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 Rudolf Eucken and the 
 Spiritual Life 
 
 By 
 
 MADAME MARGARET M. Mac SWINEY 
 
 RELIGIOUS OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 Submitted to the Catholic University of America 
 
 in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
 
 for the Degres Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 Washington, D. C. 
 1915 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the 
 Spiritual Life 
 
 By 
 
 MADAME MARGARET M. Mac SWINEY 
 
 RELIGIOUS OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION 
 
 A DISSERTATION 
 
 Submitted to the Catholic University of America 
 
 in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
 
 for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 ( 
 
 Washington, D. C. 
 1915 
 
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PREFACE 
 
 The reaction against the materialism of the last half century 
 has found an energetic supporter in the Professor of Philosophy of 
 Jena University, Rudolf Eucken, who is proclaiming over 
 three continents — directly or through his students — that the 
 corner-stone of all philosophical thought and the axiom of axioms 
 is the fact of a world-embracing spiritual life. "So ist der Angel- 
 punkt aller philosophischen Betrachtung und das Axiom der 
 Axiome die Tatsache eines weltumspannenden Geisteslebens." 1 
 
 Eucken will not accept any spiritualistic system already pro- 
 pounded. He rejects Scholasticism on many grounds, the most 
 oft repeated being that of naivete, and challenges its advocates, 
 if they still hold it to be the "one permanent foundation of the 
 search after truth," to prove their position. He has brought 
 forward a new theory, which he has named Activism, proposing 
 therein new conceptions of the spiritual and of truth and a new 
 method of reaching both. 
 
 A close study of Eucken's philosophy has convinced us that it 
 does not offer a rational interpretation of the universe. Eucken 
 insists on the practical and moral sides of philosophy, laying 
 special stress on the necessity for action, but, claiming that his 
 aim is pedagogical, not speculative, he has left us with irreconcil- 
 able contradictions. On the one hand the advocate of Activism 
 rises to a sublime height of moral eloquence, on the other he 
 gives an exposition of the Supreme Spiritual Being which destroys 
 the basis of morality. He asserts emphatically the unchange- 
 ableness of truth, yet states that he is "at one with the main 
 atmosphere of Pragmatism." Hence his system contains elements 
 which are essentially incompatible. His antagonism to Catholic 
 philosophy, and in particular to the Scholastic theory, seems to be 
 the main cause of this result. He has, in fact, been caught on the 
 horns of his own "Entweder-Oder." Either, acknowledging the 
 truth of the spiritual life, Eucken must acknowledge the grounds on 
 which it rests, Or, denying the grounds, he must, thereby, deny 
 the possibility of a philosophy of the spiritual — and even of the 
 existence of a spiritual reality. 
 
 Geistige Stromungen der Gegenwart, 4te Aufl., Leipzig, 1913, p. 97. 
 
iv Preface 
 
 The main purpose of this dissertation is to show the inconsistency 
 of Eucken's position and to answer his challenge to Scholasticism. 
 We have examined his philosophy chiefly from the standpoint of 
 Epistemology, since the theory of knowledge is the core of his 
 system. Activism stands or falls with the validity and objective 
 value of an "immediacy" of higher knowledge. We have, how- 
 ever, followed out to some extent the implications of his conception 
 of the Geistesleben and have thus touched on other aspects. In the 
 Final Note we have directed attention to certain points that call 
 for further criticism, in particular Eucken's failure to draw a 
 sufficiently sharp distinction between conscience and other mani- 
 festations of spiritual activity, e.g., art; and his inconsistent 
 attitude towards the Person of Christ. 
 
 Throughout our treatment we have endeavored to make the 
 citations sufficiently numerous and extensive to enable one other- 
 wise unfamiliar with Eucken's work to test the appreciation here 
 set forth by direct reference to the sources. Moreover, we have 
 refrained, in most instances, from all criticism of individual 
 passages in the course of the exposition. Our aim has been to 
 judge the central conceptions — the Geistesleben and the Gemiit — 
 as wholes, and for this reason some side issues have been passed 
 over. In dealing with Scholasticism we have not unfolded the 
 theory in all its details, but merely so far as was necessary to repel 
 Eucken's attack. We have sought to show that the system which 
 he rejects is intelligible in its concepts, consistent in its exposition 
 and in harmony with the universally recognized signification of 
 the term "spiritual." An examination of the philosophy of the 
 spiritual seemed to demand a preliminary inquiry into the concept : 
 this has been made in Part I. The plan of the entire dissertation 
 follows. 
 
PLAN 
 
 This dissertation is divided into three distinct though related 
 parts: 
 
 Part I treats of the Concept of the Spiritual. We have considered, 
 
 1 its profound influence on human life; 
 
 2 the earliest sources of our knowledge of it; 
 
 3 its implication; 
 
 4 the method of attaining it. 
 
 A word of apology may be needed for the brief historical 
 survey made in Chapter II: its purpose is to show that the 
 concept of the spiritual has had a definite kernel of meaning 
 for over two thousand years; that the sources through which 
 it entered the philosophy of the West, and which are today 
 as reachable as in the time of Anaxagoras, Plato and Aristotle, 
 hinder us from arbitrarily changing its signification, from 
 trying to affix "new" meanings to a time-honored word. 
 
 In this connection we have pointed out in Chapter III that 
 Eucken is unphilosophical in using the term "spiritual life" 
 to include "incomparably more than is represented by the 
 customary conception of that life." (Life's Basis and Life's 
 Ideal, p. 240.) 
 
 In Chapter IV we have called attention to the difference 
 between the intellectualistic and the anti-intellectualistic 
 theories of knowledge. 
 
 Part II, the Main Thesis, deals with Eucken's Philosophy of the 
 Spiritual Life. We have examined, 
 
 1 the "new" method of Activism and found it untrust- 
 worthy; 
 
 2 the "new" conception of the spiritual life and found it a 
 self-contradiction ; 
 
 3 the "new" idea of truth and found it an irrational belief: 
 we have further considered 
 
 4 the problem of nature — a vital point in a philosophy of 
 the spiritual. We have found Eucken's treatment of 
 it to be confused, pessimistic and inconsistent, consti- 
 tuting an insuperable obstacle to any real philosophy 
 of the spiritual. 
 
vi Plan 
 
 We therefore reject the system which Eucken has put 
 forward to supplant Scholasticism. 
 
 Part III deals with the "Permanent Foundation" of a Philosophy 
 of the Spiritual. 
 
 We have sought, by a fair and careful exposition of the 
 Scholastic teaching with regard to the method of knowledge, 
 the idea of truth and the nature of the First Cause, to re-estab- 
 lish firmly the foundations of the spiritual life and of knowl- 
 edge which Eucken's theory would completely shatter. We 
 have examined in 
 
 1 the question of truth-"imrnediacies:" we have sought 
 to show that only in an intellectualistic theory is an 
 "immediacy" trustworthy; in 
 
 2 the nature of truth is unfolded; in 
 
 3 the nature of the Absolute Spiritual Life; in 
 
 4 Eucken's challenge is investigated and the answer 
 pointed out. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Preface iii 
 
 Plan of Dissertation v 
 
 PART I 
 THE CONCEPT OF THE SPIRITUAL 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 Importance of the Concept of the Spiritual 8 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 Source of the Spiritual in Greek Thought 6 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 Implication of the Concept 13 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 Method of Attaining It 17 
 
 PART II 
 EUCKEN'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE 
 
 Introduction 25 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 Anti-Intellectualism 34 
 
 Key to Eucken's philosophy, Einheit des Geisleslebens, 34 — Evidences 
 of Anti-Intellectualism, 35 — Eucken's critics, 39 — Hermann, 39 — 
 Tudor Jones, 39 — Boyce Gibson, 40 — Eucken and Revealed Truth, 
 40 — Hermann, 41 — Dr. A. Jones, 41 — Action versus Thought, 41 — 
 Booth, 42 — Eucken and Bergson, 42 — Eucken and "the historical 
 Mystics," 45 — H. C. Sheldon, 46 — Eucken and Boyce Gibson, 47 — 
 Eucken's misapprehension of Intellectualism, 47 — Eucken and Shake- 
 speare, 48 — Further development of Eucken's system along irrational- 
 istic lines, 48 — Conclusion, 48. 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 The Life-Process 50 
 
 Activism, 50 — Two questions: Nature of the Life-Process, Manner of 
 our knowledge of it, 51 — Exposition of the Life- Process, 51 — Analysis 
 and Criticism, 57 — Conclusion, 62. 
 
viii Table of Contents 
 
 CHAPTER III page 
 
 The "Immediacy" of the Spiritual Life 63 
 
 What the inquiry involves, 63 — The "Immediacy," 63 — Two stages 
 of knowledge of the Spiritual, 64 — Psychological method, 64 — 
 Scholastic influence, 67 — Points of difference, 68 — Noology, 70 — 
 Three aspects of Activism revealed, 71 — Subjectivism, 71 — Pessim- 
 ism, 74 — Materialism, 79 — Further consequences, 81 — Conclusion, 
 83. 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 The Problem of Nature 84 
 
 Eucken's attitude, 84 — Hostility to Nature, 84 — Identification of 
 nature and human nature, 86 — Consequences, 88 — Dr. Caldecott's 
 criticism, 88 — Eucken's goal, Monism, 89 — "Human spiritual" a 
 "concentration point" of Absolute Spiritual, 92 — Absolute Spiritual 
 logically responsible for evil, 92 — Evidences of Pantheism, 92 — 
 Conclusion, 94. 
 
 Conclusion 96 
 
 PART III 
 
 THE PERMANENT FOUNDATION OF A PHILOSOPHY 
 OF THE SPIRITUAL 
 
 Introductory Note 103 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 Inquiry into the Conditions of Human Knowledge 105 
 
 General survey, 105 — Discussion of the "immediacy," 106 — Schol- 
 astic Theory of reason-' 'immediacies," 108 — Pragmatic theory of 
 feeling-"immediacies," 110 — Conclusion drawn, 113 — Nature and 
 basis of certainty, 115 — Means of perceiving truth. 121 — Conditions 
 of infallibility of common-sense criterion, 124 — Objectivity of ideas, 
 124 — Primary and secondary qualities of matter, 126 — Distinction 
 between natural and supernatural knowledge, 128 — Necessity of 
 Divine Revelation, 131 — Summary, 133. 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 Nature of Truth 134 
 
 Eucken's definitions, 134 — His affinity with Pragmatic doctrine, 184 
 — Necessary rejection of his standard, 135 — Scholastic conception of 
 truth, 135— Immutability of truth, 138 — Conclusion, 139. 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 The Absolute Spiritual Life in Se 140 
 
 Nature of the Absolute Spiritual Life, 140 — St. Thomas' proofs of tin- 
 Divine Immutability, 140 — Elucidation and commentary, 141 — 
 Relation of Absolute Spiritual to human spiritual. 144 — Problem of 
 immanence and transcendence, 146 — Final criticism of Monism. 150. 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 Conclusion 1 58 
 
 Eucken's attack on Scholasticism, l">2 — Challenge answered, 1 8 I 
 Concluding summary, 156. 
 
 Final Note 157 
 
 Bibliography 161 
 
PART I 
 
 THE CONCEPT OF THE SPIRITUAL 
 
 In which the importance, source and implication of this concept are 
 considered, and the method of attaining it is discussed. 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 IMPORTANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF THE SPIRITUAL 
 
 History seems to justify the statement that no other idea in 
 the range of philosophic thought has been the cause of such fierce 
 and bitter contest as the concept of the Spiritual; and no other 
 tenet has been the ground of such unrelenting persecution in the 
 sphere of religion. Martyrs of the Old and the New Law have 
 died for the Spiritual, but so also did the philosopher of the 
 Spiritual, Socrates, as he himself reveals to us. 
 
 "Quid ergo aiunt accusatores mei? . . . Socrates iniuste agit 
 . . . ac deos, quos civitas putat, ipse non putans" 2 . . . etc. 
 
 "Si me nunc absolvatis ... si, inquam, ad haec vos ita 
 dicatis: 0, Socrates, Any to non credimus, teque sententiis nostris 
 absolvimus, hac tamen conditione, ut nunquam posthac in hac 
 inquisitione philosophiaque verseris : ac si id facere [deprehendare, 
 mortem obeas] si igitur, ut dicebam, his conditionibus demittere 
 me velitis, respondebo utique vobis: Viri Athenienses, diligo 
 vos equidem atque amo; Deo tamen parere malo, quam vobis et 
 quamdiu spirabo viresque suppetent, philosophari non desinam, 
 exhortans et docens quemcunque nactus fuero, sicut soleo, hunc 
 in modum: Quid tu, o vir optime, cum civis sis Atheniensis, 
 civitatis amplissimae, ac sapientia ac potentia praestantissimae, 
 non erubescis in eo omnem operam ponere, quo tibi pecuniarum 
 et gloriae et honoris quam plurimum sit? Ut autem prudentia et 
 Veritas, et optimus animi habitus in te sit, neque cogitas, neque 
 curas? . . . O Viri Athenienses, profiteor equidem, sive credatis 
 Anyto, sive non credatis, sive dimiseritis me, sive non dimiseritis, 
 profiteor, me nihil aliud esse facturum, nee si mihi sit pluries 
 moriendum" 3 
 
 The prominent place which this idea holds is thus due to the 
 tremendous issues bound up with it. Every normal man whether 
 Jew or Gentile, Pagan or Christian, Deist or Theist, whether 
 unlettered or learned, has, at least once in his life, turned philos- 
 opher. We can give no direct proof of this statement, but intro- 
 spection will, it seems to us, establish it beyond doubt for the 
 
 2 Im. Bek. Platonis Dialogi; Apol. Socrates 19 and 24, Berolini, 1816, Pars I, 
 Vol. II. 
 
 8 29, 30, loc. cit. The italics are our own. 
 
4 Rudolf Eucken axd the Spiritual Life 
 
 individual. The poet-philosopher, of all men and all time, has 
 voiced this universal speculation: 
 
 "For in that sleep of death what dreams may come 
 When we have shuffled off this mortal coil, 
 Must give us pause. 
 
 . . . the dread of something after death, 
 The undiscover'd country from whose bourn 
 No traveller returns, puzzles the will," . . . 4 
 
 "But here, upon this bank and shoal of time, 
 We'd jump the life to come." 5 
 
 What we wish to bring out is the fact that philosophy and 
 religion meet and cross on the territory of the Spiritual. No 
 consistent upholder of Monotheism will accept a system of philoso- 
 phy in which there is no place for the Spiritual; and no philosopher 
 who upholds a spiritualistic system will accept a religion which 
 offers him only anthropomorphic gods. 6 
 
 The latest German exponent of the Spiritual says, in connection 
 with this problem: "The issue at stake is the destiny of man, the 
 reasonableness or otherwise of his existence, the gaining or losing 
 of a soul." 7 
 
 But, though philosophy and religion deal here with the same 
 reality, they do so from different standpoints, and the line of 
 demarcation between the two fields is, in the main, clear, if narrow. 
 An investigation into the Spiritual in philosophy will involve two 
 distinct lines of inquiry: (1) an examination into the nature of the 
 soul and its higher faculties of thinking and willing; (2) an examina- 
 tion into the nature of the First Cause. Furthermore, Ethics and 
 Art, in so far as the one treats of the will, and the other deals with 
 the objective expression of the intellectual love of the beautiful, 
 fall, in large measure, under the philosophy of the spiritual. The 
 
 4 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Sc. I. 
 
 6 Ibid., Macbeth, Act I, Sc. VII. 
 
 5 We need hardly point out the radical difference between a religion of 
 anthropomorphic gods and the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation in time 
 of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity. The infinite dissimilarity 
 between the Divine and the human nature in ne is pointed out by St. Paul 
 when he describes the Incarnation thus: 
 
 "But emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the 
 likeness of men." — Philippians, Chap. II, Verse 7. 
 
 We make the reference, however, according to Catholic interpretation — 
 not in the literal meaning which Kenoticists attribute to the words. 
 
 7 Rudolf Eucken, Main Currents of Modern Thought, trans. by Booth. 
 New York, \'Mi, p. ll.'S. Ceistige Stromungcn der (iegenwart, op. (St., p. 81. 
 
EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 5 
 
 task is therefore clearly defined as soon as philosophy and the 
 sciences exist, but previous to this it is mainly tentative. To 
 confine oneself to the concept in philosophy, when searching for 
 the origin of the idea of the spiritual in any country, would be as 
 absurd as to insist on deciding the conditions of the earliest self- 
 conscious states of the child by the mere observation of adult 
 mental life. In both cases we must get back to the antecedents 
 of the phenomena we are seeking to explain. 
 
 An examination of religious beliefs and of literature, or — in 
 default of this latter — folklore, is imperative, in order to ascertain 
 whether they offer any faint suggestions of elements of the spiritual. 
 The conservative method of science has, here, to be abandoned, 
 and the investigator must be willing to go from the alpha to the 
 omega of the then existent knowledge — whether it be alleged to be 
 of human or Divine origin — for the purpose of discovering the 
 influences through which, in the course of ages, the idea appeared. 
 
 We cannot hold with Eucken that the origin of any form of the 
 spiritual consisted in "little half -animal beginnings." 8 This 
 would be to negative the concept in toto. That such is not Eucken's 
 intention, however, may be gathered from the following: 
 
 "Change (and with it evolution) is absolutely out of the ques- 
 tion as far as the substance of spiritual life is concerned." 9 
 
 and again: 
 
 "If . . . spiritual life is a mere by-product of nature, there 
 remains no possibility of providing a counter-poise for change and 
 wresting a content from life; but humanity and the whole world 
 with it are in headlong flight towards the nothingness which is 
 their sole destination. Thus ... it is our attitude towards 
 spiritual life — more particularly the recognition or rejection of an 
 independence on the part of spiritual life — which decides the 
 direction in which our thought must move." 10 
 
 We cannot agree with the statement that any real beginning of 
 any form of the spiritual came from matter, but we do hold that, 
 in order to find the beginning in the ideal order, we must dig in the 
 debris of old superstitions and pagan rites, and search out any 
 particle of truth that may have been buried therein. If the 
 quest should prove a complete failure as regards our special pursuit 
 we have reason to suspect the existence of foreign influence. 
 
 8 Ibid., p. 262; Geistige Strbinungen, p. 212. 
 
 9 Eucken, ibid., p. 274; Geistige Stromungen, p. 228. 
 
 10 Eucken, ibid., p. 278. The italics are Booth's. Geistige Stromungen, 
 p. 227. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 SOURCE OF THE SPIRITUAL IN GREEK THOUGHT 
 
 From the preceding section it is evident that the implication 
 of the concept of the spiritual is of the highest importance: it 
 matters much to man what the spiritual does and does not mean. 
 Before dealing, therefore, with a modern exposition of spiritual 
 life it has seemed prudent to go back to the source of our first 
 knowledge of the concept in philosophy, and inquire into its origin 
 in Greek thought — the medium through which it has entered the 
 modern world. 11 
 
 This will enable us to test more accurately and fairly the worth 
 of new theories. 
 
 Ueberweg justly says that the extent to which the genesis of 
 Greek philosophy was affected by Oriental influences is a problem 
 the solution of which depends on the further progress of Oriental, 
 and, especially, of Egyptological investigation. 12 
 
 The discussion of the question does not fall here, but it is con- 
 venient to bring forward some views of it. Clement 13 and Euse- 
 bius 14 are vigorous advocates of a preponderating Jewish influence. 
 
 Clement writes: 
 
 "Tempora autem eorum, qui fuerunt principes et auctores 
 ipsorum philosophiae, sunt dicenda consequenter ut, facta com- 
 paratione, ostendamus Hebraeorum philosophiam fuisse geuera- 
 tionibus multis antiquiorem;" 15 
 
 and again: 
 
 "Philosophia ergo, res quaedam valide utilis, olim quidem 
 floruit apud Barbaros, per gentes resplendens: postea autem 
 venit etiam ad Graecos." 16 
 
 The most forceful of Clement's arguments to the modern mind 
 are his references to admissions by Greek philosophers of barbarian 
 
 11 We have not to consider here the first trace of the concept in philosophy: 
 \\ e confine our investigation to Greek thought because this is the channel 
 through which it lias been directly communicated to us. 
 
 ' Geschichte der Phil., Berlin, 7te Autl. lSOii, p. :?-»; Bte Anil.. 1894. 
 
 '■• Opera, Vol. 1. Stromatum, Lib. I. Cap. XV, pp. 7(i7 sqq. Bfigne ed. l it*! 
 
 "Praep. Evang., especially Lib. VIII, p. 587; Lib. XII. Cap. 1. X. XVI, 
 pp. 95 1 sqq. 
 
 16 Op. Cit., Cap. XIV, p. 766. 
 
 "Op. cit., Lib. I. Cap. XV, p. "s. 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 7 
 
 wisdom; e. g., to Plato, when, speaking through Socrates in the 
 Phaedo, he says: "Magna quidem est . . . Graecia, o Cebes, 
 ait ille, in qua sunt viri omni ex parte boni, multa sunt autem 
 etiam genera barbarorum." 17 
 
 Ueberweg, while maintaining that the Greeks met with no fully 
 developed and completed philosophical systems among the 
 Orientals, considers Oriental influence on early Greek thinkers 
 to be not only possible, but, in some cases, most probable. He 
 suggests that Anaxagoras possibly came in contact with Jews. 1S 
 
 Zeller reduces foreign influence to a minimum, and attributes 
 Greek Philosophy, almost exclusively, to the peculiar character- 
 istics of Greek genius. 19 
 
 Burnet 20 treats the subject with a touch of scorn, and suggests 
 that the first question to be settled is whether any pre-Hellenic 
 philosophy existed. He thinks not. On the remark of Noumenios, 
 "What is Plato but Moses speaking Attic?" he says that Nou- 
 menios was probably "thinking of certain marked resemblances 
 between Plato's Laws and the Levitical Code when he said this — 
 resemblances due to the fact that certain primitive legal ideas 
 are similarly modified in both." 21 
 
 This is a summary dismissal of a weighty question. Why are 
 the primitive legal ideas similarly modified by Moses and Plato, 
 and what would Burnet suggest as the primitive form of the 
 similarly modified legal ideas? These two points call for explana- 
 tion. 
 
 Burnet grants, however, in conclusion, that Greek Philosophy 
 did not originate quite independently of Egyptian and Babylonian 
 influences. 
 
 Gomperz 22 in his introduction to "Griechische Denker" gives a 
 very picturesque account of the influences at work in the Hellenic 
 World centuries before the appearance of the "Philosophers of 
 Nature." The description of certain details, e. g., the endless 
 line of pilgrims coming to the Delphic Oracle, and the crowds of 
 strangers thronging to the Olympic Games, is, perhaps, highly 
 colored, but the main outline seems accurate, and impresses the 
 
 17 Platonis Dialogi. Im. Bek. Berolini. Pars II, Vol. Ill, Phaedo. 
 
 18 Geschichte der Phil., op. cit., 8te Auflage, pp. 41, 42. 
 
 19 Phil, der Griechen, Leipzig, 1892. 5te Aufl., pp. 19 sqq„ 41 sqq. 
 
 20 Early Greek Phil., 2nd ed., London, 1908, pp. 17 sqq. 
 
 21 Ibid., p. 19. 
 
 22 Griechische Denker, Leipzig, 1896, Vol. I, Einleitung. 
 
8 Ktjdolf Etjcken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 reader with the incalculable effects which the East had on Greek 
 thought. Erdmann and Fouillee do not deal with the problem 
 at any length. 23 The opening lines of Erdmann's introduction 
 to his Philosophy of the Ancients are most significant. "Dazu, 
 sein eigenes Wesen denkend zu erfassen, kann der Menschengeist 
 erst dort versucht und fahig seyn, wo er sich seiner specifischen 
 Wurde bewusst ist;" 24 and he adds that man does not attain, in the 
 East, to this consciousness of his specific worth except among the 
 Jews (ausgenommen bei den Juden) 25 . 
 
 The statement of Fouillee, — in Section V of the first book of his 
 Philosophy — "Les Anciens Peuples" — concerning les "Doctrines 
 Philosophiques des Hebreux," is no less suggestive: "La Judee 
 n'offre pas non plus de la philosophic proprement dite: elle est 
 tout entiere absorbee par l'idee religieuse. Neanmoins, on peut 
 degager de ses livres sacres les grandes doctrines philosophiques 
 qui devaient plus tard entrer comme elements dans la philosophic 
 chretienne et moderne." 26 Fouillee does not seem to notice the 
 import these remarks have for the inquiry into the genesis of 
 Greek philosophy. 
 
 It is not necessary to multiply references: enough has been 
 brought forward to show the general attitude of modern thought 
 on this subject: Zeller is its most extreme exponent. Those who 
 take different views are in the minority. Nevertheless two 
 undeniable facts are generally conceded, or, at least, not disputed. 
 
 1. The Hebrews had something worth communicating, whether 
 it be called philosophy or not. 
 
 2. Greeks and Jews came into contact at an early date. 
 
 We are confining our investigation here to one point — the 
 spiritual — and in searching out its origin in Greek thought we 
 cannot ignore the historic fact that a civilized people with a high 
 ethical code and a spiritualistic religion existed for centuries before 
 Heraclitus used the term X670S, 27 or Anaxagoras spoke of the 
 voos (wOs). 28 
 
 In Greece we find the earliest attempts at system in the poems 
 of Homer and Hesiod, which serve the Greeks alike as cosmogeny 
 
 23 See Erdmann. Geschiehte der Phil., Vol. I, Berlin 1878. par. 17, p. 13; 
 par. 19, p. 14, 3rd ed., 1878. 
 
 24 Op. cit., Einleitung, p. 11. 
 " Loc. cit. 
 
 s » Hist de la Phil., 5e ed., Paris, 1887, p. *5. 
 "See Mullach, Frag., Heracliti, (1)1. 
 28 Ibid., Anax., (5) 1. 
 
EUDOLP EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 9 
 
 and theogeny. From Homer and Hesiod to Anaxagoras the dis- 
 tance is spanned by the cosmogenic systems — of which Pherecydes 
 is representative — by the scientific beginnings of the Ionians, and 
 the more abstract speculations of the Eleatics and Pythagoreans. 
 
 The poems of Homer, in the aspect of theogeny, are fatal to a 
 system of spiritualistic philosophy. If a steady succession of 
 writers had transmitted progressive ideas in an unbroken current 
 from Homer to Thales, so as to create a continuous development 
 of thought, the presence of the spiritual, at such a comparatively 
 early date, in Greek philosophy would be very difficult to under- 
 stand, apart from foreign influence. With the data which ancient 
 Greece offers, the hypothesis that the idea of the spiritual is the 
 spontaneous outcome of the fertile Greek intellect 29 seems to us 
 untenable. It is as inconceivable, from a psychological view- 
 point, that a highly developed abstraction, such as the concept 
 of the spiritual, should appear in philosophy from the above data, 
 as it would be, from an evolutionist viewpoint, that man appeared 
 in the middle of the phylogenic series instead of at the end. 
 
 We cannot agree with Gomperz that the system of Pherecydes is 
 suggestive of the spiritual. His account runs thus: "Pherekydes 
 . . . kannte drei Urwesen, die von Ewigkeit her da waren: 
 Chronos oder das Zeit-Prinzip, Zeus, von ihm Zas genannt (wohl 
 nicht ohne Riicksicht auf jene Namensdeutung, die uns schon 
 einmal bei Heraklit begegnet ist und die den obersten Gott als 
 das hochste Lebens-prinzip auffassen wollte) ; endlich die Erdgbttin 
 Chthonie. Aus dem Lamen des Chronos sei 'das Feuer, der 
 Lufthauch und das Wasser' entsprungen, aus diesen auch 'man- 
 nigfache Geschlechter der Gotter.' " 30 
 
 And in his criticism he writes: 4 'Zas und Chronos erscheinen 
 als mehr geistige Wesen." 31 
 
 Such a novel view of the spiritual would surprise us if Gomperz 
 had not thrown some light on his attitude in an earlier chapter. 
 Treating of Heraclitus he writes: "Die grosse Originalitat 
 Heraklits besteht . . . darin, dass er zum erstenmal zwischen 
 dem Natur- und dem Geistesleben Faden spann, die seitdem nicht 
 wieder abgerissen sind, und dass er allumfassende Verallgemeine- 
 rungen gewonnen hat, welche die beiden Bereiche menschlicher 
 
 29 See Zeller, op. cit., p. 45. 
 
 3(1 Griechische Denker, Leipzig, 189C, Vol. 1, p. 70. 
 
 81 Ibid., p. 72. 
 
10 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 Erkenntnis wie mit einem ungeheueren Bogen iiberwolbten." 32 
 If Heraclitus, whose eternal World-Fire Tvp adfaov 33 is iden- 
 tical with the \6yos, is an excellent exponent of the spiritual, 
 according to Gomperz, we may disregard Gomperz's views on the 
 subject in our search, since by "spiritual" we understand some- 
 thing essentially different. 
 
 In this connection we may call attention to the misleading 
 statement of Gomperz with regard to the primitive meaning of 
 the words used to signify "spirit." He says: "In der Regel 
 bleibt jedoch dem Hauch, dem Atem, dem warmen Dampf , welcher 
 aus dem Innern des lebenden Organismus hervorquillt, diese Rolle 
 vorbehalten, wie denn der ungeheuren Mehrzahl von Worten, 
 welche in den verschiedensten Sprachen 'Seele' und 'Geist' 
 bezeichnen, diese Grundbedeutung eignet." 34 
 
 As we are treating of Greece we shall test the statement by 
 reference to the Greek and Latin tongues. 
 
 1. ^X 1 ? signified primarily "breath," and was applied 
 figuratively — perhaps even literally at an early date — to "soul" 
 or "living principle." It was not used to signify "spirit." Aris- 
 totle has the word in reference to the living principle, or souls of 
 plants and animals, and though he uses the popular word for living 
 principle when treating of the human soul — which he holds to be 
 immaterial — he employs the term "NoOs" to signify its spiritual 
 activity. 
 
 2. "Anima" in Latin signifies "breath," and "soul" in popular 
 language; it is found in the Poets applied to the "shades" of the 
 departed. It is never used in philosophy to signify the spiritual 
 — as far as we can discover. The "intellectus," or "mens," is 
 employed as a correct rendering of the Greek vovs- 
 
 The Greeks were not slow to perceive the distinction between 
 the two terms as is seen from Aristotle: 
 
 "At Anaxagoras videtur quidem aliud animam, aliud intellectum 
 dicere, quemadmodumet anteadiximus; . . . verum intellectum 
 principium maxime omnium ponit: solum namque rerum omnium 
 ipsum simplicem et non mistum et sincerum esse dicit." The 
 terms used by Aristotle in the original are \pvxn v an( l voov 
 rendered in Latin by "animam" and "intellectum." 35 
 
 32 Ibid., p. 52. 
 
 ,3 Loc. cit.. Heracliti (27). 
 
 M Ibid., p. 17. 
 
 "See Arist.. Vol. S. De. An.. Lib. I. Chap. II (IS). 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 11 
 
 We conclude our investigation with the statement of our 
 conviction that the concept of the spiritual in Greek Philosophy- 
 has been taken, at least "in germ," from the Hebrews. The 
 following points resume our arguments briefly : 
 
 1. It is contrary to all psychological experience (using the term 
 in the widest sense to include both the individual and the race) 
 that an abstract science, such as Metaphysics, should spring up 
 spontaneously and reach a perfect development in the short 
 space of two centuries, without any antecedents, and independently 
 of foreign influence. 
 
 2. (a) Among ancient peoples the spiritual, in the strict 
 sense, was known to the Hebrews alone. 
 
 (b) It was quite possible for the idea to be communicated in a 
 general way. 
 
 (c) It is, in the highest degree, improbable that the Greeks 
 could be totally ignorant of the central doctrine in the Jewish 
 Religion. The Hebrew nation was too individualistic to escape 
 the quick-witted curiosity of the Greek. 
 
 To these may be added two other points: 
 
 1. The Spiritual of the Hebrews and the Spiritual of Aristotle 
 are practically identical in all essential features. 
 
 2. Aristotle accuses Anaxagoras of using the Spiritual as a 
 "Deus ex machina;" his words are: "Nam et Anaxagoras tanquam 
 machina utitur Intellectu ad mundi generationem; et quum 
 dubitat propter quam causam necessario sit, tunc eum attrahit; 
 in ceteris vero, magis cetera omnia, quam intellectum, causam 
 eorum quae fiunt, ponit. 36 The fact that Anaxagoras is unable 
 to do anything, so to say, with the spiritual principle which he is 
 the first to propound, is a strong argument against its being really 
 a portion of his own system. If he had discovered the principle 
 by the abstractive process of his own thought we believe that it 
 would have been worked in as the vital power in an organic whole. 
 To sum up: 
 
 We do not hold that the concept of the spiritual entered Greek 
 thought clothed in philosophical language, but we believe that the 
 germinal thought was cast in at a very early date, that the germ 
 of truth was more fully communicated to Anaxagoras, and that 
 the later philosophers were familiar, in a greater or less degree, 
 with the contents of the Hebrew Sacred Books. 
 
 16 Met., Lib. 1, Chap. IV (5). 
 
12 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 That this leaves much originality to the Greeks, nevertheless, 
 is evident from a comparison of the results obtained in philosophy 
 by the Greeks and Hebrews respectively. The clear scientific 
 exposition of Aristotle, contrasted with the mystic system of Philo, 
 shows, perhaps, better than any other evidence, the wonderful 
 grasp and power of synthesis of the Greek intellect. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 IMPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF THE SPIRITUAL 
 
 The investigation into the source of this concept has led to its 
 definition: Spirit is that which is not made up of constituent 
 parts nor, in itself, dependent on matter. It is thus opposed to 
 the corporeal, the material, as the supersensible. Such is the 
 widest signification of the term "spiritual" — signification univer- 
 sally recognized in the ancient, the mediaeval and the modern 
 world. Anaxagoras gives, practically, a definition in the following : 
 voos be kffTL aweipov /cat avroxpaTes /cat ^ue/zt/crat ovSevl XP^M 07 "'. aXXct 
 ixovvos avros hp euvrov eari. 37 And Aristotle emphasizes the fact 
 that the earlier philosopher had correctly understood the meaning 
 of the voos. 3 * 
 
 Today we find the "spiritual" defined as that which "consists of 
 spirit, as a spiritual substance; the incorporeal, the non-material." 
 
 Thus, for over two thousand years the content of this concept 
 has remained unchanged. There were men in the days of Anaxa- 
 goras who denied the reality of the vovs, and their type has 
 probably never failed since: sceptics, sincere and otherwise, prolong 
 the echo in every age. What was questioned, however, was the 
 existence of the vovs, not its meaning. Violent discussions have 
 raged concerning the nature of the First Principle of all things: 
 verdicts have been given for or against the spiritual, but nowhere 
 do we find a discussion as to what the spiritual stands for. Materi- 
 alists do not argue about the implication of the term : they deny the 
 reality of what it implies. Even the Monists, who sought to unite 
 matter and mind in some wn-definable third have not offered us 
 a new view of the spiritual, though their attempt might have been 
 at least more intelligible if they had. It is therefore something 
 novel, and well-nigh startling, to find one who earnestly advocates 
 a philosophy of the spiritual coming forward and clearly announc- 
 ing that he has changed the meaning of the word. In our last chapter 
 we indicated that Burnet's references to the concept were tainted 
 by materialism, but this to us seems only to suggest that physical 
 and psychical alike were looked on by him as products of the forces 
 of matter. 
 
 ,7 Fragraenta, Anaxagoras, op. cit., 6. 
 18 Arist., De. An., loc. cit. 
 
 IS 
 
14 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 With Eucken the case is different: he has proclaimed that the 
 Super-sensible exists in its own right; that an Independent Spiritual 
 Life forms the ultimate basis of all reality. There have been many 
 disputes as to what matter is, none as to what spirit is, but rather 
 as to whether it is. Eucken has affirmed the last position and we 
 have the right to demand from him a system in accordance with 
 his standpoint. In the main thesis of this dissertation an inquiry 
 will be made into the new philosophy of the spiritual; here we have 
 but to remark that its exponent is unphilosophical in the following 
 statements. 
 
 "Within the soul itself there is a distinction between two levels, 
 of which that other than nature may in agreement with established 
 usage be called spiritual, however little may be implied by this 
 expression; however mysterious, indeed, the conception may for 
 the present be." 39 The original text is "Innerhalb der Seele 
 selbst scheiden sich damit zwei Stufen, von denen die jenseits 
 der Natur gelegene nach alter Uebung als die geistige bezeichnet 
 werden mag, so wenig mit diesem Ausdrvck gesagt ist, ja so 
 rdtselhaft einshveilen dieser Begriff bleibt." 40 
 
 "The spiritual life in itself is incomparably more than is repre- 
 sented by the customary conception of that life." 41 
 
 The nature of the "more" must be inferred after the theory 
 has been examined. We may notice the words of S. H. Mellone 
 in this connection: "Another characteristic is that he uses certain 
 terms of fundamental import, — such as 'spiritual,' 'natural,' 
 'real,' 'ideal,' 'eternal,' — in meanings which, though uniform and 
 consistent, have to be discovered by the reader." 42 Surely a 
 philosopher, or teacher, is hardly justified in using "terms of 
 fundamental import" and of definite content — we may perhaps 
 except the term "ideal" owing to the now many different inter- 
 pretations of the word — in meanings which have to be discovered 
 by the reader. Our exposition of the "Geistesleben" will show 
 that we do not consider the meaning of the term to be either 
 "uniform" or "consistent." We maintain that Eucken ought to 
 have called new conceptions by new names; we disclaim the 
 charge of bias because we insist on the recognized meaning of 
 
 19 Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, translated by Alban G. Widgerv, Loudon, 
 1912, pp. 131, 132. 
 
 w Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung, 2te Aurl., Leipzig, 1913. 
 Italics ours. 
 
 41 Life's Basis, op. cit., p. 240. See also Grundlinien, <>p. fit., p. 104. 
 
 A ' 2 S. H. Mellone, Edinburgh. International Journal of Ethics, Ocl . 1910, 
 "Idealism of Rudolph Eucken," p. IS. 
 
EUDOLF ErCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 15 
 
 words. What would become of Logic if we were to play fast and 
 loose with their connotation? And what would become of Phil- 
 osophy if Logic were made a ringing of changes upon "terms of 
 fundamental import?" 
 
 We have given the definition of the spiritual in its widest 
 signification : we shall point out briefly the more specialized senses 
 in which it is employed. 
 
 In the Hebrew Sacred Books, in the metaphysics of Aristotle, 43 
 in Scholasticism and Christian philosophy in general, and in 
 theology, the First and Final Cause of all things is held to be a 
 spiritual being — an Infinite Spirit — omniscient, omnipotent, 
 omnipresent, i.e., wholly present throughout the entire universe 
 and in every part thereof, though not occupying space after the 
 manner of bodies. Possessing the plentitude of all being, He is 
 infinitely perfect and, therefore, changeless. 
 
 Man's soul is an individual spiritual substance. It comes direct 
 from the First Cause by a creative act, and being like It in nature 
 it seeks It as its last end. 44 
 
 Inasmuch as the human soul is the animating principle of 
 the body during life, it is capable of sensuous activity; in contra- 
 distinction, spiritual activity, or intellect, denotes the higher 
 power of the soul — that through which it thinks, knows, and wills; 
 in this connection are also contrasted the terms "spiritual life," 
 "sensuous life." The epithet "human," in that it connotes man's 
 rational nature, always implies the spiritual. 
 
 Spiritual life, in the sphere of theology, signifies the life of the 
 soul in its personal relations with the Creator. As this is mainly 
 dealt with in ascetic theology, we pass rapidly from natural to 
 revealed truth, and thereby go beyond the domain of philosophy. 
 A "spiritual man" is, thus, one who makes this supernatural life 
 of the soul his main study and aim. 
 
 In German, "geistige" (spiritual) is sometimes used, in a com- 
 prehensive sense, to include all the artistic and literary activities 
 and strivings of the soul, which go to form the Kultur of the age. 
 This employment of the term is philosophical in itself, since art 
 and literature are chiefly products of the spiritual activity, although 
 the aesthetic imagination plays a large part; nevertheless a careful 
 
 43 Metaph., Book XI. 
 
 44 In the Monadology of Leibniz the soul is a simple, indivisible, immaterial, 
 substantial unit, its "representative" power being likened to the spiritual 
 principle, or form, of Scholasticism; thus, except for his curious terminology, 
 be is practically at one with other Christian philosophers as to the spiritual 
 nature of the soul. 
 
16 Rudolf Euckbn and the Spiritual Life 
 
 distinction must be made here; neither art nor literature is phil- 
 osophy. The study of the underlying principles of art, as of all 
 other fundamental principles, belongs to philosophy, but the 
 interpretations of life and reality offered by artists and poets may 
 be the very antithesis of philosophical. 
 
 It is because Eucken has failed to make this distinction that we 
 find Goethe and Schiller figuring in Lebensanschauung der Grossen 
 Denker, a work which is supposed, in the main, to be a history of 
 Philosophy. It is significant that more space is allotted in it to 
 Goethe than to either Descartes or Locke. For a similar reason, 
 viz, the author's failure to distinguish between natural and revealed 
 truth, we find the second part of this volume devoted to an exami- 
 nation of Christianity. It is interesting to note that at least three 
 times as many pages are given to Luther as to St. Thomas Aquinas. 
 
 "Spirituel" in French, when used as a personal adjective, has the 
 signification of "witty." The noun "spiritualite" renders the 
 English "spiritual" when this is employed personally, e. g., "a 
 very spiritual man" corresponds in French to "un homme d'une 
 haute spiritualite." Apart from this peculiar use "spirituel" is 
 the equivalent of "spiritual" in its various shades of meaning, e. g., 
 the soul is "un principe spirituel;" "spiritual life," "la vie spiri- 
 tuelle;" matters pertaining to the relations between God and the 
 soul are termed in general "les choses spirituelles ;" "spiritual life" 
 in contradistinction to "sensuous life" is often termed "la vie 
 intellectuelle," but its operations are described as "inorganiques et 
 spirituels." 
 
 It is evident that each of the above meanings of the spiritual 
 is in perfect harmony with the original definition of the term 
 although some of them belong to it only in its religious, others 
 only in its artistic aspect. 
 
 We may remark that although spirit is the recognized English 
 translation of the vovs, mens or intellectus, it is less suited 
 etymologically than either mind or intellect. St. Thomas uses 
 the adjective "spiritualis," but more often the terms immaterialis, 
 incorporeus, intellectualis. 45 
 
 In concluding this examination of the implication of the 
 spiritual we would point out that the subject matter or context, 
 usually prevents any ambiguity as to the particular signification 
 in which the term is being employed. 
 
 vide Sum.. I, q. L. LI. LXXV. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 METHOD OF ATTAINING THE CONCEPT OF THE 
 SPIRITUAL 
 
 The philosophy of the Spiritual in the modern world is inex- 
 tricably bound up with the treatment of the problem in the ancient 
 world. It is incontestable that the Spiritual — in the one case in 
 its religious, in the other in its philosophical aspect — was known 
 and appreciated in the Hebrew and classic Greek worlds. The 
 concept of the spiritual, knowledge of the spiritual, are not, there- 
 fore, products of modern thought; they have been transmitted 
 from antiquity. However divergent the theories may be concern- 
 ing the nature of psychic activity, however arbitrarily writers 
 may impose a new content on the concept of the Spiritual, the fact 
 remains that the origin of the conception does not coincide with 
 the discoveries of modern science. 
 
 Again, since modern science has not, in fact, changed man's 
 nature, though it has suggested new interpretations of it, the 
 human mind works and must work in the modern world as it 
 did in the ancient. Fresh and abundant material is offered its 
 activity in modern life; much that was unknown or misinterpreted, 
 has been discovered or elucidated, but man does not, psychologi- 
 cally speaking, think in a different manner. He may consider the 
 universe under a new aspect, but there has been no alteration of 
 the laws that govern the working of his own mind. For the 
 philosopher and scientist of today, as for Plato and Aristotle, the 
 law of Contradiction is the fundamental principle of his thought 
 which he cannot really violate — whatever conflicting statements 
 he may make — for the reason that the mind will never accept an 
 evident contradiction. 
 
 Eucken well says, "Nothing is more characteristic of the dis- 
 tinctive nature of thought than the fact and power of the logical 
 contradiction." 46 
 
 No normal mind can assent to the statement that black is white, 
 provided it be made in clear and unmistakable terms: if the 
 thought is obscured by a mist of confused expressions, the mind 
 
 46 Main Currents of Modern Thought, op. cit., p. 183. Geistige Stromungen 
 der Gegenwart, p. 143. 
 
 17 
 
18 EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 may assent through ignorance of the nature of the data presented 
 to it. The will has much to do with such assents on insufficient 
 grounds. As Doctor Dubray points out: "That man would be 
 laboring under an illusion who would think that to him could never 
 be applied the words of Henry IV: 'Thy wish was father, Harry, 
 to that thought.' Who, knowing himself as he is and as others 
 perhaps know him, can boast that he never saw things as he wished 
 them to be?" 47 
 
 It is well to insist on this point when examining modern theories 
 of knowledge. 
 
 The genesis of knowledge is a central problem in philosophy, 
 but the attempt to transfer the seat of knowledge from what is 
 highest in man to what he shares with the brutes — from what 
 raises him above the animals to what allies him with them — seems 
 to belong exclusively to contemporary systems. The Stoics and 
 Epicureans did not hold that man possessed an intellectual faculty 
 since they conceived the soul as a form of subtle matter; hence it 
 would suggest something of an anachronism to consider them the 
 historical forbears of anti-intellectualists. The term anti-intellec- 
 tualism implies intellectualism, and anti-intellectualists are, in 
 general, prompt to acknowledge intellectual activity, but they 
 maintain that the intellect is not the true instrument of knowledge 
 — above all of the higher kind. Not through the intellect but 
 through some other channel — instinct, feeling, action — does man 
 learn the meaning of his life and come to realize his responsibility. 
 Eucken is emphatic on the importance — in fact the necessity — of 
 adopting the new method which he advocates as being "Coperni- 
 can" in contrast to the intellectualistic or "old mode of thought" 
 which is truly "Ptolemaic." We have just cited Eucken's words 
 as to the fact and power of the logical contradiction. Is he free 
 from contradiction in seeking to reject his intellect? Anti- 
 intellectualism, in fact, is a sheer impossibility: it has no more 
 reality than a round square. 
 
 Theorists may style themselves what they will, but they camiot 
 change their nature since they are not the authors of their being. 
 All men are intellectualists, since intellect or reason is an essential 
 mark of man. They think, judge, decide by intellect and can do 
 so in no other way; they reject intellect by intellect and select 
 
 47 "Intellectualism in Practical Life," Catholic University Bulletin, Vol. 
 XX, p. <H, Feb., 1914. 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 19 
 
 feeling, or instinct, or whatever they choose as new guide of life, 
 only through the intellect they have rejected. Indeed anti- 
 intellectualists move perpetually in a rather narrow circle. 
 
 There is one method, and only one, of attaining knowledge of 
 the spiritual, as well as all other knowledge: it is the Intellectual- 
 istic. This method presupposes the activities of the lower faculties, 
 especially the cognitive powers. As the Scholastics so often 
 repeat, nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit prius in sensu. Intel- 
 lect and sense work concomitantly and harmoniously. Withdraw 
 intellect and we have perception but never knowledge : to remember 
 is one phenomenon — due to association — to recognize in the true 
 sense of the word, is another — due to intellect. Dogs have good 
 memory power, it is man's prerogative to recognize. To feel is 
 one thing, to know that one feels and what one feels is quite 
 another, belonging to a different order of mental life. Perception 
 and feeling are common to all animals : the "crashing of machinery" 
 theory 48 is no longer held even by vivisectists. Intellect is, 
 solely, the prerogative of man. The experiments of recent years 
 have gone to prove that there is no trace of thought or reflection 
 in the phenomena ascribed to monkeys. Instinct and association 
 amply account for their feats of dexterity. Hence an anti- 
 intellectualistic mode of thought, if such a nonentity could be 
 conceived, so far from being "Copernican" would be decidedly 
 the reverse, since it would imply not a retrogression, but a down- 
 ward plunge to the brute world. No analogy exists between the 
 Copernican theory and anti-intellectualism. Copernicus did not 
 suggest a change in the planetary system : he brought forward no 
 theory to disturb the laws of nature; but this is, in fact, what 
 Eucken advocates, since the laws of mental life are the laws of 
 man's rational nature. Copernicus was an Intellectualist of a 
 high order; this, alone, enabled him to offer a more correct inter- 
 pretation of the material universe; and only Intellectualists can 
 offer correct interpretations, whether it be of the solar system, the 
 data of consciousness or the invisible Reality which is the "Founda- 
 tion of all the rest." 
 
 A comparison of Eucken's statement regarding the fact and 
 power of the logical contradiction with the following: "Even 
 
 <8 The Cartesian theory that .-mi ma Is were automata: some went so far as to 
 maintain that the apparent cry of pain on the dissecting table was due to the 
 crashing of the machinery— in fact, was this crashing! Such a view did not 
 prevail very widely. 
 
20 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 when gauging the external world the imaginative flight of thought, 
 piercing infinity, reaches beyond all the bounds of sense-percep- 
 tion," 49 leads one to infer that the philosopher did not compare 
 one portion of his system with another; else how could he, after 
 having written the above, advocate an anti-intellectualistic 
 method? 
 
 Thought, which is the activity of the intellect, can indeed speed 
 across the oceans, soar above the highest mountain tops, pierce 
 the clouds and make man prostrate himself in spirit before the 
 Uncreated Source of all being. In the phrase "pierce the clouds" 
 we are using an expression which helps the imagination. We 
 know that God is, in fact, everywhere and can make His presence 
 felt to the soul anywhere. The elans of the soul do not imply a 
 spatial, but a moral uplift to what is higher and holier. All 
 this is done, however, by or through the intellect, and cannot be 
 done in any other way. Even the more immediate knowledge of 
 God, to which we have just referred, and which Eucken seeks to 
 make the only means of knowledge, 50 is communicated through 
 the intellect. 
 
 We shall cite in conclusion the words of the scientist, St. George 
 Mivart: 
 
 "Self-conscious, reflective thought, ... is our ultimate and 
 absolute criterion. . . . Our ultimate court of appeal and 
 supreme criterion is the intellect, and not sense, and that act of 
 intellectual perception which is thus ultimate, we may call 'intellec- 
 tual intuition.' " 51 
 
 The results of our inquiry into the concept of the spiritual may 
 now be summed up: 
 
 1. The concept of the spiritual is the most important in the 
 range of thought; it belongs both to Philosophy and Religion, but 
 to each under a different aspect. If we pass from natural to 
 supernatural truth, from natural Religion to Revelation, the 
 highest that we can know of is Spirit: such knowledge does not 
 belong to philosophy. 
 
 2. The religious concept of the Hebrews hastened the appear- 
 ance and influenced the development of the philosophical concept 
 of the Greeks. Historical data point to the Hebrews as the first 
 
 49 Christianity and the New Idealism, p. 7. (Hauptprobleme der Religions 
 philosophie der Gegenwart, Berlin, 1912, p. 9.) 
 
 50 This matter will be treated in Part II, Chap. III. 
 61 On Truth. London, 1889, p. 113. 
 
EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 21 
 
 to possess knowledge of the Spiritual : the origin and earliest source 
 of the concept would then be religious. 
 
 3. The Spiritual is that which is in se essentially, forever and 
 in every way, distinct from and opposed to matter. 
 
 4. Whether in the natural, or supernatural order, man can 
 only attain to a knowledge of the spiritual through his rational 
 activity, or faculty, Intellect. 
 
PART II 
 
 EUCKEN'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE 
 
 In Which the Theory of Activism is Examined Mainly under Its 
 Epistemological Aspect 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Activism, its name, gives a key to Eucken's philosophy, or, 
 rather, to his own idea about his philosophy. The new system 
 insists upon action, spiritually inspired action, as the only instru- 
 ment of genuine knowledge and the only path to truth and noble 
 living. Here, at the outset, we are met by something like a 
 dilemma. Eucken has differentiated in action — he distinguishes 
 between soulless work and spiritual deed (Volltat). 52 What is 
 the principle of differentiation unless thought, and if thought 
 be introduced where is the special claim of Activism? 53 
 
 Tudor Jones, interpreting Eucken, writes: 
 
 "Something had to be done before the whole nature of what it 
 was could become known. Thus, man gains a special kind of 
 existence long before he is able to interpret such an existence. 
 He lives a reality for which he has often blindly striven, although 
 he may be far from being able to account for it." 54 
 
 It may be questioned whether this is an accurate description of 
 human activity, but it is a fair explanation of Eucken's view. 
 According to him mankind advances from a mere psychic state of 
 existence, from the "narrowly human" to the full possession of 
 spiritual life: "Kurz, der Mensch ist in seiner ersten empirischen 
 Lage nicht nur den Zusammenhangen der Geisteswelt entfremdet, 
 sondern auch unfahig, aus eigenem unmittelbaren Vermogen sie 
 wieder zu erreichen." 55 
 
 In his earlier works he states clearly that the transition can be 
 accomplished only with the help of thought: "Die Ueberzeugung, 
 dass die That mehr enthalten mag, als das Bewusstsein, gab 
 Recht und Pflicht, auf die Gesamtheit des Thuns zuriickzugreifen 
 und zu priifen, ob nicht in ihr eine Ganzheit angelegt sei, deren 
 
 62 See Erkennen und Leben, Leipzig, 1912, p. 65; Prolegomena zu Fors- 
 chungen iiber die Einheit des Geisteslebens, Leipzig, 1885, pp. 26-39, 46 (top 
 of page), 112 (top of page); Einheit des Geisteslebens, Leipzig, 1888. pp. 363 
 (end of page) sqq., 374, 384 sqq., 421—431,484 sqq.; Der Kainpf urn einen 
 geistigen Lebensinhalt, 2te Aufl., Leipzig, 1907, pp. 160-107; Geistige Striim- 
 ungen der Gegenwart, op. cit., pp. 74-83; Grundlinien einer neuen Leben- 
 sanschauung, op. cit., pp. 99 sqq.; Einfiihrung in eine Philosophic des Geistes- 
 lebens, Leipzig, 1908, p. 122. 
 
 63 "Der Aktivismus." See Grundlinien, pp. 143 sqq.; G. Stromungen, 
 pp. 51 sqq. 
 
 M The Philosophy of Rudolf Eucken, London, 1914, p. 12. 
 H Einheit des Geisteslebens, op. cit., p. 449. 
 
 25 
 
26 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 Gegenwart das Leben zu seiner Vollendung bedarf, die es aber 
 ohne Gedankenarbeit nimmer finden Jcann." 56 
 
 "Diese neue Wirklichkeit ist nicht aus seelischer Unniittel- 
 barkeit zu entwickeln; ihre Unmittelbarkeit kann keine andere 
 sein als die geistiger Arbeit; dahin aber muss der Mensch aus 
 seiner Lage den Weg erst mit Hulfe des Denkens snche?i." 57 
 
 If thought appears as prime factor and guide, then the special 
 feature indicated by its name is not peculiar to this system. 
 "Activism" may give a key to Eucken's position as a moral 
 philosopher, but we do not consider that it opens up any path 
 to the real comprehension of his philosophy. Eucken practically 
 asserts that he offers a metaphysical theory; he declares that 
 "without metaphysics, there is no independent inner world, no 
 true greatness of life," 58 and the major portion of his work is spent 
 not in inquiring into lines of conduct or springs of action, but in 
 developing, elaborating and striving to systematize his theory of 
 Spiritual Life (Geistesleben) . This is his central conception — 
 in fact it constitutes his whole philosophy; we cannot get away 
 from the Geistesleben; everything either is, or is on the road to 
 Spiritual Life. It is therefore, essential to know, in the beginning 
 of our examination, the sense in which he employs the term. 
 
 In Eucken's system the concept of the spiritual life embraces 
 all the accepted meanings of the word spiritual 59 (except the French 
 "spirituel," in its special signification — there is no wit in Activism) 
 plus the "more" which Eucken has announced 60 and which will 
 be examined in Chapter II of this section. It is not that the 
 term is used in its various shades of meaning according to the 
 context, they all belong simultaneously to the content of the 
 Geistesleben which is at one and the same time the "L T rsprlinghche 
 Quelle" of all goodness and truth, and the direct source of all 
 artistic production; which finds fitting expression alike in the 
 mystic contemplation of a Saint Augustine or a Saint Catherine, 
 and in the poetry of a Goethe. Eucken maintains that although 
 we need metaphysics in order to interpret the universe we must 
 have "a new metaphysics," "not of the Schools, but of life:" 
 its subject-matter will be the Geistesleben as above set forth. 
 
 68 Prolegomena, op. cit., p. 97. Italics ours. 
 
 67 Einheit des Geisteslebens, p. 309. Italics ours. 
 
 68 Main Currents, p. 373. (Geistige Striiniungen, op. cit., p. 311.) 
 
 69 See Part I, Chap. III. 
 80 See Part I, loc. cit. 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 27 
 
 We would point out: (l) that raetaphysics,as the name implies, 
 is something essentially abstract and therefore "of the Schools." 
 It must be based, as is all natural knowledge, on facts, on the data 
 presented by life and the universe; but metaphysics embraces a 
 great deal more than life, and cannot, in any way, be made a rule 
 of life or code of morals : it is necessary to be clear in the employ- 
 ment of terms. Metaphysics inquires into the fundamental 
 principles not only of life, but of all existence, of all being. Since 
 physics and chemistry account for much in the animal organism, 
 while biology and psychology study life itself, there is only left 
 for metaphysics the explanation of ultimate problems arising from 
 life, e. g., the origin and destiny of man's spiritual soul. Eucken's 
 severe criticism of what he calls metaphysics "of the Schools" 61 is 
 just if applied to the absolutist systems of the Hegelian School, 
 but bears no weight against the x\ristotelio-Scholastic theory, as 
 Dr. Wunderle remarks. 62 
 
 (2) We are examining a system proposed to us as Philosophy. 
 We shall therefore eliminate from our inquiry whatever does not 
 fall under this head. Art, Literature, Natural and Revealed 
 Religion, Morality, Psychology and Philosophy proper plus a 
 "more" have been united in one concept by the power of the 
 imagination. We do not intend to consider here what may be 
 called the artistic aspect of the Geistesleben any more than we would 
 a new theory of music or the latest poem. Natural religion, which 
 is a special department under philosophy, Eucken has made co-ex- 
 tensive with the whole field. Supernatural Revelation, whether 
 historical or individual, he includes in this field. We are still 
 confronted, therefore, with ordinary knowledge, with revealed 
 truths, with natural and supernatural mysticism. Revealed 
 truths, except in so far as they may be reached by unaided reason, 
 
 61 See Geistige Stromungen, op. cit., pp. 109 sqq.; Grundlinien, pp. 70 sqq.; 
 Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, pp. 46, 403; Hauptproblenie, p. 24, pp. 157 
 sqq. For "Metaphysik des Lebens," see also Erkennen und Leben, p. 83; 
 Sinn und Wert des Lebens, pp. 137 sqq.; Einfiihrung in eine Phil, des Geistes- 
 lebens, pp. 155 sqq. 
 
 82 "Eucken wirft hier die rationalistische Metaphysik des 18 Jahrhunderts mit 
 der schon liingst vorher bestehenden aristotelisch-scholastischen zusammen. 
 Fur die abstrakten Theoricn des Rationalismus ist sein oft wiederholter 
 Ausdruck 'freischwebende' Begriffe u.a. wohl am Platze. Die Metaphysik 
 des Aristoteles und der ihm folgenden Scholastiker ist aber keineswegs eine 
 mit 'freischwebenden' Begriffen aufgebaute Konstruktion, sondern hat die 
 sinnliche, konkrete Wirklichkeit zur sicheren Grundlage." 
 
 Georg Wunderle, Die Religionsphilosophie Rudolf Euckens, Paderborn, 
 1912, p. 31, footnote. 
 
28 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 or in the degree to which reason shows that they are in harmony 
 with natural truth, do not belong to the scope of philosophy. 
 In so far as they are otherwise introduced the system in which they 
 figure ceases to be strictly philosophical. 
 
 Mysticism, the study of the intimate, personal relations and 
 communications of the soul with God, the Author of its being 
 and only Source of all its happiness and perfection, is not within 
 the domain of philosophy. What we have termed natural mysti- 
 cism, e. g., the system of a Plotinus, may be dealt with to some 
 extent: philosophy can examine its grounds, acknowledge its 
 possibility, test its principles and conclusions by known truth, 
 and reject them where contrary to such truth. Supernatural 
 mysticism is never opposed to philosophy, but it is wholly beyond 
 its sphere. Where doubt of its genuineness arises, physical con- 
 ditions are inquired into, or tests of a moral nature settle the 
 question, but philosophy is in no way investigator or judge. 
 Eucken in several of his works asserts the necessity of mysticism, 
 but as he desires "a new metaphysics," so he insists on a new 
 mysticism. 63 Whether the life of "pure inwardness" (reine 
 Innerlichkeit) of which he frequently speaks, would be reached 
 by his principles and method can be best decided by the perusal 
 of the exposition of his theory. As Mysticism is not philosophy 
 it is not incumbent on us to inquire into any possible mystic 
 aspects of the Geistesleben. Eucken is surely right in maintaining 
 the reality and importance of the Interior Life. The supernatural 
 union of the soul with God is the unum necessarium, it is that which 
 gives to all the rest the proper light and shade. Its study is at 
 once the most practical and the most sublime to which the human 
 mind can be devoted, but knowledge of it must be sought where it 
 is to be found, i. e., in Revealed Religion. The Saints and Doctors 
 of the Church have contribued a vast wealth of writings on the 
 subject; they constitute a treasury, unacknowledged source upon 
 which many modern writers have freely drawn. Is it only a 
 coincidence that Eucken's oft repeated description of the Geistes- 
 leben "Ursprtingliche Quelle," is almost a literal translation of the 
 words "Living Spring" addressed to the Holy Spirit by the Church 
 in the hymn Veni Creator? In any case Eucken's works show 
 that he is acquainted with Catholic Ascetics — in fact he often 
 
 •' Grundlinien, p. 104. 
 
KUDOLF EuCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 29 
 
 speaks their language, although the context in which it is used 
 points to an imoerfect apprehension of its meaning. 
 
 Both Eucken himself and many of his interpreters look upon 
 his philosophy as a beneficial innovation. Tudor Jones says : "No, 
 there is nothing new in it as Eucken is so fond of pointing out. 
 But perhaps it is new to preach it from a University chair as part 
 and parcel of the deeper implications of philosophy." 64 That de- 
 pends on the University. Surely no educated man, in the light of 
 history, can hold that the mediaeval universities neglected the 
 "claims" "of the spirit of man." 65 Wherever Catholic philosophy 
 is taught "the spirit of man" finds, and has always found "some- 
 one to come forward to present its claims." 66 The "deeper 
 implications of philosophy" are pointed out and developed in so 
 far as they fall within the philosophical field, but the philosopher 
 who goes outside it, misses his special aim by trying to hit a higher 
 target. If "Order" is heaven's first law, it is also one of the first 
 essentials of correct human reasoning. St. Thomas did not turn 
 philosophy into either theology or religion, but he did what was 
 better — he showed that it was the "handmaid" of both, and thus 
 insured that its "deeper implications" were preached from the 
 particular chair best fitted to deal with them. 67 
 
 Having further narrowed our inquiry by the elimination of 
 Revelation and Mysticism, the ethical, psychological and meta- 
 physical aspects of the Geistesleben plus the "More," which leads 
 to cosmology, remain as our subject matter. For the reason stated 
 in the preface we have dealt with Eucken's theory mainly from the 
 standpoint of epistemology but the issues in the other spheres 
 have been shown. Before concluding this Introduction we shall 
 give a brief, general outline of Eucken's teaching, followed by a 
 brief criticism, in order to facilitate the more detailed examination 
 to those who may be unfamiliar with his thought. 
 
 Outline of Eucken's Teaching 
 
 A spiritual life is the fundamental basis of all reality. It is 
 independent and supertemporal : in dealing with it we have to do 
 
 64 Op. cit., p. 34. 
 
 86 Ibid., p. 35. 
 
 66 Loc. cit. It is true that in Germany, the home of Haeckel, as well as of 
 Eucken, "the champions of this life of the spirit" in philosophy belonged in 
 the last decades to a small minority. 
 
 87 Cardinal Newman's Idea of a University would be interesting reading 
 in this connection. 
 
30 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 "with something essentially different from any process following 
 natural laws." 
 
 Nature is a "sub-spiritual," a lower kind of inner life. The 
 spiritual is ever trying to draw this to itself, to conquer it, to assim- 
 ilate it, to spiritualize it. The spiritual develops itself by this 
 process, and finds self-expression in spiritualizing reality. Each 
 age reveals some new phase of the spiritual which speaks "through 
 all the mutations of the ages." 
 
 Man is the only part of reality that can directly participate in 
 the Spiritual; hence he alone can grasp "the content of the age." 
 This content is not revealed to him without his own effort. He 
 must — by resistance to the "merely human" — struggle upward 
 to the "vision which sees life as a whole and measures it accord- 
 ingly." His instrument in the search for truth is Philosophy, 
 which enables him to make creative syntheses; in these he en- 
 deavors to unfold "the content of the age." "The whole that" 
 Philosophy "seeks never comes to meet it from outside, but must 
 be shaped from within;" 68 thus, for the construction of the syn- 
 thesis, there must be an energetic turning inwards on the part of 
 man, in order to penetrate to the spiritual which lies hidden, at 
 least as a possibility, at the core of his being: "a whole world" comes 
 "into effective activity within man himself." 69 
 
 A distinction must be made between spiritual life as a whole, or 
 the "Absolute Spiritual," and the spiritual as it manifests itself 
 in man, or "the human spiritual form of existence." The former 
 is the absolute truth, in the latter the spiritual is bound down and 
 fettered by human limitations; hence man attains to truth in 
 proportion to the success with which he arises above the "mere ego" 
 and finds a soul, a self, a personality in the "soul of souls," the 
 "self -life," the "world-embracing personality." Yet the spiritual 
 in man is not in itself distinct from the absolute spiritual. 
 
 "It will not do for spiritual life to be communicated to him 
 through the medium of his special nature (thus becoming alienated 
 from itself) ; it must in some fashion be present to him as a whole 
 in all its infinity." 70 
 
 The spiritual thus present within him helps in the upward 
 struggle by imparting to him a "cosmic force." "A cosmic force 
 
 68 Main Currents, p. 133. (Geistige Stromungen, p. 97.) 
 
 69 Op. cit., p. 54. (G. Stromungen, p. 27.) 
 
 70 Op. cit., p. 60. (G. Stromungen, p. 33.) 
 
KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 31 
 
 must be operative in man from the very outset; there must be a 
 receptivity corresponding to man's activity, a hand from above to 
 draw the climber up; yea, in freedom itself there must shine out 
 some revelation of grace." 71 
 
 Morality is "a self active appropriation" of spirituality. It is 
 "a penetration of life to truthfulness and essential being, a winning 
 of a new, infinite self, a 'becoming infinite' from within." 72 "The 
 idea of duty which originates here springs from" man's "own being 
 and is not imposed from without." 73 Morality is dependent on 
 Art because Art is indispensable in the creation of synthesis. 
 
 General Criticism 
 
 1. (a) The descriptions of spiritual fife and natural phenomena 
 are incompatible. If spiritual life is independent, super-temporal 
 and essentially different from nature we may not speak of nature 
 as a "lower kind" of inner life, since the "lower kind" of life is 
 "lower" from the fact that it depends directly on matter: hence the 
 assertion that nature is a lower kind of inner life is self -contradic- 
 tory. 
 
 (b) In the above description of spiritual life Eucken upholds 
 dualism: in his reduction of nature to "inner life" he makes for 
 monism: the combination is self -destructive. 
 
 2. (a) The conception of the fundamental basis of all things 
 as developing itself is irreconcilable with the idea of the First 
 Cause, Which must be perfect and changeless. 
 
 (b) By describing the spiritual life as finding self-expression in 
 spiritualizing reality, Eucken negatives his own concepts. 
 
 3. (a) The antithesis between the "mere ego," the mere 
 human, on the one hand, and the "spiritual," on the other, is 
 unphilosophical, and arises from an erroneous conception of man's 
 soul. The spiritual in man is not distinct from his soul; the soul 
 is the spirit. The term "ego," since it signifies the permanent 
 subject of psychic life is synonymous with soul. 74 
 
 71 Op. cit., p. 392. (G. Stromungen, p. 328.) 
 
 72 Op. cit., p. 390. (G. Stromungen, pp. 326 sqq.) 
 
 73 Op. cit., p. 391. (G. Stromungen, p. 327.) 
 
 74 Mills Alden in the North American comments on this point as follows: 
 "He seems ... to make spiritual personality supra-human, superior to 
 what in common parlance we call the human soul. Perhaps he would not be 
 so insistent on this division between soul and spirit if he belonged to any other 
 country than that of Haeckel, to whom the soul is but an epiphenomenon, or 
 by-product of the brain. In Germany more than anywhere else his heroic 
 agonism finds the incentives which convert it to antagonism." 
 
 Eucken Agonistes, North American, 201, Jan., 1915, pp. 57-63. 
 
32 Rudolf Euckbn and the Spiritual Life 
 
 "Human" is to be contrasted with "Divine," or with "animal" 
 rather than with "spiritual." The manner in which the soul is to 
 be withdrawn from a too great application to the "merely human" 
 interests, in order to become more absorbed in the Divine, is 
 treated of in Sacred Theology rather than in Philosophy, though 
 the question enters partially into the sphere of Ethics. 
 
 (b) Eucken's exposition of the relations between man's soul 
 and the spiritual lead inevitably to Pantheism, in spite of the fact 
 that he rejects the system. "This submersion in the bottomless 
 ocean of eternity, can satisfy only those who do not recognise 
 new and independent reality in spiritual life." 75 The above 
 statement is true, but does not, on that account, save Eucken from 
 inconsistency. 
 
 (c) The conception of the soul finding a personality in the 
 "world-embracing personality" is an impossibility, since incom- 
 municability, individuality are essential attributes of "person." 
 
 (d) The exposition of the relations between the soul and nature, 
 alternating, as it does, between Hypothetical Dualism and Monism, 
 is wholly illogical. 
 
 4. (a) Unless Eucken intends to speak metaphorically, his 
 idea of the scope of morality is a false one. Morality is directly 
 concerned hie et nunc, with man's actual self; it has not to aid him 
 in the search for a "new" self, since, if the words are taken literally, 
 the idea is inconceivable. 
 
 (b) Moral truth is perceived directly by reason, as is all self- 
 evident truth, and the obligation to morality springs from the 
 fact that man is a rational being; but this fact, so far from proving 
 that the idea of duty has not objective validity is the strongest 
 argument for it. Obligation implies law, and law, a law giver. 
 
 It is true that Eucken considers moral truth to be universal 
 and absolute truth, but, in so doing, he is once more inconsistent. 
 
 (c) Morality is independent of Art, though this latter can aid 
 it both by presenting moral ideas in a concrete form and by 
 raising man's aspirations from the sensuous to the intellectual or 
 the religious. 
 
 Further, there is no place in his system for an individual, im- 
 mortal soul; but a philosophy of the spiritual which fails in this 
 point is a more enigmatical and inconsistent interpretation of 
 human life than the materialism which denies spirit. 
 
 75 Main Currents, p. 417. (G. Strotnungen, p. 351.) 
 
Rudolf Euckbn and the Spiritual Lifh 33 
 
 In treating of Eucken's philosophy of the spiritual life we shall 
 be dealing at the same time with his philosophy of History — 
 the viewpoint from which his work has seemed attractive to a 
 majority — since History is defined by him as a "coming-to-itself 
 of Spiritual Life." 
 
CHAPTER I 
 ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM 
 
 The right key to Eucken's philosophy is given, we consider, in 
 the title of one of his most important constructive works — Die 
 Einheit des Geisteslebens im Bewusstsein und That der Menscheit, 
 the Unity, the Oneness, of Spiritual Life in Human Knowledge 
 and Action. When we have grasped the fact that, according to 
 Eucken, the spiritual life is one and the same in all men, and that 
 the foundation of the universe is this same spiritual life, which 
 has found but imperfect self-expression in man, then a guiding light 
 is found through many difficult passages. If barriers cannot be 
 crossed at least we can account for their presence. 
 
 One of the chief characteristics of Activism is a very decided 
 anti-intellectualistic tendency which frequently develops into 
 absolute irrationalism. Anti-intellectualism is always a self- 
 contradiction as has before been pointed out, 76 but the elements 
 of incompatibility are intensified to the highest degree when anti- 
 intellectualistic methods are put forward in a spiritualistic system. 
 As soon as we know Eucken's first assumption, however, we 
 perceive that this feature of his work arises from his special view 
 of spiritual life. Two attributes of the Geistesleben on which he 
 lays great stress are, 
 
 1. Oneness, Einheit. 
 
 2. Super-temporality, eternity. 
 
 The first points directly to Hegelian absolutism, but from this 
 position he recoils with an energy worthy of a dualist. That 
 man's thought should be the ultimate ground of all truth and 
 reality is a proposition which Eucken, in company with the Scholas- 
 tics, rejects. The Ultimate Ground of truth and reality with 
 them is a Supreme, Independent, Eternal, Spiritual Life. Dualists 
 hold that the spiritual soul of man, which is substantially distinct 
 from the Supreme Spiritual Life, knows the Supreme Spiritual 
 through intellectual activity and seeks good of a spiritual order 
 through the rational will. Eucken's Einheit des Geisteslebens does 
 not lead him to any such satisfactory solution of the relations 
 between the "Absolute" and the "human" spiritual. The point 
 
 76 Part I, Chapter IV. 
 34 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 35 
 
 will be considered in the course of this dissertation. It will suffice 
 to remark here that the exponent of the new theory, convinced 
 on the one hand of human limitations and imperfections and keenly 
 sensible of man's frailty, holding, on the other, that spiritual life 
 is both one and eternal, seeks no escape from the dilemma, but 
 disparages the natural power of the intellect in his effort to shun 
 even the suspicion of intellectualistic absolutism. 
 
 We have selected the following citations as indicative of the 
 Activistic position: if they be compared with Eucken's earlier 
 statements regarding the necessity of thought as first guide to the 
 spiritual 77 and, still more, with his assertion as to "the fact and 
 power of the logical contradiction," 78 his halting attitude towards 
 this important problem will be evident. 
 
 Evidences of Anti-Intellectualism 
 
 "No clear demonstration of the excellency of this world will 
 allow us to infer a transcendent Reason as the cause of it." 79 
 
 "When the whole matter is surveyed, there appears no possi- 
 bility for any single aspect of life to arrive at religion. . . . The 
 experiments made in such direction are in sharp conflict with one 
 another: on the one side, the attention is directed to the outward 
 character of religion and to the building up of a scientific province 
 of thought, whilst on the other side the standpoint is that of 
 immanence and of the immediate energy of movement which 
 arises out of this. The one is as necessary as the other, but on 
 this path the two aspects refuse to coalesce: the general character 
 of religion, mirrored in the intellect alone, endangers the inward 
 immediacy and spiritual warmth, whilst through the individual 
 results of feeling and will alone the immediacy endangers the 
 spiritual width and validity which extend beyond the individual. 
 So that a new path must be sought which will unite the discordant 
 elements. It is certainly clear that through such discord between 
 the two opposites, an immediate united push and a joyous co-opera- 
 tion are impossible. The experience of history testifies to the 
 particular naivete of basing religion on thought, feeling, or will. 
 It remains here to seek a new path which is not, from the very 
 outset, under the power of the opposites." 80 
 
 "In addition, there springs up a painful doubt which no merely 
 intellectual form of religion is ever able to overcome. Is thought 
 
 77 See Introduction, pp. 25 sqq. 
 
 78 See Part I, Chapter IV, p. 17. 
 
 79 Christianity and The New Idealism, p. 2. New York, 1909. (Haupt- 
 probleme der Religionsphilosophie, p. 4.) 
 
 80 Truth of Religion, translated by W. Tudor Jones, New York, 1911, pp. 83 
 sqq. First italics are ours, second Eucken's. For original text see Wahrheits- 
 gehalt der Religion, 3te Aufl., Leipzig, 1912, p. 50. 
 
36 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 able to reach the kernel of things through its own energy, . . .? 
 Are our conceptions in reality more than mere human conceptions? 
 Is it not a mere world of phantoms which arises in them?" 81 
 
 ". . . the old-rooted intellectualism turns the greatness of 
 religion into a hybrid of many colours." 82 
 
 "Our investigation sought ... to show that not only did 
 particular contents develop side by side, but also that they con- 
 nected themselves together into a Whole of an entity and produced 
 an essentially new being, which we aspired after by means of our 
 'ever-becoming' personality." 83 
 
 "If the union of nature and intelligence produces so much confusion, 
 we are inevitably led to ask whether man does not possess in him- 
 self more than thought; whether thought is not rooted in a deeper 
 and more comprehensive life, from which it derives its power." 84 
 
 "Representations of the whole are attempted at the highest 
 points of creative activity by philosophy, religion, and art; these 
 representations accompany, indeed govern, the work in these 
 spheres of life through history. But the limitations of our capac- 
 ity, through which we are unable to give a suitable form to 
 necessary contents, and through which we attribute and must 
 attribute human traits to that which should lead us beyond the 
 human, are of particular force in this matter of forming a repre- 
 sentation of the whole; . . . These representations of the 
 whole are, therefore, inadequate; their content of truth is clothed 
 in a wrapping of myth, and humanity lies under the danger of 
 taking the myth for the chief thing and thus of obscuring the 
 truth, and this must produce an incalculable amount of error and 
 strife. Still, it is impossible to give up all claim to these repre- 
 sentations of the whole; for they alone make the fact of our 
 belonging to the whole and of the presence of the whole in our life 
 quite clear and enable it to exert a far-reaching influence . . . ; 
 only with their help can a movement from whole to whole begin. 
 Thus it is a matter not so much of abandoning these representa- 
 tions of the whole as of referring them continually to their essence; 
 to those unfoldings of life which are experienced by us; to test 
 them by these and to renew them from these. It was the error 
 of the earlier position — much too indulgent to Intellectualism — 
 that it did not sufficiently maintain the relation with these living 
 sources, and so fell into the danger of having no definite tendency, 
 or even of failing to recognise the relativity of the myth. If a 
 
 81 Ibid., pp. 74 sqq. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., op. cit., p. 50.) 
 
 82 Ibid., p. 232. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 158.) 
 
 83 Ibid., pp. 572 sqq. Italics are ours. The words and arrangement are 
 somewhat altered here in the 3rd German edition, op. cit., pp. 365, 366. 
 
 84 Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, translated by Alban G. Widgery, London, 
 1912, p. 118. Italics are ours. There are many changes in wording and 
 arrangement in 2nd ed., Leipzig, August, 1913. See Grundlinien einer neuen 
 Lebensanschauung: Hinauswachsen des Menschen iiber die Natur, p. 55. See 
 esp. Der innere Widerspruch des neuen Lebens beim Menschen, pp. 65-71. 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 37 
 
 more energetic direction of life upon its own content and experi- 
 ences teaches us to preserve these connections better and to develop 
 them more forcefully, a new type of representation of the whole 
 is yielded in contrast to the old, and far more different from it 
 than may appear at the first glance. We may hope that with 
 its development the truth will be seen more clearly through the 
 myth, and that the striving, which we cannot give up, to win a 
 universal life may not lead us astray into a world of dreams." 85 
 
 "... the modern strengthening of the subject and the cease- 
 less growth of reflection have so fundamentally overthrown the 
 immediate relation of man to the world that only a far-reaching 
 transformation of life can prepare for a reunion." 86 
 
 "We seem to overstrain our faculty when we think to prove 
 that life, with all its apparent confusions, has still a meaning and 
 value, and can be confidently declared to be worth the living." 87 
 
 "But one thing we must, above all, bear in mind — that if the 
 invisible world is to have the requisite stability and breadth, it 
 cannot be the mere object of our finite longing or any inference 
 laboriously drawn from the conditions of our finite experience; 
 it must be completely independent, and exist in its own right." 88 
 
 It seems imperative to call attention to the extraordinary 
 antithesis in the passage just cited between the reasoning process 
 and the independent invisible reality which it discloses to us. 
 
 " . . .on the plane of our ordinary existence we see humanity 
 split up into mere isolated units." Hence "there can never be 
 one common world," on this plane, "and therefore never one truth 
 common to all men and valid for every sphere." 89 
 
 Treating of the difficulties which his own peculiar conception 
 of the spiritual encounters, he says: 
 
 "Thus, as we view the puzzle from our own philosophical stand- 
 point, it grows more baffling than before: far from having solved 
 the mystery, we have but wrapped it in deeper gloom." 90 
 
 His attempt to redeem his position is as follows: 
 
 "Now, a closer scrutiny into the essentials of this life-process 
 has revealed immanent within it a movement of a unique kind, 
 
 86 Ibid., pp. 232 sqq. Refer to last note. See Grundlinicn: Grundlegender 
 Teil, C, Der Umriss einer Lebensordnung selbststandiger Geistigkeit esp., 
 pp. 115-122. 
 
 86 Ibid., p. 259. 
 
 87 Meaning and Value of Life, translated by L. and 13. Gibson, London. 
 1909, p. 2. See Der Sinn und Wert des Lebens, 3rd cd.. Leipzig, 1913. Kin- 
 leitung, p. 1. The wording is slightly altered but the eontent is the same. 
 
 88 Ibid., p. 75. See Sinn und Wert des Lebens, pp. 63 sqq.; p. 80. 
 
 89 Ibid., p. 81. See Sinn und Wert des Lebens, pp. 77-79. 
 
 90 Ibid., p. 118. See Sinn und Wert des Lebens: Die scheinbare Ohnmacht 
 des Geisteslebens im All, pp. 113-132, esp. 115. 
 
38 EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 through whose activity a new life is brought in, different in kind 
 from the life that is ordered by the succession of natural events. 
 Nor did we apprehend this movement as a series of detached occur- 
 rences, but as a main tendency set steadily in one direction, 
 gathering the manifoldness of things into a single characteristic 
 whole. . . . : the work of self-realization which we witnessed 
 was the reality itself; and it was in and through this work of self- 
 discovery that reality established its own foundations of belief. Life 
 did not here depend upon knowledge. . . . This fundamental 
 fact — the fact that an Independent Spiritual Life springs up thus 
 within us — cannot be controverted by citing the ways of a refrac- 
 tory world, however terrible these ways may be." 91 
 
 "This deepening of the life-problem sets our conviction of the 
 unity of the universe upon a broader and firmer foundation than 
 the ordinary intellectualistic outlook can possibly supply." 92 
 
 "The dangers of an intellectualistic ordering of life are plainly 
 visible to us at the present day, and there is no lack of vigorous 
 opposition. But this opposition will hardly attain to complete 
 victory without a return to the roots of science." 93 ". . . he is 
 no longer certain even of the Deity; in any case his relation 
 to the Deity no longer controls the whole of life. In this situa- 
 tion where can he now turn to find truth, and what meaning can 
 this conception still retain? In accordance with the experiences 
 which we have described man can seek truth nowhere else but in 
 himself; his own life must possess a depth which even for himself 
 at first lies in a dim and distant background; with the full appro- 
 priation of this depth, however, he may hope to discover a world 
 in himself, or rather he may himself grow into a world. The 
 object then to be aimed at is a transference of life, not into some- 
 thing which exists outside us or above us, but into something 
 which belongs to us, but which can become completely our own 
 life only by a vigorous transformation, and indeed revolution. 
 Reality is not here found already existing, but it has to be built 
 up from within: truth is thus a striving of life towards itself, a 
 seeking for its own being. Hence it cannot be the agreement 
 
 91 Ibid., pp. 119 sqq. Italics ours. See Sinn und Wert des Lebens, p. 80, 
 top; pp. 132-147, 163-165. 
 
 92 Ibid., Appendix, p. 155. See Sinn und Wert des Lebens, p. 77, "Je mehr 
 das Leben" to "nicht weiter." 
 
 93 Life of the Spirit, translated by Pogson, New York, 1909, p. 268. Italics 
 are ours. We venture to say here that this book is most disappointing and 
 unconvincing. Much of it is devoted to what Eucken terms in his Introduction 
 "an historical survey," but the historical data are strongly, and often strangely, 
 colored by the author's views; e.g., p. 225, where he tells us, in treating of the 
 Sacraments, that "a man's own disposition in the matter may easily become 
 a secondary consideration." We can find in it no satisfying proof of God's 
 existence, of the value of the soul, of immortality — at least in any true sense 
 of the word. To us it seems that the contents are unworthy of the noble 
 title Eucken has affixed to them. See Einfiihrung in eine Philosophie des 
 Geisteslebens: "Das Wahrheitsproblem," pp. 131-159. 
 
KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 39 
 
 with a given reality: it becomes an agreement with itself, a self- 
 co-ordination of a life which becomes independent and raises itself 
 to a higher level, instead of remaining disintegrated and constrained. 
 Its verification can only lie in the fact that, by embracing it, the 
 whole of existence is transformed into spontaneous life, raised to 
 an essentially higher level, and at the same time united into a 
 whole of creative effort which moulds reality. Here the main 
 problem is to find the point where a spontaneous and creative life 
 springs up in man as the deepest thing in his own nature. Accord- 
 ing to the form which this life takes, different forms will be assumed by 
 reality and truth; but that such a life is attainable in some way or 
 other is the common presupposition of that faith in reason which 
 pervades the creative efforts of the modern period and is enunciated 
 with particular clearness in the works of its leading thinkers. The 
 reason which is immanent in the human race must now take the 
 place of the universe and the Deity. This, too, is common to all 
 attempts, viz., that the movement does not proceed from a pre- 
 existing world towards man, but from man towards a world which 
 has first to be constructed." 95 
 
 We have cited the concluding passage at length because it is 
 typical of Eucken's irrational position. The words "faith in 
 reason," and "reason immanent in the human race," do not 
 redeem the situation. "Faith in reason" is a rather contradictory 
 expression. And what faith can man put in apparent revelations 
 of reason if he is no longer certain either of the Deity or of an 
 external reality? 
 
 Eucken's Critics 
 
 This characteristic feature of Eucken's system 96 has been 
 pointed out by most of his critics. Hermann says of him: "With 
 Fichte his affinities are deeper. In his anti-individualism, anti- 
 intellectualism, and theological convictions, they go deep indeed." 97 
 Tudor Jones calls attention to the fact, but he considers it a neces- 
 sary qualification for dealing with the highest problems. We 
 give the passage which he quotes and his comment on it : 
 
 "The Infinite Power and Love that has grounded a new spon- 
 taneous nature in man over against a dark and hostile world, will 
 conserve such a new nature and its spiritual nucleus, and shelter 
 it against all perils and assaults, so that life as the bearer of Life 
 Eternal can never be wholly lost in the stream of time." 98 
 
 95 Problem of Truth, ibid., pp. 303 sqq. Italics ours. 
 
 06 The point will be dealt with more fully in the third chapter of this 
 section. 
 
 97 Eucken and Bergson, London, 1912, p. 49. 
 
 98 Truth of Religion, op. cit., p. 435. (Wharheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 303.) 
 
40 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 Tudor Jones comments thus : 
 
 "We are here in a region farthest removed from sense and under- 
 standing; but the remarkable thing is that the conviction of 
 immortality does not dawn on any lower level; it is not on the 
 lower levels a portion of spiritual experience." 99 
 
 Boyce Gibson — whose work preceded that of Tudor Jones — 
 holds an opinion somewhat similar to that expressed in the second 
 part of the above citation. Gibson maintains that a higher reality 
 is utterly beyond the reach of a lower form of knowledge. Spiritual 
 life, e.g., is "inexplicable in terms of scientific categories." 100 
 
 In contrast to Tudor Jones, however, he condemns Eucken for 
 his irrationalism. He says: 
 
 "Our spiritual freedom and union with God cannot be illumined 
 and developed by any reasoned inquiry which is not inspired by 
 these spiritual experiences. . . . But that such a reasoned 
 inquiry cannot be forthcoming in the case of what is most funda- 
 mental in our spiritual experience, Eucken has certainly not 
 proved." 101 
 
 Waiving the question of categories we take exception to the 
 distinction between "spiritual" and "scientific" knowledge as 
 "higher" and "lower" forms. All spiritual knowledge, apart from 
 Revelation, must be scientific; that is, it can only be obtained 
 by exercising our rational power of observation on the manifold 
 data of experience — under which head must be included our own 
 conscious states. Again "revelation, salvation, grace," are not 
 mere "regulative concepts," requiring "categories commensurate 
 with the spiritual experience within which they are conceived," 102 
 they are facts of a supernatural order; 103 they belong to the class 
 of truths to which Our Divine Lord referred when He said: 
 "Blessed art thou, Simon-Bar- Jona : because flesh and blood hath 
 not revealed it to thee, but my Father who is in heaven." 104 
 
 As Eucken denies the central truth to which our Saviour directly 
 alluded in the above verse, viz., His Own Divinity, 105 and thereby 
 
 09 An Interpretation of R. Eucken's Philosophy, New York, 1912, p. 162. 
 
 100 R. Eucken's Phil, of Life, 2d ed., London, 1907, p. 111. 
 
 101 Ibid. For entire treatment of the point refer to Chapter VII, pp. 100 sqq. 
 > 02 Ibid., p. 112. 
 
 103 yj e employ "supernatural" in the Christian signification of the word, 
 not in the loose sense in which Eucken often uses it. 
 
 104 Matthew, XVI, 17. 
 
 106 See Konnen wir noch Christen sein? Leipzig, 1911, pp. 31-37. (Can 
 we still be Christians?, New York 1914, pp. 29-35.) Wahrheitsgehalt der 
 Rel., pp. 392-398. (Truth of Ret, pp. 582-591.) Lebensanschauung der 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 41 
 
 forfeits the right to introduce into his system the essential truths 
 of "revelation, salvation, grace," some of his interpreters have 
 sought to justify the presence of the borrowed elements by at- 
 tempting an explanation, even when, as with Tudor Jones, the 
 solution is found only in irrationalism. 
 
 Hermann is more accurate on this point. He tells us that 
 Eucken's "great and inspiring vloume" — The Truth of Religion — 
 "leaves a cloud of misgiving upon the spirit;" that, "while Eucken 
 impresses us with the reality of this new world, ... he leaves 
 the greater question of its authority, its right to exact our choice 
 and obedience, untouched." 106 
 
 Dr. Alexander makes a similar statement: 
 
 "While he insists upon the possibility, nay, the necessity of a 
 new beginning, he fails to reveal the power by which the great 
 decision is made." 107 
 
 Dr. Abel Jones, while granting that Eucken gives "little atten- 
 tion to the psychological implications of his theories," and that 
 there is "serious incompleteness," therefore, in his exposition, 
 defends him from the charge of irrationalism in the following 
 words: "In actual fact . . . the charge is more apparent than 
 real, for Eucken does . . . reason and argue closely ... he 
 feels there is something higher and more valuable in life than 
 thought — and that is action." 108 
 
 It is difficult to reconcile Abel Jones' own criticism with his 
 defense. If Eucken gives "little attention to the psychological 
 implications of his theories" — as Dr. A. Jones maintains — and 
 if there is "a serious incompleteness" about his system, then the 
 charge of irrationalism is not only real, it is also grave. Again, 
 the relative valuations of thought and action made here — and 
 which are the inverse of the decision of the Great Teacher 109 
 
 grossen Denker, 5th Auflage, Leipzig, 1904, pp. 171 sqq. (Problem of 
 Human Life, New York, 1910, pp. 170 sqq.) 
 
 It is beyond the scope of our work to criticize the superficial arguments and 
 assertions put forward in the passages to which the reader is referred. It may, 
 however, be stated that confidence in Eucken is profoundly shaken by his 
 ignorance of what "modern research" has and has not "shown." (See Prob- 
 lem of Human Life, p. 171.) 
 
 106 Eucken and Bergson, op. cit., p. 99. 
 
 107 "Christianity and Ethics," as cited in An Evangelical Warning against 
 "The False Note" in Eucken, Current Opinion, 57, Nov., 1914, pp. 339 sqq. 
 
 108 R. Eucken, A Philosophy of Life, New York, pp. 87 sqq. 
 
 109 "Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from 
 her." See Luke X (39-42). 
 
42 EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 Whose life, according to Eucken himself, "had a standard which 
 has transformed human existence to its very root," and which 
 "exercises evermore a tribunal over the world" 110 — are calculated 
 to lead to blind fanaticism. Thought, with action following on 
 it, holds the secret of the perseverance which gains the crown: 
 action, with thought following on it, is the prolific source of poig- 
 nant, lifelong regret. 
 
 Meyrick Booth perceives in Eucken's attitude towards Intellec- 
 tualism "an analogy with Bergson and with the great historical 
 mystics." 111 
 
 Comparison of Eucken and Bergson 
 
 That Eucken has close affinity with Bergson on this point seems 
 evident from a comparison of their respective conceptions as to the 
 method of reaching truth. Each rejects the scholastic standard 
 of conformity between thought and thing: "per conformitatem 
 intellectus et rei Veritas definitur. Unde conformitatem istam 
 cognoscere, est cognoscere veritatem." 112 
 
 Eucken says: "our conception decidedly rejects the widely 
 held view of truth as a correspondence of our thought with an 
 external reality." 113 
 
 Though Bergson holds the traditional view of the immediacy of 
 sense-perception and of the objectivity of the external sensations, 114 
 he maintains that the intellect cannot put us in immediate touch 
 
 110 Truth of Religion, p. 360. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 249.) 
 
 111 R. Eucken, His Philosophy and Influence, New York, p. 81. 
 
 112 St. Thomas, Summa, I, Q. XVI, a. 2. 
 
 113 Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, op. cit., p. 216. 
 
 114 See Matiere et Memoire and L'Evolution Creatrice. On p. 225 of "Matiere 
 et Memoire" he writes: 
 
 "On se plait a mettre les qualites, sous forme de sensations, dans la con- 
 science, tandis que les mouvements s'executent independamment de nous 
 dans l'espace. Ces mouvements, se composant entre eux, ne donneraient 
 jamais que des mouvements; par un processus mysterieux, notre conscience, 
 incapable de les toucher, les traduirait en sensations qui se projetteraient 
 ensuite dans l'espace et viendraient recouvrir, on ne sait comment, les mouve- 
 ments qu'elles traduisent. De la deux mondes differents, incapables de com- 
 muniquer autrement que par un miracle: d'un c6te celui des mouvements 
 dans l'espace, de l'autre la conscience avec les sensations. Et, certes, la 
 difference reste irreductible, comme nous l'avons montre nous-m&mes autrefois, 
 entre la qualite, d'une part, et la quantite pure, de l'autre. Mais la question 
 est justement de savoir si les mouvements reels ne presentent entre eux que 
 des differences de quantite, ou s'ils ne seraient pas la qualite meme, vibrant 
 pour ainsi dire interieurement et scandant sa propre existence en un nombre 
 souvent incalculable de moments." 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 43 
 
 with reality, for reality, according to him, is movement, and the 
 intellect can only grasp the stable and fixed. 115 
 
 It is intuition, i.e., disinterested instinct (l'instinct devenu 
 desinteresse, conscient de lui-meme, capable de reflechir sur son 
 objet et de l'elargir indefiniment"), 116 which enables us to appre- 
 hend movement, and therefore to know life, i.e., reality. 117 
 
 It is just here, that the analogy between the "Elan Vital" and 
 the "Geistesleben" occurs. The conception of each author 
 embraces all reality — past, present, and, in a sense, future; for 
 both "L'Elan Vital" and "Das Geistesleben" are "in the making." 
 Some of the passages already cited from Eucken may be referred 
 to in this connection, 118 but the following throw further light on 
 their respective methods. 
 
 Bergson writes: ". . .La theorie de la connaissance devient 
 une entreprise infiniment difficile, et qui passe les forces de la pure 
 intelligence. II ne suffit plus, en effet, de determiner, par une 
 analyse conduite avec prudence, les categories de la pensee, il s'agit 
 de les engendrer. En ce qui concerne l'espace, il faudrait, par un 
 effort sui generis de l'esprit, suivre la progression on plutot la 
 regression de l'extra-spatial se degradant en spatialite." 119 
 
 Eucken writes: "Wenn die Philosophic vom Ganzen des 
 Geisteslebens zum Ganzen der Wirklichkeit strebt, so liegt ihre 
 Arbeit nicht innerhalb eines gegebenen Raumes, sondern sie hat 
 
 116 See L'Evolution Creatrice, Paris, 1914. 15 ed., p. 1G9. "Bornons- 
 nous a dire que le stable et l'immuable sont ce a quoi notre intelligence s'attache 
 en vertu de sa disposition naturelle. Notre intelligence ne se represente claire- 
 ment que rimmoblite." Also p. 179. "L 'intelligence est caracterisee par une 
 incomprehension naturelle de la vie." The italics in each case are Bergson's. 
 
 116 Ibid., p. 192. 
 
 117 See ibid., p. 179: "C'est sur la forme meme de la vie. au contraire, qu'est 
 moule l'instinct. . . . il ne fait que continuer le travail par lequel la vie 
 organise la matiere." 
 
 118 See also L'Evolution Creatrice, p. 217 sq. "Un processus identique a du 
 tailler en meme temps matiere et intelligence dans une etoffe qui les contenait 
 toutes deux. Dans cette realite nous nous replacerons de plus en plus com- 
 pletement, a mesure que nous nous efforcerons davantage de transcender 
 l'intelligence pure;" and compare with Geistige Strbmungen, op. cit., p. 31. 
 "Zu cinem solchen Ganzen gehbrt eine wie aller Mannigfaltigkeit so auch dera 
 Gegensatz von Subjekt und Objekt uberlegene Einheit. Dies Ganz entwickelt 
 sich mittels des Gegensatzes von Subjekt und Objekt, von Kraft und Gegen- 
 stand, aber es bleibt ihm iiberlegen und halt beide Seiten auch in der Scheidung 
 zusammen, auf geistigem Boden kann jedc cinzelne sich nur zusammen mit 
 der anderen entfalten und ihre eigene Ilblic findcn. So sind hicr nicht sowohl 
 die beiden Seiten einander entgegengesetzt, als veilmehr der Stand ihrer 
 Einigung, der Stand der Volltiitigkeit dem der Spaltung, dem des halbseitigen 
 und zugleich leeren Lebens . . ., nicht die Beziehung der einen Seite auf 
 die andere, sondern nur die schopferische Synthcse erzeugt eine Innerliohkeit 
 und zugleich eine voile, bei sich selbst befindliche Wirklichkeit; eine solche 
 kann nie von draussen dargeboten werdern." 
 
 119 L'Evolution Creatrice, p. 226. Italics ours. 
 
44 BuDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 diesen Raum erst herzustellen, sie findet nicht ihre Welt, sondern 
 sie hat sie erst zu bilden; das Ganze, das sie sucht, tritt ihr nie von 
 aussen her entgegen, es will von innen her entworfen sein, es 
 verlangt eine Synthese schopferischer Art. Zur Sebstandigkeit 
 wird dieses Weltbild der Philosophie namentlich dadurch getrieben, 
 dass das von ihrer Synthese umspannte Dasein ohne Umwandlung 
 nicht in sie einzugehen vermag. Denn was es bietet, ist viel zu 
 verschiedenartig, um sich ohne weiteres zusammenzufiigen. 
 Namentlich das Zusammentreffen von Natur und Innenwelt in 
 Einer Wirklichkeit treibt zwingend zur Umwandlung des ersten 
 Anblichs. Schon dadurch ist namentlich der modernen Gedanken- 
 arbeit ein Trieb zur Metaphysik unzerstorbar eingepflanzt, dass 
 die Neuzeit den Gegensatz von Natur und Seele zur vollen Klarheit 
 gebracht hat, . . . Die Hilfe intellektueller Phantasie ist 
 dabei unentbehrlich; was aber diese Phantasie anGestalten entwirft, 
 das wird sie dem Menschen nicht eindringlich machen Jconnen, ohne 
 eben der Erfahrungswelt Bilder zu entlehnen, iiber ivelche die Phil- 
 osophie hinausfuhrt." 120 
 
 It seems to us that the analogy approaches a positive similarity, 
 at least of function, in the conception of the Creative Synthesis 
 in the one system, and the Engendered Thought-Categories in the 
 other. This may be made clearer by quoting again from a passage 
 already cited. In the Meaning and Value of Life Eucken says: 
 ". . . the work of self-realization which we witnessed was the 
 reality itself; and it was in and through this work of self -disco very 
 that reality established its own foundations of belief." 121 
 
 Nevertheless the systems, as wholes, offer, perhaps, more points 
 of difference than agreement in fundamentals. 122 
 
 120 Geistige Stromungen, pp. 97, 98. The italics are ours. A further point 
 of analogy may be noticed in the Concentration Points of the Spiritual Life, 
 or human foci, as one may term them, and the Bergsonian conception of 
 personality as revealed in the following: 
 
 "Plus nous prenons conscience de notre progres dans la pure duree, plus 
 nous sentons les diverses parties de notre etre entrer les unes dans les autres 
 et notre personnalite tout entiere se concentrer en un point, ou niieux en une 
 pointe, qui s'insere dans l'avenir en l'entamant sans cesse. En cela consistent 
 la vie et Taction libres. Laissons-nous aller, au contraire; au lieu d'agir, 
 revons. Du meme coup notre moi s'eparpille; notre passe, qui jusque-la se 
 ramassait sur lui-meme dans l'impulsion indivisible qu'il nous communiquait, 
 se decompose en mille et mille souvenirs qui s'exteriorisent les uns par rapport 
 aux autres." L'Evolution Creatrice, pp. 219, 220. 
 
 121 Meaning and Value of Life, p. 120, op. cit. 
 
 122 E.G., all Eucken's works tend to a rejection of the objectivity of the 
 universe: in Main Currents of Modern Thought (Geistige Stromungen) he 
 tells us that nature is a lower form of inner life; and in Meaning and Value of 
 Life, that "the sense-life sinks in importance, becomes insubstantial and prob- 
 lematic, and is reduced to the status of a mere phenomenon the truth of which 
 has first to be discovered." See Meaning and Value of Life, pp. 33 sqq. 
 
 Bergson, on the other hand, argues forcibly for the objective value of 
 
Rudolf Eucken axd the Spiritual Life 45 
 
 Eucken and the " Historical Mystics" 
 
 The second analogy that Booth seems to perceive, viz., "with the 
 historical mystics," we claim to be non-existent if by "historical 
 mystics" Booth refers to the recognized mystics of the Catholic 
 Church. These were not anti-intellectualistic either in theory or 
 practice. That they had infused knowledge and a more direct 
 apprehension of God than is possible to ordinary human means, 
 Catholics believe; but, that those who were thus favored ever 
 sought of themselves to acquire knowledge thus, is disproved by 
 their own writings. St. Teresa and St. John of the Cross, the 
 two great mystics of the sixteenth century, warn the faithful 
 against seeking or desiring such extraordinary manifestations, lest 
 they become the dupes of their own imagination. 123 
 
 St. Teresa's Letters reveal to us a woman of excellent judgment, 
 and "sound common-sense." Anything more unlike the works of 
 anti-intellectualistics it would be hard to imagine. 
 
 The attitude of the Church is unmistakable on this point. She 
 exhibits the utmost reserve in dealing with particular cases, and 
 only after a prolonged and laboriously minute scrutiny will she 
 give the sanction of her approval. 124 
 
 She values the "princely gift of Reason," with which man is 
 endowed, too highly to advocate its abdication. 
 
 Again, the human faculty of reason is the sine qua non of all 
 supernatural manifestations in man or to him. The descriptions 
 which the saints have given of their mystic states point to the 
 fact that their understanding was flooded with new light — to use a 
 metaphor — and enlarged so as to apprehend what before, or under 
 normal conditions, was "beyond its ken." Even in an ecstasy of 
 love the saints knew something of the Beauty and Goodness that 
 attracted them; otherwise how could they love? Men cannot love 
 that of which they are absolutely ignorant, still less could they leave 
 descriptions of the effects it produced in them. 
 
 Reason and reasoning are not synonymous terms, and this is 
 what the anti-intellectualistics fail to grasp: they either deny the 
 
 sensation. References have been given on preceding pages. Again, Eucken 
 rejects a vast body of truths on the ground that they are anthropomorphic, 
 while Bergson errs by an exaggerated anthropomorphism. 
 
 123 See La Vie de St. Therese, ecrite par elle-meme; also, St. John of the 
 Cross — "La montee du Carmel." 
 
 124 An examination of the process of canonization of any saint may prove an 
 instructive study for those who 6nd analogies between Ant.i-Intellectualists 
 and Catholic mystics. 
 
46 EUDOLP EtJCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 intuitive power of the mind or ascribe intuition to blind instinct, 
 as with Bergson; or to a "mysterious" communication which is 
 at the same time an "axiomatic certainty," as with Eucken. 
 
 It is not our purpose here to criticize Eucken's own view of 
 Mysticism. It will suffice to say that his treatment, in our opinion, 
 is weak and superficial, and that he allots to mysticism — to some 
 extent — a role which would be better fulfilled by Prayer: prayer 
 is one of the missing quantities in Eucken's religious system. We 
 may add that his inability to recognize the infinite distance separ- 
 ating the misty philosophical speculations of Plotinus from Chris- 
 tian Mysticism is an unfavorable index of his trustworthiness as 
 an authority on the subject. 125 
 
 Further Criticism 
 
 Henry C. Sheldon gives a clear and decisive criticism of Eucken's 
 unwarrantable rejection of our rational cognitions. His words 
 are: "A subordinate occasion for questioning the teaching of our 
 philosopher is found in his treatment of the usual arguments for 
 the divine existence — the cosmological, the teleological, and that 
 from human nature taken as a basis of scientific induction. He 
 rates them as incompetent to fulfil their purpose, and the ground 
 of so rating them he expresses in these terms : 'We must not forget 
 that no province can prove anything outside its own reach, and 
 that an attempt to do this leads into anthropomorphism.' In so 
 far as this proposition is meant to emphasize the truth that religion 
 has evidences of peculiar efficacy in its own worthful content, and 
 is not in any complete sense dependent upon the data of scientific 
 study, it is to be cordially approved. But it is possible to make 
 too emphatic an antithesis between the scientific and the religious. 
 . . . Indeed, we do not see how the assumption of such disparate 
 spheres between the two as is contained in the cited proposition 
 and in its application in the context can be maintained without 
 
 125 See Problem of Human Life, p. 122. "Plotinus . . . supplied Chris- 
 tianity with liberating forces, and preserved throughout the Middle Ages, 
 in opposition to the externalising influence of the prevailing organisation, an 
 undercurrent of pure emotional life." See also pp. 104-116. For references 
 to other mystics see index, p. 579. (Lebensanschauung der G. Denker, 
 op. cit., pp. 128, 129, 107-123; index, 520.) Consult also, "Life of Spirit," 
 pp. 351 sqq., index, p. 406; Life's Basis, pp. 246, 247. (Einfiihrung in eine 
 Phil, des Geisteslebens, pp. 168 sqq, index, p. 196; Grundlinen, p. 104.) 
 Compare also with passage p. 95 in Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensin- 
 halt, Leipzig, 2nd ed., 1907; Truth of Rel., index, p. 620. (Wahrheitsgehalt 
 der Rel., op. cit., p. 421.) 
 
EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 47 
 
 prejudicial results. . . . The supposition of the rationality of 
 the world system — a supposition absolutely necessary to any 
 security in intellectual procedure — implies a degree of corre- 
 spondence bewteen part and part. From any different point of 
 view we are left inclosed by the limitations of the human province; 
 and nothing can help us out. Not even the function of a supreme 
 spiritual life can afford us an outlet, for we have no immediate 
 knowledge of this transcendent reality. What we know imme- 
 diately is certain effects in us which serve as a ground of rational 
 inference — an inference none the less actual because possibly 
 very swift and confident. . . . We take the sane and warrant- 
 able course in appealing to the rationality of the universe as in- 
 volving a degree of correspondence between part and part, and so 
 providing that data in one department may have more or less 
 significance for another province." 126 
 
 It was Boyce Gibson's conviction when he published his inter- 
 pretation of Eucken's philosophy — November, 1906 — that anti- 
 intellectualism was not a necessary feature of the system ; that the 
 author's premises, in fact, justified solutions doing truer justice to 
 the dignity of our reason than those which he offered. He even 
 held that Eucken was his own best critic; in support of this state- 
 ment he quotes the following letter from him : 
 
 "You are perfectly right in supposing that my distrust of intel- 
 lectualistic philosophies has prevented me from fully recognising 
 the value of an intellectual and logical manipulation of ideas. 
 The fact that the conflict with intellectualism plays so prominent 
 a part in my treatment may be largely accounted for by the 
 conditions which influence our thinking in Germany to-day. We 
 are veritably deluged with intellectualism. A man will believe 
 that he has won the good life when he has reached satisfactory 
 ideas upon the subject." 127 
 
 We must differ from Boyce Gibson in our estimate of Eucken's 
 power of self-criticism; the cited extract suggests a misapprehension 
 on the part of the critic as to what "Intellectualisni'' really stands for. 
 The intuitive power of reason is, surely, but ill described in the 
 phrase "intellectual and logical manipulation of ideas;" indeed the 
 expression indicates cross-division. Further, though Eucken is 
 right in insisting on the necessity of good practical living, he is 
 wrong in slighting the equally great need of knowing ichat is good. 
 
 128 R. Eucken's Message to Our Age, New York, pp. 47 sqq. 
 127 See Boyce Gibson, op. cit., pp. 10-1 1, 10G. 
 
48 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 "I can easier teach twenty what were good to be done, than be 
 one of the twenty to follow mine own teaching," 128 is a poet's 
 statement of the profound psychological truth against which 
 Eucken is rebelling, viz., that the will does not always follow the 
 dictates of "right reason." One thing is certain, however, — if 
 no one knows "what were good to be done," then no good can be 
 done, though many useful actions may be accomplished; in order 
 that an action may be good, in the true signification of the word, 
 some sort of knowledge, either actual or habitual, must be possessed 
 of its end. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
 The development of Eucken's thought has not turned in the 
 direction of Intellectualism, on the contrary, the irrationalistic 
 element seems more pronounced in his later works. The Theory 
 of Knowledge which Boyce Gibson looked forward to as the 
 "sole true remedy" for Eucken's "spiritual mysteries" 129 has 
 appeared. Its advent, for those who accept the system, has but 
 intensified the darkness enveloping the entire sphere of human 
 knowledge. It reiterates the exorbitant, irrationalistic demands 
 which Eucken makes upon our faith as the first step in the paths 
 of knowledge. In the second part of Erkennen und Leben he 
 writes : 
 
 "Unsere kritische Untersuchung lief in die Forderung aus, dass 
 im Bereich des Menschen ein selbstandiger Lebenskomplex, ja eine 
 Welt entstehe; nur eine solche Welt, die ihm aus den Bewegun- 
 gen seines eignen Lebens zugeht und ihm daher gegenwartig 
 bleibt, kann zum Standort seines Denkens und zum Vorwurf seines 
 Erkennens werden. Ein derartiger Lebenszusammenhang wird 
 nicht zu erreichen sein ohne eine wesentliche Umwandlung der 
 vorgefundenen Lage, aber wenn er insofern neu ist, so fehlt ihm 
 nicht eine Ankmipfung an den Gesamtstand des menschlichen 
 Lebens." 130 
 
 In his summary he states : 
 
 1. Nur so we it wir an einem Beisichselbstsein des Lebens teilge- 
 winnen, ist fur uns Erkennen moglich. Es bleibt dabei viel Platz 
 fur andere intellektuelle Leistungen, aber Erkennen sind diese 
 nicht. 
 
 128 Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice, Act I, Sc. II (Portia). 
 
 129 Op. cit., p. 114. 
 
 130 Erkennen und Leben, p. 76, Leipzig, 1912. This volume gives the first 
 formulation of the Theory. (Knowledge and Life, translated by Tudor Jones, 
 London, 1913, p. 143.) 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 49 
 
 2. Ein solches Beisichselbstsein muss ira Grunde unseres 
 Wesens wirken, aber zu unserm vollen Eigentum wird es nur 
 mit Hilfe der weltgeschichtlichen Arbeit; wer es durch blosse, 
 Bewusstseinsanalyse glaubt unmittelbar ergreifen zu konnen, 
 der unterschatzt den Tatcharakter unseres Lebens und verfallt 
 unvermeidlich einem Intellektualismus, wenn auch feinerer Art." 131 
 
 Even if we blindly bow before his dogmas we are as far off — in 
 truth much further — from the knowledge we seek as we were 
 before. A theoretical description of how knowledge is acquired, 
 though it may win belief, or faith, does not necessitate practical 
 results. It must be remembered that however much Eucken 
 advocates action, he has still to prove that truth is won through 
 action. Experience — whether popular or scientific — does not 
 reveal any trace of the "Lebensprozess" of Eucken's conception; 
 reason rejects it as a contradiction. We must therefore either 
 accept it in blind faith with a hope that knowledge will come 
 "somehow or other," or, turn our attention to "the widely held 
 view of truth as a correspondence of thought with an external 
 reality" which Eucken so "decidedly rejects." In the next section 
 we shall examine this "Life-Process" — which he considers to be at 
 once the source and instrument of all true knowledge — more in 
 detail. In connection with anti-intellectualism — whether of 
 Activism or Bergsonism — it may be pointed out that a system of 
 philosophy, based on the discrediting of the faculty which generic- 
 ally marks off man from brute, is a travesty of all scientific knowl- 
 edge — and here we use "scientific" in its widest sense, to include, 
 therefore, the philosophical as well as the empirical sciences. 
 Yorke Fausset, in his criticism of Eucken's religious position says: 
 
 "But a Christianity in which the Divine-Human personality of 
 Jesus Christ is no longer the determining factor or, in New Testa- 
 ment language, the 'chief corner-stone' is not 'another' but a 
 'different' Gospel." 132 
 
 With equal truth we may affirm that a world in which man's 
 intellect had ceased to be his means of knowledge and his guide 
 through life would not be a more modern world, it would be an 
 absolutely different one. 
 
 131 Ibid., p. 160. 
 
 132 w Yorke Fausset, Neo-Christianity of R. Kucken. Ch. Quarterly Review 
 London. Oct., 1912, p. 32. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE LIFE-PROCESS 
 
 The Life-Process (Der Lebensprozess) or Spiritual Life (Das 
 Geistesleben) is, according to Eucken, the foundation of all 
 reality and truth; it is more: it is itself reality and truth. The 
 individual can win a spiritual content for his life and attain to true 
 knowledge only through an "immediacy" of the Spiritual Life. 
 In the inmost depth of his being man discovers the Spiritual Life, 
 which is also "his own," present to him "as a possibility." By 
 spiritual work ("geistige Arbeit") he appropriates it, and, in so 
 doing, wins knowledge and truth. 
 
 Activism 
 
 "Durch die Tatigkeit und innerhalb der Tatigkeit erfolgt eine 
 Scheidung zwischen Sinnlichem und Unsinnlichem; hier vermag 
 das Unsinnliche sich rein zu entfalten und auch zu einem Ganzen 
 zusammenzuschliessen, die Tatigkeit kann sich des Eindringens 
 fremder Elemente erwehren, das Sinnliche aus dem Kern in die 
 Aussenseite drangen und es zu einer nebensachlichen Begleiter- 
 scheinung herabsetzen. . . . Das Problem des Denkens ist 
 aber nur ein Auschnitt aus dem Problem des Lebens, uberall kann 
 die hohere Stufe eine Selbstandigkeit wahren. ... So wenig 
 sich daher sagen lasst, dass reines Denken und reines Wollen als 
 fertige Grossen vorhanden sind, sie sind Tatsachen, Wirklichkeiten 
 im Reich der Tatigkeit, sie sind Triebkrafte geistigen Schaffens. 
 . . . Begriffe wie die des Unendlichen, Unbedingten u.s.w. 
 werden in der geistigen Arbeit positive Grossen; auch hat alle jene 
 Bildlichkeit oder Negativitat des Gottesbegriff es den Aufbau eines 
 Reiches der Religion nicht gehindert; wie hatte sie von den grossen 
 Ordnungen des Menschheitslebens bis ins innerste Gemtit des 
 Individuums so machtig wirken kdnnen, wenn nicht die Grossen 
 innerhalb ihres Gebietes eine positive Bedeutung gewonnen hatten? 
 Verstandlich wird allerdings diese geistige Positivitat erst vom 
 Selbstleben aus; denn, wie wir sahen, kann erst dadurch, dass ein 
 Selbst in den Betatigungen gegenwartig bleibt, in ihnen Erfahr- 
 ungen macht, aus ihnen zur Einheit zuruckkekrt, dem Leben ein 
 Inhalt erwachsen." 133 
 
 "Die Welt selbstandigen Geisteslebens kann unsere Welt nur 
 werden, wenn sie auch bei uns entsteht; das aber heisst, dass ein 
 urspriinglicher Lebensprozess in uns aufgehen und eine geistige 
 
 133 j) er Xampf urn einen geistigen Lebensinhalt, op. cit., pp. 168-170. 
 Italics are ours. 
 
 50 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 51 
 
 Wirklichkeit erzeugen muss. Ein solcher Prozess diirfte nicht 
 Dinge ausser sich anerkennen und sich von draussen her an ihnen 
 zu tun machen, sondern er miisste als Volltatigkeit in dem oben 
 erorterten Sinne den Gegenstand in sich schliessen und aus sich 
 entwickeln. Er diirfte ferner nicht eine blosse Leistung innerhalb 
 einer gegebenen Welt, sondern er miisste ein selbsttatiges Leben 
 gegeniiber aller Gegebenheit sein; er diirfte nicht in einer vorge- 
 fundenen Welt nur dieses und jenes verbessern, sondern er hatte 
 ein neues Sein mit eigentiimlichen Grossen und Giitern zu 
 schaffen." 134 
 
 Two questions require a satisfactory answer before we can 
 rationally accept the new criterion of truth: 
 
 1. What, in last analysis, is the nature of this Life-Process? 
 
 2. How is it revealed to us? Under what conditions does the 
 "immediacy" of the Spiritual Life occur? What makes us aware 
 of the peculiarly objective 135 character of that which is experienced 
 in the "Gemiit?" or "Unmittelbarkeit?" 135a Eucken has, him- 
 self, rejected the intellectualistic standpoint. 136 
 
 Nature of the Life- Process 
 
 The answer to the first question may be sought in citations from 
 the philosopher's works. In "Meaning and Value of Life" he 
 writes : 
 
 "The natural and the spiritual stages both fall within an all-envel- 
 oping life whose very process of self-development is to pass upward 
 from the one to the other, and so come into full realization within 
 our universe through the very impulse of its own movement." 137 
 
 "The links that mediate between the two show that natural 
 and spiritual alike belong, in last resort, to one and the same world, 
 and that there is a Whole transcending all difference, and even all 
 opposition" 138 
 
 134 Ibid, p. 27. 
 
 135 Eucken insists on the objective character of the Spiritual Life — even 
 though it is "our own" life — and he draws a sharp contrast between "subjec- 
 tive" or merely "psychical states," and the spiritual life whereby the soul 
 wins a "content." 
 
 i36 a Eucken makes frequent use of this term in Hauptprobleme der 
 Religionsphilosophie der Gegenwart; see esp. pp. 28-32. 
 
 136 See Truth of Rel. passage cited chapter I. "The experience of history 
 testifies to the particular naivete of basing religion on thought, feeling, or will." 
 p. 84. (Wahrheitsgchalt der Rel., p. 56: "Nach den Erfahrungen der 
 Geschichte lasst sich nicht wohl aus Denken, Fiihlen, Wollen Religion zusam- 
 mensetzen," but the adjective "naive" is found on p. 55.) 
 
 137 Meaning and Value of Life, p. 80. Italics are ours. See Sinn und 
 Wert des Lebens: Geistesleben und menschliches Dasein, pp. 91-101, especially 
 p. 100. 
 
 138 Ibid, pp. 115, 116. Italics ours. 
 
52 EUDOLF ElTCKBN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 From Die Einheit des Geisteslebens we have selected the 
 following : 
 
 "Das Geisteswesen ist nicht eine punktuelle Existenz, welche 
 erst nachtraglich zu einem fremden All in Beziehungen tritt, 
 sondern es hat an einem allumfassenden Ganzen unmittelbar Teil, 
 und es entwickelt nur seine eigene Natur, wenn es seine Interessen 
 ins Unermessliche ausdehnt, ohne auf eine Ganzheit verzichten 
 zu wollen. Diese Thatsache erhalt jetzt beim Problem des 
 Personal seins eine weitere Bekraftigung und Entfaltung. Ein 
 personales Lebenssystem kann es schlechterdings nur geben 
 zusammen mit einem Ganzen personaler Wirklichkeit, einer 
 personalen Welt. Diese aber lasst sich, da die Umfassung des 
 Lebensprozesses von einer zentralen Einheit, die Erhebung des 
 Daseins zum Selbstleben, hier die entscheidende Eigentiimlichkeit 
 ausmacht, nur gewinnen, wenn eine kosmische Einheit die Wirk- 
 lichkeit umspannt, wenn alles Geschehen einen Einheitspunkt hat, 
 wenn also ein universales Personalwesen die Grundlage der Ent- 
 faltung alles Personallebens bildet." 139 
 
 "Als allgemeinste These erscheinen in dem Zusammenhange 
 unserer Untersuchung die Satze, dass alles Sein in einem Selbts- 
 wesen wurzelt, dass aber verschiedene Stufen der Gegenwart 
 des Selbst moglich sind, dass mit dem Eintreten des Selbst in den 
 Lebensprozess die Geistigkeit beginnt und mit der Entwickelung alter 
 Wirklichkeit aus dem Selbst sich vollendet. Was als Selbstwesen 
 Voraussetzung, wird als Selbstleben Aufgabe;eshandeltsichdarum, 
 ein zunachst in scheinbarer Jenseitigkeit befindliches Prinzip, 
 ohne das einmal die Wirklichkeit keine Wahrheit erreichen kann, 
 fiir uns und unsere Weltlage zu voller Entwickelung zu bringen. 
 Dies aber kann nur geschehen, indem das Selbst sich zur That 
 verkorpert, sich in ein Thun hineinlegt, dadurch das entgegen- 
 stehende Dasein in sich zieht und in sein Werk verwandelt. Da 
 das Selbst in dem kosmischen Sinne, wie es hier verstanden wird, 
 nicht von draussen an die Wirklichkeit kommt, sondern innerhalb 
 ihrer liegt und wirkt, so kann sein Fortgang zur That eine Erhebung 
 der Dinge zu ihrem eigenen Wesen sein." 140 
 
 "Des weiteren haben uns auch daruber die Untersuchungen 
 aufgeklart, dass in der spezifischen Auspragung des Geisteslebens 
 zur Vernunft- und Personalwelt nicht eine nachtragliche Zuthat 
 vorliegt, die man abldsen und fallen lassen konnte, um einen all- 
 gemeineren, minder problematischen Begriff desto sicherer festzu- 
 halten, sondern jene Welt zeigte sich als die begriindende Vor- 
 aussetzung und als die treibende Kraft aller und jeder geistigen 
 Wirklichkeit, mit em Selbstleben steht und fallt die Geistigkeit." 141 
 
 Einheit des Geisteslebens, p. 355. Italics ours. 
 Op. cit., pp. 401 sqq. Italics ours. 
 Op. cit., p. 463. 
 
KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 53 
 
 In the Truth of Religion we find: "There originates in nature 
 in its wending towards the animal level numerous and clear 
 traces of psychic life. . . . But the inner life remains scattered 
 and bound, a mere piece of an alien world, empty in the midst of 
 all the passion of the animal impulse. If now — not in man himself, 
 but yet within the range of humanity — a clarification and a libera- 
 tion arise, if here the inner life becomes independent and a depth 
 of existence opens — that such a fact has happened from simple 
 beginnings and by a very slow ascent does not alter the main fact 
 in the least, — then nature cannot any more signify the whole of 
 reality, but can only signify a special stage of it — a stage beyond 
 which the world-process proceeds to an existence-for-self. This 
 new fact is far too original and signifies far too much an inverted 
 order of things to be understood as a mere furtherance of the 
 mechanical movement of nature itself; rather must it be a cosmic 
 life superior to nature which breaks forth thus — a cosmic life 
 which works also in nature but which proceeds beyond it to a 
 stage of self -completion. In such a connection the Spiritual Life 
 cannot at all be viewed as only a result; it must also be valid as a 
 principle ; it can be the aim and the culmination of the world-process 
 only if it also forms its foundation and presupposition, and if 
 that which at first appears as a result works in and through the 
 whole movement. An energy of the Whole must be active from 
 the outset if the manifold is to be united into a Whole, and through 
 such a union is to rise to a higher plane. How could an All bring 
 forth an independent inner life if it were soulless in itself? 
 
 "Nature and the unfolded spirit become herewith stages of the 
 world-process which, beyond the juxtaposition of nature with its 
 bare relations, progress to a total-life which overcomes the cleft 
 between obscure substance and unsubstantial happening, by 
 making the Life-process independent and developing all substance 
 from it. At the same time, the All-life can no more be a stream 
 flowing nobody knows whither and which nobody experiences." 142 
 
 "What happens here is mysterious enough. Life forges its way 
 here, beyond the work of the world, to a persistency and duration 
 in itself, to a new kind of being, but in all this it is at the outset 
 split up into so many isolated appearances, and it falls easily into 
 mere subjectivity. But some kind of unity seems present in the 
 foundation, but it is not able to overcome the hindrance, and 
 succeeds in bringing forth no more than poor results. . . . And 
 here Characteristic religion steps in with its fundamental assertion 
 that a 'becoming' independence of pure inwardness and the un- 
 folding of a new unity of life result, but this is shown to happen not 
 through the energy of these qualities themselves but through the 
 
 142 Italics ours. Truth of Rel., pp. 164-166. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., 
 pp. 113, 114.) Compare Sinn un<l Wert des Lebens, op. cit., pp. 60 sqq. 
 
54 EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 communication of the inmost nature of things — from the pure self- 
 subsistence of reality." 143 
 
 In the Life of the Spirit we read: 
 
 "Where Nature ranks as a stage of reality, which remains even 
 when the spiritual is developed, the power which this stage contains 
 must be enlisted in the service of the life-process, in order that it may 
 not become too weak. Not by withdrawing from nature, but only 
 by overcoming, appropriating, and penetrating it can the spiritual 
 life attain its full height and strength; only thus can life be brought 
 from mere outline to the finished product." 144 
 
 " . . . man can participate in a cosmic life that forms the essence 
 of things, and so gain possession of truth." 145 
 
 "If truth, if a life which fashions the world and partakes of the 
 essence of things, are not in the first place incontestable facts for 
 us, then all our trouble about them is wasted." 146 
 
 In Main Currents of Modern Thought occurs the following: 
 
 "In spiritual life we recognize a new development of the universe 
 in which it unfolds a depth and gathers itself together to form 
 a world-life. To participate in spiritual life means therefore to 
 participate in a world-life. The experiences which the movements 
 and changes of the spiritual life give rise to do not belong to any 
 atomic self, but are appreciated only as revelations of reality as a 
 whole. 
 
 "Moreover this new life has shown itself superior to the contrast 
 between subject and object; it is no half -being needing to be com- 
 plemented from without, but as fully active life it is raised above 
 this contrast . It carries within itself the tracings of an independent 
 reality, and its movement is a struggle towards the complete develop- 
 ment of this reality. " 147 
 
 "Our concept of Spiritual life as the orientation of reality towards 
 an inner life of its own [der Wendung der Wirklichkeit zu einem 
 Eigen- und Innenleben], again reveals a passage between Scylla 
 and Charybdis. For we look upon spiritual life as the 'coming to- 
 itself of the world-process [Zusichselbstkommen des Weltprozesses], 
 the winning of an esential being and meaning over against the 
 meaningless network of relationships and self-preservative activ- 
 ities which result from the regime of the mere individual." 148 
 
 143 Ibid., pp. 420 sqq. Italics ours. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, p. 292.) 
 
 144 The Life of the Spirit, p. 272. Italics ours. (Einfuhrung in eine Philos- 
 ophic des Geisteslebens, p. 129.) 
 
 145 Ibid., p. 327. Italics ours. (Einfuhrung, p. 156, "an einem wesen- 
 bildenden Weltleben.") 
 
 146 Ibid., p. 331. Italics ours. (Einfuhrung, p. 158, "ein weltbildendes und 
 wesenhaftes Leben.") 
 
 147 Translated by Booth, New York, 1912, p. 132. Italics ours. (Geistige 
 Stromungen, p. 96.) 
 
 148 Ibid., p. 390. Italics ours. (Geistige Stromungen, p. 326.) 
 
EUDOLF EuCKEX AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 55 
 
 In Der Kampf urn einen geistigen Lebensinkalt Eucken writes : 
 
 "Einen weg, in der Einheit die Versckiedenkeit festzuhalten, 
 eroffnet aber die Idee, dass Natur und Geist die Hauptstufen einer 
 Bewegung des Alls bilden, dass Ein begrtindendes und unifassendes 
 Sein in ihnen und durch sie seine eigne Verwirklickung findet. 
 In solckem Zusammenkange sckeint erst mit der Wendung zum 
 Geist das All ein Beisickselbstsein zu erreicken, sick zu einem 
 inneren Zusammenkang und einem deutlickenSinn aufzuringen." 149 
 
 "Jene icesenhafte Geistigkeit . . . muss die erste und urspriing- 
 UcheLebensquelle tverden, die Kraft, die alles iibrige tragt und treibt, 
 der feste Punkt, woran sick alles andere kalt. Dazu gekort an 
 erster Stelle, dass ein Allleben wesenhafter Geistigkeit in uns unmit- 
 telbar durckbrickt." 150 
 
 In Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, ke states: 
 
 "The life-process is . . . seen to be a movement tkat is neitker 
 from object to subject, nor from subject to object; neitker tke 
 subject's attainment of content from tke object, nor tke object's 
 becoming controlled by tke subject, but an advance of a self- 
 conscious life in and through the antithesis. Life, by this movement, 
 ceases to be a single, thin thread; it wins breadtk; it expands to an 
 inner universality. At tke same time a deptk is manifested in 
 tkat a persistent and comprekensive activity emerges wkick lives 
 in tke antitkesis. In this manner life first becomes a life in a 
 spiritual sense, a self-conscious and self-determining life, a self- 
 consciousness." 151 
 
 "Nature, wkick tkere was a tendency to regard as tke wkole, 
 is now of tke essence of a wider reality and a stage in its 
 development." 152 
 
 "Tke transition to an independent inwardness is not sometking 
 wkick kappens externally to tke world but within it: no special 
 spkere, separate from all tke rest, is originated; but reality itself 
 evolves an inner life: it is tke world itself tkat reveals a spiritual 
 deptk, or, as we might say, a soul." 153 
 
 "It is necessary not only tkat tke life-process ackieve more, but 
 also tkat it grow in itself, ckange tkat wkick is alien to it into its 
 own, and display more reality witkin itself; life must experience 
 every single activity as tke manifestation of tke activity of tke 
 wkole, and tkus, along witk unlimited extension, preserve self- 
 consciousness. 154 
 
 149 Op. cit., pp. 24 sqq. Italics are ours. 
 
 150 Ibid., p. 09. Italics ours. 
 
 161 Italics ours. Life's Basis, p. 146. (Grundlinien einer neuen Leben- 
 sanschauung, p. 73.) 
 
 152 Ibid., p. 149. Italics ours. (Grundlinien, p. 75, "die Natur, die sonst 
 das Ganze scheincn mochte, wird jetzt zu ciner Stufe einer weiteren Wirk- 
 lichkeit.") 
 
 163 Ibid., p. 148. Italics ours. (Grundlinien, p. 74.) 
 
 164 Ibid., p. 213. Italics ours. 
 
56 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 "The more necessary it is to insist upon an animation of reality 
 through the development of self-conscious life, the more must we 
 guard against the danger of anthropomorphism. . . . Only 
 with much toil and with continual self-criticism can life be brought 
 to the point where the transition to self-consciousness is possible; 
 and even then the whole cannot, under human circumstances, 
 be attained at one stroke; but at first life must endeavor to concen- 
 trate, to form a nucleus so that in this way it may acquire a firm 
 basis, and from this take up a struggle for its further spiritualisa- 
 tion." 155 
 
 "... this life ["a world-transcendent spiritual life which is 
 purely and absolutely self conscious"] must become man's own 
 life, and spirituality in this way self-consciously advance towards 
 divinity"[!!] 156 
 
 In "Konnen wir noch Christen sein?" we find: 
 
 "So steigen mit der Wendung zur Geistigkeit die Ideen eines 
 inneren Zusammenhanges und einer Ewigkeit auf und werden zu 
 Machten iiber das Leben. Aber die Wandlung greift noch tiefer 
 in das innere Gewebe des Lebens ein. Schon die Betrachtung der 
 Neuzeit zeigte, wie das geistige Leben eine Scheidung und Wieder- 
 verbindung vollzieht, wie es Kraft und Gegenstand, Subjekt 
 und Objekt zunachst auseinanderriickt und sie dann durch 
 erhohendes Schaffen wieder zusammenbringt. Hier erscheint 
 zunachst die geistige Bewegung nicht als ein Mosses Hin- und Her- 
 gehen von einer Seite zur andern, sondern als eine Tatigkeit, die 
 beide Seiten umfasst, und die mit ihrer Versetzung des ganzen 
 Lebensumfanges in Bewegung Volltatigkeit heissen mag; ferner 
 aber erscheint hier das geistige Wirken nicht als ein blosses Verwer- 
 ten gegebener Elemente, sondern als ein Quell selbstdndigen Lebens, 
 als eine Kraft der inneren Erhohung. Hier befindet sich das 
 Leben noch mitten im Fluss und stellt sich dabei als ein Vordringen 
 und Aufklimmen dar, die von ihm vollzogene Verbindung ist 
 keine blosse Zusammensetzung, sondern ein Eroffnen neuer Tiefen, 
 ein Sichentziinden des Geistes im Zusammenstoss." 157 
 
 "Es gilt bei der Religion den Gewinn eines Lebens, das uns mit 
 iiberwaltigender Kraft ergreife und uns iiber den vorgefundenen 
 Stand hinaus zu neuer Hohe erhebe, es tut hier ein gewaltiges 
 Aufriitteln not, ein Abbrechen des Alten, ein Hervorbrechen 
 urspriinglicher Lebensquellen." 158 
 
 165 Ibid., p. 214. Italics are ours. 
 
 160 Ibid., p. 275. See Grundlinien, p. 132, "Es erscheint ein starkes Ver- 
 Jangen," etc., to "zur Gbttlichkeit steigern." 
 
 167 Op. cit., pp. 98 sqq. Italics ours. (Can we still be Christians?, p. 92.) 
 R. Siebert in his interpretation of Eucken writes: "Zur Geistigkeit entwickelt 
 sich die Menschheit und der Mensch auf dem Grunde einer ewigen Geisteswelt." 
 Rudolf Eucken's geschichtsphilosophische Ansichten, Berlin, 1909, p. 70. 
 
 1M Ibid., p. 145. (Can we still be Christians?, p. 135.) 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 57 
 
 In Erkennen und Leben we read: 
 
 "Dies Problem des Tragers aber fiihrt unmittelbar zum Lebens- 
 problem, und hier wird sofort ersichtlich, dass unser Leben nicht 
 ein blosses Stlick eines gegebenen Daseins ist, dass es sich nicht in 
 das Verhaltnis zur Umgebung erschopft, sondern dass es aus 
 den Verkettungen des Daseins herauszutreten, eine Selbstandigkeit 
 zu gewinnen, eine Selbsttatigkeit zu entwickeln und eine Tatwelt 
 aufzubringen vermag. Solche Wendung ergibt einen vollig neuen 
 Anblich der Wirkliehkeit und stellt sie als eine grosse Aufgabe 
 dar. . . . Dass hier grosse Verwicklungen entstehen, dass die 
 Welt, die von innen aufsteigt, und die Welt, ivelche wir um tins und 
 audi in uns finden, in harte Konflilde miteinander geraten, das ist 
 die gemeinsame Uberzeugung aller Religionen, aber auch alter 
 sehaffenden Kunst und aller durchgreifenden Philosophic. Sie alle 
 bejahen nicht das gegebene Dasein, sondern das Ja, auf dem sie 
 bestehen, finden sie nur im Bruch mit jenem Dasein, nur durch 
 Erschutterung und Verneinung hindurch. Die Verneinung wird 
 ihnen damit bei allem Schmerz ein wesentlicher Faktor des geistigen 
 Lebens, ja sie erscheint als das Salz des Lebens, ohne das es schal und 
 seelenlos wird. Erst die Verneinung fiihrt das Leben zu rechter 
 Bewegung, Kraft und Vertiefung." 159 
 
 In Christianity and the New Idealism Eucken gives a warning 
 which does not tend to lessen the difficulties in the way of the 
 Life-Process as Truth-Standard; his words are: 
 
 "Only we must beware of confounding the form that religion 
 takes among men — the existential form, in a word — with its origin- 
 ating ground or its spiritual substance." 160 
 
 Such is the exposition, in the philosopher's own words, of the 
 central conception of Activism. 
 
 Analysis and Criticism 
 
 A single reading suffices to show that the proposed basis is too 
 insecure a foundation for the structure of human knowledge. 
 
 What reality can that have which, in itself, is neither matter 
 nor purely spirit, nor essentially different from either since each is a 
 stage in its self-development? Alban G. Widgery, in his Introduc- 
 tion to "Life's Basis and Life's Ideal" says: 
 
 "The careful reader cannot fail to see that, ultimately, the 
 philosophy is essentially mystical." 1 " 1 
 
 169 Erkennen und Leben, pp. 69 sqq. Italics ours. (Knowledge and Lif< 
 pp. 128 sqq.) 
 
 180 Op. cit., p. 23. Italics ours. (Hauptprobleme, p. 25.) 
 JC1 Op. cit., p. XVIII. 
 
58 EUDOLP EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 It seems to us that Eucken's conception of the Life-Process is 
 not so much "essentially mystical" as it is wholly unintelligible. 162 
 
 It does not baffle the Reason because it discloses a truth that is 
 above Reason; it defies it because it seeks to unite elements which 
 are essentially incompatible; it suggests a concept which is contrary 
 to Reason, and, therefore, absolutely inconceivable. The doctrine 
 of the Resurrection, which Eucken dismisses with the uncritical 
 reflection that it is not necessary for Christianity, 163 is a mystery 
 but it is not a contradiction. Life is a mystery, as the futile 
 attempts of Burke, Pfliiger and other experimenters in the cause of 
 abiogenesis have testified; it is nevertheless, a reality. To hold 
 that the Power which endowed the vital principle with the capa- 
 bility of developing a single cell into a human body, is also able 
 to reunite the vital principle to the matter it once animated, is not 
 opposed to reason, though reason perceives its difficulties all the 
 more clearly from the fact that it cannot penetrate to the secret 
 of Vitalism, but must acknowledge that the first living cell was the 
 direct result of a Creative act, or, illogically, assume an Agnostic 
 standpoint. But the "mystery" for which Eucken claims recogni- 
 tion is of a very different type. 
 
 He posits as "the true, primary, and all-comprehensive reality" 164 
 a Life which is not made known to us through Biology or Psy- 
 chology, still less through Cosmology; a Life which can be reached 
 only by a "noological" "supreme" or "sovereign" ("eigenstand- 
 lich") 165 method which, by transcending the opposition between 
 subject and object, treats immediately of the First and Final Cause 
 — the All-Life (All-Leben) which contains within itself both nature 
 and spirit. 
 
 Modern science has greatly increased our knowledge of matter 
 and our power over the forces of nature, but it has not thereby 
 lessened the opposition between the "material" and the "spiritual." 
 
 162 yy e use j-jjg t erm "conception" here for convenience sake: a conception 
 that is unintelligible is, strictly speaking, an impossibility. 
 
 163 See Truth of Rel., pp. 550-554 (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., pp. 370-373). 
 In Truth of Rel., p. 553, he says: "Religion, which has already shown so much 
 energy, will finally find the energy to subsist without sensuous signs and 
 wonders." German text, p. 372 sqq. See also Prob. of Human Life, pp. 
 167 sqq. (Lebensanschauung der G. Denker, op. cit., pp. 168 sqq.) 
 
 164 Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, p. 5. See Grundlinien, p. 2; the wording 
 is changed. 
 
 165 Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., pp. 123, 318. (Truth of Rel., pp. 178 sqq.; 
 455 sqq.) (Main Currents of Modern Thought, pp. 56, 421.) G. Strom- 
 ungen, pp. 29, 354. 
 
KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 59 
 
 Empirical Psychology has brought out the contrast between sense- 
 knowledge and the spiritual activity of thought in a still stronger 
 light than was thrown on it by the older method — though the 
 result is an indirect one, in no way aimed at by those who sought 
 to separate the study of the mental activities from the study of 
 the nature of the mind itself. Although Eucken, in dealing with 
 Naturalism, distinguishes between the "material" and the "spir- 
 itual," 166 he insists that we can only reach truth by transcending 
 the antithesis between nature and spirit. We maintain that we 
 have no faculty or power whereby to do so; we cannot even conceive 
 of how it could be done. Matter and spirit are essentially different 
 in nature and mode of action; how then can they be united so as 
 to form a third "Whole" which is both their starting-point and 
 goal in the evolutionary course upon which they enter? Even in 
 purely chemical changes the new substance imprisons the gases 
 which were contained in the old, but it was in the nature of the 
 gases to enter into the fresh combination, otherwise the transforma- 
 tion of energy could not have taken place. Eucken's statement 
 about the implication of the "Geistesleben" may be recalled here: 
 
 "The spiritual life in itself is incomparably more than is repre- 
 sented by the customary conception of that life." 167 
 
 "Within the soul itself there is a distinction between two levels, 
 of which that other than nature may in agreement with established 
 usage be called 'spiritual,' however little may be implied by this 
 expression." 168 
 
 If we were translated to a realm in which the sum of the com- 
 ponent parts of a positive quantity equalled nothing, the trans- 
 cendence which Eucken demands might be accomplished. One 
 thing is certain : we have no present experience either of the trans- 
 cendent reality itself — i.e., the reality of Eucken's conception — 
 or of the manner in which the transcendent viewpoint is gained: 189 
 
 188 See Life's Basis and Life's Ide.al, pp. 24 sqq. (Grundlinien, pp. 14 sqq.) 
 Main Currents, pp. 227 sqq.; 232 sqq. (G. Strbmungen, pp. 180 sqq.) 
 Meaning and Value of Life, pp. 26 sqq. (Sinn und Wert des Lebens, pp. 19 
 sqq., esp. p. 24.) In most of his works the contrast is made, though it is 
 destroyed by the exposition of the constructive portion. 
 
 167 Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, p. 240. (Grundlinien, see pp. 104, 105, to 
 "sein," end of paragraph.) 
 
 183 Ibid., pp. 131, 132. (Grundlinien, p. 63.) 
 
 169 "Noological," from Nous the spirit, is an adjective better applied to 
 the methods of Rational Psychology than to the irrational system of Eucken. 
 "Noeticism" is, strictly speaking, the equivalent for Rational Psychology or 
 Philosophy of Mind — a science which has received careful development and 
 elaboration in the scholastic and neo-scholastic philosophy. See Truth of 
 Rel., p. 235. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 160.) 
 
60 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 we have no knowledge of it through Science, Philosophy or 
 Revelation. We cannot, therefore, stake our life on the hope that 
 a self-evident contradiction may be "somehow or other" possible. 
 A closer examination of the "Geistesleben" or "Lebensprozess" 
 shows it to be an eclectic conception, the borrowed elements 
 being taken from conflicting systems of thought — even truths 
 of Revelation are caught up, and become notes in this all-embracing 
 concept. The result is that the philosopher who starts his con- 
 structive work by stating that the "fact" of a spiritual life is the 
 "axiom of axioms," has hardly begun his exposition ere he negates 
 the concept of the spiritual, and completely negatives his own 
 position. An analysis of this complex conception reveals the 
 following elements : 
 
 1. The "Absolute Spiritual" which is none other than the 
 First Cause of Scholastic Philosophy and the God of Christian 
 Theology. 
 
 This Absolute Spiritual possesses the plentitude of all being and 
 is the Source (Urspriingliche Quelle) of all reality. The Absolute 
 Spiritual is according to Eucken, "Infinite Love" and unchanging 
 Truth : a truth that would be valid only for a time he declares to 
 be a contradiction : 
 
 "Change (and with it evolution) is absolutely out of the question 
 as far as the substance of spiritual life is concerned. The concept 
 of truth . . . tolerates neither growth nor change." 170 
 
 The concept may be compared with that of Parmenides and his 
 school in that the oneness of reality is held both by Eucken and 
 the Eleatics. Eucken differs from them in, illogically, passing 
 on to the dynamism of Heraclitus, and holding the reality of 
 change, without acknowledging a creative act of the First Cause or 
 Absolute Spiritual. 
 
 2. The Life-Process. 
 
 This bears, in general outline, an unmistakable resemblance to 
 the divine all-controlling world-fire of Heraclitus in Ancient 
 Thought, and to the central conception in the systems of Fichte, 
 Schelling and Hegel in the modern world. The resemblance does 
 not, perhaps, extend to details; in fact in the exposition Eucken 
 rather seeks to differ from his predecessors in the New Pliil- 
 
 170 Main Currents of Modern Thought, p. 274. (G. Stromungen, p. 223.) 
 
EUDOLF EUCKBN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 61 
 
 osophy; an fond, however, the likeness remains. Fichte lTOa 
 insists on the importance of action, and of free action. Schelling 
 maintains that the "Eternal Itself" is also nature, while Eucken 
 states that nature is a stage in the development of the one reality. 
 Hegel insists that the rational alone is real, Eucken — that the goal 
 of human endeavor should be the overcoming of the irrationality 
 of nature: the "spiritualization" of nature. 
 
 Eucken's striking point of difference lies in his recognition of 
 evil and sin in the full Christian sense. This idea, however, does 
 not belong to the concept of the Life-Process, strictly speaking; 
 it is one of the interpolated elements wholly at variance with its 
 environment. 
 
 3. The Christian concept of an offended Goodness and a guilty 
 creature. In no portion of his inconsistent system is Eucken 
 weaker than when attempting to deal with the problem of evil. 
 Evil and sin, apart from the recognition of a free creative act of 
 the First Cause, are insoluble mysteries: more, sin itself is wholly 
 unintelligible. When sin is acknowledged, the mind must forth- 
 with recognize a Being sinned against, but in Eucken's system 
 "Sinned against" and "sinner" must, in last analysis, be one and 
 the same. He asks, in the Truth of Religion (the passage is cited in 
 chapter III, p. 78), whether we shall dare ascribe guilt to the Deity. 
 But he offers no solution which will enable us to do otherwise. 
 
 4. The human spiritual, or the "existential form" of the 
 Absolute Spiritual. This is an essentially Pantheistic conception; 
 the influence of Kant 171 and even of Spinoza 172 are traceable in its 
 development, which is at variance with its definition. 
 
 ma p or an inquiry into the relation between Eucken and Fichte see 
 "Eucken's Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung und sein Yerhaltnis zu 
 J. G. Fichte," by Paul Gabriel; pp. 35-44. 
 
 171 See Geistige Stromungen der Gegenwart, op. cit., p. 32. "Erst Kant 
 brachte die Wendung in Fluss, welche die geistige Arbeit des 19. Jahrhunderts 
 beherrscht, die deutliche Abhebung eines Geisteslebens vorn blossseelischen 
 Getriebe. Denn bei ihra erscheint jenseit des Unterschiedes der Individuen 
 eine gemeinsame geistige Struktur, ein Grundgewebe, das alle geistige Betatig- 
 ung beherrscht und gestaltet. Aber die Sache blieb bei ihm insofern noch 
 unvollendet, als sich weder das neue fcst genug bei sich selbst zusammenschloss, 
 noch eine deutliche Abgrenzung des Geistigen erfolgte." Eucken offers us 
 his concept of the Geistesleben as the completion and perfection of Kant's 
 work ("bei ihm . . . noch unvollendet") see Der Grundbegriff des Geistes- 
 lebens; ibid., pp. 30 sqq. 
 
 172 Though Spinoza and Eucken may seem at first to have little in common 
 a close comparison suggests distinct similarities. Compare, e.g., Spinoza's 
 description of the life of passion, or, even of mere scientific pursuit, with 
 Eucken's account of blouse Menschen, blouse Menschenkultur, blossmenschliches 
 
62 EUDOLP EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 In conclusion we must reject Eucken's "All-Leben" just as de- 
 cidedly as we must keep certain of the concepts it seeks to unite. 
 In the next chapter we shall examine into the second point of 
 our inquiry. 
 
 Wohlsein, and of the Kleinmenschlich, Blossmenschlich, and Das Heine Ich: 
 See, e. g., Grundlinien, op. cit., pp. 68, 186, 196, 210; Die Einheit des Geistes- 
 lebens, p. 460. Again the peculiarly religious role, as we may call it, which 
 Eucken assigns to philosophy is surely not wholly uninfluenced by Spinoza's 
 idea of the philosopher who, rising above the strife of passion and the life of 
 worldly interest, views all things sub specie aeternitatis. See Geistige Stro- 
 mungen (pp. 97-104) where Eucken unfolds the task of philosophy. On 
 p. 99 we find "das alles ist eine Frage der Tatsachlichkiet, aber freilich einer 
 Tatsachlichkeit, die nicht von aussen her zufallen kann, sondern in Zusam- 
 menfassung des Lebens, im Aufklimmen zu einem Sehen und Messen vom 
 Ganzen zum Ganzen immer neu zu erringen ist." Italics are ours. See also 
 Grundlinien, p. 177, where the words of Spinoza occur: "Wenn das Denken in 
 seiner Arbeit eine Erhebung Uber die Zeit vollzieht, wenn es sub specie aeterni- 
 tatis wirkt," etc. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE "IMMEDIACY" OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE 
 
 The inquiry into the nature of the "Immediacy" involves a 
 double problem — the subjective How, the objective What. 
 
 The psychological question concerns us mainly here, but we 
 cannot form a fair judgment of the satisfactoriness of the solution 
 in the first case, without adverting to that offered in the second, 
 for the reason that the "immediacy" under one aspect is the how 
 of our knowledge of the Spiritual, under another aspect it is, itself, 
 the spiritual which we know. Eucken's hybrid concept of the 
 "Geistesleben" affects his exposition even of the "Absolute Spir- 
 itual:" hence the descriptions of the "immediacy" in his different 
 works — sometimes in different parts of the same work — are m 
 pointed contradiction. 
 
 In Christianity and the New Idealism he writes: "As we 
 understand the Spiritual Life, it is not this or that feature of it 
 which assures us of the presence of a transcendent Life and unites 
 us to it, but rather the totality of an underived and independent life 
 within our own." It is "the revelation of a world-transcending 
 totality of life." 173 
 
 The force of the italicized passage is destroyed by the previous 
 statement (p. 10). "It [i. e., the Spiritual Life] cannot be under- 
 stood save as a development of the organized universe." 
 
 In Truth of Religion he writes in treating of the "Revelation of 
 an Absolute Spiritual Life:" "We need not open any laborious 
 and lengthy investigation in order to prove that a Spiritual Life 
 superior to the world not only touches us with its effects, but 
 that it is also present in us as cause with all the fulness of its 
 energy. It is revealed to us as a great fact that a Spiritual Life 
 can rise up as our own life: and this actually happens. The 
 significance of this fact can be judged fully after we have recognized 
 that a total-life presents itself in the Spiritual Life, and that in 
 this total-life a new degree of reality arises, and an inverted order 
 of the world-process takes place; such a turn could not proceed out 
 of the potency of the individual elements of life, but has to proceed 
 
 173 Christianity and the New Idealism, p. 1C. (Hauptprob. dcr Religions- 
 philosophie, op. cit., p. 18.) Italics ours. 
 
 63 
 
64 BlTDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 out of the energy of the Whole. Therefore this Whole must be, 
 in a form of immediacy, present in us, and also, the great change 
 shall ensue as a gain of our own life." 174 
 
 So far from recognizing that in the "Absolute Spiritual," or 
 "Whole," "a new degree of reality" rises up, "and an inverted order 
 of the world-process takes place," we hold that the statement is 
 contrary to the recognized signification of the term "Absolute 
 Spiritual." 
 
 In Main Currents of Modern Thought we find : 
 
 "It will not do for spiritual life to be communicated to him 
 through the medium of his special nature (thus becoming alienated 
 from itself) ; it must in some fashion be present to him as a whole 
 in all its infinity [als Ganzes mit all seiner Unendlichkeit]." 175 
 
 It is needless to multiply quotations; one other passage, however, 
 may be cited as instancing Eucken's view both of the human 
 spiritual and the "immediacy." It occurs in the Problem of 
 Human Life : 
 
 "And by personality is meant a concentration-center of the 
 spiritual world, a point of convergence for countless threads of 
 existence, a point, again, at which life acquires the immediate 
 certainty of its own existence, is exalted to a state of pure self- 
 immediacy, and can at the same time gather itself together for 
 resolute action and energetically challenge such abuses as its 
 environment offers." 176 
 
 There are two stages to be distinguished in our knowledge of 
 the spiritual, according to Eucken's exposition : 
 
 1. The recognition of the existence of a Spiritual Life. 
 
 2. The realization of that Life as a personal experience; this 
 latter constitutes the "immediacy." 
 
 Psychological Method 
 
 In the facts which he brings forward as the basis of the first 
 stage he is practically at one with the scholastics — he differs from 
 them in the wording and setting of the proofs. These facts may 
 be stated as follows : 
 
 a. (1) The unifying power of thought. 
 
 174 Truth of Religion, p. 203 (cc). (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 141.) 
 
 175 Op. cit., p. 60. (Geistige Stromungen, p. 33.) 
 
 176 Problem of Human Life, p. 557. See Einheit des Geisteslebens: Das 
 Personalsein als Weltwesen, pp. 354 sqq.; ibid., pp. 468 sqq. 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 65 
 
 (2) Unity of consciousness. 
 
 b. Intellectual or Universal Ideas. 
 
 c. The Altruistic emotions and other forms of rational conation. 
 Most of Eucken's constructive works treat of this first revelation 
 
 of a spiritual reality. The following citations will suffice for our 
 present purpose: 
 
 a. (1) In Christianity and the New Idealism he writes: 
 
 "Thought refuses to be a mere link in the chain of causes and 
 effects; it steps outside the series, confronts it, and seeks to unify 
 it. Even when gauging the external world, the imaginative flight 
 of thought, piercing infinity, reaches beyond all the bounds of 
 sense-perception. ' ' m 
 
 In Main Currents of Modern Thought he writes: 
 
 "Nothing is more characteristic of the distinctive nature of 
 thought than the fact and power of the logical contradiction. It 
 would be impossible to perceive this contradiction if, in thought, 
 multiplicity was not comprehended within the scope of an all- 
 inclusive activity, and it could not be so unendurable as it is if 
 the desire for unity were not enormously powerful." 179 
 
 In Ethics and Modern Thought he states: 
 
 "Here ['wherever spiritual life develops'] life is not decomposed 
 into a multitude of separate particles, but inner cohesions are 
 formed, which embrace and dominate all achievement of individual 
 beings. This is especially the case when human thought aspires 
 towards Truth." 180 
 
 Eucken's peculiar view of spiritual life is suggested by the expres- 
 sion "inner cohesions." 
 
 (2) In Main Currents a good defense of the "Unity of Con- 
 sciousness" and its import is found. 
 
 "Moreover it is necessary to call particular attention to the fact 
 that above and beyond all intellectual processes there develops 
 an inner life, a life which exhibits, in spite of all manifoldness, a 
 permanent character, persisting through all changes and move- 
 ments." "But is there not a unity of a spiritual kind which 
 persists with living force in the face of all the changes and obscura- 
 tions of consciousness, does not all progressive scientific and artistic 
 creation work through this unity of the spiritual individuality, and 
 is not this same unity the source of all thorough-going achievement 
 also in the practical and technical domain?" 181 
 
 173 Op. cit., p. 7. (Hauptproulome, p. !).) 
 "» Op. cit., p. 183. (Grundlinien, p. 143.) 
 wo London and New York, 1913, p. 28. 
 181 Op. cit., pp. 52, 53, and footnote. 
 
66 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 b. The Moral judgments — to which conscience testifies — and 
 the ideas of the True, the Good and the Beautiful are phenomena 
 inexplicable on any hypothesis except that of a spiritual reality . In 
 Life's Basis Eucken writes : 
 
 "In the development of a self -consciousness and of a movement of 
 life itself, we rise above the motive of utility, by which nature is 
 swayed. It is a moral element in the widest sense; it is the con- 
 sciousness of something objectively necessary, unconditionally 
 transcending the ends of the narrowly human, that first gives to 
 convictions axiomatic certainty and to conduct the right energy. 
 This moral element attains to a more independent display in the 
 moral self -judgment of man that is called 'conscience.' " 182 
 
 The expressions "movement of life itself," "narrowly human," 
 point to the philosopher's inconsistent theory of the "human 
 spiritual." Moral values and conscience are but contradictions 
 if the spiritual nature of man is a "concentration-center" for the 
 "Absolute Spiritual." Again, Eucken has identified necessary 
 and moral truths. All moral truths are of an objective necessary 
 character, but there are other necessary truths which cannot be 
 termed moral. 
 
 In Truth of Religion we find : 
 
 "Also, all the darkness leaves no doubt that the Divine emerges, 
 first of all, not from the outermost boundary of our life, but 
 through a creativeness and activity in the inmost life itself. . . . 
 This appears clearly in a twofold direction. On the one hand, it 
 is seen in the power of logical thought, in which something superior 
 to all human opinion and inclination appears which shows fear- 
 lessly the weal and woe of mere man." 183 
 
 We may point out again Eucken's peculiar view of man's 
 spiritual nature. According to him the human spiritual is none 
 other than the Absolute Spiritual finding self-expression in and 
 through human psychic activities. It is not accurate therefore 
 to conceive of man as possessing a spiritual soul; rather he may 
 win a soul by "anchorage" in the Absolute Spiritual, the Soul of 
 souls; the soul thus won will not be, however, distinct from the 
 Absolute Spiritual itself. 
 
 c. In Christianity and the New Idealism we find: "In the 
 case of the True and the Good, our effort is not concentrated on the 
 external aspects of things, nor does it rest content with a merely 
 
 182 Op. cit., p. 129. (Grundlinien, pp. 61, 62.) 
 
 183 Op. cit., p. 356. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 246.) 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 67 
 
 external contact. . . . Our feeling, again, through the exaltation 
 of life above the natural level, can focus itself within the life of 
 another, and, through righteousness and love, realise the being of 
 another as a part of that larger and richer life in which we and it 
 alike participate." 184 
 
 In Main Currents of Modern Thought Eucken criticizes sharply 
 those naturalistic systems which, while denying the existence of a 
 spiritual activity, make full use of it in the construction of a theory. 
 He does not grasp the fact that he is himself as inconsistent as any 
 monist, and more so than most, for the very reason that he posits 
 an independent Spiritual Reality as the Source of nature, and yet 
 concludes that spirit and matter are, ultimately, belonging, 
 essentially, to the one all-embracing Life. 185 
 
 Scholastic Influence 
 
 The influence of the Scholastic philosophy on Eucken at this 
 juncture is too evident to escape detection. A comparison of 
 some of the cited passages with the exposition of the scholastic 
 theory will prove it beyond a doubt. St. Thomas establishes the 
 spiritual nature of thought thus: "nullum enim corpus invenitur 
 aliquid continere nisi per commensurationem quantitatis; unde, 
 et si se toto totum aliquid continet, et partem parte continet, 
 majorem quidem majore, minorem autem minore. Intellectus 
 autem non comprehendit rem aliquam intellectam per aliquam 
 quantitatis commensurationem, quum se toto intelligat et compre- 
 hendat totum et partem, majora in quantitate et minora. Nulla 
 igitur substantia intelligens est corpus." 186 
 
 184 Op. cit., p. 9. 
 
 185 See G. Stromungen, pp. 185-191 [Main Currents, pp. 232-238]. For 
 development of knowledge of spiritual, see also: G. Stromungen, pp. 27, 30, 
 104, 222 sqq., 265 sqq. [Main Currents, pp. 54, 57, 141, 273, 274, 322, 323]; 
 Einfuhrung in eine Phil, des Geisteslehens, pp. 7-14, 15, 47, 157 sqq.; Wahrheits- 
 gehalt der Rel., pp. 271-284 [Truth of Rel. r Chap. XII, pp. 391-409]: the ex- 
 position here is in parts irreconcilable with the concept of an Absolute Spiritual 
 Being; Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt, pp. 109-120. It is un- 
 necessary to multiply references as an attentive reading of any one of Eucken's 
 constructive works gives a fairly complete view of his entire philosophy. 
 Warner Fite has noticed this point in his article in the Nation; he writes: 
 "Notwithstanding the systematic development announced in his tables of 
 contents, a limited range of variations upon this theme [the independence of 
 the Spiritual Life] constitutes (if we omit the historical works) the nearly un- 
 changing content of every chapter, every volume and almost of every page." 
 (Eucken's Philosophy of Life, Nation, Vol. 95, July 11, 1912, p. 29.) 
 
 186 Contra Gent., Lib. II, Cap. XLIX. For a good brief exposition, see 
 M. Maher, Psychology, 7th ed., 1911, Bk. I, Part II. 
 
68 EUDOLP EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 The remainder of the passage is condensed by Rickaby through 
 the "commingling" of some of the arguments; in the English it 
 is as follows : 
 
 "If the understanding were a corporeal substance, its action 
 would not transcend the order of corporeal things, and therefore 
 it would understand nothing but corporeal things, which is mani- 
 festly false, for we do understand many things that are not 
 corporeal. 
 
 "There can be no infinite power in any finite body : but the power 
 of the understanding is in a manner infinite in the exercise of 
 intelligence: for it knows the universal, which is virtually infinite 
 in its logical extension. 
 
 "Of no bodily substance is the action turned back upon the agent. 
 But the understanding in its action does reflect and turn round 
 upon itself: for as it understands an object, so also it understands 
 that it does understand, and so endlessly." 187 
 
 The following is an extract from St. Thomas' proof of rational 
 appetency : 
 
 "Ad secundum dicendum, quod appetitus intellectivus, etsi 
 feratur in res, quae sunt extra animam singulares, fertur tamen in 
 eas secundum aliquam rationem universalem; sicut cum appetit 
 aliquid, quia est bonum. Unde Philosophus dicit in sua Rhetorica 
 (Lib. II, Cap. 4, circ. fin.), quod odium potest esse de aliquo 
 universali, puta cum odio habemus omne latronum genus. Simi- 
 liter etiam per appetitum intellectivum appetere possumus 
 immaterialia bona, quae sensus non apprehendit, sicut scientiam, 
 virtutes, et alia hujusmodi." 188 
 
 Points of Difference between Scholasticism and Activism 
 
 Here, however, Eucken parts company with the Scholastics, 
 posits unfounded assumptions as facts and involves himself in 
 self-contradiction . 
 
 Whereas Christian philosophers have used the foregoing argu- 
 ments as stepping stones in the ascent towards a more perfect 
 knowledge of the First Cause, and have based natural religion on 
 the intellectual perception of the True and the Good, and on the 
 yearning of the will towards the Infinitely Beautiful, Eucken 
 declares that religion cannot be based on thought, feeling, or 
 will — neither on their individual nor combined revelations. 189 
 
 is7 of q 0( j an( j Uis Creatures: a translation of Summa Contra Gentiles, by 
 J. Rickaby, S. J., St. Louis, Mo.; London; 1905, Bk. II, Chap. XLIX. 
 
 158 Suimna Theologica I, q. LXXX, art. II. 
 
 159 See Truth of Religion, pp. 72-85, esp. 84; p. 194. (Wahrheitsgehalt der 
 Rel., 49-57, esp. 56; p. 134.) 
 
KUDOLP EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 69 
 
 The point of vantage reached so far has but proved the reality 
 of an independent Spiritual Life, however; "the mere existence 
 of a power superior to man is a very insufficient basis for religion. 
 Religion requires that this power in all its fulness, should be 
 livingly manifest in us . . . and so far we have done no more 
 than reach a starting-point for our quest. We have but shown 
 the possibility of this manifestation: it still remains to prove its 
 reality." 190 
 
 We do not propose to refute at length Eucken's inconsistent 
 statement — that the combined manifestations of Thought, 
 Feeling and Will afford us no evidence of the intimate relations 
 subsisting between us and the Supreme Spiritual Reality. His 
 own proofs for the existence of this Reality offer the best refutation 
 of the illogical position he has taken up. If the spiritual activity 
 of thought, transcending particulars and stretching out to infinity; 
 if the moral judgment, proclaiming a truth objectively and neces- 
 sarily valid; if the rational emotions of "righteousness and love" 
 reveal the existence of an independent Spiritual Life, they thereby 
 enable us to recognize that Life as being for us the Supreme and 
 ultimate Reality — in the language of religion "our first beginning 
 and our last end." If Eucken denies this fact we can but con- 
 front him with his own "Entweder-Oder." Either, distrusting 
 the manifestations of intellect and will, take up a position of 
 absolute subjectivism, or, acknowledging the existence of an 
 independent Spiritual Life, acknowledge also the trustworthiness 
 of those rational activities which alone reveal it to us. in 
 
 We may quote again here the apt criticism of Henry C. Sheldon: 
 "What we know immediately is certain effects in us which serve 
 as a ground of rational inference — an inference none the less actual 
 because possibly very swift and confident." 192 
 
 The second fundamental point on which Eucken differs from the 
 Scholastics is that concerning the nature of the human spiritual. 
 It does not fall to our task here to prove at length that man's 
 soul is an individual, spiritual substance. Two of the facts 
 already adduced, viz., the unity of consciousness and the moral 
 judgment, bear irrefragable witness to it. In addition we may 
 
 190 Italics ours. Christianity and the New Idealism, p. 12. (Hauptprob- 
 leme, p. 14.) 
 
 191 We speak here of knowledge that can he acquired by Reason alone, 
 apart from historical Revelation which Eucken denies. 
 
 192 Sheldon. R. Eucken's Message to Our Age, op. cit., pp. 47 sqq. 
 
70 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 call attention to the incalculably grave implications which are 
 contained in such a theory as Eucken propounds: 
 
 1. The view that the "human spiritual" is but the "existential 
 form" of the "Absolute Spiritual" destroys the force of the epithet 
 "Absolute," and negates the attribute of infinite perfection which 
 Eucken himself ascribes to the "Geistesleben" as ultimate founda- 
 tion of truth. 
 
 2. Man's freedom, on such an hypothesis, is an impossibility, 
 not a "mystery" as Eucken suggests. 
 
 3. Moral evil is an absolute contradiction, if, indeed, we may 
 use the term "absolute" in connection with a nonentity; and the 
 moral values and the yearning towards the Good, which formed 
 the basis of Eucken's proofs for the existence of a Spiritual Life, 
 are vain, illusory phantoms. Finally, the universe is irrational 
 from apex to foundation. 
 
 In no way affected by the irretrievable consequences which 
 follow from his irrationalism, Eucken proceeds to the second point 
 of his investigation, viz., the "personal immediacy" of the spiritual 
 life. The criticism of Boyce Gibson is worthy of attention here: 
 "Eucken's defective treatment of psychology is again answerable, 
 in my opinion, for a strange doctrine of his that our psychical 
 activities, whether of thought, feeling, or will, are mere existential 
 appearances of the substantial oneness of the spiritual life. Eucken 
 has not endeavored to follow up the pseudo-mystic implications 
 of this view . . . but, with a happy disregard of all psychological 
 inadequacies, proceeds to develop his philosophy of freedom in 
 his own way." 193 
 
 Noology 
 
 A passage in the Truth of Religion gives in, perhaps, the clearest 
 manner Eucken's teaching regarding the "immediacy: "At 
 the very point where the negation had reached its climax and the 
 danger had reached the very brink of a precipice, the conviction 
 dawns with axiomatic certainty that there lives and stirs within 
 us something which all obstacles and enmity can never destroy, 
 and which signifies against all opposition a kernel of our nature 
 that can never get lost." 194 
 
 193 R. Eucken's Phil, of Life, note p. 160. 
 
 194 Truth of Rel., p. 62. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 42.) Italics ours. 
 The danger referred to is that of "the apparent total loss of what we dare not 
 renounce — our best and most real treasures," i.e., the "inner elevation of 
 human nature" and the winning of genuine happiness; op. cit., p. 61. 
 
EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 71 
 
 There are three statements which call for special examination 
 in this citation; the investigation will reveal three aspects of the 
 philosophy of Activism. 
 
 1. What is the ground of this "axiomatic certainty?" An 
 axiom is a self-evident necessary truth, objectively valid for all 
 time. The hypothesis of innate ideas and the intuitional theory 
 have been put forward to account for our knowledge of such. 195 
 
 Subjectivism 
 
 (a) Eucken's "axiomatic certainty" cannot be based on the ra- 
 tional intuition of our relations with a supreme Spiritual Being, since 
 it is just at this point that he diverges from the Scholastic position, 
 and asserts that we cannot ground religion on the knowledge we 
 acquire through our faculties. His Anti-Intellectualism debars 
 the possibility of explaining it by the hypothesis of innate ideas. 
 Eucken holds that the axiomatic character of the conviction is 
 due to the fact that the Absolute Spiritual Life is present to the 
 soul in the moment of the "immediacy," and in the revelation of 
 Itself makes man aware of his own spiritual possibilities. But 
 this does not render the epistemological issue more satisfactory. 
 If the psychic faculties through which — as Eucken himself acknowl- 
 edges 196 — the spiritual is revealed, are untrustworthy in their 
 ordinary manifestations, what assurance can we have concerning 
 the trustworthiness of extraordinary manifestations coming through 
 the same channels? Even if we grant the truth of Eucken's abitrary 
 assumption that life, by its movement, develops its own norms — 
 the fact remains that no "turn towards the Life-process" can help 
 man to reach truth, as long as he distrusts the medium through 
 which it is to be revealed to him — his own intellect. So far from 
 having an "axiomatic certainty" we are left with an irrational 
 belief and the dilemma is again inevitable. In the Truth of 
 Religion Eucken writes : 
 
 "Finally, the position of our question contains also a raising of 
 religion above the ramifications of the psychic life — above the 
 so-called faculties of the soul; the question concerns itself with 
 a particular development of a Spiritual Reality which certainly 
 unfolds itself in thought, feeling, and will, but which proceeds not 
 
 195 We omit the Associationist doctrine because it denies that any of our 
 cognitions bear this character. 
 
 196 See Truth of Religion, p. 194. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 134.) 
 
72 Rudolf Euckbn and the Spiritual Life 
 
 from one or from a combination of them. All the strict fulfilment of 
 religion in the provinces of the so-called faculties of the soul yield 
 a formation of the periphery, behind which remains unexperienced 
 and undeveloped a centre of life — the workshop of original mould- 
 ing and creativeness . . . the whole man seems to have been 
 won, and religion seems to have become the possession of his soul. 
 But is it so in reality? Or remains there not unconceived behind 
 all the expansion that which is really the fundamental fact — man 
 as a superior Whole, as a participator in infinity, as a warrior for 
 a spiritual self? This depth of his nature has now come to a full 
 consciousness, and, along with this, it has become clear that such 
 a fact alone grants him secure stability against unutterable dangers, 
 tribulations, and doubts; so that he will found his religion upon this 
 rock, weary throughout of the strife whether intellect, or will, or 
 feeling, plays the main part in the concern." 197 
 
 The italicised passage reveals once again Eucken's pantheistic 
 conception of the Absolute Spiritual Life; the phrases "centre" 
 ("zentrum") and "periphery" ("eine periphere Gestaltung") point 
 in the same direction: the metaphor of a "workshop" fits in well 
 with his exposition of the "Life-prOcess," but radically destroys the 
 idea of a supreme Spiritual Reality. The antithesis which he 
 seeks to make between the psychic activities or "faculties," of 
 thought and will, and the spiritual life of man is fatal. If the 
 spiritual character of thought and rational conation is acknowl- 
 edged — and we have shown that Eucken does acknowledge this — 
 the fact of a spiritual power, or mode of action, of the soul from 
 which these activities issue is, at the same time, recognizable, 
 and hence the spiritual, substantial nature of the human soul itself 
 can be affirmed. These three facts are inseparable; we cannot 
 accept one and reject the others, because they are but different 
 aspects of the one truth, viz., man's spiritual nature. The alterna- 
 tive which Eucken suggests — that the spiritual in man is no part 
 of his human endowment, but results from a direct participation 
 in the Divine Life, from essential oneness with the Godhead — is so 
 far-reaching in its disastrous implications that we need not 
 further comment on it, except to remark that Eucken makes no 
 attempt to prove it. 
 
 The denial of the native spiritual activity of the Intellect, and 
 of the individual, spiritual substantiality of the human soul, 
 constitutes a reductio ad absurdum of Eucken's system of philos- 
 
 197 Truth of Religion, pp. 194, 195. Italics ours. (Wahrheitsgehalt der 
 Rel., pp. 134, 135.) 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 73 
 
 ophy, insisting, as it does, on a negative movement, and a religious 
 conversion. 
 
 (b) Appealing to personal experience, who of us can say, with 
 comprehension of the terms, that he has an immediate knowledge 
 of God "in all" His "infinity?" That man's happiness, even in 
 this life, consists in the knowledge and love of God and in union 
 with His Will is the teaching of Christianity, but this knowledge 
 is not constituted by the direct vision of the Deity. God is known 
 through His works in the natural order, through His Grace in the 
 supernatural, 198 but even in the supernatural order immediate 
 vision is not attained. Such vision is the reward of the faithful 
 soul after death; through it knowledge and love are perfected. 
 The Apostle tells us "we see now as in a glass, darkly; but then 
 face to face" 199 ; to ignore the distinction between the two kinds 
 of knowledge is folly. 
 
 Eucken's error follows logically enough from his view of the 
 "human spiritual" and of immortality. He insists that we need 
 not relegate immortality to a "future" life, a "Beyond." His 
 attitude towards this fundamental truth is shown in the following 
 passages : 
 
 "Time is for us rather a problem than a rigid destiny. How 
 far, however, life overcomes time and attains to a present superior 
 to it depends, above everything else, on the spiritual power which 
 it is capable of putting forth. It rests with ourselves whether the 
 centre of gravity of our being falls in the temporal or the eternal. In 
 any case, this action of ours in thus overcoming time has for its 
 indispensable preliminary condition the reality and the inner 
 presence of a spiritual icorld. Even the most passionate excitation 
 of the mere subject can never give rise to a spiritual content and 
 with it a superiority to time, and it remains true that, for man, all 
 creation is at the same time a reception, a drawing upon invisible 
 relationships." 200 
 
 "So hangt das Unsterblichkeitsproblem aufs engste mit der 
 Frage eines Selbstandigwerdens des Geisteslebens in unserem 
 Bereich zusammen. Die Bejahung dieser Selbstiindigkeit muss 
 daher auch das Problem der Unsterblichkeit in eine eigentiimliche 
 Beleuchtung stellen; der Unsterblichkeitsglaube zieht dann seine 
 Kraft nicht aus den Wunschen und Bediirfnissen des blossen 
 Menschen, sondern aus der Eroffnung eines ewigen und unendlichen 
 
 198 Eucken does not recognize the existence of a supernatural order in the 
 Christian signification of the term. 
 198 Paul, Cor., Chap. XIII, V, 12. 
 200 Main Currents, pp. 327, 328. First italics are ours; second, Eucken's. 
 
74 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 Lebens in ihm; wem sich solches Leben erschloss und was an ihm 
 teilgewann, das kann nicht schlechthin der Zeit verfallen sein. 
 Hat das Ganze des Geisteslebens eine Gegenwart in uns gewonnen 
 und ein selbstandiges Leben in uns geschaffen, so wird es dieses 
 irgendwie auch erhalten, indem es damit sich selbst erhalt. In 
 diesem zusammenhange ist es das Geistesleben selbst, von dem aus 
 sich die Uberzeugung eines Beharrens begriindet und aus dem 
 sie ihre Gewissheit schopft, das in ahnlichem Gedankengange, 
 wie ihn Augustin in den Worten bekundet : 'Fin sich selbst kann 
 nicht untergehen, was filr Gott nicht untergeht (sibi non perit 
 quod deo non perit).' Dann diirfen wir aber die Ewigkeit nicht 
 erst jenseits des Grabes beginnen lassen, sondern wir haben anzuer- 
 kennen, dass sie schon hier uns umf angt und sich von uns aneignen 
 lasst." 201 
 
 The conclusion of this passage betrays the influence of Kant, 
 and may be contrasted with the teaching of the Scholastics who 
 hold that every soul is endowed with personal and therefore indi- 
 vidual immortality, and is destined, if faithful to the Moral Law 
 during its earthly term of existence, to lead after death a more 
 complete and perfect life. Since the soul is immortal we may say 
 in one sense that immortality does, in fact, begin in this life — i.e., 
 the soul's immortality; nevertheless the full blessedness of immor- 
 tality belongs to the state after death. 
 
 2. The second point to which we wish to call attention is the 
 peculiarity of the circumstances under which the "Gemiit" is 
 experienced. 
 
 Pessimism 
 
 The conviction "dawns," according to Eucken, when the "danger" 
 is at "the very brink of a precipice." In this extreme of peril the 
 fact of the Eternal Spiritual is an "axiomatic certainty." But 
 why is it not self-evident before this drastic extreme is reached? 
 Why may not man when his powers are developed have an 
 "axiomatic certainty" of, i.e., intuit, the spiritual, even amid peace 
 and harmony ? Is it not true that for the artist, the contemplation 
 of some scene of quiet beauty, with his own simultaneous convic- 
 tion that his nature is capable of appreciating infinitely more than 
 all that, is, at least, as ripe a moment for the dawning of the 
 "axiomatic certainty" as the one which Eucken describes? The 
 . WliM 
 
 201 Grundlinien Einer Neuen Lebensangschauung, op. cit., pp. 158, 159. 
 See also Essay on Immortality in Hibbert Journal, July, 1908, p. 836, and in 
 Collected Essays, ed. by Booth, New York, 1914, pp. 193 sqq. 
 
KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 75 
 
 element of opposition which we find within ourselves may be a 
 powerful factor in determining our knowledge of a spiritual 
 reality, but it is not an essential attribute of the concept. Eucken 
 exaggerates alike the difficulties of recognizing the existence of the 
 spiritual, and of leading a life in accordance with such knowledge. 
 Every Christian, indeed every earnest man, must agree as to 
 the imperative necessity of saying the powerful "nay" to the 
 lower part of our nature, and of adding the energetic "yea" 202 
 which affirms the higher, but no true Christian will grant that 
 "All doubt and sorrow . . . must fall with their whole energy 
 on the soul of the individual after the inauguration of an Absolute 
 Life within man's domain has immeasurably raised him," 203 
 nor that the man who realizes the fact of a spiritual reality "sees," 
 thereby, "all his work and being placed under a pointed contra- 
 diction which limits his actions, which renders his feelings uncer- 
 tain, and which makes his whole existence problematic." 204 
 These passages breathe a pessimism which is unchristian. The 
 recognition of the existence of the Absolute Spiritual, and of man's 
 relation with Him, 205 so far from rendering one's existence prob- 
 lematic, throws the necessary light upon it, and upon the entire 
 world. History proves this: A St. Paul, a St. Augustine, a St. 
 Francis of Assissi, a St. Teresa, a St. Ignatius Loyola found their 
 problem solved as soon as they had made the Spiritual Life their 
 one aim and end. The struggle against lower nature had not 
 ceased but their ignorance of life's full meaning for themselves 
 and others was dissipated. The Absolute Spiritual Life makes 
 Itself felt in the soul as the Spirit of light and peace. It is true 
 that Christ warns us against false peace: "Think ye, that I am 
 come to give peace on earth? I tell you, no; but separation." 206 
 We must take these words in their context, and understand them 
 in the light of all His teachings. Sacrifices, bitter to nature, are 
 demanded from him who would lead a truly spiritual 207 life, and 
 
 202 See Truth of Religion, op. cit., pp. 248, 353, 441, 528 (Wahrheitsgehalt 
 der Rel., pp. 169, 244, 307, 355); Christianity and the New Idealism, pp. 75-79, 
 op. cit. (Hauptprobleme, pp. 81-85); Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, op. cit., 
 pp. 185-187 (Grundlinen, pp. 89, 95, 127, 128 sqq.; 140 sqq.). 
 
 203 Truth of Religion, p. 344. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 237.) 
 
 204 Ibid., p. 344. (Wahrheitgehalt der Rel., p. 238.) 
 
 205 We are using Christian terms, Eucken would say with It. 
 
 206 St. Luke, Chap. XII, 51. 
 
 207 We are following Eucken closely at this point into the field of religion: 
 it is not necessary to remark that from a philosophical standpoint every human 
 being must, to some extent, lead a spiritual life, whether he will it or not, for 
 the reason that the spiritual is of his very nature. 
 
76 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 hard conflicts must be endured, but accompanying them is a peace, 
 and even a sweetness, which tempers the suffering. St. Paul 
 alludes to it when he wishes the Faithful that "peace of God which 
 surpasseth all understanding." 
 
 This is not the place for a treatise on the happiness of a truly 
 Christian life: we merely seek to refute Eucken's statement as to 
 the effect of what he terms "the inauguration of an Absolute 
 Life." 208 
 
 It is significant that Eucken's deepest and, according to some, 
 most valuable work — Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion — from 
 the English translation of which the above passage has been 
 cited — is stamped by a dark and gloomy ir rationalism. Hermann 
 criticizes very mildly when he writes that it "leaves a cloud of 
 misgiving upon the spirit." 209 
 
 If it were true that we were engaged in a "seemingly impossible 
 struggle for a spiritual self — for a soul and meaning of life," 210 
 few indeed would be the number of those who would persevere 
 until "a new wave of life universal . . . which carries man into 
 entirely other bearings, and which is a flowing tide that heralds 
 the inauguration of a better day" appeared. 211 
 
 Eucken tells us that we not only can, but must be Christians : 
 "Unsere Frage war, ob wir heute noch christen sein konnen? 
 Unsere Antwort ist, dass wir es nicht nur konnen, sondern sein 
 miissen." 212 
 
 To his disheartening exposition of our spiritual condition we 
 oppose, therefore, the direct teaching of the Founder of Chris- 
 tianity: "Come to Me, all you that labor and are burdened, and 
 I will refresh you. Take up My yoke upon you . . . and you 
 shall find rest to your souls. For my yoke is sweet and my burden 
 light," 213 and again: 
 
 "Seek and you shall find." 214 
 
 208 rpjjg p ecu liar phraseology of the cited passage is indicative of Eucken's 
 pantheistic tendency. 
 
 209 Eucken and Bergson, op. cit., p. 99. 
 
 210 Truth of Religion, op. cit., p. 62. Italics ours. The German text runs 
 "in dem schweren, ausserlich fast aussichtslosen Karapf um ein geistiges 
 Selbst, um eine Seele und einen Sinn seines Lebens." Wahrheitsgehalt der 
 Rel., p. 42. 
 
 211 Ibid., p. 62. (Wahreitsgehalt der Rel., p. 42.) 
 
 212 Konnen Wir noch Christen Sein? p. 236. 
 
 213 Matthew, Chap. XI, verses 28-30. 
 
 214 Matthew, Chap. VII, 7. 
 
Rudolf Eucken axd the Spiritual Life 77 
 
 Perhaps no writer on philosophy in modern times has taken 
 more pains to introduce a note of gladness into his work than 
 Eucken. This strikes us forcibly in the Problem of Human Life 
 (Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker). His allusions 
 to joy of spirit, in one form or another, are numerous — although 
 it is often impossible to endorse his application of the term — and 
 they mark his approval of the man, or views, under consideration. 
 The following phrases may be noted: "a fresh and glad spirit;" 215 
 "the whole of existence [becomes] filled with an exalted joy;" 219 
 "gladness and joy of life;" 217 "force and activity and joyous 
 assertion;" 218 "activity, joy and love;" 219 "youthful freshness 
 and joy;" 220 "courageous and joyful outlook;" 221 "joyful grati- 
 tude;" 222 "A new joy," "a larger gladness." 223 
 
 Luther is described as introducing a change from which springs 
 "a new life full of fresh and glad activity." 224 
 
 Even a meagre knowledge of the facts of Luther's life, and of the 
 scenes of bitter party strife amid which he moved, is sufficient to 
 debar assent to this statement, apart altogether from the considera- 
 tion of his religious principles. 225 
 
 215 Prob. of H. Life, op. cit., p. 293 (Lebensanschauung der G. Denker: "ein 
 Geist der Frische und Frohlichkeit," p. 280). 
 
 216 Ibid., p. 310. 
 
 217 Ibid., p. 345. 
 
 218 Ibid., p. 370. 
 
 219 Ibid., p. 377. 
 
 220 Ibid., p. 418. 
 
 221 Ibid., p. 462. 
 
 222 Ibid., p. 475. 
 
 223 Ibid., p. 475. 
 
 224 Ibid., p. 276 (Lebensabschauung der g. Denker, p. 265). 
 
 225 For the historical Luther refer to works by Janssen, Denifle, and Herman 
 Grisar on Catholic side; to the biography of Kostlein on non-Catholic. See 
 also "Luther in the Light of Facts," Cath. Univ. Bull., Feb., 1914, in which 
 occurs the following passage: "Right in the beginning it can be stated . . . 
 that the very cardinal principle of his religious system was debasing to humanity 
 as such. That cardinal principle was the doctrine of the utter corruption of 
 human nature due to original sin, and the consequent denial of free will. 
 'Articulus omnium optimus et rerum nostrarum summa' in his own words. 
 Along with these doctrines likewise went that other of Predestination. Man, 
 according to him. was utterly incapable of doing good without supernatural 
 grace: man has no freedom of choice even in the performance of works not 
 connected with salvation. It is either God or the Devil that rules him. . . . 
 Now with such a dismal and low estimate of human nature can Luther be 
 legitimately regarded as in any sense an apostle of humanity, of human 
 liberty, of human dignity or inherent worth? Pushed to its logical conclusion 
 such a doctrine would debase man below the most devil-ridden superstitious 
 savage. What becomes of human dignity or intrinsic natural nobility and 
 daring and Promethean struggle upwards, of human development and progress, 
 of aspirations for liberty, for light, for anything that mankind h:ts ever attained 
 
78 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 Of Zwingli he writes: "though his practical tendency might 
 easily result in a confusion of religion and politics, indeed, of 
 religion and the constabulary, still, the peculiar significance of 
 this simple and healthy, fresh and buoyant Christianity should 
 have permanent recognition." 226 This is an excellent example of 
 unconscious burlesque; it is also a good instance of one of Eucken's 
 misnomers. 
 
 Notwithstanding the tremendous toil and arduous effort which 
 the philosopher has bestowed on his system, "Activism" is a 
 joyless creed, and the implications imbedded in its principles lead 
 to a pessimism more extreme than that of Schopenhauer. 
 
 We have already referred 227 to the weak treatment — or lack of 
 treatment — of the most difficult and important problem which 
 the philosopher of the spiritual has to face — the existence of evil; 
 the following passage may be taken as typical of the manner in 
 which Eucken recoils when confronted with fundamental issues: 
 "Also, in spite of his guilt and in the midst of his guilt God must 
 be near to man. Dare we for this reason ascribe guilt to God? 
 All dogmatic formulation of such fundamental truths of religion 
 becomes inevitably a rationalism and a treatment of the problem 
 by means of human relationships and according to human stand- 
 ards. Such a rationalism would have injured religion for more than 
 it has already done were not life itself raised beyond all the disputa- 
 tion of ideas through the inner abiding energy of the Divine. 
 It is sufficient for the religious conviction to experience the nearness 
 of God in human suffering and His help in the raising of life out of 
 suffering into a new life beyond all the insufficiency of reason. 
 Indeed, the more intuitively this necessary truth is grasped, the 
 less does it combine into a dogmatic speculation, and the purer 
 and more energetically is it able to work." 228 
 
 in his age-long painful struggle from barbarism to civilization, if he were as 
 Luther would have him — a hopelessly corrupt being, devoid of spiritual 
 liberty as a mere animal, utterly incapable of himself of doing good, the mere 
 sport of either a devil that mocks bim or of a God that damns him without 
 mercy, a plaything in the hands of fate, an automaton? Such doctrine ipso 
 facto kills every aspiration of humanity. It halts human progress more 
 effectually than Confucianism. It would paralyze every noble aspiration and 
 stop every wheel of progress. Is it not, therefore, more correct to say that 
 humanity has progressed since Luther's day in spite of Luther anism?" (p. 108). 
 
 226 p roD> jj. Life., op. cit., p. 293. Italics are ours. (Lebensanschauung der 
 g. Denker, p. 280.) 
 
 227 P. 61 . 
 
 228 Truth of Religion, op. cit., p. 434. Italics are ours. Wahrheitsgehalt 
 der Rel., pp. 301, 302: 
 
EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 79 
 
 This fallacious reasoning needs little criticism; the flaws are 
 self-evident. 
 
 (1) As rational beings we cannot be content with an irrational 
 religion wherein the sanctity of the Deity is in jeopardy. 
 
 (2) The "inner abiding energy of the Divine" cannot raise man 
 "beyond all the disputation of ideas" in such a manner as to 
 make contradictories reconcilable, because God is Eternal Truth. 229 
 
 (3) Eucken has used "human suffering" and "guilt" as inter- 
 changeable terms. 
 
 (4) The last paragraph states gratuitous assumptions without 
 any evidence to support them. 
 
 Materialism 
 
 3. The materialistic language which Eucken employs in describ- 
 ing the "Geistesleben" is too significant to pass unnoticed. A 
 philosopher has the right to use a metaphor when by so doing he 
 makes his meaning clearer, but he is not justified in giving an 
 exposition of what he holds to be spiritual life in terms of material- 
 ism. This, however, is what Eucken does in a large majority of 
 instances, as an examination of several of the passages already 
 cited will show. If by "a kernel of our nature that can never get 
 lost" ("ein unverlierbarer Kern unseres Wesens") 230 Eucken 
 refers to man's spiritual soul his language is most misleading: 
 if he does not intend to imply that man possesses a spiritual soul, 
 
 "Auch die Religion kann nicht an der einen Stelle geben ohne an der 
 anderen zu nehmen; so muss das unmittelbare Verhaltnis zu Gott Schaden 
 leiden, wenn das Heil von der Vermittlung erwartet wird; ja die Meinung, 
 das Gbttliche helfe nicht aus eignem Wollen und Vermogen, sondern miisse 
 erst durch besondere Mittel dazu angeregt sein, kann leicht die Grundlage 
 aller Religion verdunkeln: die unmittelbare Gegenwart der unendlichen Liebe 
 und Gnade. Auch wird eine Schuld dadurch nicht aufgehoben, dass ein 
 anderer die Folgen auf sich nimmt, sondern nur durch die Schopfung eines 
 neuen Lebens. Alle dogmatische Formulierung der Probleme ftihrt gegen die 
 eigne Absicht leicht zu einer Rationalisierung, zugleich aber zu einer 
 Behandlung aus den menschlichen Verhaltnissen heraus und nach dem Masse 
 des Menschen; dieser Rationalismus wiirde die Religion weit mehr geschiidigt 
 haben, als er es in Wirklichkeit tat, hatte nicht das Leben selbst immer wieder 
 durch die ihm innewohnende gcittliche Kraft alle Irrung der Begriffe iiberwun- 
 den. Der religiosen Uberzeugung genilgt die Niihe Gottes im Leid, seine 
 Hilfe aus dem Leid durch die Erhebung in ein neues, aller Irrung Ubcrlegenes 
 Leben; je einfachcr diese notwendige Wahrheit gefasst wird, je weniger sie 
 sich mit dogmatischer Spekulation verquickt, desto reiner und kraftiger 
 kann sie wirken." 
 
 229 Refer to Truth of Rel., op. cit., p. 446, "All spiritual Life is here a struggle 
 against the flux of time — an ascent to eternal and immortal truth." (Wahr- 
 heitsgehalt der Rel., p. 311.) 
 
 230 Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, op. cit., p. 42. 
 
80 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 in the full and accepted meaning of the words, he is but restating 
 one of the truths of science, viz., the indestructibility of matter: 
 there is no need of a special revelation, whether in the form of 
 "personal immediacy" or otherwise, to make us cognizant of the 
 fact. The following citations may be studied in this connection: 
 in our opinion they either fail to convey an idea owing to the 
 conjunction of incompatible terms, or they suggest movements in 
 matter : 
 
 "Nur bei der Richtung auf das Geistesleben befindet sich der 
 Lebensprozess auch in dem Aufstreben bei sich selbst, denn er geht 
 j a auf nichts anderes als auf das eigne innerste Wesen des Mens- 
 chen." 231 
 
 "Werden wir damit zu freien Mitarbeitern, ja zu Mittrdgern des 
 Alls berujen" . . . 232 
 
 "Mit jener Wendung gewinnt die ganze Wirklichkeit einen 
 inneren Zusammenhang und eine Tiefe; der Fortgang unserer 
 Welt aber erscheint, wenigstens in den entscheidenden Wende- 
 punkten, nicht als ein einfaches Hervorgehen des Hoheren aus 
 dem Niederen, sondern als ein Weitergetriebenwerden und eine 
 innere Erhohung aus dem Ganzen des Alls." 233 
 
 "Wie aber steht diese Welt, dieser Lebensprozess, an dem wir 
 teilgewinnen, zum All, und was bedeutet sie ihm? Gewiss erfassen 
 wir sie nur innerhalb des Bereichs des Menschen, aber dieser 
 Bereich braucht keineswegs einen geschlossenen Sonderkreis zu 
 bilden, ganz wohl kbnnte in ihn sich uriendliches Leben erstrecken, 
 und etwas, das in ihm vorgeht, zugleich eine Beivegung des Alls 
 bedeuten. 234 
 
 "Dass so innerhalb des Menschen sich eine Umwalzung vollzieht 
 und ein neues Leben durchbricht, das muss auch sein Gesamtbild 
 verandern, er ist nun nicht mehr ein blosser Punkt, sondern ein 
 Mitbesitzer der Welt." 235 
 
 It is needless to multiply passages from Eucken's various works 
 since his entire system is expounded in this manner. His imagery 
 is not conducive to ideas of the spiritual. Although the philosophic 
 truths which he holds to be the corner-stone of Activism — viz, the 
 existence of an independent Spiritual Life, and the reality of 
 human freedom and responsibility — entitle him to a position far 
 
 231 Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, op. cit., 118. (Truth of Religion, op. cit., 
 p. 172.) 
 
 232 Ibid., p. 119. Italics ours. (Truth of Religion, p. 173.) 
 
 233 Ibid., p. 169. (Truth of Religion, p. 274.) 
 
 234 Ibid., p. 109. Italics ours. (In Truth of Religion, 1911, this passage 
 does not occur but the general purport of the section is unaffected. See part II, 
 Chap. VII, 2a, pp. 156-163.) 
 
 235 Erkennen und Leben, op. cit., p. 125. Italics ours. 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 81 
 
 superior to that of Spinoza, nothing throughout his numerous 
 volumes can be found so suggestive of the spiritual ideal as are the 
 happy expressions of the earlier philosopher: Sub specie aeterni- 
 tatis; 236 amor intellectus; beata immortalitas. 
 
 It may be objected that Eucken insists on the reality of Infinite 
 Love and Mercy; Redeeming Grace, etc.; this is true, but he does 
 not employ these truths of Christianity in the exposition of the 
 development of the Life-Process to self-realization: they are 
 reverted to later for ethical purposes: moreover in his monistic 
 system, as has been pointed out already, they can have no place; 
 the words become vain phrases devoid of all real content. Indeed 
 Eucken himself assures us that he is not referring to Christian 
 dogma : 
 
 "Wir konnen auch die gottliche Liebe und Gnade nicht von der 
 einen Erweisung in Jesus Christus abhangig machen, wir mtissen 
 weiter die Vorstellungen, welche den Aufbau jener dogmatischen 
 Lehren tragen, namentlich die von dem Zorne Gottes, den erst das 
 Blut Seines Sohnes beschwichtigt, als viel zu anthropomorph und 
 mit reineren Begriffen von der Gottheit unvereinbar verwerfen." 237 
 
 Dr. Yorke Fausset, whom we have already cited, commenting 
 on this passage writes : "To an English Churchman it seems passing 
 strange that a profound German thinker should thus unconsciously 
 travesty the doctrines of the Creed." In the same article he 
 criticizes Eucken's "rather supercilious depreciation of the 
 Christian documents." 238 
 
 What shadow of a meaning does Eucken wish to convey by 
 the words "Redeeming Grace?" We can hardly look to them for 
 light on the nature of the "unverlierbarer Kern unseres Wesens." 
 Hence even if the supposed "immediacy" were a trustworthy 
 source of truth its revelations would be too vague and problematic 
 to afford a rational basis for life or religion. 
 
 Further Consequences 
 
 Two other points maybe noticed: (1) at the heightened tension 
 at which the spiritual, according to Eucken, manifests itself in a 
 form of "immediacy" the vicious man seems to have a better 
 
 236 This is to be found in some of his works — borrowed from Spinoza. The 
 image suggested to the writer by the reading of certain passages in Der Wahr- 
 heitsgehalt der Religion was that of a walk in a blinding storm of sleet, where 
 one is obliged to force an advance in the teeth of a violent wind. 
 
 237 Konnen Wir noch Christen Sein?" op. cit. p., IKfi. Italics ours. 
 "< Op. cit.. pp. 8S, 35. 
 
82 KUDOLP EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 chance of becoming a "self-conscious spirituality" than the 
 virtuous: those attracted by kindness, goodness, love, appear to 
 be the least favorably situated. (2) There is absolutely no place 
 in Eucken's philosophy for the little ones whom Christ especially 
 honored: "Suffer the little children to come unto Me and forbid 
 them not, for of such is the kingdom of heaven." 239 
 
 These, at least, have not encountered bitter oppositions and 
 "intolerable contradictions" either within or without. Christ 
 Himself, both by word and act, taught that children truly possess 
 a spiritual life and are destined to immortality. The susceptibility 
 of the child to religious influence, the quick response of the young 
 heart to the teachings concerning the great Father of all are facts 
 too well known to need development. The innocence and ingenu- 
 ousness of childhood seem better able to lay hold on spiritual 
 realities than is the philosophic research of maturer years as our 
 Divine Lord tells us : 
 
 "I confess to Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because 
 Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast 
 revealed them to little ones." 240 
 
 We may note also those other words: 
 
 "And he that shall receive one such little child in My name, 
 receiveth Me. But he that shall scandalize one of these little ones 
 that believe in me, it were better for him that a mill-stone should be 
 hanged about his neck, and that he should be drowned in the depth 
 of the sea." 240 * 
 
 "See that you despise not one of these little ones." 241 
 
 Yet Eucken's principles seem to necessitate the ranking of 
 children among those whose "centre of gravity," according to him, 
 falls in the "temporal," not in "the eternal." 242 
 
 239 Matthew, Chap. XIX, Verse 14. 
 
 240 Matthew, XI, Verse 25. 
 
 240a Matthew, XVIII, Verses 5, 6. We have italicized part of verse 6. 
 
 241 Matthew, XVIII, Verse 10. 
 
 242 See Geistige Stromungen der Gegenwart, p. 271. "Wie weit aber das 
 Leben sie iiberwindet und eine uberzeitliche Gegenwart erreicht, das hangt 
 vor allem an der geistigen Kraft, die es aufzubieten vermag; bei uns selbst 
 steht es schliesslich ob der Schwerpunkt unseres Seins ins Vergangliche oder 
 ins Unvergangliche fallt." 
 
KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 83 
 
 Conclusion 
 
 We reject the "immediacy" of Activism because, (1) in this 
 theory it is necessarily a purely subjective phenomenon; 243 (2) 
 even if it were a trustworthy source of truth its revelations would 
 be too vague and problematic, as has been already pointed out, 
 to afford a solid basis for life or religion. 
 
 We must reject, further, Eucken's account of the circumstances 
 under which the existence of the Supreme Spiritual Life is inti- 
 mately realized by man, if the account is held to be complete and 
 exhaustive. Doubt and keen mental suffering may sometimes 
 be the antecedent states to such realization, but they are not 
 always so : to maintain the contrary would be to deny the possibility 
 of knowledge of the Spiritual Life to a large majority. 
 
 243 Cf. Einheit des Geisteslebens: Das Gesamtbild des neuen Lebenssystems, 
 p. 471, where Eucken illogically refuses to accept the consequences of his 
 theory: "Mehr noch als bis dahin wird damit das menschliche Leben auf die 
 Innerlichkeit des Geistes gestellt, man konnte von einer Wirklichkeit des 
 Gemiites sprechen, wenn darunter nicht leicht eine bloss subjektive und 
 individuelle Begleitung des Lebensprozesses verstanden wiirde, wahrend die 
 Innenwelt des Geisteslebens und der Geistesarbeit notwendig eine zentrale 
 und beherrschende Stellung verlangt." 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 THE PROBLEM OF NATURE 
 
 In close connection with the genesis of our knowledge of the 
 spiritual we may call attention to Eucken's extraordinary attitude 
 with regard to nature. We have already dealt with the cosmo- 
 logical 244 aspect, in so far as was necessary for our present purpose; 
 we shall treat the matter very briefly from a teleological or religious 
 standpoint. 
 
 The beauties of the material universe which have raised the 
 hearts and minds of poets, artists, saints, in every age and every 
 clime, swiftly and surely to spiritual realities find no home in this 
 philosophy; they are not welcome even as stepping-stones to 
 "higher things." 
 
 Hostility to Nature 
 
 In accordance with the entire trend of his thought Eucken's 
 attention is arrested less by the continuous benefits which accrue 
 to man from nature, than by the occasional calamities which 
 befall him from the same source: the waving crop receives little 
 notice until the advent of the sudden storm which destroys it. 
 In Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion he writes : 
 
 "Die Zwecke und Werte des Geisteslebens scheinen fur das blinde 
 Getriebe der Naturgewalten nicht vorhanden; diese kennen keinen 
 Unterschied von gut und bose, von gerecht und ungerecht, von 
 innerer Grosse und Kleinheit. Erdbeben und Wasserfluten 
 vernichten blfihendes Geistesleben wie im Spiel; Pest und Hungers- 
 not halten ihre Ernte unbekummert um menschliches Wohl und 
 geistige Werte. Nirgends weist die Natur fiber sich selbst hinaus 
 auf eine hohere Ordnung; . . . sie bildet ein geschlossenes, 
 nur mit sich selbst befasstes Reich. Wie eine ratselhafte Sphinx 
 steht sie vor unseren Augen: unermiidlich Leben gebarend und 
 Leben zerstorend, langsam bereitend, rasch vernichtend, iursorg- 
 lich und gleichgfiltig, wohlwollend und grausam zugleich, die 
 Geschopfe bald einander befreundend, bald zu unerbittlichem 
 Kampf gegeneinander hetzend, zugleich schutzende und zerstor- 
 ende Waffen schmiedend, nach einem alten Ausdruck weniger 
 eine Mutter als eine Stiefmutter ihrer Kinder. Ein unverwfist- 
 licher Trieb zum Leben, aber in aller Erregung und Bewegung 
 kein Beisichselbstsein, kein Ffirsichleben, daher kein echter 
 
 214 See Part II, Chap. II. 
 84 
 
KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 85 
 
 Ertrag, kein Sinn, keine Vernunft des Ganzen, ein leidenschaftliches 
 Spiel um Nichts und abermals Nichts. Freilich nicht ohne alle 
 Vernunft, denn es erfolgt ja alles Wirken der Natur in einfaehen, 
 unverbriichlichen Grundformen und in strenger Verkettung des 
 Geschehens, es erfolgt gesetzlich und kausal. Das ist eine Ver- 
 nunft, gewiss, aber doch nur eine formale Vernunft, die gegen den 
 Inhalt des Geschehens gleichgiiltig ist. Aueh die schmerzlichste 
 Zerstbrung des Lebens, die Entstehung entsetzlicher Missbild- 
 ungen, die Vererbung schwerer Krankheiten erfolgt gemass jenen 
 Gesetzen und in kausaler Ordnung. Was ist das aber fur eine 
 Vernunft, die so ihr Vermogen sachlicher un vernunft dienen lasst? 
 . . . Konnten wir nur aller Unsicherheit der ausseren Lage ein 
 gefestiges Innenleben entgegenhalten!" 245 
 
 "Vor allem geht das Anliegen des Menschen darauf, durch die 
 tiberweltliche Macht in seinem Streben zur Geistigkeit gefordert 
 zu werden, gefordert namentlich in dem harten Kampf gegen eine 
 fremde, undurchsichtige, ubermachtige Welt." 2i6 
 
 "Kleine Zufalle zerstoren Leben und Lebensgliick, ein Augen- 
 blick vernichtet den Ertrag miihsamster Arbeit. Oft auch ein 
 chaotisches Durcheinander, ein rasches Umschlagen der Geschicke, 
 eine scheinbare Gleichgiiltigkeit gegen alles menschliche Wohl 
 und Webe, ein blindes Umhertappen ; dabei stets verhangnisvolle 
 Mbglichkeiten wie dunkle Wolken iiber dem Menschen schwebend 
 und bisweilen niederfahrend wie ein zerschmetternder Blitz." 247 
 
 In Life's Basis and Life's Ideal he expresses the same views : 
 
 "We see now with complete clearness the indifference of the 
 forces of nature towards the aims of the spirit; we see the incessant 
 crossing of the work of reason by blind necessity; we see the 
 spiritual life divided against itself, eminent spiritual powers drawn 
 into the service of lower interests, and carried away by unre- 
 strained passion." 248 
 
 "If nature simply follows its own tendencies; if, indifferent to 
 value and lack of value, without aim and ideal, nature lives its 
 life of soulless movement, union with an order so alien and im- 
 penetrable must most seriously affect the spiritual life. The world 
 goes on its course unconcerned with the weal or the woe, the per- 
 sistence or the disappearance of spiritual being, of spiritual rela- 
 tions, indeed of spiritual life in general. Not only do great 
 catastrophes, as in earthquakes, storms, and floods, show how 
 indifferent the existence or the non-existence of spiritual life is to 
 the forces of nature, but the commonplaces of everyday experience 
 and of individual destiny also show the same indifference. In 
 
 246 Op. cit., pp. 201, 202. (Truth of Rel., pp. 292-2!)-!.) 
 2 "' Ibid., p. 224. Italics ours. (Truth of Rel., p. 326.) 
 
 247 Ibid., p. 226. (Truth of Re)., p. 328.) 
 
 248 Op. cit., p. 20. (Grundlinien Einer Neuen Lebensanschauung, p. 12, 
 top.) 
 
86 EUDOLP EUCKBN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 nature we find no difference of treatment in accordance with any 
 distinction of good and evil, great and mean, noble and vulgar. 
 Even the most eminent personality, who may be almost indispen- 
 sable to our spiritual welfare, is subject to the same contingency, 
 the same fate as all others. Regarded from the point of view of the 
 world of sense, all spiritual life is a chaotic confusion of fleeting 
 appearances, all of which are dependent; it is not an independent 
 world, but a subsidiary addition to a world which is other than 
 spiritual." 249 
 
 "We feel the rigid actuality of occurrences, the indifference of 
 the machinery of the world towards the aims of the spirit, and the 
 contradictions of existence. . . . we . . . feel . . . our bond- 
 age to obscure powers and at the same time our insignificance." 250 
 
 Identification of Nature and Human Nature 
 
 As we examine Eucken's account of nature we are struck by the 
 suggestion of a certain wilfulness in its resistance to the claims of 
 the spiritual. This suggestion is intensified by the practical 
 identification of nature and human nature in his analysis of the 
 "human spiritual." A passage in Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion 
 states his position : 
 
 "Auch die Stellung des Menschen verandert sich wesentlich, 
 wo alle Grosse und alles Gelingen seines Lebens von der Teilnahme 
 an einem iibermenschlichen Geistesleben abhangt. Zunachst 
 erscheint er stark gegen die iibliche Fassung herabgesetzt. Pfleg- 
 ten wir bei-ihrn den Scheidepunkt der Welten anzunehmen und ihm 
 in seiner eignen Natur einen unvergleichlichen Wert beizumessen, 
 so wird das nun hinfallig. Denn das Neue und Hohere liegt in 
 dem Geistesleben, als der Eroffnung einer selbstandigen Innenwelt, 
 nicht in dem Menschen als solchem. Lange, lange Zeiten verlasst 
 er kaum den Bereich der Natur, und wenn schliesslich Geistesleben 
 bei ihm erscheint, so ist es nicht sowohl sein eignes Werk als die 
 Mitteilung jener iiberlegenen Stufe. Wenn sich ferner Geistes- 
 leben im Bereich des Menschen entwickelt, so wird keineswegs 
 dieser ganze Bereich dafiir gewonnen. Vielmehr verbleibt die 
 niedere Art, leistet hartnackigen Widerstand und zieht das Geistes- 
 leben zu sich herab; so wird der Durchschnittsstand der einer 
 Halbgeistigkeit, dem eben das Grosse und Eigentiimliche des 
 Geisteslebens fehlt. Solche schiirfere Scheidung des Menschen 
 vom Geistesleben stellt auch die einzelnen Aufgaben in eine neue 
 Beleuchtung und steigert iiberall die Spannung der Arbeit. So 
 darf z. B. nun und nimmer die Moral als eine natiirliche Eigen- 
 
 249 Ibid., pp. 263, 264. (Grundlinien, p. 123.) 
 
 250 Ibid., p. 301. Italics ours. (Grundlinien, p. 191.) 
 
EUDOLP EtTCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 87 
 
 schaft des Menschen gelten . . . sie [echte Moral] aber wird 
 erst moglich vom Geistesleben aus, und der Aufstieg zu ihr bleibt 
 eine fortwahrende Aufgabe, die nur zum kleinsten Teile gelingt. 
 So erfolgt durchgangig die entscheidende Wendung innerhalb des 
 Menschenlebens, nicht schon mit seinem ersten Erscheinen. Das 
 alles besagt ohne Zweifel eine Demutigung des Menschen als 
 blossen Menschen. Aber der Herabsetzung entspricht eine 
 Erhbhung, insofern sich ihm die Moglichkeit des Teilhabens an 
 einer neuen Stufe der Wirklichkeit und zugleich an einem Gesamt- 
 leben erofnet, das iiber den Verwicklungen des menschlichen Kreises 
 liegt. Nun kann alles, was das Geistesleben auszeichnet; die 
 Universalitat, die Souveranitat, die Autonomie, auch zum Besitze 
 des Menschen werden, der zu ihm vordringt; nun kbnnen die 
 geistigen Inhalte sich abheben von der blossmenschlichen Lebens- 
 form." 251 
 
 In Life's Basis we read: "we see something grow up within the 
 human sphere which leads man beyond himself, and which is valid 
 not simply for him but even in opposition to him. The whole 
 matter bristles with problems: from the point of view of the life 
 of nature this new life must appear to be an insoluble riddle; . . . 
 Along with this detachment of life from the mere individual and 
 the mere subjectivity of man, there is a liberation from external 
 ties, and the development of a self-conscious spirituality. 252 
 
 As at the level of nature life is spent in the development of 
 relations with the environment, in action and reaction, so the 
 form of life in man remains bound, since the life of the soul cannot 
 dissociate itself from the experience of sense. The apparent 
 inwardness that is evolved at this level is simply an after-effect of 
 sensuous feelings and desires. So far as the life of nature extends, 
 the forces and laws of the life of the soul will only refine what the 
 external world exhibits in coarser features. The mechanism of 
 nature also extends into human life; natural impulses of conduct, 
 as well as association of ideas, reveal the fact that the life of the 
 soul is in complete dependence upon natural conditions. From 
 this point of view it seems impossible that inwardness should ever 
 become independent. The actual experience of human life, 
 however, shows that what is thus regarded as impossible is indis- 
 putably real." 253 
 
 251 Op. cit., pp. 116, 117. Italics are ours. (Truth of Rel., pp. 169, 170.) 
 262 See Grundlinien, p. 58. The remainder of the passage is somewhat 
 altered in the 2d German ed., 1913. 
 2 « Op. cit., pp. 123, 124. 
 
88 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 Consequences 
 
 We have not to criticize here Eucken's faulty analysis of human 
 nature, nor his erroneous conception of man's spiritual endowment : 
 the matter has been already briefly dealt with. Attention may 
 be called, however, to the astounding assumptions which he makes 
 in the above citations. If Eucken were correct we might well 
 wonder who among our friends were "self-conscious spiritualities," 
 and who were but "blosse Menschen." He, himself, finds nothing 
 strange in such a problem. In Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion 
 he writes: "wie oft erlischt alle geistige Regung schon innerhalb 
 des Lebens, die Geistigkeit wird stumpf und matt, sie erstirbt 
 fast noch bei Lebzeit des Menschen." 264 And in Life's Basis we read : 
 
 "There is no greater contrast than that between simple disposi- 
 tion and spiritual depth, between the man of mere sentiment, with 
 his dependence and vacillation, and the personality rooted in an 
 inner infinity." 255 
 
 The contrast between a weak and a strong character is always 
 striking; it is, however, a contrast in degree, not in nature as 
 Eucken implies. A "man of mere sentiment," i. e., without a 
 true, substantial, spiritual soul, which is the root of the sentiment, 
 is a creation of the imagination, not a reality. 
 
 Eucken voices the suggestion most clearly, perhaps, when he 
 complains of "der Mangel an Liebe und Gerechtigkeit in der Welt 
 und bei den Menschen," 256 and elsewhere he refers to the "want of 
 affection in things." Dr. Caldecott in his appreciation of Eucken's 
 Philosophy writes as follows: 
 
 "We now come to a problem which looms large in Eucken's 
 treatment: the lower levels of life, both in our human nature and 
 in external nature, what are these? We might have thought 
 that in a philosophy which begins so clearly with the One Cosmic 
 Spirit who descends into finite spirits of the same nature we were 
 dealing with the whole universe. But now there arises before us 
 a realm to which we are not led by Eucken on this line of descent, 
 but which presents itself unbidden, a non-spiritual range or kind 
 of being. We call it Nature: as physical it envelops us, as 'mere 
 human nature' it seems to be a part of ourselves. We know how 
 difficult it was for the Classical German idealists to take nature 
 into their account: how Hegel is alleged to have treated her as a 
 
 "< Op. cit., p. 201. Italics are ours. (Truth of Rel., p. 292.) 
 m Op. cit., p. 72. Italics ours. (Grundlinien, p. 42, towards end.) 
 266 Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, op. cit., p. 42. Italics ours. (Truth 
 oj Rel., p. 61.) 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 89 
 
 stepchild in the cosmic family; how, indeed, his high philosophy 
 led him to a positive contempt of all that nature can show . . . 
 Eucken himself alleges this contempt as a reason for renouncing 
 Hegel's lead; but how does nature fare in Eucken's own Activism? 
 Here are vast ranges of cosmic being which are accounted suffi- 
 ciently honourable to be taken in hand by 'Spirit,' and after trans- 
 formation to be admitted, it would seem, even into the life. They 
 lack high values of their own, certainly; they are manifold, par- 
 ticular, disconnected, conflicting; but at least they seem to have 
 sufficient value to enable them to furnish material upon which 
 'Spirit' can work. Indeed, in the chapter 'Growth of Man beyond 
 Nature' in Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, Eucken gives a very fine 
 account of the way in which stage after stage of improvement and 
 elevation is effected in them. But it is a very marked feature of 
 Eucken that he regards Nature with distrust and melancholy. 
 Sometimes he speaks sadly of its indifference to the requirements 
 of Spirit; at others he rises to indignation, speaking of its 'alien' 
 character, its 'opposition,' its 'hostility,' and flat refusal to submit 
 to organization. And his general estimate of what natural 
 civilization, even as assisted by Spirit, has so far accomplished is 
 a very low one. . . . We are bound to ask, what is Eucken's 
 view both of the origin and of the persistence of this alien part 
 of the Cosmos? What has become of his Monism, his unity of the 
 Cosmic Spirit? It seems to me that we have here the most 
 serious deficiency in Eucken's philosophy as a system. The 
 widespread indifference of nature has proved the rock on which 
 many an Idealist has suffered shipwreck before, but in Eucken's 
 case there seems to be an inexplicable unconsciousness on his 
 part that his bark is in peril. Apart from physical nature the 
 lower ranges of mental life are outside his system, and present 
 themselves in this alien and even hostile guise. Mr. Boyce 
 Gibson tells us that he has called Eucken's attention to this, and 
 that the deficiency of his interest in psychology is acknowledged 
 by him; but it is plain that the far-reaching effect of this is not 
 appreciated by Eucken : otherwise he could not continue at once to 
 proclaim the all-sufficiency of his Spiritualism and to give forth 
 incessant lamentations over the immensity of the oppositions to 
 be encountered, the grievous burden of the task of overcoming 
 them, and the prevalence of failure over success in the history 
 of culture and civilization." 257 
 
 Eucken's Proposed Goal — Monism 
 
 Dr. Caldecott seems to us to touch the crux when he asks : 
 
 "What has become of his Monism, his unity of the Cosmic 
 Spirit?" In truth Eucken has proposed an impossible task, viz., 
 
 257 Church Quart. Review, Religious Phil, of R. Eucken, London, April, 
 1913, pp. 57-59. 
 
90 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 the identifications of two Orders of reality which are, in se, ulti- 
 mately irreducible: there is absolute irreconcilability between his 
 fundamental assumptions and his final goal. Insisting, often 
 with the vigor of a Scholastic, on a real duality of nature 258 and 
 spirit, he holds that the task of spirit is to overcome nature by 
 assimilating and thus spiritualizing it. The following passage 
 from Geistige Stromungen is an unmistakably clear statement of 
 the proposed goal: "im Streben zu sich selbst bleibt das Geistes- 
 leben zugleich mit der grossen Welt befasst, es kann sich selbst 
 nicht finden, ohne diese an sich zu Ziehen, es kann nicht ruhen und 
 rasten, bis es sie vollauf uberwunden und in sich aufgenommen hat. 
 Darum ist all sein Gehalt zugleich eine Behauptung, die Behaupt- 
 ung, das Letzte, Ganze, Allumfassende, der Kern der gesamten 
 Wirklichkeit zu sein. Dies aber kann es nur sein, wenn die 
 Weiterbildung, die es an den Dingen durch die Aneignung bewirkt, 
 diese zur Hohe ihres eigenen Wesens flihrt, wenn der Gehalt des 
 Geisteslebens die eigene Wahrheit der Dinge bedeutet. Das 
 Geistesleben wird in sich selbst ein unertraglicher Widerspruch, 
 wenn es neben und gegeniiber der Welt, nicht innerhalb ihrer 
 steht, wenn nicht in der Wendung zu ihm sich die Wirklichkeit 
 selbst vollendet. Die Anerkennung dessen versetzt unsere Welt 
 in Fluss und verwandelt sie in ein Reich von aufsteigender 
 Bewegung." 259 
 
 There can be no doubt as to the literal meaning which Eucken 
 intends these words to bear: the same thought is conveyed in 
 similar language in his various works; and he recognizes, according 
 to Boyce Gibson, the applicability of the term "Idealism" to his 
 system. Gibson writes: 
 
 "The following extract, which Professor Eucken kindly permits 
 me to quote from a letter of April 19, 1907, sets this step of his 
 [viz, the adoption of 'the activistic label as a distinctive philosoph- 
 ical badge'] in a clear light. T fully recognize,' he writes, 'the 
 advantages of the term 'Religious Idealism.' But the expression 
 'Activism' has peculiar significance in relation to the spiritual 
 condition of Germany today. . . . But the name is, after all, 
 of little consequence; what matters is the meaning we attach to 
 it.' " 26 ° 
 
 Idealism is an ambiguous term being applied to such widely 
 
 258 By "nature" Eucken understands the non-spiritual. As well as the material 
 universe, therefore, including human organisms, man's sensuous, psychic life 
 falls under the term. We hold that owing to the fact that sensuous and 
 spiritual activities are, alike, modes of action of the one, indivisible, spiritual 
 soul, it is practically impossible for any mental state of an adult to be wholly 
 sensuous. 
 
 269 Geistige Stromungen der Gegenwart, pp. !50, 31. Italics ours. 
 
 260 Rudolph Eucken's Philosophy of Life, op. cit.. Appendix, p. 170. footnote. 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 91 
 
 different systems of thought as those of Plato and Hegel, 261 but 
 in the present instance, the meaning is evident; the "name" 
 stands for spiritualistic monism as Booth points out in the Intro- 
 ductory Note to Main Currents of Modern Thought: 
 
 "Eucken's ultimate goal is a monism — not naturalistic, as it is 
 hardly necessary to point out, but spiritualistic in character." 262 
 
 Metaphysical Idealism even in its most favorable aspect — i.e., 
 when, as with Berkely, it is grounded on the assumption that God 
 and finite spirits alone exist 263 — defies alike popular and scientific 
 experience; but when it starts from the Aristotelico-Scholastic 
 principle of a duality of nature 264 and spirit, it presents — borrowing 
 language from Eucken — "an unendurable contradiction." 265 
 
 We may remark that Eucken recoils, baffled, from his attempt, 
 and weakly acknowledges his failure in the following passage: 
 "To be sure, the world of sense retains a certain independence; it 
 resists a complete transformation into spiritual magnitudes, and 
 our life, therefore, retains a certain restriction and impenetrabil- 
 ity." 266 In these words he practically yields the entire situation, 
 and yet, as Dr. Caldecott observes, on his part "there seems to be 
 an inexplicable unconsciousness . . . that his bark is in peril." 267 
 
 261 See article on Idealism by Otto Wilmann in Catholic Encyclopedia; 
 Professor Creighton has also called attention to the point in his article in the 
 Americana under this heading. 
 
 262 Op. cit., p. 12. 
 
 263 a s Father Maher points out, "God, without the intervention of a material 
 world, could potentia absoluta immediately produce in men's minds states 
 like to those which they experience in the present order. The only demonstra- 
 tive argument against the Theistic Immaterialist is, that such a hypothesis 
 is in conflict with the attribute of veracity which he must ascribe to the Deity. 
 God could not be the author of such a fraud." Maher, Psychology, 1011, p. 
 109, footnote. 
 
 264 We use "nature" here in Eucken's signification of the term, i.e., to 
 designate the non-spiritual. The Scholastics prefer to speak of matter and 
 its forces. Eucken in der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion writes: 
 
 "Das ist ein anderer Gegensatz als der von Kiirper und Seele, von Ausserem 
 und Innerem, von raumlicher Ausdehnung und bewusster Tatigkeit, wie die 
 Aufklarung ihn in den Vordergrund riickte." op. cit., p. 58. (Truth of Itel., 
 p. 86.) See also Einheit des Geisteslebens, p. 3. The consideration of material 
 forces under the concept of the non-spiritual, whether these operate within 
 or without the organism, renders the field covered by the term in each system 
 practically co-extensive. Cf. Note 258. 
 
 265 Geistige StrLimungen, op. cit., p. 30, "unertraglicher Widerspruch." 
 Problem of Human Life, p. 286. (Lebensanschauung der g. Denker, op. cit., 
 p. 273.) 
 
 266 Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, op. cit., p. 238. Italics ours. In tin- 
 second German edition the wording and arrangement are much changed 
 through here, Cf. Part II (Grundlegender Teil), but the ideas are the same. 
 The reason of the change is indicated in the Preface to this edition. 
 
 207 Loc. cit. 
 
92 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 From the effort to bridge this impassable chasm spring the most 
 serious of the errors which disfigure Eucken's thought. The 
 most telling in its effects is that which makes the spiritual nature 
 of man the "existential form" of the Absolute Spiritual Life. 
 Such a tenet, as has been already pointed out, must logically 
 ascribe all guilt to the supreme Being, as to its source. Moral 
 evil can result only through freedom, and freedom can come only 
 from the spiritual life. Eucken terms freedom "die Grund- 
 bedingung alles Geisteslebens." 268 
 
 Where, however, the human spiritual is but a "centre-point" 
 or a "concentration-point" — "einen Mittel- und Konzentrations- 
 punkt," 269 of the Absolute Spiritual, the Absolute Spiritual, the 
 only Free Being, is necessarily made responsible for the crime of 
 the universe. On such an hypothesis crime, guilt and moral law 
 are terms wholly devoid of meaning: the following passages reveal 
 the Pantheism underlying it: 
 
 Der Zusammenhang unserer Betrachtung verlangt eine Weiter- 
 bewegung zunachst deshalb, weil der Mensch nicht in die Stufe 
 der geistigen Individuality aufgeht, die uns bis dahin beschaftigte. 
 Auch bei glanzendster Leistung umfangt diese Stufe ihn nicht 
 ganz und gar, er kann dariiber hinausblicken, sich in andere 
 Individualitaten versetzen und durch sie erganzen, er muss das 
 tun, um dem Zufalligen und Problematischen seiner eignen Natur 
 uberlegen zu werden, um bei sich selbst das Unechte ausscheiden, 
 das Echte starken zu konnen. Von hier atis gelangt das Leben auf 
 einen Standort, wo es die verschiedenen Kreise uberschaut und ihrer 
 allerGehalt in eignen Besitz verwandelt, wo sich ihm die game Unend- 
 lichkeit zusammenfasst und zu einem Beisichselbstsein wird. Hier 
 bleibt das Leben auch in scheinbarer Wendung nach aussen immer 
 mit sich selbst befasst, hier ist die Stufe der blossen Leistung 
 sicher uberwunden, und es bildet die eigne Erhohung des Lebens 
 das beherrschende Ziel alles Muhens. Das entspricht der christ- 
 lichen Uberzeugung von einem unermesslichen Werte des Menschen 
 in seiner reinen Innerlichkeit, der t)berzeugung, 'dass fur den Preis 
 der ganzen Welt, nicht eine einzige Seele erkauft werden kann' 
 (Luther); wie aber Hesse sich solche Schatzung rechtfertigen, 
 stiege nicht in jener Tiefe der Seele eine neue Art des Lebens auf, 
 erhobe sich hier nicht ein neues Reich, das den innersten Kern der 
 gesamten Wirklichkeit bildet? Wie die Sache gewohnlich gefassl 
 wird, als Empfehlung einer bloss subjektiven, von der grossen 
 
 268 "Wie das rnoglich sei, wie aus Gnade Freiheit . . . entspringen kttnne, 
 das iibersteigt als ein Urphanomen alle Erkliirung, es ist, als die Grundbedingung 
 alles Geisteslebens, durchaus axiomatischer Art." Der Wahrheitsgebalt der 
 Religion, op. cit., p. 155. (Truth of Rel., p. 22S.) 
 
 • <v Der Wahrbeitsgehalt der Religion, op. cit.. p. 108. 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 93 
 
 Welt sich in eine private Klause zuriickziehenden und dort tatlos 
 verharrenden Gesinnung, hat sie keinen geniigenden Grund, ja 
 droht sie zu einer leeren Floskel und Phrase zu werden. Jene 
 Schatzung erlangt ein gutes Recht nur, wenn in der Tiefe des 
 Seelenlebens eine neue Stufe der Wirklichkeit aufgeht, und dies 
 kann nicht aus der Kraft des blossen Punktes, sondern nur dadurch 
 geschehen, dass hier unendliches Leben unendlichem Leben begegnet, 
 dass sich an dieser Stelle ein Kreuzungs und Konzentrationspunkt 
 unendlichen Lebens bildet. Ahnliches scheint Goethe in jenen 
 merkwurdigen Worten vorzuschweben : 'Gott begegnet sich 
 immer selbst; Gott im Menschen sich selbst wieder im Menschen. 
 Daher keiner Ursache hat, sich gegen die Grossten gering zu 
 achten.' 
 
 Handlet es sich also nicht darum, das Leben auf einen besonderen 
 Punkt zu beziehen und dessen Eigentiimlichkeit zu unterwerfen, 
 sondern darum, es auf seine eigne Tiefe zu bringen und ihm einen 
 Halt in sich selbst zu geben, so wird die Sache gewaltig schwer. 
 Vollauf eignes Leben kann nur entstehen, wenn sich die Tatigkeit 
 in Selbstbetatigung verwandelt, wenn sie ein lebendiges Selbst 
 zum Ausdruck bringt, wenn die umfassende Einheit durch Heraus- 
 arbeitung eines durchgehenden und beharrenden Lebens einen Kern, 
 ein Wesen gewinnt und damit zum iibringen Leben wirkt, es 
 darauf bezieht, es daran misst. Nur eine solche Scheidung und 
 Wiederverbindung, eine solche innere Abstufung und Zuriick- 
 beziehung des Lebens lasst die Frage nach einem Inhalt entstehen, 
 nur wenn das umfassende Ganze sich die zerstreute Mannigfaltigkeit 
 unterwirft und sich selbst in sie hineinlegt, erwachst eine in sich 
 selbst beruhende Wirklichkeit. Ob solches Leben personliches Leben 
 heissen darf, darilber lasst sich streiten. . . . es ware also keine 
 Absonderung, sondern das gerade Gegenteil: innerste Verbindung 
 mit den Dingen, ja mit der Unendlichkeit . . .So empfiehlt es 
 sich vielleicht mehr, von autonomem Leben und von Autonomien zu 
 sprechen; und liegt vornehmlich an der Tatsache, dass im Geistes- 
 leben selbst eine Bewegung zur Bildung eines Kernes und zur Ver- 
 wandlung in Selbstleben im Gange ist, und dass mit solcher 
 Wendung des Lebensprozesses eine Innenwelt entsteht, die etwas 
 ganz anderes bedeutet als die schattenhafte Innerlichkeit des auf 
 sich beschrankten Subjekts." 270 
 
 "Wohl hat auch sie anzuerkennen, dass ein beisichselbst befind- 
 liches Leben und eine zeitiiberlegene Wahrheit im Menschenwesen 
 irgendwie angelegt sein, als treibende Kraft in ihm wirken und 
 ein Mass seines Unternehmens bilden muss." "Lebenskonzen- 
 trationen entstehen und wachsen zu Autonomien." 271 
 
 270 Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, op. cit., pp. 103-105. Italics are ours 
 (Truth of Rel., 150-153.) 
 
 271 Erkennen und Leben, pp. 98, 99. 
 
94 KlTDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 Conclusion 
 
 The reflex of this peculiar form of Pantheism is found in Eucken's 
 hostility to the physical world. Having failed to grapple with the 
 problem of evil, 272 the suffering and misery in the world, which 
 he so graphically describes, confront him as a baffling puzzle. 
 He makes no distinction between the pain or loss which accrues 
 to a man from the forces of Nature, and the wrong which a fellow- 
 man deliberately inflicts on him except that the presence of the 
 Spiritual Life in the second case makes the doer responsible and 
 therefore renders the act more reprehensible. In each case, 
 however, he finds a similar inappreciation of spiritual values, a 
 similar "lack of righteousness," "der mangel an Liebe und Gerech- 
 tigkeit." 273 
 
 The uniformity of nature, which has uplifted countless minds to 
 the unchanging Truth, proves an insuperable stumbling block to 
 Eucken. Kant compared the Moral Law to the starry heavens 
 "and found them both sublime," but Eucken rails at what he 
 terms the blind mechanism of the natural process, "das blinde 
 Getriebe der Naturgewalten." 274 
 
 It is not surprising therefore, that the account which he gives 
 of the genesis of our knowledge of the spiritual is unsatis- 
 factory. The ideas of the Sublime, the Beautiful, the Infinite 
 are essential elements in the content of our concept of a Supreme 
 Spiritual Reality, but these are gathered from Nature. Christ 
 Himself drew his similitudes from the physical universe, and called 
 attention to its beauty : 
 
 "Consider the lilies ... I say to you, not even Solomon in 
 
 272 We are aware that Eucken devotes a large portion of his work Der 
 Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion to this problem, but he makes no attempt at a 
 solution. He exaggerates the misery of our human lot, and leaves his student 
 in the most painful doubt as to the cause of the suffering. Although he draws 
 so copiously from Sacred Truth on other occasions he refuses to accept its 
 teaching on this point. He refers to the doctrine of original sin as "jene 
 unglilckliche Lehre von der Erbsiinde, welche das Christentum zum Man- 
 ichaismus herabzieht." Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 155. The reference to 
 Manichaeism, however, and in fact the entire context show how erroneous his 
 ideas of the Christian doctrine are. The allusion to Luther ("jene bedenkliche 
 Meinung Luthers, dass der mensch die Gerechtigkeit nicht sowohl erlange 
 als nur zugerechnet erhalte, eine Meinung, die, zu Ende gedacht, den grossen 
 Weltkampf in blossen Schein und Spiel verwandeln wlirde," op. cit.) may 
 be compared with a passage already cited from Luiher in the Light of Facts, 
 vide footnote 225, p. 77. 
 
 273 Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, op. cit., p. 42. 
 iU Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, op. cit., p. 201. 
 
Rudolf Efcken and the Spiritual Life 95 
 
 all his glory was clothed like one of these." 275 "Consider the 
 ravens, for they sow not, neither do they reap, neither have they 
 storehouse nor barn, and God feedeth them. How 7 much are you 
 more valuable than they?" 276 
 
 We may note here that Our Saviour uses the comparative 
 degree. Man is more the object of the Creator's solicitude than 
 all material objects, nevertheless these have a value in themselves, 
 apart altogether from their spiritual cognition by man. Boyce 
 Gibson holds that "Eucken's philosophy is essentially a Christian 
 philosophy of life; a restatement and development in philosophical 
 form of the religious teaching of Jesus." 277 
 
 We do not propose to criticize such a view at any length: 
 Eucken certainly borrows from the Gospel, and from the Fathers 
 even, when it suits his purpose, but his own contribution renders 
 the Gospel narrative void of all meaning, "Benedicite omnia 
 opera Domini Domino" breathes the spirit of Christ, but the 
 canticle 278 has no place in Eucken's system where nature and spirit 
 are in an internecine warfare. Our English poet is nearer the 
 Gospel spirit when he tells us that we may find : 
 
 "tongues in trees, books in the running brooks, sermons in 
 stones, and good in everything." 279 
 
 »» Luke XII, Verse 27. 
 278 Luke XII, Verse 24. 
 
 277 R. Eucken's Philosophy of Life, op. cit., p. 166. 
 
 278 Canticum, Dan. III. 
 
 279 Shakespeare, As You Like It, Act II, Sc. I. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Eueken's epistemological position is aptly criticized by Baron 
 von Hiigel as follows: "Everywhere in this philosophy we find the 
 assumption of a strictly Idealist Epistemology, and an insistence 
 . . . upon this Idealism as the starting-point of every philosophy 
 that has a right to count at all. ... in Epistemology, the present 
 writer has been driven to think that an unprejudiced analysis of 
 our actual knowing, the discoveries and requirements of modern 
 times, the history of Epistemology itself and the evidences and 
 needs of the spiritual life, conjointly clamor for a frank reconsidera- 
 tion of the entire question, and even for some critically Realist 
 conclusion. ... in knowledge we have the irreducible trinity 
 of knower, known and knowing, since the distinctness and inde- 
 pendence of the known from the knower and the knowing ever 
 appears as a fundamental condition of anything being known, 
 and as part of the information yielded by the analysis of the knowl- 
 edge thus achieved." 280 
 
 Although Eucken speaks of Von Hiigel in terms which he intends 
 to be the highest praise, and has even devoted a special essay to 
 a warm appreciation of his work, 281 the first formulation of his 
 theory of knowledge, Erkennen und Leben, which appeared some 
 months later than the article from which we have just cited, does 
 not indicate that he profited by the criticism more than he did 
 by the earlier one of Boyce Gibson. In the works since published 
 or revised there is the same insistence on the overcoming (iiber- 
 windung) of the difference between subject and object by a trans- 
 cendence of the antithesis. 282 It is quite evident, however, that 
 his desired goal is not ontological but religious. This accounts 
 for his friendly acknowledgment of, yet entire disregard for, just 
 criticism. 
 
 Eucken is neither a natural philosopher nor a metaphysician. 
 A cursory examination of Activism suffices to show the unfitness 
 of the first title; his impatience of, and even contempt for ontology 
 debars him from the second. Metaphysics without careful 
 ontological speculation is an impossibility; hence the charge of 
 
 tg0 Religious Philosophy of Rudolf Eucken, Hibbert Journal. April, 1912, 
 pp. 667, C68. 
 '-"■" Collected Essays, op. tit.. V1I1, p. 115. 
 •"See Grundlinien, 2te Anil., 1913. p. 73. 
 96 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 97 
 
 German critics that his philosophy is not Wissenschaft but Kunst; 293 
 hence Von Hugel's complaint that he treats "an abstraction as 
 though, of itself, the most fruitful of realities." 284 
 
 In so far as Eucken can be called a philosopher he must be 
 ranked with the Moralists: we say "in so far as" because a system 
 in which so many incompatible elements find a home is not 
 strictly speaking philosophy at all. M. Alden points out that 
 "his phraseology as an open air prophet often contradicts the 
 most essential formulations of his philosophy." 285 
 
 He himself, points out the ethical character (einen ethischen 
 Charakter) of Activism. 286 He knows that he is morally right in 
 recognizing the reality and claims of the Spiritual Life and heeds 
 little whether he be metaphysically and psychologically wrong in 
 his exposition of the same. He describes his own frame of mind 
 in a passage already cited 287 from the Truth of Religion "so that 
 he will found his religion upon this rock [i. e., 'the fundamental 
 fact — man as a superior Whole'], weary throughout of the strife 
 whether intellect, or will, or feeling, plays the main part in the 
 concern." 
 
 We have dealt with Eucken from the philosophical standpoint 
 and have found that his theory is equally unsatisfactory in the 
 fields of psychology, ethics, metaphysics and epistemology. In 
 concluding we shall touch on its religious aspect. 
 
 Eucken's motto might be Excelsior, so often and with such 
 vehemence does he insist on the necessity of transcendence. It 
 cannot possibly be any ontological unity that he is interested in 
 for the reasons already pointed out: the "inner life he identifies 
 with religion," 288 and "man's deepest life" with "a kind of Theistic 
 Absolutism." 289 
 
 The transcendence which Eucken is striving after and vigor- 
 ously, though incoherently, preaching is not only possible in the 
 field of religion but has been perfectly accomplished wherever and 
 whenever a Saint has lived. It is held up to us by the Church, 
 is luminously explained in ascetic theology, and is mirrored most 
 
 283 G. Wunderle, op. cit., p. 30 and footnote. 
 
 284 Op. cit., p. 669. 
 
 285 Op. cit., p. 61. 
 
 286 Grundlinien, p. 144. 
 
 287 See p. 72. 
 
 288 H. M. Alden, op. cit., p. 58. 
 
 289 Von Hiigel, op. cit., p. 665. 
 
98 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 vividly in the epistles of St. Paul. 2890 There is not any possibility of 
 literally transcending the antithesis between subject and object, 
 e.g., between a flower and the one who admires it, so that the 
 difference between the two would not exist; but just as "the life" 
 is "more than the food and the body more than the raiment," 290 
 so the soul is incomparably more than earth's most precious treas- 
 ures, and man can rise above created objects to contemplate their 
 Infinite Source Who is Himself the Cause of all, Whose Divine 
 Ideas are the prototypes of all, in Whom all Being is One and 
 undifferentiated. The more the human spirit transcends all 
 finite things by thought and desire and yearns for better knowledge 
 of — even in the natural order — and closer union of will with the 
 Supreme Infinite Spiritual Life, God, the more is the entire man 
 perfected. It is true that even in the natural order such a life 
 would bring an independence of the trivial, the "pettily human," 
 and would be filled with a profound peace and a solid happiness 
 unknown to the victims of passion and appetite. 
 
 Nevertheless we have on the one hand an individual, substantial, 
 spiritual soul, and on the other its Infinite Creator — not one, there- 
 fore, but two; and if we take into our calculation the material 
 goods that man has risen above we have three. Metaphysical 
 monism of Eucken's type is an intrinsic impossibility. What 
 matter is, in last analysis, we do not know, but that it is not, and 
 never can be, spirit, we do know. Monism of purpose is a neces- 
 sity, and the union of the soul with its Creator by conformity of 
 thought and will is, even in the natural order, the supreme end of 
 human life. Moreover it is the only fount of all true activism. 
 
 A St. Peter Damien transcending the differences between him- 
 self and the shapeless mass of hideous disease in whom he recognizes 
 a fellow being, a brother, is no isolated example of Christ -like 
 Activism, and in the spheres of Art, Letters, even Science, Geistige 
 Arbeit spiritually inspired in the manner indicated, has ever been 
 the preserving leaven. 
 
 ( luist Himself pointed out the path of transcendence when asked 
 what was necessary for salvation. Thou .shall lore (he Lord thy 
 
 289a Q ur analysis (if the Geistesleben shows, however, Imw little we a^ree 
 with the following statement of Richard Roberts: "1 cannot help feeling 
 thai tin' Pauline conception 'in Christ' is identical in all essential respects 
 
 with Encken's idea of the universal spiritual life." Rudolf Eucken ami St. 
 Paul, Contemporary Review, Vol. 97, Jan.. 1910, p. 71. 
 
 3W Matthew, Chap. VI, *5. 
 
Rudolf Eucken axd the Spiritual Life 99 
 
 God with thy whole heart and with thy whole soul and with all thy 
 mind and with all thy strength and thy neighbor as thyself for the 
 love of God. The man who strives to fulfill these "two great 
 commandments of the Law" is continually transcending the 
 difference between subject and object, in that every attraction, 
 every sweetness, every goodness, every loveliness, every beauty and 
 perfection whatsoever of created objects he refers back to their 
 Infinite Uncreated Source, and loves them because of their Source, 
 and loves the Creator ever more because of the ever new knowledge 
 acquired of Him through these created perfections. Thomas 
 a Kempis in the twenty-first chapter of the third book of the 
 Imitation unfolds this transcendence when praying to find his 
 rest in the Absolute Spiritual Life: 
 
 "Above all creatures, above all health and beauty, above all 
 glory, all honor, all power, all dignity, all science, all penetration 
 of mind, all riches; above all arts; above all joy and all diversions; 
 above all reputation, all praise, all sweetness, all consolations, all 
 hopes, all promises, all merits and all desires; above all the gifts 
 and all the graces that You can give; . . . above all things 
 visible and invisible; above all that is not what Thou art, Oh God!" 
 
PART III 
 
 THE "PERMANENT FOUNDATION" OF A PHILOSOPHY 
 OF THE SPIRITUAL 
 
 In Which the Basic Principles of Knowledge and the Necessary 
 Ground of All Truth and Reality are Exposed 
 
INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
 
 Eucken's theory has failed all along the line. The question 
 arises — Is there then no knowledge possible? No satisfactory 
 solution of life and the universe? 
 
 Eucken claims that Scholasticism will not meet the require- 
 ments of today: he considers that it will not measure up to the 
 needs of the modern thought-world. 
 
 We recall here what has been already said (Part I, Chap. IV) — 
 that the fundamental laws which govern the working of the human 
 mind are unchangeable. If, therefore, the psychology and meta- 
 physics of Scholasticism did really offer a satisfactory interpretation 
 of life and the universe in the Middle Ages — and Eucken prac- 
 tically grants that they did — it follows that that solution holds 
 good today. 
 
 In the two following chapters we shall unfold the Scholastic 
 theory of knowledge and idea of truth : in Chapter III we shall give 
 the Scholastic teaching with regard to the Foundation of all truth 
 and reality: in Chapter IV we shall direct attention again to 
 Eucken's challenge and point out its answer. 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 INQUIRY INTO THE CONDITIONS OF HUMAN 
 KNOWLEDGE 
 GENERAL SURVEY 
 
 It may be well to point out that the question at issue is not the 
 existence of a Spiritual Life, since Eucken is one with us in affirming 
 this truth and in asserting that an Absolute Spiritual Life forms 
 "the ultimate basis of all reality:" our inquiry here is concerned 
 with the necessary conditions of that existence. 
 
 It must be clearly borne in mind that Eucken has posited an 
 Absolute Spiritual Life. The spiritual is that which is wholly 
 distinct from and essentially opposed to matter, 291 hence material- 
 ism and pantheism in any and every form are eliminated from our 
 examination. 
 
 Eucken has also posited the "human spiritual," and has called 
 on us energetically to "fight a battle for the preservation of the 
 human soul." 292 
 
 He has, further, posited higher knowledge and unchangeable 
 truth as within man's reach. 
 
 We saw in Part II that he did not develop his theory in accord- 
 ance with the necessary conditions of spiritual existence and, 
 therefore, his system results in a complete failure. The Scholastic 
 philosophy does recognize these conditions and offers in conse- 
 quence a system which is consistent, rational and in harmony with 
 the implication of the term spiritual. All that is best in Eucken 's 
 thought may be found here freed from the incompatible elements 
 with which it was encased in Activism. 
 
 The Scholastic teaching with regard to the "human spiritual" 
 has been already dealt with. 293 The human soul is a spiritual 
 substance, wholly distinct in essence, though depending for 
 existence upon the Absolute Spiritual Life: the very words "Abso- 
 lute Spiritual" and "human spiritual" imply this. Only on this 
 condition can man's individuality, abiding identity, freedom and 
 personality be safeguarded. A philosophy, such as Eucken's, 
 which makes the "human spiritual" the "existential form" of the 
 Absolute Spiritual; which regards man's spiritual soul not as a 
 
 291 Refer to Part I. 
 
 292 Main Currents of Modern Thought, op. <it., p. 129. 
 2C3 Part II, Chap. III. 
 
106 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 really distinct entity but as a focus or "concentration point," 
 whereat the Absolute Spiritual Life finds self-expression, sacrifices, 
 at one stroke, God's integrity and sanctity and man's individuality 
 and freedom and destroys the entire spiritual structure it sought 
 to raise. 
 
 In this and the following chapters we shall deal with the other 
 points of our investigation. 
 
 Discussion of the "immediacy" 
 
 Eucken insists, as we have seen, that all higher knowledge is 
 due to an "immediacy" of the spiritual life. In this he is not 
 originating any distinctively new idea. The bent of contemporary 
 philosophy is to lay great stress on the native energy of 
 man's soul. The "reality-feelings" of James, the "instinct" 
 of Bergson, the "Gemiit" of Eucken all point in the same 
 direction, and may be looked on as outlying wavelets of the 
 reaction against the intellectual absolutism of the Hegelian school 
 — wavelets, moreover, of a common distinctive character in that 
 they are left from the ebb of two tides. The Materialism which 
 followed Hegelianism with quick reactionary flow was itself 
 counter-crossed by new currents: the resultant gives two anti- 
 thetical movements in present-day thought — the Absolutist, 
 or that of "Objective Idealism," and the Pragmatic in which may 
 be classed generically the humanistic and anti-intellectualistic 
 systems whatever may be their specific differences. 
 
 Eucken will not call himself a Pragmatist, yet his assertion that 
 the "human point of departure" is "the only possible [one] for the 
 work of Knowledge," 294 his denial of the trustworthiness of our 
 sense perceptions and his insistence on action as the indispensable 
 instrument of truth connect him intimately with the pragmatic 
 leaders. He acknowledges his affinities with them and even goes 
 so far as to say "we are at one with the main atmosphere of 
 Pragmatism." 205 On the other hand he touches the Absolutist 
 
 -" Knowledge and Life, p. Sf>. Erkennen and Leben, op. rit., p. 46. 
 
 295 Knowledge and Life, p. 94. Erkennen und Leben. p. 51. Eucken has 
 treated, al Bome length, of Pragmatism. Sec in particular Geiatige StrOm- 
 ungen; Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauungj Einftlhrung in eine Philos- 
 ophic dea Geiateslebens; Erkennen und Leben. The following passagea give « 
 fair indication of Ids attitude towards it. 
 
 In Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung be writes: "Bd socher 
 inneren Erhohung und mit soldier Porderung einer neuen Welt trennt sieh dec 
 Aktivismua von allem bloasen Voluntariamua und Pragmatiamus, denen er 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 107 
 
 position when he maintains that truth is reached by a transcendence 
 of the difference between subject and object. 296 
 
 We are not concerned here with intellectualistic Absolutism. 
 The Scholastic doctrine of the real duality between subject and 
 object, which we shall touch on again later, is a refutation of the 
 theory. The third distinct system which offers us an interpretation 
 of reality today lies in the "via media" between the other two: 
 it is indeed that "golden mean" which is so attractive to the sane 
 man of every age, whether in philosophy or outside of it. This 
 third — Scholastic Realism — in its theory of knowledge falls in no 
 way short of Pragmatism in emphasing the native energy of the 
 soul; here, too, "immediacies" find a prominent place, but they are 
 ascribed to a different activity from that to which Pragmatists 
 attribute them. And it is just at this point that the line of 
 demarcation between Scholastics and Anti-Intellectualists is 
 strongly drawn. The "immediacy" of the Scholastic system is 
 held to issue not from the lower activities of the soul but from the 
 higher — not from instinct, therefore, nor from feeling but from 
 reason. 
 
 We shall compare, by carefully chosen selections, the Scholastic 
 position on this point with the Pragmatic, and then estimate the 
 
 nahezustehen scheint, und mit denen er die Verneinung gemeinsam hat. 
 Denn er teilt mit ihnen die Ablehnung einer intellektualistischen Lebens- 
 gestaltung, die den Intellekt aus eignem Vermogen Wahrheit finden und sie 
 dem iibrigen Leben zufiihren lasst, mit ihnen will er die Wahrheit auf ein 
 urspriinglicheres und wesenhafteres Tun begriinden. . . . Auch der 
 Pragmatismus gestaltet die Welt und das Leben mehr aus der Lage und den 
 Bedlirfnissen des Menschen, als dass er die geistige Tatigkeit zur Selbstandig- 
 keit gegeniiber dem Menschen erhobe und von hier aus eine Priif ung und Sich- 
 tung seines Lebensbefundes vollzoge." Op. cit., p. 144. (Life's Basis, pp. 
 256, 257.) 
 
 In Erkennen und Leben he discusses the subject more fully: two selections 
 will suffice for our purpose: "Aber es ist nicht zu verkennen, dass dem starken 
 Eindruck, den der Pragmatismus eine Zeitlang machte, schon wieder ein 
 Rlickschlag gefolgt ist, und dass sich mehr und mehr Bedenken wider ihn 
 erheben. Diese Bedenken dringen von einzelnen Punkten schliesslich zum 
 Kern der Behauptung vor, und es ist uberall eben das, worin der Pragmatismus 
 seine Starke sieht, was sich ihm schliesslich zum Nachteil wendet." Erkennen 
 und Leben, op. cit., pp. 39 sqq. Knowledge and Life, p. 74. 
 
 "Wir sind uberzeugt, mit solcher Aufstellung der Lebenserhohung als einea 
 Priifsteins der Wahrheit mit vielen Pragmatisten, ja mit dem Hauptzuge des 
 Pragmatismus zusammenzugehen. Aber dann mtissen wir ihm den Vorwurf 
 machen, dass er Lebenspflege und Lebenserhohung, Ausschuiuckung einer 
 gegebenen und Erringung einer neuen Welt, Ntltzliches und Gutes nicht zur 
 Geniige scheidet." Op. cit., p. 51. Knowledge and Life, pp. 94, 95. 
 
 298 The affinity between the "Geistesleben" and the central conception of 
 Absolutism has been already pointed out. We are now dealing with the 
 theory of knowledge and it is here that Eucken is pragmatic. 
 
108 EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 relative value of the "immediacy" in each. In our exposition of 
 Scholasticism we have taken the extracts from Cardinal Newman 
 because he has treated of the point in detail; as the exponent of 
 Pragmatism we have elected James as being a good representative 
 of the current tendency to make feeling of paramount importance 
 in philosophy. 
 
 Scholastic Theory of Intuition, or Reason-" Immediacies" 
 
 That intuition is our highest and surest means of reaching truth 
 needs no demonstration. Cardinal Newman, in his Grammar of 
 Assent, has dwelt at length on the difference between the process 
 of formal reasoning and the intuitive power by which truths are 
 immediately apprehended. When the intuition is due directly 
 to the special nature of the data presented to the mind he terms 
 it Speculation: "Speculation is one of those words which, in the 
 vernacular, have so different a sense from what they bear in 
 philosophy. It is commonly taken to mean a conjecture, or a 
 venture on chances; but its proper meaning is mental sight, or the 
 contemplation of mental operations and their results as opposed 
 to experience, experiment, or sense, analogous to its meaning in 
 Shakespeare's line, 'Thou hast no speculation in those eyes.' . . . 
 Of course mathematical investigations and truths are the subjects 
 of this speculative assent. So are legal judgments, and constitu- 
 tional maxims, as far as they appeal to us for assent. So are the 
 determinations of science; so are the principles, disputations, and 
 doctrines of theology." 297 
 
 When the intuition does not arise from the intrinsic nature of 
 the things under consideration but is realized in consciousness 
 "without conscious media," even "without conscious antecedents," 
 in a way that defies analysis, it is, according to Newman, an exercise 
 of what he terms the Illative Sense or Faculty. 298 
 
 "Judgment ... in all concrete matter is the architectonic 
 faculty; and what may be called the Illative Sense, or right judg- 
 ment in ratiocination, is one branch of it." 299 
 
 297 Newman, Grammar of Assent, p. 73. It must be noticed that Newman 
 attaches a signification to speculation which is wider than that of intuition, 
 in the strict sense. 
 
 m "Illative Sense, a use of the word 'sense' parallel to our use of it in 
 'good sense,' 'common sense,' 'a sense of beauty.' " Newman, op. cit., p. 345. 
 It is thus an intellectual activity. 
 
 »»Op. cit., p. 34*. 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 109 
 
 The following extracts throw light upon this second class of 
 reason- "immediacies." As the personal element enters in they 
 have not necessarily the marks of objectivity and universality 
 which characterize the philosophical intuitions in the stricter sense : 
 in fact though they are reason-immediacies they are not always 
 frif^-immediacies : in other words, man may err. 
 
 "I say, then, that our most natural mode of reasoning is, not 
 from propositions to propositions, but from things to things, from 
 concrete to concrete, from wholes to wholes. Whether the conse- 
 quents, at which we arrive from the antecedents with which we 
 start, lead us to assent or only towards assent, those antecedents 
 commonly are not recognized by us as subjects for analysis; nay, 
 often are only indirectly recognized as antecedents at all. Not 
 only is the inference with its process ignored, but the antecedent 
 also. To the mind itself the reasoning is a simple divination or 
 'prediction; as it literally is in the instance of enthusiasts, who 
 mistake their own thoughts for inspirations. This is the mode in 
 which we ordinarily reason, dealing with things directly, and as they 
 stand, one by one, in the concrete, with an intrinsic and personal 
 power, not a conscious adoption of an artificial instrument or 
 expedient; and it is especially exemplified both in uneducated men, 
 and in men of genius, — in those who know nothing of intellectual 
 aids and rules, and in those who care nothing for them, — in those 
 who are either without or above mental discipline. . . . Some- 
 times, I say, this illative faculty is nothing short of genius. Such 
 seems to have been Newton's perception of truths mathematical 
 and physical, though proof was absent. . . . Such is the gift of the 
 calculating boys who now and then make their appearance, who 
 seem to have certain short-cuts to conclusions, which they cannot 
 explain to themselves." 300 
 
 "It is to the living mind that we must look for the means of using 
 correctly principles of whatever kind, facts or doctrines, experiences 
 or testimonies, true or probable, and of discerning what conclusion 
 from these is necessary, suitable, or expedient, when they are taken 
 for granted; and this, either by means of a natural gift, or from 
 mental formation and practise and a long familiarity with those 
 various starting-points. . . . The mind contemplates them without 
 the use of words, by a process which cannot be analyzed. Thus it 
 was that Bacon separated the physical system of the world from 
 the theological; thus that Butler connected together the moral 
 system with the religious. Logical formulas could never have 
 sustained the reasonings involved in such investigations." 301 
 
 300 Op. cit., pp. 330-333. Italics ours. 
 • 10 ' Op. cit., pp. 360, 361. Italics ours. 
 
110 Rudolf Euckbn and the Spiritual Life 
 
 We may also notice the following : 
 
 "... thought is too keen and manifold, its sources are too 
 remote and hidden, its path too personal, delicate, and circuitous, 
 its subject-matter too various and intricate, to admit of the tram- 
 mels of any language, of whatever subtlety and of whatever 
 compass." 302 
 
 "That there are cases, in which evidence, not sufficient for a 
 scientific proof, is nevertheless sufficient for assent and certitude, 
 is the doctrine of Locke, as of most men. . . . that supra-logical 
 judgment, which is the warrant for our certitude about them, is not 
 mere common-sense, but the true healthy action of our ratiocina- 
 tive powers, an action more subtle and more comprehensive than 
 the mere appreciation of a syllogistic argument." 303 
 
 Pragmatic Theory of Feeling-' "Immediacies" 
 
 In Varieties of Religious Experience James writes : 
 
 "But the whole array of our instances leads to a conclusion 
 something like this : It is as if there were in the human conscious- 
 ness a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception 
 of what we may call 'something there,' more deep and more general 
 than any of the special and particular 'senses' by which the 
 current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally 
 revealed. ... So far as religious conceptions were able to 
 touch this reality-feeling, they would be believed in in spite of 
 criticism, even though they might be so vague and remote as to be 
 almost unimaginable, even though they might be such non- 
 entities in point of whatness, as Kant makes the objects of his 
 moral theology to be. [Examples of what he terms "sense of 
 presence" follow.] ... If we look on man's whole mental life as it 
 exists, on the life of men that lies in them apart from their learning 
 and science, and that they inwardly and privately follow, we have 
 to confess that the part of it of which rationalism can give an 
 account is relatively superficial. It is the part that has the prestige 
 undoubtedly, for it has the loquacity, it can challenge you for 
 proofs, and chop logic, and put you down with words. But it 
 will fail to convince or convert you all the same, if your dumb 
 intuitions are opposed to its conclusions. If you have intuitions 
 at all, they come from a deeper level of your nature than the 
 loquacious level which rationalism inhabits. Your whole sub- 
 conscious life, your impulses, your faiths, your needs, your divina- 
 tions, have prepared the premises, of which your consciousness 
 now feels the weight of the result; and something in you absolutely 
 knows that that result must be truer than any logic-chopping 
 
 'Op. cit ., 284, 
 
 'Op. rit.. pp. 816 sqq. Italics ours. 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 111 
 
 rationalistic talk, however clever, that may contradict it. . . . 
 The unreasoned and immediate assurance is the deep thing in us, 
 the reasoned argument is but a surface exhibition. Instinct leads 
 intelligence does but follow." 304 
 
 In Essays on Popular Philosophy we find: 
 
 "What, in short, has authority to debar us from trusting our 
 religious demands? Science as such assuredly has no authority, 
 for she can only say what is, not what is not; . . . now, when I 
 speak of trusting our religious demands, just what do I mean by 
 'trusting?' ... to trust our religious demands means first of 
 all to live in the light of them, and to act as if the invisible world 
 which they suggest were real. ... If this life be not a real 
 fight, in which something is eternally gained for the universe 
 by success, it is no better than a game of private theatricals from 
 which one may withdraw at will. But it feels like area! fight. . . . 
 The deepest thing in our nature is this Binnenleben (as a German 
 doctor lately has called it), this dumb region of the heart in which 
 we dwell alone with our willingnesses and unwillingnesses, our 
 faiths and fears. As through the cracks and crannies of caverns 
 those waters exude from the earth's bosom which then form the 
 fountain-heads of springs, so in these crepuscular depths of per- 
 sonality the sources of all our outer deeds and decisions take their 
 rise. Here is our deepest organ of communication with the nature 
 of things; and compared with these concrete movements of our 
 soul all abstract statements and scientific arguments — the veto, 
 for example, which the strict positivist pronounces upon our 
 faith — sound to us like mere chatterings of the teeth." 305 
 
 A comparison of the extracts from Cardinal Newman with those 
 from Professor James reveals how closely, at moments, the later 
 writer approaches the earlier. James recognized the native 
 energy of the human mind, but his anti-intellectualism forced 
 him to attribute to blind feeling what could result only from reason. 
 When he states that "your impulses, your faiths, your needs, your 
 divinations, have prepared the premises, of which your conscious- 
 ness now feels the weight of the result; and something in you 
 ansolutely knows that that result must be truer than any logic- 
 chopping rationalistic talk, however clever, that may contradict 
 it," he is but repeating what Newman has already said about that 
 "supra-logical judgment" which is "the true healthy action of our 
 ratiocinative powers," and he is undoubtedly right; but when he 
 
 304 Varieties of Religious Experience, New York, 1902, pp. 58-74. [talica 
 are those of the author. 
 
 305 Essays in Popular Philosophy. Is Life Worth Living? New York, 1899, 
 pp. 57-62. Italics are those of the author. 
 
112 KUDOLF EuCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 passes on further to describe "intuitions" as "inarticulate feelings 
 of reality" we are upon the error of Bergson and Pragmatists in 
 general. 
 
 We have not to undertake a criticism of Pragmatism here; the 
 work has been ably done by others: one point, however, may be 
 briefly referred to — it is the denial of the power of the intellect to 
 reach objective truth. James is unmistakably clear in the 
 expression of his views : 
 
 "Objective evidence and certitude are doubtless very fine ideals 
 to play with, but where on this moonlit and dream-visited planet 
 are they found? I am, therefore, myself a complete empiricist so 
 far as my theory of human knowledge goes. . . . There is but 
 one indefectibly certain truth, and that is the truth that pyrrhon- 
 istic scepticism itself leaves standing — the truth that the present 
 phenomenon of consciousness exists." 306 
 
 It is interesting to find, in Geistige Strbmungen, the following 
 trenchant criticism of the pragmatic notion of truth, from Eucken 
 himself: 
 
 "Der starke Eindruck des Pragmatismus stammt namentlich 
 daher, dass hier die gewohnliche Betrachtungsweise umgekehrt 
 wird; wie aber, wenn dabei der Begriff der Wahrheit selbst auf den 
 Kopf zu stehen kommt? So aber geschieht es in Wahrheit . . . 
 Wahrheit ist nur als Selbstzweck moglich, eine 'instrumentale* 
 Wahrheit is keine Wahrheit." 307 
 
 We fully endorse the critic's words — that in Pragmatism "the 
 idea of truth itself is reversed and ends by standing on its head;" 
 
 306 Essays in Popular Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 14 sqq. 
 
 He saw fit to modify his dogmatic assertion, somewhat, in his volume on 
 Pragmatism: "Our ready-made ideal framework for all sorts of possible 
 objects follows from the very structure of our thinking. We can no more 
 play fast and loose with these abstract relations than we can do so with our 
 sense-experiences. They coerce vs\ we must treat them consistently, whether 
 or not we like the results." Pragmatism, New York, 1907, pp. £10 sqq. 
 Italics ours. 
 
 Lovejoy, in the journal of Philosophy, commenting on this writes: 
 "This obviously, is no doctrine that axioms are postulates, or that behind 
 every 'can't' there lies a 'won't;' it is the doctrine that axioms are necessities 
 and that the action of voluntary choice in belief is always limited by a perman- 
 ent system of a priori principles of possibility and impossibility inhering in the 
 nature of intellect, ... It is compatible, at most, with the opinion that 
 there are not so numerous, nor so useful, axioms as some dogmatic philosophers 
 have supposed, and that, when axioms fail us, postulates must in many cases 
 be resorted to." The Thirteen Pragmatisms (II); Journal of Philosophy, 
 Psychology and Scientific Methods, vol. 5, 1908, Jan.. p. 29. 
 
 307 Op. cit., pp. 49, 50. Italics ours. (Main Currents of Modern Thought, 
 pp. 77, 78.) 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 113 
 
 but while so doing we are irresistibly drawn to think of the man 
 of fable who, though living in a glass house, would throw stones. 
 
 Conclusion Drawn 
 
 Eucken condemns with justice the pragmatic conception of 
 truth and objects, in particular, to the subjective character of the 
 religious basis of pragmatism, but his own truth-standard and his 
 method of reaching it are condemned a fortiori by his words, since 
 the "immediacies" described by James are at least more intelligible 
 than that on which Eucken seeks to ground religion. 
 
 He is at one with James in denying the power of the intellect 
 but insists, most illogically, as has been already pointed out, on 
 the axiomatic character and the objective value of the Gemiit or 
 Unmittelbarkeit . 
 
 We are here confronted with three systems of thought — 
 Scholastic Realism, Pragmatism and Activism. 308 
 
 The first, following the Scholastics, owns 
 
 1 that there are necessary, universal truths; 
 
 2 that there are contingent truths, objectively valid; 
 
 3 that the human intellect by the power of reason is able 
 
 (a) to reach both classes of truths, i. e., to attain to 
 certainty; 
 
 (b) to know that it has reached truth — this is certi- 
 tude. 
 
 The second denies 
 
 1 all necessary truths; 
 
 2 the power of the intellect to reach truth; 
 
 3 all philosophical certainty; nevertheless it claims 
 certitude, based on the revelations of supposed feelings, 
 and reached by a deliberate act of the will. Faith, 
 not in supernatural revelation, but in the supremacy of 
 feeling as the guide of life, is the pet maxim of Prag- 
 matism. 309 
 
 The third maintains 
 
 1 that truth is eternal and unchangeable, yet in the 
 exposition of the Geistesleben destroys the significance 
 of the word "truth;" 
 
 308 It has been objected that Pragmatism is not a system but we use the 
 word for convenience sake. 
 
 309 For the extent to which the criterion is pushed see Essays in Popular 
 Philosophy — The Sentiment of Rationality, pp. OS sqq., op. cit. 
 
114 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 2 that neither intellect, feeling, nor will, whether in isola- 
 tion, or in combination, can serve as the basis of phil- 
 osophy or religion: they cannot reach objective truth; 
 
 3 that man can and does, although imperfectly, lay hold 
 on eternal truth. Certainty, therefore, is here based 
 on — ? 
 
 Eucken has, in fact, cut the ground from under his own feet in 
 the philosophic field: certainty cannot be attained until the sods 
 are restored, in other words, until the general trustworthiness of 
 the revelations of our faculties is re-affirmed. 
 
 A comparison of the above theories reveals the first and most 
 essential condition of all knowledge: it is certainty — certainty of 
 some facts, some truths. Unless this foundation is solid beneath 
 our feet we cannot take a step forward. James insists on personal 
 certitude regarding the "reality -feelings;" Eucken proclaims the 
 certainty of the "Gemuf ': "the corner stone of all philosophical 
 thought and the axiom of axioms is the fact of a world-embracing 
 spiritual life." 310 This may be called the objective point of 
 view, but the subjective is inseparable from it, i. e., in this 
 certainty is implied the trustworthiness of the mental state 
 through which the "fact" is known. Eucken's "corner stone" 
 has itself to rest on something : this something, as has been repeat- 
 edly pointed out, is the general trustworthiness of our faculties. 
 Here we have indeed, a "double-aspect" fact, for the trustworthi- 
 ness of our faculties and the certainty that their revelations are 
 trustworthy are but subjective and objective "aspects" of a 
 fundamental and inevitable necessity of our very nature. James 
 is willing to "trust" his "reality-feelings," but on what grounds 
 does he elect one species of mental activity as "trustworthy," 
 while discriminating against the others? This is wholly unphil- 
 osophical. The Scholastics posit the general trustworthiness of 
 our faculties, both sensuous and intellectual, and by so doing offer 
 an interpretation of reality based on the necessary conditions of 
 human knowledge. By this first affirmation they posit, indirectly, 
 the existence of objects external to us, revealed through the 
 senses; also universal, necessary truths disclosed through the 
 intellect and a vast body of contingent truths made known through 
 experience. Thus the universe, secured from theoretical destruc- 
 
 310 Main Currents of Modern Thought, op. <it., p. 183. (G. StrOmungen, 
 97.) 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 115 
 
 tion, exists in its own right, independent of man's theories, though 
 fit object for them; the structure of human knowledge rests on an 
 unshakeable foundation; we ourselves are saved from mental 
 bankruptcy and moral bewilderment. The natural law, evincing 
 itself in the laws of science, the moral law revealing itself in the 
 conscience of man are seen to be parallel manifestations of that one 
 eternal law which governs alike the tiniest leaf, fluttering to the 
 earth, and the planets revolving in unswerving course, and which 
 is itself the Will of Divine Wisdom that creation be a cosmos, not 
 a chaos. 
 
 Lest we should seem to be drawing conclusions too wide for our 
 premise we cite the words of Balmes : 
 
 "All philosophical questions are in some manner involved in 
 that of certainty. W T hen we have completely unfolded this, 
 we have examined under one aspect or another all that human 
 reason can conceive of God, man, and the universe. At first sight 
 it may perhaps seem to be the simple foundation of the scientific 
 structure; but in this foundation, if we carefully examine it, we 
 shall see the whole edifice represented: it is a plane whereon is 
 projected, visibly and in fair perspective, the whole body it is to 
 support." 311 
 
 Having taken for granted the general trustworthiness of our 
 faculties we may, if we will, inquire into the nature of certainty and 
 its basis — not question it, however, or we would approach the vicious 
 circles of Descartes. 
 
 Nature and Basis of Certainty 
 According to Balmes certainty is "the spontaneous product of 
 man's nature, and is annexed to the direct act of the intellectual 
 and sensitive faculties. It is a condition necessary to the exercise 
 of both, and without it life were a chaos." 312 
 
 And again: 
 
 "The certainty which is prior to all examination is not blind; 
 on the contrary, it springs either from the clearness of the intellec- 
 tual vision, or from an instinct conformable to reason: it is not 
 opposed to reason, but is its basis." 313 
 
 The following passage throws so much light on the question 
 that we cite it at length : 
 
 "That we have certainty, common sense assures us, but what is 
 
 311 Fundamental Philosophy, translated by Brownson, Vol. 1, p. 4. N< 
 York, 1903. 
 
 312 Op. cit., p. 14. 
 
 313 Op. cit., pp. 12, 13. 
 
116 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 its basis, and how it is acquired, are two difficult questions, which 
 it is for philosophy to answer. ... It will greatly conduce to 
 the due determination of our ideas, carefully to distinguish between 
 the existence of certainty, its basis, and the mode in which it is 
 acquired. Its existence is an indisputable fact; its basis the object 
 of philosophical researches, and the mode of acquiring it frequently 
 a concealed phenomenon not open to observation. That bodies 
 exist is a fact that no man of sane mind can doubt. No questions 
 raised upon this point can ever shake our firm conviction in the 
 existence, without us, of what we call the corporeal world. This 
 conviction is a phenomenon of our existence. Explain it, perhaps 
 we cannot; but we certainly cannot deny it; we submit to it as to an 
 inevitable necessity. What is the basis of certainty? Here we 
 have not a simple fact, but a question solved by every philosopher 
 in his own way. Descartes and Malebranche recur to the veracity 
 of God; Locke and Condillac to the peculiar character and evolu- 
 tion of certain sensations. How does man acquire this certainty? 
 He knows not: he had it before reflecting on it; he is astounded to 
 hear it made a matter of dispute, and he might never have sus- 
 pected it could be asked, why we are certain that what affects our 
 senses exists. . . . Philosophy should begin by explaining, not 
 by disputing the fact of certainty. If we are certain of nothing, 
 it is absolutely impossible for us to advance a single step in any 
 science, or to take any part whatever in the affairs of life. . . . 
 Certainty is to us a happy necessity; nature imposes it, and philos- 
 ophers do not cast off nature. ... In sound philosophy, then, 
 the question turns not upon the existence of certainty, but upon 
 its motives, and the means of acquiring it. It is an inheritance 
 of which we cannot divest ourselves, although we repudiate those 
 very titles which guaranty its possession to us. . . . Prior to 
 all systems, humanity was in possession of this certainty, so, also, 
 is every individual, although he may never during his whole life 
 have once asked himself what the world is, what bodies are, or 
 in what sensation, thought, and will consist. . . . Since inquiries 
 with regard to certainty were first instituted, it has remained the 
 same with all men, even with those who disputed it. . . . We 
 must, in discussing certainty, guard against the feverish desire of 
 shaking the foundations of human reason. We should, in this 
 class of questions, seek a thorough knowledge of the principles of 
 science, and the laws which govern the development of our mind. 
 To labor to destroy them is to mistake the object of true philos- 
 ophy: we have only to make them a matter of observation, just as 
 we do those of the material world, without any intention of dis- 
 turbing the admirable order prevailing in the universe." 314 
 
 Our purpose here is not to make a detailed examination of 
 Scholasticism, but rather to expose its basic principles and direct 
 
 Op. tit., pp. 7-12. 
 
Rudolf Euckbn and the Spiritual Life 117 
 
 attention to the broad outline. We shall not therefore investigate 
 the question of sense perception, nor unfold the theory of the 
 active and passive intellect (intellectus agens, intellectuspatiens), 
 nor inquire into the metaphysical conditions of knowledge "ex 
 parte objecti." All these points are indirectly, but satisfactorily, 
 posited in the general affirmation of the trustworthiness of our 
 faculties. If the senses reveal an object to us, and the intellect 
 seizes upon its quiditas or, in other words, discloses its essential 
 nature, it follows that the object thus made known is in itself et 
 unuvi et cognoscibile. The mode of action of the intellect in 
 cognition has been treated of extensively; moreover, Eucken, 
 whose challenge we are answering, does not attack the explanation 
 of the activity of the intellect, but rather the activity itself as a 
 means of objective truth. He does not concern himself with the 
 how of our intellectual knowledge since he denies that truth is 
 reached through the intellect; hence his main assault on Scholas- 
 ticism is directed towards the traditional conception of truth. 316 
 Since our aim is to afford an opportunity of comparison between 
 the system which Eucken deems naive and the Activism brought 
 forward to supplant it we shall cite at some length from Scholastics, 
 both mediaeval and modern. We have chosen this method of 
 exposition as the fairest. Scholastic writings are most frequently 
 criticised en masse and condemned unread. 
 
 Kleutgen in his Exposition and Defence of Scholastic Philosophy 
 has treated at length of the subject now under discussion — the 
 basis of certainty. We have selected three extracts dealing 
 chiefly with certainty in the matter of necessary truths and first 
 principles. 
 
 (1) According to Scholastic teaching truth itself is the constrain- 
 ing force: it is impossible for us not to hold them true: moreover, 
 we know these truths to be such that no one not deprived of 
 reason can doubt them. St. Thomas points out that not only are 
 these principles essentially true, but also we have necessarily the 
 knowledge of their truth. 
 
 "Avant tout la pensee pure, qui fait abstraction de toute con- 
 naissance experimentale, est en nous accompagnee d'une adhesion 
 
 316 For mode of activity of the intellect refer to St. Thomas: Sum. I; q. 85; 
 Sum I,q. 54, a. 4 (in response) . Quaest., q. 2, art. 6; q. 10, a. 4, 5, 6. See also 
 Maher, op. cit., pp. 305-313 (bibliography is given on p. 313). and Kleutgen, 
 Phil. Scolastique, Vol. I, Chap. I, IV, and for a more detailed account of 
 Scholastic theory of Knowledge refer to Theories of Knowledge, L. Walker, 
 S. J. London and New York, 1910, pp. 340 sqq. 
 
118 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 ou d'un assentiment ferme et inebranlable. Or, si nous demandons 
 pourquoi nous devons tenir ces pensees pour vraies, nous trouvons 
 d'abord . . . [que] c'est qu'elles sont conformes aux principes 
 d'apres lesquelles nous devons penser. Mais pourquoi regardons- 
 nous comme vrais ces principes eux-memes? . . . Le motif 
 pour lequel nous les admettons, c'est leur verite qui apparatt 
 manifestement a notre raison, c'est a-dire leur evidence et pas 
 autre chose. Aussitot que nous nous les representons, nous 
 sommes contraints de les tenir pour vrais; toutefois ce n'est pas 
 en vertu d'une propension aveugle de notre nature, ni a cause de la 
 connaissance de quelque autre chose qui nous en garantisse la 
 verite, mais parce que nous percevons cette verite elle-meme et 
 qu'il nous est impossible de ne pas la percevoir . . . Suppose, 
 par exemple, que nous ne sachions pas si dans la realite il existe 
 des lignes droites, nous savons neanmoins que des lignes droites, 
 s'il en existe, ne peuvent se couper qu'en un seul point. . . . 
 Nous sommes certains de la verite de ces jugements, dis-je, parce 
 que nous voyons cette verite nous-memes et que nous ne pouvons 
 pas nous empecher de la voir, toutes les fois que nous nous repre- 
 sentons ces jugements; mais ce n'est d'aucune maniere, parce 
 que nous savons que tous les autres hommes les tiennent pour 
 vrais. Au contraire, nous concluons plutot de l'evidence de ces 
 verites que nous ne sommes pas seuls a les regarder comme vraies, 
 mais que tous les autres pensent comme nous : car nous connaissons 
 en meme temps ces verites comme telles que tout etre capable de 
 les concevoir doit en comprendre l'evidence et que personne ne peut 
 les nier, a moins d'etre prive de l'usage de la raison. Si done nous 
 regardons comme atteint de folie l'homme qui nierait ces principes 
 ou pretendrait en douter, ce n'est pas . . . parce qu'il pense 
 autrement que le reste des hommes, mais parce qu'il ne comprend 
 pas ce que tout homme jouissant de la raison doit necessairement 
 comprendre. . . . Voila ce que disait Saint Thomas . . . , 
 quand il soutenait que l'esprit ne connait pas seulement des choses 
 vraies, mais encore la verite de sa connaissance, en comprenant 
 qu'il est conforme a la nature de sa raison de connaitre les choses 
 telles qu'elles sont. Tant qu'il ne s'agit que de la pensee pure 
 et abstraite, on ne peut revoquer en doute la verite de cette asser- 
 tion. Aussi le saint docteur releve-t-il que non-seulement ces 
 principes de la pensee sont essentiellement vrais, mais encore que 
 nous avons necessairement la connaissance de leur verite. 316 
 
 (2) Certainty springs from the intimate perception that our 
 thought is true, i. e., corresponds to the being possible and actual of 
 things. St. Thomas further points out what St. Augustine had 
 already spoken of, viz., that characteristic of intellectual knowl- 
 
 318 La Philosophic Scolastique Exposee et Defendue, translated by Sierp, 
 Paris, 1868, Vol. I, pp. 507-509. 
 
Rudolf Euckbn and the Spiritual Life 119 
 
 edge which causes us not only to perceive the truth but by the 
 same light of reason by which we perceive it to know that we 
 perceive it. As Suarez says, true science only exists if we know 
 that we know. 
 
 "Quelle est done la raison qui me force a juger que des lignes 
 droites peuvent coiincider, ou, si elles se coupent, que ce ne peut 
 6tre que par un seul point? Evidemment, il n'y en a point d'autre, 
 sinon parce que je vois que la chose est ainsi et qu'elle ne peut 
 6tre autrement. N'avons-nous pas la conscience claire et distincte 
 que nous connaissons et que par cette connaissance, et non par 
 d'autres raisons, nous sommes forces de croire que les lignes droites 
 sont possibles et que les propositions citees doivent se verifier en 
 elles, des qu'elles existent en realite? La necessite de penser 
 ainsi ne resulte done que de la perception intime dont nous avons 
 conscience que cette pensee, et non une autre, est vraie, e'est-a-dire 
 repond a l'etre (possible ou actuel) des choses. II est aussi 
 absolument faux que, pour etre certains, nous ayons besoin de 
 soumettre nos pensees necessaires a l'examen d'une autre pensee 
 qui ne serait egalement que subjectivement necessaire, et qu'ainsi 
 nous ne puissions jamais parvenir au terme de ces examens 
 successifs. Sans doute, si nos concepts etaient composes de 
 plusieurs autres concepts, si les jugements qu'il s'agit d'examiner 
 etaient derives d'autres jugements, nous devrions revenir aux 
 concepts simples et aux principes qu'ils forment; mais parvenus 
 a ces principes nous constatons en nous non-seulement la necessite 
 de les penser, mais encore la raison de cette necessite, la perception 
 claire de leur verite. Voila pourquoi Saint Thomas dit dans un 
 passage deja cite: Proprium est horum principiorvm, quod non 
 solum necesse sit, ea per se vera esse, sed etiam necesse est videre 
 quod sint per se vera. Longtemps avant le Docteur angelique, 
 S. Augustin avait parle de ce caractere de la connaissance intellect- 
 uelle en disant que dans la meme lumiere de la raison dans laquelle 
 nous percevons le vrai, nous comprenons en meme temps que 
 nous percevons le vrai. Les scolastiques posterieurs n'ont pas 
 perdu de vue ce commencement de toute connaissance certaine. 
 'La veritable science,' dit Suarez, 'n'existe que si Ton sait que 
 Ton sait; car la perfection de la connaissance intellectuelle consiste 
 en ce que (ramenee a ces premiers commencements) elle se revele 
 (dans ceux-ci) a elle-meme (comme vraie).' " 317 
 
 (3) According to St. Augustine the rule and motive of all our 
 natural knowledge is to be sought for in reason itself, because 
 reason can take its own nature and its knowledge as objects of its 
 reflexion. We find absolutely the same principle in St. Thomas. 
 
 317 Op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 57, 58. "Nunquam acquiritur vera scientia, nisi 
 quis sciat se scire: nam scientia debet esse perfectum intellectuale lumen, 
 quod seipsum manifestat." Metaph., disp. I, sect. 4. 
 
120 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 It is by the light of reason that the mind knows — the light of 
 reason which renders the mind an image of the uncreated Truth. 
 St. Thomas finds the cause of certitude in the reasonable nature 
 of every man. 
 
 "Tout ce que nous connaissons des choses qui depassent les 
 sens, disait St. Augustin, nous le connaissons dans la lumiere qui 
 brille au-dedans de l'homme, et tout ce que nous apprenons de 
 ces objets par le temoignage d'autrui, nous le jugeons, pour l'adniet- 
 tre ou le rejeter, par cette me'me lumiere inherente a notre nature. 
 Or, cette lumiere qui demeure au-dedans de tout homme, qu'est- 
 elle autre chose que la raison individuelle? C'est par consequent 
 dans la raison individuelle que St. Augustin trouve la regie par 
 laquelle nous discernons la verite de l'erreur en tout ce que 
 d'autres nous apprennent sur les choses supersensibles. En 
 d'autres endroits le me'me docteur de l'Eglise, revenant sur ce 
 sujet, ajoute que tout ce que nous disons de la raison elle-m£me 
 ne nous est connu que par la ni&me lumiere de la raison; car par 
 cette lumiere nous ne connaissons pas seulement la verite, mais 
 nous savons aussi que nous possedons cette connaissance. II 
 enseigne de la maniere la plus nette que la regie et le motif de 
 toutes nos connaissances naturelles doivent §tre cherchees dans la 
 raison elle-meme, parce qu'elle peut prendre pour objet de ses 
 reflexions sa propre nature et sa connaissance. Nous retrouvons 
 absolument les memes principes dans les ecrits de saint Thomas. 
 Suivant lui, toute science se forme en nous, parce que, partant des 
 premiers principes, nous progressons dans la connaissance par le 
 moyen des deductions. . . . C'est en effet par les principes 
 que nous percevons intimement non-seulement leur propre verite 
 et leur propre certitude, mais encore la necessite d'adherer avec 
 certitude a tout ce qui en decoule necessairement et de rejeter 
 tout ce qui y est contraire, tandis que le reste est du domaine des 
 opinions libres. Or, la faculte par laquelle l'esprit connait ces 
 principes, c'est la lumiere de la raison que Dieu lui a donnee et 
 qui le rend image de la verite increee. Toute certitude de notre 
 science a done sa source dans la lumiere de la raison que Dieu 
 nous a donnee au-dedans de nous-memes. . . . Nous avons 
 deja examine la doctrine du Docteur Angelique, selon laquelle 
 notre intelligence ne possede pleinement la verite que si elle 
 connait non-seulement la chose connue et sa propre connaissance, 
 mais aussi l'accord de sa connaissance avec l'objet. Or, d'apres 
 St. Thomas toujours, l'esprit est apte a connaitre cet accord, 
 parce que non-seulement il percoit sa connaissance, e'est-a-dire, 
 le phenomene par lequel il connait, mais qu'il se connait encore 
 lui-meme, ou sa nature propre. . . . [Saint Thomas] en trouve 
 la cause [i. e., de certitude] dans la nature raisonnable de chaque 
 homme." 318 
 
 Op. cit., I, pp. 541-543. 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 121 
 
 Means of Perceiving Truth 
 
 According to Balmes he who seeks to acquire complete and 
 accurate ideas upon matters relating to the first principles of 
 human knowledge must distinguish between the different means 
 by which truth is perceived. 
 
 These means are of different orders: to them correspond truths 
 of different orders. The three means are consciousness, evidence, 
 and intellectual instinct or common sense; to which correspond 
 truths of consciousness, necessary truths, and common-sense 
 truths. 
 
 "That means which we have called consciousness, or the intim- 
 ate sense of that which passes within us, that which we experience, 
 is independent of all others. Destroy evidence, destroy intel- 
 lectual instinct, yet consciousness remains. In order to feel, and 
 to be sure that we feel, and what we feel, we need only experience 
 . . . Consciousness is independent of all extrinsic testimony, 
 its necessity is inevitable, its force irresistible in producing cer- 
 tainty; it is infallible in what concerns only itself; if it exist it 
 must give testimony of itself; if it does not exist it cannot give 
 it." 319 
 
 The "intellectual light" or evidence by which necessary truths 
 are known is contrasted with the subjective testimony of con- 
 sciousness in the following passage. 
 
 "Evidence is always accompanied by the necessity, and con- 
 sequently, by the universality, of the truths which it attests. 
 There is no evidence of the contingent, except in so far as subjected 
 to a necessary principle. . . . That there is in me a being 
 which thinks, I know, not by evidence, but by consciousness. 
 That whatever thinks exists, I know, not by consciousness, but 
 by evidence. In both cases the certainty is absolute, irresistible; 
 but in the first it rests upon a particular, contingent fact; in the 
 second upon a universal and necessary truth. That I think is 
 certain for me, but not necessarily so for others; the disappear- 
 ance of my thought does not overturn the world of intelligences. 
 . . . But it is very different with the truths which are the object 
 of evidence. It is not necessary for me to think; but it is so neces- 
 sary for whatever thinks to exist, that no efforts of mine could 
 suffice to abstract this necessity for one moment. If, taking an 
 absurd position, I suppose the contrary, and imagine for an 
 instant the relation between thought and being to be cut short. 
 
 Op. cit., pp. 93 sqq. 
 
122 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 I break the chain which supports the order of the entire universe; 
 everything is reversed, thrown into confusion; and I know not 
 if what I see be chaos or nonentity. What has taken place? The 
 intellect has only suffered a contradiction, at the same time 
 affirming and denying thought, because it affirmed a thought to 
 which it denied existence. It has violated a universal and abso- 
 lutely necessasry law, the violation of which throws everything 
 into chaos. Not the certainty of the soul's existence, supported 
 by the testimony of consciousness, suffices to prevent the confusion : 
 the intellect by contradicting itself has denied itself; from its 
 insensate words, not being, but nonentity has resulted, not light, 
 but darkness; and this darkness cast over whatever exists or is 
 possible turns back upon it and involves it in eternal night." 320 
 
 The third means of acquiring truth — "intellectual instinct" or 
 "common sense," is one which Eucken holds in particular sus- 
 picion. This is our apology for the lengthy passages we are 
 about to cite. The difference of attitude with regard to matters 
 of general belief — arising logically from the different valuation of 
 the power of the human mind in the two systems — will be brought 
 out by comparing the following with the Scholastic doctrine of 
 "common sense:" In Life's Basis and Life's Ideal Eucken writes: 
 
 "The fact that man feels — as an immediate impression — free 
 in cases of hesitation between different possibilities has lost its 
 power to convince the individual of the Modern Age. For the 
 new mode of thought has evolved point for point along with an 
 increasing divergence from the naive manner of representation, 
 and it has won its greatest victories in opposition to this manner 
 of representation. The revolution that Copernicus accomplished 
 in the representation of the world has become typical of the whole 
 of modern work; and as regards our problem [viz., the nature of 
 Freedom] also, dissent from ordinary opinion is less a cause for 
 doubt than a recommendation."* 21 
 
 If Eucken consistently followed out the principle implied in the 
 italicized sentence he would promptly reach the "nihilisme in- 
 tellectuel" to which P. Pegues refers (vide, cit., p. 138.) 
 The Scholastic position is well indicated by Balmes : 
 "Common sense is an exceedingly vague expression. . . . We 
 must not, in order duly to appreciate the meaning of such expres- 
 sions, confine ourselves to their philosophical, and contemn their 
 vulgar meaning. In the latter there is often a profound philosophy; 
 for, in such cases, the vulgar sense is a kind of precious sediment 
 
 »Op. cit.. 97-99. 
 
 821 Life's Basis, op. cit., p. 175. Italics ours. Cf. also Tart I, Chap. IV, 
 pp. «7. 88. 
 
ElDOLF EUCKBN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 123 
 
 left by the flow of reason upon the word during many ages. . . . 
 The word common shows the objects of this criterion to be common 
 to all men, and consequently referable to the objective order, 
 since the purely subjective, as such, is limited to the individual, 
 and in no wise affects what is general. ... I believe the expres- 
 sion common sense to denote a law of our mind, apparently dif- 
 fering according to the different cases to which it applies, but in 
 reality and apart from its modifications, only one, always the 
 same, consisting in a natural inclination of our mind to give its 
 assent to some truths not attested by consciousness nor demon- 
 strated by reason, necessary to all men in order to satisfy the 
 wants of sensitive, intellectual, and moral life. . . . We at once 
 detect it in the case of truths immediately evident. The under- 
 standing neither does nor can prove them, and yet it must assent 
 to them, or perish like a flame that has nothing to feed upon. 
 The possession of one or more of these primitive truths is an 
 indispensable condition to intellectual life; without them intelli- 
 gence is an absurdity. Here, then, we find all that is comprised 
 in the definition of common sense: the impossibility of proof, an 
 intellectual necessity, which must be satisfied by assent, and an 
 irresistible and universal inclination to give this assent. Is there 
 any objection to calling this inclination common sense? ... I 
 shall not dispute upon words; I mark the fact, and this is all I 
 need do in philosophy. I grant that the inclination to assent is 
 not, in treating of immediate evidence, usually called common 
 sense ... In order that the word sense may be properly applied 
 to it, the understanding ought to feel rather than know: but in 
 immediate evidence it knows rather than feels. However this 
 may be, I repeat that the name is of no account. . . . What I 
 wish is to establish this law of our nature inclining us to give our 
 assent to certain truths, independently of consciousness and 
 ratiocination. Not immediate evidence alone has this irresistible 
 inclination in its favor; mediate evidence also has it. Our under- 
 standing necessarily assents, not only to first principles, but also 
 to all propositions clearly connected with them. The natural 
 inclination to assent is not limited to the subjective value of ideas; 
 it also extends to their objective value. . . . What we have 
 said of immediate and mediate evidence relatively to the objective 
 value of ideas, is true, not only in the purely intellectual, but also 
 in the moral order. The soul, endowed as it is with free will, 
 needs rules for its direction: if first intellectual principles are 
 necessary in order to know, moral principles are not less so in 
 order to will and work. What truth and error are to the under- 
 standing, good and evil are to the will. Besides the life of the 
 understanding, there is a life of the will; the one, without principles 
 on which to rest, is annihilated; the other, as a moral being, 
 perishes, or becomes an inconceivable absurdity, if it have no 
 rule, the observation or violation of which constitutes its perfec- 
 
124 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 tion or imperfection. Here is another necessity for the assent to 
 certain moral truths, and another reason of this irresistible and 
 universal inclination to assent. I would here remark, that as it 
 is not enough in the intellectual order to know, but it is also necessary 
 to act, and one of the principles of action is perception by the senses ; 
 so moral truths are not only known but felt. When they are 
 offered to the mind the understanding assents to them as unshaken, 
 and the heart embraces them with enthusiasm and love." 322 
 
 The italics in the closing paragraph are ours. Which promises 
 better fruits: the enlightened Activism of the Intellectualist, 
 which is guided by reason, or, the blind Activism of Eucken, 
 which seeks to replace reason? Surely the answer is not hard to 
 find. 
 
 Conditions upon which the Criterion of Common-sense is Infallible 
 
 Man's weakness may often turn his natural inclinations from 
 their object, the result being that they are distorted and lead to 
 error instead of truth; nevertheless a natural inclination, simply 
 because it is natural, "is in the eyes of philosophy something 
 highly respectable:" it is the province of reason and free will 
 not to allow it to go astray. The following conditions are laid 
 down by Balmes as being those of true and never-erring common- 
 sense. 
 
 "First Condition. — That the inclination be everyway irresistible, 
 so that one cannot, even by the aid of reflection, resist or avoid it. 
 
 "Second Condition. — That every truth of common sense be 
 absolutely certain to the whole human race. This condition 
 follows from the first. 
 
 "Third Condition. — That every truth of common sense stand 
 the test of reason. 
 
 "Fourth Condition. — That every truth of common sense have 
 for its object the satisfaction of some great necessity of sensitive, 
 intellectual, or moral life. 
 
 "When possessed of all these characters, the criterion of common 
 sense is absolutely infallible, and may defy skeptics to assign a 
 case wherein it has failed." 323 
 
 Objectivity of Ideas 
 In close connection with the criterion of common sense we shall 
 touch upon the "problem which vexes fundamental philosophy," 
 i. e., the transition from subject to object, from subjective appear- 
 ance to objective reality. 
 
 " J Op. oit., pp. 219 sqq. 
 " 3 Op. cit., <2«, ill. 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 125 
 
 Eucken denies its possibility in emphatic terms, with more 
 determination than strength of argument however. He is im- 
 patient that men with such "a naive mode of thought" as to 
 conceive it possible, are still in the front ranks. So much has 
 been written on this point that it is not our intention to enter upon 
 it in detail. 
 
 Balmes shows that the natural inclination which men have to 
 make the transition has all the characteristics necessary to elevate 
 it to the rank of an infallible criterion : it is irresistible, universal, 
 satisfies a great necessity of life, and stands the test of reason. 
 The connection of evidence with reality, and consequently, the 
 transition from the idea to the object, are "primitive facts of our 
 nature, a necessary law of our understanding, the foundation of 
 all that it contains — a foundation which in its turn rests, and can 
 rest only on God, the Creator of our soul." We are now '*at the 
 foundation of reason; this is the ne plus ultra of the human under- 
 standing; philosophy can go no farther." 
 
 Against Eucken's illogical affirmation of the axiomatic certainty 
 of the "Gemiit," as against James' "reality-feelings," we cite the 
 following : 
 
 "We must observe the contradiction into which those philoso- 
 phers fall who say: I cannot doubt what is subjective, what 
 affects myself, . . . but I have no right to go out of myself, 
 and affirm that what I think is in reality as I think. Do you 
 know that you feel, that you think, that you have within you 
 such or such an appearance? Can you prove it? Evidently 
 you cannot. You yield to a fact, to an internal necessity . . . ; 
 but then there is equal necessity in the connection of the object 
 with the idea, . . . Neither case admits of demonstration; in 
 both there is an inevitable necessity: where, then, is philosophy, 
 when it is attempted to establish so great a difference between 
 things which admit of none? . . . To take from ideas their 
 objective value, to reduce them to mere subjective phenomena, 
 to resist that internal necessity which obliges us to admit the 
 correspondence of the soul to objects, is to destroy the very 
 consciousness of the soul." 324 
 
 "They who oppose objectiveness, attack a fundamental law of 
 our mind, destroy thought, even consciousness, and everything 
 subjective which could serve as its basis." 325 
 
 324 Op. cit., pp. 161-166. For detailed proof of the objectiveness of ideas 
 vide entire Chap. XXIV. 
 
 325 Op. cit.. p. 170. 
 
126 EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 St. George Mivart, who followed so closely the Scholastic 
 tradition, says: 
 
 " . . . it is intellect and not sense which is the final judge and 
 criterion of our certainty; and though the ultimate facts of sensa- 
 tion are as certain and indisputable as the other ultimate declara- 
 tions of our faculties, yet they are often misinterpreted. Though 
 the facts of sensation are self-evident, we may judge wrongly as 
 to what they point to. On the other hand, the harmony which 
 exists amongst the several senses, is ever giving us stronger and 
 stronger grounds for trusting them. Everyone knows how con- 
 stantly his sense of touch or sight confirms a testimony previously 
 given by his sight or his hearing; nor will any one, ivho has not 
 some eccentric theory to maintain, deem it probable that our senses 
 thus harmoniously conspire to lead us into one and the same 
 error, since truth is one, whilst error is manifold." 326 
 
 Primary and Secondary Qualities of Matter 
 
 The Scholastics note carefully, however, the difference between 
 the primary and secondary qualities of matter — between the sub- 
 jective and the objective in sensation. The cause of the sensations 
 of smell, taste, color, sound, exist in the objective world, but not 
 the sensations as such. "As to qualities, the direct objects of 
 sensation, it is not necessary for us that they exist in bodies them- 
 selves; it is enough that these bodies have something which 
 produces in us, in some way or other, a corresponding impression 
 .... The ordinary wants of life are not at all affected by this 
 question; and man's relations with the sensible world would not 
 be disturbed by the generalization of philosophical analysis. 
 There is, perhaps, a kind of disenchantment of nature, since, 
 despoiled of sensations, it is not nearly so beautiful; but the 
 enchantment still continues with most men; and philosophy 
 itself, except in brief moments of reflection, is subject to it; and 
 even in these moments it experiences an enchantment of a dif- 
 ferent kind, as it considers how much of the beauty attributed to 
 objects, belongs to man in his own right, and that the simple 
 exercise of a sensible being's harmonious faculties suffices to make 
 the whole universe glow with splendor and glory." 3 - 7 
 
 St. George Mivart does not grant that the disenchantment 
 necessarily takes place. He writes: 
 
 "Our intellect, then, seems to tell us that, through our sensa- 
 
 "• Mivart on Truth, pp. 126, 127. Op. cit. Italics ours. 
 557 Op. cit., p. 229. 
 
Rudolf Euckex and the Spiritual Life 127 
 
 tions, we perceive secondary as well as primary qualities of different 
 kinds and orders, which are different from the sensations them- 
 selves but yet give us a practically serviceable and not mendacious 
 knowledge of such qualities. And the correctness of this belief 
 is, as we shall see, at least so far incontestable that the common 
 belief must be nearer the truth than the negation of it can possibly 
 be. Yet we are sometimes told that in the absence of organs of 
 sense, silence and darkness would envelope the world. Now, 
 our idea of 'light' may probably be quite inadequate to make the 
 essence of light known to us as we may conceive of its being known 
 by some nature much higher than ours. But, nevertheless, our 
 idea of 'light' is, at any rate, more like objective light than is our 
 idea of darkness. . . . For since we suppose the sun, moon, and 
 stars, meteors, volcanoes, and phosphorescent organisms to exist 
 in it as now they do, all the objective conditions of light, save 
 sense-organs, would, by the hypothesis, be present, while the 
 objective conditions of what, to our senses, is darkness, would 
 not be present. Though all 'sensations' would, of course, vanish 
 from an insentient universe, yet the objective qualities those 
 sensations make known to us would continue to exist." 328 
 
 "And, indeed, if our intellect has, as we know it has, the power of 
 making external objects present to it, it is not wonderful that it 
 should also have the power of making the qualities of objects 
 present to it — i. e.,to the intellect. Nor is it a bit more wonderful 
 that, not the sensations, but the apprehensions they give rise to, 
 should have a certain real likeness to the objective qualities them- 
 selves, than that our apprehensions of the objects which have 
 the qualities should be like the objects themselves." 329 
 
 Subjoined is the text of St. Thomas: 
 
 "Sic patet quod videns est tamquam coloratura, inquatum 
 habet similitudinem coloris. Et non solum videns est tamquam 
 coloratura, et simile colorato; sed etiam actus cujuslibet sensus, 
 est unus et idem subjecto cum actu sensibilis, sed ratione non est 
 unus. Et dico autem sensus, sicut auditum secundum actum; 
 et actum sensibilis, sicut sonum secundum actum. Non cnim 
 semper sunt in actu: quia contingit habentia and it inn non audire, 
 et habens sonum non semper sonare. Sed cum potens audire habet 
 suam operationem, et potens sonare habet sonare, tunc simul jit 
 sonus secundum actum qui vocatur sonatio, et auditus secundum 
 actum, qui vocatur auditio. . . . Necesse est quod auditus 
 dictus secundum actum, et sonus dictus secundum actum, simul 
 salventur et corrumpantur: et similiter est de sapore et gustu, 
 et aliis sensibilibus et sensibus. Sed si dicantur secundum poten- 
 tiam, non necesse est quod simul corrumpantur et salventur. 
 
 328 Op. cit., pp. 115 sqq. 
 
 328 Op. cit., p. 127. Italics ours. 
 
128 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 Ex hac auteni ratione excludit opinionem antiquorum naturalium 
 . . . dicens quod priores naturales non bene dicebant in hoc, 
 quia opinabantur nihil esse album, aut nigrum, nisi quando 
 videtur; neque saporem esse, nisi quando gustatur; et similiter 
 de aliis sensibilibus et sensibus. Et quia non credebant esse alia 
 entia, nisi sensibilia, neque aliam virtutem congoscitivam, nisi 
 sensum, credebant quod totum esse et Veritas rerum esset in apparere. 
 Et ex hoc deducebantur ad credendum contradictoria simul esse 
 vera, propter hoc quod diversi contradictoria opinantur. Dice- 
 bant autem quodammodo recte, et quodammodo non. Cum 
 enim dupliciter dicatur senus et sensibile; scilicet secundum poten- 
 tiam et secundum actum; de sensu et sensibili secundum actum 
 accidit quod ipsi dicebant, quod non est sensibile sine sensu. 
 Non autem hoc verum est de sensu et sensibili secundum poten- 
 tiam. Sed ipsi loquebantur simpliciter, id est sine distinctione, 
 de his quae dicuntur multipliciter." 330 
 
 "Magnitudo et figura et hujusmodi, quae dicuntur communia 
 sensibilia, sunt media inter sensibilia per accidens et sensibilia 
 propria, quae sunt objecta sensuum. Nam sensibilia propria 
 primo et per se immutant sensum, cum sint qualitates alterantes; 
 sensibilia vero communia omnia reducuntur ad quantitatem . . . 
 Quantitas autem est proximum subjectum qualitatis alterativae, 
 ut superficies est subjectum coloris. Et ideo sensibilia communia 
 non movent sensum primo et per se, sed ratione sensibilis quali- 
 tatis, ut superficies ratione coloris. Nee tamen sunt sensibilia 
 per accidens, quia hujusmodi sensibilia aliquam diversitatem 
 faciunt in immutatione sensus." 331 
 
 Distinction between Natural and Supernatural Knowledge 
 
 Before entering upon this point we shall cite a passage giving 
 the Scholastic view of the "immediacy" in the religious sense. 
 
 "II faut . . . qu'il y ait une autre connaissance de Dieu que 
 la connaissance philosophique, une connaissance si facile a ac- 
 querir et si certaine que l'ignorance et le doute a cet egard ne 
 puissent s'expliquer, si ce n'est par une legerete coupable ou par 
 une obstination orgueilleuse. Telle est aussi ... la doctrine 
 commune des Saints Peres. lis distinguaient la connaissance de 
 Dieu qu'on obtient au moyen de recherches savantes de celle qui 
 nait spontanement en tout homme, au seul spectacle de la crea- 
 tion." 
 
 Let the thoughtful man compare this exposition of the "im- 
 mediacy" of the supreme Spiritual Life with that offered by 
 Eucken. 
 
 330 Comm. de Animii, Lib. Ill, lectio i. 
 
 331 Siimma, I. q. 78, a. 3, ad. 2. 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 120 
 
 "Cette derniere connaissance est appelee par eux un temoignage 
 que Dieu a donne de lui-meme a l'ame en la creant, une dot de la 
 nature, une connaissance infuse, inherente a tout homme sans 
 instruction prealable, connaissance qui nait, en quelque sorte, 
 d'elle-meme en meme temps que la raison se developpe et qui ne 
 peut manquer que dans l'homme prive de l'usage de la raison ou 
 livre aux vices qui ont corrumpu la nature avec laquelle Dieu l'a 
 cree . . . Dieu a mis dans notre nature raisonnable tout ce 
 qui est necessaire pour le connaitre et meme pour le connaitre 
 avec facilite. . . . L'homme ne parvient pas a sa fin sans se servir 
 des forces que Dieu lui a donnees, mais l'auteur de ces dons prdte 
 encore a 1'homme son concours pour qu'il puisse s'en servir. 
 Comme cette vie morale et religieuse, pour laquelle il a ete cree, 
 est fondee sur la connaissance des verites dont nous parlons, 
 Dieu veille sur l'homme pour que sa raison, en se developpant, 
 parvienne a les connaitre avec facilite et certitude. Remarquons 
 toutefois qu'il n'est pas question ici de la grace surnaturelle, mais 
 de ce concours ou de cette assistance par laquelle Dieu est, m£me 
 dans l'ordre de la nature, le premier et principal maitre de toutes 
 les creatures raisonnables." 332 
 
 Eucken has confused the natural and supernatural orders in 
 such a manner as to render it very difficult to "see clear" in his 
 system. On the one hand he denies to the natural order much, 
 that belongs to it by right, on the other, he includes under the 
 term "supernatural" truths which may be reached by the natural 
 activity of the mind, and rejects the great body of supernatural 
 truths communicated by Revelation. Furthermore he makes 
 constant use of the Christian terms — Redeeming Love, Grace, 
 Salvation, etc. — which, as has been already indicated, can have 
 no true significance on his premises. 
 
 That the "human spiritual," i.e., man's soul, has direct, super- 
 natural relations with the Absolute Spiritual Life, i.e., God, 
 Catholics not only may, but must grant, since it is an article of 
 Christian Faith; but "Supernatural" in this case is used in a very 
 different signification from that which Eucken attaches to it. 
 This interior life of the soul does not fall into the domain of 
 philosophy, but into that of ascetic theology. The Scholastic 
 position is unfolded in the following passage : 
 
 "II doit vraiment parattre etrange que certains ecrivains 
 modernes, en parlant de la necessity d'une revelation, passent 
 si legerement sur la distinction que Saint Thomas fait ressortir 
 dans les premieres questions de ses plus celebres ouvrages, distinc- 
 
 312 Klentgen, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 438-441. 
 
130 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 tion que toute l'ecole admet. Pour les verites de l'ordre naturel 
 ... on peut, il est vrai, soutenir une certaine necessite de la 
 revelation, mais on ne peut pas regarder cette necessite comme 
 absolue. Car ces verites peuvent &tre connues par le spectacle de 
 la nature et, par consequent, elles ne depassent pas les forces natur- 
 relles de la raison humaine. Les obstacles que nous rencontrons 
 dans cette connaissance viennent du dehors, et ont leur source, pour 
 la plus grande partie, dans les egarements volontaires des homines. 
 . . . Mais, pour connaitre les verites de l'ordre surnaturel, 
 aucune raison creee ne peut suffire, quelque libre et puissant 
 qu'on la suppose; ce sont des mysteres caches dans les decrets 
 divins et qu'aucune oeuvre visible, mais la parole expresse de 
 Dieu peut seule manifester. La revelation ne peut done etre 
 regardee comme absolument necessaire que pour la connaissance 
 de ces verites. Voila ce qui, avant toute autre consideration, 
 montre son excellence et l'estime que nous en devons faire. Si, 
 en effet, nous devons y attacher la plus grande valeur, ce n'est 
 pas parce que sans elle nous ne pourrions parvenir a aucune 
 connaissance du createur, mais plutot parce qu'elle el eve 1'homme 
 au dessus de lui-meme et le rend capable de connaissances nou- 
 velles et bien superieures a toutes celles qu'il aurait pu acquerir 
 par ses propres forces . . . quoique la foi ne puisse exister sans 
 quelque connaissance de la raison qui precede, la foi, devenue 
 possible par cette connaissance, peut transporter l'esprit en des 
 regions qu'il n'aurait pu atteindre par aucun essor de sa pensee." 333 
 
 The text of St. Thomas is as follows : 
 
 "Quia vero non omnis veritatis manifestandae modus est idem, 
 'disciplinati autem hominis est tantum de unoquoque fidem capere 
 tentare, quantum natura rei permittit,' ut a Philosopho optime 
 dictum est (Ethic, I, c. 2), et ut Boetius introducit (De Trin., c. 
 2), necesse est prius ostendere quis modus possibilis sit ad verita- 
 tem propositam manifestandam. Est autem in his, quae de Deo 
 confitemur, duplex veritatis modus. Quaedam namque vera sunt 
 de Deo, quae omnem facultatem humanae rationis excedunt. ut 
 Deum esse trinum et unum. Quaedam vero sunt, ad quae etiam 
 ratio naturalis pertingere potest, sicut est Deum esse, Deum esse 
 unum, et alia hujusmodi; quae etiam philosophi demonstrative 
 de Deo probaverunt, ducti naturalis lumine rationis. Quod 
 autem sint aliqua intelligibilium divinorum, quae humanae 
 rationis penitus excedant ingenium, evidentissime apparet. Quod 
 enim principium totius scientiae, quam de aliqua re ratio percipit, 
 sit intellectus substantiae ipsius, eo quod, secundum doctrinam 
 Philosophi (Anal post. II, text. comm. 2), demonstrationis 
 principium est quod quid est, opportet quod, secundum modum 
 quo substantia rei intelligitur, sit eorum modus, quae de re ilia 
 
 ■ Loc. cit .. pp. 549, 550. 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 131 
 
 cognoscuntur. Unde, si intellectus humanus alicujus rei substan- 
 tiam comprehendit, puta lapidis vel trianguli, nullum intelligi- 
 bilium illius rei facultatem huuianae rationis excedet. Quod 
 quidem nobis circa Deum non accidit. Nam, ad substantiam 
 ipsius capiendam, intellectus humanus non potest natural] virtute 
 pertingere, quum intellectus nostri, secundum modum praesentis 
 vitae, cognitio a sensu incipiat. Et ideo ea quae in sensu non 
 cadunt non possunt humano intellectu capi, nisi quatenus ex 
 sensibus eoruin cognitio colligitur. Sensibilia autem ad hoc 
 ducere intellectum nostrum non possunt, ut in eis divina substantia 
 videatur quid sit, quum sint effectus causae virtutem non aequan- 
 tes. Ducitur tamen ex sensibilibus intellectus noster in divinam 
 cognitionem, ut cognoscat de Deo quia est, et alia hujusmodi, 
 quae oportet attribui primo principio. Sunt igitur quaedam 
 intelligibilium divinorum, quae humanae rationi sunt pervia; 
 quaedam vero, quae omnino vim humanae rationis excedunt . . . 
 Idem manifeste apparet ex defectu, quern in rebus cognoscendis 
 quotidie experimur. Rerum enim sensibilium plurimas pro- 
 prietates ignoramus, earumque proprietatum, quas sensu appre- 
 hendimus, rationem perfecte in pluribus invenire non possumus. 
 Multo igitur amplius illius excellentissimae substantiae, trans- 
 cendentis omnia intelligibilia humana ratio investigare non 
 sufBcit. Huic etiam consonat dictum Philosophi, qui asserit, 
 quod 'intellectus noster sic se habet ad prima entium, quae sunt 
 manifestissima in natura, sicut oculus vespertilionis ad solem' 
 (Metaphys., II, text, comm. I). Huic etiam veritati sacra 
 Scriptura testimonium perhibet. Dicitur enim: Forsitan vestigia 
 Dei comprehendes, et usque ad perfectum omnipotcntem reperies? 
 (Job II, 7). Et: Ecce Deus magnus, vincens scientiam nostram 
 (XXXVI, 26). Et: Ex parte cognoscimus (1 Cor. XIII, 9). Non 
 igitur omne quod de Deo dicitur, quamvis ratione investigari non 
 possit, statim quasi falsum est abjiciendum, ut Manichaei et 
 plures infidelium putaverunt (S. Aug., Retr. I., 14). " 334 
 
 Necessity of Divine Revelation 
 
 That Eucken rejects historical revelation has been already 
 indicated. Beyond the personal "immediacy," which we have 
 shown to be wholly subjective in character, and the revelation of 
 some distinct phase of the Spiritual Life in each age — as I ho 
 "Geistesleben" advances to self-realization — man has neither the 
 means nor the need of knowledge of God. Yet even this 
 much is not easily obtained, according to Eucken himself, who 
 insists that man must wrest a content from the age, and force the 
 
 Summa contra Gentiles 1. c. 111. See also Sumina 1, q. I; a. I. 
 
132 Rudolf Euckbn and the Spiritual Life 
 
 age to yield up its content. St. Thomas, in the following extract, 
 explains the necessity of Divine Revelation : 
 
 "Dupliei igitur veritate divinorum intelligibilium exsistente, 
 una ad quam rationis inquisitio pertingere potest, altera quae 
 omne ingenium humanae rationis excedit, utraque convenienter 
 divinitus homini credenda proponitur. Hoc autem de ilia primo 
 ostendendum est, quae inquisitioni rationis pervia esse potest; ne 
 forte alicui videatur, ex quo ratione haberi potest, frustra id 
 supernaturali inspiratione credendum traditum esse. Sequeren- 
 tur tamen tria inconvenientia, si hujusmodi Veritas solummodo 
 rationi inquirenda relinqueretur. Unum est, quod paucis hom- 
 inibus Dei cognitio inesset. A fructu enim studiosae inquisitionis, 
 qui est veritatis inventio, plurimi impediuntur tribus de causis. 
 Quidam siquidem impediuntur propter complexionis indisposi- 
 tionem, ex qua multi naturaliter sunt indispositi ad sciendum. 
 Unde nullo studio ad hoc pertingere possent, ut summum gradum 
 humanae cognitionis attingerent, qui in cognoscendo Deum 
 consistit. Quidam vero impediuntur necessitate rei familiaris. 
 Oportet enim esse, inter homines, aliquos qui temporalibus 
 administrandis insistant, qui tantum tempus in otio contem- 
 plativae inquisitionis non possent expendere, ut ad summum 
 fastigium humanae inquisitionis pertingerent, scilicit Dei cogni- 
 tionem. Quidam autem impediuntur pigritia. Ad cognitionem 
 enim eorum quae de Deo ratio investigare potest, multa prae- 
 cognoscere oportet, quum fere totius philosophiae consideratio ad 
 Dei cognitionem ordinetur. Propter quod metaphysica, quae 
 circa divina versatur, inter philosophiae partes ultima remanet 
 addiscenda. Sic ergo nonnisi cum magno labore studii ad prae- 
 dictae veritatis inquisitionem perveniri potest: quern quidem 
 laborem pauci subire volunt pro amore scientiae, cujus tamen 
 mentibus hominum naturalem Deus inseruit appetitum. Secun- 
 dum inconveniens est, quod illi qui ad praedictae veritatis cogni- 
 tionem vel inventionem pervenirent, vix post longum tempus 
 pertingerent, turn propter hujusmodi veritatis profunditatem, ad 
 quam capiendam per viam rationis nonnisi post longum exercitium 
 intellectus humanus idoneus invenitur; turn etiam propter multa 
 quae praeexiguntur, ut dictum est . . . Tertium inconveniens 
 est, quod investigation! rationis humanae plerumque falsitas 
 admiscetur, propter debilitatem intellectus nostri in judicando et 
 phantasmatum permixtionem. Et ideo apud multos in dubitatione 
 remanerent ea, quae sunt rcrixsime etiam demonstrate/, dum vim 
 demonstrationis ignorant, et praecipue quum videant a diversis, 
 qui sapientes dicuntur, diversa doceri. Inter multa etiam vera, 
 quae demonstrantur, immiscetur aliquando aliquid falsum, quod 
 non demonstratur, sed aliqua probabili vel sophistics ratione 
 asseritur, quae interdum demonstratio reputatur. Et ideo oportuit 
 par viam fidei, fixa certitudine, ipsani veritatem de rebus divinis 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 133 
 
 hominibus exhiberi. Salubriter ergo divina providit dementia, 
 ut ea etiam quae ratio investigare potest, fide tenenda praeciperet; 
 ut sic omnes de facili possent dkinae cognitionis participes esse et 
 absque dubitatione et errore." 335 
 
 We have to direct attention, in particular, to the italicised 
 passages. In the first St. Thomas defends the power of the mind 
 to discover and comprehend religious truths of the natural order, 
 although some minds may fail to grasp the full force of the argu- 
 ments and proofs brought before them. In the second he states 
 the reason for which God, in His mercy, has given men a Divine 
 Revelation — viz., that all his creatures may become easily par- 
 takers of divine knowledge. 
 
 In Present Estimate of Value of Human Life Eucken says, "The 
 veil which conceals the destiny of man will not be lifted. But, 
 after all, is this indispensable to true faith in our mission and the 
 cheerful performance thereof?" 336 We hold that the veil has been 
 lifted, and that without some light on man's final destiny even if 
 it be only that obtained by the exercise of reason, true faith 
 would be impossible. 
 
 Which is to be held — that an Intelligent First Cause, Infinite 
 Source of all Goodness and Truth, has abandoned minds, capable 
 of knowing Him, to the most painful toil and anxiety, and to 
 such uncertainty when truth is gained that "doubt is ever sapping 
 the foundations anew," or, that He Who created men to know 
 and love Him has Himself revealed to them all that is necessary 
 to perfectly accomplish that purpose? 
 
 Our citations, so far, have enunciated and supported three 
 principles of Scholastic teaching: (1) that certainty exists; (2) 
 that the human mind can attain to truth; (3) that, apart from 
 Divine Revelation, truth is reached by the exercise of man's 
 rational activity, whether immediately (i.e., by intution or intel- 
 lectual instinct), or mediately (i.e., by reasoning). 
 
 In our next chapter we shall inquire into the nature of truth in 
 itself. 
 
 336 Op. cit., I, I, c. IV. Italics ours. See also loc. cit., c. VI; De Verit., q. 
 XIV, Art. 11. 
 
 338 Forum, XXXIV, April-June, 1903, p. 61/5. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 NATURE OF TRUTH 
 
 With the exception of having given the Scholastic definition 
 and Eucken's rejection thereof, we have not yet entered directly 
 upon the question of the nature of truth. 
 
 What is truth? 
 
 Eucken defines truth as "an upward elevation of life to its own 
 unity," and "an advance of life to its own perfection." 337 Surely 
 these are cases of ignotum per ignotius. 
 
 An examination of the section in Life's Basis and Life's Ideal 
 entitled Problem of Truth and Reality will show how very closely 
 he approaches the pragmatic doctrine on this point; the fact that 
 he insists on an absolute truth while exposing very subjective views 
 of truth does not increase the value of his philosophy. 
 
 Eucken further informs us that "if the turning to the life-process 
 puts the question, the assertion of an independent spiritual life 
 gives the answer to it." 339 
 
 We have shown 
 
 1 the Life-Process of Eucken's system to be not only an 
 impossibility but an inconceivability; 
 
 2 the supposed "immediacy," alleged to result from the turn 
 to the Life-Process, to be valueless as a philosophical solution: 
 
 (a) in se because of the distrust (in this system) of the ordinary 
 
 337 Life's Basis, op. cit., pp. 217. 219. 
 
 338 Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, op. eit., p. 307. In the latest German 
 edition this phrase does not occur but the idea is retained: "Sie [die Philos- 
 ophic] erstrebt einen Aufbau namentlich durch die Yerbindung von drei 
 Forderungen und Angriffspunkten. Sie verlangt ein Znrucktrchen aui den 
 Lebensprozess, sie verlangt die Anerkennung einer geistigcn Welt in unserem 
 Bereich, sie verlangt endlich, dass das Leben eine Tiefe gewinne und von ihr 
 aus eine Wirklichkeit entwickle. Das zusammen fordert eine wesentliche 
 Veranderung der vorhandenen Lage, es macht vieles unzulanglich, was bisher 
 geniingend schien, aber es erotfnet auch eine Fiille neuer Aushlicke und die 
 Mbglichkeit einer durchgangigen Erhohung. . . . Dass nur vom Leben aus 
 wir uns liber uns selbst und unser Yerhaltnis zur Welt zu orientieren vermogen. 
 das war ein leitender Gedanke unserer ganzen rntersuchung und das entspricht 
 zweifellos einem Verlangen der Gegenwart. Dcnn iiberall horen wir den Huf 
 nach einem Zuriichgehcn avf das Leben, nach einer Belebung ira besonderen 
 der Erkenntnisarbeit von daher . . . ; wir miissen verlangen, dass das 
 Leben sich in ein Ganzes fasse, als ein solches eigne Krafte und eigne Gesetze 
 erweise und damit ein gestaltende.t M'irkcn an otter Manningfaltigkeit tibe. 
 Daher ham es, dass wir gem von einem Lebensprozesse sprachen, urn die Uber- 
 legenheit des Lebens gegen das individuelle Dasein zum Ausdruck zu bringen." 
 Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung, 2te Auflage, Leipzig, 1913. Op. 
 cit., p. 195. Italics ours. 
 
 134 
 
EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 135 
 
 revelations of the faculties through which the "immediacy" must 
 come, 
 
 (b) in its source which is non-existent; 
 
 3 the Spiritual Life, 339 " such as Eucken describes it — and the 
 identification of which with the Life-Process is necessitated by his 
 Monism — to be worthless as standard or ground of truth. We 
 have rejected the Geistesleben on the very grounds on which Eucken 
 himself condemns another system, viz., that "it is fundamentally 
 established on conflicting principles." 339 
 
 It remains for us to expose the Scholastic theory which here, 
 as elsewhere, is clear and direct. 
 
 Scholastic Theory of Truth 
 
 Truth is a correspondence of our thought with its object: it is 
 Adequatio intellectus et rei. 
 
 In the precise sense of the word it is a just judgment of the 
 intellect. When the truth of an object is spoken of the presence 
 in the object of its proper form, nature or quality is indicated. In 
 this sense truth is the conformity of the object with the intelligence 
 on which it depends. 
 
 Everything which exists is true, in so far as its being is in con- 
 formity with the Divine Intelligence. In so far as man has 
 faculties capable of reaching truth he can, therefore, know both 
 himself and other existing objects. 
 
 Pere Thomas Pegues gives an excellent summary of the teaching 
 of St. Thomas on this point, which we cite: 
 
 "Pour preciser encore la doctrine, fort delicate, exposee dans 
 cet article, nous pouvons nous demander, d'un mot, a son sujet, 
 ce qu'est la verite. Qu'est-ce que la verite? Distinguons tout de 
 suite entre la verite d'un objet, et la verite, d'une fagon absolue. 
 La verite d'un objet n'est rien autre que la presence, en cet objet, 
 de la forme ou de la nature ou de la qualite qu'il doit avoir. C'est 
 la conformite de cet objet avec l'intelligence dont il depend. La 
 verite, d'une facon absolue, c'est la qualite d'une intelligence 
 disant d'une chose qu'elle est ou qu'elle est telle, quand, en effet, 
 cette chose est et est telle, ou disant qu'elle n'est pas et qu'elle 
 n'est pas telle, quand, en realite, elle n'est pas et n'est pas telle. 
 C'est la conformite de l'intelligence qui affirme ou qui nie avec 
 
 338a Perhaps the best description of the "Spiritual Life" of which Eucken 
 strives to give us a concept is that it is a static aspect of the Life- Process. 
 This suggests a contradiction, but contradiction is inevitable in Monism. 
 
 339 Philosophy of Friedrieh Froebel by R. Eucken, Forum, Vol. XXX, Oct.. 
 1900. p. 179. 
 
136 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 ce qu'elle nie ou affirme. Et done la verite, d'une fagon absolue, 
 la verite, au sens premier de ce mot, la verite, en tant que bien 
 ou perfection de l'intelligence, la verite, au sens pur et simple, la 
 verite tout court ne peut-etre que dans l'intelligence qui nie ou 
 qui affirme (formellement, ou eminemment, comme nous l'expli- 
 querons quand il s'agira de la verite en Dieu) ; mais elle peut §tre 
 et elle est (elle, ou son contraire, . . .) dans toute intelligence 
 qui affirme ou qui nie. C'est une propriete, e'est la propriete de 
 cette intelligence. Des la qu'une intelligence nie ou affirme, elle 
 a la verite (ou son contraire); et elle Fa comme chose possedee, 
 comme bien propre, comme sa perfection (ou sa degradation, s'il 
 s'agissait de Ferreur); elle Fa, pour garder Fexpression de St. 
 Thomas, comme chose connue. Car cette expression 'comme chose 
 connue' ne doit pas s'entendre en ce sens seulement qu'on s'aperce- 
 vrait que la chose est, quand on dit qu'elle est, ou qu'elle n'est 
 pas quand on dit qu'elle n'est pas, ce qui ne mettrait la verite 
 que dans une operation reflexe de l'intelligence. La verite se 
 trouve aussi dans Foperation directe de l'intelligence, et la verite 
 en tant que bien de l'intelligence possede par elle. II suffit qu'on 
 dise d'une chose qu'elle est, quand elle est, ou qu'elle n'est pas 
 quand elle n'est pas, pour que la verite, bien propre de l'intelli- 
 gence, soit en elle a titre de bien possede, quoique non peut-etre 
 de bien conscient. La verite est alors dans l'intelligence comme 
 chose connue, en ce sens que la connaissance que Fon a est une 
 verite, la verite consistant dans Faffirmation juste ou la negation 
 exacte de l'intelligence. On prendra conscience de cette verite 
 que Fon a, que Fon possede, quand on se justifiera a soi-meme 
 Fexactitude de son affirmation ou de sa negation. La verite 
 est done, au sens precis du mot, un jugement juste de l'intelligence. 
 [C. F. le Commentaire de Cajetan sur le present article] Voila ce 
 qu'est la verite prise en elle-me'me." 340 
 
 And again: 
 
 "Au corps de Farticle, saint Thomas commence par nous 
 rappeler ce qu'est la verite, en nous disant ou elle se trouve. 
 'La verite se trouve et dans l'intelligence selon qu'elle saisit la 
 chose comme elle est, et dans les choses selon qu'elles ont un 
 etre qui peut s'adapter a l'intelligence. Or cela, c'est en Dieu 
 qu'on le trouve au souverain degre. En effet, son 6tre n'est pas 
 seulement conforme a son acte d'intellection; il est cet acte meme. 
 Et son acte d'intellection est la mesure et la cause de tout autre 
 6tre et de tout autre acte d'intellection. Et II est Lui-me'me son 
 6tre et son acte d'intellection. De telle sorte que non seulement 
 la verite est en Lui, mais II est encore la Verite elle-m£me souver- 
 aine et premiere." 341 
 
 iiC R. P. Pegues, O.P. (.'ommeutaire Frangais Littoral de la Somnie Th£o- 
 logique, I., Traits de Dieu, II, pp. 174-176, Toulouse, 1907. 
 »« Op. cit., p. 183. 
 
KUDOLP ElJCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 137 
 
 In God, then, Being not only corresponds, in a sovereign degree, 
 to His act of "intellection," It is this act. And His act of "intellec- 
 tion" is the cause and the measure of every other existence and of 
 every other act of intelligence. 
 
 // we start from these truths we may find Eucken's words that 
 "the turn to the Life-Process puts the question" and "the spiritual 
 life gives the answer" very full of meaning. In order to know, 
 man must turn to what is within and without him, he must 
 examine the created objects which are, as well as he himself is, 
 reflections and imperfect manifestations of God Himself, Who is 
 the Living Truth. Since the truth of objects depends absolutely 
 on His Infinite Wisdom, which sets to each its proper being, the 
 assertion of an Independent Spiritual Life does give the answer to 
 the problem. How do we know objects possess truth? We know 
 it through our knowledge that they are the work of an All Wise and 
 All Powerful Creator — Who is the Fulness of the Uncreated 
 Spiritual Life. As "Life-process" does not with us include the 
 whole universe we should get a more comprehensive word which 
 would comprise the inanimate : then within the conditions we have 
 pointed out we would endorse Eucken's statement. 
 
 We add another extract directed against the pragmatic doctrines 
 with which Eucken has so much in common. 
 
 "U (le P. Janssens) fait remarquer que cette immutability de 
 la verite dont nous parle saint Thomas au sujet de la verite 
 divine et de la verite des choses, ruine par la base la theorie chere 
 a beaucoup d'esprits, meme parmi les catholiques, et qui consiste 
 a supposer dans toutes les sciences, merne dans la science sacree, 
 meme dans les dogmes les plus essentiels de notre foi, une sorte 
 devolution indefinie. Nous avons deja signale cette tendance a 
 propos de la connaissance que nous avons de Dieu et de la ma- 
 niere dont nous le nommons. Et sans doute . . . l'intelligence 
 humaine par elle-m£me n'est pas immuablement fixee dans la 
 verite, mais cela ne veut pas dire qu'elle ne puisse pas s'etablir 
 d'une facon stable dans telles et telles verites demontrees a la 
 lumiere des premiers principes; et a plus forte raison, qu'elle ne 
 puisse pas 6tre fixee par Dieu d'une facon surnaturelle dans telles 
 et telles verites revelees. Ces verites, une fois connues, ne chan- 
 gent pas; il faudrait, pour qu'elles changent, que l'homme perde la 
 raison ou la foi. Elles sont immuables a tout jamais. Elles le 
 sont pour chaque individu; a plus forte raison, pour 1'universalite 
 du genre humain et pour l'Eglise dans sa totalite. Rever d'une 
 doctrine, soit philosophique, soit theologique, qui changerait 
 sans cesse et ou il n'y aurait rien de fixe, non pas m£me les grands 
 
138 KlIDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 principes de la raison ou les doctrines fondamentales qui en decou- 
 lent, ni les articles du Symbole ou les definitions de l'Eglise et le 
 corps de doctrine qui n'est que la resultante de ces definitions ou 
 de ces articles et des principes de la raison ou de ses doctrines 
 fondamentales, — n'est pas seulement une chimere, c'est une folie 
 et une impiete. Et il ne sert de rien, pour justifier de telles 
 pretentions, d'en appeler a telle doctrine philosophique plus ou 
 moins en vogue de nos jours . . . ou a l'histoire des multiples 
 opinions des hommes tant par mi les theologiens que parmi les 
 philosophes. Car a cela nous repondrons qu'une doctrine phil- 
 osophique, meme tres en vogue, peut etre radicalement fausse; 
 ... La verite de Dieu est immuable; et par consequent lorsque 
 Dieu a parle, ce qu'Il a dit ne changera pas. De ni§me la verite 
 que refletent les choses et qui n'est encore, en un sens, que la 
 verite de Dieu, sera toujours necessairement elle-meme. Et 
 quand nos esprits s'y adaptent par la vue directe ou par le raisonne- 
 ment sage, eux aussi participent a la meme immutabilite. Ce 
 qui n'est pas a dire que nous excluions tout progres du cote de nos 
 intelligences. Car pour tant que nous V Studious, nous n'arriverons 
 jamais a saisir dans toute son Stendue la vSritS de la nature ni a 
 scruter dans toute sa profondeur la vSritS de Dieu. Mais ce qui est 
 acquis, est acquis. Et ce n'est pas a remettre toujours tout en 
 question ou a douter de tout, que peut consister le vrai progres 
 de la raison. L'evolution, ainsi entendue, n'est rien autre que 
 l'agnosticisme, et conduit tout droit au nihilisme intellectual." 342 
 
 Truth then is eternal and unchangeable; and for man a necessary 
 truth once perceived is as changeless as for God Himself. 
 
 Our concluding passage is from an author to whom we have 
 already made abundant reference. In the summary of his treatise 
 on Certainty Balmes writes : 
 
 "Complete truth, like perfect good, exists only with harmony. 
 This is a necessary law, and to it man is subject. Since we do not 
 intuitively see the infinite truth in which all truths are one, and 
 all good is one; and as we are in relation with a world of finite, 
 and consequently multiple beings, we need different powers to 
 place us in contact, so to speak, with this variety of truths and 
 finite goods; but as they, in their turn, spring from one same 
 principle, and are directed to one same end, they are submitted to 
 harmony, which is the unity of multiplicity. With these doctrines 
 we believe philosophy without skepticism to be possible. Exami- 
 nation is not excluded: on the contrary, it is extended and com- 
 pleted. This method has another advantage; it does not make 
 philosophy extravagant and philosophers exceptional. 
 
 342 Op. cit., pp. 198-200. Italics are ours. Those who wish to pursue the 
 treatment of St. Thomas in the original may consult Quaestiones Disputatae 3; 
 De Veritate, q.s, 1 5. 
 
EUDOLF EUCKBN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 139 
 
 Philosophy cannot be so generalized as to become popular; 
 human nature is opposed to this, but there is not on the other hand 
 any necessity of condemning it to a misanthropic isolation by 
 force of extravagant professions. In such a case philosophy 
 degenerates into philosophism. Exposition of facts, conscientious 
 examination, clear language; such we conceive sound philosophy 
 to be. This does not require it to cease to be profound, unless by 
 profoundness be meant darkness. The rays of the sun light up the 
 remotest depths of space. I am aware that some philosophers 
 of our age think otherwise, that they deem it necessary, when 
 they examine the fundamental questions of philosophy, to shake 
 the foundations of the world; and yet I have never been able to 
 persuade myself that it was necessary to destroy in order to exam- 
 ine, or that in order to become philosophers we ought to become 
 madmen." 343 
 
 If this is naivetS most thinking men will choose to be naive. 
 
 Fundamental Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 242, 243. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 THE ABSOLUTE SPIRITUAL LIFE IN SE 
 
 In the preceding chapters we have dwelt mainly on the theory 
 of knowledge and the nature of truth. We propose to give here a 
 brief exposition of the Scholastic teaching with regard to the 
 Foundation of all truth and reality — the Absolute Spiritual Life. 
 
 (a) This Absolute Spiritual Life is "a God who is numerically 
 One, who is Personal; the Author, Sustainer, and Finisher of all 
 things, the life of Law and Order, the Moral Governor; One who is 
 Supreme and Sole; like Himself, unlike all things besides Himself 
 which all are but His creatures; distinct from, independent of them 
 all; One who is self-existing, absolutely infinite, who has ever 
 been and ever will be, to whom nothing is past or future; who is 
 all perfection, and the fulness and archetype of every possible 
 excellence, the Truth Itself, Wisdom, Love, Justice, Holiness ; One 
 who is All-powerful, All-knowing, Omnipresent, Incomprehensible. 
 These are some of the distinctive prerogatives" to be ascribed 
 "unconditionally and unreservedly to the great Being . . . God," 
 the Absolute Spiritual Life. 344 
 
 This supreme Spiritual Life is immutable: St. Thomas proves 
 this truth thus : 
 
 ''Prima autem, et manifestior via est, quae sumitur ex parte 
 motus. Certum est enim, et sensu constat, aliqua moveri in 
 hoc mundo: omne autem, quod movetur, ab alio movetur. Nihil 
 enim movetur, nisi secundum quod est in potentia ad illud, ad 
 quod movetur: movet autem aliquid, secundum quod est actu. 
 Movere enim nihil aliud est, quam educere aliquid de potentia in 
 actum. De potentia autem non potest aliquid reduci in actum, 
 nisi per aliquod ens in actu: sicut calidum in actu, ut ignis, facit 
 lignum, quod est calidum in potentia, esse actu calidum, et per hoc 
 movet, et alterat ipsum. Non autem est possibile, ut idem sit 
 simul in actu, et potentia secundum idem, sed solum secundum 
 diversa: quod enim est calidum in actu, non potest simul esse 
 calidum in potentia, sed est simul frigidum in potentia. Impossibile 
 est ergo, quod secundum idem, et eodem modo aliquid sit movens, 
 et motum, vel quod moveat seipsum: omne ergo, quod movetur, 
 oportet ab alio moveri. Si ergo id, a quo movetur, moveatur, 
 oportet et ipsum ab alio moveri, et illud ab alio: hie autem non est 
 
 144 Newman, Grammar of Assent, op. cit., p. 101. 
 140 
 
KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 141 
 
 procedere in infinitum, quia sic non esset aliquod primum movens, 
 et per consequens nee aliquod aliud movens, quia moventia secunda 
 non movent nisi per hoc, quod sunt mota a primo movente, sicut 
 baculus non mo vet, nisi per hoc, quod est motus a manu; ergo 
 necesse est devenire ad aliquod primum movens, quod a nullo 
 moveatur; et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum." 345 
 
 "Ad Primum sicproceditur. Videtur, quod Deus non sit omnino 
 immutabilis. Quidquid enim movet seipsum, est aliquo modo 
 mutabile. Sed, sicut dicit August. 8. super Gen. ad litter. 
 (cap. 20, in fin.) : Spiritus Creator movet se, nee per tempus, nee 
 per locum; ergo Deus est aliquo modo mutabilis. 
 
 2. Praeterea. Sap. 7. dicitur de Sapientia, quod est mobilior 
 omnibus mobilibus. Sed Deus est ipsa Sapientia; ergo Deus est 
 mobilis. 
 
 3. Praeterea. Appropinquare et elongari, motum significant: 
 hujusmodi autem dicuntur de Deo in Scriptura Jac. 4: Appropin- 
 quate Deo; et appropinquabit vobis; ergo Deus est mutabilis. 
 
 Sed contra est, quod dicitur Malach. 3: Ego Deus, et non mutor. 
 
 Respondeo dicendum, quod ex praemissis (q. 2, art. 3) ostenditur : 
 Deum esse omnino immutabilem. 
 
 Primo quidem, quia supra ostensum est (ibid.) esse aliquod 
 primum ens, quod Deum dicimus; et quod hujusmodi primum ens 
 oportet esse purum actum absque permixtione alicujus potentiae, 
 eo quod potentia simpliciter est posterior actu. Omne autem, 
 quod quocumque modo mutatur, est aliquo modo in potentia. 
 Ex quo patet, quod impossibile est, Deum aliquo modo mutari. 
 
 Secundo, quia omne, quod movetur, quantum ad aliquid manet, 
 et quantum ad aliquid transit: sicut quod movetur de albedine in 
 nigredinem, manet secundum substantiam; et sic in omni eo quod 
 movetur, attenditur aliqua composito. Ostensum est autem 
 supra (q. 3, art. 7), quod in Deo nulla est compositio, sed est omnino 
 simplex. Unde manifestum est, quod Deus moveri non potest. 
 Tertio, quia omne, quod movetur, motu suo aliquid acquirit, et 
 pertingit ad illud, ad quod prius non pertingebat; Deus autem, cum 
 sit infinitus, comprehendens in se omnem plenitudinem per- 
 fectionis totius esse, non potest aliquid acquirere, nee extendere 
 se in aliquid, ad quod prius non pertingebat. Unde, nullo modo 
 sibi competit motus. Et inde est, quod quidam antiquorum, quasi 
 ab ipsa veritate coacti, posuerunt primum principium esse immo- 
 bile. Ad Primum ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus (loc. cit. 
 in arg.) ibi loquitur secundum modum, quo Plato dicebat primum 
 movens movere seipsum: omnem operationem nominans motum, 
 secundum quod etiam ipsum intelligere, et velle, et amare motus 
 quidam dicuntur. Quia ergo Deus intelligit, et amat seipsum, 
 secundum hoc dixerunt, quod Deus movet seipsum, non autem 
 secundum quod motus, et mutatio est existentis in potentia: ut 
 nunc loquimur de mutatione, et motu. 
 
 45 Sum I, q. 2, art. ?5. 
 
142 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 Ad secundum dicendum, quod sapientia dicitur mobilis esse 
 similitudinarie, secundum quod suam similitudinem diffundit 
 usque ad ultima rerum : nihil enim esse potest, quod non procedat 
 a divina sapientia per quamdam imitationem, sicut a primo 
 principio effectivo, et formali, prout etiam artificiata procedunt 
 a sapientia artificis. Sic igitur, inquantum similitudo divinae 
 sapientiae gradatim procedit a supremis, quae magis participant 
 de ejus similitudine, usque ad infima rerum, quae minus participant, 
 dicitur esse quidam processus, et motus divinae sapientiae in res, 
 sicut si dicamus solem procedere usque ad terrain, inquantum 
 radius luminis ejus usque ad terram pertingit. Et hoc modo 
 exponit Dionys. cap 1, Coelestis hierarch. (in princ.) dicens, quod 
 omnis processus divinae manifestationis venit ad nos a Patre luminum 
 moto. 
 
 Ad Tertium dicendum, quod hujusmodi dicuntur de Deo in 
 Scripturis metaphorice. Sicut enim dicitur sol intrare domum, 
 vel exire, inquantum radius ejus pertingit ad domum: sic dicitur 
 Deus appropinquare ad nos, vel recedere a nobis, inquantum 
 percipimus influentiam bonitatis ipsius, vel ab eo deficimus." 346 
 
 "Substantiae vero incorporeae, quia sunt ipsae formae subsis- 
 tentes, quae tamen se habent ad esse ipsarum, sicut potentia ad 
 actum, non compatiuntur secum privationem hujus actus: quia 
 esse consequitur formam, et nihil corrumpitur, nisi per hoc, quod 
 amittit formam. Unde in ipsa forma non est potentia ad non esse : 
 et ideo hujusmodi substantiae sunt immutabiles, et invariabiles 
 secundum esse: et hoc est, quod dicit Dionys. 4. cap. de Div. Nom. 
 (parum a princ. led. 1.) quod substantiae intellectuals creatae 
 rnundae sunt a generatione, et ab omni variatione, sicut incorporates, 
 et immateriales: sed tamen remanet in eis duplex mutabilitas. 
 Una secundum quod sunt in potentia ad finem, et sic est in eis 
 mutabilitas secundum electionem de bono in malum, ut Damascen. 
 (lib. 2, cap. 3. et 4.) dicit. Alia secundum locum : inquantum virtute 
 sua finita possunt attingere quaedam loca, quae prius non attinge- 
 bant: quod de Deo dici non potest, qui sua infinitate omnia loca 
 replet, ut supra dictum est (q. 8. art. 9). . . . Unde cum Deus 
 nullo istorum modorum sit mutabilis, proprium ejus est, omnino 
 immutabilem esse." 3 ® 
 
 Pere Pegues, following St. Thomas, gives a clear and inspiring 
 exposition of this truth: 
 
 "Saint Thomas nous previent que 'de tout ce que nous avons 
 dit jusqu'ici, il resulte que Dieu est tout a fait immuable.' On le 
 peut montrer a l'aide de trois raisons: premierement, parce quTl 
 est le premier Etre; secondement, parce quTl est souverainement 
 simple; troisiemement, parce qu'en Lui se trouve la plenitude de 
 la perfection. — 'Nous avons montre plus haut (q. 2, art. 3) qu'il 
 
 846 Sum I, q. 9, art. 1. 
 
 ™ Ibid., q. 9, art. 2. Vide loc. cit., q.s. 3, 4, 6-11; IS, 14; 18-22; 25. 26. 44. 
 
EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 143 
 
 est un premier Etre, que nous appelons Dieu, et que ce premier 
 Etre doit etre acte pur, sans aucun melange de puissance, parce 
 que la puissance en tant que telle suppose un certain acte qui lui 
 est anterieur. Puis done qu'en tout etre qui change, quelle que 
 soit d'ailleurs la nature du changement, se trouve necessairement 
 quelque puissance, il s'ensuit que Dieu,' Etre premier ou acte pur, 
 'ne peut changer en aucune maniere,' qu'Il est tout a fait immuable. 
 — 'Dieu est souverainement simple, e'est-a-dire qu'il n'y a en 
 Lui aucune composition, de quelque nature qu'on la suppose.' 
 II n'est done pas possible d'imaginer en Dieu plusieurs parties 
 dont 1'une demeurerait tandis que l'autre passerait. Or, 'en tout 
 £tre qui change, il faut trouver cela: un quelque chose qui passe 
 et un quelque chose qui demeure; e'est ainsi qu'une chose blanche 
 qui devient noire demeure quant a sa substance; et done en tout 
 ce qui change nous devons trouver une certaine composition. 
 II s'ensuit que Dieu,' qui est souverainement simple, 'ne peut 
 absolument pas etre soumis au changement.' — Enfin, 'Dieu 
 est au sommet de toute perfection; II est infini, et en Lui se 
 trouve la plenitude de l'etre. II s'ensuit qu'il n'y a rien,' en dehors 
 de Lui, 'qu'il puisse acquerir on qu'il puisse atteindre alors qu'au- 
 paravant II ne l'atteindrait pas.' II a tout deja et d'une fagon 
 sureminente. Si done tout mouvement, tout changement a 
 pour but d'acquerir quelque chose, une perfection, qu'on n'avait 
 pas, il s'ensuit que Dieu, ayant tout de par son fond, ne peut 
 aucunement changer on se mouvoir. II est done totalement 
 immuable. — La splendide verite! Et comme elle fait du bien a 
 lame, comme elle est consolante! Dieu est totalement immuable. 
 Que nous importe, des lors, que tout change autour de nous, 
 puisque au-dessus de nous se trouve quelqu'un pour qui nous 
 sommes faits, et qui, Lui, ne change pas. Nous nous donnons 
 beaucoup de mal, nous nous tourmentons beaucoup pour arriver 
 a ces multiples fins que que nous nous proposons toujours et qui 
 toujours nous echappent; et nous oublions que nous sommes les 
 enfants de Celui qui possede en Lui la plenitude de tout bien, 
 et qui, partant, n'a pas a, chercher en dehors de Lui. Se suffisant 
 pleinement a Lui-meme, il se repose eternellement dans l'immuable 
 serenite de son Etre et de ses perfections infinies. S'appuyer sur 
 Lui, ne chercher que Lui, ne serait-ce pas participer en quelque 
 maniere a son immuable et inalterable serenite? . . . En 
 finissant son corps d'article, saint Thomas nous fait remarquer 
 que la grande verite qu'il vient d'etablir est si eblouissante de 
 clarte qu'elle a contraint 'plusieurs esprits,' nieme 'parmi les 
 anciens philosophes' pourtant si ignorants des choses de Dieu, et 
 qui, 'forces par l'evidence, avaient affirme que le premier principe 
 des choses etait immuable.' . . . en un certain sens il est 
 permis de dire que 'Dieu se meut, qu'il y a du mouvement en Lui. 
 Mais alors on prend le mot mouvement, non pas au sens on nous 
 le prenons maintenant et ou on le prend d'ordinaire, e'est-a-dire 
 
144 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 au sens d'un acte qui perfectionne un &tre en puissance, mais au 
 sens general d'acte on d'operation. C'est ainsi que l'entendaient 
 Platon et saint Augustin; et, dans ce sens,' Aristote lui-meme con- 
 cede que 'Dieu se meut, c'est-a-dire qu'Il agit, qu'Il op ere, non 
 d'une action et d'une operation quelconques, mais de ces opera- 
 tions qui n'emportent aucune imperfection, qui sont au con- 
 traire le couronnement et l'achevement de la perfection. Telles 
 sont les operations intellectuelles, connattre, vouloir, aimer, et 
 le reste.' " 348 
 
 (b) The Supreme Spiritual Life being absolutely changeless 
 it is impossible to conceive of it as "developing dialectically 
 through self-diremption and self-return." 349 
 
 The problem of the relation of the Absolute Spiritual Life to the 
 universe admits, therefore, of only one solution: it is the relation 
 of Creator to creature. This solution is eminently rational and 
 is the only one which can safeguard the integrity and sanctity of 
 God, and the free-will of man. A contemporary scientist writes: 
 "Since we have begun by admitting God's existence, or rather 
 since we have taken it as the corner-stone, we recognize in Him 
 the Creator. The difficulties which now surround us come from 
 the inability of our finite minds to grasp all that creation implies. 
 Again the trouble is not with our reason so much as with our 
 imagination. The idea that Omnipotence can make something 
 out of nothing is clear enough and sound enough; but there are 
 those who puzzle their minds by trying to imagine how it is done, 
 and so cannot get rid of anthropomorphic conceptions." 350 
 
 348 Commentaire Frangais Litteral, op. cit., I. I., pp. 255-257. 
 
 349 B. Gibson, R. Eucken's Philosophy of Life, op. cit., p. 154. The passage 
 which expresses Eucken's views fairly is as follows: "No just conception of 
 the meaning which Eucken attaches to this fundamental concept can possibly 
 be gained so long as we fail to bear in mind that the spiritual life, however 
 deep and divine our conception of it may be, is not an oppositionless experience, 
 but shares, qua personal, the essential characteristic of all [?] personal activity 
 — that, namely, of developing dialectically through self-diremption and self- 
 return. It is within the spiritual life itself that all oppositions are at once 
 created and overcome. The opposition between life and death, which is the 
 divinest stimulus of our human existence, is in this sense indigenous to the 
 spiritual life [!!] The conquest over death, though it raise the whole spiritual 
 condition and profoundly modify our whole spiritual perspective, can hardly be 
 held to cancel once and for all the oppositional, self-diremptive character of 
 spiritual life. . . . Hence to conceive the spiritual life aright, we have not 
 to abstract from its oppositional quality or conceive it as developing apart 
 from the pain and the evil, the ignorance and the ugliness which it resists." 
 This is truly surprising language when we recollect that Gibson has described 
 Eucken's philosophy as "a restatement and development in philosophical 
 form of the religious teaching of Jesus"!! Op. cit., p. 166. 
 
 :,r, ° Thomas Dwight, M.D., LL.D. (late Professor of Anatomy at Harvard). 
 Thoughts of a Catholic Anatomist, New York. 1911, p. 97. 
 
Rl'DOLF El'CKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 145 
 
 St. Thomas writes : 
 
 "To every effect produced by God there is either something 
 pre-existent or not. If not, the thesis stands, that God produces 
 some effect out of nothing pre-existent. If anything pre-exists, 
 we either have a process to infinity, which is impossible, or we 
 must come to something primitive, which does not presuppose 
 anything else previous to it. Now this primitive something 
 cannot be God Himself, for God is not the material out of which 
 anything is made (Bk. I, Chap. XVI) : nor can it be any other 
 being, distinct from God and uncaused by God ... It is 
 not proper to the universal cause of being, as such, to act only by 
 movement and change : for not by movement and change is being, 
 as such, made out of not-being, as such, but 'being this' is made 
 out of 'not being this.' But God is the universal principle of 
 being (Chap. XV). Therefore it is not proper to Him to act only 
 by movement or change, or to need pre-existent material to make 
 anything . . . God is in actuality, not by anything inhering in 
 Him, but to the whole extent of His substance (B. I., Chap. XVIII) . 
 Therefore the proper mode of divine action is to produce the whole 
 subsistent thing, and not a mere inherent thing, as is form in 
 matter. Between actuality and potentiality such an order obtains, 
 that, though in one and the same being, which is sometimes in 
 potentiality, sometimes in actuality, potentiality is prior in time 
 to actuality (although actuality is prior in nature), yet, absolutely 
 speaking, actuality must be prior to potentiality, as is clear from 
 this, that potentiality is not reduced to actuality except by some 
 actual being. But matter [i.e., materia prima, or primordial 
 matter] is being in potentiality. Therefore God, first and pure 
 actuality, must be absolutely prior to matter, and consequently 
 cause thereof." 351 
 
 "Every movement or change is the actualization of something 
 that was in potentiality, as such: but in this action of creation 
 there is nothing pre-existent in potentiality to become the subject 
 of the action. The extremes of movement or change fall under 
 the same order, being either of the same kind, as contraries are, 
 or sharing one common potentiality of matter. But nothing of 
 this can be in creation, to which no previous condition of things 
 is supposed. In every change or movement there must be some- 
 thing coming to be otherwise than as it was before. But where the 
 whole substance of a thing is brought into being, there cannot be 
 any permanent residuum, now in this condition, now in that: 
 because such a residuum would not be produced, but presupposed 
 to production." 352 
 
 "Hence appears the futility of arguments against creation drawn 
 from the nature of movement or change, — as that creation must 
 
 151 God and His Creatures, op. cit., B. II, Chap. XVI. 
 ' 52 Op. cit., B. II. Chap. XVII. 
 
146 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 be in some subject, or that not-being must be transmuted into 
 being : for creation is not a change, but is the mere dependence of 
 created being on the principle by which it is set up, and so comes 
 under the category of relation: hence the subject of creation may 
 very well be said to be the thing created. Nevertheless creation 
 is spoken of as a 'change' according to our mode of conceiving it, 
 inasmuch as our understanding takes one and the same thing to 
 be now non-existent and afterwards existing. If creation (crea- 
 turedom) is a relation, it is evidently some sort of reality; and this 
 reality is neither uncreated, nor created by a further act of creation. 
 For since the created effect really depends on the Creator, this 
 relation must be a certain reality. Now every reality is brought 
 into being by God; and therefore also this reality is brought into 
 being by God, and yet was not created by any other creation than 
 that of the first creature, because accidents and forms do not 
 exist by themselves, and therefore neither are they terms of separ- 
 ate creation, since creation is the production of substantial being; 
 but as they are 'in another,' so are they created in the creation of 
 other things." 353 
 
 It is difficult to form a mental picture of Creation, but is it easier 
 to form an image of the ultimate constituents of the universe? 
 
 Whether we hold the atom to be indivisible with Dalton, or 
 split it into electrons with Thompson, or adopt the Dynamical 
 Theory of Boscovitch, or the Dynamism of Ostwald we are far 
 from having a clear conception as to what matter really is in last 
 analysis. 
 
 (c) Another problem arises from that of creation : it is that of 
 immanence and transcendence. How is the Infinite Creator, Who is 
 "like Himself, unlike all things besides Himself," "distinct from, 
 independent of them all," present to His Creatures? Eucken 
 discusses the question at considerable length, 354 yet in his concep- 
 tion of the Geistesleben there is absolutely no possibility of predi- 
 cating transcendence of it. How can that which is of the essence 
 of things, and Eucken claims this for the Geistesleben, be at the 
 same time wholly distinct from them? Boyce Gibson touches 
 on the subject while maintaining the oppositional character of 
 the spiritual life- He writes: 
 
 "To conceive immanence apart from transcendence is to conceive 
 it metaphorically in the light of the spatial distinction between 
 inclusion and exclusion, and not as a spiritual immanence which, 
 qua spiritual, includes within itself the oppositions of sameness 
 
 363 Op. cit., B. II, Chap. XVIII. 
 
 364 See especially Geistige Stromungen der Gegenwart, op. cit., E2, Das 
 Problem der Religion, p. 390. 
 
KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 147 
 
 and otherness, of self -surrender and true freedom. The Divine 
 immanence implies, then, the Divine transcendence; or, to express 
 the same truth in the simpler language of emotion, love implies 
 reverence; intimacy, respect. And what in God must transcend 
 all human appropriation is an inwardness of Divine experience, 
 unapproachable save through an emotion of reverence, which is 
 none other than love itself become aware of its own intrinsic 
 limitation." 355 
 
 A careful reading of this passage reveals its pantheistic tendency. 
 How can "immanence" include within itself "sameness and other- 
 ness?" We are confronted with the old difficulty of the presence 
 of incompatible elements in the concept of the Geistesleben. Not 
 only does "an inwardness of Divine experience" transcend "all 
 human appropriation," but God Himself, in every respect, infinitely 
 transcends such appropriation. Faith teaches us that a super- 
 natural union of the soul with God is effected by Divine Grace, 
 but such a union transcends the natural powers of the soul, and 
 is completely outside and beyond the sphere of philosophy. As 
 has already been pointed out God cannot be known, in the present 
 life, as He essentially is, but only as the cause is known by the 
 effect. 356 
 
 Gibson, still interpreting Eucken, is more explicit in the fol- 
 lowing : 
 
 "Human freedom, truly interpreted, is seen to imply the Divine 
 omnipresence, not as a mere postulate, a mere hope, a desire, or 
 even a belief, but in the sense of the higher pantheism, as an inti- 
 macy closer to us than breathing and nearer than hands and 
 feet." 357 
 
 The Divine Omnipresence cannot be conceived in the light of 
 
 pantheistic philosophy: it is just this which transcendence prohibits. 
 
 Though Faith, as well as reason, teaches us that God is more 
 
 intimately present to His creatures than the mind can grasp, 
 
 yet God is, at the same time, infinitely distinct from them, for 
 
 while being with them or in them by His essence He is not of 
 
 their essence. The concluding words ("as an intimacy, etc.") 
 
 of the cited passage recall the works of Catholic Theologians and 
 
 ascetic writers — notably those of Father Faber. Indeed both 
 
 Eucken and his interpreters have had frequent recourse, in our 
 
 
 
 866 R. Eucken's Philosophy of Life, op. cit., p. 157. 
 
 366 See God and His Creatures, op. cit., B. Ill, Chap. XLVII. 
 
 367 Op. cit., p. 156. Italics ours. 
 
148 Rudolf Euckbn and the Spiritual Life 
 
 opinion, to Catholic writings in order to "fill in" the content of the 
 Geistesleben, and to strengthen their philosophy. We feel justified 
 in stating that if we subtracted from Activism all that has been 
 taken from Scholasticism 358 and from Catholic ascetic writings 
 the barrenness of the residuum would be startling. 
 
 The following is the Scholastic teaching with regard to immanence 
 and transcendence: 
 
 "God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor 
 as an accident; but as an agent is present to anything upon which 
 it works. An agent must be joined to anything wherein it acts 
 immediately, and touch it by its own power; hence it is proved 
 that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. 
 Since God is Existence itself by His own Essence, so created exist- 
 ence must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of 
 fire. God causes this effect in things not only when they first 
 begin to exist, but as long as they are preserved in existence; as 
 light is caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illumi- 
 nated. Therefore as long as a thing exists, God must be present 
 to it, according to its mode of existence. 
 
 "The existence (esse) of anything is all the closer to it and all 
 the more profoundly belongs to it as the formal idea of all that 
 is in it, as was shown above (Q. VII). Hence it must be that God 
 exists intimately in all things. . . . God is above all things by 
 the excellence of His nature; moreover, He is in all things as the 
 cause of the being of all things. . . . No action of any agent, 
 however powerful it may be, acts at a distance, except through a 
 medium. But it belongs to the great power of God that He acts 
 immediately in all things. Hence nothing is distant from Him, 
 as if it could be without God in itself. But things are said to be 
 distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in nature or grace; 
 as also He is above all by the excellence of His own nature. . . . 
 to be in a place can be understood in a twofold sense; either by 
 way of other things — i.e., when anything is said to be in other 
 things, no matter how, as the accidents of a place are in the place; 
 or by a way proper to place, as things placed are in the place. In 
 both these in some way God is in every place; which means to exist 
 everywhere. First, He is so in all things as giving them being, 
 and power, and operation; for He is in every place as giving it 
 existence and locative power. Also, things placed are in place, 
 inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills every place; not, indeed, 
 like a body; for a body is said to fill place, inasmuch as it does not 
 suffer the co-presence of another body; whereas by God being in a 
 place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed, by the 
 very fact that He gives existence to everything in every place, He 
 
 ass ^y e p i n ted out in Part II the influence of Scholastic teaching on Eucken. 
 
KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 149 
 
 fills every place. . . . Incorporeal things are not in place by 
 contact of dimensive quantity, as bodies are; but by contact of 
 power . . . God is in anything in two ways; in one way as its 
 active cause; and thus He is in all things created by Him; in 
 another way He is in things as the object of operation is in the 
 operator; and this belongs to the operations of the soul, according 
 as the thing known is in the one who knows ; and the thing desired 
 in the one desiring. In this second way God is especially in the 
 rational creature, which knows and loves Him actually or habit- 
 ually. And because the rational creature possesses this preroga- 
 tive by grace, as will be shown later (Q. XII), He is said to be thus 
 in the Saints by grace. How He is in other things created by Him, 
 must be considered from human affairs as ordinarily known. A 
 king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom by his power, 
 although he is not everywhere present. Anything is said to be 
 present in other things subject to its inspection; as things in a 
 house are said to be present to anyone, who nevertheless may not 
 be in substance in every part of the house. A thing is said to be 
 in a place by way of substance or essence wherever its substance 
 may be . . . God is in all things by His Power. . . . There- 
 fore, God is in all things by His Power, inasmuch as all things are 
 subject to His Power; He is by His Presence in all things, as all 
 things are bare and open to His eyes; 359 He is in all things by His 
 Essence, inasmuch as He is the cause of existence to all things. 
 . . . His Substance is to all things the cause of existence. . . . 
 Knowledge and will require that the thing known should be in the 
 one who knows; and the thing willed in the one who wills. Hence 
 things are more truly in God by knowledge and will than God is in 
 things. . . . No other perfection, but Grace, added to substance, 
 renders God present in anything as the object known and loved; 
 therefore only Grace constitutes a singular mode of God's existence 
 in things. There is, however, another singular mode of God's 
 existence in man by union, which will be treated of in its own 
 place (Part III)." 360 
 
 369 It is hardly necessary to remark that this expression does not imply 
 anything anthropomorphic in St. Thomas' point of view, but is purely hgura- 
 tive. 
 
 360 Summa, Eng. translation by Fathers of Eng. Dominican Province, 
 New York, 1911, I, I, q. VIII, arts. 1, 2, 3. As the mystery of the 
 Incarnation is wholly beyond the sphere of philosophy, it has been 
 merely referred to in the closing paragraph. The words of St. Paul, "In Him 
 we live, and move, and have our being" (Acts XVII, 28), are borne out by the 
 following from St. Thomas: "Although corporeal things are said to be in 
 anything as in that which contains them, nevertheless spiritual things contain 
 those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body. Hence also 
 God is in things as containing them; nevertheless by a certain similitude to 
 corporeal things, it is said that all things are in God; inasmuch as they are 
 contained by Him." (Op. cit., 1, 1, q. VIII, a. 1, obj. 2.) How wholly removed 
 from the pantheistic conception is this presence the entire Scholastic doctrine 
 shows. The concluding passage of Dr. Dubray's article on the Philosophy of 
 
150 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 From this exposition it is evident that monism of essence is not 
 only an absurdity, it is a blasphemy. Monism of purpose — 
 oneness in origin and destiny — such is the only unity to which all 
 multiplicity is reducible. We cite again from Balmes : 
 
 "The human mind seeks that by reason to which it is impelled 
 by an intellectual instinct; how to reduce plurality to unity, to 
 re-unite, as it were, all the variety of existences in a point from 
 which they all proceed, and in which they are all absorbed. The 
 understanding knows that the conditioned must be included in 
 the unconditioned, the relative in the absolute, the finite in the 
 infinite, the various in the one. In this, all religions, all schools of 
 philosophy agree. The proclamation of this truth belongs to no 
 one of them exclusively; it is to be met with in all countries of the 
 world, in primitive times, back even to the cradle of the human 
 race. Beautiful, sublime tradition! Preserved through all genera- 
 tions, amid the ebb and flow of events, it offers us the idea of the 
 Divinity presiding over the origin and destiny of the universe. 
 Yes! The unity sought by philosophers is the Divinity itself, — 
 the Divinity whose glory the firmament declares, and whose 
 august face of ineffable splendor appears to us in our inmost 
 consciousness. Yes! it is the Divinity which enlightens and 
 guides the true philosopher, but blinds and confounds the proud 
 sophist; it is what the true philosopher calls God, and venerates 
 and adores in the sanctuary of his soul. . . . Considering its 
 personality, its consciousness, its infinite intelligence, and its 
 most perfect liberty, it is the foundation and the copestone of 
 religion: distinct from the world, it produced the world from 
 nothing, and preserves and governs it, and leads it by mysterious 
 paths to the destiny assigned in its immutable decrees. There is 
 then unity in the world; there is unity in philosophy. In this all 
 agree; the difference is that some separate, with the greatest care, 
 the finite from the infinite, the thing created from the creative 
 power, unity from multiplicity, and maintain the necessary com- 
 munication between the free will of the omnipotent agent and 
 
 Henri Bergson applies with equal force to every pantheistic system, and may 
 be directed against the "higher pantheism" (vide Boyce Gibson, op. cit., p. 
 156) of Eucken. It runs as follows: "It is, therefore, in a sense different 
 from that of Saint Paul that Professor Bergson applies to the absolute as 
 conceived by him the words which the Apostle applies to God (Acts XVII, 28). 
 No; it is not of the absolute felt vaguely in intuition, but of God as known by 
 reason, 'for the invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood 
 by the things that are made' (Rom. I, 20); it is not of the absolute conceived 
 as becoming, but of God who gives to Himself the name of 'He who is' (Exod. 
 Ill, 14) and who 'changeth not' (Mai. Ill, 6); it is not of the absolute who has 
 nothing of the already made, but of God of whose 'greatness there is no end' 
 (Ps. CXLIV, 3), that St. Paul speaks when he utters the sublime words: 'In 
 Him we live, and move, and have our being.' " (Catholic University Bulletin, 
 April, 1914, p. 323.) 
 
KUDOLF ElTCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 151 
 
 finite existences, between the wisdom of the sovereign intelligence 
 and the fixed course of the universe: while others, affected with 
 melancholy blindness, confound the effect with the cause, the 
 finite with the infinite, the various with the one, and re-produce 
 in the domain of philosophy the chaos of primeval times; but all 
 scattering and in frightful confusion, without any hope of order 
 or union. . . . The absurd systems invented by philosophical 
 vanity explain nothing; the system of religion, which is that also 
 of sound philosophy, and of all mankind, explains everything." 361 
 
 We have concluded a brief survey of Scholastic philosophy: 
 it remains to be considered whether Eucken's attack is refuted 
 thereby. 
 
 361 Balmes, op. cit., pp. 64 sqq. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 Eucken' s Attack on ScJwlasticism and Its Refutation 
 
 Eucken's early attitude was favorable to Scholasticism rather 
 than the reverse. His first four articles dealing with the subject 
 were a distinct advance upon Prantl and men of similar caliber. 
 This was largely due, doubtless, to the influence of Teichmiiller 
 and Trendelenburg — an influence exerted in the direction of 
 Aristotelianism — and was not far-reaching. In proportion as 
 Eucken has developed his own irrationalistic system he has shown 
 an increasingly bitter and hostile spirit to Scholastic philosophy. 
 One might almost infer he realized that here, and here only, was 
 the rock against which his inconsistent theory would go to pieces. 
 
 As has already been pointed out, Eucken has struck the note of 
 challenge to Scholasticism, in one form or another, in a number of 
 his works: his anti-intellectualism is, in itself, a challenge. 362 
 
 We do not propose to examine into his charges in detail; the 
 main points will be briefly dealt with. Before mentioning them, 
 we shall cite two statements as indicative of his general attitude. 
 In Life of the Spirit he writes : 
 
 "It demands men who are either senile or else spiritually im- 
 mature: it cannot satisfy men who are grown up and conscious 
 of their powers [es verlangt eine greisenhafte oder eine geistig 
 noch unreife Menschheit, einer miindigen und kraftbewussten 
 kann sie nicht geniigen]." 363 
 
 In Erkennen und Leben: 
 
 "Das ergibt dann eine Scholastik, sie ist eine Gefahr aller 
 Zeiten, nicht bloss des Mittelalters." 364 
 
 We find in the index, "Scholasticism a permanent danger," 
 "Scholastik, eine bleibende Gefahr." 
 
 362 It may be well to point out that in treating of Scholasticism we are 
 dealing with the system of philosophy universally recognized under that name. 
 We do not grant that Hegel was a scholastic, much less can we agree with 
 Professor Stanley Hall who terms him "the greatest of modern scholastics," 
 (Stanley Hall, Founders of Modern Psychology, New York, 1912, p. 455). 
 The "Intellectualism" of Hegelianism is incompatible with scholastic philos- 
 ophy and Christian truth. 
 
 363 Einfuhrung in eine Philosophic des Geisteslebens, op. eit., p. SO, Life 
 of the Spirit, op. eit., p. 63. 
 
 u * Erkennen und Leben, op. eit., p. 109. 
 
 152 
 
KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 153 
 
 Such language is more akin to abuse than to argument and is 
 wholly beneath serious criticism. In a pamphlet published eleven 
 years before the work last cited, Eucken's tone is much milder and 
 a fair attempt is made to prove the charges he there formulates. 
 In Thomas von Aquino und Kant he writes : 
 
 "Was uns im Thomismus geboten wird, ist eine Verbindung der 
 aristotelischen Philosophic und der kirchlich-christlichen Lehre, 
 eine Verbindung aber gemass der Art des Mittelalters. Ein 
 solcher Versuch treibt den Draussenstehenden sofort zu Zweifeln 
 und Fragen. Eignet sich die aristotelische Philosophic zur 
 beharrenden Grundlage der Wahrheitsforschung? Ist sie, was 
 immer ihr Wert mag, vereinbar mit der christlichen t)berzeu- 
 gung? Geniigt die Weise, wie beide Welten von Thomas verbun- 
 den sind, den Anspriichen, welche wir nach den Erfahrungen 
 einer Reihe von Jahrhunderten und nach grossen geistigen Um- 
 walzungen erheben miissen?" 365 
 
 Boyce Gibson puts the challenge succinctly as follows : 
 
 "Whatever claim is made in support of the abiding value of 
 this synthesis must substantiate itself by showing — (1) that the 
 Aristotelian philosophy is still qualified to retain the old supre- 
 macy it held in the day of Thomas Aquinas as the one permanent 
 foundation of the search after truth, and (2) that it is logically 
 possible to unite the requirements of the old Greek philosophy 
 with those of Christian conviction." 366 
 
 Eucken answers both questions in the negative. 367 
 Taking the second point first, we do not intend to enter upon a 
 discussion of Eucken's arguments — with some of which we disagree 
 — because the possibility, or otherwise, of such a complete union 
 is not the question at stake. The same remark applies to the chief 
 reason he assigns for the supposed reconciliation effected by St. 
 Thomas. In the Problem of Human Life he writes : 
 
 "Following the precedent of most of the Arabic philosophers, 
 he [St. Thomas] saw Aristotle through the medium of Neo- 
 Platonic ideas, and understood him in a more inward and religious 
 sense than the facts really allow." 368 
 
 It seems to us that this is a petitio principii; there is no sufficient 
 evidence for the statement. Why forget that Plato was Aristotle's 
 
 365 Thomas Von Aquino und Kant, Berlin, 1901, p. 25. 
 
 366 Op. cit., p. 78. 
 
 367 See Thomas Von Aquino und Kant, ein Kampf Zweier Welten, op. cit., 
 pp. 26-39; also Geistige Strcimungen der Gegenwart, op. cit., p. 58 sqq., 
 "Die Hohe der Scholastik," etc., to "ergeben hatte." 
 
 388 Op. cit., p. 255. Lebensanschauung der grossen Denker, p. 247. 
 
154 KtJDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlPE 
 
 master? "Like master like servant" may well hold here. How 
 could the great mind of Aristotle remain uninfluenced by Plato 
 to the extent that his philosophy will not bear "an inward and 
 religious meaning?" 369 
 
 Even if this be the case the greatness of the Scholastics is accen- 
 tuated thereby since, starting from Aristotle's principles, they were 
 able to go so far beyond them. The spiritual soul, e.g., as 
 conceived by Aristotle, lends itself to be the "fit" for the Christian 
 idea, and the Scholastics develop on the philosophic side, inde- 
 pendently of Revelation, what is really implied in Aristotle's 
 teaching, though he may have failed to realize the full import of 
 his own conceptions. 370 
 
 It is not here a question of what Aristotle himself meant — not a 
 question of what he with his limitations could draw out of his 
 philosophic principles — but of what the more enlightened Scholas- 
 tics could, and did, draw therefrom and add thereto, so as to 
 formulate a comprehensive system, in broad outline unchangeable 
 for all time. Is the Aristotelico-Scholastic philosophy (not merely 
 the Aristotelian, read in the light of certain moderns — waiving the 
 question of their correct or wrong interpretation) qualified to 
 retain its "old supremacy" "as the one permanent foundation of 
 the search after truth?" We are now at the first point — with ihe 
 interrogation slightly modified — and we answer in scholastic 
 fashion "Distinguo:" in fundamental principles and broad outline, 
 "yes:" — we do not intend to defend our statement except by 
 referring to our exposition of Scholasticism; it is its own proof — 
 in every detail of its teaching with regard to natural science, "no." 
 But this does not detract from the basal soundness of the system. 
 Both St. Thomas and Albertus Magnus recognized that the 
 scientific knowledge and beliefs 371 of their day might well be en- 
 larged and superseded as fresh discoveries were made. The true 
 formulators of Scholasticism were not slavish followers of Aristotle, 
 
 369 B. Gibson, op. cit., p. 82. 
 
 370 According to Eucken Aristotelianism is more akin to Judaism than it 
 is to Christianity. (Vide Thomas Von Aquino, op. cit., p. 39.) This would 
 bear out the position which we took up in part I, viz., that the concept of the 
 spiritual in Greek philosophy was directly influenced by the Hebrew Religion: 
 moreover, Aristotelianism and Judaism belong to the Old World; they deal 
 with the same Great Spiritual Reality, but before the bright Sun of Spirituality 
 had actually "dwelt amongst us," so that men can no longer plead ignorance. 
 
 371 We use "scientific" here, in its restricted sense, as designating what we 
 termed the natural sciences. 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 155 
 
 but took and rejected according to the dictates of reason and supe- 
 rior knowledge, with perfect freedom and independence. It is as 
 referring to this second aspect of Scholasticism that the words of 
 the revered Right Rev. Bishop Spalding — of which Eucken seeks 
 to make so much 372 — must be understood. Eucken's criticisms 
 betray not only a lack of appreciation of Scholasticism, but also 
 an entire lack of comprehension of the system itself and of its 
 leading minds. The condescension with which he pays a rather 
 dubious tribute to the master genius of St. Thomas is amusing. 373 
 In a critique in the Dublin Review we read: 
 
 "Why, . . . should Neo-Thomism be styled unhistorical? Why 
 should we be told that 'while Thomas Aquinas was not a thinker 
 of the first rank, he was no insignificant mind and no fanatic'? 
 Such statements leave us musing." 374 
 
 We shall close our defense by a critique of the challenger: 
 
 "W'e find it very difficult to follow Professor Eucken when he is 
 expounding his own philosophy. When we are told for instance 
 that the individual 'must take possession of the infinite' and 
 'assert it,' we are left wondering how it could possibly be done. 
 We have indeed some conception of what he means by 'activism' 
 and some vague thought of 'the spiritual life.' But the Professor 
 is really not a philosopher: he is a 'seer' who uses words in strange 
 meanings, and who feels himself charged with some great message 
 for humanity. He is, in fact, like our Carlyle in many ways, in 
 feeling that he bears within himself a message of regeneration, 
 and above all, in the vehemence and perplexing obscurity of his 
 utterances." 375 
 
 372 Thomas Von Aquino und Kant, op. cit., p. 40. 
 
 373 Problem of Human Life, op. cit., p. 254. [Lebensanschauung der g. 
 Denker, p. 246.] See also Thomas Von Aquino und Kant, op. cit., pp. 26 sqq. 
 
 374 Dublin Review, Vol. 155, July, 1914, p. 215. Probably Eucken intended 
 the second statement to be an answer to Prantl who calls St. Thomas "einen 
 Schwachkopf" (Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, Bd III, S. 2, u. 107). 
 In the same critique the subjectivism of the Problem of Human Life is thus 
 referred to: "There is no research- work to be found in the volume, and the 
 personal factor looms large in all the interpretations" (p. 214). 
 
 375 Dublin Review, op. cit., pp. 213 sqq. Italics ours. 
 
156 KUDOLF ElTCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 In the foregoing inquiry into Rudolf Eucken's philosophy we 
 have confined ourselves, in the main, to an examination of his 
 concept of spiritual life, and to his theory of knowledge. We 
 have sought to show that the one is an inconceivability, and the 
 other an impossibility. In our exposition of Scholasticism we 
 believe we have shown that the system is consistent in its prin- 
 ciples, intelligible in its concepts, and in harmony with the uni- 
 versally recognized signification of the term "spiritual" as opposed 
 in toto to matter: we have shown further that, in its general 
 principles and broad outline, it is the only permanent foundation 
 of the search after truth. 
 
FINAL NOTE 
 
 There are several other important aspects of Activism which 
 call for criticism, but the task does not fall within the limits of 
 this dissertation. We shall, therefore, point them out briefly, 
 leaving the detailed refutation to others. 
 
 1. Eucken confuses the relations of Art and Morality in a 
 serious degree, insisting that there exists an essential relation be- 
 tween them. In Geistige Stromungen he writes : 
 
 "Das Angewiesensein von Kunst und Moral aufeinander wird 
 namentlich da zu voller Anerkennung gelangen, wo unsere Welt 
 nicht als eine fertig abgeschlossene, sondern als eine erst im Werden 
 befindliche, ja als eine solche gilt, in der nicht nur Vorhandenes 
 auszubauen, sondern eine neue Stufe der Wirklichkeit zu erreichen 
 ist. . . . Aber zugleich bedarf es eines kraftigen und gliicklichen 
 ktinstlerischen Bildens, wenn die neue Welt uns nicht in vagem 
 Umriss verbleiben, und wenn sie das Ganze unserer Seele gewinnen 
 soil; auch die Kunst ist eine unentbehrliche Helferin zum Aufbau 
 eines neuenLebens." 377 
 
 In Life of the Spirit, he writes : 
 
 "Further, without the creative activity of art there can be no 
 successful construction of an independent spiritual world in the 
 human sphere, for this construction involves the severance of the 
 subject from the confused initial situation and a creative effort in 
 contradistinction to it." 378 
 
 Various statements in the same spirit are scattered through his 
 writings: the Problem of Human Life in particular, may be con- 
 sulted on the point. We maintain that art may be an aid to 
 morality both by presenting moral ideas in a concrete form, and 
 by raising man's aspirations from the sensuous to the intellectual 
 or the religious, but Eucken himself has shown how often art 
 lowers rather than raises the moral standard; 379 it cannot then be 
 indispensable to morality. Moreover to assert an essential 
 connection is to ignore the peculiar character of spiritual activity 
 which manifests itself in conscience. 
 
 A study of Eucken's distinctively ethical works throws light on 
 the mental attitude which causes the confusion; in Konnen wir 
 noch Christen sein? he writes: 
 
 "Die Zeit liegt hinter uns wo alle Bestreitung des Christentums 
 
 377 Op. cit., pp. 335 sqq. Italics ours. (Main Currents, p. 400.) 
 
 378 Pp. 264 sqq., op. cit. (Einfiihrung in cine Phil, des G., p. 126.) 
 
 379 See Geistige Stromungen, pp. 329-342. 
 
 157 
 
158 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 an der Tatsache der christlichen Moral wie an einem unerschiitter- 
 lichen Felsen scheiterte, wir sahen die Neuzeit sowohl gegen die 
 eigentiimliche Fassung als gegen die herrschende Stellung, welche 
 die Moral im Christentum erhalt, harteste Angriffe rich ten." 380 
 
 Eucken evidently thinks the attacks in part merited. In 
 Present Day Ethics we find : 
 
 "Owing to the closer connection between man's endeavor and 
 his environment and to the accentuation of the struggle for 
 existence, this kind of morality appears too mild, too soft, too 
 subjective, and there is often a desire for a sterner and more virile 
 kind. Religious ethics does not seem to have sufficient latitude 
 to transform the whole of life. We can therefore understand the 
 wide spread desire for something which can sufficiently supplement 
 religious ethics." 381 
 
 We cite again from the Dublin Review: 
 
 "Of what religious morality can the Professor be thinking? 
 Surely not of the Christian code, seeing that nothing less soft or 
 more manly has ever been suggested. Was there anything soft or 
 unmanly in the actions or ethical principles of St. Paul, St. Jerome, 
 St. Athanasius, St. Ignatius, ... St. Thomas a Becket?" 382 
 
 Eucken's views of morality cannot be accepted in toto by a 
 Christian : as usual he is vague in matters of detail but he can hardly 
 be considered a firm upholder of the Decalogue. The exponent of 
 Activism and kindred spirits may lead strictly moral lives in spite 
 of the vagueness of their moral code, but the danger of spreading 
 such teachings among the masses is self-evident. We have little 
 hesitation in saying that these latter will trouble little about a 
 Spiritual Life to obtain which they should enter upon a "seemingly 
 impossible struggle;" rather will they avail themselves of the 
 suggested "latitude" in a somewhat wider manner than the phil- 
 osopher intended. 
 
 2. Eucken's subjectivism in treating of History and of historical 
 personages is almost incredible in one who professes to believe in 
 abiding truth. In the conception of an "historical fact" he 
 out-pragmatises the pragmatists. 383 
 
 380 Kbnnen wir noch Christen sein? Recht und Erneuerungs-fahigkeit des 
 Christentums, 4, p. 175. 
 
 381 Present Day Ethics, translated by M. Legdewitz [Seydewitz?], New York, 
 1913, pp. 21 sqq. 
 
 382 Op. cit. 
 
 383 See Prolegomena zu Forsehungen iiher die Einheit des Geisteslebens — 
 Darlegung des eigenen Verfahrens, especially, p. 42. Cf. R. Eucken's Phil, 
 of Life, by Boyce Gibson, op. cit., pp. 41 sqq. 
 
Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 159 
 
 3. His attacks on the Catholic Church are unworthy of one 
 who has been described as "a profound German thinker:" indeed 
 they are unworthy of any one who has the reputation of being 
 enlightened or just. Dom Feuling seems to us a very lenient critic 
 when he writes : 
 
 "It is true, there occur in his works, down to the last editons, 
 passages of scornful criticism on Christian and Catholic doctrines 
 whose sense and importance he is far from understanding. But 
 he endeavors throughout, and in most cases succeeds, to be fair 
 and to abstain from methods of dispute which are as little scientific, 
 as they are apt to invite to serious controversy." 384 
 
 With this point we may take the confidence of his assertions on 
 matters of which he has no real knowledge, and his perfect assur- 
 ance of the necessity of adopting his particular views and philo- 
 sophical methods. 385 
 
 Indeed, he cannot claim to have followed "his own teaching" 
 as set forth in the following passage from one of his early works. 
 "It is especially necessary that we do not fabricate dogmatically a 
 self-sufficiency in our own range of thought, or faith in the all- 
 sufficiency of our own principles." 386 In this connection too we 
 may notice his harsh treatment of St. Augustine. The encomiums 
 he bestows on him and the admiration he professes for him cannot 
 atone for his failure to recognize the fact of St. Augustine's con- 
 version as an event which transformed his life, so that an analysis 
 of his character after that conversion must necessarily differ from 
 an appreciation preceding it. Moreover, following Luther, he 
 attributes to St. Augustine doctrines the precise opposite of what 
 he taught. 387 We may add here, too, that Eucken's statement 
 that no thinker, today, holds the same views on religion as were 
 formerly held, is so gratuitous and untrue as to be undeserving 
 of attention. 
 
 384 Dom. D. Feuling, O.S.B. R. Eucken's Philosophy, Dublin Review, 
 op. cit., p. 77. 
 
 385 See, e. g., Life of the Spirit, Problem of Truth, pp. 275-388. [Kinflihrung 
 in eine Phil, des G., pp. 131-159.] Having criticised the Historical Standard, 
 Protestantism, various philosophical systems, Tradition and the Catholic 
 Church, he decides that none of them can solve the truth-problem. He 
 forthwith unfolds his own system as the only means of reaching truth. 
 
 386 Fundamental Concepts of Modern Phil. Thought, p. 304. New York, 
 1880. [Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart, Leipzig, 1878, p. 264.] 
 
 387 See Prob. of Human Life., op. cit., 211 sqq. [Lebensanschauung der 
 grossen Denker, pp. 207 sqq.] and for St. Augustine's teaching consult City 
 of God. 
 
160 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 4. Finally Eucken cannot consistently speak of the truth of 
 Christianity — even of the "Eternal" in Christianity — and avail 
 himself, at will, of its ethical treasures while denying the Divinity 
 of Our Saviour. Nothing was more clearly taught by Christ 
 than that He was the Son of God. On this very charge the 
 High-Priest condemned Him. 
 
 "And the high-priest said to Him: I adjure thee by the living 
 God, that thou tell us if thou be the Christ the Son of God. 
 
 "Jesus saith to him: Thou hast said it. Nevertheless I say to 
 you, hereafter you shall see the Son of Man sitting on the right 
 hand of the power of God, and coming in the clouds of heaven. 
 Then the high-priest rent his garments, saying: He hath blas- 
 phemed, what further need have we of witnesses? Behold now 
 you have heard the blasphemy: What think you? But they 
 answering said: He is guilty of death." 388 
 
 Will Eucken revere One Whose veracity he doubts? Here in 
 concluding we again confront Eucken with an inevitable Entweder- 
 Oder: Either acknowledge the Divinity of Christ, or renounce the 
 ethical wealth which you have borrowed from Him, and which, 
 alone, constitutes the worth of your system. 
 
 Matthew, Chap. XXVI, Verses 63-67. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 of the principal works used in preparing this dissertation. In the list of 
 Eucken's works we have placed only those mainly dealt with: 
 
 Rudolph Eucken. 
 
 Die Einheit des Geisteslebens in Bewusstsein und That der Menschheit. 
 
 Leipzig, 1888. 
 Prolegomena zu Forschungen iiber die Einheit des Geisteslebens. Leipzig, 
 
 1885. 
 Geistige Strbmungen der Gegenwart. 4te Auflage. Leipzig, 1913. (Trans- 
 lated by Meyrick Booth, under the title "Main Currents of Modern 
 
 Thought." London and New York, 1912). 
 Hauptprobleme der Religionsphilosophie der Gegenwart. 5te Auflage. 
 
 Berlin, 1912. (Translated by Lucy Judge Gibson and W. R. B. Gibson, 
 
 under the title " Christianity and the New Idealism." 2d ed., New 
 
 York, 1912.) 
 Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion. 3tte Auflage. Leipzig, 1912. (Trans- 
 lated by W. Tudor Jones, under the title "Truth of Religion." New 
 
 York, 1911.) 
 Grundlinien Einer Neuen Lebensanschauung. 2te Auflage. Leipzig, 1913. 
 
 (Translated by Alban G. Widgery, under the title "Life's Basis and 
 
 Life's Ideal." London, 1912.) 
 Der Sinn und Wert des Lebens. 3tte Auflage. Leipzig, 1913. (Translated 
 
 by Lucy Judge Gibson and W. R. B. Gibson, under the title "Meaning 
 
 and Value of Life." London, 1909.) 
 Einfiihrung in eine Philosophie des Geisteslebens. Leipzig, 1908. (Trans- 
 lated by F. L. Pogson, under the title "Life of the Spirit." New York, 
 
 1909.) 
 Konnen Wir noch Christen Sein? Leipzig, 1911. (Translated by Lucy 
 
 Judge Gibson under the title, "Can we still be Christians?" New York, 
 
 1914.) 
 Die Lebensanschauungen der Grossen Denker. 7te Auflage. Leipzig, 1907. 
 
 (Translated by Williston S. Hough and W. R. B. Gibson, under the 
 
 title "Problem of Human Life." New York, 1910.) 
 Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt. 2tc Auflage. Leipzig, 1007. 
 Erkennen und Leben. Leipzig, 1912. (Translated by W. T. Jones, under 
 
 the title "Knowledge and Life." New York, 1913.) 
 Ethics and Modern Thought. New York, 1913. 
 Present-Day Ethics. New York, 1913. 
 
 (The two last named arc; translations from the German manuscript l>y 
 
 Margaret von Seydewitz.) 
 Thomas von Aquino und Kant, ein Kampf zweier Welten. Berlin, 1901. 
 Geschichte und Kritik der Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart. 1878. (Earliest 
 
 form of Geistige Strbmungen der Gegenwart. Translated by M. Stuart 
 
 Phelps, under the title "Fundamental Concepts of Modern Philosophic 
 
 Thought." New York, 1880.) 
 
 101 
 
162 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 
 
 Religion and Life. London, 1911. 
 
 Back to Religion. New York, 1912. 
 
 Philosophic der Geschichte. Systematische Philosophic Berlin und Leipzig, 
 
 1908, (5) pp. 248-281. 
 Collected Essays. (Edited and translated by Meyrick Booth. New York, 
 
 1914.) 
 Problem of Immortality. Art. in Hibbert Journal, July, 1908, p. 836. 
 Philosophy of Friedrich Froebel. Art in Forum, vol. XXX: October, 1900, 
 
 p. 172. 
 Present Estimate of Value of Human Life. Art. in Forum, vol. XXXIV: 
 
 April-June, 1903, p. 608. 
 
 Interpretations of Eucken. 
 
 T 
 
 G. Wunderle, Die Religionsphilosophie Rudolf Euckens. Paderborn, 1912. 
 R. Siebert, Rudolf Euckens geschichtsphilosophische Ansichten. Berlin, 
 
 1909. 
 T. Kappstein, Rudolf Eucken der Erneuerer des deutschen Idealismus. 
 
 Berlin-Schoneberg, 1909. 
 P. Gabriel, Euckens Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung und sein 
 
 Verhaltnis zu J. G. Fichte. Bunzlau, 1910. 
 E. Hermann, Eucken and Bergson: their significance for Christian Thought. 
 
 London, 1912. 
 W. Tudor Jones, An Interpretation of R. Eucken's Philosophy. New 
 York, 1912. 
 The Philosophy of R. Eucken. London, 1914. 
 W. R. Boyce Gibson, R. Eucken's Philosophy of Life. 2nd ed. London, 
 
 1907. 
 A. J. Jones, R. Eucken: A Philosophy of Life. New York. 
 Meyrick Booth, R. Eucken: His Philosophy and Influence. New York, 1913. 
 H. C. Sheldon, R. Eucken's Message to our Age. New York, 1913. 
 Baron F. von Hugel, The Religious Philosophy of Rudolf Eucken. Hib- 
 bert Journal, April, 1912, p. 660. 
 W. Yorke Fausset, The Neo-Christianity of Rudolf Eucken. Art. in 
 Church Quart. Review, vol. LXXV: October, 1912, 
 p. 21. 
 Rev. A. Caldecott, The Religious Philosophy of R. Eucken. Ibid., vol. 
 
 LXXVI: April, 1913, p. 47. 
 Dom Daniel Feuling, O.S.B., Rudolph Eucken's Philosophy. Dublin Re- 
 view, vol. 155: July, 1914, p. 62. 
 R. Roberts, Rudolf Eucken and St. Paul. Contemporary Review, vol. 97: 
 January, 1910, p. 71. 
 Living Age, vol. 264: January-March, 1910, p. 432. 
 H. N. Brown, Some Aspects of the Religious Philosophy of Rudolph 
 
 Eucken. Harvard Theo. Review, vol. 2: 1909, p. 465. 
 S. H. Mellone, The Idealism of Rudolph Eucken. International Journal 
 
 of Ethics; October, 1910, p. 15. 
 A. L. Whittaker, Rudolph Eucken: Champion of a Spiritual Reality. 
 Forum: July, 1914, p. 41. 
 
Rudolf Euckbn-and the Spiritual Life 163 
 
 B. Bosanquet, The Philosophy of Eucken. Quart. Review, No. 439: April, 
 
 1914, p. 365. 
 W. R. B. Gibson, The Philosophy of Eueken. Ibid., p. 379. 
 W. T. Balmer, Bergson and Eucken in Mutual Relation. London Quart. 
 
 Review, July-October, 1914, p. 84. 
 Warner Fite, Eucken's Philosophy of Life. Nation, vol. 95: July 11, 1912, 
 
 p. 29. 
 H. M. Alden, Eucken Agonistes. North American, vol. 201: January, 1915, 
 
 p. 57. 
 F. Granger, R. Eucken: The Problem of Human Life. Hibbert Journal, 
 
 vol. 8: July, 1910, p. 900. 
 L. Abbot, Philosophy of the Spiritual Life. Outlook, vol. 103: March 1, 
 
 1913, p. 482. 
 T. Seltzer, Eucken, Germany's Inspired Idealistic Philosopher. Review of 
 
 Reviews, vol. 46: December, 1912, p. 698. 
 E. E. Slosson, Twelve Major Prophets of Today. Independent, vol. 74: 
 
 February 27, 1913, p. 445. 
 S. Kennedy, The Struggle for a Spiritual Content of Life (paraphrase, in 
 part, of Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt). 
 Princeton Contributions to Philosophy. February, 1899. 
 
 Reviews, Etc. 
 
 Erfolge und Aufgaben der Scholastik. Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, vol. 31: 
 
 Miscellen, 1886, p. 223. 
 Rudolph Eucken's New Gospel of "Activism." Current Literature, vol. 53: 
 
 July-December, 1912, p. 67. 
 Bergson and Eucken Under Fire. Current Opinion, vol. 54: April, 1913, p. 
 
 307. 
 Return of the Gods. Ibid., vol. 54: January, 1913, p. 46. 
 Why We Not Only Can, But Must Be Christians. Ibid., vol. 55: July, 1914, 
 
 p. 40. 
 An Evangelical Warning Against "The False Note" in Eucken. Current 
 
 Opinion, vol. 57: November, 1914, p. 339. 
 A Chronicle of Some Recent Philosophical Works. Dublin Review, vol. 155: 
 
 July, 1914, p. 208. 
 John Bascom, The Long Path of Light. Dial, vol. 48: May 16, 1910, p. 352. 
 Eucken and Bergson. Independent, vol. 74: February 13, 1913, p. 868. 
 Eucken's Philosophy. Ibid., vol. 68: February 24, 1910, p. 417. 
 Impressions of Eucken. Outlook, vol. 103: March 22, 191:!, p. 600. 
 Rudolph Eucken and His Doctrine. Review of Reviews, vol. 42: December, 
 
 1910, p. 741. 
 Dial, vol. 46: January 16, 1909, p. 37. 
 Homiletic Review, vol. 63: January-June, 1912. 
 Nation, vol. 95: October 24, 1912, p. 388. 
 
 Other Works. 
 
 Aristotle, Opera. Paris, 1848-1887. 
 St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei. 
 
164 EUDOLP EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 
 
 J. M. Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. New York, 
 1901, 1902. 
 
 J. Balmes, Fundamental Philosophy. Translated from the Span ish by H. 
 
 F. Brownson. New York, 1903. 
 H. Bergson, L'EvoIution Creatrice. 15e ed. Paris, 1914. 
 Matiere et Memoire. 2e ed. Paris, 1900. 
 J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy. 2nd ed. London, 1908. 
 
 Greek Philosophy, London, 1914. 
 Clement, Opera. Ed. Migne, 1857. 
 Le Conte, Evolution and Its Relation to Religious Thought. New York, 
 
 1894. 
 Darwin, Origin of Species. 
 
 T. Dwight, Thoughts of a Catholic Anatomist. New York, 1911. 
 Eisler, Philosophisches Worterbuch. Berlin, 1904. 
 Erdmann, Geschichte der Philosophic 3tte Auflage. Berlin, 1878. 
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BIOGRAPHY 
 
 The author of this dissertation was born April 16, 1881, in 
 Cork, Ireland. She attended the Preparatory Department, 
 High School and College of the Ursuline nuns, St. Angela's, Cork. 
 While there she went through the four years Intermediate Exami- 
 nations for Secondary Schools, under the control of the Board 
 of Education. Among the subjects elected by the candidate 
 each year were French, German and Latin. She also obtained 
 certificates in Science and Mathematics from South Kensington, 
 England. In 1899 she passed the Matriculation examination of 
 the Royal (now the National) University of Ireland, Dublin, 
 taking the Honor Courses in English and French. She passed 
 the First and the Second of Arts of the same University during 
 the two following years, electing the Honor Courses in English, 
 French and Logic. In October, 1901, she went to the convent 
 of the Religious of Christian Education, Farnborough, England, 
 where she remained for nearly three years teaching and continuing 
 her personal work. While there she studied Latin under Professor 
 C. A. Brown (BA. Cambridge), and followed courses in Pedagogy 
 by the Directress of the High School, and in Sacred Scripture and 
 Introductory Philosophy by Dom A. Gatard, O.S.B., Benedictine 
 Abbey, Farnborough. In 1904 she obtained the certificate of 
 recognized teacher for Secondary Education from the London 
 Board of Education, and having been registered as postulant 
 of the Order, returned to Ireland early in the same year where she 
 completed the work for B.A. and studied for the MA. degree. 
 She obtained her degree in Moral and Mental Science and Latin, 
 at the Royal University of Ireland, Dublin, in 1905, having studied 
 Latin under Professor J. Hollins, M.A., R.U.L, and Dr. Osborne 
 Bergin (Prof. Nat. Univ.) ; and philosophy under Miss F. Vaughan 
 MA., R.U.L, and Professor P. Malone, M.A., R.U.L She was, 
 for a short time, assistant Professor of Latin at the Ursuline 
 College, Cork. In January, 1906, she went again to England 
 as Professor of English and History — for one term at the Pupil- 
 Teachers' Centre of the "Dames de St. Maur," Wolverhampton, 
 and for one term at the boarding school of the same Order, Wey- 
 bridge, Surrey. While in England she prepared students for the 
 Oxford Junior and Senior, and the Cambridge Higher Local 
 
 166 
 
KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 167 
 
 Examinations. In September, 1906, she went to the Novitiate 
 of the Religious of Christian Education, Tournai, Belgium. 
 Being professed in 1908 she returned for a brief period to Farn- 
 borough, then left for the American foundation of the Order in 
 Asheville, N. C. Here she taught Latin and Mathematics in the 
 Academy, and became professor of philosophy in the College of 
 St. Genevieve's on its establishment. In 1912 she attended the 
 Sister's Summer School of the Catholic University, Washington, 
 D. C, and registered for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
 September, 1913, to October, 1914, she spent in residence at the 
 Sisters' College of the University. The courses she followed at 
 the University are: Latin under Rev. T. McGourty; Greek under 
 Rev. Hoey and Dr. J. B. O'Connor; History of Philosophy under 
 Rev. Dr. W. Turner; Psychology under Rev. Dr. E. A. Pace; 
 Philosophy under Rev. Dr. T. V. Moore and Rev. Dr. E. A. Pace. 
 The author wishes to thank the Professors for the attentive 
 interest shown in her work and, in particular, to gratefully acknowl- 
 edge her indebtedness to Rev. Dr. E. A. Pace for his kindly 
 encouragement and assistance in the preparation of this 
 dissertation. 
 
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