Class _Ul 
 Book ^4p- 
 
 1'UKSKNTUl BY 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2011 with funding from 
 The Library of Congress 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/meditationsofmar01marc 
 
i$UMtatton0 
 
 OF 
 
 Marcus aurelius Antoninus 
 
 EMPEROR OF TEE ROMANS 
 
 TRANSLATED BY GEOEGE LONG 
 
 NEW AND COMPLETE EDITION 
 
 Chicago : 
 
 CORNELIUS H. SHAVER, 
 
 MDCCCLXXXII; 
 
^e^° 
 
 
 Gift 
 Kebekah Crawford 
 Mar. 14-19 2?7 
 
 PRINTED AND BOUND 
 
 BY 
 
 BONOHUE & HENNEBERRY, 
 
 CHICAGO. 
 
To 
 KALPH WALDO EMERSON, 
 
 THIS EDITION OF 
 
 THE THOUGHTS OF THE EMPEROR M. AURELIUS 
 ANTONINUS, 
 
 IS INSCBIBED BY THE PUBLISHERS. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Life of Marcus Aurelius 7 
 
 Philosophy of Marcus Aurelius ... 36 
 Meditations of Marcus Aurelius . . 81 
 Index of Greek Terms, with corres- 
 ponding English 307 
 
The portrait of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus is 
 from a bust in the British Museum. The medallion 
 die is from a coin of the time of Aurelius. 
 
M. AURELIUS ANTONINUS. 
 
 ANTONINUS was born at Rome 
 A. D. 121, on the 26th of April. 
 His father Annius Verus died while 
 he was praetor. His mother was 
 Domitia Calvilla, also named Lu- 
 eilla. The Emperor Antoninus Pius married 
 Annia Galeria Faustina, the sister of Annius 
 Verus, and was consequently Antoninus' uncle. 
 When Hadrian adopted Antoninus Pius and de- 
 clared him his successor in the empire, Antoninus 
 Pius adopted both L. Ceionius Commodus, the 
 son of Aelius Caesar, and M. Antoninus, whose 
 original name was M. Annius Verus. Antoninus 
 took the name of M. Aelius Aurelius Verus, to 
 which was added the title of Caesar in A. D. 139 : 
 the name Aelius belonged to Hadrian's family, 
 and Aurelius was the name of Antoninus Pius. 
 When M. Antoninus became Augustus, he dropped 
 the name of Verus and took the name of Anto- 
 ninus. Accordingly he is generally named M. 
 Aurelius Antoninus, or simply M. Antoninus. 
 
 The youth was most carefully brought up. He 
 thanks the gods (i. 17) that he had good grand- 
 fathers, good parents, a good sister, good teachers, ■ 
 
8 M. A U RE LI US 
 
 good associates, good kinsmen and friends, nearly 
 everything good. He had the happy fortune to 
 witness the example of his uncle and adoptive 
 father Antoninus Pius, and he has recorded in 
 his work (i. 16 ; VI. 30) the virtues of this ex- 
 cellent man and prudent ruler. Like many young 
 Romans he tried his hand at poetry and studied 
 rhetoric. Herodes Atticus and M. Cornelius 
 Fronto were his teachers in eloquence. There 
 are extant letters between Fronto and Marcus, 
 winch show the great affection of the pupil for 
 the master, and the master's great hopes of his in- 
 dustrious pupil. M. Antoninus mentions Fronto 
 (i. 11) among those to whom he was indebted for 
 his education. 
 
 When he was eleven years old, he assumed the 
 dress of philosophers, something plain and coarse, 
 became a hard student, and lived a most labori- 
 ous abstemious life, even so far as to injure his 
 health. Finally, he abandoned poetry and rhet- 
 oric for philosophy, and he attached himself to 
 the sect of the Stoics. But he did not neglect 
 the study of law, which was a useful preparation 
 for the high place which he was designed to fill. 
 His teacher was L. Volusianus Maecianus, a dis- 
 tinguished jurist. We must suppose that he 
 learned the Roman discipline of arms, which was 
 a necessary part of the education of a man who 
 afterwards led his troops to battle against a war- 
 like race. 
 
 Antoninus has recorded in his first book the 
 names of his teachers and the obligations which 
 
ANTONINUS. 9 
 
 he owed to each of them. The way in which 
 he speaks of what he learned from them might 
 seem to savor of vanity or self-praise, if we look 
 carelessly at the way in which he has expressed 
 himself ; but if any one draws this conclusion, he 
 will be mistaken. Antoninus means to com- 
 memorate the merits of his several teachers, what 
 they taught and what a pupil might learn from 
 them. Besides, this book like the eleven other 
 books, was for his own use, and if we may trust 
 the note at the end of the first book, it was writ- 
 ten during one of M. Antoninus' campaigns against 
 the Quadi, at a time when the commemoration of 
 the virtues of his illustrious teachers might re- 
 mind him of their lessons and the practical uses 
 which he might derive from them. 
 
 Among his teachers of philosophy was Sextus 
 of Chaeroneia, a gi'andson of Plutarch. What 
 he learned from this excellent man is told by him- 
 self (i. 9). His favorite teacher was Q. Junius 
 Rusticus (i. 7), a philosopher and also a man of 
 practical good sense in public affairs. Rusticus 
 was the adviser of Antoninus after he became 
 emperor. Young men who are destined for high 
 places are not often fortunate in those who are 
 about them, their companions and teachers ; and 
 I do not know any example of a young prince 
 having had an education which can be compared 
 with that of M. Antoninus. Such a body of 
 teachers distinguished by their acquirements and 
 their character will hardly be collected again ; and 
 as to the pupil, we have not had one like him since. 
 
10 M. AURELIUS 
 
 Hadrian died in July a. d. 138, and was suc- 
 ceeded by Antoninus Pius. M. Antoninus mar- 
 ried Faustina, his cousin, the daughter of Pius, 
 probably about A. r>. 146, for he had a daughter 
 born in 147. M. Antoninus received from his 
 adoptive father the title of Caesar and was associ- 
 ated with him in the administration of the state. 
 The father and the adopted son lived together in 
 perfect friendship and confidence. Antoninus 
 Avas a dutiful son, and the emperor Pius loved 
 and esteemed him. 
 
 Antoninus Pius died in March 161. The 
 Senate, it is said, urged M. Antoninus to take 
 the solemn administration of the empire, but he 
 associated with himself the other adopted son of 
 Pius, L. Ceionius Commodus, who is generally 
 called L. Verus. Thus Rome for the first time 
 had two emperors. Verus was an indolent man 
 of pleasure and unworthy of his station. Anto- 
 ninus however bore with him, and it is said that 
 Verus had sense enough to pay to his colleague 
 the respect due to his character. A virtuous 
 emperor and a loose partner lived together in 
 peace, and their alliance was strengthened by 
 Antoninus giving to Verus for wife his daughter 
 Lucilla. 
 
 The reign of Antoninus was first troubled by 
 a Parthian war, in which Verus was sent to com- 
 mand, but he did nothing, and the success that 
 was obtained by the Romans in Armenia and on 
 the Euphrates and Tigris was due to his generals. 
 This Parthian war ended in 165. 
 
ANTONINUS. 11 
 
 The north of Italy was also threatened by the 
 rude people beyond the Alps from the borders 
 of Gallia to the eastern side of the Hadriatic 
 These barbarians attempted to break into Italy, 
 as the Germanic nations had attempted near 
 three hundred years before ; and the rest of the 
 life of Antoninus with some intervals was em- 
 ployed in driving back the invaders. In 169 
 Verus suddenly died, and Antoninus administered 
 the state alone. 
 
 In A. d. 175 Avidius Cassius, a brave and skil- 
 ful Roman commander who was at the head of 
 the troops in Asia, revolted and declared himself 
 Augustus. But Cassius was assassinated by some 
 of his officers, and so the rebellion came to an 
 end. Antoninus showed his humanity by his 
 treatment of the family and the partisans of 
 Cassius, and his letter to the senate in which he 
 recommends mercy is extant. (Vulcatius, Avid- 
 ius Cassius, c. 12.) 
 
 Antoninus set out for the east on hearing of 
 Cassius' revolt. We know that in a. d. 174 he 
 was engaged in a war against the Quadi, Marco- 
 manni and other Germanic tribes, and it is prob- 
 able that he went direct from the German war 
 without returning to Rome. His wife Faustina 
 who accompanied him into Asia died suddenly at 
 the foot of the Taurus to the great grief of her 
 husband. Capitolinus who has written the life 
 of Antoninus, and also Dion Cassius accuse the 
 empress of scandalous infidelity to her husband 
 and of abominable lewdness. But Capitolinus 
 
12 M. AURELIUS 
 
 says that Antoninus either knew it not or pre- 
 tended not to know it. Nothing is so common 
 as such malicious reports in all ages, and the 
 history of imperial Rome is full of them. Anto- 
 ninus loved his wife and he says that she was 
 " obedient, affectionate, and simple." The same 
 scandal had been spread about Faustina's mother, 
 the wife of Antoninus Pius, and yet he too was 
 perfectly satisfied with his wife. Antoninus Pius 
 says in a letter to Fronto that he would rather 
 live in exile with his wife than in his palace at 
 Rome without her. There are not many men 
 who would give their wives a better character 
 than these two emperors. Capitolinus wrote in 
 the time of Diocletian. He may have intended 
 to tell the truth, but he is a poor, feeble biog- 
 rapher. Dion Cassius, the most malignant of 
 historians, always reports and perhaps he believed 
 any scandal against anybody. 
 
 Antoninus continued his journey to Syria and 
 Egypt, and on his return to Italy through Athens 
 he was initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries. 
 It was the practice of the emperor to conform to 
 the established rites of the age and to perform 
 religious ceremonies with due solemnity. We 
 cannot conclude from this that he was a supersti- 
 tious man, though we might perhaps do so, if his 
 book did not show that he was not. But this 
 is only one among many instances that a ruler's 
 public acts do not always prove his real opinions. 
 A prudent governor will not roughly oppose even 
 the superstitions of his people, and though he 
 
ANTONINUS. 13 
 
 may wish that they were wiser, he will know that 
 he cannot make them so by offending their prej- 
 udices. 
 
 Antoninus and his son Commodus entered 
 Rome in triumph on the 23rd of December a. d. 
 176. In the following year Commodus was asso- 
 ciated with his father in the empire and took the 
 name of Augustus. This year a. d. 177 is memor- 
 able in ecclesiastical history. Attalus and others 
 were put to death at Lyon for their adherence 
 to the Christian religion. The evidence of this 
 persecution is a letter preserved by Eusebius 
 (E. H. v. 1 ; printed in Routh's Reliquiae Sacrae, 
 vol. i. with notes). The letter is from the Chris- 
 tians of Vienna and Lugdunum in Gallia (Vienne 
 and Lyon) to their Christian brethren hi Asia 
 and Phrygia ; and it is preserved perhaps nearly 
 entire. It contains a very particular description 
 of the tortures inflicted on the Christians in 
 Gallia, and it states that while the persecution 
 was going on, Attalus a Christian and a Roman 
 citizen was loudly demanded by the populace and 
 brought into the amphitheatre, but the governor 
 ordered him to be reserved with the rest who 
 were in prison, until he had received instructions 
 from the emperor. It is not clear who the " rest " 
 were who are mentioned in the letter. Many had 
 been tortured before the governor thought of ap- 
 plying to the emperor. The imperial rescript, 
 says the letter, was that the Christians should be 
 punished, but if they would deny their faith, they 
 must be released. On this the work began again. 
 
14 M. A U RE LI US. 
 
 The Christians who were Roman citizens were 
 beheaded : the rest were exposed to the wild 
 beasts in the amphitheatre. Some modern writers 
 on ecclesiastical history, when they use this letter, 
 say nothing of the wonderful stories of the mar- 
 tyrs' sufferings. Sanctus, as the letter says, was 
 burnt with plates of hot iron till his body was one 
 sore and had lost all human form, but on being 
 put to the rack he recovered his former appear- 
 ance under the torture, which was thus a cure 
 instead of a punishment. He was afterwards 
 torn by beasts, and placed on an iron chair and 
 roasted. He died at last. 
 
 The letter is one piece of evidence. The 
 writer, whoever he was that wrote in the name 
 of the Gallic Christians, is our evidence both for 
 the ordinary and the extraordinary circumstances 
 of the story, and we cannot accept his evidence 
 for one part and reject the other. We often re- 
 ceive small evidence as proof of a thing which 
 we believe to be within the limits of probability 
 or possibility, and we reject exactly the same evi- 
 dence, when the thing to which it refers, appears 
 very improbable or impossible. But this is a false 
 method of inquiry, though it is followed by some 
 modern writers, who select what they like from a 
 story and reject the rest of the evidence ; or if 
 they do not reject it, they dishonestly suppress it. 
 A man can only act consistently by accepting ali 
 this letter or rejecting it all, and we cannot blame 
 him for either. But he who rejects it may still 
 admit that such a letter may be founded on real 
 
ANTONINUS. 15 
 
 facts ; and he would make this admission as the 
 most probable way of accounting for the existence 
 of the letter : but if, as he would suppose, the 
 writer has stated some things falsely, he cannot 
 tell what part of his story is worthy of credit. 
 
 The war on the northern frontier appears to 
 have been uninterrupted during the visit of Anto- 
 ninus to the East, and on his return the emperor 
 again left Rome to oppose the barbarians. The 
 Germanic people were defeated in a great battle 
 a. d. 179. During this campaign the emperor 
 was seized with some contagious malady, of which 
 he died in the camp at Sirmium (Mitrovitz) on 
 the Save in Lower Pannonia, but at Vindebona 
 (Vienna) according to other authorities, on the 
 17th of March a. d. 180, in the fifty-ninth year 
 of his age. His son Commodus was with him. 
 His body, or the ashes probably, was carried to 
 Rome, and he received the honor of deification. 
 Those who could afford it had his statue or bust, 
 and when Capitolinus wrote, many people still 
 had statues of Antoninus among the Dei Penates 
 or household deities. He was in a manner made 
 a saint. His son Commodus erected to his mem- 
 ory the Antonine column which is now in the 
 Piazza Colonna at Rome. The bassi rilievi 
 which are placed in a spiral line round the shaft 
 commemorate his father's victories over the Marco- 
 manni and the Quadi, and the miraculous shower 
 of rain which refreshed the Roman soldiers and 
 discomfited then* enemies. The statue of Antoni- 
 nus was placed on the column, but it was removed 
 
16 M. A URELIUS 
 
 at some time unknown, and a bronze statue of St. 
 Paul was put in its place by Pope Sixtus the fifth. 
 
 The historical evidence for the times of Anto- 
 ninus is very defective, and some of that which 
 remains is not credible. The most curious is the 
 story about the miracle which happened in A. d. 
 174 during the war with the Quadi. The Roman 
 army was in danger of perishing by thirst, but a 
 sudden storm drenched them with rain, while it 
 discharged fire and hail on their enemies, and -the 
 Romans gamed a great victory. All the authori- 
 ties which speak of the battle speak also of the 
 miracle. The Gentile writers assign it to their 
 gods, and the Christians to the intercession of the 
 Christian legion in the emperor's army. To con- 
 firm the Christian statement it is added that the 
 emperor gave the title of Thundering to this legion ; 
 but Dacier and others who maintain the Christian 
 report of the miracle, admit that this title of Thun- 
 dering or Lightning was not given to this legion 
 because the Quadi were struck with lightning, but 
 because there was a figure of lightning on their 
 shields, and that this title of the legion existed in 
 he time of Augustus. 
 
 Scaliger also had observed that the legion was 
 called Thundering (/<epawo/3oAos, or Kepawo<f>6pos) 
 before the reign of Antoninus. We learn this 
 from Dion Cassius (Lib. 55, c. 23, and the note 
 of Reimarus) who enumerates all the legions of 
 Augustus' time. The name Thundering or Light- 
 ning also occurs on an inscription of the reign of 
 Trajan, which was found at Trieste. Eusebius 
 
ANTONINUS. U 
 
 (v. 5) when he relates the miracle, quotes Apoli- 
 narius, bishop of Hierapolis, as authority for this 
 name being given to the legion Melitene by the 
 emperor in consequence of the success which he 
 obtained through their prayers ; from which we 
 may estimate the value of Apolinarius' testimony. 
 Eusebius does not say in what book of Apolina- 
 rius the statement occurs. Dion says that the 
 Thundering legion was stationed in Cappadocia 
 in the time of Augustus. Valesius also observes 
 that in the Notitia of the Imperium Romanian 
 there is mentioned under the commander of Ar- 
 menia the Praefectura of the tAvelfth legion named 
 " Thundering Melitene ; " and this position in 
 Armenia Avill agree with what Dion says of its 
 position in Cappadocia. Accordingly Valesius 
 concludes that Melitene was not the name of the 
 legion, but of the town in which it was stationed. 
 The legions did not, he says, take their name from 
 the place where they were on duty, but from the 
 country in which they were raised, and therefore, 
 what Eusebius says about the Melitene does not 
 seem probable to him. Yet Valesius on the au- 
 thority of Apolinarius and Tertullian believed that 
 the miracle was worked through the prayers of 
 the Christian soldiers in the emperor's army. 
 Rufinus does not give the name of Melitene to 
 this legion, says Valesius, and probably he pur- 
 posely omitted it, because he knew that Melitene 
 was the name of a town in Armenia Minor, where 
 the legion was stationed in his time. 
 
 The emperor, it is said, made a report of his 
 2 
 
18 M. A URELIUS 
 
 victory to the Senate, which we may believe, for 
 such was the practice ; but we do not know what 
 he said in his letter, for it is not extant. Dacier 
 assumes that the emperor's letter was purposely 
 destroyed by the Senate or the enemies of Chris- 
 tianity, that so honorable a testimony to the 
 Christians and their religion might not be perpet- 
 uated. The critic has however not seen that he 
 contradicts himself when he tells us the purport 
 of the letter, for he says that it was destroyed, 
 and even Eusebius could not find it. But there 
 does exist a letter in Greek addressed by Anto- 
 ninus to the Roman Senate after this memorable 
 victory. It is sometimes printed after Justin's 
 second Apology, though it is totally unconnected 
 with the apologies. This letter is one of the 
 most stupid forgeries of the many which exist, 
 and it cannot be possibly founded even on the 
 genuine report of Antoninus to the Senate. If 
 it were genuine, it would free the emperor from 
 the charge of persecuting men because they were 
 Christians, for he says in this false letter that if 
 a man accuse another only of being a Christian 
 and the accused confess and there is nothing else 
 against him, he must be set free ; with this mon- 
 strous addition made by a man inconceivably ig- 
 norant, that the informer must"' be burnt alive. 1 
 
 1 Eusebius (v. 5) quotes Tertullian's Apology to the 
 Roman Senate in confirmation of the story. Tertullian, 
 he says, writes that letters of the emperor were extant, 
 in which he declares that his army was saved by the 
 prayers of the Christians ; and that he " threatened to 
 punish with death those who ventured to accuse us." 
 
ANTONINUS. 19 
 
 During the time of Antoninus Pius and Mar- 
 cus Antoninus there appeared the first Apology 
 of Justinus, and under M. Antoninus the Oration 
 of Tatian against the Greeks, which was a fierce 
 attack on the established religions, the addi-ess of 
 Athenagoras to M. Antoninus on behalf of the 
 Christians, and the Apology of Melito, bishop of 
 Sardes, also addressed to the emperor, and that 
 of Apolinarius. The first Apology of Justinus is 
 addressed to Antoninus Pius and his two adopted 
 sons M. Antoninus and L. Verus ; but we do not • 
 know whether they read it. The second Apology 
 of Justinus is addressed to the Roman Senate, 
 but there is nothing in it which shows its date. 
 In one passage where he is speaking of the perse- 
 cution of the Christians, Justinus says that even 
 men who followed the Stoic doctrines, when they 
 ordered their lives according to ethical reason, 
 were hated and murdered, such as Heraclitus, 
 Musonius in his own times and others ; for all 
 those Avho in any way labored to live according 
 to reason and avoided wickedness were always 
 hated ; and this was the effect of the work of 
 daemons. 
 
 Justinus himself is said to have been put to 
 death at Rome, because he refused to sacrifice to 
 the gods ; but the circumstances of Ins death are 
 doubtful, and the time is uncertain. It cannot 
 
 It is possible that the forged letter which is now extant 
 may be one of those which Tertullian had seen, for he 
 uses the plural number "letters." A great deal has 
 been written about this miracle of the Thundering 
 Legion, and more than is worth reading. 
 
20 M. A U RE LI US 
 
 have been in the reign of Hadrian, as one author- 
 ity states ; nor in the time of Antoninus Pius, 
 if the second Apology was written in the time of 
 M. Antoninus. 
 
 The persecution in which Polycarp suffered at 
 Smyrna belongs to the time of M. Antoninus. 
 The evidence for it is the letter of the church 
 of Smyrna to the chinches of Philomelium and 
 the other Christian churches, and it is preserved 
 by Eusebius (E. H. iv. 15). But the critics do 
 not agree about the time of Polycarp's death, 
 differing in the two extremes to the amount of 
 twelve years. The circumstances of Polycarp's 
 martyrdom were accompanied by miracles, one of 
 which Eusebius (iv. 15) has omitted, but it ap- 
 pears in the oldest Lathi version of the letter, 
 which Usher published, and it is supposed that 
 this version was made not long after the time of 
 Eusebius. The notice at the end of the letter 
 states that it was transcribed by Caius from the 
 copy of trenaeus, the disciple of Polycarp, then 
 transcribed by Socrates at Corinth ; " after which 
 I Pionius again wrote it out from the copy above 
 mentioned, having searched it out by the revela- 
 tion of Polycarp, who directed me to it," &c. The 
 story of Polycarp's martyrdom is embellished with 
 miraculous circumstances which some modern 
 writers on ecclesiastical history take the liberty 
 of omitting. 2 
 
 2 Conyers Middleton, An Inquiry into the Mirac- 
 ulous Powers, &c. p. 126. Middleton says that Eusebius 
 omitted to mention the dove, which flew out of Poly- 
 
ANTONINUS. 21 
 
 In order to form a proper notion of the con- 
 dition of the Christians under M. Antoninus 
 we must go back to Trajan's time. When the 
 younger Pliny was governor of Bithynia, the 
 Christians were numerous in those parts, and the 
 worshippers of the old religion were falling off. 
 The temples were deserted, the festivals neglected, 
 and there were no purchasers of victims for sacri- 
 fice. Those who were interested hi the mainte- 
 nance of the old religion thus found that their 
 profits were in danger. Christians of both sexes 
 and of all ages were brought before the governor, 
 who did not know what to do with them. He 
 could come to no other conclusion than this, that 
 those who confessed to be Christians and per- 
 severed in their religiou ought to be punished ; 
 if for nothing else, for their invincible obstinacy. 
 He found no crimes proved against the Christians, 
 and he could only characterize then religion as 
 a depraved and extravagant superstition, which 
 might be stopped, if the people were allowed the 
 opportunity of recanting. Pliny wrote this hi a 
 letter to Trajan (Plinius, Ep. x. 97). He asked 
 for the emperor's directions, because he did not 
 know what to do : He remarks that he had 
 never been engaged in judicial inquiries about 
 
 carp's body, and Dodwell and Archbishop Wake have 
 done the same. Wake says, " I am so little a friend to 
 such miracles that I thought it better with Eusebius to 
 omit that circumstance than to mention it from Bishop 
 Usher's Manuscript," which manuscript however, says 
 Middleton, he afterwards declares to be so well attested 
 that we need not any further assurance of the truth of 
 it. 
 
22 M. A URELIUS 
 
 the Christians, and that accordingly he did not 
 know what or how far to inquire and punish. 
 This proves that it was not a new thing to inquire 
 into a man's profession of Christianity and to 
 punish him for it. Trajan's Rescript is extant. 
 Pie approved of the governor's judgment in the 
 matter ; but he said that no search must be made 
 after the Christians ; if a man was charged with 
 the new religion and convicted, he must not be 
 punished, if he affirmed that he was not a Chris- 
 tian and confirmed his denial by showing his rev- 
 erence to the heathen gods. He added that no 
 notice must be taken of anonymous informations, 
 for such things were of bad example. Trajan 
 was a mild and sensible man, and both motives 
 of mercy and policy probably also induced him to 
 take as little notice of the Christians as he could ; 
 to let them live in quiet, if it were possible. 
 Trajan's Rescript is the first legislative act of the 
 head of the Roman state with reference to Chris- 
 tianity, which is known to us. It does not appear 
 that the Christians were further disturbed under 
 his reign. The martyrdom of Ignatius by the 
 order of Trajan himself is not universally ad- 
 mitted to be an historical fact. 
 
 In the time of Hadrian it was no longer possi- 
 ble for the Roman government to overlook the 
 great increase of the Christians and the hostility 
 of the common sort to them. If the governors 
 in the provinces wished to let them alone, they 
 could not resist the fanaticism of the heathen 
 community, who looked on the Christians as athe- 
 
ANTONINUS. 28 
 
 ists. The Jews too who were settled all over the 
 Roman Empire were as hostile to the Christians 
 as the Gentiles were. With the time of Hadrian 
 begin the Christian Apologies, which show plainly 
 what the popular feeling towards the Christians 
 then Avas. A rescript of Hadrian to the Pro- 
 consul of Asia, which stands at the end of Jus- 
 tin's first apology, instructs the governor that 
 innocent people must not be troubled and false 
 accusers must not be allowed to extort money 
 from them ; the charges against the Christians 
 must be made in due form and no attention must 
 be paid to popular clamors ; when Christians 
 were regularly prosecuted and convicted of any 
 illegal act, they must be punished according to 
 their deserts ; and false accusers also must be pun- 
 ished. Antoninus Pius is said to have published 
 Rescripts to the same effect. The terms of Ha- 
 drian's Rescript seem very favorable to the 
 Christians, but if we understand it in this sense, 
 that they were only to be punished like other 
 people for illegal acts, it would have had no mean- 
 ing, for that could have been done without asking 
 the emperor's advice. The real purpose of the 
 Rescript is that Christians must be punished if 
 they persisted in then belief, and would not prove 
 their renunciation of it by acknowledging the 
 heathen religion. This was Trajan's rule, and we 
 have no reason for supposing that Hadrian granted 
 more to the Christians than Trajan did. There 
 is printed at the end of Justin's Apology a Re- 
 script of Antoninus Pius to the Commune of Asia 
 
24 M. A URE LI US 
 
 (to koivov rrjs "Acrtas) , and it is also in Eusebius 8 
 (E. H. iv. 13). The Rescript declares that 
 the Christians, for they are meant, though the 
 name Christians does not occur in the Rescript, 
 were not to be disturbed, unless they were attempt- 
 ing something against the Roman rule, and no 
 man was to be pumshed simply for being a Chris- 
 tian. But this Rescript is spurious. Any man 
 moderalely acquainted with Roman history will 
 see at once from the style and tenor that it is a 
 clumsy forgery. 
 
 In the time of M. Antoninus the opposition 
 between the old and the new belief was still 
 stronger, and the adherents of the heathen re- 
 ligion urged those in authority to a more regular 
 resistance to the invasions of the Christian faith. 
 Melito in his apology to M. Antoninus represents 
 the Christians of Asia as persecuted under new 
 imperial orders. Shameless informers, he says, 
 men who were greedy after the property of others, 
 used these orders as a means of robbing those who 
 
 3 In Eusebius the name at the beginning of the Re- 
 script is that of M. Antoninus ; and so we cannot tell to 
 which of the two emperors the forger assigned the Re- 
 script. There are also a few verbal differences. 
 
 The author of the Alexandrine Chronicum says that 
 Marcus being moved by the entreaties of Melito and 
 other heads of the church wrote an Epistle to the Com- 
 mune of Asia in which he forbade the Christians to be 
 troubled on account of their religion. Valesius sup- 
 poses this to be the letter which is contained in Eusebius 
 (iv. 13), and to be the answer to the apology of Melito 
 of which I shall soon give the substance. But Marcus 
 certainly did not write this letter which is in Eusebius, 
 and we know not what answer he made to Melito. 
 
ANTONINUS.- 25 
 
 were doing no harm. He doubts if a just em- 
 peror could have ordered anything so unjust ; and 
 if the last order was really not from the emperor, 
 the Christians entreat him not to give them up to 
 their enemies.* We conclude from this that there 
 
 4 Eusebius, iv. 26 ; and Routh's Reliquiae Sacrae, vol. 
 i. and the notes. The interpretation of this Fragment 
 is not easy. Mosheim misunderstood one passage so far 
 as to affirm that Marcus promised rewards to those who 
 denounced the Christians ; an interpretation which is 
 entirely false. Melito calls the Christian religion " our 
 philosophy," which began among barbarians (the Jews), 
 and flourished among the Roman subjects in the time 
 of Augustus, to the great advantage of the empire, for 
 from that time the power of the Romans grew great and 
 glorious. He sajs that the emperor has and will have 
 as the successor to Augustus' power the good wishes of 
 men, if he will protect that philosophy which grew up 
 with the empire and began with Augustus, which phi- 
 losophy the predecessors of Antoninus honored in addi- 
 tion to the other religions. He further says that the 
 Christian religion had suffered no harm since the time 
 of Augustus, but on the contrary had enjoyed all honor 
 and respect that any man could desire. Nero and Domi- 
 tian, he says, were alone persuaded by some malicious 
 men to calumniate the Christian religion, and this was 
 the origin of the false charges against the Christians. 
 But this was corrected by the emperors who immediately 
 preceded Antoninus, who often by their Rescripts re- 
 proved those who attempted to trouble the Christians. 
 Hadrian, Antoninus' grandfather, wrote to many, and 
 among them to the governor of Asia. Antoninus Pius 
 when Marcus was associated with him in the empire 
 wrote to the cities, that they must not trouble the Chris- 
 tians ; among others to the people of Larissa, Thessa- 
 lonica, the Athenians and all the Greeks. Melito con- 
 cluded thus : We are persuaded that thou who hast 
 about these things the same mind that they had, nay 
 rather one much more humane and philosophical, wilt 
 do all that we ask thee. — This Apology was written 
 after a. d. 16.), the year in which Verus died, for it speak3 
 
26 M. A URELI US 
 
 were at least imperial Rescripts or Constitutions 
 of M. Antoninus, which were made the founda- 
 tion of these persecutions. The fact of being a 
 Christian was now a crime and punished, unless 
 the accused denied their religion. Then come 
 the persecutions at Smyrna, which some modem 
 critics place in A. D. 167, ten years before the 
 persecution of Lyon. The governors of the prov- 
 inces under M. Antoninus might have found 
 enough even in Trajan's Rescript to warrant them 
 in punishing Christians, and the fanaticism of the 
 people would drive them to persecution, even if 
 they were unwilling. But besides the fact of the 
 Christians rejecting all the heathen ceremonies, 
 Ave must not forget that they plainly maintained 
 that all the heathen religions were false. The 
 Christians thus declared war against the heathen 
 rites, and it is hardly necessary to obseive that 
 this was a declaration of hostility against the 
 Roman government, which tolerated all the vari- 
 ous forms of superstition that existed in the empire, 
 and could not consistently tolerate another religion, 
 which declared that all the rest were false, and all 
 
 of Marcus only and his son Commodus. According; to 
 Melito's testimony, Christians had only been punished 
 for their religion in the time of Nero and Domitian, and 
 the persecutions began again in the time of M. Anto- 
 ninus and were founded on his orders, which were abused 
 as he seems to mean. He distinctly affirms '■ that the 
 race of the godly is now persecuted and harrassed by 
 fresh imperial orders in Asia, a thing which had never 
 happened before." But we know that all this is not 
 true, and that Christians had been punished in Trajan's 
 time. 
 
ANTONINUS. 27 
 
 the splendid ceremonies of the empire only a wor- 
 ship of devils. 
 
 If we had a true ecclesiastical history, we should 
 know how the Roman emperors attempted to check 
 the new religion, how they enforced their princi- 
 ple of finally punishing Christians, simply as Chris- 
 tians, which Justin in his Apology affirms that they 
 did, and I have no doubt that he tells the truth ; 
 how far popular clamor and riots went in this 
 matter, and how far many fanatical and ignorant 
 Christians, for there were many such, contributed 
 to excite the fanaticism on the other side and to em- 
 bitter the quarrel between the Roman government 
 and the new religion. Our extant ecclesiastical 
 histories are manifestly falsified, and what truth 
 they contain is grossly exaggerated ; but the fact is 
 certain that in the time of M. Antoninus the hea- 
 then populations were in open hostility to the 
 Christians, and that under Antoninus' rule men 
 were put to death because they were Christians. 
 Eusebius in the preface to his fifth book remarks 
 that in the seventeenth year of Antoninus' reign, 
 in some parts of the world the persecution of the 
 Christians became more violent, and that it pro- 
 ceeded from the populace in the cities ; and he 
 adds in his usual style of exaggeration, that we 
 may infer from what took place in a single 
 nation that myriads of martyrs were made hi the 
 habitable earth. The nation which he alludes to 
 is Gallia ; and he then proceeds to give the letter 
 of the churches of Viemia and Lugdunum. It 
 is probable that lie lias assigned the true cause of 
 
28 M. AURELIUb 
 
 the persecutions, the fanaticism of the populace, 
 and that both governors and emperor had a great 
 deal of trouble with these disturbances. How 
 far Marcus was cognizant of these cruel proceed- 
 ings we do not know, for the historical records of 
 his reign are very defective. He did not make 
 the rule against the Christians, for Trajan did 
 that ; and if we admit that he would have been 
 willing to let the Christians alone, we cannot 
 affirm that it was in his power, for it would be a 
 great mistake to suppose that Antoninus had the 
 unlimited authority, which some modern sovereigns 
 have had. His power was limited by certain con- 
 stitutional forms, by the Senate, and by the prece- 
 dents of his predecessors. We cannot admit that 
 such a man was an active persecutor, for there is 
 no evidence that he was, though it is certain that 
 he had no good opinion of the Christians, as ap- 
 pears from his own words. 5 But he knew nothing 
 
 5 See xi. 3. The emperor probably speaks of such 
 fanatics as Clemens (quoted by Gataker on this passage) 
 mentions. The rational Christians admitted no fellow- 
 ship with them. " Some of these heretics," says Clemens, 
 " show fheir impiety and cowardice by loving their lives, 
 saying that the knowledge of the really existing God is 
 true testimony (martyrdom), but that a man is a self- 
 murderer who bears witness by his death. We also blame 
 those who rush to death, for there are some, not of us, 
 but only bearing the same name who give themselves 
 up. We say of them that they die without being martyrs, 
 even if they are publicly punished ; and they give them- 
 selves up to a death which avails nothing, as the Indian 
 Gymnosophists give themselves up foolishly to fire." 
 Cave in his Primitive Christianity (n. c. 7) says of the 
 Christians : " They did flock to the place of torment 
 
ANTONINUS. 2» 
 
 of them except their hostility to the Roman relig- 
 ion, and" he probably thought that they were 
 dangerous to the state, notwithstanding the pro- 
 fessions false or true of some of the Apologists. 
 So much I have said, because it would be unfair 
 not to state all that can be urged against a man 
 whom his contemporaries and subsequent ages 
 venerated as a model of virtue and benevolence. 
 If I admitted the genuineness of some documents, 
 he would be altogether clear from the charge of 
 even allowing any persecutions ; but as I seek the 
 truth and am sure that they are false, I leave him 
 to bear whatever blame is his due. I add that it 
 is quite certain that Antoninus did not derive any 
 of his Ethical principles from a religion of which 
 he knew nothing. 6 
 
 faster than droves of beasts that are driven to the sham- 
 bles. They even longed to be in the arms of suffering. 
 Ignatius, though then in his journey to Rome in order 
 to his execution, yet by the way as he went could not 
 but vent his passionate desire of it : O that I might 
 come to those wild beasts, that are prepared for me ; I 
 heartily wish that I may presently meet with them ; I 
 would invite and. encourage them speedily to devour me, 
 and not be afraid to set upon me as they have- been to 
 others ; nay should they refuse it, I would even force 
 them to it ;" and more to the same purpose from Eusebius. 
 Cave, an honest and good man, says all this in praise of 
 the Christians ; but I think that he mistook the matter 
 We admire a man who holds to his principles even to 
 death ; but these fanatical Christians are the Gymnoso- 
 phists whom Clemens treats with disdain. 
 
 6 Dr F. C. Baur in his work entitled Das Christenthum 
 und die Christliche Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte, 
 &c. has examined this question with great good sense 
 and fairness, and I believe he has stated the truth as near 
 as our authorities enable us to reach it. 
 
30 M. A URELIUS 
 
 There is no doubt that the Emperor's Reflec« 
 tions or liis Meditations, as they are generally 
 named, is a genuine work. In the first book he 
 speaks of himself, his family, and his teachers ; 
 and in other books he mentions himself. Suidas 
 (v. MapKos) notices a work of Antoninus in twelve 
 books, which he names the " conduct of his own 
 life ; " and he cites the book under several words 
 in his Dictionary, giving the emperor's name, but 
 not the title of the work. There are also passages 
 cited by Suidas from Antoninus without mention 
 of the emperor's name. The true title of the 
 work is unknown. Xylander who published the 
 first edition of this book (Zurich, 1558, 8vo., with a 
 Latin version) used a manuscript, Avhich contained 
 the twelve books, but it is not known where the 
 manuscript is now. The only other complete 
 manuscript which is known to exist is in the Vati- 
 can library, but it has no title and no inscriptions 
 of the several books : the eleventh only has the 
 inscription MdpKov auro/cparopos marked with an 
 asterisk. The other Vatican manuscripts and the 
 three Florentine contain only excerpts from the 
 emperor's book. All the titles of the excerpts 
 nearly agree with that which Xylander prefixed 
 to his edition, M.dpKOv 'Avtwvlvov AvroKparopos rwv 
 eh lavTov /3i/3A.ia ifB. This title has been used by 
 all subsequent editors. We cannot tell whether 
 Antoninus divided his work into books or some- 
 body else did it. If the inscriptions at the end of 
 the first and second books are genuine, he may 
 have made the division himself. 
 
ANTONINUS. 81 
 
 It is plain that the emperor wrote down his 
 thoughts or reflections as the occasions arose ; and 
 since they were intended for his own use, it is no 
 improbable conjecture that he left a complete copy 
 behind him written with his own hand ; for it is 
 not likely -that so diligent a man would use the 
 labor of a transcriber for such a purpose, and 
 expose his most secret thoughts to any other eye. 
 He may have also intended the book for his son 
 Commodus, who however had no taste for his 
 father's philosophy. Some careful hand preserved 
 the precious volume ; and a work by Antoninus 
 is mentioned by other late writers besides Suidas. 
 
 Many critics have labored on the text of Anto- 
 ninus. The most complete edition is that by 
 Thomas Gataker, 1652, 4to. The second edition 
 of Gataker was superintended by George Stan- 
 hope, 1697, 4to. There is also an edition of 1704. 
 Gataker made and suggested many good correc- 
 tions, and he also made a new Latin version, which 
 is not a very good specimen of Latin, but it 
 generally expresses the sense of the original and 
 often better than some of the more recent trans- 
 lations. He added in the margin opposite to each 
 paragraph references to the other parallel passages ; 
 and he wrote a commentary, one of the most com- 
 plete that has been written on any ancient author. 
 This commentary contains the editor's exposition 
 of the more difficult passages, and quotations from 
 all the Greek and Roman writers for the illustra- 
 tion of the text. It is a wonderful monument of 
 learning and labor, and certainly no Englishman 
 
32 M. A URELIUS 
 
 has yet done anything like it. At the end of his 
 preface the editor says that he wrote it at Rother- 
 hithe near London in a severe winter, when he 
 was in the seventy-eighth year of his age, 1G51, 
 a time when Milton, Selden and other great men 
 of the Commonwealth time were living ; and the 
 great French scholar Sanmaise (Salmasius), with 
 whom Gataker corresponded and received help 
 from him for his edition of Antoninus. The 
 Greek text has also been edited by J. M. Schultz, 
 Leipzig, 1802, 8vo. ; and by the learned Greek 
 Adamantius Coral's, Paris, 1816, 8vo. The text 
 of Schultz was republished by Tauchnitz, 1821. 
 
 There are English, French, Italian and Spanish 
 translations of M. Antoninus, and there may be 
 others. I have not seen all the English transla- 
 tions. There is one by Jeremy Collier, 1702, 8vo. 
 a most coarse and vulgar copy of the original. 
 The latest French translation by Alexis Pierron 
 in the collection of Charpentier is better than 
 Dacier's, which has been honored with an Italian 
 version (Udine, 1772). There is an Italian ver- 
 sion (1675) which I have not seen. It is by a 
 cardinal. " A man illustrious in the church, the 
 Cardinal Francis Barberini the elder, nephew of 
 Pope Urban VIII, occupied the last years of his 
 life in translating into his native language the 
 thoughts, of the Roman emperor, in order to 
 diffuse among the faithful the fertilizing and vivi- 
 fying seeds. He dedicated this translation to his 
 soul, to make it, as he says in his energetic style, 
 redder than his purple at the sight of the virtues 
 
ANTONINUS. 33 
 
 of this Gentile " (Pierron, Preface). I have made 
 this translation at intervals after having used the 
 book for many years. It is made from the Greek, 
 but I have not always followed one text. I have 
 occasionally compared other versions. I made 
 this translation for my own use, because I found 
 that it was worth the labor. It may be useful 
 to others also and at last I have determined to 
 print it, though, as the original is both very difficult 
 to understand and still more difficult to translate, 
 it is not possible that I have always avoided error. 
 But I believe that I have not often missed the 
 meaning, and those who will take the trouble to 
 compare the translation with the original should 
 not hastily conclude that I am wrong, if they do 
 not agree with me. Some passages do give the 
 meaning, though at first sight they may not appear 
 to do so ; and when I differ from the translators, 
 I think that in some places they are wrong, and in 
 other places I am sure that they are. I. have 
 placed a t in some passages, which indicates cor- 
 ruption in the text or great uncertainty in the 
 meaning. I could have made the language more 
 easy and Mowing, but I have preferred a somewhat 
 ruder style as being better suited to express the 
 character of the original ; and sometimes the ob- 
 scurity which may appear in the version is a fair 
 copy of the obscurity of the Greek. If I should 
 ever revise this version, I would gladly make use 
 of any corrections which may be suggested. I 
 have added an index of some of the Greek terms 
 with the corresponding English. If I have not 
 
34 M. A U RE LI US 
 
 given the best words for the Greek, I have done the 
 best that I could ; and in the text I have always 
 given the same translation of the same word. 
 
 The last reflection of the Stoic philosophy that 
 I have observed is in Simplicius' Commentary on 
 the Enchiridion of Epictetus. Simplicius was not 
 a Christian, and such a man was not likely to be 
 converted at a time when Christianity was grossly 
 corrupted. But he was a really religious man, 
 and he concludes his commentary with a prayer 
 to the Deity which no Christian could improve. 
 From the time of Zeno to Simplicius, a period of 
 about nine hundred years, the Stoic philosophy 
 formed the characters of some of the best and 
 greatest men. Finally it became' extinct, and we 
 hear no more of it till the revival of letters in 
 Italy. Angelo Poliziano met with two very inac- 
 curate and incomplete manuscripts of Epictetus' 
 Enchiridion, which he translated into Latin and 
 dedicated to his great patron Lorenzo de' Medici 
 in whose collection he had found the book. Poli- 
 ziano's version was printed in the first Bale edition 
 of the Enchiridion, A. d. 1531 (apud And. Cra- 
 tandrum). Poliziano recommends the Enchiridion 
 to Lorenzo as a work well suited to his temper, 
 and useful in the difficulties by Avhich he was sur- 
 rounded. 
 
 Epictetus and Antoninus have had readers ever 
 since they were first printed. The little book of 
 Antoninus has been the companion of some great 
 men. Machiavelli's Art of War and Marcus 
 Antoninus were the two books which were used 
 
ANTONINUS. 35 
 
 when he was a young man by Captain John 
 Smith, and he could not have found two writers 
 better fitted to form the character of a soldier 
 and a man. Smith is almost unknown and for- 
 gotten in England his native country, but not in 
 America where he saved the young colony of Vir- 
 ginia. He was great in his heroic mind and his 
 deeds in arms, but greater still in the nobleness of 
 his character. For a man's greatness lies not in 
 wealth and station, as the vulgar believe, nor yet 
 in his intellectual capacity, which is often asso- 
 ciated with the meanest moral character, the most 
 abject servility to those in high places and arro- 
 gance to the poor and lowly ; but a man's time 
 greatness lies in the consciousness of an honest 
 purpose in life, founded on a just estimate of him- 
 self and everything else, on frequent self-exami- 
 nation, and a steady obedience to the rule which 
 he knows to be right, without troubling himself, 
 as the emperor says he should not, about what 
 others may think or say, or whether they do or do 
 not do that which he thinks and says and does. 
 
THE 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF ANTONINUS. 
 
 |T lias been said that the Stoic phi- 
 losophy first showed its real value 
 when it passed from Greece to Rome. 
 X W The doctrines of Zeno and his suc- 
 cessors were well suited to the gravity and practi- 
 cal good sense of the Romans ; and even in the 
 Republican period we have an example of a man, 
 M. Cato Uticensis, who lived the life of a Stoic 
 and died consistently with the opinions winch he 
 professed. He was a man, says Cicero, who em- 
 braced the Stoic philosophy from conviction ; not 
 for the purpose of vain discussion, as most did, bul 
 in order to make his life conformable to its pre- 
 cepts. In the wretched times from the death of 
 Augustus to the murder of Domitian, there was 
 nothing but the Stoic philosophy which could con- 
 sole and support the followers of the old religion 
 under imperial tyranny and amidst universal cor- 
 ruption. There were even then noble minds that 
 could dare and endure, sustained by a good con- 
 science and an elevated idea of the purposes of 
 man's existence. Such were Paetus Thrasea, 
 
PHILOSOPHY OF ANTONINUS. 3' 
 
 Helvidius Priscus, Cornutus, C. Musonius Rufus, 1 
 and the poets Persius and Juvenal, whose ener- 
 getic language and manly thoughts may be as in- 
 structive to us now as they might have been to 
 their contemporaries. Persius died under Nero's 
 bloody reign, but Juvenal had the good fortune to 
 survive the tyrant Domitian and to see the better 
 times of Nerva, Trajan and Hadrian. His best 
 precepts are derived from the Stoic school, and 
 they are enforced in his finest verses by the un- 
 rivalled vigor of the Latin language. 
 
 The two best expounders of the later Stoical 
 philosophy were a Greek slave and a Roman em- 
 peror. Epictetus, a Phrygian Greek, was brought 
 to Rome, we know not how, but he was there the 
 slave and afterwards the freedman of an unworthy 
 master, Epaphroditus by name, himself a freed- 
 man and a favorite of Nero. Epictetus may have 
 been a hearer of C. Musonius Rufus, while he 
 was still a slave, but he can hardly have been a 
 teacher before he was made free. He was one of 
 the philosophers whom Domitian's order banished 
 from Rome. He retired to Nicopolis in Epirus, 
 and he may have died there. Like other great 
 teachers he wrote nothing, and we are indebted to 
 his grateful pupil Arrian for what we have of 
 
 1 I have omitted Seneca, Nero's preceptor. He was 
 in a sense a Stoic and he has said many good things in 
 a very fine way. There is a judgment of Gellius (xn. 
 2) on Seneca, or rather a statement of what some peo- 
 ple thought of his philosophy, and it is not favorable. 
 His writings and his life must be taken together, and I 
 have nothing more to say of him here. 
 
38 THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Epictetus' discourses. Arrian wrote eight books 
 of the discourses of Epictetus, of which only four 
 remain and some fragments. We have' also from 
 Arrian's hand the small Enchiridion or Manual 
 of the chief precepts of Epictetus. There is a 
 valuable commentary on the Enchiridion by Sim- 
 plicius, who lived ha the time of the emperor Jus- 
 tinian. 2 
 
 Antoninus in his first book (i. 7), in which he 
 gratefully commemorates his obligations to his 
 teachers, says that he was made acquainted by 
 Junius Rusticus with the discourses of Epictetus, 
 whom he mentions also in other passages (iv. 41 ; 
 xi. 33. 36). Indeed, the doctrines of Epictetus 
 and Antoninus are the same, and Epictetus is the 
 best authority for the explanation of the philo- 
 sophical language of Antoninus and the exposi- 
 tion of his opinions. But the method of the 
 two philosophers is entirely different. Epictetus 
 addressed himself to his hearers in a continuous 
 discourse and in a familiar and simple manner. 
 Antoninus wrote down his reflections for his own 
 use only, in short unconnected paragraphs, which 
 are often obscure. 
 
 The Stoics made three divisions of philosophy, 
 Physic (4>v(jlk6v), Ethic (?7#tKoi ), and Logic (Xoyt- 
 koi ). This division, we are told by Diogenes, was 
 made by Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic 
 
 2 There is a complete edition of Arrian's Epictetus 
 with the commentary of Simplicius by J. Schweighaeu- 
 ser, 6 vols. 8vo. 1799, 1800. There is also an English 
 translation of Epictetus by Mrs. Carter. 
 
OF A NT ON I N US. 39 
 
 sect and by Chrysippus ; but these philosophers 
 placed the ttiree divisions in the following order, 
 Logic, Physic, Ethic. It appears however that 
 this division was made before Zeno's time and 
 acknowledged by Plato, as Cicero remarks (Acad. 
 Post. i. 5). Logic is not synonymous with our 
 term Logic in the narrower sense of that word. 
 
 Cleanthes, a Stoic, subdivided the three divis- 
 ions, and made six : Dialectic and Rhetoric, com- 
 prised in Logic ; Ethic and Politic ; Physic and 
 Theology. This division was merely for practi- 
 cal use, for all Philosophy is one. Even among 
 the earliest Stoics Logic or Dialectic does not oc- 
 cupy the same place as in Plato : it is considered 
 only as an instrument which is to be used for the 
 other divisions of Philosophy. An exposition of 
 the earlier Stoic doctrines and of their modifica- 
 tions woidd require a volume. My object is to 
 explain only the opinions of Antoninus, so far as 
 they can be collected from Ms book. 
 
 According to the subdivision of Cleanthes, 
 Physic and Theology go together, or the study 
 of the nature of Things, and the study of the 
 nature of the Deity, so far as man can under- 
 stand the Deity, and of his government of the 
 universe. This division or subdivision is not 
 formally adopted by Antoninus, for as already ob- 
 served, there is no method in his book ; but it is 
 virtually contained in it. 
 
 Cleanthes also connects .Ethic and Politic, or 
 the study of the principles of morals and the study 
 of the constitution of civil society ; and undoubt- 
 
40 THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 edly he did well in subdividing Ethic into two 
 parts, Ethic in the narrower sense and Politic, for 
 though the two are intimately connected, they are 
 also very distinct, and many questions can only be 
 properly discussed by carefully observing the dis- 
 tinction. Antoninus does not treat of Politic. 
 His subject is Ethic, and Ethic in its practical 
 application to his own conduct in life as a man 
 and as a governor. His Ethic is founded on his 
 doctrines about man's nature, the Universal Na- 
 ture, and the relation of every man to everything 
 else. It is therefore intimately and inseparably 
 connected with Physic or the nature of Things 
 and with Theology or the nature of the Deity. 
 He advises us to examine well all the impres- 
 sions on our minds (^avrao-ta/) and to form a 
 right judgment of them, to make just conclusions, 
 and to inquire into the meanings of Avords, and 
 so far to apply Dialectic, but he has no attempt 
 at any exposition of Dialectic, and his philosophy 
 is in substance purely moral and practical. He 
 says (vin. 13), " Constantly and, if it be possible, 
 on the occasion of every impression on the soul, 3 
 
 3 The original is em ndor]<; fyavraaiaq. We have no 
 word which expresses (bavraoia, tor it is not only the sen- 
 suous appearance which comes from an external object, 
 which object is called to davraarov, but it is also the 
 thought or feeling or opinion which is produced even 
 when there is no corresponding external object before us. 
 Accordingly everything which moves the soul is ipavraa- 
 tov and produces a tpavraoia. 
 
 In this extract Antoninus says <t>vaio\<r)'elv, irad-oloyelv, 
 6i.a?ieKTiKtveo$ai. I have translated na^oTioyelv by usir g 
 the word Moral (Ethic), and that is the meaning here. 
 
OF ANTONINUS. 41 
 
 apply to it the principles of Physic, of Moral and 
 of Dialectic : " which is only another way of tell- 
 ing us to examine the impression in every possi- 
 ble way. In another passage (in. 11) he says, 
 " To the aids which have been mentioned let this 
 one still be added : make for thyself a definition 
 or description of the object (to ^aiTaa-rov) which 
 is presented to thee, so as to see distinctly what 
 kind of a thing it is in its substance, in its nudity, 
 in its complete entirety, and tell thyself its proper 
 name, and the names of the things of which it 
 has been compounded, and into which it will be 
 resolved." Such an examination implies a use 
 of Dialectic, which Antoninus accordingly em- 
 ployed as a means towards establishing his Physi- 
 cal, Theological and Ethical principles. 
 
 There are several expositions of the Physical, 
 Theological, and Ethical principles, which are 
 contained in the work of Antoninus ; and more 
 expositions than I have read. Putter (Geschichte 
 der Philosophic, iv. 241) after explaining the 
 doctrines of Epictetus, treats very briefly and in- 
 sufficiently those of Antoninus. But he refers to 
 a short essay, in which the work is done better.^ 
 There is also an essay on the Philosophical Prin- 
 ciples of M. Aurelius Antoninus by J. M. Schultz, 
 placed at the end of his German translation of 
 Antoninus (Schleswig, 1799). With the assistance 
 of these two useful essays and his own diligent 
 
 4 De Marco Aurelio Antonino ... ex ipsius Commen- 
 tariis. Scriptio Philologica. Instituit Nicolaus Bachius, 
 Lipsiae, 18"26. 
 
42 THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 study a man may form a sufficient notion of the 
 principles of Antoninus ; but he will find it more 
 difficult to expound them to others. Besides the 
 want of arrangement in the original and of con- 
 nection among the numerous paragraphs, the cor- 
 ruption of the text, the obscurity of the language 
 and the style, and sometimes perhaps the confu- 
 sion in the writer's own ideas, — besides all this 
 there is occasionally an apparent contradiction in 
 the emperor's thoughts, as if his principles were 
 sometimes unsettled, as if doubt sometimes 
 clouded his mind. A man who leads a life of 
 tranquillity and reflection, who is not disturbed 
 at home and meddles not with the affairs of the 
 world, may keep his mind at ease and his thoughts 
 in one even course. But such a man has not 
 been tried. All his Ethical philosophy and his 
 passive virtue might turn out to be idle words, if 
 he were once exposed to the rude realities of hu- 
 man existence. Fine thoughts and moral disser- 
 tations from men who have not worked and suf- 
 fered may be read, but they will be forgotten. 
 No religion, no Ethical philosophy is worth any- 
 thing, if the teacher has not lived the " life of an 
 apostle," and been ready to die " the death of a 
 martyr." " Not in passivity (the passive affects) 
 but in activity lie the evil and the good of the 
 rational social animal, just as his virtue and his 
 vice lie not in passivity, but in activity " (ix. 16). 
 The emperor Antoninus was a practical moralist. 
 From his youth he followed a laborious discipline, 
 and though his high station placed him above all 
 
OF A NT ONI N US. 43 
 
 want or the fear of it, he lived as frugally and 
 temperately as the poorest philosopher. Epictetus 
 wanted little, and it seems that he always had 
 the little that he wanted ; and he was content with 
 it, as he had been with his servile station. But 
 Antoninus after his accession to the empire sat on 
 an uneasy seat. He had the administration of an 
 empire which extended from the Euphrates to the 
 Atlantic, from the cold mountains of Scotland to 
 the hot sands of Africa ; and we may imagine, 
 though we cannot know it by experience, what 
 must be the trials, the troubles, the anxiety and 
 the sorrows of him who has the world's business 
 on his hands with the wish to do the best that he 
 can, and the certain knowledge that he can do 
 very little of the good which he wishes. 
 
 In the midst of war, pestilence, conspiracy, gen- 
 eral corruption and with the weight of so un- 
 wieldy an empire upon him, we may easily com- 
 prehend that Antoninus often had need of all his 
 fortitude to support him. The best and the bravest 
 men have moments of doubt and of weakness, but 
 if they are the best and the bravest, they rise again 
 from their depression by recurring to first principles, 
 as Antoninus does. The emperor says that life 
 is smoke, a vapor, and St. James in his Epistle 
 is of the same mind ; that the world is full of en- 
 vious, jealous, malignant people, and a man might 
 be well content to get out of it. He has doubts 
 perhaps sometimes even about that to which he 
 holds most firmly. There are only a few passages 
 of this kind, but they are evidence of the struggles 
 
44 THE P HILOSOPHY 
 
 which even the noblest of the sons of men had to 
 maintain against the hard realities of his daily life. 
 A poor remark it is which I have seen somewhere, 
 and made in a disparaging way, that the emperor's 
 reflections show that he had need of consolation 
 and comfort in life, and even to prepare him to 
 meet his death. True that he did need comfort 
 and support, and we see how he found it. He 
 constantly recurs to his fundamental principle that 
 the universe is wisely ordered, that every man is 
 a part of it and must conform to that order which 
 he cannot change, that whatever the Deity has 
 done is good, that all mankind are a man's brethren, 
 that he must love and cherish them and try to 
 make them better, even those who would do him 
 harm. This is his conclusion (11. 17): "What 
 then is that which is able to conduct a man ? One 
 thing and only one, Philosophy. But this consists 
 in keeping the divinity within a man free from 
 violence and unharmed, superior to pains and 
 pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose nor 
 yet falsely and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need 
 of another man's doing or not doing anything ; 
 and besides, accepting all that happens and all that 
 is allotted, as coming from thence, wherever it is, 
 from whence he himself came ; and finally waiting 
 for death with a cheerful mind as being nothing 
 else than a dissolution of the elements, of which 
 every living being is compounded. But if there 
 is no harm to the elements themselves in each 
 continually changing into another, why should a 
 man have any apprehension about the change and 
 
OF ANTONINUS. 45 
 
 dissolution of all the elements [himself]? for it is 
 according to nature ; and nothing is evil that is 
 according to nature." 
 
 The Physic of Antoninus is the knowledge of 
 the Nature of the Universe, of its government, 
 and of the relation of man's nature to both. He 
 names the universe (fj rw> ok<ov ovaia, vi. I), 5 "the 
 universal substance," and he adds that " reason," 
 (Aoyos) governs the universe. He also (vi. 9) 
 uses the terms " universal nature " or " nature of 
 the universe." He (vi. 25) calls the universe 
 " the one and all, which we name Cosmus or Order " 
 (koct/xos). If he ever seems to use these general 
 terms as significant of the All, of all that man can 
 in any way conceive to exist, he still on other oc- 
 casions plainly distinguishes between Matter, Ma- 
 terial things (yXrj, vXlkov), and Cause, Origin, 
 
 5 As to the word ovaia, the reader may see the Index. 
 I add here a few examples of the use of the word ; Anto- 
 ninus has (v. 24), tj av/inaaa obala, "the universal sub- 
 stance." He says (xii. 30), "there is one common" sub- 
 stance {ovaia), distributed among countless bodies ; and 
 (iv. 40). In Stobaeus (torn. i. lib. 1, tit. 14) there is this 
 definition, ovaiav 6s 6aauv tUv ovtuv uttuvtuv ttjv Kpurrjv 
 vfa]v. (In viii. 11), Antoninus speaks of to oiiaitjdec nai 
 vIlkov, "the substantial and the material ; " and (vn. 10) 
 lie says that " everything material''' (evvlov) disappears 
 in the substance of the whole (r>) tuv o\m ovaia). The 
 ovaia is the generic name of that existence, which we as- 
 sume as the highest or ultimate, because we conceive no 
 existence which can be coordinated with it and none above 
 it. It is the philosopher's " substance : " it is the ultimate 
 expression for that which we conceive or suppose to be the 
 basis, the being of a thing. " From the Divine, which is 
 substance in itself, or the only and sole substance, all and 
 everything that is created exists." (Swedenborg ) 
 
46 THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Reason (atYi'a, airiwSes, Ao'yos). 6 This is conform- 
 able to Zeno's doctrine that there are two original 
 principles (ap^at) of all things, that which acts 
 (to 7roLovi) and that which is acted upon (to 
 7rd(rxov). That which is acted on is the formless 
 matter (vXrj) : that which acts is the reason (Adyo?) 
 in it, God, for he is eternal and operates through 
 all matter, and produces all things. So Anto- 
 ninus (v. 32) speaks of the reason (A.dyos) which 
 pervades all substance (cnWa), and through all 
 time by fixed periods (revolutions) administers 
 the universe (rd ttclv). God is eternal, and Mat- 
 ter is eternal. It is God who gives to matter its 
 
 6 I remark, in order to anticipate any misapprehension, 
 that all these general terms involve a contradiction. The 
 "one and all," and the like, and "the whole," imply 
 limitation. "One" is limited; "all" is limited; the 
 " whole " is limited. We cannot help it. We cannot find 
 words to express that which we cannot fully conceive. 
 The addition of " absolute " or any other such word does 
 not mend the matter. Even God is used by most people, 
 often unconsciously, in such a way that limitation is im- 
 plied, and yet at the same time words are added which are 
 intended to deny limitation. A Christian martyr, when 
 he was asked what God was, is said to have answered that 
 God has no name like a man ; and Justin says the same 
 ( Apol. ii. 6). We can conceive the existence of a thing, 
 or rather we may have the idea of an existence, without 
 an adequate notion of it, " adequate " meaning coexten- 
 sive and coequal with the thing. We have a notion of 
 limited space derived from the dimensions of what we 
 call a material thing, though of space absolute, if I may 
 use the term, we have no notion at all ; and of infinite 
 space the notion is the same, no notion at all ; and yet 
 we conceive it in a sense, though I know not how, and 
 we believe that space is infinite, and we cannot conceive 
 it to be finite. - - 
 
OF A XT ON IN US. 47 
 
 form, but he is not said to have created matter. 
 According to this view, which is as old as Anax- 
 agoras, God and matter exist independently, but 
 God governs matter. This doctrine is simply the 
 expression of the fact of the existence both of 
 matter and of God. The Stoics did not perplex 
 themselves with the insoluble question of the origin 
 and nature of matter. 7 Antoninus also assumes a 
 beginning of things, as we now know them ; but 
 his language is sometimes very obscure. I have 
 endeavored to explain the meaning of one difficult 
 passage, (vn. 75, and the note.) 
 
 Matter consists of elemental parts (o-Toixeia) 
 of which all material objects are made. But 
 nothing is permanent in form. The nature of 
 the universe, according to Antoninus' expression 
 (iv. 36), "loves nothing so much as to change 
 the things which are, and to make new things 
 like them. For everything that exists is in a 
 manner the seed of that which will be. But thou 
 art thinking only of seeds which are cast into the 
 
 7 The notions of matter and of space are inseparable. 
 We derive the notion of space from matter and form. But 
 we have no adequate conception either of matter or of 
 space. Matter in its ultimate resolution is as unintelligible 
 as what men call mind, spirit, or by whatever other name 
 they may express the power which makes itself known by 
 its-acts. Anaxagoras laid down the distinction between 
 intelligence [vovq) and matter, and he said that intelli- 
 gence impressed motion on matter and so separated the 
 elements of matter and gave them order ; but he probably 
 only assumed a beginning, as Simplicius says, as a 
 foundation of his philosophical teaching. 
 
 The common Greek word which we translate " matter " 
 is vlrj. It is the stuff that things are made of. 
 
48 THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 earth or into a womb : but this is a very vulgar 
 notion." All things then are in a constant flux 
 and change : some things are dissolved into the 
 elements, others come in their places ; and so the 
 " whole universe continues ever young and per- 
 fect." (xn. 23.) 
 
 Antoninus has some obscure expressions about 
 what he calls " seminal principles " (<nrepjj.aTiKol 
 Ao'yoi) . He opposes them to the Epicurean atoms 
 (vi. 24), and consequently his " seminal principles " 
 are not material atoms which wander about at 
 hazard, and combine nobody knows how. In one 
 passage (iv. 21) he speaks of living principles, 
 souls (ibvxa) after the dissolution of their bodies 
 being received into the " seminal principle of the 
 universe." Schultz thinks that by " seminal prin- 
 ciples Antoninus means the relations of the various 
 elemental principles, which relations are deter- 
 mined by the Deity and by Avhich alone the pro- 
 duction of organized beings is possible." This 
 may be the meaning, but if it is, nothing of any 
 % T alue can be derived from it. 8 Antoninus often 
 uses the word "Nature" (<£i'o-i?), and we must 
 attempt to fix its meaning. The simple etymo- 
 logical sense of cpvcns is " production," the birth of 
 
 8 Justin ( Apol. ii. 8) has the expression Kara anepfiaTLKov 
 ?Myov iitpoQ, where he is speaking of the Stoics. The 
 early Christian writers were familiar with the Stoic terms, 
 and their writings show that the contest was begun be- 
 tween the Christian expositors and the Greek philosophy. 
 Even in the second Epistle of St. Peter (n. 1, v. 4) we find 
 a Stoic expression, Iva Sea tovtuv yevqa&e -&elac Koivuva 
 (pvaecoq. 
 
OF ANTONINUS. 49 
 
 what we call Things. The Romans used Natura, 
 which also means " birth " originally. But neither 
 the Greeks nor the Romans stuck to this simple 
 meaning, nor do we. Antoninus says (x. 6) : 
 " Whether the universe is [a concourse of] atoms 
 or Nature [is a system], let this first be estab- 
 lished that I am a part of the whole which is 
 governed by nature." Here it might seem as if 
 nature were personified and viewed as an active, 
 efficient power, as something which, if not inde- 
 pendent of the Deity, acts by a power which is 
 given to it by the Deity. Such, if I understand 
 the expression right, is the way in which the word 
 Nature is often used now, "though it is plain that 
 many writers use the word without fixing any 
 exatc meaning to it. It is the same with the 
 expression Laws of Nature, which some writers 
 may use in an intelligible sense, but others as 
 clearly use in no definite sense at all. There is 
 no meaning in this word Nature, except that which 
 Bishop Butler assigns to it, when he says, " The 
 only distinct meaning of that word Natural is 
 Stated, Fixed or Settled ; since what is natural as 
 much requires and presupposes an intelligent agent 
 to render it so, i. e. to effect it continually or at 
 stated times, as what is supernatural or rniraculous 
 does to effect it at once." This is Plato's meaning 
 (De Leg. it.), when he says, that God holds the 
 beginning and end and middle of all that exists, 
 and proceeds straight on his course, making Ms 
 circuit according to nature (that is, by a fixed 
 order) ; and he is continually accompanied by jus- 
 4 
 
50 THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 tice who punishes those who deviate from the 
 divine law, that is, from the order or course which 
 God observes. 
 
 When we look at the motions of the planets, the 
 action of what we call gravitation, the elemental 
 combination of unorganized bodies and their reso- 
 lution, the production of plants and of living 
 bodies, their generation, growth, and their disso- 
 lution, which we call their death, we observe a 
 regular sequence of phaenomena, which within the 
 limits of experience present and past, so far as we 
 know the past, is fixed and invariable. But if 
 this is not so, if the order and sequence of phae- 
 nomena, as known to us, are subject to change in 
 the course of an infinite progression, — and such 
 change is conceivable, — we have not discovered, 
 nor shall we ever discover, the whole of the order 
 and sequence of phaenomena, in which sequence 
 there may be involved according to its very nature, 
 that is, according to its fixed order, some varia- 
 tion of what we now call the Order or Nature of 
 Things. It is also conceivable that such changes 
 have taken place, changes in the order of things, 
 as we are compelled by the imperfection of lan- 
 guage to call them, but which are no changes ; 
 and further it is certain, that our knowledge of 
 the true sequence of all actual phaenomena, as for 
 instance, the phaenomena of generation, growth, 
 and dissolution, is and ever must be imperfect. 
 
 We do not fare much better when we speak of 
 Causes and Effects than when we speak of Nature. 
 For the practical purposes of life we may use the 
 
OF ANTONINUS.. 51 
 
 terms cause and effect conveniently, and we may 
 fix a distinct meaning to them, distinct enough at 
 least to prevent all misunderstanding. But the 
 case is different when we speak of causes and 
 effects as of Things. All that we know is phae- 
 nomena, as the Greeks called them, or appearances 
 which follow one another in a regular order, as 
 we conceive it, so that if some one phaenomenon 
 should fail in the series, we conceive that there 
 must either be an interruption of the series, or 
 that something else will appear after the phae- 
 nomenon which has failed to appear, and will 
 occupy the vacant place ; and so the series in its 
 progression may be modified or totally changed. 
 Cause and effect then mean nothing in the se- 
 quence of natural phaenomena beyond Avhat I have 
 said ; and the real cause, or the transcendent cause, 
 as some would call it, of each successive phaenome- 
 non is in that which is the cause of all things 
 which are, which have been, and which will be 
 forever. Thus the word Creation may have a 
 real sense if we consider it as the first, if we can 
 conceive a first, in the present order of natural 
 phaenomena ; but in the vulgar sense a creation 
 of all things at a certain time, followed by a 
 quiescence of the first cause and an abandonment 
 of all sequences of Phaenomena to the Laws of 
 Nature, or to any other words that people may 
 use, is absolutely absurd. 9 
 
 9 Time and space are the conditions of our thought ; 
 but time infinite and space infinite cannot be objects of 
 thought, except in a very imperfect way. Time and space 
 
52 THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Now, though there is great difficulty in under- 
 standing all the passages of Antoninus, in which 
 he speaks of Nature, of the changes of things and 
 of the economy of the universe, I am convinced 
 that his sense of Nature and Natural is the same 
 as that which I have stated ; and as he was a man 
 who knew how to use words in a clear way and 
 with strict consistency, we ought to assume, even 
 if his meaning in some passages is doubtful, that 
 his view of Nature was in harmony with his fixed 
 belief in the all-pervading, ever-present, and ever- 
 active energy of God. (iv. 40 ; x. 1 ; VI. 40 ; and 
 other passages.) 
 
 There is much in Antoninus that is hard to 
 understand, and it might be said that he did not 
 fully comprehend all that he Avrote ; Avhich would 
 however be in no way remarkable, for it happens 
 now that a man may write what neither he nor 
 anybody can understand. Antoninus tells us 
 (xn. 10) to look at things and see what they are, 
 resolving them into the material (y^yj), the causal 
 (alrtov), and the relation (aixufcopa), or the pur- 
 pose, by which he seems to mean something in the 
 
 must not in any way be thought of, when we think of the 
 Deity. Swedenborg says, " The natural man may beliei r e 
 that he would have no thought, if the ideas of time, of 
 space, and of things material were taken away ; for upon 
 those is founded all the thought that man has. But let 
 him know that the thoughts are limited and confined in 
 proportion as they partake of time, of space, and of what 
 is material ; and that they are not limited and are extend- 
 ed, in proportion as they do not partake of those things ; 
 since the mind is so far elevated above the things corpo- 
 real and worldly." (Concerning Heaven and Hell, 169.) 
 
OF ANTONINUS. 53 
 
 nature of what we call effect, or end. The word 
 cause (atria) is the difficulty. There is the same 
 word in the Sanscrit (hetu) ; and the subtle phi- 
 losophers of India and of Greece, and the less 
 subtle philosophers of modern times have all used 
 this word, or an equivalent word, in a vague way. 
 Yet the confusion sometimes may be in the in- 
 evitable ambiguity of language rather than in the 
 mind of the writer, for I cannot think that some 
 of the wisest of men did not know what they in- 
 tended to say. When Antoninus says (iv. 36), 
 " that everything that exists is in a manner the 
 seed of that which will be," he might be supposed 
 to say what some of the Indian philosophers have 
 said, and thus a profound truth might be converted 
 into a gross absurdity. But he says, " in a man- 
 ner," and in a manner he said true ; and in 
 another manner, if you mistake his meaning, he 
 said false. When Plato said, " Nothing ever is, 
 but is always becoming" (dei yiyverai), he deliv- 
 ered a text, out of which we may derive some- 
 thing ; for he destroys by it not all practical, but 
 all speculative notions of cause and effect. The 
 whole series of things, as they appear to us, must 
 be contemplated in time, that is in succession, and 
 we conceive or suppose intervals between one state 
 of things and another state of things, so that there 
 is priority and sequence, and interval, and Being, 
 and a ceasing to Be, and beginning and ending. 
 But there is nothing of the kind in the Nature of 
 Things. It is an everlasting continuity, (iv. 45 ; 
 fii. 75.) When Antoninus speaks o£ generation 
 
64 THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 (x. 26), he speaks of one cause (ourta) acting, 
 and then another cause taking up the work, which 
 the former left in a certain state, and so on ; and 
 we might perhaps conceive that he had some no- 
 tion like what has been called "the self-evolving 
 power of nature ; " a fine phrase indeed, the full 
 import of which I believe that the writer of it 
 did not see, and thus he laid himself open to the 
 imputation of being a follower of one of the 
 Hindu sects, which makes all things come by 
 evolution out of nature or matter, or out of some- 
 thing which takes the place of deity, but is not 
 deity. I would have all men think as they please 
 or as they can, and I only claim the same free- 
 dom, which I give. When a man writes any- 
 thing, we may fairly try to find out all that his 
 words must mean, even if the result is that they 
 mean what lie did not mean ; and if we find this 
 contradiction, it is not our fault, but his misfor- 
 tune. Now Antoninus is perhaps somewhat in 
 this condition in what he says (x. 26), though he 
 speaks at the end of the paragraph of the power 
 which acts, unseen by the eyes, but still no less 
 clearly. But whether in this passage (x. 26) he 
 means that the power is conceived to be in the 
 different successive causes (curi'ai), or in some- 
 thing else, nobody can tell. From other passages 
 however I do collect that his notion of the phae- 
 nomena of the universe -is what I have stated. 
 Ihe deity works unseen, if we may use such lan- 
 guage, and perhaps I may, as Job did, or he who 
 wrote the book of Job. " In him we live and 
 
OF ANTONINUS. 55 
 
 move and are," said St. Paul to the Athenians, 
 and to show his hearers that this was no new 
 doctrine, he quoted the Greek poets. One of 
 these poets was the Stoic Cleanthes whose noble 
 hymn to Zeus or God is an elevated expression 
 of devotion and philosophy. It deprives Nature 
 of her power and puts her under the immediate 
 government of the deity. 
 
 " Thee all this heaven, which whirls around the earth, 
 Obeys and willing follows where thou leadest. — 
 Without thee, God, nothing is done on earth, 
 Nor in the sethereal realms, nor in the sea, 
 Save what the wicked do through their own folly." 
 
 Antoninus' conviction of the existence of a 
 divine power and government was founded on his 
 perception of the order of the universe. Like 
 Socrates (Xen. Mem. iv. 3), he says that though 
 we cannot see the forms of divine powers, we 
 know that they exist because Ave see their works. 
 
 " To those who ask, Where hast thou seen the 
 gods, or how dost thou comprehend that they ex- 
 ist and so worshipest them ? I answer, in the first 
 place, that they may be seen even -with the eyes ; 
 in the second place, neither have I seen my own 
 soid and yet I honor it. Thus then with respect 
 to the gods, from what I constantly experience of 
 their power, from this I comprehend that they 
 exist and I venerate them." (xn. 28. Comp. 
 Xen. Mem. i. 4, 9 ; St. Paul's Epistle to the Ro- 
 mans, i. 19, 20 ; and Montaigne's Apology for 
 Raimond de Sebonde, n. c. 12.) This is a very 
 old argument which has always had great weight 
 
56 THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 with most people and has appeared sufficient. It 
 does not acquire the least additional strength by 
 being developed in a learned treatise. It is as 
 intelligible in its simple enunciation as it can be 
 made. If it is rejected, there is no arguing with 
 him who rejects it : and if it is worked out into 
 innumerable particulars, the value of the evi- 
 dence runs the risk of being buried under a mass 
 of words. 
 
 Man being conscious that he is a spiritual power 
 or an intellectual power, or that he has such a 
 power, in whatever way he conceives that he has 
 it — for I wish simply to state a fact — from this 
 power which he has in himself, he is led, as An- 
 toninus says, to believe that there is a greater 
 power, which as the old Stoics tell us, pervades 
 the Avhole universe as the intellect 10 (Vo£>s) per- 
 
 10 I have always translated the word vovc, " intelli- 
 gence " or " intellect." It appears to be the word used by 
 the oldest Greek philosophers to express the notion of 
 " intelligence " as opposed to the notion of " matter." I 
 have always translated the word A.6yoQ by "reason,'' and 
 TioyMOQ by the word "rational," or perhaps sometimes 
 " reasonable," as I have translated voepog by the word 
 "intellectual." Every man who has thought and has 
 read any philosophical writings knows the difficulty of 
 finding words to express certain notions, how imperfectly 
 words express these notions, and how carelessly the words 
 are often used. The various senses of the word ~Aoyo<; are 
 enough to perplex any man. Our translators of the New 
 Testament (St. John, c. i.) have simply translated 6 Aoyoc 
 by "the woi'd," as the Germans translated it by "das 
 Wort ; " but in their theological writings they sometimes 
 retain the original term Logos. The Germans have a 
 term Vernunft, which seems to ceme nearest to our word 
 Reason, or the necessary and absolute truths which we 
 
OF ANTONINUS.. 57 
 
 rades man. (Compare Epictetus' Discourses, I. 
 14 ; and Voltaire a Mad e . Necker, vol. lxvii. p. 
 278.) 
 
 God exists then, but what do we know of his 
 Nature ? Antoninus says that the soul of man is 
 an efflux from the divinity. We have bodies 
 like animals, but we have reason, intelligence as 
 the gods. Animals have life (i/^x 7 ?)' an< ^ w ^ at 
 we call instincts or natural principles of action : 
 but the rational animal man alone has a rational, 
 intelligent soul (i/^r/ XoyiKT), voepd). Antoninus 
 insists on this continually : God is in man, 11 and 
 so we must constantly attend to the divinity 
 within us, for it is only in this way that we can 
 have any knowledge of the nature of God. The 
 human soul is in a sense a portion of the divinity, 
 and the soul alone has any communication with 
 
 cannot conceive as being other than what they are. Such 
 are what some people have called the laws of thought, 
 the conceptions of space and of time, and axioms or first 
 principles, which need no proof and cannot be proved or 
 denied. Accordingly the Germans can say " Gott ist die 
 hochste Vernunft," the Supreme Reason. The Germans 
 have also a word Verstand. which seems to represent our 
 word " understanding," " intelligence," " intellect," not 
 as a thing absolute which exists by itself, but as a thing 
 connected with an individual being, as a man. Accord- 
 ingly it is the capacity of receiving impressions ( Vorstel- 
 lungen, fpavraijiai) , and forming from them distinct ideas, 
 (Begriffe), and perceiving differences. I do not think 
 that these remarks will help the reader to the understand- 
 ing of Antoninus, or his use of the words vovg and "kb-yoq. 
 The Emperor's meaning must be got from his own words, 
 and if it does not agree altogether with modern notions, 
 it is not our business to force it into agreement, but sim- 
 ply to find out what his meaning is, if we can. 
 n Comp. Ep. to the Corinthians, i. 3. 17. 
 
58 THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 the Deity, for as he says (xn. 2) : " With his 
 intellectual part alone God touches the intelli- 
 gence only which has flowed and been derived 
 from himself into these bodies." In fact he says 
 that which is hidden within a man is life, that is 
 the man himself. All the rest is vesture, cover- 
 ing, organs, instrument, which the living man, the 
 real 12 man, uses for the purposes of his present 
 existence. The ah is universally diffused for him 
 who is able to respire, and so for him who is will- 
 
 12 This is also Swedenborg's doctrine of the soul. " As 
 to what concerns the soul, of which it is said that it shall 
 live after death, it is nothing else but the man himself, 
 who lives in the body, that is, the interior man, who by 
 the bod} r acts in the world and from whom the body itself 
 lives " (quoted by Clissold.p. 456 of " The Practical Na- 
 ture of the Theological Writings of Emanuel Swedenborg, 
 in a letter to the Archbishop of Dublin," second edition, 
 1859 ; a book which theologians might read with profit). 
 This is an old doctrine of the soul, which has been often 
 proclaimed, but never better expressed than by the 
 " Auctor de Mundo," c. 6, quoted by Gataker in his 
 " Antoninus," p. 43ti. " The soul by which we live and 
 have cities and houses is invisible, but it is seen by its- 
 works ; for the whole method of'life has been devised by 
 it and ordered, and by it is held together. In like manner 
 we must think also about the Deity, who in power is 
 most mighty, in beauty most comely, in life immortal, 
 and in virtue supreme : wherefore though he is invisible 
 to human nature, he is seen by his very works." Other 
 passages to the same purpose are quoted by Gataker, 
 (p. 382.) Bishop Butler has the same as to the soul: 
 " Upon the whole then our organs of sense and our limbs 
 are certainly instruments, which the living persons, our- 
 selves, make use of to perceive and move with." If this 
 is not plain enough, he also says : "It follows that our 
 organized bodies are no more ourselves, or part of our- 
 selves, than any other matter around us." (Compare 
 Anton, x. 38.) 
 
OF ANTONINUS. 59 
 
 Lag to partake of it the intelligent power which 
 holds within it all things is diffused as wide and 
 free as the ah. (viii. 54.) It is by living a 
 divine life that man approaches to a knowledge 
 of the divinity. 13 It is by following the divinity 
 within, Saifjiwv or 0e6% as Antoninus calls it, that 
 man comes nearest to the Deity, the supreme good, 
 for man can never attain to perfect agreement 
 with his internal guide (to Tjye/jLoviKov) • " Live 
 with the gods. And he does live with the gods 
 who constantly shows to them that his own soul is 
 satisfied with that which is assigned to him, and 
 that it does all the daemon (8aCfuav ) wishes, which 
 Zeus hath given to every man for his guardian 
 and guide, a portion of himself. And this daemon 
 is every man's understanding and reason." (v. 27.) 
 There is in man, that is in the reason, the in- 
 telligence, a superior faculty which if it is exer- 
 cised rules all the rest. This is the ruling faculty 
 (to rjyefiLoviKov), which Cicero (De Natura Deo- 
 rum, II. 11) renders by the Latin word Principatus, 
 " to which nothing can or ought to be superior." 
 
 13 The reader may consult Discourse V. "Of the ex- 
 istence and nature of God," in John Smith's " Select 
 Discourses." He has prefixed as a text to this Discourse, 
 the striking passage of Agapetus, Paraenes. § 3 : " He 
 who knows himself will know God ; and he who knows 
 God will be made like to God ; and he will be made like 
 to God, who has become worthy of God ; and lie becomes 
 worthy of God, who does nothing unworthy of God, but 
 thinks the things that are his, and speaks what he thinks, 
 and does what he speaks." I suppose that the old say- 
 ing, " Know thyself," which is attributed to Socrates and 
 others, had a larger meaning than the narrow sense which 
 is generally given to it. 
 
60 THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Antoninus often uses this term, and others which 
 are equivalent. He names it (vn. 64) " the 
 governing intelligence." The governing faculty 
 is the master of the soul. (v. 26.) A man must 
 reverence only his ruling faculty and the divinity 
 within him. As we must reverence that which 
 is supreme in the universe, so we must reverence 
 that which is supreme in ourselves, and this is 
 that which is of like kind with that which is 
 supreme in the universe, (v. 21.) So, as Plotinus 
 says, the soul of man can only know the divine, 
 so far as it knows itself. In one passage (xi. 19) 
 Antoninus speaks of a man's condemnation of 
 himself, when the diviner part within him has 
 been overpowered and yields to the less honorable 
 and to the perishable part, the body, and its gross 
 pleasures. In a Avord, the views of Antoninus on 
 this matter, however his expressions may vary, 
 are exactly what Bishop Butler expresses, when 
 he speaks of " the natural supremacy of reflection 
 or conscience," of the faculty " which, surveys, ap- 
 proves or disapproves the several affections of our 
 mind and actions of our lives." 
 
 Much matter might be collected from Anto- 
 ninus on the notion of the Universe being one 
 animated Being. But all that he says amounts 
 to no more, as Schultz remarks, than this : the 
 soul of man is most intimately united to his body 
 and together they make one animal, which we 
 call man ; so the Deity is most intimately united 
 to the world or the material universe, and together 
 they fbrm^one whole. But Antoninus did not 
 
OF ANTONINUS. 61 
 
 view God and the material universe as the same, 
 any more than he viewed the body and soul of 
 man as one. Antoninus has no speculations on 
 the absolute nature of the Deity. It was not his 
 fashion to waste his time on what man cannot 
 understand. He was satisfied that God exists, 
 that he governs all things, that man can only have 
 an imperfect knowledge of his nature, and he must 
 attain this imperfect knowledge by reverencing 
 the divinity which is within him, and keeping it 
 pure. 
 
 From all that has been said it follows that the 
 universe is administered by the Providence of God 
 (■n-povoia), and that all things are wisely ordered. 
 There are passages in which Antoninus expresses 
 doubts, or states diffei^ent possible theories of the 
 constitution and government of the Universe, but 
 he always recurs to Ms fundamental principle, that 
 if we admit the existence of a Deity, we must 
 also admit that he orders all things wisely and 
 well. (iv. 27 ; vi. 1 ; ix. 28 ; xn. 5, and many 
 other passages.) Epictetus says (i. 6) that we 
 can discern the providence which rules the world, 
 if we possess two things, the power of seeing all 
 that happens with respect to each thing, and a 
 grateful disposition. 
 
 But if all things are wisely ordered, how is the 
 world so full of what we call evil, physical and 
 moral ? If instead of saying that there is evil in 
 the world, we use the expression which I have 
 used, " what we call evil," we have partly antici- 
 pated the Emperor's answer. We see and fee] 
 
62 THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 and know imperfectly very few things in the few 
 years that we live, and all the knowledge and all 
 the experience of all the human race is positive 
 ignorance of the whole, which is infinite. Now 
 as our reason teaches us that everything is in some 
 way related to and connected with every other 
 thing, all notion of evil as being in the universe 
 of things is a contradiction, for if the whole comes 
 from and is governed by an intelligent being, it 
 is impossible to conceive anything in it which tends 
 to the evil or destruction of the whole, (vm. 55 ; 
 x. 6.) Everything is in constant mutation, and 
 yet the whole subsists. We might imagine the 
 solar system resolved into its elemental parts, and 
 yet the whole would still subsist " ever young and 
 perfect." 
 
 All things, all forms, are dissolved and new 
 forms appear. All living things undergo the 
 ■change which we call death. If we call death an 
 evil, then all change is an evil. Living beings 
 also suffer pain, and man suffers most of all, for 
 he suffers both in and by his body and by his 
 intelligent part. Men suffer also from one another, 
 and perhaps the largest part of human suffering 
 comes to man from those whom he calls his broth- 
 ers. Antoninus says (vm. 55), " Generally, 
 wickedness does no harm at all to the universe ; 
 and particularly, the wickedness [of one man] does 
 no harm to another. It is only harmful to him 
 who has it in his power to be released from it, as 
 soon as he shall choose." The first part of this 
 is perfectly consistent with the doctrine that the 
 
OF ANTONINUS. 63 
 
 whole can sustain no evil or harm. The second 
 part must be explained by the Stoic principle that 
 there is no evil in anything which is not in our 
 power. What wrong we suffer from another is 
 his evil, not ours. But this is an admission that 
 there is evil in a sort, for he who does wrong does 
 evil, and if others can endure the wrong, still there 
 is evil in the wrongdoer. Antoninus (xi. 18) 
 gives many excellent precepts with respect to 
 wrongs and injuries, and his precepts are practical. 
 He teaches us to bear what we cannot avoid, and 
 his lessons may be just as useful to him who 
 denies the being and the government of God as 
 to him who believes in both. There is no direct 
 answer in Antoninus to the objections which may 
 be made to the existence and providence of God 
 because of the moral disorder and suffering which 
 are in the world, except this answer which he 
 makes in reply to the supposition that even the 
 best men may be extinguished by death. He 
 says if it is so, we may be sure that if it ought 
 to have been otherwise, the gods would have 
 ordered it otherwise, (xn. 5.) His conviction of 
 the wisdom which we may observe in the govern- 
 ment of the world is too strong to be disturbed by 
 any apparent irregularities in the order of things. 
 That these disorders exist is a fact, and those who 
 would conclude from them against the being and 
 government of God conclude too hastily. We all 
 admit that there is an order in the material world, 
 a Nature, in the sense in which that word has 
 been explained, a constitution (Karao-Keu??,) what 
 
64 THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 we call a system, a relation of parts to one another 
 and a fitness of the whole for something. So in 
 the constitution of plants and of animals there is 
 an order, a fitness for some end. Sometimes the 
 order, as we conceive it, is interrupted and the 
 end, as we conceive it, is not attained. The seed, 
 the plant or the animal sometimes perishes before 
 it has passed through all its changes and done all 
 its uses. It is according to Nature, that is a fixed 
 order, for some to perish early and for others to 
 do all their uses and leave successors to take their 
 place. So man has a corporeal and intellectual 
 and moral constitution fit for certain uses, and 
 on the whole man performs these uses, dies and 
 leaves other men in his place. So society exists, 
 and a social state is manifestly the Natural State 
 of man, the state for which his Nature fits him ; 
 and society amidst innumerable irregularities and 
 disorders still subsists ; and perhaps we may say 
 that the history of the past and our present knowl- 
 edge give us a reasonable hope that its disorders 
 will diminish, and that order, its governing prin- 
 ciple, may be more firmly established. As order 
 then, a fixed order, we may say, subject to devia- 
 tions real or apparent, must be admitted to exist 
 in the whole Nature of things, that which we call 
 disorder or evil as it seems to us, does not in any 
 way alter the fact of the general constitution of 
 things having, a Nature or fixed order. Nobody 
 will conclude from the existence of disorder that 
 order is not the rule, for the existence of order 
 both physical and moral is proved by daily ex- 
 
OF ANTONINUS. 65 
 
 perience and all past experience. We cannot 
 conceive how the order of the universe is main- 
 tained: we cannot even conceive how our own 
 life from day to day is continued, nor how we 
 perform the simplest movements of the body, nor 
 how we grow and think and act, though we know 
 many of the conditions which are necessary for 
 all these functions. Knowing nothing then of 
 the unseen power which acts in ourselves except 
 by what is done, we know nothing of the power 
 which acts through what we call all time and all 
 space ; but seeing that there is a Nature or fixed 
 order in all things known to us, it is conformable 
 to the nature of our minds to believe that this 
 universal Nature has a cause which operates con- 
 tinually, and that we are totally unable to specu- 
 late on the reason of any of those disorders or 
 evils which we perceive. This I believe is the 
 answer which may be collected from all that An- 
 toninus has said. 14 
 
 The origin of evil is an old question. Achilles 
 tells Priam (Iliad, 24, 527) that Zeus has two casks, 
 one filled with good tilings, and the other with 
 bad, and that he gives to men out of each accord- 
 ing to his pleasure ; and so we must be content, 
 for we cannot alter the will of Zeus. One of the 
 Greek commentators asks how must we reconcile 
 this doctrine with what we find in the first book 
 of the Odyssey, where the king of the gods says, 
 
 14 Cleanthes says in his Hymn : 
 " For all things good and bad to One thou forme9t, 
 So that One everlasting reason governs all." 
 
 5 
 
66 THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 Men say that evil comes to them from us, but they 
 bring it on themselves through their own folly. 
 The answer is plain enough even to the Greek 
 commentator. The poets make both Achilles and 
 Zeus speak appropriately to their several charac- 
 ters. Indeed Zeus says plainly that men do attrib- 
 ute their sufferings to the gods, but they do it 
 falsely, for they are the cause of their own sorrows. 
 
 Epictetus in his Enchiridion (c. 27) makes short 
 work of the question of evil. He says, " As a 
 mark is not set up for the purpose of missing it, 
 so neither does the nature of evil exist in the 
 Universe." This will appear obscure enough to 
 those who are not acquainted with Epictetus, but 
 he always knows what he is talking about. We 
 do not set up a mark in order to miss it, though 
 we may miss it. God, whose existence Epictetus 
 assumes, has not ordered all things so that his pur- 
 pose shall fail. Whatever there may be of what 
 we call evil, the Nature of evil, as he expresses it, 
 does not exist ; that is, evil is not a part of the 
 constitution or nature of Things. If there were 
 a principle of evil (apxy) m ^ ne constitution of 
 things, evil would no longer be evil, as Simplicius 
 argues, but evil would be good. Simplicius (c. 34, 
 [27]) has a long and curious discourse on this text 
 of Epictetus, and it is amusing and instructive. 
 
 One passage more will conclude this matter. It 
 contains all that the emperor could say (n. 11) : 
 " To go from among men, if there are gods, is not 
 a thing to be afraid of, for the gods will not in- 
 volve thee in evil ; but if indeed they do not 
 
OF ANTONINUS. 67 
 
 exist, or if they have no concern about human 
 affairs, what is it to me to live in a universe devoid 
 of gods or devoid of providence ? But in truth 
 they do exist, and they do care for human things, 
 and they have put all the means in man's power 
 to enable him not to fall into real evils. And as 
 to the rest, if there was anything evil, they would 
 have provided for this also, that it should be al- 
 together in a man's power not to fall into it. But 
 that which does not make a man worse, how can 
 it make a man's life worse ? But neither through 
 ignorance, nor having the knowledge, but not the 
 power to guard against or correct these things, is 
 it possible that the nature of the Universe has 
 overlooked them ; nor is it possible that it has 
 made so great a mistake, either through want of 
 power or want of skill, that good and evil should 
 happen indiscriminately to the good and the bad. 
 But death certainly and life, honor and dishonor, 
 pain and pleasure, all these things equally happen 
 to good and bad men, being things which make 
 us neither better nor worse. Therefore they are 
 neither good nor evil." 
 
 The Ethical part of Antoninus' Philosophy fol- 
 lows from his general principles. The end of all 
 his philosophy is to live conformably to Nature, 
 both a man's own nature and the nature of the 
 Universe. Bishop Butler has explained what the 
 Greek philosophers meant when they spoke of 
 living according to Nature, and he says that when 
 it is explained, as he has explained it and as they 
 understood it, it is " a manner of speaking not loose 
 
68 THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 and undetercninate, but clear and distinct, strictly 
 just and true." To live according to Nature is to 
 live according to a man's whole nature, not accord- 
 ing to a part of it, and to reverence the divinity 
 within him as the governor of all his actions. " To 
 the rational animal the same act is according to 
 nature and according to reason." 15 (vn. 11.) That 
 which is done contrary to reason is also an act 
 contrary to nature, to the whole nature, though it 
 is certainly conformable to some part of man's 
 nature,- or it could not be done. Man is made for 
 action, not for idleness or pleasure. As plants 
 and animals do the uses of their nature, so man 
 must do his. (v. 1.) 
 
 Man must also live conformably to the universal 
 nature, conformably to the nature of all things of 
 Avhich he is one ; and as a citizen of a political 
 community he must direct his life and actions with 
 reference to those among whom, and for whom, 
 among other purposes, he lives. A man must not 
 retire into solitude and cut himself off from his 
 fellow men. He must be ever active to do his 
 part in the great whole. All men are his kin, not 
 only in blood, but still more by participating in 
 the same intelligence and by being a portion of 
 the same divinity. A man cannot really be in- 
 jured by his brethren, for no act of theirs can 
 make him bad, and he must not be angry with 
 them nor hate them : " For we are made for co- 
 
 15 This is what Juvenal means when he says (xiv. 
 321) — 
 Nunquaiu aliud Natura aliud Sapentia dieit 
 
OF ANTONINUS. 69 
 
 operation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like 
 the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act 
 against one another then is contrary to nature ; 
 and it is acting against one another to be vexed 
 and to turn away." (n. 1.) 
 
 Further he says : " Take pleasure in one thing 
 and rest hi it, in passing from one social act to 
 another social act, thinking of God." (vi. 7.) 
 Again: " Love mankind. Follow God." (vn. 31.) 
 It is the characteristic of the rational soul for a 
 man to love his neighbor, (xi. 1.) Antoninus 
 teaches in various passages the forgiveness of in- 
 juries, and we know that he also practised what 
 he taught. Bishop Butler remarks that " this 
 divine precept to forgive injuries and to love our 
 enemies, though to be met with in Gentile moral- 
 ists, yet is in a peculiar sense a precept of Chris- 
 tianity, as our Saviour has insisted more upon it 
 than on any other single virtue." The practice of 
 this precept is the most difficult of all virtues. 
 Antoninus often enforces it and gives us aid 
 towards following it. "When we are injured, we 
 feel anger and resentment, and the feeling is 
 natural, just and useful for the conservation of 
 society. It is useful that wrong doers should feel 
 the natural consequences of their actions, among 
 which is the disapprobation of society and the re- 
 sentment of him who is wronged. But revenge 
 in the proper sense of that word, must not be prac- 
 tised. " The best way of avenging thyself," says 
 the emperor, " is not to become like the wrong 
 doer." It is plain by this that he does not mean 
 
70 THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 that we should in any case practise revenge ; but 
 he says to those who talk of revenging wrongs, 
 Be not like him who has done the wrong. - Soc- 
 rates in the Crito (c. 10) says the same in other 
 words, and St. Paul (Ep. to the Romans, ~K.il. 17.) 
 " When a man has done thee any wrong, imme- 
 diately consider with what opinion about good or 
 evil he has done wrong. For when thou hast 
 seen this, thou wilt pity him and wilt neither 
 wonder nor be angry." (vn. 26.) Antoninus 
 would not deny that wrong naturally produces the 
 feeling of anger and resentment, for this is implied 
 in the recommendation to reflect on the nature of 
 the man's mind who has done the wrong, and then 
 you will have pity instead of resentment : and so 
 it comes to the same as St. Paul's advice to be 
 angry and sin not ; which, as Butler well explains 
 it, is not a recommendation to be angry, which 
 nobody needs, for anger is a natural passion, but 
 it is a warning against allowing anger to lead us 
 into sin. In short the emperor's doctrine about 
 wrongful acts is this : Avrong doers do not know 
 what good and bad are : they offend out of igno- 
 rance, and in the sense of the Stoics this is true. 
 Though this kind of ignorance will never be ad- 
 mitted as >■ a legal excuse, and ought not to be 
 admitted as a full excuse in any way by society, 
 there may be grievous injuries, such as it is in a 
 man's power to forgive without harm to society ; 
 and if he forgives because he sees that his enemies 
 know not what they do, he is acting in the spirit 
 of the sublime prayer, " Father, forgive them, for 
 they know not what they do." 
 
OF ANTONINUS. 71 
 
 The emperor's moral philosophy was not a feeble, 
 narrow system, which teaches a man to look di- 
 rectly to his own happiness, though a man's hap- 
 piness or tranquillity is indirectly promoted by 
 living as he ought to do. A man must live con- 
 formably to the universal nature, which means, as 
 the emperor explains it in many passages, that a 
 man's actions must be conformable to his true re- 
 lations to all other human beings, both as a citizen 
 of a political community and as a member of the 
 whole human family. This implies, and he often 
 expresses it in the most forcible language, that a 
 man's words and actions, so far as they affect 
 others, must be measured by a fixed rule, which 
 is their consistency with the conservation and the 
 interests of the particular society of which he is a 
 member, and of the whole human race. To live 
 conformably to such a rule, a man must use his 
 rational faculties in order to discern clearly the 
 consequences and full effect of all his actions and 
 of the actions of others : he must not live a life of 
 contemplation and reflection only, though he must 
 often retire within himself to calm and purify his 
 soul by thought, but he must mingle in the work of 
 man and be a fellow laborer for the general good. 
 
 A man should have an object or purpose in life, 
 that he may direct all his energies to it ; of course 
 a good object, (n. 7.) He who has not one object 
 or purpose of life, cannot be one and the same all 
 through his life. (xi. 21.) Bacon has a remark to 
 the same effect, on the best means of " reducing 
 of the mind unto virtue and good estate ; which 
 
72 THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 is, the electing and propounding unto a man's self 
 good and virtuous ends of his life, such as may be 
 in a reasonable sort within his compass to attain." 
 He is a happy man who has been wise enough 
 to do this when he was young and has had the 
 opportunities ; but the emperor seeing well that a 
 man cannot always be so wise in his youth, en- 
 courages himself to do it when he can, and not to 
 let life slip away before he has begun. He who 
 can propose to himself good and virtuous ends of 
 life, and be true to them, cannot fail to live con- 
 formably to his own interest and the universal in- 
 terest, for in the nature of things they are one. 
 If a thing is not good for the hive, it is not good 
 for the bee. (vi. 54.) 
 
 One passage may end this matter. " If the gods 
 have determined about me and about the things 
 which must happen to me, they have determined 
 well, for it is not easy even to imagine a deity 
 without forethought ; and as to doing me harm, 
 why should they have any desire towards that ? 
 For what advantage would result to them from 
 this or to the whole, which is the special object of 
 their providence ? But if they have not deter- 
 mined about me individually, they have certainly 
 determined about the whole at least ; and the 
 things which happen by way of sequence in this 
 general arrangement I ought to accept with pleas- 
 ure and to be content with them. But if they 
 determine about nothing — which it is wicked to 
 believe, or if we do believe it, let us neither sacri- 
 fice nor pray nor swear by them nor do anything 
 
OF ANTONINUS. 78 
 
 else which we do as if the gods were present and 
 lived with us — but if however the gods determine 
 about none of the things which concern us, I am 
 able to determine about myself, and I can inquire 
 about that which is useful ; and that is useful to 
 every man which is conformable to his own con- 
 stitution (KOLTao-Kevy]) and nature. But my nature 
 is rational and social ; and my city and country, 
 so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome ; but so far as 
 I am a man, it is the world. The things then 
 which are useful to these cities are alone useful 
 to me." (vi. 44.) 
 
 It would be tedious, and it is not necessary to 
 state the emperor's opinions on all the ways in 
 which a man may profitably use his understanding 
 towards perfecting himself in practical virtue. 
 The passages to this purpose are in all parts of 
 his book, but as they are in no order or connec- 
 tion, a man must use the book a long time before 
 he will find out all that is in it. A few words 
 may be added here. If we analyse all other 
 things, we find how insufficient they are for human 
 life, and how truly worthless many of them are. 
 Virtue alone is indivisible, one, and perfectly satis- 
 fying. The notion of Virtue cannot be considered 
 vague or unsettled, because a man may find it 
 difficult to explain the notion fully to himself or 
 to expound it to others in such a way as to prevent 
 cavilling. Virtue is a whole, and no more consists 
 of parts than man's intelligence does, and yet we 
 speak of various intellectual faculties as a conven- 
 ient way of expressing the various powers which 
 
74 THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 man's intellect shows by its works. In the same 
 'way we may speak of various virtues or parts of 
 virtue, in a practical sense, for the purpose of 
 showing what particular virtues we ought to prac- 
 tise in order to the exercise of the whole of virtue, 
 that is, as much as man's nature is capable of. 
 
 The prime principle in man's constitution is 
 social. The next in order is not to yield to the per- 
 suasions of the body, when they are not conformable 
 to the rational principle, which must govern. The 
 third is freedom from error and from deception. 
 "Let then the ruling principle holding fast to 
 these things go straight on and it has what is its 
 own." (vu. 55.) The emperor selects justice as 
 the virtue which is the basis of all the rest (x. 11), 
 and this had been said long before his time. 
 
 It is true that all people have some notion of 
 what is meant by justice as a disposition of the 
 mind, and some notion about acting in conformity 
 to this disposition ; but experience shows that 
 men's notions about justice are as confused as their 
 actions are inconsistent with the true notion of 
 justice. The emperor's notion of justice is clear 
 enough, but not practical enough for all mankind. 
 " Let there be freedom from perturbations with 
 respect to the things which come from the exter- 
 nal cause ; and let there be justice in the things 
 done by virtue of the internal cause, that is, let 
 there be movement and action terminating in this, 
 in social acts, for this is according to thy nature." 
 (ix. 31.) In another place (ix. 1) he says that 
 "he who acts unjustly acts impiously," which fol- 
 
OF ANTONINUS. 75 
 
 lows of course from all that he says in various 
 places. He insists on the practice of truth as a 
 virtue and as a means to virtue, which no doubt 
 it is : for lying even in indifferent things weakens 
 the understanding ; and lying maliciously is as 
 great a moral offence as a man can be guilty of, 
 viewed both as showing an habitual disposition, 
 and viewed with respect to its consequences. He 
 couples the notion of justice with action. A man 
 must not pride himself on having some fine notion 
 of justice in his head, but he must exhibit his 
 justice in act, like St. James's notion of faith. 
 But this is enough. 
 
 The Stoics and Antoninus among them call some 
 things beautiful (koAci) and some ugly (oucrxpu), 
 and as they are beautiful so they are good, and as 
 they are ugly so they are evil or bad. (n. 1.) All 
 these things good and evil are in our power, 
 absolutely some of the stricter Stoics would say ; 
 in a manner only, as those who would not depart 
 altogether from common sense would say ; practi- 
 cally they are to a great degree in the power of 
 some persons and in some circumstances, but in a 
 small degree only in other persons and in other 
 circumstances. The Stoics maintain man's free 
 will as to the things which are in his power ; for 
 as to the things which are out of his power, free 
 will terminating in action is of course excluded 
 by the very terms of the expression. I hardly 
 know if we can discover exactly Antoninus' notion 
 of the free will of man, nor is the question worth 
 the inquiry. "What he does mean and does say is 
 
76 THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 intelligible. All the things which are not in 
 our power (dTrpoatpera) are indifferent : they are 
 neither good nor bad, morally. Such are life, 
 health, wealth, power, disease, poverty and death. 
 Life and death are all men's portion. Health, 
 wealth, power, disease and poverty happen to men 
 indifferently to the good and to the bad ; to those 
 who live according to nature and to those who do 
 not. " Life," says the emperor, " is a warfare and 
 a stranger's sojourn, and after fame is oblivion." 
 (n. 17.) After speaking of those men who have 
 disturbed the world and then died, and of the 
 death of philosophers such as Heraclitus and De- 
 mocritus who was destroyed by lice, and of Soc- 
 rates whom other lice (his enemies) destroyed, he 
 says : " What means all this ? Thou hast embarked, 
 thou hast made the voyage, thou art come to shore ; 
 get out. If indeed to another life, there is no 
 want of gods, not even there. But if to a state 
 without sensation, thou wilt cease to be held by 
 pains and pleasures, and to be a slave to the vessel 
 which is as much inferior as that which serves it 
 is superior : for the one is intelligence and deity ; 
 the other is earth and corruption." (m. 3.) It is 
 not death that a man should fear, but he should 
 fear never beginning to live according to nature, 
 (xn. 1.) Every man should live in such a way 
 as to discharge his duty, and to trouble himself 
 about nothing else. He should live such a life 
 that he shall always be ready for death, and shall 
 depart content when the summons comes. For 
 what is death ? "A cessation of the impressions 
 
OF ANTONINUS. 77 
 
 through the senses, and of the pulling of the strings 
 which move the appetites and of the discursive 
 movements of the thoughts, and of the service to 
 the flesh." (vi. 28.) Death is such as generation 
 is, a mystery of nature, (iv. 5.) In another 
 passage, the exact meaning of which is perhaps 
 doubtful (ix. 3), he speaks of the child which 
 leaves the womb, and so he says the soul at death 
 leaves its envelope. As the child is born or comes 
 into life by leaving the womb, so the soul may on 
 leaving the body pass into another existence which 
 is perfect. I am not sure if this is the emperor's 
 meaning. Butler compares it with a passage in 
 Strabo about the Brahmins' notion of death being 
 the birth into real life and a happy life to those 
 who have philosophized ; and he thinks that An- 
 toninus may allude to this opinion. 16 
 
 Antoninus' opinion of a future life is nowhere 
 clearly expressed. His doctrine of the nature of 
 the soul of necessity implies that it does not perish 
 absolutely, for a portion of the divinity cannot 
 perish. The opinion is at least as old as the time 
 of Epicharmus and Euripides ; what comes from 
 earth goes back to earth, and what comes from 
 heaven, the divinity, returns to him who gave it. 
 But I find nothing clear in Antoninus as to the 
 
 16 Seneca (Ep. 102) has the same, whether an expres- 
 sion of his own opinion, or merely a fine saying of others 
 employed to embellish his writings, I know not.- After 
 speaking of the child being prepared in the womb to live 
 this lite, he adds, " Sic per hoc spatium, quod ab infantia 
 patet in senectutem, in alium naturae sumimur partum. 
 Alia origo nos expectat, alius rerurn status." 
 
78 THE PHILOSOPHY 
 
 notion of the man existing after death so as to be 
 conscious of his sameness with that soul which 
 occupied his vessel of clay. He seems to be 
 perplexed on this matter, and finally to have rested 
 in this, that God or the gods will do whatever is 
 best and consistent with the university of things. 
 
 Nor I think does he speak conclusively on 
 another Stoic doctrine, which some Stoics prac- 
 tised, the anticipating the regular course of nature 
 by a man's own act. The reader will find some 
 passages in which this is touched on, and he may 
 make of them what he can. But there are pas- 
 sages in which the emperor encourages himself to 
 wait for the end patiently and with tranquillity ; 
 and certainly it is consistent with all his best 
 teaching that a man should bear all that falls to 
 his lot and do useful acts as long as he lives. He 
 should not therefore abridge the time of his use- 
 fulness by his own act. Whether he contemplates 
 any possible cases in which a man should die by 
 his own hand, I cannot tell, and the matter is not 
 worth a curious inquiry, for I believe it would not 
 lead to any certain result as to his opinion on this 
 point. I do not think that Antoninus, who never 
 mentions Seneca, though he must have known all 
 about him, would have agreed with Seneca when 
 he gives as a reason for suicide, that the eternal 
 law, whatever he means, has made nothing better 
 for us than this, that it has given us only one way 
 of entering into life and many ways of going out 
 of it. The ways of going out indeed are many, 
 and that is a good reason for a man taking care 
 of himself. 
 
OF ANTONINUS. 7S 
 
 Happiness was not the direct object of a Stoic's 
 life. There is no rule of life contained in the 
 precept that a man should pursue his own hap- 
 piness. Many men think that they are seeking 
 happiness when they are only seeking the gratifi- 
 cation of some particular passion, the strongest 
 that they have. The end of a man is, as already 
 explained, to live conformably to nature, and he 
 will thus obtain happiness, tranquillity of mind and 
 contentment, (in. 12 ; viii. 1, and other places.) 
 As a means of living conformably to nature he 
 must study the four chief virtues, each of which 
 lias its proper sphere : wisdom or the knowledge 
 of good and evil ; justice, or the giving to every 
 man his due ; fortitude, or the enduring of labor 
 and pain ; and temperance, which is moderation 
 in all things. By thus living conformably to 
 nature, the Stoic obtained all that he wished or 
 expected. His reward was in his virtuous life, 
 and he was satisfied with that. Some Greek poet 
 long ago wrote : — 
 
 For virtue only of all human things 
 
 Takes her reward not from the hands of others. 
 
 Virtue herself rewards the toils of virtue. 
 
 Some of the Stoics indeed expressed themselves 
 in very arrogant, absurd terms, about the wise 
 man's self sufficiency ; they elevated him to the 
 rank of a deity. 17 But these were only talkers 
 
 17 J. Smith in his Select Discourses on " the Excellency 
 and Nobleness of true religion " (c. vi.) has remarked on 
 this Stoical arrogance. He finds it in Seneca and others. 
 In Seneca certainly, and perhaps something of it in 
 Epictetus ; but it is not in Antoninus. 
 
80 ANTONINUS. 
 
 and lecturers, such as those in all ages who utter 
 fine words, know little of human affairs, and care 
 only for notoriety. Epictetus and Antoninus both 
 by precept and example labored to improve them- 
 selves and others ; and if we discover imperfec- 
 tions in their teaching, we must still honor these 
 great men who attempted to show that there is in 
 man's nature and in the constitution of things 
 sufficient reason for living a virtuous life. It is 
 difficult enough to live as we ought to live, diffi- 
 cult even for any man to live in such a way as to 
 satisfy himself, if he exercises only in a moderate 
 degree the power of reflecting upon and reviewing 
 Ins own conduct ; and if all men cannot be brought 
 to the same opinions in morals and religion, it is 
 at least worth while to give them good reasons for 
 as much as they can be persuaded to accept. 
 
M. ANTONINUS 
 
 T. 
 
 ROM my grandfather Verus 1 [I 
 learned] good morals and the gov- 
 ernment of my temper. 
 
 2. From the reputation and re- 
 membrance of my father, 2 modesty and a manly 
 character. 
 
 1 Annius Verus was his grandfather's name. There is 
 no verb in this section connected with the word " from," 
 nor in the following sections of this book ; and it is not 
 quite certain what verb should be supplied. What I 
 have added may express the meaning here, though 
 there are sections which it will not fit. If he does not 
 mean to say that he learned all these good things from 
 the several persons whom he mentions, he means that 
 he observed certain good qualities in them, or received 
 certain benefits from them, and it is implied that he was 
 the better for it, or at least might have been ; for it 
 would be a mistake to understand Marcus as saying that 
 he possessed all the virtues which he observed in his 
 kinsmen and teachers. 
 
 2 His father's name was Annius Verus. 
 
82 M. ANTONINUS. I. 
 
 3. From my mother, 3 piety and beneficence, and 
 abstinence, not only from evil deeds, but even 
 from evil thoughts ; and further, simplicity in my 
 way of living, far removed from the habits of the 
 rich. 
 
 4. From my great-grandfather, 4 not to have 
 frequented public schools, and to have had good 
 teachers at home, and to know that on such things 
 a man should spend liberally. 
 
 o. From my governor, to be neither of the 
 green nor of the blue party at the games in the 
 Circus, nor a partisan either of the Parmularius 
 or the Scutarius at the gladiators' fights ; from 
 him too I learned endurance of labor, and to 
 want little, and to work with my own hands, and 
 not to meddle with other people's affairs, and not 
 to be ready to listen to slander. 
 
 6. From Diognetus, not to busy myself about 
 trifling things, and not to give credit to what was 
 said by miracle-workers and jugglers about incan- 
 tations and the driving away of daemons and such 
 things ; and not to breed quails [for fighting], nor 
 to give myself up passionately to such things ; and 
 to endure freedom of speech ; and to have become 
 
 8 His mother was Doraitia Cal villa, named also Lucilla., 
 * Perhaps his mother's grandfather, Catilius Severus. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. I. 83 
 
 intimate with philosophy ; and to have been a 
 hearer, first of Bacchius, then of Tandasis and 
 Marcianus ; and to have written dialogues in my 
 youth ; and to have desired a plank bed and skin, 
 and whatever else of the kind belongs to the Gre- 
 cian discipline. 
 
 7. From Rusticus 5 I received the impression 
 that my character required improvement and dis- 
 cipline ; and from him I learned not to be led 
 astray to sophistic emulation, nor to writing on 
 speculative matters, nor to delivering little horta- 
 tory orations, nor to showing myself off as a man 
 who practises much discipline, or does benevolent 
 acts in order to make a display; and to abstain 
 from rhetoric, and poetry, and fine writing ; and 
 not to walk about in the house in my outdoor 
 dress, nor to do other things of the kind ; and to 
 write my letters with simplicity, like the letter 
 
 5 Q. Junius Rusticus was a Stoic philosopher, whom 
 Antoninus valued highly, and often took his advice. 
 (Capitol. M. Antonin. iii.) 
 
 Antoninus says, role ''E-aLHTTirelotg VKOjivrjfiaauv, which 
 must not be translated, " the writings of Epictetus," for 
 Epictetus wrote nothing. His pupil Arrian, who has 
 preserved for us all that we know of Epictetus, says, 
 ravra eireipa&riv VTZouvTjfxaTa k/xavrC) iia^vka^ai rfjg eiceivov 
 diavoiag. (Ep. ad Gell.) 
 
84 31. ANTONINUS. I. 
 
 which Rusticus wrote from Sinuessa to my moth 
 er ; and with respect to those who have offended 
 me hy words, or done me wrong, to be easily dis- 
 posed to be pacified and reconciled, as soon as they 
 have shown a readiness to be reconciled ; and to 
 read carefully, and not to be satisfied with a su- 
 perficial understanding of a book ; nor hastily to 
 give my assent to those who talk over-much ; and 
 I am indebted to him for being acquainted with 
 the discourses of Epictetus, which he communi- 
 cated to me out of his own collection. 
 
 8. From Apollonius 6 I learned freedom of will 
 and undeviating steadiness of purpose ; and to 
 look to nothing else, not even for a moment, ex- 
 cept to reason ; and to be always the same, in 
 sharp pains, on the occasion of the loss of a child, 
 and in long illness ; and to see clearly in a living 
 example that the same man can be both most res- 
 olute and yielding, and not peevish in giving his 
 instruction ; and to have had before my eyes a 
 man who clearly considered his experience and his 
 skill in expounding philosophical principles as the 
 smallest of his merits ; and from him I learned 
 how to receive from friends what are esteemed 
 
 6 Apollonius of Chalcis came to Rome in the time of 
 Pius to be Marcus' preceptor. He was a rigid Stoic. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. I. 85 
 
 favors, without being either humbled by them or 
 letting them pass unnoticed. 
 
 9. From Sextus, 7 a benevolent disposition, and 
 the example of a family governed in a fatherly man- 
 ner, and the idea of living conformably to nature ; 
 and gravity without affectation, and to look care- 
 fully after the interests of friends, and to tolerate 
 ignorant persons, and those who form opinions 
 without consideration f : he had the power of read- 
 ily accommodating himself to all, so that inter- 
 course with him was more agreeable than any 
 flattery ; and at the same time he was most highly 
 venerated by those who associated with him : and 
 he had the faculty both of discovering and order- 
 ing, in an intelligent and methodical way, the prin- 
 ciples necessary for life ; and he never showed an- 
 ger or any other passion, but w r as entirely free from 
 passion, and also most affectionate ; and he could 
 express approbation without noisy display, and he 
 possessed much knowledge without ostentation. 
 
 10. From Alexander 8 the grammarian, to re- 
 frain from fault-finding, and not in a reproachful 
 
 7 Sextus of Chseronea, a grandson of Plutarch, or 
 nephew, as some say ; but more probably a grandson. 
 
 3 Alexander was a Grammaticus, a native of Phrygia. 
 He wrote a commentary on Homer ; and the rhetorician 
 
86 M. ANTONINUS. I. 
 
 way to chide those who uttered any barbarous or 
 solecistic or strange-sounding expression ; but dex- 
 terously to introduce the very expression which 
 ought to have beep used, and in the way of answer 
 or giving confirmation, or joining in an inquiry 
 about the thing itself, not about the word, or by 
 some other fit suggestion. 
 
 Co 
 
 11. From Fronto 9 I learned to observe what 
 envy, and duplicity, and hypocrisy are in a tyrant, 
 and that generally those among us who are called 
 Patricians are rather deficient in paternal affection. 
 
 12. From Alexander the Platonic, not frequent- 
 ly nor without necessity to say to any one, or to 
 write in a letter, that I have no leisure ; nor con- 
 tinually to excuse the neglect of duties required 
 by our relation to those with whom we live, by 
 alleging urgent occupations. 
 
 13. From Catulus, 10 not to be indifferent when 
 a friend finds fault, even if he should find fault 
 without reason, but to try to restore him to his 
 usual disposition ;' and to be ready to speak well 
 
 Aristides wrote a panegyric on Alexander in a funeral 
 oration. 
 
 9 Cornelius Fronto was a rhetorician, and in great 
 favor with Marcus. There are extant various letters 
 between Marcus and Fronto. 
 
 10 Cinna Catulus, a Stoic philosopher. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. I. 8? 
 
 of teachers, as it is reported of Domitius and 
 Athenodotus ; and to love my children truly. 
 
 14. From my brother 11 Severus, to love my 
 kin, and to love truth, and to love justice ; and 
 through him I learned to know Thrasea, Helvid- 
 ius, Cato, Dion, Brutus ; 12 and from him I receiv- 
 ed the idea of a polity in which there is the same 
 law for all, a polity administered with regard to 
 equal rights and equal freedom of speech, and the 
 idea of a kingly government which respects most 
 of all the freedom of the governed ; I learned from 
 him also f consistency and undeviating steadiness 
 in my regard for philosophy ; and a disposition to 
 do good, and to give to others readily, and to cher- 
 ish good hopes, and to believe that I am loved by 
 my friends ; and in him I observed no conceal- 
 ment of his opinions with respect to those whom 
 
 11 The word brother may not be genuine. Antoninus 
 had no brother. It has been supposed that he may 
 mean some cousin. Schultz omk^ " brother," and says 
 that this Severus is probably Claudius Severus, a peri- 
 patetic. 
 
 12 We know, from Tacitus {Annal. xiii., xvi. 21 ; and 
 other passages), who Thrasea and Helvidius were. Plu- 
 tarch has written the lives of the two Catos, and of 
 Dion and Brutus. Antoninus probably alludes to Cato 
 of Utica, who was a Stoic. 
 
88 M. ANTONINUS. I. 
 
 he condemned, and that his friends had no need 
 to conjecture what he wished or did not wish, 
 but it was quite plain. 
 
 1 5. From Maximus V6 1 learned self-government, 
 and not to be led aside by anything ; and cheer- 
 fulness in all circumstances, as well as in illness ; 
 and a just admixture in the moral character of 
 sweetness and dignity, and to do what was set 
 before me without complaining. I observed that 
 everybody believed that he thought as he spoke, 
 and that in all that he did he never had any bad 
 intention ; and he never showed amazement and 
 surprise, and was never in a hurry, and never put 
 off doing a thing, nor was perplexed nor dejected, 
 nor did he ever laugh to disguise his vexation, nor, 
 on the other hand, was he ever passionate or sus- 
 picious. He was accustomed to do acts of benefi- 
 cence, and was ready to forgive, and was free from 
 all falsehood ; and he presented the appearance 
 of a man who could not be diverted from right 
 rather than of a man who had been improved. I 
 observed, too, that no man could ever think that 
 
 13 Claudius Maximus was a Stoic philosopher, who 
 iras highly esteemed also by Antoninus Pius, Marcus' 
 predecessor. The character of Maximus is that of a 
 perfect man. (See viii. 25.) 
 
M. ANTONINUS. I. 89 
 
 he was despised by Maximus, or ever venture to 
 think himself a better man. He had also the art 
 of being humorous in an agreeable way.f 
 
 16. In my father 14 I observed mildness of 
 temper, and unchangeable resolution in the things 
 which he had determined after due deliberation ; 
 and no vainglory in those things which men call 
 honors ; and a love of labor and perseverance ; 
 and a readiness to listen to those who had any- 
 thing to propose for the common weal ; and un- 
 deviating firmness in giving to every man accord- 
 ing to his deserts ; and a knowledge derived from 
 experience of the occasions for vigorous action and 
 for remission. And I observed that he had overcome 
 all passion for boys ; and he considered himself no 
 more than any other citizen ; and he released his 
 friends from all obligation to sup with him or to 
 attend him of necessity when he went abroad, and 
 those who had failed to accompany him, by reason 
 of any urgent circumstances, always found him the 
 same. I observed too his habit of careful inquiry 
 in all matters of deliberation, and his persistency, 
 and that he never stopped his investigation through 
 being satisfied with appearances which first present 
 
 14 He means his adoptive father, his predecessor, the 
 Emperor Antoninus Pius. 
 
90 M. ANTONINUS. I. 
 
 themselves ; and that his disposition was to keep 
 his friends, and not to be soon tired of them, nor 
 yet to be extravagant in his affection ; and to be 
 satisfied on all occasions, and cheerful ; and to 
 foresee things a long way off, and to provide for the 
 smallest without display ; and to check immediately 
 popular applause and all flattery ; and to be ever 
 watcliful over the things which were necessary for 
 the administration of the empire, and to be a good 
 manager of the expenditure, and patiently to en- 
 dure the blame which he got for such conduct; 
 and he was neither superstitious with respect to 
 the gods, nor did he court men by gifts or by try- 
 ing to please them, or by flattering the populace ; 
 but he showed sobriety in all things and firmness, 
 and never any mean thoughts or action, nor love 
 of novelty. And the things which conduce in any 
 way to the commodity of life, and of which fortune 
 gives an abundant supply, he used without arro- 
 gance and without excusing himself ; so that when 
 he had them, he enjoyed them without affectation, 
 and when he had them not, he did not want them. 
 No one could ever say of him that he was either a 
 sophist or a [home-bred] flippant slave or a pedant ; 
 but every one acknowledged him to be a man ripe, 
 perfect, above flattery, able to manage his own and 
 other men's affairs. Besides this, he honored 
 
M. ANTONINUS. 1. 91 
 
 those who were true philosophers,, and he did not 
 reproach those who pretended to be philosophers, 
 nor yet was he easily led by them. He was also 
 easy in conversation, and he made himself agree- 
 able without any offensive affectation. He took a 
 reasonable care of his body's health, not as one who 
 was greatly attached to life, nor out of regard to 
 personal appearance, nor yet in a careless way, but 
 so that, through his own attention, he very seldom 
 stood in need of the physician's art or of medi- 
 cine or external applications. He was most ready 
 to give way without envy to those who possessed 
 any particular faculty, such as that of eloquence or 
 knowledge of the law or of morals, or of anything 
 else ; and he gave them his help, that each might 
 enjoy reputation according to his deserts ; and he 
 always acted conformably to the institutions of his 
 country, without showing any affectation of doing 
 so. Further, he was not fond of change nor un- 
 steady, but he loved to stay in the same places, and 
 to employ himself about the same things ; and 
 after his paroxysms of headache he came imme- 
 diately fresh and vigorous to his usual occupa- 
 tions. His secrets were not many, but very few 
 and very rare, and these only about public mat- 
 ters ; and he showed prudence and economy in the 
 exhibition of the public spectacles and the con- 
 
92 M. ANTONINUS. I. 
 
 struction of public buildings, his donations to the 
 people, and in such things, for he was a man who 
 looked to what ought to be done, not to the repu- 
 tation which is got by a man's acts. He did not 
 take the bath at unseasonable hours ; he was not 
 fond of building houses, nor curious about what he 
 ate, nor about the texture and color of his clothes, 
 nor about the beauty of his slaves. 15 His dress 
 came from Lorium, his villa on the coast, and from 
 Lanuvium generally. 16 We know how he behaved 
 to the toll-collector in Tusculum who asked his 
 pardon ; and such was all his behavior. There 
 was in him nothing harsh, nor implacable, nor 
 violent, nor, as one may say, anything carried to 
 the sweating point ; but he examined all things 
 severally, as if he had abundance of time, and with- 
 out confusion, in an orderly way, vigorously and 
 consistently. And that might be applied to him 
 which is recorded of Socrates, 17 that he was able 
 both to abstain from, and to enjoy, those things 
 which many are too weak to abstain from, and 
 
 15 This passage is corrupt, and the exact meaning is 
 uncertain. 
 
 1S Lorium was a villa on the coast north of Rome, and 
 there Antoninus was brought up, and he died there. This 
 also is corrupt. 
 
 ^ Xenophon, Memorab. i. 3. 15. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. I. 93 
 
 cannot enjoy without excess. But to be strong 
 enough both to bear the one and to be sober in the 
 other is the mark of a man who has a perfect and 
 invincible soul, such as he showed in the illness 
 of Maximus. 
 
 17. To the gods I am indebted for having good 
 grandfathers, good parents, a good sister, good 
 teachers, good associates, good kinsmen and 
 friends, nearly everything good. Further, I owe 
 it to the gods that I was not hurried into any 
 offence against any of them, though I had a dis- 
 position which, if opportunity had offered, might 
 have led me to do something of this kind ; but, 
 through their favor, there never was such a con- 
 currence of circumstances as put me to the trial. 
 Further, I am thankful to the gods that I was 
 not longer brought up with my grandfather's con- 
 cubine, and that I preserved the flower of my 
 youth, and that I did not make proof of my 
 virility before the proper season, but even de- 
 ferred the time ; that I was subjected to a ruler 
 and a father who was able to take away all pride 
 from me, and to bring me to the knowledge that 
 it is possible for a man to live in a palace without 
 wanting either guards or embroidered dresses, or 
 torches and statues, and such-like show ; but that 
 it is in such a man's power to bring himself very 
 
94 . M. ANTONINUS. I. 
 
 near to the fashion of a private person, without 
 being for this reason either meaner in thought, or 
 more remiss in action, with respect to the things 
 which must be clone for the public interest in a 
 manner that befits a ruler. I thank the gods for 
 giving me such a brother, 18 who was able by his 
 moral character to rouse me to vigilance over 
 myself, and who, at the same time, pleased me by 
 his respect and affection ; that my children have 
 not been stupid nor deformed in body ; that I did 
 not make more proficiency in rhetoric, poetry, and 
 the other studies, -in which I should perhaps have 
 been completely engaged, if I had seen that I was 
 making progress in them ; that I made haste to 
 place those who brought me up in the station of 
 honor, which they seemed to desire, without put- 
 ting them off with hope of my doing it some time 
 after, because they were then still young ; that I 
 knew Apollonius, Rusticus, Maximus ; that I re- 
 ceived clear and frequent impressions about living 
 according to nature, and what kind of a life that 
 is, so that, so far as depended on the gods, and 
 their gifts, and help, and inspirations, nothing hin- 
 dered me from forthwith living according to na- 
 ture, though I still fall short of it through my own 
 
 18 The emptor had no brother, except L. Verus, his 
 brother by adoption. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. I. i?5 
 
 fault, and through not observing the admonitions 
 of the gods, and, I may almost say, their direct 
 instructions ; that my body has held out so long 
 in such a kind of life ; that I never touched either 
 Benedicta or Theodotus, and that, after having 
 fallen into amatory passions, I was cured ; and, 
 though I was often out of humor with Rusticus, I 
 never did anything of which I had occasion to re- 
 pent ; that, though it was my mother's fate to die 
 young, she spent the last years of her life with 
 me ; that, whenever I wished to help any man in 
 his need, or on any other occasion, I was never 
 told that I had not the means of doing it ; and 
 that to myself the same necessity never happened, 
 to receive anything from another ; that I have 
 such a wife, 19 so obedient, and so affectionate, and 
 so simple ; that I had abundance of good masters 
 for my children ; and that remedies have been 
 shown to me by dreams, both others, and against 
 
 bloodspitting and giddiness 20 ; and that, 
 
 when I had an inclination to philosophy, I did not 
 fall into the hands of any sophist, and that I did 
 not waste my time on writers [of histories], or in 
 the resolution of syllogisms, or occupy myself 
 about the investigation of appearances in the 
 
 19 See the Life of Antoninus. 
 
 20 This is corrupt. 
 
96 M. ANTONINUS. I. 
 
 heavens ; for all these things require the help 
 of the gods and fortune. 
 
 Among the Quadi at the Granua. 21 
 
 21 The Quadi lived in the southern part of Bohemia 
 and Moravia; and Antoninus made a campaign against 
 them. (See the Life.) Granua is probably the river 
 Graan, which flows into the Danube. 
 
 If these words are genuine, Antoninus may have writ- 
 ten this first book during the war with the Quadi. In 
 the first edition of Antoninus, and in the older editions, 
 the first three sections of the second book make the con- 
 clusion of the first book. Gataker placed them at the 
 beginning of the second book. 
 
n. 
 
 lEGIN the morning by saying to thy- 
 self, I shall meet with the busybody, 
 the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, 
 envious, unsocial. All these things 
 happen to them by reason of their ignorance of 
 what is good and evil. But I who have seen the 
 nature of the good that it is beautiful, and of 
 the bad that it is ugly, and the nature of him 
 who does wrong, that it is akin to me, not [only] 
 of the same blood or seed, but that it participates 
 in [the same] intelligence and [the same] portion 
 of the divinity, I can neither be injured by any of 
 them, for no one can fix on me what is ugly, nor 
 can I be angry with my kinsman, nor hate him. 
 For we are made for co-operation, like feet, like 
 hands, like eyelids, like the rows of the upper and 
 lower teeth. To act against one another then is 
 contrary to nature ; and it is acting against one 
 another to be vexed and to turn away. 
 
 2. Whatever this is that I am, it is a little flesh 
 r 
 
98 M. ANTONINUS. II. 
 
 and breath, and the ruling part. Throw away thy 
 books ; no longer distract thyself : it is not allowed ; 
 but as if thou wast now dying, despise the flesh : 
 it is blood and bones and a network, a contexture 
 of nerves, veins, and arteries. See the breath also, 
 what kind of a thing it is, air, and not always the 
 same, but every moment sent out and again sucked 
 in. The third then is the ruling part : consider 
 thus : Thou art an old man ; no longer let this be 
 a slave, no longer be pulled by the strings like a 
 puppet to unsocial movements, no longer be either 
 dissatisfied with thy present lot, or shrink from 
 the future. 
 
 3. All that is from the gods is full of providence. 
 That which is from fortune is not separated from 
 nature or without an interweaving and involution 
 with the things which are ordered by providence. 
 From thence all things flow ; and there is besides 
 necessity, and that which is for the advantage of 
 the whole universe, of which thou art a part. 
 But that is good for every part of nature which 
 the nature of the whole brings, and what serves to 
 maintain this nature. Now the universe is pre- 
 served, as by the changes of the elements so by the 
 changes of things compounded. Let these prin- 
 ciples be enough for thee, let them always be 
 fixed opinions. But cast away the thirst after 
 
M. ANTONINUS. II. 99 
 
 books, that thou mayest not die murmuring, but 
 cheerfully, truly, and from thy heart thankful to 
 the gods. 
 
 4. Remember how long thou hast been putting 
 off these things, and how often thou hast received 
 an opportunity from the gods, and yet dost not use 
 it. Thou must now at last perceive of what uni- 
 verse thou art a part, and of what administrator 
 of the universe thy existence is an efflux, and that 
 a limit of time is fixed for thee, which if thou dost 
 not use for clearing away the clouds from thy 
 mind, it will go and thou wilt go, and it will never 
 return. 
 
 5. Every moment think steadily as a Roman 
 and a man, to do what thou hast in hand with 
 perfect and simple dignity, and feeling of affection, 
 and freedom, and justice ; and to give thyself 
 relief from all other thoughts. And thou wilt 
 give thyself relief, if thou doest every act of thy 
 life as if it were the last, laying aside all careless- 
 ness and passionate aversion from the commands 
 of reason, and all hypocrisy, and self-love, and dis- 
 content with the portion which has been given to 
 thee. Thou seest how few the things are, the 
 which if a man lays hold of, he is able to live a 
 life which flows in quiet, and is like the exist- 
 ence of the gods ; for the gods on their part 
 
100 M. ANTONINUS. II. 
 
 will require nothing more from him who observes I 
 these things. 
 
 6. Do wrong to thyself, do wrong to thyself, my 
 soul ; but thou wilt no longer have the opportunity 
 of honoring thyself. Every man's life is sufficient, f 
 But thine is nearly finished, though thy soul rev- 
 erences not itself, but places thy felicity in the 
 souls of others. 
 
 7. Do the things external which fall upon thee 
 distract thee ? Give thyself time to learn some- 
 thing new and good, and cease to be whirled 
 around. But then thou must also avoid being 
 carried about the other way. For those too are 
 triflers who have wearied themselves in life by 
 their activity, and yet have no object to which to 
 direct every movement, and, in a word, all their 
 thoughts. 
 
 8. Through not observing what is in the mind 
 of another a man has seldom been seen to be un- 
 happy ; but those who do not observe the move- 
 ments of their own minds must of necessity be 
 unhappy. 
 
 9. This thou must always bear in mind, what 
 is the nature of the whole, and what is my nature, 
 and how this is related to that, and what kind of 
 a part it is of what kind of a whole ; and that 
 there is no one who hinders thee from always 
 
M. ANTONINUS. II. 101 
 
 doing and saying the things which are according 
 to the nature of which thou art a part. 
 
 10. Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad acts 
 — such a comparison as one would make in accord- 
 ance with the common notions of mankind — says, 
 like a true philosopher, that the offences which are 
 committed through desire are more blamable than 
 those which are committed through anger. For he 
 who is excited by anger seems to turn away from 
 reason with a certain pain and unconscious con- 
 traction ; but he who offends through desire, being 
 overpowered by pleasure, seems to be in a man- 
 ner more intemperate and more womanish in his 
 offences. Rightly then, and in a way worthy of 
 philosophy, he said that the offence which is com- 
 mitted with pleasure is more blamable than that 
 which is committed with pain ; and on the whole 
 the one is more like a person who has been first 
 wronged and through pain is compelled to be 
 angry ; but the other is moved by his own impulse 
 to do wrong, being carried towards doing some- 
 thing by desire. 
 
 11. (Since it is possible that thou mayest depart 
 from life this very moment, regulate every act and 
 thought accordingly.) But to go away from among 
 men, if there are gods, is not a thing to be afraid 
 of, for the gods will not involve thee in evil ; but 
 
102 M. ANTONINUS. II. 
 
 if indeed they do not exist, or if they have no 
 concern about human affairs, what is it to me to 
 live in a universe devoid of gods or devoid of 
 providence ? But in truth they do exist, and they 
 do care for human things, and -they have put all 
 the means in man's power to enable him not to 
 fall into real evils. And as to the rest, if there 
 was anything evil, they would have provided for 
 this also, that it should be altogether in a man's 
 power not to fall into it. Now that which does 
 not make a man worse, how can it make a man's 
 life worse ? But neither through ignorance, nor 
 having the knowledge, but not the power to guard 
 against or correct these things, is it possible that 
 the nature of the universe has overlooked them ; 
 nor is it possible that it has made so great a mis- 
 take, either through want of power or want of 
 skill, that good and evil should happen indiscrim- 
 inately to the good and the bad. But death cer- 
 tainly, and life, honor and dishonor, pain and pleas- 
 ure, all these things equally happen to good men 
 and bad, being things which make us neither bet- 
 ter nor worse. Therefore they are neither good 
 nor evil. 
 
 12. How quickly all things disappear, in the 
 universe ? the bodies themselves, but in time the 
 remembrance of them ; what is the nature of all 
 
M. ANTONINUS. II. 10? 
 
 sensible things, and particularly those which 
 attract with the bait of pleasure or terrify by 
 pain, or are noised abroad by vapory fame ; how 
 worthless, and contemptible, and sordid, and per- 
 ishable, and dead they are — all this it is the 
 part of the intellectual faculty to observe. To 
 observe too who these are whose opinions and 
 voices give reputation; what death is, and the 
 fact that, if a man looks at it in itself, and by 
 the abstractive power of reflection resolves into 
 their parts all the things which present them- 
 selves to the imagination in it, he will then con- 
 sider it to be nothing else than an operation of 
 nature ; and if any one is afraid of an opera- 
 tion of nature, he is a child. This, however, is 
 not only an operation of nature, but it is also a 
 thing which conduces to the purposes of nature. 
 To observe too how man comes near to the deity, 
 and by what part of him, and when this part of 
 man is so disposed.f 
 
 13. Nothing is more Avretched than a man who 
 traverses everything in a round, and pries into the 
 things beneath the earth, as the poet says, and 
 seeks by conjecture what is in the minds of his 
 neighbors, without perceiving that it is sufficient 
 to attend to the daemon within him, and to 
 reverence it sincerely. And reverence of the 
 
104 M. ANTONINUS. II. 
 
 daemon consists in keeping it pure from passion 
 and thoughtlessness, and dissatisfaction with what 
 comes from gods and men. For the things from 
 the gods merit veneration for their excellence ; 
 and the things from men should be clear to us by 
 reason of kinship ; and sometimes even, in a man- 
 ner, they move our pity by reason of men's igno- 
 rance of good and bad ; this defect being not less 
 than that which deprives us of the power of dis 
 tinofuishino- things that are white and black. 
 
 14. Though thou shouldest be going to live 
 three thousand years, and as many times ten 
 thousand years, still remember that no man loses 
 any other life than this which he now lives, nor 
 lives any other than this which he now loses. 
 The longest and shortest are thus brought to 
 the same. For the present is the same to all, 
 though that which is past is not the same ; and 
 so that which is lost appears to be a mere mo- 
 ment. For a man cannot lose either the past 
 or the future : for what a man has not, how can 
 any one take this from him ? These two things 
 then thou must bear in mind ; the one, that all 
 things from eternity are of like forms and come 
 round in a circle, and that it makes no difference 
 whether a man shall see the same things during 
 a hundred years or two hundred, or an infinite 
 
M. ANTONINUS. II. 105 
 
 time ; and the second, that the longest liver and 
 he who will die soonest lose just the same. For 
 the present is the only thing of which a man 
 can be deprived, if it is true that this is the only 
 thing which he has, and that a man cannot lose 
 a thing if he has it not. 
 
 15. Remember that all is opinion. For what 
 was said by the Cynic Monimus is manifest : and 
 manifest too is the use of what was said, if a 
 man receives what may be got out of it as far 
 as it is true. 
 
 1 6. The soul of man does violence to itself, first 
 of all, when it becomes an abscess and. as it were, 
 a tumor on the universe, so far as it can. For to 
 be vexed at anything which happens is a separa- 
 tion of ourselves from nature, in some part of 
 which the natures of all other things are con- 
 tained. In the next place, the soul does vio- 
 lence to itself when it turns away from any man, 
 or even moves towards him with the intention 
 of injuring, such as are the souls of those who 
 are angry. In the third place, the soul does 
 violence to itself when it is overpowered by 
 pleasure or by pain. Fourthly, when it plays 
 a part, and does or says anything insincerely 
 and untruly. Fifthly, when it allows any act 
 of its own and any movement to be without an 
 
106 M. ANTONINUS. I J. 
 
 aim, and does anything thoughtlessly and with- 
 out considering what it is, it being right that 
 even the smallest things be done with reference 
 to an end ; and the end of rational animals is to 
 follow the reason and the law of the most an- 
 cient city and polity. 
 
 17. Of human life the time is a point, and the 
 substance is in a flux, and the perception dull, 
 and the composition of the whole body subject 
 to putrefaction, and the soul a whirl, and for- 
 tune hard to divine, and fame a thing devoid of 
 judgment. And, to say all in a word, everything 
 which belongs to the body is a stream, and what 
 belongs to the soul is a dream and vapor, and life 
 is a warfare and a stranger's sojourn, and after- 
 fame is oblivion. What then is that which is 
 able to conduct a man ? One thing and only 
 one, philosophy. But this consists in keeping 
 the daemon within a man free from violence 
 and unharmed, superior to pains and pleasures, 
 doing nothing without a purpose, nor yet falsely 
 and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of an- 
 other man's doing or not doing anything ; and 
 besides, accepting all that happens, and all that 
 is allotted, as coming from thence, wherever it 
 is, from whence he himself came ; and, finally, 
 waiting for death with a cheerful mind, as be- 
 
M. ANTONINUS. II. 107 
 
 ing nothing else than a dissolution of the ele- ( 
 ments of which every living being is compounded. 
 But if there is no harm to the elements them- 
 selves in each continually changing into another, 
 why should a man have any apprehension about 
 the change and dissolution of all the elements ? 
 For it is according to nature, and nothing is evil 
 which is according to nature. 
 This in Carnuntum. 1 
 
 1 Carnuntum was a town of Pannonia, on the south 
 side of the Danube, about thirtj' miles east of Vindo- 
 bona (Vienna). Orosius (vii. 15.) and Eutropius (viii. 
 13.) say that Antoninus remained three years at Car- 
 nuntum during his war with the Marcomanni. 
 
in. 
 
 IE ought to consider not only that 
 our life is daily wasting away and 
 a smaller part of it is left, but an- 
 other thing also must be taken into 
 the account, that if a man should live longer, 
 it is quite uncertain whether the understanding 
 will still continue sufficient for the comprehension 
 of things, and retain the power of contemplation 
 which strives to acquire the knowledge of the 
 divine and the human. For if he shall begin to 
 fall into dotage, perspiration, and nutrition, and 
 imagination, and appetite, and whatever else 
 there is of the kind, will not fail ; but the 
 power of making use of ourselves, and filling 
 up the measure of our duty, and clearly sepa- 
 rating all appearances, and considering whether 
 a man should now depart from life, and what- 
 ever else of the kind absolutely requires a dis- 
 ciplined reason, all this is already extinguished. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. III. 103 
 
 We must make haste then, not only because we 
 are daily nearer to death, but also because the 
 conception of things and the understanding of 
 them cease first. 
 
 2. We ought to observe also that even the 
 things which follow after the things which are 
 produced according to nature contain something 
 pleasing and attractive. For instance, when 
 bread is baked some parts are split at the sur- 
 face, and these parts which thus open, and have 
 a certain fashion contrary to the purpose of the 
 baker's art, are beautiful in a manner, and in a 
 peculiar way excite a desire for eating. And 
 again, figs, when they are quite ripe, gape open ; 
 and in the ripe olives the very circumstance of 
 their being near to rottenness adds a peculiar 
 beauty to the fruit. And the ears of com bend- 
 ing down, and the lion's eyebrows, and the 
 foam which flows from the mouth of wild boars, 
 and many other things — though they are far 
 from being beautiful, if a man should examine 
 them severally, — still, because they are con- 
 sequent upon the things which are formed by 
 nature, help to adorn them, and they please the 
 mind ; so that if a man should have a feeling 
 and deeper insight with respect to the thing? 
 which are produced in the universe, there is 
 
i 10 M. A N T ON I N U.S. III. 
 
 hardly one of those which follow by way of con- 
 sequence which will not seem to him to be in a 
 manner disposed so as to give pleasure. And so 
 he will see even the real gaping jaws of wild 
 beasts with no less pleasure than those which 
 painters and sculptors show by imitation ; and 
 in an old woman and an old man he will be 
 able to see a certain maturity and comeliness ; 
 and the attractive loveliness of young persons, 
 he will be able to look on with chaste eyes ; 
 and many such things will present themselves, 
 not pleasing to every man, but to him only who 
 has become truly familiar with nature and her 
 works. 
 
 3. Hippocrates after curing many diseases him- 
 self fell sick and died. The Chaldaei foretold 
 the deaths of many, and then fate caught them 
 too. Alexander, and Pompeius, and Caius Cae- 
 sar, after so often completely destroying whole 
 cities, and in battle cutting to pieces many ten 
 thousands of cavalry and infantry, themselves 
 too at last departed from life. Heraclitus, after 
 so many speculations on the conflagration of the 
 universe, was filled with water internally and 
 died smeared all over with mud. And lice de- 
 stroyed Democritus ; and other lice killed Soc- 
 rates. What means all this ? Thou hast em- 
 
M. ANTONINUS. III. Ill 
 
 barked, thou hast made the voyage, thou art come 
 to shore ; get out. If indeed to another life, there 
 is no want of gods, not even there. But if to a 
 state without sensation, thou wilt cease to be 
 held by pains and pleasures, and to be a slave 
 to the vessel, which is as much inferior as that 
 which serves it is superior : f for the one is in- 
 telligence and deity ; the other is earth and cor- 
 ruption. 
 
 4. Do not waste the remainder of thy life in 
 thoughts about others, when thou dost not refer 
 thy thoughts to some object of common utility. 
 For thou losest the opportunity of doing some- 
 thing else when thou hast such thoughts as these. 
 What is such a person doing, and why, and what 
 is he saying, and what is he thinking of, and what 
 is he contriving, and whatever else of the kind 
 makes us wander away from the observation of 
 our own ruling power. We ought then to check 
 in the series of our thoughts everything that is 
 without a purpose and useless, but most of all 
 the overcurious feeling and the malignant ; and 
 a man should use himself to think of those 
 things only about which if one should suddenly 
 ask, What hast thou now in thy thoughts ? with 
 perfect openness thou mightest immediately an- 
 swer, This or That ; so that from thy words it 
 
112 M. ANTONINUS. III. 
 
 should be plain that everything in . thee is sim- 
 ple and benevolent, and such as befits a social 
 animal, and one that cares not for thoughts about 
 pleasure or sensual enjoyments at all, or any ri- 
 valry or envy and suspicion, or anything else for 
 which thou wouldst blush if thou shouldst say 
 that thou hadst it in thy mind. For the man 
 who is such as no longer to delay being among 
 the number of the best, is like a priest and min- 
 ister of the gods, using too the [deity] which is 
 planted within him, which makes the man un- 
 contaminated by pleasure, unharmed by any pain, 
 untouched by any insult, feeling no wrong, a 
 lighter in the noblest fight, one who cannot be 
 overpowered by any passion, dyed deep with jus- 
 tice, accepting with all his soul everything which 
 happens and'is assigned to him as his portion ; 
 and not often, nor yet without great necessity 
 and for the general interest, imagining what an- 
 other says, or does, or thinks. For it is only 
 what belongs to himself that he makes the mat- 
 ter for his activity ; and he constantly thinks of 
 that which is allotted to himself out of the sum 
 total of things, and he makes his own acts fair, 
 and he is persuaded that his own portion is good. 
 For the lot which is assigned to each man is car- 
 ried along with him and carries him along with 
 
M. ANTONINUS. III. 113 
 
 it.f And he remembers also that every rational 
 animal is his kinsman, and that to care for all 
 men is according to man's nature ; and a man 
 should hold on to the opinion not of all, tait of 
 those only who confessedly live according to na- 
 ture. But as to those who live not so, he always 
 bears in mind what kind of men they are both 
 at home and from home, both by night and by 
 day, and what they are, and with what men they 
 live an impure life. Accordingly, he does not 
 value at all the praise which comes from such 
 men, since they are not even satisfied with them- 
 selves. 
 
 5. Labor not unwillingly, nor without regard 
 to the common interest, nor without due consider- 
 ation, nor with distraction ; nor let studied orna- 
 ment set off thy thoughts, and be not either a 
 man of many words, or busy about too many 
 things. And further, let the deity which is in 
 thee be the guardian of a living being, manly 
 and of ripe age, and engaged in matter political, 
 and a Roman, and a ruler, who has taken his 
 post like a man waiting for the signal which 
 summons him from life, and ready to go, hav- 
 ing need neither of oath nor of any man's tes- 
 timony. Be cheerful also, and seek not exter- 
 nal help nor the tranquillity which others give. 
 8 
 
114 M. ANTONINUS. III. 
 
 A man then must stand erect, not be kept erect 
 by others. 
 
 6. If thou findest in human life anything bet- 
 ter than justice, truth, temperance, fortitude, and, 
 in a word, anything better than thy own mind's 
 self-satisfaction in the things which it enables 
 thee to do according to right reason, and in the 
 condition that is assigned to thee without thy 
 own choice ; if, I say, thou seest anything bet- 
 ter than this, turn to it with all thy soul, and 
 enjoy that which thou hast found to be the best. 
 But if nothing appears to be better than the deity 
 which is planted in thee, which has subjected to 
 itself all thy appetites, and carefully examines 
 all the impressions, and, as Socrates said, has 
 detached itself from the persuasions of sense, and 
 has submitted itself to the gods, and cares for 
 mankind ; if thou findest everything else smaller 
 and of less value than this, give place to noth- 
 ing else, for if thou dost once diverge and in- 
 cline to it, thou wilt no longer without distrac- 
 tion be able to give the preference to that good 
 thing which is thy proper possession and thy 
 own ; for it is not right that anything of any 
 other kind, such as praise from the many, or 
 power, or enjoyment of pleasure, should come 
 into competition with that which is rationally 
 
M. A NTO N I N U S .III. 115 
 
 and politically good. All these things, even 
 though they may seem to adapt themselves [to 
 the better things] in a small degree, obtain the 
 superiority all at once, and carry us away. But 
 do thou, I say, simply and freely choose the bet- 
 ter, and hold to it — But that which is useful 
 is the better. — Well then, if it is useful to thee 
 as a rational being, keep to it ; but if it is only 
 useful to thee as an animal, say so, and main- 
 tain thy judgment without arrogance : only take 
 care that thou makest the inquiry by a sure 
 method. 
 
 7. Never value anything as profitable to thy- 
 self which shall compel thee to break thy prom- 
 ise, to lose thy self-respect, to hate any man, to 
 suspect, to curse, to act the hypocrite, to desire 
 anything which needs walls and curtains : for 
 he who has preferred to everything else his 
 own intelligence, and the daemon [within him] 
 and the worship of its excellence, acts no tragic 
 part, does not groan, will not need either solitude 
 or much company ; and, what is chief of all, he 
 will live without either pursuing or flying from 
 [life] ; but whether for a longer or a shorter 
 time he shall have the soul inclosed in the body, 
 he cares not at all: for even if he must depart 
 immediately, he will go as readily as if he were 
 
116 M.ANTONINUS. III. 
 
 going to do anything else which can be done with 
 decency and order ; taking care of this only all 
 through life, that his thoughts turn not away 
 from anything which belongs to an intelligent 
 animal and a member of a civil community. 
 
 8. In the mind of one who is chastened and 
 purified thou wilt find no corrupt matter, nor im 
 purity, nor any sore skinned over. Nor is his 
 life incomplete when fate overtakes him, as one 
 may say of an actor who leaves the stage be- 
 fore ending and finishing the play. Besides, 
 there is in him nothing servile, nor affected, nor 
 too closely bound [to other things], nor yet de- 
 tached [from other things], nothing worthy of 
 blame, nothing which seeks a hiding-place. 
 
 9. Reverence the faculty which produces opin- 
 ion. On this faculty it entirely depends whether 
 there shall exist in thy ruling part any opinion 
 inconsistent with nature and the constitution of 
 the rational animal. And this faculty promises 
 freedom from hasty judgment, and friendship 
 towards men, and obedience to the gods. 
 
 10. Throwing away then all things, hold to 
 these only which are few ; and besides bear in 
 mind that every man lives only this present 
 time, which is an indivisible point, and that all 
 the rest of his life is either past or it is uncer- 
 
M. ANTONINUS. III. 117 
 
 tain. Short then is the time which every man 
 lives, and small the nook of the earth where 
 he lives ; and short too the longest posthumous 
 fame, and even this only continued by a suc- 
 cession of poor human beings, who will very 
 soon die, and who know not even themselves, 
 much less him who died long; a°;o. 
 
 11. To the aids which have been mentioned 
 let this one still be added : — Make for thyself 
 a definition or description of the thing which 
 is presented to thee, so as to see distinctly what 
 kind of a thing it is in its substance, in its nudity, 
 in its complete entirety, and tell thyself its proper 
 name, and the names of the things of which it 
 has been compounded, and into which it will be 
 resolved. For nothing is so productive of eleva- 
 tion of mind as to be able to examine methodi- 
 cally and truly every object which is presented 
 to thee in life, and always to look at things so 
 as to see at the same time what kind of universe 
 this is, and what kind of use everything performs 
 in it, and what value everything has with ref- 
 erence to the whole, and what with reference to 
 man, who is a citizen of the highest city, of 
 which all other cities are like families ; what 
 each thing is, and of what it is composed, and 
 how long it is the nature of this thing to endure 
 
118 M. ANTONINUS. III. 
 
 which now makes an impression on me, and whal 
 virtue I have need of with respect to it, such as 
 gentleness, manliness, truth, fidelity, simplicity 
 contentment, and the rest. Wherefore, on ever) 
 -occasion a man should say : this comes from god 
 and this is according to the apportionment f and 
 spinning of the thread of destiny, and such-like 
 coincidence and chance ; and this is from one 
 of the same stock, and a kinsman and partner, 
 one who knows not however what is according 
 to his nature. But I know ; for this reason I 
 behave towards him according to the natural law 
 of fellowship with benevolence and justice. At 
 the same time however in things indifferent I. 
 attempt to ascertain the . value of each. 
 
 12. If thou workest at that which is before 
 thee, following right reason seriously, vigorously, 
 calmly, without allowing anything else to distract 
 thee, but keeping thy divine part pure, as if thou 
 shouldest be bound to give it back immediately ; 
 if thou holdest to this, expecting nothing, fearing 
 nothing, but satisfied with thy present activity ac- 
 cording to nature, and with heroic truth in every 
 word and sound which thou utterest, thou wilt 
 live happy. And there is no man who is able 
 to prevent this. 
 
 13. As physicians have always their instru- 
 
M. ANTONINUS. III. 119 
 
 raents and knives ready for cases which suddenly 
 require their skill, so do thou have principles 
 ready for the understanding of things divine and 
 human, and for doing everything, even the small- 
 est, with a recollection of the hond which unites 
 the divine and human to one another. For 
 neither wilt thou do anything well which per- 
 tains to man without at the same time having 
 a reference to things divine ; nor the contrary. 
 
 14. No longer wander at hazard ; for neither 
 wilt thou read thy own memoirs, nor the acts 
 of the ancient Romans and Hellenes, and the 
 selections from books which thou wast reserv- 
 ing for thy old age. Hasten then to the end 
 which thou hast before thee, and, throwing 
 away idle hopes, come to thy own aid, if thou 
 carest at all for thyself, while it is in thy power. 
 
 15. They know not how many things are sig- 
 nified by the words stealing, sowing, buying, 
 keeping quiet, seeing what ought to be done ; 
 for this is not done by the eyes, but by another 
 kind of vision. 
 
 1 6. Body, soul, intelligence : to the body be- 
 long sensations, to the soul appetites, to the 
 intelligence principles. To receive the impres- 
 sions of forms by means of appearances belongs 
 even to animals ; to be pulled by the strings of 
 
120 M.ANTONINUS. III. 
 
 desire belongs both to wild beasts and to men 
 who have made themselves mto women, and to a 
 Phalaris and a Nero : and to have the intelli- 
 gence that guides to the things which appear 
 suitable belongs also to those who do not be- 
 lieve in the gods, and who betray their country, 
 and do their impure deeds when they have shut 
 the doors. If then everything else is common 
 to all that I have mentioned, there remains that 
 which is peculiar to the good man, to be pleased 
 and content with what happens, and with the 
 thread which is spun for him ; and not to de- 
 file the divinity which is planted in his breast, 
 nor disturb it by a crowd of images, but to pre- 
 serve it tranquil, following it obediently as a god, 
 neither saying anything contrary to the truth, nor 
 doing anything contrary to justice. And if all 
 men refuse to believe that he lives a simple, 
 modest, and contented life, he is neither angry 
 with any of them, nor does he deviate from the 
 way which leads to the end of life, to which a 
 man ought ■to come pure, tranquil, ready to de- 
 part, and without any compulsion perfectly rec- 
 onciled to his lot. 
 
IV 
 
 ^HAT which rules within, when it is 
 according to nature, is so affected 
 fiJ)^. with respect to the events which 
 happen, that it always easily adapts 
 itself to that which is possible and is presented 
 to it. For it requires no definite material, but 
 it moves towards its purpose, under certain con- 
 ditions however ; and it makes a material for 
 itself out of that which opposes it, as fire lays 
 hold of what falls mto it, by which a small light 
 would have been extinguished : but when the 
 fire is strong, it soon appropriates to itself the 
 matter which is heaped on it, and consumes it, 
 and rises higher by means of this very ma- 
 terial. 
 
 2. Let no act be done without a purpose, nor 
 otherwise than according to the perfect principles 
 of art. 
 
 3. Men seek retreats for themselves, houses in 
 
122- M. ANTONINUS. IV. 
 
 the country, sea-shores, and mountains ; and thou 
 too art wont to desire such things very much. 
 But this is altogether a mark of the most com- 
 mon sort of men, for it is in thy power when- 
 ever thou shalt choose to retire into thyself. 
 For nowhere either with more quiet or more 
 freedom from trouble does a man retire than 
 into his own soul, particularly when he has 
 within him such thoughts that by looking into 
 them he is immediately in perfect tranquillity : 
 and I affirm that tranquillity is nothing else than 
 the good ordering of the mind. Constantly then 
 give to thyself this retreat, and renew thyself; 
 and let thy principles be brief and fundamental, 
 which, as soon as thou shalt recur to them, will 
 be sufficient to cleanse the soul completely, and 
 to send thee back free from all discontent with 
 the things to which thou returnest. For with 
 what art thou discontented ? With the badness 
 of men ? Recall to thy mind this conclusion, 
 that rational animals exist for one another, and 
 that to endure is a part of justice, and that men 
 do wrong involuntarily : and consider how many 
 already, after mutual enmity, suspicion, hatred, 
 and fighting, have been stretched dead, reduced 
 to ashes ; and be quiet at last. — But perhaps 
 thou art dissatisfied with that which is assigned 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IV. 123 
 
 to thee out of the universe. — Recall to thy recol- 
 lection this alternative ; either there is providence 
 or atoms [fortuitous concurrence of things] ; or 
 remember the arguments by which it has been 
 proved that the world is a kind of political com- 
 munity [and be quiet at last]. — But pei'haps 
 corporeal things will still fasten upon thee. — Con- 
 sider then further that the mind mingles not with 
 the breath, whether moving gently or violently, 
 when it has once drawn itself apart and discov- 
 ered its own power, and think also of all that 
 thou hast heard and assented to about pain and 
 pleasure [and be quiet at last]. — But perhaps 
 the desire of the thing called fame will torment 
 thee — See how soon everything is forgotten, 
 and look at the chaos of infinite time on each 
 side of [the present], and the emptiness of ap- 
 plause, and the changeableness and want of judg- 
 ment in those who pretend to give praise, and 
 the narrowness of the space within which it is 
 circumscribed [and be quiet at last]. For the 
 whole earth is a point, and how small a nook 
 in it is this thy dwelling, and how few are there 
 in it, and what kind of people are they who will 
 praise thee. 
 
 This then remains : Remember to retire into 
 this little territory of thy own, and above all do 
 
124 M. ANTONINUS. IV. 
 
 not distract or strain thyself, but be free, and look 
 at things as a man, as a human being, as a citizen, 
 as a mortal. But among the things readiest to 
 thy hand to which thou shalt turn, let there be 
 these, which are two. One is that things do not 
 touch the soul, for they are external and remain 
 immovable ; but our perturbations come only from 
 the opinion which is within. The other is that 
 all these things which thou seest change, immedi- 
 ately and will no longer be ; and constantly bear 
 in mind how many of these changes thou hast 
 already witnessed. The universe is transforma- 
 tion : life is opinion. 
 
 4. If our intellectual part is common, the rea- 
 son also, in respect of which we are rational be- 
 ings, is common : if this is so, common also is the 
 reason which commands us what to do, and what 
 not to do ; if this is so, there is a common law 
 also ; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens ; if this 
 is so, we are members of some political commu- 
 nity ; if this is so, the world is in a manner a state. 
 For of what other common political -community 
 will any one say that the whole human race are 
 members ? And from thence, from this common 
 political community comes also our very intellec- 
 tual faculty and reasoning faculty and our capacity 
 for law ; or whence do they come ? For as my 
 
• M. ANTONINUS. IV. 125 
 
 earthly part is a portion given to me from certain 
 earth, and that which is watery from another ele- 
 ment, and that which is hot and fiery from some 
 peculiar source (for nothing comes out of that 
 which is nothing, as nothing also returns to non- 
 existence), so also the intellectual part comes from 
 some source. 
 
 5. Death is such as generation is, a mystery of 
 nature ; a composition out of the same elements, 
 and a decomposition into the same ; and altogether 
 not a thing of which any man should be ashamed, 
 for it is conformable to [the nature of] a reason- 
 able animal, and not contrary to the reason of our 
 constitution. 
 
 6. It is natural that these things should be 
 done by such persons, it is a matter of neces- 
 sity ; and if a man will not have it so, he will 
 not allow the fig-tree to have juice. But by all 
 means bear this in mind, that within a very 
 short time both thou and he will be dead ; and 
 soon not even your names will be left behind. 
 
 7. Take away thy opinion, and then there 
 is taken away the complaint, " I have been 
 harmed." Take away the complaint, " I have 
 been harmed," and the harm is taken away. 
 
 8. That which does not make a man worse 
 than he was, also does not make his life worse, 
 
i 26 M. A N T A JNUS. I V. 
 
 nor does it harm him either from without or 
 from within. 
 
 9. The nature o'f that which is [universally] 
 useful has been compelled to do this. 
 
 10. Consider that everything which happens, 
 happens justly, and if thou observest carefully, 
 thou wilt find it to be so. I do not say only 
 with respect to the continuity of the series of 
 things, but with respect to what is just, and as if 
 it were done by one who assigns to each thing 
 its value. Observe then as thou hast begun ; 
 and whatever thou doest, do it in conjunction 
 with this, the being good, and in the sense in 
 which a man is properly understood to be good. 
 Keep to this in every action. 
 
 11. Do not have such an opinion of things 
 as he has who does thee wrong, or such as he 
 wishes thee to have, but look at them as they 
 are in truth. 
 
 12. A man should always have these two 
 rules in readiness ; the one, to do only what- 
 ever the reason of the ruling and legislating 
 faculty may suggest for the use of men ; the 
 other, to change thy opinion, if there is any 
 one at hand who sets thee right and moves 
 thee from any opinion. But this change of 
 opinion must proceed only from a certain per- 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IV. 127 
 
 suasion, as of what is just or of common advan- 
 tage, and the like, not because it appears pleas- 
 ant or brings reputation. 
 
 13. Hast thou reason? I have. — Why then 
 dost not thou use it? For if this does its own 
 work, what else dost thou wish? 
 
 14. Thou existest as a part. Thou shalt dis- 
 appear in that which produced thee ; but rather 
 thou shalt be received back into its seminal 
 principle by transmutation. 
 
 15. Many grains of frankincense on the same 
 altar : one falls before, another falls after ; but 
 it makes no difference. 
 
 16. Within ten days thou wilt seem a god to 
 those to whom thou art now a beast and an ape, 
 if thou wilt return to thy principles and the wor- 
 ship of reason. 
 
 17. Do not act as if thou wert going to live 
 ten thousand years. Death hangs over thee. 
 While thou livest, while it is in thy power, be 
 good. 
 
 18. How much trouble he avoids who does not 
 look to see what his neighbor says or does or 
 thinks, but only to what he does himself, that 
 it may be just and pure ; or as Agathon f says, 
 'ook not round at the depraved morals of others, 
 but run straight along the line without deviating 
 from it. 
 
128 M.ANTONINUS. IV. 
 
 19. He who has a vehement desire for posthu- 
 mous fame does not consider that every one of 
 those Avho remember him will himself also die 
 very soon ; then again also they who have suc- 
 ceeded them, until the whole remembrance shall 
 have been extinguished as it is transmitted 
 through men who foolishly admire and perish. 
 But suppose that those who will remember are 
 even immortal, and that the remembrance will 
 be immortal, what then is this to thee ? And I 
 say not what is it to the dead, but what is it to 
 the living. What is praise, except f indeed so 
 far as it has f a certain utility ? For thou now 
 rejectest unseasonably the gift of nature, cling- 
 ing to something else . . . f. 
 
 20. Everything which is in any way beautiful 
 is beautiful in itself, and terminates in itself, not 
 having praise as part of itself. Neither worse 
 then nor better is a thing made by being praised. 
 1 affirm this also of the things which are called 
 beautiful by the vulgar, for example, material 
 things and works of art. That which is really 
 beautiful has no need of anything ; not more 
 than law, not more than truth, not more than 
 benevolence or modesty. Which of these things 
 is beautiful because it is praised, or spoiled by 
 beina: blamed ? Is such a thing; as an emerald 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IV. 129 
 
 raade worse than it was, if it is not praised ? ov 
 gold, ivory, purple, a lyre, a little knife, a flower, 
 a shrub ? 
 
 21. If souls continue to exist, how does the air 
 contain them from eternity ? — But how does the 
 earth contain the bodies of those who have been 
 buried from time so remote ? For as here the 
 mutation of these bodies after a certain continu- 
 ance, whatever it may be, and their dissolution 
 make room for other dead bodies ; so the souls 
 which are removed into the air after subsisting 
 for some time are transmuted, and diffused, and 
 assume a fiery nature by being received into the 
 seminal intelligence of the universe, and in this 
 way make room for the fresh souls which come 
 to dwell there. And this is the answer which a 
 man might give on the hypothesis of souls continu- 
 ing to exist. But we must not only think of the 
 number of bodies which are thus buried, but also 
 of the number of animals which are daily eaten 
 by us and the other animals. For what a number 
 is consumed, and thus .in a manner buried in the 
 bodies of those who feed on them ? And never- 
 theless this earth receives them by reason of the 
 changes [of these bodies] into blood, and the 
 transformations into the aerial or the fiery element. 
 
 What is the investigation into the truth in this 
 
130 M. ANTONINUS 1 V. 
 
 matter? The division into that which is material 
 and that which is the cause of form [the formal] 
 (vn. 29.) 
 
 22. Do not be whirled about, but in every 
 movement have respect to justice, and on the oc- 
 casion of every impression maintain the faculty 
 of comprehension [or understanding]. 
 
 28. Everything harmonizes with me, which is 
 harmonious to thee, Universe. Nothing for 
 me is too early nor too late, which is in clue time 
 for thee. Everything is fruit to me "which thy 
 seasons bring, Nature : from thee are all things, 
 in thee are all things, to thee all things return. 
 The poet says, Dear city of Cecrops ; and wilt not 
 thou say, Dear city of Zeus ? 
 
 24. Occupy thyself with few things, says the 
 philosopher, if thou wouldst be tranquil. — But 
 consider if it would not be better to say, Do what 
 is necessary, and whatever the reason of the 
 animal which is naturally social requires, and as 
 it requires. For this brings not only the tran- 
 quillity which comes from doing well, but also that 
 which comes from doing few things. For the 
 greatest part of what we say and do being un- 
 necessary, if a man takes this away, he will have 
 more leisure and less uneasiness. Accordingly 
 on every occasion a man should ask himself, la 
 
M. A N T XIX US. IV. 131 
 
 this one of the unnecessary things ? Now a man 
 should take away not only unnecessary acts, but 
 also unnecessary thoughts, for thus superfluous acts 
 will not follow after. 
 
 25. Try how the life of the good man suits 
 thee, the life of him who is satisfied with his por- 
 tion out of the whole, and satisfied with his own 
 just acts and benevolent disposition. 
 
 26. Hast thou seen those things? Look also 
 at these. Do not disturb thyself. Make thyself 
 all simplicity. Does any one do wrong ? It is to 
 himself that he does the wrong. Has anything 
 happened to thee ? Well ; out of the universe 
 from the beginning everything which happens has 
 been apportioned and spun out to thee. In a 
 word, thy life is short. Thou must turn to profit 
 the present by the aid of reason and justice. Be 
 sober in thy relaxation. 
 
 27. Either it is a well arranged universe x or a 
 chaos huddled together, but still a universe. But 
 can a certain order subsist in thee, and disorder 
 in the All ? And this too when all things are so 
 separated and diffused and sympathetic. 
 
 28. A black character, a womanish character, 
 
 1 Antoninus here uses the word noo/iog both in the 
 sense of the Universe and of Order ; and it is difficult 
 to express his meaning. 
 
132 M. ANTONINUS. I V. 
 
 a stubborn character, bestial, childish, animal, 
 stupid, counterfeit, scurrilous, fraudulent, tyran- 
 nical. 
 
 29. If he is a stranger to the universe who 
 does not know what is in it, no less is he a 
 stranger who does not know what is going on 
 in it. He is a runaway, who flies from social 
 reason ; he is blind, who shuts the eyes of the 
 understanding ; he is poor, who has need of an- 
 other, and has not from himself all things which 
 are useful for life. He is an abscess on the 
 universe who withdraws and separates himself 
 from the reason of our common nature through 
 being displeased with the things which happen, 
 for the same nature produces this, and has pro- 
 duced thee too : he is a piece rent asunder from 
 the state, who tears his own soul from that of 
 reasonable animals, which is one. 
 
 30. The one is a philosopher without a tunic, 
 and the other without a book : here is another 
 half naked : Bread I have not, he says, and I 
 abide by reason — And I do not get the means 
 of living out of my learning,! and I abide [by 
 my reason]. 
 
 31. Love the art, poor as it may be, which 
 thou hast learned, and be content with it ; and 
 pass through the rest, of life like one who has in- 
 
M . ANT N IN US. IV. 133 
 
 trusted to the gods with his whole soul all that he 
 has, making thyself neither the tyrant nor the 
 slave of any man. 
 
 32. Consider, for example, the times of Ves- 
 pasian. Thou wilt see all these things, people 
 marrying, bringing up children, sick, dying, war- 
 ring, feasting, trafficking, cultivating the ground, 
 flattering, obstinately arrogant, suspecting, plot- 
 ting, wishing; for some to die, grumbling about the 
 present, loving, heaping up treasure, desiring con- 
 sulship, kingly power. Well then, that life of 
 these people no longer exists at all. Again, re- 
 move to the times of Trajan. Again, all is the 
 same. Their life too is gone. In like manner 
 view also the other epochs of time and of whole 
 nations, and see how many after great efforts soon 
 fell and were resolved into the elements. But 
 chiefly thou shouldst think of those whom thou 
 hast thyself known distracting themselves about 
 idle things, neglecting to do what was in accord- 
 ance with their proper constitution, and to hold 
 firmly to this and to be content with it. And 
 herein it is necessary to remember that the atten- 
 tion given to everything has its proper value and 
 proportion. For thus thou wilt not be dissatisfied, 
 if thou appliest thyself to smaller matters no 
 further than is fit. 
 
134 M. ANTONINUS. IV. 
 
 33. The words which were formerly familiar 
 are now antiquated : so also the names of those 
 who were famed of old, are now in a manner 
 antiquated, Camillus, Caeso, Volesus, Leonnatus, 
 and a little after also Scipio and Cato, then 
 Augustus, then also Hadrianus and Antoninus. 
 For all things soon pass away and become a mere 
 tale, and complete oblivion soon buries them. 
 And I say this of those who have shone in a won- 
 drous way. For the rest, as soon as they have 
 breathed out their breath, they are gone, and no 
 man speaks of them. And, to conclude the mat- 
 ter, what is even an eternal remembrance ? A 
 mere nothing. What then is that about which 
 we ought to employ our serious pains ? This 
 one thing, thoughts just, and acts social, and words 
 which never lie, and a disposition which gladly 
 accepts all that happens, as necessary, as usual, as 
 flowing from a principle and source of the same 
 kind. 
 
 34. Willingly give thyself up to Clotho [one 
 of the fates}, allowing her to spin thy thread t 
 into whatever things she pleases. 
 
 35. Everything is only for a day, both that 
 which remembers and that which is remembered. 
 
 36. Observe constantly that all things take 
 place by change, and accustom thyself to consider 
 
M. ANTONINUS IV. 135 
 
 that the nature of the Universe loves nothing so 
 much as to change the things which are and to 
 make new things like them. For everything that 
 exists is in a manner the seed of that which will 
 be. But thou art thinking only of seeds which 
 are cast into the earth or into a womb : but this 
 is a very vulgar notion. 
 
 37. Thou wilt soon die, and thou art not ye,t 
 simple, nor free from perturbations, nor without 
 suspicion of being hurt by external things, nor 
 kindly disposed towards all ; nor dost thou yet 
 place wisdom only in acting justly. 
 
 38. Examine men's ruling principles, even 
 those of the wise, what kind of things they avoid, 
 and what kind they pursue. 
 
 39. What is evil to thee does not subsist in 
 the ruling principle of another ; nor yet in any 
 turning and mutation of thy corporeal covering. 
 Where is it then ? It is in that part of thee in 
 which subsists the power of forming opinions 
 about evils. Let this power then not form [such] 
 opinions, and all is well. And if that which is 
 nearest to it, the poor body, is cut, burnt, filled 
 with matter and rottenness, nevertheless let the 
 part which forms opinions about these things be 
 quiet, that is, let it judge that nothing is either 
 bad or good which can happen equally to the bad 
 
136 M. ANTONINUS. IV. 
 
 man and the good. For that which happens 
 equally to him who lives contrary to nature and 
 to him who lives according to nature, is neither 
 according to nature nor contrary to nature. 
 
 40. Constantly regard the universe as one liv- 
 ing being, having one substance and one soul ; 
 and observe how all things have reference to one 
 perception, the perception of this one living being ; 
 and how all things act with one movement ; and 
 how all things are the co-operating causes of all 
 things which exist ; observe too the continuous 
 spinning of the thread and the contexture of the 
 web. 
 
 41. Thou art a little soul bearing about a 
 corpse, as Epictetus used to say. 
 
 42. It is no evil for things to undergo change, 
 and no good for things to subsist in consequence 
 of change. 
 
 43. Time is like a river made up of the events 
 which happen, and a violent stream ; for as soon 
 as a thing has been seen, it is carried away, and 
 another comes in its place, and this will be car- 
 ried away too. 
 
 44. Everything which happens is as familiar 
 and well known as the rose in spring and the 
 fruit in summer ; for such is disease, and death, 
 and calumny, and treachery, and whatever else 
 delights fools or vexes them. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. TV. 137 
 
 45. In the series of things those which follow 
 are always aptly fitted to those which have gone 
 before ; for this series is not like a mere enumera- 
 tion of disjointed things, which has only a neces- 
 sary sequence, but it is a rational connection : and 
 as all existing things are arranged together har- 
 moniously, so the things which come into existence 
 exhibit no mere succession, but a certain wonder- 
 ful relationship, (vi. 38. vn. 9.) 
 
 46. Always remember the saying of Heraclitus, 
 that the death of earth is to become water, and 
 the death of water is to become air, and the death 
 of air is to become fire, and reversely. And think 
 too of him who forgets whither the way leads, and 
 that men quarrel with that with which they are 
 most constantly in communion, the reason which 
 governs the universe ; and the things which they 
 daily meet with seem to them strange : and con- 
 sider that we ought not to act and speak as if we 
 were asleep, for even in sleep we seem to act and 
 speak ; and that f we ought not, like children who 
 learn from their parents, simply to act and speak 
 as we have been taught, f 
 
 47. If any god told thee that thou shalt die 
 to-morrow or certainly on the day after to-morrow, 
 thou wouldst not care much whether it was on the 
 third day or on the morrow, unless thou wast in 
 
138 M. ANTONINUS. IV. 
 
 the highest degree mean-spirited, — for how small 
 is the difference ? — so think it no great thing to 
 die after as many years as thou canst name rather 
 than to-morrow. 
 
 48. Think continually how many physicians are 
 dead after often contracting their eyebrows over 
 the sick ; and how many astrologers after predict- 
 ing with great pretensions the deaths of others ; 
 and how many philosophers after endless dis- 
 courses on death or immortality ; how many heroes 
 after killing thousands ; and how many tyrants 
 who have used their power over men's lives with 
 terrible insolence as if they were immortal ; and 
 how many cities are entirely dead, so to speak, 
 Helice and Pompeii and Herclanum, and others 
 innumerable. Add to the reckoning all whom 
 thou hast known, one after another. One man 
 after burying another has been laid out dead, and 
 another buries him ; and all this in a short time. 
 To conclude, always observe how ephemeral an 
 worthless human things are, and what was yester 
 day a little mucus, to-morrow will be a mummy 
 or ashes. Pass then through this little space of 
 time conformably to nature, and end thy journey 
 in content, just as an olive falls off when it is ripe, 
 blessing nature who produced it, and thanking the 
 tree on which it grew. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IV. 139 
 
 49. Be like the promontory against which the 
 waves continually break, but it stands firm and 
 tames the fury of the water around it. 
 
 Unhappy am I, because this has happened to 
 me — Not so, but Happy am I, though this has 
 happened to me, because I continue free from 
 pain, neither crushed by the present nor fearing 
 the future. For such a thing as this might have 
 happened to every man ; but every man would 
 not have continued free from pain on such an 
 occasion. Why then is that rather a misfortune 
 than this a good fortune ? And dost thou in all 
 cases call that a man's misfortune, which is not a 
 deviation from man's nature ? And does a thing 
 seem to thee to be a deviation from man's nature, 
 when it is not contrary to the Avill of man's 
 nature ? Well, thou knowest the will of nature. 
 Will then this which has happened prevent thee 
 from being just, magnanimous, temperate, prudent, 
 secure against inconsiderate opinions and false- 
 hood ; will it prevent thee from having modesty, 
 freedom, and everything else, by the presence of 
 which man's nature obtains all that is its own ? 
 Remember too on every occasion which leads thee 
 to vexation to apply this principle : that this is not 
 a misfortune, but that to bear it nobly is good 
 fortune. 
 
140 M. ANTONINUS. IV. 
 
 50. It is a vulgar, but still a useful help towards 
 contempt of death, to pass in review those who 
 have tenaciously stuck to life. What more then 
 have they gained than those who have died early ? 
 Certainly they lie in their tombs somewhere at 
 last, Cadicianus, Fabius, Julianus, Lepidus, or 
 any one else like them, who have carried out many 
 to be buried and then were carried out them- 
 selves. Altogether the interval is small [between 
 birth and death] ; and consider with how much 
 trouble, and in company with what sort of people 
 and in what a feeble body this interval is labo- 
 riously passed. Do not then consider life a thing 
 of any value.f For look to the immensity of 
 time behind thee, and to the time which is before 
 thee, another boundless space. In this infinity 
 then what is the difference between him who 
 lives three days and him who lives three genera- 
 tions ? 2 
 
 51. Always run to the short way ; and the short 
 
 2 An allusion to Homer's Nestor who was living at the 
 war of Troy among the third generation, like old Parr 
 with his hundred and fifty two years, and some others in 
 modern times who have beaten Parr by twenty or thirty 
 years ; and yet they died at last. The word is TpLyeprjviov 
 in Antoninus. Nestor is named rpiyepuv by some writers ; 
 but here perhaps there is an allusion to Homer's Tepfjvios 
 Innora Nearup. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IV. 141 
 
 way is the natural : accordingly say and do every- 
 thing in conformity with the soundest reason. 
 For such a purpose frees a man from trouble,! 
 and warfare, and all artifice and ostentatious 
 display. 
 
V. 
 
 ,N the morning when thou risest un- 
 willingly, let this thought be pres- 
 ent — I am rising to the work of a 
 human being. Why then am I dis- 
 satisfied if I am going to do the things for which 
 I exist and for which I was brought into the 
 world ? Or have I been made for this, to lie in 
 the bedclothes and keep myself warm ? — But 
 this is more pleasant — Dost thou exist then to 
 take thy pleasure, and not at all for action or 
 exertion ? Dost thou not see the little plants, the 
 little birds, the ants, the spiders, the bees working 
 together to put in order their several parts of 
 the universe ? And art thou unwilling to do the 
 work of a human being, and dost thou not make 
 haste to do that which is according to thy nature ? 
 — But it is necessary to take rest also — It is 
 necessary : however nature has fixed bounds to 
 this too : she has fixed bounds both to eating and 
 
M. ANTONINUS. V. 143 
 
 drinking, and yet thou goest beyond these bounds, 
 beyond what is sufficient ; yet in thy acts it is not 
 so, but thou stoppest short of what thou canst do. 
 So thou lovest not thyself, for if thou didst, thou 
 wouldst love thy nature and her will. But those 
 who love their several arts exhaust themselves in 
 working at them, unwashed and without food ; but 
 thou valuest thy own nature less than the turner 
 values the turning art, or the dancer the dancing 
 art, or the lover of money values his money, or 
 the vainglorious man his little glory. And such 
 men, when they have a violent affection to a thing, 
 choose neither to eat nor to sleep rather than to 
 perfect the things which they care for. But are 
 the acts which concern society more vile in thy 
 eyes and less worthy of thy labor ? 
 
 2. How easy it is to repel and to wipe away 
 every impression which is troublesome or unsuit- 
 able, and immediately to be in all tranquillity. 
 
 3. Judge every word and deed which is accord- 
 ing to nature to be fit for thee ; and be not diverted 
 by the blame which follows from any people nor 
 by their words, but if a thing is good to be done 
 or said, do not consider it unworthy of thee. For 
 those persons have their peculiar leading principle 
 and follow their peculiar movement ; which things 
 do not thou regard, but go straight on, following 
 
144 M. ANTONINUS. V. 
 
 thy own nature and the common nature ; and the 
 way of both is one. 
 
 4. I go through the things which happen ac- 
 cording to nature until I shall fall and rest, 
 breathing out my breath into that element out of 
 which I daily draw it in, and falling upon that 
 earth out of which my father collected the. seed, 
 and my mother the blood, and my nurse the milk ; 
 out of which during so many years I have been 
 supplied with food and drink ; which bears me 
 when I tread on it and abuse it for so many pur- 
 poses. 
 
 5. Thou sayest, Men cannot admire the sharp- 
 ness of thy wits — Be it so ; but there are many 
 other things of which thou canst not say, I am not 
 formed for them by nature. Show those qualities 
 then which are altogether in thy power, sincerity, 
 gravity, endurance of labor, aversion to pleasure, 
 contentment with thy portion and with few things, 
 benevolence, frankness, no love of superfluity, 
 freedom from trifling, magnanimity. Dost thou 
 not see how many qualities thou art immediately 
 able to exhibit, in which there is no excuse of nat- 
 ural incapacity and unfitness, and yet thou still 
 remainest voluntarily below the mark ? or art thou 
 compelled through being defectively furnished by 
 nature to murmur, and to-be stingy, and to flatter, 
 
M. ANTO N 1 N U S . V. 145 
 
 and to find fault with thy poor body, and to try 
 to please men, and to make great display, and to 
 be so restless in thy mind ? No by the gods : but 
 thou mightest have been delivered from these 
 things long ago. Only if in truth thou canst be 
 charged with being rather slow and dull of com- 
 prehension, thou must exert thyself about this 
 also, not neglecting it nor yet taking pleasure in 
 thy dulness. 
 
 6. One man, when he has done a service to 
 another, is ready to set it down to his account as 
 a favor conferred. Another is not ready to do 
 this, but still in his own mind he thinks of the 
 man as his debtor, and he knows what he has 
 done. A third in a manner does not even know 
 what he has done, but he is like a vine which has 
 produced grapes, and seeks for nothing more after 
 it has once produced its proper fruit. As a horse 
 when he has run, a dog when he has tracked the 
 game, a bee when it has made the honey, so a man 
 when he has done a good act, does not call out for 
 others to come and see, but he goes on to another 
 act, as a vine goes on to produce again the grapes 
 in season — Must a man then be one of these, 
 who in a manner act thus without observing it ? — 
 Yes — But this very thing is necessary, the ob- 
 servation of what a man is doing : for, it may be 
 10 
 
146 M. ANTONINUS. V. 
 
 said, it is characteristic of the social animal to 
 perceive that he is working in a social manner, 
 and indeed to wish that his social partner also 
 should perceive it — It is true what thou sayest, 
 but thou dost not rightly understand what is now 
 said : and for this reason thou wilt become one of 
 those of whom I spoke before, for even they are 
 misled by a certain show of reason. But if thou 
 wilt choose to understand the meaning of what is 
 said, do not fear that for this reason thou wilt 
 omit any social act. 
 
 7. A prayer of the Athenians : Rain, rain, 
 dear Zeus, down on the ploughed fields of the 
 Athenians and on the plains. — In truth we ought 
 not to pray at all, or we ought to pray in this sim- 
 ple and noble fashion. 
 
 8. Just as we must understand when it is said, 
 That Aesculapius prescribed to this man horse-" 
 exercise, or bathing in cold water or going with- 
 out shoes ; so we must understand it when it is 
 said, That the nature of the universe prescribed 
 to this man disease or mutilation or loss or any- 
 thing else of the kind. For in the first case Pre- 
 scribed means something like this : he prescribed 
 this for this man as a thing adapted to procure 
 health ; and in the second case it means, That 
 
M. ANTONINUS. V. 147 
 
 which happens ] to [or, suits] every man is fixed 
 in a manner for him suitably to his destiny. For 
 this is what we mean when we say that things are 
 suitable to us, as the workmen say of squared 
 stones in walls or the pyramids, that they are 
 suitable, when they fit them to one another in 
 some kind of connection. For there is altogether 
 one fitness [or, harmony]. And as the universe 
 is made up out of all bodies to be such a body as 
 it is, so out of all existing causes necessity [des- 
 tiny] is made up to be such a cause as it is. And 
 even those who are completely ignorant under- 
 stand what I mean, for they say, It [necessity, 
 destiny] brought this to such a person. — This 
 then was brought and this was prescribed to 
 him. Let us then receive these things, as well as 
 those which Aesculapius prescribes. Many as a 
 matter of course even among his prescriptions are 
 disagreeable, but we accept them in the hope of 
 health. Let the perfecting and accomplishment 
 of the things which the common nature judges tc 
 be good, be judged by thee to be of the same kind 
 as thy health. And so accept everything which 
 happens, even if it seem disagreeable, because it 
 'eads to this, to the health of the universe and to 
 
 1 In this section there is a play on the meaning of 
 <Tuu8alveiv. 
 
148 M. ANTONINUS. V. 
 
 the prosperity and felicity of Zeus [the universe]. 
 For he would not have brought on any man what 
 lie has brought, if it were not useful for the 
 whole. Neither does the nature of anything, 
 whatever it may be, cause anything which is not 
 suitable to that which is directed by it. For two 
 reasons then it is right to be content with that 
 which happens to thee ; the one, because it was 
 done for thee and prescribed for thee, and in a 
 manner had reference to thee, originally from the 
 most ancient causes spun with thy destiny ; and 
 the other, because even, that which comes sever- 
 ally to every man is to the power which adminis- 
 ters the universe a cause of felicity and perfection, 
 aay even of its very continuance. For the in- 
 tegrity of the whole is mutilated, if thou cuttest 
 off anything whatever from the conjunction and 
 the continuity either of the parts or of the causes. 
 And thou dost cut off, as far as it is in thy power, 
 when thou art dissatisfied, and in a manner triest 
 to put anything out of the way. 
 
 9. Be not disgusted, nor discouraged, nor dis- 
 satisfied, if thou dost not succeed in doing every- 
 thing according to right principles ; but when thou 
 hast failed, return back again, and be content if 
 the greater part of what thou doest is consistent 
 with man's nature, and love this to which thou re- 
 
M. ANTONINUS. V. 149 
 
 turnest ; and do not return to philosophy as if she 
 were a master, but act like those who have sore 
 eyes and apply a bit of sponge and egg, or as 
 another applies a plaister, or drenching with water. 
 For thus thou wilt not fail to f obey reason, and 
 thou wilt repose in it. And remember that phi- 
 losophy requires only the things which thy nature 
 requires ; but thou wouldst have something else 
 which is not according to nature — It may be ob- 
 jected, Why what is more agreeable than this 
 [which I am doing] ? — But is not this the very 
 reason why pleasure deceives us ? And consider 
 if magnanimity, freedom, simplicity, aequanimity. 
 piety, are not more agreeable. For what is more 
 agreeable than wisdom itself, when thou thinkest 
 of the security and the happy course of all things 
 which depend on the faculty of understanding 
 and knowledge ? 
 
 10. Things are in such a kind of envelopement 
 that they have seemed to philosophers, not a few 
 nor those common philosophers, altogether unin- 
 telligible ; nay even to the Stoics themselves they 
 seem difficult to understand. And all our assent 
 is changeable ; for where is the man who never 
 changes ? Carry thy thoughts then to the objects 
 themselves, and consider how short-lived they are 
 and worthless, and that they may be in the pos- 
 
150 M. ANTONINUS. V. 
 
 session of a filthy wretch or a whore or a robber 
 Then turn to the morals of those who live with 
 thee, and it is hardly possible to endure even the 
 most agreeable of them, to say nothing of a man 
 being hardly able to endure himself. In such 
 darkness then and dirt and in so constant a flux 
 both of substance and of time, and of motion and 
 of things moved, what there is worth being highly 
 prized or even an object of serious pursuit, I can- 
 not imagine. But on the contrary it is a man's 
 duty to comfort himself, and to wait for the 
 natural dissolution and not to be vexed at the 
 delay, but to rest in these principles only : the one, 
 that nothing will happen to me which is not con- 
 formable to the nature of the universe ; and the 
 other, that it is in my power never to act contrary 
 to my god and daemon : for there is no man who 
 will compel me to this. 
 
 11. About what am I now employing my own 
 soul ? On every occasion I must ask myself this 
 question, and inquire, what have I now in this 
 part of me which they call the ruling principle ? 
 and whose soul have I now ? that of a child, or of 
 a young man, or of a feeble woman, or of a tyrant, 
 or of a domestic animal, or of a wild beast ? 
 
 12. What kind of things those are which ap- 
 pear good to the many, we may learn from this. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. V. 151 
 
 For if any man should conceive certain things as 
 being really good, such as prudence, temperance, 
 justice, fortitude, he would not after having first 
 conceived these endure to listen to anything f 
 which should not be in harmony with what is 
 really good.f But if a man has first conceived 
 as good the things which appear to the many to 
 be good, he will listen and readily receive as very 
 applicable that which was said by the comic 
 writer, f Thus even the many perceive the dif- 
 ference."!" For were it not so, this saying would 
 not offend and would not be rejected [in the first 
 case], while we receive it when it is said of 
 wealth, and of the means which further luxury 
 and fame, as said fitly and wittily. Go on then 
 and ask if we should value and think those things 
 to be good, to which after their first conception in 
 the mind the words of the comic writer might be 
 aptly applied — that he who has them, through 
 pure abundance has not a place to ease himself in. 
 13. I am composed of the formal and the ma- 
 terial ; and neither of them will perish into non- 
 existence, as neither of them came into existence 
 out of non-existence. Every part of me then 
 will be reduced by change into some part of the 
 universe, and that again will change into another 
 part of the universe and so on for ever. And by 
 
152 M. ANTONINUSi V. 
 
 consequence of such a change I too exist, and 
 those who begot me, and so on for ever in the 
 other direction. For nothing hinders us from 
 saying so, even if the universe is administered 
 according to definite periods [of revolution]. 
 
 14. Reason and the reasoning art [philosophy] 
 are powers which are sufficient for themselves and 
 for their own works. They move then from a 
 first principle which is their own, and they make 
 their way to the end which is proposed to them ; 
 find this is the reason why such acts are named 
 Catorthoseis or right ac ts, which word signifies 
 that they proceed by the right road. 
 
 15. None of these things ought to be called a 
 man's, which do not belong to a man, as man. 
 They are not required of a man, nor does man's 
 nature promise them, nor are they the means of 
 man's nature attaining its end. Neither then 
 does the end of man lie in these things, nor yet 
 that which aids to the accomplishment of this end, 
 and that which aids towards this end is that 
 which is good. Besides, if any of these things 
 did belong to man, it would not be right for a 
 man to despise them and to set himself against 
 them ; nor would a man be worthy of praise who 
 showed that he did not want these things, nor 
 would he who stinted himself in any of them be 
 
M.ANTONINUS. V. 15S 
 
 good, if indeed these things were good. But now 
 the more of these things a man deprives himself 
 of, or of other things like them, or even when he 
 is deprived of any of them, the more patiently 
 he endures the loss, just in the same degree he is 
 a better man. 
 
 16. Such as are thy habitual thoughts, such 
 also will be the character of thy mind ; for the 
 soul is dyed by the thoughts. Dye it then with a 
 continuous series of such thoughts as these : for 
 instance, that where a man can live, there he can 
 also live well. But he must live in a palace ; 
 — well then, he can also live well in a palace. 
 And again, consider that for whatever purpose 
 each thing has been constituted, for this it has 
 been constituted, and towards this it is carried ; 
 and its end is in that towards which it is carried ; 
 and where the end is, there also is the advantage 
 and the good of each thing. Now the good for 
 the reasonable animal is society ; for that we are 
 made for society has been shown above. Is it not 
 plain that the inferior exist for the sake of the 
 superior ? but the things which have life are 
 superior to those which have not life, and of those 
 which have life the superior are those which have 
 reason. 
 
 17. To seek what is impossible is madness: 
 
154 M.ANTONINUS. V. 
 
 and it is impossible that the bad should not do 
 something of this kind. 
 
 18. Nothing happens to any man which he is 
 not formed by nature to bear. The same things 
 happen to another, and either because he does not 
 see that they have happened or because he would 
 show a great spirit he is firm and remains un- 
 harmed. It is a shame then that ignorance and 
 conceit should be stronger than wisdom. 
 
 19. Things themselves touch not the soul, not 
 in the least degree ; nor have they admission to 
 the soul, nor can they turn or move the soul : but 
 the soul turns and moves itself alone, and what- 
 ever judgments it may think proper to make, such 
 it makes for itself the things which present them- 
 selves to it. 
 
 20. In one respect man is the nearest thing to 
 me, so far as I must do good to men and endure 
 them. But so far as some men make themselves 
 obstacles to my proper acts, man becomes to me 
 one of the things which are indifferent, no less 
 than the sun or wind or a wild beast. Now it is 
 true that these may impede my action, but they 
 are no impediments to my affects and disposition, 
 which have the power of acting conditionally and 
 changing : for the mind converts and changes 
 every hindrance to its activity into an aid ; and sc 
 
M. ANTONINUS. V. 155 
 
 that which is a hindrance is made a furtherance 
 to an act ; and that which is an obstacle on the 
 road helps us on this road. 
 
 21. Reverence that which is best in the uni- 
 verse ; and this is that which makes use of all 
 things g^nd directs all things. And in like manner 
 also reverence that which is best in thyself; and 
 this is of the same kind as that. For in thyself 
 also, that which makes use of everything else, is 
 this, and thy life is directed by this. 
 
 22. That which does no harm to the state, does 
 no harm to the citizen. In the case of every ap- 
 pearance of harm apply this rule: if the state is 
 not harmed by this, neither am I_ harmed. But 
 if the state is harmed, thou must not be angry 
 with him who does harm to the state. Show him 
 where his error is.f 
 
 23. Often think of the rapidity with which 
 things pass by and disappear, both the things 
 which are and the things which are produced. 
 For substance is like a river in a continual flow, 
 and the activities of things are in constant change, 
 and the causes work in infinite varieties ; and 
 there is hardly anything which stands still. And 
 consider this which is near to thee, this boundless 
 abyss of the past and of the future in which all 
 things disappear. How then is he not a fool who 
 
156 M. ANTONINUS. V. 
 
 is puffed up with such things or plagued about 
 them and makes himself miserable ? for they vex 
 him only for a time, and a short time. 
 
 24. Think of the universal substance, of which 
 thou hast a very small portion ; and of universal 
 time, of which a short and indivisible interval has 
 been assigned to thee ; and of that which is fixed 
 by destiny, and how small a part of it thou art. 
 
 25. Does another do me wrong ? Let him look 
 to it. He has his own disposition, his own ac- 
 tivity. I now have what the universal nature 
 wills me to have ; and I do what my nature now 
 wills me to do. 
 
 26. Let the part of thy soul which leads and 
 governs be undisturbed by the movements in the 
 flesh whether of pleasure or of pain ; and let it 
 not unite with them, but let it circumscribe itself 
 and limit those affects to their parts. But when 
 these affects rise up to the mind by virtue of that 
 other sympathy that naturally exists in a body 
 which is all one, then thou must not strive to re- 
 sist the sensation, for it is natural ; but let not the 
 riding part of itself add to the sensation the 
 opinion that it is either good or bad. 
 
 27. Live with the gods. And he does live with 
 the gods who constantly shows to them that his 
 own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned to 
 
M. ANTONINUS. V. 157 
 
 him, and that it does all that the daemon wishes, 
 which Zeus hath given to every man for his 
 guardian and guide, a portion of himself. And 
 this is every man's understanding and reason. 
 
 28. Art thou angry with him whose arm-pits 
 stink ? art thou angry with him whose mouth 
 smell's foul ? What good will this anger do thee ? 
 He has such a mouth, he has such arm-pits : it is 
 necessary that such an emanation must come from 
 such things — But the man has reason, it will be 
 said, and he is able, if he takes pains, to discover 
 wherein he offends — I wish thee well of thy dis- 
 covery. Well then, and thou hast reason : by thy 
 rational faculty stir up his rational faculty ; show 
 him his error, admonish him. For if he listens, 
 thou wilt cure him, and there is no need of anger. 
 [| Neither tragic actor nor whore. t ] 2 
 
 29. As thou intendest to live when thou art 
 gone out, . . so it is in thy power to live here. 
 But if men do not permit thee, then get away out 
 
 2 This is imperfect or corrupt, or both. There is 
 also something wrong or incomplete in the beginning of 
 S. 29, where he says «f k&A&uv §jv dcavorj, which 
 Gataker translates " as if thou wast about to quit life ; " 
 but we cannot translate el-ek&uv in that way. Other 
 translations are not much more satisfactory. I have 
 translated it literally and left it imperfect. 
 
158 M. ANTONINUS. V. 
 
 of life, yet so as if thou wert suffering no harm. 
 The house is smoky, and I quit it. Why dost 
 thou think that this is any trouble ? But so long 
 as nothing of the kind drives me out, I remain, 
 am free, and no man shall hinder me from doing 
 what I choose ; and I choose to do what is ac- 
 cording to the nature of the rational and social 
 animal. 
 
 30. The intelligence of the universe is social. 
 Accordingly it has made the inferior things for 
 the sake of the superior, and it has fitted the su- 
 perior to one another. Thou seest how it has 
 subordinated, co-ordinated and assigned to every- 
 thing its proper portion, and has brought together 
 into concord with one another the things which 
 are the best. 
 
 31. How hast thou behaved hitherto to the 
 gods, thy parents, brethren, children, teachers, to 
 those who looked after thy infancy, to thy friends, 
 kinsfolk, to thy slaves? Consider if thou hast 
 hitherto behaved to all in such a way that this 
 may be said of thee : — 
 
 Never has wronged a man in deed or word. 
 
 And call to recollection both how many things 
 thou hast passed through, and how many things 
 thou hast been able to endure : and that the his- 
 
M-. ANTONINUS. V. 15& 
 
 tory of thy life is now complete and thy service is 
 ended: and how many beautiful things thou hast 
 seen : aud how many pleasures and pains thou 
 hast despised; and how many things called 
 honorable thou hast spurned ; and to how many 
 ill-minded folks thou hast shown a kind disposi- 
 tion. 
 
 32. Why do unskilled and ignorant souls dis- 
 turb him who has skill and knowledge ? What 
 soul then has skill and knowledge ? That which 
 knows beginning and end, and knows the reason 
 which pervades all substance and through all time 
 by fixed periods [revolutions] administers the 
 universe. 
 
 33. Soon, very soon, thou wilt be ashes, or a 
 skeleton, and either a name or not even a name ; 
 but name is sound and echo. And the things 
 which are much valued in life are empty and rot- 
 ten and trifling, and [like] little dogs biting one 
 another, and little children quarrelling, laughing, 
 and then straightway weeping. But fidelity and 
 modesty and justice and truth are fled 
 
 Up to Olympus from the wide-spread earth. 
 
 What then is there which still detains thee here ? 
 if the objects of sense are easily changed and 
 never stand still, and the organs of i erception are 
 
160 M. ANTONINUS. V. 
 
 dull and easily receive false impressions ; and the 
 poor soul itself is an exhalation from blood. But 
 to have good repute amidst such a world as this 
 is an empty thing. Why then dost thou not wait 
 in tranquillity for thy end, whether it is extinction 
 or removal to another state ? And until that time 
 comes, what is sufficient ? Why, what else than 
 to venerate the gods and bless them, and to do 
 good to men, and to practise tolerance and self- 
 restraint ; 3 but as to everything which is beyond 
 the limits of the poor flesh and breath, to remem- 
 ber that this is neither thine nor in thy power. 
 
 34. Thou canst pass thy life in an equable flow 
 of happiness, if thou canst go by the right way, 
 and think and act in the right way. These two 
 things are common both to the soul of god and to 
 the soul of man, and to the soul of every rational 
 being, not to be hindered by another ; and to hold 
 good to consist in the disposition to justice and the 
 practice of it, and in this to let thy desire find its 
 termination. 
 
 35. If this is neither my own badness, nor an 
 effect of my own badness, and the common weal is 
 
 3 This is the Stoic precept avexov ml anexov. The 
 first part teaches us to he content with men and things 
 as they are. The second part teaches us the virtue of 
 self-restraint, or the government of our passions. 
 
M . A NT ONI N US. V. 16? 
 
 not injured, why am I troubled about it ? and 
 what is the harm to the common weal ? 
 
 36. Do not be carried along inconsiderately by 
 the appearance of things, but give help [to all] 
 according to thy ability and their fitness ; and if 
 they should have sustained loss in matters which 
 are indifferent, do not imagine this to be a damage. 
 For it is a bad habit. But as the old man when 
 he went away asked back his foster-child's top, 
 remembering that it was a top, so do thou in this 
 case also. 
 
 When thou art calling out on the Rostra, hast 
 thou forgotten, man, what these things are ? — 
 Yes ; but they are objects of great concern to 
 these people — Wilt thou too then be made a fool 
 for these things ? — I was once a fortunate man, 
 but I lost it, I know not how. — But fortunate 
 means that a man has assigned to himself a good 
 fortune : — and a good fortune is good disposition 
 of the soul, good emotions, good actions. 4 
 
 4 This section is unintelligible. Many of the words 
 may be corrupt, and the general purport of the section 
 cannot be discovered. Perhaps several things have been 
 improperly joined in one section. I have translated it 
 nearly literally. Different translators give the section 
 a different turn, and the critics have tried to mend what 
 they cannot understand. 
 11 
 
VI. 
 
 HE substance of the universe is obe- 
 dient and compliant ; and the reason 
 which governs it has in itself no cause 
 for doing evil, for it has no malice, nor 
 does it do evil to anything, nor is anything harmed 
 by it. But all things are made and perfected 
 according to this reason. 
 
 2. Let it make no difference to thee whether 
 thou art cold or warm, if thou art doing thy duty ; 
 and whether thou art drowsy or satisfied with 
 sleep ; and whether ill-spoken of or praised ; and 
 whether dying or doing something else. For it is 
 one of the acts of life, this act by which we die : 
 it is sufficient then in this act also to do well what 
 we have in hand. 
 
 3. Look within. Let neither the peculiar 
 quality of anything nor its value escape thee. 
 
 4. All existing things soon change, and they 
 will either be reduced to vapor, if indeed all sub- 
 stance is one, or they will be dispersed. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VI. 163 
 
 5. The reason which governs knows what its 
 own disposition is, and what it does, and on what 
 material it works. 
 
 6. The best way of avenging thyself is not to 
 become like the wrong doer. 
 
 7. Take pleasure in one thing and rest in it, in 
 passing from one social act to another social act, 
 thinking of god. 
 
 8. The ruling principle is that which rouses 
 and turns itself, and while it makes itself such as 
 it is and such as it wills to be, it also makes every- 
 thing which happens appear to itself to be such as 
 it wills. 
 
 9. In conformity to the nature of the universe 
 every single thing is accomplished, for certainly it 
 is not in conformity to any other nature that each 
 thing is accomplished, either a nature which ex- 
 ternally comprehends this, or a nature which is 
 comprehended within this nature, or a nature 
 external and independent of this. (xi. 1, vi. 40, 
 vni. 50.) 
 
 10. The universe is either a confusion, and a 
 mutual involution of things, and a dispersion ; or 
 it is unity and order and providence. If then it 
 is the former, why do I desire to tarry in a for- 
 tuitous combination of things and such a disorder ? 
 and why do I care about anything else than how I 
 
164 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 
 
 shall at last become earth ? and why am I dis- 
 turbed, for the dispersion of my elements will 
 happen whatever I do. But if the other supposi- 
 tion is true, I venerate, and I am firm, and I trust 
 in him who governs. (iy. 27.) 
 
 11. When thou hast been compelled by cir- 
 cumstances to be disturbed in a manner, quickly 
 return to thyself and do not continue out of tune 
 longer than the compulsion lasts ; for thou wirf 
 have more mastery over the harmony by continu- 
 ally recurring to it. 
 
 12. If thou hadst a step-mother and a mother 
 at the same time, thou wouldst be dutiful to thy 
 step-mother, but still thou wouldst constantly re- 
 turn to thy mother. Let the court and philosophy 
 now be to thee step-mother and mother : return 
 to philosophy frequently and repose in her, through 
 whom what thou meetest with in the court appears 
 to thee tolerable, and thou appearest tolerable in 
 the court. 
 
 13. When we have meat before us and such 
 eatables, we receive the impression, that this is 
 the dead body of a fish, and this is the dead body 
 of a bird or of a pig ; and again, that this Faler- 
 nian is only a little grape juice, and this purple 
 robe some sheeps' wool dyed with the blood of a 
 shell-fish : such then are these impressions, and 
 
M. ANTONINUS, 'vi. 165 
 
 they reach the things themselves and penetrate 
 them, and so we see what kind of things they are. 
 Just in the same way ought we to act all through 
 life, and where there are things which appear 
 most worthy of our approbation, we ought to lay 
 them bare and look at their worthlessness and 
 strip them of all the words by w r hich they are 
 exalted. For outward show is a wonderful per- 
 verter of the reason, and when thou art most sure 
 that thou art employed about things worth thy 
 pains, it is then that it cheats thee most. Con- 
 sider then what Crates says of Xenocrates himself. 
 14. Most of the things which the multitude 
 admire are referred to objects of the most general 
 kind, those which are held together by cohesion 
 or natural organization, such as stones, wood, fig- 
 trees, vines, olives. But those which are admired 
 by men, who are a little more reasonable, are re- 
 ferred to the things which are held together by a 
 living principle, as flocks, herds. Those which 
 are admired by men who are still more instructed 
 are the things which are held together by a ra- 
 tional soul, not however a universal soul, but ra- 
 tional so far as it is a soul skilled in some art, or 
 expert in some other way, or simply rational so 
 far as the possessing of a number of slaves. But 
 he who values a rational soul, a soul universal and 
 
166 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 
 
 fitted for political life, regards nothing else except 
 this ; and above all things he keeps his soul in a 
 condition and in an activity conformable to reason 
 and social life, and he co-operates to this end with 
 those who are of the same kind as himself. 
 
 15. Some things are hurrying into existence, 
 and others are hurrying out of it ; and of that 
 which is coming into existence part is already ex- 
 tinguished. Motions and changes are continually 
 renewing the world, just as the uninterrupted 
 course of time is always reneAving the infinite du- 
 ration of ages. In this flowing stream then, on 
 which there is no abiding, what is there of the 
 things which hurry by on which a man would set 
 a high price ? It would be just as if a man should 
 fall in love with one of the sparrows which fly by, 
 but it has already past out of sight. Something 
 of this kind is the very life of every man, like the 
 exhalation of the blood and the respiration of the 
 air. For such as it is to have once drawn in the 
 air and to have given it back, which we do every 
 moment, just the same is it with the whole respi- 
 ratory power, which thou didst receive at thy birth 
 yesterday and the day before, to give it back to 
 the element from which thou didst first draw it. 
 
 16. Neither is transpiration, as in plants, a 
 thing to be valued, nor respiration, as in domesti- 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VI. 167 
 
 cated animals and wild beasts, nor the receiving 
 of impressions by the appearances of things, nor 
 being, moved by desires as puppets by strings, nor 
 assembling in herds, nor being nourished by food ; 
 for this is just like the act of separating and part- 
 ing with the useless part of our food. What then 
 is worth being valued ? To be received with 
 clapping of hands ? No. Neither must we value 
 the clapping of tongues, for the praise which 
 comes from the many is a clapping of tongues. 
 Suppose then that thou hast given up this worth- 
 less thing called fame, what remains that is worth 
 valuing ? This in my opinion, to move thyself 
 and to restrain thyself in conformity to thy proper 
 constitution, to which end all employments lead 
 and all arts. For every art aims at this, that the 
 thing which has been made should be adapted to 
 the work for which it has been made ; and both 
 the vine-planter who looks after the vine, and the 
 horse-breaker, and he who trains the dog, seek 
 this end. But the education and the teaching of 
 youth aim at something. In this then is the 
 value of the education and the teaching. And if 
 this is well, thou wilt not seek anything else. 
 Wilt thou not cease to value many other things 
 too ? Then thou wilt be neither free, nor suffi- 
 cient for thy own happiness, nor without passion. 
 
168 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 
 
 For of necessity thou must be envious, jealous, 
 and suspicious of those who can take away those 
 things, and plot against those who have that 
 which is valued by thee. Of necessity a man 
 must be altogether in a state of perturbation who 
 wants any of these things : and besides, he must 
 often find fault with the gods. But to reverence 
 and honor thy own mind will make thee content 
 •with thyself, and in harmony with society, and in 
 agreement with the gods, that is, praising all that 
 they give and have ordered. 
 
 17. Above, below, all around are the movements 
 of the elements. But the motion of virtue is in 
 none of these : it is something more divine, and 
 advancing by a way hardly observed it goes hap- 
 pily on its road. 
 
 18. How strangely men act. They will not 
 praise those who are living at the same time and 
 living with themselves ; but to be themselves 
 praised by posterity, by those whom they have 
 never seen nor ever will see, this they set much 
 value on. But this is very much the same as if 
 thou shouldst be grieved because those who have 
 lived before thee did not praise thee. 
 
 19. If a thing is difficult to be accomplished by 
 thyself, do not think that it is impossible for a 
 man : but if anything is possible for a man and 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VI. 169 
 
 conformable to his nature, think that this can be 
 attained by thyself too. 
 
 20. In the gymnastic exercises suppose that a 
 man has torn thee with his nails, and by dashing 
 against thy head has inflicted a wound. Well, we 
 neither show any signs of vexation, nor are we 
 offended, nor do we suspect him afterwards as a 
 treacherous fellow ; and yet we are on our guard 
 against him, not however as an enemy, nor yet 
 with suspicion, but we quietly get out of his way. 
 Something like this let thy behavior be in all the 
 other parts of life ; let us overlook many things in 
 those who are like antagonists in the gymnasium. 
 For it is in our power, as I said, to get out of the 
 way, and to have no suspicion nor hatred. 
 
 21. If any man is able to convince me and 
 show me that I do not think or act right, I will 
 gladly change ; for I seek the truth by which no 
 man was ever injured. But he is injured who 
 abides in his error and ignorance. 
 
 22. I* do my duty : other things trouble me 
 not ; for they are either things without life, or 
 things without reason, or things that have rambled 
 and know not the way. 
 
 23. As to the animals which have no reason 
 and generally all things and objects do thou, since 
 thou hast reason and they have none, make use 
 
170 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 
 
 of them with a generous and liberal spirit. But 
 towards human beings, as they have reason, be- 
 have in a social spirit. And on all occasions call 
 on the gods, and do not perplex thyself about the 
 length of time in which thou shalt do this ; for 
 even three hours so spent are sufficient. 
 
 24. Alexander the Macedonian and his groom 
 by death were brought to the same state ; for 
 either they were received among the same semi- 
 nal principles of the universe, or they were alike 
 dispersed among the atoms. 
 
 25. Consider how many things in the same in- 
 divisible time take place in each of us, things 
 which concern the body and things which concern 
 the soul : and so thou wilt not wonder if many 
 more things, or rather all things which come into 
 existence in that which is the one and all, which 
 we call Cosmos, exist in it at the same time. 
 
 26. If any man should propose to thee the 
 question, how the name Antoninus is written, 
 wouldst thou with a straining of the voice utter 
 each letter ? What then if they grow angry, wilt 
 thou be angry too ? Wilt thou not go on with 
 composure and number every letter? Just so 
 then in this life also remember that every duty is 
 made up of certain parts. These it is thy duty 
 to observe, and without being disturbed or show- 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VI. 171 
 
 ing anger towards those who are angry with thee 
 to go on thy way and finish that which is set be- 
 fore thee. 
 
 27. How cruel it is not to allow men to strive 
 after the things which appear to them to be suit- 
 able to their nature and profitable ! And yet in 
 a manner thou dost not allow them to do this, 
 when thou art vexed because they do wrong. 
 For they are certainly moved towards things 
 because they suppose them to be suitable to 
 their nature and profitable to them — But it is 
 not so — Teach them then, and show them with- 
 out being angry. 
 
 28. Death is a cessation of the impressions 
 through the senses, and of the pulling of the 
 strings which move the appetites, and of the 
 discursive movements of the thoughts, and of 
 the service to the flesh. 
 
 29. It is a shame for the soul to be first to 
 give way in this life, when thy body does not 
 give way. 
 
 30. Take care that thou art not made into a 
 Caesar, that thou art not dyed with this dye ; for 
 such things happen. Keep thyself then simple, 
 good, pure, serious, free from affectation, a friend 
 of justice, a worshipper of the gods, kind, affec- 
 tionate, strenuous in all proper acts. Strive to 
 
172 M.ANTO NI N U S . VI . 
 
 continue to be such as philosophy wished to make 
 thee. Reverence the gods, and help men. Short 
 is life. There is only one fruit of this terrene 
 life, a pious disposition and social acts. Do 
 everything as a disciple of Antoninus. Remem- 
 ber his constancy in every act which was con- 
 formable to reason, and his evenness in all things, 
 and his piety, and the serenity of his countenance, 
 and his sweetness, and his disregard of empty 
 fame, and his efforts to understand things ; and 
 how he would never let anything pass without 
 having first most carefully examined it and clearly 
 understood it ; and how he bore with those who 
 blamed him unjustly without blaming them in re- 
 turn ; how he did nothing in a hurry ; and how he 
 listened not to calumnies, and how exact an exam- 
 iner of manners and actions he was ; and not given 
 to reproach people, nor timid, nor suspicious, nor 
 a sophist ; and with how little he was satisfied, 
 such as lodging, bed, dress, food, servants ; and 
 how laborious and patient ; and how he was able 
 on account of his sparing diet to hold out to the 
 evening, not even requiring to relieve himself by 
 any evacuations except at the usual hour ; and 
 his firmness and uniformity in his friendships ; 
 and how he tolerated freedom of speech in those 
 who opposed his opinions ; and the pleasure that 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VI. 173 
 
 he had when any man showed him anything bet- 
 ter ; and how pious he was without superstition. 
 Imitate all this that thou mayest have as good a 
 conscience, when thy last hour comes, as he had. 
 (i. 16.) 
 
 31. Return to thy sober senses and call thyself 
 back ; and when thou hast roused thyself from 
 sleep and hast perceived that they were only 
 dreams which troubled thee, now in thy waking 
 hours look at these [the things about thee] as 
 thou didst Jpok at those [the dreams]. 
 
 32. I consist of a little body and a soul. Now 
 to this little body all things are indifferent, for it 
 is not able to perceive differences. But to the 
 understanding those things only are indifferent, 
 which are not the works of its own activity. But 
 whatever things are the works of its own activity, 
 all these are in its power. And of these how- 
 ever only those which are done with reference to 
 the present ; for as to the future and the past 
 activities of the mind, even these are for the 
 present indifferent. 
 
 33. Neither the labor which the hand does nor 
 that of the foot is contrary to nature, so long as 
 the foot does the foot's work and the hand the 
 hand's. So then neither to a man as a man is his 
 labor contrary to nature, so long as it does the 
 
174 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 
 
 things of a man. But if the labor is not contrary 
 to his nature, neither is it an evil to him. 
 
 34. How many pleasures have been enjoyed 
 by robbers, patricides, tyrants. 
 
 35. Dost thou not see how the handicraftsmen 
 accommodate themselves up to a certain point to 
 those who are not skilled in their craft, — never- 
 theless they cling to the reason [the principles] 
 of their art and do not endure to depart from it ? 
 Is it not strange if the architect and the physician 
 shall have more respect to the reason [the prin- 
 ciples] of their own arts than man to his own 
 reason, which is common to him and the gods. 
 
 36. Asia, Europe are corners of the universe : 
 all the sea a drop in the universe ; Athos a little 
 clod of the universe : all the present time is a 
 point in eternity. All things are little, change- 
 able, perishable. All things come from thence, 
 from that universal ruling power either directly 
 proceeding or by way of consequence. .And ac- 
 cordingly the lion's gaping jaws, and that which 
 Is poisonous, and every harmful thing, as a thorn, 
 as mud, are after-products of the grand and beau- 
 tiful. Do not then imagine that they are of an- 
 other kind from that which thou dost venerate, 
 but form a just opinion of the source of all. 
 
 37. He who has seen present things has seen 
 
M. ANT ON IN U S. VI. 175 
 
 all, both everything which has taken place frore 
 all eternity and everything which will be for time 
 without end ; for all are of one kin and of one 
 form. 
 
 38. Frequently consider the connection of all 
 things in the universe and their relation to one 
 another. For in a manner all things are impli- 
 cated with one another, and all in this way are 
 friendly to one another ; for one thing comes in 
 order after another, and this is by virtue of they 
 active movement and mutual conspiration and the 
 unity of the substance. 
 
 39. Adapt thyself to the things with which thy 
 lot has been cast : and the men among whom 
 thou hast received thy portion, love them, but do 
 it truly [sincerely]. 
 
 40. Every instrument, tool, vessel, if it does 
 that for which it has been made, is well, and yet 
 he who made it is not there. But in the things 
 which are held together by nature there is within 
 and there abides in them the power which made 
 them ; wherefore the more it is fit to reverence 
 this power, and to think, that, if thou dost live 
 and act according to its will, everything in thee 
 is in conformity to intelligence. And thus also in 
 the universe, the things which belong to it are in 
 conformity to intelligence. 
 
176 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 
 
 41. Whatever of the things which are not 
 within thy power thou shalt suppose to be good 
 for thee or evil, it must of necessity be that, if 
 such a bad thing befall thee or the loss of such a 
 good thing, thou wilt. blame the gods, and hate 
 men too, those who are the cause of the misfor- 
 tune or the loss, or those who are suspected of 
 being likely to be the cause ; and indeed we do 
 much injustice, because we make a difference be- 
 tween these things [because we do not regard 
 these things as indifferent]. But if we judge 
 only those things which are in our power to be 
 good or bad, there remains no reason either for 
 finding fault with god or standing in a hostile 
 attitude to man. 
 
 42. We are all working together to one end, 
 some with knowledge and design, and others 
 without knowing what they do ; as men also 
 when they are asleep, of whom it is Heraclitus, 
 I think, who says that they are laborers and co- 
 operators in the things which take place in the 
 universe. But men co-operate after different 
 fashions : and even those co-operate abundantly, 
 who find fault with what happens and those who 
 try to oppose it and to hinder it ; for the universe 
 had need even of such men as these. It remains 
 then for thee to understand among what kind of 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VI. 177 
 
 workmen thou placest thyself ; ' for he who rules 
 all things will certainly make a right use of thee, 
 and he will receive thee among some part of the 
 co-operators and of those whose labors conduce to 
 one end. But be not thou such a part as the 
 mean and ridiculous verse in the play, which 
 Chrysippus speaks of. 
 
 43. Does the sun undertake to do the work of 
 the rain, or Aesculapius the work of the Fruit- 
 bearer [the earth] ? And how is it with respect 
 to each of the stars, are they not different and yet 
 they work together to the same end ? 
 
 44. If the gods have determined about me and 
 about the things which must happen to me, they 
 have determined well, for it is not easy even to 
 imagine a deity without forethought ; and as to 
 doing me harm, why should they have any desire 
 towards that ? for what advantage would result to 
 them from this or to the whole, which is the special 
 object of their providence ? But if they have not 
 determined about me individually, they have cer- 
 tainly determined about the whole at least, and 
 the things which happen by way of sequence in 
 this general arrangement I ought to accept with 
 pleasure and to be content with them. But if 
 they determine about nothing — which it is wicked 
 to believe, or if we do believe it, let us neither 
 
 12 
 
178 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 
 
 sacrifice nor pray nor swear by them nor do any- 
 thing else which we do as if the gods were present 
 and lived with us — but if however the gods de- 
 termine about none of the things which concern 
 us, I am able to determine about myself, and I 
 can inquire about that which is useful ; and that 
 is useful to every man which is conformable to 
 his own constitution and nature. But my nature 
 is rational and social ; and my city and country, 
 so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far 
 as I am a man, it is the world. The things then 
 which are useful to these cities are alone useful 
 to me. 
 
 45. Whatever happens to every man, this is for 
 the interest of the universal : this might be suf- 
 ficient. But further thou wilt observe this also as 
 a general truth, if thou dost observe, that whatever 
 is profitable to any man is profitable also to other 
 men. But let the word profitable be taken here 
 in the common sense as said of things of the mid- 
 dle kind [neither good nor bad]. 
 
 46. As it happens to thee in the amphitheatre 
 and such places, that the continual sight of the 
 same things and the uniformity make the spectacle 
 wearisome, so it is in the whole of life ; for all 
 things above, below, are the same and from the 
 same. How long then ? 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VI. 179 
 
 47. Think continually that all kinds of men and 
 of all kinds of pursuits and of all nations are dead 
 so that thy thoughts come down even to Philistion 
 and Phoebus and Origanion. Now turn thy 
 thoughts to the other kinds [of men]. To that 
 place then we must remove, where there are so 
 many great orators, and so many noble philoso- 
 phers, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Socrates ; so many 
 heroes of former clays, and so many generals after 
 them, and tyrants ; besides these, Eudoxus, Hip- 
 parchus, Archimedes, and other men of acute nat- 
 ural talents, great minds, lovers of labor, versatile, 
 confident, mockers even of the perishable and 
 ephemeral life of man, as Menippus and such as 
 are like him. As to all these consider that they 
 have long been in the dust. What harm then is 
 this to them ; and what to those whose names are 
 altogether unknown ? One thing here is worth a 
 great deal, to pass thy life in truth and justice, 
 with a benevolent disposition even to liars and 
 unjust men. 
 
 48. When thou wishest to delight thyself, think 
 of the virtues of those who live with thee ; for 
 instance, the activity of one, and the modesty of 
 another, and the liberality of a third, and some 
 other good quality of a fourth. For nothing de- 
 lights so much as the examples of the virtues, 
 
180 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 
 
 when they are exhibited in the morals of those 
 who live with us and present themselves in abun- 
 dance, as far as is possible. Wherefore we must 
 keep them before us. 
 
 49. Art thou dissatisfied because thou weighest 
 only so many litrae and not three hundred ? Be 
 not dissatisfied then that thou must live only 
 so many years and not more ; for as thou art 
 satisfied with the amount of substance which has 
 been assigned to thee, so be content with the 
 time. 
 
 50. Let us try to persuade them [men]. But 
 act even against their will, when the principles of 
 justice lead that way. If however any man by 
 using force stands in thy way, betake thyself to 
 contentment and tranquillity, and at the same 
 time employ the hindrance towards the exercise 
 of some other virtue ; and remember that thy 
 attempt was with a reservation [conditionally] 
 that thou didst not desire to do impossibilities 
 What then didst thou desire ? — Some such effort 
 as this — But thou attainest thy object, if the 
 things to which thou wast moved are [not] ac- 
 complished, t 
 
 5 1 . He who loves fame considers another man's 
 activity to be his own good ; and he who loves 
 pleasure, his own sensations ; but he who has 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VI. 181 
 
 understanding, considers his own acts to be his 
 own good. 
 
 52. It is in our power to have no opinion about 
 a thing, and not to be disturbed in our soul ; for 
 things themselves have no natural power to form 
 our judgments. 
 
 53. Accustom thyself to attend carefully to 
 what is said by another, and as much as it is pos- 
 sible, be in the speaker's mind. 
 
 54. That which is not good for the swarm, 
 neither is it good for the bee. 
 
 55. If sailors abused the helmsman or the sick 
 the doctor, would they listen to anybody else ; or 
 how could the helmsman secure the safety of those 
 in the ship or the doctor the health of those whom 
 he attends ? 
 
 56. How many together with whom I came 
 into the world are already gone out of it. 
 
 57. To the jaundiced honey tastes bitter, and 
 to those bitten by mad dogs water causes fear ; 
 and to little children the ball is a fine thing. 
 Why then am I angry ? Dost thou think that a 
 false opinion has less power than the bile in the 
 jaundiced or the poison in him who is bitten by a 
 mad dog ? 
 
 58. No man will hinder thee from living ac- 
 cording to the reason of thy own nature : nothing 
 
182 
 
 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 
 
 will happen to thee contrary to the reason of the 
 universal nature. 
 
 59. What kind of people are those whom men 
 wish to please, and for what objects, and by what 
 kind of acts ? How soon will time cover all 
 things, and how many it has covered already. 
 
VII. 
 
 ^7jTVEgoHAT is badness? It is that which 
 
 (?\U/ v*)/u t ^ l0U nast °ft en seen. And on the 
 
 (tvry Aft occas i° n °f everything which hap- 
 
 t V / <-, p eng ]j ee p ^jg m m ind, that it is 
 
 that which thou hast often seen. Everywhere up 
 and down thou wilt find the same things, with 
 which the old histories are filled, those of the 
 middle ages and those of our own day ; with which 
 cities and houses are filled now. There is noth- 
 ing new : all things are both familiar and short- 
 lived. 
 
 2. Hoav can our principles become dead, unless 
 the impressions [thoughts] which correspond to 
 them are extinguished ? But it is in thy power 
 continuously to fan these thoughts into a flame. 
 I can have that opinion about anything, which I 
 ought to have. If I can, why am I disturbed ? 
 The things which are external to my mind have 
 no relation at all to my mind. — Let this be the 
 
184 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 
 
 state of thy affects, and thou standest erect. To 
 recover thy life is in thy power. Look at things 
 again as thou didst use to look at them ; for in 
 this consists the recovery of thy life. 
 
 8. The idle business of show, plays on the 
 stage, flocks of sheep, herds, exercises with spears, 
 a bone cast to little dogs, a bit of bread into fish- 
 ponds, laborings of ants and burden-carrying, 
 runnings about of frightened little mice, puppets 
 pulled by strings — [all alike]. It is thy duty 
 then in the midst of such things to show good 
 humor and not a proud air ; to understand how- 
 ever that every man is worth just so much as the 
 things are worth about which he busies himself 
 
 4. In discourse thou must attend to what is 
 said, and in every movement thou must observe 
 what is doing. And in the one thou shouldst see 
 immediately to what end it refers, but in the 
 other watch carefully what is the thing signified. 
 
 5. Is my understanding sufficient for this or 
 not ? If it is sufficient, I use it for the work as 
 an instrument given by the universal nature. But 
 if it is not sufficient, then either I retire from the 
 work and give way to him who is able to do it 
 better, unless there be some reason why I ought 
 not to do so ; or I do it as well as I can, taking to 
 help me the man wdio with the aid of my ruling 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VII. 185 
 
 -*■ 
 principle can do what is now fit and useful for the 
 
 general good. For whatsoever either by myself 
 
 or with another I can do, ought to be directed to 
 
 this only, to that which is useful and well suited 
 
 to society. 
 
 6. How many after being celebrated by fame 
 have been given up to oblivion ; and how many 
 who have celebrated the fame of others have long 
 been dead. 
 
 7. Be not ashamed to be helped ; for it is thy 
 business to do thy duty like a soldier in the assault 
 on a town. How then, if being lame thou canst 
 not mount up on the battlements alone, but with 
 the help of another it is possible ? 
 
 8. Let not future things disturb thee, for thou 
 wilt come to them, if it shall be necessary, having 
 with thee the same reason which now thou usest 
 for present tilings. 
 
 9. All things are implicated with one another, 
 and the bond is holy ; and there is hardly anything 
 unconnected with any other thing. For things 
 have been co-ordinated, and they combine to form 
 the same universe [order]. For there is one 
 universe made up of all things, and one god who 
 pervades all things, and one substance, and one 
 law, [one] common reason in all intelligent ani- 
 mals, and one truth ; if indeed there is also one 
 
186 M. ANTON IX US. VII. 
 
 perfection for all animals which are of the same 
 stock and participate in the same reason. 
 
 1 0. Everything material soon disappears in the 
 substance of the whole ; and everything formal 
 [causal] is very soon taken back into the universal 
 reason ; and the memory of everything is very 
 soon overwhelmed in time. 
 
 11. To the rational animal the same act is ac- 
 cording to nature and according to reason. 
 
 1 2. Be thou erect, or be made erect, (in. 5.) 
 
 13. Just as it is with the members in those 
 bodies which are united in one, so it is with ra- 
 tional beings which exist separate, for they have 
 been constituted for one co-ope -ation-. And the 
 perception of this will be more apparent to thee, 
 if thou often sayest to thyself that I am a member 
 [/xe'A.05] of the system of rational beings. But if 
 [using the letter r] thou sayest that thou art a 
 part [(iiepo?], thou dost not yet love men from thy 
 heart ; beneficence does not yet delight thee for its 
 own sake ; * thou still doest it barely as a thing of 
 propriety, and not yet as doing good to thyself. 
 
 14. Let there fall externally what will on the 
 parts which can feel the effects of this fall. For 
 
 1 I have used Gataker's conjecture KaraATjKTtKug instead 
 of the common reading /caraA^Trn/cif : compare iv. 20; 
 ix. 42. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VII. 187 
 
 those parts which have felt will complain, if they 
 choose. But I, unless I think that what has hap- 
 pened is an evil, am not injured. And it is in my 
 power not to think so. 
 
 15. Whatever any one does or says, I must be 
 good, just as if the gold, or the emerald or the 
 purple were always saying this, Whatever any one 
 does or says, I must be emerald and keep my 
 color. 
 
 16. The ruling faculty does not disturb itself, 
 I mean, does not frighten itself or cause itself 
 pain.f But if any one else can frighten or pain 
 it, let him do so. For the faculty itself will not 
 by its own opinion turn itself into such ways. 
 Let the body itself take care, if it can, that it 
 suffer nothing, and let it speak,* if it suffers. But 
 the soul itself, that which is subject to fear, to 
 pain, which has completely the power of forming 
 an opinion about these things, will suffer nothing, 
 for it will never deviate f into such a judgment. 
 The leading principle in itself wants nothing, 
 unless it makes a want for itself; and therefore it 
 is both free from perturbation and unimpeded, if 
 it does not disturb and impede itself. 
 
 17. Euclaemonia [happiness] is a good daemon, 
 or a good thing. What then art thou doing here, 
 imagination ? go away, I intreat thee by the 
 
188 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 
 
 gods, as thou didst come, for I want thee not. 
 But thou art come according to thy old fashion 
 I am not angry with thee : only go away. 
 
 18. Is any man afraid of change ? Why what 
 can take place without change ? What then is 
 more pleasing or more suitable to the universal 
 nature ? And canst thou take a bath unless the 
 wood undergoes a change? and canst thou be 
 nourished, unless the food undergoes a change ? 
 And can anything else that is useful be accom- 
 plished without change ? Dost thou not see then 
 that for thyself also to change is just the same, 
 and equally necessary for the universal nature ? 
 
 19. Through the universal substance as through 
 a furious torrent all bodies are carried, being by 
 their nature united with and co-operating with the 
 whole, as the parts of our body with one another. 
 How many a Chrysippus, how many a Socrates, 
 how many an Epictetus has time already swal- 
 loAved up ? And let the same thought occur to 
 thee with reference to every man and thing. 
 
 20. One thing only troubles me, lest I should 
 do something which the constitution of man does 
 not allow, or in the way which it does not allow, 
 or what it does not allow now. 
 
 2 1 . Near is thy forgetfulness of all things ; 
 and near the forgetfulness of thee by all. 
 
M.ANTONINUS. VII. 189 
 
 22. It is peculiar to man to love even those 
 who do wrong. And this happens, if when they 
 do wrong it occurs to thee that they are kinsmen, 
 and that they do wrong through ignorance and 
 unintentionally, and that soon both of you will 
 die ; and above all, that the wrong doer has done 
 thee no harm, for he has not made thy ruling fac- 
 ulty worse than it was before. 
 
 28. The universal nature out of the universal 
 substance, as if it were wax, now moulds a horse, 
 and when it has broken this up, it uses the mate- 
 rial for a tree, then for a man, then for something 
 else ; and each of these things subsists for a very 
 short time. But it is no hardship for the vessel to 
 be broken up, just as there was none in its being 
 fastened together. 
 
 24. A scowling look is altogether unnatural ; 
 when it is often assumed, 2 the result is that all 
 comeliness dies away, and at last is so completely 
 extinguished that it cannot be again lighted up at 
 all. Try to conclude from this very fact that it 
 is contrary to reason. For if even the perception 
 of doing wrong shall depart, what reason is there 
 for living any longer ? 
 
 25. Nature which governs the whole will soon 
 change all things which thou seest, and out of their 
 
 2 This is corrupt. 
 
190 M . A N TO N I N US'. V [I. 
 
 substance will make other things, and again other 
 things from the substance of them, in order that 
 the world may be ever new. 
 
 26. When a man has done thee any wrong, 
 immediately consider with what opinion) about 
 good or evil he has done wrong. For when thou 
 hast seen this, thou wilt pity him, and wilt neither 
 wonder nor be angry. For either thou thyself 
 thinkest the same thing to be good that he does of 
 another thing of the same kind. It is thy duty 
 then to pardon him. But if thou dost not think 
 such things to be good or evil, thou wilt more 
 readily be well disposed to him who is in error. 
 
 27. Think not so much of what thou hast not 
 as of what thou hast : but of the things which 
 thou hast select the best, and then reflect how 
 eagerly they would have been sought, if thou 
 hadst them not. At the same time however take 
 care that thou dost not through being so pleased 
 with them accustom thyself to overvalue them, so 
 as to be disturbed if ever thou shouldst not have 
 them. 
 
 28. Retire into thyself. The rational principle 
 which rules has this nature, that it is content with 
 itself when it does what is just, and so secures 
 tranquillity. 
 
 29. Wipe out the imagination. Stop the pull- 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VII. 191 
 
 ing of the strings. Confine thyself to the pres- 
 ent. Understand well what happens either to 
 thee or to another. Divide and distribute every 
 object into the causal [formal] and the material. 
 Think of thy last hour. Let the wrong which is 
 clone by a man stay there where the wrong was 
 done. 
 
 30. Direct thy attention to what is said. Let 
 thy understanding enter into the things that are 
 doing and the things which do them. (vu. 4.) 
 
 81. Adorn thyself with simplicity and modesty 
 and with indifference towards the things which 
 lie between virtue and vice. Love mankind. 
 Follow god. The poet says that Law rules all — 
 t And it is enough to remember that law rules 
 all.t 3 — 
 
 82. About death : whether it is a dispersion, or 
 a resolution into atoms, or annihilation, it is either 
 extinction or change. 
 
 33. About pain : the pain which is intolerable 
 carries us off; but that which lasts a long time 
 is tolerable ; and the mind maintains its own 
 tranquillity by retiring into itself,f and the ruling 
 faculty is not made worse. But the parts which 
 are harmed by pain, let them, if they can, give 
 their opinion about it. 
 
 3 The end of this section is unintelligible. 
 
192 M. ANT ONINU S. VII. 
 
 34. About fame : look at the minds [of those 
 who seek fame], observe what they are, and what 
 kind of things they avoid, and what kind of things 
 they pursue. And consider that as the heaps of 
 sand piled on one another hide the former sands, 
 so in life the events which go .before are soon 
 covered by those which come after. 
 
 35. From Plato : 4 the man who has an elevated 
 mind and takes a view of all time and of all sub- 
 stance, dost thou suppose it pos-ible for him to 
 think that human life is anything great ? it is not 
 possible, he said. — Such a man then will think 
 that dettth also is no evil — Certainly not. 
 
 36." From Antisthenes : It is royal to do good 
 and to be abused. 
 
 37. It is a base thing for the countenance to be 
 obedient and to regulate and compose itself as the 
 mind commands, and for the mind not to be reg- 
 ulated and composed by itself. 
 
 38. It is not right to vex ourselves at things, 
 For they care nought about it. 5 
 
 39. To the immortal gods and us give joy. 
 
 40. Life must be reaped like the ripe ears of 
 
 corn : 
 One man is born ; another dies. 6 
 
 * Plato, Pol. vi. 486. 
 
 6 From the Bellerophon of Euripides. 
 
 6 From the Hypsipyle of Euripides. Cicero (Tuscul. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VII. 193 
 
 41. If gods care not for me and for my children, 
 There is a reason for it. 
 
 42. For the good is with me, and the just. 7 
 
 43. No joining others in their wailing, no 
 violent emotion. 
 
 44. From Plato : s But I would make this man 
 a sufficient answer, which is this : Thou sayest 
 not well, if thou thinkest that a man, who is good 
 for anything at all ought to compute the hazard 
 of life or death, and should not rather look to this 
 only in all that he does, whether he is doing what 
 is just or unjust, and the works of a good or a 
 bad man. 
 
 45. 8 For thus it is, men of Athens, in truth . 
 wherever a man has placed himself thinking it the 
 best place for him, or has been placed by a com- 
 mander, there in my opinion he ought to stay and 
 to abide the hazard, taking nothing into the 
 reckoning, either death or anything else, before 
 the baseness [of deserting his post]. 
 
 46. But, my good friend, consider whether that 
 
 in. 25.) has translated six lines from Euripides, and 
 among them are these two lines : — 
 
 Reddenda terrae est terra : turn vita omnibus 
 Metenda ut fruges : Sic jubet necessitas. 
 
 7 See Aristophanes, Acharnenses. 
 
 8 Erom the Apologia. 
 
 13 
 
194 ill. ANTONINUS. VII. 
 
 which is noble and good is not something different 
 from saving and being saved ; for f we must not 
 allow that it consists in living such or such a time, 
 at least for one who is really a man ; | and he 
 should not be fond of life, but entrusting this to 
 god and believing what the women say, that no 
 man can escape his destiny, he should next in- 
 quire how he may best live the time that he has 
 to live. 9 
 
 47. Look round at the courses of the stars, as 
 if thou wert going along with them; and con- 
 stantly consider the changes of the elements into 
 one another; for such thoughts purge away the 
 filth of the terrene life. 
 
 48. This is a fine saying of Plato : 10 That he 
 who is discoursing about men should look also al 
 earthly things as if he viewed them from some 
 higher place ; should look at them in their as- 
 semblies, armies, agricultural labors, marriages, 
 treaties, births, deaths, noise of the courts of 
 justice, desert places, various nations of barba- 
 
 9 Plato, Gorgias, c. 68. In this passage the text of 
 Antoninus has kaTsov, which is perhaps right ; but there 
 seems to be something wrong in the text. It is certainly 
 difficult to see the exact construction of parts of the 
 section. The reading evkteov for eareov does not mend 
 the matter. 
 
 10 It is not in the extant writings of Plato. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VII. 195 
 
 rians, feasts, lamentations, markets, a mixture of 
 all things and an orderly combination of contraries. 
 
 49. Consider the past ; such great changes of 
 political supremacies. Thou mayest foresee also 
 the things which will be. For they will certainly 
 be of like form, and it is not possible that they 
 should deviate from the order of the things which 
 take place now : accordingly to have contemplated 
 human life for forty years is the same as to have 
 contemplated it for ten thousand years. For 
 what more wilt thou see ? 
 
 50. That which has grown from the earth to 
 
 the earth, 
 But that which has sprung from heavenly seed, 
 Back to the heavenly realms returns. 11 
 This is either a dissolution of the mutual in- 
 volution of the atoms, or a similar dispersion of the 
 unsentient elements. 
 
 51. With food and drinks and cunning magic 
 
 arts 
 Turning the channel's course to 'scape from 
 death. 12 
 The breeze which heaven has sent 
 We must endure, and toil without complaining. 
 
 11 From the Chrysippus of Euripides. 
 
 12 The first two lines are from the Supp. of Eurip- 
 ides, v. 1110. 
 
196 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 
 
 52. Another may be more expert in casting his 
 opponent ; but let him not be more social, nor 
 more modest, nor better disciplined to meet all 
 that happens, nor more considerate with respect 
 to the faults of his neighbors. 
 
 53. Where any work can be done conformably 
 to the reason which is common to gods and men, 
 there we have nothing to fear : for where we are 
 able to get profit by means of the activity which 
 is successful and proceeds according to our consti- 
 tution, there no harm is to be suspected. 
 
 54. Everywhere and at all times it is in thy 
 power piously to acquiesce in thy present condi- 
 tion, and to behave justly to those who are about 
 thee, and to exert thy skill upon thy present 
 thoughts, that nothing shall steal into them with- 
 out being well examined. 
 
 55. Do not look around thee to discover other 
 men's ruling principles, but look straight to this, 
 to what nature leads thee, both the universal 
 nature through the things which happen to thee, 
 and thy own nature through the acts which must 
 be done by thee. But every being ought to do 
 that which is according to its constitution ; and 
 all other things have been made for the sake of 
 rational beings, just as among irrational things 
 the inferior for the sake of the superior, but the 
 rational for the sake of one another. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VII. 197 
 
 The prime principle then in man's constitution 
 is the social. And the second is not to yield to 
 the persuasions of the body, for it is the peculiar 
 office of the rational and intelligent motion to cir- 
 cumscribe itself, and never to be overpowered 
 either by the motion of the senses or of the ap- 
 petites, for both are animal ; but the intelligent 
 motion claims superiority and does not permit 
 itself to be overpowered by the others. And with 
 good reason, for it is formed by nature to use all 
 of them. The third thing in the rational consti- 
 tution is freedom from error and from deception. 
 Let then the ruling principle holding fast to these 
 things go straight on, and it has what is its own. 
 
 56. Consider thyself to be dead, and to have 
 completed thy life up to the present time ; and 
 live according to nature the remainder which is 
 allowed thee. 
 
 57. Love that only which happens to thee, and 
 is spun with the thread of thy destiny. For what 
 is more suitable ? 
 
 58. In everything which happens keep before 
 thy eyes those to whom the same things hap- 
 pened, and how they were vexed, and treated 
 them as strange things, and found fault with 
 them : and now where are. they ? Nowhere. 
 Why then dost thou choose to act in the same 
 
198 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 
 
 way ? and why dost thou not leave these agita- 
 tions which are foreign to nature, to those who 
 cause them and those who are moved by them ? 
 and why art thou not altogether intent upon the 
 right way of making use of the things which hap- 
 pen to thee ? for then thou wilt use them well, 
 and they will be a material for thee [to work on]. 
 Only attend to thyself, and resolve to be a good 
 man in every act which thou doest : and remem- 
 
 l-»pv» $£ -& # yfc #13 
 
 59. Look within. Within is the fountain of 
 good, and it will ever bubble up, if thou wilt ever 
 dig. 
 
 60. The body ought to be compact, and to show 
 no irregularity either in motion or attitude. For 
 what the mind shows in the face by maintaining 
 in it the expression of intelligence and propriety, 
 that ought to be required also in the whole body. 
 But all these things should be observed without 
 affectation. 
 
 61. The art of life is more like the wrestler's 
 art than the dancer's, in respect of this that it 
 should stand ready and firm to meet onsets which 
 are sudden and unexpected. 
 
 13 This section is obscure, and the conclusion is so 
 corrupt that it is impossible to give any probable mean- 
 ing to it. It is better to leave it as it is than to patch it 
 up, as some critics and translators have done. 
 
M . AN TO NIN US . ' VII. 199 
 
 62. Constantly observe who those are whose 
 approbation thou wishest to have,, and what ruling 
 principles they possess. For then thou wilt 
 neither blame those who offend involuntarily, not 
 wilt thou want their approbation, if thou lookest 
 to the sources of their opinions and appetites. 
 
 63. Every soul, the philosopher says, is invol- 
 untarily deprived of truth ; consequently in the 
 same way it is deprived of justice and temper- 
 ance and benevolence and everything of the kind. 
 It is most necessary to bear this constantly in 
 mind, for thus thou wilt be more gentle towards 
 all. 
 
 64. In every pain let this thought be present, 
 that there is no dishonor in it, nor does it make 
 the governing intelligence worse, for it does not 
 damage the intelligence either so far as the intel- 
 ligence is rational 14 or so far as it is social. In- 
 deed in the ease of most pains let this remark of 
 Epicurus aid thee, that pain is neither intolerable 
 nor everlasting, if thou bearest in mind that it has 
 its limits, and if thou addest nothing to it in imag- 
 ination : and remember this too, that we do not 
 
 14 The text has vKikt), which it has been proposed to 
 alter to loyiKr], and this change is necessary. We shall 
 then have in this section "koyiKT] and kolvuvlkt/ associated, 
 as we have in s. 68 XoyiKr/ and tto7iltlktj, and in s. 72. 
 
200 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 
 
 perceive that many things which are disagreeable 
 to us are the same as pain, such as excessive 
 drowsiness, and the being scorched by heat, and 
 the having no appetite. When then thou art dis- 
 contented about any of these things, say to thy- 
 self, that thou art yielding to pain. 
 
 65. Take care not to feel towards the inhuman, 
 as they feel towards men. 15 
 
 66. How do we know if Telauges was not supe- 
 rior in character to Socrates ? for it is not enough 
 that Socrates died a more noble death, and dis- 
 puted more skilfully with the sophists, and passed 
 the night in the cold Avith more endurance, and 
 that when he was bid to arrest Leon of Salamis, 
 he considered it more noble to refuse, and that he 
 walked in a swaggering way in the streets — 
 though as to this one may have great doubts if it 
 was true. But we ought to inquire, what kind 
 of a soul it was that Socrates possessed, and if he 
 was able to be content with being just towards 
 men and pious towards the gods, neither idly 
 vexed on account of men's villany, nor yet mak- 
 ing himself a slave to any man's ignorance, nor 
 receiving as strange anything that fell to his 
 
 15 I have followed Gataker's conjecture ol anav&puw 
 instead of the MSS. reading ol uv&pumot. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VII. 201 
 
 6hare out of the universal nor enduring it aa 
 intolerable, nor allowing his understanding to 
 sympathize with the affects of the miserable flesh 
 
 67. Nature has not so mingled f [the intelli- 
 gence] witli the composition of the body, as not 
 to have allowed thee the power of circumscribing 
 thyself and of bringing under subjection to thyself 
 all that is thy own ; for it is very possible to be a 
 divine man and to be recognized as such by no 
 one. Always bear this in mind ; and another 
 thing too, that very little indeed is necessary for 
 living a happy life. And because thou hast de- 
 spaired of becoming a dialectician and skilled in 
 the knowledge of nature, do not for this reason 
 renounce the hope of being both free and modest 
 and social and obedient to god. 
 
 68. It is in thy power to live free from all com- 
 pulsion in the greatest tranquillity of mind, even 
 if all the world cry out against thee as much as 
 
 hey choose, and even if wild beasts tear in pieces 
 the members of this kneaded matter which has 
 grown around thee. For what hinders the mind 
 in the midst of all this from maintaining itself in 
 tranquillity and in a just judgment of all sur- 
 rounding things and in a ready use of the objects 
 which are presented to it, so that the judgment 
 may say to the thing which falls under its obser- 
 
202 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 
 
 vation ; This thou art in substance [reality], 
 though in men's opinion thou mayst appear to be 
 of a different kind ; and the use shall say to that 
 which fall? under the hand : Thou art the thing 
 that I was seeking ; for to me that which pre- 
 sents itself is always a material for virtue both 
 rational and political, and in a word for the exer- 
 cise of art which belongs to man or god. For 
 everything which happens has a relationship 
 either to god or man, and is neither new nor 
 difficult to handle, but usual and apt matter to 
 work on. 
 
 69. The perfection of moral character consists 
 in this, in passing every day as the last, and in 
 being neither violently excited nor torpid nor 
 playing the hypocrite. 
 
 70. The gods who are immortal are not vexed 
 because during so long a time they must tolerate 
 continually men such as they are and so many of 
 them bad ; and besides this they also take care 
 of them in all ways. But thou, who art destined 
 to end so soon, art thou wearied of enduring the 
 bad, and this too when thou art one of them ? 
 
 71. It is a ridiculous thing for a man not to fly 
 from his own badness, winch is indeed possible, 
 but to fly from other men's badness, which is im- 
 possible. • 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VII. 203 
 
 72. "Whatever the rational and political [social! 
 faculty finds to be neither intelligent nor social, it 
 properly judges to be inferior to itself. 
 
 73. When thou hast done a good act and an^ 
 other has received it, why dost thou still look for 
 a third thing besides these, as fools do, either to 
 have the reputation of having done a good act or 
 to obtain a return ? 
 
 74. No man is tired of receiving what is use- 
 ful. But it is useful to act according to nature. 
 Do not then be tired of receiving what is useful 
 by doing it to others. 
 
 75. The nature of the All moved to make the 
 universe. But now either everything that takes 
 place comes by way of consequence [or continu- 
 ity] ; or even the chief things towards which the 
 ruling power of the universe directs its own move- 
 ment are governed by no rational principle. If 
 this is remembered it will make thee more tran- 
 quil in many things, (ix. 21, vi. 44.) 16 
 
 16 It is not easy to understand this section. It has 
 been suggested that there is some error in f/ ukoyiara, &c. 
 Some of the translators have made nothing of the pas- 
 sage, and they have somewhat perverted the words. 
 The first proposition is, that the universe was made by 
 some sufficient power. A beginning of the universe is 
 assumed, and a power which framed an order. The 
 
204 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 
 
 next question is, How are things produced now ; or in 
 other words, by what power do forms appear in continu- 
 ous succession ? The answer, according to Antoninus, 
 may be this : It is by virtue of the original constitution 
 of things that all change and succession have been 
 effected and are effected. And this is intelligible in a 
 sense, if we admit that the universe is always one and 
 the same, a continuity of identity ; as much one and 
 the same as man is one and the same, which he believes 
 himself to be, though he also believes and cannot help 
 believing that both in his body and in his thoughts there 
 is mange and succession. There is no real discontinu- 
 ity then in the universe ; and if we say that there was 
 an order framed in the beginning and that the things 
 which are now produced are a consequence of a pre- 
 vious arrangement, we speak of tilings as we are com- 
 pelled to view them, as forming a series or succession ; 
 just as we speak of the changes in our own bodies and 
 the sequence of our own thoughts. But as there are 
 no intervals, not even intervals infinitely small, between 
 any two supposed states of any one thing, so there are 
 no intervals, not even infinitely small, between what we 
 call one thing and any other thing which we speak of 
 as immediately preceding or following it. What we call 
 time is an idea derived from our notion of a succession 
 of things or events, an idea which is a part of our con- 
 stitution, but not an idea which we can suppose to be- 
 long to an infinite intelligence and power. The conclu- 
 sion then is certain that the present and the past, the 
 production of present things and the supposed original 
 order, out of which we say that present things now 
 come, are one : and the present productive power and 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VII. 205 
 
 the so-called past arrangement are only different names 
 for one thing. I suppose then that Antoninus wrote 
 here as people sometimes talk now, and that his real 
 meaning is not exactly expressed by his words. There 
 are certainly other passages from which, I think, that 
 we may collect that he had notions of production some- 
 thing like what I have expressed. 
 
 We now come to the alternative: "or even the chief 
 
 tilings principle." I do not exactly know what 
 
 he means by tu Kvpiurara, "the chief," or, "the most 
 excellent," or whatever it is. But as he speaks else- 
 where of inferior and superior things, and of the infe- 
 rior being for the use of the superior, and of rational 
 beings being the highest, he may here mean rational 
 beings. He also in this alternative assumes a governing 
 power of the universe, and that it acts by directing its 
 power towards these chief objects, or making its special, 
 proper, motion towards them. And here he uses the 
 noun (opfi>i) "movement," which contains the same 
 notion as the verb (upjj.7/ce) "moved," which he used at 
 the beginning of the paragraph when he was speaking 
 of the making of the universe. If we do not accept the 
 first hypothesis, he says, we must take the conclusion 
 of the second, that the " chief things towards which the 
 ruling power of the universe makes a movement are 
 directed by uo rational principle." The meaning then 
 is, if there is a meaning in it, that though there is a • 
 governing power, which strives to give effect to its 
 efforts, Ave must conclude that there is no rational direc- 
 tion of anything, if the power whicli first made the uni- 
 verse does not in some way govern it still. Besides, if 
 we assume that anything is now produced or now exists 
 
206 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 
 
 without the action of the supreme intelligence, and yet 
 that this intelligence makes an effort to act, we obtain a 
 conclusion which cannot be reconciled with the nature 
 of a supreme power, whose existence Antoninus always 
 assumes. The tranquillity that a man may gain from 
 these reflections must result from his rejecting the sec- 
 ond hypothesis, and accepting the first ; whatever may 
 be the exact sense in which the emperor understood the 
 first. Or, as he says elsewhere, if there is no provi- 
 dence which governs the world, man has at least the 
 power of governing himself according to the constitu- 
 tion of his nature ; and so he may be tranquil, if he 
 does the best that he can. 
 
 If there is no error in the passage, it is worth the 
 labor to discover the writer's exact meaning ; for I think 
 that he had a meaning, though people may not agree 
 what it was. (Compare ix. 28.) If I have rightly ex- 
 plained the emperor's meaning in this and other pas 
 sages, he has touched the solution of a great question. 
 
VIII. 
 
 HIS reflection also tends to the re- 
 moval of the desire of empty fame, 
 ft?)>S that it is no longer in thy power to 
 have lived the whole of thy life, or 
 at least thy life from thy youth upwards, like a 
 philosopher ; but both to many others and to thy- 
 self it is plain that thou art far from philosophy. 
 Thou hast fallen into disorder then, so that it is 
 no longer easy for thee to get the reputation of a 
 philosopher ; and thy plan of life also opposes it. 
 If then thou hast truly seen where the matter 
 lies, throw away the thought, How thou shalt 
 seem [to others], and be content if thou shalt live 
 the rest of thy life in such wise as thy nature 
 wills. Observe then what it wills, and let nothing 
 else distract thee ; for thou hast had experience 
 of many wanderings without having found happi- 
 ness anywhere, not in syllogisms, nor in wealth, 
 nor in reputation, nor in enjoyment, nor anywhere. 
 Where is it then ? In doing what man's nature 
 
208 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 
 
 requires. How then shall a man do this ? If he 
 has principles from which come his affects and his 
 acts. What principles ? Those which relate to 
 good and bad : the belief that there is nothing 
 good for man, which does not make him just, 
 temperate, manly, free ; and that there is nothing 
 bad, which does not do the contrary to what has 
 been mentioned. 
 
 2. On the occasion of every act ask thyself, 
 How is this with respect to me ? Shall I repent 
 of it ? A little time and I am dead, and all is 
 gone. What more do I seek, if what I am now 
 doing is the work of an intelligent living being, 
 and a social being, and one who is under the same 
 law with god ? 
 
 3. Alexander and Caius and Pompeius, what 
 are they in comparison with Diogenes and Hera- 
 clitus and Socrates ? For they were acquainted 
 with things, and their causes [forms], and their 
 matter, and the ruling principles of these men 
 were the same [or conformable to their pursuits]. 
 But as to the others, how many things had they 
 to care for, and to how many things were they 
 slaves. 
 
 4. [Consider] that men will do the same things 
 nevertheless, even though thou shouldst burst. 
 
 5. This is the chief tiling : Be not perturbed, 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 209 
 
 for all things are according to the nature of the 
 universal ; and in a little time thou wilt be nobody 
 and nowhere, like Hadiianus and Augustus. It 
 the next place having fixed thy eyes steadily on 
 thy business look at it, and at the same time 
 remembering that it is thy duty to be a good 
 man, and what man's nature demands, do it with- 
 out turning aside ; and speak as it seems to thee 
 most just, only let it be with good temper and 
 with modesty and without hypocrisy. 
 
 6. The nature of the universal has this work 
 to do, to remove to that place the things which 
 are in this, to change them, to take them away 
 here and to carry them there. All things are 
 change, yet we need not fear anything new. All 
 things are familiar [to us] ; but the distribution 
 of them also remains the same. 
 
 7. Every nature is contented with itself when 
 it goes on its way well ; and a rational nature 
 goes on its way well, when in its thoughts it 
 assents to nothing false or uncertain, and when it 
 directs its movements to social acts only, and 
 when it confines its desires and aversions to the 
 things which are in its power, and when it is sat- 
 isfied with everything that is assigned to it by the 
 common nature. For of this common nature 
 every particular nature is a part, as the nature 
 
 14 
 
210 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 
 
 of the leaf is a part of the nature of the plant ; 
 except that in the plant the nature of the leaf is 
 part of a nature "which has not perception or 
 reason, and is subject to be impeded ; but the 
 nature of man is part of a nature which is not 
 subject to impediments, and is intelligent and 
 just, since it gives to everything in equal portions 
 and according to its worth times, substance, cause 
 [form], activity, and incident. But examine, not 
 to discover that any one thing compared with any 
 other single thing is equal in all respects, but by 
 taking all the parts together of one thing and 
 comparing them with all the parts together of 
 another. 
 
 8. Thou hast not leisure [or ability] to read 
 But thou hast leisure [or ability] to check arro- 
 gance : thou hast leisure to be superior to pleasure 
 and pain : thou hast leisure to be superior to love 
 of fame, and not to be vexed at stupid and un- 
 grateful people, nay even to care for them. 
 
 9. Let no man any longer hear thee finding 
 fault with the court life or with thy own. (v. 16.) 
 
 10. Repentance is a kind of self-reproof for 
 having neglected something useful ; but that 
 which is good must be something useful, and the 
 perfect good man should look after it. But no 
 such man would ever repent of having refused 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 211 
 
 any sensual pleasure. Pleasure then is neither 
 good nor useful. 
 
 11. This thing, what is it in itself, in its own 
 constitution ? What is its substance and mate- 
 rial ? And what its causal nature [or form] ? 
 And what is it doing in the world ? And how 
 long does it subsist ? 
 
 12. When thou risest from sleep with reluc- 
 tance, remember that it is according to thy con- 
 stitution and according to human nature to per- 
 form social acts, but sleeping is common also to 
 irrational animals. But that which is according 
 to each individual's nature, is also more peculiarly 
 its own, and more suitable to its nature, and 
 indeed also more agreeable. 
 
 13. Constantly, and, if it be possible, on the 
 occasion of every impression on the soul, apply to 
 it the principles of Physic, of Moral and of Dia- 
 lec^c. 
 
 14. Whatever man thou meetest with, imme- 
 diately say to thyself: What opinions has this 
 man about good and bad ? For if with respect 
 to pleasure and pain and the causes of each, and 
 with respect to fame and ignominy, death and 
 life he has such and such opinions, it will seem 
 nothing' wonderful or strange to me. if he does 
 such and such things ; and I shall bear in mind 
 that he is compelled to do so. . 
 
212 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 
 
 15. Remember that as it is a shame to be sur- 
 mised if the fig-tree produces figs, so it is to be 
 surprised if the world produces such and such 
 things of which it is productive ; and for the 
 physician and the helmsman it is a shame to be 
 surprised, if a man has a fever, or if the wind is 
 unfavorable. 
 
 16. Remember that to change thy opinion and 
 to follow him who corrects thy error is as consist- 
 ent with freedom as it is to persist in thy error. 
 For it is thy own, the activity which is exerted 
 according to thy own movement and judgment, 
 and indeed according to thy own understanding 
 too. 
 
 17. If a thing is in thy own power, why dost 
 thou do it ? but if it is in the power of another, 
 whom dost thou blame ? the atoms [chance] or 
 the gods ? Both are foolish. Thou must blame 
 nobody. For if thou canst, correct [that which is 
 the cause] ; but if thou canst not do this, correct 
 at least the thing itself; but if thou canst not do 
 even this, of what use is it to thee to find fault ? 
 for nothing should be done without a purpose. 
 
 18. That which has died falls not out of the 
 universe. If it stays here, it also changes here, 
 and is dissolved into its proper parts, which are 
 elements of the universe and of thyself. And 
 these too change, and they murmur not. 
 
M.ANTONINUS. VIII. 213 
 
 19. Everything exists for some end, a horse, a 
 vine. Why dost thou wonder ? Even the sun 
 will say, I am for some purpose, and the rest of 
 the gods will say the same. For what purpose 
 then art thou ? to enjoy pleasure ? See if com 
 mon sense allows this. 
 
 20. Nature has had regard in everything no 
 less to the end than to the bejnnnino; and the con- 
 tinuance, just like the man who thi'ows up a ball. 
 What good is it then for the ball to be thrown 
 up, or harm for it to come down, or even to have 
 fallen ? and what good is it to the bubble while it 
 holds together, or what harm when it is burst ? 
 The same may be said of a light also. 
 
 21. Turn it [the body] inside out, and see 
 what kind of thing it is ; and when it has grown 
 old, what kind of thing it becomes, and when it is 
 diseased. 
 
 Short lived are both the praiser and the 
 praised, and the rememberer and the remem- 
 bered : and all this in a nook of this part of the 
 world ; and not even here do all agree, no not 
 any one with himself: and the whole earth too is 
 a point. 
 
 22. Attend to the matter which is before thee, 
 whether it is an opinion or an act or a word. 
 
 Thou sufferest this justly : for thou choosest 
 
214 M. ANTONINUS. VI. II. 
 
 rather to become good to-morrow than to be good 
 to-day. 
 
 23. Am I doing anything ? I do it with refer- 
 ence to the good of manlynd. Does anything 
 happen to me ? I receive it and refer it to the 
 gods, and the source of all things, from which all 
 that happens is derived. 
 
 24. Such as bathing appears to thee — oil, 
 sweat, dirt, filthy water, all things disgusting, — 
 so is every part of life and everything. 
 
 25. Lucilla saw Verus die, and then Lucilla 
 died. Secnnda saw Maximus die, and then Se- 
 eunda died. Epitynchanus saw Diotimus die, 
 and then Epitynchanus died. Antoninus saw 
 Faustina die, and then Antoninus died. Such is 
 everything. Celer saw Hadrianus die, and then 
 Celer died. And those sharp-witted men, either 
 seers or men inflated with pride, where are they ? 
 for instance the sharp-witted men, Charax and 
 Demetrius the Platonist and Eudaemon, and any 
 one else like them. All ephemeral, dead long 
 ago. Some indeed have not been remembered 
 even for a short time, and others have become the 
 heroes of fables, and again others have disappeared 
 even from fables. Remember this then, that this 
 little compound, thyself, must either be dissolved, 
 or thy poor breath must be extinguished, or be 
 removed and placed elsewhere. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 215 
 
 26. It is satisfaction to a man to do the proper 
 works of a man. Now it is a proper work of a 
 man to be benevolent to bis own kind, to despise 
 the movements of the senses, to form a just judg- 
 ment of plausible appearances, and to take a 
 survey of the nature of the universe and of the 
 things which happen in it. 
 
 27. There are three relations [between thee 
 and other things] : the one to the body l which 
 surrounds thee ; the second to the divine cause 
 from which all things come to all : and the third 
 to those who live with thee. 
 
 28. Pain is either an evil to the body — then 
 let the body say what it thinks of it — or to the 
 soul ; but it is in the power of the soul to main- 
 tain its own serenity and tranquillity, and not to 
 think that pain is an evil. For every judgment 
 and movement and desire and aversion is within, 
 and no evil ascends so high. 
 
 29. Wipe out thy imaginations by often saying 
 to thyself: now it is in my power to let no bad- 
 ness be in this soul, nor desire nor any perturba- 
 tion at all ; but looking at all things I see what is 
 
 1 The text has alnov which in Antoninus means "form," 
 " formal." Accordingly Schulze recommends either 
 Valkenaer's emendation uyyelov, " body," or Corae's 
 suwirwv. Compare xn. 13, x. 38. 
 
216 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 
 
 their nature, and I use each according to its value. 
 — Remember this power which thou hast from 
 natui'e. 
 
 30. Speak both in the senate and to every 
 man, whoever he may be, appropriately, not with 
 any affectation : use plain discourse. 
 
 31. Augustus' court, wife, daughter, descend- 
 ants, ancestors, sister, Agrippa, kinsmen, inti- 
 mates, friends, Arius, Maecenas, physicians and 
 sacrificing priests — the whole court is dead. 
 Then turn to the rest, not considering the death 
 of a single man, [but of a whole race,] as of the 
 Pompeii ; and that which is inscribed on the tombs, 
 The last of his race. Consider what trouble those 
 before them have had that they might leave a 
 successor ; and then, that of necessity some one 
 must be the last. Again here consider the death 
 of a whole race. 
 
 32. It is thy duty to order thy life well in every 
 single act ; and if every act does its duty, as far 
 as is possible, be content ; and no one is able to 
 hinder thee so that each act shall not do its duty — 
 But something external will stand in the way — 
 Nothing will stand in the way of thy acting justly 
 and soberly and considerately — But perhaps some 
 other active power will be hindered — Well, but by 
 acquiescing in the hindrance and by being content 
 
M.ANTONINUS. VIII. 217 
 
 to transfer thy efforts to that which is allowed, 
 another opportunity of action is immediately put 
 before thee in place of that which was hindered, 
 and one which will adapt itself to this order of 
 which we are speaking. 
 
 33. Receive [wealth or prosperity] without 
 arrogance ; and be ready to let it go. 
 
 34. If thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or a 
 foot, or a head, lying anywhere apart from the 
 rest of the body, such does a man make himself, 
 as far as he can, who is not content with what 
 happens, and separates himself from others, or 
 does anything unsocial. Suppose that thou hast 
 detached thyself from the natural unity — for 
 thou wast made by nature a part, but now thou 
 hast cut thyself off — yet here there is this 
 beautiful provision, that it is in thy power again to 
 unite thyself. God has allowed this to no other 
 part, after it has been separated and cut asunder, 
 to come together again. But consider the benev- 
 olence with which he has distinguished man, for 
 he has put it in his power not to be separated at 
 all from the universal ; and when he has been 
 separated, he has allowed him to return and to be 
 united and to resume his place as a part. 
 
 35. As the nature of the universal has given 
 to every rational being all the other powers that 
 
218 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 
 
 it has,f so we have received from it this power 
 also. For as the universal nature converts and 
 fixes in its predestined place everything which 
 stands in its way and opposes it, and makes such 
 things a part of itself, so also the rational animal 
 is able to make every hindrance its own material, 
 and to use it for such purpose as it may have 
 designed. 2 
 
 36. Do not disturb thyself by thinking of the 
 whole of thy life. Let not thy thoughts at once 
 embrace all the various troubles which thou mayst 
 expect to befall thee : but on every occasion ask 
 thyself, What is there in this which is intolerable 
 and past bearing? for thou wilt be ashamed to 
 confess. In the next place remember that neither 
 the future nor the past pains thee, but only the 
 present. But this is reduced to a very little, if 
 thou only circumscribest it, and chidest thy mind, 
 if it is unable to hold out against even this. 
 
 37. Does Panthea or Pergamus now sit by the 
 tomb of Verus ? 3 Does Chaurias or Diotimus sit 
 
 2 The text is corrupt at the beginning of the para- 
 graph, but the meaning will appear if the second loyinuv 
 is changed into o?mv : though this change alone will not 
 establish the grammatical completeness of the text. 
 
 3 « Yerus " is a conjecture of Saumaise, and perhaps 
 the true reading. 
 
M. AX TO XIX US. VIII. 219 
 
 by the tomb of Hadrianus ? That would be ridic- 
 ulous. Well, suppose they did sit there, would 
 the dead be conscious of it? and if the dead were 
 conscious, would they be pleased ? and -if they 
 were pleased, would that make them immortal ? 
 Was it not in the order of destiny that these per- 
 sons too should become old women and old men 
 and then die? What then would those do after 
 these were dead ? All this is foul smell and 
 blood in a bag. 
 
 38. If thou canst see sharp, look and judge 
 wisely,! sa 7 s the philosopher. 
 
 39. In the constitution of the rational animal I 
 see no virtue which is opposed to justice ; but I 
 see a virtue which is opposed to love of pleasure, 
 and that is temperance. 
 
 40. If thou takest away thy opinion about that 
 which appears to give thee pain, thou thyself 
 standest in perfect security — Who is this ? self — 
 The reason — But I am not reason — Be it so. 
 Let then the reason itself not trouble itself. But 
 if any other part of thee suffers, let it have its 
 own opinion about itself, (vu. 1G.) 
 
 41. Hindrance to the perceptions of sense is 
 an evil to the animal nature. Hindrance to the 
 movements [desires] is equally an evil to the 
 animal nature. And something else also is equally 
 
220 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 
 
 an impediment and an evil tq the constitution of 
 plants. So then that which is a hindrance to the 
 intelligence is an evil to the intelligent nature. 
 Apply all these things then to thyself. Does pain 
 or sensuous pleasure affect thee ? The senses will 
 look to that. — Has any obstacle opposed thee in 
 thy efforts towards an object ? if indeed thou wast 
 making this effort absolutely [unconditionally, or, 
 without any reservation], certainly this obstacle is 
 an evil to thee considered as a rational animal. 
 But if thou takest [into consideration] the usual 
 course of things, thou hast not yet been injured 
 nor even impeded. The things however which 
 are proper to the understanding no one is used to 
 impede, for neither fire nor iron nor tyrant nor 
 abuse touches it in any way. When it has been 
 made a sphere, it continues a sphere, (xi. 12.) 
 
 42. It is not fit that I should give myself pain, 
 for I have never intentionally given pain even to 
 another. 
 
 43. Different things delight different people. 
 But it is my delight to keep the ruling faculty 
 sound without turning away either from any 
 man or from any of the things which happen 
 to men, but looking at and receiving all with 
 welcome eyes and using everything according to 
 its value. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 221 
 
 44. See that thou secure this present time to 
 thyself: for those who rather pursue posthumous 
 fame do not consider that the men of after time 
 will be exactly such as these whom they cannot 
 bear now ; and both are mortal. And what is it 
 in any way to thee if these men of after time utter 
 this or that sound or have this or that opinion 
 about thee ? 
 
 45. Take me and cast me where thou wilt ; for 
 there I shall keep my divine part tranquil, that is, 
 content, if it can feel and act conformably to its 
 proper constitution. Is this [change of place] 
 sufficient reason why my soul should be unhappy 
 and worse than it was, depressed, expanded, 
 shrinking, affrighted? and what wilt thou find 
 which is sufficient reason for this ? 4 
 
 46. Nothing can happen to any man which is 
 not a human accident, nor to an ox which is not 
 according to the nature of an ox, nor to a vine 
 which is not according to the nature of a vine, nor 
 to a stone which is not proper to a stone. If then 
 there happens to each thing both what is usual 
 and natural, why shouldst thou complain ? For 
 
 * opryofiivrj in this passage seems to have a passive 
 sense. It is difficult to find an apt expression for it and 
 some of the other words. A comparison with xi. 12. 
 will help to explain the meaning. 
 
222 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 
 
 the common nature brings nothing which may not 
 be borne by thee. 
 
 47. If thou art pained by any external thing, 
 it is not this thing that disturbs thee, but thy own 
 judgment about it. And it is in thy power to wipe 
 out this judgment now. But if anything in thy 
 own disposition gives thee pain, who hinders thee 
 from correcting thy opinion ? And even if thou 
 art pained because thou art not doing some partic- 
 ular thing which seems to thee to be right, why 
 dost thou not rather act than complain ? — But 
 some insuperable obstacle is in the way ? — Do 
 not be grieved then, for the cause of its not being 
 done depends not on thee — But it is not worth 
 while to live, if this cannot be done — Take thy 
 departure then from life contentedly, just as he 
 dies who is in full activity, and well-pleased too 
 with the things which are obstacles. 
 
 48. Remember that the ruling faculty is invin- 
 cible, when self-collected it is satisfied with itself, 
 if it does nothing which it does not choose to do, 
 even if it resist from mere obstinacy. What then 
 will it be when it forms a judgment about anything 
 aided by reason and deliberately? therefore the 
 mind which is free from passions is a citadel, for 
 man has nothing more secure to which he can fly 
 for refuge and for the future be inexpugnable. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 223 
 
 He then who has not seen this is an ignorant man ; 
 but he who has seen it and does not fly to this 
 refuge is unhappy. 
 
 49. Say nothing more to thyself than what the 
 first appearances report. Suppose that it has been 
 reported to thee that a certain person speaks ill of 
 thee. This has been reported ; but that thou hast 
 been injured, that has not been reported. I see 
 that my child is sick. I do see ; but that he is in 
 danger, I do not see. Thus then always abide by 
 the first appearances, and add nothing thyself from 
 within, and then nothing happens to thee. Or 
 rather add something, like a man who knows 
 everything that happens in the world. 
 
 50. A cucumber is bitter — Throw it away. — 
 There are briers in the road — Turn aside from 
 them. — This is enough. Do not add, And why 
 were such things made in the world ? For thou 
 wilt be ridiculed by a man who is acquainted with 
 nature, as thou wouldst be ridiculed by a carpenter 
 and shoemaker if thou didst find fault because 
 thou seest in their workshop shavings and cuttings 
 from the things which they make. And yet they 
 have places into which they can throw these 
 shavings and cuttings ; but the universal nature 
 has no external space ; now the wondrous part of 
 her art is that though she has circumscribed her- 
 
224 M. ANTONINUS. VIU. 
 
 self, everything within her which appears to decay 
 and to grow old and to be useless she changes into 
 herself, and again makes other new things from 
 these very same, so that she requires neither sub- 
 stance from without nor wants a place into which 
 she may cast that which decays. She is content 
 then with her own space, and her own matter and 
 her own art. 
 
 51. Neither in thy actions be sluggish nor in 
 thy conversation without method, nor wandering 
 in thy thoughts, nor let there be in thy soul in- 
 ward contention nor external effusion, nor in life 
 be so busy as to have no leisure. 
 
 Suppose that men kill thee, cut thee in pieces, 
 curse thee. What then can these things do to 
 prevent thy mind from remaining pure, wise, sober, 
 just ? For instance, if a man should stand by a 
 limpid pure spring, and curse it, the spring never 
 ceases sending up potable water ; and if he should 
 cast clay into it or filth, it will speedily disperse 
 them and wash them out, and will not be at all 
 polluted. How then shalt thou possess a per- 
 petual fountain [and not a mere well] ? By 
 forming thyself hourly to freedom conjoined with 
 benevolence, simplicity, and modesty. 
 
 52. He who does not know what the world is, 
 does not know where he is. And he who does 
 
M ANTONINUS. VIII. 225 
 
 not kno,. - foi what purpose the world exists, does 
 not know who he is, nor what the world is. But 
 he who has failed in any one of these things could 
 not even say for what purpose he exists himself. 
 What then dost thou think of him who [avoids or] 
 seeks the praise of those who applaud, of men who 
 know not either where they are or who they are. 
 
 53. Dost thou wish to be praised by a man who 
 curses himself thrice every hour ? wouldst thou 
 wish to please a man who does not please himself ? 
 Does a man please himself who repents of nearly 
 everything that he does ? 
 
 54. No longer let thy breathing only act in 
 concert with the air which surrounds thee, but let 
 thy intelligence also now be in harmony with the 
 intelligence which embraces all things. For the 
 intelligent power is no less diffused in all parts and 
 pervades all things for him who is willing to draw 
 it to him than the aerial power for him who is able 
 to respire it. 
 
 55. Generally, wickedness does no harm at all 
 to the universe ; and particularly, the wickedness 
 [of one man] does no harm to another. It is only 
 harmful to him who has it in his power to be re- 
 leased from it, as soon as he shall choose. 
 
 56. To my own free will the free will of my 
 neighbor is just as indifferent as his breath and 
 
 15 
 
226 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 
 
 his flesh. For though we are made especially for 
 the sake of one another, still the ruling power of 
 each of us has its own office, for otherwise my 
 neighbor's wickedness would be my harm, which 
 god has not willed in order that my uuhappiness 
 may not depend on another. 
 
 57. The sun appears to be poured down, and in 
 all directions indeed it is diffused, yet it is not ef- 
 fused. For this diffusion is extension : Accord- 
 ingly its rays are called Extensions [(Wu/es] be- 
 cause they are extended [cnro tvov e/cmVecr^cu]. 5 
 But one may judge what kind of a thing a ray is, 
 if he looks at the sun's light passing through a 
 narrow opening into a, darkened room, for it is ex- 
 tended in a right line, and as it were is divided 
 when it meets with a solid body which stands in 
 the way and intercepts the air beyond ; but there 
 the light remains fixed and does not glide or fall 
 off. Such then ought to be the outpouring and 
 diffusion of the understanding, and it should in no 
 way be an effusion, but an extension, and it should 
 make no violent or impetuous collision with the 
 obstacles which are in its way ; nor yet fall down, 
 but be fixed and enlighten that which receives it. 
 For a body will deprive itself of the illumination 
 if it does not admit it. 
 
 5 A piece of bad etymology. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 227 
 
 58. He who fears death either fears the loss of 
 sensation or a different kind of sensation. But if 
 thou shalt have no sensation, neither wilt thou feel 
 any harm ; and if thou shalt acquire another kind 
 of sensation, thou wilt be a different kind of living 
 being and thou wilt not cease to live. 
 
 59. Men exist for the sake of one another. 
 Teach them then or bear with them. 
 
 60. In one way an arrow moves, in another way 
 the mind. The mind indeed, both when it exer- 
 cises caution and when it is employed about in- 
 quiry, moves straight onward not the less, and to 
 its object. 
 
 61. Enter into every man's ruling faculty; and 
 also let every other man enter into thine. 
 
IX. 
 
 L 7 E who acts unjustly acts impiously. 
 For since the universal nature has 
 made rational animals for the sake 
 
 ■^ of one another to help one another 
 according to their deserts, but in no way to injure 
 one another, he who transgresses her will, is clearly 
 guilty of impiety towards the highest divinity. 
 And he too who lies is guilty of impiety to the same 
 divinity ; for the universal nature is the nature of 
 all things that are ; and all things that are have a 
 relation to all things that come into existence. 
 And further, this universal nature is named truth 
 and is the prime cause of all things that are true. 
 He then who lies intentionally is guilty of impiety 
 inasmuch as he acts unjustly by deceiving; and he 
 also who lies unintentionally, inasmuch as he is at 
 variance with the universal nature, and inasmuch 
 as he disturbs the order by fighting against the 
 nature of the world ; for he fights against it, who is 
 moved of himself to that which is contrary to truth, 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IX. 229 
 
 for he had received powers from nature through the 
 neglect of which he is not able now to distinguish 
 falsehood from truth. And indeed he who pursues 
 pleasure as good, and avoids pain as evil is guilty 
 of impiety. For of necessity such a man must 
 often find fault with the universal nature, alleging 
 that it assigns things to the bad and the good con- 
 trary to their deserts, because frequently the bad 
 are in the enjoyment of pleasure and possess the 
 things which procure pleasure, but the good have 
 pain for their share and the things which cause 
 pain. And further, he who is afraid of pain will 
 sometimes also be afraid of some of the things 
 which will happen in the world, and even this is 
 impiety. And he who pursues pleasure will not 
 abstain from injustice, and this is plainly impiety. 
 Now with respect to the things towards which the 
 universal nature is equally affected, — for it would 
 not have made both, unless it was equally affected 
 towards both, — towards these they who wish to 
 follow nature should be of the same mind with it, 
 and equally affected. "With respect to pain then 
 and pleasure or death and life or honor and dis- 
 honor, which the universal nature employs equally, 
 whoever is not equally affected is manifestly acting 
 impiously. And I say that the universal nature 
 employs them equally, instead of saying that they 
 
 + 
 
230 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 
 
 happen alike to those who are produced in con- 
 tinuous series and to those who come after them 
 by virtue of a certain original movement of provi- 
 dence, according to which it moved from a certain 
 beginning to this ordering of things, having con- 
 ceived certain reasons of the things which were to 
 be, and having detei*mined generative powers of 
 substances and changes and such like succes- 
 sions. 
 
 2. It would be a man's happiest lot to depart 
 from mankind without having had any taste of 
 lying and hypocrisy and luxury and pride. How- 
 ever to breathe out one's life when a man has had 
 enough of these things is the next best voyage, as 
 the saying is. Hast thou determined to abide 
 with vice, and has not experience yet induced 
 thee to fly from this pestilence ? For the de- 
 struction of the understanding is a pestilence, 
 much more indeed than any such corruption and 
 change of this atmosphere which surrounds us. 
 For this corruption is a pestilence of animals in 
 so far as they are animals ; but the other is a 
 pestilence of men in so far as they are men. 
 
 3. Do not despise death, but be well content 
 with it, since this too is one of those things which 
 nature wills. For such as it is to be young and 
 to grow old, and to increase and to reach maturity, 
 
M. ANT0N1 NUS. IX. 231 
 
 and to have teeth and beard and gray hairs, and 
 to beget and to be pregnant and to bring forth, 
 and all the other natural operations which the 
 seasons of thy life bring, such also is dissolution. 
 This then is consistent with the character of a 
 reflecting man to be neither careless nor impa- 
 tient nor contemptuous with respect to death, but 
 to wait for it as one of the opei'ations of nature. 
 As thou now waitest for the time when the child 
 shall come out of thy wife's womb, so be ready 
 for the time when thy soul shall fall out of this 
 envelope. But if thou requirest also a vulgar 
 kind of comfort which shall reach thy heart, thou 
 wilt be made best reconciled to death by observ- 
 ing the objects from which thou art going to be 
 removed and the morals of those with whom thy 
 soul will no longer be mingled. For it is no way 
 right to be offended with men, but it is thy duty 
 to care for them and to bear with them gently ; 
 and yet to remember that thy departure will be 
 not from men who have the same principles as 
 thyself. For this is the only thing, if there be 
 any, which could draw us the contrary way and 
 attach us to life, to be permitted to live with 
 those who have the same principles as ourselves. 
 . But now thou seest how great is the trouble 
 arising from the discordance of those who live 
 
232 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 
 
 together, so that thou mayst say, Come quick, O 
 death, lest perchance I too should forget myself. 
 
 4. He who does wrong does wrong against 
 himself. He who acts unjustly acts unjustly to 
 himself, because he makes himself bad. 
 
 5. He often acts unjustly who does not do a 
 certain thing ; not only he who does a certain 
 thing. 
 
 6. Thy present opinion founded on understand- 
 ing, and thy present conduct directed to social 
 good, and thy present disposition of contentment 
 with everything which happens | — that is enough. 
 
 7. Wipe out imagination : check desire : ex- 
 tinguish appetite : keep the ruling faculty in its 
 own power. 
 
 8. Among the animals which have not reason 
 one life is distributed ; but among reasonable ani- 
 mals one intelligent soul is distributed : just as 
 thei'e is one earth of all things which are of an 
 earthy nature, and we see by one light, and 
 breathe one air, all of us that have the faculty of 
 vision and all that have life. 
 
 9. All things which participate in anything 
 which is common to them all move towards that 
 which is of the same kind with themselves. Ev- 
 erything which is earthy turns towards the earth, 
 everything which is liquid flows together, and 
 
M.ANTONINUS. IX. 233 
 
 everything which is of an aerial kind does the 
 same, so that they require something to keep 
 them asunder and the application of force. Fire 
 indeed moves upwards on account of the elemental 
 fire, but it is so ready to be kindled together with 
 all the fire which is here, that even every sub- 
 stance which is somewhat dry, is easily ignited, 
 because there is less mingled with it of that which 
 is a hindrance to ignition. Accordingly then 
 everything also which participates in the common 
 intelligent nature moves in like maimer towards 
 that which is of the same kind with itself, or 
 moves even more. For so much as it is superior 
 in comparison with all other things, in the same 
 degree also is it more ready to mingle with and 
 to be fused with that which is akin to it. Accord- 
 ingly among animals devoid of reason we find 
 swarms of bees, and herds of cattle, and the 
 nurture of young birds, and in a manner, loves ; 
 for even in animals' there are souls, and that 
 power which brings them together is seen to 
 exert itself in the superior degree, and in such a 
 way as never has been observed in plants nor in 
 stones nor in trees. But in rational animals there 
 are political communities and friendships, and 
 families and meetings of people ; and in wars 
 treaties and armistices. But in the things which 
 
234 M. AN TON I N US. IX. 
 
 are still superior, even though they are separated 
 from one another, unity in a manner exists, as in 
 the stars. Thus the ascent to the higher degree 
 is able to produce a sympathy even in things 
 which are separated. See then what now takes 
 place. For only intelligent animals have now 
 forgotten this mutual desire and inclination, 
 and in them alone the property of flowing to- 
 gether is not seen. But still though men strive 
 to avoid [this union], they are caught and held 
 by it, for their nature is too strong for them ; and 
 thou wilt see what I say, if thou only observest. 
 Sooner then will one find anything earthy which 
 comes in contact with no earthy thing than a 
 man altogether separated from other men. 
 
 10. Both man and god and the universe pro- 
 duce fruit ; at the proper seasons each produces 
 it. But if usage has especially fixed these terms 
 to the vine and like things, this is nothing. Rea- 
 son produces fruit both for all and for itself, and 
 there are produced from it other things of the 
 same kind as reason itself. 
 
 11. If thou art able, correct by teaching those 
 who do wrong ; but if thou canst not, remember 
 that indulgence is given to thee for this purpose. 
 And the gods too are indulgent to such persons ; 
 and for some purposes they even help them to get 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IX. 235 
 
 health, wealth, reputation ; so kind they are. 
 And it is in thy power also ; or say, who hinders 
 thee ? 
 
 12. Labor not as one who is wretched, nor yet 
 as one avIio would be pitied or admired : but 
 direct thy will to one thing only, to put thyself 
 in motion and to check thyself, as the social 
 reason requires. 
 
 13. To-day I have got out of all trouble, or 
 rather I have cast out all trouble, for it was not 
 outside, but within and in my opinions. 
 
 14. All things are the same, familiar in ex- 
 perience, and ephemeral in time, and worthless 
 in the matter. Everything now is just as it was 
 in the time of those whom Ave have buried. 
 
 15. Things stand outside of us, themselves by 
 themselves, neither knowing aught of themselves, 
 nor expressing any judgment. What is it then 
 which does judge about them ? The ruling fac- 
 ulty. 
 
 16. Not in passivity, but in activity lie the evil 
 and the good of the rational social animal, just as 
 his virtue and his vice lie not in passivity, but in 
 activity. 
 
 17. For the stone which has been thrown up 
 it is no evil to come down, nor indeed any good 
 to have been carried up. (vin. 20.) 
 
236 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 
 
 18. Penetrate inwards into men's leading prin- 
 ciples, and thou wilt see what judges thou art 
 afraid of, and what kind of judges they are of 
 themselves. 
 
 19. All things are changing: and thou thyself 
 art in continuous mutation and in a manner in 
 continuous destruction, and the universe too. 
 
 20. It is thy duty to leave another man's 
 wrongful act there where it is. (vn. 29, ix. 38.) 
 
 21. Termination of activity, cessation from 
 movement and opinion, and in a sense their death, 
 is no evil. Turn thy thoughts now to the con- 
 sideration of thy life, thy life as a child, as a 
 youth, thy manhood, thy old age, for in these also 
 every change was a death. Is this anything to 
 fear ? Turn thy thoughts now to thy life under 
 thy grandfather, then to thy life under thy mother, 
 then to thy life under thy father ; and as thou 
 findest many other differences and changes and 
 terminations, ask thyself. Is this anything to 
 fear ? In like manner then neither are the ter- 
 mination and cessation and change of thy whole 
 life a thing to be afraid of? 
 
 22. Hasten [to examine] thy own ruling fac- 
 ulty and that of the universe and that of thy 
 neighbor : thy own that thou mayst make it 
 just : and that of the universe, that thou mayst 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IX. 237 
 
 remember of what thou art a part ; and that of 
 thy neighbor, that thou mayst know whether he 
 has acted ignorantly or with knowledge, and that 
 thou mayst also consider that his ruling faculty is 
 akin to thine. 
 
 23. As thou thyself art a component part of a 
 social system, so let every act of thine be a com- 
 ponent part of social life. Whatever act of thine 
 then has no reference either immediately or re- 
 motely to a social end, this tears asunder thy life 
 and does not allow* it to be one, and it is of the 
 nature of a mutiny, just as when in a popular 
 assembly a man acting by himself stands apart 
 from the general agreement. 
 
 24. Quarrels of little children and their sports, 
 and poor spirits carrying about dead bodies [such 
 is everything] ; and so what is exhibited in the 
 representation of the mansions of the dead 1 strikes 
 our eyes more clearly. 
 
 25. Examine into the quality of the form of 
 an object, and detach it altogether from its mate- 
 rial part and then contemplate it ; then determine 
 the time, the longest which a thing of this peculiar 
 form is naturally made to endure. 
 
 1 to tt)q NsKviag may be, as Gataker conjectures, a 
 dramatic representation of the state of the dead. Schulze 
 supposes that it may be also a reference to the Nenvia of 
 the Odyssey (lib. xi.) 
 
238 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 
 
 26. Thou hast endured infinite troubles through 
 not being contented with thy ruling faculty, when 
 it does the things which it is constituted by nature 
 to do. But enough [of this]. 
 
 27. When another blames thee or hates thee, 
 or when men say about thee anything injurious, 
 approach their souls, penetrate within, and see 
 what kind of men they are. Thou wilt discover 
 that there is no reason to take any trouble that 
 these men may have this or that opinion about 
 thee. However thou must be well disposed tow- 
 ards them, for by nature they are friends. And 
 the gods too aid them in all ways, by dreams, by 
 signs, towards the attainment of those things on 
 which they set a value. 
 
 28. The periodic movements of the universe 
 are the same, up and down from age to age. And 
 either the universal intelligence puts itself in 
 motion for every separate effect, and if this is so, 
 be thou content with that which is the result of 
 its activity ; or it put itself in motion once, and 
 everything else comes by way of sequence 2 
 in a manner : or indivisible elements are the 
 origin of all things. — In a word, if there is a god, 
 
 2 The words which immediately follow nar' hitaKo7Mv- 
 &i)auv are corrupt. But the meaning is hardly doubtful. 
 (Compare vn. 75.) 
 
M.ANTONINUS. IX. 239 
 
 all is well ; and if chance rules, do not thou also 
 be governed by it. 
 
 Soon will the earth cover us all :. then the earth 
 too will change, and the things also which result 
 from change will continue to change forever, and 
 these again forever. For if a man reflects on the 
 changes and transformations which follow one 
 another like wave after wave and their rapidity, 
 he will despise everything which is perishable. 
 
 29. The universal cause is like a winter torrent : 
 it carries everything along with it. But how 
 worthless are all these poor people w T ho are en- 
 gaged in matters political, and, as they suppose, 
 are playing the philosopher ! All drivellers. 
 Well then, man : do what nature now requires. 
 Set thyself in motion, if it is in thy power, and 
 do not look about thee to see if any one will 
 observe it ; nor yet expect Plato's Republic : but 
 be content if the smallest thing goes on well, and 
 consider such an event to be no small matter. 
 For who can change men's principles ? and with- 
 out a change of principles what else is there than 
 the slavery of men who groan while they pretend 
 to obey? Come now and tell me of Alexan- 
 der and Philippus and Demetrius of Phalerum. 
 They themselves shall judge whether they dis- 
 covered what the universal nature required and 
 
240 M.ANTONINUS. IX. 
 
 (rained themselves accordingly. But if they 
 acted like tragedy heroes, no one has condemned 
 me to imitate them. Simple and modest is the 
 work of philosophy. Draw me not aside to 
 insolence and pride. 
 
 30. Look down from above on the countless 
 herds of men and their countless solemnities, and 
 the infinitely varied voyagings in storms and 
 calms, and the differences among those who are 
 born, who live together, and die. And consider 
 too the life lived by others in olden time, and the 
 life of those who will live after thee, and the life 
 now lived among barbarous nations, and how 
 many know not even thy name, and how many 
 will soon forget it, and how they who perhaps 
 now are praising thee will very soon blame thee, 
 and that neither a posthumous name is of any 
 value, nor reputation, nor anything else. 
 
 31. Let there be freedom from perturbations 
 with respect to the things which come from the 
 external cause ; and let there be justice in the 
 things done by virtue of the internal cause, that 
 is, let there be movement and action terminating 
 in this, in social acts, for this is according to thy 
 nature. 
 
 32. Thou canst remove out of the way many 
 useless things among those which disturb thee, 
 
M . A NT N INUS. I X. 241 
 
 for they lie entirely in thy opinion ; and thou 
 wilt then gain for thyself ample space by com- 
 prehending the whole universe in thy mind and 
 by contemplating the eternity of time and observ- 
 ing the rapid change of every several thing, how 
 short is the time from its birth to its dissolution, 
 and the illimitable time before its birth as well as 
 the equally boundless time after its dissolution. 
 
 33. All that thou seest will quickly perish, 
 and those who have been spectators of its disso- 
 lution will very soon perish too. And he who 
 dies at the extremest old age will be brought 
 into the same condition with him who died pre- 
 maturely. 
 
 34. What are these men's leading principles, 
 and about what kind of things are they busy, and 
 for what kind of reasons do they love and honor 
 Imagine that thou seest their poor souls laid bare. 
 When they think that they do harm by their 
 blame or good by their praise, what an idea ! 
 
 35. Loss is nothing else than change. But the 
 universal nature delights in change, and in 
 obedience to her all things are now done well, and 
 from eternity have been done in like form, and 
 will be such to time without end. What then dost 
 thou say ? That all things have been and all 
 things always will be bad, and that no power has 
 
 16 
 
242 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 
 
 ever been found in so many gods to rectify these 
 things, but the world has been condemned to be 
 bound in never ceasing evil ? 
 
 36. The rottenness of the matter which is the 
 substance of everything ! water, dust, bones, filth : 
 or again, marble rocks, the callosities of the earth ; 
 and gold and silver, the sediments ; and garments, 
 only bits of hair ; and purple dye, blood ; and 
 everything else is of the same kind. And that 
 which is of the nature of breath is also another 
 thing of the same kind, changing from this to 
 that. 
 
 37. Enough of this wretched life and murmur- 
 ing and apish tricks. Why art thou disturbed ? 
 "What is there new in this ? What unsettles thee ? 
 Is it the form of the thing ? Look at it. Or is it 
 the matter ? Look at it. But besides these there 
 is nothing. Towards the gods then now become at 
 last more simple and better. It is the same 
 whether we look at these things for a hundred 
 years or three. 
 
 38. If any man has done wrong, the harm is 
 his own. But perhaps he has not done wrong. 
 
 39. Either all things proceed from one intelli- 
 gent source and come together as in one body, and 
 the part ought not to find fault with what is done 
 for the benefit of the whole : or there are only 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IX. 243 
 
 atoms and nothing else than mixture and disper- 
 sion. Why then art thou disturbed ? Say to the 
 ruling faculty, Art thou dead, art thou corrupted, 
 art thou playing the hypocrite, art thou become a 
 beast, dost thou herd and feed with the rest ? 3 
 
 40. Either the gods have no power or they 
 have power. If then they have no power, why 
 dost thou pray to them ? But if they have 
 power, why dost thou not pray for them to give 
 thee the faculty of not fearing any of the things 
 which thou fearest, or of not desiring any of the 
 things which thou desirest, or not being pained at 
 anything, rather than pray that any of these 
 things should not happen or happen ? for certainly 
 if they can co-operate with men, they can co- 
 operate for these purposes. But perhaps thou 
 wilt say, the gods have placed them in thy power. 
 Well then, is it not better to use what is in thy 
 power like a free man, than to desire in a slavish 
 and abject way what is not in thy power ? And 
 who has told thee that the gods do not aid us even 
 in the things which are in our power ? Begin 
 
 3 There is some corruption at the end of this section. 
 I believe that the translation expresses the emperor's 
 meaning. Whether intelligence rules all things or 
 chance rules, a man must not be disturbed. He must 
 use the power that he has, and be tranquil. 
 
244 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 
 
 then to pray for such things and thou wilt see. 
 One man prays thus : How shall I be able to lie 
 with that woman ? Do thou pray thus : How 
 shall I not desire to lie with her ? Another prays 
 thus, How shall I be released from this ? Another 
 prays : How shall I not desire to be released ? 
 Another thus, How shall I not lose my little son ? 
 Thou thus, How shall I not be afraid to lose him. 
 In fine, turn thy prayers this way, and see what 
 comes. 
 
 41. Epicurus says, In my sickness my conver- 
 sation was not about my bodily sufferings, nor, says 
 he, did I talk on such subjects to those who visited 
 me ; but I continued to discourse on the nature of 
 things as before, keeping to this main point, how 
 the mind while participating in such movements 
 as go on in the poor flesh shall be free from per- 
 turbations and maintain its proper good. Nor did 
 I, he says, give the physicians an opportunity of 
 putting on solemn looks, as if they were doing 
 something great, but my life went on well and 
 happily. Do then the same that he did both in 
 sickness, if thou art sick, and in any other circum- 
 stances ; for never to desert philosophy in any 
 events that may befall us, nor to hold trifling talk 
 either with an ignorant man or with one unac- 
 quainted with nature, is a principle of all schools 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IX. 245 
 
 of philosophy ; but to be intent only on that which 
 thou art now doing and on the instrument by 
 which thou doest it. 
 
 42. When thou art offended with any man's 
 shameless conduct, immediately ask thyself, Is it 
 possible then that shameless men should not be in 
 the world ? It is not possible. Do not then require 
 what is impossible. For this man also is one of 
 those shameless men, who must of necessity be in 
 the world. Let the same considerations be present 
 to thy mind in the case of the knave, and the 
 faithless man, and of every man who does wrong 
 in any way. For at the same time that thou dost 
 remind thyself that it is impossible that such kind 
 of men should not exist, thou wilt become better 
 disposed towards every one individually. It is use- 
 ful to perceive this too immediately when the occa- 
 sion arises, what virtue nature has given to man to 
 oppose to every wrongful act. For she has given 
 to man as an antidote, against the stupid man 
 mildness, and against another kind of man some 
 other power. And in all cases it is possible for 
 thee to correct by teaching the man who is gone 
 astray ; for every man who errs misses his object 
 and is gone astray. Besides wherein hast thou 
 been injured? For thou wilt find that no one 
 among those against whom thou art irritated has 
 
246 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 
 
 done anything by which thy mind could be made 
 worse ; but that which is evil to thee and harmful 
 has its foundation only in the mind. And what 
 harm is done or what is there strange, if the man 
 ■who has not been instructed does the acts of an 
 uninstructed man ? Consider whether thou shouldst 
 not rather blame thyself, because thou didst not 
 expect such a man to err in such a way. For thou 
 hadst means given thee by thy reason to suppose 
 that it was likely that he would commit this error, 
 and yet thou hast forgotten and art amazed that he 
 has erred. But most of all when thou blamest a 
 man as faithless or ungrateful, turn to thyself. For 
 the fault is manifestly thy own, whether thon didst 
 trust that a man who had such a disposition would 
 keep his promise, or when conferring thy kindness 
 thou didst not confer it absolutely, nor yet in such 
 way as to have received from thy very act all the 
 profit. For what more dost thou want when thou 
 hast done a man a service ? art thou not content 
 that thou hast done something conformable to thy 
 nature, and dost thou seek to be paid for it? just 
 as if the eye demanded a recompense for seeing, 
 or the feet for walking. For as these members 
 are formed for a particular purpose, and by 
 working according to their several constitutions 
 obtain what is their own ; so also as man is formed 
 
M. ANTONINUS. IX 
 
 247 
 
 by nature to acts of benevolence, when he hag 
 done anything benevolent or in any other way 
 conducive to the common interest, he has acted 
 conformably to his constitution and he gets what 
 is his own. 
 
X. 
 
 |JLT thou then, my . soul, never be 
 good and simple and one and naked, 
 more manifest than the body which 
 surrounds thee ? "Wilt thou never 
 enjoy an affectionate and contented disposition? 
 "Wilt thou never be full and without a want of any 
 kind, longing for nothing more, nor desiring any- 
 thing either animate or inanimate for the enjoy- 
 ment of pleasures ? nor yet desiring time wherein 
 thou shalt have longer enjoyment, or place, or 
 pleasant climate, or society of men with whom 
 thou mayst live in harmony? but wilt thou be 
 satisfied with thy present condition, and pleased 
 with all that is about thee, and wilt thou convince 
 thyself that thou hast everything and that it 
 comes from the gods, that everything is well for 
 thee and will be well, whatever shall please them, 
 and whatever they shall give for the conservation 
 of the perfect living being, the good, and just and 
 beautiful, which generates and holds together all 
 
M. ANTONINUS. X. 249 
 
 things, and contains and embraces all things which 
 are dissolved for the production of other like 
 things ? Wilt thou never he such that thou shalt 
 so dwell in community with gods and men as' 
 neither to find fault with them at all nor to be 
 condemned by them ? 
 
 2. Observe what thy nature requires, so far as 
 thou art governed by nature only : then do it and 
 accept it, if thy nature, so far as thou art a living 
 being shall not be made worse by it. And next 
 thou must observe what thy nature requires so far 
 as thou art a living being. And all this thou 
 mayst allow thyself, if thy nature, so far as thou 
 art a rational animal, shall not be made worse by 
 it. But the rational animal is consequently also 
 a political [social] animal. Use these rules then 
 and trouble thyself about nothing else. 
 
 3. Everything which happens either happens in 
 such wise that thou art formed by nature to bear 
 it, or that thou art not formed by nature to bear 
 it. If then it happens to thee in such way that 
 thou art formed by nature to bear it, do not com- 
 plain, but bear it as thou art formed by nature to 
 bear it. But if it happens in such wise that thou 
 art not able to bear it, do not complain, for it will 
 perish after it has consumed thee. Remember 
 however that thou art formed by nature to bear 
 
250 M. ANTONINUS. X. 
 
 everything, with respect to which it depends on 
 thy own opinion to make it endurable and toler- 
 able, by thinking that it is either thy interest or 
 thy duty to do this. 
 
 4. If a man is mistaken, instruct him kindly 
 and show him his error. But if thou art not able, 
 blame thyself, or blame not even thyself. 
 
 5. "Whatever may happen to thee, it was pre- 
 pared for thee from all eternity ; and the impli- 
 cation of causes was from eternity spinning the 
 thread of thy being and of that which is incident 
 to it. (in. 11 ; iv. 26.) 
 
 6. Whether the universe is [a concourse of] 
 atoms, or nature [is a system], let this first be 
 established, that I am a part of the whole which 
 is governed by nature ; next, I am in a manner 
 intimately related to the parts which are of the 
 same kind with myself. For remembering this, 
 inasmuch as I am a part, I shall be discontented 
 with none of the things which are assigned to me 
 out of the whole ; for nothing is injurious to the 
 part, if it is for the advantage of the whole. For 
 the whole contains nothing which is not for its 
 advantage ; and all natures indeed have this com- 
 mon principle, but the nature of the universe has 
 this principle besides, that it cannot be compelled 
 even by any external cause to generate anything 
 
M. ANTONINUS. X. 251 
 
 harmful to itself. By remembering then that 1 
 am a part of such a whole, I shall be content with 
 everything that happens. And inasmuch as I am 
 in a manner intimately related to the parts which 
 are of the same kind with myself, I shall do 
 nothing unsocial, but I shall rather direct myself 
 to the things which are of the same kind with 
 myself, and I shall turn all my eiforts to the com- 
 mon interest, and divert them from the contrary. 
 Now if these things are done so, life must flow on 
 happily, just as thou mayst observe that the life of 
 a citizen is happy, who continues a course of action 
 which is advantageous to his fellow-citizens, and is 
 content with whatever the state may assign to him. 
 7. The parts of the whole, everything I mean 
 which is naturally comprehended in the universe, 
 must of necessity perish ; but let this be understood 
 in this sense, that they must undergo change. 
 But if this is naturally both an evil and a necessity 
 for the parts, the whole would not continue to 
 exist in a good condition, the parts being subject 
 to change and constituted so as to perish in various 
 ways. For whether did nature herself design to 
 do evil to the things which are parts of herself, 
 and to make them subject to evil and of necessity 
 fall into evil, or have such results happened with- 
 
252 M. ANTONINUS. X. 
 
 out her knowing it ? Both these suppositions in- 
 deed are incredible. But if a man should even 
 drop the terra Nature [as an efficient power] and 
 should speak of these things [change] as natural, 
 even then it would be ridiculous to affirm at the 
 same time that the parts of the whole are in their 
 nature subject to change, and at the same time to 
 be surprised or vexed as if something were hap- 
 pening contrary to nature, particularly as the dis- 
 soluiion of things is into those things of which each 
 thing is composed. For there is either a disper- 
 sion of the elements out of which everything has 
 been compounded, or a change from the solid to 
 the earthy and from the airy to the aerial, so that 
 these parts are taken back into the universal rea- 
 son, whether this at certain periods is consumed by 
 fire or renewed by eternal changes. And do not 
 imagine that the solid and the airy part belong to 
 thee from the time of generation. For all this 
 received its accretion only yesterday and the day 
 before, as one may say, from the food and the air 
 which is inspired. This then, which has received 
 [the accretion], changes, not that which thy moth- 
 er brought forth. But suppose that this [which 
 thy mother brought forth] implicates thee very 
 much with that other part, which has the peculiar 
 
M. ANTONINUS. X. 255 
 
 quality [of change], this is nothing in fact in the 
 way of objection to what is said. 1 
 
 8. When thou hast assumed these names, good, 
 modest, true, rational, a man of equanimity, and 
 magnanimous, take care that thou dost not change 
 these names ; and if thou shouldst lose them, 
 quickly return to them. And remember that the 
 term Rational was intended to signify a discrimi- 
 nating attention to every several thing and freedom 
 from negligence ; and that Equanimity is the 
 voluntary acceptance of the things which are as- 
 signed to thee by the common nature ; and that 
 Magnanimity is the elevation of the intelligent part 
 above the pleasurable or painful sensations of the 
 flesh and above that poor thing called fame, and 
 death, and all such things. If then thou main- 
 tainest thyself in the possession of these names, 
 without desiring to be called by these names by 
 others, thou wilt be another person and wilt enter 
 on another life. For to continue to be such as thou 
 hast hitherto been, and to be torn in pieces and 
 defiled in such a life, is the character of a very 
 stupid man and one overfond of his life, and like 
 those half-devoured fighters with wild beasts, who 
 
 1 The end of this section is perhaps corrupt. The 
 meaning is very obscure. I have given that meaning 
 which appears to be consistent with the whole argument. 
 
254 M. A NTONINUS. X. 
 
 though covered with wounds and gore, still intreat 
 to be kept to the following day, though they will 
 be exposed in the same state to the same claws 
 and bites. Therefore fix thyself in the possession 
 of these few names : and if thou art able to abide 
 in them, abide as if thou wast removed to certain 
 islands of the Happy. 2 But if thou shalt perceive 
 that thou fallest out of them and dost not maintain 
 thy hold, go courageously into some nook where 
 
 2 The islands of the Happy or the Fortunatae Insulae 
 are spoken of by the Greek and Roman writers. They 
 were the abode of Heroes, like Achilles and Diomedes, 
 as we see in the Scolion of Harmodius and Aristogiton. 
 Sertorius heard of the islands at Cadiz from some sailors 
 who had been there, and he had a wish to go and live in 
 them and rest from his troubles. (Plutarch, Sertorius, 
 c. 8.) In the Odyssey, Proteus told Menelaus that he 
 should not die in Argos, but be removed to a place at 
 the boundary of the earth where Ehadamanthus dwelt: 
 (Odyssey, iv. 565.) 
 
 For there in sooth man's life is easiest . 
 Nor snow nor raging storm nor rain is there, 
 But ever gently breathing gales of Zephyr 
 Oceanus sends up to gladden man. 
 
 It is certain that the writer of the Odyssey only 
 follows some old legend without having any knowledge 
 of any place which corresponds to his description. The 
 two islands which Sertorius heard of may be Madeira 
 and the adjacent island. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. X. 255 
 
 thou shalt maintain them, or even depart at once 
 from life, not in passion, but with simplicity and 
 freedom and modesty, after doing this one [laud- 
 able] thing at least in thy life, to have gone out 
 of it thus. In order however to the remembrance 
 of these names, it will greatly help thee, if thou 
 rememberest the gods and that they wish not to 
 be flattered, but wish all reasonable beings to be 
 made like themselves ; and if thou rememberest 
 that what does the work of a fig-tree is a fig-tree, 
 and that what does the work of a dog is a dog, 
 and that what does the work of a bee is a bee, 
 and that what does the work of a man is a man. 
 
 9. Mimi, 3 war, astonishment, torpor, slavery, 
 will daily wipe out those holy principles of thine. 
 f How many things without studying nature dost 
 thou imagine and how many dost thou neglect ? * 
 But it is thy duty so to look on and so to do 
 everything, that at the same time the power of 
 dealing with circumstances is perfected, and the 
 contemplative faculty is exercised, and the con- 
 fidence which comes from the knowledge of each 
 several thing is maintained without showing it, 
 
 3 Corae conjectured fdaog " hatred " in place of Mimi, 
 Roman plays in which action and gesticulation were all 
 or nearly all. 
 
 4 This is corrupt. 
 
256 M. ANTONINUS. X. 
 
 but yet not concealed. For when wilt thou enjoy 
 simplicity, when gravity, and when the knowledge 
 of every several thing, both what it is in substance, 
 and what place it has in the universe, and how 
 Ion or it is formed to exist and of what things it is 
 compounded, and to whom it can belong, and- 
 who are able both to give it and take it away ? 
 
 10. A spider is proud when it has caught a fly, 
 and another when he has caught a poor hare, and 
 another when he has taken a little fish in a net, 
 and another when he has taken wild boars, and 
 another when he has taken bears, and another 
 when he lias taken Sarmatians. Are not these 
 robbers, if thou examinest their principles ? 5 
 
 11. Acquire the contemplative way of seeing 
 how all things change into one another, and COn- 
 stantly attend to it, and exercise thyself about 
 this part [of philosophy]. For nothing is so much 
 adapted to produce magnanimity. Such a man 
 has put off the body, and as he sees that he must, 
 no one knows how soon, go away from among men 
 and leave everything here, he gives himself up 
 entirely to just doing in all his actions, and in 
 everything else that happens he resigns himself 
 
 5 Marcus means to say that conquerors are robbers. 
 He himself warred against Sarmatians, and was a rob- 
 ber, as he says, like the rest. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. X. 25? 
 
 to the universal nature. But as to what any man 
 shall say or think about him or do against him, 
 he never even thinks of it, being himself con- 
 tented with these two things, with acting justly in 
 what he now does, and being satisfied with what 
 is now assigned to him ; and he lays aside all dis- 
 tracting and busy pursuits and desires nothing 
 else than to accomplish the straight course through 
 the law, 6 and by accomplishing the straight course 
 to follow god. 
 
 12. What need is there of suspicious fear, 
 since it is in thy power to inquire what ought to 
 be done ? And if thou seest clear, go by this way 
 content, without turning back : but if thou dost 
 not see clear, stop and take the best advisers. 
 But if any other things oppose thee, go on accord- 
 ing to thy powers with due consideration, keeping 
 to that which appears to be just. For it is best 
 co reach this object, and if thou dost fail, let thy 
 failure be in attempting this. He who follows 
 reason in all things is both tranquil and active at 
 the same time, and also cheerful and collected. 
 
 18. Inquire of thyself as soon as thou wakest 
 from sleep, whether it will make any difference to 
 
 6 By the law, he means the divine law, obedience to 
 the will of God. 
 
 17 
 
258 M. ANTONINUS. X. 
 
 thee, if another does what is just and right. It 
 will make no difference. 
 
 Hast thou forgotten that those who assume 
 arrogant airs in bestowing their praise or blame 
 on others, are such as they are at bed and at board, 
 and hast thou forgotten what they do, and what 
 they avoid and what they pursue, and how they 
 steal and how they rob, not with hands and feet, 
 but with their most valuable part, by means of 
 which there is produced, when a man chooses, 
 fidelity, modesty, truth, law, a good daemon 
 [happiness] ? (vn. 17.) 
 
 14. To her who gives and takes back all, to 
 nature, the man who is instructed and modest says : 
 Give what thou wilt ; take back what thou wilt. 
 And he says this not proudly, but obediently and 
 well pleased with her. 
 
 15. Short is the little which remains to thee of 
 life. Live as on a mountain. For it makes no 
 difference whether a man lives there or here, if he 
 lives everywhere in the world as in a state [polit- 
 ical community]. Let men see, let them know a 
 real man who lives according to nature. If they 
 cannot endure him, let them kill him. For that 
 is better than to live thus [as men do]. 
 
 16. No longer talk about the kind of man that 
 a good man ought to be, but be such. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. X. 259 
 
 17. Constantly contemplate the whole of time 
 and the whole of substance, and consider that all 
 individual things as to substance are a grain of a 
 fig, and as to time, the turning of a gimlet. 
 
 18. Look at everything that exists and observe 
 that it is already in dissolution and in change and 
 as it were putrefaction or dispersion, or that every- 
 thing is so constituted by nature as to die. 
 
 19. Consider what men are when they are eat- 
 ing, sleeping, generating, easing themselves and 
 so forth. Then what kind of men they are when 
 they are imperious f and arrogant, or angry and 
 scolding from their elevated place. But a short 
 time ago to how many they were slaves and for 
 what things ; and after a little time consider in 
 what a condition they will be. 
 
 20. That is for the good of each thing, which 
 the universal nature brings to each. And it is 
 for its good at the time when nature brings it. 
 
 21. "The earth loves the shower;." and "the 
 solemn aether loves : " and the universe loves to 
 make whatever is about to be. I say then to the 
 universe, that I love as thou lovest. And is not 
 this too said, that " this or that loves [is wont] to 
 be produced ? " 7 
 
 7 These words are from Euripides. They are cited 
 by Aristotle, Ethic. Nicom. vm. 1. Athenaeus (xm. 
 
260 M. ANTONINUS. X. 
 
 22. Either thou livest here and hast already 
 accustomed thyself to it, or thou art going away, 
 and this was thy own will ; or thou art dying and 
 hast discharged thy duty. But besides these 
 things there is nothing. Be of good cheer then. 
 
 23. Let this always be plain to thee, that this 
 piece of land is like any other; and that all things 
 here are the same with things on the top of a 
 mountain, or on the sea-shore, or wherever thou 
 choosest to be. For thou wilt find just what 
 Plato says, Making the walls of the city like a 
 shepherd's fold on a mountain. [The three last 
 words are omitted. They are unintelligible.] 8 
 
 24. What is my ruling faculty now to me ? and 
 of what nature am I now making it ? and for what 
 purpose am I now using it ? is it void of under- 
 
 296.) and Stobaeus quote seven complete lines beginning 
 ipg, fiev ofippov yala. There is a similar fragment of 
 Aeschylus. 
 
 It was the fashion of the Stoics to work on the mean- 
 ings of words. So Antoninus here takes the verb filet, 
 " loves/' which has also the sense of " is wont," " uses," 
 and the like. He finds in the common language of man- 
 kind a philosophical truth, and most great truths are 
 expressed in the common language of life ; some un- 
 derstand them, but most people express them without 
 knowing how much they mean. 
 
 8 Plato, Theaet. 174 D. E. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. X. 2fil 
 
 standing ? is it loosed and rent asunder from social 
 life ? is it melted into and mixed with the poor 
 flesh so as to move together with it ? 
 
 25. He who flies from his master is a runaway ; 
 but the law is master, and he who breaks the law 
 is a runaway. And he also who is grieved or 
 angry or afraid,f is dissatisfied because something 
 has been or is or shall be of the things which are 
 appointed by him who rules all tilings, and he is 
 Law, and assigns to every man what is fit. He 
 then who fears or is grieved or is angry is a 
 runaway. 9 
 
 26. A man deposits seed in a womb and goes 
 away, and then another cause takes it, and labors 
 on it and makes a child. What a thing from such 
 a material ! Again, the child passes food down 
 through the throat, and then another cause takes 
 it and makes perception and motion, and in fine 
 life and strength and other things ; how many and 
 how strange ! Observe then the things which are 
 produced in such a hidden way, and see the power 
 just as we see the power which carries things 
 downwards and upwards, not with the eyes, but 
 still no less plainly. 
 
 9 Antoninus is here playing on the etymology of vopo},, 
 law, assignment, that which assigns (vifzei) to every man 
 his portion. 
 
262 M. ANTONINUS. X. 
 
 27. Constantly consider how all things such as 
 they now are, in time past also were ; and consider 
 that they will be the same again. And place 
 before thy eyes entire dramas and stages of the 
 same form, whatever thou hast learned from thy 
 experience or from older history ; for example the 
 whole court of Hadrianus, and the whole court of 
 Antoninus, and the whole court of Philippus, 
 Alexander, Croe.-us ; for all those were such 
 dramas as we see now, only with different actors. 
 
 28. Imagine every man who is grieved at any- 
 thing or discontented to be like a pig which is 
 sacrificed, and kicks and screams. 
 
 Like this pig also is he who on his bed in ' 
 silence laments the bonds in which we are held. 
 And consider that only to the rational animal is it 
 given to follow voluntarily what happens ; but 
 simply to follow is a necessity imposed on all. 
 
 29. Severally on the occasion of everything that ?. 
 thou doe?t pause and ask thyself, if death is a 
 dreadful thing because it deprives thee of this. 
 
 30. When thou art offended at any man's fault, 
 forthwith turn to thyself and reflect in what like 
 maimer thou dost err thyself; for example, in 
 thinking that money is a good thing, or pleasure, 
 or reputation and the like. For by attending to 
 •*itiis thou wilt quickly forget thy anger, if this 
 
M . A N TONIJSTUS. X . 263 
 
 consideration also is added, that the man is com- 
 pelled : for what else could he do ? or, if thou art 
 able, take away from him the compulsion. 
 
 3 1 . When thou hast seen Satyron the Socratic,f 
 think of either Eutyches or Hymen, and when 
 thou hast seen Euphrates, think of Eutychion or 
 Silvanus, and when thou hast seen Alciphron 
 think of Tropaeophorus, and when thou hast seen 
 Xenophon think of Crito or Severus, and when 
 thou hast looked on thyself, think of any other 
 Caesar, and in the case of every one do in like 
 manner. Then let this thought be in thy mind, 
 Where then are those men ? Nowhere, or nobody 
 knows where. For thus continuously thou wilt 
 look at human tilings as smoke and nothing at all ; 
 especially if thou reflectest at the same time that 
 what has once changed will never exist again in 
 the infinite duration of time. But thou, in what 
 a brief space of time is thy existence ? And why 
 art thou not content to pass "through this short 
 time in an orderly way ? What matter and oppor- 
 tunity [for thy activity] art thou avoiding ? For 
 what else are all these things, except exercises for 
 the reason, when it has viewed carefully and by 
 examination into their nature the things which 
 happen in life ? Persevere then until thou shalt 
 have made these things thy own, as the stomach 
 
264 M. ANTONINUS. X. 
 
 which is strengthened makes all things its, own, as 
 the blazing fire" makes flame and brightness out 
 of everything that is thrown into it. 
 
 32. Let it not be in any man's power to say 
 truly of thee that thou art not simple or that thou 
 art not good ; but let him be a liar whoever shall 
 think anything of this kind about thee ; and this 
 is altogether in thy power. For who is he that 
 shall hinder thee from being good and simple ? 
 Do thou only determine to live no longer, unless 
 thou shalt be such. For neither does reason 
 allow [thee to live], if thou art not such. 
 
 33. What is that which as to this material [our 
 life] can be done or said in the way most con- 
 formable to reason ? For whatever this may be, 
 it is in thy power to do it or to say it ; and do not 
 make excuses that thou art hindered. Thou wilt 
 not cease to lament till thy mind is in such a con- 
 dition, that, what luxury is to those who enjoy 
 pleasure, such shall be to thee, in the matter which 
 is subjected and presented to thee, the doing of the 
 things which are conformable to man's constitu- 
 tion ; for a man ought to consider as an enjoyment 
 everything which it is in his power to do accord- 
 ing to his own nature. And it is in his power 
 everywhere. Now it is not given to a cylinder to 
 move everywhere by its own motion, nor yet to 
 
M. A N TONINUS. X . 265 
 
 water nor fire, nor to anything else which is gov- 
 erned by nature or an irrational soul, for the 
 things which check them and stand in the way 
 are many. But intelligence and reason are able 
 to go through everything that opposes them, and 
 in such manner as they are formed by nature 
 and as they choose. Place before thy eyes this 
 facility with which the reason will be carried 
 through all things, as fire upwards, as a stone 
 downwards, as a cylinder down an inclined sur- 
 face, and seek for nothing further. For all other\ 
 obstacles either affect the body only which is a 
 dead thing; or, except through opinion and the 
 yielding of the reason itself, they do not crush 
 nor do any harm of any kind ; for if they did, he 
 who felt it would immediately become bad. Now 
 in the case of all things which have a certain 
 constitution, whatever harm may happen to any 
 of them, that which is so affected becomes con- 
 sequently worse ; but in the like case, a man be- 
 comes both better, if one may say so, and more 
 worthy of praise by making a right use of these 
 accidents. And finally remember that nothing 
 harms him who is really a citizen, which does not 
 harm the state ; nor yet does anything harm the 
 state, which does not harm law [order] ; and of 
 these things which are called misfortunes not one 
 
266 M . A NT N 1 N (J S . X . 
 
 harms law. What then does not harm law does 
 not harm either state or citizen. 
 
 34. To him who is penetrated by true princi- 
 ples even the briefest precept is sufficient, and any 
 common precept, to remind him that he should be 
 free from grief and fear. For example — 
 
 Leaves, some the wind scatters on the ground — 
 So is the race of men. 10 
 
 Leaves also are thy children ; and leaves too are 
 they who cry out as if they were worthy of 
 credit and bestow their praise, or on the con- 
 trary curse, or secretly blame and sneer ; and 
 leaves in like manner are those who shall receive 
 and transmit a man's fame to after times. For all 
 such things as these " are produced in the season 
 of spring," as the poet says ; then the wind 
 casts them down ; then the forest produces other 
 leaves in their places. But a brief existence is 
 common to all things, and yet thou avoidest and 
 pursuest all things as if they would be eternal. 
 A little time, and thou shalt close thy eyes ; and 
 him who has attended thee to thy grave another 
 soon will lament. 
 
 35. The healthy eye ought to see all visible 
 things and not to say, I Avish for green things ; 
 
 10 Homer, II. vi. 146. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. X. 267 
 
 for this is the condition of a diseased eye. And 
 the healthy hearing and smelling ought to be 
 ready to perceive all that can be heard and 
 smelled. And' the healthy stomach ought to be 
 with respect to all food just as the mill with re- 
 spect to all things which it is formed to grind. 
 And accordingly the healthy understanding ought 
 to be prepared for everything which happens ; but 
 that which says, Let my dear children live, and 
 let all men praise whatever I may do, is an eye 
 which seeks for green things, or teeth which seek 
 for soft things. 
 
 36. There is no man so fortunate that there 
 shall not be by him when he is dying some who 
 are pleased with what is going to happen. 11 Sup- 
 pose that he was a good and wise man, will there 
 not be at last some one to say of him, Let us at . 
 last breathe freely being relieved from this school- 
 master. It is true that he was harsh to none of 
 us, but I perceived that he tacitly condemns us. — 
 This is what is said of a good man. But in our 
 own case how many other things are there for 
 which there are many who wish to get rid of us. 
 Thou wilt consider this then when thou art dying, 
 
 11 He says mnov, but as he affirms in other places that 
 death is no evil, he must mean what others may call an 
 evil, and he means only " what is going to happen." 
 
268 M. ANTONINUS. X. 
 
 and thou wilt depart more contentedly by reflect- 
 ing thus : I am going away from such a life, in 
 which even my associates in behalf of whom I 
 have striven so much, prayed, and cared, them- 
 selves wish me to depart, hoping perchance to get 
 some little advantage by it. Why then should a 
 man cling to a longer stay here ? Do not how- 
 ever for this reason go away less kindly disposed 
 to them, but preserving thy own character, and 
 continuing friendly and benevolent and kind, and 
 on the other hand not as if thou wast torn away ; 
 but as when a man dies a quiet death, the soul is 
 easily separated from the body, such also ought 
 thy departure from men to be, for nature united 
 thee to them and associated thee. But does she 
 now dissolve the union ? Well, I am separated as 
 from kinsmen, not however dragged resisting, but 
 without compulsion ; for this too is one of the 
 things according to nature. 
 
 37. Accustom thyself as much as possible on 
 the occasion of anything being done by any per- 
 son to inquire with thyself, For what object is 
 this man doing this ? but begin with thyself, and 
 examine thyself first. 
 
 38. Remember that this which pulls the strings 
 is the thing which is hidden within : this is the 
 power of persuasion, this is life, this, if one may 
 
M. ANTONINUS. X. 269 
 
 so say, is man. In contemplating thyself never 
 include the vessel which surrounds thee and 
 these instruments which are attached about it. 
 For they are like to an axe, differing only in this 
 that they grow to the body. For indeed there is 
 no more use in these parts without the cause 
 which moves and checks them, than in the 
 weaver's shuttle, and the writer's pen and the 
 driver's whip. 1 ' 2 
 
 12 See " The Philosophy of Antoninus.'' 
 
XL 
 
 HESE are the properties of the ra- 
 tional soul : it sees itself, analyses 
 fefyi itself, and makes itself such as it 
 chooses ; the fruit which it bears it- 
 self enjoys — for the fruits of plants and that in 
 animals which corresponds to fruits others enjoy — 
 it obtains its own end, wherever the limit of life 
 may be fixed. Not as in a dance and in a play 
 and in such like things, where the whole action is 
 incomplete, if anything cuts it short ; but .in every 
 part and wherever it may be stopped, it "makes 
 what has been set before it full and complete, so 
 that it can say, I have what is my own. And 
 further it traverses the whole universe, and the 
 surrounding vacuum, and surveys its form, and it 
 extends itself into the infinity of time and em- 
 braces and comprehends the periodical renova- 
 tion of all things, and it comprehends that those 
 who come after us will see nothing new, nor have 
 those before us seen anything more, but in a 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XI. 271 
 
 manner he who is forty years old, if he has any 
 understanding at all, has seen by virtue of the 
 uniformity that prevails all things which have 
 been and all that will be. This too is a property 
 of the rational soul, love of one's neighbor, and 
 truth and modesty, and to value nothing more 
 than itself, which is also the property of Law. 1 
 Thus then right reason differs not at all from the 
 reason of justice. 
 
 2. Thou wilt set little value on pleasing song 
 and dancing and the pancratium, if thou wilt dis- 
 tribute the melody of the voice into its several 
 sounds, and ask thyself as to each, if thou art 
 mastered by this ; for thou wilt be prevented by 
 shame from confessing it : and in the matter of 
 dancing, if at each movement and attitude thou 
 wilt do the same ; and the like also in the matter 
 of the pancratium. In all things then, except 
 virtue and the acts of virtue, remember to apply 
 thyself to their several parts, and by this division 
 to come to value them little : and apply this rule 
 also to thy whole life. 
 
 3. What a soul that is which is ready, if at any 
 moment it must be separated from the body, and 
 ready either to be extinguished or dispersed or 
 continue to exist ; but so that this readiness 
 
 1 Law is the order by which all things are governed. 
 
272 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 
 
 comes from a man's own judgment, not from mere 
 obstinacy, as with the Christians, but considerately 
 and with dignity and in a way to persuade an- 
 other, without tragic show. 
 
 4. Have I done something for the general in- 
 terest ? Well theii I have had my reward. Let 
 this always be present to thy mind, and never 
 stop [doing good]. 
 
 5. What is thy art? to be good. And how is 
 this accomplished well except by general princi- 
 ples, some about the nature of the universe, and 
 others about the proper constitution of man ? 
 
 6. At first tragedies were brought on the stage 
 as means of reminding men of the things which 
 happen to them, and that it is according to nature 
 for things to happen so, and that, if thou art de- 
 lighted with what is shown on the stage, thou 
 shouldst not be troubled with that which takes 
 place on the larger stage. For thou seest that 
 these things must be accomplished thus, and that 
 even they bear them who cry out 2 " Cithae- 
 ron." And indeed some things are said well by 
 the dramatic writers, of which kind is the follow- 
 ing especially : — 
 
 Me and my children if the gods neglect, 
 This has its reason too. 3 
 
 2 Sophocles, Oedipus Rex. 
 8 See vti. 41. 38. 40 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XI. 273 
 
 And again 
 
 We must not chafe and fret at that which happens. 
 And 
 
 Life's harvest reap like the wheat's fruitful ear. 
 
 And other things of the same kind. 
 
 After tragedy the old comedy was introduced, 
 •which had a magisterial freedom of speech, and 
 by its very plainness of speaking was useful in 
 reminding men to beware of insolence ; and for 
 this purpose too Diogenes used to take from these 
 writers. 
 
 But as to the middle comedy which came next, 
 observe what it was, and again, for what object 
 the new comedy was introduced, which gradually 
 sunk down into a mere mimic artifice. That some 
 good things are said by these writers too, every- 
 body knows : but the whole plan of such poetry 
 and dramatm'gy, to what end does it look ! 
 
 7. How plain does it appear that there is not 
 another condition of life so well suited for philos- 
 ophizing as this in which thou now happenest 
 to be. 
 
 8. A branch cut off from the adjacent branch 
 must of necessity be cut off from the whole tree 
 also. So too a man when he is separated from 
 another man has fallen off from the whole social 
 
 18 
 
274 M. ANTONINUS. XI. 
 
 community. Now as to a branch, another cuts it 
 off, but a man by his own act separates himself 
 from his neighbor when he hates him and turns 
 away from him, and he does not know that he 
 has at the same time cut himself off from the 
 whole social system. Yet he has this privilege 
 ceriainly from Zeus who framed society, for it is 
 in our power to grow again to that which is near 
 to us and again to become a part which helps to 
 make up the whole. However if it often happens, 
 this kind of separation, it makes it difficult for 
 that which detaches itself to be brought to unity 
 and to be restored to its former condition. Fi- 
 nally, the branch, which from the first grew to- 
 gether with the tree and has continued to have 
 one life with it, is not like that which after being 
 cut off is then ingrafted, but it is something like 
 what the gardeners mean when they say that it 
 grows with the rest of the tree, but | that it has 
 not the same mind with it. 
 
 9. As those who try to stand in thy way when 
 thou art proceeding according to right reason, 
 will not be able to turn thee aside from thy proper 
 action, so neither let them drive thee from thy 
 benevolent feelings towards them, but be on thy 
 guard equally in. both matters, not only in the 
 matter of steady judgment and action, but also in 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XI. 275 
 
 the matter of gentleness towards those who try to 
 hinder or otherwise trouble thee. For this also is 
 a weakness, to be vexed at thera, as well as to 
 be diverted from thy course of action and to give 
 way through fear ; for both are equally deserters 
 from their post, the man who does it through 
 fear, and the man who is alienated from him w r ho 
 is by nature a kinsman and a friend. 
 
 10. There is no nature which is inferior to an. 
 for the arts imitate the natures of things. But it 
 this is so. that nature which is the most perfect 
 and the most comprehensive of all natures, cannot 
 fall short of the skill of art. Now all arts do the 
 inferior things for the sake of the superior ; there- 
 fore the universal nature does so too. And indeed 
 hence is the origin of justice, and in justice the 
 other virtues have their foundation : for justice 
 will not be observed, if we either care for middle 
 things [things indifferent], or are easily deceived 
 and careless and changeable, (v. 16. 80 ; vn. 
 55.) 
 
 11. If the things do not come to thee, the pur- 
 suits and avoidances of which disturb thee, still 
 in a manner thou goest to them. Let then thy 
 judgment about them be at rest, and they will 
 remain quiet, and thou wilt not be seen either 
 pursuing or avoiding. 
 
276 M. ANTONINUS. XI. 
 
 12. The spherical form of the soul maintains its 
 figure, when it is neither extended towards any 
 object, nor contracted inwards, nor dispersed nor 
 sinks down, but is illuminated by light, by which 
 it sees the truth, the truth of all things and the 
 truth that is in itself, (vur. 41. 45 ; xn. 3.) 
 
 13. Suppose any man shall despise me. Let 
 him look to that himself. But I will look to this, 
 that I be not discovered doing or saying anything 
 deserving of contempt. Shall any man hate me ? 
 Let him look to it. But I will be mild and be- 
 nevolent towards every man and even to him, 
 ready to show him his mistake, not reproachfully, 
 nor yet as making a display of my endurance, but 
 nobly and honestly, like the great Phocion, unless 
 indeed he only assumed it. For the interior 
 [parts] ought to be such, and a man ought to be 
 seen by the gods neither dissatisfied with anything 
 nor complaining. For what evil is it to thee, if 
 thou art now doing what is agreeable to thy own 
 nature and art satisfied with that which at this 
 moment is suitable to the nature of the universe, 
 since thou art a human being placed at thy post 
 fto endure whatever is for the common advantage ? 
 
 14. Men despise one another and flatter one 
 another ; and men wish to raise themselves above 
 one another and crouch before one another. 
 
M . AN T ON IN US. XI. 277 
 
 15. How unsound and insincere is he who says, 
 I have determined to deal with thee in a fair way. 
 — What art thou doing, man ? There is no oc- 
 casion to give this notice. It will soon show 
 itself by acts. The voice ought to be plainly 
 written on the forehead. Such as a man's charac- 
 ter is,f he immediately shows it in his eyes, just 
 as he who is beloved forthwith reads everything 
 in the eyes of lovers. The man who is honest 
 and good ought to be exactly like a man who 
 smells strong, so that the bystander as soon 
 as he comes near him must smell whether he 
 choose or not. But the affectation of simplicity is 
 like a crooked stick. 4 Nothing is more disgraceful 
 than a wolfish friendship [false friendship]. Avoid 
 this most of all. The good and simple and 
 benevolent show all these things in the eyes, and 
 there is no mistaking. 
 
 16. As to living in the best way, this power is 
 in the soul, if it be indifferent to things which are 
 indifferent. And it will be indifferent, if it looks 
 on each of these things separately and all together, 
 
 4 Instead of oKaKyri Sauraaise reads mcafijlri. There is 
 a Greek proverb, OKayfidv £,vkov ov6ettot' bp&bv : " You 
 cannot make a crooked stick straight." 
 
 The wolfish friendship is an allusion to the fable of 
 the sheep and the wolves. 
 
278 M. ANTONINUS. XI. 
 
 and if it remembers that not one of them pro- 
 duces in us an opinion about itself, nor comes to 
 us ; but these things remain immovable, and it is 
 we ourselves who produce the judgments about 
 them, and, as we may say, write them in ourselves, 
 it being in our power not to write them, and it 
 being in our power, if perchance these judgments 
 have imperceptibly got admission to our minds, 
 to wipe them out ; and if we remember also that 
 such attention will only be for a short time, and 
 then life will be at an end. Besides what trouble 
 is there at all in doing this ? For if these things 
 are according to nature, rejoice in them, and they 
 will be easy to thee: but if contrary to nature, 
 seek what is conformable to thy own nature, and 
 strive towards this, even if it bring no reputation ; 
 for every man is allowed to seek his own good. 
 
 17. Consider whence each thing is come, and 
 of what it consists,! and into what it changes, and 
 what kind of a thing it will be when it has 
 changed, and that it will sustain no harm. 
 
 18. [If any have offended against thee, consider 
 first] : What is my relation to men, and that we 
 are made for one another ; and in another respect, 
 I was made to be set over them, as a ram over the 
 flock or a bull over the herd. But examine the 
 matter from first principles, from this : If all 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XI. 279 
 
 things are not mere atoms, it is nature which 
 orders all things : if this is so, the inferior things 
 exist for the sake of the superior and these for 
 the sake of one another, (n. 1 ; ix. 39 ; v. 1 6 ; 
 hi. 4.) 
 
 Second, consider what kind of men they are 
 at table, in bed, and so forth : and particularly, 
 under what compulsions in respect of opinions 
 they are ; and as to their acts, consider with what 
 pride they do what they do. (viii. 14; ix. 84.) 
 
 Third, that if men do rightly what they do, we 
 ought not to be displeased ; but if they do not 
 right, it is plain that they do so involuntarily and 
 in ignorance. For as every soul is unwillingly 
 deprived of the truth, so also is it unwillingly 
 deprived of the power of behaving to each man 
 according to his deserts. Accordingly men are 
 pained when they are called unjust, ungrateful, 
 and greedy, and in a word wrongdoers to their 
 neighbors, (vil. 62, 63 ; II. 1 ; VII. 26 ; VIII. 29.) 
 
 Fourth, consider that thou also doest many 
 things wrong, and that thou art a man like oth- 
 ers ; and even if thou dost abstain from certain 
 faults, still thou hast the disposition to commit 
 them, though either through cowardice, or con- 
 ceni about reputation or some such mean motive, 
 thou dost abstain from such faults, (i. 17.) 
 
280 M. ANTONINUS. XI. 
 
 Fifth, consider that thou dost not even under- 
 stand whether men are doing wrong or not, for 
 many things are done with a certain reference to 
 circumstances. And in short, a man must learn 
 a great deal to enable him to pass a correct judg- 
 ment on another man's acts. (rx. 38 ; iv. 51.) 
 
 Sixth, consider when thou art much vexed or 
 grieved, that man's life is only a moment, and 
 after a short time we are all laid out dead, 
 (vn. 58 ; iv. 48.) 
 
 Seventh, that it is not men's acts which dis- 
 turb us, for th*ose acts have their foundation in 
 men's ruling principles, but it is our own opin- 
 ions which disturb us. Take away these opin- 
 ions then, and resolve to dismiss thy judgment 
 about an act as if it were something grievous, and 
 thy anger is gone. How then shalt thou take 
 away these opinions ? By reflecting that no 
 wrongful act of another brings shame on thee : 
 for unless that which is shameful is alone bad, 
 thou also must of necessity do many things 
 wrong and become a robber and . everything 
 else. (v. 25 ; vn. 16.) 
 
 Eighth, consider how much more pain is 
 brought on us by the anger and vexation caused 
 by such acts than by the acts themselves, at 
 which we are angry and vexed, (iv. 39. 49 ; 
 vn. 24.) 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XI. 281 
 
 Ninth, consider that benevolence is invinci- 
 ble, if it be genuine, and not an affected smile 
 and acting ""a~ , paTtr' J *For what will the most vio- 
 lent man do to thee, if thou continuest to be of 
 a benevolent disposition towards him, and if, as 
 opportunity offers, thou gently admonishest him 
 and calmly correctest his en-ors at the very time 
 when he is trying to do thee harm, saying, Not 
 so, my child : we are constituted by nature for 
 something else : I shall certainly not be injured, 
 but thou art injuring thyself, my child. — And 
 show him with gentle tact and by^ general prin- 
 ciples that this is so, and that even bees do not 
 do as he does, nor any animals which are formed 
 by nature to be gregarious. And thou must do 
 this neither with any double meaning nor in the 
 way of reproach, but affectionately and without 
 any rancour in thy soul ; and not as if thou wert 
 lecturing him, nor yet that any bystander may 
 admire, but either when he is alone, and if others 
 are present . . . 5 
 
 Remember these nine rules, as if thou hadst 
 received them as a gift from the Muses, and 
 begin at last to be a man, so long as thou livest. 
 But thou must equally avoid nattering men and 
 being vexed at them, for both are unsocial and 
 
 5 It appears that there is a defect in the text here. 
 
 # 
 
282 M. A NT XI XL'S. XI. 
 
 lead to harm. And let this truth be present to 
 thee in the excitement of anger, that to be moved 
 by passion is not manly, but that mildness and 
 gentleness, as they are more agreeable to human 
 nature, so also are they more manly ; and he 
 who possesses these qualities possesses strength, 
 nerves, and courage, and not the man who is 
 subject to fits of passion and discontent. For 
 in the same degree in which a man's mind is 
 nearer to freedom from all passion, in the same 
 degree also is it nearer to strength : and as the 
 sense of pain 'is a characteristic of weakness, so 
 also is anger. For he who yields to pain and he 
 who yields to anger, both are wounded and both 
 submit. But if thou wilt, receive also a tenth 
 present from the leader of the Muses [Apollo], 
 and it is this — that to expect bad men not to 
 do wrong is madness, for he who expects this 
 desires an impossibility. But to allow men to 
 behave so to others, and to expect them not to 
 do thee any wrong, is irrational and tyrannical. 
 19. There are four principal aberrations of 
 the superior faculty against which thou shouldst 
 be constantly on thy guard, and when thou hast 
 detected them, thou shouldst wipe them out and 
 say on each occasion thus : this thought is not 
 necessary : this tends to destroy social union : 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XI, 283 
 
 this which thou art going to say comes not from 
 the real thoughts ; for thou shouldst consider it 
 among the most absurd of things for a man not 
 to speak from his real thoughts. But the fourth 
 is when thou shalt reproachf thyself for any- 
 thing, for this is an evidence of the diviner part 
 within thee being overpowered and yielding to 
 the less honorable and to the perishable part, 
 the body, and to its gross pleasures, (iv. 24 ; 
 n. 16.) 
 
 20. Thy aerial part and all the fiery parts 
 which are mingled in thee, though by nature they 
 have an upward tendency, still in obedience to 
 the disposition of the universe they are over- 
 powered here in the compound mass [the body]. 
 And also the whole of the earthy part in thee 
 and the watery, though their tendency is down- 
 ward, still are raised up and occupy a position 
 which is not their natural one. In this manner 
 then the elemental parts obey the universal, for 
 when they have been fixed in any place perforce 
 they remain there until again the universal shall 
 sound the signal for dissolution. Is it not then 
 strange that thy intelligent part only should be 
 disobedient and discontented with its own place ? 
 And yet no force is imposed on it, but only those 
 things which are conformable to its nature : still 
 
284 M. ANTONINUS. XL 
 
 it does not submit, but is carried in tbe opposite 
 direction. For the movement towards injustice 
 and intemperance and to anger and grief and 
 fear is nothing else than the act of one who 
 deviates from nature. And also when the ruling 
 faculty is discontented with anything that hap- 
 pens, then too it deserts its post : for it is con- 
 stituted for piety and reverence towards the gods 
 no less than for justice. For these qualities also 
 are comprehended under the generic term of 
 contentment with the constitution of things, and 
 indeed they are prior 6 to acts of justice. 
 
 6 The word npsa^vrspa, which is here translated 
 " prior," may also mean " superior : " but Antoninus 
 seems to say that piety and reverence of the gods pre- 
 cede all virtues, and that other virtues are derived from 
 them, even justice, which in another**passage (xi. 10) 
 he makes the foundation of all virtues. The ancient 
 notion of justice is that of giving to every one his due. 
 It is not a legal definition, as some have supposed, but a 
 moral rule which law cannot in all cases enforce. Be- 
 sides law has its own rules, which are sometimes moral 
 and sometimes immoral ; but it enforces them all simply 
 because they are general rules, and if it did not or could 
 not enforce them, so far Law would not be Law. Jus- 
 tice, or the doing what is just, implies a universal rule 
 and obedience to it ; and as we all live under universal 
 Law, which commands both our body and our intelli- 
 gence, and is the law of our nature, that is the law of 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XI. 285 
 
 21. He who has not one and always the same 
 object in life, cannot be one and the same all 
 through his life. But what I have said is not 
 enough, unless this also is added, what this object 
 ought to be. For as there is not the same opin- 
 ion about all the things which in some way or 
 other are considered by the majority to be good, 
 but only about some certain things, that is, things 
 which concern the common interest ; so also 
 ought we to propose to ourselves an object which 
 shall be of a common kind [social] and political. 
 For he who directs all his own efforts to this 
 object, will make all his acts alike, and thus will 
 always be the same. 
 
 22. Think of the country mouse and of the 
 town mouse, and of the alarm and trepidation of 
 the town movtSe.' 7 
 
 23. Socrates used to call the opinions of the 
 many by the name of Lainiae, bugbears U 
 frighten children. 
 
 the whole constitution of man, we must endeavour tc 
 discover what this supreme Law is. It is the will of 
 the power that rules all. By acting in obedience to this 
 will, we do justice, and by consequence everything else 
 that we ought to do. 
 
 7 The story is told by Horace in his Satires (n. 6), 
 and by others since, but not better. 
 
286 M . ANT NIN U S . XI. 
 
 24. The Lacedaemonians at their public spec- 
 tacles used to set seats in the shade for strangers, 
 but themselves sat down anywhere. 
 
 25. Socrates excused himself to Perdiccas 8 for 
 not going to him, saying, It is because I would not 
 perish by the worst of all ends, that is, I would 
 not receive a favor and then be unable to return it. 
 
 26. In the writings of the [Ephesians] 9 there 
 was this precept, constantly to think of some one 
 of the men of former times who practised virtue. 
 
 27. The Pythagoreans bid us in the morning 
 look to the heavens that we may be reminded of 
 those bodies which continually do the same things 
 and in the same manner perform their work, and 
 also be reminded of their purity and nudity. For 
 there is no veil over a star. 
 
 28. Consider what a man Sod%ttes was when 
 he dressed himself in a skin, after Xanthippe had 
 taken his cloak and gone out, and what Socrates 
 said to his friends who were ashamed of him and 
 drew back from him when they saw him dressed 
 thus. 
 
 29. Neither in writing: nor in reading wilt thou 
 
 8 Perhaps the emperor made a mistake here, for other 
 writers say that it was Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, 
 who invited Socrates to Macedonia. 
 
 9 Gataker suggested 'EiriKovpeiuv for 'Efpeciuv. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XI. 287 
 
 be able to lay down rules for others before thou 
 shalt have first learned to obey rules thyself. 
 Much more is this so in life. 
 
 30. A slave thou art: free speech is not for 
 thee. 
 
 31. And my heart laughed within. (Od. 
 
 tx. 413.) 
 
 32. And virtue they will curse speaking harsh 
 
 words. (Hesiod, Works and Days, 184.) 
 
 33. To look for the fig in winter is a madman's 
 act : such is he who looks for his child when it is 
 no longer allowed. (Epictetus, in. 24.) 
 
 34. When a man kisses his child, said Epicte- 
 tus, he should whisper to himself, " To-morrow 
 perchance thou wilt die " — But those are words 
 of bad omen — " No word is a word of bad 
 omen," said Epictetus, " which expresses any 
 work of nature ; or if it is so, it is also a word 
 of bad omen to speak of the ears of corn being 
 reaped." (Epictetus, in. 24.) 
 
 35. The unripe grape, the ripe bunch, the 
 dried grape, all are changes, not into nothing, but 
 into something which exists not yet. (Epictetus, 
 in. 24.) 
 
 36. No man can rob us of our free will. 
 (Epictetus, in. 22.) 
 
 37. Epictetus also said, a man must discover 
 
288 M.ANTONINUS. XI. 
 
 an art [or rules] with respect to giving his as- 
 sent ; and in respect to his movements he must 
 be careful that they be made with regard to cir- 
 cumstances, that they be consistent with social 
 interests, that they have regard to the value of 
 the object ; and as to sensual desire, he should 
 altogether keep away from it ; and as to avoid- 
 ance, [aversion] he should not show it with re- 
 spect to any of the things which are not in our 
 power. 
 
 38. The dispute then, he said, is not about 
 any common matter, but about being mad or not. 
 
 89. Socrates used to say, What do you want ? 
 Souls of rational men or irrational ? — Souls of 
 rational men — Of what rational men ? Sound or 
 unsound ? — Sound — Why then do you not seek 
 for them ? — Because we have them — Why then 
 do you fight and quarrel ? 
 
XII. 
 
 > LL those things at which thou wish- 
 est to arrive by a circuitous road, 
 thou . canst have now, if thou dost 
 not refuse them to thyself. And 
 this means, if thou wilt take no notice of all the 
 past, and trust the future to providence, and di- 
 rect the present only conformably to piety and jus- 
 tice. Conformably to piety, that thou inayst be 
 content with the lot which is assigned to thee, for 
 nature designed it for thee and thee for it. Con- 
 formably to justice, that thou mayst always speak 
 the truth freely and without disguise, and do the 
 things which are agreeable to law and according 
 to the worth of each. And let neither another 
 man's wickedness hinder thee, nor opinion nor 
 voice, nor yet the sensations of the poor flesh 
 which has grown about thee ; for the passive part 
 will look to this. If then, whatever the time may 
 be when thou shalt be near to thy departure, neg- 
 lecting everything else thou shalt respect only thy 
 19 
 
290 M. ANTONINUS. XII. 
 
 ruling faculty and the divinity within thee, and 
 if thou shalt be afraid not because thou must 
 some time cease to live, but if thou shalt fear 
 never to have begun to live according to nature 
 — then thou wilt be a man worthy of the uni- 
 verse which has produced thee, and thou wilt 
 cease to be a stranger in thy native land, and to 
 wonder at things which happen daily as if they 
 were something unexpected, and to be dependent 
 on this or that. 
 
 2. God sees the minds (ruling principles) of 
 all men bared of the material vesture and rind 
 and impurities. With his intellectual part alone 
 he touches the intelligence only which has flowed 
 and been derived from himself into these bodies. 
 And if thou also usest thyself to do this, thou wilt 
 rid thyself of thy much trouble. For he who 
 regards not the poor flesh which envelopes him, 
 surely will not trouble himself by looking after 
 raiment and dwelling and fame and such like 
 externals and show. 
 
 3. The things are three of which thou art 
 composed, body, breath [life], intelligence. Of 
 these the first two are thine, so far as it is thy 
 duty to take care of them ; but the third alone is 
 propeily thine. Therefore if thou shalt separate 
 from thyself, that is, from thy understanding, what- 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XII. 291 
 
 ever others do or say, and whatever thou hast 
 done or said thyself, and whatever future things 
 trouble thee because they may happen, and what- 
 ever in the body which envelopes thee or in the 
 breath, [life] which is by nature associated with 
 the body, is attached to thee independent of thy 
 will, and whatever the external circumfluent vor- 
 tex whirls round, so that the intellectual power 
 exempt from the things of fate can live pure and 
 free by itself, doing what is just and accepting 
 what happens and saying the truth : if thou wilt 
 separate, I say, from this ruling faculty the things 
 which are attached to it by the impressions of 
 sense, and the things of time to come and of time 
 that is past, and wilt make thyself like Empe- 
 docles' sphere, — 
 
 All round, and in its joyous rest reposing 
 
 and if thou shalt strive to live only what is really 
 thy life, that is, the present — then thou wilt be 
 able to pass that portion of life which remains for 
 thee up to the time of thy death, free from per- 
 turbations, nobly, and obedient to thy own daemon 
 [to the god that is within thee], (n. 13. 17 : in. 
 5, 6; xi. 12.) 
 
 1 The verse of Empedocles is corrupt in Antoninus. 
 It has been restored by Peyron thus : 
 
 S0aipof Kvn?\,0Tep7j<; fioviri irepiy?]$ei yaiuv. 
 
292 M. ANTONINUS/ XII. 
 
 4. I have often wondered how it is that every 
 man loves himself more than all the rest of men, 
 but yet sets less value on his own opinion of him- 
 self than on the opinion of others. If then a god 
 or a wise teacher should present himself to a man 
 and bid him to think of nothing and to design 
 nothing which he would not express as soon as he 
 conceived it, he could not endure it even for a 
 single day. So much more respect have we to 
 what our neighbors shall think of us than to what 
 we shall think of ourselves. 
 
 5. How can it be that the gods after having 
 arranged all things well and benevolently for man- 
 kind, have overlooked this alone, that some men 
 and very good men, and men who, as we may say, 
 have had most communion with the divinity, and 
 through pious acts and religious observances have 
 been most intimate with the divinity, when they 
 have once died should never exist again, but 
 should be completely extinguished ? 
 
 But if this is so, be assured that if it ought to 
 have been otherwise, the gods would have done it. 
 For if it were just, it would also be possible ; and 
 if it were according to nature, nature would have 
 had it so. But because it is not so, if in fact it is 
 not so, be thou convinced that it ought not to have 
 been so : — for thou seest even of thyself that in 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XII. 293 
 
 this inquiry thou art disputing with the deity; 
 and we should not thus dispute with the gods, 
 unless they were most excellent and most just ; — 
 but if this is so, they would not have allowed any- 
 thing in the ordering of the universe to be neg- 
 lected unjustly and irrationally. 
 
 6. Practise thyself even in the things which 
 thou despairest of accomplishing. For even the 
 left hand, which is ineffectual for all other things 
 for want of practice, holds the bridle more vigor- 
 ously than the right hand ; for it has been prac- 
 tised in this. 
 
 7. Consider in what condition both in body and 
 soul a man should be when he is overtaken by 
 death ; and consider the shortness of life, the 
 boundless abyss of time past and future, the 
 feebleness of all matter. 
 
 8. Contemplate the formative principles [forms] 
 of things bare of their coverings ; the purposes of 
 actions ; consider what pain is, what pleasure is, 
 and death, and fame ; who is to himself the cause 
 of his uneasiness ; how no man is hindered by an- 
 other ; that everything is opinion. 
 
 9. In the application of thy principles thou 
 must be like the pancratiast, not like the gladia- 
 tor ; for the gladiator lets fall the sword which 
 he uses and is killed ; but the other always has 
 
294 M. ANTONINUS. XII. 
 
 his hand, and needs to do nothing else than 
 use it. 
 
 10. See what things are in themselves, dividing 
 them into matter, form and purpose. 
 
 11. "What a power man has to do nothing ex- 
 cept what God will approve, and to accept all that 
 God may give him. 
 
 12. With respect to that which happens con- 
 formably to nature, we ought to blame neither 
 gods, for they do nothing wrong either voluntarily 
 or involuntarily, nor men, for they do nothing 
 wrong except involuntarily. Consequently we 
 should blame nobody, (n. 11, 12, 13 ; vn. 62 ; 
 vni. 17.) 
 
 13. How ridiculous and what a stranger he is 
 who is surprised at anything which happens in 
 life. 
 
 14. Either there is a fatal necessity and invin- 
 cible order, or a kind providence, or a confusion 
 without a purpose and without a director. If 
 then there is an invincible necessity, why dost 
 thou resist? But if there is a providence which 
 allows itself to be propitiated, make thyself 
 worthy of the help of the divinity. But if 
 there is a confusion without a governor, be content 
 that in such a tempest thou hast in thyself a cer- 
 tain ruling intelligence. And even if the tempest 
 
M.ANTONINUS. XII. 295 
 
 carry thee away, let it carry away the poor flesh, 
 the breath, everything else ; for the intelligence at 
 least it will not" carry away. 
 
 1 5. Does the light of the lamp shine without 
 losing its splendor until it is extinguished ; and 
 shall the truth which is in thee and justice and 
 temperance be extinguished [before thy death] ? 
 
 16. When a man has presented the appearance 
 of having done wrong, [say,] How then do I know 
 if this is a wrongful act ? And even if he has 
 done wrong, how do I know that he has not con- 
 demned himself? and so this is like tearing his 
 own face. Consider that he, who would not have 
 the bad man do wrong, is like the man who would 
 not have the fig-tree to bear juice in the figs and 
 infants to cry and the horse to neigh, and what- 
 ever else must of necessity be. For what must a 
 man do who has such a character ? If then thou 
 art irritable,! cure this man's disposition. 2 
 
 17. If it is not right, do not do it: if it is not 
 true, do not say it. [For let thy efforts be. — ] 3 
 
 18. In everything always observe what the 
 thing is which produces for thee an appearance, 
 
 2 The interpreters translate yopyog by the words " acer, 
 validusque," and "skilful." But in Epictetus yopyfc 
 means "vehement," "prone to anger," "irritable." 
 
 3 There is something wrong here, or incomplete. 
 
296 M. ANTONINUS. XII. 
 
 and resolve it by dividing it into the formal, the 
 material, the purpose, and the time within which 
 it must end. 
 
 19. Perceive at last that thou hast in thee 
 something better and more divine than the 
 things which cause the various affects, and as it 
 were pull thee by the strings. What is there 
 now in my mind ? is it fear, or suspicion, or de- 
 sire, or anything of the kind ? (v. 1 ] .) 
 
 20. First, do nothing inconsiderately, nor with- 
 out a purpose. Second, make thy acts refer to 
 nothing else than to a social end. 
 
 21. Consider that before long thou wilt be no- 
 body and nowhere, nor will any of the things ex- 
 ist which thou now seest, nor any of those who 
 are now living. For all things are formed by 
 nature to change and be turned and to perish in 
 order that other things in continuous succession 
 may exist. 
 
 22. Consider that everything is opinion, and 
 opinion is in thy power. Take away then, when 
 thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a mariner, 
 who has doubled the promontory, thou wilt find 
 calm, everything stable, and a waveless bay. 
 
 23. Any one activity whatever it may be, when 
 it has ceased at its proper time, suffers no evil be- 
 cause it has ceased ; nor he who has done this act, 
 
31. ANTONINUS. XII. 297 
 
 does he suffer any evil for this reason that the act 
 has ceased. In like manner then the whole which 
 consists of all the acts, which is our life, if it 
 cease at its proper time, suffers no evil for this 
 reason that it has ceased ; nor he who has termi- 
 nated this series at the proper time, has he been 
 ill dealt with. But the proper time and the limit 
 nature fixes, sometimes as in old age the peculiar 
 nature of man, but always the universal nature, 
 by the change of whose parts the whole universe 
 continues ever young and perfect. And every- 
 thing which is useful to the universal is always 
 good and in season. Therefore the termination 
 of life for every man is no evil, because neither is 
 it shameful, since it is both independent of the 
 will and not opposed to the general interest, but 
 it is good, since it is seasonable and profitable to 
 and congruent with the universal. For thus too 
 he is moved by the deity who is moved in the 
 same manner with the deity and towards the 
 same things in his mind. 
 
 24. These three principles thou must have in 
 readiness. In the things which thou doest do 
 nothing either inconsiderately or otherwise than 
 as justice herself would act ; but with respect to 
 what may happen to thee from without, consider 
 that it happens either by chance or according to 
 
298 M. ANTONINUS. XII. 
 
 providence, and thou must neither blame chance 
 nor accuse providence. Second, consider what 
 every being is from the seed to the time of ita 
 receiving a soul, and from the reception of a soul 
 to the giving back of the same, and of what things 
 every being is compounded and into what things 
 it is resolved. Third, if thou shouldst suddenly 
 be raised up above the earth, and shouldst look 
 down on human things, and observe the variety 
 of them how great it is, and at the same time also 
 shouldst see at a glance how great is the number 
 of beings who dwell all around in the air and the 
 aether, consider that as often as thou shouldst be 
 raised up, thou wouldst see the same things, same- 
 ness of form and shortness of duration. Are 
 these things to be proud of? 
 
 25. Cast away opinion : thou art saved. Who 
 then hinders thee from casting it away ? 
 
 26. When thou art troubled about anything, 
 thou hast forgotten this, that all things happen 
 according to the universal nature ; and forgotten 
 this, that a man's wrongful act is nothing to thee ; 
 and further thou hast forgotten this, that every- 
 thing which happens, always happened so and will 
 happen so, and now happens so everywhere ; for- 
 gotten this too, how close is the kinship between 
 a man and the whole human race, for it is a com- 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XII. 299 
 
 munity, not of a little blood or seed, but of intel- 
 ligence. And thou hast forgotten this too, that 
 every man's intelligence is a god, and is an efflux 
 of the deity ; and forgotten this, that nothing is a 
 man's own, but that his child and his body and 
 his very soul came from the deity ; forgotten this, 
 that everything is opinion ; and lastly thou hast 
 forgotten that every man lives the present time 
 only, and loses only this. 
 
 27. Constantly bring to thy recollection those 
 who have complained greatly about anything, 
 those who have been most conspicuous by the 
 greatest fame or misfortunes or enmities or for- 
 tunes of any kind : then think where are they all 
 now ? Smoke and ash and a tale, or not even a 
 tale. And let there be present to thy mind also 
 everything of this sort, how Fabius Catullinus 
 lived in the* country, and Lucius Lupus in his 
 gardens, and Stertinius at Baiae, and Tiberius at 
 Capreae and Velius Rufus [or Rufus at Velia] ; 
 and in fine think of the eager pursuit of anything 
 conjoined with pride ; and how worthless every- 
 thing is after which men violently strain ; and how 
 much more philosophical it is for a man in the 
 opportunities presented to him to show himself 
 just temperate, obedient to the gods, and to do 
 this with all simplicity : for the pride which is 
 
300 M. ANTONINUS. XII. 
 
 proud of its want of pride is the most intolerable 
 of all. 
 
 28. To those who ask, Where hast thou seen 
 the gods or how dost thou comprehend that they 
 exist and so worshippest them, I answer, in the 
 first place, they may be seen even with the eyes ; 4 
 
 4 " Seen even with the eyes." It is supposed that this 
 may be explained by the Stoic doctrine, that the universe 
 is a god (iv. 23), and that the celestial bodies are gods 
 (vm. 19). But the emperor may mean that we know 
 that the gods exist, as he afterwards states it, because 
 we see what they do ; as we know that man lias intellect- 
 ual powers, because we see what he does, and in no other 
 way do we know it. This passage then will agree with 
 the passage in the Epistle to the Romans (i. v. 20), and 
 with the Epistle to the Colossians (i. v. 15), in which 
 Jesus Christ is named " the image of the invisible 
 god ; " and with the passage in the Gospel of St. John 
 (xiv. v. 9). 
 
 Gataker, whose notes are a wonderful collection of 
 learning, and all of it sound and good, quotes a passage 
 of Calvin which is founded on St. Paul's language (Rom. 
 i.e. 20) : " God by creating the universe [or world, 
 mundum], being himself invisible, has presented himself 
 to our eyes conspicuously in a certain visible form." 
 He also quotes Seneca (De Benef. iv. c. 8.): " Quo- 
 cunque te flexeris, ihi ilium videbis occurrentem tibi : 
 nihil ab illo vacat, opus suum ipse implet." Compare 
 also Cicero, De Senectute (c. 22), and Xenophon's 
 Cyropaedia. (vm. 7-) I think that my interpretation of 
 Antoninus is right. 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XII. 301 
 
 in the second place neither have I seen even my 
 own soul and yet I honor it. Thus then with 
 respect to the gods, from what I constantly expe- 
 rience of their power, from this I comprehend 
 that they exist and I venerate them. 
 
 29. The safety of life is this, to examine every- 
 thing all through, what it is itself, what is its ma- 
 terial, what its formal part ; with all thy soul to 
 do justice and to say the truth. What remains 
 except to enjoy life by joining one good thing to 
 another so as not to leave even the smallest inter- 
 vals between ? 
 
 30, There is one light of the sun, though it is 
 distributed over walls, mountains, and other things 
 infinite. There is one common substance, though 
 it is distributed among countless bodies which 
 have their several qualities. There is one soul, 
 though it is distributed among infinite natures 
 and individual circumscriptions [or individuals]. 
 There is one intelligent soul, though it seems to 
 be divided. Now in the things which have been 
 mentioned all the other parts, such as those which 
 are air and substance, are without sensation and 
 have no fellowship : and yet even these parts the 
 intelligent principle holds together and the gravi- 
 tation towards the same. But intellect in a pecul- 
 iar manner tends to that which is of the same kin, 
 
302 M. ANTONINUS. XII. 
 
 and combines with it, and the feeling for com- 
 munion is not interrupted. 
 
 31. What dost thou wish? to continue to exjst? 
 Well, dost thou wish to have sensation ? move- 
 ment ? growth ? and then again to cease to grow ? 
 to use thy speech ? to think ? What is there of 
 all these things which seems to thee worth desir- 
 ing ? But if it is easy to set little value on all 
 these things, turn to that which remains, which is 
 to follow reason and god. But it is inconsistent 
 with honoring reason and god to be troubled be- 
 cause by death a man will be deprived of the 
 other things. 
 
 32. How small a part of the boundless and un- 
 fathomable time is assigned to every man ? for it 
 is very soon swallowed up in the eternal. And 
 how small a part of the whole substance ? and 
 how small a part of the universal soul ? and on 
 what a small clod of the whole earth thou creep- 
 est ? Reflecting on all this consider nothing to be 
 great, except to act as thy nature leads thee, and 
 to endure that which the common nature brings. 
 
 33. How does the ruling faculty make use of 
 itself? for all lies in this. But everything else, 
 whether it is in the power of thy will or not, is 
 only lifeless ashes and smoke. 
 
 34. This reflection is most adapted to move us 
 
M. ANTONINUS. XII. 303 
 
 to contempt of death, that even those who think 
 pleasure to be a good and pain an evil still have 
 despised it. 
 
 35. The man to whom that only is good which 
 comes in due season, and to whom it is the same 
 thing whether he has done more or fewer acts con- 
 formable to right reason, and to whom it makes 
 no difference whether he contemplates the world 
 for a longer or a shorter time — for this man 
 neither is death a terrible thing, (in. 7 ; vi. 23 ; 
 x. 20 ; xii. 23.) 
 
 36. Man, thou hast been a citizen in this great 
 state [the world] : what difference does it make 
 to thee whether for five years [or three] ? for that 
 which is conformable to the laws is just for all. 
 Where is the hardship then, if no tyrant nor yet 
 an unjust judge sends thee away from the state, 
 but nature who brought thee into it ? the same as 
 if a praetor who has employed an actor dismisses 
 him from the stage — " But I have not finished 
 the five acts, but only three of them " — Thou 
 sayest well, but in life the three acts are the whole 
 drama ; for what shall be a complete drama is 
 determined by him who was once the cause of its 
 composition, and now of its dissolution : but thou 
 art the cause of neither. Depart then satisfied, 
 for he also who releases thee is satisfied. 
 

INDEX. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 a6u'i<popa (indifferentia, Cicero) ; things indifferent, nei- 
 ther good nor bad ; the same as fieaa. 
 
 aiaxpog (turpis, Cic J, ugly ; morally ugly. 
 
 airia, cause. 
 
 alnudec, alrwv, to, the formal principle, the cause. 
 
 avafopu, reference, relation to a purpose. 
 
 unop'p'oia, efflux. 
 
 tnrpoaioETa, -a, the things which are not in our will or 
 power. 
 
 apxv, a. first principle. 
 
 arofioi (corpora individua, Cic), atoms. 
 
 airapnELa, est quae parvo contenta omne id respuit quod 
 abundat (Cicero) ; contentment. 
 
 aiiTufiKijc, sufficient in itself; contented. 
 
 ytyvbfieva, ra, things which are produced, come into ex- 
 istence. 
 
 6ai/MJv, god, god in man, man's intelligent principle. 
 
 6ia-&Eaii, disposition, affection of the mind. 
 
 diaipeoig, division of things into their parts, dissection, 
 resolution, analysis. 
 
 dLaleKTiKTj, ars bene disserendi et vera ac falsa dijudicandi 
 (Cic.) 
 
 (5id7,u£7£f, dissolution, the opposite of cvyicpime. 
 
 diavoia, understanding ; sometimes, the mind generally, 
 the whole intellectual power. 
 
 doyfiara (decreta, Cic), principles. 
 
 kyuoaTEia, temperance, self-restraint. 
 
308 INDEX. 
 
 bldog, in divisione formae sunt, quas Graeci tidy vocant; 
 nostri, si qui haec forte tractant, species appellant (Cic) 
 But eldog is used by Epictetus and Antoninus less ex- 
 actly and as a general term, like genus. Index Epict. 
 ed. Schweigh. — '&f tie ye al irpurai ovaiac rcpdg to. aXka 
 eXOVOLV, ovtcj teal to eldog npbg to yevog exei ' vwonelTat 
 yup rd eldog r£> yivzi. (Aristot. Cat. c. 5.) 
 
 eifiapjiivri, (fatalis necessitas, latum, Cic), destiny, neces- 
 sity. 
 
 eKuMoetg, aversions, avoidance, the turning away from 
 things ; the opposite of bpe^eig. 
 
 tfiipvxa, ~d, things which have life. 
 
 kvepyeia, action, activity. 
 
 evvoia, ivvoiai, notio, notiones (Cic), or " notitiae rerum ; " 
 notions of things. (Notionem appello quam Graeci turn 
 evvoiav, turn Tzpokqipiv, Cic.) 
 
 kmaTpo<pf], attention to an object. 
 
 evdvfiia, animi tranquillitas, (Cic.) 
 
 Tjye/iovuidv, to, the ruling faculty; principatus, ("Cicero.) 
 
 ^eupfifiara, percepta (Cic), things perceived, general 
 principles. 
 
 nakog, beautiful. 
 
 KdTafajrpcs, comprehension ; cognitio, perceptio, compre- 
 hensio (Cicero). 
 
 KaTaoKEVT], constitution. 
 
 naTopduoeig, tcaTop$6[uiTa ; recta, recte facta (Cicero) ; 
 right acts, those acts to which we proceed by the right 
 or straight road. 
 
 Koa/iog, order, world, universe. 
 
 Koa^iog, 6 oXog, the universe, that which is the One and 
 the All, (vi. 25.) 
 
 TioycKa, to,, the things which have reason. 
 
 7Myuibg, rational. 
 
 ?u6yog, reason. 
 
 loyog c-izepfia.TUi6g, seminal principle. 
 
 ueaa, to,, things indifferent, viewed with respect to vir- 
 tue. 
 
INDEX. 809 
 
 poepoc, intellectual. 
 
 vofiog, law. 
 
 vovg, intelligence. 
 
 oiTiaig, arrogance, pride. It sometimes means in Anto- 
 ninus the same as TvQog ; but it also means " opinion." 
 
 o'iKovofj.ia (dispositio, ordo, Cic), has sometimes the pe- 
 culiar sense of artifice, or doing something with an 
 apparent purpose different from the real purpose. 
 
 blov, to, the universe, the whole. 
 
 ovra, to., things which exist ; existence, being. 
 
 opefif, desire of a thing, which is opposed to ckkTuois, 
 aversion. 
 
 Spfifj, movement towards an object, appetite ; appetitio, 
 naturalis appetitus, appetitus animi (Cicero). 
 
 ovaia, substance, (vi. 49.) Modern writers sometimes 
 incorrectly translate it " essentia." It is often used by 
 Epictetus in the same sense as v"krj. Aristotle (Cat. 
 c. 5) defines ovaia, and it is properly translated " sub- 
 stantia " (ed. Jul. Pacius). Porphyrius (Isag. c. 2) : 
 7] ovaia uvututo ovaa r£> [irjdlv elvai Tcpb avrfiq yivog }jv t& 
 -yeviKUTarov. 
 
 ■KapaKovlr]-&LK7i 6bvap.LQ, tj, the power which enables us to 
 observe and understand. 
 
 7r«CT£f, passivity, opposed to hepysia. 
 
 ■jiEpiardaEic, circumstances, the things which surround 
 
 us ; troubles, difficulties. 
 Trsnpu[iivT], r), destiny. 
 
 irpoaipeaig, purpose, free will. 
 
 Tzpoaipera, to., things which are within our will or power. 
 
 ■KpoaipeTLKov, to, free will. 
 
 npotieaic;, a purpose, proposition. 
 
 npovoia (providentia, Cic), providence. 
 
 (T/co7r6f, object, purpose. 
 
 oroixdov, element. 
 
 avyKaTU'&saic (assensio, approbatio, Cic), assent; avyna- 
 Tadeoeig (probationes, Gellius, xix. 1). 
 
 cvyKpiaig, the act of combining elements out of which a 
 body is produced, combination. 
 

 A ■ / 
 
 
 
 310 INDEX. 
 
 
 $7iy, matter, material. 
 
 i)h,n6v, to, the material principle. 
 
 bneZalpecig, expeption, reservation ; fisd' vTret-aipioeag, con- 
 ditionally. 
 
 VTrodecig , material to work on ; thing to employ the rea- 
 son on ; proposition, thing assumed as matter for argu- 
 ment and to lead to conclusions. (Quaestionum duo 
 sunt genera ; alteram infinitum, definitum alteram. 
 Definitum est, quod VTrbdeciv Graeci, nos causam : infi- 
 nitum, quod -&EOIV illi appellant, nos propositum possu- 
 mus nominare. Cic. See Aristot. Anal. Post. i. c. 2). 
 
 vnoTajipig, opinion. 
 
 vnoGTaoLg, basis, substance, being (x. 5). Epictetus has 
 t'l rb vnoaTaTMbv nal ovaiudeg. 
 
 i<picTao&ai, to subsist, to be. 
 
 (pavraoiai (visus, Cic); appearances, thoughts, impres- 
 sions (visa animi: Gellius, xix. 1) : Qavraoia, tori 
 tvituolq kv ipvxy. 
 
 (fiavTacfxa, seems to be used by Antoninus in the same 
 sense as tyavTaoia. Epictetus uses only ^avraaia. 
 
 tpavraoTov, that which produces a favraala : ^avraardv Td 
 TTSTroiT/Kog rfjv (j)avraalav aia^r]rbv. 
 
 tyvaig, nature. 
 
 (pvoig, tj tuv ohuv, the nature of the universe. 
 
 ipvxfi, soul, life, living principle. 
 
 fvxn Twjikt), voepd, a rational soul, an intelligent soul. 
 
 THE END.