^°-;^. ■^0* .-^O^ ^^-^^^ .^^r-,.'/ ^.,^^?^:'\/ V^^-^/ . %' ► . " o ^ *>-. .0 o " a '^ •^-.^^ .;i=fs-;. %/ ;^^ %./ .;», %^ ./°-.,-m- /-K-m^ /^^^^ /■' -^' -7* ^. -^ r: /\ 1 THE GREAT PROBLEMS OF BRITISH STATESMANSHIP THE GREAT PROBLEMS OF BRITISH STATESMANSHIP BY J. ELLIS BARKER •» AOTHOB OF ' MODBBM OBBMANY,' ■ QEBAT AHD OEHATBB BBITAIH ' 'THB FOONDATIOIIS OF aBBUAITT,' »P0. NEW YORK B. P. DUTTON AND COMPANY 1917 y' :0 PREFACE The World War has created a number of most important problems which statesmanship will have to solve during the coming Peace Congress and afterwards. These may conveniently be divided into three classes : Problems of foreign policy, such as the delimitation of the national frontiers and the creation of an international organisation devised to ensure a durable peace ; economic problems, such as the re-creation of national prosperity among the war-stricken nations, the management and the repayment of the gigantic war debt, the improvement of the relations between capital and labour, &c. ; problems of internal organi- sation, such as the reform of democratic government which, during the War, in many instances has proved disappoint- ing because of its amateurishness, dilatoriness, improvidence, and, inefficiency. All these problems will be considered in the following pages. Nothing is permanent in this world except change. The great problems of statesmanship can be given only a temporary solution. States and nations rise, grow, stand still, dechne, decay, and ultimately disappear. The civilisa- tion and even the languages of the world empires of antiquity have vanished. Caesar, when conquering the savage inhabi- tants of Britain who were dressed in skins and who orna- mented themselves by painting their bodies with woad, would have laughed had a native Druid told him that the Eoman Empire would fall, and that the British savages would not only conquer but civihse the larger part of the world, and create an Empire far greater than the Eoman, vi Preface for he looked upon the native Briton as we do upon African negroes. The process of national agglomeration and dissolution will continue to the end of time. If we look into history we find that it takes centuries to settle per- manently the territorial conflicts which are apt to arise among neighbour States. It took centuries to determine definitively the differences between Britain and France, to solve the question whether Britain should or should not possess territory on the south shore of the English Channel. For centuries France and Germany have fought for the possession of the borderland, for Alsace-Lorraine, for the control of Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland, and for all we know they may continue for centuries to fight for these objects. For centuries Eussia and Germany have fought and intrigued for the possession or the control of Poland, the Balkan Peninsula, and Constantinople, and their struggle also may be renewed. Between certain nations there exists Htigation in perpetuity in respect of certain objects which are valued by either. The Peace Congress cannot bring about a permanent settlement of these great questions, for they will continue to trouble mankind. It can at best bring about a lasting one. It can give to the world a long period, perhaps a century, of peace. The roots of nations he deep in the past. We can understand the interests and the pohcy of States and gauge the character, attitude, and probable conduct of nations only by studjdng their history and development, their experiences, and their traditions. We can neither fully understand, nor hope successfully to solve, the great inter- national questions, the great international quarrels, unless we are acquainted with their historical genesis and witb the views and actions of the claimants in the past. Hence, in considering the great problems of diplomacy, due weight should be given not only to their present aspect and future possibihties, but also to their historic development. This has been done in the following pages. I have given in them a vast number of secret treaties, despatches, and other Preface vii documents of the highest importance which will not be found elsewhere. Economic policy should be based not upon theory, but upon experience ; not upon fancy, but upon fact. In con- sidering the problem of developing the prosperity of Great Britain and of the Empire, of paying off the war debt, and of improving the lot of the workers, I have availed myself of the lessons afforded by England's war with EepubHcan and Napoleonic France and by the American Civil War. Both were proportionately about as costly as the present struggle seems hkely to prove. Both were followed not by industrial collapse and financial ruin, as was beHeved by many at the time, but by unprecedented economic development and boundless prosperity. I have endeavoured to show that the Great War, far from impoverishing Great Britain and the British Empire, should greatly enrich them, provided a wise economic policy in accordance with historical ex- perience is pursued. The exhaustive and authoritative figures given in support of that contention will be new to most readers and should prove of the highest interest to financiers, business men, and others. Government, rightly considered, is not a pastime, but a business. Like every business, it has its rules, which may be learned from those who have been most successful in the science and art of directing public affairs. National organisation and administration, like economic policy, should be based, not upon abstract principles, which may prove inapphcable, nor upon historic precedents, which may be misleading, but upon universal experience. In considering the inefficiency of democratic government as revealed by the War and the necessary reform of Great Britain's national organisation, I have availed myself of the views of the greatest statesmen and administrators and the soundest thinkers of all times from Aristotle, Isocrates, Thucydides, and Polybius to Cardinal Eichelieu, the elder Pitt, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Alexander Hamilton, and Bismarck. The numerous quotations given viii Preface should prove of value to all who desire to be acquamted with the views of the greatest experts in national organisation. The present volume, like my other books, is perhaps rather a storehouse of facts than an expression of my own views. I hope that, nevertheless, it will prove thoroughly readable. It may be of value to statesmen, politicians, publicists, and the general public because of the important documentary and statistical evidence which it contains. The contents of the book are, for the convenience of readers, briefly summed up in its first chapter, ' The Peace Congress and After.' All the other chapters have previously appeared in The Nineteenth Century and After. They attracted a great deal of attention at the time., and many of them were reprinted in extenso not only on the Continent, in the British Dominions, and in the United States, but even in Japan and China. I have been urged to collect and to republish them in book form, and I am allowed to do so by the courtesy of Mr. Skilbeck, the editor of The Nineteenth Century review, to whom I herewith give my best thanks. The original articles have been revised, brought up to date, and organically connected, and considerable additions have been made to them. Although it may seem immodest, I would in conclusion sskj a few words as to my literary activity in the past. Ever since 1900, when I began my career as a pubHcist, I have warned tliis country of the danger of a war with Germany. In all my books and in innumerable articles printed in the leading reviews and elsewhere I have urged unceasingly the necessity of diplomatic, mihtary, and economic preparation, the necessity of abandoning the pohcy of * splendid isolation ' for one of alliances with France, Eussia, Japan, and the United States, the necessity of strengthening, developing, and organising the Empire towards the day of trial, the necessity of strengthening the fleet, the necessity of creating a national army, the necessity of strengthening the British industries, and espe- cially the iron and steel industry, by a pohcy of deliberate Preface ix development, by a protective tariff, the necessity of vastly increasing agricultural production by peasant proprietor- ship and various other means, the necessity of developing the neglected railway and canal systems of Great Britain, the desirability of an Anglo-American reunion, &c. I have co-operated with Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, Lord Eoberts, and other prominent men. It is a certain satisfaction that all the reforms which so many have urged in vain before the War seem hkely to be carried out in consequence of it. The ways of Providence are wonderful. Iron is tried by fire and nations by war. A new and a greater Britain is arising. The War may not only make the British Empire a reahty, but bring about an Anglo-American reunion. The War, far from being an unmitigated evil, may prove a blessing to the British race. Many eminent people have faciUtated my task by their assistance, their advice, and their encouragement. I would herewith most cordially thank them for their kindness and support. J. ELLIS BARKER. LoNDOK, June 1917. CONTENTS "I. The Peace Congress and After II. The Problem op Constantinople III, The Problem of Asiatic Turkey IV, The Problem of Austria-Hungary V. The Problem of Poland . VI. The German Emperor's Position VII. Britain's War Finance and Economic Future VIII. Britain's Coming Industrial Supremacy . IX. Democracy and the Iron Broom of War X. How America became a Nation in Arms XI. An Anglo-American Reunion . Analytical Index PAGB 1 14 55 105 146 190 216 257 293 349 398 433 THE GREAT PROBLEMS OP BRITISH STATESMANSHIP CHAPTEE I THE PEACE CONGRESS AND AFTER The Allies arrayed against Germany are practically agreed on the broad principles which will guide their action at the Peace Congress. The differences between them are rather apparent than real. The young Eussian democracy has demanded a settlement ' without annexations and without indenmities.' That seems a purely negative programme. The other Powers have declared themselves in favour of a positive policy, which likewise has been summed up in two words. They have demanded a peace which is based on the principle of ' Eestitution and Eeparation.' Eightly considered, the two demands are identical. Men who have thrown over a Government which they detest, who have suddenly freed themselves from heavy shackles, naturally rejoice, and are apt to form in their joy vast plans which spring rather from the heart than from the head. Time is needed to awaken such men to the sober realities of this workaday world. The heady wine of democracy has had the same effect in Eussia which it had in France at the end of the eighteenth century. The Eussian declarations 1 B 2 The Peace Congress and After remind one of Article VI of the French Eevolutionary Constitution : La nation fran^aise renonce a entreprendre aucune guerre dans la vue de faire des conquetes, et n'emploiera jamais ses forces contre la liberte d'aucun peuple. This ideal resolution was soon forgotten. The French revolutionaries embarked upon wars of conquest, the solemn declarations notwithstanding. It is to be expected that the Eussian people will before long awake to the realities of the situation. All the democracies are fighting for the principle of liberty, for the right of nationalities to govern themselves in their own way. All are strongly opposed to the principle of absolutism, of monarchical tyranny, of race subjection and of race exploitation. They are fighting for the freedom of the oppressed nationaUties. They are pledged to free the exploited races and to enable them to organise and to govern themselves in their own way. By setting free the subject nationahties, the non- German parts of Germany will be enabled to rule themselves and to choose their allegiance. The territory of Germany will be sUghtly reduced. By setting free the subject nationalities the Austrian and Turkish Empires, where the governing race is in a small minority, will be dissolved into their component parts. However, their dissolution cannot honestly be described as partition and be compared with the partitions of Poland. No democrat can wish to thrust back the Armenians, Czechs, Poles, &c., under their ancient yoke. The word ' war-indemnity ' has during the last few decades changed its meaning. Original^ a war-indemnity signified adequate compensation for the cost of an unjust war which was exacted from the aggressor. It was a bill for damages wantonly done. It was unobjectionable from the highest moral point of view. Since the time when powerful military States have robbed the defeated nations, whom they had wantonly attacked, not only of territory upon which they Great Problems of British Statesmanship 3 had no claim on racial grounds, but have in addition exacted from them outrageous sums of money merely in order to make their aggression both territorially and financially profitable to themselves, the word ' indemnity ' has become synonymous with spoliation, and spoliation is detestable. The word ' indemnity ' has acquired a bad odour. The AUies, Belgium, Serbia, France, Eussia, and the rest, are certainly entitled to claim from the Central Powers compensation for their gigantic losses caused by a war which was forced upon them, but they will scarcely make a profit out of such indemnities as they may obtain. The damage done is too large. Germany and her Allies are not rich enough ever to repay their victims. They can pay no more than a tithe of the damage, and they may have to rebuild with their own labour what they have destroyed. The territorial settlement at the Peace Congress will be effected in accordance with the principle of nationaUties. Eacial and State limits will be made to coincide wherever possible. However, there may be certain exceptions to the rule. Sometimes various nationalities are inextricably mixed in certain districts, and must be disentangled. Besides, the smaller States created on a racial basis must be secured against an attack from their warlike, powerful, and possibly revengeful neighbours, and they must be able to make a living ; they must be economically independent. Lastly, those nations which caused the War, and which may be inclined to renew it, must give guarantees for their good behaviour in the future. They cannot be allowed to dominate their smaller neighbours strategically or economically, and may have to lose certain vantage points. Poland and Serbia must have adequate outlets to the sea. To avoid racial injustice, men of one race who, for pressing strategical or economic reasons may have to be included in another nation, should be given the option of rejoining their brothers across the frontier and be entitled to adequate compensation for disturbance. There are a number of instances where friction may arise 4 The Peace Congress and After between several nations through conflicting claims to territory based on racial, strategical, or economic grounds. Where there is a conflict of claims, a settlement . should as a rule be effected on the principle that the weaker claim must give way to the stronger. This should, of course, not mean that the smaller Power should be sacrificed to the greater, for the settlement should be based not on might, but on justice. Differences may, for instance, arise in arrangmg the claims of Italy and Serbia to certain portions of the Adriatic, the future of Macedonia may become a matter of contention, &c. Most of these questions are not of first-rate importance, and they should easily be settled, although they may call for unhmited patience on the part of the assembled statesmen. Among the greatest and most difficult problems of the Peace Congress are the problem of Constantinople, the problem of Asia Minor, the problem of Austria-Hungary, the problem of Poland, and the position of the German Empire and its Emperor. All these have been considered in the present volume. Shortly after the revolution the representatives of the Russian democracy have waived Russia's historic claim to the possession of Constantinople on the principle of ' No Annexation and No Indemnities.' A yomig democracy is guided rather by the heart than by the head. It follows easily the generous impulses of the moment. By the time the Peace Congress assembles, the Russian people may have changed their representatives, and may have changed their mind as to Constantinople. It seems doubtful whether the desire of acquiring Constantinople was merely based upon the ambition of Russia's rulers. Russia's most valuable territories lie in the south, for the bleak north produces little. The Black Sea and the mighty rivers leading to it constitute Russia's principal outlet. The most precious part of Russia's foreign trade is the Black Sea trade. It is bound to increase indefinitely in value. Rather for economic than for strategical reasons Russia requires free access from Great Problems of British Statesmanship 5 the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Kussia's historic desire for the acquisition of Constantinople was principally due to the fact that she found it intolerable that the bulk of her trade should be at the mercy of the Turks. At the beginning of the War an overwhelming majority of the Duma demanded for these reasons the acquisition of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. The Eussian people may earlier or later change their mind with regard to Constanti- nople. That should be remembered by statesmen and publicists before and during the Congress. Besides, it is difficult to find a satisfactory alternative solution of the problem of Constantinople. As the Narrows are of great strategical value, they cannot safely be entrusted to a small Power, for various Great Powers would endeavour to obtain influence over it. The old intrigues for the possession of Constantinople would recommence. There remains the possibility of neutralising that precious site, of entrusting the guardianship to some international body. Neutrals, unless they are powerful, may suddenly be attacked by their warlike neighbours, and international guarantees do not always act as a deterrent. That has been shown in the case of Belgium. International control, on the other hand, is apt to lead to international intrigue, as was seen in the case of Egypt and of Macedonia, and international occu- pation is apt to lead to war, as is proved by the example of Schleswig-Holstein. As Eussia has on strategical and economic grounds the strongest claims to Constantinople, she will probably, on consideration, alter her mind, and the Powers will be wise not to take as permanent Eussia's. recent declarations, which some day she may regret. It would be a calamity and a danger to the peace of the world if some years hence the Eussian people should say that the nations took an unfair advantage of Eussia's momentary mood and deprived them of Constantinople, for which they have fought and bled for centuries, at a time when they could have had it for the asking. The Constantinople position connects the Black Sea and 6 The Peace Congress and After the Mediterranean on the one hand and Europe and Asia on the other. It is strategically very important, but it is far less important than Asia Minor. Asia Minor connects, separates, and dominates the three oldest and most populated Continents. It lies across the most direct route from Central Europe to Calcutta, Bombay, Canton, and Peking. Asia Minor, being surrounded by gigantic mountain ranges, vast deserts, and the sea, is a natural fortress of the greatest strength, whence Egypt, North Africa, the Caucasus, the Eussian Black Sea Provinces, the Mediterranean countries, and Persia and India may easily be attacked. Asia Minor is at present sparsely populated, but is able to nourish a vast number of people. Its wealth in minerals of all kinds may be utilised for military purposes. Its central position, its impregnable natural frontiers, and its vast agricultural and mineral potentiaUties might become dangerous to the peace of the world. A strong military Power occupying the country might convert it into a gigantic fortress and arsenal, and provide it with numerous railways leading towards Egypt, the Caucasus, and Persia. A strong mihtary Power controlling Asia Minor might strive for the domination of the three old continents, and its power for mischief would be enhanced by the fact that it would dominate the two issues of the Eed Sea, and that it could threaten from its central position not only the Suez Canal route, but also the trade of the Mediterranean and the sea-route to India by way of the Cape. I have very fully considered the problem of Asia Minor from every point of view and have made proposals for its solution. Austria-Hungary has about 55,000,000 inhabitants. The Austro- Germans and the Magyars number together only about 20,000,000, and they bitterly hate each other. By freeing the 35,000,000 Slavs, Eoumanians, and Italians from Austrian misrule the State of the Habsburgs would be reduced to 20,000,000 people. Germany has controlled the policy of Vienna in the past by making use of the differences between the Austrians and Magyars. She has Great Problems of British Statesmanship 7 ruled Austria with the assistance of Budapest. The loss of her Slavs and Latins would increase Austria's dependence upon the goodwill of Berlin and of Budapest. Austria and Hungary might be forced to attach themselves to the German Empire. As a consequence of the War, Germany- might be far stronger than she has been hitherto. The AlHes have pledged themselves to set free the subject nationalities of the Dual Monarchy. The Habsburgs, who at one time were supreme in Germany, and who gave to the HohenzoUerns the Brandenburg Electorate and raised them to royal rank, have suffered grievously at the hands of their former vassals. Brandenburg-Prussia has grown great at Austria's cost. Silesia was conquered by Prussia in 1740, and the South German States were detached from Austria in 1866. Austria has been Germany's tool in bringing about the Great War. The senile Francis Joseph scarcely knew what he was doing. The Princes of the proud house of Habsburg would no doubt like to recover their indepen- dence. They have no love for Prussia and the Hohen- zoUerns. It seems not inconceivable that as a result of the War, Austria should recover her independence, that the Habsburg Monarchy should obtain a new lease of life. If Austria should conclude a separate peace, she would be en- titled to compensation for the inevitable loss of her Slavonic and Latin citizens, and she might be given Silesia and South Germany. By receiving these, Vienna would once more rule over 30,000,000 Germans, and the 7,000,000 or 8,000,000 Magyars would no longer prove unmanageable. A balance of power would be created within Germany. Vienna might once more dominate Berlin, and if Austria should follow a liberal, tolerant, and generous policy she might once more attract to herself the smaller nations of South -Eastern Europe and overshadow Prusso-Germany. A similar situation might arise if the War should be fought to the bitter end, and if the South German States should revolt against Prussia's rule and attach themselves to Austria. It remains to be seen whether Austria-Hungary and Ger- 8 The Peace Congress and After many will patiently bear with their rulers if the War which they began should lead to disaster and general ruin. Possibly both the German and the Austrian peoples may revolt, but it seems more likely that the Germans will hold their Sovereign to account, for the yomig Austrian Emperor was not responsible for the War. Germany has a written Constitution according to which the sovereignty of the Empire lies not in the hands of the Emperor, but in those of all the allied States and their rulers. The Emperor is merely the hereditary president of the federation. Accord- ing to the Constitution, he is not entitled to declare war unless Germany has actually been attacked. For a war of aggression the consent of the Federal Council, which officially represents all the German States, is required. In embarkmg upon a war of aggression William the Second has violated the Constitution. He is not only morally but also legally responsible if disaster should overtake his country. A German defeat may lead either to the severe limitation of the Emperor's power or to the conversion of Germany into a republic. We may experience in Germany a revolution accompanied by civil war. A special chapter has been devoted to the Emperor's position. The problem of Poland is particularly important because of the vast change which the resuscitation of that State would effect on the map of Europe. An independent Polish State of 20,000,000 inhabitants might serve as a buffer-State between Eussia and Germany. The lands of the Poles possess vast agricultural, industrial, and mineral possibiHties. The Polish territories are more densely popu- lated than is France. Within the Polish zone lie the largest coalfields on the Continent of Europe. Lodz is the Bussian Manchester. As Brazil is the land of the Amazon and the United States that of the Mississippi, so Poland is the country of the Vistula. On that mighty river lie the two Polish capitals, Warsaw and Cracow, and innumerable important towns. Poland may become politically and economically the Belgium of Eastern Europe, it may become a most Great Problems of British Statesmanship 9 important industrial country, but this is possible only if she has a sufficient outlet for her manufactures and can obtain cheaply the necessary imported raw materials, such as cotton. Poland's natural harbour is Danzig, on the mouth of the Vistula. That town may become the Polish Hamburg. If Danzig should once more become Polish, East Prussia would be separated from Brandenburg by a broad belt of Polish territory, as it was in olden times. How- ever, if the question should arise whether Brandenburg should be separated from the province of East Prussia, or whether Poland should be separated from the sea by Danzig remaining in Prussian hands, it is probable that the weaker claim would have to give way to the stronger. Agricultural Eastern Prussia, though separated from Brandenburg, would have access to the sea. If Danzig remained in Germany's hands Poland would remain cut off from the sea, and the State might languish, decline, and decay. Many Poles desire that their country should obtain complete independence. It seems doubtful whether their wishes are wise. In the course of time Poland has grown into Eussia and Eussia into Poland. Her vast coalfields make Poland a natural home of the manufacturing indus- tries. A completely independent Poland might find both the Eussian and the German frontiers closed against her productions. Hence it may be best for the Poles to aim at a modified form of independence which would guarantee to them Eussia's military protection in case of need and which would leave open to the Polish industries the vast and most valuable Eussian markets. The territorial claims of the various nations cannot be permanently settled at the Peace Congress, for history knows no permanent settlements. The settlement made may come up for revision. Unsatisfactory settlements often lead to war. Therefore the representatives of the Powers should avoid not only injustice, but even the appearance of in- justice and of mifairness. The settlement made at the Con- gress of Vienna should serve them as a warning example. 10 The Peace Congress and After It led to a series of wars in the course of which the Treaty of Vienna was torn to pieces. The great international questions mentioned will not be definitively solved at the Peace Congress. They will occupy the nations during many ensuing decades. How- ever, during the period immediately foUowing the peace the problems of foreign policy will probably be overshadowed by economic problems and by questions of domestic policy. The gigantic War has created huge national debts and has destroyed incalculable values. The British War debt seems likely to amount to at least £5,000,000,000, It seems questionable whether the British people will receive any compensation from their opponents, for the devastated countries, Belgium, Serbia, Poland, Eoumania, France, and Eussia, have the first claim upon German indemnities. It may also happen that Britain's allies will not be able to repay the bulk of the sums advanced to them. The ex- perience of the Napoleonic wars, when England financed the Allies, may repeat itself. British taxation has been trebled in the course of the War, and trebled taxation may continue indefinitely. The vast war expenditures incurred may, however, not ruin Great Britain. I have shown in two lengthy chapters devoted to the economic problems that the War, far from impoverishing the country, may greatly enrich it. The twenty years' war against Eepublican and Napoleonic France created a gigantic burden of debt. It led to the trebling of taxation. The vast increase in taxation stimu- lated the latent energies of the nation. I have shown that Great Britain's industrial prosperity arose during and after the Great War, and was caused chiefly by the vastly increased demands of the tax-collector. I have further shown by most interesting and important statistics that the American workers engaged in manufacturing, mining, transport, agri- culture, &c., produce per head about three times as much as their English colleagues because they employ better and three times as powerful machinery and possess a better Great Problems of British Statesmanship 11 economic organisation, &c. It follows that Great Britain can treble her yearly output, her yearly income, and her national wealth by Americanising her industries. The Americanisation of the British industries has already begun. I have shown in the chapter, ' Britain's Coming Industrial Supremacy,' that in the course of the War production per man has approximately doubled. Production per man can once more be doubled, and more than doubled, to the great benefit of the workers and of the nation as a whole. In- creased production must be based upon improved machinery, and the better machinery is, the smaller is the exertion of the worker. America's vast industrial advance, as that of Great Britain, was caused by a ruinously expensive war. The vastly increased demands of the tax-collector consequent upon the Civil War led not only to the greatest improve- ment in industrial production, but also to the rapid opening up of the West. The British Dominions have advanced comparatively slowly in wealth and population because life has been too easy for the inhabitants. Men work hard only if compelled. The Dominions would be forced to open up their gigantic domain with the greatest energy should they decide to take over an adequate part of the financial burden imposed by the War. The War has been fought for the benefit of future generations. It is therefore only fair that posterity should help in bearing the burden. The War Debt should become an imperial obligation. Part of the undeveloped resources of the Empire should be assigned to its service and repayment. Part should be paid by the present generation. The Americans combine with their census of population a census of production and wealth. By taking regularly a similar census of production and of wealth throughout the British Empire, the abihty of every part of the Empire to assist in bearing the financial burden caused by the War might most easily and most fairly be ascertained. Every five or ten years the financial burden might be redistributed in accordance with the changes in 12 The Peace Congress and After wealth and income which have taken place in the mean- time. High taxation in comitries of bomidless latent resources is a vast advantage. It is as necessary to a State which desires to advance quickly as adequate ballast is to a ship. The Empire is four times as large as the United States. Nevertheless the United States are far wealtliier than is the gigantic British Empire. The wealth of the United States is greater than that of the British Empire, not because the former has larger natural resources, but because the boundless resources of the British Empire have either been insufficiently developed or have been completely neglected. If the War should bring about the dehberate and energetic development of the Empire, and if the Imperial domain should become as highly developed as the territory of the great Eepublic, the wealth of the British Empire should no longer be inferior to that of the United States, but should be four times as great. Among the internal problems of Great Britain which will come up for settlement after the War, the reorganisation of the body politic will probably occupy the foremost place. It has been treated fully in the chapter, ' Democracy and the Iron Broom of War.' Democracy has displayed its failings during the struggle. The great problem consists in combining liberty and popular government, which means control by the many, with efificiency in administration and execution. The jointly responsible Cabinet has proved improvident, dilatory, and extremely inefficient. The reform introduced by Mr. Lloyd George is only a temporary make- shift. The question will have to be settled whether the national executive should be in the hands of a single man or of an inexpert committee. The views of the greatest statesmen of all times favour decidedly a one-man executive. The Americans, when estabhshing their republic, after mature consideration and deliberation, chose a one-man executive. I believe Great Britain will be wise in following America's example. The reform could most easily be Great Problems of British Statesmanship 13 effected by making the Prime Minister solely responsible for governmental action, by making the heads of the great departments the Prime Minister's subordinates. The American Constitution proved its excellence in time of danger at the outbreak of the Civil War. In the chapter, ' How America became a Nation in Arms,' I have shown how a one-man executive saved the United States from disaster. During the Civil War the United States raised a gigantic army and defeated in the course of four years the rebellious South. That war destroyed nearly a milHon lives and cost two-thirds of America's national wealth. America's Civil War should be to the democracies an in- spiration and a warning against unpreparedness. Had the United States possessed an army of 30,000 men, the war would either not have broken out or it would have been ended in a few weeks. Democracy has to pay dearly for its short- sightedness and neglect. It is inspiring that an unmilitary, unruly, unorganised, and peaceful people should have been able to raise a gigantic and most efficient army. Successful improvisation should, however, not blind us to the danger of neglecting mihtary preparation in time of peace. The United States in 1861 and England in 1914 were able to create colossal armies because they were given sufficient time to organise themselves for war. The greatest latent resources and the highest patriotism would prove unavaihng if in a future war a strong mihtary Power should succeed in seizing at its outbreak the indispensable centres "of resistance, such as the seats of the iron and steel industry. From the British point of view the most important results of the War are two. The War should lead to the unification of the Empire, and it may possibly lead to the reunion of the British race. I have advocated for many years an Anglo-American reunion, and I have summed up the arguments in favour of such a reunion in the concluding chapter of this book. CHAPTEE II THE PROBLEM OF CONSTANTINOPLE ^ As foresight is the essence of statesmanship, it seems oppor- tune to consider the greatest and most difficult problems with which the future Peace Conference will have to deal. This is all the more necessary as some of the questions which will have to be settled may cause differences among the AlUes, unless the nations and their statesmen have previously arrived at some understanding as to the great lines on which the settlement should take place. Such a preliminary agreement had unfortunately not been effected when, a hundred years ago, at the Congress of Vienna, the entire map of Europe was recast. Owing to the re- sulting differences and the return of Napoleon from Elba, the diplomats hastily concluded a treaty which left the greatest and most dangerous problems badly solved or not solved at all. Guided by the principle of legitimacy, they considered the claims of the rulers, but disregarded those of the nations. At the Congress of Vienna, Germany and Italy were cut up, notwithstanding the protests of the German and Italian people. It was only natural that the work done in haste and under pressure by the diplomats at Vienna led to a series of avoidable wars, and especially to the Wars of Nationahty of 1859, 1866, and 1870-71, by which a united Italy and a united Germany were evolved. The nations and their rulers seem fairly agreed as to ^ The Nineteenth Century and After, March 1915. 14 Great Problems of British Statesmanship 15 the broad principles on which the map of Europe should be reconstructed at a future Congress. In the first place, the desires of the various nationalities to be united under a Government of their own are to be fulfilled. In the second place, territorial rearrangement will be made which will strengthen the peaceful nations, which will make unlikely a war of revenge, and which will secure the maintenance of peace for a very long time. In the third place, the nations which have fought and suffered are to receive suitable compensation, while those which have merely looked on will presumably derive little or no advantage from the general recasting of frontiers. Apparently there are only four questions which might lead to serious dis- agreement among the Allies. These are the question of Austria-Hungary, the question of Poland, the question of Constantinople, and the question of Asia Minor. All four questions are closely interwoven. Eussia is a Power which is viewed by many EngHshmen with a good deal of distrust. Many people in this country fear that when Germany and Austria-Hungary have been defeated, Eussia will become too powerful. They ask. Where will be the counterpoise to Eussia if Germany should suffer great territorial losses, and if the Dual Monarchy should no longer form a single State, but should become dissolved into its component parts in accordance with the principle of nationahty ? To many EngHshmen who have watched with concern the constant and apparently irre- sistible progress of Eussia in Asia, that country is a dangerous, aggressive Power. They remember that many Eussian generals and writers have recommended an expedition against India ; that Czar Paul, during his short and tragic reign, actually prepared such a venture ; that his successor, Alexander the First, also contemplated an attack on India by land ; that more than once Eussia has been at war with Great Britain. However, most of those who are thinking of Eussia's aggressiveness and her former hostihty to England are probably unaware that 16 The Problem of Constantinople her hostility was not without cause ; that England, fearing that Eussia might become too powerful, endeavoured, at the bidding of her enemies, to prevent Eussia's expansion, especially in the direction of Constantinople and of the Par East ; that at the time of the Crimean War, not Eussia, but England, was apparently in the wrong ; that Lord Beaconsfield prevented Eussia reaping the fruit of her victory after her last war with Turkey ; that, angered by England's attitude and incited by Bismarck and his successors, Eussia not unnaturally endeavoured to revenge herself upon this country in the only part where it seemed vulnerable. The problems of Poland, of Austria-Hungary, and of Asia Minor, which will be very fully considered in other chapters, are perhaps less dangerous to the maintenance of good relations among the Allies than is that of Con- stantinople. The question of Constantinople has for many decades been considered the most dangerous problem in Europe. Constantinople is supposed to be a point of vital interest not only to Eussia, but to Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, and this country as well. As the Turks have plunged into the War and have attacked the Alhes, they have forfeited England's good will and traditional protection. The settlement of the problem of Constan- tinople can no longer be shelved. Therefore, it seems best to consider it frankly, dispassionately, and without prejudice. We have been taught in the past that ' the possession of Constantinople will decide the fate of the world,' that ' Constantinople dominates the world,' and that ' Eussia's possession of that position would be fatal to Great Britain's position in India.' In these circumstances it seems necessary not only to consider the character of Eussia's foreign policy and of the Eussian people, but to study the problem of Constantinople in the hght of history and with special reference to Eussia's future. Since the time of Napoleon the question of Constanti- Great Problems of British Statesmanship 17 nople has loomed particularly large, and probably unduly large, on the political horizon. Apparently the strategical importance of Constantinople is at present generally over- estimated, because the last few generations, instead of studying critically and without prejudice the real impor- tance of that town, have been mesmerised by the pronounce- ments of the great Corsican warrior, and have repeated his celebrated saying that Constantinople is ' the key of the world,' although it is notliing of the kind. According to many popular historians, Eussia has ' always ' tried to wrest India from England and to make herself mistress of the world by seizing Constantinople. From some of the most serious historical books, and even from dry diplomatic documents, we learn that Eussia's policy of seizing with Constantinople the dominion of the world was initiated by her greatest ruler, Peter the Great, who recommended that policy to his successors in his celebrated political testament. History, as Napoleon has told us, is a fable convenue. Napoleon himself has skilfully created a fable convenue around the town of Constantinople, and most of the mistaken views as to Eussia's world-con- quering aims have been engendered by that great genius who has mystified England during a whole century, and who has been responsible for a century of misunderstandings between England and Eussia. It seems therefore timely and necessary to consider Eussia's actions in the direction of Constantinople and of India by means of the most authoritative documents existing, the vast majority of which are not given in English books. They will be new to most British readers, and they may help in destroying a century-old legend which has served Napoleon's purpose of sowing enmity between Eussia and this country. The political testament of Peter the Great, which plays so great a part in historic and diplomatic literature, has, as far as I know, not been translated into Enghsh. There are several versions of that document. The following pas- sages, which are taken from the combined versions given 18 The Problem of Constantinople by Sokolnicki and Lesur, are those which should be of the greatest interest to English readers : Austria should be induced to assist in driving the Turks out of Europe. Under that pretext a standing army should be maintained and shipyards be estabhshed on the shores of the Black Sea. Constantly progressing, the forces should advance towards Constantinople. A strict alliance should be concluded with England. . . . Predominance in the Baltic and in the Black Sea should be aimed at. That is the most important point. On it depends the rapid success of the plan. My successors should become convinced of the truth that the trade with India is the world trade, and that he who possesses that trade is in truth the master of Europe. Con- sequently no opportunity for stirring up war with Persia and hastening its decay should be lost. Eussia should penetrate to the Persian Gulf and endeavour to re-establish the ancient trade with the East. The influence of religion upon the disunited and Greek dissenters dwelKng in Hungary, Turkey, and Southern Poland should be made use of. They should be won over. Eussia should become their protector and obtain spiritual supremacy over them. . . . Soon after opportunities will become precious. Every- thing should be prepared in secret for the great coup. In the deepest secrecy and the greatest circumspection the court of Versailles and then that of Vienna should be approached with the object of sharing with them the domination of the world. In the following paragraphs the author recommends that Eussia should bring about a world-war ostensibly regarding Turkey, that she should set all the other Great Powers by the ears, and while they are engaged in inter- necine struggles seize Constantinople, make war upon all her opponents, subdue them, and make herself supreme throughout the world. Peter the Great died in 1725. He greatly enlarged the Eussian frontiers, organised, modernised, and Euro- Great Problems of British Statesmanship 19 peanised the country, and fought hard to give it an outlet on the Swedish Baltic, where he created Petrograd. His successors, guided by Catherine the Second, endeavoured with equal energy to give Eussia a second outlet to the sea in the south, at Turkey's cost, and apparently they carried out to the letter the recommendations contained in the poHtical testament of Peter the Great. Prophecies are usually correct if they are made after the event. The famous pohtical testament was apparently written, not in Peter the Great's hfetime, but a century after, when Eussia had succeeded in acquiring the shores of the Black Sea and had become the leader of the Slav nations belonging to the Greek Church. Peter the Great's poHtical testament was first published in a book, ' De la Pohtique et des Progres de la Puissance Eusse,' written by Lesur in 1811, at a time when Napoleon had resolved upon a war with Eussia. It was pubhshed to influence European, and especially English, opinion against that country. According to Berkholz (' Napoleon I, Auteur du Testament de Pierre le Grand '), Napoleon himself was the author. The abrupt telegraphic style of the composition indeed greatly resembles that of its putative author. The best informed now generally consider the will of Peter the Great to be a forgery. Bismarck, who was on the most intimate terms with Czar Alexander the Second, described it as ' apocryphal ' in the fifth chapter of his ' Memoirs.' The value of Peter the Great's will as a document revealing the traditional poHcy and traditions of Eussia is nil. The desire of Peter the Great's successors to conquer the Turkish territory to the south of Eussia, and to acquire for the country an outlet on the Black Sea, was not un- natural, for at a time when transport by land was almost a physical impossibihty in Eussia the country could be opened up and developed only by means of her splendid natural waterways and of seaports. As Eussia's most fruitful territories are in the south, access to the Black Sea was for her development far more important than an 20 The Problem of Constantinople opening on the Baltic. Besides, to the deeply religious Kussians a war with the Turks was, up to the most recent times, a Holy War, a kind of crusade. The Empress Catherine succeeded in conquering the shores of the Black Sea, but failed in conquering Constantinople, which she desired to take. With this object in view she proposed the partition of Turkey to x\ustria in the time of Maria Theresa and of Joseph the Second. According to her historian Castera, she urged the Minister of France to advise his Government that France should join Eussia for the purpose of partitioning the Turkish Empire. As a reward she offered Egypt to France, the conquest of which she believed to be easy. Catherine's offer of Egypt to France is significant, and should be carefully noted. For centuries France, guided by a sure instinct of territorial values, had been hankering after the possession of Egypt, seeing in that country a door to the lands of the Far East and one of the most important strategical positions in the world. The great historian Sorel wrote in ' Bonaparte et Hoche en 1797 ' that the possession of Egypt was ' le reve qui, depuis les croissades, hante les imaginations frangaises.' France hungered after Egypt. Her thinkers had planned the construction of the Suez Canal a century before de Lesseps. After the outbreak of the Eevolution her historic ambition seemed likely to be fulfilled. The French Eepubhc was at war with England and Eussia, England might be attacked in India by way of Egypt, and Egypt might, at the same time, be made a base of operations for an attack upon Eussia in the Black Sea in conjunction with Turkey. While England and Eussia were thus being attacked a revolution should be engineered in Ireland to complete England's discomfiture. On the 23rd Germinal of the year VI— that is, on April 12, 1798— the Dire«toire appointed the youthful General Bonaparte commander of the Armee d'Orient, and ordered him to take Egypt, to cut the Suez Canal, and to secure to the French Great Problems of British Statesmanship 21 Republic the free and exclusive possession of the Eed Sea. The aim and object of that expedition, and of the greater plan of operations of which it was to be a part, is clearly and fully disclosed in a lengthy memorandum on the foreign situation, written by Talleyrand, who at the time was the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and placed by him before the Directoire on July 10, 1798. We read in that most valuable and most interesting document : Si Bonaparte s'etablit en Egypte, quand il aura dirige une part de ses forces contre les Anglais dans I'lnde, qui empechera quo la flotte fran^aise, penetrant dans la INler Noire et s'unissant a celle des Turcs, aille, pour consolider cette puissance de I'occupation de I'Egypte, I'aider a recon- querir la Crimee qui est pour elle d'un bien autre interet que cette region livree depuis des siecles aux revoltes des beys ? II n'y aura pas toujours dans la Mediterranee une nombreuse flotte anglaise. Attaques dans I'lnde, menaces sur leurs cotes, frappes au cceur de leur puissance par I'insurrection de I'lrlande, dont les progres peuvent d'un moment a I'autre desorganiser leur armee navale, ils doivent finir par abandonner la station qu'ils auront etablie au fond de la Mediterranee, et des lors pour que nous soyons bien regus. La destruction de Cherson et de Sebastopol serait a la fois la plus juste vengeance de Tacharnement insense des Busses, et le meilleur moyen de negociation avec les Turcs pour en obtenir tout ce qui pourrait consolider notre etabhssement en Afrique. . . . L'expedition de Bonaparte, s'il met pied en Egypte, assure la destruction de la puissance britannique dans I'lnde. Deja Malte est en notre pouvoir ; ce succes miraculeux serait seul un coup terrible pour le commerce de I'Angleterre, et quand notre armement n'obtiendrait pas un autre fruit, celui-la serait suffisant. Mais des attentes encore plus sensibles sont reservees a cette nation, livree a tous les dechirements interieurs qu'elle a si longtemps entretenus chez nous. L'insurrection de I'lrlande, cimentee deja par le sang de quelques victimes celebres, parait faire des progres remarquables. C'est dans cette contree que doivent aboutir maintenant tous nos efforts. Des amies, des munitions, des 22 The Problem of Constantinople homines hatons-nous de les y porter, rendons a I'Angleterre les maux qu'elle nous a faits. Qu'une Eepublique s'eleve a cote d'elle pour son instruction ou pour son chatiment. . . . Si nous sommes bientot en mesure de faire ce que j'ai indique en parlant de la Eussie, au moins d'en annoncer I'intention, je ne doute pas que la Porte ne sente le prix de ce service et n'associe ses forces aux notres pour repousser la Eussie loin des bords de la Mer Noire. The war programme of the French Directoire against England, which included an attack on Egypt, an expedition against India, the support of Turkey, the raising of Ireland in rebelhon, and war upon British commerce, bears a curious resemblance to the comprehensive and world-wide war plans of modern Germany. Napoleon seized the Government of France and became the heir of the grandiose world-embracing policy of the Eepubhc. He took up the plan which was designed to destroy simultaneously the power of England and Eussia and to make France all-powerful throughout the world. Catherine the Second, the great enemy of the French Eevolu- tion, had died in 1796, and had been succeeded by the weak, eccentric, violent, and scarcely sane Czar Paul the First. During the first years of his reign he also was hostile to revolutionary France and had made war upon that country, but in 1800 he quarrelled with England. Napoleon at once utiHsed the opportunity and persuaded him to attack England in Asia in conjunction with France. In O'Meara's book, ' Napoleon on St. Helena,' we read that Napoleon described to his Irish surgeon the invasion planned in the time of Paul the First as follows : If Paul had lived you would have lost India before now. An agreement was made between Paul and myself to invade it. I furnished the plan. I was to have sent thirty thousand good troops. He was to send a similar number of the best Eussian soldiers and forty thousand Cossacks. I was to subscribe ten milhons for the purchase of camels and other requisites for crossing the desert. The King of Prussia was Great Problems of British Statesmanship 23 to have been applied to by both of us to grant a passage for my troops through his dominions, which would have been immediately granted. I had at the same time made a demand to the King of Persia for a passage through his country, which would also have been granted, although the negotiations were not entirely concluded, but would have succeeded, as the Persians were desirous of profiting by it themselves. My troops were to have gone to Warsaw, to be joined by the Kussians and Cossacks, and to have marched from thence to the Caspian Sea, where they would have either embarked or have proceeded by land, according to circumstances. I was beforehand with you in sending an Ambassador to Persia to make interest there. Since that time your ministers have been imbeciles enough to allow the Kussians to get four provinces, which increase their territories beyond the mountains. The first year of war that you will have with the Russians they will take India from you. It will be noticed that Napoleon did not suggest to Eussia an advance upon India by way of Constantinople, but by way of the Caspian Sea, by a route similar to that which she would follow at the present time, when an expedition against India would be carried by the railways running from the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea towards the north- west frontier of India. That is worth bearing in mind if we wish to inquire whether Russia's occupation of Con- stantinople would threaten India. Paul the First was assassinated in 1801 before he could embark upon his fantastic expedition, and was succeeded by his eldest son, Alexander the First. Born in 1777, Alexander came to the throne as a youth of twenty-four. He had been educated by the Swiss philosopher Laharpe in accordance with the principles of Rousseau. The great Polish statesman, Prince Adam Czartoryski, an intimate friend of his youth and of his maturer age, drew the follow- ing portrait of Alexander in his ' Memoirs ' : Young, candid, inoffensive, thinking only of philan- thropy and hberalism, passionately desirous of doing good, 24 The Problem of Constantinople but often incapable of distinguishing it from evil, he had seen with equal aversion the wars of Catherine and the despotic follies of Paul, and when he ascended the throne he cast aside all the ideas of avidity, astuteness, and grasp- ing ambition which were the soul of the old Kussian policy. Peter's vast projects were ignored for a time, and Alexander devoted himself entirely to internal reforms, with the serious intention of making his Eussian and other subjects as happy as they could be in their present condi- tion. Later on he was carried away, almost against his will, into the natural current of Eussian pohcy, but at first he held entirely aloof from it, and this is the reason why he was not really popular in Eussia. Alexander was a good man and a great idealist. His dearest wish was to free the serfs and to make the people happy and prosperous. General Savary, Napoleon's tempo- rary Ambassador in Eussia, reported to him on Novem- ber 4, 1807, the following words of the Czar : ' Je veux sortir la nation de cet etat de barbarie. Je dis meme plus, si la civilisation etait assez avancee, j'abolirais cet esclavage, dut-il m'en coiiter la tete.' Alexander the First, like the recent occupant of the throne, Nicholas the Second, was a warm-hearted idealist, a lover of mankind, and a friend of peace, anxious to elevate Eussia and to introduce the necessary reforms. However, Alexander the First, like Nicholas the Second, was forced into a great war against his will. In a number of campaigns Napoleon had subdued the Continent, and the French longed for peace. Still Napoleon desired to carry out the great pohcy of the Directoire, to destroy the power of England and Eussia and make France supreme in the world. But as long as the Continent was ready to rise against the French, Napoleon could not safely enter upon a lengthy campaign in far-away Eussia. He feared Eussia as an opponent as long as Europe was un- wilUng to bear his yoke. An alhance with Eussia would have been invaluable to him. By securing Eussia's support Great Problems of British Statesmanship 25 he could hope to hold Prussia and Austria in awe and to attack, or at least to threaten, England in India. Russia's support could best be secured by promising to her exphcitly, or at least imphcitly, the possession of Constantinople and by making her believe that she was not interested in the fate of the other European States, that their enslave- ment by Napoleon was no concern of hers. In December 1805, while he M^as at war with Russia, Napoleon significantly said to Prince Dolgoruki, the Czar's aide-de-camp, who had been sent to him, according to the Prince's report of the 2ord of that month, pubHshed by Tatistcheff : Que veut-on de moi ? Pourquoi I'empereur Alexandre me fait-il la guerre ? Que lui faut-il ? II n'a qu'a etendre les frontieres de la Russie aux depens de ses voisins, des Turcs surtout. Sa querelle avec la France tomberait alors d'elle-meme. ... La Russie doit suivre une tout autre politique et ne se preoccuper que de ses propres interets. While, in vague words. Napoleon promised to Alexander the First the possession of Turkey, he endeavoured to raise the Turks against the Russians. On June 20, 1806, Napoleon dictated, in his characteristic abrupt style, the following instruction for the guidance of General Sebastiani, the French Ambassador in Turkey, which will be found in Driault, ' La Politique Orientale de Napoleon ' : 1. Inspirer confiance et securite a la Porte, la France ne veut que la fortifier. 2. Triple Alhance de Moi, Porte et Perse contre Russie 7. Fermer le Bosphore aux Russes, fermer tous les ports, rendre a la Porte son empire absolu sur la Moldavie et la Valachie. 8. Je ne veux point partager I'Empire de Constantinople, voulut-on m'en offrir les trois quarts, je n'en veux point. Je veux raffermir et consolider ce grand empire et m'en servir tel quel comme opposition a la Russie. In 1806 Napoleon made war upon Prussia. In October of that year the Prussians were totally defeated at Jena 26 The Problem of Constantinople and Auerstadt. The Eussians came to their aid, and Napoleon feared a lengthy campaign so far from his base. On February 7 and 8, 1807, he defeated the Eussians at Eylau. However, the French suffered such fearful losses that Napoleon's position was seriously endangered. Hence he urgently desired to make peace with Eussia. Eelying upon the youth, the generous enthusiasm, the warm- heartedness, the lack of suspicion, and the inexperience of Alexander the First, Napoleon attempted once more to convert his enemy into a friend and ally and wilhng tool. With this object in view he caused articles to be pubhshed in the papers advocating a reconciliation of Napoleon and Alexander in the interests of humanity, and recommend- ing joint action by France and Eussia against England, the enemy of mankind. Napoleon knew how to convey indirectly to the Czar numerous messages expressing his sorrow at the fearful and needless slaughter, his desire for peace, his goodwill for Eussia, and his high esteem for Eussia's youthful ruler. Alexander became interested in Napoleon's suggestions, and at last became infatuated by him. He had been fascinated by Napoleon's success. He was keenly aware of the backwardness of Eussia. Desiring to advance his country, he wished to learn from his great antagonist the art of government and administra- tion, for in Napoleon he chiefly admired the organiser. On June 14, 1807, Napoleon severely defeated the Eussians at Friedland, and the Czar, following the advice of his generals, asked Napoleon for peace. A few days later the celebrated meeting of the two monarchs in a little pavilion erected on a raft anchored in the river Niemen took place. According to Tatistcheff, the Czar's first words to Napoleon were, ' Sire, je hais les Anglais autant que vous,' and Napoleon replied, ' En ce cas la paix est faite.' On the Niemen, and at the prolonged meeting of the monarchs at Tilsit which followed. Napoleon unceasingly preached to the Czar the necessity of Franco-Eussian co-operation in the interests of peace, and the necessity Great Problems of British Statesmanship 27 of breaking the naval tyranny of England. He suggested to Alexander that he should seize Turkey, spoke of the Turks as barbarians, and proposed that the two monarchs, after having destroyed the power of England by an attack upon India, should share between them the dominion of the world. He urged that they should conclude at the same time a treaty of peace and a treaty of alhance which provided for their co-operation throughout the world. Taking advantage of the Czar's easily aroused enthusiasm and of his lack of guile. Napoleon deliberately fooled Alexander the Eirst and tricked him into an alliance with France by which all the advantages fell to Napoleon. How the Czar was treated is described as follows in his ' Memoirs ' by Talleyrand, who drafted the Treaty of Tilsit : In the course of the conferences preceding the Treaty of Tilsit the Emperor Napoleon often spoke to the Czar Alex- ander of Moldavia and Wallachia as provinces destined some day to become Eussian. Affecting to be carried away by some irresistible impulse, and to obey the decrees of Providence, he spoke of the division of European Turkey as inevitable. He then indicated, as if inspired, the general basis of the sharing of that empire, a portion of which was to fall to Austria in order to gratify her pride rather than her ambition. A shrewd mind could easily notice the effect produced upon the mind of Alexander by all those fanciful dreams. Napoleon watched him attentively and, as soon as he noticed that the prospects held out allured the Czar's imagination, he informed Alexander that letters from Paris necessitated his immediate return and gave orders for the treaty to be drafted at once. My instructions on the subject of that treaty were that no allusion to a partition of the Ottoman Empire should appear in it, nor even to the future fate of the two provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia. These instructions were strictly carried out. Napoleon thus left Tilsit, having made pros- pective arrangements which could serve him as he pleased for the accomplishment of his other designs. He had not 28 The Problem of Constantinople bound himself at all, whereas, by the prospects he held out, he had allured the Czar Alexander and placed him, in rela- tion to Turkey, in a doubtful position which might enable the Cabinet of the Tuileries to bring forth other preten- sions untouched in the treaty. According to the Treaty of Tilsit, which was signed on July 7, 1807, Napoleon and Alexander were to support one another on land and sea with the whole of their armed forces. The alHance was defensive and offensive. The two nations were to act in common in making war and in concluding peace. Eussia was to act as mediator between England and France, and to request England to give up to France and her Allies all her conquests made since 1805. If England should refuse to submit, Eussia was to make war upon England. Thus the duties of the Czar under the Treaty of Alhance were clearly outhned. The corre- sponding advantages, however, were only vaguely hinted at. Only the last article. Article 8, treated of Turkey, and it was worded as follows : Pareillement, si par une suite des changements qui viennent de se faire a Constantinople, la Porte n'acceptait pas la mediation de la France, ou si, apres qu'elle I'aura acceptee, il arrivait que, dans le delai de trois mois apres I'ouverture des negociations, elles n'eussent pas conduit a un resultat satisfaisant, la France fera cause commune avec la Eussie contre la Porte Ottomane, et les deux hautes parties contractantes s'entendront pour soustraire toutes les provinces de I'Empire ottoman en Europe, la ville de Con- stantinople et le province de Eomelie exceptees, au joug et aux vexations des Turcs. In return for making war upon England, Alexander the First received merely the promise that in certain eventualities France and Eussia would act together against Turkey, and that in the event of such joint action they would come to an understanding with a view to freeing all the European provinces of Turkey from the Turks. However, Constantinople and the Province of Eumelia Great Problems of British Statesmanship 29 were to be reserved, and not to be partitioned by the Allies. In return for valuable service, Alexander the First received merely a vague and worthless promise. As, in numerous conversations, Napoleon had promised to Alexander all he could desire, and as the Czar implicitly beheved in his new friend, he probably did not look too closely into the wording of the one-sided treaty, and left Tilsit full of admiration for the Emperor of the French. Meanwhile Napoleon began a most cynical game with Alexander. Although the Treaty of Tilsit did not provide for the partition of Turkey, Napoleon continued using the partition of Turkey as a bait with which to secure Russia's support against England. He went even so far as to offer her, though only verbally, Constantinople itself. On November 7, 1807, Count Tolstoi, the Czar's repre- sentative in France, reported to Alexander that Napoleon had offered Constantinople to Eussia in the following words : II (Napoleon) me dit que lui ne voyait aucun a vantage pour la France au demembrement de I'empire ottoman, qu'il ne demandait pas mieux que de garantir son integrite, qu'il le preferait meme. . . . Cependent, que si nous tenions infiniment a la possession de la Moldavie et de la Valachie, il s'y preterait volontiers et qu'il nous offrait le thalweg du Danube, rnais que ce serait a condition qu'il put s'en dedommager ailleurs. II consent meme a un plus grand partage de I'empire ottoman s'il pouvait entrer dans les plans de la Eussie. II m'autorise a offrir Constantinople, car il m'assure de n'avoir contracts aucun engagement avec le gouvernement turc, et de n'avoir aucune vue sur cette capitale. . . . Dans la troisieme supposition qui annoncerait un entier demembre- ment de la Turquie europeenne, il consent a une extension pour la Eussie jusqu'a Constantinople, cette capitale y comprise, contre des acquisitions sur lesquelles il ne s'est point explique. Under unspecified circumstances Napoleon verbally 30 The Problem of Constantinople agreed to Eussia's occupying Constantinople in return for equally unspecified compensations for France ! While, on November 7, 1807, Napoleon professed to be completely indifferent to Turkey's fate, and expressed his willingness to the Eussian Ambassador that Eussia should have Constantinople, he sent five days later, on November 12, instructions to M. de Caulaincourt, the French Ambassador in Petrograd, in which he frankly stated that he desired the maintenance of Turkey's integrity, and that he had put the project of partitioning Turkey before Alexander solely for the purpose of attaching him to France with the bonds of hope. In these most important instructions to Caulaincourt we read : Cette chute de I'empire ottoman pent etre desiree par le cabinet de Petersbourgh : on sait qu'elle est inevitable, mais il n'est point de la politique des deux com-s imperiales de I'accelerer ; elles doivent la reculer jusqu'au moment ou le partage de ces vastes debris pourra se faire d'une maniere plus avantageuse pour I'une et pour I'autre et ou elles n'auront pas a craindre qu'une puissance actuellement leur ennemie s'en approprie, par la possession de I'Egypte et des lies, les plus riches depouilles. C'est la plus forte objection de I'Empereur contre le partage de I'empire ottoman. To these instructions Napoleon added himself the following marginal note emphasising his desire to preserve the integrity of Turkey : Ainsi, le veritable desir de I'Empereur dans ce moment est que I'empire ottoman reste dans son integrite actuelle, vivant en paix avec la Eussie et la France, ayant pour limites le thalweg du Danube plus les places que la Turquie a sur ce fleuve. . . . The instructions to M. de Caulaincourt then continued as follows : Telles sont done, Monsieur, sur ce point important de politique, les intentions de I'Empereur. Ce qu'il prefererait Great Problems of British Statesmanship 31 a tout serait que les Turcs pussent rester en paisible posses- sion de la Valachie et de la Moldavie. . . . Et enfin, quoique tres eloigne du partage de I'empire turc et regardant cette mesure comme funeste, il ne veut pas qu'en vous expliquant avec I'Empereur Alexandre et son ministre, vous la condamniez d'une maniere absolue : mais il vous prescrit de representer avec force les motifs qui doivent en faire reculer I'epoque. Get antique projet de I'ambition russe est un lien qui pent attacher la Eussie a la France et, sous ce point de vue, il faut se garder de decourager entierement ses esperances. After informing his Ambassador that the projected partition of Turkey was nothing but a piece of deception whereby to secure Alexander's support, Napoleon told him in the same instructions that the projected Franco- Russian expedition against India was a sham, and that he had put it forward only with the object of frightening the English into making peace. That most extraordinary and most significant passage runs as follows : On pourra songer a une expedition dans les Indes ; plus elle parait chimerique, plus la tentative qui en serait faite (et que ne peuvent la France et la Eussie ?) epouvanterait les Anglais. La terreur semee dans les Indes Anglaises repandrait la confusion a Londres, et certainement quarante iTiille Fran9ais auxquels la Porte aurait accorde passage par Constantinople, se joignant a quarante mille Eusses venus par le Caucase, sufiiraient pour epouvanter I'Asie et pour en faire la conquete. C'est dans de pareilles vues que I'Empereur a laisse I'ambassadeur qu'il avait nomme pour la Perse se rendre a sa destination. Napoleon's saying, ' The more fantastic an attempt to attack India will be, the more it will frighten the Enghsh,' is very amusing. There is some reason in his observation. England is more easily frightened by bogies than by reah- ties, and one of the bogies which has frightened her most frequently during many decades is the bogey of Constanti- nople which Napoleon set up a century ago. 32 The Problem of Constantinople Being carried away by his enthusiasm and simple trustfulness, Alexander the First, remembering and often repeating the words which Napoleon had uttered at Tilsit, believed that Constantinople was in his grasp. However, he and his advisers doubted that the joint expedition against India projected by Napoleon was easy to carry out. According to Caulaincourt's report of December 31, 1807, Alexander the First and his minister received with some reserve the French proposals relating to that expedi- tion. They obviously estimated more correctly the diffi- culties which such an undertaking would encounter owing to the vast distances and the wildness of the route. They did not share the illusions of Paul the First. The French Ambassador in Eussia was in constant and intimate relations with Alexander the First, and he reported his conversations like an accomplished shorthand- writer. According to a conversation with the Czar, which he communicated to Napoleon on January 21, 1808, Napoleon liimself had admitted at Tilsit the impossibihty of striking at India by a march overland. The Ambas- sador reported : Alexandre I : L'Empereur (Napoleon) m'en a parle a Tilsit. Je suis entre la-dessus en detail avec lui. II m'a paru convaincu comme moi que c'etait impossible. L'Ambassadeur : Les choses impossibles sont ordinaire- ment celles qui reussissent le mieux, parce que ce sont celles auxquelles on s'attend le moins. Alexandre I : Mais les distances, les subsistances, les deserts ? L'Ambassadeur : Les troupes de Votre Majeste qui sont venues d'Irkoutsk en Autriche ou en Pologne ont fait plus de chemin qu'il n'y en a des frontieres de son empire dans rinde. Quant aux subsistances, le biscuit est si sain et si portatif qu'on pent en emporter beaucoup avec peu de transport. Tout n'est pas desert. Alexandre I : Mais par ou pensez-vous nos armees devraient passer ? Li'Ambassadeur : II faudrait prealablement des conven- Great Problems of British Statesmanship 83 tions avec la Perse et la Turquie. L'Armee fran^aise, par exemple, en ferait une avec la Porte, puis que Constanti- nople est son chemin naturel. Celle de Votre Majeste passerait par le Caucase, si on n'avait pas les moyens neces- saires pour lui faire traverser la mer Caspienne. Alexandre I : Mon cher general, c'est un bien grand projet. Mais que de difficult es, pour ne pas dire plus. While in the time of Paul the First the combined French and Eussian armies were to march upon India via Warsaw and the Caspian Sea, Napoleon now proposed that the French army should march via Constantinople. He evidently sought for a pretext of occupying and controlling that town and the Straits, and with them the Eussian Black Sea. Meanwhile he continued playing with Alexander. On February 2, 1808, he wrote to his Ambassador in Eussia that he was on the point of arranging for an expedition to India, combined with the partition of Turkey, that a joint army of twenty to twenty-five thousand Eussians, eight to ten thousand Austrians, and thirty to forty thousand Frenchmen, should be set in motion towards India ; ' que rien n'est facile comme cette operation ; qu'il est certain qu'avant que cette armee soit sur I'Euphrate la terreur sera en Angleterre.' On February 6, 1808, Napoleon told the Eussian Ambassador, Count Tolstoi, according to the report of the latter, ' Une fois sur I'Euphrate, rien n'empeche d'arriver aux Indes. Ce n'est pas une raison pour echouer dans cette entreprise parce qu'Alexandre et Tamerlan n'y ont pas reussi. II s'agit de faire mieux qu'eux.' While Napoleon was amusing Alexander with vain hopes and fantastic proposals, the Czar had begun a very costly war with England in accordance with the stipulations of the Treaty of Tilsit. Feeling at last that the question of Turkey was being treated dilatorily and with the greatest vagueness by Napoleon, he pressed for some more definite arrangement, and a series of non-official conferences regarding that country took place between the French Ambassador 34 The Problem of Constantinople in Eussia and the Kussian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Acting upon his secret instructions given above, Caulain- court prevaricated and at first refused to consider the question of Constantinople because that position was stra- tegically too important to be rashly disposed of. Being anxious to dispossess the Turks, largely for reasons of humanity, Alexander then proposed to make Constantinople a free town. According to Caulaincourt's report of March 1, 1808, the Czar said to the French Ambassador, ' Constanti- nople est un point important, trop loin de vous et que vous regardez peut-etre comme trop important pour nous. J'ai une idee pour que cela ne fasse pas de difi&cultes, faisons- en une espece de ville hbre.' The question arose what equivalent could be given to France if Eussia should take Constantinople. At the second conference, which took place on March 2, the Eussian Minister of Foreign Affairs suggested that France should occupy Egypt, stating, ' La France a toujours desire I'Egypte. Sous le regno de I'imperatrice Catherine, elle nous avait fait proposer par I'empereur Joseph II de nous laisser aller a Constantinople si nous lui laissions prendre I'Egypte.' The question of Constantinople itself had to be tackled. On March 4 the French Ambassador, speaking, of course, without authority, offered Constantinople to Eussia, but claimed at the same time the Dardanelles for France. In other words, he suggested that although Eussia might possibly be allowed to occupy Constantinople, France ought to dominate that town by the possession of the Dardanelles ! Not unnaturally, the Czar, who was apprised of these demands, refused even to consider that suggestion. In course of time, the real intentions of Napoleon were revealed to Eussia. The Czar recognised that Napoleon had fooled him and had used him as a tool. The AUiance was followed by a breach between the two monarchs, by Napoleon's defeat in 1812, and by his downfall. The most important documents quoted in these pages show conclusively that the Eussian expeditions against Great Problems of British Statesmanship 35 India prepared or discussed in the time of Napoleon were inspired not by Paul the First and Alexander the First, but by the great Corsican, that Alexander desired to ac- quire Constantinople chiefly owing to Napoleon's incitement, that the joint Franco-Eussian expedition against India was sheer and deUberate humbug to frighten the Enghsh. In the words of the great historian Vandal, the author of the best book on Napoleon and Alexander the First : The idea of partitioning Turkey was rather a Napoleonic than a Eussian idea. Napoleon rather intended to make a demonstration than an attack. He thought that if the French troops crossed the Bosphorus, Asia would be tremb- ling, and England's position be shaken to its very founda- tions ; that in view of the menace she would be wilhng to make peace with France. The documents given clearly establish that Napoleon neither intended to give Constantinople to Eussia, nor to attack England in India, that on the contrary he wanted Constantinople for France, and that he attached greater value to Egypt than to Constantinople. In Ms instructions to Caulaincourt, Napoleon confessed that his plans could be carried out only if he ruled the sea, that a premature movement on Constantinople would result in England occupying Egypt, the most valuable part of the Turkish empire. Napoleon might conceivably have given to Eussia Constantinople for a time, but he would have done so only with the object of involving Eussia in trouble with Engla-id. According to ViUemain, he said : ' J'ai voulu refouler amicalement la Eussie en Asie ; je lui ai offert Constantinople.' Commenting on these words, Vandal tells us that, in dangling the bait of Constantinople before Eussia, Napoleon merely aimed at involving that country in a hfe-and-death struggle with England. Eather by his threats of attacking India in company with Eussia overland than by any actual attempt at carrying out that mad adventure, did Napoleon create 36 The Problem of Constantinople profound suspicion against Eussia among the English, and that suspicion has been the cause of a century of Anglo - Russian suspicion, friction, and misunderstandings. At the Congress of Vienna, Lord Castlereagh opposed Eussia's acquisition of Poland, fearing that that country might become dangerously strong. Eeplying to the expressions of the British representative's fears, Alexander sent Lord Castlereagh, on November 21, 1814, a mo&t remarkable memorandum — the clumsy translation is that given in the British Blue Book — ^in which we read : Justice estabhshed, as an immutable rule for all the transactions between the coalesced States, that the advan- tages which each of them should be summoned to reap from the triumph of the common cause should be in proportion to the perseverance of their efforts and to the magnitude of the sacrifices. The necessity for a pohtical balance in its turn prescribed that there should be given to each State a degree of con- sistency and of pohtical Conventions in the means which each of them should possess in itself to cause them to be respected. By invariably acting in accordance with the two principles which have been just stated the Emperor resolved to enter upon the war, to support it alone at its commencement, and to carry it on by means of a coalition up to the single point at which the general pacification of Europe might be based on the sohd and immovable foundations of the independence of States and of the sacred rights of nations. The barrier of the Oder once overstepped, Eussia fought only for her AlHes : in order to increase the power of Prussia i:nd of Austria, to dehver Germany, to save France from the frenzy of a despotism of which she alone bore the entire weight after her reverses. If the Emperor had based his poHcy upon combinations of a private and exclusive interest when the army of Napo- leon, collected together, so to speak, at the expense of Europe, had found its grave in Eussia, His Majesty could have made peace with France ; and without exposing Great Problems of British Statesmanship 37 himself to the chances of a war the issue of which was so much the more uncertain as it depended on the determina- tion of other Cabinets, without imposing fresh sacrifices on his people, might have contented himself, on the one hand, with the security acquired for his Empire ; and, on the other hand, have acquiesced in the conditions which Bonaparte, instructed by a sad experience, would have been eager to propose to him. But the Emperor, in the magnanimous enterprise to which he had appHed himself, availed himself of the generous enthusiasm of his people to second the desires of all the nations of Europe. He fought with disinterested views for a cause with wliich the destinies of the human race were connected. Faithful to his principles, His Majesty has constantly laboured to favour the interests of the Powers which had ralHed round the common cause, placing his own interests only in the second rank. He has lavished his resources in order to render their united efforts prosperous under the firm conviction that his AlKes, far from finding in a conduct so pure grounds for complaint, would be grateful to him for having made all private consideration subordinate to the success of an enterprise which had the general good for its object. The Czar spoke truly. He had fought in 1813 and 1814 against Napoleon for purely ideal reasons. After Napoleon's disastrous defeat in Eussia in 1812 Eussia herself was secure against another attack from France. Had she followed a purely selfish poHcy, she would have left the Western Powers to their fate. While they were weakened in their struggle against Napoleon the powerful Eussian army might have secured the most far-reaching advantages to the country, and it might certainly have taken Constanti- nople. In 1813 Alexander obviously joined in the war against Napoleon actuated by the wish of giving at last a durable peace to Europe. How strongly the Czar was inspired by ideal and religious motives may be seen from the Holy Alliance Treaty which he drew up in his own handwriting, and which estabhshed that henceforth all rulers should be guided in their policy solely by th:. dictates 38 The Problem of Constantinople of the Christian religion. That Httle-known document was worded as follows : In the name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinitij. Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Eussia having in consequence of the great events which have marked the course of the three last years in Europe, and especially of the blessings which it has pleased Divine Providence to shower down upon those States which place their confidence and their hope in it alone, acquired the intimate conviction of the necessity of settHng the steps to be observed by the Powers in their reciprocal relations upon the subhme truths which the Holy ReHgion of our Saviour teaches : They solemnly declare that the present Act has no other object than to pubhsh, in the face of the whole world, their fixed resolution, both in the administration of their respec- tive States and in their poHtical relations with every other Government, to take for their sole guide the precepts of that Holy Rehgion, namely, the precepts of Justice, Christian Charity, and Peace, which, far from being applicable only to private concerns, must have an immediate influence on the councils of princes, and guide all their steps as being the only means of consoHdating human institutions and re- medying their imperfections. In consequence their Majes- ties have agreed to the following Articles : — Article 1. Conformably to the words of the Holy Scrip- tures, which command all men to consider each other as brethren, the Three Contracting Monarchs will remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity, and con- sidering each other as fellow-countrymen they will, on all occasions and in all places, lend each other aid and assist- ance and, regarding themselves towards their subjects and armies as fathers of famiHes, they will lead them, in the same spirit of fraternity with wliich they are animated, to protect Religion, Peace, and Justice. Article 2. In consequence the sole principle of force, whether between the said Governments or between their Subjects, shall be that of doing each other reciprocal service, Great Problems of British Statesmanship 39 and of testifying by unalterable goodwill the mutual affec- tion with which they ought to be animated, to consider themselves all as members of one and the same Christian nation : the three alHed Princes looking on themselves as merely delegated by Providence to govern three branches of the one family, namely, Austria, Prussia, and Kussia, thus confessing that the Christian world, of which they and their people form a part, has in reality no other Sovereign than Him to whom alone power really belongs, because in Him alone are found all the treasures of love, science, and infinite wisdom, that is to say, God, our Divine Saviour, the Word of the Most High, the Word of Life. Their Majesties consequently recommend to their people, with the most tender solicitude, as the sols means of enjoying that Peace which arises from a good conscience, and which alone is durable, to strengthen themselves every day more and more in the principles and exercise of the duties which the Divine Saviour has taught to mankind. Article 3. All the Powers who shall choose solemnly to avow the sacred principles which have dictated the present Act, and shall acknowledge how important it is for the happiness of nations, too long agitated, that these truths should henceforth exercise over the destinies of mankind all the influence which belongs to them, will be received with equal ardour and affection into this Holy Alliance. After the Peace of Vienna an era of reaction began, and the hostihty shown by the Governments to the people was attributed not to Prince Metternich, who was chiefly responsible for it, but to the Czar and to the Holy Alliance, which was considered to be an instrument of oppression. However, the fact that the Holy AlHance was a purely ideal compact is attested by Prince Metternich himself in his Memoirs. After describing its genesis, Metternich wrote : Voila I'histoire de la Sainte Alliance, qui meme dans I'esprit prevenu de son auteur, ne devait etre qu'une mani- festation morale, tandis qu'aux yeux des autres signataires de I'acte elle n'avait pas meme cette signification ; par consequent elle ne merite aucune des interpretations que 40 The Prohlem of Constantinople I'esprit de parti lui a donnees dans la suite. . . . Ulterieure- ment il n'a jamais ete question, entre les cabinets, de la ' Sainte Alliance,' et jamais il n'aurait pu en etre question. Les partis hostiles aux Souverains ont seuls exploite cet acte, et s'en servis comme d'une arme pour calomnier les intentions les plus pures de leurs adversaires. La ' Sainte Alliance ' n'a pas ete fondee pour restreindre les droits des peuples ni pour favoriser I'absolutisme et la tyrannie sous n'importe quelle forme. Elle fut uniquement I'expression des sentiments mystiques de I'Empereur Alexandre et I'application des principes du Christianisme a la politique. Metternich described Alexander's liberal and generous views as ' chimerical, revolutionary, and Jacobinic ' in his letters to the Austrian Emperor, and in his Memoirs and his correspondence he prided himself that he had succeeded in regaining the Czar to reaction. Metternich and other Austrian and German statesmen strove to keep Eussia backward and weak by recommending a policy of repression and persecution. Austria and Germany have been largely responsible for Eussian ilHberalism and Eussian oppression in the past. Let us now cast a brief glance at the events which brought about the Crimean War. During the first half of the nineteenth century Turkey was almost continually in a state of the gravest disorder, and its downfall seemed to be imminent. Alexander the First had died in 1825, and had been succeeded by Nicholas the First. Believing a catastrophe in Turkey possible, he appointed, in 1829, a special committee, consisting of the most eminent statesmen, to consider the problem of Turkey. According to de Martens, ' Eecueil des traites de la Eussie,' Count Nesselrode, the Vice-Chancellor of the Empire, stated before that Committee that the preserva- tion of Turkey was rather useful than harmful to the true interests of Eussia, that it was in the interest of the country to have for neighbour a weak State such as Turkey. After thorough and lengthy discussion, the following resolutions Great Problems of British Statesmanship 41 were adopted at a sitting presided over by the Czar himself : (1) That the advantages of maintaining Turkey in Em:ope are greater than the disadvantages ; (2) That consequently the downfall of Turkey would be opposed to Russia's own interests ; (3) That therefore it would be prudent to prevent its fall and to take advantage of the opportunity which might offer for concluding an honourable peace. However, if the last hour of Turkey in Europe should have struck, Eussia would be compelled to take the most energetic measures in order to prevent the openings leading to the Black Sea falhng into the hands of another Great Power. During the period preceding the outbreak of the Crimean War, Russia's pohcy was directed by the principles laid down in 1829, and the war itself was obviously due to mis- understandings between England and Eussia, and to the prevalence of that distrust of Eussia among Enghshmen which Napoleon had created in the past. Foreseeing the possibiUty of Turkey's collapse, the Czar desired to provide toward such an event in conjunction with England. With this object in view, he told the British Ambassador on January 9, 1853 : The affairs of Turkey are in a very disorganised condi- tion ; the country itself seems to be falhng to pieces ; the fall will be a great misfortune, and it is very important that England and Eussia should come to a perfectly good under- standing upon these affairs and that neither should take any decisive step. Tenez ; nous avons sur les bras un homme malade — un homme gravement malade ; ce sera, je vous le dis franche- ment, un grand malheur si, un de ces jours, il devait nous echapper, surtout avant que toutes les dispositions neces- saires fussent prises. Mais enfin ce n'est point le moment de vous parler de cela. Five days later, on January 14, the Czar disclosed his intentions more clearly to the British Ambassador. Fearing 42 The Problem of Constantinople that in case of Turkey's downfall England might seize Constantinople, and desiring to prevent that event in accordance with the principles laid down by the Committee of 1829 and given above, he stated : Maintenant je desire vous parler en ami et en gentleman ; si nous arrivons a nous entendre sur cette affaire, I'Angleterre et moi, pour le reste, peu m'importe ; il m'est indifferent ce que font ou pensent les autres. Usant done de franchise, je vous dis nettement, que si I'Angleterre songe a s'etablir un de ces jours a Constantinople, je ne le permettrai pas ; je ne vous prete point ces intentions, mais il vaut mieux dans ces occasions parler clairement ; de mon cote, je suis egalement dispose de prendre I'engagement de ne pas m'y etablir, en proprietaire, il s'entend, car en depositaire je ne dis pas ; il pourrait se faire que les circonstances me misent dans le cas d'occuper Constantinople, si rien ne se trouve prevu si Ton doit tout laisser aller au hasard. Commenting upon the Czar's confidential statements, the Ambassador reported that he was ' impressed with the belief that ... his Majesty is sincerely desirous of acting in harmony with her Majesty's Government.' In a further conversation the Czar told the Ambassador on February 21 : The Turkish Empire is a thing to be tolerated, not to be reconstituted. As to Egypt, I quite understand the impor- tance to England of that territory. I can then only see that if, in the event of a distribution of the Ottoman succession upon the fall of the Empire, you should take possession of Egypt, I shall have no objections to offer. I would say the same thing of Candia ; that island might suit you, and I do not know why it should not become an EngUsh possession. The intentions of the Czar, though somewhat vaguely expressed, were perfectly clear. He wished to bring about a peaceful solution of the Turkish problem in case of Turkey's downfall. In accordance with the principles laid down in 1829, he did not desire to see the Dardanelles in the hands of a first-rate Power, and was unwilling to see England Great Problems of British Statesmanship 43 established in Constantinople and dominating the Black Sea. He was apparently quite willing that Constantinople and the Straits should be held by some small Power instead of Turkey, or that the position should be internationalised in some form or other in accordance with the ideas expressed by his brother in 1808, so long as he could feel reasonably secure that no foreign Power would seize the openings of the Black Sea and attack Russia in its most vulnerable quarter. If England should meet him in his desire to regulate the position of Constantinople in a way which would not threaten Russia's security in the Black Sea, he was quite willing that England should occupy Egypt. Possibly the idea that Russia should acquire Constantinople was at the back of his mind, but as Egypt was far more valuable than Constantinople, he had offered beforehand the most ample compensation to this country. Un- fortunately, the distrust existing against Russia since the time of Napoleon was too deeply rooted. The Czar's proposals were treated almost contemptuously. In reply- ing to the Czar, the British Government, adverting to the sufferings of the Christians living in Turkey upon which Nicholas had dwelt, stated on March 28 : . . . The treatment of Christians is not harsh, and the toleration exhibited by the Porte towards this portion of its subjects might serve as an example to some Governments who look with contempt upon Turkey as a barbarous Power. Her Majesty's Government beheve that Turkey only requires forbearance on the part of its Alhes, and a deter- mination not to press their claims in a manner humiliat- ing to the dignity and independence of the Sultan. The English Government, being filled with suspicions, did not even make a serious attempt to discover the aims and intentions of the Czar. Vaguely dreading Russia, England supported Turkey against that country. Thus Great Britain has been largely responsible not only for the Crimean War and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, but 44 The Problem of Constantinople also for the ill-treatment of the Christians and the massacres which have taken place throughout Turkey during many decades. What has created England's instinctive fear of Eussia ? If we look at the map, if we consider size to be a criterion of national strength, then Eussia is immensely powerful. However, the Eusso-Turkish War, the Eusso-Japanese War, and the present War have shown that we need perhaps not have feared Eussia's strength so much as her weakness. If Eussia had been stronger, if Eussia's strength had been in accordance with the views which until lately were gener- ally held here, the present War would not have broken out. German soldiers evidently appraised the mihtary power of Eussia far more correctly than did British statesmen, who are habitually ill-informed on mihtary matters. By opposing Eussia in the past, England has worked not for her own advantage and for the security of India, but for the benefit of Germany and Austria. England's anti- Eussian policy and Eussia's anti-British policy were largely inspired first from Paris and then from BerKn and Vienna. That is plain to all who are acquainted with recent diplo- matic history. The century-old antagonism between England and Eussia has been the work of Napoleon, of Bismarck, and of Bismarck's successors. The Eussian danger, Eussia's aggressiveness, and Eussia's constant desire to seize India, are largely figments of the imagination. Eussia has Httle desire to possess India. If she had it she would probably be unable to administer it. The late Czar said to Prince Hohenlohe on September 6, 1896 : ' Who is to take India from the English ? We are not stupid enough to have that plan.' It would be as difficult for Eussia to attack India at the present day as it was in the time of the Emperor Paul. It is true Eussia has now a couple of railways which run up to the Indian frontier, but India also has railways ; these will facilitate the concentration of troops at any point at which that country may be attacked, and with Great Problems of British Statesmanship 45 the development of transport by land and sea, and the growth of the Empire, the danger of an attack upon India by Kussia seems to be growing smaller from year to year. In the picturesque language of the late Lord Salisbury, England backed the wrong horse in opposing Kussia's policy towards Turkey in the past. National policy is, as a rule, in accordance with the national character. The Eussians are rather dreamers than men of action, rather men of quiet thought than men of ambition. The heroes of Tolstoy and of other great Eussian authors are not men of the Nietzsche type, but men of peace, idealists, desiring the best, animated by a deep sense of rehgion. The strong ideahst strain in the Eussian character has found expression not only in the ideaUst poUcy followed by Alexander the First and Nicholas the Second, but in that of other Eussian Czars as well. Eussia has had a Peter the Great, but she has not had a Napoleon, and she is not hkely to have one. Those who beheve that Eussia aims at dominating the world, at conquering all Asia, and invading India, are neither acquainted with the Eussian character nor with the re- sources, the capabiHties, and the needs of the country, Eussia is a very large State. It is extremely powerful for defence, because it is protected by vast distances, a rigorous chmate, and very inferior means of communica- tion. The same circumstances which make Eussia exceedingly powerful for defence make her very weak for a war of aggression. That has been seen in all her foreign wars without a single exception. Last, but not least, the Eussian people and their rulers have become awakened to the necessity of modernising the country. A new Eussia has arisen. Eussia has made rapid progress during the last two decades, but her progress has perhaps been slower than that of other nations. Hence Eussia is still very poor and backward. She has some railways, but her means of inland transport are totally insuificient. She has scarcely any roads, except a few military ones. 46 The Problem of Constantinople France has ten times the mileage of roads possessed by Eussia. During the Great War we have frequently heard of the absence of roads in Poland and of the impossibility of moving troops through a sea of mud. Yet Poland is that district of Eussia which is best provided with roads. The peasants throughout Eussia use still almost ex- clusively wooden ploughs with which only the surface can be scratched. By changing their wooden ploughs for iron ones they could plough twice as deeply and double their harvests, but they are too poor to provide modern agri- cultural implements. In many Eussian villages no iron implements, not even iron nails, may be seen, and the methods of Eussia's agriculture are still those of the Dark Ages. The manufacturing industries of the country are in their infancy. The vast majority of the people can neither read nor write, and newspapers exist only in the large towns. If we compare the economic and social conditions of Eussia with those existing in other countries, it becomes clear that the principal need of Eussia is not further expansion, but internal development, and in view of the poverty of the country the development of the great Eussian estate is possible only in time of peace. For her the restriction of armaments is more necessary than it is for any other Great Power. The principal interest of Eussia is peace. That has become clear to every thinking Eussian and to the whole Eussian nation. When the great Peace Congress assembles the question of Constantinople will come up for settlement, and from interested quarters we shall be told once more that Constanti- nople is ' the key of the world.' A glance at the map shows that Constantinople is not the key of the world, and is not even the key of the Mediterranean, but that it is merely the key of the Black Sea. Prince Bismarck possessed mihtary abihty of the highest kind, and, being keenly aware that foreign pohcy and strategy must go hand in hand, he kept constantly in touch with Germany's leading soldiers. He clearly recognised the fallacy of Great Problems of British Statesmanship 47 Napoleon's celebrated epigram. Hence, when a member of the Keichstag, referring to the Eastern Question, spoke of the Dardanelles as the key to the dominion of the world, Bismarck smilingly replied, ' If the Dardanelles are the key to the dominion of the world it obviously follows that up to now the Sultan has dominated the world.' Constanti- nople has been possessed by various States, but none of them has so far dominated the world. In Bismarck's words, Constantinople has disagreed with all the nations which have possessed it hitherto. Why that has been the case will presently be shown. So far Constantinople has not given a great accession of strength to the nations which have held it. Far from considering Constantinople in the hands of Eussia as a source of strength, Bismarck rather saw in it a source of weakness and of danger. He wrote in his * Memoirs ' : * I believe that it would be advantageous for Germany if the Eussians in one way or another, physically or diplo- matically, were to estabhsh themselves at Constantinople and had to defend that position.' Eussia is almost invulnerable as long as she can defend herself with her best weapons, her vast distances, her lack of railways and roads, and her rigorous chmate. But the same elements become disadvantageous to Eussia's defence if a highly vulnerable point near her frontier can be attacked. In the Crimean War Eussia almost bled to death because of the difficulty of sending troops to the Crimea. Her failure in Manchuria arose from the same cause. At present Eussia possesses only one point of capital importance on the sea, St. Petersburg, which can comparatively easily be attacked by an army landed in the neighbourhood. If she occupies Constantinople, she must be ready to defend it, and a very large number of troops will be required to protect the shores of the Sea of Marmora and the Straits against an enemy. It is not generally known that the Constantinople position is not circumscribed but very extensive, and that it is not easy to defend it against a mobile and powerful 48 The Problem of Constantinople enemy, especially if it is simultaneously attacked by land and sea. The small maps of Turkey are deceptive. It is hardly realised that the distance from the entrance of the Dardanelles to the exit of the Bosphorus is nearly two hundred miles. Strategists are agreed that a Power holding Constantinople, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles must possess territory at least as far inland as the Enos-Midia line — that is, the Hne from the town of Enos opposite the island of Samothraki to the town of Midia on the Black Sea. A straight line connecting these two towns would be 120 miles long, or exactly as long as the distance which separates London from Cardiff, Paris from Boulogne, or Strasburg from Coblenz. It is clear that a large army and extensive fortifications are needed to defend so broad a front against a determined attack. In addition, Eussia would have to defend the shore of the Gulf of Saros and the sea-coast of the peninsula of Galipoli against a landing. This shore-line extends to about one hundred miles. Lastly, she would have to defend the opening of the Dardanelles and to prevent an attack upon the Constantinople position across the narrows from the Asiatic mainland. It would be difficult enough to defend this vulnerable and extensive position if it was organically connected with Eussia. It will of course be still more difficult to defend it in view of the fact that Eoumania and Bulgaria, two powerful States, separate Eussia from Constantinople. Eussia can reach Constantinople only by sea unless she should succeed in incorporating Eoumania and Bulgaria in some way or other, or unless the entire north of Asia Minor should fall into Eussia's hands, enabling that country to create a land connection between her Caucasian provinces and the southern shores of the Sea of Marmora and the two Straits. Both events appear unlikely. The Constantinople position, if held by Eussia, would be detached from that country. The Eussian troops garrisoning it would be cut off from the motherland in case of war. Hence they would have to be prepared for Great Problems of British Statesmanship 49 a sudden attack and to be always strong enough to defend the peninsula unaided for a very long time. They would have to be provided with gigantic stores of food and of ammunition. It is therefore clear that Eussia would require a very large permanent garrison for securing the integrity of Constantinople. In case of war she would undoubtedly require several hundred thousand men for that purpose. Possibly she would need as many as 500,000 men if a determined attack by land and sea was likely ; and herein hes the reason for the opinion of the Commission of 1829 that it would be to Eussia's advantage if the status quo at Constantinople was not disturbed, if a weak Power was in the possession of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. There are two points of very great strategical importance in the Eastern Mediterranean : the position of Constanti- nople and Egypt ; and Egypt is undoubtedly by far the more important of the two. When in 1797 Napoleon reached the Adriatic he was struck by the incomparable advantages offered by the position of Egypt, and he ear- marked that country for France in case of a partition of Turkey. A year later he headed an expedition to Egypt, not merely in order to strike at England, but largely, if not cliiefly, in order to conquer that most important strategical position for France. While the Sea of Marmora and the Straits are merely the connecting hnks between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, Egypt, especially since the construction of the Suez Canal, is the connecting link of the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, of Europe and Asia, of the most populated continents and the busiest seas. Hence the Suez Canal route is, and will remain for centuries, the most valuable strategical and trade route in the world, and it is of course of particular importance to the nation which possesses India. Bismarck said to Busch : Egypt is as necessary to England as is her daily bread, because of the Suez Canal, which is the shortest connection between the Eastern and Western halves of the British 50 The Problem of Constantinople Empire. The Suez Canal is like the nerve at the back of the neck which connects the spine with the brain. Those who believe in Napoleonic epigrams will find several remarkable epigrams relating to Egypt. The great Corsican said to Montholon, ' Si j'etais reste en Egypte, je serais a present empereur d'Orient. . . . L'Orient n'attend qu'un homme.' He said to Las Cases, ' De I'Egypte j'aurais atteint Constantinople et les Indes ; j'eusse change la face du monde,' He dictated to Gourgaud, * Qui est maitre de I'Egypte Test de I'lnde.' The last maxim should be particularly interesting to Enghshmen. How great a value Napoleon attached to Egypt will be seen from his ' Memoirs ' dictated to Las Cases, Gourgaud, and Montholon at St. Helena, and from volumes xxix., xxx., and xxxi. of his ' Correspondence.' If we wish to compare the relative importance of Con- stantinople and of the Suez Canal, we need only assume that another Power possessed Egypt and Great Britain Constantinople. While Constantinople would be useless to Great Britain, the occupation of Egypt by a non-British Power would jeopardise Britain's position in India and her Eastern trade. Napoleon, with his keen eye for strategy, told O'Meara : Egypt once in possession of the French, farewell India to the English. Turkey must soon fall, and it will be im- possible to divide it without allotting some portion to France, which will be Egypt. But if you had kept Alexandria, you would have prevented the French from obtaining it, and of ultimately gaining possession of India, which will certainly follow their possession of Egypt. In the sailing-ship era the position of Constantinople was far more important to England than it is at present. Then Eussia, dominating Constantinople, might conceivably have sent a large fleet into the Mediterranean and have seized Malta, Egypt, and Gibraltar before England could have received any news of the saihng of the Eussian armada. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 51 With the advent of the electric cable, wireless telegraphy, and steam shipping, that danger has disappeared. From the Eussian point of view Constantinople is valuable partly for ideal, partly for strategical reasons, and partly because the Narrows are economically of the highest importance to Eussia. Their closure destroys the most important part of Eussia's sea trade. The glamour of Constantinople and its incomparable position on the Golden Horn has fascinated men since the earliest times. Constantinople might become the third capital of Eussia, and it would, for historical and rehgious reasons, be a capital worthy of that great Empire. From the strategical point of view Eussia desires to possess Constan- tinople not for aggression, but for defence, for protecting the Black Sea shores. Whether, however, she would be wise in accepting Constantinople, even if it were offered to her by all Europe, seems somewhat doubtful. It is true that Constantinople dominates the Black Sea. At the same time Constantinople is dominated by the lands of the Balkan Peninsula. In Talleyrand's words : ' Le centre de gravite du monde n'est ni sur I'Elbe, ni sm* I'Adige, il est la-bas aux frontieres de I'Europe, sur le Danube.' Similarly Marshal Marmont, Duke of Eagusa, one of Napoleon's best generals, said in his ' Memoirs ' that Wallachia, Macedonia, and Bulgaria were, in his opinion, the key of the Orient. He thought that the security of Europe was less threatened by Eussia possessing Constan- tinople, supposing the Austrians occupied the countries at the mouth of the Danube, than if Constantinople was held by French and Enghsh troops while the Eussians were masters of the lower Danube. The reasoning of Talleyrand and Marmont seems faultless. It will probably be con- firmed by the British strategists, who ought to be consulted by our statesmen on the strategical value of Constantinople. A ""demonstration of the Balkan States, especially if it were backed by their Central European supporters, against the 120 miles of the Enos-Midia Hne would obviously convert 52 The Problem of Constantinople the Constantinople position from a strategical asset into a very serious strategical liability. It is true that in the event of a Eussian attack upon India, England could no longer attack Eussia in the Black Sea in conjunction with Turkey. However, as Constantinople is a far more valuable point to Eussia than the Crimea or Odessa, and as the Balkan States themselves may desire to possess Constan- tinople, it is obvious that by occupying it Eussia would not increase her power, but would merely expose herself to greater dangers than heretofore. Various proposals have been made for dealing with Constantinople and the Straits after the expulsion of the Turks. Some have advocated that Constantinople should be given to Eussia, some that the position should be given to some small Power, such as Bulgaria, or be divided between two or more Powers, one possessing the southern and the other the northern shore ; others have recommended that that much coveted position should be neutrahsed in some form or other. The importance of Constantinople to Eussia lies in this, that it is the door to her house, that he who holds Constantinople is able to attack Eussia in the Black Sea. Consequently Eussia and Eussia's principal opponents would continue to strive for the possession of the Narrows, supposing they had been given to some small Power, to several Powers in joint occupation, or had been neutralised. The struggle for Constantinople can obviously end only when the town is possessed by a first-rate Power. That seems the only solution which promises finahty, and the only Power which has a strong claim upon the possession of Constantinople is evidently Eussia. Until recently it seemed possible that Constantinople would become the capital of one of the Balkan States or of a Balkan Confederation. Many years ago Mazzini, addressing the awakening Balkan nations, admonished them : ' Stringetevi in una Confederazione e sia Constan- tinopoh la vostra citta anfizionica, la citta dei vostri poteri centrali, aperta a tutti, serva a nessuno.' The internecine Crfeat Problems of British Statesmanship 53 war of the Balkan States has destroyed, apparently for ever, the possibility that Constantinople will belong to the Balkan peoples, and perhaps it is better that it is so. Constantinople might have proved as fatal an acquisition to the Balkan peoples as it has proved to the Turks, and for all we know it may not prove a blessing to Eussia. Those who fear that Eussia might become a danger to Europe in the future, and who would therefore like to see the status quo preserved both in Austria-Hungary and at Constantinople — at first sight Austria-Hungary, as at present constituted, appears to be an efficient counterpoise to Eussia — seem very short-sighted. I think I have shown that Eussia 's acquisition of Constantinople, far from in- creasing Eussia's mihtary strength, would greatly increase her vulnerabihty. Hence the possession of Constantinople should make Eussia more cautious and more peaceful. Similarly, the dissolution of Austria-Hungary into its com- ponent partS' — an event which at present is contemplated with dread by those who fear Eussia's power — would ap- parently not increase Eussia's strength or the strength of Slavism, but would more likely be disadvantageous to both. The weakness of Austria-Hungary arises from its disunion. Owing to its disunion the country is mihtarily and economically weak. If Austria-Hungary should be replaced by a number of self-governing States these will develop much faster. Some of these States will be Slavonic, but it is not likely that they will become Eussia's tools. Liberated nations, as Bismarck has told us, are not grate- ful, but exacting. The Balkan nations which Eussia has freed from the Turkish yoke, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Eoumania, have promptly asserted their independence from Eussia, and have developed a strong individuality of their own. The Slavonic nationahties of Austria-Hun- gary also would probably assert their independence. For economic reasons the small and medium-sized nations in the Balkan Peninsula and within the hmits of present-day Austria-Hungary would probably combine, and if they 54 The Problem of Constantinople were threatened from Eussia they would naturally form a strong poHtical union. A greater Austria-Hungary, a State on a federal basis, would arise in the place of the present State, and, strengthened by self-government, the power of that confederation would be far greater than that possessed by the Dual Monarchy. Since the time when these pages were written the Eussian autocracy has disappeared and has been replaced by the republic. Many of the Eussian democratic leaders have proclaimed that they are opposed to the autocratic poHcy of conquest, that they do not wish to possess Constantinople. It remains to be seen whether the new leaders of Eussia will abandon the century-old aim of their country." Not only the Eussian sovereigns but the Eussian people them- selves have for centuries striven to control the Narrows which connect the Black Sea with the Mediterranean, guided not merely by ambition but by the conviction that Eussia required an adequate outlet to the sea for economic reasons. The Eussian sovereigns who tried to conquer Constantinople followed, therefore, not a personal but a national policy. When, at the beginning of the War, Eussia's war aims were discussed in the Imperial Duma, practically all the speakers demanded the acquisition of Constantinople. The wealthiest districts of Eussia He in the south. The north is largely barren. The productions of Southern Eussia go towards the Black Sea by the magnificent Eussian rivers and by railways. The War has shown that the Power which controls the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles can blockade Eussia, can strangulate the economic life of the country. That is a position which may appear undesirable even to the most enthusiastic Eussian democrats and to the most convinced anti-annexationists. After all, a great nation requires adequate access to the sea. CHAPTEE III THE PROBLEM OP ASIATIC TURKEY^ The problem of Constantinople has perplexed and dis- tressed the world during many centuries. Numerous wars have been waged, and innumerable hves have been sacrificed by the nations desiring to possess or control that glorious city and the wonderful Narrows which separate Europe from Asia and which connect the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, the East and the West, the Slavonic and the Latin- Germanic world. Hitherto it was generally beHeved that an attempt to settle the question of Constan- tinople would inevitably lead to a world war among the claimant States, that their agreement was impossible. Hence diplomats thought with dread of the question of Constantinople, which seemed insoluble. The Great War has broadened men's minds, and has bridged many historic differences. It has- created new enemies, but it has also created new friends, and it appears that the problem of Constantinople will peacefully and permanently be settled when the Entente Powers have achieved their final victory. However, while we may rejoice that the ever-threatening problem of Constantinople has at last been ehminated, it seems possible that another, a far greater and a far more dangerous one, may almost immediately arise in its place. The question of Asiatic Tui-key is forcing itself to the front, and it may convulse the world in a series of devastating ^ The Nineteenth Centwry and After, June 1916. 65 56 The Prohlem of Asiatic Turkey wars unless it be solved together with the other great questions which will come up for settlement at the Peace Congress. Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof. Not only the map of Europe, but that of the world, will have to be re-drawn. The coming settlement will be greater,' and may be far more difficult, than that made at Vienna a hundred years ago. It would therefore not be surprising if those of the assembled statesmen who are not sufficiently acquainted with the significance, the importance, and the danger of the problem of Asiatic Turkey should say, ' We have our hands full. Let us not touch the question of Asiatic Turkey. That is a matter for another generation.' That attitude is understandable, but it should not deter those statesmen who realise the portent and the peril of the Turco-Asiatic problem, and the danger of leaving it in abeyance, from impressing upon their less well-informed colleagues the necessity of a settlement. The question of Asiatic Turkey is undoubtedly a far more difficult question than that of Constantinople. Con- stantinople and the Straits are, as I have shown, not the key to the Dominion of the World, as Napoleon the First asserted, but merely the key to the Black Sea. Former generations, uncritically repeating Napoleon's celebrated dictum, have greatly overrated the strategical importance of that wonderful site. The importance and value of Asiatic Turkey on the other hand can scarcely be ex- aggerated, for it occupies undoubtedly the most important strategical position in the world. It forms the nucleus and centre of the Old World. It separates, and at the same time connects, Europe, Asia, and Africa, three con- tinents which are inhabited by approximately nine-tenths of the human race. If we wish clearly to understand the importance of Asiatic Turkey, we must study its position not only from the strategical point of view, but also from the rehgio- political and from the economic points of view. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 57 Asiatic Turkey occupies a most commanding position, both for war and for trade. A glance at a map shows that Asiatic Turkey is the link and the bridge which connects Africa with Asia and both with Europe. It occupies a position whence three continents may easily be threatened and attacked. The strategical importance of a site depends obviously not only on its geogi'aphical position, but also on its mihtary value, on the facilities which it offers both for defence and for attack. Looked at from the defensive point of view, Asiatic Turkey forms an enormous natural fortress of the greatest strength. The waters of the Black Sea, of the Mediterranean, of the Eed Sea, and of the Persian Gulf efficiently shelter the larger part of its borders, while its land frontiers are equally powerfully protected by gigantic waterless deserts and lofty mountain ranges. Eange after range of mountains protect Asiatic Turkey towards Kussia and Persia. The no n- Turkish part of Arabia is a torrid desert, and one of the least-known and least-explored countries in the world. In the south-west Asiatic Turkey is protected by the barren waste of the Sinai Peninsula, the Suez Canal, and the Sahara. Thus, Asiatic Turkey enjoys virtually all the advantages of an island, being surrounded on all sides by the sea and sandy and mountainous wastes. Asia Minor is the nucleus, the territorial base, and the citadel of Asiatic Turkey. High mountain walls rise on its Black Sea and Mediterranean shores, and it is sheltered towards the south by the mighty Taurus chain of mountains which stretches from the Gulf of Alexandretta, opposite Cyprus, to the Persian frontier. Thus the Taurus forms a wall of defence from 7,000 to 10,000 feet high against an enemy advancing upon Asia Minor from the east or from the south, from the Eed Sea and Syria, or from the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia. The best defence is the attack. The importance of a fortress lies not bo much in its strength for purely passive defence as in its usefulness as a base for an attack. An 58 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey impregnable fortress which cannot serve as a base of attack because it hes on an inaccessible mountain or on an out- of-the-way island can safely be disregarded by an enemy, and is therefore mihtarily worthless. Asiatic Turkey is a natural fortress which possesses vast possibiHties for attack, for it borders upon some of the most valuable and most vulnerable positions in the world, and it is able to dominate them and to seize them by a surprise attack. In the north it can threaten the rich Caucasian Provinces of Eussia and their oil-fields with Tifiis, Batum, Baku. From its 600 miles of Black Sea coast it can attack the rich Eussian Black Sea provinces with the Crimea, Odessa, Nikolaeff, and Kherson. It can easily strike across the narrow Bosphorus at Constantinople. Towards the west of Asia Minor, and in easy reach of it, lie the beautiful Greek and Italian islands in the i^Egean, which until recently belonged to Turkey, and Hes Greece itself, which for centuries was a Turkish possession. West of Turkish Syria lie the Suez Canal, Egypt, Erythrea, and the Italian and French Colonies of North Africa. A powerful Asiatic Turkey can obviously dominate not only the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, and the Suez Canal, but the very narrow entrance of the Eed Sea near Aden, and that of the Persian Gulf near Muscat as well. It must also not be forgotten that only a comparatively short distance, a stretch of country under the nominal rule of weak and decadent Persia, separates Asiatic Turkey from the Indian frontier. It is clear that Asiatic Turkey, lying in the centre of the Old World, is at the same time a natural fortress of the greatest defensive strength and an ideal base for a surprise attack upon Southern Eussia, Constantinople, the .Sigean Islands, Greece, the Suez Canal, Egypt, Persia, Afghanistan, and India. Time is money. From year to year international traffic tends more and more toward the shortest and the most direct, the best strategical, routes. Asia Minor lies across one of the greatest Hnes of world traffic. It lies Great Problems of British Statesmanship 59 across the direct line which connects London, Paris, and BerHn with Karachi, Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Canton, and Shanghai. The enormous mountains of Afghanistan and of Tibet and the great Eussian inland seas compel the main railway lines connecting Europe and Asia which undoubtedly will be built in the future to be led via Con- stantinople and Asia Minor, and not via Eussia and Southern Siberia. Year by year the importance of the land route to India and China by way of Asia Minor will therefore grow. Year by year the strategical value of the railways running through Asia Minor from Constantinople towards Mosul and Baghdad will increase. Asiatic Turkey com- mands by its position the shortest, and therefore the best, land route to India and China, the route of the future. By commanding the Suez Canal and the Narrow Straits which lead from the Indian Ocean to the Eed Sea and to the Persian Gulf, that country is able to threaten with a flank attack the sea route to India and China not merely in one but in three places. As the opening of the Persian Gulf lies not far from the Indian coast, it is obvious that a strong Power holding Asiatic Turkey would be able to tlireaten with its navy not only the Mediterranean route to India and the Far East, but the Cape route as well. The strategical position of Asiatic Turkey curiously resembles that of Switzerland. Being surrounded by lofty mountains, vast deserts, and the sea, Nature has made Asiatic Turkey an impregnable fortress, another Switzerland. However, while Httle Switzerland dominates by its natural strength and strategical position merely tliree European States — Germany, France, and Italy — Asiatic Turkey dominates the three most populous, and therefore the three most important, continents of the world. Asiatic Turkey looks small on the ordinary maps ; but it is, as the table on page 60 shows, a very large and extremely sparsely populated country. Asiatic Turkey is tliree and a half times as large as Germany, and nearly six times as large as the United 60 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey Kingdom. Its population va quite insignificant. Compared with Asiatic Turkey even Eussia is a densely populated country. Asiatic Turkey is at present almost a desert, although it may be made to support a very large popula- tion, for it possesses vast possibilities, as will be shown further on. The country has certainly room for at least a hundred milUon inhabitants. Austria-Hungary has become an appendage of Germany, and Turkey a German vassal State. During many decades patriotic Germans dreamed of creating a Greater Germany, reaching not merely from Hamburg to Trieste, but from Antwerp to Aden, to Koweyt and perhaps to Muscat and Square Miles Inhabitants at Last Census Population per Square Mile Asiatic Turkey United Kingdom . Germany France .... Spain .... European Russia. . 699,342 121,633 208,780 207,054 194,783 1,862,524 19,382,900 45,370,530 64,925,993 39,601,509 19,588,688 122,550,700 28-0 372-6 310-4 189-5 100-5 64-6 far into Southern Persia. German thinkers were attracted towards Asiatic Turkey not only because of its great past and its vast economic possibilities, but also because of its matchless position at a spot where three continents meet, whence three continents may be dominated, whence Eussia and the British Empire may most effectively be attacked, whence the rule of the world may be won. The present War undoubtedly was largely a war for the control of Asia Minor. In the middle of the last century leading German economists and thinkers who exerted a most powerful influence upon German statesmanship and upon German pubHc opinion, such as Wilhelm Eoscher, Friedrich List, Paul de Lagarde, Ferdinand Lassalle, J. K. Eodbertus, Karl Eitter, the great Moltke, and others, writing long before the unification of Germany, advocated the creation Great Problems of British Statesmanship 61 of a Greater Germany embracing all the German and Austro- Hungarian States and the acquisition of Asia Minor in some form or other, and dreamt of the creation of an organic connection between Berlin and Baghdad by including the Balkan States in an Austro-German Federation. The creation of a Greater Germany, stretching from the North Sea to the Bosphorus, and across the Straits to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, was lately advocated unceasingly by many Pan-Germans. The acquisition of Asia Minor was urged by many eminent writers and men of action, such as Hasse, Dehn, Eohrbach, Sprenger, Sachau, Von der Goltz, Karger, Naumann, Schlagintweit, and many others. I would give a characteristic example out of many. Professor Dr. A. Sprenger, the former director of the Mohammedan College of Calcutta, wrote in his book ' Babylonia the Eichest Land of Antiquity, and the most Valuable Field of Colonisation at the Present Time,' pubHshed in 1886 : The Orient is the only territory of the earth which has not yet been seized by the expanding nations. It is the most valuable field of colonisation. If Germany does not miss its opportunity and seizes it before the Cossacks have put their hands upon it, the whole German nation will gain by the colonisation of the East. As soon as several hundred thousand German soldier-colonists are at work in that glorious country the German Emperor can control the fate of Western Asia and the peace of all Asia. Similar views were expressed by many eminent Germans. The Baghdad Eailway was evidently not merely a financial enterprise of the Deutsche Bank, undertaken for the develop- ment of Asia Minor. Konia, the natural capital of Asiatic Turkey, lying on the Baghdad Eailway, is situated almost exactly midway between Berlin and Karachi. Let us imagine the Turkish Government in Asia replaced by that of a strong and ambitious military Power. Such a Power would develop the country in every w^ay, and would 62 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey double and treble its population. It would open the country in every direction by means of railways. It would construct lines capable of carrying a vast amount of traffic towards the Eussian, Egyptian, and Persian frontiers, and it would continue the latter, ' on economic grounds,' through Persia towards Baluchistan, towards India. It would create a powerful navy and construct strong naval bases on the shores of the Black Sea and near the southern openings of the Eed Sea and of the Persian Gulf. Having done all this, it would be able to throw at the shortest notice an immense army either across the Bosphorus into Constan- tinople, or across the Suez Canal into Egypt, or across Persia into India. A strong European military Power, firmly settled in Asiatic Turkey, disposing of 2,000,000 Turkish-Asiatic soldiers and of a sufficiency of railways and of a fleet, could make Constantinople and Egypt almost untenable. It could gravely threaten Southern Eussia and India and the most important sea-route of the world. At the same time, such a Power, if it should become a danger, could not easily be dislodged or defeated, because the enormous defensive strength of the country would make its resistance most formidable. If we wish clearly to understand the strategic importance of Asiatic Turkey and the dangers with which the world might be threatened from that most commanding point, we need not draw upon the imagination, but may usefully turn towards the history of the past. In the Middle Ages a small but exceedingly warhke Power arose within the borders of Asiatic Turkey. Using as their base of operations that most wonderful position where three continents meet, Mohammedan warrior tribes swept north, south, east, and west. They rapidly overran and conquered Egypt, Tripoli, Tunis, Algeria, Spain, Sicily, and even invaded France and Italy. They conquered all the lands around the Black Sea, and subjected to themselves Arabia, Persia, Afghanistan, and Northern India as far as the Indus and the Syr-Daria, the ancient Jaxartes. They crossed the Straits, seized Great Problems of British Statesmanship 63 Constantinople, the whole Balkan Peninsula, and Hungary, and advanced up to the walls of Vienna. They seized the rule of the sea. The word ' admiral,' from ' amir,' the Arabic word for ' cliief, commander,' the same word as ' ameer ' or ' emir,' reminds us of their former naval pre-eminence. The strategical value of Asiatic Turkey is very greatly increased by the vast rehgio-political importance of the country. Asiatic Turkey contains the holy places of Christianity and of Islam. Mecca and Medina exercise an infinitely greater influence over Mohammedanism than Jerusalem and Bethlehem do over Christianity. Mecca and Medina give an enormous power to the nation which possesses or controls these towns. Asiatic Turkey is not only the rehgious, but also the physical centre of Mohammedanism. From Asiatic Turkey Mohammedanism spread in every direction. Starting thence it conquered all North Africa down to the tenth degree of northern latitude, and expanded eastward as far as Orenburg and Omsk in Eussia, and penetrated through Afghanistan as far as Delhi and Kashmir in India. The followers of Mohammed form a solid block which stretches from the west coast of Morocco and from Sierra Leone across Asia Minor deeply into Eussia and Siberia and into India. Lying in the centre of the Mohammedan world, Asiatic Turkey would be an ideal spot whence to organise and to govern a great Mohammedan Federation or Empire. Mohammedanism may conceivably have a new lease of life. Pan-Islamism need not necessarily remain an idle dream. A strong leader and able organiser, possessed of the necessary prestige, might make it a reahty. Turkey as the guardian of Mecca and Medina, and therefore of Islam, has naturally exercised Httle influence over the Islamic world. The Mohammedans throughout the world have rejected with scorn the Turks as their leaders, be- cause they have incurred the contempt of their brother Mohammedans by their moral and material degeneration. However, it seems not impossible that a strong mihtary 64 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey Power controlling the Holy Places might succeed once more in controlling all Islam, and might thus be able to utihse the serried ranks of 300,000,000 Mohammedans against its enemies. That idea was probably in the German Emperor's mind when, on November 8, 1898, speaking in the ancient town of Damascus and addressing his Mohammedan guests, he emphatically proclaimed : ' May the Sultan of Turkey, and may the three hundred milUon Mohammedans throughout the world who worship him as their Caliph, be assured that the German Emperor will be their friend for all time.' Since then the German Emperor has assumed the role of Protector of Islam. Mahomet was a warrior. Islam is a conqueror's- creed. A strong mihtary Power, controlHng Mecca and Medina, might bring about a revival of conquering Mohammedanism, and might make Pan-Islamism a dangerous reahty. The greatest Mohammedan Powers are the British Empire, Eussia, and France. British India alone haS 70,000,000 Mohammedans, all French North Africa is Mohammedan, and Eussia has no less than 20,000,000 Mohammedan citizens. The religio-pohtical importance of Asia Minor is so very great that its control by a strong mihtary Power might endanger not only France, Eussia, and the British Empire, but the whole world. France, Eussia, and the British Empire desire the maintenance of peace, and are therefore most strongly interested in preventing a revival of a fanatically aggressive Mohammedanism, especially if it be directed by a non-Mohammedan Power for non- Mohammedan ends. The economic importance of Asiatic Turkey is exceed- ingly great. Asiatic Turkey is the oldest and by far the most important nucleus of Western civilisation. All the most glorious seats of ancient power and culture had the misfortune of being conquered by Turkish barbarians. The wonderful empires of Babylonia, Assj^'ria, Egypt, Phoe- nicia, Lydia, Media, Carthage, Persia, Greece, Palestine, and the Arab Empire were seized by the followers of Sultan Great Problems of British Statesmanship 65 Othman and his successors, and wherever the Turks went they created nothing except disorder, ruin, and utter desolation. The country which gave rise to the far-famed towns of Babylon, Nineveh, Seleucia, Ctesiphon, Opis, Artemita, Apollonia, Corsote, Thapsacus, Baghdad, Ilium, Pergamon, Magnesia, Smyrna, Sardes, Susa, Ephesus, Tralles, Miletus, Halicarnassus, Antiochia, Laodicea, Iconium, Tarsus, Berytus, Sidon, Tyre, Damascus, Palmyra, Memphis, Thebes — this country became a wilderness. Poverty-stricken villages, or mere heaps of debris, indicate the sites of nearly all the greatest and most flourishing cities of the Ancient World. How great and how general is the desolation of Asiatic Turkey, which formerly was one of the most densely populated countries of the world, may be seen from the following figures : Square Miles Inhabitants Population per Square Mile Asia Minor . Armenia and Kurdistan Mesopotamia Sjrria .... Turkish Arabia . Total Asiatic Turkey . 199,272 71.990 143,250 114,530 170,300 10,186,900 2,470,900 2,000,000 3,675,100 1,050,000 52 34 14 33 6 699,342 19,382,900 28 The most densely populated vilayet of Asia Minor is that of Trebizond, with 76 people per square mile. It is followed by Ismid with 71, Smyrna with 64, and Brussa with 64 people per square mile. How small the population is even in the most favoured and most advanced vilayets of Asia Minor may be seen by the fact that all Bulgaria has a population of 116-4 per square mile, Serbia 144*0, and Italy 31 3 "5 per square mile. The cultivated part of Egypt had, according to the census of 1907, a population of 915 per square mile, but it should now amount to about 1000 per square mile. 66 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey How wonderfully countries which have been under the withering rule of the Turk may flourish when this rule has been abolished may be seen by the example of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Egypt. In 1882, in the year of England's intervention, the population of Egypt was, according to the census of that year, 6,831,131. At the census of 1907 it came to 11,287,359, and by now it should amount to about 13,000,000. During the brief span of England's occupation the population of Egypt has doubled, and its wealth has grown prodigiously. Between 1879 and 1881, three particularly favom^able years, Egypt's imports amounted on an average to £7,000,000 per year. In 1913 they came to £27,000,000. Trade by itself produces but Httle. The vast wealth of ancient Babylonia, Assyria, Lydia, Media, Persia, Phoenicia, and of the glorious Greek towns on the Western Coast of Asia Minor was founded on the broad and solid basis of agriculture. Asiatic Turkey was in ancient times famous for its agricultural wealth. Numerous existing ruins show that even the uplands in the interior abounded in large and prosperous towns. At present Asia Minor has only 10,000,000 inhabitants. From a statement con- tained in the ' Historia Naturalis ' of PHny, we learn that Pompey subjected in the war against Mitliridates a popula- tion of 12,183,000. If we deduct from that number the pirates against whom he fought, the soldiers of Mithridates, the inhabitants of Crete, and those of Armenia and the Caucasus, together about 3,000,000, and add the inhabitants of Western Asia Minor who, according to Beloch, should then have numbered from 8,000,000 to 9,000,000, the whole of Asia Minor — that is, the territories this side of the Euphrates — should have contained between 17,000,000 and 18,000,000 people two thousand years ago. Asiatic Turkey has large stretches of good soil and an excellent climate. Cereals of every kind, cotton, rice, and tobacco flourish. On the lower slopes of the west figs, ohves, and grapes grow in profusion and in perfection. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 67 and in the higher altitudes flourish the pine, the fir, the cedar, the oak, and the beech. Agriculture, aided by- modern methods of production and transportation, should be able to nourish an enormous population in that favoured land, and should make it once more highly prosperous. Besides, Asiatic Turkey is extremely rich in minerals, including coal, gold, silver, nickel, mercury, copper, iron, and lead, but these resources have so far remained practically untouched. Under a good Government Asia Minor may once more become an exceedingly wealthy and well-peopled country. The possession or the control of Asiatic Turkey will produce both power and wealth. A military State controlHng it would convert its wealth into power. Under its direction Asiatic Turkey would not become a second Egypt but another mihtary State, and its mineral wealth would lead to the establishment of enormous arsenals and armanent factories. On the Turkish coast there are numerous excellent bays and inlets where in olden times flourishing city States carried on an active trade. Under the Turkish Govern- ment these old harbour works, like the old towns, roads, and canals, have been destroyed or have been allowed to fall into ruin. In many places good harbours could be constructed at moderate expense, and the revival of agriculture and the exploitation of the mineral resources of the country would once more create a flourishing coast trade, would recreate the old Greek settlements. Asiatic Turkey is economically very important, not only because it is possible to increase enormously its stunted power of production, but also because, with the building of railways, an enormous passenger and goods traffic may be developed on the direct hne which connects Central Europe with India and China via Asia Minor. The inter- course between East and West is rapidly increasing. The Suez Canal traffic came in 1870 to 436,609 tons net. In 1876 it came to 2,096,771 tons, in 1882 to 5,074,808 tons, in 1901 to 10,832,840 tons, and in 1912 to 20,275,120 tons 68 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey net. The geographical position of Asia Minor on the shortest trade route connecting the East with the West, which enriched Phoenicia, and which made Sidon and Tyre the merchants of the Ancient World and the founders of a far-flung sea-empire, may greatly enrich its inhabitants. The Turks have no gifts either for government or for business. Their administration in all its branches is a byword for corruption, neglect, disorder, and incompetence, and as the Turks display the same quahties, or rather defects, in business, their trade is carried on almost entirely by foreigners, especially by Western Europeans, Greeks, and Armenians. In their vast Asiatic provinces the Turks possess, admittedly, one of the richest countries in the world, a country which imperatively calls for development. Asiatic Turkey is the stronghold of the Turkish race. However, only a part of the inhabitants are Turks. In Western Asia Minor, and especially in the harbour towns, live about 1,500,000 Greeks. Smyrna is a Greek town. In Eastern Asia Minor, near the Eussian frontier, dwell about 2,000,000 Armenians. Chiefly in the south there are about 10,000,000 Arabs. Besides these there are numerous other races — Syrians, Kurds, Circassians, Jews, &c. Wherever the Turks rule, they rule by misrule, by persecution, by extortion, and by massacre. The Greeks in the west, the Armenians in the east, and the Arabs in the south sigh for freedom from Turkish oppression. Hitherto Europe has been horrified chiefly by Turkish misrule in the Balkan Peninsula, the sufferings of which have overshadowed the equally scandalous misrule in Asiatic Turkey. When the Turks have lost Constantinople and have been finally driven out of Europe their singular capacity for misgovernment will find full scope in their Asiatic provinces. They will become a gigantic Macedonia, and the outrageous treatment of the Greeks, Armenians, and Arabs will bring about in Asia Minor the same dis- orders which hitherto prevailed in the Turkish part of the Balkan Peninsula. Here, as in the Balkans, the sufferings Great Problems of British Statesmanship 69 of the subject nationalities will arouse among other, and especially among the related, nations a desire to interfere and to protect the unfortunate peoples against their masters. The facts given in these pages allow us, then, to draw the following conclusions : 1. Asiatic Turkey occupies a position of great defensive strength and of great potential danger to its neighbours, a position which dominates the three old continents. A powerful military State, possessing or controlling the country, would be able to threaten its neighbours in some highly vulnerable quarters. It would be able to convert it into an enormous mihtary camp, and it might mobiUse Islam throughout the world and bring about a gigantic catastrophe. 2. The great latent wealth of Asiatic Turkey, its match- less position for trade and commerce, and the fearful neg- lect from which it suffers are bound to arouse among all progressive nations a keen desire to open up the country by means of railways and harbours, and to exploit its precious agricultural and mineral resources. 3. The presence of subject nationalities — Greeks, Ar- menians, Arabs, &c. — ^in Asia Minor, who are hkely to suffer persecution at the hands of the ruhng Turks, is bound to bring about a desire for intervention on the part of other Powers. In view of the commanding position occupied by Asia Minor and the possibility of some nation or other wishing to make use of that country for aggressive purposes, the European Powers may as little be able to act in harmony in endeavouring to create good order in Asiatic Turkey as they were in European Turkey. Once more philo-Turkish and anti- Turkish Powers may struggle for ascendancy. Consequently the same intrigues and counter-intrigues, dangerous to the peace of the world, of which during four centuries Constantinople was the scene, might take place in Konia or wherever the Turks should place their new seat of Government. Apparently the problem of Asiatic Turkey is insoluble. 70 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey If we look merely at the world-commanding strategical position of Asiatic Tm-key and the danger which its occupa- tion by a strong, enterprising, and ambitious mihtary Power would involve, not merely for its neighbours, but for the whole world, the best solution of the problem would seem to consist in preserving the integrity of Asiatic Turkey under unrestricted Ottoman rule. It is obvious that if one mihtary nation should occupy part of Asiatic Turkey other nations would become alarmed and, fearing that that most valuable strategical position should fall entirely under the control of that mihtary State which had first encroached upon its integrity, the other States interested in Asiatic Turkey would naturally endeavour to secure shares also. A general scramble for Turkish territory would ensue. Asiatic Tur- key would be partitioned. Eussia, France, Italy, Greece, and Great Britain, and perhaps other nations as well, would divide the country among themselves. Its com- manding position would generate mutual suspicion among the sharing nations. A tension similar to that which prevailed among the Balkan States would prevail in Asia Minor. Dangerous friction would ensue which might lead to a world-war for the control of Asia Minor. The pohcy of partition would obviously be most dangerous to the peace of the world. The policy of preserving the integrity of Asiatic Turkey in its entirety and of abstaining from all interference with the Turkish Government would, of course, prevent these evils, but unfortunately that policy is not a practicable one. As Asiatic Turkey is one of the richest, and at the same time one of the most neglected, countries in the world, and as it lies right across one of the most necessary and most valuable of the world's highways — across the direct line which connects Central Europe with India and China — the importance of which is bound to increase from year to year, the citizens of various nations would naturally seek to develop the country by means of railways, pubHc works, &c. History would soon repeat itself. Under the Great Problems of British Statesmanship 71 cloak of economic development, important strategical rail- ways, threatening one or the other of the States bordering on Asiatic Turkey, would be constructed. Thus the eco- nomic exploitation of the strategical centre of the world by private enterprise would in all probabiHty lead to a scramble among the Great Powers for spheres of influence, and to an economic partition of Asia Minor which might be quite as dangerous as a complete territorial partition. If the Powers should desire to make Asiatic Turkey a purely Turco-Asiatic buffer State, a No-man's-land as far as Europe is concerned, stipulating that both its poHtical and economic integrity should be preserved, leaving the Turks entirely to themselves and solemnly binding them- selves to abstain from both poHtical and economic inter- ference in its affairs, the difficulty would by no means be overcome. Turkish misgovernment, Armenian, Greek, or Arab massacres, or some grave political incident, might cause some Power or Powers to interfere. Then inter- national intrigues similar to those which formerly took place about Constantinople would begin, and they would be far more dangerous, because they would concern a position which is not merely the key to the Black Sea, but which is indeed the key to the dominion of the world. Besides, as Asiatic Turkey occupies a most valuable position for effecting a flank attack either upon Eussia in the very vulnerable south, or upon the British Empire in Egypt and Asia, the enemies of Eussia and of Great Britain would obviously endeavour to stir up trouble between the two countries. They would strive to bring about a struggle between Eussia and England for the control of Asiatic Turkey. They would probably try once more to recreate the army of an independent Turkey and to hurl it at Eussia or at Great Britain or simultaneously at both countries. Unfortunately it appears that the pohcy of leaving Asiatic Tm'key alone would be quite as dangerous as that of partitioning it. Therefore a third pohcy ought to be found. 72 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey The strategical position of Asiatic Turkey closely resembles, as has been shown, that of Switzerland. Switzer- land is a small natural fortress which separates, and domi- nates, three important Central European States. Asiatic Turkey is a gigantic natural fortress which separates, and dominates, the three most populous continents. Switzer- land has been neutraHsed, not for the sake of the Swiss, but for the sake of all Em^ope. The fact that Switzer- land was permanently neutraUsed for the security of Europe may be seen from the diplomatic documents signed by the Allied Powers a century ago. A Declaration made at the Congress at Vienna on March 20, 1815, wliich will be found in Kliiber's * Acten des Wiener Congresses,' stated : - Les puissances appelees, en execution du 6^ art. du traite de Paris du 30 mai 1814, a regler les affaires de la Suisse, ayant reconnu que I'interet general demande que le corps helvetique jouisse des avantages d'une neutraUte permanente . . . declarent, qu'aussitot que la diete helve- tique aura accede, en bonne et due forme, aux articles con- tenus dans la presente convention, il sera expedie, au nom de toutes les puissances, un acte solennel, pour reconnaitre et garantir la neutraUte 'permanente de la Suisse dans ses nouvelles frontieres. It will be observed that Switzerland was to be made permanently neutral for the ' interet general.' The ' acte solennel ' above mentioned was signed in Paris on Novem- ber 20, 1815, and it stated : . . . Les puissances qui ont signe la declaration de Vienne du 20 mars, reconnaissent, d'une maniere formelle et authen- tique, par le present acte la neutraUte 'perpetuelle de la Suisse, et lui garantissent Vinviolahilite de son territoire, circonscrit dans ses nouvelles hmites, telles qu'elles sont fixees par le congres de Vienne et la paix de Paris d'aujourd'hui. . . . Les puissances signataires de la declaration du 20 mars font connaitre, d'une maniere authentique, par le present acte, que la neutraUte et I'inviolabihte de la Suisse, ainsi Great Prohleyns of British Statesmanship 73 que son independance de toute influence etrangere, est conforme aux veritables interets de la politique europeenne. It will be noticed that the ' acte solennel ' emphasised the previous declaration by stating that the permanent neutrality of Switzerland was * conforme aux veritables interets de la politique europeenne.' It is noteworthy that Eussia has been one of the most convinced and one of the most determined champions of Swiss neutrality. In the instructions which, on January 14, 1827, Count Nesselrode, perhaps the greatest Eussian diplomat of modern times, sent on behalf of the Cabinet to M. de Severine, the Eussian Minister to the Swiss Con- federation,^ we read : Par sa position geographique la Suisse est la clef de trois. grands pays. Par ses lumieres et ses mceurs, elle occupe un rang distingue dans la civiHsation Europeenne. Enfin par les actes des Congres de Vienne et de Paris, elle a obtenu la garantie de son organisation presente, de sa neutraUte, et de son independance. . . . Des que la diplomatie, participant aux ameliorations de tout gem-e qui s'operaient en Europe, eut pour but dans ses combinaisons les plus profondes et les plus utiles, d'etabhr entre les diverses puissances un equihbre qui assurat la duree de la paix, I'independance de la Suisse devint un des premiers axiomes de la Politique. Les Traites de West- phalie la consacrerent, et il est facile de prouver, I'histoire a la main, qu'elle ne fut jamais violee sans que I'Europe n'eut a gemir de guerres et de calamites universelles. Lors de la revolution fran9aise, la Suisse eprouva forte- ment la secousse qui vint ebranler les deux mondes. Son territoire fut envahi, des armees le franchirent, et des batailles ensanglanterent un sol que les discordes des etats avait longtemps respecte. Lors de la domination de Buonaparte, la Suisse eut sa part du despotisme qui pressait sur le continent. Pinale- ment apparut I'Alhance avec ses nobles triomphes, et la ^ The full test may be found in A. 0. Grenville Murray's Droits el Devoirs des Snvoyes Diplomatiques. 74 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey Suisse, qui avait ete bouleversee pendant la tourmente revolutionnaire, et asservie pendant le regime des conquetes, redevint independante et neutre du jour ou les droits des Nations recouvrerent leur empire, et ou la paix fut le vcEu du Monarque dont le changement etait le salutaire ouvrage. Ce fut alors que la Confederation Helvetique occupa la pensee de I'Empereur Alexandre de glorieuse memoire, et alors aussi que son independance re9ut par les actes de 1814 et 1815 une sanction solennelle, qui completa et assura le retablissement solide de la tranquillite generale. La Suisse est par consequent, on pent le dire, un des points sur lesquels repose I'equilibre de I'Europe, le mode d'existence politique dont elle jouit forme un des -elemens du systfeme conservateur qui a succede a trente annees d'orages, et la Eussie doit souhaiter que cet etat continue a ne relever et a ne dependre d'aucun autre. Elle y est interessee comme puissance, que ses principes et le sentiment de son propre bien portent a vouloir la paix. Elle en a le droit, comme puissance qui a signe les actes de 1814 et 1815. The irrefutable arguments advanced with such force, clearness, and eloquence by Count Nessehode with regard to Switzerland apply obviously still more strongly to the closely similar, but far more important, case of Asiatic Turkey. A State which has been permanently neutralised by international agreement can preserve its neutrality only if it is sufficiently strong and well governed. If it is weak its neutraHty may be disregarded, as was that of Belgium. If it is badly governed and suffers from internal disorders it cannot be strong, and foreign nations will find reasons for interfering in its domestic affairs. When, in the course of the last century, Switzerland was torn by internal dis- sensions, the great guarantors of its permanent neutrahty and independence became alarmed. They were anxious to intervene, and as they took different sides their inter- vention nearly led to a great war. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 75 If the arguments given so far should, on examination, be found to be unchallengeable, it would appear that the problem of Asiatic Turkey can be solved only by making that country another Switzerland — a strong, independent and well-governed neutral buffer State. Can Turkey be regenerated and converted into another Switzerland ? At first sight the task seems hopeless. The experience of centuries certainly supports those who doubt it. The Turkish Government, both under the rule of the Sultans and under a nominally constitutional regime, has proved a continuous cause of oppression and revolt, of dissatisfaction and misery, of conspiracy and rebelhon. In fact, the Turkish Government, in whatever hands, is, and always has been, a public nuisance, a scandal and a public danger, a danger not only to Europe, but to the Turks themselves. The experience of centuries has shown that the Turks cannot govern other peoples, that they cannot even govern themselves. This being the case, it follows that Turkey requires, for its own security and for that of the world, guardians, or a guardian, appointed by Europe. Only then can we hope for peace and order, happiness and prosperity, in that unfortunate land. The problem of appointing European guardians, or a guardian, for Asiatic Turkey is complicated by the fact that various European Powers possess strong separate interests in that country. Before considering the way in which good government might be introduced in a neutralised Asiatic Turkey we must therefore consider the special interests of various nations which, of course, have to be safeguarded. Eussia has a twofold interest in that country — a senti- mental and a practical one. In the Caucasian Provinces of Eussia, close to the Turkish border, dwell about 2,000,000 Armenians. Their brothers in Turkey have suffered from outrageous persecution. The fearful massacres among them from 1894 to 1897 are still in everybody's memory. Not unnaturally, the Eussian Armenians and the Eussian 76 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey people themselves desire that the Armenians in Asiatic Turkey should be humanely treated. With this object in view the Eussian Press has demanded that Turkish Armenia should be ceded to Eussia. As I have shown in the chapter on ' The Future of Con- stantinople ' in considering the strategical question, the possession of Constantinople would be for Eussia perhaps not so much an asset as a liabihty. Constantinople and the Straits cover a very large area. Its defence requires a very considerable miHtary force and will by so much weaken the strength of the Eussian Army. Furthermore, its defence entails considerable difficulty because Eussia can reach Constantinople only by sea. As Eoumania and Bulgaria separate Eussia from Constantinople on the European side of the Black Sea, Eussia can secure an organic connection with that town only from the Asiatic side, by acquiring the whole of the Turkish south coast of the Black Sea. It would not be unnatural, and indeed quite understandable, if Eussian patriots should wish, or at least hope, that Eussia should not only acquire Constan- tinople and Turkish Armenia, but that she should in addition obtain easy access to that city by a secure overland route. A narrow strip of coast would, of course, suffice for con- structing a railway from Southern Eussia to the Bosphorus. However, as that route would be Hable to be cut by the Turks at many points in case of war, an attempt to link the Bosphorus to Southern Eussia would probably involve Eussia against her will in an attempt to occupy a large part, or the whole, of Asia Minor, for thus only could the safety of the Black Sea coast railway be assured. That would be a very large and a very venturesome undertaking which might have incalculable consequences to Eussia and to the world, for Eussia would create, on a very much larger scale, a position similar to that which would arise if Germany should seize Switzerland. Greece has, on the ground of nationaHty, a claim on Smyrna, the busiest harbour of Asia Minor, which is Ch'eat Problems of British Statesmanship vv practically a Greek town, and on certain coastal districts, especially about Sm5rrna, wliich are largely inhabited by Greeks. Naturally she would hke, with the strip of coastal territory which is primarily Greek, a proportionate sphere of the hinterland. Italy retains the Island of Ehodes, which, by the way, is very largely peopled by Greeks, and she is supposed to be desirous of obtaining a piece of the mainland from the neighbourhood of that island to Syria to the French sphere. The sphere claimed on her behalf is rather extensive. It contains the excellent harbour of AdaUa, in the neighbour- hood of which she has secured concessions, and includes territories of considerable agricultural and mineral poten- tialities where large numbers of Italian emigrants may be able to find a home. Great Britain has important claims upon Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf, and upon Arabia, as will be shown later on. France has strong historic and economic claims upon Asiatic Turkey, especially upon Syria with the Holy Places of Christianity, and upon CiHcia, which adjoins it. Her historic claims are so very interesting and important that it is worth while to consider them somewhat closely. From the earhest ages France has followed a twofold poUcy towards Islam. She has been the most determined defender of Christendom against conquering Moham- medanism when the latter was a danger to the world. At the same time, considering a strong Turkey a necessary factor in Europe, she has for centuries endeavoured to support that country. France concluded her first alhance with Turkey in 1535 and remained Turkey's ally up to the Peace of Versailles. Since then her place as Turkey's champion has been taken by Germany. On October 18, 732, Charles Martel signally defeated the all-conquering Arabs near Tours and thus saved Europe to Christianity. In the year 800, Charlemagne sent an Embassy to the great Arab ruler, Haroun-al-Kashid, the 78 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey Caliph of Baghdad, the hero of the ' Arabian Nights Tales,' and received from him the keys of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem. Henceforward France became the guardian of the Holy Tomb, and the protectress of Christianity against Islam. In the Crusades, which were undertaken to rescue the Holy Sepulchre from the infidels, France played a leading part. Godefroy de Bouillon defeated SoHman, besieged and took the Holy City in 1099 and was elected King of Jerusalem. Owing to the prominent position occupied by the French as leaders of all Chiistianity, European Christians in general became known in the East as Franks and are stiU so called by the people. A Frankish Kingdom existed at Jerusalem till 1291. The power of Islam grew and King Louis the Ninth, St. Louis, one of the greatest Kings of France, spent many years of his life in the East, vainly trying to wrest the Holy Land from the Moslems. His attitude, and that of ancient France, towards the Eastern Christians may be seen from the following most interesting letter which he sent on May 21, 1250, from Saint-Jean-d'Acre to ' Femir des Maronites du mont Liban, ainsi qu'au patriarche et aux eveques de cette nation ' : Notre coeur s'est rempli de joie lorsque nous avons vu votre fils Simon, h la tete de vingt-cinq mille hommes, venir nous trouver de votre part pour nous apporter I'expression de vos sentiments et nous offiir de dons, outre les beaux chevaux que vous nous avez envoy es. En verite la sincere amitie que nous avons commence a ressentir avec tant d'ardeur pour les Maronites pendant notre sejour en Chypre ou ils sont etablis, s'est encore augmentee. Nous Bommes persuades que cette nation, que nous trouvons etabhe sous le nom de Saint Maroun, est une partie de la nation fran^aise, car son amitie pour les Frangais ressemble a I'amitie que les Frangais se portent entre eux. En consequence il est juste que vous et tous les Maronites jouissiez de la protection dont les Frangais jouissent pres de nous, et que vous soyez admis dans les emplois comme ils le sont euxmemes. . . . Quant a nous et a ceux qui nous succederont sur le trone de France nous promettons de vous Great Problems of British Statesmanship 79 donner, a vous et a votre peuple, protection comme aux Fran9ais eux-memes et de faire constamment ce qui sera necessaire pour votre bonheur. Donne pres de Saint-Jean-d'Acre, etc. Charles the Fifth, the great Habsburg Prince, who ruled over Germany, the Netherlands, the Franche Comte, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and their colonies, threatened to bring all Europe under Austria's sway. King Francis the First of France courageously opposed him and concluded in 1535 an alliance with Soliman the Magnificent, perhaps the greatest ruler of Turkey, who, in 1526, at the Battle of Mohacs, had destroyed the Hungarian armies, and who in 1529 had besieged Vierma. France discovered in Turkey a valuable counterpoise, first to the house of Austria and later on to Eussia. In 1535, the same year in which she concluded the alMance with Turkey, France, who had great commercial interests in the East and who was then the leading Mediterranean Power, concluded a commercial and general treaty with Turkey, the So-called Capitulations, which were fi'equently renewed. These Treaties gave to France a preferential position within the Turkish dominions and made her the protectress of the Christians of aU nation- alities. Ever after it became a fundamental principle of French statesmanship to maintain an alliance with Turkey and with Switzerland, because both countries occupied very important strategical positions whence the central and eastern European Powers might be held in check. The celebrated Brantome, who hved from 1527 till 1614, wi'ote in his ' Vie des Grands Capitains Francois ' : J'ouys dire une fois a M. le Connetable [the highest dignitary of France] : que les roys de France avoient deux alliances et affinitez desquelles ne s'en devoient jamais distraire et despartir pour chose du monde ; I'une celle des Suysses, et I'autre celle du grand Turc. France had allied herself to the Turks for a threefold reason : For protecting the Christians in the East ; for 80 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey protecting and extending the French trade in the Levant ; for creating a counterpoise to the ever-expanding and dangerously strong power of the House of Habsburg. In an exceedingly important Memoir which M. de Noailles, the French Ambassador to Turkey, submitted to King Charles the Ninth in 1572, the full text of which will be found in Testa's ' Eecueil des Trait es de la Porte Ottomane,' we read : Sire, les rois, vos predecesseurs, ont recherche et entre- tenu I'intelHgence de Levant pour trois principals causes, la premiere et la plus ancienne etait fondee sur leur pitie et religion, laquelle tendait a deux fins, savoir : a la conserva- tion de Jesus-Christ en Jerusalem, avec la surety du passage tant par terre que par mer des pelerins qui sont conduits par voeux et devotion a le visiter, et a la protection duquel ils ont toujours uniquement recouru aux dits rois pour empecher que les amies des infideles ne molestassent les terres de I'Eglise, qui sont exposees aux surprises et passages de leurs armees de mer, etant bien certain que, sans la continuelle et devote assistance que vos predecesseurs ont fait a I'un et a I'autre, il y a longtemps que ledit Saint -Sepulcre fut rase, le temple de sainte Helene converti en mosquee et toute la rehgion romaine detruite et desolee par les invasions circasses et turquesses. Le second a ete pour etablir et conserver le trafi&c que vos sujets, et singulierement ceux de Provence et Languedoc, ont de tout temps par de 9a, lequel s'est tellement augmente sous le regne du feu roi Henri et le votre. . . . La troisieme cause pour laquelle cette intelhgence a ete entretenu par vos predecesseurs, et depuis quarante six ans etreinte par les feus rois Fran^ois-le-Grand et Henri, a ete pour contrepeser I'excessive grandeur de la maison d'Autriche qui avait accumule sous la domination sienne, ou des siens, par succession ou usurpation, les meilleures couronnes et etats de I'Europe hors la France, laquelle depuis ce temps-la a toujours ete seule au combat, tant pour essayer de ravoir le sien que pour aller au-devant do I'ambition de Charles- Quint et de PhiKppe, son fils, qui ont toute leur vie trouble le mond et singuherement I'Alle- Great Problems of British Statesmanship 81 magne, la France et I'ltalie, pour parvenir a la tyrannie de toute la chretiente. The Capitulations of 1535 were repeatedly amplified, especially in 1604 and 1740. The Treaty of 1604, concluded in the time of the great King Henri Quatre, is so quaint and interesting a document and it throws so strong a hght upon the character of Ancient Turkey and upon the unique position which France occupied in Europe and the East three centuries ago, that it is worth while giving some extracts from it according to the text in St. Priest's ' Memoires sur I'Ambassade de France en Turquie ' : Au nom de Dieu. L'Empereur Amat [Ahmad I], fil de I'Empereur Mehemet, toujours victorieux, Marque de la haute famille des Monarques Otthomans, avec la beaute, grandeur et splendour de laquelle tant de pays sont conquis et gouvernez. Moy, qui suis, par les infinies graces du Juste, Grand et tout-puissant Createur et par I'abondance des miracles du chef de ses prophetes, Empereur des victorieux Empereurs, distributeur des couronnes aux plus grands Princes de la terre, serviteur des deux tres-sacrees villes, la Mecque et Medine, Protecteur et Gouverneur de la Saincte Hierusalem, Seigneur de la plus grande partie de I'Europe, Asie et Afrique, conquise avec nostre victorieuse espee, et espouvantable lance, a s^avoir des pais et royaumes de la Grece, de Themis- war, de Bosnie de Seghevar, et des pais et Eoyaumes de I'Asie et de la NatoUe, de Caramanie, d'Egypte, et de tous les pais des Parthes, des Curdes, Georgiens, de la Porte de fer, de Tiflis, du Seruan, et du pais du Prince des Tartares, nomme Qerim [Crimea], et de la campagne nommee Cipulac, de Cypre, de Diarbekr, d'Alep, d'Erzerum, de Damas, de Baby- lone demeure des Princes des croyants, de Basera, d'Egypte, de I'Arabie heureuse, d'Abas, d'Aden, de Thunis, la Goulette, Tripoly, de Barbarie, et de tant d'autres pais, isles, destroits, passages, peuples, families, generations, et de tant de cent milHons de victorieux gens de guerre qui reposent sous I'obeissance et justice de Moy qui suis I'Empereur Amurat, 82 The Prohleyn of Asiatic Turkey fils de I'Empereur Selim, fils de I'Empereur Solyman, fils de I'Empereur Selim, Et ce, par la grace de Dieu, Eecours des grands Princes du monde, Eefuge des honorables Empereurs. Au plus glorieux, magnanime, et grand Seigneur de la croyance de Jesus-Christ, esleu [elu] entre les Princes de la nation du Messie, Mediateur des differents qui survien- nent entre le peuple Chrestien, Seigneur de Grandeur, Majeste et Kichesse, glorieuse Guide des plus grands, Henry IV, Empereur de France, que la fin de ses jours soit heureuse. . . . Que les Venitiens et Anglais en la leur, les Espagnols, Portugais, Catalans, Eagousins, Genevois, Napolitains, Florentins, et generalement toutes autres nations,, telles qu'elles soient, puissent librement venir trafiquer par nos pays sous I'adveu et seurete de la banniere de France, laquelle ils porteront comme leur sauvegarde ; et, de cette fagon, ils pourront aller et venir trafiquer par les lieux de nostre Empire, comme ils y sont venus d'anciennete, obeyssans aux Consuls Francois, qui demeurent et resident en nos havres et estapes ; voulons et entendons qu'en usant ainsi, ils puissent trafiquer avec leurs vaisseaux et gallons sans estre inquietez seulement tant que ledit Empereur de France conservera nostre amitie, et ne contreviendra a celle qu'il nous a promise. Voulons et commandons aussi que les subjects dudit Empereur de France et ceux des Princes ses amis alliez, puissent visiter les saincts lieux de Hierusalem sans qu'il leur soit mis ou donne aucun empeschement, ny faict tort. De plus, pour I'honneur et amitie d'iceluy Empereur, nous voulons que les EeHgieux qui demeurent en Hierusalem et servent I'Eglise de Comame [Saint Sepulcre] y puissent demeurer, aller et venir sans aucun trouble et empechement, ainsi soient bien receus, protegez, aydez, et secourus en la consideration susdite. Derechef, nous voulons et commandons que les Venitiens et Anglois en cela, et toutes les autres nations alienees de I'amitie de nostre grande Porte, lesquelles n'y tiennent Ambassadeur, voulans trafiquer par nos pays, ayent a y Great Problems of British States n- an ship 83 venir sous la banniere et protection de France, sans que TAmbassadeur d'Angleterre, ou autres ayent h les empescher sous couleur que cette capitulation a este inseree dans les capitulations donnees de nos peres apres avoir este escrites. . . . Et pour autant qu'iceluy Empereur de France, est de tous les Eoys le plus noble et de la plus haute famille, et le plus parfait amy que nos Ayeuls ayent acquis entre lesdits Eoys et Princes de la creance de Jesus-Christ, comme il nous a temoigne par les effets de sa saincte amitie : sous ces considerations, nous voulons et commandons que ses Ambassadeurs qui resident a nostre heureuse Porte ayent la preseance sur I'Ambassadeur d'Espagne et sur ceux des Eoys et Princes, soit en nostre Divan public ou autres lieux ou ils se pourront rencontrer, . . . Que les Consuls Francois jouissent de ces mesmes privi- leges ou ils resideront, et qu'il leur soit donne la mesme preseance sur tous les autres consuls de quelque nation qu'ils soient. ... '' Nous promettons et jurons par la verite du grand Tout- puissant Dieu, Createur du ciel et de la terre, et par I'ame de mes Ayeuls et Bisayeuls, de ne contrarier, ni contre venir a ce qui est porte par ce Traitte de paix et Capitulation, tant que I'Empereur de France sera constant et ferme en la considera- tion de nostre amitie, acceptant des a present la sienne, avec volonte d'en faire cas et de la cherir, car ainsi est nostre intention et promesse imperiale. Escript environ le 20 may 1604. It will be noticed that by the Treaty of 1604 the * Empereur de France ' was made the Protector of all the Christians in the East, that France was made the guardian of the holy places of Christianity, that the other great Christian nations, the Venetians, the Enghsh, the Spaniards, the Portuguese, the Catalans, the citizens of Eagusa, the Genoese, the Neapolitans, and the Florentines were allowed to travel and trade freely and securely in Turkey — ^under the French flag and protected by the Consuls of France. At that time France was indeed ' la grande nation,' and 84 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey enjoyed the greatest prestige in the East. According to Birch's * Memoirs of Queen Elizabeth,' ' the Turks be- heved for a long time that England was a Province of Prance.' When, at the time of the French Eevolution, nearly all Europe made war upon France, France tried once more to use Turkey against her enemies. In 1792 Citoyen Semonville, the French Ambassador to Turkey, was given instructions by the Convention Nationale to secure Tm-key's support and 8,000,000 livres were placed at his disposal, of which sum 2,000,000 were to be ' exclusively used for bribing the entourage of the Grand Vizier.' We read in that curious document : Le nouveau ministre national doit chercher surtout a rompre la coaHtion formee contre la France par Autriche, la Prusse et la Eussie, et le meilleur moyen d'obtenir ce resultat sera de tacher de diviser ces puissances. II est vrai qu'on ne saurait compter sur une assistance directe a ce sujet, de la part de la Turquie, mais la Subhme-Porte pour- rait etre tres utile en se melant seulement, par exemple, des affaires de Pologne, et en tachant de mettre en discorde les dites puissances dans ce pays-la. Pour atteindre plus facilement ce but, Semonville pourra disposer de 8,000,000 de livres, dont deux millions doivent etre exclusivement employes k corrompre les entours du grand vezir et du reis-ef¥endi, et h entretenir de bons espions aupr^s de I'inter- nonce d'Autriche et des representant^ prussien et russe ; car il est trfes important de s'assurer comment chacun de ces ministres represente, k sa cour, les affaires polonaises. In 1795 Napoleon Buonaparte, then a young general only twenty-six years old, had fallen into disfavour and disgrace with the Government. He had been dismissed from the army. He hved in penury and obscurity, and was unemployed and practically destitute. In his despair, on August 30 of that year, he very humbly offered to the Comite de Salut Public his services as an artillery officer Great Problems of British Statesmanship 85 for service in Turkey in a little-known letter which was worded as follows : Dans un temps ou Timperatrice de Eussie a resserre les liens qui I'unissent a I'Autriche, il est de I'interet de la France de faire tout ce qui depend d'elle pour rendre plus redoutables les moyens militaires de la Turquie. Cette puissance a des mihces nombreuses et braves, mais fort ignorantes sur les principes de I'art de guerre. La formation et le service de I'artillerie, qui influe si puissamment dans notre tactique moderne sur le gain des batailles, et presque exclusivement sur la prise et la defense des places fortes, est encore dans son enfance en Turquie. La Porte, qui I'a senti, a plusieurs fois demande des officiers d'artillerie et du genie ; nous y en avons effective- ment quelques-uns dans ce moment-ci, mais ils ne sont ni assez nombreux ni assez instruits pour produire un resultat de quelque consequence. Le general Buonaparte, qui a acquis quelque reputation en commandant I'artillerie de nos armees en differents cir- constances, et specialement au siege de Toulon, s'offre pour passer en Turquie avec une mission du gouvernement ; il menera avec lui six ou sept officiers dont chacun aura une connaisance particuliere des sciences relatives a I'art de la guerre. S'il peut dans cette nouvelle carriere, rendre les armees turques plus redoutables et perfectionner la defense des places fortes de cet empire, il croira avoir rendu un service signale a la patrie, et avoir, a son retour, bien merite d'elle. Had the Co mite de Salut Public accepted Napoleon's offer, he might have lived and died unknown to history. The world might have been spared some of the greatest wars. Although the first French EepubHc was atheistic and anti-Christian, it carefully continued the traditional pohcy of France in the East in its threefold aspect. It strove to maintain France's supremacy in the East, desiring to use Turkey as a counterpoise to France's enemies, to dominate the Near Eastern markets and to maintain its ancient 86 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey protectorate over the Christians in the East. That may be seen from the instructions given to the French Ambassadors. In those sent by the First Consul Buonaparte to Ambassador Brune on October 18, 1802, we read, for instance : 1°. L'intention du gouvernement est que I'ambassadeur a Constantinople reprenne, par tous les moyens, la supre- matie que la France avait depuis deux cents ans dans cette capitale. La maison qui est occupee par I'ambassadeur est la plus belle. II doit tenir constamment un rang audessus des ambassadeurs des autres nations, et ne marcher qu'avec un grand eclat. II doit reprendre sous sa protection tous les hospices et tous les Chretiens de Syrie et d'Armenie, et special- ment toutes les caravanes qui visitent les Lieux-Saints, 2°. Notre commerce doit etre protege sous tous les points de vue. Dans I'etat de faiblesse ou se trouve I'emphe otto- man, nous ne pouvons pas esperer qu'il fasse une diversion en notre faveur centre I'Autriche, il ne nous interesse done plus sous le rapport du commerce. Le gouvernement ne veut souffrir aucune avarie de pachas, et la moindre insulte a nos commerQants doit donner heu a des exphcations fort vives, et conduire notre ambassadeur a obtenir une satisfac- tion eclatante. On doit accoutumer les pachas et beys des differentes provinces a ne regarder desormais notre pavilion qu'avec respect et consideration. 3°. Dans toutes les circonstances, on ne doit pas manquer de dire et de faire sentir que si la Eussie et I'Autriche ont quelque interet de locahte a se partager les etats du Grand- Seigneur, I'interet de la France est de maintenir une balance entre ces deux grandes puissances. On doit montrer des egards a I'ambassadeur de Eussie, mais se servir souvent de I'Ambassadeur de Prusse qui est plus sincerement dans nos inter ets. 4°. S'il survient des evenements dans les environs de Constantinople, offrir sa mediation a la Porte, et, en general, saisir toutes les occasions de fixer les yeux de I'empire sur I'ambassadeur de France. C'est d'apres ce principe que le jour de la fete du prophete il n'y a point d'inconvenient a illuminer le palais de France selon I'usage orientale, apres toutefois s'en etre expHque avec la Porte. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 87 En fixant les yeux du peuple sur I'ambassadeur de France avoir soin de ne jamais chequer ses moeurs et ses usages, mais faire voir que nous nous estimons les uns les autres. . . . It will be noticed that the French Eepublic and Napoleon the First followed in every particular the same poHcy in Turkey which in more recent times was pursued by Prince Bismarck and William the Second. In the Middle Ages and in the time of the first Capitula- tions, France could easily act as the protectress of Christianity, for she was the strongest Power in Europe and in the Mediterranean and nearly all important States were Eoman Catholic. Times have changed. The other nations no longer trade in the East under the French flag, or appeal to the French Consuls when they are in need of protection. Besides, with the rise of powerful Protestant and Greek Orthodox States and of influential Armenian, Coptic and Abyssinian Christian Churches, France can no longer act as the protectress of the Holy Sepulchre on behalf of all Christendom. She acted in that capacity for the last time during the reign of Napoleon the Third. It is not generally known that the Crimean War was not merely a war for the control of Constantinople, but was in the first place a struggle for the key to the Church in Bethlehem. Small causes often have great consequences. As the question of the Holy Places bears directly upon France's claim to Syria, it is worth while looking into the genesis of the Crimean War. Beforehand, we must take note of the pecuHar position which the various States and religions occupy at the Holy Sites. A map of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem and of the buildings attached to it is as comphcated as a map of the Holy Eoman Empire. Certain parts of the Church building belong to the Latin and Greek Christians in common, while others belong exclusively to Latin Christians, Greek Christians, Abyssinian Christians, Armenian Christians, Copts, Syrians, Eussians, Prussians. Every carpet, picture, lamp, vase 88 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey has its owner. Of the fifteen lamps "m the Angels' Chapel in Jerusalem, for instance, five belong to the Greek Church, five to the Latin Church, four to the Armenian, and one to the Coptic Church. The greatest jealousy prevails among the different Churches and nationahties. The displacement of a Greek lamp or vase by a Latin one might create a riot. Property of various Churches has been displaced, stolen or burned by other Churches and sanguinary fights have often occmred within the Holy precincts. Men of the same rehgion, but belonging to different Churches, are unfortunately frequently animated by a bhnd and passionate zeal, and rehgious ceremonies performed in their presence in an unorthodox manner appear to them not merely a sacrilege but a deadly insult which calls for blood. To avoid a colhsion, the Turks have devised the most minute regulations. Still they have not been able to prevent the Churches encroaching upon the rights of their rivals. During the Napoleonic period, France had taken comparatively httle interest in the Holy Land and the Greek Church had encroached upon the position of the Latins. That encroachment was the direct cause of the Crimean War. In 1854, when the war began, the British Government pubhshed a Blue Book of 1029 pages, con- taining nearly 1200 largely abbreviated documents. If their full text had been given the volume would probably have exceeded 2000 pages. That pubhcation furnished an account of the causes of the war and was significantly entitled ' Correspondence respecting the Eights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey.' In that correspondence various Church properties, and especially the key to the Church at Bethlehem, played a very great part. As early as May 20, 1850, Sir Stratford Canning informed Lord Palmerston : My Lord, — A question likely to be attended with much discussion and excitement is on the point of being raised Great Problems of British Statesmanship 89 between the conflicting interests of the Latin and Greek Churches in this country. The immediate point of diffe- rence is the right of possession to certain portions of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem. General Aupick [the French Ambassador] has assured me that the matter in dispute is a mere question of property and of express treaty stipulation. But it is difficult to separate any such question from political considerations, and a struggle of general influence, especially if Eussia, as may be expected, should interfere in behalf of the Greek Church, will probably grow out of the impending discussion. Soon the question of the key to the Bethlehem Church came to the fi'ont and monopolised the attention of all Em'opean capitals and Cabinets. On February 9, 1852, AaH Pasha wrote to M. de Lavalette : La Grotte qui est la Sainte Creche est aujourd'hui un heu visite par les diverses nations Chretiennes, et il est etabh depuis un tres ancient temps qu'une clef de la porte du cote du nord de la grande eglise a Bethleem, une clef de la porte du cote du midi de cette eghse, et une clef de la porte de la grotte susmentionnee, doivent se trouver entre les mains des pretres Latins aussi. En cas done que ces clefs ne se trouvent point en la possession des Latins, il faut qu'on leur^donne une clef de chacune de ces trois portes, pour qu'ils les aient comme par le passe. The Sultan, as the sovereign and ground landlord, was called upon to decide between the quarrelUng Churches, and he endeavoured to arrange matters by a Firman which was to be publicly read. His attempt proved a failure. Consul Finn reported to the Earl of Malmesbury on October 27, 1852, from Jerusalem : Afif Bey invited all the parties concerned to meet him in the Church of the Virgin near Gethsemane. There he read an Order of the Sultan for permitting the Latins to celebrate Mass once a year, but requiring the altar and its ornaments to remain undisturbed. No sooner were these words uttered than the Latins, who had come to receive 90 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey their triumph over the Orientals, broke out into loud ex- clamations of the impossibiUty of celebrating Mass upon a schismatic slab of marble, with a covering of silk and gold instead of plain linen, among schismatic vases, and before a crucifix which has the feet separated instead of nailed one over the other. The French Government backed up the Latin, and the Eussian Government the Greek, Church. The religious differences soon assumed a poHtical aspect. Eussia began to threaten the Sultan with her army, and France with her fleet. Colonel Eose reported on November 20, 1852, to the Earl of Malmesbury : The Porte's position is most disadvantageous. Against all her wishes and interests she has been dragged into a most dangerous and difficult dispute between the Great Powers, who found their respective claims on contradictory docu- ments, which date from remote and dark ages. The Porte, a Mohammedan Power, is called on to decide a quarrel which involves, ostensibly, sectarian Christian religious feelings, but which, in reality, is a vital struggle between France and Eussia for political influence, at the Porte's cost in her dominions. Continuing, he reported that the Sultan had been threatened by France with a blockade of the Dardanelles, while the Eussian representative had declared that he would leave Constantinople unless his demands were ful- filled. A few weeks later Colonel Eose informed the Earl of Malmesbury : The complaints of the Eussian Legation here against the Porte in the Jerusalem question are two, an ostensible one and an undefined one. The first is that the Firman to the Greeks has not been read in Jerusalem in full Council, and in the presence of the patriarchs and clergy of all the diffe- rent sects. The second one is as to dehvery of the key of the great door of the Church at Bethlehem to the Latins. The quarrel about the Holy Places, and especially Great Problems of British Statesmanship 91 about the celebrated key, became more and more acrimonious. On January 28, 1853, Lord John Eussell wrote regretfully from the Foreign 0£Qce to Lord Cowley : To a Government taking an impartial view of these affairs, an attitude so threatening on both sides appears very lamentable. We should deeply regret any dispute that might lead to a conflict between two of the Great Powers of Europe ; but when we reflect that the quarrel is for exclusive privileges in a spot near which the Heavenly Host proclaimed peace on earth and goodwill towards men — when we see rival Churches contending for mastery in the very place where Christ died for mankind — ^the thought of such a spectacle is melancholy indeed. The Latins, backed by France, possessed keys to the two side-doors of the Church at Bethleham, but not the key of the main entrance, wliich was in the hands of the Greek Church. FaiHng to receive the key, the French Consul resolved to use force and had the main entrance broken open by locksmiths. His action led to the following protest on the part of Eussia : Nous laisserons le Ministere Franfais juge de la penible surprise que nous avons eprouvee en apprenant qu'a son retour a Constantinople, apres un court sejour en France, M. de Lavalette avait souleve de nouveau la question, en exigeant de la Porte, en termes peremptoires, et sous menace d'une rupture avec la France, la suppression du dernier Firman ; I'envoi a Jerusalem d'un Commissaire Turc, avec de nouvelles instructions ; la remise au clerge Latin de la clef et de la garde de la grande Eghse a Bethleem ; le placement sur I'autel de la Grotte de la Nativite d'une etoile aux armes de la France, qui s'y trouvait, dit-on, jadis, et qui en avait ete enlevee ; I'adjonction au Convent Latin de Jerusalem d'une batisse attenante a la coupole du Saint Sepulcre ; d'autres concessions enfin, qui de loin peuvent paraitre des minuties, mais qui, sur les lieux, et aux yeux des populations indigenes, y compris meme les Musulmans, sont autant de passe-droits et d'empietements sur les autres communautes 92 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey Chretiennes, autant de motifs de dissensions et de haine entre elle et I'Eglise Eomaine, dont on pretend soutenir par ces moyens les interets. II nous repugne de faire mention ici des scenes scandal- euses qui ont deja eu lieu a Jerusalem par suite de ces mesures, auxquelles la Porte a eu la faiblesse de preter la main, et qui ont deja re^u en partie leur execution contrairement a la teneur du dernier Firman, dont, par une autre contradic- tion etrange, on donnait lecture aux autorites locales au moment meme ou Ton chargeait celles-ci d'en violer les dispositions principales. D'apres les derniers rapports que nous avons de la Syrie et de Constantinople, les choses en etaient venues a Jerusalem a ce point de confusion et de desordre que, tandis qu'un prelat Catholique, assists du Consul de France, appelait a son aide les serruriers de la ville pour se faire ouvrir la grande porte de I'Eglise de Bethleem, bien que I'acces lui fut ouvert par deux autres portes laterales, le Patriarche de Jerusalem, Cyrille, vieillard venerable, et generalement connu par son esprit conciliant et la moderation de son caractere, se voyait oblige de protester par ecrit contre ces actes de violence, et de partir pour Constantinople, afin de porter ses plaintes et celles de sa nation au Sultan. On February 9, 1853, Sir G. H. Seymour, the British Ambassador in Petrograd, had an important conversation with Count Nesseh'ode, the Eussian Chancellor, regarding the Franco -Eussian dispute, and the celebrated key occupied once more the place of honour. The British Ambassador reported : . . . Count Nesselrode observed : * We have no wish to demand the restoration of the key of the Bethlehem Church.' As it is always desirable to guard against misap- prehensions, I ventured to enquire whether, in this case, a key meant an instrument for opening a door, only not to be employed in closing that door against Christians of other sects ; or whether it was simply a key — an emblem. Count Nesselrode rephed, unhesitatingly, that his meaning was that the key was to be used in giving the Latins access to Great Problems of British Statesmanship 93 the Church, but not to be used for securing the door against Greeks and other Christians. At last Eussia sent Turkey an ultimatum regarding the Holy Places in the form of proposals which were pressingly put forward by Prince Menchikoff, and once more the Bethlehem key was a chief object of contention. It made its appearance in the first article of that document. Com- menting on that ultimatum, Lord Stratford de Eedchffe, formerly Sir Stratford Canning, wrote to the Earl of Clarendon : All the proposals or demands in question, with two or three exceptions, refer to the Greek clergy and Churches in Turkey. They amount in substance to the conclusion of a Treaty stipulating that Russia shall enjoy the exclusive right of intervening for the effectual protection of all members of the Greek Church, and of the interests of the Churches themselves ; that the privileges of the four Greek patriarchs shall be effectually confirmed, and the patriarchs shall hold their preferment for life, independently of the Porte's approval. The Crimean War arose out of a quarrel between the Greek and Latin Churches. It was largely caused by the fact that Eussia was unwilhng to allow France to remain any longer the protectress of Christianity in the East. The Holy Places have for centuries been in the guardian- ship of the Turks, and the Turks, being Mohammedans, have been able to act as disinterested, and therefore impartial, guardians. Great jealousy prevails between Catholics and Protestants, between the Eastern and the Western Churches. All the other Churches would keenly resent it if France, by the acquisition of Syria, should obtain the guardianship of the Holy Places, and even the Eoman CathoHcs belonging to other nations would be dissatisfied. Eussia has assumed a leading position in the Holy Land. Every year enormous pilgrimages leave Russia for Jerusalem, and on the heights which command 94 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey Jerusalem and Bethlehem the Eussian Church has erected huge buildings for its pilgrims which overshadow these towns. In 1896 M. Emile Delmas wrote very truly in his book ' Egypte et Palestine ' : 'La Eussie qui est partout ailleurs notre amie, est, dans le Levant, notre rivale perseverante.' France's guardianship of the Holy Places would be disliked by other nations and possibly by Eussia herself. It might involve France in -most serious troubles. France has strong economic interests in Syria and Cilicia, where she has built railways and harbour works, and where she possesses numerous schools, clerical establishments, &c. Syria and Cilicia possess very great agricultural and mineral possibilities. If France wishes to occupy and exploit these territories she would probably act wisely in excluding the Holy Places, putting these under an international guardianship. However, that step would no doubt greatly reduce the value of Syria in the eyes of the French people. Much of its attraction would be gone. The control of the Asiatic shore of the Black Sea would be convenient to Eussia, supposing she occupied Constanti- nople, but it would, as has been shown, scarcely benefit her unless she had the hinterland as well. The possession of Syria would gratify, but would only moderately benefit, France. The control of Mesopotamia and of the Persian Gulf and of Arabia seems almost a necessity to the British Empire for strategical and economic reasons. Admiral Mahan wrote in his book ' Eetrospect and Prospect ' : The control of the Persian Gulf by a foreign State of considerable naval potentiahty, a ' fleet in being ' there, based upon a strong mihtary port, would reproduce the relations of Cadiz, Gibraltar, and Malta to the Mediterranean. It would flank all the routes to the Farther East, to India, and to Austraha, the last two actually internal to the Empire regarded as a pohtical system ; and, although at present Great Britain unquestionably could check such a fleet so placed by a division of her own, it might well require Great Problems of British Statesmanship 95 a detachment large enough to affect seriously the general strength of her naval position. A glance at the map confirms Admiral Mahan's state- ment. However, the control not only of the Persian Gulf but of Mesopotamia also is an important British interest. India is strongly protected towards the north and north- west by enormous mountains, but can comparatively easily be invaded by way of Mesopotamia and Persia, by the road taken by Alexander the Great and other conquerors, by which, as has been shown above, the railways of the future wall connect India with Central Europe. Great Britain, as India's guardian, is therefore strongly interested that that most important Hne of approach should not be dominated by a great mihtary Power to India's danger. Besides, England is on India's behalf strongly interested in Mesopotamia for economic reasons. India suffers from two evils : fi'om famine and from over-population. Mesopo- tamia lies at India's door and can, as will presently be shown, produce enormous quantities of food and receive many millions of immigrants. As the cHmate of Mesopo- tamia is not very suitable for Europeans, it is only logical that over-populated India should be given an outlet upon the Euphrates and Tigris. Great Britain has a good claim upon the control of Mesopotamia. She has developed the trade along its rivers. British archaeologists and engineers have explored the country, and British men of action have for decades striven to recreate its pros- perity. Lastly, Englishmen have conquered it. Mesopotamia has almost unlimited agricultural pos- sibilities. Babylonia and Assyria were the cradle of Christian civiHsation and perhaps of mankind. Chapter ii. verse 8, of the Book of Genesis tells us : * And the Lord God planted a garden eastward in Eden ; and there he put the man whom he had formed.' The word ' Eden ' is the Sumerian word, as Assyriologists have told us, for plain. The ancient Babylonians also had a myth of a 96 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey great plain in the centre of which stood the Tree of Know- ledge, and they possessed Hkewise the story of the Flood and of the Ark. In Genesis, chapter ii. verse 14, we read in the description of Paradise : ' And the name of the third river is Hiddekel : that is it which goeth toward the east of Assyria. And the fourth river is Euphrates.' Assyriologists tell us that the four rivers mentioned in the Bible were the Euphrates and Tigris, and two of the huge artificial canals which the ancients had constructed. In chapter x. of Genesis we are made acquainted with Nimrod, Babel, Erech, Accad, Calneh, Nineveh, and other Baby- lonian names. Ur on the Euphrates near Babylon was the birthplace of Abraham. The ancient Jews placed their Paradise in Eden because Eden, the Mesopotamian plain, was then the garden of the world. Herodotus, who had visited Mesopotamia and the town of Babylon, and who wrote about the year 450 b.c, has told us — the translation is Rawlinson's : But little rain falls in Assyria, enough, however, to make the corn begin to sprout, after which the plant is nourished and the ears formed by means of irrigation from the river. For the river does not, as in Egypt, overflow the corn-lands of its own accord, but is spread over them by the hand, or by the help of engines. The whole of Babylonia is, hke Egypt, intersected with canals. The largest of them all, which runs towards the winter sun, and is impassable except in boats, is carried from the Euphrates into another stream, called the Tigris, the river upon which the town of Nineveh formerly stood. Of all the countries that we know, there is none which is so fruitful in grain. It makes no pretension, indeed, of growing the fig, the olive, the vine, or any other tree of the kind, but in grain it is so fruitful as to yield commonly two hundredfold. The blade of the wheat plant and barley plant is often four fingers in breadth. As for the millet and the sesame, I shall not say to what height they grow, though within my own knowledge, for I am not ignorant that what I have already written concerning the fruitfulness of Baby- Great Problems of British Statesmanship 97 Ionia must seem incredible to those who have never visited the country. Among the many proofs which I shall bring forward of the power and resources of the Babylonians the following is of special account. The whole country under the domina- tion of the Persians, besides paying a fixed tribute, is par- celled out into divisions to supply food to the Great King and his Army. Now, out of the twelve months of the year, the district of Babylon furnished food during four, the other regions of Asia during eight ; by which it appears that Assyria, in respect of resources, is one-third the whole of Asia. Quintus Curtius, who wrote about 50 b.c, told us : The pasturage between the Tigris and the Euphrates is represented as so rich and luxuriant that the inhabitants restrain the cattle feeding lest they should die by a surfeit. The cause of this fertility is the humidity circulated through the soil by subterranean streams, replenished from the two Eivers. The great fruitfulness of Babylonia was praised by many ancient writers, such as Theophrastus, a disciple of Aristotle, Berosus, Strabo, Phny, &c. According to Herodotus (HI. 91, 92) Babylonia and Susiana paid to Darius a tribute of 1300 talents per year, and Egypt of only 700. Apparently Mesopotamia was at the time almost twice as wealthy as Egypt. According to the ancient writers, the fruitfulness of Babylonia exceeded that of Egypt. The account of the size of the town of Babylon given by Herodotus seems at fu'st sight exaggerated. It seems incredible that Babylon should have covered an area five times as large as that of Paris. According to the account of Herodotus the circumference of the town was 480 stades, or 56 miles. On the other hand, the circum- ference of the town was, according to Strabo, 385 stades ; according to Quintus Curtius, 368 stades ; according to Clitarchus, 365 stades ; and according to Ctesias, 360 stades. Four of the estimates given are strangely similar. 98 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey As Babylon possessed an outer and an inner wall, it is assumed by many that Herodotus gave figures for the outer and the other writers for the inner line of fortifications. Enormous towns testify to the wealth and populousness of a country. After Babylon's destruction it became a quarry and Seleucia and Ctesiphon were built with the stones of that city. The former town had, in the time of Pliny, 600,000 inhabitants, and 500,000 when destroyed by Cassius in a.d. 165. Ctesiphon, when taken by Severus in A.D. 232, must have been approximately as large, for it furnished 100,000 prisoners. Assjrria and Babylonia were the wealthiest countries of antiquity, and Mesopotamia was the richest part of the great Persian Empire. Persia's wealth was chiefly Baby- lonian wealth. In the Middle Ages, Baghdad arose among the Babylonian ruins, and between the tenth and eleventh centuries it had 2,000,000 inhabitants, 60,000 baths, 80,000 bazaars, &c. It was the capital of the gigantic Arab Em- pire, the wealth of which was founded upon the flourishing agiiculture of the Babylonian plain. In olden times Babylonia was perfectly irrigated. Under the Turks, the wonderful system of canals fell into neglect. The Babylonian plain became partly a desert and partly a swamp. Mesopotamia, which, in olden times, was the most densely populated part of the world, is at present the most sparsely peopled part of the Turkish Empire, as will be seen by reference to the table given in the beginning of this chapter. All Mesopotamia has at present only 2,000,000 inhabitants, or fourteen people per square mile. Sir WilHam Willcocks, a very eminent engineer, who has surveyed the country and planned a gigantic irrigation system, delivered, on March 25, 1903, before the Khedivial Geographical Society at Cairo, a lecture on the irrigation of Mesopotamia, in the course of which he stated : We have before us the restoration of that ancient land whose name was a synonym for abundance, prosperity, and grandeur foi many generations. Eecords as old as those of Great Problems of British Statesmanship 99 Egypt and as well attested tell of fertile lands and teeming populations, mighty kings and warriors, sages and wise men, over periods of thousands of years. And over and above everything else there is this unfaihng record that the teeming wealth of this land was the goal of all Eastern conquerors and its possession the crown of their conquests. The Eastern Power which held this land in old historic days held the East. A land such as this is worth resuscitat- ing. Once we have apprehended the true cause of its present desolate and abandoned condition we are on our way to restoring it to its ancient fertility. A land which so readily responded to ancient science and gave a return which sufficed for the maintenance of a Persian Court in all its splendour will surely respond to the efforts of modern science and return manifold the money and talent spent on its regeneration. ... Of all the regions of the earth, no region is more favoured by Nature for the production of cereals than the lands on the Tigris. Indeed, I have heard our former President, Dr. Schweinfurth, say, in this very hall, that wheat, in its wild uncultivated state, has its home in these semi-arid regions and from here it has been trans- ported to every quarter of the globe. Cotton, sugar-cane, Indian corn, and all the summer products of Egypt will flourish here as on the Nile, while the winter products of cereals, leguminous plants, Egyptian clover, opium, and tobacco will find themselves at home as they do in Egjrpt. Of the historic gardens of Babylon and Bagdad it is not necessary for me to speak. A land whose climate allows her to produce such crops in tropical profusion, and whose snow-fed rivers permit of perennial irrigation over millions of acres, cannot be barren and desolate when the Bagdad Railway is traversing her fields and European capital is , seeking a remunerative outlet. According to the painstaking and conscientious investiga- tions of Sir "William Willcocks, the irrigable area of Meso- potamia is from two to three times as large as that of Egypt. It foUows that that country should be able to nourish from two to three times as many people as Egypt, that its population might be increased from 2,000,000 to about 100 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey 30,000,000. Mesopotamia might once more become one of the great granaries of the world, and owing to its position it ought obviously to become the granary of famine-stricken and over-populated India. Mesopotamia might become, and ought to become, another, and a gi-eater, Egypt under the united efforts of Great Britain and India. Great Britain's experience in Egypt and in India in the best methods of irrigation should convert the Babylonian waste once more into a paradise. One of the most important routes, if not the most important, of the British Empire is the sea-route from England to India and Austraha by way of the Suez Canal. Admiral Mahan has stated that the control of the Persian Gulf is an important British interest because thence a flank attack may be made on the sea-route to India and China. A glance at the map shows that the control of the Ked Sea is at least as important because the Eed Sea is m^erely a prolongation of the Suez Canal. The Eed Sea and the Persian Gulf are long and narrow inlets from the shores of which British shipping can easily be attacked by means of mines, submarines, and torpedo boats. It is therefore clear that Great Britain is most strongly interested in the integrity of the shores both of the Persian Gulf and of the Eed Sea. Arabia forms the eastern shore of the Eed Sea and the western shore of the Persian Gulf. As Great Britain is vitally interested in the integrity of the Persian Gulf and of the Eed Sea, she is equally strongly interested in the integrity of Arabia. A hostile Power controlling Arabia might make both inlets untenable to Great Britain and block the Suez Canal somewhere between Suez and Aden. Great Britain and India have shown in the past that they are strongly interested in the integrity both of Southern Persia, which forms the eastern shore of the Persian Gulf, and of Arabia. A hostile Power con- trolUng Arabia could not only attack British shipping in the Eed Sea and the Persian Gulf, but could attack the Suez Canal as well. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 101 On the eastern shore of the Eed Sea lie the Holy Places of Mohammedanism, Mecca, and Medina. All Moham- medans desire that their Holy places should be controlled by an independent Mohammedan Power, not by Christian States. Great Britain is certain to respect that wish. If the arguments given in these pages should, after a careful scrutiny, be found correct, it would appear that the problem of Asiatic Turkey can be solved only by placing the country under a European guardianship, and the question arises whether several Powers or a single one should fill this office. As several Powers possess strong interests in Asiatic Tm-key, and as the country is of the greatest strategical importance, the ideal solution would seem to be a joint guardianship exercised by some body either on behalf of all Europe or on behalf of the victorious Entente Powers. It is questionable, however, whether the Powers exercising control over one of the most valuable and important territories in the world will be able to act in harmony. Natura non facit saltum. A guardianship should not be imposed upon Turkey by violent measures. It might be exercised by means of the strictest financial control. A European financial authority might be made to control and direct the entire expenditure of Asiatic Turkey, and might by purely financial means keep the country in order and shape its policy and internal development. If we look for a precedent we find one in the Caisse de la Dette, a Turkish organisation directed by Europeans which has managed the Turkish finances with conspicuous honesty and abihty without causing serious international friction. However, the example of the Caisse de la Dette supplies a false analogy. The European nations acted in harmony, when represented by that body, because the Caisse had no political power. That power was exercised by the Sultan and his advisers. Hence, the European nations intrigued against each other not in the Caisse de la Dette but around the Sultan and his Government. If the Caisse de la Dette 102 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey should be given control over the Turkish Government its harmony would probably come to an end and the European Powers would strive to influence the poHcy of Asiatic Turkey by bringing pressure to bear upon the international financial commission of supervision. A condominium, whenever and wherever tried, has proved a failure and a danger. If the European Powers should desire to convert Asiatic Turkey into a peaceful and prosperous buffer State, into a gigantic Smtzerland, by means of a European guardianship, the duty of controlhng, modernising, and developing the country should be left to a single and a non-mihtary, and therefore non-aggressive, Power acting on behalf of Em-ope. At first sight it would appear that some small and capable State such as Sweden, Holland or Belgium might act in that capacity. But there are several objections to trusting the guardianship of so large and so important a country to a small State. Swedes, Dutchmen, and Belgians have httle experience in deahng with Mohammedans. Belonging to a small State, they would not enjoy sufficient prestige with the Turks. Last, but not least, there would always be the danger that a small State furnishing the guardians of Turkey might be influenced in its poUcy by the attitude of a powerful neighbour State which thus would be able to influence the guardian of Asiatic Turkey to its own advantage. If the European Powers should decide to place Tm'key under a guardianship, a single, a strong, a non-military and therefore non-aggres- sive Power experienced in managing Mohammedans should be selected. The only Power possessing these quahfications is Great Britain. Great Britain might convert Asiatic Turkey into another, and a greater, Egypt. Outwardly it would remain an independent State with Sultan, &c. How- ever, an inconspicuous representative of the guardian Power, caUed Adviser or Consul- General, would control the Turkish administrative and executive absolutely by controlhng the entire finances of the country. Asiatic Turkey, like Egypt, would not need, and should Great Problems of British Statesmanship 103 not possess, a real army. A police force and a gendarmerie, possibly supported by a few thousand soldiers in case of internal troubles, should suffice. The entire energy of the Asiatic Turks should be concentrated upon the develop- ment of the country. Only then would Turkey cease to be a danger to other nations and to itself. Great Britain would derive no benefit from its guardian- ship, except the benefit of peace. Her activity on behalf of Europe would be distinctly unprofitable to herself. It is true that the Turks would have to pay salaries to a number of British officials — a paltry matter — and that Great Britain might possibly provide some of the capital needed for developing the country. However, Great Britain will, after the War, have no capital to spare for exotic enterprises. All her surplus capital will be required for developing the Motherland and Empire. Besides, she has no superabundance of able administrators available for the service of Turkey and of other semi-civihsed States. Great Britain would see in a guardianship over Turkey rather a duty than an advantage. If the War, as seems likely, should end in the victory of the Entente Powers, France will probably receive Alsace- Lorraine and possibly further German territory. Eussia will probably obtain considerable territory from Germany and Austria-Hungary and may receive Constantinople. Great Britain will obtain practically no material com- pensation, for the German Colonies can scarcely be con- sidered as such. Great Britain has not fought for territory but for peace. The neutralisation of Asiatic Turkey appears to be the most necessary step for preventing the outbreak of another world- war. While Eussia and France demand valuable territories as a reward. Great Britain is surely entitled to demand stability and peace as a compensation. No Enghshman has expressed the wish that Great Britain should acquire Asiatic Turkey. The aim of the British Government and of all Europe should be to enable Turkey to govern herself. But in order to be able to govern herself 104 The Problem of Asiatic Turkey Turkey must be taught the art of government, and Great Britain might be her teacher. It seems necessary for the peace of the world that Asiatic Turkey in its entirety should be neutraHsed, and it seems likely that its neutrality can be maintained only if order and good government are introduced into the country under the auspices of a strong but non-mihtary and unaggi'es- sive State, such as Great Britain, which is not likely ever to use the unrivalled position occupied by the Turkish provinces as a base for attacking the neighbouring Powers with a large army. A British guardianship would of course not prevent French, Eussian, ItaHan, and Greek capital and labour participating with England in the Government and economic development of the country, in accordance with the policy laid down by the European Powers in concert and executed by Great Britain as their appointed guardian. Thus Eussia might develop Armenia, France Syria and Cilicia, Italy the district of Adalia, and Greece that of Smyrna. If, on the other hand, the Powers should not be able to agree to a British guardianship, it would become necessary to divide Asiatic Turkey into zones of influence. In that case, the Turks would probably be restricted to a compara- tively narrow territory in the centre of Asia Minor. Being cut off from the sea and lacking great natural resources, the few million Turks would scarcely be able to retain their independence for long. Asiatic Turkey in its totality would be partitioned by the Powers. Great Britain would probably claim the control, in some form or other, of both Mesopotamia and Arabia as her share. However, it seems very doubtful whether the partition of Asiatic Turkey would prove a final one. It is much to be feared that it would lead to a disaster perhaps as great as the present War. CHAPTER IV THE PROBLEM OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY^ The War, as far as the land campaign is concerned, may- end in three different ways. It may end in the victory of Germany and of Austria-Hungary, it may lead to the exhaustion of the land Powers engaged in it, and may thus remain undecided, or it may result in the defeat of Germany and Austria- Hungary. In each of these three eventualities, the question as to the position and future of the Dual Monarchy will be of the very greatest interest and importance not only to all Europe but to the world. The War has yielded a twofold surprise to all who are interested in military affairs. The Germans have fought far better, and the Austrians infinitely worse, than was generally expected. At the beginning of the War the Austrian armies utterly collapsed. It was expected by the German General Staff that their Austrian allies would be able to hold back the Eussian hosts from the Austro-German frontiers until the Germans had destroyed the French armies, taken Paris, and occupied the most valuable portions of France. Instead of this, Austria suffered at the hands of Eussia the most disastrous defeat in her history, a defeat compared with which her defeat at Koniggratz and France's defeat at Sedan appear unimportant. Galicia, the Bukovina, and part of Hungary, districts inhabited by about 10,000,000 people and possessed of enormous resources of every kind, with Lemberg, the third largest Austrian town, were overrun by ^ The Nineteenth Century and After, November, 1914. 105 106 The Problem of Austria-Hungary Eussia, and even the little army of poor and war-exhausted Serbia utterly defeated the numerically far stronger Austrian forces sent against it. Prince Lichnowsky, referring to Austria-Hungary, said, not without reason, to a friend shortly before leaving London : ' Germany goes to war with a corpse hanging round her neck.' Owing to the initial coUapse of the Austrian army and the truly wonderful acliievements of the Germans against heavy odds — achievements which one could frankly admire, had the German soldiers by their brutality and unspeakable crimes not covered the German name with everlasting infamy — Germany took the conduct of war completely into her own hands and Austria became a mere cypher. The Austrian army commanders and the Austrian Chief of the General Staff were dismissed, and for all practical purposes the Austrian army became an adjunct and a subordinate portion of the German army. Austria's dependence upon Germany was formerly disguised. Berlin did not wish to hurt the susceptibiHties of Vienna, and allowed the Austrians to make a brave show and to pose as a Great Power. To humour their vanity, Austrian statesmen were permitted to * lead off ' when the War for the hegemony in Europe and the mastery of the world had been resolved upon in Berhn. But the relations between Germany and Augtria-Hungary will never again resemble those which existed before the War. The rulers and people of the Dual Monarchy have become aware that they depend upon Germany's good will for their very existence. The German people, and especially the German officers, refer to beaten and decadent Austria with undisguised contempt. Austria's independence is a thing of the past. She is at present a German vassal. What will be her future ? If Germany should be victorious in the War on land, or if the campaign should end undecided, Austria-Hungary will continue to be a German appendage and for all practical purposes a subject State. There may still be an Austrian Emperor in Vienna, but he will be a German puppet, not Great Problems of British Statesmanship 107 only in all questions of foreign policy, but in domestic, administrative, and military matters as well. Germany will certainly not relinquish her present control over the Austrian army. Macht'politih, the poHcy of power, will exact pay- ment and punishment from Austria's weakness and failure. We must, therefore, reckon with the fact that if the War should end in a draw, Germany and Austria-Hungary will form a single State, possibly even in outward form. It is conceivable that Austria-Hungary will have to enter the German Federation. At any rate, it seems hkely that the German Emperor will, in case of a drawn war, rule in the near future over 120,000,000 people and dispose of an active army of 12,000,000 men in case of war ; that Pola, Fiume, and Cattaro will be German war harbours in addition to Kiel, Wilhelmshaven, and Emden ; that a vigorous pohcy of Germanisation will take place throughout Austria- Hungary ; that the Austrian Slavs will gradually become Germans ; that the power of Germany will be doubled even if she should not be able to retain any of her conquests. If, on the other hand, Germany and Austria-Hungary should be victorious on land, Germany's predominance would become not merely European but world-wide. In that case, she would retain in the West all Belgium and a large part of Eastern France ; and Holland, wedged into German territory, would undoubtedly be compelled to enter the German Federation. In the East she would annex Eussian Poland, and the formerly German Baltic Provinces of Eussia, Livland, Esthland, and Courland. In addition, Germany would very hkely take the French colonies. Austria- Hungary would receive a portion of Western Eussia and all Serbia, and she would probably punish Italy's desertion by once more converting Lombardy and Venetia into Aus- trian provinces. For all practical purposes Germany and Austria-Hungary would thus be a single State of 150,000,000 inhabitants, or more. As France and Eussia would be crippled for many decades, the great German Empire would dominate the 108 The Problem of Austria-Hungary Balkan States and Turkey, and these would become German protectorates. Stretching from Calais, from Havre, or perhaps from Cherbourg, to the vicinity of Petrograd, and from the ItaUan plain to Constantinople, and to the lands beyond the Bosphorus far into Asia, Germany, together with her protectorates, would form a gigantic and compact State of more than 200,000,000 inhabitants. It would control the most valuable strategical positions in Europe and on the Mediterranean. It would dispose of unlimited armies, unHmited resources, and unUmited wealth. The HohenzoUerns would rule a State far larger than the Empire of Charlemagne. Wilham the Second would rule the world, for the British Empire and the United States com- bined would scarcely be able to resist Germany for long. Although in the present war Great Britain should be victorious at sea, her ultimate downfall and that of the United States would probably be merely a question of time. Germany would rule the world, unless the power she had gained was wrested from her in a still greater war than the present one by the combined Anglo-Saxon, Latin, and Slav nations. A subordinate Austria-Hungary, which would vastly increase Germany's population and army and which, besides, would form a bridge between Germany and Constantinople, would evidently play a very important part in enabhng Germany to recreate the Empire of Charlemagne on a vastly increased scale. The miHtary weakness of Austria-Hungary and her internal divisions may lead to her absorption into Germany if the land war should prove indecisive or if it should end in a German victory. In either case, Austria-Hungary might gradually become a homogeneous, centralised, Prus- sianised, and powerful, though dependent, State, a kind of Greater Bavaria, and her accession would enormously increase Germany's power on land and sea. However, it seems unlikely that Germany and Austria- Hungary will be victorious, or that the War will end in Great Problems of British Statesmanship 109 a draw. In these circumstances it is worth while consider- ing closely the future of Austria-Hungary in case of an Austro-German defeat. Austria-Hungary is not a modern State but a medieval survival. Modern States are erected on the broad basis of a common nationaHty. In modern States, State and nation are synonymous terms, and the people feel that they constitute a single family in a world of strangers. In Austria-Hungary, as in Turkey, the State is not formed by a politically organised nation. Austria-Hungary, like Turkey, is a country which is inhabited, not by a nation, but by a number of nations which have little in common and which hate and persecute one another. The Habsburg family possesses certain very marked hereditary pecuHarities. The hanging Habsburg hp and the long narrow jaws may be traced back through generation after generation as far as the fifteenth century. King AlphonSo of Spain curiously resembles his great ancestor, the Emperor Charles the Fifth, who ruled four centuries ago. Certain traits of character of the Habsburg family are equally persistent, and among these the spirit of acquisitiveness is particularly marked. The Habsburgs have been the most successful family of matrimonial and land speculators known to history. While most dynasties rose 'to 'j" eminence by,^v placing themselves at the head of great nations and by conducting successful wars of conquest, the Alsatian family of the Habsburgs rose from obscurity to the greatest power by acquiring territories in all parts of the world by judicious purchase, by exchange, and especially by highly profitable marriages. Spain and the countries of the New World were one of the dowries gathered in by the Habsburg princes. Four and a half centuries ago the witty Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus wrote the distich : Bella gerant alii ! Tu felix Austria nube. Nam quae Mars aliia dat tibi regna Venus. 110 The Problem of Austria-Hungary (Let other nations wage war ! You, happy Austria, marry. For Venus will give you those lands which usually Mars bestows.) The Austrian Empire is not an Empire in the generally accepted sense of the term. It is the result of gigantic deals in land, and of equally gigantic matrimonial ventures. Since the earliest times the Habsburgs have cared for land, not for people. They acquired lands right and left, regardless of the nationaHty of the inhabitants whom they got thrown in. Thus the Habsburgs ruled at one time or another not only the ten nations which constitute Austria-Hungary, but Switzerland, Burgundy, Lorraine, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal, North Africa, and the countries of the New World as well. Austria-Hungary is the residue of a much larger fortuitous collection of States and nations. Eecognising that Austria-Hungary is neither a State nor a nation, but a collection of States and nations, Austrian rulers speak habitually of their peoples, not of their people, and of their lands, not of their land. The curious genesis of the Habs- burg monarchy, and the fact that the so-called Dual Monarchy is in reality a multiple monarchy, is apparent from the title of its ruler, who is called Emperor of Austria, Apostolic King of Hungary, King of Bohemia, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, GaHcia, Lodomiria and Illyria, King of Jerusalem, Archduke of Austria, Grand Duke of Toscana and Cracow, Duke of Lorraine, Duke of Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, the Bukovina, of Upper and Lower Silesia, Modena, Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla, Prince of Transylvania, Margrave of Moravia, Princely Count of Tyrol, &c., &c., &c. The peoples of Austria-Hungary are organised in two self-governing States, Austria and Hungary, These are loosely connected by various Hnks, and Bosnia and Herzegovina are a joint possession of the two States. If, for simplicity's sake, we credit each of these States with one half of the population of Bosnia and Great Problems of British Statesmanship 111 Herzegovina, we find that their racial composition is as follows : Population of Population of ^.ustria and Half Hungary and Half of Bosnia and of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Herzegovina in 1910 1910 Germans . 9,950,000 Magyars 10,051,000 Czechs 6,436,000 Roumanians . 2,949.000 Poles 4,968,000 Germans 2,037,000 Ruthenians 3,519,000 Serbians 2,006,000 Slovenes 1,253,000 Slovacks 1,968,000 Serbians 1,683,000 Croatians 1,833,000 Italians 768,000 Ruthenians . 473,000 Roumanians 275,000 Magyars 11,000 28,863,000 21,317,000 The ten nations enumerated in this table speak ten different languages — ^the Serbians and Croats are one race and differ only in religion — and each of them has a strongly marked character and individuaHty of its own. A composite State which is peopled by different races can be ruled comparatively easily either on democratic or on autocratic Hnes ; democratically if the different races have full self-government, as they have in Switzerland and Canada, and autocratically if the ruling race consti- tutes the majority of the population. Austria is ruled by the Germans and Hungary by the Magyars. The Germans of Austria form about one-third of the population. The Magyars are apparently about one-half of the population of Hungary ; but their number is greatly overstated. In their anxiety to Magyarise Hungary and to make a good show, they have manipulated the census statistics, as will be shown later on. Hungary has in reahty only between 7,000,000 and 8,000,000 hona fide Magyars. In other words, the ruHng race, both in Austria and in Hungary, constitutes only a minority. In both halves of the Dual Monarchy one-third of the people rule over the remaining two-thirds. That is not a healthy state of affairs. 112 The Problem of Austria-Hungary Austria and Hungary, like their ally Germany, are nominally constitutionally governed limited monarchies endowed with representative government and all the usual trappings of democracy. In reahty Austria-Hungary, like Germany, is an autocracy which is governed by the ruler and for the ruler under the observation of certain Parliamentary forms. In Austria-Hungary and in Germany the Emperor is the State. The Austrian Emperor, like the German Emperor, directs the entire machinery of the government and administration in accordance with his will. Thus in Austria-Hungary, as in Germany, the bureaucracy is the State, and the officials are the servants of the Emperor-Ejng, who appoints and dismisses them.. Parliament has no power whatever over the administrative apparatus. The people of the Dual Monarchy are ruled with the assistance of the Civil Service, the army, the ex- ceedingly powerful political poHce, which spies upon every citizen, the law courts, the school, the Church, and the Press, and all seven are government institutions controlled by the Emperor. Church and Press are no exception to the rule. In Germany the Emperor is the official head, the Pope, of the Protestant State Church. That perhaps accounts for his intimate relations with the .Deity. The Austrian Church is Eoman Cathohc. Its head is nominally the Pope, but in reahty it is the Emperor. In a decree published by the Emperor Leopold the Second on March 3, 1782, we read : Although the priest's province is the cure of souls, he must also be considered as a citizen and as a State official engaged in rehgious work, for he can directly and indirectly exercise the greatest political influence over the people by working upon their feelings. It may sound strange, but it is a fact that in Austria the Church is a branch of the bureaucracy. The Press of the Dual Monarchy is Government-inspired, Government- subsidised, Government-muzzled, and Government-con- Great Problems of British Statesmanship 113 trolled to a far greater extent than it is in Germany. Every Department of State has a Press bureau of its own, and enormous sums are spent by the Government upon the Austrian Press. The judges of the Dual Monarchy, being a part of the Civil Service, possess no real independence. That may be seen by their disgraceful partisan behaviour in political prosecutions, in which they frequently brow- beat, fine, and expel from the court not only the witnesses for the defence, but even the defending solicitors. Austria-Hungary is governed by absolutism, and absolutism can be successfully maintained only if the people are weak and ignorant. Endeavouring to keep the people in ignorance and subjection, the Austrian rulers have habitually favoured the Eoman Catholic Church and opposed education. Guided by the principle * Cujus regio, ejus et rehgio,' they have persecuted Protestantism in the most savage manner, recognising in it a revolt of the people against established authority. Herein Hes the reason that, although Protestantism took powerful root in the Dual Monarchy in the time of Huss, there are in Austria at present only 588,686 Protestants, as compared with no fewer than 25,949,627 Eoman CathoHcs. While the Austrian people are poor, the Austrian Church is exceedingly wealthy and powerful. Illiteracy in Austria- Hungary is very great. From the latest issue of the ' Hand- worterbuch der Staatswissenschaften ' we learn that of 10,000 recruits only 3 are ilhterate in Germany, 2200 are ilhterate in A.ustria, and 2590 in Hungary. Among the oppressed nationalities, for instance, in the Slavonic parts of Austria and Hungary, illiteracy rises to 7000 among every 10,000 recruits. While the Austrian Government always discouraged knowledge and independence among the people, keeping them down by means of the officials, the police, and the Church, it endeavom'ed to prevent popular dissatisfaction by encouraging amusement and not discouraging vice. The Austrian towns, which might become hotbeds of revolution, are the gayest and at the 114 The Problem of Austria-Hungary same time the most immoral towns in Em^ope. In 1910 of all the children born alive 18*25 per cent, were illegitimate in Upper Austria, 21*9 in Lower Austria, 23-0 in Styria, 23'6 in Salzburg, and 35*6 in Carinthia. In Vienna the percentage of illegitimate births is on an average about forty, according to the official statistics. Possibly they understate the facts. While, for the sake of making their peoples obedient, the Austrian rulers forced them by the most savage persecu- tion into a religious uniformity, they had no desire to weld them together into one nation. The old principle of the Habsburg monarchy is ' Divide et impera.' Francis the Second, who ruled Austria at the time of the Congress of Vienna, said to the French Ambassador : My peoples are strangers to each other. That is all the better. They do not catch the same political disease at the same time. If the fever takes hold of you in France all of you catch it. Hungary is kept in order by Itahan troops, and Italy is kept down by Hungarians. Everybody keeps his neighbour in order. My peoples do not understand each other, and hate each other. Their antipathies make for security and their mutual hatreds for the general peace. Absolutism is maintained by fear. Absolute rulers in the East and the West habitually distrust their principal advisers, fearing that their power may become too great. Actuated by fear and distrust, the Austrian rulers have usually entrusted the government of the country to mediocrities and nonentities, and have treated with ingratitude the public servants who had rendered the greatest services to their country. If Austria-Hungary entered upon a war in which she was absolutely certain of victory, her armies were commanded by a member of the ruling house, so that the dynasty should receive new glory. If she was Hkely to lose, the command was given to officers who were afterwards dismissed and disgracea for their incompetence. Generals von Auffenberg, Dankl, and many Great Problems of British Statesmanship 115 other leading men have shared the fate of General von Benedek, who was defeated at Koniggratz, while Admiral Tegethoff was very badly treated by the Government because he unexpectedly defeated the far stronger Italian fleet at Lissa and was made a hero by the people. Austria's stagnation is largely due to the fact that she has usually been governed and administered by mediocrities, and that her armies have been entrusted to military nonentities in time of war. Austria-Hungary curiously resembles ancient Spain. In both countries we have seen rulers actuated by tyranny, treachery, cruelty, and jealousy. After all, the Spanish and Austrian dynasties are closely related. Both possess the same traditions and the same unbending Court cere- monial. Austria-Hungary, Hke ancient Spain, pursues not a national, but a purely Mynastic policy. The people are merely pawns, and they are exploited, oppressed, and treated with perfidy and ingratitude. The attitude of the Austrian rulers towards their subjects will be apparent from a few examples out of many. In 1690 the Emperor Leopold the First invited 200,000 Serbs to leave their country and to settle in Austria. They were to clear the Eastern frontier provinces of the Turks and to defend them against Ottoman aggression. They were promised freedom of reHgion, and their nationahty was to be respected. During one hundred and sixty years the Serbs and their descendants fought Austria's battles against the Turks. They fought for Austria in Italy and on the Ehine. Not- withstanding Austria's promises, they were deprived of their leaders and forcibly denationalised. Their reHgion was sup- pressed, the building of Serbian churches and convents was prohibited, and during a century printing in the Serbian language was not allowed. The books required for religious service had to be copied by hand as late as the nineteenth century. The Serbian saints were excluded from the calendar, and on the sacred days of their Church Serbs were purposely sent to forced labour. These persecutions 116 The Problem of Austria-Hungary drove thousands of Serbs from Austria to Kussia and even to Turkey, where at least they were allowed to practise their religion. During the struggles of the Serbians with the Turks a century ago Austria disregarded their pitiful appeal for help, betrayed them to the Tm'ks, and forced them to surrender to them by closing against them the Austrian frontier, whence alone they could obtain food. During the Ee volution of 1848 the Eoman Cathohc Serbs of Austria, the Croatians, loyally aided the Emperor against the Hungarian revolutionists, defeated them and reconquered Vienna. Yet after the suppression of the Hungarian revolution they were handed over to Hungary to be ill- used and oppressed. The Eoumanians, who also had loyally supported their Emperor against the rebelHous Magyars, were hkewise handed over to their enemies, their protests notwithstanding. When the revolution broke out in Hungary, the Austrian officers stationed there were treated with the greatest duphcity by the Austrian Govern- ment. Believing that the Hungarians would succeed in making themselves independent, and fearing their hostility, the Austrian Government wished to keep them quiet and encouraged the Austrian officers in Hungary to take service under the Hungarian Government in order to allay its sus- picions. A little later when, with the help of Eussia, Austria succeeded in defeating the Hungarian armies, she had many of the deluded Austrian officers executed for high treason. A king or emperor who rules over a number of different nationaHties will, for convenience' sake, make one of their languages the official language of the Government. The Austrian Habsburgs, being German princes, not unnaturally made German the official language and handed over to the Austro- Germans the government of the Austrian peoples and the administration of their lands. German became the language of the upper classes, and of literature, for until lately only the upper classes in Austria could read and could afford to buy newspapers and books. Not Great Problems of British Statesmanship 117 very long ago the Magyar, Czech, Polish, Serbian, Koumanian, Euthenian, Slovenian, and Slovak languages, which now have a great and glorious literature, were hardly more than rude local patois used only by the common people. Books in most of these languages did not exist. The official language of the Magyars was Latin and German. The debates of the Hungarian Parliament were conducted in a mongrel Latin until a short time ago, Joseph the Second, who ruled from 1765 to 1790, was an enthusiast and a great admirer of Frederick the Great, his contemporary. Animated, perhaps, by a premonition of the rise of a great German State outside Austria, he endeavoured to Germanise his numerous non-German possessions. He strove to Germanise the people of the monarchy by forcing upon them a centrahsed German administration and the German language. Acting clumsily and high-handedly, he outraged the non- German peoples and brought about a revival of their languages. Patriotic native philologists began to study the non-German patois and to elevate them into a language by purifying them. Languages which had apparently died were painfully reconstructed out of the debris at hand. PoHsh, Magyar, Czech, and other writers created a great and beautiful Uterature in their revived languages. The cultured Magyars abandoned Latin and German for Magyar, and the leaders of the other nationalities also took to theii' rediscovered national languages. The current of nationalism could not be stemmed. The nationahties acquired race conscious- ness and race pride. The rapidity with which the non- German languages have progressed even during the most recent times will be seen from the figures in table on page 118, which are taken from an official Austrian publication, ' Statistische Kiickbhcke auf Oesterreich,' which was pubHshed in Vienna in 1913. Between 1882 and 1912 the number of papers and periodicals of the Czechs increased sevenfold, and those of the Poles more than fourfold. In 1882 there were two 118 The Problem of Austria-Hungary German papers and periodicals to every single non- German one in Austria. In 1912 the number of German and non- German papers and periodicals had become nearly equal. The huge increase of the Czech papers and periodicals is particularly noteworthy. It has been far greater than that of the other nationaUties, because the reawakened nationahsm has grown particularly vigorous in Bohemia, where formerly it had been most ruthlessly suppressed. The nationalities had been murmuring for many years against Austrian misrule, and the German-Austrians also had become more and more dissatisfied with the reactionary Newspapers and Periodicals printed in Austria. -a d rt , 3 S pi ^-2 •.=1 "p Si '3 c3 o O o pti rt o m 1-1 > la 1882 912 176 89 24 27 85 65 466 1892 1252 374 108 24 30 67 90 693 1902 1817 631 238 41 57 99 92 1158 1912 2492 1209 389 65 96 130 153 2042 and oppressive methods of government which Metternich had introduced after the downfall of Napoleon in 1815. The great Ee volution of 1848 shook the monarchy, to its very foundations. The German, Italian, and Hungarian lands rose in arms. The Emperor and Prince Metternich had to flee from Vienna. The revolution was overcome with the greatest difficulty and with terrible bloodshed, and the reconquered lands were treated with the utmost barbarity by the victors. In 1859 the Italians rose once more against their Austrian oppressors and, with the help of France, wrested Lombardy from them. Still Italy remained dissatisfied, for Austria retained Venetia. A second war with Italy was Hkely. Since the early sixties, and especially since the time when Bismarck had become Prussia's Prime Minister, Prussia had begun to arm with feverish haste and was doubling her mihtary forces. Her Great Problems of British Statesmanship 119 attitude towards Austria became more and more menacing. It was clear to all Austrians that before long the Monarchy- might have to fight a war on two fronts. In these circum- stances it was, of course, most important that Austria, when at war in the south and the north, should not be attacked in the rear by the Hungarians under Kossuth's leader- ship. A reconcihation between Austria and Hungary was urgently required, and Vienna began to move. Austria's necessity was Hungary's opportunity. In the third volume of Kossuth's memoirs, on page 649, there is a report from Budapest dated August 16, 1861, in which we read : The Vienna Court will not give way, but is embarking upon new and desperate experiments. In the meantime the difficulties with which it is faced are constantly increas- ing. Its power keeps on diminishing, and at last a moment will arrive when it will have to fulfil all that Hungary desires, merely in order to save the Habsburg dynasty. Kossuth's forecast came true. Before 1866, when Prussia and Italy together made war upon Austria, the Magyar leaders were promised self-government. Austria was defeated by Prussia, but she prepared everything for an early war of revenge in which she reckoned upon the support of France. To defeat Prussia it was necessary to satisfy the wishes of the Magyars and to convert them from- opponents into staunch and rehable supporters with the least delay. In the year following her defeat the negotiations between Vienna and Budapest were hastily concluded. By the Ausgleich, the compromise, of 1867, the monarchy was cut in two. Vienna was to rule Austria and Budapest Hungary. The Ausgleich established the Dual system. Henceforth there was to be an Empire of Austria and a self-governing Kingdom of Hungary. The monarchy became a Dual Monarchy. The non-Magyar nations in Hungary were handed over to the tender mercies of the Magyars, while the Austro-Germans continued to rule over the non-German races of Austria. 120 The Problem of Austria-Hungary The Magyars had revolted against alien rule. They had claimed self-government in the name of equahty, Mberty, and justice. However, as soon as they had obtained self- government, they denied to the non-Magyar nations of Hungary that hberty, equality, and justice which they had claimed for themselves as a natural right. A German minority oppressed and persecuted a non-German majority in the Austrian half of the monarchy, and a Magj^ar minority introduced worse than Austrian methods of government in the Hungarian half. However, the Austrian Germans and Hungarian Magyars did not persecute and oppress all the other nationalities, but, faithful to the principle ' Divide et Impera,' endeavoured to weaken them by giving favours here and there and setting them against one another. The Poles in Galicia were protected by the Austrians because their goodwill would be precious in case of a war with Eussia. At the same time, they allowed the Poles to oppress the neighbouring Kuthenians, so that the hostihty of the Euthenians could be used as a counterpoise if the Poles should become too overbearing. Hungary patronised the Serbo- Croats for similar reasons. The Ausgleich of 1867 divided Austria-Hungary into two States, but it did not bring about a final settlement between the two leading races. Hungary aimed at full equality with Austria, if not at supremacy. Austria, which hitherto had been supreme, resisted Hungary's claims and endeavoured to keep the control of the foreign policy of the Dual Monarchy in her own hands, notwithstanding Hun- gary's objections. In numerous matters of national concern, Vienna required the consent of Budapest, and every Austrian demand was used by the Magyars as a means for extortmg fresh concessions from their unwilling partner. Year by year the friction between the two countries increased. Year by year the feelings between Austrians and Magyars became more bitter. The Hungarians openly threatened to make themselves entirely independent of Austria, and to leave her in the lurch. On many occasions they showed Great Problems of British Statesmanship 121 their determination to achieve complete supremacy and make Austria a subordinate State. On October 1, 1909, for in- stance, the Hungarian Minister, Count Albert Apponyi, published a decree addressed to the educational authorities, demanding that in books and maps the words ' Austro- Hungarian Monarchy ' should everywhere be replaced by the words ' Hungary and Austria.' Austrians and Magyars, Vienna and Budapest, loathe each other. In 1910 Austria- Hungary had in round figures 50,000,000 inhabitants. Of these about 18,000,000, the Germans in Austria and the Magyars in Hungary, form the ruling nations — the 2,000,000 Germans in Hungary are left out because they are oppressed by the Magyars — and these rule over 32,000,000 people, the subject nationahties. Now the two ruling nations are divided into 10,000,000 Germans and 8,000,000 Magyars who hate each other with the fiercest hatred, while they themselves are equally bitterly hated by the various nationalities which they try to keep down. Hobbes' ' Bellum omnium contra omnes ' prevails in the Dual Monarchy. The Dual Monarchy is a Dual Anarchy, and the Anarchy which prevails in the country is largely respon- sible for its defeats. A State which is inhabited by ten different nations, which persecute and hate one another, cannot progress in peace and cannot offer a united front against an enemy in war. The inter-racial relations in Austria-Hungary are most compHcated. As a full and adequate account would require a book, I will briefly deal with the position of only the more important nationahties, and especially those which are most likely to be directly affected by the present War. Galicia is inhabited by Poles and Euthenians. The Poles, as has been previously stated, are the ruling element in GaHcia, for they have been allowed by Austria to oppress the Euthenians, and they have been given a good deal of freedom. On August 5, the Grand Duke Nicholas, Commander-in-Chief of the Eussian forces, addressed the 122 The Problem of Austria-Hungary following appeal to the Poles in Eussia, Germany, and Austria -Hungary : Poles, the hour has sounded when the sacred dream of your fathers and your forefathers may be realised. A cen- tury and a half has passed since the living body of Poland was torn in pieces, but the soul of the country is not dead. It continues to hve, inspired by the hope that there will come for the Pohsh people an hour of resurrection and of fraternal reconcihation with Great Eussia. The Eussian Army brings you the solemn news of this reconciliation which obhterates the frontiers dividing the PoHsh peoples, which it unites conjointly under the sceptre of the Eussian Czar. Under his sceptre Poland will be governed again, free in her rehgion and her language. Eussian autonomy only expects from you the same respect for the rights of the nationalities to which history has bound you. With open heart and brotherly hand Great Eussia advances to meet you. She believes that the sword with which Poland struck down her enemies at Griinwald has not yet rusted. From the shores of the Pacific to the North Sea the Eussian Armies are marching. The dawn of a new Hfe is beginning for you, and in this glorious dawn is seen the sign of the Cross, the symbol of suffering and of the resurrection of peoples. During the reign of the late Czar, Eussia's policy towards the Poles was influenced by various currents and cross- currents. Many prominent Eussians were more afraid of constitutional government, of democracy, and of internal troubles than they were of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Consequently the poHcy of the Eussian Government towards the Poles was hesitating and somewhat contradictory. But even during the reign of the late Czar the tendency to give to the Poles self-government and freedom became constantly stronger. The leaders of the new Eussian democracy have completely abandoned the reserve and the suspicions with which Polish affairs have hitherto been treated. They have whole-heartedly declared themselves in favour of giving to the Poles complete independence in accordance with the principles of liberty and nationahty Great Problems of British Statesmanship 123 which have animated the revolutionaries in converting Russia into a Eepubhc. The outlook for the creation of an independent Poland, embracing all the Polish-speaking people, has never been fairer than it is at present. The 5,000,000 Austrian Poles receive preferential treat- ment from Austria, and they have little reason to be dis- satisfied with their present position Still, if Russia carries out her programme and reconstitutes the ancient State of Poland, the Galician Poles will scarcely care to be left out. Polish independence is bound to prove more attractive than the privileges which they receive at present from Austria, and which may be withdrawn. Besides, the Galician Poles remember the wrongs which they have suffered at Austria's hands. They remember not only the partition of Poland, but also the sanguinary agricultural risings and the fearful butcheries which Austria perpetrated in Galicia in order to weaken the Poles, and the infamous extinction of the Republic of Cracow in 1846. After the Revolution of 1848 the Poles were treated worse than ever. Only after her defeat of 1866 did Austria give them greater freedom. If the Allies should be victorious, the loss of the Pohsh districts of Austria seems inevitable. Germans and Austrians have frequently told us that the Poles are unfit to govern themselves, that they are unpro- gressive, wasteful, unthrifty, dirty, and drunken. These arguments as to Poland's unfitness to govern herself can best be refuted by the following most remarkable figures : Polish Co-operative Societies. - Number Members Share Capital Deposits Loans Outstanding 1900 1904 1909 1912 420 849 1812 2686 297,607 509,168 916,476 1,307,120 £ 1,079,929 2,370,613 4,439,337 6,309,926 £ 12,420,057 19,652,581 34,944,184 46,970,354 £ 12,047,717 20,165,980 39,048,734 55,203,6.2 These most remarkable figures are taken from Michalski's 124 The Problem of Austria-Hungary book, Les Societes Cooperatives Polonaises (Lemberg, 1914). They refer to all Poland, and they show that the co-operative movement, the best test of a nation's providence and pro- gress, has made enormous strides among the Poles. In the short space of twelve years the number of Polish co-operators has more than quadrupled, the share capital of the societies has increased about sixfold, and the deposits, which repre- sent chiefly the savings of poor people, have increased from £12,420,057 to no less than £46,975,354. People who dis- play such remarkable prudence in their own affairs may be entrusted with self-government. The 3,500,000 Ptuthenians who inhabit Southern Galicia and the neighbouring districts of Hungary are part of the great Slav family. They are part of the ' Little Eussians,' who dwell in South Eussia in the Ukraine. Desiring to weaken Eussia, Austria-Hungary has lately discovered that the Ukrainains are a separate race and possess an ancient history and language. The Austrian Government, which is not at all desirous to stimulate nationaHsm in its own borders, has suddenly become a passionate advocate of the national and linguistic claims of the Ukrainians. In the realm of the Habsburgs the end justifies the means. Men who are the enemies of nationalism in their own country have passionately championed the national claims of Albania and the Ukraine. Government money has been spent without stint in placing the claims of the Albanian and the Ukrainian nations before the public of the principal countries, by expensive illustrated books, articles, lectures, letters to the Press, &c. Besides, Austria has thoughtfully established Euthenian professorships at the Lemberg University. The Austrians have become enthusiastic about the Ukrainian nationality in the hope of producing a split among the Eussians. According to Government-paid Austrian writers. South-western Eussia, with Kiev, is Ukrainian, and claims, rightly, an individuality and an independent national exist- ence. The Austrian Government has raised the Ukrainian question in order to foment troubles in Eussia. Its Great Problems of British Statesmanship 125 attempts are likely to prove unsuccessful. The Euthenians and their Eussian neighbours across the frontier, by what- ever name they may be called, are one people, and their reunion after an Austro-German defeat is inevitable. Until 1866 all the non-German nationalities in Austria were brutalised by the ruling race. Austrian persecution was most severely felt and most bitterly resented by that highly gifted and energetic Slav race, the unfortunate Czechs of Bohemia. The Bohemian Czechs have been ill- treated by Austria during many centuries. Johann Huss, following in Wycliffe's footsteps, introduced the Eeformation there about the year 1400, partly as a protest against the degradation of the Eoman Catholic Church, partly, and prob- ably chiefly, as a protest against German domination and German brutality. Huss died a martyr. The Eeforma- tion in Bohemia was suppressed with the greatest savagery, and Bohemia was totally devastated. Germans were settled among the Czechs, Eoman Catholic dragoons were quartered upon Protestant Bohemians in order to ' convert ' them. The Czechs were treated as helots by the Germans settled among them up to a very recent date. When the Prussian armies invaded Bohemia in 1866 they endeavoured to raise the Czechs against the Austrians by addressing to them the following proclamation : Inliahitants of the Glorious Kingdom of Bohemia ! In consequence of the war, which has been caused against our wishes by the Emperor of Austria, we enter your country, not as enemies and conquerors, but full of respect for your historic and national rights. To the inhabitants, without regard of their calling, religion, and nationality, we bring not war and destruction, but consideration and friendship. Do not believe, as your enemies will tell you, that we have brought about this war through lust of conquest. Austria has forced us to fight by threatening to attack us. But beheve us that we have not the slightest intention to oip'pose your just desire for inde'pendence and for unrestrained national development. 126 The Problem of Austria-Hungary Eemembering the heavy and ahuost unbearable burdens which the Government has placed upon you in preparing for this war, we shall not impose additional taxes, nor shall we ask you to act against your convictions. We shall respect and honour particularly your holy religion. At the same time we shall not tolerate open resistance, and must punish severely all treasonable acts. We leave the issue of the war confidently to the Lord of Hosts. If our just cause should 'prove victorious, the moment may perhaps arrive when the national aspirations of the Bohemians and Moravians may be fulfilled in the same way in which those of the Hungarians have been fulfilled, and then may Providence establish their happiness for all time. The proclamation is very interesting because it throws a strong light not only upon the dissatisfaction existing in Bohemia, but also upon Prussian methods of warfare. Of the 6,700,000 inhabitants of Bohemia, 4,240,000, or about two-thirds, are Czechs and Slovaks, and the remaining third are Germans. In the neighbouring land of Moravia, which lies to the east of Bohemia, approximately the same proportion of Germans and Slavs obtains. Al- though the Czechs form the great majority of the inhabitants of Bohemia, their language was suppressed until recentty. German was the official language used throughout Bohemia in the law courts and elsewhere. German inscriptions were to be seen in the Czech villages and towns. To the casual \4sitor, Bohemia seemed to be a German land. Step by step the Czechs have ousted the Germans. To-day Prague, that old stronghold of Germanism, is a Czech town. So great is the hatred between Czechs and Germans that there is practically no intercourse between the two nations. A German will not enter a Czech restaurant or hotel in Prague, nor will a Czech enter a German place of entertain- ment. The tw^o nations have separate schools, theatres, concert rooms, banks, savings banks, co-operative societies, &c. At the German University of Prague there were in 1910-11 1726 German students and only eighty-six Czechs. At the Czech University of Prague there were in the same Great Problems of British Statesmanship 127 year 4225 Czechs and only nine Germans. At the German Technical High Schools of Prague there were 880 Germans and thirty-seven Czechs. At the corresponding Czech estab- lishments there were 2686 Czechs and ten Germans. In Bohemia the two nationalities follow the policy of segrega- tion, because the Czechs absolutely refuse to associate with Germans. A similar policy of non-intercourse is noticeable between the Poles and Euthenians at the Cracow University, where there were in 1910-11 2771 Poles and only thirty- four Euthenians. By their strength of character and strength of intellect, and by their great artistic and scientific achievements, the Czechs have become the leading nation among the Austrian Slavs. Their intellectual pre-eminence may be seen from the extent and from the wonderful progress of their Press, regarding which figures have been furnished on another page. The Czechs occupy a most important position in the Dual Monarchy. Owing to its mines, its fruitful soil, and its very highly developed industries, Bohemia is the most valuable possession of Austria, and the Dual Monarchy would lose it most unwillingly. Besides, Bohemia occupies a most valuable strategical position. Bohemia, with its surrounding mountain walls, is a strong natural fortress, and it lies on the most direct route from Berlin to Vienna. At present Bohemia connects Germany and Austria, Berlin and Vienna. An independent Bohemia would separate the two States and their capitals. An independent Bohemia and Moravia would border to the east upon an independent Poland. Prussia, which at present is in contact with Austria through Silesia and Bohemia, would be separated from the German districts of Austria by a solid wall of Slavonic nations if Poland, Moravia, and Bohemia should become independent States. In that case the German parts of Austria would be in contact with Germany only by means of Bavaria. That is an important fact, the poUtical and strategical bearings of which will presently be considered. Of the inhabitants of Bohemia and Moravia, two-thirds, 128 The Problem of Austria-Hungary as has been said, are Slavs, and one-third are Germans. The Germans form a broad fringe along the Austro- German frontier. If the future frontiers of Bohemia should be de- termined on a racial basis, about one-third of its territory- should fall to Germany. It might perhaps fall to the kingdom of Saxony, upon which it borders, and which then would regain some of its former importance, of which it was deprived by Prussia exactly a century ago. After the War the Southern States of Germany may require strengthening against Prussia, so as to create a balance of power within Germany. As the Czechs have at last conquered for themselves a position in which they can freely use their language and de- velop their individuality, and as their influence in Austria- Hungary, which as yet is not great, is bound to increase, they may hesitate to cut the connection with Austria, espe- cially as their manufacturing industries depend very largely upon the Austrian market lor the sale of their productions. The action of Bohemia will probably largely depend upon that of the other nationalities. An isolated Bohemia and Moravia, being shut off from the sea, would politically, militarily, and especially economically occupy a very exposed and insecure position, unless it could enter into a federation with some of its neighbours. South of Bohemia lie the German districts of Austria. These extend in a solid block from Switzerland and Bavaria in the west to a line about thirty miles east of Vienna. The southern border of Bohemia forms the northern frontier of the German territory of Austria, and the river Drau its southern limit. If Bohemia and Moravia should cut themselves off from German Austria, the physical connection between German Austria and Prussia would be destroyed, while direct contact between German Austria and Bavaria would be retained. Bavaria and her neighbour Baden are the most strongly Eoman Catholic States of Germany. Of their joint population of 9,000,000, about 6,100,000, or two-thirds, are Eoman Catholics. The easy-going Great Problems of British Statesmanship 129 Austrians sympathise far more with the people of Bavaria and Baden than with the overbearing Prussians. An organic connection of German Austria, Bavaria, and Baden would give 20,000,000 inhabitants to German Austria, and would correspondingly weaken the power of Prussia for mischief. That block of nations might be joined by the remaining South German States, Wiirtemberg, Saxony, and the rest, and thus a fairly even balance of power might be produced in Germany. The German race would be divided into almost equal halves, different in character, rehgion, and tradition, and possessing different historic capitals. They would be extremely powerful for defence, but would presumably be less dangerous for an attack. By uniting with Bavaria and Baden, Austria would border on the Khine. She would occupy once more a position of great political and strategical importance, not only towards Eussia and the Balkan Peninsula, but also towards France. That position should secure the peace of Europe and of the world. If Austria-Hungary should resolve to conclude a separate peace, the State of the Habsburgs might once more become the leading State of Germany. The Austrian monarch might make it a condition that he should receive compensa- tion for the Slavonic and Latin provinces which he is likely to lose by being given not only the South German States, which until 1866 followed Austria's lead, but also Silesia, which was torn from Austria by Frederick the Great. Prussia has grown great at Austria's expense. It would be only a fit retribution if the process should be reversed, and if Vienna should regain its old supremacy. If the 10,000,000 Austro- Germans were jomed by 25,000,000 or 30,000,000 South Germans and Silesians, the 10,000,000 Magyars would no longer be able to cause trouble to the Habsburg Emperors. Berlin would no longer be able to play out Budapest against Vienna. Austria's greatest internal difficulty would disappear, and so would her economic troubles. The Dual Monarchy is a poor country because 130 The Problem of Austria-Hungary it lacks prosperous manufacturing industries. The wealth of Austria-Hungary is supposed to be only one-third of that of Germany. By acquiring the South German States and Silesia the State of the Habsburgs would both poHtically and economically regain its old paramountcy. Austria-Hungary would become an almost purely German State organised on a federal basis, and if the Habsburgs should act tolerantly and liberally towards the neighbour States, the Austrian Federation might be joined in course of time by some of the secondary States which will arise after the present war in the South-east of Europe. In the south, Austria possesses two almost purely Itahan districts : the Itahan Tyrol, with towns such as Trento, Eovereto, Ala, Bondo, Borgo, &c., and the western part of Istria and a narrow strip of the Adriatic coast with Trieste, Pola, Fiume, Capodistria, Zara, Sebenico, Spalato, Eagusa, Cattaro, &c. The names of the towns mentioned show their Italian origin. The possession of the Itahan Tyrol is a matter of vital importance to Italy. The great and wealthy plain of Lombardy is protected towards the north by a crescent of mountain walls, the Alps. Italy is protected by that powerful barrier against invasion from France and Switzerland. But by retaining the Italian Tyrol, the Trentino, after withdrawing from Italy, and by occupying the mountain passes down to the foot of the mountains as far as the Lago di Garda, Alistria occupies with her army a wide breach in Italy's ramparts. Thus she can easily in- vade the country and strike at Verona, Padua, and Venice by marching to the east, or at Brescia and Milan by turning to the west. While the east coast of Italy is flat and open, the opposite coast of the Adriatic, occupied by Austria, is studded with an abundance of excellent natural harbours, the entrance to which is protected by high mountains and by mountainous islands lying in front of it. The positions occupied by Austria in the Trentino, in Istria, and in Dalmatia threaten Italy's security in the north and east, and Italy is all the more reluctant to see Great ProMnns of British StatesmanshijJ 131 them remaining in Austria's hands, as they are largely inhabited by Italians, who are very badly treated by the Austrians. Possibly the disastrous iire at the Monfalcone dockyard, which took place soon after the outbreak of the Great War, was caused by the resentment of the ill-treated Italians who live in Austrian territory. Many of these unfortunate people, although born in Austrian territory, are not allowed to acquire Austrian citizenship, and not infrequently they are expelled without notice from their homes without adequate reason. Ever since 1866 the Aus- trians have persecuted the Italians dwelhng in Austria, and have endeavoured to destroy their nationality by deny- ing them schools, colleges, and a university. Apparently the Austrians have tried to punish the Italians who have remained under their rule for the loss of Lombardy and Venetia. Owing to Austria's foolish pohcy, Italy has been filled with the bitterest hatred against the Austrians. The Irredenta Italia, Unredeemed Italy, is in the thoughts of every patriotic Italian, and frequent Austrian outrages on Italians living in Austria, on the one hand, and Itahan passionate agitation in favour of their brothers who live under the Austrian yoke, on the other, keep the wound open. Many Italian societies and newspapers have been preaching war with Austria for many years. Signor Pelle- grini wrote in his important book, ' Verso la Guerra ? — II dissidio fra I'ltaha e I'Austria,' published as long ago as 1906 : I believe we cannot live any longer under an illusion which deceives us. We have lived under the impression that the internal difficulties of Austria-Hungary are so gxeat as to prevent her from aggi'essive action towards ourselves and from expansion towards the east. We have believed that Austria-Hungary would fall to pieces after the death of the present Emperor. These views are erroneous. If the political crisis in Austria -Hungary should become more acute, and there is reason for doubting this, Austria-Hun- 132 The Problem of Austria-Hungary gary's need to expand and to acquire new markets in the east will become all the greater. And as long as Itahan commerce pursues its triumphant course in the east, the more are the opposing interests of the two nations Hkely to bring about the final collision. . . . We cannot continue a policy of vassalage which will compromise for all time Italy's future in order to preserve the outward form of the Triple AlUance. We must ask ourselves : What are our interests ? Are we ready to defend them ? What are the conditions of the Italians who dwell on the shore of the Adriatic under foreign domination ? What are our interests on the Adriatic compared with those of Austria ? What are the wishes of our people, and what is Italy's mission in the Balkan Peninsula ? Is it possible to avoid a conflict with Austria ? I believe I have shown that Austria-Hungary is at the same time our ally and our open enemy against whom we must prepare for war. . . . We have to calculate in the future with the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Empire, though nominally our ally, is our determined enemy in the Balkan Peninsula. Many similar views may be found in the writings of Enrico Corradini, Salvatore Barzilai, Vico Mantegazza, Giovanni Bertacchi, Innocenzo Cappa, Eomeo Manzoni, Fihppo Crispolti, Scipio Sighele, Luigi Villari, and many others, in the publications of the ' Societa Dante Aligheiri,' the ' Trento Trieste,' the ' Giovine Europa,' the ' Italica Gens,' and in periodicals such as II Regno, Vltalia alV Estero, II Tricolore, La Grande Italia. The Austrians have replied to the Italian threats with counter-threats. The ' Oesterreichische Eundschau,' the most important Austrian periodical, which is edited by Freiherr von Chlumecky, an intimate friend of the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and Danzer's Armeezeitung, the widely read army journal, have published innumerable articles recom- mending an Austrian war with Italy. On the walls of the Ducal Palace at Venice may be found some marble tablets giving the result of a plebiscite taken in the year 1866 in Venetia, They tell us that Great Problems of British Statesmanship IS 3 641,000 of the inhabitants voted for a reunion of Venetia with Italy, and only 68 against it. Austria has never known how to gain the affection of the people over whom she has ruled. She occupied Venetia from 1815 to 1866. In fifty-one years she gained among the inhabitants 68 adher- ents and 641,000 enemies. If to-day a plebiscite should be taken in the Italian Tyrol, in Trieste, Pola, and the other Italian towns on the Dalmatian coast, "the result would probably be similar. At one time or another Verona, Venice, Milan, Florence, Turin, Naples, Palermo, Lombardy, Venetia, Toscana, the southern half of Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia — ^in fact, practically all Italy, except the States of the Church — were Austrian, but nowhere in Italy will a man be found who regrets Austria's departure or who speaks of her occupation with affection, or even with esteem. In Italy, as elsewhere, Austria has solely been an influence for evil. Although Trieste, Pola, and Fiume, and part of Istria and Dalmatia are inhabited by many Italians, it is by no means certain that these towns and districts will revert to Italy after a defeat of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Ports and coastal positions are of value because of the hinterland which furnishes them with trade. Large inland States lying near the coast have the strongest claims upon natural outlets towards the ocean. The Italian towns on the east coast of the Adriatic are ancient Venetian trading stations, and behind and around them live about 10,000,000 Serbs in compact masses, the Serbians in Serbia proper, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Dalmatia, and the Serbo-Croats in Croatia-Slavonia. The Italians cannot expect that a Greater Serbia will consent to be deprived of adequate harbours. Italian and Serbian claims will have to be harmonised. Serbia does not intend seizing Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and Croatia-Slavonia by force ; but if these lands are dissatisfied with Austrian rule, and wish to shake it off and unite with Serbia, the Serbs will certainly not 134 The Problern of Austria-Hungary deny them. The Serbians in Serbia have laeen ill-treated in the past by Austria, as has been shown in another part of this chapter. Ever since the Eusso-Turkish War, Austria- Hungary, covetous of Serbia's territory, has endeavoured to ruin that country by preventing her gaining an outlet to the sea, by controlling her foreign trade overland and by arbitrarily interrupting and destroying it by closing the frontier against Serbia under mendacious pretexts. In 1885 the Austrians brought about war between Serbia and Bulgaria for their own ends. They favoured the out- break of the first Balkan War, hoping for Serbia's destruction. When the Allies were victorious, Austria-Hungary prevented Serbia securing the smallest outlet on the sea, and then encouraged Bulgaria to attack that country, hoping that the second Balkan War would lead to Serbia's downfall. Having suffered so much at Austria's hands in the past, the heroic Serbians wish to make themselves secure for the future by establishing a Greater Serbia, a State of 10,000,000 inhabitants, at Austria's cost, and obtaining adequate outlets to the sea. Probably they will succeed. Their heroism and their sufferings deserve a full reward. Of the. territory of Hungary, 105,811 square kilometres contain a population of which 77-61 per cent, are Magyars, 85,026 square kilometres have a population of which only 25-63 per cent, are Magyars, and 74-32 per cent. non-Magyars. Of these, the majority are Slavs. Of the population of the remaining territory of 88,650 square kilometres, 25-09 per cent, are Magyars, while the majority are Koumanians. Of the whole of Hungary, four-tenths are essentially Magyar territory, three-tenths are essentially Slavonic territory, and three-tenths are Eoumanian territory. In a table given in the beginning of this article, the strength of the Magyars in Hungary was stated to be 10,051,000, according to the census of 1910. This figure is greatly exaggerated. In order to swell their numbers, the Magyars have manipulated the census. The citizens are asked, in the census forms which they have 'to fill up, Chxat Problems of British Statesmanship 135 to state the language which they speak best or hke best. In view of the pressure exercised by the ruhng Magyars, many non-Magyars profess that they hke Magyar best, even if they do not understand the language, and they appear as Magyars in the census. Besides, the ruhng Magyars have put pressure upon the non-Magyars to Magyarise their names. Schoolmasters, post-office officials, and railwaymen in Government services are compelled to Magyarise their names. As a further inducement, the cost of Magyarising one's name was reduced in 1881 from 10 crowns to 10 pence. As an aristocratic Magyar name is a great advantage in society and in business, men with com- mon non-Magyar names have provided themselves for ten- pence with the most aristocratic Magyar names. Mr. Seton- Watson has told us in his excellent book, ' Eacial Problems in Hungary,' that Toldy, the author, was originally called Schebel ; Hunfalvy, the ethnologist, Hundsdorfer ; Munkacsy, the painter, Lieb ; Arminius Vambery, Bamberger ; Petofi, the poet, Petrovic ; Zsedenyi, the politician, Pfannschmied ; Iranyi, Halbschuh ; Helfy, Heller ; Komlossy, Kleinkind ; Polonyi, Pollatschek, &c. The Magyars have Magyarised all non-Hungarian place-names. Ancient Pressburg was turned into Pozsony, Hermannstadt into Nagy-Szeben, Earchdrauf into Szepes-Varalja, &c. According to official Hungarian statistics, the Magyars are about one-half of the Hungarian population. According to the most reliable non-Magyar authorities, they are only about one-third, numbering from 7,000,000 to 8,000,000. In Hungary, as in Austria, one-third of the population rules over the remaining two-thirds. On paper Hungary is the most liberal country in the world. It has possessed a Parliament and a Constitution since the dawn of its history. However, under the cloak of liberalism and legality, Hungary exercises the most arbi- trary and tyrannous government over the non-Magyars. Although Magyars and non-Magyars are on paper equal before the law, and are nominally fully represented in the 136 The Problem of Austria-Hungary Parliament at Budapest, the representatives in the Hun- garian ParHament represent neither the subject national- ities nor the masses of the people, but only the Magyar oligarchy. This is strikingly proved by the following table, which shows the composition of the Hungarian Parlia- ment during the five last electoral periods : Result of Hungarian TJcclionx. Mastyars, — including a Socialists Roumanians Slovaks Serbs Total 1896 descripts 412 1 413 1901 408 4 1 413 1905 402 1 8 1 1 413 1906 387 14 7 5 413 1910 404 1 o 3 413 Of the 413 members of the Hungarian Parhament about 400 are Magyars. The preponderant number of non-Magyars and the numerous Socialists send the remain- ing thirteen members. As representation shapes legislation, the legislation of Hungary is pro-Magyar and hostile to the non-Magyars, to the Sociahsts, and to the common people. Of the men of voting age onl}^ about one -fourth are given the franchise. As a high property qualification is required, only the well-to-do can vote. The non-Magyars of Hungary are poor, partly because the Magyars settled in the rich plains whence they drove the non-Magyars, partly because in districts where Magyars and non-Magyars dwell together, the former have secured for themselves the greater part of the wealth and the best land by violence and by political pressure. The non-Magyars are disfranchised not only by a high property quahfication, but by deliberate violence and trickery. If we look into the electoral statistics we find that the more Roumanian a county is, the fewer voters does it possess. We find further that the larger a con- Great Problems of British Statesmanship 137 stituency is, the farther frorn its centre is placed the solitary polHng booth. At election time bridges are often broken down or declared unsafe for the passage of vehicles, in order to force opposition voters either to walk impossible distances, or lose their vote, and with the same object in vidw all the horses in the outlying villages are often placed under veterinary supervision at the last moment. The voting is not secret, but public, and by word of mouth. Non-Magyars are thus publicly terrorised into voting orally for Magyar members. Thousands of voters are disqualified for flimsy reasons by the presiding Magyar when intending to vote for the opposition candidate. Often hundreds and thousands of voters, who have travelled all day to the polling booth, are prevented hy large forces of military and gendarmes from voting or from entering the village where the poll takes place. At election times Hungary mobilises her whole army in order to terrorise the opposition voters, and if these insist upon their legal right of voting, they are frequently attacked by armed mobs or shot down by the gendarmes and the military. Every Hungarian election is accompanied by bloodshed. According to Danzer's Armeezeitung of June 6, 1910, Hungary mobilised for the election of that year 202 battalions of infantry, 126 squadrons of cavalry, and in addition had Austrian troops sent from Lower Austria, Styria, and Moravia to Hungary. The cost of ' maintaining order ' was estimated by the journal named at from 15,000,000 crowns to 20,000,000 crowns. The Magyars monopolise not only Parhament but the Civil Service, the law, and the schools as well. Although, according to the Law of Nationalities, the State should erect schools of all kinds for the non-Magyar races, it has never erected a single secondary school where any other language but Magyar is used. Instead of this it has Magyarised the few existing non-Magyar secondary schools and dissolved the rest. Of the thirty-nine intermediate schools in the Slovak counties, not a single one provides 138 The Problem of Austria-Hungary instruction in the language of the people, and in the districts inhabited by Kuthenians the same condition prevails. Of the eighty-nine secondary schools directly controlled by the State none are non-Magyar, The ruling Magyars most effectively prevent the non- Magyar people from improving their condition by excluding them from the intermediate schools and the universities. As the Magyars form nominally one-half, but in reality only one-third, of the population, they should furnish at best one half of the scholars and students at the intermediate schools and universities. In reahty the overwhelming majority~of those who attend the higher educational establishments are Magyars. According to the Magyar statistics for the year 1911, 49,482 pupils attending the classical intermediate schools were Magyars, and only 11,131 were non-Magyars. For every non-Magyar there were nearly five Magyars. In the non- classical intermediate schools there were 2316 non-Magyars and 8372 Magyars. In the intermediate schools for girls there were only 572 non-Magyars and 5746 Magyars. In the training schools for male teachers there were 1021 Qon-Magyars and 3856 Magyars. In those for female teachers there were 481 non-Magayars and 4386 Magyars. In the maternity schools there were 56 non-Magyars and 448 Magyars. In the music schools there were 2313 non- Magyars and 7471 Magyars. In the post and telegraph school there were 23 non-Magyars and 255 Magyars. As all those who wish to enter into a professional career or into Government service must have passed through the intermediate schools, the vast preponderance of Magyar pupils at these schools effectively prevents large numbers of non-Magyars from becoming doctors, lawyers, teachers, civil servants, judges, mihtary officers, &c. In 1911 "there were at all the Hungarian universities 10,653 Magyar students and only 1273 non-Magyar students. For every non-Magyar student there were eight Magyars. We can, therefore, not wonder that Magyars occupy all the best Gy'eat Problems of British Statesman ship 139 places in Hungary, especially as in making appointments Magyars are favoured and non-Magyars discouraged. Franz Deak, one of the greatest Hungarian statesmen, said in a speech delivered on January 23, 1872 : Every nationality has a right to demand ways and means for the education of its children. If we wish to force the children of the nationalities dwelhng in Hungary to study in the Magyar language, although they do not know it, or know it only slightly, we should make it impossible for them to make progress. Parents would in vain spend their money upon education, and the children would waste their time. If we desire to win over the nationahties, then we must not endeavour to Magyarise them at any price. We can Magyarise them only if we make them . satisfied citizens of Hungary who are fond of the life and conditions prevaihng in it. Notwithstanding the warning of Deak and of other founders of the Hungarian State, the ruling Magyars have endeavoured to force the Magyar language upon the non- Magyars by the most tyrannous means. If we look at the educational statistics, we find that the non-Magyar schools are rapidly decreasing in number and the Magyar schools rapidly increasing. In purely non-Magyar districts Magyar schools are planted, and in order to force the children to learn Magyar from the cradle, compulsory kindergarten schools are opened in the non-Magyar districts, where children from threB to six years old have to attend. Notwithstanding the most far-reaching guarantees that the character and language of the other nationalities would be respected, Magyar is the official language in Hungary. All public proclamations and notices are issued in Magyar, and the proceedings in the law courts take place in that language, even when neither prosecutor nor defendant understands it. Eoumanian peasants, ignorant of Magyar, and living in purely Eoumanian districts, have to employ Magyar in their intercourse with the authorities, and if they go to law they have to provide themselves with costly 140 The Problem of Austria-Hungary and often inefficient translators and interpreters. Local government, even in practically purely non-Magyar districts, is monopolised by Magyars. The non-Magyars are strangers in their own country. Numerically the most important non-Magyar race in Hungary are the Eoumanians. According to the official statistics, they number 2,949,000. In reaHty their number is greater, and close to them live 275,000 Eoumanians in the Austrian Bukovina. A glance at the map shows that the kingdom of Roumania possesses a very awkward shape. It consists of two long and narrow strips of land which are joined together at a right angle. The land lying in the hollow of that angle consists of the Austrian Bukovina and of the Hungarian districts of Transylvania and the Banat. Owing to its awkward shape, the concentrated Roumanian army can defend the national territory only with great difficulty against an invader. The acquisition of the Austrian and Hungarian territories, inhabited nearly exclusively by Roumanians, would fill up the hollow and w^ould convert Roumania into a shapely and easily defensible State. The Roumanians in the kingdom of Roumania have during many years observed with sorrow and indignation the pitiful position of their brothers who live under Magyar rule, and their leaders have frequently and most emphatic- ally warned the Hungarian Government that its anti-Rou- manian policy might have very serious consequences to Hungary. When, in November, 1868, Count Andrassy intimated to King, then only Prince, Charles of Roumania that Roumania and Hungary should go hand in hand. King Charles replied, according to his Memoirs : I recognise the advantages of a complete understanding between Hungary and Roumania. However, I must make this reservation — that I can work hand in hand with Hungary only when Hungary has changed her policy towards the Roumanians in Transylvania. I cannot abolish the natural sympathies which exist between the Roumanians on both Great Problems of British Statesmanshij) 141 sides of the political boundary. I am therefore entitled to expect that the Hungarian Government will do every- • thing that is right and fair in deahng with the real interests of its Koumanian subjects. In expressing this wish I do not intend to be guilty of political interference. I lay stress upon this point only because it is the principal condition for bringing about a good understanding between the two countries. Being a constitutional monarch, who owes his position to the election of the people, I am obhged to be guided by public opinion in as far as that opinion is reason- able. An open and sincere policy of kindness and goodwill on the part of the Hungarian Government towards its non- Magyar subjects would most ably support me in a policy which I am prepared to enter upon. Hungary has disregarded the emphatic and frequent warnings of King Charles and of the leading Eoumanian statesmen and publicists. Austria -Hungary was foolish enough to persecute her Italian and Eoumanian citizens after the outbreak of the present War, believing that the taking of hostages and the execution of leaders would assure their fidelity. Fidelity cannot be secured by fear. If, as appears likely, Austria-Hungary should break up, Roumania will certainly see that the Roumanians on her border will be re-united to the motherland. The subject nationalities in Austria-Hungary have been ruled by misrule, and most of them are profoundly dis- satisfied. I have shown in these pages that some of the larger nations of the Dual Monarchy are likely to be absorbed by their neighbours. Galicia, with 8,000,000 people, is hkely to be divided between Russia and Poland ; the Roumanian districts, with 4,000,000 inhabitants, should fall to Roumania ; the Serbian district, with 6,000,000 people, may go to the Serbs ; and the Italian district, with nearly 1,000,000 inhabitants, may become Itahan. Bohemia may once more become an independent State. The smaller subject nations of Austria-Hungary may be expected to follow the example of the greater. Austria-Hungary seems 142 The Problem of Austria-Hungary likely to disintegrate on racial lines. In the South-East of Europe may arise a Poland with 20,000,000 inhabitants, a Serbia with 10,000,000 inhabitants, a Hungary with 10,000,000 inhabitants, and an Austria with 10,000,000. Many people, fearing the danger of Kussia, advocate that Austria-Hungary should be preserved in its present state so as to act as an efficient counterpoise to the Kussian colossus. The preservation of the Dual Monarchy is parti- cularly strongly urged by those who fear the Pan-Slavonic danger, who believe that the Slavonic nations in the Balkan Peninsula and in Austria-Hungary will amalgamate with Russia, that Russia will, through Serbia and Bohemia, stretch out its arms as far as the Adriatic and Bavaria. That fear seems scarcely justified. The Slavonic nations outside Russia have looked to Russia as a deliverer when they were oppressed, but these nations have a strongly marked individ- uality of their own, and they have no desire, after having painfully acquired their freedom, to be merged into Russia and to disappear in that gigantic State. In the spring of 1908 representatives of the Austrian Slavs attended a great Slavonic Congress at Petrograd. Mr. Karel Kramarz, a prominent Czech politician, was at the head of the Austrian delegation, and he made to the Congress the following declaration. The Slavonic movement and Slavonic policy must be based on the principle that all Slavonic nations are equal, and their aim must consist not in an endeavour to form all Slavs into a single nation, but to develop the individual character of each of the Slavonic peoples. The aim of all Slavs should be in the first instance to increase their own national consciousness and strength, and in the second to secure their mutual co-operation for promoting their common welfare, ensuring their progress in every way and defending themselves against German aggression. This declaration is characteristic of the Slavs not only in Bohemia but elsewhere. The Bulgarians and Serbians Great Problems of British Statesmanship 143 differ greatly, although they are neighbours, and they are not likely to amalgamate. Democratic Serbia will merge itself neither in Bulgaria nor in Kussia. The Czechs also have a nationality and individuality of which they are proud. A number of small and medium-sized Slav States are likely to arise in the South-East of Europe. Those who desire to re-build Austria-Hungary after its downfall are insufficiently acquainted with the difficulty of such an undertaking. Besides, they should remember that diplomacy can correct, but must not outrage, Nature ; that a lasting peace cannot be re-estabhshed in Europe by perpetuating Austria's tyranny over her unhappy subject nations. After all, Europe's security and peace are more important than a mechanical balance of power. We have no reason to fear Kussia's aggression. There is no reason to believe that she intends to swamp her Western neighbours. After the present War, Eussia will be exhausted for decades. Her task for the future consists in organising and developing her colossal territories, providing them with roads and railways, and improving the conditions of the people. Besides, if in twenty or thirty years Eussia should embark upon a great war of conquest in the West, she would have to fight nations which will be much stronger than they are at present. The prevention of the actual German danger is far more important than the prevention of a highly problematical Slav peril of the future. Austria-Hungary has outlived her usefulness. She has always been a bad master to the unfortunate nations who have come under her sway. Since 1307, the year when Wilham Tell raised the Swiss in revolution against the Habsburgs, the history of Austria is a long history of the revolts of their subject nations. The dissolution of Austria-Hungary is merely the last incident in its recent evolution. In 1859 Austria-Hungary lost her supremacy over Italy. In 1866 she lost her supremacy over Germany. By the present War she will probably lose her supremacy over the Slavs. A nation may rule over other nations only 144 The Problem of Ausina-Hungary if it treats them with justice. Austria has always ruled with barbaric methods. The atrocious acts of which Ger- many has been guilty in Belgium and France were taught by Austria. In her campaign against Serbia she has, as usual, taken thousands of hostages among her own peoples in order to prevent their rising against the tyranny of Vieima, and she has, as usual, made barbarous war upon the weak and the helpless. Austria-Hungary is an anachronism in a modern world. The Dual Monarchy is, and has always been, only a factor for evil. In Germany's crime Austria-Hungary has been an accomplice and an accessory before the fact. Austria-Hungary has existed during many years, not owing to its own strength, but owing to Europe's toleration. Austria-Hungary is another Turkey. Her hour has struck. The Empire of the Habsburgs in its present form is Ukely to disappear. In its place will arise a number of independent States possessing a national basis which in time may federate for mutual protection. The present War has a twofold object. It is a war waged to destroy the curse of militarism and to free the subject nations from their bondage. Many people have asked by what name the present War should be known to history. It might fittingly be called the War of Libera- tion. Small nations, w^hether they are called Belgium and Holland, or Bosnia and Bohemia, are entitled to Hfe and liberty. We need not deny the small nations which should take the place of Austria-Hungary their inborn right to life and prosperity. It is true that small States, especially if they have no outlet to the sea, are greatly hampered. The future, and especially the economic future, probably belongs to the great nations. Still, the small nations can survive, and if they cannot survive singly they can live and prosper by voluntary co-operation. The small nations which are arising in the Balkan Peninsula and in that part of Europe which is now called Austria- Hungary, may be expected to conclude arrangements with their friends and sympathisers for mutual defence. A Great Problems of British Statesmanship 145 great State may arise in South-Eastern Europe. Federalism may provide the bond which Habsburg absolutism, Habsburg selfishness, and Habsburg tyranny failed to create. The provision of an efficient counterpoise to Eussia may, and should be, left to Nature and to natural evolution. CHAPTER V THE PROBLEM OF POLAND ^ A CENTURY ago, at the Congress of Vienna, the question of Poland proved extremely difficult to solve. It produced dangerous friction among the assembled Powers, and threatened to lead to the break-up of the Congress. The position became so threatening that, on January 3, 1815, Austria, Great Britain, and France felt compelled to con- clude a secret separate alliance directed against Prussia and Eussia, the allies of Austria and Great Britain in the war against Napoleon. Precautionary troop movements began, and war among the Allies might have broken out had not, shortly afterwards. Napoleon quitted Elba and landed in France. Fear of the great Corsican re-united the Powers. Because of the great and conflicting interests involved, the question of Poland may prove of similar importance and difficulty at the Congress which will conclude the present War. Hence, it seems desirable to consider it carefully and in good time. The consideration of the Polish Question seems not only useful but urgent. Henry Wheaton, the distinguished American diplomat and jurist, wrote in his classical ' History of the Law of Nations ' : ' The partition of Poland was the most flagrant violation of natural justice and International Law which has occurred since Europe first emerged from barbarism.' In Koch's celebrated ' Tableau des Revolutions de I'Europe,' written by a diplomat for the use of diplomats, and published ^ The Nineteenth Century and After, January, 1915. 146 Great Problems of British Statesmanship 147 in 1825, when the partition of Poland was still fresh in men's minds, we read : The partition of Poland must be considered the fore- runner of the total revolution of the whole political system of Europe which had been established three centuries before. Hitherto numerous alliances had been formed and many- wars had been undertaken with a view to preserving weak States against the ambitions of strong ones. Now three Great Powers com.bined to plunder a State which had given them no offence. Thus the barriers which had hitherto separated right from arbitrary might were destroyed. No weak State was any longer secure. The European balance of power became the laughing-stock of the new school, and serious men began to consider the European equihbrium a chimera. Although the Courts of St. Petersburg, Berlin, and Vienna were most strongly to blame, those of London and Paris were not free from guilt by allowing without pro- test the spoliation of Poland to take place. The Polish problem is not only a very great and extremely interesting problem, but it is unique of its kind. It can be understood only by those who are acquainted with the history of Poland and of its partitions. Many Enghshmen are unacquainted with that history. Most believe that Eussia has been the worst enemy of the Poles, that she caused the partitions, that Germany and Austria-Hungary were merely her accomplices, and that Great Britain has never taken a serious interest in Polish affairs. PoHsh history, as usually taught, is a tissue of miscon- ceptions and of falsehoods. In the following pages it will be shown that not Eussia, but Prussia, was chiefly responsible for the partitions of Poland and for the subse- quent oppression of the Poles, that Eussia and Austria were, in their Pohsh policy, merely Prussia's tools and dupes, and that England, well informed by able and conscientious diplomats, has with truly marvellous insight and consistency unceasingly recommended the adoption of that liberal and enlightened policy towards Poland which seems likely 148 The Problem of Poland to prevail at last. History has wonderfully vindicated the wisdom and the far-sightedness of British statesmen in their treatment of Polish affairs from the middle of the eighteenth century to the present day. A brief resum6 of the largely secret or unknown inner history of Poland and of its partitions is particularly interesting, because it throws a most powerful light on the true character and the inner workings of Prusso-German, Eussian, and Austrian diplomacy from the time of Frederick the Great, of the Empress Catherine the Second, and of the Empress Maria Theresa to that of Bismarck, Biilow, and Bethmann- Hollweg. I would add that much of the material given in the following pages has never been printed, and has been taken from the original documents. Frederick the Great wrote in liis ' Expose du Gouverne- ment Prussien,' his Political Te__stament, which was addressed to his successor : One of the first pohtical principles is to endeavour to become an ally of that one of one's neighbours who may become most dangerous to one's State. For that reason we Prussians have an alhance with Eussia, and thus we have our back free of danger as long as the alliance lasts. He wrote in liis ' Histoire de Mon Temps ' : Of all neighbours of Prussia the Eussian Empire is the most dangerous, both by its power and its geographical position, and those Avho will rule Prussia after me should cultivate the friendship of those barbarians because they are able to ruin Prussia altogether through the immense number of their mounted troops. Besides, one cannot repay them for the damage which they may do to us because of the poverty of that part of Eussia which is nearest to Prussia, and through which one has to pass in order to get into the Ukraine. These two passages summarise and explain Prussia's policy towards Eussia during the last century and a half, and furnish a key to her subtle and devious Pohsh pohcy. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 149 During the Seven Years' War Eussia had given to Prussia the hardest blows. Guided by the considerations given above, Frederick the Great was most anxious to make peace and to conclude an alliance with Eussia. He stated in his ' Memoirs on the Events following the Peace of Hubertusberg of 1763,' referring, like Juhus Caesar, to himself in the third person : England's faithlessness (during the Seven Years' War) had broken the bonds between Prussia and that country. The Anglo -Prussian alliance, which had been founded upon mutual interests, was followed by the most lively hostility and the most serious anger between the two States. King Frederick stood alone on the field of battle. No one was left to attack him, but at the same time no one was ready to take his part. That position of isolation was tolerable as long as it was only temporary, but it could not be allowed to continue. Soon a change took place. Towards the end of the year negotiations were begun with Eussia with a view to concluding a defensive alliance with that country. . . . The King of Prussia desired to obtain influence over Eussia. . . . The power of the Eussians is very great. Prussia still suffers from the blows which she had received from them during the Seven Years' War. It was obviously not in the interest of the Prussian King to contribute to the growth of so terrible and so dangerous a Power. Therefore two ways were open : Prussia had either to set bounds to Eussia's conquests by force, or she had to endeavour to take skilful advantage of Eussia's desire for expansion. The latter poHcy was the wiser one, and the King neglected nothing in order to carry it into effect. The desired opportunity of concluding an alliance with Eussia arose owing to the death of the Empress Ehzabeth, his great opponent, which took place on January 5, 1762. Her successor, the foohsh and imbecile Peter the Third, became a tool in Frederick's hands. He made peace with Prussia on May 5, 1762, and five weeks later, on June 8, 150 The Problem of Poland he concluded with Frederick a treaty of alliance to which the following secret articles were appended : Articles Secrets : . . . Comme I'interet de S.M.I, de toutes les Eussies et de S.M. le roi de Prusse exige qu'on porte un soin attentif a ce que la republique de Pologne soit maintenue dans son droit de libre election, et qu'il ne soit permis ni concede a personne d'en faire un royaume hereditaire, ou bien meme de s'eriger en prince souverain, LL.MM. I'Empereur de toutes les Eussies et le roi de Prusse se sont promis mutuellement et se sont engagees de la maniere la plus solennelle, a ce que, dans tous les cas et dans toutes les circonstances, si quelqu'un et qui que ce soit voulaifc entreprendre de depouiller la repub- lique de Pologne de son droit de libre election, ou d'en faire un royaume hereditaire, ou de s'eriger soi-meme en souverain, LL.MM. de Eussie et de Prusse ne le permettront pas ; mais qu'au contraire elles ecarteront, repousseront et met- tront a neant de toutes manieres et par tous les moyens, des projets si injustes et si dangereux aux puissances voisines, en se concertant mutuellement, en reunissant leurs forces et meme en ayant recours aux amies, si les circonstances I'exigeaient. De plus, les deux puissances s'uniront pour faire tomber le choix sur un Piast, apres la mort du roi actuel Auguste II, et elles se concerteront sur le choix du candidat le plus convenable. Articles S Spares : . . . S.M.I, de Eussie efc S.M. le roi de Prusse, voyantavec beaucoup de chagrin la dure oppression dans laquelle vivent, depuis bien des annees, leurs coreligionnaires de Pologne et de Lithuanie, se sont reunies et alhees pour proteger de leur mieux tous les habitants de la Pologne et du grand-duche de Lithuanie, qui professent les reHgions grecque, reformee et lutherienne, et qui y sont connus sous le nom dissidents, et veulent faire tous leurs efforts pour obtenir du roi et de la republique de Pologne, par des representations fortes et amicales, que ces memes dissidents soient reintegres dans leurs privileges, liberies, droits et prerogatives qui leur avaient ete accordes et concedes par le passe. Exactly a month later, during the night from July 8 Great Problems of British Statesmanship 151 to 9, Czar Peter was deposed and his wife, Catherine the Second, was elevated to the throne. On July 17 Peter the Third was assassinated. By the Secret Articles quoted, Eussia and Prussia pledged themselves to maintain with their whole united strength the right of free election in Poland, to prevent the estabUshment of a hereditary Polish kingsliip, to cause the election of a ' Piast ' suitable to Eussia and Prussia in case of the death of the ruling King, Augustus the Second. By the Separate Article given above, Eussia and Prussia further agreed to protect with all their power the Poles belonging to the Eussian Orthodox and to the Lutheran rehgion who at the time did not enjoy full citizen rights in that Eoman Catholic State. Many years before that treaty of alliance was concluded, when Eussia was disunited, weak and overrun by Eastern hordes, Poland was a powerful State. It had conquered large portions of Eussia, including the towns of Moscow and Kieff. Hence, many Eussians saw in Poland their hereditary enemy and endeavoured, not unnaturally, to keep that country weak and disunited. Poland was a republic presided over by an elected king. All the power was in the hands of a numerous and mostly impecunious nobility. The State was weak because of two peculiar institutions — an elected king, who might be either a Pole or a stranger, and the Liberum Veto. In consequence of the latter the resolutions of the Polish Diet had to be unanimous. The Veto of a single man could prevent the passage of any measure and cripple the Government. The Liberum Veto, possessed by the numerous aristocracy, and the election of a king, whose power was jealously circum- scribed by the ruling nobility, made anarchy and disorder permanent in Poland, and weakened that country to the utmost. While patriotic Poles desired to estabhsh the strength and security of the State by reforming their Govern- ment, by abolishing the Liberum Veto, replacing it by majority rule, and by making kingship hereditary, their 152 The Problem of Poland enemies wished to perpetuate Polish anarchy in order to take advantage of it. In the Treaty of Constantinople, concluded between Turkey and Eussia in 1700, during the reign of Peter the Great, we find already an attempt on Eussia's part to perpetuate disorder and anarchy in Poland by ' guaranteeing ' the preservation of the vicious Polish constitution. In Article Twelve of that Treaty we read : Le czar declare de la maniere la plus formelle qu'il ne s'appropriera rien du territoire de la Pologne, et qu'il ne se melera point du gouvernement de cette Eepublique. Et comme il importe aux deux empires d'empecher que la souverainete et la succession hereditaire ne soient point attachees a la couronne de Pologne, ils s'unissent a I'effet de maintenir les droits, privileges et constitutions de cet Etat. Et au cas que quelque puissance qui que ce soit envoyat des troupes en Pologne, ou qu'elle cherchat a y introduire la souverainete et la succession hereditaire, il sera non seule- ment permis a chacune des puissances contractantss de prendre telles mesures que son propre interet lui dictera, mais les deux Etats empecheront, par toutes les voies possibles, que la couronne de Pologne n'acquiere la souve- rainete et la succession hereditaire ; que les droits et constitu- tions de la Eepublique ne soient point violes ; et qu'aucun demembrement de son territoire ne puisse avoir lieu. Following the policy which Peter the Great had initiated with some reason against Poland, Eussia and Prussia agreed by the Secret Articles quoted not only to keep Poland weak and distracted by preserving the constitutional dis- order of that country, and preventing all reform, but they further agreed to use all their influence with a view to having elected a king suitable to themselves. Besides, they agreed to create the most serious difficulties to the Eepublic by protecting the non-Eoman Catholic Poles. In her secret instructions, sent on November 6, 1763, to Count Keyserling and Prince Eepnin, her Ambassadors in Warsaw, Catharine the Second, acting in conjunction with Frederick the Great, gave orders that the gentle Great Problems of British StatesmanshijJ 153 Count Poniatowski, her former favourite and lover, should be elected. She placed large funds at the disposal of her Ambassadors for the purpose of bribery, and gave directions that, if the Poles should oppose Poniatowski's election, Russian troops, acting in conjunction with Prussian soldiers, should treat all opponents to the Russo-Prussian candidate as rebels and enemies. We read in that most interesting secret document : ... II est indispensable que nous portions sur le trone de Pologne un Piast a notre convenance, utile a nos interets reels, en un mot un homme qui ne doive son elevation qu'a nous seuls. Nous trouvons dans la personne du comte Poniatowski, panetier de Lithuanie, toutes les conditions necessaires a notre convenance, et en consequence nous avons resolu de I'elever au trone de Pologne. . . . . . . Que si quelqu'un osait s'opposer a cette election, troubler I'ordre public de la republique, former des confedera- tions contre un monarque legitimement elu ; alors, sans aucune declaration prealable, nous ordonnerons a nos troupes d'envahir en meme temps sur tous les points le territoire polonais, de regarder nos adversaires comme rebelles, perturbateurs, et de detruire par le fer et par le feu leurs biens et leurs proprietes. Dans ce cas, nous nous concerterons avec le roi de Prusse, et vous, de votre cote, vous vous entendrez avec son ministre resident a Varsovie. Soon it was whispered that Russia and Prussia had agreed to partition Poland. These rumours were indignantly and most emphatically denied by Frederick the Great and Catharine the Second. Frederick the Great made on January 24, 1764, the following public declaration through his Ambassador in Warsaw : . . . Les faux bruits qui se sont repandus dans le royaume et que les ennemis de la tranquillite publique ne cessent de divulguer, que les cours de Prusse et de Russie voulaient profiter des circonstances presentes pour demembrer la Pologne ou la Lithuanie, et que le concert de ces deux cours tendait uniquement a y faire des acquisitions aux depens 154 The Problem of Poland de la republique ; ces bruits, qui sont aussi denues de vrai- semblance que de fondement, ont porte le soussigne a les contredire, non-seulement de bouche, mais aussi par una note prealable reraise au prince primat. . . . . . . Sa Majeste le roi de Prusse ne travaille et ne travail- lera constamment qu'a maintenir les Etats de la republique en leur entier. S.M. I'imperatrice de Kussie ay ant le meme en vue, ce n'est que dans un pareil but que le roi s'est con- certe avec elle. The statement of the Prussian Ambassador was followed by a letter from Frederick the Great himself to the Prince Primate of Poland on July 24, in which the King, in sonorous Latin phrases, stated that he was most anxious ' ut libertates et possessiones reipublicae, sartae omnino et intactae maneant. Haec est sincera' \ et constans animi nostri sententia.' Catharine the Second, with similar unequivocal directness, publicly declared : ... Si jamais I'esprit de mensonge a pu inventer une faussete complete, c'est lorsqu'on a audacieusement repandu que, dans le dessein que nous avons de favoriser I'election d'un Piast, nous n'avions pour but que de nous faciliter les moyens d'envahir, par son secours ou son concours, quelque morceau du territoire de la couronne de Pologne ou du grand-duche de Lithuanie, pour le demembrer du royaume et le mettre sous notre domination par usurpation. Ce bruit, si peu fonde et invente aussi mal a propos, tombe de lui-meme comme denue de toute sorte de vraisemblance. The British diplomats hesitated to accept these solemn declarations. Mr. Thomas Wroughton, the British Am- bassador to Poland, reported on June 15, 1763, from Dresden to his Government, enclosing the Empress's Declara- tion of May 2, 1763 : The enclosed declaration of the Empress of Kussia ap- pears to me to be very f ague ; the idea here is that there is certainly an understanding between the King of Prussia and that Sovereign to divide the major part of the Polish Do- Great Problems of British Statesmanship 155 minions between them. I cannot by any means adopt this sentiment, conceiving it to be inconsistent with the interest of either of them. The manner in which that unfortunate country is treated on both sides shows that they are as much absolute masters of it as possible, and that without awaken- ing the jealousy of their neighbours. Eussia is inattackable on that side at present, which she would not be if she appro- priated to herself that barrier. I can easily imagine Polish Prussia and the town of Dantzig to be tempting objects to the King of Prussia, but would even Eussia, on whatever amicable footing she may be, permit him to make so formid- able an acquisition on that side and so dangerous for the Baltick Navigation when in the hands of so great a Prince ? By bribery and persuasion, and by ruthless intimida- tion, supported by the threatening presence of a large body of Eussian troops brought into the Polish capital, the Eussian and Prussian Ambassadors secured in 1764 the election of Count Poniatowski to the Polish tlirone. He reigned in the name Stanislaus Augustus. Soon after his election the Empress Catharine, supported by Frederick the Great, demanded that the dissenters of Poland should be given equal rights with the Eoman Catholics, and these demands were backed by force. In his ' Memoirs ' Frederick the Great described this as follows : Towards the end of 1765 the Polish Diet came again together. The Empress of Eussia had declared herself Protectress of the Dissenters, part of whom belonged to the Greek religion. She demanded that they should be per- mitted to exercise their religion freely and to obtain official positions on a footing of equality with the other Poles. This demand was the cause of all the disturbances and wars which soon broke out. The Prussian Ambassador handed to the Polish Diet a memoir demonstrating that his Master, the King of Prussia, could not view with indifference the abolition of the Liberum Veto, the introduction of new taxa- tion, and the increase of the Polish Army, and the Polish Eepublic acted in accordance with Prussia's representations. 156 The Prohlem of Poland The Dissenters were hostile to the ruling Poles. In view of the existence of the Liberum Vote, by means of which a single dissentient could bring the machinery of Parliament and Government to a standstill, the demands made by Eussia and Prussia could be fulfilled only if the Liberum Veto was replaced by majority rule. However, acting in accordance with their secret treaty, Eussia and Prussia opposed that most necessary reform. The demands made by Eussia and Prussia on behalf of Dissenters were particularly unwarrantable if we remember that even now Poles cannot obtain ' official positions on a footing of equality ' either in Prussia or in Eussia. However, notwithstanding the unreasonableness of the request, the new King, who possessed far more patriotism than Frederick the Great and Catharine the Second had believed, promised to fulfil their demands if he was given sufficient time. Sir G. Macartney, the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, reported on November 28 (December 7), 1766 : The King of Poland five months ago declared to Mr. Panin by his Minister that if Eussia would act moderately he would undertake in this Diet to obtain for the dissidents the free exercise of their religion, and in the next he would endeavour, nay promise, to render them not only capable of Juridicatory Starosties, but of being elected to the Nuncia- ture. Unfortunately this proposal did not content the Court of Petersburg. She [the Empress] thought it possible to obtain everything she demanded, and did not compre- hend the difficulty, the impossibility, of persuading a Great Assembly [the most august part of which consists of Ecclesi- asticks] to grant all at once without hesitation free participa- tion of their privileges to a set of men whom they have been taught to look upon as equally their spiritual and temporal enemies. The King of Prussia by his minister here en- deavours by all methods, per fas et nefas, to irritate this Court against the Poles, and as an indiscreet zeal for religion has never been reckoned among that Monarch's weaknesses, his motives are shrewdly suspected to be much deeper than they are avowed to be. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 157 Driven to despair by the threats of armed interference, made by the Eussian and Prussian Ambassadors, King Stanislaus Augustus appealed on October 5, 1766, to Catharine the Second in a most touching private letter, which, alluding to their former intimacy and love, ended as follows : Lorsque vous m'avez recommande au choix de cette nation, vous n'avez assurement pas voulu que je devinsse I'objet de ses maledictions ; vous ne comptiez certainement pas non plus elever dans ma personne un but aux traits de vos armes. Je vous conjure de voir cependant que si tout ce que le prince Repnin m'a annonce se verifie, il n'y a pas de milieu pour moi : il faut que je m'expose a vos coups, ou que je trahisse ma nation et mon devoir. Vous ne m'auriez pas voulu roi, si j'etais capable du dernier. La Foudre est entre vos mains, mais la lancerez-vous sur la tete innocente de celui qui vous est depuis si longtemps le plus tendrement et le plus sincerement attache ? Madame, De Votre Majeste Imperiale le bon frere, ami et voisin, Stanislas-Auguste, roi. The King pleaded in vain. Catharine the Second and Frederick the Great were freethinkers. Their championship of the rights of the Dissenters was merely a pretext for crippling Poland completely and for interfering in that country with a view to partitioning it. Mr. Thomas Wroughton, the British Ambassador in Poland, sent on October 29, 1766, a despatch to his Government, in which we read : I had another long conversation with the King, who represented to me in the most touching colours the situation of his affairs and the manner in which he thinks himself and the nation treated. He saw himself, he said, upon the brink of the most serious danger ; that he was determined to suffer all rather than betray his country, or act like a dishonest man ; that Her Imperial Majesty had never pre- tended to more than procuring the Protestants the full exercise of their religion, and that he had laboured for many 158 The Problem of Poland months past on that plan ; that this sudden and violent resolution of the Empress to put them on a level with his other subjects convinced him that religion was only a pretext, and that she and the King of Prussia, repenting of having placed a man on the throne that worked for the elevation of his country, were taking measures to overset what they themselves had done ; that he awaited the event with the utmost tranquillity, conscious of having ever acted on the principles of Justice and Patriotism. The British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Andrew Mitchell, confirmed in his despatches the views of his colleagues in Petersburg and Warsaw as to the ultimate aims of Russia and Prussia in Poland. He wrote, for instance, on November 22, 1766 : Neither the Empress of Russia nor the King of Prussia would wish to see such an alteration in the constitution of Poland as could not fail to render the Republick more independent, more powerful, and of more weight and importance than it has hitherto been in Europe. Before the first partition of Poland the Province of East Prussia was separated from the rest of the Kingdom of Prussia by Polish territory. The present Province of West Prussia, with Thorn, Dantzig, and the mighty Eiver Vistula, formed then part of Poland. Frederick strove to acquire that province, and with this object in view he had advocated the partition of Poland with Russia. How- ever, an event occurred which seriously affected the King's plans. In 1768 war broke out between Russia and Turkey. It was long drawn out and, to Frederick's dismay, Russia proved victorious. The King strongly desired the existence of a powerful Turkey friendly to Prussia, which, in case of need, might afford valuable support to Prussia by attacking Russia in the flank or Austria in the rear. The King wrote in his ' Memoirs ' : It was in no way in Prussia's interest to see the Ottoman Power altogether destroyed. In case of need excellent use Great Problems of British Statesmanship 159 could be made of it for causing a diversion either in Hungary or in Eussia in the event that Prussia was at war either with Austria or with the Muscovite Power. Germany's traditional philo-Turkish policy was originated not by Bismarck and William the Second, but by Frederick the Great. During a long time Frederick strove to bring about a war between Eussia and Austria by telling the Austrians that if Eussia should conquer large portions of Turkey she would become too powerful, and would become dangerous to Austria herself, that Austria should not tolerate the Eussians crossing the Danube. As his attempts at involving these two States in war proved unsuccessful, he resolved to divert Eussia's attention from the Balkan Peninsula to Poland, and for greater security he wished to make use of Austria as a tool and a partner in his designs. As Maria Theresa, the Austrian Empress, refused to take a hand in the partition of Poland, he began to work upon her son and successor. Joseph the Second, born in 1741, was at the time young, enthusiastic, inexperienced, hasty, vain, and he thirsted for glory. He envied Frederick's successes. Playing upon his vanity and upon that of Prince Kaunitz, the leading Austrian statesman, Frederick the Great obtained their support for partitioning Poland. After a long but fruitless resistance against her son and her principal adviser, Maria Theresa signed, it is said with tears in her eyes, on March 4, 1772, the Partition Treaty. However, in signing it, she expressed her dissent and dis- approval in the following prophetic phrase : Placet, puisque tant et de savants personnages veulent qu'il en soit ainsi ; mais, longtemps apres ma mort, on verra ce qui resulte d'avoir ainsi foule aux pieds tout ce que jusqu'a present on a toujours tenu pour juste et pour sacre. To preserve the appearance of legitimacy the partitioning Powers wished to receive the consent of the Polish Diet to 160 The Problem of Poland their act of spoliation. Frederick the Great describes how that consent was obtained. After mentioning that each of the partitioning Powers sent an army to Poland to over- awe the people, and that Warsaw was occupied by troops, he wrote in his ' Memoirs ' : At first the Poles were obstinate and rejected all proposals. The representatives did not come to Warsaw. Having grown tired of the long delay, the Court of Vienna proposed to appoint a day for the opening of the Diet, threatening that in case of the non-appearance of the delegates, the three Powers would partition not merely part but the whole of the country. If, on the other hand, the cession of the out- lying districts was effected by voluntary agreement, the foreign troops vfould be withdrawn from Poland. That declaration overcame all difficulties. The Treaty of Cession was signed with Prussia on the 18th of September, and Poland was guaranteed the integrity of her remaining provinces. . . . The Poles, who are the most easy-going and most foolish nation in Europe, thought at first that they could safely consent because they would be able to destroy the work of the three Powers within a short time. They argued thus in the hope that Piussia might be defeated by Turkey. At the first partition Prussia, Austria, and Eussia were, according to their treaty concluded with Poland, to take certain vast but clearly defined territories from that unhappy State. However, by fraud and violence they greatly exceeded the stipulated limits. Frederick the Great tells us with his habitual cynical candour : The Poles complained loudly that the Austrians and Prussians increased their shares without limit. There was some reason for these complaints. The Austrians used a very wrong map of Poland on which the names of the rivers Sbruze and Podhorze had been exchanged, and making use of this pretext enlarged their portion very greatly beyond the limits agreed upon by the Treaty of Partition. The basis of the Treaty had been that the shares of the three Great Problems of British Statesmanship 161 Powers should be equal. As the Austrians had increased their share, King Frederick considered himself justified in doing likewise, and included in Prussia the districts of the old and the new Netze. Careful study of the ' Memoirs ' and of the diplomatic and private correspondence of the time shows convincingly that Frederick the Great was the moving spirit, and that he was responsible for the first partition of Poland, that Kussia and Austria were merely his tools and his dupes. He has told us in his ' Memoirs ' that he sent the original plan of partition to Petersburg, attributing it to the fertile brain of a visionary statesman. Count Lynar. The late Lord Salisbury wrote in his valuable essay ' Poland,' published in the Quarterly Bevieio in 1863, in which, by the by, he treated the claims of the Poles with little justice : By a bold inversion of the real degreed of guilt the chief blame is laid on Eussia. Prussia is looked upon as a pitiful and subordinate accomplice, while Austria is almost absolved as an unwilling accessory. . . . To Frederick the Great of Prussia belongs the credit of having initiated the scheme which was actually carried into execution. It is now admitted, even by German historians, that the first partition was proposed to Catharine by Prince Henry of Prussia on behalf of his brother Frederick, and with the full acquiescence of Joseph, Emperor of Germany. Frederick had never been troubled with scruples upon the subject of territorial acquisition, and he was not likely to commence them in the case of Poland. Spoliation was the hereditary tradition of his race. The whole history of the kingdom over which he ruled was a history of lawless annexation. It was formed of territory filched from other races and other Powers, and from no Power so liberally as from Poland. The fact that Frederick the Great was responsible for the first partition of Poland is acknowledged not only by leading German historians, but even by the German school- fcooks. As an excuse, it is usually stated that necessity 162 The Problem of Poland compelled Frederick to propose that step because the anarchy prevailing in Poland made impossible its continued existence as an independent State. However, German writers never mention that the Poles themselves earnestly wished to reform the State, and that Frederick not only opposed that reform but greatly increased disorder by putting his own nominee on the PoHsh throne, by causing civil war to break out in the country, by raising the Polish Dissenters against the Government, by occupying Poland in con- junction with Eussia, by interfering with its elections and Government, and by bribing and overawing its Legislature by armed force. The second partition of Poland in 1793 is perhaps even more disgraceful to Prussia than was the first, because it involved that country and her King in an act of incredible treachery. Frederick the Great died in 1786. His successor, Frederick William the Second, was a worthless individual, and he brought about the second partition by means which his uncle would have disdained. Mr. M. S. F. Scholl, a German diplomat of standing, described in Koch's classical * Tableau des Kevolutions de I'Europe,' which is still much used by students of history, and especially by diplomats, the infamous way in which Prussia betrayed Poland at the time of the second partition in the following words : While in France, during the Eevolution, the nation was seized by a sudden rage and abohshed all institutions and all law and order, giving itself up to excesses which one would have thought to be impossible, another nation in the North of Europe, which was plunged in anarchy and oppressed by its neighbours, made a noble effort to establish good order and to throw off its foreign yoke. The Poles had persuaded themselves that they might be able to change their vicious Constitution and to give renewed strength to the Government of the Polish Eepublic during a time when Eussia was occupied with wars against Sweden and Turkey. An Extraordinary Diet was convoked at Warsaw, and in order to abolish the inconvenience of Great Problems of British Statesmanship 163 the liberum veto, which required unanimity of votes, it adopted the form of a Confederation. The Empress, Catharine the Second of Kussia, approached the Pohsh Diet and endeavoured to conclude with it an alhance against the Turks. Her plan was spoiled by the King of Prussia, who, in consequence of arrangements made with England, did all in his power to rouse the Poles against the Eussians, He encouraged them by offering them his alliance to under- take the reformation of their Government which Prussia had recently guaranteed. A Committee of the Pohsh Diet was instructed to draw up a plan of a Constitution designed to regenerate the Kepublic. The resolution taken by the Diet was likely to displease the Empress of Eussia, who considered that step as a formal breach of the Treaty between Eussia and Poland concluded in 1775. As the Poles could foresee that the changes which they desired to effect were likely to involve them in differences with the Empress of Eussia, they ought before all to have thought of preparing their defence. However, instead of improving their finances and strengthening their army, the Diet lost much in discussing the projected new Constitution. Prussia's protection, of which they had officially been as- sured, made the Poles too confident. The alliance which the King of Prussia actually concluded with the Eepublic on March 27, 1790, gave them a feeling of absolute security. King Stanislaus Augustus hesitated a long time as to the attitude which he should adopt. At last he joined that party of the Diet which desired to draw Poland out of the humiliating position in which she had fallen. The new Constitution was proclaimed on May 3, 1791. Although that Constitution was not perfect, it was in accordance with Poland's conditions. It corrected the vices of her ancient laws, and although it was truly Eepublican in spirit, it avoided the exaggerated ideas to which the French Eevolution had given rise. The throne was made hereditary. The absurd liberum veto was abolished. The Diet was declared permanent and the legislative body was divided into two chambers. The lower one was to discuss laws. The upper one, the Senate, presided over by the King, was to sanction them and to exercise the veto. The 164 The Problem of Poland executive power was entrusted to the King and a Council of Supervision composed of seven responsible Ministers. . . . The exertions made by the Poles for ensuring their independence aroused Eussia's anger. As soon as the Empress of Kussia had concluded peace with Turkey, she induced her supporters in Poland to form a separate con- federation which aimed at revoking the innovations which the Diet of Warsaw had introduced. It strove to bring the old Polish constitution once more into force. That con- federation was concluded on the 14th of May 1792, at Targowice, and the Counts Felix Potocki, Ezewuski, and Branicki were its leaders. The Empress of Kussia sent an army into Poland in support of the new Confederation, and made war against those Poles who were in favour of the new constitution. Only then did the Poles seriously think of vigorous counter measures. The Diet decreed that the Polish Army should be placed on a war footing, and a loan of 33,000,000 florins was arranged for. However, when the Prussian Ambassador was asked to state what assistance the King, his master, would give in accordance with his pledges contained in the Treaty of Alliance of 1790 — according to Articles 3 and 4 he was to furnish the Republic with 18,000 men, and in case of need with 30,000 men — he gave an evasive answer which threw the patriotic party into despair. The refusal of the Polish Diet to sanction a commercial proposal by which Poland would have abandoned the towns of Danzig and Thorn to Prussia had angered that monarch against the Poles, and the Empress of Russia did not find it difficult to obtain the Prussian King's consent to another partition of the country. The aversion which the sovereigns felt against everything which resembled the French Revolu- tion, with which, however, the events in Poland, where King and nation acted in harmony, had nothing in common except appearances, strongly influenced the Berlin Court and caused it to break the engagements which it had con- tracted with the Republic. The Poles understood the danger of their position. Their enthusiasm cooled, and the whole Diet was seized with a feeling of consternation. Having to rely on their Great Problems of British Statesmanship 165 own strength, and being torn by dissensions, the Poles were unable to face their Eussian opponents with success. The patriotic party was unfortunate in the campaign of 1792. After several victories the Kussians advanced upon Warsaw and King Stanislaus, who was easily discouraged, joined the Confederation of Targowice, denounced the Constitution of the 3rd of May, and subscribed on the 25th of August 1792 to all the conditions which the Empress of Kussia prescribed. An armistice was declared, and in consequence of its stipula- tions the Polish Army was reduced. In virtue of the Con- vention of Petersburg of the 23rd of January 1793, concluded between Prussia and Russia, the Prussian troops entered Poland and spread throughout the country, following Russia's example. Proclamations of the Courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg were pubHshed, by which these States took possession of those districts of the country which their troops had occupied. The adoption by Poland of the principles of 1789 and the propagation of the democratic principles of the French by the Poles were given as reasons for the second partition of Poland. . . . The partitioning Powers renounced once more all rights and claims to the territories of the Republic, and bound themselves to recognise, and even to guarantee, if desired, the Constitution which the Polish Diet would draw up with the free consent of the Polish nation. Notwithstanding the reiterated promises of respecting the integrity of the much-reduced country, the third partition took place in 1795. From the very beginning Prussia, Austria, and Russia treated Poland as a cor'pus vile, and cut it up like a cake, without any regard to the claims, the rights, and the pro- tests of the Poles themselves. Although history only mentions three partitions, there were in reality seven. There were those of 1772, 1793, and 1795, already referred to ; and these were followed by arbitrary redistributions of the Polish territories in 1807, 1809, and 1815. In none of these were the inhabitants consulted or even considered. The Congress of Vienna established the independence of 166 The Problem of Poland Cracow, but Austria-Hungary, asserting that she considered herself ' threatened ' by the existence of that tiny State, seized it in 1846. While Prussia, Austria, and Russia, considering that might was right, had divided Poland amongst "themselves, regardless of the passionate protests of the inhabitants, England had remained a spectator, but not a passive one, of the tragedy. She viewed the action of the Allies with strong disapproval, but although she gave frank expression to her sentiments, she did not actively interfere. After all, no English interests were involved in the partition. It was not her business to intervene. Besides, she could not successfully have opposed single-handed the joint action of the three powerful partner States, especially as France, under the weak Louis the Fifteenth, held aloof. How- ever, English statesmen refused to consider as valid the five partitions which took place before and during the Napoleonic era. The Treaty of Chaumont of 1814 created the Concert of Europe. At the Congress of Vienna of 1815 the frontiers of Europe were fixed by general consent. As Prussia, Austria, and Russia refused to recreate an independent Poland, England's opposition would have broken up the Concert, and might have led to further wars. Unable to prevent the injustice done to Poland by her opposition, and anxious to maintain the unity of the Powers and the peace of the world, England consented at last to consider the partition of Poland as a fait accom/pli, and formally recognised it, especially as the Treaty of Vienna assured the Poles of just and fair treatment under representative institutions. Article 1 of the Treaty of Vienna stated expressly : Les Polonais, sujets respectifs de la Russie, de I'Autriche et de la Prusse, obtiendront une representation et des institu- tions Rationales reglees d'apres le mode d'existence politique que chacun des gouvernements auxquels ils appartiennent jugera utile et convenable de leur accorder. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 167 By signing the Treaty of Vienna, England recognised not explicitly, but merely implicitly, the partition of Poland, and she did so miwillingly and under protest. Lord Castle- reagh stated in a Circular Note addressed to Eussia, Prussia, and Austria that it had always been England's desire that an independent Poland, possessing a dynasty of its own, should be established, which, separating Austria, Eussia, and Prussia, should act as a buffer State between them ; that, failing its creation, the Poles should be reconciled to being dominated by foreigners, by just and liberal treat- ment which alone would make them satisfied. His Note, which is most remarkable for its far-sightedness, wisdom, force, and restraint, was worded as follows : The Undersigned, His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Plenipotentiary to the Congress of Vienna, in desiring the present Note concerning the affairs of Poland may be entered on the Proto- col, has no intention to revive controversy or to impede the progress of the arrangements now in contemplation. His only object is to avail himself of this occasion of tempe- rately recording, by the express orders of his Court, the sentiments of the British Government upon a European question of the utmost magnitude and influence. The Undersigned has had occasion in the course of the discussions at Vienna, for reasons that need not now be gone into, repeatedly and earnestly to oppose himself, on the part of his Court, to the erection of a Polish kingdom in union with and making a part of the Imperial Crown of Eussia. The desire of his Court to see an independent Power, more or less considerable in extent, established in Poland under a distinct Dynasty, and as an intermediate State between the three great Monarchies, has uniformly been avowed, and if the Undersigned has not been directed to press such a measure, it has only arisen from a disinclination to excite, under all the apparent obstacles to such an arrange- ment, expectations which might prove an unavailing source of discontent among the Poles. 168 The Problem of Poland The Emperor of Russia continuing, as it is declared, still to adhere to his purpose of erecting that part of the Duchy of Warsaw which is to fall under His Imperial Majesty's dominion, together with his other Polish provinces, either in whole or in part, into a kingdom under the Russian sceptre ; and their Austrian and Prussian Majesties, the Sovereigns most immediately interested, having ceased to oppose themselves to such an arrangement — the Under- signed adhering, nevertheless, to all his former representa- tions on this subject has only sincerely to hope that none of those evils may result from this measure to the tranquillity of the North, and to the general equilibrium of Europe, which it has been his painful duty to anticipate. But in order to obviate as far as possible such consequences, it is of essential importance to establish the public tranquillity throughout the territories which formerly constituted the kingdom of Poland, upon some solid and liberal basis of common interest, by applying to all, however various may be their political institutions, a congenial and conciliatory system of administration. Experience has proved that it is not by counteracting all their habits and usages as a people that either the happiness of the Poles, or the peace of that important portion of Europe, can be preserved. A fruitless attempt, too long persevered in, by institutions foreign to their manner and sentiments to make them forget their existence, and even language, as a people, has been sufficiently tried and failed. It has only tended to excite a sentiment of discontent and self-degradation, and can never operate otherwise than to provoke commotion and to awaken them to a recollection of past misfortunes. The Undersigned, for these reasons, and in cordial concurrence with the general sentiments which he has had the satisfaction to observe the respective Cabinets enter- tained on this subject, ardently desires that the illustrious Monarchs to whom the destinies of the Polish nation are confided, may be induced, before they depart from Vienna, to take an engagement with each other to treat as Poles, under whatever form of political institution they may think fit to govern them, the portions of that nation that may be Great Problems of British Statesmanship 169 placed under their respective sovereignties. The knowledge of such a determination will best tend to conciliate the general sentiment to their rule, and to do honour to the several Sovereigns in the eyes of their Polish subjects. This course will consequently afford the surest prospect of their living peaceably and contentedly under their respective Governments. . . . This despatch was sent on January 12, 1815, a century ago. The warnings were not heeded and the past century has been filled with sorrow for the Poles and with risings and revolutions, as Lord Castlereagh clearly foretold. In their reply, the Eussian, Prussian, and Austrian repre- sentatives promised to act in accordance with England's views. However, soon after the overthrow of Napoleon, reaction set in. The promises made to the peoples at the Congress of Vienna, and the claims of the nationalities, were disregarded. Eepresentative government was either not established, or, where estabhshed, was destroyed. Under the guidance of Prince Metternich, the evil genius of Austria, an era of petty tyranny and of persecution began. An example will show how the Poles were treated. On May 15, 1815, King Frederick William the Third of Prussia, on taking possession of the Polish territories which fell to him under the Treaty of Vienna, addressed the following proclamation to the inhabitants : Inhabitants of the Kingdom of Poland ! In again taking possession of the district of the former dukedom of Warsaw, which originally belonged to Prussia, I wish to define your position. You also have a Fatherland, and you receive proof of my appreciation for your attachment to me. You will be incorporated in the Prussian Monarchy, but you need not abandon your nationality. You will take part in the constitution which I intend granting to my faithful subjects, and you will receive a provincial constitution similar to that which the other provinces of my State will receive. Your religion shall be respected, and the clergy 170 The Problem of Poland will receive an income suitable to its position. Your personal rights and property will be protected by the laws which will be made with your collaboration. The Polish language shall be used side by side with the German language in all public transactions and affairs, and every one of you shall be able to obtain of&cial positions, honours, and dignities according to his ability. In 1813, at the beginning of the War of Liberation against Napoleon, Frederick William the Third had solemnly promised a constitution to the Prussian people. At that moment he needed their help. That promise, which was received with the greatest enthusiasm, was renewed in the document given above and in many others, but it was not kept, although the King Hved till 1840. He and his suc- cessors treated the Poles with absolute faithlessness. Not a single one of the promises made to them in the Proclama- tion quoted was observed. During a century Prussia has disregarded her pledges of fair and equal treatment. Instead the Poles were persecuted and oppressed in Prussia, and their persecution in Austria, and especially in Eussia, was largely, if not chiefly, due to Prussia's instigation. Since the time of Frederick the Great, and in accordance with his advice given in the beginning of this chapter, Prussian statesmen, distrusting and fearing Eussia, aimed at maintaining the most intimate relations with that country, for Russia's support was most valuable, while her hostility was dangerous. Fearing and distrusting Eussia, they strove to keep that country weak. Animated by fear and distrust, they aimed at possessing themselves of a powerful weapon which could be used against the Northern Power in case of need. These three purposes of Prussian statesmanship could best be served by inducing Eussia to pursue in her Polish districts a policy which exasperated the Poles, which created disaffection on her most vulnerable frontier. Eussia was an autocracy, and the Poles, remembering their ancient Eepublic, have always been democratically inclined. An Great Problems of British Statesmanship 171 autocrat is naturally afraid of revolution and conspiracy. Taking advantage of these feelings, Prussia succeeded during more than a century in influencing and guiding Eussia's policy to her advantage. She unceasingly pointed out to the Czar that the three States which brought about the partition of Poland were equally interested in combating democracy and revolution. The Poles were depicted to the Eussians as born revolutionaries and anarchists. Eussia had good reason to fear a Polish rising on her western, her most vulnerable, frontier, on which dwell nearly 12,000,000 Poles. The Poles are exceedingly warlike, and Eussia has in the past found it extremely difficult to suppress their risings. Besides, an invader could always hope to raise the Poles against the Czar by promising them liberty, as was done by Napoleon the First in 1812. Prussian statesmen never tired of pointing out to the Czar that the danger of a Polish revolution could be overcome only by severe repressive measures taken jointly with Prussia. Thus Prussia and Eussia were to remain partners, being jointly interested in the persecution of Poland. Poland's unhappiness was to be the cement of the two States. For the same reason for which Frederick the Great de- sired to preserve disorder in Poland, his successors desired to see chronic dissatisfaction prevail in Eussia's Western Provinces. Prussia contemplated with fear the possibility of Poland receiving her independence. It is clear that the re-creation of an independent Poland within the limits of 1772 would affect Eussia only shghtly, but would damage Prussia very severely. The Prussian Poles dwell in dense masses in Southern Silesia, one of the wealthiest coal and industrial centres of Germany, and in the provinces of Posen and Western Prussia. If the province of Posen should once more become Polish, the distance which separates Berlin from the eastern frontier of Germany would be reduced to about one half. The capital would be in danger. If 172 The Problem of Poland the province of West Prussia, with the mouth of the Vistula and the port of Danzig, should once more become Polish, Prussia's position in the province of East Prussia would be jeopardised, for Polish territory would once more separate it from the rest of the Monarchy. Eussia, on the other hand, with her boundless territories, could easily bear the loss of her Polish provinces, especially as her capitals lie far from the frontier. Prince Biilow stated, not without cause, in the Prussian Diet on January 19, 1903 : ' The Polish question is, as it has ever been, one of the most important, nay, the most important, question of Prussia's policy.' In modern Eussia there have always been absolutist and liberal-minded Czars and a reactionary and a progressive party. Those who depicted Eussia as a land of pure and undiluted absolutism, and her Czars as a race of cruel and unenlightened despots, were not acquainted with Eussian history. While the reactionary party in Eussia favoured the policy of oppressing the nationalities, the liberal-minded were in favour of a wisely limited constitutionalism. They desired to give representative institutions to the people and some suitable form of self-government to the Poles. In 1859 Bismarck became the Prussian Ambassador in Petrograd. At that time Eussia was recovering from the effects of the Crimean War, and many of the most enlightened Eussians had become convinced that her defeat was largely due to her backwardness, that her backwardness was caused by her unprogressive institutions, that a more liberal policy in the widest sense of the word was needed. The Czar himself and his principal adviser, Prince Gortchakoff, were in favour of Liberalism and of Constitu- tionalism. Both desired to give greater freedom to the Poles. However, Bismarck, following the policy of Frederick the Great, resolutely opposed their policy in Prussia's interest. Owing to his persuasiveness and personal magnetism, that great statesman obtained the ascendant over the Czar and induced him to pursue a reactionary policy towards Great Problems of British Statesmanship 173 the Poles. Lord Cowley, the British Ambassador in Paris,' reported to Earl Eussell on March 26, 1863 : I have had a curious conversation with the Prussian Ambassador, and not altogether without importance, as showing that the Prussian Government has, if possible, greater repugnance to the restoration of Polish independence than the Cabinet of St. Petersburg itself. Adverting to the well-known desire of the Emperor to accomplish this event, Count Goltz said that it was a question of life and death to Prussia. ... In the course of this conversation Count Goltz said that M. de Bismarck, while Prussian Minister at St. Petersburg, had strenuously and successfully opposed the few concessions made to Poland by the present Emperor. In his ' Memoirs ' Prince Bismarck candidly described his anti-Polish policy in Eussia as follows : In the higher circles of Eussian society the influences which made for Poland were connected with the now out- spoken demand for a constitution. It was felt as a degrada- tion that a cultivated people like the Eussians should be denied institutions which existed in all European nations, and should have no voice in the management of their own affairs. The division of opinion on the Polish question penetrated the highest military circles. Those Eussians who demanded a constitution for themselves pleaded at times in excuse for the Poles that they were not governable by Eussians, and that as they grew more civilised they became entitled to a share in the administration of their country. This view was also represented by Prince Gortchakoff. The conflict of opinion was very lively in St. Petersburg when I left that capital in April, 1862, and it so continued throughout my first year of office. I took charge of the Foreign Office under the impression that the insurrection which had broken out on January 1st, 1863, brought up the questionnot only of the interests of our Eastern provinces, but also that wider one, whether the Eussian Cabinet were dominated by Polish or anti-Polish proclivities, by an effort after Eusso-Polish fraternisation in the anti-German Pan- 174 The Problem of Poland slavist interest or by one for mutual reliance between Eussia and Prussia. For the German future of Prussia the attitude of Eussia was a question of great importance. A philo-Polish Eussian policy was calculated to vivify that Eusso-French sympathy against which Prussia's effort had been directed since the peace of Paris, and indeed on occasion earlier, and an alliance (friendly to Poland) between Eussia and France, such as was in the air before the Eevolution of July, would have placed the Prussia of that day in a difficult position. It was our interest to oppose the party in the Eussian Cabinet which had Polish proclivities, even when they were the proclivities of Alexander II. That Eussia herself afforded no security against fraterni- sation with Poland I was able to gather from confidential intercourse with Gortchakoff and the Czar himself. Czar Alexander was at that time not indisposed to withdraw from part of Poland, the left bank of the Vistula at any rate — so he told me in so many words — while he made unemphatic exception of Warsaw, which would always be desirable as a garrison town, and belonged strategically to the Vistula fortress triangle. Poland, he said, was for Eussia a source of unrest and dangerous European complications ; its Eussi- fication was forbidden by the difference of religion and the insufficient capacity for administration among Eussian officials. . . . Our geographical position and the intermixture of both nationalities in the Eastern provinces, including Silesia, compel us to retard, as far as possible, the opening of the Polish question, and even in 1863 made it appear advisable to do our best not to facilitate, but to obviate, the opening of this question by Eussia. It was assumed that liberal concessions, if granted to the Poles, could not be withheld from the Eussians ; Eussian constitutionalists were therefore philo-Polish. Eussia's history has often been most unfavourably affected, and the clearly expressed will of the Czar himself been totally deflected, by the incompetence of a single powerful individual. The Czar Alexander was a kindly, Great Problems of British Statesmanship 175 liberal-minded, and broad-minded man, and he was, as we have learned from the testimony of Bismarck and Lord Cowley, very favourable to the Poles and to their aspirations. He intended to give the Poles a full measure of self-govern- ment, and he entrusted an eminent Pole, Count Wielopolski, an old revolutionary of 1830, with that difficult task. Wielopolski, though probably well meaning, was tactless, rash, and inclined to violence. Some of his measures had caused dissatisfaction among the Poles and had led to riots. Wielopolski resolved to rid himself of his opponents, who were chiefly young hot-headed enthusiasts, by enrolling them in the army, and sending them for a long number of years to Siberia and the Caucasus. By his orders numerous young men, belonging to good families, were to be arrested in their beds by soldiers during the night of January 1, 1863. In the words of Lord Napier, the British Ambassador in Petrograd, ' the opposition was to be kidnapped.' That foolish and arbitrary step led to a widespread revolt and a prolonged but hopeless struggle between Polish guerillas and Kussian soldiers. Bismarck, who had unceasingly re- commended a policy of reaction while he was in Petrograd, made the best use of his opportunity, and he did so all the more readily as Prince Gortchakoff was a friend not only of Poland but also of France. Foreseeing a struggle between Prussia and France, Bismarck desired to obtain Kussia's goodwill, to create differences between that country and France, and to discredit the Francophile Prince Gortchakoff with the Czar. Sir A. Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Berlin, informed Lord Kussell on March 21, 1863 : Prince HohenzoUern, in speaking to me some days ago with regret of the foreign policy of the Prussian Government, said that one of its principal objects has been the overthrow of Prince Gortchakoff, whose wish to promote an alliance between France and Eussia is, they believe, the only obstacle in the way of re-establishing the relations which existed be- tween the three Northern Courts previously to the Crimean War. 176 The Problem of Poland Bismarck exaggerated to the Czar the scope, character, and consequences of the PoHsh revolt to the utmost, and while France and England expressed their sympathy with the Poles, and reproached Wielopolski for his blundering, Bismarck hastened to demonstrate his attachment to Eussia and his devotion to the Czar by offering Prussia's assistance in combating the revolutionists. On January 22, 1863, the first sanguinary encounter took place. Ten days later, on February 1, General Gustav von Alvensleben was despatched by Prussia to the Czar with proposals for joint action against the Poles. Sir A. Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Berlin, telegraphed on February 12 to Earl Russell : Insurrection in Poland extending, and numbers of Rus- sian troops said to be insufficient for its suppression. . . . Two corps of observation are forming on the frontier, and assistance, if required, will be afforded by Prussia. Bis- marck says Prussia will never permit the establishment of an independent kingdom of Poland. Two days later the British Ambassador, telegraphed : . . . General Alvensleben, who is now in Warsaw, having arrived there two days ago from St. Petersburg, has concluded a military convention with the Russian Govern- ment, according to which the two Governments will recipro- cally afford facilities to each other for the suppression of the insurrectionary movements which have lately taken place in Poland. . . . The Prussian railways are also to be placed at the disposal of the Russian military authorities for the transport of troops through Prussian territory from one part of the kingdom of Poland to another. The Government further contemplate, in case of necessity, to give military assistance to the Russian Government for the suppression of the insurrection in the kingdom ; but I am told that no engage- ment has yet been entered into with respect to the nature or extent of such assistance. In the meanwhile, however, four corps of the Prussian Army are concentrating on the Great Problems of British Statesmanship 177 frontiers under the command of General Waldersee, whose headquarters are at Posen. To demonstrate Prussia's zeal for Eussia, one third of the Prussian Army was placed at Kussia's service on the Polish frontier, to help in suppressing the rising of a number of men armed chiefly with scythes and pistols. For reasons given in these pages, Bismarck was alarmed by the possibiHty that the Czar might establish an inde- pendent Poland on Prussia's border. Sir A. Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Berlin, informed Earl Eussell on February 14, 1863 : M. de Bismarck, in acquainting me a few days ago with his intention to take measures in concert with the Russian Government to prevent the extension of the insurrectionary movements which have lately taken place in Poland, said the question was of vital importance to Prussia, as her own existence would be seriously compromised by the establishment of an independent kingdom of Poland. I asked whether he meant to say that if Russia found any difficulty in suppressing the insurrection, the Prussian Government intended to afford them military assistance ; and he not only replied in the affirmative, but added that if Russia got tired of the contest and were disposed to with- draw from the kingdom — a course which some Russians were supposed to think advantageous to her interests — the Prussian Government would carry on the war on their own account. . . . The Emperor William the First, who at the time was only King of Prussia, frankly said to the British Ambassador, according to his telegram on February 22, 1863 : It was equally the duty and the interest of Prussia to do everything in her power to prevent the estab- lishment of an independent Polish kingdom, for if the Polish nation could reconstitute themselves as an indepen- dent State, the existence of Prussia would be seriously menaced, as the first efforts of the new State would be to 178 The Problem of Poland recover Dantzig, and if that attempt succeeded, the fatal consequences to Prussia were too evident to require him to point them out. While Prussia, for purely selfish reasons, advocated a policy of persecution and repression towards the Poles, which would only increase their resentment to the advantage of Eussia's enemies. Great Britain, following her traditional poHcy of disinterested detachment and wise humanity, recommended once more the adoption of a liberal policy towards the Poles in accordance with the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna. Earl Eussell sent to the British Ambassador in Petrograd on March 2, 1863, the following most remarkable despatch : My Lord, — Her Majesty's Government view with the deepest concern the state of things now existing in the kingdom of Poland. They see there, on the one side, a large mass of the population in open insurrection against the Government, and, on the other, a vast military force employed in putting that insurrection down. The natural and probable result of such a contest must be expected to be the success of the military forces. But that success, if it is to be achieved by a series of bloody conflicts, must be attended by a lamentable effusion of blood, by a deplorable sacrifice of life, by widespread desolation, and by impoverish- ment and ruin, which it would take a long course of years to repair. Moreover, the acts of violence and destruction on both sides, which are sure to accompany such a struggle, must engender mutual hatreds and resentments which will em- bitter, for generations to come, the relations between the Eussian Government and the Polish race. Yet, however much Her Majesty's Government might lament the existence of such a miserable state of things in a foreign country, they would not, perhaps, deem it expedient to give formal expression of their sentiments were it not that there are peculiarities in the present state of things in Poland which take them out of the usual and ordinary condition of such affairs. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 179 The kingdom of Poland was constituted and placed in connection with the Eussian Empire by the Treaty of 1815, to which Great Britain was a contracting party. The present disastrous state of things is to be traced to the fact that Poland is not in the condition in which the stipulations of that Treaty require that it should be placed. Neither is Poland in the condition in which itwas placed by the Emperor Alexander I, by whom that Treaty was made. During his reign a National Diet sat at Warsaw and the Poles of the kingdom of Poland enjoyed privileges fitted to secure their political welfare. Since 1832, however, a state of uneasiness and discontent has been succeeded from time to time by violent commotion and a useless effusion of blood. Her Majesty's Government are aware that the immediate cause of the present insurrection was the conscription lately enforced upon the Polish population ; but that measure itself is understood to have been levelled at the deeply- rooted discontent prevailing among the Poles in consequence of the political condition of the kingdom of Poland. The proprietors of land and the middle classes in the towns bore that condition with impatience, and if the peasantry were not equally disaffected they gave little support or strength to the Eussian Government. Great Britain, therefore, as a party to the Treaty of 1815, and as a Power deeply interested in the tranquilUty of Europe, deems itself entitled to express its opinion upon the events now taking place, and is anxious to do so in the most friendly spirit towards Eussia, and with a sincere desire to promote the interest of all the parties concerned. Why should not His Imperial Majesty, whose benevolence is generally and cheerfully acknowledged, put an end at once to this bloody conflict by proclaiming mercifully an immediate and un- conditional amnesty to his revolted Polish subjects, and at the same time announce his intention to replace without delay his kingdom of Poland in possession of the political and civil privileges which were granted to it by the Emperor Alexander I in execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of 1815 ? If this were done a National Diet and a National Administration would in all probability content the Poles and satisfy European opinion. 180 The Problem of Poland You will read this despatch to Prince Gortchakoff and give him a copy of it. Earl Russell's wise suggestions were sympathetically received at Petrograd, and on March 31, Czar Alexander published in the Journal de St. P^tersbourg a manifesto in which he stated that he did not desire to hold the Polish nation responsible for the rebellion, and promised to intro- due a system of local self-government in Poland, admonishing the rebels to lay down their arms. Unfortunately, they did not do so. A prolonged campaign was necessary to re-establish order in Poland, and meanwhile the Czar had been so much embittered through the agitation of the Russian reactionaries and their Prussian friends, and by the follies of some of the Polish leaders, that he deprived Poland of her constitution. Urged on by the statesmen at Berlin, another period of repression began. On February 23, 1868, Poland was absolutely incorporated with Russia, and the use of the Polish language in public places and for public purposes was prohibited. Ever since, Bismarck and his successors have endeavoured to create bad blood between Russia and her Polish citizens, being desirous of retaining Russia's support at a time when she was drifting towards France. Solely with the object of demonstrating to Russia the danger of the Polish agitation Bismarck introduced in 1886 his Polish Settlement Bill, by which, to the exasperation of the Prussian Poles, vast territories were bought from Pohsh landowners and German peasants settled on them. When the Conservative party wished to oppose that policy in the Prussian Parliament as being unpractical, its leader was, according to Professor Delbriick's testimony, expressed in his book ' Regierung und Volkswille,' urged by the Chancellor to vote for the Bill because its passage was necessary ' for reasons of foreign policy.' During a century and a half Russia's Polish policy has been made in Germany. During 150 years Russia has perse- Great Problems of British Statesmanship 181 cuted and outraged the Poles at Prussia's bidding and for Prussia's benefit. The confidential diplomatic evidence given in these pages makes that point absolutely clear. Until recent times Eussia was a very backward nation, and, not unnaturally, she endeavoured to learn the arts of government and of civilisation from Germany, her nearest neighbour. Unfortunately, Germany did not prove a fair and unselfish friend to Eussia. Germany aimed not so much at advancing Eussia as at benefiting herself. German rulers and statesmen saw in the Eussians good- natured savages to be exploited. Impecunious German princes and noblemen went to Eussia to make a fortune, and poor German princesses married Eussian princes. Thus German influence became supreme not only in the Eussian Army and Administration, but even within the Imperial Family. During 150 years German influence was supreme in Eussian society. While, during this period, Prussia, and afterwards Germany, unceasingly urged Eussia to oppress and ill-treat her Poles, England consistently recommended Eussia to adopt liberal treatment as being in Eussia's interest. One of the first British diplomatic despatches dealing with the partition of Poland isthat of Mr. Thomas Wroughton, dated June 15, 1763, and given in these pages. In that remarkable document the forecast was made that Eussia would scarcely consent to a partition of Poland, partly because such a partition would strengthen Prussia too much, partly because an independent Poland would form an efficient bufl^er State between herself and the Western Powers. He wrote : ' Eussia is inattackable on that side at present, which she would not be if she appropriated to herself that barrier.' Since then Eussia has more than once had occasion to regret that she was the direct neighbour of Prussia, and that she had given large Polish districts to that country. Soon after the beginning of the present War the Grand 182 The Problem of Poland Duke Nicholas, the Commander-in-Chief of the Eussian forces, addressed an appeal to the Poles of Kussia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary in which he promised them the re-creation of a kingdom of Poland, comprising all Poles dwelling within Eussia, Austria, and Germany, under Eussia's protection. The full text of that remarkable manifesto will be found in the chapter ' The Problem of Austria-Hungary.' The enemies of Eussia have sneeringly described that document as a death-bed repentance, and have complained that it was not issued by the Czar himself. Of course, the Grand Duke acted in the name and on behalf of the Czar. That needs no explanation. If the Czar was not of the Grand Duke's mind he would of course have disavowed him. Besides, Eussia's resolve to give full liberty to the Poles was not born from the stress of the War. It was formed long ago. However, it was obviously imprac- ticable to give full self-government to the Eussian Poles without laying the foundation of a Greater Poland. Hence such a step on Eussia's part would have met with the most determined opposition and hostility in Germany and Austria- Hungary, and it would most probably have been treated as casus belli. Lord Cowley, the British Ambassador in Paris, informed Earl Eussell, on March 26, 1863, ' The Eussian Government could make no concessions of any value to the Polish Provinces which would not lay the foundation of the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland.' Lord Napier, the British Ambassador in Petro- grad, informed his Government on April 6, 1863, that ' The restoration of the Polish State on the basis of nationality will assuredly not be effected while the strength of Eussia and Germany remains unbroken. During the struggle, whatever may be the fate of Poland, the frontier of France would be pushed to the Ehine.' That remarkable prophecy seems likely to come true. Formerly there was no Polish nation. The Poles consisted of 150,000 nobles and of many millions of ill-treated serfs. Hard times and misfortune have welded the Poles into a Great Problems of British Statesmanship 183 nation. The property-less serfs have become prosperous farmers, and the people of the middle and of the upper class have become earnest workers. Between 1900 and 1912 the deposits in the Polish Co-operative Societies have increased from £12,420,057 to £46,970,354. In every walk of life Poles have achieved most remarkable successes. Although education among the Poles, especially among those in Eussia and Austria-Hungary, is still extremely backward — there are only two Polish universities — the Poles have created a most wonderful literature. The Polish literature is the richest among the Slavonic literatures, and it need not fear comparison with any of the Western literatures. In music and in science also Poles have accomplished great things. Among the leading modern writers is Sienkiewicz, among the greatest living musicians is Paderewski, among the leading living scientists is Madame Curie-Sklodowska. Formerly, the Poles were thriftless and incompetent in business and agriculture. How wonderfully they have changed may be seen from the fact that in the Eastern Provinces of Germany they are rapidly ousting the Germans, although these receive most powerful support from the State. Notwithstanding the enormous purchases of land made under the Settlement Acts, by which £35,000,000 have been devoted to the purchase of Polish land for German farmers, the Germans have on balance since the year 1896 lost 250,000 acres of land to the Poles in the Polish districts. The Poles are to a certain extent to blame for their misfortunes. In the past they have lacked self-command and a sense of proportion. It is noteworthy that during the revolution of 1863 Polish leaders pubhshed in Paris maps of an independent Poland, which comprised large and purely Eussian districts with towns such as Kieff, on the ground of historical right. Yet Kieff was the cradle of the Eussian Orthodox faith. In Western Eussia, in Eastern Prussia, and in Galicia, there dwell about 20,000,000 Poles. If the War should end, as it is likely to end, in a complete victory of the 184 The Problem of Poland Allies, a powerful independent State of Poland will arise. The united Poles will receive full self-government under the protection of Eussia. They will be enabled to develop their nationality, but it seems scarcely likely that they will separate themselves entirely from Kussia. Their position will probably resemble that of Quebec in Canada, and if the Eussians and Poles act wisely they will live as harmoniously together as do the French-speaking ' habit- ants ' of Quebec, and the English-speaking men of the other provinces of Canada. Federation should prove a guar- antee of freedom and a bond between the two peoples, Eussia need not fear that Poland will make herself entirely independent, and only the most hot-headed and short-sighted Poles can wish for complete independence. Poland, having developed extremely important manufac- turing industries, requires large free markets for their output. Her natural market is Eussia, for Germany has industrial centres of her own. She can expect to have the free use of the precious Eussian markets only as long as she forms part of that great State. At present, a spirit of the heartiest goodwill prevails between Eussians and Poles. The old quarrels and grievances have been forgotten in the common struggle. The moment is most auspicious for the resur- rection of Poland. While Prussia has been guilty of the partition of Poland, Eussia is largely to blame for the repeated revolts and insurrection of her Polish citizens. The late Lord Salisbury, who as a staunch Conservative could scarcely be described as an admirer of the Poles, and who in his essay ' Poland,' printed in 1863, treated their claims rather with contempt than with sympathy, wrote in its concluding pages : Since 1815 the misgovernment of Poland has not only been constant but growing. And with the misgovernment the discontent has been growing in at least an equal ratio. Yet they ought not to have been a difficult race to rule. The very abuses to which they had been for centuries exposed should have made the task of satisfying them easy. Great Problems of British Statesma7iship 185 Eussian statesmen might well bear in mind the recom- mendations of that great statesman as to the way by which Russia might satisfy her Poles. Lord Salisbury wrote : The best that can be hoped for Poland is an improved condition under Eussian rule. The conditions which are needed to reconcile the Poles to a Eussian Sovereign are manifest enough and do not seem very hard to be observed. The Poles have not only been oppressed but insulted, and in their condition insult is harder to put up with than oppres- sion. A nation which is under a foreign yoke is sensitive upon the subject of nationality. ... If Eussia would rule the Poles in peace she must defer to a sensibility which neither coaxing nor severity will cure. All the substance of power may be exercised as well through Polish administra- tors as through Eussian. The union between the two countries may for practical purposes be complete, though every legal act and every kind of scholastic instruction be couched in the Polish language. It would be hazardous, and it would probably be foolish, to separate Poland completely from Eussia. Poland has grown into Eussia and Eussia into Poland. After all, it can- not be expected that Eussia will abandon her principal and most promising industrial district with two of her largest towns. In politics one should endeavour to achieve only the practical. The question therefore arises : How much self-government will Eussia grant to Poland ? Will she give her a separate legislation, taxation, post office, coinage, finances, army ? The arrangement of these details may prove somewhat difficult. It is to be hoped that during the negotiations between Poles and Eussians regarding a settlement the Poles will endeavour to be cool and reasonable, and that the Eussians will be trusting and generous. Happily, a spirit of hearty goodwill is abroad in Eussia. The greatest grievance of the Polish nation is not that it lives under foreign rule, but that it lives under oppression, and that it has been parcelled out among several States. 186 The Problem of Poland Owing to the partition of Poland, Poles have been taught to consider as enemies men of their own nationality living across the border, and they have been compelled by their rulers to slaughter each other. In the Great War more than a million Polish soldiers have been engaged against their will in a fratricidal war. That terrible fact alone constitutes a most powerful claim upon all men's sympathy and generosity. Although Kussia has in times past treated the Poles far more harshly than has Prussia, and although the Ger- man Poles are far more prosperous than are the Eussian, the Poles see their principal enemy not in Kussia but in Prussia. After all, the Eussian is their brother Slav, and they are proud of their big brother. Besides, they recognise that Eussia has been misguided by Prussia, and that Prussia was largely responsible for Poland's partition and for Eussia's anti-Polish policy. The bitterness with which the Prussian Poles hate Prussia may be seen from the Polish newspapers published in Germany, which, during many years, have successfully advocated the policy of boy- cotting Germans and everything German, both in business and in society. The Dziennik Kujawski of Hohensalza wrote on January 18, 1901 : To-morrow the kingdom of Prussia celebrates the second century of its existence. We cannot manifest our joy, because Prussia's power has been erected chiefly upon the ruins of ancient Poland. Prussia's history consists of a number of conquests made by force and in accordance with the old Prussian principle revived by Bismarck, ' Might is better than right.' Prussia's glory has been bought with much blood and tears, and she owes her existence chiefly to Poland's destruction. In the Gazeta Gdanska of November 24, 1906, published in Dantzig, we read : The Prussian and the Eussian. — If one asks a Pole whether he would rather live under German or under Great Problems of British Statesmanship 187 Eussian rule, his reply will be ' I would a hundred times rather have to do with Kussians than with Germans, and the Prussians are the worst of Germans.' Many Poles will scarcely be able to tell why they hate the Prussians. Many will find their preference illogical. Still it is there. From the fullness of the heart speaketh the mouth. After all, the worst Eussian is a better fellow than the very best German. That feeling lies in our blood. The Eussian is our Slavonic brother, and in his heart of hearts every Pole is glad if his brother is prospering and when he can tell the world ' There you see our common Slavonic blood.' The more we hate the Prussians, the more we love the Eussians. The Gazeta Grudzionska, of Graudenz, wrote in March 1899: Take heed, you Polish women and Polish girls ! Polish women and Polish girls are the strongest protectors of our nationality. The Poles can be Germanised only when Germanism crosses our Polish doorstep, but that will never happen, if God so wills it, as long as Polish mothers, Polish wives, and Polish maids are found in our houses. They will not allow Poland's enemies to enter. For a Polish woman it is a disgrace to marry a German or to visit German places of amusement or German festivals. As long as the Polish wife watches over her husband and takes care that he bears himself always and everywhere as a Pole, as long as she watches over his home and preserves it as a stronghold of Polonism, as long as a Polish Catholic newspaper is kept in it, and as long as the Polish mother teaches her children to pray to God for our beloved Poland in the Polish language, so long Poland's enemies will labour in vain. Innumerable similar extracts might easily be given. When the peace conditions come up for discussion at the Congress which will bring the present War to an end, the problem of Poland will be one of the greatest difiQculty and importance. Austria-Hungary has comparatively little interest in retaining her Poles. The Austrian Poles dwell in Galicia outside the great rampart of the Carpathian 188 The Problem of Poland mountains, which form the natural frontier of the Dual Monarchy towards the north-east. The loss of Galicia, with its oilfields and mines may be regrettable to Austria- Hungary, but it will not affect her very seriously. To Germany, on the other hand, the loss of the Polish districts will be a fearful blow. The supreme importance which Germany attaches to the Polish problem may be seen from this, that Bismarck thought it the only question which could lead to an open breach between Germany and Austria-Hungary. According to Crispi's Memoirs, Bismarck said to the Italian statesman on September 17, 1877: There could be but one cause for a breach in the friend- ship that unites Austria and Germany, and that would be a disagreement between the two Governments concerning Polish policy. ... If a Polish rebellion should break out and Austria should lend it her support, we should be obliged to assert ourselves. We cannot permit the reconstruction of a Catholic kingdom so near at hand. It would be a northern France. We have one France to look to already, and a second would become the natural ally of the first, and we should find ourselves entrapped between two enemies. The resurrection of Poland would injure us in other ways as well. It could not come about without the loss of a part of our territory. We cannot possibly relinquish either Posen or Dantzig, because the German Empire would remain exposed on the Kussian frontier, and we should lose an outlet on the Baltic. In the event of Germany's defeat a large slice of Poland, including the wealthiest parts of Silesia, with gigantic coal mines, ironworks, &c., might be taken away from her; and if the Poles should recover their ancient province of West Prussia, with Dantzig, Prussia's hold upon East Prussia, with Koenigsberg, would be threatened. The loss of her Polish districts would obviously greatly reduce Germany's military strength and economic power. It Great Problems of British Statesmanship 189 may therefore be expected that Germany will move heaven and earth against the re-creation of the kingdom of Poland, and that she will strenuously endeavour to create differences between Eussia and her Allies. The statesmen of Europe should therefore, in good time, firmly make up their minds as to the future of Poland. CHAPTER VI THE GEEMAN EMPEROr's POSITION While many people have discussed whether Germany was responsible for the War, nobody has inquired whether the German Emperor, in declaring war upon Russia and France, acted in accordance with the German Constitution, or whether he exceeded his powers. It is fairly generally assumed that the Emperor was entitled to make war upon the two countries — that the question of war and peace lay within his discretion. In the following pages it will be shown that the Emperor exceeded his carefully limited powers — that he acted un- constitutionally. The question whether the Emperor acted constitutionally or unconstitutionally is not merely a professorial but a very practical one. British statesmen and rulers enjoy a very great latitude because the British Constitution is unwritten. They can either find for their action some precedent in the past or construct a precedent from the past. In case of need they can create a new precedent, and the question whether their action was constitutional or not is one which may be discussed by experts in con- stitutional law, but is incomprehensible for the broad masses of the people. In Germany matters are different. All citizens are familiar with the written Constitution, with which they are made acquainted in the schools. Popular editions with explanations can be bought in every book- shop for a few pence, while the educated are acquainted with the commentaries on the Constitution by Laband, 190 Great Problems of British Statesmanship 191 Arndt, and many other writers. The question whether the Emperor, in making war upon Eussia and France, acted constitutionally or unconstitutionally may in due course become a very urgent one. The German people do not object to unconstitutional action on the part of their rulers if the measures taken prove successful and beneficial. That may be seen by the ease with which the Prussian Diet passed an Act of Indemnity with regard to Bismarck's Government in opposition to the will of Parliament, when the victory of 1866 over Austria had proved that the Prussian Government had been right in increasing the army very considerably against the will of Parliament. Nothing is as successful as success. If, however, the present War should end in Germany's defeat the German people will not only ask whether Germany commenced the War, but whether the German Emperor, in declaring war, acted lawfully or unlawfully, and he may be held to account. The widely held belief that Germany is a highly cen- tralised State, that Wilham the Second is the sovereign and the practically unlimited ruler of the country is erroneous. Germany is a federation of independent States. The sov- ereignty of the empire reposes not in the King of Prussia, but in the allied States themselves. The King of Prussia, being the most powerful of the German monarchs, is merely the hereditary president of the Federation. The best defi- nition of the German Empire has, perhaps, been given by President Wilson in his book ' The State,' in which we read : The German Empire is a Federal State composed of four kingdoms, seven grand-duchies, four duchies, seven principalities, three free cities, and the Imperial domain of Alsace-Lorraine, these lands being united in a great ' corpora- tion of public law ' under the hereditary Presidency of the King of Prussia. Its Emperor is its President, not its Monarch. . . . The new Empire bears stiU, in its constitu- tion, distinctest traces of its derivation. It is still a dis- tinctly Federal rather than unitary State, and the Emperor is still only its constitutional President. As Emperor he 192 The German Emperor^ s Position occupies not an hereditary throne, but only an hereditary office. Sovereignty does not reside in him, but ' in the union of German Federal Princes and the free cities.' He is the chief officer of a great political corporation. . . . It is a fundamental conception of the German constitution that ' the body of German sovereigns, together with the Senates of the three free cities, considered as a unit — tanquam unum corpus — is the repository of Imperial sovereignty.' The fact that the German Emperor is not the sovereign of the Empire but merely its hereditary President, that the Imperial power is possessed by the allied States them- selves, is known to almost every German. In the last issue of ' Meyer's Encyclopedia ' we read : According to the Imperial 'Constitution of the 16th April, 1871, the German Empire is ' an everlasting confederation ' which the German Princes and free towns have concluded ' for the protection of the territory of the confederation and the rights thereof as well as for the promotion of the welfare of the German people.' The Imperial power is possessed by the Allied States. Their organ is the Federal Council. The Presidency of the Confederation belongs to the Prussian Crown. The Presidential rights are a Prussian privilege, and they are enumerated in the German Constitution. With the Presidency of the Confederation is connected the title German Emperor, not Emperor of Germany, for the Emperor is not sovereign of the Empire. He exercises his powers ' in the name of the Empire ' or ' in the name of the Allied Governments.' If we wish to discover whether the Emperor, in making war upon Eussia and France, acted constitutionally or unconstitutionally, we should study the text of the German Constitution and the commentaries upon that document by the most authorised statesmen and professors, and especially by the allied sovereigns themselves. The preamble of the Constitution states : His Majesty the King of Prussia in the name of the North German Confederation, His Majesty the King of Bavaria, Great Problems of British Statesmanship 198 His Majesty the King of Wiirtemberg, His Koyal Highness the Grand Duke of Baden, and His Eoyal Highness the Grand Duke of Hesse and by Ehine, for those parts of the Grand Duchy of Hesse which are south of the river Maine, conclude an everlasting Confederation for the pro- tection of the Territory of the Confederation and the rights thereof, as well as for the promotion of the welfare of the German people. This Confederation will bear the name ' German Empire.' It should carefully be noted that in the short preamble it is expHcitly stated that the German Empire was formed for the purpose of defence. The fourth chapter of the Constitution, which is super- scribed ' The Presidency,' consists of articles eleven to nineteen. The first portion of article eleven reads as follows : The Presidency of the Confederation belongs to the King of Prussia, who bears the name of German Emperor. The Emperor has to represent the Empire internationally, to declare war, and to conclude peace in the name of the Empire, to enter into alliances and other treaties with Foreign Powers, to accredit and to receive Ambassadors. The consent of the Federal Council is necessary for the declaration of war in the name of the Empire, unless an attack on the territory or the coast of the Confederation has taken place. The purely defensive character of the German Empire is expressed not only in the short preamble of the con- stitution, but also in this most important article eleven, from which we learn that the German Emperor may not declare war in the name of the Empire ' unless an attack on the territory or the coast of the Confederation has taken 'place,* that for the declaration of a war of aggression, ' the consent of the Federal Council is necessary.' The Federal Council is not a popular representative body, but a body which represents all the individual States themselves. In other words, the Constitution stipulates that the German Emperor 194 The German Emperor'' s Position may make war only if Germany has actually been attacked, that a war of aggression on Germany's part can be effected only by the will of the individual States united in the Federal Council. The German Empire is the successor of the North German Confederation, which was formed by Prussia, Saxony, and various other States after the Prusso-Austrian war of 1866. The German Constitution of 1871 is almost word for word the same Constitution as that of the North German Confederation of 1867. There is only one material and important difference between the two Constitutions. It consists in the alteration which was made in the most important article eleven. That article was worded as follows in the Constitution of the North German Con- federation of 1867 : The Presidency of the Confederation appertains to the Crown of Prussia, which, in the exercise thereof, has the right of representing the Confederation internationally, of declar- ing war and concluding peace, of entering into Alliances and other Treaties with Foreign States, of accrediting and receiv- ing Ambassadors in the name of the Confederation. The King of Prussia, as President of the North German Confederation, had the right of ' declaring war and con- cluding peace.' As no condition was attached, he could in the name of the Confederation declare not only a war of defence but also a war of attack. That right was limited four years later, when the Prussian King and German Emperor was restricted to declaring war only if ' an attack on the territory or the coast of the Confederation has taken place.' The war-making power of the King of Prussia was thus limited by the express wish of the South German sovereigns, who did not desire to be dragged into a war against their will, who had seen Prussia victorious in three consecutive wars, and possibly feared that she might rashly embark upon another war which might have a less fortunate result than the previous ones. Besides, the South German Great Problems of British Statesmanship 195 sovereigns, and especially the King of Bavaria, did not wish to subordinate themselves to the King of Prussia. They desired that the King of Prussia as Emperor should merely be primus inter fares and that the fact that he was not Emperor of Germany should be expressed even in his title. He was merely to be German Emperor. Prince Bismarck has told us in his Memoirs that William the First objected to that title. He wrote : His Majesty raised a fresh difficulty when we were fixing the form of the Imperial title, it being his wish to be called Emperor of Germany if Emperor it had to be. . . . In the final Conference of January 17, 1871, he declined the designation of German Emperor, and declared that he would be Emperor of Germany or no Emperor at all. ... I urged that the title Emperor of Germany involved a sovereign claim to the non-Prussian dominions which the Princes were not inclined to allow ; that it was suggested in the letter from the King of Bavaria that ' the exercise of the Presiden- tial rights should be associated with the assumption of the title of German Emperor.' The Sovereigns of the south, and especially the Bavarian King, feared that they might become mere cyphers under Prussia's leadership, that their independence would be lost, that their individuality would be entirely merged in the German Empire. They wished to have their position guaranteed not only by the Constitution but also by binding promises made by Prince Bismarck on behalf of Prussia. On November 27, 1870, Prince Bismarck wrote to King Ludwig of Bavaria with regard to the proposed creation of a German Empire : The title German Emperor signifies that his rights have originated from the voluntary concession of the German sovereigns and tribes. History teaches that the great princely houses of Germany never regarded the existence of an Emperor elected by them as derogatory to their high position in Europe. 196 The German Emperor^ s Position In his reply, dated December 2, 1870, King Ludwig wrote to Prince Bismarck : I hope, and hope with assurance, that Bavaria will in the future preserve her independent position, for it is surely consistent with a loyal unreserved Federal policy, and it will be safest to obviate a pernicious centralisation. Prince Bismarck wrote in answer to the King : Your Majesty rightly presumes that I expect no salva- tion from centrahsation, that I perceive in that very main- tenance of the rights which the Federal Constitution secures to individual members of the Federation the form of develop- ment best suited to the German spirit, and, at the same time, the surest guarantee against the dangers to which law and order might be exposed in the free movement of the poli- tical life of to-day. The hostile position taken up by the Eepublican party throughout Germany in regard to the re-establishment of the Imperial dignity, through the ini- tiative of your Majesty and of the Federal princes, proves that it is conducive to promoting the Conservative and Monarchical interests. The King of Bavaria's fears and doubts regarding the position of Prussia were not entirely dispelled by the wording of the Constitution and by Bismarck's assurances. Hence he wrote to the Imperial Chancellor on July 31, 1874, regarding the Federal principle, and in reply Bismarck wrote on August 10 : Apart from personal guarantees, your Majesty may securely reckon on those comprised in the very Constitu- tion of the Empire. That Constitution rests on the federal basis accorded in the treaties of federation, and it cannot be violated without breach of treaty. Therein the Constitu- tion of the Empire differs from every national Constitution. Your Majesty's rights form an indissoluble part of the Constitution of the Empire. They rest on the same secure basis of law as all the institutions of the Empire. Germany, in the institution of its Federal Council, and Bavaria, in its Great Problems of British Statesmanship 197 dignified and intelligent representation on that Council, have a firm guarantee against any deterioration or exaggera- tion of efforts in the direction of unitarian aspirations. Your Majesty will be able to place the fullest confidence in the security of the treaty-guarded law of the Constitution, even when I no longer have the honour of serving the Empire as Chancellor. Not only the King of Bavaria but other sovereigns also wished to assert their independence and to guard them- selves against being dragged into a war against their will by the King of Prussia. They asserted their constitutional rights on suitable occasions. For instance on June 7, 1875, at the time when it was believed that Bismarck contem- plated an attack upon France, von Mittnacht, the Wiirtem- berg Prime Minister, wrote to Prince Bismarck : Germany places the greatest confidence in the diplomatic representation of the Empire by the Emperor and in the direction of Germany's policy by your Serene Highness. At the same time it should be pointed out that for a declaration of war in the name of the Empire the consent of the Federal Council is required unless the Federal territory is threatened with an attack. Bismarck essayed to define the position of the Emperor and that of the other sovereigns of Germany not only in the written Constitution and in confidential letters which he exchanged with the sovereigns and statesmen of the Southern States, but also in public speeches on the Con- stitution. For instance, in his speech in the Eeichstag on April 9, 1871, he expressly stated that the sovereignty of the Empire was not in the hands of the Emperor, but in those of the AUied Governments. He said : I believe that the Federal Council has a great future because for the first time an attempt has been made by its creation to concentrate power in a federal board which exercises the sovereignty of the whole Empire although it does not deprive the individual States of the benefits of 198 The German Emperor^ s Position the Monarchical Power or of their ancient repubhcan government. The sovereignty of the German Empire does not He in the hands of the Emperor, but in those of the aUied Governments as a whole. At the same time it is useful if the wisdom, or, if you like, the unwisdom, of twenty- five individual governments is brought into the delibera- tions of the Federal Council, for thus we obtain a variety of views which we have never had within the Government of any single State. Prussia is great, but she has been able to learn from the small and from the smallest States, and these have learned from us. . . . My experience has taught me to believe that I have made considerable progress in my political education by participating in the delibera- tions of the Federal Council owing to the stimulating friction provided by twenty-five German Governments, and thus I have learned a great deal in addition. Therefore I would ask you : Do not touch the Federal Council ! I see in it a kind of Palladium of our future. I see in it a great guar- antee for Germany's future. The Chancellor laid particular stress upon the fact that the German Empire was created for defence, that the existence of article eleven, quoted in the beginning of this chapter, guaranteed Germany against a wanton war of aggression. In his speech delivered in the Keichstag on November 4, 1871, he stated : A strong guarantee for the peacefulness of the new Empire lies in this, that the Emperor has renounced the unlimited right to declare war which he possessed in his former position as King of Prussia. In this renunciation lies a strong guar- antee against a wanton war of aggression. . . . The guaran- tee lies in this, that according to the constitution the Federal Council must consent to a war of aggression. By the right given to it by the Constitution the Federal Council cannot prevent mobilisation, but it can prevent a declaration of war. It cannot prevent preparation for war which the Emperor has recognised to be necessary, for the co-operation of the Federal Council is only required in the action of declaring war unless the war is purely a war of defence which has been forced upon Germany by an attack upon its territories. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 199 In this respect the Federal Council may be compared to an enlarged Cabinet. It is only fair to add that Bismarck did not disregard the possibility of Germany having to act on the aggressive. Hence he added : As regards the theory of a war of aggression conducted by Germany for the purpose of defence which was mentioned by a previous speaker, I believe that the attack is often the most efficient form of defence. It has been a frequent occurrence, and it is very useful for a country, such as Germany, which is situated in the centre of Europe and which can be attacked from three or four directions. It may be necessary to follow the example set by Frederick the Great, who, before the Seven Years' War, did not wait until the net in which he was to be caught had been thrown over his head, but tore it to pieces. I believe that those are in error who imagine that the German Empire will quietly wait until a powerful opponent or mighty coalition consider the moment favourable for an attack. Only an unskilful diplomacy could act thus. In such a case it is the duty of the Government to select a moment for making war when the danger is smallest and when the struggle can be fought at the lowest cost to the nation and at the least danger, provided, of course, that war is really unavoidable. The nation can expect that in such a case the Government will take the initiative. The fact that Bismarck disapproved of a war of aggression such as the present one may be clearly seen from numerous important statements of his, some of which I quoted in my book, ' The Foundations of Germany ' (Smith, Elder & Co., 1916). Naturally the professors of Constitutional Law who commented upon the Constitution expounded it in accord- ance with its plain meaning and with the teachings of Prince Bismarck. ; They taught, up to the outbreak of the present War, that the sovereignty of the country was not in the hands of the Emperor, but in those of the Allied States; 200 The German Emperor^s Position that the Emperor was not the monarch of Germany, but merely the President of the Confederation, and that he was not entitled to declare a war of offence except with the consent of the non-Prussian States. For instance. Professor Laband wrote in his most important standard work, ' Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Eeiches ' in four huge volumes, of which the fifth edition appeared shortly before the War : The foundation of the North German Federation and of the German Empire was effected not by the German people but by the German States. All actions which brought about the creation of the Confederation were actions of these States. By entering into the Confederation they divested themselves of their sovereignty, but not of their individuality, as States. Their individuality continued unbroken and became the foundation of the Federal State. It follows that not the individual citizens are the members of the Empire, nor that the citizens in the aggregate possess the power of the Empire. The members of the Empire are the individual States. The German Empire is not an or- ganisation composed of millions of members who constantly increase in numbers, but is an association of twenty-five members. . . . It must be observed that no new legal institution has been created by re-establishing the Imperial dignity. The idea of the presidency of the Confederation has not been altered by connecting with it the title Emperor. The historical events which led to the resuscitation of the Imperial title, the reasons and motives with which the Constitution was submitted, the discussion accompanying it, and espe- cially Article XI of the Imperial Constitution itself, show with indubitable certainty that the Emperor's position is com- pletely identical with that of the presidency in the North German Federation, and that the Emperor, apart from his title and insignia, has no rights except the right of President. . . . The Emperor is not sovereign of the Empire. The sovereign power rests not with him, but with the German allied sovereigns and free towns as a whole. If he acts in the name of the Empire, he acts not in his own name but in the name of the Empire. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 201 The facts given in these pages prove conclusively that, according to the German Constitution, the Emperor was not entitled to declare a war of aggression, that he acted unconstitutionally in attacking Russia and France. The question has now to be considered whether, in case the War should have an unfortunate end for Germany, the Emperor can justify his action by referring to the stipu- lations of the Austro-German Treaty of AlHance of 1879. It is almost universally believed, even in the best-informed diplomatic quarters, that the celebrated Dual Alliance Treaty is a defensive and offensive Treaty. That is a grave error. The Austro-German Treaty was meant to be, and is, a purely defensive instrument. This will be seen from its text and from the official note introducing it. Both the Prefatory Note and the Treaty itself were first published in the Berlin Official Gazette of February 3, 1888, and I herewith give the full text of both. The translation was made by the Foreign Office and it was published in vol. 73 of the British and Foreign State Payers : The Governments of Germany and of the Austro-Hun- garian Monarchy have determined upon the publication of the Treaty concluded between them on the 7th of October 1879, in order to put an end to doubts which have been entertained in various quarters of its purely defensive character, and have been turned to account for various ends. The two allied Governments are guided in their policy by the endeavour to maintain peace and to guard, as far as possible, against its disturbance ; they are convinced that by making the contents of their Treaty of Alliance generally known they will exclude all possibility of doubt on this point, and have therefore resolved to publish it. Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Austria- Hungarjj and Germany. Signed at Vienna, October 7, 1879. Inasmuch as their Majesties the German Emperor, King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, must consider it their inalienable duty to provide for the 202 The German Emperor^ s Position security of their Empires and the peace of their subjects under all circumstances ; Inasmuch as the two Sovereigns, as was the case under the former existing Treaty, will be enabled by the close union of the two Empires to fulfil this duty more easily and more efficaciously ; Inasmuch as, finally, an intimate co-operation of Germany and Austria-Hungary can menace no one, but is rather calculated to consolidate the peace of Europe on the terms established by the stipulation of Berlin ; Their Majesties the German Emperor and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, while most solemnly promising never to allow their purely defensive Agreement to develop an aggressive tendency in any direction, have determined to conclude an alliance of peace and mutual defence. With this object their Majesties have named as their Plenipotentiaries : His Majesty the German Emperor, His Majesty's Am- bassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Lieutenant- General Prince Henry the Seventh of Eeuss, &c. ; His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, His Majesty's Privy Councillor, Minister of the Imperial House and for Foreign Affairs, Lieutenant Field-Marshal Julius Count Andrassy of Csik-Szeut-Kiraly and Kraszna- Haka, &c. ; Who have this day at Vienna, after the exchange and mutual verification of one another's full powers, agreed as follows : Art. I. — Should, contrary to their hope, and against the loyal desire of the two High Contracting Parties, one of the two Empires be attacked by Kussia, the High Contracting Parties are bound to come to the assistance one of the other with the whole war strength of their Empires, and accord- ingly only to conclude peace together and upon mutual agreement. II. — Should one of the High Contracting Parties be at- tacked by another Power, the other High Contracting Party binds itself hereby, not only not to support the aggressor against its high ally, but to observe at least a benevolent neutral attitude towards its fellow Contracting Party. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 203 Should, however, in such a case the attacking Power be supported by Russia, either by an active co-operation or by mihtary measures which constitute a menace to the Party attacked, then the obhgation stipulated in Article I of this Treaty, for mutual assistance with the whole fighting force, becomes equally operative, and the conduct of the war by the two High Contracting Parties shall in this case also be in common until the conclusion of a common peace. III. — This Treaty shall, in conformity with its peaceful character, and to avoid any misinterpretations, be kept secret by the two High Contracting Parties, and only be communicated to a third Power upon a joint understanding between the two Parties, and according to the terms of a special Agreement. The two High Contracting Parties venture to hope, after the sentiments expressed by the Emperor Alexander at the meeting at Alexandrowo, that the armaments of Eussia will not in reality prove to be menacing to them, and have on that account no reason for making a communication ; should, however, this hope, contrary to their expectation, prove to be erroneous, the two High Contracting Parties would consider it their loyal obligation to let the Emperor Alexander know, at least confidentially, that they must consider an attack on either of them as directed against both. In virtue of which the Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty and affixed their seals. Vienna, October 7, 1879. (L.S.) H. VII, P. Reuss. (L.S.) Andrassy. It will be noticed that indeed the Austro- German AlHance bears a purely pacific and defensive character. The Official Note inserted in the Government Gazette, introducing it, refers to ' its purely defensive character.' If we read the Treaty itself we find it stated in its preamble that it has been concluded ' to consolidate the peace of Europe,' that it is a ' purely defensive Agreement,' that it is ' an alliance of peace and mutual defence.' The purely defensive 204 The German Emperor^s Position character of the Austro- German Treaty of Alhance cannot be denied, nor can it be explained away. Germany was under no obligation to come to Austria's aid in a war in which that country was the aggressor. It follows that the German Emperor cannot justify his attack upon Eussia and France by explaining that he was bound by treaty to come to Austria's aid. The fact that the Austro-German Treaty was a purely defensive one appears not only from the Treaty itself but from Prince Bismarck's commentaries upon the Alliance. Eef erence to my book, ' The Foundations of Germany,' will furnish numerous most emphatic state- ments of the Chancellor according to which Germany was under no obligation to help Austria, should the latter be involved in war with Eussia in consequence of Austrian aggressive action in the Balkan Peninsula. On June 15, 1888, the Emperor Frederick died and William the Second ascended the throne. A few days later, on June 25 and 27, he addressed the German Imperial and the Prussian State Parliament in person, reading to these assemblies his speech from the throne. In these addresses, which opened his reign, he solemnly promised to observe the Constitution and, in accordance with the Constitution, not to declare war unless the Empire or its Allies should actually be attacked. The Emperor stated in his speech to the Eeichstag on June 25 : The most important tasks of the German Emperors consist in securing the Empire politically and militarily against attacks from without and in watching the execution of the Imperial laws within. The foremost Imperial law is the German Constitution. It is one of the foremost rights and duties of the Emperor to observe and to protect the Constitution and the rights granted by it to the two legisla- tive bodies of the nation and to every German, and also to the sovereign. . . . In the domain of foreign policy I am resolved to keep peace with all nations to the best of my endeavour. My love for the German army and my position towards the Great Problems of British Statesmanshi'p 205 military forces will never lead me into temptation to deprive the country of the benefits of peace unless war should become a necessity, having been forced upon us by an attack upon the Empire or upon its Allies. The German Army is in- tended to protect our peace, and if peace is broken the Army must be able to regain it with honour. It will be able to do this with God's help owing to the strength which it has received in accordance with the recent military law which was unanimously passed. It is far from my heart to use the armed strength of the country for wars of aggres- sion. Germany neither requires further military glory nor conquests, having established by war her justification to exist as a united and independent nation. Our alliance with Austria-Hungary is generally known. I adhere to it with German fidelity not merely because it has been concluded but also because I recognise in this defensive alliance the foundation of the European Balance of Power. Two days later, on June 27, William the Second, as King of Prussia, opened the two Prussian Houses of Parlia- ment and addressed them in person as follows ; . . . Since, owing to my father's death, the throne of my ancestors has come to me, I have felt the need at the beginning of my reign to assemble you around me without delay and to give before you a solemn vow and to swear the oath prescribed by the Prussian Constitution : I vow that I will observe the Constitution of the kingdom firmly and inviolably, and that I will rule in accordance with the Constitution and the Law. So help me God ! . . . Like King William the First, I will, in accordance with my solemn vow, faithfully and conscientiously observe the laws and the rights of the popular representation, and with equal conscientiousness I will preserve and exercise the rights of the crown, as established by the Constitution, in order to hand them on in due course to my successor on the throne. It is far from me to disturb the confidence of the people in the solidity of our legal conditions by striving to increase the rights of the crown. The legal extent of my rights, as long as these are not questioned, sufiices to secure 206 The German Emperor^ s Position to the State that measure of monarchical influence which Prussia requires owing to her historical development, her present position and her place in the Empire, and the feelings and habits of the people. I am of opinion that our Constitu- tion contains a just and useful distribution of powers among the various governing factors, and for this reason, not only on account of my vow, I shall observe and protect it. In the two most important speeches quoted, the Emperor solemnly promised to the nation on his ascent to the throne ' to observe and to protect the Constitution,' not to increase his powers ' by striving to increase the rights of the crown,' and not to declare war ' unless war should become a necessity, having been forced upon us by an attack upon the Empire or upon its AlHes.' It is also worth noting that the Emperor described the Austro- German Alliance as ' this defensive alHance, the foundation of the European Balance of Power.' Nothing could be more explicit than the assurances and undertakings given in these words. The two speeches, though read by the Emperor, embody of course not merely the Emperor's views but also those of Prince Bismarck, who apparently drafted them in collaboration with the Emperor. Bismarck was an excellent judge of character. Apparently he hoped to bridle the Emperor's impetuous- ness by causing him to declare in the most solemn manner that he would observe the Constitution and not make war unless Germany should actually be attacked. His hopes that the solenm promises of the Emperor would restrain him during his reign have been disappointed. According to the Constitution, every Imperial Act has to be countersigned by the Imperial Chancellor who, by countersigning, assumes responsibility for it. Of course the responsibility of the Imperial Chancellor becomes a mere formality without meaning if the Emperor appoints to the Chancellorship a man without strength of character who readily countersigns the Imperial orders as they are given. Soon after his accession to the throne William the Second showed that he meant to be his own Chancellor, Great Problems of British Statesmanship 207 that he had no use for a Chancellor who possessed ability and independence of mind. He dismissed Bismarck and has since then appointed pHable men in his stead. Bismarck's four successors were without exception men of great pliability. Probably Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg is the most pliable of them all. To the alarm and concern of the old Chancellor, the young Emperor endeavoured to govern Germany and to direct the foreign and domestic pohcy of the country in accordance with his personal views and moods, violating the spirit, if not the wording, of the Constitution. Considering himself the Trustee of the Empire, Bismarck endeavoured during the years of his retire- ment from office to create a counterpoise to the dangerous impetuousness of the Emperor, who wished to grasp all power, by recommending, on numerous occasions, the jealous preservation and defence of the Constitution. For instance, on August 10, 1891, a year after his dismissal, addressing representatives of the University Students of Germany, Prince Bismarck stated : In order to unite Germany the individual dynasties and governments of Germany had to co-operate. All former attempts at carrying out the idea of unifying Germany were bound to fail because the dynastic forces were under- estimated. ... I see the task of the future, mainly, in preserving the existing. If I recommend preserving the existing, I mean of course that the Imperial edifice should be improved and completed. What, then, should be pre- served ? I would most urgently recommend you for the future to preserve the Imperial Constitution. Lay that to your heart. The Constitution is imperfect, but it was the best Constitution that could be obtained. Cultivate, then, the Constitution. Watch jealously over the Constitution, and see that the rights established by the Constitution are not diminished. I am not a friend of centralisation. I say again : Watch over the Imperial Constitution even if, later on in life, it should not please you. Do not advise any alteration unless all the States agree to it. That is the first condition for the political welfare of the Empire. 208 The German Emperor^s Position In July 1892 Prince Bismarck made a speech at Kissingen, in which he particularly dwelt on the danger to the nation of appointing to the Chancellorship an obedient official, a mere Imperial Secretary, and, foreseeing the danger of an Imperial absolutism exercised through a pliable Chancellor, demanded the creation of a counterpoise to the Emperor. He said in the course of that remarkable speech : I should have liked to continue the work, but our young Emperor will do everything himself. . . . The German Eeichstag does not fulfil my expectations that it would be the centre of national life as I had hoped at the time of its creation. If one wishes to strengthen the Eeichstag one must increase the responsibility of the Ministers. The Constitution of Prussia promises a law which will make Ministers responsible for their actions. Such a law has, however, not been promulgated, and ministerial responsibility does not apply to the Empire. Hence anyone can become Imperial Chancellor even if he is not qualified for that position. Consequently the office of Imperial Chancellor may be lowered so that the Chancellor will become merely a private secretary, whose responsibility is limited to doing what he is told without selecting what is useful or examining proposals. ... If responsibility was enforced by law no one would become Imperial Chancellor unless he possessed the necessary qualifications. . . . When I became Minister, the Crown was in difficulties. The King was discouraged. His Ministers refused to sup- port him. He wished to abdicate. When I saw this I strove to strengthen the Crown against Parliament. Per- haps I have gone too far in this direction. We require a counterpoise. I believe that frank criticism is indispens- able for a monarchical government. Otherwise it degene- rates into an official absolutism. We require the fresh air of public criticism. Germany's constitutional life is founded on it. When Parliament becomes powerless, becomes merely an instrument of a higher will, we shall come back again in due course to the enlightened abso- lutism of the past. Theoretically that may be the most perfect form of government, a divine form of government. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 209 However, it is practically unacceptable because of human inadequacy. In a speech delivered August 20, 1893, Prince Bismarck stated : In our attempts at unification we must not go beyond the Constitution. The German Constitution has not only demanded vast sacrifices in human lives and in blood. It was an exceedingly difficult work to combine the opposing interests which had been at variance for centuries. It was exceedingly difficult to unite them in such a manner that at last all were satisfied or at least contented. The fact that the Constitution is touched and shaken fills me with grave cares in my old age. On June 12, 1890, only a few months after his dismissal, Prince Bismarck said, addressing a deputation of Stuttgart citizens : The dynasties have appeared to me a guarantee of Germany's unity. With their assistance the work of unifying Germany, which had been begun in battle, was completed. ... I have never been an advocate of Imperial centralisa- tion, and I have made it my task as Imperial Chancellor to protect the rights of the individual States against illegiti- mate encroachments. During the eight years which Bismarck spent in retire- ment he frequently urged his countrymen in speech and in writing to preserve the German Constitution inviolate, not to diminish the rights of the individual States, to create a counterpoise to the Emperor's impetuousness and to his attempts at governing Germany as if it were a Greater Prussia, and not to embark upon an aggressive war, nor to support Austria should she come into colhsion with Eussia by an attack in the Balkans, because in that case Germany was under no obligation to help Austria and had no interest in being involved in a great war over Balkan questions. In attacking Eussia and France the German Emperor 210 The German Emperor^ s Position not only violated the Imperial Constitution but he acted with an absolute disregard of the maxims of State which the creator of Modern Germany had laid down, and he cannot even plead that he was compelled to go into war because of the Austro-German Alliance. His contravention of the German Constitution may possibly in course of time assume an exceedingly serious aspect. Prince Bismarck stated in his posthumous ' Memoirs ' : ' The Federal Council represents the governing power of the joint sovereignty of Germany.' According to the German Constitution, ' the consent of the Federal Council is necessary for the declaration of war in the name of the Empire, unless an attack on the territory or the coast of the Confederation has taken place.' The Emperor could constitutionally and legitimately attack Eussia and France only after an attack on German territory had actually occurred. In order to make an aggression legitimate, a foreign attack upon Germany had either to be brought about or to be invented. Germany went to war because, according to the official version, ' war was forced upon her,' because German territory was attacked both by Eussia and France. On August 4 the German Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, stated in the Eeichstag : The Emperor gave orders that the French frontier should be respected under all conditions. With one single excep- tion that order was strictly obeyed. France, which mobilised at the same hour as Germany, declared to us that she would withdraw her troops to a distance of 10 kilometres from the frontier. But what happened in reality ? Flying machines throwing bombs, cavalry patrols and companies of French infantry breaking into Alsace-Lorraine ! By acting thus France has broken the peace and has actually attacked Germany although a state of war had not yet been declared. As regards the exception mentioned I have received the following report from the Chief of the General Staff : ' Of the French complaints regarding the violation of the frontier only a single one must be admitted. Against express orders a patrol of the XIV. Army Corps crossed the Great Problems of British Statesmanship 211 frontier on the 2nd of August. Apparently it was com- manded by an officer. It seems that they were shot, for only one man has returned. However, long before this single crossing of the frontier took place French flying machines have thrown bombs upon the German railway lines as far as the South of Germany, and French troops have attacked German troops protecting the frontier at the Schlucht Pass. In accordance with orders given the German troops have hmited themselves entirely to the defensive.' This is the report of the General Staff. Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity, and neces- sity knows no law ! Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps have entered upon Belgian territory. According to the Eeport of the Chief of the General Staff, von Moltke, the French began the war by attacking by means of flying machines, &c. Since August 4, when that mendacious statement was read in the German Eeichstag, it has been repeated innumerable times by German officialdom and by leading private men. In the German White Book, which was published in English for the benefit of Americans, we read : A few hours later, at 5 p.m., the mobilisation of the entire French army and navy was ordered. On the morning of the next day France opened hostilities. In the book ' Truth about Germany — Facts about the War,' which was likewise issued for the benefit of Americans under the joint supervision of Prince Bulow and many other of the best-informed Germans, it is stated : Before one German soldier had crossed the German frontier a large number of French aeroplanes came flying into our country across the neutral territory of Belgium and Luxemburg without a word of warning on the part of the Belgian Government. At the same time the German Government learned that the French were about to enter Belgium. Then our Government with great reluctance had to decide upon requesting the Belgian Government to allow our troops to march through its territory. 212 The German Emperor^ s Position According to the celebrated legal authority, Professor Josef Kohler, France attacked Germany not from the air but by invasion across the frontier. He wrote in the book ' Die Vernichtung der englischen Weltmacht,' published in 1915 : You know that when we offered France neutrality the French replied to our offer by sending troops across the frontier, violating thus the Law of Nations established by the Hague Convention. The German Declaration of War upon France stated : M. le President, the German administrative and military authorities have established a Certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on German territory by French mili- tary aviators. Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country ; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel ; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel ; one has thrown bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg. I am instructed, and I have the honour, to inform your Excellency, that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power. . . . SCHOEN. According to Herr von Below Saleske, the German Minister in Brussels, Germany was attacked by France, neither by aeroplanes, nor by an ordinary attack across the frontier, but by an attack from airships. In an inter- view which he asked for at 1.30 a.m. on August 3, 1914, Herr von Below Saleske made that statement, according to a Memorandum published in the Diplomatic Correspon- dence issued by the Belgian Government. The Memorandum runs as follows : A I'heure et demie de la nuit, le Ministre d'Allemagne a demande a voir le Baron van der Elst. II lui a dit qu'il etait charge par son Gouvernement de nous informer que des dirigeables fran^ais avaient jete des bombes et qu'une patrouille de cavalerie fran9aise, violant le droit des gens, Great Problems of British Statesmanship 213 attendu que la guerre n'etait pas cleclaree, avait traverse la frontiere. Lately the assertion that France began the war upon Germany, by an attack either by land or from the air, has been less frequently heard. The insistent inquiries made by German politicians at the military headquarters in Berlin and in South German towns have failed to discover the place where, according to the statement of the Chief of the General Staff which was read by the German Chan- cellor in the Keichstag, ' French flying machines have thrown bombs upon the German railway lines as far as the South of Germany.' When the question of responsibility for the War is judicially investigated, it will, perhaps, appear who it was that created a colourable pretext for Germany's aggression by pretending that France had been the first to strike at Germany. It will then appear whether the untrue statement of the General Staff was made by order of the Emperor, or whether it originated in the General Staff itself ; whether the Emperor demanded that a pretext should be created, or whether the military leaders, especially von Moltke, who were notoriously anxious for war, invented the French attack in order to force the Emperor's hands. My impression has been for a long time that the latter was the case, as I endeavoured to show in an article published in The Nineteenth Century and After} Very likely Herr von Jagow and the Imperial Chancellor acted perfectly bond fide when they explained at the critical moment that they had been unacquainted with the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. The surmise that the military leaders first brought about the diplomatic crisis, and then forced the hands of the Emperor and of the Imperial Chancellor by inventing a French attack upon Germany, is strengthened by the admission of the Secretary of State, von Jagow, and of his Under-Secretary, Herr Zimmermann, in their conversa- tion with the French Ambassador and the Belgian Minister ^ ' How the Army has ruined Germany,' The Nineteenth Century and After, April 1916. 214 The German Em'peror^s Position in Berlin, that they were powerless, that the control of the diplomatic situation was in the hands of the military leaders. Future investigation will probably show that the military party, by a false report, engineered a deliberate and carefully planned violation of the German Constitution, that they made the Emperor their tool. However, if the war was brought about by the pressure of the military firebrands, and by the deliberate concoction of a French attack, the Emperor cannot plead irresponsibility for his action. Qui facit per aliujii facit fer se. The principal is responsible for the actions of his agents. A surgeon cannot plead that he is not responsible for a fatal operation, that he acted against his conviction, that he was forced into it by the demandsof his dresser. A lawyer cannot plead immunity because he acted against his conviction, owing to the urgent advice of his clerk. If the War should end in Germany's defeat, the German Emperor may be held responsible by the German people and he cannot then shift his responsibility on to the military leaders, nor will it suffice if he should explain fhat he had punished the late von Moltke for his intrigue by dismissing him at the earliest opportunity. The German Constitution is on the one hand a charter of popular liberties which grants to the German nation certain rights, such as Parliamentary representation with a democratic franchise. It is, on the other hand, a pact concluded between Prussia and the German States whereby their relations are regulated, and whereby Prussia's authority and competence as the presiding State of the Confederation are carefully determined and limited. The German Con- stitution delimits punctiliously the functions and powers of the Emperor- President. In accepting the Imperial Crown and in promising to observe the Constitution, the King of Prussia, as German Emperor, bound himself to observe the fundamental regulations of the Empire, which were devised not only in the interest of the dynasties or of the individual States, apart from Prussia, but m the interest pf the (jerman nation a§ a whole. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 215 The minor States were, according to the Constitution, to act as a brake upon a rash and impulsive Prussian King. Hence, not only the South Germans but the Prussians also are strongly interested in the careful observance of the Constitution on the part of the King-Emperor. The sovereigns of the minor States are not merely ornamental Lords-Lieutenant but are, according to the Constitution, partners in the Imperial concern, in which they possess a controlling interest if a war of aggression is planned by the Emperor. The sovereigns of the minor States insisted upon the limitation of the Emperor's power, not merely in their personal interest or in that of their States, but in that of all Germany, of the German nation. Hence, the limita- tions demanded by them, restricting the Emperor's powers with regard to the declaration of war, were considered reasonable by Bismarck and by the old Emperor and by his advisers, and they were readily assented to as being in the best interest of the nation and of the Emperor himself. Kightly considered, the German Constitution is a deed of partnership concluded between the King of Prussia and the German sovereigns and free towns on the one hand, and between the Emperor and the German people on the other hand. The Imperial dignity was in 1871, and again in 1888, bestowed upon the King of Prussia on conditions. WilHam the Second has broken the formal pact between liimself and his brother sovereigns and between himself and the nation, notwithstanding his solemn declarations made at the time of his accession, either owing to his wilful- ness or owing to his weakness, either because he wished to embark upon a war of aggression, or because he allowed himself to be forced into such a war, which violates the Constitution, by the intrigues of the mihtary party. It seems by no means improbable that the German sovereigns and people will hold the German Emperor accountable should the War end disastrously for Germany. CHAPTEE VII Britain's war finance and economic future a forecast and a warning^ Late in 1915, Mr. Montagu stated in the House of Commons that the British War expenditure came to £5,000,000 a day, that the War was swallowing up half the national income. This was evidently a very serious understatement. Five million pounds a day is equal to £1,825,000,000 a year. According to the ' British Census of Production,' published in December, 1912, and relating to the year 1907, the national income of that year amounted to £2,000,000,000. Even the most optimistic statisticians have not seen in that figure a very great understatement. It therefore appears that the British War expenditure per day was at that time approximately equal to the entire national income per day in normal times. It need, however, scarcely be pointed out that the War, which has taken millions of able-bodied British men from the productive occupations, and which has diverted the industries from the production of useful commodities to that of war material, has very seriously diminished the true national income. Besides, with the con- stantly increasing numbers of the British Army, and the steadily growing financial requirements of the Allies for British loans and subsidies, the daily War expenditure of this country has continually kept on increasing. Hence, the daily cost of the War may now greatly exceed the whole of the national income. * The Nineteenth Century and After, December, 1915. 216 Great Problems of British Statesmanship 217 The vastness of Great Britain's War expenditure staggers the imagination not only of people in general but even that of financiers and statisticians. It can be visualised only by comparison. The Franco-German War of 1870-71, which lasted nine months, cost Germany £60,000,000 ; the Panama Canal, the greatest and the most expensive engineering under- taking the world has seen, cost the United States in ten years £80,000,000 ; the Boer War, which lasted three years, cost this country £250,000,000. It follows that Great Britain has spent on the War, at the comparatively moderate rate of £5,000,000 per day, every two weeks almost as much as the total cost of the Panama Canal, and that she has spent every two months considerably more than she did during the whole of the protracted campaign against the Boers. The War has so far cost about £3,000,000,000. The national capital of Great Britain is usually estimated to amount to about £15,000,000,000. As the struggle seems likely to continue, it may eventually swallow a sum equal to one-third of the British national capital, if not more. Interest will have to be paid on the gigantic War debt. Its capital must, by purchase, gradually be reduced to manageable proportions, and in addition untold millions will be required every year for the support of the crippled and incapacitated veterans, and for the widows and orphans. Before the War, Budgets of £200,000,000 per year seemed monstrous. After the War, Budgets of £500,000,000 may seem modest. If we now remember that years of hard times followed the rela- tively cheap Boer War we can well understand that statesmen and business men look with grave anxiety and alarm into the future, and at the mountainous debt which Great Britain is rapidly piling up, and that they are asking themselves : Can this over-taxed country stand the additional financial burdens ? Will not the War destroy the British industries and trade, drive the country into bankruptcy and ruin, or at least permanently impoverish Great Britain ? In the following pages an attempt will be made to answer these questions. 218 Britain^ s War Finance and Economic Future In endeavouring to solve the great problems confronting them the most eminent statesmen and soldiers of all times have turned for their information and guidance to the experience of the past, to the teachings of history. A hun- dred years ago Great Britain concluded her twenty years' struggle with Eevolutionary and Napoleonic France, in the course of which she spent about £1,100,000,000, a sum which greatly exceeded one-third of the national capital of the time. What, then, can we learn from Great Britain's experience ? How was the Napoleonic War financed ? What were the consequences of that gigantic expenditure upon the British industries, British trade, and the British finances ? Unfortunately, scientific history has been greatly neglected in this country. The existing accounts of the Napo- leonic struggle are exceedingly unsatisfactory. They con- sist partly of pleasantly written popular books designed to while away the idle hours of the leisured and the uninformed, partly of books written by Party men for Party- political purposes in which are exposed the wickedness of the Tories or the stupidity of the Whigs, the narrow-mindedness of the Protectionists or the recklessness of the Free Traders. It is humiliating that an impartial documentary history of the Great War and of its economic aspects remains still to be written. The past should be a guide to the present. I propose in these pages to summarise the economic teachings of the Great War by means of most valuable evidence which will not be found in any of the histories of that struggle, and, fortified by the necessary data, an attempt will be made to apply their lesson to the present and to make a forecast of Britain's economic future. The Great War between France and Great Britain began in 1793 and lasted, with two interruptions (1802-03 and 1814-15) until 1815. It cost this country about £1,100,000,000, but as that figure is not in accordance with tradition it may be challenged. I will therefore give my reasons for using it. It is not easy, in analysing national expenditure during a Great Problems of British Statesmanship 219 time of war, to state exactly what part of it is peace ex- penditure and what is war expenditure. Most writers on pubHc finance have stated that the War with France cost this nation about £800,000,000. That seems to me to be far too low a figure. If we wish to ascertain the cost of a war we cannot do so by mechanically adding up all expendi- ture which is labelled ' War Expenditure,' for much of it will appear under civil heads. Therefore, wo must endeavour to lind out, firstly, how much debt was incurred for the war, and, secondly, by how much the current national expenditure, which is raised by taxation, was increased during the war and presumably owing to the war. Let us make this test, for it will furnish us with some exceedingly interesting data which will be of great value in the course of this investigation. Before and during the Great War the British NationaJ Debt increased, according to McCulloch's ' Account of the British Empire,' as follows : National Debt in 1775 Debt incurred during American War 1775-84 Total Repaid during peace, 1784-93 Debt at commencement of Great War in 1793 Debt contracted during the Great War 1793-1815 .... National Debt on 1st February, 1817 The British National Debt Annual Charge 128,583,635 121,267,993 249,851,628 10,501,480 239,350,148 601,500,343 840,850,491 4,471,571 5,089,336 9,560,907 249,277 9,311,630 22,704,311 32,015,941 It will be noticed that the British National Debt grew by £601,500,000 during the Great War. Between 1792 and 1815 the national expenditure, the Tax Revenue, and the interest paid on the National Debt in- creased, according to the following interesting table, which is taken from Porter's ' Progress of the Nation,' as follows. 220 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future It deserves to be studied with care, especially as we shall have to revert to it in the course of this chapter. National Revenue and Expenditure. - National Expenditure Tax Revenue Interest paid on National Debt £ £ £ 1792 19,589,123 19,258,814 9,767,333 1793 24,197,070 19,845,705 9,437,862 1794 27,742,117 20,193,074 9,890,904 1795 48,414,177 19,883,520 10,810,728 1796 42,175,291 21,454,728 11,841,204 1797 50,740,609 23,126,940 14,270,616 1798 51,127,245 31,035,363 17,585,518 1799 55,624,404 35,602,444 17,220,983 1800 56,821,267 34,145,584 17,381,561 1801 61,329,179 34,113,146 19,945,624 1802 49,549,207 36,368,149 19,855,558 1803 48,998,230 38,609,392 20,699,864 1804 59,376,208 46,176,492 20,726,772 1805 67,169,318 50,897,706 22,141,426 1806 68,941,211 55,796,086 23,000,006 1807 67,613,042 59,339.321 23,362,685 1808 73,143,087 62,998,191 23,158,982 1809 76,566,013 63,719,400 24,213,867 1810 76,865,548 67,144,542 24,246,946 1811 83,735,223 65,173,545 24,977,915 1812 88,757,324 65,037,850 25,546,508 1813 105,943,727 68,748,363 28,030,239 1814 116,832,260 71,134,503 30,051,365 1815 92,280,180 72,210,512 31,576,074 1816 65,169,771 62,264,546 32,938,751 Tc )tal Tax Revenue, 1 792-1815: £1,082,( )1 3,370. In looking over this table it will be noticed that the revenue derived from taxes increased from £19,258,814 in 1792 to £72,210,512 in 1815. Nobody can say with absolute certainty how much of this increase was due to the automatic expansion of the ordinary peace expenditure, and how much to the War. Therefore, we must make an estimate. We shall probably be fairly correct if we assume that the national expenditure, and with it the tax revenue which should provide for it, would, from 1792 to 1816, have gradually increased by, let us say, 60 per cent., that is, from £19,000,000 Great Problems of British Statesmanship 221 in round figures to £31,000,000, had there been peace. That gradual increase over the whole period under review would give us an average yearly expenditure of £25,000,000 per year, and an equally large tax revenue to balance it. During the twenty-four years from 1792 to 1915 the total British Tax Revenue should therefore have amounted to £600,000,000, had peace been maintained. As, however, the British Tax Revenue from 1792 to 1815 amounted in the aggregate to no less than £1,082,000,000, we may assume that of the revenue raised by taxes between 1792 and 1815, £482,000,000 were raised owing to the war. Hence, the true cost of the Great War should consist of £601,500,000 raised by loan, and of £482,000,000 raised by taxation, or £1,083,500,000 in all. My estimate that the British War expenditure in the Great War came to about £1,100,000,000 should err, if at all, on the side of moderation. Let us now endeavour to gauge the significance of the gigantic financial effort made by this country by looking at it from the con- temporary point of view. In 1814 Mr. P. Colquhoun, an eminent writer on eco- nomics and statistics, published his excellent 'Treatise on the Wealth, Power, and Resources of the British Empire.' It was based on the Treasury statistics. According to him the whole private and public property of the nation represented a money value of £2,736,640,000. It is noteworthy that of that sum £1,200,640,000 was in respect of agricultural land alone. Manufacturing, commerce, and trade, which now are the principal wealth-creating resources of the country, were evidently of relatively small importance at the time. According to his painstaking and conscientious investigations, the national income amounted then to £430,521,372 per year. Its composition is shown in the table on page 222. If we accept as correct my estimate that Great Britain's expenditure on the war with France amounted to about £1,100,000,000, it follows that a century ago Great Britain spent on the war a sum about equivalent to the national 222 BritairCs War Finance and Economic Future income of two and a half years, and considerably larger than one-third of the entire national capital. If, a century ago. Great Britain was able to spend on war more than one-third of the national capital, she should certainly be able to make proportionately as great a financial sacrifice at the present time, when rapidly producing machinery has taken the place of slowly producing agriculture, when capital lost or diverted by the War can more quickly be replaced. As the national capital amounts at least to £15,000,000,000, Great Britain should now be able to spend again more than one-third, or from £5,000,000,000 to £6,000,000,000, on war. If the Empire as a whole should finance the War, that amount National Income. £ From agriculture .... From mines and minerals From manufactures From inland trade From foreign commerce and shijiping From the coasting trade From fisheries, excluding Newfoundland From banks .... Foreign income .... 216,817,624 9,000,000 114,230,000 31,500,000 46,373,748 2,000,000 2,100,000 3,500,000 5,000,000 Total 430,521,372 could easily be doubled. Of course some allowance must be made for the fact that whereas a hundred years ago British war expenditure was spread over twenty years, it will now be spread over a much shorter period. Hence, the necessary economic measures, similar to those which were taken a century ago, must not be taken dilatorily but speedily. Before considering the consequences of the nation's gigantic expenditure upon its economic position and future, let us briefly study the means by which, a century ago. Great Britain raised the colossal funds required for the war against France, for such an investigation will supply u,s with some very valuable precedents. A hundred years ago, as now, the war was paid for partly with the proceeds of loans, partly with funds pro- Great Problems of British Statesmanshijj 223 vided by taxation. If, as I have endeavoured to show, the war cost this country £1,100,000,000, it appears that £600,000,000, or three-fifths, were raised by loans and £500,000,000, or two-fifths, by taxation. If we now turn back to the interesting table of national revenue and expendi- ture previously given, it will be seen that taxation was enormously increased during the Napoleonic era. Between 1792 and 1815 it increased from £19,258,814 to £72,210,512, or was almost quadrupled, and as the substantial increase of taxation only began in 1796, it was almost quadrupled in the small space of twenty years ! How great was the financial sacrifice made by the nation during the Napoleonic wars may be seen by the fact that British taxation was generally considered to be ' intolerably high ' before the war began. It was indeed very high. If we look at the table of British National Debt given in the beginning of this chapter, it appears that the National Debt had been almost exactly doubled by the costly war with the American Colonies, France, Spain, and Holland from 1775 to 1784, that this country entered the Napoleonic War with the dead weight of an enormous war debt pressing on it. From the table of National Eevenue and Expenditure it appears furthermore that in 1792 no less than practically one-half of the entire national expenditure consisted of interest paid on the National Debt, that one-half of the Budgetary expenditure in time of peace was, in fact, expenditure caused by the previous wars. During the Napoleonic War the public burdens were vastly increased. Reference to the table of National Re- venue and Expenditure shows that the interest paid per year on the National Debt increased from £9,767,333 in 1792 to no less than £32,938,751 in 1816, growing no less than three and a half fold. The British national expendi- ture of 1792 was at the time rightly considered to be a very heavy one. It was exactly twice as large as in 1775. Yet, between 1813 and 1816 Great Britain spent on an average per year on interest on the National Debt alone 224 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future 50 per cent, more than the total amount of the British national expenditme of 1792, and three times as much as the whole national expenditure of 1775. We have no reason to complain of the present war taxes. Compared with those established during the Napoleonic time they are very light indeed. Now let us study the way by which Great Britain raised her war taxes during the Great War. As the Budgets of a century ago form in their bulky original a maze in which the uninitiated are lost, I would give a useful analytical digest of the Budget revenue for the year 1815, taken from the second volume of Mr. Stephen Dowell's valuable ' History of Taxation and Taxes in England.' Details of the revenue of Great Britain, exclusive of Ireland, are shown in the table on page 225. The revenue from taxes in Ireland for the year 1815, ending January 5, 1816, was, in British currency, equal to £6,258,723. It will be noticed that a century ago, as now, the direct taxes on capital and income and the taxes on luxuries such as beer, wine, spirits, sugar, tea, coffee, tobacco, houses, coaches, &c., provided the bulk of the revenue. However, not only these but everything taxable was taxed. Exports, imports, and internal trade, coal and timber, raw materials used in the industries and manufactured articles produced in Great Britain, all had to pay their share. Sydney Smith, the witty Canon of St. Paul's, wrote in an article in The Edinburgh Review in 1820 : We can inform Brother Jonathan what are the inevitable consequences of being too fond of glory. Taxes upon every article which enters into the mouth, or covers the back, or is placed under the foot. Taxes upon anything that is pleasant to see, hear, feel, smell, or taste. Taxes upon warmth, light, and locomotion. Taxes upon everything on earth, or under the earth, on everything that comes from abroad, or is grown at home. Taxes on the raw material, taxes on every fresh value that is added to it by the industry Great Problems of British Statesmanship 225 Dike 3T Taxes £ £ The land tax . 1,196,000 Taxes on houses and establishments . 6,500,000 Income tax .... . 14,600,000 Tax on succession to property . 11,297,000 Property insured . 918,000 Property sold at auction 284,000 Coaches and cabs . 471,608 Tonnage on shipping 171,651 Oe An^ O.-.O Taxes on Abtiolks op Consumption. Food, Drink, and Tobacco : £ £ Salt 1,616,671 Sugar 2,957,403 Currants, raisins, pepper, and vinegar 641,589 Beer ...... 3,330,044 Malt 6,044,276 Hops ...... 222,026 Drink Licenses .... 200,000 Wine 1,900,772 Spirits 6,700,000 Tea 3,591,350 Coffee 276,700 Tobacco ..... 2,025,663 Ort A(\(t 4{\A Raw Materials and Customs Duties : Coal and slate ..... 915,797 Timber 1,802,000 Cotton wool ..... 760,000 Raw and thrown silk 450,000 Barilla, indigo, potashes, bar iron, and furs 297,000 Hemp ....... 285,000 Export duties ..... 364,417 Various import duties 1,188,000 R OR'* "1 i Taxes on Manufactures : Leather ...... 698,342 Soap 747,759 Bricks and tiles 269,121 Glass 424,787 Candles 354,350 Paper . 476,019 Printed goods 388,076 Newspapers . 383,000 Advertisements 125,000 Plate . 82,151 Various 132,116 -t f\9rt T*^ • ■• t,\JO\Jyl^l Stamp Duties. Bills and notes 841,000 Receipts ...... 210,000 Other instruments ..... 1,692,000 n HArt nnn Grand total £67,730,688 Q 226 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future of man. Taxes on the sauce which pampers man's appetite, and the drug which restores him to health ; on the ermine which decorates the judge, and the rope which hangs the criminal ; on the poor man's salt and the rich man's spice ; on the brass nails of the coffin and the ribbons of the bride ; at bed or board, couchant or levant, we must pay. The schoolboy whips his taxed top, the beardless youth manages his taxed horse with a taxed bridle on a taxed road ; and the dying Englishman, pouring his medicine, which has paid seven per cent., into a spoon that has paid fifteen per cent., flings himself back upon his chintz bed which has paid twenty-two per cent, and expires in the arms of an apothecary who has paid a licence of One hundred pounds for the privilege of putting him to death. His whole property is then immediately taxed from two to ten per cent. Besides the Probate large fees are demanded for burying him in the chancel. His virtues are handed down to posterity on taxed marble and he will then be gathered to his fathers to be taxed no more. The manner by which British taxation was increased in the course of the Great War may be gauged by comparing the peace Budget of 1792 with that of 1815. The following figures give a summary comparison : In 1792 In 1815 £ £ Direct taxes ...... 3,837,000 25,438,259 Taxes on food, drink and tobacco . 9,035,783 29,406,494 Taxes on raw materials and customs duties ...... 1,467,000 6,062,214 Taxes on manufactures .... 1,656,000 4,080,721 Stamp duties ...... 752,000 2,743,000 It will be noticed that the taxes on food, drink, tobacco, raw materials, imports, and on manufactures increased between 1792 and 1815 from three to four-fold, and that the stamp duties were raised at a similar ratio, while the direct taxes, that is, the taxes on the income and the pro- perty of the well-to-do, and on their estabhshments, increased Great Problems of British Statesmanship 227 almost sevenfold. If we bear in mind that a century ago • British foreign trade was carried on chiefly with the Con- tinent of Europe and the United States, that during many years practically the whole Continent was closed by Napoleon to British trade, that from 1812 to 1815 Great Britain was at war with the United States, that the British Colonies were quite unimportant, that in 1800 Canada had 240,000 and Australia only 6500 inhabitants, that the only valuable British Colonies were the West Indies, that in consequence of the closing of the principal British markets business was extremely bad, that commercial failures were very numerous, that several harvests had failed, that bread was scarce and very dear, that gold had disappeared, that the forced paper currency had rapidly depreciated, so that a guinea at one time was worth twenty-seven shillings in paper, we can appreciate the economic sufferings of the British people and their determination and staying power, their civic heroism and their moral fibre. They paid during those hard times three and four times as much in taxes as they had done during the years preceding the war. As, therefore, a hundred years ago, and under far more difi&cult economic circumstances than those which obtam at present, the British people were able to bear a burden of taxation from three to four times as heavy as that to which they had been accustomed, the British people of to-day will also be able to pay far more in taxes than they have done hitherto, although there will, of course, be grumbling and suffering. Nations, and especially nations which live luxuriously and wastefully, have almost an infinite capacity of paying taxes. That is one of the lessons of the Great War with France. Great Britain habitually makes war lavishly and waste- fully. That lies in the national character. Out of the forty years from 1775 to 1815 nine years were spent in an enormous war with the American Colonies, France, Spain, and Holland, and twenty years n a still greater war with Eepublican and Napoleonic France, and her allies and vassals. During these forty years, as we may see by referring 228 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future to the little table given in the beginning of this chapter, the National Debt and the yearly interest paid on it increased about sevenfold. Frederick the Great, Napoleon the First, and many other men of eminence, both in England and abroad, believed that the enormous British National Debt, and the ever-increasing burden of taxation, would impoverish and ruin England. Yet, at the end of the forty years' war period, England was undoubtedly far wealthier than she had been at its beginning. After the conclusion of that terrible war period the expected collapse of the British industries and of British commerce did not take place. On the contrary, all the British industries and British commerce expanded in an unprecedented manner. It has so frequently been asserted by economic and general historians who write history in order to prove a case, or to establish a doctrine, who write party pamphlets in book form, that England's economic expansion was consequent upon, and due to, the introduction of Free Trade, that that fallacy has been very widely accepted as truth. The abohtion of many of the innumerable taxes imposed during the Great War no doubt proved a powerful stimulus to certain industries. Still, Great Britain's most wonderful progress in trade and industry, in banking and shipping, in agriculture and mining, took place before Free Trade was introduced. It was effected during and shortly after the forty years of almost incessant warfare, and was, as I shall endeavour to show, chiefly due to these wars and to the burdens which they imposed upon the nation. Before endeavouring to prove this, it is necessary to show that the greatest economic advance of this country took place before 1846, the year when Free Trade was introduced. The supply of men, as Adam Smith wisely remarked, is regulated by the demand for men. In prosperous times, when work is plentiful, the people increase rapidly. Between 1801 and 1841 the British population almost doubled, growing from -19,942,646 to 18,720,394. Agriculture and Great Problems of British Statesmanship 229 the manufacturing industries flourished. As in 1841, ac- cording to Porter's ' Progress of the Nation,' only about 3,000,000 British people lived on imported wheat, it obviously follows, as that distinguished statistician pointed out, that British agricultural production must have increased by 50 per cent, in the meantime. The expansion of British agriculture may be seen not only by the large increase of the population, which relied almost exclusively on home- grown food, but also by the increasing yield of agricultural rent, which, according to McCulloch's ' Statistical Account of the British Empire,' grew as follows : Agricultural Bent 1800 . . £22,500,000 1806 . . 25,908,207 1810 . . 29,503,074 1815 . . 34,230,462 1843 . . 40,167,089 Now let us look at the progress of the British manu- facturing industries. The following tables are extracted from Porter's book, 'The Progress of the Nation,' 1851. I would add that Mr. Porter was the chief of the Statistical Department of the Board of Trade, and the founder of the Statistical Society, and he was later on Secretary to the Board of Trade. As the statistics relating to British industrial produc- tion during the first half of the last century are somewhat defective, the progress of the British manufacturing industries, as a whole, and of British trade, can best be gauged from the increase in the populations of the principal manufacturing and trading towns. These increased rapidly as is shown in a table on page 230. It will be noticed that between 1801 and 1841 the population of Manchester, Liverpool, and indeed most of the towns given, grew threefold and more than three- fold. Thes3 figures suffice to show that the British manu- facturing industries and British trade expanded at an incredible rate of speed before 1846. 230 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future The textile industry, in its various branches, is the greatest British manufacturing industry, and its rise is frequently, although erroneously, attributed by many to Population of British Towns. 1801 1811 1821 1831 1841 Manchester and Salford 94,876 115,874 163,635 237,832 311,009 Liverpool . 82,295 104,104 138,354 201,751 286,487 Birmingham 70,670 82,753 101,722 143,986 182,922 Leeds . 53,162 62,534 83,796 123,393 152,074 Sheffield . 45,755 63,231 65,275 91,692 111,091 Wolverhampton 30,584 43,190 63,011 67,514 93,245 Bradford 13,264 16,012 26,307 43,527 66,715 Oldham 21,677 29,479 38,201 60,513 60,451 Preston 12,174 17,360 24,859 33,871 60,887 Bolton 17,966 24,799 32,045 42,245 61,029 Leicester 17,005 23,453 31,036 40,639 60,806 Nottingham 28,861 34,253 40,415 60,680 63,091 Macclesfield 13,255 17,143 23,154 30,911 32,629 Coventry . 16,034 17,923 21,448 27,298 31,032 Huddersfield 7,268 9,671 13,284 19,035 26,068 Rochdale 8,040 10,392 12,998 18,351 24,272 Northampton 7,020 8,427 10,793 15,351 21,242 Free Trade. Measured by the quantity of raw material imported — the best test available — the British textile in- dustries, according to Porter, developed as follows : Imports of - Raw Cotton Raw Silk Raw Wool Lbs. Lbs. Lbs. Lbs. 1801 64,203,433 960,0001 7,371,774 1805 68,878,163 — 8,069,793 1816 92,625,951 1,475,389 13,640,376 1825 202,546,869 3,604,068 43,816,966 1836 333,043,464 6,788,458 42,604,656 1845 721,979,953 6,328,159 76,813,865 Between 1801 and 1845 the importation of raw silk increased about sevenfold, that of raw wool more than tenfold, and that of raw cotton more than thirteen-fold. 1 Ten years average. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 231 The British iron production increased, according to Porter, as follows : British Iron Production. 1806 258,000 toas. 1825 581,000 tons. 1835 1,000,000 tons. 1840 1,500,000 tons. 1845 1,700,000 tons. Between 1806 and 1845 the British iron production increased nearly sevenfold. The expansion of all the British manufacturing indus- tries was so rapid after 1815 that they speedily acquired practically a world monopoly. In 1845 Great Britain was indeed, to use Cobden's words, the workshop of the world. Modern manufacturing is based on coal. The command- ing position which the British industries had obtained during and after the Great War can best be gauged by Great Britain's production of coal. According to E. C. Taylor's valuable * Statistics of Coal,' a bulky handbook pubhshed in 1848, the world's production of coal in 1845 was as follows : — Production o£ Coal in 1845 Percentage o£ ■World's Production Great Britain ..... Belgium ...... United States ..... France ...... Russia ...... Austria ...... Total Tons 31,500,000 4,960,077 4,400,000 4,141,617 3,500,000 659,340 Per Cent. 64-2 101 8-9 S-4 7-0 1-4 100 49,161,034 In 1845 Great Britain not only produced two-thirds of the world's coal and two-thirds of the world's iron, but also worked up two-thirds of the world's raw cotton. During the war, and during the three decades of peace which followed the Congress of Vienna, Great Britain became the workshop of the world. The predictions of Napoleon and of many statesmen, financiers, and economists, that 232 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future the enormous National Debt and the huge burden of taxation would utterly impoverish Great Britain, were triumphantly- refuted . In no other period of the nation's history did its wealth progress at a more rapid rate. The principal cause which led to this marvellous economic development was, in my opinion, illogical as it may sound, the great burden which forty years of almost incessant warfare had laid upon the British people. Men do not love exertion, do not love work. They are born idlers who endeavour to enjoy life without exertion. They will not work hard — there are, of course, exceptions — unless compelled. Men, being born idle and improvident, live without labour in all chmes where a kindly Nature has provided for their wants. Necessity- is not only the mother of invention, but also the mother of labour, of productivity, of thrift, of wealth, of power, and of progress, and the greatest civilising influence of all is the tax-collector. The tax-collector converted the backward and happy-go-lucky British nation into a nation of strenuous and intelhgent industrial workers. Men like their comforts and their amusements, and they are apt to spend very nearly all they earn. If their taxes are suddenly very greatly increased, their first impulse is to stint themselves, but as this is a painful process, they soon endeavour to provide the money required by the tax- collector by harder work, or by more intelhgent exertion. During the forty years period of almost incessant war, and during the three decades which followed the Peace of Vienna, taxes were increased enormously, and as the increased taxes could scarcely be provided for by the unpleasant virtue of thrift, the people began to exert their ingenuity and strove to increase their income by increasing production. At the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, two periods of greatly increased taxation, British genius was applied to money-making, to industry, and to invention in an unparalleled manner. Not chance, but the constantly and colossally growing demands of the tax-col- lector led to the introduction of the steam-engine, of labour- Great Problems of British Statesmanship 233 saving machinery of every kind, of modern manufacturing, of modern commerce and banking, of railways, and of steamships. The time when taxation was trebled and quadrupled saw the rise of inventive geniuses such as Watt, Boulton, Brindley, Trevethick, Telford, Brunei, Maudesley, Bramah, Nasmyth, George Stephenson, Hargreaves, Arkwright, Crompton, Cartwright, Horrocks, Smeaton, Priestly, Balton, Faraday, Davy, Wedgwood, and many others. The resources of the country were carefully studied and energetically developed. Excellent roads were built to faciUtate traffic. The activity of the Duke of Bridgewater, and of other men, gave to England the then best system of inland waterways. The Duke of Bedford, Kay, and Coke of Norfolk gave a tre- mendous impetus to scientific agriculture. Eowland Hill introduced the penny postage. By the perfection of the organisation of joint-stock undertakings, the building of costly railways, of factories on the largest scale, and the evolution of modern banking, were made possible. During the end of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century, Englishmen were the most enterprising men in the world. They not only made the principal inventions of modern industry, but they were invariably the first to exploit the industrial inventions made by other nations. Since then, English enterprise and Enghsh in- ventiveness have sadly decHned. Most industrial inven- tions and improvements are made nowadays in Germany and in the United States, and the most valuable industrial inventions and discoveries made by Englishmen are ex- ploited not in England, but in Germany and America. The British discovery of making dyes from coal-tar led to the estabhshment of an enormous coal-tar dye industry in Germany. Although an EngHshman invented the valuable automatic loom, only a few automatic looms , are to be found in this country, while hundreds of thousands are employed in the United States. Many similar instances might be given. 234 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future During the last fifty years, England has undoubtedly grown slack. Many British industries have remained stagnant or have declined, while those in the United States and in Germany have mightily expanded. Great Britain was the workshop of the world in 1845, but she occupies no longer that proud position. What is the cause, or what are the causes, of this extraordinary change ? There are many causes, but the principal cause is 'undoubtedly this, that when England had become industrially supreme and very wealthy, the people were no longer compelled to work hard. Having established their position in the world of industry and commerce. Englishmen began to take their ease. Self- indulgence took the place of industry. Both the employers and their workers began to neglect their business at a time when necessity compelled the German and American peoples to concentrate their entire energy upon the development of their commerce and their industries. I have endeavoured to show in these pages that the wonderful development of the British industries during the end of the eighteenth and during the first half of the nineteenth century was due not to chance, but to high taxation — that not chance, but the pressure of high taxation produced the invention of the steam-engine and of labour- saving machinery of every kind. It is to be hoped that the vastly increased demands of the tax-collector will once more stimulate inventiveness and industry in this country to the utmost, that necessity will cause Englishmen to discover new avenues which lead to prosperity, that the gigantic cost of the present War will be as easily borne as that of the Great War a century ago. However, we need not reckon upon the discovery of new processes and the invention of new machines. Great Britain can easily provide for her financial require- ments, however long the War may last, by the simple process of Americanising her industries. Great Britain is blessed with an excellent climate and a most favourable geographical position. She is the only country in the world which, owing to the situation of its coalfields, can Great Problems of British Statesmanship 235 manufacture practically on the sea-shore, whereas other nations are greatly hampered by being compelled to manu- facture far inland. Besides, Great Britain possesses a gigantic and invaluable undeveloped estate in her vast Dominions and Colonies. Great Britain and the British Empire have absolutely unhmited resources which are partly not exploited at all, and partly quite insufficiently utiHsed. The greatest resource of every nation is, in Colbert's words, the labour of the people. Unfortunately, the labour of the British people is very largely wasted. If we compare the productivity of labour in this country and in the United States, we find, incredible as it may sound, that American labour is about three times as efficient as is British labour, that one American worker produces approximately as much as do three British workers. This assertion can be proved by means of the British and the United States censuses of production. The British census of production refers to the year 1907 and the American census to the year 1909. The two years lie so near together that one may fairly compare the results given. There is, of course, a difficulty in comparing the efficiency of British and American labour. In the first place the industries in the two countries have not always been officially classified in the same manner. There- fore many industries, such as the iron industry, cannot be compared by means of the census figures. In the second place the qualities of American and British produce fre- quently differ widely. These considerations have necessarily narrowed the range of comparable figures. The following table contains statistics relating to some British and American industries which may fairly be compared. They will show conclusively that in many of the comparable industries the American workers produce approximately three times as large a quantity of goods as do their English colleagues, and that they succeed in producing three times as much, not because they work three times as hard, but because, as is also shown in the table, the United States use in the identical industries approximately three times 236 Britain'' s War Finance and Economic Future as much horse-power per thousand men as does Great Britain. The following figures are extracted from a fuller table which appeared in an article of mine published in The Fortnightly Beview for August 1913, to which I would refer those who desire further details. They were much discussed at the time, but they have hitherto not been successfully challenged. — Production per Year Number of Wage- earners Horee-power Employed Horse- power per Thousand Wage- earners Value of Produc- tion per Wage- earner per Year Boots and Shoes : £ £ United Kingdom 20,095,000 117,565 20,171 172 171 United States 102,359,000 198,297 96,302 486 516 Cardboard Boxes : United Kingdom 2,067,000 19,844 2,288 114 106 United States 10,970,000 39,514 23,323 590 275 Cement : United Kingdom 3,621,000 18,860 60,079 3,195 192 United States 12,641,000 26,775 371,799 13,873 472 Clothing : United Kingdom 62,169,000 392,084 17,837 45 158 United States 190,560,000 393,439 66,019 165 484 Cocoa, Chocolate, and Confectionary : United Kingdom 16,171,000 54,629 19,898 346 296 United States 31,437,000 47,464 46,463 980 662 Cotton Goods : United Kingdom 132,000,000 559,573 1,239,212 2,214 236 United States 125,678,400 378,880 1,296,517 3,423 332 Clocks and Watches : United Kingdom 613,000 4,448 550 125 137 United States 7,039,400 23,857 14,957 628 296 Cutlery and Tools : United Kingdom 2,047,000 12,485 5,248 420 164 United States 10,653,200 32,996 68,294 2,069 323 Firearms and Am- munition : United Kingdom 677,000 4,444 2,619 595 152 United States 6,822,400 14,715 17,840 1,214 464 Gloves : United Kingdom 1,056,000 4,532 509 113 233 United States 4,726,200 11,354 2,889 256 416 Hats and Caps : United Kangdom 5,256,000 28,420 5,142 181 149 United States 16,598,000 40,079 23,524 588 414 Great Problems of British Statesmanship 237 — Production per Year Number of Wasre- eamers Horse-power Employed Horse- power per Thousand Wage- Value of Produc- tion per WPge- earner earners per Year Hosiery : £ £ United I^ngdom 8,792,000 47,687 7,784 163 184 United States 40,028,600 129,275 103,709 804 309 Leather Tanning and Dressing : United Kingdom 18,289,000 26,668 22,609 847 686 United States 65,574,800 62,202 148,140 2,389 1,054 Matches : United Kingdom 862,000 3,865 1,591 408 223 United States 2,270,600 3,631 6,224 1,729 625 Paint Colours and Varnish : United Kingdom 9,127,000 10,574 14,575 1,375 863 United States 24,977,800 14,240 56,162 4,012 1,754 Paper : United Kingdom 13,621,000 40,955 172,224 4,201 330 United States 53,531,000 75,978 1,304,265 15,846 705 Pens and Pencils : United Kingdom 791,000 6,025 1,450 241 131 United States 2,539,000 6,058 4,261 710 419 Printing and Pub- lishing : United Kingdom 13,548,000 34,210 38,611 1,133 396 United States 147,757,200 258,434 297,763 1,154 572 Silk : United Kingdom 5,345,000 30,710 18,867 608 142 United States 39,382,400 99,037 97,947 989 398 The figures given, which have not been selected for the purpose of ' making a case,' show irrefutably that the British manufacturing industries as a whole are almost incredibly inefiicient. Wherever we look we find that the American worker produces per year approximately three times as much as does his British colleague. Even the British cotton industry, the premier industry of the country, is, both on the spinning and on the weaving side, not pro- vided with the best labour-saving machinery, as I pointed out very fully in an article in The Nineteenth Century review some years ago.^ ^ ' Will a Tariff Harm Lancashire ? — A Lesson from America,' The Nineteenth Century and After, August, 1912. 238 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future The comparison of production per wage-earner per year in England and the United States is based upon wholesale prices. It is true that the shop prices of many commodities are higher in the United States than in England. However, this difference is due very largely to the fact that the American retailers require a larger profit because they have larger expenses, and because the business of distribution is more costly in the United States than here because dis- tances are greater. In most cases the wholesale prices of comparable commodities are nearly identical in both countries. The fact that the American workers produce on an average approximately three times as much as their British colleagues employed in the same industries can therefore not be gainsaid. It is, of course, generally known that in many cases American workers employ far more perfect machinery than do their British colleagues, but it is not generally known, and it seems almost unbelievable, that the American workers employ, besides better machinery, about three times as much power as do the British workers engaged in the same trades. If we allow for the fact that the American industries possess not only better machines, but in addition three times as much power with which to drive them, it is obvious that the mechanical efficiency of the American industries is considerably more than three times as great as that of the corresponding British industries. At the time when Great Britain was the workshop of the world, McCuUoch wrote in his ' Account of the British Empire ' : 'A given number of hands in Great Britain perform much more work than is executed by the same number of hands almost anywhere else.' That statement, which was true in the middle of the last century, is true no longer. Unfortunately the British industries have become lamentably inefficient, not only in comparison with those of the United States, but of Germany and of other countries as well. The greatest asset of a State is its man-power. Much of the British man-power is wasted. By Americanising Great Problems of British Statesmanship 239 the British manufacturing industries we can obviously double and treble the national output, and can thus double and treble the national income. That has been made abundantly clear by my analytical comparison. The lamentable inefficiency of British production is apparent not only in manufacturing, but in agriculture and mining as well. The Coal Tables of 1912, published by the British Board of Trade in March, 1914, contain many interesting figures relating to coal production in England and abroad. Coal is the bread of the manufacturing indus- tries. Its importance to the nation can scarcely be exag- gerated. Let us see how British coal production compares with coal production elsewhere. Tons of Coal Produced per Annum per Person Employed. - United Kingdom United States Australia New Zealand Canada 1886-90 312 400 333 359 341 1891-95 271 444 358 388 375 1896-1900 298 494 426 441 457 1901-5 281 543 437 474 495 1906-10 275 596 462 470 439 1908 271 538 500 478 422 1909 266 617 388 456 400 1910 257 618 449 478 453 1911 260 613 485 487 395 1912 2441 660 542 503 472 It will be noticed that the coal production per man per year is almost twice as large in AustraHa, New Zealand, and Canada as it is in the United Kingdom, and that it is almost three times as large in the United States as it is in this country. This startling difference can only partly be explained by the fact that in many cases the coal seams are thicker in the United States than in Great Britain, and are to be found at a lesser depth. This starthng dis- crepancy in output is largely, if not chiefly, ascribable to this,, that the British miner, as the British industrial worker, 1 Strike year. 240 BritairCs War Finance and Economic Future is hostile to improved machinery, and is determinedly bent upon limiting output. It is ominous that, whereas British coal production per man has steadily been decreasing during the last thirty years, American, Austrahan, New Zealand, and Canadian coal production per man has been steadily increasing. The British miner has unfortunately succeeded in more than nulhfying the technical improve- ments made in coal production which in other countries have greatly increased production per man. While an increasing coal production per man in America, Austraha, and New Zealand has brought about the cheapen- ing of coal, or has at least prevented it becoming dearer, greatly increased wages notwithstanding, the reduction in the British output per man, combined with increased wages, has fatally increased the price of British coal. This will appear from the figures given in the table on page 241. The figures given show that the British coal-miners have succeeded in reducing the output of coal per man and creating an artificial scarcity. In former years British coal was approximately as cheap as American coal, and in some years it was cheaper. Of that advantage the manu- facturing industries have now been deprived. Of late years, owing to increased wages and reduced output, Enghsh coal prices have been 50 per cent, higher than American coal prices. Hence the British manufacturing industries suffer not only from insufficient output due to inefficient machinery and insufficient power to drive it, but also from unnecessarily high coal prices. McCuUoch wrote in his 'Account of the British Empire ' •. Our coal mines have been sometimes called the Black Indies, and it is certain that they have conferred a thousand times more real advantage on us than we have derived from the conquest of the Mogul Empire, or than we should have reaped from the Dominion of Mexico and Peru. . . . Our coal mines may be regarded as vast magazines of hoarded or warehoused power ; and unless some such radical change should be made on the steam engine as should very decidedly Great Prohleins of British Statesmanship 241 lessen the quantity of fuel required to keep it in motion, or some equally serviceable machine, but moved by different means, be introduced, it is not at all likely that any nation should come into successful competition with us in those departments in which steam engines, or machinery moved by steam, may be advantageously employed. A verage Value oj Coal per Ton at the Pit's Mouth. - United Kingdom United States Australia New Zealand a. d. 5. d. S. d. s. d. 1886 4 10 6 4i — — 1887 4 9f 6 6i 9 2 10 10 1888 5 Of 6 9 10 11 1889 6 4i 5 3i 8 11 11 3 1890 8 3 5 2f 8 6 11 1891 8 5 3* 8 9 11 4 1892 7 3i 5 4| 7 11 11 3 1893 6 9* 5 4 7 5 11 1 1894 6 8' 5 1 6 8 11 1895 6 0* 4 9i 6 4 11 1 1896 5 lOi 4 9i 6 2 10 10 1897 6 11 4 ^ 6 11 10 1898 6 4i 4 5 5 9 10 1899 7 7 4 8i 6 1 10 1900 10 9i 5 3f 6 10 9 1901 9 ^ 6 6i 7 7 10 1902 8 2f 5 8i 7 9 10 11 1903 7 8 6 7 7 4 10 9 1904 7 2i 5 lOf 6 10 10 9 1905 6 Hi 5 8 6 2 10 7 1906 7 3i 5 9i 6 3 10 7 1907 9 5 Hi 6 10 10 7 1908 8 11 5 llf 7 4i 10 41 1909 8 Of 5 n 7 H 10 lOi 1910 8 2i 5 lOi 7 6i 11 u 1911 8 If 5 lOf 7 5i 10 lOi 1912 9 Of 6 1 7 6| 10 llj McCuUoch, as his contemporary Mr. Cobden, believed that England was, and always would remain, the workshop of the world because this country had then virtually a monopoly in the production of coal. It has been shown on another page that this country produced in 1845 twice as much coal as did all the other countries of the world combined. By making coal artificially scarce and dear, 242 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future the British miners, who in their fatal policy have been supported by short-sighted Governments of either party, have taken away from the British industries one of the greatest advantages which they possessed and threaten to ruin them altogether. The masters, the men, and the politicians have probably been equally responsible for the inefficiency of the British manufacturing industries and of British mining. British employers have come to consider business to be a bore, if not a nuisance. During the last few decades they were quite satisfied with the condition of their business as long as they made an income with little exertion, and they were ready to leave the supervision and direction of their affairs to a manager. They took little note of the scientific and technical progress made in other countries. They looked upon new methods, upon improved organisation, upon scientific processes of production, and upon improved machinery with indifference, if not with disHke. That indifference to progress was particularly noticeable in the case of limited liability companies, especially when they were controlled by amateur directors, or by men who had only a very small stake in the business. Compared with the United States, British transport by railway also is lamentably behindhand and inefficient, and the result is that American railway freights are far lower than British, although American railway wages are three times as high as are British wages. While British masters were opposed to industrial progress and to all innovations from conservatism, from indifference, or from sheer laziness, their men looked upon improved organisation and machinery with positive and undis- guised hostility, for they had been taught by their leaders that their greatest interest lay in a high wage and in a low output, that every increase in output injured the other workers and themselves. It seems incredible that such a foohsh fallacy should have been allowed to restrict and stifle the development of the British industries. Unfor- Great Problems of British Statesmanship 243 tunately the British workers as a whole have been almost as hostile to the introduction of modern methods and improved machinery as they were in the machine-smashing era a century ago. The world is a great co-operative society. Men are paid money wages, but as they spend them in purchasing goods they are in reality paid in goods, in food, clothes, &c. A man who produces food is paid in clothes, and a man who makes clothes has to buy food. If both produce ' scientifically ' as little as possible they will lack food and clothes, whatever their money wages may be. If, on the other hand, both produce much there will be abundance and prosperity. Production determines wages. Small production and high wages are incompatible. High production and high wages go hand in hand. In the United States wages are from two to three times as high as in this country because production per man is from two to three times as great ; and as production is from two to three times as great, goods are very little dearer in the United States than in England, high wages notwithstanding. The result is that the very highly paid American workmen can purchase with their large wages an abundance of food, clothes, &c., and can save large amounts in addition. In the lengthy table summarising British and American production per worker per year printed on pages 236-237, the gross value of the goods produced is given. Of course, a worker who converts in a day a piece of leather into a pair of boots worth fifteen shillings does not really produce fifteen shillings' worth of goods. To arrive at the real value of his day's work we must deduct from the value of the goods made by him the cost of the raw material and the general factory expenses. By deducting these we arrive at the net production per worker per week. Details will be found in the table on page 244. The figures given are based on the Censuses of Production. It will be noticed that in the trades enumerated the American workers produce per week as a rule from two to three times as much, net, as their British colleagues. As 244 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future no worker can possibly obtain for his work more than the entire value of his work, it is clear that the British worker in cardboard boxes, for instance, cannot obtain more than £1 per week unless he produces more. This table explains why wages were high in America and relatively low Net Produce, per Worker per Week. lu the United In the United Kingdom State3 £ 5. d. £ 5. d. Boots and shoes .... 1 7 4 3 10 Cardboard boxes .... 1 2 15 10 Butter and cheese .... 2 8 1 8 3 1 Cement ...... 2 10 10 4 17 8 Clothing ...... 1 3 11 4 7 4 Cocoa, chocolate and confectionery . 1 12 3 4 18 5 Cotton goods ..... 1 10 5 2 13 9 Clocks and watches .... 1 7 9 4 3 Cutlery and tools .... 1 8 1 4 1 6 Dyeing and finishing textiles 1 18 11 4 4 3 Gasworks ..... 4 1 1 11 16 7 Firearms and ammunition 2 2 8 4 9 2 Gloves ...... 1 11 2 3 10 9 Hats and caps 1 5 10 4 1 10 Hosiery ...... 1 3 5 2 2 8 Leather tanning and dressing . 2 5 4 13 1 Lime ...... 1 13 5 3 2 4 Brewing and malting 6 7 3 19 10 5 Matches ...... 1 13 7 3 1 Paint and varnish .... 3 16 2 12 9 3 Paper ...... 2 2 8 5 3 5 Pens and pencils .... 19 8 4 5 9 Printing and publishing . 3 13 1 7 16 11 Railway carriages, &c. 2 7 4 4 5 Silk . . . . . 1 1 2 3 9 3 Soap and candles .... 2 19 8 11 7 8 in this country, up to the outbreak of the present War, in the course of which British wages have materially increased. Unfortunately, the politicians of both parties have very largely contributed to the backwardness and stagnation which is noticeable in British business. Desiring to obtain votes, they have unceasingly flattered both masters and men. They have told the employers that Great Britain Great Problems of British Statesmanship 245 was the richest country in the world, and that she was industrially far ahead of all countries. They have not only not prevented the workers reducing their output to the utmost, but they have actually encouraged them in that suicidal policy by their legislation. Striving after popularity, after votes, the politicians have thus encouraged idling on the part of both employers and employees, and have opposed modern organisation and modern improve- ments. While encouraging labour to combine and to restrict production, they have opposed the combination of employers to increase efficiency. For decades both parties advocated Free Trade chiefly because that policy furnished an excellent party cry, furnished votes. If we wish to ascertain the causes of British industrial stagnation and relative decline, it is well to listen to the opinion of foreign experts. Let us in this manner consider the causes of the relative decline of the British iron industry. In 1845 two-thirds of the world's iron was produced by Great Britain. German iron production was then quite unimportant. At present German iron production is far ahead of iron production in this country. According to a valuable German technical handbook, ' Gemeinfassliche Darstellung des Eisenhiittenwesens,' Dlisseldorf, 1912, the production of iron and steel in Great Britain and Germany has developed as follows : Iron Production. Steel Production. In Germany In Great Britain In Germany In Great Britain Tons Tons Tons Tons 1865 975,000 4,896,000 100,000 225,000 1870 1,391,000 6,060,000 170,000 287,000 1875 2,029,000 6,432,000 347,000 724,000 1880 2,729,000 7,802,000 624,000 1,321,000 1885 3,687,000 7,369,000 894,000 2,020,000 1890 4,658,000 8,033,000 1,614,000 3,637,000 1895 5,465,000 7,827,000 2,830,000 3,312,000 1900 8,521,000 9,052,000 6,646,000 5,130,000 1905 10,988,000 9,746,000 10,067,000 5,984,000 1910 14,793,000 10,380,000 13,699,000 6,107,000 246 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future Why has Germany, whose production of iron and steel was formerly insignificant, so rapidly and so completely outstripped Great Britain, which possesses the greatest natural facilities for producing iron and steel ? The German handbook mentioned is published by the Union of German Iron Masters, a purely professional association. It considers this question exclusively from a business point of view. It significantly states : No land on earth is as favourably situated for iron produc- tion as is England. Extensive deposits of coal and iron, easy and cheap purchase of foreign raw materials, a favour- able geographical position for selling its manufactures, reinforced by the great economic power of the State, made at one time the island kingdom industrially omnipotent throughout the world. Now complaints about constantly increasing foreign competition become from day to day more urgent. These are particularly loud with regard to the growing power of the German iron industry. It is under- standable that Great Britain finds it unpleasant that Ger- many's iron industry should have become so strong. How- ever, Germany's success has been achieved by unceasing hard work. . . . The unexampled growth of the German industry began when, on July, 15, 1879, a moderate Protective Tariff was introduced. Until then it was impossible for the German iron industries to flourish. Foreign competition was too strong. . . . The German Trade Unions, with their Socialist ideas, are opposed to progress. If their aspirations should succeed, the German iron industry would be ruined. An attempt on the part of the German Trade Unions to increase the earnings of the skilled workers by limiting the number of apprentices, the imitation of the policy which has been followed by the British Trade Unions, would produce a scarcity of skilled workers in Germany as it has done in England. The British iron industry should be to us Germans a warning example. The English Trade Unions with their short-sighted championship of labour, with their notorious policy of ' ca' canny ' (the limitation of output), and with Great Problems of British Statesmanship 247 their hostility to technical improvements have seriously shaken the powerful position of the British iron trade. Most people see in Trade Unions an organisation which may become dangerous to the national industries by pro- moting strikes. Strikes, however, are of comparatively little danger. They are like a virulent, but intermittent, fever. The most pernicious feature of the British Trade Unions is their policy of limiting output, and their hostility to improvements in organisation and machinery. Their activity has upon the body economic an influence similar to a slow fever which leads, almost imperceptibly, to atrophy, to marasmus, and to death. The War will be long drawn out. It may cost £4,000,000,000, £5,000,000,000, and perhaps more. It may swallow up one-third, and perhaps one-half of the national capital. It may permanently double, or even more than double, taxation. I have endeavoured to show by irre- futable evidence that the British manufacturing industries and British mining are inefficient, that, by introducing the best modern methods, British production and British income can be doubled and trebled. Unfortunately, British agri- culture is as inefficient as are the manufacturing industries and mining. Space does not permit to show in detail how greatly British agricultural production might be increased. I have shown in various articles published in The Nineteenth Century review^ and elsewhere that, on an agricultural area which is only sixty per cent, larger than that of this country, Germany produces approximately three times as much food of every kind as does this country. British and German agriculture are summarily compared in the tables on page 248. They are based upon the official statistics. As the German area under woods and forests is eleven times as large as the British, and as the German woods produce far more timber per acre than do the British, the ^ See The Nineteenth Century and After, September, October, and December, 1909. 248 Britain'' s War Finance and Economic Future German timber production is probably about twenty times as large as the British. The cultivated area of Germany is 60 per cent, larger than the British cultivated area. If agriculture were equally productive in both countries, Germany should produce only 60 per cent, more than does the United Kingdom. However, we find that Germany produced in 1912 about ten times as much bread-corn as the United United Kingdom Germany Total area ..... Ciiltivated area .... Woods and forests Acres 77,721,256 46,931,637 3,069,070 Acres 133,585,000 78,632,139 34,272,841 Production in 1912. — TTnit^fl TTingrlnm Germany Tons Tons Wheat and rye .... 1,568,700 15,958,900 Barley 1,320,400 3,482,000 Oats . 2,915,900 8,520,200 Potatoes 5,726,342 50,209,500 Hay . 14,024,222 36,524,915 Cattle 11,914,635 20,182,021 Cows 4,400,816 10,944,283 Horses Not ascertainable 4,523,059 Pigs . 3,992,549 21,923,707 Sheep 28,967,495 5,803,445 Kingdom, about two-and-a-half times as much barley, about three times as much oats, about nine times as much potatoes, and about two-and-a-half times as much hay. In addition to these comparable crops Germany produced about 2,000,000 tons of sugar from nearly 20,000,000 tons of beet, and vast quantities of tobacco. According to the latest comparable statistics, Germany has about twice as much cattle as this country, about two- and-a-half times as many milch cows, and about five-and-a- half times as many pigs. The United Kingdom is superior Great Problems of British Statesmanship 249 to Germany only in sheep, which live largely on derelict grass land, and which are of comparatively little value, five sheep being reckoned equal in value to two pigs. Comparison of the figures given shows that on an agri- cultural area which is only 60 per cent, larger than that of this country, Germany produces approximately three times as large a quantity of animal and vegetable food. The inferior productiveness of British agriculture is probably ascribable to the form of its organisation. German agri- culture is based on freehold ownership, British agriculture on rent. The sense of property induces German, French, and other agriculturists to do their best. Competition for freehold farms drives up their price, and the high price of land compels German and other agriculturists working under the freehold system to increase agricultural production to the utmost. In Great Britain farmers rent their farms at so much a year. The tied-up farms are apt to remain unchanged from century to century. Fields remain un- altered, and so does cultivation. British farmers follow the old routine, and as landowners would make themselves unpopular by raising the rent, necessity does not provide the stimulus of agricultural progress which the freehold system creates in other countries. Largely for psycho- logical reasons British agriculture is conservative and stagnant. A century ago Arthur Young wrote : ' The best manure for a field is a high rent.' British landlordism is largely responsible for British agricultural stagnation. The introduction of the freehold system would raise the price of agricultural land and would compel agriculturists to double and treble their output. If the facts and figures given in these pages are correct — • I do not think that they can be successfully challenged — it follows that Great Britain can easily pay for the War by introducing, in all her industries, the best and most scientific methods which have been so extraordinarily suc- cessful elsewhere. The tax-collector is, as I have stated before, perhaps 250 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future the most powerful factor of industrial progress. His greatly increased demands will compel the employers of labour to increase production to the utmost, to replace labour-wasting with the best labour-saving machinery, to Americanise industry. However, the exertions of the employers will prove a failure unless the workers can be convinced that they are ruining not only the national industries but also themselves by their insane pohcy of antagonising all mechanical improvements and of restricting output. The pohticians in power can do much to enable employers of all kinds to double and treble production by pursuing in economic matters no longer a vote-gaining poHcy, but a business pohcy recommended by the ablest business men. The expert should replace the amateur in shaping and directing national economic pohcy. The War might, and ought to, lead not to Great Britain's bankruptcy, but to its industrial regeneration. It should be followed by a revival of industry similar to that which took place after the Great War a century ago. The natural resources of the British Empire are un- limited. They are far greater than those of the United States. Owing to the War and to the stimulus which high taxation will provide, a tremendous economic expansion should take place both in Great Britain and in the Dominions which might place the British Empire permanently far ahead of the American Commonwealth. However, individual unco-ordinated effort will not bring about such a revival. A united national and imperial effort under the control of a business Government which leads and inspires is needed. If politicians continue their shiftless hand-to-mouth pohcy, if they continue thinking mainly of votes and neglecting the permanent interests of nation and Empire, the efforts of individuals to recreate the British industries and to give to the British Empire and to this country a modern economic organisation are bound to fail. In view of the colossal war expenditure thrift is urgently Great Problems of British Statesmanship 251 needed. Unfortunately, the British nation is a very improvident nation. This may be seen from the following figures : Savings Banks Deposits, In the United States In Germany In the United Kingdom 1880 1890 1900 1907 1912 £ 163,821,000 310,005,000 477,944,000 699,082,000 945,481,000 £ 130,690,000 256,865,000 441,929,000 694,455,000 933,990,000 £ 77,721,000 111,285,000 186,006,000 209,654,000 235,916,000 Between 1880 and 1912 the Savings Banks Deposits increased in round figures in the United States and in Germany by £800,000,000, and m the United Kingdom by only £160,000,000, increasing about sixfold in the United States, about sevenfold in Germany, and only threefold in this country. During the five years from 1907 to 1912 they increased in round figures in the United States by £245,000,000, or 35 per cent. ; in Germany by £240,000,000, or 35 per cent. ; and in the United Kingdom by a paltry £25,000,000, or 12 per cent. The record of the Savings Banks Deposits is particularly humihating for this country if we remember that the German and American workers have thousands of milHons in freehold land and houses, co-operative societies, &c. Of the enormous sums spent upon the War the bulk is expended in Great Britain, and goes, with comparatively unimportant deductions — the profits made by employers and middlemen — from the coffers of the well-to-do into the pockets of the working masses in the form of wages. The Government has exhorted the people repeatedly to be thrifty, and it has enforced thrift upon the moneyed by very greatly increasing direct taxation. The well-to- do are no doubt living more thriftily than they did before the War. The working masses are far more prosperous 252 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future than they have ever been. Wages have risen enormously ; but unfortunately the masses save little. They spend their vastly increased earnings largely on worthless amuse- ments and foolish luxuries. Owing to the wholesale trans- ference of capital from the rich to the workers taxation should be remodelled.^ It is true that a century ago, in the war against France, practically the whole of the increased taxation was placed on the shoulders of the opulent. How- ever, at that time wages remained low during the war. Hence the workers could not contribute much to its costs. Now the position is different. Millions which are urgently required for defence are wasted recklessly by the masses. Universal thrift is needed. The Government should, with- out delay, increase thrift among the masses partly by taxing worthless amusements, and partly by organising thrift among the workers. Here, also, individual attempts can achieve little. The workers must be taught that they should now put by a competence upon which they will receive unprecedentedly high interest, especially as great and widespread distress may follow the War. Employers throughout the country should be prevailed upon by the Government to give on the Government's behalf premiums for savings. All employers should be requested to induce their workers to put as large as possible a portion of their increased wages into War stock. Through the employers the Government should search out the workers in the factories and induce them to put by money week by week to their benefit and to that of the nation as a whole. On November 2, 1915, Mr. Asquith stated in the House of Commons : The financial position to-day is serious. The extent to which we here in this country are buying goods abroad in excess of our exports is more than £30,000,000 per month, against an average of about £11,000,000 per month before the War ; and at the same time we are making advances to ^ Many of the reforms advocated in the following pages were introduced since their publication in The Nineteenth Century review. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 253 our Allies and to others, which were estimated by my right hon. friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer in his Budget speech to amount to a total during the current financial year, to say no more of what is to come, to £423,000,000. . . . This is a burden which, rich as we are, resourceful as we are, we cannot go on discharging unless there is on the part of the Government, as well as on the part of individuals, the most strict and stringent rule of economy, the avoid- ance of unnecessary expenditure, the curtailment of charges which under normal conditions we should think right and necessary, and, if I may use a homely expression, cutting our coat according to the cloth with which we have to make it. . . . I would once more say with all the emphasis of which I am capable, that we cannot sustain the burden which this great War has laid upon us unless as indi- viduals, as classes, as a community, and as a Government, we make and are prepared to make far greater sacrifices than we have hitherto done in the direction of retrenchment and economy. Mr, Asquith thus recommended on November 2, 1915, retrenchment and economy in the most emphatic language. He informed the nation that thrift and the avoidance of unnecessary expenditure was most necessary on the part of individuals and the nation as a whole. Yet the nation lives approximately as luxuriously as ever. The well- to-do, whose income has been greatly reduced by the War and by additional taxation, have curtailed their expenditure to some extent, but scarcely sufficiently, while the masses of the people spend far more on luxuries than they ever did before. Theatres, restaurants, music-halls, picture theatres, and public-houses are nightly crowded, and working men who are reaping a golden harvest purchase for their family gramophones, silk dresses and furs, pianos which are often only used for show, &c. Most people undoubtedly wish to save, but they spend very freely, perhaps not so much from self-indulgence as from mis- placed kindness of heart. Men and women hesitate to reduce their expenditure on luxuries because such reduction 254 Britain'' s War Finance and Economic Future would inflict injury on the providers of luxuries. The thousands of millions which will be required for the conduct of the War cannot be provided by saving the odd pence. They can be found only by the wholesale reduction of expenditure on luxuries, by putting the providers of the luxuries out of business. An able worker or business man can always adjust himself to changed circumstances. Dismissed servants will be able to find more useful work in shops and factories. Dismissed gardeners can use their experience in agriculture to better advantage to the nation. Manufacturers of luxuries and their workers, and shopkeepers who deal in luxuries, can change the character of their trade. It is impossible to carry on ' business as usual ' and to provide the untold milhons needed for the War. If we compare Great Britain's imports of luxuries during the first seven months of 1914 when there was peace, with the first seven months of 1915 when she was at war, we find the following : Imports during Seven Months up to July 31. 1914 1915 £ £ Poultry and game .... 797,492 477,683 Tinned sardines 455,041 608,231 Grapes . 109,336 40,103 Almonds . 298,101 308,934 Oranges . 1,693,206 1,982,823 Cocoa manufactures 937,785 1,385,162 Currants 331,114 643,895 Raisins . 181,495 417,417 Fruit preserved in sugar 579,776 835,527 Confectionery . 82,817 81,670 Ornamental feathers. 1,043,126 452,082 Fresh flowers . 206,837 163,306 Ivory 78,178 42,246 Cinema films, &c. 1,490,636 985,087 Watches and parts . 871,611 673,221 Silk manufactures 9,824,057 8,537,989 Glac^ kid . . . 921,648 876,193 Gloves . , . , 962,892 434,149 Motor cars, and parts 5,240,819 4,249,975 Great Problems of British Statesmanship 255 The few items in this list are representative. Space does not permit to analyse the imports of luxuries in greater detail. Production has been thrown out of gear throughout the world. Hence the imports of Great Britain have been reduced largely because the exporting nations could not export as usual. Many of the luxuries imported into Great Britain come from France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Turkey. A glance at this list shows that in some instances the imports of luxuries have fallen severely, perhaps because the exporting countries could not send the goods. In other cases the imports of luxuries are as large as usual or even larger than usual. The importation of almonds, oranges, chocolates, currants, raisins, fruit preserved in sugar, greatly increased notwithstanding the War, while the imports of manufactured silks, confectionery, flowers, watches, and motor cars and parts diminished only slightly. If the consumption of imported luxuries was very much as usual, we may safely estimate that the con- sumption of home-made luxuries was also very much as usual. Luxurious expenditure cannot easily be checked by voluntary effort, but it can easily be diminished by legisla- tion. Amusements, especially those of the worthless kind, might be taxed, and the importation of foreign luxuries can be stopped completely; or almost completely, by prohibitive enactments. A short while ago the Govern- ment explained in the House of Commons that in blockading Germany foreign luxuries were not stopped because their importation, while not increasing Germany's military strength, weakened and damaged her financial position. One of the greatest financial problems for England consists in paying for her enormous imports. The most obvious step for improving Great Britain's financial position consists in ruthlessly cutting off the importation of all imported luxuries. The import duties put on motor cars, cine- matograph films, &c., are a small step in the right direction. Import duties should without delay be put on all imported 256 Britain's War Finance and Economic Future luxuries, and even on those manufactured necessities which can be produced in this country. The question of fiscal purism, the question of Free Trade and Tariff Eeform, questions of party politics and of vote-catching, should not be allowed to undermine the financial position of this country at a time when it fights' for its very life. The War is costing Great Britain about £2,000,000,000 a year. It will probably before long cost considerably more. This country will, as I have endeavoured to show, be able to make up, and more than make up, for her War expenditure, however large it may be, by vastly increasing production, by reorganising, by Americanising, her industries. But the victory of the Entente Powers obviously depends very largely on Britain's financial strength. The immediate need of the country is therefore labour and thrift. Strenuous labour and careful thrift are required to tide this nation over the anxious months of war which will determine whether the world will become German or Anglo-Saxon, subject or free. CHAPTER VIII bkitain's coming industrial supremacy 1 It seems likely that the War will swallow approximately one- half of Great Britain's national wealth. So far it has cost this country more than £3,000,000,000. Before it is over the British war expenditure may be increased to £5,000,000,000 or £6,000,000,000. To that gigantic sum will have to be added pensions for incapacitated soldiers, war widows, and orphans, and compensation for losses caused by the War, which together may require another £1,000,000,000. If, finally, we make due allowance for the financial value of the precious lives lost it will appear that the War will absorb about £7,500,000,000, a sum which is approximately equal to one-half of Great Britain's national wealth. Opinions as to the economic consequences of the War are divided. Some assert that the gigantic losses incurred will industrially cripple Great Britain and all Europe and that, they will greatly strengthen the industrial and financial predominance of the United States. They tell us that Great Britain will decline economically and politically, and become another Belgium ; that the United States will become the leading Anglo-Saxon nation for the same reason for which Carthage became the heir to the world empire created by Phoenicia, her mother State ; that Washington will eventually become the capital of a great Empire ; that war-ruined and pauperised Europe will become practically an American dependency ; that the world will become ^ The Nineteenth Century and After, October, 1916. 257 S 258 Britain's Coming Industrial Supremacy American. That view is widely held on the other side of the Atlantic, where it is causing lively satisfaction. Other people vaguely believe that Great Britain is ' the richest country in the world,' and that the United Kingdom can easily bear the gigantic financial burden which the World War has laid upon its shoulders. In considering a great economic problem the doctrinaire turns to theory while the practical statesman applies to experience for guidance. Experience is no doubt the safer guide. Let us then con- sider the problem of the economic future from the practical, and particularly from the British, point of view. The widely held opinion that Great Britain is ' the richest country in the world ' is erroneous. According to the ' World Almanac and Encyclopedia ' of 1916, the American equivalent of * Whitaker's Almanack,' the national wealth of the British Isles, the British Empire, and the United States is as follows : £ United Kingdom 17,000,000,000 British Empire 26,000,000,000 United States 37,547,800,000 From the same source we learn that the insurances in force came to £6,231,120,800 in the United States and only to £1,174,042,400 in Great Britain. According to the American estimate the wealth of the United States is considerably more than twice as great as that of the United Kingdom, and is nearly 50 per cent, larger than that of the British Empire as a whole. As, during recent years, American wealth has been growing about three times as fast as British wealth, there is apparently much reason for believing that, owing to the heavy handicap imposed upon the United Kingdom by the War, the United States will in future outpace economic Great Britain at a faster and more furious rate than ever. Let us glance at the foundations of America's vast wealth. The United States are infinitely richer than Great Great Problems of British Statesmanship 259 Britain because they possess a greater population and far greater developed natural resources. While Great Britain has 47,000,000 inhabitants the United States have 105,000,000 people. In man-power the United States are more than twice as strong as the United Kingdom. Only 6 per cent, of the inhabitants of the world are Americans, yet among the nations of the earth the United States are the largest producers of wheat, maize, oats, tobacco, cotton, timber, cattle, pigs, coal, petroleum, iron and steel, copper, silver, zinc, lead, aluminium, woollen and cotton goods, leather, silk, &c. The relatively small number of Americans produce one-fifth of the world's wheat, gold and silver, one-fourth of the world's zinc, one-third of the world's oats, iron ore, pig iron, and lead, two-fifths of the world's steel, coal, and tobacco, one-half of the world's aluminium, three-fifths of the world's copper, two-thirds of the world's cotton, pe- troleum, and maize. ' God's own country,' as the Americans call it, has indeed been blessed. The United States are far ahead of all other nations not only in developed and ex'ploited natural resources but also in mechanical outfit. The engine-power of the United States is vastly superior to that of Great Britain and of the British Empire. According to the last British and American Censuses of Production the manufacturing industries of the United States employ 18,675,376 horse-powers, while the British industries employ only 8,083,341. I have shown in the previous chapter that per thousand workers the American industries employ from two to three times as many horse-powers as do the identical British industries. An even greater superiority in the employment of labour- saving machinery will be found in mining, agriculture, inland transport, &c. Besides, the United States have avail- able in their water-falls at least 40,000,000 horse-powers, of which, in 1908, 5,356,680 horse-powers were developed, while the water-powers possessed by the United Kingdom are quite insignificant. America's superiority in mechanical 260 Britairi's Coming Industrial Supremacy outfit may perhaps best be gauged from the following remarkable figures : Miles of Railway. Miles United Kingdom 23,441 British Empire 134,131 AU Europe 207,432 United States 254,732 The World 665,964 It is noteworthy that the 105,000,000 Americans have more miles of railway than the 440,000,000 citizens of the British Empire and the 500,000,000 inhabitants of all Europe. Several private railway systems, such as the Pennsylvania System, the Harriman System, the Gould System, and the Moore-Eeid System, have about as many miles of railway as has the whole of the United Kingdom, while the mileage of the Vanderbilt System is actually 10 per cent, larger than that of the United Kingdom. Great Britain has 780,512 telephones, while the United States have no less than 9,552,107 telephones. National wealth is either developed or undeveloped, either exploited or latent. The statistics as to the wealth of nations given refer, of course, only to the former, not to the latter, for the latent wealth is not susceptible to statistical measurement. America owes her vast wealth not to the fact that she has exceptionally great natural resources, but to the fact that her natural resources have been exploited with the utmost energy. That may be gauged from the figures of American engine and water power and from the railway and telephone statistics given. Measured by undevelo'ped and unex'ploited resources, by latent wealth, the British Empire, Russia, and perhaps China also, are far richer than the United States. The United States, including Alaska, Hawaii, and Porto Eico, have an area of 3,574,658 square miles, while the British Empire, not including the Colonies conquered from Germany, com- prises no less than 12,808,994 square miles. Providence has distributed its favours fairly evenly. There is no reason Great Problems of British Statesmanship 261 for believing that the United States have been given an unduly great share of the good things of this world. We may therefore conclude that the British Empire, though actually much poorer, is potentially much richer than the United States. In develo'ped and exploited resources the United States are undoubtedly far ahead of the British Empire, but in undevelo'ped and unexfloited resources the British Empire is undoubtedly far ahead of the United States. It is wrong to say that Great Britain is the richest country in the world, but it may safely be asserted that, by its extent and natural resources, the British Empire, which spreads through all climes, possesses the greatest potential national wealth in the world. It is therefore obvious that the incomparable latent riches of the Empire may be converted into actual wealth and power, provided they are vigorously and wisely exploited. Wealth depends after all not so much on the possession of great natural resources as on the action of men. Two centuries ago wealthy North America nourished only a few thousand roving Indians and a small number of white settlers and traders. An Indian, a Chinaman, or a Kaffir who, engaged at his home in agriculture or in manufacturing in the hteral meaning of the word, produces perhaps a shillingsworth of wealth per day, will learn in a few weeks to produce thirty or forty shillingsworth of wealth per day if transferred to Great Britain or the United States. Land and natural resources are limited, but wealth production by the employment of the most modern methods is absolutely unlimited. In certain industries a single man can produce now more wealth than could a thousand men a century ago. Yet fifty years hence men may look with the same surprise at the automatic loom or the steam-hammer with which we look now at the hand-loom and the hand-forge. The British Empire resembles the United States in many respects. Both extend tlu"ough all cHmes. Both possess vast and thinly populated areas endowed with 262 Britain^s Coming Industrial Supremacy the greatest agricultural, sylvan, mineral, industrial, and commercial possibilities. In both only a few small patches are reserved to the manufacturing industries. In view of the resemblance of the United States and the British Empire it is clear that Britain may learn much from the example set by the Great Eepublic in the development of its natural resources. Moreover, half a century ago the United States passed through an experience similar to that through which Great Britain and the Empire are passing at present. The Civil War of 1861-1865, as I have shown in the chapter entitled ' How America became a Nation in Arms,' de- stroyed about a million lives at a time when the United States had less than 35,000,000 white and coloured in- habitants, and cost altogether about £2,000,000,000. In 1860 the national wealth of the United States amounted, according to the Census, to only £3,231,923,214. It follows that the Civil War cost a sum equivalent to two- thirds of America's national wealth. Yet the war did not impoverish the country, but, incredible as it may sound, greatly enriched it. I shall endeavour to show that the Civil War created the impetus which made the United States the richest nation in the world, and that the present War will vastly benefit the allied nations, and especially the British Empire, provided they will profit by the great and invaluable lesson furnished by the United States. In the tenth volume of the excellent ' Life of Abraham Lincoln,' written by Messrs. Nicolay and Hay, we read : ' The expense of the war to the Union (the Northern States) over and above the ordinary expenditure was about $3,250,000,000 ; to the Confederacy (the Southern States) less than half that amount, about $1,500,000,000.' Accord- ing to the latest accounts the Civil War pensions, which required $164,387,941 in 1915, have hitherto absorbed $4,614,643,266, or nearly £1,000,000,000, and the pay- ments will go on for many years to come. If we add to these gigantic figures the increased local expenditure in the United States during the war, the valuable property Great Problems of British Statesmanship 263 destroyed in the fighting, and the financial value of almost a million lives lost, it will be seen that the war has cost the United States vastly more than £2,000,000,000. The war absolutely ruined the wealthy cotton, sugar, and tobacco industries of the South, pauperised the Southern States, led to the destruction of innumerable farms and buildings in the war zone, destroyed America's shipping, closed the Southern markets to the commerce of the North and seriously hampered agriculture throughout the Union because millions of able-bodied men were drafted into the Army. How disastrously American agriculture was affected by the Civil War can best be seen from the Livestock Statistics, which give the following picture : Farm Animals. - Cattle Horses Mules Pigs Sheep 1860 . 1867 . 25,616,019 20,079,729 6,249,174 5,401,263 1,151,148 822,386 33,512,867 24,693,534 22,471,275 39,385,386 Owing to the necessity of war agriculture in general had to be largely neglected. Discrimination was necessary between the essential and non-essential. The vast demand for wool for uniforms made necessary an increase in sheep. Their number grew during the war by 17,000,000. Other animals had to be neglected. Hence the number of cattle declined by 5,500,000, horses declined by 850,000, mules by 350,000, and pigs by 9,000,000. While production and trade suffered in many directions, national expenditure and taxation increased at an unprecedented and almost incredible rate. The financial burden caused by the war may be summarised in the fewest possible figures as follows : National Expenditure Cost o£ Army Cost of Navy I860 1865 Dols. 63,200,876 1,295,099,290 Dols. 16,472,203 1,030,690,400 Dols. 11,514,650 122,617,434 264 Britain's Coming Industrial Supremacy — Public Debt Ajinual Interest on Debt 1860 1865 Dols. 59,964,402.01 2,674,815,856.76 Dols. 3,443,687 137,742,617 In five short years the national expenditure of the United States increased a little more than twenty-fold, chiefly owing to the cost of the army, which increased more than sixty-fold. During the same period the public debt and the interest payable on it grew more than forty-fold. To provide for this colossal financial burden the American national revenue was increased from $41,476,299 in 1861 to $112,094,946 in 1863, to $322,031,158 in 1865, and to $519,949,564 in 1866. In five years it grew almost thirteen- fold. However, notwithstanding the total ruin of the South, and the hampering influence of the war in the North, the national wealth of the United States grew at a pro- digious rate between 1860 and 1870, the Census years. According to the Censuses the real and personal estate of the Americans compared in the two years as follows : National Wealth Population Wealth per Head I860 . 1870 . Dols. 16,159,616,068 30,068,518,507 31,443,321 38,558,371 Dols. 513.92 779.83 Of the ten years under consideration four years, except a few days, were occupied by the devastating war. Yet the national wealth of the United States almost doubled during the decade, and the wealth per head of population increased by almost 60 per cent. This is particularly marvellous in view of the fact that large districts of the United States were far poorer in 1870 than in 1860, for the enormous ravages caused in the South could not quickly be repaired. By ' great divisions ' the wealth per head was changed. This change is shown in the tables on page 265. It will be noticed that wealth per head increased at a Great Problems of British Statesmanship 265 moderate rate in the North-Central and Western States, which are chiefly devoted to agriculture, while it increased at an enormous rate in the North Atlantic Division, the principal seat of the manufacturing industries and com- merce. On the other hand wealth per head dechned disas- United States N. Atlantic States N. Central States S. Atlantic States I860 .... 1870 .... Dols. 514 780 Dols. 528 1243 Dols. 436 735 Dols. 537 384 South Central States Western States 1860 1870 Dols. 598 334 Dols. 434 843 trously in the South Atlantic and the South-Central Divisions, the home of the defeated slave-holding States. As the comparisons given are perhaps a little too summary it will be worth while to compare the wealth of some of the more important States in 1860 and 1870. According to the United States Censuses their wealth has changed very unequally. Statistics will be found on page 266. While during the decade the wealth of the Southern States shrunk to one-half and even to one-third notwith- standing six years of peace, the wealth of the Northern States increased prodigiously. That of Hhnois, Massa- chusetts, and Pennsylvania grew two-and-a-half-fold, that of New York increased three-and-a-half-fold, and the wealth of the ' new ' agricultural States in the West grew even more quickly. The wealth of Kansas increased sixfold, and that of Nebraska nearly eightfold. During the decade 1860-1870 the wealth of the manufacturing States and of the wheat-growing States of the Far West grew at an unprecedented rate. The simultaneous develop- ment of industry and agriculture during the decade 1860- 266 Britain's Coming Industrial Supremacy 1870 coincided with, and was chiefly due to, the American Civil War. That is recognised by many scientists and writers who have studied that period. Mr. E. L. Bogart, in his * Economic History of the United States,' wrote : The Civil War, by practically cutting off foreign inter- course, immensely hastened the growth of domestic indus- Southern States. I860 1870 Dols. Bols. Alabama ..... 495,237,078 201,855,871 Georgia ..... 645,895,237 268,107,207 Louisiana ..... 602,118,580 323,125,006 Mississippi. .... 007,324,911 209,197,345 South Carolina .... 548,138,754 208,140,989 Texas ..... 305,200,614 159,052,542 Northern States. — I860 1870 Dols. Dols. Connecticut .... 444,274,114 774,031,524 Ulinoia . 871,800,282 2,121,080,579 Indiana . 528,835,371 1,208,180,543 Towa 247,338,205 717,044,750 Kansas . 31,327,895 188,892,014 Massachusetts 815,237,413 2,132,148,741 Minnesota 52,294,413 228,907,590 Missouri . 501,214,398 1,284,922,877 Nebraska . 9,131,398 09,277,483 New York 1,843,338,517 0,500,841,204 Ohio 1,173,898,422 2,235,430,300 Pennsylvania 1,410,501,848 3,803,340,112 Wisconsin .... 273,071,608 702,307,329 tries. The industrial revolution thus inaugurated has been compared with that in England one hundred years before. It certainly marks a turning-point in the economic develop- ment of the country as distinct as that in political life and more significant in its effects than the earlier industrial revolution, introduced in this country fifty years before by the restrictive period. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 267 Another American writer, Katharine Coman, stated in her ' Industrial History of the United States ' : The war demands, coupled with the protective tariff, induced an extraordinary activity in every department of business enterprise. Universal buoyancy and unbounded confidence in the future rendered it easy to borrow money at home and abroad. European capitalists invested readily in the United States securities, railroad bonds and mining stock, and the resources of the country were exploited as never before. Theodor Vogelstein wrote in his book ' Organisations- formen der Eisenindustrie und Textilindustrie in England und Amerika ' (Leipzig, 1910) : The manufacturing industries of the North came out of the war in a splendid condition. The enormous exertions made during the struggle, by which more than a million of the best workers were withdrawn from economic life, pro- moted the replacing of human labour by machine labour to an unusual extent. The necessity of paying interest on the large loans raised abroad naturally stimulated very greatly the export trade. On the other hand, imports, except of such goods as were required for the army, suffered. Lastly, the war brought with it a system of rigid protection, of a protection more severe than any American manufacturer would have thought possible in his wildest dreams. One of the greatest errors which one may encounter over and over again, even in scientific publications, is the idea that rigid American protectionism was created in 1890. ... It is no mere coincidence that 1866, when Congress began to abolish internal war taxes, and left unaltered the corre- sponding import duties, saw the rise of the first American Trust. When hostilities began between the North and the South, the United States had only a few thousand troops, and were utterly unprepared for the gigantic struggle. The vastness of the conflict, the employment of millions of soldiers, naturally created an enormous demand for weapons, and 268 Britain's Coming Industrial Supremacy munitions, vehicles, railways, telegraphs, and manufactures of every kind. As the American foreign trade was very seriously restricted through reasons which will be discussed further on, and as the majority of the able-bodied men were withdrawn from the economic activities and enrolled in the army, a greatly reduced number of workers in field and factory had suddenly to provide an immensely increased output. The necessity of vastly increasing individual production compelled employers to introduce the most perfect and the most powerful labour-saving machinery available both in agriculture and in industry. Professor E. D. Fite wrote in his excellent book ' Social and Industrial Conditions in the North during the Civil War ' : Three things saved the harvest : the increased use of labour-saving machinery, the work of women in the fields, and the continued influx of new population. Up to this time the use of reaping machines had been confined almost entirely to some of the large farms of the West. . . . Grain was generally sown by hand. These processes required the work of many men, so that when the able-bodied began to go to war, with large harvests left to garner, new methods and new implements were absolutely necessary if the crops were to be saved. Immediately interest in labour-saving machinery and in the relative merits of the different machines became widespread, and next to enthusiasm over abounding crops in time of war was the most striking characteristic of the world of agriculture. . . . The old apathy was gone. The war suddenly had popularised methods of cultivation in which the agricultural papers had striven in vain for a decade to arouse interest. The Scientific American of February 12, 1864, stated : The total number of mowers manufactured increased from 35,000 in 1862 and 40,000 in 1863 to 70,000 in 1864 ; estimating the number for 1861 at 20,000, this would make the number for the four years 165,000, compared with 85,000 the number made in the preceding ten or twelve years. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 269 Owing to the great improvements in agricultural machinery, agricultural production increased rapidly, and the losses caused by the war were soon made good. I have shown in the beginning of this chapter that between 1860 and 1867 the number of cattle, horses, mules, and pigs de- creased very severely owing to the war. Between 1867 and 1877 the number of farm animals increased rapidly, as follows : Farm Animals. - Cattle Horses Mules Pigs Sheep 1867 1877 20,079,725 29,216,900 5,401,263 10,155,400 822,386 1,443,500 24,693,534 28,077,100 39,385,386 35,804,200 The great improvement in agricultural appliances and machinery enabled a few men to do the work of many. The steam plough, the seed-casting machine, the reaper, the self-binder, and the railway made possible the opening and the vigorous exploitation of the rich agricultural plains of the West, notwithstanding the scarcity and the dearness of labour and the inaccessibiUty of the far-away interior. But for these machines the enormous agricultural wealth of the North American prairies would still be unutilised. The Civil War gave a powerful stimulus to the develop- ment of the American railway system, especially as transport by the Mississippi was interrupted by the war, for the mouth of that mighty river was in the hands of the rebels. Professor Fite has told us : The Mississippi formerly had been the outlet, carrying the grain and other produce to New Orleans, whence it was distributed in all directions. After the war closed the river, if the railroads had not been in existence, the West would have been isolated without a market ; and it was believed by some that, rather than lose this, the section would have followed its market into secession. . . . The new routes of trade to the Atlantic coast were 270 BritairCs Coming Industrial Supremacy developed rapidly indeed, thanks to the wonderful increase of the crops even more than to the closing of the river. . . . The receipts and shipments of the port of Chicago grew apace, and were typical of the growth of the new routes eastward. Starting in 1838 with a shipment of 78 bushels of wheat, and gradually thereafter increasing her shipments, but never before 1860 sending out over 10,000,000 bushels of wheat and wheat flour, this new city in each year of the war shipped on the average 20,000,000 bushels of wheat and wheat flour ; her yearly corn exports, in the past never above 11,000,000 bushels, now averaged 25,000,000 bushels. The closing of the Mississippi route, the abundance of the harvests and the vast transport requirements of the Army very greatly increased the pressure of railway traffic. It could be handled only by greatly increasing the efficiency of the railroads. Necessity thus led to the introduction of scientific railway management. Hitherto railways had been built haphazard by enterprising capitalists. Unre- stricted individualism and the desire to hamper competitors had led to the introduction of at least eight different gauges, which varied from 4 feet 8| inches to 6 feet. The war forced the railways to combine and to adopt a single gauge. The standardisation of railways was gradually evolved. An Imperial railway system was created which found its highest expression in the Interstate Commerce Commission of 1887. The United States have private railways, but an Imperial railway system owing to the supervision and control exercised by the Interstate Commerce Commission through- out the Union. During the war the weak iron rails, which rapidly wore out, were replaced by heavier iron and especially by steel rails. Stations, goods yards, and sidings were enlarged. Military and economic pressure made the rapid extension of the railway system indispensable. Notwith- standing the war the length of the American railways was increased from 30,626 miles in 1860 to 36,801 miles in 1866, or by 20 per cent. In consequence of the vast increase in railway business and of the improvements in handling Great Problems of British Statesmanship 271 the traffic which were introduced the American railways flourished greatly during the war. The American Railway Becord of January 8, 1863, wrote, in reviewing the year 1862: The year 1862 will ever be remembered in railroading as one of the most prosperous that has ever been known. The railroads never earned so much in the whole course of their existence as they have during this much-dreaded year. The American Railroad Journal of January 2, 1864, declared in reviewing the business of the year 1863 : The railway system has greatly flourished the past year. The Companies have got out of debt or largely diminished their indebtedness, their earnings are increasing, their dividends have become regular and inviting. The past year has been, therefore, the most prosperous ever known to American railways. Modern war is carried on by weapons and by machines. It is fought quite as much in the factory as in the field. The Civil War, while greatly promoting the development of America's agriculture and of the American railways, had not unnaturally the most far-reaching and the most strik- ing effects upon the American manufacturing industries. Without their help the North could not possibly have won the war. Before 1861 the United States manufactured little. They imported vast quantities of manufactured goods of every kind from Europe, chiefly from Great Britain. Therefore, when the war broke out the Americans found that they lacked not only weapons and ammunition but wool and cloth for uniforms, boots, &c., as well. The heavy cost of imported goods, the unfavourable position of the American exchange, and the disinchnation to buy the commodities needed at an extortionate price and a ruinous exchange in Europe made necessary not only the rapid creation of war industries but that of general 272 BritairCs Coming Industrial Supremacy manufacturing industries as well. The war had totally disorganised America's foreign trade. It had stopped the exports of cotton, tobacco, and sugar which were produced in the revolted South, with which foreign imports were very largely paid for. How seriously America's foreign trade had been affected thereby may be seen by the fact that American exports shrank from $333,576,057 in 1860 to only $166,029,303 in 1865. They declined to one-half. During the same period imports were reduced from $353,616,119 to $238,745,580. However, soon after the war the American export trade expanded rapidly. In view of the total disorganisation of the foreign trade and of the foreign exchange the United States were no longer able to buy manufactured goods in Europe and to pay for them chiefly with cotton, sugar, and tobacco. Necessity forced them to become self-supporting as far as possible. To encourage the American industries to produce those goods which hitherto were imported from abroad the American Government took a step comparable to that which the British Government took during the present War. With the intention of discouraging imports heavy taxes were imposed upon imported goods. The change effected in America's Fiscal Policy, owing to the stress of war, may be seen at a glance by the following table : Customs Beceipts Duties per cent, ad valorem 1861 . 1862 . 1863 . 1864 . 1865 . 1866 . 1867 . 1868 . 1869 . 1912 . 39,582,126 49,056,398 69,059,642 102,316,153 84,928,261 179,046,652 176,417,811 164,464,600 180,048,427 304,899,360 18-84 3619 32-62 36-69 47-56 48-33 46-67 48-63 47-22 40-12 It will be noticed that the ad valorem duties were twice Great Problems of British Statesmanship 273 as high in 1862 as in 1861, and that they were considerably increased in 1865. Since then import duties have on an average been only little below 50 per cent, ad valorem on dutiable articles. Only during the last few years has the duty declined to an average of about 40 per cent. Before the Civil War iron and iron ware had been one of the principal American imports. The Civil War laid the foundations of the gigantic iron and steel industry of the United States which is at present by far the largest in the world. Professor Fite wrote : The progress of manufactures involving the raw materials of the mines was marked. Iron was used in all branches of manufacturing, and its growing consumption was an indica- tion of general industrial progress. ... Of all the flourish- ing centres of iron manufacturing Pittsburg was the largest ; here in one year six extensive iron mills were erected, and in the last year and a half of the war $26,000,000 worth of iron and steel were manufactured. The report of the American Iron and Steel Association of 1871 stated : In 1860 205,000 tons of iron rails were made in the United States, the largest amount ever made in any one year up to that time ; 187,000 tons were made in 1861, 213,000 tons in 1862, 275,000 tons in 1863, 335,000 tons in 1864, and 356,000 tons in 1865. In 1853 importations reached 358,000 tons, the highest figure reached in the 'fifties ; 146,000 tons were imported in 1860, 89,000 tons in 1861, 10,000 tons in 1862, 20,000 tons in 1863, 146,000 tons in 1864, and 63,000 tons in 1865. The Civil War was instrumental in creating the gigantic American clothing and boot and shoe industries. Professor Fite tells us : At first uniforms were very scarce ; in the various United States garrisons, when the war came, there were only enough on hand to accommodate the regular army of 13,000 men, and but few factories were fitted for making 274 Britain's Coming Industrial Supremacy cloth for military purposes. . . . When the War Depart- ment made heavy purchases of army cloth in England and Prance in order to meet the crisis, the almost savage cry arose in some quarters : ' Patronise home industries.' . . . In the succeeding years the woollen factories were able to cope with the situation, and no more complaints were heard ; the millions of soldiers were clad in products of the country's own mills. The annual military consumption of wool in the height of the war was 75,000,000 pounds, for domestic purposes 138,000,000 pounds more, a total con- sumption for all purposes of over 200,000,000 pounds, against 85,000,000 pounds in times of peace. The progress of the woollen factories, most of them located in New York and New England, was enormous ; every mill was worked to its fullest capacity, many working night and day, Sunday included. In all 2000 sets of new cards were erected, representing many new mills. As the report of the New York Chamber of Commerce said, the progress seemed scarcely credible. . . . The ready-made clothing industry was as necessary for clothing the army as were the sheep farms and the woollen mills. . . . The trade thus created did supplant importa- tions from the East side of London. By the middle of the war the importations ceased, and then the country succeeded in clothing its army of over a million men almost entirely by native industry, not only furnishing a large percentage of the wool for manufacturing all the cloth, but making the uniforms. Much of this success was doubtless due to the sewing machine then but recently invented. . . . The manufacture of clothing was greatly stimulated. Men's shirts, which required fourteen hours and twenty minutes for making by hand, by the machine could be made in one hour and sixteen minutes. . . . The shoe industry likewise benefited by the sewing machine ; in fact, was converted by it from a system of household manufacture to the modern factory system. During the Civil War British cotton thread, which hitherto had had practically a monopoly in the United States; Great Problems of British Statesmnnshi'p 275 was replaced by American cotton thread. In the words of Professor Fite : Cotton thread continued to be used, with the more or less complete substitution of American-made for the English- made product, which had been almost the only thread sold before the war. Through the influence of the heavy war tariff three-fourths of the market came to be supplied from home. The advance in the price of ' Coats,' which finally reached four times its old value, created a chance for American manufacturers, which was readily seized upon, and a vast new industry sprang up ; the Willimantic Company, with a new plant worth $1,000,000, Green & Daniels, and other firms appeared. At Newark, New Jersey, an English firm built a very large plant to manu- facture their product on this side of the tariff wall and thus reap its advantages. The huge modern meat-packing industry of Chicago also was greatly stimulated, if not created, by the war. Professor Fite wrote : Progress in hog-packing was centred chiefly in Chicago. The industry here had been progressing slowly for almost thirty years, when suddenly, as the result of the unusual transportation conditions arising out of the closing of the Mississippi Eiver, the yearly output rose from 270,000 hogs in 1860, the largest number packed in any one year before the war, to 900,000. Many other industries, too numerous to mention, owed their creation, or their powerful expansion, to the war. Industrial efficiency and productiveness are increased not only by improved labour-saving machinery but by an improved organisation as well. Industrial co-operation and the division of labour can be carried to the greatest perfection only by a concentration of energy and direction, by manufacturing on a large scale, by eliminating unnecessary and therefore wasteful competition. Owing to the pressure 276 Britairi's Coming Industrial Supremacy of the war a powerful tendency towards industrial con- solidation arose. Professor Fite has told us : As soon as expansion set in it was evident that the existing industrial machinery was inadequate to the tasks imposed upon it. Industrial enterprises in the past under a system of free competition had been very numerous, and each had been conducted on a small scale ; there was no unity of effort in allied lines and over large areas of territory, while in some cases unwise laws had created inequalities. This lack of unity needed to be corrected, more harmony among common interests introduced, and unequal privileges swept away, if business was to be transacted on an increased scale. This was the fundamental reason for the sudden and pronounced . tendency towards consolidation that charac- terised the world of capital as soon as the war began, although other factors doubtless contributed to the same end, such as internal taxes, large fortunes, the progress of inventions, peculiar transportation conditions, the tariff, high prices, and the assaults of the labouring classes. . . . When once started, concentration of manufacturing went on swiftly. Soon after the war was over the special commissioner of the revenue noted a rapid concentration of the business of manufacturing into single vast estab- lishments and an utter annihilation of thousands of little separate industries, the existence of which was formerly a characteristic of the older sections of the country. . . . Never in the history of the country up to that time had there been such a strong tendency towards united and har- monious action on the part of the employing classes, whether this resulted in a complete merging of one company into another or looser and more temporary organisations to consider the subject of prices, internal taxes, the tariff, or wages ; never had there been such an incentive to consolidation and union. Combination in every line was the tendency of the hour. A determination was growing to merge small, isolated units, often hostile to each other, into larger and more harmonious groups ; big corporations supplanted smaller ones ; things were done on a more exten- sive scale than had ever before been attempted. Although Great Problems of British Statesmanship 277 the new spirit appeared suddenly, it did its work thoroughly, and while it was not carried as far as at the present time, it must still be recognised that its advent created a new epoch in industrial and commercial life, the foundation for all that has come later. There was a definite turning away from the independent self-reliant localism and small units of the past, a decided right-about toward centralisation. . . . Another element entering into the situation was the peculiar effects of internal taxes. There was a tax on the sales of most industrial products, placed finally at 6 per cent. ad valorem, which bore heavily on manufacturers, inas- much as most products represented more than one process of manufacture. . . . The manufacturer with little capital, who could afford only a small establishment, was discriminated against in favour of the rich man ; if the cotton manufacturer could afford not only to spin but also to weave, he escaped one tax ; if he could have his own dyeworks, he escaped another tax. Such a man, after enlarging his plant, could undersell his poor neighbour. Concentration in manufacturing, there- fore, came to be the rule, for the more nearly complete and comprehensive the plant, the less was the tax. During the Civil War the American manufacturing in- dustries expanded with almost incredible vigour. Professor Fite briefly summed up the principal causes of their expansion in the following words : For this progress of manufacturing there were many reasons. First, the ordinary needs of the country were greater than usual. . . . Then the paper money regime was in full swing, and money was plenty and prices soaring. There was, too, the incentive of the tariff, not a session of Congress passing without some raising of these bars to foreigners. Every manufacturer, great and small, was conscious of more buoyancy and freedom as he realised that under the cloak of the supposed needs of revenue with which to wage the war he was rapidly dispensing with foreign competition with all its attendant risks ; examples of industries benefited in this way were sugar, thread, iron, steel rail, and woollen 278 Britain's Coming Industrial Supremacy manufacturing. But greatest of all incentives were Govern- ment contracts, which generally have a way of bringing higher prices than ordinary sales, and which at this time became more and more lucrative as foreigners were effectually barred from competition. Fortunate the manufacturer who had such contracts, and small the number who did not have them. Contemporary opinion plainly inclined to the view that a Government contract was the manufacturer's greatest opportunity. The best and the most imposing picture of the pro- gress of the American manufacturing industries during the decade in which the Civil War occurred is furnished by the dry statistics of the American Censuses of 1860 and 1870. While Professor Fite in his excellent account describes to us the causes, the Censuses merely give the facts. They confirm the views expressed by Professor Fite and they show the following remarkable and almost unbelievable progress during a period of war : I860 1870 Manufacturing establishments Capital employed Hands employed Wages paid .... Value of products 140,433 $1,009,855,715 1,311,246 $378,878,966 $1,885,861,676 252,148 $2,118,208,769 2,053,996 $775,584,343 $4,232,325,442 Between 1860 and 1870 the number of manufacturing establishments increased by 80 per cent, and their capital was more than doubled. The number of hands employed increased by 55 per cent., and the wages paid to them and the value of products turned out increased each by more than 100 per cent. That is truly a wonderful record. The figures given prove conclusively that the Civil War, not- withstanding its destructiveness and huge cost, did not ruin the American industries but caused their rise and prosperity. As the table given treats summarily the American Great Problems of British Statesmanship 279 industries as a whole, their progress can perhaps more correctly be gauged by a more detailed comparison of their output according to the Censuses : Value of Industrial Production. In 1860 In 1870 Dols. Dols. Agricultural implements 17,487,960 52,066,875 Bricks and tiles . 11,263,147 29,302,016 Hosiery 7,280,606 18,411,564 Cotton goods 115,681,774 177,489,739 Tndiarubber goods 5,768,450 14,566,374 Pig iron 20,870,120 69,640,498 Rolled iron . 31,888,705 120,311,158 Cast iron 36,132,033 99,843,218 Forged iron. 2,030,718 8,385,669 Lumber 96,715,854 210,159,327 Machinery . 51,887,266 138,519.246 Nails and tacks . 9,857,223 23,101,082 Sewing machines . 4,255,820 13,638,706 Silk manufactures 6,607,771 12,210,662 Steel . 1,778,240 9,609,986 Tobacco and snuff 21,820,535 38,388,359 Tobacco and cigars 9,068,778 33,373,685 Woollen goods 61,894,986 155,405,358 Worsted goods 3,701,378 22,090,381 Comparison of the figures given shows that between 1860 and 1870 the production of agricultural implements, bricks and tiles, indiarubber goods, pig iron, cast iron, machinery, sewing machines, cigars and woollen goods increased threefold, that the production of rolled iron and forged iron increased fourfold, and that the output of steel and worsted goods increased no less than sixfold. These figures, which have not been picked in order to make a case, but which are all those given in the American Censuses, prove that the war enormously benefited the American manufacturing industries, that the great struggle between the North and the South brought about the rapid expansion of American manufacturing which carried the United States to the first rank among industrial nations. Nations are born in war and die in peace. Peace creates 280 Britain^s Coming Industrial Supremacy sloth, neglect, intrigue, and dissension. A keen sense of danger, on the other hand, is the most powerful unifying factor known to history. The hostility of Austria united Switzerland, Hungary, and Italy and is uniting the Southern Slavs. The hostility of France united Germany. The hostility of England united the quarrelling American Colonies and creaeed the United States. The hostiUty of Germany is welding the British Empire into an indis- soluble whole. Wars, though disastrous to individuals, often prove a blessing to nations. They unite and toughen men. They prepare them for the struggle of life both in the military and in the economic sphere. Success in trade and industry, as in war, depends after all not so much on the possession of dead resources as on the intelligence, ability, energy, and industry of men. Most men are born idlers. They prefer ease and comfort to physical and mental exertion. Hence they dishke and oppose change and progress. Necessity is the mother not only of ingenuity and of invention but of labour and of thrift, and therefore of economic progress and of wealth. Herein lies the reason that the countries most blessed by Nature are often the poorest and the least progressive. Great Britain's former industrial predominance was founded not in peace but in war. It was created, as I have shown in the previous chapter, during the period 1775-1815. Of these forty years thirty were spent in colossal wars, the war with the American Colonies and their European allies, and the gigantic war with Eepublican and Napoleonic France. These wars gave to Great Britain her late pre- eminence in commerce and industry. Necessity, especially the enormous increase in taxation, made vastly increased production indispensable. It led to the introduction of the steam engine, of modern industry, of modern commerce, of modern agriculture, of modern transport, and of modern capitalism. It brought about the industrial revolution. Peace and ease have almost unnoticed deprived Great Great Problems of Briiish Statesmanship 281 Britain of the foremost industrial position which she had obtained during the Great War, and which now is possessed by the United States. The present War should not only- unite the British Empire but should once more give to the British people the foremost position in the economic world, provided they make wise and energetic use of their opportunities. On the other hand, the United States, far from enriching themselves at the cost of the fighting nations, far from coining the sweat and blood of the Allies into dollars, may, through peace and ease, fall a prey to that fatal self-complacency and stagnation from which political and industrial Britain has suffered for decades and from which she has been saved by the War. Before long the Great Eepublic may begin to stagnate and decline and become a victim of her undisturbed material prosperity. It seems not impossible that, owing to the War, the United States will henceforth decline, not only poUtically but economically as well, while Great Britain will once more become economically the leading Anglo-Saxon nation. Let us now consider the economic effects of the War upon Great Britain and upon the Empire as a whole. In the chapter on ' Britain's War Finance and Economic Future,' I showed by means of irrefutable figures, which have attracted the attention of the principal technical papers and of many eminent industrialists, that the American workers in factories, mines, &c., produce per head from two to three times as much as their British colleagues engaged in the same callings ; that the vastly greater output of the American workers is due to the employment of far more powerful and far more efficient machinery, better organisation, a greater desire for progress on the part of the manufacturers, and a comparative absence of a delibe- rate limitation of output on the part of the workers. I showed that Great Britain could double and treble her income and wealth by doubling and trebling her engine- power upon the American plan and by improving her organisation. I showed that she could easily pay, and 282 Britain's Coming Industrial Supremacy more than pay, for the War by Americanising her industries. Since the time when those words were printed ^ the American- isation of British industry has begun. The pressure of necessity has brought about many of the necessary changes. The British employers have been awakened to the need of progress and reform, and the British Trade Unions have abandoned in part their fatal policy of restricting output and antagonising improved machinery. Before the War the United Kingdom had, in round numbers, 18,000,000 male and female workers employed in agriculture, industry, commerce, domestic service, &c. Since then about 6,000,000 men have joined the Army and Navy, while, according to Mr. Montagu's statement made in the House of Commons on August 15, 1916, 2,250,000 men and women are engaged in making munitions under the Ministry of Munitions. If we estimate that, in addition to these, 750,000 men and women not under the Ministry of Munitions are engaged on war work, it appears that the War has reduced the number of British workers by exactly one-half. However, the loss in man-power is probably not 50 per cent, but about 60 per cent., because the youngest, the strongest, and the most efficient workers are either in the Army and Navy or engaged on war work. The consumption of the country is about as great as it was in peace time, for, while private demand for goods is smaller here and there, the reduction effected by the economy of some is probably counter-balanced by the increased spending on the part of the workers, and especially by the enormous demands for ordinary goods for the use of the Army and Navy. The British exports for the first seven months of 1916 were, but for £10,000,000, as large as those during the corresponding seven peace months of 1914, although, allowing for the rise in prices, they were considerably smaller. It therefore appears that with only one-half of her workers Great Britain produces now approximately as 1 September, 1915. Ch'eat Problems of British States7nanship 283 large a quantity of ordinary goods as she did with all her workers before the War. In other words, the output per worker has approximately doubled. Necessity has led to more intensive and more scientific production, to better organisation, to the introduction of the most modern methods and of the most perfect machmery, not only in the manu- facture of munitions of war, but in ordinary manufacturing as well. It has been stated that during the War the United Kingdom has imported £200,000,000 worth of American machinery. The vast advance made in manufacturing will no doubt be of permanent benefit to the nation. The new and efficient processes will not be abandoned for the old and wasteful ones. Mr. Montagu stated in the House of Commons on August 15, when describing the activity of the Ministry of Munitions, according to the verbatim report : Old-fashioned machinery and shp-shod methods are disappearing rapidly under the stress of war, and whatever there may have been of contempt for science in this country, it does not exist now. There is a new spirit in every depart- ment of industry which I feel certain is not destined to dis- appear when we are at liberty to divert it from its present supreme purpose of beating the Central Powers. When that is done, can we not apply to peaceful uses, the form of organisation represented by the Ministry of Munitions ? I am not thinking so much of the great buildings which con- stitute new centres of industry, planned with the utmost ingenuity so as to economise effort, filled with machines of incredible efficiency and exactitude. I wish rather to emphasise the extent to which all concerned — and each section is vital to our objects — are co-operating to obtain the best results from the material in our hands. We have the leaders of all the essential industries now working for us or co-operating with us in the Ministry. The great unions render us constant assistance in the discussion and solution of difficulties, whether with our officers or within their own body. On technical questions of the most varied character we have the advantage of the best expert advice in the country. 284 Britain's Coming Industrial Sujjremacy We have in being, now that British industry is organised for war, the general staff of British industry. I am sure that we should sacrifice much if we did not avail ourselves of that staff to consider how far all this moral and material energy can be turned to peaceful account. Sir W. Essex, a great industrialist, said at the same sitting : I think the products of this Armageddon are going to be real and substantial. I know the price we shall pay for it will be enormous, but we shall not begrudge it, or a tithe or a hundredth of it, but a great by-product will be that our mechanical industry and our chemical industry, and all the industries which are touched — and hardly an industry is not touched more or less intimately — will have been revivified, modernised, and invigorated to an incredible degree, and that must of necessity react on the whole industrial work of our Empire, and will not only maintain, but enormously enhance all the advantages which as a manufacturing nation we have hitherto enjoyed. . . . These men [the leaders of industry who are co-operating with the Ministry of Munitions] are going up and down, week in and week out, month in and month out, energising the thousands of factories which are under the control of the Ministry of Munitions, bringing them up to date in their workshop methods, making them acquainted in many cases I know with tools, the like of which they had no previous knowledge of save by hearsay, bringing them up also to new methods, new systems, and organisation until — this is the common testimony of many of the proprietors of these factories — ' We did not know our business until we got linked up with the Minister of Munitions.' You are able by this aggregation of the manufacturing industries of the country here employed to level up the whole, and that, I take it, would be a by-product of incalculable value to the industry of this country, and must enormously affect it for good and make for our advantage in the future com- petition with other races of the world. The necessity of war has not only vastly increased the Great Problems of British Statesmanship 285 efficiency of the existing industries, but has caused power- ful new industries to arise. Vast quantities of chemicals, electrical apparatus, glass, optical-ware, machinery, tools, &c., which formerly were imported from abroad, are now manufactured in this country, especially as import pro- hibitions have provided a powerful stimulus. The War has greatly promoted technical education and increased technical ability, for skilled workers in enormous numbers were wanted. Hence hundreds of schools had to be created in which unskilled workers were converted into highly skilled ones. Inventiveness was stimulated by the neces- sity to manufacture numerous articles which hitherto were made abroad by secret processes. Last, but not least, the War has led to the creation of huge model factories for making munitions, compared with which the great Wool- wich estabhshment is small and out of date. These giant factories will not be pulled down after the conclusion of peace, but will, of course, be adapted to the production of ordinary goods. Great Britain will undoubtedly follow in this the example set by the United States after the Civil War. The War has doubled the manufacturing efficiency not only of Great Britain, but of France, Eussia, Italy, and Japan as well. When the struggle is over, the United States will no longer compete with industrial nations possessed of an antiquated outfit whose output per man is exceedingly low owing to the use of inefficient and labour-wasting machinery and methods. During the War the most impor- tant industries of the whole world have become Americanised. The United States wiU henceforth have to compete on equal terms in an Americanised world. They may discover that the War has destroyed their industrial paramountcy. The change effected by the War will be particularly striking in the iron and steel industry, the most important of all manufacturing industries. Before the struggle the United States and Germany dominated the world's iron and steel trade, and Britain's position had sunk very low indeed. 286 Britairi's Coming Industrial Supremacy as the following figures show, which are taken from the ' Statesman's Year Book ' : Production of Iron in 1912 Production of Steel in 1912 United States .... Germany ..... United Kingdom .... Tons 29,727,000 17,582,000 8,751,000 Tons 31,251,000 17,024,000 6,903,000 In 1912 the United Kingdom produced only about one- half as much iron as Germany, and one-third as much iron as the United States. In the same year the United Kingdom produced only about one- third as much steel as Germany and one-fifth as much steel as the United States. Germany's defeat wiU no doubt lead to the decline of her mightiest industry. The bulk of the iron ore employed by the German iron industry came before the War from German Lorraine, Luxemburg, and the French districts close to the German frontier. The principal iron deposits on the Con- tinent are dominated by the guns of Metz and Diedenhofen on the one hand, and of Verdun and Nancy on the other. Germany's desperate attack upon Verdun was probably largely due to the wish to deprive France of her steel. France's acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine will deprive Ger- many of the bulk of her iron ore and make France the proprietor of the largest iron deposits in Europe. The iron ore in sight in the small Lorraine-Luxemburg district is approximately as plentiful and as rich in metal as the iron ore of the United States. Iron-smelting requires of course vast quantities of coal. About a ton and a half of coal is needed for every ton of iron ore. Unfortunately France has little coal, and has to import vast quantities of coal, although her iron industry is at present of comparatively little importance. The output of the French coal-mines can apparently not be greatly increased. Near the German frontier, but outside Alsace- Lorraine, on the Saar Eiver, there are German coal-mines Great Prohleyns of British Statesmanship 287 which France might acquire, but these do not yield a satis- factory coke for iron-smelting. Hence Germany uses West- phalian coal for smelting the iron of Lorraine, Possessing the Lorraine ore beds, France would lack coal wherewith to smelt it. She would therefore either have to import coal from Westphalia or England for exploiting that vast resource, or she would have to send a large part of the Lorraine ore to Germany or England for smelting. Great Britain and France have been partners in war and should be partners in peace. They might jointly exploit the vast ore deposits mentioned. By co-operating, England and France might dominate not only the iron trade of Europe, but perhaps that of the world. They might leave far behind them the iron industry of the United States In consequence of the War the industrial output of the United Kingdom, as that of the United States after the Civil War, may be doubled and trebled. The United Kingdom, like the small industrial area of the United States, will find its best and safest market for a vastly increased industrial output in the Dominions and Colonies, in its Far West. After the Civil War the United States developed their great estate with the same energy with which they had conducted the war. I have shown in the beginning of this chapter that the United States, with their comparatively small territory; have almost exactly twice as many miles of rail- way as has the whole of the British Empire with its immense territory. Hundreds of thousands of miles of railway are required throughout the British Empire. The opening of the Dominions and Colonies by means of railways alone will give full employment to the vastly enlarged iron and steel industries of Great Britain and the Dominions for decades to come. The British Dominions have room for hundreds of millions of white settlers. After the end of the Civil War money had to be made to pay off the war debt. To make money, the Far West had to be opened up by means of railways and immigrants, for railways and settlement must go hand in hand. The numerous immigrants kept fully 288 Britain'' s Coming Industrial Supremacy employed not only the American iron and steel industry which the war had created, but all the American industries which had been immensely enlarged during the struggle. In territory and in latent resources the British Empire is far superior to the United States, but in developed and exploited resources, in industrial power, wealth, and white population, the Empire is very inferior to the Great Kepublic. Between 1871 and 1911 the population of the United States increased by 53,500,000, that of Germany increased by 25,400,000, while the white population of the British Empire grew by only 21,500,000. That comparison is humihating for the British Empire. If the same rate of progress or a similar rate should continue to prevail, the British Empire would in course of time become a second-rate or a third-rate Power. Wealth is power. The British Empire should endeavour to be the leading Anglo-Saxon nation, not only in territory, but in white population and wealth as well. Hitherto the development of the Empire has been restricted by a small-minded parochial policy of the component parts, by lack of Imperial organisation and co-operation. The great Imperial domain can be adequately protected and exploited only by the Empire as a whole, by a truly Imperial Govern- ment, by Empire-wide co-operation. Immigration and emigration, transportation by land and water, the planful opening and settlement of the vast empty spaces of the Empire, and the question of inter-Imperial trade must be settled imperially, not parochially. If that is done, there is every reason to believe that in a few decades the British Empire will be far ahead of the United States both in white population and in wealth. It may be argued that the British Dominions and Colonies cannot be developed as rapidly as the United States, although the resources of the former are greater than those of the latter, because the United States are a single country which nature has opened up by a number of magnificent rivers. That argument is erroneous. The United States are not Great Problems of British Statesmanship 289 a State, but a number of States, which jealously defend their State rights and which do not readily co-operate. Besides, the seas are the Mississippi, the Missouri, and the Hudson of the British Empire. They do not separate, but connect the different parts. In consequence of the Civil War, the United States stan- dardised their chaotic railway system, as has been shown. They placed it under imperial control, and gradually evolved a unified and national system by means of the Inter-State Commerce Commission. Cheap transport and freight and equitable rates are the best means for opening up the Empire rapidly. The Governments of the Empire should learn from America's lesson and control transport by land and water throughout the Empire. At present private railway companies and shipping companies direct, divert, stimulate, or restrict the imperial trade according to their convenience, or even penalise British and facilitate foreign trade for their own benefit. The transport companies by land and sea must be taught that the interests of the Empire are more important than those of their shareholders. An Imperial Government in the full sense of the term should investigate and take stock of the Imperial resources, for they are unknown. It is nobody's business to study and describe the resources of the Empire. No official survey has even been made of England's coal beds. The resources of the Empire are exploited, or wasted, at will by private individuals. The mineral resources of the United States have been explored and described by the American Geo- logical Survey, which has rendered invaluable service, and of recent years the Americans have embarked upon the policy of preserving their natural resources under the guidance of their national Conservation Commission. An Imperial stocktaking is necessary. The Empire belongs to the race, not to a few capitalists. Its exploitation should be guided by national and Imperial interests. Yet such guidance need not restrict very much the activities of enterprising capitalists. 290 Britain's Coming Industrial Supremacy The British race will scarcely suffice to fill up the vacant lands of the Empire. The Dominions will become keen competitors with the United States for desirable immigrants. Hitherto the bulk of European emigrants have gone to the United States, but the British Empire may be able to divert the stream. For decades men have gone to the United States not only because it was easy to make money in that country, but also because the United States were considered a home of freedom, the champion of liberty. America's prestige as a defender of freedom and liberty has probably suffered owing to her attitude during the first two years of the War. Men wishing for liberty may henceforth rather go to the British Empire than to the United States. The planful development of the Imperial domain by the building of railways and the cheapening of transport will bring hundreds of thousands of desirable emigrants to the British Empire. The tariff policy of Great Britain and the Dominions will have the most far-reaching influence upon the economic development of the Empire. A common-sense tariff policy will further the settlement and exploitation of the Imperial estate, while a doctrinaire, a vote-catching, or sectional policy will condemn the Empire to stagnation and decline. The development of the United States has been helped im- mensely by the fact that they form a single market. The British Empire, like the United States, is so vast that there need be no jealousy among the component States. British industry, like the industry of Pennsylvania or Illinois, cannot provide all the manufactured goods wanted by the Empire. There is room for manufacturing centres in all parts of the Empire. A narrow spirit of monopoly and exclusion or a cosmopolitan fiscal policy advocated by doctrinaires would greatly, and perhaps fatally, hamper the Empire's development in population and wealth. The War, as has been shown at the beginning of this chapter, may cost about £7,500,000,000. That is a colossal burden, and the British Empire should endeavour to pay off Great Problems of British Statesmanship 291 the debt with reasonable speed. The War was waged not merely for the benefit of the United Kingdom, but for that of the British Empire as a whole. It seems therefore only fair that the British Dominions should assume their full share of the cost of the War, especially as the assumption of their part of the burden should prove highly beneficial to them. A large increase in taxation throughout the Dominions would most powerfully stimulate production. Hitherto the development of the Empire has been hindered very seriously by the fact that too many emigrants have endeavoured to make a living not by production, but by trade and specula- tion. Nearly 40 per cent, of the inhabitants of Austraha live in the five capital towns, while the vast expanses of the country remain empty. Nearly 50 per cent, of the inhabitants of New South Wales and Victoria live in Sydney and Melbourne. Several years ago, when I was in the West of Canada, I found that the principal industry consisted in gambling in real estate. The Dominions have developed so slowly very largely because money was too cheap, taxes were too low, and life was too easy. Men could make a good living by little work. If Great Britain should, by the unwillingness of the Dominions, be forced to take over an unduly large share of the war debt, it may be ruinous not only to the Mother Country, but to the Empire as a whole, especially if the Dominions should practise at the same time an exclusive policy towards British manufactures. Happily this seems unlikely. The War has been waged not only for the present genera- tion, but for future generations as well. It seems therefore only fair that part of the cost should be borne by future generations. It might be thrown in part on the latent and undeveloped resources of the Empire, which might be pooled for the purpose of repaying the war debt. The 3thei part of the cost, to be paid by the present generation, might be allocated to the various States of the Empire according to the number of the people and their wealth per head, so that 292 Britain's Coming Industrial Supremacy the burden should be borne fairly and equally by all. Periodically the allocation might be revised and a redis- tribution effected in accordance with changing circum- stances. The latent resources of the Empire are boundless. There is every reason to believe that the British Empire, if wisely governed and administered, will exceed the United States in white population and in wealth in a few decades. The War will apparently devour a sum equal to about one-half of Great Britain's national wealth, but that fact need not disturb us. The Civil War cost the United States a sum which was equal to about two- thirds their national wealth at the time. During the fifty years which have elapsed since its conclusion, the wealth of the United' States has grown at so rapid a rate, largely in consequence of that war, that to the present generation the gigantic war cost seems almost trifling. The sum of £7,500,000,000, though equal to one- half of Great Britain's national wealth, comes only to about one-fourth of the Empire's national wealth. In a few decades the cost of the World War may appear as small to the citizens of the British Empire as that of the Civil War appears now to most Americans and that of the Napoleonic War to most Englishmen of the present. The war with Napoleon created England's economic supremacy. The Civil War created the industrial supremacy of the United States. The present War should give the industrial supremacy of the world to the British Empire. CHAPTEE IX DEMOCRACY AND THE IRON BROOM OF WAR ^ AN ANALYSIS AND SOME PROPOSALS^ Gold is tested by fire and nations by war. The World War has glaringly revealed the improvidence, the inefficiency, and the wastefulness of the democratically governed States. France, though utterly defeated by Germany in 1870-71, and frequently threatened by her with war since then, especially in 1905 and in 1911, when a German attack seemed almost inevitable, was quite unprepared for her ordeal. A fortnight before the fatal ultimatum was launched upon Serbia, at a moment when the tension was very great, and when Germany was possibly hesitating whether she should strike or not, Senator Humbert revealed to the world in an official report which created an enormous sensation throughout Europe, that the French fortresses were unable to resist efficiently a modern siege, that the French Army lacked heavy guns, ammunition, rifles, and uniforms, that France had in stock per soldier only a single boot, thirty years old. Belgium separates France from Germany. The numerous purely strategical railways which Germany had constructed towards the Belgian frontier had clearly revealed her hostile intentions towards her small neighbour. Belgium, having a population of 8,000,000, 1 The Nineteenth Century and After, February, 1916. * Most of the ' proposals ' contained in the following pages were carried out by Mr. Lloyd George on his taking over the premiership, eleven months after their publication in The Nineteenth Century review. This was probably due purely to coincidence, for the reforms introduced in the national organisa- tion were logical and necessary, 293 294 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War might easily have raised an army of 500,000 or 1,000,000 men. Such an army, supported by modern fortresses, would certainly have caused Germany to respect Belgium's neutrality. The test of war found the Belgian fortresses and army totally inadequate. Except for her Fleet, Great Britain was equally unprepared for the War. She has since then raised a huge army, but disappointment and failure have been the result of her diplomatic action in Turkey and Bulgaria, and of her military efforts at the Dardanelles, on the Vardar, in Mesopotamia, and elsewhere. Poor and backward Russia, on the other hand, surprised the world by her preparedness, and invaded Eastern Prussia and Galicia soon after the opening of hostilities. Comparison of the improvidence, inefficiency, and waste- fulness displayed by democratic France, Belgium, and Great Britain with the war-readiness and efficiency of the auto- craticalty governed States, and especially of Germany, has clearly revealed the inferiority of democracy in war- fare and in national organisation. It is easy to make sweeping generalisations. Many people have proclaimed that democracy has proved a failure, that the doom of democracy is at hand, that the iron broom of war will sweep it into the limbo of forgotten things. England has invented modern representative and democratic govern- ment. The national organisation of most civilised States is modelled upon that of this country. Let us then inquire whether democracy is indeed a failure, or whether, like every institution in this world, it has merely certain failings which can be remedied. If it possesses grave but remediable defects, let us try to find a cure. England, who has evolved representative Government, should be the first to deal with its faults and to introduce the necessary changes. In the fourth century before Christ Aristotle wrote in his book ' Politics ' : ' It is not for what is ancient, but for what is useful, that men of sense ought to contend ; and whatever is distinguished by the former quahty cannot Great Problems of British Statesmanship 295 be expected to possess much of the latter.' About the same time Thucydides stated in his history : ' It is the custom of mankind, even where their own country is con- cerned, to acquiesce with complacent credulity in the tradi- tions of former ages without subjecting them to the test of critical examination.' Flattery and misplaced admira- tion are far more dangerous than honest hostility. The British Constitution has suffered more from its friends than from its enemies. It has been dealt with in innumer- able books, but unfortunately most of these are written in a spirit of blind and uncritical admiration. Besides, practically all who have written on the British Constitu- tion treat it as if it were an ancient Gothic cathedral or some other venerable relic of the past. They look upon it with awe from the point of view of the antiquary, the historian, the artist, and true believer. They do not recognise that a constitution is in the first place not a work of art, but an instrument of government. They describe to us in full detail its ancient history, the gradual changes it has under- gone, its Gothic intricacies and (irregularities, and its present aspects, but they fail as a rule to inquire whether it answers its practical purposes. Walter Bagehot, one of the very few men who endeavoured to consider it from the practical point of view, wrote in his book ' The English Constitution' : The characteristic merit of the English Constitution is that its dignified parts are very complicated and somewhat imposing, very old and rather venerable ; while its efficient part, at least when in great and critical action, is decidedly simple and rather modern. We have made, or rather stumbled, on a constitution which — though full of every species of incidental defect, though of the worst workmanship in all out-of-the-way matters of any constitution in the world — yet has two capital merits : it contains a simple efficient part which, on occasion and when wanted, can work more simply and easily, and better, than any instrument of govern- ment that has yet been tried ; and it contains likewise 296 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War historical, complex, august, theatrical parts which it has inherited from a long past — which take the multitude — which guide by an insensible but an omnipotent influence the associations of its subjects. Its essence is strong with the strength of modern simplicity ; its exterior is august with the Gothic grandeur of a more imposing age. In view of the experience of the World War, or, indeed, of any great war in which this country has been engaged, Bagehot's emphatic assertion that the English Constitution ' in great and critical action is decidedly simple and rather modern,' that ' when wanted it can work more simply and easily, and better, than any instrument of government that has yet been tried,' can only be described as a ludicrous travesty and perversion of fact. Unfortunately his view is representative of that of most constitutional writers. Statesmanship is not an abstract science, not a science based upon theory, but an eminently practical science, a science which is based on experience. A serious disease should not be subjected to empiric treatment. A wise physician will carefully diagnose the case submitted to him before considering the remedy. Let us then consult some of the greatest and wisest statesmen of all times. Their opinions, which are based on unrivalled experience, will provide us with invaluable guidance, and the importance of the views given in the following pages will be greatly en- hanced by the fact that most of them will be new to British readers. Aristotle, the friend and teacher of Alexander the Great, whose book ' Politics ' should be read by every statesman and politician, wrote : ' An error in the original structure of government often proves ruinous both to republics and to aristocracies.' The ancient Greeks had much experience of the practical working of democracy. They saw their democracies first assailed by the military obligarchy of Sparta and then destroyed by the Macedonian autocracy under King Philip. Their greatest thinkers believed that their Great Problems of British Statesmanship 297 downfall was due not to the chance of war, but to ' a fatal error m the origmal constitution of their government.' They believed that democracy was, owing to its very nature, a less efficient form of government than monarchy. Aristotle wrote in his book ' Politics ' : That which is a common concern to all is very generally neglected. The energies of man are stimulated by that which depends on himself alone, and of which he only is to reap the whole profit or glory. In concerns common to him with others, he employs with reluctance as much atten- tion and activity as his own interest requires. He neglects that of which he thinks other men will take care, and as other men prove equally negligent, the general interest is universally abandoned. Those families are commonly the worst served in which the domestics are the most numerous. Isocrates, one of the greatest Greek orator-statesmen, whose works are very little known, wrote in his ' Third Oration ' : Democracies honour those who by delusive eloquence govern the multitude, but monarchies those who are most capable in managing the affairs of the nation. Monarchies surpass democratic governments not only in the ordinary routine of administration, but especially in war, for mon- archies are more able than are democracies to raise troops, to use them to advantage, to arm in secret, to make military demonstrations, to win over some neighbours, and to over- awe others. All are acquainted with the military events which brought about the downfall of Athens, the wealthiest and most powerful Greek republic, whose fleet ruled the sea, but few know its hidden causes. In the second century before Christ the Greco-Koman Polybius, the most statesman-like historian of antiquity, who was not only a great writer, but a diplomat and general as well, and who wrote history from the point of view of the statesman, stated that Athens fell 298 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War because a change in her constitution had deprived her of a single head. He wrote : Athens, having been raised by the ability of Themistocles to the greatest height of power and glory, shortly afterwards sank into weakness and disgrace. The cause of this sudden change lay in the inappropriate constitution of the Govern- ment, for the Athenian State was like a ship without a captain. His views are confirmed by Thucydides, a contemporary of Pericles, who was an eye-witness of the decline and fall of Athens. Writing in the fourth century before Christ, he tells us that in the time of Pericles, Athens, though a republic in name, was, owing to the great prestige of Pericles, a monarchy in fact, and that her greatness declined when, after his death, the State became a true democracy and a prey to party-political strife. He wrote : Pericles, a man of acknowledged worth and ability, whose integrity was undoubtedly proof against corruption, kept the people in order by gentle management, and was not directed by them, but was their principal director. Pie had not wormed himself into power by dubious methods. There- fore he was not obliged to soothe and praise their caprices, but could oppose and disregard their anger with peculiar dignity. Whenever he saw them bent on projects injurious or unreasonable, he terrified them so much by the force of his eloquence that he made them tremble and desist, and when they were disquieted by groundless apprehensions, he animated them afresh into brave resolution. The State, under him, though called a democracy, was in fact a mon- archy. His successors were more on a level with one another, and as every one of them aspired to be their leader, they were forced to cajole the people, and so to neg- lect the concerns of the pubhc. This was the source of many grievous errors of statesmanship, as must unavoidably be the case in any great community which is possessed of large dominions. Pericles had introduced the pernicious system of con- Great Problems of British Statesmanship 299 verting into an object of gain those services rendered to the nation which formerly were rendered gratuitously and which had been considered a trust and an honour. He died, and politicians desirous of power endeavoured to obtain it by cajoling, flattering, and bribing the masses, by outbidding and by attacking one another. Aristotle has told us in jiis book, ' Politics ' : Pericles, by granting fees to the judges and jurymen, and converting a matter of duty into an object of gain, still further debased the composition, and increased the tyranny, of the Athenian tribunals. What Pericles had left imperfect, succeeding demagogues supplied. One democratical regula- tion followed another, until the government assumed its present form, or rather its present deformity. Henceforth domestic politics monopolised public atten- tion in Athens. Politicians anxious for power, for votes, filled the ears of the people with promises and with mutual denunciations, and in the heat and passion of the faction fight the national interests were completely neglected. Thucydides informs us : Engaged in contests for power, the Athenians did not pay sufficient attention to the army abroad and were em- broiled in mutual altercations at home. . . . They would not have been conquered, had not their own domestic feuds at last utterly disabled them from resisting their enemies. Men strongly divided with regard to domestic politics and goaded to passion against one another by their leaders will not easily bury their feuds and act in common if united action is urgently wanted to preserve the State from destruc- tion. Besides men who have become used to hear all sides cannot in any case decide quickly. If opinions differ, influence necessarily takes the place of reason, and if the opposing parties cannot unite on energetic action, a weak, and probably foolish, middle course, acceptable to both parties will be adopted after infinite procrastination and delay. Machiavelli, who, as Secretary of State to the 800 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War Kepublic of Florence, knew a great deal of the practical working of democratic institutions in time of national emergency, wrote in his ' Discorsi ' : In all matters of difficulty wherein courage is needed for resolving, vacillation will always be met with whenever those who have to deliberate and decide are weak. Not less mischievous than doubtful resolves are those which are late and tardy, especially when they have to be made on behalf of a friend. From their lateness they help none, but hurt ourselves. Tardy resolves are due sometimes to want of spirit or want of strength, or to the perversity of those who have to determine. Sometimes they are due to the secret desire of politicians to overthrow their opponents or to carry out some selfish purpose of their own. Hence these men prevent the forming of a decision, and only thwart and hinder. Vacillation, lateness, and tardiness are in Machiavelli's opinion the characteristics of divided counsels which are habitually found in Governments by discussion — in demo- cracies. His statement that vacillation and delay are particularly harmful if a friendly nation requires support is strikingly illustrated by the fatal delay of democratic Britain and France in coming to Serbia's aid. Frequently during the War the British Government has been reproached in innumerable newspaper articles that it is always too late both in its diplomatic and in its military activities, that statesmen are discussing when they should be acting, that they lack initiative, that they are always surprised by the enemy, that they are acting only after the event, that nothing is done in time. These reproaches irresistibly remind one of similar taunts levelled at the Athenians by that great statesman and patriot Demos- thenes, who, like the late Lord Koberts, tried in vain to arouse the misguided and pleasure-loving citizens to a sense of the danger which threatened them from an am- bitious neighbour King and his powerful national army. In his ' First Philippic,' that great orator said : Great Problems of British Statesmanship 801 Why, Athenians, are the festivals in honour of Athenae and of Dionysus always celebrated at the appointed time — festivals which cost more treasure than is usually expended upon a whole fleet and attended by larger numbers and greater magnificence than any other event in the world — while all your expeditions have been too late, as that to Methone, that to Pegasae, and that to Potidaea ? I will tell you the reason. Everything relating to your amuse- ments is carefully studied and ordered beforehand. So everyone of you knows long before the event who is to conduct the various entertainments, what he is to receive, where he is to go, and what he has to do. Nothing is left uncertain or undetermined. But in affairs of war and in warlike preparations there is no order, no certainty, no regulation. Only when events alarm us we appoint our Trierarchs. Having done so, we dispute with them, and lastly we consider the question of supplies for war. . . . It is shameful, Athenians, that we deceive ourselves by allow- ing all disagreeable news to be suppressed, that we listen only to the pleasing speeches of our leaders, and that we thus delude ourselves ; that by putting off everything unpleasant, we never move until it is too late ; that we refuse to understand that those who would wage war suc- cessfully should not follow, but direct, events. In the ' Fourth Philippic ' Demosthenes stated : You, Athenians, have never made the necessary disposi- tion in your affairs, or armed yourselves, in time, but have ever been led by events. Then, when it proves too late to act, you lay down your arms. If another incident alarms you, your preparations are once more resumed in general tumult and confusion. But this is not the way to obtain success. . . . When Philip was preparing, you, instead of doing the like and making counter-preparations, remained listless, and, if anyone spoke a word of warning, shouted him down. When you receive news that any place is lost or besieged, then you listen and prepare. But the time to have heard and consulted was when you declined to listen, and the time to act and employ your preparation is now when you are hearing me. Such being your habits, you are 302 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War the only people who adopt this singular course. Other nations deliberate before action. You deliberate after action. While King Phihp was preparing everything for his attack upon Athens, the leaders of the Athenian democ- racy were fighting one another for votes and influence, for place and power. Demosthenes sadly stated in his ' First Philippic ' : If we sit at home listening to the mutual recriminations of our orators we cannot expect the slightest success in any direction. . . . They may promise and assert and accuse this person or that, but to such proceedings we owe the ruin of our affairs. In his ' Oration for the Liberty of the Ehodians * we read : You, Athenians, must fight a double battle. Like others, you have your open enemies, but you have enemies still more dangerous and alarming. You have to overcome in the first place the opposition of those of your own citizens who, in this assembly, are systematically engaged against the interests of their own country. And, as they are ever strenuous in their opposition to all useful measures, it is no wonder that many of our designs are frustrated. Athens owed her downfall to her party-political divisions, to the fact that she had many heads, but no head, to the fact that the Athenians, engaged in an unending struggle for power, were taught to place party above country and self above the State. Trusting to their democratic orator- politicians, who desired to be popular, who desired to please, the misguided people delayed preparation and action against their enemies until it was too late. If we study the history of Athens at its source, it becomes clear that that great republic rose to eminence during the time when it was a democracy in name but not in fact ; that it was a great, efficient, and wisely governed Power as Great Problems of British Statesmanship 303 long as it was ruled by an aristocracy and was guided by a single man of great ability, such as Aristides, Themistocles, Cimon, Pericles ; that it began to decline when it became a true democracy, when the controlling power in the State fell into the hands of the people, when ambitious or needy politicians and adventurers, contending for power, divided the nation, corrupted and destroyed the patriotism of the people, and taught theni to exploit the State and to consider it as an institution which existed mainly to administer to their wants and their vices, to their love of ease and of self. The policy of Athens was bound to be improvident, hasty, reckless, and foolish when the affairs of State were no longer directed by the ability of the experienced few or by the wisdom of a single eminent man, but by the momentary emotions and the shortsightedness of the crowd. In Athens public affairs were discussed and decided by the people, assembled in their thousands in the market-place. It may therefore be objected that the Athenian democracy cannot in fairness be compared with modern democracies which have evolved highly developed representative institu- tions. It may be said that in Great Britain not the people nor the elected representatives, but a small and select body, the Cabinet, enjoying great latitude for action, discusses policy and decides and directs in the greatest secrecy. Let us then study the cause of the decline and fall of another great commercial, maritime, and colonising republic, of Venice. The case of Venice should be particularly interest- ing because the Constitution of that State curiously re- sembles that of this country as established in the eighteenth entury. In fact, it may be said that the British Constitu- tion, as we know it now, was modelled upon that of Venice. Venice, like Great Britain, did not possess a written and fixed Constitution. The Venetians recognised that government by a crowd is bound to be a failure. The con- trolling power of the State, which at first had been held by the Doge and then by representative assemblies, passed into the hands of the Council of Ten, which originally had been 304 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War merely a judicial committee. The Senate of Venice may fairly be compared to the British House of Commons, and the Council of Ten to the British Cabinet. The Council of Ten acted in conjunction with the Senate, and its power was practically unlimited. Like the British Cabinet, it carried on its work in absolute secrecy. It was not dependent upon public opinion. The Doge, the Duke, who had been all- powerful at the time when Venice rose from insignificance to greatness, had been deprived of all authority. He was a mere figure-head. He was, as we are told, ' rex in purpura, senator in curia, in urbe captivus, extra urbem privatus.' The Doge was indeed a captive in a golden cage. He was not allowed to open the despatches which were addressed to him, as the head of the State, by foreign sovereigns. His palace, and even his person, were liable to be searched at any moment. In fact, he was a prisoner of the Ten. To make his revolt unlikely, only very old and feeble men were elected Doge. He was held responsible during his lifetime with his liberty and his head, and after his death with his estate. Venice was an aristocratic repubhc. The people were powerless. Owing to the absence of anything resem- bling popular control or public opinion, the authority of the Ten, acting in conjunction with the Senate, was of the greatest. Although much power was thus concentrated into the hands of a small secret Council, Venice declined and decayed. Government by councils and committees proved fatal to her. In 1677 was published a remarkable book, ' Histoire du Gouvernement de Venise.' It was written by Amelot de la Houssaye, a diplomat and a keen student of political affairs, who during several years was attached to the French Embassy in Venice, and who had made a special study of that wonderful State. In a chapter ' On the Principal Causes of the Decline of Venice ' we read ; The Eepublic of Venice has had the same fate as that of Sparta. Both were flourishing as long as they were small. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 505 Both have decMiiecl after extending their territory. Herein hes the first cause of the dedine of Venice. Its second cause may be found in the slowness of its dehberations. Slow- ness of action, it is true, is a fault which is found in all de- mocracies, but it is extreme in Venice. Their Senate seems to be sometimes asleep. So difficult it is at times to cause it to move. The Venetians were advised in good time of the prepara- tions made by Turkey for invading the Island of Crete. Nevertheless, they did not think of preparing their defence, as if they had never suffered from the perfidy of the Turks, or as if Heaven had assured them that the powerful expe- dition prepared by Turkey was not directed against their own possessions. Their confidence was founded upon the promises of a Turk who had told them that the military preparations of the Porte were directed against Malta. They were blind to their danger, and they refused to heed the advice of Sorance, the Venetian ambassador at Con- stantinople, who had warned them of their peril and en- treated them unceasingly to take precautions. Fearing to ofTend the Turks by showing their suspicion, they did not arm, but trusted for their security to their alliance with the Turks, which had recently been renewed. Thus their fortress of Saint Theodore was taken by surprise and Candia besieged. Only then would they believe that the Turks were hostile to them. . . . The Venetians lost Cyprus in a similar manner. They could not make up their mind what to do, although Jerome Zane, their admiral, and Pascal Cicogne, their general at Candia, urged them not to wait until attacked by the Turks, but to fight the Turkish fleet on the sea, and so prevent a hostile landing. By similar irresolution the Senate lost in the last cen- tury the whole of the Venetian territory on the mainland. The Venetian government could not make up its mind as to the policy to be pursued until the sovereigns united in the League of Cambray had invaded the Venetian posses- sions. . . . The third cause of the disorder in the affairs of Venice lies in the fact that the Senate is composed of a large X 306 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War number of members. Hence bad proposals are more likely to be adopted than good ones, especially if a bad policy is outwardly attractive, and therefore popular, while a wise policy seems unpleasant. In Venice, as in ancient Athens, wise men may propose, but fools deliberate. The resolu- tions are formed by a majority. The votes of fools have as much weight as the votes of wise men, and fools are more numerous than are men of understanding. Lastly, the Venetian Senate is, in time of danger, liable to steer a middle course, which is the worst course of all. If two different policies are proposed, one brave and daring, and the other timorous and cowardly, the Venetians are apt to follow a policy which is partly brave and partly cowardly without inquiring whether it is wise and whether it will avert the danger. The extracts given from the book of the French diplomat make it clear that Venice, in times of great emergency, when rapid and decisive action was required, was as short- sighted, vacillating, and hesitating as was Athens, that in the later centuries of her existence she was never prepared for war, and was always forestalled by her enemies, all timely warnings notwithstanding. Three centuries ago Turkey fooled Venice in exactly the same manner in which she fooled Great Britain in 1914 and in which Bulgaria fooled her in 1915. Over the grave of Venice, as over that of Athens, the words ' Too late ' may be inscribed. Venice, like ancient Athens in the time of her decline, had many heads but no head. Improvidence and irresolution arising from divided counsels destroyed both. If we survey the history of the world we find that nearly all true democracies have been exceedingly short-lived, that they have gone the way of Athens. The republics which flourished were, like Carthage and like Athens in the time of her greatest glory, aristocracies directed by single men of genius. The Eepublic of the Netherlands, like that of Venice, was an aristocracy. William the Silent, her Stadt- holder, was her Themistocles. He established the power Great Problems of British Statesmanship 307 of the Eepublic, and his successors of the House of Orange, the Princes Maurice, Frederick Henry, and William the Second, maintained it. At that time she ruled the sea, colonised the world, dominated the world's trade, and was the richest State in Europe. In 1650 the Dutch Eepublic changed its Constitution. It aboHshed the Stadtholder, whose supreme position had aroused the envy of the demo- crats. The politicians were established in power. From 1650 to 1672 the Netherlands were a true Eepublic. Her politicians quarrelled among themselves hke those of Athens and Venice. Her counsels were divided, and during the twenty-two years of democratic control she experienced defeat after defeat and lost her naval supremacy, her world trade, and her greatness. The Dutch wealth and power fell to England, ruled by one man, by Cromwell. Improvidence and irresolution springing from the rule of poHtical com- mittees brought about her decline. It is only natural that aristocratic or oligarchial republics have shown a greater vitality than democratic ones. Aris- tocratic Venice existed during nearly a thousand years. The wealth of the wealthy can be preserved only by pru- dence, fort sight, and timely energy. It may be destroyed by a defeat, and it may be preserved or increased by a timely victory. Wealthy men are therefore apt to take more pro- vident and more statesmanlike views in matters of foreign policy than the labouring masses, which live from day to day. Besides, the wealthy and the powerful are as a rule far better informed on foreign affairs than the poor and the ignorant, who may easily be deluded by wily agitators. If one set of politicians proposes to the people a wise and patriotic, though costly, policy of military preparedness in view of possible dangers from without, while another set promises them peace, higher wages or a reduced cost of living, and disarmament, and holds up the former poHcy — which is supported by the well-informed rich — and its supporters to odium, the people will readily vote for a policy of unpreparedness and for a reduction of armaments. 308 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War Before the War the French, Belgian, and British armies were starved, and national defence was neglected because the workers were told by their leaders that not Germany, but domestic capitalism, was their greatest enemy. Before the War adequate military preparation was systematically opposed in France, Belgium, and Great Britain by politicians who pandered to the short-sighted and ill-informed masses. The story of Athens in the time of Demosthenes repeated itself. The question now arises whether inefficiency and improvi- dence are inseparably connected with democracy, whether it is not possible to combine the advantages possessed by democracy with the governmental efficiency and foresight which are found in highly organised and semi-military States such as Germany, whether it is not possible to blend repre- sentative government and one-man rule. Before deciding whether this is feasible we must inquire into the causes of the governmental efficiency which is found in the most highly developed monarchical States. The efficiency of a nation, as of any commercial or industrial undertaking, depends mainly on two factors : its organisation and its direction, its Constitution and its director or directors. If we study the organisation of the most successful monarchies of all time, we find two different types. Some have been ruled by a prince of the greatest genius who governed in person, who was his own Prime Minister, such as Peter the Great of Eussia. Some have been ruled by men of moderate, or even of small, capacity who have entrusted an able Minister with the task of government, such as Germany under William the First and Bismarck. It is frequently asserted that the combination of a William the First and of a Bismarck is unique or almost unique. That view is erroneous. A wise king rules, but does not govern. Monarchy is a business which is best carried on through a manager. The direct rule of the sovereign is dangerous for the nation and for himself, even if the monarch is a man Great Problems of British Statesmanship 309 of the greatest genius. That may be seen by the example of Napoleon the First. For psychological reasons alone the highly technical and laborious task of government is as a rule far more ably fulfilled by a patient and painstaking Minister who lives for his work than by a high-spirited, though able, sovereign who necessarily can only devote part of his time to the dry and tedious details of administration. The most successful States have been raised to greatness not through a great ruler but through a great statesman, such as Bismarck, working under a ruler of moderate ability. Civilisation arose in the East. Every Eastern ruler has his manager, his Vizier. Moses had his Aaron, Pharaoh his Joseph, and Solomon his Asaph. According to the Moham- medan tradition, these were the Viziers of Moses, Pharaoh, and Solomon. The foundation of the greatness of France was laid by the co-operation of the able Henry the Fourth and of Sully, his great Minister, and by Eichelieu and Mazarin, who governed France in the King's name under the rule of the incapable Louis the Thirteenth and during the minority of Louis the Fourteenth. These statesmen raised France to the greatest glory and made her wealthy and powerful. Louis the Fourteenth, though personally highly gifted and well supported by great Ministers such as Colbert and Louvois, wishing to govern himself, weakened France through his impetuousness and pride. As the greatness of Germany has been established by Bismarck working under the conscientious but moderately gifted WilHam the First, and that of France by three all-powerful Ministers, Sully, Eichelieu, and Mazarin, so that of Sweden was the work of Oxenstierna, who co-operated with the great genius King Gustavus Adolphus. His work was destroyed by the rashness and pride of Charles the Twelfth as that of Bis- marck seems likely to be destroyed by the pride and vanity of William the Second. Many Englishmen are interested in the science of legis- lation, but only a few in that of national administration and organisation, although the latter is infinitely more important 310 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War than the former. While the Hterature deahng with legis- lation and with domestic politics in all its branches is exceed- ingly vast, there is not a single book in the English language, except perhaps the American Federalist, which deals ade- quately and critically with the science of national organisa- tion and administration. As the nation-builders of England have apparently not recorded their views as to the best form of national organisation, we must turn for information to the great constructive statesmen of the Continent and of the United States. Eichelieu, the great organiser of France, one of the wisest statesmen of all time, stated his views on government in his little-known ' Testament Politique.' It was written for the use and guidance of King Louis the Thirteenth, to whom it was dedicated, and for that of his successors and of the future Ministers of France, In Chapter VIII. ' Du Conseil du Prince,' which might be translated ' On the Cabinet,' we read : Among statesmen it is a much debated question whether it is better that a sovereign should govern the State in person, according to his own views, or whether he should be largely guided by his Council and do nothing without its advice. Either form of government might be advocated in bulky volumes. The worst government, in my opinion, is one which is entirely in the hands of a sovereign who is so incapable, and at the same time so presumptuous, that he pays no attention whatever to any council. The best government of all is one where the mainspring is the will of the sovereign who, though capable of deciding for himself, possesses so much modesty and judgment that he does nothing unless he is supported by good advice, acting on the principle that several eyes see more than a single one. . . . A highly-gifted ruler is a great treasure to his State, and an able council in the fullest sense of the word is no less precious. But the co-operation of an able ruler and a good council is of inestimable value because on such co-operation is founded the happiness of States. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 311 There are no doubt only few sovereigns who can govern their States without assistance, but even if there were many such gifted men they should not endeavour to administer it by themselves. . . . Many qualities are required in a good minister, and the most important are four : ability, faithfulness, courage, and industry. The abiUty of ministers does not consist in that form of self-conceit which is usually found in pedants. Nothing is more dangerous for a State than men who endeavour to govern it by means of abstract principles drawn from books. Such men have completely ruined States because the rules of the past cannot always be applied to the present, for time, place, and persons differ. . . . In considering the ability of ministers, two facts are of particular importance. In the first place, men of the greatest natural genius are often more dangerous than useful in handling affairs of State unless they have more lead than quicksilver in their composition. Many men are fertile in good ideas. They abound with original thoughts. How- ever, such men are often so changeable in their plans that in the evening they have abandoned their intentions of the morning. They have so little staying power and logic that they change their good plans as readily as their bad ones, and never steadily pursue any policy. I may say with truth, and I know from experience, that the unsteadiness and changeableness of such people is no less dangerous in the management of national affairs than the ill-will of others. The second fact which must be borne in mind is that nothing can be more dangerous for a State than to give a position of great authority to men who have not sufficient gifts to guide themselves, but who, nevertheless, believe that they have so much ability that they need not be guided by others. Men of that stamp can neither form a good plan for themselves nor follow the advice of those who might give them good counsel. Hence they commit constantly very great mistakes. One of the greatest vices which a public man may possess is presumption. Although humility is not required in those whose destiny it is to administer a State, 312 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War they should possess modesty. Modesty is absolutely neces- sary to them, especially as the most capable men are often least able to bear with assistance and advice, without which even the ablest men are little fit to govern. Men of the greatest genius, unless possessed of modesty, are so much enamoured with their own ideas that they are apt to condemn the proposals of all other people, even if their views are better than their own Hence their natural pride and their high position are apt to make them altogether unbearable. Even the very ablest man must often listen to the advice of men w^hom he believes to be less able. It is prudent for a minister to speak little and to listen much, for one can profit from all kinds of advice. Good advice is valuable for itself, while bad advice confirms the good. ... The leading men must be industrious, as I have stated. However it is not necessary that a man directing public affairs should be working unceasingly. On the contrary, nothing is more harmful for him than unceasing labour. The nature of affairs of State makes relaxation necessary, and the more important the office is the more necessary is relaxation. The physical and mental strength of man is limited, and unceasing labour exhausts both in little time. It is necessary that those who manage affairs of State should make these their principal pre-occupation, and that they should devote to them their whole mind, their whole thought, and all their strength. Their greatest pleasure should con- sist not in their amusement, but in their success. States- men directing the affairs of a country should survey the whole world in order to be able to foresee the events of the future. Then they will be able to take measures against the evils which may come, and to carry through those measures which are required in the national interest. As the number of the physicians is often responsible for the death of the patient, even so the number of ministers is more often harmful than advantageous to the State. I would add that no more than four ministers can be usefully employed, and one of these should be invested with superior authority. This leading minister should be the mainspring of the State. He should be like the sun in the firmament. He should be guided only by his intelligence and should guide Great Problems of British Statesmanship 313 those around him. I hesitate to put forward this idea, for I may appear to be pleading my own cause. Still, I should find it easy to prove from Holy Writ, and from authoritative, sacred, and profane writers, the necessity of a principal minister. Besides, I would say that the confidence with which your Majesty has always honoured me during the time when I have guided the policy of France was due to your own free will. Posterity will find that the authority which I have always enjoyed in your councils has been legitimate. Therefore, I believe that I may freely speak upon the subject without being suspected of questionable motives. The envy which naturally arises among men of equal authority, as among States of equal power, is too well known to make it necessary that I should prove at length the truth of the fact that a single minister should occujjy the pre- eminent position described above. My experiences have been so convincing with regard to this principle that I think I should fail in my duty before God did I not state in formal terms in this my testament that there is nothing more dangerous to a State than to entrust its administration and government to a number of men enjoying power and authority. A step which one minister desires to undertake is liable to be opposed by another, and unless the minister who possesses the best idea is at the same time most skilful in steering them through, his plans will always be brought to nought by an opponent gifted with greater power of persua- sion. Each of the opposing ministers will have his followers. These will form parties in the State, and thus the strength of the country, which ought to be united, will be divided. As the sicknesses and death of man are caused by the oppos- ing humours of his body, even so the peace of States is dis- turbed by the disunion and the conflict of men of equal power, who direct the fate of nations, and these dissensions are apt to produce evils which at last may bring about the downfall of the nation. If it is true that monarchical most closely resembles divine government by its outward form, if it is true that a monarchy is superior to all other forms of government, as the greatest sacred and profane writers have told us, one may boldly state that the sovereign should entrust the manage- 314 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War ment of the State to one particular person above all others, for he cannot, or, if he could, would not, have his eye con- stantly on the chart and on the compass. That stands to reason. Exactly as several pilots never direct simultaneously the rudder, even so the rudder of the ship of State should never be controlled by more than one man at a time. The steersman of the ship of State may well receive the advice of other men, and he should even ask for it. Still, it is for him to examine the advice given, and to direct the course of the ship to the right or to the left according to his judg- ment, in order to avoid rocks and to steer his course. . . . I am well acquainted with the ability, honesty, and courage which are required in ministers of State. As the controlling minister of whom we have spoken must stand above the other ministers in power and authority, so he must be superior to them by his personal qualities. Consequently the character of the person chosen to direct the State must be carefully examined before appointment. The sovereign must personally know the man whom he entrusts with so great a responsibility. But although the leading minister must be appointed by the sovereign, his choice should, if possible, find the approval of the public, for general approval will increase the minister's ability to do good. It is easy to depict the qualities which a principal minister should possess, but it is difficult to find these gifts united in any single person. Still, it must be stated that the happiness or the misfortune of States depends upon the choice made. Hence sovereigns are compelled either to undertake themselves the heavy burden of government, or to select a man who will so conduct the affairs of the nation that their selection is approved of in earth and in Heaven. Eichelieu believed a monarchy to be the best form of government. He thought that the best organised monarchy was not one which was governed by the monarch in person, be he ever so gifted, but one which was governed by an able monarch supported by an able Council of Ministers, because even a ruler of inferior ability could rule well by entrusting the national government to eminent Ministers. He attached the greatest value to their ability, experience, and character. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 315 In Kichelieu's opinion, as in that of Prince Bismarck, the worst ministers are brilHant and dazzhng men, lacking thorough- ness, and men of book-learning and of preconceived notions, doctrinaires. Unfortunately, men of these two types easily impose upon the masses. Hence they are usually found in democratic Cabinets. Eichelieu thought it most important that Ministers should possess that quiet modesty which is always found in men who thoroughly know their business, in great experts. He wished that Ministers should devote their activities entirely to their office, concentrating all their thoughts and ambitions upon their departments. He thought that the Council of Ministers should be small ob- viously because only a small council can deliberate in secret and can decide rapidly. He advised that the Cabinet should consist of no more than four men, that one of the four should be given authority above the remaining three, and that these three Ministers should not be the equals of the principal Minister but his assistants, his subordinates. Particular attention should be paid to the fact that Eichelieu attached the very highest value to the subordination of the Ministers to a principal Minister, and that he condemned emphatically a Cabinet of Ministers possessing, at least nominally, equal authority such as those who form the British Cabinet. In Richelieu's words : ' There is nothing more dangerous to a State than to entrust its administration and government to a number of men enjoying equal power and authority.' His arguments in favour of concentrating all ministerial responsibility into the hands of a single presiding and directing Minister are unanswerable. Lastly, Richelieu re- commended that the position of principal Minister should be entrusted only to a man most eminent both in ability and in personal character, and that, if possible, a popular man should be chosen. The ideal Prime Minister and his minis- terial assistants should not be overburdened with work, but should have sufficient leisure to be able to think ahead, and to prepare for the future, for otherwise he would be worn out with labour, and, being too much occupied with 316 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War current affairs, would be surprised by the march of events. It will be noticed that government by means of a Cabinet, as practised in this country, is in every particular dia- metrically opposed to the form of national organisation which the great Cardinal described as the most perfect and the most efficient. Eichelieu lived three centuries ago. Nevertheless, the broad principles of efficient government expounded by him have not been superseded. Experience has proved their worth. Let us now trace the development of modern national organisation in the best organised State, in Germany. Brandenburg-Prussia has had the rare good fortune of having possessed some most highly gifted rulers endowed with administrative genius and ability of the highest kind : Frederick William the Great Elector, who ruled from 1640 to 1688, Frederick William the First, who ruled from 1713 to 1740, and Frederick the Great who ruled from 1740 to 1786. These three sovereigns, who together ruled during no less than 121 years, raised Brandenburg-Prussia by their personal labours from insignificance to the rank of a prosperous Great Power. They governed the country in person, and directed and controlled themselves the whole administration. They presided over the ministerial councils, heard and weighed the opinions of their counsellors, and then decided. They established the tradition that the ruler of Prussia is his own Prime Minister, a doctrine to which Eichelieu was strongly opposed. Capable rulers were followed by lamentably incapable ones. The personal misgovernment of Frederick William the Second and Frederick WilHam the Third brought about Prussia's decline and downfall. The Napoleonic War had ended in the triumph of Great Britain. At the peace England was richer and more power- ful than she was when the war began. Her prestige in Europe was unlimited. All nations desired to copy her political institutions and her economic policy. The British Government was carried on by a Cabinet of jointly Great Problems of British Statesmanship 317 responsible Ministers, presided over by a Prime Minister. It was, therefore, only natural that Prussia, in reorganising the country, created a Cabinet of jointly responsible Ministers presided over by a Prime Minister. However, there was a profound difference between the two Cabinets. The Prussian Prime Minister was to be the King's Manager. Bismarck stated on January 24, 1882 : In Prussia the King himself governs. The ministers may put on paper the orders which the King has given, but they do not govern. In the words of the Prussian Constitu- tion, ' The King alone possesses the power of the executive.' Cabinet Ministers are not mentioned in that document. The Prussian Ministers are the King's servants, not the country's. The great characteristic of Bismarck was his clear critical faculty. He refused to believe that a form of government or an economic policy was best because it existed in England. He thought government by means of a jointly responsible Cabinet an evil, even if it were directed, or presided over, by the King who was able to order the Ministers whom he had appointed to do this or that, whether they approved or disapproved. He shared Eichelieu's opinion that * there is nothing more dangerous to a State than to entrust its administration and government to a number of men enjoying equal power and authority.' He considered that joint responsibility meant irresponsibility, friction, delay, inefficiency. Therefore, when he created in 1866 the North German Federation, the forerunner of the German Empire, he concentrated all power into the hands of a single principal Minister, giving him sole responsibility and making the other Ministers his subordinates. This organisation was later on taken over by the German Empire. The Empire has only a single responsible Minister, the Imperial Chan- cellor, and the subordination of his ministerial assistants has been emphasised in their very title. While Prussia has a number of Ministers and a Prime Minister the 318 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War German Empire has a Chancellor supported by a number of ' Secretaries of State.' As the German Liberals, who loudly advocated Free Trade and Cabinet Government ' as in England ' for the North German Federation and the German Empire, were opposed to the absolute supremacy of a single Minister, Bismarck had to defend this form of government on numerous occasions. He stated, for instance, in the Reichstag of the North German Federation, on April 16, 1869 : A strong, active, and progressive Government is required. Yet it is desired that for every decision several Ministers of equal authority should be responsible. It is believed that by their appointment all the evils of this world may be cured. A man who has been at the head of a Cabinet and who has been forced to form decisions on his own responsibility is not afraid to act, though he alone is responsible, but he shrinks from the necessity of convincing seven people that his measures are really the best. That task is more difficult than that of governing a State. All members of a Cabinet have an honest and firm conviction. The more honest and the more capable Ministers are, the more difficult they will find it to give way to any other man. Every one of the Ministers is surrounded by a number of pugnacious perma- nent officials, who also have convictions of their own. In any case it is difficult to convince a man. One persuades a man occasionally, or gains him over through courtesy, but one has to do this seven times. I am firmly convinced, and my opinion has been created by practical experience, that government by means of a Cabinet, by means of a board, is a constitutional error and mistake which every State should endeavour to get rid of as soon as possible. I would not lend a hand to impose that mistaken institution of a Cabinet upon the North German Federation. I believe that Prussia would make an immense step forward if she would adopt the principle of the North German Federation, according to which only a single Minister is responsible. Eesponsibility is possible only in the case of a single individual who in his person can be held responsible for his action. If the same individual is member of a Cabinet, he Great Problems of British Statesmanship 319 may answer that he has been outvoted by his colleagues, or he may say that the opposition he experienced made his intended measures im^practicable, that a bill he intended to bring in has been delayed for seven years because seven honest men could not agree on its text. Besides, in every board discussion the moment arrives at last when the decision has to be left to chance, to the toss of a coin. He said in the Beichstag on December 1, 1874 : What guarantee of moral responsibility have you in the case of any institution unless responsibility is borne by a single person ? Absolutely none. Who is responsible in a Cabinet, consisting of eight or ten independent Ministers, none of whom can take an important measure unless the majority of his colleagues support it ? Who is responsible for the resolutions of a parliamentary majority ? It is clear that it cannot be sought for in any individual, because in the case of a majority vote everybody is entitled to say that he was not in favour of the measure taken, but that others were opposed to him. . . . I believe that national affairs can be conducted in a spirit of unity only if the Government is presided over by a man who is able to give orders. I should, of course, raise difficulties to myself if I should frivolously or too easily make use of that power. On the other hand, the ability to give orders is a weapon, the possession of which is known to all, and therefore it becomes rarely necessary to use it. He stated in the Reichstag on November 22, 1875 : The position of a Prime Minister of Prussia is ungrateful because of his powerlessness. One can be responsible only for that which one does with one's own free will. A board is irresponsible, for later on it is impossible to discover the men who formed the majority which passed this or that measure. Joint responsibility is a fiction. It may be very convenient to leave resolutions to a Cabinet and to say the Cabinet has resolved to do this or that. However, if you inquire how the resolution was arrived at, every Minister will shrug his shoulders and tell a different tale, for if there has been failure no one cares to assume responsibility. 320 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War In his posthumous memoirs, his pohtical testament, we read : Official decisions do not gain in honesty and moderation by being arrived at collectively, for, apart from the fact that, in the case of voting by majority, arithmetic and chance take the place of logical reasoning, that feeling of personal responsibility in which lies the essential guarantee for the conscientiousness of the decision is lost directly it comes about by means of anonymous majorities. . . . The board character of the Prussian Ministry, with its majority votes, daily compels Ministers to compromise and surrender to their colleagues. A real responsibility in high politics can only be undertaken by one single directing Minister, never by a numerous board with majority voting. Many similar pronouncements of his might easily be given. Bismarck was a keen student of history, and had learned its lessons. He was aware that divided counsels had been responsible for confusion in policy and administration and for the downfall of States since the earliest times ; that divided councils had sapped the strength, and destroj'^ed, kingdoms and oligarchies, aristocracies and democracies ; that no organisation can be efficient which is nominally controlled by many heads— which has no real head but at best a figurehead ; that a nation, like an army, or like a commercial undertaking, can be successfully and responsibly directed and controlled only by one man. Eichelieu and Bismarck were the greatest civilian states- men of modern times, and Frederick the Great and Napoleon the First were the greatest military statesmen. They were certainly at least as eminent as organisers and adminis- trators as they were as generals. Not unnaturally both were in favour of a single and undivided control of the national government and administration, and were abso- lutely opposed to divided control because the latter means no control, but drift, delay, inefficiency, intrigue, and disaster. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 321 Frederick the Great stated in his ' Essai sur les Formes de Gouvernement ' of 1777 : If a ruler abandons the helm of the ship of State and places it into the hands of paid men, of Ministers appointed by him, one will steer to the right and another to the left. A general plan is no longer followed. Every Minister disap- proves of the actions of his predecessor, and makes changes even if they are quite unnecessary, wishing to originate a new policy which is often harmful. He is succeeded by Ministers who also hasten to overthrow the existing institutions in order to show their ability. In consequence of the numerous innovations made none can take root. Confusion, disorder, and all the other vices of a bad administration arise, and incapable or worthless officials blame the multitude of changes for their shortcomings. Men are attached to their own. As the State does not belong to the Ministers in power they have no real interest in its welfare. Hence the Government is carried on with careless indifference, and the result is that the administra- tion, the public finances, and the army deteriorate. Thus the monarchy becomes an oligarchy. Ministers and generals direct affairs in accordance with their fancy. Systematic administration disappears. Everyone follows his own notions. No link is left which connects the directing factors. As all the wheels and springs of the watch serve together the single object of measuring time, all the springs and wheels of a Government should be so arranged and co- ordinated that all the departments of the national adminis- tration work together with the single aim of promoting the greatest good of the State. That aim should not be lost sight of for a single moment. Besides, the individual interests of Ministers and generals usually cause them to oppose each other. Thus personal differences often prevent the carrying through of the most necessary measures. National disasters of the greatest magnitude are obviously the most searching tests of the value of the national organisa- tion. The Seven Years' War was fought chiefly on Prussian soil. The country had been overrun by hostile troops, had 322 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War been utterly devastated, and had in part become abandoned by man. Yet, ten years after the war the population, the income and the wealth of Prussia were considerably greater than at its beginning, as I have shown very fully in another book which supplies a mass of documentary information on Frederick the Great as an organiser and administrator.^ In it will be found copious extracts from the King's writings, and especially from his two Political Testaments, which have not previously been published in English. Now let us see what the administration of Napoleon the first can teach us. Napoleon the First was an organising genius. His military triumphs proved ephemeral, but in the domain of national organisation and administration his work has endured. Professor Pariset wrote justly in the ' Cambridge Modern History ' : Bonaparte directed the reorganisation of France, and never perhaps in history was a work so formidable accom- plished so quickly. Order and regularity were established in every branch of the administration. The greater part of the institutions founded during the Consulate have sur- vived to the present day, and it is no exaggeration to state that it was Bonaparte who created contemporary France. The French Revolution had destroyed the work of eight centuries and had left nothing but ruin and disorder. The Treasury was empty. The taxes failed to come in. The paper money was greatly depreciated. No loans could be raised. The nation had repeatedly become bankrupt. The consecutive revolutionary Governments were govern- ments of many heads. Although the revolutionary leaders were men of the greatest ability, divided councils and the influence of popular passion had caused them to adopt the most insane measures. They had madly destroyed the national organisation and the national credit. In 1796 the louis d'or of twenty-four francs was worth from 1 The Foundations of Germany, Smith, Elder & Co., 1916. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 323 6107 francs to 8137 francs in assignats. A pair of boots which cost thirty francs in gold cost about 10,000 francs in paper. In 1799, at the end of which Napoleon became First Consul, the 5 per cent. Rente reached the minimum price of seven, yielding thus 111 per cent, to the purchaser. Unrestricted self-government had produced administrative lanarchy throughout the provinces. Edmond Blanc tells us in his ' Napoleon I, ses Institutions Civiles et Administratives ' : For a long time no money had been available for con- structing or repairing roads and bridges, and these had fallen into decay. Roads no longer existed. Where they had been, the ground was full of holes yards wide and deep, in which carts and carriages disappeared. Fourcroy reported that in travelling from Tours to Poitiers and to La Rochelle, and thence to Nantes, his carriage was broken six times, and that eleven times he was compelled to employ several teams of oxen for drawing it out of the mire. Carters would only proceed in numbers so as to be able to assist one another, and would frequently travel across the cultivated fields because passage through them was easier than along the so-called roads. At night the roads were unusable, and carters could often do no more than three or four miles per day. This state of affairs had made transport by road very expensive. The internal trade of France came almost to an end. Wheat which fetched 18 francs in the market at Nantes cost 36 francs at Brest. Hence, scarcity prevailed in many departments. During the first years of the Direc- toire, out of 85,000 people in Rouen no less than 64,000 had to be supplied with bread by public distribution. During the Directoire and the first few years of the Consulate the problem how to feed the people was the principal preoccupa- tion of the Government. France, like modern India, lived under the dread of impending famine. The canals of France were as neglected as the roads. The harbours of Rochefort and Frejus were filled with mud. The vast drainage works of the time of Louis the Fourteenth had fallen into ruin, and so had the dykes which protected the country against floods. The roads were infested with 324 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War robbers. The administration of the law had broken down, and the prevaiHng insecurity had led to the standstill of business. On December 24, 1799, Napoleon was made First Consul, and on the evening of that day he dictated to his friend Eoederer a proclamation in which he promised to the people not only independence and glory, but also the creation of an orderly administration, the re-establishment of the national finances, the reform of the laws and the re-creation of the prosperity of the utterly impoverished nation. To the surprise of the world he carried out that colossal pro- gramme within a few years. He created order in the local and national government and security of the person and of property. Soon the taxes were once more regularly paid. Eapidly the laws were improved and codified. Eoads; canals, and public works of every kind were constructed. A new France arose. The 5 per cent. Eente, which in 1799 had touched seven, touched 44 in 1800, 68 in 1801, and 93"40 in 1807. According to a statement which on February 25, 1813,Comte de Montalivet, Napoleon's Minister of the Interior, placed before the Corps Legislatif, France spent, from 1804 to 1813 alone, the following gigantic sums on public works : Fortresses, arsenals, and barracks Roads and highways ..... Bridges ....... Canals, river regulation, and draining of swamps Sea harbours and dykes .... Public works in Paris ..... Public buildings in the provinces . Imperial residences and Crown properties Francs 143,669,600 277.484,549 30,605,356 122,587,898 117,328,710 102,421,187 149,108,550 62,054,583 Total 1,005,260,433 Napoleon had an unlimited power for work. His Ministers, like those of Eichelieu, Bismarck, and Frederick the Great, were his servants. They were independent of Parliament. The initiative for legislation and adminis- tration was given to the Conseil d'Etat, a most interesting Great Problems of British Statesmanship 325 and most valuable institution which had the same function in the State that a powerful General Staff has in an army. It contained men of the very highest ability and distinction belonging to all parties — red revolutionaries, moderates, royalists, exiled and former nobles, administrators, generals, admirals, and great lawyers. It possessed five sections for Finance, Legislation, War, Navy, Home Affairs. Each section discussed and prepared its own measures, and these were then submitted to, and discussed by, the whole council. The Code Napoleon was thus evolved. Napoleon himself took a very active part in these plenary sittings, attending often during seven or eight hours and scrutinising every proposal. As the Conseil d'Etat worked behind closed doors, no speeches addressed to the electors were made in it. Discussion was carried on by brief and telling argument. No time was wasted. The result was that innumerable vast reforms were brought forward at almost incredible speed, and that every Government measure was wise and was carefully worked out in all details, embodying not only the views of the technical experts but the experience of the foremost men of France as well. Both Frederick the Great and Napoleon the First by concentrating all the administrative power into their own hands, were able to repair in a few years unprecedented ravages and to convert chaos, poverty, and starvation into order, wealth, and plenty. Boards and councils are slow-moving and timorous bodies wedded to precedent and hampered by obstruction, intrigue, and sheer stupidity. No Cabinet of Ministers could have achieved a tithe of the national reconstruction and reorganisation accom- plished so rapidly by Frederick and Napoleon. The greatest statesmen of the New World agree with the greatest statesmen of the Old in believing that the national government should be controlled and directed not by a Cabinet, not by a number of men of equal authority, but by a single individual supported by a council of able men of his own choosing, his subordinates. The founders 826 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War of the United States placed the Executive into the hands of a practically irresponsible President who was free to appoint his Ministerial subordinates who cannot be forced out of office by a parliamentary vote. The American President is an elected king possessed of vast power, and in time of war he is the actual commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy. The greatest American statesmen, the makers of the Constitution, entrusted the Executive to a single man, believing that only thus efficiency and true responsibihty could be ensured. I have given their views very fully in the following chapter, to which I would refer those who desire detailed information. Alexander Hamilton, the greatest constructive statesman of the United States, wrote in the Federalist : Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any com- mon enterprise or pursuit there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. . . . Men often oppose a thing merely because they have had no agency in planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom they dislike. But if they have been con- sulted and have appeared to disapprove, opposition then becomes, in their estimation, an indispensable duty of self- love. ... No favourable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of dissension in the executive depart- ment. Here they are pure and unmixed. There is no point at which they cease to operate. They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the Executive which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition, vigour and expedition, and this without any counterbalancing good. In the conduct of war, in which the energy of the Executive is the bulwark of the national security, everything would be to be apprehended from its plurality. . . . But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive is that it tends to conceal faults and destroy Great Problems of British Statesmanship 327 responsibility. ... It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or a series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author. ... 'I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided, in their opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution on the point.' These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true or false. And who is there that will either take the trouble or incur the odium of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs of the transaction ? Alexander Hamilton's views curiously agree with those of Prince Bismarck previously given. To the readers of these pages it will be clear that the greatest statesmen of the European Continent and of the United States were absolutely opposed to entrusting the control of the national government and administration to a Cabinet of jointly responsible Ministers, believing that efficiency was incompatible with that form of government. It will be clear to them that the greatest statesmen of modern times believed a body, such as the British Cabinet, a source of division, of weakness, and of danger ; that they considered that such a body would, owing to its divided councils, create disorganisation and confusion ; that joint responsibihty would destroy all real responsibility ; that the control of affairs by a number of men would chiefly be productive of hesitation, vacillation, and delay, and make secrecy and rapid action impossible. Those who write or speak about the British Constitution habitually treat the control of national affairs by a number of jointly responsible directors, who are supposed to act unanimously in all matters of importance, as if this arrange- ment were a matter of course, as if it had existed since time immemorial and had by its very antiquity proved its excel- lence. They treat it as if it were the last word and the 328 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War highest expression of national organisation. In reahty the national organisation of Great Britain, which formerly was highly centrahsed and extremely ef&cient, has gradu- ally much deteriorated. Let us see what we can learn from that most important part of Britain's history which is usually not mentioned in the text-books. In the olden days Great Britain was governed by powerful Kings with the assistance of a Council. The local adminis- tration was entrusted to great noblemen who acted as the King's representatives, for a regular civil service with salaried officials is a very modern invention. These noble- men were paid by being allowed to exploit the land granted to them and the people dwelling thereon, and in return they had to keep order and to support the King. In course of time the power of the noblemen grew at the cost of the King, against whom they frequently revolted. They considered themselves the nation and dominated Parlia- ment, the lung's Council, and the King himself, and ruled the country. The most powerful noblemen occupied then a position not dissimilar to that now held by party leaders and, like party leaders, they fought one another for supremacy. They ruined the nation by their personal feuds. These disorders and abuses, which might have ended in England's downfall, were abolished by the energetic rulers of the House of Tudor, who reorganised the dis- tracted and impoverished country and made it united, rich, cultured, and powerful. Professor Marriott tells us in his excellent book, ' English Pohtical Institutions ' : Erom 1404 to 1437 the King's Council was not merely dependent upon Parliament, but was actually nominated by them. But the result was a dismal failure. . . . The result was that while Parliament was busy in establishing its rights against the Crown, the nation was sinking deeper and deeper into social anarchy. . . The people, reduced to social confusion by the weak and nerveless rule of the Lan- castrians, emerged from the Wars of the Koses anxious for the repose and discipline secured to them by the New Monarchy. Great Problems of British Statesmanship) 329 For a century the Tudors continued to administer the tonic which they had prescribed to the patient suffering from disorder and economic anaemia. The evolution of the Parhamentary machinery was temporarily arrested, but meanwhile the people grew socially and commer- cially. Aristocratic turbulence was sternly repressed ; extraordinary tribunals were erected to deal with powerful offenders ; vagrancy was severely punished ; work was found for the unemployed ; trade was encouraged ; the navy was organised on a permanent footing ; scientific training in seamanship was provided ; excellent secondary schools were established — in these and in many other ways the New Monarchy, despotic and paternal though it was, brought order out of chaos and created a New England. Let us now briefly survey how the Fredericks and Bismarcks of the Tudor period created this New England. About the year 1470, during the reign of King Edward the Fourth of the House of York, Sir John Fortescue, the Chief Justice of the Eng's Bench, wrote a most interesting and important treatise, ' The Governance of England.' A particularly remarkable chapter, the fifteenth, deals with the Cabinet question, and is entitled ' How the King's Council may be Chosen and Established.' In slightly modernised Enghsh it runs as follows : The King's Council was wont to be chosen of great princes and of the greatest lords of the land, both spiritual and temporal, and also of other men that were in great authority and office. Which lords and officers had in their hands also many matters of their own to be treated in the Council, as had the King. Wherefore, when they came together, they were so occupied with their own matters, and with the matters of their kin, servants, and tenants, that they attended but little, and sometimes not at all, to the King's business. And also there were but few matters of the King's, but if these same matters touched also the said counsellors, their cousins, their servants, tenants or such others as they owed favour to, what lower man was there sitting in that Council 330 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War that durst speak against the opinion of any of the great lords ? And why might not then men, by means of corrup- tion of the servants, counsellors, and of some of the lords, move the lords to partiality, and make them also favourable and partial as were the same servants or the parties that so moved them ? Then could no matter treated in the Council be kept quiet. For the Lords oftentimes told their own advisers and ser- vants that had sued to them for those matters how they had sped in the Council and who was against them. How may the King be counselled to refrain giving away his land, or giving officers grants or pensions of abbeys by such great lords to other men's servants, since they most desire such gifts for themselves and their servants ? Which things considered, and also many others which shall be showed hereafter, it is thought good that the King had a council chosen and estabhshed in the form that follows, or in some other form like thereto. First that there were chosen twelve ecclesiastics and twelve laymen of the wisest and best disposed men that can be found in all parts of this land, and that they be sworn to counsel the King after a form to be devised for their oath. And, in particular, that they shall take no fee, no clothing, and no reward from any man except from the King as do the justices of the King's Bench and of the Common Pleas when they take their offices. And that these twenty-four men be permanent councillors, but if any fault should be found in them, or if the King should desire it by the advice of the majority of the Council, he should change any of them. And that every year be chosen by the King four lords spiritual and four lords temporal to be for that year of the same council, exactly as the said twenty-four councillors shall be. And that they all have a head or a chief to rule the Council, one of the said twenty-four, and chosen by the King and holding his office at the King's pleasure, which may then be called Capitalis consiliarius. . . . These councillors might continually, and at such hours as might be assigned to them, discuss and deliberate upon the matters of difficulty that have fallen to the King, and upon the poHcy of the realm, how the going out of money Great Problems of British Statesmanship 331 may be restrained, how bullion may be brought into the land, how plate, jewels, and money lately taken out of the country may be got back again. For all this truly wise men will soon find the means. Also how the prices of merchandise produced in this country may be maintained and increased, and how the prices of merchandise imported into England may be lowered. How our navy may be maintained and augmented, and upon such other points of policy which are of the greatest profit and advantage to this country. How also the laws may be amended in such things in which they need reform. Through the activity of the Council the Parliament will be able to do more good in a month by way of amending laws than they do now in a year, if the amendments proposed be debated and made ripe for their hands by the Council. Sir John Fortescue complained that the ' greatest lords ' of the King's Council, the Cabinet of the time, attended chiefly to their own business and to that of their friends and retainers, neglecting that of the King and Nation, that they practised a shameless favouritism, did not keep secret the affairs of State, and thus made a wise policy and efficient administration impossible. He proposed that a new council of twenty-four of the wisest and best-disposed men should be established, one-half being laymen, and one-half clerics. Before the Eeformation the Church represented learning and was comparable to the professional classes of the present day. Besides Churchmen had learnt the art of organisation, of administration and of government through their Church. Lastly, as the Church was an international body. Churchmen were best acquainted with international affairs. Hence, ecclesiastics were the greatest administrators and diplomats of the time. The twenty-four councillors were not to be ' great lords,' corresponding to eminent politicians of the present. They were to be chosen on the ground of their capacity for business and to be permanently employed. In modern language, they were to be permanent officials, experts. They were to be reinforced by four lords spiritual, 332 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War and four lords temporal, corresponding to Members of Parliament of the present day, but these were not to be permanent members of the Council, for they were to be chosen every year. The President of the Council, it is worth noting, was to be taken from the permanent official members, not from the powerful representatives of the nobility or the Church, and he was to act as manager for the King who was to be the real head of the Council. Sir John Fortescue wished to create a Council which combined the functions of the present Cabinet with those of Napoleon's Conseil d'Etat described in these pages, for the Council was to prepare all measures which were to be submitted to Parliament making them ' ripe for their hands.' Sir John's wish to reduce the power usurped by the territorial and clerical magnates and to increase that of the King, for the Nation's good, and his wish to have the national policy and administration controlled by a king, supported by the most eminent experts, was soon to be fulfilled. In 1485 the wise and energetic Henry the Seventh came to the throne. He did not allow the powerful nobility to dominate him or his Council. He governed the country himself, supported by the ablest men of the land. The great Lord Bacon has told us : He was of a high mind and loved his own will, and his own way ; as one that revered himself, and would reign indeed. Had he been a private man he would have been termed proud. But in a wise prince it was but keeping of distance, which indeed he did towards all ; not admitting any near or full approach, either to his power or to his secrets, for he was governed by none. . . . To his council he did refer much and sat oft in person, knowing it to be the way to assist his power and inform his judgment. In which respect also he was fairly patient of liberty, both of advice and of vote, till himself were declared. He kept a straight hand on his nobihty, and chose rather to advance clergymen and lawyers which were more ob- sequious to him, but had less interest in the people, which Great Problems of British Statesmanship 833 made for his absoluteness, but not for his safety. He was not afraid of an able man, as Louis the Eleventh was ; but, contrariwise, he was served by the ablest men that were to be found, without which his affairs could not have pros- pered as they did. Neither did he care how cunning they were that he did employ, for he thought himself to have the master-reach. And as he chose well, so he held them up well. . . . He was a prince, sad, serious, and full of thoughts and secret observations, and full of notes and memorials of his own hand, especially touching persons ; as whom to employ, whom to reward, whom to inquire of, whom to beware of, what were the dependencies, what were the factions, and the like ; keeping, as it were, a journal of his thoughts. King Henry the Seventh, who had found England impoverished and distraught, left to his son, Henry the Eighth, a well-ordered and prosperous country and an overflowing treasury. Henry the Eighth, his son, was only eighteen j^ears old when he succeeded his father, and very naturally he was not able to govern in person through a Council. The Govern- ment was carried on by the King through a Manager, first through Cardinal Wolsey, who raised England's prestige to the highest point by his foreign policy, and afterwards through Thomas Cromwell, who carried through the Refor- mation. Henry's rule was of the greatest benefit to the country. In Professor Pollard's words : Henry the Eighth took the keenest interest from the first in learning and in the navy. ... No small part of his energies was devoted to the task of expanding the Royal authority at the expense of temporal competitors. Wales and its marshes were brought into legal union with the rest of England, and the Council of the North was set up to bring into subjection the extensive jurisdictions of the Northern Earls. ... It was of the highest importance that England should be saved from religious civil war, and it could only be saved by a despotic government. It was necessary for the future development of England that its governmental 334 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War system should be centralised and unified, that the authority of the monarchy should be more firmly extended over Wales and the western and northern borders, and that the still existing feudal franchises should be crushed ; and these objects were worth the price paid in the methods of the Star Chamber and of the Councils of the North and of Wales. Henry's work on the navy requires no apology ; without it Elizabeth's victory over the Spanish Armada, the liberation of the Netherlands, and the development of English Colonies would have been impossible ; and of all others the year 1545 best marks the birth of the English naval power. He had a passion for efficiency, and for the greatness of England and himself. King Ht-nry the Eighth died in 1547, and between that year and 1558 the country was under the rule of the child- king Edward the Sixth and of Queen Mary, Bloody Mary, of painful memory. Under their weak and only nominal rule, England was once more torn by party strife, and at the advent of Queen Elizabeth in 1558 disorganisation and poverty had become great and general. Froude has told us in his History : On all sides the ancient organisation of the country was out of joint. The fortresses from Berwick to Falmouth were half in ruins, dismantled, and ungarrisoned. The Tower was as empty of arms as the Treasury of money. . . . Bare of the very necessaries for self-defence, the Queen found herself with a war upon her hands, with Calais lost, the French in full possession of Scotland, where they were fast transporting an army, and with a rival claimant to her crown, whose right, by the letter of the law, was better than her own. Her position was summed up in an address to the Council as follows : ' The Queen poor ; the realm exhausted ; the nobility poor and decayed ; good captains and soldiers wanting ; the people out of order ; war with France ; the French King bestriding the realm, having one foot in Calais and the other in Scotland ; steadfast enemies, but no steadfast friends.' The Spanish Ambassador, the Conde de Feria, reported shortly after Elizabeth's accession : Great Problems of British Statesmanship 335 ' His Majesty had but to resolve, and he might be master of the situation. . . . The realm is in such a state that we could best negotiate here sword in hand. They have neither money, leaders, nor fortresses.' The position was truly a desperate one. It seemed inevitable that Great Britain would be conquered by France and Spain. To the surprise of the world, Queen Ehzabeth once more created order in the country and made Great Britain more powerful, flourishing, and cultured than she had ever been in the past. She accomplished that mar- vellous feat not through her own genius but through the great ability of Lord Burleigh, the Bismarck of the time. In Froude's words : The wisdom of Elizabeth was the wisdom of her Ministers, and her chief merit lay in allowing her policy to be guided by Lord Burleigh. The golden age of the Tudors was created by three all- powerful Ministers who with heart and soul worked for their country. Both Cardinal Wolsey and Thomas Cromwell governed the country during ten consecutive years, and Lord Burleigh toiled unceasingly on behalf of his Queen during no less than forty years. One-man government exercised through a single responsible and all-powerful Minister raised impoverished and diminished England to the greatest glory. With the death of Queen Ehzabeth in 1603 the hne of Tudor monarchs came to an end. To England's misfortune these able, energetic, wise, and far-seeing rulers were suc- ceeded by the weak, headstrong, capricious, and incapable Stuarts, who never felt at home in England, James the First, Charles the First, Charles the Second, and James the Second. They endeavoured to govern through Court favourites. They brought the Crown into contempt. They were followed by foreigners, by dull and weak monarchs, and the prestige of the Crown declined still further. The capable Wilham the Third, a Dutchman, was suc- ceeded by Queen Anne, the daughter of James the Second, whose husband was a Danish Prince, and at her death, in 836 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War 1714, the Crown was given to George the First, the Elector of Hanover, a grandson of a daughter of James the First. He was installed by the aristocracy, which desired to keep all power in its own hands. George the First, like a Venetian Doge, was to be merely a shadow-king, a puppet of those who had made him. He felt a stranger in England, he never liked the country and the people, he did not know English, he painfully communicated with his Ministers in broken and ungrammatical Latin, and he was told by those who had installed him that his whole duty consisted in wearing his crown, drawing his pay, and saying ditto to his Ministers. According to Coxe's ' Walpole,' the French Ambassador reported to his Government on July 20, 1724, when George the First had been King for ten years : The King, leaving the internal government entirely to Walpole, is more engaged with the German Ministers in regulating the affairs of Hanover than occupied with those of England. ... He has no predilection for the English nation, and never receives in private any English of either sex. . . . He rather considers England as a temporary possession, to be made the most of while it lasts, than as a perpetual inheritance to himself and family. He will have no disputes with the Parliament, but commits the entire transaction of that business to Walpole, choosing rather that the responsibility should fall on the Minister's head than his own. As the foreign King did not preside over the Ministerial Councils, whose proceedings he could not follow owing to his ignorance of Enghsh, the Ministers decided without him in his absence. Thus the present form of Cabinet government arose. George the Second, who had a German consort, felt almost as much a stranger in England as did his father. He did what he was told by his Ministers, whose omni- potence became still more firmly established. He told Chan- cellor Hardwicke ' The Ministers are the King in this country.' The wives of George the Third, George the Fourth, Great Problems of British Statesmanship 337 and William the Fourth also were German Princesses. Monarchy and Government drifted apart. England became an oHgarchy. Her government, as that of Venice, fell into the hands of aristocratic factions which dominated Parha- ment, filled all offices with their relatives and friends, fought one another for place and power, and divided the country against itself. They ruled largely by intrigue and corruption and they desired to enjoy power without responsibility. The Cabinet is a Committee of the Privy Council from which it has sprung. The Act of Settlement of 1700 provided : That from and after the time that the further limitation by this Act shall take effect, all matters and things relating to the well governing of this kingdom, which are properly recognisable in the Privy Council by the laws and customs of this realm, shall be transacted there, and all resolutions taken thereupon shall be signed by such of the Privy Council as shall advise and consent to the same. England's new rulers wished to replace the divine right of kings by the divine right of party leaders. Personal responsibility was felt by the men in power to bo an incon- venience. The paragraph quoted was repealed in 1706. The fiction of the joint responsibility of the Cabinet was created in order to make the responsibility of individual Ministers unascertainable. The British Cabinet Council, like the Venetian Council of Ten, its prototype, sits in secret. Nothing is transacted in writing. No notes are allowed to be taken. No records of the proceedings are kept for the information and guidance of future generations. As in a conspiracy, no traces are left which might help to attribute the responsibility for decisions arrived at to any individuals or enable posterity to discover the reasons why they were taken. Committee government through a Cabinet has proved as improvident, dilatory, inefficient, and wasteful in England as it has in Venice. The British Government was a by- 338 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War word of inefficiency during the rule of the Georges, except in the time of the elder Pitt, the great Lord Chatham. Then it suddenly became most efficient because Pitt's powerful personality absolutely dominated his nominal colleagues. Under his energetic direction England once more enjoyed one-man rule. Pitt converted defeat, humilia- tion, and disorder into efficiency, order, and victory. His ministerial colleagues were his subordinates. Important decisions were taken by an inner Cabinet composed of Pitt, Holderness, and Newcastle. Basil Williams, in his excellent ' Life of William Pitt,' has briefly and correctly described his government as follows : Much as he asked from his subordinates, Pitt gave more himself. He had trained himself for directing campaigns by his military studies, for diplomacy by his industry in acquiring a knowledge of French history and standard works on treaties and negotiations. . . . Where his own knowledge was deficient he was always ready to learn from those better informed. . . . His regular system of intelli- gence from foreign countries was admirably organised. . . . All these advantages — a well-ordered office, his own industry and knowledge, good intelligence — were subservient to the daemonic energy with which he executed his plans. His maxim was that nothing was impossible. When an admiral came to him with a tale that his task was impossible, ' Sir, I walk on impossibilities,' replied Pitt, showing his two gouty crutches, and bade him be off to the impossible task. . . . Pitt's Cabinet, on the whole, worked well with him, for the members rarely ventured to oppose him. Newcastle was cowed and could always be brought to reason by a threat of resignation by Pitt ; Holderness was too devoid of convictions to give much trouble ; the Lord Keeper Henley had not found his feet ; Temple was devoted to his brother-in-law, and not yet jealous ; Anson and Ligonier were really no more than chiefs of the Navy and Army staffs ; Legge was timid ; Halifax, of the Board of Trade, was only admitted on sufferance ; Devonshire and Bedford Great Problems of British Statesmanship 339 took little part ; Hardwicke was kept in order by Granville, who had generally dined and pleased himself with unpalatable truths about his colleagues ; and Mansfield, if he ever had an opinion to express, was reduced to silence by Pitt's withering ' The Chief Justice of England has no opinion to give on this matter.' Pitt made Cabinet government a success by subordinating the Ministers to his imperious will and his vast ability, by not allowing his so-called colleagues to restrain his daemonical energy and his all-embracing genius. To those who have studied EngHsh history at its source it is clear that Great Britain was most progressive, that her government was most efficient, and that her diplomacy and army w^ere most ably handled in the time of the Tudors, of Cromwell, and of the elder Pitt, when she enjoyed the advantages of one-man government. England's experience confirms the views of Eichelieu, Bismarck, Frederick the Great, Napoleon the First, Alexander Hamilton, and of the greatest statesman of antiquity given in these pages. Unfortunately the British Cabinet tends to become from year to year more unwieldy and more inefficient. A friendly and discriminating American critic. Professor Lowell, wrote in his classical book, ' The Government of England ' : The number of members in the Cabinet has varied very much at different times, and of late 3"ears it has shown a marked tendency to increase. . . . The development of the parliamentary system has made it necessary for the Cabinet to have an ever stronger and stronger hold upon the House of Commons ; and, therefore, the different shades of feeling in the party that has a majority in that House must be more and more fully represented in the Cabinet. This alone would tend to increase the number of its members ; but far more important still is the fact that a seat in the Cabinet has become the ambition of all the prominent men ' in Parliament. Consequently the desire to be included is very great, and the disappointment correspondingly acute. For these various reasons there is a constant pressure to 340 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War increase the size of the Cabinet. The result is not without its evils. A score of men cannot discuss and agree on a policy with the same readiness as a dozen. There is more danger of delay when action must be taken. There is a greater probability of long discussions that are inconclusive or result in a weak compromise. There is, in short, all the lack of administrative efficiency which a larger body always presents, unless, indeed, that body is virtually guided and controlled by a small number of its own members. The unwieldiness and inefficiency of British Cabinets are still further increased by a very important factor which Professor Lowell has not m.entioned. The Prime Minister and other influential Ministers who wish to control the national policy through the Cabinet endeavour to strengthen their position by keeping some of the ablest men outside the charmed circle and by introducing into it a number of nonentities, a bodyguard of their own, which increases their influence and voting power and correspondingly diminishes the Cabinet's efficiency. This residuum of nonentities is naturally sometimes fought for by the leading Ministers who wish to secure its support. Lord John Eussell significantly wrote to Lord Lansdowne on May 28, 1854 : ' It seems to me that the presence of many able men in the Cabinet tends to discordance of opinion and indecision.' In the third volume of Morley's * Gladstone ' we read, ' A slight ballast of mediocrity in a Government steadies the ship and makes for unity.' Great Britain is governed by a Cabinet composed of the most eminent party leaders and of those of their followers whom they wish to have near at hand. The management of Army and Navy, the direction of the diplomatic service, &c., are political prizes, are ' spoils of office.' The highest administrative positions have become political perquisites. They are given to men not for their administrative qualifica- tions, but exclusively on account of their political and social influence without any regard to their aptitude. High office is often given to politicians who have had no practical Great Problems of British Statesmanship 341 experience whatever in administration, and sometimes to men who are utterly unfitted for a Ministerial post. No one can faithfully serve several masters. As a politician-minister has probably a business of his own to attend to and must devote much time to party politics in the House of Commons, he can attend only perfunctorily to the business of State. Naturally, disorder, delay, and stagnation in departmental administration is the result. In former ages the national Government was mismanaged by Court favourites. Their place has been taken by party favourite^. The Cabinet is supposed to decide all important questions unanimously. The Army, the Navy, the Diplomatic Service, the national finances, &c., are nominally directed by a single am.ateur, but in important questions each service is directed by the combined wisdom of some twenty amateurs. One of these knows a Httle of the business in hand, and the remaining twenty-one know less. Thus, a party politician, who all his life has done nothing except make speeches, has suddenly to take over the functions of a general, an admiral, a diplomat, an expert on agriculture, an authority on shipping and finance, &c., in rapid succession. To do this efiiciently he must have a greater and more universal genius than was vouchsafed to Napoleon the First or to the elder Pitt. Jack-of-all-trades are masters of none. Napoleon wrote to Berthier on October 24, 1803 : L'experience prouve que le plus grand defaut en admini- stration generale est de vouloir faire trop ; cela conduit a ne point avoir ce dont on a besoin. In former ages when niatters were simple, when the public services were rudimentary, when a few clerks and a door-keeper could handle the business of one of the great Government departments, it was perhaps possible for an amateur to direct successfully a department of State. Now, when the administrative departments have grown to gigantic size, and when the Services have become all-embracing and highly technical, none but great experts can satisfactorily 342 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War manage a great department. Aristotle wrote in the fourth century before Christ : A State requires many assistants and many superin- tendents. . . . We observe that the division of labour greatly facilitates all pursuits, and that each kind of work is best performed when each is allotted to a separate workman. To the complicated affairs of Government this observation is particularly applicable. If a careful division of administrative labour, if Govern- ment by specialists was recognised to be necessary in the tiny Greek City-States 2300 years ago, how much more necessary then is expert government in a modern world- empire of 400,000,000 inhabitants ? Blackstono wrote in the time of Frederick the Great in his celebrated ' Commentaries ' : It is perfectly amazing that there should be no other state of life, no other occupation, art, or science, in which some method of instruction is not looked upon as requisite, except only the science of legislation, the noblest and most difficult of any. Apprenticeships are held necessary to almost every art, commercial or mechanical : a long course of reading and study must form the divine, the physician, and the practical professor of the laws ; but every man of superior fortune thinks himself born a legislator. During the last three centuries British national organisa- tion has progressively deteriorated. Napoleon wrote at St. Helena un mauvais general vaut mieux que deux hons. War is a one-man business. The greatest generals of all time — lack of space prevents giving their opinions in this place — have stated that nothing is more dangerous in w^arfare than to allow military operations to be directed by a mihtary council, by a council of experts. The great War was for a long time directed not by a council of mihtary experts, but by a council of politicians, by the Cabinet. When Mr. Churchill was reproached for the failure Great Problems of British Statesmanship 843 of the Dardanelles Expedition, Mr. Asquith declared in the House of Commons that Mr. Churchill was not to blame, that it had been approved of ' by the Cabinet as a whole,' and the House and the country were perfectly satisfied with that explanation. No one asked whether that expedition had been originated and approved of by the experts ! As long as mihtary operations are jointly directed by a body of amateurs, disaster is more likely to be the result than success. The British Government, as hitherto constituted, is not the organisation of efficiency, but its negation. It is an organisation similar to that which caused the down- fall of Poland. It is the organisation of disorganisation. Amateurs are bound to govern amateurishly, and their insufficiency will be particularly marked if they have to run an unworkable Government machine and are pitted against perfectly organised professionals. The assertion that inefficiency is inseparable from democracy is not true. Democracy means popular control, but popular control need not mean disorganisation. It need not mean government by amateurs. A highly suc- cessful business may have a number of amateur directors, but these will in reality be merely supervisors. The actual management and direction will be left to an expert manager. Similarly, a jury of twelve good men and true does not expound the law, but leaves that technical duty to a single expert, the judge. The fact that democracy and the highest efficiency are compatible is illustrated by the British police, which is at the same time the most democratic, the most efficient, and the least corrupt police force in the world. However, the London police are directed not by a board of politicians, but by a single great expert, who possesses vast powers, and who is controlled by politicians to whom he is personally responsible. Committees are excellent for investigation and deliberation — twenty eyes see more than two — but they are totally unsuitable for decisive and rapid action, especially in the age of railways and telegraphs. Only one man can usefully command a ship. 344 Democracy and the Iron Broo^n of War conduct an orchestra, manage a business, or direct a State, especially in difficult times. The rules of good organisation are simple and few. They demand (1) That a single man of the highest directing ability should be in sole control and should be solely responsible. (2) That he should be supported by a number of expert assistants, and that he should be able to draw either on their individual or their combined advice, according to the nature of the problem before him. (3) That every man should have only one job, and that every man should attend only to his own job. A commercial business directed jointly by twenty-two amateur directors of nominally equal authority, who can only act when they are unanimous, would go bankrupt in a very short time. A business so incompetently organised does no exist. If such an organisation is totally unsuitable for a business where, after all, only a sum of money is at stake, how much more unsuitable then is it for a nation and empire where the existence of 400,000,000 people is at stake ? The British Empire has poured out lives and treasure with- out stint, and the results achieved so far — the action of the Fleet excepted — have been far from encouraging. The return for the gigantic sacrifices made has been totally inadequate. The strength of Great Britain and of the Empire cannot indefinitely be wasted with impunity. The organisation of Great Britain cries for immediate reform. Continuance of organised disorganisation, of haphazard warfare, directed by inexpert committees, may have the gravest consequences to this country. A democracy has a great advantage over a monarchy by being more able to adapt its constitution to changing conditions. The wonderful vitality of Ancient Eome was largely due to its adaptabihty, to the fact that the State had an institution, the Dictatorship, by which the Kepublic could rapidly be converted into a monarchy in time of danger. Machiavelli has told us in his ' Discorsi ' : Great Problems of British Statesmanship 345 Among the institutions of Eome, that of the Dictator- ship deserves our special admiration. The ordinary institu- tions of a Commonwealth work but slowly. No Councillor or magistrate has authority to act alone. In most cases several must agree, and time is required to reconcile their differences. Hesitation is most dangerous in situations which do not brook delay. Hence every republic ought to have some resource upon which it can fall back in time of need. When a republic is not provided with some such safeguard, it will either be ruined by observing its Constitu- tional forms, or it will have to violate them. However, in a republic nothing should be done by irregular methods, for though the irregularity may be useful, it would furnish a pernicious precedent. Every contingency cannot be fore- seen and provided for by law. Hence those republics which cannot in a sudden emergency resort to a Dictator or some similar authority may in time of danger be ruined. The Dictator was originally called Magister populi. According to Dionysius he was nominated by the Senate and approved of by the people. Later on he was appointed by the Consuls, the highest civil authorities, whom he superseded. He was not a high-handed tyrant but a popular leader elected by the representatives of the nation. While the Consuls could act only with the co-operation of the Senate, the Dictator could act on his own responsibility. However, his power was limited. He was appointed only for six months. He had no power over the Treasury, but had to come to the Senate for money. The power of the purse remained with the representatives of the nation. Eome was repeatedly saved from ruin by a Dictator when its Civil Government was unable to deal with the situation. We may learn from Eome's example. A Dictator is wanted. As the Cabinet in its original shape has proved totally unsuitable for conducting a great war, an inner Cabinet of six has been evolved. It remains to be seen whether six can successfully accomplish the work of direction which, accord- ing to the greatest statesmen and the practical experience of all time, should be left to a single man. If the committee 346 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War of six should prove unsatisfactory, the Government should frankly declare its inability to deal efficiently with the situation and ask Parliament, without delay, for power to effect the necessary constitutional changes. The leading politicians themselves must surely recognise that they can- not successfully direct a war. The simplest way of con- centrating control into one hand would obviously consist in increasing the authority of the Prime Minister, making him solely responsible to Parliament for the conduct of the national business in all its branches, making the other Ministers distinctly his subordinates and appointing to the direction of every Department not politicians but the best experts that can be found. Only the Prime Minister should attend Parliament, for ministers cannot at the same time attend to Parliament and their Departments. The greatest administrative experts would undoubtedly furnish a far stronger advisory council to the Prime Minister than a Cabinet of pohticians, however eminent and of whatever party. Statesmanship and party poHtics must be kept strictly apart. The direction of the nation and the lead- ing of the House require totally different qualifications. To enable the Prime Minister to give his undivided atten- tion to national affairs the two offices should be separated by law. Otherwise national affairs will continue to be sub- ordinated to party matters and be perfunctorily attended to for lack of time. In addition, an advisory Council modelled upon Napoleon's Conseil d'Etat, as described in these pages and foreshadowed by Sir John Fortescue in his ' Governance of England,' might be created by resuscitating the moribund Privy Council. The Privy Council might once more become a most valuable institution, a national intelligence depart- ment, for investigating matters, preparing laws, &c. Its ranks should be greatly strengthened. At present it includes too many politicians and society leaders and too few experts. It should be composed of the ablest men in every branch of human knowledge and activity. It is noteworthy that at present science is quite unrepresented on that Council. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 347 Wars are not won by speeches. Tlie province of poli- ticians is speech, that of statesmen action. Men of words are rarely men of action, and men of action rarely men of words. Eichelieu, Cromwell, Frederick, Napoleon, Bismarck, were wretched speakers, and most great speakers, the elder Pitt excepted, wretched statesmen. To entrust the direction of the State to men of words seems as inappro- priate as to entrust a valuable racehorse to a plausible sporting journalist. It is questionable whether another set of amateurs will do better than the present one, for the fault lies chiefly with the system. Government by debating society has proved a failure. It should be abolished before it is too late. The situation seems to call for three reforms : (1) A solely responsible Prime Minister exclu- sively engaged with national business ; (2) the replacing of politician-ministers by the best experts ; (3) the creation of an efficient Privy Council to serve as a national inteUigence department. The traditional organisation of Great Britain is an anachronism and a danger. Every statesman must be convinced of its insufficiency and inaptitude. Happily it can easily be modernised and immensely strengthened. The advantage of democracy, which means popular control over the Government, can easily be combined with an efficient and well-ordered administration carried on by experts. If the national organisation were reformed in the maimer indicated. Great Britain would no longer suffer disappoint- ment after disappointment in war through inexpert direc- tion and divided councils. She would no longer be surprised by events. The AlHes would no longer offer a chiefly passive resistance to Germany's onslaughts. The War would be greatly shortened. Efficiency would be met with efficiency, and greater numbers and resources would rapidly prevail. England's example of reorganisation would no doubt be followed throughout the world. The saying that democracy means improvidence, inefficiency, wastefulness, bungling, amateurishness, and delay would cease to be true. Well- 348 Democracy and the Iron Broom of War organised Great Britain would become an example to democracy throughout the world. The democratic form of government which, in consequence of the War, has lost prestige everywhere, would be rehabilitated and obtain a new lease of life. CHAPTER X HOW AMERICA BECAME A NATION IN ARMS : ^ SOME LESSONS FOR PEACEFUL DEMOCRACIES AND THEIR LEADERS ^ On December 10, 1914, Professor C. K. Webster stated in his inaugural lecture delivered before the University of Liverpool : You will look in vain for the books which can teach Englishmen the connection of their own country with the political life of the Continent during the nineteenth century. Such books cannot be improvised on the spur of the moment in the midst of a national crisis. . . . Few will dispute that the study of our diplomatic history in the past century is of real and immediate importance to-day. Yet the work has scarcely been begun. There is, for example, as yet no adequate record of the part England played in the great reconstruction of Europe after the Napoleonic Wars. . . . Neither Canning nor Palmerston is known to us, except by loose and inadequate records. This statement is exceedingly humiliating. It seems incredible, but unfortunately it is only too true. While the art of vote-catching, called politics, has been assiduously studied in all its branches, the science of statesmanship in the broadest sense of the word, has been completely neglected. The most important of all human sciences is ^ The Nineteenth Century and Alter, September, 1915. ^ The recommendations contained in the following pages have since been adopted. 349 350 How America became a Nation in Arms apparently thought unworthy of study. It is not taught at any of the British Universities, and it is disregarded by those who strive to obtain place and power by way of the ballot-box. Fifty years ago the United States fought a gigantic war, in the course of which they became a nation in arms. Yet there is in the Enghsh language no adequate documentary account of that struggle, from which the Anglo-Saxon democracies may derive the most necessary and the most salutary lessons for their guidance, lessons which should be invaluable to them at the present moment. The fact that the United States introduced conscription during the Civil War is Scarcely known in England. In a lengthy article on conscription in the ' Encyclopaedia Britannica,' an historical and philosophical account of compulsory service in France and Germany is given, but the fact that America introduced conscription is not even mentioned ! Ninety-nine out of every hundred well-edu- cated Enghshmen ignore the means whereby the United States raised millions of soldiers at a time when their popu- lation was very much smaller than that of the United Kingdom is at present. The main facts and the principal documents relating to the American Civil War are buried deeply in the contem- porary journals and in bulky official publications such as the ' Official Eecords of the Union and Confederate Armies ' pubhshed by the American Government between 1880 and 1900, a work which is about five time^ as large as the ' Encyclopaedia Britannica,' but which is practically un- usable because it is merely an inchoate, incoherent, and confusing collection of documents which lacks an index. In the following pages an attempt will be made to rescue the most important facts and documents from oblivion and to deduce from them the principal lessons which they supply to the Anglo-Saxon peoples of both hemispheres for their encouragement and their guidance in the present crisis. The American Civil War began on April 12, 1861, at Great Problems of British Statesmanship 351 4.30 A.M., when the Southern Army commenced the bom- bardment of Fort Sumter, which dominates the mouth of Charleston Harbour, and which was garrisoned by Union troops. In the Southern States secession and rebeUion had been preparing, both secretly and openly, for a long time. Yet the United States Government had neglected making any preparations for the inevitable struggle. Pre- sident Buchanan, who was in office from 1857 to 1861, was well-meaning, scrupulously honest, kindly, but weak. He was deeply rehgious and philanthropical, and he loved peace and his ease. He disliked trouble and wished to leave the settlement of the gravest problem of his country to the next President. Fearing to precipitate the struggle, he made no preparation to meet the crisis, and allowed the Southern forts and arsenals to be seized by the secessionists. Abraham Lincoln had been elected as his successor. He was inaugurated on March 4, 1861, at a moment of the severest tension between North and South, only five weeks before the cannon began to speak. He was a minority President, for the voting at the Presidential contest had been as follows : Lincoln Douglas Breckinridge Bell (Republican Party) (Democratic, non-Interventionist, Party) (Democratic, pro-Slavery, Party) . (Constitutional Union Party) Total . . . . 1,857,610 votes 1,365,976 „ 847,953 „ 590,631 „ 4,662,170 votes As at the Presidential Election of 1912, the largest American party had split in two and had failed to return the President. Only 40 per cent, of the people had voted for Lincoln. His position was one of unexampled difficulty. He was a novice at his office, he had entered it at a moment of the gravest danger, he was quite inexperienced in dealing with national, as distinguished from local affairs, he represented only a minority of the people, and he was surrounded by treason and intrigue. On January 1, 1861, the United States Army was only 16,402 men strong, and of these 1745 352 How America became a Nation in Arms were absent. These few troops were distributed in small parcels all over the gigantic territory of the Union to hold the marauding Indians in check. The Navy had been scattered over distant seas. The arsenals of the North were ill-supplied with arms. Washington, the Federal capital, lay on the border between North and South, within easy reach of the army which the South had collected threateningly close to that city before opening the attack on Fort Suniter. Washington lies on the left bank of the Potomac. It is dominated by the heights on the right bank of that river, and these were in the hands of the insur- gents. On April 12, the day when the bombardment of Fort Sumter began, the following telegram was sent from Montgomery, Alabama, the temporary capital of the Southern States, to all parts of the Union : An immense crowd serenaded President Davis and Secretary [of War] Walker at the Exchange Hotel to-night. The former is not well, and did not appear. Secretary Walker appeared and declined to make a speech, but in a few words of electrical eloquence told the news from Fort Sumter, declaring in conclusion that before many hours the flag of the Confederacy would float over that fortress. No man, he said, could tell where the War this day commenced would end, but he would prophesy that the flag which now flaunts the breeze here would float over the dome of the old Capitol at Washington before the first of May. Let them try Southern Chivalry and test the extent of Southern resources, and it might float eventually over Faneuil Hall [in Boston] itself. Immediately on the outbreak of war the railways and telegraphs around Washington were cut. The city was completely isolated from the outer world. The State of Maryland, to the north of the Federal capital, prevented a few rapidly mobilised Militia troops from New York and Boston reaching the seat of the national Government. Washington was denuded of troops and was hastily barricaded to protect it and the President against a cowp de main. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 353 The gallant South had furnished to the State a dispropor- tionately large number of able officers and of high officials. Local patriotism was exceedingly strong in the Southern States. Hence many of the best military and naval officers and many of the ablest Civil Servants resigned immediately after the outbreak of the Civil War and joined the Southern forces, crippling simultaneously the Army, the Navy, and the national administration in all its branches. On April 20, eight days after the bombardment of Fort Sumter, General Eobert E. Lee, who was considered to be the ablest officer in the United States Service, and who had been offered the active command of the Union Army, resigned his commission to the general consternation of the North, and crossed the border. Altogether 313 commissioned officers resigned and joined the rebellion. According to Moore's ' Rebellion Record,' the Southern States received from the Regular Army the following generals, most of whom resigned their commissions between December 20, 1860, the date when the State of South Carolina seceded, and January 1, 1862 : Generals ......... 8 Lieutenant -Generals ...... 15 Major-Generals . . . . . . ' . 48 Brigadier-Generals . . . . . . .111 The Secretary of War, in his Report of July 1, 1861, stated that ' but for this startling defection the rebellion never could have assumed its formidable proportions.' The guns bombarding Fort Sumter had given the signal for the collapse of the Government. The position which' was created by the outbreak of the rebellion was graphically described by President Lincoln in his message to Congress of May 26, 1862, as follows : The insurrection which is yet existing in the United States and aims at the overthrow of the Federal Constitution and the Union was clandestinely prepared during the winter of 1860 and 1861, and assumed an open organisation in the form of a treasonable provisional Government at Mont- gomery, in Alabama, on the 18th day of February, 1861. 2a 354 How Ainerica became a Nation in Arms On the 12th day of April, 1861, the insurgents committed the flagrant act of Civil War by the bombardment and the capture of Fort Sumter, which cut off the hope of imme- diate conciliation. Immediately afterward all the roads and avenues to this city were obstructed and the capital was put into the condition of a siege. The mails in every direction were stopped, and the lines of telegraph cut off by the insur- gents, and military and naval forces which had been called out by the Government for the defence of Washington were prevented from reaching the city by organised and combined treasonable resistance in the State of Maryland. There was no adequate and effective organisation for the public defence. Congress had indefinitely adjourned. There was no time to convene them. It became necessary for me to choose whether, using only the existing means, agencies, and processes which Congress had provided, I should let the Government fall at once into ruin, or whether, avaihng myself of the broader powers conferred by the Constitution incasesof insurrection, I would make an effort to save it. . . . The leaders of the Secession movement had skilfully chosen the most suitable time for action. They believed that at the critical moment all would be confusion at Wash- ington, that, lacking an adequate army and an experienced leader, the Northern States would not dare to act with vigour, that the new President would hesitate to adopt a course which might lead to civil war, and that, if after all war should break out, they would have numerous auxiliaries. The Southern States had a monopoly in the production of cotton. The leaders of the South believed that the demand for cotton in England and France would put a speedy end to any blockade of the Southern ports which the United States might wish to undertake. They thought that the great Democratic Party of the North, which, if united, was far stronger than the Eepublican Party which had elected Lincoln, would refuse to support the President if he should wish to re-take the Southern forts and arsenals by force. They believed that the industrial North had degenerated and that it would prove an inefficient opponent to the Great Problems of British Statesmanship 355 agricultural South where every man knew how to ride and how to handle a gun. When the South struck its blow for independence there certainly was confusion in Washington and throughout the States of the North. In describing the condition of the country in 1861 the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War reported : ' There was treason in the Executive Man- sion, treason in the Cabinet, treason in the Senate and the House of Eepresentatives, treason in the Army and Navy, treason in every department, bureau and office connected with the Government.' The position of affairs was more fully described in the First Executive Order in Relation to State Prisoners, which was issued on behalf of the President by Mr. Edwin M. Stanton, the Secretary of War, on February 14, 1862. He wrote : The breaking out of a formidable insurrection, based on a conflict of political ideas, being an event without precedent in the United States, was necessarily attended by great confusion and perplexity of the public mind. Disloyalty, before unsuspected, suddenly became bold, and treason astonished the world by bringing at once into the field military forces superior in numbers to the standing army of the United States. Every Department of the Government was paralysed by treason. Defection appeared in the Senate, in the House of Eepresentatives, in the Cabinet, in the Federal Courts ; Ministers and Consuls returned from foreign countries to enter the insurrectionary councils or land or naval forces ; commanding and other officers of the army and in the navy betrayed the councils or deserted their posts for commands in the insurgent forces. Treason was flagrant in the revenue and in the post office service, as well as in the Territorial Governments and in the Indian reserves. Not only Governors, Judges, Legislators, and Ministerial Officers in the States, but even whole States rushed, one after another, with apparent unanimity into rebellion. The capital was besieged and its connection with all the States cut off. 356 How America became a Nation in Arms Even in the portions of the country which were most loyal political combinations and secret societies were formed furthering the work of disunion, while, from motives of disloyalty or cupidity, or from excited passions or perverted sympathies, individuals were found furnish- ing men, money, and materials of war and supplies to the insurgents' miHtary and naval forces. Armies, ships, fortifications, navy yards, arsenals, military posts and gar- risons, one after another, were betrayed or abandoned to the insurgents. Congress had not anticipated, and so had not provided for, the emergency. The municipal authorities were power- less and inactive. The judicial machinery seemed as if it had been designed not to sustain the Government, but to embarrass and betray it. Foreign intervention, openly invited and industriously instigated by the abettors of the insurrection, became imminent, and has only been prevented by the practice of strict and impartial justice with the most perfect moderation in our intercourse with nations. . . . Extraordinary arrests will hereafter be made under the direction of the military authorities alone. At the touch of war all the factors of national str^gth, the Army, the Navy, and the Civil Administration, had broken down. Consternation and confusion were general. At the head of affairs was a quaint and old-fashioned country attorney from the backwoods, possessed of a homely wit and infinite humour, ignorant of national government, surrounded by treason and besieged by a mob of clamorous office-seekers who blocked the ante-rooms and the passages at the White House, sat on the stairs and overflowed into the garden. Congress was not in session. Washington was isolated and threatened. It was questionable whether the two Houses of the Legislature would be able to meet in the Federal Capital. Many people in the North sympathised secretly with the South. Few officials could be trusted. The position was desperate. Everything had broken down except the Constitution. In the hour of the direst need the Great Problems of British Statesmanship 357 American Constitution proved a source of the greatest strengtli and it saved the country. The American Constitution had been planned not by pohticians but by great statesmen and soldiers, by the able and energetic men of action who had fought victoriously against England. They had wisely, and after mature deliberation, concentrated vast powers in the hands of the President, and had given him almost despotic powers in a time of national danger. President Lincoln unhesitatingly made use of these powers. It will appear in the course of these pages that the Southern States were defeated not so much by President Lincoln and the Northern Armies as by the Fathers of the Commonwealth, who in another century had prepared for,^, the use of the President a powerful weapon which would be ready to his hand in the hour of peril. Those who wish to understand the foundations of American statesmanship as laid down by the American nation-builders, should not turn to Lord Bryco's excellent volumes but should go to the fountain-head, to the pages of The Federalist The Federalist was published in a number of letters to the Press for the information of the public in 1787-88, at the time when the American Constitution was being painfully evolved by the Convention and was being discussed by the public. The authors of The Federalist were tlu'oe of the greatest American statesmen — Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, and the lion's share was taken by that great genius, Hamilton. The Federalist was, and is still, the ablest and the most authoritative exposition of the Constitution. It contains the Arcana Bei'puhlicae. It is the American statesman's Bible. It has inspired America's leading men to the present day, and among them Abraham Lincoln. If we wish to understand America's pohcy in the Civil War we shall do well to acquaint ourselves at the outset with some of the most important views contained in The Federalist. The founders of the American Eepublic were democrats 358 How America became a Nation in Arms but not demagogues. They were statesmen who feared the rise of demagogues. It is highly significant that we read in the very first letter of The Federalist : ' History will teach us . . . that of those men who have overturned the liberties of repubhcs, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people ; com- mencing demagogues and ending tyrants.' The Fathers of the American Commonwealth were not sentimentalists but statesmen and men of common sense. They did not believe that an era of universal peace was approaching or was possible, that monarchy meant war and democracy meant peace, that popular government or ' democratic control,' as it is now usually called, would bring about the millen- nium. In the sixth and seventh letters of The Federalist we read : . . . Nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it. . . . . . . There are still to be found visionary or designing men who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace between the States though dismembered and alienated from each other. The genius of republics (say they) is pacific ; the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men. . . . Have republics in practice been less addicted to war than monarchies '? Are not the former administered by men as well as the latter ? Are there not aversions, predilec- tions, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitions that affect nations as well as kings ? Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent pro- pensities ? Is it not well known that their determinations are often governed by a few individuals in whom they place confidence, and are, of course, liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those individuals ? Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the objects of war ? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and enter- prising a passion as that of power or glory ? Have there not been as many wars founded upon commercial motives Great Problems of British Statesmanship 359 ... as were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory or dominion ? Believing that the United States were Hkely to be in- volved in further wars, the founders of the American Eepubhc wished to strengthen the State by making the President powerful and independent, by giving him almost monarchical authority in time of peace and by making him a kind of Dictator in time of war. The United States Constitution states : ' The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the Militia of the several States when called into the active service of the United States.' In time of danger State rights were to disappear, the mihtary independence of the individual States was to come to an end. Unhke the British Prime Minister, the American Presi- dent is free fi'om popular and Parliamentary control. He can at any time repudiate a majority of both Houses. He can veto any act of Congress even if it is supported by large majorities, and he has frequently done so, for he is supposed to act solely in the interests of the nation and in accordance with his own conscience without regard to party majorities and party intrigues. He can place at the head of the Army and Navy any man he chooses, or he can command in person and no one can question his action. His Cabinet, the Secretaries of State, are nominated by him, and they are his subordinates. They are the President's, nor the people's, servants. They have no seat and no voice in Congress. They are supposed to stand, like the President, outside and above party, to be servants of the nation as a whole. The Ministers, like the President, cannot be removed by a chance majority. The President and his Secretaries of State are not so constantly hampered in their actions by the fear of losing popularity and office as are British statesmen. The founders of the Commonwealth gave to the President a vast and truly royal authority because they believed that a national executive could be efficient only if it was strong, and that 860 How America became a Nation in Arms it could be. 'strong only if it was independent of party ties and entrusted to a single man. We read in the thirty- seventhpetter of The Federalist, written by Madison : The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side not only that all power should be derived from the people, but that those entrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the people by a short duration of their appointments ; and that even during this short period the trust should be placed not in a few, but in a number of hands. Stability, on the contrary, requires that the hands in which power is lodged should continue for a length of time the same. A frequent change of men will result from a frequent return of elections, and a frequent change of measures from a frequent change of men, whilst energy in government requires not only a certain duration of power, but the execution of it by a single hand. Hamilton, Jay, Governor Morris, John Adams, and other leading men of the time were so much in favour of a strong executive that they advocated that American Presidents, Hke British Judges, should be appointed for life and should be removable only by impeachment. The doctrine that a Government, to be efficient, requires not many heads but a single head, that a one-man Govern- ment, a strong Government, is valuable at all times, and especially in time of national danger, was more fully developed by Hamilton in the seventieth letter of The Federalist. He wrote : . . . Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks ; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws ; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice ; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Eoman history knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge Great Problems of British Statesmanship 361 in the absolute power of a single man under the formidable title of Dictator. . . . There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples on this head. A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution ; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in prac- tice, a bad government. . . . The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first, unity ; secondly, duration ; thirdly, an adequate provision for its support ; fourthly, competent powers. Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the justice of their views have declared in favour of a single Executive and a numerous legislature. They have, with great propriety, considered energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand ; while they have, with equal propriety, considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges and interests. That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch will generally characterise the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any great number ; and in proportion as the number is increased these qualities will be diminished. Great Britain is ruled by a Cabinet, by a number of men who are nominally equal, and the Prime Minister is their President, he is primus inter 'pares. The British Cabinet Ministers take resolutions collectively and they act, at least in theory, with unanimity. As they act unanimously, there is no individual, but only collective, responsibility for Cabinet decisions. Until recently twenty-two Cabinet Ministers were collectively responsible for every important decision, even if the decision required high expert know- ledge which few, if any, of them possessed, or if it con- cerned only a single Department — such as the Army or 362 How America became a Nation in Arms Navy — with which twenty Ministers out of twenty-two in the Cabinet were quite unacquainted. An anonymous author wrote some years ago of the British Cabinet that it had many heads but no head, many minds but no mind. Government by a crowd is a danger in war time. Hamilton clearly foresaw the weakness and danger of governing by means of a committee of politicians, especially in time of war. His opinion is so interesting, so weighty, and so valuable, and it applies with such force to Cabinet Govern- ment as practised in Great Britain up to the present crisis, that it is worth while to give it in extenso. He stated in the seventieth letter of The Federalist, with regard to government by Cabinet, by means of an executive council : The experience of other nations will afford little instruc- tiyn on this head. As far, however, as it teaches any- thing, it teaches us not to be enamoured of plurality in the Executive. . . . Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any com- mon enterprise or pursuit there is always danger of difference of opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in which they are clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity. From either, and especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissensions are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and operations of those whom they divide. If they should unfortunately assail the supreme executive magis- tracy of a country, consisting of a plurality of persons, they might impede or frustrate the most important measures of the government in the most critical emergencies of the State. And, what is still worse, they might split the com- munity into the most violent and irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the different individuals who com- posed the magistracy. Men often oppose a thing merely because they have had no agency in planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom they dislike. But if they have been consulted and have appeared to disapprove, opposition Great Problems of British Statesmanship 363 then becomes, in their estimation, an indispensable duty of self-love. . . . Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from the somxe just mentioned must necessarily be sub- mitted to in the formation of the legislature ; but it is un- necessary, and therefore unwise, to introduce them into the constituent of the Executive. It is here, too, that they may be most pernicious. In the legislature promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. . . . But no favourable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of dissension in the executive depart- ment. Here they are pure and unmixed. There is no point at which they cease to operate. They serve to em- barrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclu- sion of it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the Executive which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition, vigour and expedition, and this without any counterbalancing good. In the conduct of war, in which the energy of the Executive is the bulwark of the national security, everything would be to be apprehended from its plurality. . . . It must be confessed that these observations apply with principal weight to the first case supposed — that is, to a plurality of magistrates of equal dignity and authority, a scheme, the advocates for which are not likely to form a numerous sect ; but they apply, though not with equal, yet with considerable, weight, to the project of a council, whose concurrence is made constitutionally necessary to the operations of the ostensible Executive. An artful cabal in that council would be able to distract and to enervate the whole system of administration. If no such cabal should exist the mere diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to tincture the exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness and dilatoriness. But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. Responsibility is of two kinds — to censure. 364 How America became a Nation in Arms and to punishment. The first is the more important of the two, especially in an elective office. Man, in a public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or a series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where there are a number of actors, who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable. ' I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in their opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution on the point.' These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true or false. And who is there that will either take the trouble or incur the odium of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs of the transaction ? War is a one-man business. To the founders of the American Eepublic it seemed so essential and so self- evident that only a single hand could direct the Army and Navy efficiently and ' with decision, activity, secrecy and despatch ' that they thought that the paragraph of the Constitution which made the President Commander-in- Chief of both Services was unchallengeable and required neither explanation nor defence. That paragraph is curtly dismissed by Hamilton in the seventy-fourth letter of The Federalist, as follows : The President of the United States is to be ' Commander- in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of Great Problems of British Statesmanship 365 the Militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States.' The propriety of this provi- sion is so evident in itself, and it is, at the same time, so consonant to the precedents of the State constitutions in general, that little need be said to explain or enforce it. Even those of them which have in other respects coupled the chief magistrate with a council have for the most part concentrated the military authority in him alone. Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which dis- tinguish the exercise of power by a single hand. The direc- tion of war implies the direction of the common strength, and the power of directing and employing the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority. War is a one-man business. The maxim that a nation at war should be directed by a single man, not by a council, which the greatest statesmen and soldiers of all times have recognised and which Hamilton and Washington have preached, has sunk deeply into the American mind. Pre- sident Lincoln illustrated the necessity of unity in the direction of national affairs in time of war in his homely and inimitable way. He wrote in his Message to Congress of December 3, 1861 : It has been said that one bad general is better than two good ones, and the saying is true if taken to mean no more than that an army is better directed by a single mind, though inferior, than by two superior ones at variance and cross-purposes with each other. And the same is true in all joint operations wherein those engaged can have none but a common end in view and can differ only as to the choice of means. In a storm at sea no one on board can wish the ship to sink, and yet not infrequently all go down together because too many will direct and no single mind can be allowed to control. President Lincoln, though a great character and a great citizen, can scarcely be called an exceptionally great statesman. He certainly was not brilliant. He 366 How America became a Nation in Arms was endowed with homely common sense and was honest, unprejudiced, industrious, conscientious, fair-minded, pains- taking, patient, warm-hearted, fearless, determined, patriotic, a democrat but by no means a demagogue. He was a model citizen who quietly and resolutely would do his duty, would do his best, and who was not afraid of responsibility if an important decision had to be taken. At the outbreak of the Civil War, when all the factors supporting the Govern- ment's authority had broken down, President Lincoln fell back on the Constitution. He rather relied on its spirit as it appears in TJie Federalist than on its wording, and he did not hesitate to strain his powers to the utmost in order to save the State. On April 15, immediately after, the bombardment and fall of Fort Sumter, he called upon the governors of the individual States to raise 75,000 men of State Mihtia in proportion to their inhabitants and to place them into the service of the United States and under his command. These 75,000 men were called upon to serve only for three months, not because the President or his Cabinet believed that the War would last only ninety days, but because, according to the Act of 1795, the President had authority which permitted ' the use of the Militia so as to be called forth only for thirty days after the com- mencement of the then next session of Congress.' A musty law circumscribed and hampered the President's action but it did not hamper it for long. Very soon it became evident that that preliminary measure was totally insufficient, that energy and novel measures were required to overcome the dangers which threatened the Northern States from without and from within. Eelying on the spirit of the Constitution and on his duty to defend the Union at all costs, President Lincoln, to his eternal honour, did not hesitate to make illegal, but not unscrupulous, use of dictatorial powers. On April 27 he directed General Scott to suspend the privilege of Habeas Corpus, if necessary, in order to be able to deal with treason and with opposition in the Northern States. On May 3 he decreed by procla- Great Problems of British Statesmanship 367 mation that the regular army should be increased by 22,714, or should be more than doubled, and that 18,000 seamen should be added to the Navy. At the same time he called for forty regiments, composed of 42,034 volunteers, to serve during three years. President Lincoln candidly explained the necessity for these high-handed and obviously illegal measures as follows in his Message to Congress of July 4, 1861 : . . . Kecurring to the action of the Government, it may be stated that at first a call was made for 75,000 militia, and rapidly following this a proclamation was issued for closing the ports of the insurrectionary districts by proceed- ings in the nature of blockade. So far all was believed to be strictly legal. At this point the insurrectionists announced their purpose to enter upon the practice of privateering. Other calls were made for volunteers to serve for three years, unless sooner discharged, and also for large additions to the regular army and navy. These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what ap- peared to be a popular demand and a public necessity ; trusting then, as now, that Congress would readily ratify them. It is believed that nothing has been done beyond the constitutional competency of Congress. Soon after the first call for militia it was considered a duty to authorise the commanding general in proper cases, according to his discretion, to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or, in other words, to arrest and detain, without resort to the ordinary processes and forms of law, such individuals as he might deem dangerous to the public safety. This authority has purposely been exercised but very sparingly. Nevertheless, the legality and propriety of what has been done under it are questioned, and the atten- tion of the country has been called to the proposition that one who has sworn to ' take care that the laws be faithfully executed ' should not himself violate them. Of course, some consideration was given to the questions of power and propriety before this matter was acted upon. The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully executed were being resisted and failing of execution in nearly one- 368 How America became a Nation in Arms third of the States, Must they be allowed to finally fail of execution, even had it been perfectly clear that by the use of the means necessary to their execution some single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty that, practically, it relieves more of the guilty than of the innocent, should to a very limited extent be violated ? To state the question more directly, are all the laws but one to be unexecuted and the government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated ? Even in such a case would not the official oath be broken if the government should be overthrown when it was believed that disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it ? But it was not believed that this question was presented. It was not believed that any law was violated. The provision of the Constitution that ' the privilege of the writ of liaheas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it,' is equivalent to a provision — is a provision — that such privilege may be suspended when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does require it. It was decided that we have a case of rebellion, and that the public safety does require the qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ which was authorised to be made. Now it is insisted that Congress, and not the Executive, is vested with this power. But the Constitution itself is silent as to which or who is to exercise the power ; and as the provision was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed the framers of the instrument intended that in every case the danger should run its course until Congress could be called together, the very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by the rebellion. Democracy loves strength, loves plain speaking, loves a man. The President's energetic though high-handed and unconstitutional action was enthusiastically approved by the people throughout the loyal States, and was later on legalised by Congress by means of a resolution. At the beginning of the war the Northern^States^were almost unarmed. The Government had completely neg- lected the Army and Navy. In the country was only a Great Problems of British Statesmanship 369 scanty supply of arms and ammunition. Under Buchanan's presidency an incapable, if not a treacherous, Secretary of War, who later on joined the Southern forces, had allowed large numbers of arms to be removed from arsenals in the North to arsenals in the Southern States, where they were seized by the Secessionists. For the supply of muskets the Government depended chiefly on the Springfield Armoury, and upon that at Harper's Ferry. The capacity of the pri- vate manufacturers was only a few thousand muskets a year, and after the destruction of the arsenal and armoury at Harper's Ferry on April 19, 1861, which contained 15,000 muskets, and which otherwise might have fallen into the hands of the Confederates, the resources of the Government were seriously diminished. The want of arms limited the call of the President on April 15 to 75,000 men, and many regiments were detained for a long time in their camps in the different States until muskets could be imported from Europe. Orders for weapons were hastily sent abroad, and many inferior arms were imported at high prices. The Springfield Armoury, the capacity of which was only about 25,000 muskets per year, was rapidly enlarged, and its production, assisted by outside machine shops, was brought up to about 8000 muskets per month at the end of 1861, and to about 15,000 per month shortly afterwards. The United States had to pay for their neglect of military preparations in the past. Everything had laboriously to be created. Meanwhile confusion was general. The Army which had been collected was merely a mob of ill-armed men. During 1861 the State of Indiana, for instance, had raised and sent into the field in round numbers 60,000 men, of whom 53,500 were infantry. The statement shown in the table on page 370, taken from * Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia,' shows what arms they received during the year. In their need, anything that had a barrel was used to arm their troops. The Southern States even fell back upon shot-guns and ancient fowling-pieces. Gradually order was evolved out of chaos. The inborn energy and talent for 2 R 370 How America became a Nation in Arms organisation of the race asserted themselves. The North was far superior to the South in population, wealth, machinery, and apphances of every kind. In the course of time a large, well-organised, and well-equipped army arose. At the beginning of 1862 the Southern States were threatened with invasion by large armies. A great forward movement of the Northern forces was ordered to begin on February 22, and rapid progress was being made. Forts Henry and Donelson were rapidly captured from the rebels, Bowhng Green and Columbus had to be evacuated, and Muskets and Rifles. Prussian miiskets United States rifles Padrci rifles Belgian rifles New percussion muskets Altered percussion muskets Long-range rifles . Springfield rifles . Short Enfields . Long Enfields Saxony rifles Austrian rifles, -54 cal. Mississippi rifles, -54 cal. 4,006 3.290 5,000 057 7,299 8,800 600 1,830 960 13,898 1,000 3,822 362 Nashville surrendered. Tlie entire line of defence formed by the Southern States towards the west was swept away, and a march by the Northern troops into the heart of the South-western States seemed imminent. Consternation seized upon the Southern people. The Southern Army of 1861 was composed chiefly of volunteers who had enhsted for twelve months. The voluntary system had yielded all it could yield. It became clear that the Southern States could not successfully be defended by volunteers against the North, that national and compulsory service was needed. The Southern Government was aroused to action, and with- out hesitation President Jefferson Davis sent a message to the Confederate Congress, in which he laid down that it was the duty of all citizens to defend the State, and in which he demanded the introduction of conscription for all men Great Problems of British Statesmanship 371 between eighteen and thirty-five years. This most important document was worded as follows : To the Senate and Rouse of Beyresentatives of the Confederate States The operation of the various laws now in force for raising armies has exhibited the necessity for reform. The frequent changes and amendments which have been made have rendered the system so complicated as to make it often quite difficult to determine what the law really is, and to what extent prior amendments are modified by more recent legislation. There is also embarrassment from conflict between State and Confederate legislation. I am happy to assure you of the entire harmony of purpose and cordiality of feeling which has continued to exist between myself and the executives of the several States ; and it is to this cause that our success in keeping adequate forces in the field is to be attributed. These reasons would suffice for inviting your earnest attention to the necessity of some simple and general system for exercising the power of raising armies which is vested in Congress by the Constitution. But there is another and more important consideration. The vast preparations made by the enemy for a combined assault at numerous points on our frontier and seaboard have produced results that might have been expected. They have animated the people with a spirit of resistance so general, so resolute, and so self-sacrificing that it requires rather to be regulated than to be stimulated. The right of the State to demand and the duty of each citizen to render military service need only to be stated to be admitted. It is not, however, a wise or judicious policy to place in active service that portion of the force of a people which experience has shown to be necessary as a reserve. Youths under the age of eighteen years require further instruction ; men of matured experience are needed for maintaining order and good government at home, and in supervising preparations for rendering efficient the armies in the field. These two 372 How America became a Nation in Arms classes constitute the proper reserve for home defence, ready- to be called out in case of any emergency, and to be kept in the field only while the emergency exists. But in order to maintain this reserve intact it is neces- sary that in a great war like that in which we are now engaged all persons of intermediate ages not legally exempt for good cause should pay their debt of military service to the country, that the burdens should not fall exclusively on the ardent and patriotic. I therefore recommend the passage of a law declaring that all persons residing within the Confederate States between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five years, and rightfully subject to military duty, shall be held to be in the military service of the Confederate States, and that some plain and simple method be adopted for their prompt enrolment and organisation, repealing all of the legislation heretofore enacted which would conflict with the system proposed. It will be noticed that President Jefferson Davis demanded not only conscription, but practically the total surrender of State rights. He wished the confederation of Southern States to fight like a single State, recognising that concen- tration increases strength. A Conscription Act was rapidly passed on x\pril 16, 1862. As conscription for all men from eighteen to thirty-five years did not sufiice to fill the depleted ranks of the Southern Army, it was made more rigorous. An order by Brigadier- General John H. Winder dated August 1, 1862, stated : The obtaining of substitutes through the medium of agents is strictly forbidden. When such agents are employed, the principal, the substitute, and the agent will be impressed into the military service, and the money paid for the sub- stitute, and as a reward to the agent, will be confiscated to the Government. The offender will also be subjected to such other imprisonment as may be imposed by a court martial. As desertion from the ranks had weakened the Southern Army, the Press appealed to the citizens of the^South to Great Probleins of British Statesmanship 378 assist in the apprehension of deserters and stragglers. All men and women in the country were exhorted to ' pursue, shame and drive back to the ranks those who have deserted their colours and their comrades and turned their backs upon their country's service.' Still further exertions were required to prevent the Northern troops invading the Southern States in force. Hence, in September 1862, the Confederate Congress passed another Act of Conscription which called out for military service all men between the ages of thirty-five and forty-five. The most important part of this Act was worded as follows : An Act to amend an Act entitled 'An Act to provide further for the Public Defence,'' approved April 16, 1862. The Congress of the Confederate States of America do enact That the President be and he is hereby authorised to call out and place in the military service of the Confederate States for three years, unless the war shall have been sooner ended, all white men who are residents of the Confederate States between the ages of thirty-five and forty-five years at the time the call or calls may be made, and who are not at such time or times legally exempted from military service ; or such part or parts thereof as, in his judgment, may be necessary to the public defence, such call or calls to be made under the provisions and according to the terms of the Act to which this is an amendment ; and such authority shall exist in the President during the present war as to all persons who now are or may hereafter become eighteen years of age ; and when once enrolled all persons between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years shall serve their full time. Years of fighting reduced the ranks of the Southern armies. They could hold their own against the over- whelming numbers of the North only by extending the age limit of compulsory military service still further, by making conscription still more rigorous. In February 1864 a general mihtary Act waS passed which enrolled all 374 How America became a Nation in Arms white men fi'om seventeen to fifty years in the Army. It stated : 1. That all white men, residents of the Confederate States, between the ages of seventeen and fifty shall be in the military service of the Confederate States during the war. 2. That all between the ages of eighteen and forty-five now in service shall be retained during the present war in the same organisations in which they were serving at the passage of this Act, unless they are regularly discharged or transferred. ... 4. That no person shall be relieved from the operation of this Act by reason of having been discharged where no disability now exists, nor by reason of having furnished a substitute ; but no person who has heretofore been exempted on account of religious opinions and paid the required tax, shall be required to render military service. 5. That all between seventeen and eighteen years and forty-five and fifty years of age shall form a reserve corps, not to serve out of the State in which they reside. . . . 7. That any person of the last-named failing to attend at the place of rendezvous within thirty days, as required by the President, without a sufficient reason, shall be made to serve in the field during the war. The American Civil War had begun in April 1861. At its commencement the people in the North had believed that, owing to their overwhelming superiority in numbers, in wealth, and in resources of every kind, they would be able to subdue the insurgent States by armies raised on the voluntary principle within a reasonable time. However, the war dragged on interminably. Enthusiasm for volun- teering diminished, men became cool and indifferent. Owing to the reduced number of workers wages rose very greatly throughout the Union, and men turned rather to the factory than to the Army. Week by week the expenditure in blood and treasure increased. At last the people in the North began to see the necessity of abandoning the voluntary Great Problems of British Statesmanship 375 system and of imitating the Southern States by introducing compulsory service. It will be of interest to see the way in which public opinion veered round. In his Eeport of March 17, 1866, the Provost-Marshal-General James B. Fry, the head of the great Eecruiting Department of the Northern armies, described this change in opinion under the heading ' Pubhc Recognition of the Necessity of a General Conscrip- tion,' as follows : During the latter part of 1862 the necessity for a radical change in the method of raising troops in order to prosecute the war to a successful issue became more and more apparent. The demand for reinforcements from the various armies in the field steadily and largely exceeded the current supply of men. The old agencies for filling the ranks proved more and more ineffective. It was evident that the efforts of the Government for the suppression of the rebellion would fail without resort to the unpopular, but nevertheless truly republican, measure of conscription. The national authori- ties, no less than the purest and wisest minds in Congress, and intelligent and patriotic citizens throughout the country, perceived that, besides a more reliable, regular, and abundant supply of men, other substantial benefits would be derived from the adoption and enforcement of the principle that every citizen, not incapacitated by physical or mental disability, owes military service to the country in the hour of extremity. It would effectually do away with the unjust and burdensome disproportion in the number of men furnished by different States and localities. But it was not easy to convince the public mind at once of the justice and wisdom of conscription. It was a novelty, contrary to the traditional military policy of the nation. The people had become more accustomed to the enjoyment of privileges than to the fulfilment of duties under the General Government, and hence beheld the prospect of compulsory service in the Army with an unreasonable dread. Among the labouring classes especially it produced great uneasiness. Fortunately the loyal pohtical leaders and Press early realised the urgency of conscription, and by judicious agitation gradually reconciled the pubhc to it. ^76 How America became a Nation in Arms When the enrolment Act was introduced m Congress in the following winter the patriotic people of the North were willing to see it become a law. Early in 1863 the Bill introducing conscription was placed before Congress at Washington, and was discussed by both Houses. The debates were brief and the speeches delivered are most interesting and enlightening at the present moment, when the principle of conscription is still discussed not only in Great Britain but throughout the British Empire. Let us listen to the principal arguments in favour of conscription. Mr. Dunn, representative of Indiana, urged the necessity of conscription in the following words ; The necessity is upon us to pass a Bill of this character. We have many regiments in the field greatly reduced in numbers. ... It is due to the gallant men remaining in these regiments that their numbers should be promptly hlled up. This cannot be done by voluntary enhstment, on account of the influence of just such speeches as are made here and elsewhere denouncing the war ; many make a clamour against the war as an excuse for not volunteering. Moreover, a draft is the cheapest, fairest, and best mode of raising troops. It is to be regretted this mode was not adopted at first. Then all would have shared alike in the perils and glories of the war. Every family would have been represented in the field, and every soldier would have had sympathy and support from his friends at home. The passage of this Bill will give evidence to the rebels that the nation is summoning all its energies to the conihct, and it will be proof to foreign nations that we are prepared to meet promptly any intermeddling in our domestic strife. The Government lias a right in war to command the services of its citizens, whom it protects in war as well as in peace. We, as legislators, must not shrink from the discharge of our high responsibility. Mr. Thomas, Eepresentative of Massachusetts, stated : For the last six or nine months a whole party — a strong party — has deliberately entered into a combination to dis- Great Problems of British Statesmanship 377 courage, to prevent, and as far as in it lay to prohibit, the volunteering of the people of the country as soldiers in our army. Members of that party have gone from house to house, from town to town, and from city to city urging their brethren not to enlist in the armies of the nation, and giving them all sorts of reasons for that advice. . . . Mr. Speaker, this is a terrible Bill ; terrible in the powers it confers upon the executive, terrible in the duty and burden it imposes upon the citizen. I meet the suggestion by one as obvious and cogent, and that is that the exigency is a terrible one and calls for all the powers with which the Government is invested. . . . The powers of Congress, within the scope of the Constitu- tion, are supreme and strike directly to the subject and hold him in its firm, its iron grasp. I repeat what at an early day I asserted upon this floor, that there is not a human being within the territory of the United States, black or white, bond or free, whom this Government is not capable of taking in its right hand and using for its mihtary service whenever the defence of the country requires, and of this Congress alone must judge. The question of use is a question of policy only. ... It is, in effect, a question to this nation of life or death. We literally have no choice. Mr. Wilson, Senator for Massachusetts, said : We are now engaged in a gigantic struggle for the pre- servation of the life of the nation. ... If we mean to main- tain the supremacy of the Constitution and the laws, if we mean to preserve the unity of the Eepublic, if we mean that America shall live and have a position and name among the nations, we must fill the broken and thinned ranks of our wasted battalions. The issue is now clearly represented to the country for the acceptance or rejection of the American people : an inglorious peace with a dismembered Union and a broken nation, on the one hand, or war fought out until the rebellion is crushed beneath its iron heel. Patriotism accepts the bloody issues of war, rather than peace purchased with the dismemberment of the Republic and the death of the nation. If we accept peace, disunion, death, then we may speedily 378 How America became a Nation in Arms summon home again our armies ; if we accept war, until the flag of the Eepubhc waves over every foot of our united country, then we must see to it that the ranks of our armies, broken by toil, disease, and death, are filled again with the ' health and vigour of life. To fill the thinned ranks of our battalions we must again call upon the people. The im- mense numbers already summoned to the field, the scarcity and high rewards of labour, press upon all of us the convic- tion that the ranks of our wasted regiments cannot be filled again by the old system of volunteering. If volunteers will not respond to the call of the country, then we must resort to the involuntary system. . . . Senator MacDougall of California stated : I regretted much, when the war was first organised, that the conscription rule did not obtain. I went from the ex- treme east to the extreme west of the loyal States. I found some districts where some bold leaders brought out all the young men and sent them or led them to the field. In other districts, and they were the most numerous, the people made no movement towards the maintenance of the war ; there were whole towns and cities, I may say, where no one volun- teered to shoulder a musket and no one offered to lead them into the service. The whole business has been unequal and wrong from the first. The rule of conscription should have been the rule to bring out men of all classes and make it equal throughout the country. . . . Mr. Sargent, Eepresentative of California, said : For a want of a general enrolment of the forces of the United States and a systematic calling out of those forces, we have experienced all the inconveniences of a volunteer system, with its enormous expense, ill discipline and irregular efforts, and have depended upon spasmodic efforts of the people, elated or depressed by the varying fortunes of war or the rise or fall of popular favourites in the Army. I believe I hazard nothing in saying that we should have lost fewer men in the field and from disease and been much nearer the end of this destructive war had we earlier availed Great Problems of British Statesmanship 379 ourselves of the power conferred by the Constitution and at last proposed to be adopted by this Bill. For short and irregular efforts no force can be better than a volunteer army. With brave and skilful officers and a short and active term of service, volunteer troops are highly efficient. But when a war is to last for years, as this will have done, how- ever soon we may see its termination, it must depend for its success upon regular and systematic forces. . . . Such filling up is not possible to any degree under the volunteer system, as the Government has had occasion to know in this war. . . . The practical operation of the volunteer system has been that the earnest lovers of the country among the people, the haters of the rebellion, the noblest and best of our citizens, have left their homes to engage in this war to sustain the Constitution ; while the enemies of civil liberty, those who hate the Government and desire its failure in this struggle, have stayed at home to embarrass it by discontent and clamour. By this system we have had the loyal States drained of those who could be relied upon in all political con- tests to sustain the Government ; going forth to light the manly foe in front, the covert foe left behind has opened a fire in the rear. Under the garb of democracy, a name that has been so defiled and prostituted that it has become synony- mous with treason and should henceforth be a byword and hissing to the American people, these demagogues in this hall and out of it have traduced the Government, misrepresented the motives of loyal men. . . . The Bill goes upon the pre- sumption that every citizen not incapacitated by physical or mental disabihty owes military service to the country in its hour of extremity, and that it is honourable and praise- worthy to render such service. The views given fairly sum up the opinion held by the majority of the American people in the North and by that of their representatives at Washington who passed the Conscrip- tion Act without undue delay against a rather substantial minority. The principal provisions of the Act of March 3, 1863, establishing compulsory military service and exempt- ing certain citizens, furnish so valuable and so interesting 380 How America became a Nation in Arms a precedent to the fighting democracies that it is^worth while giving them in this place. We read in the Act : Be it enacted hy the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of Aynerica in Congress assembled : That all able-bodied male citizens of the United States, and per- sons of foreign birth who shall have declared on oath their intention to become citizens under and in pursuance of the laws thereof, between the ages of twenty and forty-five years, except as hereinafter excepted, are hereby declared to constitute the national forces, and shall be liable to perform military duty in the service of the United States when called out by the President for that purpose. Section 2. And be it further enacted : That the following persons be and they are hereby excepted and exempt from the provisions of this Act, and shall not be liable to military duty under the same, to wit : Such as are rejected as physi- cally or mentally unfit for the service ; also, first, the Vice- President of the United States, the heads of the various Executive Departments of the Government, and the Gover- nors of the several States. Second, the only son liable to mihtary duty of a widow dependent upon his labour for support. Third, the only son of aged or infirm parent or parents dependent upon his labour for support. Fourth, where there are two or more sons of aged or infirm parents subject to the draft, the father, or if he be dead the mother, may elect which son shall be exempt. Fifth, the only brother of children not twelve years old, having neither father nor mother dependent upon his labour for support. Sixth, the father of motherless children under twelve years of age dependent upon his labour for support. Seventh, where there are a father and sons in the military service of the United States as non-commissioned officers, musicians, or privates, the residue of such family and household, not exceeding two, shall be exempt. And no person but such as herein excepted shall be exempt. Provided, however, that no person who has been convicted of any felony shall be emolled or permitted to serve in said forces. In each district a Provost-Marshal, acting under the Provost-Marshal-General, an examining surgeon, and a Great Problems of British Statesmanship 381 commissioner constituted the Board of Enrolment. The enrolHng officers were directed to enrol all able-bodied per- sons within the prescribed ages and to judge of age by the best evidence they could obtain. They were required to make two classes in their returns, the first of all men between twenty and thirty-five years, and the second of all between thirty-five and forty-five years. If we wish to learn how the Conscription Act worked in the unruly North, where an enormous percentage of the population liable to military service consisted of immigrant foreigners who often were ill- acquainted with the English language, we should turn to the Eeport which the Provost-Marshal-General made to the Secretary of War on March 17, 1866. We read : The Act of Congress creating the office of Provost-Mar- shal-General was approved March 3, 1863. I was appointed to it March 17, 1863. Within a few weeks from that date the network of organi- sation adopted under the law was extended over the loyal States and the counties and towns of the same, and the principal duties of the Bureau [the Provost-Marshal- General's], to wit, the arrest of deserters, the enrolment of the national forces for draft, and the enlistment of volun- teers had been commenced. When the Bureau was put in operation the strength of the Army was deemed inadequate for offensive operations. Nearly 400,000 recruits were required to bring the regiments and companies then in service up to the legal and necessary standard. Disaster had been succeeded by inactivity, and the safety of the country depended on speedy and continued reinforcement of the Army. The insufficiency of the system of recruitment previously pursued had been demonstrated, and the Army was diminishing by the ordinary casualties of war, but more rapidly by the expiration of the terms for which the troops had engaged to serve. To meet the emer- gency a new system of recruitment was inaugurated. The General Government, through this Bureau, assumed direct control of the business which had heretofore been transacted mainly by the State Governments. . . . 382 How America became a Nation in Arms The following is a condensed summary of the results of the operations of this Bureau from its organisation to the close of the war : (1) By means of a full and exact enrolment of all persons liable to conscription under the law of March 3, and its amendments, a complete exhibit of the military resources of the loyal States in men was made, showing an aggregate number of 2,254,063 men, not including 1,000,516 soldiers actually under arms wdien hostilities ceased. (2) 1,120,621 men were raised at an average cost (on account of recruitment exclusive of bounties) of 9*84 dols. per man ; while the cost of recruiting the 1,356,593 raised prior to the organisation of the Bureau was 34-01 dols. per man. A saving of over 70 cents on the dollar in the cost of raising troops was thus effected under this Bureau, not- withstanding the increase in the price of subsistence, trans- portation, rents, &c., during the last two years of the war. (3) 76,526 deserters were arrested and returned to the Army. The vigilance and energy of the officers of the Bureau in this branch of business put an effectual check to the wide- spread evil of desertion, which at one time impaired so seri- ously the numerical strength and efficiency of the Army. (4) The quotas of men furnished by the various parts of the country were equalised and a proportionate share of military service secured from each, thus removing the very serious inequality of recruitment which had arisen during the first two years of the war, and which, when the Bureau was organised, had become an almost insuperable obstacle to further progress in raising troops. . . . The introduction of compulsion acted as a powerful stimulus to voluntary enlistment throughout the Union,^ and, in consequence of this revival of voluntary enlistment, the number of men compulsorily enlisted was not as great as it might have been, especially as the compulsory system was not exploited to the full. Only a comparativelymoderate number of those who by law were declared to be liable for ^ This was due to the fact that the individual States vied with one another to fill their quota so as to make compulsion unnecessary. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 383 military service were called upon to join the Army, On the other hand, the moral effect of the passing of the Con- scription Act was very far-reaching and salutary. The Provost-Marshal-General's Eeport stated : The historian who would trace accomplished results to theirtrue and genuine causes must assign to the law constitut- ing this Bureau a most important place among the agencies by which the great work of restoring the national authority has been so happily accomplished. The true turning-point of the War was reached when the first ' draft wheel ' began to revolve, under the provisions of the Act of March 3, 1863. The general effect of this law throughout the country has been highly favourable to loyalty. No one department has brought its operations so directly and closely home to the people, or has given such a feeling of security, such a confidence in and such assurance of the. power of the Govern- ment to preserve itself, conquer its enemies, and protect all its citizens. Next to the success of its arms, the ability of the Government to bring men into the field at its call, and the manner in which it has been done by this Bureau in the execution of the ' enrolment act,' in spite of innum- erable and apparently insuperable difficulties, has best de- monstrated that power. The Conscription Act of 1863 was a most beneficial measure, but it had several grave defects. It failed to place upon the men liable for military service the duty of coming forward without delay. Hence the Government had to search them out. The Official Eeport tells us : Instead of endeavouring to search out and hunt up every person liable to military service through the agency of a vast multitude of petty enrolling officers, upon whose capa- city and fidelity it is not possible in all cases to rely, I think the Government should impose its supreme demands directly upon the people themselves, and require them, under the sternest penalties, to report themselves for enrolment. If the Government has a right to the military service of its citizens in times of public peril, rebellion, and war, it 384 Ho'w America became a Nation in Arms has a right to secure such services in the simplest, cheapest, and most direct manner. Enrolled men whose names had been drawn from the wheel for service and who failed to obey the call were liable to the extreme penalty, for the Provost-Marshal-General pubhshed the following opinion of the Solicitor of the War Department to all concerned : When a person has been drafted in pursuance of the Enrolment Act of March 3, 1863, notice of such draft must be served within ten days thereafter, by a written or printed notice, to be served on him personally, or by leaving a copy at his last place of residence, requiring him to appear at a designated rendezvous to report for duty. Any person failing to report for duty after notice left at his last place of residence or served on him personally without furnishing a substitute or paying 300 dols., is pronounced by law to be a deserter ; he may be arrested and held for trial by court- martial and sentenced to death. If a person, after being drafted and before receiving the notice, deserts, it may still be served by leaving it at his last place of residence, and if he does not appear in accordance with the notice, or furnish the substitute, or pay the 300 dols., he will be in law a deser- ter, and must be punished accordingly. There is no way or manner in which a person once enrolled can escape his public duties, when drafted, whether present or absent, whether he changes his residence or absconds ; the rights of the United States against him are secured, and it is only by performance of his duty to the country that he will escape hability to be treated as a criminal. Deserters were proceeded against with great energy. Death sentences for desertion were not infrequent, but in many cases they were commuted. Still, from the table given later on it appears that 261 soldiers of the Northern Army were executed. Among these were a good many deserters. The Union Government had made the unfortunate mistake of allowing men who had been enrolled as liable Great Problems of British Statesmanship 385 for military duty and who had afterwards been * drafted ' for service to escape their duties by the undemocratic expedient of finding a substitute or of paying $300. That provision was naturally much resented by the poorer classes, and especially by alien immigrants in the large towns. The Opposition made the utmost use of their opportunity, denounced the Government, and incited the masses to resistance. The Provost-Marshal-General's Report tells us that the people were incited against the Government * by the machinations of a few disloyal political leaders, aided by the treasonable utterances of corrupt and profli- gate newspapers . . . by a steady stream of political poison and arrant treason.' While the Government was obeyed in the country, these incitements led to sanguinary riots among the worst alien elements in several towns, especially in New York, Boston, and Troy. A large part of New York was during several days devastated by the mob, and the suppression of the rising cost more than 1000 lives. When order had been re-established Mr. Horatio Seymour, the Governor of New York, expressed doubt whether con- scription was constitutionally permissible, and asked Presi- dent Lincoln to obtain a judicial decision on that point. The President replied on August 7 : . . . We are contending with an enemy who, as I under- stand, drives every able-bodied man he can reach into his ranks, very much as a butcher drives bullocks into a slaugh- ter-pen. No time is wasted, no argument is used. This produces an army which will soon turn upon our now victorious soldiers already in the field, if they shall not be sustained by recruits as they should be. It produces an army with a rapidity not to be matched on our side, if we first waste time to re-experiment with the voluntary system, already deemed by Congress, and palpably in fact, so far exhausted as to be inadequate ; and then more time to ob- tain a court decision as to whether the law is constitutional which requires a part of those not now in the service to go to the aid of those who are already in it, and still more 2 c 386 How America became a Nation in Arms time to determine with absolute certainty that we get those who are to go in the precisely legal proportion to those who are not to go. My purpose is to be in my action just and constitutional, and yet practical, in performing the important duty with which I am charged — of maintaining the unity and the free principles of our common country. Shortly afterwards conscription was enforced through- out New York with the energetic assistance of Governor Seymour, who clearly recognised the pertinence of the Presi- dent's arguments. Let us now consider the principal facts and figures relat- ing to the Civil War. It began on April 12, 1861, with the bombardment of Fort Sumter ; it ended on April 9, 1865, with the surrender of General Lee and his army to General Grant at Appomat- tox Court House. Except for three days the war lasted exactly four years. The history of the Civil War is at the same time inspiring and humiliating. It is inspiring because of the patriotism, the heroism, the ability, and the resourcefulness which were displayed by both combatants. Both showed that it was possible to improvise huge and powerful armies. It is deeply humiliating because the Civil War is a gigantic monument of democratic improvidence and of unreadiness, of governmental short-sightedness, and of criminal waste, of bungling, and of muddle. The North possessed so overwhelming a superiority in population and in resources of every kind, and had had so ample a warning of the threatening danger long before the trouble began, that the war would probably never have broken out had the Northern statesmen exercised in time some ordinary foresight and caution, as they easily might have done and as they ought to have done. If some precautions had been taken, and if, nevertheless, the Southern States had revolted, their subjection might have been effected within a few months at a comparatively trifling expenditure of blood and treasure. How crushing the numerical superiority Great Problems of British Statesmanship 387 of the North was over the South will be seen from the Census figures of 1860, which supply the following picture : American Population in 1860. Population of Northern and Western States . 22,339,978 White Population of Southern States . 5,449,463 Coloured „ „ „ „ . 3,653,880 9,103,343 Total 31,443,321 If we compare the total population of the antagonists, it appears that the North had twenty-five inhabitants to every ten in the South, both white and coloured. However, as the Southern negroes did not furnish soldiers during the war, we must deduct their number. Thus we find that for every ten possible combatants in the South there were no fewer than forty in the North. In 1860 the Northern States had two-and-a-half times as many inhabitants and four times as many men able to bear arms as had the Southern States. In addition, the Northern States possessed infinitely greater wealth, and infinitely greater resources of every kind, than did their opponents. James Ford Ehodes, in his excellent ' History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850,' briefly and correctly compared their position as follows : The Union had much greater wealth, was a country of a complex civilisation, and boasted of its varied industries ; it combined the farm, the shop, and the factory. The Confederacy was but a farm, dependent on Europe and on the North for everything but bread and meat, and before the war for much of those. The North had the money market, and could borrow with greater ease than the South. It was the iron age. The North had done much to develop its wealth of iron, that potent aid of civilisation, that necessity of war ; the South had scarcely touched its own mineral resources. In nearly every Northern regiment were me- chanics of all kinds and men of business training accustomed to system, while the Southern army was made up of gentle- men and poor whites, splendid fighters of rare courage and 388 How America became a Nation in Arms striking devotion, but as a whole inferior in education and in a knowledge of the arts and appliances of modern life to the men of the North. The Union had the advantage of the regular Army and Navy, of the flag, and of the prestige and machinery of the national Government ; the Ministers from foreign countries were accredited to the United States ; the archives of what had been the common Government were also in the possession of the Union. . . . From the official statistics available it appears that the wealth of the Union was in 1860 about fifteen times as great as that of the Southern States, which were merely producers of food and raw materials. In the course of the war the economic supremacy of the North increased very greatly, for while the manufacturing power of the Northern States expanded rapidly, the economic position of the Southern States deteriorated continually. Northern warships blockaded the coast of the South, and the Southerners could neither sell their staple products — especially cotton and tobacco — nor import the machines, weapons, and manufactures of every kind which they needed. While the North was self-supporting and could freely import from abroad all it required, the South was thrown on its own resources, and before long the people lacked even the most essential things. Hence their sufferings were terrible, while the people in the North lived in relative comfort and affluence. The people, both in the South and in the North, made a most gigantic military effort. The Secretary of War laid before Congress information from which it appeared that the Northern States furnished altogether the gigantic number of 2,653,062 soldiers. If this colossal aggregate is reduced to a three -years' standard, they furnished no less than 2,129,041 men. If we compare this figure with the totarpopulation of the Northern States given above, we find that the North sent to the army 10 per cent, of the total population. The official figures relating toHhe mili- tary effort of the South are incomplete and not reliable. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 389 Estimates vary. However, when we draw the average of the various estimates it appears that the Southern States furnished to the army about one miUion men, or approxi- mately 20 per cent, of the white population. The war entailed colossal losses in men and money. According to the accounts furnished in the Official Kecord the war losses of the Northern Army were as follows : Losses of Northern Army Volunteers Officers Men Total Killed in action ..... 4,057 61,654 65,711 Of wounds received in action 2,164 39,912 42,076 Of disease. ..... 2,688 218,806 221,494 Accidental (except drowned) 141 3,869 4,010 Drowned ...... 102 4,749 4,851 Murdered ...... 36 468 504 Killed after capture .... 14 89 103 Suicide ...... 24 340 364 Executed by U.S. military authorities. — 261 261 Executed by enemy .... 4 60 64' Sunstroke. ..... 5 301 306 Other known causes .... 61 1,910 1,971 Caases not stated .... Aggregate .... 28 11,987 12,015 9,324 344,406 353,730 Losses of Northern Regular Army Grand Aggregate — Regulars and 260 5,538 5,798 Volunteers .... 9,584 349,944 359,528 These figures are considered by many authorities to be an under-statement. Some estimate that the Northern States lost approximately 500,000 lives through the war. Through death the Northern Armies lost about 20 per cent, of their men, and the losses come to about 2 per cent, of the whole population. The war losses of the Southern States were approximately as great as those of the North. Apparently about one-half of the Southern Army died, and the deaths caused by the war equal almost 10 per cent, of the white population of the South. Altogether the American States combined lost between 700,000 and 1,000,000 lives in four years' warfare. 390 How America became a Nation in Arms The economic losses caused by the war were enormous. Estimates vary, but the most reliable one gives the figure of 10,000,000,000 dollars, or £2,000,000,000. The war-bill of the United States continues, mounting up through the payment of pensions which entail at present an expenditure of about £30,000,000 a year. The Civil War crippled the North financially for many years, but it ruined the South. Between 1860 and 1870 the taxable wealth of Virginia decreased from 793,249,681 dollars to 827,670,503 dol- lars ; that of South Carolina from 548,138,754 dollars to 166,517,591 dollars ; that of Georgia from 645,895,237 dollars to 214,535,366 dollars, &c. Let us consider now the principal lessons of the Civil War. If the American statesmen had exercised merely reason- able caution and foresight, the war would probably never have occurred. The principal towns of the South lie near the sea border in spacious bays or up-river. They were protected against an attack from the sea by strong forts. By adequately garrisoning these forts in time, as General Scott, the Head of the Army, had advised President Buchanan, the American Government could have dominated the rebellious towns, and could have cut their connection with the sea, as had been done with the best success at the time of the nullification troubles of 1832. Unfortunately, President Buchanan paid no attention to the views of his military experts. Washington said in his fifth Annual Address : ' If we desire to avoid insult we must be able to repel it. If we desire to secure peace, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.' He and many of the founders of the Republic had pointed out in Tlie Federalist and elsewhere that it was dangerous for the country to rely merely on an untrained militia, and had urged the necessity of main- taining an adequate standing army. Unfortunately their warnings were not heeded by the short-sighted and unscrupu- lous politicians. Had the United States possessed a small Great Problems of British Statesmanship 391 standing army ready for war the Southern States would scarcely have dared to rise, and had they done so their power could easily have been broken. In the opinion of many American military experts a standing army of 50,000 men would have sufficed to end the war in a few months. The disregard of the views of the military experts, and the criminal levity and recklessness of self-seeking politicians cost the United States approximately a million lives and £'2,000,000,000. They paid dearly for their previous improvi- dence and their neglect of military preparations. When the bombardment of Fort Sumter began, when the army, navy, and the whole administrative and judicial apparatus broke down, the dissolution of the Great Eepublic seemed inevitable. The Union was saved by a man of sterling character but of merely moderate ability, by a great citizen, but scarcely a statesman of the very first rank. Abraham Lincoln was animated by an unwavering faith in the Union and in the righteousness of its cause. Undis- mayed by disaster, he rallied the waverers, encouraged the downhearted, and created harmony among the quarrel- ling parties. When matters seemed desperate, he mobi- lised the country, raised a huge army, and saved the State by his exertions. Had a Buchanan or a Johnson been in power the Union would undoubtedly have been lost. He did not hesitate to exceed his constitutional powers and to act as a Dictator when the fate of his country was at stake. In Lord Bryce's words, * Abraham Lincoln wielded more authority than any single Englishman has done since Oliver Cromwell.' One-man rule undoubtedly saved the United States. A democratic Government which at any moment may be overturned by a hostile majority lives precariously by popularity, by votes. Popularity is therefore indispens- able to the politicians in power. It is more necessary and more precious to them than national security and adminis- trative efficiency. The result is that a Government which is dependent from hour to hour for its life on the popular 392 How America became a Nation in Arms will and the popular whim must be guided by the mombntaiy moods and impulses of the ill-informed masses. It must pursue a hand-to-mouth policy. Fearing to endanger its position by taking the initiative, it will, as a rule, wait for a popular demand for action. It will often refuse to act with foresight and even with common sense, but will readily obey the clamour of the noisiest but least well- informed section of the Press and the public. Hence a democratic Cabinet cannot act with foresight. It cannot unite on necessary, wise, and far-sighted action. On the other hand, the disunited ministers, who are merely waiting for a popular lead, will readily agree on some useless, foohsh, or even mischievous measure, provided it is popular, provided it is demanded with sufficient clamour and insistence by the prejudiced, and by those who live by pandering to the short-sightedness and to the momentary moods and emotions of the masses and act as their spokesmen. The founders of the American Commonwealth, like all great statesmen, recognised that a Government can act with energy, sagacity, foresight, secrecy, and despatch — qualities which are indispensable in critical times, and especially in war — only if there is absolute unity of purpose, if the executive is in the hands of a single man who is assisted by eminent experts. In Great Britain a Cabinet composed of twenty-two personages was supreme. Of these only one man. Lord Kitchener, was a military expert. As, according to tradition, the Cabinet forms its decisions unani- mously, it is clear that that unwieldy and inexpert body could act neither with energy nor with secrecy, neither with despatch nor with foresight. It could scarcely act with wisdom or with common sense. It is difficult to secure agreement among twenty-two men. As an energetic and provident policy will probably be opposed by the timorous, or the short-sighted, a compromise between action and inaction, between wisdom and folly, becomes necessary, for otherwise the Cabinet will spHt. Hence a safe common- place policy, a weak and dilatory, shilly-shally policy, a Great Problems of British Statesmanship 398 policy of vacillation, of make-believe, and of drift, was likely to be adopted. Foresight became impossible. At best half-measures were taken, and urgently necessary energetic action was delayed until it was too late, until disasters, which could no longer be explained away, had occurred and had demonstrated even to the dullest and to the most obstinate members of the Cabinet the folly of their opposition. Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Nelson, Moltke, indeed all great generals and admirals whose views are known, have stated that war is a one-man business, that in war the worst possible direction is that of a military council. It is true that great commanders have often called councils of war, but they have done so only for advice, not for direction. If, according to the greatest leaders, it is dangerous to entrust the direction of military or naval operations to a council of war composed of great experts, how much more dangerousihen will it be to entrust it to a council of politicians unacquainted with war ! Apparently the twenty-two men who formed the late Cabinet had the supreme direction not only of the country's domestic and administrative policy, but that of its armies and fleets as well. Herein lay the reason that more than once during the war we have seen inadequacy, vacillation, hesitation, improvidence, and incompetence ; that belated half-measures and quarter- measures have sometimes been taken when immediate and energetic action was imperatively called for. Unani- mity, energy, foresight, secrecy, and despatch, in one word, efficiency, is difficult enough in business jointly transacted by twenty-two men belonging to one party. Will it be easier to obtain unanimity in Cabinet decision, will the Government act with greater wisdom, foresight, energy, and rapidity when there is a Coalition Cabinet, when one half the Ministers belong to one party and the other half to the late Opposition ? It is, of course, highly desirable that in a time of crisis the country should possess a strong national Government, 394 How America became a Nation in Arms a Government representing not a party but the nation as a whole. However, as a Cabinet cannot possibly act with unanimity, foresight, energy, rapidity, and secrecy, it seems indispensable that the Cabinet should entrust the supreme direction of affairs to a single strong man supported by a small number of expert advisers who are not his equals but distinctly his subordinates. A democracy at war requires for its salvation a kind of Dictator, an Abraham Lincohi, and British statesmen will do well to ponder over the most important views of the founders of the American Commonwealth given in the beginning of this chapter. Many politicians and numerous organs of the Press have urged that the situation calls for a Dictator, and have regretted that no man of transcendent ability has come forward to whom the Government could be entrusted for the duration of the War. It is, however, perhaps unnecessary to wait for the advent of a Chatham. Government by a single man of moderate, or even of inferior, ability, will prob- ably prove far more efficient than government by twenty- two very able men, non-experts, who possess, at least theoretically, equal power and authority in directing the affairs of the nation. The British Constitution is unwritten, is fluid, is adaptable to the necessities of the moment. It has been created by gradual evolution, and it lends itself easily to the creation of a one-man Government for the duration of the War. The Prime Minister need only be made solely responsible for the conduct of the Government in all its branches during the War. By thus increasing the power of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Ministers would be made responsible merely for their departments. They would be responsible to the Prime Minister, and he to Parliament. Cabinet Ministers could therefore devote themselves practically entirely to their administrative duties. They would become the Prime Minister's subordin- ates. He would assume sole responsibility for important decisions. He would consult the Cabinet Ministers, but could no longer be hampered in his action by the opposition Great Problems of British Statesmanship 395 of one or several of his colleagues. The direction of affairs would no longer be in the hands of an unwieldy body, such as could not successfully direct any business. The State would possess a managing director, as does every business, and thus foresight, unity, energy, despatch, and secrecy in action might be secured. Many Englishmen extol the voluntary system and oppose compulsory service because in their opinion compul- sion, conscription, is undemocratic. Most of these are quite unaware that the greatest, the freest, and the most unruly democracy in the world gladly submitted to conscription half a century ago, and appear to forget that France and Switzerland recognise that the first duty of the citizen consists in defending his country. If the United States found conscription necessary to prevent the Southern States breaking away and forming a government of their own, how much more necessary is the abandonment of the voluntary system when not merely the integrity but the existence of Great Britain and of the Empire is at stake ! The American War was unnecessarily protracted because the North had never enough troops to crush the rebellion. On July 3, 1862, President Lincoln wrote despairingly a confidential letter to the Governors of various States worded as follows : I should not want the half of 300,000 new troops if I could have them now. If I had 50,000 additional troops here now, I believe I could substantially close the War in two weeks. But time is everything, and if I get 50,000 new men in a month I shall have lost 20,000 old ones during the same month, having gained only 30,000, with the difference between old and new troops still against me. The quicker you send, the fewer you will have to send. Time is every- thing. Please act in view of this. . . . While the Southern States armed their whole able-bodied population at an early date, the Northern States were late in introducing conscription. Besides, conscription was with 396 How America became a Nation in Arms them only a half-measure, as has been shown. They in- troduced it only on March 3, 1863, two years after the outbreak of the war, and as they failed to arm all available men the war dragged on for two whole years after conscrip- tion had been introduced. The four-fold superiority in able-bodied men and the fifteen-fold superiority in wealth would undoubtedly have given to the Northern States a rapid and complete victory had they acted with their entire national strength at the outset. The United Kingdom and the British Empire have made enormous efforts, but greater ones will be needed. The United States have provided this country with a great and inspiring precedent. The Northern States placed 10 per cent, and the Southern States 20 per cent, of their entire population in the field, as has been shown on another page. If Great Britain should follow the example of the Northern States she alone should be able to raise 4,500,000 men. If she should follow the example of the South she should be able to provide 9,000,000 soldiers. The British losses during the first years of war have been appalling, but they are small if compared with those incurred by the Americans in the Civil War. If Great Britain should lose men at the same rate as the Northern States, her dead would number about 1,000,000. At the proportion of the Southern States her dead would number about 4,000,000. Great Britain and her daughter-States have an opportunity of demonstrating to the world that they have as much energy, resourcefulness, patriotism, and vitality as the men who laid down their lives in the terrible campaign of 1861-65. If the United States were ready to make the greatest sacrifices for preserving their Union, the United Kingdom and the Dominions should be willing to make sacrifices at least as great for the sake of their existence. The story of the Civil War provides invaluable lessons to this country. It shows that the United States were saved by two factors, by one-man government and by conscription. It shows that far greater exertions than those Great Problems of British Statesmanship 397 made hitherto are wanted by Motherland and Empire — and that they can be made. It shows that the sooner con- scription is introduced throughout the Empire, the more energetically national service is enforced, and the more fully the whole manhood of the Empire States is employed in the War, the smaller will be its cost in blood and money, and the sooner it will be over. At the same time, the Civil War furnishes the gravest warnings to the United States. It should show them the danger of unpreparedness. The European crisis may become their crisis as well. At the dedication of the Soldiers' Cemetery in 1863, Abraham Lincoln pronounced the following immortal words : It is for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us — that from these honoured dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion — that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain, that this nation under God shall have a new birth of freedom, and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth. These words are known by heart by every American schoolboy. They may well serve as a memento and as a motto to Englishmen of the present generation and inspire them in the heavy task which lies before them. CHAPTEE XI AN ANGLO-AMERICAN REUNION ^ On Christmas Eve, 1814, in the old Carthusian Convent in the city of Ghent, a peace was signed which brought to an end the Anglo-American War of 1812-14, and on Christmas Eve, 1914, occurred the one hundredth anniversary of that memorable event. To celebrate worthily the Hundred Years' Peace between the British nation and the United States powerful committees were formed in the United States, in Canada, and in this country, and they resolved to observe it by religious services and various festivities, by purchasing, by popular subscription, Sulgrave Manor, Washington's ancestral home in England, by placing a statue of George Washington in Westminster Abbey, by erecting monumental arches and columns on the United States-Canadian boundary, by erecting imposing memorial buildings in London, New York, and elsewhere, by creating a park at the Niagara Falls and a toll-free International Peace Bridge over the Niagara Eiver which separates the United States from Canada, and by giving prizes for improved text-books on Anglo-American history, designed to improve relations between the two countries. Senator Burton introduced a Bill in the United States Senate pro- viding for the creation of a Peace Celebration Committee, and appropriating £1,500,000 to be spent on the celebration provided that the nations of the British Empire would furnish ' such sum or sums as will equal the amount or * The Nineteenth Century and After, September, 1913, 398 Great Problems of British Statesmanship 399 amounts thus appropriated.' The War has interfered with the planned celebration, and perhaps it is for the best. The promoters of the movement obviously intended to celebrate the Hundred Years' Peace by improving the relations between the British and American peoples, and they were prepared to spend money lavishly for that purpose. But would they have achieved their aim by giving large commissions to a number of sculptors, architects, and monu- mental masons, who might only have succeeded in producing monumental eyesores, and by creating on the Niagara frontier a park and a toll-free Peace Bridge ? The Niagara is the American Blackpool. It is visited every year by more than a million cheap trippers, who are conveyed there at a very small price in railway trains which are crowded to their utmost capacity. Apart from the two railway bridges there is already an excellent passenger bridge over the Niagara which people can cross by electric tram for the modest sum of ten cents. Did the promoters of the peace celebrations seriously believe that they could bridge the gulf which until lately unfortunately still divided the British and American nations by constructing promiscuously and at very large expense a number of imposing and possibly unbeautiful stone monuments and a totally unnecessary bridge, which would have no practical benefit except that of saving the trifling sum of ten cents per head to swarms of hilarious excursionists, who, anxious to see the sights on the other side, or to get something to eat, would rush across the toll-free bridge without giving a moment's thought to its symbolical meaning ? Were not the excellent people on the Peace Celebration Committees bent upon spending their money and their energy in the wrong direction ? On Christmas Eve the angels sang ' On earth peace, goodwill toward men.' The Peace of Ghent was most auspiciously signed on Christmas Eve, and the idea of celebrating its centenary by taking steps which would increase the goodwill between the two great branches of 400 An Anglo-American Reunion the Anglo-Saxon race and secure their peace for all time was excellent. However, experience teaches us that peace and goodwill between nations cannot be secured by wasting money on stone monuments and bridges and that inter- national agitation by private committees does little to bring nations together. From the invasion by William the Conqueror in 1066 to the surrender of Fashoda in 1898 England and France have passionately hated one another and have almost incessantly been at war. Yet to-day France and Great Britain are excellent friends. How has that marvellous and almost incredible change been brought about ? By the Anglo-French Agreement of April 8, 1904, concluded between Lord Lansdowne and Monsieur Delcasse, which settled all outstanding questions and abohshed all friction between the two nations, and by the conclusion of an understanding whereby the two countries have resolved to support one another in case of need. Through the action of their leading statesmen, France and Great Britain have discovered that they need one another and that they ought, in their own interest, to support one another. The long- continued efforts of well-meaning individuals in France and Great Britain to bring the two countries together proved fruitless. It is worth noting that France and Great Britain had become firm friends long before the great War, although many of the text-books used in the French schools still described Great Britain as the hereditary enemy of France, and although many of the books used in the British schools reciprocated the compliment. After all, the influence of well-disposed private indi- viduals, of bodies such as Chambers of Commerce, and of the schools is very much overrated. Nowadays the people receive their political education not from schoolmasters and social leaders but from the Press. The newspapers exercise a far more powerful influence upon public opinion than school and society combined. Diplomacy, the actions of statesmen, not schoolmasters and social leaders, brought France and^Great Britain together overnight, and soon the Great Problems of British Statesmanship 401 French and British nations unlearnt what they had been taught about one another in the schools, and learnt to respect and trust one another, and, in case of need, to defend one another. If statesmanship was able to bring together France and Great Britain, two nations of different race, different ideas, different habits, different thought, and different speech, which have fought one another almost unceasingly during nine centuries, it should surely not be impossible to bring the United States and Great Britain once more together by the conclusion of a second and final peace treaty, by a treaty whereby the two great Anglo-Saxon nations might pledge themselves to support one another in perpetuity in case of a great emergency, by a treaty which would most fitly be concluded on the next anniversary of the Treaty of Ghent, and which would secure their peace and security practically for all time. That would, I venture to assert, be its most appropriate celebration. I shall endeavour to show the necessity of such a treaty in the following pages, but before doing so I think I ought to deal briefly with the causes which until recently have kept the two nations asunder. The fact that Great Britain and the United States have been at war has been almost forgotten in this country, but it is keenly remembered in America. That is only natural. In the course of her long and chequered history Great Britain has been at war with many powerful nations, but the United States have had only one great foreign war, and, owing to their geographical position, they have had hitherto a possible enemy only in that nation which is supreme at sea. If the American history-books had not contained long and highly -coloured accomits of ' America's fight for freedom against England's tyranny,' and of ' America's heroism and England's treachery,' they would have made very dull and uninspiring reading indeed. National patriotism demands to be inflamed by the heroic deeds of one's ancestors. The Americans have every reason 2 D 402 An Anglo-American Reunion to be proud of their fight against England, and it is only right and proper that they have made the most of it and so strengthened their spirit of patriotism and of nationalism. However, although all Americans are proud of their victory over England, a large and constantly gi'owing number of them have begmi to recognise that the English nation is not a nation of tyrants and of inhuman monsters, that at the time of the American Revolution not all the wrong was on the side of England and all the right on that of the American Colonists, that the war was caused rather by mutual misunderstandings than by the evil dispositions of the English Government and the English people, and there- fore they feel a little ashamed of the patriotic exuberance of some of their countrymen. Nations are usually welded together by war. Without the Anglo-American war there might have been American States, but these would scarcely have formed a firmly knit American State and an American nation. Besides, no great State, and especially no great democratic State, and no great federation of States, has ever been established without war. In every family of strong, healthy, and high-spirited boys there are fights. However, these do not lead to eternal enmity or to a permanent estrangement, but to increased mutual respect and to a better understand- ing. There have been great fraternal fights in Great Britain, Germany, Switzerland, France, and in the United States themselves, and it was only natural that there should have been such a fight between the United States and Great Britain. Lastly, the losses and sufferings which the Anglo- American war caused to the Americans have been much exaggerated. When I was in the United States I was seriously informed by eminent and competent men that the yearly celebration of the Fourth of July, the day of the Declaration of Independence, when patriotism impels Americans to let off in the streets fireworks and revolvers, had in the course of time claimed a heavier hecatomb of life than the Anglo-American war. Great Problems of British Statesmanship 403 In the American school books Great Britain is usually- described as the hereditary enemy of the United States. It is true that much bitterness against the United States prevailed in England long after the conclusion of the Anglo- American Peace Treaty. It was only natural that the loss of our greatest possession created abiding resentment, especially as Americans kept open the sore by numerous provocations and by frequent endeavours to damage Great Britain and Canada. Of course provocation met with counter provocation. However, it should in fairness be remembered in the United States that, notwithstanding all mutual misunderstandings and disputes which have taken place in the past. Great Britain has more than once acted as America's good friend. Great Britain has preserved the United States more than once from the in- tended intervention of European Powers, she has prob- ably preserved them from dangerous wars, and she has undoubtedly been responsible for the promulgation and the defence of the Monroe Doctrine which has estab- lished the principle ' America for the Americans.' The fact that Great Britain was responsible for the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine is so important and is at the same time so little known both in Great Britain and in the United States that it is worth while to give briefly the secret history of that doctrine, which has become the fmidamental principle and the sheet anchor of America's foreign policy. After the Napoleonic Wars a reign of reaction began on the Continent of Europe. The Holy Alliance strove to destroy the democratic governments and institutions which the revolutionary period had called into being throughout the world, and to introduce a universal despotism. At Verona, on November 22, 1822, the Powers which had fought against Napoleon signed a secret treaty, to which, however, only the names of Metternich (Austria), Chateau- briand (France), Bernstorff (Prussia), and Nesselrode (Kussia) were appended, for England refused to be a party. 404 An Anglo-American Reunion The first two Articles of this instrument are of special interest, for they read as follows : The undersigned, specially authorised to make some additions to the treaty of the Holy Alliance, after having exchanged their respective credentials, have agreed as follows : Article I. The high contracting Powers, being con- vinced that the system of represantative government is as incompatible with the monarchical principles as the maxim of the sovereignty of the people is with the divine right, engage mutually, in the most solemn manner, to use all their efforts to put an end to the system of representative government, in whatever country it may exist in Europe, and to prevent its being introduced in those countries where it is not yet known. Article II. As it cannot be doubted that the liberty of the Press is the most powerful means used by the pretended supporters of the rights of nations, to the detriment of those of Princes, the high contracting parties promise reciprocally to adopt all proper measures to suppress it, not only in their own States, but also in the rest of Europe. In Henderson's ' American Diplomatic Questions ' we read : The Congress adjourned with the understanding that France, in the name of the Holy Alhes, should send an army into Spain ' to put an end to the system of repre- sentative government ' which was struggling for existence beyond the Pyrenees. A French army, under the Due d'Angouleme, crossed the frontier, and after a feeble resistance from the revolutionists restored Ferdinand to a despotic throne. The next step of the alHes seemed to be reasonably certain — a movement agamst the South Amercian revolutionists. The advisability of taking such a step had already been broached at Vienna, and freely discussed at Verona. Keports of these contemplated movements in the Americas had reached Washington, and had impressed the administra- tion with a deep feeling of concern. It was feared that Great Problems of British Statesmanship 405 France might demand Cuba as a price for restoring Ferdinand. Through its agents the British Government had become aware of the danger threatening the United States from the Continent of Europe. Mr. Canning, the British Foreign Secretary, sought an interview with Mr. Eichard Kush, the United States Minister to Great Britain, and Mr. Eush reported the gist of his conversation with Mr. Canning immediately to Mr. J. Q. Adams, the Secretary of State at Washington. Mr. Eush referred to a note which Mr. Canning had previously sent to the British Ambassador in Paris. In that note the British Foreign Secretary had stated : ' As his Britannic Majesty disclaimed all intention of appropriating to himself the smallest portion of the late Spanish possessions in America, he, Mr. Canning, was satisfied that no attempt would be made by France to bring any of Spain's possessions under her dominion either by conquest or by cession from Spain.' Commenting upon this important note Mr. Eush reported to the United States Secretary of State : By this we are to understand in terms sufficiently distinct, that Great Britain would not be passive under such an attempt by France, and Mr. Canning, on my having referred to this note, asked me what I thought my Govern- ment would say to going hand in hand with the British Government in the same sentiment ; not, as he added, that any concert in action under it could become necessary between the two countries, but that the simple fact of our being known to hold the same sentiment would, he had no doubt, by its moral effect, put down the intention on the part of France, admitting that she should ever entertain it. . . . Eevertmg to his first idea, he again said that he hoped that France would not, should even events in the Peninsula be favourable to her, extend her views to South America for the purpose of reducing the colonies, nominally, perhaps, for Spain, but in effect to subserve ends of her own ; but that, in case she should meditate such a policy. 406 An Anglo-American Reunion he was satisfied that the knowledge of the United States being opposed to it, as well as Great Britain, could not fail to have its influence in checking her steps. In this way he thought good might be done by prevention, and peaceful prospects all around increased. As to the form in which such knowledge might be made to reach France, and even the other Powers of Europe, he said, in conclusion, that that might probably be arranged in a manner that would be free from objection. On August 20, a few days after this conversation, Mr. Canning sent to Mr. Eush a letter marked ' Private and confidential ' in which he said : Before leaving town I am desirous of bringing before you in a more distinct, but still in an unofficial and confidential shape, the question which we shortly discussed the last time that I had the pleasure of seeing you. . . . We con- ceive the recovery of the American colonies by Spain to be hopeless. . . . We aim not at the possession of any portion of them ourselves. We could not see any portion of them transferred to any other Power with indifference. If these opinions and feelings are, as I firmly believe them to be, common to your Government with ours, why should we hesitate mutually to confide them to each other and to declare them in the face of the world ? If there be any European Power which cherishes other projects, which looks to a forcible enterprise for reducing the colonies to subjugation, on the behalf or in the name of Spain, or which meditates the acquisition of any part of them to itself, by cession or by conquest, such a declaration on the part of your Government and ours would be at once the most effectual and the least offensive mode of intimating our joint disapprobation of such projects. . . . Nothing could be more gratifying to me than to join with you in such a work. Commenting upon the foregoing letter Mr. Eush reported to Mr. Adams on August 23, 1823 : . . . The tone of earnestness in Mr. Canning's note, and the force of some of his expressions, naturally start the II Great Problems of British Statesmanship 407 inference that the British Cabinet cannot be without its serious apprehensions that ambitious enterprises are medi- tated against the independence of the South American States. Whether by France alone I cannot now say on any authentic grounds. On August 23 Mr. Canning sent to Mr. Eush another ' Private and confidential ' letter, in which he said : I have received notice — but not such notice as imposes upon me the necessity of any immediate answer or proceed- ing; — that as soon as the military objects in Spain are achieved (of which the French expect, how justly I know not, a very speedy achievement) a proposal will be made for a Congress, or some less formal concert and consultation, especially upon the affairs of Spanish America. Mr. Adams, the American Secretary of State, communi- cated the news which he had received from Mr. Eush to the President of the Eepublic, Mr. Monroe, and President Monroe wrote for advice to his eminent predecessors in office, Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison, two of the surviving founders of the American Eepublic, who had co-operated with George Washington and Benjamin Franklin. Mr. Jefferson replied on October 24, 1823 : Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe ; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and particularly her own. . . . One nation, most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit ; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By acceding to her proposition we detach her from the bands, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government, and emancipate a continent at one stroke, winch might otherwise linger long in doubt and difficulty. Great Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of any one, or all, on earth ; and with h3r on our side we need not fear the whole world. With her, then, we should most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship ; and nothing would tend more 408 An Anglo-American Reunion to knit our affections than to be fighting onc3 more, side by side, in the same cause. Mr. Madison wrote to Mr. Jefferson on November 1; 1823: With the British power and navy combined with our own we hav3 nothing to fear from the rest of the world ; and in the great struggle of the epoch between liberty and despotism we owe it to ourselves to sustain the former, in this hemisphere at least. From the sixth volume of the ' Memoirs ' of Mr. J. Qi Adams, who at the time was the United States Secretary of State, we learn that he did not believe that the Holy Alliance had any intention of ultimately attacking the United States ; but, if they should subdue the Spanish provinces, they might recolonise them and partition them out among themselves. Eussia might take California, Peru, and Chile ; France Mexico, where she had been intriguing to get a monarchy under a Prince of the House of Bourbon, as well as at Buenos Ayres ; and Great Britain, if she could not resist this course of things, would take at least the island of Cuba as her share of the scramble. Then what would be the situation of the United States — Eng- land holding Cuba, and France Mexico ? The danger that France, supported by the Powers of the Holy Alliance, would mterfere on the American Con- tinent was great, and this was generally recognised in America. In the North American Beview for October, 1823, we read, for instance : If success should favour the aUied monarchs, would they be satisfied with reforming the Governmsnt of Spain ? Would not the Spanish colonies, as part of the same Empire, then demand their parental attention ? And might not the United States be next considered as deserving their kind guardianship ? On December 2, 1823, President Monroe published his Great Problems of British Statesmanship 409 annual message, which contains the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine — one ought really in fairness to call it the Canning-Monroe Doctrine — in the following words : The occasion has been judged propar for asserting as a principle in which tha rights and interasts of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonisation by any European Powers. . . . We owe it, therefore, to candour, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those Powars, to declare that w^e should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the govern- ments who have declared their independence and main- tained it, and whose independence we have, on great con- sideration and on just principbs, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlHng in any other manner their destiny by any European Power, in any other light than as the mani- festation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. After the reading of President Monroe's famous message Mr. Henry Clay, Speaker of the House of Eepresentatives, caused the following resolution to be introduced : Eesolved by the Senate and House of Eepresentatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That the people of these States would not see, without serious inquietude, any forcible intervention by the allied Powers of Europe, in behalf of Spain, to reduce to their former subjection those parts of the continent of America which have proclaimed and estabhshed for themselves, respectively, independent governments, and which have been solemnly recognised by the United States. Commenting upon the genesis of the Monroe Doctrine 410 An Anglo-American Reunion Mr. Henderson wrote in his book, ' American Diplomatic Questions ' : If England had, after all, joined the allies in their schemes it is much to be doubted whether the President's message of 1823 would have seriously embarrassed them in the ultimate perfection of their Spanish-American plans ; but the realisation that Great Britain, with her poAverful navy, endorsed in the main the sentiments of President Monroe cast a gloom over the propagandists of divine right, and the great South American project was abandoned. The American Civil War broke out in the begirming of 1861. Mexico was at that time in the throes of a revolution, and she refused to satisfy her Spanish and French creditors and to do justice to Great Britain for havmg broken into the British Legation and carried off £152,000 in sterling bonds belonging to British subjects. The British claims were substantial and hona-fide. The French and Spanish claims were more or less doubtful. Great Britain, France, and Spain agreed upon joint action for the protection of their interests, and British, French, and Spanish warships sailed for Vera Cruz with the avowed intention of taking possession of the Custom Houses of two or three Mexican ports for the purpose of satisfying the claims of their Govern- ments. However, within a few weeks after the arrival of these ships, and before the Allies had done much more than seize Vera Cruz, the English and Spanish commanders became dissatisfied with the adventurous action of the French and the English and Spanish forces withdrew in April, 1862. While Great Britain and Spain merely sought to obtain satisfaction for the claims of their citizens, France, taking advantage of the American Civil War, evidently intended to violate the Monroe Doctrine and to establish herself firmly and permanently on the American Continent under the pretext of satisfying some very shadowy demands of her subjects upon Mexico. It is a well-known fact that it was one of the favourite projects of Napoleon the Thu'd Great Problems of British Statesmanship 411 to create on the American Continent a great Latin- American State or Confederation controlled by France, a monarchical comiterpoise to the United States. We can therefore not bo surprised that the secret instructions which Napoleon the Third sent to General Forey, the Commander-in-Chief of the French Expedition, contained the following statement of France's policy : If Mexico preserves her independence and maintains the integrity of her territory, and if a suitable Government )je constituted there with the assistance of France, we shall have restored to the Latin race on the other side of the ocean its strength and prestige. . . . Mexico thus regenerated will always be favourable to France. ... As now our mihtary honour is pledged, the exigencies of our policy and the interests of our industry and our commerce make it our duty to march upon Mexico, to plant there boldly our standard, and to estabhsh there a monarchy, if this is not incompatible with the national sentiment of the country, but at all events a government wliich promises some stability. Taking advantage of the embarrassment of the United States, Napoleon the Third endeavoured not only to create a powerful monarchy on American soil but to intervene in the struggle between the North and the South with the object of permanently weakening the United States. In Moore's ' Digest of the International Law of the United States ' we read : On October 30, 1862, Napoleon instructed the French ambassadors to Great Britain and Eussia to invite those Powers to join France in requesting the belhgerents to agree to an armistice of six months, so as to consider some plan for bringing the war to an end. . . . Great Britain promptly and unquahfiedly declined the proposition. Napoleon's policy was frustrated partly by the mis- management of the French Generals, partly, and probably chiefly, by the unsympathetic attitude of Great Britain. If Great Britain had actively, or merely passively, supported 412 An Anglo-American Reunion Napoleon, the American Civil War might have had a very different ending. The great American Eepublic might have been divided against itself for all time. During the Civil War Great Britain rendered midoubtedly very valuable services to the United States. However, Great Britain's attitude towards the United States and her unflinching opposition to European intervention on the American Continent, first by the Holy Alliance and then by France, was soon completely forgotten because of the unfortunate Alabavia occurrence. So great was America's anger at the Alaba7na incident that when, shortly after the close of the Civil War, the British Government promoted the unification of her Canadian possessions by the creation of a single Dominion, violent objections were made in the United States that Great Britain's action was in violation of the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, and the United States Congress considered a resolution which voiced the uneasi- ness of the country at witnessing ' such a vast conglomera- tion of American States established on the monarchical principle in contradiction to the traditionary and constantly declared principles of the United States, and endangering their most important interests.' Great Britain agreed to go to arbitration on the American Alabama claims. The United States demanded the colossal sum of £9,476,166 135. M. for the damage done by that cruiser. By an impartial international tribunal they were awarded £3,229,166 13s. 4:d. (note the 13s. Ad. !), which was paid to them by Great Britain, but even that sum was twice as large as it ought to have been, for, after all claims had been satisfied, there remained a surplus of £1,600,000 in the hands of the United States Government. During the Spanish- American War of 1898 all Europe was hostile to the United States except Great Britain. Before Manila a collilion between the German and the American fleets was prevented with difficulty. France and other Powers seemed strongly disposed to take Spain's part. Once more, joint action by European Powers against Great Problems of British Statesmanship 413 the United States appeared to be impending. Great Britain was sounded, but once more she refused to support or to countenance European intervention. The Power which is supreme at sea once more protected the Monroe Doctrine. In 1902 Great Britain was induced by Germany to blockade, in company with her, the Venezuelan ports, in order to obtain satisfaction for flagrant wrongs done by Venezuela to her citizens. However, as British public opinion was strongly opposed to co-operation with Germany on the American Continent, Great Britain readily con- sented to arbitration. History, as Napoleon the First has told us, is a fable agreed upon, and often it is a tissue of fables. According to many of the popular history books used in the United States schools Great Britain is a Power which, animated by tyranny and selfishness, has always been hostile to the United States. In the United States the fact that Great Britain was largely responsible for the formulation and the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine, and that she has consistently defended that doctrine by placing her fleet between the military Powers of Europe and the United States, is scarcely ever mentioned, and the fact that Great Britain is and always has been as strongly opposed to the settlement of one of the great military Powers in the New World as are the United States themselves, is practically unknown. It is an error to speak of the Monroe Doctrine as the leading principle of American policy, for the Monroe Doctrine — one ought in justice always to call it the Canning- Monroe Doctrine — is also a leading principle of British fpreign policy. It is an Anglo-American doctrine. Bis- marck once described the Monroe Doctrine as ' an inter- national impertinence.' Perhaps it is an international impertinence. Still, the European Great Powers "have respected it even at a time when the American fleet was quite insignificant. Why have they done so ? Because they knew that the British fleet would, in case of need. 414 An Anglo-American Reunion protect the United States. Foreign nations have discovered that the route to New York and to Washington goes via London. But for the British fleet the Powers of Europe would long ago have torn the Monroe Doctrine to shreds and have established themselves on the American Continent. Englishmen, when discussing Anglo-American relations with Americans, are apt to adopt an apologetic attitude because of the mistakes which their Government and their forefathers made in the time of George the Third. That attitude of penitence is, I think, uncalled for. Mistakes were made on both sides at the time of the American Kevolu- tion and afterwards ; fights between blood relations are natural and common ; and since the time of the Anglo- American Peace Great Britain has powerfully supported the United States whenever an opportmiity arose, making their interests her own. The late Professor Seeley's frequently quoted assertion that Great Britain has created the British Empire ' in a fit of absence of mind ' is scarcely correct. Great Britain follows neither a policy of absent-mindedness, as Professor Seeley has told us, nor a policy of sordid self-interest as her adversaries maintain. Great Britain follows a policy not of interest but of sentiment. She has consistently striven to enlarge her dominions, not in order to exploit them — it is very doubtful indeed whether on balance her possessions yield a profit to the Motherland — but in the instinctive desire of reserving the vast and fruitful territories of the New World to the Anglo-Saxon race. She has been actuated not by blood-lust nor by lust of conquest but by race-instinct, and she has acquired her vast possessions not for herself but for the Anglo-Saxon race. Therefore she views not with jealousy but with approval America's prosperity and America's expansion. Her policy has been racial, senti- mental, and, on the whole, possibly unprofitable to her citizens. That cannot too frequently be stated. If Great Britain's policy were guided by self-interest, envy, perfidious- ness, and trade jealousy, as we are so often told, she would Great Problems of British Statesmanship 415 have worked for the downfall of the United States, and would at the same time have avenged her former defeats and ridded herself of a powerful competitor. She has had many opportunities to expose the United States to the greatest dangers, without any risk to herself, by merely allowing the European Powers to attack them, but she has steadfastly resisted their temptations to countenance Euro- pean aggression. The great democratic Eepublic is naturally not beloved by the miHtary monarchies of Europe. They see in it a great danger and desire its downfall. Hence many Conti- nental writers have recommended that a pan-European coalition should be formed against the United States. Time after time the States of the Continent have endeavoured to secure Great Britain's support, or at least her neutrality, in order to be able to encroach upon the Monroe Doctrine or to strike at the United States, but they have always failed. Great Britain's refusal to countenance European aggression, even passively, has sprung from her race instinct, not from her fear of losing Canada. In the first place, the United States would have had no cause to attack Canada if Great Britain merely maintained a strict neutrality in the event of a war between the United States and some European Power or Powers. Secondly, the United States would not find it very easy to conquer the Dominion. Last, and not least, it must not be forgotten that, while the Continental Powers could never obtain Great Britain's support against the United States, Great Britain herself would probably very readily have received the support of the Continental Powers against the great Eepublic had she gone to war with that country. If, for instance. President Cleveland's high- handed action regarding Venezuela in 1895 should unhappily have led to an American attack upon Canada, Great Britain need not have stood alone. That fact should be borne in mind by all those on both sides of the Atlantic who beheve that Great Britain's attitude towards the United States has in the past been dictated by her fear of losing Canada. 416 An Anglo-American Reunion An Anglo-Saxon reunion is highly desirable upon ideal grounds, and it is equally necessary to the British Empire and to the United States for the most potent practical reasons. The first instinct of nations, as of individuals, is that of self-preservation, and their principal requirements are peace and security. At first sight the British Empire and the United States appear to be very differently situated. The one is a widely scattered island-Empire which is extremely vulnerable, being exposed to attacks on many sides, while the other is a firmly knitted and homogeneous Continental State, difficult to attack and impossible to conquer. However, these outward geographical and structural differences merely obscure the fact that the British Empire and the United States are similar in character, that they have identical interests, that they are threatened by the same dangers, that they suffer from the same disadvantage of lacking powerful standing armies, that both can be attacked only by sea, and therefore depend upon their fleet for their security from attack, and that consequently both are equally strongly interested that neither one of the great military Powers nor a combination of military Powers should become supreme at sea. Admiral Mahan, the great American naval writer, said, in 1890, in the Atlmitic MontJdy : While Great Britain is undoubtedly the most formidable of our possible enemies, both by her great navy and by the strong positions she holds near our coasts, it must be added that a cordial understanding with that country is one of the first of our external interests. Both nations doubtless, and properly, seek their own advantage ; but both, also, are controlled by a sense of law and justice, drawn from the same sources, and deep-rooted in their instincts. What- ever temporary aberration may occur, a return to mutual standards of right will certainly follow. A formal alliance between the two is out of the question, but a cordial recogni- tion of the similarity of character and ideas will give birth to sympathy, which in turn will facihtate a co-operation Great Problems of British Statesmanship 417 beneficial to both ; for if sentimentality is weak, sentiment is strong. If we look more closely into the circumstances of the British Empire and of the United States, we find that they are in a very similar position. The United States are no longer an invulnerable continental State. Their interests, which were formerly purely continental, have become world-wide. By the acquisition of Hawaii, the Philippine Islands, Porto Rico, Guam, Samoa, the Panama Canal, and by their interest in Cuba and many other islands and territories which are of great strategical importance to them, they also have become a widely scattered and very vulnerable Empire, and their vulnerability is all the greater, as the United States army and navy are considerably weaker than are the British army and navy. The loss of the magnificent Pearl Harbour on the island of Oahu, which lies midway between the Pacific Coast and Asia, would, as is generally recognised in America, be as serious a loss to the United States as the loss of Gibraltar would be to Great Britain, and the loss of the Panama Canal would probably be more serious to them than the simultaneous loss of the Mediterranean route and the Cape route to the East would be to Great Britain and the British Empire. In 1894 Admiral Mahan published in the Islortli Ameri- can Bevieiv a paper entitled ' Possibihties of an Anglo- American Reunion,' in which he said : Partners, each, in the great commonwealth of nations which share the blessings of European civilisation. Great Britain and the United States alone, though in varying degrees, are so severed geographically from all existing rivals as to be exempt from the burden of great land armies ; while at the same time they must depend upon the sea, in chief measure, for the intercourse with other members of the body of nations upon which national well-being depends. To Great Britain and the United States, if they rightly estimate the part they may play in the great drama of human 418 An Anglo-American Reunion progress, is entrusted the maritime interest, in the broadest sense of the word. I am convinced firmly that it would be to the interests of Great Britain and of the United States and for the benefit of the world that the two nations should act together cordially on the seas. Admiral Mahan was right. As Great Britain and the United States have no enormous standing armies, as they are not likely ever to have standing armies capable of facing those of the great military States, and as they do not desire to become a nation in arms in the continental sense, they must perforce control the seas so as to be able to keep the huge armies of Europe, and perhaps of -Asia as well, at arm's length. Let the great military nations of Europe share the rule of the land in Europe, but let the Anglo-Saxons share between them the rule of their own seas in which they are equally vitally interested. Whether Great Britain or whether the United States rule the seas is, after all, of minor importance. The thing that matters is that the seas should be ruled by the peaceful Anglo- Saxons and not by a great military nation. Providence and the wisdom and energy of its early rulers and colonisers have greatly favoured the Anglo-Saxon race. A glance at the map shows that practically all the most valuable and the most promising territories and strategical positions in the world are owned or controlled by the Anglo-Saxon nations. To civilised nations the value of extensive territories lies chiefly in this, that they afford an outlet to their surplus population. The more thinly populated territories situated in a temperate zone are, the greater is their value to them. The policy of powerful nations is guided not by their momentary dispositions but by their great and abiding interests. Self-preservation is their first instinct and their first duty. All the great mihtary nations of the Continent of Europe, Eussia alone excepted, and China and Japan, are greatly over-populated, and are therefore in urgent Great Problems of British Statesmanship 419 need of territories in a temperate zone, for, without the possibiHty of expansion under the national flag, they are bound to stand still and then to decline in relative power and influence. The future belongs evidently to those countries which possess vast reserves of thinly populated territories. How happy, in this respect, is the position of the United States and the British Empire will be seen from the following table : Population at Last Census United Kingdom . In 1911 45,216,665 people = 372-6 per sq. mile Japan . ,, — 49,582,505 „ = 335-8 Germany „ 1910 64,925,993 „ = 331-0 Italy / . „ 1911 34,687,000 = 313-5 China Proper „ — 407,253,029 „ = 266-0 Austria ., 1910 28,571,934 „ = 246-7 France . „ 1911 39,601,509 „ = 191-2 Hungary ., 1910 20,886,487 „ = 166-6 Russia in Europe . ., 1897 105,413,775- „ = 55-2 British Empire . „ 1911 417,148,000 „ = 36-8 United States and Possessions „ 1910 101,840,367 „ = 13-7 The British Empire and the- United States have room for hundreds of milhons of people. Therefore it is only natural that the military Powers, which have a population of 200 people and 300 people and more per square mile, look with longing and envy to the vast, fruitful, highly mineralised and thinly populated territories, situated in a temperate zone, which are owned and controlled by the Anglo-Saxon nations, especially as these hold in addition all the most important strategical points which command the approaches to their world-wide possessions. The Continent of America lies midway between over- populated Europe and over-populated Asia. Its east coast is coveted by the overcrowded European, and its west coast by the overcrowded Asiatic, nations. How thinly some of the most desirable parts of the United States are populated is seen by comparing the size and the population of some of the American States with the size and popula- tion of some great empires. The German Empire has a 420 An Anglo-American Reunion territory of 208,770 square miles and a population of 64,925,993, The single State of Texas is considerably larger, for it contains 265,896 square miles. Yet Texas has a population of only 3,896,542. Per square mile there are 14-8 people in Texas and 881-0 in Germany. As Texas has a rich soil, an excellent climate, and great natural resources, it could probably support a population of 40,000,000. It has often been asserted by men anxious to make mischief that the Japanese are casting covetous eyes upon California. They have certainly every reason to envy the Americans the possession of that paradisaical country, but they are scarcely likely to contemplate seriously, its acquisition. Still the temptation is there. The Empire of Japan contains 147,657 square miles, while California contains 158,297 square miles. Japan has 49,582,505 inhabitants, but California, though it is slightly larger than Japan, has only 2,877,549 inhabitants. Per square mile there are 835*8 people in Japan but only 15*3 in California. The two other American States on the Pacific Coast, Oregon and Washington, extend to 165,826 square miles, and their population is only 1,814,755. How vast the territories of the United States are may be seen from the fact that the United States without Alaska are exactly twice as large as is the enormous Empire of China, that they are fifteen times as large as Germany, and twenty-five times as large as the United Kingdom. The nations of the world envy the British Empire and the United States, not so much for their industries, their trade, and their wealth, as for their boundless latent resources, which promise to give them the dominion of the world, or at least world-w'ide predominance, if they are united. The United States receive perhaps a greater share of ill-will than does the British Empire. They are disliked owing to their enormous wealth, their ruthless energy, their aggressive methods, and especially owing to the Monroe Doctrine. On the Continent of Europe it is generally con- Great Problems of British Statesmanship 421 sidered, and not without reason, that by that doctrine the United States have virtually declared a protectorate over the whole of Central and South America, and that they will annex these countries when time and opportunity are favourable. The Monroe Doctrine is an American doctrine, not an international one. It is, as Bismarck truly remarked, an international impertinence. It can become generally ac- cepted and respected only if the United States are strong enough to defend it against all comers. Hitherto they have been able to leave the defence of the Monroe Doctrine largely to Great Britain, as has been shown in the foregoing pages. Many thoughtful Americans believe that, in view of the insufficiency of their military and naval armaments, the Monroe Doctrine is a provocation to the world at large and a danger. A distinguished American military author, Mr. Homer Lea, wrote in ' The Valor of Ignorance,' a book which received the highest praise from President Koosevelt : In the history of manldnd never before has one nation attempted to support so comprehensive a doctrine as to extend its political suzerainty over two continents, com- prising one-fourth of the habitable earth and one-half of its unexploited wealth, in direct defiance of the whole world and without the shghtest semblance of mihtary power. The Monroe Doctrine is Promethean in conception but not so in execution. It was proclaimed in order to avoid wars ; now it invites them. The Monroe Doctrine, if not supported by naval and mihtary power sufficient to enforce its observance by all nations, singly and in coalition, becomes a factor more provocative of war than any other national policy ever attempted in modern or ancient times. The maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine requires un- doubtedly a fleet strong enough to defend America against any Power or any conceivable combination of Powers. It can be defended only by irresistible force. In Admiral Mahan's words, ' There is no inahenable right in any 422 An Anglo-American Reunion community to control the use of a region when it does so to the detriment of the world at large.' The maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine is not founded on right but on might. The Panama Canal will greatly increase the vulnerability of the United States. A distinguished United States Govern- ment Commission, presided over by Admiral Walker, reported : The Canal is but one link in a chain of communications of which adjacent links are the Caribbean Sea on the east and the waters of the Pacific, near the Canal's entrance, on the west. Unless the integrity of all the links can be maintained, the chain will be broken. The Power holding any one of the links can prevent the enemy from using the communication, but can itself use it only when it holds them all. The Canal would be a prize of extraordinary value ; it would be beyond the reach of reinforcement if the enemy controlled the sea. The enormous importance of the Canal becomes clear by giving the matter a little thought. If, for instance, in a war with the United States, Japan should seize the Panama Canal, she could attack the Atlantic coast of the Eepublic, and if Germany should seize it she could attack the United States simultaneously on her Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Of late all the great mihtary Powers have increased their navies with feverish haste. Between 1900 and 1913 the naval expenditure of the eight Great Powers has exactly doubled, increasing from £87,000,000 to £174,000,000, while their military expenditure has increased by only 40 per cent. Germany trebled her naval expenditure from £7,900,000 in 1900 to £23,400,000 in 1913, and so did Austria and Italy by increasing theirs from £6,400,000 to £18,100,000 during the same time. The Japanese also have greatly increased their fleet. The Great War has been largely a maritime war, a war for maritime objects, for sea power and colonies. Germany and Japan and many other countries urgently require colonies. The fact that Germany requires them is Great Problems of British Statesmanship 423 of course known, but it is generally believed that Japan has acquired adequate outlets for her surplus population in her wars with China and Eussia. That is not the case. Her new possessions are very densely populated, and there- fore give very little scope to the Japanese. The population of Korea is 115'9 per square mile, that of Formosa is 215'6 per square mile, and that of Kwantung is 341 "6 per square mile ; while that of California is only 15*3, and that of Mexico 17"7 per square mile. Twenty years ago the German Emperor proclaimed ' Germany's future lies upon the water.' Not only Germany but the other great and over-populated military States of Europe and Japan as well have become convinced that their future also lies upon the water, that they can secure sufficient elbow-room only by wresting adequate territories situated in a temperate zone from those nations which, fortunately for them, lack large armies. Herein lies the reason that the great military States have been creating large navies with the utmost speed, and the danger is great that some of them should at some time or other combine for the purpose of destroying the land monopoly of the Anglo-Saxons and of securing for themselves ' a place in the sun,' as the German Emperor picturesquely called it. Besides, the Anglo-Saxon nations are not loved abroad. Democracy dislikes militarism and militarism fears, hates, and despises democracy. For many years American military and naval men have been watching Germany and Japan with concern, and have been wondering what attitude Great Britain would adopt in case the United States should be involved in a war either with one of these nations or with both, and what attitude the United States should adopt should Great Britain be seriously menaced by Germany. Admiral Mahan wrote in his book ' Naval Strategy,' published in 1911 : If Germany should wish to embark her fleet in a trans- Atlantic venture, how far will her relations with other European States allow her to do so ? 424 An Anglo-American Reunion Should our Pacific coast citizens precipitate us into a war, or even into seriously strained relations, with Japan, that pressure upon us would add to the force of Germany's fleet. Where ought Great Britain to stand in case we have troubles with Germany ? And where ought we to stand in the reverse case ? Great Britain does for the moment hold Germany so far in check that the German Empire can do no more than look after its European interests ; but should a naval disaster befall Great Britain, leaving Germany master of the naval situation, the world would see again a predominant fleet backed by a predominant army, and that in the hands not of a State satiated with colonial possessions as Great Britain is, but of one whose late entry into world conditions leaves hsr without any such possessions at all of any great value. Although the colonial ambitions in Germany are held in abeyance for tha moment, the wish cannot but exist to expand her territory by foreign acquisitions. It is this line of reasoning which shows the power of the German navy to be a matter of prime importance to the United States. The power to control Germany does not exist in Europe except in the British navy. Admiral Mahan, the most eminent naval writer of modem times, recommended the co-operation of Great Britain and the United States, not for ideal reasons, but because he believed that Anglo-American co-operation on the seas is a necessity. Great possessions are to their owners a responsibility and a danger unless they are adequately guarded. Neither the United States nor Great Britain are likely ever to possess standing armies that can be pitted against the vast military hosts of the Continental Great Powers and of Japan, because the spirit of the people is impatient of com- pulsion, restraint, and discipline, in time of peace. As it takes a long time to improvise armies, they must put their trust in their fleets. Before the Great War the American fleet was weaker Great Problems of British Statesmanship 425 than the German fleet and was inferior to it in organisation, in certain types of ships, and in armaments, especially in reserve stores of guns and ammunition. The American fleet was then on paper about 50 per cent, stronger than the Japanese fleet, but it seemed questionable whether the American fleet equalled the Japanese fleet in organisation, preparedness, and efiiciency. The British fleet is the strongest in the world. It is more powerful than it has ever been, but with the advent of the submarine, the influence of maritime power has been greatly weakened unless it is overwhelming. The great military nations of the world naturally base their hopes of expansion at the cost of the Anglo-Saxons — as the world is divided they can expand only at the cost of the Anglo-Saxons — upon the inadequacy of the Anglo- Saxon fleets and the disunion of the two great Anglo-Saxon nations, for they know full well that it would be hopeless to challenge Anglo-Saxon supremacy on the seas if Great Britain and the United States were firmly united. In endeavouring to build up large navies they may in the future strain their resources to the utmost, hoping that by combin- ing they will be able to overwhelm, or to overawe, either Great Britain or the United States. While Great Britain and the United States may in the future not be able to defeat single-handed any conceivable combination of naval Powers which may attack them, they can face the world if they are united. Herein lies the necessity for their reunion. Admiral Mahan wrote in his book ' Ketrospect and Prospect' : ' As the world is now balanced, the British Empire is in external matters om' natural, though not our formal, ally.' The race instinct is strong on both sides of the Atlantic. In Great Britain and in the United States it is instinctively felt that one nation depends for its security largely upon the other, and that neither nation can allow the other to go down. The United States and Great Britain are in the same boat. Great Britain realises that it would be a calamity to see the United States defeated by a great mihtary nation, 426 An Anglo-American Reunion which would probably settle on the American Continent and militarise it, and the United States reccgnise that they would become the immediate neighbours of the military Great Powers of Europe if the British fleet should be de- stroyed. So far militarism in its most objectionable form has been restricted to the European Continent and to Japan. The defeat of the United States or of Great Britain might bring about the militarisation of the world. The greatest interest of the overcrowded military nations of Europe and Asia is expansion. The greatest interest of the Anglo-Saxon nations is peace, security, and the restriction of armaments. These blessings can scarcely be obtained by the federation of the world, dreamt of by the late Mr. Stead, or by the federation of Europe, proposed by other dreamers, but only by the federation of the Anglo- Saxon nations. Experience shows that the world can be at peace only if it is controlled by one nation. It will be at peace only when the jpax Bomana has been replaced by the fax Britannica, by the peace of the Anglo-Saxons, when the military Great Powers have, owing to the growth of the Anglo-Saxon nations, become military small Powers. The world must either become Anglo-Saxon or fall a prey to militarism. The arguments in favour of an Anglo-American Eeunion are overwhelming. Great Britain and the United States are one in language, spirit, and tradition — in short, in all the things that count. The argument that they cannot com- bine because one is a monarchy and the other is a republic is a fallacious one. Both are democracies. They differ only in the outer form, but not in the essence and the spirit, of their government. Great Britain has an hereditary president and the United States have an elected king. Eightly considered, Great Britain is the more democratic nation of the two. The King of England has far less power than the President of the United States. Besides, the will of the people is more likely to prevail in Great Britain than in the United States, because Great Britain has an unwritten. Great Prohlemn of British Statesmanship 427 flexible, and therefore truly democratic, constitution, while the United Stati3S have a written, almost unchangeable, and therefore somewhat antiquated, constitution. King- doms and republics may be joined in a single federation. The Empire of Germany, for instance, contains three repub- lics. Last, but not least, democratic nations combine not because their outward forms of government are identical but because they are of one race and have the same interests. The United States and Great Britain should be united on a basis of race solidarity and of the identity of their vital interests. The objection that Great Britain is a European nation with European interests is contradicted by Professor Coolidge, of Harvard University, in his book ' The United States as a World Power,' as follows : Are we to regard Imperial Britain as a European Power, when the greater part of her external interests and difficulties are connected with her situation on other continents ? Are not the vast majority of Englishmen more in touch in every way with Australians, Canadians, Americans than they are with Portuguese, Itahans or Austrians of one sort or another ? What strictly European interests does England represent ? Eome was not built in a day. The reunion of the Anglo- Saxon nations will take time, but it is bound to take place for it is logical and inevitable. The growth of the military Powers and the rapid increase of their fleets must auto- matically bring about an Anglo-Saxon reunion earlier or later. The Hundred Years' Peace would, I think, be most appropriately celebrated by the conclusion on its next anniversary of a treaty of defence by the two great Anglo- Saxon nations, of a treaty which would guarantee to them their peace and the secure possession of their territories, and which would deprive foreign nations of the temptation to attack them singly. Such a step would slacken, or bring to a stop, the naval armament race. Great Britain extends a fraternal hand to her kinsmen across the sea. How completely she has forgotten the revolt 428 An Anglo-American Reunion of her colonies may be seen by the fact that Earl Grey pro- posed in 1913 to erect the statue of George Washington in Westminster Abbey among England's heroes, and to present by public subscription Sulgrave Manor, the ancient family home of the Washingtons in England, to the American nation. Never in the history of the world has a revolutionary leader been more greatly honoured by those against whom he took up arms. Since the time when these pages were written the Great War, which I had foreseen and frequently foretold, has broken out, the United States have jomed the AlUes in their fight for freedom and against tyranny, a new chapter has been opened in the history of the world. An Anglo- American reunion has come within the limits of possibility. The World War may wipe out completely the memory of past misunderstandings and of ancient wrongs. The firmest cement between nations is the remembrance of dangers borne in common. The fathers of the American Eepublic who had cut themselves adrift from England, thought that the Great Eepublic should pursue a purely American policy. In his celebrated Farewell Address of 1796, his political testament, Washington laid down the principles of America's foreign policy in the following words, which are known to every American citizen : Observe good faith and justice towards all nations. Cultivate peace and harmony with all. Eeligion and morality enjoin this conduct ; and can it be that good policy does not equally enjoin it ? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and, at no distant period, a great nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a People always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence. . . . Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence, I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens, the jealousy of a free people ought to be co7istantly awake, since history and Great Problems of British Statesmanship 429 experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican Government. . . . The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little Political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be ful- filled with perfect good faith Here let us stop. Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote, relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary com- binations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. . . . Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation ? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground ? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humour, or caprice ? 'Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world. The policy of isolation and non-interference recom- mended by Washington and his contemporaries has had to be abandoned. America has become a true World- Power. Commenting upon Washington's Farewell Address and the necessity of abandoning the traditional policy of the United States, I wrote in The Nineteenth Century Review in May, 1914, in commenting upon the Mexican imbroglio : Washington wrote in his Farewell Address, ' Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a very remote, relation.' That assertion was formerly correct, but is so no longer. Nowadays Great Britain is vitally inter- ested in American, and the United States are equally vitally interested in European, policy. Neither can safely allow that the position of the other should become jeopardised. 430 An Anglo-American Reunion Both are vitally interested in the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. Both are vitally interested in seeing the military Great Powers of the world divided against themselves. If these should combine, or if one of them should obtain the supremacy in Europe, it might mean the end not only of Great Britain but also of the United States. When Washington wrote, ' 'Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world,' the United States could stand alone. At that time a combination of military Powers possessed of powerful navies was inconceivable. Besides, formerly the United States could be attacked by no European nation except Great Britain, because all the other nations lacked ships. As the United States cannot safely meet single-handed a joint attack by the Great Powers, they must endeavour to meet a hostile combination by a counter-combination. If serious complications should arise out of the Mexican War, we must stand shoulder to shoulder with the United States, with or without a treaty of alliance. In defending the United States against a joint attack of the military Great Powers we defend ourselves. Policy should be not merely national but should be racial. Accidents have divided the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race, but necessity may again bring them together. Herein lies the hope of the future. We may not approve of Mr. Wilson's policy, but we must bear in mind that he has acted with the best intentions. America's troubles are our troubles. We cannot afford to see the United States defeated or humiliated. The present moment seems eminently favourable not only for offering to the United States our unconditional support in case of need, but for approaching them with a view to the conclusion of a care- fully limited defensive alliance. Such an alliance would be the strongest guarantee for the maintenance of the world's peace. The Mexican War may have the happiest conse- quences upon Anglo-American relations, and it may eventu- ally bring about an Anglo-American reunion. At the time these lines were written the political horizon Great Problems of British Statesmanship 431 of Europe seemed free from clouds. On the other hand, it appeared possible that the Mexican trouble might involve the United States in difficulties with some European military Power or Powers. It seemed more likely that Great Britain might have to come to the aid of the United States than the United States to the aid of Great Britain. Providence has willed it otherwise, and perhaps it is better so. If, as is devoutly to be hoped, the Anglo-American brotherhood in arms should lead to the establishment of a great brother- hood in peace of all the English-speaking peoples — to an Anglo-American reunion — a great step would have been taken in strengthening the cause of freedom and the peace of the world. The British Empire and the United States combined would not dominate the world. Anglo-Saxondom has no desire for such domination. Possessing only small standing armies, merely a police force, other States need not fear their aggression. On the other hand, the numbers of their citizens, the power of their industries which can be mobilised for war, and their great wealth, would make the combined Anglo-Saxon nations the most powerful factor in preserving the peace of the world, while their own peace would in all probability be secured by their reunion for an indefinite period. Nowhere in the world does the white population increase more rapidly than in the United States and in the British Dominions. To all who have the welfare of the Anglo-Saxon race at heart it must be clear that not the least benefit of the Great War would consist in the reunion of the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race, in the recreation of the British Empire in its greatest glory. The hope to secure the peace of the world by arbitration treaties or by some great international organisation such as a federation or a great league of nations, may prove an illusion. All attempts to ehminate war by mutual agree- ment among States have failed since the time when the Greek States created their Amphyctionic Council. All endeavours to link together the satisfied and the land- hungry nations and to combine them for the defence of the 432 An Anglo-American Reunion territorial status quo may prove futile. The peace of the world can most easily be maintained not by creating an artificial and unnatural partnership between nations of different and, perhaps, irreconcilable aims and interests, a partnership which will break down at the first opportunity, but by creating a permanent partnership between the freedom-loving and peace-loving Anglo-Saxon nations which in addition have the advantage of belonging to the same race, of speaking the same language, of having the same < ideals, the same laws, and the same traditions. A British-American union devised for the protection of their possessions against foreign attack should be the most powerful instrument imaginable not only for protecting the future peace of the Anglo-Saxons but also for protecting the peace of the world. ANALYTICAL INDEX. Note. — The letter ' f ' following a page number signifies ' and following page ' ; ' fi,' ' and following pages.' Adriatic, Position on the ..... Agriculture, British and German compared . „ Development of, 1800-43 „ „ Reason of backwardness of Alabama Incident ...... Alexander I and Lord Castlereagh at Vienna Congresss „ and Napoleon I . . . . ,, Czartoryski on character of Alexander II, Policy of, towards Poland Alliance, Austro-German, of 1879, Text of „ Holy, Activities of, in Spain and New World „ ,, Treaty and text of . . . „ „ „ Additions to, made in Verona Alsace-Lorraine, Importance of iron beds in . Amclot de la Houssaye on Government of Venice . America — See United States. Anglo-American Differences, how kept alive Anglo-American Reunion, Admiral Mahan on Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 .... Arabia, Strategical value of ... Aristotle on Democracy and Government Army, American — See United States. Army, British. See England. Asia Minor, Populousness of, in antiquity „ „ Strategical and economic significance of Asiatic Turkey, Danger of integrity of . Danger of partition of . England should become its guardian England's claims to France's claims to German leaders on value of . Greece's claims to Italy's claims to . Nationalities of . Neutralisation of, desirable, . Position of, resembles that of Switzerland Russia's claims to ... 433 416 ff 4, 130 ff 247 ff . 229 . 249 . 412 . 36 f . 24 ff . 23 f . 172 ff .201 ff .403 ff . 36 ff .403 f . 286 f 304 ff 423 294, 296, 401 ff f, 425 400 94 f 97, 299, 342 68 . 66 6, 56 ff f, 70 f, 102 70 101 ff 77 77 ff 60 ff 76 f 77 68 101 ff 72 ff 75 f 74 ff, 434 Analytical Index Asiatic Turkey, Sparse population of ... „ „ Strategical and economic significance of „ „ Value of, in hands of strong military Power Assyria and Babylonia, Ancient prosperity of Athens, Causes of decline of . Ausgleich of 1867 in Austria-Hungary . Austria-Hungary, Ausgleich of 1867 in . „ „ Characteristic ingratitude of „ „ Church in, is part of the bureaucracy „ „ has created Ukrainian movement „ „ Hates and persecutes the Italians „ „ Illegitimacy in . „ „ Illiteracy in ... . „ „ Ill-treatment of Serbia by, since 1690 „ „ is a mediaeval survival „ „ is and may remain a German vassal „ „ is governed by the maxim Divide et Impera „ „ may establish a federation after the War „ „ Nationalities of, enumerated „ „ Position of, .... . „ „ „ Czechs in „ ,, „ Italians in „ „ „ Poles in . „ „ „ Rumanians in . „ Ruthenians in . PAGE 60, 65 . 56 fE 57 £E, 61 £E 95 fE ,294 fE 114 f 119 fE 119 fE 116 f 112 124 f 130 fE 113 f 113 115 f 109 106 fE 112, 114 143 £E . Ill 6 £E, 105 £E .125 ff .130 £E .120 ff .140 ff 120, 121, 124 Possibility of acquisition of South German States and Silesia by . . . . 6 f, 128 ff Press of 112 f, 117 f „ „ Prince Lichnowsky's opinion of . „ „ Probability of disintegration of . „ „ Rehgions in .... . „ „ Revolution of 1848 in . . . „ ., Suppression of nationalities in „ „ The Emperor is the State in „ „ The problem of .... „ „ tried to Germanise nationalities under Joseph II Austro-German Alliance Treaty of 1879, Text of . 106 141 f 113 118 ff 115 ff 112 105 ff 117 201 ff Babylonia and Assyria, Ancient prosperity of Bacon, Lord, on Cabinet Government . Bagehot, on British Constitution . Baghdad Railway ..... Balkan States ...... Bavaria, King of, and German Constitution , Belgium, Unreadiness of, in 1914 . Benedek, Field-Marshal, ungrateful treatment of Bismarck, and Anglo-Russian antagonism Anti-Poiish policy of, British diplomats on , 95 ff , 332 f , 295 f 59, 61 4, 48, 51, 52, 53 .195 ff . 293 f . 115 . 44 173, 175, 176, 177 laid down that German Emperor might not declare war of aggression ........ 198 f on Cabinet Government . . . 317, 318, 319, 320 on his Polish policy 173 f, 188 Analytical Index Bismarck on ingratittide of liberated nations „ on Monroe Doctrine ...... „ on Political Testament of Peter the Great „ on strategical significance of Constantinople . „ on „ „ of Egypt and Suez Canal „ on the German Constitution and the rights of Emperor ...... 195 „ opposed a war of aggression „ successfully opposed Liberalism in Russia ,, „ ,, Russian concessions to the Pok Blackstone on democracy and amateurishness Bohemia and Moravia, Position of .... Brantome on Franco -Turkish Alliance Buchanan, President, Weakness of ... . Budget, British, of 1815, details of ... . Budgets, British, of 1792 and 1815 compared 435 PAGE . 53 . 413 . 19 . 46 f . 49 f the ff, 207 £E . 199 . 172 .172 £E . 342 .125 £E . 79 351, 391 .225 ff .226 ff Cabinet, British, and Act of Settlement „ „ Lord John Russell on . ,, „ Lord Morley on „ Government, Alexander Hamilton on „ ., Bismarck on „ „ Blackstone on „ „ Evolution of, in England „ ,, Frederick the Great on „ ,, Lord Bacon on . „ „ Napoleon I on ■ . „ ,, Professor Lowell on „ ., Ptichelieu on „ ., Sir John Forescue on . Weakness of 12 f, 312 ff, 317 ,, ,, William Pitt and Canning, George, and Monroe Doctrine Canning, Sir Stratford, and Crimean War Capitulations, lOstory of Turkish Oastlereagh, Lord, at Congress of Vienna Charles, King of Rumania's protest against ill-treatment of Ru- manians in Hungary . . . . . . . . 140 f Civil War— See United States. Coal, Prices of, in England and elsewhere compared . . . 241 „ Production in England, 1806-45 231 „ „ per man in England and elsewhere compared .239 ff Congress of Peace and After. . . . . . . .Iff Conseil d'Etat, Advantages of ...... . 324 f Conscription, American — See United States. Constantinople, Bismarck on strategical significance of . . . 46 f ,, Danger of neutralising or of giving it to small Power 4, 52 „ Exposed position of . . . . . . 47 ff ,, in Russian hands would require huge garrison . 48 f „ is dominated by Balkan Peninsula ... 51 „ Marmont on strategical significance of . . .51 „ Mazzini on . . . . . . . .52 . 337 . 340 . 340 326 f, 360 f, 362 ff 317, 318, 319, 320 . 342 .327 ff . 321 . 332 f . 341 . 339 f .310 ff .329 ff ff, 343 ff, 361 ff, 391 ff . 338 f .405 ff 88 f, 93 . 79 ff 36 f, 167 ff 436 Analytical Index Constantinople, Napoleon I and .... „ promised to Russia by Napoleon I „ Russia's claims to . . . „ Talleyrand on strategical value of. „ The problem of . Constitution, American — See United States. „ British, Bagehot on . „ „ was modelled on that of Venice „ weakness of. .12 f, 294 ff, 343 „ German, and Emperor's powers Co-operative Societies, Polish, Record of Cotton Industry, Development of British, 1801-45 . Cracow, Republic of, Extinguished by Austria Crimean War, Causes of .... . Czartoryski, Prince Adam, on Alexander I . Czechs, Position of, in Austria-Hungary „ Prussia appeals to the, against Austria in 1866 fi, PAGE . 16 ff . 25 ff . 4 f, 51, 54 . 51 . 4 f, 14 ff . 295 f 303 ff, 336 f 361 ff, 391 ff .190 ff . 123 f, 183 . 230 . 123, 165 f . 40 ff, 87 ff . 23 .125 ff . 125 f D Dalmatia 4, 130, 133 Debt, British National, How to deal with the 10 ff, 249 ff, 287 ff, 291 ff „ „ ,, Increase of the ..... .218 ff Democracy and Government, Alexander Hamilton on 326 f, 358, 360 f, 362 ff Amelot de la Houssayc on . .304 ff Aristotle on 294, 296, 297, 299, 342 Bismarck on . . 317, 318, 319, 320 Blackstone on .... 342 Demosthenes on . . . 301 f, 302 Frederick the Great on . . . 321 Isocrates on .... . 297 Lord Bacon on . . . . 332 f Machiavelli on . . . . 300, 345 Napoleon I on . . . 322 ff, 341 Professor Lowell on . . . . 339 f Polybius on 298 Richelieu on 310 ff Sir John Fortescue on . . .329 ff Thucydides on . . . 295, 298, 299 William Pitt on . . . 338 f „ Inadequacy of, in war ..... 293 ff Demosthenes on Democratic Government .... 301 f, 302 Dictatorship, Advantages of ..... 344 ff, 394 f „ Machiavelli on, 344 f E Egypt, Bismarck on strategical value of Historic longing of France for possession of Napoleon's desire for Napoleon on strategical value of offered by Russia to England in 1853 Strategical importance of . Elizabeth, Government of Queen . 49 f 20 ff 20 ff 49 f 42 20 ff 334 f Analytical Index 437 Emperor, German — See German Emperor. Empire, British, Bismarck on value of Egypt to . . . . 49 f ,, „ Insignificanco of, in 1800 ..... 227 Possibilities of the . .11 S, 258 ff, 287 ff, 289 ff ,, „ should assume part of War Debt . . . 11 f, 291 f ,, ,, Wealth and potentialities of, and of United States compared ... 258 fE, 287 ff, 290 ff ., ,, why envied by other nations . . . .418 ff Engine-power in Great Britain and United States compared . ,235 ff England, Agricultural development of, 1800-43 . . . .229 „ Agriculture of, and German agriculture compared . .247 ff „ and Russia at war in time of Napoleon I ... 33 „ „ „ Cause of distrust between . . . 15 ff, 44 f „ „ „ in Crimean War . . . . . . 41 ff ,, and United States during Venezuela trouble . . . 413 ,, „ „ „ how estranged ..... 401 f „ „ „ „ England's consistently friendly attitude 414 ff, 425 ff Attitude of .towards partition of Poland 154 ff, 166 ff, 176 ft", 178 ff „ Claims of, to part of Asiatic Turkey .... 77 Coal production in 231, 239 ff „ Consistently friendly policy of, towards United States 414 ff, 425 ff „ Economy, Mr. Asquith on necessity of, in . . . 252 f „ Evolution of Cabinet Government in . . . .327 ff „ has pursued a racial, not a national, policy . 414 ff, 425 ff ,, how reconciled with France ...... 400 f industrial development of 1800-46 229 ff „ Luxury in, at beginning of the War . . . .253 ff „ Napoleon proposes Indian invasion to strike at . 22 f, 31 ff „ National income of, in 1814 ...... 221 f in 1907 216 „ Neglect of history in ...... . 349 „ Production and engine-power per man in . . .235 ff „ Population, increase of, from 1801-41 .... 228 f „ Savings Banks Deposits in Germany, United States, and in 251 „ spent in war against Napoleon one-third of national .221 ff . 349 f .412 ff .403 ff .410 ff .282 ff . 20 ff .243 ff . 216 ff .258 ff .219 ff wealth and income „ Study of statesmanship neglected in „ supported United States during war against Spain „ supported United States against Holy Alhance „ supported United States against Napoleon III „ Vast increase of production in, during the War „ Vast war programme of Directoire against „ Wages in, and in United States compared „ War finance and economic future of „ Wealth of, and of United States compared Executive — See .Cabinet. Expenditure, Increase of national, during Napoleonic War E Federalist, Extracts from, on Government 326 f, 357 ff, 360 f, 362 ff, 364 f Fortescue, Sir John, on Democracy and Cabinet Government . .329 ff France — See also Napoleon. „ and Syria 87 ff 438 Analytical Index France, Claims of, to part of Asiatic Tiukey . . . 77 fF, 93 f, 104 „ Conseil d'Etat, Advantages of . . . . . . 324 f ,, Economic ruin of, at French Revolution . . . .322 ff I „ Historic policy of, towards Turkey . . . . , 78 ff ,, History of Protectorate over Eastern Christians . . . 78 ff „ how reconciled with England ...... 400 f ,, Reorganisation of, by Napoleon I .... .322 ff ,, should she continue protecting Eastern Christians ? . 87 ff, 93 f Franco-Turkish Alliance, History of the . . . . . 78 ff Frederick the Great on Cabinet Government . . . . .321 „ Policy of, regarding Poland . . . .148 ff „ „ towards Austria . . . .159 „ „ towards Russia . . . 148 ff, 159 Turkey . . . . 158 f „ Secret Treaty of, with Prussia, regarding Poland . 149 ff ,, was moving spirit in partition of Poland . .161 Frederick William III broke his promises to the Poles . . .169 f Free Trade not responsible for Britain's industrial development ,228 ff G Galicia, Racial position in . . . . . . 120, 121, 124 f George I and British Constitution. ...... 336 German-Austrian Alliance of 1879, Text of 201 ff German Emperor has no right to declare aggressive war . 193 f, 198 ff " " ~ .195 ff .190 ff .195 ff .213 ff 6ff, is not the Emperor of Germany . „ „ Position of the ...... „ „ Prince Bismarck on rights and power of „ „ was poisibly tool of army in declaring war Germany — Sec also Prussia, Frederick the Great, Bismarck, &c „ Agriculture of, and British agriculture compared ,, and Austria-Hungary „ and Asia Minor .... „ and United States .... „ Bavaria and the Constitution of „ has been created for defence „ has made Austria-Hungary her vassal „ Iron industry of, and British iron industry compared 245 ff, 286 f „ „ „ based on Alsace- Lorraine ore beds . . 286 f „ is a federation, not a single State .... .191 ff „ Savings Banks Deposits in ..... . 251 „ Sovereignty of, resides not in Emperor . . . .192 ff „ why pretended having been attacked in 1914 . . .210 ff „ would dominate Europe after absorption of Austria-Hungary 107 f Ghent, Treaty of 398 Great Britain — See England. Greece, Claims of, to part of Asiatic Turkey . . . . 76 f, 104 .247 ff 105 ff . 57 ff 419 f, 422 f, 424 .195 ff . 193 f . 106 f H Habsburgs follow a purely dynastic policy „ Hereditary peculiarities of „ Ingratitude of, towards eminent men „ Matrimonial and territorial policy of Rise of ..... .112 ff . 109 114 . 109 f , 109 f Analytical Index 439 FAQB Habsburgs tried to Germanise Austria-Hungary . . . .117 Hamilton, Alexander, on Cabinet Government . 326 f, 360 f, 362 ff Henry VII, Government of 332 f Henry VIII, Government of 332 f Hoherdohe, Prince, quoted ........ 44 Holy Alliance, Activities of, in Spain and the New World . .403 ff „ „ Treaty and text of . . . . . . 37 ff „ „ „ Additions made to, at Verona . . .403 ff Holy Places of Christianity, Position of . . . . . 87 ff Horse-powers in British and American industries compared . .235 ff „ Total in Great Britain and United States compared . 259 Hundred Years' Peace Celebration . ..... .398 ff Hungary — See also Magyars. Deak recommended racial toleration .... 139 Educational injustice in . . . . . . . 138 ff Growing ascendancy of, over Austria . . . .120 f Hostility to Austria . . . . 116, 117, 119 ff is an oligarchy ........ 135 Misleading racial statistics of . . . . . . 134 f Oppression of nationalities in . . . . . . 120 f „ Rumanians in . . . . . .139 ff Parliamentary institutions of, arc a fraud .... 135 ff Racial tyranny of . . . . . . . .134 ff Revolution of, in 1848 118 ff I Idleness natural to men ........ 232 Income, British national, in 1814 ....... 221 f Industry, development of British, 1800-46 229 ff India, Difficulty of invading. . . . . . . . 44 f „ Interest of, in Mesopotamia and Persian Gulf . . •. 94 ff „ Planned invasion of, by revolutionary France . . . 21 ff by Napoleon I . . . . 22 f, 31 ff Iron and steel industries, British, German criticism of . . . 246 Development of British, 1800-46 . . 231 „ „ „ „ German, are dependent upon Lorraine ore beds 286 f „ „ ,, ,, in Germany and United Kingdom com- pared .... 245 ff, 287 „ „ „ ,, in United States and United Kingdom . compared ..... 286 Irredenta Italia . . . . . . . . • . 130 ff Islam — See Mohammedanism. Isocrates on Democracy and Government ..... 297 Istria 4, 130, 133 Italians, Position of, in Austria-Hungary ..... 130 ff Italy, Claims of, to part of Asiatic Turkey .... 77, 104 „ is hated by Austria-Hungary ...... 130 ff J Japan and the United States 419 f, 422 f Jefferson, President, and Monroe Doctrine ..... 407 f Jerusalem — See Holy Places. Joseph II, tried to Germanise Austria ..... 117 440 Analytical Index Kossuth, Louis, Policy of K PAGE 119 Labour, Productivity of, in Great Britain and United States pared Lincoln, President, and Civil War „ „ Autocratic power of „ „ Character of . „ „ introduces conscription „ „ Lord Bryce on „ „ on advantage of one-man Executive „ „ on bitter need of troops „ „ on New York di'aft riots ., „ Speech on the fallen „ „ Suspends Habeas Corj)us „ „ was elected by a minority Lowell, Professor, on Cabinet Government com- 235 £E 351, 353 f, 356, 365 £E .391 f 365 f, 391 .374 ff . 391 . 365 . 395 .385f . 397 .367f . 351 . 339 M Machiavelli on advantages of Dictatorship „ on Democracy and Government . Machinery, in Great Britain and United States compare Madison, President, and Monroe Doctrine Magyars, how distributed in Hungary . „ monopolise Civil Service, Parliament, &c. „ Racial tyranny of . „ Relations between Austrians and . . 116 „ Small number of . Mahan, Admiral, on Anglo-American reunion . 416 „ „ on importance of Persian Gulf Malta and revolutionary France , . . . Manufacturing industries — *See Industries. Maria Theresa and partition of Poland . Marmont on strategical value of Constantinople Mazzini on Constantinople ..... Mecca and Medina ...... Mesopotamia, England's claims to . . . „ Former prosperity of . . . „ Possibilities of irrigation in Metternich, Prince, on Holy Alliance . Mexico, Napoleon Ill's designs on . . . Troubles of, in 1861 .... Mohammedanism, Position and possibihties of Monroe Doctrine, Bismarck on the „ Danger of the, to the United States „ Genesis of. . „ has consistently been defended by England „ Homer Lea, on . „ how regarded on the Continent . „ President Jefferson and „ President Madison and . 344 f . 300 .235 fE . 408 . 134 f .135fi .134 ff 117, 119 ff HI, 134 , 423 f, 425 . 94 f . 21 . 159 . 61 . 52 63, 101 . 94 ff . 95 fi . 98 ff . 39 f .410ff . 410 . 62 ff . 413 .420 ff .403 ff .413 ff . 421 . 421 . 407 f . 408 Analytical Index Monroe Doctrine proposed by England Text of j . Munitions, British Ministry of 441 PAGE .403 S . 409 .283 fif N Napoleon I, Achievements of, as an organiser . . „ advocates invasion of India „ advocates reconciliation with Russia „ i and Alexander I conclude Peace and Treaty of Tilsit ,, [and Alexander I meet on the Niemen „ and Constantinople . . . . , „ and Peter the Great's Political Testament . ,, desires Russia's alliance against England „ Eastern pohcy of .... . „ i Instructions of, regarding Turkey „ on strategical value of Egypt and Suez Canal . 20 „ Policy of, regarding Egypt „ proposes partition of Turkey „ proposes that Russia should have Constantinople „ tried to dupe Alexander I at Tilsit ,, wished to push -Russia back into Asia Napoleon Ill's designs on Mexico in 1861 National Debt — See Debt, National. Nesselrode, Count, and Crimean War .... „ „ on neutrality of Switzerland „ „ Policy of, regarding Turkey New York draft riots ...... Nicholas I, Policy of, regarding Turkey Nicholas II, quoted . ...... .322 £E f, 31 ff 26 26 ff 26 16 ff 19 24 ff 25 ff 86 f ff, 49 f 20 ff 25 ff 25 ff 26 ff 35 410 ff 91 ff 73 f 40 385 f 40 ff 44 O'Meara, quoted One-man Executive, Advantage of Organisation, Rules of good Output, Limitation of, in England 22 f 50 308 ff, 344 f, 360 ff . 344 . 246 f, 250 Palestine — See Holy Places. Palmerston, Policy of, towards Turkey .... Panama Canal, Vulnerability of . Panslavism, unjustified fear of .... . Paul I of Russia and invasion of India Peace Congress, The, and After ..... Peace is responsible for England's industrial backwardness Pericles, Character of ...... Persian Gulf, Strategical importance of ... Peter the Great, Political Testament of ... „ „ proposes partition of Poland Peter III, Secret PoUsh treaty with Frederick the Great Pitt, the Elder, and Cabinet Government Poland and Congress of Vienna Bismarck's policy towards . 422 . 142 f . l22f . 1 ff 234, 280 f 298, 299 94 f, 100 . 17 ff . 152 .149 ff .338f .166 ff 172 ff, 180, 188 442 Analytical Index Poland British diplomatic reports on 154, 156, 157, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178 „ First partition of, Catherine the Great and . . .152 fE Frederick the Great and Lord SaUsbury on Maria Theresa and Peter III and Stanislaus Augustus' appeal to the Great Great past of ..... independent, value of, as a buffer State Partition of, England's remonstrance against „ „ Henry Wheaton and Koch on. „ „ Lord Castlereagh's protest against „ „ Peter the Great and proposed in 1700 Prussia's jiolicy towards, was part of her Russian pohcy 148 ff, 170 ff Record of co-operative societies in Recreation of, independent, consequences of, to Germany ...... Rising of, in 1863 ..... „ „ „ British diplomatic reports on .148 fE 161, 184, 185 . 159 .149 ff Catherine . 157 . 151 . 181 166 ff, 178 ff . 146 f . 36, 167 ff . 152 . 152 123 f, 183 Russia and .171 ff .175 ff 173, 175, 176, 177 ,, „ „ „ Earl Russell's despatch on . . .178 ff ,, Second partition of . . . . . . . .162 ff ,, should preserve connection with Russia . . 8 f, 183 ff „ The problem of 8 f, 146 ff ,, Third partition of ....... . 165 „ Weakness of Government of ..... . 151 f Poles, Denationalisation of, England's attitude towards 166 ff, 178 ff Grand Duke Nicholas' appeal to . . . . . 121 f Numbers of ........ . 183 Position of, in Austria-Hungary ..... .120 ff Prussia's treatment of the ...... 169 f Russia's pohcy towards the .... 122 ff, 146 ff Polybius on Democracy and Government ..... 298 Prague, National position in ....... 126 f President, American, is Commander-in-Chief of Army and Navy . 364 f Power of the ... 326 f, 359 ff, 391 Privy CouncU, Advantages of efficient . . 329 ff, 332, 337, 346 f Production, British and American, per worker compared . .235 ff „ British, per worker has doubled during War . .282 ff Protectorate, French, over Eastern Christians . . . . 78 ff Prussia — See also Germany. Appeals to Czechs against Austria in 1866 . . . 125 f Greatness of, established by three great rulers . . .316 Land pui'chase policy of, in Polish districts . . .183 Polish policy of 148 ff, 170 ff, 186 f PoUsh newspapers on Government of . . . . 186 f R Reunion, an Anglo-American RicheUeu, on Cabinet Government Rumanians, Ill-treatmeat of, in Hungary 13, 398 ff .310 ff .140 ff Analytical Index Russell, Lord John, and Crimean War . Russia, and Turkey in Crimean War Backwardness of ... . Cause of distrust between England and Claims of, to Asiatic Turkey Claims of, to Constantinople Economic value of Constantinople to Exploitation of, by Germany Frederick the Great's policy towards Fundamental peacefulness of Interests of, in Holy Land offers England Egypt in 1853 . Polish policy of ... . „ „ was made in Germany Ruthenians in Austria-Hungary . 443 PAfiE . 91 40 ff, 87 ff . 45 f 15 ff, 44 f 75 f, 104 4 f, 19 f 4 f, 19 f . 181 .148 ff 45, 142 f . 93 f . 42 .147 ff . ISO f 120, 121, 124 f S St. Louis, Letter of, to Maronites , . . . Salisbury, Lord, on Crimean War .... „ „ on Poland ..... Savings Banks Deposits, in England, Germany, and United Serbia, Ill-treatment of, by Austria, since 1690 Position of .... 3, 4, 48, Serbians, Number of ...... . Slavonic Congress of 1908 ...... Smith, Sydney, on British taxation .... Spanish-American War, England's attitude during . Statesmanship, Study of, neglected in England Suez Canal, Bismarck on strategical value of „ „ Construction of, ordered by revolutionary Fr „ „ Great increase in traffic of ... „ „ Importance of . „ „ Napoleon on strategical value of Sumter, Bombardment of Fort ..... Switzerland, why neutralised at Congress of Vienna Syria, French claims to ... • . 161, States 78 f 45 , 184, 185 251 . 115 f, 134 51, 62, 53, 133 f . 134 . 142 . 224 f . 412 . 349 f . 49 f ance . 20 . 67 . 100 . 49 f . 351 . 72 ff . 87 ff Talleyrand, diplomatic activities of . . . „ on strategical value of Constantinople . Taxation, British, in 1792 and 1815 compared „ in 1815, details of . . . „ Increase of, during Napoleonic War „ Sydney Smith on . . . high, benefit of .... „ reformed British industry Tax-collector is the greatest civilising factor Telephones in United States and Great Britain compared Thucydides on Democracy and Government . Tilsit, Peace and Treaty of . Trade unions, British, most dangerous feature of Trentino ........ Trieste ........ . 21 f, 27 f . 51 ,226 ff .225 ff .219 ff 224 10 ff! 232 f .232 ff . 232 . 259 295, 298, 299 . 26 ff . 247 . 130 . 130, 133 444 Analytical Index PAGE Turkey and Russia in Crimean War . . . . . . 40 £E „ Asiatic — See Asiatic Turkey. „ Frederick the Great's Policy towards . . . . 158 f ,, History of Capitulations .... „ Napoleon I's instructions regarding . „ Partition of, proposed by Catherine the Great „ „ „ by Napoleon I Tyrol 79 ff 86 f 20 25 £E, 130 U Ukrainian movement ...,...., 124 f United Kingdom — See England. United States — See also Lincoln, Monroe Doctrine, Hamilton, &c. „ Advantages of Constitution of . 12 f, 325 ff, 357 ff, 36GfE „ „ and England,*England has been consistently friendly towards former . . 414 ft', 425 fE „ „ „ „ how kept estranged . . . 414 ff, „ and Germany . ... 419 f, 422 f,^424 and Japan Army, desertions from . „ strength of, in 1861 Civil War, Confusion during 420, 423 372, 384 .351 f . 355 f Cost of . . ... .262 If „ „ could have been avoided . . 13, 390 f „ „ created industrial supremacy of . . 280 f ,, „ defective armaments .... 369 f „ Effect of, upon agriculture . 263, 268, 269 ,, „ ,, ,, fiscal policy . . . 272 ,, „ „ ,, industrial organisation . 277 „ Machinery . .268, 275 ff „ „ „ „ manufacturing industries 266 ff, 271 f, 273 ff „ „ „ „ National Debt and taxa- tion. . . .263f „ „ „ „ Population and wealth .264 ff „ „ ,, „ railway development .269 ff „ „ Habeas Corpus suspended . . .366 ff „ „ Losses during ..... 389 f „ „ Number of soldiers raised during . . 388 f „ Outbreak of 350 ff „ „ President Lincoln's difficulties dm-ing .351 ff „ „ Treason during ..... 355 f Coal production in Great Britain and, compared .239 ff Engine-power „ „ „ .235 ff Importance of conservation movement in . . 289 „ Geological Survey in . . . 289 „ Inter-State Commerce Commission in 289 Mihtary achievements of, in Civil War . . 13, 349 ff „ Unpreparedness of, in Civil War . 13, 351 ff Population and wealth of, before Civil War . . 387 f Potentialities of British Empire and, compared . 260 President, Powers of .... . 359 ff Production per worker in Great Britain and, com- pared 235 ff Analytical Index 445 PAGE United States— Reunion with Great Britain . . . .13, 398 fE „ „ Railway mileage in British Empire and, compared . 260 „ „ Savings Banks Deposits in Great Britain and, com- pared ........ 251 „ „ Situation in, before Civil War. . . . .350 11 „ „ Supported by England against Holy Alliance . .403 ff „ Napoleon III . .410 ff „ „ „ „ during war with Spain . 412 f „ „ Telephones in United Kingdom and, compared . 260 f „ „ Total horse-powers in United Kingdom and, com- pared 259 „ „ Wages in Great Britain and, compared . . . 243 f „ „ Water-powers in . . . . . . . 259 „ ,, Wealth of, and of British Empire, compared 258 ff, 287 ff, 290 ff „ „ were unified by war with England . . . 412 „ „ why envied by other nations . . . .418 ff V Vandal, Albert, quoted ........ 35 Venezuela trouble Venice, Causes of decline of . Venice, Constitution of, resembled that of England Verona, Congress and Treaty of . 413 .303 ff 303 ff, 336 f . 403 f Vienna, Congress 9 f, 36 f, 72 f, 106 ff W Wages in Great Britain and United States compared . . . 243 f War, Beneficial effect of, upon industry . 232 ff, 251 ff, 280 ff „ Cost of the Great . . " . . . . 216 ff, 257 „ „ „ against Napoleon I .... . .218 ff „ Debt, How to deal with the . . 10 ff, 249 ff, 287 ff, 291 ff „ unifies nations ......... 402 Washington, George, on preparedness for war .... 390 Pohtical Testament of . . . .428 ff Wealth, National, of United States and British Empire compared .258 ff WiUcox, Sir W., on irrigation of Mesopotamia . . . . 98 ff WiUiam II has violated the German Constitution . . -8, 204 ff „ vowed to observe the Constitution . . . .204 ff „ was possiblj'^ forced by army into War in 1914 . . 213 f Workers, British, Production of, has doubled during War . .282 ff AT THE PAI.r.ANTYNE PRESS PRINTED BY SPOTTISWOODE, BALLANTYNE AND CO. 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