473 
 772 
 C53 
 3py 1 
 
 fm^fi 
 
 C ^4^ S E 
 
 OF 
 
 GENERAL FITZ-.TOHN PORTER. 
 
 mr. choate's 
 
 Argument for Petitioner 
 
 "VsTEST ZPOHnTT, 
 1879. 
 
OF 
 
 GENERAL FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 
 
 mr. choate's 
 
 Argument for Petitioner 
 
 18 7 9. 
 
.C53 
 
ARGLfMENT OF MR. CHOATE, 
 
 COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER. 
 
 ^* Mr. CiioATE said : If the Board i)]ease, I will, as biietiy as I can, oou- 
 clude the argument on the part of the [)etitiouer, and reply, so far as it 
 may seem necessary, to what has been presented on the part of the gov- 
 ernment. I say as briefly as I may, for I have been reminded of the 
 advice that was given by Dr. Breckenridge to a class to whom he was 
 lecturing on the subject of the efticacy of i)rayer, as coinpared with its 
 length, when he said, "Young gentlemen, 1 beg you to remember that 
 the Lord knows something." 
 
 I am going to argue this case u[)on the assumi)tion that this Board 
 knows something of the evidence which has been taken, and which they 
 have been engaged in re(ieiving and examining for a period of six months, 
 and especially something of the laws of war and of the rules of miUtary 
 conduct. We, who represent General Porter, pretend to know very little 
 of the latter subject, and confide entirely in the ample knowledge of the 
 whole subject which this Board ])ossesses. 
 
 At the outset, I wish to express our obligations to the learned Eecorder 
 for the ingenious and instructive argument wliich for the last two days 
 he has been laying before the Board. It is exactly that which we could 
 have wished should be done, namely, that the strongest argument that 
 could possibly be made upon all the facts sliould be ])resented to the 
 Board on behalf of the government before you proceed to decide upon 
 the evidence. In my judgment, the best argument which could be made 
 on behalf of the government, from the facts presented, has now been 
 made. 
 
 More than that, we owe a considerable obligation to the Eecorder for 
 the diligence whicli he has manifested in searching for and procuring 
 evidence supposed to be adverse to the cause of (Treneral Porter. A 
 large part of it consists, in my A'iew, of matter very strongly favorable 
 to the cause of the i)etitioner, and matter which we never could have 
 found by any search or power on our part, lie has gone further than 
 the mere gathering of facts. Every rumor, every suspicion ; yes, I may 
 say, every piece of scandal detriuiental to the interest or conduct of 
 (leneral Porter, in relation to the events of the UTth and L*9th of August, 
 180-5, has now been presented before you. And if, as I hope, notwith- 
 standing all this, 3'our judgment shall arrive at a conclusion favorable 
 to his cause, it must always be said that the search has been fully ex- 
 hausted, and that everything that could possibly be brought into the 
 balance against him has been thrown in. 
 
 As it seems to me, nuich of the closing argument of the Recorder has 
 relieved us of a great deal of responsibility and anxiety and labor ; be- 
 cause, upon the main (luestion of this case, as I have always regarded it, 
 namely, the conduct of General Porter on the afternoon of the l*9th of 
 August, he has now seen tit to i>resent, for the first time, an entirely 
 new view, something altogether different from all that has heretofore 
 been clainu^l, and not only difterent, but absolutely anta.g(mistic to it. 
 If we may accept him as the authorized mouth-piece of the go\erument, 
 or of the prosecution, or of the adverse side which we are to resist or 
 that is to resist us, so that we may take the propositions that he now 
 
 1 CH 
 
presents as final against us, we may dismiss from pur minds all tlie claims 
 that liave heretofore been made in relation to the decisive events of that 
 important <lay. For, wiien we come to discuss that part of the case, I 
 tliink wc shall be able to demonstrate to the Board that the claim of fault 
 on tin' part ofCreneral Porter, ;is now in-esented, is not what General 
 McDowell claimed, either on tlic former trial or upon this examination. 
 It is not what (ienend Pope claimed, eitlier then or in any of the numer- 
 ous and varied i)resent:itions of the case that he has since made. It not 
 only is not the same, but is absolutely hostile and lepu^nant to all those. 
 And, if what he now insists upon does n(>t bear the test of examination, 
 that branch of the case will be entirely ended. 
 
 We are entirely satisfied with the view that the Kecorder has pre- 
 sented ; but in what light it i)laces those two great generals, who have, 
 up to this time, stood in the attitude of accuser and of champion of the 
 accuser, it is not for me to say. It does seem to me, however, that it has 
 been a litth' ungrateful on the ])art of the learned Recorder, for he had 
 a full view of the results of what he was ju-esenting ami of its necessary 
 ert'ects ; ungrateful, foi- instance, to (4eneral McDowell, who, according 
 to his statements made ujton oath in this investigation, has aided the 
 Kecorder in this case, and comiK)sed, for his consideration and use in the 
 ])reparation of it, somewhere from six to twenty written and printed 
 pa])ers. The general intimated at (lovern(n''s Island that he thought he 
 was on trial. I <lid not then understand the trne purport of the renuirk. 
 But now it appears that he was on trial in the mind of the representative 
 of the government, and that by him he has been tried and found want- 
 ing. He hjis thrown him overboard in this case, and turned him out of 
 court with the utmost ignominy, as I tliink I shall demonstrate to yon. 
 And so of (ieneral Poi)e; one would have supposed that the represen- 
 tative of the government, now presenting this case for final consideration, 
 would have tbund in some of the nuiny, the almost countless i)ublica- 
 tions of General Pope on this subject, hostile to General Porter, an ink- 
 ling of the elainj that he has now made. But he, too, is treated with 
 contempt and scorn by this i»rosecution, as I shall show. Now, it will 
 be my unexpected duty, which 1 shall ]n'rform with alacrity, to defend 
 these generals ; and I shall he glad that while defending General Porter 
 I can <lefend General McDowell, also, from what seems to me to be the 
 attempt at com))lete stultitication, which is nuide against him by the 
 learned liecorder. Whatever grievances we may have against that gen- 
 tleman, howeN'cr nnich we may have reason to coinplain of his attitude 
 in the juwious stages of this case, 1 do not think any one on our part 
 has ever dared to suggest, or would be willing to intimate that he was 
 guilty of the stui)idity and ignorance which is inevitably fixed upon 
 him, if you feel called upon to adoi)t the view of the learned Kecorder, 
 presented the day before yesterday for the first time in the whole history 
 of this case. By what moti\'e is he actuated '? Is it to ascertain the 
 truth t Does he believe now, as his argument necessarily concludes, 
 that all the charges that were made on that branch of the case before 
 the conrt-martial, and upon which General P(nter was condemned, that 
 all these serious charges of sixt-'cn years ago were invalid? Does he 
 desire to l)ring (Icneral McDowell into disreiaite i? Does he wish to con- 
 vert this controversy into a third Bull Bun for that distinguished gen- 
 ei-al, as if two wonld not sullice .' I shall, in its juoper ])lace, ask the 
 careful attention of this P>oard to the view which he has set forth, 
 because, as it impresses my mind, it stamps this whole prosecution with 
 contempt, and demands for it the scorn of every intelligent and honest 
 man. 
 
Again, the learned Recorder said — an nnnecessary straAv thrown into 
 tlie scale against General Porter — that he had i>ersonally changed his 
 mind as to the petitioner's guilt or innocence ; that, having coine to this 
 investigation with A'iews favorable to General Porter, he, upon an exami- 
 nation of the case, had been compelled to change his mind. AVell, we shall 
 have to bear that. I do not think that it was necessary, in his oUicial 
 capacity, that he should seek to ])ut that additional burden u]K)n Gen- 
 eral Porter's back. ^Tor did it seem to me that the reasons that lie gave 
 for the change of his views were reasonable, or woi-thy of any consider- 
 ation. You will recollect that he enumerated the causes for his change 
 of mind. But as he has done this, it may not be improper for me to 
 acknowdedge also, a change of mind in regard to the case. For I must 
 confess, almost with shame, tliat for more than fifteen years I Avas one 
 of those heedless and unthin]<ing millions who took it for granted that 
 (reneral Porter was guilty. Xot guilty, if you please, of the atrocious 
 " crimes of whicli he was convicted, because I never knew the exact nature 
 of these charges ; but guilty of something heinous and derogatory to his 
 character as a soldier. I had taken it for granted, as I believe the mil- 
 lions of the iidial)itants of this country had, that a court-martial con- 
 sisting of nine eminent generals sitting in judgment upon their peer, 
 could not liave foun<l him guilty and put ui>on him the brand of infamy, 
 which is conveyed by their sentence, unless he had really committed some 
 fearful crime. AVlien he came to ask me to act for him in a professional 
 capacity, I was obliged to tell him so; and he said, with a manliness 
 which I shall never forget, that he wouhl not ask me to act for him unless 
 upon an examination of the record, and upon the facts that he had to 
 present, I was satisfied of his innocence ; and further even than that, for 
 he ad<led, that if, after taking his case, I should find, as it proceeded 
 and was de\'eloped, any reason to believe him guilty, I should be at 
 liberty to abandon it. Well, I examined the record. I found that the 
 case had not been half tried ; that the trial had taken j^lacein the midst 
 of the frightful excitement of war, when party and sectional passions 
 were at their utmost height, when the disasters in which the war had 
 involved the country had saturated the minds of the people and of almost 
 all the soldiers of the country witli alarm an<l indignation. I found that 
 there were circumstances most unfavorable to Justice in the surround- 
 ings and in the composition of the court which tried him. I found that 
 one-half of the main witnesses cognizant of the facts had not been ac- 
 cessible to him or to the court at the time of the trial. I found that the 
 most able and learned Jurists of the country, in examining the case, had 
 pron<mnced that even upon the record as it stood, there was no evidence 
 fairly, upon the acknowledged principles of Justice, to sustain the con- 
 viction. A personal study of the record satisfied me of his innocence, 
 and when I (;ame to examine his new evidence, not only did it demon- 
 strate that he was not guilty, but that fVu^ the very acts and omissions 
 to act witli which he was charged, he was entitled to the very highest 
 merit and commciidatio)!. So it seemed to me to be not only a high 
 l»rofessional service, but an urgent public; duty to enter into his detense, 
 and to stand by him as long as he needed sui)port. 1 say a public duty, 
 as well as a professional service, because, in my view, this is not (reneral 
 Porter's case alone; it is the cascof the whole Army; it is the case of 
 every honest soldier who marches un(M' our flag ! Yes, it is the case of 
 all the people of this country, for blighting as was the stigma Avhich was 
 jilaced upon him, it rests upon the Army and tlie countiy, too. [ think 
 I shall show you that there never has been a soldier exjiosed to such 
 shame and humiliation, and there never has been an army sutt'ering from 
 2 CH 
 
such a brand as tliis; and if it is undeserved by him and by the Army, 
 why, as the President has said, it is time that it was reviewed and 
 removed. 
 
 The learned Recorder has further said that he did not regard the fact 
 that General Porter had l)een for sixteen years besieging the executive 
 department at AN'ashington for relief as a circumstance entitled to any 
 consideration. But I do. I think that is the first great convincing ar- 
 gument of innocence which ])resents itself upon the threshold of this 
 case before yon look into the CAidence. AVhy, what could have borne him 
 up during all these sixteen years ? Could guilt have done it ? Suppose 
 him to have been guilty of the crimes with which he was charged, should 
 we ever have lieard of the case any more ? Should we ever have heard 
 of General Porter any more, except as bearing his shame to his grave as 
 best he might ? Xo ; a guilty man would never ask for a re-examination 
 of the charges, knowing only too well that if one-half of the proof de- 
 monstrated his guilt, all the knowledge that could be brought trom all 
 the world to bear upon the sulyect would oidy prove it blacker and deeper. 
 Yet I suppose that General Porter, from the I'lst of January, ISOo, until 
 thismoment, has never had a single Avaking hour that has not been inspired 
 with the i)rayer that he might not die until he should be al)le to demon- 
 strate to his countrymen his innocence — should be able to clear his name 
 from this infamous brand that has been put up(m it, and hand it down 
 to his children as i>ure and bright as he received it from ancestors of 
 honor and renown. This conscience which has been im])lauted within 
 us is a great and powerful engine for sui)port or foi' destruction. It may 
 make — Shakesjteare says it does make — "cowards of us all." It may 
 make the great and gallant general, who has sought and found a bubble 
 reputation at the cannon's mouth, qnail at the idea of coming before 
 three of his brother soldiers simply to tell the truth. But when it takes 
 the shape of what Virgil calls the " mens sihi couHcia recti^''^ the heart 
 cons(;ious of its own innocence, it can carry a man, as it has carried Gen- 
 eral l*orter, through perils such as have never yet been found upon the 
 battle-field, and through years of suffering and humiliation to which 
 death itself, at any time, would have been a merciful release. So I submit 
 mit to yon that tlie fact that General l*orter has been asserting his inno- 
 cence, in the face of all the world, from the moment of his conviction until 
 now, is at least entitled to be taken into consideration in passing upon 
 the question of the guilty or innocent intent within the breast of the man, 
 which, after all, constitutes the very gist t>f this in(|uiry. 
 
 AVell, he has maintained this contest, and upon wh^it ground has he 
 ass<>rted it ? 
 
 The learned Recorder is pleased to say, u])on the ground of newly-dis- 
 covered evidence. 
 
 Why, not so entirely, if the Board please. It is on the ground that he was 
 always innocent, that ui)on no facts that could ever be truly stated ought 
 he to have been convicted. And then, upon the further fact that what 
 he asserted upon his original trial, and what the court refused to believe, 
 he could now demonstrate so clearly that any man who runs might read 
 and understand, and must believe it. 
 
 Well, the leained Ivecorder says, why didn't he ask President Lincoln 
 to open his case, if he liad such conlideiu-e in it himself.' and several 
 questions of that sort have been asked by the learned Recorder, which 
 inq)ly a forgetfulness of facts, facts proved in the case on his own part. 
 There has not been a President at the White House from the day of his 
 sentence to this, beibre whom he has not laid his case; and as to Presi- 
 dent Liiu'oln, we expressly ])ro\ed an application on the ])art of Governoi' 
 2sewell, representing the i>etiti(mer ; and we have always believed that if 
 
President Lincoln had not been taken away l)y tlie bullet of the assassin, 
 we should have had Justice at his hands. But — and I beg the attention 
 of the court to this tact — urgently as he has presented his appeal, just 
 as urgently has it been resisted from other quarters. It is not for us to 
 inquire or to know who has had an interest to prevent the question of 
 General Porter's guilt or innocence being inquired into, but somebody 
 has done it. And I rather think that the opposition has come from more 
 sources than one. One of them is apparent upon this record : General 
 Pope, his original accuser, has always, except u])on one occasion, the 
 sincerity of which I do most truly doubt, been resisting the effort and 
 inquiry, and has, down to this moment, been standing in the way of 
 justice. I conceive that nothing but a consciousuess of absolute inno- 
 cence could have carried General Porter through to his present position 
 in this case against such obstacles. 
 
 POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE BOARD. 
 
 Now, we have the first result of all these strenuous efforts upon his 
 part, the order for the constitution of this Board. The learned Recorder, 
 from motives that I cannot understand, and from a view of the case which 
 he has not disclosed, has studiously undertaken to behttle the functions 
 of this Board. Ah, he says, it is to be regretted that this Board has no 
 judicial functions. Judicial functions! A dignified board of eminent 
 soldiers, ordered by the President of the IJnited States, and commanded 
 to ascertain the truth of this controversy — for it is a controversy with 
 sides, as it appears — and he a member of the Board, what object could 
 tempt him to impute to it insignificance and a lack of judicial functions ? 
 I had always thought that the highest function of judicial bodies, the 
 highest aad the grandest, was the ascertainment of truth ; and when it 
 takes the shape of the ascertainment of the truth of a point of history, 
 which involves the good name not only of a gallant soldier, but of a 
 great army, and a great nation, human justice can attain to nothing 
 higher. And so it did seem to me that this reflection upon the Board of 
 which he is a constituent member was wholly uncalled for. 
 
 Again, he regrets that this Board has no power to summon witnesses, 
 or, as he terms it, compel the attendance of witness. Well, who has 
 been hurt by that ? Who has not come that was wanted l)y us or by 
 the Board ? One man and one only. There is one big fish who has 
 escaped from the meshes of this judicial net, the great general who stands 
 behind this prosecution, holding up its arms. But is it for the learned 
 Eecorder, especially in view of the tender and confidential relations 
 which seem to have existed between himself and General Pope, to regret 
 that this Board has not had the power to drag him across the continent, 
 and to place him a reluctant witness upon the stand, and have the truth 
 drawn out of him as by the forceps of the dentist ! Yet these are his 
 reflections ; these are his regrets, and I have no doubt that, as I think 
 I shall show you, it is General Pope's regret, which the Eecorder has 
 uttered, that the suggestion originated from him, that this Board has 
 not the power to compel the attendance of witnesses. And considering 
 the defiant attitude in which that gentleman stands to this case, and to 
 this Board, I think that the suggestion is cool, even for AVest Point, in 
 the month of January. 
 
 I submit that this Board has the most ample powers for the discharge 
 of the duty imposed ui)on it. For the one thing that we have missed, 
 the personal presence of General Pope, I do think we shall be able to 
 get along without. I do think we shall be able first to ascertain what 
 General Pope's views are, and, second, to put them to a competent aualy- 
 
6 
 
 sis by eoiiiparisou with the facts as they have been proved here, just as 
 well without his presence as with it. 
 
 AUTHORITY FOR THE BOARD. 
 
 Now, if the Board please, I wish to read the application of General 
 Porter, and the order organizing- this Board, to show what its functions 
 are. 
 
 To His Excflleiioy Ki'THKRI-ord B. Hayks, 
 
 J'residoit of the United SIdtes : 
 
 Sir : I most respectfully, but most urgently, renew my oft-repeated appeal to have 
 you review my case. I ask it as a matter of long-delayed justice to myself. I renew 
 it upon the ground heretofore stated, that public justice cannot be satisfied so long as 
 my a]>peal remains unheard. My sentence is a continuing sentence, and made to fol- 
 low my daily life. Yav this reason, if for no other, my case is ever within the reach 
 of executive as well as legislative iuteifcrence. 
 
 I beg to jtresent copies of papers heretofore presented bearing upon my case, and 
 trust that you Avill deem it a projier one for your prompt and favorable consideration. 
 If I do not make il i)lain that I have been Avrouge<l, I alone am the sutferer. If I do 
 make it plain that great injustice has been done me, then I am sure that you, and all 
 others who love truth and, justice, Avill be glad that the oppportnnity for my viudica- 
 tion has not been denied. 
 
 Verv respectfuUv. vours. 
 
 FITZ-JOHX POKTKR. 
 
 Then follows the order of the President organizing the Board : 
 
 In order that the President may be fully informed of the facts of the case of Fitz- 
 John Porter, late major-general of volunteers, and be enabled to act advisedly upon 
 his application for relief in said case, a Board is hereby convened by order of the Presi- 
 dent. 
 
 This is what it is to do : 
 
 To examine, in connection Avith the record of the trial by court-martial of Major- 
 General Poi'tei-, such new evidence relating to the merits of said case as is now on file 
 in the War Department, together with such other evidence as may be presented to 
 said Board, and to report, w ith the reasons for their conclusion, what action, if any, 
 in their opinion, justice requires should be taken on said application bj' the President. 
 
 One would think that there was an order from an unquestionable 
 source of authority, which did constitute a judicial tribunal for one of the 
 highest judicial purposes ever known to history. 
 
 Well, then, at the outset, questions arose how yon "W'ere to proceed, 
 and I have noticed a disi)osition on the ])art of the learned Recorder to 
 hamper you by technical I'ules and restrictions ; but we do not under- 
 stand that there is any reason for putting fetters upon the action or 
 power of this Board. What is it that you have to do — what is the object ? 
 Truth, is it not ? Truth, and the wliole truth, is the only object; and 
 jUvStice, pure justice, is the simple end of it. 
 
 The record of the court-martial is submitted to you first, but in con- 
 nection with everything else in the nature of evidence which nni>' be 
 brought before you. " You are to fully inform the President of the facts 
 of the case," so as to enable him to act advisedly on the ap])lication for 
 relief, and to report your conclusion with your reasons. 1 think my 
 learned friend, the Pecordcr, might have cudgeled his brains for a good 
 many years before he could have framed an order, the sco]»e of which 
 would be nu)re full and large, to enable the Board to attain the oidy ob- 
 ject which this ]u'titioner in askiug, and, as I believe, the President in 
 organizing the Board, lias ever had, namely, complete and final justice. 
 
 Now, the nature of General Porter's claim, I wish it to be understood, 
 is not for ])ardon hut for justice only, lie does not ask for pardon, as a 
 condemned and guilty defendant, but he asserts now, as he has always 
 asserted, his entire innocence of all guilt, and asks that that maybe de- 
 clared. Complete innocence, perfect, unconditional loyalty is what he 
 
asserts for himself, and what we, upon the record now before you, assert 
 for liini. 
 
 THE president's POWER. 
 
 And that raises a question, I supjwse, of the power of the President 
 in this uuitter of the constitution of this Boar<l. In res[)ect to that I 
 liave a suggestion to make. At one time, when General Porter was 
 making one of these renewed appeals for executive interference in this 
 case, influences, which,. I suppose, were the same as have so long thwarted 
 his application for justice, prevailed in procuring an act of Congress, 
 Avhicli I will now read to you. It is to be found in the loth Statutes, 
 page 125, and is known as "An act declaratory of the law in regard to 
 ofi&cers cashiered or dismissed from the Army by sentence of a general 
 court-martial." 
 
 Be it enacted hy the Senate and House of Bepresentatives of the United States of America 
 in Congress assembled, Thitt uo officer of the Army of the Uuited States who has been, 
 or shaU hereafter be, cashiered Or dismissed from the service by the sentence of a gen- 
 eral conrt-niartial, formally approved l>y the proper reviewing anthority, shall ever be 
 restored to the military service, except by a reappointment, confirmed by the Senate 
 of the Uuited States. 
 
 A law which appears to me to be altogether just and wise, and as you 
 see, it bears directly on the question, if ever there was a question, of 
 the al)ility of the President in such a case to restore General Porter, or 
 any other officer in a like situation, however innocent, to the military 
 service, unless the reappointment shall be confirmed by the Senate of 
 the Uuited States. Well, now, under that branch of this order, which 
 requires you to form an opinion and to report what the cause of justice 
 requires of the President, there may be occasion for your action ; there 
 will be, as it seems to me, in any event. If, as tlie result of all our 
 labors, you find the court-martial correct on all the facts now known ; if 
 you find on all the evidence that has been brought before you that 
 General Porter was guilty of the charges, you will so report, and 
 that justice re(|uires no action of the President. I think that more than 
 that would come within your province and your duty ; if you find that 
 after all his lamentations he was guilty of all these infamous charges, 
 you should not only report your conclusion, but that the punishment 
 that was inflicted on him was altogether inadequate to the crime that 
 he had committe<l. It would be only a just rebuke to the petitioner for 
 vexing the ears of the country, and of the Presi<lent, and of this Board, 
 and of the students of history witli his unfounded appeals. I say grossly 
 inad(M|uate to the crime conunitted, because, as it does seem to me, 
 there never was so foul a crime imputed to a soldier in historical times 
 as has been by this record placed upon the petitioner. I desire to call 
 the attention of the Board to this : it is not a mere case of disobedience 
 of orders ; there have l)een ample cases of disobedience of orders l)efore ; 
 it is not a case of treason, for which you can invent a motive, a provoca- 
 tion, or an apology ; not at all. There have l>een other traitors. The 
 place where we now sit was a witness to a conspicuous one ; but Arnold's 
 treason was merely an intent to hand over one of the military posts of 
 the country to its enemies. The case of General Charles Lee has been 
 cite<l by the Recorder, occurring at Monmouth, in the Eevolutionary 
 war, but that was of trifling malignity as compared with this, which was 
 imi)uted to General Porter. Let me read one of these charges of which 
 he was found guilty ; the third specification of the second charge : 
 
 In that the said Fitz-John Porter, V)eing with his army corps near the field of bat- 
 tle of Manassas, on the '29th August, ISG'i, wliile a severe action was Vieing fought by 
 the troops of Major-General Pope's command, and being in the Vielief that the troops 
 
8 
 
 of the said General Pope were sustaiuiug defeat and retiring from tlie iield, did shame- 
 fully fail to go to the aid of the said troops and general, and did shamefully retreat 
 away and fall liaek with his army to tlie Manassas Junction, and leave to the disasters 
 of a presumed deft-at the said army ; and tlid fail, hy any attempt to attack the enemy, 
 to aid in averting the misfortunes of a disaster that would have endangered the safety 
 of the caitital of the country. 
 
 Now, I challenge the Eecorder, or anybody else, to find in all history 
 a crime like that. I do not believe it is possible for any sncli crime to 
 be found related. The annals of history may be searched in vain for the 
 counterpart of this. That he willfully, consciously, and merely to spite 
 his commander — for that is the view in which it was presented by the 
 learned Judge- Advocate and by the Eecorder here — merely to spite his 
 commander, did hold aloof, A^ith his brave army corps, from the battle 
 in which the rest of the army were engaged, with intent to sacrifice the 
 rest of the army and bring shame upon its commander and ruin upon 
 the country, and perhax)S to hand over its capital and its very existence 
 to its rebel adversaries. There is an instance, not in history, but in the 
 legendary days of Eome — and in those legends we have ideal history 
 embodied — which shows the judgment, I think, of maiddnd as to the 
 proper punishment to be inflicted for such a crime. It is related that in 
 the days of Tullus Hostilius a conquered king of the Albans, Mettius 
 Fufetius by name, whom he had placed as corps commander in charge 
 of one of the armies of Eome, went out with him to the contest with the 
 Yeientians, and the legend states that he stood aloof while the armies 
 were engaged, in order that the anny of Eome might be vanquished. 
 jSTow you liaAC observed that that had not the elements of crime here 
 imi)uted ; it was not the case of a man who had been a loyal subject and 
 a general of his own army, but it was that of a conquered king who had 
 been trusted Avith a command. What did Tullus do with him ? 
 
 So when the Eomans had won the battle, Tullus called the Albans together as if 
 he Avere goiiig to make a speech to tliem, and tliey came to liear him. as was the cus- 
 tom, without tlieir arms; and t-he Eoman soldiers gathered around them, and they 
 could neither tight nor escape. Then Tullus took Mettius and bound hiiu between 
 two chariots, and drove the chariots different ways and t<ne him asunder. 
 
 And in my Judgment no less than that would have been an adequate 
 punishment of such atrocious crimes as were imputed to General Porter. 
 
 DISPARITY BETWEEX OFFENSE AND PUNISHMENT. 
 
 Now, we call the observation of the Board to the startling difference 
 between the guilt that was imputed and the punishment that Avas im- 
 posed in this case. As one of the secrets of history it will probably never 
 be exi)laiued how it could be that the court-martial regarded him as 
 guilty of such a crime and yet merely dismissed him from service, and 
 declared him to be forever disqualified from holding any office of honor 
 or profit under the Tnited iStates. The sentence itself confesses the in- 
 justice of the conviction. If it was for the punishment of the offender, 
 it was wholly, as everybody sees, inade(|uate; but if there was an indirect 
 purpose in that prosecution, if he was a sacrifice to the dicipline pf other 
 men, of other generals, and other soldieis, that might ex])lain a thing 
 Avhich otherwise is .so mysterious. And perhaps tlie learned Eecorder 
 Avill not ((uarrel with the autliority which I now cite on that subject, 
 which is tlie reply of Judge-Advocate General-Holt to the ansAver of Mr. 
 Eeverdy Johnson, from whicli he has cited and to which he has so 
 stronglj- objected : 
 
 The wonder of military men, who uuderstand rlic atrocity of Porter's otfense in all 
 its bearings, is. not that he was condemned, but that his life was sjiared. The court- 
 martial might well have sentenced him to death, and they forbore to do so, in all prob- 
 
9 
 
 ability, only l»ecans(^ tlioy felt that, as a walking, blasted monument of treachery to his 
 country's llag, he ■would be a warning to others, far more effective than any voice 
 which could issue from the depths of his dishonored but perhaps forgotten grave. 
 
 Does not the Judge-Advorate-General here reveal the true inwardness 
 of the action of the conrt-niartial '? 
 
 If Porter was tried and sentenced and punished for the snpposed 
 crimes or a]>prehended crimes of otlier men, we can understand it. If 
 lie was sacrificed to tlie discipline of the Army of which he had formed 
 a glorious part, even that, lilce death and wounds, is something which a 
 patriot soldier can bear. It may be that we shall have occasion to ex- 
 amine that very question a little further, because, as it does seem to us, 
 that must be the explanation of the otherwise extraordinary judgment 
 of the court-martial. This case has often called up to public recollection 
 and comment the case of Admiral Byng, wlio, in the middle of the last 
 century, was court-nmrtialed for a supi^osed failure on his part to do his 
 utmost "\Aiien proceeding with a British tleet for the relief of the island 
 of Minorca, that was besieged by the French. He was not guilty. He, 
 too, was a brave and gallant soldier, faithful to his country's flag, but 
 he was chargeable with an error of judgment in not pressing the French 
 fleet with all his power, as his brother soldiers assembled in court-mar- 
 tial felt that he might and should have done. There is, however, this 
 remarkable difference between J:>yng's case and Porter's case: The court 
 that declared the former innocent, condemned him to be shot, and he 
 was shot — shot, in obedience to a supposed governmental necessity, to 
 appease the bowlings of the British mob, for the court expressly declared 
 he had been guilty of no cowardice, of no treacthery, of no evil intent. 
 Yet, being instructed that the imperative nature of the article of war 
 bearing upon the subject, if they found that he did not do his utmost, 
 permittted no sentence short of death, they sentenced him ; 'and, the 
 king and the ministry not being brave enough to stand up against the 
 brutal demands of the British public, he was led out and shot like a 
 traitor. The government, in spite of the eloquent appeals of William 
 Pitt, deliberately sacrificed him to the mob, who had burned his eiflgy 
 in every town in England, and had placarded all the streets of London 
 with the startling threat, "Hang Byng, or look out for your king!" 
 Well, as it seems to me, to a brave soldier, Byng's late was a light pun- 
 ishment compared to these sixteen years of imputed infamy and shame- 
 ful humiliation which Porter has borne, and so Byng thought, for when 
 he heard of the judgment of the court, he said, " What! have they put 
 a slur upon me ?" apprehending that they had ])ronounced him a coward. 
 But when told that it was not so, that they had acquitted him of cow- 
 ardice, a smile wreathed his features, a^nd he marched to his fate as 
 bravely as he had ever trodden u])on tlie deck of his frigate. But this 
 court which tried General Porter found him guilty of all these damnable 
 attrocities to wliich 1 have called your attention, and yet failed to impose 
 any punisliment at all in proportion to the magnitude of the offense. 
 
 And now, suppose, on the other hand, after giving all weight to the 
 judgment of tlie court-martial and its proceedings, you find General 
 Porter innocent. You must ]»roteHl further under the instructions of 
 the order organizing the Board and requiring it to report; and as a nec- 
 essary' part of your investigation, and especially as bearing upon the 
 question of the weight whicli you are to give to the proceedings of the 
 court-martial, the imi)oitant (|uestion must be answered, how, being 
 innocent, so far as tlie record discloses, he came to be convicted. Jus- 
 tice to Porter, justice to the country, justice to the action of the court 
 will require at least a recognition of that <iuestion. If there were cir- 
 cumstances surrounding the court, or in its coinjiosition, or in the iieces- 
 
10 
 
 sary haste imposed on its action by the exigencies of the service, or in 
 the imperfect facts before them, or in the rules of evidence ap})lied by 
 tliem, unfavorable to justice, it is important to know it — for you, for the 
 President, for the country to know it — for the jturpose of determining 
 how mucli you ouglit to regard yourselves as con<strained, as guided by 
 their conclusions. And so, as to the action of President Lincoln, entitled 
 in the eye of every American, in the judgment of history, to the very 
 first merit as an authority. 
 
 CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH PORTER WAS TRIED BEFORE. 
 
 I ask you, first, to consider briefly the cii'cumstanccs under which the 
 court-martial convened, with a view to the (]uestion whether they were 
 favorable to a just trial of the cause. If they were, it lends a support 
 to the judgment of that tribunal which it will require all the more 
 comi)lcte demonstration of tiiith on the part of General Porter now to 
 overcome. A\'ell, a\ e knew that it did not need any evidence to bring 
 before you the circumstances under which the court assenn)led; and I 
 submit to you that they were most unfavorable to tlie consideration of 
 sucli a case or to the administration of justice ujion the particular ques- 
 tions raised. This brings into view the whole previous history of the 
 war in Virginia, but which need not occuf)y the attention of this Board 
 for more than a few minutes. 
 
 The breaking out of tlie war of the rebellion, as everybody knows, 
 found this government and country in a state of absolute destitution as 
 to i)rei)aration for wai-. The first efforts and struggles on tlie i)art of the 
 government to sustain itself were of the most painful character ; and 
 ])articularly is this true of the history of the war in Virginia, where 
 these transactions occurred on the 29th of August, 1802. This has a 
 bearingu])onthecircumstances that surrcmnded this court-martial. AVho 
 has forgotten tht mortification and humiliation in which the first cam- 
 paign in Virginia resulted ? The whole campaign, if it may be called a 
 campaign, in 1801, exi)osed the government and the country to chagrin, 
 remorse, and mortification. AVhile the ])ress and the ])eoi)le were howl- 
 ing "On to llichmoiKr' with ten million voices, our arms in Virginia 
 s(M'med almost ])araly/,e<l. The story of the first J)ull Pun and of the 
 Fe«leral Army waiting before the cpiaker guns of ^lanassas, is a tyi^e 
 and a picture of the whole history of that year. Then the government, 
 and its gallant generals who had rallied to its sui)]>ort, devoted them- 
 selves to the great work of prei)aration ; the Army of the Potomac was 
 organized, and the campaign of that army f(n- 18(i2, for the next year, 
 was set on foot. It was suitjjosed to be the best organized and the 
 greatest anny that ever, on this continent, sallied forth, and all the hopes 
 and all the boastful promises and expectations of the goveriunent and 
 of the peo])le were staked upon it. Put it is not too nuu'h to say that 
 its career was another history of disap])ointnu'nt and mortification. AVho 
 can ever forget the doleful stories that came from the swanii)s of the 
 Chickahouiiny, and the ]>alsy that seemed to rest upon the country when 
 the final step of a retreat to the James Piver was taken ? There were 
 redeeming features in the view of the government of the distressing his- 
 tory of that ]>eriod. There were two bright days: there Avas the day at 
 Gaines' ^lill. and that other day at ^Malvern Hill, when it is not too 
 much to say that the services of the i)etitio:ier Avere the most brilliant 
 of all the great and brave achievements of its record. 
 
 J>nt that army got back to James Piver, and in the judgment of the 
 government and of the country, nothing useful had yet been accom- 
 j)lished. 
 
11 
 
 Well, our hopes never failed us, at any rate, and our courage never 
 failed us, and a new plan was resolved upon. 
 
 An Army of Virginia was organized ; General Halleck was called from 
 tlie ^^'est and ])laced in command as General-in-Chief, and (4eneral Pope, 
 for whom the best wishes and best promises were held forth, was called 
 to organize and command this Army of Virginia; and as the next step, 
 the Army of the Potonuic was i-ecalled to unite with the Army of Vir- 
 ginia in the protection of Washington, and in new projects for the con- 
 quest of the rebel Confederacy. 1 need not re])eat to you the history of 
 the sixty days' existence of the Army of Virginia. It was another story 
 of disai)i)ointment and chagrin ; more mortifying, more depressing than 
 all that had gone before ; there was fighting enough, there Avas slaughter 
 enough, but in the public judgment there was no result. And noAv we 
 come, as I suppose, to the most distressing period in the whole history 
 of our contest with the Confederacy. Gold went up and the hearts of 
 men went <loAvn, and shanx? and anger possessed the hearts alike of the 
 people and the government. Always, in times of great distress and 
 dfsaster, I think there is no exception in history, it is the natural impulse 
 of the great masses of a nation, the irresistible impulse of the popular 
 heart, to loolv out for somebody to blame ; to put it upon the shoulders 
 of somebody, for somel)o<ly nuist be to blame. Well, what was the key- 
 note of this last imputed failure ? I pass no judgment. I can form none 
 in such a matter, but I am looking at the jjublic judgment that sur- 
 rounded that court. 
 
 What was the key-note of the failure? Why, it was that General 
 Jackson and his famous rebel army, after its capture had been heralded 
 as an absolute certainty, was allowed to escape. That was what hap- 
 pened, that was the crisis, that was the culminating point of national 
 distress and mortitication, and everybody in(]uired who was to blame. 
 
 Do you not know, does not everybody know that there are times, and 
 that such are the times when accusation and conviction are equivalent and 
 interchangeal)le terms ? Well, there was another Avheel within the wheel 
 of the national distress; there were suspicions, there were charges that 
 hung on e\ery lip, that were l)elieved by every other man you ]net in 
 those days, that were evidently believed by the government, that 
 there was treachery, that there was disloyalty in the Army of the Po- 
 tomac, and among the generals of the Army of the Potomac, and 
 that some procee<lings were necessary. Some example was necessaiy 
 that shouhl enforce discipline and (^it out the roots of any such supposed 
 disloyalty or treachery. For myself, I believe that the whole charge 
 was without foundation ; for myself, 1 believe that they were all loyal, 
 and that under any commander, as their achievements l)efore and after- 
 ward <lemonstrated, they were ever willing to fight their best. P)Ut, 
 nevertheless, this charge was made, was taken up and became a pul)lic 
 outcry, and the necessity for something to be done that should stop or 
 should i)unisli the sui)posed offense, was in every newspaper and on 
 every tongue. The thirst of a great jiation for vengeance, for a victim, 
 will always be satiated. Just then, General Porter was accused ; the 
 government believed him guilty; (Tcneral Pope, the commanding gen- 
 eral of the army, asserted liis guilt, and General McDowell, who was 
 next in command, su])ported the charge. And who, in such times, could 
 resist such a charge? 
 
 Who does not know that in times like those the mere accusation was, 
 from the inherent infirmities of hunmn nature itself, alhiost the same 
 thing as a conviction ? The llecorder says that we bring charges against 
 the court-martial. I disavow it. I unite with him in all his encomiums 
 
12 
 
 npoii the distiuguislied geutlemeii who composed that court. I question 
 not their cons(.'ientious pertbrmnnce of duty in that critical time. But 
 they were ouly men, and human Judgment is finite. The learned Eecorder 
 puts it most admirably, and if I had a copy of his opening- address I 
 should be under obligations to him for expressing the very idea which 
 I Mish to present in regard to that court. 
 
 It is too true that human judgment is but finite, and that there are 
 many times and occasions when an innocent man is necessarily con- 
 victed. History is full of instances which demonstrate exactly what I 
 mean. I mean the impossibility of preserving an unbiased judicial 
 mind in the face of an overwhelming pressure of popular impulse or 
 popular opinion. The greatest judges that ever sat upon the bench^ 
 the wisest and most trained minds who had made law and the investiga- 
 tion of disputed cases their sole province and study tl trough a score or 
 more of years, have been exposed to the same subtle, insidious, irre- 
 sistible influence of public feeling upon them; and it is not in the least 
 derogatory to their character as judges, but merely imputes to them that 
 they are men. Take, for instance. Queen Caroline's case, a case which 
 enlisted the public feeling of every man and every woman in England 
 upon (me side or the other. It is a regretted but a recognized fact 
 that upon the questions of law raised by the facts in that case, and pre- 
 sented to the law lords, embracing the greatest and wisest of the judicial 
 minds of England, they always voted upon them, not according to the 
 law and the facts as afterwards considered, when reviewed by judicial 
 minds, but invariably according to the dictates of that party division of 
 the people of England with which, by traditiim and by the experience 
 of their lives, they happened to sympathize. Xobody has ever ques- 
 tioned the integrity of Lord Eldon or Lord Erskine. So it was in 
 O'Connell's case, when England was agitated throughout every hamlet 
 and household. There are times when the administratiim of justice in 
 the face of this subtle, far-reaching, irresistible ])opular i)Ower becomes 
 wholly impossible. And so I say that this court-martial sat in times 
 and under circumstances which were not fa\orable to the administra- 
 tion of justice; and if any unfavorable reflections have ever been cast 
 upon those judges or their action, l,for one, on the part of the petitioner 
 and of my associates, disavow them all. We imiuite to them notliing 
 but honest performance of duty. 
 
 THE COMrOSITION OF THE COURT-MAE TIAL. 
 
 In the next place, was there anything in the composition of the court- 
 martial that was not favorable to justice ? In that respect, my learned 
 friend, the Eecorder, has seen fit to comment upon the manner in Avhich 
 the court-martial was organized. I think, myself, that there was an error 
 conuuittcd. but one with which you have not to deal, and one for which 
 the court was ]U)t at all to blame. Let me read to you the law to which 
 I refer, the act of Congress of ]May 2!>, 1S3(», which was supplementary 
 to an act for the establishment of rules and regulations for the govern- 
 nuMit of the armies of the United States, passed April 11), 1800. 
 
 It enacted that — 
 
 AVlionovcr a jrtMU'niloIificiT C(nniii;in(liiijj; iiii army sliall lip accuser or proKcciitor of any 
 ofHcrr ill tilt' Aiiny ol' the United Sratis. iiiidfr his coiiiiiiaiul, the iifiicial coint-inartial 
 tor tlu' trial of such otliccr shall Itc apjioiiitftl hy the Picsiih-nt of the I'liitiMl States. 
 
 In our present view of the evidence, as it stands recorded before this 
 Board, General Porter was bnmght to trial by reason of the accusation 
 and jirosecution presented against hnu by the general commanding the 
 
13 
 
 Army of ^vllicll he was a i)art. If the facts bad been presented to tlie 
 President or to tlie conrt-niartial at the outset of its sessions, as they 
 have been presented to you, that court, at any rate, would never have 
 proceeded with the trial. But General Pope saw fit to go befoi'e that Board 
 and say that he was not the author of the charges, that he had nothing- 
 to do with them, and so to leave the court under the impression that the 
 real accuser and prosecutor was General lioberts, his inspector-general, 
 in whose name they were presented. 
 
 Now, as to the object of this law, we dift'er from the learned Recorder 
 in his construction of it. We suppose that when an act says that when 
 a general is to be tried upon charges presented by his superior general, 
 commanding the army of which he is a part, that the court-martial shall 
 be constituted by the President, and not by the commanding gen- 
 eral — General Halleck in this case — we suppose it is so enacted out 
 of consideration for the dignity of the offense and of the offender — that 
 if a general officer is to be brought to trial upon charges involving his 
 fame and his life emanating from such a source, no less dignified a per- 
 son than the President shall appoint the court ; no less imi)artial a trib- 
 unal than one created by him — raised, as far as human foresight can raise 
 it, above army quarrels and army rivalries — shall be the judges who are 
 to try him. JSTow, if that is the proper view of the law, suppose that 
 General Pope had gone before the Board, and instead of swearing as he 
 then did, that he had nothing to do with the charges, had sworn as he 
 afterwards stated in his report to the Committee on the Conduct of the 
 War in 18G5, which I have in my hand, for there he liot only boasted of 
 having been the accuser, but confessed that he had denumded his reward 
 for carrying the prosecution successful!}- through. 
 
 He said : 
 
 I consiclcrcd if a duty I owed io the country to hrinq Fits-John Porter to justice, lent at 
 another time, and jcith yrenter opportunities, he might do that trhich would he still more dis- 
 astrous. With his conriction and punishment ended uU official connection I hare since had 
 with anythiny that related to the operations I conducted in Virginia. — (Supplement to 
 Eeport of Committee on the Conduct of the War, part 2, p. 19(i.) 
 
 Now, let me read you a previous sentence from the same report, to 
 show his boast : 
 
 In the last days of January, 18(13, when the trial of Fitz-John Porter had closed, and 
 when his guilt had been esldhlinhed, I intintattd to tlie I'resident th((t it seemed a proper time 
 then for some 2)ublic aeliiowledgmenf of my serrice in f'irginia from him. — {Ibid, p. 190.) 
 
 Suppose, now, that the President of the United States, or General 
 Halleck, or the court-martial had known those facts as there stated by 
 General Pope, can anything be more certain than that a court-martial, at 
 any rate selected not by the President, but by General Halleck, would 
 never have proceeded to the trial of the cause ? 
 
 The next circumstance in regard to the composition of the court that 
 I have to suggest, without imputing the least reflection or suggesting 
 anything in the least derogatory to the members of that court, except 
 that they are but nuMi, is tliis — and is in the direct line of the last objec- 
 tion that I have made — because T do not believe that the Presi(ient 
 of the United States would ever have committed that mistake. What 
 was it? What Avas the cardinal thing that General Porter was accused 
 of! What Avas it that tlie rage of the country was to be ai)peased 
 about! Why, it Avas letting Jackson escape, was it not — Jackson witli 
 his army, after the '-'bagging of the whole crowd" had been most 
 felicitously and publicly proclaimed ? Noav, from the facts that have 
 been spread and confessed before this Board, we know that Jackson's 
 escape was accomjtlished the day before that u])on Avhich General 
 
14 
 
 Porter is charged with dereliction. It was not on the 20th of August 
 that General Jackson effected his escape. It was on the 2Sth, because 
 then, as was supposed, they had him in a trap from which he could not 
 escape, and General IMcketts, Avho constituted one division of General 
 McDowell's corps, was stationed at Thoroughfare Gap, between Jackson 
 and Longstreet, and General King Ava.s marcliing down tlie turnpike to 
 Centreville, behind Jackson, so tliat if they had remained there, as they 
 "were ordered at all liazards to do, tliere could have been no possible 
 help or relief for Jackson. But they left those i)Ositions, where it is due 
 to General Poi)e to say, especially as to General King, that he was 
 ordered at all hazards to remain, and, as was stated by General 
 McDoTvell, and as everybody knows, and as the IJecorder will not ques- 
 tion, the door of the trap that held Jackson was thereby left open, and 
 nobody remained to guard it. Xot a regiment, not a soldier of our 
 forces, intervened any longer between Longstreet and Jackson. Well, 
 one would have su]i)posed, who knows anything of wliat are tlie neces- 
 sary attributes of a judicial mind, that the very last thing which it 
 would occur to the power constituting the court-martial to <lo would 
 liave been to ])lace General Eicketts and Creneral King upon the court 
 to try the offender — absolutely upright men, perfect men, as I sui)pose, 
 but how could they sit as judges ? How could they bring to bear the 
 iudicial element and the unbiased mind ? They might themselves be 
 tried for letting riackson escape, and they to sit in judgment upon 
 another man to be tried for that offense! What we say is this: That 
 judicial impartiality under tliose circumstances cannot be asked of men. 
 This law that I read was a wise one. I do not believe that the Presi- 
 dent of the United States, if he had had the organization of the court, 
 Avould have organized it in the manner in which it was constituted. I 
 tlo not believe that General Halleck, who did organize the court-martial, 
 knew the fact at all. What a position in whicli to place those generals ! 
 I have spoken of the historical and traditional liability of the great and 
 trained judges of courts of law to bias, to the diftlculty of sustaining a 
 judicial mind, in times of popular rage or excitement ; but how much 
 greater is the exi)osure of generals summoned hastily from the tield for 
 the discharge, ]»erhaps for the only time in their lives, of the great func- 
 tions of judges ? Well, why was this done ? The order constituting the 
 court-martial explains it, and it is certainly a source of the utmost regret 
 that the exigencies of tlie public service did require any such selection, 
 for the (U'der orgaiuzing the court-martial says positively that it was 
 necessaiy, and that there was nobody who c<)uld ])ossibly be s])ared to 
 sit upon that court except those nine generals who did compose the 
 court. I want to read the exact words of the order : 
 
 No other oHicer.s than those named can be assenibk-il, without manifest injury to the 
 public service. 
 
 Was not that a lamentable thing, that two of the judges were thus 
 related to tlie subjects that were to be tried '! I doubt not that they did 
 their best; I doubt not that they tried to be judges, but how could they 
 be? Unman ]iature will not stand everything, and however great they 
 may have been as generals, or wise as men, I (h) not believe they could 
 stand that. Nay, more, (General King, to whose withdrawal from the 
 rear of Jackson on the L'Stli, contrary to orders, is now im})uted by every- 
 body the esca])e of .lackson, not only sat as a judge, but had to be a wit- 
 ness. The exigencies of the ])ublic service not only compelled him to 
 sit in the impossibh; attitude of a judge, but comjKdied him to take the 
 stand and establish the truth as a witness adverse to one of the princi- 
 
15 
 
 pal aides and Avitnesses on the part of General Porter. Is it not askinj^ 
 a little too nmeh of our poor luunan natnre to put a man in that posi- 
 tion? Who knows bnt that it was the votes of (lenerals King and 
 Eicketts — who knows bnt that it was General King's vote alone, that 
 turned the scales of justice against General Portt^r? Nobody will ever 
 know, except the members of tliat court. But Avhy do I cite all this? 
 I^ecanse the ^Recorder said that the judgment of that court-martial was 
 right, and must be accepted by you. independent of its being right, 
 I think we see now that it was impossible for those nine men, all of them, 
 to act as judges. That could not be. They might sit there and record 
 their votes, but it was imx)ossible for them all — it was imi)ossible for 
 two out of the nine — in the nature of things, according to the laws of 
 the human mind, to be judges. 
 
 Another thing, among the many circumstances unfavorable to the ad- 
 ministration of justice by that court-martial : Was there any unnecessary 
 haste ? The Eecorder says that the record shows tliat it took a great 
 many days to get in the evidence. But was there any unnecessary haste 
 in their judicial i)roceedings, which were required to be deliberate and 
 slow — considering all things — looking before and after? I will read to 
 you the order that was served upon the court upon the morning of Jan- 
 uary 6, 1803, five days before the sentence was pronounced. Before I do 
 that, let me say that even now, after we have had the benefit of a second 
 trial, it would be regarded as rather summary if you should receive orders 
 from the War Department to hurry back to your resx)ective commands 
 as quickly as possible, and to close this case without regard to hours, 
 because the public service required it, and that you should instantly, 
 ui)on the closing of the argument, take a vote. It might be necessary, 
 owing to the exigencies of the public service, but it would not be judicial. 
 1^0 w I read this order from Secretary Stanton to this court-martial : 
 
 War Departjiext, 
 JVasMngton Citij, D. C, January 5, 1863. 
 General : The state of the service imperatively demands that the proceedings in 
 the conrt over which yon are now presiding, having been pending more than four 
 weeks, shonld be brought to a close withont any unnecessary delay. Yon are there- 
 fore directed to sit, withont regard to hours, and close your proceedings as si^eedily as 
 may be consistent with justice to the public service. 
 Yoius, truly, 
 
 EDWIN M. STANTON, 
 
 Secyetary of fVar. 
 Major-General Hunter, 
 
 Fresident, tfc, tSc. 
 
 It was not, you will observe, justice to the accused, but justice to the 
 public service, that the Secretary appealed to as the final motive for a 
 hasty decision of the case. 
 
 That was served upon the court-martial on the Gth of January. Then 
 the prosecution brouglit up their rear guard of witnesses, and the ease 
 was almost instantly closed that day. There- were given to the peti- 
 tioner three days to prepare his defense, and then what happened ? 
 Wliy, these generals, although they were judges, were generals first, 
 last, and always. Plow could they shut their eyes to such an imperative 
 order as that from the great War Secretary, who was in that day the 
 master of the fortunes of the whole Army ! The country was in danger, 
 its capital was at stake : it was more important to the public service 
 that they should get back to their commands than that they sliould stoi) 
 to deliberate upon the evidence upon which they had to pass. Xow 
 what took jAace ? You can form some notion of how this imi)erative 
 letter operated, judging by your own proceedings here. The Board met 
 
16 
 
 at half past ten the morning- of tlie 10th of January. Tliere was an argu- 
 ment presented on the part of General Porter, called the defense of the 
 accused, which, read with even the speed of the rapid tongue of our 
 learned Recorder, could not have been finished much before the shades 
 of afternoon were falling, for it occupies forty closely printed pages of 
 this record. I do not state it as a fact, because it is not in the record, 
 but I have been informed that it did actually occupy four hours and a 
 half, or until half past two in the afternoon. At six o'clock that court- 
 martial had adjourned, and General Porter was already condemned and 
 sentenced, because the exigencies of tlie public service demanded it ; 
 that each one of these generals should go post haste to his command. 
 Was that a condition of things favorable to the administration of justice! 
 I should think that even you, after you know, as you now must know, all 
 about the case, would deem it necessary to deliberate after the argu- 
 ments were concluded, and to compare the evidence with the arguments 
 to see whether on either side they were specious and fallacious or sound 
 and based upon the truth. You would not say, '^ ^Vhy, I must be off 
 to Saint Paul by the morning train," and " I must be off to Fortress 
 ^Monroe to-night," and ''I must return to my neglected cadets." But 
 you would say, " Let us look into this thing ; there is a man's life at 
 stake ; the fame of an officer of the Army is involved." You would 
 require to deliberate ; and if you did receive such an order, which would 
 be impossible in times of peace, you would remonstrate — you would 
 refuse to decide the case witliout a chance for deliberation. 
 
 So it does seem to me that there are circumstances surrounding the 
 history of that court-martial which make it only fair for us to sa^' — and' 
 e\en the learned Recorder will not term it libelous — that it was asking 
 more than human judgment, ami more than human nature was master 
 of, for them to pass judicially upon the case. 
 
 Next, as to the state of facts before them. Do you believe that the 
 court-martial knew anything to si)eak of about the real facts of the case ? 
 AVhat does a soldiei', when he is looking for the movements of troops, lirst 
 ask for ? Is it not for a map of the country ? Did they have a map ? Yes, 
 they had a map, and only one map. Well, was it a map ? For there 
 are maps and mai)s, fis the Recorder knows. It was in the form of a 
 map, but it was all wrong. You could not tell anything about the coun- 
 try from it. I do not think that General Pope and (ieneral McDowell and 
 the other generals are so much to be blamed, as they sometimes have been, 
 for the movements of that campaign ; l)ecause this map, the same which 
 was produced before the court-martial, Avas the only one they had to 
 study, and they did not know anything about the country independent 
 of the map. Xow, what is the fact about this ma]> ? General Reynolds 
 has said that it Avas all wrong, (reneral Warren, Avho has made a 
 special study of the snl)ject, l)ecause he has been sent down by the War 
 Department, detaiU-d for the sjjccial pur[)ose of preparing it, has given 
 a correct map of tlie same region to tliis Board. 1 read from General 
 Warren's evidence, at page 20 of the new record : 
 
 That map is so citouoous that a proper answer oaimot be <>iven to tlie question. - I 
 cannot reeoj^nizc these roails or phices, or any of the streams, as corresjiondiug to the 
 jilaces as they are on the map I have matte, now before us. 
 
 So I think that their pole star was wrong ; it was several degrees out 
 of the way; and many a mariner might easily make shipwreck if the 
 north star were to get dish)cated and removed many degrees, or even a 
 few degrees, from its place in the heavens. Well^ did they know the 
 great main facts of the case? Did they know that Longstreet's army 
 had arrived on the scene of action, not whether they were in front or 
 
01— V 
 
17 
 
 behind the Gibbon's woods — but did the court-niartial Iciiow that they 
 Avere anywhere there ? Not at all. It was told them, Init obviously 
 they did not believe it. You have heard from ]\rr. liullitt a discussion 
 of the Judge- Advocate's reasons, which are to be taken as the reasons 
 of the court and the I'resident, and it is perfectly obvious that they ut- 
 terly disbelieved and ignored the great and the leading fact in the case 
 as it is now known. Again, did they know the real location of General 
 Porter, with respect to Jackson's right wing, when he was expected to 
 fall upon and consume it ? Not at all. They had not the least concep- 
 tion of the relative positions. 
 
 Now, maps are to form an important part of my argument. I w^ant to 
 call the attention of the Board at this moment to one or two. There is 
 a map which has been produced here as indicative of what was under- 
 stood by the court-martial, because it was so understood by the priuci- 
 l)al witnesses who testified against General Porter as to the position 
 from which he was supposed to have fallen back at the close of the action 
 of August 29, 1802. It is one of those maps prepared by Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Snuth, and is a \ery important item in this case, because, when 
 1 come to ask you to look at the map which was before the court-martial, 
 you will observe that the same error of fact Avas before that court as 
 there is in this map in regard to the position of General Porter's force. 
 Here it is described as the position from which Fitz-John Porter had 
 fallen back. (See Map No. 5, from General Pope's Report to the Coni- 
 luittee on the Conduct of the War, Map A in appendix.) 
 
 Now, I ask the Board to look, in the same connection, at the Army 
 map, which has been every day, until now, before the Board, and which 
 I present as part of my argument, and shall ask to have it incorporated — 
 to look at the errors of position connnitted before the court-martial, and 
 Avhich the court-martial itself has committed in respect to the location 
 of the troops — I mean, of Porter's force and of the resi)ective forces of 
 Jackson and of Pope on the 29th. For that purpose I have here taken 
 one of General AVarren's nuips (Map No. 3), the topography of which 
 and the locations of the roads and streams upon which are all correct, 
 and have applied u}»on it, according to the evidence and according to 
 the original record, the location of the troops, as they were believed, 
 upon the court-martial, to be. I think it will be found not without iu- 
 i^truction, even to the Board. Here is the junction of the Manassas and 
 Sudley road, at which General Porter is placed. Here [^13] is where 
 Morell placed himself, and l*orter's corps deployed for a forward move- 
 ment. There [M 3 or 8] is where the witnesses for the government 
 (so called). Pope and McDowell and Koberts and Smith, place General 
 Porter. Here are the positions in which, upon the evidence before that 
 court, the rebel army, extending- to the Centreville pike, until the latter 
 part of the day, and then supposed to extend down here [31 2], across 
 the pike, were i)laced. Now, as General Eeynolds says, it was only two 
 mdes, in a direct line, from this position of Porter's here [M 3] over to 
 his own position. [These two maps, viz, the Army ma}) and Warren's 
 map, with the same positions i)rqiected, will be found in appendix, 
 Maps B and C] As tlie Court wili"bb«^rve, there was nothing to pre- 
 vent, in that view, as there presented on ttie map before the court-mar- 
 tial, a flank and rear attack by Porter upon the unsuspecting right wing 
 of the rebel army, and that was the supposition of facts upon which he 
 was tried and con\icted. Falsely placed immediately ui)on the right 
 wing, and a little in the rear of the right wing, of Jackson's army, with 
 no rebel foroe between, and nothing in the ground between to prevent 
 hiQi, he was found guilty of lying idle on his arms all day, and keeping 
 
out of tbe fight, in which, upon that showing, he might ha^-e home an 
 ettective part. All that, on this trial, has been taken back. On this 
 trial, the witness Smith, who placed him thereby a spy-glass; and the 
 Avitness McDowell, who placed liim there by mistake, both admit that 
 they had put him, at least, a mile in achance of where he actually was. 
 It has been demonstrated, as I suppose, that the right wing of Jackson's 
 army, which he was expected to attack, was here at the Warrenton 
 turnpike, and that the Confederate forces, under Longstreet (25,000 
 strong), whose presence was proved beyond dis[)ute, but ignored l)y the 
 court-martial, extended down cAen beyond the railroad, and the Ma- 
 nassas and Gainesville road, far in front of Porter — I mean, over on the 
 other side of Dawkins' Branch — and occui)ying an impregnable i)osition 
 between his little band and the right wing of Jackson, which he was 
 expected to attack. 
 
 Now, I desire that this other map (Xo. 4) of the true position, at noon 
 of the 29th, as now proved, may be recorded as a part of my argument. 
 I do not, of conrse, present it as evidence, but as argument. I believe 
 the projection of the positions upon this ma]) have all l>een honestly, 
 conscientiously, and faithfully made ; and I shall be glad if the liCcorder 
 has any ol)Jection or criticism to make that hemay be])ermittedtomake 
 it. We do not, in this investigation, desire in tbe least to mislead the 
 Board, or to vary from the record of the trial, and I earnestly hope that 
 if tlie l\ecorder,upon that mai>, or upon any of the other maps that I pre- 
 sent as a ]»art of my argument, can find any fault, whether it is founded on 
 fact or not, that he be i)ermitted to find it. For, if these maps do not 
 lie, they demonstrate that while Porter was convicted by the court-mar- 
 tial of not attacking the right wing of Jackson's army while that army 
 was contending at ecjual odds with Pope, he was really ])unished for not 
 throwing liis army corps of ten thousan men in a hopeless assault upon 
 Longstreet's twenty-five thousand, whose presence, known to him, was 
 unsuspected by General Pope and the court-martial, and which put him 
 as far out of the reach of Jackson's right wing as if an ocean had rolled 
 between them. (The map last referred to showing the positions as 
 claimed by the petitioner, will be found in Appendix as map I>.) 
 
 Well, what else was there about that court ? Why, one-half of the 
 witnesses could not be had. Some few witnesses from — shall I be per- 
 mitted to call it the "Federal" Army, in spite of the Recorder's protest 
 against that word? — were there; but all the Confederate soldiers and 
 generals and other ofticer.> were, from the "(exigencies of the ])ublic 
 service," compelled to be absent, and the court was compelled to get 
 along without them. It does not give a very impressive weight to the 
 judgment of a court that the doors of the court were locked, so that 
 one-lialf of tlie witnesses could not get in. That would not pass muster, 
 even in a case of " i)etty larceny," to the like of which the Recorder is 
 sometimes dis[>osed to degrade tliis examination. I think that any poor 
 wretch who had been convicted and sent to the county jail for thirty 
 <lays for thieving, would be entitled to a new trial at once if it turned 
 out that one-half liis witnesses could not get in, because tlie doors of 
 the court-room were barre<l against iM)])ular entrance. That is a very 
 important matter indeed in considering the weight to be given to the 
 action of the court. 
 
 I observe that my learned friend, the Recorder, has been inclined to 
 draw a line between rebel witnesses an<l Union Avitnesses, to the disad- 
 vantage of the former. But he cannot raise any sucli issue with us, nor, 
 as I believe, with this lioard. I know nothing in regard to the gentle-, 
 men who have been called on our pait from the Confederate army. Gen- 
 
19 
 
 erals Loiigstreet, Wilcox, Early, and Eobertson, Colonel Marshall, and 
 many others, except wliat is known by everybody as historical abont 
 them. They were mostly soldiers educated at this institution ; and, with 
 rare exceptions, I believe the gradnates of West Poiut arc taught, and 
 do learu, so thoroughly that they carry it with them through all their 
 lives, to speak the truth; whatever else they learn or fail to learn, they 
 do learn that. It is a pretty good certificate from this institution that 
 anyl)ody who does not tell the truth is \erj apt to sli]* out by the ba(?k 
 door or' the ^Military Academy before the day of graduation comes 
 around. Well, 1 believe they were gentlemen, I believe that they were 
 possessed of just as perfect personal integrity as though they had not 
 been rebels. 
 
 They were just as good witnesses as the Federal witnesses and no bet- 
 ter, entitled to equal credit, and to be measnred by the same standard. 
 Their evidence all around is to be weighed in the balance, and all the 
 witnesses alike are not to be counted, but weighetl. If they were to be 
 counted we should have got out of court a good while ago ; for after we 
 had closed our case with the examination of forty or fifty witnesses, the 
 Kecorder summoned in a hundred. So, pray, don't count the witnesses, 
 but weigh them. 
 
 Again, the court-martial was led to believe, and it disposed of the case 
 upon the theory, that there was a retreat by General Porter. On this 
 vital point it has now been <lemonstrated, to the satisfaction of the most 
 skeptical, as already shown to you by the arguments of my associates, 
 that the whole pretense of any retreat at all was without the least founda- 
 tion in fact. But once more, to dwell a little longer on the errors of the 
 court-martial, and that on a part of the case which was most essential, 
 namely, the alleged disobedience of the 4,30 p. m. order of August 21»th, 
 the \^'hole truth was not before them, and there Avas what has now been 
 shown to have been the most palpable fiilsehood before them instead of 
 the truth. I suppose that if there is one fact that now stands clear be- 
 yond — I Avill not say c<nitradiction, because the Recorder can contradict 
 anything — but beyond reasonable contradiction, it is, that that order 
 ]iever reached the hands of General Porter until the sun was setting at 
 about half past six; yet the case was passed upon by the court-martial 
 upon the evi<lence befine them, in the belief that it was received by him 
 at five o'clock oi- half past five. Now, everything is perverted by false 
 evidence. No court can stand up against ]ierjury — no court can stand 
 up against mistake, or against any manner of false evidence, and if you 
 find that they were misled l>y false evidence, whether intentionally false 
 or not is wholly immaterial, it lessens the weight to be given to the 
 judgment of the court-martial. This is also, I thiidc, fairly to be said 
 upon the record of the court-martial, that Avhatever weight was given 
 to facts, the facts Nvere outweighe<l by the o]>inions of witnesses— the 
 oi>inions, I mean, of General Pope, General McDowell, (ieneral Koberts, 
 and Colonel Smith. If I undertake anything in this argument, it will 
 be to demonstrate to the satisfaction of this court, ami of every thinking- 
 mind tlmt looks into the case, that the opinions of these witnesses can- 
 not be treated as fair or impartial opinions ; tluvt, whether from bias or 
 from mistake and ignorance of fact, it was utterly im])ossible for them to 
 express a fair and im])artial opinion. But that their opinions did carry 
 that court-martial, there is and can be no (hmbt. As to both General 
 McDowell and General Pope, with the utmost disposition to do honor to 
 the established authorities, it is our <luty in this case to demonstrate to 
 you that if they had stated to the court martial what they have stated 
 since, and what one of them has stated upini oath befoic you, General 
 3 cii 
 
20 
 
 Porter'.s (^omictioii could not possibly bn^e taken i)la('e, and he would 
 have been disehaiged hy that court, not with condenmation, not with re- 
 buke, but with honor. 
 
 Now, as to the rules of evidence applied by the court-martial, I think 
 that, if they were overborne by pojmlar impulse, if they were men and 
 not gods, if their minds were biased by(;auses which they could not help 
 or prevent, perha])s you wouhl find .some signs of it ir^ their proceedings. 
 And so, an<l only for that ])urpose, 1 ask you to look into the record for 
 tlie ]mrpose of seeing how they treated certain questions of evidence 
 M'hich are subject to well-established rules. And first, when General 
 Pope was on the stand, at page liOof the court-martial record, a question 
 was put to him which was certaiidy very material — in a case tried upon 
 opinions, to the last degree was it material : 
 
 Question. If, as you liave stated, you were of the o]iiiiion tliat the army under your 
 command had been detV^ated, and in danj>er of still greater defeat, and the capital of 
 the country in diinger of capture by the enemy, and you thought that these calamities 
 could have been oltviated if (icneral Porter had obeyed your orders, why was it that 
 you doubted, on tin? '^d of (SL'ptember, whether you would or would not take any 
 miction against him ? 
 
 The witness declined to answer the question, as not being relevant to 
 the investigation. The i-oom was cleared for delil)eration ; and although 
 they allowed the question to be filed, they did not allow it to be answered 
 until the following took place : 
 
 Tlu^ .Indge-Advocate said: The witness requests the permission of the court to 
 answer the (juestion referred to in the ]»rotest just read. The accused made no objec- 
 tion. The room was thereupon cleared, and the court x)roceeded to deliberate with 
 closed doors. Some time after the doors M-ere re-opened and the .Judge-Advocate an- 
 nounced the decision of the court to l)e that the witness have permission to answer the 
 ([Uestiiui i-eferred U>. 
 
 Now, is not that a novel method of judicial procedure — to make the 
 admission of a <|uestion of evidence depend upcm the wish of the witness 
 and not upon the rights of the accused '. First, to exclude the evidence 
 as irrelevant, because the witness refused to answer it, and then to ad- 
 mit it as bearing against the defendant, when the Avitness requested 
 permission to answer it. A whole day for deliberation intervened. It 
 Avas not admitted the second day because of any mistake in thejudg- 
 juent of the court on the first day, or of any change of opinion as to its 
 relcA'ancy, but because the Avitness changed his mind and his wish. 
 Well, you cannot sit in review upon that ; but, does it or not tend to 
 confiriii the suggestion that we make on the part of General Porter, that 
 that court, from the necessities of the situation, could not be judges ? 
 I Avill not state all the numerous instances of this kind, but I aaIII call 
 attention to three orfour more. 
 
 The .same Avitness, General Poi)e, AA'as still being examined by the ac- 
 cused. He had given an opinion against (leneral Porter, Avhose counsel 
 Avanted to test that opinion. 
 
 Question. Hearing in mind the terms and tenor of the order of 4.30 p. m. of the 2'Mi 
 of August, and its direction to the accused to attack the enemy's liank, and, if possi))ie, 
 liis rear, and at the same time to keej) up connnunication with General Keynolds, on 
 the right of the accused, jdease to inform the court whether, if it could have been 
 foreseen at 4.;3n p. ni. that at the tiijie when the accused should receive that order he 
 would find himself in front of the enemy in large force, in such a jxtsition that he could 
 not ontHank the enemy without severing his connect ion with (ieneial IJeynolds, f»n his 
 ri^ht, would you. if tiiat state of facts bad been foreseen at the date of the i-eception 
 t>f the order, have expected or antici]>ated obedience from tlu^ accused to the older, 
 according to its terms ! 
 
 He had already testified against the a<5cnsed that he A\ould expect 
 obedience to the order as the (piestion had been put. Here Avas a ques- 
 
21 
 
 tioii put to liiiii ou cross-examination for the purpose of testing' the weight 
 of liis oi)inion in every aspect of the facts of the case ; it was the clear 
 right of the accused to put the question. The question was objected to, 
 iind after a good deal of discussion, and after the clearing of tlie court 
 and its deliberation — 
 
 After some time tlie court was reopened; whereupon — 
 
 The judge-advocate announced the decision of the court to be that the witnesis shall 
 not ans\\er the question propounded by the accused. 
 
 Then, when the cotirt- martial had General Eoberts (at page 40 of the 
 record) under examination, the same sort of a question, as it appears to 
 nie, was decided in a different way. He was now being examined by 
 the Judge-Advocate: 
 
 Question. In view of what the army had accomplished during the battle of the day 
 in the nbsence of General Porter's command, what do you suppose would have been 
 the result u}»ou the fortunes of the battle if General Porter had attacked, as ordered 
 by the order of 4.30 p. m., either on the right flank or the rear of the enemy? 
 
 (The accused objected to the (£ue8tiou.) 
 
 The court was thereupon cleared. 
 
 Sometime after the court was reopened, and the Judge-Advocate announced that the 
 court determined that the question shall be answered. 
 
 What I have to say is, that undue weight was given to the opinions 
 of the generals wlio testified adversely, and that they Avere not freely 
 l)ermitted to testify upon one side as upon the other. For, further, it 
 appears that on the cross-examination the accused was not allowed to 
 test his opinion which had been introduced on the direct. On page 51 
 of the court-martial record, when the same witness was under examina- 
 tion by the counsel for the accused, this occurred : 
 
 Question. Did not the joint order speciallj- exclude from the discretion of Generals 
 Porter and McDowell the necessity of their remaining in such position as to enable 
 them to fall back behind Bull Kun f 
 
 (The question was objected to bj- a member of the court.) 
 
 The court was thereupon cleared. After some time the court was reopened, and the 
 Judge-Advocate announced that the court determined that the question shall not be 
 answered. 
 
 I^ow, whether these and other similar rulings could have been reviewed 
 or not in a court of law is not the question. There are many more of the 
 same sort. They have been carefully digested in a previous paper, which 
 will be placed before this Board.* I only call the attention of the Board 
 to them for the puri)ose of demonstrating, as it seems to me they dem- 
 onstrate themselves, that the times were not favorable to the adminis- 
 tration of justice by that Board upon the case and the questions that 
 were before them ; so I will not trouble the court with any more refer- 
 ence to what may be called internal evidence from the record. I only 
 claim from all these cu-ciunstances that I have now brought to the atten- 
 tion of the Board that there is good ground for saying that the judg- 
 ment of that court-martial, as a judgment, ought not to stand in the way 
 of justice now on any of the questions involved in the record ; that it 
 does appear that they were not placed in a position that rendered it 
 likely, or, as we think possible, for them to bring to bear a clear, undis- 
 turbed, unbiased, judicial mind upon the questions before tliem. 
 
 So, too, in regard to the opinion of President Lincoln. There is no 
 man in histoiy for whose oi)inion on a case like this, if he understood 
 it, if the facts were l)efore him, I Avould claim greater weight than for 
 that of President Lincoln, and I believe that will be the judgment of 
 the country. You will ol)serve, in the first place, that these errors 
 which were committed by the court were all involved in the record ui)On 
 
 * The appendix to reply of Hon. Reverdy Johnson to Judge-Advocate Holt. 
 
22 
 
 which it was his constitutional province to pass ; and if he had exam- 
 ined that record and then approved the sentence, they woidd have been 
 committed by him also. But ^\e have made it clear that President 
 Lincoln did not examine the record, that he could not have examined 
 the record, and that he made his decision not upon the evidence, not 
 upon any opinion of his on the evidence and the facts in the case, but 
 upon the paper that was of a nature to mislead him, i)repared by the 
 Judge-Advocate General under the order re(iuiring a fair and judicial 
 revision to be made of the whole evidence, but which unfortunately sets 
 forth only parts of the evidence, as it appears to us, in a cruel and vin- 
 dictive spirit, and in a way calculated only to lu'ejudice and poison the 
 mind of the reader against General Porter and against the truth. The 
 great i>ressure of his overwhelming official duties in that crisis of our 
 country's fate left the President no time to examine the record, and 
 compelled him to rely, as he had a right to rely, upon what he believed 
 to be a fair judicial review of the evidence, but which was, in fact, the 
 (me-sided and embittered statement of an advocate determined upon the 
 ruin of the accused. We proved that by Governor Xewell, because 
 President Lincoln told him so. When application was being made to 
 President Lincoln for relief on the part of General Porter, he said to 
 the governor, in substance, that he had not been able to read the record. 
 Do not the dates demonstrate with equal clearness that he had not and 
 could not have done so ? The judgment and sentence were pronounced 
 on Saturday night, the 10th of January. On Monday morning the 
 order was made by the President — this order requiring the revision for 
 the advice and determination of the mind of the President to be made 
 by Judge-Advocate-General Holt. Yes, on the 12th, one day prior to 
 the proceedings having been forwarded to the Secretary of AVar for 
 transmission, under the law, to the President. So that the proceedings 
 were not in the President's hands before they went to Judge-Advocate 
 Holt, or before the 10th, when his pretended review beais date. For 
 on the 19th comes that extraordinary paper, which has been suffi- 
 ciently reviewed and exposed by Mr. Bullitt; a paper calculated not to 
 lead the President to the knowledge of the facts, but to lead him away 
 from the knowledge of the real facts ; and on that he based his judgment 
 approving the action of the court-martial. 
 
 1 have said before that we were nuich obliged to the Eecorder for 
 calling many a witness that we did not know of and couhl not have 
 «>l)tained. He calls a son of l*resident Lincoln; and if there was any 
 doubt before about how much and what sort of weight ought to be given 
 to the opinion of the President, it is terminated by his evidence, is it 
 not? What <loes he say? He was then a young man of nineteen or 
 twenty, and his father was in the habit of talking with him confidenti- 
 ally. One day he found his father reading or meditating on the Porter 
 case; and the President produced to him, what? Why, that dispatch 
 of General Porter to Generals King and McDowell in the latter part of 
 the 29th of August, indicating an intenticm to withdraw to ALmassas, 
 in accordance with the injunctions contained in the joint order of 
 General Pope. Wliere did he find that? Why, it was set forth in 
 full in the opinion, in the paper, prepared by Judge-.Vdvocate-Gen- 
 eral Holt. The whole fact of the retreat was there; and that was all 
 the retreat there was; and Ave shall find that, instead of being a cen- 
 surable purpose, it was altogether in'aiseMorthy under the circum- 
 stances as now known and the facts out of which it arose. But 
 the President was led to believe, because it is so stated in that paper of 
 Judge-Advucate-General Hi)lt, that there was no doubt that General 
 
23 
 
 Porti^r carried out and acted upon the intention declared in tliat letter 
 and did retreat, believing that the rest of the army was standing its 
 ground against destructive odds. It Avas in this false belief that the 
 President evidently spoke, is^ow we know, if we know anything, that 
 the dispatch to Generals McDowell and King meant nothing of the 
 sort, and that there was no retreat. Then what did President Lincoln 
 say ? And this sliows exactly what I have said before, as to the dis- 
 crepancy between the guilt imputed, and the punishment awarded. 
 Why, President Lincoln said that if that was true — if all those malig- 
 nant statements aiul those i^erversions of testimony so insidiously set 
 forth, in the papers of Judge Holt were true — that it would not have 
 been too much or too severe a sentence if General Porter had been con- 
 demned to be shot. So, when you examine that opinion and find the 
 basis of it, you will see that, as a])plied to the facts and circumstances 
 now before the comt, it is no more pertinent than if it were in refer- 
 ence to the case of some other ofticer in some other war. But the 
 striking point in Kobert Lincoln's testimony as compared with Gov- 
 ernor Xewell's is this: The two together show how completely the 
 mind of the President in regard to the case had been changed before 
 his death, and how from being satisfied, and more than satisfied, with 
 the condemnation of Porter, he had come, by a knowledge of the actual 
 facts, to the conviction that injustice he was entitled to a new trial. 
 
 THE CHARGES AGAINST GENERAL PORTER. 
 
 Let me now take up very briefly these several charges. I propose to 
 consider them in their order, because there is some confusion likely to 
 creep into the case if they are considered otherwise, as the learned Ee- 
 corder lias seen fit to treat them. In respect to the transactions of the 
 29th, he jumbled up the consideration of all the charges, irrespective of 
 the Article of AVar under which they are drawn. It may be that an 
 officer is guilty of disobedience and yet is not guilty of the heinous 
 crime of misbehavior in the face of tlie enemy, running away for the 
 purpose of abandoning the cajutal of his country to a rebel host; and 
 on the other hand, the accused party might be not guilty of disobedi- 
 ence, and yet guilty of misbehavior before the enemy. So it seems to 
 me tliat accuracy of judgment can only be preserved by treating of the 
 distinct charges in the order in wiiich they are arranged. 
 
 In respect "to the first charge, the alleged disobedience by General 
 Porter, of the order of the 27th. I Avill first read the charge, and then 
 offer a very few observations about it. 
 
 Charge Ist^ NpecJJimthm 1st — Disobedience of 6.30 p. m. order. 
 
 C'uah(;e 1st. — Vittliition of the 9tli Article of "War. 
 
 S2)(ciJicafioii 1-sf. — In this, that the said jMajor-General Fitz-Johu Porter, of the vol- 
 imteers of the United States, haviiii;- received a hiwfnl order, ou or ahont the 27th 
 Anji;iist, 1H6'2, wliih' at or near Warreiiton Jimctiou, in A'irgiuia, from Major-Geueral 
 John Pope, his superior and commanding officer, in the following figures and letters, 
 to wit : 
 
 Headquarters Army of Virginia, 
 
 Briiftoe Station, Au{)ust 27, 1862 — (j.:50 p. m. 
 
 General: The majitr-general connnanding directs that you start at one o'clock to- 
 night, and come forward with your whoU> corps, or sucli i>art of it as is with yon, so 
 as to be here by daylight to-morrow morning. Hooker lias had a very severe action 
 with the enemy, witli a loss of aV)out thice liuudred killed and wounded. The enemy 
 has been driven back, but is retiring along the railroad. We must drive him from 
 Manassas and clear the country between that place and Gainesville, where McDowell 
 is. If Morell has not joined yon, send word to him to push forward immediately ; also 
 
24 
 
 send word to Banks to hurry forward with all speed to take your place at Warreutou 
 Junction. It is necessary, on all accounts, that you shoujd be here l)y daylight. 
 
 I send an officer with this dispatch, who will conduct you to this i)lace. Be sure tO' 
 s<'nd word to Banks. avIio is on the road from Fayetteville, piobahly in the direction 
 of Bealton. Say to Banks, also, that lie had Ijest run hack the railroad trains To this 
 side of Cedar Run. If he is not with yon, write him to that effect. 
 By command of Maior-General Pope. 
 
 GEORGE D. RUGGLE.S, 
 
 Colonel and Chief of Stuff. 
 Major-General F. J. Poijtkr, 
 
 Warreiitou Junction. 
 
 P. S. — If Banks is not at ^Varrenron Junction, leave a regiment of infantry and two 
 pieces of artillery, as a guard, till he comes uj). with instructions to follow you iunue- 
 diately. If Banks is not at the Junction, instruct Cokmel Cleary to run the trains 
 T)ack to this siile of Cedar Run, and post a regiment and section of artillery with it. 
 Bv conmiand of Major-General Pope. 
 
 GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 
 
 Colonel and Chief of iSt off. 
 
 did then and there disobey the said or<ler, being at the time in the face of the enemy. 
 
 This at or near "Warrenton, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 28th of August. 
 18G2. 
 
 The ground lias been very fully gone over on our side, and it would 
 be only imposing upon the good nature of the Board if I should detain 
 it very long. In the first jdace your attention has been called to the 
 eomi)aratively trifling nature of the charge — I mean as compared with 
 the gross magnitude of those in respect to the 29th. It all depends 
 upon what Ave believe to be an immaterial variance, utterly immaterial, 
 of two hours in the time of starting on the march on the night of the 
 27th. Without any regard to discretion, to judgment, to reasons that 
 existed to the contrary, without any regard to the circumstances of the 
 case, the learned IJecorder asks in the most defiant manner, "Was he 
 not ordered to march at one o'clock ? He was. Did he march until 
 three? He did not. Is he guilty? Guilty." Well, if that is the Avay 
 to dispose of the charge, there is no use of examining it; there is no use 
 of a trial. He was ordered to start at one; he did not start until three. 
 And the Board will observe that the same case might be made if, instead 
 of being two hours, it was one hour, or Imlf an hour, or quarter of an 
 hour. If a court-martial can convict an otticer and dismiss Iiimtrom the 
 service for a variation of two hours from the time at which he Avas ordered 
 to march without the least regard to the circumstances, they can just as 
 well do so, by the same summary method, for a delay of fifteen minutes. 
 
 The learned Recorder made one suggestion in this connection that 
 rather galled me. Even on the court-martial there was a decent regard 
 l»aid to the feelings of the accused. The forn)s of courtesy at least were 
 adhered to. But tbe learne<l Becorder in his opening argument has 
 suggested that this change of two hours on the night of the 27tli was 
 made by Ciencral Porter in the hope that those two hours would bring- 
 a change of commanders, from roi)e to McClellan. I do not tliink such 
 a suggestion as that is worthy of this Board or of a component member 
 of it. Xow that 1 am upon that sid)ject, let me say also this: that the 
 observations tliat he made tliis morning imputing a lack of personal 
 integrity to ( Jeneral Porter are as gratuitous as they are ottensive. I do 
 not think he would have made that after deliberation. Nobody ever 
 made any such suggestion before as that General Porter wilfully stated 
 falsehoods in his dispatches — a charge distinctly made by the Recorder 
 this morning. That was not the charge on which he was being tried by 
 the court-martial or retried here. I sliall not make any more observa- 
 tions about these insinuations in the further progress of the discussion, 
 except to repeat once for all that they were \'ery uncalled for and \ery 
 painful to the feelings of the ]>etitiouer and his counsel. 
 
-25 
 
 As to this order of tlie 27tli. 1 say, although the eoinphiiiit was a 
 trivial one, although nothing came of it, and there was no delay result- 
 ing, although, as I su])i)ose, it Avas nun-ejy tin-own in as a nuilce-weight 
 on the subsequent and greater charges, still General Porter is bound to 
 explain it and Justify it. We ask nothing that shall loosen the bands of 
 disci[>line or impair the cardinal rules of the military service as to im- 
 plicit obedience to orders. We claim implicit obedience, and we claim 
 intelligent obedience; we claim actual and not fictitious and pretended 
 'obedience; we claim that a corps commander should act. and tliat (ien- 
 eral Porter did act, not like a umchine set in motion by an order which 
 he was not to read or interpret, but that he was an inteliigent instrument 
 of the dignity of a corps commaiuler, invested with the functions which 
 the military law imputes to that high grade of service. ^STow, what is 
 the nature of the (juestion ? It is not, as it seems to me, whether he was 
 ordered to start at one and did not start until three. ] cannot think 
 that that is the question. If it is, all the lal)or, talk, and study that 
 has been devoted to it has been thrown away. 
 
 The (luestion, it seems to me, is one of intent. Was his failure to 
 march until three, an act of intended disobedience and disregard of the 
 order, or was it a decision justittably arrived at by him in good faith, in 
 the exercise of his duties and his responsibilities as a corps commander, 
 ten miles trom his chief who gave it, an<l receiving it under circum- 
 stances which could not be known to General Poi>e, who gave it ? If 
 you establish the aftirmative of the latter question, we claim that Gen- 
 eral Porter is comi)letely exonerated from this charge. The I'ecorder 
 has said that General Porter has no right to set u]> his will against that 
 of the counnanding general. ^Vell, so we say. We say he did not set 
 up his will; that he did not assume or pretend to set u]) his will. His 
 will, his imi>ulse, was to obey the order strictly and to tiie minute; l)ut 
 his judgment, wliich he Avas at liberty to exercise, which he was bound 
 to exercise, recpiired him not to move until the near ai>in'oach of day. 
 In the first place, in regard to this order, I make one observation, and 
 that is, that whatever may be the duties of corps commanders in the in- 
 terpretation and execution of orders, they have a right to expect that 
 all orders that are sent to them by their chiefs at a distance shall be 
 both intelligible and possible of excution — I mean possible within the 
 view of tlie sender. Now, was this such an order ? xVlthough the Board 
 are iierfectly familiar with the order and the objects expressed upon its 
 face, I will read it once more. 
 
 I want to ask whether you think that General Pope thought it was 
 possible of exact execution when he gave the order. Because, if he did 
 not, the rule of discretion conceded by the Judge-Advot-ate and con-' 
 ceded by the learned Recorder comes in. Applyiiig the test of the 
 Napoleonic rule in respect to obedience and discretion, as to orders given 
 by a commander at a distance, it is contended by both of those learned 
 legal authorities that there is no discretion as to the end, although there 
 may be a discretion as to the means. The rule is as follows: 
 
 A military ordor exacts ])assive f)li(Mlieiice oiilji when if is given % a superior who is 
 present on Ihe spot at the moment }vli( n lie f/ires if. Haxiiig, tlien, kno\vled<i;e of tlie state 
 of things, lie can listen to tlie ohjcctions and give the necessary exidanations to him 
 Avho should execute the order. 
 
 The prosecution in that view says that this order was to get to Bris- 
 toe by dayliglit, and if he could get to Bristoe by daylight by starting 
 at some other hour than one o'clock, all right, no offense given or taken 
 in changing the hour of starting; but there is no discretion as to the 
 end. Well, sui)pose you have a written order of \\hich the sender does 
 
26 
 
 not believe the end was possible ; suppose General Pope orders General 
 Porter to march from Warrenton Junction at one o'clock, so as to get 
 there at daylight, when he knows it is not i)ossible for him to get there 
 at daylight, or wheu he has fair reason to believe that it is not ])Ossible 
 for him to get there at daylight, and that General Porter on receiving it 
 knows that; how does that affect the ai)plication of the rule as to dis- 
 cretion, if there is such a rule ? It removes the end altogether, does it 
 not ? If the commanding general orders a cori)S commander to march at 
 one to reach a certain i>lace by daylight, knowing that he cannot do it,* 
 even by starting at one, what is the next conclusion ? How is it to be 
 construed '? 'Why, it is to get there with all practicable speed, is it 
 not ? 
 
 NoAv, 1 want to ask the Board whether they believe that General 
 Pope, when he said start at one a. m., and get to Bristoe at daylight, 
 thought Porter could do so ? That is an im])ortant (luestioii. If Gen- 
 eral Pope had honored us with his i.rescnce, Ave couhl have found out 
 from the best authority. Bnt when he stood at his post in Kansas and 
 said he wouhl not come upon a re<piest, Imt would come upon a sub- 
 poena, and then when he was subpcenaed said he would not come at all, 
 and defied the summons of this Board, we have a right still to explore 
 the case for his motives and his knowledge. And, fortunately, we are 
 not witliout the means of ascertaining tliem. It so ha]»peJis that General 
 Pope had gone over this very road from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe 
 that afternoouj^starting in the latter part of the afternoon and getting 
 there early in the evening, and he knew sonu'thing about the coiulition 
 of the road. He did not know how it was after the wagon trains had 
 closed up behind him, but he knew something about the distance and 
 the condition of the road as it was when he went over it. He Avas ac- 
 com])anied by two very intelligent and distinguished ofHcers. He went 
 alone Avith those fcAV personal attendants on horseback, and it took them 
 a good while to go; I do not knoAV hoAV long, but more hours tlian he 
 aHoAved to this army corjjs to go in the middle of the darkest night and 
 get there at daylight. Having got there, he sentls an order for this 
 army cor])s to start at one, saying tliat it was necessary iorthem to be 
 there at daylight. Xoav, a\ liat I say is, in the A'oluntaiy absence of 
 (reneral Poi)e, if you liaVe the judgment of tAvo e(pially comi)etent per- 
 scms A\ iio Avere Avith him Avhen this order Avas issued, and Avho accom- 
 panied him on that Journey, you haAC, I tbiuk, a pretty fair means of 
 testing Avhether General Po])e thought it was a i)ractical)le or possible 
 order. I refer to the evidence of General Buggies and General Mc- 
 KeeA'er, to both of Avhich I shall ask permission to call the attention of 
 the court. 
 
 I Avill read ^Iclveevei's testimony first, at ])age 147: 
 
 Question. I will ask you wliethcr, in your judiiincnt and cxijericuc-c, a iiiiiitary 
 coniniandf'i-, who had himsflf acconiiianit'd an ainiy corjjs over lliar I'oad in ilayli^lit 
 that (lay fVoni ^A'al•l■<■nt()n Junction to Bristoe. would ha\(' deemed it ad\isalile lor 
 anotlier army corjis oi" 9,0(10 men. with artillery, to leave AA'arrenton .Tunction at one 
 o'clock in the nn)rning to reach Uristoe .Statimi by daylight or near that hour.' 
 
 From the ansAver it is CAident that the AA'ord " advisable" is a misprint 
 for " practicable." 
 
 Daylight, I believe, for the purpose of this discussion, is generally 
 admitted on all sides as about four o'clock. 
 
 Answer. That is a ditfwult question to answer. It did not seem to nu^ at the time 
 to l)e practicable. 
 
 There is a clear and emi)hatic opinion by one oflicer entitled to great 
 Aveight, as it seems to me. 
 
27 
 
 On pai>e 279 General llnggles, General Pope's cliief of staff, says: 
 
 Question. Have yon lifavd the i)roof here, or do you know what has l)e('n proved 
 the ohstrnetion of that road by 2,000 or 3,000 army wagons? 
 
 Answer. I knew tliere were a hirue number of wagons and that the road was 
 hloekeil ; I heard that after Genciral Porter had come u^). I knew that tlie road was 
 reported to liave been heavily bh)cked with wagons. 
 
 Question. Do you know anything of the darkness of that night? 
 
 Answer. I knoAV it was veiy dark, so dark that I lost my way going a few hundred 
 feet from the bivouac. 
 
 Question. How do you recollect that ? 
 
 Answer. I recfdlect that from the reason that I had nothing to eat since morning. 
 Our mess-wagon came u]> ; our cook had been captured, and we could not tiud any 
 servants, and I had to stumble round in the dark myself. I think we slnmted and 
 hallooed to people, and tinally we got to the wagon ; then I got in and looked around, 
 but could lind nothing more than a ham bone, the same as Colonel Johnson ; the ham 
 bone had been pretty well picked. 
 
 Question. Does your experience enable you to form a judgment as to the practica- 
 bility of an army e<u-ps on such a night, with a road obstructed as you understand 
 this to have been, starting from Warrentou Junction at 1 o'clock a. m., to reach Bristoe 
 Station by daylight? 
 
 Answer' I donU think it could hare hceit done. I recollect that road as I came through. 
 
 And lie eanie tlirongh side by side with General Pope. 
 
 It ran jiart of the way tlnough groves or woods; audi recollect that there were 
 stumps of trees and of sajdings in the road ; that the road was filled with these little 
 stumjis ; That the road itself was tortuous. I think the men would have beeu impeded 
 in the road by the trains, by these stumps, and Ijy the crookedness of the road. Ac- 
 cording to my recolh'ction, there were several runs that crossed the railway l>etween 
 those two ])oints, and over these runs were open bridges. I think the men could not 
 have marched upon the lailway, because in the darkness they would have fallen 
 through these open l>ri<lges. 
 
 Xow, does not tliat satisfactorily establisli tliat General Po])e, when 
 he gave that order, eonld not luniself have deemed that it was practica- 
 ble to obey it ? If so, what lieconies of this rnle, urged by the Judge- 
 Advocate' and by the liecorder, that the corps connnander, in such a 
 case, has no discretion as to the end ? There is no end if the end is im- 
 possible, except the end indicated by the order as the object of calling- 
 the army corps over the road. As it has been pressed against General 
 Porter, we have considered whether it was possible. But, further, was 
 it quite fair and honest ! It was pressed upon the attention of the Presi- 
 dent, you will recollect — and the court seems to have been imposed upon 
 to believe — that the immediate occasion of giving this order was, be- 
 cause, after the tight with Ewell in the afternoon, it was found that 
 Hooker had got out of amnmnition ; and Porter having ammunition, that 
 was the reason for sending for his corps to come up; and, also, because 
 of an anticipated attack in the morning by the returning enemy. Both 
 those consi<lerations were urged upon the President, in the review by 
 the Judge-Advocate, and he was led to bebeve, as I understand, that 
 that l)eing the purpose for which the order was sent, was the reason for 
 its urgency, as nmde known to the court-martial. Well, now, if those 
 were the purposes, would not it have l)een fair to put them in the order? 
 If General Porter was afterwards to be tried and convicted for not obey- 
 ing an order, the urgency of which was that they were out of aininuni- 
 tion and expected aii immediate attack, would it not have been fair to 
 put one or both of those reasons in the order ? 
 
 PRETENDED REASONS FOR THE ORDER. 
 
 Let us see now how this matter about the aninuuution and the antici- 
 pated attack stands. General Pope made a report of Sei)tember 3, which 
 has been put in evidence, but not yet called to the attention of the court, 
 
28 
 
 aiul it is to be found in this Board Record, on page 1115. In that was 
 the first suirrgestion that this order was sent oh one of those accounts. 
 There it is stated in this way, on page 1110 : 
 
 The luifortunate oversight of not luiiiginsi more than fcn-ty rounds of ammunition, 
 hecame at once ahirniing. At nightfall, Hooker had hut iibout live rounds to the 
 main left. As soon as I learned this I sent back orders to Fitz-John Porter to march 
 w itli his corps at one o'clock that night, so as to be with Hooker at daylight in the 
 moriuug. 
 
 He does not say anything about any anticipated attack in the morn- 
 ing. But he afterwards, January 27, 18G3, made wliat is called his 
 official rei)ort; and there both these circumstances for the first time ap- 
 pear. There, at page 18, he puts it in this Avay : 
 
 Thinking it altogether likely that Jackson would mass his Avhole force and atteniptto 
 turn our right' at liristoe .Station, and knowing that Hooker, for want of ammunition, 
 was in little condition to nuike long resistance, I sent liack orders to General Porter, 
 altoutdark of the 27th, to move forward at (»ne o'clock in the nigiit, and report to me 
 at Ihistoe by daylight iu the morning. 
 
 You Avill observe that the order says nothing about either of these 
 matters. The order describes a very difterent state of things, and of 
 l)urposes. After giving directions to come, and referring to the tight 
 that Hooker has had, the order says : 
 
 The eiicinj/ hiH heen dricvn back, aiid is retiring (don;/ the railroad ; ice must drire him from 
 Manassas and clear the country between that place and GaiHesrille, where McDowell is. 
 
 And these are the only purposes exjiressed in the order. Nothing 
 about ammunition, notliing about an anticipated atti\ck; and for two 
 reasons: First, he <lid not know when he sent the order that they were 
 out of amnumition; and, second, he had no reason for anticipating an 
 attack, because he tliought the rebels were retreating, and wanted 
 Porter there to pursue them. Now, the Recorder says that General 
 L'ojie and (Jeneral Heintzelman, and all the witnesses, prove that Pope 
 knew, Avhen he gave tlie order, that Hooker was short of ammunition. 
 I take direct issue witli that statement, and say that they do not; that 
 tlicy prove just the contrary: that they prove that General Pope did 
 not know of the ammimition being short, and did not know of the anti- 
 ci])ated attack when he wrote this order. The order is dated 0.30 p.m., 
 wliich is sunset; an hour after that it is dark. (Jeneral Buggies, in his 
 testimony before this Board, says he wrote the order and dispatched it 
 before reaching Bristoe, where Pope arrived at dark; and then, and not 
 till then, could he have received any report of lack of amiintnition on the 
 part of Hooker. (Jeneral Pope, on page 12 of the court-martial record, 
 says ''just at dark." Very precise. This is his sworn statement: 
 
 Jnut at dark Hocd^er sent me word, and General Heint/.<dmaii also rcjuuted to me 
 th.-it he. Hooker, was almost entirely out of anniiunititui, lia\ ing bur li\ c rounds to a 
 mail leff. 
 
 Gc-neral Heintzelman, at ])age SO of the same record, says this: 
 
 Question. What information have you iu regard to the condition of General Hooker's 
 supjdy of ammunition after the battle of Kettle Run, on the '27th of August ! 
 
 Answer. A ])ortion of liis division was nearly out of ammunition. 
 
 Question. Was or was not that fact made known to Major-Geiieral Pojjc in the after- 
 noon of tile 27tii of August .' 
 
 Answer. Late in the afternoon it was. 
 
 Well, this says late in the afternoon. l>nt tliat ju'ecisc point of time 
 is fixetl by (Jeneral Pope, for he says it came to him jnst at dark; and 
 he ouglit to know. Then the witness Dwight does not help the Recorder 
 
29 
 
 at all oil tliat matter. His evidence appears at pages 722 and 724 of the 
 Board record. He says, after the fight: 
 
 We wore sluirt of innnmiiitioii. I was sent hy Colonel Taylor to General Hooker to 
 ascertain what we slionld do in case we were attacked dniiiij;- the night, as there 
 seemed to he some donbt as to whether it was a rear-<>nard or whether there wonld 
 be an attack made. General Hooker replied to me, nearly as I can recollect: "TeU 
 Colonel Taylor that we have no anininnition, bnt that there has l)een conniinnication 
 had with General Pope, and (ieneral I'ope has commnnicated to General l'ort(>r, and 
 General Porter should be here now. He will be here in the morning certainly." 
 
 And on page 724 : 
 
 Question. What time did you go into camp? 
 
 Answer. Some time in the afternoon When Ave commnnicated with General Hooker 
 it was towards dark, if I recollect. 
 Question. How near dark? 
 
 Answer. It was dusk; I could not say the hour; late in the afternoon. 
 Question. May it not have been liefore dark ? 
 Answer. No, sir; it was quite dark. 
 
 Thus you have all tl»e facts and circumstances;, and you have the 
 time when Hooker communicated to Pope, and it was just at dark. 
 There is not a 'particle of evidence in the case varying- it from that. 
 Writing his order to General Porter at 0.30, he does not say a word about 
 ainmunition, liecause he knew nothing about it; and yet, in his report, 
 and on the trial, and before the President, it was imputed to General 
 Porter that this order was based upon the urgency of a want of ammu- 
 nition known to General Pope at the time he sent it. 
 
 porter's interpPvEtation of the order and action under it. 
 
 The first thhig, in considering- the action of General Porter under this 
 order, as it seems to me, is to inquire how it must have been considered 
 by him when he received it. It was brought by Capt. Drake DeKay, 
 whose evidence was taken on the court-martial. ]S^o\v, what is the fact 
 about Drake DeKay's arrival with the order and how did he come ? 
 He came alone ; he came on horseback with this order, which is regarded 
 all around as one of great urgency, and he came as fast as he eould, did 
 he not? I suppose so. He claims so. Xow, what time did he get there? 
 The learne<l Pecorder thiiilcs he got there about i) o'clock, lint General 
 Pope, in his report of the 3d of September, states the exact hour. He 
 says : 
 
 The di.stance was only nine miles, and he (Porter) received the dispatch at 9.50 
 o'clock. 
 
 It is said that General Porter did not .know very much al)out the road. 
 Didn't he ? He knew that there was an aide, bouml to make all possible 
 speed, coming- alone on horseback over the road, starting at 0.30 — that is, 
 with the advantage of the last hour of daylight— and it took him three 
 hours and twenty minutes, which was twenty minutes more than Gen- 
 eral Pope proposed by the order to allow an army corps to go the same 
 distance over the same road, in the darkness of midnight, afoot. Did 
 not General Porter know anything- about the condition of the road ? 
 Was not the first thing- that necessarily came to his mind the impracti- 
 cabilitv of exactly executing- the order ? It seems to me that is beyond 
 all question. What else came with it ? Wliy, DeKay complained that 
 the road was obstructed, and of tlie great difticulty he had had in get- 
 ting- through. ^^)v\', if he had had great difficulty in getting through 
 alone on horseback, because of the obstructions of the road. General 
 Porter at once saw that to an army corps, going- without any light what- 
 
30 
 
 ever, on foot, and with their artillery, as they were re<inire(l, it was an 
 impossible order. What was his lirst inipnlse ? There is a great deal 
 of talk about aniinu.s in this case. The first words that an oftieer utters 
 when he receives an order have a very strong' l)earing' ui)on the question 
 of animus. He says, this order must be obeyed ; General Pope, w^ho 
 gives it, knows what he wants. Let ns start at once I To whom does he 
 say that ? To his division commanders ; all men of character and un- 
 questioned loyalty and integrity — Morell, Butterfield. and Sykes. Some 
 criticism is made as to the manner of the ])etitioner, whether he read 
 the order aloud, or whether he handed it to each one of them, or Avhether 
 tliey knew its entire contents. lUit General Butterfield says he handed 
 it to Sykes or Morell; and I think General Warren says the same thmg. 
 And ]Mr. DcKay says that they discuss(-d the subject-matter; he told 
 them what had liai»pened, and that he was sent to guide them back. 
 
 Xow comes the cpiestion of discretion. These division commanders, 
 all three of them, instantly united in a common ]notest against starting 
 at one o'clock. And on what ground ? Because of the jaded comlition 
 of their troops, taken in connection with the impenetrable darkness of 
 the night, for it was impenetrable at that time, and tlu? blocked condi- 
 tion of the road, it being absolutely blocked up with wagons. AVagons 
 had been rolling through there all day on the retreat to Alexandria, as 
 specified in the orders of General Poi)e, which I will presently read to 
 you. Now, it seems to me that the question Avhich is jn-esented in a mil- 
 itary sense (and on that I speak with infinite distrust) is this : When the 
 division commanders. Avho are charged with the responsibility for the 
 weltare and condition of the troops and the performance of a marcli, 
 nnite in such a jnotest on such a ground, ought tlu'ir protest to l)e taken 
 into consideration ? There is the test of the guilt or innocence — of the 
 alleged disobedience. Ought such a i>rotest to be taken into eonsider- 
 ation ? Well, General Porter thought it ought. And if it ought, who 
 is to consider it? Who is to say whether, in view of the jaded condi- 
 tion of the trooi)S, or some of them, and of the infinite darkness of the 
 night, and of the absolute blockade of the road — who is to pass upon 
 that question, or is it not to be ])asse(l upon at all ? Is it to be consid- 
 ered, and if it is to be considered, who is to consider ,it ? General Pope, 
 who gave the order, cannot consider it ; he is ten miles away, and does 
 not know these circumstances. If you answer the question, yes, that it 
 is to be considered, the AA'hole question of disobedience ])asses away, for 
 General Porter is the only man left to consider it ; the rules of war plac^' 
 him there as the substitute of (rcneral Poi)e. That is the way it aj)- 
 l)ears to me. You will ol)serve that while it is an absolute and pereiu])- 
 tory order, if ycm please, to staiit" at one and get there l>y daylight, yet 
 it gave the reasons why his in'esence with his cori)s was wanted. On 
 this question of whether he <mght to consider the protest of his division 
 commanders in view of the terms of the order, what the order says as 
 to what he was wanted for, as it seems to me, comes in : 
 
 The <'iicmy lias liotii diivon baclc ; l.nt is ivtiriiio- along the railroad. We must 
 drive him iVoiii Manassas, and elear the eountry between that place and (Tainesville, 
 Avhere MeDowell i.s. 
 
 He was Avanted, then, to be there, not at daylight — not at all ; Gen- 
 eral Pope, as we have seen, never could have suspi^-ted it i>ossible for 
 him to be thereat daylight: he was Avanted as early as he couhl get 
 there in the morning to i>ursue the retreating rebels, and sweej) the 
 country between Manassis and Gainesville. 
 
 Now, Avas it the thing, in a military point of A'iew, for a cor])s com- 
 mander so situated, receiving such a i)rotest on such a ground fiom his 
 
^ 31 
 
 division commaiulers — was it rijiht for liiiii to take the protest and tlie 
 circuinstances into consideration, in view of wliat be was wanted at 
 Bristoe for? Well, we snbniit that it was. We snbniit thatjnst that 
 protest, on jnst those grounds, raised the qnestion, whether he eouhl be 
 there so as to fnllill the ])urposes for which the order said he was wanted — 
 not his own ideas, not his own purposes — but General Pope's statement 
 of what he was wanted for. If you find, first, that it was right for him 
 to exercise that judgment; second, that he exercised it in good faith; 
 and, third, that he exercised it on fair and reasonable grounds and knowl- 
 edge, he must stand acquitted. It does not seem to me that there can 
 be the least doubt, regarding it as a question of law, or military science, 
 or common sense. 1 sni)pose that in yonr i^rofession, as in ours, great 
 (juestions of law, and great questions of military duty, alike depend 
 upon the dictates of common sense, and are governed by them. 
 
 l^ow look at the ground of protest as bearing npon the objects of the 
 order, as stated in the order. What kind of obedience did it (;all for ? 
 Did it call for General Porter to plunge his corps into the absolute dark- 
 ness of midnight, at one o'clock, and thro\v them into inextricable con- 
 fusion, and set them floundering al)out in camp, or at the first run, so 
 that they conld not be extricated until after daylight, and so that they 
 conld not start on the road nntil long after they had broken camp[? I 
 supi)ose that it called for an effectual, serviceable obedience. That is 
 what common sense dictates. That is what we suppose military laws 
 and regulations reqnire. General Porter heard the protest. What did 
 he know that General Pope did not know ? Well, he knew the condi- 
 tion of the road as Drake DeKay, the messenger, found it. He knew 
 the condition of the road, as his officers knew it ; as his aides-de-camp, 
 Captains Monteith and McQuade, who had been sent out for the purpose, 
 had reported to him. And then, as to the condition of the troops, Gen- 
 eral Pope had not made any inquiries about that; there is not the least 
 scintilla of evidence in the case that he had any knowledge whatever 
 about it. Well, these troops that had been making day and night 
 marches all the way from A quia Creek — their condition is not to be 
 tested by a question of how many hours and minutes they had been in 
 camp that day, or that night, but upon the knowledge and honest judg- 
 ment of their direct and immediate commanders, exercised in good faith, 
 as to their condition. The Eecorder says that the direction of the order 
 was, that Sykes should come alone. That was not so. Sykes was not 
 to come alone. Nobody was to come alone ; if Morell was not there, 
 Sykes was to come alone ; but if Morell and Sykes were together there, 
 as the proofs show that they w-ere, then the order is imperative. 
 
 The major-general commandiug directs that you start at oue o'clock to-night, and 
 come forward with yonr a-ltole corps. 
 
 THE CONDITION OF THE EOAD. 
 
 Briefly, as to the condition of the road. The evidence on this subject 
 is very full. So fully has it been developed that I will not refer to it. 
 I understand the substance of the evidence to be that there were be- 
 tween 2,000 and 3,000 army wagons upon the te\^ miles of road. In one 
 respect it will be seen that this case differs from its attitude before the 
 former court upon this question ; the government has abandoned the 
 pretense that he could have gone along the railroad, because, I siqipose 
 under the evidence of McKeever and Kuggles, the Pecorder thought it 
 was idle to make any such claim as was claimed before. Well, then, it 
 was a common dirt road, and not a turnpike; running partly through 
 
32 
 
 the woods, and blocked up "uitli 2,000 or 3,000 army wagous, which, if 
 stretched out one by one, would occupy 24 miles in length ; and if they 
 were doubled up it is very diflicnlt to say how ieven a horseman could 
 get through without the greatest difticulty, as Drake De Kay found 
 when he undertook to come alone. 
 
 DAKKNESS OF THE NIGHT. 
 
 The character of the night also has been pretty amply developed. If 
 ever there was a dark night, it appears to me, from the evidence, that 
 this of the 27th of August, 1802, was it. They say that there were other 
 marches that night. Yes ; there were. There was the march of King's 
 division. I should think a dozen privates had been brought here from 
 Gibbon's brigade, King's division, to say how they marched that night. 
 Bo you recollect the evidence of General Patrick and General Gibbon 
 about it ! They were terminating a march that night, floundering and 
 straggling along, going into bivouac at ten or eleven o'clock. The evi- 
 dence of General Patrick is that he had to stretch a line of men across the 
 road, in order that the troops might be stopped as they came along and 
 turned aside, for it was not possible for them otherwise to see that those 
 in advance had stopped. Then it is said that Lieutenant Brooke made 
 a ride from Pope's headqnarters to Greenwich, ^^ith a troop of sixteen 
 men, to carry an order to General Kearney and another to Eeno. Yes ; 
 he did. How did he do it I Riding on an unobstructed road it took him 
 three hours and ten minutes to go four and a half miles. There is also 
 another very signiflcant piece of evidence in the case, l)ecause it is the 
 testimony of one of the main witnesses for the government ; Lieut. Col. 
 T. C. H. Smith went out on a scout, as he calls it, and he ma<le five miles 
 between one o'clock and six o'clock. He says he was scouting for rebels, 
 but I don't think he was. I think he was scouting for General Porter; for 
 he says that he came around soon after daylight or about six o'clock, at a 
 distance of tAvo or three miles from Bristoe, whence he had started, and 
 then and there saw the head of the column come up, Mith General Porter 
 at the head. Colonel Smith was, as you know, one of the most malignant 
 of witnesses against General Porter. But he confessed that there was that 
 night, beginning at nine o'clock or thereabouts and extending until eleven 
 or twehe o'clock, a storm of darkness that exceeded anything he had ever 
 witnessed ; the darkness was absolute ; he could not see his hands 
 before his ej-es ; what eyes he has the Board know, because it was those 
 marvelous optics that saw treason lurking in the eye of General Porter 
 on the next day, the 28tli of August. The darkness, according to him, 
 was total. He says it is true, that at one o'clock, when he started out, 
 it was not so dark ; that he could see the forms of the houses and fences 
 in Bristoe ; but he forgot to add what we called out from him on further 
 examination, that the light of the fire at Manassas, that was made by 
 Jackson burning our ham and bacon and flour in such immense quanti- 
 ties, was still perceptible, but even that light was extinguished by the 
 Cimmerian darkness of the storm between nine and twelve o'clock. Xow, 
 there is something singular about this. When General Porter was called 
 u])on to act ujton this order, it was right in the middle of the Egyptian 
 darkness of that night,as depicted by Lieut. Col. T. C. H. Smith. I do 
 not think the llecorder had ever considered that Avhen he pretended 
 there was not any new evidence in the case on the subject of the dark- 
 ness of the night. 
 
 Another suggestion was made by the learned Recorder. I must admit 
 that it would be unfair to ask any lawyer or military man to charge his 
 
33 
 
 miiul with all the proof in tliis case. It is not ])ossil)le. No man's slcnll 
 is large eiiongh to carry it all, and therefore I do not l)lam(^ the llccorder 
 for forgetting it. I>ut he wonhl not have asked the ([uostion that he 
 did ask if he had reniendjcred the evidence, lie asks, why did not Gen- 
 eral Porter send back Avord to General Pope that he was not going to 
 start nntil daylight, and his reasons for not starting? Well, the answer 
 is, he did. After a la])se of sixteen years, when we have snch an infinite 
 variety of facts brought out with such i»erfect clearness, it is one of our 
 grievances that we still lack four things, four links in the perfect chain 
 of proof. I refer to the failure of General Pope to produce the three 
 dispatches which he received on the 29th from General Porter, and the 
 dispatch that he received on this night of the 27th, when General Por- 
 ter, at the close of the deliberations of his council of war, sent a written 
 message by special messenger to General Pope, declaring that he could 
 not start, and why he could not start, at one o'clock, the hour mentioned 
 in the order, and when he was going to start. That is so important 
 that I want to call the attention of the Board to the evidence on the 
 subject. General Pope, at page 13 of the court-martial record, testified 
 as follows: 
 
 Question. Did ho at tliat time, or at any time bt'fore his arrival, explain to yon the 
 reason why he did not obey the order ? 
 
 Answer. He wrote me a note, which I received, I tliink, in the morning- of tlie 23tli, 
 rcrif ((trill in the montiiuj, pcvhapa a Utile before dai/Iif/ht. I am not iinitc sure about the 
 time. The note I have mislaid. I can give the substance of it. I remember the rea- 
 sons given by General Porter. If it is necessary to state them I can do so. 
 
 And on page 27 : 
 
 On the contrary, from a note that I had received from him, I did not ui>der>itaiid that 
 he would marelt until daijlight in the morning. 
 
 Question. Have you, sir, in your possession, or can you readily tind in this city that 
 note? 
 
 Answer. I cannot, as I stated in my evidence yesterday. As the same statements 
 contained in the note were made to my aid-de-camp, if other testimony on the subject 
 is necessary it can be got fiom him. 
 
 Question. When yon received the note which, according to your recoUeotiou, stated 
 that he would be unable to march, or would not march until daylight, will you state 
 at what hour you received it ? 
 
 AnsAver. I think that, in my testimony, I stated that it was quite late in the night. 
 I do not remember exactly the h(nir ; I think towards morning — towards daylight ; 
 perhajjs a little before that. 
 
 Question. Did you take any steps, by message or order, in another form, to the 
 accused to expedite his march ? 
 
 Answer. I sent back several officers to try and see General Porter and request him 
 to hurry up. 
 
 Xow, he sent back several officers, because of the answer he received 
 from General Porter. He also says that this note expressed the reasons 
 of the change in the execution of the order. We do not accept General 
 Pope's statement that he mislaid this order. He had no right to mislay 
 it. If he mislaid it he should have found it. It is not for the general 
 commanding an army to come into court and saj' that he has mislaid or 
 destroyed his dispatdies when he is seeking the condemnation of an of- 
 ticer in respect to matters which would be explained if those dispatches 
 Avere produced. General Puggles has testitied that when he ceased to 
 be chief of statf of General Pope, on leaving Washingtcm at the end of 
 that comi)aign, General Pope reijuired him to hand over all his dispatches, 
 which he did ; and he says all were preserved. General kSmith, who was 
 aide-de-camp to General Pope, in the same capacity, testified as posi- 
 tively that he handed over to General Pope all the disi)a.tch.es that he 
 had had. The learned Pecorder has quoted a good deal of Latin. 1 will 
 give him a sentence: ^'- Omnia pre-suttnintur contra spoUaforcm." A favor- 
 
34 
 
 ite maxim of law, that all things are to be presumed against the destroyer 
 of evidence. There never was a more outrageous pretense or claim made 
 than this, to condemn General Porter for disobedience of an order, and 
 for not explaining the nature of his reasons for that disobedience, wlien 
 the commander has destroyed or mislaid the note M'hich he received, 
 stating wh}' the order could not be obeyed. 
 
 I say there was no delay, no time lost. But suppose that instead of 
 this intelligent obedience and this rational exercise of the functions 
 of a corps commander, having in view the carrying ont the expressed 
 l)urposes of the order in the best way in which they could be accom- 
 plished, he had floundered out at one o'clock, as the order required, know- 
 ing that he could not, by so doing, get there at daylight in this darkness, 
 as described by Colonel Smith, that they had been involved in the inex- 
 tricable confusion incident to such starting, and, instead of gettingto Broad 
 Bun with the head of the column at eight o'clock, as did hax>pen, the 
 corps had been delayed so that the head of the column did not get there 
 until ten or eleven o'clock; he would have appeared to obey the order 
 and he would not have obeyed it. Would not he have been culpable? 
 I am not .competent to answer the question. I put it to you as military 
 men; would not he be blam able for making a pretended obedience to 
 the order, and not a real and intelligent obedience, if it had resulted in 
 a delay that had thwarted the objects of the order as indicated on its 
 face '? 
 
 The Recorder has referred to certain worthless evidence on this sub- 
 ject, of one Buchanan. Buchanan says that he was in front of Porter's 
 lieadquartei's at 3 o'cdock and there were no signs of life till after break 
 of day, and that he waited there and saw nothing of Porter till iifter sun- 
 rise; but it turns out from the evidence of Locke and ^lonteith, who 
 were in personal contact with Porter, that General Portei- was already 
 out upon the road endeavoring to clear it to expedite that march in the 
 dark. Then Solomon Thomas, corporal Thomas, who is always brought 
 in when the Recorder don't know whom else to appeal to — he is Ijrought 
 in to say that they did not start as soon as they should; but it turns 
 out, on his cross-examination, that he says tliey did start at one o'clock 
 a. m., and did not get to Bristoe until two o'clock the next afternoon. 
 
 1 call the attention of the Board to another matter, which seems to 
 me to be worthy of consideration. 
 
 Several very eminent legal gentlemen have expressed to General Por- 
 ter their views upon this case ; and, if the Board Avill permit me, I would 
 hke to read a short extract from the o])inion of Charles O'Conor, which 
 seemed to me exceedingly sensible and entitled to the greatest consider- 
 tion, and we will treat it as an offset to the opinion of the Recorder: 
 
 After making all ])ropev iiiqniries and cousulting with his chief subordinates, tlie 
 accused, in conformity witli their judgment, deferred the rime of starting on tlie di- 
 rected mar<-h for two hours. This was regarded by the c<Hirt-martial as an unautlior- 
 ized deviation from thi^ chief's instriu'tions. For tlie (h'feiise it was asserted that, 
 owing to the (L'lrkness of tlie uiglit, tlie condition of the road and the obstnictioris 
 upon it, nothing c<nild have been lost by the change, either in celerity of movement 
 or iu the time of arrival, and that the exhaustion of (leiieral Porter's troops from their 
 lirevious service was such'that their arrival at daybreak, if ]iracticable l>y means of a 
 start at the hour indicated, A>ovdd have be«'ii unavailing for the jmriiose in view. On 
 some, of these iioints the evidence was slightly contlictiiig, but that in the aHirmative 
 Itrepouderated. In my Judgment no examination of it was or is necessary. The tind- 
 iiig manifestly went u]ion the ground that in respect to the hour of starting the order 
 was positive in its terms, and that iniiilicit obedience, if ]diysically jiossible, wasthere- 
 fore an iiiiperative duty. I think this view was not sustained by the law or the fact. 
 A careful inspection of the order should convince any one tliat the writer did not in- 
 tend to fix positively the time of starting or that of completing the march ; taking its 
 Avhole contents into view, it imported nothing of the kind. The prosecutor was con- 
 
35 
 
 scions of tliis, for, iipou the trial, lie sought by means of the oral extrinsic evidence 
 hereafter stated to iini)ort into the docnnient a meaning quite contrary to its ])urpose 
 and to anything Avhicli General Pope intended to convey, or which General Porter 
 could have siipjiosed ov even imagined at the time he received it. It advised him (^2) 
 that a severe action had taken i)lacc (at Bristoc), in which the enemy had been effect- 
 ually and decisively defeated and driven back, so that he was retreating. It also stated 
 distinctly (§:{) that the tste]) then in view and determined upon was, '' to drive him 
 from Manassas and deny the country between that place and Gainesville." This can- 
 not be regarded as idle gossip; the facts must have been connnunicated with a pur- 
 ))ose, and that i>uri)ose could not have been anythingelse than to give the subordinate 
 full knowledge of the object and intent of the directed march. The words of the di- 
 r<'ction itself (^l) were imleed peremptory ; but this was merely the writer's fashion 
 of speaking. If they weie inten<led to exact the same blind obedience that, standing 
 alone, they might seem to enjoin, adding a statement of the cause or motive was su- 
 perliuous. Nay, more; it was extremely olyectionable, for it implied tliat the subor- 
 dinate was not expected to act blindly, but to exercise his judgment. Looking to 
 this announcement (^^^^^2 and 3), we perceive that it conveyed to General Porter, in the 
 plainest and most intelligible form, infornuition that his troops were not needed either 
 to nuike an assault at daybreak or to aid in repelling one that was a])Y>rehended at 
 that time. And, on the ccnitrary, it showed explicitly that they were to be employed 
 in a service essentially different. Their presence was sought as auxiliaries in the pur- 
 suit of a defeated and retiring enemy. 
 
 On behalf of the prosecution it was testified at the trial that General Pope's reason 
 for directing this night march Avas an apprehension that the enemy, though defeated 
 and driven back, might learn that his victorious oi)ponent, General Hooker, was short 
 of annnunition, and, inasmuch as he had not been actually routed, he might, by that 
 intelligence, have been encouT'aged to contemplate an attack on Hooker in the morn- 
 ing. The date and tenor of the order, in connection with this very testimony (Rec, 
 1>. 12), show that the latter Avas in all resi>ects a mistake. General Pope says it was 
 "just at dark "that he learned the av ant of ammunition. The order Avas written, 
 dated, and dis])jitched at sundoAvn, an hour before dark. It contained no reference to 
 the Avant of anunnnition. Insteatl of advising General Porter that, as this testimony 
 suggests, the enemy "still coufronte<l Hooker's diAision at Bristoe Station," it stated 
 the A-ery rcA'crse, (. c, that the enemy had been driven back; and most emphatically, 
 in w'onls of the i)resent tense, it announced that he Avas tlwit, I. e., at the date of the 
 ordei", "reiirin(/ along the railroad." And this, too, Avas made the basis of a super- 
 added exultant resolve to folloAV him into the territory toAvhich he had retreated, and 
 thus clear the country of him. It could not be supposed that General Pope had in his 
 mind Avhen he dictated this order the want of ammunition or aji ai>preheuded assault 
 at day)>reak. 
 
 The evidence of his somewhat communicative messenger, and the wlnde frame of the 
 order, ]»reclude such a a'Icav of the case. These facts must haA*e come to General Pope's 
 knoAvledge subseqiiently to the transmission of the order. Peremptorily enough, to be 
 sur(^, in vS 1 he directed the start at one o'clock ; but, conscious that in vSvS 2 and 3 he 
 had shown the absence of any necessity for a night march, he returned to the Object 
 at ^ 5 and, in what unist be deemed an advisory or persuasive shape, expressed the de- 
 sire for an arriAal at daybreak. Preliminarily to the expi-ession of this desire he caI- 
 dently attempted to state some more forcible reason for it. But the attempt was 
 ineffecttial; foi", in fact, none existed except that already indicated, /. e., the project 
 of an eaily start from Bristoe in the intended pursuit. The phrase "on all accounts" 
 defined no ground of urgency ; and the Avord "necessary" was eA'ideutly employed as 
 synonymous with expedient. (Pec, pp. 19, 20.) Inexact Avriters, and even those who 
 are generally accurate, often use the word in that sense. I have said that this attempt 
 to engraft upon the Avritten order, by means of oral extrinsic cAidence, a su])plement 
 or postscript (|uite inconsistent with its actual terms, must haAC been founded in mis- 
 take. Using the expression in no incnljiatory sense, I must say it appears to be a mere 
 afterthought; not, indeed, an afterthought conceivc'd in subtlety, but arising from an 
 involuntary misconception. Whether such a niistakcexisted or not is, hoAvever, quite 
 i)nmaterial, as there was no charge except for disoljediencc of the Avritten o der. 
 
 Besides, General Porter could not have divined that in giA'ing the order General 
 Pope Avas influenced by an object the very opitosite of that Avhich Avas clearly stated 
 and expressed. If the oral testimony Avas correc't, the dispatch Avas most uuAvisely 
 framed. It Avas actually misleading in its character and tendency. So great is the 
 conflict betAveen the written and oral evidence of General Pope's intent and obj(>ct, That, 
 if the dispatch had been lost or sui)pressed, there might Ikiac appeared to be ,s(mie 
 color for this charge. Witli that Avritiug before the court, there being no pretense 
 that the messeng<!r communicated anything about the want of annnunition or the 
 anticijiation of an attack in the morning, the ccwiclusion of the court seems unaccount- 
 able. 
 
 General Popti was ten miles off; the conditi(ui of Porter's corps as to marching capa- 
 
 4 CH 
 
36 
 
 city was (luite nukuowu to him, and the order affirmatively iudica ted that nothing was 
 designed bnt a general movement in the direction of Bristoe Station for the purpose 
 of pursuing an enemy //(f'H on a retreat. Ihider these circumstances it seems quite 
 clear that Gejieral Porter acted judiciously iu avoiding the exhaustion of his already 
 fatigued eor])s by a night marcli. This, it could he jterceived, wonhl enable him to 
 bring them to the jioint iiulicated Avithout undue loss of time, refreshed by ueedful re- 
 l)ose and in lit condition to march on still further, if recjuired, in pursuit of the flying 
 foe. His action was more conformable to the spirit, intent, and actual import of the 
 whole order than if he had started at one o'clock, in literal comi)liance Avith its first 
 sentence. Acccn-ding to very ample testimony, from sources entitled to the utmost 
 contidence, he judiciously exercised, in conducting the retpiired march, a discretion 
 vested in him by military law; and on this charge he was manifestly entitled to an 
 acquittal. 
 
 The Board then, at G o'clock, adjourned until to -nioirow moniiiiji- at 
 10 o'clock. 
 
 FOllTY-FOUETH DAY. 
 
 West Point, January 11, 1879 — 10 a. m. 
 
 The IJoai'd met pursuant to the forefioinj.;' order and adjournment. 
 
 Present, Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, U. S. A. ; Brig-. Gen. A. H. Terry, 
 U. S. A. ; Col. George W. Getty, U. S. A., and the Pecorder; also, Fitz- 
 John Porter, the petitioner, and the several gentlemen of counsel. 
 
 The reading of the minutes of the previous session was omitted, with 
 the consent of the petitioner. 
 
 Mr. Choate resumed his argument on behalf of the petitioner, as 
 follows : 
 
 Mr. Choate said : In reference to the subject of the state of public 
 feeling at the time the prosecution of General Porter was initiated, and 
 to the distress and excitement, especially of the authorities at Washing- 
 ton, where the public feeling culminated, I omitted to read a passage 
 or two from the rei)()rt of General l*ope to the Committee on the Con- 
 duct of tlie War. I wish to read this morning" from page 106 of that 
 report, where he descrilies the origin of the complaints — I will niot say 
 the beginning of them, but where they take shape in ofticial form, pre- 
 sented l)}^ the commanding-general of the Army of Virginia to the 
 authorities at Washington. It is in a dispatch written by him on the 
 1st of September, at Centreville, and addressed to Major-General Hal- 
 leck, General-in-Chief. He says: 
 
 I think it my duty to call your attention to the unsoldierly and dangerous condnct 
 of many brigade and some division connnauders of the foi'ces sent here from the 
 ])eninsula. Every Avord and act and intention is discouraging, and calculated to 
 break down the spirits of the men and prodnee disaster. One conunander of a corps, 
 who was ordered to march from Manassas Junction to join mcuearGrovctou, although 
 lie was only live miles distant, faih-d to get up at all — Avorse still, fell back to Ma- 
 nassas Avithout a fight, and iu plain hearing, at less than three miles distance, of ii 
 furious battle wliich raged all day. It Avas only in consequence of ])ereni[itory orders 
 that he joined me nt^xt day; one of his lu'igailes, the brigadier-general of whi(di pro- 
 fessed to be looking for his division, absolutely remained all day at Centreville, in 
 plain Aiew of the l)attle, and made no attempt to join. What renders theAA'hole mat- 
 ter worse, these are both otticers of the Regular Ariay, Avho do not hold back from igno- 
 rance or fear. Their constant talk, indulged in ]iul)licly and in pronnscuous company, 
 is that the Army of the Potomac Avill not fight; that they are demoralized by Avitli- 
 drawal from the jx'uinsula, Ac. When such example is set by officers of high rank, 
 the intlnence is Aery )»a(l among those in subordinate stations. Yon liaA'e hardly an 
 idea of the demoralization anioug officers of high rank iu the Potomac army, arising 
 in all instances friuii ]>ersonal feeling iu relation to changes of connnander-in-chief 
 and others. These men are mere tools or parasites, bnt their example is producing 
 and must necessarily produce Aery disastrous results. You should know these things, 
 as you alone can stop it. Its source is beyond my reach, though its elfects are Aery 
 
37 
 
 perceptible and very claiigeroiis. I am emleavoriug- to do all I cau, and will luo^t 
 assuredly put tlieui where they shall light or run away. 
 
 l^ow, to see what effect these words had (and by and by we shall be 
 able to judge what measure of truth there was in them), the effect 
 appears m the same report at page 189 : 
 
 I made my personal camp at Ball's Cross-Roads, and on the morning of the 3d of 
 September repaired to Washingtou, with a few officers of my staff, and reported in 
 person to the General-in-Chief, the Secretary of War, and the President. Each one of 
 these high functionaries received me with great cordiality, and expressed in the most 
 decided manner his appreciation of my services, and of the conduct of my military 
 operations throughout. 
 
 Qreat hidif/uation was expressed at the treaeheroiis and iDifaithfitl conduct of officers of 
 hif/h rank who were directly or indirectlji connected with these operations, and so decided was 
 this fcrlinf/, and so determined the purpose to execute justice upon them, that I was urged to 
 furnish for use to the f/ovcrnment, immediately, a brief official report of the campaign. So 
 anxious were the authorities that this report should be in their possession at once, 
 that General Halleck urged me to remain that day in Washington to make it out. I 
 told him that my papers, dispatches, tSrc, were at my camp, near Ball's Cross Eoads, 
 and that I couhl not well make a report without having them by me. He still urged 
 me to remain with great persistence, but I tinally returned to my'camp, and proceeded 
 to make out my report. The next day it was delivered to General Halleck, but by 
 that time influences of questionable character, and transactions of most nuquestiou- 
 able impropriety which were well known at the time, had entirely changed the pur- 
 poses of the authorities. It is not necessary, and perhaps would scarcely be in place, 
 for me to recount these things here, and I shall therefore only speak of results which 
 followed. The first result was that my report, so urgently denianded the day before in 
 order that the facts might at once be laid before the country and made the basis of 
 such action as justice demanded, it was resolved to suppress. The reason for this 
 change of purpose was sufficiently apparent. The influences and transactions to 
 which I refer seemed to the authorities to make it essential to the temporary interests 
 of the goverument that General McClellau should be reassigned to the command, and, 
 as a result, that the bad faith and bad conduct which the government was so anxious 
 the day before to expose should at least for the present, be overlooked. 
 
 Here we have it clearly stated and confessed by General Pope himself 
 that the alarm and distrust which his dispatch of September 1, from 
 Oentreville, excited in the mind of the government at alleged treachery 
 and infidelity among the generals of the Ai*my of the Potomac led 
 directly to the avowed purpose of executing justice ui)0u them, or, at 
 least, as the event showed, of finding a victim among them, and that it 
 was to reports and information to be furnished in hot haste by General 
 Pope, the author of the charges, that they looked for material upon 
 which to base aud conduct a prosecution. If General Porter was really 
 innocent, and if those were tlie motives in which his prosecution orig- 
 inated, and which sustained and carried it through to the end, then we 
 are not without jiroof upon the record of the truth of what has been so 
 often observed, that General Porter stands iu the position of a scape- 
 goat for the calamities that had overwhelmed the people, and the trans- 
 gressions which had been committed, or which were supposed to have 
 been committed, not by him, l^ut by others. And that that matter may 
 be tested, I have looked into the original authority, to see what the real 
 character of the scape-goat was; and for that purpose I beg leave to 
 read three or four verses from the sixteenth chapter of Leviticus, where 
 the matter is fully set forth: 
 
 And Aaron shall cast lots upon the two goats; one lot for the Lord, and the other 
 lot for the scapegoat. 
 
 And Aaron shall bring the goat upon which the Lord's lot fell, and offer him for a 
 sin ottering. 
 
 Hut the goat, on which the lot fell to he the scapegoat, shall he presented alive — 
 
 Which may account for the failure of the court-martial to sentence him 
 
 to be shot — 
 
 before the Lord, to make an atonement with him, and to let him go for a scapegoat into 
 the wilderness. 
 
38 
 
 And Aarou Hliall lay both his hands upon the head of the live goat, and confvus over 
 him (lU the iniquities of tJie children of Israel, and aU their transgressions in all their sins, 
 putting them upon the head of the goat, and shall send him away hg the hand of a ft man 
 into the wilderness. 
 
 And the goat shall bear npon him all their iniquities unto a land not inhabited: 
 and he shall let go the goat in the wilderness. 
 
 And he that let go the goat for the scapegoat shall ^ash his clothes, and bathe his 
 flesh in water, and afterward come into the camp. 
 
 Now, wlio is the Aaron of tliis (Iramatie performance may easily be 
 conjeotnred; and bow can tbere be timcb more donbt as to wbo fills tbe 
 role of tlie man wbo let go tbe goat for tbe scapegoat ont into tbe 
 wilderness^ for it was be who therchi/ secured the 7ca.^Jiiii(/ofhisoicn handSy 
 (Old returned info the canq). Inj which I understand that he continued in the 
 military service of the United States. 
 
 OPERATIONS OF AUGUST 29. 
 
 iSTow we reacb tbe matters of tbe 20tb of Angiist, wbicb 1 sball en- 
 deavor to dispose of as briefly as possible. 
 
 Tbe situation on tlie morning of tbe 29tb of Angnst is best displayed 
 by tbe dispatcbes of General Pope, and whatever we can extract from 
 tbose certainly tbe Eecorder will not object to. Tbe movement of tbat 
 day originated witb a disi)atcb from General Pope, at a very early bour 
 in tbe morning, an bonr wbicb be is fond of describing as tbe earliest 
 blusb of dawn — 3 a. m. Tbe situation tben was tbat General Porter 
 Avas at Bristoe witb bis corps, where be bad been directed tbe day before 
 to wait and rest bis troops, their fatigued condition being recognized by 
 the general in command. General Pope had gone on expecting to con- 
 centrate his forces, as I understand, at Centreville, behind Bull Eun, 
 excepting those which, as he then thought, lay between General Jackson 
 and Thoroughfare Gap, consisting of McDowell's and Sigel's troops. 
 He was of the belief that, if be had a fight, it should be, certainly, some- 
 Avhere between Gainesville and Centreville ; and 1 think the dispatcbes 
 will show you tbat be expected to have this fight behind Bull liun.. 
 Now, cjuite a contest has been made here as to whether General ]VrcDow- 
 ell disclosed to General Porter that that was tbe original pnrjiose tbat 
 morning of tbe commander-in-chief, or whether that had been bis view 
 on the previous day. But if the dispatcbes of General Pope show you 
 that he expected the fight to be at Centreville, which is behind Bull 
 Pun, all that controversy falls out of tbe case. He sends, at three o'clock 
 in tbe morning, from bis headquarters near Bull Eun, this dispatch to 
 General Porter : 
 
 General McDowell has intercepted the retreat of Jackson ; Sigel is immediately on 
 the right of McDowell. 
 
 He was in entire unconsciousness of the retreat of McDowell's force 
 from behind Jackson, although it had then actually taken place two 
 hours before. 
 
 Kearney and Hooker maich to attack the enemy's rear at early dawn ; Major-General 
 Pope directs yon to move ujyon Centrerille at the first dawn of day with your whole 
 command, leaving your trains to follow. It is very important that you should be here 
 at a very early hour iu the morning. A screre engagement is likelg to take place — 
 
 [That is, of course, at Centreville — ] 
 
 and your jn'esence is 7iecessary. 
 
 The Eecorder has laid great stress upon this statement in the dispatch, 
 tbat a severe engagement is likely to take place, and tbat General Por- 
 ter's presence was necessary. So do I. But in a different direction, I 
 
39 
 
 call it to the attention of the Board, as declaring- as eniijhatically as 
 words could declare that he expected Porter to be then at Centerville, 
 for the ])ur])ose' of taking' iiart in an engagement to be had there. That 
 was, undoul)tedly, his expectation. Tlie heights of Ceutreville was the 
 place where he might ho[)e, if he could hnd Ja<*kson there, for a success- 
 ful engagement, as Jackson had MclJowell and Kicketts behind him. It 
 so hai)pened, however, that at midnight of the previous day, the whole 
 groundwork of the movement contemplated by this dispatch, without 
 his knowing it, had fallen out ; instead of McDowell ha^■ing• intercepted 
 the retreat of Jackson, that had faile<l, and his force, as I have said, and 
 as it has been so often said, had moved away, leaving the way open behind 
 Jackson, at a time, too, when everyl>ody knows that the main army of Lee 
 was pressing forward to join him. and was coming through Thoroughfare 
 Gap. Xow, the Board will observe that the suspicion had not yet reached 
 General Pope, and no rumor had reached him, that McDowell was not, 
 where this dispatch places him, behind Jacksou, cutting him off from any 
 relief from the west. General Porter i)roceeded with the execution of 
 that order. He advanced from Bristoe as soon as could be done after 
 the receipt of this order, in the direction of Ceutreville, aiul his force 
 arrived at Manassas Junction, or Manassas Station, or a little beyond ; 
 and he, himself, reached Bull Eun, or very near Bull Eun, where it has 
 been testitied he found a messenger from General Pope that morning. 
 
 The Eecorder has somewhat gratuitously, I think, indicated that there 
 was some delay in the execution of this order on the part of General 
 Porter. It does not seem to me so, and it is not worth while to discuss 
 it. It has been ably and fully discussed by Mr. Maltl\v. I challenge a 
 careful inspection of the record, to bear me out in the proposition that 
 this order was faithfully carried out by General Porter to the best of his 
 ability, and that he was making rapid headway to the point to which he 
 was directed, to Ceutreville, there to take part in a severe engagement, 
 expected by General Pope to take phice, when the whole movement in 
 that direction was counteracted by the receipt of the next dispatch, which 
 turned him to the right about face to go tiack upon the road upon which 
 he had come, and to proceed upon Gainesville — the explanation of this 
 being, of course, that General Pope, in the mean time, between 3 a. m., 
 when he wrote the dis]iatch which I have already read, and about eight 
 or nine o'clock, when he wrote this next dispatch which I am about to 
 read, had received news of the catastrophe which had taken place In^ the 
 falling back of McDowell's force from behind Jacksou. You will see 
 that General Pope, in those six hours, had got from near Bull Eun, 
 where his headquarters were during the night and at 3 a. m., to Ceutre- 
 ville, where this was written, probably at about eight o'clock — from eight 
 to nine o'clock. 
 
 C'ENTKEVILLK, AltflHSt 29th, 1662. 
 Pnsli forward witli yonv corps aud Kiii<;'s division, ■wliicli you will take with you, 
 upou Gainesville. I am following the euciuy <lowu the Warrenton turnpike. Be ex- 
 peditious, or we shall lose much. 
 
 JOHN POPE, 
 Major-Ginerul Commuiiillng. 
 Major-General FiTZ-JoHX Porter. 
 
 It is observable that in this order there is no mention of General IMc- 
 Dowell. The first dispatch had state<l that McDowell had intercepted 
 the retreat of Jackson. This disi)atch, giving a new direction to the 
 movements of Porter's (torps because of the departure of King's force 
 from the turnpike, makes no reference to McDowell, or his great army 
 corps, except what is implied in the order to Porter to take King's divi- 
 
40 
 
 sion with liim. Xow, the first question is, what was the reason of that ? 
 The reason is manifest, in the conspicuous fact uj)on this record, that 
 McDowell at that moment was lost — lost to the commanding- general, 
 lost to the Army, lost to all the world, and had been lost since four 
 o'clock on the afternoon before ; and it was necessary that King's di^^- 
 sion, which had fallen back in the immediate neighborhood of Manassas 
 Junction where Porter was, should be put under competent command, 
 and it was, therefore, placed under the command of General Porter. 
 That being so is demonstrated by a map which I propose to offer as a 
 l^art of my argument, showing the movements of McDowell i)ersonally 
 from four o'clock on the afternoon of the 2Sth until midnight, or after 
 midnight of the 28th, and where he was during that most imi>ortant 
 period, while his troops, in defiance of positive orders, were abandoning 
 the very key of the Federal position and throwing away the only chance 
 of the capture of Jackson. His testimony is that, before the fight, on 
 tlie turn])ike between King's division and Ewell's on the evening of the 
 2Sth, being evidently in a state of great anxiety in consequence of the 
 situation, he went in search of General Pope, and he went for the reason ' 
 that he Avas better informed as to the situation than General Pope, and 
 that General Poi)e would be benefited by a little conversation with him. 
 That, I believe, is his exact language. He started out at four o'clock 
 from a place on the turnpike a little west of where the fight of the 28th 
 was, and he made this remarkable ride which will rank in history with 
 Sheridan's ride, although under dift'erent circumstances. 
 
 [The map was here explained to the Board, and will be found in the 
 appendix as map F.] 
 
 Thus the temporary disappearance of General McDowell is the obvi- 
 ous reason for this order to put his troops under the command of Gen- 
 eral Porter. 
 
 Now, the immediate military object of this order is one ujion which I 
 take issue with the Eecorder. The Eecorder says that the intent was to 
 get this force of King's division, which had retreated from the turnpike, 
 increased bj' Porter's corps, to which it was now added, back to the very 
 l)lace of the battle of the night before between King and Ewell's force, 
 which we will suppose to be Gibbon's woods, a very familiar ground to 
 us now through the map, and on the pike just west of Groveton. Well, 
 I do not know Avhat military object there could have been in getting 
 them back there, if he wished to retrieve the position that had been lost 
 the night before by their retreat, because the enemy were then under- 
 stood by everybody to be in possession of that battle-ground, from which 
 our forces had retreated. No ; the object of the order is evident to every- 
 body. As has been asserted here, on our i)art, and as has always been 
 asserted by General Porter — you will fiud it in his preliminary state- 
 ment — it was to get this increased force back behind the lebel i)Osition, 
 between them and Thoroughfare Gap, between them and, if possible, 
 Gainesville, and at Gainesville, which was the comumnding position of 
 the whole situation. There has been an attempt made to show, b}- Gen- 
 eral Gibbon, that it was to put the increased force right back into Gib- 
 bon's woods; and you know that the whole argument of the liccorder 
 on this ]>oint was that, when he got to Dawkins' Branch, Porter was 
 pointed a way proceeding straight n\y to (Jibbon's woods, and that he 
 ought to have gone there, (ieneral Gibbon does not say any such thing. 
 I desire to call the attention of the Board to exactly what he does say. 
 
 General Gibbon, on page 243 of the new record, says: He having been 
 concerned in the retreat, and being desirous that the mischievous con- 
 
41 
 
 sequences of it should be remedied, went early in the iiiorniiiA' in search 
 of General Pope: 
 
 Qttostidu. Describe wliat occurred at that interview. 
 
 Answer. I told liiui what had occurred the night hefore, and that the division liad 
 ]cit tlie line of tlie AVarrenton pike, and that I had ridden over and cave him the 
 information, liecanse the aiiseiice of troops from tliat point left the Avay open for Lee's 
 army to join Jacksoji, and that I thought it was a matter of importance that he should 
 have this information, inasmuch as I xiresnmed if he had any troops to send out to that 
 point, that lie ^^ ould dis))ateh them. After some little conversation, the particulars 
 of which I do not recall, he turned to Colonel Ruggles, his adjutant-general, and 
 directed him to write an order directing General Porter to move with his corps out 
 on the Gainesville road, and take King's division with him, and gave it to me to let 
 me carry it back to General Porter. The order was given. I was furnished with a 
 fresh horse and started back. I rode rapidly as I couhl to Manassas Junction, and 
 near the junction met General Porter, and delivered him the order. 
 
 Question. Before leaving the conversation with General Pojte, do yon recollect Gen- 
 eral Poi)e stating to you w hat he was doing in reference to this probable approach of 
 the enemy through Thoroughfare Gap, with reference to the disposition of his troops? 
 I wish you would try to recall what was said in that conversation. You informed him, 
 as I understand, that your division, by leaving the Wai'renton pike, had left the road 
 open for Lee's army to g(5t up and unite with Jackson. Now, wliat did General Pope 
 say, if anything, in reference to the disposition he was making of his troops, or had 
 made of them, with a view to jirevent tliat ? 
 
 Answer. General Pope did not seem to appreciate, I thought, the fact which I in- 
 formed him of, that the absence of those troops from the Warrenton turnpike left the 
 door open to Lee's army to come up. He said, "Wh^-, we are pressing Jacksou now!" 
 I cannot pretend to repeat the words. 
 
 General Pope apparentlj" failing fully to realize the effect of the fall- 
 ing back of King's division, and still hanging on to the idea that they 
 were pressing Jackson in front. 
 
 As I say, General Pojte did not seem to appreciate the importance of what I regarded 
 as fatal; that is, the absence of troops from the Warrenton turnpike, between the 
 detachment of Jackson and Lee's main army. To my mind, the fact that he was 
 pressing Jackson from the east did not appear conclusive at all that he could ruin 
 Jackson simply because he was pressing him back to Lee's main army. 
 
 That is important in two aspects. It shows that General Pope under- 
 stood perfectly well that it was not any small detachment of the rebel 
 force that was i)ressing through Thoroughfare Gap to relieve Jackson, 
 but that it was the main army of Lee, from which Jackson's force was a 
 detachment. General Porter received this order at Manassas Station, 
 or thereabouts, and just then, singularly enough, General McDowell ap- 
 pears. Well, what was the situation ? It has been claimed that they 
 fell unde]' tbat article of war which provides that where forces under 
 difl'erent commanders are united upon a march, accidentally or other- 
 wise, the senior hi rank takes connnand. That was not the situation. 
 General McDowell had no troops. Khig's division, which was the only 
 one of his corps that was then there, had been given to Porter, and he, 
 under his responsibility, as corps commander had been compelled to 
 take command of it with his own. The conduct of both generals shows 
 perfectly well that that was recognized, although I know that General 
 McDowell has intimated an oi)inion that he did have command or might 
 have commanded. Xot so. Because, if he claimed connnand, why did 
 he not lead the column ? Why did he ask Porter, as a favor, that he 
 would put King on his right in forming his line, so that he could have 
 him when General I*ope said so ? Why did he linger l)ehind at ^lamis- 
 sas Station when there was this important order, important upon its 
 face, Ui move on Gainesville and be expeditious or they would lose much — 
 why did he linger at .Manassas Junction? That is fully ex])lained 
 from his own testimony, and from Pope's testimony, namely, that he was 
 impressed with his si'tnation and fully reabzed it; that wbile he might 
 
42 
 
 be seuior in rank to (Teneral Porter, yet King's division liad been taken 
 from liiiii and turned over to Porter, juntas tliese important movements 
 were taking- jdace. How distasteful this was to McDowell and how 
 embarrassing- to Porter appears irom their interview near Manassas Sta- 
 tion. You can conceive how awkward and trying- it was to both of tliem ; 
 under what restraint it necessarily placed both of them ; how embarrass- 
 ing to McDowell ; and how ten times more so to General Porter, Well, 
 General ]\IcDowell, to cure that, writes his note to Geneial Pope, pro- 
 testing against King's division being taken from him, and asking that 
 it might be restored; and then from that follows the joint order, the 
 violation of which is the subject now under consideration. 
 
 THE JOINT OlIDER TO M'DOWELL AND POKTEli. 
 
 Head(juakti;i!s Ahmv ok Yii;gixia, 
 
 Ceuirevillr, Jiif/ii>si2[), ISm. 
 
 Yon will ])l('!i.sc move lorward with your joint comniiuul.s towards Gainesvillr. I sent 
 Geuciiil I'ortfi- written oiders to that eticct an lioi'.r and a Latt' aj;'o. Heintzeluiau, 
 Sigel, and Keuo are movino- on "Warrenton turnpike, and must now be not far from 
 Gainesville. I desire that as soon as eommunieation is established l)etween this force 
 and your own, the Avhole connnand shall halt. It nniy be neeessary to fall back be- 
 hind Bull Kuu, at Centreville, to-nif;ht. I presume it will be so on account of our 
 sui)]>lies. I haA'e sent no orders, of any description, to Eicketts, and none to interfere 
 in any way with the movements of McDowell's troops, except what I sent by his aide- 
 de-caiu]), last niftht, which were to hold his position on the Warrenton pike until the 
 trooiis Irom here should fall on the enemy's tlank and rear. I do not even know 
 Kicketts' i)Osition, as I have not been able to find out where General McDowell was, 
 until a late hour this morning. General McDowell will take immediate ste]»s to com- 
 municate with General Kicketts, and instruct him to join the other divisions of his 
 corps, as soon as jiracticable. If any considerable advantages are to be gained by de- 
 parting from this order, it will not lie strictly carried out. One thing must be held in 
 view, that the troo])s must occupy a jiosition from which they can reach Bull Kun to- 
 night, or by morning. The indications are that the whole force of the em-niy is mov- 
 ing in this direction at a pace that will bring them here by to-morrow nigiit, or the 
 next day. ^[y own heaihjuarters will, forthe present, be with Heintzelman's corps, or 
 at this place. 
 
 JOHX POPE, 
 Major-General VommatnlliKj. 
 
 Generals McDowkli- and I'ouTioi:. 
 
 This joint order was not received until General Porter had reached 
 the front at Dawkins' Branch, and the messenger who brought it, Dr. 
 Abbott, declared that, bringing duplicates of it, which he took fro]n 
 General Pope about ten o'clock in the morning, he fcmnd General IMc- 
 Dowell somewhere between Manassas Junction and Dawkins' Branch, 
 and delivered him his copy and then rode ra])i(lly on to Porter, found 
 him at the head of the column at Bawkins' Branch and gave him his 
 copy. Tlie>' were about a mile a]>art. That would very nearly account 
 for the situation, because (ieneral ^rcDowcll says tliat at tliat time, at 
 least, a full brigade of King's division marching behind Porter's had 
 ])assed Bethlehem cluirch and had got out, as I understand it, very near 
 the Five Forks load, which the Becorder has now nuide the wonderful 
 discovery was a road which somebody ought to have taken. Now, when 
 General ^IcDowell and Geiu^ral Porter were together near Manassas 
 Station, and had this unideasant talk — of (-ourse, it must Imve l>een un- 
 pleasant to botli of them ; nothing could have lieen more disagreeable — 
 General ^McDowell tlu^n declared liis Avillingness to recognize the situa- 
 tion, stating that King's division had been taken from him and given to 
 General Pcu'ter, and ex]»resse<l the wish that l^orter, when he formed 
 his line of battle, would phu^e King's division u])on the rigid of him, so 
 that it would connect with his own force, which was un<lerstood to be 
 
43 
 
 south of tlie Waneiiton i)ike, or iij) at the AVarreuton pike in the neigh- 
 borhood of Grovetoii. Now, wiieii tleueial iMoDowell getts his copy of the 
 joint order he rides iumiediately forward, as he says, and overtakes Gen- 
 eral Porter. IIow soon he reached Porter, after the joint order reached 
 Porter, you can iniaj>ine, because the messenger was only a mile away, 
 and he followed the messenger, and must have reached General Porter 
 ahnost immediately with the joint order. 
 
 Before considering the (juestion of the joint order, and as there is no 
 fault found with Porter's conduct up to the time, at any rate, of the 
 receipt of that order, and as there has never been any complaint of his 
 execution, so far as he could, of this i)revious order to push forward 
 "SAith his own force and King's division upon Gainesville, I want to call 
 the attention of the Poard to what he did umk'r that order, before the 
 receipt of the joint order, because it seems to me that is very important; 
 it discloses. to us the military situation at which he had arrived, and the 
 animus which inspired him un<ler that order, under his instructions to 
 move upon Gaines\ille. oSTow, if Porter had any intention of holding 
 back that day, it seems to me that is the time when he would have mani- 
 fested it, is it not ? ]>ut what happened ? In the tirst place, it is neces- 
 sary" to understand the point at which he had arrived. General Warren 
 has fully described to the court his knowledge of the situation, and the 
 Board has knowledge of it, as depicted by the map, and this makes it 
 unnecessary for me to describe the stronghold at Dawkins' Branch, 
 which Porter had reached, or that other similar stronghold, on the other 
 side of that branch, which Mas already in possession of the army of Long- 
 street. Beyond the Aalley was this other commanding situation, not un- 
 like that at Dawkins' Branch, which he had already reached, and the bed 
 of which stream was the dividing valley. To the right stretched the 
 ravine, through which the stream continued, and an open space beyond 
 that spread onward toward Groveton, fully commanded in all its pai'ts 
 by the batteries of Longstreet from the opposite stronghold which he 
 occupied, i^ot all known to General Porter, of course, for he had never 
 been there before, luit sutticiently known, as a glance at the map will 
 show, to enable him to realize the imjtortance and strength of that posi- 
 tion, Avhich he had reached, and of the similar ])Osition in front of him, 
 which the enemy already held. Then, it appears, they halted. Has 
 that halt ever been com])lained of? Not in the least. McDowell says 
 that " up to twelve o'clock" — which must have been from half an hour to 
 an hour after the halt — ''Porter's movements were unexceptionable." 
 What kind of a halt was it ? Was it ordered by General Porter ? That 
 does not appear. But the reason appears : it was that necessary, spon- 
 taneous, involuntary halt that any column of troops, I suppose, makes 
 when they come into the actual i)resence of the enemy, placed in a posi- 
 tion corresponding and opposite to that which they had themselves 
 reached, and which, in this instance, was quite as inaccessible to Porter 
 as Porter's own ])osition on Dawkins* Branch was inaccessible, in a mili- 
 tary pohit of view, to the enemy across the stream. Now, what does 
 General Porter do ? You will observe that there is a good deal of time 
 from the arrival of General Porter at the head of his column at Daw- 
 kins' Branch — he was neai- the head of the column Avhen it halted — 
 there is a good deal of time between that and (leneral JMcDowell's 
 arrival, and the arrival of the joint order. lie is not yet under the 
 direction of the joint order. His direction was to move upon Gaines- 
 ville l)y the order under which he was then acting. The road was the 
 road to Gainesville. What did he do ? He prepared, as I sup])ose any 
 wise comnmnder would, to move upon Gainesville, according to the 
 
44 
 
 order — to continue to move upon Gainesville. He (lei)loyed Lis leading- 
 di"\dsion, ^lorell's, on the right and left of the road ; he had Sykes' divis- 
 ion then drawn up in column heliind jNIorell ; he sent General Butter- 
 field Avith his brigade across Dawkins' Branch, where this enemy was in 
 sight upon the opposite hill ; he sent out his line of skirmishers under 
 Colonel ^Marshall. That was the situation when the joint order and 
 General McDowell arrived. 
 
 ISTow, was that right ? Did that show zeal and earnestness and skill 
 on his part 1 It is for you to judge. General McDowell testifies em- 
 phatically that it was all right. Now, the issue between ourselves and 
 the Recorder is right here; he says that without and independent of the 
 joint order, Porter was under orders from 3IcDowell ; there, says the 
 Recorder, was his mistake ; that duty required him to march up this 
 road, as he calls it, from Deats to Groveton, a road which is no road, a 
 road which I think is a fiction of the Recorder's imagination. General 
 Warren, when he went to make a map, found none there ; I do not under- 
 stand that the Recorder, when he went to make his personal inspection, 
 found any road there ; but somebody told him there had been a road 
 there, so he marked it doAvn upon his map. It is not at all material, as 
 it seems to me, for the deciding of this issue, whether there was a road 
 there or not. If there was no enemy opposite, the country was all one 
 road, for all the way to Gibbon's wood was open, and this resort to an 
 imaginary road is wholly unnecessary ; but on the other hand, if there 
 was an enemy in force upon the opposite rise of ground, then it does not 
 matter, I supiiose, whether there is or ever was a road there or not. If 
 there was a road, we suppose they could not march by the flank exposed 
 to this enemy in force upon the opposite rise. On that matter the tes- 
 timony of General ^Varren as to Avhat was the proper mode, supposing 
 that a-military commander arrived with a corps at Dawkins' Branch, in 
 that situation, finding a force upon the opposite rise of ground, knowing 
 from the cannonading at Groveton that something of a hostile character 
 was going on there, as to what was the proper mode if he wished to make 
 a movement to the right, a movement to get oxev to Groveton to take 
 part in Avhat was then going on — how he was to do it — that testimony 
 was so important that I beg now to call it to the attention of the Board. 
 It is a long while since it was taken, but it explains the situation very 
 exactly, and is found on page 43 of the record. He is being carefully 
 examined by the president of the Board : 
 
 Question, What is the distance, measured along the ridge occupied by Morell, from 
 the Avagou-road to the railroad / 
 
 Answer. A little over half a mile. 
 
 Question. Along the same general line from the railroad to the -vvagon-road above; 
 ■what is the name of that road '! 
 
 Answer. The Warrenton and Alexandria road. That would lie a little more than 
 three-(|narters of a mile. 
 
 Question. Bearing a little more to the north, kee)>ing the military position from 
 Morell's right, following along the edge of the woods to the north '! 
 
 Answer. About thn'PMiuarters of a nnle. This ridge (on Dawkins' Branch) oontiu- 
 nes along till about this j'lace (.James Xickerson's) facing this valley. Then these 
 little ridges run on in this direction (Five Forks). 
 
 Question. If you turn to the north, would there be any jiositiou along therefrom 
 Morell's right ! 
 
 Answer. There would be no good itosition anywhere in that direction, until this 
 road was obtained (the (dd Warrenton, Alexandria, and Washington i-oad). 
 
 Question. The natural ]iosition tlien woniil be around here if you had to lay a de- 
 fensive line / (Around and behind Five Forks. ) 
 
 Answer. If I had to hold Poiter's position ])ermauent]y. with time to pre])are to do 
 so, I should have let the left rest where his was, extend along the ridge to the right 
 to about the railroad, then take the highest line to the east and rest the right on Mount 
 Pone ; tlien I would slash all the timber in front of mv line for at least half a mile. 
 
45 
 
 That Avn.s soinetliing', I suppose, not to be tliouglit of by one who was 
 ordered to move towards Gaiuesville. 
 
 Question. What is tlie character of this cotiutry between the forest aud the Sudley 
 Spring road ? 
 
 Answer. Fainning country ; descendiuo- very considerably towards the southeast. 
 
 Question. Could a coluuiu of tniops with artillery move through there .' 
 
 Answer. Yes; but they would have to make crossings for streams and little ditches 
 and things of that kind. 
 
 Question. Indicate on the map, for present information, Avhere Reynolds was on the 
 29th, if yon have such information. 
 
 Answer. I have not it very definite, but it was somewhere in these woods (between 
 Chinn's and Groveton). 
 
 Qnesti(m. Can yon give the general direction of his line on that day ? 
 
 Answer. If he had met the skirmish line, the advance line of Jackson, early in the 
 day, his line wotdd face north ; if late in the day he had seen the approach of Long- 
 street, he probably would ha\"e faced westward. 
 
 Question. Al)OUt how far from Groveton was his left ? 
 
 Answer. That I cannot say ; I cannot say where his left or right was, or where he 
 faced. 
 
 Question, Give us now the distance from Groveton, the shortest line, where Comi)ton 
 lane strikes the old Warrenton road ? 
 
 Answer. About a mile and a half. This map will enable you to see very easily what 
 roads the Army used independent of these routes. There were no fences then, or if 
 there were, armies disregarded them. 
 
 Question. Give the distance from the junction of the Gaiuesville road with the 
 Siidley road to New Market, and thence to Compton's house '1 
 
 Answer. Three miles to New Market, or a little over ; to Compton's lane, a little over 
 four miles. ^ 
 
 Xow, here is the important part : 
 
 Question. What is the nature of this position with respect to an advance of an enemy 
 from the west (pointing to the Comptou house) ; I do not mean that exact point, but 
 this general position between the headwaters of Dawkins' Branch and of Young's 
 Branch f 
 
 Answer. Yon have got to suppose the position of the enemy. Suppose the advance 
 is from the west, on the old Warrenton and Alexandria road — there really is no good 
 line. This would be the line on the rif Ige between Chinn's Branch and Holknm Branch, 
 but it would place both tianks iuto the woods, and I'ender them liable to be got around 
 by the enemy without his being seen. In the woods the flanks would have no effective 
 tire. The natural position to resist an advance from the west is here (parallel to the 
 Sudley Springs road, between Wheeler's and Dogau's) ; not a very good position either. 
 
 Question. Not a good position anywhere there ? 
 . Answer. No, sir; but that is the' one that we held finally, and that we held on the 
 night of the 30th. 
 
 Question. Is tliis ground here, generally speaking, commanded by this ? 
 
 Answer. The most prominent ridge runs this way (from east to west, from Britt's to 
 Compton's). If you form a line here, the enemy coming from the west could flank 
 readily at Britt's. It is pretty nearly the same level. It is a high ridge and this ridge 
 east of Carraco's is high. 
 
 * s ^ # # » * 
 
 Question. I understood this railroad (Manassas Gap Railroad) is such that iufantry 
 coukl move along in column ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir ; rather by the flank than column. 
 
 Question. Could they deploy along Dawkins' Branch here liy the road from the 
 woods ? 
 
 Answer. Yes ; I think they might. 
 
 Question. Could they see the valley in front of them some hundreds of yards ? 
 
 Answer. 0, yes; they couhl see part of it, and all of the cleared places here (ou the 
 southwest side of the high ridge which lies southeast of Carraco's). 
 
 Questiou. The only difHculty across here would be the occupation of these heights 
 by the enemy, as I understand '? 
 
 ' Answer. Yes ; that would be the greatest difficulty. 
 
 Question. If you were forced to connect this point where General Porter advanced 
 witii some military position in the vicinity of Groveton, what point would you first 
 occupy ? What would you regard as the key of that position to be first occu)>ied, 1)e- 
 ing compelled by the situation of the army to hold this point or some ])oint near 
 Groveton ? Could you get to that place more quickly by coming this way (around by 
 the Sudley road), taking into account the nucertaintyas to what might be in your front ? 
 
 Answer. That, of course, would be a problem I cannot answer. I know very well — 
 
46 
 
 take the case as it stood — that a movemeut made direct from Porter's position toward 
 Groveton on that day would probably have brought on a general battle there. Of 
 course, this occupation of this ridge, either at Britt's or Coihpton's, woukl only have 
 been possible on the su])position that we wliipped the enemy. 
 
 Question. Knowing that i)art of your army was near Grovettm and you arrived here, 
 at Porter's position, witli the head of your cohimu, Avhat was the first move to make 
 to secure tlie position of the whole army .' 
 
 Answer. I should have withdrawn tlie whole army to the east of Bull Run. 
 
 Question. 8u])pose you had not the ])ower to do that. Suppose your force here, 
 wliere General Porter \\-as, ^^'as ordered to connect with the other troops, what would 
 you have to do to accomplish that ? 
 
 Answer. 1 should think I had a very desperate thing to do. 
 
 Question. Suppose you had :50,000 men, and formed yourself with the head of your 
 column on this road to Gainesville, and information that 30,000 other men of your own 
 army were here (east of Groveton) and you were ordered to connect with them so as 
 to form a continuous line of battle ? 
 
 Answer. If I had an enemy in here, on the northwest side of Dawkins' Branch, I 
 .should liaA-e moved against him to secAvhat he had (toward Vessel's). I don't suppose 
 that I would be compelled to risk my 30,000 men to save the other 3(1.000; the risk 
 would have to be e(iually divided and not to risk the destruction of this to save that 
 Avhich could, without danger, be drawn to a safe place, but I should have certainly 
 wanted to see what was the force of the enemy in my immediate vicinity before ex- 
 jiosing my Hank to his line of battle. 
 
 (Question. Considering the general extent of this position, as you now know it, how 
 many troox>s would you want to make that attack ? 
 
 Answer. I should feel that reasonably I ought to have a force here superior to the 
 enemy. 
 
 Question. Aljout what force of the enemy would occupy this position, as you now 
 know it ? 
 
 (Vessel's toward Carraco and Lewis.) 
 
 Answer. As I now know it, I now know that all the forces from Groveton could have 
 been brought up, Avhich i)robalily would have been 30,000 men; that an encounter 
 here in the woods would not have been .successful unless we could have been able to 
 whip 30,000 men. 
 
 Question. You would not have felt at liberty to hate made that attack with less 
 than 30,000 ? 
 
 Answer. No ; not to engage seriously. At any time that you like you can feel the 
 t?uemy with a force that you cannot afford to spare. 
 
 Question. In the case supposed, would not you have taken this course and keep con- 
 trol of this ground rather than by attempting to force the enemy's position ; you have 
 here a ridge of high ground sejtarating the waters of Dawkins' Branch from the 
 Avaters of Young's Branch. To tight a battle in as unfaviu'able a position as that you 
 must have control of that ground ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Then this ])osition Avas a bad one to occupy ? 
 
 AnsAver. It was a bad one to uioA^e from, but not a bad one to defend. 
 
 Question. If you had to fight a battle against an enemy occupying this general po- 
 sition, and difficult to attack Avith less than 30,000 men, Avould not you have moved 
 to occnjjy this i)osition, so as to hold command of the ground between the tAVo posi- 
 tions you now occu]ty? 
 
 Answer. I (k)n't think I AAonld, because I think the enemy, seeing my object, Avould 
 get there first. He Avould get command of that position before I could, in the position 
 in Avhich Ave were ])laced lu-re. 
 
 Question. Suppose you Avere ordered to connect with the troops at Groveton, i)rac- 
 tically ; you see no alternative but to move front and fight ? 
 
 Answer. Yes; move to the front and attack. 
 
 Question. You think it would not be juacticable to move a portion of your troops 
 here and occui)y this place (near Compton's) ? 
 
 Answer. I woublu't <lo it. I have seen such attempts made. A great deal depends 
 upon Avhodoit; what kind of troops you have. I hold it to be a general rule to ncA-er 
 try to cstabUsh a line of I)attlc that the enemy have any chance to get hold of before 
 you do. 
 
 Question. Success, then, depends upon a question of time ; Avhctlier you Avere there 
 beiore the enemy ? 
 
 Answer. Yes. AVell, it comes under the general head of military i)rinciples ueA'er 
 to establish your point of concentration inside of the enemy's line. 
 
 So be goes on further at greater length and to the same efteet, that if 
 he desired to move OYer to the right and occnpv tlie ground Avhich it is 
 
47 
 
 claimed Porter sliould have occupied, the way to do it, in the eye of a 
 military man, vras to move over and feel and attack the enemy in front 
 of yon, clear them out from this rise of ground on the opposite side of 
 Dawkin.s' Branch, advance over Stuart's Hill, about wliich so much has 
 been said, and then you would be in a position to move u])on Groveton. 
 Now, we are obliged to rely upon the testimony of a skillful and accom- 
 plished officer, as to whose capacity there can be no question in a matter 
 of engineering and military movements ; and we are content to rely 
 upon the testimony of General Warren in the ob\ious situation upon 
 the stronghold that General Porter had arrived at, as demonstrating 
 the entire propriety of his movements before the receii)t of the joint 
 order, and before the arrival of McDowell; and so clear is it, as we sup- 
 pose, to military men that Porter's actual movements were dictated by 
 the highest military intelligence and skill, that it is the reason why Mc- 
 Dowell has always said that Porter committed no fault until after his 
 own departure from the scene, and CA'erybody connected with the case 
 heretofore has admitted that that is so. But now, for the first time, the 
 learned Eecorder advances the theory that all this is wrong ; that, inde- 
 pendent of the joint order, independent of anything, independent of hav- 
 ing that interview Avith IMcDowell, and especiallj' after that interview, that 
 it w^as Porter's duty to have marched to the riglit immediately on arrival 
 at Dawkins' Braflch, and to occupy the battle-ground of the night before, 
 because the purpose of the order was to move to Gibbon's wood, tlie 
 scene of the last night's fight. IsTow, the Eecorder can fight a very good 
 battle, if you get the enemy out of the way, I will agree. If there had 
 been no enemy, any boy could have seen that when he got to Dawkins' 
 Branch, if he was in sight of Groveton, and there was no enemy com- 
 manding the heights opposite, why, he could go to Groveton. The Ee- 
 corder has gone to great effort to discover this road. ^ Singularly enough, 
 some k^'nd individual, apparently not connected with this case, but a 
 student of it, has made and circulated a map which, by a happy coinci- 
 dence, exactly conforms to the Eecorder's idea of the situation, and of 
 wlmt then should have been done. 
 
 The Eecorder. I should like to ask if that is in evidence ? 
 
 Mr. Choate. No ; I propose to ask to have it incorporated as a part 
 of my argument. 
 
 The Eecorder. As an historical illustration ? 
 
 Mr. Choate. As a geographical illustration. It is a singular piece 
 of prophetic foresight in Avhoever prepared this map that he should so 
 exactly have hit the views afterwards expressed by the learned Eecorder. 
 I suppose I can have it incorporated as a part of my argument, because 
 it shows exactly the condition in which the learned Eecorder's proposed 
 movement would be a right one, and why it would not be exactly the 
 wrong one, as demonstrated by General Warren. It w^as wholly un- 
 necessary for the delineator of this map to lay out a broad army road from 
 Deats' to Lewis Lane, through the valley of Dawkins' Branch, because 
 on either condition it does not make any difference whether there was a 
 road there or not. This road, known only to Lieutenant Brooke and 
 the Eecorder, occupies a very conspicuous position upon this map. Then, 
 a very important condition, a necessary condition, is to get the troops 
 out of the way from the field in front, from the high ground correspond- 
 ing to Dawkins' Branch, across on the northwest side. That is most 
 happily and successfully done by the projector of this map, by withdraw- 
 ing the Avhole of Longstreet's force, after he had got in position, and we 
 liave proved that when Porter arrived at Dawkins' Brand i he had sul)- 
 stantially got in position — withdrawing all those forces in the rear of 
 
48 
 
 Pageland Laue, and placing- them exactly half way between Gaines^ille 
 and Grovetou, a most extraoidinaiy thing to do with a rebel army under 
 such an accomplished general as Lee, with such an aid as Longstreet, 
 after they had been driving thiongh CTaiuesville three or four hours 
 before, at the top of their speed, for the purpose of re-enforcing Jackson 
 at Groveton. Then another necessary part of the condition is to com- 
 press the rebel force into such a narrow place into the awkward posi- 
 tion into which he has drawn them, or a very large i)art of them, up 
 behind the rebel batteries that were posted between Jackson and Long- 
 street. What good any of them could do there it is impossible to see, 
 because it is demonstrated by the evidence that that was verj low ground, 
 and they would have had to tire through several ridges in order to reach 
 anybody anywhere. That is so happily in accordance with the views of 
 the Eecorder, that I shall ask to have it incorporated as illustrative of 
 my argument. 
 
 [This map will be found in Appendix as Map G.] 
 
 THE RECEIPT OF JOINT OEDER AND M'DOWELL'S ARRIVAL. 
 
 Xow, w^hat happened when General McDowell came up ? for that is 
 one of the important questions. General McDowell, we have proved — 
 and this he has not contradicted, although he says he doesn't recollect 
 it — General McDowell rushes i\]) with the joint order (which, of course, 
 having been just received, is fresh in the minds of both and does not 
 need much discussion) ; he comes quickly up, having now, however, ac- 
 complished a purpose which he had in view in writing to General Pope 
 in the morning. He has the joint order which now, under the Articles 
 of War, places him for the first time in command of all the forces. 
 Porter now, and until they separate, is his mere lieutenant. What does 
 he do ? He rushes up and sees what is going on, does he not ? He says 
 so. He says that the sJcinnishers were already engarjed. ^Miat does that 
 mean ? Engaged with whom ? Why, engaged with the skirmishers of 
 the rebel army on the opposite height. That he saAv himself. He is 
 informed that shots have been exchanged. What does he say ? He 
 says, "Porter, you are too far out; this is no i)lace to fight a battle." 
 What did he mean I Here we come first to the consideration of the joint 
 order, as those generals considered it. iSTow, what was deemed too far 
 out by that joint order? Why, there was this: 
 
 One thing must be held in view, that tlie ti'oops ninst occnpy a i)o.sition from which 
 they can reach Bull Run by night or by morning. The indications are that the whole 
 force of the cneiiiy is moving in this direction, at a pace that will bring them here by 
 to-morrow night or the next day. 
 
 Another passage which you will recollect is : 
 
 It may be necessary to fall back l>ehind Bull Run, at Ceutreville, to-night. I pre- 
 sume it will be so on account of our supplies. 
 
 Such was tlie situation. Here was Porter, a mere lieutenant to IMc- 
 Dowell from the nioment of the hitters arrival, after the receipt of the 
 joint order. 
 
 We proved by five witnesses that McDowell gave him this order, 
 " Porter, you are too far out; this is no place to fight a battle'" — two of 
 them new witnesses intro<luced upon this trial, in addition to those who 
 testified before. Was it binding on Porter? Nobody questions. Was 
 it given '? Nobody can doubt it. Now, what was he to do ? It thwarted 
 his jdau, which had been to feel and press the enemy, as he was already 
 doing by 3>utter}ield, and the express testimony is that he obej'S the 
 order and withdraws Butterfield, leaving his skirmish line out. Now, 
 
49 
 
 wliat next liappened ? What was there in tlie Joint order that tliey had 
 to look to? 
 
 You will please move forward with your joint counnnnds towiirds Gainesville. I 
 sent Geueral Porter written orders to that etiect an hour and a halt' a<;(). Heiutzel- 
 luan, Sigel, and Reno are moving on the Warrentou turnpike, and must now be not 
 far from Gainesville. 
 
 Let me pause there to ask the Board one question which I do not 
 quite understand. This joint order was Avritten by General Pope, at 
 Centrevilk', at ten o'chx-k in tlie morning-. Si}j;el, at least, under his 
 directions, had commenced a severe skirmish with the enemy, on the 
 turnpike, at six o'clock. Tell me, if you can, why no reference is made 
 to that in this dispatch. This dispatch, as expressed, is an order of 
 pursuit, ami not an order of l)attle. Was it possil)le that General Pope, 
 the responsible commander of all those forces, was ignorant, four hours 
 after it had taken ]»lace, of an important skirmish between Sigel's 
 force and Jackson's force at Groveton ? AVas it possible, that knowing- 
 it, he left it intentionally out of this dispatch, in so important a commu- 
 nication to McDowell and Porter? But he did leave it out. He does 
 not indicate the least suspicion on his part that an immediate action is 
 impending. He makes it an order of pursuit, as I think you will see. 
 
 I desire that as soon as communication is established between this force and your 
 owu, the wh(de command shall halt. 
 
 Halt with what view ? The next word is : 
 
 It may lie necessary to fall back behind Bull Run, at Centreville, to-night. I pre- 
 sume it will be so on account of our supplies. 
 
 ]^ow, in respect to this order, if this was in the minds of both generals 
 when General McDowell rode up, what did General McDowell mean by 
 saying: " You are too far out; this is no place to tight a battle" ? Did 
 not he mean that the time had come, hearing this liring on the right, at 
 (xroveton, and knowing that there the Federal forces had probably 
 stopped, did not he mean to indicate — was it not plain u])on the face of 
 the situation, without even this indication, that when he said '' You are 
 too far out," he meant that this was the time and the jilace to halt, ac- 
 cording to the directions of tlie joint order ? I suppose so. Then, what 
 was the next thing ? The next thing was to ol)ey the joint order, un- 
 less they should see tit to vary in the exercise of that discretion which 
 was now McDowell's direction in carrying it out. 
 
 As soon as communication is established between this force and your own, the whole 
 command shall halt. 
 
 Well, communication was not established ; but there was the place, 
 according to General JMcDowell's indication, to make a comnumication — 
 not connection. Tlie word is not " connection," which I understand has 
 a very ditferent military significance from "communication"; but com- 
 munication, at least, was ])ossible. l^ovr, what do they do ? They pro- 
 ceeded through that unknown woods to a point down here [on the rail- 
 road, nearly half a mile east of Dawkins' Branch], to see what there was, 
 and how it was practifaljle to make communication, the remaning duty 
 enjoined by the joint order. They go over across the railroad on horse- 
 back, and come down and water their horses in this stream, which I do 
 not consider must have been necessarily Dawkins' Branch, but some 
 stream that rau into Dawkins' Branch. 
 
 Xow, irresi^ective of the dispute which appears to l)e in the case, as to 
 what orders General McDowell gave when he left, let us see what was 
 determined at any rate, beyond all dispute. What were they there for 1 
 What could be the only object of their ridino- there ? Of course to see 
 
50 
 
 about this coinmuuication with Heintelzman, Sigel, and EeynokLs, on 
 the left of the Federal troops. They came back, didn't they ? They 
 found that that could not be done there, did they not, unless by this 
 hajjpy device of the Recorder, according to that map, which neither of 
 them was soldier enough to think off ? They found they could not do it. 
 Now, it is suggested, and McDowell claims to have originated the idea, 
 of his taking King's division around, which Porter testified in the 3Ic- 
 Dowell court of inquiry, that he perhaps first suggested. "When they 
 met at Dawkins' Branch, is it difiicult to see how it actuallytooki)lace? 
 There is no doul)t that the request to put King on his right had been 
 made in most urgent terms by Cleneral ^IcIJowell, aggrie^'ed as he felt 
 himself in the taking away of King's division at their unhappy conver- 
 sation at Manassas Junction. Now, then, they come uj) to study this 
 qnestion of communication. McDowell has stoi)i)ed Porter's advance. 
 Porter says that he suggested it. Well, what does that mean ? ]t was 
 the suggestion of a lieutenant to his chief, was it not ; a suggestion in 
 deference to A\'hat had been said at Manassas Junction, bet()re he had 
 (;ome under McDowell's command, was it not ? And what did it amount 
 to! AVhy— 
 
 As yon cauuot get through here in the face of that eueiiiy in front of ns, it is po.ssi- 
 ble to cany out your idea by taking King's division around l>y the Dudley road, and 
 come up and make this communication. 
 
 At any rate, that was the plan which ]\rcJ)o\vell, under his then re- 
 sponsibility, conceived ; and it was ai)])arently concurred in by (xeneral 
 Porter at the moment, for he says, in his answer to Secretary Chandler, 
 which is harped ui)on here as a contradiction, that, when McDowell left 
 him, he understocxl that that was his idea. 1 cannot see any contr;u,lic- 
 tion betM'ecn his various statements on the subje(.*t. I wish I had time 
 to read tliem all, and show you that they are exactly alike, and consist- 
 ent with his statement as made here, and with the proved position as 
 we claim it. I speak apart from anything that was said or any orders 
 given. It was determined by McDowell, whose resptmsibility it was to 
 determine, to take King around by the Sudley road. What was that 
 for I What n)ust Porter have understood it to be for ? Was it for Gen- 
 eral McDowell's troops to wander up the Sudley road to the turnpike ? 
 No; it was to make the communication required by the joint order, by 
 going around the Sudley road, and coming in on the ground between 
 him and Eeynolds. Is there any question, then, that communication 
 Avould have been established as required by the joint order ? Is there in 
 the least a question that it never was established ? Whose fault was it ? 
 Was it Porter's ? Is not McDowell and his force the missing link through- 
 out this day ? There is a ma}) here, as I have stated, as to what they 
 did; and (ieneral McDowell did not come in and make a connection or 
 communication. Was Porter to do it ! Should they both do it? Gen- 
 eral McDowell left him there and went around l>y the Sudley Springs 
 road to make the connection which the joint order required. It would 
 have been a very stupid violation of the understanding if, while McDow- 
 ell was going arcmnd, Porter had gone over an^l occupied the ground 
 to which McJ^owell had agreed to go, would it not' So I say that 
 Porter's conduct is justified without any reference to any dispute that 
 there may be about what was said. 
 
 Let us see what became of ]McDowell's troops. 
 
 Now, I introduce a map, which I ask to have incorporated as part of 
 my argument, to show where General McDowell went, u]>on the evidence, 
 as I understand it. Here [along Dawkins' Branch, and on Manassas — 
 Gainesville road] is Porter's force ; here, substantially in the same posi- 
 
51 
 
 tion, is where ]\[cDowell lott liiiii ; here [the prolongation north of Por- 
 ter's line] is where the connection was to be made, somewhere in a 
 direct line from here to the federal force at Groveton. Xow, did (Gen- 
 eral McDowell ever come there ! Here [just east of the Chinn house, 
 on and near the Sudley Si)rings road] is King's division at six o'clock. 
 There is not the least symptom of any attempt by ^McDowell to occupy 
 that ground; Porter was abandoned by him here, and if it was the nn- 
 derstanding that McDowell should make the connection, or form on the 
 left of lleynolds, that understanding Avas never carried out. [Tliis map 
 will be found in Api»endix as Map E,] 
 
 I desire now to call your attention to what was done under the joint 
 order by General ^McDowell. One thing he certainly did do ; he ob- 
 served the precaution ; he held it in view, that his part of the troops 
 should occupy a position from which they could reach Bull Pun that 
 night. General Patrick, at pages 189 and 190 of the new record, states 
 what was done. Let ns see whether General McDowell carried out his 
 purpose of making that connection. General Patrick was one of Gen- 
 eral JMcDowelfs brigade commanders ; he describes the march ; he 
 describes the orders. Xow, I do not care whether it was McDowell's 
 I'esi^onsibility or Pope's responsibility ; Po])e was fighting that battle, 
 and the responsibility lay between them for the movement of McDowell's 
 forces after they got up on to the Sudley road ; certainlj* not on General 
 l*orter. 
 
 Wliil(? I Liiil been at Bt'tlileliem clmrcli, and ;n the iiitei-iiu between tlie time I had 
 left Manassas, and this time I had strnek the Sndh'V .Sprinji's road, the other Imgades 
 of the division, under General Hateli, liad moved on up the Sndley Springs i-oad on the 
 pike, so I was now in tlie rear instead of leading. They eame np in this neighborhood, 
 not very far from Conrad's, althongh I don't recollect the house. He left me after 
 striking the Sndley S[)rings road, as near as I can recollect, near Conrad's, ami was 
 gone a little while, and eame back, and then left again. 
 
 Question. Did McDowell give yon any order there ? 
 
 Answer. He left me here and told nie to take this ])Osition on the road and to the 
 left of it, I think. I was subsecpiently moved by General Hatch somewhere Tip near 
 this road that runs to Chinu's house from the Sndley Springs road ; it was under the 
 cover of a wood. 
 
 Question. How far from the Sudh-y Springs road ? 
 
 Answer. Close by, a little off to the left, a luiiidred or two hundred yards; tliat was 
 my second i)osition. Tlie tirst assignment was by General McDowell, and the second 
 by General Hatch. I was then moved, but by whose order I don't now reccdlect, in 
 past the shoulder of this wood to the east of the Chinn house. I think that must have 
 been by McDowell, to be near to sup])oi't the Pennsylvania Beserve that were up liere 
 in this wood northwest of the Chinn house. All tins time I was here, there was ar- 
 tillery tiring going on, over along in this direction [north of the pike]. Apparently 
 I could see from certain jioints what I afterwards learned to be the Dogan house. And 
 in that neighborhood and along here there was firing. I saw the smoke ami heard the 
 discharges. In here [woods south of Yf)nng's Branch] I should say that at that time 
 there was rather nmre wood aiul undergrowth and lirush near this creek [Young's 
 Jiranch] than is rt^preseuted on the map, but I could not say. I was then ordered by 
 a staff-otticer of General Pope, I don't recollect who — a mounted staff-officer came up 
 to me and said, "(ieneral Pope directs yon to take your connnand down directly across 
 to Ihe pike in the neighborhood of that crest where Sigel is at work."' 
 
 Question. Down by the Sudley Springs road f 
 
 Answer. No. Go right down across ; and, ])articularly in the exhausted condition 
 of the men, it was a very hard march to get down through there. We had reached this 
 sti'eam, Young's Branch, and part over it. I suppose that we were about rwo-thirds 
 of the way to three-fourths, when a staff-officer of General McDowell 
 
 Question. This is the fifth order that you got ? 
 
 An.swer. Well, I don't know — directed me to return instantly to my former position, 
 with some other instructions as t<) supporting Reynolds, aud pushing in nearer to him 
 farther into the west. I came back towards the Chinn house, but farther than I had 
 been when I went in ; I cannot tell exactly where I was. I saw Reynolds before I 
 left and had some C(mversation Avith him. 
 
 Question. Can you locate where ycm had that conversation with Reynolds and what 
 he was doing ? 
 
 ') CII 
 
52 
 
 Answer. It was in this ueigliborliood [south of Young's Brancli and northwest of 
 the Chinn house], just beyond the point wliere the wood-road erosses the arrow line. 
 There was skirmishing going on in tlun-e. 
 
 Question. You got your brigade there, did you ? 
 
 Answer. Yes. 
 
 Eitlier the making of comnmiiicatioii by the phiu tliat McDowell 
 agreed upon "svas iiupos.sible, or if possible, he did not at'coniplish it. 
 Either alternative is equally satisfactory to us on behalf of General 
 Porter. 
 
 DISOBEDIENCE OF THE JOINT ORDEK. 
 
 Kow, we come to this question of the disobedience of the joint order. 
 As I understand this joint order, it does not direct an attack, it directs 
 a pursuit. But, of course, the Eecorder says that you cannot say it 
 does not contemi)late an attack. Any movement in pursuit of a tiying 
 enemy contemplates the possibility of an attack. But the not making 
 an attack is not a disobedience to tlie joint order ; that is a disobedience 
 to the military rules that control the situation. How^ was it in this case ? 
 It has never been claimed by anybody, l)y General McDowell, or Gen- 
 eral Pope, or by Judge- Advocate Holt, or by the Eecorder, that the 
 joint order, taken by itself, was disobeyed. Not a bit of it. What is 
 the claim ? ^Vhy, that the joint order as moditied l)y General McDowell 
 was disobeyed, asserting the right of INIcDowell on leaving Porter to 
 modify it. ' So the Judge-Advocate, and General Pope, and General 
 McDowell say that a Aiolation of the joint order was committed; a 
 violation of the jc^int order, as moditied by JMcDowell, because (xeneral 
 McDowell directed him to make an attack. ISTow, what does the learned 
 Eecorder say ? He says that Porter violated the joint order as moditied 
 by McDowell, not liecause he did not make an attack; he should not 
 have made an attack, says the Eecorder. That was an unmilitary move- 
 ment; it was contrary to the recognized i)rinciples of warfare — but he 
 violated the joint order, as moditied by McDowell, l)ecause, when he got 
 to Dawkins' Branch, he did not wheel around and march up to the right, 
 straight to the front of the enemy at Groveton. General McDowell, at 
 Governor's Island, protested against being defended by the Eecorder. 
 I see now, i)erhaps, what he meant, although I do not believe the 
 Eecorder then disclosed this view. It is a com]»lete going back upon 
 all of my learned friend's antecedents. Nobody heretofore has suggested 
 this view ; and as I said at the beginning of my argument, if we are to 
 take him as the authoritative mouth-i)iece of this ]»rosecution on this 
 important part of the case, we need not consider it any further. For, 
 he now asserts that McDowell was all wrong; that General Pope did 
 not know anything about it; that the Judge-Advocate-General Avas en- 
 tirely in the chmds, and that Porter's error, joint order or no joint order, 
 and particularly under the order of General ^LcDowell, ordering him to 
 go to the right, Avas in sending Butterlield across, in pressing the enem\ 
 upon the other side of Dawkins' Branch, that he should have marched 
 up to the right — they said that he should have attacked, and attacked 
 more vigorously. AVell, I must leave them to settle their hash between 
 themselves; I certainly cannot solve that i)rol>lem. 
 
 Now, I fall back briefly upon the consideration of the case as it stands. 
 We nuist either leave McDowell out or the Eecorder out; and it does 
 seem to me that his presentation of the case dis])oses of itself. Now, I 
 propose to leave him out, and consider a little further the case as made 
 without him. Njw, how is it ? Here is a case presenting this remarka- 
 ble situation. I did intend to read what Generals Pope and McDowell 
 
53 
 
 said on that subject. I tliiuk I will briefly call your attention to that, 
 because it bears on the question of the construction of the joint order. 
 Was it, as the Eecorder now claims, to go right up to the liattle-field of 
 the night before, or get in behind that l>attle-tield and reach Gainesville ? 
 Oeneral Pope, at page 14 of the General Court-Martial IJecord, says (I 
 think it is refreshing after the views that have been i^reseuted, to go 
 back to what he and McDowell said on the former trial) : 
 
 I then sent a joint order to Generals Porter and McDowell, directed to them at Ma- 
 nassas Junction, specifying, in detail, the movement that I wished to he made hy the 
 troops under their command — the withdrawal of King's division, of ^IcDowell's corps, 
 which, during the greater part of the night, I had understood to be on the WaiTen- 
 ton turnpike, and west of the troops under Jackson. Their withdrawal to Manassas 
 Junctifin, I feared, had left open .Jackson's retreat in the direction of Thoroughfiire 
 Gap, to which point the main portion of the army of Lee Avas then tending, to rein- 
 force him. I did not desire to pursue Jackson beyond the town of Gainesville, as we 
 could not have done so on account of the want of supplies — rations for the men and 
 forage for the horses. My order to Generals Porter and McDowell is, therefore, worded 
 that they shall pursue the route to Gainesville, until they effect a junction with the 
 forces that are marching upon Gainesville from Centreville — the forces under Heiut- 
 zelman, Sigel, and Reno; and that when that junction was formed (as I expected it 
 would have l)een very near to Gainesville), the whole command should halt, it being, 
 tis I stated before, not feasible with my command in the condition it was in, ou ac- 
 -count of supplies, to pursue Jackson's forces further. 
 
 Then at page 30 General Pope further says — now, here is a pretty 
 ^ood answer to the Recorder : 
 
 Question. Will yon state ou what road you intended General Porter should march 
 to Gainesville, in the execution of vour written order, referred to in the joint order of 
 the --^'Jth of August ? 
 
 Answer. I intended him to march on the direct road from Manassas Junction to 
 Gainesville. 
 
 Question. Would that road have brought the accused and his command to the bat- 
 tle-lield at Groveton ^ 
 
 Now, my learned friend insisted that you should construe the joint 
 order so that it would have brought them ou to the battle-field at Grove- 
 ton. Then at page 33 : 
 
 I knew the position of the enemy, who occupied a line perpendicular to the War- 
 rentou turnpike, and at or near the town of Groveton; I was sure, from the orders I 
 had given him, that General Porter must be somewhere between Manassas Junction 
 and Gainesville on the road to Gainesville. 
 
 So that you see a departure from the road to Gainesville would have 
 been a departure from General Pope's idea. 
 
 .So £{tr I knew, within certain limits, though not exactly, the relative positions of 
 General Porter and of the enemy. My belief was that the road from Manassas Junc- 
 tion to Gaines-viUe either passed by the right flank or was occupied by that flank of 
 the enemy, and that Porter's march, if i)ursued, conducted him either to the right 
 flank of the enemy or past the right flank of the enemy toward his rear. 
 
 But it is not necessary to occupy any further time in reading from the 
 record about tliat, it is so clear what the understanding of Pope and 
 McDowell was about it, that they were to move toward Gainesville and 
 not in any other direction. This new figment of the imagination about 
 turning oft' at Dawkins' Branch is to my mind a wild and delusive one. 
 Now, how was it ? If you cannot impute any violation of that joint order 
 except as modified by McDowell, was there any modification of it? 
 General Porter says there was, by General McDowell telling him to 
 remain where he w^ks. General McDowell says there was by his giving- 
 Porter an immediate order to make a vigorous attack upon the right 
 flank of the enemy in front of him. Now, which is right ? Did General 
 McDowell give any such order as he claims to have done ? He says he 
 told him, "Put your troops in here"; but you will still recollect his 
 
54 
 
 description of it, wliich has been brought to your attention by Mr. 
 Bullitt — his interpretation of those words given on the former trial — 
 when he is brought to the point of what he meant, saying: "I meant 
 just what is stated in the 4.30 p. m. order/' Well, there is no doubt 
 about what that was, and what that order directed, because that is just 
 what McDoAvell testified on the former trial that he meant to say, and 
 did say by, " Put your troops in liere.'' The 4.30 p. m. order says : 
 
 Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's riglit flank. I desire you to push 
 forward into action at once on the enemy's flank, and if ]iossible on liis rear, keeping 
 your right in eommunication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the 
 woods in front of us. 
 
 Now, did General McDowell give any such order as that? AVe say he 
 did not. He swore upon the former trial that he did. The case went 
 again.st General Porter on the violation of this joint order upon the 
 belief of the court-martial that General McDowell did give such an 
 order. Xow, did he do it ? In the tirst place, let us see Avhat the two 
 generals knew ou the subject of the force in front of them at that time. 
 We have seen, up to the time of General McDowell's arriving, that Gen- 
 eral Porter Avas not very fully informed ; he saw there was a force there, 
 and he was proceeding to feel it and i)ress it; he had taken a couple of 
 scouts who said it was Lcmgstreet's force, and that opened his eyes. 
 AVhat came with McDowell ? McDowell brought a dispatch from 
 Buford. AMiat did that tell him ? Why, if they were not fools, it told 
 them everything; it told them that all of Longstreet's force Avas there. 
 Because you will observe in what I have read from General Poise's testi- 
 mony that he understood perfectly Avell that it was the main army of 
 Lee that was inx'ssing through Thoroughfare Gap to reinforce Jack- 
 son; no small detachment, no room for any quibbling about divisions 
 or brigades, but it was the main army of Lee that was pressing through, 
 and nobody knew it better than McDowell. Had he not been stationed 
 in front of Lee on the Ilappahaunock when Jackson broke oft' from him? 
 Do not his dispatches subsetpieutly .show that he knew well that what 
 Lee was fearing was that he could not get through Thoroughfare Gap 
 in time to relieve Jackson ? That was obvious Avithout any special in- 
 formation; it seems to me that the youngest lieutenant in the Army 
 might have guessed it and ought necessarily to have inferred it. Now, 
 the Pecorder says that the captured scouts may have been two of Rob- 
 ertson's troopers, and that llobertson's troopers were not with Long- 
 street ; they were Avith Jackson. Was that quite ingenuous ? Did he 
 suppose that he could mislead the minds of this P>oard by such a sug- 
 gestion as that ? What does this dispatch of Buford's say ? 
 
 Headquarters Caa'alry Brigade, 9.30 a. m. 
 Seventeen regiments, one battery, five hundred caA^alry, iiassed through Gainesville 
 three-cjuarters of an hour ago, on the Ceutreville road. I think this division should 
 join our forces now engaged at once. 
 Please forward tliis. 
 
 JOHN BUFORD, 
 
 Brig. General. 
 
 That was Buford Avho had been sent to keep watch of them. The Ke- 
 corder has saved me the trouble of counting those troops. They were 
 14,100 men, he says — more than one-half of the main army of Lee that 
 Avas ju-essing forward aa ith all speed tt) relieve Jackson, as tliey all under- 
 stood it. What had happened ? Why, a quarter before nine, just about 
 the time that (ieneral I'orter receiA'ed his order to reverse march at Ma- 
 nassas Junction, they had, Avhat ? Come through Thoroughfare Gap ? Xo.- 
 Reached GainesA'ille ? No; but ^><^(.s.se</ ihrouijli GainesA'ille — the main 
 
55 
 
 army of Lee tliat was coiuiiio" tlirouj>li Tlioiougiifare Gaj), that was what 
 had come. I do not mean the entire army that had come np from Kich- 
 moud. I mean the main army ; the portion that Jackson had left or 
 broken himself off from, when he came thronj^h Tlioronghfare Gap. 
 Now, then, if they came to re-enforce Jackson post-haste and had passed 
 through Gainesville, which is nearer to D iwkins' Bianch by far — a little 
 more than half as far as the distance from Manassas Junction to Daw- 
 kins' Branch — if those two generals were not fools, didn't they know who 
 and what was in front of them ? There were, at least, 14,100 men. 1 do 
 not care whether they were at Stuart's Hill, or between there and the 
 turnpike, or between there and this road ; they were there ; they com- 
 manded this position on the other side of ]>awkins' Branch, which Gen- 
 eral Warren has described as a stronghold, corresponding to this strong- 
 hold on which Porter was. General McDowell disavowed knowiug 
 anything about Longstreet, ami led the court-martial to believe that he 
 did not believe they were there. But you must put yourselves in the 
 places of Generals JNIcDowell and Porter, when they read that dispatch 
 of Buford on that ground, and found that those two scouts had reported 
 Long-street's men in front of them. What ought they to have under- 
 stood I But we are not left to that. We are not left to any mere cal- 
 <;nlation, because INIcDowell himself says what he thought aljout it. At 
 page 803 of the new record, it does seem to me this question is settled 
 beyond all dispute. Here is the passage to which I call the attention of 
 the Board : 
 
 Question. AVhen you testified on the foiiucr trial of General Porter, were you of the 
 belief that thti force mentioned by General Bnford's dispatch was the whole rebel force 
 in front of General Porter that afternoon ? 
 
 Answer. Did not I answer the question a little while ago ? 
 
 Question. I now call your attention to later in the afternoon ? 
 
 AusAver. I left General Porter about noon. After that time I knew nothing of what 
 occurred in his front. 
 
 Question. You knew of no increase of rebel force in his front ? 
 
 Answer. I knew nothing of what occurred in his front. 
 
 Question. When you testified on the court-martial, it was with the belief that the 
 rebel force in front of Porter all that afternoon was limited to the troops mentioned in 
 Bufoi'd's dis])atch ? 
 
 Answer. I didn't say that. 
 
 Of course, we knew that he would not stultity himself b}' saying that, 
 so we pressed the question. 
 
 Question. I ask you ? 
 
 Answer. No ; I don't. I say that was not a question that came up. I acted upon 
 that thing up to twelve o'clock. 
 
 That is, on Buford's dispatch. 
 
 After I went away from there I had no further concern personally with that question- 
 / took it for grunted that there ivould he other forces come «j>. 
 
 Of course, they took it for granted. They were educated at W^est 
 Point, were they not f They knew that here was an army of 25,000 men, 
 more than half of which had passed through Gainesville at a quarter 
 before nine, and the question was at twelve, where were they ? Were 
 those troops interfering with their progress ? Longstreet was another 
 name for the main army of Lee. How much was it 1 Fourteen thousand 
 one hundred men certaiidy already there, and they took it for granted 
 that the rest were coming. General McDowell says, " That under those 
 circumstances he told General Porter to attack at once witli his whole 
 force." That he swore to on the former trial. Was he mistaken about 
 it ? May he have been mistaken about it ? I will not reargue that 
 question ; it has been so fully argued by Mr. Bullitt. Of course, he was 
 
56 
 
 mistaken. Of course, this lameutable result of tlie first trial upon Gen- 
 eral Porter came from that testimouy. 
 
 On pages 802, 803 of the Board Record, General McDowell testifies as^ 
 follows : 
 
 Questiou. Didn't yon tliiuk that ■when yon left liim, lie A\-as left to the nurestrained 
 oi)eiation8 of General Pope's joint order ? 
 
 Answer. Ivo, sir; as moditied by me. It is for tlie Board to decide that qnestiou. 
 
 Question. Suppose that General Porter ascertained, alter yon left hiin, that the rebel 
 force in front of him was twice what yon had supposed it to be, and spoken of to liim, 
 and twice Porter's own force, do you think then that he should have maile an attack? 
 
 Answer. I think he should have found out the force. 
 
 Question. Ytui say he should have teste<l and found out the force ? 
 
 Answer. I think so. That is a question for this Board. 
 
 Question. Now, having tested and found out a force quite as large as his own, do 
 yon think he should liave attacked them ? 
 
 Answer. He should have made some tentative operations. There are a number of 
 ways of attacking; you attack headlong, or you skirmish, or you shell; but to do 
 nothing whatever, certainly would not be complying with the order — to make no eti'ort 
 with the troops. 
 
 Question. Now, I ask yon, if, after making efforts necessary for the purpose, he had 
 ascertained there was a force there double his own after you left him and took King 
 away, do you say that he sliould have attacked ? 
 
 Answer. He sliould have made an attack ; yes. 
 
 Questiou. He should have made an attack just as you ordered it ? 
 
 AnsAver. My order was, I confess to you, a very vague one. It was made to a per- 
 son whose zeal and activity and energy I had every knowledge of. I did not pretend 
 to give him any particular iustructious or directions that he should skirmish, or shell, 
 or charge, or anything of that sort. I merely indicated the direction in which his 
 troops should be applied. Further than that I did not think, and would not think 
 now, if I had the thing to go over again, to direct. 
 
 Question. You did not construe it as an order given by yon to an inferior geueral? 
 
 Answer. Certainly I did. 
 
 Question. What clid you mean, then, by giving orders that were vague and amounted 
 to nothing ? 
 
 Answer. I did not say that. 
 
 Question. Well, gave orders of the kind yon have described ? 
 
 Answer. What orders .' 
 
 Question. What did yon mean by giving orders "vague" and merely au indication? 
 
 Answer. I meant just \vhat I said, that General Porter commanded a corps. I did 
 not tell him that he sliould deploy so many troops, or that he should put in so many 
 skirmishers, or so many batteries, and do this, that, or the other. Those are <|u<'stions 
 of detail which, as an army corps commander, he was to carry out. All I did was to 
 give line to his operations. 
 
 Question. You meant that with the indication you gave him, he should act on his 
 own discretion f 
 
 Answer. Yes; but he should act. 
 
 Question. Now I come back to the f[uestiou I put to you before. If, after acting, he 
 ascertained the presence of a rebel force in front of him twice as great as his own,, 
 twice as great as yon on leaving him had supposed it to be, he should have brought 
 on a general tight with them ? 
 
 Answer. He should not have brought on so general a fight as to have thrown the 
 whole of his force headlong upon this supposed double force of the enemy. 
 
 And on pages 814, 815, he testifies : 
 
 Question. When you left him did you expect that within an hour he would be en- 
 gaged with the enemy .' 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Then you do not tliink it would have taken him an hour? 
 
 AnsAvei'. You just asked me that question — if I thought that within an hour he 
 would be engaged with the enemy ; I said yes, I thought he would. 
 
 Question. Short of an hour .' 
 
 Answer. I did not say short of an hour. 
 
 Questiiui. Well, that is what I understood by icifhhi an hour. 
 
 Answer. I say at the end of au hour, if yon want to get at the exact time. 
 
 Question. Did not yon expect V»y the end of that time to get your force well around 
 and coiniect with Reynolds? 
 
 Answer. I hoped to do so. 
 
57 
 
 Qnestiou. Tlieu, as you left General Porter, I understand your itlau was oncvof co- 
 oiteratiou f 
 
 Answer. With liim? 
 
 Question. With hiui and with Reynolds. 
 
 Answer. We were all co-ctix'ratinji,- to the same point. 
 
 Question. But you did not expect that he should become engaged with the enemy 
 until yon should get arouiul to the left of Reynolds? 
 
 Answer. I did not nuike any such calculation ; I have said nothing of the kind. 
 
 Question. You said souicthiug very near it ; aud I want to know whether that was 
 your expectation — that he would he in a general engagement with the enemy before 
 yon got round <ui the left of Reynolds? 
 
 Answer. You want to make me say what he would be doing at a certain time, and 
 where I should be ; I say no such calculation entered into my mind. 
 
 Question. You said by the end of an hour you expected to be well <ir )und on the 
 left of Reynolds with ycmr troops? 
 
 Answer. No, sir ; I did nf)t say well around to tlu; left of Reynolds. 
 
 Question. What did you say '1 
 
 Answer. Well around. 
 
 Question. Well, around where? 
 
 Answer. In the direction where I was going. 
 
 Question. Around to the Sudley road, and on the left of tlie >Sudley road, towai"d 
 Reynolds ? 
 
 Answer. I say yon are putting that in. 
 
 Question. Well, the record will show what you did say. Did you intend that he 
 should get into a general engageuient with the enemy while you were removed from 
 the scene back on the Sudley road, so as to be oiit of all possibility of rendering him 
 innnediate assistance ? 
 
 Answer. I do not want that question put in that way. 
 
 Question. That is the one I want you to answer. 
 
 Answer. Because you are putting words in my mouth, aiul putting plans in ray head 
 which were not suggested there. 
 
 Question. Then you can merely say it was not the case. 
 
 Answer. JVheii I left General Porter, I left him a corps commander, for him to operafe in 
 the direction indicated. How (/uickli/ he n-as to r/et in an enfifu/emcnt, irhctlirr an hour or an 
 lionrand a liatf, and how he wonld do it, wlicthcr in one W(i;i or another, I did not indicate, 
 nor did I take it into mi/ mind ; it was simply that lie was to operate on the left, and necessa- 
 rihi, whfn he got over there, the natnre of his operations would he determined bi/ the condition 
 of things that he would find. What those conditions would he I could not at that time tell. 
 
 And on page 817 lie testifies : 
 
 Question. Did yon exjiect General Poi'ter to engage the enemy alone, when along 
 tlie rest of the line there was nothing but artillery engaged ? 
 
 Answer. He would not be engaging the enemy alone if the rest of the line were en- 
 gaged Avith artillery. Yon seem to think artillery is of no consequence. 
 
 Question. What kind of an engagement did you expect him to enter into while no 
 other but artillery fighting was going on along the rest of the line ? 
 
 Answer. As I have tried to make myself understood on several occasions, the nature 
 of the particular kind of contest which he was to engage in was not a matter which 
 I ventured to impose upon liim. As a distinguished and zealous officer, with his corps 
 under his connnaml, I did not venture to do anything more than indicate the place 
 where I thought he was to api)ly that force. Whether he wan to skirmish or have a 
 very dee^) line, or extended one, was a question which I did not go into at all, nor 
 think of going into. 
 
 Question. Then a skirmish-line would have answered your expectation when you 
 left General Porter if, in his discretion, that was more advisable ? 
 
 Answer. It would depend upon the nature of the skirmish — how it was done ; how 
 vigorously carried out ; whether the circumstances reqviired it, and it only. It de- 
 pends upon a great many things that you must make a great many suppositions about 
 before I can give an intelligent answer. If you Avant to know a general principle, I 
 believe it is laid down by military writers that a body of men should be in a condition 
 to otter battle or decline i( ; whether the main body shall be advanced or retire on the 
 reserve, and many other ]>ositions; all of which are coiulitions upon which battles are 
 determined. 
 
 Question. And deleruiin.)d upon the discretion of the corps commander? 
 
 Answer. Yes; provided he acted energetically. 
 
 Question. Provided he acted according to the best of his discretion as a soldier ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 I have tlxus shown that General McDowell was utterly reckless in his 
 testimony, on the court-martial, producing a wholly false impression on 
 which Porter was convicted, and which he has now been compelled to 
 
58 
 
 retract and coiTect. On tlie court-martial, he .swore that he left Porter 
 with a positive order to attack at once. For not doing so, as ordered by 
 him. General Porter was convicted and disgraced. 
 
 How far, and from what motives the error arose, it is not for me to 
 say. There may be various explanations of it. • I should think, perhaps, 
 he might have been angry, so as to disturb his good judgment, but he 
 denies that we have ever seen him angiy. Peihaps he had the uight- 
 mare, as he says this caiupaign has been a nightmare to him from the 
 time of its occurrence. T took occasion to see what eftect that would 
 have, and I tind that it might disturb any man's judgment if it was 
 operating upon him when he was testifyina'. A very recent scientific 
 authority describes a nightmare as "a terrific dream, in which there ap- 
 pears to be a disagreeable object, as a i)erson, an animal, or a goblin 
 present, and often upon the breast or stomach of the sleeper, accom- 
 l)anied by an inalnlity to cry out, or move or (;all for help." Well, some- 
 thing hap])ened to destroy his judgment or his presence of mind, or his 
 recollection upon the former trial, and he swore to that. Xow, at Gov- 
 ernor's Island he came and said that he meant no such thing as he had 
 been understood to mean, and had sworn at the court-martial that he 
 did mean — not that he did not use the words, "Put your troops in here," 
 but that he didn't mean any such thing as was imputed to Ins hmguage 
 at the court-martial, but that all he meant was to do just what General 
 Porter did do, act ui)on his discretion, feel the force of the enemy in 
 front of him by a skirmish-line, if in his judgment that was thfe proper 
 thing to do under the circumstances, and any other method that he, as 
 a corps commander, left as sole master of the situation, might deem 
 sufficient and proper. What we claim is that General Porter, acting 
 under that discretion, did what he did, and that it was the best thing 
 under the military circumstances to do. If it was left to his discretion 
 the question is whether his discretion was exercised honestly aiid in 
 good faith, and not whether it was the best thing that might have been 
 (lone. McDowell comes to Governor's Island and says that he did not 
 mean what was imputed to his language before, but that he did not think 
 there could be much doubt about it, because when he said it he indi- 
 cated by a gesture what he meant by "Put your troojts in here." Now, 
 his testimony on that sul)ject is very remarkable. One would suppose 
 that if he said "Put your troops in here," and indicated by a gesture, 
 he would know where the gesture indicated. Xow, here is the cross- 
 examination on that subject: 
 
 Question. You are quite positive, I uiiilerstanil, as to your recolleetion of tlie exact 
 words whicli you used to (ieneral Porter al>out putting- in liis troops, as you stated on 
 page 85, "You put your force in here." Is it your recollection of those being the ex- 
 act wordn/ 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Was then and is now ! 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. Then you did not say ''Put your tro(>i)s in tliere"? 
 
 Answer. Is not that wliat you said ? 
 
 Question. A'o ; '• IMit your troops in h(;re." 
 
 Answer. It was accoiu])anied by a motion of the hand, here or there. 
 
 Question. I want to know whether it was lure or ilteirf 
 
 Answer. Tliat I cannot tell yon. 
 
 Question. Would it ni;ikr a difference Avhether ir was here or there.' 
 
 Answer. No; one might be. a litrle more critically correct as an expression, but 
 ''here or there" would have been understood. 
 
 Well, it would have been a very singular order for him to say to (ien- 
 eral Porter, "Put your trooi)s in here or there." 
 
 Question. I look for your recollection of the real words, whether yon said "Put your 
 troops in here," or "Put your troops in there." 
 
59 
 
 Answer. I coiild uot tell you as to that. 
 
 Qiii'stion. Yon say tliat Iicic or tlirre would make no difference ? 
 Answer. No; in connoctiou witli the movement of the liand, as indicating the place 
 Question. Do you recollect the movement of your hand f 
 Answer. I cannot tell you whether it was the right liand or the left. 
 Question. Can you recollect which way you were facing? 
 Answer. No, sir. 
 
 Question. Can you recollect whetlier you moved your hand north, or south, or east, 
 or west ? 
 Answer. It Avas not in reference to the direction of the compass. 
 Question. No ; can you recollect that fact ? 
 Answer. I could not. 
 
 I do not think the order is helped out much by the ge.stiue, and when" 
 you come to see that there was no order, but only a gesture, achled t(i 
 this wild and unintelligible " here " or " there," east, west, n(n'th, or south, 
 it left General Porter in the position which I now will indicate. 
 
 General Porter swore before the McDowell court of inquiry, ^vhich I 
 am much obliged to the llecorder for putting in e\ideuce, that when 
 McDowell left him he said no such thing as "Put your troops in here"; 
 luit that when Porter said, in view of this idea of taking King away, 
 "What shall I do?" he, McDowell, said nothing, but waved his hand 
 and rode off as fast as he could. Is thei-e any corroborating testimony 
 to that ? Yes, Captain ]Montieth, aide-de-camp to General Porter, was 
 l)resent and heard the question and saw the wave of the hand, and saw 
 the de])arture without an answer. Xow, what ? "Why, General Porter 
 was left there alone, down near the place where the horses were drink- 
 ing, and he came l)ack alone to his command. As he came back, he 
 saw, as he swears before the McDowell court of inquiry, the enemy 
 gathering in his front. He knew well enough what that meant, did he 
 not ? That those troops reported by Buford were there, and, as he 
 thought then, coming down upon him. What was the natural move- 
 ment ? What was the natural suggestion? He had thought before Mc- 
 Dowell arrived, and when he was in command of 17,000 men, 0,000 of 
 his men and 8,000 of King's, which had been placed under his special 
 command — he had thought the wise course was to press the enemy in 
 front, and if possible, go over to attack him; but McDowell having now 
 left him, without any answer even to his suggestion that now was a 
 time when he might make a communication by taking King's division 
 around on the Sudley Springs road : (these things slnfted with every 
 changing view from the euem}', did they not?) And, as he rode back, 
 he saw the enemy gathering in his front, and he says : " Now, if ever, is 
 the time to attack. Don't we know that the force rei)orted by Buford is 
 here — don't we take it for granted, as McDowell says, that all the rest 
 are coming ! Now or never is the time to attack ! " What does he do ? 
 Why, he renews and continues his movement to piess the enemy, and 
 in that view jjushes Morell over to the right 1)eyond the railroad ; he is 
 l)reparing a new or a forward movement beyond Dawkins' Branch, 
 AVell, on what view was that possible ? On what theory had it always 
 been possilde and practicable in his idea ? Why, it was not with 0,000 
 men against from 14^,000 to 25,000 over there, wherever they were. I 
 don't care whether they were within a. few rods of Dawkins' Branch, or 
 anywhere that the Recorder pleases to put them; No ; it was not with 
 any such idea. It was, that with 17,000 men he might try it ; and that 
 was the only time, as it seems to me that military men will say, that an 
 attack should liave been tried. So, on the imi)ulse of the soldier, know- 
 ing that there is a su] (porting force within reach of him, namely. King's 
 division, he sends to King to hold on. What was that for ? That he 
 might press with Morell ; that he might bring Sykes out here (in sup- 
 
60 
 
 port), and make tlie movement described by Warren as tbe necessary 
 movement and tbe only practical)le one, witb King's force to be beld in 
 reserve wbile Morell deployed, and to come np as be and Sykes advanced. 
 Now, tbe learned Eecorder sees fit to dispute tbat tbat took place. I 
 never bave seen bow it can be dispnte<l. I never could see bow, at 
 least, General Porter could belp believing- tbat it was so ordered by 
 General McDowell, and acting on tbat belief. He sends General Locke 
 after King's force. Tbe answer comes back from ^McDowell in place of 
 King — 
 
 Give my compliments to General Porter, and tell liim to stay where he is ; I am 
 going to the right, and I will take King's division around with me. 
 
 Now, if tbat was tbe time to attack, wbo is responsible for its not Lav- 
 ing been done ? Porter, wbo wanted to do it. Porter, wbo began to do 
 it, or McDowell, wbo refused to join or support bim ? 
 
 And now I wisb to call attention to tbe Recorder's imputations upon 
 our evidence tbat wbat I ba^ e tbus stated did really bappen. McDowell 
 said be didn't recollect it. Tbat is all be said. General King said be 
 didn't recollect it. Well, if it turns out tbat General King was not tbere, 
 and tbat it was some otber oflicer, tbere is pretty good reason for King- 
 not recollecting it, apart from tbe terrible illness under wbicb be was 
 suffering, wbicb migbt naturally affect bis memory, an illness wbicb it 
 is proven ui)on tbe record did overcome bim, and from wbicb be bad 
 ])een suffering and in a disabled condition for tbe wbole of two weeks 
 before. Well, but, says tbe Recorder, Porter knew tbat King bad gone 
 away, and, Avben Porter says tbat be sent Locke to King, be tells a 
 falsebood. Now it would be soinetbing if Porter knew tbat King bad 
 gone. Tbe Recorder bas made tbe deliberate statement, witb tbe intent 
 tbat you sbould believe it, tbat tins recortl sbows, by tbe evidence of 
 Patrick and Judson, tbat Porter knew tbat King bad gone. I deny it. 
 I say it does not sbow any sucb tbing. At page 104 is tbe testimony 
 of Judson, upon wbicb be relies, wbicb is tbis : 
 
 Question. What time did yon reaeh that position (Bethlehem Chnrch) ? 
 
 Answer. I cannot state the hour; it was early in the morning of the 2yth. I think. 
 
 Question. Then your division knew the way very well from Bethlehem Church to 
 where the lighting was the night before ? 
 
 Answer. Yes, sir. 
 
 Question. In the morning, were you still posted on that road when General Porter';* 
 division came along marching towards Gainesville? 
 
 Answer. We were. 
 
 Question. Did they come hy you; the head of the colunm on the road ? 
 
 Answer. ]\Iy recolle<'tion is such. 
 
 Question. Was General Porter with them ? 
 
 Answ»^r. He was. 
 
 Question. Did you see liim ? 
 
 Answer. I saw him. 
 
 Question. Did you have any conversation with him? 
 
 Answer. I did. 
 
 Question. State that. 
 
 Answer. General Porter asked me where the commanding otficer of these troops 
 was. 
 
 Now tills was a man in Hatcb's brigade. 
 
 Answer. I coiulucted him to General Hatch. 
 
 Question. Had General McDowell at that tinu^ made his apjiearance? 
 Answer. I have no reeollection of s 'eing General McD;>well since the day before 
 until that time. 
 
 Is tbat an indication cAen to Porter tbat i>robably King was not 
 tbere ? Not in tbe least ; tbere is not a word of suggestion about King. 
 Judson may bave taken bim to ILitcb as tbe immediate commander of 
 
61 
 
 the brigade, wliicli lie was, or King may have been tem]»<)i'ari]y away. 
 There being no reference to King, how unfair it is to impute to Judson's 
 testimony knowledge on Porter's part that King had gone. It does not 
 help the matter any more to refer to General Patrick, at page 187, be- 
 cause it shows tllat, when Patrick says that King came up to say good- 
 bye, Porter's column had already gone past. 
 
 I think General King was the tii'st whom I saw. It was somewhere ah(mt eight or 
 nine o'chiek, while my commissariat and personal start' were hunting up siii)plies, &(•. 
 General King rode over to my head([Uarters, anil told me that he was not tit to be in 
 command, that he was going to Gentreville, and came over to hid me good-bye. I 
 think Colonel Chandler, his adjutant-general, and I do not reooHect who else, were 
 with him at the time ; he came to say good-bye, and I do not know that I saw him 
 after that. 
 
 Question. In the mean time had you found the promised supplies '? 
 
 Answer. We got some somewhere. 
 
 Question. You found after a while the rest of the brigades of your division? 
 
 Answer. No; I have no personal recollection of seeing them there at all. I must, I 
 think, have seen them or knew of their being thereabouts from some source. 
 
 Question. What happened next after King's departure for Centreville ! 
 
 Answer. I was ordered, I think, by McDowell in person, to move as soon as I could 
 in the rear of General Porter; Porter having just passed through, or passing through 
 near Manassas Junction, to go back to the scene of our fight the uiglit previous. 
 
 Clearly, when General King came there to bid General Patrick good- 
 bye. Porter had already gone to the front. How puerile is it then to 
 say that Porter must have known that King had gone, and therefore he 
 could not have sent this message by Locke to King, when it appears 
 that he was all day (and the government produces the dispatches) send- 
 ing dispatches, not to ]McDowell and Hatch, but to McDowell and King. 
 O, says the Recorder, those disiiatches were properly described by a 
 little 'word of three letters, seldom used among gentlemen and never 
 among soldiers. Well, will that go down with the common sense which 
 we claim for leading military minds ? Of course not. This message 
 was sent by Locke to McDowell, and this was the answer ; and, mind 
 you, it corresponds in substance with what McDowell said at Governor's 
 island, that he meant by "put your troops in here," "I meant to indi- 
 cate the point at which he should operate." For there is not nuich 
 difference between that and " Give my compliments to General Porter, 
 and tell him to stay where he is." 
 
 Was there a disoijedience of the joint order ? Xobody claims that there, 
 was, except as moditied by McDowell ; and it was not moditied by Mc- 
 Dowell, except to thwart what General Porter thought ought to be done 
 with the 17,000 men, and to leave him there with his force of 0,000 or 
 10,000 men — a force utterly insigniflcant, as compared with what they 
 both knew was over on the other side. I will not enter into a dispute 
 with the Recorder as to Avhere each division of the enemy's troops Avas. 
 They were there, as everybody knew. Longstreet, AVilcox, Marshall, 
 and" Williams have told you where they Avere. Corporal Solomon 
 Thomas and bis reverend associates, and the medical assistant surgeons 
 of this, that, and the other regiment, may come and tell you to the con- 
 trary, but there is the evidence. It hardly needed more thau Buford's 
 dispatch to demonstrate it. 
 
 Well, both the Recorder and the Judge-Advocate-General say that 
 there was a retreat, and that that was a violation of the joint order. It 
 is pretty late in the history of this discussion, as it appears to me, for 
 us to be arguing the question upon the evidence as to whether there 
 was a retreat that day. I think we will be stultifving ourselves to dis- 
 cuss that matter anymore; unless we accept the learned Recorder's mili- 
 tary view. If you clo, then there was a retreat. He says that when 
 
62 
 
 General MorelFs force, m obedience to the order of IMcDowell, was with- 
 drawn from beyond the raih'oad and bron<>ht back to the road and 
 placed under cover to '' come the same ;iame " upon the enemy, as they 
 were evidently coming' upon him, and so Sykes' brigade was withdrawn 
 100 or 200 or 300 yards to make room for them, he says that was a retreat. 
 ^Vell, it seems to me that there was a pretty emphatic expression upon 
 the countenances of the several meml^ers of the Board about that when 
 the evidence Avas coming in. It seemed to be a pretty plain indication 
 that some of us did not know what the word "retreat" meant. We do 
 not pretend to dilate now upon that question. There it stands upon the 
 record. All the witnesses, as it seems to me, sul)Stantially agree that 
 there was not any retreat ; that there was nothing in the nature of a 
 retreat; there were movements back and forth. If a brigade is moA'ed 
 up 100 or UOO yards we do not call that an advance upon the enemy ; 
 and if they withdraw to give place for the movements of other brigades, 
 we do not call that a retreat. Well, that is all there was that day af- 
 fecting in the least the situation. 
 
 It is true that, under tlie circumstances which I shall present!}' de- 
 iScribe, there is claimed to have been an order to General Sturgis — or so 
 stated by him, and forgotten from the outset by General Porter — there 
 was a direction to General Sturgis, who was in the rear of Sykes, to go 
 back to Manassas Junction; and then there was apparently an almost 
 immediate recall, and they came back before they had got anywhere 
 near Manassas Junction ; and it is not far from the junction of the Dud- 
 ley Springs and the JManassas and Gainesville road to Manassas Junc- 
 tion. Ah, but, says the Eecorder, there was an intention to retreat; and 
 in a case of petit larceny, he says, the taking of a watch or other chat- 
 tel and having it in your hand, even for a moment, makes out the crime. 
 Well, is this a petit larceny court ? AVe think that sometimes he has 
 had that idea. We supposed it was a great military tribunal, examin- 
 ing" into a (juestion according to the recognized maxims of warfare, 
 not to judge that there was a retreat unless there was a retreat, and 
 when there was no retreat, flnding that there was none; but if this 
 Board is going to be degraded into a police justice's court, I for one beg 
 leave to retire. I should retire beyond 3Ianassas Junction. It seems to 
 me that we should be imposing upon the good nature of the Board if we 
 took uj) the details and answered the criticisms of tlie learned Recorder 
 about the movements in the nature of a retreat. He said a good nuiuy 
 other ingenious tilings ; it seems to me that a good many niglits must 
 have been emph)yed in digging them out — keen and crispy criticisms 
 upon the evidence. But how any of them fairly weigh upon the mind 
 of the Board as indicating a retreat it is impossible for me to guess. It 
 would be a waste of time to discuss that (juestion. They all admit of 
 the obvious answer that a great deal of the testimony upon which they 
 were founded was from utterly incompetent men. Dr. Faxon ; who 
 is he ? Dr. Faxon was assistant surgeon of a Massachusetts regiment. 
 His office required him to atteiul to his pills and powders, his lancets and 
 his cutting knives ; he did not notice anything in i»articular, but he 
 thought there was a retreat. But ]\Eorell, aiul Butterfield, and Sykes, 
 and Warren, ami Griftin. all skilled lead<n-s, didn't see it. Wt-ll, it is 
 the medical view of the situation. 
 
 We do not believe it will be a valuable use of the few remaining hours 
 of this day to discuss that ([uestioii of a retreat, and so we leave the 
 subject of the joint order. AH pretenses of disobedience of that order 
 have long since been exploded. If it was violated, it was not violated 
 by Porter. If it was varied from, he could not vary from it, because 
 
63 
 
 the responsibility was on otlier shoulders. He wanted to do, with a force 
 which possildy niioht have been adequate, what here and there in this 
 case it has-been claimed he ou«iht to have done, but he was thwarted 
 by the peremptory refusal of his superior officer. In that same connec- 
 tion we call the attention of the Board to a most renmrkable document, 
 and one that has excited no little curiosity, one that was sent here by 
 the Secretary of War, or under his authoritative sanction. We have 
 tried to get the Eecorder to admit its paternity, but lie does not see tit 
 to do so, and we have liad to look at the internal evidences, which are 
 sometimes quite conclusive. The external evidences are considerable, 
 because on the back of it is this endorsement, which does not say Avho 
 wrote it or where it came from, but which indicates, it seems to me, its 
 source : 
 
 "Washixgtox, Jmw I'yili, 1878. 
 
 Respectfully referred to Maj. A. B. Gardner, Judge-Advocato, U. S. A., Recorder of 
 Board, ai)poiuted l)y S. 0. 78, of April 1'2, 1878, from tlii.s ottice. 
 
 It is understood that (General I'opc wishes Maj. T. C. H. Smith, ])ayraaster U. S. A., 
 to attend the trial, and the Secretary of War thinks it would l)e welf to sultpiena him, 
 as he is quite familiar with the facts. 
 
 Bv order of the Secretary of War. 
 
 (Signed) E. D. TOWXSEXD, 
 
 Acljtttaiit-General. 
 
 The Eecorder. Do I understand that that is in evidence ? 
 
 Mr. Choate. Xo; I am using it as part of my argument. 
 
 The Eecorder. Then I shall bring it to the notice of the Board that 
 the gentleman is arguing upon what is not in evidence. 
 
 Mr. Choate. Xone of my argument is in evidence. 
 
 Mr. Maltey. That was admitted and shown to the Board <luring this 
 session, though the name of the author was not recinired. 
 
 The President of the Board. Not admitted as evidence, but as a 
 suggestion of a line of argument. 
 
 The Eecorder. Is it put upon the record to be printed as the rest '? 
 
 The President of the Board. Xot at all ; it is received as a line 
 of argument. 
 
 Mr. Choate. I will ask leave to incorporate it in my argument. 
 There is some little indication of its authorship. It is sometimes said 
 that the style is indicative. I think the style is very indicative, and if 
 you can attribute a part of it to anybody, perhaps you can impute the 
 rest of it to the same author. Now, I find in a letter of General John 
 Poi^e to the Compte de Paris, written from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 
 December 21, 1870, this sentence : 
 
 The f/reaier tite force of the enemy hi our front, the greater need there was of the help of 
 Porter's corps, and the greater his obligation to render it, and If ijoa conlel prore that flie 
 whole SoHthern Confederacy was in front of him on that day, you would only succeed in hlack- 
 eniny his crime — the crime of desertiny the field of battle and ubandoniny his comrades to the 
 nnecinal odds he left behind him. 
 
 Now, in the document thus indorsed by the Secretary of War I find 
 this : 
 
 The greater the force of the enemy in front of Porter, the greater the necessity of his aid, 
 and if the whole ^Southern Confederacy had been before him, it only made his desertion of the 
 rest of the Army the more shameful. 
 
 I should not suppose that better exterjial and internal evidence could 
 be furnished or reipiired than this of the authorship of this remarkable 
 document, which has been sent here under the imi)rimatur of the Secre- 
 tary of War for you to consider, and I trust you will consider it. I care 
 not whether it originated with (leneral Pope, whose language it evi- 
 dently bears, or with Colonel Smith, whose name is upon the back of it, 
 
64 
 
 €r from some unknown source, which appears to be pressing this prose- 
 cution from behind. It is the last authoritative statement, prior to the 
 Ifecorder's, of the aroument, and in that point of view I want to read it. 
 If it differs from what was chiimed on the former trial ; if it differs from 
 what General Pope then claimed ; if it differs from what General Mc- 
 Dowell then claimed ; if it differs from what he claimed at Governor's 
 Island ; if it differs from what the learned Eecorder now claims, I give 
 the government the benefit of the doul)t. They may choose between 
 their various theories when they get through. 
 
 Now, I will read this. The theory of it is this, that Porter was at fault 
 for not attacking when General McDowell was going around on the Sud- 
 ley road. Was ever anything so preposterous as that heard before, in 
 view of the claims that have now been made, and all the evidence that 
 has been laid before you ? After McDowell's refusal to let King stop a 
 juoment that he might make an advance, they say Porter was at fault in 
 not making an attack any time while McDowell, with King's division 
 and Pickett's division, was going around Avhere they went. Now, there 
 is a remarlcaljle circumstance connected with this theory, the cardinal 
 idea of which is that King and Eicketts were \\ithin supporting distance, 
 although they were l)eing led by their commander away from the scene 
 of action, in which he refused to let them participate, and away from this 
 theory; that is to say, around upon the Sudley road, where we always 
 supposed King and Eicketts both went up. But some clergyman or 
 sutler, or ])ossil)ly Oori)oral Solomon Thomas, having said that he saw 
 Eicketts' division around on Avhat is called the new road, the gentleman 
 wlio got up this fancy map, as we will call it, which harmonizes with the 
 Eecorder's view, put Eicketts aAvay around — not on this road to Sudley, 
 but away around here [on the "New road'' from Manassas Station to the 
 Sudley Springs road], several miles further off". Now, in the light of 
 that consideration, we will observe -uliat this paper says about theii* 
 being in sup])orting distance as a reason why Porter shouhl have made 
 an attack between 12 and 2 o'clock : 
 
 At 12 o'clock m. on the 29tli of Auo;iist, 1862, a severe battle -was going on, and so 
 (•ontinueil until dark, between the right wing of the Union Array and the Confederate 
 forces under General T. J. Jackson, at Grovetou, on the turnpike leading frouiCeutre- 
 ville to Warrenton, Ya. 
 
 The line of battle was perpendicular to the turnpike, the left of our force and the 
 right of the enemy's being just south of that road. 
 
 If this came from General Pope, it is an emphatic denial of the Ee- 
 corder's theories about a contrary position of his own troops. 
 
 At twelve o'clock noon — 
 
 That is the objective point of time — 
 
 when the battle of the right wing was at the hottest — 
 
 Just think of that, in view of the clear proof to the contrary — 
 
 these twocorjjs. Porter's leading, had reached a point west of the Bethlehem Church. 
 At that church the road to Sudley Springs branched to the right (north) and passed 
 tlirectly throuj;h the lines of battle. 
 
 The orders of these two corps, which directed their march from Manassas Junction 
 upon Gainesville, are j>iven in the testimony before the Porter court-martial, and re- 
 (piired their march to be lontiuued towards Gainesville until tliey connected 1)V their 
 rif-ht with the rij-lit wing of the army. When they reached Bethlehem Church,' about 
 half-way betAvcen Manassas Junction and (liainesville, they were in full hearing of the 
 battle going on on the right, and found their advance in the pre.sence of a force of the 
 en«'my. 
 
 The writer of this paper thought the enemy was there. 
 
 McDowell, finding the whole road in front of him toward Gainesville blocked up by 
 Porter's corps, which was stretched out in column, and knowing how necessary it was 
 
65 
 
 for liim as well as Porter to go iiniiicdiately into action, told Porter to attack at once 
 where he was, and that he (McDowell) would take the Sudley Springs road, on which 
 the rear of Porter's column rested, and join the battle on the right. 
 
 Sec liOAvtliis clift'ers from McDowell at Governor's Island and from the 
 Eccorder here: 
 
 That McDowell would linve attacked, as he told Porter to do, liad lie been in front, 
 there is not the faintest shadow of a doubt. 
 
 McDowell declares that he thought that he then had so far advanced 
 that they were close u]t to the pike, and that there was not room for any 
 considerable force of the enemy between them and the i)ike. And it is 
 clear from an examination of his whole testimonj- and his false position 
 admitted in it, that he thought they were very near the pike at twelve 
 o'clock. 
 
 At that time and for two hours afterwards McDowell's corps was still with Porter. 
 
 What an outrageous proposition that is. Porter sends back for King's 
 division. McDowell says "You cannot have it," and takes it away with 
 him, and this paper says that at that time, and for two hours afterwards, * 
 all the while they were getting up to the Henry house,, McDowell was 
 still with Porter. 
 
 Or so near that its rear, as it marched to the right up the Sndley Springs road from 
 Bethlehem Church, must have been still iu view, so that Porter's iittack could and 
 would, if necessary, have been supported by McDowell. At the time Porter's attack, by 
 every rule of warfare, aud of military oi)ligatiou, should have l)ceu made, and for 
 hours afterwards there were present ou the ground, not uiucli (if any) less than twenty 
 thousand Union troojis, viz. the corps of McDowell and Porter, less Kicketts' division, 
 but plus Piatt's brigade of Sturgis' division which was with Porter's corps, in additit)n 
 to his own two divisions. 
 
 The sul:»stance of it all is that Porter was at fault for not attacking 
 while McDowell was going off to make connection on the right, after 
 having positively refused to let him have a man. That is about a fair 
 specimen of the groun<l upon which this prosecution has been pressed. 
 
 The Board then, at one o'clock, took a recess of one hour. 
 
 Mr. CiiOATE resumed his argument as follows : 
 pouter's testimo^vy before the m'dowell court of inquiry, 
 
 IN JANUARY, ISOo. 
 
 I desire now to call attention to what I regard as a most authentic 
 and true statement of the situation then an<l there ; I mean the sworn 
 statement of General Porter before the McDowell court of inquiry. 
 Much criticism has been passed on that. 
 
 I desire to incorporate it as a part of my argument, because it will 
 stand any criticism that can be brought to bear upon it. The facts were 
 then fresh in the miml of General Porter. 
 
 It is true that the examiimtion was under the most constrained cir- 
 cumstances. It is not true, and the Eecorder has been misinformed, 
 when he said that General Porter volunteered his evidence there. He 
 was brought compulsorily Ijefore the court. It is one of those little 
 errors which seem to me"^ of very little consequence, l>ut which give a 
 coloring to the argument for which they are presented, like the state- 
 ment tiiat GeneralHunter was invited to sit upon the court-martial by 
 General Porter, and was one of his intimate friends, both of which are 
 denied by him. But the circumstances under which Porter Mas exam- 
 ined were these : It was after all the evidence in his case had been 
 closed ; it was after ]\tcDowell had given destructive testimony against 
 
G6 
 
 biin before that court, which he then knew, and we now know, was not 
 true. It was pending' the time between the closing of tlie evidence and 
 the publication of the sentence. He was not i>erinitted to testify fully 
 and freely; he was restricted to certain questions which bore ui>on the 
 question of this joint order, and of the relations of Porter and ]\IcDowell. 
 Fortunately you will tind the matter stated, with perfect consistency, 
 not only with its various parts, but, as we claim, with all the subse- 
 quent statements that General Porter has ever made. The ground of 
 criticism as to inconsistency in itself is this : He speaks of various move- 
 ments and intentions as to his operations at Dawkins' Branch, after 
 (xeneral McDowell left him, an<l of the effect of what General McDow- 
 ell said to him, but the court will see, when they come to examine it, 
 that he had always in his miiul the eti'ect of these three things, the rec- 
 ognized presence of the enemy in front. General McDowell's injunction 
 to remain where he was, and the fact of General McDowell taking King- 
 with his 0,000 men awa^' from the combination — away from any possible 
 operation under the joint order. It is. said also, that the statements in 
 this deposition are falsified and contradicted by the dispatclies which 
 are now" produced in this, that General Porter said it would be "a fatal 
 military blunder'' to move over to the front, or to the right and front, 
 as it was insisted that General McDowell had directed him to do. It is 
 said that by these dispatches it appears that he did afterwards direct 
 mo\"ements over to the front or to the right and front. That certainly 
 is not so. The only movement to the right and front was that which 
 was put an end to by General McDowell. The only movement to the 
 right was that jnade through Morell's deployment over beyond the rail- 
 road, exactly to the right, after General JMcDowell had i)ersonally 
 (piitted (xeneral Porter, and before the message had been received 
 througli Locke for him to reuiain where he was, and that he should take 
 Kirfg with him. Xow, I will read a few passages of General Porter's 
 testimony before the ]\[cDowell court of inquiry, because, in view of the 
 argument I presented this morning, it seems to me tliat it will come in 
 as a complete corioboration. 
 
 Question (By Coart). What order did General McDowell give, or what anthority 
 did heexereise over you, a.id in virtue of whose order f State fully and particularly. 
 
 Answer. General McDowell exercised authority over me in obedience to an order of 
 General Pope's, addressed jointly to General McDowell and me, and which I presume 
 is in possession of the court. I have no copy of it. Our commands being united, he 
 necessarily came into the command under the Articles of War. 
 
 The witness hei'e stated in substance to the court that the question leads to many 
 things pertaining to the recent court in his case, the de^-isiou of which has not yet 
 be<'n annotiuced. 
 
 The ([uestion requires .a statement of what transpired, and he felt, at this time, some 
 delicacy in answering, both so far as (ieneral McDowell and himself are concerned. 
 I would have to state the orders under Avliich I was moving in that dire<;tion. 
 
 The court decided that the (question was a proper one. 
 
 The witness continued: 
 
 That joint order refers to a previous oi'der given to me, of which this is a copy. 
 
 The witness jn'oduced a co]iy of an r)rder from Major-Gencral Po])e. datrd Hea(h|uar- 
 ters Army of Virginia, Centreville, August 29, 1862, which was read by ilif Recorder, 
 and is appended to the proceedings of the day and marked A. 
 
 The witness continued : 
 
 Under that order, .King's division constituted a part of my conunand. I was mov- 
 ing toward (iainesville when I received the joint order, and was joined by General 
 McDowell, who had also received a copy of the joint order. / had at Ihat time received 
 notice of the eiicniji hciii;/ ni front atid }utd captured two prisoiierx. Aly coiiiinaiid was then 
 formiiKj in line, jtreparatori/ to inorint/ and (tdrancin(/ towards (lainesriUc. General Mc- 
 Dowell, on arriving, showed me the joint order, a copy of which I acknowledged hav- 
 ing in my possession. An exi)ression of opinion then given by him to the etfect that 
 that was no place to fight a battle, and that I was too far out, whicli, taken in con- 
 ne<;tion with the conversation, I c<nisidercd an order, and stopped further progress towards 
 
67 
 
 Gainesville for a short time. General McDowell aud I went to the riglit, which was 
 rather to the north, with the view of seeing the character of the country, aud with the 
 idea of conneetin;/, as that joint order required, with the troops on my rifjht. But very few 
 words passed between us, and I suggested, from the character of the country, that he 
 should take King's division with him, and form eonnection on the right of the timber tvhich 
 icas then on the left ofliei/nolds, orjiresnmed to be Ixeiinolds. He left me suddenly, not replying 
 to a call from me to the effect, "What should I do?" aud with no understanding on 
 my part how I should he governed, I immediately returned to my command. On the 
 way back, seeing the enemji (jathering on my front, I sent an officer {Lieutenant-Colonel Locke, 
 my chief of staff ), to King's division, directing it to remain tvhere it was for the jircsent, and 
 commenced moving my eommand toivards Gainesville, and one division to the right or north of 
 the road. I received an answer from General McDoivell to remain where I teas ; he was going 
 to the right aud would take King with liim. He did go, taking King's division, as I pre- 
 sumed, to take position on the left of Reynolds. I remained where I was. When General 
 McDowell left me, I did not know where he had gone. No troops were in sight, and 
 L knew of the position of lieytiolds and Sigel, who were on our right, merely by the sound of 
 SigeVs cannon aud from information that day, that Reynolds was in the vicinity of Groveton. 
 The head of my corps was on the first stream after leaving Manassas Junction on the 
 road to Gainesville, one division in the line of battle, or the most of it. 
 
 Question (by Court). Did you consider the expression of General McDowell, as stated 
 by you, that you were too far to the front, and that this was no ])la(e to fight a battle, 
 in the light of an order not to advance, but to resume your original position? 
 
 Answer. / did, when Kiug^s division was taken from me, and as countermanding the 
 first order of General Po]ie, under the authority given him by that joint order. 
 
 Question (by Court). Was such an order a proper one under the circumstances ? If 
 not, state why. 
 
 Answer. I did not think so, and for that reason when General McDowell left me, I eon- 
 tinned my movement as if I had not seen the joint order. My previous order required me 
 to go to Gainesville, and from information received by the bearer of the first order. 
 General Gibbon, I knew it was to prevent the junction of the advancing enemy and 
 Jackson's force, then near Groveton, and that the object was to strike tiie turnpike 
 to Gainesville before the advancing column should an-ive. The sooner we arrived 
 there the more ettective would be our action. That order directed me to move quickly 
 or we would lose much. That order had been seen by General McDowell, and when 
 he altered it, as I conceived he had the authority, I presumed he knew more fully than 
 I did the plans of General Pope. I will add that the joint order contemplated forming 
 a line connecting with the troops on the right, and as I presumed, as General McDowell 
 acted, taking King's division with him, that he intended to form such a line. / thought 
 at the time that the attack should have been made at once upon the troops as they were coming 
 to us and as soon as possible. 
 
 Question (by Court). State, so far as you know, what followed, so far as the move- 
 ments of Genersil McDowell's troops and your own were concerned, and what orders 
 you subse(juently received from General McDowell. 
 
 Answer. General McDowell took King off' to the right. I know nothing further 
 of his movements. I remained where I was until three o'clock next morning. A 
 portion of the command left at daybreak. I received no orders whatever iiom Gen- 
 eral McDowell. 
 
 Question. (By Court.) But for this order, what movem,ent would you have made, and 
 have you reason to suppose that if you had not been stopped the junction of Longstreet and 
 Jackson would have been rffccled f 
 
 Answer. / should have continued moving towards Gainesville, and until %ve got out to 
 the turnpike, or met the enemy; I presume we would have prevented the junction or been 
 whipped. 
 
 ******* 
 
 Question. (By General McDowell.) Under what relations, as to command, did yon 
 and General McDowell move from Manassas and continue, iirior to the receipt of Gen- 
 eral Pope's joint order? 
 
 Answer. I di<l not know that General McDowell was going from Manassas, and I 
 have no recollection of any relations whatever, nor of any understanding. 
 
 Question. (By General McDowell.) Was there nothing said about General McDowell 
 being the senior, ami of his commanding the whole by virtue of his rank ? 
 
 Answer. Nothing that I know of. 
 
 Question. (By General McDowell.) What time did you take up your line of march 
 from Manassas Junction for Gainesville? 
 
 Answer. The hour the head of the column left, I presume, was about ten o'clock; it 
 may have been earlier. Ammunition had been distributed to the men, or was directed 
 to be distributed, and the comuiand to be put in motion immediately. 
 
 Question. (By'General McDowell.) When you received the joint order, tvhere were you 
 personally, aud where was your eommand ? 
 
 AuswiM'. / (('«■* at the he id of my coin nn, and a portion of the command, or the head of 
 
 cii 
 
68 
 
 the column, was then formiug line in front ; one regiment, as skirmishers, was in advance, and 
 also a small party of cavalry which I had as escort. The remainder of the corps was ou 
 the road. The head of jny column was in the Manassas road to Gaiuesville, at the 
 first stream, as previously described by me. 
 
 Question. (By GenerarMcDowell.) The witness says he received an order from Gen- 
 eral McDowell,"^ or what he considered an order, when General McDowell first joined 
 him, which order he did not obey. Will witness state why he disobeyed what he con- 
 sidered an order ? 
 
 Answer. The order I have said I considered an order in connection with his conver- 
 sation, and his taking King's division from me. I therefore did obey it. 
 
 Question. (By General McDowell.) What did you understand to be the effect of 
 General McDowell's conversation ; was it that you were to go no further in the direc- 
 tion of Gainsville than you then were? 
 
 Answer. The conversation was in connection with moving over to the right, which 
 necessarily would prevent an atlvance. 
 
 That is in connection with Mt'DoweH's taking King over to connect 
 on the right. 
 
 It will be observed from Avhat follows that General Porter had not 
 the least impression of any direction from McDowell after he left him 
 Avith King, to go to the front, or right and front. 
 
 Question. (By General McDowell.) Yon state you did not think General McDowell's 
 order (if it was one) a proper one, and that for that reason you continued your move- 
 ment as if you had not seen the joint order. Is the witness to l»e understood that this 
 was in obedience of what he has stated to be General McDowell's order 'I 
 
 Answer. I did not consider that an order at that time, and have tried to convey that 
 im])ression, but it was an expression of opinion which I might have construed as an 
 order ; hut ivhen General McDowell left me, he gave no reply to my question, and seeing ih< 
 enemy in my front, I considered myself free to act according to my own judgment until I re- 
 ceived notice of the withdraival of King. 
 
 Question. (By General McDowell.) What Avas the effect on your movements of the 
 message you state was brought to you by Colonel Locke (your chief of staft), from 
 General McDowell, that you were to stay where yon were, that he was going to the 
 right, and would take King with him ? 
 
 Answer. The eft'ect was to post my command, or a portion of the command, in line 
 where the head of the column then was, ])r(ii)ared to resist the advance of an enemy 
 in that direction, and turn a portion of the command a little back on the r«)ad. After 
 doing this, I sent messengers to General Pope, informing him of the fact. 
 
 Question. (By G<'neral McDowell.) Informing General Pope of what fact ? 
 
 An.swer. Of my jjresent position and what there was in my front. I will say that I 
 sent several messengers, conveying, to the best of my recollection, the general informa- 
 tion of my location, and one telling him that King's division had hecn taken to the right. 
 Some of tiiose messengers never returned to me, and I presume were captured. 
 
 Question. (By General McDowell.) Did yon receive any further nu'.ssage from Gen- 
 oral JUcDowell, other thftu the one yon state that Colonel Locke brought you, as before 
 stated, which you considered an order '? 
 
 Answer. IS'one that I recollect of. I had memoranda which I sent to General Morell, 
 and which conveys the general impression that I had rcMcived messages from General 
 McDowt'll, but I have no recollection of receiving them, nor were they brought to 
 mind till their appearance before the court. That memoranda says General McDowell 
 informs me all is going well on the right, or something to that ett'ect. 
 
 Question. (By General McDowell.) Is witncssto be understood lie did not on the 29th, 
 after seeing General McDowell the second time, receive any instructions or directions 
 or orders from General McDowell to move his troops from where he states he was 
 directed to remain ? 
 
 Answer. I have no recollection, and I am confident I received no message or order 
 from him other than those that I have mentioned. 
 
 The witness speaks of the effect of CJeneral McDowell's message as 
 brought by General Locke, to cause him to remain in i)Osition. 
 
 Question. (By General McDowell.) How far was it from the head of witness' column 
 to Gainesville? 
 
 Answer. I do not know; I had never been over that portion of the country, and have 
 not been since. 
 
 Question, (liy General McDowell.) How long had the witness' head of coliunn been 
 halted when G<'neral McDowell joined him 1 
 
 Answer. I cainiot siiy, but not long. It had halted before I arrived there. 
 
 Question. (By General McDowell.) Witness speaks of the eficct of General McDowell's 
 
69, 
 
 message (as brought by Colonel Tjoeke) to liave been to cause luni to remain iu posi- 
 tion at the place where (ieneral McDowell first saw him. How long did witness" troops 
 contimu^ in this position ? 
 
 Answer. A ])ortion of the command remained there until daybreak the following 
 morning, and some till after daybreak. The most of Morell's division was on or near 
 that ground all day. 
 
 Question. (By General McDowell.) Did witness conceive himself prohibited from 
 making, or attempting to make, any movement to the front, or to the right, or to the 
 front and right ? 
 
 Answer. By that direction or order token in connection with the joint order, I con- 
 sidered myself checked in advancing, ('.s7kywV(//// toA'AH ill coiiiirclioii with the removal of 
 King's dirlmin. I did not consider that I miitd more to the rii/lit, and [considered: that (len- 
 eral McDoircU took Kin(fs dirision to form a connection on the right, or to go to the right 
 and form Kiich a connection, as was possible. 1 add further, that I considered it impracti- 
 cahle to go to the right. 
 
 Question. (By General McDowell.) Did witnesa attempt to make any movement in 
 either of the directions above named ? 
 
 Answer. Not directly to the right. I did to the light and front, and when I received 
 the last message from General McDowell to remain where I was, I recalled it. 
 
 Showing that the attempt referred to is the one stated in the subse- 
 quent message from himself to McDowell, that he had made an attem])t 
 to get Morell over to the right, and before the message came by Colonel 
 Locke to remain where he was. 
 
 Then the Recorder has insisted that the orders to Morell "to push 
 over to the aid of Sigel" were in express contradiction of this state- 
 ment that he made no attempt either to the right or the right and 
 front. But the direction to Sigel was not to the right or right and front. 
 McDowell and Porter together had found it impracticable to enter the 
 woods to the right. What was the direction to move to the aid of Sigel ? 
 Why, it was to move over and strike upon the road by which Khig was 
 marching ; that was the movement ; not into and through the woods to 
 the right, beyond where McDowell and Porter had gone together, but 
 farther back in the direction to strike the Sudley road, which was the 
 road by which King was moving. 
 
 Question. (By General McDowell.) Did you make no attempt to go to the front or 
 the right, or the riglit and front, after that message ? 
 
 Answer. I made no attempt Avith any body of troops. I sent messengers through 
 there to go to General Pope, and to get information from the troops on the right. 
 
 Question. (By General McDowell. ) After General McDowell left the witness, did the 
 witness not know he was expected by General McDowell to move to the right or to the 
 right and front ? 
 
 Answer. I did not. » 
 
 My learned friend says that these subsequent messages to go to the 
 aid of Sigel show that he <lid not know that McDowell did expect it. 
 There is not the least warrant for that on a fair reading of this testi- 
 monj'. This point, and the bearing and connection of the dispatches tO' 
 what took place that afternoon, are so full,y explained by Mr. Bullitt 
 that I pass on. Let us read it, however, once more : 
 
 Question. (By General McDowell.) Witness speaks of havijig reported tj General 
 Pope. When did witness conceive himself as no longer under (icneral McDowell ? 
 
 Answer. My messages were addressed to General McDowell, I think, all of thimi. 
 The ujcssengers were directed to deliver them to General Pope, if they saw or met 
 him. I considered myself as limited in my operations under General McDowell's or- 
 ders, until I should receive directions from General Pope. ,.*.«< 
 
 Question. (By General McDowell.) How long Avas witness and General McDowell 
 together before they moved to the right " with a view of seeing the character of the 
 country " ? 
 
 Answer. I do not think we were together more than four or five minutes, tliou"-h I 
 have no distinct recollection. ° 
 
 Question. (By General McDowell.) How long were thev together, after movino- to 
 the right ? .0,0 
 
 Answer. It may have been ten (tr twelve minutes, perhaps longer. 
 
70 
 
 Question. (By General McDowell.) You have stated "when General McDowell left 
 nie, I did not know where lie liad gone." Have you not stated before the recent court- 
 martial, in your defense, as follows: "We" (General McDowell and yonrself) "soon 
 l)arted, General McDowell to proceed towards the Sudley Springs road, I to return to 
 the position at which he first spoke to me, after our meeting"? 
 
 Answer. I know now where General McDowell went. I did not know then. 
 
 Question. (By General McDowell.) After General McDowell left you, you say you 
 Bent an officer to King's division, directing it to remain wliere it was, for the present. 
 What Avas the necessity for this order? Had the division, so tar as you then knew, 
 been ordered clsewhex-e ? 
 
 Answer. I sent the message to tliat dirision to remain where if was for the present, in order 
 not to iring it to the front, where I was forming a line, hefore I was ready for it, and intend- 
 ing to use it as the main support. 
 
 Question. (By General McDoAvell.) Why did you continue to regard King's division 
 as attached to your command after the receipt of the joint order ? 
 
 Answer. I never thought of the point before, but General McDowell had left me and, 
 as I understood, in no wise changing the relations of King's diWsion to my corps. 
 
 Question. (By General McDowell.) Did not the joint order itself modify the first 
 order you received from Genei'al Pope ? 
 
 Answer. It placed all under the direction of General McDowell. 
 
 Question (by General McDowell). If it placed all under General McDowell, how 
 did you regard the fact of its being addressed jointly to you and him, and not to him 
 only, if he was the sole commander? 
 
 Answer. I had reason to believe that order was written on an api)lication made by 
 me to General Pope for orders to be given to me in writing ; this, in consequence of 
 having received verbal orders from him by persons wliom I knew nothing of, and 
 which were contrary to some instructions which I had received in writing. I presume 
 the order was written by General Pope, because I had a portion of General McDowell's 
 coumiand with me, and the order was intended for both. 
 
 Question (by General McDowell). Did witness send any written order to King's 
 division? 
 
 Answer. No, sir. 
 
 Question (by General McDowell). How long was it after you left General McDow- 
 ell, before you sent Colonel Locke to King's division? 
 
 Answer. I sent him as soon as I returned to my command after leaving General Mc- 
 Dowell. I returned inmiediately. 
 
 I do not know, nor do I care, whether there was any different state- 
 ment by General Porter as to the legal effect of the joint order. I have 
 not heen able to find it. But if there was, it had no relevancy whatever 
 to this case. The pretended contradictions and inconsistencies imi)uted 
 by the Recorder do not exist; and I submit that that piece of testimony 
 from which I have now read these extracts is one of the strongest pieces 
 of testimony in this case that has been presented by the goverimient, 
 and that it is fatal entirely to the prosecution in this respect. 
 
 THE 4.30 P. M. ORDER. 
 
 Now, a few words as to the pretense of a disobedience, on the part of 
 General Porter, to the 4.30 p. m. order of the 29th. So nnich has been 
 said already on that subject that I am only called upon to answer what 
 the Recorder has said about it. 
 
 Headquarters in the Field, 
 
 August 29, 1862— 4.:iO p. m. 
 Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right fiank. I desire you to push 
 forward into action at once on the enemy's fiank, and, if possible, on his rear, keeping 
 your right in coniinuuication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the 
 woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage their fiank. Keep 
 lieavy reserves, and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. 
 In case you an- obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear, so as to keep yon in 
 close communication with the right wing. 
 
 JOHN POPE, 
 Major-Generul Commanding. 
 Maior-Gcueral Portkk. 
 
 The Recorder's first and main proposition is, that there is no new evi- 
 dence before this Board, and that the case is not changed fiom the atti- 
 
71 
 
 tucle which it hekl on the former trial. It does seem to me that such a 
 statement ignores all the real evidence in this case. But, 1 supjiose, it 
 is necessarj^, in attempting to make an argument against General Por- 
 ter, at this stage of the case and on this subject, to ignore and forget all 
 material evidence. ISTo new evidence ! What do you say to the evidence 
 of Geueral Euggles, one of the most important pieces of testimony in- 
 troduced into this case, in respect to the 4:30 p. m. order? 
 
 General Ruggles was the man who wrote that order. It was very 
 material to know whether the " 4.30 " which is on it could be taken as 
 a certain indication of its actual date. Why was that so ? Because 
 Captain Pope had undertaken to say that he knew that he started with 
 the order at 4.30, because that was the date of the order ; but he had no 
 other means of knowledge, and no other foundation for his recollection, 
 
 Now, theu, if General Euggles had written the order, and had dated 
 it upon delivery to Captain Pope, there would have been some sense 
 and substance to Captain Pope's testimonj", some foundation as to the 
 beginning of the half hour to two hours, which, from his various state- 
 ments, it must be regarded that he has said it took him to go with it. 
 But Euggles says his habit was, and he knows it was followed in this 
 instance, when he and General Pope began the work of i)reparing the 
 order, he acting as scribe, and General Pope as dictator, to date the 
 order first, and whether, after writing the " 4.30 j). m.," there were inter- 
 rujitions, or whether the whole order was written consecutively and im- 
 mediately afterwards, or whether he Jind the general went about other 
 business in the mean time, he has no means of stating. Neither he nor 
 any one else has any means of stating. So that the very foundation of 
 Captain Pope's evidence entirely falls out of the case, viz, immediate 
 connection between 4.30 as the time of the beginning of the order, and 
 4.30 as the time of its delivery to Captain Po]De. Xow, when the Ee- 
 corder says that there is not au}^ new evidence in the case, he must have 
 forgotten that. 
 
 Then, is there no other new evidence in the case ? A\Tiat does he say 
 to the testimony of Captain Eandol, of the regular service, who came 
 from Boston Harbor, where he is now stationed ? The Board cannot 
 have forgotten his clear and strong statement. If my recollection does 
 not fail me, he saw the delivery of that order to General Porter. He 
 saw the ofticer come uj) and deliver it ; and adds his testimony to that 
 of five or six witnesses, who were produced on the trial before the court- 
 martial, that it was sundown — 6.30, not 5 o'clock, or 5.30. Had the 
 Eecorder forgotten that when he said " There is no new evidence" ? 
 Should he say that there is no new evidence, in face of the fact of the 
 complete demolition of all the government evidence on the foriner triaP? 
 Is the testimony of Captain Moale, and of Lieutenant Jones, no new 
 evidence ? It is true they were not present on the scene of action there, 
 and they did not witness the delivery or the receipt of that order ; but 
 they had a far more fatal x)iece of new e^ddence to produce, to the de- 
 struction of the government case on this head; and what was it? Why, 
 that Captain Pope, when he was no longer in the immediate service oi 
 his uncle, when he was in a remote part of the continent, years after- 
 wards, when there was no anticipation of any new trial for Porter, when 
 it was not supposed that any such transaction could take place, in 
 friendly discourse with his associates, with his mess in the comj^any to 
 which he belonged, he confessed — that is the word to use — confessed 
 that his testimony on the former trial was not true. He had said on 
 the former trial that he presumed that he got that order at 4.30, be- 
 cause it was dated 4.30, and he accomplished the journey in half an hour, 
 
72 
 
 and delivered the order to General Porter at 5 o'clock ; with great pre- 
 cision, as if he had a clear recollection about it, he said, " Perhaps within 
 three minutes after five." But to Captain Moale and Lieutenant Jones 
 he confessed that on the way with that order he got lost, and to one of 
 them he said he was from one to two hours, and to the other he said he 
 was a very long time, making the same statement, that he had lost his 
 way in carrying the order. 
 
 Now, where is the substance of the evidence for the prosecution on 
 that part of the case ? Where is there any evidence whatever, to meet 
 that ottered by General Porter, that it was received at 0.30 p. m., sun- 
 down or after i I cannot, as a hiAvyer, see any. And how a military 
 man can discover any substance of evidence whatever left on the part 
 of the prosecution, it is impossible for me to imagine. Further than 
 that, you have had Capt. Douglas Pope recalled. He has endeavored 
 to show you how he came. You have had Duttee, the orderly, recalled, 
 and he, too, has tried to show you liow he came. I submit that their 
 evidence on this subject, on this new examination, independent of all 
 new evidence, independent of the demolition of their former statements, 
 by the testimony of Captain Moale and Lieutenant Jones, shows that 
 they had not the least idea which Avay they went, and that they 
 have not now. They tried to pick out a path upon the map ; but you 
 have i)Ositive proof that Duttee said that until he went and viewed the 
 ground, he thought he went around through Five Forks. 
 
 What, then, is the fair conclusion from all the testimony as it stands ? 
 Is it not that the testimony of Douglas Pope aud of Duttee on the former 
 trial ought not to have been credited, and that now it cannot be credited, 
 in the least ? The fact is established of their having lost their way, of their 
 seeing no troops on the Sudley road, which from below the old Alexandria 
 pike is where they pretend to have come, when King's division and 
 Eicketts' division must have been blocking up that road entirely, so that 
 the passage of any one would have been a work of extreme ditficulty. Yet 
 they did not see a soldier. Wli at is the inevitable conclusion ? That they 
 got down to the junction somehow after wandering in the woods, whether 
 by Wheeler's or down by Comi)ton's Lane, or somewhere else ; and that 
 they struck the Alexandria road and came down to the junction of the 
 Sudley road is probable. But it is not possible that from there they 
 went down the Sudley road, because then they must have met these 
 troops. The ingenious mai)-maker for the government has attempted 
 to relieve that difticulty by getting Kicketts ott' the road. ]>ut it will 
 hardly serve the purpose. Kicketts was on the Sudley road right be- 
 hind King. There is but one way that they could not have seen a sol- 
 dier, and that was to cross directly tlie Sudley road and go down the 
 continuation of the old Warrenton, Alexandria and Washington jiike 
 from their junction in the direction of Manassas, and get around some 
 way on the Manassas road, and come up by the junction by Hethlehem 
 church, and that is the way they took, and that accounts for their being 
 so long upon the way, and shows the 
 
 TIME OF DELIVERY OF 4.30 ORDER. 
 
 There is one other remark to be nmde in connection with the 4.30 p. 
 m. order as to the time of its delivery. There was testimony on the 
 former trial, and I think there is testimony now, that they came up to 
 the junction from the direction of Manassas to the headquarters of Gen- 
 eral I'orter, and it seems to me that there is notliing left whatever of 
 the case, but t(.) conclude, taking all the parts of the testimony together. 
 
73 
 
 that they did come around by that way, aud must necessarily, receiving 
 that order some time after 4.30, and that they, by some round-about 
 way, must have got h^st. Then you malve all tlie evidence coincide. 
 You accept as true these six witnesses introduced on the part of Gen- 
 eral Porter, all credible, all intelligent, all respectable, that it was 
 received not before sundown. But there is one other fatal circumstance 
 which I must not omit to mention. In all celebrated cases, I think the 
 experience of every lawyer will permit him to testify that before the 
 case concludes, there is some piece of false evidence foisted ui)on the 
 case, sometimes even by voluntary evidence from some unknown source, 
 originated and promoted by some unknown party. That has actually 
 taken place in this instance. A third ]iarty, a second orderly, one Dyer, 
 has been produced here, who pretends to have accompanied Captain 
 Pope and Orderly Duffee on that expedition. But Duflee does not recol- 
 lect his i)resence; if you can accept Duffee's testimony, it is that he was 
 not there, and the most convincing proof that he was not there is what 
 he says himself. I will not recall all the particulars of how he recog- 
 nized the road when he went down there. He went over the ground 
 with Buflee to find the way, and he found it by an unmistakable land- 
 mark of a house with a four-square roof. That was the way he recog- 
 nized it as he rode over. He says he went with Captain Pope sixteen 
 years ago, and then saw the same house which he recognized last week. 
 Unfortunately for that statement, it turned out that tliat four-square 
 house was built after these battles were over. He said he did not go 
 quite up to General Porter's headquarters, but that he saw the church 
 by which his headquarters were, and he recognized the church, knew it 
 was a church by the steeple. Well, it turned out upon authentic testi- 
 mony, which cannot be disbelieved or doubted, that the church never 
 had a steeple. The Eecorder has an idea that it was in ruins, a melan- 
 choly ruin, and that perhaps two of the walls had fallen in, so that any- 
 body could see that it was a sacred ruin. But that did not impress the 
 man Dyer. He saw a steeple which never had existed. Then he saw 
 General Porter come out of his tent with Captain Pope. But the evi- 
 dence is clear that General Porter had no tent. And the evidence on 
 which General Porter was convicted before, aud which was reasserted 
 by Judge-Advocate Holt in melancholy tones in his paper to the Presi- 
 dent, was that General Porter was lying down under a tree, and con- 
 tinued lying nnder the tree for several minutes after the order was 
 received. But this man Dyer pretended to have seen him come out from 
 around the corner of his tent with Captain Pope. But to crown all, 
 he swears that he went back with Captain Pope, and went direct to Gen- 
 eral Pope's headquarters. Well, how was that '? Captain Pope testified 
 that it was about 8 o'clock when he reached the scene of headquarters 
 on his retiu^n, and he was confused at so many camp-fires ; he could not 
 tell General Pope's headquarters from those of anybody else, and he 
 had to go to General McDowell's headquarters to inquire which General 
 Pope's headquarters were. But this witness says they got there before 
 dark, and saw no camp-fires, and did not go to McDowell but went 
 straight to Pope. Now, we are known by the company we keep, and 
 when yoVi find these three witnesses now brought, thus standing together, 
 Douglass Pope, Dufifee, and Dyer, what remains to sustain the ground 
 of this prosecution on their evidence and accusation f It seems to me 
 tliat they all tumble out of the case together. 
 
 But there is another new and startling piece of evidence which 
 demonstrates that the 4.30 p. m. order was not received by Porter until 
 sunset. At page 810 of the new testimony, there is a fatal piece of 
 
74 
 
 evidence — two of tliem — and tlie Eecorder must have been slumbering 
 ^vlien be failed to recollect tbem. Tbe necessary part of the case of the 
 prosecution is that this 4.30 p. m. order was received at 5 or 5.30 
 o'clock, in time for General Porter to have made an attack before 
 dark. But here is a dispatch which General Porter wrote at 6 p. m., 
 Avhich absolutely negatives, in everj' line of it, all possible idea of his 
 having- received this order to attack, not only from the fact that he says 
 he has no cavalry — and Captain Pope brought him some orderlies as now 
 appears, left three with him — but the whole tenor of the dispatch shows 
 that he had heard nothing from McDowell or Pope for a long time, and 
 did not know what the situation was. Let me read this dispatch : 
 
 Failed in getting Morell over to you. After wandering about tlie woods for a time, 
 I withdrew him, and while doing so artillery opened on ns. My scouts could not get 
 through. Each one found the enemy betAveen us, and I lielieve some have been cap- 
 tured. Infantry are also in front. I am trying to get a battery, but have not suc- 
 ceeded as yet. From the masses of dust on our left, and from rejjorts of scouts, think 
 the enemy are moving largely in that way. Please communicate the way this mes 
 senger came. I have no cavalry or messengers now. Please let me know your de- 
 signs; whether you retire or not. I cannot get water, and am out of provisions. Have 
 lost a few men from infantry liring. 
 
 Aug. '^9 — 6 ]). m. 
 
 F. J. PORTER, 
 
 J/«/. Gcii. Vo s. 
 
 Xow, when he wrote that dispatch at p. m., had he yet received the 
 4.30 p. m. order? That is impossible. 
 
 Another thing I must refer to in order to refute the suggestions made 
 about this. He says : " I have no cavalry or messengers." Where was he 
 when he wrote that ? He was at his headquarters at Bethlehem Church. 
 "0,"says the Eecorder, "he had cavalry." Yes; there were cavalry 
 up by Morell, because, shortly afterward, not getting any cavalry from 
 McDowell under this message, he sends to Morell for some cavalry. 
 The meaning is, not to deny that he had cavalry up at the other end of 
 his hue, but none at his headquarters. And that leads me to this — in 
 this place I may as well say it as in any other — that as to the alleged 
 variations and inconsistencies in the various statements of General Por- 
 ter, and particularly in his opening statement before this Board, there 
 are just exactly two. And the AAonder to me always has been, and the 
 wonder to me when General Porter's opening statement was prepared 
 was, that it was possible, or could be possible, to make a statement in 
 which there should be so few omissions or failures of memory as com- 
 pared with the facts which now appear demonstrated here. There are 
 two. One is a diflerence of recollection between him and Sturgis, 
 "whether he knew of the presence of General Sturgis, and ordered him 
 back to Manassas with his 840 men on that day. There is a direct dif- 
 ference of recollection between them, and, judging it by the ordinary 
 laws-of evidence, it looks to me as if Sturgis's recollection Avas the bet- 
 ter. But I am tbrowu into confitsion u2>on that when I refer to Porter's 
 examination ujKm the McDowell court of inquiry in January, 18G3, when 
 he testified that he knew nothing of the movenunits of Sturgis on that 
 day. The other lailui-e of menuuy which the Eecorder regards as so 
 destructive to General Porter is in this matter of forgetting that he had 
 some cavalry with IMoiell that day, a part of a Pennsyhania troop — a 
 ti'oop that Morell, to whom the commander says he was to report, but 
 don't recollect rei)orting, and Locke and jVIartin, who Avere in the front, 
 did not see or huxe any knowledge of. 
 
 So if tlie testimony of those cavalrymen is to be taken, that must stand 
 confessed, that failure of memory. But it does not in the least affect the 
 
75 
 
 merits of this case, nor in respect to any material point the deductions 
 that are necessarily to be drawn. 
 
 That ends what I have to say upon the 4.30 p. m. order, because I 
 assume it to be demonstrated that not being received till sunset, it was 
 then too late to make the attack which was directed by it. That Porter, 
 acting' upon the natural impulse of a loyal and devoted soldier, receiving- 
 such an order as that from his chief— that his first imimlse was to carry 
 it out, is manifest. What did he do ? Did he, as was pretended by the 
 Judge-Advocate, and I think is still insisted by the Kecorder, send an 
 order to move forward two regiments suj)ported by two more ? No. It 
 appears now clearly proved ui)on the record, that that had all been 
 already done ujjon some previous but false report that the enemy before 
 him were retreating. But he sent an immediate order to General Morell 
 to make an attack with his whole force, and he followed it up in i^erson 
 instantly to the front, and with such speed that he was guilty of a pos- 
 sible omission which has been charged upon him as an act of criminal 
 neglect. What was that "^ Why, that Sykes being with him at head- 
 quarters, he hurried forward to the front, where Morell was ready to 
 begin an attack, in such haste that he omitted to tell Sykes of the re- 
 ceipt of the order. To my mind, that is onlj^ clear proof of Porter's zeal 
 to carry out the order. He found that he had been under a misappre- 
 hension about the withdrawal of the forces behind Bull Eun, indicated 
 by his dispatches shortly before. He found that General Pope now was 
 insisting that he should make an immediate attack, and he hastens for- 
 ward. What is in his mind is to carry out that order. He first sends 
 Locke ahead with his order to make an immediate attack with his whole 
 force. He goes to the front, and if it is true, if Sykes' memory is not at 
 fault on this point, he went forward without ordering Sykes or com- 
 municating the order to him. If I understand the military maneuver- 
 ing the order was properly to be given as it was given to IVIorell to make 
 the attack. Sykes, with his division, was right behind, ready to be 
 brought \i]) in instant support. He w^as in immediate contact. Now, 
 what is all his parade of rhetoric and of assertion about this failure to 
 exhibit this order to Sykes ? It oidy shows the instant zeal with which 
 Porter sprang to obey that order. Then what happened ? He got to 
 the front ; he found Morell about ready to obey that order, and dark- 
 ness was already upon them. I accept the military authority that has 
 been brought into the case, to the effect that it was imiiracticable then 
 to make an attack. General McDowell said on the former trial that he 
 might have made an attack within an hour after receiving the order. 
 He confessed, on the present examination, that he knew he w^as wrong- 
 about this, confessed that Porter's position was in fact not so fiir ad- 
 vanced as he had supposed; he will not say exactly how mach, but it 
 would have taken much longer to make the attack here ordered than he 
 had ]>reviously supposed. Colonel Smith, who before testified, to the 
 destruction of General Porter, that that attack might have been made 
 within an hour, concurring in the opinion then given by McDowell, now 
 comes and frankly states that it would have taken not less than two 
 hours. Suppose it to have been in the neighborhood of seven o'clock, 
 already nearly dark, when Porter got to the front, could he but concur 
 with the conclusion of his skillful subordinate, Morell, that it was too 
 late — two hours, nine o'clock — to complete the movement and i)ush for- 
 ward into contact with the enemy f I suppose it is a military absurdity 
 to pretend that. So I leave that branch of the case. 
 
76 
 
 VIOLATION QF THE 52d ARTICLE OF AVAE. 
 
 Now ill respect to those more grievous charges, as they seem to me to 
 be. Having- acquitted Geiieial Porter of all that can possibly be charged 
 against him under the head of disobedience, now comes the question of 
 Avhether he was guilty of the frightful crimes charged upon him in the 
 specifications under the second charge, imputing to him shameful treach- 
 ery and misconduct in the face of the enemy, running away when he 
 knew that a battle was raging on his right, in which the rest of the 
 forces were engaged, by which even the capital of the country itself was 
 involved in danger, and moving off without the least effort, or lying- 
 still upon his arms all day without the least effort tor assist. You will 
 observe that all this has practically been disposed of in our discussion 
 of the previous question under the joint order, if there was no retreat. 
 The whole pretense of a retreat was based upon the dispatch to Mc- 
 Dowell and King, that, as the sound of battle seemed to retire, indicat- 
 ing to him that the main part of our forces were withdrawing behind 
 Bull Itun, as the joint order had contemplated the necessity of doing-, 
 he had made up his mind to retire also. I never have been able to dis- 
 cover any just ground of complaint as to that suggestion of his. If the 
 ^circumstances were what he supposed, and what the dispatch shows he 
 supposed, it was not acted upon ; there was no movement whatever such 
 as the dispatch contemplated; there was no retreat. The substance of 
 the information upon which he had written that dispatch was immedi- 
 ately contradicted, and he moved forward and dh-ected an advance in- 
 stead of a retreat. But under the application of the joint order, under 
 General Pope's reiterated injunction in that order that it might be 
 necessary, and that it probably would be necessary, for all of that army 
 to fall back behind Bull Eun that night, and under no circumstances to 
 get into any position by which they could not foil behind Bull Bun that 
 night, if at three or four or five o'clock in the afternoon he became sat- 
 isfied from the sound of battle, as this dispatch shows he did, that the 
 rest of the army was falling behind Bull Bun, what ought he to have 
 done? Ought he to have left his little band of 9,000 or 10,000 men ex- 
 posed to the whole rebel army of now 50,000 instead of 25,000, and he 
 the only outpost and wholly unsupported I AVell, I know nothing of 
 soldiery, but it does seem to me to be the obvious dictate of common 
 sense that, if that was his belief, the i)urpose of following the rest of 
 the army beliind ]>ull Run, as indicated in this message to McDowell 
 and King, was not only eminently proi)er, but under the circumstances 
 was absolutely necessary ; and when that information is contradicted, 
 then you find that the first tiling he does is to move forward. 
 
 As to the numbers of the respective armies that day, 1 do not propose 
 to afflict you with any further discussion. I have taken it for granted 
 that, from all the statements that have been made up to this time. Por- 
 ter's force consisted of 10,000 men; that is the proof upon which he was 
 tried before ; that is the theory ui)on which this case has been tried 
 throughout, until the day before yesterday, when the Becorder, upon 
 what Ave regard as mistaken and fictitious methods, figured it at 12,000 
 or 15,000. I'ope tliought it was 12,000, but the actual figures show 
 10,000. ]S"either do I know or care what the exact number was of the 
 rebel forces opposed to him on Dawkins' Branch, or between there and 
 tlie pike; they were all in reporting distance of each other. It was one 
 united force, and an attack by him iii)on that force at any time after 
 McDowell left him would have brought down togetlier, concentrated 
 upon any jiart of that ground, the whole of Lee's and Longstreet's force. 
 
77 
 
 And what had he reason to believe they were? He and McDoAvell 
 agree, upon the testimony as it now stands upon the record, tliat they 
 knew there were at least 14,100 who must have got there before they 
 did, and they took it for granted that the rest were coming. 
 
 Kow, what is the nature of the question under this specification ? AYe 
 have got the question of disobedience out of the way. That is all gone. 
 I assume that we have made a complete case in answer to the charge of 
 disobedience. The question on this part of the case then is, the retreat 
 being out of the way, whether it was his duty to make an attack between 
 the time of McDoAvell's departure, taking King with him, and the receipt 
 of the 1.30 p. m. order. Now, I am perhai)s not capable of discussing 
 the military principles that must govern such a question ; but I can state 
 upon the one side the theory ui)on which he was found guilty because 
 he did not attack, and I can state, upon the other, the facts as they now 
 stand, and I think you will ag.ree that, if those facts as they have now 
 been proved had been before tliat court-martial, there never w<mld have 
 been the least idea of convicting him. In the first place, we liave the 
 fact of the actnal force that he had ; and, substantially, there is no dif- 
 ference between the former trial and this in respect to that. King and 
 Eicketts having been withdrawn from him, he was left with, say, in 
 round numbers, 10,000 men. The Kecorder pretends, by a novel method 
 of reckoning, that he had 33,000 men. The triumph of the science of 
 mathematics is here well illustrated. He had his own 13,000 (magnify- 
 ing this 10,000 to 13,000) ; then he had King's and Eicketts' 17,000 ; 
 then he had Banks' 10,000 — 10,000 ; a great many more than I supposed. 
 Forty thousand men, so says the learned Eecorder, and that he ought 
 to have made an attack. Well, yes ; if he had 10,000 men, I agree that 
 he ought to have n\ade an attack. But, when it is necessary for the 
 Eecorder at this late day to resort to such marvelous calculations, is it 
 not a pretty clear abandonment of the case as it always stood before 
 and as we think it stands now. Why bring into this case all this rub- 
 bish about Banks ? Was Banks under the command of Porter ! Why 
 didn't Pope, anxious as he was to have Porter's conviction stand in 
 former years, make that suggestion ! Why didn't the Judge-Advocate- 
 General, reciting to the President all the evidence there was against 
 Porter, say anytljing about Banks ? That is the triumph of the Eecord- 
 er's ingenuity ; that is a new invention, and, I think, a weak invention 
 of the enemy. General Banks (says the Eecorder) was at Bristoe or 
 Kettle Eun. There has been a quite a deal of dispute -and discussion, 
 raised by him upon the evidence of Professor Andrews, and of his sui>e- 
 rior ofiicer. General Gordon, as to the precise point where Banks was, 
 whether at Bristoe or at Kettle Eun. I don't know where he was. The 
 Eecorder says it is quite manifest that it was not Porter's force, but it 
 was a brigade of observation from Banks' force, sent out half a mile or a 
 mile from Bristoe, that caused the transportation of Wilcox's force over 
 to their right wing in the afternoon of the 29th. But is it not too ob- 
 vious for dispute that it was some movement of Porter's 10,000 men 
 close upon the enemy, so close that Longstreet wonld not let Lee attack, 
 although Lee wanted to attack, that dictated to them that precautionary 
 transfer of Wilcox ? If that was not sufficient cause for transferring 
 Wilcox over there with his three brigades, how was the advance of a 
 single brigade of observation, away down within a mile of Bristoe, cause 
 for the transfer of Wilcox "i The Eecorder say the enemy in that move- 
 ment was waiting for something to turn uj). Well, sometliing- had al- 
 ready turned up. Porter had turned up, and was there with his 10,000 
 men close upon them. It was undoubtedly some threatening movement 
 
78 
 
 upon Moreir.s part ; something done, or apparently threatened to be 
 done, that called for that transfer. So I do not think it worth while to 
 discnss that qnestion any more. 
 
 The character of the position at Dawkins' Branch, held by Porter for 
 offence and defense, is proved by the maps and snrvejs, and the testi- 
 mony of Warren, of ^Nforell, of Sykes, and others. Did the former conrt- 
 martial nnderstand that? The maps that were before them show that 
 they did not. For all that they knew, Porter, Avherever he was, had 
 nothing bnt the clear open conntry before him, withont a single rebel 
 soldier intervening between him and Jackson's right wing. On their 
 theory, an atta<;k was jnst as practicable as it is u])on the Eecorder's 
 theory, as ovideiicetl hj the map which I have been enabled to incorpo- 
 rate into my argnment, becanse there was nothing to prevent his attack- 
 ing. 'Sow, here is this new fact of the introdnction of anywhere from 
 14,000 to 2."),000 men absolntel}' commanding and closing the way. They 
 ontflanked him on his left and they ontflanked him on the right, clear 
 away to the Warrenton tnrnpike. Xow, where is the soldier — we chal- 
 lenge him to come forward — who will say that, nnder these circnm stances, 
 (General Porter ought to have made an attack! General Pope does not 
 dare say so. If he could have said that, he would have been here to 
 say it ; he would not have waited for any subpcena ; if he, as a soldier, 
 could have demonstrated to you, as soldiers, that Porter, in that situa- 
 tion, ought to have attacked, he would have come, because he is anxious 
 to support this prosecution, and keep General Porter under this brand of 
 infamy which he has laid upon his head. No ; I don't believe there is a 
 soldier in this or any other country who dares to come and say hat 
 Porter, under those circumstances, should have made an attack. 
 
 Then what else is there ? There is the difference of position. I speak 
 not now of the ignorance of the court-martial of the ground which has 
 been so clearly laid down before this Board. I speak now of the con- 
 fessed difference as to I^orter's position, the relative position of Porter 
 to the right wing of the rebel army as it was then believed to be and as 
 it is now demonstrated to have been. It is involved in the question of 
 the then su^iposed absence of the Confederate force which we now know, 
 and was then by Porter asserted, assuredly to have been i>resent be- 
 tween Jackson and l*orter. They thought, and all thought apparently — 
 McDowell certainly thought — that Porter was much nearer the Warren- 
 ton turnpike than he was. They all thought that Porter had reached 
 the second run that crossed the Manassas and Gainesville road, one 
 mile in advance of where he was. The ma])s show it. The sworn state- 
 ments show it. And then they thought that he was behind the right 
 wing of the rebel army, and very near to it; that there was nothing there 
 but Jackson's force, as has been demonstrate<l to you over and over 
 again — nothing there but Jackson, and that there was no jtretense of 
 execution on Porter's part of his recognized duty, the situation being 
 what they supposed it was, of going in, orders or no orders, and attack- 
 ing the right tiank and rear of Jackson's force. 
 
 WAS A BATTLE " RAGIN(^ " ALL DAY? 
 
 There was another thing. The court-martial believed, and it was so 
 sworn, that there was a battle raging all day in his plain sight and hearing- 
 Well, was there ! You all know about tliat now. The Pecorder called 
 a host of witnesses to prove that there was a battle. It has enabled us 
 to develo]) exactly the situation. There was not a battle laging with 
 continuous fury from daylight until dark, as Pope, in his dispatch of the 
 
7y 
 
 next moruiug, asserted. There was a series of successive spurts, as 
 Heintzelmau said; there were skirmishes all along the line from just 
 below the Warrenton pike up to Sudley Springs and Sudley Church. 
 Was there no battle 1 Why, yes ; there were lots of them. Every regi- 
 ment, apparently, and every brigade, had a battle of its own. But they 
 were no more connected than if one had been in Maine and another in 
 Florida, and the rest in interlying States. There was no support of one 
 attack by another attack. Let me read what General Schurz said upon 
 that subject. He was there ; he was engaged in it. Heintzelmau says 
 there were successive spiu-ts. General Schurz says : 
 
 If all those forces, instead of being frittered aicay in inaolated efforts, liad co-operatod 
 with each other at any one moment after a common plan, the result of the day would 
 have been far greater than the mere retaking and occupation of the gnniud we had 
 already taken and occupied in the morning, and which, in the afternoon, was for a 
 short time at least lost again. 
 
 We have prepared, and will give you, a synopsis in i^rint of what 
 these successive spurts were, where they were, and when they took 
 place. It demonstrates that there was no continuous battle, and they 
 account for the fact that General Porter, who, you will remember, was 
 left alone, without a word from General Pope, all this time, ne^'er heard 
 anything but artillery firing. The Eecorder says, "O, yes, he did." 
 General Marshall, in charge of his skirmish-line, makes very strong 
 statements of seeing from that skirmish-line, on the other side of Daw- 
 kins' Branch, the rebel army and Pope's army in fight, moving back- 
 wards and forwards, heard their yells, and that there was no man in our 
 force who did not feel assured that Pope's army was being driven from 
 the field. General Marshall stated that. I have no doubt that, so far 
 as he was concerned, it was entirely true. There is not the least evi- 
 dence that he made any such statement to General Porter. But what 
 was it ? He does not fix the time on his first examination ; but on this 
 new trial he does. What was it ? What conflict was there that day 
 that answered all these conditions that could possibly be seen from any 
 ground in the neighborhood of Dawlcins' Branch ? It was the fight be- 
 tween King's division and Hood, when King was thrust down on the 
 turnpike just at dusk. There is not any other fight that day, on that 
 field, that could possibly have been seen or heard from that part of the 
 country, that coidd answer the conditions described by General Mar- 
 shall, and that does answer exactly to them. Mr. Maltby tells me, 
 from a very caretul inspection of the record, that, until that fight with 
 King's division, on no part of the line was there, at any time, a larger 
 force than eight regiments concerned in any one of these skirmishes or 
 conflicts. There was a great deal of slaughter, undoubtedly. What 
 principle it was conducted ui)on no historian has ever yet stated. We 
 have a promised history of Colonel Smith's, which may probably explain 
 it, but tliere never yet has been any explanation of that method of war- 
 fare. Well, I have one which I will give you presently. I think it was 
 conducted upon the general laws of war as laid down by General Pope 
 when he took command of the army ; upon the principles of attacking 
 whenever you see anybody to attack, without regard to the circum- 
 stances or the consequences, exactly according to the military code of 
 the Irishman at Donnybrook fair. 
 
 But, now, what is the real fact as to its being a continuous battle, 
 within sight and hearing of General Porter, and raging all day 'I We 
 have ])roduced the evidence of every man in his division who is worth 
 believing that until General Marshall saw the fight between Hood and 
 King thev saw nothing. Thev heard onlv artillerv firing. And there 
 
80 
 
 Tvas General Porter awaiting ne\A'S from Pope and McDowell. The news 
 from McDowell that lie got, said that all went well with him towards Bull 
 Rnn. It didn't go well anywhere else. I suppose that what Porter 
 thought was that McDowell had got in there and formed a connection. 
 The evidence shows that King, or rather Hatch (as King was absent), 
 marched uj) the Sudley Spring road, going to and fro on contradictory 
 orders from Pope and McDowell, and that he did not get into any 
 action until this disastrous run on the pike, when he Avas rushed down 
 through all the other forces at about sunset or after. I suppose that 
 a corps commander, as I have had occasion to say on this subject, is 
 bound to take notice of the situation, and if he was aware of circum- 
 stances and facts wholly unknown to his commanding general at the 
 other end of the line, he was bound to act upon what he saw before 
 him, was he not ? Now, was there any time that day when he ought 
 properly to have attacked, and when it Mould not, on the contrary, 
 luiAe been a fatal and stupid blunder, for Avhich he would liave been 
 grossly culi)able, and chargeable witli all the destruction of life that 
 would have been occasioned, if he had nmde an attack — was tliere any- 
 thing known to him that would have justified the saciitice of his 
 corps by an attack that day? We know noAV that if he had sacriJiced 
 liis wliole cor]»s by the blunder of an attack, it would not have afforded 
 any relief to l*ope\s army. There is a demonstration of this, as it seems 
 to me, in this case that the whole Avorld Avould l)e content with, in con- 
 firmation of Longstreet's testimony, tliat it was Porter's presence there 
 tliat prevented an attack by Lee that day. 'And what is the demon- 
 stration ? AVhat happened next day Avh en Porter Avas withdrawn by 
 the orders of ( Jeneral Poi)e from this i)osition t What is the evidence f 
 Wliat is the irresistible conclusion from the proofs as to Avhat hapi>ened 
 on the 30th ? Why, that it was oidy l\>rter holding on to Avhere he 
 Avas against every threat and cA'ery doubt that pievented on the 2!)tli 
 the slaughter that Avas consummated on the .'30th. AVhat could haA^e 
 justified Porter in AvithdraAA'ing his force from there on the morning of 
 the 30tli but the i)ositiA'e orders of General Poi)e, who still remained, or 
 claimed to liaAn* remained, in absolute ignorance of the inter\ening sit- 
 uation. 
 
 liemember that day of ihe 30th. Wlien General Pope withdrew Gen- 
 eial Porter's force and brought it up witli him to Groveton, lie could not 
 belieA'e, Peynold's and Porter together coukl not couAince him, that the 
 rebel army, under Lee and Longstreet, Avas there. Had not he said in 
 his disi»atch of tlie previous day tliat they were coining at such a rate 
 as would bring them in by the night ol' the 30tli or the 3lst ? No, he 
 could not believe that the Avhole rebel army Avas then already there. 
 He said they Avere in full retreat even then, that morning of tiie 30th. 
 He launched his army upon them sup])osing that they Avere in full re- 
 treat, Avhen they Avere there in that fortress, that im])iegnable fortress, 
 ui)on the Independent railroad cut, and thence stretching away upon 
 these heighfs (h>wn to the situation Avhere Porter had left them that morn- 
 ing. Well, y(m know what slaughter took place on the 30th. Y(m knoAV 
 it Avas Avhen Porter Avas AvithdraAvn from the i)c>sition which on his judji- 
 ment he had maintained the day before. It seems to me that the truth 
 as to the situation of the 20th, and the ]no])iiefy of Porter's conduct (m the 
 20tli, are demonstrated by Avhat ajijieared to folloAv on the .{Otli, Avhen, 
 contrary to his own judgment, he Avas AvifhdraAvn from this fortified po- 
 sition on Dawkins' Branch, Avhich had up till that time hehl the main 
 force of the rebel army in check, and the Avhole Federal force Avas hud- 
 dled together on the inside of the circle in front of the Independent 
 
81 
 
 railroad cut, aiul upon the successive heights, beginning Avith Douglas 
 height aud extending down to the Manassas and Gainesville road, all 
 along which the rebel army was intrenched. 
 
 At this point, if the Board please, let me call your attention specially 
 to two maps, one called Map No. 4, showing what we claim to be the 
 positions of the respective forces during this time which is covered by 
 these general specifications, under the second charge, and irrespective of 
 any specific order to attack, showing what w^e now know to have been 
 the situation, and Avhat General Porter then substantially believed to be 
 the situation. That map has been criticised, and unjust reflections cast 
 upon Captain Judson in regard to it. So I will beg leave to state the 
 facts in regard to it. The map itself is one of the Government maps 
 made for this case, made by (reneral Warren and by Captain Judson — 
 the great map from which tliis is reduced. When the evidence was all in 
 substantially — the evidence of those positions especially upon which we 
 rely, we desired General Porter to have a map, that soldiers would under- 
 stand, prepared, <lepicting the respective positions of the ( 'Onfederate 
 and Federal forces, from O o'clock until 12 on the 20th. Cai)tain Judson 
 was employed by him personally, at his own expense, outside of his offi- 
 cial time — that is, not involving his oflicial time — to do what ? To make 
 these positions f No. Simply to project them upon the map as given to 
 him from the evidence. General Porter and his conn sel , from the evidence, 
 defined the positions, and we believe and are certain that they will be sus- 
 tained by all the evidence in the case that is worth considering. What 
 Captain Judson did in that matter I cannot see the least imin-opriety in 
 his doing, any more than if our learne<l friend, the Eecorder, is employed, 
 as I hope he often is, to try and argiie cases at private expense for some 
 party when the Government does not require his services. There is no 
 time now to discuss these positions. Whether they are right or not this 
 Board will have to determine. The only point of conflict appears to be in 
 respect to these movements sworn to by Sigel and Schenck in the neigh- 
 borhood of the W^arrenton pike, which took place on the noon and after- 
 noon of the 29th. We believe these positions fixed upon this map to be 
 true, although they refer you not to the original, but to the altered time 
 of the movements, as stated by Sigel and by Schenck. [This map has 
 already been referred to as Map J).] 
 
 Sigel alters his testimony from his first statement. If you look at his 
 second statement, you will find that it substantially accords with these 
 positions. If you will take the time stated in Heintzelman's diary for 
 the movement by Reno, and then take the testimony of the only man 
 from Eeno's force who has been examined, the only man of substance, 
 Stevens, and then take Benjamin's testimony, and that of General 
 Reynohls, as it stands in the old record, you will find that they all fully 
 substantiate the testimony of the Confederate generals, and accord with 
 these positions. But, in the view we take, it matters very little for the 
 purpose of these general charges that I am now considering exactly 
 where the force of Longstreet was, if only it was in such a position that 
 it could and did command these heights on the other side of Dawkius' 
 Branch, and could reach them before General Porter could. And to 
 accomi)any the map just produced, I otter another map prepared in 
 the same way, showing what happened on the 30th, and I believe that 
 is the last map that I shall ask to have incorporated in my argument. 
 This probably puts to the test the wisdom of Porter's course on the day 
 before. (Map shown to the Board.) TJiere (on Map No. 4, Map I)) 
 are the forces as they were substantially from twelve to six on the 29th. 
 
82 
 
 How is it possible tliat, with Porter's force where it is thus shown to 
 have been, this Federal force under Pope could be destroyed? 
 
 Here on Map No. 6, of the 30th, is the situation when, by Pope's or- 
 ders, General Porter was drawn over into the very center of the circle 
 formed by the Confederates, whereby the Confederates were enabled to 
 advance unobstructed to their final positions as here shown and surround 
 and slaugliter our forces as they did upon the 30th. 
 
 I suppose that this Board can never forget the touching testimony 
 of General Warren as to the complete and hopeless slaughter of his 
 entire force, wlien this position as depicted on this maj) was consum- 
 mated. 
 
 That event came about by an abandonment of what General Porter 
 had deemed a wise position, and had maintained against all hazards and 
 doubts tlie previous day. [This map of the position on the 30th will be 
 found in the Appendix as Map H.] 
 
 DISPATCHES OF THE 29TH. 
 
 Now, if the Board please, the Eecorder has had a great deal to say in 
 respect to the dispatches that passed between General Morell on the 
 20th and General Porter. I do not propose to weary the Board with a 
 reconsideration of these. That has been done in the statement pre- 
 sented by Mr. Bullitt, and most carefully perfected by him. 
 
 Tliese dispatches sliow no inconsistency ; they fully explain the much 
 complained of message to McDowell and King, on the strength of which 
 Porter was convicted of retreating. Now there are some things to be 
 said in regard to these dispatches. General Porter remained at the 
 front after McDowell left him. McDowell did not go until somewhere be- 
 tween twelve and one o'clock ; that is certain. Porter remained a long 
 time after that at the front, and came to the rear, and established his 
 headquarters at Bethlehem church, somewhere from two to three o'clock, 
 probably at three o'clock. These written dispatches between him and 
 Morell must have begun about that hour. I do not suppose there was 
 any need of written dispatches when both were at the front. It is not 
 likely that we have all the dispatches. If we could have all that Gen- 
 eral Porter wrote that day, if none were withheld from us by the pros- 
 ecution, there would not ba a single circumstance in all the details of 
 that afternoon left unexplained. If we could have the dispatch that 
 General J*orter sent to General Pope by AVeld ; if we could have the 
 other <lispatch that he sent to General Pope in answer to the 4.30 \). m. 
 order, that came by Douglass Pope, explaining the situation then in re- 
 gard to the force in front of him, in regard to the time, showing the ex- 
 act time when that was received, we should have everything. But it 
 does seem to me that those disi)atclies now before you tell sul)stantially 
 the whole story, an<l make out a perfect case, under all the charges, 
 in respect to the conduct of General Porter on the 20th. 
 
 The Recorder, for some reason or other, has seen fit to say that Por- 
 ter's headquarters were two and five-eiglitlis miles from the head of his 
 column. Well, if it were so, I don't know that there would be anything 
 wrong, if his column were two and flA'c-eighths miles long: but unfor- 
 tunately for the statement his column was only a mile and three-quar- 
 ters ; IVIorell at one end of it, and he at the other. I think you will find 
 it admitted by Judge- Advocate Holt, on his written argument, that 
 Sykes, who was Avith Porter at his headquarters, was in the pro])er place. 
 1 sui)pose that is an admission that General Porter was in his i)roper 
 place, where he could not only command his whole force in front of him — 
 
83 
 
 wiiere lie could cominaud his own force, and get the i)ronii)test intelli- 
 gence of everything that was going on in front, and at the same time he 
 in a situation to communicate with Generals IMcDowell and Pope, and 
 to receive the messages that General Pope did not send him. General 
 Lee, it seems, had his headquarters in the rear of his force, on. the 20th 
 and 30th. General Po])e started out in the morning, with his headquar- 
 ters at Centreville, eight or ten miles away, and did not come on the 
 lield until after one o'clock, and then he established his headquarters a 
 little farther from his foremost force than General Porter was from his. 
 General Pope said that he was in the presence of the enemy when he 
 was at Centreville, so that I do not think there is any difficulty in this 
 matter of the distance of General Porter's headquarters from his front. 
 
 VALUE OF GOVERNMENT TESTOIONY — GENERAL M'DOWELL. 
 
 The whole case, so far as the facts go, has now been completely dis- 
 ])Osed of. There is not a rag left of the government case against General 
 Porter; and yet there is something that remains. There are the opinions 
 of two witnesses, Avho, if their opinions were entitled in this particular 
 case to weight, ought to receive great consideration. Those are the 
 opinions of Generals McDowell and Pope. What I proi^ose further to 
 say in respect to them, to complete this review of the affairs of the 29th, 
 is, that General McDowell and General Pope have placed themselves in 
 such a position before this Board, that you must utterly reject their 
 opinions when given adversely to General Porter. 
 
 About General McDowell enough doubtless has already l)een said. 
 The fatal mistake that he made on the former trial, or that he alleged 
 was made, was in allowing his testimony as to what lie said to Porter to 
 be construed into an order to make an immediate attack with Porter's 
 whole force on the right flank and rear of the enemy in front of him. He 
 claimed this time, and said, that he didn't mean any such thing ; he didn't 
 mean that General Porter should have done anything more than we have 
 fully proved that he did do. Well, I think that should have removed 
 General McDowell's evidence, and the weight of his opinion, if there 
 is a shred of his opinion still left in the case, should have removed it all. 
 But I must call attention to two or three circumstances in respect to 
 (xeneral McDowell which would wipe out, as it seems to me, from the 
 case, the weight of his opinions, because of bias and hostility from some 
 cause, I don't know what, to General Porter. Let us see. In 1870, I 
 think it was, he, in answer to the petition or application of General 
 Porter to the President of the United States for a reopening of his case, 
 prepared for circulation and distributed certain evidence, as he called it, 
 to counteract that claim. What Avas it ? It was an account by General 
 Jackson of the battle of the 30th, but purporting to be of the battle of 
 the 20th. With what object ? To show that General Porter must have 
 known that there was a tierce contest going on between the Federal 
 troops and the Confederate troops at Groveton. Well, it now so hap- 
 ])eiied that that account of General Jackson related not to the 20th, but 
 on its face related to, and purported to relate to, the 30th. And the 
 worst part of it was, that the ferocious Federal onsets referred to by 
 Jackson, which were intended to be a demonstration of Porter's knowl- 
 edge on the 20th, from his distant position at Dawkins' Branch, that 
 there was a furious battle raging, were Porter's own tighting of the 30th. 
 It was his impetuous attack ; it was his brave troops of the Fifth Army 
 Corps on the 30th that made such a demonstration — such onslaughts, 
 such irresistible attacks upon Jackson's front, that he was comi)elled to 
 7 CH 
 
84 
 
 call for reiiiforceiuents, and that was jiut forth to the public as a demon- 
 stration tliat Porter, in his distant position on the day before, must have 
 known that that very state of things was going on then, and thus to 
 find cause to condemn his inaction on the 20th, the day before. 
 
 Well, the question is as to General ^McDowell's purpose in this. I am 
 going to read to you Jackson's account of what then happened on the 
 .'30th, because, with that niaj) of tlie 30th before you, it can be more easily 
 followed. You know what took i)lace, and you know who did the great 
 deeds of tliat day. As C^eneral McDowell now admits, it was General 
 Porter and his troops that bore the brunt of that fight. Xow, the ques- 
 tion is whetlier General ]M<-Dowe]l, who was charged Avith the superin- 
 tendence of that whole work of the 30th — who was charged with the 
 whole business of the pursuit — in tlie first iilace, whether he ever read 
 this, which 1 hope he never <lid ; and if he did read it, whether he could 
 for a nuunent have remained of the impivssion that it referred to the 
 29th. This is Jackson's account of that fight, and you will see that 
 nothing ajtproaching this or anytlung like it happened on the 29th : 
 
 Aftor sojiif* desultory skirmisliiug and heavy cannonading during the day, the Fed- 
 eral infantry, about four o'clock in the evening, moved I'rom under cover of the wood, 
 and advanced in several lines, iirst engaging the right, hut soon extending its attack 
 to the center and left. In a few niouiciits our entire line was engaged in a iierce and 
 sanguinary struggle with the eneiny. As one line Avas repulsed another took its place, 
 and pressed forward as if deterniiued, by force of nunilters and fury of assault, to drive 
 us from our {lositiou. So impetuous and well maintained were these onsets as to in- 
 duce me to send to the commanding geueral for re-enf(ucements ; but the tin)ely and 
 gallant advance of General Longstreet, on the right, relieved my troops from the pres- 
 sure of overwhelming numbers, and gave to those brave men the chance of a more equal 
 conflict. As Longstreet pressed ujicm the right, the Federal advance was checked, 
 and soon a general advance of my wliole line was ordered. Eagerly and fiercely did 
 each brigade press forward, exhibiting in ])arts of the iield sceaes of close encounter 
 and nnirderous strife, not witnessed often in the turmoil of battle. The Federals gave 
 way before our troops, fell back in disorder, and fled precipitately, leaving their dead 
 and wounded on the field. During tlieir retreat the artillery opened witli destructive 
 power upon the fugitive masses. The infantry followed until darkness put an end to 
 the pursuit. 
 
 An exact description of the transaction of the 30th, of which General 
 Porter bore the brunt. Xow, is it possible for General ^McDowell, pro- 
 curing tliat, publishing it, putting a heading on it that it referred to the 
 transactions of the 29th, to have read it and not seen at once that it 
 referred not tf» the 29th, but to Porters fight, as we may well call it, of 
 the 30th ? I do not wish totiirow the least discredit upon any general ; 
 I am only speaking as I have a riglit to speak of Miiat stands recorded 
 here, and to sjteak of the weight to be given to General McDowell's 
 opinion, as adverse to General Porter's. If it liad stopped tliere it would 
 have been l»ad enough. Bat what more have we? Why, Avhen that 
 came out, Colonel Smith, who seems to be a deluded but a reasonably 
 truthful witness, at once ]»roteste«l that it was not true ; that that was 
 a mistake: that it referred not to the 29t]i, but to Porter's figlit of the 
 30th. Well, the question was raised, and it Itecame a i)ublic, bruited, 
 agitated question among military men. What hai»])ened .' That ques- 
 tion came to General McDowell's ears. What slumld have ha])pened? 
 I su}>i)ose fair ]»lay is a rule among soldiers as it is among civilians. 
 Here was this report gotten up by General .McDowell, circulated by him 
 for the iuiri>ose of thwarting i'orter's ajqilii-ation for a rehearing, which 
 necessarily must have been to his infinite damage and i)rejudice. The 
 question was publicly raised whether (Jeneral ^McDowell had not made 
 a mistake in his dates — Avliether he lia<l not erroneously ]»ublished the 
 events of the 30th as the events of the 29th. I should sui)pose that the 
 
85 
 
 first iiistiiK't of a soldier in such a case would have been to find out 
 whether he liad nuide a mistake or not. It would be the first impulse 
 of anybody outside of the Army, and it seems to me that it would be of 
 every man in the Army. AVell, now, what did General McDowell do? 
 Knowing- that the question was agitated, and that he was suspected of 
 having made this mistake, to the great damage of his brother soldier, 
 who was suffering under this undeserved ignominy, what did he do "? 
 He did nothing. He let it go uncorrected. Why I Now, do not let 
 me do him any injustice. Let me show you his own words. Why did 
 he let it go uncorrected ? I read from page 768 of the recoi'd : 
 
 Question. Now, wlieu this doubt was raised, whether it did, iu fact, refer to the 29th 
 or the 30th, did you take any paius to find out .' 
 
 Answer. I did u< it ; but the ' ' pains " were taken in that being sent on to Washington, 
 to see whetlier it was a correct extract, and tli(\v said it was. 
 
 Question. Did it occur to you then, that if this mistake had been made, and it, in 
 fact, referred to tlie 30th, and not to the 29th, an injustice had beeu done to General 
 Porter, which miglit be corrected then? 
 
 Answer. You must understand, that up to within a few minutes, I never knew what 
 I have since admitted to be the fact, that that statement did not i-efer to tlie 29th. 
 
 Question. lint when it did become a matter of question, whether it referred to the 
 29th or SOtli, you did not take any paius to find out which it did refer to? 
 
 Answer. Xo, sir. 
 
 Question. Did it occur to you, at that time, tliat if it was a mistake, an injustice 
 had been done to General Porter by that, which might, and should then be corrected, 
 at that time ? 
 
 Answer. No, it did not, because I did not thinJc it mi/ jn'ovincc to do it. 
 
 Not his province to correct an error which he himself had made to the 
 prejudice of another soldier, who was suffering under this ignominy ! It 
 cannot be that lie wants fair play for General Porter. It cannot be, 
 that any opinion that he expressed ought to be for one moment consid- 
 ered. There is one other little matter, in respect to General Mc- 
 Dowell, to which I call your attention in that same connection, although 
 it seems to me that what I have just shown is enough. That is fatal, 
 is it not, to the impartialityof any opinion of his involving the conduct 
 of General l*orter ? 
 
 GENERAL POPE'S J ESTIMONY. 
 
 Now I come to General Pope, wiiose opinion is so much relied upon 
 by the prosecution, and, in fact, his is now the only remaining opinion. 
 I supi»ose it may fairly be said to have been abandoned by his contempt- 
 uous refusal to come before this Board and supi^ort it. Put, under- 
 standing that it may be claimed differently, let us see how he stands. 
 It seems to me that there is exhibited upon this record a deadly hostility 
 on his part to General I'orter, and a confession by him of personal inter- 
 est in the question of Porter's guilt or innocence; and there is some- 
 thing more exhil>ited, if I understand the matter right. He has a most 
 peculiar congenital defect; I mean his way — constitutional with him 
 and peculiar to him — of looking at things and stating things; his method 
 of stating the truth, if that is the proper word. He will tell the biggest 
 kind of a "truth,'' that is out of all relations, not only with all truths 
 known to other people, but with his own truths as he has seen them and 
 stated them the day before. Now, if that be so, his opinion certainly 
 ought not to be regarded as of any great force. In respect to that, I 
 shall be under the necessity of calling your attention to oidy a few in- 
 stances. There is a disease called " color blindness/' when a man can- 
 not distinguish one color from another : when he will look at the red 
 diamonds of a colored window, and say that they are green, or at a yel- 
 
86 
 
 low light, and declare that is blue. It is no fault on his part. It is a 
 natural, inherent, constitutional defect. So it seems to me that there is 
 such a thing as 1>liudness to the truth, and inability to recognize the ex- 
 isting relations of things. That seems to be the infirmity of this general. 
 Let us see — he did declare, did he not, in the presence of General Eug- 
 gles, on the 2d of September, that he -was entirely satisfied with all of 
 General Porter's explanations in regard to these much-complained-of 
 matters. He met him cordially at Centreville, in the presence of the 
 ■witnesses, General Webb, and General Green, and General William F. 
 Smith. ]Srow, that would seem to be a pretty strong contradiction of all 
 his opinions and charges before. P)Ut, as to this natural infirmity of his, 
 I want to call the attention of the Board to certain written statements. 
 At page -!34 of the court-martial record is his account of the battle of 
 the 29th. I will only read one sentence. It was written on the morning 
 of the oUth, at 5 a.m.: 
 
 We fouj^lit .a terrific battle here yesterday with the combiued forces of the euciiiy, 
 which lasted with coiitimioiis fury from daylight until after dark, by Avhich time the 
 enemy was tbiven from the field, which we now occui)y. 
 
 If he did not know anything of the presence of Longstreet, it is a 
 very curious thing to find here a statement that he hatt been fighting 
 against the combined forces of the enemy; and if he knew that, as he 
 swore upon the court-martial, he came upon the field about twelve or 
 one, and i)ractically put a stoji to hostilities until about four, it is a A'ery 
 remarkabk' thing that on the next nu)rning he saw the truth to be in 
 this way : 
 
 We foii<;ht a terrific battle yesterday with the coinhbud fonc-s of the eucniy, which 
 lasted with continuous fury from (taylujltt tintil after dark. 
 
 Then, at 9 p. m. on that day he wrote another dispatch, which is con- 
 tained in General Porter's opening statement, at page 101. You know 
 the facts of the battle of the oOth, that it was brought on l)y an assault 
 which General Porter was directed under General ]McDowell to make, 
 and that the assault was directed upon the assurance that the enemy 
 were fiying and in full retreat. Well, they made an assault. They were 
 almost cut to i»ieces. Bh)od flowed like water. Tliousands of lirave 
 men perislied, and this is the account that General Pope gave of it that 
 same night, 9.15 p. m., from Centre ville: 
 
 We have had a terrific battle again to-day. The enemy, largely re-enforced, as 
 mulled our poHiiion earhj io-d(u/. We held our ground firmly until 6 "p. m., when the 
 enemy, massing A-eiy heavy forces on the left, forced back that wing aliout half a mile. 
 At dark we held that jiosition. Under all the circumstances, both horses and men 
 having been two days without food, and the enemy greatlyoutnnmbering us, I thought 
 it best to draw back to this place at dark. The nioveuielit has been made in i>erfect 
 order and without loss. The troops are in good heart, and marched off the field with- 
 out the least hurry or confusion. Their conduct uns rcri/Jiii). 
 
 Tltat refers to Porter's troops especially. 
 
 If'e have lo^t uothiur/, ucithcr yuiis ))or wagons. 
 
 Well, General Puggles, his aide-de-camp, who was reipiired to pen 
 this dispatch for hiiii, says, at the time it was written : 
 
 "General, I saw some guns lost, I saw some wagons lost. You are mistaken there, 
 are you not r' He said, "Well, write it. We have lost lu^thing, neither guns nor 
 v.agousi" 
 
 Then lie comes to Washington and is stung to madness by the tele- 
 grams upon which the Pecorder has relied so much, and that' madness, 
 as it seems to me, has continued until this day. 
 
 Kext 1 want to call your attention to his report of September 3, at 
 
87 
 
 page lllG of this record. That' is one of tliemost remarkable manifest- 
 ations of this pecuharity of General Pope that I have ever fonnd. We 
 know exactly now the orders that General Pope gave on the morning 
 of tlie 29tli. The history of this report is that it was Avritten for the 
 l)urpose of laying the fonndation for the prosecution of delinquent ofH- 
 cers, as claimed or stated in his report to the Committee on the Conduct 
 of the War. They Avanted the actual truth, and here he states it, as he 
 then sa:w it, speaking of what happened on the morning of the 29th. 
 You know Avhat the orders were then ? There was a written order to 
 Porter to march upon Centreville at daylight. Then a verbal message, 
 followed by a written order for him to march upon Gainesville, and then 
 the joint order. Xow, here is the way General Pope states it : 
 
 I also insfntcfed F. J. Poytcr, witli his own corps and Einr/\^ dhusion of McDovreVl'a covy>s, 
 which liad for some reason fallen back from the Wavreutou turnpike toward Manassas 
 Junction, 1o more at dai/Jif/lit in the inornini/ upon GaincuviUe along the Manassas Gap liail- 
 road, until they communicated closely with the force under Heintzelmau and Sigel, 
 cautioning them not to f/o further than was necessary to effect this junction, as \ve might be 
 obliged to retire behind Bull Run that night for subsistence, if nothing else. 
 
 It shows also his construction of what he got jumbled up here with the 
 joint order cautioning them not to go further than necessary to effect 
 this junction. Did the Recorder ever see that ? 
 
 Porter marched as directed, followed h\j Kinrfs division, which was hy this time Joined hij 
 liicletts^ division, Avhich had been forced back from Thoroughfare Gap by the heavy 
 forces of the enemy advancing to support Jackson. As soon as I found that the enemy 
 had been l)roitght ti) a half, and was heiny viyoronsly attaclccd along U'arrenioii turnpike, I 
 sent orders to McDowell. 
 
 Xow, here are two orders, which nobody else has ever heard of. 
 
 I'o advance rapidly on our left, and attack the enemy on his flank, extending his right to 
 meet Beynolds^ left, and to Fitz-John Porter to keep his right well closed on McDowelVs left, 
 and to attack the enemy in flank and renr, while he was pushed iu front. This would 
 have made the line of battle of McDowell and Porter at right angles to that of the 
 other forces engaged. 
 
 Can you conceive of a general who had commanded three or four days 
 before, and had issued these written orders which Ave have been consid- 
 ering here, that he should state it in this way, unless he was suffering 
 from the disease Avhich I have imputed to him ? 
 
 pope's eepout of .tanuary 27, 18G3. 
 
 Then what is the next ? His official report, made to the government, 
 and withheld, for some reason or other, from publication, until the exi- 
 dence in General Porter's case was all in. There are some rousing state- 
 ments of " truth " there to which I would like to call the attention of the 
 Board. Referring to the 29th, on page 19, he says : 
 
 I sent orders to General Porter, whom I supposed to he at Manassas Junction, ivhere he 
 should hare been in compliance with my orders of the day previous, to move upon Centreville at 
 the earliest dawn. 
 
 Well, that whole history- has been explored, and nol)ody but General 
 Pope has CA^er known of any order to General Porter that day, the 28th, 
 but to Htay at Bristoe until he ica.s ir anted, and it was at Bristoe that he 
 AA'as ordered to move upon Centreville. 
 
 On page 20: 
 
 I also sent orders to Maj. Gen. P"'itz-J(>hn Porter, at IVIanassas Junction, to move for- 
 ward with the utmost rapidity with his own corps and King's division of McDowell's 
 corps, wliich was gupposed to be at that point, upon Gainesville, by the direct road 
 from ^Manassas Junction to that jilace. I urged him to make all speed that he might 
 come up with Ihe enemy and be able to turn his tiank near where the Warreuton turn- 
 pike is intersected by the road from Mauassas Junction to Gainesville. 
 
88 
 And at page 23 : 
 
 It was neressarv for me to act thus promptly and make an attack, as I bad not the 
 time, for want of provisions and forage, to await an attack from the enemy; nor did I 
 think it good policy to do so under the circumstances. 
 
 During the whole night of the 29th, and the morning of the 30th, the advance of the main 
 body under Lee wav arriving on the field to re-enforce Jackson. 
 
 Tliink of tbis. ]\[ontbs after the events lie still insists that the main 
 army of Leo came throns'li Tlioronghfare Gap during the night of the 
 29th, and tlie morning of the 30th, to get on to the held. 
 
 Every moment of delay increased the odds against us, and I, therefore, advanced 
 to the attack as rapidly as I was able to bring my forces into action. Shortly after 
 General Porter moved forward to the attack along the TVarrenton turnjnke. 
 
 This is the 30th. See how he recognizes the truth on the 30th. 
 
 And the aumuU on the enemy was made Inj Heintzehnan and JReno on the right. It became 
 .ipparent that the enemy was massing his troo])s, as fast as they arrived on the field, on 
 his right, an<l was moving forward from that direction to turn our left, at which point 
 it Avas itlaiu he intended to make his main attack. I accordingly directed General 
 McDowtll to recall Ricketts' division immediately from our right and post it on the 
 left of our line with irs left refused. 
 
 Now, here — 
 
 The attack of I'orier was neither vigorous or jiersistent, and his troojys soon retired in con- 
 s i dira h le eo nfu s io n . 
 
 Certainly the mind that penned that sentence, kno^ving and seeing 
 what he did of Porter's conduct and of the conduct of his glorious troops 
 of the Fifth Army Corps on the 30th, is suffering under some serious 
 perturl)ation. Xow, the report to the Committee on the Conduct of 
 the AVar made by General Pope, at page 190, lias another startling 
 "truth." It is, however, the one which shows his hostility to Porter. 
 His claim of the authorshii) of the prosecution, and his claim for reward 
 from the administration for having carried it successfully through, show, 
 as 1 think, his infinite bias against General Porter. And the map which 
 is attached to that report must now be taken, in vicAV of the facts as 
 they now stand, as a confession of his bewilderment or ignorance, to 
 state it in the mildest way, of the transactions of the 29th, when he 
 testified on the tV)rmer trial. I want to lead to you a letter that he wrote 
 in answer to (ieneral Porter's appeal, addresse<l to General Grant, rec- 
 ognizing the fact that General Porter is trying to get a rehearing: 
 
 HEADQrAirri.ns Tiiiin* Miut.vry District, 
 
 Atlanta, Georgia, tSeptcmher 1(5, 1867. 
 Gkxeral U. S. Grant, 
 
 Washington, D. C. : 
 Genkral : As lam one of the principal imrtivs concerned in the case of Fit:-Jolin Porter, 
 and as I learn that he is in Washington City seeking a reo])ening of his case, on the 
 ground that lie lias come into possession of testimony since the close of the war Avhich 
 has an important bearing on the subject, and as I sujuiose it is not unlikely tliat a 
 commission may be ordered to examine that testimony, and report upon it, I consider 
 it my duty, as well as my right, respectfully to submit to your attention, or that of 
 .any connnissicm that may be ordered, the following remarks, for smli eonsidt ration .is 
 they merit. * * * 
 
 I am, neiu-ral, verv respectfnllv, vour obedient servant. 
 
 JOHN POPE. 
 Bvt. Maj. Gen. U. IS. A. 
 
 Then follows an elaborate argument, a rehash of all the old errors 
 that he committed five years liefore at the court-martial, which he adhere<l 
 to then, as he has ever since, with tlic tenacity of a Bourbon who <'an 
 learn nothing and forget nothing. 
 
89 
 
 GENERAL POPE'S "BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE CASE." 
 
 His brief statement of facts made in 1S69 is his next pul)lication, and 
 it is well worthy of a brief inspection. It is at pages 757 and 759 of 
 this record. In the first place it undertakes to state the case against 
 General Porter. It is in answer to another appeal by Porter to the 
 President. In the first place it omits to state any charge or complaint 
 of disobedience of the joint order. 
 
 It states this : 
 
 McDoweU had marched in Portei-'s rear from Mnnnssas Junction irith his corps, Jnil hear- 
 infi, OH reochint) the forks of the road at Bethlehem Church, the sounds of a severe battle being 
 fought at Groreton, 2)assed the rear of Porter's corps, and following the road to Sudley Springs, 
 brought his corps in upon the Uft of our line and iuiniediately pushed forward into action. 
 
 Do you suppose that he believed that, unless he saw things through 
 diseased o])tics ? He then sets forth Porter's message to McDowell and 
 King, incor])orates that in his brief statement, and in it he omits the 
 vital part of it as it was in his hands, viz : 
 
 I am now going to the head of the column to sec n-hat is pa^ssing and how affairs are going. 
 I will communicate with tjou. 
 
 The whole spirit of this document is liostile. He repeats tlie old story 
 about the delivery of the 4.30 p. m. order at five o'clock: 
 
 27(C dclircrji of tltis order to Porter atfre o'chicl;, at least one and a half hours before sun- 
 set, and full two hours before the battle dosed for the night, was prorcd on liis trial; but the 
 order was in no respect obeyed, and seems to hare produced no effect upon Porter, except that 
 instead of retreating to Manassas, according to his first intention, he only retreated part of 
 the way — far enough to be out of sight of the enemy and ont of danger. 
 
 Then certainly here is a most enormous statement of " truth" in view 
 of the present facts. At page 760 in the brief statement : 
 
 That Porter did precisely ivhat he wrote McDowell and King he intended to do was perfectly 
 uiell known, of course, to every man in his army corps, and easily proved before the court- 
 martial. It is impossible to believe that any man in tliis country possessed of the 
 facts can lie found so prejudiced as to justify such a ti'ansactiou, or to ask a modifica- 
 tiou of the sentence against Porter. It is Porter liimself who wrote tlie charges 
 against himself, and whose own written testimony establishes his crime. It is impos- 
 sible for any man, especially any military man, to imagine any excuse for, or any 
 satisfactory explanation of, such condncT. 
 
 Then, on page 701, he publishes, as of the 2!)th, an extract from Gen- 
 eral J. E. 1>. Stuart's report, which sliows tliat Longstreet was there in 
 force. 
 
 In this extract, General Stuart states that before noon he had been 
 informed of Porter's advance along the Manassas Gainesville road. 
 
 General Stuart then says : 
 
 T^e prolongation of his (Porter's) line of march would have passed through my position, 
 tvhich was a very fine one for artillery as well as observation, and struck Longstreet in flank. 
 
 * ^ ^ Immediately upon receipt of that intelligence, Jenkins', Kemper's, and D. 
 R. Jones' luMgades, and several pieces of artillery, were ordered to me by General 
 Longstreet. and l)eing placed in position, fronting Kristoe, awaited the enemy's 
 advance. 
 
 Ul)on this. General Pope asserts : 
 
 It will be observed, also, that when Longstreet was duly notified of his danger, and 
 asked to send troops to resist Porter's advance, he sent only three brigailes, viz, Jen- 
 kins', Kemper's, and D. K. Jones' (all he could spare, as will appear fiom .lack.son's 
 report), and this was positively all the force ever in front of Fitz-Johu Porter from first to 
 last, placed there with no purpose whatever to attack, bnt, if possible, to i)reveut his 
 advance, 
 
 Eather reiffarkable, in view of the clear proof of Wilcox's three 
 brigades being transferred in addition, to withstand Porter. He pub- 
 
90 
 
 lishes in this same brief statement an extract from Long^street's report, 
 which omits, however, a very important part of that rei)ort, cutting out 
 a preceding sentence and giving the sentence immediately following that 
 Avhich Avould liave set forth somewhat more, as other people understand 
 it, and as it is now known, the history of the movements of that day. 
 He left out this (showing Longstreet's presence and line of battle) : 
 
 Early ox the" 29tli (AiKjust), the coJiimits were united, and the (tdvance to join Genend 
 Jackson resumed. 
 
 ■* On approaching the field, some of Bri(iadier-(ieneraJ Rood's hatteries were ordered into 
 position, and his Divisiox was i')i:i'loyki) on RKiirr and left of the turnpike, at 
 right angles with it, and supported hg Brigadier I'Juans' brigade. 
 
 Three brigades, uuder General Svileox, were tliro-\vn forward to the support of the 
 left, and three others, nnder General Kemper, to the support of the right of these 
 conjuiands. General D. R. Jones' dlA ision was placed upon the Manassas Gap Kail- 
 road, to the right, and in echelon with regard to the three last Itrigadee. 
 
 Having omitted thef;e important sentences, General Pope proceeds 
 to quote tlie subsequent portion thus : 
 
 * * * At a late hour in the day Major-General Stuart rcixtitcd the approach of 
 the enemy in heavy columns against my extreme right. I withdrew General Wilcox^ 
 nith his three brigades, from the left, and placed his command in position to su]>port 
 .Jones in case of an attack against my right. Jfter some few shots the enemg withdrew 
 his forees, moving them around toAvards his front, and about four o'clock in the after- 
 noon began to ]>ress forward agaiilst General Jackson's position. Wilcox's brigades 
 tvere moved back to their former position. 
 
 Then General Pope, assuming that General Wilcox's division of three 
 brigades were the same as the three brigades mentioned by Stuart in 
 the passage quoted from him (which they were not), and ignoring the 
 fact that Jones, upon the right, was in command of a division, and that 
 Kemper Avith his division was there also, and the fact that AVilcox and 
 Hood, if needed, Avere within easy reach, exclaims : 
 
 It s?ems, then, that as soon as Porter retreated towards Manassas from this over- 
 whehning force, Lungstreet innnediateig withdrew Ihtsc brigades, and, joining Jackson's right, 
 immediaichi pressed forward with them against that jwrtion of our armg concerning whose 
 defeat Porter expressed such doleful apprehensions in his letter to McDowell. 
 
 Then he incorporates what he got fiom McDowell, that extract from 
 eTackson's report of the 30th, nniking it of the 2'Jth, turning Porter's own 
 guns against him^elt; and charging him Avith lying inactiA'e at DaA\^- 
 kins' Branch all tliat day, although in full hearing" of a great battle, 
 that is to say, of Porter's oAvn memorable attack of the 30th, Avhich so 
 nearly overwhelmed the rebel army of Jackson, until Longstreet came 
 in obedience to his urgent call for re-enforcements. Here is an extract 
 or statement of '' truth "' as of the 20th : 
 
 But Lee, according to the testimony of the chief engineer on hisstailt', took breakfast 
 that morning {i. e., the 2i)th) on the opposite side of Thoroughfare Gap, full thirtg miles dis- 
 tant, and it was utterlg impossible to re-enforce Jackson before a rerg late hourlpf ni(;ht, long 
 before which time the whole affair would have been ended. 
 
 This taking breakfast on the ojiposite side of Thoroughfare (xjip, full 
 thirty miles distant, is one of the most astonishing statements that I 
 have ever heard. Thoroughfare (4ap is about six miles from Gaines- 
 ville. There is a map i)ublished in connection with his report to the 
 Committee on the Conduct of the War which seems to have some bear- 
 ing on this statement of General Lee's taking' breakfast on the other 
 side of Thoroughfare Gap, fully thirty miles from Gainesville ; a very 
 singular thing, Avhich ought to be explained by somebody. Here is 
 Thoroughfare Gap ; this is Gentreville ; and this'map reverses the true 
 ])ositions of the ga])s, and puts Thoroughfare Gaj) Avhere Mana.ssas Gap 
 hould lie, thirty miles to the Avest. That is o ne of the niiips n:ade and 
 
91 
 
 annexed to General Pope's report to the Committee on the Conduct of 
 the War. It is very strange that a man slioukl read history wrong and 
 geography wrong too. I cannot understand it. It seems to me tliat 
 must be an accident. Of course General Pope must have IcnoAvn, as 
 well as General McDowell, that the statement in Jackson's report, incor* 
 l)orated in his " brief statement" to refer to the 29tli, did in fact refer 
 to the 30th, and to Porter's glorious conduct on that day. I'et he in- 
 sisted, and by-and-by I will show you that he insists to this day, that 
 that is right. But General McDowell, when brought face to face with 
 his error, conceded that he was wrong. General Pope not only still in- 
 sists upon it that it is right, but still insists that it is no business of his 
 to correct it if it is not right. 
 
 GENEEAL POPE'S EXPLANATORY LETTER OR BRIEF STATEMENT. 
 
 IsTow I come to his letter of October 23, 1878, showing why he imt out 
 the brief statement. This is worthy of attention in considering whether 
 he is an unbiased person in speaking of General Porter. It seems that 
 some question had been made, and it came to his ears, about these ex- 
 tracts, and he publishes them again in a letter to General Sherman, dated 
 October 23, 1878. He says : 
 
 Although General jNIcDowell (states in his testimony before the Board now in session 
 in Porter's ease that he made this extraet and sent printed slips to me, I still think it 
 proper fully to explain my connection with its subsequent use in the })aper (l>rief state- 
 ment) above referred to, and my authority for using it. 
 
 Then he states how he got it from the War Department and got it 
 verified. But we know what that meant; that it was a verified extract 
 from the book, but the extract which was verified, not giving the date, • 
 the date was put on by somebody else, viz, General McDowell. 
 
 Having thus called attention in the statement itself to Porter's assertion that the 
 extract Ironi Jackson's report referred to the 30th and not the 29th of August, 1862, 
 and given my authority for using it, a7id my belief that Porter was nmtakeii, and an ad- 
 ditional statement that the case Avas complete without considering the extract from. 
 Jackson's report ; so that it was, and is, practically out of consideration. / supposed, 
 and istill suppose, that I did everiithiug denuuidtd hy fairness and justice. 
 
 The ''Brief statement," with the above note inserted at the bottom of it, was then 
 filed in the War Department, and copies were furnished Colonel Sehriver, General 
 Townseud, and others, so that the note at the bottom has been known to them for 
 eight years past, and neither of these officers has ever sugaested to me even that there icasany 
 mistake about them. The opinion of Colonel Smith and the assertion of General I'oritr are, 
 therefore, hfl to hi balanced against the certificate of General Townsend and the letter of Colo- 
 nel Schrire'r, and whatever the facts may ultimately prove to be, I do not see wliat I have to do 
 with it. 
 
 But how are these mistakes of history to be corrected if the two men 
 who got up that circular say when they are brought face to fiice with the 
 glaring error, the one that " he does not think that it is his province to 
 correct it," and the other that "he does not see what he has to do with 
 it"? There is one singular fact in this letter which bears rather hardly 
 upon General McDowell, as showing how unnecessary it was for General 
 McDowell to come here and say that he furnished these statements to 
 General Pope, when he procured them from the War Department in 
 1809. He says : 
 
 It is proper to say thai the " Extracts '' in ejuestton were sent m:- in 16G7 from IVashimjton, 
 I do not know by whom. 
 
 That was two years before General McDowell went through the 
 supererogatory work of furnishing them to General Poi)e; he had them 
 already, and had been laying them by for future use against General 
 
92 
 
 Porter. Tlien he has written various letters to General Belknap and 
 the Comte de Paris, which are in evidence, full of tliese reassertions of 
 the exploded mistakes against General Porter, and all testifying in the 
 vstrongest manner to his absolute and undying hostility to Porter ; which, 
 as I have said, is also fairly deducible from the oral e^idence in this 
 case. There is nothing left adverse to General Porter but this opinion, 
 and you can fairly estimate the weight that is to be given to it. 
 
 General Koberts has been cited. He is no longer living; but to show 
 you how much weight is to be given to General Eoberts' testimony, he 
 IS the author of this false and malicious libel against the Fifth Army 
 Corps, which was contained in the fourth specitication of the second 
 charge against General Porters corps and its commander in respect to 
 the action of the oOth, which General Ivoberts, as a brigadier-general 
 and inspector-general of General Pope's army, could not but have known 
 all about. That specitication is as follows : 
 
 Specification 4th. In this: That the said Major-Geueral Fltz-John Porter, on the 
 field of battle of Manassas, on Saturday, the 'iOth of Aiitntst, 1862, having received a lawful 
 order from his shjj<'/-/o>- offieer and eommandintj general, Major-GeneralJohn Pope, to engage 
 the cnemy^s lines, and to carry a position near their center, and to fake an annoying battery 
 there posted, did procsid in the execution of that order with unnecessary slowness, and, by 
 delayn, give the enemy opportunities to n-atch and know his movements and to prepare to 
 'meet his attack, and did finally so feebly fall upon the enemy's line ax to make little or no im- 
 jirevsion on the same, and did fall back and dran- away hix forces nnncccxsarily, and wilhout 
 making any of the great personal efforts to rally his troops or to keep their line, o'' to inspire 
 his troops to meet the sacrificts and to make the resistance demanded by the importance of his 
 position and the monn'ntons consequences and disasters of a retreat at so critical a juncture of 
 the day. 
 
 That was too nuich e^en for the court-martial. General IJoberts stands 
 as the author, with his name subsci-ibed to that statement of Porter's con- 
 duct of the 30th, probablj* about as gallant and determined a fight and 
 series of charges as was ever made by an army corps in the American 
 Army or any other army. How can you give any weight to the remnant 
 of his opinion ? So I leaA'e that part of the case, stating that, against the 
 solid facts thttt we have proved, it seems to me you can attach no value 
 whatever to these opinions. 
 
 THE ArNlMUS OF frE>"ERAL PORTER. 
 
 Finally, a few words as to the animus of General Porter. On the pres- 
 ent solid facts, tliis charge of evil animus seems to me to be not the least 
 material. It never was resorted to even by Judg•e-Ad^'ocate-General 
 Holt, except to throw in as a makeweight to determine the scales, which 
 he thought were, upon tlie evidence, doubtful. But now it is ajtparent 
 to all the world, and no longer doubtful, that Porter did his whole duty, 
 no matter what his estimate of General Poj)e might have been. If his 
 feelings were such as General Burnside testified to, that he entertained, 
 in common with all the ofiicers of the Army, or a gi'eat part of them, 
 namely, a distrust of General Pope's ability to conduct a great campaign,, 
 and yet, notwithstanding that, he did his whole <luty, the i)erformance 
 of his whole duty is all the more meritorious, is it not '? But what was 
 General Porter's attiiniis l 1 shall not consume the time of the Board in 
 develoi)iug all that is shown by the dis])atches and telegrams of Porter, 
 from the time of starting from Harrison's Landing, from the tinu^ that 
 he first kncAV that he was to co-operate with and finally to join the army 
 of l\)pe in Mrginia. There is c^■erything in those dispatches which is 
 to his credit — sleepless vigilance, untiring activity, implicit obedience 
 as an otticer, evidenced by all the dispatclies, by all the telegran)s, by 
 all the orders. I will not consume the time of the Board in<h)ing it, but 
 
93 
 
 I would like the Board to take these telegrams, these dispatches, cover- 
 iiig the movements all the way from Harrison's Landing up to the 20th 
 of August, where his telegrams are first called in question as otfensive. 
 They show that he did all thatcouhl become a gallant and braAC general, 
 as in all our previous history where he Avas concerne<l he had done. 
 They do not indicate anywhere any hostility to Pope, oi- any i)urpose not 
 to do his duty. They testity all the time tlmt he was doing his duty to 
 the utmost. 
 
 AVhat were the relations iii which he stood in sending these tele- 
 grams ? To whom were they addressed ? AVere they telegrams for 
 publication ' Not at all. AVere they orders to subordinates ? Not at 
 all. Were they for the pul)lic eye ? Not at all. But General Burnside 
 had requested him to keep him informed, as a means of comnumication 
 with the President, of what was going on. Now, I challenge the doc- 
 trine of the prosecution in this case as to the relative attitude of cor[)s 
 commanders. I deny that they are not at liberty to criticise the move- 
 ments of their superior general, to asupei'ioror to the supreme source of 
 all military authority. I agree that they must not criticise to subordi- 
 nates; that they nuist not criticise in the public ear; that they must 
 not so speak as to create disaftection. But has it ever been known, in 
 any country, that subordinate generals might not send criticisms to 
 hea(h]uarters, even upon the conduct of a campaign by their immediate 
 commander f In Avhat army has it not been done? In what country 
 has it not been permitted ? Why, the theory of the infallibility of the 
 Pope, to question which is heresy, is now for the first time sought to l)e 
 applied to military matters — they set np the infallibility of this Pope, 
 and that all questioning of it is treason. That will not do. Even Na- 
 l)oleon, in the zenith of his glory, allowed criticisms upon himself, and 
 of sui)erior generals by those under them. It is a new theoiy in this 
 free country, that because a man happens to be a major-general and a 
 corps commander, he is tongue-tied, that he has lost all freedom of thought, 
 all freedom of speech. A pretty good specimen of what a co-ordinate, if 
 not a subordinate, commander can do in the way of criticism of a com- 
 manding general appears in General Pope's criticism to President 
 Lincoln about General ^McClellan, which is contained in hisrej^ort to the 
 Committee on the Conduct of the War, at page 105; and as his author- 
 ity will not be questioned here, I would like to read that. lie says : 
 
 In face of the exti'aordinary difficulties wliicli existed, and the terrible res]ioiisibi]- 
 ity about to be throwu upon ine, I considered it my duty to state plainly to the Prcsi- 
 ideut that I felt too much distrust of General McClellan to risk the destruction of my 
 <army, if it were left in his ])owcr, under any circumstances, to exhil)it the feebleness 
 and irresolution which had hitherto characterized his operations. 
 
 Well, I think that is a pretty good samjde of the kind of criticism 
 which is allowable. It seems to me that it is necessary to allow criti- 
 cisms, for the safety of the army. Suppose that, instead of a great 
 master of the art of' war like General Pope, a great army had an in- 
 comi>etent commander, with skillful generals under him, the ^^■hole army 
 might be destroyed if you take from them that power of criticism. 
 NoV, T undertake to say that Porter's allusions in these telegrams are 
 all true, all perfectly justifiable ; although the discreetness of sending 
 them or making some of those remarks, knowing what General Pope is, 
 might i)ossibly l)e questioned. I have stated his relations to Burnside, 
 and the ol)ject of sending the telegrams. It is true that Po])e's Avhole 
 campaign is not in review here; but something is in view which is re- 
 ferred to in these telegrams, and tliat much I must bring to the attention 
 of the Board. It appears that General Pope took comnumd in the sum- 
 
94 
 
 mer, I think it was June or July of 1802, and began tlie formation of 
 tliis Army of Virginia. He came from the West and imported ne\\' doc- 
 trines of militar}' science, which certainly startled, if they did not shake, 
 tlie confidence of all military men in the East ; and as these telegrams of 
 Porter, so much objected to, refer expressly to these new theories of 
 war, I desire to bring the new theories of war once more to the atten- 
 tion of the Board. I refer to his fiimous introductory order of July 
 14, on page 278 of the Board Eecord. If such an order cannot be 
 criticised, then General Porter was wrong in criticising it ', if it cannot be 
 lidiculed, it was wrong for General Porter to laugh at it. But I shall 
 insist that even a military saint, if there be such a person, could not 
 help laughing at it. This was the order which was proclaimed, not only 
 to his own army, but to the rebel army, when he assumed command of 
 the xVrmy of Virginia : 
 
 "Wasiiixgtox, Mondaii, July 11. 
 To the ofiicefH and soldiers of the Army of Virgliiid : 
 
 By the siK'fial assijiuineut of the President oftlie United States, I have assumed eoni- 
 niaud of tliis army. I have spent two weeks in learninj>; your whereabouts, yourcondi- 
 tiou and your wants, in preparinf*' you for active operations, and in placing you in posi- 
 tions from wliich you can act promptly and to the ])nrpose. 
 
 / have eome to ijon from the U'est, where we have ahvays seen the Vacls of our enemie.^, 
 from an armi) whose business it has been to seek the adversary, and to heat him when found ; 
 whose policy has been attack and not defense. In but one instance has the enemy been able to 
 place our 11'estern armies in a defensive attitude. I presume that I have been called here to 
 pursue the same system and to had you ayainst the enemy. It is my purpose to do so, and 
 that speedily. I am sure you lony for an opportunity to win the distinction you are capable 
 of achieviny; that opportunity I shall endeavor to yive you. Meantime I deiire you to dismiss 
 from your minds certain phrases which I am sorry to find in voyue amongst you. I hear con- 
 stantly of taking strong positions and holding thcni — 
 
 As Porter did on the 29th— 
 
 of lines of retreat and of bases of su2}plies. Let us discard such ideas. 
 
 There, I think, voit see the source of his condemnation of Porter's acts 
 of the 2yth. 
 
 The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which, he can most easily 
 advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and 
 leave our own to take care of themselrcs. Let us look before us and not behind. Jiiuccess and 
 glory are in the advanci'. Disaster and shame lurk in the rear. 
 
 Let us act on this understanding, and it is siife to predict that your banners shall be 
 inscribed with many a jflorions deed, and that your nauies will be dear to your coun- 
 trymen forever. 
 
 JOHN POPE, 
 Major-dencral Commanding. 
 
 This was a pul)lic i)roclamation, made on the 14th of July. It was 
 not only proclaimed to his own army, but to the army opi)osed to him. 
 AVhat did it jiromise them ? It gave them an understanding of how he 
 was going to act; it assured the enemy that there should be no more 
 such conduct on the part of the Federal army as taking strong jwsitions 
 and hohling them; that they would not preserve any lines of retreat, 
 or nniintain any bases of sui)]>lies ; the only strong position he would 
 h»(>k for ^\ ould be the one from which he could most easily advance upon 
 the enemy, by which, I understand, he means to be afways upon the 
 road; that he wcmld always leave his own lines of retreat to take care 
 of themselves; that he would never look behind him, because disaster 
 and shame lurked in the rear. That is his ]»roclamation. Was it merely 
 for the i^urpose of buncombe, or was he going to act on this understand- 
 ing ? On that we have sonie light thrown in his report to the Committee 
 on the Conduct of the War, which shows, as it seems to me, that it was 
 
95 
 
 a genuine tiling— a deliberate method of warfare — because eight days 
 previous he had been examined as a witness by Mr. Covode, before the 
 Committee on the Conduct of the War, at Washingtoji, and v.hen asked 
 how he proposed to light, he said : 
 
 At the same, time I sliall be in siicli position that, in case the ciii-inv advance in 
 considerable force towards Wasliinijton, I shal! be a))]e to concentrate all my forces 
 for the defense of this phace, which I ]>ropose to defend, not by standing on the de- 
 fensive at all, or confronting the enemy and intrenching myself, "bnt I im)2)oiie to do it 
 htj Jailing of on his fanls, and atfacl: him from the momnit he crom's the Rupimhannock, 
 <hty and nhjht, imlil his foi-o<s are datroi/ed, or mine. 
 
 By Mr. Odell : 
 
 Qnestion. Is it yonr design to act on the defensive alone? 
 
 Answer. Not at all. 
 
 Question. So that you mean to attack ? 
 
 Answer. I mean io attack them at all times that I can get an opiwrtmulij. If I were to 
 confront them with the force that I have, and go'buiiding intrenchiiients, &c., they 
 could Hank me on either side, and force me back without my ])eing able to offer any 
 resistance of any consequence. There is a possibility that they nuiy send a large 
 force this way, if the command of (ieueral McClellaii be in a perilous condition, or 
 where it can be held by an inconsiderable foi-ce, and prevented from coming out. 
 They may do that, \mi I do not think it very likely that they will attempt to'move 
 on this i»laee just now. ' But if they should come this way with a very huge force, it 
 seems to me that the only sort of defense of Washington I can attbrd, with the force 
 I have, is to lie off upon the Jlanls of iheir army, and aitack them day and night, at nvex- 
 perted times and places, so as to prevent them from adraniing. It will he hard work, but I 
 do not see anything else so likely to jyreraiJ against them. 
 
 By Mr. Covode : 
 
 Question. Would you not, in all these movements, feel eniljarrassed with the knowl- 
 edge that while you are moving forward on the enemy, you are looked, upon as the 
 protector of the capital here? 
 
 Answer. No, sir ; for I am fully convinced I am doing the best I know to effect that 
 object. It is not necessary, in my oj>inion, in order to protect the capital, that I should in- 
 terpose myself hetween the enemy and. the place itself; in fact, it would he the very tvorst pol- 
 icy to do so now, for wherever I could put myself, they could place themselves between 
 me and the capital, l)y attacking my Hanks. By laying of on their flanks, if they 
 ■should have onli/ forty thousand o)' Jifty thousand men, I could ichi^} them. If they should 
 have seventy thousand or eighty thousand men, I would attack their flanks and force 
 them, in order to get rid of mc, to follow me out into the mountain, which would be tvhat you 
 would want, I should suppose. They couhl not march on Washington, ivith me lying with 
 such a force as that on their flanks. I should feel perfectly satisfied that I was doing 
 the best I could with my force to dispose of them in that way. 
 
 These declarations had been already made and published when he 
 took command of the Army, and it is the reference to this sort of thing 
 in these dispatches of Porter's that has been so much complained of. 
 We do not see the Avhole of this campaign, but we have certain glimpses 
 of it Avhich show that he acted upon this understanding and view of the 
 art of war, and provoked the criticism, not onlj^ of General Porter, but 
 of all soldiers. I invite your attention to the position at 7 p. m., on the 
 2Cth of August, to see how it was that Jackson got in behind him while 
 he was " looking before and not behind." Pope's dispatch is contained 
 in Porter'fe statement, at page 80, and it shows where these forces of his 
 were jiosted. It is a disi)atch from AVarrenton Junction, August 26, 7 
 J), m., to General Porter: 
 
 Please move forward with Sykes' division to-morrow morning, through Fayettevillo, 
 to a point within two and a half miles of the town of Warrenton, and take position 
 where you can easily move to the front, with your right resting on the railroad. Call 
 up Morell to join you as speedily as possible, leaving only small cavalry forces to 
 watch the fords. If there are any troops below, coming uj), they should come np 
 rapidly, leaving only a small rear guard at Rappahannock Station. You will find 
 General Bauks at Fayetteville. I append below the position of our forces, as also 
 those of the enemy. I do not see how a general engagement can be postponed more 
 than a dav or two. 
 
96 
 
 McDo-ivell with his own corps. Siiffl's and three hriijades of Reynolds' men, being^ 
 about thirty-four thousand, are at and immediately in front of Warrenton ; Reno joins 
 him on his riijlit and rear, with eiijht thousand men. at an early hour to-morrow ; C'ox^ 
 with seven thousand men, will move forward to jnin him in The afternoon of To-mor- 
 row; Banks witli six thousand is at FayetTeville ; .Stur^^is, about eight thousand strong, 
 will move forward by day after to-morrow. 
 
 There tliey were at 7 o'clock p. m. on the 20th of August, facing 
 towards the Rappaliannock, facing the enemy. At 12 o'clock that night 
 in a (li.spatch from General Pope to ^McDowell in hi.s official report, at 
 page 234, we have this extraordinary state of things growing out of this 
 policy of " looking before *' and not ''behind,*' and letting his lines of 
 communications "take care of themselves." Jackson had, in fact, got 
 through Thoroughfare Gap on the 2Gth, in the morning. That aj^pears 
 in Jackson's report, printed m the Board Eecord, at page 522. He had 
 gone perhaps twenty miles and struck, and Pope knew nothing of it 
 until he was informed l)y report next morning, when his whole army was 
 still "looking before" across the Eappahannock ; an<l Jackson, twenty- 
 four hours previous, had slix»ped in behind him. This is dated August 
 26, 1802, at midnight, just at the very moment, as I understand, that 
 Jackson was striking in his rear upon the railroad, between him and 
 Washington : 
 
 Gen«'ral Sigel reports the enemy's rear ,>;Mard aT Orleans, to-night, with Ids main 
 force encamped at White Plains. You will i>lease ascertain vmy early in The m<uiiiug 
 whether this is so, and liave the whole of your command ready ; yon had best ascer- 
 tain to-night, if you j)ossib1y can. Whether his wliole force, or the larger ])art of it, 
 has gone around, is a question which we nnisT setTle instanTly, and no portion of his 
 .force nuist march oi)j)osite to us to-night without our knowing if. I telegraithed you 
 an hour ago what disposition I had made, sujtposing the advance through Thorough- 
 fare Gap to be a. colunni of not more than ten or fifteen thousand men. If his wliole 
 force, or the larger i>art of it, lias gone, we must know it at (uice. Tlie troops here 
 have no artillery; and if the main forces of the enemy arc still opposite to y<ui, you 
 must send forward to Greenwich, to be there to-morrow evening, with two liatteries 
 of artillery, or three if you can get them, to meet Kearney. We must know at a very 
 early hour in the morning, so as to determine our plans. 
 
 JNO. POPE, 
 M((jor-GciicraJ. 
 
 Now, there is an illustration of leaving lines of retreat to take care of 
 them.selves, and emphatic proof that <lisaster and shame lurked in the 
 rear of this very movement. Stuart .struck at Catlett's Station on the 
 night of the 2(>th, throwing everything into confusion, and at daybreak 
 of the 27th Jackson's force cajitured Manassas, the base of su])plies, 
 destroying" an immen.se quantity of st<n'es upon which the sustenance of 
 Pope's army depended, and actually cutting off that army from commu- 
 nication with the capital, which he Avas defending' by " laying off on the 
 flanks of enemy." Tliis appears by Stuart's report in the Ijoard Eecord, 
 at page r>2r>; and Trimble, Avho was in that attair. ]mts it at 12.30 a. m. 
 on the night of the 20th and morning of the 27th. There was an illus- 
 tration of the in^actical working of his ])]an of "looking before" and not 
 " behind'' — of letting his lines <»f retreat and communication take care of 
 themselves and of not caring anything about his bases of sui>plies. Then 
 you have the illustration of the jnirsuit of .laclcson to Centreville when 
 .Jackson was not at Centreville, and had not been there. Eeno and 
 Jleintzelman were ord(ned to Centreville on the 2Sth and Porter on the 
 2f)th. There was an instance of studying the probahU- lines of retreat of 
 the em'my. I claim that all the fighting on the 2J)th ilhistrates his 
 method of attacking' wherever he "could get an op]tortufiity to do .so," 
 as he swore before Covode's committee that he intend«'d to <lo; and his 
 insisting that the enemy were running away on the .'JOth, and attacking 
 them as if they were, is a specimen of his policy of attacking under all 
 
97 
 
 circuinstances and never standing on the defensive. Let me read you 
 the evidence of General Patrick on the vsubject, at ])age 103, for it shows 
 that this theory of attacking under all circumstances was carried out to 
 the fuU. General Patrick found the enemy very speedily on that morn- 
 ing and the nighi previous. 
 
 I reporteil the condition of affairs, as tliey liad been during the niglit and as they 
 then ap])eared, that the enemy had come down the road here about where they lay 
 dnrin<i the night [noith of Young's Branch], and tliat they liad withdrawn to witliiii 
 the woods here [near Ciroveton]. My recollection is that it came out farther than 
 tliat; That is. that it continued nearer toward the pike and made something of au 
 angle here. I reported that tlie wood was full of rebs. 
 
 Question. On both sides of the pike? 
 
 Answer. Yes; but mostly on the south side. I was there twice. I cannot say at 
 which time this occurred. I should think, hoAvever, it wa.s the second time I was 
 tliere. My instructions then were from General McDowell to go back. The conver- 
 sation was between McDowell, Pope, and myself. 
 
 Question. Yon had better state it as it was. 
 
 Answer. Well, I cannot give the words. 
 
 Question. No: the substance. 
 
 Answer. The substance of it was, "Yon are mii-.taken. There is nobody in there of 
 any consequence. They are merely stragglers." I gave the reasons, and I supposed, 
 I believed, that there were heavy bodies in that wood; the fact that this column had 
 come down in that way and must have fallen liack in that directiim, because otherwise 
 Reynolds would have iuterti'red with them. The direction was to go back and feel of 
 them — put ill my skirmishers on both sides of the road and see what there was there. 
 As I got there some of Sigel's scouts, mounted, were there ; they went in, and before 
 getting ui> to the wood anywhere from the edge of the wood there was a pretty strong 
 fire fi-om what would seem to be a skirmish line poured out upon them, and they came 
 riding back very hastily, and I remarked, "It was as I told you; the woods are full." 
 In the mean time I was getting out the skirmishers to go forward, and I went up 
 again to McDowell and Pope and I'eported this. I cannot say to which it was; they 
 were both tf)gether, and one of them replied, "O, these Dutchmen are always seeing 
 the enemy,"' referring to these scouts. "Now get off and get some coffee, and you will 
 feel better natured, and then go back and throw out your skirmishers and pursue them 
 with your whole command, for we can't affonl to let them escape. We have got to 
 bag them." 
 
 Question. Who said that f 
 
 Answer. They both used the expression, but McDowell was the one who used it 
 especially to me. 
 
 Question. Did yon make any reply '? 
 
 Answer. I think I asked him, "Which side of the bag will it be?" 
 
 And in fact it proved to be the wrong side of the bag. 
 
 Was not that an instance of attack, because he would never assume 
 a defensive policy I Well, now, with these glimpses of the method of 
 the campaign, let us coine to these telegrams that are so much com- 
 plained of. At page Si appears a telegram of August 25. It will be 
 rememliered that at that time General Porter was under General Mc- 
 Clellan's direction. He telegraphs to Burnside, giving a full account 
 of all that transpired: he was then in the advance proceeding up from 
 the Rappahannock. 
 
 To General Burxside : 
 
 Have you received my dis]iatches indicating my movements to-morrow ? Y'ou know 
 that Rappahannock Station is under lire from opposite hills, and the houses were de- 
 stroyed l)y Pope. I do not like to direct movements on such uncertain data as that 
 furnished" by General Halleck. I know he is misinformed of the location of some of the 
 corps mentioned in Iiis dispatches. Reno has not been at Kelly's for three days, and 
 there is (Uily a picket at Rappahannock Station ; and Kearney, not Banks, is at Bealeton. 
 Reno and Reynolds are beyond my reach. I have directed Sykes to go to Rappa- 
 hannock Station at tive to-nunrow, and will go there myself via Kelly's Ford. JJoes 
 (lent-rnl McClellan approve f 
 
 Now, what harm is there in that? McClellan was his superior com- 
 mander. Was it wrong for him to seek to have the approval of Gen- 
 eral McClellan? The next telegram that they complain of is that of 
 
98 
 
 August 27, wlien General Porter had, as'we claim, voluutarily joined 
 General Pope, and made himself a part of his army. But whether vol- 
 untarily or not, it was the disconnectiug from one army and attaching 
 to another; and the thing complained of is, that he asked General 
 Burnside to inform General ]McClellan that he had done it; that he might 
 know that he was doing right. Pie did not ask for any advice from Mc- 
 Clellan; he had no communication from or with McOlellan; and it seems 
 to me that, as a wise soldier, he informed General McClellan, so that he. 
 Porter, might know that 3IcClellan was informed that he was with Pope, 
 and looking no further to JVIcClellau for orders. Is not that the fair 
 construction of this dispatch ? Let me read it: 
 
 From Advaxck, 11.45 j). m., August 26. Received August 27, 18G3. 
 Major-Gcneral Bukxside : 
 
 Have just received orders from General Pope to move Sykes to-morrow to within 
 two miles of Warrenton, and to call up Morell to same point, leaving tlie fords guarded 
 l)y the cavalry. 
 
 You see the vigilance which all these telegrams display, notwithstand- 
 ing they contain these objectionable passages. 
 
 He says the troops in rear should he hrought up as rapidly as possible, leaving only 
 a small rear guard at Rappahannock Station ; and that he cannot see how a general 
 engagement can he i)nt oft' more than a day or two. I shall move up as ordered, hut 
 the want of grain and the necessity of receiving a supply of subsistence will cause 
 some delay. Please h<isten back Ihe ivayons sent down, and inform McCleUan, that I may 
 know I am. doing right. 
 
 jS^ow, what harm there is in a commander of a corps departing from 
 one army and coming, whether by orders from Washington or by his 
 own voluntary act, to constitute a part of a co-operating army, sending 
 back word that he had done so for the information of his former com- 
 mander, nobody has yet undertaken to explain. They said it was looking 
 to McClellan. Well, were not those circumstances under which it was 
 proper for him to look to McClellan for the purpose I have indicated ? 
 
 The next complaint is in regard to a telegram of August 27, from War- 
 renton Junction. Now we are coming to the time when General Porter, 
 having a clearer insight as to what was going on, and of the metliod in 
 which the campaign was being conducted, could not help expressing his 
 natural instincts, as it seems to me, as a soldier, and he in<lulged in a 
 little criticism upon the ])erformances which were so startling and so 
 different from the theories of war upon whiclv, I su])pose, he had been 
 educated. At page 88 of the statement this disi)atch inclosed an order 
 from General Pope, which I will presently refer to; but this is what is 
 complained of: 
 
 Waukkxtox, 27tii — p. ni. 
 To General BuiiXsiOK : 
 
 Morell left his medicine, ammunition, and baggage at Kelly's Ford : can you have it 
 hauled to Fredericks) mrg and stored ? 
 
 General Porter was looking all this time to General Burnside for sup- 
 plies : 
 
 His wagons were all sent to you for grain and aiumujiition.- I have sent back to 
 you every nmu of the First and .Sixth New York Cavalry, excej)! what has been sent 
 to Gainesville. I will get them to you after a while. ^ Ecei-ything here iv at sixes and 
 sevens, and I find I am to take care of mi/sclf in erer;/ respect. Oukijxk ok communi- 
 cation HAS TAKEN CAKE OF ITSKI.F, IX coMl'i.iAXCK WITH OHDEUs. The ariuv has not 
 three days' i)rovisions. The enemy captured all Pope's and other clothing ;' and from 
 McDowell the same, inclndine/ H(2nors. 
 
 Now, what does he refer to there I Is it not absolutely true ? What 
 had happened f Jackson had got in behind Pope while Pope was look- 
 
99 
 
 iiig out for liiiii at the front, and while <li>saster and shame Avere tlms 
 hirking in the rear; there they were, Stuart at Oatlett's Station, in tlic 
 shape of disaster, and Jackson, as shame, at Manassas. Evervthiiii;- 
 was at " sixes and sevens." Had not the commanding general \no- 
 claimed that he was going to act on the understandiilg that lines of 
 communication and retreat should take care of themselves, that he Avould 
 not take care of them, and that his subordinate commanders should 
 not take care of them I This was one of the results of his novel policy. 
 Was it criminal ? Was it more than human for General Porter, in writ- 
 ing to General Burnside, \vith whom his communication was lawful — 
 communicating, if yon please, with the President, who was the superior 
 of Pope — to indulge in this irresistible and spontaneous criticism uj^on 
 the results of this novel metliod of warfare, which had here for the tirst 
 time l)een inaugurated and so forcibly illustrated f You observe Gen- 
 ei-al Pope's very words in his proclamation are the words that Porter 
 uses in this dispatch. 
 
 The next one that they complain of is that of August 27, 4 p. m., on 
 page 8t) of the statement : 
 
 I send you the last order from General Pope, wliicli indieates the future as well as 
 the present. Wagons are rolling- along rapi<lly to the rear, as if a mighty power was 
 propelling them. I see no cause of alarm, though this may cause it. 
 
 That referred to the w^agons by the thousand that were pouring on 
 towards Alexandria, rolling night and day over those roads, esi)ecially 
 that road from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe, which we have so care- 
 fully examined. Had he any authority for the statement? This order 
 from General Pope, which it transmitted, contained the very facts upon 
 which he was commenting. Let me read it. Here is the order from 
 General Pope, directing the flight of all wagons and of all trains towards 
 Alexandria : 
 
 Hkad'.juarters of Army of Virginia, 
 
 Warrenton Junction, August 27th, 186*2. 
 
 Major-General Banks, as soon as he arrives at Warrenton Junction, will assume the 
 charge of the trains, and cover their movement towards Manassas Junction. The 
 train of his own corps, under escort of two regiments of infantry and a battery of 
 artillery, will pursue the road south of the railroad, which conducts into the rear of 
 Manassas Junction. As soon as the trains have passed Warrenton Junction he will 
 take post behind Cedar Run, covering the fords and bridges of that stream, and hold- 
 ing the position as long as possible. He will cause all the railroad trains to be loaded 
 with the public ami private stores now here, and run them back towards Manassas 
 Junction as far as the railroad is practicable. Wherever a bridge is burned, so as to 
 impede the further passage of the railroad trains, he will assemljle them all as near 
 together as possible, and protect them with his connnand until the bridges are rebuilt. 
 If the enemy is too strong before him, before the bridges can be repaired, he will be 
 careful to destroy entirely the train, locomotives, and stores, before he falls back iu 
 the direction of Manassas Junction. 
 
 TMs was an order for a precipitate and universal flight in the direc- 
 tion of Alexandria of all wagon trains. It was the execution of that 
 order that blocked \\\) the road on the night of the 27th, so that General 
 Porter, up to three o'clock, could not move. Now, was it a serious or 
 wicked criticism for General Porter, writing as he was this message to 
 Burnside, to say : 
 
 Wagons are rolliiig along rapi<lly to the rear as if a mighty power was propelling 
 them. I see no cause of alarm, though this may cause it. 
 
 This, also, is seriously complained of in the same telegram : 
 
 I found a vast difference between these troops and ours ; but I suppose they were 
 new, as to-day they burned their clothes, &c., when there was not the least cause. I 
 
 8CH 
 
100 
 
 hear tliat they are mucli demoralizcil, aud needed some oood troops to give them 
 heart and, I think, head. We are working now to get behind Bnll Run, and I pre- 
 sume will be there in a few days, if strategy don't use ns np. 
 
 How true tliat was! How proplietic! Strategy did use them up, 
 and those that were not used up did upon the night of the 30th quietly 
 withdraw behind Bull Run and take their places in safety on the 
 heights of (Jentreville. 
 
 The strategy is magnificent, and tactics in the inverse proportion. I wouhl like some 
 of my ambulances. I would like also to be ordered to return to Fredericksburg, to 
 push toward Hanover, or, with a larger force, to pusii towards Orange Court-House. 
 
 Now, what does that mean '? A suggestion of what I have heard 
 military men say ,was, even in the then wretched situation, a wise expe- 
 dient. What was it ? To strike behind Lee, at his liues of commuuica- 
 tiou, and compel his instantaneous retreat. If that had been done, all 
 this useless slaughter of the 29th and 30th would have been avoided. 
 That was Porter's suggestion, of which they complained. That was his 
 his idea of getting away and doing something; of dealing an effectual 
 blow at the enemy, with whom they were all contending. 
 
 I do not doubt the enemy have a large amount of supplies provided for them, and I 
 believe tliey have a contempt for the Army of Virginia. 
 
 Do you not believe it ? What else but such a sentiment could have 
 inspired Jackson to make that dash through Thoroughfare Gap, and 
 put himself in the trap in which he did put himself, surrounded by the 
 Army of Virginia ? Facts are to be looked at in analyzing this case, 
 now that the passions of the war are over. Is it not true ? What but 
 that very sentiment could have brought Jackson in there ? Will any 
 military man say that if he ha<l not entertained such a sentiment he 
 would have dared to do so ? He had read Pope's i)roclamation — to him 
 a lu'oclamation as well as to Pope's own army — which notified him that 
 Poi)e was not going to look behind him, nor at his base of su])plies; 
 that he was to look before and not behind, because disaster and shame 
 lurked in the rear. He knew that there was a great supi)ly depot at 
 Manassas, and in he went, in obedience to General Pope's invitation, 
 and destroyed it utterly. 
 
 I wish myself away from it, with all our old Army of the Potouiac, and so do our 
 companions. 
 
 What does that mean ? Has he not suggested what he meant, that 
 lie would lilvc to be ordered to make a strike in Lee's rear ? 
 
 I would like also to be ordered to return to Fredericksl)urg, to push towards Hano- 
 ver, or, with a larger force, to push towards Orange Court House. I wish 8umuer was 
 at Wasluugton, and u]) near tlie Monocacy, witli good batteries. I do not doubt the 
 enemy have a large amount of supplies provided for them, and I believe they have a 
 contempt tor the Army of Virginia. I wish myself away from it, with all our old 
 Army of the Potomac, and so do our comj)anions. I was informed to-day by the best 
 authority that, in opposition to Gcnieral Pope's views, this army Avas i>uslied out to 
 save the Army of the I'otoniac, an ariuy tliat could take care of itself. Poite says lie 
 long since wanted to go heiiiud tlie Occorpian. I am in great need of the ambulances, 
 iiwA the ot'licers need medicines, whicli, for want of trans[)ortatiou, were left bi^hind. 
 I hear many of the sick of our corps are in liouses by the road — very sick, I think. 
 There is no fear of an enemy crossing the Kai)]i.ilinniiock. The cavalry arc all in the 
 advance of the rebel army. At Kelly's and ISariiett's Fords much pioperty was left, 
 in conse(iuen<-e of the wagons going down for grain, Ac. If you can push up the grain 
 to-night, please <lo so, direct to this place. There is no grain here or anywhere, and 
 this army is wretchedly snpjjlied in that line. Pope says he never could get enough. 
 Most of this is private, but if you can get me away, ^ilease (Jo so. 
 
 What does he refer to '! Has he not stated what it referred to f Has 
 he not laid out principles of counter-attack, which, if acted upon, would 
 have a\oided the partial destruction of this army ? 
 
101 
 
 Well, what is the next tliat is complained of! It is tlie dispatcli of 
 August 28, 9.30 a. m., at Bristoe. 
 I hope all ones well near Washmgtoii. 
 
 :n^ow, McClellau was back, near Wasliington. 
 
 I Tliiuk there need be no canseof fear for us. I feel as if on my own way now, and 
 thus far have ke^it my command and trains well up. More sn])plies than I supposed 
 on hand have l)e(>u 1 nought, but none to spare, and we nuist mai<e connection soon. 
 I hope for the best, and my lucky star is always up about my Inrthday, the 31st, and 
 hope Me's is up also. You will hear of ns sooii by way of Alexandria." 
 
 That is complained of as a very contemj^tuous reference to the move- 
 ments of the army. " You will hear of us soon by way of Alexandria." 
 1 want, in that connection, to read to you a jiassage from General Pope's 
 report to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, at page 172, con- 
 taining, as it seems to me, a passage bearing on this. Three years after- 
 wards, when his i)assions were somewhat cooled, and he had got over 
 the excitement of the cami)aign, at least, he malvcs this confession, 
 giving an account of this campaign of the Army of A^irginia : 
 
 At no tinie could I have lioped to tight a successful battle with the innneusely su- 
 perior force of the army which confronted me, and which was able at any time to out- 
 flank me, and bear my little army to the dust. 
 
 Is not that an extraordinary statement after all the boasting j)rocla- 
 nuitions of the campaign? This is a cool statement of fact three years 
 afterwards. Of course, he knew, and everybody knew, that he might be 
 looked for, as is here stated by Porter, and as tlie fact turns out, by way 
 of Alexandria. What else could possibly be hoped for in the situation, 
 as it was on the morning of the 28th"? Then they complain of this: 
 
 All that talk about bagging Jackson, &c., was bosh. 
 
 Well, it had so turned out, had it not? 
 
 That enormous gap — Manassas — was left open and the enemy Jumped through ; and 
 the story of McDowell having cut off Longstreet had no good foundation. The enemy 
 have destroyed all our bridges, burnt trains, &c., and made this army rush back to 
 look at its line of communication, and find us bare of subsistence. We are far from 
 Alexandria, considering the nu>ans of transportation. Your supply trainof forty wagons 
 is here, but I can't find them. There is a rejiort that Jackson is at Centreville, which 
 you can believe or not. 
 
 There is a sneer in that. But is it not justified ? This was at Manas- 
 sas, at 2 p. m. of the 28th. The next morning the raid by Longstreet, 
 Avho was cut off, took place. It shows that General I'oi'ter's sagacity 
 and soldierly instinct led him to see, and foresee, the situation in a clear 
 manner, the information of which, to the government, was of the 
 greatest utility. Again is his dispatch of G a. m., on the 29th, at 
 Bristoe : 
 
 I shall be off in half an hour. The messenger Avho brought this says the enemy had 
 been at Centreville, and pickets were found there last night. 
 
 Sigel had severe hght last night ; took many inisoners ; Banks is at WaiTenton 
 Junction ; McDoAvell near Gainesville ; Heintzelnian and Reno at Centreville, where 
 tliey marched yesterday, and Pope went to Centreville with the last two as a body- 
 guard. 
 
 There is the only personal reflection that I can find in these dispatches. 
 It seems to me to be ver^' liarndess and innocent. 
 
 At the time, not knowing where was the enemy, and when Sigel Avas figLtiug within 
 eight miles of him, and in sight. Comment is unnecessary. 
 
 The enormous trains are still rolling on, many animals are not being watered for 
 fifty hoiirs; I shall be out of provisions to-morrow night ; your train of forty wagons 
 cannot be found. 
 
 I hope Mac's at work, and we will soon get ordered out of this. It would seem 
 from proper statements of the enemy that he was wandering around loose ; but I 
 expect they know what they are doing, which is more than any one here or anywhere 
 knows. 
 
102 
 
 Is tliat not true ? "What had ju8t happened ? What was true tliat 
 morning f What is sworn to by General McDowell as being true during 
 all that canii)aign from the 12th, when he went to joiu General Pope, up 
 to the UUth, when this dispatch was written ? General McDowell swore 
 before you at Governor's Island that on all these days, Irom August 12 to 
 August 29, he and General Pope were hunting for each other a good 
 deal. Now, does not that justify this observation, that knowhig what 
 other i)eople are doing is "more than any one here knows"? This was 
 written at the Aciy time when ]McDom ell was taking his famous ride, 
 Avhen J*ope himself was saying, "' I Inive not been al)le to tind out any- 
 thing al)out ]\rcDowell for a long time, or until a late hour this morning." 
 
 I submit that at this late day, when we look at these things coolly and 
 dispassionately, there was no wickedness, no malice, no evil animus in 
 these disi>atches. They were almost irresistibly' i)rompted and called 
 forth by the extraordinary situation ; they were confidential to Bnrnside 
 and the President. General Burnside testified that it never occurred to 
 him that General Porter in Avriting them had any evil motive or pur- 
 ])ose towards General Pope ; he oid;\' thought that it showed that General 
 Porter felt about the commanding general as everybody else did, a cer- 
 tain distrust in consequence of his new methods of Avarfare ])ractically 
 carried out. It is stated in the statement, and it may not be improi)er 
 to repeat it here, that the President thanked General Porter personally 
 for those very telegrams on the battlefield at Antietam, Avhere lie met 
 him. Now, Ave say that if you want to find General Porter's aniuuis in 
 these disi)atches you must find it in what he Avas doing at this time, as 
 cA'idenced by the dispatches, working to his utmost, night and day, press- 
 ing forAvard with irresistible A'igor, as it seems, and with a wise ai)i)lica- 
 tion of Avhat he knew of the rules of war. HoAVCAcr he may liaAC felt about 
 General Pope, these A^ery telegrams demonstrate that all the time he did his 
 Avhole duty. What more is Avanted ? Did not the authorities at AVash- 
 ington think so ? Why was it that the Aveek after they put him in com- 
 mand of JS,000 troops in the defense of the fortifications at Washington ? 
 AVhy was it that thej' left him in commaiul afterwards during the great 
 battle of Antietam, and only checked his course when they were pursu- 
 ing the enemy after Antietam down toAvards Fredericksburg ? Those are 
 (piestions that are very hard to answer. 1 do not Avish to discuss this ques- 
 tion of animus further. I only want to say that actions, as the Pecorder 
 .says, s])eak louder than Avords, and if you want Porter's animus you nrnst 
 find it in the Avhole history of his life; you must find it in all his record 
 from the time he left this Academy, all through the war Avith Mexico, 
 U])on the Peninsula, Avhere he achieved great and glorious deeds ; y(m 
 must lind it in that day of the oOth ; yes, and in this day of the 2i)th, 
 Avhich is among his i»roudest, and Avill stand in history as one of his 
 Avisest and l)esf dnys. 
 
 Li closing this case, I nnist refer, by way of general obserxation, to 
 certain evidence that has been introduced unnecessarily, as it seems to 
 ]ne. The facts nol)ody can couq)lain of; but Avhen it conu's down to 
 small scandals, is it not better to reject them, as Judge-Advocate Holt 
 rejected them — this evidence of Lord and Ormsby, and their absurd 
 stories of Avhat they say took place in General Porter's (juarfers in 
 AVashington during his trial there? There he Avas one day in great ex- 
 citement coming in from the trial. Do you doubt, on Avhat you knoAv 
 noAv, that he had cause for immense excitement t He is a very cool 
 man, but do you question that his blood nnist have been uj) and that all 
 there Avas in him of indignation and rage Avas stirred to its utmost 
 depths? They said that they heard him say, "I Avar'n't loyal to Pope. 
 
103 
 
 I was loyal to McClellaii." Well, what was that? Was it addressed to 
 them I No; it was an exclamation, excited and wratlifnl. AVhat did it 
 mean? Bid it not mean simply an ontlneak of wrath, that he conhl 
 not contain, at sonu^hin^- that had been said or done at the court-martial 
 that was trying him that day ? Instead of l)ein8- a statement, a propo- 
 sition, an admission, a confession, as it is claimed, it was a wrathful re- 
 pudiation of the idea, and is inca] table of any other construction. I will 
 luit dwell upon that. The Judge- Advocate rejected it. Lord and Ormsby 
 swore each other to secrecy, and then ran and told the Judge- Advocate, 
 and he treated it with the contempt that it deserved. Yet that which 
 could not be used in the days of the heat and passion of war is brought 
 in here to serve a certain i)urpose, in this era of peace and good-vidll. 
 Then, what do you think of Dr. Faxon's story? Was it necessary to 
 bring in these absurdities? Dr. Faxon, who liad heard that there was 
 a charge against General Porter of being dilatory on the march from 
 Warrenton Junction to Bristoe, comes and testifier that as he was niarch- 
 ing along with his regiment, going through Bristoe, at two o'clock in the 
 afternoon, he passed where General Porter was standing at his head- 
 quarters with some gentlemen, one hundred feet off, and although his 
 regiment did not stop, although they went tramping along on the road, 
 he" heard General Porter say to one of his aides that he "didn't care a 
 damn if they didn't get there." But they had got to Bristoe already; 
 it was beyond Bristoe, at two o'clock, where General Porter had ar- 
 rived at eight in the morning, that this took ]dace. I think that doctor 
 had better have been left in charge of his patients in Massachusetts. 
 Then, what do you think of John Bond? He was sent to carry rations 
 up the Sudley road on the afternoon of the 20th, and he saAv a nuin Avho 
 sonu4iody told him was General Porter, and General Porter asked him 
 how the battle goes, and he made an explanation of how the battle went, 
 lie described General Porter's person, that he had a moustache and no 
 beard, that he had a hat and a major-general's uniform; but it turns 
 out that he had a cap and a full beard, and no major-general's uniform 
 at all. Now, might not John Bond have better been left carrying rations 
 to the end of his days than to have been called here ? And Bowers, the 
 scout. The learned Kecorder tries to find points of distinction between 
 a scout and a spy. Well, Bowers Avas at headquarters one day when 
 General Porter was surrounded l)y his staft". Porter says, " General Pope 
 is coming through this counnaiul this afternoon, and I don't want any 
 attention paid to him" — absolutely denied by all the survivors of his 
 start". AVas there ever any nu:>re ridiculous stuff than that sought to be 
 imported into a serious controversy ? I suppose that all these witnesses 
 are absolutely worthless in every point of ^iew. 
 
 And now, if the Board please, enough has been said. 
 
 The fate of the petitioner is in your hands. His sufferings under this 
 sentence for the last sixteen years have been ])eculiar, unlike those that 
 any other general or soldier has ever sustained. I do not ])ropose to de- 
 pict them ; they cannot be exaggerated by any language. Only eminent 
 soldiers, such as compose this Board, can fully realize and appreciate 
 them. He is not the only person who now stamls awaiting your judg- 
 ment ; not only he, but liis family and his comrades in arms, that glo- 
 rious Fifth Army Corps, which never yet met without reaftirming 
 their tiiith in his innocence, the whole Army, as I believe, and every 
 faithful man who has ever been connected with it stands expecting 
 and hoping for the restoration of his good name and fame; because, it 
 is not his good name and tVnue only that is concerned, but the Army's 
 and the country's. I believe that this nation is too great, that it is too 
 
104 
 
 magiianiuious, to snfl'er the coiitiiuiation of such a wrong when once 
 it has been ascertained. If the exigences of those times required that 
 this slianie and contumely shoukl be borne by him during all this inter- 
 A'al, his patriotism and his loyalty have stood the test. Nobody has 
 ever heard a Axhisper or a murmur against his country, or its cause, from 
 liim. He has always been faithful. He knew, or hoped he knew that 
 time would bring his relief. There were historical instances which 
 Avould justify the hope. There was the case of brave old Admiral Coch- 
 rane, Earl of Dundonald, who suffered a similar but by no means equal 
 ignominy, convicted of a crime of wliich he was wholly ignorant and inno- 
 cent, in 1814; aiul he had to live until 183-? before the brand of intiimy was 
 taken from him. But the British nation was magiumimous, and restored 
 him at last to all the honors and titles of which he had been unjustly de- 
 l)ri\'ed. If any such indirect puii)ose as I have refei'red to nuide Por- 
 ter's punislnnent and humiliation necessary ; if he was a sacrilice to dis- 
 cipline, has it ]U)t answered its purpose t If it was necessary to strike 
 down an innocent man to enforce discipline upon susiiected men in the 
 Army of tlie Potomac, has it not done its work ? Look at them under 
 all commanders, before and certainly afterwards — look at them from An- 
 tietam to the last struggles in the Wilderness, under the successive com- 
 mands of McClellan, Burnside, Hooker, Meade, and Grant. ^Mlen, any- 
 Avhere, did a man of them fail to do his whole duty ? 
 
 We think the time has come at last for this gross wrong to the pe- 
 titioner to be righted. He has looked for it hopefully and faithfully for 
 the last sixteen years. He has looked for it because he was sure of his 
 innocence, because he had absolute faith in his cause, faith in his coun- 
 try, faith in justice, faith in God. The question now is, whether God 
 and justice and country shall all forsake him. AVe have no fears. We 
 leave the result contidently with you. It seems to me that the time and 
 place are both propitious for his A'indication. In ten days more will be 
 the anniversary of his humiliation. Here, where his military life began, 
 is the place where his star should be lestored to its true and native lus- 
 ter, and so in his name, and the name of the brave army corps which he 
 commanded, in the name of the Army which he did his best to honor, in 
 the nauu; of truth insulted, and of justice outraged, we demand for the 
 petitioner full and complete reparation. 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
 Mil! 
 
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