7 ■V /> >t i ' Glass Book 2J / LETTER FROM THE HON. TIMOTHY PICKERING, A SENATOR OF THE UNITED STATES ST A IT. 01 if AS SETTS, IIIHITING TO HIS CONSTITUENTS A VIEW OF THE IMMINENT DANGER OF AN UNNECESSARY AND RUINOUS WAR. ADDRESSED TO HIS EXCELLENCY JAMES 3L'T,-,TVAN , GOVERNORS. ILL SAID SI.!:*.' ',' BOSTON : PRINTED BT CREEXOUGH AND STEBB1XS. 1 808. TO THE READER. i THE following is a publick Letter. It is very properly addressed to the Governor, and through him to the Legislature : by this channel it would have come most regularly to the eye of the whole people. It is not known to the publishers why it has not been already printed for the use of the publick ; — whether it is only delayed, or intended to be entirely with- held. But a copy, which was sent from Washington, after the original, to a private friend, has been happily obtained for the press. If at this day any honest citizen cm doubt of the great credit and weight to which the facts and opinions of the Writer arc f u'rly entitled, •-uch citizen is referred to the Writer's enemies for information. Among these many of the most respectable will say, that his pure patriotism and intrepid publick virtue have honoured the name of Republican in our country, and would have honoured the best of the Romans, in the best days of Rome. Boston, March 9tl>, 1808. CITY OF WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 1G, 1808. SIR, IN the even current of ordinary times, an addrefs from a Senator in Congrefs to his conftituents might be difpenfed with. In fuch times, the proceedings of the Executive and Legiflature of the United States, exhibited in their publlck aBs, might be fufficient. But the prefent fingular condition of our country, when its mod interefting concerns, wrapt up in myftcry, excite univcrfal alarm, requires me to be no longer filcnt. Perhaps I am liable to cenfure, at fuch a crifis, for not fooner prefenting, to you and them, fuch a view of our national affairs as my official litu- ation has placed in my power. I now addrefs it to yon, "Sir, as the proper organ of communication to the legiflature. The attainment of truth is ever defirable : and I cannot per- mit myfelf to doubt that the ftatement I now make muft be accept- able to all who have an agency in directing the affairs, and who are guardians of the intcrefts of our Commonwealth, which fo materially depend on the mcafures of the Government of the Nation. At the fame time, I am aware of the jealoufy with which, in thefe unhappy days of party diflenfions, my communications may, by fome of my conftituents, be received. Of this I will not complain : while I eameftly wiih the fame jealoufy to be extended towards all pub- lick men. Yet I may claim fome (hare of attention and credit — that fhare which is due to the man who defies the world to point, in the whole courfe of a long and publick life, at one inftance of deception, at a fingle departure from truth. The embargo demands the firft notice. For perhaps no aft of the National Government has ever produced fo muoh folicitude, or fpread fuch univerfal alarm. Becaufe all naturally conclude, that a meafure pregnant with incalculable mifchief to all claflcs of our fel- low-citizens, would not have been propofed by the Prefident, and adopted by Congrefs, but for caufes deeply affecting the interefts and fafety of the nation. It mud have been under the influence of this opinion that the legiflative bodies of fome States have exprcfT- ed their approbation of the Embargo, either explicitly, or by im- plication. The following were all the papers laid by the Prefident before Congrefs, as the grounds of the Embargo. 1. The proclamation of the King of Great-Britain requiring the return of his fubjeds, the feamen efpecially, from foreign countries, to aid, in this hour of peculiar danger, in the defence of their own. But it being an acknowledged principle, that every nation has a rirrht to the fervice of its fubjeds in time of war, that proclamation could not furnifh the flightcft: ground for an Embargo. 2. The extract of a letter from the Grand Judge Regnier to the French Attorney General for the Council of Prizes. This contained a partial interpretation of the imperial blockading decree of November 21, 1806. This decree, indeed, and its interpreta- tion, prefent flagrant violations of our neutral rights, and of the cx- ifling treaty between the United States and France : but Hill, the execution of that decree could not (from the fmall number of French cruifers) extenfively interrupt our trade. Thcfe two pa- pers were publick. P>. The letter from our Minifter, Mr. Armflroog, to Mr. Cham- pagny, the French Minifter of Foreign Aflairs : and 4. Mr. Champagny's anfwer. Both thefe ought, in form or fubftance, alfo to have been made publick. The latter would have furnifhed to our nation fome idea of the views and expectations of France. But both were withdrawn by the Prefident, to be depof- ited among other Executive fecrets : while neither prefented any new ground to juflify an Embargo. In the vSenate, thefe papers were referred to a committee. The committee quickly reported a bill for laying an Embargo, agreea- bly to the Prefider.t's propofal. This was read a firft, a fecond, and a third time, and palled ; and all in the fliort compafs of about four hours ! A little time was repeatedly aiked, to obtain further information, and to confider a meafure of fuch moment, of fuch univerfal concern : but thefe requefts were denied. We were hur- ried into the paiTage of the bill, as if there was danger of its being rejected, if we were allowed time to obtain further information, and deliberately confider the fubjeft. For to that time our veflels were freely failing on foreign voyages ; and in a national point of view, the departure of half a dozen or a dozen more, while we were inquiring into the necefiity or expediency of the Embargo, was of little moment. Or if the danger to our veflels, feamen and mer- chandize had been fo extreme as r.ot to admit of one day's delay, ought not that extreme danger to have been exhibited to Congrefs ? The Conflitution which requires the Prefident " to give to Congrefs information of the date of the union," certainly meant, not partial, but complete information on the fubjedl of a communication, fo far as he pofleflcd it. And when it enjoins him " to recommend to their confideration fuch meafurcs as he fliould judge neceflary and expedient," it as certainly intended that thofe recommendations fhould be bottomed on information communicated, not on fails ivith- heldi and locked up in the Executive cabine* Had the publick fafety been at (lake, or any great publick good been prefented to our view, but which would be loft by a moment's delay ; there would have been fome apology for difpatch, though none for adling without due information. In truth, the meafure appeared to me then, as it ftill does, and as it appears to the publick, without a fufficient motive, without a legitimate object. Hence the general inquiry — " For what is the Embargo laid ?" And I challenge 1 any man not in the fecrets of the Executive to tell. I know, Sir, that the Prefident faid the papers abovementioned " fhowed that great and increafing dangers threatened our veflels, our feamen, and our merchandize :" but I alfo know that they exhibited no new dangers ; none of which our merchants and feamen had not been well apprized. The Britilh proclamation had many days before been publifhed in the newfpapers [the copy laid before lis by the Prefident had been cut out of a nevvfpaper ;] and fo had the fub- ftance, if not the words of Regnier's letter. Yet they had excit- ed little concern among merchants and feamen, the prefervation of whofe perfons and property was the profejfed object of the Prefi- dent's recommendation of an Embargo. The merchants and fea- men could accurately eftimate the dangers of continuing their com- mercial operations ; of which dangers, indeed, the a&ual premiums of infurance were a fatisfactory gauge. Thofe premiums had very little increafed : by the Britifh proclamation not a cent : and by the French decree fo little as not to ftop commercial enterprizes. The great numbers of vefTels loading or loaded, and prepared for fca ; the exertions every where made, on the firft rumour of the Embargo, to difpatch them ; demon (Irate the Prefident's dangers to be imaginary — to have been ajfumed. Or if great and real dan- gers, unknown to commercial men, were impending, orfure to fall, how defirable was it to have had them officially declared and publish- ed ! This would have produced a voluntary embargo, and prevent- ed every complaint. Befides, the dangers clearly defined and un- derftood, the publick mind would not have been difquieted with im- aginary fears, the more tormenting, becaufe uncertain. It is true that confiderable numbers of vefTels were collected in our ports, and many held in fufpenfe : not, however, from any new dangers which appeared; but from the myfterious conduct of our affairs, after the attack on the Chefapcake ; and from the painful npprehenfion that the courfe the Prefident was purfuing would ter- minate in war. The National Intelligencer (ufually confidered as the Executive newfpaper) gave the alarm ; and it was echoed through the United States. War, probable or inevitable war, was the conftant theme of the newfpapers, and of the converfations, as was reported, of perfons fuppofed to be bed informed of Executive defigns. Yet amid this din of war, no adequate preparations were feen making to meet it. The order to detach a hundred thoufand militia to fight the Britifh navy (for there was no appearance of an enemy in any other fliape) was fo completely abfurd, as to excite, with men of common fenfe, no other emotion than ridicule. Not the fhadow of a reafon that could operate on the mind of a man of common underftanding can be offered in its juftilication. # The re- fufal of the Britifh officer to receive the frigate Chefapeake as a prize, when tendered by her commander, is a demonftration that the attack upon her was exclusively for the purpofe of taking their deferters ; and not intended as the commencement of a ivar be- tween the two nations. The Prefident knew that the Britifh had no invading army to land on our fhores ; and the detached militia would be ufelefs, except againfl land-forces. Why then was this order for the Militia given ? — The nature of the cafe, and the actu- al flate of things, authorize the inference, that its immediate, if not its only object, was to increafe the publick alarm, to aggravate the publick refentment againfl; Great-Britain, to excite a war pulfe ; and in the height of this artificial fever of the publick mind, which was to be made known in Great-Britain, to renew the demands on her government ; in the poor expectation of extorting, in that flate of things, conceffions of points which fhe had always confidered as her rights, and which at all times and under all circumftances, fhe had uniformly refufed to relinquifh. The refult of the fubfequent negociation at London has fhown how utterly unfounded was the Prefident's expectation, how perfectly ufelefs all this blufter of war. While no well informed man doubted that the Britifh Government would make fuitable reparation for the attack on the Chefapeake. The Prefident himfelf, in his proclamation, had placed the affair on that footing. A rupture between the two nations, faid he, " is e- qually oppofed to the interefts of both, as it is to afTurances of the moft friendly difpofitions on the part of the Britifh Government, in the midft of which this outrage was committed. In this light the fubject cannot but prefent itfelf to that Government, and ftrengthen the motives to an honourable reparation for the wrong which has been done." And it is now well known that fuch rep- aration might have been promptly obtained in London, had the Prefident's inftructions to Mr. Monroe been compatible with fuch an adjuftment. He was required not to negociate on this fingle, tranfient act (which when once adjufled was for ever fettled) but in connection with another claim of long Handing, and, to fay the leaft, of doubtful right ; to wit, the exemption from impreffment of BrU'ifh feamen found on board American merchant veflcls. To remedy the evil ariiing from its exercife, by which our own citizens were fometimes impreffed, the attention of our Government, under every adminiftration, had been earneftly engaged : but no practica- ble plan has yet been contrived : while no man who regards the truth, will queftion the difpofition of the Britifli Government to a- dopt any arrangement that will fecure to Great-Britain the fervices of her own fubjecls. And now, when the unexampled fituation of that country (left alone to maintain the conflict with France and her numerous dependent States — left alone to withftand the Power which menaces the liberties of the world) rendered the aid of all her fubjects more than ever needful ; there was no reafonable ground to expeft that fhe would yield the right to take them when found on board the merchant vefiels of any nation. Thus to infill on her yielding this point, and infeparably to connect it with the affair of the Chefapeake, was tantamount to a determination not to uegociate at all. I write, Sir, with freedom ; for the times are too perilous to al- low thofe who are placed in high and refponfible fituations to be fdent or referved. The peace and fafety of our country are fuf- pended on a thread. The courfe we have feen purfued leads on to war— to a war with Great-Britain — a war abfolutely without ne- ceflity — a war which whether difaflrous or fuccefsful, mud bring mifery and ruin to the United States : rmfery by the deftruction of our navigation and commerce (perhaps alfo of our faireft fea- port towns and cities) the lofs of markets for our produce, the want of foreign goods and manufactures, and the other evils inci- dent to a ftate of war : and ruin, by the lofs of our liberty and in- dependence. For if with the aid of our arms Great-Britain were fubdued, — from that moment (though flattered perhaps with the name of allies) we fliould become the Provinces of France. This is a refult fo obvious, that I muft crave your pardon for noticing it. Some advocates of Executive meafures admit it. They acknowl- edge that the navy of Britain is our fhield againft. the overwhelm- ing power of France. — Why then do they perfift in a courfe of conduft tending to a rupture with Great-Britain ? — Will it be eved that it is principally, or folely, to procure inviolability to merchant flag of the United States ? In other words, to pro- aU feamen, Britijh fubjeds, as well as our own citizens, on rd our merchant veffels ? It is a fact that this has been made greateft obftacle to an amicable fettlement with Great- Britain. (I repeat) it is perfectly well known that (he defires to obtain her own fubjebls ; and that American citizens, impreffed by ake, are delivered up on duly authenticated proof. The evil :omplain of arifes from the impoffibility of always diftinguifhing perfons of two nations who a few years fince were one peo- who exhibit the fame manners, fpeak the fame language, and efs fimilar features. But feeing that we feldom hear complaints he great navigating States, how happens there to be fuch ex- le fympathy for American feamen at Wafl/ington ? Efpecially ;entlemen from the interiour States, which have no feamen, or i thofe Atlantick States whofe native feamen bear a very fmall aortion to thofe of New-England ? In fad, the caufes of com- nt are much fewer than are pretended. They rarely occur in States whofe feamen are chiefly natives. The firft merchant in United States, in anfwcring my late inquiry about Britifh im- fments, fays, " Since the Chefapeake affair we have had no e of complaint. I cannot find one fingle inftance where they : taken one man out of a merchant veffel. I have had more 1 twenty veffels arrived in that time, without one inftance of a being taken by them. Three Swedes were taken out by a nch frigate. I have made inquiry of all the matters that have red in this vicinity, and cannot find any complaints againft the ifh confers."' !an gentlemen of known hojlility to foreign commerce in our own ■Is — who are even willing to annihilate it (and fuch there are) — - thefe gentlemen plead the caufe of our^amf « becaufe. they real- rifh to protect them ? Can thofe defne to prated our feamen, who, laying an imneceffary embargo, expofe them by thoufands to ve or beg P — One gentleman has faid (and I believe he does not i alone) that fooner than admit the principle that Great- Brit- :iad a right to take her onvnfubjefts from our merchant veflels, he 10 would abandon commerce altogether ! — To what will every nun in New-England and of the other navigating States, afcribc fuch a fen- timent ? A fcntimeiit which] to prevent the temporary lofs of five men, by imprefs, would reduce fifty thoufand to beggary ? But for the Embargo, thoufands depending on the ordinary operations of commerce, would now be employed. Even under the reilraints of the orders of the Br'tiih Government, retaliating the French im- perial decree, very large portions of the world remain open to the commerce of the United States. We may yet purfue our trade with the Britifh dominions, in every part of the globe ; with Afri- ca, with China, and with the colonies of France, Spain, and Hol- land. And let me aik, whether in the nrdlt of a profound peace, when the powers of Europe poflefling colonies, would, as formerly, confine the trade with them to their own bottoms, or admit u foreigners, only under great limitations, we could enjoy a commerce much more extculivc than is practicable at this moment, if the I m« bargo were not in the way ? . Why then Ihould it be continued ? Why rather was it ever laid ? Can tl itimate reafona for the Embargo which are concealed from Congrefs, at the moment when they are required to impofe it : Are the reafons to be found in the difpatches from Talis : Thefe have been moved for ; and the motion was qualhed by the advocates for the Embargo. Why are thefe difpatches withheld by the Executive ? Why, when all claffes of citizens anxioufly inquire " For what is the Embargo laid :" is a falisfactory anluer denied ? Why is not Congrefi made acquainted with the actual lituation of the United States in relation to France ? Why, in this dangerous crilis, are Mr. Arrnftroi letters to the Secretary of State abfoluetly withheld, fo that a line of them cannot be feen ? Did they contain no information of the demands and intentions of the French Emperor ? Did the Revenue fail from England to France, and there wait three or four weeks for difpatches of no importance ? IT fo, why, regardlefs of the publick Solicitude, are their contents fo carefully concealed ? If really un- important, what harm can ariie from telling Congrefs and the Na- tion, officially, that they contain nothing of moment to the fafety, the liberty, the honour, or the interc-ils of the United States ? On the contrary, are they fo clofely locked up becaufe they will not 11 bear the light ? Would their difclofure roufe the fpirit of the peo- ple, ftill (lumbering in blind confidence in the Executive ? Has the French Emperor declared that he will have no neutrals ? Has he required that our ports, like thofe of his vaffal ftates in Europe, be Jbut againjl Britjjlo commerce P Is the Embargo a fubjlltute, a milder form of compliance with that harfli demand, which if exhibited in its naked and infulting afpect, the American fpirit might yet re- fent ? Are we ftill to be kept profoundly ignorant of the declara- tions and avowed defigns of the French Emperor, although thefe may ftrike at our liberty and independence ? And, in the mean time, are we, by a thoufand irritations, by cherifning prejudices, and by exciting fre(h refentments, to be drawn gradually into a war with Great-Britain ? Why amidft the extreme anxiety of the pub- lick mind, is it ftill kept on the rack of fearful expectation, by the Prefident's portentous fdence respecting his French difpatches ? — In this concealment there is danger. In this concealment mull be wrapt up the real caufe of the Embargo. On any other fuppofi- tion it is inexplicable. I am alarmed, Sir, at this perilous flate of things, I cannot re- prefs my fufpicions ; or forbear thus to exhibit to you the grounds on which they reft. The people are advifed to repofe implicit confidence in the National Government : in that unbounded confi- dence lies our danger. Armed with that confidence, the Execu- tive may procure the adoption of meafures which may overwhelm us with ruin, as furely as if he had an army at his heels. By falfe policy, or by inordinate fears, our country may be betrayed and fubjugated to France, as furely as by corruption. I tru ft, Sir, that no one who knows me will charge it to vanity when I fay, that I have fome knowledge of publick men and of publick affairs : and on that knowledge, and with folemnity, I declare to you, that I have no confidence in the wifdom or corre&nefs of our publick meaf- ures : that our country is in imminent danger : that it is effential ° to the publick fafety that the blind confidence in our Pviilers ftiould ceafe ; that the State Legiflatures ftiould know the facts and rea- fons on which important general laws are founded ; and efpecially that thofe Stales whofe farms are on the ocean, and wbojk harvejls are 12 gathered in every fea,Jhould immediately and fertoujly conjider hoiv to preferve them. In all the branches of Government, commercial in- formation is wanting ; and in " this defert," called a city, that want cannot be fupplied. Nothing but the fenfe of the commer- cial States, clearly and emphatically exprefTed, will fave them from ruin. Are our thoufands of (hips and vefTels to rot in our harbours ? Are our fixty thoufand feamen and fifhermen to be deprived of em- ployment, and, with their families, reduced to want and beggary ? Are our hundreds of thoufands of farmers to be compelled to fuffer their millions in furplus produce to perifh on their hands ; that the Prefident may make an experiment on our patience and fortitude, and on the towering pride, the boundlefs ambition, and unyielding perfeverance of the Conqueror of Europe ? Sir, I have reafon to»be- lieve that the Prefident contemplates the continuance of the Embar- go until the French Emperor repeals his decrees violating as well his treaty with the United States as every neutral right ; and un- til Britain thereupon recals her retaliating orders ! — By that time we may have neither fhips nor fcamen : and that is precifely the point to which fome men wifli to reduce us. — To fee the improvi- dence of this projeft (to call it by no harfher name, and without ad- verting to ulterior views) let us lookback to former years. Notwithftanding the well-founded complaints of fome individuals, and the murmurs of others ; notwithftanding the frequent Execu- tive declarations of maritime aggreflions committed by Great-Brit- ain ; notwithftanding the outrageous decrees of France and Spain, and the wanton fpoliations practifed and executed by their cruifers and tribunals, of which we fometimes hear a faint whifper ; — the commerce of the United States has hitherto profpered beyond all example. Our citizens have accumulated wealth ; and the publick 'icvenue, annually increafing, has been the Prefident's annual boast. Thefe fafts demonftrate, that although Great-Britain, with her thoufand mips of war, could have deftroyed our commerce, {he has really done it. no efTential injury ; and that the other belligerents IS heretofore reftrained by fome regard to National Law, and limit- ed by the (mall number of their cruifers, have not inflicted upon it any deep wound. Yet in this full tide of fuccefs, our commerce is fuddenly arrefled : an alarm of war is raifed : fearful apprehenfions are excited : the merchants, in particular, thrown into a ftate of confternation, are advifed, by a voluntary embargo, to keep theif veifels at home. And what is the caufe of this mighty but mif- chievous akrm ? We know it in its whole extent. It ivas the un- authorized attack of a Briti/h naval officer on the American frigate Chefnpeake, to fearch for and take fome deferters hnoivn to have been received on board, ivho had been often demanded, and as often refufedto be delivered up. As was expected by all confiderate men, and by the Prefident himfelf (as I have before obferved) the Britifh Gov- ernment, on the firft information of the unfortunate event (and with- out waiting for an application) difavowed the act of its officer — dif- claimed the principle of fearching National armed veffels — and de- clared its readinefs to make fuitable reparation, as foon as the ftate of the cafe fhould be fully known. Under fuch circumftances, who can juliify this alarm of war ? An alarm which greatly difquieted the publick mind, and occafioned an interruption of commerce extremely injui'ious to our merchants and fea-faring citizens. I will clofe this long letter by ftating all the exifling pretences — for there are no caufes — for a war with Great-Britain. 1. The Britifh (hips of war, agreeably to a right claimed and ex- ercifed for ages — a right claimed and exercifed during the whole of the adminiftrations of Wafhington, of Adams, and of Jefferfon, — continue to take fome of the Britifh feamen found on board ouf merchant veffels, and with them a fmall number of ours, from the impoffibility of always diftinguifhing Englifhmen from citizens of the United. States. On this point our Government well know that Great-Britain is perfectly willing to adopt any arrangement that can be devifed, which will fecure to her fervice the feamen