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FRANCE 
 
 AND THE 
 
 AMERICAN R E \' L U T I O N 
 
 i7'j^-'77^^ 
 
 A thesis presented to the Fac-it>- of Corneil Uni\-ersity for the 
 degree of D^xtor of Philosophy. J.nt. i^iigs. 
 
 fcV 
 
 LALFA CHARLOTTE SHELbON 
 
 AXljRrS 4; Cm.'RCH 
 
 ITHACA. N. V 
 
 1900 
 
CON T 1<: NTS. 
 
 chapt]';r 1. 
 Forecasts of Rhvolution i 
 
 CHAl'TIvR II. 
 
 Aid for Amkrica 
 
 3 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 The Beginning of Dii'Lomatic Relations 30 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 The Demand for Recognition 46 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 Thf; Conclusion of the Tricaty 60 
 
P R Iv F A C R . 
 
 In this study of the circninstaiices which led to the 
 Franco-American alliance of 1778, without hopinj:^ to attain 
 minuteness of analysis, I have tried to show the princi])al 
 motives of France, and to suj^j^^est how they were nuxlified 
 by the influence of Spain. In dealing with the American 
 side of the story, no attempt has been made to do more than 
 hint at the political complications which, beginnin" in this 
 early period, produced their most important results in the 
 later stages of the war. 
 
 The most helpful documents easily accessii)le for the 
 study of this topic are : on the American side, Wharton's 
 Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, the Journals of 
 Congress, and the writings of the statesmen concerned ; on 
 the r'rench, Mr. B. F. Stevens' great collection of Fac- 
 similes, and the original material contained in M. Doniol's 
 important but biased history. These may be supplemented 
 by the manuscript collections of Mr. Jared Sparks and Mr. 
 George Bancroft. The letters published by DeWitt in his 
 study of Jefferson may also be found among the Sparks 
 manuscripts. The vSpanish documents have been consulted 
 in English and French translations. 
 
 I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Mr. Thomas 
 J. Kiernan of the Harvard Library, Mr. Wilberforce Fames 
 of the Ivcnox Library, and Mr. Robbins Little, formerly of 
 the Astor Library, for their kindness in giving me access to 
 valuable collections ; and also to thank the officers of the 
 Cornell Library for favors continued during the revision of 
 this thesis. 
 
 Laura C. Sheldon. 
 
I. 
 
 KORI'CAvSTvS OF RI-N'OLUTION. 
 
 The agreeniciit made between France ul the United 
 States in 1778, thongh a welcome relief to struggling patriots 
 in America and a source of joy to Repnblican enthusiasts in 
 France, did n)t, in either country, lack critics to condemn it 
 as an unnatural alliance. In view of the wars which had 
 sundered F^renchmen and Fjiglishmen for nearly a centurx', 
 the feeling was inevitable ; yet those who deliberatel\' called 
 this miion of enemies a natural alliance had wiser political 
 insight. They saw that the transfer of Canada to Kngland 
 in 1763 had opened the way for a friendshi]i between F^ngiish 
 America and FVance. 
 
 Early in the series of contests, here and there an onlooker 
 had dimly seen that the relation l)etween Kngland and her 
 thirteen Colonies depended on whether FVance or Kngland 
 held Canada. Two opposite predictions were made : one, 
 that Ivngland, if she should conquer Canada, would follow 
 up the victory by tightening her grasp on her own Colonies ; 
 the other, that she would soon lose them altogether. Toward 
 the close of Queen Anne's War, an enterprising F'reiich 
 officer formed a plan for winning the Knglish Colonists to the 
 side of France : namely, to jiersuade them that the troops 
 which Kngland was sending to their shores were designed, not 
 for the conquest of their enemy, but for their own subjuga- 
 tion ; and that, if New France should fall into the hands of 
 Kngland, their lil)erties would be destroyed. The French 
 colonial minister approved of the scheme. " It is much to 
 be w'ished," he wrote, " that the Council at Boston coidd be 
 informed of the designs of the F"nglish Court, and shown 
 how important it is for that province to remain in the state 
 of a republic. The King would even approve <nir helping 
 it to do so." In furtherance of this policy, an emissar\- was 
 sent to Boston in 171 1, to treat with the Colonies as an inde- 
 
2 France and the Anierica)i Revolution . 
 
 pendent people and arrange a mutual cessation of hostilities, 
 on condition that they should give England no more aid ; 
 but when he arrived on the enemy's coast, his vessel was 
 seized, and his mission came to an ignominious end.' 
 
 At about this time another Frenchman, with wiser fore- 
 sight, was predicting the actual results of the British policy. 
 " Old England," he said, alluding to the possible conquest 
 of Canada and its influence on the thirteen Colonies, " will 
 not imagine that these variotis provinces will then unite, 
 shake off the yoke of the English monarchy, and erect them- 
 selves into a democracy." " A generation later, in 1748, the 
 Swedish traveller, Kalm, believed that the presence of the 
 French in Canada was the main security for England's re- 
 tention of Iier Colonies.'^ Before the close of the Seven 
 Years' War, French and English statesmen alike were pre- 
 dicting that the transfer of Canada to England would be 
 followed by the revolt of the British Provinces ; for their in- 
 habitants, released from constant dread of a hostile neighbor 
 and no longer in need of support from England, w^ould be 
 free to luirse their grievances against her. The Count de 
 Vergennes, who was to direct the foreign affairs of France 
 during the American Revolution, foretold the crisis in which 
 he afterward found his opportunity. " England," he said, 
 " will ere long repent of having removed the only check that 
 could keep her colonies in awe. They stand no longer in 
 need of her protection. vShe will call on them to contribute 
 toward supporting the burdens they have helped to bring on 
 her, and they will answer by striking off all dependence." ^ 
 
 In 1763, the long contest for empire ended in the triumph 
 of England and the expulsion of France from the North 
 American continent. With her chief colonial possessions 
 torn away, her army weakened, and her navy almost 
 destroyed, France suddenly found her.self in the position of 
 a minor power. Her humiliation brought with it not even 
 
 ' rarkmaii, .A. Half-Century of CoiiHict, I, ])p. 150 ff. 
 '^Ibid. I, p. 155. Quoted from an anonymous memorial of 1710, 
 171 1. 
 ^Lecky, Knj.;lan(] in the Kighteenth Century, III, p. 291. 
 * Bancroft, History of the United vStates, 11, p. 564. 
 
Forecasts of Revolution . 3 
 
 the pDor comfort of security : for I^uglaiul was. in the eyes 
 of the French Ministry, a treacherous opponent, disposed to 
 take ever}' advantage of a concpiered enemy ; ready, for 
 any hope of gain, to reopen the war, under her own prece- 
 dent, without tlie forniahty of a declaration. If Choiseul, 
 at this time the most influential minister of France, not only 
 tried to strengthen his conntr\- Ijy forming alliances and 
 building up a new navy, Init w.itched for an opportunity to 
 strike an underhand blow at Ivngland tlirough her Colonies ; 
 if Vergennes, a few years later, built up for her discomfiture 
 a consistent policy of deception, their excuse must be .sought 
 in the desperate plight of France and in previous wanderings 
 from the i>ath of international virtue on the part of ICngland. 
 " Power can never render honorable that which is not hon- 
 orable," — so wrote a contemporary of these men — '"and in 
 politics, everything which is not avowed, everything which 
 is not clothed with a public character, is intrigue. 
 Separate morals from politics, and politics have no longer 
 any supjiort, but lose themselves in a bottomless abyss." ' 
 Choiseul and Vergennes employed their power without too 
 keen an eye to international honor ; used means, to avow 
 which would have been insanity ; and, in their dealings 
 with England, sunk moral considerations to a fathomless 
 depth. 
 
 The treaty of 1763 was a di.sgrace, to be wiped out. 
 Choiseul lost no time and took no chances. He laid plans 
 to thwart the policy of England in India, in the Mediter- 
 ranean, in the Ea.stern islands ; he kept strict watch over the 
 diplomacy of Europe. " There was not a single point," 
 says the biographer of one of his secret emi.ssaries, " where 
 the wary and alert minister had not his agents, spies, and 
 instruments for the aggrandizement of France and the 
 injury of England."' From time to time, his animosity 
 broke out freely in his official correspondence. ' ' We are in 
 no haste, as \'ou may well imagine," he wrote in 1767 to a 
 member of the embassy at London, " to see a firm ministry 
 
 ' Se^ur, Le Politique de Tous les Cabinets de I'Europe, I, p. 119, 
 note ; p. 113, note. 
 
 '^ Kapp, Life of Kalb, p. 43. 
 
4 J''ra>icc and the Atnerira?! Revolution . 
 
 established in Hn^laiid. 1 hope that the anarchy will not 
 soon cease. Would that it might last a century." ' A year 
 later, he expressed a wish that the popular tumult on behalf 
 of Wilkes might increase. " A rumor is abroad here," he 
 said, " that on the fifteenth there was a sort of action in the 
 city of London, in wdiich many people perished. I dare not 
 flatter myself that this report is true. The English never 
 destroy one another so fast as we could wish." ' 
 
 That he might the more safely hasten their destruction, 
 Choiseul fortified his country by diplomacy. He adhered 
 to the sharply criticized Austrian alliance ; chiefly, it is 
 said, to secure neutrality on the continent in case of war 
 with England, and thus to avoid the disadvantage of a 
 double conflict with the navy of Great Britain and the 
 armies of her allies.' Before the close of tlie Seven Years' 
 War, he had strengthened the natural l)ond between France 
 and Spain by the Third Family Compact. This agreement 
 assured France of at least one ally in case her minister 
 should succeed in bringing on the war which he desired. 
 Meanwhile, further negotiation, wcjrking on the easily ex- 
 cited jiassions for revenge and acquisition, aroused the 
 Spaniard to eagerness for war. Choiseul was "as sure of 
 Spain," we are told, " as if he had been the ])rnne minister 
 of Charles III." ' 
 
 Choi.seul tried to bring al)()Ut a ruptiu'e with Juigland in 
 1765. Three years later he made a second attempt, but his 
 colleagues in the Council overruled him. Papers drawn up 
 by his order are .still extant, minutely describing the 
 Englisli coast, with a view to its facilities for landing an 
 army of invasion.' The fact that no u.se was made of this 
 information argues prudence on the part of the King and 
 his advisers, rather than any sentiment of forbearance 
 toward England. Not only the publicly recognized C<)uncil 
 
 ' Choiseul to Diiraiul, Aug. 4, 1767. l)e Witt, JefTerson, j). 420. 
 
 '•'Choiseul to du Chatelet, May 23, 176S. Ibid. p. 438. 
 
 ^ S^gur, Le Politique de Tous les Cabinets, I, p. 88, note. Cape- 
 figue, Louis XVI, II, p. 22. Fla,ssan, Diplomatic Fran9aise, VI, p. 53. 
 
 * Lacretelle, Histoire de PVance, IV, p. 191. 
 
 ^ Mahon, History of England from the Peace of Utrecht to the Peace 
 of Versailles, V, .\))]ien(lix, ]ip. xix, xxii. 
 
/'omas/s of Rcvolutio}i. 5 
 
 but llic secret cabinel of Louis X\' were intent on prospects 
 of war. A plan for the invasion of Iint>lan(l was the only 
 paper spared when the secret correspondence was consigned 
 to the flames b}' order of Louis XVL at the opening of his 
 reign.' 
 
 At the very time when luigland was adjusting her un- 
 •stable peace with France, the British Ministry were pre- 
 paring measures that could not fail to embroil them with 
 the American Colonies and give France an opportunity for 
 mischief. Seven months after the ratification of the treaty 
 of 1763, the proper commissioners were instructed to pre- 
 pare a bill imposing a stamp duty on the Colonists. This 
 bill was laid aside for a year, but in the meantime laws 
 were pas.sed to extend the Navigation Acts and modify 
 American imposts.' The news of these measures roused in- 
 tense excitement in the Provinces. Tidings of tlie discon- 
 tent reached France, and Choiseul ])romptly sent his first 
 secret agent to America. 
 
 This emissary, sent out in 1764, was 1\L de Pontleroy, a 
 lieutenant in the P^rench navy.' On his return to Europe 
 in 1766, he made his report to ^L Durand, then chief clerk 
 of the iMench embassy in London. The report comprised 
 an account of the products, occupations, and industrial and 
 military resources of the Provinces, the state of their de- 
 fences, the character and the political aspirations of their in- 
 habitants. Durand, in forwarding this information to Choi- 
 seul, expres.sed the opinion that the Colonies were too oj)U- 
 lent, ambitious, and conscious of their strength, to remain 
 in obedience, but that a revolution ending in American 
 independence would be a disadvantage to I'rance ; because 
 the Colonies in question, producing, as they did, all the 
 necessaries of life, could absorb at will their southern neigh- 
 bors, the producers of sugar, coffee, and cotton. In a word, 
 the independence of America would endanger French rule 
 in the West Indies. Durand was a conservative. He held 
 
 ' Vergennes and du May lo Louis XVI, Feb. (?) 1775; Segur, I^e 
 Politique, I, p. 106. 
 
 2 Bancroft, III, pp. 55, 73. 
 
 ^ De Witt, JefTcTSf)n, p. 407, note. 
 
6 France and the Ameriean Revolntio)i . 
 
 to the old policy of war against all the Knglish. He spoke 
 of the importance of injuring British conunerce, and advised 
 that Pontlero3''s instructions for a second mission be framed 
 with that object.' 
 
 Choiseul, reph'ing briefly, put aside Durand's scheme for 
 attacking the commerce of h^igland. He said that M. de 
 Pontlero}' would i)e instructed, on his second tour through 
 the Colonies, simply to verify his former report. "Our 
 ideas on America, whether military or political," said he, 
 " are infinitely changed within thirty years." ' 
 
 A few months after this discussion, Benjamin Franklin's 
 published replies to the Parliamentary intpiiry on the sub- 
 ject of the Stamp Act sup])lied the F'rench Ministry with 
 another source of information on American affairs. M. 
 Durand, who was acting as minister plenipotentiary at this 
 time, zealously cultivated P'ranklin's accpiaintance, ques- 
 tioning him about America, asking for all his political writ- 
 ings, and offering him various social attentions. P^ranklin 
 suspected a hidden motive for these civilities. " I fancy," 
 he wrote to his son, " that intriguing nation would like very 
 well to meddle on occasion, and blow U]1 the coals between 
 Great Britain and her Colonies, but I hope we shall give 
 them no opportunity." '' 
 
 Durand gathered from Franklin's report, that the opposite 
 commercial interests of England and America were tending 
 to produce an outbreak of hostilities ; but he thought that 
 England, foreseeing the trouble, would take measures to 
 ward it off. He believed that the revolution would be 
 gradual and would lead, not to a separation of the Colonies 
 from the mother country, but to a luiion such as that of 
 Scotland with the crown of Great Britain. On this point, 
 too, Choiseul was of a different opinion. He thought that 
 England could hold her Colonies only by ab.solute control of 
 their conunerce ; while, if she tried to luaintain this control 
 
 'Durand to Choiseul, Aug. 3, 7, 20, 22, 24, 1766. De Witt, Jeffer- 
 son, pp. 407, 410, 412, 413, 415. 
 
 'Choiseul to Durand, Aug. 11, Se])t. 15, 1766. Ibid. pp. 412, 417. 
 ^To William Franklin, Aug. 28, 1767. Works, IV, p. 32. 
 
Fo>ecasfs of Revolution. 7 
 
 by imposts, the Colonics would rebel, and she would be un- 
 able to subdue them.' 
 
 Choiseul believed, then, that a revolution in America was 
 approach iiii^;. It is clear, from his instructions to his next 
 colonial agent, that he did not fear American independence, 
 and that he was inclined to aid the Colonies The projected 
 second voyage of M. de Pontleroy seems never to have taken 
 place; but on the fourth of October, 1767, the Baron de 
 Kali), an officer in the French service, who had been secretly 
 gathering American news in Holland, set sail for Philadel- 
 phia. Choiseul instructed him to iind out what the Ameri- 
 can people intended nj do, and what it was advisable to send 
 them — for instance, whether the\' recjuired engineers and 
 cavalry officers ; — and also to enquire into their facilities for 
 procuring munitions and suj^plies, the strength of their de- 
 termination to escape from luiglish rule, their militarv 
 resources and local advantages, the plan of their revolt, and 
 the names of the leaders who would probably take com- 
 mand." 
 
 Through the year 1768, during his stay in America and 
 after his return, de Kalb made frequent reports. He found 
 the country in a ferment. The excitement caused by the 
 Stamp Act had hardly had time to die out after the repeal, 
 before new taxes caused fresh irritation. The jieople were 
 entering into non-importation agreements and setting up 
 manufactories for themselves. De Kalb thought that if 
 the Colonies had any easy means of comminiication (jr if 
 they were united in their interests, they would soon become 
 indejKMident. b<ven as it was, this result would come in 
 time. \{ not produced by British oppression, it would 
 follcjw fr(jm the natural growth of population ; for the 
 country was too large to be governed from a distance. But 
 the people showed no inclination to call on foreign powers 
 for help. In fact, such aid would be an object of greater 
 susjMcion to them than the encroachments of England. 
 
 ' Durand to Choiseul, Aug. 11, 30, vSept. 3, 1767. Choiseul to 
 Durand, Aug. 24. De Witt, Jefferson, pp. 420, 427, 428, 425. 
 
 ' Kapp, Life of Kalb, p. 46. Colleville, I<es Missions Secretes, 
 p. 20. 
 
8 Fra)ice and the Americaji Revolution . 
 
 Even if they should ask assistance, de Kalb thouglit it 
 would be unwise to grant it until they had declared their 
 independence, formed a confederation, invited all nations to 
 share their commerce, and established an army and a navy. 
 Premature advances, he thought, would only reconcile the 
 Colonies to Ivngland and unite the two countries for an 
 attack on the I'^rench territories in America.' 
 
 While de Kalb was carrying on his rcsearcht-s abroad and 
 making his reports, the discussion at home continued. The 
 new ambassador at IvOndon, the Coiuit du Chatelet, showed 
 keen interest in American affairs. In March, 176S, evi- 
 dently in ignorance of the measures already taken by 
 Choiseul, du Chatelet advised him to send agents to America 
 to gather information while the peace lasted, and, in case a 
 revolution seemed imminent, to form centers of union and 
 hope, and suggest an a])peal for foreign aid." In a letter 
 written in November, du Ciiatelet discussed the question 
 whether a revolution in then^-ar future was probable. The 
 Colonists were firm in their refusal to trade with England, 
 l)ut many people believed that the mother country would 
 give way under the pressure of industrial distress. Du 
 Chatelet feared that the British Ministry, realizing how 
 hard it would be to subdue the Americans by force, would 
 come t(> an accommodation with them and then divert their 
 minds from i)ast grievances by operations against France 
 and Spain. He deplored the fact that the Bourbon powers 
 could not profit by the state of affairs in America ; Init, like 
 de Kalb, he feared that any advances would lead the 
 Colonists to make peace with England.'' As time passed, 
 and there was no sign of change in the British policy, he 
 began to doubt whether a reconciliation was probable, and 
 
 ' De Kalb to Choiseul, Philadelphia, Jan. 15, 20, 176S; New York, 
 Feb 25 (or 21); Boston, March (or May) 2; Philadelphia, Apr. 19; 
 Paris (?) Aug. 6; Paris, Sept. 16 (or Oct. 10); Nov. 6, 15. Kapp, 
 Life of Kalb, pp. 53-68, passim, and 286 to 295. Colleville, Les 
 Missions Secretes, pp. 43-81. De Witt, Jeflerson, pp. 458-464. 
 
 ' Du Chatelet to Choiseul, March 12, 1768. De Wilt, Jeflerson, 
 
 P- 433- 
 
 ^Du Chatelet to Choiseul, Nov. 11, 18, 176S. Ibid. pp. 445, 448. 
 
Forecasts of Rcvolntioi. 9 
 
 to fear a premature declaration of war. Ever\'thing de- 
 pended on the action of the Ivnghsh Parhatnent, he wrote 
 early in December, 1768. If it persisted in taxing the 
 Colonies, the revolution would probabh' break out within 
 six months. In that case, France would fnid herself face to 
 face with two questions : could the union of the Colonies 
 maintain itself against the power of England, without the 
 support which a foreign war would lend it ; and could 
 France and Spain remain idle spectators of the struggle ? 
 The two nations would be obliged to decide wdiether they 
 would run the risk involved in supporting the revolution, or 
 leave it to the chance of dyiug out for want pf sustenance/ 
 
 Choiseul agreed, in the main, with the ambassador's con- 
 clusiotis. He thought a revolution certain unless England 
 changed her colonial policy." But the veto of his war pro- 
 ject, occurring at about this time, probabh' dampened his 
 interest in the Provinces. De Kalb was coldly received on 
 his return from America. P'or some time, the Minister re- 
 fused even to grant him an audience. " It was obvious," 
 says de Kalb, "that his system .... had changed, as he 
 no longer expressed any desire to know what was pas.sing in 
 America."^ " It was he," Lafayette afterwards wrote of 
 de Kalb, in words which betray characteristic impatience of 
 the minister's seeming apathy, — " It was he whom M. de 
 Choiseid sent to visit the English Colonies, and who, on his 
 return, obtained money from him, but no audience; so little 
 did this minister think of the Revolution, the retrospective 
 honor of which .some people have assigned to him."^ 
 
 The time for military interference in America had not yet 
 come ; but early in 1769 Choiseul and du Chatelet discussed 
 the feasibility of binding the Colonies to France and Spain 
 by commercial ties. Du Chatelet originated the plan. A 
 bolder design, adapted oid\' to a state of war, had been pro- 
 posed to him in a letter of the preceding July, written prob- 
 
 ' Du Chatelet to Choiseul, Dec. 9, T76S. De Witt, Jeffersou, p. 449. 
 ■^Choiseul to du Chatelet, Nov. 22, Dec. 20, 1768. lljid. pp. 449, 
 
 451- 
 
 » Sparks MSS. XXXII, vol. I. 
 * Ibid. LXXXVI, p. 3. 
 
lO France and the American Revolution. 
 
 ably by his chief secretary, M. Frances.' This may have 
 suggested to the ambassador his own less venturesome 
 scheme. The writer of the letter believed that a com- 
 mercial treaty with the Americans would be desirable. 
 Such a treaty, he said, could be jM'oposed to them only at 
 the moment of a rupture with the mother country and. for 
 that reason, ought to be fully discussed in advance. If 
 offered at the critical moment, it might detach the Colonies 
 from England. France and Spain would then profit by the 
 lowering of the British reveimes ; while a stipulation of 
 neutrality would free their colonies from the danger of 
 being attacked by the Americans in future wars, and would 
 naturally develop into a treaty of alliance. 
 
 About six months after the receipt of this letter, we find 
 du Chatelet laying before the minister, evidently not for the 
 first time, a plan of collusion with the Americans, suited to 
 a state of peace." He proposed that France and »Spain 
 should relax their connnercial restrictions, even at the risk 
 of temporary inconvenience to their own citizens. This 
 would encourage trade between Americans .and subjects of 
 the King, enable FVenchmen to provide the Colonists with 
 those manufactured articles which they had ceased to obtain 
 from England, and lead to the formation of commercial 
 habits which England, even in case of a reconciliation, 
 would find hard to break. Besides this, France would gain 
 an indirect advantage. Tlie encouragement to American 
 connnerce would inspire the Provincials with a desire for 
 independence, while giving them means to carry on the 
 struggle for liberty. In this wa\', the embarra.ssment of 
 England would be prolonged. Du Chatelet saw, as his cor- 
 respondent of the preceding July had not seen, that, as a 
 counterpoi.se to these gains, the risk to French and Spanish 
 possessions from enterprising Americans might be increa.sed 
 rather than diminished by helping them to independence. 
 
 ' De Witt assigns the letter to M. Frances, (Jefferson, p. 440 ;) Ban- 
 croft, to Choiseul, (III, p. 294.) The request for instructions, and the 
 writer's ignorance of the date at which the treaty with Holland would 
 expire, point to the clerk rather than the minister. 
 
 ■^ Du Chatelet to Choiseul, Jan. 28, 1769. De Witt, Jefferson, p. 451, 
 
Forecasts of Revolniion. ii 
 
 France and Spain " must reflect," lie said, " whether it is 
 to their interest to second this revolution at the risk of the 
 consequences which might result from it later for the whole 
 new world, and whether the enfeeblement of the common 
 enemy can compensate the risk to which such an example 
 would expose them, from their own Colonies." But the 
 danger was remote, and less impressive than the present 
 advatitage. 
 
 This i)lan was wholly at variance with the conservative 
 policy of the Bourbons ; yet Choiseul recommended it to the 
 Council, all the members present approved of it, and it was 
 sent by the King's order to the Court of Spain.' Here, it 
 met with serious opposition. Spain feared that such con- 
 cessions would lead to contraband trade with her colonies 
 and to illicit extraction of gold and silver from their mines. 
 She feared, too, that a republican neighbor would indulge 
 in schemes of con(juest at her expense. Choiseul was 
 obliged to drop the project for a time, to give the vSpanish 
 Court leisure for reflection.'' He never had an opportunity 
 to resume it, for he was deprived of his ofhce in 1770. The 
 too independent zeal with which he showed his enmity 
 toward Ivigland was one of the causes of his downfall. He 
 was plotting with Spain at this time, for a war against the 
 common foe ; and it is said that he insj)ired the Spanish 
 attack on the British settlement of Port Egmont, in the 
 Falkland Islands. His i^ersonal enemies informed King 
 Louis of his secret activity, and the monarch promptly 
 ended his public career b}' a decree of exile. ^ 
 
 The Duke d'Aiguillon, who succeeded Choiseul, reversed 
 his foreign policy. In order to oppose the combined 
 powers, Prussia, Russia, and Austria, whose influence in 
 European politics was growing at the expense of P'rance, 
 ■d'Aiguillon cultivated friendly relations with luigland/ Of 
 
 ' Choiseul to du Chatelet, Feb. 6, 1769. De Witt, Jefferson, p. 454. 
 
 ^ D'Ossun to Choiseul, Feb. 20, 1769. Choiseul to du Chatelet, ilarch 
 14. Ibid. pp. 455, 457. 
 
 '^ Lacretelle, Histoire de France, IV, pp. 243, 255. 
 
 *Flassan, Diplomatic Fran^aise, VII, p. 45. Soulavie, IMenioires, 
 III, p. 340. 
 
j2 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 „,,, „, u,e <^r<^lX^::^, , 'ortltsLn^r Act, 
 "" r^VJ^.H^e of Ur>ortu„ity which Choisenl had 
 Z^ ad CO c:;:u,: a frie, 'uv aUiance . i.h the A„,erica„s. 
 
11. 
 
 AID FOR AMERICA. 
 
 The Council appointed by Louis X\'I on his accession to 
 the throne, was not of a character to raise expectations 
 of a vigorous foreign i:)olicy. The King liimself, without 
 whose consent no important stej) could be taken, desired 
 peace even with England. Burdened with a conscience, an 
 awkward encumbrance under the circumstances, he had 
 scruples against breaking a treaty without sufficient cause. 
 His prime minister, the Count de Maurepas, was an aged 
 courtier who, after suffering a long exile, had returned to 
 the pleasures of the court with a desire to enjo}- them un- 
 disturbed. To the pursuit of this end, he brought political 
 skill and incredible lightness (;f mind, "capable," said a 
 member of his Cabinet, "of sacrificing great interests to a 
 witticism."' It could be foretold that he would not 
 willingly make himself responsible for another war with 
 England. Soon after his appointment, Turgot, the econo- 
 mist, became minister of finance. Finance ministers do 
 not love war, nor do economists. Turgot's voice might 
 safel}' be counted on the side of peace. 
 
 The policy of the Count de Vergennes, who, as head of 
 the department of Foreign Affairs, would probably have 
 more influence for peace or war than any other man, was 
 less easy to predict. Vergennes had already made a reputa- 
 tion in diplomacy ; but his name was not, like those of 
 Choiseul and d'Aiguillon, connected with any special sys- 
 tem, Austrian or English. Without binding himself to any 
 theory, he had employed his skill in dealing with each 
 problem as it arose. Yet the general direction of his course 
 might perhaps be foreseen from certain facts of his past 
 career. Connected since 1755 with the secret diplomatic 
 service of Louis X\','' he had been trained in hostilit}' toward 
 
 ' St. Germain ; quoted by Soulavie, III, p. 170. 
 ^ Segur, Le Politique, I, p. 97. 
 
14 France and the Americaii Revolutio7i. 
 
 Great Britain ; and when the secret correspondence was 
 burned, he had pleaded for leave to preserve a plan for the 
 debarkation of troops in England. 
 
 During the three and a half years sin^e the downfall (A 
 Choiseul, the dispute between the Americans and the 
 mother country had reached a crisis. The Colonies were 
 uniting. Regular communication had been established be- 
 tween them through conunittees of C(jrres[)ondence ; and 
 now, in response to the series of harsh measures by which 
 the British Parliament expressed its disapproval of the 
 Boston tea party, the Provinces were electing delegates to a 
 Continental Congress. The lack of means of communica- 
 tion and the absence of any common interest, conditions 
 which de Kalb had noted as obstacles to union, were being 
 overcome ; and the .same changes which were preparing the 
 Colonies to unite against England, were making it possible 
 for them to welcome foreign intervention. 
 
 Vergennes moved cautiously. He received reports of the 
 situation from Gamier, the charge d'affaires! \n London, but 
 at first showed no desire to interfere in the quarrel. Merely 
 as a quarrel, whatever its outc(jme, it was to the interest of 
 France ; for it occupied England, and kept her from troub- 
 ling her neighbors. This was an advantage ; for, however 
 busily France might plot against England, she did not at this 
 time desire open war. \'crgennes regarded the American 
 conflict as " the surest guaranty of the pacific sentiments of 
 His Britannic Majesty and of his ministers." vSome guar- 
 anty, he believed, was needed ; for he had no confidence in 
 the peace policy of England. "Let us not deceive our- 
 .selves in this," said he: "whatever parade the F^nglish 
 ministry make of their pacific intentions, we can count on 
 this disposition onh' so long as their domestic embarrass- 
 ments last." ' 
 
 Vergennes, like man}' other observers on both sides of the 
 Channel, at first considered the American Revolution the 
 work of the Opposition party in lingland. " If the King of 
 England governs his Parliament at will, the Opposition 
 
 'Vergennes to Garnier, Sept. ii, 1774. Mhnoire by Vergennes,, 
 Dec. 8. Doniol, I, pp. 13, 19. 
 
Aid for America. 15 
 
 governs the Colonies uo less abselutely. " ' Almost np to 
 the date of I^exington, he believed that the interests (^f com- 
 merce and industry would force an acconnnodation. Yet he 
 was always on the alert ; and it was [Mobably with his 
 approval that Garnier, conx'ersing with Franklin just before 
 his departure from London, several weeks prior to the out- 
 break of the war, significantly reminded him of the aid 
 which France had given the United Provinces in their 
 struggle against vSpain.' 
 
 When war had begun, Vergennes was quick to see the 
 trend of events. Even if the grievances of America had 
 been at first, as he suspected, a mere pretext for the quarrel, 
 the Colonists when once aroused could not be restrained 
 from going beyond the designs of their political abettors in 
 England, and seeking independence. Owing to the nature 
 of the country and the distribution of the population, he 
 thought that England would be unable to reduce the Colo- 
 nies by force of arms. The success of a negotiation seemed 
 extremely doubtful, but he believed that England would try 
 this way of adjusting the dif^culties. Only when he heard 
 of the British King's proclamation of August, 1775, declar- 
 ing the Americans rebels, was he convinced that England 
 had cut herself off from all hope of bringing the contest to 
 a peaceful close.'' 
 
 Before England had taken this decisive step, the war 
 alarm sounded in the French Cabinet. In July, 1775, the 
 Count de Guines, ambassador at London, reported a conver- 
 sation in which Lord Rochford had said that some of the 
 members of both political parties were advocating war 
 against France as the surest way to stop the American con- 
 flict.' Ever since the time of the vStamp Act. the French 
 authorities had feared that England would have recour.se to 
 a vigorous foreign policy in order to end her domestic 
 troubles. Now the British foreign .secretary, with singular 
 
 ' Vergennes to de Guines, July i, 1775. Doniol, I, p. S^. 
 Tarton, Life of Franklin, II, p. 67. 
 
 ^Vergennes to Garnier, Jan. 15, 1775. To de Guines, July 10, 29; 
 Aug. 20, 27 ; Sept. 3. Doniol, I, pp. 68, 90, 95, 171, 172, 174. 
 ^ De Guines to Vergennes, July 28, 1775. Ibid. I, p. 116. 
 
i6 Frmuc- iind the American Revolution . 
 
 indiscretion, contributed his word of warning. The hint 
 threw France o\\ her guard. \'ergennes sent the substance 
 of de Gnines' dispatch to the ambassador in Spain, and rec- 
 ommended a plan of defense. At the first act of open hos- 
 tihty on the part of England, let France and Spain seize as 
 man\- of her ships as po.ssible. They might, however, ex- 
 empt the vessels of the North American Colonists ; for it 
 would be impolitic to make tliem regret tlieir war with Eng- 
 land, and to force them back under the yoke. Circnm- 
 stances might arise in which it would be advisable to treat 
 them as an independent ]ieople, invite them to visit French 
 and Spanish ports, and offer them freedom of connnerce.' 
 
 Some time before this, de Gnines had complained that he 
 could not obtain reliable American news in England, and 
 had suggested the advantage of having an agent in America. 
 For this mission he had recommended M. de Bonvouloir, a 
 French officer who had visited all the British colonies in 
 America, and who desired an opportunity to return. \'er- 
 geunes, with the King's approval, now authorized de Guines 
 to send the man. His journey and correspondence were so 
 arranged that the Ministry could not be compromised. His 
 two chief duties were, to report the course of events and the 
 developments of opinion in America, and to teach the peo- 
 ple that they had no reason to fear the PVench. His first 
 instructions, which contained a word of reassurance for the 
 Americans on independence, the dcstin\- of Canada, and 
 commercial facilities in French ports, were considerably 
 modified before he sailed. De Guines heard that the insur- 
 gents were proclaiming their hopes of aid from France and 
 Spain; and, taking alarm, he forbade his emissary "even 
 to pronounce the word French," and left him nothing to do 
 but watch and report the progress of affairs.' Bonvouloir, 
 as we shall see, ignored this prohibition ; and it is hard to 
 decide whether \'ergennes was more pleased or offended by 
 his indiscretion. 
 
 ' Vergennes to d'Ossun, Aug. 7, 1775. Doniol, I, pp. 123-7. 
 
 -De Guines to Vergennes, July r, 28, 1775. Vergennes to de Guines, 
 Aug. 7. Doniol, I, pp. 154, 155. De Guines to Vergennes, Sept. S. De 
 Wilt, JefFer.son, p. 475. 
 
Aid for A //I erica . 1 7 
 
 Boiivouloir sailed early in vSeptcinher, 1775, arrived at 
 Philadelphia in December, and was cordially received. A 
 change ot" sentiment had gradually taken ])laee in the 
 Colonies since the days of Choiseul, when iManklin met the 
 advances of the iM'eiich andjassador with suspicion, and 
 when de Kalh became convinced that the Americans would 
 repel all f(;reign interference. Although the Colonists 
 fought during the first year for redress of grievances and 
 not for independence, there were a few radicals who saw 
 from the beginning that inde])endence would be the natural 
 outcome of the contest, and that this result might be 
 hastened by foreign alliances. In 1774, Patrick Henry pre- 
 dicted an alliance with Fraiice, Spain, and Holland.' At the 
 opening of the Congress of 1775, vSrnnuel and John Adams 
 were convinced that an immediate declaration was necessary. 
 Independence first, .said John Adams ; then a last attem])t to 
 treat with luigland ; and in case of failure, overtures to 
 foreign countries. ]^>ut the conservatives carried the day, 
 and a la.st petition was sent to the King. Convinced of its 
 uselessness, Adams persisted in urging almost daily a 
 declaration of independence and the adoption of a plan of 
 treaties to be offered to foreign powers, especially France 
 and Spain. In the fall of 1775, probably late in September, 
 Mr. Chase of Maryland moved to send ambassadors to 
 France. The effect of this motion on the nerves of Con- 
 gress, says Mr. Adams, was galvanic. " The grimaces, the 
 agitations and convulsions were very great." In the argu- 
 ment which followed, many substitutes for the motion were 
 offered, and there were " twenty subtle projects to get rid of 
 it." The debate ended, on the twenty-ninth of November, 
 in a compromise measure : the f(jrmation of a connnittee to 
 correspond with friends "in Great liritain, Ireland, and 
 other parts of the world." '^ 
 
 A fortnight after the Committee of Secret Correspondence 
 was formed, it .sent a letter to Dr. Arthur Lee, P'ranklin's 
 successor in the agency for Massachusetts in London, direct- 
 
 'Parlon's Franklin, II, jj. iii. 
 
 ^ Life and Works of John Adams, II, pp. 406 ff. ; I, pp. 200-3; 
 II, pp. 503-6. Secret Journals of Congress, II, p. 5. 
 2 
 
1 8 Fra)icc ajid tlie American Revolutioji. 
 
 ing him to find out the disposition of foreign powers toward 
 the Colonies. A week later Franklin wrote in the name of 
 the Committee, to his friend Charles Dumas, a Swiss resi- 
 dent of Holland, requesting him to take advantage of his 
 situation at The Hague to find out whether any of the 
 European states would prolnd^ly be willing to assist the 
 Colonies or enter i'.ito an alliance with them. Dumas wa.s 
 empowered to confer with ministers of state, using Frank- 
 lin's letter as a credential and taking precautions for keep- 
 ing the matter from the ears of the Ivnglish ambassador.' 
 
 At this critical time the French agent, Bonvouloir, ap- 
 peared in Philadelphia. Making Dr. Franklin's acquaint- 
 ance, he obtained several hearings from the Committee of 
 Secret Correspondence. The substance of these interviews 
 may be gathered from his report to de Guines." He made 
 .some indefinite offers of service, and was asked how France 
 regarded the Colonies. He answered : he believed that 
 France wislied ilieni 'cvell. Would she aid them ? Perhaps 
 so. On what footing ? He knew nothing about it ; but if 
 she should do .so, it would always be on just and equitable 
 terms. Would it be prudent to send a " deputy plenipoten- 
 tiary " to France ? He thought it would be precipitate, even 
 hazardous. Yet lie would not advise them in any way. He 
 was a private individual, a curious traveller ; but he would 
 be charmed to serve them through his acquaintances. When 
 the committee broached the subject of a treaty, Bonvouloir 
 refused to indicate the terms that France might be induced 
 to grant ; but he argued that France was more eligible as an 
 ally than Spain. In consequence of these interviews, he 
 received from the committee a written request for French 
 engineers, leave to procure arms and annnunition in France, 
 and the privilege of entry into French ports. He replied, 
 also in writing, giving some encouragement as to engineers 
 and munitions, but speaking with hesitation about commer- 
 cial privileges. 
 
 While one Frenchman was telling Congress that help 
 
 ' l-"raiiklin cl al . to Arthur Lee, Dec. 12, 1775. Franklin to Dumas, 
 Dec. 19. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, pp. 63, 65. 
 ' De Witt, Jefferson, pp. 47S ff. 
 
Aid /oi' .Inierica. 19 
 
 might be obtained in France, another was trying to persuade 
 King L,ouis to grant it. The political and mercantile ven- 
 ture of Caron Beaumarcliais, courtier, man of letters, and 
 agent in the secret service, — his trials and achievements on 
 behalf of America — form one of the most romantic episodes 
 of the Revolution. Beaumarcliais was in London in 1775, 
 collecting news of American affairs and spying on the British 
 Ministry. His sources of information were varied. He was 
 on friendly terms with Lord Rochford, the English Secretary 
 for Foreign Affairs, and also with Wilkes, the most notori- 
 ous leader of the Opposition ; he had dealings with Arthur 
 Lee, the agent for Massachusetts ; and he frequently met 
 travellers from America. Reporting his impressions to 
 King Louis, he repeatedly urged him, for the safety and 
 glory of France, to aid the American insurgents. In case 
 the King decided to grant them money, the breach of neu- 
 trality might be hidden by conveying the favors through a 
 fictitious mercantile company. Beaumarcliais expressed his 
 willingness to personate this firm.' The King objected to 
 the plan, on the ground of justice to England. Beaumar- 
 cliais, in a long reply," tried to reconcile his project with the 
 "delicate conscientiousness" of the King. "The policy 
 which maintains nations," he argued, "differs almost en- 
 tirely from the moral law which governs individuals 
 
 The masterpiece of sound policy is to ba.se your tranquillity 
 on the divisions of your enemies." With unscrupulous 
 plausibility, he argued that no treaty with the English mon- 
 arch could justly re.strain the King of France ; for it was the 
 English people who desired war, and they would always 
 compel their King to yield. The conscience of Louis was 
 not entirely satisfied with this logic, for we hear that he con- 
 tinued to protest ; but pressure, official and unofficial, forced 
 him to give way.'^ 
 
 For some time the Americans had been obtaining aid from 
 citizens of France by the channels of commerce. The reports 
 of English spies showed the existence of an active trade in 
 
 * Deane Papers, I, p. no. 
 
 ^Durand, New Materials, pp. 59, 68, 69. 
 
 •^Soulavie, Memoires, III, pp. 346-8. 
 
20 Fra)icc and the American Revolution. 
 
 arms and ammunition. The British Ministry, believing that 
 the government connived at it, repeatedly called attention to 
 the subject through their embassy. \'ergennes protested 
 innocence, saying that military stores could not be shipped 
 from France without special orders, and thai the govern- 
 ment did not lend such countenance to men who were aiding 
 the in.surgents. He would not vouch for all the acts of un- 
 ruly individuals, but whatever the Ministry could prevent 
 should be j^revented. England's trouble with her Colonies, 
 he declared, was to nobody's interest ; the consecpiences of 
 it were as obvious as those of the cession of Canada. The 
 Count de Maurepas added his professions of friendsliip. 
 " Be sure," said he, " that we are not people who seek to 
 take unfair advantage of circumstances, and to fish in 
 troubled waters." He even hinted that the Americans had 
 forfeited the sympathy of the French in aiming at indepen- 
 dence. By their united efforts the two ministers convinced 
 the suspicious ambassador, Lord Stormont, that France was 
 desirous of peace. ' 
 
 It was probably not far from the time of these friendly 
 professions that Vergeinies' secretary, Gerard de Rayneval, 
 drew up an elaborate memorial discussing the interest of 
 France in the affairs of the American Colonies." His argu- 
 ment was based on suggestions which different persons had 
 made to Vcrgennes, some at his request, others of their own 
 initiative.^ The writer traces the development of the quarrel 
 between England and her Colonies in a manner which shows 
 his sympathy with the Americans. Inquiring whether 
 France ought to desire the independence of America, he an- 
 swers that the benefit to France can be measured by the 
 injury to Ivngland. Three specific advantages will be 
 gained : a diminution of English power and an increase of 
 French ; loss to linglish and gain to French trade ; and a 
 chance to recover part of the French j)ossessions in America. 
 To those who fear that the iVmericans will try to encroach 
 
 'St. Paul to Rochford, Sept. 20, 1775. Stormont to Rochford, Ocl. 
 31. Stevens Facsimiles, 1303, 1306. 
 "^Reflexions: qy. end of 1775. Ibid. 13 10. 
 ^Doniol I, p. 242. 
 
Aid for .1 III erica. 21 
 
 on the French and vSpanish territories, lie sa_\'s lliat the peo- 
 ple will be too ninch exhausted bv the war to think of con- 
 ciuest. This fear "deserves no consideration." But it does 
 not follow that it is best to aid thcni at once. It would be 
 well to wait and see whether Ivn^land can conquer them in 
 another campaign. If she is not strong enough for this, 
 France ma}' safely interfere. Meanwhile, let her sup])ort 
 the courage of the Americans and flatter them with the hope 
 of assistance. In this way she will avoid compromising her- 
 self either with the insurgents or with the F^nglish Court. 
 The animus with which this counsel is given is even more 
 significant than its substance. " Ivngland is the natural 
 enemy of France," — st) reads this official document, — " and 
 she is a ra[)acious, unjust, and faithless enemy. The invari- 
 able object of her policy is, if not the destruction, at least the 
 al)asement of France. This is always the real motive of the 
 wars wliich she has stirred up against her, and this State 
 leason always prevails over any other consideration ; and 
 when it speaks, all means are lawful, provided they be effi- 
 cacious. This dis])osition, known to all the universe, dis- 
 charges France from the obligations which the right of 
 nations has established between countries, and authorizes her 
 to make use of reprisals in order to weaken an enemy who 
 is constantly seeking to injure hei." 
 
 While the American question was under consideration in 
 the fiM'eign office, Beaumarchai.^- was urging the government 
 to adopt a decided course. On the last day of February, 
 1776, he addressed to the King a memorial,' written to prove 
 the necessity of assisting the Americans, as a measure of 
 self-defense. Whether lingland obtained peace with her 
 Colonies by victory, defeat, or reconciliation, war between 
 France and England was sure to follow. The onl}' way, 
 then, {or France to maintain peace was to keep the Ameri- 
 can conflict alive. At nearly the .same time with Beau- 
 marchais' memorial, the government received Bonvouloir's 
 report,^ containing an assurance that the Americans would 
 welcome the co-operation of France. The arguments of 
 
 ' Peace or War. Beauniarchais and hi.s Times, III, p. 117. 
 ^De Witt, Jefferson, p. 478, note. 
 
22 France and the American Revolution . 
 
 these amateur dipUMiiatists were reinforced by urgent mes- 
 sages from the Court of Spain. Bound to France b}' an 
 alHance offensive and defensive, bound to her still more 
 closely by common hatred of hhigland, vS])ain was as ready 
 for mischief as her ally, and far more eager for gain. At 
 this period, her ambition pointed toward the con(iuest of 
 Portugal, with whom rival interests in America had brought 
 her into conflict. France had declared her unwillingness to 
 risk a continental war by attacking Portugal in Europe, and 
 bad tried to dissuade Spain from a course which would rouse 
 F^nglaud to hostility and divert her from the American war 
 so advantageous to the Bourbon i)owers. But when the 
 aggressions of Portugal, prolonged beyond reason, suggested 
 the connivance of England, Spain availed her.self of this 
 opportiuiity to persuade P'rance that their old enemy was 
 preparing for an attack, and that counter-measures were 
 needed. " His Majesty understands," wrote Grimaldi, the 
 prime minister of vSpain, "that it is necessary before all 
 else to decide whether or no we ought to prepare for 
 war, .... whether, calndy rel\ing on our good faith and 
 our uj)right intentions, we ought to wait until England her- 
 self .... strikes a blow at our ]-)Ossessions or those of 
 F'^rance in such a way that afterwards it ma>' be almost im- 
 possible to recover them." ' 
 
 Yergennes, though averse to prematiu'e aggressive mea.s- 
 ures, was keenly alive to a threatened danger. Unwilling 
 to go to the extreme which vSpain desired, he chose a course 
 that would leave P'rance uncommitted for the present, but 
 able at any moment to strike at Englantl or, better still, to 
 provoke P^ngland into dealing the first blow. On the 
 twelfth of March, with the approval of the King — won with 
 difhculty, as we have .seen, by Beaumarchais' arguments — 
 he submitted his plan to his colleagues in the Council. 
 Rayneval's manoire had asserted that PVance was interested 
 in favoring the insurgents, and that the previous conduct of 
 F^ngland would justify such a policy. Vergennes went 
 farther. Like Beaumarchais, he claimed that this cour.se 
 
 ' Grimaldi to d'Aranda, Feb. 26, 1776. Doniol, I, p. 336. See other 
 documents in chapters IX and X. 
 
Aid for America. 23 
 
 was dictated by political necessity. Whatever tlie outcome 
 of the American contest, war between France and Kngland 
 might result. In case of reconciliation, Kngland might be 
 tempted .to use against France the troo|)S set free in America, 
 or the English King might wish to build up arbitrary power 
 at home by the aid of a foreign war. In case of defeat, the 
 ministers would have recourse to such a war, to save their 
 official heads. On the other side was the risk that the 
 Colonies might encroach on their neighbors ; but \'ergennes 
 gave this danger only passing mention, and returned to less 
 remote po.ssibilities. If the two Kings did not ])refer peace, 
 he said, this woidd be the time to strike a blow at England, 
 place her in the rank of secondary powers, and " deliver the 
 universe from a rapacious tyrant." In any case, it was de- 
 sirable that the i'>re,sent war should last a year, to keep the 
 British forces in America, to prevent a change in the British 
 Mini.stry, to weaken the British army, and to give France 
 and Spain time for j^reparation. To ensure this, they mu.st 
 convince the English of their friendship, and at the same 
 time encourage the Americans with vague hopes. "Con- 
 tinue to feed dexterously the security of the English Min- 
 istry as to the intentions of France and Spain ; " aid the in- 
 surgents with money and munitions, but enter into no 
 alliance with them ; above all, increase the forces of France 
 and Spain, and prepare for defense : — this was the sum of 
 Vergennes' advice.' 
 
 This memorial drew from Tmgot a re])ly '"' remarkable 
 for its deviation from the political and economic views of 
 the time. The prevailing belief was that a country reaped 
 benefit from its colonies only so long as it monopolized their 
 trade, and that it could secure this a.scendancy only by force. 
 The aim of the pro- American party in France, as we find it 
 expressed in many writings of the period, was, b}' severing 
 the political tie which bound the Colonies to England, to 
 deprive her of the prestige and also of the commercial ])ros- 
 perity which she owed to that connection, and thus to bring 
 
 ' Stevens Facsimiles, 13 16. 
 ■^ Oeuvres, II, p. 551. 
 
24 FriDice (Did the Anieriia>i Revolution . 
 
 about her ruin.' Turgot, while predicting wide-spread 
 results from the success of the American re\'olt, threw 
 doubt on its efficacy as a means for the abasement of 
 England. He said that if the British Provinces became in- 
 dependent, the colonies of all the otlitr luiropean nations 
 would demand conimeicial freedom and, if denied it, would 
 fight for it until they, too, acquired independence. But he 
 maintained that the loss of all the colonies would affect the 
 prcsperity of the European nations but little, becau.se 
 only a very small part of the connnercial beuelit derived 
 from colonies was due to restrictions on trade. In view of 
 the coming revolution, he advi.sed that France should make 
 concessions to her own colonies and thus secure them as 
 friends and allies, instead of waiting to see them become 
 enemies ; and that she should urge Spain to take the same 
 precautions. 
 
 Turgot saw no reason to fear an attack from England ex- 
 cept in case ai reconciliation with her Colonies. As minister 
 of finance, he objected to beginning a war with army and 
 navy only half prepared and with a yearly deficit of twenty 
 million livres. Besides, he feared that an attack on 
 England would be the signal for an accomuiodation with her 
 Colonies. Aid to the Americans, he thought, should not 
 transgress the bounds of .strict neutrality. French citizens 
 might trade with the insurgents, because the government 
 had no reason to discriminate between them and other 
 British subjects ; but to supply them with money would be 
 a step difficult to conceal, and in case of exposure, would 
 incur the just resentment of lingiand. 
 
 Vergennes' vicmoire, attacked in part by Turgot, was 
 adopted by the majority of the Council, approved by the King, 
 and submitted to the Court of Spain. The Spanish King had 
 already expressed his willingness to share the expense of 
 aiding the Americans, in order to prolong the revolt and 
 allow ICngland and the Colonies to exhaust one another.^ 
 He thought, with \'ergennes, that the two Courts were in- 
 terested in prolonging the struggle ; that the Colonists, if 
 
 ' p-iske, American Revohition, II, pp. 5-6, 131-2. 
 
 ' Letter of Grimaldi, March 14, 1776. Doniol, I, 371. 
 
Aid for America. 25 
 
 not aided, would probably soon succmnb ; and that, while 
 it was best not to make common cause with them, it would 
 be well to furnish them with what they needed.' 
 
 In the meantime, the commercial facilities granted to 
 American traders in French ports continued to arouse indig- 
 nation in England. Vergennes had more than once issued 
 orders forbidding the exportation of arms by Americans ; 
 but they were sham orders, and the practice continued. In 
 April, 1776, the English discovered through the treacherous 
 mate of an xVmerican ship, that several vessels from the 
 Colonies, consigned to merchants of Nantes, were on their 
 way to France to procure arms and ammunition. Beau- 
 marchais, then in London, was questioned by Lord Roch- 
 ford, and answered with all the nonchalance of an irrespon- 
 sible private citizen : " Why would you wish our adminis- 
 tration to take proceedings against the Nantes merchants ? 
 Are we at war with anyone? . . . are not our ports open to 
 all the merchants in the world ? . . . On account of a 
 quarrel special to England, and in which we do not, nor do 
 we want to, take part, has England the right to restrict our 
 commerce?" "But, Sir," Lord Rochford answered, "the 
 Americans are rebels and are declared enemies!" "My 
 Lord, they are not ours. . . . Who prevents you from tak- 
 ing measures again.st them ? Cruise on all sides, seize them 
 everywhere ; except under the cannon of our forts, how- 
 ever ; we have nothing to do with it." Vergennes, forced 
 by his official position to be more complaisant, ordered that 
 the vessels should not be allowed to take powder and arms 
 on board ; but he conveyed to Beaumarchais the Knig's 
 approval of his reply to Lord Rochford. Powder and arms 
 were objects of commerce, he said ; and it was out of friend- 
 ship for England that the King had forbidden their exporta- 
 tion. Lord Rochford's tone implied that France was bound 
 to make England's interest her own. "I do not know of 
 this agreement," said Vergennes ; and, calling to mind the 
 aid which England had given to the C(jrsicans in their 
 recent .struggle against France, he added: "It does not 
 
 ' D'Ossun to Vergennes, Apr. i, 1776. Doniol, I, p. 341. 
 
26 France a)id the American Revolution. 
 
 exist ill the exrun])le which England gave us at the time 
 when she thonglit she could injure us." ' 
 
 Dissatisfied with Vergeiines' assunijition of neutrality, 
 Beautnarchais urged him to lend the insurgents one or two 
 million livres, and thus gather all the fruits of victory with- 
 out a battle. Vergennes began his rejily by contrasting the 
 respon.sibilities of practical statesmen like himself with the 
 freedom of theorists like Beaumarchais, but concluded by 
 assuring him that his advice was not necessarily rejected 
 because not seized with avidity : " Consider the matter well, 
 and you will find me nearer to you than you thnik." " You 
 were certainl}' near me," replied Beaumarchais, quick to 
 take the hint, " when I thought you far away." His confi- 
 dence was justified. On the very day of the reassuring 
 letter, Vergennes submitted to the King for his signature an 
 order for a million livres, to be used in aiding the English 
 Colonies." The conduct of the enterprise was entrusted to 
 Beaumarchais, who assumed, for the .sake of concealment, 
 the style of a commercial firm, — Rodrique Hortalez and 
 Company. 
 
 During the next few weeks, between the deci.sion of the 
 Cabinet and the completion of Beaumarchais' plans, an agent 
 of the Americans, without proper credentials but with a 
 goodly supply of zeal, was laboring on behalf of his coun- 
 trymen and receiving some encouragement from the Minis- 
 try. Dr. Barbeu Dubourg, a friend of Franklin, had been 
 entrusted by an agent of the Committee of vSecret Corre- 
 spondence with the charge of American interests at Paris 
 and Versailles. Having learned in conversation with the 
 ministers and their friends, that they were devising means 
 of aiding the insurgents, he tried to procure a supply of 
 ammunition, liy official coiniivance, he was allowed to bor- 
 row muskets and cannon from the King's arsenals, for sale 
 
 ^Beaumarchais to Vergennes, Apr. i6, 1776. St. Paul to Wey- 
 mouth, Apr. 17. Vergennes to Beaumarchais, Apr. 26. Stevens 
 Facsimiles, 1322, 1324, 1330. 
 
 ^Beaumarchais to Vergennes, Apr. 26, May 11, 1776. Vergennes to 
 Beaumarchais, May 2. Ibid. 1328, 1334, 861. Diplomatic Corre- 
 .spondence, II, p. 89. 
 
Aid for America. 27 
 
 to the Americans. Kiiowiiij; that the American arm}' 
 needed engineers, Dnbonrg tried to procure them. He also 
 "ventured promises" to one or two officers of artiller>-, 
 though he doubted the wisdom of employing foreign officers. 
 " I believe this is what you have the least need of," he wrote 
 to Franklin, "as it may disgust your valiant countrymen." 
 He set on foot arrangements with the Farmers General for 
 the reception of American tt)bacco, and obtained a promise 
 from the Minister of the Navy that his department would 
 purchase supplies from America. He reported that the 
 Ministry in general seemed to be favorably disposed toward 
 the insurgents, but were not inclined to assume any respon- 
 sibility for their fortunes. Indeed, these gentlemen were 
 much absorbed in their own concerns. Turgot had just 
 received his dismissal, " and all the others," wrote Dubourg, 
 " are so teased at this time by the extraordinary cabals of 
 the court," that no one wishes to go outside his own imme- 
 diate department.' 
 
 The change in the ministry of finance did not, of course, 
 affect the decision already reached with regard to the insur- 
 gents. On the tenth of June, Beaumarchais received a mil- 
 lion livres from the treasury, and he began without delay to 
 collect supplies for shij)ment to America. 
 
 It is natural to ask, while considering the first acts of 
 France in support of the American cause, whether her plea of 
 self-defense was genuine, or whether she was influenced 
 wholly by a wish to humiliate her rival. Vergennes, in his 
 mcmoire of March 12, gave prominence to the aggressive 
 motive, — the desire to strike a blow at England and restore 
 the former glory of France. As we see him, ostensibly in 
 fear of British designs, draw gradually nearer to an alliance 
 with America, the suspicion recurs again and again that he 
 saw danger ahead becau.se he wished to see it, and that his 
 eye for peril grew keener as France became better prepared 
 for defense. But this suspicion is misleading. No one who 
 reads the letters that passed between the French and Span- 
 
 ' Dubourg to Frauklin, June 12-July 2, 1776. Sparks MSS. LII, vol. 
 I, p. I. Stevens Facsimiles, 566, 567, 568, 570, S84. Diplomatic Cor- 
 respondence, II, p. 113. 
 
28 France and the Anicrican Rcvohiiion . 
 
 ish Courts during the earl}' years of the Revolution can fail' 
 to see that they were watching England as men watch some 
 dangerous animal crouching for a spring. Ivvery increase 
 in the British naval forces, every movement of a British 
 fleet, was jealously noted. Spain, especially, was uncom- 
 fortably conscious that her own colonies were near the 
 revolted Provinces, and that the destination of an English 
 fleet need be changed but little to menace her possessions, 
 luirly in 1776 she had special cruisers on the American coast 
 to watch the movements of British ships, and was urging 
 France to co-operate with lier in the defense of her colonies.' 
 
 Though considerations of safety set the pace of the Bour- 
 bon Courts from week to week, as they made haste to antici- 
 pate a dreaded attack or held back from provoking an 
 encounter for which they were not quite prepared, we can- 
 not doubt that, without regard to the intentions of England, 
 they desired war, provided they might have it in their owiv 
 good time. They were eager to wipe out the treaty of 1763, 
 and to regain their lost prestige. Very early in the discus- 
 sion, Spain freely hinted her desire for territorial acquisi- 
 tions. With France, the chief ambition was to humiliate 
 England and destroy her influence among nations. Ver- 
 gennes has left a clear .statement of his owmi leading motive,, 
 and of the means which he intended to employ. x\ memo- 
 rial written by him at the end of his career, contains the 
 following passage : "A nation may experience reverses- 
 and may yield to the imperious law of necessity and of her 
 own preservation ; but when these rever.ses and the humilia- 
 tion which has resulted from them are unjust, when they 
 have had for their principle and their end the pride of an 
 influential rival, she ought, for her honor, her dign.ity, and 
 her reputation, to recover herself whenever she finds the 
 opportunity. If she neglects it, if fear overpowers duty,, 
 she adds abasement to humiliation ; she becomes the object 
 of .scorn of her century and of future races. 
 
 "These important truths, Sire, have never left my 
 thoughts. They were already deeply graven in my heart 
 
 ' Grimaldi to d'Aranda, Feb. 26, 1776. D'Ossuii to Vergennes, Apr. 
 29. Doniol, I, 333, 350. 
 
Aid /or America. 29 
 
 when Your Majesty suinmoned me to your Council ; and I 
 waited with lively ini])atience an opportunity to follow their 
 impulse. It was these truths that fixed my attention on the 
 Americans, that caused me to watch for and to seize the 
 moment when Your Majesty could assist this oppressed 
 nation with the well-founded hope of effecting their deliver- 
 ance. If I had held other sentiments, Sire, other principles, 
 other views, I should have betrayed your confidence and 
 the interests of the State ; I should regard myself as 
 unworthy to serve Your Majesty ; I should regard myself 
 as tinworthy to bear the name of Frenchman." ' 
 
 ' Doniol, I, p. 3. 
 
Ill 
 
 TH]<: BKGINNING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. 
 
 We have seen that the Cotninittee of vSecret Correspond- 
 ence wrote in December, 1775, to Arthnr Lee and Charles 
 Dnnias, requesting them to find out whether any of the 
 Ivuropean powers were willing to assist the Americans. 
 Lee held several interviews with the L^'ench ambassador at 
 London, and indirectly heard from him that aid would- 
 be furnished to the Colonies. Dumas obtained an inter- 
 view with the French minister at The Hague,' and 
 enquired whether the King of France would offer his- 
 mediation to end the war ; and, in case of failure to reach 
 an agreement, whether France and vSpain would form an 
 alliance with the Colonies. He received the impression 
 that the minister was pleased with the idea of mediation 
 and would not have objected to a treaty except for the 
 danger of a F^uropean war. But a few weeks later the same 
 official told Dumas that the King could not mediate while 
 the Colonies were subject to Great Britain, nor ally himself 
 with them nor furnish them aids while he was at peace with 
 lingland. " The King is a true knight," said the minister ; 
 " his word is sacred." But he promised that strict neu- 
 trality should be maintained, and that the Aniericans should 
 have the same right as " all the other linglish," to export 
 merchandise, arms, and munitions of war from France.'' 
 
 Early in March, 1776, while FVanklin's letter was on its 
 way to Dumas, the Committee of Secret Correspondence 
 appointed Silas Deane, an ex-member of Congress and of the 
 Secret Committee for procuring supplies, commercial agent 
 to France, giving him at the same time an important political 
 
 ' Dumas lo Franklin, Apr. 30, 1776. Diplomatic Correspondence, 
 II. p. 86. 
 
 ' Dnmas to Committee of Secret Correspondence, May 21, 1776. 
 Ibid. II, p. 91. 
 
The Bcoiniiino- of Diplomatic Relatio)is. 31 
 
 errand. The}' iustructed liiui to introduce liiniself to the 
 Count de Vergennes as a mercliant, ask for a suj^ply of arms 
 and ammunition on the credit of Congress and, in case of 
 refusal, request permission to buy in France as hirge a 
 quantity of these articles as he could pay for or obtain on 
 credit. If received with favor, he was to ask whether the 
 Colonies might hope for an alliance, commercial or defensive, 
 with France ; and at what time she would l^e ready to 
 recognize them.' He was given no }>ower, however, to con- 
 clude a treaty. 
 
 On his arrival in France, in June, 1776, Deane was told 
 that he could probably accomplish nothing, as a new reign 
 had lately begun ; several departments of the government, 
 notably that of finance, were deranged ; and the King and 
 his ministers wished to keep the peace. Yet Deane easil}^ 
 obtained an audience with Vergennes, and Was partly suc- 
 cessful in the commercial half of his errand. Vergennes 
 told him that the Court could not openly encourage the 
 shipping of warlike stores to America, but would place no 
 obstacles in the way. He invited Deane to avail himself of 
 the privilege, open to all American merchants, of carrying 
 on every kind of connnerce allowed to the traders of any 
 nation. He refused to discuss the feasibility of a treaty 
 while events were .so uncertain, but he questioned Deane 
 about the resources of the Colonies and the strength of their 
 union." 
 
 This interview was an auspicious beginning, and Deane 
 soon detected further evidence of ministerial good-will, in 
 an offer of Beaumarchais to procure on credit the supplies 
 which the Colonies had ordered. Deane suspected that 
 Beaumarchais was supported by the government, because 
 he did not, like other merchants, require securities endorsed 
 by a banker or a well-known man of business ; and M. 
 Gerard, Vergennes' first secretary, confirmed the suspicion 
 by telling Deane that he could safely rely on Beaumarchais' 
 
 'Committee of Secret Correspondence to Deane, March 3, 1776. 
 r)i])lomatic Correspondence, II, p. 78. 
 
 M)eane to Committee of Secret Correspondence, Aug. 18, 1776. 
 Ibid. II, p. 112. 
 
2,2 l''rancc a)id t/ie American Revolution . 
 
 commercial t-iij^agements. Tlie two agents soon came to an 
 agreement, Beanmarchais jiromising to furnish supplies, and 
 Deane pledging the credit of Congress to pay for them in 
 tobacco or other American products.' 
 
 Beaumarcliais knew lunv to obtain powder and arms from 
 the state arsenals. Because the exportation of this mer- 
 chandise was forbidden, and because it could not even be 
 carried to tlie sea-coast without publicity, he suggested to 
 Deane the advantage of having influential friends at court. 
 With this in view, he advised him to send officers to America 
 with the stores, " and, by fixing on such as should be 
 recommended by persons at court, or of influence by their 
 connections, to procure . . . friends and patrons." It is 
 due to Beanmarchais to state that he also believed the 
 Americans too inexperienced in the art of war to manage 
 artillery without the aid of foreign officers. Deane listened 
 to his advice, and the crowd of officers, " all brave as their 
 swords," who besieged the American agents in Paris, per- 
 plexed Congress, and harassed Washington, was a direct re- 
 sult of this ingenious scheme." 
 
 The Ministry winked at the little emigration, but was 
 careful to avoid responsibility. Of all the officers who 
 crossed the water, four enguieers were the only ones .sent by 
 the government.' 
 
 Even with the aid of inlluential friends, the work of sup- 
 plying the American army was not easy. Beaumarcliais 
 informed Congress in August that he had procured two 
 hundred brass cannon, a large amount of ammunition, and 
 a quantity of clothing for the troops. Everything promised 
 well, and Deane hoped that the troops would sail in October.* 
 
 •Diplomatic Correspondence, II, ])p. ii6 ff. Beauniarchai.s to 
 Deane, Julv 18, 1776. Deane to Reaiiniarchais, July 20, 24. Ibid. II, 
 pp. 99, 102, 105. 
 
 ■^Deane's Address to Congress, Dec. 1778. vSparks MSS., LII, vol. 
 I, p. 104. Beanmarchais to Deane, July 26, 1776. Deane to Beanmar- 
 chais, July 27. Deane Papers, I, pjx 164, 166. 
 
 •'Memoirs of Lafayette, I, p. 70. 
 
 *Roderique Horlalez and Co. to Committee of Secret Correspond- 
 ence, Aug. 18, 1776. Deane to R. Morris, Sept. 17. Diplomatic Cor- 
 respondence, II, pp 129, 148. 
 
The />eo!}i?iiuQ of Diplomatic Relations. 33 
 
 But the British ambassador spread a report that Congress 
 was treating with General Howe, and at once the supply of 
 government stores was checked. Soon after this a native of 
 Maryland, in the service of France, insinuated that Deane 
 was trying to bring about a reconciliation with Great Britain 
 and planning to use the supplies against France. These 
 rumors, annoying as they were, caused little delay. A far 
 more serious obstacle was the indifference produced in the 
 Ministry by news of the serious defeat on L,ong Island. 
 This disaster threatened to wreck American hopes, in France 
 as well as at home. Another reason for ministerial coldness 
 was the delay in receiving news from America. The British 
 were so active at sea that it was November before an official 
 announcement of the Declaration of Independence arrived 
 in France.' In the meantime the English were on the watch 
 for suspicious shipments, and, in order to escape the notice 
 of their spies, the government hindered the loading and 
 despatching of Beaumarchais' vessels almost as persistently 
 as if it had disapproved the enterprise. At last, "after 
 orders and counter-orders and manoeuvers the very history 
 of which," Deane said, " would fill a volume," the Amphi- 
 trite set sail on the fourteenth of December, laden with 
 military stores and carrying a number of officers for the 
 American service. She had been loaded at night, — over a 
 hundred men working together in confusion, crowding in 
 stores picked up by lighters from the nearest points of the 
 shore, with little regard to the invoice.^ The cause of this 
 haste was an indiscretion on the part of Beaumarchais. While 
 superintending the affairs of his mercantile house he had 
 called attention to himself by directing the rehearsals of one 
 of his comedies. The English ambassador had learned 
 where he was, and why ; and the Ministry had been forced 
 to take notice of his doings. A government embargo caught 
 his other ships and detained them in port. Unfortunately, 
 
 ' Deane to Committee of Secret Correspondence, Oct. 1, 17, 25, 1776. 
 Diplomatic Correspondence, II, pp. 153, 173, 1S3. Deane to Ver- 
 gennes, about Nov. <S. Stevens Facsimiles, 592. 
 
 ^Beaumarchais to Deane, Dec. 17, 1776. Deane Papers, I, p. 424, 
 
34 
 
 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 through the selfish caprice of an officer on board the 
 Amphitrite, that ship was brought back to L' Orient, and 
 there detained. For several weeks the enterprise remained 
 at a standstill. It was not until the last of January, 1777, 
 that Beauniarchais received the welcome news that three of 
 his vessels had .sailed. In February, he despatched a fourth ; 
 early in March, he reported eight ships at sea and one load- 
 ing ; in the first week of May, the ninth ship sailed, and 
 Beauniarchais heard that three of his cargoes had arrived in 
 America. These supplies came just in time for the camj)aign 
 of 1777, and were e.specially welcome by reason of an alarm- 
 ing scarcity of guns, due to the fact tliat many of the .soldiers, 
 at the end of their .short terms of service, not only refused to 
 re-enli.st, but carried home the government property.' 
 
 It must not be suppo.sed that Beauniarchais' fir.st nine car- 
 goes, to say nothing of later ones, were paid for out of the 
 million livres which he obtained from the French treasury 
 in June, 1776. In August of the same year, he received an 
 equal amount from Spain, and over a million livres were 
 contributed by France during 1777.' Besides this, he bor- 
 rowed money, like an ordinary merchant, from wealthy 
 individuals. During one year, he shipped to America stores 
 to the value of five million livres. 
 
 The terms on which the French government advanced 
 the money, especially the first million, have been and rtre 
 still the subject of much discu.ssion. The disputed question 
 is whether the money was intended as a gift to the Ameri- 
 cans or as a loan to Beauniarchais, capable of being con- 
 verted into a gift if his losses were so great as to call for 
 some recompense. On the former supposition, the amount 
 ought to have been deducted from the bill which Beau- 
 niarchais presented to the United States for services ren- 
 dered ; on the latter, the United States had no claim on it, 
 and Beauniarchais was responsible only to the French 
 
 'Deane to Gerard, Jan. 7, 1777. Beauniarcliai.s to Vergeniies, Jan. 
 7, 30; Feb. 4, Mar. 7, May 4. Vergennes to Gerard, Jan. 7. Stevens 
 Facsimiles, 617, 912, 916, 1424, 1445, 1526, 618. Deane's Address to 
 Congress, Dec, 1778. Sparks MSS., LII, Vol. I, p. 92. 
 
 -' Beauniarchais and his Times, III, pp. 130, 165. 
 
Tlie Beginning of Diplomatic Relations. 35 
 
 Ministry. The doubt on this point caused dissensions 
 among the American Commissioners in Europe, and fac- 
 tional disputes in Congress ; deprived Beaumarcliais of the 
 remittances from America, which he claimed in return for 
 his outlay ; and gave rise to a law-suit half a century long, 
 which ended in a compromise between the United vStates 
 and the heir of Heaumarchais, to the great disadvantage of 
 the claimant. To decide this question, on which congres- 
 sional committees and attorneys general of the United States 
 have disagreed, is exceedingly difficult, even with the aid 
 of the documents, both private and official, now open to the 
 public ; but a few facts may be given on either side. 
 
 Against the claim of Beaumarcliais we may place, first, 
 the statements of Arthur Uee. Uee said that Beaumarcliais 
 told him in 1775 that France would furnish the United 
 States with /,'200,ooo, to be sent by way of the West Indies. 
 He claimed that, after the plan of direct remittance had 
 been changed to that of utilizing a commercial company, 
 the appearance of commerce was only a blind, and no pay 
 was expected in return for the supplies. An entry in Lee's 
 Journal, for October 3, 1777, tells us that M. Grand, a 
 banker with whom the Americans had dealings, coming- 
 direct from Vergennes, brought word that Congress " need 
 give themselves no trouble about making returns ; that 
 nothing which we had received or were to receive was lent, 
 but to be considered as given." ' In line with this testi- 
 mony is a letter written by Vergennes to the ambassador in 
 Spain, Maj' 3, 1776, in which the following words occur : — 
 " All will be done in the name of a commercial society 
 directed by a merchant of one of our maritime towns, who 
 will take securities — not very binding, to be sure ; but will 
 color his zeal vi'itli the motive, plausible enough on the part 
 of a merchant, of desiring to attract to himself the largest 
 part of the American commissions when the commerce of 
 the Colonies shall be rendered free by the declaration of 
 their independence." '"■' The fact that Beaumarcliais, in 
 pressing his claim, falsely stated that the supplies were 
 
 ' Life of Arthur Lee, L P- 336. 
 
 '■^ Vergennes to d'Ossvin, May 3, 1776. Doniol, L p. 375- 
 
^6 France and the Amcricaii Revolution. 
 
 bought with his own money,' would seem ahnost conclusive 
 evidence against him, if it had not been impossible for him 
 to explain the matter truthfully without divulging govern- 
 ment secrets. 
 
 One of the strongest arguments in favor of Beaumarchais 
 may be drawn from his own plan of operations, submitted to 
 the King in the fall of 1775.' He asked the French govern- 
 ment to entrust him with a million livres, half of which he 
 would send to America in the form of coin, and the rest in 
 powder. He asked leave to buy the powder from the state 
 magazines, at the government rate of from four to six sols a 
 pound ; intending to sell it to the insurgents at the market 
 price of from twenty to thirty sols, and invest the difference 
 in more supplies for the Americans. By a clever calculation, 
 whose weakest point was reliance on remittances that never 
 arrived, he proved that the King, by advancing one million 
 livres, could make enough money to invest three million in 
 the second venture and nine in the third. '' If it were certain 
 that this plan was adopted, Beaumarchais' reputation would 
 be cleared. 
 
 One of the most baffling elements in the puzzle is, that 
 most of the evidence seems to be of little value. Nothing 
 could be more positive than the assertions of Arthur Lee, 
 that all the supplies advanced by the French Court were 
 intended as a gift ; but, after repeating this declaration again 
 and again, Lee finally owned that he did not know whether 
 they were so intended or not. If, as Lee recorded, Vergennes 
 told M. Grand in October, 1777, that no return was expected 
 for the supplies, he also wrote to Gerard in September, 1778 : 
 The Commi.ssioners "insinuate that all, or at least a large 
 portion, of what has been sent is on account of His Majesty. 
 I am about to reply that the King has not furnished any- 
 thing ; that he has simply allowed M. de Beaumarchais to 
 provide himself with what he wanted in the arsenals, on con- 
 dition of replacing what he took."' Again, in 1779, he 
 
 ' Journal of Arthur Lee, Dec. 24, 1777. Ufe, I, 369. 
 
 ^Possibly in February, 1776. 
 
 3 Deane Papers, I, p. 108. 
 
 * A Vindication of Arthur Lee, p. 36. 
 
The Beginning of Diplomatic Relations. 37 
 
 declared through Gerard that Beamnarchais was " the credi- 
 tor of the United States, and at the same time debtor to the 
 King." ' These statements might be taken as conclusive if 
 diplomats always spoke the truth. When the United States 
 government, learning by accident that a million livres had 
 been advanced by France, requested an explanation, \'er- 
 gennes merely kept silence and refused to name the person 
 to whom the money had been paid. His successors, unable 
 to conceal the agency of Beaumarchais, stoutly and falsely 
 averred that the money " was for an object of secret political 
 services, the knowledge of which the King had reserved to 
 himself," and that it was unjust " to confound this political 
 object with the mercantile operations of the same individual 
 with Congress."" While a witness who perverts the truth 
 ordinarily throws discredit on the cause which he represents, 
 the attempts of the French government, repeated through a 
 period of fifty years, to secure attention to the claim of 
 Beaumarchais, may be regarded as a strong point in his 
 favor. It is hard to imagine why a succession of ministers 
 should have devoted so much effort and prevarication to the 
 support of a groundless demand. 
 
 While Deane, with the aid of Beaumarchais, was obtain- 
 ing supplies for the Americans, he did not neglect the polit- 
 ical side of his mission. He promptly announced to the 
 French Court the Congressional resolution of May 15, the 
 forerunner of the Declaration of Independence ; and, pre- 
 dicting that this re.solution would soon be followed by im- 
 portant instructions with regard to France, he asked aid 
 for his country. A month later he submitted an elaborate 
 memorial on American trade, in the hope of persuading 
 France to abandon her restrictive system and open her own 
 ports and those of her colonies to American commerce. ' He 
 did not obtain all the concessions which he desired for his 
 countrymen, but they were liberally treated. The authorities 
 allowed them to import certain prohibited articles and to con- 
 
 ' Claim of Beaumarchais' Heir, p. 4. 
 nbid., p. 8. 
 
 •'July 18, Aug. 15, 1776. Stevens Facsimiles, 572, 577. .See Dip- 
 lomatic Correspondence, II, p. 126. 
 
38 France and the American Revohitioji. 
 
 tiiuie to export arms and aniimmition. " The registers must 
 not contain any item nor any indication of this connivance, 
 entire liberty being left to the Americans to load and export 
 as they please the articles in question:" — such were Ver- 
 gennes' significant orders.' 
 
 Not all the commercial privileges which France gave to 
 the Americans were necessarily violations of international 
 law. The French theory of the rights of neutral trade was 
 broader than the English. It embraced the principle that 
 free ships make free goods ; while England claimed that an 
 enemy's goods, even in a neutral ship, were liable to confisca- 
 tion. If the Americans could beconsidered a separate power 
 at war with England, France, according to her own doctrine, 
 had the right to trade with them. England, of C(jurse, de- 
 nied both the premise and the conclusion. If, on the con- 
 trary, the Americans were colonies, France admitted that 
 England, if powerful enough, might prevent them from 
 trading with French citizens, but denied her right to for- 
 bid French citizens to trade with them : — a distinction which 
 the Bourbon monarch would hardl}' have maintained if his 
 own colonies had been the ones concerned. There are two 
 kinds of commerce, said the French authorities : that which 
 confines its dealings to ordinary merchandise, and that which 
 includes contraband articles. Even if our citizens indulge 
 in contraband trade, this constitutes no breach of neutralit}" , 
 but merely renders the goods subject to confiscation.' With 
 this careful definition of the rights in question France veiled 
 her connivance at prohibited trade. 
 
 While playing fast and loose with international obliga- 
 tions, the Ministry assumed a defiant attitude in the face of 
 British protest. An unofficial agent of the English govern- 
 ment having called the French charge d' affaires to account, 
 for the presence of Deane in Paris, Vergennes made this 
 comment : " He surely knows that the King is master in his 
 own house, that he has no account to render to any one con- 
 cerning the strangers whom he tliinks proper to admit into 
 his vStates, and that His Majesty does all that Great Britain 
 
 ' Vergennes to Clugny, Sept. 22. Stevens Facsimiles, 1365. 
 '■'Sparks' translation and abridgment of Rayneval's Observations 
 sur le Manoire Jnsticatif dc la Coiir de Londres. .Sparks' MSS., LI. 
 
Tlie Begimiino of Diplomatic Rclatioin. 39 
 
 could demand as a favor, in not receiving openly a repre- 
 sentative on the part of the English Colonies." ' 
 
 The expression, even in a private letter, of a sentiment so 
 uncompromising, indicated the approach of a crisis. At 
 this time, France and vSpain were seriously considering a 
 declaration of war against England. Spain, on the eve of a 
 contest with Portugal, in which Ivngland might be expected 
 to take part with her ally, had one more reason than usual 
 for desiring the co-operation of France. Late in August, 
 the Spanish ambassador d'Aranda tried, in an unofficial 
 interview with Maurepas, to persuade him that the time for 
 an attack on England had come. It was believed in Spain 
 that no effort to keep tlie peace would long be successful ; 
 and that it would be wise to take the offensive and anticipate 
 the dreaded attack. There was no proposal to form an 
 alliance with the Americans. The reason or pretext for 
 hesitation was the advantage of waiting until another cam- 
 paign had shown how nuich aid the Colonists could give to 
 an ally." 
 
 In a iiirmoire laid beftjre the King and Council as a result 
 of the Spanish overtures, Vergeinies reviewed the arguments 
 in favor of war, but gave the proposals of France a turn 
 which might easil}' prove obnoxious to vSpain, and so defer 
 the critical moment. Once more, he declared that a war 
 with England could be justified as a measure of self-defense ; 
 for England was so jealous of- the increasing naval power of 
 France that only the necessity of concentrating her forces in 
 America restrained her from giving v^ent to her einuity. He 
 gave the impression that France would welcome a war with 
 C/reat Britain, if it could be waged without the intervention 
 of other European powers ; and that, unlike vSpain, she saw 
 advantage in an alliance with America. In order to 
 avoid the danger of arousing jealousy of the increasing 
 power of France, he suggested that Spain might begin the 
 war, and allow France to enter as her auxiliary.'' 
 
 ' Vergenties to Garnicr, Aug. 31, 1776. Doniol, I, p. 5S3. 
 
 '^Grimakli to d'Aranda, Aug. 26, 1776. Bancroft MvS.S., ,-i/;77//r'r5 
 FrcDifaiscs, Espague, 1 768-1 776, p. 267. 
 
 ■' Considerations read to the King in Committee, on the course to be 
 taken with regard to Enghmd, Aug. 31, 1776. Stevens Facsimiles, 897. 
 
40 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 Thus called on to act as principal, Spain beat a prompt 
 retreat. Maintaining still that war could not long be 
 avoided, her minister developed a doubt whether the proper 
 moment had arrived. He feared that, while France and 
 Spain were attacking England, she might make ])eace with 
 America and turn her forces against them. Another reason 
 for objecting to hasty action, a reason ominous of future dis- 
 agreement between Spain and her ally, was the necessity of 
 deciding beforehand on some plan of operations. Incident- 
 ally, d'Aranda expressed a desire to drive the Knglish from 
 Jamaica and Minorca.' 
 
 Before this reply reached the French Court, Vergennes 
 heard news that made him even less desirous of war than 
 before, — that of the American defeat on Tx)ng Island. The 
 fate of New York was not known ; but, in its bearing on the 
 foreign policy of France, it was considered immaterial. 
 Even if New York was in the hands of the British there 
 would no longer be any reason for haste in attacking Eng- 
 land or declaring for the Americans. They were not likely 
 to submit after one defeat ; and the occupation of their 
 strongholds would keep the common enemy busy. Besides, 
 delay would give France and Spain time for further prepara- 
 tion, and at the same time exhaust the resources of England. 
 Meanwhile, it would be possible " to direct the furnishing of 
 aid to the Colonies in such a way as to force the English into 
 becoming the aggressors themselves ; in this capacity", " said 
 Vergennes, with his eye on the danger of a continental war, 
 "they would lose their right to the interest which several 
 powers might take in not seeing them crushed." "' 
 
 In this wa3' the military disasters in America fixed, for 
 the time being, the hesitating course of the two European 
 powers. "After all," said a French noble,' " France was 
 not fool eiu)Ugli to pla)' such a silly game as vSpain did in 
 the la.st war, when she got so soundly drubbed for espousing 
 a ruined cause." 
 
 ' Grinialdi lo d'Aranda, Oct. 8, 1776, Doiiiol, I, pp. 60S-612. 
 
 ^Garnier to Vergennes, Oct. 1 1, 1776. Vergennes to the King, Oct. 
 17, 26. Vergennes to d'Aranda, Nov. 5. Ibid., I, pp. 615, 618, 620, 
 682-4. 
 
 ^ The Duke de Chartres. 
 
The Bi'ginnino of Diplomatic Relations. 41 
 
 In the midst of the discussion between the French and 
 Spanish Cabinets, Deane called attention to the Declaration 
 of Independence, — the adoption of which was a well-known 
 fact, although it had not been officially announced, — and 
 asked for an answer to the questions, whether France would 
 recognize the United States and receive an ambassador from 
 them, and whether the}^ might hope for an alliance. "The 
 moment approaches," wrote Beaumarchais to \"ergennes, 
 " when you will have to say yes or no. I would go and 
 hang myself immediately if it were the latter." Beaumar- 
 chais was mistaken. The moment was receding. Deane 
 continued to wait for an answer to his questions. He 
 waited, too, in a state of distress " beyond the power of 
 language to paint," for official news of the Declaration of 
 Independence, and power to negotiate a treaty. He at- 
 tributed the failure of his efforts to the negligence of Con- 
 gress, not knowing that, since the tidings from Long Island, 
 the Americans could hope for only enough aid to keep them 
 from succumbing.' 
 
 At the moment when the fortune of America was lowest 
 in official circles, tiie powerful force of public opinion began 
 to make itself felt in our favor. "It is difficult," .says a 
 French historian of this period, "for governments, even 
 ab.solute ones, to resist a movement of public opinion when 
 it extends to all classes, from the summit of society to 
 its lowest foundations."" It is more difficult when, in 
 addition to this, the king lacks strength and is desirous of 
 wiiuiing popular favor. It is hardest of all when the 
 general cry is for war, and when a popular war-minister in 
 exile has a strong party of friends at court. Choiseul is 
 said to have disapproved of the alliance with the United 
 States, and to have wished merely to use the Americans for 
 the exhaustion of Rngland ; ■' but, however persistently he 
 opposed the measures of Vergennes, every influence in favor 
 of w-ar was pu.shing the country with almost irresistible logic 
 tQward an American alliance. 
 
 ^ Mi' mo ire of Deane, vSept. 24, 1776. Stevens Facsimiles, 5S5. 
 Beaumarchais to Vergennes, Sept. 25. Ibid., 898. 
 ^Capefigue, Louis XVI, II, p. 34. 
 ' vSoulavie, Menioires, III, p. 412. 
 
42 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 During the first months of our Revohition, the French 
 public knew little of the incidents or the merits of the strug- 
 gle ; but Deane's attempt to gain friends at court by con- 
 ferring favors on military officers, soon made the insurgent 
 cause popular among the young nobility ; and they, in turn, 
 enlisted the enthusiastic sympathy of the Queen . At the same 
 time the admission of American traders to French ports en- 
 gaged the interest, less conspicuous but equally important, 
 of the mercantile class ; and the struggle of the insurgents 
 for republican self-government won the support of the 
 philosophers and their followers, who formed a large and 
 influential body, and who appreciated American political 
 ambitions all the more because they took it for granted that 
 these aspirations were borrowed from their own writings.' 
 Radical theories had spread through the entire younger gen- 
 eration of French society. The military nobility were 
 attracted toward the American cause, not only through am- 
 bition, desire of adventure, weariness of peace, and hatred of 
 Fviigland, but through their recently acquired admiration for 
 republican and democratic institutions. Under the influ- 
 ence of such motives, Lafayette, among others, determined 
 to offer his services to Washington. F^'inding that the disas- 
 ter of Long Island had placed a serious ob.stacle in the way 
 of the shipments directed by Deane and Beaumarchais, and 
 that he could not hope to reach America soon on one of their 
 vessels, he offered to buy and equip a ship on his own ac- 
 count ; and, eluding the vigilance of the Ministry, he made 
 his way to the scene of action. The escapade of Lafayette 
 greatly increased the popularity ot the American cause. As 
 time passed and news of the battles in which he and his 
 companions figured, reached France, tlie court and even the 
 ministers felt their interest quicken. With the army, " de- 
 sertion became a fashion." A friend of Lafayette" has 
 recorded that Maurepas said more than once "that it was 
 the impetuous ardor of the young courtiers and the F'rench 
 warriors which had cried down the wisdom of the Council 
 
 • S^gur, Alciiioircs, 1, pp. 74, 80 ; II, p. 43. 
 "Mbid., I, p. 80. 
 
The Begi)ining of Jhploiiiatic Relations. 43 
 
 and, so to speak, forced tlie governineiit into war." Ac- 
 cepting this statement as true of Maurepas and the King, 
 we may believe that X'ergennes, though he sometimes vacil- 
 lated, followed a consistent policy in the main, and advised 
 the recognition of America for reasons of state. 
 
 The desirability of an alliance had been debated in 
 America as well as in France. The question was closely 
 bound up with that of independence. The more radical 
 element in Congress had asserted that the Colonies could 
 hope for no European assistance until they declared their inde- 
 pendence ; the more cautious members had feared that such a 
 declaration would place them in the power of foreign nations. 
 "France," they said, "will take advantage of us when 
 they see we cannot recede, and demand severe terms of us ; 
 .... she and Spain, too, will rejoice to see Britain and 
 America wasting each other." In spite of these fears, a 
 committee had t)een appointed on the twelfth of June, 1776, 
 to draw up a plan of treaties for presentation to foreign 
 powers.' Dr. Franklin and John Adams were the most dis- 
 tinguished members. Adams, with all his enthusiasm for 
 independence, saw the threatening danger, and always in- 
 sisted that any connection established with foreign powers 
 should be purely commercial. In his work on the com- 
 mittee, he held his colleagues rigidly to this principle. On 
 the supposition that France would not accept a distinctly 
 commercial treaty, many motions were offered to insert 
 "articles of entangling alliance, of exclusive privileges, 
 and of warranties of possessions;" but they were all 
 defeated," and the draft submitted to Congress for debate 
 w^as that of a perpetual treaty of amitj' and commerce, 
 drawn up with special reference to France. It contained 
 a stipulation that if England should attack France in conse- 
 quence of the treaty, the United States would not aid 
 England. As some of the members of Congress feared that 
 France would not be satisfied with a mere promise of neu- 
 trality, the plan was reconsidered. John Adams was absent 
 at the time ; but in spite of the withdrawal of his restrain- 
 
 ' Secret Journals of Congress, II, pp. 475-7. 
 
 ^ Life and Works of John Adams, II, pp. 516-7 ; IX, p. 409. 
 
44 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 ing influence, the concessions which were made did not 
 greatlj' alter the spirit of the treaty. The Commissioners 
 were instructed to promise, if necessary, that the United 
 States would never acknowledge allegiance to Great Britain 
 nor grant more coinmercial privileges to her than to France ; 
 and also to stipulate that no treaty for ending the war be- 
 tween the United States and Great Britain or between Great 
 Britain and France should take effect until six months after 
 the allies had notified each other. Thus modified, the plan 
 of treaty was agreed to by Congress, September 17, 1776. 
 Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and vSilas Deane 
 were chosen Commissioners to treat with France ; but Jeffer- 
 son declined to serve, and Arthur Lee was appointed in his 
 place.' 
 
 Early in November, Deane's painful suspense was relieved 
 by an ofificial announcement of the Declaration of Inde- 
 pendence, and news that Congress had a plan of treaty 
 under consideration. On notifying the Mini.stry, Deane 
 was met by the question : What would the United States 
 gain from the acknowledgement of their independence, 
 unless this were followed by a war against Great Britain ; 
 .since they already enjoyed all the other advantages which 
 would accrue to them from such an acknowledgtnent ? It 
 was intimated that in one respect the change would be a 
 di.sadvantage : it would i)lace the United States under addi- 
 tional obligations to France." 
 
 Though the Declaration of Independence had no immedi- 
 ate effect on the policy of the government, it justified itself, 
 in France as in America, l)y its influence on public opinion. 
 Expressing, as it did, the h^ngli.sh in.stinct for liberty in the 
 formulas of French political philo.sophy, it was sure to in- 
 crea.se the popular enthusiasm for the young republic' 
 
 Soon after the Americans had taken the irrevocable step, 
 Vergennes marked out in a tentative way the general lines 
 
 'Secret Journals of Congres.s, II, pp. 27 IT., 31, 35. 
 * Stevens Facsimiles, 592. Deane lo Committee of vSecrct Corre- 
 spondence, Nov. 28, 1776. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, p. 197. 
 ' Capefij^ne, Louis XVI, II, ]). 38. 
 
The Beginning of Diplomatic Relations. 45 
 
 which the French goveniinent afterward tried to follow.' 
 He wished to postpone the war with England until the end 
 of 1777, when he thought the naval and military prepara- 
 tions of France and Spain would be completed. Kven then, 
 they were not to take the aggressive or to call for allies : 
 they would leave that to England. Would it be well, he 
 asked the Spanish minister, to conclude an alliance with the 
 Americans, offensive while the war lasted and defensive 
 from the conclusion of peace? As Spain was betraying 
 solicitude with regard to the objects of the war, he urged 
 that the abasement of England and the destruction of her 
 commerce should be made their primary aim. Thus, bv the 
 close of 1776, a fairly definite plan was shaping itself out of 
 the fluctuating counsels of the French Ministry. 
 
 ' Vergennes to d'Aranda, Nov. 5. 1776. Vergennes to d'Ossun, Dec. 
 8. Sparks MSS., LXXX, vol. I, pp. 116, 133. Plan de measures 
 a eoncerter avec VEspagtie, Dec. 1776. Bancroft ilSS., Archives 
 Frangaises, Espagne, 1 768-1 776, p. 2S9. 
 
IV. 
 
 THE DEMAND FOR RECOGNITION. 
 
 When the British ambassador heard that FraiikHii was on 
 the way to Paris he threatened, it is said, to leave without 
 cerenion}-. Vergennes told him that a message had already 
 been sent to intercept Franklin and forbid him the country ; 
 but that, as his route was uncertain, the courier might fail 
 to meet him.' This messenger, if he existed, was con- 
 venientl}' unsuccessful ; for Franklin arrived in Paris in the 
 last part of December. On the following day, he and Deane 
 were joined by Arthur Lee. The Connnissioners informed 
 Vergennes of their powers, and asked for an audience. 
 Vergennes received them in secret, renewed his promise of 
 commercial facilities, and presented them to the ambassador 
 of Spain. From this time until the revocation of their com- 
 missions, the Deputies labored to obtain aid and recognition 
 for their country. Their success has won them fame. 
 Their most conspicuous failure has been mercifully obscured 
 by time ; namel^^ their inability to preserve harmony among 
 themselves. The three colleagues had not been long in 
 France when they and two other agents of Congre.ss then in 
 Paris became involved in a lively quarrel, which .spread to 
 their constituents in Congress, delayed and complicated the 
 public business, and introduced personal rancor into ques- 
 tions of international policy which needed for their decision 
 as clear and unbiased judgment as any problems which have 
 ever confronted the American Congress. Fortunately, it is 
 not necessary to enter into the petty details of the.se disagree- 
 ments ; but whoever desires a complete picture of the life of 
 our representatives in Paris, should remember that they 
 were zealous in their enmities as well as in devotion to their 
 public duties. Franklin was the only one who had self- 
 control ; and this very (juality was an added source of ex- 
 asperation to his opponents. 
 
 ' Lescure, Correspoiulaiice Secrete, I, p. 2. 
 
Tlic Pcniaiid for Recognitio}! . 47 
 
 The Deputies not only addressed themselves to the Min- 
 istry, but tried to enlist public opinion in favor of the 
 American cause. A larj^e jiart of their success with the 
 people, however, was unpremeditated. The simplicitv of 
 their costumes and manners won the approval of a society 
 enthusiastic for democratic plainness and equality. They 
 were comjiared to citizens of the ancient republics of Greece 
 and Rome. The most eminent men of the kingdom sought 
 their acquaintance. Franklin, especially, made himself the 
 idol of the hour. Gifted with a natural comprehension of 
 the French character, he won his way with an adroitness 
 which may have been unstudied, but which has been attrib- 
 uted to art. " He showed himself little," .said a French 
 historian, "as all men do who wish to exert a mysterious 
 influence ; but he made peoi)le speak of him a great deal., . 
 . . . His simple air concealed extreme shrewdne.ss ; he un- 
 derstood that in France it is necessary to get one's self talked 
 about, and talked about continually, if one wishes to remain 
 ma.ster of ])ublic opinion, and he did not fail to do it." ' 
 
 As soon as po.ssible after their arrival in Paris, the Com- 
 missioners submitted the proposed treaty to Vergennes, and 
 asked France to sell eight ships of the line and a supply of 
 munitions to the United vStates and to provide a convoy at 
 the expense of Congress.^ 
 
 In his surprise at the moderate terms of the treaty, Ver- 
 gennes wrote to d'Ossun, the ambassador in Spain, with 
 some exaggeration, that the Americans really asked for 
 nothing which they did not already enjoy. "If it is 
 modesty," he said, " if it is fear of being a burden to powers 
 on whose interest they think they can rely, the sentiments 
 are very praiseworthy." But he suspected that they secretly 
 wi.shed to provoke England, by the loss of her commerce, 
 into declaring war ; and, at the same time, to avoid any en- 
 
 ' Capefigue, Louis XVI, II, pp. 44, 15. 
 
 ^American Commissioners to Vergennes, Dec. 23, 1776, vStevens 
 Facsimiles, 606. Memoh'e, Jan. 5, 1777. Ibid., 614. Franklin and 
 Deane to Committee of Secret Correspondence, Jan. 17, March 12. 
 Franklin, Deane, and Lee to Vergennes, Jan. 5. Diplomatic Corres- 
 pondence, II, ])p. 248, 283, 245. 
 
48 France and the American Revohitio7i. 
 
 gagemetit which would outlast the conflict. The application 
 for ships of the line confirmed his suspicion. This favor 
 was refused, as courteously as possible, and the request for 
 convo}' met the same fate. The question how to avoid 
 either accepting or rejecting the proffered treaty, was more 
 serious. At first, Vergennes thought of a declaration of 
 commercial reciprocity, but he feared that it would be con- 
 strued as a refusal, and would lead to a reconciliation be- 
 tween the contending parties. The reply which was finally 
 given was, that at present France had not enough interest 
 in an alliance with America to justify her in risking a war ; 
 and that, while future events might make an alliance 
 desirable, it was best in the mean time not to "anticipate 
 time and events." In a letter to d'Ossun, Vergennes went 
 .so far as to say that he did not wish an alliance with 
 America. He put no faith in the honor of republics, and 
 he did not see what security France could have for the 
 fidelity of the Americans. But if England .should declare 
 war again.st France or Spain .such an alliance might become 
 valuable, and with this contingency in view he left an open- 
 ing for future negotiations.' 
 
 The Spanish Mini.stry were still more emphatic in their 
 objections to an American alliance, unless in case of an at- 
 tack by England.'* They granted that, if the insurgents 
 were showing themselves capable of respectable resistance, 
 such a connection might be necessary to prevent reconcilia- 
 tion with England. But, .said Grimaldi, they continually 
 retreat ; the British generals are masters of entire provinces ; 
 it is probable that the Americans must .soon submit. Besides, 
 their example is to be dreaded. The King " ought to hesi- 
 tate greatly to make a formal treaty with provinces which 
 cannot yet be considered in any other light than that of 
 rebels. . . . The rights of all .sovereigns in their respective 
 territories ought to be extremely sacred, and the eixample of 
 a rebellion is too dangerous for his Majesty to wish to sup- 
 port it openly." 
 
 'Vergennes to d'Ossun, Jan. 4, 12, 1777. Doniol, II. pp. 113, 122. 
 Minutes for the Answer of the French King. Approved. Jan. 9. 
 Stevens Facsimiles, 622, See also 621. 
 
 ^Grimaldi to d'.Vranda, I'^eb. 4, Doniol, II, p. 189. 
 
Tlic ncDUDid for Recognition . 49 
 
 While repellin^^ the offer of a treaty, the French Court 
 granted the Americans a loan of two million Hvres.' This 
 gave Congress a little respite from the anxiety which they 
 were beginning to feel abont the public credit. The evil 
 results of indiscriminate issues of paper money were already 
 showing themselves in America. At the close of 1776, 
 specie was worth from two to two and a half times as much 
 as paper ; but a far greater depreciation was necessary to 
 teach otir rulers financial wisdom, and many French mil- 
 lions were destined to be sunk in this ever-widening gulf. 
 
 Franklin and his colleagues did not relax their efforts be- 
 cause of the first rebuffs. Early in February, 1777, on 
 hearing alarming accounts of England's preparations for the 
 next campaign, they again tried to persuade Vergennes that 
 the Bourbon powers would find it advantageous to declare 
 war. At the same time, the Commissioners placed on record 
 in a private written agreement their intention, under certain 
 circumstances, to exceed their instructions, and hazard the 
 censure or the utmost penalty of Congress. That is, if 
 France or Spain should conclude a commercial treaty with 
 the United States, and be drawn into a war with Great 
 Britain in consequence, the Commissioners resolved to 
 stipulate that the United vStates would not conclude a 
 separate peace, provided the other power concerned would 
 give the same pledge." 
 
 Until now, the Commissioners had been acting under their 
 first instructions, without official news from America. On 
 the fourteenth of March, they received letters containing 
 further directions, together with an account of the retreat 
 through the Jenseys. Discouraged by repeated misfortunes, 
 Congress had voted to offer France a treaty of alliance. 
 That this decision did not meet with unanimous approval is 
 shown by a letter of John Adams, written a few months 
 
 'Franklin, Deane, and Lee to Gerard, Jan. 14, 1777. To Committee 
 of Secret Correspondence, Jan. 17. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 
 pp. 247, 250. 
 
 'Franklin, Deane, and Lee to Vergennes, Feb. i, 1777. Personal 
 pledge of Commissioners, Feb. 2. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 
 pp. 257, 260. 
 
50 France and the Anieriean Revo/ufion. 
 
 later.' " I nuist confess," said he, " that I am at a loss to 
 determine whether it is good poHcy in us to wisli for a war 
 between France and Britain, unless we could be sure that no 
 other powers would engage in it. l>ut if France engages, 
 Spain will, and then all ICurope will arrange themselves on 
 one side and the other, and what consequences to us might 
 be involved in it, I do not know. ... I have very often 
 been ashamed to hear so many Whigs groaning and sighing 
 with despondency, and whining out their fears that we must 
 be subdued, unless France should step in. Are we to be 
 beholden to France for our liberties?" The irritation of 
 self-reliant patriots like Adams could not bring back the day 
 of moderate measures. In order to induce France, if she 
 intended war against England, to open hostilities .sooner, the 
 United States offered to join her in an attack on the British 
 territories and a division of the conque.sts, and to enter into 
 a .stipulation that neither party should conclude a separate 
 peace. As an inducement to Spain Congress offered not 
 only to declare war against Portugal, if a report that she had 
 insulted American commerce should prove true, but to " con- 
 tinue the said war for the total conquest of that kingdom to 
 be added to the dominion of Spain." To such a subversion 
 of their principles, discouragement over military reverses led 
 the representatives of a people who were fighting for their 
 own independence. They were saved from the necessity of 
 fulfilling this promise by Spain's rejection of the overtures 
 as premature." 
 
 Besides requesting a treaty of alliance. Congress asked for 
 a secret loan of two millions sterling, to be .secured by lands 
 on the Mississippi or the Ohio. The Commissioners made 
 special exertions to obtain this favor, but they were told that 
 France could not spare the money. They received permis- 
 sion to borrow of private capitalists, on condition that they 
 
 ' To James Warren, Apr. 27, 1777. Life and Works, IX, p. 462. 
 
 ' Deane to Vergennes, March 15, 1777. Deane on behalf of himself 
 and B. Franklin, March 18. Stevens Facsimiles, 655, 659. Secret 
 Journals of Congress, II, pp. 36 and 38 ff. Committee of Secret Cor- 
 respondence to Commissioners, Dec. 30, 1776. Diplomatic Corres- 
 pondence, II, p. 240. D'Ossun to Vergennes, March 24. Bancroft 
 MSS. , Archives Framaises, Espaj^iie, 1777, p. 429. 
 
The Dc)}ia)id fo> Recooiiitioi . 51 
 
 sliDukl not offer more than tlie gt)vernnient rate of interest. 
 In tlie existing;" state of American credit, this was eqnivalent 
 to a ])roliil)ition. Hnt the second (piarterly instaUment of 
 the two milHon Hvres promised in January was fnrnished 
 promptly, and the Commissioners were told that payments 
 wonld be continued even after the fnll amount had been con- 
 tributed. Besides this, the Farmers General entered inttj a 
 contract, engaging to place two million livres at their dis- 
 posal, and to take American tobacco in return.' 
 
 At this time, the Ministry were keejMng a watchful eye on 
 the Deputies, because of certain interviews with which they 
 were favored by agents of Great Britain. Although the 
 Americans promptlj^ reported these conversations to \'er- 
 gennes, he feared that they might be tempted to listen to 
 secret proposals from the British government. " We cannot 
 conceal from ourselves," he owned, " that what we have 
 done so far for the United Colonies is not enough to engage 
 their gratitude." '"' Far from meditating concessions to Eng- 
 land, the Commissioners were in good spirits over the pros- 
 pect of a French war. " It is the universal opinion, " they 
 wrote to the Committee at home, " that the peace cannot 
 continue another year." Vergennes shared this conviction. 
 He expected the outbreak of war within a few months, and 
 already thought of warning the fishermen at sea. ' 
 
 The forbearance of England was due to policy, and not to 
 any illusion. The British not only learned through spies 
 the details of the intercourse between France and America, 
 
 ' Stevens Facsimiles, 660, 661 . Deane to Beaumarchais, Macrh 24, 27, 
 1777. Beaumarchais to Maurepas, March 30. To Vei-gennes, March 
 30 and Apr. i. Stevens Facsimiles, 1493, 1498, 1499, 150x3. Franklin, 
 Deane, and Lee to Committee of Secret Correspondence, Apr. 9. Dip- 
 lomatic Correspondence, II, p. 2S5. Contract, March 24. Stevens 
 Facsimiles, 251. 
 
 - M. Gerard, Report of information received from Mr. Deane. 
 Stevens Facsimiles, 675. Vergennes to d'Ossun, Apr. 7, 1777. (Never 
 sent.) Doniol, II, p. 341. 
 
 ' Connnissioners to Committee of Secret Correspondence, Apr. 9, 
 1777. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, p. 289. Inquiry about the pre- 
 cautions to be taken against England. Vergennes, Apr. Doniol, II, 
 p. 409. Vergennes to d'Ossun, July 18. Ibid., II, p. 451. 
 
52 France and the American Revolution . 
 
 but they penetrated the secrets of the Cabinet. It was at 
 this time that lyord vStorniont wrote : " Tlie Courts of France 
 and Spain have had three projects in agitation ; i. To ac- 
 cede to the requisitions of the Court of lyondon in pre- 
 serving an exact neutralit}- ; 2. To continue the plan formed 
 under the Ministry of the Duke of Choiseul, in seeking to 
 detach the Colonies from the mother country, and to oppose 
 against her a redoubtable rival in the republic formed of the 
 thirteen Colonies . . . ; 3. To deceive equally on both 
 sides, to promise his Britannic Majesty not to afford an 
 asylum to his rebel subjects, and yet to do it under the pre- 
 tence of humanity.'" Lord Stormont's information was 
 probably correct. The French and Spanish correspondence 
 of the time abounds in discussions of the policy of active 
 interference and that of temporizing deception. A French 
 hi.storian ■ informs us that neutrality also was seriously con- 
 .sidered, and that the price to be demanded was the retro- 
 cession of Canada. This statement, surprising because at 
 variance with repeated of]ficial declarations of intention with 
 regard to Canada, is confirmed by a manoire^ attributed to 
 Vergennes, written during the war. After setting forth the 
 advantages that France would gain by the restitution of 
 Canada and Louisiana, the writer suggests that these trans- 
 fers be discus.sed in a general Congress of European nations 
 at the close of the war, in case the American Colonies ob- 
 tain their independence. The main reason given for this 
 advice is the danger, — which Vergennes made light of when 
 advocating a more vigorous policy, — that the Americans 
 may develop a spirit of conquest. 
 
 With these three plans in view, the Ministry are said to 
 have made their choice from necessity rather than judgment. 
 A contemporary author' describes them as halting between 
 the peace policy of the King and the warlike measures urged 
 upon them by public opinion, until they were forced to take 
 a middle cour.se, deceiving England and the Colonies alter- 
 
 ' Capefigue, II, p. 47, note. 
 
 ^Capefigue, II, p. 46. 
 
 •' Menioire Historiqiie et Politique sur la Louisiane. 
 
 * S^gur, Mcnioires, I, p. 109. 
 
TJie Dojiaiid for Rccoguitiov . 53 
 
 iiately, and failing to reap the advantages of either peace or 
 war. This statement, while true to appearances, probably 
 exaggerates the indecision of the Ministry, especially of 
 Vergennes. He adopted the policy of double-dealing so 
 early and maintained it so steadily that we may say with 
 some confidence, he was not forced into this line of action, 
 but chose it. He i^redicted the date of the rupture so ac- 
 curately, a year ahead, that we can hardly suppose his final 
 decision to have been due solely to a military chance. At 
 least, we must believe the chance was welcomed. On 
 the other hand, it would be misleading to regard Vergennes 
 as a man of unshaken resolution. It cannot be denied that 
 he sometimes vacillated. All that can be claimed for him is 
 a fairly steady adherence to a policy of compromise. It was 
 natural that men like Lafayette, impatient for results and 
 unburdened by responsibility, should complain of the 
 " labyrinth of precautions, of weaknesses, and of dis- 
 avowals," in which the foreign department involved itself. 
 But it would have taken a man of iron to remain unmoved 
 in the midst of the influences which surrounded Vergennes : 
 the King, the people, the intriguing friends of Choi.seul, the 
 calculating and obstinate Spaniard. 
 
 While Franklin and Deane labored with the French Min- 
 istry, Lee had taken a journey to Spain, in hope of procur- 
 ing an alliance. He had been warned off from the capital, 
 but had received promises of material aid, which was after- 
 ward furnished in moderation. In April, 1777, Spain, under 
 the lead of her new minister, Florida Blanca, brought for- 
 ward a new project : that Spain and France, adding to the 
 weight of their influence by strengthening their colonial de- 
 feu.ses, should try to influence the deliberations between the 
 American Provinces and England, and also the relations of 
 the Provinces among themselves.' France was not im- 
 pressed with the wisdom of her ally. " In order to have the 
 right to meddle in the internal deliberations of the Colonies," 
 Vergennes wrote, "and in the negotiations which they 
 
 ' Bancroft's note on a letter of Florida Blanca to d'Aranda, Apr. 7, 
 1777. Bancroft MSvS., Archives Fran(,a!ses, Espague, 1777, p. 443. 
 See Doniol, II, p. 264. 
 
54 France and the A)ncrica>i Revolution . 
 
 might have with the nietropohs, it would be necessarj' to 
 bind ourselves so closely to them that our respective interests 
 would be the same. This would be, assured!}', to place our- 
 selves in a state of open though undeclared war with Eng- 
 land." Florida Blanca had suggested that France and 
 Spain, while acting as mediators, might regain some of their 
 lost territory by negotiation with England. In reply, Ver- 
 gennesgave the reason for the moderate policy which France 
 had already decided to adopt. " If the loss of Canada was 
 felt by her," he said, " she ought to regret it the less since 
 her forced abandonment of it has become the signal for the 
 revolt of the English pos.sessions on the continent. If we 
 should think of reinstating ourselves there, we should arouse 
 again the old uneasiness and jealousies which ensured the 
 fidelity and submission of these same Provinces to England." 
 These Provinces, he said, " are not striving to throw off the 
 yoke of the mother country in order to run the risk of bow- 
 ing beneath that of any other power." ' 
 
 During July and August, .777, the relations between 
 France and England became so strained that it appeared 
 doubtful whether the Bourbon powers would retain the 
 choice between peace and war. The principal cause of irri- 
 tation was the treatment accorded to American privateers in 
 French ports. In April, 1776, Congress had authorized the 
 capture of English vessels," and by the summer of 1777, 
 privateering enterprise was at its height. France had en- 
 couraged it by ignoring treaty stipulations and allowing the 
 .sale of prizes in her ports. ' The Americans responded by try- 
 ing with true Yankee ingenuity to force France into war. 
 Their captains were ordered to fit out privateers in French 
 ports, man them with French sailors, and try to provoke 
 the FvUglish to inifair reprisals, in order that France might 
 be involved in the claims to compensation.* Encouraged by 
 
 ' Vergennes to d'Aranda, Apr. 26, 1777. Doniol, II, p. 273. 
 
 '■■' Journals of Congress, I, p. 304. 
 
 3 Deane to R. Morris, Aug. 23, 1777. Diplomatic Correspondence, 
 III P- 379- Beauniarchais to Vergennes, Feb. 20, March 7. Vergennes 
 to Noailles, March 21. Stevens Facsimiles, 919, 1445, 1488. 
 
 ^Carmichael to Bingham, June 25-July 6, 1777. Diplomatic Cor- 
 respondence, II, pp. 347, 348. 
 
Tlie Demand for Recognition. 55 
 
 tlie leiiiency of the P'reiicli goveninieiit i)rivateers grew 
 more and more darmg. vSliips were armed in the ports of 
 France, and returned thither with their prizes ; an luiglish 
 mail i^acket was carried into Duidcirlc ; a small fleet cruised 
 off the coast of luigland and took seventeen or eighteen 
 captured vessels to France. " For the first time," we are 
 told, " since Britain was a maritime power, the river Thames 
 and other of its ports were crowded witli French and other 
 ships, taking in freight, in order to avoid the risk of having 
 British property captured.'" The English government ])ro- 
 tested angrily against the violations of international law. 
 Vergennes was ol)liged to act. He relinked the Commis- 
 sioners severely, and apologi/.ed for rebuking them ; he had 
 a man imprisoned now and then ; he took securities for 
 good behavior, that failed to secure it. He .seriously em- 
 barrassed the privateers, but did not produce conviction in 
 the xAmerican mind. 
 
 The Knglish Ministry were still less convinced. The per- 
 sistence with which they made their resentment known sug- 
 gested the approacli of an ultimatum. This danger, and the 
 constantly recurring fear of an acconmiodation between Eng- 
 land and America,'' ma}' have been among the reasons which 
 led Vergennes, in July, to advise aggressive measures.'^ He 
 declared that the insufficiency of the aid which France had 
 given to the insurgents would lend countenance to the belief 
 that she merely wished to see England and America wear 
 each other out. As the military preparations of France 
 were nearly complete, it would be well to anticipate the de- 
 signs of England by setting an early date for the connnence- 
 ment of hostilities. "If the two Crowns allow January or 
 February of 1778 to pass," he said, mentioning in advance 
 the ver}^ months in which the treaty with the Americans was 
 negotiated, " they will have only to regret the opportunity 
 wliich they have neglected." The change from their late 
 professions of frientlship toward England might seem unduly 
 
 ' Deane's Address to Congress, Dec, 1778. Sparks MSS. LII, vol. I, 
 p. 124. 
 ^Life and Works of John Adams, I, p. 311. 
 ^ Memoiir, July 23, 1777, Doniol, II, p. 460. 
 
56 Fra)ice and the American Revolution. 
 
 abrupt : — this he foresaw. But they would have a reason- 
 able pretext for their action in Kngland's recent encroach- 
 ments on their connnerce, while exercising her so-called 
 riglit to search the ships of neutrals for American goods.' 
 If they decided on war, they must first of all make sure of 
 the Americans by a treaty ; for "it would be inconsistent," 
 Vergennes said, "to arm ourselves for them and to allow 
 them to lay down their arms." In discussing the plan of 
 sending political agents to the Americans, he suggested the 
 expediency of persuading them that they would need the 
 guaranty of France and Spain. This idea was seized with 
 avidity in Spain. The proposal of a guaranty would test the 
 sincerity of England ; and if she should unexpectedly give 
 her consent, the guarantors might be able to influence the 
 terms of the treaty. 
 
 On every other })oint Spain proved intractable. She ob- 
 jected to the date suggested by Vergennes, because a 
 treasure-ship and a troop-ship which she was expecting from 
 America could not arrive so soon. She doubted the wisdom 
 of aggression, at a time when it seemed probable that the 
 British Ministry would welcome a foreign war as a happy 
 release from their embarrassment. She did not wish an 
 American alliance, and she did wish Gibraltar. In order to 
 make sure of enough causes of complaint to justify a future 
 attack on England, she devised a plan as cold-blooded as it 
 was likely to be effectual. " We will treat the English with 
 justice and dignity . . . while taking care not to give [the 
 Ministr\J just motives for complaint, and complaining our- 
 selves with firmness but without bitterness, of those which 
 they and their nation give us, so that the complaints, multi- 
 plying, may assume more consistence." " 
 
 The French Ministry con.sented to postpone the war in 
 deference to the wishes of Spain, and \'ergennes took up 
 the i)roblem of inducing the Americans to accept a guaranty. 
 He hoped to effect this through the messengers whom the 
 two Courts were sending to America. He despaired of 
 
 ' Vergennes to d'Ossun, July 18, 1777. Doniol, II, p. 451. 
 "■ Metnoire of the Court of Spain, Aug. 8, 1777. Sparks MSS., 
 LXXX, vol. I, p. 281. 
 
The Demand for Reeoonition. 57 
 
 gaiiiitii; his point with the Deputies at Paris. They were 
 men who would not lend themselves to interested schemes. 
 Vergennes complained of their suspicion, their unwilling- 
 ness to assume anj' ties unless France engaged to take ]:)art 
 in the war, and the calculated indiscretion by which the\' 
 were apparently trying to commit France in the sight of 
 FvUgland. Still, he would have some proposals of a guaranty 
 thrown to them. " If they do not l)ite at this hook," 
 he says, he has an alternative plan : namely, to per- 
 suade them that they cainiot trust to an acknowledgment of 
 their independence by F^ngland ; and that their best security 
 would lie in commercial treaties, to be concluded with the 
 nations most interested, at the same time with the treaty of 
 peace.' For the moment, France halts in the position 
 a.ssumed at fir.st by the Americans : — connnercial union, but 
 no entangling alliance. 
 
 France had no sooner declared her readiness to wait the 
 pleasure of vSpain, than a sudden threat from the British 
 government reminded them both that they did not control 
 the situation. Through a private agent, whose words could 
 be disavowed, the English Ministry demanded that the King 
 should surrender without examination all prizes brought 
 into his ports by the Americans, publish the orders given to 
 his admirals on the subject, and dismiss all the privateers 
 who were then in the ports of France. Vergennes prepared 
 an answer to these demands — a refusal, tempered by yield- 
 ing some minor points. His report was approved by the 
 King, on August twenty-third." "If these concessions are 
 not enough for Kngland, there can be no further choice." 
 
 Vergennes expected war. He advised that all vessels be 
 detained in port for fifteen days, and despatch boats sent 
 to the fisheries, the French islands, and the Levant. He 
 warned the ambassador at London : " Tlie flame of war is to 
 all appearance ready to burst forth, and will probably have 
 broken out before my letter reaches you. ... I fear much 
 that I shall have the pleasure of seeing you .sooner than I 
 
 ' Vergennes to d'Ossun, Aug. 22, 1777. Doniol, II, p. 5cx3. 
 ■^ Stevens Facsimiles, 706. 
 
58 hrancc and tlie .iinerica7i Revolution . 
 
 wislied."' Tliose Americans who wanted to drag France 
 into war seemed sure of success. But they did not attain it. 
 Lord Stormont, who conversed with Maurepas and Ver- 
 genneson the luiglish demands, carefully refrained from sup- 
 porting these by any official sanction.' The British demon- 
 stration ended in an anti-climax, and war was averted. After 
 this, the treatment of privateers was discussed in a desultory 
 manner, while the increase of armaments for the French and 
 Spanish colonies became the crying grievance of England. 
 The French Court continued to profess friendship for Great 
 Britain, and to give " ver}' essential aids" to the United 
 States. " How long these two parts will continue to be 
 acted at the same time, the Deputies said, in one of their 
 reports, "and which will finally predominate, may be a 
 question. As it is the true interest of France to prevent our 
 being annexed to Britain . . . we are inclined to believe 
 the sincerity is toward us." '^ 
 
 In September, the Commi.ssioners found themselves em- 
 barrassed for want of funds. They had ordered a large 
 quantit}' of supplies in anticipation of remittances from 
 America and of money which Spain had promised them ; 
 but the accidents of war had cut off the remittances, and 
 Spain, in irritation at the conduct of some American pri- 
 vateers, had suddenly withheld her assi.stance. Obeying 
 timely orders of Congress, the Deputies appealed to FVance 
 and Spain for a loan of eight million livres. News of the 
 abandonment of Ticonderoga had recently arrived, and the 
 Commissioners were so discouraged that Vergennes became 
 alarmed. In order to secure their confidence, he advised 
 giving them .some compensation for the rigorous treatment 
 to which their privateers had been subjected ; and, on the 
 ground that it was "beneath the dignity of two great 
 powers to lend," he advocated a subsidy. France asked 
 Spain to join her in a contribution of six million livres, on 
 condition that the Deputies solennily bind themselves not to 
 begin any secret negotiation with England. But the Spanish 
 
 ' Vergennes to Noailles, Aug. 23, 1777. Stevens Facsimiles, 1656. 
 ' Vergennes to Noailles, Aug. 30, 1777. Ihid., 1666. 
 •'Sept. 8, 1777. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, p. 38S. 
 
The Di'Diaiid for J\e('og)iitio)i. 59 
 
 Minislrv, jircfcrriiig- to keep the Americans in expectancy, 
 refused to promise any definite amount. Tliou<;li all at- 
 tempts to change tliis decision were inisuccessful, France 
 resolved to furnish three million livres during the next 
 year.' 
 
 France and Spain now carried out their intention of 
 sending emissaries to America. The French agent, M. 
 Holker. was directed to approach the leaders of Congress, 
 inform them of the favors and aids which France had ex- 
 tended to the Americans, and impress upon them her 
 interest in their independence. It was hoped that he 
 could persuade them that their liberties would be insecure 
 without a guaranty from France and Spain, and the ex- 
 clusion of England from all special commercial privileges. 
 He was instructed to try cautiously to find out their senti- 
 ments on the subject of connnercial treaties, and to suggest 
 that interest would lead them to favor the powers from 
 which they expected support. He was also to enquire into 
 the state of American resources and the trend of opinion 
 among the people and in the Provincial Congres.ses, and to 
 find out whether there were any party divisions in Con- 
 gress.'^ 
 
 Before these instructions were formulated, a decisive 
 event had occurred in America, to convince Vergennes that 
 favors, subsidies, and persuasions were not sufficient to 
 bind the United States to France. During November, 
 rumor said that the fortune of war was turning against the 
 F^nglish ; and on December fourth, the Commissioners an- 
 nounced the fact of Burgoyne's capitulation.' 
 
 ^ Ml' moire submitted to Vergennes and d'Aranda, Sept. 26, 1777. 
 Vergennes to d'Ossun, Sept. 26, Nov. 7. Florida Blanca, Oct. 17. 
 .Stevens Facsimiles, 1698, 267, 1704, 171 1, 1725. 
 
 'Nov. 25, 1777. Ibid., 1748. 
 
 'Ibid., 716. 
 
V. 
 
 THK CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY 
 
 The news of Burgoyne's defeat impelled the vacillating 
 French Ministr}' to decisive action. The King authorized 
 more definite overtures to the American Commissioners. 
 Gerard conveyed to them the congratulations of Maurepas 
 and Vergennes, with an intimation that the Court v.nshed a re- 
 newal of their proposals for an alliance.' At the same time, 
 M. Holker, who had not yet sailed for America, was made the 
 bearer of an open proflfer of friendship.' The change in the 
 situation was explained to him, for the benefit of the Ameri- 
 cans, as inolTensively as possible. It was said that the un- 
 willingness of European powers to recognize them had been 
 due chiefly to the uncertainty of their fortunes. A slight 
 cau.se would have been enough to defeat them, and any na- 
 tion which had declared for them would have been compro- 
 mised to no purpose. Yet the value of the recent succe.ss, 
 it was said, lay not .so much in its militar\^ as in its political 
 consequences : it would strengthen the credit of tlie Ameri- 
 can leaders and ensure popular support for the cause of in- 
 dependence. The time had come for closer contact between 
 the United States and the European powers. " If the Con- 
 gress thinks proper to address instructions to its Commis- 
 sioners in France," M. Holker was directed to say, "there 
 is every reason to be })ersuaded that they will speedilj' re- 
 ceive substantial proofs of the favorable (lisj)osition of the 
 Courts of the House of Bourbon." 
 
 ' Slatetnetit in the hand of Conite de Vergennes, Dec. 6, 1777. 
 Stevens Facsimiles, 1762. Arthur I.ee's Journal, Dec. 6. Life, I, p. 
 
 357- 
 
 ^ M. Gerard. Paper dictated to M. le Ray de Chauniont for M. 
 Holker. Overtures of a more open policy toward America. Stevens 
 Facsimiles, 760. 
 
The Conclusion of the Treaty. 6 1 
 
 This e.Kplaualioii of tlie change in tiie poHcy of France 
 was incomplete, and hence misleading. Nothing was said 
 of the motive most conspicnous in the official correspondence 
 of those critical days, — the fear that defeat would lead Ivng- 
 land to offer terms which the Americans could accept. The 
 apprehension was not so much that they would be strong 
 enough to wrest their independence from luigland, as that 
 she would grant it and proht by the concession. Htjlker's 
 instructions give no indication of the anxiety with which 
 the French Ministry and its embassy at lyondon were watch- 
 ing for the effect of the American victory on the tactics and 
 the personnel of the l^ritish Cabinet.' Beaumarchais, who 
 had the instincts of a diplomatist, was on the alert at once. 
 " What is the real meaning of this crisis? " he wrote to Yer- 
 gennes. " It is, that of two nations, English and French, 
 the first who recognizes American independence will alone 
 gather from it all the fruits, while that independence will be 
 certainly fatal to the one who allows her rival to take the 
 lead." Vergennes adopted his very words. " L,et us not 
 be mistaken." he wrote to the ambassador in Spain ; " the 
 Power which first recognizes the independence of the Amer- 
 icans will be the first to gather all the fruits of this war." '■' 
 
 The Deputies responded promptly to the friendly hints of 
 the Ministry, by formally requesting an answer to their 
 proposal of a treaty. They repeated the well-worn argu- 
 ment, that the Americans, uncertain with regard to the in- 
 tentions of France and ignorant of the secret aids which 
 she had furnished, might be tempted by the enemy to 
 waver ; and that a treaty concluded at this time would 
 strengthen their resolution."^ 
 
 The French Cabinet, convinced that the Americans could 
 resist England with .some hope of success, anxious about 
 the future course of the British Ministry, and besieged by 
 
 ' Garnier to (qy. ) Rayneval, Dec. 5, 1777. Vergennes to Noailles, 
 Dec. 6. Stevens Facsimiles, 1755, 1760. 
 
 ^Beaumarchais to Vergennes, Dec. 11, 1777. Vergennes to Mont- 
 morin, Dec. 11. Ibid., 1768, 1769. 
 
 ^ Franklin, Deane, and Lee to Vergennes, Dec. 8, 1777. Diplo- 
 matic Correspondence, II, p. 444. 
 
62 Ff-aiur a)id the Amoican Revolution . 
 
 the military enthusiasts, had decided to conchide a treaty 
 with the Americans; and the King, against his will, had 
 given his approval. Vergennes granted the Deputies an 
 audience on the twelfth of December, 1777. The day be- 
 fore this meeting, he wrote to supply the amba.ssador in 
 Spain with arguments for an American alliance.' " What 
 have we to put in the way," said he, " to prevent the 
 Americans lending themselves to a reconciliation ? We 
 have no measures, no ties, and no means, in common with 
 them." An accommodation would be all the more 
 dangerous to France, since war with England now seemed 
 inevitable. It would be be.st to enter on this war in alliance 
 with the Americans ; for, even if they .should listen to pro- 
 posals from England after they had bound themselves to 
 France, the con.sequences would not be so serious as those 
 which might be expected from a refusal of their demands. 
 They might de.sert their ally, but they v^'ould hardly be .so 
 base as to attack her. 
 
 In a subsequent letter, Vergennes expressed the opinion 
 that Spain's interest in the propo.sed war was ten times as 
 great as that of France, since the French islands would 
 offer little temptation to the Briti.sh, in comparison with the 
 Spanish treasures on the mainland. Looking for every 
 argument that would appeal to Spain, he suggested that she 
 might regain Florida by the war. He confessed that he did 
 not know the sentiments of the Americans on this point ; 
 but he thought it natural to suppose that they did not 
 .specially care to po.s.sess Florida themselves.'"' 
 
 Meeting the Deputies at the appointed time, Vergennes 
 complimented them on the ]irosperous state of American 
 affairs, and on the conduct of Washington in giving battle 
 to General Howe's army at Germantown ; an unsuccess- 
 ful attempt, the boldness of which had impressed him 
 as deeply as the victory at Saratoga. Circumstances, he 
 said, seemed favorable to an understanding between the 
 
 ' Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 11, 1777. Stevens Facsimiles, 
 1769. 
 
 '^ Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 13, 1777. Ibid., 1775. 
 
The Conclusion of the Treaty. 63 
 
 two countries ; and he promised that the Kini;- would 
 examine all the proposals of the Americans and give them 
 as many marks of " affection and interest" as possible, re- 
 serviui; the rij^ht to conclude nothing without the King of 
 Spain. In the informal conversation that followed, \'er- 
 gennes encpured into the demands of Congress and indicated 
 the terms that iM'ance would accept : — all this, with the 
 understanding that the interview should have "no conse- 
 se(iuences." The Americans at first ])roposed a mere treaty 
 of amity and conunerce ; but \'ergennes, reminding them 
 that such a treaty would draw France into war with luigland, 
 insisted that the agreement between them should " have all 
 the solidit>' of which human institutions are capable." At 
 the same time, he assured them that they could not be secure 
 without the guaranty of France and vSpain, as long as Eng- 
 land retained any lantl on the continent. The Connnis- 
 sioners, in turn, renewed the offer of Congress to guarantee 
 the American possessions of F'rance and Spain.' 
 
 The reports from England confirmed the government in 
 its policy. The party of the Administration was .said to be 
 outdoing the Opposition in proposing concessions to the 
 Americans, while at the same time it asked for unlimited 
 subsidies. If the attempts at conciliation were genuine, for 
 what purpose were the subsidies demanded ? The question 
 was ominous for France. The situation was critical. Eord 
 North might even feel sure enough of support to begin a 
 negotiation without waiting until the measure had been 
 discussed in Parliament. Vergennes was impatient at the 
 length of time that nui.st pass before he could hear from 
 Spain. " 1 will not conceal from you,'" he wrote to the 
 ambassador, Montmorin, "that the issue makes me 
 tremble." " Next came a rumor that the King of England 
 was making overtures to Lord Chatham ; and another, that 
 Lord Germaine was sending his secretary to Paris, to treat 
 with the American Conunissioners. " If his offers are pre- 
 
 ' Journal of Arthur Lee. Life, I, p. 360. Statement in the hand of 
 Vergennes, marked by the King, " Approiive," Dec. 6, 1777. Stevens 
 Facsimiles, 1762. Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 13. Ibid., 1774. 
 
 •-'Dec. 13, 1777. Ibid., 1774. 
 
64 Fra)ice and the American Revolution. 
 
 cise," said V^ergennes, "' if those who receive them have the 
 w-ood faitli to ask our advice and decision, what shall we 
 reply?" He did not say that France would repl}' by con- 
 cluding- a treaty witli the Americans ; but he hinted that if 
 she did, Spain would have no right to complain.' 
 
 It was true that an agent of the British government, 
 Wentworth by name, was busy with the Deputies. Deane 
 reported the conferences to Vergennes. They did not 
 threaten any serious results ; but Vergennes learned from 
 the reports, that the Ministry had instructed the brothers 
 Howe to open a negotiation in America, and that a formal 
 proposition had been made to unite with America again.st 
 France and Spain. ^ Mr. Wentworth was not the only 
 British agent who communicated with the Americans at this 
 time. The Londoners showed enough interest in Franklin 
 and his colleagues to justify some uneasine.ss on the part of 
 France ; and it is not strange that, when these attempts 
 failed, Vergennes betrayed an emotion of relief. " I regard 
 it as a special piece of good fortune," this benefactor of 
 America wrote, '" and as the effect of the happy star of the 
 House of Bourbon, that the English Ministry in the intoxi- 
 cation of its hopes rather than of its succe.sses has so cir- 
 cumscribed itself by the acts which it has caused Parliament 
 to pass, that it has no power to grant this independence 
 which it foresees that it will be obliged to let slip."'* In 
 order to make sure that the overtures on the other side of 
 the water should be equally unsuccessful, a King's frigate 
 carried to Boston despatches of the Deputies, reporting the 
 proposals of the British emissaries, and warning Congress 
 of the advances to be made through the Howes. 
 
 While the interviews between Deane and Wentworth were 
 takingplace, the Commissioners impressed upon Vergennes the 
 importance of their knowing, at a time when England seemed 
 on the point of proposing peace, what the United States 
 might expect from France and Spain. This was the critical 
 
 ' Vergennes to Montmorin, Kvening of Dec. 13, 1777. Stevens 
 Facsimiles, 1776. 
 
 nbid., 177S, 718, 719, 231, 17S0, 1781, 1786, etc. 
 
 ' Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 19, 1777. Doniol, II. p. 662. 
 
Tlie Conclusion of tlie Tyeaty . 65 
 
 question which Vergennes thought would justif}- him in pro- 
 ceeding without the concurrence of S[)ain. He informed the 
 CommissicMiers through Gerard, on the seventeenth (jf De- 
 cember, that the King had resolved to acknowledge their in- 
 dei)endence and to make a treaty with them.' As His 
 Majesty aimed to found a permanent alliance, advantageous 
 to both peoples, and not to exact concessions because he was 
 dealing with a new nation, the terms of the treaty would be 
 liberal. In supporting the independenci.- of the United 
 States, the King would jirobably be drawn into war with 
 England ; yet he would ask no compensation, and France 
 would seek her advantage in diminishing the power of Great 
 Britain. The Commissioners, in their report to the Com- 
 mittee of Foreign Affairs, ' represented Gerard as saying that 
 the King would not insist on a stipulation forbidding a 
 separate peace, and would require only that the Americans 
 should not give up their independence. This interpretation 
 of the King's intentions gave rise to one of the earliest de- 
 bates of Congress on our duty to our ally. At the time of 
 the discussion, Gerard denied that he had made the state- 
 ment ; and it seems more probable that he was misunder- 
 stood than that France contemplated any such half-way 
 measure. Gerard did not fix a date for beginning the 
 negotiations, but promised that the treaty should be con- 
 cluded as soon as Spain was ready to join the alliance. 
 
 While the Ministry waited for the decision of the Spanish 
 Court, important events were occurring in Kngland. When 
 Parliament adjourned, to meet on the twentieth of Januar}', 
 Lord North announced that he would propose a plan of 
 reconciliation at the opening of the next session.' It 
 seemed improbable that the North Ministry would offer 
 America complete indejxMideuce ; but Vergennes feared that 
 they would gain their point by yielding the substance while 
 withholding the name. Granting that reconciliation on 
 these terms might be difficult if the American government 
 
 ' I-'ranklin, Deane, and Lee to Coiuinittee of I'\)reign .Aflairs, Dec. 
 18, 1777. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, p. 452. 
 ■* Succe.ssor to the Committee of vSecret Correspondence. 
 ■' Noailles to Vergennes, Dec. 23, 1777. Stevens Facsimiles, 1793. 
 
 5 
 
66 France and the American Revolutioii . 
 
 had more influence and stability, he feared that the people, 
 sufTering' for the necessaries of life, would not continue the 
 war for a point of honor. "The Americans jM'opose that 
 we should conquer the linj^lish islands," said he, "and 
 grant them free trade thither. If, on the other hand, the 
 Knglish make the .same proposal, will it not l)e listened to? 
 will it be rejected?" He confessed that the views of the 
 French government had been too restricted ; they had 
 feared a change in the British Ministry, and had not 
 anticipated the consecjuences of a change in the policy of 
 the Ministry now in power. "England's aim being no 
 longer doubtful," he said, "it .seems that neither should 
 our decision be .so ; for the question we have to decide is to 
 know whether it is more expedient forusto have war against 
 England and America together, than with America for us 
 against England."' In writing to the and^a.ssador at Lon- 
 don, he spoke with more hesitancy, as if trying to draw out 
 information. " What would be important to find out is with 
 wdiat view the Mini.stry seems to incline to peace ; many 
 people believe, and wish to make us believe, that it would be 
 fatal to us in the present and in the future. ... I confess 
 to you that I am not far from that way of thinking."' 
 Yielding to the.se apprehensions, Vergennes engaged Gerard 
 in drawing up a plan of treaty, and Gerard began to dis- 
 cuss with the Deputies the several articles of the Congres- 
 sional plan.'' It was not thought worth while even to con- 
 ceal their interviews. The customary precautions for en- 
 suring secrecy were relaxed, and Franklin was observed in 
 the company of all the ministers in turn, dining and ne- 
 gotiating with them.' 
 
 On the last day of the year, Vergennes received the 
 answer of the Spanish Court. ' It could hardly have been 
 less complaisant under any circumstances, and it might 
 
 ' Vergenne.s to Montmorin, Dec. 27, 1777. Stevens Facsiniile.s, 1S05. 
 ''Vergennes to Noailles, Dec. 27. Ibid., 1807. 
 
 ■'Arthur Lee's Journal, Dec 29. 1777, and subsequent dates. Life, 
 I, pp. 371 flf- 
 
 ' Correspondance Secrete, L P- 125. 
 
 ^Florida Blanca to d'Aranda, Dec. 23, 1777. Doniol, H, p. 765. 
 
The Concludon of the Treaty. 67 
 
 liave been more so if the vSpaiiisli authorities liad not lieard 
 of the advances which the French Court had ah-ead}- made 
 to the Americans. On receiving this news, Fh)ri(Ui Blanca, 
 a statesman characterized by extreme reserve, was betrayed 
 into an exph)sion of anger. Montmorin assured him that 
 no formal negotiation had been opened, took ])ains to soothe 
 his injured vanity, and flattered himself that he had suc- 
 ceeded and that Spain would soon follow in the steps of 
 France ; ' but the length of time which elap.sed before 
 Spain, on her own exorbitant terms, entered the war, bore 
 witness that she did not easily forget an injury or \ield a 
 purpose. 
 
 In his reply to France,' I'lorida Blanca expressed a strong 
 doubt whether an early reconciliation between Great Bri- 
 tain and America was probable. In conversation, just be- 
 fore this, he had given luigland four years t<^ come to 
 terms with her Colonies. He made allowance for the fact 
 that the Americans had an interest in exaggerating the 
 likelihood of an agreement. " The American Dejmties are 
 playing their game. Their aim has always been to com- 
 promise us with the Fnglish."'' Repeating an argument 
 often used by Spanish statesmen, he said that an alliance 
 between America and the Bourbons would give the British 
 Ministry the best possible excuse for ending the war, — the 
 plea of nece.ssit}', and of perfidy on the part of PVance and 
 Spain. The outcome of his argument was that Spain 
 would engage to do nothing except fix the amount of her 
 subsidy to the Americans, offer them her mediation in ca.se 
 of need, and watch the English Ministry. 
 
 On learning the Spanish decision, the advi.sers of the 
 King carefully di.scussed the situation. Vergennes then 
 sent the Court of Spain an elaborate reply,' and the King 
 added the weight of his influence by a personal letter to his 
 tincle. Vergennes declared the vSpanish proposals in- 
 
 ' IVIoiilinorin to Vergeinie.s, Dec. 23, 1777. Stevens I'^acsimiles, 
 1792. 
 'Florida Blanca to d'Araiida, Dec. 23, 1777. Doniol, II, p. 765. 
 ^ Montmorin to Vergennes, Dec. 23. vStevens I-'acsiniiles, 1792. 
 'Jan. 7, 1778. Ibid., 1S24. 
 
68 France and the American Revolution . 
 
 adequate. Pecuniary aid had served to keep up the 
 hopes of the iusurgeuts ; but now that the desired end 
 was witliin their reach, money would not prevent them 
 from forming a coahtion with Enghind. Me(hation would 
 be useless and dangerous, for England would regard it as 
 an insult. Besides, she was now offering the Colonies all 
 that France and Spain could procure for them ; for media- 
 tion based on absolute independence would amount to a 
 declaration of war against Ivigland. To offer a guaranty 
 would be equally useless ; for both England and the C(.»lo- 
 nies, if they treated without the intervention of France and 
 Spain, would reject their guaranty. As to watching for a 
 change of ministry in England, Lord North was now more 
 likely to bring about a war against France than Eord 
 Chatham. A treaty, then, was absolutely necessary. 
 France must begin negotiations before " the ominous date 
 of the twentieth." 
 
 On the independence of America, Vergennes exjMessed 
 his opinion plainly. "The United States are in fact inde- 
 pendent. They have in their hands all that constitutes 
 .sovereign power. Our recognition will add nothing to the 
 reality of that possession." Without asserting this inde- 
 pendence, France was prepared to assume it for the purpo.ses 
 of the alliance. vSlie desired a treaty consisting of two parts : 
 the first establishing a commercial agreement ; the second 
 providing for an eventual alliance, " to procure absolute and 
 unlimited independence to the United States." France 
 would require that the Americans should not make peace 
 secretly or without her guaranty ; and the two powers would 
 guarantee each other's American possessions. The King 
 might be obliged to sign a treaty before hearing from Spain 
 again. In that ca.se, Vergennes promised to reserve the 
 right of Spain to accede to it at any time. One reason for 
 ha.stening the negotiation was Vergennes' suspicion that, 
 even at this late stage, the Deputies were withdrawing their 
 confidence. " What a humiliation . . . if after having the 
 opportunity to attach the Americans to ourselves, we should 
 have reason to reproach ourselves with having attached them 
 to England. ... I do not know," he said, "whether I 
 
The Couihision of i/ie Treaty. 69 
 
 could ,survi\-e the shame of .si*;iiiiig the passport which the 
 Deputies would ask of nie to go to London." ' 
 
 "As it is not we who will and act, but circumstances 
 which imperiouslx- dictate the law to us," \'ergennes wrote 
 to the ambassador in Spain, in this letter of Januar>- 8, "to- 
 morrow will not pass without my informing the Americans 
 of our tlis])osition and endeavoring to penetrate theirs." He 
 was better than his word. On the evening of the same day, 
 Gerard held a conference with the Conunissioners. Binding 
 them to secrecy, he told them that the King had resolved to 
 assist the United States in maintaining their independence. 
 After warning them against the designs of Kngland, Gerard 
 asked them two definite questions : first, what they would 
 regard as sufficient to ensure their rejecting all English pro- 
 posals which did not include absolute independence ; second, 
 what they believed necessary to cause Congress to reject all 
 such proposals. The Commissioners replied to the first 
 question, that a treaty of commerce and alliance would be 
 sufficient.' Gerard told them that tlie King, anticipating 
 this answer, had decided to conclude a treaty ; and that the 
 formal negotiations should begin wdienever they wished. At 
 their request, he made a brief .statement of the terms which 
 would be agreeable to France, following the lines of Ver- 
 gennes' despatch to the Spanish Court. The policy of the 
 commercial treaty, he said, would not differ materially from 
 that of the Congressional plan. He explained that the King 
 woidd not require any compensation for his support; and that, 
 since his motive was not desire for conquest, France could 
 not co-operate with America for the reduction of Canada and 
 the West Indies."' In spite of this limitation, the Deputies 
 felt that the main object of their endeavor was gained. 
 They "applauded this recital," Gerard reported, " with a 
 sort of transport." 
 
 Three days later, Deane gave Gerard the answer of the 
 Commissioners to his second question.^ To prevent Con- 
 
 ' Verge nil e.s to Moiitiiiorin, Jan. 8, 1778. Doiiiol, II, ]>. 719. 
 
 ■■' Stevens F'acsimiles, 774. 
 
 'Journal of Arthur Lee. Life, I, p. 377. 
 
 *Jan. II, 1778. Stevens l''acsiiiiiles, 776. 
 
yo France and the American Revolution. 
 
 gress from making peace with England, they said it would 
 be necessary that France should guarantee the territories 
 then in possession of the United States and those acquired 
 during the war, and either declare war against England or 
 provide Congress with enough money to carry on the strug- 
 gle until the British should be expelled from the continent. 
 A fleet of six or eight ships of the line would make doubh' 
 sure, by procuring the success of the Americans. In 
 making the.se requests, the Commissioners a.sked for more 
 than they could hope to obtain ; for they had been told that 
 immediate war formed no part of the King's plan. Ver- 
 gennes was annoyed. "These people," he said, "show 
 themseh^es infinitely more troublesome and more moro.se 
 than we could have thought.'" 
 
 After the interview just described, the negotiation went 
 on with little delay. On the eighteenth of January, the 
 treaties drawn up by \'ergennes were submitted to the 
 Deputies, who deliberated on them for ten days* and, after 
 obtaining some changes in minor points, accepted them. 
 The principal matter of di.scussion was the nature of the 
 alliance ; the Americans wishing to make it actual, the 
 French insisting that it must be eventual. Of course the 
 Commissioners were obliged to yield. 
 
 While France was entering on the la.st stage of her ne- 
 gotiation with the Americans, the Spani.sh Ministry were 
 preparing an elaborate .set of questions for discussion. They 
 took this step, apparently, with a double aim : to gain time ; 
 and to give a forcible hint that Spain would not prosecute a 
 war for the mere humiliation of England, but would insist 
 on substantial advantages.' This promising document had 
 .scarcely been completed, when the French nicnioire of Jan- 
 uary 8 arrived, to convince the Spaniards that their efforts 
 were useless, for the measure which they were trying to 
 delay had probably been adopted. The natural irritation of 
 the baffled statesmen found vent in criticism of their ally. 
 The Court of F'^rance had not performed its agreements ; it 
 
 ' Vergenncs to Montinorin, Jan. i6, 1778. SteveiLS Facsimiles, 183S. 
 ■•'See Arthur Lee's Journal, Jan., 1778. Life, L pp- 377 ff- 
 ^Florida Blanca to d'Aranda, Jan. 13, 177S. Doniol, U, p. 775. 
 
Tilt' Co)irlusio)i of flu: Treaty . 71 
 
 had compelled Spain to change her whole plan of war, with 
 the result that her colonies were ill defended ; it had " ob- 
 served neither secrecy, moderation nor neutrality in any re- 
 spect as to the Americans. ... In a matter of so grave 
 importance,"— thus ran the .Spanish arraignment, — " it has 
 followed no swstem or plan, since at one time it worked 
 openly and with great zeal in favor of the Colonies, and at 
 another, had resort to condescensions by no means becoming, 
 on the slightest complaint or insinuation of the British Cabi- 
 net.'" In this light, the temporizing policy of France 
 apjieared to her ally. Spain was not left long in doubt of 
 the outcome of that ]Kjlicy. On January 30, Vergennes 
 wrote to Montmorin that the treaties were practically com- 
 pleted ; and on the sixth of February, the month which, 
 half a year before, \"ergennes had set as a limit l)evond 
 which delay would be disastrous, they were signed and 
 sealed. 
 
 The Treaty of Amity and Conunerce followed, in its main 
 lines, the plan of Congress and the specific modifications 
 contained in the instructions of the Commissioners. The 
 plan provided for nuitual exemption from all duties on im- 
 ports except those wdiich each state required of its own citi- 
 zens. France declined to become a party to this agreement, 
 and the privileges of the most favored nation were substi- 
 tuted, each party reserving liberty to admit other nations to 
 the same advantages. An attempt was made to provide for 
 reciprocal exemptions between the United States and the 
 We.st Indies. This met with objections on the part of one 
 member of the Commission and two of his countrymen who 
 were admitted into the secret. After the di.scussion had done 
 as much harm as possible by exciting ill feeling among the 
 Americans, an effort was made to have the articles in 
 question omitted. They were left untouched, with the un- 
 derstanding that Congress might ratify them or not, w-ithout 
 prejudice to the rest of tlie treaty, and were finally rejected. 
 France reserved her share in the Newfoiuidland fishery, as 
 
 ' Mhnoirt' to be read in Council of Ministers, Jan. 22, 1778. Sparks 
 MvSS., CII. 
 
72 l^^rancc o)id the America )i Revolution. 
 
 stipulated in tlie treaty of Paris ; and each nation renounced 
 the right to fish on the grounds l)eh)nging to the otlier. 
 
 More important to the world at large than tlie commer- 
 cial privileges and fisliing rights conv^eyed by the treaty 
 were the rules which it laid down for the regulation of trade 
 in time of war. The principle that " free ships make free 
 goods" was adopted ; and the term 'contraband' was re- 
 stricted to arms, munitions, accoutrements, and horses.' 
 
 A treaty of defensive alliance" supplemented the commer- 
 cial agreemeut and ensured protection to the trade thereby 
 authorized. The alliance, eventual in its nature as long as 
 Great Britain and France remained at peace, should become 
 actual on the outbreak of hostilities between them, if this 
 occurred during the American war. The aim of the alliance 
 was declared to be, to maintain effectually the libert}', sov- 
 ereignty, and independence of the United States. Kach 
 nation bound itself to attack the enemy separately and, on 
 request, to assist its ally as much as po.ssible. The rights of 
 the two powers to conquests in America were defined : the 
 United States claiming any which they might make in the 
 northern part of America, or the Bermuda Islands ; while 
 France reserved the right to take any of the English islands 
 in or near the Gulf of Mexico. The articles containing 
 the.se reservations were expressed in general terms, although 
 the corresponding passage in the Congressional plan named 
 specifically the territories and islands which the United 
 States desired to possess : among them, Florida, Newfound- 
 land, Cape Breton, and St. Johns. This change caused the 
 same men who protested against the reciprocity articles to 
 suspect that France wished " to leave an opening for nego- 
 tiating Florida into the pos.session of Spain " at a general 
 peace, and for excluding the United States from the islands 
 which command the Newfoundland fisheries.' Their ob- 
 .stinac}' in clinging to this suspicion was a .source of annoy- 
 
 'Secret Journals of Congress, II, ]). 59. 
 
 Mbid., II, p. 82. 
 
 ^ Ralph Izard to Arthur Lee, May 18, 1778. A. Lee to Izard, May 
 23. Izard to Henry Laurens, June 28, vSept. 12. John Adams to Izard, 
 Oct 2. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, pp. 586, 594, 629, 713, 753. 
 
The Conrhtsioii of the Treaty. 73 
 
 aiice to the negotiators at the tune, and has since been treat- 
 ed b}' some of the ablest historians as wholly nnjnstified ; 
 but the instructions given to Gerard, the first French minis- 
 ter to the United vStates, show that France preferred to see 
 F'lorida, at least, in the hands of vSjjain.' 
 
 The parties to the treat)' bound themselves tO' conclude no 
 peace without mutual consent, and not to la\' down their 
 arms until the independence of the United States had been 
 " formally or tacitly" assured. They renounced in advance 
 all claim to compensation. They mutually guaranteed their 
 American possessions ; and France guaranteed the inde- 
 pendence of the United vStates from the moment of a rupture 
 with Kngland or, in case no such breach should occur, from 
 the close of the American war. A separate article gave the 
 King of Spain the right to accede to the treaties at pleasure. 
 
 Vergennes thought at the time of the negotiation that, 
 owing to the natural difficulty of keeping such a secret, the 
 Americans would hear of the treaty by the end of April 
 or the beginning of Ma}' ; so he decided to announce it 
 to England at that time." Rut, before the date set, he 
 began to fear that Congress would not hear of it early 
 enough to prevent them from listening to the British propo- 
 sitions. As news reached America more surely and quickly 
 by way of the English newspapers than when .sent direct 
 from France, he determined to ainiounce the treaty to 
 England even earlier than he had intended. Rumors of 
 the negotiation had reached England before it was concluded, 
 and news of the signing was i)romptly conveyed to the 
 British Cabinet by agents who were always ready to 
 carry reports across the Channel. But the existence of the 
 treaty was positively known to only a few people ; and the 
 doubt thrown upon it by the British Ministry indicated that 
 concealment was desired b}' England and, as a natural con- 
 sequence, that an announcement would be advantageous to 
 France. So the ambassador at London received orders to 
 declare the treaty ; and, for fear that the British govern- 
 
 ' Gerard's In.structions, approved March 29. 177.S. Vergennes lo 
 Gerard, Oct. 26. Doniol, III, pp. 155, 156. 
 
 ' Vergeinies to Montmorin, Jan. 30, 1778. Ibid., II, ]x 791. 
 
74 /''ra?ice and tlic Ameyican Revolution. 
 
 nieiit iniglit conceal the facts, lie was instructed to let noth- 
 ing prev'cnt him from allowing the secret to leak out in 
 private conversation the next daj-.' The announcement 
 was made on the thirteenth of March. The Treaty of 
 Amity and Commerce was communicated with insolent un- 
 concern ; and Ivngiand was informed that France and the 
 United States had also entered into an engagement for the 
 protection of their connnerce.^ Within a week, both Eng- 
 land and France recalled their ambassadors, and war had 
 virtually begun. 
 
 In announcing the treaty so early, France ignored the re- 
 quest of Spain that it be concealed until July, to allow the 
 return of her trooi)s and her treasure-fleet. In this way, 
 another cause of offense was prepared ; but one more was 
 of little consequence, where the points of disagreement were 
 alread}' so many and important. Clearly, if France desired 
 more aid than the minimum secured to her by the Family 
 Compact, she must promote the exorbitant ambition of her 
 ally. With the utmost frankness, d'Aranda had exposed 
 the reason why Spain demanded so many advantages as the 
 price of her a.ssi.stance. Her statesmen feared that, if 
 war should break out and be continued until England 
 made overtures of peace, France would " recjuire Spain to 
 comply also, and to be content with the .same terms;" 
 they believed "that the explanation of the purpo.ses of 
 Spain having preceded, France would be obliged to sustain 
 the undertaking until they should be carried out."' 
 
 By the ratification of the treaties, which took place 
 promptl}' on their arrival in America, France gained two 
 important points : she bound the United States to continue 
 the war until their independence was achieved, and to accept 
 her guaranty. I>ut was it necessary that she should commit 
 lier.self so decisively and, with reference to her other 
 
 ' Vergennesto Monlniorin, March 6, lo, 1778. VergeiinestoNoaillcs, 
 March 10. Doniol, II, pp. 810, 813, 822, 826. 
 2 Ibid., II, p. 823. 
 'DAranda to Florida Blanca, Jan. 31, 1778. .Sparks MSS., CII. 
 
The Coiuii(sio!i of the Treaty. 75 
 
 interests, so preinatureK', in order to seeure the end desired ? 
 In other words, was there innninent danger of peaee between 
 Kngland and Anieriea ? 
 
 It is generally eoneeded that the United .States eonld ncjt 
 have carried the strnggle to a snccessfnl issne withont the 
 aid of France. vSnbniission nnist have come at last ; bnt, 
 for the innnediate pnrpose of connteracting Lord North's 
 Conciliatory Bills, the treaty which \'ergennes rushed to a 
 conclusion without the concurrence of Spain, was super- 
 finous. Lord North's propositions were not so ' conciliatory' 
 as Vergennes' fears led him to believe : they did not hokl in 
 reserve an offer of independence as a last resort. Hurried 
 to America before their first reading in Parliament, they 
 arrived in advance of the French treaty, onl)' to be re- 
 jected.' France might have postponed her decision without 
 serious danger. 
 
 This decision was of fatal consequence to France. The 
 immediate results were not the uio.st serious. The war in 
 which France became involved, her difficult task as guardian 
 of the conflicting interests of the United States and vSpain, 
 the restoration of her prestige at the close of the war, — 
 trials and gains alike tlwindle to incidents, beside the over- 
 throw of her tottering finances and the impulse given to 
 revolutionary sentiment at home. Of this result, Spain had 
 warned her ; England herself had warned her. Ha5)pily 
 for America, most unhappily for her own interests, she was 
 deaf to the warning. "You are arming, imprudent mon- 
 arch ; do you forget in what century, in what circumstances, 
 and over what nation you reign ? . . . The legislators of 
 America are proclaiming themselves disciples of the French 
 philosophers ; they are executing what these have dreamed. 
 Will not the French philosophers a.spire to be legislators in 
 their own country ? Will principles which cannot be bent 
 to English laws accord better with those on which your 
 monarchy is based ? How dangerous to place the flower of 
 your officers in communication with men enthusiastic for 
 liberty ! You will take alarm, but too late, when you hear 
 
 ' Journals of Coiigres.s, II, pp. 521 flf. 
 
76 J '"ranee and the American Revolution . 
 
 repeated in your court vague and specious axioms which 
 they have meditated in the forests of America. . . . Eng- 
 land will be only too well avenged for your hostile designs, 
 when your government is examined, judged, and condemned 
 according to the principles professed at Philadelphia and 
 applauded in >-our cajiital.'" 
 
 ' Retranslated from the French. Quoted from a pamphlet pub- 
 lished in England toward the end of 1777, said to have been inspired 
 by the British Ministry. Lacretelle, //istoire de France, V, p. 82. 
 
A LIST OF Till' AUTHORITIKS CITKI) 
 IN THIS THESIS. 
 
 ■v" Adams, Jf)iiN. The Works of : Willi a lift- of the aullior, notes and 
 illustrations, hy Charles I'rancis Adams. lo vols. Boston. 1.S56. 
 
 Bancroft, C.kokc.]';. History of the United States of America, from 
 the Discovery of the Continent. 6 vols. New York. 1884-5. 
 
 Bancroft, GeorCtIC. Manuscripts. Lenox Library, New York. 
 
 Beaumarchai.s, see Chevallie and Lonienie. 
 
 Capkkicue, J. B. H. R. Louis XVI son Administration et ses Rela- 
 tions Di])lomatiques avec 1' Europe. 4 vols. Bruxelles, 1844. 
 
 Chev.\llie, p. J. Claim of Beaumarchais' Heir against the United 
 States. Washington, 181 7. 
 
 Colleville, Vicomte de. Les Missions Secretes du General-Major 
 Baron de Kalb et son Role dans la Guerre de I'lndepejidance 
 Americaine. Paris, 1855. 
 
 CoNCRESS, see Journals and vSecrel Journals. 
 CorrESPondance Secrete, see de Lescure. 
 Correspondence;, Diplomatic, see Wharton. 
 
 DE.A.NE Papers. Collections of the New York Historical vSociety for 
 the year 1886. New York, 1887. 
 
 DONIOL, Henri. Histoire de la Particii)ation de la P'rance a I'PUa- 
 blissement des Etats-Unis d'Amerique. Correspondance diplo- 
 matique et documents. 5 vols. Paris, 1886-92. 
 
 Durand, John, editor. New Materials for the History of the Ameri- 
 can Revolution. New York, 1889. 
 
 FiSKE, John. The American Revolution. 2 vols. Boston, 1891. 
 
 > Flass.\n, Gae;t.\n de Raxis, Comte de. Histoire Generale et Rai- 
 sonnee de la Diplomatic I'>an9aise, ou de la Politique de la France, 
 deptiis la Fondation de la Monarchie, jusqu' a la Fin du Regne de 
 Louis XVL 7 vols. Paris, 1811-29. 
 
 Franklin, The Complete Works of. John Bigelow, editor. 10 
 vols. New York and London, 1887-8. 
 
 Fr.\nklin, see Parton. 
 
78 France and the American Revohition . 
 
 ^' Journals OK riiK AMiiKiCAN CoNGKivSS. From 1774 to 177S. 4 vols. 
 Washington, 1S23. 
 
 Kalb, see Collevillc and Kapp. 
 
 Kapp, I'kihdrich. The Ijfe of John Kalb, Major-Gcneral in the 
 Revolutionary Army. New York, 18S4. 
 
 Lacrktki,LK, Charij-;s. Histoirede I'-rance jicndant Ic Dix-huitieme 
 Siecle. 6 vols. Paris, iSio. 
 
 Laka\}';ttic, Memoirs, Correspondence and IManiiscripts of. Pub- 
 lished 1)3' his family. New York, 1837. 
 
 Leckv, \V. E. H. a History of England in the Eighteenth Century. 
 8 vols. New York, 1878. 
 
 Lee, Arthur. See Lee, Charles Henry and Richard Henry. 
 
 LKK, Charles Henry. A Vindication of Arthur Lee, Former Rep- 
 resentative of the Province of Massachusetts Ba}', at London. 
 Richmond, Va., 1894. 
 
 Lee, Richard Henry. Life of Arthur Lee. 2 vols. Boston, 1829. 
 
 Lescures, M. F. a. de. Corre.spondance Secrete Inedite sur Louis 
 XVL Marie Antoinette, la Cour, et la Ville, de 1777 a 1792. 2 
 vols. Paris, 1866. 
 
 LOMrCNiE, Louis de. Beaumarchais and his Times. vSketches of 
 French society in the eighteenth century, from unpublished doc- 
 uments. Translated by Henry S. Edwards. 4 vols. London, 
 1856. 
 
 Mahon, Lord. (Stanhope.) History of England from the Peace of 
 Utrecht to the Peace of Versailles. 7 vols. London, 1851. 
 
 Manuscripts, see Bancroft, Sparks and Stevens. 
 
 Memoirs, see Lafayette, S6gur, Soulavie, and Vergennes. 
 
 Parkman, P^r.^nCIS. A Half-Century of Conflict. 2 vols. Boston, 
 
 1893. 
 Parton, J.\mes. Life and Times of Benjamin Franklin. 2 vols. 
 
 Boston. 
 Secret Journals ok the Acts and Procep;dings of Congress. 
 
 2 vols. Boston, 1820-1821. 
 
 SEGUR, Louis Philippe, LE Comtp: de. Memoires ou Souvenirs et 
 Anecdotes. 2 vols. Paris, 1S44. 
 
 SEGUR, Louis Philippe, l'Aine. Politique de Tons les Cabinets de 
 I'Europe, pendant les Regnes de Louis XV et de Louis XVI. 3, 
 vols. Paris, 1801. 
 
.1 It //i or /firs Cift'd i)i this Thesis. 79 
 
 Sorr.Aviic, JivAX I, oris, i/AIni;. Memoires Historiqucs el Poliliques 
 (hi RC'i^iie (le I/niis XVI, depuis son Manage jus(iu' a sa Mori. 
 Paris, I. Sol. 
 
 Sp.\RK.S, Jarkd. Manuscripts. Uhrary of Harvard I'niversilv. 
 
 Stevens, B. F. Ivicsiniiles of Manuscripts in P<uro])eaii .Vrchives 
 Relating to .Vmerica, 1773-1783. 23 vols. 1889-1S95. 
 
 TuRC.cvr, OicuvKES. I'kliteurs, Eugene Daire el lIii)])olyte Dnssard. 
 2 vols. Paris, 1S44. 
 
 Vercennes, Memoiriv Hi.stokiou]'; et Por.iriouE sur i^a L,oi;isi- 
 
 ANE. 
 
 Wharton, Francis, editor. The Revolutionary Diplomatic Corre- 
 s{)ondence of the United States. 6 vols. Washington, 1889. 
 
 Witt, Cornicus de. Thomas Jefferson. l<;tude liistorique sur la 
 Democralie Americaine. I'aris. 1861. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Adams, John, advises Dfclaration 
 of Iiulepeiidencc and treaties 
 with foreign powers, 1 7 ; inein- 
 ber of Committee on plan of 
 treaty, wishes commercial treaty 
 only, 43 ; objects to alliance, 50. 
 
 Adams, Samuel, advises Declara- 
 tion of Inde])endence, 17. 
 
 AigLiillon, d', foreign jiolicy of, 1 1. 
 
 Alliance between I-'raJice and 
 America, nieasnres leading to, 
 advocated in 176.S, ro ; not de- 
 sired by S])ain, 39 ; considered 
 by Vergennes, 39, 44 ; nrged by 
 Beaumarchais, 41 ; objections of 
 Vergennes and Grimaldi, 4S ; of- 
 fered by Congress, 49 ; France 
 wishes proposals for, 60 ; nature 
 of, actual or eventual, 63, 65, 70 ; 
 Florida Blanca objects to, 67 ; 
 terms of, 72. .SV'^ Treaty. 
 
 .Ambassadors, motion to send to 
 France, 17 ; withdrawn l)y En- 
 gland and France, 74. 
 
 Ainphitiite, 33-34. 
 
 Aranda, d", 39, 40, 46, 74. 
 
 Armaments, a causeof jealousy, 5.S. 
 
 Beaumarchais, collects informa- 
 tion, 19 ; urges the King to aid 
 America, 19, 21 ; replies to Lord 
 Rochford, 25 ; advises a loan 
 to the Americans, 26; receives 
 1,000,000 livres from F'rench 
 Treasury, 27 ; agreement with 
 Deanc, 31 ; obtains supplies from 
 royal arsenals, 32 ; advises send- 
 ing bVench officers to America, 
 32 ; sends cargoes to America, 
 32, 33 ; receives money from 
 vSpain and France, 34 ; claim 
 against United vStates, 34-37 ; 
 plan for aiding Americans, 36 ; 
 desires recognition of Ameri- 
 cans, 41 ; connnent on capitula- 
 tion of Burgoyne, 61. 
 
 Bermuda Islands, right of conquest 
 reserved to United Stales, 72. 
 
 Bonvouloir, instructions, 16; sails 
 for America, 17 ; meets the Com- 
 mittee of vSecret Correspondence, 
 18 ; report reaches France, 21. 
 
 British Ministry, measures dis- 
 please American Colonists, ^ ; 
 distrusted by Vergennes, 14 ; 
 protest against ])rohibited trade, 
 20 ; may desire foreign war, 23 ; 
 to be cajoled, 23 ; learn secrets 
 of French Cabinet, 51-52 ; pro- 
 test against tolerance of Ameri- 
 can privateers, 55 ; demand re- 
 versal of policy, 57 ; conduct, a 
 cause of satisfaction to Vergen- 
 nes, 64 ; change of policj- feared, 
 73 ; throw doubt on I'rench 
 treaty, 73. 
 
 Burgoyne's capitulation, 59 ; effect 
 on French Ministry, 60. 
 
 Canada, effect of cession to En- 
 gland, I, 2; mentioned in Bon- 
 voidoir's instructions, 16 ; de- 
 mand for retrocession consid- 
 ered, 52, 54 ; King will not aid 
 Americans to conquer, 69. 
 
 Chase, of Maryland, moves to send 
 ambassadors to France, 17. 
 
 Chatelet, du, discusses American 
 aft'airs with Choi.seul, 8, 9 ; plans 
 informal connnercial agreement 
 with Americans, 10. 
 
 Chatham, Uord, 63, 68. 
 
 Choiseul, enmity toward England, 
 3, 4, 1 1 ; alliances with Austria 
 and Spain, 4 ; sends agents to 
 America, 5, 7 ; hints at new plans 
 with reference to America, 6 ; 
 predicts American Revolution, 
 7 ; receives de Kalb coldly, 9 ; 
 reconmiends commercial rela- 
 tions with Americans, 1 1 ; goes 
 into exile, 1 1 ; opposes Vergen- 
 nes, 41 ; policy, 52. 
 
 Colonies, Turgot's views of, 23-24. 
 
 Commercial intercourse between 
 French and American citizens 
 proposed by Frances and du 
 Chatelet, 10 ; approved by Coun- 
 cil, II ; opposed by Spain, 11 ; 
 existence of, known, 19; British 
 protests against, 25. 
 
 Commis-sioners to France, appoint- 
 ed, 44 ; audience with Vergennes, 
 46 ; dissensions, 46 ; popularity, 
 
82 
 
 Index. 
 
 47 ; submit proposed treat}' to 
 Vergennes, 47 ; additional in- 
 structions, 48 ; urge I'rance to 
 declare war, 49 ; personal pledge 
 of, 49 ; expect war, 5 1 ; Vergen- 
 nes complains of, 57 ; ask loan, 
 58 ; congratulated l)y King. 60 ; 
 request answer to their ])roposals, 
 61, 64; important conferences 
 with Gerard, 65, 69 ; answer 
 question about Congress, 70 ; 
 deliberate on the treaties, 70. 
 
 Connnittee of Foreign Affairs, 65. 
 
 Committee of Secret Correspond- 
 ence, formation of, 17; instruc- 
 tions to Arthur Lee, 17 ; to 
 Charles Dumas, 18; appoint Silas 
 Deane commercial and political 
 agent, 30. 
 
 Committee to draw up plan of 
 treaties, 43. 
 
 Congress, Continental, delegates 
 elected, 14 ; debates on inde- 
 pendence and foreign alliances, 
 17; Heaumarchais writes to, 32; 
 said to be treating with Howe, 
 33 ; Resolution of May 15, 37 ; 
 debates on alliance, 43 ; relieved 
 by French loan, 49; offers alli- 
 ance to France, 49 ; inducements 
 to France and vSpain, 50 ; author- 
 izes capture of British vessels, 
 54 ; measures necessary to pre- 
 vent from making peace, 69-70. 
 See Committee. 
 
 Contraband, defined in Treaty of 
 i77«, 72. 
 
 De.-\ne, Sil.\s, sent to France by 
 Committee of Secret Correspond- 
 ence, 30 ; instructions, 31 ; audi- 
 ence with \'ergennes, 31 ; agree- 
 ment with Beaumarchais, 32 ; 
 announces Resolution of May 
 15, 37 ; memorial on American 
 trade, 37 ; asks recognition for 
 Uniled vStates, 41 ; joint Com- 
 missioner to France, 44 ; notifies 
 l-'rance of Declaration of Inde- 
 pendence, 44 ; interviews with 
 British agent, 64. See Commis- 
 sioners. 
 
 Declaration of Independence, de- 
 sired by John and vSamuel Adams, 
 17 ; delay in receiving news of, 
 33 ,41 ; Resolution of May 15. 37 ; 
 feared by cautious members of 
 Congress, 43 ; ofiicial announce- 
 
 ment, 44 ; influence on public 
 opinion in France, 44. 
 
 Deputies. See Conmiissioners. 
 
 Dubourg, obtains aid for America, 
 26. 
 
 Dumas, instructed by Committee 
 of Secret Correspondence, 18 ; 
 requests mediation of France, 30. 
 
 Durand, di.scusses effect of a revo- 
 lution in America, 5 ; cultivates 
 Franklin's acquaintance, 6; 
 thinks revolution will be grad- 
 ual, 6. 
 
 Famii.v Compact, Third, 4, 22, 74. 
 
 Farmers General, ap]:)roached by 
 Dubourg, 27 ; contract with 
 American Commissioners, 51. 
 
 Florida, Vergennes tempts Spain 
 with, 62 ; suspicion that France 
 wished Spain to possess, 72 ; evi- 
 dence, 73. 
 
 Florida Blanca, plan of interven- 
 tion in American quarrel, 53 ; 
 suggests recovery of territory, 
 54 ; anger at French policy, 67 ; 
 thinks peace between England 
 and America unlikely, 67. 
 
 Franklin, Benjamin, suspicious of 
 France, 6 ; receives friendly hint 
 from Garnier, 15 ; member of 
 Conmiittee on plan of treaty, 43 ; 
 joint Commissioner to France, 
 44 ; arrives in Paris, 46 ; popu- 
 larity, 47 ; negotiates with the 
 Ministry, 66. ..S't'^ Conmiissioners. 
 
 G.\RNiHR, 14, 15. 
 
 Gerard, endorses Beaumarchais, 
 31 ; receives explanation from 
 Vergennes, 36 ; gives informa- 
 tion about Beaumarchais, 37 ; re- 
 ports King's decision to Com- 
 missioners, 65 ; statement about 
 separate peace, 65 ; draws up 
 plan of treaty, 66 ; important 
 conference with Commissioners, 
 69 ; instructions, on Florida, 73. 
 
 Germaine, Lord, 63. 
 
 Germaiitown, Battle of, impresses 
 Vergennes, 62. 
 
 (ribraltar, desired by Spain, 56. 
 
 Grand, statement about supplies 
 sent by Beaumarchais, 35. 
 
 Grimaldi, suggests attack on Kn- 
 gland, 22 ; objects to American 
 alliance, 48. 
 
 Guaranties in Treaty of 1778, 73. 
 
Index. 
 
 83 
 
 Guaranty of American rights by 
 France and Spain, suggested bj- 
 \'ergennes, 56 ; apj^roved by 
 Spain, 56 ; no hope of, through 
 Commissioners, 57 ; Holker's in- 
 structions on, 59 ; proposed as 
 part of treaty, 63 ; offer of, with- 
 out treaty, useless, 68. 
 
 Guines, de, 15, 16. 
 
 Gulf of Mexico, islaiuls near, right 
 of coiu|uest reserved to hVance, 
 72. 
 
 IlENRV, Patrick, predicts alH- 
 ance with France, Spain, and 
 Holland, 17. 
 
 Holker, instructions of, 59-61. 
 
 Independence of the United 
 States, foreseen, i, 2, 5, 6, 9 ; 
 interest of France in, 5, 7, 10, 11, 
 20 ; mentioned in Bonvouloir's 
 instructions, 16 ; advantage of 
 recognizing, 6r ; King ready to 
 acknowledge, 65 ; Vergennes as- 
 serts, 68 ; France anxious to se- 
 cure, 69 ; object of alliance of 
 1778, 72 ; guaranteed, 73. See 
 Declaration. 
 
 Jamaica, 40. 
 
 Jefferson, Thomas, declines a]:)- 
 
 pointment as joint Commissioner 
 
 to France, 44. 
 Jerseys, retreat through, effect on 
 
 Congress, 49. 
 
 Kalb, de, secret mission to Ameri- 
 ca, 7 ; reports, 7-8 ; cold recep- 
 tion on return, g. 
 
 Lafayette, comment on Choi- 
 seul's treatment of de Kalb, 9 ; 
 goes to America, 42 ; criticizes 
 Vergennes, 53. 
 
 Lee, Arthur, instructed by Com- 
 mittee of Secret Correspondence, 
 17 ; interviews with French am- 
 bassador, 30 ; statements bearing 
 on Keaumarchais claim, 35, 36 ; 
 joint Commissioner to France, 
 44 ; arrives in Paris, 46 ; goes to 
 Spain, 53. See Commissioners. 
 
 Loan, by France, 49 ; requested and 
 refused, 50 ; obtained from I'\'irm- 
 ers General, 51 ; requested bv 
 Congress, 58. See Subsidy. 
 
 Long Lsland, Battle of, effect on 
 French Ministry, 33, 40, 41. 
 
 Louis XVL character, 13 ; Coiuicil, 
 13 ; opposes ])lans of lieaumar- 
 chais, 19 ; approves Vergennes' 
 iiieiiioire on America, 24 ; influ- 
 enced b\- public o]Mnion, 42-43 ; 
 advised by Grimaldi, 48 ; author- 
 izes overtures to Commissioners, 
 60 ; resolved to recognize Ameri- 
 can indej)endence,65 '. intentions 
 as to separate peace, 65; personal 
 letter to King of Si)ain, 68 ; in- 
 tentions rejiorted to Commis- 
 sioners, 69. 
 
 Mauri; I'AS, character, 13 ; replies 
 to British complaint, 20 ; iirged 
 to attack England, 39 ; remark 
 on inflvience of ]iublic opinion, 
 42 ; conversation with Lord Stor- 
 mont, 58 ; congratulates Ccnn- 
 missioners, 60. 
 
 Mediation between Kngland and 
 America, requested of France by 
 Dumas, and refused, 30 ; sug- 
 gested 1)}' Florida Blanca, 53 ; 
 idea rejected by Vergennes, 53, 
 68 ; Spain willing to offer, 67. 
 
 Merchants, interested in American 
 success, 42. 
 
 Military class, republican theories, 
 enthusiasm for America, 42. 
 
 Minorca, 40. 
 
 Montmorin, 63, 67, 71. 
 
 Neutrality, advised by Turgot, 
 24 ; considered by I'rench Min- 
 istry, 52. 
 
 Neutrals, rights of, 38 ; under 
 Treaty of 1778, 72. 
 
 Newfoundland fishery, in Treaty 
 of 1778, 71 ; suspicion that France 
 wished to exclude United States 
 from, 72. 
 
 North, Lord, 63 ; annoiuices plan 
 of reconciliation, 65 ; likely to 
 cause war with France, 68 ; terms 
 rejected by Congress, 75. 
 
 Officers, French, sent to America 
 by advice of Beaumarchais, 32. 
 Ossun, d', 47, 48. 
 
 Pai'KR money, 49. 
 
 Personal pledge of Connnis.sioners, 
 
 49- 
 
84 
 
 Index. 
 
 Philosophers, sympathize with 
 Americans, 42. 
 
 Pontleroy, mission to America, 5. 
 
 Portugal, French co-operation in 
 conquest of, desired by Spain, 
 22, 39 ; Congress offers to declare 
 war against, 50. 
 
 Privateering, American, 54 ; British 
 demands for its repression, 57 ; 
 these demands not official, 58. 
 
 Public opinion in favor of Ameri- 
 cans, 41 ; effect on I-Vench Min- 
 istry, 42, 52. 
 
 yuEEN, sym])athizes with Ameri- 
 cans, 42. 
 
 Ratification of Treaty oi' i 77S, 
 
 74- 
 
 Rayneval. Memorial on the Ameri- 
 can question, 20. 
 
 Reconeiliation between luigland 
 and America, fear of, 8, 23, 33, 
 40, 51. 55- 5«> 61-65, 68, 73, 75. 
 
 Rochford, Lord, 15, 19, 25. 
 
 Rodrique Hortalez and Companv, 
 26. 
 
 Secret agents sent to America, 
 unknown officer, i ; Pontleroy, 
 5 ; de Kail), 7 ; Bonvouloir, 16 ; 
 Holker, 59. 
 
 Secret Cabinet of Louis XV, ])lans 
 invasion of England, 5. 
 
 Secret proposals of peace from 
 p;ngland, 51, 64. 
 
 Separate Article, Treaty of 1778, 73. 
 
 vSeparatc peace, Commissioners re- 
 solve to stipulate against, 49 ; 
 King's intentions, 65 : forbidden 
 Vjy treaty, 73. 
 
 vSpain, enters Family Compact, 4 ; 
 warlike spirit aroused, 4 ; objects 
 to trade relations with English 
 Colonies, 1 1 ; desires aid of 
 France against Portugal, and 
 war with England, 22 ; willing 
 to aid Americans, 24 ; fear of 
 England, 28 ; desires territory, 
 28, 54, 70 ; entrusts money to 
 Beaumarchais, 34 ; wishes war 
 with England, 39 ; objects to 
 American alliance, 39, 48, 67 ; 
 postpones war, 40 ; rejects ad- 
 vances of Congress, 50 ; proposes 
 offer of mediation, 53 ; wishes to 
 guarantee American rights, 56 ; 
 refuses to declare war, 56; wishes 
 
 Gibraltar, 56 ; irritation at priva- 
 teers, 58 ; sendsagent to America, 
 59 ; refuses to fix amount of sub- 
 sidy, 59 ; criticism of France, 70- 
 71 ; right to accede to Treaty of 
 '77''^- 73 i requests concealment 
 of Treaty, 74 ; reason for de- 
 mands, 74. 
 
 Stamp Act, 5, 6. 
 
 Stormont, Lord, persuaded that 
 I'rance wishes peace, 20 ; pro- 
 tests against Beaumarchais' ship- 
 ments, 33 ; threatens to leave, 
 46 ; discovers secrets of French 
 Cabinet, 52 ; avoids an ultima- 
 tum, 58. 
 
 Subsidy to Americans, 59. See 
 Beaumarchais. 
 
 TicONDEROCA, abandonment of, 
 
 5«. 
 
 Treaty of 1763, 3, 28. 
 
 Treaty of 1778, Congressional plan, 
 43-44 ; resolved on by French 
 Cabinet and King, 61-62 ; wishes 
 of France concerning, 68 ; sub- 
 mitted to Commissioners, de- 
 bated, accepted, 70; signed, 71 ; 
 terms of, 71-73 ; announced, 74 ; 
 ratified, 74 ; consequences to 
 France, 75. 
 
 Turgot, minister of finance, 13 ; 
 views aV)out colonies, 23 ; advises 
 neutrality, 24 ; is dismissed, 27. 
 
 Vergennes, predicts result of ces- 
 sion of Canada, 2 ; policy of de- 
 ception, 3 ; enters Cabinet, 12 ; 
 previous career, 13 ; distrust of 
 England, 14; foresees American 
 independence, 15 ; advises de- 
 fensive measures against En- 
 gland and concessions to Ameri- 
 cans, 16 ; replies to British com- 
 plaint, 20 ; advises aid for Ameri- 
 cans, 22-23 ; forVjids exportation 
 of arms to America, 25 ; explains 
 his motives, 28 ; receives Deane, 
 31 ; letter on manner of helping 
 Americans, 35 ; statements about 
 supplies for America, 36-37 ; re- 
 fuses information to United 
 States government. 37 ; justifies 
 reception of Deane, 38 ; proposes 
 war as auxiliary of Spain, 39 ; 
 guards against continental war, 
 40 ; motives, 43 ; outlines j)olicy 
 of France, 45 ; audience to Com- 
 
Index. 
 
 85 
 
 inissioners, 46 ; opinion of their 
 proposals, 47 ; rejilies to tlicin, 
 48 ; olijecliun to American alli- 
 anct', 48 ; fears effect of T5ritish 
 pro])osals, 51 ; ex])ects war, 51 ; 
 iiieinonal on Canada ami Louisi- 
 ana, 52 ; ])olicy of comjiromise, 
 53 ; opposes S])anish proposals, 
 53; checks American ]irivateers, 
 55 ; wishes early dale for war, 
 55 ; desires American alliance, 
 ,s6, 62 ; sn,<^,tjests and plans for 
 guaranty of American rights, 56 ; 
 criticizes I)e])ulies, 57 ; pre])ares 
 to refuse British demands, and 
 expects war, 57 ; advises sn])sidv 
 
 to Americans, 58; discusses terms 
 of treaty, 62; glad that British 
 Ministry i-aunot grant independ- 
 ence, 64 ; informsCommissioners 
 that the King will treat, 65 ; re- 
 monstrates with Spain, 67-68 ; 
 states wishes of I'Vance concern- 
 ing treaty, 68 ; annoyed at Ameri- 
 can demands, 70 ; reasons for an- 
 nouncing treaty, 73. 
 
 Wkntworth, 64. 
 
 West Indies, King will not helji 
 Americans conquer, 69 ; discus- 
 sion of duties on products, 71. 
 
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