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THE LOST FRUITS OF 
 WATERLOO 
 
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 H1W YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO • DALLAS 
 ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO 
 
 MACMILLAN & CO., Limited 
 
 LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA 
 MELBOURNE 
 
 THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltdu 
 
 TORONTO 
 
The 
 Lost Fruits of Waterloo 
 
 BY 
 JOHN SPENCER BASSETT, Ph.D., LL.D. 
 
 Author of "Life of Andrew Jackson," "A Short History 
 
 of the United States," "The Middle Group 
 
 of American Historians," "The 
 
 Federalist System," etc. 
 
 Km flork 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 1918 
 
 All rightt reterved 
 

 Copyright, 1918 
 By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 Set up and printed. Published April, 1918 
 
 niM 
 
 _ 3 \s\a 
 
 ©CI.A495961 
 
PREFACE 
 
 This book was begun under the influence 
 of the enthusiasm aroused by President Wilson's 
 address to Congress on January 22, 1917. It 
 was then that he first gave definite utterance of 
 his plan for a league, or federation, of nations to 
 establish a permanent peace. The idea had long 
 been before the world, but it was generally dis- 
 missed as too impracticable for the support of 
 serious minded men. By taking it up the Presi- 
 dent brought it into the realm of the possible. 
 In the presence of the great world catastrophe 
 that hung over us it seemed well to dare much 
 in order that we might avoid a repetition of 
 existing evils. And if the idea was worth trying, 
 it was certainly worth a careful examination in 
 the light of history. It was with the hope of 
 making such a careful examination that I set 
 to work on the line of thought that has led to 
 this book. 
 
vi PREFACE 
 
 As my work has progressed the great drama 
 has been unfolding itself with terrible realism. 
 New characters have come upon the stage, char- 
 acters not contemplated in the original cast of 
 the play. At the same time some of the old 
 parts have undergone such changes that they 
 appear in new relations. I am not unmindful 
 of the fact that events now unforeseen may make 
 other and radical changes in the dramatis 
 persona? before this book is placed in the hand 
 of the reader. But always the great problem 
 must be the same, the prevention of a return to 
 the present state of world madness. That end 
 we must ever keep in mind as we consider the 
 arguments here advanced, and any inconsistency 
 discovered between the argument and the actual 
 state of events will, I hope, be treated with as 
 much leniency as the transitions of the situation 
 seem to warrant. 
 
 As I write, many things indicate that the great 
 conflict is approaching dissolution. The ex- 
 haustion of the nations, the awakening voices 
 of the masses, the evident failure of militarism 
 to lead Germany to world empire, the rising 
 spectre of the international solidarity of the 
 
PREFACE vii 
 
 laborers, and many other portents seem to show 
 that the world will soon have to say "yes" or 
 "no" to the plain question: "Shall we, or shall 
 we not, have a union of nations to promote per- 
 manent peace?" 
 
 The warning that they must answer the ques- 
 tion is shouted to many classes. Bankers are 
 threatened with the repudiation of the securities 
 of the greatest nations, manufacturers may soon 
 see their vast gains swallowed up in the destruc- 
 tion of the forms of credit which hitherto have 
 seemed most substantial, churches and every 
 form of intellectual life that should promote 
 civilization may have their dearest ideals swept 
 away in a rush toward radicalism, and even the 
 German autocracy is fighting for its life against 
 an infuriated and despairing proletariat. Are 
 not these dangers enough to make us ask if the 
 old menace shall continue? 
 
 It is not my purpose to answer all the ques- 
 tions I ask. It is sufficient to unfold the situa- 
 tion and show how it has arisen out of the past. 
 If the reader finds that mistakes were once made, 
 he will have to consider the means of correcting 
 them. No pleader can compel the opinions of 
 
Vlll 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 intelligent men and women. It is enough if he 
 lays the case before clear and conscientious minds 
 in an impersonal way. More than this he should 
 not try to do: as much as this I have sought to 
 do. If the world really lost the fruits of its 
 victory over a world conqueror at Waterloo, it is 
 for the citizen of today to say in what way the 
 lost fruits can be recovered. 
 
 Many friends have aided me in my efforts to 
 present my views to the public, and among them 
 Dr. Frederick P. Keppel, Dean of Columbia 
 University, deserves special acknowledgment. I 
 am also under obligation to Dean Ada C. Corn- 
 stock, of Smith College, for very careful proof- 
 reading. But for the opinions here expressed 
 and the errors which may be discovered I alone 
 am responsible. 
 
 John Spencer Bassett. 
 Northampton, Massachusetts, 
 February 5, 1918. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The nations of Europe fought a great war to a 
 finish a hundred and two years ago, defeating a 
 master leader of men and ending the ambitions 
 of a brilliantly organized nation. They were so 
 well satisfied with their achievement that they 
 imagined that peace, won after many years of 
 suffering, was a sufficient reward for their sac- 
 rifices. To escape impending subjugation 
 seemed enough good fortune for the moment. 
 They forgot that it was a principle and not 
 merely a man they had been contending against, 
 and when they had made sure that Napoleon was 
 beyond the possibility of a return to power, they 
 thought the future was secure. But the prin- 
 ciple lived and has come to life again. It was 
 the inherent tendency to unification in govern- 
 ment, a principle that appeals to the national 
 pride of most peoples when they find themselves 
 in a position to make it operate to the supposed 
 advantage of their own country. It has been 
 
x INTRODUCTION 
 
 seized upon by the Germans in our own genera- 
 tion, to whom it has been as glittering a prize as it 
 was to the Frenchmen of the early nineteenth 
 century. To conquer the world and win a place 
 in the sun is no mean ideal; and if the efforts of 
 the Entente allies succeed in defeating it in its 
 present form, it is reasonably certain that it will 
 appear again to distress the future inhabitants of 
 the earth, unless sufficient steps are taken to 
 bind it down by bonds which cannot be broken. 
 
 This conviction has led to the suggestion that 
 when Germany is beaten, as she must be beaten, 
 steps should be taken, not only to insure that she 
 shall not again disturb the earth, but that no other 
 power coming after her shall lay the foundations 
 and form the ambition which will again put the 
 world to the necessity of fighting the present war 
 over again. When the North broke the bonds of 
 slavery in the South in 1865 it was filled with 
 a firm determination that slavery should stay 
 broken. In the same way, when the nations shall 
 have put down the menace of world domination 
 now rampant in Europe, they should make it their 
 .first concern to devise a means by which the 
 menace shall stay broken. 
 
INTRODUCTION xi 
 
 To kill a principle demands a principle equally 
 strong and inclusive. No one nation can keep 
 down war and subjugation; for it must be so 
 strong to carry out that purpose that it becomes 
 itself a conqueror. It would be as intolerable to 
 Germany, for example, to be ruled by the United 
 States as it would be to the United States if they 
 were ruled by Germany. The only restraint that 
 will satisfy all the nations will be exercised by 
 some organ of power in which all have fair repre- 
 sentation and in which no nation is able to do 
 things which stimulate jealousy and give grounds 
 for the belief that some are being exploited by 
 others. This suggestion does not demand a well 
 integrated federal government for all the func- 
 tions of the state but merely the adoption of a 
 system of cooperation with authority over the 
 outbreak of international war and strong enough 
 to make its will obeyed. It is federation for only 
 one purpose and such a purpose as will never 
 be brought into vital action as long as the feder- 
 ated will is maintained at such a point of strength 
 and exercised with such a degree of fairness that 
 individual states will not question that will. 
 
 This principle of federated action for a specific 
 
xii INTRODUCTION 
 
 purpose was adopted by the United States in 
 1789, and though hailed by the practical states- 
 men of Europe as an experiment, it has proved 
 the happiest form of government that has yet 
 been established over a vast territory in which are 
 divergent economic and social interests. In it 
 is much more integration than would exist in a 
 federated system to prevent war, where the 
 action of the central authority would be limited to 
 one main object. If it could be formed and put 
 into operation by the present generation, who 
 know so well what it costs to beat back the spectre 
 of world conquest it might pass through the pre- 
 liminary critical stages of its existence success- 
 fully. At any rate, the world is full of the feel- 
 ing that such things may be possible, and it would 
 be unwise to dismiss the suggestion without giv- 
 ing it fair and full consideration. 
 
 The discussion brings up what seems to be a 
 law of human activities, that as the ages run and 
 as men develop their minds they combine in 
 larger and larger units for carrying on the par- 
 ticular thing they are interested in. And they 
 make these combinations by force or through 
 mutual agreement. We have before us the con- 
 
INTRODUCTION xiii 
 
 sideration of the most important form of this 
 unifying process, the unification of nations, 
 which has generally come through force, but 
 sometimes has come through agreement. 
 
 In recent industrial history is a parallel process 
 so well illustrating the point at issue that I 
 can not refrain from mentioning it. In his book, 
 My Four Years in Germany, Mr. James W. 
 Gerard contrasts great industrial combinations in 
 the United States and Germany. In one coun- 
 try are trusts, in the other great companies 
 known as cartels. The development of the trust 
 we know well. It came out of a process of com- 
 petitive war. Some large manufacturer who 
 possessed ability for war, formed an initial group 
 of manufacturers with the prospect of controlling 
 a large part of the market. He was careful to 
 see that his own group had the best possible or- 
 ganization, central control, and a loyal body of 
 subordinates. Then he opened his attack on his 
 smaller rivals, and in most cases they were driven 
 into surrender or bankruptcy. It was a hard 
 process, but it led to industrial unity with its 
 many advantages. 
 
 The cartel began with co-operation. All the 
 
xiv INTRODUCTION 
 
 persons or companies manufacturing a given 
 article were asked to unite in its creation. They 
 pooled their resources, adopted common buying 
 and selling agencies, and shared the returns 
 amicably. They proved very profitable for the 
 shareholders, and they strengthened the national 
 industry in its competition against foreigners. 
 In the United ^States the trust has been unpopu- 
 lar, despite its many economic advantages. The 
 reason is the battle-like methods by which it de- 
 stroyed its rivals. The result was the enactment 
 of laws to restrain its development, laws so con- 
 trary to the trend of the times that they have 
 been very tardily enforced. The cartel, estab- 
 lished with the co-operation of the whole group 
 of manufacturers, aroused no antagonism and 
 obtained the approval of the laws. It is not nec- 
 essary to say which is the better of these two 
 methods of arriving at the same object. 
 
 Turning to the subject with which we are here 
 chiefly concerned, it is interesting to note that 
 Germany has undertaken in the last years to 
 carry forward her world expansion by methods 
 that are entirely different. While she has feder- 
 ated in industrial life she appears in her foreign 
 
INTRODUCTION xv 
 
 relations as a true representative of the spirit 
 that built up the trusts. She means to unify 
 her competitor states, not as she has united her 
 industries, but as the American trusts secured the 
 whole field of operations. First she forms a 
 small group with herself at the head. In the 
 group are Germany, Austria, Turkey, and, later 
 on, Bulgaria. At this stage of her progress she 
 has gone as far as the Standard Oil Company had 
 gone when Mr. Rockefeller had perfected the 
 idea of the "trust" in 1882. Her next step was 
 to attack her rivals. France she would crush at 
 a blow, first lulling Great Britain to inactivity 
 by feigned friendship and the promise of gains 
 in the Near East. Then she would do what she 
 would with Russia. With these two nations dis- 
 posed of, Britain, the unready, could be easily 
 brought to terms, and the United States would 
 then be at her mercy. The mass of German peo- 
 ple had not, perhaps, reasoned the process out in 
 this way; but it was so easily seen that it could 
 not have escaped the minds of the leaders of the 
 German military party. No trust builder ever 
 made fairer plans for the upbuilding of his enter- 
 prise than these gentlemen made for putting 
 
xvi INTRODUCTION 
 
 through their combination, before which they 
 saw in their minds the states of the world top- 
 pling. So well were the plans made and so 
 efficient were the strokes that the utmost efforts 
 of the rest of the world have become necessary to 
 defeat the German hopes. 
 
 The United States have approached the prob- 
 lem of world relations in another spirit. Reject- 
 ing the spirit of the trust magnate, which 
 Germany accepted, we have turned to co-opera- 
 tion as the means of avoiding international 
 competition and distrust. President Wilson's 
 repeated suggestions of a federated peace are 
 couched in the exact spirit of the cartel. He 
 asks that war may be replaced by co-operation, 
 pointing out the tremendous advantage to all 
 if the machinery of competition can be discarded. 
 
 Viewed in its largest aspects, therefore, the 
 present struggle has resolved itself into a debate 
 over the amount of unity that shall in the future 
 exist between states. It does not seem possible 
 that Austria will ever be a thoroughly sovereign 
 state again, nor that Turkey will escape from 
 the snare in which her feet are caught. What 
 degree of unity this will engender between 
 
INTRODUCTION xvii 
 
 France and Great Britain, if the old system of 
 international relations continues, it is not hard 
 to guess. And as for the small states of Europe, 
 their future is very perplexing. 
 
 This much rests on the assumption that Ger- 
 many and her allied neighbours are going to 
 make peace without defeat and without victory. 
 If they should be able to carry off a triumph, 
 which now seems impossible, it would not be hard 
 to tell in what manner unification would come. 
 However the result, the separateness of Euro- 
 pean states will probably be diminished, and 
 their interdependence, either in two large group- 
 ings or in some more or less strong general 
 grouping, will be increased. 
 
 No wise man will undertake to say which form 
 of interdependence will be the result. But it 
 seems certain that we stand today with two roads 
 before us, each leading to the same end, a stronger 
 degree of unity. One goes by way of German 
 domination, the other by way of equal and mutual 
 agreement. I do not need to say which will be 
 pleasanter to those who travel. We cannot 
 stand at the crossing forever: some day we shall 
 pass down one of the roads. It is said that the 
 
xviii INTRODUCTION 
 
 world is not yet ready to choose the second road, 
 and that it must go on in the old way, fighting 
 off attempts at domination, until it learns the 
 advantages of co-operation. It may be so; but 
 meanwhile it is a glorious privilege to strike a 
 blow, however weak, in behalf of reason. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Introduction ix 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 I The Question of Permanent Peace ... 1 
 
 II Early Advocates of Universal Peace . . 23 
 
 III Problems of the Napoleonic Wars ... 43 
 
 IV Europe Under the Concert of the Powers 65 
 
 V The Later Phases of the Concert of Eu- 
 rope 83 
 
 VI The Balkan States 103 
 
 VII German Ideals and Organization . . .132 
 
 VIII The Failure of the Old European System 154 
 
 IX If the Submarines Fail 184 
 
 X Obstacles to an Enduring Peace . . . 205 
 
 XI Arguments for a Federation of States . . 229 
 
 XII A Federation of Nations 254 
 
THE LOST FRUITS OF 
 WATERLOO 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE QUESTION OF PERMANENT PEACE 
 
 When war broke over the world three years 
 ago many ministers and other people declared 
 that Armageddon had come. They had in mind 
 a tradition founded on a part of the sixteenth 
 chapter of Revelations, in which the prophet was 
 supposed to describe a vision of the end of the 
 world. In that awful day seven angels appeared 
 with seven vials of wrath, and the contents of each 
 when poured out wiped away something that was 
 dear to the men of the earth. The sixth angel 
 poured out on the waters of the river Euphrates, 
 and they were dried up ; and then unclean spirits 
 issued from the mouths of the dragons and of 
 other beasts and from the mouth of the false 
 prophet, and they went into the kings of the 
 earth, then the political rulers of mankind, and 
 
2 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 induced them to bring the people together "to 
 the battle of that great day of God Almighty." 
 And the armies met at Armageddon and fought 
 there the last battle of time. This striking fig- 
 ure made a deep impression on the early Chris- 
 tians, and out of it arose the belief that some 
 day would come a great and final war, in which 
 the nations of the earth would unite for their 
 mutual destruction, after which the spirit of 
 righteousness would establish a millennial reign 
 of peace. And so when most of the nations of 
 the world came together in war in 1914, many 
 persons pronounced the struggle the long ex- 
 pected Armageddon. 
 
 It was easy to say in those days of excitement 
 that this war was going to be the last. Madness 
 it certainly was, and surely a mad world would 
 come back to reasonableness after a season of 
 brutal destruction. Common sense, humanity, 
 and the all powerful force of economic interest 
 would bring the struggle to an end, and then by 
 agreement steps would be taken to make a recur- 
 rence of the situation impossible. 
 
 It was in the days when we still had confidence 
 in civilization. Humanity, we said, had devel- 
 
PERMANENT PEACE 3 
 
 oped to such an extent that it could not return to 
 the chaos that an age of war would imply. Inter- 
 national law was still considered a binding body 
 of morality, if not of actual law. International 
 public opinion was believed to have power to pun- 
 ish national wrong-doers. We who teach said as 
 much to our classes many times in those days of 
 innocence. In all sincerity we felt that a nation 
 could not do this or that thing because public 
 opinion would not tolerate it. How far distant 
 seem now the days of early summer in 1914! 
 
 We had adopted many specific rules to re- 
 strain needless barbarity in war. For example, 
 we would not use dum-dum bullets, nor drop 
 bombs on non-combatants, nor shell the homes of 
 innocent dwellers on the seashore. It was con- 
 sidered an achievement of the civilized spirit that 
 an army occupying enemy territory would re- 
 spect the rights of the non-combatant inhabitants, 
 set guards over private property, protect women 
 and children from injury, and permit civilians to 
 go about their business as long as they did not in- 
 termeddle with military matters. In three and 
 a half horrible years we have drifted a long 
 way from these protestations. Those of us who 
 
4 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 once studied the elements of international law 
 may well study them again when the war is over, 
 if, indeed, international law is still thought worth 
 studying. 
 
 In the vision the angel poured out his vial on 
 
 the great river, to the early men of Mesapotamia 
 the symbol of the great waters. In our own day 
 we have seen strange engines of wrath placed in 
 the great waters, foul spirits that destroy men 
 and ships in disregard of the rules of fair fighting. 
 And out of the mouths of dragons and other 
 loathsome beasts, and of false prophets as well, 
 evil spirits have issued in these sad days. They 
 have taken their places in the hearts and minds 
 of self-willed men and made beasts of them; so 
 that the rest of humanity have had to fight against 
 them and suffer themselves to be killed by them, 
 in order that the wicked shall not triumph over 
 the whole earth. 
 
 The war has been gruesome beyond the imagi- 
 nation of man. No other recorded experience 
 has told us of so much killing, and of so many 
 different ways of killing. Men have been slain 
 with swords, cannon, great howitzers, rifles, 
 machine guns, tanks, liquid fire, electrified wires, 
 
PERMANENT PEACE 5 
 
 and finally with the germs of disease deliberately 
 planted. Nothing that science could invent for 
 destroying human life has been omitted, except, 
 possibly, dum-dum bullets; and in view of the 
 use of much more cruel means we may well ask, 
 "Why not dum-dums also?" 
 
 We must admit that if the author of the Book 
 of Revelations had prophetic insight and foresaw 
 the world struggle that now is, he did not over- 
 paint its terrors. And so, asks the man of faith, 
 if the first part of the vision comes true, why 
 may not the second part likewise come true? 
 If the seer could foresee the war and its horrors, 
 may he not also have spoken truly when he fore- 
 told that after Armageddon wars would be no 
 more; for God would wipe away the desire for 
 them from the hearts of men ? 
 
 To this question I answer: If a man is left 
 in the world when this conflict is ended who 
 glories in deliberate war, he is too bad to live in 
 civilized society. Certain it is that the vast 
 majority of men and women are already con- 
 vinced that the desire for war, henceforth and 
 forever, is wiped out of their hearts. In the 
 stress of actual battle or in the preparations to 
 
6 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 sustain those who fight they may forget the 
 fundamental folly of the whole thing for the time ; 
 but it is always at the bottom of their hearts. 
 What is the human power of reasoning worth, 
 if it is not able to devise some way to escape 
 from this obsession of self -slaughter? 
 
 Do not be deceived by the strut of Mars. His 
 Day has come with a vengeance. He has shot 
 up rapidly, like a jimson-weed, and blossomed 
 like a cactus. We may have laughed at him in 
 the days of peace, but we now look to him for 
 protection. We cannot decry the men who are 
 dying for us, dying in the best sportsmanslike 
 manner. But we do not like their business as a 
 business, and we wish at the bottom of our hearts 
 that it were abolished as a peril to humanity. 
 And we believe that of all who hate war, none 
 hate it more than those who are actually righting 
 in this struggle. Let us give Mars his Day and 
 all the glory that belongs to it, but let us not 
 forget peace while we serve war. 
 
 Nor should we be deceived by the pallid paci- 
 fist. He has his counterpart in every struggle; 
 and in general he serves some good purpose in 
 a multitude of opinions. But the day of stress 
 
PERMANENT PEACE 7 
 
 and world crisis is not his Day; and the practical 
 world loses little time in putting him in his place. 
 The pacifist does not represent the peace move- 
 ment in its freest and most significant form. 
 The advocates of peace today who are best serv- 
 ing its promotion are those who are out in the 
 armies bent on putting down that nation who is 
 the most dangerous enemy of peace. 
 
 These men are not mere pieces of machinery 
 in a great driving process. They are thinking 
 men with political power in their hands, either 
 actually or potentially. War is a great school- 
 teacher. It has lasted in our own time nearly as 
 long as a course in college. The soldiers who 
 survive from the beginning of this conflict may 
 now be considered as more than half through 
 their senior year. They know what war is and 
 what it means, and they know something about 
 the necessary form of cooperation that must 
 exist in any society before the will of the people 
 can be carried into effect. They knew little 
 about war four years ago : they now know all the 
 professors know. Behind the lines and here in 
 our homes one never sees man nor woman who 
 does not admit that it would be a blessing to 
 
8 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 make war impossible ; but few of us have any idea 
 how to go about getting it made impossible. 
 Many of us think we shall never get people to 
 act together in such a cause. But it seems un- 
 reasonable to expect that men who have raided 
 through "No Man's Land," captured trenches 
 and defeated great armies through organization 
 and initiative should quail before the inertia 
 of opinion, perhaps the chief obstacle confronting 
 those who labor for a cooperative peace. 
 
 The example of the Russians is a useful point 
 in this connection. At the beginning of the war 
 their armies were as machine-like as any armies 
 could be. The privates were generally peasants 
 who did not know why they fought, and who cer- 
 tainly had nothing to say about the origin of the 
 war. They were typical "cannon-fodder," and 
 as unthinking as any modern soldier can be. 
 They have learned much from less than three 
 years of war. They slowly acquired purpose, 
 a sense of organization, and leaders whom they 
 follow. Having made this progress they over- 
 threw the imperial government, drove away the 
 great nobles, put an ensign in the place of a 
 former grand duke and two exiles in the seats, 
 
PERMANENT PEACE 9 
 
 of the highest officials, and stripped the high- 
 est born army officers of their titles and in- 
 signia. 
 
 At the present writing they are holding out 
 against all attempts to overthrow them, they are 
 playing the diplomatic game with Germany 
 without discredit, 1 and they are reported to be 
 shaking the foundations of autocracy in Austria. 
 At any rate, it must be confessed that a small 
 group of the Russian "cannon-fodder" have 
 made commendable progress in the process of 
 education during the last ten months. The 
 process seems to have been under the direction 
 of the socialists, a small but well organized group 
 of intelligent persons who do not lack initiative. 
 It is they who are educating the Russian peasants 
 into political self-expression. 
 
 The possible results of this incident are tre- 
 mendous. Nowhere else in the world have the 
 agricultural classes fallen into one party with 
 vigorous and trained leaders. If Russia is now 
 embarking on an era of representative govern- 
 
 i Since the above was written events have occurred in Russia 
 which seem to discredit the diplomacy of the revolutionists; but 
 the general situation is so unsettled that no conclusions can be 
 drawn at this time, February 27, 1918. 
 
10 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 ment, as seems probable, she is passing through 
 a stage in which political parties are being 
 crystallized. So far, it does not appear that any- 
 considerable party is organized in the vast empire 
 on what we should call a conservative basis. It 
 will be an interesting experiment in political 
 history if Russia has a great peasant party in 
 control of the administration. 
 
 The party that now controls Russia is com- 
 mitted to the idea of a peace through the co- 
 operation of the nations. It is true that inter- 
 nationalism goes further than mere federation of 
 nations ; for it also implies the socialization of in- 
 dustry, the equal distribution of property. In 
 short, it is the internationalism and unification of 
 the industrial classes in all nations for a com- 
 bined opposition to capital. With these aims 
 we shall, probably, not be pleased. But they 
 imply the destruction of war; and it now seems 
 possible that Russia will stand before the world, 
 at least until the radical elements fall before 
 conservatives, as the most prominent champion 
 of cooperative peace. 
 
 As to the socialistic purpose of the interna- 
 tionalists, it stands apart logically from that fea- 
 
PERMANENT PEACE 11 
 
 ture of their doctrine that relates to the mere 
 cooperation of nations. They would say, prob- 
 ably, that cooperation is but incidental to their 
 main desire, the unification of the workers of 
 the world. But it is right to expect that they 
 would support cooperation among the nations 
 to obtain the destruction of war, since it would 
 make it easier for the world to accept their other 
 ideals. On the other hand the man who opposes 
 internationalism as such, could accept the aid of 
 a radical Russia in obtaining federated peace, 
 without feeling that in doing so he was necessarily 
 contributing to the promotion of the socialistic 
 features of internationalism. 
 
 This remarkable shifting of power in Russia 
 has had its counterpart on a less impressive scale 
 in other countries. Whether it comes to the 
 point of explosion or not, there is in the minds 
 of all — the thoughtful people, the working-men, 
 and all intermediate classes — a growing belief 
 that a new idea should rule the relations of 
 nations among themselves. From an age of in- 
 ternational competition they are turning to the 
 hope of an era of international agreement; and 
 it does not appear that their influence will be un- 
 
12 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 heeded when men come to face steadily the 
 problems the war is sure to leave behind it. 
 
 Most notable influence of all in behalf of a 
 federated peace is the position taken by Presi- 
 dent Wilson. In the beginning of this conflict 
 he had the scholar's horror of warfare, and he has 
 taken more than one opportunity to suggest the 
 formation of a league of nations to prevent the 
 outbreak of future wars. His address to Con- 
 gress on January 22, 1917, was a notable pre- 
 sentation of the idea to the world. Enthusiastic 
 hearers pronounced the occasion a turning-point 
 in history. Whether a league of nations is es- 
 tablished or not, according to the president's 
 desires, his support of the idea has given it a 
 great push forward. He has taken it out of the 
 realm of the ideal and made it a practical thing, 
 to be discussed gravely in the cabinets of rulers. 
 
 A year after the question has been brought 
 forward, it should be possible to form an opinion 
 of the attitude of European nations in regard 
 to the suggestion. From all of them, including 
 Germany and Austria, have come courteous 
 allusions to the idea of the president; and the 
 pope has given it his support. But it is not 
 
PERMANENT PEACE 13 
 
 clear that all are sincerely in favor of a logically 
 constituted league that will have power to do 
 what it is expected to do. That President Wil- 
 son will continue to urge steps in this direction 
 is to be taken as certain. The measure of his 
 success will be the amount of hearty and sub- 
 stantial support he has from that large class of 
 people who still ask: "Can't something be done 
 to stop war forever?" 
 
 When this page is being written the news- 
 papers are full of a discussion of the two speeches 
 that came from the central powers on January 
 25, 1918, one from Chancellor von Hertling of 
 Germany, and the other from Count Czernin, of 
 Austria. In the former is the following utter- 
 ance: 
 
 "I am sympathetically disposed, as my political activity 
 shows, toward every idea which eliminates for the future 
 a possibility or a probability of war, and will promote 
 a peaceful and harmonious collaboration of nations. If the 
 idea of a bond of nations, as suggested by President 
 Wilson, proves on closer examination really to be conceived 
 in a spirit of complete justice and complete impartiality 
 toward all, then the imperial government is gladly ready, 
 when all other pending questions have been settled, to 
 begin the examination of the basis of such a bond of na- 
 tions." 
 
14 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 This very guarded utterance means much or 
 little, as the German rulers may hereafter deter- 
 mine. By offering impossible conditions of what 
 they may pronounce "complete justice and com- 
 plete impartiality to all" they may be able to 
 nullify whatever promise may be incorporated in 
 it. On the other hand, the sentiment, if accepted 
 in a fair spirit and without exaggerated demands, 
 may be a real step toward realizing President 
 Wilson's desires. If, for example, Germany 
 should insist, as a condition for the formation 
 of a "bond of nations," that Great Britain give 
 up her navy, or dismantle Gibraltar, while she 
 herself retained her immense Krupp works and 
 her power to assemble her army at a moment's 
 notice, it is hardly likely the demand would be 
 granted. We can best know what Germany 
 will do in this matter when we see to what ex- 
 tent she is willing to acknowledge that her war 
 is a failure and that her military policy is a 
 vast and expensive affair that profits nothing. 
 Moreover, there is a slight sneer in the chan- 
 cellor's words, as though he does not consider the 
 president's idea entirely within the range of the 
 diplomacy of experienced statesmen; and this is 
 
PERMANENT PEACE 15 
 
 not very promising for the outcome — unless, 
 indeed, the logic of future events opens his eyes 
 to the meaning of the new spirit that the war has 
 aroused. 
 
 Among our own allies the suggestion of our 
 president has found a kinder reception. Mr. 
 Lloyd George has announced his general support 
 of the proposition, and Lord Bryce and others 
 have given it cordial indorsement. It seems 
 that if the United States urges the formation 
 of a league of peace, she will have the coopera- 
 tion of Great Britain. As to the position of 
 France and Italy, the matter is not so clear. 
 They probably are too deeply impressed by the 
 danger they will ever face from powerful neigh- 
 bors to feel warranted in dismissing their armies, 
 unless the best assurance is given that Germany 
 and Austria accept federated peace in all good 
 faith. 
 
 As the contending nations approach that state 
 of exhaustion which presages an end of the war, 
 the question of such a peace becomes increasingly 
 important. Everything points to the conclusion 
 that the time has arrived to debate this subject. 
 If the hopes of August, 1914, that Armageddon 
 
16 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 would be succeeded by an era of permanent 
 peace are to be realized, they will not come with- 
 out the serious thought of men who are willing 
 to dare something for their ideals. And if they 
 come out of the present cataclysm it is time to 
 be up and doing. The sentiment that exists in 
 this country, and in other countries, must be 
 organized and made effective at the critical 
 moment. There is nothing more dispiriting to 
 the student of history than to observe as he reads 
 how many favorable moments for turning some 
 happy corner in the progress of humanity were 
 allowed to pass without effort to utilize them. 
 It has been a hundred years since the world had 
 another opportunity like this that faces us, and 
 if it is not now tried out to the utmost possibility, 
 there is little hope that the next century will be as 
 bloodless as the past has been, even with the 
 present conflict included. 
 
 Every general war in Europe since the days 
 of the Roman Empire has brought humanity 
 there to a state of exhaustion similar to that 
 which now exists. So it was with the Thirty 
 Years' War, with the wars inaugurated by Louis 
 XIV to establish the predominance of France, 
 
PERMANENT PEACE 17 
 
 and with the Napoleonic wars a century ago. 
 Each of these struggles, it will be observed, ex- 
 tended to a larger portion of Europe than its 
 predecessor; and it was because the common in- 
 terests of nations were progressively stronger; 
 for it was ever becoming so that what concerned 
 one state concerned others. In the present war 
 the interrelations of nations is such that Japan 
 and the United States have been brought into the 
 conflict, along with China and several of the 
 smaller American states. If the conflict recurs 
 in the future it may be expected to involve a 
 still wider area. 
 
 There is evidence that in each of these strug- 
 gles the humane men then living were filled with 
 the same longing for permanent peace that many 
 men feel today. 1 The feeling was especially 
 strong during the last stages of the Napoleonic 
 wars and immediately after they ended. Singu- 
 larly enough it was strongest in Russia, due, how- 
 ever to the accident that an enthusiastic and 
 idealistic tsar was ruling in that country. He 
 had received his ideals from a French tutor who 
 was deeply imbued with the equality theories 
 
 i See below, pp. 46-62, 
 
18 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 of the revolution that swept over his own country. 
 The tsar accepted them with sincerity and spent 
 several years of conscientious effort in his at- 
 tempts to have them adopted. More singularly 
 still, they found their only sincere indorsement, 
 among the rulers who had the right to indorse or 
 reject, with the king of Prussia, who at that time 
 was a very religious man. Most peculiar of all 
 they found very strong opposition in England, 
 where practical statesmen were in power. As I 
 read the history of that day and reflect on what 
 has been the train of events from the battle of 
 Waterloo to the invasion of Belgium in 1914, it 
 is hard to keep from wishing that a better effort 
 had been made in 1815 to carry out the sugges- 
 tion which the tsar urged on his royal brothers 
 in Europe. 
 
 The defeat of Napoleon was purchased at im- 
 mense sacrifices. To the people of the day the 
 most desirable thing in the world seemed to be a 
 prevention of his reappearance to trouble man- 
 kind. They took the greatest care to keep his 
 body a prisoner until he was dead; but they did 
 not seriously try to lay his ghost. Probably 
 they did not think, being practical men, that his 
 
PERMANENT PEACE 19 
 
 spirit would walk again in the earth. They 
 were mistaken; for not only has the ghost come 
 back, but it has come with increased power and 
 subtlety. In fact, it was an old ghost, and having 
 once inhabited the bodies of Louis XIV, Augus- 
 tus Caesar, and Alexander of Macedon, as well as 
 that of Napoleon I, it knew much more than 
 the grave gentlemen who undertook to arrange 
 the future of Europe in practical ways in 1815. 
 
 As we approach again the re-making of our 
 relations after a world war, it is worth while to 
 glance over the things that were done in 1815, to 
 understand what choice of events was presented 
 to the men of that day, and what results came 
 from the course they deliberately decided to 
 follow. Thus we may know whether or not the 
 course proved a happy one, and whether or not 
 it is the course that we, also, should follow. And 
 if it is not such a course, we ought as thinking 
 people to try to adopt a better. 
 
 We should always remember that the condi- 
 tions of today are more suitable to a wise decision 
 than the conditions of 1815. We have, for one 
 thing, the advantage of the experience of the 
 past hundred years. There is no doubt in our 
 
20 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 minds as to how the old plan has worked and 
 how it may be expected to work if again followed. 
 It led to the Concert of Europe and the Balance 
 of Power, both of which served in certain emer- 
 gencies, but failed in the hour of supreme need. 
 Indeed, it is probable that they promoted the 
 crash that at last arrived. 
 
 Another advantage is that we have today in 
 the world a vastly greater amount of democracy 
 than in 1815. The people who pay the bills of 
 Mars today can say what shall be done about 
 keeping Mars in chains; and that is something 
 they could not do in 1815. It is for them to know 
 all his capers, and his clever ways of getting out 
 of prison, and to look under his shining armor to 
 see the grizzly hairs that cover his capacious ribs ; 
 and having done this to decide what will be their 
 attitude toward him. 
 
 It is not the business of an author to offer 
 his views to his reader ready made. Enough if 
 he offers the material facts out of which the 
 reader may form his own opinions. That is my 
 object in this book. I do not disguise my con- 
 viction that some of the fruits of the war that 
 ended at Waterloo were lost through the inex- 
 
PERMANENT PEACE 91 
 
 perience of the men who set the world on its 
 course again. Whether or not the men were as 
 wise as they should have been is now a profit- 
 less inquiry. My only object is to set before 
 the reader as clearly as I can the idea of a per- 
 manent peace through federated action, to show 
 how that idea came up in connection with the 
 war against Napoleon, how it was rejected for a 
 concerted and balanced international system, 
 what came of the decision in the century that 
 followed, and finally in what way the failure of 
 the old system is responsible for the present war. 
 If the reader will follow me through these con- 
 siderations, he will be prepared to examine in a 
 judicial spirit the arguments for and against 
 President Wilson's suggested union of nations 
 to end war. 
 
 As these introductory remarks are written, we 
 seem to be girding up our loins again with the 
 firm conviction that we cannot talk of peace until 
 Germany knows she is beaten. The decision is 
 eminently wise. But if it is worth while to fight 
 two or ten years more to crush Germany's con- 
 fidence in her military policy, how much ought it 
 not to be worth to make the nations realize that 
 
m THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 if they really wish to destroy war they can do 
 it by taking two steps: first, end this struggle 
 in a spirit of amity ; and second, make an effective 
 agreement to preserve that state of amity by pre- 
 venting the occurrence of the things and feelings 
 that disturb it. That is the task as well as the 
 opportunity of wise men, who can govern them- 
 selves; and it is for their information that this 
 volume is written which undertakes to point out 
 "The Lost Fruits of Waterloo" and the con- 
 ditions under which we may seek to recover them. 
 It is not a book of propaganda, unless facts are 
 propagandists. It is not a pacifist book, al- 
 though its pages may make for peace, if God 
 wills. It is only a plain statement of the les- 
 sons of history as they appear to one of the many 
 thousands of puzzled persons now habitants of 
 this globe who are trying to grope their ways out 
 of this fog of folly. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 EARLY ADVOCATES OF UNIVERSAL PEACE 
 
 Those who have tried to point the world to 
 universal peace may be divided into two schools : 
 one advocating a form of cooperation in which 
 the final reliance is to be reason, the other looking 
 forward to some effective form of common action 
 behind which shall be sufficient force to carry 
 out the measures necessary to enforce the com- 
 mon will. It is convenient to describe the former 
 group as advocating a league of peace, since we 
 are generally agreed that a league is a form of 
 concert from which the constituent members may 
 withdraw at will, and in which does not reside 
 power to force them to do what they do not find 
 reasonable. The second group wish to have a 
 federation, if by that term we understand a united 
 group in which exists power sufficient to pre- 
 serve the common cause against any possible 
 disobedient member. To form a league is easier 
 than to form a federation. States are tenacious 
 
 23 
 
24 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 of sovereignty. The Swiss cantons, the Dutch 
 provinces, and the original thirteen states of 
 North America are the most striking illustrations 
 of states that were willing to submit themselves 
 to the more strenuous process of union. They 
 acted under stress of great common peril, and 
 their first steps in federation were short and 
 timid; but none of them have regretted that the 
 steps were taken. It was the good fortune of 
 these groups of states that they were able to 
 unite at the proper time and that their actions 
 were not overclouded by the counsel of "prac- 
 tical statesmen" to whom ideals were things to 
 be distrusted. 
 
 In other states in periods of great distress from 
 war men lived who dreamed of cooperation to 
 promote peace, but their voices were too weak for 
 the times. The most notable early advocate of 
 this scheme was the Duke of Sully, if we may 
 accept the notion that he wrote the work known 
 as the Grand Design of Henry IV. In that 
 plan was contemplated a Christian Republic, 
 composed of fifteen states in Europe, only three 
 of which were to have a republican form of gov- 
 ernment. They were to give up warring among 
 
ADVOCATES OF UNIVERSAL PEACE 25 
 
 themselves and to refer to a common council, 
 modeled on the Ionic League, all matters of 
 inter-state relation that were of importance to 
 the "very Christian Republic." The only war 
 this republic was to wage was the common war 
 to expel the Turks from Europe. It was after 
 Henry's death that Sully published the plan with 
 the assertion that his former master had formed 
 it just after the treaty of Vervins, 1598. 
 
 Whether it was the work of king or duke, no 
 attempt was made to put it into force. In 1598 
 Europe was in the throes of a long and hopeless 
 struggle for religion. Cities were destroyed, 
 men and women were butchered, and the safety 
 of states was threatened. The Grand Design 
 represents the reaction of either Henry's or 
 Sully's mind against such a terror. It was a 
 thing to be desired, if it could have been attained. 
 One of the marks of peace that it displayed was 
 the attitude it took towards the branches of the 
 Christian faith. Complete tolerance was to 
 exist for the three forms, Catholicism, Lutheran- 
 ism, and Calvinism. This was a kind of idealism 
 that was then unattainable; but in the course of 
 time it has been achieved. I should not like to 
 
26 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 say the day will not come when the other side of 
 the scheme, interstate peace, will also cease to be 
 too ideal for realization. 
 
 The next important suggestion of union for 
 peace was made by William Penn in 1693 in an 
 Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of 
 Europe. At that time the Continent was racked 
 with war — a result of the ambition of Louis XIV 
 to raise France to a dominating position among 
 the other nations — , the Palatinate had been dev- 
 astated, and the will of the "Grand Monarch" 
 was the dreaded fact in international politics. 
 Penn realized that great sacrifices were ahead; 
 for it was as true then as now that when a strong 
 state rises to a position in which it can threaten 
 universal rule, there is nothing for the other 
 states but to combine and fight as long as they 
 can. 
 
 Penn's proposal was that the sovereigns of 
 Europe should form a Great Diet in which all 
 their disputes should be adjusted. If any 
 state refused to submit to the judgment of the 
 diet and appealed to arms, all the other states 
 were to fall upon it with their armies and make 
 it rue the course it had taken. Quaker though 
 
ADVOCATES OF UNIVERSAL PEACE 27 
 
 he was, he would have war to prevent war. His 
 proposal made no impression on his "practical" 
 contemporaries; but he was prepared for that. 
 Men of his faith were used to "bearing testi- 
 mony" in the expectation that "the world" would 
 scoff. Although it was not included in the origi- 
 nal folio edition of his works this essay remains 
 to this day the best known thing he wrote. It 
 is one of the most logical arguments for peace 
 that we have. 
 
 From 1701 to 1714 was waged the War of 
 the Spanish Succession, the last of the series of 
 struggles in which Louis XIV wore out his king- 
 dom in trying to make it supreme over its neigh- 
 bors. It left France exhausted and miserable, 
 and it had not realized the king's ambition. 
 In 1713, the year in which Louis was forced to 
 accept the Treaty of Utrecht in token of his 
 defeat, was published by the Abbe Castel de St. 
 Pierre a book called Pro jet de Traite pour rendre 
 la Paix Perpetuelle. Like the utterances of 
 Sully and Penn, it was wrung out of the mind of 
 the author by the ruin that lay around him. It 
 differed from them in nothing but in its more 
 abundant details. The abbe had taken many 
 
28" THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 things into account, and the union of nations that 
 he proposed was to do six important things. 
 
 1. There was to be a perpetual alliance of 
 European rulers with a diet composed of pleni- 
 potentiary agents in which disputed points were 
 to be settled amicably. 2. What sovereigns 
 were to be admitted to the alliance was to be de- 
 termined by the act of alliance, which was also 
 to fix the proportion in which each should con- 
 tribute to the common fund. 3. The union 
 was to guarantee the sovereignty of the con- 
 stituent states with existing boundaries, and 
 future disputes of this nature were to be referred 
 to the arbitration of the council. 4. States 
 offending against the laws of the diet were to be 
 put under the ban of Europe. 5. A state under 
 the ban was to be coerced by the other states 
 until it accepted the laws it had violated. 6. The 
 council was to make such laws, on instruction 
 from the sovereigns, as were thought necessary 
 to the objects for which the perpetual alliance 
 was created. 
 
 Like the two preceding plans the abbe's scheme 
 was too strong to be rated as a league. It does 
 not allow us to think that a state could withdraw 
 
ADVOCATES OF UNIVERSAL PEACE 29 
 
 at pleasure from the alliance; and it gave to the 
 council the authority to lay taxes, make laws that 
 were binding, and punish defiant members. It 
 is noteworthy for the large amount of power it 
 gave to the sovereigns, since the members of the 
 council were their agents and acted only on in- 
 structions. Under the prevalent notions of the 
 divine right of kings no other method of selecting 
 the members of the council would have been 
 considered in France, Spain, or Germany. On 
 the other hand, the abbe's scheme was less liberal 
 in this respect than Penn's, which provided that 
 the wisest and justest men in each nation should 
 be sent to the council. It was also a part of 
 Penn's plan that the council should be a really 
 deliberative body, a parliament of Europe as 
 truly as there was in England a parliament of the 
 realm. 
 
 We have no evidence that the arguments of the 
 good abbe made a profound impression upon 
 any of the sovereigns upon whose favor the 
 scheme depended. The Treaty of Utrecht was 
 followed by a season of peace. So deeply 
 wounded was Europe by conflict that it had no 
 stomach for war during a generation. It was a 
 
30 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 time of great industrial prosperity in England, 
 France, and Prussia. Walpole, the wise guard- 
 ian of peaceful society, dominated the first of 
 these nations, Fleury, also a man of peace, was 
 for a large part of the time the guiding hand 
 in the second, and Frederic William I directed 
 the development of the third with a sure sense of 
 economy and the efficient use of resources. At 
 the same time Austria was under the direction of 
 Charles VI, a peaceful monarch who had too 
 many anxieties at home to think of wars against 
 the Christian sovereigns around him. The small 
 struggles that occurred were without signifi- 
 cance; and it was not until 1740, when a new 
 generation was on the scene, that Europe again 
 had a period of general war, precipitated by an 
 imaginative young king who could not resist 
 the temptation to use the excellent tool with 
 which his father had provided him. Out of the 
 twenty years' struggle that now followed, no 
 new plan arose for a system of cooperation to 
 secure peace, but one of the great philosophers 
 of the time made a new statement of the Abbe 
 St. Pierre's plan, which served as a new proposi- 
 tion. 
 
ADVOCATES OF UNIVERSAL PEACE 31 
 
 It was during the last years of the Seven 
 Years' War that Rousseau received the papers 
 of the good abbe, with the expectation that he 
 would prepare them for publication in a more 
 popular form than the twenty-one volumes in 
 which the author's thoughts were buried. He 
 eventually gave up the task, but he produced two 
 short summaries, one of which was entitled 
 Eootrait dn Projet de Paix perpetuelle de M. 
 UAbbe de Saint-Pierre, The "extract" proper 
 was followed by a "judgment" in which Rousseau 
 voiced his own views. He advocated the creation 
 of a confederacy mutually dependent, no state to 
 be permitted to resist all the other states united 
 nor to form an alliance with any other state in 
 rivalry with the confederacy. The scope of the 
 central authority was defined, and there was to 
 be a legislature to make laws in amplification 
 of that authority, such laws to be administered 
 by a federal court. No state was to withdraw 
 from the union. Thus, Rousseau made his pro- 
 posed confederacy rest on force. In his mind it 
 was to be vitally efficient government, capable 
 of doing all it was created to do. 
 
 All the plans I have mentioned contemplated 
 
32 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 the creation of a central authority strong enough 
 to make itself obeyed. They implied, therefore, 
 that each constituent state should relinquish a 
 part of its sovereignty in order to form the fed- 
 eration. Now this was, as at the present time, a 
 strong objection to the scheme. No one has met 
 it better than William Penn, who said : 
 
 "I am come now to the last Objection, That Sovereign 
 Princes and States will hereby become not Sovereign: a 
 Thing they will never endure. But this also, under Cor- 
 rection, is a Mistake, for they remain as Sovereign at Home 
 as ever they were. Neither their Power over their People, 
 nor the usual Revenue they pay them, is diminished: It 
 nay be the War Establishment may be reduced, which will 
 indeed of Course follow, or be better employed to the Ad- 
 vantage of the Publick. So that the Soveraignties are as 
 they were, for none of them have now any Soveraignty 
 over one another: And if this be called a lessening of their 
 Power, it must be only because the great Fish can no 
 longer eat up the little ones, and that each Soveraignty is 
 equally defended from Injuries, and disabled from com- 
 mitting them." 
 
 A quarter of a century later, in the beginning 
 of the French Revolution, Jeremy Bentham, the 
 English philosopher, advocated the union of 
 states in behalf of common peace, but he rested 
 his argument on morality, not on force. There 
 
ADVOCATES OF UNIVERSAL PEACE 33 
 
 was to be a league of states, with a legislature 
 and courts of justice, but the decisions were to 
 be executed by the states themselves. He held 
 that after the court gave a decision in a specified 
 case and published the evidence and arguments, 
 public opinion would be strong enough to en- 
 force the judgment. By discarding force Ben- 
 tham had the advantage of preserving the sover- 
 eignty of the states, a thing that is particularly 
 esteemed by an Englishman. He is to be con- 
 sidered the first of a series of eminent peace 
 advocates who look no further than a league of 
 states bound together by their plighted word and 
 relying on the weight of public opinion to coerce 
 the individual states. 
 
 He had given his life to the task of fixing the 
 sway of law in the minds of humanity, and it was 
 a part of his general idea that a high court of jus- 
 tice, investigating a controversy, and exposing 
 all the sides of it before a world of fair minded 
 observers, would lessen the asperity of opposing 
 passions so that the verdict of the court would be 
 received as saving credit and honor to the party 
 who had to yield. It is out of this attitude that 
 our whole doctrine of arbitration as an expedient 
 
34 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 for escaping war has its rise, a doctrine of such 
 importance in our general subject that no peace 
 advocate would dare reject it wholly. 
 
 Bentham's opinion was expressed in a stray 
 pamphlet that made little impression in his time 
 and has nearly escaped the notice of posterity. 
 A more conspicuous achievement, and nearly 
 contemporary, was an essay by Immanuel Kant, 
 philosopher at Konigsberg, in Prussia. In 1795 
 he published Zum ewigen Frieden, an outline for 
 a league of perpetual peace. There was a time, 
 he argued, when men lived by force under the 
 laws of nature, each regulating his own conduct 
 toward his neighbors, the strongest man having 
 his way through his ability to overawe his asso- 
 ciates. Then came the state and the rule of law, 
 and with their arrival one saw the exit of personal 
 combat. Kant applied the same argument to 
 the intercourse of the nations, saying they were 
 in a state of nature toward one another. He 
 proposed to organize a super-state over them, 
 with authority to bring them under a law pro-!* 
 hibiting wars among themselves. He would as- 
 sign a definite field of action to the new power, 
 with the function of making laws in enforcing 
 
ADVOCATES OF UNIVERSAL PEACE 35 
 
 that authority, and it would have the neces- 
 sary administrative and judicial officers. The 
 law made by the united government was to be as 
 good law for its own purposes as the law made 
 by the individual states for their purposes. 
 
 Kant's suggestion was closely kin to Rous- 
 seau's ideas of the state, but he wrote at a time 
 when the world, stampeded by the excesses of 
 the Jacobins, was turning away from all the po- 
 litical theories that underlay the French Revolu- 
 tion. It had no use for the idea that govern- 
 ment was the outcome of a social contract; and 
 if this idea was not accepted for the state itself, 
 how much less would it be accepted as a means of 
 organizing the international state! The world 
 suffered too much at the hands of Napoleon to 
 like ideas that were responsible for the very be- 
 ginning of the letting out of the waters. And 
 this was especially true in Prussia, where the foot 
 of the French conqueror was extremely heavy. 
 
 At the moment when Kant's ideas were at 
 the height of unpopularity came the young 
 philosopher, Hegel, who announced a philo- 
 sophical view of war that pleased the govern- 
 ing class of Prussia, bent on establishing a system 
 
36 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 of military training that would be sufficient for a 
 redeemed country. He taught that war through 
 action burns away moral excrescences, purifies 
 the health of society, and stimulates the growth 
 of manly virtue. This idea became the basis of 
 much German reasoning, and it is not improb- 
 able that its defenders in trying to discern the 
 virtues they argued for, were led to develop 
 them. But in their enthusiasm they came to ex- 
 aggerate these virtues into habits that were often 
 mere manifestations of an exalted egoism. As 
 to the claim that war burns up the effete products 
 of society, it may be met by the undeniable as- 
 sertion that it also burns much that is best. One 
 does not burn a city to destroy the vermin that 
 are in it. 
 
 The next attempt to bring about a system of 
 cooperation to secure peace among the nations 
 was the formation of the Holy Alliance, a futile 
 attempt to apply principles like those just de- 
 scribed, made by Alexander I, of Russia, at the 
 close of the Napoleonic wars. It is considered at 
 length in the chapter following this, where it 
 finds its proper setting. The extremely religious 
 spirit in which it was conceived was a drawback 
 
ADVOCATES OF UNIVERSAL PEACE 37 
 
 to success, but it is not likely that it would have 
 fared better than it did fare, even if stripped of 
 all its pious fantasy, since the world was not 
 educated to its acceptance as a purely political 
 idea. 
 
 At this stage one must notice the development 
 of peace societies. Organized at first as local 
 bodies they were drawn together into national 
 organizations in the early decades of the nine- 
 teenth century. It was in 1816 that such a 
 society was created in Great Britain, and in 1828 
 that the American Peace Society was formed out 
 of local societies in the United States. In the 
 same year was established at Geneva the first 
 peace society on the Continent, the second being 
 organized at Paris in 1841. The influence of 
 such societies was weak for a long time; but 
 within the past twenty years it has been much 
 stronger. 
 
 One of the most striking examples of the 
 prevalence of the peace idea in recent times is the 
 growing use of arbitration as a means of settling 
 international disputes. Another is the meeting 
 of the Hague conferences to promote peace. 
 The first was called by the tsar, Nicholas II, in 
 
38 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 1899 and laid a broad outline of the work that 
 such conferences ought to do. A second as- 
 sembled in the year 1907, and a third was about 
 to convene when the Great War began in 1914. 
 The conferences devoted their strongest efforts 
 to the reduction of armaments and the checking 
 of militarism; but in each case they found the 
 German Empire planted boldly across their path, 
 and in this respect their efforts were futile. It 
 is not to be doubted that the attitude of Germany 
 contributed much to develop the widespread sus- 
 picion of that country which has been one of her 
 handicaps in the present war. 
 
 The "peace movement," as the totality of these 
 activities is called, has thus gained strength, and 
 it would seem that it must eventually prevail in 
 public opinion. It received an important mo- 
 mentum in 1910, when Mr. Andrew Carnegie 
 gave $10,000,000 to establish the Carnegie En- 
 dowment for International Peace, an organiza- 
 tion which has contributed powerfully to the pro- 
 motion of peace ideas. It acts on scientific 
 principles, seeking to gather and publish such 
 facts bearing on international relations, the laws 
 
ADVOCATES OF UNIVERSAL PEACE 39 
 
 of economics and history, and the science of in- 
 ternational law, as will show in what respect war 
 is to be removed from its hold on society. 
 
 The careless enthusiasm with which a great 
 many people hailed the outbreak of war in 1914 
 swept the peace advocates into the background 
 and was the occasion of some sarcasm at their 
 expense. But as the struggle grew in grimness 
 and horrors the advocates of peace on principle 
 returned to their old position in public esteem, 
 and have steadily gained on it. It seems un- 
 deniable that the war has done more to convince 
 the world of the madness of war than many dec- 
 ades of agitation could do. 
 
 One of the manifestations of the rebound 
 here mentioned was the organization in June, 
 1915, of "The League to Enforce Peace." This 
 society was created in a meeting of representa- 
 tive men assembled in Carpenters' Hall, Phila- 
 delphia, the place in which the Declaration of 
 Independence was adopted. Its principles are 
 embraced in the following proposals: 1. A 
 judicial tribunal to which will be referred judi- 
 ciable disputes between the signatory powers, 
 
40 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 subject to existing treaties, the tribunals to have 
 power to pass on the merits of the disputes sub- 
 mitted as well as on its jurisdiction over them. 
 2. The reference of other disputes between the 
 signatory states to a council of conciliation, which 
 will hear the cases submitted and recommend 
 settlements in accordance with its ideas of jus- 
 tice. 3. If any signatory state threatens war 
 before its case is submitted to the judicial tri- 
 bunal or the council of conciliation, the other 
 states will jointly employ diplomatic pressure to 
 prevent war; and if hostilities actually begin 
 under such circumstances they will jointly use 
 their military forces against the power in con- 
 tempt of the league. 4. The signatory states 
 will from time to time hold conferences to formu- 
 late rules of international law which are to be 
 executed by the tribunal of arbitration unless 
 within a stated time some state vetoes the pro- 
 posal. 
 
 The system of cooperation embodied in these 
 proposals is not a federation, within the meaning 
 that I have given to that term. It is what it 
 pretends to be, merely a league. It seems to 
 concede the right of a state to secede from the 
 
ADVOCATES OF UNIVERSAL PEACE 41 
 
 league at will. As to what would happen under 
 it if a signatory state refusing to abide the decis- 
 ion of the tribunal or council of conciliation should 
 attempt to withdraw and make war at once, we 
 can have little doubt. In such a case the attempt 
 to secede would probably be considered defiance 
 and steps be taken to reduce the state to sub- 
 mission. Nevertheless it might happen that a 
 state within the league, finding its action re- 
 stricted so that it could not adopt some policy 
 which it considered essential to its welfare, might 
 proceed to withdraw in view of a line of conduct 
 it intended to take at a later time. In that case 
 it is difficult to see how the league could resist 
 unless it was willing to take the position that it 
 had a kind of sovereignty over all interstate rela- 
 tions, a position that involves more concentration 
 than the form of the league seems to imply. 
 
 At this point in our inquiry into the subject of 
 cooperation to secure universal peace an inviting 
 field of speculation opens before us, but we must 
 turn aside for the time, in order to consider 
 various phases of the process by which the world 
 has arrived at the crisis now before it. This 
 chapter will serve its purpose if it gives the reader 
 
42 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 a view of the earliest suggestions of systems of 
 common action and if it makes clear the differ- 
 ences between the two general plans that have 
 been formulated, the league and the federation. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 
 
 The career of Napoleon, which has long com- 
 manded the greatest interest, not to say en- 
 thusiasm, of students of history, aroused grave 
 fears in the minds of most of the thoughtful 
 men of his day who did not live in France. His 
 design to conquer all his neighbors was most 
 evident, and his apparent ability to carry it into 
 execution caused him to be regarded as the em- 
 bodiment of greed and insatiable ambition. 
 Not since the days of Louis XIV had Europe 
 felt such thrills of danger and horror. All its 
 energy was called into play to withstand his at- 
 tacks. Wars followed wars in a series of cam- 
 paigns that ended after many years of extreme 
 anxiety in his ruin, only when France had been 
 worn out by his repeated victories. When he 
 began his wars he was at the head of the best 
 prepared nation in the world. He struck with 
 sudden and vigorous blows against nations that 
 
 43 
 
44 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 were not united, defeating one after the other 
 with startling effect. Their lack of preparation 
 was most marked and was probably the most 
 effective cause of his initial success. After years 
 of conflict they learned how to oppose him. 
 From his own example they learned the value of 
 organization and method in fighting, and from 
 their own disasters they at last acquired the sense 
 of union that was necessary to give him the final 
 blow that made him no longer a menace to their 
 national integrity. It was not until 1815 that he 
 was finally defeated and reduced to the state of 
 ineffective personal power from which he had 
 risen. 
 
 From the beginning of the struggle he was to 
 his opponents the incarnation of all that was 
 hateful in government. Few of the epithets 
 now hurled at the kaiser were not as lavishly cast 
 at Napoleon. He was tyrant, robber, brute, and 
 murderer in turn, and it was pronounced a serv- 
 ice to humanity to suppress him. In the begin- 
 ning of the wars his pretensions were treated with 
 disdain, but as his victories followed one another 
 in bewildering rapidity, his power was treated 
 with more respect, although there was no greater 
 
PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 45 
 
 disposition to contemplate his triumph with com- 
 placency. As the struggle became fiercer, the 
 other states than France began to think of some 
 permanent form of cooperation for restraining 
 him; and they even began to speculate on the 
 possibility of some permanent arrangement by 
 which the world might be saved from a recur- 
 rence of such a vast waste of life and treasure as 
 was involved in the struggle. It was thus that 
 suggestions were made during the Napoleonic 
 era for abolishing war through international ef- 
 fort. For us, who are today burdened with the 
 ruin of a similar but more stupendous struggle, 
 these efforts have a special interest, and the space 
 of a single chapter is none too much to give to 
 their consideration. 
 
 It is singular that these plans should have 
 found their most conspicuous supporters in 
 the heads of the two governments most widely 
 apart with reference to the popular character 
 of their institutions. It was in autocratic 
 Russia that one found the most advanced idea 
 of dealing with the future, and in Great Britain, 
 the most liberal of the great powers, that the 
 most conservative design was held. Each plan 
 
4S THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 was supported by the head of these two gov- 
 ernments respectively, each ran through its 
 own development while the armies were locked 
 in deadly struggle, and each was debated with 
 seriousness in the moment of victory when the 
 statesmen of the winning powers met to arrange 
 for the future relations of the states whose 
 victories made them the arbiters of Europe. 
 
 The initiative was taken by Alexander I, of 
 Russia. He was a man of the best intentions, 
 and throughout the period with which we are 
 now dealing he showed himself persistently fa- 
 vorable to views which, to say the least, were a 
 hundred years ahead of his time. By tempera- 
 ment he was imaginative and sympathetic. In 
 his personal life were irregularities, but not as 
 many as in Napoleon's, Louis XIV's, or Talley- 
 rand's. He lacked the royal vice of despotism, 
 and his escape from it was probably due to the 
 influence of Frederic Cesar de La Harpe, an 
 instructor of his youth, who arrived in Russia 
 with his head full of the dynamic ideas of the 
 French philosophers of the pre-revolutionary 
 period. 
 
 While "liberty, equality, and fraternity" mad- 
 
PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 47 
 
 dened France, long oppressed by the dull repres- 
 sion of the ancient regime, La Harpe was con- 
 verting his royal pupil to the doctrine of the 
 "Rights of Man." So well was the lesson taught 
 that a long series of encounters with the solid 
 wall of Russian autocracy was necessary before 
 the pupil ceased to try to do something to 
 ameliorate the condition of his people. His- 
 torians have called Alexander a dreamer, but 
 what is a man to do who is born a tsar and has 
 the misfortune to believe in the doctrines for 
 which we honor Lincoln and Jefferson? I am 
 willing to call him impractical, but I cannot with- 
 hold sympathy from a man who tried, as he, to 
 strike blows in behalf of the forms of government 
 which makes my own country a home of liberty. 
 Alexander I came to the throne of Russia in 
 1801, anxious to carry out his liberal plans. 1 In 
 1804, through his minister in London, he sug- 
 gested to Pitt, the prime minister, a plan for 
 settling the affairs of Europe after the defeat of 
 Napoleon. France, he said, must be made to 
 
 i For an excellent treatment of the events discussed in this 
 chapter see W. A. Phillips, The Confederation of Europe, London, 
 1914. 
 
48 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 realize that the allies did not war against her 
 people but against Napoleon, from whose false 
 power they proposed to set her free. Once liber- 
 ated she was to be allowed to choose any gov- 
 ernment she desired. From La Harpe he had 
 imbibed a deep repugnance to the government of 
 the Bourbons, and in all his future discussions 
 of the subject he showed no enthusiasm for re- 
 storing that line to their throne. 
 
 One of the charges often made by the allies 
 was that Napoleon overthrew international law. 
 It was a part of Alexander's plan to reestablish 
 its potency and to have the nations see to it that 
 no future violations of it could occur. He also 
 suggested that the firm agreement then existing 
 between Russia and Great Britain should con- 
 tinue after the establishment of peace and that 
 other great powers should be brought into it so 
 that there should be a means of securing common 
 action in affairs of mutual significance. At this 
 time he had not, it seems, fully determined just 
 what form of cooperation ought to be adopted, 
 but in the suggestion of 1804 can be found the 
 germ of all his later designs for permanent peace. 
 
 At that moment Pitt was looking for the re- 
 
PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 49 
 
 newal of the European war and he expected the 
 formation of the great coalition of 1805, in which 
 Russia, Great Britain, Austria, and Sweden un- 
 dertook to defeat France. He did not dare, 
 therefore, reject the tsar's proposals outright. 
 He gave approval to the suggestion in regard to 
 the restoration of international law, but he quali- 
 fied his sanction of the scheme for a future league 
 of nations. Napoleon crushed, he said, it would 
 be for the states to guarantee such an ad j ustment 
 of European affairs as they should agree upon in 
 solemn treaty. Looking into these two state- 
 ments it is seen that the tsar had in mind the 
 formation of some kind of league of nations, 
 with well defined powers and duties, while Pitt 
 looked forward to that kind of international co- 
 operation which was later described by the term 
 ''Concert of Europe." In the subsequent deal- 
 ing of Alexander with the British leaders over 
 this matter there was always this difference be- 
 tween them. 
 
 In 1807 Napoleon won the battle of Friedland 
 over Russia and occupied a large part of the 
 tsar's domain. Then came the Treaty of Tilsit 
 in which Alexander and Napoleon standing face 
 
50 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 to face came to an unexpected agreement to 
 divide the accessible part of the world between 
 them, Alexander ruling one half and Napoleon 
 ruling the other. It is certain, however, that 
 the tsar had in his mind that both he and his new 
 ally would rule their respective halves in the 
 spirit of La Harpe's teaching. Napoleon baited 
 his trap with no less attractive a morsel than 
 self-government under a wise monarch in order 
 to catch Alexander I. 
 
 The Moscow campaign brought the tsar to his 
 senses. He himself said that it was the burning 
 of the ancient city, 1812, that illuminated his 
 mind and enabled him to see the true character of 
 the Corsican. For five years he had been lulled 
 into inactivity by the belief that some form of per- 
 manent peace was coming to the world through 
 Napoleon. He now realized that he had been 
 duped, and after making due acknowledgment 
 of his error turned to the task of destroying the 
 deceiver. From that time he did not waver in his 
 determination. 
 
 Russia and Great Britain were thus in close 
 alliance, and immediately began consideration of 
 a permanent alliance looking toward a regulation 
 
PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 51 
 
 of affairs in Europe after the war was ended. 
 The British cabinet took up the question and in 
 1813 passed a resolution in which occurs the fol- 
 lowing declaration: "The Treaty of Alliance 
 [between the states which were united against 
 Napoleon] is not to terminate with the war, but 
 is to contain defensive engagements, with mutual 
 obligations to support the Power attacked by 
 France with a certain extent of stipulated suc- 
 cors. The casus foederis is to be an attack by 
 France on the European dominions of any one 
 of the contracting parties." * This provision was 
 kept secret for the time, but it remained the 
 basis of the British policy throughout the negotia- 
 tions that followed. Castlereagh, in ability and 
 character the greatest statesman of his day, was 
 then at the head of the British cabinet, and it 
 seems certain that he inspired its policy. 
 
 He was already suspicious of the position of 
 the tsar in reference to France. That sover- 
 eign had in no way relaxed his friendship for the 
 French people. Hating the Bourbons he would 
 have prevented their restoration to the throne, 
 and he had a project for allowing the French to 
 
 i Phillips, loc. cit. } 67. 
 
52 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 determine whom they would have for king after 
 Napoleon. If he could carry this plan through 
 he would make himself very popular in France 
 and would have a strong position with the ruler 
 whose selection he should thus make possible. 
 To Castlereagh this was nothing but a shrewd 
 piece of policy for laying the foundation of a 
 Franco-Russian alliance which would have over- 
 weening influence in Europe, and he set himself 
 against its execution. He was forced to proceed 
 cautiously, however, since Napoleon was not 
 beaten and the aid of the tsar was essential. 
 There is nothing to suggest that Alexander did 
 not entertain his French views in all singleness 
 of purpose. The worst his enemies said of him 
 was that he was a dreamer ; but he was not given 
 to a policy of calculation. 
 
 To thwart Alexander and carry through his 
 own views Castlereagh set himself to "group" the 
 tsar, that is, to draw him into an agreement with 
 other sovereigns in which such a policy was ac- 
 cepted as would serve to deflect the whole group 
 of allies from the direct course which the tsar 
 would have followed if left alone. Early in 
 1814 a treaty was signed at Chaumont by Great 
 
PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 53 
 
 Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia in which all 
 the problems then before the allies were taken 
 up. The sixteenth article of the treaty dealt 
 with the point which had caused Castlereagh so 
 much anxiety. It ran: 
 
 "The present Treaty of Alliance having for its object 
 the maintenance of the Balance of Europe, to secure the re- 
 pose and independence of the Powers, and to prevent the 
 invasions which for so many years have devastated the 
 world, the High Contracting Parties have agreed among 
 themselves to extend its duration for twenty years from 
 the date of signature, and they reserve the right of agree- 
 ing, if circumstances demand it, three years before its 
 expiration, on its further prolongation." 1 
 
 By this means Alexander was "grouped" with 
 his three allies in the support of a kind of co- 
 operation which was not what he had hitherto 
 insisted upon. It is probable that he did not 
 realize how completely he was outplayed, when 
 he was forced by the logic of events to set his 
 hand to a treaty that provided for the Concert 
 of Europe, and not for the league to which he had 
 long looked forward. At any rate, he did not 
 give up his ideals and he seems to have thought 
 that in the hour of victory he could do what he 
 
 i Phillips, loc. cit. } 78. 
 
54 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 had not been able to do in the hour of necessity. 
 The Treaty of Chaumont was followed by the 
 battle of Leipzig, and that was followed by sev- 
 eral smaller battles in which the allies fought 
 their way through French territory until they 
 stood before the gates of Paris in the autumn of 
 1814. Napoleon fled the Nemesis that had over- 
 taken him, the city was opened to his enemies, 
 and Alexander I, at the head of his splendid 
 guard, led the conquering army down the broad 
 avenue of Champs Elysee, the inhabitants of the 
 city cheering the radiant pageant. Men reflected 
 that two years earlier a great French army had 
 penetrated to the Russian city of Moscow and 
 found it smoking ruins; and they could but 
 observe the contrast. It was worthy of the great- 
 ness of the tsar of the Russias to show a gen- 
 erous face to a beaten foe; and the Frenchmen 
 were gallant enough to receive the friendship of 
 the tsar in the spirit in which it was given. A 
 lenient treaty by which France was saved from 
 humiliation and Napoleon was given Elba, was 
 also due chiefly to the good will of Alexander. 
 An Englishman on the spot, who did not see 
 things with the broad vision of the prime min- 
 
PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 55 
 
 ister, wrote that the tsar "by a series of firm 
 and glorious conduct has richly deserved the 
 appellation of the liberator of mankind." But 
 as Alexander continued to "play the part 
 of Providence in France" the same writer became 
 alarmed and five days later wrote to London 
 urging that Castlereagh come to the French 
 capital. The hint was taken, and soon the manly 
 stride of the handsome tsar was intercepted by 
 the deftly woven webs of the skilled diplomat. 
 Erelong France was handed over to the Bour- 
 bons, who came back to show that they had 
 learned nothing and forgotten nothing. 
 
 The center of interest now shifted to the Con- 
 gress of Vienna, whose sessions lasted from 
 September 10, 1814, to June 9, 1815. Europe 
 had looked forward to it for many years as the 
 means of effecting a wise and just reform in 
 all the evils that afflicted the continent. "Men 
 had promised themselves," said Gentz, "an all- 
 embracing reform of the political system of 
 Europe, guarantees for universal peace, in one 
 word, the return of the golden age." Thus 
 Alexander was not entirely ahead of his time. 
 There were enlightened men then, as now, who 
 
56 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 hoped for a spirit that would rise above mere 
 diplomatic self-interest; and we may look upon 
 the tsar as their exponent. But they were to be 
 disappointed. Spoils were to be divided and in 
 the disputes that the expected division engen- 
 dered, the spirit of reform was dissipated. 
 Alexander spent his energy in trying to reestab- 
 lish the kingdom of Poland with liberal institu- 
 tions, but his desire that it should be under his 
 protection aroused the keenest opposition from 
 the neighboring nations. If a victorious Russia 
 stood as protector of a reestablished France and 
 a renewed Poland, who could foretell her power 
 in future dealings among nations? Considering 
 the extent to which jealousy carried the conten- 
 tions of the states at Vienna, it is enough that 
 the congress did not break up in an appeal to 
 arms. 
 
 Gentz, whom we recall as the secretary of the 
 congress, was one of the men who had entertained 
 hopes that it would give a new and better form to 
 the political structure of Europe. He avowed 
 his disappointment at the results in saying: 
 
 "The Congress has resulted in nothing but restorations, 
 which had already been effected by arms, agreements be- 
 
PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 57 
 
 tween the Great Powers of little value for the future 
 balance and preservation of the peace of Europe, quite ar- 
 bitrary alterations in the possessions of the smaller states; 
 but no act of a higher nature, no great measure for public 
 order or for the general good, which might compensate 
 humanity for its long sufferings or pacify it for the future. 
 . . . But to be just, the treaty, such as it is, has the un- 
 deniable merit of having prepared the world for a more 
 complete political structure. If ever the Powers should 
 meet again to establish a political system by which wars 
 of conquest would be rendered impossible, and the rights 
 of all guaranteed, the Congress of Vienna, as a preparatory 
 assembly, will not have been without use. A number of 
 vexatious details have been settled, and the ground has been 
 prepared for building up a better social structure." x 
 
 Looking back over the past century it is hard 
 to find justification for Gentz's optimism. The 
 respite that Europe had for a generation from 
 war was due in a sense to the lesson learned 
 in the Napoleonic struggle; but it was not a 
 permanent lesson. We shall proceed to examine 
 the expedients that came to be used for the end 
 specified; but it is certain that they did not 
 achieve permanently the end desired. Had the 
 Congress of Vienna done all that was expected 
 of it, the world might today be at peace. If not 
 
 i See Phillips, loc. cit., 118. 
 
58 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 at peace, we might at least say that the men of 
 the Congress did all they could to secure peace. 
 
 If we ask for the fundamental cause of the 
 failure of the Congress of Vienna to satisfy the 
 hopes of liberal men in constructing what Gentz 
 called "a more complete political structure," the 
 answer must lie in the illiberal views of the ruling 
 classes in the European states. Self-govern- 
 ment was less developed than in the most con- 
 servative state of today. Had the people of these 
 states been in power, and had they been to a fair 
 degree trained in the principles of good govern- 
 ment, the result could hardly have been as it was. 
 But the ignorant bureaucrats and arbitrary 
 rulers were in power, men who in their own lives 
 never knew the burdens of war, and to whom 
 national egotism appeared a high virtue; and 
 they thought only of gaining territory for 
 their states. They placed such things above the 
 Jiigh opportunity to reform the political structure 
 of Europe. They turned to the future with the 
 old principles still dominant, hoping that by a 
 system of concert among the great states they 
 could stave off war for an indefinitely long period. 
 They could place self-interest against self -in- 
 
PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 59 
 
 terest, forgetting that a time was likely to come 
 when self-interest might lead the strongest to 
 dare the rest of the world, hoping to move quickly 
 in a moment of temporary advantage and thus 
 gain ends that only the most severe sacrifices 
 could take away. But that is a story reserved 
 for another chapter. 
 
 Before we take up the Concert of Europe we 
 must deal with the Holy Alliance, which, though 
 but an interlude in the play, is so frequently men- 
 tioned in the books that it cannot be omitted 
 from this discussion. It was signed at Paris, 
 November 20, 1815, and may be considered only 
 one of the forms in which the tsar's ideal was 
 embodied. Its religious character made it the 
 butt of ridicule for the "practical" statesmen 
 of the day, and the historian has been prone to 
 look at it from their standpoint. But it was then 
 popular to express political principles in reli- 
 gious phrases, and the alliance is to be inter- 
 preted by the purpose that lay underneath, rather 
 than by the mere form in which it was set forth. 
 
 As we have seen, Alexander I had formulated 
 his plan for a league of states long before the end 
 of the war. He had relaxed his intentions in no 
 
60 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 sense when he met Baroness Kriidener in June, 
 1815. This remarkable woman, though nobly 
 born, was a religious enthusiast who to the faculty 
 of intense conviction added the gift of preaching. 
 Wherever she went she found followers who hung 
 on her words and yielded themselves to her im- 
 passioned appeals for religious devotion. In the 
 height of her enthusiasm she came to think that 
 she had revelations from God. Many a popular 
 revivalist of recent times could be compared with 
 her ; and if we are tolerant of their undoubtedly 
 well-meant efforts to stir humanity to righteous- 
 ness, we may allow her also a fair share of our 
 esteem as a would-be agent of good through the 
 employment of human means to attain human 
 ends. 
 
 Like the other religious teachers of the day 
 she was deeply impressed by the calamities of the 
 war. She knew of the tsar's desire to establish 
 a regime of peace and came to believe she was 
 divinely called to induce him to take a conspicu- 
 ous step in that direction. At first Alexander, 
 who was not always religious, refused to see her ; 
 but in June, 1815, an interview was arranged 
 while he was at Heilbron, on the campaign. He 
 
PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 61 
 
 was deeply impressed and asked her to remain 
 near him. When he went to Paris after the 
 second defeat of Napoleon she was given quarters 
 near his palace, and it was there, in the following 
 autumn, that he drew up the plan of the Holy 
 Alliance. 
 
 The "Alliance" was expressed in the spirit of 
 a mediaeval religious brotherhood. The signa- 
 tory sovereigns pledged themselves to take the 
 will of God for highest law, to give aid to an im- 
 periled brother sovereign, and to hold the Alliance 
 as "a true and indissoluble fraternity." The 
 constituent states were to make "one great Chris- 
 tian nation" and their sovereigns were to act 
 "as delegates of Providence" in ruling their re- 
 spective states. If such an ideal could have 
 been accomplished at all, a stronger grip of the 
 church on the springs of government would have 
 been necessary than existed in that day. The 
 tsar proclaimed the Holy Alliance on November 
 26, 1815. It was signed by all the states of 
 Europe except Turkey, Great Britain, and the 
 Papal State. Great Britain's refusal to sign 
 was due to Castlereagh, to whom the tsar seemed 
 mentally unbalanced. He gave as his justifica- 
 
6& THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 tion that the prince-regent, ruling in the place of 
 his insane father, had no authority to sign, but 
 said that he would support the principles of the 
 Alliance. As it was to be a union of Christian 
 states the sultan was not invited to sign. The 
 Pope was not asked because of his overwhelming 
 influence in matters connected with religion. 
 Frederick William, of Prussia, was a religious 
 man and is believed to have signed in good faith. 
 Metternich advised the emperor of Austria to 
 sign but said that the document was mere ver- 
 biage. 
 
 In all I have said hitherto about the tsar's idea 
 of preserving peace no definite plan has been 
 mentioned. His most specific utterance was to 
 ask for a league of nations, but he said nothing 
 of its powers, its specific organization, or the 
 limits of its action. The suggestion was vague, 
 probably because the mind of its author was itself 
 vague. If taken seriously it could be made to 
 serve as the foundation of a unified state of 
 Europe which might hold all other states under 
 its hand, a unified state largely under the domi- 
 nation of Russia. That its author had no such 
 object in view is not to be doubted for an in- 
 
PROBLEMS OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 63 
 
 stant; but who could tell how long he would 
 remain in his existing state of mind, and how 
 soon he might be succeeded by a tsar of far other 
 spirit? As a plan for permanent peace the Holy 
 Alliance was impossible, not only because it was 
 cast in religious forms and thrown to a world in 
 which the authority of religion had lost much of 
 its ancient hold on the minds of men of influence, 
 but because its indefinite form made it a possible 
 instrument of greater evils than war. 
 
 Beneath its defects, however, was the great 
 idea of a unified Europe, in which justice has the 
 place of suspicion and intrigue, in which runs one 
 law, one order, and one obedience to the majesty 
 of the state. Alexander not only believed in such 
 an ideal, but he was willing to cast his nation into 
 the melting-pot in order to fuse such a state. He 
 could have given no better proof of his support of 
 his ideal. Of course, it was ahead of the time, 
 how much so it is hard to say. The widespread 
 popular longing for permanent peace would have 
 gone far in accepting unification of the states, 
 and in this sphere of opinion the religious cast 
 of the scheme was not a great disadvantage. The 
 thing which stood firmly in its way was the dull 
 
64 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 practicality of the upper, ruling class. If it 
 could have passed these lions in the way, it might 
 have had a chance of working its way forward 
 into some acceptable form of a league in per- 
 petuity. But it is a big if that I have used. 
 Upper ruling classes know more about govern- 
 ment than the lower classes, and that is a source 
 of conservatism. The lower classes, knowing 
 little, usually act upon their impulses; the mem- 
 bers of the upper, ruling class, having informa- 
 tion in varying degrees, usually strike an aver- 
 age of mediocre enlightenment, and it is a difficult 
 thing for a new idea to gain possession of them. 
 In 1815 the upper, ruling class was well settled 
 in power in Europe, and it was most convinced 
 of its superior wisdom. It never accepted the 
 tsar's plan; and failing to get its acceptance the 
 plan was futile. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 EUROPE UNDER THE CONCERT OF THE POWERS 
 
 Having disposed of Alexander's plan for a 
 federation of nations it now remains to consider 
 the other plan which, under the name of "Con- 
 cert of Europe," was adopted by Castlereagh and 
 Metternich, though not for the same purpose as 
 that which had inspired the tsar. Its funda- 
 mental idea had been in the positions taken by 
 Pitt and Castlereagh when replying to the tsar's 
 proposals, but it found its official basis in a Treaty 
 of Alliance signed by Great Britain, Russia, 
 Austria, and Prussia at Paris, November 20, 
 1815, the same day they accepted the Holy 
 Alliance. Its chief provisions were as follows: 
 1. The Powers bound themselves to see that 
 the second treaty of Paris, regulating affairs be- 
 tween France and the allies, was executed. 2. 
 They agreed to meet from time to time to take 
 cognizance of the state of affairs in Europe. 3. 
 They promised to suppress any recurrence of the 
 
 65 
 
66 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 revolutionary activity of France. 4. They set- 
 tled upon the quota of men and supplies that each 
 nation should furnish in case common action be- 
 came necessary. 5. They undertook to "con- 
 solidate the intimate tie which unites the four 
 sovereigns for the happiness of the world." The 
 most important of these provisions for the pur- 
 pose of this inquiry was the second, taken in con- 
 nection with the fifth. 
 
 The first meeting that may be said to have been 
 called under the agreement was the Conference 
 of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1818. It was called to 
 determine whether or not France should be re- 
 lieved of her garrisons of occupation, a matter 
 which was soon adjusted. Alexander I saw 
 his opportunity and urged that the sovereigns 
 should take steps to make the Holy Alliance a 
 more vital kind of league. But Castlereagh in- 
 terposed, as in former meetings, and turned the 
 efforts of the tsar aside without arousing his dis- 
 pleasure. This may be considered the last gasp 
 of the Holy Alliance, as it was the complete tri- 
 umph of the Concert over it. At the same time 
 France was admitted to the alliance of the four 
 powers, which henceforth was known as the Quin- 
 
EUROPE UNDER CONCERT OF POWERS 67 
 
 tuple Alliance. But if ever a question were 
 to come up in which France was at variance with 
 the four other Powers over matters connected 
 with her obligations assumed in recent treaties, 
 these four Powers would continue to act in their 
 old capacity. Mr. W. A. Phillips remarks that 
 the Quadruple Alliance still survived as "a rod 
 in pickle for a France but doubtfully disciplined." 
 For us, who are chiefly concerned to see the result 
 of the attempt to take the affairs of Europe un- 
 der the protection of the great Powers, it is suffi- 
 cient to remember that France gave no further 
 trouble of the kind anticipated, and that the 
 Quintuple Alliance, as the formal expression of 
 the Concert of Europe, had other problems to 
 consider. 
 
 The first arose out of revolutions in Spain 
 and Naples, where armed men seized the power 
 and forced the kings to accept liberal constitu- 
 tions. Alexander I and Metternich looked on 
 with different feelings. The former had been 
 encouraging the liberals in Italy and was not 
 greatly shocked by the revolution there, but he 
 was deeply concerned over the upheaval in Spain 
 and would have led a Russian army thither to 
 
68 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 suppress it. The suggestion alarmed Metter- 
 nich, who did not relish the idea of Alexander's 
 marching through Austrian lands with a great 
 body of men. He did what he could to dis- 
 courage the expedition against Spain. At the 
 same time he believed that Naples should be 
 disciplined, since its revolution endangered the 
 safety of Austrian possessions in Italy. It is 
 amusing to see how self-interest ran across the 
 currents of the general good as proclaimed in the 
 Concert of Europe. 
 
 The tsar thought the situation warranted call- 
 ing another conference of the Quintuple Alliance. 
 Metternich objected, being chiefly concerned by 
 the seeming certainty that the tsar would wish 
 to carry into the situation his well-known views 
 in support of liberalism. To him it seemed suffi- 
 cient that the powers should agree severally to 
 give their arms to the suppression of revolution, 
 without meeting in conference. After much 
 discussion a conference was called, at Troppau, 
 but it was regularly attended by only three of 
 the five powers. The suppression of constitu- 
 tional government was not popular in Great 
 Britain, and her government took no official part 
 
EUROPE UNDER CONCERT OF POWERS 69 
 
 in the conference. France held aloof also; she 
 was so much under the protection of Great 
 Britain that she did not dare risk British dis- 
 pleasure by allying herself with the forces of re- 
 pression. 
 
 Did the absence of two nations from Troppau 
 presage the dissolution of the Alliance? Castle- 
 reagh gave a negative reply. His nation, he said, 
 was not bound beyond her treaty obligations, the 
 terms of which were clear and specific. They 
 were embodied in the Treaties of Chaumont and 
 Paris. He considered the project of dealing with 
 revolution in its present form as beyond the mean- 
 ing of these agreements. "If," he said, "it is de- 
 sired to extend the Alliance so as to include all 
 objects present and future, foreseen and unfore- 
 seen, it would change its character to such an ex- 
 tent and carry us so far, that we should see in it 
 an additional motive for adhering to our course at 
 the risk of seeing the Alliance move away from us 
 without our having quitted it." These frank 
 words show that the Alliance was strained but 
 not broken. It would seem that a system like 
 that of which we speak should have at bottom 
 some broad common principles. In purpose it 
 
70 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 should be harmonious. As between the prevail- 
 ing British idea of liberty and Metternich's ideas 
 of legitimacy there was no ground for mutual 
 support; and out of this divergence of views was 
 to grow the disruption of the Alliance, as we shall 
 soon see. 
 
 Up to this time the two ideas that had run side 
 by side were the tsar's plan for a league to se- 
 cure cooperation of a general nature and the 
 British plan limiting common action to a few 
 specific matters, chiefly connected with the re- 
 pression of France in case she wished to return 
 to a policy which would threaten the peace of 
 Europe. As it became increasingly apparent 
 that France was no longer a menace this type of 
 union became less important, and the British 
 ardor for it cooled, especially since it was becom- 
 ing more and more certain that the Alliance was 
 being used to support repression. 
 
 At the same time a change was passing through 
 the mind of the tsar. In all he had done he had 
 been supported by liberal ministers, against whose 
 influence at his court Metternich did not hesitate 
 to intrigue. Alexander's conversion to the cause 
 of repression came suddenly and completely in 
 
EUROPE UNDER CONCERT OF POWERS 71 
 
 1820, when there was a mutiny in a favorite reg- 
 iment of his guard. Sober advisers pointed out 
 to him that the action of the regiment had no 
 political significance, but he would not be con- 
 vinced. He insisted he would not countenance 
 revolt abroad, lest it encourage insurrection at 
 home. All the fervor he had shown in behalf of 
 liberal ideas he now manifested in behalf of re- 
 pression. At Troppau he met Metternich in a 
 spirit of profound repentance for what he had 
 done in the past, saying with an outburst of 
 emotion: "So we are at one, Prince, and it is to 
 you that we owe it. You have correctly judged 
 the state of affairs. I deplore the waste of time, 
 which we must try to repair. I am here with- 
 out any fixed ideas ; without any plan ; but I bring 
 you a firm and unalterable resolution. It is for 
 your Emperor to use it as he wills. Tell me what 
 you desire, and what you wish me to do, and I 
 will do it." The speech astonished the Prince 
 as much as it pleased him. All his schemes had 
 lost in the defection of Castlereagh, and probably 
 more, was made up in the accession of his new 
 ally. Not only was the cause of legitimacy, as 
 he advocated it, made safe; but the danger was 
 
72 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 removed of a Franco-Russian alliance, always 
 a thing to be dreaded by the great Powers in 
 the center of Europe. 
 
 In the conference at Troppau, Austria, Russia, 
 and Prussia now acted together. Up to that 
 time Metternich had ignored the Holy Alliance. 
 He now brought it out as his stalking horse. 
 The three sovereigns, controlling the conference, 
 issued a declaration suspending from the Alliance 
 any state that tolerated revolution in its borders 
 and declaring that the other Powers in the 
 Alliance would bring back the offending state by 
 force of arms. Under the indefinite terms of the 
 instrument this was a legal interpretation of 
 power, but it was not in the spirit of the benevo- 
 lent sovereign who made the Holy Alliance pos- 
 sible. 
 
 Those of us who now favor a league or fed- 
 eration of states as a means of preserving peace 
 perpetually may well study the crisis to which a 
 similar system had come in the development of 
 international relations in 1820. The tsar's ideal 
 was a thing of glory thrown before a sordid 
 world. Not even he, as we see, was proof against 
 the debasement of his surroundings. If his 
 
EUROPE UNDER CONCERT OF POWERS 73 
 
 plan had been adopted by all the nations, it is 
 likely that the time would have come when 
 the confederation thus formed would have be- 
 come an agency for reaction against which liberal 
 views would have been unable to contend. 
 
 On the other hand, we must not ignore the 
 weight that a confederation would have had as 
 an idea in promoting respect for liberal govern- 
 ment. If it had been established under the pro- 
 tection of the tsar, it may well have been that 
 Metternich would not have taken up the crusade 
 of legitimacy, that the tsar and Castlereagh 
 acting together in behalf of liberal institutions 
 would have insured a steadier attitude on the 
 part of the former, and that under such circum- 
 stances the kings of Spain and Naples would 
 have been less inclined to the severe measures 
 which provoked revolution. Of course, these 
 are mere conjectures, but it is only fair to men- 
 tion them as things to be said for the other side 
 of the question. 
 
 When we come to apply the lessons of 1815- 
 1820 to the present day, we must not forget that 
 conditions, are now very greatly changed. It 
 was the supremacy of arbitrary government in 
 
74 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 Europe that made the hopes of 1815 come to 
 naught. Of all the agents who then controlled 
 affairs in the great states of Europe, Castlereagh, 
 next to the tsar, was the most liberal. If a plan 
 of union were adopted after the present war, it 
 might not be a success, but the failure would not 
 be for the same reasons as those that brought 
 the Alliance of 1815 to a nullity. 
 
 Castlereagh made a protest against the pur- 
 poses of the three Powers at Troppau in which 
 were some telling arguments against such a 
 league as was threatening. They were well made 
 and would be applicable to the situation today, 
 if it were proposed to establish a league like that 
 which found favor at Troppau. The plan pro- 
 posed, said he, was too general in its scope. It 
 gave the projected confederation the right to 
 interfere in the internal affairs of independent 
 states on the ground that the general good was 
 concerned, and if carried out the Alliance would, 
 in effect, be charged with the function of policing 
 such states. Against all this he protested, and 
 he pointed out that so many grounds of dissatis- 
 faction lay in the scheme that to try to enforce 
 it would surely lead to counter alliances, the end 
 
EUROPE UNDER CONCERT OF POWERS 75 
 
 of which would be war It ought to be said, also, 
 that Castlereagh was opposed to giving up war 
 as a means of settling disputes. "The extreme 
 right of interference," he said, "between nation 
 and nation can never be made a matter of writ- 
 ten stipulation or be assumed as the attribute of 
 an alliance." If a man takes that position he 
 can hardly be expected to see good points in any 
 scheme to preserve peace perpetually. 
 
 The evils he pointed out are largely eliminated 
 in the modern plans that are offered. For ex- 
 ample, the jurisdiction of the proposed leagues 
 or federations is strictly limited to the enforce- 
 ment of peace. A supreme court held by emi- 
 nent judges would pass upon cases as they 
 come up and say whether or not the central au- 
 thority should employ force. Under the plan it 
 would be hard to bring a purely internal ques- 
 tion before the court, and if brought there it 
 would not be considered by the judges, since the 
 pact of the federation would specify that such 
 cases were not to be tried. The pact would be 
 the constitution of the federation, and the court 
 would be expected to pass on the constitutionality 
 of measures from the standpoint of that instru- 
 
76 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 merit. Under a system like that recently ad- 
 vocated a revolution in Naples would have to be 
 submitted to a court whose members were ap- 
 pointed from states in which free institutions 
 are in existence. It could not be the tool of 
 a Metternich. Under such a system the whim of 
 a tsar, if such a ruler ever again wears a crown, 
 could not make or mar a question like that 
 which underlay the calling of the Conference of 
 Troppau. So many are the differences that it 
 is, perhaps, not profitable to dwell longer on 
 this point. The study of the peace problem and 
 the attempt to solve it a hundred years ago is 
 extremely interesting to one who considers the 
 situation now existing, but it is chiefly because 
 the mind, having grasped the development of the 
 former problem and become accustomed to see 
 the process as a whole, is in a better state to un- 
 derstand the present and to know wherein it 
 differs from the past and in what respect old 
 factors are supplemented by new factors. Such 
 lessons from the past are open to all who will but 
 read. 
 
 These reflections should not make us forget the 
 main thread of our story, which became relatively 
 
EUROPE UNDER CONCERT OF POWERS 77 
 
 weak after Troppau. From that time it was 
 clear that Europe had no hopes of peace through 
 cooperation under either of the two plans that 
 had been suggested. Almost immediately began 
 a train of events which gave added impulse to the 
 dissolution of the Alliance. In 1821 began the 
 Greek War of Independence. Austria was in 
 consternation lest the revolution should spread 
 to her own people. Russia, however, was deeply 
 sympathetic with the Greeks, partly through 
 religious affiliations and partly because the Rus- 
 sian people, looking toward the possession of 
 Constantinople, were anxious to weaken the 
 Turk in any of his European possessions. 
 Alexander I showed signs of going to war for 
 the Greeks, and Metternich hastily sought to 
 counteract any such course. 
 
 At the same time the situation in Spain's 
 American colonies was becoming more urgent, 
 because the weakness of the government had 
 stimulated the South American revolutionists to 
 renewed activity until Mexico as well as the rest 
 of the Continental colonies except Peru was in 
 successful revolt. Metternich would have helped 
 Turkey against the Greeks and allowed the 
 
78 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 tsar to carry out his long cherished wish of inter- 
 vening in Spain, as a means of keeping him quiet. 
 The situation seemed to call for another confer- 
 ence and after some discussion a meeting was 
 arranged at Verona, 1822. France was anxious 
 to take over the task of punishing the Spanish 
 revolutionists, and as Russia, Austria, and Prus- 
 sia agreed to her plan, four of the five Great 
 Powers now stood side by side in favor of repres- 
 sion. They would have gone further, and settled 
 the fate of the American revolutionists, but 
 against that course Great Britain made such a 
 protest that the question was left open. 
 
 It was not definitely closed until the next year, 
 and then through the action of the United States, 
 taken in association with Great Britain. For 
 when France had performed her task, she looked 
 forward to taking some of the Spanish colonies as 
 indemnity for her expenses. The principle of 
 federation among the Powers was working so well 
 that it was considered only a natural thing to 
 call another conference at which France could be 
 assigned the right of conquering the colonies. 
 Canning, at the head of the British government, 
 was genuinely alarmed. The four united Powers 
 
EUROPE UNDER CONCERT OF POWERS 79 
 
 were willing to defy Great Britain if she stood 
 alone. He turned to the United States as the 
 only ally in sight. Would we support him in op- 
 position to the designs of the Powers ? President 
 Monroe, influenced by John Quincy Adams' 
 stout patriotism, replied in the affirmative and 
 went a step further; for he insisted that the de- 
 fiance of the Powers should be announced in 
 Washington, not as a mere expedient to meet an 
 isolated case, but as a general policy of our gov- 
 ernment. The Monroe Doctrine was one of the 
 things that broke up the Quintuple Alliance, 
 already weakened by the alienation of Great 
 Britain. 
 
 The last blow was the revolution in France 
 in 1830, which drove the Bourbon king into exile 
 and made a liberal government possible. At the 
 same time so strong were the manifestations of 
 republicanism in other countries that the old con- 
 servatism was lowered in tone and chastened in 
 pride. From France the revolutionary move- 
 ment passed into Belgium, which the Congress of 
 Vienna had decreed should be a part of the king- 
 dom of the Netherlands. So completely was the 
 revolution successful that even the Great Powers 
 
80 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 had to bow to it, and in a congress at London 
 they recognized Belgium as a separate state and 
 saw it set up a liberal constitution with a king at 
 the head of the government. Several of the 
 small German governments also adopted more 
 liberal forms. Poland broke into rebellion and 
 before its power of resistance was crushed by- 
 Russia the infection spread into Lithuania and 
 Podolia. At last the arms of the tsar over- 
 powered all resistance and peace reigned ; but the 
 reactionaries were sobered, and the dream of a 
 league to enforce repression passed away. 
 
 Glancing backward we may see through what 
 a development the ideas of reform had passed. 
 Europe, distressed by the wars of 1800-1815, 
 had hungered for peace. Having issued from a 
 decade of discussion of liberty and humanity, the 
 friends of freedom were more than ordinarily 
 earnest for replacing war by an age of reason. 
 In our own day the cause of universal peace 
 stands on a broader and better laid foundation 
 than a hundred years ago, but it is, perhaps, no 
 more impressive. At any rate the philosophically 
 inclined men of the earlier period supported Kant 
 and Rousseau, among them, Alexander I. A 
 
EUROPE UNDER CONCERT OF POWERS 81 
 
 considerable portion of the world believed that 
 the outcome of the war madness then reigning 
 must be an era of sanity. 
 
 We have seen that two plans of improvement 
 were formed in the minds of men who were in 
 position to have practical influence: the tsar's 
 scheme for a league, or federation, that was so 
 strongly integrated that the central authority 
 should be able to enforce its commands upon con- 
 stituent states; and the plan of Castlereagh for 
 prolonging the existing system of cooperation in 
 a form which we may call the Concert of the 
 Great Powers. We have seen that the tsar's 
 plan, ignored at first, was seized on by Metter- 
 nich as a possibility for enforcing a system of re- 
 action, that it met the opposition of Great Brit- 
 ain and aroused the revolutionary protest of 
 1830, and thus it came to an end. It was never 
 the dream of any of the philosophers that a fed- 
 eration should be formed which might become an 
 engine of despotism, yet practical use showed 
 that such a course was within the bounds of pos- 
 sibility. The mere glimpse of such a thing was 
 enough to make Europe prefer the old era of 
 wars. 
 
82 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 One does not have to look far into the situation 
 to see that the real failure of the plan was due 
 to the wide use of arbitrary government in Eu- 
 rope. Had Austria, Russia, and Prussia been 
 ruled by the people, either as republics or as lib- 
 eral monarchies, the great alliance of Europe 
 could hardly have been turned to the side of re- 
 pression; and under the guidance of enlightened 
 statesmen it might have been the beginning of a 
 long era of peace and international good will. 
 The failure of the nineteenth century, therefore, 
 does not prove that federation is essentially im- 
 possible. It only proves that a century ago the 
 world was not ready to employ it successfully. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 THE LATER PHASES OF THE CONCERT OF EUROPE 
 
 The revolutionary movement of 1830 did not 
 destroy the influence of Metternich in Europe. 
 He was too able a man to be overthrown as leader 
 of the legitimists merely because the people were 
 in a ferment. To his party he was still the man 
 to be trusted, and as legitimacy managed to beat 
 down revolution in most of the areas in which 
 commotion appeared, the scope of his power was 
 wide, although it was evident that he could not 
 use it with former impunity. 
 
 At the same time he gave up the pretense of 
 making the Alliance of the Powers a federation. 
 He was content to try to secure that concert of 
 action that would enable the states that leaned 
 to legitimacy to act together against incipient 
 revolution; and for a time he was successful. 
 In anticipation of the failure of the plan to per- 
 mit France to interfere in the Spanish colonies, 
 Canning exclaimed: "Things are getting back 
 
 83 
 
84 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 to a wholesome state again. Every nation for 
 itself and God for us all!" But the cry of joy 
 was premature. The time had not returned in 
 which each crisis was to be met in its own way, 
 without reference to a recognized concert of ac- 
 tion, and the reason was the deep consciousness 
 of the states that certain grave questions that 
 ever hung over the horizon had in them the pos- 
 sibilities of general war. Let one of these ques- 
 tions loom large, and common action was taken 
 to avert the threatened danger. In such way the 
 Concert of Europe was kept alive, and remained 
 something to be reckoned with as a part of the 
 background of European policy. In spite of 
 its temporary disuse, it was a thing to be brought 
 forth again if the nations decided that it was 
 needed to meet an emergency. 
 
 In fact, it reappeared many times in the course 
 of the nineteenth century, notably in 1840, when 
 the so-called Eastern question became promi- 
 nent. At that time Mehemet Ali, who had made 
 himself lord of Egypt and seized Syria, was 
 threatening Constantinople, having the support 
 of France. Russia became alarmed, made a 
 close alliance with the sultan, and seemed about 
 
LATER PHASES OF CONCERT 85 
 
 to get that secure foothold on the Bosphorus for 
 which she had striven many years. Great Brit- 
 ain, Austria, and Prussia resented this prospect 
 and took steps jointly to counteract it. Their 
 object was to preserve Turkey from the dangers 
 that threatened to divide her. Before such a 
 combination Russia was not able to stand, and 
 she gave up her pretensions in order to join the 
 other three powers. France, however, held to 
 her purpose, supporting the adventurer of 
 Egypt. Thus it happened that the four Great 
 Powers, reviving the Concert of Europe, but 
 leaving out the government of Louis Philippe, 
 had a conference in London to settle Eastern 
 affairs. They decided to offer Mehemet Ali cer- 
 tain concessions and to make war on him if he 
 refused to accept them. He spurned their coun- 
 sel and was expelled from Syria but was saved 
 from utter destruction by the interference of 
 France, who secured a settlement by which he 
 was left in firm possession of Egypt, as heredi- 
 tary ruler under the nominal authority of Tur- 
 key. All the powers now united in an agree- 
 ment by which Turkey was to exclude foreign 
 warships from the Dardanelles. Thus, by an 
 
86 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 appeal to the principle of the Concert of Europe, 
 a grave crisis was averted, and war between 
 Great Britain and Russia was avoided. 
 
 In 1848, seven years after the conclusion of 
 these negotiations, Europe was thrown into con- 
 vulsions by the appearance of a new era of 
 revolution. France became a republic, and Ger- 
 many, Austria, and Hungary went through such 
 violent upheavals that the existence of arbitrary 
 government hung for a time in the balance. Out 
 of the struggle emerged Napoleon III, of 
 France, who thought some military achievement 
 was necessary to stabilize his power. At that 
 time Russia was asserting a protectorate over all 
 Christians in Turkey, and it was generally be- 
 lieved that she was about to establish vital politi- 
 cal control. Napoleon took up the sword against 
 her and Great Britain came to help, the result 
 being the Crimean War, 1854-1856. 
 
 In the beginning of this struggle the Concert 
 of Europe seemed to be dead, but two years of 
 heavy fighting and nearly futile losses brought it 
 to life again. The war, which began in an out- 
 burst of international rivalry, ended in the Con- 
 ference of Paris, 1856, in which all the Great 
 
LATER PHASES OF CONCERT 87 
 
 Powers but Prussia undertook to settle the 
 Eastern question by neutralizing the Euxine and 
 the Danube and by making new allotments of 
 territory which were supposed to adjust bound- 
 aries in such a manner that rivalries would dis- 
 appear. The Conference went on to take up the 
 work of a true European congress by agreeing 
 upon the Declaration of Paris, in which were 
 assembled a body of rules regulating neutral 
 trade in time of war. England gave up her long 
 defended pretension to seize enemy goods on 
 neutral ships and neutral goods on enemy ships, 
 and in return gained the recognition that priva- 
 teering was unlawful. Thus the Crimean War, 
 fought by Great Britain and France against 
 Russia, and in support of Turkey — with Austria 
 and Prussia as neutrals — was at last ended by 
 an agreement between all the parties concerned. 
 The nations undertook to settle the long Eastern 
 dispute by pledging the sultan to reforms which 
 it was not in his nature to carry out. 
 
 The next three wars were fought without 
 respect to the Concert of Europe. They arose 
 from local causes and were soon determined with- 
 out the aid of the Great Powers. They were the 
 
88 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 war of Austria and France over the liberation of 
 Italy, 1859 ; the war between Prussia and Austria, 
 1866, in which Prussia overthrew the Austrian 
 predominancy in Germany; and the Franco- 
 Prussian war in 1870-1871, in which Prussia 
 crushed France and made herself the head of the 
 German Empire. In the first of these struggles 
 no state could gain enough power to become a 
 menace to the other states, since Italy was to be 
 the recipient of all territory gained. Had the 
 contest gone so far as to promise the vast en- 
 largement of the power of France by reason of 
 an alliance with enlarged Italy, interference 
 might have resulted. In fact, the German states 
 began to suspect such a result, and the realization 
 of it was one of Napoleon's reasons for with- 
 drawing very unceremoniously from the war. 
 Here we see, therefore, that the principle of con- 
 cert was not entirely dead. The second and third 
 wars were fought by a brilliantly organized state, 
 Prussia, with whose successful armies no nation 
 cared to make a trial of strength. 
 
 In 1877 Russia made war on Turkey and pro- 
 ceeded with such energy that she soon forced 
 the sultan to sign the treaty of San Stefano, al- 
 
LATER PHASES OF CONCERT 8<9 
 
 together in favor of Russia. The particulars 
 of the struggle belong to another chapter, 1 but 
 here it is only necessary to point out that the 
 Concert of Europe was now suddenly revived by 
 the Great Powers, and Russia was forced to sub- 
 mit her well won victory to the Congress of Ber- 
 lin, which scaled down the awards of San Stefano 
 until Russia might well ask what was left of her 
 victory. A similar thing happened in the Bal- 
 kan War of 1912-1913. Here the parties con- 
 cerned had fought their quarrel out to the end 
 and had nearly expelled Turkey from Europe, 
 dividing the spoils among themselves. Then 
 in stepped the Great Powers, prescribing in a 
 treaty at London the limits of gain to the suc- 
 cessful contestants. They acted in the interest 
 of peace ; for Austria, watching the actions of Ser- 
 bia and Greece, let it be known that she would 
 not allow Serbia to have Albania, and the Powers 
 interfered in order to prevent such action from 
 kindling a great European war. 
 
 Thus in three notable wars, the Crimean War, 
 the Russo-Turkish War, and the Balkan War, 
 the action of the Great Powers was not to pre- 
 
 i See below, p. 112. 
 
90 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 vent war, but to neutralize its gains. So far did 
 this principle go that writers were known to sug- 
 gest that war would no longer be profitable to 
 nations, since in a Concert of Europe the Great 
 Powers would ever nullify the gains of the con- 
 testants. 
 
 At this time concert had come to mean another 
 thing than it meant in the decade after the fall 
 of Napoleon. Then it was a fixed system of con- 
 sultation and decision in anticipation of some 
 issue that threatened war: now it was concerted 
 action to keep a local war from going so far 
 as to involve a general conflict. It was a 
 last resort in the presence of dire danger. A 
 more present means of preserving peace was the 
 Balance of Power, which consisted in forming 
 the states in groups one of which balanced an- 
 other group and prevented the development of 
 overwhelming strength. The principle was well 
 known in the past history of Europe, but it was 
 never so clearly defined in the remote past as in 
 the last half century. For our purposes its 
 modern phase begins after the Franco-Prussian 
 War, 1870-1871. 
 
 Before that time Prussia was strong in Europe 
 
LATER PHASES OF CONCERT 91 
 
 but not over-whelmingly great. On one side 
 was Austria, long her enemy, and on the other 
 was France. Within five years they were de- 
 feated with such quick and crushing blows that 
 the world was startled and the Germans them- 
 selves were as much astonished as delighted. 
 Out of this brilliant period of success arose the 
 German Empire, with Prussia for its corner- 
 stone and Bismarck for its builder and guardian. 
 Immediately a singular thing happened. One 
 would hardly expect that a beaten state would 
 straightway form an alliance with the power that 
 had humiliated her; yet such a relation was es- 
 tablished between Germany and Austria, and it 
 has lasted to this day. Where Germany has 
 loved Austria has loved, where Germany has 
 hated Austria has hated, and the ambition of 
 one has been supported by the other. Bis- 
 marck's policy had this state of friendship in view 
 and he gave Austria generous terms of peace in 
 1866, when she was at his feet. Common blood 
 bound the two states together and later led to 
 the hope of unification in a great Pan-German 
 empire. 
 
 With France, however, the empire which Bis- 
 
92 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 marck founded was to have no such state of 
 amity. Between them was no brotherhood, not 
 even in the tenuous bonds of the theory of the 
 rights of man. Back of 1871 were many acts 
 of aggression, many bitter wars, and some very 
 humiliating experiences for states inhabited by 
 Germans. And now the tables were turned. 
 France was weak and the often beaten Germans 
 were strong and victorious. Their vengeance 
 was expressed in the long siege of Paris, the 
 proclamation of the German Empire in the 
 chateau of the old French kings, the humiliating 
 indemnity levied on the French people, and the 
 annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, so long in 
 the quiet keeping of France that they were thor- 
 oughly French in sympathy and political pur- 
 pose. Bismarck usually ruled his heart with his 
 head, but he lost himself for the moment when 
 he sent a defeated neighbor under the yoke of 
 needless disgrace, and Germany has paid the 
 price many times over in maintaining a great 
 army and parrying the diplomatic thrusts of 
 France. The hostile feelings thus engendered 
 gave rise to the particular kind of balance of 
 power that has existed in Europe since 1871; 
 
LATER PHASES OF CONCERT 93 
 
 for on whatever side Germany was found France 
 was on the other, and however the elements 
 shifted in the grouping of nations these two states 
 were always opponents. 
 
 It was Bismarck's idea to form an alliance so 
 powerful that no other state nor group of states 
 would dare attack it, and by holding his allies 
 in hand to preserve peace. That was the way 
 the Balance of Power was to serve to prevent 
 war. For his purpose he formed what was 
 known as the Three Emperors' League, consist- 
 ing of the rulers of Germany, Russia, and Aus- 
 tria. The combination was weak in one im- 
 portant point; for Russia and Austria had rival 
 hopes of territorial gains in the Near East, and 
 they were not likely to remain permanently in 
 accord. With an eye to such a disruption of the 
 alliance Bismarck looked about for another state 
 which could be added to the group. He turned 
 to Italy, bound to him because he had befriended 
 her in her struggle for nationality. 
 
 To bring Italy into the alliance was not easy; 
 for she was bitterly hostile to Austria, who still 
 held the unredeemed part of the Italian people 
 and who was still hated in the peninsula for her 
 
94 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 ancient oppression of Italian provinces. The 
 Iron Chancellor generally carried his point, 
 partly because of his personal ability and partly 
 because it was felt that he could and would live 
 up to his promises. He showed the king of Italy 
 the advantages the kingdom would have under 
 German protection, which would support it 
 against France, strengthen it in the quarrel with 
 the pope, and even hold back Austria if that 
 power was inclined to pay off old scores. These 
 arrangements were completed in 1882 and gave 
 rise to the Triple Alliance, until 1914 a strong 
 factor in European affairs. The greatness of 
 Bismarck is well shown in the fact that he could 
 carry this plan through and still retain Russia 
 in cooperation with Austria and Germany. 
 Until he retired from office in 1890 he had the 
 support of the tsar. 
 
 After he withdrew the union of the three em- 
 perors was dissolved. But for his strong hand 
 it could hardly have been formed. Russia and 
 Austria were at bottom rivals If Germany 
 supported Russia in her plans for the Near East 
 she would offend Austria, and if she lent herself 
 to Austria she would lose Russia. Moreover, if 
 
LATER PHASES OF CONCERT 95 
 
 she favored Russia openly she was likely to 
 arouse the opposition of Great Britain, who was 
 at that time very suspicious of the tsar's designs 
 on Constantinople. It was a delicate situation, 
 and it was only good luck and Bismarck's char- 
 acter that kept it intact for more than fifteen 
 years. 
 
 After 1890 the Triple Alliance continued its 
 existence, Italy suppressing her dislike for 
 Austria as well as she could in view of her need 
 of strong friends among the nations. But Rus- 
 sia fell away and in 1895 announced that she had 
 formed a Dual Alliance with France, a thing 
 which Bismarck had been very solicitous to 
 prevent. By holding Russia in hand he had been 
 able to isolate France in Europe, but her isola- 
 tion was now a thing of the past. The Dual 
 Alliance confronted the Triple Alliance and the 
 result was peace. At the same time the rivalry 
 of Russia and Austria over Turkey became more 
 energetic, which tended to increase the probability 
 of war. 
 
 Succeeding Bismarck came German states- 
 men who were not so steady as he, and their 
 weaker hold on the situation added to the gravity 
 
96 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 of the prospects of peace. It can hardly be 
 doubted that the fall of Bismarck lessened the 
 prospect that Europe would remain at peace. 
 The Balance of Power, which took so clear a 
 form with the organization of the Dual Alliance, 
 was not as good a guarantee of peace as it seemed ; 
 for while it made the checking of powers by 
 powers more apparent, its very existence was 
 evidence of a state of stronger rivalry of na- 
 tions than existed before the Dual Alliance was 
 formed. At the same time the men who now 
 guided the fortunes of Germany were not so con- 
 vinced as Bismarck that the country should have 
 peace. 
 
 While these things happened Great Britain re- 
 mained generally neutral. She was busy with 
 trade expansion and the development of her 
 colonies, especially in Africa ; and her chief inter- 
 est, so far as the schemes of the Continental 
 nations were concerned, was to see that none of 
 them interfered with her progress in that field 
 of endeavor. Late in Bismarck's time, however, 
 she became convinced that Germany was becom- 
 ing a rival both in trade and colonization. It is 
 true that France was also a rival, and between 
 
LATER PHASES OF CONCERT 97 
 
 her and Great Britain occurred some sharp pas- 
 sages; but France was not an aggressive nation 
 and had no strong military resources to back her 
 ambitions in the field of peaceful activities. Ger- 
 many, on the other hand, was increasingly mili- 
 taristic and the logic of events seemed to indicate 
 that she would at some time in the future be 
 willing to support her commercial and colonial 
 ambition with a formidable appeal to arms. 
 British anxiety was quickened when the young 
 kaiser began to build a great navy, with the 
 avowed object of making it equal to the British 
 navy. For centuries it had been the key-note 
 of British policy to have a navy that could con- 
 trol the seas; and while there was nothing in the 
 will of Father Adam that gave Britons the do- 
 minion of the seas, the kaiser must have known 
 that he could not challenge their superiority on 
 water without arousing their gravest appre- 
 hension. During the Boer war (1899-1902) 
 Germany gave added offense to Britain. She 
 showed sympathy openly for the Boers, and it 
 was generally believed in Great Britain that she 
 took advantage of the opportunity to try to form 
 a grand alliance to curb the power of the "Mis- 
 
98 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 tress of the Seas." Rumor said that the plan 
 was defeated only by the refusal of France to 
 lend her assistance unless she received Alsace- 
 Lorraine. If the report is true, it only shows 
 what a costly thing to Germany was the hatred 
 that Bismarck created when he put France to 
 the humiliating dismemberment of 1871. 
 
 During this period Theophile Delcasse was 
 head of the French foreign office (1898-1905). 
 He was a man of great original ability and was 
 desirous of restoring the prestige of France. 
 When he came into office the French public was 
 excited over the Fashoda incident, a clash of 
 French and British interests in the Sudan which 
 seemed to threaten war. The British govern- 
 ment took a strong attitude, as it was likely at 
 that time to do, when it felt that it was dealing 
 with a weaker nation. Delcasse realized that 
 the true welfare of his country demanded friend- 
 ship with the one power which could help it 
 against Germany, and at the risk of denunciation 
 at home he gave up all that Great Britain de- 
 manded in the Sudan. He thus showed that 
 he possessed that high trait of statesmanship 
 
LATER PHASES OF CONCERT 99 
 
 which consists in the ability to convert an op- 
 ponent into a firm friend. 
 
 The opportunity to which he was looking for- 
 ward came when Germany set her plans into 
 operation during the Boer war. He not only 
 held out for the return of the lost provinces but, 
 that failing, made overtures for a better under- 
 standing with the British. It was a time when 
 a friendly hand was gladly received by the Lon- 
 don government. The result was a series of 
 agreements which became known as the Entente 
 Cordiale, 1904. They marked the reappearance 
 of Great Britain as a leading power in Conti- 
 nental affairs, after a long period of aloofness. 
 She had become an active part of the Balance 
 of Power, and her strength was thrown to the 
 side which was bent on restraining the vast in- 
 fluence of Germany. Her action caused great 
 alarm at Berlin, where her motive was inter- 
 preted as commercial jealousy, the statesmen of 
 that city apparently forgetting that they had pro- 
 voked it by their unfriendly attitude in the Boer 
 war. 
 
 In the same year began the Russo-Japanese 
 
100 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 war (1904-1905) . At first glance it would seem 
 that this conflict threatened to weaken the En- 
 tente Cordiale, for Japan was allied to Great 
 Britain and Russia was bound up with France 
 by the Dual Alliance. But the result was just 
 the opposite. The Entente was not only left in- 
 tact, but it was actually strengthened. When 
 Japan defeated Russia, Great Britain ceased to 
 fear Russian aggression in the Far East, which 
 made it possible for her to draw nearer to the 
 Muscovite power. At the same time, Russia, 
 always seeking an outlet to the sea, turned her 
 eyes with greater eagerness than ever to the 
 Near East, which brought her into a more intense 
 state of opposition to Austria and Germany. 
 Delcasse seized the opportunity offered him and 
 succeeded in bringing together these two great 
 nations, which for many years had been con- 
 tinually ready to fly at one another. He put 
 into motion the negotiations out of which was 
 formed the Triple Entente (1907) in which 
 Great Britain, France, and Russia announced 
 that they had settled their differences and would 
 stand together in future crises. 
 
 The incidents that followed the culmination 
 
LATER PHASES OF CONCERT 101 
 
 of Delcasse's diplomacy are very striking, but 
 they must be deferred until I reach a later stage 
 of my subject. Here it is only proper to observe 
 that it brought the theory of the Balance of 
 Power to its logical development. Delcasse was 
 in a world in which one great and most efficiently 
 armed nation stood in a position to turn sud- 
 denly on the rest of Europe and sweep it into 
 her lap. By her military and naval power, by 
 her vast trained army, by her readiness for in- 
 stantaneous action, by her well planned strategic 
 railroads, and by her alliances with the middle- 
 European states she was in a threatening position. 
 At a given signal she could seize great domains, 
 fortify herself, and defy all the world to drive 
 her out of what she had taken. There was hardly 
 an intelligent German who did not believe that 
 this course would be followed in the near future 
 and who did not feel confident that it would make 
 Germany the dominating nation of the world. 
 Against this system the Triple Entente was 
 formed, as a means of balance. It was larger 
 than the Triple Alliance but not so effectively 
 led. 
 
 And here I must observe that these two groups 
 
102 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 had come into existence in the most natural way. 
 Bismarck had founded the Triple Alliance as a 
 means of preserving peace, not as a means of 
 aggression; but it had become something more 
 than he intended it to be. It had enabled Ger- 
 many to play such a part in European politics 
 that the creation of another great group as a 
 balance was apparently demanded. Imme- 
 diately that her position was lowered Germany 
 felt aggrieved that the combination had been 
 made against her. So powerful were her con- 
 victions about her wrongs that she threw away 
 all thought of a concert of the Great Powers for 
 the settlement of the difficulty. She had trusted 
 to the Balance to protect her; but she now con- 
 sidered it something more than a state of equi- 
 librium and she appealed to arms. Before this 
 narrative recounts the actual events by which 
 she felt that she was justified in taking this step, 
 it is necessary to consider the Balkan question, a 
 series of causes and events which for nearly a 
 century has been an open menace to European 
 peace and stability. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE BALKAN STATES 
 
 Viscount Grey has been criticized for not 
 understanding the Balkan problem. If his 
 critics understood how complex is the story of the 
 last century in this part of Europe they would 
 withold their strictures. I, at least, do not 
 blame any man for failing to carry in his mind 
 an appreciation of all that the mixed mass of 
 races and religions in the Balkan country have 
 striven and hoped for during the recent past. In 
 this chapter the best that can be promised is an 
 account of the main facts of Balkan history. A 
 more detailed narrative would be confusing to 
 the reader. A failure to mention the subject 
 would leave much unexplained that is essential to 
 an understanding of the origin of the present 
 war. And we shall hardly know how to decide 
 what kind of a peace the future security of 
 Europe demands, if we leave out of consideration 
 the proper disposition to be made of the small 
 states of the Southeast. 
 
 103 
 
104 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 In 1453 Turkey took Constantinople and be- 
 gan a series of conquests that carried her to the 
 very gates of the city of Vienna. That impor- 
 tant stronghold seemed about to fall into her 
 hands in 1683, when an army of Polish and Ger- 
 man soldiers came to its rescue in the name of 
 Christianity, drove off the infidels, and wrenched 
 Hungary out of their hands for the benefit of 
 the Austrian power. This struggle proved the 
 highwater mark of Turkish conquest in Europe. 
 From that time to this, wars of reconquest have 
 followed one another, the pagans always playing 
 a losing game. But for a long time all that part 
 of Southeastern Europe that could be reached 
 from the Black Sea was held by the Turks, the 
 part that was easily reached from Germany 
 was held by the Christians, and the part that lay 
 between, a broad belt of hilly country, was con- 
 tinually in dispute. Across it armies fought 
 back and forth, each side winning and losing in 
 turn, but with the general result in favor of the 
 Christians, who slowly pushed back the frontier 
 of their enemies. 
 
 The region held by the Turks was tenacious of 
 its Christian faith and recognized the religious 
 
THE BALKAN STATES 105 
 
 authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople, 
 who, Christian though he was, stood under the 
 control of the sultan. The inhabitants suffered 
 many hardships and were reduced to the condi- 
 tion of serfs under Mohammedan masters. The 
 long bondage to their overlords had a peculiar 
 effect on their characters. They came to think it 
 right to use fraud, violence, and subterfuge 
 against their oppressors, and so they employed 
 religion and patriotism to defend the commission 
 of acts which in ordinary situations are consid- 
 ered without the pale of civilized conduct. To 
 this day the Balkan states are not rid of their 
 heritage from these years of moral darkness. 
 
 The Balkan people, ruled long as Turkish 
 subjects, have gradually formed themselves into 
 five principal groups as follows: the Serbians, 
 dwelling in the interior of the country northwest 
 of Turkey proper and occupying much of the 
 hinterland lying east of the Adriatic; the Bul- 
 gars, settled east of the Serbs and extending as 
 far as the shores of the Black Sea; the Wallach- 
 ians and Moldavians, who were of kindred stock 
 and became known as Rumanians because they 
 believed themselves the descendants of the inhabi- 
 
106 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 tants of the ancient Roman colony of Dacia; 
 the Albanians living along the lower eastern 
 shores of the Adriatic; and the Montenegrins, of 
 the same race as the Serbians, who defended 
 themselves so well in their mountain strongholds 
 that they could say they had never been con- 
 quered by the Turks. Many race elements 
 entered into these groups, but the Serbs and 
 Montenegrins were largely Slavic, while the 
 Bulgars were generally of a distinct race of 
 Asiatic origin, and the Rumanians were gen- 
 erally Vlachs, a name given to the Latin speak- 
 ing population of the Eastern Roman Empire. 
 The Albanians seem to be of mixed stock, but 
 they have a strong sense of nationality. These 
 five groups correspond respectively to the five 
 civil divisions that have emerged from the Turk- 
 ish provinces, each playing its part in the modern 
 Balkan problem. 
 
 Montenegro aside, the first group to become a 
 state was Serbia, whose hardy mountain in- 
 habitants rose in revolt in 1804. A number of 
 brave leaders appeared and valley by valley the 
 Turks were forced out of the country. The 
 Serbs were practically independent for a time, 
 
THE BALKAN STATES 107 
 
 but the sultan did not acquiesce in their freedom, 
 and the constant preparedness that was necessary 
 to repel any attack he might launch was a source 
 of much expense and anxiety to the people. 
 
 In 1821 the Greeks, also under the domination 
 of Turkey, rose in revolt. Great sympathy was 
 aroused in the rest of Europe and in spite of 
 the disposition of the Great Powers to allow 
 Turkey a free hand to preserve her territory in- 
 tact, lest one of them gain over-balancing terri- 
 tory, public opinion forced them to intervene. 
 The first to show sympathy was Russia, who had 
 an interest in making herself the protector of the 
 Christians in Turkey. The other powers re- 
 sented her assistance to the Greeks, and finally 
 Great Britain and France united in a project of 
 intervention, sending a joint fleet to the Medi- 
 terranean which destroyed the Turkish fleet at 
 Navarino in 1827. The stubborn sultan re- 
 mained unyielding, and in 1828 Russia entered 
 the war openly, having come to an agreement 
 with the other Powers. She sent an army across 
 the border which carried all before it, and the 
 sultan was forced to make the treaty of Adria- 
 nople, in which Turkey recognized the independ- 
 
108 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 ence of Greece and acknowledged Serbia as an 
 autonomous state under Turkish suzerainty. 
 At the same time Wallachia and Moldavia, where 
 Humans lived, were recognized as independent 
 under a Russian protectorate. Thus one sov- 
 ereign and three dependent but locally autono- 
 mous states stood forth out of the confused 
 and misgoverned Christian area of Turkey in 
 Europe. 
 
 The rest of the region, occupied by Bulgars 
 and Albanians, with Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
 claimed by the Serbs as legitimate parts of their 
 national habitat, remained in an unredeemed con- 
 dition and were governed by agents appointed 
 by the sultan. Montenegro retained her posi- 
 tion of practical independence, which Turkey 
 had been forced to acknowledge in 1799. These 
 arrangements were confirmed in a more formal 
 treaty in 1832. 
 
 The successes of this period quickened the 
 spirit of nationality in the Balkans. Just as the 
 Greeks were swept by a wave of enthusiasm for 
 their classical culture and sought to revive the 
 language and ideals of the remote past, so the 
 Balkan peoples set out to revive their ancient 
 
THE BALKAN STATES 109 
 
 culture, long obscured by the shadow of Turkish 
 masters. Serbs, Rumans, and Bulgars made 
 grammars of their own languages, gathered up 
 what was preserved of their ancient literatures 
 and traditions, taught their children to revere 
 the national heroes, and sought in many other 
 ways to stimulate the spirit of nationality. The 
 Slavic portion turned to Russia for support, 
 whom they called their "big brother," while the 
 Rumans cultivated an appreciation of Italy and 
 France, whom they considered kindred descend- 
 ants of the ancient Romans. To their national 
 hopes in these things was added the desire for 
 religious independence. They disliked being un- 
 der the ecclesiastical authority of the Patriarch 
 of Constantinople, who was appointed by the sul- 
 tan, and looked forward to a time when they 
 might have exarchs of their own, with jurisdiction 
 not limited by the Patriarch. 
 
 In 1854 Russia was ready for another advance 
 in the region of the Balkans, hoping to gain at 
 last what Peter the Great had declared was es- 
 sential to her progress, a window looking out on 
 the Mediterranean. Great Britain and France 
 came to the help of the sultan and the Crimean 
 
110 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 War followed. After a hard struggle it ended 
 in Russia's defeat, and at the Conference of 
 Paris, 1856, the affairs of the Balkans were again 
 up for settlement, but this time the victory leaned 
 to the side of the Turk, although it was modified 
 by the restraining hand of his two allies. The 
 purport of the treaty was to reduce the power 
 of Russia, and in doing so the aspirations of the 
 Balkans states were checked. The protectorate 
 the tsar had established over Wallachia and Mol- 
 davia was destroyed, and Bulgars, who had 
 expected independence, remained under the rule 
 of the sultan, while Greece, who had desired a 
 large portion of Macedonia, was forced to con- 
 tinue in her old boundaries. This crisis was not 
 the last in which the vexed Balkan question, 
 seemingly near solution, was made to give way 
 before the complicated problems of the general 
 European situation. Looking backward we may 
 well say that if Russia had secured her wish, ex- 
 pelled the Turk from Constantinople and liber- 
 ated the Balkan states, the fortunes of France 
 would not have been lessened, and Great Britain, 
 safe through her supremacy at sea, would not 
 have lost any of the strength she had in India. 
 
THE BALKAN STATES 111 
 
 At the same time the sore spot of European 
 relations would have been healed, and we should 
 probably have had no war in 1914. 
 
 Wallachia and Moldavia were of the same 
 stock and wished to unite as one kingdom. They 
 made their desires known in the negotiations 
 that resulted in the Treaty of Paris, but the 
 Powers did not mean to create a large state on 
 the borders of Russia which might prove a bul- 
 wark of influence for the tsar, and accordingly 
 they denied the request. The two states found 
 a way to accomplish their desire, soon after the 
 conference at Paris adjourned. Meeting to 
 select rulers each chose Alexander John Cuza 
 simultaneously, and after hesitating two years 
 the Powers acknowledged him as king. Thus 
 was formed the united kingdom of Rumania; 
 and its formation illustrated a weak point in the 
 Concert of Europe. However much the Powers 
 might interfere to prevent the consummation of 
 an act they considered dangerous, they would 
 think twice before trying to punish a Balkan 
 state, since in doing so they might set off an 
 explosion in the very system they were working 
 to keep peaceful. Rumania understood this 
 
112 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 phase of the matter and took her chances. Her 
 firm course had its reward. 
 
 The influence of Great Britain was now para- 
 mount at Constantinople. The sultan was satis- 
 fied with his ally, since he knew that of all the 
 Powers he had least to fear from this state, which 
 had no territories in that part of the Mediter- 
 ranean and was committed to the preservation of 
 his rule as a means of keeping Russia away from 
 the Bosphorus. To justify herself for defending 
 the Turk, Great Britain gave the world assur- 
 ances that the sultan was about to become good. 
 Under her insistance a series of reforms was an- 
 nounced, but they did not go far in the realiza- 
 tion. Some of the promises referred to the gov- 
 ernment of the Balkans, but they were as fruit- 
 less as the others. Meanwhile French and 
 British merchants found large profits in Turkish 
 trade. 
 
 The tsar was humiliated by his loss of influence 
 in the Southeast, and in 1877 he began another 
 war against Turkey. He thought the time 
 favorable for such action. Impeded for a while 
 at Plevna, in Bulgaria, he at last swept the enemy 
 before him and took Adrianople on January 16, 
 
THE BALKAN STATES US 
 
 1878. His successes created great enthusiasm 
 among the Serbs, Bulgars, and Rumans, who 
 flocked to his victorious standard. The panic- 
 stricken sultan sued for peace and at San Stefano 
 signed a treaty which granted all that was de- 
 manded of him. Serbia, Montenegro, and 
 Rumania were recognized as completely inde- 
 pendent, Bulgaria as an autonomous tributary 
 province, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were as- 
 sured of important administrative reforms. 
 Russia was awarded some territory not strictly in 
 the Balkans, but her greatest gain was the pres- 
 tige she now had as liberator of Christian states. 
 The treaty of San Stefano alarmed Great 
 Britain and Austria, both of whom felt that they 
 had major interests at stake. They got a con- 
 gress of the Great Powers to meet at Berlin, 
 1878, which revised the treaty in what they were 
 pleased to call the interest of European peace. 
 Complete independence was announced for 
 Serbia, Rumania, and Montenegro, and the sul- 
 tan accepted the fact of their perfect sovereignty. 
 By the treaty of San Stefano Bulgaria was to 
 include Macedon and eastern Rumelia, making 
 one great buffer province between the Turkish 
 
114 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 and the Christian states. The three parts were 
 now left distinct, Bulgaria proper being autono- 
 mous but under Turkish suzerainty, and the 
 other two less independent. 
 
 To create a "Big Bulgaria" as a bulwark 
 against Turkey had been Russia's chief hope in 
 the war. Her initial success awakened enthus- 
 iasm in all the Balkan people, and the results 
 were expressed in the way in which they rallied 
 to her aid. At last, said the onlookers, an op- 
 portunity had come to found a strong Balkan 
 confederacy which would play an important 
 part in the development of the Near East. The 
 hand of Russia seemed strong enough to hold 
 these nascent states to one policy, allay their in- 
 cipient jealousies, and bring them to a great com- 
 mon ideal. If such a course could have been 
 adopted the future of Europe would have been 
 profoundly altered. It was defeated by that 
 Concert of Europe which was supposed to exist 
 in order that the world might be spared the bur- 
 den of war. It was really prevented through the 
 operation of the forces of national selfishness, 
 safely esconced in the system which we have 
 called the Concert of Europe. 
 
THE BALKAN STATES 115 
 
 The ambition of Austria-Hungary played a 
 large part at the Congress of Berlin. This na- 
 tion had long looked upon the region that sepa- 
 rated her from the Adriatic as a sphere through 
 which she was justified in extending her power at 
 the expense of Turkey, and she now felt that 
 the time had come to realize her plans. If she 
 waited, Russia would acquire such an influence 
 as to forestall Austrian advancement. Her eyes 
 were fixed on Bosnia and Herzegovina, for some 
 time in revolt against Turkish misgovernment. 
 Her influence was such that the congress gave 
 her the right to occupy and administer the two 
 provinces under the reservation of sovereignty to 
 the sultan. The inhabitants, who were largely 
 Slavic, were forced to accept the decision, al- 
 though they did not relax their cherished hopes 
 of independence. They were pawns thrown to 
 Austria as a balance for the gains of Russia. 
 The transaction only whetted the Austrian appe- 
 tite for more and deepened the Serbian resent- 
 ment for Austria. 
 
 Great Britain had her advantage out of the 
 bargain also. She retained her position of para- 
 mount friend at Constantinople, justifying her- 
 
116 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 self with the assurance that the sultan would 
 carry out reforms in his empire. She seemed 
 to think that the "Sick Man of Europe" would 
 cure himself under her guidance and then defend 
 himself against states that tried to oust him from 
 his seat of power. To enable her to watch the 
 bedside of her patient from a convenient posi- 
 tion, as well as to safeguard the Suez Canal, 
 Great Britain was given the right to occupy and 
 administer the island of Cyprus under nominal 
 authority of Turkey. To be perfectly fair we 
 must admit that there is little moral difference 
 between her acquisition of Cyprus and Austria's 
 gain in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and it is clear 
 that in this case the Concert of Europe was a 
 concert for the gain of selfish ends. It is also 
 worth while to note that two of the Great Powers 
 took no benefit from the agreement. France 
 was slowly recovering from the war of 1870- 
 1871 and was in no condition to fight, although 
 in 1881 she established a protectorate over Tunis. 
 The German Empire, newly founded and not yet 
 fully adapted to the imperial system, was also in 
 no condition to undertake a stiff encounter. 
 There were many Germans who wished that their 
 
THE BALKAN STATES 117 
 
 government should not allow the other states to 
 get large gains of territory while Germany got 
 nothing; but they yielded to Bismarck's wise 
 policy which held that it was not yet time 
 for Germany to assume an aggressive position 
 in the world. The impatience of the Ger- 
 man patriots lost nothing through having to 
 wait. 
 
 No treaty ends the march of time, and the 
 Balkan situation continued to develop along the 
 old lines. In 1881 Greece acquired Thessaly in 
 accordance with a promise made to her at the 
 Congress of Berlin. In 1885 East Rumelia de- 
 clared herself united to Bulgaria, acting in de- 
 fiance of the will of the Congress of Berlin. The 
 Powers did not interfere for the same reason 
 that they did not act when Wallachia and Mol- 
 davia united in 1862. To attempt to undo the 
 union would have precipitated a general war. 
 The Concert was stronger to prevent a given 
 action than to correct it after it was done. 
 Serbia, however, took the action of the two 
 provinces as a menace and declared war against 
 the new state of Bulgaria. She seemed about 
 to throw herself on her adversary when she sud- 
 
118 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 denly made peace, evidently feeling she was not 
 strong enough to carry on the war alone. 
 
 Thenceforth the Powers showed that they did 
 not mean to allow the Balkan states to profit 
 by seizing parts of the decaying Turkish Em- 
 pire. But for their restraint it seems that the 
 Turk would have been expelled from Europe 
 before the end of the nineteenth century. 
 
 Their intention was clearly manifested in re- 
 gard to the island of Crete, whose population 
 long suffered from Turkish oppression. In 1896 
 the island was in revolt and the sultan was forced 
 to promise reforms. The assurance proved 
 empty and in 1897 Greece interfered in behalf 
 of Crete. In the war that followed the Greeks 
 fought heroically but alone and were no match 
 for Turkey in operations on land. They made 
 peace without success, but through the instru- 
 mentality of the Great Powers the sultan agreed 
 to allow Crete self-government under an elected 
 assembly. The powers let it be known that 
 they would not have the island annexed to Greece, 
 which they did not mean to make a preponderat- 
 ing influence in the Balkans. Now appeared a 
 great Cretan leader, Eleutherios Venezelos, 
 
THE BALKAN STATES 119 
 
 whom his admirers call the Cavour of Greece. 
 'Under his influence the Cretan assembly voted the 
 union of the island with Greece in 1905, but again 
 the Powers interposed, insisting that the sover- 
 eignty of the sultan should not be abrogated. 
 However, they permitted the Greek king to ap- 
 point a representative to rule the island as a 
 Turkish fief, and Greek officers were allowed to 
 train the Cretan soldiers and police. At last 
 the Balkan war (1912-1913) brought the com- 
 pletion of union, the Great Powers yielding their 
 assent. 
 
 The explanation of the conduct of the Powers 
 in this incident is to be found in the delicate 
 nature of the whole Balkan question. With 
 Austria and Russia keenly aroused and each of 
 the Balkan states anxiously looking for the 
 moment when the rest of the sultan's territory in 
 Europe was to be divided between them, it was 
 evident that a little thing could precipitate a 
 serious conflict. It was in view of this phase of 
 the situation that the Balkans were called "the 
 tinder-box of Europe." 
 
 It will be observed that while these things 
 happened the Balkan states were developing 
 
120 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 steadily in national resources and spirit. Greece, 
 Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania became vitally 
 organized powers, it became more and more evi- 
 dent that they were no longer mere pawns in 
 the diplomatic game, and the time was fast ap- 
 proaching when they would wish to take parts 
 on their own initiative. So assertive were they 
 becoming that it was certain that the time would 
 soon come when the Great Powers would tire of 
 the process of holding conferences to keep these 
 states out of trouble. It is not an easy task to 
 serve as custodian for a "tinder-box." 
 
 A fair warning of this kind of danger oc- 
 curred in 1908. For twenty-three years Bul- 
 garia had remained undisturbed, giving herself 
 to a rapid process of educational and industrial 
 development, in both of which lines she had 
 come under the influence of German methods. 
 Suddenly she threw off her nominal Turkish 
 sovereignty and declared herself an entirely in- 
 dependent state. At the same time, and 
 evidently by agreement with the German Em- 
 pire, Austria-Hungary announced that she would 
 hold Bosnia-Herzegovina as an integral part of 
 her empire, thus superseding the "occupation" 
 
THE BALKAN STATES 121 
 
 that was authorized by the congress of Berlin, in 
 1878. Serbia took the matter as a great injury, 
 but she could do nothing alone. Her natural 
 ally was Russia, then recovering from the severe 
 losses of the war against Japan. Had the tsar 
 been ready for war it is doubtful if he would 
 have drawn the sword in this instance; for a 
 world war would have resulted, and the nations 
 were not yet ready to think of such an under- 
 taking. But Serbia nursed her wrongs and to 
 Russia the sense of her shame grew as she thought 
 how her weakness had been flaunted in the face 
 of the world. The day came when the fire could 
 no longer be smothered. 
 
 To understand Serbia's feelings we must re- 
 call the national ideal by which her hopes had 
 been formed for many years. Most of the 
 people of Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, 
 Novi-Bazar, and the northwestern corner of 
 Macedonia were Serbs by blood. To unite them 
 into a great Serbia had long been spoken of in 
 Serbia as the "Great Idea." When, therefore, 
 Austria took definite possession of Bosnia- 
 Herzegovina the "Great Idea" seemed defeated 
 forever. Rage and despair possessed the Serbs 
 
122 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 wherever they lived, patriotic societies voiced the 
 feeling of the people, and vengeance was plotted. 
 Probably it was the feeling that this wide-spread 
 hatred should be uprooted in the most thorough 
 manner that prompted Austria to make the heavy 
 conditions that were demanded as atonement for 
 the crime of Sarajevo. 
 
 After Austria took the fateful step of 1908 
 Turkey still held the territory just north of the 
 Bosphorus, organized as the province of 
 Adrianople. She also had in Europe the prov- 
 inces of Macedonia, Albania, and the sanjak 
 of Novi-Bazar. To drive her out of these pos- 
 sessions was the object of the Balkan states. In 
 1911 Italy began a war against the sultan to 
 gain Tripoli. The Balkan States seeing their 
 enemy embarrassed, concluded that the hour of 
 fate had come. They formed the Balkan 
 League, made up of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, 
 and Montenegro, and made ready for war. 
 Their action alarmed the Great Powers, who 
 brought the Concert of Europe to bear against 
 the League. They gave the allies fair notice 
 that they would not permit them to take any of 
 the sultan's territory in Europe, even though 
 
THE BALKAN STATES 123 
 
 a war was won against him. The reply to this 
 threat shows how weak the Concert had become. 
 It was voiced by Montenegro, the smallest of 
 the states, whose king immediately declared war 
 and called on his allies to aid him in driving the 
 pagan out of Europe. The call was accepted 
 gladly and an ultimatum was sent to the sultan, 
 who, relying on the promise of the Powers, defied 
 his opponents. 
 
 In the war that followed Turkey was con- 
 fronted by a united army of nearly a million 
 men. It was impossible to withstand them and 
 in two months most of Macedonia was lost, Con- 
 stantinople was threatened, and Turkey asked 
 for an armistice. Negotiations began in Lon- 
 don, the Powers seemingly forgetting their empty 
 threat that they "would not permit at the end of 
 the conflict any modification of the territorial 
 status quo in European Turkey." The allies de- 
 manded hard terms which seemed about to be 
 accepted by Turkey when by a coup d'etat the 
 "Young Turks," a patriotic party of reformers, 
 got possession of the government at Constanti- 
 nople and resumed the fighting. Although they 
 fought well, they could not withstand the large 
 
124* THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 numbers that were against them. Janina fell to 
 the Greeks, Adrianople was taken by a Serbo- 
 Bulgarian force, and Scutari was taken by the 
 Montenegrins. The Turks now yielded defi- 
 nitely and negotiations for peace were resumed. 
 Behind the diplomatic proceedings was the fol- 
 lowing interesting situation: Austria-Hungary 
 was dismayed at the prospect of having a strong 
 and permanent league organized in the Balkans ; 
 for it would probably make it impossible for her 
 to realize her desire to extend her territory in 
 that direction. She was especially unwilling to 
 allow Serbia and Montenegro to hold the con- 
 quered shore of the Adriatic, since it was here 
 that she designed to gain additional outlets to 
 the seas. Italy at the same time was alarmed at 
 the extension of Serbian power, since she, also, 
 did not relish the prospect of having a strong 
 state on the eastern side of the sea. It was with 
 unexpected short-sightedness, however, that she 
 was willing to block Serbia in order to promote 
 the schemes of Austria, a far more formidable 
 rival in that quarter, if she were ever firmly es- 
 tablished there. Both states, therefore, appeared 
 at London to limit the expansion of Serbia, and 
 
THE BALKAN STATES 125 
 
 Germany supported them, seemingly on the 
 principle that she was merely standing by the 
 members of the Triple Alliance. It has been 
 supposed that she expected that Ferdinand, heir- 
 apparent of Austria, when he came to rule, would 
 promote a vital union of the two great Mid-Con- 
 tinental empires. If we accept this theory, we 
 must conclude that she had a still more vital rea- 
 son for wishing Austria to have a large Adriatic 
 coast-line, with important commercial harbors. 
 
 These considerations ran exactly counter to 
 Serbia's hopes in Albania. She had already oc- 
 cupied the Albanian port of Durazzo and ex- 
 pected to make it the center of a fair commercial 
 life. When ordered to withdraw she did not dare 
 refuse; but it was a great humiliation to her to 
 cut off the possibility of her future growth. For 
 a second time Austria had given her a vital blow, 
 and there was another wrong to be remembered 
 by those Serbians who were inclined to remember. 
 By the decree of the Powers Albania was made 
 an autonomous state under Turkish suzerainty, 
 and later on a German prince was appointed to 
 rule it. 
 
 While these affairs were being discussed 
 
126 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 Montenegro besieged Scutari, in northern Al- 
 bania and continued operation until the place 
 was taken, notwithstanding the purpose of the 
 Powers was well known. Her courageous con- 
 duct won the admiration of lovers of brave men 
 everywhere. Eight days after the capture of 
 Scutari, Austria announced that she would enter 
 the war if the place was not evacuated, and Italy 
 and Germany declared they would support her. 
 Throughout all slavic countries arose a cry of 
 indignation. In Russia especially it was loud 
 and bitter; and it seemed that a great war was 
 about to begin when King Nicholas, of Monte- 
 negro, gave the world the assurance of peace by 
 withdrawing his army from Scutari. 
 
 Then came that unhappy turn of affairs by 
 which the Balkan League was dissolved and the 
 hope disappeared that a strong power would 
 arise which would take the Near East out of the 
 position of pawn for the greed of the Great 
 Powers. Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria had made 
 an ante-bellum agreement for the disposal of the 
 territory they would take from Turkey, and the 
 first was to have a large part of Albania. Denied 
 this region she asked her allies to make a new 
 
THE BALKAN STATES 127 
 
 allotment. Bulgaria raised strong objection, 
 since the new demand, if granted, would mean 
 that her gains would be smaller than was first 
 agreed. Angry speeches led to war, and after 
 a sharp struggle Bulgaria was beaten and forced 
 to make peace without honor. While they were 
 locked in the conflict Turkey seized the oppor- 
 tunity to recover Adrianople, and eventually held 
 it. It illustrates the sordid nature of some of 
 the Balkan states that Rumania entered this war 
 for purely predatory purposes. She had re- 
 mained neutral during the common effort to drive 
 the Turk out ; but now that Bulgaria was march- 
 ing to sure defeat she came into the battle against 
 her, and at the end of the war she demanded and 
 was given a large part of Bulgarian territory. 
 The "July War," as this stage of the Balkan con- 
 flict is called, left the allies filled with bitter 
 hatred for one another, and Bulgaria, weakened 
 as she was, felt little inclined to lean on any of 
 her immediate neighbors. She was ripe for the 
 reception of Teutonic offers of friendship, and 
 the result was soon seen of all men. 
 
 I have thus followed the complex story of the 
 Balkan States to the year 1913. Through a 
 
128 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 century of war and intrigue Serbia, Bulgaria, 
 Rumania, Greece, and the small state of Monte- 
 negro had emerged from the Christian lands over 
 which the Turks had ruled. Russia and Austria 
 had taken small portions of those lands and had 
 definite plans to secure influence over larger por- 
 tions. In the Balkans Russian prestige was 
 great, but if a state feared it she was apt to look 
 to Austria, or to Germany — which was the same 
 thing — as a means of balancing against Russia. 
 At the same time it was known that Russia was 
 planning to construct strategic lines of railroad 
 leading to the Black Sea along the western bor- 
 der of her empire, and this was considered an 
 ominous sign for the future. Altogether, the 
 "tinder box" was ready for ignition. 
 
 As to Turkey, her fortunes shrank steadily. 
 At the end of the Balkan War she retained only 
 1,900,000 subjects in Europe, inhabitants of the 
 district around Adrianople. She was becoming 
 a distinctly Asiatic power, and the sultan must 
 have felt that his hold on Constantinople was 
 precarious. At the same time, as we shall see 
 later on, Great Britain had secured a foothold 
 on the shores of the Persian Gulf, and Russia 
 
THE BALKAN STATES 129 
 
 was extending her influence in Persia, two threats 
 from the eastward. Any far sighted Turk could 
 see that his country was in danger of being 
 crushed in a vise of foreign aggression. To 
 which of the great states should Turkey turn for 
 that protection which had long been her safety? 
 Not to Russia, whose ambition was for Con- 
 stantinople itself, nor to Great Britain, who 
 seemed to desire the Euphrates Valley, and who 
 was safely established in Egypt. In her ex- 
 tremity she listened to the suggestions of Ger- 
 man wooers, who promised industrial develop- 
 ment, railroads, and financial aid. Here was 
 laid the foundation of Turko-German sympathy 
 which was to be very important in the Great 
 War. 
 
 After a calamity has occurred it is easy to 
 point out the course by which it might have been 
 avoided. It seems certain that if we stood again 
 where the world stood in 1914 we should not do 
 what we did in 1914. So we can see in what 
 respects the events of the Balkan history went 
 wrong. But the men who settled the crises of 
 the past were not able to see what we see. They 
 had the same blindness for the future that we 
 
130 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 have for that which lies before us now. They 
 fumbled their problems as most men fumble 
 problems, as we shall, perhaps, go on fumbling 
 until the end of time. It is asking much to ex- 
 pect that statesmen shall be as wise as we who 
 review their deeds. 
 
 But there are great facts in history which it is 
 possible to know and use with profit. One of 
 them is the incompetency of the principle of the 
 Concert of Europe to deal with a situation like 
 that we have reviewed in the Balkans. Concert 
 predicates a group of satisfied great states, with- 
 out over-reaching ambitions, who are willing to 
 unite their efforts to restrain small states, or even 
 one large state, from a course which shall force 
 the rest of the world into conflict. When a 
 group of great states have united to carry out a 
 certain policy, and another tries to restrain the 
 first group, concert is in great danger of break- 
 ing down. That was the situation in the Bal- 
 kans. These states were drawn into the whirl 
 of general European politics, and they intensi- 
 fied its velocity at one particular corner, so that 
 what may be contemplated as a harmonious ro- 
 tary movement broke into a twisting tornado. 
 
THE BALKAN STATES 131 
 
 If, when the present war is over, the nations of 
 the world undertake to go on under the old sys- 
 tem, trusting to concert as the means of avoiding 
 war, there is no reason to expect that the future 
 will be less turbulent than the past. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 
 
 When wars begin between nations we usually 
 see the leaders of thought on each side busy de- 
 veloping distrust among their own citizens for 
 the people against whom they are fighting. In 
 accordance with this fact, the people of the 
 United States have read a great deal since Au- 
 gust, 1914, to make them think very unkindly of 
 Germany. 
 
 This chapter is not a plea for the Germans, 
 and I agree that they did unnecessarily cruel and 
 impossible things in Belgium. It is not to be 
 denied that they played a most unwise part in 
 the war game, when they tried to steal a march 
 on France by invading through Belgium, a thing 
 they were pledged not to do. It pays to keep 
 faith; and when a nation does not keep faith 
 other nations have no recourse but to treat it as 
 if it were a pirate. If they do otherwise, the 
 whole game will become a pirate's game, and 
 good faith will disappear from international re- 
 
 132 
 

 GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 133 
 
 la t ions. If Germany may violate Belgium at 
 will, why may she not violate Switzerland, Hol- 
 land, or any other state that stands in her way; 
 and who would not expect her to do it, if no 
 powers faced her that were willing and able to 
 dispute her will? 
 
 It is not improbable that German leaders un- 
 derstood this as well as we who now pass it under 
 review. They must have made their calculations 
 on arousing the opposition of the world and pro- 
 ceeded with the expectation that they would gain 
 so much by their sweep through forbidden Bel- 
 gium that they could defy the world. And if 
 things had gone well for them, the calculation 
 would have been well made. For if Germany 
 had carried France off her feet and placed her 
 in a position to offer no further menace during 
 the next ten years, and if she had dealt a similar 
 blow to Russia, what power could have checked 
 her in the future decade? By glancing at the 
 situation in Europe today we may see how an 
 intrenched Germany defies the united and un- 
 whipped world. How much more might she not 
 have had her way, if the thrust through Belgium 
 had succeeded! 
 
134* THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 Let us suppose that the game of bad faith had 
 proved successful as planned, what would have 
 been the result? Probably Great Britain would 
 have wakened slowly to her peril, but her posi- 
 tion was such that she could have done nothing. 
 Her fleet would have been useless against an 
 enemy that rules on land. Her army could not 
 have met the combined Teutonic armies, and she 
 would have had no allies. Meanwhile, Germany 
 and Austria at their leisure could have digested 
 the Balkans and drawing Turkey into their net 
 could have established a "Mittel-Europa" that 
 would have left the rest of the world at their 
 mercy. These were alluring stakes to play for, 
 and it is not hard to see how a nation whose lead- 
 ers have thrown aside the homely motto that 
 "Righteousness exalteth a nation" would be will- 
 ing to take a chance in order to obtain them. 
 
 When we think of such things as these we are 
 in danger of concluding that they represent the 
 real Germany. We look back to that Germany 
 of the past which we saw in our youth, whose 
 music we have heard all our lives, whose Goethe 
 we have read, whose scholarship we have built 
 upon, and whose toys have amused us and our 
 
GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 135 
 
 children through many decades and ask our- 
 selves whether or not we were mistaken in our 
 ideas of Germany. Are there two Germanies, 
 and if so, which is the true Germany? Probably 
 the answer is that each is the real Germany mani- 
 festing herself in different moods. Fundamen- 
 tally we have an intense and emotional people, 
 swayed in one instance by artistic emotions, in 
 another by the love of exact research for facts, 
 in another by the feeling of domesticity, and in 
 still another by the powerful impulse of a great 
 national egoism. They are a people who can 
 love much, hate much, play much, sacrifice much, 
 and serve well when called into service. In their 
 war-maddened mood they have stained a fair 
 reputation, and they are now trying to think that 
 the stain will not matter if they can only fight 
 through to victory. But nations are like men in 
 this that however successful one may become 
 personally he never gets to be so great that he 
 can afford to carry a tarnished reputation. 
 
 Let us turn to the Germany of old and see 
 if we cannot observe the process by which she 
 came to her present state of mind. While I 
 realize that it is absolutely necessary for the 
 
136 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 world to crush her attempt to rule Europe, I 
 cannot find it in my heart to hate her. She has 
 risen to such a state of efficiency in social organ- 
 ization and in the capacity to spread the light of 
 civilization that she commands respect from 
 thinking foes. It is the duty of the world to 
 chasten the spirit of arrogance out of her, but to 
 leave her sound and able to deal with the future 
 in that way in which she is so well fitted to play 
 a strong and beneficial part. If ever a great 
 people needed the discipline of disaster to teach 
 them that nations, like men, should do to others 
 as they wish others to do to them, that nation is 
 the Germany of today. To understand in what 
 way this splendid state has run away from its 
 past we shall have to glance at its history in the 
 recent past. 
 
 For a point of departure let us take the Seven 
 Years' War. This struggle was the result of the 
 ambition of young Frederick, a strong and un- 
 ethical king of Prussia. When he came to the 
 throne he found that a parsimonious father had 
 left him a full treasury, an excellent army, and 
 a united kingdom, while fate had sent the neigh- 
 boring state Austria, a young woman for ruler 
 
GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 137 
 
 and an army that was not formidable. It was 
 a favorable opportunity to seize Silesia, which 
 Prussia considered necessary to her welfare, and 
 to which she had the flimsiest pretense of right. 
 The rapacity of Frederick, her king, cannot be 
 justified on moral grounds, and it threw Europe 
 into commotions for which nearly a quarter of 
 a century was needed for settlement. The last 
 phase of this quarter-of-a-century was the Seven 
 Years' War, 1756-1763. By the time it began 
 Frederick of Prussia was looked upon by his 
 neighbors as a menace to Europe; and Austria, 
 France, and Russia united to crush him. He 
 had a friend in Great Britain, who was gen- 
 erally found among the foes of France. In the 
 great war he waged through seven years he 
 fought off foes first on one side and then on the 
 other until the war ended at last with Prussia 
 still unconquered. 
 
 If hard and valiant fighting and solicitude for 
 the welfare of his country could redeem the error 
 of the invasion of Silesia the Seven Years' War 
 would relieve Frederick, whom posterity calls 
 "Frederick the Great," of all odium on account 
 of the thoughtless way in which he began his 
 
138 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 wars. Unlike the present kaiser, he began a 
 long reign rashly and ended it wisely. Admin- 
 istrative reforms and a policy of peace with his 
 neighbors made his last years a period of happi- 
 ness for Prussia. 
 
 But Silesia fixed a firm hold on the Prussian 
 imagination. Long justified as an act necessary 
 to the safety of the Fatherland, and therefore 
 permissible, it has given sanction for the idea 
 that wrong may be done that good shall result, 
 if only the state is to be benefitted. It is a false 
 doctrine, and it can do nothing but lead to wars. 
 Nations are under the same obligations to do 
 right as individuals. 
 
 The next phase of German history which has 
 interest for us in connection with this study is 
 that which lies between the years 1806 and 1813. 
 It was a period of deep humiliation at the hands 
 of Napoleon. The small states were huddled to- 
 gether in a Confederation which was, in fact, a 
 tool of the Emperor of France, and Prussia lay 
 like a trembling and crushed thing in his hand. 
 No living man who hates Germany for the deeds 
 of the present war could wish her a worse fate 
 than Napoleon inflicted on her after the battle 
 
GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 139 
 
 of Jena in 1806. He insulted the king, burdened 
 the people with requisitions, and limited their 
 armies. It was the acme of national shame for 
 the nation that is now so strong. 
 
 The cause of these woes was the lack of organ- 
 ization, and perhaps Napoleon did the nation a 
 service when he beat the Prussians into a realiza- 
 tion of it. No nation is so poor that it has not 
 reformers who see in what way its evils may be 
 corrected. In the days that preceded the calami- 
 ties of which I speak Prussia had her prophets 
 crying to deaf men. Misfortune opened the ears 
 of the rulers so that the prophets might be heard. 
 Reforms were adopted out of which has grown 
 the Germany of today. They all looked toward 
 the unification of national energy, whatever its 
 form; but they are expressed in three notable 
 ways: universal military service, the correction 
 of waste energy in civil life, and the inculcation 
 of the spirit of obedience to authority. On these 
 principles chiefly a new Germany was built. 
 
 We have said a great deal recently about 
 crushing the German military system. Prob- 
 ably we do not know just what we mean in say- 
 ing this. At least, it was not always our habit 
 
140 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 to decry the system. Many a time we have 
 spoken with admiration of the reforms of 
 Scharnhorst, of the glory of Leipzig and of the 
 services of Blucher at Waterloo. If we stop to 
 think we shall see that our real objection is the 
 purpose for which the German military system 
 has been used. And it seems that if it is to be 
 broken into pieces it must be opposed with a 
 stronger system built on a similar plan. 
 
 The next period that expresses Germany's 
 peculiar spirit is the era of Bismarck, 1862 to 
 1890. It was the time of the cult of iron. Bis- 
 marck was the "Iron Chancellor," the nation of- 
 fered its enemies "blood and iron." Iron can- 
 non, iron words, and iron laws became the ideals 
 of the people. Statesmen, historians, poets, edi- 
 tors, professors, and all other patriots began to 
 worship according to the rite of the new cult. 
 And iron entered into the blood of the Germans. 
 
 To carry out Bismarck's policy it was neces- 
 sary to break down a promising liberal movement 
 that seemed on the point of giving Prussia re- 
 sponsible government. It was his faith that a 
 united Germany must hew her way into the posi- 
 tion of great power in Europe, and in order to 
 
GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 141 
 
 have a state that could do this there must be a 
 strong central authority, able to direct all the 
 resources of the state to the desired end. The 
 large number of small nobles had long ago 
 formed the celebrated Junker autocracy, a body 
 with like ideals. He gave their restless energy 
 a more definite political and military object, and 
 made them take places as parts of his great state 
 machine. 
 
 He had his reward. In 1866 he fought a de- 
 cisive war against Prussia's old enemy, Austria, 
 and won it so quickly that even the Prussians 
 were astonished. In 1870-1871 he threw the 
 state against France in a war that left the land 
 of Napoleon as completely at his feet as Prussia 
 had been at the feet of the Corsican. And then 
 in the moment of exultation over the victory he 
 founded the German empire by uniting with 
 Prussia the numerous smaller German states. 
 There is much to support the suggestion that a 
 similar stroke is held in reserve to create a Mittel- 
 Europa of Germany and Austria-Hungary as a 
 final glory of the present war, if Germany shows 
 herself able to carry off the victory. 
 
 Bismarck's ambition for Germany was to hold 
 
142 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 a position of arbiter in Continental affairs. He 
 felt that this was the best way to make his coun- 
 try safe from hostile combinations, and it met 
 his ideal of the dignity to which Germany ought 
 to attain. He achieved his desire in the Three 
 Emperors' League and the Triple Alliance. 
 Predominance in influence was the height of his 
 ambition. The conquest of new lands, and the 
 support of industry and trade by a policy of ter- 
 ritorial expansion, were not within his plans. 
 He was a man of an older generation to whom 
 a predominance among the Great Powers was 
 better than chasing the rainbow of world empire. 
 In 1888 died Wilhelm I, the king whom Bis- 
 marck made Emperor. He was an honest man 
 who loved the simple and sound Germany in 
 which he was reared. At this time the leading 
 men of 1871 were passing from power and a 
 group was coming on the scene who were young 
 men in the intoxicating times of Sedan and Metz. 
 A new emperor came to the throne, possessing 
 great energy and the capacity of forming vast 
 plans. He was eleven years old when the em- 
 pire was proclaimed at Versailles, the age at 
 which ordinary boys begin to wake from the 
 
GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 143 
 
 dreams of childhood. From such dreams Wil- 
 helm II passed to dreams of imperial glory. 
 The idea of bigness of authority that he thus 
 formed has remained with him to this day. Add 
 the effects of an impulsive disposition and an un- 
 usual amount of confidence in himself and you 
 will account for the peculiar gloss spread over a 
 character that is strong and otherwise wholesome. 
 
 Early in his reign he gave ground for alarm 
 by several acts that are hardly to be described 
 in a less severe word than "bumptious." He 
 dismissed Bismarck from the Chancellorship, 
 seemingly for no other reason than that he wished 
 a chancellor who would be more obedient to the 
 imperial will, and he uttered many sentiments 
 which caused sober men to wonder what kind of 
 emperor he was going to be. But as the years 
 passed it was noticed that all his aberrations fell 
 short of disaster, and as he was very energetic 
 and devoted to efficiency in civil and military 
 matters the world came at last to regard him 
 with real esteem. 
 
 When the present war began the kaiser became 
 its leader, as was his duty and privilege. Opin- 
 ion in hostile countries pronounced him the 
 
144 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 agent responsible for its outbreak. Around his 
 striking personality have collected many sto- 
 ries of dark complexion. At this time it is not 
 possible to test their accuracy, but it is safe to 
 say that many of them are chiefly assumption. 
 On the other hand, it is undoubted that he is now 
 a firm friend of the military party, and that he 
 supports the autocracy in its purpose to carry 
 the war to the bitter end. He has been a dili- 
 gent war lord and he has shown a willingness to 
 share the sacrifices of the people. Stories of ap- 
 parent reliability that have come out of Germany 
 in recent months imply that he has steadily 
 gained in popularity during the conflict, while 
 most of the other members of his family have 
 lost. 
 
 If it is important to clear thinking to see the 
 kaiser in an impartial light, it is equally neces- 
 sary to understand the German Kultur. This 
 term is used in Germany to indicate the mass of 
 ideas and habits of thought of a people. It ap- 
 plies to art and industry, to religion and war, to 
 whatever the human mind directs. From the 
 German's standpoint we have a Kultur of our 
 own. We have no corresponding term, nor con- 
 
GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 145 
 
 cept, and we cannot realize all he means in using 
 the term if we do not put ourselves in his place. 
 Now it is true that the German has won great 
 success in intellectual ways. Scholarship, scien- 
 tific invention, the application of art to industry, 
 and well planned efficiency in social organization 
 are his in a large degree. He is proud of his 
 achievements; and when the war began he felt 
 that it was the German mission to give this Kul- 
 tur to other peoples. From his standpoint, a 
 Germanized world would be a world made 
 happy. It was an honest opinion, and it went 
 far to support his desire for expansion. 
 
 The Germans are a docile people with respect 
 to their superiors, and this trait is a condition of 
 their Kultur. It is traditional in Germany for 
 the peasant to obey his lord, the lord to obey his 
 over-lord, and the over-lord to obey his ruler. 
 To the kaiser look all the people in a sense which 
 no citizen of the United States can understand 
 without using a fair amount of imagination. 
 The lords and over-lords constitute the Junkers, 
 who in the modern military system make up the 
 officer class. A high sense of authority runs 
 through the whole population, the upper classes 
 
146 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 knowing how to give orders and the lower classes 
 knowing how to take them. 
 
 Before the battle of Jena, 1806, the Prussian 
 army was made up of peasants forced to serve 
 under the nobles, who took the offices. Towns- 
 men were excluded from the army. The peas- 
 ant's forced service lasted twenty years. The 
 system was as inefficient as it was unequal, and 
 a commission was appointed to reform it. The 
 result was the modern* system of universal serv- 
 ice, put into complete operation in 1813. After 
 a hundred years it is possible to see some of the 
 effects of the system on the ideals of the peopls. 
 It has taught them to work together in their 
 places, formed habits of promptness and clean- 
 liness, and lessened the provincialism of the lower 
 classes. It has been a great training school in 
 nationalism, preserving the love of country and 
 instilling in the minds of the masses a warm de- 
 votion to the military traditions of the nation. 
 
 It has also produced results of a questionable 
 value. By fostering the military spirit it has de- 
 veloped a desire for war, on the same principle 
 that a boy in possession of a sharp hatchet has a 
 strong impulse to hack away at his neighbor's 
 
GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 147 
 
 shrubbery. It is probable that the temptation 
 to use a great and superior army was a vital fact 
 in bringing on the present war. Furthermore, 
 the wide-spread habit of docility leaves a people 
 without self-assertion and enables their rulers to 
 impose upon them. As to the influence of uni- 
 versal service in promoting militarism, that has 
 been frequently mentioned. 
 
 On the other hand, it should be borne in mind 
 that not all states that have had universal mili- 
 tary training have been saddled with these evils. 
 France, for example, has had universal training 
 without becoming obsessed with the passion for 
 war and without the loss of popular individual- 
 ism. It seems well to say that universal training 
 itself does not produce the evils sometimes at- 
 tributed to it. In Germany, at least, it seems 
 that it was the purpose for which the army ex- 
 isted, and not the army itself, that developed 
 militarism and brought other unhappy effects. 
 
 Probably the German army before the war was 
 the most efficient great human machine then in 
 existence. There was less waste in it and less 
 graft than in any other army. Since the army 
 included all the men of the empire at some stage 
 
148 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 or other of their existence, it was a great train- 
 ing school in organization. Its effects on Ger- 
 man history are hardly to be exaggerated. 
 
 I have said that military organization alone 
 was not sufficient to make the modern Germany. 
 It was also necessary to give the nation a definite 
 national purpose, and this was the task of its 
 intellectual leaders. The purpose itself was ex- 
 pressed in the idea of German nationality. By 
 a bold stretch of fancy every part of Europe 
 that had once been ruled by Germans, that 
 spoke the German language, or that could be 
 considered as a part that ought to speak that 
 language was fixed upon as territory to be 
 brought within the authority of the Fatherland. 
 It was in accordance with this principle that 
 Schleswig-Holstein was taken from Denmark 
 in 1864 and Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. Here the 
 march of annexation paused. Bismarck was too 
 wise to carry the theory to an extreme; but a 
 growing number of writers and speakers in the 
 empire took up the idea and kept it before the 
 people with winning persistence. It is thus that 
 Pan-Germanism has come to be one of the great 
 facts in German public opinion. By preaching 
 
GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 149 
 
 race unity with patriotic zeal the intellectual lead- 
 ers have established a powerful propaganda of 
 expansion. 
 
 Of the men most prominently associated with 
 this movement especial attention must be given 
 to Heinrich von Treitschke, for years profes- 
 sor of Modern and Contemporary History at the 
 University of Berlin, whose remarkable influence 
 reached all classes of people. He was a hand- 
 some man with an open face that invited admira- 
 tion without appearing to care whether it was 
 given or not. When he spoke the auditor heard 
 "a raucous, half -strangled, uneasy voice" and 
 noticed that his movements were mechanical and 
 his utterances were without regard to the pauses 
 that usually stand for commas and periods, while 
 his pleasant facial expression had no apparent 
 relation to what he was saying. The explana- 
 tion was that he was so deaf that he did not hear 
 himself speak. That such a speaker could fire 
 the heart of a nation is evidence that he was filled 
 with unusual earnestness and sympathy. 
 
 He had great love of country, and if he exalted 
 royalty and strong government it was because he 
 thought that Germany would reach her highest 
 
150 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 authority through them. It was no selfish or in- 
 competent king that he worshiped, but one that 
 lived righteously and sought diligently to pro- 
 mote the interest of the people. He held that the 
 nobility should serve as thoroughly as the com- 
 mon men. Strong government in his idea did 
 not mean privilege, as ordinarily understood, but 
 vital energy in all the organs of administration, 
 efficiently directed by a will that was not ham- 
 pered by the contrarywise tugging of individual 
 opinions. 
 
 Treitschke's penetrating eloquence was heard 
 throughout the land. Editors, preachers of re- 
 ligion, schoolmasters, authors, members of the 
 legislative assemblies, high officials, and even min- 
 isters of state came to his class-room and went 
 away to carry his ideas into other channels. He 
 inspired the men who did the actual thinking for 
 the nation. All his efforts were expended for 
 what he considered the enhancement of Ger- 
 many's position among nations. 
 
 In giving him his due we must not overlook his 
 faults. He was narrow in his ideas of interna- 
 tional relations. His exaltation of Germany 
 would have left other nations at her mercy. He 
 
GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 151 
 
 seems to have had small respect for the principle 
 of live-and-let-live among states. As much as 
 any one in his country he was responsible for the 
 idea that the British are a pack of hypocrites, of- 
 fering inferior races the Bible with one hand and 
 opium with the other. That they had not a good 
 record with respect to the opium trade is true, 
 but it was sheer narrowness to make it the chief 
 characteristic of a people who have done a great 
 work in behalf of the backward races. 
 
 Although Treitschke wrote many pamphlets 
 on topics of current interest, all bearing upon 
 what he considered the destiny of Germany, he 
 was preeminently a historian. It was by telling 
 the story of Germany since the revival of na- 
 tional feeling after the battle of Jena that he 
 wished to serve best the generation in which he 
 lived. For him it was the historian to whom was 
 committed the task of making the citizen realize 
 what place he had in the nation's complex of 
 duties and hopes. 
 
 He came upon the scene when history had be- 
 come fixed upon the basis of accuracy and de- 
 tached research. Men like Leopold von Ranke 
 had insisted that history should deal with the 
 
152 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 cold exploitation of universal laws. For them 
 Treitschke was a bad historian, and they used 
 their influence to prevent his appointment at the 
 University of Berlin. He was a Chauvinist, un- 
 doubtedly, and his History of Germany in the 
 Nineteenth Century is a highly colored pic- 
 ture of what he conceived the reader should know 
 about the history of his country. It is a work 
 written to arouse the enthusiasm of the people for 
 their country, rather than to instruct them in the 
 universal laws of human development; and it 
 would be a sad day for the world if all history 
 were written as he wrote this. But it was a 
 powerful appeal to national pride and energy. 
 It played a great part in the formation of the 
 Germany with which we are concerned in this 
 chapter, the striving, self-confident, and aspiring 
 empire that set for itself the task of dominating 
 the European continent. 
 
 This chapter is not written to reconcile Amer- 
 ican readers to the German side of the contro- 
 versy that now engages the attention of all men. 
 I wish to enable the reader to have a clear view 
 of the people with whom we fight. It is they 
 with whom we must deal in building up the sys- 
 
GERMAN IDEALS AND ORGANIZATION 153 
 
 tern out of which the future is to be constructed 
 again; and we shall not know how to deal with 
 them if we do not see their point of view and 
 know what they are thinking about. 
 
 If in some of their ideals they are superior to 
 other peoples, and if their organization of indi- 
 viduals into the state has some elements of 
 strength not found in other systems, it is not for 
 us to seek to destroy the advantage they have 
 won. It would be better for us to adopt their 
 good points, in order that we might the more 
 surely defeat them on the field of battle. Hav- 
 ing won the victory we desire, we should cer- 
 tainly not seek to destroy that which we cannot 
 replace. Live and let live, a principle which 
 Germans have ignored in some important re^ 
 spects, must be recognized after the military am- 
 bition of Germany is broken, if we are to have 
 an enduring peace. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE FAILURE OF THE OLD EUROPEAN SYSTEM 
 
 Much has been written to prove that one side 
 or the other was responsible for the present war. 
 Minute facts, as the words in a dispatch, or the 
 time at which the troops were mobilized, or 
 whether or not a preliminary summons of troops 
 to the colors was in itself an act of mobilization, 
 have become the subjects of bitter debate. Such 
 questions will have to be settled by the historians 
 of the future years: they cannot be discussed 
 here with any profit, since this book is an appeal 
 to the reason of men on each side of the con- 
 troversy. 
 
 Back of the events of July, 1914, is a more 
 fundamental cause of the war. It is the break- 
 down of the systems of concert and balance to 
 which the powers had trusted themselves. Cas- 
 tlereagh and Metternich allowed themselves to 
 slip into these theories, when they set aside the 
 suggestion of a federated Europe, which came 
 
 154 
 
FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 155 
 
 from Alexander I. Granted that the tsar's 
 dream was too ethereal for a world steeped in sel- 
 fishness, it does not follow that a policy entirely 
 devoted to the balancing of selfishness with self- 
 ishness would have preserved peace. 
 
 On the other hand, we must admit that nations 
 are not idealists. Selfishness is their doctrine. 
 So long as the project of a federation is viewed 
 idealistically it is practically impossible. But if 
 it ever comes to be admitted by the people who 
 count in political things that it is for the interests 
 of the nations to adopt it, that is, if it is brought 
 within what we may call the sphere of selfishness, 
 it ceases to be idealistic and comes to be a subject 
 worthy of the consideration of the practical 
 statesman. 
 
 Furthermore, the political philosopher has 
 ever to answer the question, "What about the 
 future?" What are we going to do after the 
 present debauch of waste and murder is over? 
 Are we to trust the world to the same old forces 
 that brought us this ruin? One says that human 
 nature is the same forever, that it learns only in 
 the hard school of experience, and that it must 
 fight its wars as the price it pays for being human 
 
156 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 nature. To such a man the Napoleonic wars 
 did all that could be expected of them when they 
 so impressed the world with the cost of war that 
 a system was adopted which gave the world a 
 measure of peace for a hundred years. "What 
 more can you ask?" said such a philosopher to me. 
 In humble responsibility to the throne of reason I 
 reply that we can try as intelligent beings to re- 
 move the war madness permanently, making it 
 our duty to posterity to do the best we can. 
 Some generation must make the start, or we shall 
 wring our hands forever. 
 
 In this chapter I wish to show in what way the 
 old system crumbled before the desire of world 
 power. It seems a vicious system by virtue of 
 its innate qualities of selfishness, and it is all 
 the more to be feared because its subtle spirit 
 gets control of our own hearts as well as the 
 hearts of other men. While our opponents — 
 Germany and Austria — were following the sys- 
 tem to its bitter conclusion, our friends — Great 
 Britain, France, and Italy — were doing nearly 
 the same things, but in a slightly different way. 
 And there is no reason to expect that under the 
 continuation of the balancing of great and am- 
 
FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 157 
 
 bitious world powers we shall have more respect 
 for the rights of one another than we had in the 
 past. 
 
 The system of Balance of Power flourished best 
 in Bismarck's time. It was his strong personal- 
 ity that held together the Three Emperors' 
 League for a brief season and the Triple Alli- 
 ance for a longer period. Each of these groups 
 had certain interests in common which gave them 
 coherence : Bismarck alone knew how to exploit 
 these mutual advantages and lessen the jars of 
 clashing feelings. His objects were made easier 
 by the fact that most of the other nations of 
 Europe at that time had developed quarrels of 
 their own. Great Britain and Russia were at 
 swords' points over the Far Eastern question, and 
 France and Great Britain had not forgotten their 
 century old antagonism, which only a minor dis- 
 pute was sufficient to set aflame. 
 
 Moreover, Great Britain was engaged in a vast 
 task of empire building. Manufactures in- 
 creased rapidly in the United Kingdom, an ever 
 growing trade threw out ever expanding tentacles 
 to the remotest parts of the world, and the 
 growth of the colonies produced greater pros- 
 
158 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 perity at home and abroad than the most hope- 
 ful Briton had previously thought within the 
 bounds of probability. She was too busy with 
 this splendid process of internal prosperity to 
 take notice of what was happening on the Conti- 
 nent, so long as her own interests were not threat- 
 ened. From her standpoint Bismarck's policy of 
 preserving peace through the means of a Ger- 
 man predominating influence was a welcome re- 
 lief from other burdens. 
 
 This state of affairs was prolonged for at least 
 fifteen years after the death of Bismarck. 
 Kaiser Wilhelm II 's temperamental impetuous- 
 ness did not break up the balance that had been 
 established, although many prophets had foretold 
 such a thing. As the corner-stone of the Triple 
 Alliance Germany was looked upon as the pro- 
 tector of European peace, and the kaiser, it is 
 said, was pleased to regard himself as the man 
 especially responsible for that policy. 
 
 It is difficult to say when and how this happy 
 situation began to be undermined and whose was 
 the responsibility. One cause of the rupture was 
 the rapid growth of German manufactures and 
 trade, which brought about stern competition be- 
 
FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 159 
 
 tween the business interests of Germany and 
 Great Britain. The newspapers of the two na- 
 tions, like all other newspapers of modern times, 
 were closely connected with the capitalistic in- 
 terests of the respective states, and voiced the 
 alarm and antipathy of the industrial classes. 
 Thus the people of Germany and the people of 
 Britain were stimulated to a condition of mutual 
 distrust. They believed that each practiced the 
 most disreputable tricks of competition against 
 the other, and each talked of destroying the in- 
 dustry of the other. It is difficult to say who is 
 responsible for the beginning of commercial 
 rivalry. 
 
 Late in the last century Germany began to en- 
 large her navy with the evident purpose of mak- 
 ing it rival the navy of Great Britain. Her 
 justification was found* in the idea that a navy 
 was necessary to protect the great commerce that 
 she was building up. At the same time German 
 writers began to make many criticisms on the 
 British claim of being mistress of the seas. 
 "Freedom of the seas" became a phrase of com- 
 fort in their mouths. It is not clear that it meant 
 what it seemed to say ; for the seas were as free to 
 
160 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 the Germans in times of peace as to any other 
 people, and Germany's plan to build a great 
 fleet that would defeat the British fleet would 
 establish that same kind of rule at sea that Great 
 Britain through her naval superiority then held. 
 
 Now it is very certain that Germany had a per- 
 fect right to enter each of these two fields of 
 endeavor. The contests of industry are open 
 to all, and the laws of peace protect them. She 
 had the right, also, to build up her navy, al- 
 though she should not have expected to overtop 
 the British navy specifically without arousing the 
 hostility of the British people. The insular posi- 
 tion of the United Kingdom and its relations with 
 its colonies are such that a navy is its surest pro- 
 tection if assailed in war ; and to fall into a second 
 position is to hold its life at the permission of 
 another state. Germany must have seen this 
 phase of the situation. Her statesmen were poor 
 leaders of men if they did not realize that they 
 were entering upon a rivalry in which was the pos- 
 sibility of great resistance. 
 
 Another phase of the opposition that was 
 steadily rising against Germany was the general 
 alarm at the growth of her military power. Her 
 
FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 161 
 
 army and navy ever increased in size and readi- 
 ness for that initial rush to victory which is half 
 the struggle in modern war. At the same time 
 German leaders did not disguise their desire for 
 the enlargement of German territory on the Con- 
 tinent. The Pan-German party made a great 
 deal of noise, and other nations were not re- 
 assured by being told that the party was not as 
 strong as its agitation seemed to indicate. 
 
 Now and again one read in some German paper 
 an assertion to the effect that Germany was 
 bound to become the dominant power in Europe 
 and that she would next turn on the United 
 States. How many Americans have not heard 
 some over-confident German friend make a 
 prophecy of like import? It was evident that 
 many Germans regarded the great republic of the 
 West as an over-fattened commercial nation with- 
 out the power of resistance and destined at the 
 proper time to furnish rich nourishment for their 
 conquering arms. That we considered these 
 thoughts but the idle boasts of a nation intoxi- 
 cated by success did not lessen the conviction of 
 ourselves and others that Germany was running 
 into a state of mind that required cooperative 
 
162 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 measures of resistance on the part of people who 
 might become victims of her infatuation. 
 
 While these two processes of national feeling 
 ran their courses, several political events, which 
 have already been described added vigor to the 
 antagonism that was rising against Germany. 
 Her attitude toward the Boers when they were 
 at war against Great Britain was one, Delcasse's 
 wise adjustment of the Fashoda incident was 
 another, his clever formation of the Entente Cor- 
 diale between France and Britain was another, 
 the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance 
 was still another, the defeat of Russia by Japan 
 and her elimination as a threat against British 
 interests in India was another, and the formation 
 of the Triple Entente by Great Britain, France, 
 and Russia, announced in 1907, was the final act 
 of the series. Great Britain was not only again 
 seriously concerned in Continental affairs, but a 
 combination had been formed of three great 
 European nations, with the strongest power of 
 the East as a flying buttress, to hold back the 
 much dreaded aggressions of the Triple Alliance, 
 consisting of Germany, Austria, and Italy. The 
 Balance of Power had come to its most logical 
 
FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 163 
 
 state of development; for instead of having one 
 great state balancing between the other states 
 around it, we now had the great states of the 
 world ranged in two camps, each side checking 
 the other in the belief that in so doing it was pre- 
 serving the world from war. 
 
 It is hard to establish a balance when two 
 opposing sides are strong and mutually jealous 
 of one another; for the opposition of forces is 
 then formed to secure mutual advantages, and 
 not to promote the common interest through the 
 preservation of equilibrium. In such a case one 
 side or the other, possibly each side, is apt to 
 fancy itself the stronger, and if it acts on that 
 assumption it arouses the apprehension of the 
 other which finds itself tempted to make a coun- 
 ter stroke. Once such a step is taken equilibrium 
 is lost. This is what happened in 1914. The 
 train of events that led up to the destruction of 
 the international balance is now to be described. 
 
 Here we must go back to the days when Del- 
 casse was foreign secretary in Paris, 1898-1905. 
 One of his achievements was to come to agree- 
 ment with Spain and Italy in reference to the 
 northern coast of Africa. He effected a treaty 
 
164* THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 with the former nation by which French and 
 Spanish spheres of influence in Morocco were 
 defined, and another with Italy by which the right 
 of France in Tunis was accorded in exchange for 
 recognition of the right of Italy to Tripoli and 
 Cyrenaica. 
 
 Making this treaty by Italy did not constitute 
 treason to the Triple Alliance, since it was clearly 
 advantageous for Italy without infringing the 
 rights of either Germany or Austria; but it 
 alarmed Germany, already drawing close to Tur- 
 key, because the object of Italian policy was to 
 get territory over which Turkey had a vital 
 claim. Nor was it pleasant for the kaiser to see 
 one of the members of the Triple Alliance acting 
 in cooperation with the members of the Entente 
 in so important a matter. 
 
 Taking these achievements in connection with 
 the formation of the Dual Alliance and the mu- 
 tual approach of France and Great Britain, Ger- 
 many had reason to feel that she was being iso- 
 lated. Her whole population resented this turn 
 of events, seeing in it a sort of challenge hurled 
 forth by France, who at last found herself strong 
 enough to assume a position of self-assertion. It 
 
FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 165 
 
 is true that Delcasse only placed Germany in 
 a position of isolation like that which Bismarck 
 imposed on France for many years ; and it was, in 
 strict logic, as fair for him to treat Germany 
 thus as for Bismarck to isolate France. Let 
 Germany submit to her fate, as France sub- 
 mitted, when she had to submit. But we are not 
 dealing with logical matters here. It is a plain 
 fact that confronts us. Germany, who had 
 been strong through three decades without seek- 
 ing to expand her territory, suddenly realized that 
 her opponents were forming a combination 
 stronger than hers, their acquisition of territory 
 that followed set her in a rage, and she made 
 plans for getting her share in the world that was 
 to be taken. Under the system of balance then 
 recognized as the proper means of regulating 
 international relations her course was a natural 
 result of Delcasse's policy. 
 
 The particular portion of the earth to which 
 she turned her eyes was Turkey. While she sup- 
 ported the plans of Austria-Hungary to acquire 
 territory on the Adriatic, she herself looked 
 further to the East. She encouraged the party 
 at Constantinople known as the "Young Turks," 
 
166 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 she furnished improved arms to the Turkish 
 army, she formed plans to establish her influence 
 in Palestine, and she projected a great railroad to 
 Bagdad in the center of the Euphrates-Tigris 
 Valley. It was a sphere of influence that might 
 be considered more than a fair offset for the lands 
 her rivals were about to gain. 
 
 At the same time Germany found a means of 
 restoring her prestige, which was sorely wilted by 
 the progress of her rivals. The occasion arose in 
 connection with France's occupation of Morocco, 
 which had begun without the aid or consent of the 
 kaiser. 
 
 Morocco had long been under a line of inde- 
 pendent sultans. Most of her commerce was 
 with Great Britain although German capitalists 
 had received concessions within her border. As 
 the country next to the French province of Al- 
 geria, France looked upon it as her own particu- 
 lar sphere of influence. We have already seen 
 that Italy conceded this claim, 1901, while France 
 conceded Italy's claim to Tripoli and Cyrenaica. 
 In 1904 France conceded Great Britain's prac- 
 tical supremacy in Egypt and in return was as- 
 sured the protectorate over Morocco. She asked 
 
FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 167 
 
 no concession from Germany but came to an 
 agreement with Spain, who had a small strip of 
 territory south of the Straits of Gibraltar. 
 
 In 1905 Delcasse was quietly preparing to 
 carry out his plan for the development of Mo- 
 rocco, when the kaiser landed in Tangiers without 
 the slightest warning, and announced in a public 
 address that he had come to visit his friend, the 
 independent sultan of Morocco, in whose country 
 all foreign nations had equal rights. The speech 
 was received by the world as a challenge to 
 France and a means of announcing that Ger- 
 many was no longer to be ignored. The moment 
 of the landing at Tangiers was well chosen by the 
 kaiser; for only three weeks earlier Russia, the 
 ally of France, had been defeated by the Japan- 
 ese at Mukden and could give her no assist- 
 ance. 
 
 In this unfortunate situation it was necessary 
 for France to bend before the storm. She agreed 
 to submit the whole Moroccan question to an in- 
 ternational congress, thus appealing to the prin- 
 ciple of the Concert of Europe, and when she 
 learned that the kaiser demanded that she dis- 
 miss the minister whose hands had been played 
 
168 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 so skillfully against Germany, she agreed to that 
 also. 
 
 The dismissal of Delcasse recalls an incident of 
 1807. In that year Napoleon forced the king of 
 Prussia to dismiss Stein, his great minister, who 
 was bending all his efforts to reestablish Prussia 
 on a war footing. It marked the triumph of 
 Napoleon's power for the time being, but it 
 was a futile action; for Stein out of office under 
 such circumstances had more influence than ever, 
 and the shameful way in which he was treated 
 only emphasized Prussia's humiliation and made 
 the Prussians more determined than ever to as- 
 sert their national power. Similar results in 
 France in 1905 followed the stab given to that 
 nation's faithful and efficient minister. 
 
 The international congress assembled at Al- 
 geciras in 1906. It adopted a compromise de- 
 cision, which gave something to each side and sat- 
 isfied neither. Germany was supposed to have 
 gained when the congress recognized the terri- 
 torial integrity of Morocco under the sovereignty 
 of the sultan and guaranteed equal rights of trade 
 in the country to the citizens of all the signa- 
 tory powers. On the other hand, France and 
 
FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 169 
 
 Spain were jointly to have the right to instruct 
 and furnish officers for the Moroccan police force. 
 Winning in a quarrel rarely makes the victor 
 think well of the vanquished. Certainly Ger- 
 many, who had now blocked the plans of France, 
 was not less bitter in her attitude toward that 
 nation; while France, feeling that she had been 
 caught at a disadvantage, smothered her indigna- 
 tion and waited for the opportunity to make 
 things even. 
 
 In 1907 disturbances occurred in Moroccan 
 ports and French marines were landed to pre- 
 serve order. When they were not withdrawn in 
 a year Germany protested and an irritating 
 diplomatic discussion followed. At last Ger- 
 many was persuaded to submit the point actually 
 at issue to the Hague tribunal, whose decision 
 was not conclusive and satisfied neither side. 
 Then a Franco- German convention was held to 
 pass on the rights of each nation in Morocco. 
 Its decision, given in February, 1909, announced 
 that the interest of Germany in the province was 
 only economic; and as France agreed to give 
 equal protection in such matters, the kaiser 
 promised he would not interfere in the country. 
 
170 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 In each of these incidents war seemed about to 
 begin, and Europe awaited the results in great 
 anxiety. When the clouds lifted the nations 
 breathed freely again. 
 
 Still there was no way under the existing sys- 
 tem to solve the difficulty that presented itself, 
 had Germany only decided that she would not 
 trust her cause to peaceful negotiation. The 
 fact that she took such a step was to her own 
 people but a mark of the kaiser's love of peace. 
 This and similar incidents, in which the militarists 
 carried their country to the verge of war only 
 to be held back by the hand of the emperor served 
 to lay the foundation for that popular belief 
 in Germany that a peace policy had been steadily 
 followed under provocations and that Europe 
 was indebted to Wilhelm II for immunity from 
 war. In reality the system of balance of power 
 had needlessly brought the world to the verge of 
 a bitter and unnecessary conflict. 
 
 Almost immediately after the war clouds lifted 
 Europe had evidence of the small amount of 
 tolerance the leading classes of Germany had for 
 the slightest manifestation of the spirit of com- 
 promise in the matter under discussion. The 
 
FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 171 
 
 chancellor under whom the recent settlement was 
 made was von Billow, who thought it better to 
 adjust so small a quarrel than to incur the re- 
 sponsibility of war. His action received the 
 stern denunciation of the military party. So 
 strong was the criticism that he was forced to 
 retire from office, his place going to Bethmann- 
 Hollweg, who had the support of the militarists. 
 The only explanation to be advanced for this 
 turn of the affair is that the German national 
 spirit was so much excited by the long agitation 
 of men like Treitschke that a concession which 
 others might consider only trifling seemed to 
 them a sacrifice of national honor. 
 
 In 1911 occurred a third Moroccan incident, in 
 which Bethmann-Hollweg took occasion to re- 
 cover some of the attitude of assertiveness that 
 von Biilow had given up in 1909. In pursuance 
 of their plan to extend their protectorate over 
 Morocco the French occupied Fez with a military 
 force. A short time later the German warship 
 Panther entered the Moroccan port of Agadir, 
 ostensibly to protect German property. It was 
 soon known that the German government pro- 
 posed to hold the Panther at Agadir until the 
 
172 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 French withdrew from Fez. The war spirit 
 again flared up. Russia still suffered from the 
 wounds received from the hands of the Japanese, 
 which Germany well knew; but Great Britain 
 was in fighting condition and announced her sup- 
 port of France. After a short discussion Ger- 
 many took a more complaisant attitude, and a 
 settlement was made whereby the French were 
 allowed a protectorate over Morocco on condi- 
 tion that they guarantee an "open door" in Mo- 
 roccan trade and transfer to Germany two valu- 
 able strips of territory in the French Congo re- 
 gion. 
 
 Again Europe breathed easily, and again wise 
 men reflected that no real settlement had been 
 made. France had been bluffed out of a valu- 
 able portion of her Congo colony and was not 
 disposed to endure the affront longer than was 
 necessary. Some day Russia would be fully re- 
 stored to her strength and ready to help her ally 
 in the face of German aggression. Until then 
 France would have to yield. Meanwhile she 
 was consoled by the reflection that Great Britain 
 had pronounced for her openly. That was some- 
 thing to take to heart. The great sea power, 
 
FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 173 
 
 though slow to anger, was at last conscious of her 
 danger if Germany overran France and seized a 
 channel port. 
 
 On the other hand, Germany was not fully 
 pleased at the outcome of the affair. The ap- 
 pearance of Great Britain in it was an indication 
 that the Entente was a thing of vitality. Ger- 
 many had been forced to moderate her demands, 
 taking colonial territory while her whole thought 
 for the future was not developing African colon- 
 ies but curbing the power of France. Not only 
 was France not checked, but she was much 
 strengthened in a vital part of her power. She 
 had acquired lands in just the region that she 
 needed them to carry out her ambition to control 
 the western end of the Mediterranean. If some 
 day Spain were to become a republic, could she 
 fail to establish cordial relations with the republic 
 of France, and thus be swept into the anti-Ger- 
 man group? It may well be that in these reflec- 
 tions were born two German impulses: first to 
 win Great Britain to some kind of a compromise 
 with Germany, detaching her, at least for a time, 
 from the Entente; and second, to strike a vital 
 blow before Russia was entirely recovered. 
 
174 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 Within the next three years she acted on each 
 of these impulses. 
 
 At the same time it became evident that the 
 Triple Alliance was crumbling, and this was an- 
 other source of anxiety to Germany. It meant 
 that she should hasten her steps if she was to carry 
 forward her great purpose. It was in Septem- 
 ber, 1911, while the Agadir incident was still 
 unsettled, that Italy began the war with Turkey 
 to establish control of Tripoli and Cyrenaica. In 
 view of Germany's well-known friendliness with 
 Turkey, this step was most unexpected. It 
 could only mean that Italy was not disposed to 
 subordinate her own interests to those of Ger- 
 many at Constantinople. If she had not felt cer- 
 tain of support by the Entente powers, in case 
 Germany turned on her, she would hardly have 
 ventured to begin the war. 
 
 Another advance made by Entente powers 
 within the period under consideration was in 
 Persia. This ancient state was in sad disorder. 
 Weak and unpatriotic shahs, bold bands of 
 brigands, and foreign intrigues plunged it into 
 such a condition that it invited the domination of 
 foreign nations. Russia approached from the 
 
FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 175 
 
 north, and Great Britain appeared in the south, 
 where rich oil fields had caught her eye. 
 
 After some initial gains the two powers 
 came to an agreement in 1907 by which they 
 established their respective spheres of influence, 
 so that Persia was occupied at the two ends, 
 north and south, by strong powers, and the mid- 
 dle portion was in such a chaotic state that its 
 future seemed very doubtful. By making loans 
 to the shah and furnishing capital for public im- 
 provements British and Russian capitalists en- 
 abled their respective countries to tighten their 
 grips on Persia. Soon that country was in the 
 throes of revolution, a so-called Nationalist party 
 came into power which was not able to rule with- 
 out the aid of Russia and Great Britain. So far 
 did the foreign influence go that Morgan W. 
 Shuster, an American financial adviser of the 
 shah who had tried hard to place the government 
 on a satisfactory basis, was fain to withdraw from 
 Persia in despair. To the rest of the world it 
 seemed that the independence of the country was 
 near its end. 
 
 A mere glance will show us what these de- 
 velopments meant for Germany and Austria- 
 
176 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 Hungary. Remembering that Italy was acting 
 with the Entente in her African policy, we 
 see that the entire southern shore of the Medi- 
 terranean was passing into hands adverse to the 
 central powers, and that the new combination 
 stretched out a long arm to the Persian Gulf and 
 the region south of the Caspian. In view of 
 Germany's hope that she would some day gain 
 through Syria a railway route to the Far East, 
 the trend of things in Persia threatened to close 
 the narrow gap that was left her for such a route 
 by completing the absorption of the kingdom of 
 the shah. Should she allow the gap to be 
 stopped, or should she strike while there was still 
 time? And if she did not strike, what was there 
 in the system of the Balance of Power that could 
 be counted on as a guarantee that she was not a 
 passive victim to the play of politics in the system 
 then in use ? 
 
 Furthermore, it was evident that Germany's 
 prestige was being undermined by the progres- 
 sive steps of her rivals. Three times had she 
 rattled the saber over the Moroccan incidents, 
 and each time with decreasing terror in the minds 
 of her opponents. Perhaps its rattling had been 
 
FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 177 
 
 one of the main facts in promoting the union of 
 those opponents, since it always brought before 
 them the picture of Germany embattled against 
 the rest of Europe. To strike a blow that would 
 teach France and Russia a lesson would restore 
 German prestige and bring the balance back to 
 the German side of the rivalry, if it did not do 
 more. 
 
 There is good ground for the guess that it was 
 expected in high quarters in Berlin that the blow 
 would do far more than restore prestige. It is 
 true that the plan to which I am about to refer 
 has not been openly accepted by responsible 
 agents of state, but it was widely advocated by 
 a portion of the people, the Pan-Germans. It 
 involved the union of Austria-Hungary and Ger- 
 many in a great state, Mittel-Europa, with strong 
 influence in the Near East. Treitschke and 
 many others had written and spoken for such a 
 thing, and to a large number of Germans it had 
 become a sacred ideal. When some one spoke to 
 the deaf Colussus about the acquisition of ter- 
 ritory in Africa he exclaimed: " Cameroons? 
 What are we to do with this sand-box? Let us 
 take Holland; then we shall have colonies." It 
 
178 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 was a part of the dream of the Pan-Germans 
 that the proposed Mittel-Europa should extend 
 from the Baltic to the Black Sea. If such a thing 
 could be carried through, how excellent a trump 
 card to play against the Entente plotters ! 
 
 Francis Joseph, of Austria-Hungary, was too 
 stout a patriot to hand his country over to the 
 schemes of the Pan-Germans, but he was ap- 
 proaching an already long deferred demise. 
 The heir-apparent, Ferdinand, was supposed to 
 be a great admirer of the kaiser, and the advo- 
 cates of union had high hopes that he would pro- 
 mote their desires. Suddenly came the crime of 
 Sarajevo. In a peculiar manner it dashed the 
 hopes of the dreamers ; for not only was their chief 
 reliance taken away, but the new heir-apparent 
 was supposed to be a pacific man who would 
 favor constitutional government. Such a ruler 
 would hardly support the formation of a great 
 empire built after the fashion of Prussian autoc- 
 racy. It was the inspiration of the moment to 
 have the war come, and demonstrate the glory of 
 Germanjr and Austria-Hungary, while the old 
 emperor still lived. And if it was precipitated 
 in the interest of Austria-Hungary, that was all 
 
FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 179 
 
 the greater reason that the people of the dual 
 empire should feel under obligation to the mili- 
 tary power that carried it through. Possibly 
 they would be so much impressed that they would 
 sweep a youthful emperor on with them in the 
 realization of a great united empire. 
 
 It is not certain how far the Pan-German party 
 controlled the policy of government in July, 
 1914; but it does not seem too much to attribute 
 such plans to men who did not hesitate to dream 
 of the annexation of Holland and who had defi- 
 nitely planned for the acquisition of Constanti- 
 nople. The imagination of a German patriot is 
 no mean thing in ordinary situations ; but a great 
 sweep would be vouchsafed to it when its pos- 
 sessor realized that his country was being out- 
 played by the diplomats and the grim Captain of 
 Death. It was an extraordinary situation that 
 the Germans confronted in July, 1914, and there 
 was not much time for deliberation. 
 
 This chapter is not written to show that Ger- 
 many was, or was not, responsible for the war. 
 If it explains how it was that the German people 
 believed that the war was forced on them, it will 
 accomplish more than it was designed to accom- 
 
180 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 plish. But it is intended to enable persons to 
 keep calm heads in these times of perplexity in 
 order to understand how each side approached 
 the great conflict. It is evident that the Entente 
 powers thought that Germany wished to change 
 Europe into a great empire with herself at the 
 head, while the central powers felt that the chains 
 were being riveted around about them. 
 
 In view of this long train of events the last 
 week in that fateful July assumes small propor- 
 tions. If Ferdinand had not been killed war 
 would still have hung over the horizon. If Ser- 
 bia had accepted the Austrian ultimatum war 
 would still have threatened; for though it may 
 have been averted for the moment, the Triple 
 Entente would still have existed, nor would it 
 have brooked the increase of German prestige 
 that the backdown of Serbia would have implied. 
 If Russia had not mobilized her army, Germany 
 may not have mobilized, but the ancient fear of 
 Russia as an overwhelming opponent when 
 she was once organized in the modern way 
 would have remained as a threat of dire conse- 
 quences. 
 
 The theory of the Balance of Power is built 
 
FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 181 
 
 upon the idea that states act for their own in- 
 terests in the restraint of one another from over- 
 weening ambition. At bottom it is selfish. It 
 assumes a state of rivalry; and it is necessary to 
 the theory that as fast as one side gains in 
 strength the other shall gain also. If the En- 
 tente nations acquire Morocco, Tripoli, Cyre- 
 naica, and parts of Persia, the central powers 
 must gain also or they are over-balanced. And 
 who is to determine how much they shall gain? 
 Manifestly each will strive to get all it can. The 
 very process of gaining stimulates antipathy and 
 makes war a probability. 
 
 Another observation that is worthy of consider- 
 ation is that balance is logically possible only 
 when more than two sides are opposed to one 
 another. When Great Britain, France and 
 Russia had varying purposes it was not difficult 
 for Bismarck to play one against the other and 
 so keep the equilibrium. But when it happened 
 that the central powers became so strong that 
 they constituted a threat against every other na- 
 tion in the world, it was natural for the other 
 nations to unite to check them. In such a con- 
 dition no true balance of power could exist, and 
 
182 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 it was folly to expect that theory to serve as it 
 served in former days. 
 
 One of the things the world ought to learn 
 from the war that now afflicts it is that no nation 
 can conquer the world by stealth. It is one of 
 the happy shortcomings of political selfishness 
 that its agents usually fancy they can cover their 
 tracks. How often do we see a bad politician 
 doing something wrong in the false confidence 
 that while he knows what he is doing the people 
 cannot see it! So with Germany in the years 
 before the war. Making her plans for large 
 accretions of power, she thought she could steal 
 a march on other nations and gain in a spurt a 
 position from which at a later time she could ex- 
 tend her power by other and still larger sweeps 
 of conquest. She did not think that the other 
 nations would take part until it was too late. 
 
 But the rest of the world was as wide awake 
 as she. No man in England accustomed to view 
 political things in the large failed to see the in- 
 stant the war began that the hour of crisis for 
 his country was at hand. If Great Britain had 
 not fought in August, 1914, she would have been 
 the stupidest nation in the world. To have al- 
 
FAILURE OF THE OLD SYSTEM 183 
 
 lowed her greatest rival to sit down in the French 
 channel ports would have been suicidal for her. 
 The only probable explanation of Germany's fail- 
 ure to realize this is that she had become so con- 
 fident of the superiority of her own mind that 
 she thought all other minds were sodden. 
 
 In a similar way, when she had carried on the 
 war for two years and a half and resorted to 
 the submarine in ruthless attacks on American 
 ships of commerce, she should have known that 
 she was giving the United States a reason for 
 participating in the war at a time when it was 
 clear to most Americans that their national safety 
 demanded that they should take part. If by this 
 kind of battle the Germans forced Europe to 
 bend to her, what could we expect in the future? 
 The very imminence of German success de- 
 manded that the United States should throw her- 
 self into the struggle. And after the war is 
 over this truth will be written indelibly in the 
 pages of history: No great nation can be al- 
 lowed to conquer the world piecemeal. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL 
 
 The German people say the submarines will 
 not fail. They seem to think that what they call 
 the highest achievement of the scientific mind of 
 Germany cannot fail. There is little doubt 
 that they pin on this arm of the service their 
 last hope of securing a decision in actual war- 
 fare. If it fails them they can look forward 
 only to a long course of sheer dogged resistance, 
 hoping they can last longer than their adver- 
 saries. Let us consider the probable results re- 
 spectively of the success and the failure of the 
 submarine campaign. 
 
 If the under-sea boats do all the Germans 
 expect of them the result is soon told. Great 
 Britain will be forced to make lame and in- 
 efficient war, France will be unable to do more 
 than hold on to the line that she occupies, and 
 the United States, unable to send her vast army 
 across the seas in large numbers, will not be able 
 to repair the loss of strength that her allies sus- 
 
 184 
 
IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL 185 
 
 tain. Under such circumstances Russia, even if 
 she should recover from her present state of 
 weakness, could hardly deliver the blows that 
 would bring Germany to reason. 
 
 Under such conditions the war would end with- 
 out the defeat of the Teutons, and Mittel-Europa 
 would still be impending. If the enthusiasm 
 of victory would stimulate such a union, the re- 
 alization that Germany and Austria-Hungary 
 were pressed back to the wall and must fight for 
 their future existence might equally bring them 
 to unite their fortunes. In fact, if these two 
 states wish to unite it is hard to see how they are 
 to be prevented, unless at the end of the war they 
 are so much weaker than their opponents that 
 they can be forbidden to take such a step, with 
 assurance that the prohibition will be respected. 
 
 To form such a union would be, in fact, to 
 snatch victory out of sore distress ; for the united 
 empires, even though Serbia, Bulgaria, and Tur- 
 key were left out of account, would have a popu- 
 lation of 116,000,000, which is more than the 
 population of the United States and smaller only 
 than that of Russia and China. Ten years' 
 breathing space in which to reorganize the indus- 
 
186 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 trial and social life of. so large a body of men 
 would work wonders with them; and when re- 
 organized and fired by a common ambition they 
 would be able to dictate terms to any two of the 
 nations of Western Europe. It is the probable 
 union of these states rather than the power of 
 either when acting alone, that makes it necessary 
 for the rest of the world to procure their defeat. 
 In two ways the union can be prevented. One 
 is to inflict such a defeat on the central allies 
 that they will not dare run the risk of another 
 war through endeavoring to combine. Possibly 
 such a defeat could be inflicted by fighting long 
 and winning great victories. It would have to 
 be a greater victory than was won by Prussia 
 over France in 1871 ; for after that victory 
 France, fired with hatred for all that was Ger- 
 man, was so much feared by her conquerors that 
 it became a chief object of their diplomacy to 
 keep her isolated by drawing possible allies over 
 to the German interest. The great military 
 strength of Germany at present hardly warrants 
 the hope that she can be brought to a lower 
 state than France at the end of the siege of 
 Paris. 
 
IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL 187 
 
 The other method is to bring about such a 
 situation that union shall not be desired in the 
 Teutonic states. For it is not to be disputed 
 that if ever a strong and competent group of 
 states wish to become an empire, nothing short of 
 a great war by other states can stop them. 
 It behooves us, therefore, to make our appeal to 
 the reasons of the Germans, Austrians and Hun- 
 garians. It is not necessary to limit our argu- 
 ments to words merely; it is, however, essential 
 that the Teutonic mind shall understand what 
 to threaten the equilibrium of nations means. 
 To show that such a preponderance cannot be 
 established practically would be an effective 
 warning to those leaders who set up to preach 
 Germanic militarism in the future. 
 
 As this chapter is being printed, it seems that 
 the submarines are not a success. They have 
 taken a great toll but not all the grist. Enough 
 ships are left on the sea to carry the minimum of 
 food and war material that our allies must 
 have to maintain their grip on Germany. The 
 war of the central powers does not force their 
 enemies to their knees, and it seems that the best 
 the kaiser can hope for is to hold out for a time 
 
188 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 with the expectation that victory will be snatched 
 by accident out of the gloom that hangs over his 
 cause. 
 
 When the war began it was essentially a con- 
 test between two groups of powers, each of which 
 had been pursuing policies of aggrandizement. 
 One group had progressively acquired territory 
 in Africa and Asia, and the other had a plan 
 equally definite for acquiring territory in South- 
 eastern Europe and the Near East. If the war 
 had been fought out as begun it would probably 
 have led to the realization of one or the other of 
 these desires. Either the Entente powers would 
 have fixed their hold on their respective spheres 
 of influence and broken the schemes of Germany 
 and Austria- Hungary, or Germany would have 
 made a great sweep forward and established her- 
 self in the keystone position of Europe, with im- 
 mense consequences for the future. 
 
 As the war progressed it became evident that 
 it was becoming a supreme test of the ability of 
 one combination of nations to create a new empire 
 that would dominate Europe. It is no stretch 
 of imagination to say that the Germans dreamed 
 of reestablishing a modern Roman Empire of 
 
IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL 189 
 
 the Germans. If the scheme had materialized — 
 and the future historian will probably conclude 
 that it was near success at one time — the fate 
 of the rest of the world would have been far 
 different from what we wish it to be. A gigantic 
 struggle would have been thrust upon the United 
 States to save the Western World from con- 
 quest. It was the conviction that such a crisis 
 actually menaced us that brought us to join in the 
 attempt to block the German plans. 
 
 Assuming, therefore, that the anti-German al- 
 lies are victorious, it is unthinkable that the war 
 shall be allowed to end as a mere check on the 
 plans of the central powers. To do so would 
 be to grant that the Entente powers should be 
 left to carry on their plans for national aggran- 
 dizement with carte blanche approval by the 
 United States. It would mean that we are fight- 
 ing at a great sacrifice in order to enable Great 
 Britain to maintain her position as mistress of 
 the sea and ruler of a far distant empire. Now 
 we do not object to British rule in the distant 
 parts of the earth: we have found it a tolerable 
 thing that she should be entrusted with the task 
 of developing the backward races over whom she 
 
190 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 has established her authority. But we have 
 never meant to save her toppling empire for her 
 own comfort, as an act of grace merely. 
 
 If we are to contribute a material part to the 
 suppression of aggression in the world, we have 
 a right to say in what way and to what end our 
 sacrifice will have been made. As the greatest 
 of the anti-German allies we shall have the larg- 
 est burden to bear in proportion to the time in 
 which we are to fight. That we should guar- 
 antee to Great Britain and our other allies the 
 full existence of their rights is but fair. It is 
 equally reasonable that we shall demand that 
 the future does not inure to the special advan- 
 tage of any one of the group; but in fixing 
 upon the terms under which it shall be arranged 
 the main end in view should be the good of all 
 the nations in the world. 
 
 This is a view which is likely to have the sup- 
 port of all the anti-German allies, with the pos- 
 sible exception of Britain. France and Russia, 
 to say nothing of the smaller states, have the 
 same interest as we in making the common wel- 
 fare the chief aim in peace negotiations. If 
 we were not in the group and if victory came to 
 
IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL 191 
 
 it, these nations would perforce have to yield the 
 lead to Great Britain, since she would outclass 
 them in strength by reason of her sea power. 
 She might well say that as the nation on which 
 would fall the largest burden in keeping Ger- 
 many in a state of restraint, she should have 
 the largest influence in deciding what was to be 
 done. She cannot make such a claim under ex- 
 isting conditions. 
 
 Of course, there is the difficulty that the United 
 States may not be guided by statesmen who real- 
 ize the importance of following a thoroughly 
 American policy. It has long been a practice 
 with a great many Americans to follow the lead 
 of Great Britain. Unaccustomed to take a nor- 
 mal share of responsibility in world problems, we 
 may now be inclined to hold back, leaving the 
 game to hands that have acquired greater skill 
 in playing it. Such a course would be a misfor- 
 tune. It would mean that statesmen would be 
 given charge of the situation who derived all 
 their ideas under the old system of Balance of 
 Power, and it would be strange if they did not try 
 to carry on the world in the future with a strong 
 squint at the only principles of international 
 
192 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 policy they know anything about. To break into 
 this well crystallized realm of so-called practical 
 ideas, demands an unusually strong man, a man 
 well founded in principles and able to convince 
 others of the wisdom of his views. 
 
 It is true that the President of the United 
 States now in office has many of the traits that 
 seem necessary to a correct conduct of the situa- 
 tion. A man who had the training of a mere 
 politician might well be less than able to deal 
 with the situation that faces us. President Wil- 
 son's knowledge of history enables him to think 
 in terms of large national movements. That is 
 the chief value of historical training to a states- 
 man. If he knows the history of the attempts to 
 settle the affairs of the nations after the great 
 world struggles of the past, he is better able to 
 understand how the various suggested plans will 
 work in the crisis that is to be passed through. 
 
 President Wilson has, also, the unusual faculty 
 of doing what he wishes to do. When he has 
 formed a purpose it is not generally a com- 
 promise with a number of men whose chief con- 
 cern is how the result of action will affect their 
 party support. At least this is true in mat- 
 
IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL 193 
 
 ters not clearly within the bounds of party activ- 
 ity. Moreover, he has spoken and written words 
 which seem to show that he understands the need 
 of providing for such a course of conduct between 
 the nations as will assure us of cooperation fof 
 the elimination of future wars. In his long de- 
 lay in urging war and in his early pronounce- 
 ment for a league of peace, he gave us the assur- 
 ance, if nothing else, that he understands the sit- 
 uation and is capable of holding a firm course in 
 accordance with his principles. 
 
 If the submarines fail, therefore, and if we 
 come to a settlement of the largely new world 
 problems that will confront us, and if our policy 
 is in the hands of wise men, what principles will 
 guide our actions and the actions of the rest 
 of the world? This is a question that all intelli- 
 gent citizens should consider, since it cannot be 
 answered well unless there is a restrained and 
 broad-minded public opinion to support the lead- 
 ers of the people. It is a matter for the consider- 
 ation of Germans as well as their opponents ; for 
 their attitude toward any policy adopted will 
 have a strong effect upon the continuation of the 
 policy. 
 
194 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 The first question we should ask ourselves is: 
 What are we to do to the Germans? How shall 
 we punish them for what they have done to make 
 the world miserable? My answer to that is: 
 Let God punish them. For us it is not a ques- 
 tion of giving the Germans their deserts but a 
 question of coming out of this cataclysm with 
 a clear gain for the cause of human happiness. 
 Let us look upon the Germans as suffering from 
 a kind of disease of the mind which produces 
 bad results on those with whom they are in con- 
 tact. It is ours to prescribe a cure, both for 
 their sake and for ours. I suggest that we first 
 put them on a liquid diet to reduce their exuber- 
 ant vitalitjr and then give them the rest cure. 
 At any rate, that is better than cropping their 
 ears or putting them into strait- jackets. To 
 treat an impassioned man you do not kick and 
 beat him but try to bring him to his senses. To 
 bring the Germans into a realization that this 
 world is run on the principle of live-and-let-live, 
 we ourselves must show a willingness to let live. 
 
 We had a large amount of the opposite spirit 
 in the United States from 1865 to 1875. The 
 South, passionately convinced that slavery was 
 
IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL 195 
 
 no evil, had made as good a fight to preserve her 
 cause as Germany has made or can make. She 
 held out to the last with what her own people 
 called a stout heart, but her foes said with a 
 stiff neck. For a year and a half after the out- 
 side world concluded that she could never win, 
 she held on in the hope that her adversaries would 
 tire of war and make peace without victory. 
 Now all this was exasperating, and the mass of 
 the Northern people felt in 1865 that some pun- 
 ishment should be inflicted on the perverse people 
 who had inflicted so much unnecessary misery on 
 the country. But Lincoln did not feel that way. 
 There is no reason to think that he gave a mo- 
 ment's thought to making the South suffer for 
 her course. For him all thought was how to 
 smooth the wrinkles out of the present, and how 
 to make the Southern people cast out their hatred 
 of the union and come back to their former loy- 
 alty. The Lincoln spirit should guide the world 
 at the end of the present struggle. 
 
 War lives on hatred. To make your people 
 put all their energy into the fight make them 
 hate the other people; and you may rest in the 
 assurance that the leaders of the others are striv- 
 
196 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 ing to make their followers hate the men on your 
 side. The mill of hate grinds steadily and at a 
 high speed while war lasts. In Germany in these 
 days is a vast amount of industrious abusing of 
 England. That makes the German people sup- 
 port the war. In Great Britain is a great ac- 
 tivity in describing atrocities in Belgium and 
 Armenia, and it exists in order to make the Brit- 
 ish people mad for war. When you see a new 
 crop of the testimony concerning the torturing 
 horrors of the first month of war in Belgium, 
 you may know that the war spirit is running low 
 in Britain. Unhappily, such propaganda is a 
 necessary feature of war. We are naturally 
 good-hearted, and we do not go out to kill men 
 until we are made to hate them. 
 
 The moment war ends all this kind of thing 
 should cease. The time will then have come for 
 the propaganda of peace. Unfortunately there 
 are few men whose mission it is to spread such 
 ideas. Merchants and tourists may do what is 
 their nature to do, but they are not sufficient ; and 
 it generally takes years for the fires to cool off. 
 
 The aftermath of our civil war was as un- 
 happy a series of events as we have encountered 
 
IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL 197 
 
 within our national history. Undertaken as a 
 means of making sure of the gains of the civil 
 war, it became a procession of passion in which 
 stalked all the worst feelings that divided the 
 people in actual warfare. There are still men in 
 the North who have Andersonville in mind when 
 they vote, and men in the South who can never 
 respect the republican party because it was re- 
 sponsible for the reconstruction acts of 1867. It 
 will be extremely unfortunate if we take up the 
 problems that are soon to be upon us in the spirit 
 with which we assumed the duties of reconstruct- 
 ing the South. 
 
 During the civil war the South was possessed 
 of a fixed idea: the same thing is true of Ger- 
 many today. The South was committed to a 
 position that the rest of the world had abandoned : 
 Germany is committed to a type of bureaucratic 
 government which is as much out of date in a 
 modern world as slavery. No ordinary system 
 of reasoning could show fair and honest Southern 
 men in what respect they had the sentiment of 
 civilization against them: the German is thor- 
 oughly convinced that he is fighting for the pre- 
 servation of the most efficient type of government 
 
198 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 the world has seen. The South went to her de- 
 feat after a long and astonishingly effective re- 
 sistance : Germany seems to be destined to a simi- 
 larly long and steady process of reduction into 
 complete prostration. The South was ruled by 
 a small but able class of landed proprietors who 
 refused to see the plain truth of the situation 
 before them and prolonged the struggle until 
 they were exhausted, although by making a fav- 
 orable adjustment in accordance with the logic 
 of the conditions before them they might have 
 ended the war in 1864 and saved their people 
 from the uttermost bitterness of defeat : the Ger- 
 mans, ruled by their Junkers, are equally deaf 
 to argument, equally determined to die at their 
 posts, and equally opposed to a compromise by 
 which they will have to give up their antiquated 
 "institution," relinquish their special privileges, 
 and make their country like the rest of the world. 
 There are so many parallels between the two 
 countries that we wonder if there will not also be 
 a disposition of the victorious opposing allies to 
 degrade Germany in her defeat. 
 
 Probably her best adjusted punishment will be 
 the reflection that her "peculiar institution" 
 
IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL 199 
 
 proved a failure in time of need. For a century- 
 she has been training an army, but it is not the 
 army that has failed her. It has done all that 
 could have been expected of it. Nor did the 
 Southern army fail the South. It is not the 
 sense of loyalty, nor the scientific efficiency, nor 
 the unity of purpose within the empire, that have 
 failed her. They are all splendid and have done 
 what could be demanded of them. The thing 
 that has failed is the peculiar way in which the 
 German ruling classes have made use of these 
 forces. They have used army, scientific effici- 
 ency, loyalty, and unity of purpose to promote 
 the ends of an aggressive ruling class. Now the 
 best treatment is to defeat them in the war and 
 allow them plenty of time, with no unnecessary 
 antagonisms, to learn that their system does not 
 pay, and that any attempt to revive it in the 
 future will be followed by another punishment as 
 severe as that which this war brought. The sup- 
 port of a military caste and the training of all the 
 men in a great army are heavy burdens on the 
 economic life of the state. Will any nation con- 
 tinue to bear them if they come to nothing in the 
 day of trial? Armies for defense do not demand 
 
200 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 the great expenditures that Germany has made 
 in the last decades. 
 
 No penalty that the victors could lay on Ger- 
 many would be permanently effective in reduc- 
 ing her. So great are her economic energies that 
 they would restore her to prosperity within a short 
 time, and she would be ready to take advantage of 
 any favorable combination to strike in revenge. 
 Disarmament would not be a guaranty that she 
 would cease to be troublesome to her neighbors; 
 for she would still have her excellently trained 
 soldiers who could be reassembled in a great army 
 at short notice. She might well be required to 
 dismantle her great armament factories ; and since 
 they are essential to the re-arming of a great 
 army some check on her restoration would come 
 from such dismantling. But it would be a tem- 
 porary check. It is only necessary to remember 
 that the beginning of the present German army 
 was the attempt of one conqueror, Napoleon, to 
 limit the Prussian army to 42,000 men. 
 
 Moreover, what nations could be expected to 
 agree among themselves while standing guard 
 over Germany? Under the Balance of Power 
 we might expect a fair amount of mobility of 
 
IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL 201 
 
 alliances. We have just seen that not even the 
 Triple Alliance was proof against the skillful 
 hands of Delcasse. If Italy could be withdrawn 
 by France from that powerful combination, how 
 can we doubt that a humiliated Germany would 
 find means of weakening the combination against 
 her? She would have the greatest inducement 
 to do so ; and it is not probable that complete har- 
 mony would prevail long between the victors, if 
 they were held together only by the bonds of 
 mutual friendship. The history of diplomacy is 
 the record of broken friendships. 
 
 To see what readjustment might occur with 
 respect to a humiliated Germany, it is only neces- 
 sary to recall the position of France after the 
 Napoleonic wars. Beaten beyond resistance, 
 suspected of carrying the germs of bad govern- 
 ment from which all other nations felt that they 
 must be protected as from deadly disease, and 
 held down by great armies of occupation, her sit- 
 uation would seem to have been most deplorable. 
 But her isolation lasted for only a moment. She 
 was admitted to the Congress of Vienna, — called 
 to pass on the future arrangements of Europe, — 
 because there was division among her conquer- 
 
202 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 ors. From that time she was suspected less and 
 less, and at the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, 
 1818, she was admitted to the Concert of Europe, 
 but not with full fellowship; for the other powers 
 made a secret agreement to watch her for a while 
 longer. She progressed so rapidly in eliminat- 
 ing the republican virus in her system that in 
 1823 she was entrusted with the task of suppress- 
 ing the constitution of Spain. Thus in eight 
 years after the battle of Waterloo France was 
 again in full accord with the other powers. 
 Probably few people would have said in 1815 that 
 her restoration would come about so rapidly. It 
 would be no more singular if within ten years 
 after the end of the present struggle a conquered 
 Germany were to forget her antipathies of 1918 
 and be ready to give and be given in diplomatic 
 alliances with as little regard for the past. 
 
 If, for example, a restored and highly nation- 
 alized Russia becomes a threat against Western 
 Europe some years hence, the antagonisms of 
 today would be forgotten and Germany, France, 
 and Great Britain would probably be found 
 fighting side by side to restrain the Muscovite 
 giant. The old system is intensely selfish and it 
 
IF THE SUBMARINES FAIL 203 
 
 lends itself to rapid changes in policies. But it 
 is an expensive thing to keep up the system. 
 Large armies are necessary, great debts are 
 created, and a vast amount of nervous strength is 
 diverted from the normal activities of humanity. 
 It is small hope for him who longs to see war put 
 down permanently that only by fighting a war 
 like that now raging may we expect the nations 
 to defeat any future aspirant for universal 
 power. 
 
 Finally, if the submarines fail and the anti- 
 German allies break down the defenses of their 
 enemies and thus are able to determine the kind 
 of peace that is to be made, the treaty of peace 
 should not have for its end the prolongation of 
 the power of the Entente group. The history of 
 the first half of the nineteenth century shows how 
 easy it is for such a group to be re-arranged 
 with the result that new wars threaten. We 
 must trust the fair mindedness of human nature 
 and the logic of the situation to do much for the 
 Germans. It is on their acceptance of the issue 
 that we must rest our hopes for a peaceful future. 
 
 These truths are especially pertinent to the in- 
 terests of the United States. We are not fight- 
 
£04 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 ing Europe's war, but the world's. We are the 
 only nation in the struggle that has not a special 
 interest at stake. We are the only member of 
 our group of allies that has a right to take the 
 side of the weakest member of that group against 
 the desire of the strongest. If any one member 
 should in a moment of more or less pardonable 
 forgetfulness of the common good advance 
 claims that would be based on a desire to recoup 
 herself for her sufferings, we best of all could 
 demand equal treatment and see that the seed of 
 future discord are not sown. These are prin- 
 ciples that every American citizen should under- 
 stand. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE 
 
 By an enduring peace I mean a peace that 
 shall last as long as we can see into the future. 
 It is such a peace as has in it, so far as we can see, 
 no fact that would seem to make for its ruin. If 
 we adopt a peace that has the seed of destruction 
 in its very nature, we cannot hope for relief from 
 the evils of war. We must, under such a condi- 
 tion, take account of war as one of the permanent 
 burdens of civilization, with the full consciousness 
 that it will become increasingly expensive in 
 life and property, and with the result that at re- 
 curring periods an intelligent world will drop its 
 peaceful tasks to try to reduce its population to 
 a nullity. From the possibility of such a strife 
 we turn to ask the question: "Can nothing be 
 done to save humanity from such madness?" 
 
 The answer is very simple: All people are 
 unreasonable to some extent. In connection 
 with the question now under consideration, each 
 of the great states of the world, our own in- 
 
 205 
 
206 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 eluded, has its own special form of unreasonable- 
 ness, which acts as an obstacle to the formation 
 of a regime of peace. If the immense disaster 
 by which we are depressed could serve as a means 
 of bringing us to a state of entire reasonableness, 
 the present war would be worth all it costs. 
 Whether or not it can lead to such a result the 
 reader must determine for himself. 
 
 An important obstacle to such a result is the 
 economic competition of nations. Economic 
 competition by individuals has ugly sides, but it 
 is not dangerous in the sense in which national 
 competition is dangerous. When two merchants 
 undersell until one breaks down the business of 
 the other, the victim passes out of sight in the 
 business world, and the current of trade soon goes 
 on as before. When two corporations, however 
 great, engage in a business "war" and one is 
 crushed or absorbed by its competitor, the ripple 
 that was made is soon obliterated, and the victor 
 serves the human wants with which it has to do 
 without serious damage to humanity. 
 
 But when one nation finds itself in strong com- 
 petition with another in the hope of controlling a 
 sphere of trade, it is apt to seek territorial annex- 
 
OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE 207 
 
 ation to gain the desired field of exploitation. 
 The competitor can only follow the same course. 
 It is the only thing it can do, if it is not willing to 
 give up the contest. If it is strong enough to dis- 
 pute the will of the rival, its very sense of individ- 
 uality demands that it shall not tamely yield be- 
 fore the aggression of a rival. When France 
 acquired Morocco, Italy acquired Tripoli, and 
 Great Britain acquired the southern part of 
 Persia, economic advantage was a strong motive, 
 but not the only motive. When Germany laid 
 out the field of her future expansion in Turkish 
 lands and when she expected to establish a per- 
 manent influence over the Balkans, the extension 
 of her sphere of commerce was a chief motive. 
 
 Probably the fundamental wrong here was 
 the idea, widely held by the present generation, 
 that a nation has a right to establish bars around 
 her national territory to keep the trade of other 
 nations out, so that her own citizens shall have 
 preferential advantages in the exploitation of the 
 territory. That idea is so firmly held today 
 that one must be a rash man who attempts to get 
 the nations to give it up. But it is a fundamental 
 obstacle to permanent peace in the world. Prob- 
 
208 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 ably it is not too much to say that as long as the 
 business men of the world insist on dividing 
 themselves into national groups with these 
 national preferences, so long may they expect 
 business at recurring intervals to be burdened 
 with the waste and ruin of war. 
 
 Against the existing practice we may place the 
 "open door" policy, which we have known chiefly 
 in connection with the trade of the undeveloped 
 nations. It means the free opening of the trade 
 of a given state to all the nations that may care 
 to have it. We heard much of the "open door" 
 in China a few years ago, and most of the benev- 
 olent governments approved of the suggestion. 
 To have been perfectly logical they should have 
 applied the same idea to their own commerce; 
 and if the world ever comes to a perfect state of 
 international comity, it is likely that national 
 tariff barriers will be broken down. . 
 
 It is true, however, that we can have enduring 
 peace and have national protective tariffs, also. 
 If nations agree that tariffs are one of the un- 
 happy excrescences of an unreasonable world, 
 they may find it in their hearts to tolerate such 
 growths. To tolerate them would be, no doubt, 
 
OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE 209 
 
 better than going to war. But when a state sets 
 its eyes on a certain part of the earth which it 
 feels it must acquire in order to enlarge the terri- 
 tory in which it can trade without fair competi- 
 tion, the peace of the world is imperiled. 
 
 It is probable that this kind of motive played 
 a large part in Germany's decision to begin the 
 present war. For a long time her industries 
 had been developing at a rapid rate. Protected 
 at home by tariffs they were able to sell goods 
 to the German people at high prices, while they 
 sold at cheap prices in foreign markets in order 
 to drive their competitors away. The volume of 
 German trade increased immensely, factories 
 were multiplied, and large credits were extended 
 by the banks in order to support this great 
 structure. At last the situation became un- 
 steady. The expansion of the foreign part of the 
 national trade at small profits was a clog on the 
 home trade, which could not be made to yield 
 enough profit to keep the business of the country 
 in a healthy condition. Then the manufacturers 
 and capitalists came to the conclusion that it was 
 to their interest for the country to go into a war 
 of conquest in which new national territory should 
 
210 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 be laid at their feet for profitable exploitation. 
 Thus, the large business interests, usually sup- 
 porters of peace, swung to the support of the mil- 
 itarists. It is significant that the liberals, that 
 party in the Reichstag which speaks especially for 
 the traders, capitalists, and manufacturers, have 
 been among the most outspoken advocates of an- 
 nexation. 
 
 In a powerful, if indirect, way the laborers 
 are reached by this argument. They see that if 
 the manufacturers and transportation companies 
 expand their business wages are better and em- 
 ployment more abundant, and this leads them 
 to favor a policy of expansion. To what extent 
 the remote organs of the business world are thus 
 reached it is difficult to say. But it is evident 
 that in a phase of human activity which has been 
 organized most intricately the influence of the in- 
 itial idea that a war of annexation helps business 
 is far reaching. 
 
 We frequently encounter the assertion that 
 economic laws are unchangeable; but the state- 
 ment is not true, as it is made. Many economic 
 processes that appeared fundamental in their 
 time have changed as the minds of men have taken 
 
OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE 211 
 
 new grips on human life. The world has out- 
 grown the mercantile school of economic ideas. 
 The attitude toward private property and 
 monopolies, and the view of the right of individ- 
 ual bargaining have been greatly modified in the 
 process of time. If a so-called economic law 
 stands in the way of a reasonable adjustment of 
 human relations, it can be altered, if enough time 
 and effort be given to the attempt to change it. 
 Although it may seem to be fundamentally fixed 
 in the minds of business men and laborers that 
 a war for annexation is in their interests, if rea- 
 son shows that they are mistaken, there should 
 be a way of bringing reason to their minds, even 
 as it has come to ours. 
 
 Another obstacle to enduring peace is a false 
 sense of patriotism. If a man extols his own vir- 
 tues we say he is a boaster : if he extols the good 
 qualities of his town, state, or nation, we say he 
 is a patriot. I am inclined to say that it is not 
 permitted to a man to praise his country — I do 
 not say love his country — in any sense but that in 
 which he may praise himself, modestly and with 
 reservations. At any rate, he should praise and 
 magnify his country in the most restrained 
 
212 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 spirit possible. Patriotism does not demand 
 national egotism in the good citizen. Those 
 writers and teachers who try to create a national 
 spirit should be careful lest they make men mere 
 chauvinists. 
 
 Especially perilous is the doctrine that "self- 
 preservation is the first law of nature" as applied 
 to nations. Times come when a man is not justi- 
 fied in preserving his life. So to nations come 
 crises in which they are not permitted by the rules 
 of morality to save themselves by what appear to 
 be the only means left. In the present war Ger- 
 many asserted that she was justified by this prin- 
 ciple in adopting the ruthless war of the sub- 
 marine, since it was the only thing that would 
 save her from destruction. It is better for a 
 state to go to destruction, just as it is better for 
 a man to go to his death, with clean hands than 
 to live foully. 
 
 It is but an extension of this doctrine for men 
 of normal' morality to say they may do things 
 for the benefit of the state which they 'may not 
 do for their own benefit. A statesman has no 
 more right to make his state steal another state's 
 lands than he has to take his neighbor's watch. 
 
OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE £13 
 
 It is not a virtue if he lies for his state. The 
 state cannot speak of itself : it speaks through its 
 agents. It is sullied, even as a man is sullied in 
 his character, when its only voice, the words and 
 acts of its servants, is not true. Judged by the 
 standards here set up, the world's diplomacy 
 needs amendment, and if amended one of the 
 obstacles to peace will be removed. 
 
 A false sense of patriotism may lead to acts 
 that imperil peace. When France acquired Mo- 
 rocco her object was not wholly to extend her 
 economic interests. To increase the national 
 strength was also a motive. Likewise, Ger- 
 many's desire to establish control over the terri- 
 tory southeast of her was not entirely economic 
 in its origin. She also wished to increase the 
 glory and strength of the Fatherland. How 
 much we are to condemn this desire of a citizen 
 for the glory of his country it is hard to say ; but 
 it seems to be clear that such a desire may mani- 
 fest itself in such a way as to become a serious 
 obstacle to peace. 
 
 At the end of the present war the victorious 
 nations will be in a position to abate national 
 glory in the interest of enduring peace. Our 
 
214 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 own citizens are supposed to be particularly 
 proud of the achievements of the United States. 
 If our efforts should contribute as much as we 
 wish to the triumph of our own side, we should 
 be careful lest we forget that we entered the 
 war with the modest purpose of making the world 
 a fit place of habitation for all people. Likewise 
 we should be justified in using our influence 
 among our allies to see that the desire of no 
 statesman to enhance the glory of his nation leads 
 to action which may imperil peace in the future. 
 When we shall have fought long and suffered 
 greatly our hearts are likely to become harder 
 than now, in the beginning of the war; and there 
 is danger that we shall forget early resolutions 
 if we are not firmly committed to them at the 
 outset. 
 
 Another obstacle to enduring peace is the sense 
 of nationality. The older men of this generation 
 who were students in Germany in their youth 
 acquired much respect for the passionate desire 
 of Germans to build up unity among all German 
 speaking people. It was a sacred idea to young 
 men and imaginative writers. Long had North 
 Germany been disunited, stumbling forward un- 
 
OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE 215 
 
 der the lead of the Hapsburgs. To be able to 
 form a dominating group among all the Germans 
 in the world seemed no more than was their just 
 due. We did not realize in those days to what 
 an end these people who lost so many opportuni- 
 ties through internal weakness would put their 
 strength when they had at last developed it. 
 And yet, it was the right of the Germans to unite 
 themselves into as strong a nation as they might 
 form. The wrong came in the improper exten- 
 sion of the idea. When men like Treitschke talk 
 about including Holland in the German Father- 
 land we may well ask where nationality's pre- 
 tensions are taking us? 
 
 It was natural, also, that the sense of national- 
 ity should be manifested in many other European 
 countries. Each of the Balkan states had its 
 own phase of it. Russia had a large hope of 
 uniting in her control all the peoples of Slavic 
 blood. Italy demanded Trieste as a part of the 
 Italian-speaking world. Greece lived for the 
 acquisition of Macedonia and the Greek Islands, 
 and France never diminished her pathetic long- 
 ing for Alsace-Lorraine, where lived French- 
 speaking peoples. 
 
216 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 Often the desire for nationality runs directly 
 counter to economic laws. For example, what 
 are we to do when we have Austria holding on 
 to her only great Adriatic seaport as the essential 
 outlet of her trade to the sea, and nationality 
 proclaiming that this port shall be handed 
 over to Italy? Moreover, different peoples are 
 so intermixed in some parts of Europe that it is 
 impossible for any but a scientific specialist to 
 say which states, or sections of states, are oc- 
 cupied by a majority of one race and which by 
 a majority of another. If we are to set out to 
 divide Europe according to nationality we shall 
 have a large task on our hands. In the United 
 States the principle of nationality is not to be 
 pleaded, since we are so intimately intermixed 
 that it would be hopeless to try to range us into 
 racial groups. Moreover, we get along very well 
 as it is, having once agreed that we shall have to 
 get along together. Perhaps if the nationaliz- 
 ing propaganda ceased in Europe race antagon- 
 ism would subside. 
 
 Autocratic classes in society constitute still an- 
 other obstacle to peace. We have heard much on 
 this subject of late, and some of the things that 
 
OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE 217 
 
 have been said have been so ill-established in truth 
 that they must make the real autocrats smile. It 
 will probably help us to understand the situation 
 if we undertake to enumerate the good things an 
 autocracy can do. For truth never profits by 
 falsehood, and the most autocratic people in the 
 world have sense enough to know when they are 
 misrepresented. 
 
 Let us remember that under favorable condi- 
 tions an autocracy is composed of the more ca- 
 pable people in the community in which it exists. 
 They are more capable because they have been 
 brought up most carefully, that is, because they 
 have the best trained minds. There is no law of 
 nature by which more fools are born in an aris- 
 tocracy than in a proletariat. In fact, the tend- 
 ency is the other way; for since the aristocrats 
 are in a position to cultivate themselves in a given 
 generation, it is natural that a comparatively 
 large portion of their children shall be well en- 
 dowed mentally. To this gift of nature add the 
 influence of better educational training, and you 
 see how natural it is to expect an autocracy to be 
 stronger mentally than those who would have to 
 replace it if it were overthrown. 
 
218 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 Again, an autocracy is not necessarily un- 
 patriotic. Of course, it has its own idea of what 
 patriotism is, but so have the classes below the 
 autocracy. Its patriotism usually embraces an 
 honestly held opinion that the autocratic state is 
 the best form of society. On this basis it is will- 
 ing to sacrifice much for the state. We see it 
 putting "lives, fortunes, and sacred honor" lit- 
 erally at the entire command of the state. No 
 man can do more than give his all for that which 
 he holds right. 
 
 An autocracy may be composed of men of the 
 best private manners and principles. They fre- 
 quently include the best poets, historians, novel- 
 ists, philosophers, and teachers of the nation. It 
 is they who encourage art, and set standards of 
 taste in architecture, landscape gardening, and 
 general culture. Compared with the leisure class 
 of a prosperous industrial country they may be 
 more courteous, more unassuming, and less given 
 to offensive use of their wealth. They are the 
 kind of men whom any of us could love if we 
 knew them personally. These words do not, of 
 course, apply to all members of the class, but to 
 the group as a whole in ordinary conditions. 
 
OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE 219 
 
 Of the German autocracy most of these things 
 can be said, and more. It is a hard working 
 group and generally speaking it is honest. In 
 the service of the state it has a record of efficient 
 government that few democratic countries can 
 show. The officials of German towns and cities, 
 provinces and states, taken from the hereditary 
 upper classes, are well trained, faithful, and free 
 from the suggestion of corruption. It will take 
 New York or Chicago many years to develop 
 the state of good government that exists in Ber- 
 lin. Moreover, the German autocracy has the 
 respect of the German people. 
 
 Up to last winter the Russian autocracy was 
 an obstacle to peace. Many who looked forward 
 to a reign of reason wondered how they were go- 
 ing to make the theory work while the largest 
 Entente nation was in the hands of an autocracy 
 that was less tolerable than the German autoc- 
 racy. Fortunately, fate has settled the question, 
 for the time at least. So uncertain is the condi- 
 tion of affairs in Russia, that no one can say what 
 will be the outcome. It is by no means certain 
 that the peasants, workers, and soldiers, will not 
 make actual war against the former autocrats, 
 
220 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 leading to a state of chaos like the worst phases 
 of the French Revolution. If such a thing hap- 
 pens, a reaction in favor of the former ruling 
 class may well follow. If the war ends before 
 the newly established government is firmly 
 seated in power some such upheaval may be 
 expected. Certainly the time of danger is not 
 yet passed. 
 
 The German autocracy is better than that 
 which ruled Russia. In fact, it would be less 
 dangerous if it were less serviceable. Its sins are 
 not the patent sins of pecculation, cruelty, lazi- 
 ness, or despotism. It offends in that it takes 
 away the confidence of nation in nation. It of- 
 fends because it is filled with unfortunate pur- 
 poses. It is possible to think of an autocracy 
 that would be no menace for the peace of the 
 world, an autocracy filled with no ambition for 
 world conquest. It is true that most autocratic 
 governments have not been of this kind, and they 
 seem militarists by nature, whence arise the ideals 
 with which they trouble the world. 
 
 When Hegel preached the philosophy of war 
 that underlies the German's devotion to 
 war, he was largely right from the Prussian 
 
OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE 221 
 
 standpoint. He held that the mind becomes 
 sluggish through inactivity and that war burns 
 up its waste matter and leads to energy of char- 
 acter. This doctrine would not be essentially 
 true in any normally organized society ; for there 
 are as many opportunities for self-expression in 
 commerce, finance, manufactures, art, and other 
 peaceful occupations as in war. But a century 
 ago Prussia was filled, even more than today, with 
 a mass of small nobles, unaccustomed to any or- 
 dinary form of labor, and with slender incomes. 
 They were just the class that would fall into the 
 effete vices of an aristocracy. To them the mili- 
 tary life was an avenue of steady and moral em- 
 ployment. They took places in the great ma- 
 chine, and by 1870 they had been bred into its 
 very spirit. The process saved the German 
 nobles from vapidity. At the same time, as 
 a class, they preserved their political privileges, 
 and it has happened that they, with their official 
 heads, the kaiser, kings, and princes, have been 
 able to unite political power and military pur- 
 poses until they have made of their country the 
 most military state of modern times. If Ger- 
 many has fought the present war with great abil- 
 
THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 ity, it is the organized autocracy that deserves the 
 credit. 
 
 It is, therefore, the union of the political and 
 military power in the hands of a privileged class 
 in Germany that now constitutes the greatest 
 obstacle to peace. It enables a small and efficient 
 portion of the German population to wield the 
 rest of the people for the ends they have decided 
 are best. If this union of functions could be 
 broken up, and if political power could be dis- 
 tributed as in the countries governed by the peo- 
 ple, the obstacle would be reduced in size. It is 
 not necessary to suppose that it would be re- 
 moved altogether ; for even if equal suffrage were 
 established in Germany, and if autocracy were 
 shorn of its preponderating electoral power, 
 the nobles would still be the most capable class in 
 the empire. Their personality would go a long 
 way in perpetuating their influence. If they 
 played the game of trying to lead the people 
 they might remain rulers of Germany for a long 
 time after losing their present electoral ad- 
 vantages. 
 
 It is fair to assume that a democracy will be 
 less likely to go to war than an autocracy. It is 
 
OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE 223 
 
 the middle and lower classes that bear the chief 
 burdens of war. They fight for no promotions. 
 Generally the happiest thing that can come to one 
 of them is a disabling wound to send him home 
 with his head safely on his shoulders. Kings and 
 their sons are rarely killed in battle. When this 
 war began the kaiser was one of the proud Ger- 
 mans who had five tall sons of military age. 
 After nearly four years of fighting none of them 
 have been seriously injured. It would be inter- 
 esting to know if there is another German father 
 of five sons who has been so gently treated by for- 
 tune. Report says that fifty thousand school- 
 masters were killed in Germany during the first 
 two years of the war. It would be interesting to 
 learn whether or not the titled class has given up 
 so large a proportion of its members for the cause 
 of the Fatherland. 
 
 And yet, it must not be thought that wars can- 
 not exist in democratic countries. When Rome 
 was a republic war was a constant thing. Athens 
 in her republican days had many wars. In the 
 region that is now the United States of America 
 have been several wars. The war for independ- 
 ence was essentially popular. It was organized 
 
224 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 by that part of the population which resented 
 British aristocratic institutions, the class we 
 should today call "the plain people." In the civil 
 war the demand that slavery be destroyed did not 
 come from the wealthy men of the North, the 
 class that stood for the American aristocracy, but 
 from the middle classes, men who filled the 
 churches and who followed the common impulses 
 of the heart. It was resisted by the South, as 
 democratically organized as Germany would be 
 with the Junkers turned out of power, and the 
 struggle was as bitter as any the world had 
 seen up to the fatal year 1914. Democratic 
 states can fight, and they do fight, but they are 
 less likely to go to war than autocratic states. 
 
 If it seems to any of us a necessary thing that 
 autocracy must be removed from the earth, it is 
 well to remember that autocracy can be removed 
 only through the operation of a long and slow 
 process. It can be reduced by some great catas- 
 trophe, but it cannot be smitten out in a day. 
 Take away its political power, and perhaps its 
 financial power will be left. Undermine that by 
 raising up a rich bourgeoisie, and its social influ- 
 ence will perhaps still exist. You do not abolish 
 
OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE 225 
 
 it by decree; you banish it only when you have 
 substituted a better thing. 
 
 What force exists in Germany with which the 
 autocracy can be supplanted? Next to the rad- 
 icals, a small faction at best, we have the social- 
 ists, numerous enough to have great influence, 
 but committed to a theory of society which can- 
 not be established until humanity has gone 
 through centuries of development in the princi- 
 ples of equality. Then we find the national lib- 
 erals, whose name is likely to mislead liberals in 
 other parts of the world. They would be called 
 the stand-pat, capitalistic portion of society in 
 the United States, men who believe first of all in 
 the protection of their large interests. In the 
 present struggle they are committed to the Pan- 
 Germany policy since it means the expansion of 
 markets for German wares. Next come the cen- 
 trists, Catholics in their primary interests, and 
 fundamentally opposed to the doctrines for which 
 the socialists stand. Finally we come to the con- 
 servatives, who believe in the autocracy. What 
 magician can fuse these parties into a solid move- 
 ment for the establishment of really parliamen- 
 tary government? 
 
226 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 Last obstacle of all that I shall mention here 
 is the accumulated machinery of war that has 
 been built up in modern states. I do not refer 
 to ideas but to materials and men. Much has 
 been written to show that munition makers have 
 deliberately fostered a belief in war, so as to make 
 a market for their products. Probably some ex- 
 aggeration exists in most of these arguments 
 and statements. The Krupps and their brethren 
 have plausible grounds for saying that war is 
 inevitable, and that they serve it but do not pro- 
 mote it. But giving them as much benefit of the 
 doubt as they can expect, it must be true that 
 their very existence, and their fine application of 
 science to their business, have led states to count 
 on war as a matter of course. These great ag- 
 gregations of capital have vast influence in politi- 
 cal circles. They have so many stockholders that 
 they affect a large number of influential men. 
 So much are they committed to the cause in which 
 their fortunes and hearts are enlisted that they 
 ought not to have the opportunity to wield their 
 peculiar influence. When this war is over, it 
 would be a real service if every munitions factory 
 as such were taken into government hands and its 
 
OBSTACLES TO AN ENDURING PEACE 227 
 
 capital stock closed out as a business enterprise. 
 It is only the state, and the state in the hands of 
 the people, that can safely be trusted with this 
 powerful weapon for the creation of war senti- 
 ment. 
 
 The professional soldiers are also a part of the 
 war machinery which stands in the way of an 
 enduring peace. They can hardly be expected to 
 become pacifists. They are trained to regard 
 war as a necessity. All their ideas of virtue are 
 wrapped up in the fine qualities of a brave soldier. 
 Any other standard is strange to them. They 
 may be expected to throw all their weight of in- 
 fluence in favor of recurring wars. Not that 
 they wish wars to recur, but that they consider 
 it improper to contemplate anything else in the 
 natural order of events. This is a hard problem 
 to deal with. A few professional soldiers may be 
 brought to set their faces against war; but as to 
 the great majority, I fear that those who try to 
 abolish war will have to count on the opposition 
 of the professional warriors until the end of the 
 chapter. 
 
 This array of obstacles to enduring peace, is it 
 not formidable? Economic competition, the ac- 
 
228 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 tual if false sense of patriotism, the desire for 
 nationality — which is liable to run into extreme 
 assertions and sometimes to run counter to the 
 strongest economic interests — the existence of 
 autocratic government, and the powerful influ- 
 ence of munition makers and professional war- 
 riors — these are some of the obstacles against 
 which those must contend who try to convince 
 the world that peace is the better way. They 
 may well appal the stoutest hearted friend of en- 
 during peace. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 ARGUMENTS FOR A FEDERATION OF STATES 
 
 The arguments against attempting to estab- 
 lish an enduring peace are undoubtedly formid- 
 able, but they do not leave the idealist entirely 
 vanquished. On his side fight humanity and 
 reason, and it is his function to stand by humanity 
 and reason. He has long ago formed the habit 
 of attacking obstacles. In this case the objec- 
 tions he meets are all rooted in the opinions of 
 men, and he loves to change opinions, or, if he 
 does not change them, to hammer away at them 
 as long as life lasts. For his fine optimism we 
 can but have great respect, and in this chapter I 
 intend to summarize his arguments and give them 
 to the public in as strong a light of plausibility 
 as possible. If the stolid opposition of the 
 "practical" world is not to be broken down, let it 
 be shaken as much as may be. The time of its 
 defeat is written in the book of fate. It may be 
 that the time is near at hand. 
 
 229 
 
230 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 In the first place, let me recall a statement 
 made in the preceding chapter. To get any- 
 desired reform adopted and carried out, it is 
 first necessary to get the people to imagine the 
 reform in operation. I mean that they must 
 have a clear mental picture of themselves living 
 contentedly under the proposed plan. Let the 
 proposition be made in such a way that the effec- 
 tive people who direct the government can not, or 
 will not, in the mind's eye see it in operation, and 
 it will surely fail. Let them imagine its success- 
 ful use and they will most likely find it unobjec- 
 tionable. Likewise, if the people of the world 
 could imagine a great cooperative union to pro- 
 mote peace, with enough force behind it to enforce 
 the will of the union, if in their minds they could 
 see themselves adjusted into such a system, with 
 all its economy in taxes, human suffering, and 
 ordinary governmental effort, it would not be 
 very difficult to make such a scheme work in 
 actual experience. 
 
 The "practical" man has but little imagina- 
 tion. He has to be deceived into the acceptance 
 of reforms. Make him believe that a given plan 
 has been made to work and his objections are 
 
ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION 231 
 
 diminished, if not overcome altogether. This is 
 not said for scolding but as a sober fact confront- 
 ing the man who reasons his way through matters 
 that perplex him. The "practical" man is not 
 responsible for his weakness, and he is in the ma- 
 jority among men. On the other hand, the man 
 with imagination is not to be faint-hearted. If 
 he can see and talk, he may, by reiteration finally 
 make his brothers see also. 
 
 Fundamentally his position rests upon the rea- 
 sonableness of his proposition: war is madness, 
 brutality, useless waste of wealth and life, and the 
 negation of civilization. It proceeds from the 
 unnecessarily irritated state of the public mind. 
 Reason demands that she be allowed to have an 
 opportunity to exert her influence in a reasonable 
 world over reasonable beings. Since law is the 
 expression of the will of reasonable beings, let law 
 be given the supervision of all the disputes which 
 may possibly lead to war. How true all this 
 sounds! And the preacher of peace says boldly 
 that it is more worth while to plan, spend money, 
 and take a chance in a great world effort to bring 
 such a reasonable situation to pass than to go on 
 planning, spending, and risking things in the 
 
232 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 efforts to make a system work that has ever led 
 us around in a circle to the same old end, war and 
 misery. 
 
 The advocate of peace points to the duel. 
 There was a time when every man felt it his right 
 and duty to settle his own quarrels. He was his 
 own judge and his own sheriff. The result was 
 so bad that law was created to enforce peace be- 
 tween individuals. The old condition survived 
 in the duel, but in most countries this at last was 
 brought under the authority of law. Private 
 combat in its nature does not differ from public 
 combat, and if one was eliminated by the creation 
 of a law that was strong enough to forbid it, the 
 other can be abolished by creating a still stronger 
 law, powerful enough to restrain states as crim- 
 inal law restrains individuals. 
 
 Kant's argument for perpetual peace ran like 
 this, but he, in sympathy with Rousseau's social 
 contract theory, argued that the law that re- 
 strained individuals was the result of agreement 
 between individuals; and he went further and 
 argued that all that was necessary to secure per- 
 petual peace would be for the states to agree to 
 establish a league, or a federation, to enforce it. 
 
ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION 233 
 
 Now there was a fallacy in Kant's argument that 
 has a bearing on the subject immediately before 
 us today. There is no reason to suppose that any 
 state ever arose from an agreement of individ- 
 uals. The ordinary process was growth out of 
 several conditions. An enlarged family might 
 become a state, or one tribe might conquer an- 
 other and enlarge itself into a state. Kinship 
 and force were probably the chief causes in pro- 
 ducing the state ; and reason seems to have played 
 a small part. Similarly, law grew up, not as the 
 result of reason, but as a body of tribal customs, 
 reasonably interpreted by the wise men of the 
 early state. 
 
 There is, therefore, no analogy between the 
 proposed method of forming a great super-state 
 with its own body of law, the object of which is to 
 restrain the states from going to war, and the 
 method by which the early state was created. In 
 fact, if one great nation were to conquer the rest 
 of the world and impose its peace on all the world, 
 as it would do, we should have a process more 
 analogous to the origin of the early state. And 
 that is one way of having peace. Within the 
 last years it has seemed a horribly possible 
 
234 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 method; for if Mittel-Europa becomes a fact, it 
 will have such predominating power that it is 
 difficult to see what will stop its march to general 
 authority. 
 
 Pointing out Kant's fallacy weakens his argu- 
 ment as such, but it leaves us in such a dilemma 
 that we are prone to pronounce his suggestion 
 worth trying as an escape from conquest by one 
 great power. For if the world is tending toward 
 unity through conquest, who can doubt that it 
 would be better to anticipate the process, save a 
 great sum of human suffering, and by agreement 
 found the world federation which is the same 
 result to which ages of war will lead us. That 
 we could have such a super-state by contract is 
 not to be doubted. It would be as possible as the 
 creation of the United States of America by 
 agreement. 
 
 Another argument of the peace advocate is that 
 the old system by which the world was kept in 
 equilibrium, the balance of power, has broken 
 down, and cannot be trusted to preserve the peace 
 of the future. Its chief characteristic was that 
 several states mutually checked one another. If 
 one manifested an intention that was alarming 
 
ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION 235 
 
 to the rest they combined to restrict the action of 
 the aggressor. The several states were with re- 
 gard to one another in a condition mobile enough 
 to permit any state to shift from one side to an- 
 other as the situation demanded. Now this con- 
 dition no longer exists. There has developed a 
 mid-continental alliance, apparently expecting 
 to continue to act as one state for practical 
 purposes, which in itself threatens to dominate 
 Europe. To hold it in check calls forth all the 
 united force of the other states and then success is 
 obtained only through the greatest amount of 
 preparedness. Such a condition is anything but 
 the old system which was to work through bal- 
 ance and concert of action. 
 
 The central position of the Germans and Aus- 
 trians gives them an immense advantage, if the 
 world is to go on in its national rivalries. On the 
 west lie the two nations who are today doing most 
 to hold them in restraint, France and Great Brit- 
 ain. The former could never stand against Ger- 
 many alone, and the latter is remote enough from 
 the German frontier to make it improbable that 
 her forces could reach that spot in time to prevent 
 the Germans from gaining the initial advantage 
 
236 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 which, in a state of efficient preparation is the 
 only military success that either side can hope 
 to win. In the face of a strong and threatening 
 Germany it would be very likely that these two 
 nations would have to make a more than formal 
 alliance. Even if that happened, it is possible 
 that Germany would construe it as a threat and 
 begin war. 
 
 The only other strong check on the central 
 powers is Russia, now in a sad state of change. 
 What her future is going to be is still problem- 
 atic. It is a stupendous task for so large a na- 
 tion, composed of landlords and peasants for the 
 most part, to pass from an autocracy to a self- 
 governing nation. It took France, a smaller 
 country, from 1789 to 1879 to pass through the 
 various changes and counter-changes by which 
 she reformed her government into a republic. It 
 is safe to say that in the Russian development 
 the changes will come more rapidly, but it is not 
 impossible that in this country a period of pro- 
 longed unrest is ahead. Under such circum- 
 stances Russia could hardly be counted on to give 
 much aid to the Western nations who wished to 
 restrain Germany. In fact, so fluid would be the 
 
ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION <W 
 
 state of her society that she might well become 
 the victim of German ambition and contribute 
 valuable parts of her empire to swell the resources 
 of her aggressive western neighbors. 
 
 One insecure spot must be pointed out in this 
 argument. It is the continuous close alliance of 
 Germany and Austria-Hungary. If that breaks 
 down the whole argument fails. At the present 
 time it is impossible to say what may happen in 
 this respect. Much will depend on the new em- 
 peror of the Dual Empire. That he has a very 
 difficult problem before him is without ques- 
 tion. On one hand is the intense Hungarian 
 aversion to absorption by Germany, on the other 
 the passionate desire for union by the German 
 people in the Dual Empire. It is supposed that 
 the emperor does not favor absorption; but it 
 seems certain that he is not able at this time to 
 take an open stand against it. 
 
 The strong part Germany has taken in saving 
 Austria from Russia gives Germany a firm hold 
 over the imagination of the Austrian people. It 
 is possible that financial aid has also been ex- 
 tended to such an amount that Austria would be 
 embarrassed if called on to pay back. Nor is the 
 
238 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 kaiser in Berlin in a mood to brook defiance from 
 Vienna. If, therefore Kaiser Karl wishes to be 
 free of his too intimate dependence on Kaiser 
 Wilhelm, he will find it to his advantage to con- 
 ceal his desire for the time being. It is probable 
 that we shall not know the present true state of 
 feelings in Austria for several years after the 
 war. But unless she is very well Germanized, it 
 would seem that she must soon realize that she is 
 playing a losing game in the combined movement. 
 The real advantages of this war, if any are ob- 
 tained, are German advantages. It is German 
 trade, German kultur, and German prestige that 
 are being enhanced by the war. Austria as Aus- 
 tria is not reaping advantages commensurate 
 with the gains of her greater partner. 
 
 The financial argument seems to be much on 
 the side of the peace advocate. Let us consider 
 the situation in which the European states will 
 find themselves after the return of peace. Bank- 
 ruptcy is a relative term, if we so interpret it. 
 That is to say, if the people are willing to bear 
 patiently their great burdens they will bear them, 
 and the debts that have been acquired will be 
 shouldered. If one nation repudiates this debt, 
 
ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION 239 
 
 or scales it down, it is probable that the others 
 will do the same, since to continue to carry the 
 debt would leave the faithful nation at a disad- 
 vantage with the other nations in reference to 
 future struggles with one another. 
 
 No one knows as yet just who owns the bonds 
 in the several nations. From Germany we hear 
 that they are widely held. It is the policy of the 
 government of any nation to distribute a heavy 
 debt as widely as possible ; and we have in recent 
 history instances of great patriotism in assuming 
 debts of this kind. Now it is fair to say that 
 the more widely the debt is distributed, the 
 greater its likelihood of permanency. The 
 larger the number of poor people who own it, the 
 harder it will be to lessen the burden of the na- 
 tion. It follows that in this case the immense 
 interest charge is likely to persist as a permanent 
 encumbrance on the economic life of the country. 
 
 On the other hand, let us say that it turns out 
 that the debt is not very widely distributed after 
 all, or that after the war it follows the course of 
 most national debts and passes into the hands of 
 the rich. Then we have the situation likely to 
 promote class friction. The taxes necessary to 
 
240 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 pay the interest will fall on the mass of people, 
 who will probably come to believe that they are 
 taxed for the benefit of the wealthy. Class jeal- 
 ousy will lead to suggestions of repudiation. 
 Such a course is more than ordinarily easy in 
 Germany, France, and Russia, where there are 
 well organized socialist parties, already keenly 
 suspicious of the capitalists. 
 
 Thus, whether the debt is widely distributed or 
 not, it contains a menace to society. In one case 
 it constitutes such a burden that it absorbs the 
 financial strength of the government. In the 
 other it invites the most formidable struggle of 
 the poor against the rich that the world has seen 
 in a century. 
 
 Such a situation is bad enough in itself, but it 
 does not directly affect the question of peace, our 
 main consideration at this time ; for the debt will 
 exist as a result of the war, and nothing in the 
 view of the friends of peace can prevent it. But 
 through whichever of the two contingent courses 
 it goes, the state will have difficulty in continuing 
 the old system. 
 
 Let us say that we have a permanent great 
 debt with a huge interest fund, and the state 
 
ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION 241 
 
 wishes to add to the taxes in order to keep up its 
 measures of preparedness. The result must be 
 to produce uneasiness in the minds of the tax- 
 payers. In Germany, for example, the interest 
 charge and the provision for pensions on account 
 of the present war will probably be considerably 
 more than a billion dollars a year. Added to the 
 ordinary expenses of government it will make a 
 burden more than double that of 1913. Can the 
 government go on providing armaments, that 
 may lead to another war, without jeopardizing 
 the loans that are already issued ? In the face of 
 such heavy taxation it would not be surprising 
 if the people sold their holdings of bonds to the 
 capitalists and later turned toward repudiation. 
 On the other hand, it would be to the interest of 
 the capitalists to favor moderate expenditures 
 for armaments and armies, lest the patience of the 
 people under their burdens might be exhausted. 
 
 But suppose the debt was not distributed 
 widely in the first place, and suppose it was re- 
 pudiated after a class struggle, or for any other 
 reason scaled down. The result would be a se- 
 vere blow to credit, and in the future it might 
 be so difficult to raise funds that war could not 
 
242 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 be carried on. No nation can afford to contem- 
 plate war if it has not borrowing capacity. If 
 the debts of one war are repudiated those of an- 
 other may also be repudiated. It behooves the 
 capitalists, therefore, to support a policy which 
 will make armed conflict impossible. While 
 bonds benefit the banker when issued up to a cer- 
 tain point, they can in some conditions become 
 his most serious difficulty. So many perils await 
 the capitalist from a renewal of struggles like the 
 present, that it is not too much to count upon 
 him as a supporter of peace until the financial 
 situation in Europe shall become better than it 
 will be for many a day. It is his true interest to 
 support a federated peace, which will tend to 
 make his bonds secure. 
 
 As to the influence of autocracy, the advocate 
 of peace must admit that it is by nature hostile 
 to his system of cooperative peace. Such co- 
 operation must depend on mutual confidence and 
 trust between nations; and it is natural for dis- 
 trust to exist between republican and autocratic 
 states. The whole trend of autocracy is to self- 
 assertion. As it exists in Germany today it 
 could hardly be relied on to take its place in any 
 
ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION 243 
 
 union of states which would involve the subordi- 
 nation of individual national interests to the com- 
 mon good. 
 
 Granting this, the advocate of peace can assert 
 that Germany must eventually give up autoc- 
 racy. As the only great nations that hold to this 
 relic of a departed age Germany and Austria- 
 Hungary are becoming anachronisms. They are 
 set against the spirit of the twentieth century. 
 If they tide over the crisis that now confronts 
 them they will encounter more furious storms at 
 a later time, and eventually autocracy must be 
 broken down. The argument rests on faith in 
 progress. It is the result of confidence in the in- 
 nate qualities of human nature. So many times 
 in the past ages have the people risen against 
 bad government, that it is safe to say they will 
 repeat the process until all inequality shall have 
 been reduced. 
 
 German autocracy, a survival of a past cen- 
 tury, exists only because it takes for its object 
 the good government of a parliamentary system. 
 In intelligence and honesty it is not like the an- 
 cient system. The resemblance is only in forms. 
 The republican says: "I will give the people 
 
244 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 just, intelligent, and honest government." The 
 German autocrat says: "I will do all these 
 things"; and he redeems his promise. His 
 brother of the eighteenth century had no such 
 purpose, being so certain of his position that he 
 did not have to promise the people anything. 
 The German autocrat lives in fear of an over- 
 throw. Perhaps some day he will make a slip — 
 it may be from the action of an unwise emperor 
 or a selfish party clique — and away will go the 
 whole system. 
 
 Last summer a crisis arose in Berlin. The 
 very life of the autocracy seemed about to be 
 taken. It was saved finally by a narrow margin, 
 and with the making of promises which seem 
 a long step forward. The people were assured 
 that such was their meaning. If the promises are 
 broken, there will be a reckoning. It may be 
 said that there will never again be so good an 
 opportunity to force the granting of parliamen- 
 tary reforms. That statement is contestable. 
 The autocracy needs the support of the people at 
 present, in order to bring Germany through the 
 crisis that has arisen from the action of the 
 autocracy, and it may seem from that standpoint 
 
ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION 245 
 
 that the people never had and will never have an 
 equally good opportunity to strike a blow. But 
 the call of patriotism is strong in Germany, and 
 if the liberally minded persons were to stand de- 
 liberately for the defeat of the war credits unless 
 they were given the reforms they demanded, it is 
 doubtful if the people would support them. It is 
 hard to carry a country through a great political 
 revolution while the very life of the country is 
 threatened. 
 
 After war comes a time of questioning. The 
 German people will have reason to ask them- 
 selves what has been done to them. The burdens 
 of taxes, the loss of commerce, the wrecks of 
 human life through maiming, and the great gaps 
 in population through death, all these things can 
 but come to the minds of the people. At that 
 time the press must lose something of its rigorous 
 control, for it is impossible that when the Ger- 
 mans get over the feeling that their country is in 
 danger they will continue to tolerate a press 
 whose every word is dictated by the one thought 
 of keeping the people solidly united in war senti- 
 ment. If it should happen that the empire has 
 an emperor who is not trusted by the people it 
 
246 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 may be that the questioning will sweep away- 
 many old doubts and forms. 
 
 These things should not be taken as prophecy, 
 but as possibilities for tempering the opinion that 
 Germany is destined to be permanently auto- 
 cratic. The advocate of an enduring peace has 
 a right to think a self-governing Germany well 
 within the bounds of possibility before another 
 decade has elapsed. If such a thing happens, 
 certainly one of the most serious obstacles to 
 peace will have been removed. 
 
 I shall venture to put one more argument into 
 the mouth of the advocate of peace. Probably 
 he has not used it as I am going to use it, but it 
 works his way; for it shows that a tremendous 
 fate threatens, unless some cooperative move- 
 ment is established to avert it. Stated briefly it 
 is this : Through the ages runs a law of unifica- 
 tion in society, and it seems probable that the 
 world has today come to the point at which the 
 unifying force is likely to take a long stride for- 
 ward, a force which may operate in one of two 
 directions. I mean that with the next century 
 unification seems imminent by conquest, if not by 
 common consent. 
 
ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION 247 
 
 It is not easy to say that the process of concen- 
 tration in human society is a law in the sense in 
 which there is law in natural science. But there 
 is a general social tendency, seemingly irrepres- 
 sible, operating steadily from the beginning of 
 history, for the political units to be larger and 
 ever larger. If this tendency is not a law it is an 
 extremely strong force ; and we may well ask if it 
 is not about to take one of its great steps forward. 
 
 A glance at the past will show how the process 
 has gone on. In ancient times diminutive states 
 were absorbed by larger but still very small 
 states, which in turn were welded into so-called 
 confederacies, or leagues, which at last became 
 integrated states. The concentration went for- 
 ward in cycles, one empire rising in power until it 
 ruled most of its known world, and then it broke 
 into pieces through its lack of cohesive power. 
 Thus it was with Babylon, Assyria, Persia, 
 Greece, and Rome. Whenever the bubble burst 
 the process of unification began again immedi- 
 ately, and on a larger scale. After the fall of 
 Rome it was again set in motion in an area that 
 included most of Europe, the unifying hand be- 
 longing to Charlemagne, king of the Franks. 
 
248' THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 His personal valor won the triumph of his will, 
 but his empire fell away soon after he relaxed his, 
 hold upon it. 
 
 Then began a rebuilding process. Feudal 
 states evolved out of clashing duchies, counties, 
 and bishoprics. Immediately feudal states be- 
 gan to devour one another. With each century 
 the unit of government became larger. At last 
 rose the great power of Spain, so great that it 
 became a threat to other powers, and then fol- 
 lowed a series of wars to decide whether or not 
 Spain should be the supreme state in Europe, 
 and Spain lost. A century later France seemed 
 to be seeking to establish herself in the same kind 
 of supremacy, and again the combined force of 
 Europe was necessary to break her purposes. 
 Still later came the Napoleonic wars, in which 
 Europe seemed for a moment to be subjected by 
 one central will, but again it was saved through 
 great suffering. To some people it seemed that 
 the Napoleonic attempt would be the last. 
 
 Of these modern struggles in Europe it is seen 
 that each has been harder than the struggle that 
 preceded it. That is because in each the imple- 
 
ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION 849 
 
 ments and organization of warfare were im- 
 proved as compared with the former struggle, and 
 because states were stronger and more capable of 
 endurance. It is also evident that each of these 
 great wars was the result of the ambition of one 
 sovereign, supported by a strong and well united 
 nobility, while in each case the most effective re- 
 sistance was offered by the states in which some 
 degree of self-government had been adopted. 
 
 The struggle that now exists is the highest 
 manifestation of this tendency to unification that 
 the world has seen since the fall of Rome. Al- 
 though Napoleon seemed at certain moments in 
 his career to stand nearer absolute success than 
 Germany now stands, he never really gained as 
 much as the kaiser now holds ; for he won his suc- 
 cesses against the poorly trained and dispirited 
 troops of Prussia, Austria, and Spain, while the 
 Germans have won what they have won against 
 some of the best troops of history. Moreover, 
 Napoleon's power was founded on his suc- 
 cess solely, while the German victories rest on 
 the long established and certain foundation of the 
 German empire. It seems reasonable to say that 
 
250 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 Europe stands today nearer to unification than 
 it has stood since the fall of Charlemagne's 
 power. 
 
 Two great combinations are fighting for mas- 
 tery. One has the avowed purpose of extending 
 its power until it is in a fair way to absorb the 
 rest of the states one after the other. The other 
 group fights to beat off the fate that threatens, 
 and it acknowledges that it cannot succeed unless 
 it crushes its opponents into such a state as will 
 take from them the desire and the power to at- 
 tempt another war for supremacy. Whichever 
 side wins, the other will feel an impulse to con- 
 tinue to act in alliance. And we may have a 
 Europe of two great federal states, with the 
 little states at their mercy. 
 
 For example, how can Great Britain and 
 France ever be opponents again, as in the old 
 days? The sense of common sacrifices would of 
 itself make them more than friends, but the con- 
 sciousness that each depends on the other in deal- 
 ing with the great danger will never fail them, 
 and it will force them into some kind of political 
 union. In the same way, we should expect to 
 see a greatly altered relation between Great 
 
ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION 251 
 
 Britain and her colonies. Three-quarters of a 
 million of colonial defenders constitute a contri- 
 bution that demands reward. As the colonies 
 depend on the mother country for some important 
 elements of defense, and Great Britain cannot 
 comfort herself with the assurance of safety un- 
 less she has a broad imperial power for its basis, 
 it would seem natural to expect some kind of im- 
 perial union. As to Belgium, when she escapes 
 from the grasp of Germany, what mind has the 
 ingenuity to foresee her fate? If she relies on 
 the promise of neutralization, she is again tempt- 
 ing fate. If she is annexed to France, with some 
 kind of autonomy, German enmity will be 
 aroused. 
 
 Probably her fate is to be bound up with the 
 fate of the other small states of Europe, states 
 which in the present war are hardly entirely 
 sovereign. Holland, Denmark, Norway, Swe- 
 den, Switzerland, Greece, and Portugal have lost 
 something of the power to direct their internal 
 affairs. In war they have had a lesson of the 
 necessity of bending to the will of an external 
 government, which they will probably remember 
 many times in the days of peace. When once a 
 
252 THE LOST FRUITS OP WATERLOO 
 
 state has yielded at the dictation of a neighbor, 
 and made money out of it, the next time it is 
 pressed yielding becomes an easier thing. The 
 fate of these small states in a possible era of fierce 
 competition between two great groups would be 
 very perplexing. In an era of peace through 
 federation, says the advocate of peace, it would 
 be much happier. 
 
 In short, it is a practical question that our 
 idealist puts to us. Here is a world that has gone 
 mad, shall it not turn to reason again? The old 
 system has broken down, shall we try to make it 
 work again? To do so will lead us to just the 
 disaster that now overwhelms us. Shall we 
 not try a plan which will not cost us in money 
 half what the old system of preparation cost, and 
 which if it fails cannot be more of a failure than 
 the old system has proved ? If autocracy stands 
 in the way, let us hope that autocracy will give 
 way before the march of the spirit of the times. 
 And finally, the law of unification is working so 
 strongly in these days of international relations, 
 that we are at last at the point at which we 
 cannot longer elect to remain distinct in our na- 
 tional activities. We must choose between a 
 
ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERATION 253 
 
 world state through conquest, and a world state 
 through mutual agreement. Which shall we 
 take? To try to go on with the states entirely 
 distinct, is to invite their conquest by a great 
 state. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 
 
 Taking into consideration the obstacles and 
 the advantages summarized in the two preceding 
 chapters what are we going to do when the war 
 comes to an end? The easiest and most likely 
 thing is to adjust ourselves as quickly and quietly 
 as possible to the peace that is given to us, take 
 up the old problems of living as nearly as we can 
 where we left them in 1914 — or in 1917, when 
 the war began for the United States — and trust 
 to our good stars to guide us to a happy haven. 
 But if there is one thing this war has shown, it 
 is that trusting to stars is not a safe protection 
 against war. The only thing sensible people 
 ought to count on in these days is the judgment 
 of their capable and efficient minds. And it 
 seems that the suggestion of the men who wish to 
 obtain peace by cooperation is worthy of the most 
 careful debate by men who have the best interest 
 of humanity at heart. 
 
 When the war ends it may be that the world 
 
 254 
 
A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 255 
 
 will not have arrived at the time when such a 
 scheme can be adopted, but we should not be 
 hasty in saying so. It is not a scheme to be dis- 
 posed of by newspaper editors, who rarely have 
 time to weigh the conditions of such a serious mat- 
 ter, or of senators and representatives, whose 
 views arise out of party interests, or of high 
 officials as a class, who are usually overburdened 
 with administrative matters. It is a thing for 
 all the people to consider, and in order that it 
 may have the fairest and most conspicuous hear- 
 ing, there should be a great world congress, not 
 composed of theorists merely, but of the most 
 practical statesmen, who will take up the matter 
 in a spirit of friendliness, with the intention of 
 adopting the scheme if it can be received in a 
 manner that warrants the hope of success. 
 - Every nation in the world has reason to desire 
 the establishment of an enduring peace; but the 
 United States has a larger interest in such an 
 issue of the war than any other nation. Since we 
 became a nation we have gone on developing 
 along peaceful lines. Having had no reason to 
 fear our neighbors and being so remote from 
 Europe that we were not likely to be molested 
 
256 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 from that part of the world, we formed our insti- 
 tutions on the basis of peace. Our public ideals, 
 our sense of citizenship, the aims of our lawmak- 
 ing have all been such as are natural for a nation 
 that has nothing to fear from external enemies. 
 
 One result of the present war is to relegate 
 these ideals into the junk-heap of institutions, un- 
 less we can be assured that peace is a certainty. 
 Under a system of competition between states we 
 cannot afford to be less ready for war than any 
 other great nation. We must have a large navy 
 and a great army ready to meet the blows of any 
 power that feels that it has reason to interfere 
 with our peaceful development. We must be- 
 come a militaristic republic, a thing which seems 
 against nature. When such an attempt has been 
 made in the past, the result has been an oligarchy. 
 In the United States it would probably lead to a 
 sad clash of social classes mingled with vicious 
 party politics and timidity in the national legisla- 
 ture. And yet, under a continuation of the old 
 system it would be folly to endeavor to get along 
 without an army and navy large enough to pro- 
 tect us from the initial swoop of some powerful 
 adversary. 
 
A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 257 
 
 If from this fate the advocate of coopera- 
 tion can offer an escape, it behooves us to listen to 
 his scheme. We should weigh it carefully and 
 be willing to take some kind of a chance to secure 
 its adoption, if in it there is the possibility of suc- 
 cessful operation. 
 
 To be perfectly fair to those who suggest 
 leagues or federations we should remember that 
 we are not dealing with the ideas of pacifists, as 
 such. The schemes that are set forth by the 
 friends of lasting peace come from men who are 
 giving all their energies to the prosecution of the 
 war. They believe, as much as any of us, that 
 the war should be pressed with every ounce of the 
 nation's strength. They are fighting as hard as 
 any one in the country, and they desire the defeat 
 of Germany as much as any soldier or statesman 
 in the world. They are fighting to establish a 
 basis on which the peace of the world can be built. 
 They are not cranks, and even if they are mis- 
 taken, they are honestly trying to call mankind 
 to the better way. 
 
 One of their suggestions is a league of peace, 
 to be composed of the civilized nations. As we 
 have seen, it is loosely organized and does not 
 
258 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 allow the central authority of the league enough 
 power to punish a state that tries to withdraw 
 from the league. Nor does it grant the central 
 authority the right to punish a state which, after 
 submitting its case to the proposed tribunal of 
 arbitration and losing the decision, decides to go 
 to war in defiance of the tribunal's judgment. 
 What would Germany do, for example, if she 
 had lost such a judgment and did not wish to 
 accept her defeat? Strong and well prepared 
 for war, she might disregard all respect for the 
 opinion of the world, if she felt that her future 
 was at stake, and we can hardly doubt that her 
 own people would support her. 
 
 Connected with the idea of a league is the plan, 
 advocated by those who place respect for law 
 above all other considerations, for creating a high 
 court of judicature, with judges selected from all 
 nations, which shall have authority to try and 
 give judgment on all disputes of nations. As a 
 part of a strongly organized federation such a 
 court would have great influence, but if it existed 
 under a league it could hardly have enough 
 authority to secure the obedience of the great 
 states. As for the small states, they never give 
 
A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 259 
 
 trouble any how, except as they act in association 
 with some great state, or as they are threatened 
 by some great power. No union for peace can 
 accomplish its object that does not deal with the 
 great states, and any scheme suggested may leave 
 the small states out of consideration. On the 
 other hand, the small states are deeply interested 
 in forming such a union, since it would give them 
 a safety they could hardly get otherwise. 
 
 The proposed plans for a league of peace and 
 for an international court of arbitration were an- 
 nounced before the war or in its early stages. 
 They were made with an eye to the most that 
 the nations could be induced to give up of their 
 control over their own actions. It is possible that 
 their authors would not follow the same plans if 
 they were forced to make them today. The war 
 has shown us several things. It has revealed 
 Germany's reason for opposing steadily all the 
 real peace plans at the Hague conferences. It 
 has shown us what fate awaits the world after 
 the war, unless there is a return to reason and 
 cooperation. It is possible that in writing out 
 a plan for peace today the gentlemen who met in 
 Carpenters' Hall, Philadelphia, in June, 1915, 
 
260 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 would feel justified in supporting a stronger 
 proposition. 
 
 Mr. H. N. Brailsford, in a book called A 
 League of Nations, London, 1917, announces the 
 outline of a working scheme, which he hopes the 
 friends of peace will consider. Its chief features 
 are: 1. An international court of justice to con- 
 sider and pass on justiciable cases, with a council 
 of conciliation to pass on non- justiciable cases, 
 and a pledge by the states that they will not make 
 war nor mobilize their troops until the court or 
 council has within a stipulated time passed on the 
 several matters in dispute. 2. An executive of 
 the league to take steps, military or economic, 
 to enforce the obligations of the members of the 
 league. 3. The guarantee of the right of seces- 
 sion together with the possibility of expelling a 
 state. 4. A consideration of disarmament on 
 land and sea. 5. An international commission 
 to see that all the signatory powers have access to 
 raw material in manufactures, with a pledge to 
 permit trading among themselves without dis- 
 crimination and to follow the "open door" policy 
 in trade with the undeveloped regions of the 
 world. 
 
A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 261 
 
 In this scheme we see the influence of the war. 
 The author is brought to see that some form of 
 central authority to coerce a state is necessary. 
 On the other hand, he does not allow his league 
 to become a law-making body, an omission that 
 goes far to weaken the united efforts of the 
 league. Guaranteeing the right of secession, also 
 shows that the author of the plan is unwilling to 
 merge the nations into a great state, in which they 
 will each give up a portion of their sovereignty. 
 His plan is a little stronger than the American 
 plan but it nevertheless falls short of being a fed- 
 eration. 
 
 If we are to make a serious attempt to obtain 
 enduring peace by cooperation it behooves us to 
 start on the basis of sufficient force to insure 
 that the attempt will be worth while. If that 
 cannot be done, it is unwise to make the attempt, 
 since to trust ourselves at this juncture to that 
 which we have good reason to believe insufficient 
 only lulls us to a false sense of security and dis- 
 sipates resolution that might with better effect 
 be used in an opposite direction. If we do not 
 have peace through cooperation we must main- 
 tain a sharp state of preparation for war. 
 
262 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 Furthermore, no people can be rallied to a scheme 
 which seems insufficient to them. Give them that 
 which they can trust and they can perhaps be 
 made to support it, in spite of the inconveniences 
 they find in it. 
 
 Probably it is not too much to say that the only 
 form of united action that can be relied on is a 
 federation with enough cohesive force to guard 
 against secession, repress any constituent state 
 that defies the united will, make laws that concern 
 the purposes for which the federation is formed, 
 exercise the right of interpreting those laws by a 
 system of federal courts, and maintain an execu- 
 tive that can make itself obeyed. It need not 
 have these extensive functions for all the areas of 
 government, but it should have them for those 
 things that concern the declaration of war and the 
 preservation of peace. It means that to escape 
 an era of conflict ending, perhaps, in a world 
 united through conquest as the Roman Empire 
 was united, we establish by agreement a world 
 united through federation, as the United States 
 of America were united. A league of nations, 
 under the plans suggested above, would be only 
 a half-way house that would lead to rupture and 
 
A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 263 
 
 failure or to some future struggle out of which 
 a world taught by experience might possibly form 
 "a more perfect union." 
 
 Some of the fundamental ideas of a federation 
 were embodied, as we have seen, in the plans of 
 the Abbe St. Pierre and the philosopher, Kant. 
 Living at a time when the state was conceived as 
 the seat of power, they trusted to force to execute 
 the will of the suggested government that was to 
 provide peace. Bentham, however, was deeply 
 impressed with morality as a force for good gov- 
 ernment, and he was willing to trust his proposed 
 system to the reasonable impulses of men. To 
 him it is possible to reply that if men were so 
 reasonable that they would respect an agreement 
 to settle disputes by arbitration, they would be 
 reasonable enough to avoid the differences which 
 run into such disputes. In our modern world 
 reason thrives best when it is reenforced by au- 
 thority. 
 
 The attempt of Alexander I, of Russia, to ob- 
 tain some practical realization of the principle of 
 a federated Europe in behalf of peace followed 
 these lines as closely as could be expected, but, it 
 must be confessed, in a very lame way. The 
 
264 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 failure of his efforts has been taken as proof that 
 the idea is impracticable. But it does not fol- 
 low that it is impracticable to the same extent and 
 in the same way today as in 1815. No Metter- 
 nich now controls the policy of the majority of 
 the European courts. Republican institutions 
 exist to an appreciable extent in most of them. 
 The mind of Europe is more nearly a unit today 
 than a century ago, and commerce, travel, and 
 international sympathy bind nations together as 
 never before. Moreover all these unifying forces 
 are growing rapidly. When the feeling engen- 
 dered by the war subsides, and it always does 
 subside after a war, the nations will be more con- 
 scious of one another and less willing to chal- 
 lenge one another than before they engaged in 
 the present appalling struggle. In these things 
 there is a hope that the federation of Europe for 
 the preservation of peace would be more possible 
 than in the times of Metternich. I do not mean 
 that all obstacles are removed, but they are fewer 
 than formerly. 
 
 Considering these things I find myself driven, 
 in closing my essay, to a serious examina- 
 tion of the possibility of creating a world federa- 
 
A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 265 
 
 tion out of the chaos that now floats over the 
 globe — not an integrated world empire, with 
 power over all phases of political action, but a 
 federation that will have authority to regulate the 
 forces that make for war. If such a thing could 
 be created and accepted by the states of the world, 
 it would make the present struggle, with all its 
 horrors, the best and most fortunate event that 
 has come to humanity since the beginning of the 
 Christian era. If the war should result in the 
 thorough defeat of the present regime in Ger- 
 many, followed by the creation of a world fed- 
 eration into which Germany should be forced to 
 come, with her pride so reduced that she could 
 be kept obedient to the federation until the virus 
 of world power should get out of her system, the 
 world would have passed a milestone in civiliza- 
 tion, and for our part in it future generations 
 would thank us to the end of time. 
 
 The organization of the American Union in 
 1787-1789 was a similar process on a smaller 
 scale. So many of its features are analogous to 
 conditions that suggest themselves in connection 
 with the proposition of a world federation that it 
 is worth while to recall them. If we are not led 
 
266 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 to conclude that a similar step should be taken 
 at this time in the larger sphere, we shall at least 
 have a clearer idea of what such a federation 
 would mean, and it may happen that we shall 
 conclude that it is not so difficult a thing to estab- 
 lish as appears on first sight. 
 
 Before the war for independence the American 
 colonies it is true, were not as separate as the 
 present European states, but they were so dis- 
 tinct in their ideals and purposes that no one 
 thought their union possible. When Franklin 
 proposed a very mild sort of concentration in 
 1754 his suggestion was rejected in the colonies 
 because it involved the surrender of some of the 
 colonial separateness. Had no pressure come 
 from the outside it is difficult to see what would 
 have forced the thirteen colonies to come together. 
 
 The external pressure was the conviction that 
 Great Britain was about to adopt a policy by 
 which the interests of the colonies would be sub- 
 servient to the interests of British traders, thus 
 destroying their partially avowed hope of a dis- 
 tinctly American policy. Then came seven years 
 of war and four years of fear lest Great Britain 
 should recover through American dissension 
 
A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 267 
 
 what she had lost in the trial of arms. Under 
 such conditions the newly liberated states were 
 willing to form the American union. 
 
 A similar pressure on the nations will exist in 
 the burden of preparedness and the danger of a 
 renewal of the present struggle. The last three 
 years of conflict are more burdensome to the 
 world than the seven years of the American revo- 
 lution to the states engaged against Great Brit- 
 ain. Moreover, the danger of chaotic conditions 
 in the future is as great as the danger that con- 
 fronted the Americans in 1787. Every period is 
 a critical period in history, but that which follows 
 the present struggle is especially important. 
 
 When our revolution ended a majority of our 
 people thought the old system good enough. 
 The men — and there were many of them — who 
 pointed out the advantages to the western world 
 of a great federated state were pronounced ideal- 
 ists. "Practical" men meant to go on living in 
 a "practical'' way. But the idealists were led by 
 Washington, Madison, and Hamilton, and the 
 logic of events came to their aid. Dissensions 
 appeared, taxes were not paid, and the national 
 debt seemed on the verge of repudiation. Then 
 
268 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 the country was willing to listen to the idealists ; 
 and the American federated state was estab- 
 lished. 
 
 It was received with derision by the publicists 
 of Europe. They could not believe that republi- 
 can government would succeed in an area as large 
 as that of the thirteen states. Their fears were 
 not realized and today most of their descendants 
 live under republican government of some form 
 or other. We should not blame them too much. 
 They had never seen republican government op- 
 erated on a large scale, and they were not able 
 to imagine that it could operate on a large 
 scale. If they could have seen it working with 
 their mind's eye, they would have had confidence 
 in its operation. The Americans were accus- 
 tomed to using their imagination, and seeing the 
 "experiment" working in their imagination, they 
 could adopt it and make it work. 
 
 The greatest obstacle to "federation" in the 
 American constitutional convention was the jeal- 
 ousy of small states toward the large states. 
 Since it would have been unwise to leave any 
 state out of the proposed system, the small states 
 were in a position to make demands. When they 
 
A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 269 
 
 were allowed equality in the senate they became 
 quite reasonable. This obstacle could hardly 
 exist in the formation of a great federation for 
 the elimination of war ; for the small states would 
 probably be the first to accept such a plan, as our 
 small states were most willing to adopt our con- 
 stitution, once it was prepared. It would give 
 them as perfect security as they could desire, 
 and without such a guaranty their continued ex- 
 istence is always precarious. 
 
 Next to the fears of the small states was the 
 unwillingness of many people in the states to give 
 up the idea that only a state should control the 
 happiness of its citizens, and that the union, if 
 formed, would destroy or lessen individual lib- 
 erty. This idea inhered in whatever idea of state 
 sovereignty the people of the day held. To form 
 a federation to enforce peace would undoubtedly 
 limit to some extent the sovereignty of the pres- 
 ent states of Europe. But sovereignty in itself is 
 worth nothing. It exists to give in general some 
 forms of life and dignity to states. If a sur- 
 render of part of a state's sovereignty will give 
 that state immunity from wars perpetually, is it 
 not sovereignty well exchanged? No American 
 
270 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 state suffered because it gave up control over its 
 right to make war, but, on the contrary, it gained 
 immensely. Such a right is a costly necessity, a 
 thing to be held tenaciously as long as we are in 
 a condition which makes wars necessary, but to 
 be given up as quickly as we can do without it. 
 
 To enter a federation would mean that individ- 
 ual nations would give up the right to expand 
 their territories. Germany could not acquire 
 more territory under such a system, unless she 
 got it by agreement of the parties concerned. 
 The British empire could become no larger by 
 any forceful process. But this would not be a 
 hardship. The only real justification of expan- 
 sion is to enlarge trade areas. A federation to 
 eliminate war would necessarily adopt a policy 
 which allowed all states an "open door" in trade. 
 This was one of the essential things in the forma- 
 tion of our union ; for we read that no state shall 
 interfere within its borders with the rights of the 
 citizens of other states to trade there. Under 
 such circumstances territorial expansion becomes 
 useless. 
 
 When the American states were trying to form 
 that simple kind of union that was expressed in 
 
A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 271 
 
 the articles of confederation, Maryland long re- 
 fused to join. She was jealous of the great size 
 of her neighbors and especially of Virginia, 
 whose claim to the Northwest was in general not 
 disputed. Experience showed that her fears 
 were groundless. Virginia not only never be- 
 came a menace to Maryland, but she soon realized 
 that her wide boundaries were worthless to her 
 under a system which guaranteed her against 
 quarrels with her neighbors, and as a result she 
 surrendered her Northwestern lands. Under a 
 federation an undeveloped part of Asia or Africa 
 would be open as freely to Germans as to others 
 for trade, settlement, and the happiness of life, 
 just as our Northwest was open to Virginians, 
 Pennsylvanians, and New Englanders alike. 
 The only thing that Virginia gave up in relin- 
 quishing her lands was the right to call herself a 
 big state, that is, self-glorification, a thing the 
 nations would have to give up in a federation. 
 But might it not be well exchanged for the right 
 to call themselves safe from warfare? 
 
 When the American constitution was being de- 
 bated the small states declared they would not 
 "federate" unless they were given privileges 
 
<m% THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 which guaranteed them against absorption by the 
 large states, while the large states declared they 
 would not "federate" unless it was arranged that 
 the small states should not have the power to de- 
 feat measures that were for the common good. 
 Each side was very honest in suspecting the other, 
 and great patience and persistence were necessary 
 to bring them together in a compromise which 
 gave neither what it at first demanded. For 
 us it is interesting to observe that in actual prac- 
 tice there has never been a time when the large 
 states seemed to threaten to devour the small 
 states, nor a time when the small states placed 
 their welfare against any measure that concerned 
 the general good of the country. The union 
 formed, the people began to debate questions that 
 had nothing to do with this or that state, general 
 policies that cut across great sections of the fed- 
 eration, without regard to the states as such. 
 
 It seems that if a federation of Europe were 
 once formed a development might be expected of 
 a somewhat similar nature. At least, it is not 
 unlikely that the clashes predicted by the doubt- 
 ers would not be as violent as they fear. It 
 seems certain that at once a new class of issues 
 
A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 273 
 
 would engage the minds of the politicians, issues 
 that would spring from the general interests that 
 were conceived essential to life in the new group- 
 ing. It is not possible to say what clashes might 
 grow out of these general issues, but it is probable 
 that the genius of man would be as competent to 
 take care of them as to direct the issues that 
 will arise if the world goes on under a system 
 like that now in use ; for clashes we must have in 
 any event. After all, humanity has to manage 
 its own problems, and there will never be a gov- 
 ernment under which it will not have all it can 
 do to make the doubts of today resolve themselves 
 into the confidence of tomorrow. 
 
 In our American constitution-making one 
 often heard the question, "What will become of 
 the liberties of the citizen of the state under the 
 federation?" The answer was well made at the 
 time: "Will not the citizen of the state still be the 
 citizen of the state, and will not the state continue 
 to guarantee him all that it can now guarantee 
 him? Does he not also pass under the protection 
 of the federation as truly as the citizens of any of 
 the states? All that the federation proposes to 
 do is to take charge of the functions that concern 
 
274 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 the things for which the federation is founded, 
 and these are things to which the states are not 
 so well adjusted as a united government." And 
 so it proved in practice. No American has ever 
 had reason to think his liberty lessened because 
 the union was formed ; and he has been immensely 
 stronger in all his rights on the high seas, in trav- 
 eling abroad, in being safe from the burdens of 
 foreign wars, and in his rights of trade in the ut- 
 termost parts of the earth; for he has been the 
 citizen of a great federation of small states. 
 
 Applying the analogy to the suggested federa- 
 tion of the world it appears that under such a 
 system the citizen of France, Great Britain, Rus- 
 sia, or the United States would in nowise lose his 
 rights under his own government, and he would 
 gain vastly in relief from burdens. He would 
 no longer have to think of wars, his trade rela- 
 tions would be adjusted in such a way that no 
 other man could have what he did not have. In 
 short, for all the purposes for which the federa- 
 tion was founded he would stand on equal footing 
 with any other man, and for the purposes for 
 which his own state existed he would have all the 
 rights he had before. His only losses would be 
 
A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 275 
 
 in casting off the burdens that grow out of inter- 
 national rivalry under the present system. 
 
 One of the things for which the American 
 union was created was the payment of the revolu- 
 tionary debts. Compared with the debts the 
 colony had incurred individually before the revo- 
 lution, and compared with their ability to pay 
 them at the time, these debts were large, although 
 they proved, under the union, a very small bur- 
 den. It was the sense of security under a gov- 
 ernment which had eliminated the possibility of 
 interstate wars that made the burden light. 
 
 The amount of indebtedness that the several 
 nations in the present war have contracted seems 
 appalling. It would become a comparatively 
 light burden, if we could feel that for the future 
 the world had nothing to do but to pay it. The 
 waste of interstate rivalry, the burden of prepara- 
 tions for future wars, the loss to industry through 
 uncertainties on account of wars, all these things 
 would disappear from the consideration of the 
 financiers, the credit of a federated world would 
 become excellent, and bonds that are likely to be 
 quoted very low when the artificial stimulus they 
 get from patriotism is taken away would be con- 
 
276 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 sidered better investments than any bonds ever 
 offered under the existing system of states. The 
 capitalists of the world, like the American cap- 
 italists of 1787-1789, should be the most earnest 
 supporters of federation. 
 
 In the United States a great deal has been said 
 about "entangling alliances." As the term was 
 used a century ago it meant an alliance that was 
 likely to make us parties to the quarrels of Euro- 
 pean states, one against the other. Into such a 
 maze of selfish maneuvers it would never be well 
 for us to enter. But to take our place in a fed- 
 eration to preserve peace would be quite another 
 thing. That it would pledge us to the discharge 
 of a duty is not to be doubted; but we should be 
 entering no intrigue. We should be doing the 
 most patriotic thing possible; for the very es- 
 sence of the act would be to protect ourselves 
 from the possibility of being drawn into "en- 
 tangling alliances" with Europe. Let us sup- 
 pose that the old system is continued, and that 
 Germany has a mind to pay off what she may 
 consider an old score. Suppose she tries to set 
 Mexico up against us, or to induce Japan to 
 attack the Philippines, or to interfere with any 
 
A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 277 
 
 weaker American government in such a way as 
 to threaten the integrity of the Monroe doctrine, 
 have we not an "entangling alliance" on hand? 
 If Germany emerges from the present war strong 
 enough to threaten the world as before the war, 
 when other nations found it necessary to form 
 ententes against her, we shall not dare remain 
 outside of some kind of alliance that will be 
 formed to check her pretensions. World federa- 
 tion is the guaranty against the formation of 
 "entangling alliances" on the part of the United 
 States. 
 
 In drawing the parallels between the forma- 
 tion of our union and the possible creation of a 
 federation of nations, it is hard to avoid the infer- 
 ence that the two systems lead to the same end, 
 federated general government. And yet they 
 are not the same. Our union was created to take 
 over a large area of government which the indi- 
 vidual states could not conduct successfully. It 
 has a direct bearing on the citizens of the states, 
 it even has its own citizenship, although it was a 
 long time after 1787 before it was defined. It 
 has popular elections, a postal system, and hun- 
 dreds of other things which no one would allot to 
 
278 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 the kind of federation discussed here. It has 
 been cited only for the argument that can legiti- 
 mately be derived from analogous conditions re- 
 lating to the difficulties of forming the union. 
 
 A world federation, on the other hand, could 
 have only one main purpose, the preservation of 
 peace. No other bonds should knit it together 
 except those which exist for that purpose. They 
 would be strong enough for the strain that would 
 be put upon them, and no stronger. They would 
 be made for a specific object by persons who 
 would be careful that they were properly made. 
 A federation of this kind could not be adopted 
 until it was approved by the authorities in the 
 constituent nations, which would guarantee that 
 it did not sacrifice the individuality of those 
 nations. In fact, so great would be the obstacles 
 at this point that it is safe to say that there would 
 be more danger that the federation would be too 
 weak rather than that it would be too strong. 
 
 Here ends this statement of the arguments for 
 the only possible plan of cooperation that will, if 
 adopted, give the world enduring peace. It 
 would be easier to form a league to enforce peace 
 
A FEDERATION OF NATIONS 279 
 
 by arbitration and moral suasion than to form a 
 federation with power sufficient to enforce its 
 decrees. But a league would in all probability 
 be flouted by the states as often as their interests 
 seemed to them to make it advisable. Reverting 
 to the analogy of our own formative period in 
 national government, a league would be like our 
 articles of confederation, weak and insufficient 
 because they did not authorize the central govern- 
 ment to coerce a recalcitrant state. As a step 
 toward a more desirable end the articles of fed- 
 eration were worth while: as a similar step a 
 league of nations might be better than nothing, 
 but it would not lead to the end to which the 
 world is looking. 
 
 The idea of a federation of nations has been 
 behind many a philosopher's dream. Jesus 
 looked forward to it when he offered the world 
 "my peace," and many another has held that 
 somewhere in the shadowy future a millennial era 
 of super-government and peace will fall upon 
 the earth. It would be a great thing if at this 
 day we could take a step toward the realization 
 of an ideal whose universality attests its desir- 
 ability. The "fruits of Waterloo" were lost a 
 
280 THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO 
 
 century ago by a wide margin, due to the less per- 
 fect comprehension the world then had of the 
 advantages of federated peace. If they are lost 
 at the end of this war it will be by a smaller 
 discrepancy. Some time they will be secured, 
 not because men have dreamed of them ; but be- 
 cause, in such a case at least, dreams are but "sup- 
 pressed desires." 
 
 The writer of a book can do no more than raise 
 his voice to the people who do things. To that 
 large class who make things happen he can only 
 give impulse and hope. His cry goes to those 
 who govern, to those who direct the press, and to 
 all citizens who feel responsibility for the forma- 
 tion of good public opinion. If he speaks to 
 them faithfully and without prejudice or mere 
 enthusiasm, he has done all he can do. The re- 
 sults are on the knees of the gods. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Adams John Quincy and the 
 Monroe Doctrine, 79. 
 
 Agadir, 171. 
 
 Aix-la-Chapelle, Conference of, 
 66. 
 
 Albania, in the Balkan war of 
 1912-1913, 89, 125, 126; or- 
 igin of, 106, 108, 121. 
 
 Alexander I, of Russia, 155; 
 his peace plans, 36, 45-63; 
 his personal qualities, 46; his 
 education, 46-48; and the 
 Treaty of Tilsit, 49; eyes 
 opened to Napoleon, 50; his 
 friendship for France, 51 ; 
 "grouped" by Castlereagh, 
 52; signs treaty of Chau- 
 mont, 52; enters Paris in 
 1814, 54; at Congress of 
 Vienna, 55; and Poland, 56; 
 and the Holy Alliance, 59- 
 64; and Baroness Kriidener, 
 60; and the Conference of 
 Aix-la-Chapelle, 66; at Con- 
 ference at Troppau, 68-70; 
 his change of policy, 70; and 
 the Greek war of indepen- 
 dence, 77; and a federation 
 of nations, 263. 
 
 Algeciras, Conference at, 168 
 
 Alliance, the Treaty of, 65; the 
 Quadruple, 65, 66, 67; the 
 Quintuple, 66, 67, 68, 69, 79; 
 
 disruption of, 69. See Holy 
 Alliance. 
 
 Alsace and Lorraine, 92. 
 
 American Peace Society, 37. 
 
 Armageddon, 1-5, 15. 
 
 Austria and the Greek war of 
 independence, 77; and the 
 revolution of 1848, 86; and 
 Congress of Berlin, 89, 113, 
 114; and Balkan War of 
 1912-1913, 89; and the Triple 
 Alliance, 93; acquires rights 
 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
 115; and the revolt in Crete, 
 119; takes over Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina, 120; interest in 
 the Balkan War of 1912- 
 1913, 124-126, 128. See Met- 
 ternich. 
 
 Austria-Hungary, see Austria. 
 
 Autocracy, an obstacle to per- 
 manent peace, 216-224; qual- 
 ities of, 217; in Germany, 219, 
 220-222; in Russia, 219; fu- 
 ture bearing of German fi- 
 nances on, 242-246. 
 
 Balance of Power, 90; under 
 Bismarck's policy, 93; after 
 Bismarck, 96; affected by the 
 Entente Cordiale, 99; by the 
 Triple Entente, 100, 101. 
 
 Balance of Power, failure of the 
 
 281 
 
282 
 
 INDEX 
 
 theory, 157, 162; breaks down 
 in practice, 234-236. 
 
 Balkan States, history of, 103- 
 131; Turkish rule over, 104; 
 spirit of nationality in, 108; 
 growing power of, 119; a 
 "tinder-box," 120; the war 
 against Turkey, 122-127; The 
 Balkan League, 122. 
 
 Balkan War of 1912-1913, 89. 
 
 Belgium, and the revolution of 
 1830, 79. 
 
 Bentham, Jeremy, on perpetual 
 peace, 32-34; and a federa- 
 tion of nations, 263. 
 
 Berlin, Congress of, 89. 
 
 Bethman-Hollweg, and the 
 Moroccan question, 171. 
 
 Bismarck, builder of the Ger- 
 man Empire, 91 ; policy to- 
 wards France, 92, 93; and 
 the Three Emperors' League, 
 93; and the Triple Alliance, 
 93-94 ; his retirement, 95, 143 ; 
 his German policy, 140-143; 
 not for Pan-Germanism, 148; 
 his foreign policy, 157. 
 
 Boer war, Germany's attitude 
 in, 97, 99. 
 
 Bosnia, 108; Austria acquires 
 rights in, 115; taken over by 
 Austria, 120, 121. 
 
 Brailsford, H. N., his idea of a 
 league of nations, 260. 
 
 Bryce, Lord, attitude toward 
 federated peace, 15. 
 
 Bulgaria, origin of, 105, 106; its 
 position under Turkey, 108; 
 national feeling in, 109; at 
 the Conference of Paris, 110; 
 in the war of 1877, 113; "Big 
 
 Bulgaria," 114; acquires East 
 Rumelia, 117; growing power 
 of, 119; declares complete in- 
 dependence, 120; in the Bal- 
 kan War of 1912-1913, 122- 
 127. 
 Biilow, Chancellor von, 171. 
 
 Canning, George, and the Span- 
 ish Colonies, 78 ; and the Mon- 
 roe Doctrine, 79; welcomes 
 end of the Alliance, 83. 
 
 Carnegie Endowment for Inter- 
 national Peace, 38. 
 
 Cartels, compared with trusts, 
 xiii-xvi. 
 
 Castlereagh, Lord, 154; his rela- 
 tions with Alexander I, 51; 
 and treaty of Chaumont, 52; 
 goes to Paris, 55; his idea of 
 the Concert of Europe, 65; 
 and the Treaty of Alliance, 
 65-67 ; at Troppau, 68, 69 ; his 
 relation to the Concert of Eu- 
 rope, 74; his object, 81. 
 
 Chaumont, Treaty of, 52-53; 
 Castlereagh on the application 
 of, 69. 
 
 "Christian Republic" of Henry 
 IV, 24, 25. 
 
 Concentration, laws of, in so- 
 ciety, xii-xvi; progress of, 
 247-251. 
 
 Concert of Europe, theory of, 
 49, 53, 65; its character, 81; 
 its condition after the end of 
 the Alliance, 84; and the 
 struggle of Mehemet Ali, 85; 
 and the Crimean War, 86; 
 and other mid-century wars, 
 88; and Congress of Berlin, 
 
INDEX 
 
 283 
 
 89; and the Balkan War of 
 1912-1913, 89, 124-127; its 
 new meaning, 90; and the 
 revolution of the Greeks, 107; 
 and the Crimean War, 110; 
 defied by Moldavia and Wal- 
 lachia, 111; and the Congress 
 of Berlin, 114, 116; and 
 Crete, 118; defied by Balkan 
 League, 123; incompetent to 
 deal with the situation of 
 1913-1914, 130; and the Mo- 
 roccan incidents, 167-173; 
 failure of, in 1914, 180-182, 
 201, 234-236. 
 
 Conference of Paris, see Paris. 
 
 Congo, French, given up, 172. 
 
 Congress of Berlin, 89, 113. 
 
 Congress of Vienna, disappoint- 
 ments of the, 55; cause of its 
 failure, 58. 
 
 Congress of London on Balkan 
 situation, 1913, 124. 
 
 Contract theory of the origin of 
 the state, 232-234. 
 
 Crete, revolt in, 118. 
 
 Crimean War, 86, 109. 
 
 Cuza, John, 111. 
 
 Cyprus, handed over to Great 
 Britain, 116. 
 
 Debt, public, makes for feder- 
 ation, 238-242. 
 
 Delcasse, Theophile, his foreign 
 policy, 98, 100, 101, 163-168; 
 and the Fashoda incident, 
 162; building up French colo- 
 nial power, 163-168; dismissed 
 at the demand of Germany, 
 167. 
 
 Democracy, not an absolute 
 
 safeguard against recurring 
 
 wars, 223. 
 Dual Alliance, 95, 96. 
 Dueling, how abolished, 232. 
 Dum-dum bullets, 3, 5. 
 
 Economic competition as an ob- 
 stacle to peace, 206-211. 
 
 Economic laws not unchange- 
 able, 210; sometimes opposed 
 to nationality, 216. 
 
 England, see Great Britain. 
 
 "Entangling alliances" and a 
 federation, 276. 
 
 Entente Cordiale, The, formed, 
 99, 162. 
 
 Fashoda Incident, the, 98, 162. 
 
 Federation, definition of, 23. 
 
 Federation of Nations, why it 
 would now have better chance 
 of success than in 1815-1818, 
 72-76; discussion, 261-264; 
 why a federation is better 
 than a league, 261-273; anal- 
 ogy with the American con- 
 stitution, 267-276; differences 
 pointed out, 277 ; the idea held 
 up, 278-280; arguments for, 
 229-253. 
 
 Ferdinand, Crown Prince of 
 Austria, 178, 180. 
 
 Fez, the French in, 171. 
 
 Finances, national debts make 
 for federation, 238-242, 275. 
 
 France, attitude toward feder- 
 ated peace, 15; Alexander I's 
 friendship for, 51-53; and the 
 Spanish colonies, 78 ; the revo- 
 lution of 1830, 79; and the 
 
INDEX 
 
 wars of Mehemet Ali, 85 ; and 
 the revolution of 1848, 86; 
 and the Crimean War, 86; 
 War against Prussia, 188; in 
 Franco-Prussian War, 91 ; 
 later relations with Germany, 
 91; new attitude towards 
 Great Britain, 97; influence 
 of Delcasse, 98; and Entente 
 Cordiale, 99; and Triple En- 
 tente, 100; and the revolu- 
 tion of the Greeks, 107; ex- 
 tends rule over Tunis, 116; in 
 Franco-Prussian War, 141 ; 
 military training in, 147; for- 
 eign policy under Delcasse, 
 163-168; in Morocco, 164, 166- 
 173; gives up the Congo for 
 Morocco, 172; her position 
 after war with Prussia, 201; 
 future relations with Great 
 Britain, 250. 
 
 Francis Joseph, of Austria, 178. 
 
 Franco-Prussian War, 88; and 
 the Balance of Power, 90. 
 
 Franklin, Benjamin, his propo- 
 sal for union, 266. 
 
 Frederick William III and the 
 Holy Alliance, 62. 
 
 Freedom of the seas, 159. 
 
 Gentz, Frederick von, on the 
 Congress of Vienna, 55-57, 58. 
 
 George, Lloyd, attitude toward 
 federated peace 15. 
 
 Gerard, James W., xiii. 
 
 Germany, attitude of, toward 
 federated peace, 13; opposed 
 plans of Hague Conference, 
 38; and the revolutions of 
 1848, 86; under Bismarck's 
 
 policy, 93-95; under his suc- 
 cessors, 95; policy during the 
 Boer War, 97; growing an- 
 tagonism toward Great Brit- 
 ain, 97; later relations with 
 Austria, 91; and Three Em- 
 perors' League, 93; his influ- 
 ence for peace, 94, 95; under 
 his successors, 94; attitude 
 during the Boer War, 99; 
 gets nothing at the Congress 
 of Berlin, 117; and the Balkan 
 War of 1912-1913, 125, 128; 
 ideals and organization of, 
 132-153; her broken faith, 
 132-134; and Mittel-Europa, 
 134; a better Germany, 134, 
 136, 146-148; development of 
 pernicious ideals in, 136-138; 
 under the heel of Napoleon, 
 138; re-making the army of 
 Prussia, 139; under Bis- 
 marck's lead, 140-143; Kultur 
 of, 144; and Militarism, 146- 
 148; the work of intellectual 
 leaders, 148-152; national ego- 
 tism, 153; peaceful attitude 
 under Bismarck, 157; under 
 Wilhelm II, 158; growth of 
 manufactures, 158; building 
 a navy, 159; growing military 
 power of, 160; Pan-German 
 hopes, 161; isolated by Del- 
 casse during the Boer War, 
 162; eyes turned to Turkey, 
 165; in the Moroccan inci- 
 dents, 166-173; attempt to 
 win over Great Britain, 174; 
 alarmed by growing power of 
 rivals, 176; her plans in be- 
 ginning the Great War, 177; 
 
INDEX 
 
 285 
 
 short-sighted policy in war, 
 182, 183; a mild treatment 
 after her defeat, 194, 196-202; 
 economic reasons for engag- 
 ing in war, 209; autocracy in, 
 219, 220-222, 224; parties in, 
 225; influence of munition 
 makers, 226; influence of the 
 military men, 227; future in- 
 fluences on surrounding na- 
 tions, 235-240; future rela- 
 tions with Austria, 237-239; 
 influences of finances, 238- 
 242 ; autocracy threatened, 
 242-246; in a possible league 
 of peace, 258 ; reasons for op- 
 posing, 259. See also Bis- 
 marck; see Prussia. 
 
 Grand Design, of Henry IV, 24, 
 25. 
 
 Great Britain, attitude toward 
 federated peace, 15; attitude 
 towards peace in the Napol- 
 eonic wars, 45; approached by 
 Alexander I to establish a 
 peace agreement, 48; and the 
 Spanish American colonies, 
 78; and Turkey, 85; and the 
 Crimean War, 86; and the 
 Conference of Paris of 1856, 
 87; policy during Bismarck's 
 era, 96; new attitude towards 
 Germany, 96; new attitude to- 
 wards France, 97; forms the 
 Entente Cordiale, 99; and the 
 revolution of the Greeks, 107; 
 in the Crimean War, 109; at 
 the conference of Paris, 110; 
 influence over Turkey, 112, 
 115-117; at Congress of Ber- 
 lin, 113, 115-117; and Cyprus, 
 
 116; and Suez Canal, 116; in 
 Persia, 128, 174; imperiled by 
 German success, 133, 134; 
 former isolation in Europe, 
 157; and the German naval 
 program, 159; reenters Conti- 
 nental politics, 162; position 
 in Egypt recognized, 166; 
 supports France in third 
 Moroccan incident, 172; nec- 
 essary for her to enter the 
 war, 182; probable course if 
 Russia becomes aggressive, 
 202; future relations with 
 France, 250. 
 
 Greece and Balkan War of 
 1912-1913, 89. 
 
 Greece, beginnings of modern, 
 107; the revolt against Tur- 
 key, 107; acquires Thessaly, 
 117; and Cretan revolution, 
 118; growing power of, 120; 
 in the Balkan War of 1912- 
 1913, 122-127. 
 
 Greek war of independence, 77. 
 
 Hague Conferences to promote 
 
 peace, the, 37. 
 Hague tribunal and the Mo- 
 roccan question, 169. 
 Hatred as an implement in war, 
 
 195-197. 
 Hegel, his relation to the peace 
 
 plans, 35; philosophy of war, 
 
 35, 220. 
 Henry IV, his Grand Design, 
 
 24. 
 Hertling, Chancellor von, on 
 
 federated peace, 13. 
 Herzegovina, 108; Austria ac- 
 
286 
 
 INDEX 
 
 quires rights in, 115; taken 
 over by Austria, 120, 121. 
 Holy Alliance, 36; history of, 
 59-64 ; terms of, 61 ; discussed, 
 62-64; compared with the 
 Treaty of Alliance, 66; taken 
 up by Metternich, 72. 
 
 Internationalism, 10-12. 
 
 Italy, attitude toward federated 
 peace, 15; wars for libera- 
 tion, 88; and the Triple Alli- 
 ance, 93; and her right to 
 Tripoli, 164; weakened rela- 
 tion with the Triple Alliance, 
 164, 174; war in Tripoli, 174. 
 
 Japan — effect of her war with 
 Russia, 99; alliance with 
 Great Britain, 100. 
 
 Junkers, character of, 141, 145. 
 See Autocracy. 
 
 Kant, Immanuel, his plan for 
 peace, 34; error in his theory, 
 232-234; and a federation of 
 nations, 263. 
 
 Krudener, Baroness, 60. 
 
 Kultur, discussion of, 144-146. 
 
 La Harpe, Frederic C6sar de, 
 46, 47, 48, 50. 
 
 League, definition of, 23. 
 
 League of peace, probable 
 working of, 257-261. See 
 Federation of Nations. 
 
 "League to Enforce Peace," 
 formed in 1915, 39. 
 
 Lincoln, President, his way of 
 dealing with conquered peo- 
 ple, 195. 
 
 Mars, his Day, 6, 20. 
 
 Maryland, hesitating to accept 
 union, 271. 
 
 Mehemet Ali, 84-86. 
 
 Metternich, Prince, 154, and 
 the Holy Alliance, 62; and 
 the Treaty of Alliance, 65 ; on 
 the situation in Naples, 67; 
 at Troppau, 68; gets support 
 of Alexander I, 70-72; and 
 the Greek war of independ- 
 ence, 77; end of his power, 
 83; his influence not existent 
 to-day, 264-276. 
 
 Military Class in Germany, in- 
 fluence of, 227. 
 
 Mittel-Europa, 134, 141, 177, 
 185; its strength, if estab- 
 lished, 185; how to prevent 
 its formation, 186; future of, 
 237. 
 
 Moldavia, 105, 110; united with 
 Wallachia, 111. 
 
 Monroe Doctrine, 79. 
 
 Montenegro, origin of, 106, 
 108; opens the Balkan War, 
 123; takes Scutari, 124, 126. 
 
 Morocco, French rights in, 164; 
 position of, 166; German in- 
 terference in, 167-173. 
 
 Munition makers, influence of, 
 226. 
 
 Naples, revolution in, 67, 73, 76. 
 
 Napoleon I, repressing his 
 spirit, 18; hatred felt for, 43; 
 and Russia in 1807, 49; his 
 severe treatment of Prussia, 
 138-140. 
 
 Napoleonic wars, and perma- 
 nent peace, 17-21. 
 
INDEX 
 
 287 
 
 Nationality, an obstacle to per- 
 manent peace, 214. 
 Nicholas II, of Russia, 37. 
 Novi-Bazar, sanjak of, 122. 
 
 Obstacles to permanent peace, 
 205-228. 
 
 Pan-Germanism, 148, 161; be- 
 hind the Great War, 177-179. 
 
 Panther, the, at Agadir, 171. 
 
 Paris, conference of, 86-110; 
 Declaration of, 87. 
 
 Patriotism, false, an obstacle 
 to peace, 211. 
 
 Peace Societies, development 
 of, 37. 
 
 Penn, William, his plan for 
 peace, 26, 32. 
 
 Persia, occupied by Great Brit- 
 ain and Russia, 128, 174. 
 
 Phillips, W. A., on the Quad- 
 ruple Alliance, 67. 
 
 Pitt, William, reception of 
 Alexander I's suggestions, 
 47, 48, 65. 
 
 Poland, Alexander I's support 
 of, 56; revolution in, 80. 
 
 Prussia, supported peace pol- 
 icy of tsar in 1815, 17; war 
 against Austria, 88, 91; 
 against France, 91; creates 
 the German Empire, 91. See 
 Germany, Holy Alliance, and 
 Frederick William III. 
 
 Quadruple Alliance. See Alli- 
 ance. 
 
 Quintuple Alliance. See Alli- 
 ance. 
 
 Revolutionary movement of 
 1830, 79-80. 
 
 Rousseau, his plan for peace, 
 31, 35. 
 
 Rumania, origin of 105, 106; 
 under Russian protection, 
 108; national feeling in, 109; 
 Russian protectorate abol- 
 ished, 110; union of Moldavia 
 and Wallachia, 111; in the 
 war of 1877, 113; growing 
 power of, 120; enters the 
 Balkan War of 1912-1913, 
 127. 
 
 Russia, recent progress of 
 events in, 8-11; friendly to 
 peace under Alexander I, 17- 
 19, 45; and the Greek war of 
 independence, 77; and Tur- 
 key, 84; in the Crimean War, 
 86, 109; and war of 1877, 88; 
 and Bismarck, 93; and Dual 
 Alliance with France, 95; 
 effect of Russo-Japanese war, 
 99; enters Triple Entente, 
 100; and the revolution of 
 the Greeks, 107; nourishes 
 Balkan hopes, 109; at the 
 Conference of Paris, 110; war 
 against Turkey in 1877, 112; 
 her hopes for a "Big Bul- 
 garia," 114; unable to aid 
 Serbia in 1908, 121; and the 
 Balkan War of 1912-1913, 
 126-128; in Persia, 128, 174; 
 possible future aggression of, 
 202; autocracy in, 219; un- 
 certain part in the future, 
 236. See Alexander I. 
 
 San Stefano, treaty of, 88, 113. 
 
288 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Scharnhorst, military reforms 
 in Prussia, 140. 
 
 Serbia, in Balkan War of 
 1912-1913, 89; origin of, 105, 
 106; desire for Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina, 108, 115; na- 
 tional feeling in, 109; be- 
 comes autonomous, 108; in 
 the war of 1877, 113; growing 
 power of, 120; and Austria's 
 assumption of power in Bos- 
 nia and Herzegovina, 120- 
 122; in the Balkan War of 
 1912-1913, 122-127. 
 
 "Self-preservation, the law of," 
 212. 
 
 Shuster, Morgan W., 175. 
 
 South, reconstruction of not a 
 model for Germany, 194, 196- 
 199. 
 
 Spain, revolution in, 67, 73, 76; 
 Alexander I and, 77; revolu- 
 tion of its colonies, 77, 78. 
 
 St. Pierre, Abbe" Castel de, 27- 
 29, 263. 
 
 Stein, Baron vom, 168. 
 
 Submarines, and the United 
 States, 183; if they succeed, 
 184; if they fail, 185-204. 
 
 Suez Canal, 116. 
 
 Sully, Duke of, 24. 
 
 Tariffs and obstacles to per- 
 petual peace, 207-209. 
 
 Three Emperors' League, the, 
 93, 142, 157. 
 
 Tilsit, Treaty of, 49. 
 
 Treaty of Alliance, the, 65. 
 
 Treitschke, Heinrich von, his 
 ability, 149; his ideals, 150, 
 
 177; his influence, 151; his 
 histories, 151. 
 
 Triple Alliance formed, 93, 
 142, 157; its influence, 95, 
 157; balanced by the Triple 
 Entente, 101, 102; weakened 
 by Italy, 164, 174, 201. 
 
 Triple Entente formed, 100; its 
 influence, 162, 173, 174. 
 
 Tripoli, 164. 
 
 Troppau, conference at, 67, 68, 
 69, 71, 72, 74. 
 
 Trusts compared with cartels 
 xiii-xvi. 
 
 Turkey and the Greek war of 
 independence, 77; and Me- 
 hemet Ali, 84-86; and the 
 Crimean War, 86; and war 
 of 1877, 88; rule over Balkan 
 States, 104; revolt of Greece 
 against, 107; and Crimean 
 war, 109-111; under British 
 influence, 112; war of 1877, 
 112; and Crete, 118; and the 
 Balkan War of 1912-1913, 
 122-127; position of in 1913, 
 128; approaching friendship 
 with Germany, 165; and the 
 war in Tripoli, 174. 
 
 Turks, conquer Constantinople, 
 104; hold on the Balkans, 
 104. See Turkey. 
 
 "Turks, the Young," 123. 
 
 Tunis, under French rule, 116, 
 164. 
 
 Union, the American, as a 
 model for a federation of na- 
 tions, 265. 
 
 United States, the, their part 
 in the Great War, 189-193; 
 
INDEX 
 
 289 
 
 constitution of, the adoption 
 of, 267-276; an "experi- 
 ment," 267. See Union, the 
 American. 
 
 Venezelos, Eleutherios, 118. 
 Vienna, threatened by Turks, 
 104. 
 
 Wallachia, 105, 110; united 
 
 with Moldavia, 111. 
 War, the Great, the real cause 
 
 of, 154-156; and Pan-Ger- 
 
 manism, 177, 178, 179; the 
 beginning of, 177-179; the 
 changing character of, 188. 
 
 Wilhelm I, 142; II, ideals of, 
 142; his part in the war, 143; 
 his character, 158; changed 
 German policy under, 158- 
 160; lands in Tangiers, 167; 
 his sons uninjured in the 
 war, 223. 
 
 Wilson, Woodrow, his attitude 
 toward a federated peace, v, 
 12; address of January 22, 
 1917, 12; peace views of, 192. 
 
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