py l 
 
 AMERICA AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 
 
 TO 1648 
 
 FRANCES G. DAVENPORT 
 
 Reprinted from the Annual Report of the American Historical Association 
 for 1915, pages 151-161 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 1917 
 
AMERICA AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 
 
 TO 1648 
 
 BY 
 
 FRANCES G. DAVENPORT 
 
 Reprinted from the Annual Report of the American Historical Association 
 for 1915, pages 151-161 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 1917 
 
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 VI. AMERICA AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY TO 1648. 
 
 By Frances G. Davenport, 
 
 Carnegie Institution of Washington, D. C. 
 
 151 
 
AMERICA AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY TO 1648.* 
 
 By Frances G. Davenport. 
 
 In the last decade of the fifteenth century modern oversea com- 
 merce began. With envious eyes the maritime nations of Europe 
 beheld richly-laden ships returning from America, the west coast 
 of Africa, or the East Indies, and unloading their precious freights 
 in the harbors of Spain or Portugal. France and England, and 
 later Holland and Denmark, determined to divert some of this 
 wealth into their own treasuries. Since Spain and Portugal claimed 
 a monopoly of the trade, the excluded countries could enter it in 
 only two ways — by force, or by inducing Spain and Portugal to alter 
 their laws and admit them to the commerce. The former method 
 was the more immediately successful. By 1648, however, the method 
 of diplomacy had won important victories. It is the main purpose 
 of this paper to describe the principal diplomatic arrangements 
 which up to 1G48, France, England, and the United Provinces, re- 
 spectively, concluded with Portugal and Spain in regard to Ameri- 
 can trade or territory. 
 
 The history of the struggle of the European nations for partici- 
 pation in the profits of the American trade naturally falls into three 
 periods. In the first, France was the most formidable opponent of 
 the Spanish-Portuguese monopoly. Jean Ango and his pilots led 
 the attacking forces. This phase ended with the treaty concluded 
 between France and Spain at Cateau-Cambresis in 1559. In the 
 second period England took the place of France as the principal 
 antagonist. Hawkins and Drake were the most conspicuous foes of 
 Spain. This epoch extended to the treaty concluded between Eng- 
 land and Spain at London in 1604. In the third period commercial 
 maritime supremacy passed from England to the United Provinces. 
 The Dutch West India Co., organized within this epoch, played 
 a role similar in many respects to that of the French corsairs and 
 English privateers; but in addition possessed great administrative 
 powers. This period ended with the treaty concluded between the 
 United Provinces and Spain at Minister in 1648. 
 
 Jean Ango and his pilots, Hawkins and Drake, and the Dutch 
 West India Co., each attacked the Spanish-Portuguese monopoly 
 
 » Supporting evidence for the statements made in this paper will be found in the first 
 volume to be published in 1917, of a collection of " European Treaties bearing or Ameri- 
 can History " to be issued by the Carnegie Institution of Washington. 
 
 153 
 
154 AMERICAN HISTOETCAL ASSOCIATION. 
 
 for the sake of pecuniary gain; each represented a syndicate of 
 capitalists, and had government support; and the profits of each 
 were derived partly from trade and partly from booty. 
 
 I. 
 
 Throughout the first period, to 1559, France and Portugal were 
 at peace ; while during a great part of the same interval France and 
 Spain were at war. As between France and Spain, Portugal posed 
 as neutral. This, however, did not suffice to protect her vast colonial 
 trade and territory, which she was unable to defend. Jean Ango, 
 like the directors of the Dutch West India Co., " dreamed of 
 an empire in Brazil." But when his pilots reached Brazilian waters 
 they met the crudest of receptions; and their sufferings caused them 
 to undertake reprisals. The complaints arising from these reprisals, 
 which Portugal, from 1516 onward, repeatedly made to France, 
 proved unavailing and Portugal endeavored to frighten off the in- 
 truders. In 1526 the King of Portugal ordered his subjects under 
 pain of death to run down all French vessels going to or returning 
 from these distant territories. This and other instances of harshness 
 on the part of Portugal and also of Spain toward interlopers were 
 defended chiefly on the ground that the intruders were pirates, and 
 that treaties provided that pirates should be put to death. On this 
 pretext Charles V refused for a time to send back to France the 
 companions of Fleury (the captor of Montezuma's treasure), al- 
 though the treaty of Cambray had provided for the mutual return 
 of all prisoners of war. For the same reason Philip II refused to 
 deliver over the survivors of the Florida massacre, although the 
 French ambassador protested that their enterprise was authorized 
 by the Admiral of France. Under this name Hawkins, returning 
 to England after a peaceful trading voyage, was denounced by the 
 Spanish ambassador. Other instances might be cited. 
 
 But whatever the excuse for Portugal's treatment of French 
 corsairs, France could not tamely accept it. In 1528 Francis I 
 affirmed the principle of freedom of trade " as of all rights one of 
 the most natural." Following a practice then in use, he granted to 
 Ango and to one of his associates letters of marque, giving them the 
 right to reimburse themselves for the losses which they had suffered 
 from the Portuguese. General letters of marque were also issued 
 enjoining the French admirals to permit all their captains, wherever 
 they should be, to run down the Portuguese, seize their persons, 
 goods, or merchandise and bring them to France. In 1531 the King 
 of Portugal complained that the French had captured 300 of his 
 ships. Unable to defend himself by force, he employed gold, and 
 by bribing the French admiral managed to have Ango's letters of 
 
 
AMERICA AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY TO 1648 155 
 
 marque revoked. In obtaining this revocation he was also helped 
 by the intervention of the Emperor, Charles V, who in the matter 
 of defending the oversea trade identified the interests of Portugal 
 with his own. The reason for this identification is not far top seek — 
 the Portuguese Islands of Madeira and the Azores were situated on 
 or near the routes of ocean commerce. The Spanish fleets returning 
 from America put in at the Azores, hence Spain must always keep 
 on the best terms with Portugal. Hence, also, the Emperor's dis- 
 pleasure when in 1536 Portugal concluded a treaty with France 
 which permitted the French to bring their prizes — i. e., Spanish 
 ships — into all Portuguese havens and had the effect of making the 
 harbors of the Azores and Madeira as well as of Portugal lurking 
 places from which the French preyed upon the ocean shipping of 
 Spain. In return Francis I forbade his subjects to sail to Brazil 
 and Guinea; but when a few years later Portugal's bribery of the 
 French admiral was discovered this prohibition was revoked. 
 
 The activities of Ango's captains were directed not only against 
 their Portuguese friends but also against their Spanish enemies. 
 The sensational capture made by one of them of a part of Monte- 
 zuma's treasure has already been referred to. In 1523 and 1525 the 
 Cortes of Castile complained of the frequent and intolerable depre- 
 dations committed by the French at sea, and their feeling appears 
 to be reflected in the treaty of Madrid in 1526. 
 
 The question of admitting the French to the American trade seems 
 to have been discussed in the negotiations for the Franco-Spanish 
 truce of 1538, as it certainly was in connection with the treaty of 
 1544. In 1541 the Emperor had been greatly disturbed by Cartier's 
 plan to colonize in Canada. Despairing of keeping the French 
 altogether away from the new world, Charles V was willing to come 
 to terms with them. 
 
 An article signed by the French commissioners in 1544 contained 
 the following stipulation: That the King of France, his successors 
 and subjects, would leave the Emperor and the King of Portugal at 
 peace in all that concerned the East and West Indies and would not 
 attempt any discoveries or other enterprises there. French subjects 
 might, for purposes of trade only, go to both the East and the West 
 Indies, but if they committed any acts of violence in going or return- 
 ing they should be punished. This article was apparently acceptable 
 to the Emperor and Prince Philip and to the president of the Council 
 of the Indies. Other councilors believed that the permission to trade 
 would lead to further trouble, because the French would not conduct 
 it in accordance with regulations. The Council of the Indies urged 
 that in this as in former treaties matters pertaining to the Indies 
 should not be mentioned at all. If, however, the French were per- 
 mitted to trade they should be held to the laws prohibiting the 
 
156 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 
 
 removal of gold and silver from territory subject to Castile, even in 
 exchange for merchandise, and their homeward-bound ships should 
 be obliged to touch at Cadiz or San Lucar. The King of Portugal 
 also objected to the article, declaring that the French went in armed 
 ships not only for the purpose of trading but in order to rob with 
 more security. The article seems never to have been ratified. 
 
 In the truce between France and Spain concluded in 1556 it was 
 agreed that during the period of the truce the French should not 
 sail to or trade in the Spanish Indies without license from the King 
 of Spain. In a few months the truce was violated. The Venetian 
 ambassador ascribed the rupture partly to the sending of French 
 ships to the Indies " to occupy some place and hinder the naviga- 
 tion." The reference is to Villegagnon's colony in Brazil, which 
 seemed a danger to Spain as well as to Portugal. 
 
 In the negotiations for the treaty of Cateau-Cambresis, in 1559, 
 the right of the French to go to the Spanish Indies was discussed 
 repeatedly and at length. 
 
 The Spanish commissioners urged that Villegagnon should be 
 recalled. They based their claim to a monopoly of the western navi- 
 gation on the bulls of Popes Alexander VI and Julius II, and on the 
 fact that Spain alone had borne the labor and expense of discovery. 
 The French deputies argued that the sea was common. They would 
 not consent to exclude Frenchmen from places discovered by them 
 and not actually subject to the Kings of Portugal or Castile. On 
 the other hand, they would agree that the French should keep away 
 from lands actually possessed by the aforesaid sovereigns ; or, as an 
 alternative, that the Indies should not be mentioned, and if French- 
 men were found doing what they should not there, they might be 
 chastised. King Philip did not approve of the former alternative. 
 The Indies were therefore not mentioned in the treaty, but an oral 
 agreement was made, the precise wording of which is not known. 
 From accounts in Spanish and French documents it appears that it 
 was to the effect that Spaniards and Frenchmen encountering one 
 another west of the prime meridian might treat each other as enemies, 
 without thereby giving ground for complaint of the violation of 
 existing treaties. The location of the prime meridian remained a 
 matter of dispute. In 1634 the King of France placed it at the 
 island of Ferro, in the Canaries. Richelieu stated that Spain pre- 
 ferred to locate it farther west, in the Azores, because ships captured 
 west of the prime meridian must be declared good prize. 
 
 The rule that might would be the only right recognized between 
 nations west of the prime meridian was the one permanent result of 
 Spanish-French diplomacy regarding America up to 1559, or indeed 
 up to 1648. In the treaty of Vervins, in 1598, no better arrangement 
 could be agreed on. 
 
AMERICA AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY TO 1648 157 
 
 II. 
 
 During the wars of religion in France the maritime strength of 
 that nation fell to its lowest ebb. Leadership in maritime affairs, 
 and hence in the effort to force an entrance into the American 
 trade, passed to England — the second great antagonist of the Portu- 
 guese-Spanish monopoly. In 1553 a joint-stock company was 
 founded in London for the Guinea trade. This intrusion of the 
 English into regions claimed by Portugal led to repeated complaints 
 by the ambassador of Portugal, who was supported by the ambas- 
 sador of Spain. Important negotiations relative to the commerce 
 with Portuguese colonies were in progress in 1555, 1561, 1562, and 
 from 1569 to 1576. The treaty signed in 1576 permitted the English 
 to trade in Madeira and the Azores, but did not mention Barbary, 
 Guinea, or Brazil. 
 
 Between 1562 and 1568 Hawkins made three slave-trading voyages 
 to the West Indies. Subsequently English privateers played havoc 
 with Spanish shipping there, and in 1580 Drake returned from his 
 voyage around the globe with treasure estimated at a million and a 
 half sterling. The Spanish ambassador in London wrote that Drake 
 was preparing for another voyage and that everybody wanted to 
 have a share in the expedition. He therefore considered it in the 
 King of Spain's interest that orders be given that no foreign ship 
 should be spared in either the Spanish or the Portuguese Indies, but 
 that every one should be sent to the bottom. War followed in a 
 few years. Peace negotiations took place in 1588, 1600, and 1604. 
 The negotiations of 1588 were insincere, at least on the part of 
 Spain, in whose ports the Armada was preparing. But they have an 
 interest as indicating England's attitude. Of her two main griev- 
 ances against Spain, one was the restrictions imposed by Spain upon 
 English trade to the newly discovered lands. The instructions issued 
 to Elizabeth's commissioners also, in so far as they relate to the 
 West Indies, are of interest. For they indicate that England based 
 her claim to trade in the Indies upon the ancient treaties concluded 
 between Charles V and Henry VIII providing for reciprocal trade 
 in all of their dominions. On this ground, in 1566, Cecil asserted 
 a right to the Indian trade, and the claim seems to explain Philip 
 II's reluctance to renew these treaties. The Spanish view was that 
 the Indies were a new world, to which treaties between European 
 powers did not apply unless the Indies were indubitably referring to 
 them. 
 
 Not until after the death of Elizabeth could peace be made. After 
 the accession of King James negotiations were again undertaken. 
 Concerning trade to the East and West Indies an arrangement was 
 then effected, though no real agreement was reached. The instruc- 
 
158 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 
 
 tions of the English commissioners in this matter were identical 
 with those for the negotiations of 1600. They sanctioned only one 
 concession, that Englishmen should be prohibited from going to any 
 places in the Indies where the Spaniards were actually " planted " — 
 a principle embodied in the charter granted to the English East 
 India Co. on December 31, 1600. It was rejected by the Spaniards, 
 who insisted that the English should be excluded from every part 
 of the Indies, either expressly or by clear implication; or else that 
 the King of England should declare in writing that his subjects 
 would trade in the Indies at their own peril. These demands the 
 English refused. Cecil and Northampton alleged that an express 
 prohibition to trade would wrong James's honor since Spain had not 
 put it in the treaties made with France and other princes. After 
 much debate it was resolved that intercourse should be permitted 
 in those places " in which there was commerce before the war, ac- 
 cording to the observance and use of former treaties." These words 
 were differently interpreted by each party. Soon after the conclu- 
 sion of the treaty Cecil wrote to the English Ambassador in France : 
 
 If it be well observed how the [ninth] article is couched, you shall rather 
 find it a pregnant affirmative for us than against us; for, sir, where it is writ- 
 ten that we shall trade in all his dominions, that comprehends the Indies ; if 
 you will say, secundum tractatus antiquos, no treaty excluded it. 
 
 When the Venetian ambassador wished to hear from his majesty's 
 own lips how he read the clause about the India navigation, and 
 said, " Sire, your subjects may trade with Spain and Flanders, but 
 not with the Indies." " What for no?" said the king. " Because," 
 I replied, " the clause is read in that sense." " They are making a 
 great error whoever they are who hold this view," said His Majesty ; 
 "the meaning is quite clear." The Spaniards, on the other hand, 
 resolutely affirmed that the terms of the peace excluded the English 
 from the Indies. However, as was remarked in the instructions, 
 Spain was not able to bar out the English by force, and the latter 
 not only continued their trade in the East, but in spite of Spanish 
 opposition proceeded to colonize Virginia under a charter which 
 allotted to the grantees a portion of America " not actually pos- 
 sessed by any Christian prince." 
 
 III. 
 
 The memorable year of 1580, which saw Drake's return to Eng- 
 land, witnessed also Spain's annexation of Portugal's vast empire 
 and trade. The threat of Spain's sudden aggrandizement brought 
 France and England together; and toward the close of the century 
 the United Provinces joined the alliance against the common enemy. 
 Several treaties provided for joint naval operations by England and 
 
AMERICA AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY TO 1648 159 
 
 the United Provinces against Spain. Early in the seventeenth cen- 
 tury the Dutch outstripped Spain in the race for commercial su- 
 premacy. The Dutch East India Co., founded in 1602, under- 
 mined the power of the Portuguese in the East; and in Guiana, 
 Brazil, Guinea, Cuba, and Hispaniola, the Dutch were also prose- 
 cuting an active trade. In 1607 peace negotiations between Spain 
 and the United Provinces began. The hope of expelling the Dutch 
 from the forbidden regions was believed by many to be the princi- 
 pal motive that induced Spain to treat. Another reason was the 
 project of a Dutch West India Co. " that should with a strong 
 fleet carry at once both war and merchandize into America." Dur- 
 ing the protracted negotiations one of the main points of dispute 
 was the India trade. Both sides regarded the question as vital. The 
 States brought forward three alternative means of accommodation: 
 peace, with free trade to those parts of the Indies not actually pos- 
 sessed by Spain; peace in Europe, and a truce in the Indies for a 
 term of years with permission to trade during that period; trade to 
 the Indies " at their peril " after the example of the French and 
 English. The Catholic deputies totally rejected the first and third 
 propositions, but would submit the second to Spain if it were accept- 
 ably modified. They wished the States to declare expressly that 
 they would abstain from going to the West Indies, and that in the 
 East Indies they would not visit the places held by the Portuguese. 
 The Dutch, who meanwhile had tried to frighten their opponents 
 by showing a renewed interest in the West India Co., finally drafted 
 what was deemed an acceptable article, but Spain insisted on their 
 prompt withdrawal from both the East and West Indies as one 
 of the two indispensable conditions for her recognition of their 
 independence. Peace was unattainable, and negotiations were 
 broken off. The French ambassador, however, persuaded the States 
 to revive negotiations for a truce and to employ the French and 
 English ambassadors as intermediaries. The principal point of dif- 
 ficulty was the India trade. The French ambassador labored for the 
 end desired by the Dutch not because France wished to strengthen 
 them unduly but because she was unwilling to restore Spain to 
 her former power or to play into the hands of the English, who 
 were believed to desire the trade for themselves. An article was 
 finally agreed on which was a concession of the India trade veiled 
 by circumlocutions. Traffic was permitted in Spain's European lands 
 and in any other of her possessions where her allies were permitted to 
 trade. Outside these limits (i. e., in the Indies) subjects of the States 
 could not traffic without express permission from the King in places 
 held by Spain, but in places not thus held they might trade upon 
 permission of the natives without hindrance from the King or his 
 officers. The agreement that Spain would not hinder the subjects 
 
160 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION. 
 
 of the States in their trade " outside the limits " was also strength- 
 ened by a special and secret treaty in which the name Indies was 
 again avoided. The name, however, appeared in an act signed by 
 the French and English ambassadors, which certified that the arch- 
 dukes' deputies had agreed that, just as the Dutch should not traffic 
 in places held by the King of Spain in the Indies without his per- 
 mission, so subjects of the King of Spain should not traffic in places 
 held by the States in the Indies without their permission. 
 
 In 1621 the truce of 1609 expired and Spain declared war on the 
 United Netherlands. Between 1621 and 1625 the Dutch negotiated 
 with Denmark, France, and England to secure their alliance against 
 Spain. The States General earnestly desired that these nations 
 should co-operate with the Dutch West India Co., chartered by the 
 States in 1621 for the purpose of attacking Spain's American pos- 
 sessions and treasure fleets as well as for trade, but the Danes and 
 French preferred rather to share in the East India commerce. In 
 1621 the Dutch and Danish commissioners signed an agreement that 
 in their journeys, trade, and navigation in the East and West Indies, 
 Africa, and Terra Australis subjects of either party should befriend 
 subjects of the other. The treaty between the Dutch and French 
 merely stipulated that the question of traffic to the East and West 
 Indies should be treated later by the French ambassador. The 
 offensive alliance with England in 1625 enjoined attacks by both 
 parties on Spain's dominions on both sides of the line and espe- 
 cially on the treasure fleets, and one of the results of this treaty was 
 the opening of trade between the Dutch and the English colonists 
 in North America. 
 
 During the 20 years following 1621 there were repeated negotia- 
 tions for peace between the United Provinces and Spain. The most 
 important took place in 1632 and 1633. They failed chiefly because 
 no agreement could be reached on colonial matters, particularly those 
 in which the Dutch West India Co. was involved. Since this com- 
 pany had captured the port of Pernambuco, in Brazil, it looked for- 
 ward to a rapid extension of its authority and trade in this region 
 and to profits from raids undertaken thence against the Spanish 
 treasure fleets, the West India Islands, and Central America. Hav- 
 ing acquired a great fleet equipped for war, it opposed any peace or 
 truce with Spain that should extend beyond the Line, unless, indeed, 
 Spain would permit the Dutch to trade in both Indies. Since Spain 
 refused these demands, negotiations ended fruitlessly. 
 
 The negotiations at Minister from 1646 to 1618 were carried on 
 under widely different circumstances from those of 1632, 1633, just 
 mentioned. In 1646 peace was essential to the Spanish Government, 
 exhausted by its efforts against domestic and foreign foes. Moreover, 
 the chief obstacle to peace had been removed by her loss of Brazil 
 
AMERICA AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY TO 1648. 161 
 
 and other Portuguese colonies. On the other hand, the Dutch East 
 and West India companies would willingly have continued the war. 
 The West India Co. considered that if the two companies should be 
 united it would be more profitable to continue hostilities in both 
 Indies and Africa than to conclude any peace or truce with Spain. 
 In case of a peace or truce the company desired freedom to trade in 
 all places within the limits of its charter where the King of Spain had 
 no castles, jurisdiction, or territory, and it further sought the ex- 
 clusion of Spaniards from trade in all places similarly held by the 
 company unless like privileges were granted to the company in 
 places under the dominion of Spain. These stipulations were prac- 
 tically those agreed to in the truce of 1609. Somewhat modified they 
 were finally included in the treaty of Minister, a treaty in which for 
 the first time Spain granted to another nation, as a permanent con- 
 cession, in clear and explicit terms, and with mention of the Indies, 
 the right to sail to, trade, and acquire territory in America. 
 
 IV. 
 
 By treaties concluded in 1641 and 1642, Portugal, newly liberated 
 from Spain, had legalized the trade which the Dutch and English 
 had previously established with the African coast, and recognized 
 Dutch possession of a part of Brazil. 
 
 Thus, in the fifth decade of the seventeenth century, the two 
 Iberian powers, then bitterly estranged from each other, were both 
 compelled to concede to certain European nations the right to occu- 
 pation and trade in those oversea lands from which, since the period 
 of discovery, they had endeavored to exclude them- But, as old 
 walls were breached, new ones were erected. The Dutch, English, 
 and French, having acquired much oversea territory and commerce, 
 each tried to use them for the exclusive profit of their respective 
 peoples, or even of certain of their own trading companies. Hence 
 in 1648 the ideal of free ocean commerce and navigation, conceived 
 long before by Grotius, remained unrealized. 
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