GIass_ Book. D^35~ ^_ The Facts — and the Documents AMERICAN RIGHTS & BRITISH PRETENSIONS On the Seas At Book-stores and News-stands, One Dollar y AMERICAN RIGHTS & BRITISH PRETENSIONS on the SEAS 2 ?±^ The Facts and the Documents, Official and Other, Bearing upon the Present Attitude of Great Britain toward the Commerce of the United States Compiled, with introductory memoranda, by WILLIAM BAYARD HALE New York Robert M. McBride & Company 191 5 3^ Copyright, 19 15, by William Bayard Hale CONTENTS I The First Encroachments II The Summit of Arrogance III Ships and Cargoes Stopped at Sea IV The Case of Cotton V Indirect Interference with Trade VI Interference with Communication VII Our Larger Interests VIII List of Ships Detained IX Quotations Pertinent to the Issue X Official Documents XI Diplomatic Correspondence The Government of Great Britain has virtually set up in the midst of the busy seas an arbitrary court, claiming unheard-of powers and exercising the most tyrannous police functions; seiz- ing and haling into the dock as suspects all travelers upon the ocean highways, and visiting many of them with heavy penalties for unproven, and indeed unprovable, offenses. This lawless assizes of the seas, contemptuous alike of its own precedents and of the rights of others, scarcely stoops to the pretense of citing authority for its actions, which are determined solely by its brutal will, and enforced, though indeed largely through intimidation, by the gigantic power of its naval police. The extent of the earth's surface over which this extraordinary court is permitted to wield its self-arrogated jurisdiction, the magnitude of the in- terests which its actions vitally affect, and the supineness with which sovereign States submit to the erection, upon the ruins of their self-respect and the debacle of their highest commercial and political interests, of an island's municipal statutes into inter- national formulas, unite to render this one of the spectacles of history. AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS On the SEAS THE FIRST ENCROACHMENTS THE people of the United States have spent a great deal of breath in dis- cussing the respective merits and in- terests of the nations at war in Europe. Is it not time for us to give our attention seriously to our own interests, as they are affected by the struggle? It is an easier mental exercise, a more engaging diversion, unquestionably, to fol- low the fortunes of opposing armies, as dis- played in the morning papers day by day, than it is to study the unromantic subject of the treatment which American interests are receiving at the hands of the belliger- ents. Yet, after all, the question whether Roumania sides with the British Allies or with the Teutons, whether Bulgaria or Servia gets Macedonia, whether Germany retains or gives up Courland, is of slight practical importance to us compared with the question whether the condition of the people of the United States is bettered or worsened by the events of the war. This volume owes its existence to a belief that it is the business of Americans to guard the interests of America — and if to guard them, then, necessarily, to study them. It aims to afford materials for such study of American interests in at least one aspect — the aspect which, as the months draw on, emerges as perhaps the most anxious object of our concern : the vindication of the right of neutral ships to sail the seas on peace- able errands with innocent cargoes. Against Germany that right has been vindicated. It remains to assert it against Great Britain. Less tragic than German attacks upon our rights at sea, the persistent tres- passes of the British have not drawn the same strained attention nor aroused the same dramatic passions. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to exaggerate the serious- ness of the issue which Great Britain has forced upon us by a course of conduct, which, months ago, and long before it had reached its present excess of insolence, the United States Government was obliged to characterize as "an almost unqualified de- nial of the sovereign rights of nations now at peace." * Let us get a few principles in mind: Civilization does not countenance the view that war works a stoppage of the or- dinary vocations, or interferes with the or- dinary lives, of non-combatants. Com- merce is free to flow in its regular channels in war as in peace, subject to two limita- tions or exceptions only, clearly defined and universally understood. These exceptions are that vessels are forbidden to go through a blockade; and that they are forbidden to carry what is denominated "contraband." There are, then, two grounds on which goods may lawfully be stopped on their way to a belligerent: First, on the ground that they are at- tempting to run a blockade, which has been formally declared and is being physically maintained against the port to which the goods are consigned. Second, on the ground that the goods are contraband. As for goods coming from the country of a belligerent, there is only one good ground on which they may be stopped, namely : the ground that they are attempting to run a blockade. The subject of blockade will be more fully considered further on; at present it is enough to point out the indisputable fact that international law makes these require- ments concerning a blockade, namely : first, that it must be a real blockade ; second, that it must be effective ; and, third, that it must apply equally to all nations. The United States Government contends that no block- ade exists against any German port. It follows that it is only as contraband, and only when on the way to Germany that *Note to the British Government, March 30, 1915. AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS cargoes from America are lawfully liable to interference. Let us remind ourselves what, precisely, "contraband," is. Contraband goods fall into two distinct classes. Certain articles, which are mani- festly intended for warlike uses, are absolute contraband. They are subject to capture if shown to be destined to territory of the enemy. Certain other articles, which may or may not be intended for warlike uses, fall into the category of conditional contraband, and the rule of international law regarding it is this: Conditional contraband is subject to seizure by an enemy if it is detected at sea on its way to the army, navy, or official administration of the enemy Government. It is not subject to seizure if consigned to a neutral country or to private citizens of a country at war. The first issue between the Government of the United States and that of Great Britain lies here. Let us get the facts, then, clearly in mind : It is a firmly established principle of modern international law that articles of conditional contraband, carried in neu- tral ships, not intended for the use of the army, navy or Government of a belligerent, are not subject to capture or detention at sea. If intended for military use, they are so subject — they are contraband; but if destined for the ordinary use of life in the enemy's country, and not distinctly for the enemy's forces, they are not contraband. It is clear that no question can arise as to the character of goods known as conditional contraband when they are on their way to a neutral port; in that case they are inno- cent. There is nothing particularly abstruse in the subjects of blockade and contraband. They are two subjects upon which inter- national law has really reached clear con- clusions. On Feb. 26, 1909, an interna- tional conference in session in London pro- mulgated what has become known as the Declaration of London Eelative to the Laws of Naval Warfare. The provisions of this declaration were the result of long study on the part of experts in international law and practice; they represent the result of a careful weighing of the interest of belliger- ents on the one side and of neutral coun- tries on the other side during the prevalence of war. On the above date the Declaration of London received the signatures of all the Powers represented in the conference, namely: The United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, Japan, Germany, Austria- Hungary, Italy, Spain and Holland. It is true that it has never received formal rati- fication at the hands of the Powers; its authority consists alone in the fact that it represents the attested and conceded con- sensus of expert opinion established by ac- credited representatives of the world's Powers, and stands as the fullest and latest statement of the principles of international law on the subject. The principles set forth above are those which the signatories of the Declaration of London declared to be the understood and accepted law of nations with respect of blockade and contraband. Such being the principles and the laws governing maritime affairs in time of war, how has the practice of the British Govern- ment conformed to them? The long series of abuses and outrages inflicted upon American commerce by the Government of Great Britain may perhaps be summarized under the following heads : I. Neutral merchantmen carrying inno- cent merchandise from American to German ports, or from German to American ports, are forbidden to proceed on their voyages. Any neutral ship attempting to proceed from an American to a German port, or from a German to an American port, will be taken to a British port, where the cargo will be discharged and handed over to the marshal of the Prize Court. As a matter of fact, no ships now attempt to pass between Germany and America. And, yet, under all accepted rules of international law, neutral ships have a perfect right to proceed to Ger- man ports or to come out from German ports save such as are specifically blockaded. There is no blockade of any German port. (See, however, page 13, ff.) II. American and other neutral vessels on their way between American ports and other neutral ports are forced to call at British ports, there to be examined and often to discharge their cargoes. International law allows the right of visit and search at sea, but it does not contem- plate the dragging of merchantmen into ports out of the line of their voyage and their detention there for days, weeks or months, at all sorts of inconvenience and loss. III. Shipments of American goods of or- dinary character heretofore recognized as strictly peaceable and legitimate, on their way from American to neutral ports, are habitually seized by Great Britain, being, forcibly removed from American and other neutral ships. Under all recognized international law, Americans have a perfect right to ship ab- solutely anything they please to neutral ports, and no belligerent has a right to touch them. But especially is it an intoler- able outrage for England to stop American shipments of such innocent goods as food- stuffs and clothing stuffs on their way to Norway, Sweden, Denmark and the Nether- lands — countries with which we have a perfect right to trade without consulting Great Britain. THE FIRST ENCROACHMENTS IV. No goods of German ownership or origin are suffered to be shipped from any neutral port to America. Neutral mer- chantmen on their way to the United States are hauled into British ports and ransacked for goods bought in Germany by American merchants for use in American manufac- tures or for American consumption. We are not only forbidden to sell our products to Germany and Austria, but we are denied the right to procure the neces- sities and comforts for which we look to Germany and Austria. V. Great Britain not only interdicts us from selling our products to Germany and Austria, but she forbids our selling to any of the neutral countries more than a certain quantity of a product. Thus she has the assurance to notify us that we may sell Norse countries only a limited amount of cotton. Great Britain constantly declares that our increased exports to neutral coun- tries (which have hitherto been able to buy of the countries now too busy in war to manufacture) is suspicious. So Great Brit- ain confiscates our products on the way to our customers — and there proceeds to sell them herself at a profit for herself. VI. Great Britain refuses to recognize the registry awarded by the Government of the United States to ships purchased by American citizens, in good faith, for the sole purpose of relieving the distresses of our commerce. VII. American merchantmen which are suspected by the British government to be owned by persons whose nationality is of- fensive to it are seized and dragged to Brit- ish ports. One such ship, a native Ameri- can, proceeding without cargo of any kind, between the ports of New York and Norfolk, Virginia, was captured within gun-shot of our coast and taken, a prize, into Halifax. VIII. Thus the insolence of unrebuked naval power has been extended to our own waters, and British cruisers hover on our coasts and lie at the entrance of our harbors. There they wait to capture, and often do capture, innocent merchantmen suspected of carrying some of the articles included in the almost all-embracing British list of contra- band. There they overhaul passengers and require passports from American citizens still within sight of their own land. There they seize American vessels on one pretext or another and carry them off to a British prize court. IX. All this direct interference with American ships and American goods is not enough. It is supplemented by a series of ingenious devices craftily calculated by Great Britain to carry still further the work of destruction wrought upon our commerce. These devices are innumerable, and many of them are most adroitly concealed, but illustrations of their character are to be found in: 1. The exercise of intimidating argu- ments designed (successfully) to prevent the American Government's meeting the critical national necessity of an American merchant marine; 2. The intimidation (at first by the hand of its ally, France) of American enterprise in the legitimate purchase of mercantile vessels to ply the seas under the protection of the American Flag; 3. A group of trade agreements enforced upon the rubber, textile, tin and other in- dustries of America — agreements under which American manufacturers are allowed to import raw materials only under a Brit- ish license carrying heavy conditions and involving severe hardships ; 4. Agreements, like those enforced upon exporters in many trades, in which Amer- ican producers, in order to dispose of their goods, must agree not to sell to others than those living in British and Allied countries, except on permit from the British Admir- alty. 5. The enforcement of a censorship of absurd severity over commercial cablegrams between the United States and the rest of the world, involving the suppression of com- munication between American merchants and their foreign customers, and between foreign merchants and their American cus- tomers, and the appropriation and dishon- est use of intelligence passing between American and foreign business houses. The chronology of the British war on American commerce is easy to master — the principal dates to learn are but three: August 20, October 29, 1914, and March 11, 1915. These are dates of three Orders in Council — for it is by the same method and in the same form as that which out- raged our forefathers and finally provoked them to the War of 1812 that England to- day is closing the sea to our commerce. The Order in Council of August 20 de- clared it to be the intention of the British Government to act during the present hos- tilities in accordance with the provisions of the Declaration of London, subject to some additions and modifications. A glance at the additions and modifications which this order and that of October 29 then proceed to make reveals the fact that the pretense that the British Government is observing the Declaration of London would be much like the claim of a man who professed that he was carefully observing the command- ments of Moses, subject to the striking out of the nots. The additions and modifica- tions which the British Government has placed upon the Declaration of London are of such a character that they obliterate the Declaration. 10 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS I The Declaration of London, in Articles XXIL, XXIV., and XXVIII., established a list of absolute contraband, another of conditional contraband, and another of mer- chandise not contraband. These lists Great Britain has revised beyond any possible recognition. The catalogue of absolute con- traband has been enormously expanded, and practically everything else has been marked down as conditional contraband. The free list has disappeared. And this in defiance of the rule of the Declaration itself, and of the well-understood principle of interna- tional law, and especially of the century- long contention of the United States, that it is vital to the legitimate commerce of neu- tral States that there should be, as Mr. Hay when Secretary of State put it, no deviation from the rule which determines what is and what is not lawfully subject to belligerent capture, namely: warlike nature, use, and destination. But even more vital is the modification which the British Order in Council makes in the sense of Articles XXXIII. and XXXV. of the Declaration of London. The former article declares that there can be no question of conditional contraband except in cases where the cargo is destined for the use of the administrative depart- ments, or the military or naval force of the enemy. Under the latter article there can be no question of conditional contraband on vessels sailing for a neutral port. The British Government announced that it would regard articles of conditional con- traband consigned' to "merchants or other persons under the control of the authorities of the enemy" in the same light as if they were consigned directly to the military forces of the enemy. This means nothing else than that provisions, for instance, on the way to a German port, consigned to a private importer and intended for no other use than the consumption by the peaceful population in the ordinary way of life, are subject to capture by British ships — be- cause all the inhabitants of the country are under the control of the authorities. Not only so, but the same harmless cargoes on the way to Danish, Dutch, or Norwegian ports are likewise subject to capture — be- cause it may suit the purposes of the British Government to suspect any importer, any- where, of being "under the control" of Ger- man authorities. In other words, American farmers, cattle-raisers, and pork-packers are today, by British edict, denied the right to sell and deliver their products to the peaceful populations of the countries with which Great Britain happens to be at war, and of the countries which she suspects sympathize with them. A year ago, when the above sentence was first written, it seemed a thing impossible that Britain would be permitted to forbid our selling the products of our farms to whom we would. She has been permitted to do it for a year, and the shock of the thing has passed. Yet surely, even though it has been endured for a year, it cannot be the settled policy of the people of the United States to submit to so intolerable an op- pression. There is too long a record of American insistence on the right to sell and ship food to civilian populations anywhere in peace or war. Something like the following has been our historic attitude : In 1795 the British Government, being then at war with France, by an Order in Council directed the seizure of all vessels laden with provisions bound for French ports. The Government of the United States protested against this action. It secured the appointment in 1795 of a Mixed Commission for the purpose of awarding damages by reason of illegal captures and condemnations by the British. This com- mission held that the action of the British in holding up provisions on the way to French ports, but not specifically intended for the French army and navy, was illegal, and awarded large damages. The language of Thomas Jefferson, Sec- retary of State of the United States, in in- structing Mr. Pinckney, our Minister in London, Sept. 7, 1793, represents the posi- tion which this Government has ever since consistently maintained : When two nations go to war, those who choose to live in peace retain their natural right to pursue their agriculture, manufactures, and other ordinary voca- tions, to carry the produce of their industry for ex- change to all nations, belligerent or neutral, as usual. Mr. Jefferson contended that the fact that Great Britain and France were at war af- forded neither of them the right to inter- rupt the agriculture and commerce of the United States. Such interruption tended directly to draw us from the state of peace in which Ave wished to remain. Mr. Jeffer- son instructed Mr. Pinckney that the United States Government could not allow itself to be forced either to withhold pro- visions from France, (thus making our- selves a party to the war), or to withhold them from both France and her enemies, (thus closing to our farmers, manufactur- ers, and shippers all the ports of Europe). He admitted that Great Britain might "feel the desire of starving an enemy nation, but she can have no right of doing it at our loss, nor of making us the instrument of it." Edmund Kandolph, Secretary of State, on May 6, 1794, instructed Mr. Jay, who had gone on a special mission to England in connection with the subject, that "provi- sions, except in the instance of a siege, THE FIRST ENCROACHMENTS It blockade, or investment, are not to be ranked among contraband." After 1795 the Government of Great Brit- ain did not, for 119 years, undertake to assert that provisions destined elsewhere than to the government, army or navy of a belligerent were contraband. Indeed, un- til the year 1914, it consistently maintained the opposite position. In the year 1885, France, being in a state of hostility with Ghina, declared shipments of rice destined to any ports in Northern China to be contraband. The pretension was resisted by Great Britain, on the ground that though provisions may, in par- ticular instances, acquire a contraband character, they cannot in general be so treated. Lord Granville, British Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a note to M. Wadding- ton, Feb. 27, 1885, replied to the French contention that the British Government could not admit it. The United States Minister at Berlin, Mr. Kasson, wrote to Mr. Bayard, Secretary of State, April 23, 1885, relative to the dis- cussion then going on in Europe over the French declaration making rice contraband. Mr. Kasson said : I beg your attention to the importance of the prin- ciple involved in this declaration, as it concerns our American interests. We are neutrals in European wars. Food constitutes an immense portion of our exports. Every European war produces an increased demand for these supplies from neutral countries. The French doctrine declares them contraband, not only when destined directly for military consumption, but when going in the ordinary course of trade as food for the civil population of the belligerent Government. If food can be thus excluded and captured, still more can clothing, the instruments of industry, and all less vital supplies be cut off, on the ground that they tend to support the efforts of the belligerent nation. Indeed, the real principle involved goes to this extent, that everything the want of which will increase the distress of the civil population of the belligerent country may be declared contraband of war. The entire trade of neutrals with belligerents may thus be destroyed, irrespective of an effective blockade of ports. War itself would become more fatal to neutral States than to belligerent interests. The rule of feudal times, the starvation of beleag- uered and fortified towns, might be extended to an entire population of an open country. It is a return to barbaric habits of war. During the Boer war, question having arisen as to the position of the British Gov- ernment with regard to dispatch of provi- sions to South Africa, Lord Salisbury, then head of the Government, (Jan. 10, 1900,) thus defined it : Foodstuffs with a hostile destination can be consid- ered contraband of war only if they are supplies for the enemy's forces. It is not sufficient that they are capable of being so used ; it must be shown that this was in fact their destination at the time of the seizure. During the Eusso-Japanese war the Rus- sian government undertook to put foodstuffs on the contraband list. The British Gov- ernment protested, and the American Gov- ernment declared its total inability to ac- quiesce in the Russian position. Lord Lansdowne, British Minister of For- eign Affairs, on June 11, 1904, instructed Sir C. Hardinge, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that his Government ob- served "with great concern that rice and provisions will be treated as unconditional contraband, a step which they regard as in- consistent with the law and practice of nations." The United States Government was es- pecially emphatic in its refusal to admit the Russian contention. The steamship Arabia, bound for Japanese ports and laden with railway material and flour, consigned to pri- vate commercial houses, was seized by the Russians and taken to Vladivostok. A prize court held that the Arabia's cargo should be confiscated. In the course of a remark- able letter of instruction sent to Mr. McCor- mick, our Ambassador at St. Petersburg, on Aug. 30, 1901, Mr. Hay made use of the following language : When war exists between powerful States it is vital to the legitimate maritime commerce of neutral States that there be no relaxation of the rule — no deviation from the criterion for determining what constitutes contraband of war, lawfully subject to belligerent cap- ture, namely : Warlike nature, use and destination. Articles which, like arms and ammunition, are by their nature of self-evident warlike use, are contraband of war if destined to enemy territory; but articles which, like coal, cotton, and provisions, though ordinarily innocent are capable of warlike use, are not subject to capture and confiscation unless shown by evidence to be actually destined for the military or naval forces of a belligerent. This substantive principle of the law of nations can- not be overridden by technical rule of the Prize Court that the owners of the captured cargo must prove that no part of it may eventually come to the hands of the enemy forces. The proof is of an impossible nature ; and it cannot be admitted that the absence of proof in its nature impossible to make can justify the seizure and condemnation. If it were otherwise, all neutral commerce with the people of a belligerent State would be impossible; the innocent- would suffer inevitable con- demnation with the guilty. . . . If the principle which appears to have been declared by the Vladivostok Prize Court and which has not so far been disavowed or explained by his Imperial Majesty's Government is acquiesced in it means, if carried unto full execution, the complete destruction of all neutral commerce with the non-combatant popu- lation* of Japan ; it obviates the necessity of blockades ; it renders meaningless the principle of the Declaration of Paris set forth in the Imperial Order of Feb. 29 last that a blockade in order to be obligatory must be effective; it obliterates all distinction between com- merce in contraband and non-contraband goods, and is in effect a declaration of war against commerce of every description between the people of a neutral and those of a belligerent State. II THE SUMMIT OF ARROGANCE GREAT BRITAIN does not, however, now limit herself to "war against commerce of every description be- tween the people of a neutral and those of a belligerent State"; she has gone on to declare war against commerce of every de- scription between the people of neutral States among themselves. It is no longer the complaint of American exporters mere- ly that they may not sell innocent goods to the noncombatants of Germany ; that out- rage has taken its place as only a minor fea- ture of the campaign of which our trade- rights are the victim, a campaign which has reached the length of forbidding our selling to or buying from any European country except under British supervision and with British permission in the case of each and every shipment of goods. The first steps in the hostilities against us were those considered above, namely : the extension of the definition of contraband to include practically all articles of commerce; and the presumption of a hostile destination in all cases. Within a few months after the beginning of the war — on November 2, 1914 — England closed the English channel to navigation, planting mines in the seas north of the British Isles and notifying the world that entrance into those waters was hazard- ous. The effect of this was to compel trans- Atlantic vessels to take the northern route and to put into a British port to secure a British pilot — and submit to British exami- nation. On March 11, 1915, there issued an Or- der in Council which the calmest and most well-considered judgment can only describe as probably the most insolent public docu- ment of modern times. On March 11, 1915, His British Majesty, by and with the advice of His Privy Coun- cil, was pleased to order and did order that "No merchant vessel which sailed from her port of departure after the first of March, 1915, shall he allowed to proceed on her voyage to any German port. "No merchant vessel which sailed fromi any German port after the first of March, 1915, shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage with any goods on board laden at such port. "Every merchant vessel which sailed from a port other than a German port after the first of March, 1915, having on board goods which are of enemy origin or are enemy property, may be required to discharge such goods in a British or allied port." Is it possible that the people of the United States understand these words and what they mean? Is it possible that they under- stand that during many months the power of Great Britain has forbidden a merchant vessel passing between America and Ger- many under any circumstances, or its pass- ing between America and any port on the continent of Europe except by British per- mission and after British examination? Can the American people be aware that Great Britain refuses to allow, and for many months has not allowed, an article suspected to be owned by a German, or to have orig- inated on German, Austrian, or Belgian soil, to cross the Atlantic Ocean? Are we really aware, do we understand, that for months every ship going and coming be- tween American ports and neutral European ports has been stopped and examined by the British naval constabulary and either held or unloaded or given a British license to continue her voyage? Have we apprehended the meaning of the language which, on the publication of the March 11th Order in Council, our own Government addressed to the British Government, namely, that "it would constitute, were its provisions actual- ly to be carried into effect as they stand, a practical assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral commerce within the whole European area, and an almost unqual- ified denial of the sovereign rights of the na- tions now at peace?" And can we then be indifferent to the fact that for months those provisions have been actually in effect ; that for months England has been practicing "an almost unqualified denial of the sovereign rights" of the United States? Today the American Government is un- able to assure merchant ships flying the American flag that they may cross the At- lantic to any port except by permission of the British Admiralty. To-day an Iowa farmer or a Texas cattle-raiser is for- bidden, by the English Government, to sell his products to European customers whose families need food. Not a barrel of flour nor a ham can be landed in Rotterdam or THE SUMMIT OF ARROGANCE 13 Copenhagen without England's permission — which is unobtainable. Not a bale of cot- ton can be shipped except on the same terms. Not a case of medicines nor a box of Christ- mas toys, much desired by our people, can be obtained^-for it is more important that England should punish the chemists of El- berfeld and the toy-makers of Nuremberg than that American hospitals should get medicines and American children have a merry Christmas. So there lie piled up on the wharves of Eotterdam and Copenhagen and Malmoe, mountains of boxes of goods for which we are anxious to trade our own products, but which England forbids the ships to touch, because they are "goods of enemy origin." The British position is that Germany has committed illegitimate acts, and that this gives England "an unquestioned right of re- taliation." Whether or not it is becoming to England to use the illegal acts of her enemy to excuse unlawful acts of her own, even in respect of the enemy, it can hardly be claimed that the retaliation should be vis- ited upon the United States, an innocent neutral. England is assumed to be the enemy of Germany, not of the farmers, planters and merchants of the United States, but it is the merest statement of fact to say that thousands of the citizens of the United States are being interfered with in the ordi- nary pursuit of their livelihood, not to say in the enjoyment of the ordinary comforts of life — and unnecessarily interfered with — by the economic war which Great Britain is waging upon the United States under the excuse of its war with Germany. It was only after considerable hesitation that the British Government allowed itself to use the word "blockade" in describing the measures it had put in hand March 11th to stop commerce with Germany. It is not a physical fact. It does not apply alike to all countries; Sweden, Norway and Denmark are freely trading with German ports in the Baltic, access to which the British deny us. It forbids access to neutral ports. It is not maintained by ships; the fact is the British navy is, most of it, safe in harbor, while the so-called "blockade" is enforced, so far as it is physically enforced, largely by mines. How tremendous a departure from all known and accepted principles of interna- tional law is this new long-distance paper blockade ! Historically, the theory of block- ade by sea is closely connected with that of siege by land. The original theory of the blockade was that it was intended to reduce a seaside fort by means of investment on all sides. It was often questioned (for in- stance, by perhaps the greatest American jurist, John Marshall, afterwards Chief Justice, then Secretary of State, in an in- struction, September 30, 1800, to Mr. King, American Minister in London), whether the rule of blockade could be applied to a port "not completely invested by land, as well as by sea." Mr. Marshall was convinced that the extension of the doctrine to towns in- vested by sea alone was "an unjustifiable en- croachment on the rights of neutrals." Even though the principle of sea blockade independent of siege by land did establish itself, certain specified requirements have al- ways been insisted upon. Among these are the following — the particular form of state- ment being that given by Prof. T. A. Walk- er, of Cambridge University. [Manual In- ternational Law, III, 77, 78.] I. A Blockade to be Binding Must be Real. It is legally essential that there be a blockade in fact. A mere proclamation of blockade unsupported by the presence of an actual blockading force, i. e., a "paper blockade," is in no way binding upon a neutral. II. A Blockade to be Binding Must be Effective. The presence of an adequate force is an absolutely essential condition for a valid blockade. The powers of the Armed Neutrality required for the validity of a blockade that it should be maintained by vessel "an- chored and sufficiently near" to make the attempt to enter manifestly dangerous . . ." It may be convenient to have brought to- gether at this point some of the pertinent au- thorities on the subject. The rules of the Declaration of Paris and of the Declaration of London are given later, under the head- ing "Official Documents." The quotations below are from Secretaries of State of the United States: To guard against the abusive extension of the term "blockade," it will be necessary explicitly to describe its meaning, and to confine it as in the declaration of the Armed Neutrality, "to a port where, by the disposition of a Power which attacks it, with vessels stationed sufficiently near, there would be evident danger to enter it." [Mr. Pickering, Secretary of State, to Mr. King, Minister to England, June 8, 1796.] The law of nations requires, to constitute a blockade, that there should be the presence and position of a force rendering access to the prohibited place mani- festly difficult and dangerous. Every jurist of reputa- tion, who treats with precision on this branch of the laws of nations, refers to an actual and particular blockade. [Mr. Madison, Secretary of State, to Mr. Thornton, October 27, 1803.] No maxim of the law of nations is better established than that a blockade should be confined to particular ports, and that an adequate force shall be "stationed at each to support it. The force should be stationary, and not a cruising squadron, and placed so near the en- trance of the harbor or mouth of the river as to make it evidently dangerous for a Vessel to enter. [Mr. Monroe, Secretary of State, to Mr. de Onis, Spanish Minister, March 20, 1816.] The fictitious blockades proclaimed by Great Britain and made a pretext for violating the commerce of neutral nations have been one of the greatest abuses ever committed on_ the high seas. During the late war they were carried to an extravagance which would have been ridiculous, if in their effects they had not afflicted such serious and extensive injuries on neutral nations. Ports were proclaimed in a state of blockade previous to the arrival of any force at them, were con- sidered in that state without regard to intimations of the presence of the blockading force; . . . the British cruisers during the whole time seizing every vessel bound to such ports, at whatever distance from them. [Mr. Madison, Secretary of State, to Mr. Mon- roe, Minister to England, January 5, 1804.] The British Government in defending its long-distance blockade has made reference to 11 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS precedents set by the American Government, especially to the Springbok case and the Peterhoff case. But a study of these cases [5 Wallace, 1, and 5 Wallace, 28] will clearly show that in neither of these in- stances the decision of our courts provides any support for the present British conten- tion. The Peterhoff — to take the time for but one instance — was a British vessel which, during the Civil War, cleared with a cargo for the Mexican port of Matamoras, just across the Eio Grande from Brownsville, Texas — then occupied by Confederate troops. The vessel was taken by United States au- thorities, but the court's decision held that "the ship and cargo are free from liability for violation of blockade." The temptation to include in the blockade our navy was con- ducting the little Mexican port across from the Confederate camp at Brownsville was surely no less than the desire to include in the present British blockade all the great city ports of neutral Europe. But the United States court resisted that temptation. It said: It must be premised that no paper or constructive blockade is allowed by international law. When such blockades have been attempted by other nations, the United States have ever protested against them and denied their validity. * * * We must say, therefore, that trade between London and Matamoras, even with intent to supply, from Mata- moras, goods to Texas, violated no blockade, and can- not be declared unlawful. Trade with a neutral port in immediate proximity to the territory of one belligerent, is certainly very incon- venient to the other. Such trade, with unrestricted in- land commerce between such a port and the enemy's territory, impairs undoubtedly, and very seriously im- pairs, the value of a blockade of the enemy's coast. But in cases such as that now in judgment, we ad- minister the public law of nations, and are not at liberty to inquire what is for the particular advantage or disadvantage of our own or another country. We must follow the lights of reason and the lessons of the masters of international jurisprudence. Much in contrast with this sober, law-re vering reasoning is the position assumed by the British Government today. In its note of July 24th, Sir Edward Grey says: "A blockade limited to enemy ports only would leave open routes by which every kind of German commerce could pass almost as easily as through the ports in her own ter- ritory." It is therefore absurd, is the Eng- lish conclusion, to say that they may not close those neutral routes. "If the blockade can only become effective by extending it to enemy commerce passing through neutral ports, such an extension is defensible." As a rule, goods which are of German ownership or origin are refused shipment from neutral ports, but in some instances such goods have been accepted by ship-mas- ters and have started on their voyage to America, only to be seized by British author- ities. What are the rights in such cases? The question whether goods which are the private property of citizen of a bellig- erent country may be seized at sea, if on board a neutral vessel, cannot be regarded as decisively settled. In early times the private possessions of citizens of an enemy country were regarded as good spoil wher- ever found. Nowadays, it is unpermissible for a belligerent to seize private property of citizens of the enemy country, when found on land. With regard to private property of citizens of an enemy country, found at sea, the law is not quite so clear. While there would seem to be no difference in the inviolability of private property by land and by sea, practically the international conscience cannot be said to have advanced to the point where there is absolute unan- imity that enemy goods must be respected, if they can be captured on the water. The doctrine "free ships, free goods," has always been popular in America, but, as a matter of fact, we can hardly rest upon it as an ac- cepted axiom of international law or prac- tice. Indeed, our own courts, except in cases where definite treaties prescribe a different rule, have with practical uniformity upheld the seizure of enemy property, if contraband, even when sailing under a neutral flag. True, a score of our treaties with foreign Powers recognize the principle "free ships, free goods." We have no treaty with Great Britain in which either party recognizes the principle. However, both the Declaration of Paris and the Declaration of London hold that privately owned property is inviolable at sea. Of course, goods once the possession of an enemy, but which have been sold to citizens of a neutral state in the ordinary ways of trade and in good faith, are exempt from capture or interference. As for goods of origin in belligerent terri- tory, precedents and opinions are contradic- tory; it cannot be averred that there was any clearly predominant decision up to 1909, when the London Conference declared against the seizure of property at sea on the ground that it was the product of the enemy's soil. During the present war, the British Government has stopped shipments from Belgium, as "goods of enemy origin," the local government of Belgium being to- day administered by Germans. Thus, while we are exhorted to contribute, and have con- tributed many thousands of dollars for the relief of Belgian distress, we are not per- mitted, by Great Britain, to offer the most practical form of relief, namely, by the pur- chase of Belgian goods. It is of course- apparent that, once the principle of the long-distance blockade is asserted, the mere matter of miles ceases to be of any consequence at all. If England is free to close the whole coast of Europe by a constructive blockade somewhere out at sea, there is no impropriety in her station- THE SUMMIT OF ARROGANCE 15 ing cruisers at the mouth of New York har- bor, the Delaware capes and Hampton Roads, to seize contraband — whatever she pleases being "contraband." The United States Government early in the war made representations to Great Britain that the presence of war vessels in the vicinity of New York harbor was offensive, and the cruisers were for a while withdrawn. But they were soon busy again on our coast, and now were not satisfied merely to waylay or capture vessels starting on the Atlantic voyage. On October 26th, the Dutch steamer Ham- bom, on the way from New York to Cabair- en, Cuba, for bananas for the American market, was captured by a British cruiser and taken to Halifax as a prize. A few days later, we found that the voyage from New York to Norfolk, Virginia, had become dangerous. For more than a year American ships bound to foreign neutral ports had constantly been seized and their cargoes taken off for England's benefit. But our ships still retained the proud privilege of travelling without molestation between our own home ports. On October 30th, the British Government took away this privilege. On that day one of the British blockading cruisers off Sandy Hook captured the steamship Hocking, an American vessel, flying the American flag, owned by Americans, steaming between two American ports. She had, and could have had, no contraband on board, for nothing can be contraband passing between two American ports. But, as a matter of fact, she was in ballast, without a pound of car- go in her. The cruiser put an armed prize crew on board the Hocking, hauled down the American flag, ran up the Union Jack, and took the prize into Halifax, where she will lie for months, and almost certainly be con- fiscated on the ground (which is positively denied), that German capital is invested in her. If this ship was not safe, no American coast-wise trading ship is safe. However, up to the present time, American vessels are permitted to navigate the Great Lakes and the Hudson River. On Nov. 11th, the Yin- land, of Danish registry, but on the way from New York to Norfolk, was chased by the British blockaders after leaving Sandy Hook, but escaped by running close inshore and creeping in thick weather down the coast. Thus far no vessel has been pursued into a port of the United States, though the Zea- landia, an American steamsh ip, was, on Nov. 5th, while anchored off Progresso, Mexico, at the usual discharging place (there being no ship-landing at Progresso), within the 3-mile limit, boarded and searched by an armed party from the British cruiser Iris. However, it is not the purpose to go, at this point, into details concerning captured ships; another chapter will do that. Other chapters will take up for more extended dis- cussion particular features of the British campaign against neutral commerce, such as the interference, through iron-clad trade agreements, in our domestic business; the cable censorship, ably used as an aid to the demoralization already wrought by the cen- sorship of cargoes ; the blacklisting of many specified ships in the neutral trade, etc., etc. All these devices for the injury of rival trade, outrageous as they are, are only out- growths of the central iniquity which makes them possible — England's violation of the neutrality of the sea. No indictment could be more complete than that which the facts cited, though incompletely, in this book, bring against the King and his Council and the Admiralty of England as the contemner of international law and the enemy of the rights of nations at peace. No one can peruse the cases set down in detail in later pages of this book without astonishment at the height to which British pretensions have been allowed to mount. The Govern- ment of Great Britain has virtually set up in the midst of the busy seas an arbitrary court, claiming unheard of powers and exer- cising the most tyrannous police functions ; seizing and haling into the dock, as suspects, all travellers upon the ocean highways, and visiting many of them with heavy penalties for unproven, and indeed unprovable, of- fenses. This lawless assizes of the seas, con- temptuous alike of its own precedents and of the rights of others, scarcely stoops to the pretense of citing authority for its actions, which are determined solely by its brutal will, and enforced, though indeed largely through intimidation, by the gigantic power of its naval police. The extent of the earth's surface over which this extraordinary court is permitted to wield its self-arrogated jur- isdiction, the magnitude of the interests which its actions vitally affect, and the supineness with which sovereign States sub- mit to the erection, upon the ruins of their self-respect and the debacle of their highest commercial and political interests, of an island's municipal statutes into interna- tional formulas, unite to render this one of the spectacles of history. A contemplation of that spectacle sug- gests that the hour imposes upon the United State a duty of supreme historical impor- tance. Ill SHIPS AND CARGOES STOPPED AT SEA AMEBICAN manufacturers and export- ers to-day are unable; because of Brit- ish interference on the high seas, to send goods direct to customers in any neutral, non-belligerent European country. Deliveries of goods to such nations can be effected only after the cargoes of vessels have been examined by British authorities in such ports as Kirkwall, Leith, Shields, Hull or Liverpool, to whichall vessels — American, Dutch, Norwegian and Swedish — are forci- bly diverted, at a great financial loss. Even then, the continuance of a ship's voyage and the delivery of consignments are uncertain, because, on the mere suspicion that goods may be resold to Germany or her allies, car- goes Jire often discharged and held for Prize Court proceedings. American exporters are obliged to suffer losses in the deterioration of perishable goods, in the charter cost and operating expenses of ships detained, and in, what is more serious, the destruction of business relations enjoyed for years with foreign customers. In consequence of Brit- ish rulings certain goods, such as rub- ber, wool and tin, manufactured in the United States, cannot now be sold to cus- tomers in Norway, Sweden, Holland, Den- mark, or any neutral country, except through British brokers, located in London. These brokers charge a commission on sales thus made. American goods thus sold, must be shipped via England, which necessitates great expenses in loading, reloading and in warehouse tolls. Shut off from direct relations with their legitimate customers, American merchants are thus rendered helpless in the disposition of goods and the establishment of prices. Thus American business abroad, fostered and developed for years at great expense, has been usurped by British interests which can themselves, under present conditions, without hindrance or competition, supplant American manufacturers. Every American enterprise engaged in foreign trade has suffered from Great Brit- ain's maritime policy. Even trade with South American countries has been inter- fered with and damaged. The loss inflicted has fallen upon manufacturers, importers, exporters and ship-owners. No class of goods has been exempt from British deten- tion and seizure. The mere suspicion on the part of any British authority engaged in the examination of ships is sufficient for the holding of a cargo for Prize Court proceed- ings. According to the basic principle of Eng- lish common law, which places the burden of proof upon the accuser, and by the Dec- laration of London, which presumes that all cargoes are innocent of an enemy desti- nation until proven guilty, the policy pur- sued by Great Britain is illegal and in vio- lation of the established rights of neutral nations. Beversing these principles, Great Britain first assumes that all cargoes are suspect, and acts accordingly. Thus, any and all ships may be held and cargoes seized. American shippers are asked to guarantee that goods sent to Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Holland will not be re-sold by their purchasers to Germany or her allies. By what right can Great Britain ask this of American merchants? How can such guarantee be logically given? The captain of any British patrol boat, hailing and taking into port an American, Norweg- ian, Danish or Dutch boat, at his discretion may assume that the cargoes may be re- sold to Germany. The American shipper, as well as his customers, has no recourse from long detention, actual seizure and Prize Court proceedings. Vessels are often brought into Kirkwall and other British ports even after the cargoes had been ex- amined by representatives of British consuls at American ports and the holds officially sealed before the ship set sail. Whether the cargo be seized or the vessel allowed to pro- ceed, a financial loss is inflicted upon ex- porters and ship charterers. Bealizing their helplessness under the monopoly exercised by Great Britain upon the sea, regular lines, like the Scandinavian- American and Norwegian- American, volun- tarily call at Kirkwall for inspection. Other lines using the English channel, such as the Holland-American Line, stop at the Downs. The mere deflection from their regular course of voyage means an expense in the burning of coal and in delay. If her pa- pers are deemed beyond criticism or sus- picion by the British officer examining the cargo and the vessel is allowed to proceed, there is a delay of at least forty-eight hours. In most cases ships are detained several SHIPS AND CARGOES STOPPED AT SEA 17 days. In other cases the period which they are held has ranged from one to sis months. The damage inflicted, and the gross injustice of such detention upon the mere suspicion of some petty examining official, are obvious. Vessels of lighter tonnage pay a charter fee averaging from |400 to |500 a day. Larger vessels pay from $1,400 to $1,500 a day. The charter cost for a trip may aver- age about $45,000 to $50,000. Each day's detention in a British port means so much loss, which is, of course, not paid by the British Government, but must be deducted from the profit on the cargo should that cargo have the good fortune to be passed and finally reach its destination. To illustrate the working out of the con- ditions generally explained, certain specific cases may be cited. These are to be regarded as illustrations merely, as it would be im- possible to furnish a full list of ships de- tained and cargoes held : The steamship Edward Pierce, owned by an American concern and flying the Amer- ican flag, sailed November 25, 1914, from New York for Copenhagen and Gothenburg. This vessel was detained at Falmouth from December 8 to December 13, the master be- ing told that consignments of flour and peas were suspected, although these had been sold direct to parties in Copenhagen. The vessel was finally permitted to proceed, the loss in charter fees during the delay — on mere suspicion — amounting, according to the owners, to $7,000. The steamship George Eawley, owned by the same concern, sailed from New York, November 15, 1914, for Co- penhagen. This ship was held at Falmouth. The master was informed by the custom of- ficers that they were compelled to detain the ship on account of flour, wheat and oil on board. They later informed the master that the British government suspected the des- tination of 550 barrels of oil. On January 1, 1915, the master was directed to proceed on his course, with the full cargo. The satis- faction of British suspicion in this case, re- quiring a delay of thirty-three days, cost the owners $14,000 in charter fees and other expenses. On February 9, 1915, the steamship An- tilla, American, sailed from New York for Malmoe and Copenhagen. The ship was stopped February 24 by a British cruiser and ordered to proceed to-Kirkwall with a prize crew on board. The ship was taken to Dundee on March 23. The cargo aboard this vessel had been loaded under the inspection of watchmen appointed by the British Con- sul in New York, and all of the ship's mani- fests had been certified and signed by the British Consul before the ship sailed. De- spite this fact, and the presentation of the British consul's certificate, the ship's papers were seized by the Admiralty authorities at Dundee, and part of the cargo, consisting of machinery, hardware, graphite and food- stuffs, was discharged. The vessel itself was held until April 27, when it was allowed to proceed with only the remainder of the car- go. The damage in this case, according to the owners, amounted to $98,000. On April 6, 1915, an officer from the Brit- ish cruiser Teutonic boarded the American ship, Joseph W. Fordney, sailing from New York to Malmoe, when the ship was four miles off the Norwegian coast but inside the headlands of Norway. Despite the fact that the captain showed that the hatches of the ship had been closed under the supervision of the British consul at New York with the consular seal, a prize crew was sent aboard and the vessel was ordered to Kirkwall, where customs officers seized all the ship's papers. The vessel was ordered to Dalton Bay and thence to Portishead, where it ar- rived April 27. There the cargo was arbi- trarily ordered to discharge, without explan- ation, and the vessel was released, sailing for New York on May 17. These are only isolated and typical illus- trations of Great Britain's treatment of American ships carrying American goods. Even in cases where cargoes are allowed to proceed, the expenses incurred by British in- terference often wipe out any chance of profit. The loss in charter fees and operat- ing expenses of ships are repeatedly in- creased by the capricious orders of British officials. Often ships ordered to Kirkwall are not examined there and the matter set- tled, but are compelled to proceed to Leith, Newcastle, Hartlepool or Middlesborough, and are sometimes thus sent from port to port, only in the end to have the cargo seized for Prize Court proceedings. These delays occupy periods ranging from several days to many months. The steamship Carolyn, American, for instance, sailed from Savan- nah, Ga., March 30, 1915, with a cargo of cotton for Botterdani. The ship put into Kirkwall for inspection on April 28. It was then ordered to Leith, where the cargo was detained. The ship was discharged only on May 21, the delay in this case covering a perod of twenty-three days. Another instance of great expense brought upon American shippers may be found in the case of the steamship Leelanmo, Ameri- can, which sailed from New York May 17, 1915, for Gothenburg, Sweden, carrying a cargo of cotton for Eussia valued at $400,- 000. This ship was captured May 31 by the British cruiser Mantua and detained at Kirkwall from June 2 to July 6, a period ex- ceeding one month. Because the British au- thorities suspected that the cotton might not go into Eussia from Sweden, clearance to Gothenburg was refused and the vessel was 18 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS forced to deviate its course to Archangel. The shipper thereby suffered great loss by the delay and deviation, in charter cost, oper- ating expenses, war' risk and maritime in- surance. Ships carrying valuable cargoes are de- tained on the most petty pretexts. The steamship Portland, American, which sailed from San Francisco April 25, 1915, for Stockholm, was detained at Kirkwall, and thence sent on to Blyth, where it was held several days. The holding up of this ship was occasioned merely by British suspicion, which in this case cast its eye upon a 34-ton cargo of dried fruit, which was sent to the Prize Court. The mere suspicion that may rest on food shipments, from wheat to peas, from meat to prunes, may cost innocent American shipping concerns and exporters thousands of dollars. No consideration for the deterioration of perishable cargoes or for the expense of de- lay is shown by the British authorities. The case of the Norwegian steamship, Bjornst- jerne Bjorson, which left New York October 28, 1914, for Copenhagen carrying a large cargo of American meat is illustrative. This ship was taken into Kirkwall on November 10, 1914, where it was detained until the 27th. It was then ordered to Newcastle, where it arrived November 29. Only on January 5, 1915, after a delay of 37 days, was the cargo ordered discharged. But even then this vessel, flying a neutral flag, was not released that it might go about its business. It was held until May, 1915, about five months after the seizure of the cargo. For the financial loss imposed the British author- ities made no plausible excuse. The steamship Alfred Nobel, flying the Norwegian flag, suffered likewise. This ship sailed from New York October 20, 1914, for Copenhagen, carrying a cargo including meat. It was detained at Lerwick from No- vember 7 to the 14, and was then ordered to Liverpool, where the cargo was seized on the 17th. The vessel was not released until May 13, 1915, the period of unnecessary de- lay covering almost six months. In addition to the daily expense of char- ter costs, and the operating cost of the ship in coal, food and the pay of crews, ship- owners must pay the cost of anchorage in ports where vessels are held. They must pay for the unloading of suspected cargoes, and if the cargoes are deemed innocent in the arbitrary opinion of British authorities, they must again pay the cost of reloading, as well as warehouse tolls for the storage of goods while in port. All of this must be borne by the innocent shipper. Should a cargo be thrown into the Prize Court, the owners must bear the expense of legal repre- sentation, which is not inconsiderable. The discrimination against American mer- chants dealing with customers in the Scan- dinavian countries resulted last August in the advance of war risk insurance upon car- goes to these countries. Because of the rig- orous hold-up of trade, and the constant seiz- ures of shipments, war risk insurance under- writers advanced their special hazard rates two to three per cent. The rates on cargoes destined for ports in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, not beyond Malmoe, were raised to 7 per cent, for each f 100 of insurance, and the rate on shipments sent to Scandinavian countries via Stockholm to a basis of 8 per cent. On the other hand the rates on ship- ments, in ships owned by the British Allies, to allied ports remained as they were — 1 per cent, on each f 100 for shipments to Liver- pool, 1% to Ireland, 1% to London, V/ 8 to Havre, 1% to the coast ports of England and Scotland, and 1% to the Far East via of the United Kingdom. While the rates to neutral Scandinavian countries were raised, it is significant that no advance Avas made in the rates to Archangel. The policy of Great Britain has been avowedly to discourage shipping to the neu- tral Scandinavian and Dutch countries. There seems to be no limit to the extent to which Great Britain will go in interfering with commerce on the suspicion that goods may be resold to Germany. On August 26, 1915, for instance, the Swedish steamship United States sailed from New York carry- ing a cargo for Copenhagen. The ship had unloaded at Copenhagen, a neutral port, when the British Government, on the sus- picion that the goods might be resold to Germany, ordered this neutral vessel to re- load under threat of seizure and to take the cargo back to Great Britain. This act ap- pears to be not only a violation of the rights of neutral nations to trade with one another, but a gross infringement of the sovereignty of a friendly nation. According to the statement of Sir Edward Grey, in his note of January 7, 1915, Great Britain averred that she did not intend to consider foodstuffs contraband unless des- tined for the armed forces of her antagonists. The W. T. Green Commission Co.," of St. Louis, chartered the Wilhelmina to take ad- vantage of the position announced by Great Britain and establish a resumption of trade which had consisted previously in the ex- porting of provisions to Germany. The Wil- helmina was accordingly loaded with a car- go of grain, flour and provisions, valued at $200,000. The vessel sailed from Brooklyn, January 22, 1915, and the goods were con- signed to Mr. Brooking, manager of the W. T. Green Company, who sailed in advance to Hamburg to receive the cargo. The ship sailed with the endorsement of the Depart- ment of State, and later, on January 29, the German Ambassador at Washington com- SHIPS AND CARGOES STOPPED AT SEA 19 ruunicated n guarantee to the Department of State that the cargo would not be used by the German Government, its agents or con- tractors, nor by the naval or military forces. According to a decree issued by the Ger- man Government on January 25, the Govern- ment took control of certain food supplies within the empire, but the decree specifically stated : "The provisions of this ordinance do not apply to grain and flour imported from foreign countries." Importers, however, had to deal through the War Grain Company, the Central Purchasing Company, or German community officials. This regulation regard- ing distribution did not throw such food- stuffs into the hands of the German mili- tary agents, but meant that the grain would be distributed through these agencies for private consumption. As the situation was not well understood abroad, the German Federal Council on February 5 rescinded the requirement regarding importers operating through the specified agencies. On February 4 the British Foreign Office issued a state- ment that it would stop the Wilhelmina and throw her cargo into a Prize Court. This contemplated action was based, allegedly, on the German Decree of January 25. Paying no attention to the fact that the regulations did not touch imported flour and grain, nor to Count Bernstorff 's guarantee that the foodstuffs should reach civilians only, the British seized the cargo after the Wilhemma had been forced to put into Falmouth on ac- count of severe gales. Sir Edward Grey in- formed the United States Government that the seizure was based on the German Decree of January 25, and that the modification of the German Decree was not known in Eng- land on February 9, when the Wilhelmina was seized. In regard to this assertion it is significant that the modification had been passed by the Bundesrat on February 6, and the news was cabled to the United States via London. It was sent from Berlin February 6, passed the British censor on February 7, and was published in the American papers on February 8. After long delay the Amer- ican shippers were finally compelled to sub- mit to the purchase of the Wilhelmina cargo by the British Government, and in May a settlement of $430,000 was decided upon by Lord Mersey, referee. Despite the com- pensation for loss of time, the shippers con- tended that they could find no satisfaction in the settlement for the enforced surrender of neutral rights and interests. Immediately after the beginning of the war a close espionage was established by British cruisers off American, ports. Neu- tral vessels, leaving for the ports of non- belligerent nations were stopped and searched, and in a number of cases forced to go to Halifax. The Norwegian steamer Sandefjord sailed from New York on No- vember 27, 1914, with a mixed cargo, includ- ing 1,000 bags of coffee, for Copenhagen. One half hour after she had dropped her pilot off Sandy Hook the vessel was stopped by a British man-of-war, a prize crew was put aboard, and she was forced to go to Halifax, where part of her cargo was discharged. The reason for this was declared to be that the 1,000 bags of coffee destined for Copenhagen were suspected, inasmuch as it probably exceeded the city's needs, and that it might consequently find its way into the homes of Germany. The steamship Brindilla, flying the Amer- ican flag, sailed from Bayonne, N. J., Octo- ber 13, 1914, with a cargo of kerosene for Alexandria, Egypt. This vessel had been bought by the Standard Oil Co. from the Biedermann Line and transferred to Ameri- can registry. Just outside the three-mile limit of Sandy Hook she was seized by the British cruiser Caronia, taken to Halifax and put through Prize Court proceedings. The steamship Maracas, American, sailing from New York December 9, 1914, for Genoa, without excuse or explanation, was forced by a British cruiser to go to Halifax, where later she was given permission to proceed on her journey. For a period, because of the protests of American shippers, this annoyance abated, but interference of a like kind, off the shores of the United States, has again been instituted. On October 31, 1915, the Dutch steamer Samborn and the American steamer Hocking, were brought into Halifax. The Hamborn had sailed from New York Octo- ber 27, with a general cargo for Caibarien, Cuba, while the Hocking had left New York to go to Norfolk for coal. The Hocking, according to Captain Fabre, was captured by the British just outside the three-mile limit and in sight of the New Jer- sey coast, off Asbury Park, just about four hours from New York. Upon its arrival at Halifax, the American flag was hauled down by the prize crew in charge, just as, eight months earlier, the Greenbrier's flag had been lowered under similar circumstances. In seizing the Hocking, which had entered American registry, on the suspicion of its ownership, Great Britain acted in accord- ance with the Order in Council, of October 20, 1915, abrogating Section LVII of the Declaration of London : The neutral or enemy character of a vessel is deter- mined by the flag which she is entitled to fly. Great Britain has always maintained this principle and upon it has based her mari- time conduct in war. Her intention of con- tinuing to do so was restated in a note dated "British Foreign Office, February 10, 1915," and addressed to the American Ambassador at London, in which Sir Edward Grey said : 18 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS forced to deviate its course to Archangel. The shipper thereby suffered great loss by the delay and deviation, in charter cost, oper- ating expenses, war' risk and maritime in- surance. Ships carrying valuable cargoes are de- tained on the most petty pretexts. The steamship Portland, American, which sailed from San Francisco April 25, 1915, for Stockholm, was detained at Kirkwall, and thence sent on to Blyth, where it was held several days. The holding up of this ship was occasioned merely by British suspicion, which in this case cast its eye upon a 34-ton cargo of dried fruit, which was sent to the Prize Court. The mere suspicion that may rest on food shipments, from wheat to peas, from meat to prunes, may cost innocent American shipping concerns and exporters thousands of dollars. No consideration for the deterioration of perishable cargoes or for the expense of de- lay is shown by the British authorities. The case of the Norwegian steamship, Bjornst- jerne Bjorson, which left New York October 28, 1914, for Copenhagen carrying a large cargo of American meat is illustrative. This ship was taken into Kirkwall on November 10, 1914, where it was detained until the 27th. It was then ordered to Newcastle, where it arrived November 29. Only on January 5, 1915, after a delay of 37 days, was the cargo ordered discharged. But even then this vessel, flying a neutral flag, was not released that it might go about its business. It was held until May, 1915, about five months after the seizure of the cargo. For the financial loss imposed the British author- ities made no plausible excuse. The steamship Alfred Nobel, flying the Norwegian flag, suffered likewise. This ship sailed from New York October 20, 1914, for Copenhagen, carrying a cargo including meat. It was detained at Lerwick from No- vember 7 to the 14, and was then ordered to Liverpool, where the cargo was seized on the 17th. The vessel was not released until May 13, 1915, the period of unnecessary de- lay covering almost six months. In addition to the daily expense of char- ter costs, and the operating cost of the ship in coal, food and the pay of crews, ship- owners must pay the cost of anchorage in ports where vessels are held. They must pay for the unloading of suspected cargoes, and if the cargoes are deemed innocent in the arbitrary opinion of British authorities, they must again pay the cost of reloading, as well as warehouse tolls for the storage of goods while in port. All of this must be borne by the innocent shipper. Should a cargo be thrown into the Prize Court, the owners must bear the expense of legal repre- sentation, which is not inconsiderable. The discrimination against American mer- chants dealing with customers in the Scan- diuavian countries resulted last August in the advance of war risk insurance upon car- goes to these countries. Because of the rig- orous hold-up of trade, and the constant seiz- ures of shipments, war risk insurance under- writers advanced their special hazard rates two to three per cent. The rates on cargoes destined for ports in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, not beyond Malmoe, were raised to 7 per cent, for each $100 of insurance, and the rate on shipments sent to Scandinavian countries via Stockholm to a basis of 8 per cent. On the other hand the rates on ship- ments, in ships owned by the British Allies, to allied ports remained as they were — 1 per cent, on each $100 for shipments to Liver- pool, 1% to Ireland, 1% to London, iy s to Havre, 1% to the coast ports of England and Scotland, and V/ 2 to the Far East via of the United Kingdom. While the rates to neutral Scandinavian countries were raised, it is significant that no advance Avas made in the rates to Archangel. The policy of Great Britain has been avowedly to discourage shipping to the neu- tral Scandinavian and Dutch countries. There seems to be no limit to the extent to which Great Britain will go in interfering with commerce on the suspicion that goods may be resold to Germany. On August 26, 1915, for instance, the Swedish steamship United States sailed from New York carry- ing a cargo for Copenhagen. The ship had unloaded at Copenhagen, a neutral port, when the British Government, on the sus- picion that the goods might be resold to Germany, ordered this neutral vessel to re- load under threat of seizure and to take the cargo back to Great Britain. This act ap- pears to be not only a violation of the rights of neutral nations to trade with one another, but a gross infringement of the sovereignty of a friendly nation. According to the statement of Sir Edward Grey, in his note of January 7, 1915, Great Britain averred that she did not intend to consider foodstuffs contraband unless des- tined for the armed forces of her antagonists. The W. T. Green Commission Co.," of St. Louis, chartered the Wilhelmina to take ad- vantage of the position announced by Great Britain and establish a resumption of trade which had consisted previously in the ex- porting of provisions to Germany. The Wil- helmina was accordingly loaded with a car- go of grain, flour and provisions, valued at $200,000. The vessel sailed from Brooklyn, January 22, 1915, and the goods were con- signed to Mr. Brooking, manager of the W. T. Green Company, who sailed in advance to Hamburg to receive the cargo. The ship sailed with the endorsement of the Depart- ment of State, and later, on January 29, the German Ambassador at Washington com- SHIPS AND CARGOES STOPPED AT SEA 1!) municated a guarantee to the Department of State that the cargo would not be used by the German Government, its agents or con- tractors, nor by the naval or military forces. According to a decree issued by the Ger- man Government on January 25, the Govern- ment took control of certain food supplies within the empire, but the decree specifically stated : "The provisions of this ordinance do not apply to grain and flour imported from foreign countries." Importers, however, had to deal through the War Grain Company, the Central Purchasing Company, or German community officials. This regulation regard- ing distribution did not throw such food- stuffs into the hands of the German mili- tary agents, but meant that the grain would be distributed through these agencies for private consumption. As the situation was not well understood abroad, the German Federal Council on February 5 rescinded the requirement regarding importers operating through the specified agencies. On February 4 the British Foreign Office issued a state- ment that it would stop the Wilhelmina and throw her cargo into a Prize Court. This contemplated action was based, allegedly, on the German Decree of January 25. Paying no attention to the fact that the regulations did not touch imported flour and grain, nor to Count Bernstorff's guarantee that the foodstuffs should reach civilians only, the British seized the cargo after the Wilhemina had been forced to put into Falmouth on ac- count of severe gales. Sir Edward Grey in- formed the United States Government that the seizure was based on the German Decree of January 25, and that the modification of the German Decree was not known in Eng- land on February 9, when the Wilhelmina was seized. In regard to this assertion it is significant that the modification had been passed by the Bundesrat on February 6, and the news was cabled to the United States via London. It was sent from Berlin February 6, passed the British censor on February 7, and was published in the American papers on February 8. After long delay the Amer- ican shippers were finally compelled to sub- mit to the purchase of the Wilhelmina cargo by the British Government, and in May a settlement of $430,000 was decided upon by Lord Mersey, referee. Despite the com- pensation for loss of time, the shippers con- tended that they could find no satisfaction in the settlement for the enforced surrender of neutral rights and interests. Immediately after the beginning of the war a close espionage was established by British cruisers off American, ports. Neu- tral vessels, leaving for the ports of non- belligerent nations were stopped and searched, and in a number of cases forced to go to Halifax. The Norwegian steamer Sandefjord sailed from New York on No- vember 27, 1914, with a mixed cargo, includ- ing 1,000 bags of coffee, for Copenhagen. One half hour after she had dropped her pilot off Sandy Hook the vessel was stopped by a British man-of-war, a prize crew was put aboard, and she was forced to go to Halifax, where part of her cargo was discharged. The reason for this was declared to be that the 1,000 bags of coffee destined for Copenhagen were suspected, inasmuch as it probably exceeded the city's needs, and that it might consequently find its way into the homes of Germany. The steamship Brindilla, flying the Amer- ican flag, sailed from Bayonne, N. J., Octo- ber 13, 1914, with a cargo of kerosene for Alexandria, Egypt. This vessel had been bought by the Standard Oil Co. from the Kiedermann Line and transferred to Ameri- can registry. Just outside the three-mile limit of Sandy Hook she was seized by the British cruiser Caronia, taken to Halifax and put through Prize Court proceedings. The steamship Maracas, American, sailing from New York December 9, 1914, for Genoa, without excuse or explanation, was forced by a British cruiser to go to Halifax, where later she was given permission to proceed on her journey. For a period, because of the protests of American shippers, this annoyance abated, but interference of a like kind, off the shores of the United States, has again been instituted. On October 31, 1915, the Dutch steamer Hamborn and the American steamer Hocking, were brought into Halifax. The Hamborn had sailed from New York Octo- ber 27, with a general cargo for Caibarien, Cuba, while the Hocking had left New York to go to Norfolk for coal The Hocking, according to Captain Fabre, was captured by the British just outside the three-mile limit and in sight of the New Jer- sey coast, off Asbury Park, just about four hours from New York. Upon its arrival at Halifax, the American flag was hauled down by the prize crew in charge, just as, eight months earlier, the Greenbrier's flag had been lowered under similar circumstances. In seizing the Hocking, which had entered American registry, on the suspicion of its ownership, Great Britain acted in accord- ance with the Order in Council, of October 20, 1915, abrogating Section LVII of the Declaration of London : The neutral or enemy character of a vessel is deter- mined by the flag which she is entitled to fly. Great Britain has always maintained this principle and upon it has based her mari- time conduct in war. Her intention of con- tinuing to do so was restated in a note dated "British Foreign Office, February 10, 1915," and addressed to the American Ambassador at London, in which Sir Edward Grey said : 20 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS Another instance of the efforts which his Majesty's Government have made to deal as leniently as possible with neutral interests may be found in the policy which we have followed with regard to the transfer to a neutral flag of enemy ships belonging to companies which were incorporated in the enemy country, but all of whose shareholders were neutral. The rules appiied by the British and by the American Prize Courts have always treated the flag as conclusive in favor of the captors in spite of neutral proprietary interests. When the steamship Dacia, purchased by Edward M. Breitung, and placed under American registry January 4, 1915, sailed from Galveston January 31, 1915, for Rot- terdam, with a cargo of cotton, valued at |800,000, to be transhipped to Bremen, the British threatened to seize the vessel. This, however, they refrained from doing, as such a procedure would have been against the English position that the character of a ship is to be determined by the flag she flies. Unwilling at that time to make an issue of such a case, and violate all precedents, the British Government got the French to seize the Dacia, the French Government having no such - embarrassing precedents. Ten months later, the British seized the Hocking, thus repudiating all the precedents of Brit- ish courts and reversing and stultifying the British record. Richard G. Wagner, president of the Transatlantic Company, which owns the Hocking, declared there was not a cent of German capital in his corporation. The Hocking was built in England and was orig- inally the English tramp steamer Parkland. She was sold to a Dutch company and her name changed to Ameland. The vessel was then sold to the Gronland Steamship Com- pany, of Copenhagen, and the name changed to Gronland. Among other vessels she was purchased by Mr. Wagner's company. The change of registry in the case of the Hocking was made October 15, on her re- turn from Argentina. After discharging cargo and being overhauled in Erie Basin, the Hocking left in ballast for Norfolk, on which trip she was seized. The bill of sale for each ship purchased by Mr. Wagner was submitted to the De- partment of State by him and is there on file. Accompanying each bill of sale is an affidavit stating that Mr. Wagner and his associates are the sole owners of the vessels and that the absolute and full control of them is in their hands. In these papers it is further stated that the ships have been permanently transferred and sold without reservation of any charter, and that it is not the intention of the owners to resell or trans- fer them back to their former owners. The vessels received American registry after meeting all the requirements of the Govern- ment. This registry might not unnaturally be taken to mean that the ships accorded it were entitled to the protection of the Ameri- can flag. Great Britain lias inflicted untold damage on American business, not only by interfer- ence with our sales to neutrals, but by re- fusing to permit the shipment to the United States of goods purchased from Germany. For months goods amounting in value to many millions of dollars have littered the ports of Sweden, Denmark and Holland, especially Rotterdam. On April 4, 1915, the Ogeechee, flying the American flag, left Bremen for New York carrying a general cargo of goods purchased by American importers from German manu- facturers. This ship was seized by the Brit- ish and taken to Sharpness, where the car- go was unloaded and a great portion con- fiscated because of its German origin. An instance of how such a seizure hurts American merchants may be illuminating. Among the goods seized from the Ogeechee was a shipment of 50 cases of glassware val- ued at |600 for a New York dealer. This dealer decided to fight out the case and en- gaged a lawyer to represent him. He finally got his goods, but at a cost far exceeding their purchase price. The British charged the original freight rate from Bremen to New York to cover the transportation from Bremen to Sharpness, £27.13.3; warehouse charges after goods were seized, £15.2.3 ; cus- toms fees, £1.0.0; railroad express from Sharpness after goods were released to port, £2.11.0; freight to New York on the steamer Bristol City, £49.1.11, additional expenses, £5.6.0. In addition to these charges, amount- ing to $483.48, the legal fees involved amounted to $125, and re-insurance on the shipment from England, $18, making a total of $626.48. This brought the total cost, of the wares, including their purchase price, up to $1,226. Had they not been seized, the cost, including purchase price and freight, would have been $735. The loss entailed by British interference was therefore $491. This is the case of only one small importer among many who lost by this single seizure of the Ogeechee. By this sample case one may gauge the losses inflicted upon larger manufacturers and importers. An idea of the scope of British activities on the high seas, and the extent to which neutral commerce has suffered since the war began, may be gleaned from the list of ships published on page 49, ff. It will be seen that no class of goods has been exempt from seiz- ure. Cargoes of cotton, copper, grain and foodstuffs have generally been seized and thrown into the Prize Court. The Dutch steamer Rotterdam, sailing from New York for Rotterdam with a cargo of copper, was seized September 26, 1914, when copper was conditional contraband. The cargo was pur- chased by the British Government. Other cargoes seized and arbitrarily bought even before this metal was put on the contraband SHIPS AND CARGOES STOPPED AT SEA 21 list, were carried on the Dutch steamers Sloterdyk, Potsdam and Westerdyk. The list of copper-carrying ships seized at Gibral- tar is too long to mention. Before Italy joined the British Allies innumerable ship- ments destined for that country were seized. The fact that the British Government pur- chased shipments, on a basis whereby it practically made its own prices, did not mit- igate the wrong involved or the damage to American shippers in the breaking off of legitimate business relations. Within recent months cargoes of food- stuffs for the Scandinavian countries and Denmark have suffered especially from Brit- ish suspicion that the shipments exceeded these countries' needs. The Swedish steamer Indianic sailed from New York April 28, 1915, with a cargo of foodstuffs for Gothen- burg, Sweden. The vessel was hauled into Kirkwall and the cargo sold at auction. The Swedish steamer Sydland, which sailed from New York May 1, 1915, was taken into Har- tlepool and a cargo of machinery and food- stuffs thrown into the Prize Court. Despite the position maintained by the United States in its note to Great Britain of March 30th, in which we declared our right to ship provisions and foodstuffs without hindrance to Germany via the Scandinavian countries, Great Britain has continued to seize cargoes of foodstuffs carried in neutral ships to Holland and the Scandinavian coun- tries on the mere suspicion that some of this food might reach Germany. By July, 1915, there was $14,000,000 worth of provisions held up in England. Disregarding our official protest against the seizing of food, Great Britain put through Prize Court proceedings the meat cargoes of four ships — the Kim, Alfred Nobel, Bjoernstjerne Bjoemson and Fried- land — which were seized in November, 1914. On September 16, 1915, the Prize Court ordered confiscated three cargoes of meat valued at |2,500,000. At the time this ver- dict was reached the cases of twenty-nine other vessels were pending, involving Ameri- can shipments valued at $12,500,000. The financial wrong wrought is not alone in withholding $15,000,000 worth of meat from neutral customers, but in the breaking off of an established trade annually amount- ing to many more millions. Among recent meat-carrying ships seized was the Vitalia, Norwegian, which sailed from New York August 19, 1915, for Bot- terdam. She was forced into Falmouth Sep- tember 7th, and the cargo seized for Prize jourt proceedings. On September 30th the Danish steamship Frederik VIII, sailing from New York to Copenhagen, was detained at Kirkwall and forced to discharge a cargo of bacon. In a memorandum sent October 11, 1915, by the British Government through Mr. Page, the doctrine was flatly asserted that shippers sending foodstuffs on neutral ves- sels to neutral ports are under obligation to the British Government to prove that their goods are not going to the army or navy or the government of Germany. The British memorandum of October 11th says that the Chicago shippers refused to admit that their shipments to Copenhagen were intended for Germany, but that "the pretense was kept up to the end that the whole business was bona fide neutral trade." To oppose this "pretense," the British Gov- ernment maintained that "there were strong indications" that a large part of this food was really intended to go on to Germany; "strong indications that it was not merely a civilian German destination which was con- templated." The British Government averred that it had been informed that "fat bacon," besides being of value for army ra- tions was in much demand in Germany as the raw material of "glycerine, out of which an explosive can be made." Thus, on the pretext that Germany might utilize bacon for the making of explosives, such ships as the Frederik VIII are held and cargoes of smoked bacon sold to Copenhagen merchants are seized and thrown into the Prize Court. A particularly outrageous case was that of the American steamer Llama, which left New York October 14, 1915, for Copenhagen, carrying a cargo of oil. The ship was seized by the British, boarded by a prize crew, and on October 30 run aground on Skal Skerries, Firth, Scotland. Meanwhile, with American business thwarted, throttled and utterly intimidated, Great Britain has gone the length of openly blacklisting ships flying neutral flags — ships upon which we are depending for the trans- portation of goods we need to buy and goods we want to sell — on the suspicion that they are controlled or owned by German capital. The British Admiralty in October published a list of forty-seven such vessels, warning shipping men against chartering these ships. Of this number ten fly the American flag. Their names are the Allaguash Ausabti, the Genesee, the Hocking, the Kankakee, the Maumee, the Seneca, the Spyros, the Val- lianos, the Winnebago and the Winneconne. The following nations were represented on the taboo list : Denmark, eight ships be- longing to the same company ; Norway, eigh- teen ships; Sweden, two; Spain, one; Hol- land, four, and Brazil, four. It was stated that such of the vessels named as would agree to trade only with the British Allies would be removed from the list. What is this but a flagrant intimida- tion of neutral commerce, and a wanton dis- crimination against the trade of all neutral 22 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS nations to the advantage alone of Great Britain? The steamship Hocking, seized while on her way, not to a German port, not even to a European port, but actually when plying between New York and Norfolk, Vir- ginia, for coal, and taken to Halifax on October 31, 1915, is one of the blacklisted vessels. On November 20, within a month after the capture of the Hocking, the steamship Gen- esee of American registry, flying the Ameri- can flag, on her way from Norfolk to Monte- video, carrying a cargo of coal, was seized by a British cruiser and taken, in charge of a prize crew, to St. Lucia, British West Indies. The Genesee is owned by the American Transatlantic Company, and was one of the vessels placed on the British blacklist. The Genesee, according to E. G. Wagner, presi- dent of the Transatlantic Company, was built in England and was run under British registry as the Avristam; she was sold through a British shipping agency to a Greek company, which sold her to the Pin- land Steamship Company, of Copenhagen, which, in turn, last June sold her to the American owners. The Genesee was char- tered to C. G. Blake & Co., of Cincinnati, to take a cargo of 3,800 tons of coal to Monte- video. She cleared from Norfolk, October 14, and no reason for the seizure was given. Because of the blacklisting of the Winne- conne by the British Admiralty, the cancel- lations of cargoes, according to P. H. Gra- ham & Co., charterers, amounted to $10,000. Mr. Graham, who is the son of an English baronet, Sir Bobert James Stuart Graham, was born in the United States. In an adver- tisement published in the New York Journal of Commerce, October 26th, Mr. Graham's company declared they had investigated the assertion of the British Government to the effect that the Winneconne was controlled by German capital and had found, to the con- trary, that the vessel is owned by a corpora- tion the stock of which is entirely held by citizens of the United States; that the vessel never flew the flag of any of the present bel- ligerent nations, and that all the regulations and laws for securing United States registry had been complied with. Mr. Graham an- nounced that the cargo of the ship had been examined and passed for shipment by repre- sentatives of the British consul in New York, for which service a fee had been paid by check for $250. Every box and package taken aboard had been inspected, the British authorities going so far as to X-ray goods packed in bales. The blacklisting of the ship by the British Admiralty not only caused cancellations of cargoes, but caused certain insurance companies to refuse to in- sure any part of the cargo, and others to in- crease the premium. By reason of the continued interference by Great Britain with cargo-carrying ships on the ground that Sweden would not guar- antee that goods shipped to Sweden would not be resold to Germany, the Norwegian- American line, according to a news despatch dated November 21, from Christiania, de- cided to abandon the transportation of freight from the United States. The liner Kristianiafjord arrived in Ber- gen with a cargo including 6,000 cases of American pork and 1,800 bags of coffee. Be- cause of the suspicion that the pork might not be consumed in Sweden or Norway, but might perhaps find its way into Germany, Great Britain issued orders that the goods must be returned to England. The list of ships printed on pp. 49 ff. in- clude only a portion of the vessels held. Be- cause of the reticence of shipping concerns, it is not possible to secure anything like a comprehensive list of detentions and seiz- ures. It has been likewise impossible to se- cure adequate data from manufacturers re- garding cargoes of merchandise detained and seized. British interference has had the effect of intimidating American business in- terests to the degree that these are afraid to complain lest they invite further hostility and persecution from the British authori- ties. Woolen manufacturers decline to talk about their difficulties in selling wool to Scandinavian customers for fear that Great Britain will shut off their import of raw products. Exporters of grain, cotton and copper refuse to complain publicly of the losses suffered for fear that their entire ex- port trade, such as it now is, may be an- nihilated. Fear of arousing British animos- ity bars them from uniting in vigorous complaint. There are certain classes of crimes con- cerning which it is next to impossible to procure evidence. Murder is said to be the safest of felonies because the victim, who is often a sole witness aside from the criminal, is silenced. Dishonored women do not com- monly make public their humiliation. Few indeed of the victims of English wrong-doing are willing to furnish the facts for publica- tion. As for protesting and appealing to the United States Government, few now do even that, either because they have learned that their protests and petitions are of no avail, or that the United States Government will do nothing more than possibly put the case in a memorandum and send a Trade Adviser over to the British Embassy to chat with Sir Eichard Crawford over it. The prostration of American enterprise before the domineering naval strength and commercial mercilessness of England, and acquiescence without hope of succor, are among the most discouraging features of the situation. IV THE CASE OF COTTON PEOBABLY more human beings are in- terested, from first to last, in the growth, movement, manufacture and use of cotton than in any other industry on earth. The cotton crop is the most valuable single crop produced from the soil of the United States. One-fourth of the total value of our exports is accounted for by cotton. In a large area of the United States all pros- perity depends on the sale of cotton. All other business interests in the South are de- pendent upon this staple, as is also the earn- ing power of thousands of miles of railway communicating with the South. Further- more, since the population of the cotton States rely upon this product to purchase other goods, the rest of the country feels im- mediately the pinch of any deficiency of growth, depreciation in price, or difficulty of sale. The successful marketing of the cotton crop is dependent on the foreign sales of the raw product. Two-thirds of the crop, in recent years, has been sold abroad. To pre- vent interference with the sale is, therefore, a matter of vital importance not only to the South but to the nation. Any hindrance to it inflicts more financial damage than a par- tial crop failure. Provided export trade is possible, high prices in foreign markets will offset the loss of a deficient crop. On the other hand, if foreign purchasers are lack- ing, ruinously low prices prevail. It will be of interest, therefore, to examine particu- larly into the influence which the trade re- strictive measures of the British Govern- ment have had upon this industry. That hardships have been inflicted and great financial loss brought about is obvious. Of our total exports of cotton, Great Brit- ain normally takes about one-third. Here- tofore, Germany and Austria have taken an- other third. The war, owing to the break down of foreign peace industries, the inter- ruption of commerce and the abrupt disor- ganization of credits, would inevitably have temporarily affected the cotton trade ad- versely. On the other hand, Germany and Austria formerly used a certain amount of Egyptian and Indian cotton ; the cutting off of this supply obliged those countries to look to the United States to make good the de- ficiency. Then, too, neutral European coun- tries that hitherto purchased cotton goods from German and Austrian manufacturers, found it necessary to increase their own manufactures, and therefore to increase their imports from America. Finally, the strain and waste of war caused increased consumption of the staple on the part of all belligerents. This demand should have meant increased prices and prosperity for the Southern planter. What actually happened is common knowledge. The average price per bale for the year ending July, 1915, was $41.04, against $68.06, for the previous year, accord- ing to the figures of H. G. Hester, Secre- tary of the New Orleans Cotton Exchange. The average price per pound in the same periods was 7.94 cents, against 13.49 cents. The crop for 1914-15 was 15,108,011 bales, but it brought only $593,432,978, while the crop for 1913-14 was only 14,882,493 bales, yet brought the huge price of $977,844,114. Why, with this increased prospective de- mand, this special market in Germany and Austria, these new markets in neutral Eu- rope, with plenty of cotton to meet all re- quirements, should cotton sell for less than it costs to raise it, which is about eight cents a pound? Why and how was this great in- dustry compelled to suffer a loss, compared with the previous year's business, of $400,- 000,000? At the beginning of hostilities in Europe, in August, 1914, the New York and New Orleans Cotton Exchanges closed. Shipping was paralyzed. Nearly all our cotton was carried in English or German bottoms. These ships dared not sail for fear of cap- ture by enemy cruisers. Ordinary insurance did not protect against such capture, and war risk insurance became necessary. The German ships never left American ports, and their withdrawal meant a big loss in means of carriage. The British Govern- ment requisitioned certain ships, but the others were free to sail when, a short time after the war started, the British Govern- ment insured against war risk British ves- sels carrying for the United Kingdom, and when, after a fortnight, the British Admi- ralty declared the North Atlantic free of German cruisers. Transportation of cotton to England was thus assured ; but the prob- lem of getting the staple to Germany or to 24 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS European neutrals was by no manner of means solved. More than a third of our cotton exports were thus cut off from their markets. This condition existed for several months — long enough to affect cotton prices disas- trously — before arrangements were effected whereby cotton could be sent to the neutrals and through Italy, Holland, Sweden and Denmark to Germany and Austria. Even after arrangements for shipping through neutrals had been devised, cotton movements were seriously hampered. Amer- icans feared that Great Britain would not allow cotton to be moved to Germany at all. The rumors would not die down that any day, while cargoes were in mid-ocean, cotton might be declared contraband. That Great Britain fostered this impression seems indubitable. In fact she took no steps to still them until forced to by Wash- ington. Cotton, as is known, as on the "free list," as unconditionally non-contraband, of the Declaration of London. Although this codification of international law affecting commerce in war time had never been for- mally ratified by all the Great Powers, Great Britain, in an Order in Council an- nounced August 20th, accepted the rulings of the Declaration of London, with certain exceptions. Cotton was not affected by these exceptions. However, cotton could not be carried to German ports in any but neutral bottoms. The use of other than American ships for this trade proved impossible, for the very simple reason that British capital con- trols the maritime insurance business of the whole world and British capital was not available for the aid in any way of Great Britain's enemies. Neutral vessels carrying cargoes to Germany could not get insurance, and could not sail without it. American marine insurance companies are closely as- sociated financially with the English com- panies and were in no position to jeopardize that association. Foreign neutral companies were in a similar position. The United States Government's War Bisk Insurance Bureau was limited by law to insuring American cargoes in American vessels, and to insuring them for a restricted amount. Unfortunately there was a plethora of Amer- ican cargoes, cotton particularly. But where were the American vessels adapted to trans- Atlantic cargo carrying? There was practically none, and the ob- vious thing to do was to buy the foreign ves- sels tied up in American ports and enter them under American registry, a step that had been rendered feasible by a law passed by Congress in 1914. The experiment proved unsuccessful. A Hamburg-American liner, the Georgia, was purchased by an American citizen and fitted out for the South Ameri- can trade, but since the British Government intimated that the validity of the transfer was questioned, the ship never left port. Of greater interest in the effort to increase the American merchant marine is the case of the Dacia. It will be recalled that this former Hamburg American liner was tied up at Port Arthur, Texas. Careful study had convinced lawyers that the validity of her transfer, where the sale was bona fide and the change of ownership absolute, could not be questioned. British precedents fully sanctioned such transfers. The Dacia was purchased outright by an American citizen, entered under American registry, equipped with American officers and an American crew and loaded at Galveston with Texas cotton consigned to Bremen. The validity of the transfer was acknowledged by the Department of State at Washington. Great Britain announced that she would cap- ture the ship. Its destination was then changed to Botterdam, a neutral port, and Washington endeavored to get the British Government to permit the vessel to make one trip. Great Britain would not com- mit herself, but it was thought that in view of her own precedents and her somewhat in- volved diplomatic relations and purposes with the United States she would hesitate to bring this matter to an issue. So the Dacia sailed. Then Great Britain showed that there are several ways to prevent unwelcome additions to the American merchant marine. The Dacia was captured by a French cruiser and thrown into a French prize court. France had never recognized the validity of the transfer of a ship of a belligerent nation to a neutral flag. The Dacia experiment had failed. The result was not much of a surprise to American shipping circles, whose manifest reluctance to undertake similar enterprises had impressed the Administration long be- fore the Dacia case ; as a solution of the dif- ficulty the Ship Purchase Bill had been in- troduced into Congress. This called for the organization of a steamship company the greater part of whose capital was to be con- tributed by the Government, thus giving the organization a quasi governmental standing. Of course everyone realized that the pur- pose of the bill was to provide bottoms to carry non-contraband to German ports and that the only available ships were the Ger- man liners tied up in various American ports. A powerful opposition soon mani- fested itself in Congress and in certain in- fluential newspapers. The underlying mo- tive in this opposition was consciously and unconsciously to aid Great Britain. Eng- land objected to the transfer because the money paid would undoubtedly be used to create credits in America. Again, it would be impossible for His Majesty's Government THE CASE OF COTTON 25 to exercise the "economic pressure" against a government-backed line that had already proved so successful against privately owned ships. The opposition was so vehement that the spokesmen for the bill were confused and endeavored to placate it by assurances that no step would be taken that would in- volve the United States with any belligerent. The situation was from one aspect humor- ous. Everyone thought of nothing but Ger- man ships and British opposition; but the adjectives "German" and "British" tem- porarily disappeared from the language. For a few weeks, these words became the great political taboo. The silence was elo- quent. And in it the Ship Purchase Bill was killed and laid to rest. But in many re- spects, the fate of the Bill is one of the most instructive examples that could be found of the British attitude towards America's legitimate aspirations for an American mer- chant marine, and is worthy of long and profound study. Before the fate of the Bill was decided, however, American cotton exporters to Ger- many perceived that it was hopeless to evade England's "economic pressure" on American shipping and sought to deliver their goods to Germany by neutral ships to neutral Euro- pean ports. But Great Britain was pre- pared and took powerful aggressive action at once. One means used was to bring pres- sure to bear on European neutrals to place re-export embargoes on cotton to Germany, and another to create a fear in the minds of shippers that, in spite of everything, Eng- land would declare cotton contraband and confiscate cargoes. Neutral Holland was first influenced and in the early days of the war placed an em- bargo on the re-exportation of cotton. Italy, also, under pressure of her economic interests and her peculiar situation of hav- ing all her overseas commerce at the mercy of the Franco-British fleets in control of the Mediterranean, also established a re-export embargo. Thus the two natural channels for the shipment of cotton into Germany were closed. Other neutrals protested at this course, basing their protest on the fact that the Declaration of London specified cot- ton as always "free," and that England had accepted this Declaration. That England fostered the rumors that she was about to rescind her action in this matter and de- clare cotton absolute contraband seems cer- tain. Whether or no, however, these rumors accomplished their purpose; neutral ship- owners were afraid to accept cotton cargoes and consistently refused to do so. The distress throughout the South had become acute. The current price of cotton was six cents a pound. The cotton growers of limited means were deeply in debt. Small wonder that thev began an agitation for the protection of their staple on the high seas, when they realized that they could obtain at least three times the price for their prod- uct in Germany that they could from Eng- lish purchasers. How the low prices for cotton affected the revenues of the South during this trying period, may be learned from the following extract from the "Annual Review of the American Cotton Crop, 1914-15," issued by H. G. Hester, Secretary of the New Orleans Cotton Exchange, on August 1st, of this year: The Commercial Cotton Crop of the United States for the year ending with the close of July, 1915, amounted to 15,108,011 bales, showing an increase over that of 1913-14 of 225,518 bales. The average price for middling cotton for the year was 7.94 cents per pound, comparing with 13.49 cents last year and 12.20 the year before. The average commercial value per bale was $41.04, against $68.06 last year, and $63.59 the year before. Mr. Hester then presents the following table, indicating the losses cotton growers had suffered during the trying period of the fiscal year 1915 : Total Value of Crop. Year. Bales. Value. 1914-15 15,108,011 $593,432,978 1913-14 14,882,115 $977,844,114 1912-13 14,106,116 $866,185,562 This showed that, with a record crop of more than 15,000,000 bales, Southern grow- ers had received $384,411,136 less money for it than for a crop of less than 15,000,000 bales the year before. Among the palliatives for this condition suggested was the "buy a bale" movement. The purchaser was to buy a bale for $50, pay storage charges for a year, and sell his bale at a handsome profit when the year ex- pired. His cotton was thus to cost him ten cents a pound plus storage charges. The President of the United States purchased a bale and presented it to a hospital. The daughter of the Speaker of the House also bought a bale, as did many other individuals and organizations. Patriotic fervor took other forms. "Cotton Goods Bargain Days" were promoted throughout the country. The wearing of cotton clothes was urged to re- lieve the distress in the South. Judges, law- yers and officers of the Mississippi Supreme Court held a session, all clad in cotton shirts and overalls. The year has passed, and the average price of cotton has been 7.84 cents. It is pertinent to inquire what became of the President's bale, for instance, and what final good that and similar purchases did. As an outcome of the depression, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad reduced the annual dividend on its shares from 7 per cent, to 5 per cent. The Southern Railway suspended altogether dividend payments on its preferred shares. How the cotton crisis affected the railroads of the South may be learned from the figures of the reports is- sued by the following three most important 26 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS roads in their annual statements, issued for the year ending June 30, 1915 : Losses in Operating Revenues. Illinois Central Railroad $4,173,327 Southern Railway Company 8,551,487 Louisville & Nashville 8,300,451 In his report to the stockholders of the Illinois Central Railroad, for the year ended June 30th, C. H. Markham, the road's presi- dent, said: Your company during the past year has suffered from the depression in business prevalent throughout the country, and this has been most pronounced on the lines south of the Ohio River. The low price received by cotton growers for their product not only affected the revenues your company received from the transpor- tation of lumber, but also, in connection with both com- modities, had a depressing effect on the revenues from the transportation of general merchandise and on pas- senger travel. In his report for the fiscal year, Fairfax Harrison, President of the Southern Rail- way Company, said : It has been a difficult year. The flame of war which burst forth all over Europe at the beginning of August, 1914, had a sudden and withering effect upon industry in the South. Preparing to market the largest crop in the history of cotton growing in the United States, the Southern people were looking forward to the profits from the sale of this, their chief staple, as a stimulus to their purchasing power. When, over night, they were apparently shut out by the war from the European market, which has always consumed a large part of the American cotton crop, the people of the South were thrown back upon their own resources with a disturb- ingly large proportion of their chief money crop on their hands and an inadequate market price in prospect. Despite several futile plans of assistance from without, the South practically suspended for a time its industrial activities. The result was a fall, as vertiginous as that of the price of cotton, in the revenues of the rail- ways at the South, and this lean diet was protracted, with the condition which caused it, throughout the year now under review. In the annual report of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, the stockholders are in- formed that : This great shrinkage (in gross revenues) was due largely to the effect produced by the war in Europe upon the price and consumption of the products and manufactures of the territory served b3' the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, and to the consequent decrease in passenger travel. In view of the heavy losses they had al- ready sustained, and the need of the South for relief from the distress from which it was suffering, cotton shippers began to press the State Department in Washington for the adoption of measures to remedy the situa- tion. Senator Hoke Smith, of Georgia, in- troduced in the Senate on October 22d a res- olution providing for the appointment of a committee of five senators to take up the question of facilitating shipments of cotton to Europe. This committee was appointed, and immediately it entered upon conferences with the State Department and the British Ambassador. Congress had it in its power to adopt re- prisals against Great Britain ; it might have placed an embargo on the war material which England so sorely needed. The Brit- ish Government knew this full well, and in order to guard its interests, it was compelled to emerge from the mysterious and threaten- ing silence it had maintained and relieve the tension of uncertainty with which it had surrounded the question of its attitude con- cerning cotton shipments. Sir Cecil Spring- Rice, on October 26th, wrote to Mr. Lan- sing, then Acting Secretary of State, as fol- lows: Last night I received a reply from Sir Edward Grey. in which he authorizes me to give the assurance that cotton will not be seized. He points out that cotton has not been put in any of our lists of contraband, and, as your Department must be aware from the draft proc- lamation now in your possession, it is not proposed to include it in our new list of contraband. It is, there- fore, as far as Great Britain is concerned, in the free list, and will remain there. There was a world-wide feeling of relief at this definite announcement, for shippers felt that now all obstacles had been removed, and that the great American staple could move freely to all the countries of Europe, neutral and belligerent alike. How mis- taken was this confidence soon became man- ifest. Some days after Sir Cecil Spring-Rice's letter to Mr. Lansing was published, Den- mark declared an embargo on the exporta- tion of cotton. This closed the cotton trade routes to Germany by way of Copenhagen, after Rotterdam the most direct way to the Empire. Great difficulty, moreover, was ex- perienced in obtaining from France an as- surance on her part that she regarded cotton as being on the free list. It was not until December 17th, that Secretary Bryan could make this announcement. Hardly had the movement of cotton direct to Germany begun, when American shippers began to complain of the extraordinary pre- cautions England was taking against sus- pected concealment of contraband material, such as copper and rubber, in cotton cargoes destined for Germany. Cotton shippers in this country were compelled to submit their cargoes to the examination of British con- suls. The inspection became more rigid at a later demand from England that all bales of cotton be X-rayed, and that the photo- graphs must accompany the consular cer- tificates as further assurance that the cot- ton contained no hidden contraband. All these regulations, of course, caused much additional delay and expense to American shippers. But even this was no guarantee that the vessels would not be detained by British cruisers and subjected to search. The British Government, on November 2nd, declared the North Sea a military area, and warned merchant craft that, owing to mines and other dangers threatening navi- gation, they must strictly follow the sailing directions of the Admiralty. These in- structed all vessels trading to and from Scandinavian countries and Holland, when inward bound, to move via the English Chan- nel and the Straits of Dover. This simpli- THE CASE OF COTTON 27 fied the English practice of seizing and de- taining neutral merchant vessels. The effect of this announcement was to cause renewed demoralization among cotton shippers. Owners of American vessels were reluctant to charter them for cotton exports to Germany and send them through the mined area of the North Sea (no Admiralty directions were given for getting through to Germany), and insurance on such craft again soared to prohibitive figures. Yet throughout this period when by in- direction the American cotton crop was be- ing forced to lower and lower price levels and its shipment to the eager and profitable markets of Germany prevented, England solemnly denied that she was interfering or had any intention of interfering with the movement of this staple. In fact, in a Brit- ish communication dated as late as February 10th, the statement was made : Any decrease in American exports which is attrib- utable to the war is essentially due to cotton. Cotton is an article which cannot possibly have been affected by the exercise of our belligerent rights, for, as your Ex- cellency is aware, it has not been declared bv His Maj- esty's Government to be contraband of war, and the rules under which we are at present conducting our belligerent operations gives us no power in the absence of a blockade to seize or interfere with it when on its way to a belligerent country in a neutral ship. Conse- quently no cotton has been stopped. The latter statement was true as far as it went. To more adequately present the situ- ation might have been added — "because, ow- ing to various forms of indirect pressure, little or no cotton has started!" On the other hand, British merchants were not slow to perceive the advantage which their benevolent government was creating for them. With cotton at starvation prices, their agents began to acquire the staple in quantities far. beyond the normal British consumption. How England "stocked up" on cotton at these prices, is evident from the following table which appeared in "Cot- ton," the official journal of the Manchester Cotton Exchange, Manchester, England, on October 9, 1915 : In Bales. Season. . American. Total. 1910-11 236,349 413,910 1911-12 466,264 605,962 1912-13 397,935 578,020 1913-14 614,682 907.562 1914-15 1,197,650 1,505,500 England, by the end of the season, August 31, 1911, had a stock in hand of 413,910 bales ; the next season the stock amounted to 605,962 bales; in 1913, she had 578,020 bales. These, therefore, represent the normal fig- ures. But by August 31, 1914, at the close of the first month of the war, she had hur- riedly begun to accumulate, not only Amer- ican, but also her Egyptian and Indian cot- ton. One year later, with this accumula- tion, carried on during the end of 1914 and the beginning of 1915, while the South was suffering from the effects of the low prices, she had a reserve stock of 1,505,500 bales, nearly three times her normal amount, on hand. This procedure aroused a storm of indig- nation throughout the South. The feeling in the Cotton Belt was set forth clearly and emphatically in the following resolution adopted by the State Farmers' Union of Louisiana (See Congressional Record, Feb- ruary 3, 1915, pp. 3232-3233) : Resolved, by the Louisiana State Farmers' Educa- tional and Co-operative Union of America, that we •hereby pledge ourselves to do all in our power to ob- tain for ourselves and our fellow-citizens and man- kind generally, the freedom and unhindered use of the seas and of the air, and we hereby respectfully petition our Federal Government to give due notice to all na- tions, in view of the losses sustained by the people of these United States, that in future we henceforth shall ship all of our products at all times and to our cus- tomers in any nation just as in the past; that this na- tion, being neutral, will not favor one over the other, but will treat all alike, as it ought to do, but that our government proposes to send its own ships, under its own flag, with the products of its own citizens, to its customers in any nations on earth, and will brook in- terference from no one in protecting the rights and the property and trade relations of its own people. From the day that cotton began to move to Germany, throughout England voices were raised in protest. How to find a real excuse for preventing shipments was a prob- lem, partly solved by Sir William Bamsay, the eminent British scientist who, in a let- ter to the London Times, advocated the plac- ing of cotton on the absolute contraband list because, he asserted, it was extensively used in the manufacture of explosives. Other British scientists, more distinguished for their work in the field of chemistry, flatly contradicted Sir William Ramsay's theories. W. F. Eeid, former President of the Society of Chemical Industry, spoke as follows be- fore that seciety in London : There is practically no cotton used in the manufac- ture of high explosives. The whole thing is a great fraud. There may be some trace of cotton in the ex- plosive, but the bulk of it is coal products. Eminent scientists have made erroneous statements on this sub- ject. If poople associated with science would speak only on the branches with which they are connected, the ad- vantages would be very great. The British press opposed this popular clamor. Great American interests were in- volved, and the fear of an embargo on the exports of ammunition as a retaliatory measure figured largely in the public mind. To declare cotton contraband would be a particularly drastic violation of the Declar- ation of London. Above all, the British Government, as a neutral, was on record as opposed to this step. During the Russo-Japanese War the Rus- sian Government had undertaken to place cotton on the list of contraband. The Rus- sian Government asserted in a note dated April 21, 1905, that raw cotton was used in the manufacture of explosives, and that, it being impossible to distinguish between cotton imported for this military purpose and cotton imported for ordinary peaceable 28 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS use, it was necessary to prohibit its trans- portation altogether. The enforcement of this order would have shut off from British India its cotton trade with Japan, valued at approximately twenty million dollars annually. Under instruc- tion from Lord Lansdowne, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg notified the Russian Minister of Foreign Affiairs that the Russian position was inadmissible. The British note said : The quantity of raw cotton that might be used for explosives would be infinitesimal in comparison with the bulk of the cotton exported from India to Japan for peaceful purposes, and to treat harmless cargoes of this latter description as unconditionally contraband would be to subject a branch of innocent commerce to a most unwarrantable interference. In the meantime, while the so-called "eco- nomic pressure" was being exerted on Ger- many, British shippers continued to accum- ulate large stocks of cotton at the low prices. Their representatives in the South bought and carried large quantities of the staple for the benefit of English spinners. When the freer movement of cotton began, the cargoes were in greater part composed of the staple which had been purchased earlier at nearly the very lowest prices by British representatives. This is made evident by the following table, which shows that, while the exports of the staple from the United States for the first seven months of 1915, ending July 30 th, amounted to 5,937,400 bales, yet the amount of money obtained was but little greater than for the 3,713,300 bales shipped abroad during the same period in 1914 : Department of Commerce of the United States. • Monthly summary of Foreign Commerce of the United States July, 1915 : Total bales Seven months ended exported. July, 1914. 1915. Bales 3,713,321 5,937.436 Value $235,102,634 $271,153,652 It was obvious that if Great Britain wanted to put cotton on the contraband list, some other excuse must be found. The op- portunity soon came. The German Govern- ment, on February 4, 1915, declared the wa- ters about Great Britain a War Zone where- in enemy merchant vessels would not be safe. England promptly hinted at retalia- tion in the form of complete stoppage of our exports to Germany. The Premier, Mr. Asquith, speaking before the House of Com- mons on February 11th, said that the Brit- ish Government was about to adopt more stringent measures against German trade. He continued : The government is considering the question of taking measures against German trade, in view of the viola- tion by the enemy of the rules of war. I hope shortly to make an announcement of what those measures are to be. Practically, this announcement was a trying out of American public opinion. Some days later another test was made by means of a news dispatch from London which stated that "a blockade of German coast, or, at any rate, the prohibition of foodstuffs destined for Germany" was under consideration. Then, on March 1st, Mr. Asquith announced in Parliament the now famous March 11th Order in Council. It declared that the British and French Gov- ernments would hold themselves free to de- tain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership or origin. The effect of this was a virtual blockade of the neutral ports of Holland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, with the ex- ception of the ports of Norway and Sweden in the Baltic Sea. Vessels immediately refused to accept cotton or other shipments of German des- tination or origin. Insurance was with- drawn on all such shipments. A great vol- ume of cotton was lying in this country con- tracted for delivery to Germany, but had not yet moved. The British Ambassador was "requested" by an official of the United States Govern- ment to extend relief to the embarrassed shippers by adopting some rule that might permit such shippers, who had sold cotton to Germany before March 1st, to forward their cotton. In a communication issued by the British Embassy in Washington, on March 8, 1915, it was announced that the British Govern- ment would make the following concessions : 1. All cotton for which contracts of sale and freight engagements had already been made before March 2, to be allowed free (or bought at contract price if stopped), provided ships sail not later than March 31. 2. Similar treatment to be accorded to all cotton insured before March 2, provided it is put on board not later than March 16. 3. All shipments of cotton claiming above pro- tection to be declared before sailing, and documents produced to and certificates obtained from consular of- ficers or other authority fixed by (Allied) Governments. Ships or cargoes consigned to enemy ports will not be allowed to proceed. This meant, therefore, that cotton con- tracted for Germany before March 1st, might be shipped to neutral countries up to March 31st, but not directly to Germany. The instance of the steamship Kina gives evidence of what the British Government de- scribed as a sympathetic consideration of the cotton interests. This vessel, which had a cargo of cotton contracted for before March 1st, destined for Germany, found it impos- sible to load before the end of March. The State Department sought permission from the British Government for a time extension on this one ship. Great Britain accorded this favor in a cable despatch transmitted through the American Ambassador in Lon- don, dated March 29, 1915: I am informed by the Foreign Office on the 24th that the S. S. Keit (Kina), in view of the special circum- stances of the case, will be permitted to go forward on her prearranged trip from Savannah to Rotterdam, THE CASE OF COTTON 29 Goeteborg, and Copenhagen, provided, however, that her cargo of cotton is covered, with the exception of the date of sailing, by the terms of the agreement re- cently concluded concerning such shipments, and fur- ther provided that there shall be allowed no undue delay to occur in reloading this steamer on arrival at Savan- nah, and in the departure of the steamer from Savan- nah. Sir Edward Grey most earnestly requests that it be distinctly understood that this indulgence must not be used as a precedent for further exceptions from the provisions of the agreement above referred^ to. The Kina steamed from her port, but she never reached Rotterdam, for, notwithstand- ing the above promises, she was stopped and her cargo thrown into a British prize court. It was then evident that Great Britain would neither permit cargoes to go direct to a Ger- man port, nor allow cotton cargoes destined for Germany via neutral ports to reach their destination. On March 31st, a new Order in Council became known, empowering the British Government to requisition the car- goes of neutral vessels found in British ports. Since British cruisers could stop and bring into British ports any neutral vessels they encountered, it was evident that ships bound for neutral countries carrying car- goes of cotton, or any other commodities, could be taken into British ports and their cargoes requisitioned at England's whim. Many cotton cargoes destined for neutral countries and their legitimate needs, were seized and bought by England, but the com- pensation thus accorded by no means made good the loss sustained by the American shipper. His trade connections were broken off, for the foreign purchaser thereafter would give his orders to English cotton mer- chants rather than take the risk of further losses and delays when trading with Ameri- cans. It was a golden windfall to the Brit- ish manufacturer to find the neutral coun- tries of Europe restricted in their supplies of raw cotton. The Department of Com- merce in Washington, on August 5, 1915, stated that British exports of cotton goods a: 1 cotton yarns to Scandinavia and Hol- H nd in the first six months of 1915, showed .'. large increase over 1914. While our ex- porters were hampered in their shipments of raw cotton to European neutrals, Holland and Sweden each bought from England five times as much raw cotton in June, 1915, as, in June, 1914. Twenty-six cargoes of cotton, destined for neutral ports in Europe were detained in English ports during March and April, but despite the efforts of the unofficial Foreign Trade Advisers of the State Department, England did not begin to make payments on this cotton until the month of June. These detained cargoes amounted on July 19 th, to sixty, and by that date only $3,500,- 000 had been paid on the seized shipments. Finally, on July 20th, the British Board of Trade made a ruling that detained cotton cargoes, the ownership of which had passed to Germans, would be confiscated without payment. Meantime a form of "economic pressure" was being exerted on cotton dealers in the United States. Many of the latter are associate members of the Liver- pool Cotton Exchange, and these were in- structed to sign agreements not to deal di- rectly or indirectly with enemies of Great Britain. It was stated that those Avho so signed would have their names posted on the Liverpool Exchange and receive preference by the Liverpool members, which, in effect, was a blacklisting of such Americans who did not accede to the British demands. The agreement was as follows : I, , of an Associate Member of the Liverpool Cotton Association, do solemnly and sincerely declare that neither I nor my firm, nor any partner in the same, nor any branch house or other firm or firms in which I or any one of my partners may be directly or indirectly pecuniarily interested, will trade or have dealings with any person or a member or representative of any firm or person domiciled or carrying on business in any State at pres- ent at war with His Britannic Majesty until such time as peace may have been declared, and I further under- take when trading with subjects of neutral countries to make all necessary inquiries in order to satisfy myself as to the ultimate destination of the goods, and that none of them are intended for consumption in or for transit through any State at war with His Majesty. Declared this day of Witness Address of witness There was a renewal in England, toward the middle of July, of the agitation for mak- ing cotton contraband, and then the British Government announced its intention of re- stricting neutral countries to the amounts of cotton which they had annually imported in normal years. Any excess of this amount, thereupon, was promptly confiscated by Eng- land, despite the vehement and indignant protests of the neutrals. We have seen now how Great Britain, step by step, on one specious plea or another, has crippled the foreign trade of the United States in her most valuable commodity, cot- ton. And this cotton, be it remembered, is the basis of British trade supremacy. In detail, her methods to this end were as fol- lows : At the very commencement of the war, in unofficial warnings she allowed shippers to believe that she might at any moment seize all cotton shipments to Germany. Through her great marine insurance companies, she made insurance rates to enemy ports pro- hibitive. Refusing to recognize the transfer of foreign ships to the American flag, she seized American vessels purchased from for- eigners. Then England checked the attempt to create an American merchant marine, and caused the abandonment of the Ship Pur- chase Bill by her threats not to acquiesce in the purchase by the American Government of foreign-owned vessels. She exerted pres- sure on neutral countries adjacent to Ger- many, and compelled them to place re- 30 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS export embargoes on cotton entering their ports. Having by these methods, caused a drop in the price of cotton to six cents a pound, less than one-half its normal price, impoverishing the South, her importers bought up, for the benefit of the British man- ufacturing trade, vast and unusual quanti- ties of the staple, which in future months was to be exported by the English in its raw and manufactured state to the benefit of British commerce and the detriment of America's foreign trade. Compelled by the indignant protests of American cotton growers and their repre- sentatives in Congress, to announce that cot- ton was still on the free list, Britain began a systematic course of imposing expensive and vexatious rules and regulations on American shippers, such as X-raying their bales of cotton and enforcing the submission of shipments to the examination of British consuls. England still further hampered the export of cotton by declaring the North Sea a mili- tary area, and forcing navigation into pre- scribed channels so that the seizure of neu- tral vessels was facilitated. On March 1st, of this year, England announced that she would stop and take into port ships carry- ing goods of presumed enemy destination. Great Britain then announced by an Or- der in Council that she would, if need arose, requisition the cargoes of neutral vessels brought to British ports. American cotton merchants who did not sign an agreement to deal exclusively with Great Britain and her Allies were blacklisted on the Liverpool Ex- change. But the final step was to come; Great Britain was to drop her mask and boldly de- clare that all these restrictions were but mere subterfuges, and that all along she had determined not to abide by her given word, so earnestly repeated, that she regarded cot- ton as being on the free list, in accordance with international usage and the provisions of the Declaration of London. Suddenly and shamelessly, the announce- ment was made in the House of Commons that Great Britain intended to declare cot- ton absolute contraband of war. This was on August 23rd, and on August 25th the formal notification reached the authorities at Washington. And this declaration of embargo on cotton was issued by the Government which had announced that it would abide by the pro- visions of the Declaration of London, and which even as late as October 26, 1914, had given this country the assurance, that, so far as Great Britain was concerned, cotton "is in the free list, and will remain there." If the British Government dealing with an interest of the magnitude of American cotton violates its promises formally made to another great power, what confidence can be felt in any assurances whatsoever that the British Government may make? Yet even this abandonment of her most solemn promises and pledges was not suffi- cient, England has gone further. On Oc- tober 12th, in the House of Commons, Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, made this announcement in response to a question : Great Britain has declared raw cotton, cotton waste and cotton yarn all contraband. It is intended that every possible step shall be taken to prevent the supplies of these articles from reaching Germany. It is intended also to declare contraband cotton piece goods and other cotton products and to prohibit the exports to neutral countries contiguous to Germany and Austria of goods susceptible of being used in the manufacture of explosives. The end and aim of Great Britain's activities in restraint of the American cot- ton trade is fully reavealed by the follow- ing table taken from British sources, "Cotton," the official journal of the Man- chester (England) Cotton Association, Oc- tober 9, 1915, Page 16. They explain how, despite the war, and despite the fact that she has lost her best customer, Germany, England is exporting greatly increased quantities of cotton, while she is curtailing American shipments to neutral countries : LIVERPOOL STATISTICS. (In 1,000's of bales.) Actual export of Great Britain from August 1, pre- vious year, to nearest Friday to July 31 of named year: Year. American. Total. 1912 315 507 1913 233 429 1914 177 342 1915 249 519 Here it may be seen that Great Britain exported 507,000 bales of cotton in 1911'; 429,000 in 1913; 342,000 in 1914 (to Jul./ 31st), and 519,000 for the twelve months, dating from the very beginning of the war. In the twelve months of the war, naturally, England was not sending her customary ex- ports of raw cotton to countries such as Germany, Belgium, Austria-Hungary. England's increased shipments of cotton can be accounted for only by the fa"ct that she has been selling to the neutral countries of Europe our own cotton which she does not allow us to sell them directly. V BRITAIN'S INDIRECT INTERFERENCE WITH AMERICAN TRADE DEPENDENT upon raw materials, im- ported from Great Britain, British colonies, or from nations whose out- put comes through British-controlled chan- nels and, above all, subject to the dominion which Great Britain ' arrogates to her- self over the merchant marine of the world, American manufacturers, in order to obtain these necessary raw materials, have been compelled to enter into agreements in re- straint of trade — agreements by which vir- tually and practically Great Britain, a for- eign power, assumes control of our great national industries. Those branches of industry vitally and seriously affected by British dominance and exactions include the rubber, textile and tin trades. By reason of sworn agreements which manufacturers must sign in order to obtain raw products, no sales can be made by American manufacturers to customers in any country outside of Great Britain and her allied nations. Sales to Germany, Aus- tria-Hungary and Turkey are absolutely pro- hibited. Sales to neutral nations, such as Holland, Norway, Sweden and even South American countries, can be effected only through agents in London. Shipments to United States possessions, including Porto Rico, the Philippines and Hawaii, can be made only by the gracious acquiescence of the British Consul at ports of shipment. Sales of manufactured, or even partly manu- factured, products even to merchants in the United States are restricted, wholesalers putting themselves under the obligation of guaranteeing that their own customers in turn will not make sales to the Germanic countries. The agreements into which rub- ber, wool and tin manufacturers are obliged to enter are specific and ironclad, and give to British commercial representatives in the United States unrestricted, unhindered and absolute control of these great and impor- tant industries. The agreements aforesaid are in violation of United State_s laws — spe- cifically of Section 73 of the Act of Feb- ruary 12, 1913 (CI. 40), and Section 3 of the Sherman Act of July 2, 1890 — and make of all merchants signing them violators of these laws and enforced criminals. Consider, as an example, what has hap- pened in the case of rubber. Great Britain declared rubber conditional contraband in September, 1914. She placed rubber on the absolute contraband list No- vember 12, 1914. Inasmuch as seventy per cent, of all rubber used in the United States comes from the Federated Malay States and Ceylon, and as the British policy threatened to shut off the delivery of Brazilian rubber, constituting thirty per cent of that used, and which could reach the United States only via England, or direct by the British Booth Line, delivering goods only consigned to the order of the British Consul-General, negotia- tions were begun in December, 1914, for the lifting of the embargo by a committee repre- senting the Rubber Club of America, Inc., and the Department of State. Told that the United States was helpless, the committee consulted with the British Ambassador, Sir Arthur Cecil Spring Rice, and later a repre- sentative— B. G. Worth, of the B. F. Good- rich Co. — went to London, where conditions for the import of rubber into the United States were agreed upon. The "Rubber Club of America" was designated to act as im- port agent for Great Britain, and Sir Rich- ard Crawford was sent to the United States as commercial attache of the British Em- bassy, to take charge of the situation. Under the terms of the agreement decided upon, an agreement to which each individual manufacturer must adhere under oath in order to obtain crude rubber, no rubber products whatever can be exported from the United States except to Great Britain and her allies, and no sales made to neutral non- belligerent countries except through British agents stationed in London, all shipments being made by way of and through London. The terms include a restricton in the disposi- tion even of Brazilian rubber, thus enabling Great Britain to tie up the entire rubber trade of the United States. The terms were first made known to rubber manufacturers by a circular sent to all members of the Rubber Club of America and the Rubber Trade Associaton of New York on January 30, 1915. The specifications given were as follows : 32 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS First — Manufacturers cannot export or sell to any one who might export crude rubber, waste rubber or reclaimed rubber, except to Great Britain or a British possession. They may not sell plantation rubber even to any one in the United States. A manufacturer may, however, sell Brazilian rubber to a customer in the United States, but for his own protection should as- sure himself that no exportation is intended. All plantation rubber must be used in the factory of the manufacturer for whom it is imported. Second — No direct shipments of partly manufactured goods may be made to a European neutral, like Sweden, Holland or Italy. Such orders can be filled only through an agent in London. For example, an order for automobile tires for Sweden cannot be shipped direct. You must appoint an agent in London, and he must get a permit from the British Government to ship the goods from London to Sweden. This having been arranged, you can forward the goods to your London agent. It is recognized that this mode of shipment is diffi- cult for those who have no London agent, and the embargo committee is endeavoring to secure the accept- ance of a plan which will greatly simplify it. To such manufacturers as have no London agents the secretary is prepared to recommend firms of for- warding agents with both New York and London houses who can attend to such business. Third — Bear in mind that the British Consul-Gen- eral at New York has no authority to modify these rulings. If you attempt to make a shipment direct _ to Sweden, and have the papers vised by the British Consul, you are still in violation of your obligation. Informing the consul that you are about to violate will not help you. His signature means only that he has been informed, not that your obligations have been modified by him. Fourth — No goods must be sold for delivery to an enemy of Great Britain. This is plain enough. If through intent, carelessness, or misfortune, your goods are found in transit to Germany, your permit will be cancelled. You must be sure. This does not mean, we are informed, that there must be an agreement not to export accompanying every tire you sell, but every reasonable precaution must be taken. You should have definite agreements from every customer who is likely to export, and we would suggest the use of a rubber stamp for all orders and invoices, stating that the goods are sold with the understanding that they are not to be exported, except to Great Britain, France or Rus- sia or to a European neutral by way of the United Kingdom or to a non-European neutral. Fifth — All goods exported to a non-European neu- tral, like the South American countries, Mexico or Cuba, must be reported to the British consul at the port of shipment. We recommend that this report state only of what the shipment consists and the port of des- tination. We do not understand that it is necessary to state prices or even the name of the consignee. Sixth — Pending further information we would also advise notifying the British consul of shipment to Porto Rico, the Philippine Islands and the Hawaiian Islands. Seventh — Tires which you export must bear adequate marks of identification. You must inform the British consul in writing, stating what these are. Eighth — The question has been raised whether or not rubber from the Dutch East Indies will come under these obligations. On this point we would strongly advise, pending further information, that Dutch rub- ber be regarded exactly the same as if it were planta- tion rubber; otherwise misunderstandings will almost surely arise, and the shipper would perhaps suffer can- cellation of his permits pending investigation. In general it is unquestionably the desire of Sir Francis Hopwood, who is in charge, that everything consistent with the protection of British interests shall be done for the convenience of the American industry and as rapidly as the organization can be perfected for handling it. If any part of the plan proves too cumbersome after trial, it is believed any reasonable relief can be secured. Sir Richard Crawford has just arrived and will be attached to the British Embassy as commercial attache. It will be a part of his duties to deal with the prob- lems arising in connection with the rubber situation, and it is promised that he will co-operate fully with this committee. Sir Francis Hopewood made it particularly clear to Mr. Work that the American industry could feel se- cure under the present plan unless numerous violations occurred. Emphatic warning was given that in case any manufacturer, importer or dealer came under sus- picion his permits should be immediately revoked. Re- instatement will be slow and difficult. The British Gov- ernment will cancel first and investigate afterward. The initial communication was signed by the Embargo Committee, consisting of Ar- thur H. Marks, of the B. F. Goodrich Com- pany; H. Stuart Hotchkiss, of the United States Kubber Company; George B. Hodg- man, of the Hodgman Rubber Company, and William E. Bruyn, of L. Littlejohn & Com- pany. American importers, in applying for rub- ber through the Rubber Club of America, are obliged to sign an agreement embodying the above requirements. The agreement exacted is as follows : His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at New York. In consideration of your consenting to the delivery to us of the rubber specified in the margin, we hereby give you the following undertaking, which shall remain in force so long as Great Britain is at war with any European Power : We will not export from the United States any raw rubber, reclaimed rubber, or waste rubber, whether the same has been imported from the British Dominions or not, otherwise than to the United Kingdom or to a British possession. We will not sell the rubber now delivered by you to any dealer or other person or persons in the United States, but will use it for our own manufacturing pur- poses. All orders received by us for manufactured or partly manufactured rubber goods to be sent to neutral Euro- pean countries shall be executed by shipments to the United Kingdom and reshipment from there under li- cense to be obtained for export therefrom. We will not execute any orders for manufactured or partly manufactured rubber goods to be sent either di- rectly or indirectly to any country or State at war with Great Britain. We will not sell any manufactured, or partly manu- factured, rubber goods to any person in the United States without satisfying ourselves that there is no intention on his part to export or resell the same for exportation to any countries in Europe other than Great Britain, France, Russia, or Italy, otherwise than by shipping to the United Kingdom and reshipping from there, under license to be obtained for export there- from. If we export any manufactured or partly manufac- tured rubber goods to a destination outside Europe not being in a British possession, we will, prior to or simul- taneously with the shipment, give you particulars of the goods so shipped and their destination. All rubber tires exported by us or sold by us for export shall bear a distinctive name or mark, which we will communicate to you, so as to identify them as being our manufacture. When he sells to an American purchaser, the importer himself is obliged to sign a guarantee, which is sent to the British Con- sular representative at New York, as fol- lows: RUBBER GUARANTEE His Britannic Majesty's Consul Gen- RUBBER. eral, New York. I beg to inform you that I have Ex. s. s -...sold the rubber specified in the mar- gin to Packages whose guarantee you will find on the back hereof. I will produce to you Weight at any time on demand the original contracts or other documents evi- Marks dencing the sale. In consideration of your consenting to the delivery to them of the said rubber, I undertake that I will not, directly or indirectly, at any time so long as the pres- ent war continues, export any raw rubber, reclaimed INDIRECT INTERFERENCE WITH TRADE 33 ruober, or waste rubber from the United States, ex- cept to the British dominions, and that I will not sell any raw rubber, reclaimed rubber or waste rubber for exportation without satisfying myself that it is not in- tended for exportation from the United States, except to the British dominions. Date (163-2) The intending purchaser of the consign- ment in turn signs a similar guarantee in his application for crude rubber. These appli- cation forms are turned over to the Rubber Club of America, which is required to stamp them with "Approved." The British Con- sulate at New York then forwards the appli- cation to the British Government, which per- mits the sending of rubber or forbids it, as it sees fit. Three large rubber concerns — the United States Rubber Company, the B. F. Goodrich Company and the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company — are importing rubber through the British Government direct, on the same guarantees required of other importers. In addition, however, these firms were required to put up a bond of £50,000, to be forfeited in case of violations of their guarantees. A rubber manufacturing concern, which had done business with one of the countries to which sales are prohibted, endeavored to secure raw rubber from the B. F. Goodrich Company. In reply the concern received the following letter, which reveals the strin- gency of conditions imposed : THE B. F. GOODRICH COMPANY, 1780-82 Broadway, New York City Dear Sirs : Without discussion as to the merits of the case, we beg to advise that our supply of crude gum is dependent on the actions of the English Government. Under cer- tain restrictions we are enabled to obtain our require- ments. This involves a heavy cash penalty for failure to observe the obligation we have assumed, far and away in excess of this is involved the good faith of our Company in absolutely complying with its pledges. We cannot afford for the sake of any one business to risk in the slightest this latter obligation. Necessity, there- fore, compels certain operations to protect the situation in both your and our interests. It will not permanently serve you to attempt in any way to violate the restrictions now surrounding the ex- port of rubber goods to foreign countries. On the con- trary, you would do a great harm to the domestic needs of this country. If for any reason the Amer- ican manufacturers of rubber goods are prevented from executing their pledges, the supply of gum would cease, hundreds of thousands be thrown out of employment, prices for all classes of rubber goods reach unheard- of figures, all to the hurt of the domestic buyer here at home. We feel, therefore, we will not be misunderstood in asking that before we quote or sell you, you execute the attached form of agreement. On its return signed by an official of your company, and acknowledged be- fore a notary, we will be pleased to sell you in accord- ance with the terms therein. Very truly yours, THE B. F. GOODRICH COMPANY. With the letter was enclosed the following agreement : AGREEMENT. THE B. F. GOODRICH COMPANY. We hereby agree that any quotation asked for, and any purchases made by us from you or another of any of your products, shall be in each and every case only for domestic use or shipment to Great Britain, France or Russia, unless accompanied by permit satis- factory to you. We pledge ourselves in this fact, and agree that the execution of this document shall be bind- ing on us for such length of time as you shall consider it to be effective, and cancellable only by you. We further agree to submit to any and all investiga- tions that may be necessary on your part, and to give free access to any and all of our books, if called on so to do, to establish the fact of our non-exporting, or selling to another to export, in violation of this agree- ment. And further, we agree that any order, even though accepted by you, may be cancelled without redress on our part at your option for any cause whatsoever, dur- ing the period that a state of war exists abroad, be- tween Great Britain and any other country. In case we tender any order that is for shipment out of this country, we will in each instant state thereon its destination. Signed Dated Per Inscribed and sworn to before me this day of '. Notary Public. To summarize the situation as Great Brit- ain's policy affects American rubber manu- facturers : In order to obtain crude rubber, from British possessions as well as from neutral Brazil, every manufacturer must sign an agreement whereby he relinquishes his right to sell manufactured goods to cus- tomers in any and every country outside of Great Britain and her Allies, and takes oath that he will not do so; intending purchasers of manufactured, or partly manufactured, products must themselves make a similar guarantee. No rubber can, therefore, be sold to customers in any of the neutral, non- belligerent European countries. Shipments even to South American countries are pro- hibited except where the goods are sold through London agents and shipped far out of their way to London, and thence to South America. To cite an illustrative instance: A concern located in New York, with a branch house in New Orleans, gave an order July, 1915, for rubber tires to the Goodrich Tire and Rubber Company, for shipment to Cartegena, Columbia, South America. This house carried on an extensive trade with South and Central American countries. The Goodrich company sent to the trading con- cern a copy of the embargo affidavit, asking them to sign it in accordance with the in- structions imposed by the British Govern- ment. The concern in its reply declared that the goods ordered were for shipment to Car- tegena, were positively not to be used for any other purpose, and that the Goodrich con- cern might give the details to the British Consul at New York in order to obtain a 36 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS shipper "Textile Alliance, Inc.," and must be consigned in one of two ways, namely : — (1) "To Messrs. Freshfield, 31 Old Jewry, London, E. C, account of Messrs (Name of recipient)." In this case the shipper must send all of the original Bills of Lading, and one memorandum copy to the Textile Alliance, Inc., 120 Milk Street, Bos- ton, or 45 E. 17th Street, New York, with notice that all requirements have been complied with. This will enable the Alliance to transmit the Bills of Lading to Messrs. Freshfield with proper notification to enable them to release the shipment. The Alliance will not accept documents unless free from notice of lien. (2) "To Messrs (name of ap- proved Custodian bankers) for account of Messrs. Freshfield. Notify Messrs (name of recipient.)" Shippers must send us in each case one memorandum copy Bill of Lading to enable us to notify the War Trade Department that their requirements have been complied with, and furnish Messrs. Fresh- field with the necessary information that they may au- thorize the custodian bankers to release the merchan- dise to the recipient. The Custodian bankers approved by the British Gov- ernment are : Messrs. Baring Bros. & Co., Ltd. Messrs. Brown, Shipley & Co. Messrs. Higginson & Co. Messrs. Morgan, Grenfell & Co. Standard Bank of- South Africa, Ltd. (London ofifice). Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. (London of- fice). Third : The name of the person in the United King- dom to whom the Bill of Lading is to be released by Messrs. Freshfield, must appear in the notice that the shippers send to the Textile Alliance, Inc., with the Bill of Lading. Fourth : The Alliance charge to cover their expenses is 1 per, cent, of the total selling price of the merchan- dise, including all charges, but not including prepaid freight and prepaid insurance, if any. This charge is payable at the time of shipment and remittance should accompany Bills of Lading sent to the Alliance. It is understood that on the expiry of the Agreement between the Textile Alliance, Inc., and the British Government -any balance or fund created for the services and ex- penses of the Alliance, shall be returned pro rata. Fifth : Shipments made under the foregoing condi- tions may be sent via all routes and to all destinations in the United Kingdom. Sixth : The granting of licenses and permits to ship rests solely with the British Government. Interested parties must bear in mind that licenses and permits will be granted only in so far as may be to the interest ol Great Britain and her allied countries, and furthermore, that the granting of licenses does not insure that the merchandise upon arrival in the - United Kingdom is necessarily to be delivered to the intended recipient. Seventh : Consignors must pay all charges imposed toy the Custodian Bankers and should make their bank- ing and shipping arrangements independently of the Textile Alliance, Inc. Eighth : Messrs. Freshfield will make suitable provi- sion for releasing shipments in the United Kingdom upon receipt of advice from the Textile Alliance, Inc., that all requirements have been complied with. Ninth : Persons attempting to export by irregular channels will not only risk detention, but will disqualify themselves as exporters of Tops and Yarns and import- ers of Wool, etc., from all parts of the British Empire. Tenth : The President and the Textile Alliance, Inc., assume no responsibility in regard to financial or other arrangements. Buyers, sellers and importers must in- demnify and agree to hold harmless the Textile Alli- ance, Inc., and A. M. Patterson, individually and as an officer of the Alliance, and Messrs. Freshfield from ALL liability. Under existing conditions, as has been shown, American manufacturers do not suf- fer alone by the detention of ships and the seizure of cargoes by Great Britain. The restrictions placed upon various" industries within the United States by illegal trade agreements affects business with neutral na- tions not only at present, or so long as the British sea policy continues, but threaten to alienate customers in non-belligerent coun- tries for years to come. With rubber declared contraband by Great Britain, shipments of rubber goods cannot be made by an American manufac- turer to any customer in Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden or any neutral country. If shipments are made, they will be seized in all probability by Great Britain. On the other band, shipments can, however, be made through British agents, the goods being sent to England and reshipped thence by the agent, who collects a commission. Thus the rubber trade of the world, outside of the United States, is practically, and to all pur- poses, thrown entirely into the hands of British agents, who can seize the trade re- lations broken by England's policy between American sellers and European buyers and establish themselves in all countries where American trade is ousted. And the imposi- tions placed upon the textile industry have absolutely wiped out our export trade with neutral European nations in wool. An American manufacturer desiring to import raw wool into the United States must make application to the president of the Textile Alliance, signing an agreement not to sell any woolen products, manufactured or partly manufactured, to a customer in any country except Great Britain. Like- wise shipments of manufactured, or partly manufactured, goods to Great Britain can also be made only through an arrangement with the Textile Alliance. It is absolutely impossible for American exporters to ship yarns, etc., direct to customers in Sweden, Norway, Holland, Denmark or any neutral country. Even American manufacturers who buy their raw products in the United States suf- fer from these conditions. American raw wool, yarns, and "tops" cannot be shipped to a customer in Sweden, Norway, Holland or Denmark. Any wool shipped except through the Textile Alliance and to Great Britain alone is liable to confiscation. Ex- cept through the Textile Alliance, or through the British Embassy, no guaran- tees of delivery of American woolen goods to customers abroad can be obtained. And yet, despite the restrictions to which American manufacturers subject them- selves, entangled as they are by a network of agreements, legal clauses and prohibi- tions, all acting to the advantage of Great Britain alone, American manufacturers, when they come to the point of selling to customers in neutral countries, find that the guarantees are quite ineffectual and worthless. Goods may be sold to British customers direct — even then the delivery is not guaranteed by British authorities. Goods may be consigned to customers in neutral countries through British brokers, INDIRECT INTERFERENCE WITH TRADE 37 but then the Textile Alliance takes the po- sition that it cannot guarantee the safe conduct of shipments even to the Lon- don brokers. Thus tied up as they are by agreements and trade entanglements, Amer- ican manufactures enjoy no recompense, in- asmuch as all the guarantees work out so as to be absolutely worthless, and in the end they find themselves helpless in the arbitrary hands of Great Britain's naval authorities. What is the result of this bottling-up of legitimate American commerce and the re- striction of its export trade to Great Britain alone? British woolen manufacturers and agents — to whom the entire export trade of the United States is diverted — can them- selves sell to whomsoever they will. They can — and do — take over the trade with all the concerns in Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, as well as in any other country, who have hitherto dealt with American man- ufacturers, and they can — and do — prevent American manufacturers from securing new customers forced by the war to look in this direction. Taking advantage of the fact that nearly all of the tin, tin ore and chloride of tin used by American manufacturers is im- ported from Great Britain and her depend- encies, conditions quite as rigid as those im- posed for the use of rubber and wool govern this trade. That Great Britain has assumed to control the tin industry of the world is shown in a letter sent by the United States Steel Products Company — which is closely allied with the United States Steel Corpora- tion — of which James A. Farrell and El- bert T. Gary are directors, to all of its ex- porters and customers. Guarantees that sales of tin products shall not be made to countries other than Great Britain and her allies must be made to obtain raw material. The letter sent out by the United States Steel Products Company is as follows : The tin plate sold by us is manufactured by the American Sheet and Tin Plate Company, and the sup- plies of pig tin which are used by them in the manu- facture of said tin plate are imported from Great Brit- ain and possessions. In order to obtain such supplies of pig tin we are obliged to sign an undertaking, which has been put into effect by the British authorities, known as the "tin guarantee," a complete copy of which is given herewith for your information. In order to carry out the terms of this guarantee, notice is hereby given that all sales and shipments made by this company on and after this date are made sub- ject to the following conditions: "It is understood and agreed that the within men- tioned tin plate, or tin canisters and tin boxes suitable for food packing made therefrom, is sold subject to the terms of the guarantee as promulgated by the British government authorities, which requires (a) that orders for such materials will not be executed to be sent, either directly or indirectly, to any country or state at war with Great Britain ; (b) that no sales of such materials will be made without obtaining satisfactory assurances from the buyer that there is no intention on his part to export or resell the same for exportation to any country in Europe other than Great Britain, France, Italy or Russia, otherwise than by shipping to the United Kingdom and reshipping from there under license to be obtained for export therefrom ; (c) if any exporta- tion of such materials are made to a destination out- side of Europe not being in British possessions, full particulars of same are to be reported to his Brittanic Majesty's consul-general at New York prior to or si- multaneously with the shipment, giving particulars of the goods so shipped and their destination." This notice is issued with the understanding that the terms and conditions . under which sales of tin plate shall hereafter be made to this company may be altered or changed in accordance with any changes or modifi- cations that may be required by the British government authorities. Accompanying the letter was the follow- ing copy of the agreement which the United States Steel Products Company had entered into: In consideration of your consenting to the delivery to us of the tin, chloride of tin, tin ore, specified in the margin, we hereby give you the following undertak- ing, which shall continue in force so long as Great Brit- ain is at war with any European power : We will not export from the United States any tin, chloride of tin or tin ore, whether the same has been imported from the British dominions or not, otherwise than to the United Kingdom or to a British possession. We will not sell the tin, chloride of tin, tin ore now delivered by you to any dealer or other person or per- sons in the United States, but will use it for our own manufacturing purposes. All orders received by us for tin plates or tin can- isters and tin boxess suitable for food packing made therefrom, or for tin foil, solder, Babbitt's metal, type metal or any metallic alloys containing tin, to be sent to neutral European countries, shall be executed from stocks maintained by us in the United Kingdom, or be executed by shipments to the United Kingdom and re- shipment from there, under license to be obtained for export therefrom. We will not execute any orders for tin plates, or tin canisters and tin boxes suitable for food packing made therefrom, or for tin foil, solder, Babbitt's metal, type metal or any metallic alloys containing tin, to be sent, either directly or indirectly, to any country or state at war with Great Britain. We will not sell any tin plates, or tin canisters and tin boxes suitable for food packing made therefrom, or for tin foil, solder, Babbitt's metal, type metal or any metallic alloys containing tin to any person in the United States without satisfying ourselves that there is no intention on his part to export, or resell the same for exportation, to any countries in Europe other than Great Britain, France, Italy or Russia, otherwise than by shipping to the United KingdonO and reshipping from there under license to be obtained for export therefrom. If we export any tin plates or tin canisters and tin boxes suitable for food packing made therefrom, or tin foil, solder, Babbitt's metal, type metal or any metallic alloys containing tin, to a destination outside of Europe not being in British possessions, we will, prior Jo or si- multaneously with the shipment, give you particulars of the goods so shipped and their destination. The Special Committee of the Metal Ex- change of New York sent out a letter — signed by C. Mayer, Secretary — specifically revealing the conditions imposed by Great Britain upon tin manufacturers. The let- ter was occasioned by the belief that certain manufacturers were not observing the exac- tions required. It is as follows : NEW YORK METAL EXCHANGE, New York, Sept. 1, 1915. To the Trade : TIN. Certain transactions coming to the knowledge of the Tin Committee lead it to believe that arrangements with the British Government governing the importation of tin are not fully understood. Importations are permitted only for the purpose of supplying domestic requirements. The jobber is required to use all due diligence in the carrying out of the agreement thus entered into, when selling the metal, and thereafter to stamp his invoices 38 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS with a notice calling attention to the fact that the tin is sold with the distinct understanding that it shall not be exported, but must be sold or used only for the purpose of supplying domestic requirements. With the circular are three forms of guarantees. One to be signed by the im- porter, one by the manufacturer, and one by the purchaser from the manufacturer, each binding himself not to sell or trade with any countries not countenanced by the Brit- ish Empire. They are almost identical in form. The first is as follows : Issued by the NEW YORK METAL EXCHANGE. TIN GUARANTEE His Britannic Majesty's Consul-Gen- TIN eral, New York. Ex. s. s In consideration of your consent- ing to the delivery to us of the tin, chloride of tin, tin ore (a), specified in the margin, we, Packages hereby give you the following un- dertaking, which shall remain in Weight force so long as Great Britain is at war with any European power. Quality We will not export from the United States any tin, chloride of tin, or tin ore, whether the same has been im- ported from the British Dominions or not, otherwise than to the United Kingdom or a British possession. Marks. .We will not sell the tin, chloride of tin, or tin ore (a) now delivered by you to any dealer, or other person or persons, in the United States, but will use it for our own manufactur- ing purposes. Date. (a) Strike out the words which are inapplicable. (421) In regard to the impositions made by Great Britain and executed through her offi- cial representatives upon American indus- tries, it is not only germain, but urgently important, to remember that these exactions are in violation of United States laws. Shall the United States, by submitting to impositions and requirements now made upon American manufacturers by a foreign power, establish the precedent that — for all time — she shall, whenever the expediency of a foreign policy dictates, servilely and tin- protestingly submit to an interference with her trade, domestic as well as foreign, in siross violation of her own statutes? Here are exactions forced by Great Brit- ain upon American manufacturers : Article 1 of the rubber agreement : "Manufacturers cannot export or sell to any one who might export crude rubber, waste rubber or reclaimed rubber except to Great Britain or a British possession. They may not sell plantation rubber even to any one in the United States." Fourth section of the rubber agreement: "No goods must be sold for delivery to an enemy ot Great Britain ... If through intent, carelessness, or misfortune, your goods are found in transit to Ger- many your permit will be canceled. . . You should have definite agreements from every customer who is likely to export, and we would suggest the use of a rubber stamp for all orders and invoices, stating that the goods are sold with the understanding that they are not to be exported, except to Great Britain, France or Russia or to a European neutral by way of the United Kingdom or to a non-European neutral." Article 6 of the guarantee made by pur- chasers of wool with the Textile Alliance : "That no part of the merchandise subject to this agreement, nor any wool, tops, noils, or yarn produced therefrom, shall be exported to any destination from the United States of America except to Canada." Pledge made to "His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at New York" by manufac- turers desiring to obtain tin : "We will not export from the United States any tin, chloride of tin, or tin ore, whether the same has been imported from the British Dominions or, not, otherwise than to the United Kingdom or to a British Possession. "We will not export from the United States any tin, delivered by you to any dealer or other person or per- sons in the United States, but will use it for our own manufacturing purposes." And here are the tables of our laws : Section 73 of the Act of February 12, 1913 (CI. 40) : Section 73 of the Act of February 12, 1913 (CI. 40) : "That every combination, conspiracy, trust, agree- ment or contract is hereby declared to be contrary to public policy, illegal and void when the same is made by or between two or more persons or cor- porations either of whom as agent or principal is engaged in importing any article from any foreign country into the United States, and where such combination, conspiracy, trust, agreement or contract is intended to operate in restraint of lawful trade or free competition in lawful trade or commerce, or to increase the market price in any part of the United States of any article or articles imported or intended to be imported, into the United States, or of any manufacture into which said imported article centers or is intended to center." Sherman Act of July 2, 1890 : "Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or of the District of Columbia, or in restraint of com- merce between any such Territory and another or between any such Territory or Territories and any State or States or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations or between the District of Colum- bia and any State or States or foreign nations, is hereby declared illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such com- bination or conspiracy shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $5,000 or by imprison- ment not exceeding one year, or by both said pun- ishments in the discretion of the court." VI INTERFERENCE WITH COMMUNICATION IN times of peace many thousand com- mercial and private messages pass every day over the cables connecting the United States and the other countries of the world. Even in war times the num- ber of submarine telegrams is over five thousand per day. Our commercial and financial relations with the world are de- pendent on cables. The wires beneath the sea are our international trade arteries. Great Britain has it in her power to cut those arteries, because of certain physical facts and of geographical advantages which she possesses. Today practically all commercial and personal telegrams from the United States to foreign countries pass through the hands of the British censor. Great Britain's right in time of war to censor dispatches is un- questioned. The International Telegraph Convention and the International Kadio- Telegraph Convention, to which all the Powers are signatories, expressly grants to any government "the power to in- terrupt the system of international tele- graphs for an indefinite period, if it judges it necessary, either generally, or only upon certain lines and for certain kinds of mes- sages, upon the condition that it immedi- ately advises each of the other contracting parties." (See Article VIII of the Tele- graph Convention, applying also to wireless dispatches.) Great Britain has complied with the stipulations of this article. She merely exercises the same rights that the United States Government exercises today in regard to wireless dispatches. But in actual practice the British censor has adopted and continues a policy which has proved exacting beyond the needs of war, onerous in the extreme, and one which has caused and is today causing American com- merce financial losses running into millions of dollars. In many instances the action of the censor has been unreasoning, arbitrary and practically despotic. As a result, buy- ers of American goods in neutral countries have been and are unable to make purchases from American exporters. In import- ant deals involving the exchange of many . cables, vitally important messages in a series have been suppressed altogether. The Brit- ish censor has it in his power to suppress messages for any reason, or for no reason at all. He does so, under the specious and spacious excuse of "war measures." He does not notify the sender of the non-delivery of stopped messages. Errors made in retrans- mission after passing the censor are not cor- rected, and the censor is not liable for dam- ages. All corrections must be made by a private message between addressee and sender. The censor alters messages to suit himself. He cuts out words that displease him. Although all messages, other than those sent in the limited specified codes and so marked, are written in plain English, the censor, suspicious of private codes, pur- posely alters messages to see whether a secret code is in use. In certain cases the contents of sup- pressed American commercial cablegrams to neutral countries have formed the basis for commercial propositions to the addressees from British firms. In brief, American cables passing through the hands of the British censor, except mes- sages between the Department of State and our envoys abroad, are at the censor's mercy. No business secrets can escape his eye. Great Britain wields this tremendous power by reason of her control of the great cable line centers and junctions. A glance at the map on page 40, on which the chief American cable routes are indicated, will show this clearly. The heavy lines show the only cables which terminate on American territory or in territory not belonging to or controlled by Great Britain and her allies — the only lines by means of which an American message can be depended upon to reach the foreign world. All the cables crossing the Atlantic, except the French cable to Brest, and the German cable, now out of commission, ter- minate in England or Ireland, or the Azores, belonging to Great Britain's ally, Portugal. On the way south, American cables reach Cuba, Porto Bico and Hayti ; from Havana a line extends across Panama, along the west coast of South America, and overland to Buenos Ayres. The Atlantic coast cables of South America are all British owned. The United States Government owns the cable from Seattle to Sitka. American cap- ital owns the cable from San Francisco to Hawaii and Manila and thence to Shanghai and Tokio. Since Shanghai is British and 40 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS INTERFERENCE WITH COMMUNICATIONS 41 Tokio Japanese, this cable is indicated by dotted lines from American to Allied ports. Business with the west coast of South America is not as yet a heavy item in Amer- ican trade. In the East, the lines beyond Shanghai are owned by the British, and the lines beyond Tokio by the Japanese, largely financed by British capital. All American communications affecting our great coffee and rubber trade with Bra- zil must pass over British lines. Not only commercial, but official cables, army dispatches and consular dispatches, have been held up. The British Govern- ment, upon protest from the Department of State, has "explained" interference with United States Government business, but for the financial loss suffered by our mer- chants no redress is available. Specific charges of loss are innumerable, and from a mass of data the following are selected : In several cases New York merchants do- ing business with Greek houses assert that cablegrams between New York and Athens have been intercepted and suppressed, and that within a few days' time British firms have approached these same Greek houses with propositions exactly duplicating those contained in the suppressed American cables. One firm, which had conducted for many years a very profitable trade in dried fruits with Greece, has abandoned that trade altogether, because of British interference. In another case, an order from a Scan- dinavian to a New York house for 48,000 pounds of coffee was suppressed by the Brit- ish censor; the loss sustained by this firm, which otherwise has suffered severely, in this one transaction amounted to f 3,000. A grain exporting house offered a cargo of grain to a house in Denmark for $ 1.07 a bushel; the British censor delayed the mes- sage and when it was finally delivered to the Danish house the price per bushel had be- come $1.03. The American firm had to stand a loss of about $10,000. An American ex- porting firm offered a quantity of ammuni- tion from a manufacturer to the Russian Government; the cablegram got no further than London — but several days later J. P. Morgan & Company approached the manu- facturer in the case directly and the profits in the transaction went to the credit of the official purchasing agents of the British Government. Protests against this condition of affairs have been laid before the Department of State by organizations and individuals. The Merchants Association of New York, the Western Union Telegraph Company, the Swiss People's Bank of Berne, the American Trade Agency at Eome, Spanish cotton im- porters at Barcelona, Danish firms, the Chamber of Commerce at Naples, the New Orleans Cotton Exchange, the Galveston Cotton Exchange, the Manila Chamber of Commerce, coffee exporting houses in Bio de Janeiro— these and many others have made formal complaint. These protests have been of little avail. To a formal protest from the Swiss Gov- ersment, the British General Post Office, un- der whose administration the direction of the censorship falls, stated that "in order to avoid the inconvenience which would have arisen from a total stoppage of communica- tion it was decided as an act of grace (so underlined in the original communication made by the British Government, 1 to accept telegrams for transmission on the under- standing that they were to be accepted at the senders' risk and subject to censorship by the British authorities; that is, that they might be stopped, delayed, or otherwise dealt with by the censors, and that no claim for reimbursement could be entertained." The mere "acceptance of telegrams at the owner's risk" is "an act of grace." Only as an act of grace, therefore, are American ex- porters permitted to send telegrams which remain undelivered to merchants in Greece, while British firms later offer the same prop- osition to the same Greek concerns to whom the suppressed cables were addressed. Only_ as an act of grace, again, is an American grain exporter permitted to sell a cargo of grain for four cents less a bushel than he had quoted it, thereby sustaining a loss of $10,000. Only an act of grace, is the propo- sition of an American firm to Bussia, Great Britain's ally, suppressed, and the transac- tion diverted into the hands of J. P. Mor- gan & Company. The extent of the loss caused by this act of grace is not readily computable, but in known specific cases it already amounts to many millions of dollars. Specific instances of interference which have formed the basis of representations from the Department of State to Downing Street will illustrate England's absolute con- trol of American commercial messages to neutral European countries and Brazil. 2 On November 15, 1914, the director of the Swiss People's Bank at Berne, through the American Minister to Switzerland, Pleasant A. Stovall, complained to the De- partment of State that telegrams to New York from Swiss financial institutions were never delivered. Messages between Berne and New York could be routed in several ways : overland to Brest and thence by the French cable (Compagnie Francaise des Cables Telegraphiques ) to New York, pass- ing through the French censor's hands at Brest; or overland and by cable to London, thence to an Irish or English cable station, 'See Department of State Publication, "Diplomatic Correspondence with Belligerent Governments," p. 77. 2 Ibid, p. 93. 42 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS thence to Newfoundland or Nova Scotia and thence to New York, passing through the British censor's hands at London. It is im- possible to reach Switzerland without pass- ing the British or the French censor. In the case of the Swiss People's Bank, the mes- sages never got beyond the censor. And nothing could be done about it. The same conditions govern communica- tions with Italy, Greece and all Mediteran- ean countries. It is impossible to cable these countries without encountering the French or British censor. He must read all mes- sages, and he can and does suppress at will, without notification of stoppage. In case of protest, he blandly answers that he has no records of his activity, 1 and that is all that there is to it. If he chooses to hand a message to a British competitor of an Amer- ican firm, he can. He has no records. Cable communication is permitted only as an act of grace, anyway. The particular case in which the British censor was unable to trace suppressed mes- sages illustrates our difficulties in handling a valuable part of our South American trade — Brazil's coffee and rubber. Nine tele- grams between March 12, 1915, and April 20 th, from L. C. Fallon & Company, New Or- leans, routed over the Postal Telegraph Com- pany to New York, thence to the Azores by the Commercial Cable Company, thence to Rio de Janeiro by the Western Pacific Cable Company, a British concern, never reached their destination. Another telegram from C. A. Fairchild & Co., New York, to the same address, "Ornstein, Rio de Janeiro," also vanished. "Ornstein" is a German ap- pearing name. These cables were probably promptly sent to the London General Post Office. One of them was found. The rest vanished as utterly as though they had been smoke. There were no records, nothing — and no liability. The following items serve to show Amer- ican dependence on British lines in the East : On August 21st and August 22, 1914, two code telegrams from the Colonel command- ing the United States forces at Tientsin to the Commanding General in the Philippines were detained by the British censor at Hong Kong. The messages were signed "Tilson" and "Rowell," and despatched to a code ad- dress. The decoding of this address was a matter of a moment; but not a moment's effort was made. The telegrams were sup- pressed. And for two days, the commander of the United States forces in China was left out of touch with his superiors in the Philippines because of the act of the Brit- ish censor. On another occasion, in December, 1914, a code message from the American Minister to China at Peking, Paul S. Renisch, to the Amer ican Consul-General in the British pos- '"Diplomatic Correspondence with Belligerent Govern- ments," page 94. session at Hong Kong, G. E. Anderson, was held up — though subsequently allowed to pass. In both instances the reason advanced was the use of a cipher, not permitted by the regulations laid down by the British. The United States Government accepted the reg- ulation, but the incident illustrates the sway of the British censor and the dependence of this nation upon Great Britain for tele- graphic communication with the world. Our direct relations with our possessions in the East are dependent upon a single line, which is crossed by the British line from Van- couver to Australia and New Zealand. The point of junction of these two lines, readily found, offers the exact location at which to intercept communications with Manila, if this was not done to the island of Van- couver. If occasion were to arise, the United States could be immediately isolated. All our trans-Atlantic lines pass through Brit- ish territory or that of her allies. The Ger- man cable is out of commission. The French cable might or might not be available. Pana- ma, Porto Rico, Hawaii and the Philippines could be detached from us by a few snaps of the cable cutter. Wireless telegraphy and telephony are not so readily blocked. But as a means of com- munication they are uncertain, subject to weather conditions, and, above all, they are non-secretive. Privacy in communication is impossible ; theoretically attainable in slight measure by the use of codes, it is never safe. Yet in view of the present circumstances and the losses so far sustained by American business firms, the project of allowing greater freedom in the commercial uses of the wireless stations might seem advisable. Within a short time, in addition to the wire- less routes already in use, direct communica- tions between the Cape Cod coast and Nor- way will be established. By the exercise of a judicious but intelligent censorship, by granting the use of specified codes, Ameri- can firms doing business with Europe might be assured of greater freedom and con- venience in their communications with their European correspondents. Despite protests innumerable, the British Government has been unwilling to grant to reputable Ameri- can merchants and associations privileges which they should have and reasonable im- munity from the activities of a not too intel- ligent censor. A study of the map of undersea com- munications, makes one thing convincingly clear: Great Britain not only dominates trade at sea, she practically controls all means of quick communication between the United States and Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia and South America. We are com- pletely at the mercy of the British Govern- ment in this respect. VII OUR LARGER INTERESTS WILL the positions which the present Administration has taken, during the progress of the European war, with reference to maritime warfare, bear in- spection in the cool light of the best inter- ests of the United States? To raise the question is to make no reflection upon the patriotism of the Administration. What- ever may have been the ruling motives which determined them, there is some reason to be- lieve that, from one cause or another, the Government of the United States has taken a series of positions which, when scrutinized in the light of commercial and political pos- sibilities of the future, work precisely the wrong way, so far as the interests of Amer- ica are concerned. Consider : Should the United States ever become in- volved in war, the war would be one of de- fense on our part. The American people would not sanction a war of aggression abroad. No one contemplates aggression. We entertain no ideas of aggrandizement that suggest an aggressive policy. The most pronounced advocates of a big army and a big navy dare not urge more than a policy of "preparedness" against attack. What, then, would be the effect of the poli- cies of the present Administration upon the ability of the United States to defend itself in a foreign war? The foreign wars in which we might pos- sibly become involved fall into the following general classes : (1) A war with some other Power or Powers on the American Continent. (2) A war with a European Power or a European alliance. (3) A war with an Asiatic Power or an Asiatic alliance. (4) A war with allied European and American, allied European and Asiatic, or allied American and Asiatic Powers. 1. Suppose we were engaged in war with another American Power. We have taken the ground that it is legiti- mate for the manufacturers of any nation to supply the armies of another nation with arms and ammunition. We have gone fur- ther than this; we have taken the position that for a Power to deny the armies of an- other Power arms and ammunition would be unneutral; that is to say, that it is the duty of the people of one country to supply the armies of a belligerent Power with muni- tions of war. In a war between the United States and another American Power, it would consequently be the duty of European and Asiatic arms and ammunition manufac- turers to supply our opponent with weapons with which to fight against us. But this is opposed to the interests of the United States. 2. The case would be still worse in the event of a war between the United States and a European Power. Under the prece- dents established by Mr. Wilson's Adminis- tration, it would be the duty of all European and Asiatic manufacturers to furnish arms and ammunition to the Power combating us. True, it would be their duty likewise to sup- ply us with arms and ammunition. But these would never be delivered to us. For, while the manufacturers of the various European and Asiatic countries would have no difficulty in transporting munitions of war overland to the army and navy of the European Power at war with us, they could by no means send them across the seas. We have acceded, practically, to the proposition that a blockade may be laid anywhere ; it is no longer necessary, under our admissions, that a blockade be laid before particular ports or that it be actually maintained by ships. A torpedo boat or two in the Strait of Gibraltar, a few mines in the English Channel and the North Sea, and the Atlantic seaboard of the United States would be in a state of blockade. Not only no ammunition, but nothing else, could get through. We should have all the ammunition makers of Europe and Asia furnishing our opponent with guns and shells, while we ourselves would be thrown upon our own resources. 3. In the event of a war with an Asiatic Power, that Pow 7 ei* could procure overland from Europe all the munitions of war she desired, and it would be the duty of Euro- pean Powers to furnish her with these in- struments of combat. But it would be opposed to the interests of the United States to have Japan, for instance, supplied from Europe with arms to be used against us. 4. In the event of an alliance between European and Asiatic Powers — and this is precisely the combination of Powers most likely to envisage us — the situation would 44 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS OUR LARGER INTERESTS 45 be far worse. All the arms manufactories in the rest of the world would be combined against the United States. We should prob- ably not be able to get anything overseas into our ports. The biggest navy we shall ever, by any possibility, build would be none too big to guard our own extensive coasts. We have — or Mr. Wilson's Administration has — made the submarine impossible as a weapon of defense, to say nothing of attack. Other- wise by far the most potent weapon of mari- time defense thus far invented, we have de- clared it an illegitimate weapon. The sub- marine, we say, must visit and search be- fore it acts. But a submarine cannot visit and search; a single shot from the lightest gun of a merchantman can sink a submarine. Furthermore, we have taken the position that a neutral vessel carrying ammunition may not be sunk if it happens to have a neu- tral citizen or subject on board. The truth of the matter is there is noth- ing which more vitally concerns the well- being, indeed the very existence, of the United States, more than the maintenance of the laws of war at sea as enunciated by the Declaration of London. Being isolated alike from Europe and Asia, our great defense is the sea. We have little interest in land war- fare, but we have the deepest interest in sea warfare. And it is not the naval battles, spectacular as these are, that concern us. For us the important matters are the laws of contraband, blockade and coast defense. The rules concerning blockade in whieh we are most interested are those laid down in articles 1, 2 and 18 of the Declaration of London, 1909 : 1. A blockade must not extend beyond the ports and coasts belonging to or occupied by the enemy. 2. In accordance with the Declaration of Paris of 18S6, a blockade, in order to be binding, must be effec- tive — that is to say, it must be maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the enemy coast line. 18. The blockading forces must not bar access to neutral ports or coasts. The British Order in Council of March 11, while not using the word blockade, prac- tically declared a blockade of the German coasts and of the coasts of the neutral coun- tries contiguous to Germany. As a matter of fact, there is no blockade at all. By the simple expedient of planting mines in the Strait of Dover and between the Orkney and Shetland Islands and the coast of Nor- way, neutral ships are compelled to enter British ports in order to obtain pilots through the mine fields. The waters north of Scotland are patrolled by small boats. Battleships and cruisers are safe in British harbors, keeping out of the way of German submarines. Contraband is denned by the British memorandum attached to the report of the London Conference on the Rules of Warfare at Sea as "neutral property on board ship on the high seas or in the territorial waters of either belligerent which (1) is by nature capable of being able to assist in, and (2) is on its way to assist in the naval or mili- tary operations of the enemy." When these two elements are combined, the capture of the goods by a belligerent is permissible. By the second simple expedient of considering that all merchandise on the way to Germany, or to countries adjacent to Germany, is ca- pable of assisting in the naval or military operations of Germany, and by the further assumption that it is on its way actually to assist in such naval or military operations, the whole distinction between contraband and innocent goods has been obliterated by Great Britain. In consequence of this new kind of block- ade, and of the new, all-embracing definition of "contraband," our entire commerce to and from Europe is surrendered to the control of any Power which has a predominant naval strength or which has a predominant geographical position. Against no country could these admis- sions work more harm than against the United States, separated as it is from Eu- rope by two oceans, and, moreover and espe- cially, commanded as are its coasts by. the British naval stations, whose iron ring around us must appall the stoutest heart that contemplates the map. While the Government of the United States allows its people to be plundered by the new definition of contraband enunciated by Great Britain, it takes, with regard to goods of an actual and always admitted con- traband character, namely, arms and ammu- nition, a position of peculiar contrast to its meek admissions Avith regard to goods here- tofore always considered innocent. There has been some difference of opinion among nations and among authorities on in- ternational law as to the duty of a neutral government to prevent its subjects engaging in contraband trade, some contending that such a duty exists; others, including the- United States, holding that the neutral State is under no duty to stop contraband ex- ports, the punishment being in the hands, of the belligerent adversely affected thereby.. But probably never has a nation undertaken to protect its citizens in the contraband trade and to claim (what the United States Government claimed in its recent notes to Austria) that contraband trade is legiti- mate, and that the United States Govern- ment has no control over it, or that the at- tempt to exercise such control would be un- neutral, and therefore impermissible. The net result of the positions we have taken, or acceded to with very mild protests, is the preposterous one that, while the Gov- 46 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS ernment of the United States has no control over its own trade, even its contraband trade, with belligerents, any belligerent that is physically able to exercise it enjoys complete control over our trade, even in the most innocent articles. Take again our position with regard to the activity of submarines. We assert that a submarine may not sink merchant vessels belonging to the enemy without "visit and search." But visit and search is a right and not a duty ; a right, moreover, the assertion of which on the part of Great Britain the United States combatted for many years, finally going to war largely in its contention against it. Visit and search, furthermore, applies only to neutral vessels. It was an unheard of thing until the United States Department of State invented it, that a belli- gerent was compelled to visit and search an enemy ship before dealing with it. Visit and search was a privilege claimed with re- gard to a neutral vessel ; never a duty incum- bent upon a warship with regard to a bellig- erent vessel. Its purpose was that of ascer- taining whether the suspected craft carried contraband. But there is no longer a neces- sity for that, because all vessels leaving our shores for Europe carry contraband — under the new all-inclusive definitions. We insist also that all merchant ships carrying contraband shall be free from at- tack until after it is ascertained that no neutral citizen or subject is on board. We have asserted that the life of this hypotheti- cal neutral citizen or subject, who may be or may not be aboard, and who really has no right to be on board, is more vital than the right of the submarine commander to defend the lives of the soldiers of his coun- try who are beyond all question in the trenches where they will be attacked by the ammunition whicli the spared ship is carry- ing. Now no question is raised at this point regarding the justice of these claims. It is merely pointed out that their effect would be utterly to destroy the efficiency of any submarines of our own commission to de- fend our coast against attack or to prevent ammunition from reaching any enemies we might have. Considerable sentiment has been devel- oped in the United States in favor of a larger army and navy by way of prepared- ness for future wars. But the increase of our army to half a million men and the doub- ling or tripling of the size of our navy will not serve to overcome the disadvantage we shall labor under in consequence of the precedents we are allowing Great Britain to pile up against us in her interpretation of the laws of the sea, and the precedents we are piling up against Germany in our inter- pretation of the laws of the sea. We shall probably never send an army abroad, at least not to the other hemisphere. Our soldiers will stay at home to defend our own territory. But suppose a European or an Asiatic enemy obtains a foothold in America, or an American Power undertakes to invade us; his munitions of war, in his own merchant ships even, cannot be attacked by our submarines, provided he brings a neu- tral passenger with him. And as for our great navy, what good is a great navy unless it be the greatest navy? Great Britain maintains the right to have a navy equal to the sum of the two next largest navies in the world, plus ten per cent, Is it proposed to build a navy greater than the British navy? Is it for a moment believed that England would permit that? And even if England were to permit it, one need only take a glance at a map of the world on which is displayed Britain's widely-scattered and artfully-disposed naval stations to realize how very much greater indeed an American navy would have to be to hope to cope suc- cessfully even with a British navy consider- ably smaller. But, of course, our navy would not go abroad on aggressive expedi- tions. Its primary work would be to defend our territory — work that a navy of sub- marines could better do, if we had not ruled submarines out of warfare. We might, in- deed, do some blockade work, but it is we ourselves who would be the chief victims of the blockade. Great Britain, for instance, by her control of the narrow passages through which the commerce of the world is forced to pass, could practically, without moving a ship, cut us off from all connection with the rest of the world. Because, remem- ber, everything is contraband now, and a blockade may be thousands of miles away from the ports against which it is directed. And not England alone, but any other Euro- pean naval Power could cut us off from Eu- rope; while in conjunction with an Asiatic naval Power our enemy could absolutely close our ports. VIII LIST OF SHIPS DETAINED Note. — It is impossible, for reasons explained on page 22, to obtain anything like a full list of ships de- tained and cargoes seized by Great Britain on their voyages between the United States and other neutral coun- tries, but the following list of carefully verified cases may serve to illustrate the methods by which the British Government is strangling American commerce. The first list includes the cases of 155 vessels brought into British ports or otherwise detained for ex- amination. Of these 40 were forced to discharge their cargoes, which were held for prize court proceedings. Thirty more were subjected to protracted detention, at great loss. One American vessel carrying oil to Copen- hagen was run aground by the English prize crew aboard her off the coast of Scotland. It will be noted that this list does not include cases like that of fhe WILHELMINA, which, when seized by the British, was bound for Hamburg with an innocent cargo, and the DACIA, which was seized by the French navy under British instructions. Nor does this list include the vessels, 273 in number, recorded by the Government of the United States in an appendix to its note of October 21st, as having been detained in the port of Kirkwall alone, between March nth and June 17th. The Government list is appended, bringing this merely illustrative record of ships detained up to a total of 428: LIST OF SHIPS DETAINED S.S. KUMERIC, British. Sailed from Galveston, July 17, 1914, (via Newport News, July 24), for Bremen. Cargo — 49,000 bushels of grain. Taken to Queenstown, August 2. Detained at Liverpool, August 19. S.S. BERWINDMOOR, British. Sailed from New Orleans, July 21, 1914, for Rotterdam. Cargo — 196,000 bushels of grain. Diverted to Falmouth, August S. At London, August 21. S.S. CAMFANELLO, British. Sailed from New York. July 30, 1914, for Rotterdam. Sent to Cardiff, August 12. Detained. S.S. SPENSER, British. Sailed from New York, July 31, 1914, for Rotterdam. Sent to Liverpool. S.S. SAINT HELENA, British. Sailed from Galveston, July 16, 1914 (via Norfolk, Virginia, July 24), for Bremen and Hamburg. Cargo — Phosphate rock, wheat and cotton. Diverted to Manchester. Cargo seized August 12. Phosphate rock released as well as part of cotton. Large quantity of cotton and the wheat not released, including SO bales of cotton shipped by Alex- ander Spunt & Company, of Houston, Texas, and Bremen; claimed belonging to neutral subjects and as such not subject to seizure, also on ground that contract of sale between American citizens dated May 8, 1914. These goods, including wheat, condemned in Prize Court. S.S. PENLOVER, British. Sailed from Galveston, July 18, 1914, for Rotterdam. Cargo — 264,000 bushels of grain. Diverted to Falmouth and ordered to London, August IS. S.S. KALOMO, British. Sailed from New Orleans, July 24, 1914, for Rotterdam. Cargo — 64,000 bushels of grain. Detained at Falmouth. At London, August IS. S.S. ANDIJK, Dutch. Sailed from New Orleans, July 30, 1914, for Rotterdam. Cargo — 136,000 bushels grain. Sent to Falmouth for orders. Arrived at Rotterdam, August 16. S.S. NORUEGA, Norwegian. Sailed from Galveston, July 30, 1914, for Christiania. Cargo — 40,000 bushels grain. Diverted to Falmouth. Arrived at Christiania, August 26. S.S. ORTERIC, British. Sailed from Galveston, July 27, 1914. (Newport News, August 4.) Detained at Queenstown, August 17. Arrived at Liverpool, August 21. Cargo for Bremen and Hamburg seized S.S. NITONIAN, British. Sailed from New Orleans, July 31, 1914, for Antwerp. Cargo — 142,000 bushels grain. Diverted to Falmouth. Arrived at London, August 22. At Antwerp, September S. S.S. GLENFINLAS, British. Sailed from New Orleans, August 1, 1914 (via Norfolk, August 7), for Rotterdam. Cargo— 108,000 bushels grain. Diverted .to Falmouth, August 26. At London, September 1. S.S. ST. DUNSTAN, British. Sailed from Galveston, August 4, 1914, for Rotterdam. Cargo — 122,400 bushels grain. Diverted to Cork for orders. At Liverpool, August 27. At Manchester, September S. S.S. MIRAMICHI, British. Sailed from New York, July 3, 1914 (via Galveston, July 23), for Rotterdam. Cargo — 16,000 bushels of wheat (part of cargo) shipped by Muir & Company for Rotterdam to-be de- livered to George Fries & Company in Colmar, Germany, and Gebrueder Zimmern & Company, Mannheim, Germany. Vessel not permitted to proceed to Rotterdam. Taken to Eastham and cargo consigned to Germany seized. Prize Court decided that goods seized were property of the American claimants and not subject to seizure. Ordered released to claimants (December, 1914). S.S. KLOSTERFOS, Norwegian. Sailed from New York, August 28, 1914, for Christiania. Cargo — Flour in barrels. Vessel stopped and boarded by British officers off the north coast of Scotland and ordered to Aberdeen. Held several days until neutral ownership of cargo was established. Arrived at Christiania, September 17. S.S. VITALIA, Norwegian. Sailed from New York, August 19, 1914, to Rotterdam. Cargo— Meat. Detained at Falmouth, September 7. S.S. LORENZO, American, (New York and Porto Rico Line). Chartered on August 2, 1914, by Gans S.S. Line. Sailed from New York, August 6, 1914, for Buentos Ayres. Cargo — Coal. Captured by British and taken to St. Lucia, September 12. October 16— Cargo condemned. October 30 — Vessel condemned. S.S. HEINA, Norwegian. Sailed from Philadelphia, August 7, 1914, for St. Thomas. , Cargo — Coal. Seized September 13, off St. Thomas, by French cruiser CONDE. Detained six months, released at Fort de France, March 20, 1915, reached New York, April IS, 1915. 50 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS S.S. VESTFOS, Norwegian. Sailed from New York, August 28, 1914, for Christiania. Cargo — Flour in barrels. Stopped and boarded by British officers. Taken to Kirkwall. Left September 14. Arrived Christiania, September 17. S.S. RYNDAM, Dutch (Holland-America Line). Sailed from New York, September 8, 1914, for Rotterdam. Seized by British warship and brought into Cork Harbor, September 17. Released September 20, at Queens- town. Again held up and ordered by British cruiser (September 21) to enter Falmouth. Arrived at Rotterdam, September 24. S.S. AMSTELDYK, Dutch (Holland-America Line). Sailed from Philadelphia, September 10, 1914, for Rotterdam. Captured by British cruiser and taken to Queenstown, September 25. Released. Arrived at Rotterdam, October 12. S.S. ROTTERDAM, Dutch. Sailed from New York, September 15, 1914, for Rotterdam. Cargo — Copper. Shippers: American Smelting and Refining Company. United Metals Selling Company. American Can Metal Company. L. Vogelstein & Company. Norfolk Smelting and Refining Company. Seized September 26. En route while copper was made conditional contraband (absolute contraband only since October 29). Copper bought by Great Britain. Arrived Rotterdam, October 12. S.S. SLOLERDIJK, Dutch. Sailed from New York, September 9, 1914, for Rotterdam. Cargo — Copper. Shippers : American Metal Company, Ltd. L. Vogelstein & Company. Seized September 26. En route while copper was made conditional contraband (absolute contraband only since October 29). Copper bought by British Government. Arrived Rotterdam, October 6, 1914. S.S. POTSDAM, Dutch. Sailed from New York, September 22, 1914, for Rotterdam. Cargo — Copper. Shippers : American Smelting and Refining Company. United Metals Selling Company. American Metal Company, Ltd. L. Vogelstein & Company. Seized October 9. Copper bought by British Government. Arrived Rotterdam, October 15. S.S. WESTERDYK, Dutch. Sailed from Baltimore, September 21, 1914, for Rotterdam. Cargo — Copper. Shipper: American Smelting and Refining Company. Seized October 9. Copper bought by British Government. Arrived Rotterdam, October 18. S.S. BETA, Swedish. Sailed from Philadelphia, September 23, 1914, for Helsmgborg and Oscarshamn. Detained and taken to Kirkwall for examination, October 12. ■ Arrived at Helsingborg, October 21. S.S. AQUILA, Norwegian. . . Sailed from New York, September 23, 1914, for Christiansand, Korsoer and Copenhagen. Detained at Kirkwall, October 12, for examination. Arrived at Copenhagen, October 24. S.S. NICHOLAS CUNEO, Norwegian. Sailed from New York, September 26, 1914, for Christiania. Detained and taken to Kirkwall for examination, October 12. Arrived at Christiania, October 19. S.S. NOORDAM, Dutch .(Holland- America Line). Sailed from New York, October 6, 1914, for Rotterdam. Cargo of about 13,000 tons consigned to Dutch Government. Wheat, flour, foodstuffs diverted to Falmouth, October 15. S.S. LEANDER, Norwegian. Sailed from New York, September 25, 1914, for Copenhagen. Cargo — Grain. Arrived at Kirkwall, October 16. Detained for general inspection. Left October 17. S.S. BRINDILLA, Under American Flag. Sailed from Bayonne, New Jersey, on October 13, 1914. Cargo — Kerosene for Alexandria, Egypt. Steamer bought by Standard Oil Company from Riedermann Line and. transferred from German to Ameri- can registry under Underwood Amendment to the Panama Canal Act of 1914. Seized by British cruiser CARONIA just outside three-mile limit off Sandy Hook, October 18, and taken to Halifax, Nova Scotia. Submitted to Prize Court. Released. Left Halifax, October 30. S.S. DANIA, Danish (Scandinavian- American Line). Sailed from Philadelphia, September 26, 1914, for Copenhagen. Cargo — General. Detained about one week at Kirkwall. LIST OF SHIPS DETAINED 51 S.S. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, American. Sailed from Philadelphia, September 27, 1914, for Copenhagen, Denmark. Captured and taken to Orkney Islands. At Kirkwall, October 17. Released upon protest by United States after considerable delay. S.S. PRINZ DER NEDERLANDEN, Dutch (Royal Dutch West India Mail). Sailed from New York, September 4, 1914, for Havre and Amsterdam by way of West Indian and Venez- uelan ports. Taken at Falmouth on October 21. Arrived at Amsterdam, October 26. S.S. SAN, American, oil tank (Sun Oil Company, Philadelphia). Sailed from Philadelphia, October 8, 1914, for Amsterdam. Diverted, to Falmouth and released on October 25, at request of American Government. Arrived at Amster- dam, October 29. S.S. MARENGO, British. Sailed October 10, 1914, for Sweden. Cargo— Copper. Shippers : L. Vogelstein & Company. Held at Hull, October 25. S.S. ASCOT, British. Sailed from New York, October 10, 1914, for Genoa. Cargo — Copper. Consigned to order, but intended for delivery to Brown, Borari & Company, in Baden, Switzerland. Shippers : American Smelting and Refining Company 450 Tons United Metals Selling Company 500 " American Metal Company, Ltd 300 " L. Vogelstein & Co 50 " Norfolk Smelting and Refining Company 40 " Total 1,340 " Held at Gibraltar, October 26, and seized. To Prize Court. S.S. SAN GIOVANNI, Italian. Sailed from New York, October 14, 1914, for Naples. Cargo — Copper. Shippers : American Smelting and Refining Company. Held at Gibraltar, October 26. Cargo suspected to be intended for re-export to Germany. Arrived Naples, November 5. S.S. REGINA D'lTALIA, Italian. Sailed from New York, October 15, 1914, for Naples and Genoa. Cargo — Copper. 200 tons consigned to order, but intended for delivery to U. Vedorelli, Milan, Italy. Seized on October 26, at Gibraltar, and held for Prize Court. Cargo suspected to be intended for re-export to Germany. Arrived Genoa, November 11. S.S. JOHN D. ARCHIBALD, American Tank Steamer (Standard Oil Company). Sailed from New York, September 23, 1914, for Italy. Cargo — Oil. Held up by French cruiser and convoyed to Antibes, France. Detained two days pending decision as to whether cargo was contraband. Finally released and allowed to proceed. S.S. PROSPER III, Norwegian. Sailed from New York, October 3, 1914, for Copenhagen and Gothenburg. Cargo — Copper. 1,343,895 pounds of copper, valued at $166,649 for Copenhagen ; 246,361 pounds, valued at $30,559 for Gothenburg ; also foodstuffs and crude rubber. Arrived at Leith, October 27. Detained at Scottish port and placed before the Prize Court, copper being suspected for re-export to Ger- many. Arrived at Copenhagen, November 12. S.S.. SECURITY, American (Standard Oil Company Tug). On or about October 27, 1914, boarded and searched at St. John, N. B., by Canadian soldiers, who detained three German members of the crew. Upon protest of Captain, men were released, but not allowed to leave Canada. S.S. TYR, Norwegian. Sailed from New York, October 29, 1914, for Sweden. Cargo — Copper. Shippers : United Metals Selling Company. L. Vogelstein & Company. Held at Glasgow, November 2. Arrived Gothenburg, December 17. S.S. FRANCISCO, British. Sailed from New York, October 17, 1914, for Sweden. Cargo — Copper. Shippers : L. Vogelstein & Company. Held at Hull, November 2. S.S. ULLER, Norwegian. Sailed from Savannah, Georgia, October 26, 1914, for Gothenburg. Cargo — Cotton. Detained for inspection at Kirkwall and allowed to proceed. S.S. ITALIA, Italian. Sailed from New York, October 24, 1914, for Italy. Cargo — Copper. Shippers : American Smelting and Refining Company. United Metals Selling Company. Norfolk Smelting and Refining Company. Held at Gibraltar, November 8. - S.S. VERONA, Italian. Sailed from New York, October 24, 1914, for Naples, Genoa, and Palermo. Cargo — Copper. Shippers : American Smelting and Refining Company. United Metals Selling Company. Held at Gibraltar, November 8. 52 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS S.S. PALERMO, Italian. Sailed from Boston, October 20, 1914, to Naples and Genoa. Cargo — Copper. Shippers : American Metal Company, Ltd. 300 tons. 200 tons of copper consigned to order, but intended for Schweizer Metallwerke, Thonne, Switzerland. Held at Gibraltar, November 2. To Prize Court. Arrived November 7, at Naples. S.S. SAN GUGLIELMO, Italian. Sailed from New York, October 21, 1914, for Naples. Cargo — Copper. Shippers : United Metals Selling Company. Held at Gibraltar, November S. S.S. DUCA DI GENOA, Italian. Sailed from New York, October 17, 1914, for Naples and Genoa. Cargo — Copper. Shippers : American Smelting and Refining Company. Held at Gibraltar, November 8. S.S. ANTARES, Norwegian. Sailed October 22, 1914, for Sweden. Cargo — Copper. Shippers : United Metals Selling Company. L. Vogelstein & Company. Held at Liverpool. Arrived at Ardrossan, November 9, for Gothenburg. S.S. KROONLAND, American. Sailed from New York, October IS, 1914, for Italy. Cargo — Copper and rubber. Copper Shippers : American Smelting and Refining Company. United Metals Selling Company. Held November 8, at Gibraltar. Ordered before Prize Court. Arrived Naples, November 11. S.S. PLATURIA, American (entered under American Registry in October, 1914, Standard Oil Company). Belonged formerly to Deutsch Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft (controlled by Standard Oil Company). Sailed from New York, October 5, 1914, for Aarhus, Denmark. Cargo — Illuminating Oil. Seized and taken to Stornoway, Lewis Islands, Scotland. S.S. KIRUNA, Swedish (Scandinavian-American Line) Sailed from New York, October 25, for Swedish ports. Cargo — General. Detained four days at Kirkwall. S.S. EUROPA, Italian (La Veloce Line). Sailed from New York, October 28, 1914, for Naples and Genoa. Cargo — Copper. Shippers : American Smelting and Refining Company. Detained at Gibraltar, November 9. Alleged contraband. Arrived at Naples, November 13. S.S. BJORNSTJERNE BJORNSON, Norwegian (Gans S.S. Line). Sailed from New York, October 28, 1914, for Copenhagen. Cargo — General. Taken into Kirkwall, November 10. Left Kirkwall, November 15. Ordered to Leith, November 16. Cargo discharged and seized, December 21. Steamer detained till May 25, 1915. S.S. FRIDLAND, Swedish. Sailed from New York, October 28, 1914, for Copenhagen. Cargo — General, including meat. Taken into Kirkwall, November 10. Left Kirkwall, November 27. Ordered to Newcastle, November 29. Cargo discharged, January 5, 1915. Steamer detained till early in May, 1915. S.S. IDAHO, British. Sailed from New York, October 24, 1914, for Sweden. Cargo — Copper. Shippers : L. Vogelstein & Company. Held at Hull, November 10. Left Hull, November 30, for New York. S.S. PERUGIA, British. Sailed from New York, November 8, 1914, for Italy. Cargo — Copper. Shippers : United Metals Selling Company. Held at Gibraltar, November 13. S.S. FRAM, Norwegian (Gans S.S. Line). Left Charleston, South Carolina, October 22, 1914, for Danish ports. Cargo — Cotton. Taken into Aberdeen, November 13. Ordered to Hull. Left Newcastle, December 8. Arrived at Nyborg, December 18. S.S. JOS. W. FORDNEY, American (American Exporters' Line). Sailed from New York, November 7, 1914, for Copenhagen. Cargo — General. Taken into Falmouth and detained two days, then allowed to proceed. S.S. TAURUS, Norwegian. Sailed from New York, November 1, 1914, for Italy. Cargo — Copper. Shippers : United Metals Selling Company. Held at Glasgow, November 13. LIST OF SHIPS DETAINED 53 S.S. TABOR, Norwegian. Sailed from New York, October 26, 1914, for Italy. Cargo — Copper. Shippers : United Metals Selling Company. Norfolk Smelting and Refining Company. Held at Gibraltar, November 13. To Prize Court. Left Gibraltar, November 29. S.S. ALFRED NOBEL, Norwegian (Gans S.S. Line). Sailed from New York, October 20, 1914, for Copenhagen. Cargo — General, including meat At Lerwick, November 7. Left Lerwick, November 14. Ordered to Liverpool, cargo discharged, and seized November 17. Prize Court. Released May 13, 1915. S.S. TORONTO, British. Sailed from New York, October 31, 1914, for Sweden. Cargo — Copper. Shippers : L. Vogelstein & Company. Held at Hull, November 15. S.S. SIF, Norwegian. Sailed from New York, October 30, 1914, for Gothenburg. Cargo— Copper. 400 tons sold and consigned to B. Ursells' Successors, Stockholm, in order to meet objec- tions to consignments "to order." Held at Glasgow, November 18, for Prize Court. Arrived at Gothenburg, December 17. S.S. NORHEIM, Norwegian. Sailed October 17, 1914, for Italy. Cargo — Copper. Shippers : United Metals Selling Company. L. Vogelstein & Company. Held at Gibraltar, November 18. S.S. SIGRUN, Norwegian. Left New York, November 9, 1914, for Gothenburg and Malmoe. Seized November 26, and taken into Newport, England, December 2. Vessel detained pending search for suspected contraband. Cargo held for Prize Court included, for Gothenburg 560,894 pounds of copper valued at $/0,047; 222 pack- ages crude rubber valued at $21,414; 1,596 barrels lubricating oil valued at $8,778. For Malmoe: 1,009,53*. pounds copper valued at $126,871 ; 600 barrels lubricating oil valued at $3,300. For balance of cargo, con- sisting of oilcake, paraffine, cornoil, oats, cocoa, feed, tea, furs, engines and machinery, sewing machines and oleo, reshipment allowed. Sailed for Gothenburg, January 15, 1915. Arrived Gothenburg, January 25. Arrived Malmoe, February 16. S.S. GALILEO, British. Sailed from New York, November 7, 1914, for Sweden. Cargo — Copper. Shippers : L. Vogelstein & Co. Held at Hull, November 26. Left Hull, December 13, for New York. S.S. KIM, Norwegian (Gans S.S. Line). Sailed from New York, November 11, 1914, for Copenhagen. Cargo — General, including meat. Taken into Falmouth, November 27; left December 4. Ordered to Newcastle, December 8; cargo discharged and seized January 5, 1915. March 27, Prize Court ordered payment for cargo. Steamer detained until May 23, 1915. S.S. TANCRED, Norwegian (Gans S.S. Line). Left Port Arthur, Texas, November 13, 1914, for Danish ports. Cargo — Cotton Arrived at Falmouth. Detained for inspection, November 28. Left November 30. Arrived at Aarhus, Denmark, December 10, where cargo discharged. S.S. STRINDA, Norwegian (Gans S.S. Line). Sailed from New York, November 14, 1914, for Copenhagen. Cargo — General. Taken into Falmouth, November 29. After inspection allowed to proceed. Left December 3. S.S. RAN, Norwegian. Sailed from New York, November 13, 1914, for Liverpool and Sweden. Cargo — Cotton-seed products, copper and leather ; part for Liverpool, balance for Gothenburg and Malmoe. Taken into custody by British authorities, November 29,- and held as a prize. Released December 26. S.S. SANDEFJORD, Norwegian. Sailed from New York, November 27, 1914, for Copenhagen. Cargo — Cotton. Prize crew put on board outside of Sandy Hook. Arrived at Halifax, November 30. Cargo partly discharged, suspected contraband. Arrived at Kirkwall, January 15, 1915. Sailed, January 16. Arrived at Copenhagen, January 19. S.S. GEORGE HAWLEY, American (American Exporters' Line. C. H. Sprague & Son, Boston). Sailed from New York, November 15, for Copenhagen. Cargo — General. Taken into Falmouth, November 30 : gave up ship's papers voluntarily for examination. Reason for detention : None given to Master officially. Released January 2, 1915, and proceeded with full cargo to destination. Other circumstances : Master protested in writing on December 5, 1914. Master was verbally informed by Customs Officers that they would have to hold the vessel on account of the flour, wheat and oil on 54 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS board. Later Master was simply informed verbally that trouble was because the consignee of the SSO barrels of oil was at that time under suspicion by the British Government. On January 1, 1915, Master was told to proceed with his full cargo on board and no excuse or reason given for the thirty-three days' detention at Falmouth. Damage for detention at charter rates, etc., etc., amounted to $14,000. S.S. CANTON, Swedish. Sailed from New York, November 17, 1914, for Stockholm and Gothenburg. Cargo — Copper, 375 tons. Shipper : American Smelting and Refining Co. Held December 1, The Tyne. S.S. EDWARD PIERCE, American (American Exporters' Line. C. H. Sprague & Son, Boston). Sailed from New York, November 24, 1914, for Gothenburg and Copenhagen. Cargo — General. Taken into Falmouth, December 8. On December 13, proceeded with full cargo. Master was told verbally he was detained on account of flour and peas on board, although both were consigned direct to parties in Copenhagen. No excuse or reason given for delay. Master was shown a telegram to Customs Officers reading, "American S.S. Edward Pierce with suspected cargo from New York expected Falmouth about 6th inst. If she comes in send her immediately into harbor (Signed) F. C. December 3, 6 p. m." Detention premeditated days ahead on mere suspicion. Damage for detention at charter rates, etc., etc., amounted to $7,000. S.S. HERM, Norwegian (Gans S.S. Line). Sailed from New York, November 12, 1914, for Bilbao, Oporto, Lisbon, Genoa and Barcelona. Cargo — General. Stopped outside Lisbon ; ordered to Gibraltar, December 8. Released and sailed, December 14. S.S. MARACAS, American. Sailed from New York December 9, 1914, for Genoa, via Gibraltar and Naples. Brought into Halifax, N. S., by Prize Crew from British warship, December 12. No reason given for detention by officer in charge. Later allowed to proceed to destination upon assurance that cargo not destined to enemy ports. Arrived Genoa, January 10, 1915. S.S. BRINDILLA, American (Standard Oil Company). Sailed from Alexandria,, Egypt, on or about November 26, 1914. Arrived at St. Michaels, Azores, to take an oil cargo from a German steamer on December' 12. Reported leaving St. Michaels, December 20, for Copenhagen. Intercepted off the coast of Scotland and taken to Aberdeen. (Second seizure.) S.S. TELLUS, Norwegian. Sailed from New York, November 18, 1914, for Genoa. Cargo — 200 tons of copper, sold and consigned to U. Vedorelli, Milan. Seized and held at Gibraltar. Arrived Genoa, December 28. S.S. A. A. RAVEN, American. Sailed from Wilmington, Delaware, December 5, 1915, for Rotterdam. Cargo — Cotton. (First steamer since war to reach Dutch port with cotton for Germany.) Arrived at Rotterdam, December 24, 1914. Held up by British warship in Channel, delayed twenty-four hours for examination of papers. S.S. MIRJAM, Norwegian. Sailed from New York, November 24, 1914, to Copenhagen. Detained at Kirkwall, December 16. Released January 15, 1915. S.S. SORLAND, Norwegian. Sailed from New York, November 27, 1914, for Gothenburg. Cargo — 600 tons copper. Arrived at Leith, December 27. Detained. Arrived at Gothenburg, January 22, 1915. S.S. NEW SWEDEN, Swedish. • Sailed from New York, December 6, 1914, for Sweden. Cargo — Copper. Shippers : American Smelting and Refining Co. Arrived at Kirkwall, December 21. Held at Shields, December 28. Sailed January 10, 1915. Arrived Gothenburg, January 13. S.S. RAMSDAL, Norwegian. Sailed from New York, November 28, 1914, for Christiania. Taken to Kirkwall, December 21. Arrived at Leith, December 24, in charge of a Prize Crew. Arrived at Christiania, February 8, 1915. S.S. ZAMORA, Swedish. Sailed from New York, December 8, 1914, for Copenhagen. Cargo — Copper. Arrived at Kirkwall, December 29. Arrived at Copenhagen, January 11, 1915. S.S. KENTUCKY, Danish. Sailed from Baltimore, November 24, 1914, via New York for Copenhagen.. Detained at Kirkwall, December 16. Arrived at Leith, December 29. 714 tons of meat consigned to Denmark thrown into Prize Court. Arrived at Copenhagen, February 2, 1915. S.S. VIRGINIA, Danish. Sailed from Philadelphia, December 3, 1914, for Copenhagen. At Kirkwall. December 23. Arrived at Shields, December 30, 1914. S.S. GREENBRIER, American (C. L. Dimon, New York). Sailed from New Orleans, December 11, 1914 (via Norfolk, December 17), for Bremen. Cargo— Cotton, under certificate of British Consul at New York. Stopped on December 30, by British cruiser, boarded and searched. British flag hoisted and taken to Kirkwall. Detained three days and then taken to Leith and allowed to proceed to Bremen. Arrived at Bremen, January 9, 1915. LIST OF SHIPS DETAINED 55 S.S. TULA, American (Crucible Steel Company). Sailed from New York, December 1, 1914, for Copenhagen. Cargo — Grain and flour. Seized by the British and detained at Leith. Upon investigation as to ultimate destination of cargo permitted to proceed on December 31. Sailed January 7, 1915, and arrived at Copenhagen, January 11. S.S. HELIG OLAV, Danish (Scandinavian- American Line). Sailed from New York, December 3, 1914, for Christiansand and Copenhagen. Boarded at Kirkwall by British marines and detained eight days pending investigation as to character of cargo. Arrived at Copenhagen, December 23, 1914. S.S. ARKANSAS, Danish (chartered by Gans S.S. Company). Sailed from New York, December 11, 1914, for Copenhagen. Cargo — Meat. Arrived at Shields in charge of a Prize Crew, January 2, 1915. Arrived at Copenhagen, January 22. S.S. AUGUSTA, Swedish. Sailed from New York, December 9, 1914, for Gothenburg and Malmoe. Taken to Kirkwall. Arrived at Newcastle, January 4, 1915, in charge of a Prize Crew. At Hartlepool, January 10. Arrived at Gothenburg, February 1. S.S. ONEKA, British. Sailed from New York, January 2, 1915, for Piraeus, Greece. Cargo — American oil. (Standard Oil Company.) Partly for Bulgaria and Greece. Detained at Malta, being suspected delivery to Turkey. S.S. DENVER, American (Mallory S.S. Company, New York). Sailed from Norfolk, December 23, 1914, for Bremen. Cargo — Cotton. Loaded under supervision of British Consul at Norfolk. Detained January 6, 1915, at Kirkwall. Released on representation. S.S. GOVERNOR. American (Pacific Coast Company, New York). Detained by Canadian Customs Officials, January 13, 1915, at Vancouver, B. C. Cargo — Hides for San Francisco, California. Released after unloading hides. S.S. OSCAR II, Danish. Sailed from New York, February 4, 1915, for Christiania and Copenhagen. Taken into Kirkwall and held for examination as to her cargo. Arrived at Copenhagen, February 20. S.S. VITALIA, Norwegian. Sailed from New York, February 3, 1915, for Rotterdam. Cargo — Packing products. Taken into Falmouth, February 20. Released after cargo was consigned to Netherlands Oversea Trust. S.S. ANTILLA, American (New York and Cuba Mail S.S. Company). Sailed from New York, February 9, 1915, for Malmoe and Copenhagen. Cargo — Cattle food of various kinds. On February 24, stopped by British cruiser when in Lat. 59-58 N, Long. 9-14 W. No reason given. British cruiser ordered vessel to proceed to Kirkwall with a Prize Crew on board after four hours' detention while examining ship's papers. On March 9 was taken by British Prize Crew to Dundee. March 23, Admiralty discharged part of cargo in Dundee and reloaded the balance. On April 27, vessel was allowed to proceed with remainder of cargo. Alleged damage to vessel for detention, etc., amounted to $98,000. Certified to both by Danish and British Consuls. S.S. PLATURIA, American Registry (Controlled by Standard Oil Company). Sailed from Philadelphia, February 13, 1915, for Malmoe and Helsingborg. Detained at Kirkwall, March 2. S.S. PASS OF BALMHA, American. Sailed from New York, January 30, 1915, for Bremen. Cargo — Cotton. Detained at Kirkwall, March 8. Released after inspection. Arrived at Bremen, March 31. S.S. VIGILANCIA, American (Walker, Armstrong and Company, Savannah). Sailed from Savannah, Georgia, February 22, 1915, for Bremen. Cargo — Cotton. Intercepted at sea by British cruiser, taken into Kirkwall. Arrived at Kirkwall, March 8. Arrived at Bremen, March 15. S.S. GREKLAND, Swedish. Sailed from New York, February 18, 1915, for Gothenburg. Cargo — American meat products. Held in Kirkwall from March 10, because destination of cargo suspected. Released and sailed April 1 for Gothenburg. S.S. A. A. RAVEN, American. Sailed from New York, February 13, 1915, for Rotterdam. Cargo — Meat. Held at Deal, March 12. Reconsigned to the Netherlands Oversea Trust. Arrived Rotterdam, April 2. S.S. SPYROS VALLIANOS, Greek. Sailed from Savannah, Georgia, March 10, 1915, for Rotterdam. Cargo — Cotton. Detained at Falmouth. S.S. LIVONIA, Danish. " ' Sailed from Galveston, March 20, 1915, for Aalborg and Copenhagen. Held at Falmouth, April 14. Bristol, May 6, pending settlement of price of cotton cargo. 56 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS S.S. SEGURANCA, American. Sailed from New York on March 9, for Holland. Cargo — General. Consigned to consignees in Holland. Detained by the British in April. The Department of State protested against the detention of the Seguranca, stating that the shipper's manifest showed that the entire cargo was consigned to Dutch consignees and was accompanied by a certificate from the British Consul-General at New York, and that the loading of the vessel, moreover, had been supervised by the British Consul-General's inspector. The United States Government could not admit the right of the British Government to require that this cargo be reconsigned to the Netherlands Oversea Trust. S.S. OGEECHEE, American. Sailed from Bremen, April 4, 1915, for New York. Arrived at Sharpness, April 18. Cargo confiscated as being of German origin. Sailed for New York, May 1. Arrived May 18. S.S. SOUTHERNER, Danish. Sailed from Charleston, S. C, March 31, 1915, for Rotterdam. Cargo — Cotton. Detained at Falmouth, pending negotiations by Great Britain for the purchase of cotton on board. Arrived at Rotterdam, April 28. S.S. GIOVANNIG, Italian. Detained, but allowed to proceed on April 20, 1915, without discharging her cargo. S.S. KELBERGEN, Dutch. Sailed from New York, April 26, 1915, for Rotterdam. Taken into Kirkwall. Innocence of cargo established and released. S.S. MARIE, Swedish. Sailed from Galveston, Texas, March 13, 1915, for Malmoe, Sweden. Arrived at Clyde in charge of Prize Crew. Was stopped on suspicion regarding destination of cargo. S.S. ATHINAL, Greek. Sailed from New York, May 16, 1915, for Palermo and Piraeus. Arrived, and seized, at Gibraltar, May 29. Permitted to proceed after discharging 400 bales of cotton and 1,200 reels of barbed wire. Placed before Prize Court, charge being destination for Germany. S.S. GARGOYLE, American (Vacuum Oil Company). (Changed from German to American Registry.; Sailed from New York, May 10, 1915, for Alexandria. Cargo — Bulk oil. Reported at Malta, May 31. Seized by British authorities and Prize Court writ issued. S.S. F. J. LISMAN, American. Sailed from New York, May 23, 1915, for Rotterdam. General cargo consigned to Netherlands Oversea Trust. Held at London, June 8, and 1,000 barrels of phosphate removed for disposition by Prize Court. S.S. PORTLAND, American. Sailed from San Francisco, April 25, 1915, for Stockholm (via New York). Cargo — General. Detained at Kirkwall, June 16. Taken to Blyth, June 19, where 34 tons of dried fruit were sent to Prize Court. Arrived at Stockholm, July 8. S.S. VARING, Swedish. Sailed from Savannah, Georgia, May 30, 1915, for Swedish ports. Cargo — General. Detained at Kirkwall, June 19. S.S. BERGENSFJORD, Norwegian. Sailed from New York, June 12, 1915, for Bergen. Cargo — General. Taken to Kirkwall, June 21. Arrived at Bergen, June 24. S.S. NOR, Norwegian. Sailed from New York, June 5, 1915, for Rotterdam. Held in the Downs for examination of cargo, June 28. S.S. MUSKOGEE, American. Sailed from New Orleans, June 7, 1915 (Newport News, June 14), for Gothenburg. Taken into Kirkwall, July 5, and released July 7, for Gothenburg. Arrived July 9. S.S. BRATLAND, Norwegian. Sailed from Baltimore, June 15, 1915, for Aalborg, Denmark. Taken into Kirkwall, July 6. Arrived at Aalborg, July 12. S.S. JANNA, Norwegian. Sailed from San Francisco, March 4, 1915, for Bergen, Norway. Cargo — Grain. Taken into Kirkwall, July 8. Arrived at Bergen, July 19. S.S. GURRE, Danish. Sailed from Baltimore, July 1, 1915, for Aalborg, Denmark. Taken into Kirkwall, July 19. Released July 23, and sailed for Aalborg and Randers. S.S. HULDA MAERSK, Danish. Sailed from Savannah, Georgia, July 10, 1915 (Norfolk, July 13), for Malmoe. Cargo — Cottonseed. Detained at Kirkwall. Arrived at Malmoe, August 12. LIST OF SHIPS DETAINED 57 S.S. NECHES, American. Sailed from Rotterdam to the United States. Cargo — General. Detained at the Downs and brought to London, where cargo was discharged. The United States Government, July IS, 1915, made vigorous protest against the detention of the vessel and the unloading of the cargo, which was the property of American citizens, at London. S.S. BUFFALO, British. Sailed from New York, August 18, 1915, for Christiania. Cargo — Hacksaws. Arrived at Hull, September 5. Thrown into Prize Court on the assertion that cargo was bound for Germany. S.S. VITALIA, Norwegian. Sailed from New York, August 19, 1915, for Rotterdam. Cargo— Meat. Detained at Falmouth, September 7, and thrown into Prize Court, the British Government's contention being that there were fats and oils in the cargo not consigned to the Netherlands Oversea Trust. S.S. CORNING, American (Standard Oil Company). Sailed from Baton Rouge, La., August 17, 1915, to Malmoe. Cargo — Refined petroleum and naphtha. Detained at Kirkwall, September 7. Standard Oil Company placed the case in the hands of the American Government. Released. Arrived at Malmoe, September 28. S.S. OSCAR II, Swedish. Sailed from New York, September 9, 1915, for Christiansand. Taken to Kirkwall. Sailed September 21. S.S. LOUISIANA, Danish. Sailed from New York, September 15, 1915, for Copenhagen. Arrived at Kirkwall "prior to October 1, 1915," and sent to Aberdeen to discharge part of her cargo. S.S. UNITED STATES, Danish. Sailed from New York, August 26, 1915, for Copenhagen. Cargo — General. Had unloaded at Copenhagen, when British Government ordered her to reload and to take cargo back to England under penalty of seizure. S.S. HELSINGBORG, Swedish. Sailed from Port Arthur, Texas, August 28, 1915, via Norfolk, for Aarhus, Denmark. Cargo — Cottonseed. Detained at Kirkwall, September 28. Arrived at Blyth, October 3. S.S. CALIFORNIA, Danish. Sailed from New York, August 31, 1915, for Christiania. Cargo — General. Detained September 29, at Leith. S.S. ABSALOM, Danish. Sailed from Philadelphia, September 12, 1915, for Copenhagen. Detained at Kirkwall. S.S. ORIGIN, Norwegian. Sailed from New York, September 14, 1915, for Kirkwall and Vallo. Detained at Kirkwall. S.S. PETROLITE, American (Standard Oil Company). Sailed from Philadelphia, September 15, 1915, for Copenhagen. Detained at Kirkwall, September 29. Arrived at Copenhagen^ October 8. (Had been previously detained by British authorities and released, August 17, 1915.) S.S. ST. JOHN, Swedish. Sailed from Baltimore, September 12, 1915, for Gothenburg. Detained at Kirkwall. Arrived at Gothenburg, October 8. S.S. ESTER, Swedish. Sailed from Port Tampa, Fla., September 5, 1915, for Newport News and Malmoe. Detained at Kirkwall, September 30. S.S. FREDERICK VIII, Danish. Sailed from New York, September_22,1915, for Copenhagen. Cargo — Bacon. Ordered to unload at Kirkwall, September 30. S.S. OSMAN, Swedish. Sailed from New Orleans, September 11, 1915, via Norfolk, for Copenhagen. Arrived at Kirkwall, Oct. 6. Released. Arrived at Copenhagen, October 12, 1915. S.S. CONRAD MOHR, Norwegian. Sailed from Baton Rouge, La., September 15, 1915, via Norfolk, for Bergen. Arrived at Kirkwall, October 7. Released. Arrived at Bergen, October 11. S.S. FRAM, Norwegian. Sailed from Baltimore, September 18, 1915, for Vaksdal. Arrived at Kirkwall, October 7. Released. Arrived at Bergen, October 11, 1915. Second seizure. S.S. ALADDIN, Norwegian. Sailed from New York, September 21, 1915, for Stockholm. Brought to Kirkwall, October 7. Released. 58 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS S.S. ORION, Swedish. Sailed from Philadelphia, September 22, 1915, for Stockholm. Cargo — Coal. Brought into Kirkwall, October 10. Released October 14. S.S. VIGINIA, Danish. Sailed from New York, September 25, 1915, for Christiania and Copenhagen. Cargo — General. Taken to Kirkwall, October 10. Taken to Grimsby, October 19. To Prize Court. S.S. MEXICANO, Norwegian. Sailed from New Orleans, September 24, 1915, for Christiania and Copenhagen. Cargo — General. Detained at Kirkwall. Sailed October 12, 1915, for Christiania. S.S. HOCKING, American. (Formerly Danish, purchased and transferred by American Transatlantic Steamship Company to American Registry, July 31, 1915.) Objected to by British alleging that she was purchased with German capital. Sailed from New York, October 29, 1915, for Norfolk. Seized by British cruiser and taken to Halifax, N. S., October 31, in charge of Prize Crew convoyed by British warships. In charge of Admiralty Court. S.S. HAMBORN, Dutch (Munson Line). Sailed from New York, October 27, 1915, for Cuba. Cargo — General. Halted eighty-five miles from New York by British cruiser. Taken to Halifax, N. S., October 31, by Prize Crew, convoyed by British warships. In charge of Admiralty Court. S.S. LLAMA, American (Standard Oil Company). (Formerly German, transferred to American Registry.) Sailed from New York, October 14, 1915, for Copenhagen. Cargo — Oil. Seized by British Prize Crew and afterward run aground (October 31) on Skae Skerries, Westray Firth, Scotland. S.S. ATHAMAS, Greek. Sailed from Galveston October 15th, 1915 (Norfolk, October 24th), for Rotterdam. Seized and taken into British port, November 18th. ANDREW WELCH, American bark, George W. McNear, San Francisco. Sailed from San Francisco, August 19th, 1915, for Halstad, Sweden. Cargo — beans. Boarded by British prize crew off the Shetland Islands and ordered into Lerwick. On account of storms carried towards Norway and towed into Christiansand by S.S. "Russland," Novem- ber 17th. S.S. ZEALANDIA, American, sailed from Tampa Sept. 15, 1915, cargo: rosin, hides, rubber for Sweden, arrived at Pensacola Sept. 27th, left for Tampico Oct. 3rd, arrived at Progresso Oct. 25th bound for Malmoe, Sweden, boarded and searched by British crew, according to Captain, within three miles limit. Steamer still remains at Progresso on account of fear of capture. S.S. KRISTIANIAFJORD, Norwegian, sailed from New York November 6, 1915 for Bergen and Chris- tainia, general cargo, detained at Kirkwall, arrived at Bergen November 21st. Compelled to return to England 6,000 cases of American pork, 1,800 bags of coffee, the ultimate destination of which having been questioned by British authorities. S.S. GENESEE, American, owned by American Tran satlantic Co., New York, sailed from New York Oc- tober 11, 1915, left Norfolk October 14 with cargo of coal for Montevideo, seized and boarded by British Prize crew, ordered to St. Lucia, November 20. On the following pages is an incomplete list of vessels carrying American cargoes which, sailing in practically all instances from American to Scandinavian ports, were di- verted by British authorities to the port of Kirkwall, or called at that port under instruc- tions from owners, between March 11, 1915, and June 17, 1915 : DETENTION RECORD OF A SINGLE BRITISH PORT Name of vessel. ELSA; part cargo put in prize court; ordered Sunderland discharge. MARACAS; cargo put in prize court; ordered Hull to discharge. GUDRUN; bound from Europe to the United States. AMPHITRITE JENS BANG; bound from Europe to the United States. RODFAZE RAN LISKEN ...: ABSALON WICO TORV1G GREEN BRIAR EINAR JARL OGEECHEE TANCRED JOHN BLUMMER . . . . SUTRA FROGNER HJORTHOLM CALIFORNIA UFFE; bound from Europe to United States via Ardrossan. CARL HENCKEL HELGA NEWA HAVET TERNO UNITED STATES TEXAS HAAKON VII VARING SINSEN OXELOSUND SIGURD MYRDAL SARK BORGLAND VARD NIKE: sailed for Newcastle GULFAXE Date of arrival Date of leaving Cargo. in British ports. British ports. '. March 11, 1915 March IS, 1915 Cottonseed cake March 12 March 12 Maize March 12 Maize and rye March 12 Maize and rye March 12 '■ March 12 Oil March 13 Cottonseed cake March 13 March 13 Cotton March 13 •. • March 14 Cotton March 14 Oilcake March 14 Cotton March 14 General Vlarch 15 March 17 General March 17 March 19 . March, 11, 1915 March 16 .March 11, 1915 March 11 Cottonseed cake Cottonseed cake Cottonseed cake Maize . . General General Cotton . Oilcake Wheat NEW SWEDEN; prize crew to New- castle. STIKELSTAD KORSFJORD; whole cargo put in prize court; ordered Grimsby to dis- charge. CYGNUS : cargo put in prize court; ordered West Hartlepool to discharge INDIANIC; bound from Europe to United States. VESTA CARMELINA HENRIK; part cargo put in prize court; ordered to Leith to discharge. UNITA THORSDAL DROTT KARMA STRINDA IRIS LARGO VINCENT; bound from Europe to United States. RAN TERTE VIKEN ■ BRETAGNE BODEN AVONA HELMER MORCH CENTRIC General Maize and barley ....... Cotton Grain, oilcake and starch Maize Wheat, maize, rye and barley. General March 20. March 20. March 20, March 20 March 20 March 21 March 21 March 21 March 21 March 21 March 21 March 21 March 22 March 22 ■ March 22 March 23. • March 23 March 23 . March 23 General March 23 Lard March 24, 1915 March 14 1915 March 12 ; 1915 March 14 1915 March 14 1915 March 12 1915 March 13 1915 March 31 1915 March 15 1915 March 16 1915 March 16 1915 March 16 1915 March 16 1915 March 16 1915 March 15 1915 March 18 1915 March 18 1915 March 23 1915 March 19 1915 March 25 1915 March 31 1915 March 26 1915 March 23 1915 March 23 1915 March 24 1915 March 24 1915 March 23 1915 March 26 1915 March 23 1915 March 23 1915 March 22 1915 March 24, 1915 March 28, 1915 March 24 1915 March 25 1915 April 1 1915 March 25 1915 March 29 1915 April A, 1915 March 28 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 General March 24, 1915 March 31, 1915 March 24, 1915 March 24, 1915 . . . March 24, 1915 March 25, 1915 Cotton March 25, 1915 March 27, 1915 General March 25, 1915 April 14, 1915 Maize March 25, Maize March 25, Oilcake March 26, March 26, Cotton March 26, Cottonseed cake March 26, Rye March 26, March 26, Maize March 27, General March 27, Barley March 27, Wheat March 27, Cottonseed cake March 27, Oil cake March 27, Cotton March 28, 1915 March 29, 1915 1915 March 27, 1915 1915 March 28, 1915 1915 March 28, 1915 1915 March 28, 1915 1915 March 28, 1915 1915 March 28, 1915 1915 March 28, 1915 1915 March 30, 1915 1915 April 29, 1915 1915 March 31, 1915 1915 March 30, 1915 1915 March 30, 1915 1915 March 30, 1915 1915 March 30, 1915 60 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS Name of vessel. STAVN; part cargo put in prize court; sailed Leith to discharge. CLITRA ATHENS; cleared at Ardrossan DANMARK; cleared at Ardrossan.... BERGENSFJORD Date of arrival Cargo. in British ports. General March 28, 1915 . SIRIUS; bound from Europe to United States. BIA; whole cargo put in prize court; sailed to Manchester to discharge. OSCAR TRAPP; bound from Europe to United States. FIONIA SVERRE HILDING; part cargo put in prize court; sailed Leith to discharge. LIGURIA NYLAND ANTWERPEN CAPELLA ELLEN ATLAND DORTE JENSEN NORDLAND ALEXANDRA UTO; whole cargo put in prize court; steamer ordered to Hull to discharge. ROMSDALFJORD; part cargo put in prize court; ordered Sunderland to discharge. SVERIGE ....- HAMMERSHUS; cargo put in prize court; ordered to discharge at Glas- gow. ULRICK HOLM TESSIE ROMSDAL AVANCE HANS JENSEN KRONSTAD NEDENES STEINSTAD ALBIS; whole cargo put in prize court; ordered Middlesboro to dis- charge. LALY MAUD ; part cargo put in prize court; ordered Fleetwood to discharge. WALDIMIR REITZ KRONSPRINS OLAF ELSE CHUMPON LLAMA ". . = SORLAND; part cargo put in prize court; ordered West Hartlepool to discharge. MUSKOGEE ■. NAVAGO : ANNUM; part cargo put in prize court; ordered Hull to discharge. ALBERT W. SELMER SILJESTAD LEANDER MARIE; prize crew to Greenock JOSEPH W. FORDNEY; prize crew to Wallow Bay. IMO ARKANSAS VIRGINIA LAPLAND; part cargo put in prize court; ordered to Barrow to dis- charge. ZAMORA; part cargo |put in prize court; ordered to Barrow to discharge SELMA HELLIG OLAF PACIFIC; part cargo put in prize court; ordered Leith to discharge. SONGELV LEJRE; part cargo put in prize court; ordered Sharpness to discharge. MAGDALENE; ordered Manchester to discharge. DROT THOLMA Maize March 28 March 29 March 29 General, mail and pas- March 30, sengers. March 30 : Cotton, March 30. March 30 Barley and general March 31 Barley March 31 General March 31 Cotton April Oats April April Oil cake April Maize April Wheat April Maize April Maize April General April Cottonseed cake April General April Wheat and rye April Rum, hides April Grain April Cottonseed cake April April Cottonseed cake April Maize April April Maize April Maize and rye April General April Cotton and tobacco April Cotton and flour April Oilcake April Cotton and oil cake April Maize April Cotton April Oil April General April April General -^Pnl General April Rye A P"1 Maize April April Cotton'..' April April Cottonseed cake April General April Rye April General April Grain and copper April April General " ' April General April Cottonseed cake April Cotton April Cotton April 12 April 12 April 12 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. Date of leaving British ports. ..April 1, 1915 .April 2, 1915 ..April 29, 1915 ..April 29, 1915 ..April 6, 1915 1915 March 30, 1915 1915 April 7, 1915 1915 March 31, 1915 1915 April 6, 1915 1915 April 13, 1915 1915 April 7, 1915 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. 1915. April 4, 1915 April 3, 1915 April 2, 1915 April 3, 1915 April 3, 1915 April 2 1915 April 4, 1915 April 4, 1915 April 4, 1915 April 11, 1915 1915 April 12, 1915 1915 April 4, 1915 1915 April 17, 1915 . April .April .April .April .April .April . April . April .April 6, 1915 7, 1915 4, 1915 7, 1915 7, 1915 1915 1915 . April . April .April .April .April .April . April . April . April . April . April . April . April . April .May . April . April . April .April . April 9, 1915 11, 1915 13, 1915 17, 1915 7, 1915 13, 1915 20, 1915 13, 1915 13, 1915 10, 1915 14, 1915 11, 1915 11, 1915 10, 1915 10, 1915 10, 1915 3, 1915 19, 1915 11, 1915 14, 1915 11, 1915 13, 1915 .April 16, 1915 .April . April . April 13, 1915 15, 1915 16, 1915 April 19, 1915 April 20, 1915 ....May 2, 1915 1915 ..April 14, 1915 1915 April 14, 1915 LIST OF SHIPS DETAINED 61 Date of arrival Date of leaving Name of vessel. Cargo. in British ports. British ports. AMERICA; part cargo put in prize General April 12, 1915 April 16, 1915 court; ordered Sunderland to dis- charge. N. F. HOLDING Grain ■. April 12, 1915 April 14, 1915 GEORGIA; prize crew to Sharpness. .. Cotton ..' April 12, 1915 April 20 1915 TOHAN SIEM Cottonseed cake April 13, 1915 April 15 1915 HANS BROGE: cleared at Ardrossan.. Rye April 13,1915 April 13 1915 TORDIS Cottonseed cake April 13,1915 April 15 1915 BALTIC; ship ordered to Hull to dis- Cotton April 13, 1915 May 13, 1915 charge. BRAKER Maize April 13,1915 April 18,1915 ROMA .. Lubricating oil April 13, 1915 April 17, 1915 L. H. CARL; cleared at Ardrossan April 13, 1915 April 13, 1915 HERO Maize April 14, 1915 April 16, 1915 MIRJAM Rye ■ A.pril 14, 1915 April 16, 1915 KONG HAAKON Maize April 14,1915 April 27,1915 DICIDO; prize crew to Fleetwood Cotton April 14. 1915 May 1 1915 LARS KRUSE Maize ...April 14, 1915 April 16, 1915 TALAVERA Maize Vpril 14,1915 April 17,1915 FALKA Cottonseed cake April 15, 1915 April 17, 1915 CAROLINA; ordered Grimsby to dis- Cotton April 15, 1915 May 2, 1915 charge. LOUISIANA; ordered Hull to dis- General \pril 16, 1915 April 23, 1915 charge part cargo. MEXICANO; ordered Greenock with General April 16, 1915 April 18, 1915 prize crew. ANGLIA; prize crew to Dundee Cotton and resin April 16, 1915.. .. April 24 1915 JUNGSHEVD April 16, 1915 April 18^ 1915 ORN; cleared at Ardrossan April 16, 1915 April 16 1915 BRETAGNE ■ April 17, 1915 April 19' 1915 STORAKER Maize April 18,1915 April 21,1915 OLAF KYRRE; ordered Grimsby to Cotton April 19, 1915 May 5, 1915 discharge cotton. HEROS ' Wheat and rye April 20, 1915 April 22 1915 BERTHA Maize April 21,1915 April 23 1915 WILH COLDING; cleared at Ardros- April 21, 1915 April 21, 1915 san. KRISTIANIAFJORD General cargo, mail "and April 21, 1915 April 22, 1915 passengers. GOTHARD Cottonseed cake April 21,1915 April 23 1915 CHRISTIAN MICHELSEN General April 21,1915 April 24 1915 EIDSWA Cottonseed cake April 21, 1915 April 24, 1915 TOMSK April 22, 1915 April 27, 1915 REGINA Cottonseed cake April 22,1915 April 24 1915 RUSS Cottonseed cake April 22,1915 April 24,1915 HOGLAND; bound from Europe to April 23, 1915 April 23, 1915 United States. RANDULF HANSEN Maize April 23, 1915 April 25, 1915 ST. CROIX Cottonseed cake April 23,1915 April 25 1915 RINGHORN Rye April 24,1915 April 25 1915 PIONEER Petroleum April 24, 1915 April 26, 1915 CARL HENKEL; via Newcastle for April 24, 1915 April 24 1915 bunkers. HERO ; cleared at Ardrossan April 24, 1915 April 24 1915 LOCKSLEY Wheat April 24, 1915 April 27 1915 KENTUCKY General April 24, 1915 April 27, 1915 SOBORG Maize and barley April 25,1915 April 27,1915 ARTEMIS; prize crew to Avonmouth. . General April 25 1915 April '8 1915 GROINTOFT Maize and barley April 25^ 1915 April 26, 1915 HANS JENSEN; via Ardrossan for April 25, 1915 April 25,1915 bunkers. KONGSFES Oil cake April 26, 1915 April 28, 1915 BRYNH1LD; cleared at Ardrossan April 26, 1915 April 26, 1915 DRONNING OLGA; prize crew to Wheat, lard, etc April 27, 1915 April 30, 1915 Leith. KRANSPRINS FREDERICK Barley April 27, 1915 April 29, 1915 SALINA Rye and Maize \pril 28, 1915 April 29, 1915 IVAR; cleared at Ardrossan Maize April 28,1915 April 28 1915 NERBOTTEN Coal and lubricating oil. .April 28,1915 April 30,1915 FREDERICIA; cleared at Ardrossan April 29, 1915 April 29 1915 WICO; cleared at North Shields Ballast April 29] 1915.' ......... April 30^ 1915 CAROLYN; prize crew to Leith Cotton and turpentine April 29, 1915 May 3', 1915 VARING; via Newcastle for bunkers April 30, 1915 May 1, 1915 INLAND; cleared at Ardrossan May 1 1915 May l' 1915 UNITED STATES Mails and passengers .... May 2, 1915 May 4 1915 JENS BANG Maize May 2, 1915 May 4, 1915 LUDVIG PEYRON Wheat May 4, 1915 May 5, 1915 MINERVA; prize crew to Newcastle. . General May 4, 1915. May 7 1915 HATHOLMEN Cottonseed cake May 4,1915 May 6^ 1915 BUR Wheat May 6, 1915 May 8, 1915 PETROLITE Petroleum lubricating oil. May 7,1915 May 9,1915 AUGUSTA : prize crew to Leith General May 7, 1915 May 10, 1915 GERD; prize crew to Leith General May 7,1915 May 10 1915 THEKLA Linseed cake May 7,1915 May 10,1915 ORION Maize May 8,1915 May 10,1915 PARIS; cleared at Ardrossan Lubricating oil May 8,1915 May 8,1915 OTTERSTAD Cottonseed cake May 8,1915 May 10,1915 62 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS Name of vessel. SIGYN; prize crew to Ipswich. GUDRUN OSCAR II Cargo LONDON: prize crew to Barrow MARICOPA GUNBORG; prize crew to Dundee... LIV LOCH TAY NORDIC; prize crew to Manchester. INDIANIC; prize crew to Leith VINLAND SVEN; prize crew to King's Lynn.... SKINFAXE OOMAN PROSPER III; cleared at Ardrossan. DANIA JOHN BLUMER GURTH SOMMERSTAD SYDLAND; prize crew to West Hartlepool. UFFE ; cleared at Ardrossan REDFAXE EXCELLENCE PLESKE VULCAN; cleared by customs on June 5, but detained by Admiralty. ESTER SIGURD: cleared at Ardrossan. DRAMMENSFJORD GLENDOOM PYTHIA; prize crew to Immingham. . Date of arrival in British ports. . Wheat, rye and maize. . . . May , Maize May General cargo, mail and May passengers. Lubricating oil May . Gas oil May General May Rye May General May General May General May •Maize May fRock, phosphate May , Maize May Maize ■ May May General May Maize May Wheat May Maize May General May 8, 1915 May 8, 1915 May 9, 1915 May Date of leaving British ports. 14, 1915 9, 1915 10, 1915 10, 1915 May 13, 1915 10, 1915 May 19, 1915 10, 1915 May 12, 1915 11, 1915 May 12, 1915 11, 1915 May 19, 1915 12, 1915 May 15, 1915 12, 1915 May 17, 1915 13, 1915 May 15, 1915 13, 1915 May 24, 1915 14, 1915 May 16, 1915 14, 1915 May 16, 1915 14, 1915 May 14, 1915 14, 1915 May 19, 1915 15, 1915 May 18, 1915 15, 1915 May 17, 1915 18, 1915 May 20, 1915 18, 1915 May 21, 1915 SOPHIE ALDEBARAN KIRUNA FREDERICK VIII. JUSTENSEN; cleared at Ayr ROMANOFF TYR; cleared by customs on 25th AMPHITRITE OLAF; cleared at Ardrossan EINAR JARL; prize crew to Sunder- land. LLAMA EDDERSIDE H. V. FIEKER MARIETTA DI GIORGIO LYEGLINT SYDIC VIDAR LEELANAW; cleared for Archangel. BRETAGNO; Tyne for bunkers POLSTAD GULFAXE ROS M. J. MANDAL- cleared at Ayr WHINLATTER; detained NARVIK BEDEN NORDKYN; prize crew to Leith POLARINE; detained CARL HENCKEL JEMTLAND; prize crew to Leith PLATURIA: detained CALIFORNIA DJURSLAND CUSHING ABSALON LISA; detained WICO BALTO NORDHAVET; prize crew to Gribsby NEW SWEDEN OSCAR TRAPP HANS JENSEN SIGNE; cleared by customs; taking bunkers: expect sail July 2, 1915. DORTE JENSEN; cleared at Ardros- san. PORTLAND; prize crew to Blyth 21, 1915 May 21, 1915 22, 1915 May 25, 1915 23, 1915 May 27, 1915 23, 1915 June 9, 1915 23, 1915 May 25, 1915 23, 1915 May 24, 1915 25, 1915 May 27, 1915 25, 1915 May 27, 1915 27, 1915 May 30, 1915 27, 1915- May 29, 1915 28, 1915 May 30, 1915 28, 1915 May 30, 1915 28, 1915 May 29, 1915 28, 1915 May 28, 1915 28, 1915 June 30, 1915 29, 1915 June 29, 1915 29, 1915 June 1, 1915 29, 1915 May 29, 1915 29, 1915 June 11, 1915 29, 1915 June 5, 1915 30, 1915 June 1, 1915 31, 1915 May 31, 1915 1, 1915 June 18, 1915 1, 1915 June 3, 1915 1, 1915 June 3, 1915 2, 1915 June 6, 1915 2, 1915 June 26, 1915 3, 1915 June 5, 1915 3, 1915 June 6, 1915 3, 1915 June 5, 1915 6, 1915 June 8, 1915 6, 1915 June 6, 1915 6, 1915 6, 1915 June 8, 1915 6, 1915 June 10, 1915 8, 1915 June 17, 1915 8, 1915 9, 1915 June 11, 1915 9, 1915 June 12, 1915 10, 1915 11, 1915 June 19, 1915 11, 1915 June 17, 1915 12, 1915 June 13, 1915 13, 1915 June 13, 1915 13, 1915 13, 1915 June 14, 1915 14, 1915 June 15, 1915 14, 1915 June 19, 1915 14, 1915 June 15, 1915 14, 1915 June 14, 1915 14, 1915 June 16, 1915 14, 1915 June 30, 1915 SEACONNET; prize crew to New- castle. . Oil cake May . Rye May . Cottonseed cake May Oil May .Cottonseed cake May Oil cake May . General May . Cottonseed cake May . Cotton and cottonseed May cake. . Cottonseed cake May . Maize May . Wheat May .General mail and pas- May sengers. , Maize May .Barley May General May Rye May Cottonseed cake May Cottonseed cake May Gas oil May Oil cake May Maize May Gas oil and lubricating Tune oil. Oil cake June Wheat June .Cottonseed cake June Cotton June Maize June .Cottonseed cake June .Maize June .Rye June Maize June Barley and oil cake June Rye June Coal June Maize June Petroleum and naphtha. . . June Cottonseed cake June Resin, cotton, cottonseed June cake oil. Oil June General June Oil cake June Petroleum June Lubricating Oil June Resin Tune Oil June Coal June Agricultural implements . . June Gas coal June Pitch pine wood Tune Maize June General June Maize June 15,1915 June 15,1915 Barley, beans, dried fruit June 15, 1915 June 18, 1915 and oil cake. General June 16,1915 June 19,1915 IX QUOTATIONS PERTINENT TO THE ISSUE THE PATRIOTIC PRESS OF A CENTURY AGO ENGLAND AND THE LAW OF NATIONS From The General Advertiser, Philadelphia, Dec. 16, 1793 The law of nations is the tacit acquies- cence of nations, in those rules by which they consent to be governed in their transac- tions, with respect to each other. This law must therefore vary as civilization softens and improves the general mass of manners, among those nations whose mutual inter- course subjects them to similar laws. Thus it was anciently held that the conqueror had the power of life and death over the con- quered — and from thence was deduced the practice of holding prisoners in a state of slavery. The humanity of modern nations has exploded this doctrine, and the law of nations limits the power of the conqueror to a temporary confinement. The ancient law of nations declared, that an enemy's prop- erty, or even the subject of a power at war, might be taken from a neutral ship, provid- ed that freight and demurrage were paid ; so that the neutral vessel lost nothing by the capture. The violence and inconveniences that this law, even thus qualified, gave birth to, induced the Empress of Russia to pro- pose during the last war, an alteration of it, whereby neutral vessels should be inviolate, except ivlien carrying contraband goods, and to prevent any misapprehensions on that subject, she enumerated the contraband goods — to this law all Europe (with one ex- ception) and the United States formally ac- ceded. Britain, the exception alluded to, not being willing to relinquish her piratical system, did not formally acknowledge the rule — however, she respected it so far, as to confine her aggressions to the weaker states, and those aggressions produced here were with the United Netherlands. But as one individual of a community cannot prevent the operation of a law which the majority impose, the law of nations has by their con- sent been changed, notwithstanding the dis- sent of Britain ; and that this is the opinion of the President, appears from his appealing to the modern law of nations in his procla- mation. It follows, therefore, that every seizure and detainer of our vessels; every condemnation of their cargoes, under pre- tense of their belonging to an enemy, is an open and gross violation of the modern law of nations. But why do we talk of modern law? There is no law either ancient or mod- em — no law either human or divine — that confines her usurpations, that sets bounds to her violence. By a late proclama- mation of the British King, every vessel carrying the produce of our own country, of any kind, to any port of France, is made liable to seizure: she must suffer the insol- ence of British cruisers, and be compelled to dispose of her cargo at such rates as they choose to give. In what law of nations has this usurpation upon the rights of a neutral power ever been found? Injury does not stop her — it goes further and declares, that when- ever any place shall be declared to be in a state of siege, that every vessel going towards it shall be lawful prize — so that the Royal Proclamation alters the nature of things, and makes that a state of siege, which is not so actually; and that contraband which no law of usage ever declared to be such. ENGLAND AND THE RIGHTS OF NEUTRALS From The Aurora, Philadelphia, May 30, 1801 Who is there that can regard the great laws which connect society and establish the rights of property, that will assert the legiti- macy of a seizure upon the property of a traveler on shore? Is the character of prop- erty changed, or the title of the proprietor changed, by the accident of my rice or to- bacco being on board a ship instead of being in my store or on my plantation? From The Aurora, June 17, 1801. We shall put the case in a simple point of view. Mr. Higginson, at Boston, plans a voyage to Canton. The ship on her outward passage is met by the English frigate Bos- ton, but, not satisfied with her papers, or obtaining information from a vindictive sea- man, or a person sent by the British Captain to ship as a seaman in the American vessel that the cargo was French property, or contraband, the vessel is carried into Provi- dence or Halifax; there she is libelled — lawyers of course are engaged and fees given in proportion to the value of the ship and the cargo, and the ship after a few months' detention is delivered up, after an expendi- ture of from five to six thousand dollars, court fees, and lawyers' fees ; beside the de- lay of the voy r age, the expense of the crew, QUOTATIONS PERTINENT TO THE ISSUE 65 and the interest upon the value of the whole — even if the cargo has escaped pillage — this is only a case in the mildest form, thou- sands of which have occurred since the British treaty. (From The Aurora, December 13, 1805.) As war itself is an outrage of moral jus- tice, and indifferent nations are not allowed to interfere in their disputes, so neither are indifferent nations to be involved in the con- sequences of their dispute; for a vice or crime, that is war, is itself sufficiently afflict- ing to those who are engaged in it ; the prin- ciples of universal justice demand then that those who are not concerned or involved in it, should be exempted from its effects. This was, in fact, the principle of the armed neu- trality of 1780. The object was to secure peaceable nations from the injuries and wrongs of nations arrogant and despotic, and who being themselves at war, would not suf- fer any other nation to be at peace. We infer, therefore, that if the moral law — of which Christians and Christian nations boast so much — is to be the standard of right and wrong, that it cannot be maintained, that the peace, property, liberty, rights, and independence of free, peaceable nations, can, consistently with the moral law, be inter- rupted or injured; and that if the moral law is to prevail (and if it does not there is an end of all law), that the peaceable nation has the right to the full latitude of the treaties quoted to trade with all the world unmolested. ( From The Aurora, December 16, 1805. ) A dollar at sea is 100 cents on shore — a robbery of my ship of five or ten thousand dollars is as much a robbery and a wrong done to me as the robbing of my house in town or country of the like amount. If the law of nations is to be decided by coercion — then let Britain plunder on the ocean until she once more incenses and com- bines all nations against her. We cannot meet her in a line of battle at sea — for her fleets cover it ; we must, therefore, make war where we can, sequester first; and if that does not procure justice, embargo; if that fails, confiscate; and then we cannot be worse treated than we have been and are daily. (From The Aurora, December 17, 1805.) It is time then that we do not submit to the reproach of conniving at a total change of the usages of civilized nations — it is time that we rescued ourselves from the disgrace of an abandonment of the principles of the armed neutrality of 1780, in which the true principles of neutral national right were as- serted. These principles . . . cannot be but constantly kept in view, "a nation in- dependent and neutral, does not lose by the war of others, the right which they had be- fore the war, because peace exists between her and all the belligerent powers." Without receiving or being obliged to follow the laws of either of these she has a right to follow, in all places (contraband excepted) the traf- fic which she would have a right to carry on if peace existed between all other nations, as it existed here. That neutral vessels have a right to navi- gate freely from port to port, even on the coasts of the powers at war. That the effects of the subjects of the pow- ers at war shall be free in neutral vessels on the high sea, except such as are acknowl- edged by all nations to be contraband. That as the blockade of a port is to be un- derstood only where a vessel cannot enter without evident danger, on account of vessels of war stationed there to form an effectual blockade. . . . But moral justice does not enter into the English interpretation of the law of nations. Her principles and her practices are anal- agous to those of the highway robber, who, because he carries a pair of pistols, forbids the unarmed and innocent travelers, whom he meets on the road, from passing till he has plundered them. . . The right of search, which was at first a qualified right, subject to restrictions within the bounds of reason- ableness, has been extended to a search the most vexatious and injurious to the cargo, on the high seas; to the disregard of papers, and to breaking open of hatches and pack- ages. The next step was, from the right of car- rying into port upon strong and palpable suspicion of contraband, to carrying in at discretion. From this followed the extension of the principle of contraband to articles not actually war-like, such as timber and metals, because they MIGHT be used in war. After this extension, the principle of contraband was enlarged to food, and even to the vul- gar luxury of tobacco. After flour and to- bacco had been determined to be contraband of war, it was not at all surprising that Eng- land should believe she had befooled or dis- mayed mankind; and having involved Hol- land in war, and commanded Genoa and Tuscany to declare war, when they wished to be, and it was their interest to be, at peace; it was not at all wonderful to find England attempting to accomplish by a proclamation what she could not effect by her fleets, the blockade of the whole coast. The blockade of the whole world, however, suitably succeeded, for in fact such is the effect of the orders, decrees and decisions of the English privy council and courts. Take the new principles, or rather the vio- lation of all just principles, held up by the English concerning the navigation of neu- 66 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS trals, and it amounts to this : That the ports of a nation at war with England and the ports of the colonies of that nation are in a state of blockade, when England chooses to publish an Order in Council; and whenever she does not choose to issue such an order, it is to be considered that she relaxes from the straight rule, and this, of course, is con- sidered as an indulgence! If the law of na- tions and the laws of war were to be regu- lated in this way, it would be absurd in the last degree to talk of national independence. Not only the United States, but every nation on earth would be no better than the vassals of England. The neutral nation is not surely bound to lie still and suffer ! . . . England says : "No ! I am at war in defense of all order and all religion, and all government — have I not stood up for the Pope in 1795, and the Turk in 1805 — have I not taken the Mogul and the Mahattahs under my protection — and shall I not take the golden bull and the Republic of Genoa under my effective protection now?" Extravagant and ludicrous as this personification of England is — it furnishes as coherent argument as any that can be set up in support of its oppression of neutrals. (From The Aurora, Dec. 5, 1805.) Britain boasts that her present greatness is owing to her navigation laws — let the United States form theirs also. (From The Aurora, Dec. 18, 1805.) It has been too long the fashion to esteem other countries before our own .... and it is time that the fashion of loving our country should once more resume its benefi- cent and cheering influence. Our situation is original in the annals of the world; our youth do not sufficiently appreciate the superiority of our country over other na- tions, in every particular that has been con- sidered meritorious and worthy of historical celebrity and the imitation of great and noble minds. It is time that our youth should begin to feel this honor and to act upon it. It is time that we think with a boldness and dignity suited to the originality and glory of their condition, and that they learn to pre- serve sacred and to hand down to their suc- cessors the glorious gifts which the virtues of their forefathers have secured for them by the sacrifice of so much blood — -those sacri- fices should be constantly kept in sight— and every invasion of our national rights should be deemed an invocation on us to rise, reas- sert and defend them under every peril. Note. — The "Aurora" was the most in- fluential newspaper in the United 8tates in the .beginning of the nineteenth century. Founded by Benjamin Franklin Bache, son- in-law and heir of Benjamin Franklin, is- sued from the Franklin printing house at No. 15 Franklin Court, Philadelphia, and carried on by William Duane after Bache's death, the "Aurora" teas the chief single agency that wrought the election of Jeffer- son and framed the policies of the Govern- ment after the Republican party had begun its fifty-year lease of power. To the printing office of the "Aurora" early in the nineteenth century came a young immigrant, James Wilson, grand- father of the twenty-eighth President of the United States. James Wilson became chief compositor on the "Aurora," and as such worked for a number of years. He was de- voted to his chief, even naming his first son William Duane Wilson. In 1812, the name of James Wilson went up as owner of the "Aurora.", In reading extracts like those above (which might be multiplied many fold), one is constrained to ask himself whether, dur- ing the past hundred years, civilization has advanced or retreated. Have manners soft- ened, or grown more barbarous? Have peaceable populations maintained their rights in fuller degree, or have they yielded those they had already achieved? Are the patriotic sentiments which these idols of their day — Bache and Duane — penned, and which the young Irish immigrant (not being afraid of a hyphen more or less, he called himself a Scots-Irish-American) put into type — are they uncongenial to the minds of Americans today? Were those sentiments mistaken, were they inhumane, toere they unenlightened? Or, are they merely too vig- orous? In short, why are not the views which James Wilson put into type a century ago appropriate to the pen of his grandson to- day? QUOTATIONS PERTINENT TO THE ISSUE 67 THOMAS JEFFERSON ON NEUTRAL RIGHTS [Mr. Jefferson, Secretary of State, to Mr. C. Pinckney, United States Minister in London, September 7, 1793.] The state of war existing between Great Britain and France furnishes no legitimate right either to interrupt the agriculture of the United States or the peaceable exchange of its produce with all nations, and conse- quently the assumption of it will be as law- ful hereafter as now, in peace as in war. No ground, acknowledged by the common rea- son of mankind, authorizes this act now, and unacknowledged ground may be taken at any and at all times. We see then a practice begun, to which no time, no circumstances, prescribe any limits, and which strikes at the root of our agriculture, that branch of industry which gives food, clothing and comfort to the great mass of the inhabitants of these States. If any nation whatever has a right to shut up to our produce all the ports of the earth, except her own and those of her friends, she may shut up these also, and so confine us within our own limits. No nation can sub- scribe to such pretensions; no nation can agree, at the mere will or interest of another, to have its peaceable industry suspended and its citizens reduced to idleness and want. The loss of our produce, destined to foreign markets, or that loss which would result from an arbitrary restraint of our markets, is a tax too serious for us to acquiesce in. It is not enough for a nation to say we and our friends will buy your produce. We have a right to answer that it suits us bet- ter to sell to their enemies as well as their friends. Our ships do not go to France to return empty; they go to exchange the sur- plus of our produce which we can spare for surpluses of other kinds which they can spare and we want; which they can furnish on better terms, and more to our mind, than Great Britain or her friends. We have a right to judge for ourselves what market best suits us, and they have none to forbid to us the enjoyment of the necessaries and comforts which we may ob- tain from any other independent country. Were we to withhold from her (France) supplies of provisions, we should in like manner be bound to withhold them from her enemies also, and thus shut to ourselves all the ports of Europe where corn is in demand or make ourselves parties in the war. This is a dilemma which Great Britain has no right to force upon us, and for which no pre- text can be found in any part of our con- duct. She may, indeed, feel the desire of starving an enemy nation, but she can have no right of doing it at our loss nor of mak- ing us the instruments of it. Thomas Jefferson to Baronne de Stael Holstein, May 24, 1813. England is in principle the enemy of all maritime nations. The object of England is the permanent dominion of the ocean, and the monopoly of the trade of the world. To do this she must keep a larger fleet than her resources will maintain. The resources of other nations then must be impressed to supply the deficiency of her own. This is sufficiently developed and evidenced by her successive strides towards the usurpa- tion of the sea. Mark them after her first war, after William Pitt, the little, came in- to her administration. She first forbade neutrals all trade with her enemies in time of war, which they had not in time of peace. Then she forbade them to trade from the port of one nation to that of another at war with her, although a right fully exercised in time of peace. Next instead of taking ves- sels only entering a blockaded port, she took them over the whole ocean, if destined to that port, although ignorant of the blockade, and without intention to violate it. Then she took them returning from that port, as if infected by previous infraction of block- ade. Then came her paper blockades, by which she might shut up the whole world without sending a ship to sea, except to take all those sailing on it, as they must, of course, be bound to some port. And these were followed by her orders of Council, for- bidding every nation to go to the port of an- other nation without coming first to some port of Great Britain, there paying a trib- ute to her, regulated by the cargo, and tak- ing from her a license to proceed to the port of destination; which operation the vessel was to repeat with the return cargo on its return. And finally that her views may not longer rest in inference, in a recent debate, her minister declared in open parliament that the object of the present war is a monopoly of commerce. AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS PRESIDENT MADISON ON PAPER BLOCKADES (From President Madison's Message to Congress, June 18, 1812.) Under pretended blockades, without the presence of an adequate force, and some- times without the practicability of applying one, our commerce has been plundered in every sea; the great staples of our country have been cut off from their legitimate mar- kets; and a destructive blow aimed at our agricultural and maritime interests. In ag- gravation of these predatory measures, they have been considered as in force from the dates of their notification; a retrospective effect being thus added, as has been done in other important cases, to the unlawfulness of the course pursued. And to render the outrage the more signal, these mock block- ades have been reiterated and enforced in the face of official communications from the British Government, declaring, as the true definition of a legal blockade, "that particu- lar ports must be actually invested, and previous warning given to vessels bound to them not to enter." Not content with these occasional expedi- ents for laying waste our neutral trade, the Cabinet of Great Britain resorted at length to the sweeping system of blockades, under the name of Orders in Council, which has been moulded and managed as might best suit its political views, its commercial jealousies, or the avidity of British cruisers. To our remonstrances against the com- plicated and transcendent injustice of this innovation, the first reply was that the or- ders were reluctantly adopted by Great Britain as a necessary retaliation on decrees of her enemy proclaiming a general block- ade of the British Isles, at a time when the naval force of that enemy dared not to issue from his own ports. She was reminded without effect that her own prior blockades, unsupported by an adequate naval force, actually applied and continued, were a bar to this plea; that executed edicts against millions of our property could not be re- taliation on edicts confessedly impossible to be executed; that retaliation, to be just, should fall on the party setting the guilty example, not on an innocent party which was not even chargeable with an acquies- cence in it. PRESIDENT GRANT'S IDEA OF AN "UNFRIENDLY ACT" [Mr. Fish. Secretary of State, to Mr. Washburn, Minister at Paris, October 4, 1870. (See For. Rel. 3rd S. Jflst C, Executive Documents I, Franco-German War, 37.)]. marine league. But of this there is no posi- tive evidence. She has entered the port of New York, as claimed by some, for the pur- pose of watching a German steamer about to sail thence. Three of them have put into the harbor of New London, which looks out upon Long Island Sound, the eastern en- trance to the New York Harbor, avowedly for small repairs. One recently asked per- mission, which was granted, to make some repairs at the Norfolk navy yard, near the entrance of Chesapeake Bay. All this may be consistent with an inten- tion of perfect observance of the neutral character of our waters and jurisdiction and with an entire absence of undertaking any hostile movement against the vessels of north Germany from those waters or that jurisdiction. A large trade has been carried on from the ports of the United States approached by the waters in which these vessels have thus appeared by vessels belonging to north Ger- many. The appearance of French vessels in these immediate neighborhoods in such numbers and force does not fail to excite the alarm of these vessels and must have the effect to a greater or less degree of diminishing that trade. The United States is not prepared at pres- ent to say that any actual violation of in- This government desires and intends to maintain a perfect and strict neutrality be- tween the two powers now unfortunately en- gaged in war. It desires also to extend to both the manifestation of its friendly feel- ing in every possible way and will allow to the vessels of war of each power equally the hospitality of its ports and harbors for all proper and friendly purpose. But this hospitality is liable to abuse, and circumstances have arisen to give rise in the minds of some persons to the apprehen- sion that attempts at such abuse have taken place. I am not in possession of facts to justify me in saying that such has been the case, but I have deemed myself justified in call- ing the attention of M. Berthemy, the French representative at this capital, to the current rumors, sustained as they are by the presence of a number of French vessels upon the coast of the United States. These ves- sels have appeared at or near the entrance of the harbor of New York, off Sandy Hook ; at the entrance of the Long Island Sound and at or near the entrance of Chesapeake Bay. One or more is represented to have been anchored not far from Sandy Hook, the main entrance to New York Harbor, and there is a difference of statement as to the precise distance at which she lay from shore; some claiming that she was within a QUOTATIONS PERTINENT TO THE ISSUE 69 ternational law has been committed or that the hospitality of these waters has been posi- tively abused. But the hovering of the ves- sels of war of a belligerent on the coast near the entrance of the principal ports of a friendly power does interfere with the trade of the friendly power. The interruption of the regular communi- cation with you by reason of the investment of Paris has led me to represent to M. Berthemy our views on this subject and to say that, although the vessels of either bel- ligerents may not actually shelter within the jurisdiction of the United States and pro- ceed thence against the vessels of its enemy, this government would regard as an un- friendly act the hovering of such vessels upon the coast of the United States near to its shores in the neighborhood of its ports and in the track of the ordinary commerce of these ports with intent to intercept the vessels of trade of its enemy. THE BRITISH AND GERMAN WAR ZONES (Special to the New York Times.) COMPARED Washington. Feb. 7, 1915. — Develop- ments to-day with respect to the German war zone proclamation indicate that the American Government is not likely at this time to file any protest or make representa- tions to the German Government respecting the enforcement of the German order. The long memorandum delivered by the German Foreign Office to Ambassador Gerard, ex- plaining the proclamation, has been received at the State Department, and perusal of its text, which was cabled to American news- papers this morning, convinced officials here that at present no issue could be raised with Germany over the creation of the projected war zone without at the same time raising identically the same issue with Great Britain. The German memorandum transmitted by Ambassador Gerard emphasizes the fact — a vitally important one in the present sit- uation — that Great Britain has declared the entire Worth Sea to be a tour area, and that if England has not made impossible the passage of neutral shipping through the sea between Scotland and Norway she has ren- dered "it so difficult and so dangerous that she has to a certain extent effected a block- ade of neutral coasts and neutral ports, in violation of all international laws." The fact that the British Government has done identically the same thing with re- spect to the establishment of war zones in the open seas beyond the three-mile terri- torial limit, has been officially certified to the State Department by Sir Cecil Spring- Rice, the British Ambassador. This was dove three months ago, and no protest has en r been made by the United States against the action of Great Britain in establishing such a war zone. Since the American Gov- ernment has not protested against nor ques- tioned the right of Great Britain to estab- lish its war zone, it is evident that it would be impossible for the United States^ without a violation of its attitude of strict neutral- ity, to attack or even question the German war zone proclamation at this or any other time, without similarly questioning the Brit- ish war zone order. Trump Card for Germany. It dawned upon officials here today that the German Government had executed a rather neat and clever counter-diplomatic stroke in notifying the world of its inten- tion to create a war zone around the Brit- ish Isles by taking a leaf out of the British book, and doing the very thing that the Brit- ish Government had done. The British and German war zone orders, as officially com- municated to the State Department, were compared and closely studied today. This comparison was not found to be to the dis- advantage of the Germans. The situation resolves itself something after this fashion : For England the official date of the beginning of the war was August 1th. England waited until three months of the war had been fought and then served notice on the neutral powers of the world of her intention to establish a war zone. The British war zone teas set up on November •5th. The Germans watted an additional three months, twice as long as did Great Britain, or until February Jfth, exactly six months from the official British beginning of the icar, and then announced its decision to establish a war zone, very similar to that of Great Britain, although someiohat more- ex- tensive. However, the principle involved with respect to both war zones is the same, since each is extensive enough to cover the high seas outside of the three-mile territor- ial limit, and the two war zones differ in im- portance only in degree, and the character of the operations to be conducted in them. War Zones Compared. A comparison of the British and German war zone orders disclosed these striking facts : First. — The British Government on Nov. 4th, notified the United States Government that its war zone would be effective from Nov. 5th — one day's notice. Second. — The German Government issued its war zone proclamation on Feb. 4th, and communicated it to Ambassador Gerard on the same day, announcing that the German war zone around the British Isles would be 70 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS effective after Feb. 18th — fifteen days' notice. Third. — The British war zone covers the whole of the North Sea. Fourth. — The German war zone covers the entire English Channel and all the ter- ritorial and high sea waters around the Brit- ish Isles. Fifth. — The British war zone order sought to close the north of Scotland route around the British Isles to Norway, the Bal- tic, Denmark and Holland. Sixth. — The German war zone seeks to close the southern or English Channel route around the British Isles to Holland, Nor- way, Sweden, Denmark and the Baltic. Seventh. — The British war zone decree drew an arbitrary line from the Hebrides Islands along the Scottish coast to Iceland, and warned neutral shipping that it would cross this line at its risk, but that ships of neutral nations might go to Holland and other neutral nations along the eastern lit- toral of the North Sea by taking the Eng- lish Channel and Straits of Dover route. Eighth. — The German war zone declares that neutral vessels will be exposed to dan- ger in the English Channel, but routes of navigation around the north of Scotland Is- lands in the eastern part of the North Sea and in a strip thirty miles wide along the Dutch coast are not open to the danger zone. Ninth. — The Germans make the south- ern channel route dangerous, and declare the north of Scotland route safe, while the Brit- ish declare the north of Scotland route dan- gerous and the English Channel route safe, the effect of this being that neither the north- ern nor the southern routes around England will be safe for neutral vessels. Tenth. — The British war zone order was based on the discovery of mines in the North Sea, while the German decree is based on England's attitude toward contraband, the Wilhelmina case and England's establish- ment of a war zone. The British Proclamation. Here is the text of the communication in which the British Ambassador three months ago notified the American State Department of the establishment of the British war zone : Owing to the discovery of mines in the North Sea the whole of that sea must be considered a military area. Within this area merchant shipping of all kinds, traders of all countries, fishing craft, and all other vessels will be exposed to the gravest dan- gers from mines, which it has been necessary to lay from warships, searching vigilantly by night and day for suspicious craft. All merchant and fishing vessels of every descrip- tion are hereby warned of the dangers they encoun- ter by entering this area except in strict accordance with Admiralty decisions. Every effort will be made to convey this warning to neutral countries and to vessels on the sea, but from the Sth of November onwards the Admiralty announce that all ships pass- ing a line drawn from the northern point of the Hebrides through the Faroe Islands to Iceland do so at their own peril. Ships of all countries wishing to trade to and from Norway, the Baltic, Denmark, and Holland are ad- vised to come, if inward bound, by the English Chan- nel and Straits of Dover. There they will be given sailing directions which will pass them safely so far as Great Britain is concerned, up the East Coast of Eng- land to Faroe Island, whence safe route will, if pos- sible, be given to Lindesnaes Lightship. From this point they should turn north or south, according to their destination, keeping as near the coast as possible. Converse applies to vessels outward bound. By strict adherence to these routes the commerce of all countries will be able to reach its destination in safety, so far as Great Britain is concerned, but any straying, even for a few miles, from the course thus indicated may be followed by serious consequences. X OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS DECLARATION OF PARIS April 16, 1856. Declaration respecting maritime law signed by the plenipotentiaries of Great Bri- tain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia- and Turkey, assembled in Congress at Paris, April 16, 1856. Article 2 The neutral flag covers enemy's goods with the- exception of contraband of war. Article 3 Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to cap- ture under the enemy's flag. Article 4 Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coasts of the enemy. DECLARATION OF LONDON* Feb. 26, 1909. Preliminary Provision. The Signatory Powers are agreed that the rules contained in the following Chapters correspond in substance with the generally recognized principles of international law. BLOCKADE. Article 1 — A blockade must not extend beyond the ports and coasts belonging to or occupied by the enemy. Article 2 — In accordance with the Declaration of Paris of 1856, a blockade, in order to be binding, must be effective — that is to say, it must be maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the enemy coastline. Article 3 — The question whether a blockade is effective is a question of fact Article 5 — A blockade must be applied impartially to the ships of all nations Article 17 — Neutral vessels may not be captured for breach of blockade except within the area of operations of the warships detailed to render the blockade effective. Article 18 — The blockading forces must not bar access to neutral ports or coasts. Article 19 — Whatever may be the ulterior destination of a vessel or of her cargo, she cannot be captured for breach of blockade if, at the moment, she is on her way to a non-blockaded port. CONTRABAND OF WAR. Article 22. The following articles may, without notice, be treated as contraband of war, under the name of absolute contraband:— ( 1 ) Arms of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes, and their distinctive component parts. (2) Projectiles, charges, and cartridges of all kinds, and their distinctive compo- nent parts. (3) Powder and explosives especially prepared for use in war. (4) Gun mountings, limber boxes, limbers, military wagons, field forges, and their distinctive component parts. ( 5 ) Clothing and equipment of a distinctively military character. (6) All kinds of harness of a distinctively military character. (7) Saddle, draught, and pack animals suitable for use in war. (8) Articles of camp equipment, and their distinctive component parts. (9) Armour plates. (10) War-ships, including boats, and their distinctive component parts of such a nature that they can only be used on a vessel of war. (.11) Implements and apparatus designed exclusively for the manufacture of muni- tions of war, for the manufacture or repair of arms, or war material for use on land or sea. * The Declaration of London Concerning the Laws of Naval Warfare was made at a Conference initi- ated by the British Government in a circular to the Powers. The British Government suggested the subjects to be discussed, the invitations were accepted, and the Conference met on the 4th of December, igo8. For the assistance of the Conference the British Government had collected material into a volume which became known as the Red Book and which served as a basis for the deliberations of the Conference. All the Powers convened in the Conference {namely: the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, Japan, Italy, Germany, Austria- Hungary, Spain and Holland) were signatory to the Declaration, which, however, on account of various circum- stances, failed to receive the formal ratification of the Powers. The authority^ of the Declaration of London, nevertheless, rests upon the Preliminary Provision, which declares that the principles enunciated in the Declara- tion are those which are in substance recognized principles of international law. There is in international law no authority higher than this. 74 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS Article 23. Articles exclusively used for war may be added to the list of absolute contraband by a declaration which must be notified. Such notification must be addressed to the Governments of other Powers, or to their representatives accredited to the Power making the declaration. A notification made after the outbreak of hostilities is addressed only to neutral Powers. Article 24. The following articles, susceptible of use in war as well as for purposes of peace, may, without notice, be treated as contraband of war, under the name of conditional con- traband : — (1) Foodstuffs. (2) Forage and grain, suitable for feeding animals. (3) Clothing, fabrics for clothing, an i boots and shoes, suitable for use in war. (4) Gold and silver in coin or bullion; paper money. (5) Vehicles of all kinds available for use in war, and their component parts, (6) Vessels, craft, and boats of all kinds; floating docks, parts of docks and their component parts. (7) Eailway material, both fixed and rolling-stock, and material for telegraphs, wireless telegraphs, and telephones. (8) Balloons and flying machines and their distinctive component parts, together with accessories and articles recognisable as intended for use in connection with balloons and flying machines. (9) Fuel; lubricants. (10) Powder and explosives not specially prepared for use in war. (11) Barbed wire and implements for fixing and cutting the same. (12) Horseshoes and shoeing materials. (13) Harness and saddlery. (14) Field glasses, telescopes, chronometers, and all kinds of nautical instruments. Article 25. Articles susceptible of use in war as well as for purposes of peace, other than those enumerated in Articles 22 and 24, may be added to the list of conditional contraband by a declaration, which must be notified in the manner provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. Article 26. If a Power waives, so far as it is concerned, the right to treat as contraband of war an article comprised in any of the classes enumerated in Articles 22 and 24, such in- tention shall be announced by a declaration, which must be notified in the manner pro- vided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. Article 27. Articles which are not susceptible of use in war may not be declared contraband of war. Article 28. The following may not be declared contraband of war : — (1) Raw cotton, wool, silk, jute, flax, hemp, and other raw materials of the textile industries, and yarns of the same. (2) Oil seeds and nuts; copra. (3) Eubber, resins, gums, and laces; hops. (4) Eaw hides and horns, bones and ivory. (5) Natural and artificial manures, including nitrates and phosphates for agricul- tural purposes. (6) Metallic ores. (7) Earths, clays, lime, chalk, stone, including marble, bricks, slates, and tiles. (8) Chinaware and glass. (9) Paper and paper- making materials. (10) Soap, paint and colours, including articles exclusively used in their manufac- ture, and varnish. (11) Bleaching powder, soda, ash, caustic soda, salt cake, ammonia, sulphate of ammonia, and sulphate of copper. (12) Agricultural, mining, textile, and printing machinery. (13) Precious and semi-precious stones, pearls, mother-of-pearl, and coral. (14) Clocks and watches, other than chronometers. (15) Fashion and fancy goods. (16) Feathers of all kinds, hairs, and bristles. (17) Articles of household furniture and decoration; office furniture and requisites. Article 29. Likewise the following may not be treated as contraband of war: — (1) Articles serving exclusively to aid the sick and wounded. They can, however, OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 75 in case of urgent military necessity and subject to the payment of compensation, be requi- sitioned, if their destination is that specified in Article 30. (2) Articles intended for the use of the vessel in which they are found as well as those intended for the use of her crew and passengers during the voyage. Article 30. Absolute contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be destined to territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or to the armed forces of the enemy. It is imma- terial whether the carriage of the goods is direct or entails transhipment or a subsequent transport by land. Article 31. Proof of the destination specified in Article 30 is complete in the following cases : — ( 1 ) When the goods are documented for discharge in an enemy port, or for delivery to the armed forces of the enemy. (2) When the vessel is to call at enemy ports only, or when she is to touch at an enemy port or meet the armed forces of the enemy before reaching the neutral port for which the goods in question are documented. Article 32. When a vessel is carrying absolute contraband, her papers are conclusive proof as to the voyage on which she is engaged, unless she is found clearly out of the course indi- cated by her papers and unable to give adequate reasons to justify such deviation. . Article 33.* Conditional contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be destined for the use of the armed forces or of a government department of the enemy State, unless in this lat- ter case the circumstances show that the goods cannot in fact be used for the purposes of war in progress. This latter exception does not apply to a consignment coming under Article 24 (4). Article 34.t The destination referred to in Article 33 is presumed to exist if the goods are con- signed to enemy authorities, or to a contractor established in the enemy country who, as a matter of common knowledge, supplies articles of this kind to the enemy. A similar pre- sumption arises if the goods are consigned to a fortified place belonging to the enemy, or other place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy. No such presumption, however, arises in the case of a mechant vessel bound for one of these places if it is sought to prove that she herself is contraband. In cases where the above presumptions do not arise, the destination is presumed to be innocent. The presumptions set up by this Article may be rebutted. Article 35. Conditional contraband is not liable to capture, except when found on board a ves- sel bound for territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or for the armed forces of the enemy, and when it is not to be discharged in an intervening neutral port. * The Drafting Committee of the Conference prepared a general report on the Declaration, in the course of which it says, discussing Article 33 : "There is no question of destination for the enemy in general, but of destination for the use-of his armed forces or government departments." . . . t Discussing Article 34, the Drafting Committee said: "Contraband articles will not usually be directly addressed to the military authorities or to the govern- ment departments of the enemy state. Their true destination will be more or less concealed, and the captor must prove it in order to justify their capture. But it has been thought reasonable to set up presumptions based on the nature of the person to whom, or place for which, the articles are destined. It may be an enemy authority or a trader established in an enemy country who, as a matter of common knowledge, supplies the enemy Government with articles of the kind in question. It may be a fortified place belonging to the enemy or a place used as a base, whether of operations or of supply, for the armed forces of the enemy." "In the absence of the above presumptions, the destination is presumed to be innocent. That is the ordi- nary law, according to which the captor must prove the illicit character of the goods which he claims to capture." Considerable discussion took place in the Press, and several questions were asked in the House of Com- mons with reference to this Article, both with regard to the translation of commercant by "contractor," and as to whether ennemi meant "enemy government." The Report in discussing the destination of conditional contra- band says, "It may be an enemy authority or a trader established in an enemy country who as a matter of com- mon knowledge, supplies the enemy Government with articles of the kind in question." The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Mackinnon Wood) stated in the House of Commons on the 29th March, 1909, that the word commergant in this Article "cannot possibly apply to a mere merchant who supplies goods to the gen- eral public," and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Edward Grey) on the 5th April, 1909, in answer to a question on the divergence between the terms of Article 34 and the General Report, replied as fol- lows : "For the reasons already given, I cannot admit that there is any ambiguity as to the meaning of Article 34. It is made clear, both by Article 33, on which Article 34 is dependent, and by the general official report of the Conference, that the word ennemi in Article 34 can only mean the enemy government. It is evident, how- ever, that if the point had been raised at the time it would have been made perfectly clear in the drafting, and we therefore propose to make a declaration, at the time of the ratification, that the word ennemi in Article 34 means the government of the enemy." {The Times, 6th April, 1909.) 76 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS The ship's papers are conclusive proof both as to the voyage on which the vessel is engaged and as to the port of discharge of the goods, unless she is found clearly out of the course indicated by her papers, and unable to give adequate reasons to justify such deviation. Article 36. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 35, conditional contraband, if shown to have the destination referred to in Article 33, is liable to capture in cases where the enemy country has no seaboard. Article 37. A vessel carrying goods liable to capture as absolute or conditional contraband may be captured on the high seas or in the territorial waters of the belligerents throughout the whole of her voyage, even if she is to touch at a port of call before reaching the hostile des- tination. Article 38. A vessel may not be captured on the ground that she has carried contraband on a previous occasion if such carriage is in point of fact at an end. Article 39. Contraband goods are liable to condemnation. Article 40. A vessel carrying contraband may be condemned if the contraband, reckoned either by value, weight, volume, or freight, forms more than half the cargo. Article 41. If a vessel carrying contraband is released, she may be condemned to pay the costs and expenses incurred by the captor in respect of the proceedings in the National Prize Court and the custody of the ship and cargo during the proceedings. Article 42. Goods which belong to the owner of the contraband and are on board the same ves- sel are liable to condemnation. Article 43. If a vessel is encountered at sea while unaware of the outbreak of hostilities or of the declaration of contraband which applies to her cargo, the contraband cannot be con- demned except on payment of compensation ; the vessel herself and the remainder of the cargo are not liable to condemnation or to the costs and expenses referred to in Article 41. The same rule applies if the master, after becoming aware of the outbreak of hostilities, or of the declaration of contraband, has had no opportunity of discharging the contra- band. A vessel is deemed to be aware of the existence of a state of war, or of a declara- tion of contraband, if she left a neutral port subsequently to the notification to the Power to .which such port belongs at the outbreak of hostilities or of the declaration of contra- band respectively, provided that such notification was made in sufficient time. A vessel is also deemed to be aware of the existence of a state of war if she left an enemy port after the outbreak of hostilities. Article 44. A vessel which has been stopped on the ground that she is carrying contraband, and which is not liable to condemnation on account of the proportion of contraband on board, may, when the circumstances permit, be allowed to continue her voyage if the master is willing to hand over the contraband to the belli gerent warship. The delivery of the contraband must be entered by the captor on the logbook of the "vessel stopped, and the master must give the captor duly certified copies of all relevant papers. The captor is at liberty to destroy the contraband that has been handed over to him under these conditions. TRANSFER TO A NEUTRAL FLAG. Article 56. The transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag, effected after the outbreak of hos- tilities, is void unless it is proved that such transfer was not made in order to evade the consequences to which an enemy vessel, as such, is exposed. There is, however, an absolute presumption that a transfer is. void — (1) If the transfer has been made during a voyage or in a blockaded port. (2) If a right to repurchase or recover the vessel is reserved to the vendor. (3) If the requirements of the municipal law governing the right to fly the flag under which the vessel is sailin°', have not been fulfilled. INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH DELEGATION TO THE SECOND PEACE CONFERENCE, THE HAGUE Sir Edward Grey to Sir Edward Fry Foreign Office, June 12, 1907. 25. His Majesty's Government recognize to the full the desirability of freeing neu- tral commerce to the utmost extent possible from interference by belligerent Powers, and they are ready and willing for their part, in lieu of endeavoring to frame new and more satisfactory rules for the prevention of contraband trade in the future, to abandon the principle of contraband of war altogether, thus allowing the oversea trade in neutral ves- sels between belligerents on the one hand and neutrals on the other, to continue during war without any restriction, subject only to its exclusion by blockade from an enemy's port. They are convinced that not only the interest of Great Britain, but the common in- terest of all nations will be found, on an unbiased examination of the subject, to be served by the adoption of the course suggested. 26. In the event of the proposal not being favourably received, an endeavor should be made to frame a list of the articles that are to be regarded as contraband. Your ef- forts should then be directed to restricting that definition within the narrowest possible limits and upon lines which have the point of practical extinction as their ultimate aim. 27. If a definite list of contraband cannot be secured, you should support and, if necessary, propose regulations intended to insure that nations shall publish, during peace, the list of articles they will regard as contraband during war, and that no change shall be made in the list on the outbreak of or during hostilities. 28. A list might be prepared and submitted for adoption by the Conference, speci- fying the articles which in no event shall fall within the enumeration of contraband, e.g., mails, foodstuffs destined for places other than beleaguered fortresses, and any raw ma- terials required for the purposes of peaceful industry. It is essential to the interest of Great Britain that every effective measure necessary to protect the importation of food supplies and raw materials for peaceful industries should be accompanied by all sanc- tions which the law of nations can supply. 29. His Majesty's Government would further be glad to see the right of search limited in every practiable way, e.g., by the adoption of a system of Consular certificates declaring the absence of contraband from thf cargo, and by the exemption of passenger and mail steamers upon defined routes, etc. THE ORDERS IN COUNCIL ORDER IN COUNCIL August 20, 19 14 Directing the Adoption and Enforcement During the Present Hostilities of the Conven- tion Known as the Declaration of London, Subject to Additions and Modifications. At the court at Buckingham Palace, the 20th day of August, 1914. Present, The King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. Whereas during the present hostilities the naval forces of His Majesty will cooperate with the French and Russian naval forces ; and Whereas it is desirable that the naval operations of the allied forces so far as they affect neutral ships and commerce should be conducted on similar principles; and Whereas the Governments of France and Russia have informed His Majesty's Government that during the present hostilities it is their intention to act in accordance with the provisions of the convention known as the Declaration of London, signed on the 26th day of February, 1909, so far as may be practicable. Now, therefore, His Majesty, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, is pleased to order, and it is hereby ordered, that during the present hostilities the convention known as the Declaration of London shall, subject to the following additions and modifications, be adopted and put in force by His Majesty's Government as if the same had been ratified by His Majesty: The additions and modifications are as follows : ( 1 ) The lists of absolute and conditional contraband contained in the proclamation dated August 4, 1914, shall be substituted for the lists contained in Articles 22 and 24 of the said declaration. (2) A neutral vessel which succeeded in carrying contraband to the enemy with false papers may be detained for having carried such contraband if she is encountered before she has completed her return voyage. (3) The destination referred to in Article 33 may be inferred from any sufficient evidence, and (in addition to the presumption laid down in Article 34) shall be presumed to exist if the goods are consigned to or for an agent of the enemy State or to or for a merchant or other person under the control of the authorities of the enemy State. (4) The existence of a blockade shall be presumed to be known — (a) To all ships which sailed from or touched at an enemy port a sufficient time after the notification of the blockade to the local authorities to have enabled the enemy Government to make known the existence of the blockade; ( b ) To all ships which sailed from or touched at a British or allied port after the publication of the declaration of blockade, (5) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 35 of the said Declaration, condi- tional contraband, if shown to have the destination referred to in Article 32, is liable to capture, to whatever port the vessel is bound and at whatever port the cargo is to be dis- charged. (6) The General Report of the Drafting Committee on the said Declaration pre- sented to the Naval Conference and adopted by the conference at the eleventh plenary meeting on February 25, 1909, shall be considered by all Prize Courts as an authoritative statement of the meaning and intention of the said Declaration, and such courts shall construe and interpret the provisions of the said Declaration by the light of the commen- tary given therein. And the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and each of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, the President of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, all other judges of His Majesty's Prize Courts, and all governors, officers, and authorities whom it may concern are to give the necessary directions herein as to them may respectively ap- pertain. Almeric Fitzeoy. OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 79 ORDER IN COUNCIL October 29, 1914 At the Court of Buckingham Palace, the 29th day of October, 1914. Present, The King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. Whereas by an Order in Council dated the 20th day of August, 1914, His Majesty was pleased to declare that during the present hostilities the Convention known as the Declaration of London should, subject to certain additions and modifications therein specified, be adopted and put in force by His Majesty's Government ; and Whereas the said additions and modifications were rendered necessary by the special conditions of the present war; and Whereas it is desirable and possible now to reenact the said Order in Council with amendments in order to minimize, so far as possible, the interference with innocent neu- tral trade occasioned by the war : Now, therefore, His Majesty, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, is pleased to order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows : 1. During the present hostilities the provisions of the Convention known as the Dec- laration of London shall, subject to the exclusion of the lists of contraband and noncon- traband, and to the modifications hereinafter set out, be adopted and put in force by His Majesty's Government. The modifications are as follows : (i) A neutral vessel, with papers indicating a neutral destination, which, not- withstanding the destination shown on the papers, proceeds to an enemy port, shall be liable to capture and condemnation if she is encountered before the end of her next voyage, (ii) The destination referred to in Article 33 of the said Declaration shall (in ad- dition to the presumptions laid down in Article 34) be presumed to exist if the goods are consigned to or for an agent of the enemy State. (iii) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 35 of the said Declaration, condi- tional contraband shall be liable to capture on board a vessel bound for a neutral port if the goods are consigned "to order," or if the ship's papers do not show who is the consignee of the goods, or if they show a consignee of the goods in territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy. (iv) In the cases covered by the preceding paragraph (iii) it shall lie upon the owners of the goods to prove that their destination was innocent. 2. Where it is shown to the satisfaction of one of His Majesty's Principal Secre- taries of State that the enemy Government is drawing supplies for its armed forces from or through a neutral country, he may direct that in respect of ships bound for a port in that country, Article 35 of the said Declaration shall not apply. Such direction shall be notified in the "London Gazette" and shall operate until the same is withdrawn. So long as such direction is in force, a vessel which is carrying conditional contraband to a port in that country shall not be immune from capture. 3. The Order in Council of the 20th August, 1914, directing the adoption and enforce- ment during the present hostilities of the Convention known as the Declaration of Lon- don, subject to the additions and modifications therein specified, is hereby repealed. 4. This Order may be cited as "the Declaration of London Order in Council, No. 2 1914." And the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and each of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, the President of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, all other Judges of His Majesty's Prize Courts, and all Governors, Officers, and Authorities whom it may concern, are to give the necessary directions herein as to them may respectively ap- pertain. . „ Almekic Fttzroy. ORDER IN COUNCIL March 11, 1915 At the Court of Buckingham Palace, the 11th day of March, 1915. Present, The King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. Whereas the German Government has issued certain orders which, in violation of the usages of war, purport to declare the waters surrounding the United Kingdom a mili- tary area, in which all British and allied merchant vessels will be destroyed, irrespective of the safety of the lives of passengers and crew, and in which neutral shipping will be exposed to similar danger in view of the uncertainties of naval warfare ; and Whereas in a memorandum accompanying the said orders neutrals are warned against entrusting crews, passengers, or goods to British or allied ships : 80 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS Whereas such attempts on the part of the enemy give to His Majesty an unquestion- able right of retaliation : And whereas His Majesty has therefore decided to adopt further measures in order to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany, though such meas- ured will be enforced without risk to neutral ships or to neutral or noncombatant life and in strict observance of the dictates of humanity; And whereas the allies of His Majesty are associated with him in the steps now to be announced for restricting further the commerce of Germany; His Majesty is therefore pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered as follows : 1. No merchant vessel which sailed from her port of departure after the first March, 1915, shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage to any German port, Unless the vessel receives a pass enabling her to proceed to some neutral or allied port to be named in the pass, goods on board any such vessel must be discharged in a British port and placed in the custody of the marshal of the pi'ize court. Goods so dis- charged, not being contraband of war, shall, if not requisitioned for the use of His Majesty, be restored by order of the court, upon such terms as the court may in the cir- cumstances deem to be just, to the person entitled thereto. 2. No merchant vessel which sailed from any German port after the first March, 1915, shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage with any goods on board laden at such port. All goods laden at such port must be discharged in a British or allied port. Goods so discharged in a British port shall be placed in the custody of the marshal of the prize court, and, if not requisitioned for the use of His Majesty, shall be detained or sold un- der the direction of the prize court. The proceeds of goods so sold shall be paid into court and dealt with in such manner as the court may in the circumstances deem to be just. Provided, that no proceeds of the sale of such goods shall be paid out of court until the conclusion of peace, except on the application of the proper officer of the Crown, un- less it be shown that the goods had become neutral property before the issue of this or- der. Provided also, that nothing herein shall prevent the release of neutral property laden at such enemy port on the application of the proper officer of the Crown. 3. Every merchant vessel which sailed from her port of departure after the first of March, 1915, on her way to a port other than a German port, carrying goods with an enemy destination, or which are enemy property, may be required to discharge such goods in a British or allied port. Any goods so discharged in a British port shall be placed in the custody of the marshal of the prize court, and, unless they are contraband of war, shall, if not requisitioned for the use of His Majesty, be restored by order of the court, upon such terms as the court may in the circumstances deem to be just to the per- son entitled thereto. Provided, that this article shall not apply in any case falling within articles 2 or 1 of this order. 4. Every merchant vessel -which sailed from a port other than a German port after the first of March, 1915, having on board goods which are of enemy origin or are enemy property may be required to discharge such goods in a British or allied port. Goods so discharged in a British port shall be placed in the custody of the marshal of the prize court, and if not requisitioned for the use of His Majesty shall be detained or sold under the direction of the prize court. The proceeds of goods so sold shall be paid into court and dealt with in such manner as the court may in the circumstances deem to be just. Provided, that no proceeds of sale of such goods shall be paid out of court imtil the conclusion of peace except on the application of the proper officer of the Crown, unless it be shown that the goods had become neutral property before the issue of this order. Provided, also, that nothing herein shall prevent the release of neutral property of enemy origin on the application of the proper officer of the Crown. 5. Any person claiming to be interested in, or to have any claim in respect of, any goods (not being contraband of war) placed in the custody of the marshal of the prize court under this order, or in the proceeds of such goods, may forthwith issue a writ in the prize court against the proper officer of the Crown and apply for an order that the goods should be restored to him, or that their proceeds should be paid to him, or for such other order as the circumstances of the case may require. The practice and procedure of the prize court shall, so far as applicable, be followed mutatis mutandis in any proceedings consequential upon this order. 6. A merchant vessel which has cleared for a neutral port from a British or allied port, or which has been allowed to pass, having an ostensible destination to a neutral port, and proceeds to an enemy port, shall, if captured on any subsequent voyage, be lia- ble to condemnation. OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 81 7. Nothing in this order shall be deemed to affect the liability of any vessel or goods to capture or condemnation independently of this order. 8. Nothing in this order shall prevent the relaxation of the provisions of this order in respect of the merchant vessels of any country which declares that no commerce in- tended for or originating in Germany or- belonging to German subjects shall enjoy the protection of its flag. Almeric Fitzroy. ORDER IN COUNCIL March 23, 1915 At the Court of Buckingham Palace, the 231 day of March, 1915. Present, The King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. Whereas by section 3 of the prize courts act, 1894, His Majesty in Council is author- ized to make rules of court for regulating, subject to the provisions of the naval prize act, 1864, and the said act, the procedure and practice of prize courts within the meaning of the naval prize act, 1864, and the duties and conduct of the officers of the courts and of the practitioners therein, and for regulating the fees to be taken by the officers thereof, and the costs, charges, and expenses to be allowed to the practitioners therein : And whereas in pursuance of the prize courts act, 1894, certain rules were made by the order of His Majesty in Council, dated the 5th day of August, 1914, and amended by the Orders of His Majesty in Council of the 30th day of September, 1914, and the 28th day of November, 1914, respectively, which said rules and amended rules were by the said orders in council directed to take effect provisionally in accordance with the provi- sions of section 2 of the Kules Publication Act, 1893, from the dates of the said Orders in Council respectively: And whereas the provisions of section 1 of the rules publication act, 1893, were duly complied with in respect of the said rules and amended rules, and the same were finally made by the orders of His Majesty in Council, dated respectively, the 17th day of Sep- tember, 1914, the 28th day of November, 1914, and the 3d day of February, 1915. And whereas it is expedient that the said rules and amended rules should be further amended. And whereas on account of urgency this order should come into immediate opera- tion. Now, therefore, His Majesty, by virtue of the powers in this behalf by the said act or otherwise in him vested, is pleased, by aid with the advice of His Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows: 1. That in Order IX (discovery, inspection, and admission of documents and facts) of the said rules : In rule 1, the words "upon filing an affidavit" shall be omitted. In rule 1, instead of the words "any other party" there shall be substituted the words "any party other than the proper officer of the Crown." 2. That in Order XI (sale, appraisement, safe custody, and inspection of prize) of the said rules, in rule 1, the following words shall be omitted : "on account of the condi- tion of a ship, or on application of a claimant, and on or after condemnation." 3. That in Order XV (evidence and hearing) of the said rules, the following rule shall be added : "21. Nothwithstanding anything contained in these rules the proper officer of the Crown may apply to the judge for leave to administer interrogatories for the examina- tion of any person whether a party to the cause or not." 4. That order XXIX (requisition by admiralty) of the said rules, as amended by His Majesty's Order in Council dated the 28th day of November, 1914, shall be, and the same is hereby revoked, and in lieu thereof the following order shall have effect : '•'order xxix— requisition. "1. Where it is made to appear to the judge on the application of the proper officer of the Crown that it is desired to requisition on behalf of His Majesty a ship in respect of which no final decree of condemnation has been made, he shall order that the ship shall be appraised, and that upon an undertaking being given in accordance with rule 5 of this order, the ship shall be released and delivered to the Crown. "2. Where a decree for the detention of a ship has been made in accordance with Order XXVIII, the proper officer of the Crown may file a notice (Appendix A, Form No. 55) that the Crown desires to requisition the same, and thereupon a commission (Ap- pendix A, Form No. 56) to the marshal directing him to appraise the ship shall issue. Upon an undertaking being given in accordance with rule 5 of this order the ship shall be released, and delivered to the Crown. Service of this notice shall not be required be- 82 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS fore filing, but copies thereof shall be served upon the parties by the proper officer of the Crown as soon thereafter as possible. "3. Where in any case of requisition under this order it is made to appear to the judge on behalf of the Crown that the ship is required for the service of His Majesty forthwith, the judge may order the same to be forthwith released and delivered to the Crown without appraisement. "4. In any case where a ship has been requisitioned under the provisions of this or- der and whether or not an appraisement has been made, the court may, on the applica- tion of any party, fix the amount to be paid by the Crown in respect of the value of the ship. "5. In every case of requisition under this order an undertaking in writing shall be filed by the proper officer of the Crown for payment into court on behalf of the Crown of the appraised value of the ship, or of the amount fixed under Rule 4 of this order, as the case may be, at such time or times as the court shall declare by order that the same or any part thereof is required for the purpose of payment out of court. "6. Where in any case of requisition under this order it is made to appear to the judge on behalf of the Crown that the Crown desires to requisition the ship temporarily, the court may, in lieu of an order of release, make an order for the temporary delivery of the ship to the Crown, and subject as aforesaid the provisions of this order shall ap- ply to such a requisition; provided that, in the event of the return of the ship to the custody of the court, the court may make such order as it thinks fit for the release of the undertaking given on behalf of the Crown or the reduction of the amount undertaken to be paid thereby, as the case may be ; and provided also that, where the ship so requisi- tioned is subject to the provisions of Order XXVIII, rule 1, relating to detention, the amount for which the Crown shall be considered liable in respect of such requisition shall be the amount of the damage, if any, which the ship has suffered by reason of such temporary delivery as aforesaid. "7. The proceedings in respect of a ship requisitioned under this order shall conti- nue notwithstanding the requisition. "8. In any case of requisition of a ship in respect of which no cause has been in- stituted, any person interested in such ship may, without issuing a writ, provided he does not intend to make a claim for restitution or damages, apply by summons for an order that the amount to be paid in respect of such ship be fixed by the court, and the judge may, on the hearing of such summons, order the ship to be appraised or to be val- ued, or give such other directions for fixing the amount as he may think fit." 5. That in Form 4 in Appendix A to the said rules there shall be omitted the words "commander of our ship of war" and the words "taken and seized as prize by our said ship of war." 6. This order shall take effect provisionally in accordance with the provisions of Sec- tion 2 of the rules publication act, 1893, from the date hereof. Almeric Fitzroy. ORDER IN COUNCIL October 20, 1915 At the Court of Buckingham Palace, the 20th clay of October, 1915. . Present, The King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. "Whereas by the Declaration of London, Order in Council, Number 2, 1914, His Majesty was pleased to declare that during the present hostilities the provisions of the said Declaration of London should, subject to certain exceptions and modifications therein specified, be adopted and put in force by His Majesty's Government; and "Whereas by article 57 of the said Declaration, it is provided that the neutral or ene- my character of' a vessel is determined by the flag which she is entitled to fly ; and "Whereas it is no longer expedient to adopt the said article : "Now, therefore, His Majesty, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, is pleased to order, and it is hereby ordered, that from and after this date article 57 of the Declara- tion of London shall cease to be adopted and put in force. "In lieu of the said article, British prize courts shall apply the rules and principles formerly observed in such courts. "This order may be cited as 'The Declaration of London Order in Council, 1915.' "And the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, the Lords Commission- ers of the Admiralty, and each of His Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, the presi- dent of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, all other judges of His Majesty's prize courts, and all governors, officers, and authorities whom it may concern, are to give the necessary directions herein as to them may respect- ively appertain." Almeric Fitzroy OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 83 ORDER IN COUNCIL November io, 19 15 Restrictions on British Merchant Shipping. Licenses Necessary to Trade Between For- eign Ports. At the Court at Buckingham Palace, the 10th day of November, 1915. Present, The King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. Whereas, A state of war exists between His Majesty and the German Emperor, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, the Sultan of Turkey and the King of the Bulgarians : And whereas, His Majesty holds it to be his prerogative duty as well as his pre- rogative right to take all steps necessary for the defense and protection of the realm : And whereas, It has been made to appear to His Majesty that it is essential to the defense and protection of the realm that, in the exercise of his prerogatives as afore- said, he should prohibit as from and after the first day of December, 1915, the carrying of cargo from any foreign port to any other foreign port by any British steamship reg^ istered in the United Kingdom exceeding 500 tons gross tonnage — and whether or not such ship while carrying such cargo calls at any intermediate port within His Majesty's dominions — unless the owner or charterer of such steamship has been granted exemp- tion by license as hereinafter provided : Now, therefore, His Majesty is pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, and in exercise of his prerogatives as aforesaid and of all other powers him thereunto enabling, to order and it is hereby ordered that, from and after the first day of Decem- ber, 1915, no British steamship registered in the United Kingdom exceeding 500 tons gross tonnage shall carry any cargo from any foreign port to any other foreign port and whether or not such ship while carrying such cargo calls at any intermediate port within His Majesty's dominions — unless the owner or charterer of such steamship has been granted exemption by license as hereinafter provided. And His Majesty doth hereby declare that the expression "foreign port" herein used shall mean and include any port outside His Majesty's dominions. And His Majesty, by and with the advice aforesaid, and in exercise of his preroga- tives and powers as aforesaid, is further pleased to authorize and direct the president of the Board of Trade to appoint a committee of persons to carry out and give effect to the provisions hereof, and that the said committee shall have power to grant licenses of exemption therefrom to or in favor of owners and charterers of such steamships as afore- said, which licenses may be general in reference to classes of ships or their voyages or special. And His Majesty is further pleased to authorize the president of the Board of Trade from time to time to add other persons as members of such committee, and to substitute as members thereof other persons for such members as may from' time to time die, resign, or be or become incapable of acting thereon. And the president of the Board of Trade is to act and to give instructions and directions accordingly. Almeeic Fitzroy ORDER IN COUNCIL November 10, 1915 Poioers to Requisition Tonnage. Vessels for Carriage of Foodstuffs. At the Court at Buckingham Palace, the 10th day of November, 1915. Present, The King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. Whereas, A state of war exists between His Majesty and the German Emperor, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, the Sultan of Turkey, and the King of the Bul- garians : And whereas, His Majesty holds it to be his prerogative duty as well as his pre- rogative right to take all steps necessary for the defense and protection of the realm : And whereas, It has been made to appear to His Majesty that it is essential to the defense and protection of the realm that all British ships registered in the United King- dom should be made liable to requisition in manner hereinafter appearing for the car- riage of foodstuffs and of any other articles of commerce: 82 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS fore filing, but copies thereof shall be served upon the parties by the proper officer of the Crown as soon thereafter as possible. "3. Where in any case of requisition under this order it is made to appear to the judge on behalf of the Crown that the ship is required for the service of His Majesty forthwith, the judge may order the same to be forthwith released and delivered to the Crown without appraisement. "4. In any case where a ship has been requisitioned under the provisions of this or- der and whether or not an appraisement has been made, the court may, on the applica- tion of any party, fix the amount to be paid by the Crown in respect of the value of the ship. "5. In every case of requisition under this order an undertaking in writing shall be filed by the proper officer of the Crown for payment into court on behalf of the Crown of the appraised value of the ship, or of the amount fixed under Eule 4 of this order, as the case may be, at such time or times as the court shall declare by order that the same or any part thereof is required for the purpose of payment out of court. "6. Where in any case of requisition under this order it is made to appear to the judge on behalf of the Crown that the Crown desires to requisition the ship temporarily, the court may, in lieu of an order of release, make an order for the temporary delivery of the ship to the Crown, and subject as aforesaid the provisions of this order shall ap- ply to such a requisition ; provided that, in the event of the return of the ship to the custody of the court, the court may make such order as it thinks fit for the release of the undertaking given on behalf of the Crown or the reduction of the amount undertaken to be paid thereby, as the case may be ; and provided also that, where the ship so requisi- tioned is subject to the provisions of Order XXVIII, rule 1, relating to detention, the amount for which the Crown shall be considered liable in respect of such requisition shall be the amount of the damage, if any, which the ship has suffered by reason of such temporary delivery as aforesaid. "7. The proceedings in respect of a ship requisitioned under this order shall conti- nue notwithstanding the requisition. "8. In any case of requisition of a ship in respect of which no cause has been in- stituted, any person interested in such ship may, without issuing a writ, provided he does not intend to make a claim for restitution or damages, apply by summons for an order that the amount to be paid in respect of such ship be fixed by the court, and the judge may, on the hearing of such summons, order the ship to be appraised or to be val- ued, or give such other directions for fixing the amount as he may think fit." 5. That in Form 4 in Appendix A to the said rules there shall be omitted the words "commander of our ship of war" and the words "taken and seized as prize by our said ship of war." 6. This order shall take effect provisionally in accordance with the provisions of Sec- tion 2 of the rules publication act, 1893, from the date hereof. Almeric Fitzroy. ORDER IN COUNCIL October 20, 1915 At the Court of Buckingham Palace, the 20th day of October, 1915. . Present, The King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. "Whereas by the Declaration of London, Order in Council, Number 2, 1914, His Majesty was pleased to declare that during the present hostilities the provisions of the said Declaration of London should, subject to certain exceptions and modifications therein specified, be adopted and put in fopce by His Majesty's Government; and "Whereas by article 57 of the said Declaration, it is provided that the neutral or ene- my character of' a vessel is determined by the flag which she is entitled to fly; and "Whereas it is no longer expedient to adopt the said article : "Now, therefore, His Majesty, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, is pleased to order, and it is hereby ordered, that from and after this date article 57 of the Declara- tion of London shall cease to be adopted and put in force. "In lieu of the said article, British prize courts shall apply the rules and principles formerly observed in such courts. "This order may be cited as