
 October, 1648, a few months before Charles ^ ^^^ 
 I. ascended the scaffold at Whitehall, the Peace of 
 Peace of Westphalia was signed. 
 
 The religious difficulty in Germany was settled as it 
 ought to have been settled long before. Calvinism 
 was to be placed on the same footing as 
 Lutheranism. New-Year's day 1624 was feuiem1'S°"^ 
 fixed upon as the date by which all dis- 
 putes were to be tested. Whatever ecclesiastical bene- 
 fice was in Catholic hands at that date was to remain in 
 Catholic hands forever. Ecclesiastical benefices in Pro- 
 testant hands at that date were to remain in Protestant 
 keeping. Catholics would never again be able to lay 
 
214 The End of the War. 1648. 
 
 claim to the bishoprics of the north. Even Halberstadt, 
 which had been retained at the Peace of Prague, was 
 now lost to them. To make this settlement permanent, 
 the Imperial Court was reconstituted. Protestants and 
 Catholics were to be members of the court in equal 
 numbers. And if the judicial body was such as to make 
 it certain that its sanction would never be given to an 
 infringement of the peace, the Catholic majority in the 
 Diet became powerless for evil. 
 
 In political matters, Maximilian permanently united 
 the Upper Palatinate to his duchy of Bavaria, and the 
 
 Electorate was confirmed to him and his 
 settlement*^^ descendants. An eighth electorate was 
 
 created in favour of Charles Lewis, the 
 worthless son of the Elector, Frederick, and the 
 Lower Palatinate was given up to him. Sweden estab- 
 lished herself firmly on the mouths of the great north- 
 ern rivers. The Eastern part of Pomerania she sur- 
 rendered to Brandenburg. But Western Pomerania, 
 including within its frontier both banks of the lower 
 Vistula, was surrendered to her ; whilst the possession 
 of the bishoprics of Bremen and Verdun, on which 
 Christian of Denmark had set his eyes at the beginning 
 of the war, gave her a commanding position at the 
 mouths of the Elbe and the Weser. The bishoprics of 
 Halberstadt, Camin, Minden, and the greater part of 
 the diocese of Magdeburg, were made over to Branden- 
 burg as a compensation for the loss of its claims to the 
 whole of Pomerania, whilst a smaller portion of the 
 diocese of Magdeburg was assigned to Saxony, that 
 power, as a matter of course, retaining Lusatia. 
 
 France, as a matter of course, retained its conquests. 
 , „ . r It kept its hold upon Austrian Alsace, 
 
 94. Gains of ^ ^ 
 
 France. Strasburg, as a free city, and the immediate 
 
1648. Tlie Treaty of Westphalia. 215 
 
 vassals of the Empire being, however, excluded from 
 the cession. The strong fortress of Philippsburg, erected 
 by the warlike Elector of Treves, received a French gar- 
 rison, and the three bishoprics, Metz, Toul, and Verdun, 
 which had been practically under French rule since 
 the days of Henry II. of France, were now formally 
 separated from the Empire. Equally formal was the 
 separation of Switzerland and the Netherlands, both of 
 which countries had long been practically independent. 
 The importance of the peace of Westphalia in Eu- 
 ropean history goes far beyond these territorial changes. 
 That France should have a few miles more „ ^, 
 
 Z5- Iheques- 
 
 and Germany a few miles less, or even that tion of toiera- 
 
 T-. 1111 • 1 M". 1 tion left to the 
 
 r ranee should have acquired military and German 
 political strength whilst Germany lost it, P^^'^^^es. 
 are facts which in themselves need not have any very 
 great interest for others than Frenchmen or Germans. 
 That which gives to the Peace of Westphalia its promi- 
 nent place amongst treaties is that it drew a final de- 
 marcation between the two religions which divided Eu- 
 rope. The struggle in England and France for the 
 right of settling their own religious affairs without the 
 interference of foreign nations had been brought to a close 
 in the sixteenth century. In Germany it had not been 
 brought to a close for the simple reason that it was not 
 decided how far Germany was a nation at all. The 
 government of England or France could tolerate or per- 
 secute at home as far as its power or inclination per- 
 mitted. But the central government of Germany was 
 not strong enough to enforce its will upon the territorial 
 governments ; nor on the other hand were the territorial 
 governments strong enough to enforce their will with- 
 out regard for the central government. Thirty years of 
 war ended by a compromise under which the religious 
 
 Q 
 
2i6 The End of the War. 1648. 
 
 position of each territory was fixed by the intervention 
 of foreign powers, whilst the rights of the central gov- 
 ernment were entirely ignored. 
 
 Such a settlement was by no means necessarily in 
 favour of religious toleration. The right of an Elector of 
 I 6. How Bavaria or an Elector of Saxony to impose 
 the^resuk of^^ ^^^ belief by force upon his dissident sub- 
 *^'^- jects was even more fully acknowledged 
 
 than before. He could still give them their choice be- 
 tween conversion or banishment. As late as in 1729 an 
 Archbishop of Salzburg could drive thousands of indus- 
 trious Protestants into exile from his Alpine valleys, leav- 
 ing a void behind them which has not been filled up to 
 this day. But if such cases were rare, their rarity was in- 
 directly owing to the Peace of Westphalia. In 1617 a 
 bishop who had to consider the question of religious per- 
 secution, had to consider it with the fear of Christian of 
 Anhalt before his eyes. Every Protestant in his do- 
 minions was a possible traitor who would favour, if he 
 did not actively support, the revolutionary attacks of 
 the neighbouring Protestants. In 1649 ^ such fear was 
 at an end for ever. The bishop was undisputed master 
 of his territory, and he could look on with contemp- 
 tuous indifference if a few of his subjects had sufficient 
 love of singularity to profess a religion other than his 
 own. 
 
 It may perhaps be said that the assurance given by 
 
 the Peace of Westphalia was after all no better than the 
 
 „, _ assurance given by the Peace of Augsburg, 
 
 ?7. The Peace , ^ ^ -^ , , . ^ ^ 
 
 of Westphalia but cven SO far as the letter of the two 
 
 compared with j , j ^-l • c 
 
 the Peace of documcnts was conccmcd, this was very tar 
 Augsburg. from being the case. The Peace of Augs- 
 burg was full of uncertainties, because the contracting 
 parties were unable to abandon their respective desires. 
 
1648. Condition of Germany. 217 
 
 In the Peace of Westphalia all was definite. Evasion 
 or misinterpretation was no longer possible. 
 
 If the letter of the two treaties was entirely different, 
 it was because the spirit in which they were conceived 
 was also entirely different. In i;;!; Protes- 
 
 \ . ■'■'■' §8. General 
 
 tantism was on the rise. The peace of 1555 desire for the 
 
 ,, ,, 1^ ^^1 ,-ii continuance of 
 
 was a vam attempt to shut out the tide by peace. 
 artificial dykes and barriers. In 1648 the tide had re- 
 ceded. The line which divided the Protestant from 
 the Catholic princes formed almost an exact division be- 
 tween the Protestant and Catholic populations. The 
 desire for making proselytes, once so strong on both 
 sides, had been altogether extinguished by the numbing 
 agony of the war. All Germany longed for peace with 
 an inexpressible longing. The mutual distrust of 
 Catholic and Protestant had grown exceedingly dull. 
 The only feeling yet alive was hatred of the tyranny and 
 exactions of the soldiers. 
 
 Section III. — Condition of Germany, 
 
 What a peace it was when it really came at last! 
 Whatever life there was under that deadly blast of war 
 had been attracted to the camps. The strong man who 
 had lost his all turned soldier that he might be able to 
 rob others in turn. The young girl, who in 
 better times would have passed on to a life of\he war? 
 of honourable wedlock with some youth 
 who had been the companion of her childhood in the 
 sports around the village fountain, had turned aside, for 
 very starvation, to a life of shame in the train of one or 
 other of the armies by which her home had been made 
 desolate. In the later years of the war it was known 
 that a body of 40,000 fighting men drew along with it a 
 loathsome following of no less than 140,000 men, women. 
 
2i8 The End of the War. 1648. 
 
 and children, contributing nothing to the efficiency of 
 the army, and all of them living at the expense of the 
 miserable peasants who still contrived to hold on to 
 their ruined fields. If these were to live, they must steal 
 what yet remained to be stolen ; they must devour, with 
 the insatiable hunger of locusts, what yet remained to be 
 devoured. And then, if sickness came, or wounds — 
 and sickness was no infrequent visitor in those camps — 
 w'hat remained but misery or death ? Nor was it much 
 better with the soldiers themselves. No careful surgeons 
 passed over the battle-field to save life or limb. No 
 hospitals received the wounded to the tender nursing 
 of loving, gentle hands. Recruits were to be bought 
 cheaply, and it cost less to enrol a new soldier than to 
 cure an old one. 
 
 The losses of the civil population were almost incre-- 
 dible. In a certain district of Thuringia which was pro- 
 _ bably better off than the greater part of 
 
 3 2. Decrease o tr 
 
 of the Germany, there were, before the war cloud 
 
 popuation, "burst, 1,717 houscs standing in nineteen 
 villages. In 1649, only 627 houses were left. And even 
 of the houses which remained many were untenanted. 
 The 1,717 houses had been inhabited by 1,773 families. 
 Only 316 families could be found to occupy the 627 
 houses. Property fared still worse. In the same dis- 
 trict 244 oxen alone remained of 1,402. Of 4,616 sheep, 
 not one was left. Two centuries later the losses thus 
 suffered were scarcely recovered. 
 
 And, as is always the case, the physical decline of the 
 population was accompanied by moral decadence. Men 
 who had been accustomed to live by the 
 decadence. Strong arm, and men who had been accus- 
 tomed to suffer all things from those who 
 were strong, met one another, even in the days of peace, 
 
1648. Conditio7i of Germany. 219 
 
 without that mutual respect which forms the basis of well- 
 ordered life. Courts were crowded with feather-brained 
 soldiers whose highest ambition was to bedeck them- 
 selves in a splendid uniform and to copy the latest 
 fashion or folly which was in vogue at Paris or Versailles. 
 In the country district a narrow-minded gentry, without 
 knowledge or culture, domineered over all around, and 
 strove to exact the uttermost farthing from the peasant 
 in order to keep up the outward appearance of rank. 
 The peasant whose father had been bullied by maraud- 
 ing soldiers dared not Hft up his head against the ex- 
 actions of the squire. The burden of the general 
 impoverishment fell heavily upon his shoulders. The 
 very pattern of the chairs on which he sat, of the vessels 
 out of which he ate and drank, assumed a ruder appear- 
 ance than they had borne before the war. In all ranks 
 life was meaner, poorer, harder than it had been at the 
 beginning of the century. 
 
 If much of all this was the result of the war, something 
 was owing to causes antecedently at work. 
 The German people in the beginning of the tuai decfine*^' 
 seventeenth century was plainly inferior to the^wa?^^ 
 the German people in the beginning of the 
 sixteenth century. During the whole course of the war 
 Maximilian of Bavaria was the only man of German 
 birth who rose to eminence, and even he did not attain 
 the first rank. The destinies of the land of Luther and 
 Gothe, of Frederick II. and Stein were decided by a few 
 men of foreign birth. Wallenstein was a Slavonian, 
 Tilly a Walloon, Gustavus a Swede, Richelieu a French- 
 man. The penalty borne by a race which was unable 
 to control individual vigour within the limits of a large 
 and fruitful national life was that individual vigour itself 
 died out. 
 
220 The End of the War. 1648. 
 
 We may well leave to those who like such tasks the 
 work of piling up articles of accusation against this man 
 or that, of discovering that the war was all 
 ties inherited" the fault of Ferdinand, or all the fault of 
 times^^^^^ Frederick, as party feeling may lead them. 
 
 Probably the most lenient judgment is also 
 the truest one. With national and territorial institutions 
 the mere chaos which they were, an amount of political 
 intelligence was needed to set tjiem right which would 
 be rare in any country or in any age. 
 
 As far as national institutions were concerned the 
 Thirty Years' War made a clean sweep in Germany. 
 Nominally, it is true, Emperor and Empire 
 (disintegration Still remained. Ferdinand III. was still ac- 
 ermany. cording to his titles head of all Christendom, 
 if not of the whole human race. The Diet still gathered 
 to discuss the affairs of the Empire. The imperial court, 
 re-established on the principle of equality between the 
 two religions, still met to dispense justice between the 
 estates of the Empire. But from these high-sounding 
 names all reality had fled. The rule over German men 
 had passed for many a long day into the hands of the 
 princes. It was for the princes to strive with one 
 another in peace or war under the protection of foreign 
 alliances ; and by and by, half consciously, half uncon- 
 sciously, to compete for the leadership of Germany by the 
 intelligence and discipline which they were able to fos- 
 ter under their sway. 
 
 When the days of this competition arrived it was of 
 
 inestimable advantage to Germany that, whatever else 
 
 had been lost, Protestantism had been 
 
 imism saved, savcd. Wherever Protestantism had firmly 
 
 rooted itself there sprang up in course of 
 
 time a mighty race of intellectual giants. Gothe and 
 
1648. War between France and Spain. 221 
 
 Schiller, Lessing and Kant, Stein and Humboldt, with 
 thousands more of names which have made German in- 
 tellect a household word in the whole civilized world, 
 sprung from Protestant Germany. When Bavaria, 
 scarcely more than two generations ago, awoke to the 
 consciousness that she had not more than the merest ru- 
 diments of education to give to her children, she had to 
 apply to the Protestant north for teachers. 
 
 For Germany in 1648 the worst was over. Physically, 
 at least she had no more to suffer. One 
 
 ri- 1 • , , , , § 8. The 
 
 page ot her history was closed and another worst over for 
 had not yet been opened. She lay for a G^'^^^^y- 
 time in the insensibility of exhaustion. 
 
 Section IV. — Continuance of the War between France 
 and Spaiit. 
 
 For France 1648 is hardly a date at all. She was rid 
 of the war in Germany. But her war with Spain was 
 not brought to an end. And if Spain would 
 no longer have the support of the imperial- between Spain 
 ists of Germany, France was at the same ^" ^ ^ ^^^ ' 
 time deprived of the support of a far more vigorous ally. 
 Spain at last lowered its haughty neck to accept condi- 
 tions of peace on terms of equality from the Dutch re- 
 public. The eighty years' war of the Netherlands was 
 brought to a conclusion simultaneously with the thirty 
 years' war of Germany. Spain could now send rein- 
 forcements to Flanders by sea without fearing the over- 
 whelming superiority of the Dutch marine, and could 
 defend the southern frontier of the obedient provinces 
 without having to provide against an attack in the rear. 
 
 In the long run, a duel between France and Spain 
 could be of no doubtful issue. It was a contest between 
 the old system of immobility and intolerance and the 
 
222 Hie End of the War. 1652. 
 
 new system of intelligence and tolerance ; between a 
 g 2. France government which despised industry and 
 and Spam. commerce, and a government which fostered 
 them. But however excellent might be the aims which 
 the French government kept in view, it was still in its 
 nature an absolute government. No free discussion en- 
 lightened its judgment. No popular intervention kept 
 in check its caprices. It was apt to strike roughly and 
 ignorantly, to wound many feelings and to impose griev- 
 ous burdens upon the poor and the weak whose lamen- 
 tations never reached the height of the throne. 
 
 Suddenly, when Mazarin's government appeared most 
 firmly rooted, there was an explosion which threatened 
 § 3. The to change the whole face of France. An 
 
 Fronde. outcry arose for placing restrictions upon 
 
 rights of the crown, for establishing constitutional and 
 individual liberties. The Fronde, as the party which 
 uttered the cry was called, did its best to imitate the 
 English Long Parliament whose deeds were then ringing 
 through the world. But there were no elements in France 
 upon which to establish constitutional government. The 
 Parliament of Paris, which wished itself to be considered 
 the chief organ of that government, was a close corpora- 
 tion of lawyers, who had bought or inherited judicial 
 places ; and of all governments, a government in the 
 hands of a close corporation of lawyers is likely, in the 
 long run, to be the most narrow-minded and unprogres- 
 sive of all possible combinations ; for it is the business of 
 a lawyer to administer the law as it exists, not to modify 
 it in accordance with the new facts which rise constantly 
 to the surface of social and political life. Nor were the 
 lawyers of the parliament fortunate in their supporters. 
 The Paris mob, combined with a knot of intriguing 
 courtiers, could form no firm basis for a healthy revolu- 
 
165 7- War between Frcuice a7id Spain. 223 
 
 tion. It was still worse when Conde, quarrelling on a 
 personal question with Mazarin, raised the standard of 
 aristocratic revolt, and threw himself into the arms of the 
 Spanish invader. Mazarin and the young king repre- 
 sented the nation against aristocratic selfishness and in- 
 trigue ; and when they obtained the services of Turenne, 
 the issue was hardly doubtful. In 1652 Louis XIV. entered 
 Paris in triumph. In 1653 Conde, in conjunction with a 
 Spanish army, invaded France, and pushed on hopefully 
 for Paris. But Turenne was there with a handful of troops ; 
 and if Conde was the successor of Gustavus in the art of 
 fighting battles, Turenne was Wallenstein's successor in 
 the art of strategy. Conde could neither fight nor advance 
 with effect. The siege and reduction of Rocroy was the 
 only result of a campaign which had been commenced 
 in the expectation of reducing France to submission. 
 
 In 1654 Conde and the Spaniards laid siege to Arras, 
 whilst the French were besieging Stenay. Stenay was 
 taken ; Arras was relieved. In 1655 further ^^ The war 
 progress was made by the French on the ^^* Spain. 
 frontier of the Netherlands ; but in 1656 they failed in the 
 siege of Valenciennes. 
 
 With the check thus inflicted, a new danger appeared 
 above the horizon. In England there had 
 
 J r- 11 J \J>- France, 
 
 arisen, under Cromwell, a new and power- Cromwell, and 
 ful military state upon the ruins of the mon- ^^'"' 
 archy of the Stuarts. To Cromwell Spain addressed itself 
 with the most tempting offers. The old English jealousy 
 of France, and the political advantage of resisting its 
 growing strength, were urged in favour of a Spanish alli- 
 ance. Cromwell might renew the old glories of the Plan- 
 tagenets, and might gather round him the forces of the Hu- 
 guenots of the south. If Charles I . had failed at Rochelle, 
 Cromwell might establish himself firmly at Bordeaux. 
 
2 24 The End of the War. 1660. 
 
 For a moment Cromwell was shaken. Then he made 
 two demands of the Spanish ambassador. He must 
 have, he said freedom for Englishmen to 
 refused ^'" trade in the Indies, and permission for Eng- 
 
 terms^^^^'^ lishmen carrying on commercial inter- 
 course with Spain to profess their religion 
 openly without interference. " To give you this," was 
 the Spaniard's cool reply, *' would be to give you my 
 master's two eyes." 
 
 To beat down religious exclusiveness and commercial 
 exclusiveness was the work to which Cromwell girded 
 himself. An alliance with France was 
 between^^'^^ quickly made. The arrogant intolerance of 
 Eng^ancf^^ Spain was to perish through its refusal to 
 admit the new principle of toleration. The 
 politic tolerance of France was to rise to still higher 
 fortunes by the admission of the principle on which all 
 its successes had been based since Richelieu's accession 
 to power. In 1657, six thousand of Cromwell's Ironsides 
 landed to take part in continental warfare. The union 
 of Turenne's strategy with the valour and discipline 
 which had broken down opposition at Naseby and Wor- 
 cester was irresistible. That autumn the small Flemish 
 port of Mardyke surrendered. In 1658 Dunkirk was 
 taken, and given over, according to compact, to the 
 English auxiliaries. But France, too, reaped an ample 
 harvest. Gravelines, Oudenarde, Ypres saw the white 
 flag of France flying from their ramparts. 
 
 Spain was reduced to seek for peace. In 1660 the 
 
 Treaty of the Pyrenees, a supplement as it were to 
 
 the Treaty of Westphalia, put an end to the 
 
 Treaty of the long war. The advantages of the peace 
 
 yrenees. were all on the side of France. Roussillon 
 
 and Artois, with Thionville, Landrecies, and Avesnes, 
 
i66o. War between Fraitce and Spain. 225 
 
 were incorporated with France. Another condition was 
 pregnant with future evil. Lewis XIV. gave his hand to 
 the sister of PhiHp IV. of Spain, the next heiress to the 
 Spanish monarchy after the sickly infant who became 
 afterwards the imbecile and childish Charles II. At 
 her marriage she abandoned all right to the great in- 
 heritance ; but even at the time there were not wanting 
 Frenchmen of authority to point to circumstances which 
 rendered the renunciation null and void. 
 
 Richelieu's power had been based upon tolerance at 
 home and moderation abroad. Was it likely that his 
 successors would always imitate his exam- g g, The 
 pie? What guarantee could be given that f'^f^^f^^^d 
 the French monarchy would not turn its on its tolerance. 
 back upon the principles from which its strength had 
 been derived ? In a land of free discussion, every gain 
 is a permanent one. When Protestantism, or toleration, 
 or freedom of the press, or freedom of trade had been 
 once accepted in England, they were never abandoned ; 
 they became articles of popular belief, on which no hesi- 
 tation, except by scattered individuals, was possible. 
 Multitudes who would find it difficult to give a good 
 reason why they thought one thing to be true and 
 another untrue, had yet a hazy confidence in the result of 
 the battle of reason which had taken place, much in the 
 same way as there are millions of people in the world 
 who believe implicitly that the earth goes round the sun, 
 without being able to give a reason for their behef. 
 
 In France it was hard for anything of the kind to take 
 
 place. Tolerance was admitted there by the mere will of 
 
 the government in the seventeenth century, 
 
 r 1 1 • 1 1 .1. g 10. But this 
 
 just as free trade was admitted by the mere depended on 
 
 will of the government in the nineteenth g^g^^^^ °^ '^* 
 
 century. The hand that gave could also 
 
226 The End of the War. 1660. 
 
 take away ; and it depended on the young king to 
 decide whether he would walk in the steps of the great 
 minister who had cleared the way before him, or whether 
 he would wander into devious paths of his own seeking. 
 At first everything promised well. A great statesman, 
 Colbert, filled the early part of the manhood of Lewis 
 
 XIV. with a series of domestic reforms, the 
 tolerance of Icast of which would havc gladdened the 
 
 heart of Richelieu. Taxation was reduced, 
 the tolls taken upon the passage of goods from one pro- 
 vince to another were diminished in number, trade and 
 industry were encouraged, the administration of justice 
 was improved ; all, in short, that it was possible to do 
 within the circle of one man's activity was done to make 
 France a prosperous and contented land. But the happy 
 time was not of long duration. The war fever took pos- 
 session of Lewis ; the lust of absolute domination entered 
 into his heart. He became the tyrant and bully of Eu- 
 rope ; and as abroad he preferred to be feared rather 
 than to be loved, at home he would be content with 
 nothing else than the absolute mastery over the con- 
 sciences as well as over the hearts of his subjects. The 
 Edict of Nantes, issued by Henry IV. and confirmed by 
 the policy of Richelieu, was revoked, and intolerance 
 and persecution became the law of the French monarchy, 
 as it had been the law of the Spanish monarchy. 
 
 It was not for this that Henry IV. and Rl- 
 §12. Fate chelieu had laboured. The tree that bears no 
 French iryixt must be cut down to the ground, or it will 
 
 monarchy perish by its own inherent rottenness. As the 
 Empire had fallen, as the Spanish monarchy had fallen, 
 the French monarchy, shaken by the thunders of La 
 Hogue and Blenheim, fell at last, when, amidst the corrup- 
 tion of Versailles, it ceased to do any useful work for man. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 AUS 
 
 AACHEN {Aix-la-Chapelle) 
 place of coronation, 2. 
 
 Administrators. See Bishoprics. 
 
 Aix la-Chapelle. See Aachen. 
 
 Aldringer, oflfers to assist Wallen- 
 stein, 17s ; declares against him, 
 177 ; tries to seize him, 177. 
 
 Alsace, Mansfeld in, 50 ; his designs 
 there, 56 ; Mansfeld returns, to, 60 ; 
 proposed march of Mansfeld to 75 ; 
 its possession of importance to 
 France, 191 ; comes into French 
 possession, 197. 
 
 Anhalt, Prince of. See character of 
 Anhalt. 
 
 Anne of Austria, Regent of France, 
 205. 
 
 Anspach, the Margrave of, hopes for 
 a revolution, 135. 
 
 Anstruther, Sir Robert, his mission 
 to the King of Denmark, 84. 
 
 Arnim, ordered by Wallenstein to 
 besiege Stralsund, 108 ; commands 
 the Saxons at Breitenfeld, 139 ; his 
 conference with Wallenstein, 153 ; 
 is expected to meet Wallenstein at 
 Eger, 179. 
 
 Arras, besieged by Conde, 223. 
 
 Augsburg, city of, swears obedience 
 to Gustavus, 150 ; besieged by the 
 imperialists, 187 ; resists Turenne, 
 212. 
 
 Augsburg, Peace of, 9 ; questions 
 arising out of it, 10; evaded by the 
 Protestants, 11. 
 
 Austria, Lower, estates of, attempt 
 to wring concessions from Ferdi- 
 nand, 36. 
 
 Austria, Upper, surrenders to Maxi- 
 milian, 42 ; pledged to Maximilian, 
 46; restored to Ferdinand, 119. 
 
 BET 
 
 Austria, the House of; territoriei 
 governed by it, 9 ; its branches, 24. 
 
 Avesnes incorporated with France, 
 225. 
 
 BAUTZEN, besieged by John 
 George, 42. 
 
 Bergen-op-zoom, siege of, 63. 
 
 Bernhard of Weimar, joins the King 
 of Denmark, loi ; joins Gustavus, 
 138 ; takes the command of the 
 Swedes at Liitzen, 163; his expec- 
 tations after the death of Gustavus, 
 166; his duchy of Franconia. 167; 
 takes Ratisbon, 173 ; is invited to 
 assist Wallenstein, 179 ; prepares 
 to march to Eger, 179; is defeated 
 at Nbrdlingen, 183 ; loses his duchy 
 of Franconia, 183 ; his alliance with 
 France, 190 ; defeats the imperial- 
 ists at Rheinfelden and takes 
 kheinfelden, Freiburg, and Brei- 
 sach, 195 ; his death, 196. 
 
 Bachararch, misery at, 187. 
 
 Baden-Durlach, Margrave of, joins 
 Frederick, 54 ; defeated at Wimp- 
 fen, 57; abandons his allies, 60; 
 aids the King of Denmark, loi. 
 
 Bamberg and Wiirzburg, Bishop of, 
 attacked by Mansfeld, 49. 
 
 Baner, defeats the Imperialists at 
 Wittstock, 194; is driven back to 
 the coast of the Baltic, 195; fights 
 in different parts of Germany, 196. 
 
 Barwalde, treaty of, 132. 
 
 Bethlen Gabor, Prince of Transylva- 
 nia, attacks Austria, 40 ; prepares 
 to aid Frederick, 44 ; defeats Buc- 
 quoi, 49 ; threatens Austria, 88, 
 94; is joined by Mansfeld, 97; 
 withdraws from the contest, loi. 
 227 
 
228 
 
 Xndex. 
 
 BRE 
 
 Bishoprics, question connected with 
 them left unsettled at the Peace of 
 Augsburg, ID ; in the north they 
 mainly fall under Protestant ad 
 ministrators, 12 ; forcible recon- 
 version of the population where 
 this is not the case, 14; T^rotestant 
 administrators not acknowledged 
 by the Diet, 14 ; attempt to bring 
 over Cologne and Strasburg to 
 Protestantism, 14 ; questions relat- 
 ing to them settled for a time at 
 Muhlhausen, 41 ; reopened after 
 the battle of Stadtlohn, 67 ; names 
 of those reclaimed in the Edict of 
 Restitution, 121 ; arrangement for 
 them at the treaty of Prague, 184. 
 
 Boguslav, Duke of Pomerania, com- 
 
 f)elled to accept a garrison by Wal- 
 enstein, 108 ; supports Wallenstein 
 in the siege of Stralsund, no ; com- 
 plains of Wallenstein's soldiers, 
 127 ; submits to Gustavus, 130. 
 
 Bohemia, the Royal Charter granted 
 in, 25 ; its infringement, 27 ; ac- 
 knowledgment of Ferdinand as its 
 king, 28 ; revolution in, 29 ; direc- 
 tors appointed, 32 ; war begins in, 
 32 ; political incapacity of the re- 
 volutionary government, 32 ; it 
 makes application to foreign powers, 
 35 ; election of Frederick as king, 
 38 ; suppression of the Revolution, 
 45 ; occupied by John George, 151.; 
 the Saxons driven out of, 155 ; Tor- 
 stenson's occupation of, 209. 
 
 Bohemia, King of, his functions as 
 an Elector, i. See also Rudolph 
 II., Matthias, Frederick V., and 
 Ferdinand II. 
 
 Bohemian Brethren expelled from 
 Bohemia, 46. 
 
 Brandenburg, bishopric of, named in 
 the Edict of Restitution, 131. 
 
 Brandenburg, Elector of, i. See also 
 John Sigismund, and George 
 William. 
 
 Braunau, Protestant church at, 27. 
 
 Breda, siege of, 76. 
 
 Breisach, taken Dy P>ernhard, 195. 
 
 Bieisgau, taken possession of by the 
 French, 105. 
 
 Breitenfeld, battle of, 141. 
 
 Bremen, archbishopric of, connexion 
 of, with Christian IV., 78; named 
 in the Edict of Restitution, 120; 
 given up to Sweden, 214. 
 
 CHE 
 
 Bridge of Dessau, battle of, 96. 
 
 ]^>riinn, besieged by Torstenson, 209, 
 
 Brunswick, peace negotiations at, 93. 
 
 Brussels, conferences for peace at, 52, 
 57, 60. 
 
 Bucquoi, commands the army in- 
 vad' ig Bohemia, 32 ; defeats Mans- 
 feld, 3: ; joined by Maximilian, 43 ; 
 advises to delay a battle, 44 ; is 
 killed, 49. 
 
 Buckingham, Duke of, his expedition 
 to Rh6, 114 ; intends to raise the 
 siege of Rochelle, 115 ; is mur- 
 dered, 115. 
 
 Budweis, attacked by the Bohemians, 
 
 32- 
 Burgundy, Eastern. See Franche 
 
 Comt6. 
 Butler, receives orders to capture 
 
 Wallenstein, 180 : consults on the 
 
 murder with Leslie and Gordon, 
 
 180. 
 
 CALVINISM in Germany, 18. 
 Camin, bishopric of, named in 
 the Edict of Restitution, 121. 
 
 Casale, sieges of, 122, 123. 
 
 Catalonia, insurrection of, 190. 
 
 Charles I., King of England, forms an 
 alliance with Christian IV., 86; is 
 unable to fulfil his engagement, 95 ; 
 sends Sir C. Morgan to aid Chris- 
 tian IV., loi ; quarrels with France, 
 III ; attempts to succour Rochelle, 
 113; his arrangements about the 
 Spanish fleet in the Downs, 198. 
 
 Charles V., his strength external to 
 the empire, 8; his meeting with 
 Luther, 9 ; forced to yield to the 
 Protestants, 9. 
 
 Charles Emanuel, Duke of Savoy, 
 helps the Bohemians, 33 ; plans fur 
 his advancement in Germany, 35 ; 
 attacks Genoa, 76; reduced to sub- 
 mission by Richelieu, 122. 
 
 Charles Lewis, Elector Palatine, 
 claims his father's dominion, 198 ; 
 receives the Lower Palatinate, 214. 
 
 Charles, Prince of Wales, proposed 
 marriage with an Infanta, 51 ; 
 treaty with Spain broken off, 70 ; 
 proposed marriage with Henrietta 
 Maria, 74. See Charles I., King 
 of England. 
 
 Charles the Great {Charlemagne), 
 nature of his authority, 2. 
 
 Chcrasco, ticaty of, 135. 
 
Index. 
 
 229 
 
 COR 
 
 Chichftster, Lord, his embassy to the 
 Palatinate, 59. 
 
 Christian IV., King of Denmark ; 
 his connection with Germany, 78 ; 
 his views on the course of the war, 
 79 ; his offers to England to make 
 war, 84 ; his offer accepted, 85 ; at- 
 tacked by Tilly, 94 ; defeated at 
 Lutter, 96 ; refuses Wallenstein's 
 terms of peace, loi ; sends agents 
 to Stralsund, 109 ; makes peace at 
 Liibeck, 117. 
 
 Christian of Anhalt, leader of the 
 German Calvinists, 18 ; his cha- 
 racter and policy, 18 ; his part in 
 the foundation of the Union, 21 ; 
 his intrigues in Austria, 26 ; his 
 plan for supporting the Bohemians, 
 34 ; commands the Bohemian 
 army, 44. 
 
 Christian of Brunswick, administra- 
 tor of Halberstadt, his instalment 
 in the cathedral, 54 ; resolves to 
 take part in the war, 55 ; invades 
 the diocese of Paderborn, 55 ; de- 
 feated at Hochst, 59 ; retreats to 
 Alsace, 60 ; marches through Lor- 
 raine, 63 ; loses his arm at Fleurus, 
 64 ; threatens the Lower Saxon 
 Circle, 65 ; negotiates with the Em- 
 peror, 66 ; is defeated at Stadtlohn, 
 and resigns the See of Halberstadt, 
 67 ; joins Christian IV., 95 ; dies, 96. 
 
 Christina, Queen of Sweden, 166. 
 
 Christina, Regent of Savoy, assisted 
 by the French, 197. 
 
 Church lands secularized, 10, 11 ; 
 legal decision about them against 
 the Protestants, 14. 
 
 Cities, free imperial, their part in the 
 Diet, 6. 
 
 Cleves, war of succession in, 21. 
 
 Coblentz, fired at by the French in 
 Ehrenbreitstein, 187. 
 
 Colbert, his reforms, 226. 
 
 Cologne, Elector of, i ; failure of an 
 attempt by him to bring over the 
 electorate to Protestantism, 14. 
 
 Conde, Prince of, takes part with 
 Spain, 223. 
 
 Convention of Passau. See Pas- 
 sau. 
 
 Corbie, taken by the Spaniards, and 
 retaken by the French, 193. 
 
 Cordova, Gonzales de, commands 
 the Spaniards in the Lower Palati- 
 nate, 50 ; takes part in the battle 
 
 EMP 
 
 ofWimpfen, 57; joins in defeating 
 Christian of Brunswick at Koohst, 
 59 ; commands at Fleurus, 63. 
 
 Corneille, writes " The Cid," 169. 
 
 Cromwell, courted by France and 
 Spain, 223 ; decides to help France, 
 224. 
 
 DANHOLM, seized by Wallen- 
 stein's soldiers, 109. 
 
 Darmstadt, entered by Mansfeld, 58. 
 
 Descartes, his first work published, 
 169. 
 
 Dessau, the Bridge of, battle of, 96. 
 
 Devereux, murders Wallenstein, 180. 
 
 Diet of the Empire, i ; its reform in 
 the 15th century, 5; its constitu- 
 tion, 5 ; how far opposed to Pro- 
 testantism, 8 ; its meeting in 1608, 
 21. 
 
 Directors of Bohemia appointed, 31. 
 
 Donauworth, occupation of, 20 ; en- 
 tered by Gustavus, 149 ; surren- 
 ders to Turenne, 212. 
 
 Downs, the Spanish fleet takes refuge 
 in the, 198. 
 
 Dunkirk, surrender of, 224. 
 
 EAST FRIESLAND, invaded by 
 Mansfeld, 64. 
 
 Ecclesiastical reservation, the. See 
 Bishoprics. 
 
 Edict of Restitution, issued, 120. 
 
 Eger, Wallenstein summons his colo- 
 nels to, 179. 
 
 Eggenberg confers with Wallenstein, 
 99 ; favours Wallenstein's restora- 
 tion, 151 ; joins OHate against Wal- 
 lenstein, 176. 
 
 Ehrenbreitstein, receives a French 
 garrison, 170 ; fires on Coblentz, 187. 
 
 Elector Palatine, i. See also Frede- 
 rick IV., and Frederick V. 
 
 Electors, functions of, i ; their part 
 in the Diet, 6 ; their quarrel with 
 Wallenstein, 103, 124 ; demand 
 Wallenstein's dismissal, 127. 
 
 Eliot, Sir John, his satisfaction at the 
 victories of Gustavus, 142. 
 
 Elizabeth, Electress Palatine, en- 
 courages her husband to accept the 
 crown of Bohemia, 39. 
 
 Emperor, functions of, i ; he is prac- 
 tically scarcely more than a Ger- 
 man king, 2. 
 
230 
 
 Index. 
 
 FER 
 
 Enghien, Duke of (afterwards Prince 
 of Conde), defeats the Spaniards at 
 Rocroy, 206 ; commands at the 
 battle of Freiburg and NordUngen, 
 208. See Cond6, Prince of. 
 
 England. See James I., Charles I., 
 Charles, Prince of Wales. 
 
 English ambassador (the Earl of Ar- 
 undel), notes of his journey through 
 Germany, 187. 
 
 Erfurt, Gustavus at, 147. 
 
 FABRICIUS, thrown out of win- 
 dow, 30. 
 
 Felton, murders Buckingham, 115, 
 
 Ferdinand, the Archduke, afterwards 
 the Emperor Ferdinand I., repre- 
 sents Charles V., at Augsburg, 
 10. 
 
 Ferdinand, Archduke (afterwards the 
 Emperor Ferdinand II.) rules Sty- 
 ria, Carinthia, and Carniola, 24 ; 
 puts down Protestantism there, 24 ; 
 acknowledged as Kirg of Bohemia, 
 28 ; his character, 28 ; swears to 
 the Royal Charter, 29 ; elected 
 King of Hungary, 32 ; receives help 
 from Spain, 33 ; promises to re- 
 spect the Royal Charter, 36 ; be- 
 sieged by Mansfeld, 37 ; elected 
 Emperor, 38 ; comes to terms with 
 Maximilian, 40 ; puts Frederick to 
 the ban, 46 ; refuses to go beyond 
 the agreement of MUhlhausen, 68 ; 
 accepts Wallenstein's offer to raise 
 an army, 89 ; grants Mecklenburg 
 to Wallenstein, 105, 118 ; oppresses 
 the Protestants, 120 ; recovers Up- 
 per Austria, 119 ; takes part in the 
 Mantuan war, 121 ; carries out the 
 Edict of Restitution, 126 ; despises 
 Gustavus, 134; refuses to abandon 
 the Edict, 137 ; looks to Spain for 
 help, 151 ; hesitates what to do 
 about Wallenstein, 174 ; decides 
 against him, 176 ; consents to the 
 Peace of Prague, 184 ; his death, 
 194. 
 
 Ferdinand, King of Hungary (after- 
 wards the Emperor Ferdinand 
 III.); his marriage, 174 ; com- 
 mands the army after Wallenstein's 
 death, 182 ; becomes Emperor, 
 194 ; reluctance to surrender Al- 
 sace to the French, 210. 
 
 Ferdinand, the Cardinal-infant ; pro- 
 
 FRE 
 
 posed command of, resisted by 
 Wallenstein, 171 ; joins the King 
 of Hungary before the battle of 
 Nordlingen, 182 ; proceeds to Brus- 
 sels, 183 ; invades France, 192. 
 
 Fleurus, battle of, 63. 
 
 France, takes precautions against 
 Mansfeld, 63 ; its internal dissen- 
 sions, 77, 112 ; at war with Eng- 
 land, 113; intervenes in Italy and 
 makes peace with England, 122 ; 
 supremacy of Richelieu in, 168 ; 
 places itself at the head of a Ger- 
 man alliance, 189 ; declares war 
 openly against Spain, 192 ; con- 
 tinues the war with Spain, 197 ; its 
 victories over Spain, 205 ; its vic- 
 tories in Germany, 207; its gains 
 by the Peace of Westphalia, 214 ; 
 continuance of its war with Spain, 
 221 ; successes of, in Flanders, 
 224 ; its gains by the treaty of the 
 Pyrenees, 224 ; its condition under 
 Lewis XIV , 226. 
 
 Franche Comte, included in the Em- 
 pire, 2. 
 
 Franconia, duchy of, assigned to 
 Bernhard, 167 ; taken from him, 
 183. 
 
 Frankenthal, garrisoned by Vere's 
 troops, 57 ; given up to the Span- 
 iards, 60. 
 
 Frankfort-on-the Main, place of coro- 
 nation, 2. 
 
 Frankfort-on-the-Oder, taken by 
 Gustavus, 134. 
 
 Frederick III., the Emperor, words 
 used to him, 2. 
 
 Frederick IV., Elector Palatine, 
 nominal leader of the Calvinists, 
 18 ; his death, 31. 
 
 Frederick V., Elector Palatine, his 
 marriage, 31 j encourages the Bohe« 
 mians, 31 ; proposal that he shall 
 mediate in Bohemia, 34 ; is elected 
 King of Bohemia, 38 ; becomes un- 
 popular at Prague, 43 ; his defeat 
 at the White Hill, 45 ; takes refuge 
 at the Hague, 45 ; put to the ban, 
 46 ; maintains his claims to Bo- 
 hemia, 48 ; proposal that his eldest 
 son shall be educated at Vienna, 
 52 ; his prospects in 1622, 53 ; joins 
 Mansfeld in Alsace, 57 ; seizes the 
 Landgrave of Darmstadt, 58 ; 
 driven back to Mannheim, 59 ; re- 
 turns to the Hague, 60 ; enters 
 
Index. 
 
 231 
 
 GUS 
 
 Munich with Gustavus, 150; his 
 
 death, 171. 
 Freiburg (in the Breisgau), surrenders 
 
 to Bernhard, 195 ; retaken, 208 ; 
 
 battle of, 208. 
 Friedland, Prince and Duke of. See 
 
 Wallenstein. 
 Friesland. See East Friesland. 
 Fronde, the, 217. 
 Fuentes, Count of, killed at Rocroy, 
 
 207. 
 Fiirth, Wallenstein's entrenchments 
 
 at, 158. 
 
 GALLAS, offers to assist Wallen- 
 stein, 175. 
 
 Gassion, advises the French to give 
 battle at Rocroy, 206. 
 
 Gaston, Duke of Orleans, leaves 
 France, 167 ; takes part in a re- 
 bellion, 168. 
 
 George of Ltineburg, a Lutheran in 
 Wallenstein's service, 98 : sent into 
 Silesia, loi. 
 
 George William, Elector of Branden- 
 burg, consents to his sister's mar- 
 riage with Gustavus, 81 ; refuses to 
 join Gustavus, 131 ; compelled to 
 submit to him, 135. 
 
 Germany, its political institutions, 
 1-7 ; what it included, 2 ; divided 
 into circles, 6 ; its miserable condi- 
 tion, 186 ; its condition after the 
 Peace of Westphalia, 217. 
 
 Gliickstadt, fortified by Christian IV., 
 78 ; siege of, 117. 
 
 Gordon, his part in Wallenstein's 
 murder, 180. 
 
 Gravelines surrenders to the French, 
 224. 
 
 Guebriant, defeats the Imperialists at 
 Wolfenbiittel and Kempten, 201. 
 
 Guise, the Duke of, leaves France, 168. 
 
 Guiton, Mayor of Rochelle, 115. 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, 
 his character, 79 ; early struggles, 
 80; visits Germany, 81 V hostile to 
 the growth of the Empire, 82 ; 
 views on religion and politics, 83 ; 
 projects a general league against 
 the House of Austria, 84 ; refuses 
 to ta'ice part in it on the terms of- 
 fered, and attacks Poland, 86 ; sends 
 help to Stralsund, 104 ; makes peace 
 with Poland, 124; negotiates with 
 France, 124 ; lands in Pomerania, 
 
 HEN 
 
 127 ; gains possession of the lands 
 on the Baltic coast, 131 ; negotiates 
 with France, 131 ; signs the treaty 
 of B'arwalde, 132 ; compels the 
 Elector of Brandenburg to join him, 
 
 135 ; fails to relieve Magdeburg, 
 
 136 ; entrenches himself at Wer- 
 ben, 138 ; allies himself with Saxony, 
 139 ; his skill as a commander, 140 ; 
 defeats Tilly at Breitenfeld, 141 ; 
 receives overtures from Wallenstein, 
 143 ; his political plans, 144 ; de- 
 termines to march to the Rhine, 
 145 ; keeps Christmas at Mentz, 
 147; his reception at Nuremberg, 
 148 ; enters Donauworth, and de- 
 feats Tilly at the Lech, 149 ; occu- 
 pies Munich, 150 ; lays down terms 
 of peace, 156; proposes a league of 
 the cities, 157 ; rebukes his officers, 
 159 ; fails in storming Wallenstein's 
 entrenchments, 160 ; follows Wal- 
 lenstein into Saxony, 161 ; attacks 
 Wallenstein at Liitzen, 162 ; his 
 death, 163 ; his future plans, 165. 
 
 TTAGENAU, seized by Mansfeld, 
 
 Hague, the, Frederick takes refuge 
 there, 45; returns after his cam- 
 paign in Germany, 60. 
 
 Halberstadt, diocese of. Christian of 
 Brunswick Bishop of it, 54 ; for- 
 feited by his treason. 65 ; occupied 
 by Wallenstein, 92 ; named in the 
 Edict of Restitution, 120 ; execu- 
 tion of the Edict at, 125 ; not re- 
 covered by the Protestants at the 
 treaty of Prague, 184 ; restored at 
 the peace of Westphalia, 214. 
 
 Halle, Pappenheim's march to, 162. 
 
 Hamburg, its commerce, 78 ; refuses 
 to submit to Wallenstein, no. 
 
 Hanse Towns, offers made them by 
 the Emperor, 106. 
 
 Havelberg, bishopric of, named in the 
 Edict of Restitution, 121. 
 
 Heidelberg, garrisoned by Vere, 57 ; 
 taken by Tilly, 61 ; treatment of 
 Protestants at, 119. 
 
 Heilbronn, the league of, 167; its 
 leading members excepted from the 
 amnesty of the treaty of Prague, 
 184. 
 
 Heiligenhafen, combat of, 102. 
 
 Henry IV., King of France, plans in- 
 tervention in Germany, 22. 
 
 R 
 
232 
 
 Index. 
 
 JOH 
 
 Henry the Fowler, not an emperor, 2. 
 Hesse Cassel, Landgrave of. See 
 
 Maurice, and William. 
 Hesse Darmstadt. See Lewis. 
 Hdchst, battle of, 59. 
 Horn, commands a Swedish force in 
 
 Mecklenburg, 134 ; is defeated at 
 
 Nordlingen, 183. 
 Huguenots, nature of toleration 
 
 granted to, 173 ; insurrection of, 77, 
 
 112 ; tolerated by Richelieu, 116. 
 Hungary, political divisions of, 40. 
 
 IMPERIAL Council {Reichsho- 
 frath) intervenes in the case of 
 Donauwbrth, 20. 
 Imperial Court i^Reichskawimerge- 
 richt), institution, 6 ; out of work- 
 ing order, 19. 
 Ingolstadt, Tilly's death at, 149. 
 Italy, kingdom of, 3, 122. 
 
 JAMES I., K ng of England, offers 
 to mediate in Bohemia and Ger- 
 many, 35, 47 ; proposes to pay 
 Mansfeld, 51 ; his negotiations with 
 Spain, 51, 70; desires aid from 
 France, 71 ; supports Mansfeld, 75 ; 
 orders him not to relieve Breda, 
 76 ; agreement with Christian IV., 
 85 ; death of, 86. 
 
 Jankow, battle of, 209. 
 
 Jesuits, the, appear in Germany, 13. 
 
 John Ernest, Duke of Saxe-Weimar, 
 ideas of religious liberty, 94 ; sup- 
 ports Mansfeld, 96 ; dies, loi. 
 
 John George, Elector of Saxony, at 
 the head of the Lutheran and neu- 
 tral party, 15, 22 ; wishes to pacify 
 Bohemia, 31 ; his share in Ferdi- 
 nand's election to the Empire, 38 ; 
 is gained over by Maximilian, 41 ; 
 his vacillations in 1622, 62 ; refuses 
 to join in the Danish war, 87 ; his 
 son elected administrator of Mag- 
 deburg, 126 ; attempts to mediate 
 between Gustavus and the Em- 
 peror, 133, 134 ; joins Gustavus, 
 139 ; failure of his army at Breiten- 
 feld, 141 ; despatched into Bohe- 
 mia, 151 ; enters Prague, 151 ; is 
 driven out of Bohemia, 155 ; pro- 
 poses terms of peace to Gustavus, 
 156; refuses to join the League of 
 Heilbronn, 167; negotiates with 
 
 LOR 
 
 Wallenstein, 170 ; hopes for peace, 
 184 ; agrees to the Peace of Prague, 
 185; his troops defeated at Witt- 
 stock, 194. 
 
 John Sigismund, Elector of Branden- 
 burg, his claim to the duchy of 
 Cleves, 21 ; turns Calvinist, 22. 
 
 Joseph, Father, employed as Riche- 
 lieu's agent, 128. 
 
 KEMPTEN, battle of, 201. 
 Klostergrab, Protestant church 
 at, 27. 
 Koln. See Cologne. 
 
 LA FORCE, commands at Paris, 
 193- 
 Lamormain, Father, Ferdinand's 
 confessor, declares against peace, 
 
 Landrecies incorporated with France, 
 224. 
 
 League, the Catholic, its formation, 
 21 ; agrees to the treaty ef Ulm, 
 42. See Maximilian, Duke of Ba- 
 varia. 
 
 Lebus, bishopric of, 121. 
 
 Lech, battle at the passage of the, 149. 
 
 Leipzig, assembly at, 133. 
 
 Leipzig, battle of. See Breitenfeld. 
 
 Leslie, his part in Wallenstein's mur- 
 der, 180. 
 
 Leuchtenberg, Landgrave of, taken 
 prisoner by Mansfeld, 49. 
 
 Lewis XIII., King of Prance, his 
 character, 72 ; his jealousy of Spain, 
 73 ; summons Richelieu to his 
 council, 74 ; takes part against 
 Spain, 75 ; his policy towards the 
 Huguenots, 112 ; at war with Eng- 
 land, 113; invades Italy, 122 ; dis- 
 likes the success of Gustavus, 148 ; 
 takes the field against Spain, 193 ; 
 dies, 205. 
 
 Lewis XIV., King of France, acces- 
 sion of, 205. 
 
 Lewis, Landgrave of Hesse Darm- 
 stadt, taken prisoner, 58. 
 
 Lombardy, the iron crown of, 3. 
 
 Lorraine {Lothringen), included in 
 the Empire, 2 ; Mansfeld and Chris- 
 tian of Brunswick, in, 63. 
 
 Lorraine, Duke of, joins the Span- 
 iards against Gustavus, 158; is re- 
 duced to subjection by France, 170. 
 
Index. 
 
 233 
 
 MAN 
 
 Lower Saxony, Circle of, threatened 
 by Christian of Brunswick and 
 Tilly, 64 ; refuses to support Chris- 
 tian, 65 ; disunion amongst its 
 members, 68 ; attacked by Tilly, 87. 
 
 Liibeck, bishopric of, named in the 
 Edict of Restitution, 121. 
 
 Liibeck, Peace of, 117. 
 
 Lusatia, invaded by the Saxons, 42. 
 
 Luther, his meeting with Charles V., 9. 
 
 Lutherans, 17; their estrangements 
 from Frederick in Bohemia, 43 ; 
 still remain in Paderborn, 55. 
 
 Lutter, battle of, 96. 
 
 Liitzen, battle of, i6i. 
 
 MAGDEBURG, city of, refuses to 
 admit Wallenstein's troops, 105, 
 126 ; declares for Gustavus, 134 ; 
 stormed and sacked, 136. 
 
 Mag leburg, diocese of, occupied by 
 Wallerstein, 92 ; included in the 
 Edict of Restitution, 120; execu- 
 tion of the Edict at, 126. 
 
 Mrigdeburg, Protestant administra- 
 tor of, not acknowledged as Arch- 
 bishop by the Diet, 14. 
 
 Maintz. See Mentz. 
 
 Majest'dtsbrief. See Royal Charter. 
 
 Manheim, garrisoned by Vere, 57 ; 
 retreat of Frederick and Mansfeld 
 to, 59 ; taken by Tilly, 60. 
 
 Mansfeld, C unt Ernest of, takes 
 service with the Bohemians and 
 besieges Pilsen, 33 ; takes the field 
 against Bucquoi, 36 ; is defea ed by 
 him, 37 ; character of his army, 
 
 48 ; occupies the Upper Palatinate, 
 
 49 ; marches into Alsace, 50 ; aims 
 at becoming master of part of it, 
 
 56 ; invades the Lower Palatinate, 
 
 57 ; seizes the Landgrav) of Darm- 
 stadt, 58 ; state of his army, 59 ; 
 retreats to Alsace, 60 ; occupies 
 Lorraine, 63 ; cuts his way through 
 the Spanish, Netherlands, relieves 
 Bergen-op-zoom, and invades East 
 Friesland, 64 ; returns to the Neth- 
 erlands, 69 ; assisted by France, 
 74 ; proposed march into Alsace, 
 75 ; fails to relieve Breda, 76 ; sent 
 to help the King of Denmark, 86 ; 
 joins Christian IV. ,94,- defeated 
 at the Bridge of Dessau, 96; 
 marches through Silesia into Hun- 
 
 . S^ry, 96 ; dies, 97. 
 
 MER 
 
 Mantua and Montferrat, war of suc- 
 cession in, 121. 
 Mardyke, surrender of, 224. 
 Martinitz, one of the Regents of Bo~ 
 
 hemia, thrown out of window, 30. 
 Mary of Medici, opposes Richelieu, 
 
 132 ; obliged to leave France, 160. 
 Matthias, Archduke, rises against 
 Rudolph II., 25 ; succeeeds as 
 Emperor, 26, See Matthias, Em- 
 peror. 
 Matthias, Emperor, his election, 26 ; 
 his attempts to breaij the Royal 
 Charter, 27 ; his death, 36. 
 Maurice, Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, 
 
 submits to Spinola, 47. 
 Maximilian, Archduke, governs Ty- 
 rol, 24. 
 Maximilian; Duke of Bavaria, his 
 character and policy, 15 ; his part 
 in the formation of the League 21 ; 
 prepares to attack Bohemia, 39 ; 
 proposed transference of the Pa- 
 latinate Electorate to, 40 ; gains 
 over the North German princes, 
 41 ; attaches Austria and Bohemia, 
 42 ; receives Upper Austria in 
 pledge, 46 ; receives Che Electorate, 
 6r ; his policy after the peace of 
 Liibeck, 118 ; makes an (effort 
 against the French, 207 ; is ready 
 to surrender Alsace to the French, 
 211 ; but refuses to surrender the 
 Upper Palatinate, 211; makes a 
 truce, wliich does not last long, 213. 
 
 Mayence. See Mentz. 
 
 Mazarin, Cardinal, Minister of Anne 
 of Austria, 205. 
 
 Mecklenburg, Dukes of their land 
 pledged to Wallenstein, 105 ; for- 
 mally given to Wallenstein, 118. 
 
 Meissen. See Misnia. 
 
 Melancthon, his protest against theo- 
 logical disputation, 13. 
 
 Mentz, entered by Spinola, 42 ; 
 treaty for the dissolution of tha 
 Union signed at, 47. 
 
 Mentz, Archbishop of, one of the 
 Electors, 6; lays claim to lands in 
 North Germany, 98. 
 
 Mentz, city of, Gustavus at, 147 ; 
 given over to Oxenstjerna, 148 ; 
 misery at, 187. 
 
 Mercy, prudence of, 208 ; is killed, 
 208 ; 
 
 Mcseburg, bishopric of, named in 
 the Edict of Restitution, 121. 
 
234 
 
 Index. 
 
 NUR I 
 
 Merseburg, city of, taken by Pap- 
 penheiin, 139. 
 
 Metz, annexed by France, 215. 
 
 Minden, bishopric of, named in the 
 Edict of Restitution, 121. 
 
 Misnia, bishopric of, named in the 
 Edict of Restitution, 121. 
 
 Montmorenci, Duke of, his rebeUion, 
 168; 
 
 Morgan, Sir Charles, commands an 
 English force sent in aid of Den- 
 mark, lOI. 
 
 Muhlhaus-en (in Thuringia), agree- 
 ment of, 41 ; meeting of ihe Electors 
 at, 103. 
 
 Munich, occupied by G istavus, 150. 
 
 Munster, meeting of diplomatists at^ 
 210. 
 
 Munster, diocese of, threatened by 
 Mansfeld, 64. 
 
 NANCY, taken possession of by 
 the French, 180. 
 Nantes, Edict of, 71 ; its revocation, 
 
 226. 
 Naumburg, bishopric of, named in 
 
 the Edict of Restitution, 121. 
 Naumburg, city of, entered by Gus- 
 
 tavus, i6r. 
 Netherlands, the, included in the 
 
 Empire, 2. 
 Netherlands, the Spanish, defended 
 
 against a French attack, 191. 
 Netherlands, United States of the, 
 
 end of their truce with Spain, 51 ; 
 
 acknowledgment of their indepen- 
 dence, 221. 
 Neuberg, Wolfgang Wilhelra, Count 
 
 Palatine of, lays claim to the 
 
 duchy of Cieves, 22 ; has his ears 
 
 boxed, 22. 
 Neustadt, misery at, 188, 
 Nevers, Duke of, his claims to the 
 
 succession in Mantua, 122. 
 New Brandenburg, taken by Tilly, 
 
 134- 
 Nienburg, holds out for Christian IV., 
 
 lOI. 
 
 Nordheim, holds out for Christian 
 IV., loi. 
 
 Nbr> lingen, treatment of the Pro- 
 testants at, 120 ; battle of, 183 ; 
 second battle of, 208 ; surrenders 
 to Turenne, 213. 
 
 Nuremberg, joins the Union, 20, 21 ; 
 meeting of the Union at, 41 ; de- 
 
 PIL 
 
 serts the Union, 47 ; welcomes 
 Gustavus, 148 ; de"^ patches Gustav- 
 us against Wallenstein, 158 ; suffer- 
 ings of, 158. 
 
 ONATE, opposes Wallenstein, 
 175; proposes to kill Wallen- 
 stein, 177. 
 
 Oppenheim, stormed by Gustavus, 
 147. 
 
 Osuabriick, election of a Catholic 
 Bishop of, 67 ; meeting of diploma- 
 tists at, 217. 
 
 Otto the Great, becomes Emperor, 2. 
 
 Oudenarde, surrender to the French, 
 224. 
 
 Oxenstjerna, his view of Gustavus' 
 march upon the Rhine, 145 ; re- 
 ceives the government of Mentz, 
 148 ; his position after the death 01 
 Gustavus, 166 ; asked to help Wal- 
 lenstein, 172 ; keeps his doubts till 
 the last, 179 ; surrenders fortresses 
 in Alsace to Richelieu, 192. 
 
 PADERBORN, attack upon by 
 Christian of Brunswick, 55. 
 
 Palatinate, the Lower, attacked by 
 Spinola, 43 ; defended by Vere, 49 ; 
 invaded by Tilly, 50 ; conquered by 
 Tilly, 60 ; the eastern part made 
 over to Maximilian, 119 ; the 
 whole restored to Charles Lewis, 
 214. 
 
 Palatinate, the Upper, Mansfeld's 
 occupation of, 50 ; its conquest by 
 Tilly, 50; made over to Maximi- 
 lian, 119 ; secured to him by the 
 peace of Westphalia, 214. 
 
 Pappenheim, confidence that Gusta- 
 vus wiil be beaten, 139 ; storms 
 Magdeburg, 135 ; commands on 
 the Rhine, 161 ; leaves Wallen- 
 stein before the batde of Liitzen, 
 161 ; is killed at Liitzen, 161. 
 
 Passau, convention of, 9. 
 
 Peace of Augsburg. See Augsburg. 
 
 Peace of Phillipsburg, French garri- 
 son of, 215. 
 
 Piccolomini, offers to join Wallen- 
 stein, 17S ; declares against him, 
 177 ; tries to seize him, 177 ; orders 
 Butler to capture Wallenstein, 180. 
 
 Pignerol, seized by Richelieu, 124. 
 
 Piisen refuses to take part with the 
 
Index, 
 
 235 
 
 RIC 
 
 Bohemian directors, 32 ; besieged 
 and taken by Mansfeld, 33 ; Wal- 
 lenstein holds a meeting of officers 
 at, T77. 
 
 Pomerania laid wa^te by Wal' en- 
 stein's troops, 127 ; Gustavus lands 
 in, 128 ; divided between Branden- 
 burg and Sweden, 214. 
 
 Pomerania, Duke of. See Boguslav. 
 
 Portugal, independence of, 200. 
 
 Prague, revolution at, 29 ; Frederick 
 crowned King of Bohemia at, 38 ; 
 Frederick's growing unpopu'arity 
 there, 43 ; battle at the White Hill 
 near, 45 ; entered by the Saxons, 
 151 ; recovered by Wallenstein, 
 155 ; part of it taken by the Swedes, 
 213. 
 
 Prague, the treaty of, 184. 
 
 Princes of the Empire, their increas- 
 ing power, 3 ; compared with the 
 French vassals, 4 ; care little for 
 the Diet, 5 ; their part in the Diet, 
 6; the majority opposed to Pro- 
 testantism, 9. 
 
 Protestantism, its rise in Germany, 
 7 ; its position in North Germany, 
 12; its divisi-^n, 12; contrast be- 
 tween it in the north and the south, 
 
 17- 
 Pyrenees, treaty of the, 224. 
 
 RATISBON, diets held at, 61, 
 127 ; taken by Bernhard, 173. 1 
 
 Ratseburg, bishopric of, named in 1 
 the Edict of Restitution, 121. 1 
 
 Regensburg. See Ratisbon. j 
 
 Reichshofrath. See Imperial Conncil. 
 
 Reichskatmnergericht. See Imperial 
 Court. 
 
 Rh6, Isle of, Buckingham's expedi- 
 tion to, 114. 
 
 Rheinfelden, battle of, 195. 
 
 Richelieu, becomes a minister of 
 Louis XIII., 74 ; recovers the Val- 
 telline, 75 ; his plans frustrated by 
 the insurrection of the Huguenots, 
 77 ; wishes to make peace with 
 them, 112 ; causes of his success, 
 116; his policy of toleration, 116; 
 takes part in the Mantuan War, 
 122 ; negotiates with Sweden, 124; 
 is startled by the victories of Gus- 
 tavus, 148; defends himself against 
 the French aristocracy, 167 ; na- 
 ture of the government established 
 
 SPA 
 
 by him, 168 ; his aims in Europe, 
 169 ; intervenes more decidedly in 
 Germany, 184, 190 ; aims at the 
 conquest of Alsace, 191 ; obtains 
 control over fortresses in Alsace, 
 
 192 ; failure of his a tack upon the 
 Spanish Netherlands, 192 ; suc- 
 cessfully resists a Spanish invasion, 
 
 193 ; continues the struggle with 
 Spain, 197 ; his successes, 197, 201 ; 
 his death an 1 policy, 201. 
 
 Rochelle, insurrection of, 77, 112 ; 
 
 siege of, 114; surrender of, 115; 
 
 subsequent treatment of, 116. 
 Rocroy, attacked by the Spaniards, 
 
 2q6 ; battle of, 207. 
 Rohan, Duke of, insurrection of, 123. 
 Rostock, its harbour blocked up by 
 
 Wallenstein, 108. 
 Roussillon, conquered by France, 
 
 200, 201 ; annexed to France, 224. 
 Royal Charter, the {Majestiitsbrief), 
 
 granted by Rudolph II., 25 ; its for- 
 feiture declared, 45. 
 Riidesheim, misery at, 187. 
 Rudolph II., Emperor, his part in 
 
 the Austrian territories, 24; grants 
 
 the Royal Charter of Bohemia, 25 ; 
 
 tries to withdraw it, 26; dies, 26; 
 
 fate of his art-treasures, 43. 
 Rupert, Prince, his birth at Prague, 
 
 43. 
 
 SALUCES, siezed by Richelieu, 
 124. 
 
 Salzburg, persecution of Protestants 
 of, 216. 
 
 Saxony, Elector of, i. See also John 
 George. 
 
 Savoy, Duke of. See Charles Emanuel. 
 
 Schorndorf, surrenders to Turenne, 
 212. 
 
 Sigismund, King of Poland, a claim- 
 ant to the crown ol Sweden, 81. 
 
 Sigismund, the Emperor, anecdote 
 of, 2. 
 
 Slawata, one of the Regents of Bohe- 
 mia, 30 ; thrown out of window, 30. 
 
 Soissons, Count of, rebels in France, 
 200. 
 
 Soubise, Duke of, rebels, 77. 
 
 Spain, intervenes in the war, 42 ; 
 anxious for peace, 43 ; military 
 position of in 1624, 74 ; loses the 
 Valtelline, 75 ; takes part in the 
 Mantua war, 121 ; supports Wal* 
 
236 
 
 Index. 
 
 TIL 
 
 lenstein, 151 ; takes part in the 
 war on the Rhine, 158 ; turns 
 against Wallenstein, 171 ; at war 
 with France, 192 ; invades France, 
 193 ; naval inferiority of, 197, 198 ; 
 rebellion of the Catalans, 199 ; loss 
 of Portugal, 200 ; continues the 
 war. with France after the Peace 
 of Westphalia, 221; continues the 
 war with France, 221 ; agrees to the 
 Peace of the Pyrenees, 224. 
 
 Spens, Sir James, his mission to 
 Sweden, 84. 
 
 Spinola, attacks the Palatinate, 42 ; 
 returns to Brussels, 50; besieges 
 Bergen-op-zoom, 63 ; besieges Bre- 
 da, 75 ; besieg-^s Casale, 123. 
 
 Spires, Bishop of, attacked by Vera, 
 50. 
 
 Stade, taken by Tilly, 117. 
 
 Stadtlohn. battle of, 66. 
 
 Sienay, besieged by Cond6, 223. 
 
 Stralsund, siege of, 108. 
 
 Strasburg, Bishopric of, failure of an 
 attempt to place it in Protestant 
 hands, 14. 
 
 Strasburg, city of Joins the Union, 
 20, 21 ; deserts it, 47. 
 
 Sweden, her gains at the Peace of 
 Westphalia, 214. 
 
 Switzerland included in the Empire, 
 
 TABOR, occupied by Mansfeld, 
 48. 
 
 Thionville, besieged by the French, 
 207 ; annexed to France, 224. 
 
 Thirty Years' War, the disputes 
 which led to it, 14 ; commencement 
 of, 30 ; end of, 213. 
 
 Thurn, Count Henry of, his part in 
 the Bohemian Revolution, 30 ; his 
 operations against Bucquoi, 33 ; 
 besieges Vienna, 36; aids Chris- 
 tian IV., loi. 
 
 Tilly, commands the army of the 
 League, 42 ; his part in the con- 
 quest of Bohemia, 44 ; his army, 
 48 ; conquers the Upper Palati- 
 nate, 50; invades the Lower Pa- 
 latinate, 51 ; his prospects in 1622, 
 55 ; defeats the Margrave of Baden 
 at Wimpfen, 57 ; defeats ( hristian 
 of Brunswick at Hbchst, 59 ; con- 
 quers the Lower Palatinate, 61 ; 
 threatens the Lower Saxon Circle, 
 
 WAL 
 
 64 ; defeats Christian of Bruns- 
 wick at Stadtlohn, 66 ; attacks 
 Lower Saxony, 87 ; makes head 
 against Christian IV., 95 ; defeats 
 him at Lutter, 96 ; besieges Stade 
 and Gliickstadt, 117; his campaign 
 against Gustavus, 134 ; takes Mag- 
 deburg, 136; attacks Saxony, 139; 
 defeated at Breitenfeld, 141 ; his 
 defeat and death at the passage of 
 the Lech, 149. 
 
 Torgau, holds out against Wallen- 
 stein, 161. 
 
 Torstenson, his campaign of 1645, 
 209. 
 
 Toul, annexed to France, 215. 
 
 Treves, Elector of, 1 ; makes an alli- 
 ance with France, 170. 
 
 Trier. See Treves. 
 
 Tubingen, university of, 17. 
 
 Turenne, his part in the campaigns 
 of 1644 and 1645, 208 ; his strategy 
 in Bavaria in 1646, 212. 
 
 Turin, changes of government in, 
 197. 
 
 ULM, joins the Union, 20, 21 ; 
 deserts it, 47. 
 Ulm, treaty of, 42. 
 Union, the Protestant, formation 
 ©f, 21 ; enters into an agreement 
 with the Duke of Savoy, 33 ; its 
 coolness in the cause of the Bohe- 
 mians, 34 ; refuses to support Fre- 
 derick in Bohemia, 41 _; agrees to 
 the treaty of Ulm, 42 ; its dissolu- 
 tion, 47. 
 
 VALTELLINE, the Spaniards 
 driven from the, 75. 
 
 Verden, bishopric of, occupied by a 
 son of Christian IV., 78; named 
 in the Edict of Restitution, 121 ; 
 given up to S^weden, 215. 
 
 Verdun, annexed to France, 214. 
 
 Vere, Sir Horace, defends the Lower 
 Palatinate, 49, 57. 
 
 Vienna, besieged by Thurn, 36 ; at- 
 tacked by Hethlen Gabor, 40 ; at- 
 tacked by Torstenson, 209. 
 
 WALLENSTEIN, his birth and 
 education, 88 ; raises an armj 
 for the Emperor, and is created 
 
Index. 
 
 237 
 
 WAL. 
 
 Prince of Friedland, 89 ; his mode 
 of carrying on war, 90; enters 
 Magdeburg and Halberstadt, 92 ; 
 defeats Mansfeld at the Bridge of, 
 Dessau, 96 ; his quarrel with the 
 League, 98 ; confers with Eggen- 
 berg, 99 ; is created Duke of Fried- 
 land, 100 ; subdues Silesia, loi ; 
 conquers Schleswig and Jutland, 
 102 ; complaints of the Electors 
 against him, 103 ; his fresh levies, 
 
 104 ; Mecklenburg pledged to hiia, 
 
 105 ; named Admiral of the Baltic, 
 108 ; attempts- to burn the Swedish 
 fleet, 108 ; besieges Stralsund, 108 ; 
 assists in the siege of Gliickstadt, 
 117 ; his investiture with the Duc'iy 
 of Mecklenburg, 118 ; his breach 
 with the Electors, 124 ; talks of 
 sacking Rome, 127 ; his depriva- 
 tion demanded, 127 ; his dismis- 
 sal, 129 ; makes overtures to Gus- 
 tavus, 142 ; breaks off his inter- 
 course with Gustavus, 15? ; is re- 
 instated in command bv the Em- 
 peror, 153 ; character of his army, 
 153 ; drives the Saxons out of Bo- 
 hemia, 155 ; entrenches himself 
 near NQremberg, 158 ; repulses 
 Gustavus and marches into Saxony, 
 160 ; takes up a position at LUtzen ; 
 is defeated, 161 ; negotiates with 
 the Saxons, 170; hopes to bring 
 about peace, 171; negotiates with 
 the Swedes, 172; prepares to force 
 the Emperor to accept peace from 
 him, 174; opposition to him, 175; 
 the Emperor decides against him, 
 176 ; throws himself upon his offi- 
 cersj 177; is declared a traitor, 
 and abandoned by the garrison of 
 
 zus 
 
 Prague 178 ; his murder, 181 ; 
 causes of his failure, 18 c. 
 
 Werben, camp of Gustavus at, 138. 
 
 Werth, John of, general in Maximi- 
 lian's service, 207. 
 
 Weston, Sir Richard, represents Eng- 
 land at the Congress at Brussels, 
 
 57- . . , 
 
 Westphalia, the Peace of, opening of 
 negotiations for, 209 ; signature of, 
 213 ; Its results, 215. 
 
 White Hill, battle of the, 45. 
 
 Wiesloch, combat of, 57. 
 
 William, Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, 
 joins Gustavus, 138 ; shut out from 
 the benefits of the treaty of Prague, 
 186 ; his alliance with France, 190. 
 
 Wimpfen, battle of, 57. 
 
 Winter-king, nickname of Frederick, 
 
 39- 
 Wismar in Wallenstein's hands, 108. 
 Wittingau, occupied by Mansfeld, 48. 
 Wittstock battle of, 194. 
 Wolfenbiittel holds out for Christian 
 
 IV., loi ; battle at, 201. 
 Wrangel, succeeds Torstenson as 
 
 commander of the Swedes, 209 ; 
 
 joins Turenne, 212. 
 Wiirtemberg, accepts the terms of the 
 
 treaty of Prague, 195. 
 Wurzburg taken by Gustavus, 147 ; 
 
 surrenders to Turenne, 212. 
 
 YPRES, surrenders to the French, 
 224. 
 
 ZNAIM, Wallenstein confers with 
 Eggenberg at, 153. ' 
 Zusmarshausen, battle of, 231. ■ 
 
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