o * « ^^^^ ^0^ < O \v ^^ •'" ^^ ^ *•••' -r^ ^ ♦ ^'% ' ^o <>* 4.*^ *> ^^c-^ s*^ ♦* X.. tf> ^^ 'I^^^^o* .««-' .^^^ ^^^ ." *<^ * I Our Military History > « •^llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll'IIIIHIIIIIIIIIIlllllllllllllllllHIIIIIIHlHHIIIIIIIIII'MIMtf ^lllllllllllllllllllllillllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllltllllillllllllllilllllllillllllllllllllllillllililllllllllllllllllMlllfrT UA^J^^^L^ Our Military History Its Fads and Fallacies By Leonard Wood Major General, U. S. Army Chicago The Reilly 8C Britton Co Copyright, 1916 By The Reilly & Britton Co. Our MilitaryHj^tory m IM9I6 ©GI.A431016 FOREWORD Panic patriotism appears from time to time when the clouds of possible trouble loom up heavier than usual. There is much discussion, some fever- ish activity, but little accomplishment. Adequate national preparedness on sound lines will be secured only when there is a general appreciation of its vital importance for defense and of the further fact that it can not be impro- vised or done in a hurry. It includes both moral and material organization. Military preparedness, which in- cludes preparation on land and sea, should go hand and hand with a nation's policy. Our policy is not one of aggression, but one which looks only Foreword to a secure defense. Consequently, the arrangements for our military estab- lishment should be limited to the needs of a secure and certain national defense against any force which may be brought against us. A brief review of our past military policy, its shortcomings and cost, may aid in establishing an appreciation of our needs. CONTENTS I The Cost of Unprepared- ness 9 II The Struggle for Peace. 31 III Past National Policy. ... 55 TV Lessons of the Revolution 87 V Seventy Years of Ineffi- ciency 122 VI The Price of Unprepared- ness in the Sixties. ... 149 VII The Value of Prepared- ness 168 VIII What We Should Do... 193 IX Constructive Work of the Army 227 Appendix 228 The Australian System 228 The Swiss System 236 Our Military History chapter i The Cost of Unpreparedness "Our culture must, therefore, not | omit the arming of the man." ! — Emerson. Wars and rumors of wars world- wide in extent have aroused to an unusual degree the interest of the American people in their own military problems, especially the question of national defense, including, as it must, the organization of national resources. There is a failure on the part of our people to appreciate the defects of our military organization in the past, 9 OUR MILITARY HISTORY and a tendency growing out of this state of misinformation as to what has been really done, to continue to place too much dependence upon a military policy found gravely defective, even to the extent of endangering success and in most instances making it unnec- essarily costly. There is still a general lack of appreciation of the fact that military operations, in order to be effective, must be conducted by highly trained, well organized and equipped forces, and that such training, organization and equipment require much time and must be accompanied by an organization of industrial resources, all in complete readiness in advance of the day of trouble. There is a general tendency to con- sider that our geographical position 10 COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS renders us secure from invasion and that our numbers, resources and wealth would be a secure defense if we should be attacked. These very dangerous misconceptions are largely due to a failure on the part of our educational institutions, public and private, to teach properly our military history, and espe- cially to their failure to present that side of it which relates to the methods employed in the conduct of our mili- tary establishment in the past. With few exceptions, the teaching of the military history of our country has not been such as to give the people a correct idea of our military achieve- ments or of the conditions under which military operations have been con- ducted. As a rule, students leave school, and even college, not only with superficial knowledge, but often with 11 OUR MILITARY HISTORY entirely incorrect ideas concerning our achievements in war. They know Httle or nothing of the system under which we have raised and maintained our armies, still less of the unnecessary cost in life and treasure which has charac- terized the conduct of our wars, or the reasons therefor. Only too often the real facts of our failures are overlooked and the account of our successes exag- gerated. The schools teach the dates of battles and the names of the com- manding generals, but nothing of the organization which determined the effi- ciency of military operations in our various wars. The natural result has been an unwarranted degree of confidence, a confidence which has grown into a belief that we always have been easily successful in war; that, in the language 12 COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS of the Fourth of July orator, we can defeat a world in arms. The effect of this lack of sound information is not limited by any means to those in pri- vate life, but too often characterizes the remarks of those in places of trust and responsibility who should know better. The result of this general failure to teach correctly our military history, and of the resulting mis- information concerning it, is seen in the general lack of interest in our military situation, ignorance of the most elementary facts concerning our military establishment, its organization, strength, equipment and needs. There is a lack of information also as to the nation's resources in men and material, both mechanical and chemi- cal. Americans are unaware that this country is depending upon sea control 13 OUR MILITARY HISTORY for many of these, and are uninformed as to the time required to make arms and ammunition. Intelligent public interest in adequate preparedness has been so long dormant, and ignorance of the need of it is so general, that our people do not appreciate how many links in our industrial and chemical chain are wanting, how many breaks are tied together with string, how helpless the nation would be in certain lines of endeavor without these missing necessities. They are cheerfully confident that an untrained American is as effective in war as a highly trained and equally well educated foreigner of equal phys- ical strength and intelligence. There is a lack of appreciation of the fact that willingness does not mean fitness or ability. This condition of mind is 14 COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS undoubtedly ascribable to the fact that we have been actively engaged in mat- ters in no way relating to our military establishment, an immense work has been accomplished in developing our resources. We are entitled to credit for what we have done, and we can justly take much pride in it. We now need pitiless pubhcity as to the defects in our military system, organization and resources, which have characterized them and endangered our safety in all our past wars. The general lack of information and interest in military matters is the result of various causes; but first and fore- most is the want of sound teaching of our national history, especially its mili- tary side, and an unwarranted sense of security because of our assumed inaccessibility. It is also due in a 15 OUR MILITARY HISTORY measure to our rapid expansion, accom- panied by the development of our vast resources. We have unconsciously- come to look upon the size, wealth and population of our country as sufficient protection, forgetting that without the organization of our resources and the training of our men these will be of little value against lesser forces well organized and prepared, and ignoring also the further fact that valuable ter- ritory, great wealth, and commercial aggressiveness, accompanied by weak arrangements for defense, are always an incentive to attack. For many years after the Civil War we had a large, well-trained, though unorganized, reserve of officers and men who had seen service. This fact gave us for many years a sense of security which was well justified. 16 COST OF UNPREPAREDN^ESS Gradually this reserve of well-trained men has passed away. The Spanish War gave little train- ing, as did the Philippine insurrection. Campaigns of this kind are of limited value as a preparation for war with an organized, prepared power. Our reserves to-day are reserves in name only and consist of those trained but unhsted and unlocated men who have served in our army and have gone back into the mass of the people, forgotten and unheeded, valuable material lost. Their number is only a fraction in comparison with the well-trained alien reservists living in this country but owing military obligation to their home countries. The balance of our reserve consists of the wholly untrained and unprepared men of our population, of little military value until trained. 17 OUR MILITARY HISTORY The general failure to impress upon our people the defects, weakness and unreliability of our militia and volun- teer systems in the past, has resulted in an unwarranted degree of depen- dency upon them as reliable instru- ments of defense, a dependence which is not warranted by careful study of the real facts of our military history; a dependence which, if continued, will cost us dearly in case of war with an organized military power of the first class. The spirit of the officers and men who served under these systems, and are now serving under one of them, is good, but neither of the systems will stand the test of war with an organized and trained force. They will crumple up at the first heavy impact of such a force. The reason will not be the 18 COST OF UNPREPAREDN'ESS physical or moral deficiency of the men, but the fact that they will be un- trained. If all great nations were trusting to military props of the type of these, the condition as to possible defense would not be so serious, but even in this case the waste of life in camp and field from ignorance of the proper care of men and lack of train- ing for leading them in action, should condemn these systems on the ground of plain humanity/ The danger of depending on these systems or upon either one of them should be made clear to our people in order that their support may be had in establishing a sound policy, one which ^ Every American should read Emory Up- ton's Military Policy of the United States, and follow it up with Huidekoper's work, which brings the statement of our military policy, or lack of it, up to date. 19 OUR MILITARY HISTORY will give the largest measure of insur- ance against war, one which will, if war be forced upon us, enable us to conduct it with the minimum loss of life. We have no right to employ the services of loyal and willing men under a system which insures the maximum loss of life and the minimum of success, a system which has been condemned by military experts the world over, including our own. A continuance of these systems, or either one of them, invites attack and greatly increases the probability of defeat. The real facts of our mili- tary history make these conclusions so absolutely clear that he who runs may read. " In time of peace prepare for war! " This was the advice of George Wash- ington. It was drawn from the expe- rience of all time. The advice was 20 COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS sound and conservative when given. It is of even more importance to-day, for the reason that organization, prepara- tion, rapidity of transportation, have all tremendously increased the rapidity of the onset of modern war. There is nothing particularly new in the condition of the world to-day, so far as our own situation is concerned, as the following extracts from the messages of the early presidents indi- cate. As one reads them he cannot fail to be impressed with the fact that with the change of a word here and there they are as applicable to condi- tions to-day as when written. On December 3, 1799, President John Adams, in his third annual address, spoke as follows: " At a period like the present, when momentous changes are occurring and 21 OUR MILITARY HISTORY every hour is preparing new and great events in the political world, when a spirit of war is prevalent in almost every nation with whose affairs the interests of the United States have any connection, unsafe and precarious would be our situation were we to neglect the means of maintaining our just rights. The result of the mission to France is uncertain; but however it may terminate, a steady perseverance in a system of national defense com- mensurate with our resources and the situation of our country is an obvious dictate of wisdom; for, remotely as we are placed from the belligerent nations, and desirous as we are, by doing jus- tice to all, to avoid off*ense to any, nothing short of the power of repelling aggressions will secure to our coun- try a rational prospect of escaping 22 COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS the calamities of war or national degradation." A few years later, December 3, 1805, in his fifth annual message, President Thomas Jefferson said: " In reviewing these injuries from some of the belligerent powers, the moderation, the firmness and the wis- dom of the Legislature will all be called into action. We ought still to hope that time and a more correct esti- mate of interest, as well as of char- acter, will produce the justice we are bound to expect. But should any nation deceive itself by false calcula- tions, and disappoint that expectation, we must join in the unprofitable con- test of trying which party can do the other the most harm. Some of these injuries may perhaps admit a peace- able remedy. Where that is competent 23 OUR MILITARY HISTORY it is always the most desirable. But some of them are of a nature to be met by force only, and all of them may lead to it. I can not, therefore, but recommend such preparations as circumstances call for." Two years later, on October 27, 1807, in his seventh annual message, Jefferson made the following state- ments : " Circumstances, fellow citizens, which seriously threatened the peace of our country have made it a duty to convene you at an earlier period than usual. The love of peace so much cherished in the bosoms of our citizens, which has so long guided the proceed- ings of their public councils and induced forbearance under so many wrongs, may not insure our continu- ance in the quiet pursuits of industry. 24 COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS The many injuries and depredations committed on our commerce and navi- gation upon the high seas for years past, the successive innovations on those principles and usage of nations as the rule of their rights and peace, and all the circumstances which induced the extraordinary mission to London are already known to you. " Under the acts of March 11 and April 23, respecting arms, the difficulty of procuring them from abroad during the present situation and dispositions of Europe, induced us to direct our whole efforts to the means of internal supply. The public factories have therefore been enlarged, additional machineries erected, and, in proportion as artificers can be found or formed, their effect, already more than doubled, may be increased so as to keep pace with the 25 OUR MILITARY HISTORY yearly increase of the militia. The annual sums appropriated by the latter act have been directed to the encour- agement of private factories of arms, and contracts have been entered into with individual undertakers to nearly the amount of the first year's appro- priation." On February 18, 1815, President James Madison, in a special message, said: " Experience has taught us that neither the pacific dispositions of the American people nor the pacific char- acter of their political institutions can altogether exempt them from that strife which appears beyond the ordi- nary lot of nations to be incident to the actual period of the world, and the same faithful monitor demonstrates that a certain degree of preparation 26 COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS for war is not only indispensable to avert disasters in the onset, but affords also the best security for the contin- uance of peace." And on December 5, 1815, in his seventh annual message, Madison wrote as follows: " Notwithstanding the security for future repose which the United States ought to find in their love of peace and their constant respect for the rights of other nations, the character of the times particularly inculcates the lesson that, whether to prevent or repel danger, we ought not to be unprepared for it. This consideration will sufficiently recom- mend to Congress a liberal provision for the immediate extension and grad- ual completion of the works of defense, both fixed and floating, on our mari- time frontier, and an adequate provi- 27 OUR MILITARY HISTORY sion for guarding our inland frontier against dangers to which certain por- tions of it may continue to be exposed." The foregoing are quoted at some length for the purpose of pointing out that there is nothing new in the advice which is being given us for prepara- tion. The general conditions under which nations live always render ade- quate preparation necessary, and our country is no exception to the rule. We stand to-day after a period of a hundred years as we shall probably stand a hundred years hence, in a position that renders adequate meas- ures of defense absolutely necessary, if we consider our institutions and our rights worth defending, and are to defend them successfully against pow- erful adversaries. Our presidents throughout the entire 28 COST OF UNPREPAREDNESS period of our national life have con- stantly warned our people with refer- ence to preparedness, not only as a measure necessary for the successful conduct of war, but more often as a means of preventing war. International relations are in a little less precarious condition in these days, speaking of the world at large, because the telegraph, the wireless, and rapid transmission of dispatches to all por- tions of the world, make full and prompt explanation of misunderstand- ings possible. On the other hand, rapid transport and complete organiza- tion make preparation even more necessary, as less time is given to pre- pare after war is decided upon. Earnest efforts have been made for arbitration and the maintenance of world peace, but, as present conditions 29 OUR MILITARY HISTORY indicate, success is still remote, and every nation, while striving for peace, must make adequate preparation to defend its life. 30 1 CHAPTEE II ; The Struggle for Peace "But in demonstrating by our con- duct that we do not fear war in the necessary protection of our rights and honor_, we should give no room to infer that we abandon the desire of peace. An efficient preparation for war can alone secure peace." — John Adams t Second Annual Message. J There is nothing new in the move- ment for peace. It is centuries old. Men have dreamed of it since they had things of value to hold. Women have prayed for it through the ages. Good people have looked forward to the day of peace and tranquility since the beginning of written history, and doubtless long before. Just as they 31 OUR MILITARY HISTORY have desired to avoid great misfor- tunes, plagues, earthquakes, fire, or famine, so they have struggled to escape war, except in those instances where war was the lesser of two evils. Yet war is with us to-day, was with us yesterday, and so through all the years since histoiy records man's action or tradition tells of his deeds. To-day, initiated as a rule with more formality, conducted with greater regard for the lives of the noncom- batants, and characterized by a larger measure of observance of the dictates of humanity in the treatment of pris- oners and the helpless, war is still with us. Peace leagues struggle to prevent it; great alliances attempt to abate it through preponderant forces — through war itself, if need be. Arbitration serves to lessen it a 32 THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE little through disposing of many minor questions which, if allowed to grow, might bring about disputes resulting in war. As one of the means of pos- sible avoidance of a resort to force, we welcome arbitration with open arms and strive to give it the largest meas- ure of success, although realizing that in many cases it will not avail to pre- vent that final resort to force which can only be avoided when all great powers think alike. That time will come only when absolutely unselfish justice marks international relations; when trade is equitably shared among competing peoples; when the rich help freely the poor; when competition, greed, selfishness, race interests and prejudices and religious intolerance pass away; when men and nations have no fixed convictions which differ from 33 OUR MILITARY HISTORY those of others; when they neither dream dreams nor see visions. Until then, strive as we may, the cry will be "Peace! Peace!" and yet there will be no permanent peace. Nevertheless, we must strive unceasingly to reduce war to the minimum, and to build up arbitration, but in so doing we must not lose sight of the fact that our efforts will not always be successful. An infinite wisdom has established the conditions under which we live and put in being the great law which runs through the universe: the law of the survival of the most fit. We may struggle against it, but it rules in its general application. The most fit in a military way, which includes good bodies, based on good food, careful sanitation, well thought-out training, clear intelligence resting on good 34 THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE schools and early training, good arma- ment, equipment and organization, all springing from intelligence and edu- cation applied to self -protection and expansion of interests and trade, will win in war just as they win in commerce. They may not be the most fit in abstract morality as relates to busi- ness relations between individuals or nations, or with regard to generosity or sense of justice. The characteristics of selfishness, self-interest and the spirit of acquisitiveness are often accompanied by a development of the means to get what is coveted and to hold it securely. Human nature in the mass is still human nature; under a little more restraint, perhaps, but still the old complex proposition of the ages, characterized and controlled 35 OUR MILITARY HISTORY only too often by expediency and self- interest. Nations are but collections of indi- viduals; we need courts for the individual man, and courts are of no avail without the police. In the vast group of individuals constituting a community, city or nation, the resort to force by small groups representing perhaps a thousandth, or less, of the population, is a nuisance and is not permitted by the great aggregation of the individuals among whom they live, as it interferes with the interest and activities, often safety, of too many other people. The individuals in the community of nations are few in num- ber, and it is much less easy to bring preponderant force to the control or restraint of the more powerful. Yet as men struggle within the 36 THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE community and too often resort to force unless restrained, so do nations struggle and resort to force in the world community, only here counter force in the form of international police has never been resorted to. Can it be effectively done while there still exist strong groups characterized by century-old prejudices of race and interest? This is one of the great questions of the hour. While consider- ing it we should not neglect prepara- tion for defense or fail to recognize conditions as they are. The maintenance of peace and the prevention of war have been attempted through alliances to compel or regulate the action of other groups or other combinations of nations, by efforts so to group nations as to maintain the balance of power between people whose 37 OUR MILITARY HISTORY territorial expansion and increase of population and interests might other- wise jeopardize peace. These efforts have usually resulted in war sooner or later, although in many instances serving to maintain peace for long periods. The policy of no combination satisfies the greed, ambition or policy of all its members, and eventually the dominating interest of one or more members of such a combination, or the injection of new interests or condi- tions, serves after a time to bring about the loosening of the bonds of the alliance and the formation of new combinations, too often with a resort to force as the final argument. Thus far we see little prospect of change. We may hold down for a time the explosive pressure or give it a safe vent, but from time to time human 38 THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE effort will fail and the explosion will occur. In other words, the controlling nations are too few in number and their vital interests are so coincident or interwoven with those of the con- trolled nations that constant changes and rearrangements result in this grouping, and these changes inevitably bring about an appeal to force. It is difficult to see how this condition can be changed so long as national lines exist and racial groups continue, or certain trade areas remain under the control of these groups. Justice and righteousness are not enough to insure protection, nor is an upright and blameless personal or national life a guarantee against the unscrupulous. A Pilate was found to crucify Christ; and a strong, aggres- sive nation, believing in its own worth 39 OUR MILITARY HISTORY and right to expand, has always been prone to crush and coerce a weaker one, regardless of the abstract justice of the weaker nation's cause. Why all these things are, is a ques- tion which this world cannot answer in precise terms, and with such answer we are not at this moment concerned. We can with justice say that public and national morality is largely the reflection of the education of our youth. Given sound moral training in the home, a healthy body and a devel- oped sense of justice and fair play, and you have the youth who will most probably make the sound, just and normal man in public life, the best citizen, and, collectively, when assem- bled in legislative bodies or engaged in executive or administrative work, the man who will act on the most just, 40 THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE reasonable and tolerant lines. But even among men of this class there will be strong differences of opinion and it is little short of folly to assume the contrary. We may diminish the frequency of strife and make more humane the struggle, but for the present nothing more. Blood, race, tradition, trade and a host of other influences, capped by ambition to go on, to lead, to expand, will always produce strife. We cannot escape this conclusion if we take as our guide the evidence of things done and being done, rather than follow the dictates of fancy or desire. The strug- gle for peace is centuries old, and efforts to end war and establish undis- turbed peace have filled the minds of men and taxed the resources of nations. The great combinations of power to 41 OUR MILITARY HISTORY prevent war were, after all, but combi- nations of forces to restrain the exer- cise of force, and have more often than not ended in a great struggle for readjustment of the balance of power. The theories and policies of addled minds and shallow intelligences, prod- ucts of the applause of the lecture platform, or of minds upset by the flattery incident to sudden wealth, have^ had their share of attention, and even of sympathy. After all, they indicate only a failure to understand that war generally has its roots running deep below the surface that is swept by the gaze of such observers. The authors of these theories never have studied seriously the causes of war. They assign as causes the little incidents which serve to touch off the mass of explosive which other forces have been 42 THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE accumulating and piling up for a gen- eration or perhaps a century. War, whether it be for evil or good, is among men, and our clear duty is to recognize this fact, instead of deny- ing the evidence of our senses simply because it is disagreeable and brutal, something that we would get rid of. Our duty is to protect ourselves as best we can against war and build our pro- tection on so secure a foundation and maintain its efficiency so systematically that our own institutions, ideals and interests may be secure and that we may be able to hand down to our children all the benefits we have received from our fathers. God has given us eyes to see, ears to hear, and intelligence and memory to glean and carry from the lessons of the past some- thing of wisdom to guide us in meeting 43 OUR MILITARY HISTORY the issues of the present. If we fail to make the best use of those faculties which have been given us, we must pay the penalty. We must continue to strive for world peace, for the betterment of human conditions; we must do what we can to promote arbitration, love of justice; but we have no right to forget that none of these will serve to protect us against an unjust aggressor. Let us do all these good things, but at the same time take those measures of wise precaution which the experience of time and of all people teaches, that we may be prepared to defend with force those things which justice, honesty and fair dealing are inadequate of them- selves to defend? As Cromwell said: " Trust in God — but keep your powder dry." In other words, do THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE right, but do not trust to that alone. The highwayman is not especially con- cerned with the morals of the man whose purse he covets, nor is the great nation struggling for trade and expan- sion disposed to give especial consider- ation to the morals of the people standing in her way. Every nation does, however, give serious and prompt heed to the strength and ability of another to hold and protect what she has. After going over the evidence of past results and present conditions, we must realize that arbitration to-day cannot as a rule be depended upon for protection or even as a means of delay- ing a resort to force, except in such cases as are not of vital importance to either of the disputants. Questions of citizenship, cases arising under the 45 OUR MILITARY HISTORY Monroe Doctrine — in which we are particularly interested — are among those which cannot well be turned over to arbitration. Our interests in them are vital. Preparedness to resist injustice or attack with force tends to amplify the possibilities of successful arbitration, as the cost and danger of the strug- gle and the uncertainty of the out- come are evident. Preparedness lends weight to just claims and makes the would-be aggressor hesitate. It is the well-guarded house in which the robber sees the danger and realizes the cost. It does not mean that the people of the house are less just because they have had the good sense to recognize conditions and take the wise measure of protection. All arbitration has a much better 46 THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE chance of success when each party realizes that the other has the abihty to make strong opposition to unjust claims. A country unable to defend her rights on land and sea is not the country to determine whether arbitra- tion or force is to be resorted to. It is the strong, well-prepared nation which will determine whether a dispute is to be settled by arms or arbitration, not the weak and unprepared one. Washington's words still hold good: " To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace." The assertion so often made that preparedness increases the proba- bihty of war, is unsound from every standpoint, unless those who make the assertion assume that we should not engage in war in any case but rather submit passively to whatever demands 47 OUR MILITARY HISTORY are made upon us. The resort to aggressive force will always be gov- erned to a certain extent by the ques- tion of cost — cost in men and treasure. If no serious resistance is possible on the part of one party to a dispute, the temptation of the stronger and better prepared to use force is great; if the reverse is the case, consideration and a disposition to arbitrate may be counted on. Every dictate of common sense, the teaching of history and the lessons of the moment, suggest strongly and unmistakably the urgent necessity of the organization of the might of the nation, in order that we may be ready to meet force with force, if other means fail. Reliance on peace treaties is not a safe policy. Experience shows they often mean little in the face of 48 THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE a great crisis threatening the life and interests of a nation. Preparedness does not mean militar- ism or an aggressive military spirit; it means simply the application to the military questions of the day of some- thing of the experience and lessons of the past as well as those of the present. A man armed against thieves is not prone to become a thief unless he is one at heart. A nation can be strong without being immoral or a bully. Militarism, as indicated by the exist- ence of a military class demanding and receiving special consideration and pre- cedence and exercising an undue influ- ence in the internal affairs of the nation or upon its international relations, is to be avoided beyond peradventure. But effective preparedness can be had without a trace of this condition, as 49 OUR MILITARY HISTORY illustrated by Switzerland and France — taking only representative forms of government as examples. The entire trend of our sentiment, past and present, disproves the possi- bility of such a condition of affairs. No class of the population is more opposed to the establishment of a condition of militarism than the army itself. The army is absolutely demo- cratic, representing, as it does, all classes of the people. The great dan- ger which confronts our people is that which arises from an ignorance of the organization and capacity for the prompt use of highly organized force on the part of all the great nations except China and ourselves. While talking peace and arbitration we are, through wealth, commercial aggressive- ness and heedlessness as to preparation 50 THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE to defend our rights and properties, one of the great menaces to peace. Lack of intelligent preparedness can^ not promote peace; it can and does prejudice its continuance and will cer- tainly serve to prolong and make more deadly the effects of war. It is an insult to us as a people to assume that we cannot be strong and prepared to fight for the right with- out becoming likely to use our power for wrong. This is the cant of weak- lings who have no strong convictions of right for which they are willing to die, if need be. Let us drop cant and hypocrisy and be sure that we can be both strong enough to protect our own rights and interests, and just and self- restrained enough, even though strong, to respect those of others. There is no real basis for assuming that if we 51 OUR MILITARY HISTORY prepare to resist aggression we are likely to become aggressors. We have no right to jeopardize all we have and hold most dear by failing to organize and prepare our strength because of the fear that if strong, organized and ready, our nation may become an international highwayman. Rubbish and cant of the faint-hearted! Lacking the spirit which places prin- ciples and honor above fear and wounds ! Peace treaties — international law — they should be observed, but they are not always. Where are those who trusted them and forgot that force is still to be reckoned with? The great Peace Palace stands empty in the land of a prosperous, industrious people at present under arms to protect their own neutrality. None of the causes of the 52 THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE greatest war of the ages has been or is being heard within its walls. Inter- national law has been too often only the will of the strongest and may be again. It is at the best but a feeble staff to lean on, when issues involving the life of a nation, or nations, are involved. As Washington said: ** The best way to make a good peace is to have a good army," — using the word " army " in the sense of military force, which includes the navy; and he might have said that the best way to preserve peace is to be prepared against war. We should favor preparedness not only on the grounds of safety, but on the grounds of humanity, for it is a brutal waste of life to send an undisci- plined and untrained people into war, and war will come, from time to time, 53 OUR MILITARY HISTORY do what we may to try to avoid it. _No nation does more to tempt others to war than one which, possessing much of the trade and more than her propor- tion of the wealth of the world, fails to make adequate preparations to guard what she has. 54 chapter iii Past National Policy **A government is the murderer of its citizens which sends them to the field uninformed and untaught, where they are to meet men of the same age and strength mechanized by education and disciplined for battle." — General Richard Henry Lee. We are a warlike, but not a mili- tary people; that is to say, we are quick to resent injury and ready to meet force with force, but we are not organized to employ force effectively. We are commercially aggressive; we are exceedingly rich. We never have submitted and are still indisposed to submit ourselves to discipline or prepa- ration. We spend human life like 55 OUR MILITARY HISTORY water and pay with blood and treasure for the lack of ordinary intelligent preparation. We are not so much unready to resort to war for the right if need be as we are unprepared to wage it. We hate militarism, object to large standing armies, and prop- erly, and we can continue so to do and still make full preparation on lines not at variance with our ideals or the prin- ciples laid down by the founders. In our country peace societies are not a new idea. The New York Peace Society was founded in 1815, and as long ago as 1827 there were many peace societies in the United States. The effort has passed through many stages; the pacifists of to-day must not flatter themselves that they have dis- covered that war is brutal. Cicero emphasized it in his day. Seneca char- 5Q PAST NATIONAL POLICY acterized war as "plain insanity." If it could be stopped by pointing out that it is brutal and gives pain, it would have been stopped long ago. We must realize that there are two types of peace. There is the peace of Rome under Augustus, which was a real peace, and Rome and Roman citizens were respected by their neigh- bors; and there is the other type, the peace of Honorius, in whose time pacifists prated as they do at pres- sent. Nonresistance was the theory. Emperor Honorius raised poultry and the barbarians overran the empire. In the first instance there was peace with honor and dignity; in the second instance the empire was overrun, a civilization almost destroyed through failure to listen to the teachings of history and make reasonable, rational 57 OUR MILITARY HISTORY preparation. It was the sort of peace which has existed in China. It was the kind of peace which marks the decadence of a nation. It goes hand in hand with the poUcy advocated by the peace-at-any-price people of to-day. Our early presidents were most of them truly great men, lovers of peace; some of them had participated in war, and all of them had lived through periods of war. They were just and upright in character. What was their advice to our people? Washington says, in his first annual address: " To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace. A free people ought not only to be armed, but disciplined; to which end a uniform and well digested plan is requisite; and their safety and inter- 58 PAST NATIONAL POLICY est require that they should promote such manufactures as tend to render them independent of others for essen- tial, particularly military, supplies." In his third annual message, speak- ing of the militia, which under the pro- visions of the organic law included men from eighteen to forty-five, Washing- ton said: " The safety of the United States, under divine protection, ought to rest on the basis of systematic and solid arrangements, exposed as little as pos- sible to the hazards of fortuitous cir- cumstances." In his fifth annual message he made this statement: " I cannot recoinmend to your notice measures for the fulfillment of our duties to the rest of the world without again pressing upon you the necessity 59 OUR MILITARY HISTORY of placing ourselves in a condition of complete defense and of extracting from them the fulfillment of their duties towards us. The United States ought not to indulge a persuasion that, contrary to the order of human events, they wiU forever keep at a distance those painful appeals to arms with which the history of every other nation abounds. There is a rank due to the United States among nations which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult we must be able to repel it ; if we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war." In Washington's eighth annual ad- dress, speaking of the country's inabil- ao PAST NATIONAL POLICY ity to protect its commerce, he said: " Will it not then be advisable to begin without delay to provide and lay up materials for the building and equipping of ships of war and to pro- ceed in the work by degrees in pro- portion as our resources shall render it practicable without inconvenience, so that a future war in Europe may not find our commerce in the same unpro- tected state in which it was found dur- ing the present?" John Adams, in a special message, stated : '* With a view and as a meas- ure which even in time of universal peace ought not to be neglected, I recommend to your consideration a revision of the laws for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, to render that natural and safe defense of the country efficacious." 61 OUR MILITARY HISTORY In his second annual message, which dealt with our relations with France, President Adams declared: "But in demonstrating by our conduct that we do not fear war in the necessary pro- tection of our rights and honor, we should give no room to infer that we abandon the desire of peace. An effi- cient preparation for war can alone secure peace. We ought, without loss of time, to lay the foundations for that increase of our navy to a size suffi- cient to guard our coasts and protect our trade." Thomas Jefferson, in his fifth annual message, advocated: "The organiza- tion of 300,000 able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 26, for defense at any time or at any place where they may be wanted." In a letter to James Monroe, from 62 PAST NATIONAL POLICY Monticello, dated June 19, 1813, Jef- ferson wrote: " It proves more forcibly the neces- sity of obliging every citizen to be a soldier. This was the case with the Greeks and Romans, and must be that of every free state. Where there is no oppression there will be no pauper hire- lings. We must train and classify the whole of our male citizens, and make military instruction a regular part of collegiate education. We can never be safe till this is done." This letter was written fourteen months before the fiasco at Bladens- burg and the burning of Washington. Again he says: " If war be forced upon us in spite of our long and vain appeals to the justice of nations, rapid and vigorous movement at the outset will go far 63 OUR MILITARY HISTORY toward securing us in its course and issue, and toward throwing its burdens on those who render necessary the resort from reason to force. " Considering the conditions of the times in which we live, our attention should unremittingly be fixed on the safety of our country. For a people who are free and who mean to remain so, a well-organized and armed militia is their best security." One might continue almost indefi- nitely to quote from the messages and state papers of our presidents, con- cerning this great matter of defense, organization and readiness. General Henry Knox, when Secre- tary of War, sent to President Wash- ington, on January 18, 1790, a plan which provided for the enrolling, classi- fying and training of all able-bodied 64 PAST NATIONAL POLICY men from eighteen to sixty years of age. General Knox refers to the fact that this plan had been previously pre- sented to Washington, had been modi- fied somewhat, and as now finally presented had Washington's approval. Among other things he states in his letter of transmission: " It had been my anxious desire to devise a national system of defense adequate to the probable exigencies of the United States, whether arising from internal or external causes; and at the same time to erect a standard of republican magnanimity, inde- pendent of, and superior to, the powerful influence of wealth." Both Washington and Knox had had unfortunate experiences with the untrained militia during the Revolu- tion, and the plan they now proposed 65 OUR MILITARY HISTORY was not one which contemplated the use of militia as it was used during the Revolution, but it was, in effect, the forerunner of the idea voiced by Jeff'erson in 1813, namely, the organ- izing, classifying and training of the male population. General Knox pre- cedes his plan by a long introduction, much of which was apparently written by Washington. Among other state- ments therein made, worthy of note are the following: "But it is at the same time acknowl- edged that, unless a republic prepares itself by proper arrangements to meet those exigencies to which all states are in a degree liable, its peace and exist- ence are more precarious than the forms of government in which the will of one directs the conduct of the whole, for the defense of the nation. 66 PAST NATIONAL POLICY "It is the intention of the present attempt to suggest the most efficient system of defense which may be com- patible with the interests of a free people — a system which will not only produce the expected effect, but which, in its operations, shall also produce those habits and manners which will impart strength and durability to the whole government. " All discussions on the subject of a powerful militia will result in one or other of the following principles: " First : Either efficient institutions must be established for the military education of the youth, and that the knowledge acquired therein shall be diffused throughout the community by the means of rotation; or, " Secondly: That the militia must be formed of substitutes, after the 67 OUR MILITARY HISTORY manner of the militia of Great Britain. " If the United States possess the vigor of mind to establish the first institution, it may be reasonably- expected to produce the most unequiv- ocal advantages. A glorious national spirit will be introduced, with its exten- sive train of political consequences. The youth will imbibe a love of their country; reverence and obedience to its laws; courage and elevation of mind; openness and liberality of character, accompanied by a just spirit of honor; in addition to which their bodies will acquire robustness, greatly conducive to their personal happiness, as well as the defense of their country, while habit, with its silent but efficacious operations, will cement the system. " Every intelligent mind would rejoice in the establishment of an insti- 68 PAST NATIONAL POLICY tution, under whose auspices the youth and vigor of the constitution would be renewed Avith each successive gen- eration, and which would appear to secure the great principles of freedom and happiness against the injuries of time and events." General Knox then concludes his letter with the following summary: " First : That it is the indispensable duty of every nation to establish all necessary institutions for its own per- fection and defense. " Secondly: That it is a capital security to a free state for the great body of the people to possess a compe- tent knowledge of the military art. "Thirdly: That this knowledge cannot be attained, in the present state of society, but by establishing adequate institutions for the military education 69 OUR MILITARY HISTORY of the youth; and that the knowledge acquired therein should be diffused throughout the community by the prin- ciples of rotation. " Fourthly: That every man of the proper age and ability of body, is firmly bound, by the special compact, to perform personally his proportion of military duty for the defense of the state. "Fifthly: That all men of the legal military age should be armed, enrolled and held responsible for different degrees of military service. "And, sixthly: That, agreeably to the Constitution, the United States are to provide for arming, organizing and disciplining the militia, and for gov- erning such a part of it as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states, respec- 70 PAST NATIONAL POLICY lively, the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline pre- scribed by Congress." This plan, briefly stated, consisted of the grouping of physically and mentally fit men, between the ages of eighteen and sixty years of age, into three corps. The young men between eighteen and twenty-one years of age formed the Advance Corps, and the men between twenty-one and forty-five formed the Main Corps. There was a third, or Reserve Corps, which con- sisted of men from forty-five to sixty years of age. The plan further pro- vided that these first and second groups should be organized into vari- ous military units; that the young men of eighteen and nineteen years of age should receive thirty days' training in 71 OUR MILITARY HISTORY camp each year; the men of twenty, ten days of training in camp each year ; the men from twenty-one to forty-five, four days of training each year. This was a federal force and it was to be equipped, armed and subsisted at the expense of the United States; its members were required to take an oath of allegiance to the state and to the United States. Herein was an element of weakness. A force of this kind, or any kind of national force, should be purely a federal force. Its officers should be appointed by the president on the federal authority and it should be available for service within or with- out the United States. The plan was a great advance over anything hitherto proposed, inasmuch as it recognized the necessity for general military train- ing. The training of these troops was 72 PAST NATIONAL POLICY to be prescribed by the United States. The early plan was a tremendous improvement over the militia idea finally adopted. It would have resulted in the general military train- ing of our people and the dissemina- tion of a knowledge of our military policy. It represented an appreciation of the necessity for military training. Had this system been adopted, the War of 1812 would probably never have occurred. Or, if it had occurred, we should have been quickly success- ful in obtaining our objective. Both Washington and Knox recognized the economic efficiency which would be gained by this training, and they also realized that a tremendous improvement in citizenship would result. They did not expect the men from forty-five to sixty to serve in 73 OUR MILITARY HISTORY the first line, but they saw that they would be a valuable asset on the lines of communication, depots, and other important fields of activity where the highest degree of physical excellence is not required. This proposed act, if it had been passed and put into eiFect, would have saved many tens of thou- sands of lives and many hundreds of millions of money. If the advice of our early presidents was sound at the time it was given, when the ocean was a real barrier instead of, as at the present time, the readiest means of approach, once sea control is lost ; when troops were moved over sea by sailing ships of relatively small capacity; when none of the great nations contained large, highly organ- ized and equipped armies prepared for prompt movement in any direction; 74 PAST NATIONAL POLICY when tHe arms of war were simple and easy of manufacture and easy to acquire familiarity with; when we had little in the way of commerce or wealth to tempt aggression; how much more sound is it now, when all great nations have highly organized armies, large reserves of men and material, adequate equipment of all kinds? Since then steam has divided time and distance by ten; the arms of war are most intricate and require a long time to manufacture, and it takes a still longer time to teach men to use them effectively; our wealth has enormously increased; our commerce spreads over the earth and we hold great areas far beyond our continental limits; our people are unskilled in the use of arms, and our population as a whole has little appreciation of its 75 OUR MILITARY HISTORY military obligation. There is no ques- tion but that the advice of our early presidents is entitled to much more attention to-day than when given. This country has never engaged single-handed in a war with a nation of the first class prepared for war. We have absolutely no conception of what modern war means when con- ducted by a nation organized and ready in men and material. It is to be hoped that we may never have this experience, certainly not until we have learned something from the experience of others, something from the lessons of the past as well as those of the present. We have no markedly superior mili- tary virtues; as a people, the blood of all peoples runs in our veins. We live under a form of government which tends to develop individuality and self- 76 PAST NATIONAL POLICY confidence, good qualities if coordi- nated and harmonized by discipline. But there is nothing which indicates peculiar or superior military excellence, and there is nothing in our military history upon which we can found such an assumption. We have splendid material for soldiers, if trained, but without training that material is rela- tively of little value. There seems to be a general impres- sion that, having blundered through our past wars with a hideously unnecessary expenditure of life and treasure, somehow or other we shall continue to blunder on successfully, regardless of lack of preparation on our part or of thorough organization and preparation on the part of our possible antagonist. Such an opinion is absolutely unwarranted. Thorough 77 OUR MILITARY HISTORY preparation is absolutely indispensable. General Hariy Lee — popularly known as *' Light-Horse Harry" — stated at the end of the Revolution that the nation was the murderer of its men which sent them untrained and undisciplined to meet equally good men, mechanized and disciplined by training. These words were true when they were uttered and they are true to-day, and they apply with peculiar force to our own people. It is not enough to be willing — we must be prepared. One would not think of putting into a lifeboat men who could neither row nor swim; and yet we assume to send them into battle undis- ciplined and untrained, unfamiliar with the use of arms, where they are to meet men trained to the minute. It is murder — nothing else. 78 PAST NATIONAL POLICY If a lot of men physically of the right type presented themselves for the crews or for the teams of a uni- versity and said they were willing to go into athletics, but would not train, they would receive scant courtesy at the hands of their college mates. Experience in athletics has taught that success is absolutely dependent upon thorough preparation; and the would- be athlete who assumed that he could meet, with any hope of success, an equally good man, physically fit and trained in all the details of the game, would be looked upon as little better than a fool. So it is with professional soldiers, who have devoted their lives to their work: they see the folly of the idle declarations of the Fourth of July orator, or the equally fatuous and mis- 79 OUR MILITARY HISTORY leading statements of the men who say that we, by virtue of peculiar qualities, are superior to equally good men, trained and ready. Such vain boasts are more than foolish — they are dan- gerous. They strike at the very life of the nation. If we heed them longer we shall repent in sackcloth and ashes. While students of military policy and our professional soldiers of the best type — not the machine-cut-and- dried type, but the soldiers with learn- ing and imagination — have always recognized that campaigns are won in the preparations for them, our people have never appreciated this great truth, nor do they realize that thorough organization of the nation's resources in men, material and money is neces- sary to a success which shall be charac- terized by the minimum loss of blood 80 PAST NATIONAL POLICY and treasure. Battles are won as well as lost in the national legislature, in the offices of the administration, in departments, as well as in the field. Failure to provide means for conduct- ing the war, neglect properly to organize, undue interference by non- technical persons in the direction of that highly specialized and technical business, war, the direction of opera- tions to meet political demands of the hour, all contribute, with fateful force, to the outcome of the armed struggle. Under our procedure in the past, the soldier too often has had little to say in the great question of prepara- tion in its varied forms, involving organization, supply and equipment, and only too often has found himself like a sailor put on board a ship in a gale of wind — a ship built not by 81 OUR MILITARY HISTORY professional shipbuilders — a ship of whose equipment and personnel he is largely ignorant. All he can do is to make the best of a bad situation, reorganize and re-equip in the face of a storm. So it has been only too often with our soldiers, called to lead badly organized, uninstructed, half- armed bodies of troops without previ- ous training. This describes, in a general way, the situation which has existed at the beginning of our wars in the past. These conditions should not be possible in future wars; but they will be unless we study thoroughly the question in all its aspects, and take wise measures of precaution and make such preparation as the experience of the past and the best information of the present indicate. When our people offer their bodies 82 PAST NATIONAL POLICY and their lives to the nation for service in war in the nation's defense, they have a right to demand that these sacrifices shall be made — if made they must be — under conditions which min- imize the probability of disaster from lack of preparation, instruction, arms, equipment or organization, both on the fighting line and behind it. Preparation will tend to make the struggle as brief as possible, and reduce the cost in life and treasure to the lowest possible limit. Our people have never entered into war with any of these assurances. They have gone into it blindly, uninformed as to the necessity of the hundred and one things which make for preparation and which are the sure foundations of success. National defense begins with the people, and must find its main sup- 83 OUR MILITARY HISTORY port among their representatives, for, as John Adams said, " National de- fense is one of the cardinal duties of a statesman; the soldier can only endorse when asked; the statesman must advo- cate, and the legislative body enact." Only too often do we find men who should know better, speaking of our great military resources, forgetting that unless developed and organized they will be of no more value in the quick onrush of modern war, initiated by a prepared nation, than would an undeveloped gold mine in Alaska be in a crisis in Wall Street. The fact that a nation has resources does not help if those resources are undeveloped and unavailable. If modern war em- phasizes any one thing above another, it is that resources of all kinds must be promptly available and organized. 84 PAST NATIONAL POLICY Mere numbers, untrained, unorgan- ized and unequipped, mean little; no wolf was ever frightened by the size of a flock of sheep. As one considers the conduct of our various wars from the standpoint of military efficiency and economy in life and treasure, there is but one con- clusion possible, and that is that our lack of system has been not only unduly expensive from every stand- point but that it has led to great pro- longation of war, unnecessary loss of life and treasure, and consequent inter- ference with the development of the country. In some instances that lack of organization has resulted in failure to attain the object sought. In the Revolutionary War, Wash- ington stands out conspicuously as the great coordinating, dominant fig- 85 OUR MILITARY HISTORY ure, and the more one studies the conduct of that war the more he is impressed by the debt we owe to Washington. His sound judgment, able mihtary leadership, and, above all, his patience and persistence, cou- pled with infinite tact, made it possible for him to retain the confidence of Congress and the people to an unusual extent and to hold together the poorly equipped and hastily assembled raw levies which formed the bulk of the Revolutionary armies. 86 CHAPTER IV Lessons or the Revolution "Against stupidity the very gods / themselves contend in vain." — Schil- ler. The causes leading to the Revolu- tion had produced such effect that, as early as 1774, several of the Colonies began preparations for war with Eng- land, and a Provisional Congress was convened in Massachusetts, with John Hancock as president. This Congress appointed officers and adopted organi- zation for the militia and made certain arrangements for the collections of sup- plies, equipment and provisions. The royal governor of the colony attempted 87 OUR MILITARY HISTORY to prevent the assembly of this Con- gress, but was unsuccessful. In the following year a second Con- gress assembled and appointed a Committee of Safety, with authority to raise and support a military force to resist the Acts of Parliament. Under this authority a considerable force of militia was raised, part of it called Minute Men, or troops bound to hold themselves in readiness for instant service. This was the condi- tion of affairs when the conflicts occurred at Lexington and Concord. A few days later, April 22nd, steps were taken formally to organize for defense against Great Britain. The Congress decided to raise an army of 30,000 men, and immediately to enroll 13,600 men within the limits of Massa- chusetts, trusting that the balance 88 THE REVOLUTION might be supplied by New Hamp- shire, Rhode Island and Connecticut. Troops were raised by giving to any- one who succeeded in enrolling fifty- nine men, a captain's commission, and a colonel's commission to any man who could secure ten such companies. In other words, qualifications for com- mand rested solely on the ability to enroll men. It is not difficult to foresee the results which must necessarily follow under a system based upon such a policy. The training of the officers and their qualifications for command meant little. Of course we must not forget that the situation was an extremely difficult one. The troops had to be raised, there were relatively few trained officers in the colony, and many who had had previous military 89 OUR MILITARY HISTORY experience remained constant in their allegiance to Great Britain. Still there is no doubt that a larger propor- tion of trained officers could have been secured had the matter of organization been more systematically undertaken. The men were courageous, and when led by officers of experience and capa- city, fighting in a defensive position, and not required to maneuver in the face of an enemy, rendered brave and good service, as at Bunker Hill. The Continental Army, when Washington assumed command, consisted of a mass of raw levies, generally speaking, under incompetent officers — levies composed of men who had no idea of remaining throughout the war and undergoing thorough training. There were many things outside the condition of the army itself which led 90 THE REVOLUTION to great embarrassment. The action at Lexington took place three weeks before the assembhng of the Second Continental Congress, and compelled that body to assume immediately the functions of civil government, but as it had no authority to levy taxes or provide a revenue, it could only issue Bills of Credit. The power to create and support armies was crippled by a financial system which was based wholly upon the faith of the people in ultimate success. If the Congress had had the power to levy taxes and raise a revenue, the war would have been much shorter and its conduct more vigorous. Moreover, the Con- gress was vested with both executive and legislative power and there was consequently a lack of the balance and adjustment which exists where these 91 OUR MILITARY HISTORY functions are distinct and separate. The country was dependent for its military legislation upon the decisions of a group of citizens wholly without instruction in military matters, and influenced by general fear of a stand- ing army. Washington's correspond- ence indicates very clearly the embar- rassments and the difficulties of the situation. The strength of the army at the time of Washington's assignment to command was about 17,000 men, all of them under short enlistment. Much had to be accomplished. It was abso- lutely essential to organize a force which would owe its allegiance to the United Colonies, and in June, with this end in view, Congress authorized the raising of ten companies of rifle- men in Pennsylvania, Maryland and 92 THE REVOLUTION Virginia, with a term of enlistment of one year. This was the nucleus of the army which finally achieved Amer- ican independence. During the year both infantry and artillery were added. The enlistments were still for a short period, and did not extend beyond the end of the following year. The terms of enlistment of the troops thereby enrolled mostly expired at or near the end of 1775. As it was necessary promptly to raise troops to replace them and to add to those already enrolled. Congress decided to raise twenty-six regiments: sixteen in Mas- sachusetts, five in Connecticut, two in Rhode Island, and three in New Hampshire. Washington was author- ized to appoint the officers. This resulted in a condition to which Wash- ington refers in various letters. 93 OUR MILITARY HISTORY On November 11, 1775, he writes as follows : " The trouble I have in the arrange- ment of the army is really inconceiv- able. Many of the officers sent in their names to serve in expectation of promotion; others stood aloof to see what advantage they could make for themselves, while a number, who have declined, have again sent in their names to serve. So great has the confusion arising from these and many other perplexing circumstances been that I found it absolutely impossible to fix this very interesting business exactly on the plan resolved on in the con- ference, though I have kept up to the spirit of it as near as the nature and necessity of the case would permit. " The difficulty with the soldiers is as great, indeed, more so, if possible, 94 THE REVOLUTION than with the officers. They will not enlist until they know their colonel, lieutenant-colonel, major, and captain, so that it was necessary to fix the offi- cers the first thing, which is, at last, in some manner done, and I have given out enlisting orders." And on November 28th he con- tinues : " The number enlisted since my last is two thousand five hundred and forty men. I am sorry to be necessitated to mention to you the egregious want of public spirit which reigns here. Instead of pressing to be engaged in the cause of their country, which I vainly flattered myself would be the case, I find we are likely to be deserted in a most critical time. Those that have enlisted must have a furlough, which I have been obliged to grant to 95 OUR MILITARY HISTORY fifty at a time, from each regiment. The Connecticut troops, upon whom I reckoned, are as backward, indeed, if possible, more so than the people of this colony. Our situation is truly alarming, and of this General Howe is well apprised, it being the common topic of conversation when the people left Boston last Friday. No doubt when he is reinforced he will avail him- self of the information." And in a private letter a little later, he describes conditions in the following words : " Such a dearth of public spirit and such want of virtue, such stock- jobbing and fertility in all the low arts to obtain advantages of one kind or another in this great change of mili- tary arrangement I never saw before, and pray God's mercy that I may 96 THE REVOLUTION never be witness to again. What will be the end of these maneuvers is beyond my scan. I tremble at the prospect. We have been till this time enlisting about three thousand five hundred men. To engage these I have been obliged to allow furloughs as far as fifty men to a regiment, and the officers, I am persuaded, indulge as many more. The Connecticut troops will not be prevailed upon to stay longer than their term, saving those who have enlisted for the next campaign, and are mostly on furlough; and such a mercenary spirit pervades, the whole that I should not be at all surprised at any disaster that may happen. In short, after the last of this month our lines will be so weak- ened that the Minute Men and militia must be called in for their defense, 97 OUR MILITARY HISTORY and these being under no kind of gov- ernment themselves, will destroy the little subordination I have been labor- ing to establish, and run me into one evil while I am endeavoring to avoid another ; but the lesser must be chosen. These letters point out very plainly the conditions which existed. Another important thing to remember is that these occurrences took place during a period when our forefathers were struggling for independence, when, as we were taught in school, a spirit of patriotism and self-sacrifice stirred the country. The foregoing extracts from Washington's letters show the real sit- uation. It was extremely difficult to secure troops for the armed forces. Men came only for short periods of time, and insisted upon the election of their officers. Discipline was poor, and 98 THE REVOLUTION such as there was, was difficult of enforcement. In fact, the situation was more or less one of military chaos, and it was only Washington's remarkable personality that made it possible to hold together these discordant elements in the form of a fighting force. We soon went to the bounty, small at first, but gradually increased. In 1778 freedom was offered by Rhode Island to negroes if they would enlist. The difficulty in increasing the Con- tinental forces augmented instead of diminished from year to year. Wash- ington was twice empowered with dic- tatorial powers. The colonial assem- bhes singly and collectively made special efforts to secure troops but there seems to have been lacking a sense of individual responsibility for soldier service and the result was that 99 OUR MILITARY HISTORY our greatest force was in 1776, when we had 89,000 troops, 47,000 Con- tinentals, 42,000 mihtia. The Con- tinentals were really short service troops. From this year on the strength of the American force steadily de- creased until, in 1781, the force was only a trifle over 29,400 men. At no time during the war did Washington have an effective force of 20,000 men in line, notwithstanding the fact that nearly 400,000 men were enrolled dur- ing the war. One of the principal causes of diffi- culty during the war was that control of military matters rested with the Continental Congress, and that body was jealous of a standing army, knew little of military matters, and was inclined to make economies which resulted in vast expenditures through 100 THE REVOLUTION extending the war and rendering unavailing such expenditures as had previously been made. Washington did everything a man could do in his position, and he accomplished miracles. We were fortunate in this war in receiving at a critical time the invalu- able assistance of France, and from the further fact that the contention of the Colonies was supported by a strong party in England. The difficulties which Washington encountered can best be appreciated by soldiers who realize what it means to make new armies practically every year. Large forces of militia were called in from time to time but they were almost useless. Washington's opinion of men raised in this manner without training and without discipline, was expressed as follows; 101 OUR MILITARY HISTORY " To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff. Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life, unaccustomed to the din of arms, totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill (which is followed by want of confidence in themselves when opposed by troops regularly trained, disciplined, and appointed, superior in knowledge and superior in arms) are timid and ready to fly from their own shadows. " Relaxed and unfit as our rules and regulations of war are for the govern- ment of an army, the militia (these properly so called, for of these we have two sorts, the six-months men and those sent in as a temporary aid) do not think themselves subject to them, and therefore take liberties which the 102 THE REVOLUTION soldier is punished for. This creates jealousy, jealousy begets dissatisfac- tion, and this by degrees ripens into mutiny, keeping the whole army in a confused and disordered state, render- ing the time of those who wish to see regularity and good order prevail more unhappy than words can describe. Besides this, such repeated changes take place that all arrangement is set at naught and the constant fluctuation of things deranges every plan as fast as it is adopted. " Those, sir. Congress may be as- sured, are but a small part of the inconveniences which might be enumer- ated and attributed to militia, but there is one that merits particular attention, and that is the expense. Certain I am that it would be cheaper to keep 50,000 or 100,000 in constant pay than to 103 OUR MILITARY HISTORY depend upon half the number and supply the other half occasionally by militia. The time the latter are in pay before and after they are in camp, assembling and marching, the waste of ammunition, the consumption of stores, which in spite of every resolution or requisition of Congress, they must be furnished with or sent home, added to other incidental expenses consequent upon their coming and conduct in camp, surpass all idea and destroy every kind of regularity and economy which you could establish among fixed and settled troops, and will, in my opinion prove, if the scheme is adhered to, the ruin of our cause." During the war various reorganiza- tions took place; the conditions were somewhat improved through the grad- ual acquirement of a small nucleus of 104 THE REVOLUTION trained officers; but the old vicious con- ditions concerning the method of raising men, short terms of enhstments, rather than enhstments for the war, bounties, desertions, continued. Boun- ties grew from small sums to sums which, in those days, were small for- tunes and the foundation was laid for a procedure which was most vicious and tended to corrupt the patriotism of the nation: namely, the bounty system, or the buying of men to dis- charge their military obligations to the nation. Washington's opinion of our military policy is found in a letter to the president of Congress, August 20, 1780: " Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning, which, by the con- tinuance of the same men in service, 105 OUR MILITARY HISTORY had been capable of discipline, we never should have had to retreat with a handful of men across the Delaware in 1776, trembling for the fate of America, which nothing but the infatu- ation of the enemy could have saved; we should not have remained all the succeeding winter at their mercy, with sometimes scarcely a sufficient body of men to mount the ordinary guards, liable at every moment to be dissipated, if they had only thought proper to march against us; we should not have been under the necessity of fighting Brandy wine, with an unequal number of raw troops, and afterwards of seeing Philadelphia fall a prey to a victorious army; we should not have been at Valley Forge with less than half the force of the enemy, destitute of every- thing, in a situation neither to resist 106 THE REVOLUTION nor to retire; we should not have seen New York left with a handful of men, yet an overmatch for the main army of these States, while the principal part of their force was detached for the reduction of two of them; we should not have found ourselves this spring so weak as to be insulted by 5,000 men, unable to protect our baggage and magazines, their security depending on a good countenance and a want of enterprise in the enemy; we should not have been the greatest part of the war inferior to the enemy, indebted for our safety to their inactivity, enduring frequently the mortification of seeing inviting opportunities to ruin them pass unimproved for want of a force which the country was completely able to afford, and of seeing the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the inhabi- 107 OUR MILITARY HISTORY tants plundered, abused, murdered, with impunity from the same cause. " Nor have the ill effects been con- fined to the military line. A great part of the embarrassments in the civil departments flow from the same source. The derangement of our finances is essentially to be ascribed to it. The expenses of the war and the paper emissions have been greatly multiplied by it. We have had a great part of the time two sets of men to feed and pay — the discharged men going home and the levies coming in. This was more remarkably the case in 1775 and 1776. The difficulty and cost of engaging men have increased at every successive attempt, till among the present lines we find there are some who have received $150 in specie for five months' service, while our officers 108 THE REVOLUTION are reduced to the disagreeable neces- sity of performing the duties of drill sergeants to them, with this mortifying reflection annexed to the business, that by the time they have taught these men the rudiments of a soldier's duty their services will have expired and the work recommenced with a new set. The consumption of provisions, arms, accouterments, and stores of every kind has been doubled in spite of every pre- caution I could use, not only from the cause just mentioned, but from the carelessness and licentiousness inci- dent to militia and irregular troops. Our discipline also has been much hurt, if not ruined, by such constant changes. The frequent calls upon the militia have interrupted the cultivation of the land, and of course have lessened the quantity of its produce, occasioned a 109 OUR MILITARY HISTORY scarcity, and enhanced the prices. In an army so unstable as ours order and economy have been impracticable. No person who has been a close observer of the progress of our affairs can doubt that our currency has depreciated with- out comparison more rapidly from the system of short enlistments than it would have done otherwise. " There is every reason to believe that the war has been protracted on this account. Our opposition being less, the successes of the enemy have been greater. The fluctuation of the army kept alive their hopes, and at every period of the dissolution of a considerable part of it they have flattered themselves with some decisive advantages. Had we kept a perma- nent army on foot the enemy could have had nothing to hope for, and 110 THE REVOLUTION would in all probability have listened to terms long since." There is no reason to believe that the Washington opinions, as expressed, underwent any essential change. War drew its weary length along, with con- stantly changing personnel and small and ineffective commands. The year of 1781 was marked by a mutiny of troops of the Pennsylvania line. Our regular officers had become skilled and able and were making the best pos- sible use of the inferior troops fur- nished them. Following the junction of the French and American troops came the operations against Yorktown and the capture of Cornwallis. This was the last battle of the Revolution. The United States had employed dur- ing the war 395,858 troops. Their forces were strongest in 1776. The 111 OUR MILITARY HISTORY British forces at the outbreak of the war numbered 20,121, while at the end they amounted to 42,075. The mihtary events which had a strong bearing upon the expulsion of the British were, first, the capture of Burgoyne, and, secondly, that of Corn- wallis, an event which was made pos- sible only by the strong cooperation of the French forces on sea and land. The prosecution of the war by the British had not been at any time especially vigorous. The lack of centralized power was felt throughout the Revolution, and we have the curious picture of an alli- ance of states engaged in war viewing with suspicion a standing army, and yet on two occasions forced to give to the commander of these forces dicta- torial power. Embarrassing complica- 112 THE REVOLUTION tions occurred from the tendency to the exercise of power by the states. They assumed at critical moments a quasi-independent attitude, as illus- trated by the action of Governor Thomas Jefferson in detaining the Virginia militia for home defense when it was urgently required by General Greene; and by the action of the people of Boston in fitting out (without consulting the commander- in-chief) an independent military expedition for operation against the British in Maine. In April, 1812, the governor of Massachusetts denied the right of Con- gress or the president to determine when conditions justified the calling out of the militia, and claimed that this right is vested in the commanders-in- chief of militia of the various states — 113 OUR MILITARY HISTORY in other words, in the governors. At the same time Connecticut made sub- stantially the same claim. A little later in the same year, Vermont declared that the military strength and resources of the state must be reserved for its own defense and protection exclusively, and in the following year the same state refused to permit the militia to go to General Macomb's support. In fact, the whole structure was loosely jointed and could not have resisted a strong and well- organized attack. Taking it as a whole, however, and considering the lack of centralized power, ignorance of the legislative and executive body in all matters mihtary, the depreciation of currency, and that consciousness which must have existed among the troops of a lack of strong 114 THE REVOLUTION government, there was less trouble than might have been expected. Mutiny — although causes for it in the way of shortage of pay and clothing often existed — seldom oc- curred. The record of the Continental troops, one might say " the regular troops," was remarkably good. We had the material for both officers and men, but we lacked a strong govern- ment, organization and system. In other words, there was a weak military policy and no appreciation of the mil- itary needs of the country, if the war was to have been conducted vigor- ously and with the minimum loss of life and expenditure of treasure. During the revolutionary war the states formed a very loose confederacy, lacking most of the elements of strength which come from national re- 115 OUR MILITARY HISTORY sources properly mobilized and directed by a central authority. The Conti- nental Congress exercised only a lim- ited measure of control and toward the end of the war it was, to a large extent, advisory. Congress lacked the power to utilize and make available the country's military resources. The result was that at no time during the revolution was the full strength of the new-born nation brought to bear, and not only was there lack of a strong coordinating authority, but the whole military system was fatally defective. It represented the folly of depending upon troops enlisted for short periods, untrained, poorly organized, with a constantly changing enlisted personnel. The unnecessary sacrifice of life and expenditure of treasure incident to this system and adherence to it, has fol- 116 THE REVOLUTION lowed through all our wars, as the table on the following page indicates. As a result of this pernicious system of frequent and short enlistments, fol- lowed naturally a pension system involving tremendous expense, only a small portion of which would have been necessary had we had a sound military policy. The policy of short enlistments, of enrolling men hastily, not only cost us unnecessarily in life and treasure, but at times exercised a dangerous influence upon military operations. Arnold was forced to deliver an assault upon Quebec because of the approaching expiration of the enlistments of a large portion of his troops. Montgomery was killed, Arnold wounded, and a large part of the force killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. 117 o >n O v^ ^ O O Oi O 00 ■^ O (N -TO l- S O 05 O Tf( rO O »-^ O) S S "=^ o o a 4J o o .2 O 2 ^ en w o ;o fl O CO p »0 00 o CO o < 2 ® o o CO p 3 o o << .2 C! . 00 O? O? « O CO Oi t) (U •^ i-H OO ■^ CO 1> rj< T-i G^ O £ t- CO O M t^ O CO vj ■— ' .-( CO & rt 00 »o i-i 00 00 05 00 CO O 00 »0 GO l-H 00 r-l O CO CM 1-t o »0 O b- »o 05 00 CO 00 o o o o o o o o o o o o O 00 o o? o o •N »s •n •s ws »-• l-H »-i O? CO JD Tj« CO o -sf* o^ -«?* •> oo" »o l-H 00 r-r CO 05 CO O rH O -^ O CO W5 00 05 CO oo 00 1> 'a c^? o l-H rH G< l-H i-H 00 J4 P 0< o; : • ^ O P ^ CO ^ CN '^^ CO ^' ^ "^ CO 05^ oT 1-^ '!j< CO •s ^ 00 CO rH O^ !>. rH 00 -<* CO t^ ifj 00 b- (>? »o »N rs •n Oi CO CO Ir^ GO 0< O 00 oo •N WN •N l-H rH O b- o? t^ 00 CO »-! V5 O O "73 O CO QJ O '"' "n? -^ p HJ -M >— 1 O O ^ -Q << rH >0 OJ "^ 00 >o 00 G^ O »S ^ •N CO 00 o O C>< «5 CO CN O <» ^ O <» -' o ^ ^ t-Too CO CO ^ J> > rH 0) B •< CS P^ rH O C/2 PQ C3 O .1 ^ •- ^ O 'T^ I—* •<— P iM ^O o 'p 03 (X! T3 o >c 00 i-H CO 00 t-l GO CO >— I ■* O O 0< O ^ "-•<>? t~ Oi ^ #\ #\ »\ ^ *\ ,— ( 1— I GO O Oi o l-H «^ t- O t- t- T? i^ 00 »o o »o »\ •% «S «\ ^N •% O Ci GO 00 00 CO Ci CO I— ( X CO GO rl t- Oi Tft CO CO Oi O Oi Jt^ O CO 6 d ''SH * * 1-1 O v:> O CO G^ Oi r- 1 CO ■^ 0< GO 1:^ GO 00 CO I— I I— I 00 rH o? lO O? GO 00 O CO CO CJ^ CO CO o CO 00 1—1 CO a CO GO 00 n3 a o o o o CO c 'So > a 00 *:i o . 09 a 03 c3 •^ rQ CO he G oj S o O p^ ^ ^ . Oi 1— I 1— I 1::^ 00 00 00 »0 O O «^ 05 Tf< tJ* -^ CO CO CO 00 00 00 00 00 00 1— I 1—t 1-H 1—1 1-H 1-H CO CO CO O 1-t CO GO '^ -^ VJ CO CO 00 00 00 00 00 00 be bcH c3 cj cj 5^ P-( h- ( H-^ Ph 1> 05 G9 »0 05 05 O 1— I 00 00 05 C5 O 00 3t~- C5 O <3<{ o o V5 «5 05 CO 05 o GO CO o C5 o H 00 q CO CO • ^ (D !>. o3 05 00 (U o u 03 05 ^ §5 l-H CC o ce (U o o 00 00 05 05 (192) chapter viii What We Should Do "Oh, ye Athenians, yet is there time! And there is one manner in which you can recover your greatness, or, dying, fall worthy of your past — go yourself, every man of you, and stand in the ranks; and either a vic- tory beyond all victories in its glory awaits you, or, falling, you shall fall greatly and worthy of your past." — Demosthenes to the Athenians. Our past military policy, so far as it concerns the land forces, has been thoroughly unsound and in violation of basic military principles. We have succeeded not because of it, but in spite of it. It has been unnecessarily and brutally costly in human life and recklessly extravagant in the expendi- 193 OUR MILITARY HISTORY ture of treasure. It has tended greatly to prolong our wars and consequently has delayed national development. Because we have succeeded in spite of an unsound system, those who do not look beneath the surface fail to recognize the numerous shortcomings of that system, or appreciate how dan- gerous is our further dependence upon it. The time has come to put our house in order through the establishment of a sound and dependable system, and to make such wise and prudent prepa- ration as will enable us to defend suc- cessfully our country and our rights. No such system can be established which does not rest upon equahty of service for all who are physically fit and of proper age. Manhood suffrage means manhood obligation for service 194 WHAT WE SHOULD DO in peace or war. This is the basic principle upon which truly representa- tive government, or free democracy, rests and must rest if it is successfully to withstand the shock of modern war. The acceptance of this fundamental principle will require to a certain extent the moral organization of the people, the building up of that sense of individual obligation for service to the nation which is the basis of true patriotism, the teaching of our people to think in terms of the nation rather than in those of a locality or of per- sonal interest. This organization must also be accompanied by the organization, clas- sification and training of our men and the detailed and careful organization of the material resources of the coun- try with the view to making them 195 OUR MILITARY HISTORY promptly available in case of need and to remedying any defects. In the organization of our land forces we must no longer place reliance upon plans based upon the development of volunteers or the use of the militia. The volunteer system is not dependable because of the uncer- tainty as to returns, and in any case because of lack of time for training and organization. Modern wars are often initiated without a formal declaration of war or by a declaration which is coincident with the first act of war. Dependence upon militia under state control or partially under state con- trol, spells certain disaster, not because of the quality of the men or officers, but because of the system under which they work. 196 WHAT WE SHOULD DO We must also have a first-class navy, well balanced and thoroughly equipped with all necessary appliances afloat and ashore. It is the first line of defense. We need a highly efficient regular army, adequate to the peace needs of the nation. By this is meant a regular force, fully equipped, thor- oughly trained and properly organ- ized, with adequate reserves of men and material, and a force sufficient to garrison our over-sea possessions, including the Philippines and the Hawaiian Islands. These latter are the key to the Pacific and one of the main defenses of our Pacific coast and the Panama Canal, and whoever holds them dominates the trade routes of the greater portion of the Pacific and, to a large extent, that ocean. The 197 OUR MILITARY HISTORY army must be sufficient also to provide an adequate garrison for the Panama Canal, which is an implement of com- merce and an instrument of war so valuable that we must not under any conditions allow it to lie outside our secure grasp. The regular force must also be ade- quate to provide sufficient troops for our coast defenses and such garrisons as may be required in Porto Rico and Alaska. The regular force must also be sufficient to provide the necessary mobile force in the United States; by this is meant a force of cavalry, infantry, field artillery, engineers and auxiliary troops sufficient to provide an expeditionary force such as we sent to Cuba in 1898, and at the same time to provide a force sufficient to meet possible conditions of internal 198 WHAT WE SHOULD DO disorder. It must also furnish train- ing units for the National Guard, or whatever force the federal government may eventually establish in place of it, and provide sufficient officers for duty under the detail system in the various departments, instructors at the various colleges and schools where military instruction is or may be estabhshed, attaches abroad and officers on special missions. The main reliance in a war with a first-class power will ultimately be the great force of citizen soldiers forming a purely federal force, thoroughly organized and equipped with reserves of men and material. This force must be trained under some system which will permit the instruction to be given in part during the school period or age, thereby greatly reducing the time 199 OUR MILITARY HISTORY required for the final intensive period of training, which should be under regular officers and in conjunction with regular troops. In brief, the system must be one which utilizes as far as possible the means and oppor- tunities now available, and interferes as little as possible with the educa- tional or industrial careers of those affected. A system moulded on the general lines of the Australian or Swiss^ will accomplish this. Some modifications will be required to meet our conditions. Each year about one milhon men reach the military age of 18; of this number not more than fifty per cent are fit for military service, this being about the average in other countries. Far less than fifty per cent come up ^ See Appendix for complete description. 200 WHAT WE SHOULD DO to the standards required for the regu- lar army, but the minor defects reject- ing them for the regular army would not reject them for general military service. Assuming that some system on the general lines of the Australian or Swiss must be eventually adopted in this country, it would seem that about 500,000 men would be available each year for military training. If the boys were prepared by the state author- ities, through training in schools and colleges, and in state training areas — when the boys were not in school — to the extent that they are in Switzerland or Australia, it would be possible, when they come up for federal training, to finish their military training — so far as preparing them for the duties of enlisted men is concerned — within a period of approximately three months. 201 OUR MILITARY HISTORY We should be able to limit the period of first line obligation to the period from eighteen to twenty-five, inclusive, or seven years, or we could make the period of obligatory service begin two years later and extend it to twenty- seven. This procedure would give in the first line approximately three and one-half millions of men at the age of best physical condition and of minimum dependent and business responsibility. From the men of certain years (classes) of this period, organizations of federal forces should be built up to the extent of at least twenty-five divisions. They would be organized and equipped exactly like the regular army and would be held ready for immediate service as our present militia would be were it under federal control. Men of these organizations would 202 WHAT WE SHOULD DO not live in uniform but would go about their regular occupations as do the members of the militia to-day, but they would be equipped, organized and ready for immediate service. If emer- gency required it, additional organiza- tions could be promptly raised from the men who were within the obligatory period. There should be no pay in peace time except when the men were on duty and then it should be merely nominal. The duty should be recog- nized as a part of the man's citizenship obligation to the nation. The organiza- tions to be made up of men within the period of obligatory service, could be filled either by the men who indi- cated their desire for such training or by drawing them by lot. This is a matter of detail. The regular army 203 OUR MILITARY HISTORY as organized would be made up as to-day ; it would be a professional army. The men who came into it would be men who had received in youth this citizenship training. They would come into the regular army because they wanted to be professional soldiers. The regular army would be to a certain extent the training nucleus for the citizen soldier organizations and would be the force garrisoning our over-sea possessions. It would be much easier to maintain our regular army in a highly efficient condition, as general military training would have produced a respect for the uniform and an appre- ciation of the importance of a soldier's duty. The reserve corps of officers would be composed of men who had had longer and more advanced training, and 204 WHAT WE SHOULD DO could be recruited and maintained as indicated below, through further train- ing of men from the military schools and colleges and those from the officers' training corps units of the nonmilitary universities and colleges. There would also be those from the military training camps and other sources, such as men who have served in the army and have the proper qualifications. This would give a military establishment in which every man would be physically fit to play his part and would have finished his obligation in what was practically his early manhood, with little proba- bility of being called upon again unless the demands of war were so great as to require more men than those of the total first line, eighteen to twenty-five years, inclusive. Then they would be called by years as the occasion required, 205 OUR MILITARY HISTORY and would be available for service up to their forty-fifth year. It would give us a condition of real national pre- paredness, a much higher type of citizenship, a lower criminal rate and an enormously improved economic efficiency. Pending the establishment of such a system, every effort should be made to transfer the state militia to federal control. By this is meant its complete removal from state control and its establishment as a purely federal force, having no more relation to the states than the regular army has at present. This force under federal control will make a very valu- able nucleus for the building up of a federal force of citizen soldiers. Offi- cers and men should be transferred with their present grades and ratings. The states have full authority to 206 WHAT WE SHOULD DO maintain a military force of their own and under their exclusive control, if they desire to do so. Pennsylvania has established a state constabulary and in doing so has taken a long step in the right direction. Pennsylvania has not had to call upon her militia for strike or riot duty for a good many years. As has been recommended by the General Staff, there should be built up with the least possible delay a corps of at least 50,000 reserve offi- cers, on lines and through means recommended by the General Staff, and by means of a further develop- ment of the United States Military Training Camps for college students and older men, which have been in operation for a number of years. These plans include the coordination 207 OUR MILITARY HISTORY of the instruction at the various military colleges and schools and the establishment of well-thought-out plans for the nonmilitary colleges at which it may be decided to establish officers' training corps units on lines now under consideration. This number of officers, fifty thou- sand, may seem excessive to some, but when it is remembered that there were one hundred and twentv-seven thou- sand officers in the Northern army during the Civil War, and over sixty thousand in the Southern, fifty thou- sand will not appear to be excessive. Fifty thousand officers w^ll be barely sufficient properly to officer a million and a half citizen soldiers. We had in service. North and South, during the Civil War, over four million men, and at the end of the war we had 208 WHAT WE SHOULD DO approximately one and a quarter mil- lion under arms. Under legislative provision enacted during the Civil War, commonly known as the Morrill Act, Congress established mechanical and agricultural colleges in each state, among other things prescribing military instruction and providing for this purpose officers of the regular army. There are nearly thirty thousand students at these institutions who receive during their course military instruction for periods of from one to two years. In some cases the instruction is excel- lent; in others it is very poor. There are in addition a large num- ber of military colleges and schools; at these there are some ten thousand students, so that there are approxi- mately forty thousand young men 209 OUR MILITARY HISTORY receiving military instruction, nearly all of them under officers of the army. This means a graduating class of about eight thousand, of whom not more than forty-five hundred would be fit to undergo military training. These men should be assembled in United States Military Training Camps for periods of five weeks each for two consecutive years, in order that they may receive that practical and thorough instruction which in the majority of instances is not possible during their college course. With these should be assembled the men who have taken the officers' training course at the various nonmilitary universi- ties. This course, as outlined by the General Staff, will be thorough and conducted, so far as the purely mili- tary courses and duties are concerned, 210 WHAT WE SHOULD DO under the immediate control of officers of the army. From all these sources we have practically an inexhaustible supply of material from which excellent reserve officers can be made. From the men assembled in camp each year, fifteen hundred should be selected and com- missioned, subject only to a physical examination, as they are all men of college type, for one year as second lieutenants in the line and in the vari- ous staff corps and departments of the regular army. They should receive the pay and allowance of second lieu- tenants, or such pay and allowance as may be deemed to be appropriate. The men who receive this training would furnish very good material for reserve officers of the grade of captain and major, whereas as a rule the men 211 OUR MILITARY HISTORY >vho have not had this training would quahfy only in the grade of lieutenant. From this group of men could well be selected, subject to the prescribed mental and physical examination, the greater portion of the candidates from civil life for appointment in the army. We have the material and the machin- ery for turning out an excellent corps of reserve officers. All that is needed is to take hold of it and shape it. The prompt building up of a reserve corps of officers is one of the most vitally important steps to be taken. It is absolutely essential. It takes much time and care to train officers. Not only should students of the various colleges, universities and schools where military training is given, be made use of to the fullest extent, but the military training camps which have 212 WHAT WE SHOULD DO been conducted so successfully during the past few years should be greatly extended and made a part of the gen- eral plan of providing officers for the officers' reserve corps. It will be nec- essary to place the instruction at these camps on a different basis and to com- bine certain theoretical work with the practical work of the camp. This is a matter of detail which can be readily arranged. The results attained at these camps fully justify their being given the most serious attention and being made a part of the general plan for the training of officers. 213 chapter ix Constructive Work of the Army "All civic virtues^ all the heroism and self-sacrifice of patriotism, spring ultimately from the habit men acquire of regarding their nation as a great organic whole, identifying themselves with its fortunes in the past as in the present, and looking forward anxiously to its future destinies." — LecJce, Our people as a whole do not under- stand what a tremendous factor our little army has been in the building up of the nation and the development of its resources from the earliest days. They too often think of it only as an instrument of destruction. As a mat- ter of fact it has been one of the great influences in opening up and building 214 WORK OF THE ARMY up the country and maintaining public order. Of recent years it has played a very great role as an administrative force, and in areas under its control great advances have been made and lasting benefits to humanity secured. Before and after the Civil War the army was the main instrument in the maintenance of order, the safeguard- ing of life and in the opening up and protection of lines of communication incident to the development of the West. This period of the army's activity was full of fascinating inter- est; it was attended by much hard and dangerous work. Even to this day the strongest hold the army has upon the affections of our western people is the result of the work of this period. At the outbreak of the Spanish 215 OUR MILITARY HISTORY War the army entered upon a new field of activity. The war with Spain was not a great war. Fighting was limited to a few hotly-contested actions in Cuba and to some of lesser impor- tance in Porto Rico. Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities the army was confronted with the neces- sity of taking over the civil adminis- tration of the conquered territory. This administration was conducted under the broad authority of military law, but the agency employed was the law of the land. It was military for the time being, in that its source of authority was the power of the mili- tary occupant. Some deviations in form of procedure, due to emergency measures, were required, but, generally speaking, the municipal law governed in the town and city, and the general 216 WORK OF THE ARMY law of the land in the administration of justice and the control of admin- istrative procedure. The basic policy- was to avoid changes in the substan- tive body of the law, and to limit, as far as possible, modifications to pro- cedure, with a view to its betterment and simplification, and also to giving the accused a larger measure of protection. The administrative work in Cuba not only involved the everyday con- duct of public business, but an immense amount of constructive work incident to the establishment of a school system, construction of great public works, and of the general laws governing charitable institutions, as well as an enormous amount of sani- tary organization, an electoral law and constructive and administrative work 21T OUR MILITARY HISTORY to bring about the many changes nec- essary to convert a war-wrecked, demoralized and exhausted colony, fever-stricken and overrun by disease, into a self-governing republic. This great work of the army involved not only the maintenance of public order and the safeguarding of life and property, but, what was more far-reaching, the building up of a sound system of sanitation, a system which, when once in operation, greatly reduced the death rate. Malaria, in its various forms, had been one of the great causes of death in Cuba. Measures were taken which very greatly reduced its ravages among the native population and almost elimi- nated it from the army. Smallpox had been a devastating scourge. This was done away with entirely by vacci- 218 WORK OF THE ARMY nation and the establishment of proper regulations. Yellow fever, one of the most dreaded of all tropical diseases, was brought under thorough control, the means of transmission discovered and the method of control worked out. This discovery freed Cuba of the dread disease which has swept away count- less thousands of its population and decimated the Spanish garrisons and the Spanish population for genera- tions. It is a discovery of vast impor- tance for all time to all living in the American tropical and semi-tropical countries. Its accomplishment was the work of medical officers of the army under the direction of Major Walter Reed. The general sanitary work in the Island was under the control of an army medical officer who was directly under the military governor. 219 OUR MILITARY HISTORY Cuban physicians of great ability co- operated loyally in the great work of the sanitary rehabilitation and ren- dered invaluable service. The discov- eries made in Cuba and the methods established for the control of yellow fever were adopted by other countries and the benefits secured are now com- mon to all countries formerly ravaged by this disease. The saving of life and money in our own country inci- dent to doing away with yellow fever and the quarantine that paralyzed the movement of business in the entire South, has been many, many times the cost of the war. In Porto Rico similar work was done with reference to malaria and smallpox. The same methods were applied as were employed in Cuba to control yellow fever. The great 220 WORK OF THE ARMY problem of tropical anemia was taken up and solved. A very great portion of the credit for this work is due to the army, principally to Major Bailey K. Ashford, army surgeon, who took up the work in Porto Rico and found that there was a real cause for what we looked upon as tropical shiftlessness and laziness. The cause was the hook- worm. Most energetic and successful measures were taken to combat it. Recent opinion is to the effect that the re-energization of the working class in Porto Rico incident to doing away with tropical anemia or hookworm dis- ease, amounts to about 60 per cent increased efficiency. The benefits of this discovery are being applied to many tropical and semi-tropical coun- tries, including our own South. It means the re-energization of a great 221 OUR MILITARY HISTORY mass of the people. The life-saving value is tremendous. Each year in Porto Rico the reduction in the death rate incident to the control of tropical anemia, exceeds the total loss by death and wounds in the Spanish- American War. Important constructive and administrative work was also accom- plished, during the period of military control, much of it directly under the military governors who were first appointed. Similar work, administrative, con- structive and sanitary, was accom- plished in the Philippines. There for a long time the government was under exclusive militarv control. Much val- uable and far-reaching sanitary work was done in those islands by medical officers of the army. This work has been taken up and continued by the 222 WORK OF THE ARMY medical forces of the civil government and pushed to a degree of success hard to appreciate by those who have not seen what has been done. It has been a great work, resulting in the saving of thousands and thousands of lives. The construction of the Panama Canal was largely army work. It was built very largely on a sanitary foundation. Splendid and effective as has been the work of the army engineers, the fright- ful death toll would have prevented the accomplishment of the undertaking had it not been for Reed's discovery concerning yellow fever and the splen- did application of the system of pre- vention by Surgeon- General William C. Gorgas, who made it possible to conduct the gigantic work of construc- tion under conditions — so far as health was concerned — equal to those existing 223 OUR MILITARY HISTORY in almost any portion of the conti- nental United States. These great sanitary works in lands under our con- trol or taken over by us, alone have saved many times the number of lives lost in the war. The benefits of these discoveries will be for all time. More recently other measures of the greatest value in saving human life have been taken by the military authori- ties of the government in the use of the anti-typhoid serum in the army; so effective has the serum been that although there are more than 100,000 men scattered all over the world from Tientsin, China, to Panama, and from Porto Rico to Alaska, in the army we did not have a single death from typhoid in 1915. The universal application of this preventive measure in the army has 224 WORK OF THE ARMY demonstrated thoroughly that typhoid fever can be completely controlled ; that it is a preventable disease. Its univer- sal application to the military estab- lishment was first made in the United States. England first began the use of it, but did not make it general. The army has done tremendous serv- ice for the country in the handling of the grave and alarming conditions arising from the great Mississippi flood of recent years. So quietly was this work done that few people appreciate it; thousands and thousands of people have been saved from watery graves or from starvation. Such has been some of the con- structive and life-saving work of the army. A force designed to protect our lives and liberties in time of war, in time of peace it has always been 225 OUR MILITARY HISTORY one of the great factors in the develop- ment of our own country and of lands under our control. As has been pointed out again and again in the foregoing pages, the train- ing which men get in the army, the knowledge of sanitation, the respect for law and authority, and the habits of discipline, are of unestimable value in building up a sane and sound people. What the army has meant to our peo- ple, how far-reaching its work has been, is understood by few. It may at times fail, and in great emergency must fail unless backed and supported by an organized and devoted people, a people who appreciate that no amount of will- ingness can take the place of prepared- ness and training. Behind the regular army must always stand the great reserve army 226 WORK OF THE ARMY consisting of the able-bodied men of the nation, so trained as to be promptly available for military service if needed, but following their normal occupations in time of peace. Any policy which fails to recognize the principle of equal obligation and equal service is but a makeshift and a stop-gap. The volunteer system is unworthy of serious consideration; not trustworthy because it would cer- tainly break down under the sudden shock and strain of modern war; dan- gerous because it serves to lull people into a false sense of security. 227 APPENDIX THE AUSTRALIAN SYSTEM OF DEFENSE. Prior to 1870 the main defense of Australia was in the hands of the British troops quar- tered in the leading cities ; the primary purpose of these troops was to serve as a convict guard. Whenever war appeared to be imminent volun- teer corps were organized. All British troops were withdrawn in 1870, and small detachments of permanent forces were formed as a nucleus around which it was proposed to shape a citizen soldiery. In 1883- 1884 a partially paid volunteer militia was organized. There was established at this time a system of military instruction in the schools for boys. This cadet system had attained con- siderable development, but had not reached the class of boys who fail for any reason to attend these schools, and was purely of a volunteer nature. In 1908 the volunteer system was ex- tended by providing for the military training of the youth not attending school, and who were 228 APPENDIX authorized to form a part of the land defense of the country. This system for both the gen- eral forces and the cadet forces proved unsat- isfactory, so that in 1909 a statute was passed making both the cadet system and the adult system compulsory. This act of 1909 did not become effective until June 30, 1911, on which date the volunteer system ceased, and on the following day the compulsory provisions of this act became effective. They divided the military and naval forces of the Commonwealth into "permanent" and "citizen" forces — the former bound to service for a term, the latter not so bound. Until 1911 they were divided into militia who were paid and volunteers who were not ordinarily paid for their services, with a reserve who had done active service. Until July 1, 1911, when compulsory training went into effect under the Act of 1909, enlist- ment in time of peace was voluntary. All male inhabitants between 18 and 60 were liable to service in time of war within the territorial limits of Australia only, and, in addition, cadet corps, in which were enrolled schoolboys under 12 years of age and youths between 14 and 19 not attending school, were established. These corps were not liable for active service. The Act of 1909 was the direct outcome of 229 OUR MILITARY HISTORY the feeling shared by all classes in the com- munity that the defense of Australia was inse- cure under a voluntary system; section 125 of this Act provides: All male inhabitants of Australia (excepting those who are exempted by this Act), who have resided therein for six months and are British sub- jects, shall be liable to be trained as follows: (a) From 12 to 14 years of age in the junior cadets; (b) From 14 to 1 8 years of age in the senior cadets ; (c) From 18 to 26 years of age in the citizen forces ; provided that, except in time of imminent danger or war, the last year of service in the citizen forces shall be limited to one registration or one muster parade. The Acts of 1910-191S merely extended or curtailed certain minor provisions of the Act of 1909. To-day the system is substantially as follows : On July 1st of his 12th year every Australian boy who has been officially declared physically, mentally and morally fit, starts his training as a junior cadet. He is furnished with a hat, shirt, breeches, puttees and shoes, and is given a minimum of 90 hours' elementary military 230 APPENDIX training for each of two years. In his 14th year he becomes a senior cadet — his funda- mental military training for four years, with an annual minimum of four 4-hour drills, twelve 2-hour drills and twenty-four 1-hour drills in marching, discipline, the handling of arms, physical drill, guard duty and minor tac- tics. A cadet rifle and belt are added to his "junior" uniform, and 10 per cent of the best shots are given target practice with the service rifle. In his nineteenth year the youth becomes a member of the "citizen forces." He receives two woolen shirts, two pairs of breeches, over- coat, hat, sleeping cap, two pairs of leggings, two pairs of shoes, a kit bag, rifle and bayonet. In the "citizen forces" the minimum annual instruction must reach an equivalent of sixteen whole days' drill, not less than eight of which must be in camps of continuous training. From the senior cadets the youth is assigned to that arm of the "citizen forces" to which he seems best fitted and in which he is most inter- ested, and is given infantry and cavalry drill, or staff corps training until he is 25 years of age. In his 26th year he is required to attend one muster parade only, and is then discharged from "active" service. He remains, however, subject to recall to the colors in time of war 231 OUR MILITARY HISTORY until he becomes 60 years of age. If he is declared proficient at the end of each year's training by a board of officers convened to pass judgment_, he has received twelve years of sys- tematic progressive military training. To win his discharge he must hold twelve annual cer- tificates of proficiency — a failure to pass the efficiency board means a repetition of that year of training. Promotions in the "citizens" forces are absolutely by merits the principle adopted being that "the best soldiers must lead, what- ever their civil avocation or birth." The pop- ulation of Australia of military age is about 500,000. Exemptions and rejections average about 10 per cent for senior cadets and 33 1-3 per cent for "citizen forces." The number under training when the system is in full sway will give 100,000 senior cadets and 120,000 "citizen" soldiers. The available trained force of Australia will in the course of a few years approximate 300,000 men. Under the Defense Acts the following classes of exemptions exist: Persons physically, men- tally or morally unfit, members and officers of parliament, judges, police, prison employees, ministers of religion, lighthouse keepers, and physicians and nurses of public hospitals. The governor general may by proclamation vary or 232 APPENDIX extend these exemptions^ or he may exempt specified areas. Persons whose religion or belief prohibits them from bearing arms may be exempted from service in the combatant branches, but are liable for service in the sup- ply departments; and in every case the burden of proof rests upon the person claiming exemp- tion. The parent or guardian who fails to reg- ister a son or ward of service age, or the employer who interferes in any way with the miltary service of his employees, although he is not required to pay an employee for time absent on military duty, is liable to a heavy fine, and the boy or man who is absent from a formation may be fined or imprisoned. Should the Congress of the United States pass the proposed act to partially pay our organized militia, our system of defense will be practically that which was long ago abandoned by Austra- lia as "insecure." The effect of the present sys- tem is the constant maintenance of an adequate, trained force, which is under the direct control of the commonwealth in time of emergency. The government maintains *'area officers'* who look after registration and enrollment of the available recruits in their districts, and it supplies its forces with a simple, inexpensive uniform, but no pay. 233 OUR MILITARY HISTORY The young men of Australia give a small amount of their time to the service of their country, and in return receive the best kind of mental and physical training at the most recep- tive period of their lives. The expense to the government is small, the benefits derived by it and the individuals it accepts for training are many and important. The foregoing is a brief synopsis of the Australian system. It will be noted that to apply this system in this country, where prac- tically the entire matter of education is in the hands of forty-eight state governments instead of being in the hands of the general government, will require considerable modification for its practical application. As a matter of fact, practically the greater portion of the inherent difficulties attending the securing of efficiency in the militia will have to be overcome in the establishment of an efficient system of military training of any kind that is undertaken by our government. It is not believed that these diffi- culties will be insurmountable if the people of the country can be made to realize the inherent defects in our present system, and our actual inability to organize even a protective defensive force in this country. By this effective organi- zation is understood, of course, an organization 234i APPENDIX that can be comi3leted in time to be of use under modern conditions. The following ideas are deemed to be essential to efficiency in any system of defense that may be adopted^ viz: 1. Absolute and unqualified control by the central or responsible power. 2. A nation-wide appreciation of the needs of the country in the form of national de- fense. 3. The actual training and organization of a sufficient number of regular troops to act as an expeditionary force or as a retaining force until the citizen soldiers, whether cadets or militia, can be mob- ilized. 4. That this citizen force, composed as it must be of militia and students, shall be not only trained, but organized into fixed defensive units, at all times, whether in peace or war, under the con- trol and subject to the direct call of the President as Commander in Chief of the Land and Naval Forces. 235 THE SWISS SYSTEM OF DEFENSE. "Nothing is more powerful, happier, or more praiseworthy than a State which possesses a very great number of trained soldiers. The independence of the Swiss Confederation rests not upon assurances or promises of em- perors or kings, it rests on a founda- tion of iron — ^that of our swords." The Swiss have always recognized the neces- sity of universal military service, and as early as 1291 it appears that all who did not serve — even widows and nuns — were subject to a special tax. From a military policy based upon hurried levies when war appeared to be imminent, and which were as broken reeds in action, the Swiss in 1874 passed laws which form the basis of the present system. The laws of 1874 have from time to time been modified in many minor respects. Today every Swiss schoolboy, from the time he enters school until he is graduated, is given a systematic course of athletic training to fit him for his later military service. This train- 236 APPENDIX ing, which is progressive and prescribed by the federal government, although directly super- vised by the canton authorities, is followed in every public and private school and institution for boys in Switzerland. The minimum time devoted to this instruction is two hours a week for the younger classes, and three hours a week for the older. Upon leaving school the young man may vol- unteer for a course in preliminary training. He receives from 50 to 80 hours a year in athletics, marching, care and use of the service rifle and target practice to include 300 metres. This course is purely voluntary, and is largely gone into by those who hope to win a commis- sion in the Swiss forces. In his 20th year, if examination finds him morally, mentally and physically fit, he must be enrolled as a member of the recruit class of the local battalion of the "Elite," or First Line. He is furnished with a simple service uniform and receives pay at the rate of 16 cents per day. In his recruit year the Swiss receives from 60 to 90 days of military training, depend- ing upon the branch of the army he enters, by instructor-officers of the permanent establish- ment. Every year after the recruit year, he, as a soldier of the First Line, returns to the 237 OUR MILITARY HISTORY colors for at least 11 days of "review" instruc- tion. He retains his uniform, rifle and equip- ment in his immediate possession, and since all other impedimenta is kept at the headquarters of the local organization, the details of mobili- zation are greatly simplified. Upon reaching the age of 32 the First Line soldier is transferred to the Landwehr, or Sec- ond Line, and at 48 to the Landsturm or Third Line. The Landwehr is a feeder for the Elite, and is itself fed from the Landsturm. Officers are made through merit, are given special courses, and retained in "active" serv- ice for longer periods. The law permits no soldier to decline promotion with its added responsibilities in either the commissioned or noncommissioned grades. The government encourages the formation of rifle clubs and competitions among them in every possible way, and officers of the Second and Third Lines make it a practice to assemble often for tactical discussions and war games. Every soldier is insured against sickness, accident or death by the government while under instruction or while engaged in any mili- tary duty. Certain classes are exempted from active serv- ice in time of peace, as members of the Federal 238 APPENDIX Council, ministers of religion (except the nec- essary chaplains), prison wardens, frontier guards, police, personnel of public hospitals, and railroad and steamship employees, but are liable for service in time of war in their pro- fessional capacities. The morally and physi- cally unfit are not permitted to serve, but are required to pay a special income tax in lieu of service. In one sense it may be said that Switzerland has no standing army, as its permanent estab- lishment consists of a general staif and a small number of territorial recruiting supply and instructor officers; yet with a population of 4,000,000 in the year 1912 it had a fully organ- ized and equipped, well trained and disciplined force of 490,430 men instantly available. The military expenses of the Government for that year were $8,229,941, or $16.77 per man. While the obligatory military service of the boys is extremely short in contrast with that of the great European powers, it must be remem- bered that the boy has been receiving military instructions for a number of years, that he has been acquiring a good body and familiarity with the rifle and a high moral sense of his obligation to his country, so that when he comes to the colors he has already absorbed a large 239 OUR MILITARY HISTORY proportion of the training which the recruit has to receive after joining the colors in other armies. Physical training forms an essential part of this preliminary work^ and the training is uni- form throughout the country, as it could be here, it all being based upon the calisthenic meth- ods prescribed by the army regulations. Prac- tically all of this instruction is given by the male teachers of the public schools. Rifle shoot- ing is encouraged throughout the country, as it should be here. 240 H84 83 ^ .*'% ^^V ' • o. 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