» -. o -^^ ^^■^ '"^^^^^. 1 ACCUSE! I ACCUSE! (/* ACCUSE!) BY A GERMAN TRANSLATED BY ALEXANDER GRAY "A pitiable wretch is he Who knows the truth and yet can silent 6e'' NEW YORK GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY i\^l< p c' Copyright, 1915, By George H. Doban CompasV out UtaRL fldvln O. Dinwidditt, Deo. 25, 1086 PBINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PREFACE J 'Accuse J a work recently published anon3nTiously in Lausanne, has deservedly attracted much attention on the Continent on account of the independent standpoint of the author, the penetration shown in his analysis of the critical events of last year, and the vigour and clarity which characterise his presentation of the case. The German edition is prefaced by the following note : — "The book 'T Accuse, written by a German patriot, and entrusted to me, is herewith presented to the public. "I regard this work as an act which can only confer a blessing on the German people and on humanity, and I accordingly assume responsibility for its publi- cation. "Dr. Anton Suter. "Lausanne, April 20th, 191 5." A further note is added in the following terms : — ''Having regard to the situation arising from the war and the conditions of the censorship, certain pas- sages in the manuscript have for the present been omitted. These passages are indicated by blank spaces." In the present translation the censored passages have been indicated in the same way. The very few explanatory footnotes added in the course of translation are indicated by square brackets. I /lesire to express my indebtedness to Mr. T. Lindsay for his assistance in the work of revision and correction of proofs. July, 191 5. A. G. CONTENTS I GERMANY AWAKE PAGE Can the Victory of Germany and Austria be expected? — The economic position of belligerent countries — The po- litical and military position of the belligerent countries — The situation in France — Partie Remise — The question of guilt 11—34 II HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME £)ur Imperialists: Bernhardi and Co. — Have we been attacked or were we going to be attacked? — The head of the War Party — The Imperial War — The place in the sun — The chosen people — Germany's brilliant development — In- crease of population and the colonies — Our true colonies — ^What advantage has France drawn from her colonies? — The Germans abroad: France, England, America — The place in the sun for us, the place in the shadow for the others — The fear of Germany — Diplomatic success of the Triple Alliance — Austria's Balkan policy — The Crown Prince and the war party — The policy of encirclement — England and Germany: The first Hague Conference — Be- tween the first and second Hague Conferences: The English Liberal Government — Second Hague Conference: England and Germany — English proposals for a political understanding and for a naval agreement with Germany — What are we fighting for? — The freedom which they mean — The end of peace: Security? — Did France mean to attack us? — Did Russia mean to attack us? — The Triple Entente a defensive alliance — Giolitti's revelations — The change of front in Berlin; the war party . 26 — 141 idii CONTENTS III THE CRIME PAGB A. Austria > . . 146 B. Germany . 170 C. England . 245 D. Russia . 289 E. France . 295 F. Appendix: The Austrian Red Book . . 315 IV THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED How beautiful to die for the Fatherland! — Prestige — Prole- tarians of all countries, massacre each other! — Political morality — Moral politics — Quidquid delirant reges, plec- tuntur Achivi — Dreams of world power — Who will pay the cost of the war? — Quoiisque tandem? . . 353 — 385 V THE FUTURE What should peace bring us? — The system of armed peace — A covenant 01 peace between free nations — Is this a Utopia? — The coercive force — What will peace bring us? — Should it happen otherwise — The twilight of the Gods 386—419 EPILOGUE 420—423 APPENDICES Speech delivered by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, August 4th, 1914 424 Speech delivered by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, December 2nd, 1914 430 Circular note of Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, December 24th, 1914 c . 440 I ACCUSE! {J'ACCUSEti ACCUSE! GERMANY AWAKE I La vERixi; est en marche. If there were in Prussian-Germany a system of minis- terial responsibility, such as exists in all other countries with effective Parliamentary Government, and such as has been held out with many other fair promises to the Prussian people for more than sixty-four years, the Imperial Chancellor and President of the Prussian Council, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, would have to be arraigned and condemned. It might be allowed in his favour, as an extenuating circumstance, that he was not the driving force of the war, but that he was driven to it — driven from above and from below. But a Minister, who yields himself as the tool of those who instigate war, who covers those who are irresponsible with his responsibility, who ac- cepts the despicable task of representing to his nation and to all the world as a war of defence the offensive war which was prepared long in advance, who by this falsehood unchains the most fearful disaster which has ever fallen upon our globe, and which is inflicting on his Fatherland, whether victorious or de- feated, wounds which will be incurable for generations to come; who delivers over to death and to mutilation II 12 I ACCUSE! hundreds of thousands of his countrymen in the flower of their age, annihilates at a stroke the arduous labour of half a century, suddenly wrenches asunder the bonds of culture between civilised nations, and transforms prosperous regions of Europe into ruinous wastes — such a man must bear the punishment which is due to his crime., In gathering together in the following pages the vari- ous points in the indictment which reveal the exclusive guilt of Germany and her ally, Austria-Hungary, in provoking the universal war, I am well aware of the fact that I will expose myself to the disapproving criti- cism of a large section of the Gennan public, which proclaims it to be a patriotic duty to shut one's eyes to the truth, or if the truth be recognised, to conceal it in silence for the duration of the war. Only by bearing in mind these two points of view is it possible to understand the present frame of mind of such a highly intelligent people as the German nation. The "State of War" (Kriegssustand) , proclaimed on the 31st July, which placed the intellectual life of Ger- many under the supervision of Generals, and which even GERMANY AWAKE? IS today, after more than six months have elapsed, care- fully keeps watch on the frontiers lest there should pene- trate into the country so much as a suggestion of the intellectual life or of the views of foreign countries which might disturb the unity of Germany, or of foreign information or evidence which might illumine the Ger- man people — this "state of war" has produced the result that nine-tenths of the whole German people have blindly followed the dexterously coined phrases about the "state of defence which is forced upon us," about "the strug- gle for our freedom and culture against aggression and oppression." "The French and the Russians have al- ready pressed over our frontiers"; "The Fatherland is in danger" ; "They mean to humiliate us" ; "In the midst of peace the enemy falls upon us"; "The existence of our Empire is at stake"; "We are called upon to de- fend our holiest possessions, our Fatherland, our very hearths against an unscrupulous attack" ; "We are fight- ing for the fruits of our works of peace, for the in- heritance of a great past and for our future," These and similar phrases (all taken from official documents) have been used with the conscious intention of deceiv- ing the German people, of inflaming its patriotism, and of inspiring it to unutterable' and incalculable sacrifices in wealth and in life. "The few, who here have aught of Truth divined, Yet foolishly revealed their inner heart, Who showed the mob their feeling and their mind — The cross, the stake have always been their part." ^ The few who, after the first days of intoxication, gradually returned to their senses, and who were able ^"Die wenigen, die was davon erkannt. Die toricht g'nug ihr voiles Herz nicht wahrten, Dem Pobel ihr Gefuhl, ihr Schauen ofifenbarten. Hat man von Je gekreuzigt und verbrannt." 14 I ACCUSE! to procure foreign documents and representations behind the backs of the military censors, and by careful study and comparison of these slowly arrived at the truth, — these had to shut the truth within them, since it was and is considered unpatriotic to give expression to it, since every utterance in word or in writing would be suppressed by the military authorities, and the offender would expose himself to the risk of punishment. It is to escape this fate that those who know the facts have kept, and still keep, silence. Those, however, who do not know the truth, or do not wish to know it, cry out all the more loudly, and as a work of illumination scatter broadcast the foolish products of their minds throughout the world, where no one believes them, even if they were to repeat the German lies a million times. iWhat are we to say when Germans of the highest emi- nence, from Bode to Dehmel,^ from Haeckel to Haupt- mann,^ from Liszt to Sudermann, from Laband to Lie- bermann,^ (in all nearly a hundred of them), distribute in foreign countries an appeal, which immediately after the opening words contains the following sentence : — "Germany on the other hand made every effort to avoid war. The incontestable evidence in support of this fact ^ Decorated on the Emperor's birthday 191S, Fourth Class of the Red Eagle. ^ Wilhelm von Bode, General Director of the Royal Museum, Ber- lin, a leading authority on art, Richard Dehmel a distinguished poet, Ernst Haeckel, the celebrated Professor of Zoology at Jena; Ger- hardt Hauptmann, perhaps the most eminent of contemporary poets; Franz von Liszt, Professor of Jurisprudence at Berlin, a leading criminologist; Hermann Sudermann, the novelist; Paul Laband, Professor of Jurisprudence at Strassburg; Max Lieber- mann, a distinguished painter. GERMANY AWAKE! 15 are open to all the world, . . . Only when the overwhelm- ing forces of the enemy, who had long been lying in am- bush on our frontiers, fell into our country from three sides (!), only then did the German people rise like one man." And with such robber-stories as these about the enemy lurking in ambush — one thinks involuntarily of Leder- strumpf and Ali Baba — they dare to humbug such highly educated, cultured nations as, for instance, the Italians (among whom even a street-porter has to-day a better knowledge of the historical truth about the war than a Harnack has among us), among a people whose Gov- ernment, with the approval of the whole country, de- clared that the war was an offensive war on the part of Germany and Austria, and rightly and of necessity so declared unless it wished to charge itself with faithless- ness and the breach of its own word. It is to these men a self-evident fact that we are the leading culture-people of the world, and consequently (such is the logic of these gentlemen!) we are called upon to impose our culture forcibly on the other inferior races and even on neutrals by means of bombs and grenades, by fire and devastation. Such is the mission which Providence has pointed out to us, as it called upon the Crusaders to fight against the Crescent (which now we have gained as an ally in the struggle against Christian nations), and as it instigated the Catholics in the Thirty Years' War to cast out of the Protestants by fire and sword their new- won faith. In the view of our leading spirits, in place of the wars of religion there has suddenly arisen since the ist August, 1914, a culture- war, in which the nations are fighting for the equal privileges or the supremacy of the various "hostile cul- tures." Has ever a greater madness than this been con- ceived? In 1870 when France was defeated and crushed. 16 I ACCUSE! did we suppress, did we so much as touch, the culture of that country? Did the foreign domination of Na- poleon wipe out even a trace of our German spiritual cul- ture, which just then had reached an incomparable height? When the Romans conquered Greece did they at the same time overthrow Greek culture? Precisely the opposite took place. The captor was made captive. The mind of Greece, the art of Greece, subdued Rome. And we find the same thing in the history of Christian- ity. In the end was it not the small province of Galilee that imposed its spirit on the world-empire of Rome? How indeed is it possible for anyone to speak of the present struggle as a struggle of cultures when what we really have before us is merely a struggle of anti- cultures, of barbarisms, against each other, — a struggle which from day to day becomes more bitter, more cruel, and more murderous, — a struggle in which all the prin- ciples of international law and of humanity are more and more forgotten, if indeed it is still possible to speak of humanity in face of this inhuman massacre? What has all this got to do with culture? Do we intend in any way to suppress the culture of England and France, of Russia and Belgium? Do we mean to renounce Shakespeare, Darwin, Newton, and Spencer, Tolstoy and Dostoiewsky, Voltaire, Rousseau, Zola, Goncourt, Ru- bens, Van Eyck, Meunier, and Maeterlinck, or do we mean to rid the world of their achievements? With what right, then, do we impute to the others intentions against us which we do not have against them, and to which we could not give effect even if we entertained them? If we had not read it daily in print, we would not have believed that the intellectuals of Germany could have persuaded themselves and the German people that Gennan culture is in danger, and that it must be de- fended with Zeppelins and with 42-centimetre artillery. The "neurosis of war" has indeed become epidemic. GERMANY AWAKE! 17 like St. Vitus's dance or flagellantism in the Middle Ages, As the Dervishes in the East for hours at a time utter the same formulae of prayer and go through the same contortions with their arms and legs and their bodies until at last they fall down foaming at the mouth and overpowered, so now we have seen the learned men of Germany repeating for months past the same patri- otic litanies, the same unproved assertions (assertions indeed of which the contrary is proved) ; at all times reaching upwards with their arms and their legs and indeed their whole body, until in their opinion they and their people surpass all other nations of the earth, and if they do not become like to God, they at least be- come the chosen people of God. They overpower them- selves with their own phrases, until they foam at the mouth from sheer patriotism and fall down in adoration of themselves. . . . But they will in time awake from their stupefaction, and the wild intoxication will be fol- lowed by the terrible discomfort of returning sobriety. The purpose of this book is to hasten this awakening. This / regard as a patriotic duty; for the longer the in- toxication lasts, the worse will be the consequences for the German people, and the process of awakening will be more difficult and more terrible. It is only a better knowledge of the origins and objects of this war, a recognition of the guilt and responsibility for this war, that can bring about a change for the better. 18 I ACCUSE! Can the Victory of Germany and Austria Be Expected? the economic position of belligerent countries To-day it is no longer permissible to imagine the pos- sibility of the victory of the Allied Empires. The finan- cial and military superiority of the countries allied against them is so great that they cannot be counter- balanced by military efficiency on the part of Germany, nor even by the greatest sacrifices in life and well-being. No declamatory statements about "holding out till the last breath," no false and dazzling promises about the economic resisting power of Germany can in any way alter this fact. The balance of gold in the imperial bank is no proof that the economical position is still tolerable ; for indeed nearly all the gold in circulation has flowed to the bank, and the notes for the hundred and fifty million pound sterling issued by the loan fund have been covered not by gold but by unrealisable goods and ef- fects. Manufactures find employment only in so far as they are engaged for the internal needs of the coun- try and for military purposes. The money required for the supply of military stores is, however, raised from the German taxpayer, and as it represents an unpro- ductive investment it must be entered in the books as a pure loss. One class at least has nothing to complain of; I mean the agrarian class. It is they who have sounded the call to the battle, who have stirred up war, the imperialists and the chauvinists, whom the German people have to thank for this hideous war. From their ranks come the colonels and the generals, the Bernhardis and the Frobeniuses, who prescribe to the German Em- pire its historical mission, "world-power or downfall," and who announce to it its "hour of destiny." These GERMANY AWAKE! 19 are the men who possess the ear of the highest in the country, and who instil into them the poison of their selfish ideas. These are the men who at the same time are making the best profit out of the war. They and their comrades must of course also bleed, but what they lose in blood flows back to them in gold, gold in the form of gold-lace and in glittering coins. They are also making a career for themselves, and the more of- ficers fall, so much the better for the younger men. They are, too, succeeding in business more brilliantly than they could ever have done in time of peace. The prices of their produce, grain, potatoes, and cattle, would have risen immeasurably if the Government had not in the end seen the necessity of fixing maximum prices. But even these maximum prices are already enormously above the prices ever paid in times of peace.^ The workmen and the middle classes however perish and decay. The longer the war lasts, the more surely will German trade, the German system of finance and German manufactures, be deprived of their connections with foreign countries. The seas of the world are open to our enemies, England and France, as well as to neutral States, and it would be a surprising fact if they did not gradually usurp our place in markets abroad. The exports and imports of Italy and of Holland must necessarily show an upward tendency after Germany is ruled out of account. The longer the war lasts, the more successful will be the efforts of England to drive our trade out of America, Asia, and Africa, and in any case decades will pass before we again reach the position we occupied before the war. And while the economic life of Germany is thus advancing to a stage at which it will slowly bleed to death, this process can only * Bread has meanwhile become constantly scarcer, and the mo- nopoly of grain and the distribution of bread by the State has al- ready been introduced. W I ACCUSE! be accelerated by the necessity of producing the enor- mous stores of materials required for the maintenance of our armies of millions, and for the conduct of the war. It has been estimated by an expert that the cost of maintenance per man per day may be reckoned at lo marks, and this estimate takes no account of the wear and tear of materials, the ammunition used up (a single shot from our 42-centimetre guns is said to cost thousands of marks), or the loss of all kinds of instru- ments of war. If we maintain five million soldiers under arms, the war will cost us in ready money paid out of our pockets two and a half million pounds sterling a day; it will cost monthly 75 million pounds, it will cost in a 3^ear 900 million pounds sterling. If we include in our estimate the sums indicated above, for ordinary wear and tear, for material used up or lost, it will be impos- sible to estimate the yearly cost of the war at anything less than 1,250 million pounds sterling, that is to say 250 millions more than the sum-total of the debts of the German Empire and of the individual States in 1912. Further, the justice of this calculation is more or less confirmed by the war-loans which so far have been asked and approved in the German Empire, amounting to 500 million pounds, to which the war contribution of 1913 amounting to 50 millions must be added. These war loans were intended to reach until somewhere about the end of the financial year, that is to say until about 31st March, 191 5, but doubtless they are not intended, and are not sufficient to provide for a complete current renewal of the material of the war which has been lost or used up. If we add the sums necessary for this purpose we will arrive more or less at the sum estimated above, as that required for the conduct of the war for a year, that is to say 1,250 million pounds sterling. The countless millions of pounds which the war is costing and has already cost our economic life, surpasses GERMANY AWAKE! 21 all estimation. The Exchanges are closed. No one knows to-day what he possesses. In any case nearly all effects are as good as unrealisable ; and without the cunningly devised system of loan- funds, a system In essence supported on feet of clay, without the protective laws of the 4th August and all the other conceivable measures which were passed, Intended partly to stave off the malady and partly to conceal It, the collapse of our German economic life would within a short time become an accomplished fact. At the same time England is abused in every key because she avails herself of the advantages conferred on her by her geographical and economical position, j Had we been In England's place would we have behaved otherwise? "A la guerre comme a la guerre." Every- one defends himself to the best of his ability, and If the English, apart from their land forces and their navy, can make use of their economic superiority to defeat us, i who has any right to reproach them with the fact?| Are we not speculating on the possibility of Mohamme- dan risings in English colonies, behind which we stand as spiritus rector? Are we not levying from the wretched and desolate Belgium, the prey of penury and soon to be the prey of famine, — a country which after all Is only defending its Independence and freedom (aj war of liberation in the true sense!) — ^are we not levying from this exhausted country and from Its wholly or partly devastated cities many hundreds of millions of marks as a so-called "war contribution"? From my own points of view the economic war which England is waging against us is far preferable to the warfare of blood which we have brought upon the world. The war of blood involves the loss both of human life and of economic values; the war of trade demands only eco-' nomic sacrifices, but spares that which in the end has the greater value, the life of men. In this It to a certain 22 I ACCUSE! extent approaches the conditions of peace which exist between countries whose relations are not regulated by treaties of commerce ; in this case also we find economic struggle without loss of life. Here there is indeed opened to our vision a prospect of the form which strug- gles will assume in the future configuration of human society. It will no longer be a struggle with weapons , forged of steel and of iron, but a struggle of the nerves and of the brain, a more refined struggle between civil- ised men, who will become more and more removed from the brutal bodily struggle of wild beasts and of barbaric nations, among whom Europe to-day assumes the first place. It is of course a feeble consolation that the other belli- gerent countries are also exhausting themselves. A country so economically undeveloped as Russia, whose exports and imports, in spite of her i8o million inhabi- tants, amounted in 19 12 only to 300 million pounds sterling, need scarcely be considered in such a compari- son. The more developed the economic life of a coim- try is, the more extensive its trade and its industries, the more sensible is it to the effects of war. So far as England and France are concerned, these countries are in the first place much more wealthy than Ger- many, and in the second place, as we have already ob- served, after the disappearance of the few German com- merce raiders all the seas of the world are open to them, so that they can export their produce and bring back again from foreign countries the necessary raw ma- terial, the means of subsistence and any other articles that may be required. It is at once foolish and per- nicious when the German Press and the public opinion of Germany seek to deceive themselves and others on this point. The credit of the countries at war with us, so far as France and England are concerned, has so far scarcely GERMANY AWAKE! 23 suffered in any way. In foreign countries French and English notes have maintained their rate of exchange almost unaltered, whereas German notes are constantly sinking in value. A loomark note can already be pur- chased abroad for 112 francs (instead of nominally 125 fr.), whereas English £1 notes cost at the same time ; 26 francs (instead of nominally 25 fr.). 1 The German 5 per cent, war-loan was issued at 97 ' per cent, whereas the English 3^ per cent, war-loan was issued at 95 per cent. If the wealth and credit of the German Empire were equal to that of England, the German 5 per cent, imperial loan would have been about 40 per cent, more valuable than the English 3j^ per cent, and instead of being issued at 97^ per cent, it could have been issued somewhere about 135 per cent. In this enormous difference there is clearly revealed the comparative economic strength and the power of resistance possessed by the two countries. No patriotic talk, no stifling of the truth, will help us here. Hard facts are the best arguments. The more we ignore the facts, the worse will it be for us. We do not succeed in throwing sand into the eyes of others, but in lying to ourselves, we lull ourselves in hopes impossible of ful- filment, we become ever more stiff-necked in the pursuit of the unholy struggle, and in the end we will accom- plish our own destruction. THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY POSITION" OF THE BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES The political and military aspect of affairs is precisely similar to the economic aspect. The whole of our Colonies, built up by the expendi- ture of many hundreds of millions of marks, and tended with something of a mother's love, have been lost. Aus- tria has lost Galicia and part of Bukovina, and Hun- ^4 I ACCUSE! gary is in danger of being overrun by the Russians. On the other side, Belgium and the eastern corner of France are occupied by the Germans and a small part of east- ern Poland is occupied by the allied German and Austrian forces. But we must not forget that French troops are still in Upper Alsace and that until a few days ago Russian troops were still in East Prussia.^ Thus we see that both sides have in their possession a number of objects of barter which at the end of the war should be mutually returned as is done in the case of prisoners. The longer the war lasts and the more extensive it becomes, the more other countries unite themselves to the belligerent parties, the more will the number of these objects of barter increase. While the Turks are pressing forward towards the Suez Canal, the English are making progress in Persia, Mesoptomia, and Arabia ; here also it may be presumed that territory will ,be seized on both sides, which on the conclusion of peace will have to be exchanged. The world-war, notwithstanding the fearful daily im- pacts and loss of blood, is, as it were, being conducted in such a way that the opponents pass each other by, and it would be the best, because the most humane so- lution, if the impacts were to become constantly less, and, on the other hand, the possession of territory be- longing to the other side were to become constantly more extensive. The result would be the same as now, only with less loss of blood. For from the military, just as little as from the economic, point of view no one can still entertain the illusion that the war may end with a victory of the allied empires. To-day the possibility of such an issue must already be regarded as completely excluded. The battles in the '■This book was completed in February, and cannot therefore take account of later events; these, however, cannot affect the final result of the war. GERMANY AWAKE! 25 East are essentially no more than a defensive, unsuc- cessfully conducted so far as Austria is concerned, but hitherto maintained with success by Germany after the first blows fell. What does the occupation of Lodz, and even, so far as I am concerned, the conquest of Warsaw mean against such a colossus as the Russian Empire? Will Russia be defeated when we get posses- sion of the half or the whole of Poland? It will be nothing but a new object of barter given into our hands, but will it mean the conquest of Russia? Not in the slightest. And what about the situation in France ? What diffi- culties have we to overcome to gain possession of even the small north-western corner of Belgium! What un- speakable sacrifices does that involve ! How many thou- sands of poor, deluded, heroic soldiers have miserably perished in snow and in ice, in the trenches and in the canals, in mud and in mire, on their lips a last whisper of farewell to wife and child and mother, in their hearts a last thought of peace and home! And why? To gain possession of a few square metres of inundated and impoverished country with ruined towns and villages, and then on to the pursuit of the great illusion: on to Calais! on to England! All this reminds me of a pic- ture by Spangenberg entitled "The Pursuit of Happi- ness," which thirty years ago was rightly the subject of much admiration in the Berlin Art Exhibition. A beautiful naked woman was represented hovering over a shining iridescent ball of glass before a troop of wild horsemen who, with gestures of passion, are seeking to reach the crown of laurels which she holds aloft in her right hand. She entices them on with her ensnaring eyes ; her golden yellow hair flutters in the wind, almost reaching the horsemen who are nearest to her. But the crown, the object of their passionate desires, ever eludes their longing grasp. An abyss yawns in front, crossed 26 I ACCUSE! only by a narrow bridge, just broad enough to ensure a passage for the Ball of happiness and the goddess who hovers above it, but which means inevitable death for the warriors in pursuit. The first is already tot- tering into the chasm, the others will follow, and the vision of happiness dissolves, never to be seen again. So will it be, I fear, with the invasion of England, which since the beginning of the war has been held out to the German people as a seductive magic picture. Near as the other side may appear, we will not succeed in getting over, "the water is much too deep." Hundreds of thousands of men might perish in the effort, were the venture risked, and even if we were over there, a war of the people would be let loose, and our troops, deprived of their connections with the home country, would be crushed by the enemy. What every German for months back has been whispering to his neighbour in desire and in hope appears to me to be nothing but a daring flight of the imagination, which will break miserably on England's unbroken sea power. Notwithstanding all the admiration we may feel for the achievements of our heroic navy, it would be foolish to close our eyes to the fact that the gigantic superiority of the English fleet cannot be equalised by means of Zeppelins and submarines — of which latter, be it ob- served, England possesses a greater number than we do (in 1912, 85, to which must be added 90 French). And in all this we have to bear in mind the fact that the English fleet would be the assailant; the German fleet would be the fleet assailed, in so far as it man- aged to press forward to the Channel. The German fleet would, however, have to protect not only itself, but also clumsy cargo-boats, incapable of self-defence, on which there would have to be transported to England a number of army corps, with the appropriate light and heavy artillery, cavalry, trains, pioneer troops, automo- GERMANY AWAKE! ST biles, and air-craft material. Is such an attempt at all conceivable? Is it possible that there are human beings who are prepared to expose to destruction at a blow, on such a scale as this, hundreds of thousands of their fellow men. It should be enough for us to have those mountains of corpses and of mutilated bodies which to-day already cover the battle-fields of Europe, Asia and Africa, and v/hich for centuries, in virtue of their fertilising proper- ties, will be an advantage to agriculture. Must even, the bottom of the sea also be covered with human bodies ? Are the thousands of brave mariners, v/ho have already found death in a watery grave, not sufficient? Must whole army-corps at one stroke be swallowed up in the waves? And even assuming that we were on the other side, would the war then in any sense be won, would England thereby be defeated? Will the English nation allow terms of peace to be dictated to them by the Germans I in London, as one can daily hear from every babbler jand every seer of visions in Germany? Will the English colonies then fall into our possession? Nothing of the sort will happen. I should like to see how Canada, India, Australia, and New Zealand would acclaim the German conqueror, who, as the Chancellor has so beauti- fully expressed it to an American journalist, is des- tined to bring freedom to the world. Charity begins at home. He who imposes bondage in his own house cannot bring freedom to the world. What country 28 I ACCUSE! politically is so undeveloped and so gagged as Prussian Grermany, if we except Russia and our illustrious ally Austria-Hungary? What country has as little under- standing as Germany of the art of assimilating to itself foreign nationalities, of allowing them to live according to their own habits and customs, according to their own culture and language, of making them happy and there- , fore making them faithful? Our policy towards the Poles and the Danes, and towards Alsace-Lorraine, speaks volumes on this point. All opposition to this species of Germanisation has exhausted itself without fruitful result. Zabern is the illuminating zenith of this policy in the West. The Polish laws with their compul- sory expropriation of land possessed by inheritance, laws which have uselessly cost us hundreds of millions of marks, and which have only produced the opposite effect of that intended, will remain a perpetual memorial of this policy in the East. In the North against Den- mark things are no better. At present, of course, in the necessity of war, this vexatious policy is being miti- gated. The Poles have now suddenly become the good child of the family. If formerly they protested that they had no sympathy with efforts hostile to Prussia, and that they were only urged to join the opposition in defence of their speech and of their nationality, their protests were constantly answered by new coercionary measures, and by an extension of the Polish laws. Since there cannot be a Parliamentary opposition in the mis- erable Junker-Parliament of Prussia, all warnings of the left wing were constantly scattered to the wind, and a courageous advance was made along the false and the costly path of Germanisation. And is it supposed that this Germany, conducted on Prussian principles, is endowed with the gifts neces- sary to assume England's position as a world-power, the position of England which owes its world-power not GERMANY AWAKE! 29 merely to the cold pursuit of her interests in the course of the centuries, but above all to her genius in under- standing how to link foreign nations to her world em- pire, without oppressing them, without even wishing to assimilate them? The English language does not know the word "An- glicisation," because the idea is absent in English poli- tics, as indeed language, at least in politics, ever halts behind the "thing," and only gives expression to what already is. Here the saying of Goethe does not hold : For where the understanding falters A word steps in to take its place.^ In politics the reverse is the case. The word is dis- covered, when the idea exists. The word culture-strug- gle (Kulturkampf) arose only when this struggle had already broken out. And so the English colonies will fly to us and hail us as liberators, should we ever succeed in penetrating to England? Far from it. They also will defend them- selves to the last ship and the last man, before they give up English freedom and independence, and sur- render to German bondage and oppression. THE SITUATION IN FRANCE So far as can be foreseen, the war in France also will lead to no result which could be regarded as a victory for Germany. A war of offence which ends in the trenches has in advance failed in its purpose — in trenches whose amenities have been enjoyed by our brave troops for more than five months, in wind and weather, in rain and in snow, in a monotony destructive of the body and 1 - *Denn eben wo Begriffe fehlen, Da stellt ein Wort zur rechten Zeit sich eim. 80 I ACCUSE! of the soul, a monotony however agreeably interrupted from time to time by bombs, shells, and airmen's darts. On the eastern frontier of France the line of fortijfi- cations Verdun, Toul, Nancy, Epinal, and Bel fort still stands almost unshaken, so little affected by the be- sieging German armies that the French ministers and the President can undertake continuous tours of in- spection from one fortress to the other. Fortunately for a long time nothing has been heard of the victor of Longwy, the "heroic son," as the Emperor Francis Jo- seph called him in his telegram to the Emperor William. The famous saying of Count Haseler, passed from mouth to mouth in Berlin, that he intended to breakfast on Sedan day in the Cafe de la Paix in the Place de I'Opera has not proved true. Perhaps the Field Marshal has postponed his breakfast until next Sedan day, unless in- deed, as I fear, he has had to postpone it ad calendas teutonicas. The French Government and the entire dip- lomatic circle are back again in Paris, and it does not look as if they had any intention of making a speedy return to Bordeaux. As every honest observer of the situation must admit, the war with France has come to a standstill, and here, if anywhere, a standstill amounts to a withdrawal. The plans of our General Staff, weighed and matured for years in advance, contained as the cardinal point of the long-intended European war the rapid overthrow of France, followed by a violent attack on the Russian Colossus, with our liberated forces united with those of Austria. Providence — almost involuntarily one falls into the jargon of the German despatch — providence has ruled otherwise. After seven months of fearful conflict France is not overthrown. Our victorious career has been unexpectedly checked by the brilliant strategy of Joffre, the French Moltke — (the uncle, be it observed, not the nephew, who at present is being medically GERMANY AWAKE! 31 treated at Homburg for biliousness) — and our conquer- ing army has been forced to a fortification war in the trenches. The fluctuations of this fortification war, which for the most part oscillate over advances or with- drawals of kilometres or half -kilometres, are so insig- nificant that a decisive turn of events is scarcely to be expected, unless our leaders resolve to throw aside every consideration for human life, unless they call our brave German soldiers from the trenches and expose them in frontal attacks to the devastating fire of the hostile rifles, machine-guns, and artillery. In a few places this has already happened,^ and to judge from the views and sentiments of those in our leading circles (has not the telegram of the German Crown Prince to Colonel Renter, so full of wit and taste, "hammer away," be- come the catchword and the watchword of the nation of poets and thinkers?) the generals will soon lose all patience And if these further incalculable hecatombs in human blood and human happiness are sacrificed, shall we then have gained the victory? In no way. Even if we should succeed with all these sacrifices in making a consider- ^Just before this book went to press I read the official report of the General Staff of January 15th, 1915, in which it is pointed out with pride that in the battles around Soissons from 4,000 to 5,000 French bodies had been found on the field of battle. And how many German bodies were there? And how many wounded on both sides? The Germans as the attacking party will certainly have suffered as severely as the defenders. So altogether there would be 10,000 dead. To this, as experience has shown, there must be added at least three times as many wounded. There would thus be 40,000 soldiers sacrificed in one battle I S2 I ACCUSE! able advance, we shall only have gained what in the war of 1870 we had achieved in four weeks. Without doubt the French have made use of the five months' standstill to increase still more the strength of their fortifications and their possible lines of retreat. Con- stant reinforcements of English and French Colonial troops, of which the end cannot be foreseen, fill up the gaps and increase the number of the troops in the field. With every week which passes in the indecisive trench warfare, the difficulties of our victorious advance are increased. Even in the Boer war the English showed how many troops they could raise in the event of war, in spite of their small standing army. Then they carried out the long-distance transport of troops to South Africa ; to-day they have only to cross the narrow Chan- nel. Our opponents continue to increase, and to-day we have with luck already got as far as the second levy of the Landsturm. PARTIE REMISE How is it to end? In the most favourable circum- stances as partie remise, — ^with a conclusion of hostili- ties which for both sides will mean a complete exhaus- tion in men and in wealth, but which will mean for neither side a victory. According to my sure and earnest conviction that is the most favourable result which Germany can still ex- pect. The possibility of an issue which could more or less be designated as a victory, I regard as wholly ex- cluded. And the longer the war lasts the less chance Vv^ill there be of this relatively favourable issue, the greater will be the probability of a development, which if not a decisive defeat of Germany, would yet represent an overwhelming exhaustion of her resources In com- parison with those of her opponents, and which would therefore inevitably lead to the conditions of peace being GERMANY AWAKE! 33 framed on less favourable lines than would now be granted. Austria has already reached the limits of her strength. In the case of Germany it is not yet possible to speak of any decisive weakening. We still stand erect; we can still offer everywhere a bold forehead to the enemy. Our resources in men and in money are not yet ex- hausted. But this condition of "not yet" cannot now endure for long. It is foolish to pursue an ostrich policy. No matter how dexterously, following the watchword that has been issued, we hide our head in the sand, the enemy still sees the weaknesses which shake the body of our people, they still see the seeds of that malady which must lead to our destruction. We can still ask for an honourable peace. If we from our side freely ask it we will atone for a small part of the wrong which we have committed by conjuring up this world catastrophe, the wrong which has drawn upon us the hatred and the loathing of the whole civ- ilised world, not of our enemies merely, but also of neutral nations. The Question of Guilt That we have forfeited the sympathies of the world is not due to malevolence, envy, and lies; our own actions must bear the responsibility for this. Foreign countries, \ and above all those which are neutral, know better than the German nation the development of events, they know who bears the guilt of the world catastrophe. Foreign neutral countries know well enough our political con- ditions. They know that under a mask of constitution- alism we are in fact ruled absolutely. Recently they observed how an Imperial Chancellor of Germany, against whom Parliament by a three-fifths majority passed a vote expressive of its lack of confidence, could 34 I ACCUSE! yet continue to hold office unshaken, secure in the sup- port of the Court and the military circles, — an occur- rence which, apart from Russia, is no longer possible in any other civilised country. They know that the Prus- sian people are politically without rights, and that they are governed by a small clique of Junkers who have taken in fee all the high offices in the Government and , in the army. Above all neutral countries know — and now I come to the cardinal points in what I have to say — • that the plans and the preparations for this war have long been made by Germany and Austria not only from a military but also from a political point of view; that for long it had been resolved to represent this offensive war to the German people as a war of libera^ tion, because it was known that only thus could the necessary popular enthusiasm be awakened; that the object of this war is an attempt to establish a hegemony on the continent and, as a later sequel, the acquisition of England's position of power in the world according to the principle "ote-toi de Id que je m'y w^ettef For these facts and endeavours there is in existence evidence of so convincing a character written by our- selves in the German language, that it is a task as in- fatuated as it is hopeless to try to combat the convic- tion of the whole world by the untenable publications of those who take it upon themselves to "enlighten" the world about Germany. II HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME OUR imperialists: bernhardi and CO. The writings of Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, of Frobenius, The German Empire's Hour of Destiny, the books of Treitschke, German History and Politics, are as well known abroad as in Germany, and they have in part been translated into foreign languages. The im- perialistic tendencies of a political clique have never been more distinctly expressed than in these writings, and, in the view of their originators, justified. A few quotations from Bernhardi may suffice. This man is a Prussian Cavalry General, and, if I am not mis- taken, has been entrusted with a command in the East, and he has already been decorated with the Iron Cross of the First Class. That he is competent and authorised to give expression to the views of authoritative German circles can scarcely be disputed. On page 255 of his book we find ^ : "The Government will never be able to count upon a well- armed and self-sacrificing people in the hour of danger or necessity, if it calmly looks on while the war-like spirit is being systematically undermined by the Press and a feeble peace policy preached, still less if it allows its own organs to join in with the same note, and continually to emphasise the maintenance of peace as the object of all policy. It must rather do everything to foster a military spirit, and to make the nation comprehend the duties and aims of an imperial policy. ^[References are to the English translation (popular edition). Edward Arnold, London.] 35 B6 I ACCUSE! ''It must continually point to the significance and the necessity of war as an indispensable agent in policy and civilisation together with the duty of self-sacrifice and de- votion to State and country." Page 257 : "The soul of our nation is not reflected in that part of the Press with its continual dwelling on the necessity of up- holding peace, and its denunciation of any bold and com-- prehensive political measure as a policy of recklessness. "On the contrary, an intense longing for a foremost place among the Powers and for manly action fills our nation. Every vigorous utterance, every bold political step of the Government, finds in the soul of the people a deeply felt echo, and loosens the bonds which fetter all their forces. In a great part of the national Press this feeling has agaia and again found noble expression. But the statesman who could satisfy this yearning, which slumbers in the heart of our people undisturbed by the clamour of parties and the party Press, would carry all spirits with him." Page 258: "Such a policy {i.e., a military policy) is also the best school in which to educate a nation to great military achieve- ments. When their spirits are turned towards high aims they feel themselves compelled to contemplate war bravely, and to prepare their minds to it: " 'The man grows up, with manhood's nobler aims.' "... . . . "We Germans have a far greater and more urgent duty towards civilisation to perform than the Greek Asiatic Power. We, like the Japanese, can only fulHl it by the sword. "Shall we, then, decline to adopt a bold and active policy, the most effective means with which we can prepare our people for its military duty?" On page 275 : "A successful policy, therefore, cannot be followed with- out taking chances and facing risks. It must be conscious HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME ST of its goal, and keep this goal steadily in view. It must press every change of circumstances and all unforeseen occurrences into the service of its own ideas. Above all things, it must be ready to seize the psychological moment, and take bold action if the general position of affairs indi- cates the possibility of realising political ambitions or of waging a necessary war under favourable conditions." Pages 275-6 : " 'Old Fritz' must be our model in this respect {i.e., in disregarding historical rights), and must teach us with re- morseless realism so to guide our policy that the position of the political world may be favourable for us, and that we do not miss the golden opportunity. "It is an abuse of language if our unenterprising age tries to stigmatise that energetic policy which pursued positive aims as an adventurist policy." On page 2yy the author points out that the military and political preparation for war must go hand in hand in order to make it possible to strike at the moment which from the military point of view is the most un- favourable. "The obligation imposed on the General to stand aloof from politics in peace as well as in war only holds good in a limited sense. The War Minister and the Head of the General Staff must be kept au courant with the all-fluctu- ating phases of policy ; indeed, they must be allowed a cer- tain influence over policy, in order to adapt their measures to its needs, and are entitled to call upon the statesman to act if the military situation is peculiarly favourable." Page 280 : "The disadvantages of such a situation {i.e., the war on two fronts) can only be avoided by a policy which makes it feasible to act on the offensive, and, if possible, to overthrow the one antagonist before the other can actively interfere. 38 I ACCUSE! On this initiative our safety now depends just as it did in the days of Frederick the Great. We must look this truth boldly in the face." On the same page our diplomacy is entrusted with the task of so "shuffling the cards that we may be at- tacked by France." The author then continues : "This view undoubtedly deserves attention, but we must not hope to bring about this attack by waiting passively. Neither France nor Russia nor England need to attack in order to further their interests. So long as we shrink from attack they can force us to submit to their will by diplomacy, as the upshot of the Morocco negotiations shows, and as the issue of the Balkan crisis will probably also demonstrate. "If we wish to bring about an attack by our opponents, we must initiate an active policy, which, without attacking France, will so prejudice her interests or those of England, that both these States would feel themselves compelled to attack us. Opportunities for such procedure are offered both in Africa and in Europe." That is plain enough, is it not? Not only the ten- dencies of German policy are revealed without any dis- guise, but the manner in which these tendencies are to be realised is prescribed with the minutest detail. The Chancellor, it must be admitted, has been an apt pupil of the General and has fulfilled in a masterly fashion his task of so shuffling the cards that out of the offen- sive war there has been created a war of liberation. At least that is how it appears in the eyes of the simple Michael,^ for the rest of the world has long ago seen through the gigantic fraud. But let us hear further how Mr. Bernhardi chatters out of school. ^[Michael, a name commonly given to the German people, some- what analogous to John Bull. The chief features of the German Michael are simplicity and honesty, amounting almost to stupidity.] HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 39 Page 286 : , "The worst result of our Morocco policy is, however, un- doubtedly the deep rift which has been formed in conse- quence between the Government and the mass of the na- tionalist party, the loss of confidence among large sections of the nations, extending even to classes of society which, in spite of their regular opposition to the Government, had heartily supported it as the representative of the Empire abroad. In this weakening of public confidence, which is undisguisedly shown both in the Press and in the Reichstag, lies in my opinion the great disadvantage of the Franco- German understanding." Bernhardi would naturally have preferred that we should even have allowed a European war to break out on account of the Morocco dispute, but he consoles himself with the thought that all chances are not yet past. Page 285 : "We need not, therefore, regard this convention as defin- itive. It is as liable to revision as the Algeciras treaty, and indeed offers, in this respect, the advantage that it creates new opportunities of friction with France." That is the Record: an International treaty which has prevented a world-war, meets with the conditional approval of the author, only because it offers new sources of friction, and so, it may he hoped, will soon lead to the world-war which he desires. Particularly instructive is his discussion of our rela- tions to England and of the negotiations then being conducted in Berlin by Lord Haldane. These negotia- tions along with the previous and subsequent English proposals with a view to arriving at a political and naval understanding with Germany deserve a special chapter, in which it will be clearly shown that England 40 I ACCUSE! constantly and in the most earnest manner took the In- itiative in these negotiations, but that these were al- ways wrecked on the refusal of Germany or on the impossible conditions which she sought to impose. Per- haps on this point also they were following the pre- scription of Bernhardi, which runs: Page 287 : "Even English attempts at a rapprochement must not blind us as to the real situation. We may at most use them to delay the necessary inevitable war, until we may fairly imagine we have some prospect of success." In the concluding apostrophe of his book the author emphatically exclaims: Pages 287-8 : "If the Imperial Government was of the opinion that it was necessary in the present circumstances to avoid war, still the situation in the world generally shows there can only be a short respite, before we once more face the ques- tion whether we will draw the sword for our position in the world or renounce such position once and for all. We must not in any case wait. . . . The political situation of- fers many points on which to rest our lever. England, too, is in a most difficult position. . . . The disturbances in the Far East will probably fetter Russia's forces, and Eng- land's interests will suffer in sympathy. These are all con- ditions which an energetic and far-sighted German policy can utilise in order to influence the general political situa- tion in the interests of our Fatherland. "If people and Government stand together, resolved to guard the honour of Germany and make every sacrifice of blood and treasure to insure the future of our country and our State . . . we need not fear to fight for our position in the world, but we may, with Ernst Moritz Arndt, raise our hands to heaven and cry to God: HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 4^-' 'From the height of the starry sky May thy ringing sword flash brighf; Let every craven cry Be silenced by thy might !' " In conclusion I should further like merely to draw attention to the headings of the chapters of Bernhardi's book, which afford so clear an insight into the tendencies / of the author, that it might appear almost superfluous to read his work. Chapter i. The right to make war. Chapter 2. The duty to make war. Chapter 3. A brief survey of Germany^s historical development. Chapter 4. Germany's historical mission. Chapter 5. World power or downfall. Chapter 6. The character of our next war.; Chapter 7. The next naval war, &c. I wish once more in as emphatic a manner as possible to draw attention to the fact that Bernhardi expressly excludes an offensive war on the part of the Triple En- tente, and he indicates that the only method of arriv- ing at the desired world-war, and at the same time at * world-dominion, is that Germany must act as an agent provocateur and mu^t so shuMe the cards that the other, side will he compelled to attack. This of course does not prevent Bernhardi and hl^ comrades in the faith, especially Frobenius, from speak-* ing elsewhere of the aggressive intentions of the Triple: Entente, and from depicting the dangers to which Ger-* many is exposed, unless she anticipates these intentions. HAVE WE BEEN ATTACKED OR WERE WE GOING TO BE ATTACKED ? This is the same logic as we hear to-day in every corner of Germany, if indeed what is heard in Germany: , ,42 I ACCUSE! can still be designated as logic. The official version states that the Triple Entente has attacked us. "We have to protect our holiest possessions, the Fatherland and our own hearths against a sudden ruthless attack." [(The appeal of the Emperor on the 6th August to the German army. "The sword must then decide. In the midst of peace the enemy falls upon us, therefore to arms! Every hesitation, every delay, would be treach- ery to the Fatherland. The existence of our empire is at stake — the existence of German power and German character." Such is the official version which crops up in a thou- sand various forms from the Chancellor down to the last street-sweeper. Semi-officially however and in the confidence of secrecy many Germans can be heard asserting that we were not, it is true, attacked, but that we would have heen attacked later, if we had not now begun the war at a moment favourable for us. Should we then ask for evidence in support of this hypothesis, most of those who maintain this view have nothing to say, or else they declare that the intention of the enemy to attack us was so obvious that any proof would be superfluous. "What did they mean by their enormous preparations?" is what they most frequently say. And what about our preparations? I reply, which were certainly greater and more comprehensive than in any other country in the world. Did ever any country in time of peace act as we did in 1913 when we suddenly raised the strength of our army on a peace footing by :i 40,000 men, that is to say, from 720,000 to 860,000, and when we rose to an extraordinary war tax of •£50,000,000? "What was the meaning of the Entente, the celebrated policy of 'encirclement' (Einkreisung) , if they did not mean to attack us?" is what they next fuy. And what, I reply, was the meaning of the Triple HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 43 ( Alliance which Involved even stricter obligations than the Entente, and In spite of this, according to our as- sertions, was defensive In Its nature? *'Yes, but think of the Pan-Slavs !" Is urged as an objection against me. And what about the Pan-Germans? I venture to an- swer. Are our "Alldeutschen," our national party, our Pan-Germans of the school of Treltschke and Bernhardi, in any way better or less aggressive than the Pan-Slavs ? Such "Pan-tendencies" are to be found In all coun- tries. They are harmless, so long as they do not ad- vance to action. The decisive act was however taken by our Pan-Germans, when they drove us Into this horrible war — a war desired and openly proclaimed by them. The Head of the War Party; And they had and still have friends and patrons in high places. They have gradually acquired more influ- ence In our authoritative circles than ever the Pan-Slavs exercised at the Russian court. I need not mention by name the person who for years has been the influential head and the battering-ram of this movement against the originally peace-loving mind of the Emperor. Every- one knows to whom I refer. The Zabem telegram, the message of farewell to the Danzig Hussars, the open demonstration from the tribune of the Reichstag against our Morocco policy, which was at the time still peaceful In intention — these and countless other occurrences and suggestions leave not the slightest room for doubt as to the quarter and the camp from which the Inciters to war have discharged their destructive missiles over Ger- many. One has but to wander along the streets of Ber- lin to see In all bookshops the work of Frobenlus en- titled The German Empire's Hour of Destiny, with the commendatory telegram of the exalted gentleman on the outside. In his recommendation he expresses the 44 I ACCUSE! desire that this "distinguished book" which he has "read with the greatest interest" will find the widest circula- tion among the German people. And this Frobenius is a comrade in thought of Bernhardi, and the whole pur- port of his book is that we should strike before it is too late; since the others mean to attack us, we must anticipate them and attack them. Of course no proof, not the shadow of a proof, is advanced in support of this premise, which in reality is but a pretext, and which is denied by Bernhardi himself in the passage quoted above (page 280). But that does not inconvenience these great minds; they do not recognise the defects of their logic. They do not see that of the two assertions only one can be true. Either we have been attacked, in which case we are conducting a defensive war, or else we were going to he attacked, and in that case we are conducting a pre- yentive war. If the second statement is true the first must be untrue; and in that case all official utterances from the Imperial speech from the Palace on the 31st July down to the speech of the Chancellor on the 2nd December are branded as lies. If the assertion that it is a defensive war is true, thei idea of a preventive war is at once put completely aside, and it is superfluous to discuss further whether the presuppositions of a preventive war in fact existed, or whether such a preventive war politically and morally can be defended. Bismarck, who after all knew some- thing about politics, emphatically answered this latter question in the negative, in stating that "even victori- ous wars cannot be justified unless they are forced upon one, and that one cannot see the cards of Providence 'far enough ahead to anticipate historical development according to one's own calculation." ^ ^ Bismarck Gedanken und Ermnerungen [Vol. II. p. 102 of the JEnglish translation. Smith, Elder and Co.] HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 43 This dictum of the great man of the past appears to have fallen into oblivion. While monument after monu- ment has been erected to his memory, this sentence might have been inscribed in brass and in marble in the walls of the palaces of kings and of governments in places where it would at all times have been visible; then per- haps the German people and the world might have been spared this most terrible of evils. Bismarck also after 1870 was repeatedly urged by Generals and by the in- stigators of war to undertake a new campaign against France in order to crush once for all and to make harm- less for all time the country that was again raising its head. All such efforts he constantly rejected with un- yielding energy, and the idea of initiating a war because it must come sooner or later, he declared to be "criminal" and "insane." The saying is apposite, and those whom it fits will not be able to escape its application. The Imperial War the place in the sun It will be obvious from all that I have so far said that I regard the present war neither as a defensive nor as a preventive war. This war is purely a war of con- quest, horn of imperialist ideas and serving imperialist ends. It is nothing else. It is a war for the celebrated ''Place in the sun," which it is supposed is being refused us, and which we must take forcibly with the sword in our hand. What is the meaning of the "Place in the sun" ? No one says clearly what it is, and everyone understands the phrase in a different sense. The idea is so alien to the people that it may be pre- sumed that they would not have allowed themselves to 48 I ACCUSE! have been sacrificed, if it had been said to them : "You' must gain for us a place in the sun," For the initiated however it is the magic spell which unites their imperialistic desires. "Only thus relying on the sword, can we gain the place in the sun, which is our due, but which is not voluntarily accorded to us" (Crown Prince Wilhelm). With this inscription, and with the motto "pro patria et gloria," the photograph of the German Crown Prince is sold in German bookshops. THE CHOSEN PEOPLE The place in the sun Is the world-power which is due to us, as to the chosen people of God. From the point of view of the psychology of the nation it is remark- able how the old Jewish idea has mastered the good, Christian, Protestant, anti-semitic Empire, and how it has ousted the true teaching of Christ, that all men arc brothers. We change our religious ideas, like our uniforms, according to our needs and our circumstances. The God, whom in war we Invoke every day, whom we entreat to grant that we may destroy as many of the enemy as possible, and to whom we give thanks when he fulfils our prayers is the old Jewish God, Jehovah, the God of battles and of vengeance, to whom no sacri- fice appears too great, if it is to serve the power and the dominion of his chosen people. The Christian God, however, and his "only-begotten Son," who wandered about on earth preaching love and sacrifice, whose king- dom Is not of this world — ^they have nothing to do with this shedding of blood, which is entirely contradictory to the doctrine they taught. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 47. The observations of Kant in his essay on Everlasting Peace are entirely in the spirit of the Christian religion. "On the conclusion of peace at the end of the war it might not be unseemly for a nation to appoint a day of humiliation, after the festival of thanksgiving, on which to invoke the mercy of Heaven for the terrible sin which the human race are guilty of, in their continued unwilling- ness to submit (in their relations with other States) to a law-governed constitution, preferring rather in the pride of their independence to use the barbarous method of war, which after all does not really settle what is wanted, namely, the right of each State in a quarrel. The feasts of thanks- giving during a war for a victorious battle, the hymns which are sung — to use the Jewish expression — 'to the Lord of Hosts,' are not in less strong contrast to the ethical idea of a father of mankind ; for, apart from the indifference these customs show to the way in which nations seek to establish their rights — sad enough as it is — these rejoicings bring in an element of exultation that a great number of lives, or at least the happiness of many, has been destroyed." ^ That is true Christianity, and at the same time It is the true crown of German culture. Those same people, however, who profess that they are drawing the sword on behalf of this culture trample its finest products in the dust, and rattle over it with their cannons. If it were known in certain places in Germany how educated men and religious people throughout the whole world judge these continual blasphemous appeals to God, ^ [Perpetual Peace. English translation by Miss Campbell Smith (George Allen and Unwin), p. 136-7. Later references to Kant's essay are also adapted to this edition.] % ACCUSE! 12mgi tuzzatti, one of the most distinguished politi- cians and most important thinkers in Italy, who, as is well known, has more than once been Prime Minister [(be it observed a strict Jew — ^this I mention as an ex- ample to Germany whose mission is to "bring free- dom," ialthough in time of peace it does not go so far as to promote a Jew to be a Second Lieutenant), Luigi Luzzatti has recently published in the Corriere delta Sera a remarkable article bearing the title "The abuse of the name of God," from which I quote some sen- tences : "From the day on which this fearful war broke out 'Princes (not the people, it must be said) have bored every- one by the use and abuse of the name of God. In the tele- grams which were recently exchanged between the Austrian Emperor and the Sultan the Almighty makes his appear- ance. The matter would take on an ironical tinge if up in Heaven the conquerors and the defeated of Lepanto and the soul of John Sobieski were to hear of it. One could have wished that at least on this occasion they might have felt enough shame to induce them to leave heaven in peace out of the question ! . . . Fortunately God has not yet appeared HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 49 in the telegrams exchanged between the monarchs of Eng- land and Japan. And indeed it would have been a difficult matter to reconcile in the same fearful uproar of war Jesus and Buddha, a religion without God and a religion which rests on a personal God and Saviour. We are reminded of a bitterly ironical saying of Voltaire, who observed 'Since God created man in his own image, how often has man endeavoured to render a similar service to God.' . . . Let us save God from such profanation! Let us leave in peace the Father of all mankind who punishes guilt and re- wards virtue, and who gives no one the right to represent Flim on earth, and to claim for himself His omnipotence in this tragedy of war." Such is the judgment of serious men abroad on certain German peculiarities and on the presumption of Ger- many to be the chosen people of God. The place in the sun which is due to us as the chosen people, thus represents the true object of this war, even if it is not admitted to the nation that this is the object. Germany's brilliant development If anyone seeks a place in the sun, and seeks it sword in hand, it must be assumed that hitherto he has stood in the shadow. Is this so in the case of Germany? I maintain that the opposite is the case, and in support of this assertion I rely on those very people, who have pressed the sword into our hand to enable us to seek a place in the sun. In the chapter entitled "Financial and Political Preparation for War" (p. 260 et seq.) Bernhardi gives a comprehensive view of the brilliant and unprecedented economic development of Germany since the Franco-Prussian war. He points out, and supports his assertion freely with statistics, that the increase of wealth continues on an ascending scale, and that the advance in trade and industry since the founda- 50 I ACCUSE! tion of the Empire has been extraordinary. He quotes a lecture delivered by Professor Dade before a general meeting of the Finance and Tax-Reformers held on the 22nd February, 19 10, from which we gather that the value of German imports and exports in the last years before 1910 had increased from 300 million pounds sterling to between 725 million pounds and 800 million pounds. In 19 12 German imports and exports reached a value of approximately 1,200 million pounds sterling. The value of the import of raw material for industrial purposes rose from 75 million pounds in 1879 to 225 million pounds ; the import of manufactured goods rose from 30 million pounds in 1879 to 62^ million pounds in 1908, and the export of manufactured goods during the same period rose from 50 million pounds to over 200 million. The amount of coal raised in 1879 was only 42 million tons ; in 1908 it was 148^ million tons, and the value of the coal raised increased from 5 mil- lion pounds to 75 millions. The production of iron ore rose from 6 million to 27 million tons, and in value it rose from £1,350,000 to £5,950,000. From 1888 to 1908 the amount of coal raised in Germany increased by 127 per cent., as against only 59 per cent, in Eng- land. The production of pig iron in Germany in the twenty years mentioned above rose 172 per cent., a^ against only 2."] per cent, in England. Similar figures, according to Dade and Bernhardi, can be adduced in all other spheres. At the same time there took place a continued growth in revenue and a progressive capitalisation. From 1892 to 1905 an increase in national wealth of about 100 mil- lion pounds sterling has taken place annually in Prussia alone. In the grades of the Property Tax ranging from £300 to £5,000 the number of those taxed and the number of properties on which taxes are paid has in- creased in these fourteen years by 29 per cent., whereas HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 51 from 1905 to 1908 the increase was 11 per cent., that is to say, in the first period the yearly increase was 2 per cent., but in recent years 3 per cent. An even greater increase has taken place in the case of the large fortunes. In the grades of the property tax ranging from £5,000 to £25,000 the increase in the numbers paying, and the properties on which payment is made has been about 44 per cent., that is, on an average of the fourteen years, 3 per cent, annually; in the last three years however it has been 4*6 per cent. The higher the grades of the tax, the greater is the increase; in the grades from £300 to £5,000 the in- crease per head of the population has been £32 los. ; in the grades from £5,000 to £25,000 there was an increase per head of £320, and in the grades above £25,000 there was an increase of £3,522^^ per hear per year. Emphasis is further laid on the increase of wages, on the decrease of unemployment and of emigration as signs of our economic prosperity, and statistics are ad- duced in support of these contentions. In 1908 only 20,000 emigrants left our country, whereas in the same year 336,000 persons emigrated from Great Britain. The investment of capital in State railways amounted at the end of March, 1908, in Prussia to £494,400,000 and at the end of 191 1 to £552,500,000. This brilliant picture of our industrial development, which could be supported by a series of other figures, is naturally of use to General Bernhardi, only in so far as it enables him to represent as tolerable a further in- crease of military burdens. He forgets, however, that in thus demonstrating our continuous increase of na- tional wealth, and in particular in emphasising our in- creasing advantage over England, he cuts from under his own feet the ground on which there should be erected the edifice of his Imperialism. If we already have 52 I ACCUSE! such a sunny corner in the sun, what is still lacking f What more do we wantf If in many respects we, the most recent industrial State in the world, the growth of scarcely more than two generations, are already placing England, the old- est industrial State, in the shadow, we certainly cannot complain of any deficiency of sunshine. What about extension of territory? What about Colonies? Does the happiness of nations depend on the number of square miles which they possess, or does it depend on their Colonies? If that were the case, small countries like Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway would necessarily be poor in com- parison with Great States, whereas as a matter of fact the opposite is the case. The highest figures for im- ports and exports per head of the population are shown by Holland, followed by Belgium, Switzerland, and Den- mark, and then only after these the great Powers. The Belgian 3 per cents, stood at 96 when the German stood at 83 per cent. The Norwegian 3^ per cents, stood at 102, when the Russian could be had at 81. Similar figures may be adduced in every sphere of economic life. The greatness of a country, and in particular the extent of its Colonial possessions, has no relation to the pros- perity of a country. The best proof for this fact is found In Germany itself. No one, not even the most fanatical nationalist, will or can dispute the fact that the increase in pros- perity of Germany in the last forty years, and in par- ticular in the twenty-six years which have elapsed since the present Emperor ascended the throne, has been with- out precedent in the history of the world. On the oc- casion of the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniver- sary of the accession of William II. a compilation ap- peared under the title, Social Culture and the Well- being of the People during the iirst 25 Years of the HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 53 'Reign of William II. This work describes, and supports with statistics, the prosperity of Germany in all branches of human culture during this period. It is superfluous to reproduce here these well-known figures. Only a few; need here be cited. The population has increased from forty-eight millions in 1888 to sixty-seven millions Iri 19 14. The yearly increase due to births amounted in 191 1 to ii°3 per thousand inhabitants, and was only exceeded by Russia with 17 per thousand. The produc- tion of pig-iron (estimated in thousands of tons) rose from 4,024 in 1887 to 17,853 in 1912, that is to say, by 343'6 per cent., whilst the production of Great Britain in the same time only increased by 17*6 per cent., namely, from 7,681 to 9,031. The production of America in pig-iron increased in the same time by 363*2 per cent., that is, from 6,520 to 30,203, and thus America still takes the first place in this field of production, while Germany has advanced from the third place in 1887 to the second place in 19 12, thereby outstripping England and attaining a percentage of increase twenty times as great. A development on exactly similar lines is shown in the production of steel, which (also estimated in thou- sands of tons) has risen from 1163*9 ^^ 1887 to 17,302 in 1 91 2, Here also we have advanced from the third place to the second in the production of the world, and have considerably outstripped England, whose produc- tion has only increased from 3,i96'8 in 1887 to 6,563*3 in 191 1. Estimating the increase by percentages, Ger- many here takes the first place, and leaves far behind both of her competitors, America and England. The increase in percentage amounted in the twenty-five years mentioned in Germany to no less than 1,377 P^i" cent., in America 835 per cent., and in England only 105 per cent. The net tonnage of our German mercantile fleet has 64 I ACCUSE! increased from 1,240,182 in 1888 to 3,153,724 in 1913, and at the same time it is specially to be noted that the commercial value of the individual vessels has been enormously increased by the transformation from sail- ing ships into steamships. The net tonnage of steam- ships alone has almost increased six-fold in the period mentioned; it has risen from 470,364 in 1888 to 2,655,- 496 in 1913. The increase of the national income and the national wealth correspond to the commercial and industrial de- velopment of Germany. Dr. Karl Helfferich, Director of the German Bank,^ in his contribution to the compila- tion mentioned above, summarises his conclusions in the following words : "The German national income amounts to-day to 2,150 million pounds annually as against from 1,150 to 1,250 mil- lion pounds in 1895. "Of these 2,150 millions about 350 millions, that is to say a bare sixth, are applied annually for public purposes ; from 1,350 to 1,450 million pounds are used privately, and about 400 to 425 millions, which may be raised by the automatic increase in value of wealth now in existence to 500 million pounds, grow as an increase of the wealth of the nation as against a sum of from 225 to 250 millions 15 years ago. "The wealth of the German people amounts to-day to more than 15,000 million pounds, as against about 10,000 million pounds about the middle of the 'nineties of last century. "These solid figures summarise, expressed in money, the result of the enormous economic labour, which Germany has achieved under the government of our Emperor." That is the place in the sun which we occupy, which no one has disputed, can dispute, or means to dispute, a place in the sun for which we are, indebted to the spirit ^ Now Secretary of the Treasury. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 55 of enterprise, the pertinacity and the skilful methods of our merchants and our manufacturers, but not to the braggart company of our nationalists, and just as little to the sword of our Generals or the plans of campaign of our General Staff. It is exclusively the work of the German merchant and his motto "My field is the world," exclusively the result of the long-enduring condition of peace, which, to judge from the experience of the past, the longer it lasted would have more and more promoted the pros- perity of the German people. INCREASE OF POPULATION AND THE COLONIES The objection is advanced that it is indeed precisely the increase of the German people, the yearly accession to our population of about 800,000 souls, which neces- sarily demands such an extension of territory. Where, it is asked, are all these new people to find sustenance and a home? The objection is as insecurely founded as all the others. If Germany were too small to support its increasing population, the emigration statistics would show a constant rise. The opposite, however, is the case. The number of emigrants from 1881 to 1890 amounted yearly to 134,200, from 1891 to 1910 to only 52,800 yearly, and in 1912 only 18,500 people emigrated from Germany. On the other hand, the number of immigrants has increased. Whereas, formerly, immigrants were con- siderably fewer than emigrants, in the last fifteen years or so they have exceeded the latter so that the stream of emigration is on the point of flowing towards instead of away from Germany. From these figures it may be deduced that Germany, so far from not being In a position to give employment and nourishment to its increasing population, ofi^ers, on 56 I ACCUSE! the contrary, increasing opportunities of employment and nourishment, not only for its own population, but also for those persons who stream to it from abroad. At the same time wages show a constant, although by no means a sufficient, rise. And this fabulous development took place at a time when other countries, and particularly France, were substantially extending their Colonial possessions, while our Colonial possessions remained limited to the few places in Africa, East Asia, and in the Pacific which could still be acquired by a Germany which arrived too late on the scene. What has the importance of these Colonies been in connection with our economic develop- ment in the last forty years ? In this they have played no part, not the slightest. If we add together the sums which our Colonies have cost us directly and indirectly (in the indirect cost we must allow for the increase of the fleet abroad rendered necessary for their protection), and if on the other side we reckon the financial advan- tages obtained from these Colonies, we shall find as the result that we have made a miserable bargain. In this respect also Bismarck saw much further than his successors. He resolved on the first steps towards a colonial policy, only when subjected to strong pressure and almost against his will, and he constantly remained aware of the fact that this policy is one that cuts both ways ; he realised that it would afford our enemies new points of attack, while furnishing us with no correspond- ing advantages. The present occurrences have proved the justice of his foresight. Our Colonies have delivered into our ene- mies' hands objects of exchange, which are indeed ma- terially of no value to us, but in our imagination, seeing that we have once possessed them, they have for us a certain worth, VN^hich our enemies will make us pay dear for on the conclusion of peace. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 57 Materially they have no value for us. Will anyone venture to assert that our economical prosperity (which I have supported with figures quoted above) would have been diminished by one iota if we had never possessed either South West or East Africa, Kiao-chau, or Samoa? The total white population of our Colonies amounted in 191 3 to something over 27,000, that is to say, about 3*5 per cent, of the annual increase of the population of Germany. Would there have arisen in our country any question of over-population or of a scarcity of food if these 27,000 people had remained in Germany? Would this increase, or rather this non-withdrawal, have ex- ercised the slightest effect on our economic life, on the life of 67 million people? Further, the entire commercial Intercourse of Ger- many with her Colonies in imports and exports amounts to-day to something over £5,000,000. The total imports and exports of Germany in 19 12 amounted in round figures to £1,000,000,000. The trade with the Colonies thus amounts to 0*5 per cent, of our total foreign trade. If this 0*5 per cent, fell away, would Germany economi- cally so much as feel the effect? But indeed this per- centage would not fall away, if we did not possess these Colonies. If the Colonies need our products they would buy them just as much if they were not our possessions, but were either independent, or were subject to the rule of another people. We have indeed no monopoly of trade with our Colonies, but they belong to the territory of the German Empire, and are bound to the commercial treaties concluded by Germany. In spite of the fact that we possess our Colonies, we meet within them the competition of all industrial countries, regulated by com- mercial treaties; it follows that even if we were not the owners, they would still buy from us those of our wares which we could deliver better and at a cheaper rate than others could 58 I ACCUSE.' Our True Colonies Our best customers are in fact precisely those coun- tries which we have never possessed, and which we never can possess: England, Russia, France, Italy, America, Brazil, the Argentine — these are our true Colonies ; these are the countries which, in the enormous developments of exchange in the modern world of trade, make us rich by the purchase of our manufactures, while we draw from them as an equivalent the raw material which we need, as well as manufactures of foreign origin. These are the countries which open to the German merchant inexhaustible fields of activity, where in free competition with the trading nations of the world he can spread his pinions and can make his efficiency felt. These are the gigantic sponges which absorb millions in the form of German produce transferred thither by German mer- chants settled abroad, and there distributed through all the industrial channels. Throughout the whole world huge German trading firms, either enjoying a position of independence or acting as the branches of the central house, may be seen flourishing and developing their strength in the struggle with English and American com- petition. That is the biological struggle for existence which to-day rules the world, not the armed struggle of barbaric times. That is the struggle that will always remain, the struggle of efficiency against inefficiency, the struggle of skill against stupidity, the struggle of en- durance against slackness, above all the struggle which in reality produces the flower of the higher modern type of hum'anity, the spiritually higher which on the firm basis of a wellbeing embracing all circles of the people can rise even to higher levels of morality and of culture. Those who speak for our imperialist party naturally know nothing of this struggle; for them the merchant will always remain a term of contempt, no matter how HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 59 glad they may be to take home in marriage to their noble castles the daughters of wealthy merchants. The officers and the junkers still remain the highest caste in the country. They remain the props of the throne and of the altar, of discipline and of morals. They would not care a brass button if, as a consequence of their militant undertakings, all that the merchant has through long generations built up as a result of arduous daily labour should perish at a stroke. For them the economic prosperity of a country exists only in so far as it prepares the means for military undertakings: these are the true aims of national existence, and its prosperity is of use only in so far as it assists in the fulfilment of this end. WHAT ADVANTAGE HAS FRANCE DRAWN FROM HER COLONIES ? Let us however come back to the question of colonies. We have seen that the lack of important colonies has not injured Germany; it has not hindered our enormous boom of prosperity. What is the position in the case of France? Has the acquisition of her North African Colonial Empire, of her East Asian possession, of Mada- gascar yielded her any profit or furnished her with any advantage over the German Empire? None whatever; the reverse is indeed the case. The economic develop- ment of France has in some branches remained at a complete standstill; on others it has shown a progress which is out of all proportion less than in the case of Germany. The entire foreign trade of France amounted in 19 1 2 to only 580 million pounds sterling, although her foreign possessions contain more than four times the superficial area of those of the German Empire. Her population of about forty millions has, as is well known, remained almost stationary. Above all we should ex- 60 I ACCUSE! pect, according to the theory of our imperiahsts, that the estabhshment of a great Colonial Empire would result in an enormous increase in the mercantile navy. Nothing of all this has taken place. The tonnage of French commercial vessels has indeed fallen (expressed in thousands of tons) from 1,492 tons in 1885 to 1,462*6 in 191 1, whereas in the same period, as shown above, the tonnage of German vessels has risen from 1,275*5 to 3,023*7. The production of pig-iron which, as shown above, rose in Germany in twenty-five years by 343*6 per cent., rose in France in the same period only 210*7 per cent. The production of steel in the same twenty-five years rose in Germany by 1,377 P^^ ^^^^- ^^ 17^302 (estimated in thousands of tons), whereas the French production rose by only 727 per cent, on 4,078*4 (in thousands of tons). Similar figures can be adduced in nearly all branches of economic life. Where, then, I ask, is the advantage'* which France has drawn from her Colonial Empire? She would probably have done better if she had left the yellow and the black and the brown inhabitants of her Colonial possessions to themselves, and if she had kept in her own pocket the enormous expenditure in- volved in the military acquisition and the civil admin- istration of these wide territories. Above all, she would then have had no Morocco dispute, no Agadir incident, and in consequence no foaming of the imperialistic beast in Germany, and very probably no war to-day. After all, the dead Archduke has only had to wipe out the "discomfiture" of Agadir. The French people were instinctively right when they constantly moved their Colonial conquerors on a step and threw them into the lumber-room. So it happened to Jules Ferry the man of Tonkin, so it happened to Jo- seph Caillaux the man of Morocco. This is indeed a HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 61 peculiar irony of history! The French drive away in disgrace those who have gained for them their Colonies, and in our country the national party spits out fire and destruction because France has snapped up these won- derful Colonies from under her nose. In this the French gentlemen have at least the excuse that they have ac- complished their extension of territory without drawing the sword in Europe (the modern man scarcely speaks of the lives of the natives), whereas we consider these same seductive corners of the world of sufficient value to pour out on their account oceans of the best blood of Europe and to pile up for their sake hecatombs of corpses. Truly, we may exclaim with Ulrich von Hutten, "It is a pleasure to be alive," or better still with Nunne in Ulk ^ : "Nowhere do things happen so funnily as in this world." THE GERMANS ABROAD I FRANCE, ENGLAND, AMERICA When on the occasion of the Agadir incident someone observed to a witty Parisian: "Have you heard that the Germans are at Agadir?" he replied quite coolly, "I don't care; they are in the heart of Paris, at the Champs Elysees ; that is what matters." And in fact, that is what matters. Not only in countries beyond the ocean, but above all even in Euro- pean countries, in those now neutral as well as in those which are now at war with us, everywhere the Ger- mans sat in the heart of trade and commerce until the outbreak of this fearful war — in Germany it is called the "Dawn of the Great Time." Everywhere they conducted important undertakings of their own, or represented German firms, or they managed banks, manufactories, ^ [ Ulk, a weekly humorous paper, published by the Berliner Tage- blat] 62 I ACCUSE! or trading concerns which belonged to foreigners. The Paris Bourse, the high finance of Paris, is full of Ger- man names; Rothschild, Heine, Seligmann, Porges, Schickler, and all the rest of them control the French money-market. German breweries have effected a revo- lution in the restaurant life of France, and with their sumptuous beer-palaces have driven out more and more the fine intimacy of the French eating-house in honour of which we older people may at least shed many a tear of joyful-sorrowful remembrance. The same holds good of countless other fields of activity in France, in which Germans play an authoritative role. This holds, however, with even greater truth in the case of England. It is well known how great a section of the trade and the industry of Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham and other industrial centres is in German hands, and how Germans occupy a leading position in leading English firms as well. Anyone who is ignorant of this should read the reports of the Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry which was appointed to devise measures against the threatened dispossession of Eng- lishmen in their own country, not forcible measures, it is true, for the Englishman is far too much a practical man of business not to know that any forcible measure would cut into his own flesh. Measures were aimed at whereby the young Englishmen would acquire German education, German methods, German adaptability — ■ qualities which it was supposed would enable them to withstand the competition of young Germans in their own country. not to speak of North or South America. The difference between the two Americas consists chiefly in the fact that the Germans in the United States to a large extent assume a new nationality, whereas those in South America for the most part hold firm to their Ger- HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 63 man nationality. Both are of use to the Fatherland, and it is one of the many conventional lies to assert, as is repeatedly done, that the Geniicin who assumes a new nationality is a loss for the German Fatherland. The opposite is nearer the truth. The German who is nat- uralised in the United States does not by any means lose his German character. He remains German in blood, in language, in culture, and in thought. Who will dispute this fact? Are not the artists, writers, and learned men of Germany who tour the American towns received everywhere with enthusiasm by millions of German colonists — indeed, often with most exaggerated and unjustifiable enthusiasm? Even the minores genfes, who in Germany have fallen more or less out of the running, endeavour to rehabilitate themselves by the naive undistinguishing national enthusiasm (which of course they promptly telegraph home). The Germans in North America, whether naturalised or not, are politically and economically an enormous gain for our Fatherland. The intiUiate political relations be- tween the two countries rest in no small degree on the strong percentage of naturalised Germans included in the American population. The whole American culture may be designated as a German-Anglo-Saxon mixture. A section of the American newspapers, which is not without influence on public opinion, appears in the Ger- man language. The export of German books to Amer- ica is enormous. As in democratically-governed coun- tries the representatives in Parliament and the Govern- ment must consider the views of the electors more than in our countr}?-, a policy directed in principle against Germany would over there be impossible. We are ourselves to blame for the fact that we have destroyed the favourable attitude of the American peo- ple by this war, the blame for which is rightly put upon us by all Americans, almost without exception, from 64 I ACCUSE! Roosevelt down to the last newspaper scribbler; and this fact represents a new and important entry in the negative side of our books, in balancing the results of the war. The economical advantages which Germanism in America creates for us is so obvious and so universally- known that a more detailed discussion may be regarded as superfluous. In the high finance of New York, as in that of Paris, naturalised Germans play a distinguished part. We need but mention the names of Ladenburg, Thalmann, Warburg, Speyer, Ellissen, Kuhn, Loeb and Co., Schiff, &c. The enormous imports and exports of the two countries, which in union with England occupy the leading place in the trade of the world, is to a large extent conducted over there by German merchants who almost without exception have assumed American na- tionality — presumably because the political conditions there suit them better than those in our country, a fact which indeed is not to be wondered at. The greatest American breweries are in the possession of Germans, for example, the brewery of Pabst in Milwaukee, and of Peter Dolger in New York. In connection with the brewery of Pabst there are benevolent institutions on a large scale as well as schools in which the children of the employees receive, along with the children of the proprietors, instruction In the German and English lan- guage. The greatest toyshops, for example, those of Schwarz in New York, are in German hands and they naturally obtain their goods from Germany. A very considerable section of American doctors are German by birth, and thus they not merely spread German science in America, but also obtain from Germany their in- struments and their medicinal supplies. The greatest warehouses in New York, the American Gorringe or Peter Robinson, are in German hands. They bear such names as Altmann, Strauss, Gimbel, Blumen^ HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 65 daal, &c. It is natural that all these German "captains of industry" should make use of their knowledge of German sources of supply which they took over with them, and should thus take their wares from the Ger- man contractor, so long as he is in a position to com- pete with the foreigner. The German contractor thus learns, in his turn, to know the requirements of the market there, he adapts himself to the circumstances, and thus there naturally arises from the German origin of the American firm a lasting connection between the German producers and the German-American customer. Whether the latter remains a German or becomes an American is naturally a matter of complete indifference. It is part of the complete ignorance of our nationalist brawlers that they constantly repeat the foolish asser- tion — false assertions as is known do not become more true by frequent repetition — that Germans who are nat- uralised abroad are lost to the Fatherland. The exact opposite may be maintained and proved by reference to the example of South America. Whereas in North America the transition to foreign nationality represents the rule, it is in South America the excep- tion. The Germans in Brazil, in the Argentine, in Chile only in exceptional cases become Brazilians, Argentiners, Chilians; in most cases they remain Gemians. They are thus subject even in times of peace to the disadvan- tage that they must return to Germany for military training — many of them are officers of the reserve and of the Landwehr — and thus they are obliged to interrupt their mercantile activities. When however a war breaks out as has now occurred, and suddenly calls them with- out any preparation to the home country, they have frequently to pay for their adherence to German nationality by the complete ruin of their business, even if they should return alive and unmutilated. This ruin is accelerated by the fact that, as is well known, the 66 I ACCUSE! South American people, like the rest of the neutral world, brand us as the disturbers of the peace, and rightly hold us responsible for the severe blow sustained by their economic life, and thus they are without excep- tion sympathetic to the other side. Owing to the ex- citable temperament of the Spanish population of South America this attitude against Germany manifested itself so strongly against Germans living there, that frequently even those who were not called to arms packed up their knapsacks and returned to Europe. This judgment is based not on newspaper reports but on my personal observations. About the end of August while travelling from America to Germany I had an opportunity of speaking to many Germans returning by Genoa from Brazil, Argentine and Chile. They painted to me the condition of affairs in these countries in the manner indicated above; they were naturally glowing with patriotic enthusiasm (they could not be expected, in South America in the month of August, to guess at the gigantic lie about the war, which to-day professors in Germany have as yet failed to recognise), yet they all admitted that everything which they had laboriously built up in the course of many years, in many cases in the course of decades, had been destroyed at a blow by the outbreak of war. Young men, who had crossed at an early age, and who had slowly worked their way up by industry and efficiency in the great German ex- port-houses, had been obliged to leave their situations to defend their Fatherland "threatened" by Russians and Frenchmen, to defend the freedom and existence of the German people. But even without the order of recall they would probably have lost their situations, since their firms under the effects of the war, which in these countries has produced an almost universal condition of bank- ruptcy, would have had either to close their doors, or at HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 67 least to restrict their business as far as possible. Older people who through many trials and difficulties had ac- quired a position of independence were obliged to give up the conduct of their business in consequence of the war and the antipathy felt towards them by the popu- lation, and had to struggle back to the homeland with wife and child. These also were the innocent victims of their adherence to their German nationality. On the long fifty-two-hours' railway journey from Ala to Munich it was moving to listen to all these stories of broken existences, of shattered hopes, and to observe the quiet spirit of surrender with which all these active pioneers of Germanism abroad, yielding themselves to the inevitable, laid down on the altar of the Fatherland their success and their hopes, built up with so much labour. The inevitable ! So they believed these good, trusting people. If they had but known, and if they only knew how little there was of the inevitable in all this! If they only knew that they were but the marionettes, di- rected by invisible wire-pullers, to pay with their lives and fortunes for the selfish interests and the insane dreams of world-power and Pan-Germanism which these men entertain; if they had but known that all this was arranged and prepared by criminal and ignorant men, who seek to achieve by fire and blood, by murder and devastation, what can only be obtained by the patient, peaceful labour continued through generations of the merchant and the manufacturer, the man of science and the man of knowledge — if these vigorous men had but known all that — ^men who even across the sea had not forgotten German dreams and German idealism, and who had not lost the confidence that the cause for which the German draws the sword must necessarily be a just cause — had they but known the truth, they would scarcely have crossed the sea; they would not 68 I ACCUSE! have left the soil, which had given to them and their families a second home. They were all agreed that the thought of rebuilding their existence in South America could not be enter- tained, and that the years and decades laboriously spent by them there were merely thrown away. Which German then is of most use to the Fatherland ? He who assumes a foreign nationality, as in North America, or he whp remains by nationality a German, as in South America? The former, in my opinion. If we survey the collapse into which our business relations with South America have fallen, and if we transfer this phenomenon to the gigantic proportions of North Amer- ica, v\Ae may congratulate ourselves on the fact that the Germans of North America have for the most part not remained Germans, but have become Americans. What would have been the result if the effects of the war had revealed themselves in North America in a way similar to that in which they have been manifested in South America, if nearly all Germans, those subject to mili- tary service as well as those exempt from service, had had to leave North America, their adopted Fatherland, their positions and their business? An irreparable eco- nomic disaster for Germany would have resulted. As we shall in any case gradually bleed to death if the war endures for any length of time, in consequence of the breach in our business relations with belligerent coun- tries which must remain for many years, such a blow from the neutral country of North America might well have been for us the finishing stroke. Thank God that our German-Americans have always been more sober and more reasonable in their thoughts than our Pan- Germans. By giving up their German nationality they have rendered Germany the best service. This again disposes of one of the theories on which territorial expansion is supported, one of the theories HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 69 productive of constant friction between civilised peoples. Our true colonies lie where we do not possess a square metre of territory: in North and South America, in England, Prance, Russia, and Italy, in North and South Africa, in Canada, and Australia.^ Our commercial intercourse with England amounts to about 185 million pounds sterling, with France about yyy2 million pounds sterling, with both countries to- gether about 262^ million pounds sterling, that is to say, to more than a quarter of our total foreign trade. At the same time we sell more to these countries than we buy from them. We sell to them in round figures to the extent of 1 623/4 million pounds, and we buy from them 100 million pounds. The value of our ex- ports thus amounts to more than 50 per cent, above our imports. About 44 per cent, of German foreign trade, that is to say, about 425 million pounds, is accounted for by all our enemy countries taken together. What is the significance of these figures when we contrast them with the miserable scraps of country — in part wild and unfertile, uninhabitable by Europeans — over which diplomatists wrangle, nations are incited against each other, money is uselessly squandered in gigantic arm- aments, and for which in the end, since the bomb must explode sooner or later, the bloodiest of all wars has been conjured up? When will the peoples of the world at last compre- hend the madness of this situation? When at last will they call aloud to their rulers, and above all when will the Germans exclaim to the rulers of Germany: "We have indeed already got the place in the sun. Only leave us alone in peace and quietness to warm ourselves in the sunshine and to do our work. Do not for ever oppress us with burdens too grievous to be borne. Free ^ These ideas are developed in an admirable manner in The Great Illusion, by Norman Angell (William Heinemann, London). 70 I ACCUSE! yourselves at last from the geographical monomania, whose ambition is to devour square miles, but whick has already almost devoured us poor nations." THE PLACE IN THE SUN FOR US THE PLACE IN THE SHADOW FOR THE OTHERS In reality our imperialists are seeking to achieve some- thing quite different. They also know, even if they do not say it to the stupid people (and Bernhardi's book proves that this is so) that we have indeed the place in the sun, that no one seeks to dispute it, and that if anyone were to seek to do so, he would necessarily fail. But it is something else that they want. They want the exclusive place in the sun; they are striving for the world-dominion of Germany, and that at any rate is what the others are not prepared to yield to them. The German Wehr-Verein, in a meeting held in the House of Representatives, has quite recently expressed this with all the lucidity that can be desired. In this manifesto we find the following words : "We need room and air for the further development of our German nationality. The time for moderation is past. Relentlessly thinking only of our interests, we must and we will dictate peace. Only one peace can be thought of, a peace which assures the permanent leading world-positiom of Germany. . . .The criminal breakers of the peace . . . England, France and Russia, must be so weakened that in future they will cease to be a danger to the peace of the world." Thus we find, on the one side, breakers of the peace, and on the other a permanent leading world-position! Explain this to me, Count Oerindur ! Here we find truth and falsehood mingled in a most dexterous manner. On the one side the true aims of the war-party are HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME *ri openly proclaimed, and yet on the other the pretence that the peace was broken by the other party is boldly maintained. Nevertheless, these gentlemen do not suc- ceed in their sommersault over logic. If to extend our nationality we must obtain for Germany the permanent leading position in the world, that is equivalent to say-j ing in other words that we must compel the others to' subject themselves to our leadership, since to-day we already enjoy equal privileges with others, but not a leadership. If, however, we do this, it is we who are the breakers of the peace, and not the others. In reality that is the position of affairs, as I will point out in the second section of this book. It is none the less of great value that these gentlemen, even while they attempt to deny this, yet admit it against their will. THE FEAR OF GERMANY It is leadership that we seek, not merely equal privi- leges with others. It would be nonsense to say that we seek the latter, since we already possess in the fullest measure such equal privileges. If we are not, as a Ger- man professor has expressed it, "morally and intellec- tually beyond all comparison superior to all other na- tions," ^ there is at least one superiority which has will- ingly been granted to our Prussian Germany by the rest of the world for a century and a half. I refer to our military superiority. While we need only fear God, but nothing else in the world, Germany has been feared by all — almost more than God Himself. Even Tacitus long ago pointed out that the defectiveness of the Ger- man frontiers was made good by fear of the Teutons: "A Sarmatio Dacisque mutuo metu aut montibus separa- tur." The fear of Germany produces the effect that our word weighs heavi ly in the council of the nations * Professor Lasson. 72 I ACCUSE! despite all "encirclement," and despite the wretchedness of our diplomacy. On a certain occasion recently the most important conditions of peace were being discussed in a lively con- versation. Frenchmen, Germans, and Englishmen living abroad were taking part in the discussion seated round the common table, and in the end they almost arrived at an agreement as to the terms of peace. Then, how- ever, the German observed in jest, "One more condi- tion; you French must take over en bloc our German diplomatists." The Frenchman sprang up in indigna- tion and broke off the peace negotiations, exclaiming, **Ah Qa, non ! Ca c'est trop. Nous continuerons a com- hattre." And with these words he left the restaurant. DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE The lack of dexterity shown by our diplomacy — ■ where could all the high-born Borussen and Saxo- Borussen be expected to learn skill in business! — the defects of our diplomacy are constantly made good by the weight of the army, standing In the background. For long the Triple Alliance was Indeed only a sham, but It looked quite well from the outside, and it worked almost like a being of flesh and blood. Thus in all the conflicts of recent years Germany, In union with Austria and Italy, has come out quite well in the end, and her allies, relying on the power of Ger- many, have been able to bear home spoil, with which it would scarcely be proper to compare the acquisi- tions of the Triple Alliance. Was Austria not able in 1908 to bag Bosnia and Herzegovina, a fat morsel of more importance than twenty Moroccos ? Was Italy not able to appropriate without a European conflict Tripoli and the .^gean Islands — acquisitions which it can scarcely be expected to disgorge again? In addition to HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CREVIE 731 the open door in Morocco, which is of more value than any costly rights of possession demanding the expendi- ture of blood, have we not got into the bargain a con- siderable piece of the French Congo — an exchange which cost Caillaux, the Minister responsible for it, his pres- tige and his position, and which almost cost his wife her life? Did we not, acting with our ally Austria, achieve in her interests the great feat of gracefully turning the Montenegrins out of Scutari, which they had purchased with streams of blood, and of introduc- ing there an international garrison? Was not the crea- tion of that mannikin-kingdom of Albania, that "vile abortion of filth and fire," ^ accomplished exclusively in the interests of our allies Austria and Italy? Were we not able to complete with England and Turkey an agree- ment that was favourable to us in connection with Asia Minor and the Bagdad line ? This list of successes could be considerably lengthened. I need not emphasise the fact that, from my point of view, many — indeed nearly all — of these diplomatic bickerings, these alterations and annexations of terri- tory have not the slightest connection with the real interests of the nations. When we reflect that a Euro- pean war, like that raging to-day, almost broke out in 19 12 on the question whether Serbia should receive her celebrated "window on the Adriatic" — when we reflect that nearly every one of the questions mentioned above brought Europe for the time being to the verge of an armed conflict, while these so-called "vital questions"' frequently had not in any way decisive importance for the well-being, in the true sense of the word, of the States immediately concerned, we are constantly con- strained to admire anew the lamb-like patience of the nations and the craziness of the diplomatists, and to concur in the saying of the good Oxenstjema in oon- * Spottegeburt aus Dreck und Feuer — Faust, [74 I ACCUSE! ' doling his son who professed himself unfit for the post of Swedish Ambassador, "An nescis, mi fili, quantilla prudentia mundus regatur?" Austria's Balkan policy ' What advantage has Austria derived from her an- nexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina? — One more worry- added to the many by which she was already plagued. iWould it not have been better for Austria and for the whole world if the Empire had remained content with an occupation such as had existed since 1878 on the basis of the Treaty of Berlin? The Great-Serbian move- ment was fanned into more vigorous life than ever be- jfore by the formal annexation in 1908, and notwith- standing the propitiatory declaration of Serbia in March, 3909, it continued to take its course. National move- ments in fact cannot be suppressed. The practical poli- tician must deal with them as facts, and if he desires to conduct them in the desired direction, he must en- deavour as far as possible to satisfy their demands which rest on community of race, of language, and often of religion, demands which are thus healthy and justi- fied. Therein lies the skill of the English, and the true basis of the colonial greatness of this people. They subdued the South African republics, but almost imme- diately after their subjection they gave them self-gov- ernment within the framework of the great South African Union, and placed at the head of the Union General Botha, their most distinguished military leader. They have acted in the same way towards all their other colonies throughout the world as soon as these were Sufficiently far developed for self-government. Under the flexible suzerainty of Britain, Canada and Australia are independent States enjoying merely the advantages >vhich spring from their connection with the world- HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 75 empire, while suffering no disadvantage from this con- nection. This is the source of the attachment showni by all these colonies to the Mother Country, even by the one most recently acquired by force of arms. This explains the complete failure of Germany's speculations on rebellions or secessions, vi^hich might create difficul- ties for the English, and drive their colonies into the arms of the Germans, — these same Germans who even to-day, before they have yet annexed Belgium, can find nothing better to do than banish the French language from the streets of Brussels and Antwerp and from public life by command of the military authorities. If Austria, instead of annexing Bosnia and Herze- govina to the accompaniment of the rattling sabre o£ her German ally, had accepted the Serbian national movement as a natural fact, and had made reasonable concessions to it on the principle "naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret," we would to-day — ^this can be definitely asserted — we would to-day have had no world-war. But clearly the Austrians understand these things better. They consider it right to treat all their foreign nationalities, Italians, Croats, Slavonians, Rumanians, Serbians, according to the principle: "A brother's love, sir, ere too late ! Or with this stick I'll break your pate." ^ How far they have got with this we see to-day, not' only on the Serbian, but also on the Italian side, and how long will it be until we see, on the Rumanian frontier as well, the effects of this extreme reactionary policy of oppression! But the worse Austrian policy has been, the more as- tonishing are the diplomatic successes which in recent *"Und willst du nicht mein Bruder sein So schlag ich dir den Schadel ein." 76 I ACCUSE I years she has everywhere been able to gain, relying on the armed force of Germany. Germany and Austria have indeed no reason to complain that European diplomatists have constantly trodden on their corns. [Apart from the Morocco question, the questions which have cropped up in recent years were all what are called "vital questions" for Austria, if indeed it is possible to speak of vital questions in the case of a corpse. With this corpse the dexterity of German diplomacy has linked for weal or for woe (unfortunately more for woe than 'for weal) the German national organism, in itself healthy and vigorous. This is in the interest of the **Germanic races in central Europe," to use the beauti- [ful expression of our White Book. Does anyone feel inclined to laugh at this ? Austria, as is well known, consists only so far as a fourth part is concerned of inhabitants of the Germanic race, yet with this idea of "race-protection" we have fortunately advanced so far ^hat these Eastern questions, which to a Bismarck were not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier, are likely to cost us the bones of many hundreds of thou- sands of our countrymen in the prime of their life, and rob us of the labour of many generations. This is indeed a sorry transaction, yet it is one which ^ould have succeeded brilliantly, if it had been left in the field of diplomacy, like all similar transactions in recent years, and if it had not been transplanted to the battlefield. The diplomatic success which was attained on the evening of the 25th July in the Serbian answer to the Austrian Note was one of the most brilliant in the whole diplomatic history of Europe. Austria had gained everything of importance which she had de- manded apart from a few points, and these not decisive, on which Serbia expressed her readiness to negotiate further ; moreover, what she had won exceeded anything that ever one State had obtained from another inde- HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 1% pendent State by diplomatic means in time of peace^ Further, the humiliation of Serbia was at the same time a humiliation of Russia, and the prestige of Austria; at the moment when she insolently and without any grounds recalled her ambassador from Belgrade, stood higher in the Balkans than it had ever done before, and certainly higher than it will ever stand hereafter. This success she owed entirely to the unflinching sup- port of her German ally. Why, notwithstanding this, the situation was allowed to lead to war, or rather why war was intentionally produced, can only be explained by reference to German policy and the tendencies in Berlin, as I will demon- strate by documentary evidence in the second section of this work. For the present discussion it is enough to establish the fact that the assertion constantly repeated in Germany that the Triple Alliance was always left in the cold or beaten over the ears by the diplomacy of the Entente, rests on a falsehood, and that on the contrary the policy of the Triple Alliance on all occa- sions — even at the very last in July, 1914 — was bril- liantly victorious. THE CROWN PRINCE AND WAR PARTY Everyone in Germany constantly speaks about the ^'policy of encirclement" (Einkreisungspolitik) , to which the present catastrophe is attributed. Here also we naturally meet with the same phenomenon as in the whole campaign of justification, which seeks to repre- sent Germany as the innocent lamb and England as the ravening wolf. Those who are initiated, however, know quite well how the matter stands, and if the Crown Prince were to meet Bernhardi or Frobenius in the field, these comrades in the faith would smile to each other like Roman augurs. They know quite well frs I ACCUSE! that it is no foreign policy but our own will — or rather their will — ^that has urged us into this war, and if they were to deny it, now that they see the fearful conse- quences, their own writings would rise up against them as bloody witnesses. What do we find in the introduction to the Crown ■ Prince's book, Germany in Arms? "To-day, indeed, we live in a time which points with special satisfaction to the proud height of its culture, which is only too willing to boast of its international cosmopoli-t tanism, and flatters itself with visionary dreams of the pos- sibility of an everlasting peace throughout the world. This view of life is un-German and does not suit us. The Ger- man who loves his people, who believes in the greatness and the future of our homeland, and who is unwilling to see its position diminished, dare not close his eyes in the indul- gence of dreams such as these, he dare not allow himself to be lulled into indolent sleep by the lullabies of peace sung by the Eutopians. . . . Germany has behind her since the last great war a period of economic prosperity, which has in it something almost disconcerting. Comfort has so in- creased in all circles of our people, that luxury and claims to a certain style of life have undergone a rank development. Now certainly we must not thanklessly deny that a wave of economic prosperity brings with it much that is good. But the shady side of this too rapid development often mani- fests itself in a painful and threatening manner. Already the appreciation of wealth has gained in our country an importance, which we can only observe with anxiety. . . . The old ideals, even the position and the honour of the nation, may be sympathetically affected ; for peace, peace at any price, is necessary for the undisturbed acquisition of money. But the study of history teaches us that all those States which in the decisive hour have been guided by purely commercial considerations have miserably come to grief. The sympathies of civilised nations are to-day, as in the battles of antiquity, still with the sturdy and the bold HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 7^ fighting armies * ; they are with the brave combatants who, in the words which Lessing puts in the mouth of Tellheim, are soldiers for their country, and out of the love which they bear to the cause for which they are fighting. .. . . Certainly diplomatic dexterity can, and should, postpone the conflict for a time, and at times disentangle the difficulties. Certainly all those in authority must and wih be fully con- scious of their enormous responsibility in the grave hour of decision. They must make it clear to their own mindsi that the gigantic conflagration, once enkindled, cannot be so easily or so quickly extinguished. As, however, lightning is an adjustment of the tension between two differently charged strata of the atmosphere, so the sword will always be and remain until the end of the world the decisive fac- tor. . . . And therefore everyone, to whom his country is dear, and who believes in a great future for our nation, must joyfully do his part in the task of seeing that the old military spirit of our fathers is not lost, and that it is not sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought. For the sword alone is not decisive, but the arm steeled in exercise which bears the sword. Each of us must keep himself fit for arms and also prepared in his mind for the great solemn hour when the Emperor calls us to the standard — the hour when we no longer belong to ourselves, but to the Fatherland with all the forces of our mind and our body ; for all these facul- ties must be brought to the highest exertion, to that 'will to victory' which has never been without success in his- tory." That should be sufficient, but there is something better to come. The royal author describes a regimental manoeuvre of the guards on the field at Doberitz : "The steel helmets glitter in the sunshine ; in the galloping exercises every individual horseman endeavours to keep on to the man in front, and to keep the right direction — no easy matter when there is dust, and the ground is rough. Many a one stumbles, and away past him gallops the company of ^ This has now been shown to be true. 80 I ACCUSE! riders. What does it matter ! When you plane wood, shav- ings must fall. . . . And there the call resounds over the field, clear and quivering amid the uproar of the galloping mass, 'Front !' The reins whirl round, and as if by a stroke of magic, the line is formed again, with a front of five impetuous squadrons of the guards, — and then comes the signal 'Charge.' Then the last ounce is taken out of the horses, and with bodies strained forward and with lances in rest with a 'hurrah' we ride to the attack. . . . For any- one who has taken part in such attacks, there is nothing fairer in the world! . . . And yet to the true horseman there is one thing which appears more beautiful: if all that were the same, but if only at the end of the rapid charge, the enemy were to ride out against us, and the struggle for which we have been drilled and trained, the struggle for life and death, were to begin. How often dur- ing such attacks have I heard the yearning call of a comrade riding behind : 'Donnewetter! if that were only the real thing f . . . O horseman's spirit! All who are true soldiers must know and feel: 'Duke et decorum est pro patria The same spirit of the attack finds expression in the message of farewell to the Danzig Hussars. The young war-hero becomes sentimental, because he can no longer ride through life at the head of his Hussars. Already he is "bearing his youth to its grave," but he is con- soled by the thought : "It is indeed possible for me to be separated from you ; but my heart and my spirit remain yours. H some day the King calls, and the bugle sounds the signal 'Charge,' then I ask you to think on him whose most ardent wish it has al- ways been to be allowed to share at your side this, the su- preme moment of a soldier's happiness." This moment has now come. It is now, donnerwetter ! the real thing. The deathhead-hussars have charged into death; they have been mown down like stalks of HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 81 corn. But where at this moment was the gallant colonel of cavalry? Why did he, who still to-day wears the effective uniform of his hussars, not put himself at their head with a "hurrah" against the enemy? Why did he allow to pass ungarnered the supreme moment of a soldier's happiness? "What are the real merits of this young gentleman?" asked Bebel In the Reichstag on the occasion of a discus- sion on the Crown Prince's demonstration, and this young gentleman might be left quietly to himself, to his conscience, and to his further self-education, had he not unfortunately been advanced to the position of a na- tional hero in the course of this war for which he and his friends bear the chief load of guilt, Kor long he has been the undisputed head of the German nationalist party and of the chauvinists, and his views give the key to the German National Orchestra. Great is the Crown Prince, and Liman is his prophet.^ In fighting against him we are fighting against the tendency which without any provocation, without any practical attainable end, has dragged Germany into this unfortunate war, and which, if we do not repent in time, will irredeemably lead to our destruction. It is the misfortune of kings that they are unwilling to hear the truth. But Truth is stronger than they. With stern finger it knocks at their doors. With rever- berating sound it pierces their ears, and if Germany, as the Chancellor says, cannot be crushed, still less is Truth capable of being thus dealt with. It tears asunder the veil, with which it is sought to shroud it, and in triumphant nakedness it advances to meet the light of day. "^The Crown Prince: Thoughts on Germany's Future by Dr. Paul Liman (Wilhelm Kohler, Minden). 82 I ACCUSE! THE POLICY OF ENCIRCLEMENT (EinkreisutigspoUtik) The policy of encirclement is one of the veils with which it is sought to shroud the truth. What do we mean by the phrase: a policy of encirclement? Every- one uses the expression, and no one connects with it any clear idea. If it is supposed to have any meaning, it can only mean a policy which seeks to enclose Ger- many and Austria, the central Powers, by an opposing alliance of the peripheral Powers. That is to say it is a geographical idea. What specially aggressive tendency is to be found in the fortuitous geographical situation of the Powers of the Entente? Are aggressive intentions in any way determined or proved by geographical situation? Would it not have been equally dangerous, or perhaps even more dangerous, for Germany and Austria, if Italy in place of one or other of the Entente Powers had be- longed to the opposing alliance? Or perhaps even America might have been a member. In the case of Italy or America could we have spoken of an "inten- tion to encircle"? At the most we could have done so in the sense in which Fusilier Kutschke maintained that "he had alone and without assistance surrounded a whole company of the enemy." It is clear that geography has nothing to do with the danger of war or with the intention to make war. Just as the Triple Entente is called an encirclement, the Triple Alliance could be called an "excirclement" {Auskreisung) , since indeed Germany, Austria, and Italy form a sort of central block, from which the Powers of the Entente are excluded. The one is just as much defensive or aggressive as the other. The geographical constellation is a mere fortuitous conse- quence of the chronological development of the alliance.; Had Italy still been free when King Edward trans- HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 83 formed the Victorian policy of splendid isolation into a policy of alliances, he would probably have introduced Italy rather than Russia into his system of alHances. Without doubt he would have preferred the democratic Italy, with which he had no conflicting interest, but merely interests in common, to an ally whose political backwardness as well as her conflicting interests in Asia must necessarily make her a very unwelcome friend for England. The grouping of the six Powers in Europe has arisen from historical circumstances and from communities of interest. Their geographical position is purely accidental, and has nothing to do with the character and the tendency of these two groups. It is thus as false as it is superficial to regard the circumferential situation of the Powers of the Entente as merely in itself a danger for the Empires. He who asserts that aggressive intentions exist is under an obli- gation to prove their existence, and further to do so on grounds other than the geographical situation of the Powers concerned. These other grounds, however, are completely lacking. In Germany no matter how much we inquire, no one is in a position to give a definite answer. England is said to have been envious of our commercial development. Envy is an attitude of mind, but not an action. Just as I can compel no one to love, so I cannot forcibly drive out of anyone envy and ha- tred. I must rest content if he does not transform his evil thoughts into actions, just as I also on my side would not submit to be called to account by my neigh- bour merely on account of my disposition. Thoughts indeed are duty-free, and even in reactionary Prussia every citizen, according to the constitution, has the right not only to think as he will, but to give expression to his thoughts "in word, writing or printing." Criminal law punishes not the mere will to do the act, but (with few 84 I ACCUSE! exceptions) only the attempt to do the act, which it defines as the "first step in the commission of it." Where, how and when has England ever attempted to transform her envy of Germany into action? In other words, when has she sought to attack Germany ? Never at any time. Not one action of England can be pointed out, from which the intention to make a military at- tack, in common with her Allies, on Germany could be deduced. You may say that she gave diplomatic sup- port to France on the occasion of the Morocco dispute. But England had a right to do so and indeed a duty, based on the Anglo-French agreement with regard to Egypt and Morocco. And did our ally Austria not adhere to us in this conflict? Have we not adhered to Austria in all Eastern questions? Why should diplo- matic support extended to a friendly or an allied power in the one case be defensive, in the other aggressive? Is England not free in diplomatic negotiations to judge of her own interests and obligations according to her own standard, as we ourselves do with regard to our interests and obligations ? Again I ask : where is the proof of aggressive intentions on the pa/rt of England against usf Objection will be taken to what I have said on the ground of the military and naval agreements which Eng- land had concluded with France, and which she was on the point of concluding with Russia. Have we then concluded no military agreements with Austria regulat- ing the support to be given on either side in a European war down to the last cannon and company? Have not visits and conferences constantly been taking place be- tween the two General Staffs? If our much stricter military agreement with Austria had no aggressive character, why should there be an aggressive character in the much looser adjustments between English and French experts, which scarcely extended beyond the HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 85 scope of a discussion?^ These discussions were, as is documentarily established, entirely of a noncommittal character, because they did not rest on any obligation imposed by the terms of an alliance to afford to each other mutual military support. The Anglo-French En- tente did not contain such obligations, but left it to each party in any given case to decide freely according to her own judgment whether she should or should not afford military support to the other.^ Even in the event of an unprovoked attack by a third Power this freedom remained, and it was only in the case where both Powers freely decided to co-operate that the discussions of the military experts were intended to have practical consequences. The relations between England and Russia were, so far as general European politics are concerned, much looser even than those between England and France. The adjustments between Russia and England were concerned exclusively with territorial interests in Asia, and contained no obligations with regard to Europe. England had so little concern in the Franco-Russian Alliance that it was not even acquainted with the word- ing of the terms of the Alliance.^ Apart from any obligation or intention to attack us there was also, so far as England was concerned, a com- plete absence of any inducement to do so. What advan- tage could England hope to gain from a war against usf We who constantly have on our lips "the English shopkeeper-spirit," and contrast the cold calculating business-sense of the Englishman with our patriotic (En- thusiasm, should really not attribute to this nation of shopkeepers the insanity of desiring to kill their best cus~ ^ See Grey's speech in the House of Commons of August 3rd, 1914. ' See Grey's letter to Cambon, November 22nd, 1912. English Blue Book, No. 105. ® See Grey's speech August 3rd, 1914. 86 I ACCUSE! tomer in order to Improve their business. Such a hare- brained course of action is indeed possible in a nation in which cavalry-colonels and generals and the oppo- nents of the trading classes have the decisive word, but not in a nation of merchantmen in which even the leading politicians in part have their origins in the world of trade, and in any case are without exception fully acquainted with the ideas of the modern commercial spirit. The fact is that England has never had aggressive intentions against us; she has never concluded an al- liance with aggressive intentions against us, and she ha» never done anything whatever to urge on others to at- tack us. Anyone who maintains the contrary is obliged, ac- cording to general rules of procedure, to prove it. I have hitherto looked in vain in German speeches and writings for the submission of this evidence. Every- where there is the empty assertion, without the shadow of a proof. So far, however, as this assertion is advanced in our country by official quarters, that is by people who are acquainted with the diplomatic history of the last fifteen years, the assertion is made against their better knowl- edge, that is to say it is a lie. These last fifteen years, since the first Hague Confer- ence of 1899, are nothing but a continuous series of attempts on the part of England to arrive at a political entente with Germany, and on the basis of this to effect a limitation of naval armaments on both sides — attempts which on every occasion have been wrecked on the lack of judgment or on the evil will of the German Govern- ment. It is well known, and does not here require any de- tailed demonstration, that England on the occasion of the Fashoda incident, when her relations to France were HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 8T becoming' ever more strained and were almost impelling her to a conflict of arms, endeavoured to give up her "splendid isolation," and to conclude an entente with us. Our far-seeing politicians, as so often happens, did not seize the opportunity. They allowed to slip past them the favourable moment in which, without ruinous preparations, without drawing the sword, and in the enjoyment of a lasting security, they might have pro- moted our further prosperity in industry and in culture, and gained for the world an enduring peace. England and Germany the first hague conference On the 28th of August, 1898, there appeared in the Petrograd Official Journal the celebrated Peace Mani- festo of the Tsar. On the mention of this manifesto our war-brawlers smile and point in contempt to the "Tsar of blood" who has now let loose the second fearful war since that message of peace. We shall see later how far Russia is concerned in letting loose the present war. How far Russia was to blame for the Japanese war is a chapter by itself, which should scarcely be allowed to end with the condemna- tion of Russia alone. The intention of the manifesto was in any case correct and honourable, and the aims proposed to the nations of Europe: true and enduring peace, and the limitation of armaments which even in peace slowly lead nations to their economic destruction, — these aims will be, and must continue to be, the un- alterable rule of conduct governing the efforts of all who guide the destinies of European States. Even the pres- ent war, unless it is to be nothing but an insane and purposeless shedding of blood, can have no other aim than this. 88 I ACCUSE! What was the attitude of England towards this mani- festo f What was the attitude of Germany f While in England public opinion in harmony with the Govern- ment hailed the manifesto with the greatest sympathy, and the English Foreign Minister could report to Petro- grad this unanimous approval, there developed in Ger- many also a popular movement in favour of the ideas expressed by the Tsar. But the Government maintained a frigid attitude, and only the social democratic party recognised the epoch-making significance of these ideas — ideas which they had constantly advocated, but which now for the first time received expression in high places. That the idea was Utopian, that it was but a chimaera. — these were the least reproaches thrown at the origina- tor of the manifesto. In conformity with the customary tactics which have since been constantly followed, many rose to the crazy heights of asserting that Russia only desired to entice other States to a limitation of arma- ments in order that she herself might be able to pile up in secret still greater armaments and thus with greater security pursue her Pan-Slav efforts. The record in malicious attacks was naturally achieved even then by a German professor, Stengel, the lecturer in international law at Munich, who prophesied in ad- vance the most dismal results of the Conference which at the time had not yet assembled. In recognition of this, he was straightway sent by the Foreign Office to the Hague Conference as one of Germany's representa- tives. After the epoch-making memorials of the Russian Councillor Von Bloch, the Conference owed its origin chiefly to English influences. As early as 1891 the English Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, had had a state- ment of the cost of European military preparations com- piled, and had transmitted this confidential document to the German Emperor without, it is true, achieving any HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 89 success. The efforts of Lord Salisbury met with suc- cess only when they were emphasised by the inter-par- liamentary conference of 1896. On that occasion Lord Salisbury in a remarkable speech in the Guildhall re- gretted the ruinousness of .constantly increasing arm- aments, and in the end, through the instrumentality of Count Lambsdorf, laid the whole of the material bearing on the question before the Tsar.^ The preludes played by Germany and by England were in harmony with the performances given by these two States at the Conference itself, which in spite of all hostility assembled at the Hague on the i8th of May, 1899, under the participation of twenty-six States. Throughout the whole proceedings of the Conference we find the same picture, that, namely, of England leading in all efforts the aim of which was to diminish the in- tolerable burdens of armaments and, in an ever-widening degree, to place the differences arising between civilised nations on a legal basis. On the side of England there were France, Russia, America, and naturally all the smaller States. On the other side, however, there con- stantly stood Germany with her true ally, Austria-Hun- gary. The opposition of Germany to all progressive efforts Was at times so pronounced that if the others had not repressed their desires, the whole Conference would have broken up. So it was on the question of armaments ; so also on that of arbitration. By way of introduction to the discussion on arma- ments the German Emperor delivered a speech in Wiesbaden in which he declared that the best pledge of peace was the "sharp, gleaming sword." In the course of this discussion we shall have occasion to ob- serve that it is a part of the German system to furnish on every occasion an introduction to the concert of the ^ See Fried. Handbuch der Friedensbewegung, Vol. I, p. 204. 90 , I ACCUSE! European pipes of peace by blowing a war-fanfare on the Prussian bugle. The Russian proposal was to the effect that the strength of the Army on a peace basis and the military estimates should not be increased in the next five years, and that in the case of the navy this respite should be fixed for three years. This proposal, which was bril- liantly defended by the Russian military plenipotentiary — (he emphasised above all the incontestable fact that the competition in armaments was futile, since the rela- tive strength between the various States still remained constant) — was energetically rejected by the German military plenipotentiary General Gross von Schwarzhof. If the French plenipotentiary Leon Bourgeois, who rep- resented the restriction of armaments as a requirement of civilisation and a duty imposed on all States, had not succeeded in uniting the votes of the commission in sup- port of a resolution formulated by him (a resolution, it is true, wholly without effect in practice) the negotia- tions of the Conference on this point would have been completely wrecked. The resolution ran: "The Conference is of opinion that the restriction of military charges, which are at present a heavy burden on the world, is extremely desir- able for the increase of the material and moral welfare of mankind." The recognition of this fact has not prevented Euro- pean Governm.ents, under the leadership of the German Empire, from inflating their armaments to such an extent that in the end the balloon, distended to the bursting- point, was bound to explode and set the whole world in flames. Even worse was the fate of the Russian proposal for the establishment of international arbitration. This pro- posal, indeed, was modest enough in what it contem- plated; obligatory arbitration on principle was, it is true, HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 91 to be introduced, but this was to be excluded in all cases affecting" vital interests or the honour of a State. As each State was to remain its own judge as to what it should regard as a qttestion of honour or of vital inter- ests, the Russian proposal cannot be said to have had a revolutionary character, a matter to be regretted, for the most important steps forward in the history of mankind are achieved by revolutions and not by warfare as is maintained by those who pay homage to war. The pro- posal, then, secured the approval of almost all taking part in the Conference ; on this point also Germany alone raised objection on the ground that subjection to a court of arbitration was not, as Professor Zorn maintained, "in conformity with the traditions of the Bismarckian policy." The opposition of Germany was so violent that nego- tiations came to a dead stop, and they had to be post- poned for a period of fourteen days to enable Professor Zorn to receive new instructions from Berlin. The Con- ference very nearly proceeded without the co-operation of Germany. But here again, rather than allow the whole proposal to be wrecked, it was resolved in the end to yield to the will of Germany and in all cases to allow optional in place of compulsory jurisdiction. Here again Germany had the undisputed merit of hav- ing barred the way to a decisive step forward in the peaceful organisation of the nations. The establishment of a perpetual court of arbitration at the Hague was similarly refused by Germany from the outset, and it was admitted only when it was made optional and not compulsory to summon this court. Thus the first Hague conference ended, in spite of Ger- many and Austria, and owing to the active exertions of France and England in support of the efforts of Russia for peace, with a final result which after all represented a first important step towards the aim of an organisa- 92 I ACCUSE! tion of States based on law and of a gradual liberation of the nations from the intolerable oppression of their armaments. BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCES ! THE ENGLISH LIBERAL GOVERNMENT. Between the first and the second Hague Conferences — the second was held from July to October, 1907 — • the development of events in the different European countries was highly characteristic of the attitude of these countries and of their governments towards the problems of the Hague, and the occurrences during this period serve to emphasise in the sharpest manner the difference between England and Germany. Even before the first Conference was held, Goschen, the First Lord of the Admiralty, speaking on behalf of the English Conservative Government, made a definite declaration on March 9th, 1899, in favour of a regulation by treaty of the system of armaments. This declaration was confirmed in July, 1903, by Mr, Chamberlain, a member of the Government, with the observation that it was still regarded as binding on the English Cabinet.^ When in 1905 the Liberal party came into power and Campbell-Bannerman, a convinced pacifist, became leader of the Ministry, the English Government at once began to display an energetic and untiring activity on the same lines as the efforts which at the first Hague Conference had, chiefly in consequence of the opposition of Germany, produced only very modest results. This activity of the English Liberal Government was on so large a scale and was so comprehensive that it is impossible within the limits of this work to emphasise all their individual acts. In Parliament, at inter-Parlia- mentary Conferences, in speeches at clubs and at the "■ See Fried. Handbuch der Friedensbewegung, II, p. ^6^. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 93 Guildhall, in diplomatic negotiations with other Powers, in newspaper and magazine articles, English Ministers' never grew weary of laying stress on the perniciousness for all nations of the competition in armaments by land and by sea, and never flagged in their efforts to devise remedial measures for this ruinous situation. These same men who are to-day represented to the deluded and infatuated German people as men refined in the prepara- tion and instigation of war, whose personal honour Ger- man historians dare to deny, men like Grey, Haldane, Lloyd George, Campbell-Bannerman, Asquith, and the others, these men devoted themselves with the utmost zeal to these problems, which, as they well saw, affected the vital nerve not only of England, but of all European states. "A policy of huge armaments," exclaimed Camp- bell-Bannerman in his programme, "keeps alive and stimulates and feeds the belief that force is the best, if not the only, solution of international differences." ^ "I wish," Haldane, then Minister for War, declared in the House of Commons on March 8th, 1906, "we were near the time when the nations would consider together the reduction of armaments . . . only by united action can we get rid of the burden vv^hich is pressing so heavily on all civilised nations." ^ On the occasion of a banquet on September 26th in the same year the Prime Minister expressed the hope that the understanding then reached with regard to Morocco (the Algeciras Convention had been completed on April 7th) would lead to a possibility of reducing the oppressive military expenditure, and he declared that England would put itself at the head in this matter. To this intention the English Government gave effect. The outline of the Russian programme for the second Hague Conference, published in spring, 1906, contained * [Albert Hall speech December 21st, 1905.] " [Hansard, 1906, Vol. 153, 8, 674.] 94 I ACCUSE! nothing on the problem of armaments, presumably be- cause the Russian Government had gathered from the attitude of Germany at the first Conference that any dis- cussion of this question would be useless. The English Liberal Government now made the most determined efforts to secure the inclusion in the programme of the Conference of the question of armaments as well as the question of arbitration. A proposal on this point, put forward in the House of Commons by the Labour mem- ber, Mr. Vivian, was accepted unanimously amid ap- plause, and the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, associated himself with the resolution on behalf of the Government. "I do not believe," said Grey, "that at any time has the conscious public opinion in the various countries of Europe set more strongly in the direction of peace than at the present time, and yet the burden of military and naval expenditure goes on increasing. . . . No greater service could it {the Hague Conference) do, than to make the conditions of peace less expensive than they are at the present time. . . . It is said we are wait- ing upon foreign nations in order to reduce our expen- diture. As a matter of fact, we are all waiting on each other. Some day or other somebody must take the first step. ... I do, on behalf of the Government, not only accept, bvit welcome such a resolution as this as a whole- some anti beneficial expression of opinion." ^ j When in July, 1906, the Interparliamentary Union, | including 620 representatives from twenty-three coun- tries, met in London, the Prime Minister, Campbell-Ban- nerman, made a memorable speech in opening the pro- ceedings : "Insist, in the name of humanity," he ex- claimed to the members, "that your Government should go to the Conference at the Hague with the firm inten- tion with which we ourselves are going, with the inten- ^ [Hansard, 1906, Vol. 156, 78, 1414-5-] HISTORICAL ANTECEHENTS OF THE CRIME 95 tion of diminishing the burdens of the Army and Navy Estimates." The American poHtician, WilHam Jennings Bryan, who also was present, expressed himself in the sam.e sense. A resolution, corresponding to the views then expressed, was carried unanimously. In the following year, some months before the open- ing of the Conference, Campbell-Bannerman spoke even more strongly in a meeting of the House of Commons on March 5th, 1907, in support of the idea of a common restriction of armaments. He declared that it was the duty of England to bring this matter forward for dis- cussion before the second Hague Conference, ''holding the opinion that there is a great movement of feeling among thinking people in all the nations of the world in favour of . . . some restraint on the enormous ex- penditure involved in the present system so long as it exists. . . . We have desired and still desire to place ourselves in the very front rank of those who think that the warlike attitude of Powers as displayed by the ex- cessive growth of armaments is a curse to Europe, and that the sooner it is checked, in however moderate a de- gree, the better." ^ The leading men in the other countries of Europe and of America also gave expression to views similar to those of the English Ministers. Leon Bourgeois in Paris, Tittoni, then Foreign Minister in Rome, Roosevelt in his message to Congress, all expressed themselves in favour of an agreement with regard to armaments, and a discussion of this question at the Hague Conference. Only Austria and Germany made once again a vain- glorious exception. In reply to an inquiry on the sub- ject Count Gulochowski gave in the Austrian Delega- tions only an evasive answer. In Germany the mere idea of an international discussion of these questions ^ [Hansard, 1907, Vol. 170, 78, 675.] 96 I ACCUSE! was at once enough to let loose the devil of nationalism. Behind the efforts of the other Powers they scented, as usual, a cunning trick to deprive Germany of her de- fences, and they professed to see the danger of war threatening them in the inclusion of such a point in the Hague programme. "The nearer the Peace Conference approaches," so wrote the Tdgliche Rundschau in a lead- ing article on April 9th, 1907, "the clearer it becomes that it is expressly characterised by tendencies inimical to peace." Herr Bassermann, a representative in the Reichstag, did not venture to hope for a more peaceful situation until after the Hague Conference had been safely got over. The Prussian Minister of War osten- tatiously emphasised Germany's readiness for war. Liebermann von Sonnenberg, a representative in the House, concluded a patriotic Pan-German speech in the Reichstag with the courageous words : "Let them come." And last, but not least. Prince Biilow did not allow himself to hope for any results from the discussion of the problem at the Hague, and publicly expressed his intention of "leaving the discussion to be conducted by those Powers alone who hoped that any success might result from it." That was the answer which Germany gave to the Eng- lish proposal for an international agreement on armor- ments. SECOND HAGUIi CONFERENCE! ENGLAND AND GERMANY The negotiations which took place at the Conference corresponded to the very promising way in which it began. Matters took pretty much the same course as at the first Conference. England wanted a discussion of the problem of armaments; Germany, however, de- clined it To avoid a conflict a way out was sought and found. The first representative of England, the Lord HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 97 Chief Justice, Sir Edward Fry, delivered a speech in which he elucidated the problem from every point of view, and proposed a resolution which declared that it was eminently desirable that Governments should re- sume their study of the question. This resolution was unanimously adopted, since according to the arrange- ment made no discussion could take place. Once more we see that Germany scored a brilliant success; once again a pathway to progress was barri- caded ! When a member of the House, Bebel, interpellated Prince Biilow in the sitting of the Reichstag of Novem- ber 2 1st, 1907, with regard to the attitude of the German delegates, the Imperial Chancellor could truthfully reply that the German delegates had taken no part in a dis- cussion on the question of armaments, because such a discussion had not taken place. But he forgot to add that this exclusion of a debate had been dictated hy Germany. In England there was naturally universal disappoint- ment over the failure of the noble-minded efforts of leading Liberal Ministers. A few months before his death Campbell-Bannerman gave expression to this dis- appointment in the words : "We had hoped that a great step forward might be made in the direction of putting a stop to the increasing competition of armaments. We were disappointed." They were disappointed but not disheartened. After this failure to arrive at the desired end along the path of international agreement the method of private negotia^ tions with Germany was adopted. We shall see later with what success. Apart from the problem of armaments the question which chiefly engaged the attention of the second Hague Conference was naturally that of international arbitra- tion. The problem before them was to give to the torso m I ACCUSE! "55 of 1889 ^ finner and more harmonious form. It was in- tended that the compulsory element, which had miscar- ried owing to Germany, should be inserted in the earlier resolutions. In order not to encounter once more the opposition of Germany a very complicated proposal had been prepared, which, it is true, made it compulsory for the contracting Powers to submit to arbitration, but only subject to the exclusion of all questions which affected important interests or the independence of the parties to the dispute. Even this limited element of compulsion encountered the determined resistance of Germany. The proposal was remodelled in every direction in order to meet Ger- many; but not even this watery proposal gained the ap- proval of Germany, which voted against it along with Austria, while the great majority of States, including England, France, and Russia, accepted the proposal by 32 votes to 9. But even then the path of tribulation of international arbitration was not ended. The proposal was put for- ward that the agreement accepted by so great a majority should be binding at least on those Powers v/hich had concurred in it. But the German representative, Frei- herr von Marschall, protested against this as a violation of the principle of unanimity, and no other course was open to the Conference than to be content on this ques- tion also with a declaration which, indeed, expressed the platonic inclination of the Powers to the principle of compulsory arbitration, but, in practice, "preserved for each of the Powers represented the maintenance of its own standpoint." Thus the number of Germany's successes increase! Our title of glory, that of being everywhere a drag on the peaceful understanding between the nations, will remain undisputed, but it can scarcely contribute to mak- ing us loved throughout the world. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 99 ENGLISH PROPOSALS FOR A POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING AND FOR A NAVAL AGREEMENT WITH GERMANY. Scarcely had the sound of the peaceful concluding words of the President of the Conference died away in the Rittersaal at the Hague when the English Ministers began to turn their attention to devising new ways [whereby they could attain the object that hovered be- [fore them — an end equally advantageous to all the na- tions. After all outstanding questions between England and France had been disposed of by the Convention of April, 1904, and the conflicts of interest between Eng- land and Russia had likewise been overcome by the Agreement of 1907, the Liberal Government, which, after the death of Campbell-Bannerman, was now under the leadership of Asquith, regarded it as the most impor- tant task of its foreign policy to establish its relations with Germany on a basis calculated to exclude, as far as possible, the occurrence of conflicts. There were no real conflicting interests or occasions of friction between England and Germany, or at most these only existed to a very small extent. The difficulties in East Africa had been regulated by the treaty concluded in 1890 by Salisbury and Caprivi whereby Heligoland was handed over to Germany, and in return concessions were made to England in East Africa. Questions arising in Asia Minor scarcely offered enough material for a serious con- flict, and the treaty contluded in the early summer of 1914, notwithstanding the tension in the political situa- tion, shows that the peaceful demarcation of spheres of interest between England and Germany involved no particular difficulty where there was mutual good will. "What, then, is the object of this competition in naval armaments, which constantly grows more fatal for both sides?" — this was the question which the English Gov- ernment and English public opinion was bound to ask. 100 I ACCUSE! If both countries desired peace, why should they ruin each other in armaments? If, however, one side pro- poses limitation of armament by treaty, as England did at the Hague in 1889 and 1907, and the other side con- stantly declines any such limitation, is it not, in these circumstances, a justifiable suspicion that the party which declines entertains unconfessed intentions against the party which makes the proposal? The English public were logically bound to propound such questions to themselves, and they might quite rightly put the further question : What would Germany, what would the whole of Europe say, if England, the leading Power on sea, were suddenly to begin to create a force by land, which sooner or later might become equal to the German in strength ? Would not this rightly be regarded as a threat against the Power competing against her on the Continent? The German naval law and the con- stant increases in naval strength effected at short inter- vals of time, whereby Germany, in the course of twenty years, has become the second naval Power in the world, was bound to place the English Government before the alternative of either answering Germany's naval arma- ments by a corresponding increase in their own or em- barking on the attempt to make good, by a private agree- ment between Germany and England, the general ar- rangements which had been wrecked at the Hague. Mr, Asquith's Government chose in the first place the latter way, which was thorny enough in view of Germany's opposition in principle to restrictions of armaments of any kind, imposed by way of a treaty. This disinclination must, indeed remain entirely in- comprehensible to the ordinary man. It is probably a part of the superior insight of those who govern by the grace of God to be in a position to dispute the correct- ness of the following simple calculations. The English say to the Germans : "We consider that the present re- HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 101 lation in strength of our two fleets, sixteen to ten, is a suitable one, and in any case, since we do not possess an army of any importance, we consider ourselves under an obligation to stick to this proportion for the main- tenance of our power and for the protection of our trade and of our over-sea possessions. If you, Germany, agree to this proportion being fixed, so much the better for both of us ; further construction will then be useless, for the relative strength of the one compared to the other will always remain the same. If, however, you do not agree, so much the worse for you. We on our side will then lay down two ships for every ship which you lay down; the relation of sixteen to ten will thus be at once changed to your disadvantage, absolutely as well as relatively. When you have built ten new ships, that is to say, when you have got as far as twenty, we will have built twenty new ships, and will have reached thirty-six, etc. The absolute distance between our two fleets will thus constantly increase, and the relative posi- tion will constantly become more unfavourable for you. In the end we will ruin each other, and will be like the Kilkenny cats which ate each other up until only the tails were left. It is for you to choose. If you decide on our first proposal, in ten years' time you will be in as safe a position as you are to-day, and you will have spared your money and your people. If you choose the second proposal your security will be diminished every year, and at the same time you will be gradually ruining yourself; and it will be but a small consolation to you that you are at the same time bringing us to the verge of ruin also. One would have thought that a ragged schoolboy, who had just learned the first elements of the multiplication table, would have understood this calculation, and would have been overjoyed to accept the first proposal. The German Imperial Government could not rise to this 103 I ACCUSE! height, and so the wearisome negotiations constantly re- newed from the side of England — they might be called the seven years' armaments war of 1907-14 — collapsed without result. Indeed, it may be asserted that the fail- ure of the negotiations, the constant increase of arma- ments caused thereby, and the increasing tension in the political situation due to the increased armaments, are to a considerable extent responsible for the fact that a real war has at last grown out of the war of arma- ments. The responsibility for this is exclusively Germany's, as a short account of the relevant events will reveal. At the seventeenth World Peace Congress, which met in London in July and August, 1908, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Lloyd George, advocated with pas- sionate words an understanding between England and Germany, and lamented "that it should be necessary in the twentieth century of the Christian Era to hold a meeting in a civilised country to protest against the ex- penditure by Christian communities of 400 millions a year upon preparing one nation to kill another." Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister, on the occasion of the Lord Mayor's banquet in 1908, gave the assurance that Eng- land would "not be reluctant to grasp any hand that is extended to us in good will and in good faith." On March i6th in the following year Mr. Asquith stated to the House of Commons that the question of a mutual reduction of expenditure for naval purposes had more than once formed the subject of communications between the two Governments, but unfortunately without result.^ This utterance of the English Prime Minister led, in the last days of March, to a discussion in the German Reich- stag, in the course of which various speakers urgently besought the Government to grasp somewhat more ener- getically the hand offered by England. Bassermann, a ^ [Hansard, 1909. Vol. 72, 8, 1,459.] HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 103 member of the House, felt, of course, all kinds of scruples, and prepared the way for Prince Biilow, who in the first place denied that any definite proposal had been made by England, and on the general question "held out no hope of any effective results from negotia- tions with reference to the limitation of naval con- struction." These utterances of Biilow occasioned a new discus- sion in the English House of Commons, in the course of which the Foreign Secretary, Sir E. Grey, delivered a highly important speech on the naval competition be- tween England and Germany. For England, declared the Foreign Secretary, the Navy was what the Army was to Germany. The superiority of the English Navy must be maintained, but on the basis of this superiority an understanding might very well be arranged between the two countries. Grey let it be seen that England might be prepared to alter her attitude with regard to the ques- tion of the capture of an enemy's private property at sea, if this would be accepted as a starting-point for a diminution of naval expenditure.^ In introducing the Navy Estimates in 1909 Mr. Mc- Kenna, then First Lord of the Admiralty, speaking in the House of Commons on July 26th, declared that "the British Government not only expressed its desire, but by something much stronger than words showed its deter- mination to give the lead in restricting armaments, and for three successive years the British Government did its utmost to convince the world of the futility of its race in armaments, and of the desirability of curtailing construction." ^ After enumerating all the previous en- deavours of England, which unfortunately had proved fruitless, Mr. Asquith also declared that even then the door was still open and that they were anxious and even * [Hansard, 1909. Vol. 3, 61.] * [Hansard, 1909. Vol. 8, 859.] 104 I ACCUSE! eager to come to some arrangement with other Powers.^ Every indication that the German Government desired to enter into such an agreement would meet with the heartiest reception from the English Government. In answer to a question of a member Mr. Asquith answered shortly and definitely: "We have taken the initiative." The more the English Ministers revealed their en- deavour to arrive at an understanding with Germany on the question of naval armaments, the more did they be- come an object of attack and suspicion to the German chauvinist press. On July 14th, 19 10, Mr. Asquith was obliged to declare that the German Government had evaded further inquiries, stating that they were bound by a law, and that a modification of this law would not have the support of public opinion in Germany.^ On the following day Mr. Lloyd George, speaking at a ban- quet, denounced in passionate words "the epidemic of prodigality which seems to be sweeping over the world and sweeping to destruction." In reply to these earnest and uninterrupted efforts of the English Ministry the Imperial Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, offered in December, 1910, a few platonic ob- servations which must have acted like a stream of cold water: England, he said, had indeed made suggestions, but had submitted no positive proposals ; Germany in the pourparlers had constantly started from the idea that an open and unrestrained discussion leading to an under- standing with regard to their interests on both sides was the surest means of overcoming any distrust due to their relative strength by land and by water. "The mere continuance of a free and unrestrained exchange of thought on all questions connected with these matters is a guarantee for the friendly intention ..." &c. As Thoas says in "Iphigenle" : '' [Hansard, 1909. Vol. 8, 879.] ^ [Hansard, 1910. Vol. 19, 645.] HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 105 "A flood of words is useless in refusing ; The other hears in all the one word : 'No/ " * This "No!" resounds again with full distinctness in the following year. In the House of Commons on March 13th, 191 1, Grey had once more emphasised the necessity of arriving at an agreement with Germany and of restricting the continuing increase of the expenditure on armaments. He foresaw that if this tremendous ex- penditure on, and rivalry of, armaments continued, it must in the long run break civilisation down. The bur- den of armaments was a greater danger than war itself, since it involved a bleeding to death in time of peace.^ This speech of Grey formed the subject of the debate in the Reichstag on March 30th, 191 1, in which the Imperial Chancellor — now quite plainly and without any concealment — declared that the question of an agreement as to armaments was insoluble so long as men were men and States were States. Thus the decisive word was now spoken, and in view of Parliamentary conditions in Gennany little signifi- cance could be attached to the fact that the Reichstag passed a resolution calling upon the Chancellor to enter into negotiations with other Powers with regard to the limitation of armaments should the occasion arise. Ac- cording to German political law of the Bismarckian tra- dition the Imperial Chancellor is, as is well known, merely the servant of his lord, and is not obliged to pay any attention to Parliamentary resolutions. But the English did not yet relax their efforts. Events in Morocco had led to the dispatch of a German warship to Agadir, and to negotiations arising out of this be- tween the Powers affected — negotiations which put a ^ "Man spricht vergebens viel, um zu versagea Der andere hort in allem nur das Nein." " [Hansard, 191 1. Vol. 22, 1,985-6.! il06 I ACCUSE! severe strain on the peace of Europe. In the autumn of 191 1, the negotiations at last arrived, through many- perils, at the goal, with the result that the disputes be- tween France and Germany with regard to Morocco were finally composed, and as an equivalent for France's freedom of action in Morocco a portion of French Congo w^as ceded to the German Empire. Scarcely had this cloud passed away from the political horizon vv^hen Sir Edward Grey emphasised anew, in the English Parlia- ment on November 27th, 191 1, England's urgent desire for the establishment of better relations with Germany. The existing friendships of England did not constitute a hindrance to the conclusion of new friendships. Eng- land had co-operated in securing a peaceful solution of the Morocco crisis, the air was now purified, and he would gladly welcome any wish on the part of Ger- many for better relations with England.^ In the beginning of February, 19 12, the English Gov- ernment sent Lord Haldane to Berlin, not as an official plenipotentiary, but with the task of sounding the ground in conversations with the Chancellor and the Emperor, with whom Haldane was a persona gratissima, and if possible of preparing the way for the political and naval agreement which had been so long sought. The prelude to Lord Haldane's activity was not exactly encouraging; , two days before his arrival in Berlin the Emperor, in opening the Reichstag, had announced great increases both in the Army and in the Navy. The increase in the Navy was to extend to no less than three capital ships, many submarines, and fifteen hundred men. On this Lord Haldane put to the Chancellor and to Admiral von Tirpitz the very proper question : What would be the use of negotiations aiming at friendly relations be- tween the two Powers, if Germany was going at the Same mom ent to increase her battle fleet as a precaution ^[Hansard, 191 1. Vol. z^, 43-65.] HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME lOT against England, and thereby compel England to a cor- responding increase on her side? Negotiations with a view to friendly relations accompanied by increases in the Navy would provoke worldwide derision. The Ger- man representatives indicated that a naval agreement without a simultaneous political Entente was purposeless, but they also at once emphasised that even in the event of a political understanding, there could be no question of a reduction in the naval programme, but that at the most a certain retardation in carrying it out might be approved.^ The promise of a possible retardation in naval construction was even further limited in that it was to be an "understanding and not a written agree- ment." Thus, while on the one hand the aim pursued with un- tiring zeal by the Liberal English Government for seven years, the aim of arriving at a cessation of naval arma- ments on both sides, remained unachieved — since the pro- posed retardation, which was not even of a binding na- ture, would result neither in such a cessation nor in a saving of expenditure — Germany, on the other hand, demanded, as an equivalent for these so-called conces- sions, political conditions which it was simply impossible for England to fulfil. The attitude assumed by the Ger- man Government in connection with all Anglo-German negotiations is in itself sufficiently remarkable, namely, that an equivalent could justifiably be demanded in re- turn for a concession, which, after all, did not repre- sent a sacrifice on one side, but was a duty implicit in the vital interests of both. With just as much right an equivalent could have been demanded by England, who was equally ready to bind herself. ^ These and the following facts are taken from Sir Edward Cook's pamphlet entitled: How Britain Strove for Peace. A Record of Anglo-German Negotiations 1898-1914. Told from authoritative sources. (Macmillan and Co., London, 1914.) 108 I ACCUSE! But, to pursue the question, what was the equivalent demanded by Grermany? Germany demanded neither more nor less — and here it revived a demand already formulated in previous years by the Chancellor, Beth- mann Hollweg — than the obligation for Britain of un- conditional neutrality in the event of any European con- flict in which Germany might be involved. England was thus to free herself from her engagements to the En- tente and was to withhold herself from every co-opera- tion in European questions. In view of the close alliance with Austria it was scarcely possible to conceive a con- flict in which Germany might not be involved, either on account of her own interests or on account of those of Austria, yet everywhere England was expected to re- main an inactive spectator, and to allow Germany and her ally full freedom to rule the roast on the Continent. Even treaty-obligations to protect neutrals would have been abolished had England concurred in the German proposal of an unconditional neutrality in all disputes aflfecting Germany. It is, therefore, not surprising that this suggestion, which had already been rejected between 1909 and 191 1, should again have been rejected in 1912 after Haldane's visit; indeed, it amounted to no more than a demand that England should simply renounce her position as a European great Power. This demand would in any case have been monstrous, even if its fulfilment had been sought to be purchased at a high price. But what was the price offered by Herr von Bethmann Hollv/eg? An unbinding, unwritten, temporary retardation, which in- volved no reduction in naval construction on the basis of the most recent increase of the fleet in 19 12. This suggestion was really rather strong, and postu- lated a high degree of simplicity on the part of the shrewd English men of business. What, indeed, would German diplomacy have said if it had been suggested HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 109 that Germany should sell the birthright of her position as a great Power in Europe in exchange for the mess of pottage of an English retardation in naval construc- tion? Sir Edward Grey was obliged to decline the German proposal; he did not, however, content himself with merely declining it, but he repeated again on this occa- sion what he had said in previous years in public as well as in diplomatic negotiations; that is to say: 1. That England could not agree to an unconditional obligation to observe neutrality, such as Germany de- manded, but, on the other hand, she would always be ready, as she had hitherto been, to work in common with Germany in the interests of the peace of Europe; 2. That the Triple Entente was not based on general political formulae, but on a settlement of specific ques- tions affecting the interests of the Entente Powers, and that only indirectly by the settlement of these questions and by the removal of causes of friction had relations of friendship resulted; 3. That these relations had neither an exclusive nor an offensive character against Germany and that there was no reason why Germany should not enter into simi- lar relations with England. In order to give as precise a form as possible to these ideas the English Cabinet resolved to express them in a short formula, which was handed by Sir Edward Grey to the German Ambassador, Count Metternich, and which was intended to serve as a basis for further naval negotiations. The formula ran as follows : — "The two Powers being naturally desirous of securing peace and friendship between them, England declares that she will neither make, nor join, in, any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part, of any treaty, under- standing, or combination to which England is now a 110 I ACCUSE! party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object." England thus promised that she would, for herself, make no unprovoked attack upon Germany and that she would not share in any such venture; she further de- clared that an attack upon Germany was neither contem- plated nor permitted by any treaty or convention to which she was a party. Lastly, England promised that she would never be a party in any such treaty or agree- ment. This was thus a promise of non-aggression in the widest sense of the word. What more could Ger- many reasonably ask? Germany was secured against every attack on the part of England, and with this se- curity any reason or pretence for naval competition col- lapsed, unless — and there's the rub! — unless Germany herself had aggressive intentions against her neighbours, England's friends in the Entente, and thus indirectly against England. Here we have the salient point, on which the year-long negotiations between the two coun- tries constantly and necessarily came to grief. England offered the assurance that she would not attack. Germany, however, asked for security to he able to attack undisturbed. The English offer had little value for Germany, since the German Government knew quite well from the attitude of the English Liberal Cabi- net since 1905 that there was no ground to fear an at- tack from the side of England. The only point that mat- tered to Germany was that she should be able to count on English neutrality, under all circumstances, in all Continental conflicts, even if they were provoked by Ger- many or her ally, and even if they affected the inde- pendence of neutral countries, and thereby directly or indirectly affected English interests. By isolating Eng- land, Germany desired to make her path secure, in the first place, to a hegemony on the Continent, in order later on to rise from this advantageous position to the HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 111 perpetual leadership of the world at the cost of England. This idea also dominates, as we shall see, German's dip- lomatic preparations for the war in the last days of July, 1914. "The thought is clever — devilishly so ! Apart from that, it might be called damned silly." ^ Neither at an earlier nor at a later date did the English allow themselves to be entrapped by this lime. The negotiations of 19 12 failed, like all other negotiations before and after this, on Germany's demand for neu- trality. But one last English attempt, again along different lines, was still to be made. After the new German navy increase of 1912, after Haldane's visit had passed with- out results, and after the last negotiations between Grey and Metternich, the British Government resumed an at- tempt — already undertaken under Campbell-Bannerman in 1906 — to induce in the other side a better insight into the interests of both parties through the measures actu- ally adopted by them in connection with the Navy, with- out having recourse to any diplomatic negotiations. Al- though in spring, 1906, the Gemian navy programme of 1900 had again been increased by six large cruisers, the English Government announced in July of the same year that the programme laid before Parliament in March for the construction of new ships would be re- duced by 25 per cent, in the case of battleships, by 60 per cent, in the case of destroyers, and by 33 per cent, in the case of submarines. The reason for this one- sided voluntary reduction was, as the Government ex- pressly declared, on the one hand, to announce to the whole world, before the meeting of the second Hague ^ "War' der Gedank' nicht so verwiinscht gescheit, Man war' versucht, ihn herzlich dumm zu nennen." 112 I ACCUSE! Conference, England's firm intention to reduce the bur- den of armaments, and, on the other, to induce other Powers to follow the same procedure. This second object was of course not realised in the case of Germany; rather the contrary effect was produced. On three dif- ferent occasions — to the English Ambassador, Sir F. Lascelles, to the English Under Secretary of State, Sir Charles Hardinge, who accompanied King Edward to Germany, and to the English Minister of War, Mr. Haldane — ^the Kaiser in the late summer and in the autumn of the same year personally expressed strong disapprobation of any attempt to bring the question of armaments before the Hague Conference, and declined to allow the German delegates to take any part in this superfluous and futile discussion. There could, as a matter of course, be no question of the English example being followed on the part of Germany. In spite of this failure a similar attempt was made in 1912-1913 by Mr, Churchill, the First Lord of the Ad- miralty. New negotiations with Germany after recent experiences appeared futile, but as an alternative method Churchill declared, in introducing the estimates in the two years mentioned, that he pledged himself that any retardation or reduction in German construction should he followed by this country in fidl proportion. If Ger- many decided to take a naval holiday and build no ships in any given year, England would at once follow suit and drop her programme for the year likewise. In this way "without negotiations, bargainings, or the slightest restriction upon the sovereign freedom of either power" relief might be obtained for both nations. This declaration of Churchill, which as we have ob- served was officially repeated on two different occasions, remained unanswered and unreciprocated by Germany, presumably because here also she was awaiting "positive proposals," which would then of course have been an- HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 113 swered or reciprocated to no greater purpose than had been done on previous occasions. This is the history of the Anglo-German negotiations extending over many years, of the vain wooing of Eng- land for Germany's favour — a wooing which was un- attended by success, since the coy beauty would sell her favour only at a price which the wooer could not pay unless he were prepared to sacrifice himself. Once more it appeared, as if in this case also circumstance? were stronger than the will of man. The work of peace pursued in common throughout the Balkan crisis, the success achieved in maintaining peace, attributable exclu- sively to the co-operation of the two Empires, had quite automatically given a more friendly form to the re- lations of the two countries to each other. The delimi- tation of the spheres of interest in Asia Minor held out the promise of a further favourable development of these relations, but unfortunately this did not touch the kernel of the question; the constantly increasing danger involved in the competition in naval armaments, occa- sioned by Germany's infatuated refusal of every agree- ment. What would the world have looked like to-day if Ger- many had accepted the last proposal put forward by Grey in 1912? The security from every attack on the part of England and her Allies would not indeed have diverted Germany from her imperialistic ambitions, which in their nature were bound to be aggressive, but it would have deprived the German Government of the pretext which has enabled them to represent their war of prestige and expansion as a war of defence, and with- out this pretext it would have been impossible to have urged into so fearful a war the German people, the great majority of whom are attached to peace. The truce in naval armaments would in addition have created a more friendly atmosphere between Germany and Eng- 114 I ACCUSE! land, and as a consequence between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. It may be presumed that in Germany the last enormous increase in the army and the measure providing for the raising of millions of pounds would not have come into being. France would not have introduced her system of three-year service, and the Austro-Serbian dispute — which, as we shall see later, any child could have solved — would not have led to the universal war. What Are We Fighting for? If Germany really had no other objects than those constantly advanced in all Imperial and princely speeches and in all speeches by the Chancellor, "Security from at- tack, free development for her forces, unhampered at- tention to her culture," how could all these possessions have been obtained more surely or more cheaply than by accepting the English proposals ? "We will persevere until we have the assurance that no one will again disturb our peace, a peace in which we will care for and develop German character and Ger- ' man strength as a free nation," — ^with these words the Imperial Chancellor concluded his speech on the 2nd of December. A few days later the Emperor delivered an address on the Eastern scene of war to the delegates of the German and Austrian divisions : "We are fight- ing," he exclaimed, "for a just cause, for freedom, for the right of our nation to exist, for a long future peace." His Majesty might have been respectfully answered in these words, "May it please your Majesty, what we are supposed to be fighting for we had before the war began. We had our freedom, the right to our national existence, which no one disputed, and we had had a long undis- turbed peace. Why then, your Majesty, are we fight- ing t' And one might have added : If Germany be- HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 115 lieved herself to be Imperilled — ^which is not proved, and which cannot be proved — why then did she not gain for herself the greater security offered by England? The security, which was then offered in peace, can never again be achieved by victory on the battlefield. It could not only have been obtained at less expense — for then it would have cost neither life nor treasure — it would also have been more enduring and more tenable. Ac- cording to the dictum of Sallust, Kingdoms can only be maintained by the means by which they were created, and in the same way an international treaty, which Is intended to regulate the relations of nations in peace. Is more surely cemented by peaceful than by military means. Treaties of Peace after war always contain the tacit clause, rebus sic stantibus, which Kant, In his first preliminary article of his work On Perpetual Peace, re- gards as a hindrance to an enduring condition of peace. Treaties of peace, however, established in time of peace, which arise out of common interests and which do not bear on their forehead the remembrance of death and destruction, of hatred and vengeance, like the mark of Cain, such treaties hold acre perennius, and like all good things carry in them the seeds of further good. So I again say that what we are supposed to be fight- ing for, we already possessed. We possessed it more se- curely than we will possess it for generations even after a victorious war, and anything that we lacked we could have obtained without war by a treaty in peace. The Freedom Which "They" Mean.^ But as we have said the questions at stake are quite different from security, freedom, and the right to exist. The word "freedom" Is to-day very often heard in the ^ [The title of this section is an adaptation of Max von Schenken- dorf's song: "Freiheit, die ich meine."] 116 i ACCUSE! mouths of men who formerly crossed themselves thrice on hearing the forbidden word from any other quarter. We have all, without exception, become lovers of free- dom over night, — above all those who previously ex- tolled the "state of dependence willed by God." We have become so enamoured of freedom that we mean to bring it not only to our nation, but also to aH the other nations in the world. (See the explanation of the Im- perial Chancellor to the American people.) We simply no longer know how far the impulse to freedom will carry us. . ^ . "Be embraced, ye countless millions ! With the wide world's ardent kiss." ^ Social democrats, clericals, progressives, Poles, Danes, Alsatians — all who were formerly enemies of the Empire are now pressed by the Prussian Junker to his sensitive heart — that is, on the assumption that they keep the "peace within" - which, as is known, consists in think- ing, speaking, and writing as the Junkers think, speak, and write. The transaction, however, is not a mutual one, it is a societas leonina in the worst sense of the word. Anyone who allows himself to think, or write, or speak otherwise than is pleasing to the governing class is suppressed, punished, or if need be, shot dead. That is the freedom which they mean. The German people will in time realise to what bond- age these apostles of freedom are leading them. After every period of exaltation of the German people a period of bitterest bondage has always followed. It was so after 1813, after 1848, and after 1870, when the first years of the intoxication of victory had passed away. ^ ["Seid umscMungen, Millionen Diesen Kuss der ganzen Welt."] ^[Burgfrieden. The jurisdiction of a castle, the peace within the castle, hence almost equivalent to the "civil truce."] HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME IIT It will be precisely the same after 19 14. The soldiers and the Junkers, who in essential matters form one class, feel themselves entirely in their element in war! It is quite to their liking to suppress the freedom of the Press, to suppress the right of free assembly, to throttle trade and industry — the representatives of which had already taken up too much room at the Imperial Court. "Cer- tain barriers of Court etiquette" — ^we find in Liman, the apostle of the Crown Prince — "still make inaccessible to wealth certain pathways which are only open to the sons of the old agnati of the kingdom and to officers; otherwise the millionaire has carried off the victory, and the society of the Court jostles in the salons of lucky speculators or their heirs. The nobility of wealth grows up, a new Junkerdom, which never saw a battlefield; it is even spreading to the country, and already the capital of the Empire is surrounded with a golden girdle of luxurious estates. The list of guests invited to accom- pany the Emperor on his northern tours shows the names of numerous financial magnates. The new aristocracy carries instead of the sword the dividend warrant, in- stead of the shield the company prospectus, and it ^Dears as its weapon the bill of exchange. The nobility of the sword, however, withdraws into the background; the sons of those men who once won the battles of the HohenzoUerns sit embarrassed on their fathers' acres. And capital increases in the hands of a few until it as- sumes gigantic proportions, and with it respect for money whether it has been inherited or graspingly ac- quired." These are the thoughts of authoritative circles in Prussia and in Germany on the subject of trade and in- dustry. The dividend warrant and the bill of exchange are for them the contemptible emblems of these ranks of the nation on which Germany's greatness and her position in the world are built, and which in the end 118 I ACCUSE I must provide the means of satisfying the military mega- lomania of her "nobility of the sword." And is it likely that those who entertain these thoughts will bring to the German people freedom and equal privileges? When the Moor has done his duty, he will be allowed to go/ just as after 1813, 1848, and 1870. Even to-day, dur- ing the war, the smelling-out of demagogues has begun. Everywhere good Prussians are ferreting about for sus- picious people who do not think like good Prussians or good Germans. This can be seen at home, and even more among Germans abroad. A military and a Junker reaction will set in after the war such as the present generation has never seen. And that is called fighting for freedom, for German culture! The End of Peace. Security? The trend of thought of these circles will be notice- able and will make itself felt on the conclusion of peace. While German professors are bending over their maps at their study-tables and are elaborating international plans for the future formation of Europe, these men of action are laughing at the crazy ideas of the Utopians, just as they described the negotiations of the Hague Conference as "chatter about everlasting peace" (Gen- eral-Major von Deimling) and the English proposals for agreement as lies and deception. For them there is only one end of peace : oppression and security — security, with the same brilliant success as has been se- cured for us by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine ; that annexation which, so far, has brought us only difficulties and no advantages either of a political or of an economi- cal nature, which has, indeed, from a military point of view, been directly injurious to us, since it led to the ^ ["The Moor has done his work, — the Moor may go." — — Schiller, Fiesco.] HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 119 creation of that new, and apparently impregnable, line of fortresses, before which we have now been sitting for more than five months. Security of our frontiers: be- yond this the train of thought of our authoritative cir- cles does not go, but with security they include, of course, expansion in and outside Europe. They mean security at any cost, without respect to the rights of nationalities, the free destinies of nations, which after all we pretend that we are defending, and without respect to the fact, revealed by experience, that such a brutal policy of se- curity constantly bears with itself the germs of new wars. This security we could have had at a cheaper rate and with a better prospect of permanence by an agree- ment with England. France and Russia were as far from entertaining aggressive intentions against Germany as England was. He who maintains that such inten- tions existed is bound to produce evidence to prove their existence. He who denies their existence is not obliged to prove the contrary. Did France Mean to Attack Us? So far as England is concerned I have been able to produce conclusive rebutting evidence. With regard to France I may be allowed to deal with the matter briefly, since there is scarcely anyone in Germany — apart, of course, from the Government — who seriously maintains the assertion that France intended to attack us. That France is not abused, but that, on the contrary, regret is expressed that she was drawn into the war, innocently and against her will, is one of the few remaining sympa- thetic traits in the public life of Germany of to-day. As a matter of fact, anyone who should advance the asser- tion that the French Republic of 19 14 entertained even the remotest idea of reconquering Alsace-Lorraine by force of arms, would merely prove that he knows nothing 120 I ACCUSE! of the history or of the tendency of thought of modern France, and that his judgment is based on impressions, which may have been correct forty-four years ago, per- haps even thirty-rour or twenty-four years ago, but which in the last twenty years have more and more faded into a phantom. In framing this judgment I do not rely on newspaper articles, but on personal impressions gained in France during many periods of residence there, extending over many years. Until about the middle of the 'nineties the wound of Alsace-Lorraine still ached ; from tliat time it healed more and more, and about the beginning of the new century scarcely a trace of the old wound re- mained. The end of Boulangism rang in the end of the revanche idea; the worst of the noisy patriots, De- roulede at their head, were condemned or banished from France. The result of the Dreyfus affair, with the vic- tory of the party of illumination, purified the atmosphere from the powers of darkness, from the forces of political and clerical reaction, which in France were favourable to a policy of war, as they are to-day in Germany. Con- vinced friends of peace like Jules Simon, Frederick Passy, the Senator Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, and, above all, Jaures, gained more and more influence on serious public opinion, and pressed into the back- ground the noisy patriots of the Boulevard. The intel- lectual relations between France and Germany constantly became more intimate. Politicians, writers, actors and actresses of distinction, learned men and artists, brought about this exchange in matters of the mind on this side and on that, and by the reciprocation of visits succeeded in establishing personal relations between the countries. Coquelin and Sarah Bernhardt were honoured in Ger- many and were received by the Emperor with marks of distinction. In the summer of 1901 two French officers of high rank paid an official visit to Berlin, and were in- HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 121 vited by the Emperor to a military banquet at which one of these officers, General Bonnal, proposed the toast of the German Army and their soldier-Emperor. In- numerable other phenomena could be cited to show the increasing understanding and friendship between the two nations. The speech of Jaures in the French Cham- ber of Deputies, in June, 1902, was, however, epoch- making ; in this speech expression was, for the first time, given, in clear words and from a responsible quarter, to the thought that it was at last time to forget the ideas of revanche, to become reconciled with history, and to free the nations of Europe from the intolerable burden of armaments. The speech of Jaures found almost unanimous approval in the French Chamber and in the whole of the serious-minded Press. Certain chauvinistic rags, of course, which, like similar papers in our coun- try, earn their daily bread by stirring up passion, ex- pressed their discontent with Jaures, but they could not alter the fact that the Socialist leader ^ had given ex- pression to the views of the overwhelming majority of the industrious and thrifty French nation. In a speech in November, 1904, Jaures developed his train of thought and held up an alliance with Germany based on a renun- ciation of all retaliation by force as an end worthy of pursuit. A few months later the Morocco dispute began, when, in March, 1905, the Emperor William landed in Tangier, and in an address to the Envoys of the Sultan ran counter to French policy in Morocco. Was France to blame for the tension which now arose? Must France be held responsible for the fact that this challenging action on the part of Germany produced — as in the case of the Kriiger telegram previously, and the ship sent to Agadir later — ^the opposite effect from what was in- tended? These theatrical coups are indeed no proper instrument for use in foreign policy. They are irri- tating rather than impressive, and since it is more diffi- 'n2 I ACCUSE! cult to effect an understanding between people in a state of irritation than between people who are not so irri- tated, it would be advisable to discontinue such theatrical coups and to convey our wishes to foreign Governments in a normal, business-like way. The atmosphere of irri- tation which since then has almost continuously governed our diplomatic relations with France must accordingly be attributed to us and not to France. Notwithstanding all this it was, as is known, possible to arrive at a definite settlement of the Morocco con- fusion by means of three treaties in 1905, 1909, and 191 1, France, again, is not to blame if we came out of this worse than France did. Success in diplomatic negotiations depends not solely on military strength, but even more on the diplomatic dexterity of the Govern- ments negotiating. There can be no doubt that, from a military point of view, we are stronger than France. There can be equally little doubt that we are diplomati- cally the weaker. And this, indeed, need cause no sur- prise when we consider the manner in which we recruit and train the scions of our diplomacy. In the list of French representatives at European Courts the names which occur are those of middle-class families only; in the list of German representatives there are exclusively Barons, Counts, and Princes. This, of course, does not imply that a nobleman may not be as competent in busi- ness as an ordinary citizen. Since, however, the percen- tage of the nobility among the German people is quite insignificant, whereas the members of the nobility claim 100 per cent, of the diplomatic representatives, the sus- picion is justified that it is not their competence in busi- ness, but their title of nobility which is the decisive consideration in filling appointments in our diplomatic service. Diplomacy is a business, like any other; if it differs from others, it differs only in the exceptional re- sponsibilities involved, and in the most stupendous con- HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 123 sequences which may be entailed by errors committed. If even a merchant chooses a clerk without regard to whether he is of high birth or an officer in a cavalry regiment, how much more is the State in filling these responsible offices under obligation to ignore these qual- ities, which may be decoratively beautiful, but which are practically worthless. If the German Empire had acted from this point of view, the Morocco negotiations, which, indeed, in the view of our opponents, were not entirely unfavourable to us, might have borne even richer fruit. Those who are not satisfied with the result should seek for the cause where it really is to be found, not in England or in France, or in anyone beyond the German frontier. They may beat the breast and cry aloud "Mea culpa, mea maxima culpa!" In any case, however, the German people does not appear to me to be under any obligation to pay for the failures of its diplomatists by the sacrifice of its blood and its well- being. Here there appears to me to be clearly a lack of proportion between the offence and the expiation, espe- cially since it is not the guilty but the innocent who is called upon to bear the punishment. Let us make bet- ter diplomatists, voila tout! That is the only practical conclusion which a reasonable nation can draw from any diplomatic checks which it may have suffered. There is, however, not the slightest occasion for patriotic anguish and for bellicose shrieks for revenge. Where, then, is the evidence for the assertion that France was evilly disposed towards us? What evidence is there for supposing that, apart from the alleged dip- lomatic defeats, she intended to inflict on us military de- feats as well? I seek, but I find none. Did Russia Mean to Attack Us? The position is similar in the case of Russia. For a century and a half there have been no conflicts of in* lU I ACCUSE! terests between Germany and Russia, and such conflicts could, indeed, scarcely arise, since the pressure exercised by the two countries follows quite different lines which nowhere intersect. As we have no ambitions, or at least have hitherto had none, on the Russian Baltic Provinces — a Prussian Irredentism fortunately does not exist — ■ so Russia never thought of appropriating East Prussia, West Prussia, or Posen. Russia is large enough to be able to do without our provinces. The pressure of her expansion follows a direction which touches neither our property nor our interests. The tension between Russia and Austria I here leave intentionally out of the question. It was we who de- clared war against Russia while she was still living in full peace with Austria, and was, indeed, still conduct- ing her negotiations which held out a rich prospect of success. The war between Austria and Russia only broke out on August 6th, whereas we delivered the declaration of war at Petrograd on August ist. We began the war asserting that Russia meant to attack us, and we have succeeded in persuading the German people that she had already attacked us. I am, then, justified in asking: Why did Russia at- tack us? What end did she have in view? What did she want from us ? It is no sufficient answer to this ques- tion to refer to Pan-Slav efforts. Did Russia wish to make us Slavonic? Did she wish to suppress German culture in favour of Slavonic culture? No one will seriously maintain such a foolish assertion. Russian cul- ture in the last generations has, quite apart from this, exercised a strong influence on our German spiritual life; it would be diflicult to mention a German poet of the last fifty years who has given an impulse to the literature and to the intellectual tendencies of Germany similar to that received from Tolstoi. On the other hand, not merely the intellectual but also the political HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 125 and military life of Russia was everywhere permeated by German elements, and everywhere in Russia men of German name occupied leading positions. This, moreover, need cause no astonishment, for the Romanovs are themselves of German blood and their wives have nearly always been of German stock. It may, indeed, be asserted that there were scarcely any other two Eu- ropean countries which were more intimately connected than Germany and Russia by means of peaceful pene-^ tration on both sides, thus constituting a league of peace which was crowned by the traditional friendship of the two ruling houses, and sealed by the comradeship in arms of a hundred years ago. What, then, is the source from which there has sud- denly sprung "the hatred of Germany nourished on Pan- Slav ambitions/' of which the Chancellor spoke on De- cember 2nd? Do we suffer from Russophobia? Had this hatred of Germany not to be expressly constructed in order to give a psychological basis for the alleged Russian attack? What facts are adduced in support of this hatred of Germany? Out with them! I fear we may have long to wait before these facts are produced. In any case, the hatred of Germany entertained in Russia does not appear to be insuperable. Already we begin to hear the views of well-meaning people who speak of peace at an early date with Russia, and who are anxious to gather all our forces against the chief enemy, England. On the other hand, there are those who declare that Muscovitism and the absolutism of the Tsar are our chief enemies, and who emphasise our com- munity of culture with Western Nations. Where is the truth to he found? What are we really aiming at? Against whom, and for what are we Ughting? These are all questions which are answered differently by dif- ferent people, producing a gigantic confusion of the mind, an ocean of lies and of perversions, an ocean. 126 I ACCUSE! unfortunately, dyed in blood, which threatens completely to sweep away German happiness and well-being. This confusion is to be attributed to the fact that there is, among those who know, a tacit conspiracy not to speak the truth, but that they have overlooked the necessity of arriving at a complete agreement as to what is to be established in the place of truth. So every- one tells lies on his own, and the lies impinge on each other, like the electric sparks from two stations which are differently charged; one saying cancels the other; one lie drives another out of the field. Swift, in his old age, was indeed right when he said : "As universal a practice as lying is, and as easy a one as it seems, it is astonishing that it has been brought to so little perfection even by those who are most celebrated in that faculty." The Triple Entente a Defensive Alliance Not only is there thus a complete absence of evidence in support of the assertion that the Triple Entente in- tended to attack Germany, but the exact opposite has been proved in the preceding discussion. The leading spirit in the Entente was undeniably England. We hear this asserted daily in every possible key, and quite re- cently it was emphatically advanced by the Chancellor in the meeting of the Reichstag on December 2nd; the statement, moreover, rests on the truth. If, however, this leading spirit has for almost a decade striven only for peace and an understanding with Germany, if the other two Entente Powers have never in the slightest degree shown, by word or by action, their intention to hamper or suppress the initiative taken by their political friend in the direction of peace, if, on the contrary, they also have given unmistakable expression to their desire for peace by conciliatory behaviour on great and small HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE"CRIME 127 diplomatic conflicts (Morocco, the Balkan War, the Potsdam Agreements of 191 1, etc.), it would not be a bold conclusion to infer that the Triple Entente has been a defensive alliance, and that it has in no way whatever had aggressive intentions. He who asserts the contrary must submit proofs in support of his statement. These proofs the Chancellor himself was unable to submit in his two speeches in the Reichstag. The Entente Powers are reproached on account of their evil disposition towards Germany, but no actions are instanced which have proceeded from such a disposition. We celebrate in our enemies such beautiful qualities of the heart as envy, hatred, race antipathy, the lust of vengeance, but they cannot be reproached with a single action in which they have endeavoured to translate these dispositions into deeds. So long as Germany is not recognised as the educator of the world — something after the style of "Rembrandt as the educator" of the Germans — we must be content to leave other people in possession of their dispositions, as, indeed, they on their side have neither the wish nor the power to suppress ours. We must rest satisfied with combating their disposi- tions only when these manifest themselves as actions. We are not the rulers of foreign nations as Ahlwardt was the ruler of all the Germans. We are scarcely called upon to give moral instructions to others so long as we ourselves need such instruction more than they do. The hatred, the envy, and rage for revenge which has been produced in our country — ^formerly by a small section of the people of no intellectual standing, but since the beginning of the war by the greatest and best part of the German nation — surpass in volume ^nd intensity all that has been produced in the three other countries taken together. But if there were no aggressive Intentions, what was it that brought the Entente together and cemented them 128 I ACCUSE! more and more closely to each other? It was the fear of Germany and the distrust of Germany's imperiahstic efforts. It was this fear that united them and gave in- creasing compactness to their alHance. The more they saw Germany increasing — not our trade nor our well being, which indeed benefited their trade and prosperity also, but our mihtary power and our warhke dispo- ' sition — the more they saw the danger of German na- tionalism raising her head and appearing above the steps of the throne, the more distrustful and apprehensive they became, and the more closely did they draw together for the purpose of common defence. Everything combined in recent years to increase their apprehensions : the enormous naval armaments which, in spite of English proposals for agreement, were piled up with constantly increasing acceleration, the sudden increase of our land army, quite unprecedented in mili- tary history, the policy of the mailed fist, which in all international questions affecting the interest of Germany or Austria struck on the table and compelled the others to give way, above all, however, certain facts, which did not take place in public, but which were well known to European Governments. These facts have only re- cently received publicity, but must, at an earlier date, already have received from the Entente Powers the attention they merited. GioLiTTi's Revelations It is known that, soon after the annexation of Bosnian and Herzegovina, the Austrian Government proposed to take military measures against the growing Great- Serbian movement, which had been produced as a result of the annexation. This was an act of criminal insanity on the part of Austria; it was a crime, because here the violator intended to punish the violated because he re- HISTOMCAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 129 sisted violation; it was insane, because national ten- dencies cannot be suppressed by force of arms. But the wise men of Austria thought otherwise. Serbia was threatened with war, and only through the submission of Russia and the mediation of England and Germany was it possible to prevent, by means of a propitiatory declaration on the part of Serbia, the European war which even then threatened to break out. That was in March, 1909, and is known to everyone. What, how- ever, was not known, and has only become known by the revelations of Giolitti on December 5th, 19 14, in the Italian Chamber, is the fact that Austria entertained in August, 19 13, the same intentions as in 1909, and was prevented from giving effect to these intentions only by the opposition of Italy. These revelations of Giolitti have rightly been re- garded in the whole of the foreign Press as epoch-mak- ing, because they revealed in an incontestable manner the aggressive intentions of Austria. But precisely for these reasons the German and Austrian Governments have preserved, with regard to these revelations, a silence as of death. There is therefore all the more reason why I should in this place once more awaken the dead to life. In midsummer, 19 13, after the second Balkan War, the relations in the Balkans between those States im- mediately concerned were regulated by the Treaty of Bucharest. Austria-Hungary was not satisfied with the arrangement to which effect was given, since in her view Serbia had got too much and Bulgaria too little. She aimed at accomplishing a revision of the Treaty and in view of Serbia's opposition resolved to give effect to her desires by arms. For this purpose she naturally required the support of the Powers of the Triple Al- liance and above all of Italy, who had always claimed the right to make her influence felt in the settlement 130 I ACCUSE! of the Balkan question. The concurrence of the alHed Powers in military action against Serbia was, however, regarded as necessary by Austria chiefly, because the Austrian Government was even then fully aware of the fact that a war with Serbia must lead to a European struggle. Austria consequently addressed inquiries to Italy with a view to ascertaining what her attitude would be in view of her duties under the Triple Al- liance in the event of a Serbian, and, should it arise, a European war. As a result of the Austrian inquiry the following exchange of telegrams took place between the Foreign Minister, Di San Giuliano, and the Prime Minister, Giolitti, who was then absent : "Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention of taking action against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the casus foederis of the Triple Alliance, which, on the contrary, I believe to be inapplicable. I am endeavouring to ar- range for a combined effort with Germany to prevent such action on the part of Austria, but it may become necessary to state clearly that we do not consider such action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and that, therefore, we do not consider that the casus foederis arises. Please telegraph to me at Rome if you ap- prove." Giolitti replied to this : "If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a ca^sus foederis cannot be estab- lished. It is a step which she is taking on her own account since there is no question of defence inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made to Aus- tria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous adventure {pericolosissima avven- tura)." On this occasion success, in fact, attended the task of HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 131 restraining Austria from a war against Serbia, but whether this was due to Germany's efforts or to Italy's opposition is not known. What, however, is to-day of the highest interest is the fact that, even a year before the outbreak of the present war, Austria was firmly resolved to initiate, without any urgent reason, a mili- tary conflict with Serbia, for there was then no ques- tion of the death of an Archduke, nor had a specially dangerous Serbian propaganda been developed against Austria, since Serbia had been sufficiently engrossed by the war against the Turks, and later against her own ally, Bulgaria. This fact is of the greatest importance in judging the question of guilt in the present war. But there is one other point which may be learned from the events of 191 3; first, that the danger of a European war as a consequence of an Austro-Serbian war was even at that time clear to the minds of the politicians of the Triple Alliance; and, secondly, that it was possible to exorcise this danger by dissuading Austria from the perilous ad- venture, and by refusing to furnish her with assistance. If these lessons of the past had been observed a year later the present war would not have broken out. Italy has observed these lessons, and her attitude is morally and legally incontestable. Germany, however, did not desire to do so, and she cannot, therefore, object if her attitude is described in terms which are exactly opposite to those applied to Italy. The fact that Ger- many in July, 1914, neglected to exercise on Austria the moderating influence which she had successfully brought to bear on her a year before is capable of a simple explanation. Germany at that time did not de- sire a European war, or more correctly expressed, she did not yet desire it, whereas in 1914 she did desire this war. 132 I ACCUSE! The Change of Front in Berlin. The War Party The tendencies in Berlin which led to this change of front are placed in a most interesting light by the French Yellow Book> If these French Reports were the only sources of in- formation available for this period of contemporary history they might be regarded with distrust. As, how- ever, they are in accordance with all the facts, which have been distinctly manifested in the political life and in the politico-military literature of Germany,^ these French Reports on the state of opinion in Germany must be recognised as entirely accurate, and, indeed, the clear analysis of Geniian conditions contained in them can only evoke admiration. I have already in an earlier passage dealt with the dangers involved in the efforts of the war party whose exercising ground was exclusively in North Germany and whose headquarters were situated at the Court of Berlin. The leaders of this party were for the most part Generals who devoted the pensioned leisure of their retirement to the creation of something approaching a military organisation of their forces, and both by the spoken and the written word prepared the German peo- ^ Report of the French Ambassador, Cambon, dated the 17th March, 1913, enclosing two reports of the Mihtary and Naval At- taches; further, a report of Etienne, the Minister of War, to Jon- nard, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated the 2nd April, 1913. with enclosure; a report of Cambon to Pichon, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated 6th May, 1913, a report to the same Minister dated 30th July, and a report of Cambon dated 22nd November, 1913. ^ After this book was finished a very interesting dissertation came to my notice, entitled "Der deutsche Chauvinismus," by Professor Dr. O. Nippold, Stuttgart, 1913. The book contains a survey of the chauvinistic literature of recent years, and earnestly points out the dangers of this movement. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 133 pie for the war, which they, because they wished it, de- clared to be inevitable. In addition to the existing naval league they founded, in 1912, a "Wehrverein," the ob- ject of which was to combat the tendencies in favour of peace to be found in the German nation, to create a public opinion in favour ©f an increase in the land forces, and gradually to accustom the nation to the thought of a European war. The natural auxiliary forces of these gentlemen were their social and profes- sional companions, the territorial and the military no- bility who from remote times have controlled the Prus- sian State, and have regarded the King of Prussia as their supreme head. The increasing democratisation of Germany, which had already advanced so far as to pass a vote of no confidence in an Imperial Chancellor and a Prussian First Minister, and to extend protection to the civil powers in Alsace against the military authori- ties, the constant increase in the vote of the social democratic party, and of their representatives in Parlia- ment, the increasing industrialisation of Germany, which threatened more and more to repress the economic and the social importance of the territorial nobility — all these phenomena were an abomination to the Prussian Junkers, and had produced in the circles which they frequented a state of mind which can be expressed in the thought: "Things cannot go on like this in Ger- many, and since an amelioration in the sense we desire cannot be achieved in peace, we must be assisted in our need by a lively and joHy war" {ein frischer, frohlicher Krieg) . At all times the Junkers have formed the kernel of the Prussian war-party. More recently, however, they have been joined by various auxiliary forces, colonial enthusiasts who pursued the foolish madness of terri- torial expansion as an outlet for our economic and hu- man surplus, ideologists in whose narrow outlook Ger- 134. I ACCUSE! many marches at the head of civilisation and who there- fore consider that German culture has a claim to rule the world, diploniatists still grieving over their own failures and calling aloud for revenge for Algeciras and Agadir, but chiefly, as a matter of course, the cannon kings and the manufacturers of armour plate, who with the wealth at their disposal can support the venomous Press not only at home but abroad. All these elements, some of them interested and some deluded, the deceivers and the deceived, formed a compact force which, under military leadership, fell into line with true Prussian dis- cipline on the word of command, and steadfastly ad- vanced to the end in view. The war-party formed only a minority of the German people. The great majority was distinctly devoted to peace. The great mass of the labouring population, the industrious middle classes, the banking and manufacturing circles, the national groups of Poles, Alsatians, etc., the South of Germany not yet entirely Prussianised, all these sections of the Ger- man people without doubt desired peace and quiet prog- ress along the path by which Germany had arrived at her present height. But these ^ the forces of peace, were not organised. They were merely individuals; they did not form a compact body. They did not consider it necessary to organise themselves as a peace-party to oppose the war-party, because until midsummer of this year the latter were regarded as a quantite negligeahle; a European war with all its horrors was regarded as an impossibility; no one realised how far the instigators of war with their powerful patronage had already un- dermined the ground of peace. In the middle of July any one who had asserted in Germany that on August 1st we would be face to face with a European war would have been in danger of being shut up in an asy- lum. The people of rabid views were known, but their outpourings were looked upon as harmless, and any HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 1S5 counter-organisation for the protection of peace was regarded as a superfluity. It is true that disappointment over the Morocco agree- ment had affected even wider circles. The supposed diplomatic defeat was regretted, but this was not re- garded as a reason for crying aloud for vengeance in blood. The diplomatists were criticised, but Generals were not demanded. Criticism was naturally directed in the first place against the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, who bore the sole responsibil- ity; it did not, however, stop there, but ascended as far as the Emperor himself. The policy of peace, which the Emperor William had taken as the guiding line of his conduct after the first stormy days of his youth, had for long ceased to find favour in certain circles. He was not merely criticised, but the attempt was made — not without success — ^to procure for him what was nothing short of unpopularity. A zealous and well-organised Press praised the son at the expense of the father and increased the dissensions between the two which had found open expression in a number of well-known serious disputes. With diabolic dexterity they succeeded in playing upon the most sen- sitive chords in the Emperor's soul, his personal vanity, his thirst for popularity, his ambition to be the first amongst his people, living in no man's shadow, the con- sciousness he had of his authority, which had led him to adopt as his motto the dictum suprema lex regis volun- tas. Like the poison poured into the ear of Hamlet's father the poisonous thought was instilled into him that the times demanded deeds, not words, that only a puri- fying war could drive away the sultry heat and restore 136 I ACCUSE! to the German Empire and to its Emperor the old pres- tige within and without. In the end a continual dropping" will wear out a stone. It is interesting to observe the gradual change in the Emperor's views during the last three years, from 191 li to 19 14. In 19 10 the Emperor William could still dis- cuss with the French Minister, Pichon, the idea of a union of all civilised States and express his approval of the idea. In the previous year, in 1909, speaking at Cuxhaven, he emphasised that peace was needed in equal measure by all civilised nations "to enable them to discharge undisturbed the great tasks of culture in- volved in their economic and commercial develop- ment." ^ In 191 1 he emphasised, in a speech delivered in Hamburg, that economic competition between nations could not be fought out by one party striking at the other, but only by each nation straining their capacity to the highest point. On New Year's Day, 191 1, in an address to the diplomatists, he still eulogised the peace- ful understanding existing between the nations, which was more in accordance with their interests than the conduct of dangerous wars. But in his speech at Ham- burg on June i8th, 1912, a different note is already sounded : "Not inconsiderately must we raise the standard where we are not sure that we shall be able to defend it." This speech was delivered six months after the Morocco Convention, and anyone who can read between the lines may already detect the influence which tlie criticism of the Emperor's peaceful policy had begun to exercise on the thoughts of the Emperor; he no longer rejects war under all circumstances, but if war must come, it is to be, according to the saying of Clausewitz, a continuation of policy by other means — that is, of course, on the assumption that the stand- ard can be defended, in other words, that we are ^ Ft. Fried : Der Kaiser imd der Weltfriede, Berlin, igio. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 137 stronger than the other side. In the next year, at the boisterous banquets in commemoration of the War of Liberation of 1813, this mihtary note more and more suppressed the notes of peace. An intoxication ap- peared to have seized the whole of Germany — a new- intoxication of freedom — from what bondage no one knew. This drunkenness was artificially produced by the fiery beverages which an unscrupulous patriotic Press had for many a year and day poured out to the German nation. Even those occupying the highest po- sitions were unable to escape this condition of intoxi- cation. A true epidemic of patriotism broke out, set- ting high and low, young and old, in a fever of ecstasy. No one any longer inquired as to the grounds or the object of this popular movement prepared long in ad- vance and skilfully staged by the Nationalist wire-pull- ers, a movement in which the Emperor and the Chan- cellor were at first victims carried away by the stream, a movement In which later they were voluntary partici- pators, and of which in the end they became the con- scious directing leaders. Herr von Bethmann certainly made a long resist- ance before capitulating to the war-party. But in the end he was obliged to yield, that he might not fall a victim to the Camarilla of the Crown Prince and to the company of Generals. Even in 1910 and 191 1 he vigorously defended himself against his opponents, who more and more were digging the ground from under his feet. When he was accused in the Mannesmann affair of showing excessive pliability towards foreign countries he exclaimed to his critics In the Reichstag: *'I will never make myself a party to a policy of break- ing treaties." When the great debate took place in the Reichstag on March 30th, 191 1, on the question of arm- aments, Bethmann turned almost in supplication to the representatives of the German people and urged thenj 138 I ACCUSE! to protect the German people against irresponsible Press agitations, to which, unfortunately, it often weakly suc- cumbed, "A counterpoise against all these and similar influences," exclaimed the Chancellor, "cannot be other- wise than desirable, and if international labour succeeds in creating such a counterpoise, I will be the first to extend it a hearty welcome." But, as we have said, the elements which might have formed such a counter- poise against the war-movement were too few. The opposition of the Chancellor, as previously that of the Emperor, was soon borne down, and the great military law of 19 1 3 was the first beacon-signal of the victory of the enemy along the whole line. That war was not, in accordance with Austria's de- sires, brought about as early as the summer of 191 3, rested no longer on grounds of principle, but merely on motives of opportunism. The occasion for striking the blow which Austria believed, or professed, that she had — a regulation of the frontier between Bulgaria and Serbia, and similar matters — was too threadbare to jus- tify to the German people a murder of the European nations, and too little designed to enkindle patriotic enthusiasm. "Wars which are not supported by popular sentiment are no longer possible in our time" — ^to this extent the political thought even of these reactionaries had already advanced. The question whether this or that place with an unpronounceable name situated some- where in the south-east of Europe should be governed by Serbian or Bulgarian officials was of too little im- portance for the German people to permit of it being stamped as a war for the holiest possession of the nation. Thus the word went from Berlin to Vienna : "Not yet." Moreover, military considerations were clearly de- cisive in favour of this "Not yet." We were not yet sufficiently prepared. We were, it is true, considerably HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 1S9 superior to all others, but this, superiority had to be increased still further by bringing into force the new law of defence, which had just received preliminary approval from the Reichstag. The extension of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, which was intended to provide unhampered movement from the North Sea to the Baltic for even the largest ships of war, was not yet ready. The newest instruments of death were probably still awaiting the hour of their birth. Zeppelins and sub- marines had still to be built, and in many other ways our military preparations had still to be carried to the stage of perfection. In a word, we were not yet ripe for striking the blow, which in principle had even then been decided upon. We were only waiting for the next favourable opportunity, and for a condition of perfect preparedness, to be able to make use of this opportunity with success. Meanwhile, the change in the views of the Emperor made further progress ; his entourage, with von Moltke, the head of the General Staff, as their leader, the Minister of War, the Crown Prince, and his influential adherents, all laboured — although still to a certain extent in opposition to the Chancellor, who had, it is true, taken part in the whole development, and covered it with his responsibility, but who was now still shrinking from the decisive step — all laboured for the one end — that of bringing about the "inevitable", war as speedily as possible, and of gaining the entire • support of the Emperor for their efforts. "We must put on one side," said General von Moltke on one occasion, "all commonplaces as to the responsibility of the ag- gressor. When war has become necessary it is essen- tial to carry it on in such a way as to place all the chances in one's favour. Success alone justifies war." ^ What success had attended the activity of the War Party is seen in Cambon's repor t of November 22nd, ^French Yellow Book, No. 3. 140 I ACCUSE! 191 3, to the Minister, Pichon. Cambon tells of a con- versation which the Emperor William had in the pres- ence of the Chief of the General Staff with King Al- bert, an account of which was communicated to the French Ambassador "from an absolutely reliable source." King Albert found a complete change in the Emperor, whom he had formerly known as an honour- able lover of peace. He had given up his pacific ten- dencies, and had made the ideas of the war-party his own. War now appeared to him inevitable, and he agreed with his Chief of the Staff when the latter de- clared that this time the matter must be settled, and that the Emperor could be sure that his people would follow him with irresistible enthusiasm. The thoughts of the Emperor were directed chiefly against France, and King Albert made fruitless efforts to convince him of the peaceful intentions of the French Government and of the French people. Cambon also confirmed from his own observation the altered train of thought of the Emperor, which he attributed to the increasing Impa- tience of the soldiers, to the influence of the Pan-Ger- manists, and to a certain extent to jealousy at the popu- larity acquired by his son in these circles. "The Em- peror is becoming used to an order of Ideas which were formerly foreign, to him" ; with these words Cambon concludes his report. It is impossible to deny that the shrewd Frenchman was a careful observer. Scarcely eight months later the consequences of the change in the views of the Emperor were revealed. But even in the critical days which preceded the outbreak of the European War, the forces of good and of evil, of Ormuzd and Ahriman, still struggled with each other in the soul of the Emperor. Now that the portentous decision had to be taken which was to set the world in flames and bring upon mankind unprecedented evils, now that the project which had been so long prepared HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 141 and resolved upon was at last to be transformed into an act, the Imperial hand shrank from the decisive stroke of the pen, and as in a mist the old ideals of peace and of the happiness of nations once more arose in the soul of the monarch. To this must be attributed the oscil- lations of the last days, the continual change in the actions of the Emperor, fluctuating to and fro between the desire for peace and the threat of war, between intimidation and sincerity, pursuing so long the policy of the mailed fist, until gradually all policy disappeared and only the mailed fist was left. Ill The Crime The detailed discussion in the previous chapter of the antecedents of the war was necessary in order to un- derstand the rapid development of events which in the ten short days from July 23 rd to August ist, 191 4, led to the greatest war in the history of the world. The whole attitude of Germany from the first Hague Conference onwards, her consistent refusal of all restric- tions of naval or military armaments, her opposition to the formation of a court of compulsory arbitration, her constantly renewed efforts to secure for herself the neu- trality of England, without on her part giving up in any way her own freedom of action, the gigantic increase in her land and naval forces, the toleration shown for years to a criminal chauvinist movement, and the ap- proval extended to this movement at a later date — these all indicate that for long Germany had reckoned on the European war as a matter of fact, and that she had re- solved to bring about the "inevitable" in the moment most favourable for her. The antecedents of the war down to 19 14 must give rise to what in criminal proceedings would be called a prima facie case, that Germany, in common with her ally Austria, desired a European war sooner or later — Germany, in order to give effect to her plans of world power; Austria, in order to improve her position in the Balkans. Such a prima facie case, however, does not amount to a certainty. The probability which may be inferred 142 THE CRIME 143 from the antecedents of the war Is not in itself a proof of guilt. This proof of guilt can only be deduced from the circumstances of the case, that is to say, from the diplomatic documents which place before us the histori- cal origins of the war. The indictm.ent to be brought against the Empires of Germany and Austria is that in the summer of 19 14 they intentionally brought about the war which they had long prepared and desired, because they thought that the moment was specially favourable for striking the blow. This time the occasion of the dispute was not, as in previous years, a paltry territorial question in the Balkans, a squabble about a harbour or a stretch of sea-shore, questions which could neither arouse public interest nor kindle the enthusiasm of nations. The issue raised on this occasion related to the murder of an Arch- Duke and his Consort, a tragic event which was bound to awaken the indignation of the whole world, and, so they calculated, could not fail to enlist universal sym- pathy on behalf of the Powers who appeared as the avengers of such a crime. Thus, in the first place, the moral advantage was on their side. But they believed that they could also rely on a similar military advantage. Certain matters just about this time had come to light which were regarded as proving the disorganisation of the French and the defective preparation of the Russian army. The revela- tions of Senator Humbert had just made public the ex- istence of serious defects in the French Army, and it was believed that the Russian Army, quite apart from its defective equipment, Vi^^as still required to cope with in- ternal unrest and weakened by civil dissensions. Eng- land's neutrality was still hoped for, in spite of previous failures in this direction, and the Italians were thought to be foolish enough to draw the chestnuts out of the fire in the Balkans for the hated Austrian, and to risk IM I ACCUSE! their whole national existence "pour le roi de Prusse." All this was a complete miscalculation. But as the art of calculation was not understood in Berlin and Vienna, it was thought that the moment was favour- able for striking — and they struck. This is the accusation which is now to be proved. The events connected with the assassination of the Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand and his Consort are in their main features universally known, and do not here require any detailed discussion. For my purpose it will be sufficient to examine critically the diplomatic trans- actions, and to emphasise those points which are of de- cisive importance in considering the question of the guilt and the responsibility for this war. The demonstra- tion which I will submit will rest only on official docu- ments, and reference will chiefly be made to the five volumes of diplomatic correspondence which have been published In white, blue, yellow, orange, and grey by Germany, England, France, Russia, and Belgium re- spectively. A book in red has not yet appeared; It Is left to the nations to write this volume in blood. Other diplomatic documents which have appeared apart from these books will also be considered. At the very outset surprise is occasioned by the meagre contents of the Geniian White Book and by the fact that Austria, unlike all the other belligerent countries, has not considered It advisable to publish a volume of diplomatic correspondence. The telegrams exchanged between the German and the Austrian Governments are, further, almost completely absent from the German White Book, whereas those between the Entente Powers are reproduced In their publications with the utmost detail. The German White Book contains only 36 docu- ments ; the English Blue Book, on the contrary, contains THE CRIME 145 i6i; the Russian Orange Book, 79; the French Yellow' Book, 161 ; and the Belgian Grey Book, 79. The state- ments of our opponents are thus far more detailed than those of the two allied Empires, one of which has until to-day maintained a complete silence. This fact is in itself very illuminating.^ The historical investigator is frequently obliged to complete the gaps revealed in the German White Book by reference to the comprehensive accounts of the En- tente Governments. There is, however, general agree- ment between the various publications in their reports as to fact, and it is only from the spirit of the narrator that they assume varying complexions. In my critical discussion I will completely ignore these different com- plexions. It will be sufficient if I restrict myself to the bare facts reported by all parties alike, facts which indeed are in themselves eloquent enough. One cannot, of course, assert that of the various publications some are more deserving of credence than others. Diplomatic documents are merely documents, and they are all equally credible. Moreover, they are mutually supported by each other, and taken together they form so complete a chain, each link so fits into the other, that the truth appears clear and incontestable. I will deal in succession with the various points which are decisive on the question of guilt, and I will take each State separately. Each State will receive its own debit and credit account, and each account will be closed with a balance which will show the guilt or the inno- cence of the State in qtiestion. ^ An Austrian book has just appeared in the beginning of Febru- ary when this work was in the press, that is to say, six months after the beginning of the war. I will discuss this book in a separate appendix. 146 I ACCUSE! AUSTRIA At 6 o'clock on the evening of July 23rd the Austro- Hungarian Government handed to the Serbian Govern- ment a Note, in which the Government presented a series of demands, with reference to the Great Serbian propaganda which it was suggested had reached its high- est point in the assassination of the Grand Ducal couple, intended to bring about the suppression of these ef- forts which, as was alleged, were tolerated by the Ser- bian Government. There were contained among the ten demands made by Austria some (and, indeed, a con- siderable number) of a character such as had never be- fore been presented to an independent State, and such as hitherto had only been imposed on subject nationali- ties. The Serbian Government were required to pub- lish on a certain day on the first page of their official journal a declaration, the wording of which was pre- scribed. This declaration had in view the most rigor- ous suppression of every form of Great Serbian prop- aganda, and threatened with severe punishment the whole population, but more particularly those officers and officials who should in future take part in this move- ment. This threat was simultaneously to be communi- cated by the King to the Army as an order of the day, and published in the official bulletin of the Army. A series of detailed demands followed : the suppression of publications ; dissolution of societies and the prevention of the formation of similar societies; elimination from school-books of all statements hostile to Austria; re- moval of all officers and functionaries guilty of the prop- aganda mentioned; arrest of certain persons compro- mised by the inquiry into the assassination; prevention THE CRIME 147 of illicit traffic in arms across the frontier; explanation regarding unfriendly utterances of high Serbian officials, &c. Under numbers 5 and 6 of the Austrian Demands it was exacted of the Serbian Government that they should "accept the collaboration in Serbia of represen- tatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the Territorial integrity of the Monarchy," and further, that they should "take judicial proceedings against ac- cessories to the plot of June 28th who are on Serbian territory." "Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Gov- ernment," it is further stated, "will take part in the in- vestigation relating thereto." A memorandum on certain conclusions of the inquiry at Serajewo on points 7 and 8 was added to the Note, and an answer was required within forty-eight hours, that is to say, before 6 o'clock in the evening of July 25th. The Note was communicated to the European Powers on July 24th — ^without the addition of the evidence in support of the accusations — and on July 25th it was published in the European Press. It is well known that the unusual contents and the abrupt form of the Note created excitement everywhere, not only in Govern- mental circles, but also among the general public. Every- one expected an abrupt refusal on the part of Serbia, followed by a war between Austria and her neighbour- ing kingdom, the intervention of Russia in the conflict, and in further sequence a European war. Ever since a Balkan question had existed the close relations between Russia and Serbia were known to everyone. From time immemorial community of race and religion, political traditions and interests, had united the two countries, and had created a kind of relationship extending far beyond the framework of the usual "spheres of in- terest." Russia had during and after the Balkan War 14.8 I ACCUSE! officially declared that any attack by Austria on Serbia would lead to her intervention.^ On this occasion also it was announced in the official journal that Russia could not remain Indifferent to military action on the part of Austria.^ At the same time, however, Russia, England, and France made the most urgent endeavours : ( 1 ) To induce Serbia to go as far as possible in meet- ing the demands of Austria.^ (2) To obtain an extension of the time limit from Austria, which would enable the Powers to study the documentary material promised by Austria, and thus to exercise a moderating influence in Belgrade.* The extension of the time limit was sharply refused by Austria,^ although England and Russia rightly pointed out that the communication of the Note to the Powers was purposeless and contradictory to interna- tional usages if they were not allowed time and oppor- tunity to study the documents, and to intervene at Bel- grade. Herr von Jagow had from the beginning ex- pressed "doubts" as to whether Austria could concur in the extension of the time-limit.^ Count Berchtold was at Ischl. No grounds were given for the refusal. Nevertheless, Anglo-Russian influence in Belgrade succeeded in obtaining from the Serbian Government an answer which caused throughout Europe even greater astonishment than the Austrian Note itself. Serbia con- curred in nearly all the demands of the neighbouring monarchy. She declared herself ready to hand over for ^Blue Book, No. 139, and p. v. [popular edition.] * Orange Book, No. 10. ' Blue Book, Nos. 12, 15, 22, 30. Orange Book, Nos. 4, 25, 40, 92. Yellow Book, No. 26. *Blue Book, Nos. 13, 17, 26. Orange Book, Nos. 4, 16. ''Orange Book, No. 12. " Orange Book, No. 14. Blue Book, No. 18. THE CRIME 149 trial, without regard to his situation or rank, anyone whose compHcity in the assassination should be proved. She pledged herself to publish the desired declarations in the official journal and to the Army, to introduce new criminal laws and an amendment of the Constitu- tion to facilitate the prosecution and confiscation o'f hostile utterances in the Press. She promised to dis- solve hostile societies, to revise the instruction in schools in the sense desired by Austria, to punish guilty officers and officials, to prevent the illicit traffic of arms, &c. Only on two points did the Serbian Government per- mit itself in all submissiveness — the tone of the whole Note is, in fact, that of a subject to his over-lord, not that of one independent State to another — only on two points (5 and 6 of the Austrian Note) did the Serbian Government permit itself to raise a few modest objec- tions. In reply to point 5 it observed*. "'The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning of the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Gov- ernment that Serbia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their Territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly re- lations." In reply to point 6: "It goes without saying that the Royal Gov- ernment consider it their duty to open an inquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15/28 June, and who happen to be within the territory of the king- dom. As regards the participation in this inquiry 150 I ACCUSE! of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities ap- pointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal pro- cedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases, communi- cations as to the results of the investigation in question might he given to the Austro-Hungarian agents." The conclusion of the Serbian Note runs as follows : — "If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Serbian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Serbian Gov- ernment on the 1 8th (31st) March, 1909." The Serbian Note was handed to the Austrian Am- bassador at Belgrade on the afternoon of July 25th. Two hours later the Ambassador with his staff had left the Serbian capital. The Serbian answer appeared to the Austrian Government to be insufficient. Diplomatic relations with the neighbouring country were broken off by Austria. Why? European diplomacy — apart, of course, from that of Germany — was confronted with a riddle for which only one solution was possible, the assumption that Austria, under all circumstances, desired war with Serbia. And as the Austrian Note was unique in its exorbitant demands, both in form and substance, so the Serbian Note also was unique in its essential and formal THE CRIME 151 submlsslveness. Never in time of peace had an inde- pendent State allowed itself to he dictated to in this way; never had an independent State submitted to similar intrusions in its internal life. Education, the army, ad- ministration, justice, the Press, the right of association — all were to be trimmed to meet the wishes of Austria, and even where it was not possible to comply with these wishes to the last iota without being debased to the position of a vassal State — even then Serbia did not re- solve on a bare refusal, but humbly asked for further explanations, and professed herself ready to go to the limits permitted by international law, and in these few points still in dispute she submitted herself to the de- cision of the International Tribunal at the Hague or of the Great Powers. What more could Austria desire? Why did she refuse to give the explanations asked for? Why did she not accept decision by arbitration in questions which, ac- cording to the transactions and the resolutions of the Hague Conference, were in a peculiar sense suitable for reference to the Court of Arbitration — questions, namely, of law and of interpretation? On July 27th the Austrian Government published the Serbian answer with observations in such a form that the text of the Serbian Note is throughout broken up by the Austrian observations. Even the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung only published the text broken up in this way. The intention of this mutilation was obvi- ously to preclude an appreciation of the submissive form and the extremely conciliatory contents of the Serbian answer by the insertion of the Austrian observations. The pedantic nature of these observations was described by the Italian Minister, Di San Giuliano, as "quite child- ish." ^ The expression is indeed much too mild, when one reflects that the fate of Europe, and indeed of the ' Blue Book, No. 64. 152 I ACCUSE! world, depended on these discussions. A hedge-lawyer would be ashamed to produce in the paltriest case quib- bles such as those to which Austria descended in order to find grounds to justify her dissatisfaction with the Serbian answer. It is not worth while to discuss the details of this composition, which is miserable even in style. In part, the Austrian observations amount to an assertion that misunderstandings, more or less inten- tional, existed on the side of Serbia. Point 5, for ex- ample, was said to have nothing to do with international law or criminal procedure ; it was rather "purely a mat- ter of State police which must be settled by way of a separate agreement." Point 6, it was stated, was con- cerned only with the collaboration of Austrian officials at the preliminary police investigations, not in the ju- dicial proceedings. In these two points then, the only ones in which Serbia had made any reservations — all the other points were in essence agreed to — in these, the only points still at issue, there were, according to the assertion of "the Austrian Government itself, mis- understandings (due to the want of clearness in the Austrian Note), but these misunderstandings were of such a nature that they could have been removed in half-an-hour's discussion between experts, or, at the worst, they could have been submitted to the decision of a court of arbitration. Why did Austria not take steps to bring about such a discussion or such a decision f Why did she at once have recourse to a measure as sharp as any that could have been adopted in the event of a flat refusal of her demands — to a rupture of diplo- matic relations? This was the third incomprehensibility in the course of three days — an incomprehensibility, that is to say, except on the assumption that Austria intended under all circumstances to begin a war against Serbia, even at the risk of a European war. The Note itself was in THE CRIME 153 reality nothing but a declaration of war in disguise. No one, least of all Austria herself, could have expected from Serbia that she should give to demands so humili- ating as those contained in the Note more careful at- tention than she did in fact devote to them. That Ser- bia, nevertheless, considered these suggestions, and, in- deed, concurred in most of the Austrian demands, was a sign of an extraordinary devotion to peace on the part of this country, exhausted by two wars, and was at the same time the effect of the energetic summons to assume a compliant attitude issued by the Entente Powers with Russia at their head. The appeal for help which Alexander, the Prince Regent of Serbia, addressed on July 24th to the Czar Nicholas emphasised the readi- ness of Serbia to accept everything that was compatible with her position as an independent State, and asked Russia for advice as to the course to be pursued.^ The advice thus elicited led to the Serbian Note of July 25th, that is to say, to a humiliation unprecedented in the history of diplomacy. This in itself is enough to prove beyond all doubt the desii'e for peace which animated Serbia and Russia. On the other hand, the facts that Austria regarded the Serbian Note as a negligible quan- tity, and that she did not even consider it of sufficient value to be accepted as the basis of further discussion, and flatly broke off diplomatic relations, prove that Aus- tria under all circumstances desired war. Her inten- tion to provoke a war is manifest in the first three acts of the tragedy: in the Austrian Note, in the refusal to extend the time-limit, and in the recall of the Ambas- sador. The compliance of Serbia which the whole world longed and hoped for, and which the diplomacy of Europe — again, of course, with the exception of Ger- many — had endeavoured to bring about by all possible ^ Orange Book, No. 6. il54!' I ACCUSE! means, was for Austria the greatest of disappointments. In Vienna they had desired and hoped for a flat refusal, which would have justified a breach of diplomatic re- lations and a declaration of war. It was precisely for this reason that the Note had been couched in such sharp terms, in order that it might provoke a refusal. These expectations were disappointed because the love of peace on the part of Serbia and Russia was greater than the desire for war on the part of Austria. The authorities in Vienna thus found themselves in straits, since the expected ground for war had failed, and they saw themselves obliged to construct artificially a ground for war by seeking to trans fonn the patent submission into a refusal by means of pettifogging and sophistical quibbles. Until the Serbian Note was known to the public, everyone believed in a Serbian refusal, which was uni- versally regarded as the only possible answer to the veiled declaration of war made by Austria. When, how- ever, the European chancellories and the general public became acquainted with the Serbian Note on the 26th and 27th of July everyone was amazed at the attitude of Austria, for which no other explanation could be found than that she intended unconditionally to provoke a war, and everyone looked with horror to the approach- ing danger of a European war. Sir Edward Grey was the first who sought to meet this danger. He proposed a conference of the ambassa- dors of Germany, France, and Italy under his presi- dency in London with the object of devising ways and means of arriving at a settlement of the differences be- tween Austria and Serbia. France and Italy at once accepted the proposal of Grey with great alacrity, and Russia also declared without hesitation that she regarded a conference of the ambassadors of the four Powers not directly concerned as the best method of maintaining THE CRIME 155 peace, and that she herself would accept the decision of this conference.-^ In fact, the composition of a confer- ence consisting of two representatives of the Alliance and two of the Entente guaranteed an impartial exami- nation of the questions at issue, which, in view of the Serbian answer, were reduced to a minimum, and were easily capable of solution in the shortest possible space of time. If it is borne in mind how incomparably more difficult problems had been successfully solved by the Conference of Ambassadors at London during the Bal- kan crisis, it must be admitted that a settlement be- tween the Austrian demands and the Serbian conces- sions in July, 19 14, was child's play compared with the previous achievements of the London conference, which, apart from arriving at a decision on many other ques- tions affecting land and sea, race and nationality, had to undertake the task of bringing into the world nothing less than a whole kingdom. But the idea of a conference of ambassadors encoun- tered the opposition of Germany and Austria, precisely because it would have been such an easy matter to ar- rive in this way at a solution of the questions at issue. If the representatives of the four Powers not directly affected had sat down round a table in London to com- pare the verbal differences of the two Notes and to explain the misunderstandings, it was absolutely certain that they would have been successful in arriving at a solution, and Austria could not then have v/ithdrawn from the proposals decided on by the ambassadors when Russia, speaking both for herself and on behalf of Ser- bia, had in advance expressed her readiness to accept these suggestions. Such a course would have frus- trated the war, and for this reason it was unaccept- ^Blue Book, Nos. 17, 24, 35, 2/^, 42, 51, 53 (Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy). 156 I ACCUSE! able to Austria. For this reason Germany was in the first place entrusted with the task of stepping forward with the objection that they "could not call Austria before a European tribunal." ^ And when this objection was reduced by Grey to an absurdity with the observa- tion that "it would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made for a settlement," ^ Austria came out with the flat declaration that she must decline the Eng- lish proposal.^ This was the fourth action within five days whereby Austria, with the support of Germany, had brought to failure the efforts of the other Powers to preserve peace. The Austrian refusal was all the more glaring inasmuch as it was expressly intended that the conference should only discuss those points which affected Serbian sov- ereignty and independence, and since Austria had from the very beginning given assurances that she did not desire to touch the sovereignty or the independence of Serbia. The proposal thus, in fact, related only to an investigation from the point of view of public law into the question of the extent to which the Austrian de- mands, especially those in Articles 5 and 6 of the Note, were compatible with the sovereignty of the neighbour- ing State. The voluntary acceptance of the result of such an inquiry — which was not in any way an arbitra- tion — could have done as little damage to the prestige of Austria as is done to the honour of a private citizen when in a civil action he accepts a compromise on ex- pert advice. But Austria did not desire any settlement, and thus the idea of a conference failed. ^ White Book, p. 409 [The references to the White Book are adapted to the reprint in the Collected Diplomatic Documents relat- ing to the outbreak of the European War]. ' Blue Book, No. 67. * White Book, p. 409. THE CRIME 15T Simultaneously with her objections to the conference of ambassadors, Germany had proposed direct discus- sions between Austria and Russia as tlie best method of preventing the Serbian question from developing ^ to a European conflict. This proposal was readily concurred in by England, Russia, and France, and Grey was at once prepared to withdraw his proposal for a confer- ence of the four Powers until the direct discussions between Vienna and Petrograd had led to a result, whether positive or negative.^ If the result were posi- tive, the conference would then be superfluous. If it were negative, the conference could still seek to attain what direct discussions had been unable to achieve. So here again there was a new ray of hope! But unfortunately here again they reckoned without Aus- tria. It is scarcely credible, yet it is true — the docu- ments incontrovertibly prove it — Austria declined the direct discussions with Russia^ proposed by her ally Germany, and Count Berchtold declared to the Russian ambassador Schebeko, who had impressed upon Mm in the most friendly manner the desirability of a free discussion in Petrograd, that Austria could neither "re- cede nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian Note." ^ Here there is either a lack of harmony between Berlin and Vienna, or else we have an instance of preconcerted collusion. Since a lack of harmony, for the existence of which there is no evidence, cannot be accepted, there only remains the other alternative, that of preconcerted collusion. The matter is all the more suspicious because, as already observed, the correspondence between Berlin and Vienna has not so far been published, and may *Blue Book, No. 43. White Book, p. 409. ^Blue Book, No. 45. * Blue Book, Nos. 61, 74, 75, 78, 81, 93. Orange Book, Nos. 45, 50. White Book, p. 409. 158 I ACCUSE I therefore be presumed to contain things which it is de- sired to keep silent. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, who every day of his hfe publishes all possible kinds of un- official documents — extracts from the archives of Brus- sels, intercepted letters, and so on — would certainly have published long ere now his correspondence with Vienna if it had contained any confirmation of the truth of his ever-repeated but ever-unproved assertions, that he earnestly pressed for moderation in Vienna and car- ried this labour to the "utmost point." In any case the fact remains that the direct under- standing between Austria and Russia, proposed by Ger- many, came to nothing in consequence of Austria's re- fusal. On July 28th, the same day as that on which the decisive conversation between Berchtold and Schebeko took place, Austria declared war against Ser- bia, and on the next day the bombardment of Belgrade began. This declaration of war made the European situation almost desperate. Austria's intention to crush under all circumstances the inconvenient neighbouring State, re- gardless of the European conflagration which must re- sult, had now revealed itself in action, and it appeared that all further attempts to quench the fire or to prevent its extension would be void of any prospect of success. Austria had mobilised, not only against Serbia, which could be regarded as a matter of course, but against Russia as well. The views vary as to the extent of her' mobilisation towards the north and north-east. The Rus- sian reports maintain that more than half of the Aus- trian army had been mobilised,^ whereas the Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, in his speech of August 4th admits the mobilisation of only two army corps "against the north." ^ In any case it is clear that on July 28th ^ Orange Book, No. 49. 'The Collected Documents, p. 937. THE CRIME 159 Austria was the only great Power which had mobilised, and that its mobilisation was directed, not only against her small neighbour, but also against the great Russian Empire. This fact was bound to compel Russia to take counter- measures, the necessity for which was based not merely on the military measures taken by Austria, but even more on her systematic frustration of all attempts to bring about an understanding. The Russian Govern- ment on the 29th of July officially commjjnicated to foreign Governments that they had ordered mobilisation in the army districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kasan, and that this was designed as a protective meas- ure against Austria's mobilisation and without any ag- gressive intentions against Austria or Germany.^ Simultaneously with these events, renewed efforts were being made by Russia and England to find a for- mula whereby a settlement could be arrived at between the conflicting interests of Austria on the one hand and of Russia on the other. War had now broken out. The question to be discussed was no longer that of inducing Austria to withdraw, but only that of bring- ing about a cessation of military operations, of leaving to Austria as a pledge any Serbian territory which she had meanvv^hile occupied, and of making an attempt on this basis to satisfy as far as possible the demands of Austria. In this direction Grey and Sazonof showed indefati- gable activity, and were most energetically supported by Viviani, the ^R'rench Prime Minister, The first formula in this sense was proposed on July 29th by Grey to the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky. It amounted to the suggestion that Austria should express herself as satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neigh- bouring Serbian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory ^\White Book, p. 409. Orange Book, No. 51. Blue Book, No. 78. 160 I ACCUSE! 'settlement of her demands, and should allow the other ; Powers time and opportunity to mediate between Aus- tria and Russia.^ This proposal of Grey was insistently urged on the Emperor In the telegram despatched on July 30th by King George to Prince Henry of Prussia, and the hope was expressed that the Emperor would apply: — ■ "his great influence in order to induce Austria to accept this proposal. In this way he will prove that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe. Please assure William that I am doing all I can, and will continue to do all that lies in my power, to maintain the peace of Europe." The Secretary of State, Sir E. Grey, exerted himself with the same zeal as the King to move the Powers to the acceptance of his proposal, which, in fact, offered satisfaction to all, and a way of .escape from the dan- gerous confusion which had resulted. Meanwhile the Russian Minister, Sazonof, had also dictated to the German Ambassador, Count Pourtales, a formula as the basis of a settlement, which was directed to the same objects as Grey's proposal. The formula runs : — ■ *Tf Austria, recognising that the Austro-Serbian question has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to elimi- nate from her ultimatum points which violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia engages to stop her military preparations." ^ This proposal of Sazonof dates from July 30th, that is to say, two days after the Austrian declaration of ^Blue Book, Nos. 76, 88, 90, 98. White Book, 410. * Orange Book, No. 60. THE CRIME 161 war against Serbia, and after the bombardment of Bel- grade and the invasion of Serbian territory had already begun. The proposal contained no obligation on the part of Austria to cancel the military action taken by her; it merely imposed on Austria the requirement that she should leave untouched the sovereign rights of Serbia, that is to say, an obligation which could well be accepted by Austria, if she desired honourably to observe the declaration given by her at the beginning of the crisis. What, however, took place? The Russian Ambassa- dor at Berlin, Swerbeiev, on July 30th handed to von Jagow, the Foreign Secretary, the proposal made by Sazonof, which had simultaneously been telegraphed to the Foreign Office through the German Ambassador, Count Pourtales. The answer of Jagow was a Hat re- fusal: "it was impossible for Austria to accept the pro- posal." ^ This refusal, be it noted, was given at once,' without any previous inquiry in Vienna. Herr von Jagow obviously regarded himself as the guardian or man of business of the Austrian Government, which, since the declaration of war against Serbia and her refusal of any kind of discussion, no longer stood in any direct relation with Petrograd. One more attempt thus ended in failure! But even this further failure did not deter the English and Rus- sian Governments from making renewed attempts to bring about an understanding. There were two formulae 1 in the field, that of Grey of the 29th of July and that of Sazonof of the 30th of July. The latter had been re- fused by Jagow without any reasons being given, whereas the former was still awaiting an answer. The English Ambassador in Berlin constantly pressed for an answer, and was repeatedly put off with empty phrases. Owing to the Austrian refusal of all direct discussions, diplomatic intercourse was rendered ex- ^ Orange Book, No. 63. 162 I ACCUSE! traordinarily difficult. All inquiries had to go via Ber- lin, and Berlin was never able to give a positive answer, since, as was professed, an answer had not been received from Vienna. Whether the agent in this case was hon- est or dishonest cannot be proved with full certainty. But in any case the suspicion in favour of the second alternative is overwhelming — a point with which we shall deal in greater detail later in stating the grounds for the indictment against Germany, The peacemakers were put off from day to*- day. On one occasion Jagow had received no answer from Vienna ; on another, Beth- rnann regrets that he had pressed the button so vigor- ously in Vienna that he had perhaps gone too far and produced the opposite effect from what was intended. On a third occasion, when Goschen was still urging that an answer should be given and was recommending that an even more violent pressure should be applied to the button in Vienna, the only answer which he got from Bethmann was that Count Berchtold would take the wishes of the Emperor Francis Joseph in the matter next morning.^ Thus three complete days, from the 29th to the 31st of July, glided unprofitably into the past without any answer being received from Austria in reply to Grey's proposal which the English King had so fervently urged on the Emperor William. Three days glided unprofit- ably into the past while Europe in suspense and In horror watched the approach of the dreaded catastrophe. The diplomatists of Germany and Austria were In no haste. They knew what they wanted, and with complete com- posure they prepared the drama behind the scenes, while in front everyone was running to and fro in agitation, calling aloud in terror for the fire brigade. Grey, Sazonof, and Vivian! persevered, notwithstand* ing all their failures, In the earnest endeavour to prevent ■^Blue Book, Nos. 98, 103, 107, 112. THE CRIME 16S the outbreak of the conflagration. Scores of telegrams flew backwards and forwards between London, Paris, and Petrograd. Night and day men laboured in the Chancellories of the Entente Powers to preserve peace. Since Sazonof's proposal had been declined, and no answer had been sent in reply to Grey's proposal — even to-day no answer has been received — an attempt was made to devise a third formula which would represent a middle way between the first two formulae. This third formula — ^the result of the zealous action taken by Vi- viani in the cause of mediation ^ — went even further to meet the wishes of Austria th^n the first proposal of Sazonof, and thus appeared to offer every prospect of a favourable result. It was communicated by Sazonof to the Great Powers of Europe on the 31st of July, and runs as follows: — < *Tf Austria consents to stay the m-arch of her troops on Serbian territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the char- • acter of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfac- tion which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hun- garian Government without injury to her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude." ^ This formula, which now represented the utmost ex- tent to which it was possible to go in meeting Austria's wishes, and could only have been suggested by Russia's, decisive desire for peace, has never received an answer from Austria or Germany. While Sazonof in a des- patch to London still expressed the hope that a peaceful issue to the situation had' been found,^ while Grey in ^Yellow Book, No. 112. 'Orange Book, No. 67. * Orange Book, Nos. 69, 71. 164 I ACCUSE! his despatches to Berlin most urgently recommended the acceptance of the second formula of Sazonof/ Ger- many and Austria maintained an unbroken silence. In place of the Serbian question, which was in danger of being amicably settled, another question was put for- ward, which was bound to lead inevitably to war — the question of the Russian mobilisation. Germany ap- peared no longer as Austria's man of business, but took her place as a party to the case in her own name. The understudy assumed the leading role. Austria's book of guilt was closed, and a new book of guilt for Germany was opened. The Russian general mobilisation undoubtedly took place on July 31st. On this all the diplomatic publica- tions agree.^ It was, however, occasioned by the previ- ous Austrian general mobilisation. This fact requires to be decisively emphasised, since in Germany an in- tentional silence has been preserved on this point of- ficially and unofficially. This silence is only natural, for the guilt of Russia would hopelessly collapse like a house of cards if it were proved that the Russian mobilisation not only followed the Austrian in point of time, but was also its necessary consequence; not merely because of the military measures of Austria, but equally because of the whole diplomatic attitude of the two Empires in the days between July 23rd and 31st. I have already shown that the first of all the mobilisa- tions was the Austrian partial mobilisation against Ser- bia and against the Russian frontier. This mobilisation, according to Russian and French reports, comprised against Russia more than a half of the entire Austrian army, and according to Bethmann's admission at least two army corps. The precise time of the complete mobilisation of Austria Is differently given; a ccording "^Blue Book, Nos. in, 120, 121, 131, 132. ^ White Book, p. 412. THE CRIME 165 to the report of the Russian Ambassador in Vienna it had already taken place on July 28th.^ According to French and English reports it took place at i o'clock in the morning on July 3ist.^ To be on the safe side, I will assume that the latter date only is proved. Of the correctness of this date there can be no doubt in view of the reports of Dumaine, the French Ambassador In Vienna, of de Bunsen, the English Ambassador in Vi- enna, and Bertie, the English Ambassador in Paris. The Russian general mobilisation was ordered, at the earliest, towards midday on July 31st, that is to say, after the Austrian mobilisation. On the same day — the exact hour is unknown — the "threatening danger of war" (drohende Kriegsgefahr) was proclaimed in Germany. In the evening about 7 o'clock the ultimatum to France was delivered in Paris, and about midnight the ultimatum to Russia was de- livered in Petrograd. An eventful day! But the most remarkable occur- rence was contributed by Austria, when, in the course of the same day, unperturbed by general mobilisation, the state of war (Kriegssustand) , and ultimata, she sud- denly gave simultaneous expression in Paris and Petro- grad to her readiness to enter into negotiations with Russia and the other Powers with regard to the contents of her ultimatum to Serbia. Austria thus at last de- clared herself ready at the eleventh hour to do some- thing which up till then she had most energetically re- fused to do, that is to say, "to discuss the grounds of her grievances against Serbia with the other Powers."^ In Paris, London, and Petrograd this final apparent con- version of Austria was received with feelings of in- tensely pleasant surprise. Everyone hailed what was * Orange Book, No. 44, 47. ^Yellow Book, No. 115. Blue Book, Nos. 113, 118, 126, 134. ^Yellow Book, No. 120. Orange Book, No. yz- 166 I ACCUSE! regarded as a new ray of hope. Grey and Sazonof at once seized the opportunity of guiding the apparent goodwill of Austria into paths which held out the guar- antee of a happy^ issue. As a shopkeeper spreads out before a fastidious cus- tomer all his available wares in the hope that she will in the end find something to suit her taste, so Grey and Sazonof submitted to Austria, even at the eleventh hour, every possible proposal in the hope that at least one would gain the approval of this fastidious customer. Grey promised to support in the capitals of the other Povs^ers any reasonable proposal of peace put forward by Germany and Austria. He offered to support in Petrograd a proposal which would satisfy all Austrian demands without exception, in so far as the sovereignty and integrity of Serbia were not thereby impaired.^ In answer to the Austrian overture, Sazonof not only de- clared himself ready to discuss with Austria the sub- stance of the Austrian ultimatum, but he made the fur- ther proposal — in order to guarantee as far as possible that the discussion would have a chance of success — ^that the proceedings should take place in London under the "participation" of the Great Powers. He added that it would be very important if Austria, during the nego- tiations in London, were to put a stop provisionally to her military action on Serbian territory. ^ "It would be very important," be it observed; it was not made a conditio sine qua non. This represents a further sub- stantial concession to Austria as compared with previous proposals which had made the cessation of military action a condition. But all these proposals made In the last hour re- mained without success. They were bound to be fruit- less, because the assumption underlying them, namely, ^Blue Book, No. iii. ^Blue Book, No. 133. Orange Book, No. 69. THE CRIME 167 that Austria was honestly prepared to come to an un- derstanding, was illusory.. Why did Austria in the criti- cal days between the 23rd and 31st of July refuse all discussions on the facts of the Serbian dispute? Why did she with unyielding obstinacy constantly declare only what she did not intend against Serbia, but never fur- nish any explanation as to what she really did intend? She did not intend to touch the integrity and inde- pendence of Serbia. This negative declaration she con- stantly repeated. But what did she mean to do posi- tively? Even to-day we have no information on this point. The German Emperor himself did not know when he telegraphed to the Tsar on July 29th: — "According to my opinion the action of Austria- Hungary is to be considered as an attempt to re- ceive full guaranty that the promises of Serbia are effectively translated into deeds." Herr von Schoen also, the German Ambassador at Paris, knew just as little as his Imperial Master how to furnish Viviani with a positive answer to the question as to what Austria really did want.^ What precisely was the nature of the gua/ranties of which the Emperor William speaks, and of which the German White Book is constantly making mention? Were they contained in the Austrian Note, or did they go beyond the Austrian Note? If they were contained in it, then they were conceded, apart from the demands contained in Articles 5 and 6, with regard to which Serbia was prepared to negotiate. If, however, they were not contained in the Note, then they extend still further the scope of the Austrian demands, which apart from this were in all conscience sufficiently far-reaching. If this extension of the Austrian demands were to be "Orange Book, No. 55. 168 I ACCUSE! made the subject of negotiations, it should clearly have been stated in precise language; but until the evening of the 31st of July this had not been done, and even to-day we are no further forward. How then, I ask again, are we to explain this sudden change on the part of Austria^ I can find no other explanation than this, that the readiness of Austria to negotiate, which if expressed at an earlier date would without doubt have led to a peaceful settlement, was, in the moment when it was finally expressed, completely harmless. A peaceful solution was no longer to be dreaded; by the independent lead assumed by the Cabinet of Berlin war was already completely assured. Here, again, the question arises whether there was a divergence between Berlin and Vienna, or whether the events which took place are to be attributed to precon- certed duplicity. The paths followed by the two Cabi- nets apparently led in opposite directions on the evening of July 31st. Austria, in virtue of her readiness to negotiate, was moving in the direction of peace. Ger- many with her "threatening danger of war," with her Imperial speeches,^ and the speeches of the Chancellor to the people of Berlin, advanced consciously and in- tentionally in the direction of war. It is impossible to believe that there was any divergence between the two Cabinets. Had such a divergence existed it must have • revealed itself at an earlier date than the 31st of July. ' The coincidence in time between the two apparently opposed actions, the sudden overnight conversion of Austria as though by an illumination — in individuals as in States such sudden illuminations are highly sus- picious, and only slow conversions inspire confidence — the conversion of Austria calculated to take effect at the moment when it could no longer lead to salvation — all these circumstances raise to a certainty the suspicion that here there was preconcerted duplicity between the THE CRIME 169 two Governments intended to shift the guilt of the war from themselves to Russia. It must and had to come to war. The further discus- sion of the question will completely convince anyone who has so far been able to entertain doubts of the truth of this assertion. All diplomatic negotiations were thus bound to remain fruitless even if they resulted in the whole of Europe being forced to her knees before Ger- many and Austria. It was not enough to achieve a diplomatic victory; a military victory had to be added in order to assure the supremacy of Austria in the Bal- kans and to pave for Germany a path to the stars where she dreamed that her destiny was written. The indictment which I bring against Austria may be •summarised in the following sentences : (i) Austria, after having already planned an attack on Serbia in August, 191 3, presented to Serbia in July, 19 14, a Note containing demands of such an exorbitant nature that a war with Serbia, and as a further conse- quence a European war, was to be expected. (2) She refused the prolongation of the forty-eight hours' time-limit which was sought for by the Entente Powers. (3) She recalled her Ambassador, and declared war against Serbia, although the Serbian Government had submissively conceded nearly all the Austrian demands, and so far as the others were concerned declared her- self ready to negotiate and to submit the outstanding points to arbitration. (4) She flatly refused every discussion with Russia and with the other Powers on the contents of the Ser- bian Note, and only expressed her readiness to take part in such discussions on July 31st when it was too late. (5) She refused the proposal of Grey to accept media- tion, or at least advice, from the four Powers not di- 170 I ACCUSE! rectly concerned, although Russia had agreed to this proposal. (6) Notwithstanding repeated urgent requests from England, she left unanswered the formula of agreement proposed by Grey. (7) She declined, through Herr von Jagow, the first formula of agreement proposed by Sazonof. (8) She gave no answer to the second formula of agreement proposed by Sazonof. (9) The last proposals for an agreement made by Grey and Sazonof were also not considered worthy of an answer by Austria. (10) In so far as she furnished any explanations, she restricted herself to saying what she did not wish, but she never said what she did wish. (11) She was the first of all the Great Powers to be- gin mobilisation and military operations ; she preceded all the other Powers, first with her partial and then with her general mobilisation. These points in the indictment are proved, and jus- tify the judgment: '^Austria is guilty, either alone or in common with others, of having provoked the European wa/r." We shall now see who the others are. B GERMANY The guilt of Germany is even easier to prove than that