X. c ^ ^ ^. . / * 8 I ' V •-' ; .0* % A /> \ v ^ ■>/- ' •'■ ft S ^> , I ft , »0 1 .^ « . O W ^ v. '>> C," * $\, > \ v P **, Aj -^ a\ ■/• *W ■ \ v fV * v * ' , 4^ CONTRIBUTIONS THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE, DE, AIKIN'S ATHEN^UM, THE MONTHLY EEPOSLTOEY, AND THE CHEISTIAN EEEOEMEE. THE LATE REV. ELIEZER COGAN. k In ^fco $arts. PART I.— CLASSICAL. PART IL— THEOLOGICAL, METAPHYSICAL, AND BIBLICAL. EXTRACTED AND COMPILED BY HIS SON, RICHARD COGAN. LONDON: PRINTED BY WOODFALL AND KINDER, ANGEL COURT, SKINNER STREET. 1856. • 4 1 205449 '13 V* <-> / TO THE READER Soon after the death' of my venerated father I looked over the periodicals mentioned in the title-page, to which I knew he had been a contributor, with a view of ascertaining what he had written upon classical and other subjects. I was somewhat ' surprised to find that he had written so much, and, thinking that many of the articles might be read with interest by, at 1o ast, some of his surviving friends, I determined to collect and print them in a small volume. I was not at all aware until after his decease that he had written so much upon classical subjects at so early a period. The articles, it is true, are shorty but as he never published any large work, it was these fugitive pieces, and these alone, which in the first instance gained for him the reputation of a scholar. And when I find that they were thought worthy of consideration by such men as Carey, Dawes, and Wakefield, I trust I may be pardoned for having made this attempt to rescue them from e?itire oblivion. The reader will see that I have divided the volume into two parts. One or two observations in Part II. might with more propriety (not being Biblical) have been placed in Part I. ; but as they were contri- butions to the Monthly Bepository, I did not think it worth while to disturb the order in which they were written. There is, I am well aware, a vast difference of opinion upon the sub- jects treated of in the second part of the volume. Few, if any, of the denomination of Christians to which he belonged, will be found to agree with him on all points. They were, however, those in which he felt a deep interest, and upon which, espe- cially in early life, he had spent considerable time and thought. In theology as well as metaphysics he was a follower of the celebrated Priestley, of whose character, talent, and writings IV he had formed the highest estimate. He did not consider him- self by any means a profound theologian. This he has stated in a passage which will he found in pp. .208-9 of this volume. In what estimation he was held as a metaphysician by one of the most acute and able metaphysicians of modern times (the late Dr. Crombie) may be judged by the fact of his having placed in the hands of my father the manuscript of his " Natural Theology " before he sent it to press. I may add with truth, that what he wrote upon these subjects was not for the purpose of displaying either his theological learning or his metaphysical ingenuity, but because he deemed them of great importance, and with the hope, by throwing out a hint or two, of inducing others, who had "more leisure and more ability," to devote their powers to such inquiries. Should the following pages afford gratification to any of his former friends, my ob- ject will be gained, and I shall have the satisfaction of knowing that my labour has not been altogether in vain. R. 0. November, 1855. CONTENTS. PART I. CLASSICAL. Remarks upon a Passage in Virgil, iEneid, V. v. 373-4 the Particle re . the Greek Accents the Article in the Writings of Homer, and upon line 78 of the first Book of the Iliad Mr. Cogan's reading of simularit for simularat in iEneid, VI v. 591 Mr. Wakefield's Remarks on Mr. Cogan's reading of simularit for simularat ..... E. W. on the same ..... Remarks upon a line in Virgil, iEneid, VI. v. 242, and upon the Subjunctive Mood, in ^neid, VI. v. 591 the Nominative Case before the Infinitive Mood in the Greek Language .... , Mr. Wakefield's " Noctes Carcerariae" . the use of such Words as amantes - a Hemistich of Virgil, iEneid, II. v. 619 For Observations and Conjectures Remarks upon the Punctuation of Homer, II. T. v. 133 i. in the text read T, or xix. Mr. Singleton's Inquiries respecting irefyavras in Homer, II. xvi. v. 207 . . . . the Punctuation of Virgil, iEneid, V. v. 372 a Passage in Virgil, iEneid, IX. v. 438-9 the omission of the Augment . ■ ■ the Reading of simularit for simularat, iEneid VI. v. 591 Communication of John Nic. Dawes Remarks upon the Punctuation of Homer, II. T. v. 133. For i in the text read T, or xix. the same Passage, also upon Mr. Dawes' Com- munication ....... PAGE 1 2 3 3, 4 5 6 7 8, 9 9, 10 10—12 12, 13 13, 14 14, 15 16 16 17 18, 19 20 20—22 22, 23 23 23—25 VI Observations and Conjectures on certain Passages in the Greek and Roman Classics ..... Remarks upon an error in the Press in the preceding Com- munication, also upon an observation of Bentley's the omission of the Augment in the Word e8v err vx.r) cre the Pocula Acheloia in Virgil, Georg. I. v. 9 a Peculiarity of Herodotus . . i the Hymns of Homer Tlpcorov and JJpcora Metrical remarks . . . Mr. Cogan's Estimate of the late Gilbert Wakefield's Abilities as a Scholar ..... 25—27 27 28 28, 29 29, 30 30—33 33 33—35 36, 37 * PAET II. THEOLOGICAL, METAPHYSICAL, AND BIBLICAL. Mr. Cogan's account of the late Mr. Dewhurst as a Scholar Remarks upon Dr. Williams's Essay. on the Divine Govern ment ; also illustration of Phil. ii. 6 . the Popular Theology . Mysteries .... the Mythology of Armageddon his Papers against Calvinism . Mr. Hume's Argument against Miracles the same .... Mr. Stodhart's Anathemas against Unitarians Strictures on some of the Arguments of " Apeleutherus, with regard to the Natural Evidences of a Future State Remarks upon the Eternity of Hell Torments the Moral System of Calvinism the aged and infirm Ministers' Society the question of Liberty and Necessity . 38- 40 . 40— 43 . 44— 46 . 46— 50 . 50— 52 . 52— 54 . 54— 59 . 59. 60 ? 60— 63 e 63— 71 . 71 . 71— 74 . 74, 75 . 75— 83 Addendum to Paper on Necessity, and Remarks on a Maxim of the ancient Philosophers .... 83 — 89 Remarks upon the Effects of the Unitarian and Calvinistic Systems ....... 89— 93 the Calvinistic Doctrine of the Evil of Sin . ,93 — 99 Summary of the Evidences of Christianity . . . 99 — 110 Presumptions in favour of Christianity . . . 110 — 115 Remarks on Miracles ...... 115 — 117 Vll v PAGE Examination of Mr. Hume's Objection to the being of a God, P.S. on John xxi. 15 117—126 Remarks upon Scriptures relating to the death of Christ . 126 — 128 John xxi. 15 . . . . 128 Scriptural and Calvinistic Phraseology . 129, 130 Moderate Calvinism, P. S. on 1 John ii. 12 . 130—134 ■ Remission of Sins .... 135 a Criticism of Porson's . . . 136 — a Passage in Paley's " Natural Theology," on the Unity of the Deity ..... 136—139 — the Necessity and Evidence of Revelation . 139 — 145 Mr. Sturch on the Religion of Nature . . . 145—150 Mr. CoganV Reply to Mr. Sturch .... 150—156 Remarks upon an error of Mr. Locke . . . . 156, 157 Mr. Sturch in reply to Mr. Cogan . . . - . 158—163 Mr. Cogan in reply to Mr. Sturch .... 164—167 Remarks upon Bishop Burgess's Uncharitableness . . 168 — 170 a Canon of Criticism relating to the Greek Article ....... 170—172 Dr. Channing's opinion of Dr. Priestley . 172 — 177 a Canon of Criticism relating to the Greek Article ........ 178, 179 Grotius's Interpretation of Heb. i. 2 . . • 179, 180 the meaning of the Verb yiyveaOai . . 180 — 184 Correction of a former communication . . • 185 Remarks upon the meaning of the words yiyveadai and Mystery . . • 185—187 : the Greek Article .... 187 • Analogical Reasoning . . . . 188 — 192 — the Doctrine of the Atonement . . 192 — 196 the Trinitarian Controversy . . . 196 — 202 : ■ Divine Justice . . . . 202 — 206 — the Vice-Chancellor's Critique in a late Judg- ment on the Improved Version .... 206 — 211 APPENDIX. A Letter from the late Gilbert Wakefield to Mr. Cogan . 213 A Letter from the late Dr. Parr to Mr. Cogan . . 214 Extract of a Letter from Dr. Parr to Dr. Abraham Rees . 214, 215 Extract of Letters received by a Member of Mr. Cogan's Family, from the Rev. Thomas Johnstone, of Wakefield 216—218 EXTRACTS FROM THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE, AND DR. AIKIN'S ATHENAEUM. PAKT I.— CLASSICAL. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. Sir, — The true solution of the question proposed by a cor- respondent on the passage in Virgil, Nihil iste nee ausus nee potuit, is to be found in the following well-known peculiarity of the Latin language ; that after a negative a distribution is generally made, not by aut or vel repeated, but by nee or neque. Corn. Nep. de Timoleon: Nihil unquam neque inso- lens neque gloriosum ex ore ejus exiit. Plaut. Trin. v. 97. Neque de illo quicquam neque emeres neque venderes. Schell. Prsecepta Stili bene Latini, vol. i. p. 291. ed. Sec. Prisci rots nee (neque) — nee (neque) prsemittunt ssepe vocabulum negans, v. c. nullns, nihil, non, &c. Cic. Mil. Non possum reliqua nee cogitare nee scribere. This peculiarity seems not to have been present to the mind of the great Bentley, when on the Andria of Terence, Act i. Sc. ii. v. ult. he wrote the following note : Vera sine dubio et vetusta ilia lectio est neque haud, non neque hoc: Sic Plautus ter quaterque, Noster iii. 3, 31. At ego non posse arbitror, neque ilium hanc perpetuo habere, 7ieque me perpeti. Allow me to remind your correspondent, who proposes an ingenious interpretation of Virg. Ec. i. 54, of a passage in the B iEneid, i. 602, " magnum quae sparsa per orbem," which will show that the genius of the Latin language is not violated by the ellipsis of the verb est after depasta. While I have my pen in my hand, allow me to detain your classical readers another moment, to propose a correction of a passage in Homer : II. xxii. v. 346, for ai ya% Trcog read ui yap us. See Odyss. xv. 156, and in vindication of the metre, II. xiv. 521. By the critical scholar the emendation, whether approved or not, will be instantly understood on read- ing the passage. I am, Sir, yours, &c. E. Cogan. Cheshunt, Feb, 23, 1800. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. Sir, — I have not at hand the observations of Mr. Wakefield referred to by a correspondent in your last number. Without knowing, therefore, whether I have been anticipated, I take the liberty to trouble you with the following remark. The particle re in the Latin language has in several compounds the force sought for in the verb recludo. Take for examples repono and recondo. Scientia condendi ac reponendi fructus. Cicero. Quasque recondiderat, Stygiisque admoverat undis, Effodiuntur opes, irritamenta malorum. Ovid. Hence the ordinary use of reconditus, and the English recondite. E. 0. May 5th, 1800. P.S. The force of particles in composition has not been sufficiently attended to in studying and teaching the Latin language. That treasure of critical learning, that *Tu^a st$ aiEi, Mr. Wakefield's Lucretius, casts much light on this subject. Of its importance allow me to give an instance Virg. An. iv. 230 :— genus alto a sanguine Teucri Proderet which Ruaeus, vir non indoctus, has thus interpreted, qui pro - baret originem suam esse e nobili sanguine Teucri! For an elegant use of the verb prodo, see Lucret. vi. 562. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. Sir, — In consequence of Mr. Robinson's communication on the Greek accents, I take the liberty to acquaint those of your classical readers who may not be at present possessed of the information, that some very curious remarks on the subject are to be found in Hermannus's " Treatise on the Metres of the Greek and Roman Poets," a very ingenious work of a very acute and learned man, which it is to be hoped will speedily find a place in the library of every British scholar. E. C. June 7th, 1800. P.S. In reading the Medea of Seneca the other day, I could not help remarking that Gronovius, in his note on verse 335, affirms of the verb recludo that it signifies both to shut and to open. But he produces no examples. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. Sir, — To the question proposed by N. K., in page 535, vol. ix., it may, perhaps satisfactorily, be replied, that the existence of the article in the writings, and of course in the age, of B 2 Homer is sufficiently proved by the instances which your cor- respondent has himself produced; and that the unfrequency of its use is to he attributed to a peculiar licence of heroic poetry, as will appear from the consideration that it is very sparingly used by the later heroic poets. Apollonius Ehodius will suffice for an example. Nay, in the iambics of the tragic poets the article is frequently omitted when in a prose writer it would have been inserted. Allow me another moment to correct a false translation of line 78 of the first book of the Iliad ; which ought to be rendered, not, with Dr. Clarke, "For I think that a man will be angry," but, " I think that I shall provoke a man." The accusative case of the pronoun is omitted, because o'iofxai and xoAoxxe^ev respect the same person. This is a simple matter, but the greatest critics have not been sufficiently aware of it. That admirable scholar Mr. Mark- land, for instance, has several times violated this propriety of the Greek language in his conjectures, v. g. Iph. in Aul. v. 475, where Scaliger and Aldus were mistaken before him; again, on the Supplices, v. 504, and on verse 1192. It may be curious to remark, that when the Greek poets use the formula kttu yaia, &c, for opvufxt yaiav and the like, they still omit the pronoun as though the other form had been adopted. Vide Moschus, Meg. v. 75 et sequent. Homer, Od. v. 184 et sequent. Apoll. Khod. iv. 95 et sequent. But in reality it is the nominative which is understood in this construction.* Vide Eur. Med. 751, and following, from opvu down to sfcoua-ia T^oTroj. Soph. Antig. 897, 898, Ed. Brunk. 910, 911, of the new edition of Musgrave. This peculiarity was misapprehended by Heath and Henry Stephens on Eur. Cyclops, v. 266, and has been offended against by * I mean, if a verb and an infinitive mood following respect the same person, a pronoun or adjective appertaining to that person will stand before the infinitive in the nominative case. V. Hoogv. ad Vige- rum, p. 207. Brunk, in a conjecture on Tbeoc. xxvii. 34. These hints may be of use to young proficients in the Greek language. E. C. Cheshunt, July 7, 1800. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. Sir, — Permit me to propose a correction of a trifling error in a passage of Virgil. iEneid vi. 591. Deinens ! qui nimbos et non imitabile fulmeii iEre et cornipeduni pulsu siuiularat equorum. Instead of simularat, it should probably be simularit. Compare a similar epiphonema in the second book, v. 345. Infelix ! qui non sponsss praecepta furentis Audierit.* It has often occurred to me, in the course of my classical reading, to remark that the elegancies of classical phraseology are not uncommonly preserved in the vulgarisms of the Eng- lish language. An instance or two may amuse your classical readers. The redundant pronoun is found in such expressions as the following : " That horse will trot you ten miles an hour." This is somewhere observed by Mr. Wakefield, in his very learned and valuable Commentary on Matthew. Virg. Georg. iii. 434 : — Ssevit agris, asperque siti, atque exterritus sestu. • In some parts of this kingdom, country people will say, that they have been much terrified with gnats, &c. Lucret. ii. 539 : — Tanta ferarum Vis est, quaruni nos perpauca exempla videmus. The good woman of whom I bought fruit when a child used often to talk of there being a power of apples this season. * How it is read in other editions I know not ; I have only those of Ituseus, Burmann, and Heyne. The manuscripts fluctuate between simularat, simulabat, and simidaret. " I '11 comb your locks," " I '11 give you a dressing," " I '11 trim your jacket for you," are tlireatenings the full force of which is understood by those who know nothing of their origin. So the Greeks use, in the sense of chastising, ttkwsiv, vittteiv, a/wxsiv, &c. Terence, Heaut v. 1. 77: Adeo exornatum dabo, adeo depexum, ut, dum vivat, meminerit semper mei. To save trouble, I have borrowed these instances from Koen ad Gregor, p. 127. Vide etiam Harles. ad Theocrit. v. 119. E. C. Cheshunt, July 29, 1800. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. Sir, — Your correspondent E. Cogan, at p. 137 of your last Number, prefers the reading simulant in Virg. iEn. vi. 590, to that generally received. I venture to differ from this writer on any subject with diffidence and circumspection. In my notes, however, on Lucretius, v. 744, I propose simularet, as the genuine reading of the passage ; nor do I repent recom- mending that tense in preference to simularat commonly adopted, or even hesitate to undervalue simularit, approved by Mr. Cogan, in comparison with this authorised reading, for these reasons : The perfect tense simularit, equivalent to simulavit, and substituted for it in compliance with the relative, implies a complete action; namely, that Salmoneus imitated the thunder with efficiency and success ; a supposition wholly incompatible with the language and spirit of the passage: whereas the imperfect tense simularet conveys a signification of an in- adequate and incomplete performance, and exhibits, with grammatical exactness, in conformity with the obvious purpose of the poet, a bungling attempt of infatuated (demens) impiety to represent that criterion of the supreme Deity, which was inimitable (non imitabile) by any contrivances of human power. G. Wakefield. Dorchester Gaol, Sept. 3, 1800. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. Sir, — Having read, in p. 137 of your last Number, a con- jectural emendation, proposed by Mr. Oogan, of a passage in the sixth book of Virgil's iEneid, I send to you, as an accom- paniment for it, the following remarks on the same passage, extracted from the " Analysis of the Hexameter," in a recent publication by Mr. Carey, entitled " Latin Prosody made Easy," page 165. In doing this, I neither pretend to prefer Mr. Carey's idea to Mr. Cogan's, nor Mr. Cogan's to Mr. Carey's: my only object is, to give your readers an opportunity of comparing the reasons on both sides, and judging for them- selves. " Demens ! qui nimbos, et non imitabile fulmen, iEre et cornipedum pulsu simularet equorum." " Simularet, which appears to be the reading of some re- spectable MSS., is here restored to its station, as better agree- ing in tense with Ibat and Poscebat, whether we choose to understand those verbs as implying the constant habit of transgression, or as moreover describing the offender in the very act of transgressing at the moment when Jupiter checked him in the midst of his triumphant career by suddenly inflict- ing on him a public and exemplary punishment of his impiety. If Virgil had used the pluperfect at all on this occasion, he would have written Simuldsset, not simuldrat. Every scholar knows that the subjunctive is elegantly combined with the rela- tive to express the cause, reason, motive — as here, 'Infatuate wretch! to attempt mimicking ',' &c." E. W. Piccadilly, Sep. 6, 1800. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. The following is the concluding part of a communication upon another subject: — 8 As I was reading the following line of Virgil, a few weeks ago, with one of my pupils (2En. vi. 242), Unde locum Graii dixerant nomine Aornon, it occurred to me that it might perhaps be admitted as genuine if a little spirit were given to it by the following alteration : — Unde locum Graio dixerunt nomine Aornon. Vide Mn. vi. 440. Lugentes campi ; sic illoa nomine dicunt. And Mm iii. 210. Strophades Graio stant nomine dictse. E. 0. Cheshunt, Sept. 7, 1800. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. The following is the latter part of an article written on a metaphysical subject: — Sir, — Allow me to thank your correspondent J. 0. (page 311 of your last Number) for his animadversions on my correction of Virgil's iEneid, vi. 242. I did not propose the emendation as necessary on the score of phraseology, but to try whether, by a slight alteration, a line might not be vindicated to Virgil which Burman and Heyne reject as spurious. Mr. Wakefield, I ought to observe, on the other hand, thinks that Lucretius, in book vi. v. 420, rather countenances its genuineness. In the second remark of your correspondent there is much force, but it applies only to Aornon, and not to Avernum, which some copies read. Should it be said that Avemus is only a corruption of a Greek name, and therefore that Graio nomine would be improper, I would refer the objector to the following lines of Ovid : — Sed Veneris mensem Graio sermone notatum Auguror : a spumis est dea dicta maris. Nee tibi sit mirum Graio rem nomine did, Itala nam tellus Greecia major erat. Fast. iv. 61. 9 Certainly Aprilis is no more a genuine Greek word than Avernus. Perhaps the following lines of Silius Italicus afford the best commentary on this controverted passage of the Man- tuan hard, if indeed the line be his : — Ille, olirci populis dictum Styga, nomine vero Stagna inter celebrem nunc mitia monstrat Avernum. Pun. xii. 120. In further confirmation of the subjunctive mood in Virg. iEn. vi. 591, which confirmation can only be needed, because Burman and Heyne, at qui viri ! have acquiesced in the indi- cative, let me add Mn. ix. 728-9 : — Demens ! qui Rutulum in medio non agmine regem Viderit irrumpentem, ultroque incluserit urbi. I have since observed, that in the Oxford edition (which I did not recollect that I had in my possession), simularet is given for simularat. E. 0. Cheshunt, Nov. 1, 1800. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. Sir, — In your Magazine for August last, p. 33, I made an observation on the use of the nominative case before the infini- tive mood in the Greek language. I wish to suggest that the case there specified, namely, when the nominative, the infinitive, and the preceding verb, all respect the same person, appears to be the only case in which the ancient Greek writers used the nominative before the infinitive. Dr. Huntingford, under the following rule of his Greek syntax, "The infinitive mood is elegantly used with a nominative case either before or after it, particularly by the Attics," gives sixteen examples. The first is rather an instance of the avaxohovQov. All the rest, save one from Lucian (of which, not having the connection before me, I can say nothing), come under the predicament of my obser- vation. I will not answer for the fidelity of my memory, but I recollect no indubitable instance in the poets which contra- dicts my remark. I hesitate, however, when I find such critics 10 as Musgrave and Mr. Wakefield defending the nominative before the infinitive in the following passage of the Trach. of Sophocles, v. 585 : — 00CTTE /JLYJTIV EKTlduV I.te^oci yuvaiH.cc. heivo$ ccvti (tov ttXeov. Musgrave, indeed, refers to a passage which comes under the above description, and upon that passage cites an instance from Philostratus. At any rate, this passage of Sophocles is not decisive, as Brunk's cte^ei is supported by manuscript authority. I do not know whether any writer on the English language has traced the resemblance between our auxiliary verb have and the use of the Greek £%w with the aorist participle. In a matter known to every Greek scholar I will be sparing of quo- tations. Vide Eur. Troad. 1150, svo$ fxsv ouv fxoxQou a^ a.7ra.\- xa^ag ex®, and Aristoph. Eccl. 355, Ed. Brunk. In Eurip. Troad. v. 1121, for Aocvaoi kteivovtes exovuiv read kteivoivtss f%owcnv, as the sense requires not interjiciunt but interfecerunt. E. 0. Cheshunt, Dec. 6, 1800. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. Sir, — Mr. Wakefield, in his Nodes Carcerarice, amidst other very curious matter, has favoured the world with an acute observation on Greek prosody, which he once did me the honour to communicate viva voce; namely, that an hiatus frequently occurs in the third foot of an hexameter, as in the following line of Homer : — A;\x' ctKEQuaa kjj, as in other places. Vide II. a. v. 28. II. t. v. 133, 00' eov (piKov ulov bguro Epyoi/ aEiKE$ £x,ovra, U7r' JLuguo-QYiog JLupucQykx; ueOxuv, not as it stands in the editions of Barnes and Dr. Clarke, -who show that they have mistaken the construction by translating, sub Eurysthei laborious, but after EupuaOyos as well as Exovra, that aeQxcov may be governed of spyov. This correction is in- disputable. In confirmation of the force given to vtto 9 com- pare Moschus Megara, iv. 4, 5, where speaking of Hercules and Eurystheus he says : — H f or i aXyscc 7ra,oiG.ovv ; tettcc^cov A^ax/^oov (jbaXicna ibv no(pivov — they will con- sent to let Machon and Aristophanes enjoy their old reading. John Nic. Dawes. Oct. 11, 1802. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. Sir, — If any of your classical readers recollect that, in your Magazine of February last, I proposed to alter the punctua- tion of a line in Homer, II. i. 133, I owe them and myself the following defence of the common reading. In Iliad, 0. v. 393, we read — TEigOftEvov ctcoeitkov bit JLuguaQwog aeQhcov. Eurip. Her. Fier. v. 832 :— ettei $e [xox^oug diETTEpacr' Euguafocog* The correction proposed was strictly classical, and well enough defended by the passage of Moschus ; but my usual caution forsook me, when I pronounced it indisputable. E. 0. Higham Hill, Nov. 8, 1802. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. Sir, — Heyne's Homer having reached me within these few days, I turned with some impatience to the passage in the 19th 24 Book, on which I made a remark in your last. This admirable editor has observed that Epyov astKsg is used, miro modo, for Egya asiHYi, but that Epyov sometimes signifies labor, cerumnosus labor. He has not noticed the Epyov poxQuv of Moschus. He allows us to connect spyov asQhuv, but proposes that the words should be joined, as9xuv vtt Eupuo-Qyog. But if asQ^cov is to be joined with spyov, I should still prefer my old construction, as u7ro, TTgog, and ff, are frequently construed with neuter and active verbs. All your classical readers will thank Mr. Dawes for his com- munication. He handsomely suggests that it might not be from oversight that I did not take notice of the hiatus intro- duced into the line of Euripides by Mr. Porson's correction. I pointed it out in a letter sent to you, Sir, but for which you allowed me to substitute that which you published. To the suggestion of a friend, I am indebted for the knowledge of a fact which I was not aware of, namely, that Tuyxavu occurs again in the Electra of Sophocles, without the participle, v. 313, vvv d'aypoiat ruyxav£i. Here, however, it might be read ayp 01$ cov Tuyxavsi, in which order the formula, I think, occurs elsewhere. The expression v. 993 is of a different kind. In Euripid. Hecuba, v. 1038 — »j yap xx&Eiteg Spyna, nai Hparsig %evqv ; I some years ago conjectured &vov. The correction was at that time approved by Mr. Wakefield, and Herman has since given it in the text. The cause of the depravation, allowing it to be such, is obvious. As the accusative appears to have been here supplanted by the genitive, I have sometimes suspected that it has been sup- planted by the dative in Sophocles (Edip. Col. v. 1096 : — TW (THOTTU /J.EV OUH, EPEig tog YEudo/xavTig ; tov G-H07rov would exhibit an elegant Greecism. Vide Eurip. Med. V. 250, teyouai d'y/uag, 'HS amv^uvov Qiov Za/xsv. Inf. v. 453, Euripides might have written, if he did not write, XEyoua 25 laaov, u$ Hania-Tog ectt' avn%. The elision of the vowel, after a short syllable in the ccesura, is liable to no objection. Vide p. 24 of Professor Porson's Supplementary Preface to the Hecuba. E. 0. Iligham Hill, Dec. 6th, 1802. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. Sir, — The following observations and conjectures on certain passages of the Greek and Roman Classics are very much at your service. A mag no Tragoedice patre auspicemur : Agam. v. 101, for 5y tou o afMorov hyZavTog eti tt^ouxovto Hoc^rwoc TTCCVTEg b /xco$' That o fxsv and tou fe should be used of the same person is hardly consistent with the genius of the Greek language, and aporov, which belongs to tt^ouxovto, stands oddly between tou h XnZavTog. I should propose reading — 'Oj 3° a/J.0T0v } Xy%avT0$, eti «.t\X. The passage may have been depraved by some one who did not know the pronoun may be omitted in the genitive absolute. But we need not go further for an example of this peculiarity than back to verse 260 of the very book in hand. If an in- stance of ol h TravTig b /xu; is required, it will be found in verses 474, 475. In Sophocles (Edip. Tyr. 464— !"£VY]V E7TI a)CY\7TT^Cp TTgodElXVUS EfJLTTOgEUCTETat Villoison (Animadver. in Longus, p. 85,) condemns o-kyittt^w vrpofeiKvug, as not Greek, and proposes o-kyi7tt$ov. But the com- mon reading may be defended by Theocrit. Idyl. xxii. v. 102* ETcoaia x £ ? ai 7r^ob^EiHVug. In Virgil ^En. ii. 615— Nimbo effulgens, et Gorgone sseva, it is rather doubtful whether sceva is the nominative or ablative. Perhaps the doubt may be resolved by the Gorgone cruda virago of Statius. In the 8th book of the iEneid, v. 222, there is a passage on which the critics have entertained different opinions :■ — Turn primum uostri Cacum videre timentem, Turbatumque oculis, Mr. Wakefield reads oculi. In Livy we find oculisque simul et mente turbatum. 27 In the 12th book, v. 797, the sense of morta lis is considered as ambiguous — Mortaline decuit violari volnere divum ? The author of the Epitome of Homer's Iliad, in v. 469, has shown how he understood it. Speaking of Diomede, he says : — Celestemque mamim mortali vulnerat hasta. Horace Carm. lib. iii. Od. ii. v. 14 — Mors et fugacem persequitur virum. Bentley reads consequitur. Baxter objects suo more. Gesher observes, quern persequitur : i. e. cupide et constanter sequitur mors, ilium sine dubio consequitur etiam asse- quiturque. No one seems to have remembered that persequi fugie?ites is a military phrase, which at once defends the com- mon reading, and gives spirit and beauty to the passage. E. C. Higham Rill, Sept. 6, 1803. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE. Sir, — I scarcely know whether it is worth while to notice an error of the press in my last, as no Greek scholar can be perplexed thereby: but the letter 9 was omitted in the words Bavocaifxcov, SavaTvpopuv, and crx^sv. While I have my pen in my hand, I will detain you a moment longer. In perusing Huschke's Analecta Critica, I have just fallen upon an excel- lent observation of Bentley's, on the suolimis anhelitus of Horace. I wonder that no critic has compared this expression with the following passage in the Hercules Furens of Euri- pides, v. 1095, 1096:— KCt.1 TTVOag §Eg/AOL$ 7TVS00 fAETagaf, 0V @£@ fyoirov. 29 But let us further hear Hesychius : — A%£Aojo(7 ? irora/xog Agxad'tag, nai irav bdcop ovrog XEysrat. See Alberti, and the authors cited by him. The Scholiast on Homer, II. (p. v. 194, remarks — Koivag ds irav udcog Ax^coog JtaXEirat. With respect to the Achelous, I have nothing more to add, but that Dawes (vide Miscel. Critica, p. 176) was precipitate in affirming that the name of this river could not be written Ax^aiog. The evidence of Apollonius Ehodius on this point is satisfactory. L. iv. v. 293 : — ,i eteov ys Tains vftETEgYis A%£Aoho£ E^avincriv. E. C, Bigham Hill, March 11, 1805. A PECULIAEITY IN HEEODOTUS. TO THE EDITOR OF THE ATHENiEUM. Sir, — Every reader of Herodotus has probably observed in him a peculiarity which has indeed been noticed by the critics, namely, that he frequently separates the preposition from the verb to which it belongs by the insertion of the particle j£. See Heyne's Excursus on the digamma, v. Ifa. V. 85. Eidog te (/,Ey£8o$ te nai Eifxwra aiyahoEVTa. Here it is easy to read ufog xat ^syEOog xai t which correction is also pro- posed by Matthsei. V. 86. UettXov (mev ya% ee o xcu [xa'hXov Eiuog, ei; tyiv %g> jtrnavianv io^eclv tou Xoyou h£%n9oTcog v7ro$E()0[AEVov E17TEIV, ' ' A^7rccy[xa, r)y£LO-9cci } KlXTOt, TO (<$>LM7r7TYio- B, r) " ouk a$7ra.y[AQv y\yy\aaT0 to Eivai icra. §eu." E. C. Higham Hill, Walthamstow, Feb. 1, 1815. M. R. vol. x. 44 Sir, — The reason why I addressed you a little while ago [x. 76-78] was, that I wished for once to enter my protest as an individual against a doctrine which is as dishonourable to God as, were it true, it would be fatal to the happiness of man; and I did not think that a better opportunity would offer than that of which, through your indulgence, I availed myself. Nor do I know any evasion by which the force of the observations which I then made can be eluded, except the following, that man is incompetent to pronounce upon the plans of an infinite Being. This, as a general proposition, will be admitted. But let the character of this infinite Being be defined, and let a cer- tain conduct be attributed to him which I can distinctly comprehend, and I shall be able to judge whether there is or is not a consistency between the acknowledged attributes of this great Being, and the conduct ascribed to him. Let this ob- servation be applied to the Calvinistic system of theology. God is represented as a Being infinite in power, wisdom, goodness, holiness, and justice. But it is maintained that his human off- spring, in consequence of the transgression of their first parents, are brought into existence with a nature totally cor- rupt, and that, with the exception of a chosen few, who without any claim to such a distinction will be rendered eternally happy, they will suffer the pains of hell for ever. Unless, then, reason was given me in vain, I can confidently conclude that either the divine character is misrepresented, or that this doctrine must be false. And the justice of this conclusion will be easily established by the following mode of reasoning : — God is in- finitely powerful, therefore he can do whatever is the object of power. God is infinitely wise, therefore he will choose the best ends, and pursue them by the best means. God is in- finitely good, therefore he must have a satisfaction in the hap- piness of his creatures, and his measures must be calculated to promote it. Thus far our deductions are clear and certain. But let us proceed. God is infinitely just, therefore he has created a race of depraved beings, and will punish them eternally for that, which it was out of their power to avoid. God is infinitely holy, therefore he has decreed that his off- 45 spring should be unholy, that their eternal sufferings may bear testimony to his holiness. Were ever premises and conclusion so at variance ! Should it still be said that we know not what justice and holiness may demand in an infinite Being, not to reply that the infinity of an attribute cannot change its nature, this would only be saying that holiness and justice, when pre- dicated of God, may mean something different from what they mean in the common use of language; in other words, that God may have been improperly denominated just and holy. Upon the same principle, goodness in God may mean something very different from the usual import of the term, and for anything that we know to the contrary, it may be the very benevolence of his nature which has doomed the majority of his human off- spring to eternal misery ! Before I dismiss the subject from my pen, perhaps for ever, with your permission I should be glad to make one or two ob- servations more : — God is allowed to be infinitely good. But according to the system which I am opposing, no ray or trace of goodness ap- pears in the issue of his dispensations towards the majority of mankind. Their condition is the same under the best of beings as it would have been under the worst ! Much has been said respecting vindictive justice as demand- ing the eternal punishment of sin. It would be easy to prove that the expression vindictive justice is egregiously incorrect. Punishment, when inflicted for some object of utility, is not vindictive, and when it goes beyond this object, it is universally denominated cruelty. But, waving this, if any case can be imagined which excludes the exercise of vindictive justice, it is that of Adam's helpless offspring. Born with a nature totally depraved, they are no more the proper subjects of vindictive punishment, than those brute animals whose natural propen- sities are savage and ferocious. My last observation respects the infinite satisfaction which Jesus Christ is supposed to have made to vindictive justice for the sins of the elect. To say nothing of the other absurdities with which this notion abounds, if sin is an infinite evil in the 46 case of the individual, it might be objected that the death of Christ could only do away the guilt of one sinner, and the rest must be pardoned gratuitously. Should it, on the other hand, be said that the combined guilt of a multitude cannot add to that which is already infinite, it uu questionably follows that the death of Christ was, in itself considered, an equivalent for the sins of the whole world. Why, then, is it not accepted as such ? The debt is discharged, and yet the debtor not set free. What nameless attribute of the Divine Nature is it which re- mains thus inexorable, or how comes it to pass that a man should do more mischief than a God could repair? . E. C. Higham Hill, March 1, 1815. M. R. vol. x. TO THE EDITOR OE THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir, — Being disengaged a few Sundays ago, I had an op- portunity of hearing a very good and useful sermon delivered by an orthodox dissenting minister. I did not indeed agree with the preacher in every point, and my ear was particularly struck with words to the following effect; — that there are two descriptions of men who are hostile to Christianity, they who reject revelation altogether, and they who will admit nothing as an article of revelation which they do not understand, who rush upon a mystery without any reverence for its awful retire- ment. As I have never been accustomed to feel much re- verence for the retirement of a mystery, I found myself com- pelled to take my station in this latter class, and there I was led into a train of reflections which I have since committed to paper, and which are now at your service. My first reflection, if such I may call it, was a feeling of as- tonishment that Christian divines should be so fond of contend- ing for mysteries in religion, after having read the fifth verse of the seventeenth chapter of the book of Kevelation. " And on her forehead was a name written, Mystery, Babylon the Great, the mother of harlots and abominations of the earth." But 47 my astonishment subsided a little when I recollected that theologians, as by a species of infatuation, have not unfre- quently sealed the condemnation of their favourite doctrines, by the very terms in which they have expressed them. I was next led to ask myself what is meant by the term mys- tery, as it has been generally applied to the doctrines of reve- lation. Is it simply a truth which surpasses the comprehension of the human mind, as the self- existence of the Deity, or is it a proposition which contradicts the most certain conclusions of the understanding, as the doctrine of transubstantiation ? Or, is it a term which they who employ it do not wish to have ac- curately defined, and which, as implying generally what is in- comprehensible, may denote either what is above reason, or w T hat is contrary to it ? Is it one of those ambiguous sounds which controversialists not unfrequently make use of as though to perplex the subject of inquiry, and by which they not only attempt to deceive others, but often impose upon themselves ? Certain it is that mystery is a word of very convenient applica- tion, and which theologians can employ or not, according as they w 7 ish to defend or refute a particular article of belief. Thus the Protestant tells the Catholic that his doctrine of tran- substantiation involves absurdity and contradiction; but when the same charge is brought against certain dogmas in his own creed, he finds in them nothing absurd or contradictory, but sees only certain sublime mysteries, into which, as they are not to be comprehended, it is impious to pry. Thus mystery, it seems, is a term which is conceived to afford a retreat from the persecution of argument, and is employed to soften that which ought to go by a different name into something which, with the appearance of falsehood, possesses the reality of truth. But are we not obliged, in many cases, to admit what is mysterious ? When I am informed what is meant by mys- terious in this question, I shall immediately be able to give an answer to it. If by mysterious is intended simply that which our understanding cannot grasp, I reply that we are often compelled to admit what is mysterious; for instance, that the great First Cause is self- existent ; but if by mysterious is meant 48 what is self- destructive and contradictory, as that a being who is infinitely benevolent should act the part of a cruel, arbitrary tyrant, we are not and we cannot be compelled to admit it. When, therefore, any proposition is set before us which seems to come under the general denomination of incomprehensible, we should carefully distinguish between that which surpasses our reason, and that which contradicts it. Great care should also be taken, lest we receive what is self- contradictory while misled by the vague and ambiguous use of language. Were these simple rules attended to, I conceive we should soon hear no more of what have usually been termed mysteries in re- ligion. But is it not an evidence of becoming diffidence and humility in fallible man to receive on the authority of revelation a truth by which the ordinary conclusions of the human mind are set at nought and confounded? If the authority of revelation were clearly made out on the one side, and on the other a pro- position were laid down to be admitted on this authority which should involve a contradiction, this would be a very perplexing case indeed ; but until God can contradict himself, this is a per- plexity to which we can never be reduced. We may indeed be called, on the authority of revelation, to admit truths which surpass the apprehension of our limited faculties ; and that this is perfectly reasonable may be shown by such a case as the following : — A child shall be informed by his father that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. Con- ceiving his father to be wiser than himself, and that he has no intention to deceive him, he will naturally give credit to this proposition, though he cannot comprehend the evidence on which it rests, and has no reason but authority for believing such to be the fact. But let the child be told that there is no angle, or only one angle in a figure which is affirmed to have three angles, and he would be no very promising child if he did not immediately perceive that there must be some error or equivocation in the use of the terms in which the proposition is conveyed. There is an important and obvious difference be- tween not seeing how a thing can be, and seeing why it cannot 49 be. I do not see how God should have existed from eternity, but I seem compelled to admit this, that I may not be obliged to admit what is more inexplicable. But I do see why God cannot be eternal and not eternal, self- existent and not self- existent, omnipotent and not omnipotent. Had this distinction, which it has sometimes been very convenient to overlook, been always attended to, certain religious controversies might have been brought to a speedier termination. It deserves also to be remembered, that there are certain propositions which, though they cannot perhaps be reduced in form to a contradiction, are so repugnant either to our reason or to our moral feelings, that nothing but the most irresistible evidence would lead the thoughtful inquirer to admit them. And yet propositions of this kind are thrust upon us on the faith of detached texts of scripture, which either imperiously demand or easily admit a more rational interpretation. I was next going to inquire into the practical utility of mysteries, but as this appeared clearly a non- entity, I proceeded to ask myself upon what evidence the doctrines which are usually termed mysteries are admitted. The evidence in favour of Christianity shall now be allowed to be as strong as it has at any time been represented by its most confident advocates. Is the evidence more satisfactory than those conclusions of the human mind which these mysterious doctrines would set aside ? Can I ever be more certain that Christianity is divine than I am that what I taste to be bread is bread and not flesh, and that what my senses inform me to be wine is wine, and not blood? How far the same mode of reasoning will apply to certain Protestant mysteries, it will become those who receive them to inquire. But it will be said, Does it not favour scepticism thus to balance the doctrines of revelation with its evidences, and to admit nothing that we do not conceive more likely to be true than that revelation itself should be false ? I answer, that the evidences of Christianity are, in my opinion, strong enough to support what I consider as the Christian doctrine, but not strong enough to support any mass of absurdity which the folly of man may choose to erect upon them. Experience indeed E 50 has shown, that that faith in Christianity which is the result of education and prejudice is strong enough to bear the most cumbrous load of error that the imagination of man has ever piled together ; but the intelligent inquirer who should come to the study of Christianity without any preposession in its favour, would certainly demand that, when from its external evidence he had seen reason to admit it to be divine, he should not be driven by its internal evidence to a contrary conclusion, — that when he had thought it morally impossible that this religion should be false, he should not find it absolutely impossible that it should be true. But whoever may charge the above mode of reasoning with being favourable to scepticism, it is to be hoped that this charge will not be brought by the advocate of mystery. Not to dwell on the consideration that the mysteries which have been annexed to religion have been the fruitful source of scepticism and infidelity, the admission of what has usually been termed a mystery shakes the very foundation of all human reasonings, and affords cause to sus- pect that those conclusions of the understanding which we should deem most clear and certain may nevertheless be false. E. C. Higham Hill, Aug. 9, 1815. M. R. vol. x. P.S. Allow me to thank your correspondent W. D. (p. 358) for his information respecting the passages from Heliodorus. Just before I read his communication, I had found, by looking into a number of the " Classical Journal," that I had been anti- cipated again and again. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir, —Upon reading the extracts fromMr. Townsend's Arma- geddon in your last (pp. 649—652), I could not help conceiving a wish that its merit as a poem might recommend it to an ex- tensive circulation, as it seems under the guise of poetic 51 imagery to present a just view of the horrors and absurdities of a system, which is infinitely more absurd and horrible than any other extravagance which the human mind has yet conceived. The perusal of such a work may perhaps have the happy effect of terrifying into their senses some of those who have been terrified out of them, and by presenting their creed before them in its true colours, may lead them to seek a refuge from its terrors in a diligent examination of the scriptures, that they may learn " whether these things are so." It requires a mind of a certain temperament, such as that of Jonathan Edwards and Mr. Townsend, to dwell upon the views exhibited in "Ar- mageddon " with a conviction of their truth, and not to sicken into anguish and despair. Hence I suspect that the generality of those who in the main think with Mr. Townsend will wish that, however his own fancy was delighted with such contem- plations, he had not endeavoured to fix the fancy of his reader on descriptions at which, I do not say reason stands aghast (for that in theology is a trifle), but at which humanity shudders. How much more to be applauded is the caution of a writer in the "Evangelical Magazine," who observes that though the doctrine of predestination is beautiful in its place (in what place, he has omitted to mention), it is not desirable that it should be dwelt upon too frequently. But leaving Mr. T., with whom, in truth, after the excellent remarks of your reviewer, I have very little to do, I proceed once more, with your permis- sion, to make one or two remarks on that system of Theology which is usually termed Calvinistic. It is then a system which, to say the least, is nowhere laid down in form in the New Testament, but is collected by inference from detached passages of scripture, and is a mere hypothesis to account for a certain phraseology which is infinitely better accounted for without it. It is a system which no good man can wish to be true, and which no man can believe to be true, who suffers his mind to be impressed with the general representation of the divine character and government which are given from Genesis to Re- velation. It is a system which gives a hideous picture of the Deity, transforming love into blind partiality, and justice into E % 52 insatiable vengeance. It is a system which, were it true, would render it a happiness for the human race, and, by probable in- ference, for the universe at large, could the theory of the Atheist be realised! It is a system which, by representing human nature as radically depraved, and sin in itself an infinite evil, leaves no room for degrees of criminality in human actions. It is a system which, consistently enough with itself, but in direct defiance of the scripture doctrine of retribution, makes something altogether independent of moral rectitude the ground of salvation, and which can send one man triumphing to glory from the scaffold, and calmly leave another who has endeavoured to exemplify every Christian virtue (unless a change not of character, gentle reader, but of views and reliance should take place) to be " whelm'd in stormy gulphs of rolling fire ! "* E. 0. Higham Hill, Nov. 13, 1815. M. R. vol. x. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir, — I am aware that when I said in my last, that the Cal- vinistic system can send a man triumphing to glory from the scaffold, I brought forward a case which the more intelligent and moderate of Calvinistic divines will consider as an enthu- siastic abuse, not a just consequence of their doctrine. But the system itself does not positively exclude such a case, as it admits conversion to be wrought at the very close of a vicious life. I think my memory is strictly correct with respect to an instance recorded in the obituary of a work published under the sanction of respectable names, the " Evangelical Maga- * 'Abov Ttves avoiyovrat 7rv\ai (3adeiai, Kai irorapoi nvpos opov Kai arvyos anoppcayes avaneTavvvvrai, Kai (tkotos €Tai 7ToKv(pavTa(7Tov, Kai XatrpLara Kai pvx oi > KaKaiV p-vpiav yepovres. — Plutarch de Super stitione. 58 zine." The writer visits a prostitute on her death-bed. He awakens her to a sense of her sad condition, goes through the usual process, and concludes his account with expressing a full conviction that he shall meet that poor creature in glory. To the observations of my last perhaps you will allow me to add the following : It will strike most minds with the force of an axiom, that it must be a general blessing to any species of beings to be under the government of an infinitely wise, just, and benevolent Creator. This axiom, Calvinism, if admitted, proves to be false. The first and great commandment is, " Thou shalt love thy God with all thy heart;" this commandment Calvinism sets aside by rendering the observance of it impracticable. On the other hand, the command refutes the doctrine. Calvinists with other Christians admit, on the evidence of Scripture, that God is infinitely good ; but Calvinism reduces this infinite goodness to mere theory which fact most woefully contradicts. And, strange to tell, the causes which prevent the exercise of this attribute are found in the Divine Nature itself ! Scripture assures us in various ways that mercy is what God delights to exercise ; but Calvinism sets up in its stead an infi- nite indignation at a supposed infinite evil, which reigns in the divine dispensations, triumphs over wisdom, equity, and good- ness, and which nothing can satisfy but the eternal sufferings of myriads of creatures, whose grand crime (as they were born with a nature radically corrupt) has been, that they were destined to exist ! And now, sir, as it is not probable that I shall trouble you again on this subject, I should like to take my leave of it with saying a word on the tone in which my observations have been written. Conceiving Calvinism to be a most gross corruption of the best gift of God to man, I have exhibited its inconsis- tencies and its horrors as they have struck my own mind with unrestrained freedom, but without even an evanescent feeling of ill-will towards those from whom I differ thus widely. Strong as is my conviction of the absurdity and impiety of the system it- 54 self, I shall ever lose sight of the theoretical Oalvinist when found in the person of the practical Christian. E. 0. Higham Hill, Bee. 8th, 1815. M. R vol. x. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir, — To some of your younger readers who may be dis- posed to inquire into the evidences of Christianity, the follow- ing remarks on Mr. Hume's objection to miracles may not be useless. I have considered this celebrated objection, and I think impartially, at different times for more than thirty years, and I have had but one opinion concerning it, which is, that it has no force whatever. The objection, indeed, has been ably answered again and again, and by some more elaborately than it required. To meet the conceptions of the multitude it may indeed be desirable that error should be exposed in many words ; but it is a maxim with me, that false reasoning always admits a short refutation, when it is once clearly discerned in what the fallacy consists. Mr. Hume's objection amounts to this, that a miracle being a violation of the order of nature, can never be rendered credible by testimony, as the falsehood of testimony can in no case be deemed miraculous. It would perhaps have been more correct to define a miracle to be a deviation from the order of nature ; but let this pass. It is to be observed that Mr. Hume does not object to the evidence which is produced in favour of the Christian miracles as being deficient in quantity, but denies in toto that this species of evidence can confirm a miracle. This makes it necessary to inquire a little into the force of this evidence. It will suit Mr. Hume's purpose that we should consider testimony in the gross, in which view of it, it must be confessed that it not unfrequently deceives. But testimony differs from testimony as much as error does from truth, and it 55 may be so circumstanced and so accumulated in force that its falsehood will be deemed impossible. Let the actions and the fate of the late Emperor of France be for a moment called to mind. These are admitted by thousands, upon the evidence of testimony alone, and admitted with as jull conviction as can be produced by mathematical or ocular demonstration. And will any one presume to sny that this evidence may be false ? Is it not to suppose a violation of the order of nature to suppose it false ?* It has just been intimated that testimony of a certain kind produces a conviction equal to what is produced by ocular demonstration. And whence does this arise ? It is the spontaneous and necessary result of experience. That kind and degree of testimony which we have never known to deceive us, we rest assured cannot deceive us ; and such is the confidence which we place in it, that the supposed improbability of the fact to which it bears witness, usually detracts nothing from the strength of the conviction which is effected by it. It is true enough that, according to Mr. Humes observation, we can- not rationally admit any fact till we conceive it to be more improbable that the evidence should be false than that the fact should be true. But in order to a just judgment, it is neces- sary that we consider on what ground we pronounce any fact to be antecedently improbable ; and it is certain that when our notions of its improbability arise, as they often do, from a mere defect of knowledge, they instantly yield to certain testimony. Such being the force of testimony, and such the nature of the faith which we place in it, I ask what fact cannot be sup- ported by testimony, the falsehood of which would be deemed * How far the evidence which is produced in favour of the Christian miracles falls short of the strongest possible testimony, is a question with which I have nothing to do. Mr. Hume's is an abstract position, that no testimony can prove the reality of a miracle. When this has been shown to be false, it remains with every one to consider for him- self whether the antecedent improbability of the Christian miracles appear to him to be surmounted by the testimony which is brought forward in their behalf. 56 impossible, except that which should itself appear to involve an impossibility ? But the Christian miracles do not come under this predicament, nor does Mr. Hume's argument proceed upon such a supposition. What, then, is it which renders them in- capable of being supported by testimony ? Their antecedent improbability \ And of this improbability how are we to judge ? Were they not referred to a superior power ? Were they supposed to be effected by some hidden law of nature which was never in action before nor since ; were it necessary to maintain that they took place without any assignable cause, and to acknowledge that they produced no important effect, their antecedent improbability would certainly be great. But from what data are we to conclude that God would never interfere miraculously in the government of the world, or, in other words, would never communicate to mankind such a revelation as the Christian ? And this improbability is the precise improbability which, if Mr. Hume is to be believed, no testimony can overcome. But such an interposition is contrary to experience. It has been observed that this expression is not quite accurate ; but waving this, I ask, may it not with equal truth be affirmed that the falsehood of testimony in certain circumstances is contrary to experience ? But to what expe- rience is the interposition in question contrary ? To say that it is contrary to universal experience is to beg the question. When, therefore, it is said that such an interposition is con- trary to experience, the meaning must be that it is contrary either to our experience or to general experience. To urge that it is contrary to our experience would be to lay it down as an axiom, that if God should ever interfere miraculously in the affairs of men, he must interfere also in our age and for our particular satisfaction. To press the objection that such an interposition is contrary to general experience, would subject the objector to a very perplexing question. What reason is there to suppose that if God should interfere miraculously in the administration of the world, such interpositions would be so frequent as to be matters of general experience ? In the case of events which must take place, if they take place at all, by 57 the operation of the laws of nature, general experience will reasonably influence our belief, and the want of similar instances will render us slow in admitting facts which seem to set the ordinary course of nature at defiance. But to bring a miraculous interposition of Providence, which is recorded to have taken place at a certain time and for a certain purpose, to the test of general experience, is palpably absurd, unless it could be proved that if miracles were ever wrought they must be wrought frequently, which is a proposition that no one would choose to defend.. But to show how little experience has to do with the credibility of a Divine revelation, let us suppose that God had never interposed miraculously in the government of the world to the present hour, and that the question were now put, whether he ever would so interpose. The only rational reply would be, Who can tell but he who sees the end from the beginning ? Allowing the improbability of such an interposition from the want of past experience, would this improbability amount to anything like a proof that the future would in this respect correspond to the past ? And shall that become incredible, when attested, which it was by no means certain would not take place ? In a word, that anything short of the absolute incredibility of a fact in itself considered should render it incapable of being proved by testimony, is a paradox which it may require some ingenuity to defend, but which it is truly wonderful that any human being should be found seriously to believe. I affirm, then, without fear of refutation, that the evidence of testimony may be so circum- stanced as to render a miracle wrought for a certain purpose the object of rational belief. And I have no hesitation to affirm, also, that whoever would not believe such miracle upon the strongest possible testimony, would not believe it on the evidence of ocular demonstration. But in fact, a being so incredulous does not exist. I once, indeed, heard an unbe- liever say, that he would not believe a miracle if he saw it. I approved his consistency, though I did not give credit to his declaration. Man, however reluctant, may be compelled to believe his eyes, and he may also be compelled to put faith 58 in testimony, in spite of all the refined and subtle reasonings in the world. In many cases, he cannot wait to calculate between the strength of the evidence and the improbability of the fact; and in some cases, could he wait for ever, he would not know how to manage the calculation. And conscious of his infirmity, he chooses in such cases rather to examine the validity of the testimony, of which he can judge with tolerable exactness, than to fatigue his faculties with endeavouring to balance the evidence which is laid before him against improbabilities, the force of which he cannot estimate. And in the case of Chris- tianity, if he conceives himself to be an incompetent judge of the antecedent credibility of a Divine Kevelation, his business is to inquire into the evidence with as much impartiality as he can, and to abide by the result of such inquiry. If any Christian has precisely calculated the preponderance of this evidence above the a priori improbability of the facts, I should be glad to be acquainted with the balance. And if any disciple of Mr. Hume will point out the measure in which the antecedent improbability of the facts surmounts the strength of the testimony, added to the improbability of the prevalence of Christianity, had the miracles been false, he may call upon me to abjure the Christian faith. One word more on the subject of miracles, and I have done. Though we could not judge a priori whether God would inter- fere miraculously in the government of the world, yet when such an interposition has taken place, its credibility may be heightened by the end which was proposed by it, and the con- sequences by which it has been followed. Thus the Christian dispensation, among other objects, was avowedly intended to overthrow the idolatry of the heathen world, and to establish the worship of the One living and true God. And this purpose it has most fully and gloriously accomplished. The miracles, then, recorded in the Christian Scriptures, are not events which have left no trace behind them, but are events of which the effects have been experienced from the season of their occurrence to the present hour, and which will continue to be experienced till time shall be no more. 59 It has, I think, been made to appear that Mr. Hume, while he threatens destruction to Christianity at a blow, has in fact effected nothing, and that the Christian does not set aside every principle of rational belief, when he acknowledges Jesus of Nazareth to have been a man approved of God by MIEACLES and signs which God did by him. E. C. Higham Hill, Nov. llth, 1816. M. K. vol. xi. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir, — When a man has been handsomely invited to speak, it might appear disrespectful to be silent. This is my apology for saying a few words more on the subject of miracles, while I am not conscious that I have anything to advance which is worthy the notice of your readers. I am happy that your ingenious Correspondent, A. B. C, agrees with me in the main point, that Mr. Hume's reasoning is inconclusive. The only remaining question, then, is, whether the testimony in favour of the miracles recorded in the New Testament is sufficient to establish facts confessedly so extraordinary : and of this question every man must judge for himself. There is no scale of im- probability on the one hand, or of the strength of testimony on the other, to which such an appeal can be made as to force con- viction on every mind. I agree with your Correspondent, that no event which has taken place according to the laws of nature, could in reality have been antecedently improbable. But I at the same time conceive that we can form no judgment of the improbability of a miracle, by a miracle being understood an evidence of a Divine interposition for a certain object. Your Correspondent observes that I should require stronger testimony to prove that a man had risen from the dead, than that a man had died. Undoubtedly. And if this supposed resurrection of a dead man were not referred to a Divine Power, and were 60 not intended to answer some useful purpose, though I might perhaps be compelled to admit it (as no violation of the laws of nature can he more wanton and inexplicable than the false- hood of the strongest testimony), I should scarcely know how to defend the belief of it on the ground of reason. But the credibility of this fact is altogether changed when I see that it is calculated to answer an important end, and moreover see this end effected by it. The event now supposed is not, properly speaking, a violation of the laws of nature, which, I take for granted, will continue to operate as before. It is necessary for the benefit of man that the laws of nature should be steady in their operation; but it may, however, also be necessary that God should for a certain purpose interpose and act without them. Your Correspondent observes, that we are not much disposed to admit the miracles of the second and third centuries, and asks, if we make thus free with testimony removed from us by the lapse of time, where are we to stop ? I reply, when we arrive at miracles which were calculated to answer an im- portant object, and which are supported by testimony which appears unexceptionable and satisfactory. And I cannot help remarking here, that the progress and present existence of Christianity, afford such a proof of the credit which was given to the miracles of the New Testament history in the earliest ages, as compensates for the distance to which the testimony is thrown by the intervention of time, and which, though it does not actually diminish the force of the testimony in itself considered, causes it to press with less force upon our minds, and leaves us at liberty to neglect it if we please. E. C. Higham Hill, Jan. \5th, 1817. M. E. vol. xii. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir,— In p. 56 of your " Repository " for January, I find this alarming declaration, sealed by the authority of Mr. Stodhart, 61 of Pell Street, Ratcliff Highway, that " they who deny the co-equal and co-essential godhead of Jesus Christ, will, with Unitarians, he damned to all eternity." I read this denun- ciation with a mingled feeling of astonishment, contempt, and pity. My astonishment, indeed, was not called forth "by any novelty in the thing, as the temper which dictates these ana- themas is, unhappily, prevalent enough. But were the sen- tence rung in my ears every hour of every day, I should never cease to he astonished at the presumption of a poor fallible mortal, who should dare to seat himself on the throne of God, and shut the gates of mercy on all who do not think as he does. — Unitarians are to be damned to all eternity ! — Not surely because they differ in their religious creed from Mr. Stodhart. And yet I defy him, in conjunction with all who hold the same opinion, to assign a better reason why they should be damned than this would be. Theologians are not always with caution bold, but he must be a bold man indeed, who should have the hardihood to deny that Unitarianism has ranked amongst its professors, men who have been eminently adorned with every Christian virtue. Nor would he be less audacious, who should venture to affirm, that Unitarianism does not embrace every practical 'principle of Christianity. Virtue, indeed, is to a Unitarian the acknowledged end of his faith, and every article in his creed enforces the practice of virtue. But he does not believe the co-equal and co- essential Godhead of Jesus Christ ; and, therefore, he is to be damned to all eternity. Mr. Stodhart, I am afraid, would not hear him, or he might plead, if not in arrest of judgment, at least in extenuation of his crime, that amidst the various and contra- dictory explanations which have been given of the Trinitarian doctrine, he was altogether at a loss to understand what it was that he was called upon to believe. Mr. Stodhart, however, (whose knowledge, no doubt, is equal to his zeal,) may perhaps be able to throw some new light on this perplexing subject, and may condescend to inform us how three false* deities * The Father alone, saith Mr. Stodhart, is a false Deity. " To us there is but one God even the Father," says the Apostle Paul. And in in- 62 make one true God ; unless, indeed, he should determine, in his anger, to leave us to find out the secret for ourselves. But Mr. Stodhart would say, mine is the doctrine of Scripture, and if the Unitarians would read the New Testament with im- partiality, they would find it there expressed in every page. No doubt if they would take Mr. Stodhart for their guide, and obligingly accept his interpretation of Scripture phraseology, they would find not only this doctrine, but every other article of his delectable system. But with Mr. Stodhart's good leave, they would rather see with their own eyes than with his ; especially as, were they to borrow his optics, they might per- chance, imbibe his spirit ; from which, at present, every feeling of their heart revolts. But Mr. S. would add, or if he did not, somebody would for him, the Unitarians perversely and wil- fully shut their eyes against the truth. It is no wonder that they who usurp one prerogative of the Almighty, should, upon occasion, exercise another. And, in truth, many of our orthodox brethren have a marvellous faculty of diving into the hearts of their opponents. In the twinkliug of an eye they can unlock the breast of a poor Unitarian, and there, amidst other dire and dreadful things, they can clearly behold original depravity, in the shape of carnal reason, arming itself in proud rebellion against the truth of God. Some of this perspicacious fraternity have ascertained that Unitarians are neither more nor less than unbelievers in disguise. Others, I terpreting this declaration according to its literal meaning, I am sup- ported by a good authority. A recent convert to Orthodoxy, in order to guard against the dire effects of interpreting Scripture upon the princi- ples of rational criticism, has laid down a rule of interpretation, in terms to the following effect : that Scripture language is always to be explained according to the natural and obvious meaning of the words. Were this canon applied to the greater part of the New Testament, what woeful work would it make with the popular theology ! It was kind, however, to endeavour to furnish a principle, which would at once clear up every difficulty. Mr. Stodhart, it is to be feared, would not have been thus indulgent ; he would have contented himself with proclaiming, This is the truth, and if you will not believe it, you will be damned to all eternity ! 63 am told, have discovered that, in the heart of a Unitarian, piety at best never rises above the level of infidel devotion. As we have been accustomed to pay some respect to the in- junction of our Master, "Judge not, that ye be not judged," we confess ourselves not qualified to carry on our theological warfare by this method of attack. We, therefore, leave it in the exclusive possession of our opponents ; and much good may it do them. — But enough and more than enough on this ungracious topic. I will therefore, only add, that it is high time that this damning spirit of bigotry should hide its head and blush. Blush, indeed, it cannot, for bigotry, as it has no feeling, knows no shame. Let it, then, if it must be so, pour forth its fury while it may. The time cannot fail to come, when the wretched system which ministers fuel to this unholy flame, shall have been swept from the face of the earth by the progressive operation of that spirit of inquiry, which weak men may lament and bigots may execrate, but which no threats of damnation can intimidate, nor any mortal power repress. e: o. Higham Hill, March 4th, 1819. M. R. vol. xiv. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir, — My attention having been lately directed to the subject of natural religion, I send you a few reflections upon it, to make such use of as you shall please. By natural religion, as distinguished from revealed, might seem to be meant that system of faith and worship which has prevailed in the world where revelation has been unknown. But this appellation is rather given to certain principles which, while they have been admitted by some, have been rejected by others, and which have been very indistinctly apprehended by the majority of mankind. But whatever may be the principles of natural religion, and however clear may be their evidence, I ask, what has this religion effected ? Has it ever saved man- 64 kind from the grossest idolatry and the most debasing super- stition ? Has it at at any period led the great mass of the human race to the worship or the knowledge of One all-wise, all-powerful, all-benevolent Creator ? The fundamental principle of religion is the being of a God ; and it is generally admitted, that there is no truth in the whole circle of moral inquiry, which rests upon such satisfactory and conclusive evidence. We also, as Christians, believe that this God is infinite in wisdom, power, and goodness; and this glo- rious truth we pronounce to be not more the doctrine of reve- lation than the dictate of sound philosophy. But let us hear the voice of an enlightened Heathen. Cicero begins his work on the " Nature of the Gods" with this memorable declaration, that the question respecting the nature of the gods is very diffi- cult and very obscure. And whoever reads the Treatise through, may see reason to congratulate himself that he did not live in an age when such a disputation could be held on such a subject. I pass over the providential government of God, to the doctrine of a future life ; and on this important doctrine I shall quote a few observations from a work recently published, and entitled " Apeleutherus," premising that though I differ from the Author most materially, this difference does not diminish my respect for his talents, or my admiration of his sincerity. But I shall first make a remark on a position of our Author's, respecting the evidence of what he terms super- natural revelation. " The history of a miracle cannot, without absurdity, be ad- mitted as evidence of the truth of any doctrine, since it cannot communicate that certainty which it does not itself possess." What it does not possess it undoubtedly cannot communicate. But suppose it to possess some degree of probability , which indeed the Author virtually admits, there will certainly be no absurdity in taking its evidence as far as it will go ; but there would be a great absurdity in rejecting this evidence alto- gether, because it does not amount to certainty ; unless, indeed, the doctrine for which it pleads " is already supported by more than sufficient evidence of an indisputable kind." " In all C5 oases in which human nature can feel an interest, would it not be much more easy to learn the truth, independently of the miracle, than to arrive at absolute certainty concerning the miracle, in order to prove the doctrine ? I say absolute cer- tainty, because nothing short of this can be of any use in the case we are considering." Do the principles of natural religion, then, rest upon absolute certainty ? * If not, they can be of no use whatever, and we shall be in danger, for want of cer- tainty, of having no religion at all. But why is this absolute certainty required ? Human belief and human conduct in general are governed by probability, and by probability alone. The conviction, however, which is produced by historical testi- mony, and that with respect to facts of great antiquity, is scarcely to be distinguished from the confidence of certain knowledge. And though " human testimony," according to our Author, " however credible, may or may not be true," when upon sufficient inquiry we have satisfied ourselves that it is true, we feel persuaded that in this particular case it cannot be false. " But if any man could persuade me that my eternal salvation were depending upon its truth, he would, at the same moment, fill my mind with doubt and anxiety." Let me feel the same conviction of the reality of any fact, as I do of the reality of many facts, even of ancient date, and my mind would be filled with no doubt or anxiety, whatever were depending upon its truth. But to proceed to the subject of a future life; "what I principally rely on/' says our Author, ' ' is the obvious suitable- ness and propriety of a sequel to our present existence, and the manifest absurdity of supposing the wise and benevolent Creator to have produced so noble a work as man, for the mere purpose of destroying him; and I rely principally on this, because, from its simplicity and force, it appears emi- * That they do not, our Author himself acknowledges when he says, with respect to a future life, p. 234, that " certainty is entirely out of the question." This concession, indeed, I did not expect, after having read in p. 219, that it is impossible that human life should terminate in the silence and darkness of the grave. F 66 nently calculated to affect, and is, in fact, that consideration which has always affected, the mass of mankind, and produced that universal expectation of a future life which we find to pre- vail in the world ; " * and which he tells us elsewhere has pre- vailed among the generality of the human race, " with scarcely the intervention of a doubt." What has been thus confidently received by the generality of the human race, I am not able to say ; but there are many passages in the ancient authors which satisfactorily demonstrate that the wisest philosophers of Greece and Kome could not advance beyond this alternative — that death would either prove the extinction of being, or be an in- troduction to a better state of existence than the present. And much as this argument has always affected the mass of man- kind, Plato seems to have felt its force but feebly, when he wrote his Phsedon, or he would not have taken so much pains to estab- lish the natural immortality of the soul ; which he conceived, and, I think, justly in his circumstances, to be essential to the proof of a life to come. As it is not, I presume, an article of natural religion that a time will come when the whole human * But our Author proceeds : — " Not indeed that this argument necessarily presents itself to the unassisted understanding of every individual of mankind ; or even that a majority of the human race has in any age possessed powers and information to reason correctly in this way ; but that in every age it has pleased the sovereign Creator and Governor of the universe to raise up men of superior discernment and penetration, who, after having explored the paths of science for them- selves, have delighted in communicating their discoveries to others." This does not appear very consistent with what we read in p. 128, that " the religion of reason and nature is intelligible to every human being, who is willing to open his eyes, and to fix them attentively upon its luminous and instructive lessons." But if, as we are informed, there is a manifest absurdity in supposing the wise and benevolent Creator to have produced so noble a work as man for the mere purpose of destroy- ing him, I cannot help inquiring how it came to pass that superior discernment and penetration should be necessary for discovering this absurdity 1 Did the difficulty lie in ascertaining the premises, or in drawing the conclusion 1 As for the multitude who were too dull to discern this absurdity themselves, there is reason to suspect that they took the matter upon trust, and never distinctly apprehended the force of the argument by which they were so much affected. 07 race will at once be raised from their graves, and restored to life and action, he who shall attempt, without the light of reve- lation, to establish the future existence of the human species, will fail in a material point if he omits to show that there is something in man which must or may survive the stroke of death. It would not have satisfied Plato, nor would it satisfy me to say, " It is in vain for me to inquire how I am to exist hereafter, since I am utterly unable to comprehend how I exist at present!' But to return to the argument under consideration. It rests upon the position that the phenomena of human life, without a future being, imply a. defect of wisdom and goodness in the Creator. Thus far, then, the perfection of the Divine charac- ter is an hypothesis unsupported by fact. And unless it can be established by certain abstract reasonings (and these, while they may appear satisfactory to some, will seem nugatory to others), it will be precipitate to draw from it an inference so contrary to present appearances, as the future existence of the human race. But, says our Author, admit a future state, " and we at once obtain a view of the scheme of Divine Providence, comprehensive, luminous, and delightful." This I am by no means disposed to deny. But unless this view of it be con- firmed by the authority of that God who alone knows his own counsels, it is only an hypothesis, and an hypothesis which, in many minds, would not prevail against that universal analogy, which seems to forbid the hope that life, when once extinct, will ever be restored. Setting revelation entirely out of the ques- tion, we might say, that, as a matter of fact, God seems to consult not so much for the individuals of mankind as for the species, and that it would be difficult to prove that the conti- nuation and progressive improvement of the species would not answer all the ends which the Creator had in view in their formation. Man, it might be said, is a noble work, but not so noble, perhaps, in the eyes of the Creator as in his own ; and as for the waste of intellectual and moral attainment, which is implied in the destruction of the individuals of the species, it may be no great object amidst the immensity of creation, and F 2 68 in the estimation of a Being whose power, no doubt, is perpe- tually employed in producing life, intellect, and happiness throughout his vast dominions. And were the whole human race what the great majority have thus far been, their extinc- tion might not seem to form a much stronger objection to the plan of Providence than that of the beasts that perish. But our Author's argument, as stated above, seems to resolve itself into this simple proposition, that a perfectly wise and good Being could not form a rational agent without making him immortal. The fact, however, that man dies and is heard of no more, seems to negative the proposition ; and that reason- ing must be powerful which shall overcome this stubborn objection.* I am by no means prepared to prove that the pro- * Even granting the perfections of the Deity, it would be difficult to show that such a being as man, even though the individuals of the species should perish, would not be a desirable link in the chain of animated existence ; and it has always appeared to me something like presumption to affirm that God cannot be wise and good, unless A., B., and C, should be immortal. My view of the subject is well expressed in p. 18 of Mr. J. Kenrick's admirable Sermon "On the Necessity of Revelation to teach the Doctrine of a Future Life." In a word, the constitution of the world differs, in various respects, from what our limited understandings would have led us to expect from the combina- tion of infinite power, wisdom, and benevolence ; and being thus, as it should seem, convicted of ignorance (if these are in truth the attri- butes of the Deity), we go beyond our province, when we confidently pronounce that the future existence of the human race is necessary to make the scheme of Providence complete. Our Author's error (for if I had not thought him in an error I should not have troubled myself to write what I have written) consists in magnifying presumptions into proofs, and attributing an undue force to certain considerations which render revelation credible, in order to show that it was not necessary. But as long as man should appear to be lost for ever in the grave, it would be at least a thing ardently to be desired, that we could be distinctly informed by Him who made us, what he has yet in view respecting us. Setting aside the history of revelation, nothing like the restoration of a man once dead, that is, nothing which, as a matter of fact, could give any assurance of a life to come, has ever been heard of since the world began. As Mr. Belsham somewhere 69 position is false, but were my hope of a future life to rest solely or principally upon it, I should wish to see it confirmed by something like logical demonstration. In pp. 218, 219, of " Apeleutherus," there is a fine passage on the painful moral discipline to which man is rendered sub- ject, and which gives a more persuasive force to the argument. But I am afraid that the sufferings of which our Author treats so eloquently, would more generally excite a doubt of the per- fection of the Divine attributes, than suggest a confident ex- pectation of a life to come. Our Author rejects with disdain the argument for a future life, which has been drawn from the inequality of the Divine dispensations, asking, with the poet, What can we reason but from what we know ? and quoting the well-known observation of Mr. Hume, " that you have no ground to ascribe to the author of Nature any qualities but what you see he has actually exerted and displayed in his pro- ductions." I am surprised that he did not perceive that there is opportunity to apply this reasoning against himself. 1 take human life as I find it, checkered with suffering, deformed by moral evil, and terminating in death ; and I ask, whether the plan of Providence, as far as we have any certain knowledge of it, corresponds to the character of an infinitely wise, power- ful, and benevolent Creator ? The ground on which our au- thor's argument is founded will oblige him to answer, no. How, then, am I to be assured that God is infinite in wisdom, power, and goodness ? The hypothesis of a future life, indeed, will settle everything ; but on what certain foundation is the hypothesis to rest, until the perfection of the Divine character shall have been established ? It will not satisfy to say, that there must be a future state, and therefore that God may be infinitely powerful, wise, and good ; nor, on the other hand, that eloquently expresses himself, on the natural probability of a resurrec- tion, " Experience is silent ; philosophy is confounded ; revelation alone darts a beam of light through the solid gloom ; the messenger of heavenly truth announces, that all who are in their graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth." 70 God is all perfection, and therefore there must be a life to come. Here Christianity comes admirably to our assistance, and declares what otherwise, however plausible, would be assumption only, that " this mortal will put on immortality." But, it is said, the grand miracle on which Christians have usually laid so great a stress, namely, the resurrection of Christ, neither proves the immortality of the soul nor the general resurrection of human bodies. Granting the reality of the fact, and, what I think will not be denied, that the apostles understood its meaning, it is a divine attestation to the future existence of the human race ; and an attestation which I would not exchange for all the arguments which have been advanced in favour of the doctrine, from the days of Plato to the present hour. Upon the whole, I feel a decided conviction, that, without revelation, the question respecting a future life is involved in deep obscurity. And I think it worthy of remark, that, with the exception of one or two individuals of a sanguine east of mind, I have met with no one who doubted of the truth of Christianity, who did not doubt in an equal degree of a life to come. At the same time, the uncertainty in which nature leaves the subject is no objection to the reality of a future being, when it is confirmed by the voice of revelation. We are told, indeed, that " if Christianity be not built upon the solid rock of natural religion, it can have no foundation at all." If by this observation were meant that revelation cannot contradict the clear and certain deductions of reason, I should subscribe to the proposition with all my heart and soul. But if thereby be intended that revelation cannot disclose what reason might never have discovered, I cannot help regarding it as manifestly false ; since it is only saying, in other words, that God must reveal all that he chooses to make known of his purposes by one medium, which is what few men would choose to affirm. Or if it is to be understood as intimating, that no historical and external evidence can confirm the truth of revelation, I should reply, that this is a proposition which 71 cannot be maintained without setting aside our faith in testi- mony, and undermining the principal foundation of human knowledge. E. 0. April, 1819. M. R. vol. xiv. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir, — I am sorry that your correspondent Homo (p. 293), who attributes to me a great deal more than I dare take to myself, should look to me for that satisfaction which he has not, it seems, been able to obtain from the liberal divines of the present day. He must, however, I think, have been convinced that the doctrine of the eternity of hell torments is not the doctrine of Scripture ; and when this is set aside, I do not know what compels us to affix an interpretation to the ex- pressions in which the future punishment of sin is denounced, which would be inconsistent with that infinite goodness which we ascribe to the Creator. I take this opportunity to suggest, that I have long doubted whether the description in the twenty-fifth chapter of Matthew, from the 31st verse to the end, has any reference to a future life. Certainly the reason which is assigned for the acceptance of those on the King's right hand, and the rejection of those on his left, is altogether inapplicable to myriads of the human race, and therefore does not naturally direct the mind to what is called the day of judgment. I propose this doubt with diffidence, and should be glad to see the question discussed by some abler person who should think that there is ground for my suspicion. E. C. June, 1819. M. R. vol. xiv. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir, — Upon perusing Mr. Hutton's excellent sermon lately delivered at Bradford (see "Mon. Repos." p. 400), I was led to 72 ask myself upon what principle our Oalvinistic brethren can refuse to yield to the force of his reasonings ; and the answer was, that it can only be by persisting to view morality through a medium of their own ; a medium which, it may be observed, annihilates the moral agency of man. Their system is founded on the position that the human heart is altogether depraved, and that man, in an unregenerate state, can do nothing which will be of any avail towards acceptance with God. If this be so, man is not a moral agent according to any imaginable de- finition by which the notion of moral agency can be conveyed. Not only the knowledge of what is good, but the power to do what is good enters into the very essence of moral action ; and this power is by the Oalvinistic hypothesis excluded. But the freedom of the will may constitute man a moral agent. Let the will be as free as freedom can make it, as long as the humau heart remains totally corrupt, it can only choose between different forms of evil; and since every sin is an infi- nite evil, it can signify nothing, as to the moral quality of the action, in what form the offence is committed. But does not the moral evil which abounds in the world countenance the doctrine of the original depravity of man ? Does not this hypothesis well explain the wickedness which deforms the moral creation, and afford the solution of a phenomenon which no one, whatever be his views of theology, can refuse to admit? No doubt, the hypothesis that the human heart is totally and radically corrupt, will account for all the sin (if sin it ought to be called) which man does or can commit; but there is an- other phenomenon for which it does not account, and with which it can never be reconciled, and that is, the quantum of good which is found in the actions of men together with the evil, and which, whatever this quantum may be, completely sets aside the hypothesis. Will the Calvinists say that there is nothing morally good in those acts which mankind have deno- minated virtuous, when performed by the unregenerate man ? Would the chastity of a Joseph and the benevolence of the good Samaritan have no quality of moral excellence in an Uni- tarian Christian ? Then will I in my turn deny that there is 73 any moral turpitude in the deeds which are ascribed to an Heliogabalus and a Nero. To what sad extremities are men driven in reasoning, when they oppose hypothesis to fact ! But let us pass from the unregenerate to the regenerate man. Were anything surprising in the business of theology, it would be surprising that intelligent Oalvinists should not see that the effects which they ascribe to the operation of the Holy Spirit' may easily be accounted for without having recourse to super- natural interposition. Let a man who sincerely admits the principles of Calvinism be also disposed to reflect much upon these principles (and this he surely may be, without a divine influence), and his conversion seems to follow of course. When he is once convinced that, without flying to the right- eousness of Christ he is undone for ever, nothing is more natural than that he should ardently embrace what he is taught to consider as the gospel method of salvation ; and in the con- templation of what he regards as the scheme of redemption, his religious feelings will be wrought up to a tone which the undiscerning mind may easily be led to ascribe to the agency of the Spirit of God, especially when possessed of an opinion that the human heart is naturally incapable of raising its affections to things above. And hence it is not to be wondered at, that men of a sanguine temperament should at length attain an un- doubting conviction that they have experienced that operation of divine grace, which alone can save them from the wrath to come. But what is it ; after all, that is effected by regeneration ? Does it purify the heart altogether from the corruption of sin ? This will hardly be affirmed. There is then an infinite evil still lurking within, and which must occasionally burst forth into actual transgression ; so that it would be difficult to prove that the regenerated soul is better fitted for heaven after regene- ration than before. And though the moral disposition and conduct may be in the main consistent with the pure precepts of Christianity, this is no more than what is found in many whom Calvinism dooms to everlasting perdition. So that, judging from fact, the human heart, which is by hypothesis 74 radically and totally corrupt, is capable of as much moral ex- cellence in its natural and depraved state, as when it has been wrought upon and purified by the Spirit of God ! E. C. Higham Hill, June 25, 1819. M. K. vol. xiv. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir, — Allow me to join Mr. Howe (p. 661), in recommend- ing to the attention of our Unitarian friends the Society for the Belief of Aged and Infirm Dissenting Ministers. For what reasons they have hitherto been backward upon this occa- sion, I have no right to inquire. But if there are any who think that it will wound the feelings of ministers in distress to be relieved by this Society, I can only say, that to me this ap- prehension appears altogether groundless. It will not, I con- ceive, wound any man's feelings to receive assistance from a fund which was not raised in consideration of his individual case, but with a prospective view to the case of all who should be circumstanced as he is ; nor will any man be ashamed to ac- knowledge himself poor, whose profession has been known to exclude the means of rising above poverty. The situation of Dissenting Ministers, who are solely or chiefly dependent upon the emoluments of their profession, does not appear to me to have been sufficiently considered. Their sensibilities are com- monly somewhat refined by education ; their office introduces them to the intimacy of men comparatively rich, and thus they contract a familiarity with the comforts and accommodations of what are called easy circumstances ; the whole of their active life is not unfrequently one continued struggle with difficulties; and, at length, when overtaken by age and infirmity, they may, without any fault of their own, be thrown upon the support of precarious charity. Surely to men thus circumstanced it will be cheering and consolatory to find that, while they are labour- ing to promote the best interests of mankind, the peculiarities 75 of their condition are not overlooked, but that the more wealthy part of the Dissenting community are cheerfully contributing to a society, which has for its object the support and comfort of their declining years. It will be to them a delightful argu- ment that they have not laboured in vain in inculcating the lessons of that Master, who left it as his last injunction to his followers, that they should love one another. What objections of any weight can be urged against the institution in question, I am unable to conceive. But I shall, I trust, be excused if I remark, that those reasonings ought to be founded on clear and certain principles, which are allowed to stop the hand of charity. Benevolence may, indeed, be exercised indiscreetly; but it is better for a man's self that it should be indiscreetly exercised, than that it should be checked by scrupulous and, perhaps, mistaken calculations of the good or evil by which its exercise might be followed. But no imaginable evil, that I can see, can possibly result from any support which is likely to be given to the Society for which Mr. Howe is pleading, and for which I sincerely hope that he may not plead in vain. E. 0. Higham Hill, Dec. 4, 1819. M. K. vol. xiv. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir, — Having repeatedly heard intelligent persons express an opinion, that the question concerning Liberty and Necessity involves difficulties from which the human mind cannot easily extricate itself, I conceived that it might not be useless to show, that as a philosophical question it is as simple as need be, and admits a most clear and certain solution. The controversy has been embarrassed by the use of the term motive, which is not essential to it, and which, being capable of different interpre- tations, has left room for misapprehension and subterfuge. The proposition of the Necessitarian is precisely this, that every volition or determination of the mind is the necessary 76 result of the state of the mind at the time when the determi- nation is formed.* Of the truth of this proposition, in regard to myself, I am conscious; and presuming that the general constitution of all human minds is the same, I suspect that, were the question closely urged, the consciousness of every other man would coincide in this respect with my own. And were it not for certain consequences, which are supposed to follow the admission of this doctrine, I am persuaded that no human being would have been found to doubt its truth. But in opposition to this statement the advocate of Liberty maintains, that there is in the human mind a self- determining power, to which, as their proper cause, all the volitions or determinations of the mind are to be referred. What, then, is the operation of this self- determining power ? By the very definition, it is not governed in its exercise by the state or disposition of the mind. Does it, then, itself determine the state of mind in which a certain volition shall be formed ? Then, as no mental act can be performed except in some certain state of mind, it may be asked, How came the mind to be in that state in which the self- determining power was called upon to act ? Did this power of its sovereign pleasure decree this state of the mind also, and before this a former state, and so on to the first moment of conscious existence, always acting in a certain state of mind, and always determining that state ? But in reality, the determining the state of the mind, in which a given volition shall take place, would not differ from deter- mining the volition itself. In a given state of mind, then, does * Though I have avoided the use of the term motive, I do not mean to intimate, that motives have nothing to do with volition. By motive, indeed, the Necessitarian means not only the inducement which is pre- sented to the mind, but the mental disposition in which a given volition is formed. But to use the term in its ordinary acceptation, it may be remarked, that every state of mind in which a volition takes place, results partly from a former state, and partly from the influence of certain motives or considerations which are suggested to the mind. And no truth in the whole circle of intellectual inquiry seems more self-evident than this, that from a definite state of mind, nothing but a definite volition can proceed. 77 it determine the volition ? If so, can it determine in opposition to the state of the mind at the time when the volition is formed? If not, it can do nothing that is worth contending for. If it can, whenever this case is realised the will inclines one way, and the mind another. But as the will in its exercise cannot, even in imagination, he distinguished from the mind in the act of willing, the mind wills against itself, or wills and does not will the same thing, at the same time. That this reasoning may not be confronted by classical authority, I just remark, that Homer's well-known oxymoron shcov czshovti ye Sy^w, stands at an immeasurable distance from the case which is here supposed. But let this self- determining power be examined a little more closely. And as it is stated to be the faculty of the mind which determines the volitions, and, therefore, the actions of men, it is reasonable to ask, whether it possesses the properties of judgment, reflection, and other qualities which have always been supposed to have some influence upon the determinations of the will ? If so, it is no longer a faculty of the mind, but the mind itself; and when we are told that it is the efficient cause of volition, all that is meant is, that our volitions are the volitions of the mind. If it does not possess these properties, it is nothing but the simple power of volition, which, as it will not submit to be governed by the state or habit of the mind, but insists upon the privilege of determining itself, is not dis- tinguishable from blind caprice, or what we usually term chance. Shall it be said that the mind determines its volitions by means of a self- determining power, which is inherent in it, and essential to it ? Can the mind, then, form either of two oppo- site volitions at the same time, and in the same frame and dis- position ? If not, it does not possess a self- determining power, and everything is conceded which the Necessitarian contends for. If, when the mind is said to possess a self- determining power, it were meant that the volitions of the mind originate in itself, and are not forced upon it by extraneous compulsion, nothing would be said but what is true, and nothing but what 78 the Necessitarian admits and maintains. But this will not serve the cause for which this power has been devised. In order to set aside the position of the Necessitarian, this faculty must be supposed to be altogether independent of the feelings and dispositions of the mind, and must, in the strictest sense, determine itself, and govern its own decisions. The advocate of Liberty may say, that this is not what he means, but he will hear in reply, that if he does not mean this, he means nothing. But if the mind can form either of two opposite volitions at the same time, then the true and proper cause of definite volitions is the abstract power of willing ; a fit prin- ciple, in good truth, to which the government of life should be committed. Will the advocate of Liberty lay down his proposition in terms to the following effect : that though the state of the mind has a certain influence upon the self- determining power, yet that it does not, strictly speaking, cause the volition, which is the free act of the power for which he contends ? What, then, is the nature of the influence supposed ? Does it in any way effect that the volition should be what it is ? If so, all that the Necessitarian will be solicitous to maintain is granted. If not, we must look somewhere else, that is, to the self-deter- mining power, for the reason why one volition takes place rather than another : that is, a power which bears the same relation to all imaginable volitions, contains in itself the sole cause of every definite and specific volition. And on this faculty depends the moral agency of man! But does the self-determining power, in fact, obey the influence which the mind exerts upon it ? Why, then, does it obey it ? Because it chooses. Does it, then, reflect and judge, and thus determine on the propriety of yielding this obedience ? No such thing. Reflection and judgment are properties not of a self- determin- ing power, but of intellect and reason. They are not attributes of the will, but of the mind. But what, after all, can we understand by a self determining power, considered as the efficient cause of volition ? It is an incontrovertible truth, that the act of volition implies a certain 79 inclination or disposition of the mind. Does, then, the self- determining power cause this disposition, or is it acted upon and governed by it ? If the latter, it is not a self -determining power, and the controversy is at an end. If it he said to de- termine this disposition, the question arises, whether it must be considered as acting independently of every mental feeling 1 If so, it is a manifest nonentity, since a volition cannot take place except in some state and disposition of the mind. If it does not act independently of mental feeling, it will again be asked, does it determine that state of feeling in which it acts ? To what conclusion this question would lead, it must be need- less to remark. But let the advocate of Liberty plead for himself in the language of that able metaphysician, Dr. Clarke : *' The true, proper, immediate, physical efficient cause of action," says he, "is the power of self-motion in men, which exerts itself freely, in consequence of the last judgment of the un- derstanding." If this power always obeys the last judgment of the understanding, the Necessitarian will ask no more. But can this power, at the very time when it exerts itself freely, in consequence of the last judgment of the understanding, deter- mine without any inducement whatever to set this last judgment at defiance, and to act in direct opposition to it ? This Dr. Clarke would not have affirmed. If it cannot, what is gained by maintaining, with an appearance at least of contradiction, that it exerts itself freely 9 in consequence of this judgment? If it can, then it is in very deed a power of self-motion, a power which, without any reason, can act against the very reason in consequence of which it acts.* * Dr. Clarke is disposed to consider the last judgment of the under- standing as the same with the act of volition. Then, as in this case the power of self-motion has nothing to do with volition, but only acts in consequence of the determination of the will or the understanding, it may be dismissed from the controversy, as having no relation to the matter in dispute. " But," says he, " if the act of volition be distin- guished from the last judgment of the understanding, then the act of volition, or rather the beginyiing of action, consequent upon the last 80 In a word, if definite volitions have not their causes in definite states of mind, they can be attributed to no cause distinct from the mere power of willing. But to say that the mere faculty of the will, or what would here be the same thing, the self- determining power, is the sole cause of specific voli- tions, does not in reality differ from saying that a definite vo- lition is the cause of itself. The self-determining power, in itself considered, is equally indifferent to all volitions ; but by a determinate act, it is supposed to cause a specific volition; but this act is the volition itself, nor can even for a moment be conceived of as distinct from it. The self- determining power, in other words, wills this or that, because it wills it ; that is, the only reason for the volition is the volition itself. Were it necessary to reason any further against this same self- determining power, this independent faculty, which will submit to no control, and acknowledge no principle of action but the imperious maxim sit pro ratione voluntas, it might be objected in the first place, that its existence is a mere as- sumption; secondly, that the assumption is unnecessary, as the phenomena of volition are satisfactorily accounted for without it ; thirdly, that the assumption is unwarrantable, as we are acquainted with nothing in the whole compass of nature which bears any analogy to such a faculty ; and fourthly, that the supposed operation of this faculty contradicts the only notions which mankind have ever formed of the connection between cause and effect. We are, indeed, ignorant of the operation of what we term causes, but this ignorance does not diminish the force of the objection. For a definite effect, we, in fact, look for a definite cause ; and every variation in the effect is always supposed to imply a proportionable variation judgment of the understanding, is not determined or caused by that last judgment as the physical efficient, but only as the moral motive" If the last judgment of the understanding causes the volition, that is sufficient. By what name its operation shall be called, the Neces- sitarian will not be very anxious to determine. For what avails the distinction between the physical efficient, and the moral motive, if the volition in given circumstances could not be different from what it is ? HI in the cause. Let it, then, be remembered, that the subject of controversy is not the cause of volition in general, but of definite and specific volitions. Now a self- determining power, if it means anything, must mean a power which, at the same time and in the same circumstances, can form either of two different or opposite volitions. But to refer a definite volition to the act of such a faculty, is, according to the only idea which ice have of causation, to say that a specific volition can be formed without a cause. The sic volo of the self-de- termining power will not be a satisfactory answer to the ques- tion, how it came to be the pleasure of the will to determine as it did. The prevalence of one inclination at the very moment when it was possible by the hypothesis that another inclination should have prevailed, requires a defiuite cause as much as any effect in nature ; or rather the supposition in- volves an impossibility, unless mankind have been thus far mistaken in requiring a definite cause for a definite effect. And if they have been herein mistaken, they may also have~ been mistaken in requiring any cause at all for that which they have denominated an effect ; since the same reasoning which has led them to the notion of a cause, has led them to con- ceive of it as a definite energy, from which a definite result proceeds. To deny, then, that a definite cause is necessary to a definite effect, or what is the same thing, to deny that a dif- ference in the effect implies a difference in the cause, is to call in question the very existence of a cause. The term, indeed, may be retained, but the only idea which we have of the thing is gone. And when the advocate of Liberty imagines a power which can at the same time cause either of two different volitions, he deceives himself by a mere abuse of language. A self- determining power, then, is not only gratuitously assumed, but involves another assumption, which sets at defiance what have hitherto been thought the most certain conclusions of the human mind. I will now say one word respecting the moral consequences which are supposed to follow from the doctrine of Necessity. 82 The most formidable of these is, that it annihilates the accoun- tableness of man, and renders him an unfit subject of reward and punishment. T shall consider the difficulty as pressing entirely on the side of punishment, and shall observe, that as, according to the Necessitarian system, punishment can operate on the state of the mind, it may with the greatest propriety be applied. But if man had within him such a capricious principle as a self- determining power, the application of punishment would be improper, because it would be useless. What, indeed, has been called vindictive punishment t the doc- trine of Necessity does exclude ; but this, instead of being an objection to the doctrine, is one of its recommendations. Vin- dictive punishment, it is true, cannot be defended upon any system ; but upon the principles of the Necessitarian it is manifestly and palpably absurd. It will easily be perceived that I have not written for those who are altogether strangers to the controversy, nor for those who thoroughly understand the subject; but, as I intimated above, for those who have conceived that it cannot be tho- roughly understood. And if the light in which it has now been placed shall render it more intelligible to any who have hitherto thought it obscure and intricate, my end will answered. E. 0. P. S. I am aware that I have written much more than was necessary; but the supposed difficulty of the subject seemed to require that it should be treated somewhat at length. Other- wise the argument (like most other arguments) lies in a small compass. The Necessitarian maintains, that every volition necessarily results from the state of mind in which the volition takes place. His opponent, to set aside this proposition, con- tends for a self- determining power as the efficient cause of voli- tion. Here a simple question presents itself. Can the mind will this or that without a certain feeling or disposition that prompts the volition ? Fact, to which even a self- determining power must bow, will answer, Certainly not. Consequently it 83 cannot will against the state or disposition in which it is at any given time. And here, were impartial reason to decide, the controversy must end. Jan. 1820. M. E. vol. xv. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir, — By way of an addendum to my paper on the doc- trine of Necessity, (pp. 7 — 11,) I should wish briefly to state the objections which are brought against this doctrine, and briefly to reply to them. Objection. The doctrine of Necessity annihilates the dis- tinction between virtue and vice. Answer. The objection is not true. A benevolent deed will retain its character, though the doctrine of Necessity be admitted. But if the actions of men proceeded from a self- determining power of the will, then, indeed, as they * would indicate no disposition of the heart, they would have no moral quality, and the distinctions of morality would be set aside. Objection. The doctrine of Necessity subverts the founda- tion of praise and blame. Answer. Then praise and blame, according to the obser- vation just now made, can have no foundation at all. The truth is, we view moral beauty with complacency, and moral deformity with disgust ; and praise and blame are the expres- sions of these sentiments. Hence may be explained the origin of what is termed remorse. Objection. The doctrine of Necessity, if true, renders man an unfit subject of reward and punishment. Answer. The objection is false, unless it can be shown that, upon Necessitarian principles, reward and punishment cannot operate to the formation of virtuous affections, which, were man really constituted upon the principles of Philoso- phical Liberty, they certainly could not. But as the objection chiefly respects future punishment, it may be observed that, if this punishment is considered as corrective, the difficulty g 2 84 vanishes. The case of the wicked, indeed, compared with that of the righteous, may seem to reflect upon the goodness of the Universal Parent. But that there should be gradations of happiness seems to be the favourite law of Providence ; nor is it more incumbent upon the Necessitarian than upon any other man to vindicate this appointment. But let it be supposed that future punishment will not be corrective.* Let the Liber- tarian reconcile this supposition to the Divine benevolence, and the same solution of the difficulty which will serve for him will do for his opponent. Objection. The doctrine of Necessity makes God the author of sin. Answer. If the moral evil which exists in the creation is conducive to good, no difficulty arises from its introduction ; if it is not, when the advocate of Liberty shall have vindicated the Divine perfections, the Necessitarian may avail himself of his vindication. Objection. The doctrine of Necessity leads to moral in- activity. Answer. There is nothing which human folly cannot abuse. But he would deserve the palm for folly who should refuse to exert himself for the promotion of his own happiness because the series of human actions is predetermined, while experience and observation concur to convince him that what a man soweth that he also reaps. Suppose a man to be afflicted with a disorder for which he believed that a particular medicine was a certain cure. What should we think of him if he refused to apply the remedy from a persuasion that it was predeter- mined whether he should or should not recover ? * Dr. Paley speaking of human punishments properly considers them as founded on utility, and observes that the retribution of so much pain for so much guilt, which we expect at the hand of God, does not obtain here. Query. Do we see any reason why pain should follow guilt if it could be of no advantage either to the sufferer or to others ? The experience of life has caused guilt and suffering to be associated in our minds ; but do we not deceive ourselves if we fancy that we perceive a connection between them which, independent of all con- siderations of utility, rests on the abstract principle of justice ? 85 Objection. According to the doctrine of Necessity, our actions are not properly our own, and there is but one will in the universe. Answer. Our actions are in a sufficiently proper sense our own, as they are the result of human powers. With respect to the latter part of the objection, that there is but one will in the universe, this in a sense is true, and to the Christian Necessitarian a glorious truth it is. Believing in the infinite wisdom, power, and goodness of the Great First Cause, he will see reason to consider all events, whether pleasurable or pain- ful, and all actions, whether morally good or morally evil, as equally essential to the harmony of the creation, and equally conducive to the ultimate happiness of mankind. Thus, in his view, as in that of his Maker, all real evil is exterminated from the universe. Hence, if he properly reflects upon his prin- ciples, he will find in them the most powerful aids to devotion and benevolence. As I have not trespassed long on the time of your readers, I will, with your permission, detain them a few moments by turning to another subject. The other day, upon reading Plutarch's Consolatio ad Apollonium, I was led to reflect a little upon a favourite maxim of the ancient philosophers, that, in grief occasioned by afflictive bereavements, it is the part of a wise man temporis medicinam ratione prmcipere. I will not bring forward quotations in evidence that such was their maxim, but will simply state to the English reader that, accord- ing to the opinion of these philosophers, it is the part of wis- dom to remedy grief by reason, and not to wait for the alleT viation which time would otherwise bring with it. This senti- ment affords a striking, but not the only proof, that the ancients attributed to reason much more than it can justly claim. It seems also to show that they were but little acquainted with the constitution of the human mind. A little just reflection would have taught them that the effect of time in mitigating sorrow is not to be anticipated by any act of the understand- ing It is almost needless to remark that time diminishes 86 grief, by causing new impressions to succeed to old ones, and that, by engaging the mind in interests which arise out of new occurrences, it gradually weakens the recollections by which the painful events of a former period had been succeeded. But by what effort of reason is this progressive operation of time to be superseded ? Experience, indeed, sufficiently proves that no mental energy can effect, without the aid of time, what time, without the aid of reason, seldom fails to accomplish. But what topics of consolation had reason to offer which could render the lenient hand of time unnecessary to the mitigation of human sorrow ? That it is wise to bear with patience what it is impossible to avoid; that whatever sufferings visit the individual, he is not the only sufferer; that if we lose our friends by death, they escape the evils which might have awaited them in a longer life, and at the worst are only as though they had never been.* Such, and no better than such, were the considerations which philosophy could suggest to soothe the anguish of an afflicted heart. How inferior to the assurances of Christianity, that "this mortal must put on im- mortality," and that suffering is a part of a wise and benevolent discipline which may assist to prepare us for everlasting hap- piness in the life to come ! Not, indeed, that these assurances will immediately calm the agitated spirit, or produce the effect for which philosophy in vain invoked the aid of reason. Time still supplies the only certain cure for the agony of poignant grief. And if affliction has a beneficial influence on the human heart, it is right that the remedy should not be instantly at our command. But while the philosophers of old demanded of reason to perform the work of time, they not only demanded what the law of nature forbids, but showed that, while they felt grief to be an evil, they were strangers to the considerations which are best calculated to soften its severity, and had no proper conception of the present state as a scene of moral * When the ancient philosophers speak of a future life in circum- stances which put their faith to the proof, they generally state the hypothesis of annihilation, together with that of a future being, and in such a manner as to render it dubious to which their minds inclined. 87 discipline. Whence, indeed, should they have had this con- ception, when, as Cicero expressly informs us, there was no- thing on which both the learned and the unlearned differed so much as on this, whether the gods pay any regard to the concerns of men ? I shall he believed when I say that I am not disposed to despise or undervalue the ancients ; but truth compels me to confess that their philosophy falls lamentably below the dis- coveries of revelation ; discoveries which he will value most who endeavours to ascertain what unassisted reason can do by carefully examining what it has done. E. C. Jan. 1820. M. R. vol. xv. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir, — It was not my intention to say anything more on the doctrine of Necessity, but I seem called upon to add' a few words upon the subject : and they shall be as few as possible. Your ingenious correspondent Homo (p. 93) is of opinion that the question is to be resolved into consciousness. But I conceive that, without an appeal to consciousness, we may pro- nounce upon the truth of the following proposition, that a definite effect must have a definite cause. But your Corre- spondent further observes, that the doctrine of Necessity seems to exclude accountability altogether. To this I reply, that the doctrine of Necessity appears to me demonstrably true; and fact proves that man is an accountable being. In his journey through life he takes the consequences of his own conduct, and is in an important sense the author of his own happiness or misery. And what more than this need be understood by accountableness ? The following observation of Dr. Jebb seems to be rational, and, if just, is much to the purpose here : " Punishment (the Doctor means in the common sense of the term) is the annexing of something over and above the natural consequence of an action. But this addition, let divines say what they please, obtains not in a future state." But granting 88 that this observatioD is not just, does aeeountableness, in any sense of the term, imply that the actions of men proceed from a self-determining power of the will ? With respect to the objection of my friend Dr. Morell, (p. 86,) for the convenience of replying to it, I shall state it in the following terms : The moral feelings of mankind teach them that it is just that punishment should follow guilt, and therefore that man cannot be what the Necessitarian represents him. But do the moral feelings of mankind teach them that justice would demand the punishment of guilt, if the punish- ment could produce no beneficial effect ? Then their feelings, I conceive, reason faster than their understanding. See note in p. 70 of your last number. But do their feelings teach them that punishment would be more justly inflicted on a being constituted upon the principles of philosophical liberty, than on what is termed a necessary agent? Then their feelings teach them what is not true. The fact seems to be, that obser- vation and experience have caused the ideas of guilt and punish- ment to be so closely associated in our minds that we may imagine that we see or feel a connection between them which does not rest on the basis of utility, and which cannot be proved to exist. — Is the moral consciousness of which Dr. Morell speaks an innate feeling ? Is there reason to think that, if man had never seen punishment follow guilt, he would have inferred from his moral constitution that it ought to follow it ? If so, we need not, I think, object altogether to the doc- trine of innate principles. But is this feeling the result of experience ? Then it cannot teach us what experience does not teach ; and if we feel convinced that justice calls for the punishment of sin, though the punishment would be in every sense useless, it must be reason and not feeling which has taught us this lesson. Where, then, is the evidence of this proposition to be found ? But after all, is this feeling, if care- fully considered, anything more than an acquiescence in a law. of nature which is presumed to be wise and right ? Perhaps, indeed, there may be blended with this feeling a secret con- viction that the suffering which is the consequence of guilt is, 89 in a general view of it, beneficial ; a conviction which expe- rience can scarcely have failed to generate. At all events, it may be observed, that feelings are sometimes difficult things to analyse, and cannot be successfully opposed to what appear to be the clear and certain deductions of reason. I submit these hasty remarks to the consideration of my friend, and if they should appear satisfactory to his reflecting mind, I shall feel persuaded that they are just. E. 0. P. S. Does our moral consciousness teach us that there is a connection between guilt and punishment which is not founded on utility, but on the immutable fitness of things ? This, I think, my friend will hardly allow. Is there not reason to think that we sometimes lose sight of the origin of our moral notions, and overlook the medium by which ideas have been associated in our minds ? Is not this the case with those who imagine that they perceive virtue to" be intrinsically excellent, and vice intrinsically odious, all regard to their respective tendencies and effects being set aside ? March, 1820. M. R. vol. xv. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir, — It has sometimes been objected to Unitarianism that it is a cold and philosophical system, which by no means lays the same hold on the feelings with those views of religion which are denominated Calvinistic. This objection I wish briefly to consider. And in reply to it, I should say, that the true test of religious feeling, I mean that feeling which alone is valuable, is a good and holy life. Now, if Unitarians, as a body, fall below their fellow-professors in the practice of Christian virtue, some presumption may be derived hence against their doctrine. But this, I trust, is not the fact; nor is this, I believe, alleged against them. Having premised thus much, I do not wish to deny, that the Calvinistic system is calculated to make a stronger impression on the feelings than 90 the simpler doctrine of the Unitarian. And fiction, in like manner, often has the advantage over truth in the power of impressing the imagination and the heart. But what are the feelings which this system addresses, and which it so power- fully affects ? Chiefly and peculiarly the feelings of appre- hension and terror. And certainly it is not less calculated to overwhelm the soul with horror than to confound wad prostrate the understanding. But it will be said, that by the economy of Kedemption it calls forth in the sincere believer the liveliest emotions of gratitude and joy. Be it so. But does it follow hence that the views on which these affections are founded are correct? Then we must establish a new test of truth; and those opinions must be considered as most likely to be theo- retically just by which the feelings are most deeply interested. But is there, then, nothing in the Unitarian doctrine upon which the human heart can fix with a warmth of religious affection ? I trust that the experience of many of its pro- fessors can bear witness, that, by the views which it gives of the Divine Being, it lays a foundation for that sacred admira- tion of his character which cannot be long cherished without terminating in love to him ; and that, by the representations which it exhibits of the Divine government, it encourages the most cheerful trust in Providence, and an unqualified sub- mission to the will of God. And though it directs every sen- timent that can properly be termed devotional to the Universal Parent alone, it leaves room for that affectionate regard to Jesus Christ which will constrain the sincere believer to keep his commandments. I now propose to inquire, whether the mere ardent feelings which are inspired by the Calvinistic doctrine can justly be considered as a moral benefit ? And in this inquiry I would first ask, Are the feelings in question excited by practical principles ? If not, it is fair to conclude, that they are prac- tically useless. Calvinism, indeed, by the instrumentality of terror, may sometimes secure a greater degree of attention to religion than the milder doctrine of the Unitarian will usually direct to it. And this appears to be the only imaginable ad- 91 vantage to which the system can lay claim. But it may bear a question, whether what is gained in point of strong impression will make any compensation for what is lost by encumbering a system of plain practical truths with dark and inexplicable mysteries. But in relation to the present inquiry it is worthy of remark, that feelings which elevate the mind much above its ordinary tone cannot be long sustained, and consequently that the sum of devotional feeling in the serious-minded Uni- tarian may not be less than in the serious Calvinist, though the former may not experience the occasional fervours of the latter. And it may also be observed, without any imputation on the sincerity of our Galvinistic "brethren, that the appear- ance of religious feeling, which is exhibited in their religious exercises, may sometimes go beyond what is actually expe- rienced. A certain language founded on their system may be, and probably often is, employed, when the feelings of which it seems to be the natural expression are not in fact excited. But granting that these feelings are awakened whenever the language which is appropriate to them issues from the lips, yet when they have subsided, the mind may be left less sensible to the influence of those practical considerations which address themselves chiefly to the understanding. In connection with this remark I would observe, and the observation is by no means unimportant, that when strong religious feelings are excited by mysterious doctrines that have no necessary relation to practice, there is danger lest the concerns of morality should be regarded as uninteresting and of small comparative value. And that this is not an imaginary danger seems sufficiently proved by fact. To the great majority of Calvinistic professors the moral part of religion does not appear to present a subject of interesting reflection. And the preacher, who should make it his primary business to illustrate and enforce that bright assemblage of virtues which constitutes the Christian character, would be soon suspected of not being sound in the faith, and would probably be left in a short time to deliver his lectures on dry morality to empty pews. A Calvinist, I cheerfully con- fess, may love virtue, as a man, and may practise it, as a 92 Christian ; but as a Calvinist, he cannot regard it with the interest with which it will be regarded by the consistent Uni- tarian. He holds it, indeed, to be essential to the favour of God ; but his notions of original depravity and the regenera- ting influence of the Spirit place it out of the sphere of human exertion ; not to say that the atoning sacrifice and imputed righteousness of Christ seem to do away the necessity of labouring to attain that for the want of which so extraordinary a compensation has been made. In the estimation of the Uni- tarian, on the other hand, virtue is, strictly speaking, a human attainment, resulting naturally and necessarily from the proper exercise of the human powers, and, in itself considered, the object of Divine approbation and complacency. But to return from this digression, I observe, once more, that where great stress is laid upon fervours of religious affec- tion, there is no small danger lest the character should be estimated by them; than which no error can be more preju- dicial to the interests of Christian virtue. In the opinion of the Calvinist, the most upright and holy life is but an equivocal evidence that the work of grace has been carried on in the heart. Certain feelings must be experienced before this evi- dence can be pronounced to possess any value. But it is easy to see that a man who is not enamoured of moral rectitude may not unnaturally fall into the error of laying more stress on the requisite feelings than on the practice which ought to accompany them ; and I am greatly mistaken if it is not much easier to obtain the one than to observe the other. But after all, it will be said that Calvinism, by means of the powerful impression which it makes on the imagination and feelings, has a great effect upon the lower orders of society, and has been the happy means of reclaiming many from vicious irre- gularities to sobriety and decency of conduct. This I believe to be true ; and it seems to furnish something like an expla- nation of a phenomenon, which to the Unitarian might appear extraordinary and perplexing; namely, that what he regards as a gross corruption of Christianity should have spread so widely and prevailed so long. To this system, however, he 93 believes that the progress of mental improvement must one day be fatal ; and he is at liberty to believe, that by that time the Christian world in general may have attained sufficient refinement to allow its full efficacy to the simple doctrine of the gospel, when stripped of the awful mysteries and adven- titious terrors with which it has been encompassed by the mis- apprehension of man. E. 0. Walthamstotv, May 20, 1820. M. K. vol. xv. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir, — The Calvinist has sometimes urged against the Uni- nitarian, that he thinks and speaks too lightly of the evil of sin. Does not the fundamental error of Calvinism lie in at- tributing to sin a degree of malignity which does not appertain to it ? * Sin, says the Calvinist, is an infinite evil, because it is com- mitted against an infinite Being. Hence he infers that it deserves an infinite punishment, and that this punishment must be suffered unless an infinite satisfaction be made to the justice of God, which satisfaction can only be made by an infinite Being. Now, as there is not one word of all this in Scripture, but the doctrine which is here presented is a merely human expla- nation of what Scripture is supposed to teach, if upon inquiry it should appear altogether destitute of reason, no impartial man will doubt what is the just and necessary inference. I mean to examine these propositions in their order, and I sin- cerely wish that our Calvinistic brethren would fairly and can- didly discuss the subject with us. If I am wrong, it does not indeed follow that their interpretation of the language of Scrip- ture must be accepted ; but if I am right, the whole of their system necessarily falls to the ground. * On the malignity of sin, see Dr. Cogan's " Theological Disquisition on the Characteristic Excellencies of Christianity," pp. 543-549. 94 Sin is an infinite evil, because it is committed against an infinite Being. But by whom is it committed ? The propo- sition, to be fairly stated, ought to stand thus : sin, which is committed by a finite against an infinite Being, is an infinite evil. It would then be just as reasonable to say that sin is a finite evil because it is committed by a finite being, as to say that it is an infinite evil because the Being against whom it is committed is infinite. In fact, the only intelligible rule by which the evil of sin can be estimated, is the mischief which it does, or the misery which it produces. Does it then, neces- sarily, and from its own nature, produce infinite misery,* or is infinite misery judicially annexed to it by the Creator ? The former will not be maintained, and to assume the latter, is to beg the question. But the criminality of an offence, in rela- tion to the offender, is universally estimated by the powers of his understanding, and the means of knowledge and improve- ment which he has enjoyed. And if it is deemed impossible for him to have had any just conception of the moral turpitude of the offence, his guilt is justly considered as proportionably extenuated. But is it possible for the finite mind of man to comprehend the enormity of an infinite offence ? If not, the guilt of such an offence can never be charged upon him. But what is sin in itself considered ? A deviation from rectitude and virtue. And if the slightest neglect of the perfect law of God (whether intentional or otherwise) is an infinite offence, and that it must be according to the axiom, what shall we say to the bold and daring act of iniquity ? Is this more than an * The Calvioistic argument is, not that sin is an infinite evil because it produces infinite misery, but that infinite misery will follow it because it is an infinite evil. Should it be said that sin, considered in the abstract, is an infinite evil as it is committed against an infinite Being, I should reply, that it will be time enough to consider this position when sin shall be committed in the abstract. Sin is necessarily relative, and, to be justly considered, must be considered in connec- tion with the offending party as well as with the Being against whom the offence is committed. On the question whether sin is an infinite evil, see Keasons for rejecting the Calvinistic Theology, in the Monthly Bepository, vol. x., pp. 23, 24. 95 infinite offence, or are we, with the Stoics of old, to maintain that all sins are equal ? " Sensus moresque repugnant ; Atque ipsa utilitas, justi prope mater et cequi." But I would further ask, whether it be possible for man to avoid sin in every form ? If not, sin is so far the inevitable result of his imperfect nature ; which nature, according to the Calvinistic reasoning, must itself be infinitely evil. But shall this be predicated of anything of which God is the author ? I have not, indeed, forgotten what is said concerning Adam as the federal head of his offspring. But did Adam proceed from the hands of his Creator a being morally perfect ? If so, how came he to fall ? If not, and he had in his constitution the seeds and stamina of sin, he had in him an infinite evil. With regard to what is said respecting the abuse of free-will, in the first parent of our race, I must be excused discussing that question here. But sin, because it is an infinite evil, deserves an infinite punishment. That is, an infinite punishment is due to even the slightest transgression of the perfect law of God in a frail and imperfect creature, and this punishment is to be awarded by the Creator ! I shall only observe on this proposition, that if the premises are false, the conclusion cannot stand. But let us proceed to consider the next proposition, that the sinner must suffer an infinite punishment unless an infinite satisfaction be made to the justice of God. — In this proposition. it is intimated that something distinct from the punishment of the offender may satisfy the claims of justice. But does jus- tice demand, or does it not demand, that sin, being an infinite evil, should be followed by an infinite suffering; and does it demand, or does it not, that where the guilt has been incurred, there the punishment should fall? And if it does demand this, and such demand is consistent with the justice of God, which, in common with his other attributes, must be infinite, the demand itself must be infinitely just. And to what prin- ciple can such a demand give place ? If it be said that justice 96 sometimes yields to mercy, I answer, that were justice what the present argument supposes it to be, it never would yield to it, and that when it does so yield, it does not demand an equiva- lent satisfaction. But what is the nature of the satisfaction required ? It is even that the suffering due to sin should be transferred to one by whom the guilt could not be contracted, in order that by this exchange the guilty should escape. Thus this stem and unrelenting principle, which will have nothing- short of an infinite punishment for the offences of a finite being, and which infinite benevolence cannot prevail upon to relinquish one iota of its claims, can suffer its demands to be altogether set aside as far as concerns the offender, and, pro- vided the sin be punished, can permit the sinner to go free ! The present proposition may be dismissed when two questions have been asked: What is justice but a modification of bene- volence ? What are the only intelligible ends of punishment ? But the required satisfaction can only be made by an infinite Being. Then we might have pronounced the case to be hope- less, since, except the Deity, an infinite being does not exist. Against this objection, however, the Calvinistic system provides by a wonderful expedient. The second person * of that mys- terious Trinity into which the Divine nature is distributed, undertakes to make the demanded satisfaction. And to whom does he make this satisfaction ? Doubtless to the other two and to himself. And how is this satisfaction made ? By his union with a mortal man who expired upon a cross. Did the divine nature of Christ, then, suffer in the stead of sinners, or of the elect, all that they would have suffered to all eternity? * What is the meaning of the term person in this use of it ? Is there not reason to think that this term, used confessedly without a definite signification, is retained as convenient, because when the Father and the Son are represented as doing what nothing but in- telligent agents could do, the term person allows them to be con- sidered as such ; but when, on the other hand, the doctrine itself is the subject of inquiry, it is conceived that the charge of Tritheism may be eluded by pleading that the term person is not intended to denote an intelligent being or agent ? 97 If not, the full demands of justice have not been satisfied, and sin consequently cannot he forgiven. Did the Divinity suffer at all ? If not, where is the value of the sacrifice which has been offered? Could the death of a human, finite being, make a satisfaction for that which is pronounced to be an infinite offence, and for which it is affirmed that none but an infinite being could atone ? If the primary proposition that sin is an infinite evil is shown to be false, every conclusion which is drawn from it necessarily falls to the ground. In like manner, if it appears that an infinite satisfaction has not been made for the sins of mankind, those reasonings which are advanced to prove such a satisfaction necessary, must be fallacious. Now, unless the Deity himself suffered (which few, I trust, in the present day will choose to affirm), such a satisfaction has not been and could not be made. Whatever was the nature of the union between the second person of the Trinity and the man Christ Jesus, it did not extend to the grand object for which Kuman nature was assumed, and while the man suffered, the divinity remained untouched. — But the man was ennobled by being the residence of the Deity. Was his nature thereby changed from finite to infinite ? If not, his death was the death of a finite being, and could no more make an infinite satisfaction for sin than the death of any other man. And to say that it was accepted as a sacrifice of infinite value, would only be to say that it was accepted for that which it was not. — But it teaches in a striking manner the evil of sin, and the abhor- rence in which it is held by an infinitely holy God. These do not appear to be natural inferences from the sufferings of one who knew no sin, and I confess that my mind would be directed to some very different conclusion. — But it vindicated the honour of the Divine government, and rendered it compa- tible with justice, that sin should be forgiven. In the first place, it has never been proved to be inconsistent with justice, that the punishment of sin should upon repentance be remitted. In the next place, it can never be shown that the honour of the Divine government would not be sufficiently maintained by 98 withholding pardon from the impenitent ; and, finally, there is no intelligible connection between the expedient which is supposed to have been employed, and the end which is said to have been effected. But in order to show more clearly that the sufferings of Christ were not a satisfaction to Divine jus- tice for the sins of mankind, I observe, that in order that justice should be satisfied, the end answered by the death of Christ must be the same, as far as justice is concerned, as would have been answered if justice had taken its natural course, and the supposed satisfaction had not been made. Thus, if the ob- ject of justice had been to promote the moral improvement and happiness of mankind, and the same end was answered equally well by the death of Christ, it might with some propriety have been said, that justice was satisfied by his sufferings. But jus- tice, in the case supposed, demanded that the sinner should be consigned to everlasting punishment, and the end proposed by the sufferings of Christ was, that he should not suffer at all. If justice can accept such a satisfaction as this, it is not the inexorable principle which at first it appeared to be. — But as Christ suffered in his own person what was due to sinners, jus- tice has no further demand upon them. Is it, then, indifferent to justice who suffers, provided the due quantum of suffering be endured, and also indifferent with what view the suffering be inflicted, whether to punish the guilty or to exempt them from punishment ? — But justice may so far yield to mercy as to ac- cept the sufferings of the innocent for the punishment of the guilty. Suppose the contrary were affirmed, who could refute the affirmation ? But if justice is not a branch of benevolence, and its demand of an infinite punishment for an infinite offence is founded, as the Calvinistic argument supposes, on the immu- table fitness of things, mercy, if by mercy be meant a disposi- tion to pardon the guilty, cannot exist in a Being infinitely wise and infinitely just. And if it did exist, what would it have to plead against the demands of eternal and unchange- able rectitude? — But the death of Christ displayed the evil of sin in a manner not less awful than if the sinner had suffered in his own person. But the demand of justice was, not that 99 the sinner should witness the evil of sin, but that he should suffer the evil of it in everlasting punishment. But why was the evil of sin thus awfully displayed ? The answer must he to promote the moral improvement and happiness of mankind. Justice, then, has a view to utility, and the ground of the ar- gument is withdrawn. But is not the evil of sin sufficiently displayed in the everlasting sufferings of myriads of the human race ? And as these remain under the curse, justice has ob- tained an everlasting triumph over mercy. Justice has had its satisfaction for the salvation of the redeemed, and mercy has gratuitously consented that the great majority of mankind should be doomed to perdition. And are we called upon to believe that both these attributes are infinite ? In a word, ac- cording to the Calvinistic reasoning, an attribute which is deno- minated justice, is the grand moral perfection of the Deity, to which the essential benevolence of his nature is compelled to yield. What could be intended when it was said that "God is Love"? E.'C. October, 1820. M. K vol. xv. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir, — In the year 1796, I printed a small pamphlet on the " Evidences of Christianity." It was thought of favourably at the time by persons of whose judgment I had a good opinion. I have since been asked, whether it would not be desirable that I should reprint it. To this I should for several reasons object. The suh stance of it, however, will be found in the following observations, which, if they appear to you to be useful, you will not, perhaps, think out of place in your Bepository. The Christian religion has existed for about 1800 years; and previous to this period it did not exist. It derives its origin from a person called Jesus Christ, who lived in Judea, and was crucified by Pontius Pilate, the Roman governor. A short time after the death of its founder, it was preached in H 2 100 the Roman Empire by a few of his followers, and gained increasing credit and establishment, till at length it attained a decided pre-eminence above the Pagan religion and worship which had prevailed there for many ages, and which it finally overthrew. This conversion of the Pagans to Christianity must be considered as one of the most signal revolutions which ever took place upon earth, and is an event of which every philosophical mind must wish to know the real and proper causes. The only history which appears to account for this singular phenomenon is that of the New Testament; and this history consists of a clear and distinct narrative of facts, which, if admitted, will readily explain this extraor- dinary revolution. Hence arises a claim which this history lays to our attention, and likewise a strong presumption in its favour ; as it must be allowed to stand in a very different pre- dicament from a narrative of facts which will account for no existing phenomenon, and of which no monument, except the historical testimony, is extant. This presumption is corro- borated by the consideration, that, as far as appears from the evidence of history, it was the credit that was actually given to the facts in question which caused the gradually-increasing diffusion and establishment of Christianity.* Dr. Priestley, in his " Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever " (a work truly inestimable), has the following paragraph : " With respect to hypotheses, to explain appearances of any kind, the philosophical Christian considers himself as bound to admit that which (according to the received rules of phi- losophising or reasoning) is the most probable; so that the * Let us suppose that we knew nothing of the early history of Christianity, but merely understood that it commenced at the time at which its origin is dated, that it gradually subverted the idolatry of the Heathen world, and that wherever it came it carried with it a pure system of morality, and inspired a confident assurance of a life to come. Let the Christian Scriptures be put into our hands with proper evi- dence of their authenticity. Should we not think that we had found the true cause of an extraordinary phenomenon ? Or should we think that the volume ought to be rejected because it professed to give the narrative of a divine interposition ? 10.1 question between him and other philosophers is, whether his hypothesis or theirs will best explain the known facts, such as are the present belief of Judaism and Christianity, and also the belief of them in the earliest ages to which they can be traced." With deference to an authority which I so highly respect, I should rather say, that until the New Testament his- tory has been shown to be unworthy of credit, every hypothesis to explain the origin and progress of Christianity is unneces- sary, and consequently undeserving of attention. Let it then be considered by what methods, and by what alone, the credit of this history can be subverted. First, by proving the testimony in favour of the facts to be defective and equivocal. Secondly, by showing the facts themselves to be incredible. Thirdly, by demonstrating, that, if the facts had taken place, different consequences must have followed. Fourthly, by proving that the existence and progress of Chris- tianity are to be attributed to causes altogether independent of the truth of the facts recorded in the history under consider- ation. In order to prove the testimony to be false or deficient, it must be shown, that there is not the same reason to believe the genuineness of the books of the New Testament as of other books of equal antiquity ; or that the facts which are re- corded in them are of such a nature as to exclude certainty of information; or that the historians had no proper opportunity of ascertaining their reality ; or that, from certain rules of decision admitted in other cases, there is reason to conclude that the veracity of these historians may justly be called in question. But if it appear that the gospel-history will abide the test of this inquiry, it must be concluded that no objection can be urged against the testimony, in itself conside?*ed. And let it be remarked, that this testimony, which is now supposed to have borne a fair and strict examination, is strongly corro- borated by the original presumption in favour of the facts which has already been stated. And that there should be this concurrence of presumption and testimony in favour of a mere imposture, must be considered as very extraordinary and im- 102 probable. Thus allowing, what has never been disproved, that the testimony, in itself considered, is not objectionable, the general evidence in favour of Christianity may be stated as fol- lows : — The New-Testament history possesses all the requisite marks of credibility. It contains the narrative of facts, the belief of which prevailed and extended itself in defiance of pre- j udice and opposition, and finally produced the most signal and important consequences; consequences which are experienced at the present hour. But in opposition to this historical and presumptive evidence, it may be alleged, that the facts recorded in the history under consideration are in themselves so incredible, as to be inad- missible upon testimony which in itself considered appears to be clear and unequivocal. It will be urged, that miracles are in their nature so very extraordinary, as to carry in themselves a refutation of any evidence by which they may appear to be attended. In reply to this objection, it is to be remarked, that a revelation is in itself a deviation from the order of nature, or, in other words, a miracle, and that it must be confirmed by other miracles in order to establish its truth. The question, then, respecting the credibility of the facts recorded in the gos- pel-history, resolves itself into the previous question, Is it credi- ble that God should communicate his will to mankind in an extraordinary and supernatural manner ? Now, let it be con- sidered on what grounds (I mean on the principles of Theism) it is possible to affirm the incredibility of such an interposition ; and these must be the three that follow : — that such an interpo- sition is contrary to experience ; to the Divine perfections as discoverable by the light of nature ; or to the conduct of the Divine Government, which acts not by special interposition, but by general laws. To say that a divine revelation is contrary to experience, unless general experience be intended, is evidently to beg the question ; and to maintain that it contradicts the attributes of the Deity, is to affirm much more than it would be possible to prove. And though God has appointed general laws for the government of his creatures, it by no means admits of demonstration that he will never interfere in an extraordinary 103 manner to effect purposes which could not be so well accom- plished by the operation of general appointments. Thus, in- stead of its being affirmed that miracles, or a divine revelation, are incredible, it ought rather to be said, that, judging from general experience and what we know of the Divine conduct, they are attended with that kind of improbability which it re- quires clear and unequivocal testimony to counterbalance. To pronounce them incredible is simply to affirm, what can never be proved, that the Author of nature had from the first deter- mined never to effect a deviation from the general course of na- ture. With respect, then, to the improbability of miracles, it may be observed, that it is an improbability of which we are incompetent judges, and which may, therefore, be surmounted by a certain force of testimony. And we find, in fact, that the highest degree of supposed improbability, arising merely from a want of experience, is perpetually overcome by such evidence as is supposed to possess the proper recommendations to enforce belief. And it is further to be observed, that an improbability arising from the want of analogy, may be more or less credible according to the magnitude of the phenomena which are to be explained by the admission of it, A miracle which, if believed, accounts for no existing phenomenon, and a miracle, or set of miracles, which will explain a great and important effect for which a sufficient cause is wanting, must be allowed to be very differently circumstanced in point of credibility ; and it might be added, that a less degree of positive testimony will suffice to confirm the latter than what would be necessary to establish the former. Let me now ask, whether what appears to be an authentic record of miracles may not be admitted as containing the cause of a most extraordinary phenomenon, of which history offers no other explanation? As a further presumption in favour of miracles, it may be observed, that there are only two religions existing upon earth which profess to be established on miracles that were public and notorious ; namely, the Jewish and the Christian ; and there appertain to both these religions circumstances which are best explained upon the supposition that they are really divine. The Jews, it is acknowledged, 104 were inferior to other nations in every species of polite litera- ture and in general science. And yet, though surrounded by idolaters, they maintained, as a community, the Unity of God, and entertained more exalted views of the Divine perfections than even the wisest philosophers of the most polished nations. The Christian religion is confessedly the most pure and philo- sophical that ever appeared upon earth ; containing principles most highly beneficial to the general interests of mankind, and presenting a standard of morality to which no objection can be made. And it may safely be observed, that these extraordinary facts are best accounted for by admitting the miracles of the Old and New Testament, and that they are striking confirma- tions of their truth. But before I quit the subject of miracles, I ought to notice the objection of Mr. Hume, that no testimony can justify the belief of a miracle, since the falsehood of human testimony can never be more miraculous than the truth of the fact which it professes to establish. But the fallacy of this ob- jection will be apparent if we consider that the falsehood of testimony in certain circumstances would be impossible, with- out a violation of the order of nature. But such a violation of this order, a violation which could be referred to no cause, and could answer no beneficial end, would be far more inex- plicable, and therefore far more incredible than a set of miracles which are expressly attributed to God as their author, and from which a great and important effect has followed. But it may be objected, that, allowing the validity of the testimony, and admitting likewise the credibility of the facts, the New-Testament history cannot be received by the philo- sophical inquirer, since, if the facts there recorded had really taken place, different consequences must have followed, and all Judea and the Boman Empire must have been immediately con- verted to the Christian faith. This objection it seems, does not deny that the truth of the gospel-history is a sufficient cause of the revolution which was effected by Christianity, but simply affirms, that the progress of this revolution must have been more rapid had the facts been real. But as the sufficiency of the cause to which the Christian ascribes the origin and diffu- 105 sion of Christianity is by the very objection acknowledged, those reasonings must be very clear and forcible which will oblige him to reject it. But that the objection is by no means decisive will appear from the following observations. Few comparatively could have been eye-witnesses of the miracles in question. Prejudices of the strongest kind against Chris- tianity existed among both Jews and Gentiles. Now that these prejudices will not account for the slow and partial pro- gress of Christianity, allowing it to have been as slow and as partial as any unbeliever will maintain it to have been, can never be proved, unless it can be demonstrated that no preju- dice can resist the credible report of miracles. But on what data this demonstration is to proceed, it will be difficult to say. The mind is certainly indisposed to receive any fact in propor- tion as it is averse to the conclusion which is to be admitted upon the belief of the fact; and with certain prejudices, and in certain circumstances, it is probable that no evidence of testi- mony would be attended to. Paine, I think, somewhere^ says, that he would not have believed the resurrection of Jesus with- out ocular and manual demonstration ; and yet he too urges the unbelief of the Jews, as a proof that the event never took place. It may here be further observed, that they who were not con- verted to Christianity in the earlier ages of the Christian his- tory, must have remained unbelievers, either because their pre- judices did not allow them to pay any proper attention to the subject, or because they knew the falsehood of the pretended miracles on which Christianity depends. If the latter alterna- tive be adopted, how comes it to pass that it should not appear upon the slightest evidence, that the truth of these miracles had ever been disproved ? If these observations do not remove the objection, it may be asked, How can the belief of those who did receive Christianity be accounted for, upon supposition that the facts on which it professes to depend, are false ? It may perhaps be replied, that this fact may be explained by the natural credulity of the human mind, and that love of the mar- vellous, which has shown itself in every age and nation. But will not the force of prejudice, equally natural to the human 106 mind, just as well account for the non- conversion of the remainder who were not converted ? I now proceed to the consideration of the fourth method by which the evidences of the Christian religion may he opposed ; by proving that the truth of the facts contained in the gospel- history, was not the real cause of the existence and progress of Christianity. And here it must be observed, that if the evidence in favour of this history had not been already invalidated, the contrary evidence must be very clear and convincing before it can with justice be rejected. Nothing, in fact, will avail but evidence, which shall be clearer and more authentic than can be produced in favour of the history, the credit of which is to be subverted. When the Christian is asked, how the great revolution which was effected by Christianity is to be accounted for, he immediately replies, by the evidence of the facts on which it professes to rest ; and he produces a history of these facts, which he maintains to be attended with all the requisite marks of genuineness and truth ; and if the unbeliever, with- out previously subverting the credit of this history, attempts to prove its falsehood, by unfolding the origin and explaining the progress of Christianity, it is obvious that this attempt must be made on the evidence of the clearest and most decisive testi- mony ; and that the causes to which the rise and establishment of Christianity shall be thus ascribed, must have no connection, even of the remotest kind, with the truth of the controverted facts. But it may now be proper to consider the causes to which the unbeliever, in the absence of historical testimony which might set aside the Christian records, must ascribe the origin and progress of Christianity ; and these must be the fol- lowing, imposture and credulity. On this hypothesis it may be observed, that it is gratuitous, and erected in opposition to his- torical testimony ; and that the exigence of the case does not require it. Moreover, the operation which is assigned to im- posture and credulity by the unbeliever, can never be proved to be conformable to analogy; though it might reasonably be expected that an hypothesis which should be assumed for no other purpose than to avoid admitting what contradicts analogy, 107 should possess the advantage of heing itself analogous to the ordinary course of events, and free from the difficulty which it was invented to avoid. But was it ever heard of since the world began, that an imposture, appealing to public facts, produced a total change in the religious associations of a large community ? And with respect to what imposture can effect, we must be allowed to judge by what it has effected. Upon the whole, the difference between the argument of the Christian and the hypothesis of the Unbeliever stands as follows : The Christian attributes the rise, progress and establishment of Christianity, to a cause which indeed contradicts analogy, but which is affirmed upon proper evidence to have existed. The Unbeliever erects, in opposition, an hypothesis not supported by testimony, and which can never be proved to be more conform- able to analogy than the very facts which it is invented to over- throw. Upon a review of the whole it must surely be con- cluded, that if Christianity is an imposture, it was the most happy in its contrivance, the most dexterous in its management, and the most magnificent in its effects that ever wrought upon the credulity of mankind. But before I quit the subject, it will be right to notice one or two objections to Christianity drawn not from a defect of testi- mony, or the incredibility of the facts, but from circumstances connected with this religion, and conclusions to be admitted by those who receive it. Of this kind are the following : The partial diffusion of this religion supposed to be divine; the incapacity of mankind in general to judge of its evidence ; and the little good which has followed its promulgation. Before I consider these objections separately, I shall premise an observation which will apply to them all, and which does not appear to have been sufficiently attended to ; which is this : that as the legitimate and proper method of attack is now relin- quished, and objections urged against Christianity which do not, strictly speaking, apply to it as a question of history, those principles must be clear and certain from which these objec- tions are derived. For in no case can this method of oppos- ing historical evidence be properly employed, except the axioms 108 which are thus brought in opposition to the testimony, are of such a nature that to reject them would be to bid defiance to the plainest conclusions of the human mind. Let the objec- tions above-mentioned be now separately considered. It is then said, that a religion which really proceeded from God, could never have been limited to a small number of the human race, but must, like the benevolence of its Author, have been extended to them all. To this it may be replied, that a grada- tion of privilege is the favourite law of nature, and that moral advantages are, in fact, allotted to mankind in very different degrees: so that the objection, if it has any force, must be urged not against Christianity, but against the whole economy of the Divine government. But it is further affirmed, that the generality of mankind are not qualified to determine upon the evidences of the Christian religion, and that it cannot be supposed that a religion should proceed from God, of which the proof should not be equally clear and intelligible to all. This objection, like the preceding, has the misfortune to contradict a general principle of the Divine administration. It is a fact, that the lower classes of mankind, who have not leisure and ability to inquire into the evidence of important truth, depend for information upon those superior classes who possess the opportunities which are denied to them. And whatever had been the evidence of the Christian religion, multitudes in the lowest station of society, must have still remained incompetent judges of its truth, unless a per- petual miracle had been wrought to remedy the inconvenience. But it may be further observed, that the most ignorant, as well as the best-informed of men, are capable of feeling the prac- tical influence of Christianity, which is far more important than deciding upon its evidence. But we are now to encounter an objection apparently more formidable and alarming, that Christianity has been the cause of great and public evils, and that it is altogether problem- atical whether it has done more good or harm to the cause which it professes to promote — that of virtue and happiness. Admitting the objection for a moment in all its force, it may be 109 replied, that the evil which has resulted from Christianity has been purely adventitious, and that it is some argument of its excellence if it has done any good at all, amidst the general perversion of its principles, and the enormous load of absurdity with which it has been encumbered. And it will be allowed by judicious inquirers, that Christianity is now better understood than it has been for many ages, and that by the aid of learning and criticism its genuine principles have been unfolded, and their unadulterated excellence displayed; so that it must be admitted to be probable, that the evil complained of will be gradually diminished ; and should the time arrive when Christi- anity shall be professed in its primitive purity, consisting simply of the doctrines of a perfect Deity, an overruling Provi- dence, a future retribution, and the immortality of man,* it is * On the doctrine of a future life, which is the great discovery of the gospel, I have one or two queries to propose : Does the evidence of nature disprove the doctrine 1 This will not, I think, be pretended. Does nature clearly reveal this doctrine % This has been affirmed (but I must be excused if I add that it has been only affirmed) by men whose talents and character demand respect. Did nature fully disclose this doctrine to the wise men of antiquity 1 Let the learned Valcke- naer answer the question : " Quidquid optimi philosophorum, Socrates et Cicero, de immortalitate animae loquuntur, merse tantum sunt fluc- tuationes. Christiani demum de hoc dogmate certo fuerunt persuasi. Hinc sestimari poterit," adds this great man, "quam exiguam vim habuerint eximia Gentilium prsecepta ethica, quippe hanc ferme vitam tantum spectantia." Does nature by the constitution of the human mind, and the phenomena of the moral world, suggest the hope of a life to come ] This hope Christianity is designed and admirably cal- culated to confirm. And, after having reflected upon the subject much and seriously through the greater part of my life, I venture to give my decided opinion, that, unless the doctrine of future existence can be proved to be false or incredible, the Christian religion, supported as it is by the strongest direct and presumptive evidence, cannot rationally be rejected. That the subject is not without its difficulties, I do not wish to dissemble. It seems, indeed, to be the general fate of moral truths, that when they appear to be satisfactorily established, some difficulty should remain which may form the ground of objection. This observation applies (as, I think, Bishop Watson has also remarked) even to that truth which of all truths seems to rest on the surest foundation, the being of a God. And it will sometimes happen, that 110 difficult to see what evil could arise, directly or indirectly, from such a religion. Indeed, if this is not religion, there is no such thing. And if these doctrines are admitted at all, it is difficult to conceive that their influence should be more injurious in con- sequence of their being received upon the evidence of fact. It may further be remarked in reply to the objection before us, that before it can be urged with effect against Christianity, two difficult questions must be decided. First, as evil must be sup- posed to attend everything which passes through the hands of such an imperfect creature as man, what balance of good may reasonably be expected from a divine revelation ? Secondly, What is the precise balance between the good which has resulted from Christianity and the evil to which it has incident- ally given rise ? I submit these reflections to your readers, trusting that they are just in the main, and that they may be of some service to the impartial inquirer in enabling him to decide upon the evi- dences of a religion which has been justly characterized as the best gift of God to man. E. C. Jan., Feb., 1821. M. R. vol. xvi. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir, — In addition to the remarks on the External Evi- dences of Christianity, which you did me the favour to publish (pp. 1-3 and 84-87), I am induced to transmit to you a few observations on certain circumstances appertaining to this religion which may be regarded as presumptions of its truth. But I would first remark, that if God should think fit to an objection which has but little weight when contrasted with the evidence to which it is opposed, will be more intelligible to general apprehension than the answer, and will supply a topic of plausible declamation to those who find it easier to declaim than to reason. But in all cases the preponderance of evidence ought to be allowed to turn the scale. Have unbelievers, in general, appeared solicitous to hold the balance with an impartial hand ? Ill interfere in an extraordinary manner in the government of the world, it is reasonable to believe that such interference would be directed to some great and important object. Whether any such object has been proposed or effected by the Christian revelation, will speedily appear. I observe, then, that one grand and avowed object of Chris- tianity was to deliver mankind from the idolatry that prevailed in the world at the time of its promulgation, and to establish in its stead the knowledge and worship of the one living and true God. And this object has been gloriously accomplished. That this was one of the great purposes which Christianity was intended to answer, is explicitly stated by the Apostle Paul, in his manly address to his auditors at Athens, an address which may almost be considered as prophetic of the extensive diffusion of Christianity, and of the effects by which its propagation would be followed. It may, perhaps, be said, that nature so clearly teaches the being, unity, and perfections of God, that, without the aid of revelation, mankind must in time have emancipated themselves from idolatry and supersti- tion, and have attained to all necessary and useful knowledge of the Creator. What they could have done for themselves is by no means certain ; what has been done for them is manifest and unquestionable. And it is also indisputable, that, where the light of revelation was withheld, they had made but very small advances towards the attainment of the knowledge in question. On such a point it would be folly to speak with confidence; but I doubt exceedingly, whether, without the assistance of revelation, the bulk of mankind would at any period have arrived at the conception that there is one God only, and that God a being of infinite perfection. This con- ception seems to us easy and simple, and the evidence on which it rests 'to be irresistible. But the arguments by which it is supported, exclusive of revelation, are not adapted to the level of every mind. The fundamental proposition that con- trivance implies a contriver, is indeed a proposition of which every man can perceive the force ; but much more than this must have been apprehended before we could have reached the 112 sublime view of the Deity which is conveyed in the volume of revelation. Perhaps it will be objected, that the great majority of Christians do not, properly speaking, believe the unity of God, and that their views of his character are far from being consistent and honourable. This is unhappily too true. But the Christian Scriptures contain the remedy for the evil ; and the time cannot fail to come when the evil will be remedied. Nor can it reasonably be doubted but that the time will also come when idolatry in every form will be banished from the face of the earth, and that by the sole influence of the Chris- tian revelation. But another avowed object of Christianity was to teach the doctrine of future life and retribution; and this object it has most fully accomplished. Wherever its light has been diffused, it has shed its beams over the darkness of the grave, and has inspired not only the hope, but the assurance of immortality. And this may be regarded as some presumption of its truth, if we reflect, that were we now, for the first time, informed that God had given a revelation of Iris will to men, our first inquiry would probably be, whether this revelation professed to solve the grand problem, Is man intended to survive the grave ? And if he is in truth born for immortality, it surely were not unworthy of the Deity to interfere in an extraordinary manner to acquaint him with his high destination. It is indeed some- times said, that a revelation was not wanted to teach the doctrine of a future life, since this is taught with sufficient clearness in the volume of nature, and was confidently main- tained by the philosophers of old. On this subject I have given my opinion very explicitly on several occasions, and shall, therefore, not enlarge upon it now. I shall only remark, in relation to the ancient philosophers, that we have their arguments in our hands, and can therefore judge for ourselves of the conviction which they were likely to produce. I cannot, however, help adding an observation, in which I am confirmed by that great master of reasoning, Dr. Priestley, that the ancients did not employ the hope of immortality either as a motive to duty, or as a topic of consolation in those cases 113 where its influence would have been most seasonable and use- ful.* The inference from this fact (and a fact it is) is obvious and certain. But again, Christianity has established a pure and perfect system of morality. This, I trust, I may consider as granted. And it deserves observation, that the moral precepts which are laid down in the Christian Scriptures are delivered with a tone of authority which admirably accords with the supposition, that they who taught them were inspired. No premises are laid down from which certain conclusions are drawn ; there is no trace of an intellectual process by which the truth of cer- tain principles had been ascertained, but every precept is left to rest either on its own evidence, or on the acknowledged claims of the teacher by whom it is inculcated. And little as Christians in general have been disposed to practise the morality of their religion, that man must have been very un- fortunate in his social intercourse, who has not seen many instances in which the principles of Christianity have trained the sincere believer to as high a degree of moral excellence as human nature could be expected to attain. Some will object, that were Christianity divine, its efficacy would be more generally felt, and that its oelestial origin would clearly mani- fest itself in the lives of the great majority of its professors. Not now to inquire into the causes why its moral influence is not greater than it is, it will be sufficient to observe, that had it been the Divine intention that the human race at large should rapidly attain to the perfection of moral excellence, they would have been differently constituted to what they are. Forgetting the manifest plan of Providence, we demand more from Revelation than we had any just reason to expect from * I do not mean that, in the cases alluded to, they never make men- tion of a future existence. But when they make mention of it, it is merely as one branch of an alternative by which they endeavour to prove that death is not to be regarded as an evil. And how little they were themselves impressed with it, may be inferred with sufficient cer- tainty from the stress which they lay on other considerations which they conceived were calculated to mitigate the poignancy of grief. I 114 it, and then are apt to conclude that Christianity cannot be divine, because our demands have not been satisfied. But what I wished principally to remark in relation to the present subject was, the advantage of having a perfect standard of morality which is acknowledged to be divine. To say nothing of its influence upon individuals, it must have a happy effect in modifying the public opinion on all subjects connected with morality ; and he who knows the mighty influence which public opinion has upon human conduct will not think lightly of any- thing by which this powerful engine can be controlled and regulated. Will it be said that this high standard of morals has not governed public opinion in the degree which might have been expected from its divine authority ? I have virtually replied to this objection already. Suffice it then to say, that it has been the means of effecting a happy change in the man- ners and condition of mankind, and that it has a certain opera- tion even upon those who know little of its nature, and who feel no solicitude to conform their lives to its requisitions. But if the perfection of this standard be granted, the question may be put with irresistible force in relation to our Lord, Whence had this man this knowledge? My last observation respects the spirituality of the religious worship which is prescribed by Christianity. How prone man- kind have ever been to attach forms and ceremonies to religion, or rather to place religion in them, their history most fully shows. Even Christians, with the Scriptures in their hands, and in direct defiance of the genius of their religion, have appended numerous frivolities to the simple worship which alone can plead the authority of their great Master. He merely taught that God, as a Spirit, should be worshipped in spirit and in truth. Beyond this he enjoined nothing. But who was Jesus Christ as far as he was not a teacher sent from God ? A Jew, nursed in the bosom of a religion abounding with ceremonies, ceremonies to which he might have been ex- pected to feel the same attachment with the rest of his country- men. Yet, without questioning the divinity of the Mosaic ritual, without casting any reflection on the formalities which 115 he dismissed from his more pure and exalted system, he simply enjoins that God should be worshipped, and prescribes no for- malities with whieh his worship should be accompanied. With what hypothesis, but that of divine illumination, such a conduct can accord, I am altgether at a loss to conceive. Imposture is, I think, confessedly out of the question ; and that would be a very singular enthusiasm which should reject everything that could kindle the imagination, and which in its operation should surpass the ordinary effects of the most sober and enlightened reason. Upon the whole, the simplicity of the Christian wor- ship is as strong a presumption of the divine origin of the religion as can well be imagined, and must surely have its weight with every mind to which all presumptive reasoning is not addressed in vain. E. 0. March, 1821. M. R. vol. xvi. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir, — The perusal of certain papers in your Kepository, on the subject of Miracles, has led me to transmit to you one or two remarks, which, though not directly applicable to the observations of your correspondents, may not be altogether use- less. In inquiring into the truth of the miracles recorded in the New Testament, we ought to consider them as they are there represented, not as events without an author and without an object, but as events which are expressly referred to a Divine agency, and which were intended to answer a certain purpose. The resurrection of a man from the dead, regarded as an in- sulated event from which no conclusion could be drawn, and by which no object was effected, would require strong evidence indeed to render it credible. But the resurrection of a man as a pledge of the future existence of mankind, and as an event which was to lay the foundation of a theology which should change (and which has changed) the religion of the world, is 12 116 very differently circumstanced. It is also to be considered, that if God should please to interfere in a supernatural manner in the government of the world, such interference would he miraculous, and must he supported by miracles as its proof. The question, then, respecting the probability or improbability of the Christian miracles resolves itself into the question, whether it be probable or improbable that God should step aside from the usual plan of his administration in such a manner and for such an object as is stated in the Christian Scriptures; and he who feels assured that such an interposition can be con- firmed by no testimony, may of course save himself the trouble of inquiring into the evidence of the facts by which it is sup- ported. But he who has not arrived at this assurance has nothing to do but to examine as impartially as he can the evi- dence which is laid before him, and to consider whether it is in itself worthy of credit. He will act unphilosophically if, at every step, he recurs to the antecedent improbability of mira- cles, (of which we are very incompetent judges,) in order to throw a suspicion upon evidence which appears to be convinc- ing and satisfactory. He should consider the testimony not so much relatively as absolutely ; and for this plain reason, be- cause he has no balance in which he can weigh the evidence of testimony against an antecedent improbability, so as to ascer- tain precisely when the latter is surmounted by the former.* In the case of a fact which we deem to be improbable, we are * I will here take the liberty to refer to an observation which I for- merly made on this subject. "In many cases man cannot wait to calculate between the strength of the evidence and the improbability of the fact ; and, in some cases, could he wait for ever, he would not know how to manage the calculation. And, conscious of his infirmity, he chooses, in such cases, rather to examine the validity of the testi- mony, of which he can judge with tolerable exactness, than to fatigue his faculties with endeavouring to balance the evidence which is laid before him against improbabilities, the force of which he cannot estimate. And in the case of Christianity, if he conceives himself to be an incompetent judge of the antecedent credibility of a divine reve- lation, his business is to inquire into the evidence with as much impar- tiality as he can, and to abide by the result of such inquiry." 117 scrupulous, and ought to be scrupulous, as to the validity of the testimony on which it rests ; hut we never pretend to apply a scale by which we can estimate improbability on the one hand, and the force of testimony on the other, in order to decide whether the fact is to be received. And in innumerable cases a high degree of supposed improbability is so completely over- come by the power of testimony, that it forms no deduction whatever from the confidence with which a fact is believed. Nothing is more common than to hear that such or such thing might have been thought impossible, but that, nevertheless, it is true. And the miracles of the New Testament ought to be inquired into in the same manner in which we inquire into the truth of any fact which we demand should be supported by clear and solid evidence. If the notion of such a divine interposi- tion as is recorded in the Christian Scriptures, carries its own refutation along with it, we need inquire no further. But if not, we ought to examine its evidence with strictness and im- partiality, and rest in the result of such examination. ~When I say that we ought to do this, I do not now mean morally, but philosophically. It is in this way that we judge of other facts, and if we refuse to judge of miracles on the same principle, we shall be in danger of rejecting what, to say the least, may be true, and what, if true, must be most interesting and important. E. 0. Nov., 1821. M. R. vol. xvi. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir, — One of the most plausible objections to the arguments for the being of a God is that which is suggested by Mr. Hume, namely, that we have no experience in the origin of worlds, and therefore cannot safely conclude, because ships, cities, &c, are made by human art, that the universe must have had an intelligent Author. This objection I propose to consider. 118 The universe exhibits in innumerable instances an adaptation of means to ends, or what, for the sake of brevity, I shall sometimes call contrivance, not meaning thereby to assume the matter in dispute. And this adaptation of means to ends seems to be as truly prospective as anything which we call con- trivance in the works of art. The eye appears to have been as> manifestly formed for seeing, as the telescope for assisting the vision of the eye. The universe, then, is justly comprehended in the general description of works which indicate a fitness of means to ends : and if I may not, in the case of the universe, call this fitness intentional, I must maintain that it is strictly analogous to the effects of intention in the works of art. As far as relates to the appearance of design, the works of art have no advantage over the works of nature. The question, then, is, why I should not apply to the latter the reasoning which I apply without hesitation, and, as it seems, without error, to the former. Is it not reasonable to maintain, as a universal truth, that such an adaptation of means to ends as was never known to be fortuitous must be referred to an in- telligent Author ? But I have had no experience in the origin of worlds. This is true ; nor is this experience needed. I have seen, in cases innumerable, the connection between in- tellect in a designing cause, and the marks of contrivance in the works which intellect has effected ; and unless the human mind must be denied the privilege of reasoning from the clearest analogies, I may safely infer that this connection must be universal. Contrivance is contrivance, wherever it be found ; and the connection between cause and effect is not more certain than the connection between an effect which indicates con- trivance, and an intelligent or designing cause. We gain our knowledge of both these connections in precisely the same manner, or rather they are virtually the same, the latter being only a specific modification of the former. But Mr. Hume says, that all that we can pretend to know concerning the connection of cause and effect is constant conjunction. That conjunction is all that we perceive is true; and a more harm- less truth was never made known to the world. For until some JN9 disciple of Mr. Hume shall assign a better reason for constant conjunction than that the things thus conjoined are necessarily connected, the humau mind will go on to reason from effect to cause, as it did before Mr. Hume's discovery saw the light. Could Mr. Hume's observation disjoin what we see to be con- joined, it would do something; but the fact remains exactly as it was, and where we see that an effect is, there we cannot help concluding that a cause has been. And this is sufficient for all purposes of reasoning. And if any one shall choose to be- lieve that cause and effect are always conjoined but never con- nected ; for example, that, though a ball, when struck by a cricket-bat, is invariably put in motion, yet, for any necessity that operates, it might invariably remain at rest: he may, in- deed, enjoy the satisfaction of not thinking with the vulgar, but assuredly he will not have the credit of thinking with the wise. But Mr. Hume further observes, that " all reasoning from the relation of causes and effects is founded on a certain instinct of our nature, and may be fallacious and deceitful." If this proposition is intended merely to intimate a possibility that the reasoning in question may be fallacious, it amounts to no more than this, that this reasoning does not rise to absolute or mathematical demonstration. But if it is intended to imply that all reasoning from the relation of causes and effects pro- bably is fallacious, it may be satisfactorily replied, that it does not follow because a thing possibly may be, that, therefore, it probably is. Moreover, if the observation were to be thus interpreted, it would imply, that the contrary conclusions to those which mankind have hitherto drawn from the relation of cause and effect would be more likely to be just; an extrava- gance to which no soberminded man can assent for a moment. In innumerable instances we rest with as much confidence upon reasonings drawn from this source as upon the evidence of the senses or upon mathematical proof. And this, however it comes to pass, we cannot help doing. But to spend another moment upon Mr. Hume's proposition : were the reasoning from the relation of causes and effects founded upon instinct, this, I conceive, would be a presumption that it would not be 120. fallacious. It is, however, founded on no such thing. It is founded on experience, on which Mr. Hume can place suffi- cient dependence when it suits his purpose. And the same experience which has taught us to "believe that every effect must have a cause^ has also taught us to look for a designing cause where there is an indication of contrivance in the effect. And hence we infer thus much with sufficient certainty, that if the universe is an effect at all, it must he referred to an intelligent cause. But, it seems, our experience does not reach far enough to justify the conclusion, that the universe, because it exhibits an adaptation of means to ends, must have had an intelligent Author. We want the only experience which the case demands — an experience in the origin of worlds. Were this principle carried to its full extent it would follow, that when I see a work of art, which is altogether new to me, I must not confidently conclude that it had a maker. 1 know, indeed, that men exist, and though all reasoning from the relation of causes and effects may be fallacious, I think T know that the human intellect is adequate to the production of those effects which we call the works of art. But as my experience cannot reach to a novel case, unless I may venture to call in the axiom, that similar effects must be referred to similar causes, I must draw my conclusion with diffidence and hesitation. But, as Mr. Hume observes, I have no experience of the origin of worlds. And if I had, what would be its precise value ? " All reason- ing from the relation of causes and effects may be fallacious and deceitful." But the argument from experience, which Mr. Hume says is wanting, would rest upon the presumption, that similar effects proceed from similar causes, in which presump- tion Mr. Hume ought to have maintained that in all cases there may be no force. Indeed, if all reasoning from the rela- tion of causes and effects may be fallacious and deceitful, were a world constructed before my eyes, the possibility of doubt, as to its origin, would not be precluded ! In opposition, however, to these extravagancies of scepticism, I maintain that expe- rience affords a sufficiently certain ground of reasoning, and I further maintain, that the experience which we have had of the 121 connection between contrivance and a contriver, abundantly justifies the conclusion, that the universe must have had a de- signing cause. To reject this conclusion is to set aside, with- out necessity,* one of the strongest associations of the human mind, and to reason upon a principle, if a principle it can be called, which would subvert the foundation of all reasoning. If similar effects are not to be referred to similar causes, all ratiocination is at an end. It is in vain to urge that there is a difference between the works of nature and the works of art. As far as respects the adaptation of means to ends, and on this alone the argument rests, there is no difference, except that this adaptation, in the former, is far more curious and exquisite than in the latter. Were any one still to say that the expe- * I said without necessity, because no difficulty attending the hypo- thesis of Theism can possibly be greater than the difficulty of con- ceiving that such an adaptation of means to ends, as is equivalent to contrivance, should exist without the operation of intelligence. In- deed, ideas are more closely associated in the human mind than those of contrivance and a contriver. In contemplating the works of art, as connected with intelligence, we not only recognise the general relation of cause and effect, but are, moreover, led to acknowledge that the work effected corresponds to an archetype in the mind of the artist. And hence we seem satisfactorily to infer, that everything which indi- cates contrivance answers to a certain model which previously existed in the mind of some intelligent agent. And shall the works of nature, with all their various and exquisite adaptation of means to ends, be regarded as answering to no model, as corresponding to no archetype 1 There is one point of difference, it is true, between the works of nature and the works of art, which is, that the latter are put together by the application of mechanical powers, whereas the former are many of them evidently produced by the action of certain laws, which are called the laws of nature. But this circumstance of difference by no means counterbalances the circumstances of resemblance, and, therefore, does not avail to set aside the analogy. And what are the laws of nature but a certain mode of operation 1 Does the law in any case design and anticipate the effect ? It may not be altogether foreign to the argu- ment to observe further, that the laws of nature, together with all real existences, must be, in themselves considered, the objects of know- ledge. And yet from the hypothesis of the Atheist, it will follow that no being exists by whom these laws are understood. 122 rience of which I have been speaking is no certain guide in a case to which it does not itself extend, I should think it suffi- cient to reply, that it is the only guide which we have, and that it is absurd to relinquish this guide in order to wander in a field of vain conjecture, without a ray of probability to direct us. One thing we know, which is, that intellect can adjust means to ends, and produce effects which indicate contrivance; but that anything else can produce these effects, we not only do not know, but have not even the slightest reason to believe. But men sometimes argue as if it were the perfection of human wisdom to follow the weaker probability instead of the stronger, or to set probability altogether at defiance, because it falls short of strict and mathematical demonstration.* From the view which has been now taken of Mr. Hume's objection to the being of a God, it appears that the reasoning which ascribes the universe to an intelligent Author, rests upon precisely the same foundation as that which attributes what is denominated an effect to that which is denominated a cause. Contrivance is the thing to be accounted for, and that reason- ing, founded on experience, which has led us to conceive that every effect must have a cause, has led us to demand an intelli- gent cause for every effect which indicates such an adaptation of means to ends, as could not, in our apprehension, be the re- sult of chance or accident. And against this reasoning I do not see what can be urged, except that it does not amount to such a demonstration as would exclude all possibility of doubt. If the argument does not amount to the highest probability, I do not know what probability is. And Mr. Hume's reason- * If any one should say that probability is not a reasonable ground of confidence, I should only desire him to carry this principle as far as it will go, and to act upon it. I need not point out what consequences would follow. But shall that evidence, upon which mankind do not scruple to act in ordinary concerns, be considered as unsatisfactory only in concerns of the highest importance 1 The practice of demand- ing absolute demonstration where it is not to be had, and where it is not needed, has done much mischief. It has given rise to an unrea- sonable scepticism on the one hand, and to an absurd appeal to common sense on the other. 123 ings only show that this probability is not absolute and incon- trovertible proof. That this may appear more clearly, I will deduce from Mr. Hume's observations the only conclusions which would be formidable to the hypothesis of Theism, and leave the reader to judge whether these conclusions are legiti- mate. Between cause and effect we perceive only conjunction ; therefore the probability is, that cause and effect are not con- nected ! All our reasonings from the relation of causes and effects may be fallacious ; therefore the probability is, that they are fallacious! We have no experience in the origin of worlds ; therefore it is probable that the universe, which shows throughout an adaptation of means to ends, is not the work of an intelligent Author ! If these are just conclusions, Mr. Hume's reasonings carry with them more weight than has been hitherto attributed to them. But, in spite of Mr. Hume's sub- tleties, mankind will continue to reason with confidence from the relation of cause and effect. They will also assume to themselves the privilege of generalising their ideas, and from similarity in different effects will infer similarity in their causes. And unless it shall be shown by some solid argument, that an organised universe is not an effect, they will think that they cannot, err in ascribing it to an intelligent though invisible Cause. But it may, perhaps, be said, that we may as well rest in a self-existent universe as ascend beyond it to a self-existent God. Were the universe a mass of matter, without any indication of design, it might, for anything that I am able to allege, be self- existent. But the marks of design, which it everywhere exhibits, stamp upon it the character of an effect which could be produced only by a designing cause. Between a harmonized universe and the idea of self- existence there is a repugnance, a repugnance founded on the experience which we have had of the connection between contrivance and a contriver, between effects- which indicate an adaptation of means to ends, and an intel- ligent agent by whom this adaptation was devised. But between the notion of intelligence and self- existence there is no repug- nance, and for anything that either experience or reason sug- 124 gests to the contrary, intellect may exist uncreated. Something uncreated there must be ; but as analogy forbids us to suppose that this something is an organized system, which seems to testify the operation of an intelligent contriver; it consequently leads us to conclude that this something is that incomprehensi- ble Being whom we call God. I will conclude with the senti- ment of the poet, in which even an Atheist will not refuse to join, " And if a God there is, that God how great ! " E. 0. Feb., 1822. M. R. vol. xvii. Sir, — In my last (p. 65) I committed a trifling error in quoting the words of Mr. Hume. Instead of writing, " all reasoning from the relation of causes and effects," &c, I should have written, " all reasoning from the relation of cause and effect," &c. I will avail myself of this opportunity to say another word on the nature of this relation. The question is, whether the constant conjunction of cause and effect implies that there exists between them a necessary connection. I contend that it does. The conjunction under consideration must either be for- tuitous or necessary.* If fortuitous, then every event which takes place in the universe must be truly and properly con- tingent. How then comes it to pass that causes should not often act without being followed by their effects, and that effects should not spring up without being preceded by their causes ? Moreover, as that which is contingent, or altogether independent of previous circumstances, (could it happen at all,) may * I am aware that a third hypothesis may be formed, namely, that the conjunction between cause and effect is arbitrary, depending on the pleasure of the Deity, by whose energy the effect is produced. But as this hypothesis would only shift the notion of a cause from one thing to another, and would imply a necessary connection between the real cause and the effect, it does not require a distinct consideration. 125 happen at one time as well as at another, how comes it to pass that those events which we term effects uniformly follow those which we denominate causes ? Whence is it, for instance, that the motion of the cricket-hall always instantly succeeds to the impulse of the hat ? Are not the chances against such a succession infinite, unless the phenomena which are thus con- joined are necessarily connected ? And will not this reasoning hold with respect to the innumerable combinations of cause and effect which take place throughout the whole of nature ? Is it not then infinitely improbable that cause and effect should be uniformly conjoined, if they were not necessarily connected ? Here, I think, we have the necessary connection of cause and effect made out by something like a process of the understand- ing. But perhaps some sceptical philosopher may say, that the contrary hypothesis, namely, that there is no necessary con- nection between cause and effect, does not involve a contra- diction, and, therefore, that it may possibly be true. This inference is not quite correct. It does not follow because a proposition does not involve a contradiction, that therefore it may be true. It does indeed follow, that it may be true for any thing that we can prove to the contrary ; but our ignorance is not an infallible criterion of possibility. Mr. Hume, I think says, that this proposition, The sun will not rise to-morrow, does not involve a contradiction; from which the intended inference doubtless is, that perhaps the sun may not rise to- morrow. Nor does it involve a contradiction to say, that the sun did not rise yesterday ; so that had I slept through the day, I might have had some doubt whether the world was not during that period involved in total darkness. But the information of my friends would, in this case, have set me right. But who could have vouched for the truth of their information ? The falsehood of the strongest testimony does not amount to a con- tradiction ; consequently (it might be said) the strongest testi- mony may be false. But methinks, Sir, I hear you say, Enough of these extravagancies ! I say so too, and will take my leave of them with observing, that scepticism, when in her most incredulous, or what she doubtless considers as her most philo- 126 sophic mood, borders on the opposite extreme of puerile cre- dulity. E. C. P.S. — Your correspondent O.P.Q. (p. 76) is desirous of information respecting John xxi. 15. The little which I have to communicate he is welcome to, and that little will concern the Greek of the passage alone. If the sense were, " Lovest thou me more than these ? " the Greek ought to have been, aya.7ra; sps ttxeiov rouruv ; I recollect but one passage in which txs seems to be used as a contradistinctive, and that is Eur. Phoeniss. 447: navo-ai ttovcov [as, koci and to rest in the judgment of those whom we consider as wiser than ourselves, in cases where we are conscious that our own judgment will not avail us, is another thing ; and, much as it may " savour of the credulity of a child," is conformable to the constitution of nature, and the universal experience of mankind. With respect to the insolent demands of men who call upon you to prostrate your understanding before the dogmas which they choose to erect into articles of faith, I should certainly urge it upon the most illiterate Christian strenuously to resist them, believing it to be infinitely better that he should think for him- self as well as he can, than that any man should assume the right of thinking for him. But I still maintain, that there are multitudes in every Christian country who are altogether in- capable of deciding upon the truth or falsehood of the Chris- tian religion. But if Mr. Sturch, who is himself a believer, would point out any principles which would enable them to determine the question, he would effectually refute me, and confer a benefit upon them. But it seems, if my remark is just, " Protestantism and everything connected with it is at an end." This, did I believe it, I should be sorry for. But truth is truth, whatever becomes of consequences. There is, how- ever, no ground of apprehension. As it has been judiciously observed, " The right of private judgment is unquestionable, but the ability to exercise that right is quite another thing." Nor is it at all necessary in order to refute the arrogant claims of the Church of Borne, to maintain that every Christian, whatever have been his means of improvement, is competent to judge of the evidences of revelation. Mr. Sturch has the good fortune to possess two indestruc- tible and divine religions, one of which he believes to be true, the other (Natural Keligion) he certainly knows to be so. In this, Mr. Sturch, who does not seem to have distinguished very accurately between faith and knowledge, differs somewhat from that zealous champion of Natural Keligion, the author of 156 " Apeleutherus," who, if I rightly recollect, when speaking of an important article of this religion, says, that certainty is entirely out of the question. Were I called upon to decide between Mr. Sturch and this anonymous author, I should pro- nounce judgment in favour of the latter, and should give it as my opinion that Mr. Sturch, in a moment of inadvertency, has mistaken a strong persuasion for certain knowledge. E. C. March, 1824. M. K. vol. xix. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir, — In my last (p. 137) I quoted a passage from Mr. Locke; and as it is always useful to point out the errors and inconsistencies of great men, that others may not be misled by them, I wish, with your leave, to say another word or two on the sentiment which is there expressed. Mr. Locke maintains that all mankind without the aid of revelation could have attained an undoubting conviction of the being of a God, and a knowledge of the obedience which is due to him. When Mr. Locke expressed this opinion, he either could not have carefully considered what he meant by all mankind, or could not have had in his mind what he afterwards wrote on the existence of a God, which he regards as the most certain of all truths. Of this truth he gives a demonstration, which no doubt he thought to be the most clear and simple. This demonstration, however, he acknowledges to be complex, when he says that " he believes nobody can avoid the cogency of it, who will but as carefully attend to it as to any other demonstration of so many parts." Of these parts, the first indeed is a proposition of which no man can doubt, but the rest consist of abstract and metaphysical reasoning. If your readers will turn to it (vol. ii. p. 239 et seq.), and then ask themselves whether the discovery of this demonstration is within the reach of a Hottentot or Indian savage, they will, I 157 conceive, agree with me that even that truth which lies at the foundation of all religion, whether natural or revealed, is not so intelligible to all mankind as Mr. Locke has represented it ; unless, indeed, they should fortunately hit upon some shorter and easier method of proof. But if the first principle of religion is involved in obscurity, as to multitudes of the human race, what shall we say of the whole system which is to be deduced from it ? But Mr. Locke, as appears from what he says elsewhere, was misled by the opinion that it is inconsis- tent with the wisdom and goodness of God, not to furnish all mankind with the means of knowing the great principles of religion. But surely we may leave in the hands of a mer- ciful Creator those to whom these opportunities have been denied. If I have pointed out an error in Mr. Locke, I have done nothing but what this great and good man would have wished to be done ; and, perhaps, nothing but what the light which he himself shed over the world of intellect has enabled me to do. One word more, and I have done. If the advocates of Natural Religion would content themselves with saying, that its principles may be discovered by men of thought and reflection, and by their means be diffused among mankind in general, they would not run into palpable absurdity ; but when they maintain that the truths of this religion, that is, the truths of which this religion is usually said to consist, are intelligible to every human being who will give himself the trouble to inquire into them (which implies that every human being is capable of conducting such an inquiry), they lay down a position which is not to be surpassed in extravagance by the wildest vagaries of the human mind — a position, which it would be the extreme of folly wilfully to misstate, and which it would be no easy task to caricature. E. C. April, 1824. M. R. vol. xix. 158 TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir, — To my remarks (p. 110), perhaps rather too uncere- moniously expressed, on the Rev. Mr. Cogan's paper on the Evidences of Christianity, that gentleman has replied, in your publication of this day, in a spirit of mildness and candour, which does him the highest honour, and which would greatly tend to increase, if that were possible, the respect with which his character is regarded by all who know him. I shall endea- vour to follow his example in the few observations I have to make on his reply. Mr. Cogan appears to treat with great scorn the supposition, that men unacquainted with the Christian revelation may believe in the unity and perfections of God, the doctrine of a universal Provideuce, and the future existence and immortality of man. He declares that he should not think favourably either of the understanding or the modesty of the man who should venture to say so; and he says, "If Mr. Sturch is dis- posed to believe that they would have had the conviction of their truth which they now have, had not their lot been cast in a Christian land, I can only say, that he has my hearty con- sent." Now, sir, Mr. Cogan, who is much better acquainted with antiquity than I can be supposed to be, well knows, that all these doctrines have been believed before the Christian revelation had any existence. He knows, too, that the belief of a Deity and a future life, though always more or less dis- figured and debased by superstition and absurdity, has been very general, I might say universal, in all ages. He knows that these doctrines were believed by the heathen inhabitants of this island, in their rude and savage state ; and it is for Mr. Cogan to show, which I think he will find it difficult to do, that they would not have been generally believed to this day, whether Christianity had been introduced or not. For my own part, I see no reason whatever to doubt that they ivould ; and, probably, in a much improved state, bearing some proportion 159 to the civilisation of the country. But if by the words, "con- viction of their truth which they now have" Mr. Cogan means the same clear, full, rational and consistent informa- tion on these subjects, that we derive from the Christian revela- tion, I beg leave to assure him that no such supposition ever entered into my mind. For although I have no doubt what- ever that the light of nature opens to mankind in general the prospect of futurity, yet I believe that even to the strongest eyes it must appear somewhat indistinct and imperfect ; and I therefore rejoice in that splendid and glorious light which the Christian revelation throws over the scene, and for which I can never be sufficiently thankful. Mr. Cogan seems desirous of declining the task of pointing out to us in whose writings it is that the truths of Natural Religion are spoken of as " emblazoned in the heavens in characters which all can read, and none can misunder- stand!' The only passage he quotes is from Locke, and he thinks it will answer his purpose tolerably well ; but, I con- fess, I think quite otherwise, inasmuch as I can discover in it nothing more than the plain, simple position, that the light of nature is sufficient to convince those who " set themselves to search," that there is a God to whom obedience is due; a position which, I presume, Mr. Cogan will not venture to deny, after having, in this very letter, on which I am remarking, told us that he " readily concedes to the advocates for Natural Reli- gion, that the argument for the being of a God is as conclu- sive as need be, and that from the predominance of good which appears in his works, it is difficult not to conceive of him as benevolent!' By the word God, I presume, he means a Creator and Governor of the world; and if this Creator and Governor is also a kind and benevolent Benefactor, Mr. Cogan will, doubtless, admit the conclusion to be very natural, that obedience is due to him. In a note on this quotation, Mr. Cogan goes on to say, "Mr. Locke speaks of searching for the truths of Natural Religion ; and I never supposed any man to say, that they could be understood by those who would not take the trouble to learn them. But that which is intelli- 160 gible to all mankind, must be very easy to understand? Now, from this position, I must beg leave to withhold my assent. By all mankind, I suppose, we do not mean every individual without exception. We do not intend, for instance, tc include idiots ; but we mean mankind in general. Now, I think, I know many things which mankind in general are very capable of learning and understanding, if they will take the trouble to do so, which yet cannot be said to be very easy. It can hardly be doubted, I suppose, that at least nine out of ten of mankind, if taken at a proper age, may be taught the chief rules of arithmetic; though these are so far from being very easy, that they certainly are far more difficult to under- stand than the leading principles of morals. Indeed, the very phrases, " take the trouble" and " set themselves to search" plainly show that all is not perfectly easy, but that there are some difficulties to be overcome by persevering labour ; and, I will add, by all the assistance that the learner can obtain. For I will not hesitate a moment to satisfy Mr. Cogan's curiosity, by answering in the affirmative the question which he suggests, but modestly doubts whether he has any right to put to me, concerning the propriety of calling in, as often as it may be needful, the aid of some person of superior mind, to explain whatever may be obscure or difficult. I would, how- ever, advise Mr. Cogan not to distress himself with fears, lest the instructor should show something of the spirit of the usurping priest, of which I think there is little danger; for to repeat what I have elsewhere said, there is " this unspeakable advantage in favour of Natural Religion ; that whoever under- takes to inculcate its pure and salutary maxims is on a footing of perfect equality with his fellow-men." He can assume no dictatorial authority, nor exact from them any implicit obedience. As he cannot have the shadow of pretence for " dominion over their faith," he must content himself with being the <( helper of their joy." In short, it appears to me that the quotations from Locke are extremely unfortunate, and not in any degree rele- vant to Mr. Cogan's purpose ; and as he has not produced any other authority to justify the use of the language to which I 161 objected, I must consider his omitting to do so, as a tacit admission, that if it was not the language of misstatement and caricature, it was, to say the least, a little too strong. I proceed now to remark on the surprise which Mr. Cogan expresses to my objection to his notion of the value of belief without evidence. He tells us he is very sure that it is true ; and he maintains "that there are multitudes in every Christian country who are altogether incapable of deciding on the truth or falsehood of the Christian religion." Now, if he means that there are multitudes who are incapable of deciding with certainty on the external evidence of Christianity, that is, of the truth of every miracle related in the New Testament, or in any writer of the earliest Christian age, I not only admit the truth of the position, but I go a great deal further, — I believe that there is not one man upon the face of the earth who is compe- tent to the decision. But if his meaning be, that men in general have no adequate means of judging whether the important truths inculcated in the New Testament are worthy to be received and acted upon, I must be allowed to differ from him in to to. For being fully persuaded that Cicero was right in vindicating the authority of Eight Reason in his book " De Republica ; " — that St. Paul was right in asserting the universal obligation of the Law of Nature, in his Epistle to the Romans ; — that Bishop Sherlock was right in maintaining that " the religion of the Gospel is the true original religion of Reason and Nature ;" — that Locke was right when he said that " God had discovered to men the Unity and Majesty of his Eternal Godhead, and the truths of Natural Religion, by the light of Reason ; — that the learned and excellent Lardner was right in affirming " that St. Paul was not wont to deny and contest, but to improve the natural notions which men had of Religion ; " — that the Reverend Robert Robinson was right in saying, "a conformity between the dictates of Nature and the precepts of Revelation, is the best proof of the divinity of the latter;" — and that Archdeacon Paley, and a thousand others, have been right in asserting the authority of both natural and super- natural revelation ; and having myself read the New Testa- M 162 ment with care, and found it to consist principally of con- firmation and illustration of Natural Religion, which, I am persuaded, men in general, being properly educated, are capable of understanding and justly appreciating, — I deem it a libel on human nature to assert that mankind are incapable of judging for themselves, and that they must and ought to depend for their religious ideas on any dictatorial governor, whether eccle- siastical or civil. Mr. Cogan, adverting to my profession of attachment both to Natural Religion and to Christianity, the latter of which I have said " / verily believe to be true ; the former I certainly know to be so " — imagines that he has discovered some differ- ence of opinion on this subject between me and the author of a book, entitled " Apeleutherus ; " who, in speaking of a par- ticular article of religious belief, says that certainty is entirely out of the question. And, as it is well known to Mr. Cogan, and to my friends in general, that the author of that book and myself are in reality one and the same person, I must, of course, be sorry and ashamed, if there should be found to be any material difference between us. But I hope that a few words of explanation will show that the supposed difference is rather in appearance than in reality; and will satisfy both Mr. Cogan, and another of your correspondents, whose signature is B., that they have both misunderstood my meaning. When I spoke of Natural Keligion as certainly true, I should have thought it quite obvious that I was consi- dering its general or abstract character, and not inquiring into the particulars of which it might be supposed to consist. And, undoubtedly, as a general position, it may be safely affirmed, that whatever can be proved to be a principle of Natural Religion must be true ; because the witnesses of this religion — the heavens, which declare the glory of God — the firmament, which showeth his handiwork — day unto day uttereth speech — night unto night showeth knowledge — cannot for a moment be imagined to bear false testimony. But with respect to the supposed particulars of this religion the case is different. In considering them the question arises, — What is the testimony 163 that these witnesses give, and to what extent does it go ? And in some cases, the answer to this question may not be so clear and satisfactory as we could wish; probability may be the utmost that we can obtain — certainty, in such cases, may be entirely out of the question. With regard to Supernatural Religion, I have no hesitation in affirming that it is always, in some degree, dependent upon things which are, in their own nature, fallacious; and, therefore, whether it be considered in the abstract or in the detail of any particular revelation, certainty must be entirely out of the question. It may still, however, possess a high degree of probability, and be entitled to be " verily believed." If, therefore, Mr. Locke, in the pas- sages quoted by Mr. Cogan, has really given Natural Religion " an advantage over the Bible," it was no great " fault," and Mr. Cogan need not be very anxious to clear himself from the suspicion of being the accomplice of that illustrious man. Notwithstanding my declaration of attachment both to natural and supernatural revelation, with, however, an undis- guised preference of the authority of the former, I cannot admit the congratulatory statement of Mr. Cogan, that I have " the good fortune to possess two religions." On the contrary, I am decidedly of opinion that there never was or can be more than one true and acceptable religion; winch, as it has been well observed by my late learned and valuable friend, the Rev. Charles Bulkeley, " being originally founded in the perfections of God, and the nature of man, must of necessity, in every period of time, and under every particular dispensation of it, be fundamentally and essentially the same." I now take leave of this controversy, regretting that it has been my painful duty to appear in opposition to the opinions of a gentleman whose personal character I so highly esteem ; and, thanking you, sir, for permitting me to occupy so much space in the pages of your valuable Miscellany. WILLIAM STURCH. April 1st, 1824. M. R. vol. xix. M % 104 TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir, — My acknowledgments are due to Mr. Sturch for the handsome manner in which he has spoken of the temper with which I replied to his animadversions (p. 220). His last paper will furnish matter for an observation or two which I wish to make, not from the love of controversy nor the desire of victory, but for the sake of truth, in a matter of some moment. Mr. Sturch acknowledges that Christianity has cast a glo- rious light on the future hopes of man. But if I rightly under- stand Mr. Sturch 's views, he considers Christianity as borrow- ing its principal evidence from its conformity to the Keligion of Nature. Now, as far as this is the case, Christianity can- not render any truth more clear than the Religion of Nature had previously rendered it. Christianity, then, must possess a clear and satisfactory evidence altogether distinct from that which it derives from its conformity to Natural Religion ; and if this evidence does not amount to certainty, it must amount to something that to practical purposes will serve as well. By all mankind, Mr. Sturch means mankind in general. Mr. Locke meant something more. He did not, it is true, include idiots in this expression ; but he, doubtless, meant all who possess the common faculties of human nature. And I must repeat, that those truths, which are intelligible to all mankind, must be too plain to be misunderstood. So that the quotation from Mr. Locke, though not the most appropriate that might have been selected, was not altogether irrelevant to my purpose. I suspected that it might be necessary to call in the aid of some spiritual guide to interpret the Religion of Nature, and that its truths are not quite so clear as they are sometimes represented. And I am confirmed in the opinion that some obscurity hangs over this religion, when I recollect that different commentators annex different interpretations to the language in which it is written. To instance in the doctrine of a future 165 life : Dr. Clarke professes to demonstrate this doctrine chiefly from the inequality of the Divine dispensations in relation to the virtuous and the vicious. This demonstration Mr. Sturch altogether rejects; and, if my memory does not deceive me, maintains what Dr. Clarke considers as altogether untenable, that virtue is in every case its own reward. Another maybe as little satisfied with Mr. Sturch's reasonings, as Mr. Sturch is with the reasonings of Dr. Clarke. And a third may reject as inefficient and inconclusive the reasonings of both Dr. Clarke and Mr. Sturch. So that it does, indeed, appear that though the Eeligion of Nature is certainly true, "in its general and abstract character," yet " with regard to the supposed particulars of this religion the case is different," and that " certainty may he entirely out of the question!' Here I am led to observe, that he who certainly knows that what nature teaches must be true, but does not certainly know what it is that nature does teach, knows no more than what is known to every other man. Every man is aware that " the heavens which declare the glory of God cannot be imagined to bear false testimony." But as Mr. Sturch observes, " the question arises, what is the testimony that they give, and to what extent does it go ? " And to this question different answers will be returned, which may perplex, the inquirer quite as much as " interpolated texts and various readings." But, it seems, while certainty may be out of the question with respect to the truths of Natural Eeligion, it must always be out of the question with regard to the truths of revelation. But why so? If Christianity is allowed to be true, then, as it confirms the Eeligion of Nature, and "is fundamentally the same with this religion," it must partake of the same certainty, which is indeed no certainty at all, if Natural Eeligion is only certain as to its authority, and this certainty cannot be transferred to the principles which it incul- cates.* But Christianity, moreover, has its separate and inde- * Mr. Sturch observes, that " whatever can be proved to be a prin- ciple of Natural Eeligion must be true? But as some difficulty attends this proof, and Mr. Sturch has not enabled us to distinguish between those truths which Nature teaches with certainty, and those in which 166 pendent evidence. And the value of this evidence appears from the fact, that it is this by which Christianity has thrown that " splendid and glorious light over the prospect of futurity," for which Mr. Sturch very properly says that he can never be suf- ficiently thankful. But supernatural religion is " always in some degree dependent upon things which are in their own nature fallacious." Here Mr. Sturch probably alludes, in part, to historical testimony, of which his views are somewhat sin- gular, and which he is disposed to distrust in exact proportion to the importance of the conclusions which are to be drawn from it. And hence, perhaps, he not only allows with me that multitudes are incapable of deciding on the external evidence of Christianity, but maintains, that not one man upon the face of the earth is competent to the decision— a decision which, it seems, involves the necessity of determining on the truth of every miracle related in the New Testament. However, that these miracles, collectively and singly, are worthy of belief, I am happy to pronounce, upon the authority of Mr. Sturch him- self, who in Apeleutherus expresses himself in words to this effect — that the doctrine of Jesus and his Apostles is so far beyond their natural means of knowledge as to constitute a miracle, and a miracle which renders all the rest credible. If this be so, I need give myself little uneasiness about those passages of Scripture which " defy all human power of inter- pretation." But though the external evidence of Christianity is so difficult to decide upon, yet " men in general, being pro- perly educated," are capable of judging how far its truths are worthy to be received, by their conformity to the principles of Natural Beligion. This is so far well. But what are they to do who have not been " properly educated," or who have not been educated at all ? I am afraid that they must be con- tented to believe upon authority, that is, to take upon trust the opinions which prevail in the communities to which they be- long. However, I have the satisfaction to feel assured, that their incapacity of judging for themselves does not confer upon 'probability is the utmost that we can obtain, I am at liberty to suppose that some little uncertainty is attached to most of them, if not to all. 1.67 any man, or body of men, a right to judge for them; so that the interests of Protestantism are still secure. Upon the whole, from the descriptions which are given of the Religion of Nature, T find it utterly impossible to ascertain what is its true character and value. It is sometimes said to be *' intelligible to every human being who is willing to open his eyes and fix them attentively on its luminous and instructive lessons;" sometimes its principles require that men should be "properly educated" in order to understand them. Its authority is higher than that of revelation, but the informa- tion which it gives is not so clear, full, rational, and con- sistent. It is certainly true in the abstract, but falls short of certainty in its supposed particulars, which is something like being certain and uncertain at the same time. It is the main support of Christianity, and in return (which indeed is equita- ble enough) it receives from Christianity a splendid and glo- rious light which it does not itself possess, and consequently cannot diffuse. All that here appears clear and intelligible is, that of the two religions, if I may still be allowed to call them two, Christianity is, as I always suspected, by far the more valuable and important. But I am impatient to take my leave of the controversy, which I do without any diminution of the respect which I have been long accustomed to feel for the cha- racter and talents of my opponent. And if he shall appear here and there to have reasoned inconsistently, of which I do not make myself the judge, the reader will, I doubt not, attri- bute it, with me, to the difficulty of maintaining the divine origin of Christianity, together with the superior authority of Natural Religion. E. C. May 24, 1824. M. E. vol. xis. [The above article concludes the controversy between Mr. Cogan and Mr. Sturch upon the subject of Natural Religion. The reader will see that it was carried on with spirit on both sides ; and I think it right to state, that it did not in the least degree interrupt the friendship which existed between them, for many years.] 168 TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir, — Lately, when I was on a visit in the country, I laid my hands on the Evangelical Magazine, and noticed the passage on which your correspondent E. B. has animadverted with just severity, p. 409. When I read the passage I said, This is in course, and gives me no concern. But I am sorry to find that a learned and estimable man, the Bishop of St. David's, should have chosen to pronounce in the House of Lords that Unitarians are not Christians. Whether the Bishop means that they are unbelievers in disguise, or that, though they fancy themselves Christians, they are not really such, I neither know nor wish to be informed. But as I would willingly suppose that the Bishop does not profess to search the secrets of the heart, I shall con- sider his declaration as meaning, that though Unitarians believe what they profess to believe, still they are not entitled to the appellation of Christians. What then is the definition of the term Christian ? I should propose the following : a Christian is one who admits the divine mission of Christ, and consequently acknowledges his religion as the rule of faith and practice. And I should add, that he who successfully endeavours to act up to the moral precepts of this religion, in the expectation of a life to come, is a real and a good Christian. This definition would not satisfy the Bishop of St. David's ; nor, I presume, would the Bishop's definition satisfy the Catholic. But the Bishop, no doubt, would say that the Unitarian rejects the essential doctrines of Christianity. But who is authorised to determine what are and what are not its essential doctrines ? Until this question is settled, it may seem reasonable to con- clude that those doctrines constitute the essence of Christianity which are inculcated in the New Testament with such perspi- cuity and force, that they have been admitted, in every age, though with various combinations of error, by all who have borne the Christian name. The doctrines for which the Bishop is so zealous are doubtless essential to the system which he con- 169 siders as Christianity, but I should marvel if his Lordship, with the aid of all who think with him, could prove them to he essential to the great practical object of the Christian faith, that is, to living soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world, in the expectation of " that blessed hope, and the glorious appearing of the great God, and of our Saviour Jesus Christ." Not awed by the Bishop's skill in Greek, I repeat the words, "and of our Saviour Jesus Christ;" which version is not in- consistent with the terms of the original, as the Greeks not unfrequently pass from one subject to another without repeating the article before the second. Of this some curious examples may be found in Thucydides. I know the canon by which it has been attempted to prove the divinity of Christ from the passage now cited. But in the application of the canon it is assumed, that the expression, "the great God," can be an attri- butive of the subject, Jesus Christ. But if this can be, how comes it to pass that we never meet with the simple expression our God Jesus Christ in the New Testament? an expression which was used when the divinity of our Lord was at length believed. Jesus Christ is sometimes called our Saviour, but his usual designation is that of " our Lord;" a designation which occurs about 100 times in the epistolary part of the New Tes- tament. But in no one instance is he simply called our God. But, perhaps, some one may say, is not the passage in question rendered ambiguous by the omission of the article ? Ambiguous to whom ? I will venture to say that it was ambiguous to no one who read the epistle in the age in which it was penned. But granting it to be ambiguous, which version has a just right to be preferred, that which makes Jesus Christ the same with the great Supreme, or that which distinguishes him from his Father and our Father, his God and our God ; that which makes the passage speak a language consistent with the tenor of the sacred volume from beginning to end, or that which imports into it an inexplicable mystery which has no support whatever except from two or three passages of dubious construction ? Yet for explaining these passages in such a manner as to render them conformable to innumerable clear and express declara- 170 lions of Scripture, Unitarians are reproached as unlearned, and pronounced not to be Christians ! I believe the Bishop of St. David's to be a Christian, and though in my judgment a mistaken, yet a conscientious Christian. But allow me to define the essentials of the Christian faith, and let me imbibe a little of his Lordship's spirit, and borrow his Lordship's mode of reasoning, and I shall be able to show that he has no just claim to this appellation. Christianity, I should say, teaches that God is one undivided essence or person ; but this fundamental doctrine the Bishop does not believe ; therefore the Bishop is no Christian. " Quam temere in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam ! " E. C. Sept. 24, 1824. M. R. vol. xix. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir, — Having in my last (pp. 531 — 533) alluded to a grammatical canon which has been applied to prove the divi- nity of Christ, I will now, with your leave, state the canon, as given in the " Classical Journal," No. XVI., and make an observation or two upon it. " When two or more attributives joined by a copulative or copulatives are assumed of the same person or thing, before the first attributive the article is inserted, before the remaining ones it is omitted" That this canon holds true in general I have no doubt. But it is manifest that it is applicable only when the noun which has the article can be an attributive of the subject which is to follow. And it is worthy of observation, that the epistolary writers of the New Testament do not commonly use the article with an attributive standing before the name of Jesus Christ, when such attri- butive is introduced by a conjunction, the word ®£oj having preceded. Before ®eo$, in such case, I contend, that they 171 employ the article or not, as the occasion may require. Such passages as the following are numerous, awo ©sou Traroog rifxcov, nai Kupiou Iyktqu Xgicrrou, and in all these passages Kugiog is the same to us as b Kvgiog; and before ©sog the article is not wanted. Should it be said that the article is omitted before Kvgiog because it is omitted before ©sog, I answer that this rea- son, simply considered, is not sufficient, as might easily be shown.* In the Epistle of James i. 1, we read, lanu(3og ©sou nai Kugiou Iwou X^icrrou SouXog. Here the article before ©sog is omitted as unnecessary; hence Paul also writes, HTr)pa aireicde- XOjJLeda Kvpiov Ir]i^ the remark which I made in relation to the word Ky^oj, nor do I see any sufficient reason why it should not be thus extended. Indeed, when I made the remark, I conceived that if there were good reason to believe that the canon did not hold good with respect to b ®sog h^cov kcu Kugiog Incroug X$iarog, it could not hold good with respect to 6 Qsog hfj-cov xai o-utyi^ \y\aovg X^icrrog. But your correspondent asks, " If o Kvgiog YifAcov hcci crcoryg Incroug X^iarog is correctly rendered l our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ,' why should not 6 ©teg Yif/.uv kcci acoTyg Inaovg Xgitxrog be rendered ' our God and Saviour Jesus Christ ? " To this question my former commu- nication will give what, I think, may be considered as an answer; and if your correspondent will do me the favour to read it again, if I mistake not, he will perceive that, though the grammatical construction of the two passages is the same, yet when the general language of the apostolic writers is considered, there is a circumstance of difference between them which jus- tifies an adherence to the canon in the former instance, and the neglect of it in the latter. It may moreover be observed, that when a writer can suspect no danger of being misunderstood, he may unconsciously fall into a construction which he would 179 otherwise have avoided. I have reasoned, as your correspondent will perceive, upon the supposition that Peter was the author of the Epistle, and that he wrote Qsou, not Kugiou. Since I wrote my former paper, I have read Appendix, No. III., to Dr. Carpenter's third edition of Unitarianism the Doc- trine of the Gospel; to which I would refer those of your readers who wish to see a full and judicious discussion of the subject. E. 0. Feb. 1825. M. R. vol. xx. TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTHLY REPOSITORY. Sir, — As I do not wish to see the cause of Unitarianism aided by a single erroneous interpretation of Scripture (any more than by the " disingenuous artifices " * of any Unitarian preachers), I was not sorry to find that the Keviewer of Dr. Spry's Two Sermons in your last Number, in treating of Hebrews i. 2, has rejected the interpretation of Grotius, which, however, as the interpretation of so great a man, Valckenaer justly thinks ought to be modestly refuted. It is an interpre- tation to which I never could subscribe, as I do not remember in the course of my reading to have met with a passage in which ha with the genitive must necessarily be rendered propter, though I think I have seen one or two in which it might be rendered indifferently by propter or per. In the passage pro * The Bishop of Chester has lately affirmed that several Presbyterian congregations have been " deluded into Unitarianism by the most dis- ingenuous artifices on the part of some of their preachers." I wish that his lordship, of whom I have been accustomed to think too favourably to suppose that he has thrown out a random charge with- out imagining that he has facts to support it, had thought it worth his while to inform us what these artifices have been, and by whom they have been employed. At present the imputation is too vague to be refuted, and, as it falls on no one individually, may be supposed to be applicable to many. N 2 180 duced by the Keviewer from Thucydides, lib. v. § 53, ha does not govern rou Bu/^arog, but mv Eiai %u/j,(3E&Xvfj.£V0t Sngioig ovk oi$a t An im- mensi Mi (Gig antes) fuerint, et serpentibus cincti, non novi. Theocriti Scholiastes ad Id. vii. ver. 8 : BPA2IAA* bi ygapovrEs foa rov d\ a/JtagTavouo-i. RyEvsro yag B^aori^ag Aaxav to ysvog, 6 de B$as" says the Vice-Chancellor, "might signify many parts of time or many parts of space." In criticism, the question is not what a word might signify, but what, in the 207 usage of a language, it does signify. At' ov nat rovg aiuvag i-Trowo-tv : '* For whom also he constituted the ages." On this version the Vice- Chancellor remarks, that " the translators, finding themselves a little pushed hard when they translated 3i* ov ' for whom/ have recourse to a note, by which it appeared that two or three persons had fancied that might he the proper translation." One of those who fancied this, and, for aught I know, the first, was the incomparable Grotius, whose fancy, it is true, is ably refuted by that most profound scholar Valck- naer,* who, at the same time, notwithstanding his orthodoxy, observes that the interpretation of Grotius is to be refuted modestly. The Vice-Chancellor cannot, indeed, be charged with any offence against modesty in his remarks on this version. His honour pronounces nothing upon it with confidence, except that it certainly is not the received translation. "He does not think, however, that any Greek scholar would dream that such was the offliand construction." His honour might have ventured to assume a more decisive tone, for most certainly no real Greek scholar, in the present day, would offhand translate di ov " for whom." I consider this version as indefensible, and I am not the only Unitarian who passed that judgment upon it in the Old Series of the Monthly Kepository. However, as an apology for the authors of the Improved Version, I must remark that the authors of the Common Version have in one instance supposed ha, with a genitive, to express the final cause. "Who being a ray of his brightness, and an image of his perfections." The Vice-Chancellor was "perfectly astonished" to find the word v7roarao-ig rendered perfections. This version is borrowed from Mr. Wakefield, who no doubt considered the vTroo-rao-ig here spoken of to be the moral, not the physical essence of the Deity. In a former work he had rendered the word substance. The translators might have borrowed from the orthodox Schleusner, and substituted Divine Majesty for person. Here * This great man has been the object of admiration to all the scholars in Europe, and was such, not least of all, to the late Professor Porson. 208 the observation of Dr. Sykes deserves to be considered, namely, that the word unoo-rao-is was not used in the days of Paul to signify person. "And ruling all things by his powerful word." "This," namely, "powerful word," for "the word of his power," says the Vice- Chancellor, " does not express the literal meaning of the Greek, nor did the translators mean that it should." Valc- kenaer gives the following version : Nutu suo potentissimo. He does not, indeed, agree with Grotius and the authors of the Improved Version in his view of the passage ; but as far as the • Vice- Chancellor's objection goes, he is with them* and with them must share the censure. The Vice-Chancellor does not like the translation of 7rv£UfxaTa into winds in the 7th verse, and pronounces it to be truly astonishing that such a transla- tion as "'flames of lightning' should be given to vrugog ^ "io* ^ V* :/ .** -H V' _ %« ? r * -0 V < * -^ : ''^' \ • "^* oV'' Deacidified using the Bookkeeper proi ■ \ O .0 Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide A N ,A ' fi * v Treatment Date: March 2005 Deacidified usmj Neutralizing agein. ivicjyn / ,v c Treatment Date: March 2005 PreservationTechnolog A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVA 1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive ri C5ci vcuiuii itJunuuiuy A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVA 1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive Cranberry Township, PA 16066 1724) 779-P111 *>. »,,r k *" o h o * v * , . e* * t , i %,** 0v v ^ »/,^ ;.° •> a ; ^ ^ *>- s -\ \> * V * A > v° %, .-^ A ^, '- N V - '/- * -0 h ■' \^' - o (V ** Vvvr "* ,s /> -V «£■ .-^ .^v O0 1