OFFICIAL DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE EUROPEAN WAR Copyright, 1916, By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. Set up and electrotyped. Published Se StP 28 1916 Nortoooli Jlrcas J. 8. Cushing Co. - Berwick & Smith Co. Norw I. Mass., U.S.A. ►CI ■'. 1378G2 INTRODUCTION In constitutionally governed countries it is customary for the Executive at important times to lay before the Representatives of the people "collected documents" containing the information on which the Government has shaped its foreign policy. In Great Britain these documents are often printed on large sheets of white paper, loosely bound, called "White Papers." If the docu- ments are very important, they are later reprinted in pamphlet form, and are then called by the color of their cover, " Blue Books." At the outbreak of the World War in 1914 several Governments besides that of Great Britain issued pamphlets of collected docu- ments, and these have become known, by the color of their respective bindings, as the German "White Book," the French "Yellow Book," the Russian "Orange Book," and so on. Following the previous customs of their respective countries the several Governments issued more or less exhaustive collections, and in each case were primarily guided by the desire to justify themselves before their own people. In America the British Blue Book won the greatest favor, not only because it became known first but also because of its inherent worth. Its despatches are well written, and sufficiently numerous to tell a consecutive story. The book is well printed, provided with indexes and cross references, and represents the most scholarly work done by any of the European Governments. The German White Book, on the other hand, contains few de- spatches, and these only as illustrations of points made in an exhaust- ive argument. Such a presentation can be convincing only if one has confidence in the honesty of the author. There can be no doubt that as a source book for study the British Parliamentary Papers are superior to the German Papers, but even the British Papers are not, as many people have wished to believe, complete and do not, there- fore, offer the final authority on which scholars can rely. This has been conceded and actually emphasized by so staunch a friend of the Allies as the late Charles Francis Adams. Writing in the Pro- ceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, January, 1915, Mr. Adams said : — "We hear a great deal from those interested in original research of public archives and access thereto, and of dates arbitrarily fixed by the various Foreign Offices at which those archives have been, or are to be, laid open to the investi- gator. It is, however, a bit confounding in this connection to learn, as we now vi Introduction are learning, that, so far at least as the Foreign Office of Great Britain is concerned, the papers there to be found are at times of somewhat secondary importance. A knowledge of the true inwardness of any given situation of a certain sort must be looked for elsewhere. More even than that, the papers on file in the Foreign Office are not unseldom even illusory. The statement is unquestionably star- tling;, and how, it will be asked, did such a condition of affairs come about ? The explanation is curious — English ! For at least two centuries now — indeed ever since the British Foreign Office took its present form — a usage as to cor- respondence has prevailed in connection with it which has now to be reckoned with, a usage in no wise generally understood. As Parliament, far back in the eighteenth century — during in fact the Walpole epoch — gradually assumed the large state functions it has since developed, it became more and more a prac- tice to call on those constituting the Ministry for papers relating to events connected with foreign affairs, especially correspondence. The modern Blue Book was thus gradually evolved. As the practice grew, its inconveniences made themselves felt. Both the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and those with whom he was in correspondence wrote under an ever increasing sense of restraint. A- the British diplomatic service was constituted this, not unnaturally, resulted in two forms of correspondence ami sets of records — first the usual official exchanges, including instructions and despatches subject to parliamentary call through the Blue Book. Meanwhile, on the other hand, a private interchange of letters, frequently familiar in tone as between old friends, or perhaps relatives, would be going on between the representatives at certain of the foreign courts and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. . . . It was, moreover, in times of exigency that recourse was naturally had to this form of communication. . . . Theformal despatches, constituting the great mass of the Foreign Office correspondence — 95 per cent of it, perhaps — were regularly filed in the official archives ; and there they now are. The private communications, however, coming from the important embassies and relating generally to more or less critical situations, were consid- ered as belonging to the First Secretary for the time being. . . . Such were the British usage and understanding. Such are they now." This quotation establishes the presumption that also in the present British Blue Book only a part of the Correspondence that was ex- changed between the British Foreign Office and the British Ambas- sadors and Ministers abroad litis been published. For none of the other books litis completeness bem claimed. The question, therefore, arises whether the study of any one of these books or of all of them together can enable the student to arrive at the truth. The editor believes that this question should be answered in the affirmative. If six or more interested spectators describe one event, no two descriptions may agree. By a judicious comparison of all, however, an impartial observer may come very near to understanding the truth. By noting, moreover, not only what each man says but also what he refrains from saying, it is easy to understand the atti- tude of each toward the event described, and thus to check his credibility. A successful study from this point of view necessitates an intimate familiarity with the documents published by all the European Gov- ernments, and to attain it the documents must be studied in their relation to one another. This is, however, very difficult unless the system of cross references contained in the British Blue Book is extended to cover all the books. The Maemillan edition is the Introduction vii first to do this, and to enable the student to turn at once from one_ book to another and to check the probable accuracy of a Russian presentation, for instance, by comparing it with the British or Ger- man version of the same incident. The several versions are often so different that it becomes neces- sary to adduce proof for the statement that they have reference to the same event. Such proofs are given in the footnotes. A great amount of additional information which the editor had gathered in the course of his studies and which he thought might be helpful to other students is also given in the footnotes. It is, of course, not intended to be exhaustive. There is one other point in which the Macmillan edition differs from the official British publication of The Collected Diplomatic Documents. The latter prints one book after another, complete, beginning with the British Blue Book. This edition, on the other hand, prints the despatches according to dates, and within the dates according to the alphabetical order of the countries which sent or received them. This enables the student to see at a glance the state of the diplomatic activities in the various European capitals on any one day. There are several reasons why this is desirable, but the bare mention of one suffices. The Serbian reply to Austria-Hungary was given on the evening of July 25th. It did not become known in the European Chancel- leries until the afternoon of July 26th, as is stated both in the French Yellow Book and in the Russian Orange Book. Whether the delay was due to Serbian negligence or to Austro-Hungarian interference is not known. As a matter of fact, however, practically all the messages of July 26th, in which the reply is discussed, were based on hearsay and not on a knowledge of the wording of the reply. In the British arrangement of the despatches this and similar facts disappear. In the present arrangement they become immediately apparent. The English translations of the foreign books in the official British version are excellent, and have been followed in this edition through- out. Good translations cannot always be literal translations, and while the editor believes that occasional errors have crept into the Official English version there is no need of a general revision. Serious students, moreover, will prefer to check the accuracy of any given passage of importance themselves by consulting the original. Nor will they be satisfied with reprints in which the possibility of errors cannot be avoided. For this reason photo- graphic reproductions of official copies of the books have been added as an appendix to this edition. 1 This appendix has relieved the editor of a double responsibility, first of vouching for the accuracy of the translation, and secondly of discussing every inaccuracy he discovered however slight it might have been. He has, therefore, drawn attention to mistranslations 1 The Editor was unable to obtain an official Serbian Blue Book, and has substituted an excellent French edition. viii Introduction only when they appeared to him to have a possible bearing on dis- puted points. One instance will illustrate his meaning. In No. 39 of the Austro-Hungarian Red Book Count Berchtold instructs the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London to explain to Sir Edward Grey in detail the dossier "which has been sent to you by mail" ("ilas Ihnen auf dem Postwege vbermittelte Dossier"). This is ren- dered in the official English version "which is being sent to you by mail." Since the question has arisen whether Sir Edward Grey received the dossier before Great Britain declared war on Germany, the change of the past tense in this despatch to the present tense may be important. There are many more points in which this edition differs from others. To students they will be self-explanatory, because they are the result, in every case, of the editor's wish to prepare a serviceable source book, not for partisans but for scholars and intelligent readers. The editor has been content with doing the hard and slow work of collating the despatches and bringing order out of chaos. He has tried to dispel the confusion due to redundance and at times perhaps to wilful misrepresentation. He has cracked the nut, as it were, that the kernel of truth might lie revealed. What this truth is, or what it seems to him to be, he may discuss at some future time. All he wished to do in this book was to make the initial studies for others less arduous and thus to stimulate them to search for the truth themselves. His greatest reward, therefore, will be, if scholars agree that he has succeeded in keeping prejudice out of the book, being fair to all, and preparing that most necessary of all helps to a scholar, a reliable source book. In many doubtful cases the Editor has fortunately had the in- valuable advice of Professor C. A. Beard of Columbia University, whose impartial fairness and keen scent for the truth are well known among scholars and to whom he wishes to express his sincere thanks. EDMUND VON MACH. Cambridge, Mass. June, 191G. LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE CORRESPONDENCE, SHOWING THEIR OFFICIAL POSITIONS 1. GREAT BRITAIN. Lord High Chancellor . . Secretary of State for Foreign • Affairs Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs French Ambassador . . . Russian Ambassador . . . German Ambassador . I ustro- Hungarian Ambassador Belgian Minister .... Serbian Minister .... Viscount Haldane. Sir Edward Grey. Sir A. Nicolson. M. Paul Cambon. M. de Fleuriau (Charge d'Affaires). Count Benckendorff. M. de Etter (Counsellor of Embassy). Prince Lichnowsky. Count Mensdorff. Count de Lalaing. M. Boschkovitch. 2. FRANCE. President of the Republic . President, of the Council ■ Ministers for Foreign Affairs Political Director British Ambassador . Russian Ambassador German Ambassador . . A ustro-H u ngaria n A mbassador Belgian Minister .... Serbian Minister .... M. Poincare. M. Rene Viviani. 1. M. .lunnart. 2. M. Stephen Pichon. 3. M. Rene Viviani. 4. M. Bienvenu-Martin (Acting). 5. M. Doumergue. 6. M. Delcasse. M. Berthelot. Sir Francis Bertie. M. Isvolsky. M. Sevastopoulo (Charge d'Affaires). Baron von Schoen. Count Szecsen. Baron Guillaume. M. Vesnitch. 3. RUSSIA. Minister for Foreign Affairs Minister for War . . . British Ambassador . . French Ambassador . . German Ambassador . . Austro-H ungarian Ambassador Serbian Minister .... M. Sazonof. M. Suchomlinof. Sir George Buchanan. M. Paleologue. Count Pourtales. Count Szapary. Count Czernin (Charge d'Affaires). Dr. M. Spalaikovitch. List of Principal Persons 4. GERMANY. Imperial Chancellor .... Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg. Secretary of State Herr von Jagow. Under-Secretary of State . . . Herr von Zimmermann. British Ambassador .... Sir Edward Goschen. Sir Horace Rumbold (Counsellor of Embassy I. French Ambassador .... M. Jules Cambon. M. cic Manneville (ChargS d'Affaires). Russian Ambassador .... M. Swerbeiev. M. Broniewsky (Charge' d'Affaires). American Ambassador . Mr. Gerard. Austro - Hungarian Ambassador Count Szogyeny. Belgian Minister Baron Beyens. Serbian Charge d' Affaires . . Dr. M. Yovanovitch. French Minister at Munich . M. Allize. French < 'onsul-General at Frank- fort M. Ronssin. 5. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. Secretary <>f State for Foreign Affairs Count Berchtold. Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs .... Baron Macchio. < 'oiint Forgaeh. President of the Ministry of Hungary Count Tisza. British Ambassador .... Sir Maurice de Bunsen. French Ambassador . . . . M. Dumaine. Russian Ambassador .... M. Schebeko. Prince Koudacheff (Charge d'Affaires). American Ambassador . . . Mr. Penfield. Herman Ambassador .... Herr von Tschirscky. Italian Ambassador .... Duke d'Avarna. Belgian Minister Count Errembault de Dudzeele. Sicilian Minister M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch. French Consid-General at Buda- pest M. d'Apchier-le-Maugin. Russian Cimsiil-tti nerul at Finnic M. Salviati. Acting Russian Consid at Prague M. Kazansky. 6. TURKEY. British Chargt d'Affaires French Ambassador Serbian Charge d' Affaires Austrian Consul-General Mr. Beaumont. M. Bompard. M. M. ( reorgevitch. Herr Jehlitschka. BELGIUM. Minister for Fi iijn . [ffairs . Colonial Minister . . . British Minister . . . French Minister .... American Minister . . . German Minister . . . Austro- Hungarian Minister Dutch Minister .... M. Davignon. Baron van der Elst (Seoretarv-General). H. Renkin. Sir Francis Yilliers. "SI. Klobukowski. Mr. Brand Whitlock. Herr von Below Saleske. ( 'mint < larv. M. de Weede. List of Principal Persons 8. SERBIA. Prime Minister M. Pashitch. Acting Prime Minister and Min- ister for Foreign Affairs . Dr. Laza Patchou. British Minister Mr. des Graz. Mr. Crackanthorpe (First Secretary). French Minister M. Boppe. Russian Charge a" Affaires . . M. Strandtman. German Secretary of Legation . Herr von Storck. Austro- Hungarian Minister. . Baron Giesl von Gieslingen. Belgian Minister M. de Welle. Austro- Hungarian Consular '. at Nish Herr Hoflehner. 9. ITALY. Minister for Foreign Affairs British Ambassador . . French Ambassador . . German Ambassador Serbian Minister . . Marquis di San Giuliano. Sir Rennell Rodd. M. Barrere. Herr von Flotow. M. Ljub Michailovitch. 10. SPAIN. Belgian Minister Baron Grenier. 11. DENMARK. French Minister M. Bapst. 12. HOLLAND. Minister for Foreign Affairs . . M. Loudon. French Minister M. Pellet. Belgian Minister Baron Fallon. 13. LUXEMBURG. Minister of State and President of the Government .... Dr. Eyschen. French Minister M. Mollard. German Minister Herr von Buch. 14. NORWAY. French Minister M. Chevalley. 16. SWEDEN. French Minister M. Thiebaut. 16. SWITZERLAND. French Consul-General at Basle M. Farges. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction v List of principal persons mentioned in the correspondence, showing their official positions . . . . . . ix Calendar of despatches sent and received xv Part One. Despatches sent and received at the various Foreign Offices; arranged by names and places; with diaries, summaries of despatches, and footnotes ... 1 Part Two. The parts of the several official publications of diplomatic documents not printed under Part One . . 525 I. The Austro-Hungarian Red Book : Introduction . 525 II. The French Yellow Book : Chapter I, Warnings (1913) 531 III. The German White Book 551 IV. The British Blue Book : Introductory Narrative of Events 561 Part Three. Documents frequently quoted but not contained in the official publications of collected diplomatic docu- MENTS 571 I. The Chancellor's speech, August 4th, 1914 . . 573 II. The " Brussels " documents 577 III. The Allied Answer to the " Brussels " Documents 581 IV. Negotiations of Prince Lichnowsky with Sir Edward Grey 586 V. Documents found in the possession of Mr. Grant- Watson, Secretary of the British Legation . 588 VI. The telegrams and letters exchanged between the Royal and Imperial courts of London, Berlin, AND PeTROGRAD, AND BETWEEN KlXG GEORGE AND President Poincare 500 Index 599 Appendix. The several official publications of collected diplomatic documents in photographic reproduction . . 609 xiii Calendar CT- g m J3 c > o § CO t3 g c 5 3> o ^ -a a> o § & CO —' E < -d M "5. 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Amb. 66 Tokio 69 Berlin 6S Augusl 22 August 20 August 23 August 23 Brussels The Hague 56 Paris and London 57, 58 Paris 59 The Hague 60 Paris 61 The Hague 63, 64 To Entente 65, 06 The Hague 62 Wlitl M-k67 Brit Min. 68 August 7 August 7 August S Augusl 'i August 9 August in August 10 August 10 August 11 August 11 French Min. 69 The Hague 71 The Hague 70 From Sazonof 72 The Hague 73 Paris 74 London 75 From colonies 76 FromA.-H. Min. 77 The Hague 78 To all 79 August 11 August 12 August 12 August 12 August 13 August 16 August 17 August 26 August 28 August 29 August 29 Paris Declaration 160 Sept. 4 Berlin London Sir E. Goschen 160 August 8 Sir M. de Bunsen 161 Sept. 1 Petrograd Belgrade Report from Serbian Min. to Austria 52 August 16 PART ONE DESPATCHES SENT AND RECEIVED AT THE VARIOUS FOREIGN OFFICES; ARRANGED BY NAMES AND PLACES; WITH DIARIES, SUMMARIES OF DE- SPATCHES, AND FOOTNOTES DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE WAR Sunday, June 28, 1914 On this day Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife, the Duchess of Hohen- berg, were murdered in Serajevo. SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreion Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Belgium France Vienna Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia France : From Vienna French Yellow Book No. 7 1 M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, June 28, 1914. News has just arrived at Vienna that the Hereditary Archduke of Austria and his wife have been to-day assasinated at Serajevo by a student belonging to Grahovo. Some moments before the attack to which they fell a victim, they had escaped the explosion of a bomb which wounded several officers of their suite. The Emperor, who is now at Ischl, was immediately informed by telegraph. Dumaine. Monday, June 29, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Austria-Hungary Belgium France Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia 1 For earlier numbers of French Yellow Book, see p. 531 B 1 Belgrade Vienna 2 Official Diplomatic Documents Austria-Hungary : From Belgrade AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 1 Ritter von Storck, Secretary of Legation, to Count Berchtold. Belgrade, June 29, 191 4- Under the terrible shock of yesterday's catastrophe it is diffi- cult for me to give any satisfactory judgment on the bloody drama of Serajevo with the necessary composure and judicial calm. I must ask you, therefore, to allow me for the moment to limit myself to putting on record certain facts. Yesterday, the 15/28, the anniversary of the battle of the Amsel- feld, was celebrated with greater ceremony than usual, and there were celebrations in honour of the Servian patriot, Milos Obilic, who, in 1389 with two companions treacherously stabbed the victorious Murad. Among all Servians, Obilic is regarded as the national hero. In place of the Turks, however, we are now looked on as the hereditary enemy, thanks to the propaganda which has been nourished under the aegis of the Royal Government and the agitation which has for many years been carried on in the press. A repetition of the drama on the field of Kossovo seems, therefore, to have hovered before the minds of the three young criminals of Serajevo, Prineip, Cabrinovic and the third person still unknown, who also threw a bomb. They also shot down an innocent woman, and may therefore think that they have surpassed their model. For many years hatred against the Monarchy has been sown in Servia. The crop has sprung up and the harvest is murder. The news arrived at about 5 o'clock ; the Servian Government at about 10 o'clock caused the Obilic festivities to be officially stopped. They continued, however, unofficially for a considerable time after it was dark. The accounts of eye-witnesses say that people fell into one another's arms in delight, and remarks were heard, such as: "It serves them right, we have been expecting this for a long time," or "This is revenge for the annexation." Serbia : From Vienna Serbian Blue Book No. 1 M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. A*. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, June 16/29, 1914. The Vienna Press asserts that the magisterial enquiry has already shown that the Serajevo outrage was prepared at Belgrade ; further, that the whole conspiracy in its wider issues was organised at Bel- June 30, Serbian Blue Book No. 2 3 grade among youths inspired with the Great Serbian idea, and that the Belgrade Press is exciting public opinion by publishing articles about the intolerable conditions prevailing in Bosnia. Press articles of this kind, according to the Vienna Press, are exercising a strong influence, as Serbian newspapers are being smuggled in large quan- tities into Bosnia. Tuesday, June 30, 1814 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Belgrade Belgium France Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia Vienna, Berlin, Constantinople Austria-Hungary enquires what measures the Serbian Government had taken "to follow up the clues to the crime which notoriously are partly to be found in Serbia." Serbia remarks on the attempt of Austria-Hungary to "represent in the eyes of Europe" the Serajevo murder as "the act of a conspiracy engineered in Serbia." The murder " has not yet engaged the attention of the Serbian police." Austria- Hungary : From Belgrade AuSTRO-HtJNGABIAN RED BOOK No. 2 Ritter Von StorcJc, Secretary of Legation, to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, June 80, 1914- To-day I sent an enquiry to Herre Gruic, General Secretary of the Foreign Office, to ask the obvious question what measures the Royal police had taken, or proposed to take, in order to follow up the clues to the crime which notoriously are partly to be found in Servia. The answer was that the matter has not yet engaged the attention of the Servian police. Serbia : From Vienna Serbian Blue Book No. 2 M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitrh, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, June 17/30, 1914- The tendency at Vienna to represent, in the eyes of Europe, the outrage committed upon the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince as 4 Official Diplomatic Documents the act of a conspiracy engineered in Serbia is becoming more and more apparent. The idea is to use this as a political weapon against us. The greatest attention ought, therefore, to be paid to the tone adopted by our press in its articles on the Serajevo outrage. Serbian Blue Book No. 5 M. Yov. M. Yovanoviteh, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Vienna, June 17/30, 1914- As Count Berchtold was not able to receive me when I called, I spoke to the Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry for Foreign Ail'airs concerning the Serajevo outrage. In the course of our conversation I adopted the following line of argument: — "The Royal Serbian Government condemn most energetically the Serajevo outrage and on their part will certainly most loyally do everything to prove that they will not tolerate within their terri- tory the fostering of any agitation or illegal proceedings calculated to disturb our already delicate relations with Austria-Hungary. I am of opinion that the Government are prepared also to submit to trial any persons implicated in the plot, in the event of its being proved that there are any in Serbia. The Royal Serbian Govern- ment, notwithstanding all the obstacles hitherto placed in their way by Austro-IIungarian diplomacy (creation of an independent Albania, opposition to Serbian access to the Adriatic, demand for revision of the Treaty of Bucharest, the September ultimatum, etc.) remained loyal in their desire to establish a sound basis for our good neighbourly relations. You know that in this direction something has been done and achieved. Serbia intends to con- tinue to work for this object, convinced that, it is practicable and ought to be continued. The Serajevo outrage ought not to and cannot stultify this work." Baron Macchio has taken note of the above and promised to com- municate to Count Berchtold all that I said to him. On the same day I communicated to the French and Russian Am- bassadors the substance of this conversation. I have, etc. From. Berlin Serbian Huk Book No. 3 Dr. M. Yovanoviteh, Charge if Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister fur Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.) Berlin, June 17/30, 1014. The Berlin Press, in publishing articles based on information from Vienna and Budapest, in which the Serajevo outrage is connected with Serbia, is misleading German public opinion. June 30, Serbian Blue Book No. 6 5 Serbian Blue Book No. 4 Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Charge d' 'Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.) Berlin, June 17/30, 1914. The hostility of public opinion in Germany towards us is growing, and is being fostered by false reports coming from Vienna and Buda- pest. Such reports are being diligently spread in spite of the contra- dictions issued by some newspapers and news agencies. From Constantinople Serbian Blue Book No. 6 M. M. Georgevitch, Charge d' Affaires at Constantinople, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister a?id Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Constantinople, June 17/30, 191 4- I had to-day a long conversation with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador here concerning the Serajevo outrage. I expressed the hope that this regrettable event — whatever is said about it in certain diplomatic circles — would not unfavourably influence the relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary which lately had shown con- siderable improvement. He replied that such an eventuality was impossible, and ought not to be contemplated. He was also of opinion that Serbo-Austro- Hungarian relations had much improved lately. He added that the work in that direction ought to be persevered in. He informed me that from his latest conversations with Count Berchtold he understood that the latter was satisfied with the attitude adopted by tlie Serbian Government, and that he, on his part, sincerely desired friendly relations with Serbia. I have, etc. Wednesday, July i, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Uskub, Serbia Belgium France Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia All Legations abroad London, Vienna Austria-Hungary is informed by her consul in Llskub, Serbia, of "the inhuman joy with which the murder of Serajevo was received in Serbia." English newspapers discuss the crime as emanating from Serbian revolu- tionists. 6 Official Diplomatic Documents Austria-Hungary : From Uskub, Serbia AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BoOK No. 3 M. JeMitschka, Consul-General, to Count Berchtold. Uskub, July 1, 191 4. On the 15/28 June the Feast of St. Vitus (Corpus Christi Day), which on this occasion coincided with the 525th anniversary of the battle of the Amselfeld (1389), was for the first time officially cele- brated as the " Festival of the Liberation " of the Servian nation. For four months a special committee had worked at making this celebration an especially solemn and magnificent demonstration of Servian nationality. The propaganda connected with this at the same time extended to Croatia, Dalmatia and Bosnia, but especially to Hungary ; those who took part in it received free passes on the Servian State railways ; food and lodging at low prices, maintenance by public bodies, etc., were promised. The agitation was carried on with energy, and was with a definite end in view. The visitors to the celebration at Prestina were brought in special trains. The various speeches ran riot in historical reminiscences, which were connected with the scene of the celebration, and dealt under different aspects with the well-known theme of the union of all Servia and the "liberation of our brethren in bondage" beyond the Danube and the Save, even as far as Bosnia and Dalmatia. When, during the course of the evening, the news of the horrible crime of which Serajevo had been the scene was circulated, the feeling which animated the fanatical crowd was, to judge by the numerous expressions of applause reported to me by authorities in whom I have absolute confidence, one that I can only characterise as inhuman. In view of this attitude of the population, which was also displayed at I'skub, all attempts of the Servian press to divest Servia of the moral responsibility for a deed which was received by a representa- tive gathering with such unvarnished satisfaction, collapse miserably. Serbia : To All Serbian Legations Abroad Serbian Blue Book No. 8 M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs to all the Royal Serbian Legations abroad. Belgrade, June 18/ July 1, 1914. The Austrian and Hungarian press are blaming Serbia more and more for the Serajevo outrage. Their aim is transparent, viz., to July 1, Serbian Blue Book No. 7 7 destroy that high moral reputation x which Serbia now enjoys in Europe, and to take the fullest advantage politically against Serbia of the act of a young and ill-balanced fanatic. But, in Serbia itself, the Serajevo outrage has been most severely condemned in all circles of society, inasmuch as all, official as well as unofficial, immediately recognised that this outrage would be most prejudicial not only to our good neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary but also to our co-nationalists in that country, as recent occurrences have proved. At a moment when Serbia is doing everything in her power to im- prove her relations with the neighbouring Monarchy, it is absurd to think that Serbia could have directly or indirectly inspired acts of this kind. On the contrary, it was of the greatest interest to Serbia to prevent the perpetration of this outrage. Unfortunately this did not lie within Serbia's power, as both assassins are Austrian subjects. Hitherto Serbia has been careful to suppress anarchic elements, and after recent events she will redouble her vigilance, and in the event of such elements existing within her borders will take the severest measures against them. Moreover, Serbia will do every- thing in her power and use all the means at her disposal in order to restrain the feelings of ill-balanced people within her frontiers. But Serbia can on no account permit the Vienna and Hungarian press to mislead European public opinion, and lay the heavy respon- sibility for a crime committed by an Austrian subject at the door of the whole Serbian nation and on Serbia, who can only suffer harm from such acts and can derive no benefit whatever. Please act in the sense of the above views, and use all available channels in order to put an end as soon as possible to the anti-Serbian campaign in the European press. From London Serbian Blue Book No. 7 M. M. S. Boschkovitch, Minister in London, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.) London, June 18/ July 1, 1914- Basing their information upon reports coming from Austrian sources, nearly all the English newspapers attribute the Serajevo outrage to the work of Serbian revolutionaries. 1 For the reputation of Serbia see the Report on the Balkan Wars by an Inter- national Commission appointed by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and published by the Endowment, Washington, D. C, in the spring of 1914. The murderers of the late king and queen have not yet been brought to justice. 8 Official Diplomatic Documents From Vienna Serbian Blue Book No. 9 M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, June IS/ July 1, 1914. There were demonstrations last night in front of the Legation. I may say that the police showed considerable energy. Order and peace were maintained. As soon as I obtain positive information that the Serbian flag has been burned, 1 I will lodge a complaint in the proper quarters. I will report to you the result. Hatred against Serbians and Serbia is being spread among the people, especially by the lower Catholic circles, the Vienna press, and military circles. Please do what is possible to prevent demonstrations taking place in Serbia, and to induce the Belgrade press to be as moderate as possible in tone. The tendency towards us here is still the same. It is expected that the decision as to the attitude to be adopted towards Serbia and the Serbians will be taken after the funeral. Thursday, July 2, 1014 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreion Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Belgium France Vienna Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia Paris France is informed of great excitement in Vienna, and is quoted as counselling composure in Serbia. France : From Vienna French Yellow Book No. 8 M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, July 2, 1914. The crime of Serajevo arouses the most acute resentment in Austrian military circles, and among all those who are not content to allow Servia to maintain in the Balkans the position which she has acquired. 1 See July 3, Serbian Blue Book No. 11. July 3, Serbian Blue Book No. 11 9 The investigation into the origin of the crime which it is desired to exact from the Government at Belgrade under conditions intoler- able to their dignity would, in case of a refusal, furnish grounds of complaint which would admit of resort to military measures. Dumaine. Serbia : From Paris Serbian Blue Book No. 10 Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Minister at Paris, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.) Paris, June 19/ July 2, 1914. The French Government advise ' us to maintain an attitude of the greatest possible calm and composure in official circles as well as in public opinion. Friday, July 3, 1014 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Belgium France Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia Vienna Austria-Hungary complains officially of the tenor of the Serbian press, while Serbia complains of the Austro-Hungarian press and of a "flag" incident in Vienna which is not clearly described in the despatch. Serbia : From Vienna Serbian Blue Book No. 11 M. Yov. M. Yovanomtch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Vienna, dune 20/ July 3, 1.914- Yesterday being the day on which the remains of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife were brought from Serajevo to Vienna, I gave instructions that the national flag at my residence should be hoisted at half-mast as a sign of mourning. 1 Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 13, July 24. 10 Official Diplomatic Documents Yesterday evening, on this account, protests were made by the concierge, the other tenants, the landlord's agent, and the landlord himself, who demanded the removal of the flag. Explanations proved of no avail, and the assistance of the police authorities was requested. The latter privately asked that the flag should be removed in order to avoid further disorders. The flag was not removed, and accord- ingly noisy demonstrations took place last night in front of the Legation. The conduct of the police was energetic, and nothing happened to the flag or to the building which might constitute an insult. At 2 a.m. the crowd dispersed. To-day's papers, more particularly the popular clerical papers, publish articles under the heading " Provocation by the Serbian Minister," in which the whole incident is falsely described. The flag on the Legation building remained flying the whole time up to the conclusion of the service at the Court Chapel. As soon as this ceremony was concluded, the flag was removed. People from all over the quarter in which I live went to the Prefecture, the Municipality i and the State Council to demand the removal of our flag. The crowd was harangued by Dr. Funder, director In chief of the Catholic Reichspost, Ilermengild Wagner, and Leopold Mandl, all of whom are known as the chief instigators of the attacks in the Austrian and German press against Serbia and the Serbians. I have, etc. Serbian Blue Book No. 12 M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Vienna, June 20/ July 3, 1914- In the course of a conversation which I had with the Under- Secretary at the Foreign Office on the subject of the Serajevo outrage, Baron Macchio severely criticised the Belgrade press and the tone of its articles. 1 He argued that the Belgrade press was under no control and created die Hetzereien gegen die Monarchic. I told him that the press in Serbia was absolutely free, and that as a result private people as well as the Government very often suffered ; there were, however, no means of proceeding against the press except by going to law. I told him that in the present instance the fault lay with the Austrian and Hungarian press which was controlled by the Austro-Hungarian Government. Was it not true that during the past two years the Austrian and Hungarian press had been attacking Serbia, in such a manner as to offend her most sensitive feelings ? The anniversary of the unfortunate war with Bulgaria had taken place a few days ago. I had myself witnessed the great lack of respect with 1 For quotations from the Serbian Press see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, under date of July 25, 1914. See also French Yellow Book No. 14, under date of July 20, 1914. July S, Serbian Blue Book No. 12 11 which the Vienna press had written about Serbia and the Serbian army during and after the war, as well as in many other matters. The press in Belgrade was much more moderate. For instance, in the present case, a terrible crime had been committed and telegrams were being sent from Vienna to the whole world accusing the entire Serbian nation and Serbia of being accomplices of the detestable Serajevo outrage. All the Austrian newspapers were writing in that strain. Was it possible to remain indifferent ? Even if the crimi- nal was a Serbian, the whole Serbian nation and the Kingdom of Serbia could not be held guilty, nor could they be accused in such a manner. Baron Macchio replied, "Nobody accuses the Kingdom of Serbia nor its Government, nor the whole Serbian nation. We accuse those who encourage the Great Serbian scheme and work for the realisation of its object." I told him that it appeared to me that from the first the nationality of the criminal had been deliberately put forward in order to involve Belgrade and to create the impression that the outrage had been organised by Serbia. This had struck me immediately, as I knew that up till now the Serbians of Bosnia had been spoken of as die Bosniaken, bosnische Sprache, die Orthodoxen aus Bosnien, while now it was being said that the assassin was ein Serbe, but not that he was a Bosnian nor that he was an Austrian subject. . . . "I repeat," said Baron Macchio, " that we do not accuse the Serbian Government and the Serbian nation but the various agi- tators. ..." I begged him to use his influence in order to induce the Vienna press not to make matters more difficult by its accusations in this critical moment, when Serbo-Austrian relations were being put to a severe test. I have, etc. Saturday, July 4, 191 5 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Paris Belgium France Berlin Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia Paris, Petrograd M. Poincare, President of France, expresses his sympathy with Austria-Hungary and his belief that Serbia would show great willingness in the "judicial investiga- tion and the prosecution of the accomplices" of the Serajevo criminals. In this view he is seconded by Germany, who for this reason is quoted as expecting no fur- ther complications. 12 Official Diplomatic Documents Austria-Hungary : From Paris AUSTRO-HUN'GARIAN RED BOOK No. 4 Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 4, 1914. To-day I communicated to M. Poincare the thanks of the Imperial and Royal Government for their sympathy. In referring to the hostile demonstrations against Servia among us, lie mentioned that after the murder of President Carnot, all Ital- ians throughout France were exposed to the worst persecutions on the part of the people. I drew his attention to the fact that that crime had no connection with any anti-French agitation in Italy, while in the present case it must be admitted that for years past there has been an agitation in Servia against the Monarchy fomented by every means, legitimate and illegitimate. In conclusion, M. Poincare expressed his conviction that the Ser- vian Government would meet us with the greatest willingness in the judicial investigation and the prosecution of the accomplices. No State could divest itself of this duty. France : From. Berlin French Yellow Book No. 9 M. tie Manneville, French Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 4, 1.914. The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told me yes- terday, and lias to-day repeated to the Russian Ambassador, that he hoped Servia would satisfy the demands which Austria might have to make to her with regard to the investigation and the prose- cution of the accomplices in the crime of Serajevo. He added that he was confident that this would be the case because Servia, if she acted in any other way, would have the opinion of the whole civilised world against her. The German Government do not then appear to share the anxiety which is shown by a part of the German press as To possible tension in the relations between the Governments of Vienna and Belgrade, or at least they do not wish to seem to do so. De Manneville. July 4> Serbian Blue Book No. 14 13 Serbia : From Paris Serbian Blue Book No. 13 Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Minister at Paris, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Paris, June 21 /July 4, 1914. I had a long conversation on Wednesday last on the subject of the Serajevo outrage with M. Viviani, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was somewhat concerned ' at what had occurred. I made use of this opportunity to describe to him briefly the causes which had led to the outrage, and which were to be found, in the first place, in the irksome system of Government in force in the annexed provinces, and especially in the attitude of the officials, as well as in the whole policy of the Monarchy towards anything ortho- dox. He understood the situation, but at the same time expressed the hope that we should preserve an attitude of calm and dignity in order to avoid giving cause for fresh accusations in Vienna. After the first moment of excitement public opinion here has quieted down to such an extent that the Minister-President himself considered it advisable in the Palais de Bourbon to soften the ex- pressions used in the statement which he had made earlier on the subject in the Senate. I have, etc. From Petrogratl Serbian Blue Book No. 14 Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.) Petrograd, June 21 /July 4, 191 4. The Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that the outrages com- mitted upon Serbs in Bosnia will increase the sympathy of Europe for us. He is of opinion that the accusations made against us in Vienna will not obtain credence. The chief thing is for public opin- ion in Serbia to remain calm. Sunday, July 5, 1914 There are no published despatches. 1 The British Premier, Mr. Asquith, in speaking of the murder of Serajevo in the House of Commons, had said that it made him "shudder for the fate of humanity." [London Times, July 1, 1914.] 14 Official Diplomatic Documents Monday, July 6, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches fr Austria-Hungary Nish Belgium France Petrograd Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia Vienna Austria-Hungary is once more informed of the "joy" which the news of the Serajevo murder had created in Serbia. Serbian officials acknowledge the unfortunate tone of the Serbian press, while the Russian foreign minister, M. Sazonof, is troubled by the "attacks of the Aus- trian press against Serbia." Austria-Hungary : From Nish, Serbia AuSTRO-HuNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 5 llcrr Hoflehner, Consular Agent, to Count Bcrclifold. Nish, July 6, 1914- The news of the terrible crime at Serajevo, which had been only too successful, created here a sensation in the fullest sense of the word. There was practically no sign of consternation or indignation; the predominant mood was one of satisfaction and even joy, and this was often quite open without any reserve, and even found expression in a brutal way. This is especially the case with the so-called leading circles — the intellectuals, such as professional politicians, those occu- pied in education, officials, officers and the students. Commercial circles adopted a rather more reserved attitude. All explanations made by official Servian circles or individual higher personalities purporting to give expression to indignation at the crime and condemnation of it, must have the effect of the bitterest irony on anyone who has had an opportunity, during the last few days, of gaining an insight at first hand into the feelings of the educated Servian people. On the day of the crime the undersigned had gone to a coffee garden at about 9 o'clock in the evening without any suspicion of what had happened, and here received from an acquaintance his first information as to the very definite rumour which was being circulated. It was painful in the highest degree to see and hear what a feeling of real delight seized the numerous visitors who were present, with what obvious satisfaction the deed was discussed, and what cries of joy, scorn and contempt burst out — even one who July 6, Serbian Blue Book No. 16 15 has long been accustomed to the expression of political fanaticism which obtains here, must feel the greatest depression at what he ob- served. France : From Petrograd French Yellow Book No. 10 M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petersburgh, July 6, 1914. In the course of an interview which he had asked for with the Austro-Hungarian Charge d'Affaires, M. Sazonof pointed out in a friendly way the disquieting irritation which the attacks of the Austrian press against Servia are in danger of producing in his country. Count Czernin having given him to understand that the Austro- Hungarian Government woidd perhaps be compelled to search for the instigators of the crime of Serajevo on Servian territory, M. Sazonof interrupted him : "No country," he said, "has had to suffer more than Russia, from crimes prepared on foreign territory. Have we ever claimed to employ in any country whatsoever the procedure with which your papers threaten Servia? Do not embark on such a course." May this warning not be in vain. Paleologue. Serbia : From Vienna Serbian Blue Book No. 15 M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, June 23/ July 6, 1914- The excitement in military and Government circles against Serbia is steadily growing owing to the tone of our press, which is diligently exploited by the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Belgrade. Serbian Blue Book No. 16 M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister arid Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Vienna, June 23/ July 6, 1914. The principal lines and tendencies to be found in the articles of the Vienna press on the subject of the Serajevo outrage are as fol- lows : — 16 Official Diplomatic Documents As long ago as Sunday afternoon, June 25/28 last, when the Vienna newspapers issued extra editions regarding the outrage upon the Crown Prince, the headlines announced that both the perpetrators were Serbians ; moreover, this was done in such a manner as to leave the impression that they were Serbs from Serbia proper. In the later reports, which described the outrage, there was a marked tendency to connect it with Serbia. Two circumstances were especially emphasised and were intended to indicate Belgrade as the place of origin of the outrage, viz. : (1) the visit to Belgrade of both of the perpetrators ; and (2) the origin of the bombs. As the third and last link in this chain of evidence, the Vienna papers began to publish the evidence given by the assassins at the trial. It was characteristic to find that the Hungarian Korrespondenz- bureau, and the Hungarian newspapers, especially the Az Eszt were alone in a position to know all about this "evidence." This evidence mainly tends to show : (1) that it has been established that the perpetrators, while in Belgrade, associated with the comitadji Mihaylo Ciganovitch; and (2) that the organiser and instigator of the outrage was Major Pribitchevitch. Another tendency became apparent at the same time, viz. : to hold the "Narodna Odbrana" 1 responsible for this outrage. Fur- ther, on Friday last, the latest announcement which the Hungarian Korrespondenzbureau made to the newspapers stated : — "The enquiries made up to the present prove conclusively that this outrage is the work of a conspiracy. Besides the two perpetra- tors, a large number of persons have been arrested, mostly young men, who are also, like the perpetrators, proved to have been em- ployed by the Belgrade Narodna Odbrana in order to commit the outrage, and who were supplied in Belgrade with bombs and re- volvers." On the same day, late at night, the Hungarian Korrespondenz- bureau sent the following request to the newspapers : — "We beg the Editor not to publish the report relating to the Serajevo outrage, which appeared in our evening's bulletin." At the same time the Vienna Korrespondenzbureau published the following official statement : — "We learn from authoritative quarters that the enquiries relating to the outrage are being kept absolutely secret. 2 All the details, therefore, which have appeared in the public press should be accepted with reserve." Nevertheless, the Budapest newspapers continued to publish 1 The "Narodna Odbrana" is a political society of Serbia. For its aims and con- stitution see below, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 under date of .Inly 25, 1914. 2 The Austro-Hungarian Government did not know where the threads uncovered by the investigation would lead. Its wish to have them kept secret until it had de- cided on its course corresponds to its action a few months earlier, which is thus de- scribed in the American Review of Reviews, May. 1914, p. 545: "Then one day in March a bomb was exploded in the office of the Greek Catholic Magyar bishop that killed the vicar and two others. Evidence discovered later proved that the plot was of Russian origin, the purpose being — as those implicated admitted — to create trouble between Roumania and Austria-Hungary which in its turn would embarrass the Triple Alliance. To prevent more serious complications, the Hungarian Govern- ment decided not to probe too deeply in the affair." July 7, Serbian Blue Book No. 17 17 alleged reports on the enquiry. In the last "report" of the Budapest newspaper A Nap, which was reprinted in yesterday's Vienna papers, the tendency to lay the responsibility for the outrage on the Narodna Odbrana is still further emphasised. According to this report the accused Gabrinovitch had stated that General Yankovitch is the chief instigator of the outrage. I have, etc. Tuesday, July 7, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Belgium France Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia Vienna Austria-Hungary is reported by the Serbian Minister in Vienna to be much excited. Serbia : From Vienna Serbian Blue Book No. 17 M. Yov. M. Yovanovilch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Vienna, June 24/ 'July 7 , 1914- In influential circles the excitement continues undiminished. Though the Emperor has addressed a letter to the Prime Ministers of Austria and Hungary respectively, and to the Minister of Finance, Herr Bilinski, in which an appeal is made for calmness, it is impossible to determine what attitude the Government will adopt towards us. For them one thing is obvious ; whether it is proved or not that the outrage has been inspired and prepared at Belgrade, they must sooner or later solve the question of the so-called Great Serbian agitation within the Habsburg Monarchy. In what manner they will do this and what means they will employ to that end has not as yet been decided ; this is being discussed especially in high Catholic and mili- tary circles. The ultimate decision will be taken only after it has been definitely ascertained what the enquiry at Serajevo has brought to light. The decision will be in accordance with the findings of the enquiry. In this respect, Austria-Hungary has to choose one of the following courses : either to regard the Serajevo outrage as a national mis- fortune and a crime which ought to be dealt with in accordance with the evidence obtained, in which case Serbia's cooperation in the work 18 Official Diplomatic Documents will be requested in order to prevent the perpetrators escaping the extreme penalty ; or, to treat the Serajevo outrage as a Pan- Serbian, South-Slav and Pan-Slav conspiracy with every manifes- tation of the hatred, hitherto repressed, against Slavdom. There are many indications that influential circles are being urged to adopt the latter course: it is therefore advisable to be ready for defence. Should the former and wiser course be adopted, we should do all we can to meet Austrian wishes in this respect. I have, etc. Wednesday, July 8, 1914 There are no published despatches. Thursday, July 9, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Belgium France Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia All Serbian Legations Serbia : To All Serbian Legations Abroad Serbian Blue Book No. 18 M. X. Pashitch, Prime Minister ami Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad. (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, June 2(1/ July 9, 1914. The Crown Prince Alexander is receiving threatening letters from Austria-Hungary nearly every day. Make use of this in course of conversation with your colleagues and journalists. Friday, July 10, 1914 There are no published despatches. July 11, French Yellow Book No. 11 19 Saturday, July n, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches prom Austria-Hungary Belgium France Budapest Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia France is informed that the Austro-Hungarian Government and the press are for peace, but that "the general public here (Budapest) believes in war and fears it." France : From Budapest French Yellow Book No. 11 M. d'Apchier le Maugin, French Consul-General at Budapest, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Budapest, July 11, 1.914. Questioned in the Chamber on the state of the Austro-Serbian question M. Tisza explained that before everything else it was necessary to wait for the result of the judicial inquiry, as to which he refused at the moment to make any disclosure whatsoever. And the Chamber has given its full approval to this. He also showed himself equally discreet as to the decisions taken at the meeting of Ministers at Vienna, and did not give any indication whether the project of a demarche at Belgrade, with which all the papers of both hemispheres are full, would be followed up. The Chamber assented without hesitation. With regard to this demarche it seems that the word has been given to minimise its significance ; the anger of the Hungarians lias, as it were, evaporated through the virulent articles of the press, which is now unanimous in advising against this step, which might be dangerous. The semi-official press especially would desire that for the word "demarche," with its appearance of a threat, there should be substituted the expression "pourparlers," which appears to them more friendly and more courteous. Thus, officially, for the moment all is for peace. All is for peace, in the press. But the general public here believes in war and fears it. Moreover, persons in whom I have every rea- son to have confidence have assured me that they knew that every day cannon and ammunition were being sent in large quantities 20 Official Diplomatic Documents towards the frontier. Whether true or not this rumour has been brought to me from various quarters with details which agree with one another ; at least it indicates what are the thoughts with which people are generally occupied. The Government, whether it is sincerely desirous of peace, or whether it is ■preparing a coup, is now doing all that it can to allay these anxieties. This is why the tone of the Government newspapers has been lowered, first by one note, then by two, so that it is at the present moment almost optimistic. But they had themselves spread the alarm as it suited them (a plaisir). Their optimism to order is in fact without an echo ; the nervousness of the Bourse, a barometer which cannot be neglected, is a sure proof of this ; without exception stocks have fallen to an unaccountably low level ; the Hungarian 4 per cents were quoted yesterday at 79.95, a rate which has never been quoted since they were first issued. D'Apchier Le Matjgin. Sunday, July 12, 1914 There are no published despatches. Monday, July 13, 1014 There are no published despatches. Tuesday, July 14, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Belgium France Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia All Serbian Legations Berlin, Vienna The tone of the Serbian press and in turn that of the Austro-Hungarian press continue threatening. Serbia : From Berlin Serbian Blue Book No. 19 Dr. M. Yovanwitch, Charge a" Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 1/14, 1.914- The Secretary of State has told me that he could not understand the provocative attitude of the Serbian press and the attacks made July 14, Serbian Blue Book No. 20 21 by it against Austria-Hungary, who, as a Great Power, could not tolerate such proceedings. From Vienna Serbian Blue Book No. 22 M. Yov. M. Yovanoviteh, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Vienna, July 1/14, 1914. Once more public opinion has been excited against us by the Literary Bureau of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. With the exception of the Zeit and the Arbeitcr Zeitung, all the Austro-Hungarian newspapers have obtained from that Bureau the material and tone of their articles on the subject of the Serajevo outrage. You have yourself seen what kind of material and tone this is. I am reliably informed that official German circles here are espe- cially ill-disposed towards us. These circles have had some influence upon the writings of the Vienna press, especially upon those of the Neue Freie Presse. This latter paper is still anti-Serbian a Voutrance. The Neue Freie Presse, which is widely read and has many friends in high financial circles, and which — if so desired — writes in accordance with instructions from the Vienna Press Bureau, briefly summarises the matter as follows: "We have to settle matters with Serbia by war ; it is evident that peaceable means are of no avail. And if it must come to war sooner or later, then it is better to see the matter through now." The Bourse is very depressed. There has not been such a fall in prices in Vienna for a long time. Some securities have fallen 45 kronen. To All Serbian Legations Serbian Blue Book No. 20 M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad. (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 1/14, 1914. (1) The Austrian Korrespondenzbureau is showing a marked tendency to excite public opinion in Europe. This Bureau interprets neither correctly nor sincerely the tone adopted by the Belgrade press. It selects the strongest expressions from such articles as contain replies to insults, threats and false news designed to mislead public opinion, and submits them to the Austro-Hungarian public. (2) The Korrespondenzbureau quotes especially extracts from articles from those Serbian newspapers which are not the organs of any party or corporation. 22 Official Diplomatic Documents (3) As far back as the annexation crisis, Austria-Hungary pro- hibited the entry into the country of all Serbian political and other newspapers, and thus our Press would not be in a position to excite public opinion in Austria-Hungary and Europe if the Korrespondenz- bureau did not lay stress on and spread broadcast the items of news which it gathers from various Serbian papers, in every instance exaggerating them. Six days ago the entry into Austria-Hungary of the Odyck, the organ of the Independent Radical Party, was pro- hibited ; thus all our papers are now prevented from entering Austria- Hungary. (4) With us the press is absolutely free. Newspapers can be confiscated only for lese-majeste or for revolutionary propaganda; in all other cases confiscation is illegal. There is no censorship of newspapers. In these circumstances, you should point out for their informa- tion, where necessary, that we have no other constitutional or legal means at our disposal for the control of our press. Nevertheless, when the articles in our papers are compared with those of Austria- Hungary, it is evident that the Austro-Hungarian papers originate the controversy, while ours merely reply. Please also emphasize the fact that public opinion in Serbia is relatively calm, and that there is no desire on our part to provoke and insult Austria-Hungary. No one in Europe would know what our newspapers were writing if the Korrespondenzbureau did not publish these items of news with the intention of doing as much harm as possible to Serbia. Serbian Blue Book No. 21 M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, tn all the Serbian Ligations abroad. (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 1/14, l- r, 14- Durin<; the past few days the Austro-Hungarian newspapers have been spreading reports to the effect that there have been demon- strations at Belgrade against the Austro-Hungarian Legation, that some Hungarian journalists were killed ; that Austro-Hungarian subjects in Belgrade were maltreated and are now panic-stricken; that at the funeral of the late M. Hartwig Serbian students made a demonstration against the Austro-Hungarian Minister, etc. All these reports are absolutely untrue and imaginary. Complete calm prevails in Belgrade and there were no demonstrations of any kind this year, nor has there been any question of disorder. Not only do the Austro-Hungarian Minister and his staff walk about the town without being molested in any way, but no Austro-Hungarian subject has been in any way insulted, either by word or deed, as is reported by the Viennese papers ; still less was any attack made upon the house of any Austro-Hungarian subject or were any of their windows broken. Not a single Austro-Hungarian subject has had July 15, French Yellow Book No. 12 23 the slightest cause for any complaint. All these false reports are being purposely spread in order to arouse and excite Austro-Hungarian public opinion against Serbia. The whole of Belgrade and the entire diplomatic body were pres- ent to-day at the funeral of the late M. Hartwig; there was not the slightest sign of resentment shown by anybody. During the whole ceremony exemplary order was maintained ; so much so that for- eigners were impressed with the good behaviour of the crowd, which was such as does not always prevail on similar occasions even in their own countries. Be good enough to communicate the above to the Government to which you are accredited and to the press. Wednesday, July 15, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Austria-Hungary Belgium France Vienna Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia Vienna France is informed of some bellicose articles in German and Austro-Hungarian papers. The Austro-Hungarian intentions toward Serbia are quoted by the Serbian Minister as shrouded in mystery. France : From Vienna French Yellow Book No. 12 M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Yiejina, July 15, 1.914- Certain organs of the Vienna Press, discussing the military organi- sation of France and of Russia, represent these two countries as incapable of holding their own in European affairs ; this would ensure to the Dual monarchy, supported by Germany, appreciable facilities for subjecting Servia to any treatment which it might be pleased to impose. The Militarische Rundschau frankly admits it. "The moment is still favourable to us. If we do not decide for war, that war in which we shall have to engage at the latest in two or three years will be begun in far less propitious circumstances. At this moment the initiative rests with us : Russia is not ready, moral fac- 24 Official Diplomatic Documents tors and right are on our side, as well as might. Since we shall have to accept the contest some day, 1 let us provoke it at once. Our prestige, our position as a Great Power, our honour, are in question ; and yet more, for it would seem that our very existence is concerned — to be or not to be — which is in truth the great matter to-day." Surpassing itself, the Neue Freie Presse of to-day reproaches Count Tisza for the moderation of his second speech, in which he said, "Our relations with Servia require, however, to be made clear." These words rouse its indignation. For it, tranquillity and security can result only from a war to the knife against Pan-Servism, and it is in the name of humanity that it demands the extermination of the cursed Servian race. Dumaine. Serbia : From. Vienna Serbian' Blue Book No. 23 M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister ami Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Vienna, Jul;/ 1/15, 1914. The most important question for us is, what, if any, are the inten- tions of the Austro-Hungarian Government as regards the Serajevo outrage. Until now I have been unable to find this out, and my other colleagues arc in a similar position. The word has now been passed round here not to tell anybody anything. The evening before last the Ministers of the Dual Monarchy held a meeting. It has not been possible to learn anything about the object and the result of this meeting. The communique issued on the subject was brief and obscure. It appears that the consequences of the Serajevo outrage were discussed at length, but that nothing was decided. It is not clear whether the Chief of Staff and the Naval Commander-in-Chief were present, as was rumoured. After this meeting Count Berchtold travelled to Ischl to report to the Em- peror, who, after the funeral of Franz Ferdinand, had returned there to recover his health. In the Hungarian Parliament Count Tisza has replied to the interpellations of the opposition concerning the Serajevo incident ; you are acquainted with his statements. His speech was not clear, and I believe it was intentionally obscure. Some people saw in it signs of an intention quietly to await the de- velopment of events and of calmness in the attitude of the Austro- Hungarian Government, while others saw in it hidden intentions for 1 The reasons underlying this statement are thus set forth in the American Review 0/ Reviews, July, 1914, p. 30: "It is believed tint Russia i- intending to provoke a Near Eastern Crisis. Reports are also rife that a secret Naval Convention lias been concluded l»-t ween England and Russia with the object of enforcing the demands of the Triple Entente against Germany." And these demands of the Triple Entente, so far as Russia is concerned, are set forth in the same copy of American Review of Reviews in an interview with the Russian statesman. Professor Mitronov. as follows: "As far as Russia is concerned extension into the Balkans is a political necessity and nothing short of the possession of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles will end the in- tolerable bituaiion." July 15, Serbian Blue Book No. 25 25 (I should say) an action as yet undecided. It was noted that there was no occasion for haste until the results of the magisterial enquiry were announced. Some time has now elapsed ; the matter has been spoken of, discussed, written about and distorted ; then came the death of Hartwig and the alarm of Baron Giesl. In connection with this again came the interpellations addressed to Count Tisza in the Hungarian Parliament ; you have read his reply. Many hold the opinion here that this second speech is much more restrained than the first, and that this is to be attributed to an order from the Em- peror. (The Bourse has now recovered ; both the War Minister and the Chief of Staff have gone on leave.) I am loath to express an opinion. In the above-mentioned speech it is to be noted that the possibility of war is not excluded, in the event of the demands of Austria-Hungary in regard to the Serajevo outrage not being com- plied with. One thing is certain : Austria-Hungary will take diplomatic steps at Belgrade as soon as the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo is com- pleted and the matter submitted to the Court. I have, etc. Serbian Blue Book No. 24 M. Yov. M. Yoranovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Vienna, July 2/15, 1914- It is thought here that the magisterial enquiries and investigations have not produced sufficient evidence to justify bringing an official accusation against Serbia, but it is believed that the latter will be accused of tolerating within her borders certain revolutionary ele- ments. Diplomatic circles here criticise and condemn the mode of procedure of the Austro-Hungarian Government, especially the atti- tude throughout of the Korrespondenzbureau and the Vienna press. There are many who consider our attitude to be correct and in accordance with the dignity of a nation. They find fault only with the views expressed in some of our newspapers, though they all admit that it is provoked by the Vienna press. In spite of the fact that it appears that the German Foreign Office does not approve of the anti-Serbian policy of Vienna, the German Embassy here is at this very moment encouraging such a policy. I have, etc. Serbian Blue Book No. 25 M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. X. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Vienna, July 2/15, 1.914. What steps will be taken ? In what form ? What demands will Austria-Hungary make of Serbia ? I do not believe that to-day even 26 Official Diplomatic Documents the Ballplatz 1 itself could answer these questions clearly and pre- cisely. I am of opinion that its plans are now being laid, and that again Count Forgach is the moving spirit. In an earlier report I mentioned that Austria-Hungary has to choose between two courses: either to make the Serajevo outrage a domestic question, inviting us to assist her to discover and punish the culprits ; or to make it a case against the Serbians and Serbia, and even against the Jugo-Slavs. After taking into consideration all that is being prepared and done, it appears to me that Austria- Hungary will choose the latter course. Austria-Hungary will do this in the belief that she will have the approval of Europe. Why should she not profit by humiliating us, and, to a certain extent, justify the Friedjung and Agram trials '! Besides, Austria-Hungary desires in this manner to justify in the eyes of her own people and of Europe the sharp and reactionary measures which she contemplates under- taking internally in order to suppress the Great Serbian propaganda and the Jugo-Slav idea. Finally, for the sake of her prestige, 2 Austria- Hungary must take some action in the belief that she will thus raise her prestige internally as well as externally. . . . 3 Austria-Hungary will, I think, draw up in the form of a memoran- dum an accusation against Serbia. In that accusation will be set forth all the evidence that has been collected against us since April, 1909, until to-day ; and I believe that this accusation will be fairly lengthy. Austria-Hungary will communicate this accusation to the ( aliincts of the European Powers with the remark that the facts con- tained therein give her the right to take diplomatic steps at Belgrade, and to demand that Serbia should in the future fulfill all the obliga- tions of a loyal neighbour. At the same time Austria-Hungary will also hand us a note containing her demands, which we shall be re- quested to accept unconditionally. 4 I have, etc. Thursday, July 16, 1914 SIM MARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Belgium France Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia Berlin 1 The Austrian Foreign Office is situated on the Ballplatz. 2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 38, despatch from Rome, under date of July 23. 1914. 3 The omissions indicated by the dots are those of the official British translation. * This was the exact course taken by Austria a few days later. July 17, Serbian Blue Book No. 27 27 Serbia : From Berlin Serbian Blue Book No. 26 Dr. M. Yomnovitch, Charge d' Affaires de ce mois, a (I heures du soir. " l'n niemoire concernant les resultats de l'instruction de Sara- jevo a l'egard des fonctionnaires mentionn6s aux points 7 et 8 est annexe a cette note." J'ai l'honneur d'inviter votre Excellence de vouloir porter le contenu de cette note a la con- naissance du Gouvernement au- pres duquel vous etes accredit^, en accompagnant cette communi- cation du commentaire que voici : Le 31 mars, L 909, le Gouverne- ment Royal serbe a adress6 a l'Autriche-Hongrie la declaration dont le texte est reproduit ci- dessus. Le lendemain meme de cette declaration la Serbie s'est engagee dans line politique tendant a inspirer des idees subversives aux ressortissants serbes de la Monarchic austro-hongroise et a preparer ainsi la separation des territoires austro-hongrois, limi- trophes a la Serbie. La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agitation criminelle. Des societes et affiliations ne tarderent pax a se former qui, soit ouvertement, soit clandes- tinement, etaient destinees a their official position, have not hesitated since the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Gov- ernment ; and, finally, " 10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads. "The Austro-Hungarian Gov- ernment expect the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday even- ing, the 25th July. "A memorandum dealing with the results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note." I have the honour to request your Excellency to bring the con- tents of this note to the knowl- edge of the Government to which you arc accredited., accompany- ing your communication with the following observations : — On the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government ad- dressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above. On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and so preparing for the sep- aration of the Austro-Hungarian territory on the Servian frontier. Servia became the centre of a criminal agitation. No time was lost in the forma- tion of societies and groups, whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of dis- July 23, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7 47 creer des desordres sur le terri- toire austro-hongrois. Ces socie- tes et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des generaux et des diplomates, des fonction- naires d'Etat et des juges, bref Ies sommites du monde officiel et inofficiel du royaume. Le journalisme serbe est pres- que entierement au service de cette propagande, dirigee eontre l'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les organes de la presse serbe n'excitent leurs lecteurs a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchic voisine ou a des attentats diriges plus ou moins ouvertement eontre sa surete et son integrite. Un grand nombre d' agents est appele a soutenir par tous les moyens l'agitation eontre l'Au- triehe-Hongrie et a corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays. L'esprit conspirateur des poli- ticiens serbes, esprit dont les annales du royaume portent les sanglantes empreintes, a subi une recrudescence depuis la derniere crise balkanique ; des individus ayant fait partie des bandes jus- que-la occupees en Macedoine sont venus se mettre a la disposi- tion de la propagande terroriste eontre l'Autriche-Hongrie. En presence de ces agissements, auxquels l'Autriche-Hongrie est exposee depuis des annees, le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. ("est ainsi que le Gou- vernement serbe a manque au devoir que lui imposait la decla- ration solennelle du 31 mars, 1909, et e'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en contradiction avec la volonte de l'Europe et avec l'engagement orders on Austro-Hungarian ter- ritory. These societies and groups count among their mem- bers generals and diplomatists, Government officials and judges — in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom. Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press stir- ring up their readers to hatred or contempt for the neighbouring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity. A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Aus- tria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces. Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy in- herent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom; individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary. In the presence of these doings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Ser- vian Government have not thought it incumbent on them to take the slightest step. The Servian Government have thus failed in the duty imposed on them by the solemn declara- tion of the 31st March, 1909, and ' acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the under- is Official Diplomatic Documents qu'il avait pris vis-a-vis de l'Au- triche-Hongrie. La longanimite du Gouverne- lneiit Imperial et Royal a I'egard de 1'attitude provocatrice de la Serbie eta it inspiree du desin- teressement territorial de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et de l'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe finirait tout de meme par apprecier a sa juste valeur l'ami- tie de l'Autriche-Hongrie. En observant une attitude bien- veillante pour les interets poli- tiques de la Serbie, le Gouverne- ment Imperial et Royal esperait que le royaume se deciderait rinalement a suivre de son cote une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autriche-Hongrie s'attendait surtout a une pareille evolution dans les idees politiques en Ser- bie, Iorsque, apres les evenements de l'annee 1912, le Gouverne- ment Imperial et Royal rendit possible, par une attitude desin- teressee et sans rancune, l'agran- dissement si considerable de la Serbie. Cette bienveillance manifested par l'Autriche-Hongrie a I'egard de I'Etat voisin n'a eependant aucunement modifie les procddes du royaume, qui a continue a tolerer sur son territoire une propagande, dont les funestes consequences se sont manifestoes au monde entier le 28 juin der- nier, jour oil l'heritier presomptif de la Monarchie et son illustre epouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot trame a Belgrade. En presence de cet etat de choses le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal a du se decider a entre- prendre de nouvelles et pressantes demarches a, Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouvernement serbe a arreter le mouvement incen- taking given to Austria-Hun- gary. The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing a benevolent attitude towards the political interests of Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the kingdom woidd finally decide to follow an analo- gous line of conduct on its own side. In particular, Austria- Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Servia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandise- ment of Servia possible. The benevolence which Aus- tria-Hungary showed towards the neighbouring State had no re- straining effect on the proceed- ings of the kingdom, which con- tinued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal consequences were demonstrated to the whole world on the 28th June last, when the Heir Pre- sumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Belgrade. In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is July 22, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7 49 diaire menaeant la surete et l'in- tegrite de la Monarchic austro- hongroise. Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal est persuade qu'en entre- prenant cette demarche il se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisees, qui ne sauraient ad- mettre que le regicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impunement dans la lutte poli- tique, et que la paix europeenne Mt continuellement troublee par les agissements partant de Bel- grade. C'est a l'appui de ce qui pre- cede que le Gouvernement Im- perial et Royal tient a, la dis- position du Gouvernement Royal de Grand e-Bretagne un dossier elucidant les menees serbes et les rapports existant entre ces menees et le meurtre du 28 juin. Une communication identique est adressee aux representants Imperiaux et Royaux aupres des autres Puissances signatiares. Vous etes autorise de laisser une copie de cette depeche entre les mains de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Vienne, le 24 juillet, 1914- threatening the security and integrity of the Austro-Hun- garian Monarchy. The Imperial and Royal Gov- ernment are convinced that in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regi- cide to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in political strife, and the peace of Europe to be continually dis- turbed by movements emanating from Belgrade. In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold at the disposal of the British Government a dossier elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June. An identical communication has been addressed to the Im- perial and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers. You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, July 24, 191 4. Annexe L'instruction criminelle ou- verte par le Tribunal de Sarajevo contre Gavrilo Princip et con- sorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicite y relative — crime commis par eux le 28 juin der- nier — a jusqu'ici abouti aux constations suivantes : 1°. Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de son sejour a Annex The criminal enquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his acces- sories in and before the act of assassination committed by them on the 28th June last has up to the present led to the following conclusions : — 1. The plot, having as its ob- ject the assassination of the Arch- 50 Official Diplomatic Documents Sarajevo, de I'Archiduc Fran- cois-Ferdinand fut forme a Bel- grade par Gavrilo Princip, Nedelkjo Cabrinovic, le nomme Milan Ciganovic et Trifko Grabez, avec le concours du commandant Voija Tankosic. 2°. Lea six bombes et les qua- tre pistt ilets Browning avec muni- tion, moyennant lesquels les mal- faiteurs ont commis l'attentat, furent livres a Belgrade a Prin- cip, Cabrinovic ej: Grabez par le nomme Milan Ciganovic et le commandant Voija Tankosic. 3°. Les bombes sont des gre- nades a la main provenant du depot d'armes de L'armee serbe a Kragujevac. 4°. Pour assurer la reussite de l'attentat, Ciganovic enseigna a Princip, Cabrinovic et ( rrabez la maniere de se servir des grenades et donna, dans un foret pres intrigues may be traced back through a series of years. In a specially marked manner the pan-Serb chauvinism showed itself during the Bosnian crisis. 1 Only to the far-reaching self-re- straint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic intercession of the Powers is it to be ascribed that the provo- cations to which at that time Austria-Hungary was exposed on the part of Servia, did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of future well-behaviour which the Servian Government gave at that time, it has not kept. Under the very eyes, at least with the tacit sufferance of official Servia, the pan-Serb propaganda has meanwhile increased in scope and intensity; at its door is to be laid the latest crime the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become evident that it is compatible neither with the dignity nor with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian '.Monarchy to view any longer idly the doings across the border through which the safety and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened. With this state of affairs, the action as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment can lie viewed only as justifiable. Nevertheless, the attitude assumed by public opinion as well as by the Government in Servia docs not preclude the fear that the Servian Government will decline to meet these demands and that it will allow itself to be carried away into a provocative attitude toward Austria-Hungary. Nothing would remain for the Austro-Hungarian Government, unless it renounced definitely its position as a great Power, but to press its demands with tlie Servian Government, and, if need be, enforce the same by appeal to military measures, in regard to which the choice of means must be left with it. I have the honour to request you to express yourself 2 in the sense indicated above to (the present representative of M. Viviani) (Sir Edward Grey) (M. Sasonof) and therewith give special emphai is to the view that in this question there is concerned an affair which should be settled solely between Austria-Hungary and Servia, the limitation to which it must be the earnest endeavour of the powers to insure. We anxiously desire the localisation of the conflict because i ( if 1908-1909. "• Austria had sent her note to her representative in Belgrade on July 22. and notified her other representatives on the same day, Austro-Hungarian Red Book Nos. 7 and s. Tin" formal presentation of the note in Serbia was to take place in the afternoon of July 23, while the Power- were to be informed "I it officially, receiving a copy of the note on July 24, 101 1 ; cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 9. Informally the Powers were informed on July 23 : ci British Blue Book No "•. July '-'::. 1014. On July 21, French Yellow Hook \ T o. 15, the < icrman Secretary of Foreign Affairs had said he did not know the contents of the forthc ing note. Between then and .1 nlv l':;. < lermany had Keen informed of the note, and as the above despatch proves, given her . I 1 1 1 1 1 v i I . July 23, British Blue Book No. 3 61 every intercession of another power on account of the various treaty- alliances would precipitate inconceivable consequences. I shall look forward with interest to a telegraphic report about the course of your interview. Great Britain : From Rome British Blue Book No. 38 Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Re- ceived July 27.) ' Sir, Rome, July 23, 1914. I gather that the Italian Government have been made cognisant of the terms of the communication which will be addressed to Servia. Secretary-General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the con- viction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusions which the turn of events' in the Balkans has occasioned, to score a definite success. I have, etc. Rennell Rodd. To Vienna British Blue Book No. 3 Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. Sir, Foreign Office, July 23, 1014- Count Mensdorff 2 told me to-day that he would be able to- morrow morning to let me have officially the communication that lie understood was being made to Servia to-day by Austria. He then explained privately what the nature of the demand would be. A he told me that the facts would all be set out in the paper that he would give me to-morrow, it is unnecessary to record them now. I gathered that they would include proof of the complicity of some Servian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and a long list of demands consequently made by Austria on Servia. As regards all this, I said that it was not a matter on which I would make any comment until I received an official communication, and it seemed to me probably a matter on which I should not be able to make any comment at first sight. But, when Count Mensdorff told me that he supposed there would 1 This is a letter, delayed in transmission to July 27, and therefore printed by Sir E. Grey among the July 27 despatches. Important diplomatic messages are sent in duplicate by telegram and by letter. This is one of the few instances where Sir E. Grey did not print the telegram, which undoubtedly was properly received. The British Blue Book contains no explanation. 2 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. G2 Official Diplomatic Documents be something in the nature of a time-limit, which was in effect akin to an ultimatum, I said that I regretted 1 this very much. To begin with a time-limit might inflame opinion in Russia, and it would make it difficult, it' not impossible, to give more time, even if after a few days it appeared that by giving more time there would be a prospect of securing a peaceful settlement and getting a satisfactory reply from Servia. I admitted that, it' there was no time-limit, the proceedings might be unduly protracted, but I urged that a time-limit could al- ways he introduced afterwards ; that, if the demands were made with- out a time-limit in the first instance, Russian public opinion might be less excited, after a week it might have cooled down, and if the Austrian case was very strong it might lie apparent that the Russian Government would be in a position to use their influence in favour of a satisfactory reply from Servia. A time-limit was generally a thing to be used only in the last resort, after other means had been tried and failed. < 'ount Mensdorff said that if Servia, in the interval that had elapsed since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an en- quiry on her own territory, all this might have been avoided. In l ( .t()!), Servia had said in a note that she intended to live on terms of good neighbourhood with Austria; but she had never kept her promise, she had stirred up agitation the object of which was to dis- integrate Austria, and it was absolutely necessary for Austria to pro- tect herself. I said that I would not comment upon or criticise what Count Mensdorff had told me this afternoon, but I could not help dwelling upon the awful consequences involved in the situation. Great apprehension had been expressed to me, not specially by M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff, 2 hut also by others, as to what might happen, and it had been represented to me that it would be very de- sirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburgh should use it on behalf of patience and moderation. I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justifica- tion that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great Powers of Fairope — let us say, Austria, France, Russia, and Germany — were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European 3 credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might he completely swept away. 1 France, and therefore probably the Entente Powers had known of the time limit since .Inly 19, 1914 ; ef. French Yellow Book, Nos. 13 and 14. 2 Accounts of previous interviews to this effect, with the Russian and French Am- bassadors are not printed in the British Blue Book. 3 This suggests what Sir E. Grey ^ai>. 32 Huron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, to Dr. Laza Patchou, Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Belgrade, July 10/23, 1914. I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency herewith the enclosed Note which I have received from my Government, addressed to the Royal Serbian Government. I have, etc. Handed personally at 6 P.M. [For the text of the note see Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 7, July 22, 1014.] To All the Serbian Ligations Abroad Serbian Blue Book No. 33 Dr. Laza Patchou, Acting Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad. (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 10/23, 191 4. The Austro-Hungarian Minister handed me this afternoon at 6 p.m. a note in regard to the Serajevo outrage embodying the demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and insisting on a reply from the Serbian Government within two days, i.e., by Saturday, at 6 p.m. He informed me orally that he and his staff would leave Belgrade unless a favourable answer were forthcoming within the stipulated time. Some of the Ministers being absent from Belgrade the Serbian Government have not as yet come to any decision, but I am in a position to state now that the demands are such that no Serbian Government could accept them in their entirety. July 24, Austro-H ungarian Red Book No. 17 65 Friday, July 24, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Austria-Hungary London, Petrograd Belgium London, etc. France Viviani, London, etc. Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia Vienna, Paris, Berlin, Belgrade Vienna, London etc. Petrograd, London Crown Prince to Czar Received Despatches from London, Paris, Petrograd Vienna Viviani, Berlin, London, Petrograd, Aust.-Hung. Ambassador Vienna, Petrograd Petrograd. Vienna, Belgrade, Ger- man Ambassador Berlin, Paris, Belgrade Aust.-Hung. Ambassador, Crown Prince of Servia Petrograd The Governments of the several European Powers are officially notified of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia. Austria-Hungary and Germany insist that the dispute remain localized between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Great Britain proposes a Conference of four Powers, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy to mediate between Austria and Russia. At the request of the French Ambassador she apparently alters her plan to mean mediation between Austria and Serbia. From the published despatches of this day, which arecon- tradictory, it dors not appear which plan Great Britain is urging. She refuses however, to exert pressure on Russia while asking Germany to exert pressure in Vienna. Great Britain refuses Russia's request to promise her unconditional support of Russia and France, but instructs her representative in Belgrade to express no views except in agreement with the representatives of the other two Entente Poweis, whose alliance with each other she recognizes to be as binding as that of Austria-Hungary and Germany. Serbia is sure that war on her means a European War. Russia is hostile in her dealings with Austria-Hungary and Germany, and discusses her determination to support Serbia even to the extent of going to war, but does so only with the Entente Powers. France promises to support Russia in war, if need be, but gives active diplo- matic support to Great Britain's proposal of a Conference of Four Powers. Italy does the same. Great Britain mobilizes her fleet, according to French Yellow Book No. (ill, July 27, 1914, but does not mention this fact in any of her published despatches. Belgium foresees a European war. Austria-Hungary : To London Austro-Huxgarian Red Book No. 17 Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 24, 1914- In answer to Your Excellency's telegram of yesterday : I beg you to explain at once to Sir Edward Grey that our demarche of yesterday at Belgrade is not to be considered as a formal ultimatum, 66 Official Diplomatic Documents but that it is merely ;i demarche with a time-limit, which, as Your Excellency will he good enough to explain to Sir Edward Grey in strict confidence will — if the time-limit expires without result — for the time be followed only by the breaking off of diplomatic relations, and by the beginning of the necessary military preparations, as we are absolutely resolved to carry through our just demands. Your Excellency is empowered to add that if Servia, after the ex- piration of the time-limit, were only to give way under the pressure of our military preparations, we should indeed have to demand that she should make good the expenses which we had incurred; as is well known, we have already had twice (190S and 1912) to mobilise because of Servia. Austria-Hungary : From London AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Red Book No. 10 Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) London, .lull/ :34, 1914- Have just handed the circular note to Sir Edward Grey, who read it carefully. At the fifth heading, he asked what it meant; to introduce officials of our Government in Servia would be equivalent to the end of Servian political independence. I answered that co- operation of, e.g., police officials, in no way affected the sovereignty of the State. He regretted the time-limit, as in this way we should be deprived of the possibility of quieting the first outbreak of excitement and bring- ing pressure to bear upon Belgrade to give us a satisfactory answer. It was always possible to send an ultimatum if answer not satis- factory. I developed our point of view at length. (Necessity of defence against continued revolutionary undertakings which threaten the territory of the Monarchy, protection of our most vital interests, complete failure of the conciliatory attitude which we had hitherto often shown to Servia, who had had more than three weeks to set on foot of her own accord investigations as to accomplices in outrage, etc.) The Secretary of State repeated his objections to the short time- limit, but recognized that what was said as to complicity in the crime of Serajevo, as well as many of our other requirements, was justified. He would be quite ready to look on the affair as one which only concerned Austria-Hungary and Servia. He is, however, very "apprehensive" that several Great Powers might be involved in a war. Speaking of Russia, Germany and France, lie observed that the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance might be more or less to the same effect as those of the Triple Alliance. I fully explained to him our point of view, and repeated with emphasis that in this case we must stand firm so as to gain for our- July 24, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 11 67 selves some sort of guarantees, as hitherto Servian promises have never been kept. I understand that in the first place he considered the question only as it influences the position of Europe. He must, how- ever, in order to be fair to our point of view, put himself in our situa- tion. He would not go into any more detailed discussion on this subject, said he must have time to study the note more carefully. He was to see the German and the French Ambassadors, as he must first of all exchange ideas with the Powers who are allies of Austria-Hungary and Russia respectively, but have themselves no direct interest in Servia. From Paris Axtstro-Hungarian Red Book No. 11 Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) Paris, July % 1.914- I have just read instructions of the 22nd instant to the Minister of Justice, 1 who is entrusted with the representation of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in his absence, and left copy. M. Bienvenu-Martin, who had received information as to the con- tents of our demarche at Belgrade through this morning's papers, seemed to be considerably impressed by my communication. With- out entering on any more detailed discussion of the text, he readily agreed that recent events and the attitude of the Servian Government made energetic action on our side quite comprehensible. Point 5 in the note handed in at Belgrade seemed to make a special impression on the Minister as he asked me to read it to him twice. The Minister thanked me for my communication which, he said, would be carefully examined. I took the opportunity to impress on him that the question was one which must be brought to an issue directly between Servia and us, but that it was in the general interests of Europe that the trouble which for years past had been kept up by Sen ian intrigues against us should at last make way for a clear situa- tion. All friends of peace and order, and I placed France in the first rank of these, should therefore give serious advice to Servia com- pletely to change her attitude, and to satisfy our just demands. The Minister said that it was the duty of Servia to proceed ener- getically against any accomplices of the murderers of Serajevo, a duty which she could not escape. While laying special stress on the sympathy of France for Austria-Hungary, and on the good relations which existed between our two countries, he expressed the hope that the controversy would be brought to an end peacefully in a manner corresponding to our wishes. The Minister avoided every attempt to palliate or to defend in any way the attitude of Servia. 1 Ci. French Yellow Book No. 25, July 24, 1914. 68 Official Diplomatic Documents AlSTRO-HuNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 12 Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 24, 1914- Baron Schoen will, in accordance with instructions, 1 make a com- munication here to-day that according to the view of the Berlin ( aliinet, our controversy with Servia is a matter which concerns only Austria-Hungary and Servia. In this connection, he would give them to understand that in case third States should wish to intervene, Germany, true to the obligations of her alliance, would be on our side. Austro-Hungariax Red Book No. 13 Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 24, 1914. Baron Schoen has just made the demarche as he was instructed. M. Bienvenu-Martin said to him he could not yet express himself definitely. He could, however, already say this, that the French Government are also of opinion that our controversy with Servia concerns Belgrade and Vienna alone, and that it was hoped here that the question would find a direct and peaceful solution. The Servian Minister here had already been advised 2 that his Government should give way in every point so far as it was possible, with the limitation, however, " so far as their sovereign rights were not affected." Baron Schoen laid stress on the European necessity that the focus of constant disturbance at Belgrade must at last be done away with. To Petrograd AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 18 Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh. Vienna, July 24, 1914. I received the Russian Charge d'Affaires on the morning of the 24th, and assured him that I attached special importance to bringing to his knowedge as soon as possible the steps we were taking in Bel- grade, and explaining to him our point of view as regards them. Prince Koudacheff, while thanking me for this courtesy, did not hide his anxiety as to our categorical procedure against Servia, and he observed that there had always been apprehension at St. Peters- burgh that our demarche might take the form of a humiliation of Servia, which must have an echo in Russia. I took the opportunity of reassuring the Russian Charge d'Aft'aires 1 German White Book, Exhibit 1. July 23. 1914. 2 Cf. Serbian Blue Book No. 10. July 2. For different advice given Serbia by France, see French Yellow Book No. 26, July 24, 1914. July 24, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 14 G9 as to this. Our aim was to clear up the untenable position of Servia as regards the Monarchy, and with this object to cause the Govern- ment of that State on the one hand publicly to disavow the tendencies directed against the present position of the Monarchy, and to suppress them by administrative measures, and on the other hand to make it possible for us to satisfy ourselves that these measures were honestly carried out. I explained at greater length the danger, not only to the integrity of the Monarchy, but also to the balance of power and the peace of Europe, which would be involved in giving further scope to the Great-Servian propaganda, and how all the dynasties, and, not least, the Russian, would apparently be threatened, if the idea took root that a movement which made use of murder as a national weapon could be continued with impunity. In conclusion, I pointed out that we did not aim at any increase of territory, but only at the maintenance of what we possess, a point of view which could not fail to be understood by the Russian Govern- ment. Prince Koudacheff remarked on this that he did not know the view of his own Government, and also did not know what position Servia would take towards individual demands. At the conclusion of our interview the Charge d'Affaires expressly said that he would not fail to bring to the notice of his Government the explanation which I had given him of the step we had taken, especially to the effect that no humiliation of Servia was intended by us. From Petrograd AuSTRO-HuNGARIAN RED BoOK No. 14 Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg}}, July 24, 1914. The Minister for Foreign Affairs on receiving me, said that he knew what brought me to him, and he would at once explain to me that he could not take up any definite attitude towards my demarche. I be- gan by reading out my instructions. 1 The Minister interrupted me for the first time on the mention of the series of outrages, and, on my explanation, asked if then it had been proved that they all had orig- inated at Belgrade. I laid stress on the fact that they all sprang from Servian instigation. In the further course of the reading he said that he knew what it was all about : we wanted to make war on Servia, and this was to serve as a pretext. I replied that our attitude during recent years was a sufficient proof that we neither sought nor required pretexts against Servia. The formal declaration which is required did not elicit any objection from the Minister ; he only continued to maintain that Pasic had already expressed himself to this effect. This I corrected. "77 dim cela 25 fois si vovs vovlez," said he. I said to him that no one among us was attacking the integrity of Servia or the 1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book Nos. 7 and 8, July 22, 1914. 70 Official Diplomatic Documents dynasty. M. Sazonof expressed himself most vigorously against the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana, which Servia would never under- take. The participation of Imperial and Royal officials in the sup- pression of the revolutionary movements elicited further protest on the part of the Minister. Servia then will no longer lie master in her own house. " You will always be wanting to intervene again, and what a life you will lead Europe." I answered that if Servia shows goodwill it will be a quieter life than hitherto. The commentary added to the communication of the note was listened to by the Minister with fair composure ; at the passage that our feelings were shared by those of all civilised nations, he observed that this was a mistake. With all the emphasis I could command, I pointed out how regrettable it would lie if we could not come to an understanding with Russia on this question, in which everything which is most sacred to us was at stake and, whatever the Minister might say, everything which is sacred in Russia. The Minister attempted to minimise the Monarchial side of the question. With regard to the dossier which was put at the disposal of the Governments, M. Sazonof wanted to know why we had given our- selves this trouble, as we had already delivered the ultimatum. This was the best proof that we did not really desire an impartial examina- tion of the matter. 1 said to him that the results which had been attained by our own investigations were quite sufficient for our pro- cedure in this matter, which had to do with Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that we were only ready to give the Powers further infor- mation if it interested them, as we had nothing to keep secret. M. Sazonof said that now that the ultimatum had been issued he was not in the least curious. Tie represented the matter as if we only ., mted to make war with Servia whatever happened. I answered that we were the most peace-loving Power in the world, but what we wanted was security for our territory from foreign revolutionary intrigues, and the protection of our dynasty from bombs. In the course of the further discussion, M. Sazonof again made the observation that we certainly had created a serious situation. In spite of his relati vecalm, t lie attitude of the Minister was through- out unaccommodating and hostile. AXJSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 15 Communique of the Russian official Gazette. St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1014. The St. Petersburgh telegraphic agency announces: — The official journal publishes the following communique — Recent events and the despatch of an ultimatum to Servia by Austria-Hungary are causing the Russian Government the greatest anxiety. The Government are closely following the course of the dispute between the two countries, to which Russia cannot remain indifferent. July 24, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 16 71 AuSTRO-HUNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 16 ( 'mint Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1914. After a Council of Ministers 1 which lasted for five hours, M. Sazonof this evening received the German Ambassador, and had a long conversation with him. The Minister took the point of view, which is probably to be con- sidered as the outcome of the Council of Ministers, that the Austro- Hungarian-Servian conflict was not a matter confined to these States, but a European affair, as the settlement arrived at in the year 1909 by the Servian declaration had been made under the auspices of the whole of Europe. The Minister pointed out particularly that he had been disagree- ably affected by the circumstance that Austria-Hungary had offered a dossier for investigation when an ultimatum had already been presented. Russia would require an international investigation of the dossier, which had been put at her disposal. My German col- league at once brought to M. Sazonof's notice that Austria-Hungary would not accept interference in her difference with Servia, and that Germany also on her side could not accept a suggestion which would be contrary to the dignity of her ally as a Great Power. In the further course of the conversation, the Minister explained that that which Russia could not accept with indifference was the eventual intention of Austria-Hungary " de d&vorer hi Serbie." Count Pourtales answered that he did not accept any such intention on the part of Austria-Hungary, as this would be contrary to the most special interest of the Monarchy. The only object of Austria- Hungary was " d'iiifligcr a hi Serbie le chMimentjustemeni merite." M. Sazonof on this expressed his doubts whether Austria-Hungary would allow herself to be contented with this, even if explanations on this point had been made. The interview concluded with an appeal by M. Sazonof that Ger- many should work with Russia at the maintenance of peace.' 2 The German Ambassador assured the Russian Minister that Germany certainly had no wish to bring about a war, but that she naturally fully represented the interests of her ally. 1 This is undoubtedly the Council of Ministers at which Mr. Sazonof said, British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, 1914, he %vould have to consult his colleagues concerning the reply which Serbia would make to Austria. 2 The condition on which Russia would insist is stated in British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914, where Sazonof, as a result of the Council of Ministers held in the after- noon of July 24, states: "Russia could not allow Austria to crush Serbia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war." Students will note that while the determination of the Entente Powers to go to war unless Austria-Hungary recedes from her position is occasionally expressed even in I In- published despatches (e.g. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, French Yellow Book No. 38, July 25, and No. 37, which should be compared with British Blue Book No. 25. same day. See also the Editor's "Germany's Point of View," page 230), this is never mentioned to any of the Triple Alliance Powers. 72 Official Diplomatic Documents Belgium : From Vienna Belgian Gray Book No. 1 < 'mi nt Errembault de Dudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Vienna, July 24, 1914. I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the Austro- Hungarian ultimatum to Servia. [Here follows the text of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia, Red Book No. 7, July 22, 1!U4.] To Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna and Petrograd Beu.i w Grai Book No. 2 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers nt Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg. Sir, Brussels, July 24, 1914. The Belgian Government have had under their consideration whether, in present circumstances, it would not be advisable to address to the Powers who guarantee Belgian independence and neu- trality a communication assuring them of Belgium's determination to fulfil the international obligations imposed upon her by treaty in the event nt' a war breaking out on her frontiers. The Government have come to the conclusion that such a comminu- tion would be premature at present, hut that events might move rapidly and not leave sufficient time to forward suitable instructions at the desired moment to the Belgian representatives abroad. In these circumstances I have proposed to the King and to my col- leagues in the Cabinet, who have concurred, to give you nowexact instructions as to the steps to be taken by you if the prospect of a Franco-German war became more threatening. I enclose herewith a note, signed, hut not dated, which you should read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of which you should give him a copy, if circumstances render such a communication necessary. I will inform you by telegram when you are to act on these instruc- tion^. This telegram will he despatched when the order is given for the mobilisation of the Belgian army if, contrary to our earnest hope and to the apparent prospect of a peaceful settlement, our information leads us to take this extreme measure of precaution. Enclosure in Xo. 2. Sir, Tuk international situation is serious, and the possihility of a war between several Powers naturally preoccupies the Belgian Government. July 24, Belgian Gray Book No. 2 73 Belgium has most scrupulously observed l the duties of a neutral State imposed upon her by the treaties of April 19, 1839 ; and those duties she will strive unflinchingly to fulfil, whatever the circum- stances may be. The friendly feelings of the Powers towards her have been so often reaffirmed that Belgium confidently expects that her territory will remain free from any attack, should hostilities break out upon her frontiers. All necessary steps to ensure respect of Belgian neutrality have nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army has been mobilised and is taking up such strategic positions as have been chosen to secure the defence of the country and the respect of its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put in a state of defence. It is scarcely necessary to dwell upon the nature of these measures. They are intended solely to enable Belgium to fulfil her international obligations ; and it is obvious that they neither have been nor can have been undertaken with any intention of taking part in an armed struggle between the Powers or from any feeling of distrust of any of those Powers. In accordance with my instructions, I have the honour to communi- cate to your Excellency a copy of the declaration by the Belgian Government, and to request that you will be good enough to take note of it. A similar communication has been made to the other Powers guaranteeing Belgian neutrality. 2 1 The truth of this .statement, has been challenged by Germany. For the < official Publications on this subject see European Politics During the Decade before the Win- as Described by Belgian Diplomatists, German Foreign Office, 1915. See also Fuehr, Alexander, The Neutrality of Belgium, Funk & W agnails Co., 1915. 2 These notes were presented to the several Powers on August 1, 1914, in accordance with a telegram (see Belgian Gray Book No. 16) of that day ; i.e. a week and a day after the note had been drawn. One of the reasons why Belgium drew this note thus early, on July 24, may be found in the events touched upon in an account of the experiences of a member of the British Military Intelligence Department, given by himself before the Boston Press Club on Sunday, January 14, 1915. This British officer is Mr. Forbes Sutherland, who said according to an affidavit by two witnesses in the editor's possession : That for several years he had been a member of the British Military Intelligence Department. That he landed in New York toward the end of June, 1914, and he there found a cablegram from the home office in London, already three days old, telling him to re- port immediately. That he telephoned to his local chief in Montreal, Canada, to inquire what it was all about, and that he was told that it was for the European service. That he had returned to London and that about one week before the first declara- tion of war he had gone to Antwerp with one of the heads of the intelligence depart- ment to concert measures with the head of the Belgian secret service. 74 Official Diplomatic Documents From M. Viviani, flic French Premier, who hod been absent together with the President on a visit to Russia. French Yellow Book No. .22 M. Rene Viviani, President of tin 1 Council, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affair*. I should be obliged if you would urgently send on to M. Dumaine the following information and instructions. Herat, July 24, 1914, t a.m. In the course of my conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs we had to take into consideration the dangers which might result from any step taken by Austria-Hungary in relation to Servia in connection with the crime of which the Hereditary Archduke lias been a victim. We found ourselves in agreement in thinking that we should not leave anything undone to prevent a request for an ex- planation or sonic raise en demeure which would be equivalent to in- tervention in the internal affairs of Servia, of such a kind that Servia might consider it as an attack on her sovereignty and independence. We have in consequence come to the opinion that we might by means of a friendly conversation with Count Berehtold, give him counsels of moderation, of such a kind as to make him understand how undesirable would be any intervention at Belgrade which would appear to be a threat on the part of the < Cabinet at Vienna. The British Ambassador, who was kept informed by M. Sazonof, expressed the idea that his Government would doubtless associate itself with a demarche for removing any danger which might threaten general peace, and lie has telegraphed to his Government to this effect. M . Sazonof has addressed instructions to this effect to M. Schebeko. While there is no question in this of collective or concerted action at Vienna on the part of the representatives of the Triple Entente, I ask you to discuss the matter with the Russian and British Ambassadors, and to come to an agreement with them as to the best means by which each of you can make Count Berehtold understand without delay the moderation that the present situation appears to us to require. Further, it would he desirable to ask IN I . Paul ( 'ambon to bring tin' advantages of this procedure to the notice of Sir Edward Grey, and to support the suggestion that the British Ambassador in Russia will have made to this effect to the Foreign Office. Count Bencken- dorff is instructed to make a similar recommendation. Rene Viviani. July 24, French Yellow Book No. 25 75 French Yellow Book No. 23 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, on board the "France." Paris, .July 24, 1914. 1 have sent on your instructions to Vienna as urgent, but l from in- formation contained in this morning's papers it appears that the Austrian note was presented at Belgrade at 6 o'clock yesterday evening. This note, the official text of which has not yet been handed to us by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, appears to be very sharp; it appears to aim not only at obtaining the prosecution of the Serbs who were directly implicated in the outrage of Serajevo but to require the immediate suppression of the whole of the anti-Austrian propa- ganda in the Servian press and army. It is said to give Servia till 6 o'clock on Saturday evening to make her submission. In sending your instructions to M. Dumaine I recpiested him to come to an agreement with his British and Russian colleagues 2 as to his action. Bienvenu-Martin. France : From the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador French Yellow Book No. 24 [Here follows the text of the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia, Austrian Red Book No. 7, July 22, 1914.] To Viviani, and London, Berlin, Vienna, Petrograd, Rome and Belgrade. French Yellow Book No. 2.5 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, on hoard the "France," and to London, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, Rome, Belgrade. Paris, July .",, 1914. I have the honour to inform you that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning left me a copy of the Austrian note which was handed in at Belgrade on Thursday evening. Count Szecsen in- 1 M. Martin's reply. No. 23, indicates that he understood M. Viviani's message, No. 22, to suggest means by which Austria-Hungary might be prevented from pre- senting her note to Servia. If this was the meaning of the message, it can only have been written with a view to future publication and not in the hope of accomplishing anything. The note is dated July 24, 1 A.M. By that time both Russia and Great Britain had been informed of the contents of the note (British Blue Book No. 3) and the fact that the note had been presented (Russian Orange Book No. 2). In view of the decision of the Entente Powers to have their representatives act in unison — cf. last sentence of Yellow Book No. 23 with British Blue Book No. 12, July 24, 1914 — it is certain that neither Great Britain nor Russia would have kept so important an event as the presentation of the Austro-Hungarian note from the French Premier. 2 The Entente Powers acted in the Serbian difficulty as a unit from the first. Cf. British Blue Book No. 12, same day, and French Yellow Book No. 23, same da; Serbian Blue Book No. 5, June 30, 1914. 76 Official Diplomatic Dor 'intents forms me that the Austro-Hungarian Government gives the Servian Government up to 5 o'clock on the evening of Saturday the 25th for their answer. 1 The note is based on the undertaking made by Servia on the 31st March 1909, to recognise the annexation of Bosnia and Herze- govina, and reproaches the Servian Government with having tolerated an anti-Austrian propaganda in which officials, the army, and the press have taken part, a propaganda which threatens the security and integrity of Austria, and the danger of which has been shown by the crime of the 28th June which, according to the facts established during the investigation, was planned at Belgrade. The Austrian Government explain that they are compelled to put an end to a propaganda which forms a permanent danger to their tranquillity, and to require from the Servian Government an official pronouncement of their determination to condemn and suppress it, by publishing in the Official Gazette of the 26th a declaration, the terms of which are given, condemning it, stating their regret, and threatening to crush it. A general order of the King to the Servian army is at the same time to make these declarations known to the army. In addition to this, the Servian Government are to undertake to suppress publications, to dissolve the societies, to dismiss those officers and civil servants whose names would be communicated to them by the Austrian Government, to accept the cooperation of Austrian officials in suppressing the subversive acts to winch their attention lias been directed, as well as for the investigation into the crime of Serajevo, and finally to proceed to the immediate arrest of a Servian officer and an official who were concerned in it. Annexed to the Austrian memorandum is a note which sums up the facts established by the investigation into the crime of Serajevo, and declares that it was planned at Belgrade; that the bombs were provided for the murderers, and came from a depot of the Servian army ; finally that the murderers were drilled and helped by Servian officers and officials. On visiting the Acting Political Director immediately after making this communication, Count Szecsen without any observations in- formed him that the note had been presented. M. Berthelot, on my instructions, confined himself to pointing out to the Austro- Hungarian Ambassador the feeling of anxiety which had been aroused by the information available this morning as to the contents of the Austrian note, and the painful feeling which could not fail to be aroused in French public opinion by the time chosen for so categorical 1 The French Yellow Book prints here the following note : " The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in a private letter on the 24th July sent to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the following correction : " ' In the copy of the dispatch which I had the honour to send to your Excellency this morning, it was said that my Government expected an answer from the Cabinet at Belgrade at latest by 5 o'clock on the evening of Saturday the 25th of this month. As our Minister at Belgrade did not deliver his note yesterday until I! o'clock in the evening, the time allowed for the answer has in consequence been prolonged to 6 o'clock to-morrow, Saturday evening. "'I consider it my duty to inform your Excellency of this slight alteration in the termination of the period fixed for the answer to the Servian Government.' " July 24, French Yellow Book No. 26 77 a demarche with so short a time limit ; that is to say, a time when the President of the Republic and the President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic had left St. Petersburgh and were at sea, 1 and consequently were not able to exert, in agree- ment with those Powers which were not directly interested, that soothing influence on Servia and Austria which was so desirable in the interest of general peace. 2 The Servian Minister has not yet received any information as to the intentions of his Government. The German Ambassador has asked me to receive him at 5 o'clock this afternoon. , r Bienvenu-Martin. To Stockholm — for M. Viviani — Belgrade, Vienna, London, Berlin, Borne, Petrograd French Yellow Book No. 26 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Thiebaut, French Minister at Stockholm (for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade, Vienna, London, Berlin, Borne, St. Petersburgh. Paris, July 24, 1914- M. Vesnitch was this morning still without any telegram from his Government informing him as to their intentions, and did not know the contents of the Austrian note. 3 To a request for advice which he made to the Political Director, M. Berthelot said to him, speaking personally and for himself alone, that Servia must try to gain time, 4 as the limit of forty-eight hours perhaps formed rather a "raise en demeure" than an ultimatum in the proper sense of the term ; that there might, for instance, be an opportunity of offering satisfaction on all those points which were not inconsistent with the dignity and sovereignty of Servia ; he was advised to draw attention to the fact that statements based on the Austrian investigations at Serajevo were one sided, and that Servia, while she was quite ready to take measures against all the accomplices of a crime which she most strongly condemned, required full in- formation as to the evidence in order to be able to verify it with all speed ; above all to attempt to escape from the direct grip of Austria by declaring herself ready to submit to the arbitration of Europe. I have asked at London and St. Petersburgh for the views and in- tentions of the British and Russian Governments. It appears on 1 This thought is stated as coming from the Russian Charge d'Affaires in Berlin, in Yellow Book No. 29, July 24, 1914. Cf. also British Blue Book No. 6. 2 The Austrian Ambassador reporting to his home office (Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 11, July 24) , does not mention this interview with the Acting Political Director. On the other hand M. Bienvenu-Martin does not state here what the Ambassador quotes him there as having said. 3 The contents of the Austrian note had been published in the French morning papers of July 24, 1914, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 11, July 24; and had been disclosed to Sir Edward Grey. British Blue Book No. 3, July 23, 1914. 4 The advice given Serbia by France is differently stated in Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 13, July 24, 1914. 78 Official Diplomatic Documents the other hand from our information that the Austrian note was not communicated to Italy until to-day, and that Italy had neither been consulted nor even informed ' of it. Bienvenu-Martin. French Yellow Book No. 27 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stock- holm {for the President of the Council), and to Belgrade, London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Borne. Paris, July 24, 191.',. The French Ambassador at Vienna informs me 2 that opinion has been startled by the sudden and exaggerated nature of the Austrian demands, but that the chief fear of the military party appears to be that Servia may give way. The Servian Minister in Austria thinks that his Government will 1 show themselves very conciliatory in all that concerns the punish- ment of the accomplices of the crime, and the guarantees to be given as to the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda, but that they could not accept a general order t<> the army dictated to the King, nor the dismissal of officers who were suspected by Austria, nor the interference of foreign officials in Servia. M. Yovanovitch considers that, if it were possible to start a discussion, a settlement of the dis- pute might still be arranged, with the assistance of the Powers. Our Ambassador at Berlin 3 gives an account of the excitement aroused by the Austrian note, and of the state of feeling of the Russian Charge d'Affaires, who thinks that a large part of opinion in Ger- many would desire war. The tone of the press is threatening and appears to have as its object the intimidation of Russia. Our Ambassador is to see Ilerr von Jagow this evening. M. Barrere informs us that Italy 4 is exercising moderating influence at Vienna and is trying to avoid complications. Bienvenu-Martin. French Yellow Book No. 28 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stock- holm (for tin President of the Council), and to Belgrade, London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome. Paris, July 24, 1914. Herr von Schoen came to inform me of a note from his Govern- ment, of which he would not leave me a copy, 5 but at my request he read it twice over to me. ' Tin ■ seems to be at variance with British Blue Book No. 38, July 23, 1914. 2 The despatch from the French Ambassador in Vienna here referred to has not been published. »Cf. below French Yellow Book No. 29, .July 24, 1914. J The despatch from the French Ambassador in Rome here referred to has not been published. 6 There is no reason why lie should not leave' a copy witli M. Martin. The tier- man Ambassador in London apparent];.' left s copy with Sir E. < oe\ ; British Blue Bo >k July 24, French Yellow Book No. 28 79 The Note was almost word for word as follows : — "The statements of the Austro-Hungarian newspapers concerning the circumstances under which the assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Pan-Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise them. The facts made known must also do away with all doubt that the centre of activity of all those tend- encies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their in- corporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is, at any rate, at work there, with the connivance of members of the Government and the army. "The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Pan-Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the moderation and far-reaching self-restraint of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic intervention of the Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria-Hungary was then exposed did no1 lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission, of official Servia, the Pan-Servian propaganda, has, since that time, continuously in- creased in extension and intensity. To its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to remain longer inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circumstances, the course of pro- cedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as justified. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Government might refuse to comply with those demands, and might even allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude towards Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if they do not wish definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their de- mands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them." The German Ambassador particularly called my attention to the last two paragraphs of his note before reading it, pressing the point that this was the important matter. I noted down the text literally ; it is as follows : — " The German Government consider that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively No. 9, July 24, 1914. M. Martin must have had a copy of it when he wrote this mes- sage. However excellent his memory is, he could not have quoted a lengthy note as accurately as he did, from memory. SO Official Diplomatic Documents between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to restrict it to those two immediately concerned. "The German Government desire urgently the localisation of the dispute, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the natural play of alliances, be followed by incalculable conse- quences." 1 called the German Ambassador's attention to the fact that while it might appear legitimate to demand the punishment of all those who were implicated in the crime of Serajevo, on the other hand it seemed difficult to require measures which could not be accepted, having regard to the dignity and sovereignty of Servia; the Servian Government, even if it was willing to submit to them, would risk being carried away by a revolution. I also pointed out to Herr von Schoen that his note only took into account two hypotheses : that of a pure and simple refusal or that of a provocative attitude on the part of Servia. The third hypothesis (which would leave the door open for an arrangement) should also be taken into consideration; that of Servia 's acceptance and of her agreeing at once to give full satisfaction for the punishment of the ac- complices and lull guarantees for the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda so far as they were compatible with her sovereignty and dignity. I added that if within these limits the satisfaction desired by Austria could be admitted, the means of obtaining it could be examined; if Servia gave obvious proof of goodwill it could not be thought that Austria would refuse to take part in the conversation. Perhaps they should not make it too difficult for third Powers, who could not either morally or sentimentally cease to take interest in Servia, to take an attitude which was in accord with the wishes of Germany to localise the dispute. Herr von Schoen recognised the justice of these considerations and vaguely stated that hope was always possible. When I asked him if we should give to the Austrian note the character of a simple mise en demeure, which permitted a discussion, or an ultimatum, he answered that personally he had no views. Bienyentj-Martin. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 20 .1/. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienrcnu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 24, 1914. The delivery of the Austrian note to Servia has made a deep im- pression. The Austrian Ambassador declares that his Government could not abate any of their demands. At the Wilhelmstrasse, as well as in the press, the same view is expressed. July 24, French Yelloto Book No. 30 81 Most of the Charges d' Affaires present in Berlin came to see me this morning. They show little hope of a peaceful issue. The Russian Charge d Affaires bitterly remarked that Austria has pre- sented her note at the very moment that the President of the Republic and the President of the Council had left St. Petersburgh. 1 He is in- clined to think that a considerable section of opinion in Germany desires war and would like to seize this opportunity, in which Austria will not doubt be found more united than in the past, and in which the German Emperor, influenced by a desire to give support to the monarchic principle (par un sentiment de solidarity monarchique) and by horror at the crime, is less inclined to show a conciliatory attitude. Herr von Jagow is going to receive me late in the afternoon. Jules Cambon. French Yellow Book No. 30 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-. Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 24, 101 4. I asked the Secretary of State to-day, in the interview which I had with him, if it was correct, as announced in the newspapers, that Austria had presented a note to the Powers on her dispute with Servia ; if he had received it ; and what view he took of it. Herr von Jagow answered me in the affirmative, adding that the note was forcible, and that he approved it, the Servian Government having for a long time past wearied the patience of Austria. More- over, he considers this question to be a domestic one for Austria, and he hopes that it will be localised. I then said to him that not having as yet received any instructions, the views which I wished to exchange with him were strictly personal. Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been entirely ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were communicated to Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I showed him my sur- prise at seeing him thus undertake to support claims, of whose limit and scope he was ignorant. Herr von Jagow interrupted me, and said, " It is only because we are having a personal conversation that I allow you to say that to me." "Certainly," I replied, "but if Peter I. humiliates himself, domestic trouble will probably break out in Servia ; that will open the door to fresh possibilities, and do you know where you will be led by Vienna ? " I added that the language of the German newspapers was not the language of persons who were indifferent to, and unacquainted with, the question, but betoken an active support. Finally, I remarked that the shortness of the time limit given to Servia for submission would make an unpleasant impression in Europe. Here von Jagow answered that he quite expected a little excitement 1 The identical thought was expressed on the same day in Paris by the Acting Political Director, French Yellow Book No. 25. See also same day, British Blue Book No. 6. 82 Official Diplomatic Documents (mi pen d'emotion) on the part of Servia's friends, but that he was counting on tlmr giving her wise advice. "I have no doubt," I then said to him, "that Russia would en- deavour t<> persuade the Cabinet of Belgrade to make acceptable concessions ; but why not ask from one what is being asked from the other, and if reliance is being placed on advice being given at Bel- grade, is it not also legitimate to rely on advice being given at Vienna from another quarter?" The Secretary of State went so far as to say that that depended on circumstances; but immediately checked himself; he repeated that the difficulty must be localised. He asked me if I really thought the situation serious. "Certainly," I answered, "because if what is happening is the result of due reflection, I do not understand why all means of retreat have been cut off." All the evidence shows that Germany is ready to support Austria's attitude with unusual energy. The weakness which her Austro- Hungarian ally has shown for some years past, has weakened the con- fidence that was placed in her here. She was found heavy to drag along. Mischievous legal proceedings, such as the Agram and the Friedjung affairs, brought odium on her police and covered them with ridicule. All that was asked of the police was that they should be strong ; the conviction is that they were violent. An article which appeared in the Lokal Anzeiger this evening shows also that at the German ( 'ham-cry there exists a state of mind to which we in Paris are naturally not inclined to pay sufficient attention, I mean the feeling that the monarchies must stand together {sentiment de la solidarite monarchique). I am convinced that great weight must be attached to this point of view in order to appreciate the attitude of the Emperor William, whose impressionable nature must have been affected by the assassination of a prince whose guest he had been a few days previously. It is not less striking to notice the pains with which Ilerr von Jagow, and all the officials placed under his orders, pretend to every one that they were ' ignorant of the scope of the note sent by Austria to Servia. Jules Cambon. From Petrograd French Yellow Book No. 31 M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at S. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1014. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has communicated to M. Sazonof a threatening note to Servia. 1 This sentence reads "know nothing of the note" in The New York Times Trans- lation. Ii contradicts, therefore, the firsi part .if the despatch where the contents of the note are discussed. The official English vei ion rive iplanation of the altered wording. The edition of the French Yellow Bool ip ied to the editor by the French Ambassador in Washington, October, 1915, contains the past tense July 24, French Yellow Book No. 32 83 The intentions of the Emperor of Russia and his Ministers could not be more pacific, 1 a fact of which the President of the Republic and the President of the Council have been able to satisfy them- selves directly; but the ultimatum which the Austro-Hungarian Government has just delivered to the Cabinet at Belgrade introduces a new and disquieting element into the situation. Public opinion in Russia would not allow Austria to offer violence to Servia. The shortness of the time limit fixed by the ultimatum renders still more difficult the moderating influence that the Powers of the Triple Entente might exercise at Vienna. On the other hand, M. Sazonof assumes that Germany will desire to support her ally and I am afraid that this impression is correct. Nothing but the assurance of the solidarity of the Triple Entente can prevent the German Powers from emphasising their provocative attitude - Paleologtte. From London French Yellow Book No. 32 M. Paul Camion, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister jar Foreign Affairs. London, July 24, 191 4. Sir Edward Grey having discussed with me his desire to leave no stone unturned to avert the crisis, we agreed in thinking that the British Cabinet might ask the German Government to take the ini- tiative in approaching Vienna with the object of offering the media- tion, between Austria and Servia, 2 of the four Powers which are not directly interested. If Germany agrees, time will be gained, and this is the essential point. Sir Edward Grey told me that he would discuss with Prince Lich- nowsky the proposal I have just explained. I mentioned the matter to my Russian colleague, who is afraid of a surprise from Germany, and who imagines that Austria would not have despatched her ulti- matum without previous agreement with Berlin. Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburg!] and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter capital by the rumours of a naval entente between Russia and Great Britain, by the Tsar's visit to Bucharest, and by the strengthening of the Russian army. Count Benckendorff had concluded from this 'This differs from British Blue Book No. 6, July 24 ; and No. 17. July 25. 1914. There was a conference between Sazonof and the French and British Ambassadors in Petrograd on July 24, in the morning, as described in British Blue Book No. 6. So far as the French published despatches go, the above is the only report. Cf. also below, German White Book, Exhibit 4, July 24, 1914. 2 M. Bienvenu-Martin in quoting this suggestion in Yellow Book No. 34, same day, alters it to include mediation at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. That this was not the Cambon-Grey intention appears from British Blue Book No. 10. July 24, where Sir E. Grey begins with his idea of action "simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburgh," while M. Paul Canibon prefers "mediation between Austria and Servia." S4 Official Diplomatic Documents that a war with Russia would be looked upon without disfavour in Germany. The Under-Secretary of State has been struck, as all of us have been, by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since his return from Berlin, and he considers that if Germany had wished to do so she could have stopped the despatch of the ultimatum. The situation, therefore, is as grave as it can be, and we see no way of arresting the course of events. However, Count Benckendorff thinks it right to attempt the demarche upon which I have agreed with Sir Edward Grey. Paul Cambon. French Yellow Hook No. 33' M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at Loudon, to M. Bicnrcnit- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, Julij 24, 1914. The Servian Minister received to-night from M. Pashitch a tele- gram saying that the Austro-Hungarian Government had sent him their ultimatum, the time limit of which expires at 6 o'clock to- morrow, Saturday evening. M. Pashitch does not give the terms of the Austrian communication, but if it is of the nature reported in to-day's " Times," it seems impossible for the Servian Government t< accept it. In consultation with my Russian colleague, who thinks it extremely difficult for his Government not to support Servia, we have been ask- ing ourselves what intervention could avert the conflict. Sir Edward Grey having summoned me for this afternoon, I pro- pose to suggest that he should ask for the semi-official intervention of the German Government at Vienna to prevent a sudden attack. Paul Cambon. To Stockholm for M. Viviani, lie/grade, Petrograd, Berlin, Vienna, Home French Yellow Book No. 34 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stock- holm [for the President of the Council), Belgrade, St. Petersburg]!, Berlin, Vienna, Rome. Paris, July 24, 1914. The Austrian Ambassador having communicated his Govern- ment's note to Sir Edward Grey, the latter observed that no such 1 This despatch has I n doctored for insertion hen-. It is an impossible message in its present form. It is dated July 24, and states that the "Servian Minister received to-night. " etc., notification of the Austro-Hungarian note. This notification, however, was sent to the Servian Minister on the previous day. July 'S.i. Cf. Serbian Blue Book No. 33. The casual reader would receive the impression from this despatch that the time limit granted to Serbia was 24 hours, from "to-night," July 24, to "to-morrow, Saturday evening." The last paragraph of this despatch, No. 33. refers to a summons to a conference, v hirli has been described in No. :;_'. July 24, German White Book Exhibit 3 85 formidable declaration had ever been addressed by one Government to another ; he drew Count Mensdorff's attention to the responsibility assumed by Austria. With the possibility of a conflict between Austria and Russia before him, Sir Edward Grey proposes to ask for the cooperation of the German Government with a view to the mediation of the four powers who are not directly interested in the Servian question, namely, England, Erance, Italy and Germany ; this mediation to be exercised simultaneously at Vienna and at St. Petersburgh. 1 I advised the Servian Minister to act cautiously, and I am willing to cooperate in any conciliatory action at Vienna, in the hope that Austria will not insist on the acceptance of all her demands as against a small State, if the latter shows herself ready to give every satis- faction which is considered compatible with her independence and her sovereignty. Bienvenu-Martin. Germany : From Vienna German White Book Exhibit 3 2 Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on July Uih, 1914. Count Berchtold has asked to-day for the Russian Charge d'affaires 3 in order to explain to him thoroughly and cordially Austria- Hungary's point of view toward Servia. After recapitulation of the historical development of the past few years, he emphasised that the Monarchy entertained no thought of conquest toward Servia. Austria-Hungary would not claim Servian territory. It insisted merely that this step was meant as a definite means of checking the Serb intrigues. Impelled by force of circumstances, Austria-Hungary must have a guaranty for continued amicable relations with Servia. It was far from him to intend to bring about a change in the balance of powers in the Balkan. The Charge d'affaires, who had received no instructions from St. Petersburg, took the discussion of the Secretary "ad referendum" with the promise to submit it immediately to Sasonof. 1 Mediation both in Vienna and Petrograd was Sir E. Grey's first idea, see British Blue Book No. 10. Julv 24, but he was dissuaded from it bv the French Ambassador in London. M. Paul Cambon. Cf. British Blue Book No. 10, July 24, 1914. This statement here is, moreover, at variance with M. Cambon's report, Yellow Book No. 32, same day. M. Cambon's desire not to bring any pressure to bear on Russia was eventually shared bv Sir E. Grey. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 62, July 27, and No. 80, Julv 28, and British Blue Book Nos. 11 and 16. 2 For Exhibit No. 2 see July 28, 1914. The Exhibits of the German White Book are not numbered chronologically. 3 See above, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. IS, July 24, 1914. 86 Official Diplomatic Documents German- White Book Exhibit 4 Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chan- cellor on July 24th, 1914. I have just utilized the contents of Order 592 in a prolonged inter- view with Sasonof. The Secretary (Sasonof) indulged in unmeasured accusations 1 toward Austria-Hungary and he was very much agitated. He declared most positively that Russia could not permit'- under any circumstances that the Servo-Austrian difficulty be settled alone between the parties concerned. Great Britain : From the Austrian Ambassador. British Blue Book No. 4 Count Berchtold, Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, tU- 4 Please convey the follmoing message to the Austro-Hungarian Min- ister for Foreign Affairs: — "La communication du Gou- "The communication made by vernement austro-hongrois aux Austria-Hungary to the Powers Puissances le lendemain de la the day after the presentation of presentation de 1'ultimatum a the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves Belgrade ne laisse aux Puissances a period to the Powers which is qu'un delai tout a fait insuffisant quite insufficient to enable them pour entreprendre quoi qu'il soit to take any steps which might 1 Of. French Yellow Book No. 23, July 24, and British Blue Book No. 6, same day. and note 1 . - This advice was never given to Servia ; cf. British Blue Book no. 22. July 2.5. 1914. s According to French Yellow Book No. 39 this note was amunicated to Bucharest instead of to Belgrade and also to Berlin. 4 This note, although dated July 24, was presented in London (British Blue Bock No. 13) and Taris (Yellow Book No. 39) on July 25, the very day on which the time limit was to expire. Russia was informed of the presentation of the note on July 2.J. (Russian Orange Book No. 2.) July 24, Russian Orange Book No. 4 95 d 'utile pour I'aplanissement des complications surgies. "Pour prevenir les conse- quences incalculables et egale- ment nefastes pour toutes les Puissances qui peuvent suivre le mode d'action du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, il nous parait in- dispensable qu'avant tout led61ai donne a la Serine pour repondre so it prolonged L'Autriche-Hon- grie, se declarant disposee a in- former les Puissances des donnees de l'enquete sur Iesquelles le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal base ses accusations, devrait leur donner %alement le temps de s'en rendre compte. " En ce cas, si les Puissances se convainquaient du bien-fonde de certaines des exigences autri- chiennes, elles se trouveraient en mesure de faire parvenir au Gouvernement serbe des conseils en consequence. "Un refus de prolonger le terme de I'ultimatum priverait de toute portee la demarche du Gouvernement austro-hongrois aupres des Puissances et se trou- verait en contradiction aver les bases ineine des relations inter- nationales. "Le Prince Koudachef est charge de communiquer ce qui precede au Cabinet de Vienne." M. Sazonof espere que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste 1 See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 8, July 22, paragraph before last, where Aus- tria-Hungary offers to the Powers a "dossier elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 2Sth June." So far as Austria was concerned, this was an act of courtesy. The Powers had been unwilling or unable to protect her from these intrigues culminating in the murder of the Arch- duke. It was, therefore, she claimed, her right and her duty to punish them in her own way. Sazonof interprets the offer of Austria-Hungary not as an act of courtesy but as an accusation lodged before the tribunal of the Powers, who, therefore, should be the judges of how far Austria-Hungary might be permitted to go. According to European traditions, followed for over a century by all the nations, such a course would have affected the dignity of Austria-Hungary as one of the Great Powers. Cf. Austro- Hungarian Red Book No. 21, July 25, i914. 2 This line varied, of course, according to the Government to which the note was pre- sented. help to smooth away the diffi- culties that have arisen. "In order to prevent the con- sequences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro- Hungarian Government, it seems to ns to he above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having de- clared her readiness 1 to inform the Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them. " In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Servian Government. "A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations. "Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet at Vienna." M. Sazonof hopes that His Bri- tannic Majesty's Government 2 96 Official Diplomatic Documents britannique adherera au point de will adhere to the point of view vue expose, et il exprime l'espoir set forth above, and lie trusts que Sir Edward Grey voudra bien that Sir E. Gray will see his way niunir 1'Ambassadeur d'Angle- to furnish similar instruetions to terre a Vienne d 'instructions con- the British Ambassador at formes. Vienna. To London, Berlin, Rome and Paris lii ssian Orange Book No. ■"> Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Representatives at London, Berlin, Rome, anil Ran'.'!. (Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 11 (24), 1914. With reference to my telegram of to-day to Kudaehef ' we trust that the Government to which you are accredited will share the Russian point of view and will at once instruct their Representative at Vienna to hold similar language. ( 'oiiununicated to Belgrade. From the Serbian Croirn Prince and Prince Regent of Serbia Russian * >k inge Hook No. 6 Telegram from His Royal Highness the Crown Prince and Prince Regent of Serbia to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia. Belgrade, .Inly 11 (24), 1914. The Austro-Hungarian Government yesterday evening presented to the Servian Government a note respecting the outrage at Sera- jevo. Servia, aware of her international obligations, has declared, ever since the horrible crime was committed, that she condemned it, and that she was ready to open an enquiry in Servia if the complicity of certain of her subjects were proved at the trial instituted by the Austro-Hungarian authorities. The demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian note are, however, unnecessarily humiliating for Servia, and incompatible with her dignity as an independent State. For instance, we are peremptorily called upon to insert a declaration by the Government in the "Official Journal," and for au order from the Sovereign to the army, in which we are to check the spirit of hostility towards Austria and to blame ourselves for criminal weakness as regards our treacherous intrigues. We are further required to admit Austro-Hungarian officials into Servia to take part with our officials at the trial and to superintend the carry- ing out of the other conditions laid down in the note. We are re- quired to accept these demands in their entirety within forty-eight hours, failing which the Austro-Hungarian Legation will leave Belgrade. We are prepared to accept those of the Austro-Hun- 1 Russian Charge d'Affaires in Vienna. July 24, Russian Orange Book No. S 97 garian conditions which are compatible with the position of an independent State, as well as those to which your Majesty may advise us to agree, and all those persons whose complicity in the crime may be proved will be severely punished by us. Certain of the demands could not be carried out without changes in our legis- lation, which would need time. We have been allowed too short a time limit. We may be attacked at the expiration of the time limit by the Austro-Hungarian army which is concentrating upon our frontier. We are unable to defend ourselves and we beg your Majesty to come to our aid as soon as possible. The much appreciated good- will which your Majesty has so often shown towards us inspires us with the firm belief that once again our appeal to your noble Slav heart will not pass unheeded. At this critical moment I echo the feelings of the Servian people in praying your Majesty to be pleased to interest yourself in the fate of the Kingdom of Servia. From Berlin Russian Orange Book No. 7 Russian Charge a" Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Berlin, July 11 (24), 1914. All the morning papers, even those few which recognise the impossibility of Servia's accepting the prescribed conditions, warmly welcome the strong line adopted by Austria. The semi-official " Lokal-Anzeiger " is particularly violent; it describes as fruitless any possible appeals that Servia may make to St. Petersburgh, Paris, Athens, or Bucharest, and concludes by saying that the German people will breathe freely when they learn that the situation in the Balkan 1 peninsula is to be cleared up at last. From Paris Russian Orange Book No. 8 Russian Charge a" Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, July 11 (24), 1914. A copy of the note officially presented at Belgrade has been com- municated to the French Government by the Austrian Ambassador. 2 The German Ambassador later visited 3 the Minister and read to 1 The Balkans had been spoken of for years as the Powder Magazine of Europe, where at any moment a spark might start a European conflagration. Nobody in Berlin or Vienna believed any nation would come to the support of Serbia in view of the intrigues which had led to the murder of Serajevo, and which Berlin and Vienna be- lieved were rightlv charged against Serbia. 2 French Yellow Book No. 25. July 24, 1914. 3 French Yellow Book No. 28, July 24, 1914. 9S Official Diplomatic Documents him a communication containing the Austrian arguments, and indicating that in the event of a refusal on the part of Servia, Austria, would be obliged to resort to pressure, and, in case of need, to mili- tary measures. The communication ended with the observation that, in the opinion of Germany, this question ought to be settled between Austria and Servia direct, and that it was to the interest of the Powers to localise the affair by leaving it to the interested parties. The Acting Head of the Political Department, who was present at the interview, asked ' the Ambassador whether the Austrian action should be considered as an ultimatum — in other words, whether, in the event of Servia not submitting entirely to the Austrian de- mands, hostilities were inevitable. The Ambassador avoided a direct reply, alleging that he had no instructions. From Belgrade Russian Orange Book No. 9 Russian Charge a" Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister.for Foreign Affairs. ' (Telegram.) Belgrade, July 11 {24), 1914. Pashitch has returned to Belgrade. He intends to give an answer to Austria within the prescribed time limit — that is to say, to- morrow, Saturday, at 6 p.m. — showing the points which are accept- able or unacceptable. To-day an appeal will be addressed to the Powers 2 to defend the independence of Servia. Then, added Pashitch, if war is inevitable, we will make war. Serbia : To Pcirograd Serbian Blue Book No. 34 M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister far Foreign Affairs, to Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd. (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, Jut// 11/24, 1914. I INFORMED the Russian Charge d'Affaires that I would hand in the reply to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum on Saturday at (i p.m. I told him that the Serbian Government would appeal 3 to the Govern- ments of the friendly Powers to protect the independence of Serbia. If war was inevitable, I added, Serbia would carry it on. 1 In the French account of this interview, Yellow Book No. 2S, .Inly 24, M. Martin and not the Acting Head of the Political Department is said to have asked this ques- tion. 2 The only published appeal is that of the Serbian Crown Prince to the Czar, Russian Orange Book No. 6, July 24, 1914. 3 No such appeal had been published, except one from the Serbian Crown Prince to the ( Izar, July 24, Russian Orange Book No. 6. July 24, Serbian Blue Book No. 37 99 To London Serbian Blue Book No. 35 M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. M. Boschkovitch , Minister in London. (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 11/24, L'>1 4. I informed the British Charge d'Affaires to-day that the Austro- Hungarian demands were such that no Government of an independent country could accept them in their entirety. I expressed the- hope that the British Government might possibly see their way to induce the Austro-Hungarian Government to moderate them. I did not conceal my anxiety as to future developments. From Petrograd Serbian Blue Book No. 36 Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.) Petrograd, July 11/24, 1914- As I was leaving M. Sazonof, to whom I communicated the con- tents of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, I met the German Am- bassador. He seemed to be in very good spirits.' During the con- versation which followed in regard to the Austro-Hungarian demarche I asked Count Pourtales to indicate to me some way out of the situation created by the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. The Am- bassador replied that this depended on Serbia alone, since the matter in question must be settled between Austria and Serbia only, and did not concern anyone else. In reply I told Count Pourtales that he was under a misapprehension, and that he would see before long that this was not a question merely between Serbia and Austria, but a European question. To the Czar from the Serbian Crown Prince Serbian Blue Book No. :!7 His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia. (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 11/24, 1914. [See No. 6 of Russian Orange Book, July 24, 1914.] 1 This sentence may have been retained to give the reader an insight into the character of Count Pourtales. It should, therefore, be compared with similar pic- tures, e.g. British Blue Book No. 78, Julv 29, and contrasted with British Blue Book No. 72, July 29, and No. 97, July 30. LOO Official Diplomatic Docuvienis Saturday, July 25, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Austria-Hungary London, Petrograd Under Secretary of State, Rome etc. London etc., Vienna Belgrade ( rermany Great Britain Russia London Paris, Petrograd, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Bel- grade London All Representatives Belgium Rome etc. Belgrad France London etc., Vienna Berlin, London, Petro- grad, Rome, Vienna, Belgrade Petrograd Paris, Petrograd. Ber- lin, Rome, Vienna, Belgrade, Russian Ambassador Vienna, Belgrade, Ber- lin, Paris, London, German Ambassa- dor Russia and Great Britain endeavor to secure from Austria-Hungary an exten- sion of the time limit set in the Serbian note to expire on this day at 6 p.m. The French support of this request, while promised, does not materialize. Germany gives her support, hut doubts Austria's willingness to grant the request. Austria-Hungary denies the request, hut announces that she will not immedi- ately proceed to war, and that a period of military preparation will intervene. This appears to satisfy Great Britain as a concession of practical value. Serbia delivers Iter reply which docs not satisfy Austria-Hungary, whose lega- tion leaves Belgrade at 6.30 P.M. Great Britain continues her efforts to bring aboul a ( lonference of four powers, hut apparently has yielded to the view of the French Ambassador that no pres- sure should be exerted on Russia, for in one note Sir E. Grey even substitutes Russia for Italy in the proposed group of the mediating powers. Germany repeats that she had not been consulted by Austria-Hungary in the preparation of her note to Scrvia, hut finding her demands just would support her. She dec lines to mediate between Aus1 ria and Serbia, but announces her willingness to take part in mediation between Austria and Russia. Russia and France arc endeavoring to secure the unconditional support of Great Britain, not in the interest of Serbia, but to maintain the European balance of power. Austria-Hungary disclaims any intention of disturbing this balance of power, and explains anew her reasons for proceeding against Serbia. She also explains the meaning of those clauses of her note- which she says had been misunderstood ; and states that Russia was acting under a misapprehension. She also issues a dossier containing the- proofs of her indictment of Serbia. France refuses to issue an official correction of erroneous accounts in the French ;>n-ss concerning the- attitude of Germany. Belgium continues to contemplate the probability of a European War. July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 101 Austria-Hungary : Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal . 1 mbassadors at Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, St. Petersburgh and Constantinople. Vienna, .July 25, 191/).. Your Excellency will find herewith the dossier mentioned in the circular note 1 to the Powers with reference to the Great-Servian propaganda, and its connection with the Serajevo murder. Your Excellency is instructed to bring this dossier to the notice of the Government to which you are accredited. (See Note 2 to British Blue Book No. 48, July 27.) Enclosure "The Dossier" 2 The Servian agitation, which has as its object the separation from the Austrian Monarchy of the Southern Slav districts in order to unite them with the Servian States, dates from far back. This propaganda on Servian soil, always the same in its ultimate object, although varying in its means and intensity, reached one of its culminating points at the time of the annexation crisis. Throwing off the protecting cloak of secrecy, it then revealed its purpose openly and undisguisedly, and attempted, under the patronage of the Servian Government, to attain its ends by every means in its power. While the whole of the Servian press was calling for war against the Monarchy by malicious invectives in which facts were perverted, apart from other means of propaganda, associations were being formed to prepare for this war. The Narodna Odbrana stood out as the most important of these associations. Having its origin in an already existing revolutionary committee, it was constituted as a private society, although in fact it took the form of an organisation of Servian military and civil officials wholly dependent on the Foreign Office at Belgrade. Amongst its founders one may mention : General Bozo Jankovic, ex-ministers Ljuba Jovanovic, Ljuba Davidovic, and Velislav Vulovic, Zivojin 1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 8, July 22, 1914. 2 This "dossier," being too long to be telegraphed, was sent by mail (see Austro- Hungarian Red Book No. 39, July 28). It was presented (the Powers were advised of it on July 25, see French Yellow Book No. 38 and note 1) in Paris on July 27, and was published, in part, under No. 75 of the French Yellow Book of that date. It was prob- ably presented in London to Sir Edward Grey on the same day. Sir E. Grey, however, published only a scant summary of it in British Blue Book No. 48, omitting the rest and not stating that he had received it. In the introductory narrative to the edition of the Blue Book of Sept. 28. 1914. Sir E. Grey says : "That his Majesty's Government did not receive any statement of the evidence on which Austria had founded her ulti- matum till the 7th August." Neither the British Blue Book nor the Austro-Hungarian Red Book contains a despatch of this day, which renders it impossible to ascertain to which "evidence" Sir E. Grey referred in this sentence. It may have been a complete transcript of the evidence presented at the trial of the Serajevo murderers. The "dossier," however, contained the "evidence on which Austria had founded her ultimatum," and this Sir E. Grey kept from Parliament, from the country and possibly from his colleagues. The first partial knowledge of the "dossier" that the world had came from the French Yellow Book which was published several months after the outbreak of the war. 102 Official Diplomatic Documents Dacic (Director of the Government printing establishment), and Majors (then Captains) Vbja Tankosic and Milan Pribicevic. This association aimed at the creation and equipment of free companies for use in the impending war against the Austro-Hungarian Mon- archy. (See Appendix 2.) A convinction description of the activity at that time of the Narodna Odbrana will be found amongst others in the deposition of Trifko Krstanovic, a Bosnia-Herzegovinian subject, in the course of his evidence before the district court at Serajevo; he was then at Belgrade, and had been accepted l>y the Narodna Odbrana, with other subjects of the Monarchy as a komitadji. At the beginning of L909, Krstanovic had arrived with about 140 fellow-members at a school established for the formation of new hands at Cuprija (in the district of Jagodina), managed by < 'aptains Voja Tankosic and 1 hisan Putnik. The only instructors at this school were Servian officers. General Bozo Jankovic and Captain Milan Pribicevic inspected the three-monthly courses of these bands at regular intervals. The new komitadjis received their training in musketry, bomb throwing, mine laying, Mowing up of railways, tunnels and bridges, and the destruction of telegraph wires. According to the instructions of their leaders, it was their duty to put into practice in Bosnia and Herzegovina the knowledge they had recently acquired. By this action, carried on in the most open manner and encouraged by the Servian Government, the Narodna Odbrana was thus prepared for guerilla warfare against Austria-Hungary. In this way sub- jects of the Monarchy were led into treason against their country, and induced, as Servian emissaries, systematically to practice under- hand attacks against the means of defence of their country. This period of aggressive aspirations ended with the declaration made by the Servian Government on the Mist March, 1909, in which the Government of Belgrade announced that they were prepared to accept the new situation created in municipal and international law by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and solemnly promised to maintain in future friendly relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. With this declaration, the agitation, which constituted a source of constant trouble to Austria-Hungary, seemed to have come to an end, and the road to an amicable rapprochement between Servia and the Monarchy to have been entered on. Deprived of the encouragement of the Servian Government, and combated by that Government in accordance with their engagements, the propaganda hostile tothe Monarchy could only have continued a shadowy existence and would have been condemned to early destruction. On the other hand, the ties of language, race and culture existing between the Southern Slav districts of the Monarchy and Servia ought to have resulted in the realisation of a task of common development inspired by mutual friendship ami parallel interests. These hopes, however, have not been realised. Aspirations hostile to the Monarchy have continued, and under July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 103 the eyes of the Servian Government, who have done nothing to sup- press this movement, the anti-Austro-Hungarian propaganda has only increased in extent and volume. Hatred against the Monarchy has been fanned and kindled into an irreconcilable feeling. The Servian people alike by adapting their former course of action to the new situation and by supplementing it by fresh methods were sum- moned to the "inevitable death struggle" against Austria-Hungary. Secret ramifications have been systematically spread towards the Slav districts in the south of the Monarchy whose subjects have been incited to treason against their country. Above all, the Servian press has since then worked incessantly in this spirit. Up to the present time no' fewer than eighty-one newspapers appearing in Servia have had to forfeit their right to delivery through the post on account of their contents falling within the scope of the penal law. There is hardly a clause in the penal code protecting the sacred person of the Monarch and the members of the Imperial Family, or the integrity of the State, that has not been violated by Servian papers. A few examples of these press views, selected from the great mass of material published by the press at various dates, are contained in Appendix I. Without entering into a detailed account of these expressions of Servian public opinion, it is necessary to note that in spite of the formal recognition accorded by Servia, it has never ceased to consider the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, both before and after the event, as a robbery committed against Servia for which repara- tion is due. This idea not only constantly recurs with every modu- lation of its coarse language in the papers professing most advanced views, but also finds expression in hardly veiled terms in the Sarrum- jjrava, which is in such close touch with the Foreign Office of Belgrade. (See Appendix I (//).) Nor can one omit to draw attention to the manner in which the attempt made on the 15th June, 1910, at Serajevo, by Bogdan Zerajic against the Feldzeugmeister von Varesanin, Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was turned to account by the prcs^. As is known, Zerajic had killed himself immediately after his deed, and before committing it had burnt all his papers. Under these circumstances, it was impossible to throw full light upon the motives of his crime. It could, however, be inferred from a document found on his person that he was a follower of the views of Krapotkin. Evidence collected leads likewise to the conclusion that the crime was of an anarchist type. This, however, did not prevent the Servian press from celebrating the criminal as a national Servian hero and from glorifying his deed. Indeed, the "Politika" protested strongly against the idea that Zerajic was an anarchist, and declared him to be "a Servian hero whose name all Servians will repeat with respect and grief." 104 Official Diplomatic Documents The Politika considers the 18th August ' of the same year as a suitable opportunity on which to return to the crime of Zerajic, "whose name will be sacred to the people," and to celebrate the outrage in verse. (See Appendix I (a).) In this way this crime, which had nothing to do witli the territorial aspirations against the Monarchy, was exploited for the furtherance of these ideas and by the glorifying of Zerajic, murder was hailed in the most explicit way as a glorious means towards the realisation of this aim and one worthy to be imitated in the struggle. This approbation of murder as a weapon fully admissible in the struggle against the Monarchy re-appears later in the press in discussing the attempt made by Jukic against the Royal Commissioner von Cuvaj. (See Appendix I (c).) These newspapers, which were circulated not only in Servia but also, as we shall show later, illicitly smuggled into the Monarchy by well-organised secret methods, have awakened and kept alive this mood in the masses, a mood which has provided a fruitful field for the activities of the associations hostile to the Monarchy. The Narodna Odbrana became the centre of the agitation car- ried on by the associations. The same persons w r ho were at its head at the time of the annexation still control it. Now as then, they still control it in the capacity of the most active and energetic organ- isers, the most violent opponents of the Monarchy; General Bozo Jankovic, Zivojin Dacic (Director of the Government printing estab- lishment), and Majors Milan Pribicevic and Voja Tankosic. Organ- ised on a broad and far-reaching scale and constituted on a strict hierarchical basis (see Appendix 2, "Organisation"), the Narodna Odbrana counted soon some 400 committees which developed a very active agitation. Moreover, the Narodna Odbrana became closely allied with the "shooting federation" (Schiitzenbund) , (702 societies), the great Sokol 2 Association "Dusan" (2,500 members), the Olympian Club, the association of horsemen (Reitervereiri) , "Prince Michael," the society of sportsmen {J dgcrbund) , and the league of development (Kulturliga), as well as numerous other associations all of which, subordinate to it, were under the guidance and protection of the Narodna Odbrana, and worked on the same lines. Becoming more and more closely intermingled, these associations arrived at a com- plete amalgamation in such a way that to-day they are nothing but members of the single body of the Narodna Odbrana. Thus the Narodna Odbrana has set up all over Servia a close network of agitation, and has attracted to its principles all those who were receptive of its ideas. The official publications of the Narodna Odbrana demonstrate sufficiently clearly the spirit which animates it. While in its statutes, it represents itself as an "educational society" 1 Birthday of His Imperial and Apostolic Majesty. -[Sokol = falcon. The name given to gymnastic associations throughout Slav countries which have adopted the falcon as their emblem.) July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 105 (Kulturrercin) concerning itself only with the spiritual and physical improvement of the Servian population and its material progress, the Narodna Odbrana discloses in its official publication (see Appendix 2) the true and single motive of its existence in that which it calls its "re-organised programme": to preach to the Servian people the sacred truth by "fanatical and indefatigable work" under the pre- tence that the Monarchy wishes to "take away Servian liberty and language and even to destroy her"; that it is an essential necessity to wage against Austria-Hungary, her "first and greatest enemy," "a war of extermination with rifle and cannon," and "by every means" to prepare the people for this war, which is "to liberate the conquered territories," in which "seven million brothers are suffering in bondage." All the efforts "at an educational programme" (Kulturbestrebungen) of the Narodna Odbrana are exclusively concerned with this idea simply as a means for the organisation and education of the people for the longed-for death struggle against the Monarchy. All the associations affiliated to the Narodna Odbrana work in the same spirit ; the Sokol Association at Kragujevac will serve as an example (see Appendix 3). As in the case of the Narodna Odbrana, officers, professors and civil servants are at its head. The speech in which its President, Major Kovacevic, opened the annual meeting of 1914, made absolutely no mention of physical training, which is supposed to be the real object of a Sokol association, and confined itself solely to "the preparations for war" against the "dangerous, heartless, grasping, odious and greedy enemy in the north" who "robs millions of Servian brothers of their liberty and rights, and holds them in bondage and chains." In the administrative reports of this association the technical work is placed entirely in the background, and only serves as headlines for the avowal of the real "objects of the activities of the adminis- tration," namely, the preparation of national development and the strengthening of the "oppressed nation" with the object of enabling it to carry out its "incomplete programme and its unfinished task," and to accomplish that "great action" "which is to be carried out in the near future," "the liberation of those brothers who live across the Drina, who are suffering the martyrdom of the crucified." Even the treasurer makes use of his financial reports to send forth the appeal that " falcons must be reared " capable " of bringing freedom to the brothers still in bondage." As in the case of the "educational programme" of the Narodna Odbrana, the gymnastic activity of the Sokols is not the real object but merely a means at the service of the same propaganda carried on in the same spirit, and even with the very same words. When the Narodna Odbrana appeals to the "people" for a death struggle against the Monarchy, it does not address itself only to the Servian people, but to all Southern Slav nationalities. In the eyes of the Narodna Odbrana, the Slav regions in the south of the 106 Official Diplomatic Documents Monarchy are regarded as "our subjected Servian territories." (See Appendix 4.) The Southern Slav subjects of the Monarchy are further also expected to take part in this "national work." This "healthy and necessary work" is, therefore, to be carried on beyond the Servian frontier. The Narodna Odbrana recruits its "heroes for this holy war" even on the soil of the Monarchy, and among them Obilic, the murderer of Murad, is to light them on their way as an example of sacrifice for one's country worthy of imitation. But in order to incite "brothers outside Servia" to share in "the work of private effort," the Narodna Odbrana keeps in close touch with the "brothers beyond the frontier." It is not said in the publi- cations of the society, how this intimate association is carried out, no doubt because it appertains to that part of the "common work" which "for many reasons cannot, or ought not to be divulged." How comprehensive this branch of its activity is, can be seen by the fact that not only the central committee of the Narodna Od- brana, but also certain of its local committees contain special sections for " foreign affairs." This "foreign" activity of the Narodna Odbrana and its affiliated branches is extremely varied. What is relatively less dangerous inasmuch as it can be officially controlled, consists of lecture tours undertaken by distinguished members of the Narodna Odbrana in the southeastern parts of the Monarchy where they spe;ik before various societies on national or educational subjects. These tours give the speakers the desired opportunity, which is indeed the chief object of these journeys, of explaining the true aims of the associations in language more or less veiled, which is intelligible to those who are already initiated. Amongst these emissaries, one of the best known is Zivojin Dacic (Director of the Government printing establishment), already several times alluded to ; it was he who, on the 8th August, 1909, issued an "appeal" to the Servian people in which he called Austria-Hungary the enemy of Servia, and exhorted them to prepare for the war against the Monarchy. On numerous occasions, Dacic under- took tours of this nature in the southeastern districts of the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy. During one of these lectures at Karlovci in 1912, he flung his accustomed prudence to the winds and spoke openly of the "union of all Serbs against the common foe," by which he designated Austria-Hungary in unmistakable language. More dangerous are the relations with associations in the Monarchy formed by Servian associations imbued with the spirit of the Narodna Odbrana under the cloak of community of interests and of culture ; for the mutual visits of these associations, whether by delegates or in bodies, which escape all official control, are utilised by the Ser- vians for all sorts of plots against the Monarchy. Thus, for instance, at the well-known feast of the Prosvjeta Asso- ciation at Serajevo, in September, 1912, an envoy of the Narodna Odbrana had the effrontery secretly to recruit Bosnian, adherents to his society. (See Appendix 6.) The message which the representa- July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 107 tive of the Sokol Association at Kragujevac brought to the "brothers in Bosnia " at this feast was : " We have not forgotten you ; the wings of the falcon of Sumadija are still powerful" — a thought which in confidential intercourse would no doubt have found quite a different expression and one better corresponding to the tendencies of this society which we have already explained. (See Appendix 3.) As to the events that take place at meetings of the same kind in Servia, the Imperial and Royal authorities cannot have any information founded on unimpeachable authority, as they only possess on this matter confidential information which it is difficult to check. In this connection, one may mention the visit of Agram students to Servia in April, 1912, who received from the Servians an official military reception accompanied even by a review of troops in their honour, and that in a manner so suggestive that the administrative report of the Sokol Association at Kragujevac could say : "This event marks the beginning and germ of a great deed which will be accomplished in the near future, it is a germ which will ripen when the soul of the people bursts its bonds and until there is no barrier that has not been destroyed." It is only recently that it has come to the knowledge of the Austro- Hungarian authorities that the Servian Sokol associations have succeeded in inducing similar societies into the Monarchy to estab- lish a connection with them which is up to the present secret, and the character of which is not yet quite clear, for the inquiries on this point are still in progress. Up to the present, however, the informa- tion obtained permits the conclusion that traces have been dis- covered of one of the ways by which the subversive aims of the Servian Sokols and their friends have poisoned the minds of certain groups of mistaken and misled persons in the Monarchy. This propaganda which is aimed at wider circles, and is rather of a preparatory nature, assumes minor importance compared with that of the "foreign work" which is conducted by the Narodna Odbrana and its friends in the form of personal agitation among individuals. It is in this field that the most melancholy results are shown. By means of confidential and secret emissaries, it carries the poison of rebellion to the circles of men of mature age as well as tho e of irresponsible youth. It is thus, for example, that the late officers of the Honved B.B., D.K., Y.M., and the lieutenant of Croatian-Slavonian Gendarmerie V.K., led astray by Milan Pribicevic, left the service of the army of the Monarchy under most suspicious circumstances and turned to Servia; they have seen in the meanwhile most of their dreams unrealised and some of them, at any rate, are thinking of returning to the Fatherland they have betrayed. The agitation introduced from Servia into the middle schools of Croatia and Bosnia is unhappily too well known to need illustration ; what is less known is that people who have been expelled from Croatian and Bosnian schools owing to grave breaches of discipline, are received in Servia with open arms, and often even protected by the 108 Officio! Diplomatic Documents State and educated as enemies of the Monarchy. The Servian schools with their anti-Austrian staffs, and their large number of professors and teachers who are members of the Narodna Odbrana, are clearly establishments thoroughly adapted for training experts of this kind. A very notable case of this sort may be quoted here. In March, 1914, several pupils of the Training College of Pakrac (Croatia) were dis- missed on account of a strike. They went to Servia, where some of them immediately obtained situations as schoolmasters, while others were admitted to a college for teachers. One of those who had been thus dismissed, and who was connected with anti-Austrian circles, declared publicly that he and his people would give a proof, during the sojourn of the hereditary Archduke in Bosnia, that this province was Servian territory. It is, as we may add, highly significant that during the stay of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Bosnia, the Royal Servian Prefect of the district of Krajna gave to the three training college students, who were thus gravely implicated, Servian passports in which he falsely described them as Servian subjects, although he must have known that they were Croatians. With these passports, the three agitators were able to enter the Monarchy without being noticed, where, however, they were eventually recognised and arrested. All this is not, by a long way, enough to give a complete repre- sentation of the "foreign" activity of the Narodna Odbrana. The Imperial and Royal Government had been informed for a lung time past by confidential reports that the Narodna Odbrana had made military preparations tor the war which it desired to make against the Monarchy, inasmuch as it kept emissaries in Austria- Hungary, who, as soon as hostilities broke out, would attempt in the usual guerilla manner to destroy means of transport and equip- ment and stir up revolt or panic. (See Appendix 7.) The criminal proceedings taken in 1913 by the District Court at Serajevo against Jovo Jaglicic and his associates for espionage (Appendix 6), confirm this confidential information. As at the time of its foundation, the preparation for guerilla warfare still figures in the programme of the Narodna Odbrana, to which must now be further added a complete system of espionage. It is for this reason that the programme of the Narodna Odbrana, described as "re-organised," is in reality an extended programme which includes the preparation for a "war of extermination" against the Monarchy, and even its realisation, and finally the unfurling of the "ancient red Hag of the Narodna Odbrana." Acts of terrorism must finally result from this atmosphere of hatred against the Monarchy, which is publicly and secretly provoked, and from an agitation which considers itself free from all responsibility; in order to bring them about, all means are regarded as permissible in the struggle against Austria-Hungary, including even without any sense of shame common acts of murder. On the 8th June, 1912, a man named Lukas Jukic shot von Cuvaj, the Royal Commissioner at Agram, with the result that the Councillor July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 109 (Banalrat) von Hervoic, who was seated in the same carriage, was mortally wounded. Jukic, in his flight, shot a policeman who was pursuing him, and wounded two others. From the subsequent public investigation it appeared that Jukic was saturated with the ideas and plans propagated by the Narodna Odbrana, and that although Jukic had for some time past been devoting himself to criminal schemes, these schemes were only matured after he had made an excursion to Belgrade together with the Agram students on the 18th of April, 1912. At the noisy cele- brations in honour of the visitors, Jukic had entered into relations with several people belonging to the circle of the Narodna Odbrana, with whom he had had political discussions. A few days after- wards he returned to Belgrade, and there received from a Servian major a bomb, and from a comrade the Browning pistol with which he carried out his crime. In the opinion of experts, the bomb found at Agram was made in an arsenal for military purposes. Jukic" s attempt had not been forgotten, when on the 18th of August, 1913, Stephen Dojcic, who had returned from America, made an attempt on the life of the Royal Commissioner, Baron Skerlecz, at Agram — an attempt which was the outcome of action organised by the Servians among the Southern Slavs living in America, and which was also the work of the "foreign" propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and its confederates. A pamphlet by the Servian, T. Dimitrijevic, printed in Chicago, and entitled "Natrag u staro ognjiste vase," with its unbridled attacks against His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, and its appeal to the Servians of the Monarchy with reference to their im- pending "deliverance," and urging them to migrate home to Servia, demonstrates the fact that the propaganda carried out unchecked in America from Servia, and that carried on from Servia in the terri- tory of the Monarchy, worked on parallel lines. And again, scarcely a year later, Agram was the scene of a new outrage, this time unsuccessful. On the 20th of May, 1914, Jakob Schafer made an attempt at the Agram Theatre on the life of the Ban, Freiherr von Skerlecz, an attempt which was frustrated at the last moment by a police official. The subsequent investigation revealed the existence of a plot inspired by Rudolf Hercigonja. From the depositions of Hercigonja and his five accomplices, it is manifest that this crime also originated in Servia. Having taken part in an unsuccessful attempt to liberate Jukic, Hercigonja fled to Servia (October, 1912), where, together with his accomplice Marojan Jaksic, he consorted with the komitadjis and members of the Narodna Odbrana. As frequently happens when immature minds are excited by occupying themselves too early with political questions, the result of this corrupting company was here also disastrous. Hercigonja returned home impressed by the dogma learnt in Belgrade that the Southern Slav territories of Austria-Hun- gary must be separated from it and re-united to the Servian kingdom. 110 Official Diplomatic Documents He had further been persuaded by the teachings of the friends with whom he associated there, that this object should be pursued by of attempts on the lives of persons holding high office and leading politicians of the Monarchy as the only means of obtaining this end. This is the spirit in which Hercigonja influenced his friends at Agram and converted some of them to his ideas. Foremost among his plans was the carrying out of an attempt on the life of the heir to the throne, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. A few months before proceedings had been taken against Luka Aljinovic for treasonable agitation. In the course of these proeeed- ings three witnesses declared that Aljinovic had told them that in the year 1913 he had received at Belgrade 100 dinar from the Narodna Odbrana, and a similar sum from a secret association of students, for purposes of agitation, but especially to cam" out an attempt on the life of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. It is clear how far the criminal agitation of the Xarodna Odbrana and those who shared in its views, has of late been primarily directed against the person of the hereditary Archduke. From these facts the conclusion may he drawn that the Xarodna Odbrana, as well as the associations hostile to the Monarchy in Servia, which were grouped round it, recently decided that the hour had struck to trans- late theory into practice. It is noteworthy, however, that the Xarodna limits itself in this way to inciting, and where the incitement has fallen on fertile soil to providing means of material assistance for the realisation of its plan . but that it has confided the only dangerous part of this prop- aganda of action to the youth of the Monarchy, which it has ex- cited and corrupted, and which alone has to bear the burden of this miserable "heroism." All the characteristics of this procedure are found in the history and origin of the profoundly regrettable outrage of the 28th of June (see Appendix 8). Princip and Grabez are characteristic examples of young men who have been poisoned from their school days by the doctrines of the Xarodna Odbrana. At Belgrade, where he frequented the society of students imbued with these ideas, Princip Imsied himself with criminal plans against the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, against whom the hatred of the Servian element hostile to the Monarchy was particularly acute on the occasion of his tour in the annexed territories. He was joined by < Jabrinovic, who moved in the same circles, and whose shifting and radically revolutionary views, as he himself admits, as well as the influence of his surroundings in Belgrade and the reading of the Servian papers, inspired him with the same sense of hostility to the Monarchy, and brought him into the propaganda of action. Thanks to the state of mind in which he already was, Grabez succumbed very quickly to this milieu, which he now entered. But however far this plot may have prospered, and however July 25, Austro-Hiingarian Red Book No. 19 111 determined the conspirators may have been to carry out the attempt, it would never have been effected, if people had not been found, as in the case of Jukic, to provide the accomplices with means of com- mitting their crime. For, as Princip and Cabrinovic have expressly admitted, they lacked the necessary arms, as well as the money to purchase them. It is interesting to see where the accomplices tried to procure their arms. Milan Pribicevie and Zivojin Dacic, the two principal men in the Narodna Odbrana, were the first accomplices thought of as a sure source of help in their need, doubtless because it had already become a tradition amongst those ready to commit crimes, that they could obtain instruments for murder from these representatives of the Narodna Odbrana. The accidental circumstance that these two men were not at Belgrade at the critical moment doubtless balked this plan. However, Princip and Cabrinovic were not at a loss in finding other help, that of Milan Ciganovic, an ex-komitadji, and now a railway official at Belgrade, and at the same time an active member of the Narodna Odbrana, who, in 1909, first appeared as a pupil at the school {Bandcnschule) at Cuprija (see Appendix 5). Princip and Cabrinovic were not deceived in their expectations, as they at once received the necessary help from Ciganovic. The latter, and at his instigation, his friend Major Voja Tankosir, of the Royal Servian Army, also one of the leaders of the Narodna Odbrana, who has already been mentioned several times, and who, in 1908, was at the head of the school of armed bands at Cuprija (see Appendix 5), now appear as moving spirits and active furtherers in the plot ; the repulsive manner in which they approved as a matter of course, is significant of the moral qualities of the whole anti- Austrian movement. They had at first only one doubt, and that but a fleeting one, as to whether the three conspirators were really resi Jved to commit this act. This doubt, however, soon disappeared, thanks to their insidious counsels. Thenceforth they were prepared to give every assistance. Tankosic produced four Browning pistols, ammuni- tion and money for the journey ; six hand-grenades from the Servian army supplies completed the equipment, of which the composition and origin recalls the case of Jukic. Anxious about the success of the attempt, Tankosic had the conspirators instructed in shooting, a task which Ciganovic carried out with a success which has since been fully proved. Tankosic and Ciganovic were further anxious to ensure secrecy for the plot by special means which had not been bar- gained for by the assassins. They therefore supplied cyanide of potassium, telling the two culprits to commit suicide after the crime, a precaution which was to be specially advantageous to themselves, as secrecy would thus relieve them of the slight danger which they were incurring in the enterprise. Sure death for the victims of their corruption, perfect security for themselves, this is the motto of the Narodna Odbrana, as was already known. In order to render the execution of the crime possible, it was necessary that the bombs and arms should be secretly smuggled into 112 Official Diplomatic Documents Bosnia. There again Ciganovic gave all the assistance in his power ; he wrote out for the conspirators the exact route to be followed, and assured them of the collusion of the Servian Customs officials for getting them into Bosnia. The way in which this journey, described by Princip as "mysterious," was organised and carried out can leave no doubt but that this route was a secret one, prepared in advance, and already often used for the mysterious designs of the Narodna Odbrana. With an assurance and a certainty which could only result from long habit, the frontier guards at Sabac and Loznica lent their administrative organisation for the purpose. The secret trans- port with its complicated system of ever-changing guides, who were summoned as if by magic, and who were always on the spot when wanted, was effected without a hitch. Without inquiring into the object of this strange journey of some immature students, the Ser- vian authorities set this smootli machinery into motion at a word from the ex-komitadji and minor railway official, Ciganovic. How- ever, they had no need to ask any questions, as from the instructions they had received, it was perfectly clear that a new "mission''' of the Narodna Odbrana was being carried out. The sight of the arsenal of bombs and revolvers caused the exciseman Grbic merely to smile good-naturedly ami approvingly — sufficient proof of how accus- tomed they were on this "route" to find contraband of this nature. The Royal Servian Government have taken a grave responsibility on their shoulders, in allowing all this to take place. Though bound to cultivate neighbourly relations with Austria- Hungary, they have allowed their press to disseminate hatred against the Monarchy; they have allowed associations established on their own territory under the leadership of high officers, of public officials, of professors and of judges, to carry on openly a campaign against the Monarchy, with the ultimate object of inciting its citizens to revo- lution ; they have not prevented men devoid of all moral scruples, who share in the direction of its military and civil administration, from poisoning the public conscience, so that in this struggle low murder appears as the best weapon. APPENDIX 1 Opinions of the Servian Press (a) The Politika, on the 18th August, 191(1, on the occasion of the eightieth birthday of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, published a large portrait of Bogdan Zerajic, who, two months earlier, had made a murderous attack on the Governor of Bosnia, Freiherr von Varesanin. In the article dealing with this, the fol- lowing observations were made: — "Two months ago, on the 2nd of June (old style), on the opening day of the Diet of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a young Servian, the student Bogdan Zerajic, made an attempt in Serajevo to kill the Governor of Bosnia and Herze- govina, General Marian Varesanin. Zerajic fired five shots at July 25, Austro-IIungarian Red Book No. 19 113 this renegade, who had assured his career by pouring out the blood of his brothers in the famous insurrection in Rakovica, but, owing to a remarkable accident, did not succeed in killing him. Whereon the brave and composed Zerajic fired the sixth and last bullet through his own head, and immediately fell dead. In Vienna, they knew very well that it was not the reading of Russian and revolutionary writings which had induced Zerajic to make his attempt, but that he acted thus as the noble scion of a race which wished to protest against foreign rule in this bloody way. Therefore, they sought to hush up the whole matter as quickly as possible, and — contrary to their cus- tom — to avoid an affair which would have still more compromised the Austrian Government in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Vienna, it was desired that every memory of Zerajic should be extinguished, that no importance should be attached to his attempt ; but just this fear of the dead Zerajic, and the prohibition against mentioning his name throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, brought it about that his name is spoken among the people as something sacred to-day, on the 18th of August, perhaps more than ever. "To-day, we too light a candle at his grave and cry 'Honour to Zerajic.' " To this is added a poem, the translation of which is as follows : — "Bosnia lives and is not dead yet, In vain have you buried her corpse ; Still the chained victim spits fire, Nor is it yet time to sing the dirge. With devil's hand you have scratched a grave for her Rut the living dead will not descend into the vault ; Emperor, dost thou hear? In the flash of the revolver the leaden bullets hiss about thy throne. These are not slaves ; this is glorious freedom Which flashes from the bold hand of the oppressed. \\ hy does this horrible Golgotha shudder? Peter drew the sword in Christ's defence, His hand fell, but out of the blood A thousand brave hands will rise ; That shot was only the first herald Of the glorious Easter after Golgotha's torments." (b) On the 8th October, 1910, on the occasion of the anniversary of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Politika and the Mali Journal, the last of which appeared with a black border, published articles in which they indulged in violent attacks against Austria-Hungary. Europe must convince herself that the Servian people still think always of the " revanche." The day of the "revanche" must come; for this the feverish exertions of Servia to organise her military power as well as the feeling of the Servian people and their hatred of the neighbouring kingdom were a guarantee. On the same occasion the Samouprava wrote on the 9th October, 1910, " Abuse and excesses are no fit means to express true patriotism ; quiet, steady and honest work alone leads to the goal." (c) On the 18th April, 1911, the Politika said: "Except for a few cynics, no one in Servia would be glad to see King Peter pro- 114 Official Diplomatic Documents ceeding to Vienna or Budapest. By the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the possibility of friendship between Servia and Austria- Hungary was once for all destroyed. Every Servian feels that." (d) The Beogradske Novine wrote on the 18th April, 1911: — " Even in Government circles the projected journey of King Peter to the Emperor Francis Joseph is disapproved. The storm of indig- nation which has seized the whole of the Servian race on account of the King's proposed journey is entirely comprehensible." (e) The Mali Journal of the 19th April, 1911, says: "A visit of King Peter to the ruler of Austria-Hungary would be an insult to all Serbs. By this visit, Servia would forfeit the right to play the part of Piedmont. The interests of Servia can never coincide with the interests of Austria." (/) On the 23rd April, 1911, the Politika, the Mali Journal, the Tribuna, the Beogradske Novine, and the ]'ezernjc Nooosti, com- mented on the projected visit of King Peter to the Court of Vienna : " Between Servia and Austria, friendship can never exist. The projected visit of King Peter would, therefore, be for Servia a ' shame- ful capitulation,' 'a humiliation of Servia,' 'a solemn sanctioning of all the crimes and misdeeds that Austria-Hungary has committed against Servia and the Servian people.'" {g) On the 18th April, 1912, the Trgovinski Glasnik wrote in an article headed, "The decay of Austria": — " In Austria-Hungary decay prevails on all sides. What is now happening beyond the Danube and the Save is no longer a German, Magyar, Bohemian or Croatian crisis, it is a universal Austrian crisis, a crisis of the dynasty itself. We Servians can observe such a devel- opment of affairs in Austria with satisfaction." (/() The Balkan, in an article entitled "The Borders of Albania," in attacking Austria-Hungary, expressed itself to this effect: "If Europe is too weak to call a halt to Austria-Hungary, Montenegro and Servia will do it, saying to Austria, 'Halt ! no further!' A war between Austria-Hungary and Servia is inevitable. We have dis- membered the Turkish Empire, we will dismember Austria too. We have finished one war, we are now facing a second." (/) The Vecernje Novosti, of the 22nd April, 1913, appeals to the Servian travelling public and to Servian traders to boycott the Donau Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellsehaft (The Danube Steam Navigation Company). "No one should travel or consign goods by ships of this Austrian Company. All who do this should be punished with lines by a committee. The moneys would flow to the funds of the Komitadjis which are to be applied for the purpose of the coming war with Austria." (/.■) The Tribuna of the 26th May, 1913, on the occasion of the seizure of Ada Kaleh by Austria, writes: "The criminal black and yellow Austria has again carried out a piratical trick. It is a thief who, when he cannot steal a. whole sack of gold, contents himself with one dinar." (/) On the 10th June, 1913, on the occasion of the recurrence of July 25, Austw-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 115 the anniversary of the murderous attack on the Royal Commissary in Agram by the student Luka Jukic, the Servian newspapers pub- lished memorial articles. An article in the Pragda stated that : " It must grieve us to the bottom of our hearts that everyone has not acted like our Jukic. We have no longer a Jukic, but we have the hatred, we have the anger, we have to-day ten million Jukics. We are convinced that soon Jukic, through his prison window, will hear the last cannon shot of freedom." (m) The Mali Journal of the 7th October, 1913, gives a leading place to an article in which Austria-Hungary is denied the right of existence, and the Slavonic peoples are invited to support the offensive campaign contemplated by Servia. (n) The Piemont writes on the commemoration day of the annex- ation : " Five years ago to-day an imperial decree extended the sov- ereignty of the Hapsburg sceptre over Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Servian people will feel for decades yet the grief which was that day inflicted on them. Shamed and shattered, the Servian people groaned in despair. The people vow to take vengeance in attaining freedom by an heroic step. This day has aroused the energy which had already sunk to sleep, and soon the refreshed hero will strive for freedom. To-day when Servian graves adorn the ancient Servian territories, when the Servian cavalry has trod the battlefields of Macedonia and old Servia, the Servian people having ended their task in the South turn to the other side, whence the groans and tears of the Servian brother are heard, and where the gallows has its home. The Servian soldiers who to-day in Dusan's kingdom fight those Albanians who were provoked against us by the state which took Bosnia and Herzegovina from us, vowed to march against the 'sec- ond Turkey' even as with God's help they had marched against the Balkan Turkey. They make this vow and hope that the day of revenge is drawing near. One Turkey vanished. The good Servian God will grant that the 'second Turkey' will vanish too." (o) The Mali Journal of the 4th November, 1913, writes : "Every effort towards a rapprochement with Austria-Hungary is equivalent to a betrayal of the Servian people. Servia must understand the facts and always hold before her eyes that she has in Austria-Hungary her most dangerous enemy, and that it must be the sacred obliga- tion of every Servian Government to fight this enemy." (p) On the 14th January, 1914, the Pragda said: "Our new year's wishes are first of all for our still unfreed brothers sighing under a foreign yoke. Let the Servians endure ; after Kossovo came Kumanovo, and our victorious career is not yet ended." (g) The Novosti of the 18th January, 1914, published a picture of "The Blessing of the Water in Bosnia" with the following text: " Even in places which lie under the foreign yoke, the Servians pre- serve their customs against the day when in glorious joy the day of freedom dawns." (r) The Zastava confesses in January, 1914: "Servia incites the Austro-Hungarian Servians to revolution." 116 Official Diplomatic Documents (s) The Mali Journal of the 9th March, 1914, writes : "Servia can never forget Franz Ferdinand's sabre-rattling in the Skutari affair." (t) On the 4th April, 1914, the Zastava writes: "The Austrian statesmen who only conduct a policy of hatred, a bureaucratic policy, not a policy inspired by broad vision, are themselves preparing the ruin of their State." ((/) The Pragda of the 8th April, 1914, says: "Austria has now lost her right to exist." (v) In their Easter numbers (April, 1914) all the Servian newspapers expressed the hope that soon their unfreed, oppressed brothers under the yoke would celebrate a joyous resurrection. (w) In the Tribuna of the 23rd April, 1914, it is stated that: "The pacifists have invented a new catchword, that of the ' patriotism of Europe' This programme can only be realised, however, when Austria is partitioned." (.r) The Mali Journal of the 12th May, 1914, writes: "What are called crimes in private life are called, in Austria, politics. History knows a monster, and that monster is called Austria." APPENDIX 2 Extract from the "Narodna Odbrana," an organ published by the Central Committee of the Narodna Odbrana Society. (Narodna odbrana izdanje stredi.snog odbora narodne- ODBRANE. BeOGKAD, 1911. "NOVA STAMPARIJA" DaVIDOVIC, Decaxska ulica br. 14, L.jvb. Davtdovica.) In a short introduction it is first of all remarked that this pamphlet "does not completely or exhaustively reproduce the whole work of the Narodna Odbrana because, for many reasons, it is neither per- missible nor possible to do this." The document is divided into three parts of which the first consists of fourteen chapters and is in the nature of a programme, while the second contains a report of the activities of the Society, and in the third examples are given for the organisation of similar societies abroad. In the first chapter, "Origin and activity of the first Narodna Odbrana," it is remarked that the Society was founded as a conse- quence of the popular movement arising in Servia on the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that it had the following objects : — (1) liaising, inspiring and strengthening the sentiment of nation- ality. (2) Registration and enlistment of volunteers. (3) Formation of volunteer units and their preparation for armed action. (4) Collection of voluntary contributions, including money and other things necessary for the realisation of its task. (5) Organisation, equipment and training of a special revolutionary band (Komitee), destined for special and independent military action. July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 117 (6) Development of activity for the defence of the Servian people in all other directions. In this connection, it is remarked that owing to the recognition of the annexation by the Great Powers an end had been made to all this work of the Society on which, while retaining its existing constitution, the Society had taken measures to reorganise its programme and to undertake new work, so that, on the recurrence of a similar occasion, "the old red War Flag of the Narodna Odbrana would again be unfurled." At the beginning of the second chapter, "The new Narodna Odbrana of to-day," it is stated that "at the time of the annexation, experience had shown that Servia was not ready for the struggle which circumstances imposed upon her, and that this struggle, which Servia must take up, is much more serious and more difficult than it was thought to be ; the annexation was only one of the blows which the enemies of Servia have aimed at this land, many blows have preceded it, and many will follow it. Work and preparation are necessary so that a new attack may not find Servia equally unpre- pared." The object assigned to the work to be done by people of every class is stated to be " the preparation of the people for war in all forms of national work, corresponding to the requirements of the present day," and the means suggested to effect this object are " strengthening of the national consciousness, bodily exercises, increase of material and bodily well-being, cultural improvement, etc. . . . so far as individuals and societies can and should assist the State in these spheres." The third chapter, "The three principal tasks," begins with a hint that the annexation has taught that national consciousness in Servia is not so strong as it should be in a country which, as a small fraction of three millions, forms a hope of support for seven millions of the oppressed Servian people. The first task of the Society, therefore, consists in strengthening the national consciousness. The second task is the cultivation of bodily exercises, the third the proper util- isation of these activities learned in the field of sport. In the fourth chapter (Musketry) prominence is given to the value of good training in musketry, especially having regard to the circum- stances of Servia, where the military training only lasts six months. These observations conclude with the sentence : "A new blow, like that of the annexation, must be met by a new Servia, in which every Servian, from child to greybeard, is a rifle- man." • The fifth chapter, which treats of "The relations of the Narodna Odbrana to the Sokol societies," begins with a social and political excursus as to the conditions on which the powers of States de- pend. In this connection the fall of Turkey is referred to, and it is said : "The old Turks of the South gradually disappear and only a part of our people suffer under their rule. But new Turks come from the North, more fearful and dangerous than the old ; stronger in civilisa- tion and more advanced economically, our northern enemies come 118 Official Diplomatic Documents against us. They want to take our freedom and our language from us and to crush us. We can already feel the presages of the struggle which approaches in that quarter. The Servian people are faced by the question ' to be or not to be ?'" "What is the object of the Lectures?" is the title of the seventh chapter, the principal contents of which are covered by the following sentences : "The Narodna Odbrana instituted lectures which were largely propaganda lectures. The programme of our new work was devel- oped. Every lecture referred to the annexation, the work of the old Narodna Odbrana and the task of the new. The lectures will never cease to be propaganda lectures, but they will develop special branches more and more ami concern themselves with all questions of our social and national life." In the eighth chapter, "Women's Activities in the Narodna Odbrana," the ninth "Detail and Lesser Work," and the tenth, "Renaissance of the Society," the preparation and deepening of the Society's work and the necessity of a regeneration of the individual, the nation and the State are treated in reference to the tasks of the Narodna Odbrana. The Introduction to the eleventh chapter ("New Obilice and Singjelice" 1 ) runs as follows : — " It is an error to assert that Kossovo is past and gone. We find ourselves in the midst of Kossovo. Our Kossovo of to-day is the gloom and ignorance in which our people live. The other causes of the new Kossovo live on the frontiers to the North and West : the Germans, Austrians and 'Schwabas,' with their onward pressure against our Servian and Slavonic South." In conjunction with the reference to the heroic deeds of Obilice and Singjelice, the necessity of sacrifice in the service of the nation is alluded to, and it is declared that "national work is interwoven with sacrifice, particularly in Turkey and in Austria, where such workers are persecuted by the authorities and dragged to prison and the gallows. For this struggle, also, against gloom and ignorance there is no need of such heroes. Tht 1 Narodna Odbrana does not doubt that in the fight with gun and cannon against the 'Schwabas' and the other enemies with whom we stand face to face, our people will provide a succession of heroes. However, the Narodna Odbrana is not content with this, for it regards the so-called peaceful present day conditions as war, and demands heroes too for this struggle of to-day which we are carrying on in Servia and beyond the frontier." The twelfth chapter treats of "Union with our brothers and friends," and its principal contents are concentrated in the following sentences : — 1 Milos Obilice (or Kobilic') crept — according to Serbian tradition — into the Turkish Camp, after the battle on the Amselveld, and there murdered the Sultan Murad (von Kallay, Geschichte der Serben, Vol. I). Stephan Singjelic, Prince of Resara, played a part during the Serbian Revolution, 1807-1810. In 1809, Sing- jelic defended the redoubt of Tschagar against the Turks, and is said to have blown himself into the air, with some of his followers and many Turks, when outnumbered. (Von Kallay, Die Geschichte des serbisehen An/statutes.) July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 119 "The maintenance of union with our brothers near and far across the frontier, and our other friends in the world, is one of the chief tasks of the Narodna Odbrana. In using the word 'people' the Narodna Odbrana means our whole people, not only those in Servia. It hopes that the work done by it in Servia will spur the brothers out- side Servia to take a more energetic share in the work of private initiative, so that the new present day movement for the creation of a powerful Servian Narodna Odbrana will go forward in unison in all Servian territories." The thirteenth chapter, which is headed "Two Important Tasks," proceeds as follows : — "As we take up the standpoint that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has completely brought into the light of day the pressure against our countries from the North, the Narodna Odbrana proclaims to the people that Austria is our first and greatest enemy." This work (that is to say, to depict Austria to the Servian people" as their greatest enemy) is regarded by the Society, according to the fol- lowing expressions of opinion, as a healthy and necessary task, in fact, as its principal obligation. For the pamphlet goes on as follows : — "Just as once the Turks attacked us from the south, so Austria attacks us to-day from the north. If the Narodna Odbrana preaches the necessity of fighting Austria, she preaches a sacred truth of our national position." The hatred against Austria brought about by this propaganda is, of course, not the aim but the natural consequence of this work, the object of which is independence and freedom. If on this account hatred of Austria germinates, it is Austria who sows it by her advance, which conduct "makes obligatory a war of extermination against Austria." After some praise of the modern conception of nationalism the remark is made that in speaking of "freedom and unity," too much is mere talk. The people must be told that : — "For the sake of bread and room, for the sake of the fundamental essentials of culture and trade, the freeing of the conquered Servian territories and their union with Servia is necessary to gentlemen, tradesmen, and peasants alike." Perceiving this the people will tackle the national work with greater self-sacrifice. Our people must be told that the freedom of Bosnia is necessary for her, not only out of pity for the brothers suffering there, but also for the sake of trade and the connection with the sea. The "two tasks" of the Narodna Odbrana are then again brought together in the following concluding sentence : — " In addition to the task of explaining to the people the danger threatening it from Austria, the' Narodna Odbrana has the important duty, while preserving intact the sacred national memories, of giving to the people this new, wholesome and, in its consequences, mighty conception of nationalism and of work in the cause of freedom and union." The fourteenth and final chapter begins with an appeal to the 120 Official Diplomatic Documents Government and people of Servia to prepare themselves in all ways for the struggle "which the annexation has foreshadowed." Hereon the activities of the Narodna Odbrana are again recapitu- lated in the following sentences : — "While the Narodna Odbrana works in conformity with the times according to the altered conditions, it also maintains all the connec- tions made at the time of the annexation ; to-day therefore it is the same as it was at the time of the annexation. To-day, too, it is Odbrana (defence); to-day, too, Narodna (of the people); to-day, too, it gathers under its standard the citizens of Servia as it gathered them at the time of the annexation. Then the cry was for war, now the cry is for work. Then meetings, demonstrations, voluntary chilis, (Komitees), weapons and bombs were asked for; to-day steady, fanatical, tireless work and again work is required to fulfil the tasks and duties to which we have drawn attention by way of present, preparation for the fight with gun and cannon which will come." The pamphlet and the annual report contain the following infor- mation as to the organisation of the Narodna Odbrana : — A Central Committee at Belgrade directs all proceedings of the Narodna Odbrana. All other committees of the Narodna Odbrana are subject to this. The Central Committee is divided into four sections : — for cultural work, for bodily training, for financial policy, and for foreign affairs. 1 fistrict Committees, with their centre at the seat of the offices of the District Government, conduct the affairs of the Society in the corresponding districts. Every District Committee divides itself into sections for culture (the President being the Chairman of the local branch of the "Culture League"), for bodily training (the President being a local member of the Riflemen's, Sokol, Sportsmen's and Horsemen's clubs) and for financial affairs; some District Com- mittees have also a section for Foreign Affairs. Divisional Committees located at the seat of the local authorities conduct the affairs of the Society in the various divisions. Local Committees conduct the Society's affairs in the various towns and villages. Confidential men are located in those places in the interior of the country where the constitution of a Committee is not necessary. Societies "which work in close connection with the organisation of (lie Narodna Odbrana" and are supported by the latter in every respect are the following : — The Riflemen's Association with 7th July, under the title " Boycott against Good-for-nothings," appeals for a boycott of Austrian firms in Belgrade, as well as of Austrian wares, and says that it is the duty of the Narodna Odbrana to see that the boycott is strictly carried out. (.r) The Zvono, of the 16th July, declares Princip to be the son of < ountess Lonyay, to whom the charge was given that he should avenge the death of Crown Prince Rudolf on his murderer, Arch- duke Franz Ferdinand. (;/) The Mali Journal, of the 19th July, publishes a report which says : — "Princip was instigated to make the attempt by an Austro- Hungarian agent. It is said in Vienna that it is only in the Austro- Hungarian Legation at Belgrade that the real culprit is to be found." (-) The leading Young Radical organ, Odjek, of the 20th July, writes: — "Austria-Hungary oilers a hundred proofs that it will inherit the title of the 'sick man' of Europe. While in Servia not a single Austrian citizen has been molested, villages and towns have been plundered in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This fact is one more proof on how much higher a cultural and moral level Servia stands than Austria-Hungary." APPENDIX 10 The Local Committee of the Narodna Odbrana at Nish, on the subject of the crime aliainst the archduke franz Ferdinand. A confidential communication has come to the ears of the Imperial and Royal Foreign Office from a reliable correspondent, whose name July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19 139 will be published at the proper time, according to which the Local Committee of the Narodna Odbrana at Nish, recently held a meeting at which the president of this Committee, Jasa Nenadovic, director of the Nish prison, touched on the subject of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, using the following words : "Servia was absolutely bound this time to have recourse to a measure like the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, because the Arch- duke, on account of his aggressive and eccentric character, was a prominent and deadly danger for Servia, and possibly for wider Slavonic circles also. Had he remained alive, he would have soon challenged Servia to war or attacked it, in which case Servia, which was now so much weakened materially, and had not yet completed her army re-organisation, would certainly have been lost. But now Servia had been rescued by the Serajevo murder, and one of the dan- gers which threatened Servia in the person of the victim had been swept out of the way. Servia would now have rest for several years, as the new heir to the throne would consider well before walking in the steps of his predecessor." " Though he was aware, continued the speaker, that the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand woidd be a heavy blow and a great grief to Austria-Hungary, and that it would be followed by the torture of those of our nation who were living in that country, yet he would not have thought that his suppositions would have been so completely fulfilled, and that the Croatians would have behaved as they had. Yet his friends in Bosnia and Herzegovina had assured him that the Austro-Hungarian officials were cowards and would not dare to overstep the mark in the measures they took ; unfortunately, how- ever, these friends, and through them we too, had been disappointed. If things went on much longer as they were going at present, revolvers and bombs would at last have to play their real role. Whatever the God of Servia has in store, things cannot go on as at present." The remarks of the speaker were received with complete approval by his hearers. APPENDIX 11 Supplements after going to Press 1. — To Append i J- 8 The teacher, Cubrilovic, who undertook the guidance of Princip and Grabez at Priboj, has made a complete confession, from which the following important facts emerge : — In the year 1911, Cubrilovic, on the occasion of a Sokol expedition to Sabac, was initiated by Bozo Foviz, a member of the managing committee of the Narodna Odbrana, into the objects of that asso- ciation, and was then appointed representative of the Narodna Odbrana in Zvornik (Bosnia). At his invitation, Misko Jovanovic 140 Official Diplomatic Documents was later nominated representative of the Xarodna Odbrana for Tuzla. A peasant acted as go-between in the communications with the Xarodna Odbrana, in fact, the same peasant who brought Princip and Grabez to Cubrilovie, with the information that he was bringing two Servian students with weapons to him. When lie learned this, he knew that it was a " mission " from the Narodna Odbrana. Princip and Grabez told him that they had bombs and revolvers with them, with a view to making an attempt on the life of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. 2. — Pictures in the Belgrade War Office of a nature hostile to the Monarchy There are four allegorical pictures on the wall outside the reception hall of the Royal Servian War Office, of which three are representa- tions of Servian victories, while the fourth symbolises the realisation of the anti-Monarchical tendencies of Servia. Over a landscape, partly mountains (Bosnia), partly plains (South Hungary), rises the "Zora," the rosy dawn of Servian hopes. In the foreground stands a woman in armour, whose shield bears the names of all the "provinces still awaiting liberation" : Bosnia, Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Syrmia, Dalmatia, etc. To the Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Red BoOK No. 20 Count Berchtold to the I. nder Secretary, Freiherr von Macchio at Vienna. (Telegraphic.) Lambach, July 25, 1914- Russian Charge d' Affaires telegraphs to me that he has received urgent instructions from his Government to press for a prolongation of time-limit fixed for the ultimatum to Servia. I request Your Excel- lency to reply to him in my name that we cannot consent to a pro- longation of time-limit. Your Excellency will add, that Servia, even after breaking off of diplomatic relations, can bring about friendly solution by unconditional acceptance of our demands, although we should be obliged in such an event to demand reimbursement by Servia of all costs and damage incurred by us through our military measures. July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 22 141 To Petrograd AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 21 Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh. (Telegraphic.) Bad held, July 25, 1914. For Your Excellency's information and guidance : — The Russian Charge d'Affaires called this morning l on the Under Secretary, in order to express in the name of his Government the wish that the time-limit fixed in our note to Servia might be pro- longed. This request was based on the grounds that the Powers had been taken by surprise by our move, and that the Russian Government would regard it merely as natural consideration for the other Cabi- nets, on the part of the Vienna Cabinet, if an opportunity were given to the former to examine the data on which our communica- tion to the Powers was based and to study our prospective dossier. The Under Secretary replied to the Charge d'Affaires that he would immediately bring his explanation to my knowledge; but that he could tell him at once that there was no prospect of a pro- longation of the time-limit fixed being granted by us. As to the grounds which the Russian Government had advanced in sup- port of the wish they had expressed, they appeared to rest upon a mistaken hypothesis. 2 Our note to the Powers was in no way in- tended to invite them to make known their .own views on the subject, but merely bore the character of a statement for information, the communication of which we regarded as a duty laid on us by inter- national courtesy. For the rest, we regarded our action as a matter concerning us and Servia alone, which action, notwithstanding the patience and longsuffering we had exhibited for years past, we had been forced by the development of circumstances to take, much against our own wish, for the defence of our most vital interests. From Belgrade AlTSTRO-HuNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 22 Freiherr von Giesl to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. Cabinet Council met yesterday evening and early this morning; form of answer to our note was settled after several drafts, and is to be delivered to me before the time-limit expires. I hear that Royal train is being made up ; gold belonging to the National Bank 1 This time of day is important, because the French Ambassador says, French Yellow Book No. 48, that it "seems useless to support" the Russian request, "when there is no longer any time for it." since his instructions reached him "exactly at the moment when the time limit given to Servia expires." The time limit expired at 6 p.m. No reason is advanced in the French Yellow Book why the instructions should have reached the French Ambassador so late. There is telegraphic and telephonic communication between Paris and Vienna. See French Yellow Book No. 39, No. 41 (" this morning "), No. 44, No. 45, No. 47 and No. 48 ; British Blue Book No. 26, and Russian Orange Book No. 15. all of the same day. 2 Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 4, July 24, 1914, and note 3. 142 Official Diplomatic Documents and to the railway, as well as the Foreign Office records, are being taken into the interior of the country. Some of my colleagues are of the opinion that they must follow the Government; packing-up is proceeding at the Russian Legation in particular. Garrison has left town in field order. Ammunition depots in the fortress were evacuated. Railway station thronged with soldiers. The ambulance trains have left Belgrade, proceeding towards the south. In pursuance of the instructions which have reached me while I write, we intend, in the event of a rupture, to leave Belgrade by the 0.30 train. From Semlin, Serbia Austuo-Hungaiuan Red Book No. 23 Freiherr von Oic.il to Count Berchtold. (Telegraph c.) Semlin, July 25, 191 4. Orders for general mobilisation were issued in Servia at 3 p.m. AlTSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 24 Freiherr Von Giesl to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) Semlin, July 25, 1914. As a result of the Royal Servian Government's unsatisfactory answer to our demands of the 23rd inst., I have announced that diplomatic relations are broken off with Servia, and have left Belgrade with the staff of the Legation. The reply was delivered to me at two minutes to six P.M. From Serbia AuSTRO-HuNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 25 Note ' of the Royal Serbian Government of 12/25 July, 1914- (Translation). The Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, 2 and arc convinced that their reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia. ( 'onseious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State — protests 1 See Austrian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1014 where the Serbian Note is printed in full together with the reasons why Austria-Hungary deemed it unsatisfactory. 2 Old style. July 25, Austro-Hungarian. Red Book No. 25 143 which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Govern- ment on the 18th 1 March, 1909 — have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt lias been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their agents, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Govern- ment draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one con- cerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies — manifes- tations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Servia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries. For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Servia are supposed to have participated in the prepara- tions for the crime committed at Serajevo ; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the Journal officiel, on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration : — " The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary — i.e., the general tend- ency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings. The Royal Govern- ment regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Servian officers and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compro- mised the good neighbourly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnlv pledged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909. 1 1 New style. 144 Official Diplomatic Documents "The Government, etc. . . ." (identical with the text as de- manded). The Royal Government further undertake : — 1 . To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skuptchina a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punish- ment of incitement to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching re- vision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publi- cation may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the Constitution. 2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Im- perial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the Na- rodna Obdrana and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the Narodna Odbrana Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary. 3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia everything that serves or might serve to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda. 4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from the military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and functionaries for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them. 5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the col- laboration of the representatives of the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations. 6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th * June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authori- ties appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 26 145 procedure ; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro- Hungarian agents. 7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the v note, to arrest Commandant Voja Tankosic. As regards Milan Ciganovic, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th l June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him. The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presump- tive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry. 8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Locnitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass. 9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the re- marks made by their officials whether in Servia or abroad, in inter- views after the crime which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, al- though the Royal Government will themselves take steps to collect evidence and proofs. 10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out. If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the com- mon interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of the Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the decla- ration made by the Servian Government on the ISth (31st) March, 1909. To Petrograd Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 26 Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburg!). Vienna, July 25, 1914- We were, of course, aware, when we decided to take serious measures against Servia, of the possibility that the Servian dispute 146 Official Diplomatic Documents might develop into a collision with Russia. We could not, however, allow ourselves to be diverted by this eventuality from the position we took up towards Servia, because fundamental considerations of national policy brought us face to face with the necessity of putting an end to the state of affairs in which a Russian charter made it possible for Servia to threaten the Monarchy continuously without punishment and without the possibility of punishment. Should events prove that Russia considered the moment for the great settlement with the central European Powers to have already arrived, 1 and was therefore determined on war from the beginning, the following instructions to your Excellency appear indeed super- fluous. It might, however, be conceivable that Russia, in the event of the refusal of our demands by Servia, and in face of the resulting necessity for us of military measures, might think better of it, and might even be willing not to allow herself to be swept away by the bellicose elements. It is to meet this situation that the following explanations have been drawn up, which your Excellency will use with M. Sazonof and the President of the Council, at the right moment, in the manner which you think best, and when the opportunity, in your opinion, presents itself. I assume, generally, that your Excellency in the existing circum- stances, has established a close understanding with your German colleague,- who will certainly have been enjoined by his Government to leave the Russian Government no room for doubt that Austria- Hungary, in the event of a conflict with Russia, would not stand alone. I am under no illusion that it will be easy to make M. Sazonof understand the step taken by us at Belgrade, which had become inevitable. There is, however, one factor which cannot fail to impress the Russian Foreign Minister, and that is the emphasising of the circum- stance that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, in conformity with the principle to which it has adhered for decades past, is actuated in the present crisis by no selfish motives in appealing to arms in order to reach a settlement of her differences with Servia. The Monarchy possesses territory to repletion and has no desire for Servian possessions. If a conflict with Servia is forced upon us, it will be for us not a conflict for territorial gain, hut merely a means of self-defence and self-preservation. The contents of the circular note, which in itself is sufficiently eloquent, are placed in their proper light by the dossier relating to the Servian propaganda against the Monarchy, and the various points of connection between this propaganda and the crime of June 28th. 1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 17, July 2.3, 1914. 8 Germany and Austria, it seems, were determined to stand together diplomati- cally as closely as France, England and Russia ; cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, note 1. Italy appears to have been as close to the Entente Powers as to her own allies if "iic may judge by the despatches from Rome contained in the British Blue Book and the French Yellow Book. See also French Yellow Book No. 35, July 25, and No. 51, July -'(). July 25, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 26 147 Your Excellency will draw the Russian Minister's very particular attention to this dossier : and impress upon him that it is an unique event in history that a Great Power should have borne with the seditious intrigues of an adjoining small State for so long a time and with such unparalleled patience as Austria-Hungary has borne with those of Servia. We had no wish to pursue a policy adverse to the ambitions of the Christian Balkan States, and we have therefore — notwithstand- ing that we well knew how little value was to be attached to Servian promises — suffered Servia to increase her territory after the annexa- tion crisis of 1908 to nearly double its former extent. Since that time the subversive movement which has been fostered in Servia against the Monarchy has assumed such excessive propor- tions that the vital interests of Austria-Hungary, and even of our Dynasty itself, appear to be threatened by the revolutionary activities of Servia. We must assume that to conservative loyal Russia energetic measures on our part against this menace to all public order will appear intelligible and' indeed necessary. When Your Excellency reaches this point in your conversation with M. Sazonof, the moment will have arrived to add to your expla- nation of our motives and intentions the hint that we — as your Excellency will have already been in a position to explain — aim at no territorial gains, and also did not wish to infringe the sovereignty of the Kingdom, but that, on the other hand, we will proceed to ex- treme measures for the enforcement of our demands. That we had striven up till now, so far as in us lay, to preserve the peace which we considered to be the most precious possession of nations, was shown by the course of events during the last 40 vc-irs, and by the historical fact that our gracious Emperor has won for him- self the glorious title of "Protector of the Peace." We should, therefore, most sincerely deplore the disturbance of the European peace, because we also were of the opinion that the strengthening of the Balkan States in a position of political and national independence would prove to the advantage of our relations with Russia, and would also remove all possibility of antagonism between us and Russia; also because we have always been ready, in the shaping of our own policy, to take into consideration the dominant political interests of Russia. Any further toleration of Servian intrigues would undermine our existence as a State and our position as a Great Power, thus also threatening the balance of power in Europe. We are, however, con- vinced that it is to Russia's own interests, as her peaceful leaders will clearly see, that the existing European balance of power which is of such importance for the peace of the world, should be maintained. Our action against Servia, whatever form it takes, is conservative 1 See note 1 to Enclosure of Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25. 1914, where it is stated that Sir E. Grey did not publish this "dossier." Russia also omitted it in her published documents in the Russian Orange Book. 148 Official Diplomatic Documents from first to last, and its object is the necessary preservation of our position in Europe. Al-STHO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 27 Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburg]!. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914. As point 5 of our demands, namely, the participation of representa- tives of the Imperial and Royal Government in the suppression of the subversive movement in Servia has given rise to special objection on the part of M. Sazonof, your Excellency will explain in strict confi- dence with regard to this point that this clause was interpolated merely out of practical considerations, and was in no way intended tn infringe on the sovereignty of Servia. By "collaboration" in point 5, we are thinking of the establish- ment of a private "Bureau de Surete" at Belgrade, which would operate in the same way as the analogous Russian establishments in Paris and in co-operation with the Servian police and administration. Belgium : To Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg. Belgian Gray Bhhk No. 3 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister fur Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg. Sir, Brussels, July 25, 1914. I have addressed an undated circular note, a copy of which is enclosed, to the Belgian representatives accredited to the Powers guaranteeing the independence and neutrality of Belgium. Should the danger of a war between France and Germany be- come imminent, this circular note will be communicated to the Governments of the guaranteeing Powers, in order to inform them of our fixed determination to fulfil those international obligations that are imposed upon us by the treaties of 1S39. The communications in question would only be made upon tele- graphic instructions from me. If circumstances lead me to issue such instructions, I shall re- quest you also, by telegram, to notify the Government to which you are accredited of the step we have taken, and to communicate to them a copy of the enclosed circular note for their information, and without any request that they should take note thereof. My telegram will ' inform you of the date to be given to the cir- cular note, which you should be careful to fill in on the copy which you hand to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is unnecessary to point out that this despatch and its enclo- sure should be treated as strictly confidential until the receipt of fresh instructions from me. 1 Notice the absence of any uncertainty whether or not such a telegram will be sent. July 25, French Yellow Book No. 35 149 Enclosure in No. 3 (See Enclosure in No. 2.) From Belgrade Belgian Gray Book No. 4 M. Michotte de Welle, Belgian Minister at Belgrade, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Belgrade, July 25, IOI4. 1 I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the reply returned by the Servian Government to the Austro-Hungarian note of the 10 (23) July. Enclosure in No. 4 [Text of the Serbian reply, for which see Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 25, July 25 and No. 34,' July 27, 1914.] France : From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 35 M. Jules Cambon, French Minister at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 25, 1914. The Belgian Minister appears very anxious about the course of events. He is of opinion that Austria and Germany have desired to take advantage of the fact that, owing to a combination of circumstances at the present moment, Russia and England appear to them to be threatened by domestic troubles, while in France the state of the army is under discussion. Moreover, he does not believe in the pretended ignorance of the Government of Berlin on the subject of Austria's demarche. He thinks that if the form of it has not been submitted to the Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its despatch has been cleverly chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise the Triple Entente at a moment of disorganisation. He has seen the Italian Ambassador, who has just interrupted his holiday in order to return. It looks as if Italy would be surprised, to put it no higher, at having been kept out of the whole affair by her two allies. 2 T ^ Jules Cambon. 1 This despatch could not have reached Rrussels on July 25. It was probably sent by mail. In Belgian Gray Book No. 6, July 27, the actual Serbian reply does not seem to be known. Cf. also French Yellow Book No. 56, July 26, where it is stated that the reply became known after a delay of 20 hours. Cf. also Russian Orange Book No. 36, July 27. 2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 36, same day, where according to the German Am- bassador Austria-Hungary had acted without consulting either Germany or Italy. 150 Official Diplomatic Documents To Viviani and London, Berlin, Petrograd, and Vienna French Yellow Book No. 36 M, Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Stock- holm (for the President of the Council), and to London, Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Vienna. Paris, July 25, 1014. The German Ambassador came at 12 o'clock to protest against an article 1 in the Echo de Paris which applied the term "German threat" (menace allemande) to his demarche of yesterday. Herr von Schoen told a certain number of journalists, and came to state at the Direction Politique, that there has been no "concert" between Austria and Germany in connection with the Austrian note, and that the German Government had no knowledge of this note when it was communicated to them at the same time as to the other Powers, though they had approved it subsequently. Baron von Schoen added, moreover, that there was no "threat"; the German Government had merely indicated that they thought it desirable to localise the dispute, and that the intervention of other Powers ran the risk of aggravating it. The Acting Political Director took note of Baron von Schoen's demarche. Having asked 2 him to repeat the actual terms of the last two paragraphs of his note, he remarked to him that the terms showed the willingness of Germany to act as intermediary between the Powers and Austria. M. Berthelot added that, as no private information had been given to any journalist, the information in the Echo de Paris involved this newspaper alone, and merely showed that the German demarche appeared to have been known elsewhere than at the Quai d'Orsay, and apart from any action on his part. The German Ambassador did not take up the allusion. On the other hand, the Austrian Ambassador at London also came to reassure Sir Edward Grey, telling him that the Austrian note did not constitute an "ultimatum" but "a demand for a reply with a time limit"; which meant that if the Austrian demands are not accepted by 6 o'clock this evening, the Austrian minister will leave Belgrade and the Austro-Hungarian Government will begin military "preparations" but not military "operations." The Cabinet of London, like those of Paris and St. Petersburgh, has advised Belgrade to express regret 3 for any complicity which might be established in the crime of Serajevo, and to promise the most complete satisfaction in this respect. The Cabinet added that in any case it was Servia's business to reply in terms which the inter- ests of the country appeared to call for. The British Minister at 1 f'f. Russian Orange Book No. 19, of same day commenting on the inaccuracies and additions of this article. ■ This refers to the interview of the previous day, July 24, French Yellow Book No. 28. There, however, Mr. Martin himself does the asking. 3 Belgrade had obviously not done so before, for if it had this advice would have been superfluous. One of the chief grounds of complaint that Austria-Hungary had against Serbia was that the latter had neither officially expressed her regret, nor con- trolled the exultation permeating the Serbian press. July 25, French Yellow Book No. 37 151 Belgrade is to consult his French and Russian colleagues, and, if these have had corresponding instructions in the matter, advise ' the Servian Government to give satisfaction on all the points on which they shall decide that they are able to do so. Sir Edward Grey told Prince Lichnowsky (who, up to the present, 2 has made no communication to him similar to that of Herr von Schoen at Paris) that if the Austrian note caused no difficulty between Austria and Russia, the British Government would not have to concern themselves with it, but that it was to be feared that the stiffness of the note and the shortness of the time limit would bring about a state of tension. Under these conditions the only chance that could be seen of avoiding a conflict would consist in the mediation of France, Germany, Italy 3 and England, Germany alone being able to influence the Government at Vienna in this direction. The German Ambassador replied that he would transmit this suggestion to Berlin, but he gave the Russian Ambassador, who is a relative of his, to understand that Germany would not lend herself to any demarche at Vienna. Bienvenu-Martin. From London French Yellow Book No. 37 M . de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 25, 191 4- The German Ambassador came to the Foreign Office to state that his Government would refuse 4 to interfere in the dispute between Austria and Servia. Sir Edward Grey replied that without the co-operation of Germany at Vienna, England would not be able to take action at St. Peters- burgh. If, however, both Austria and Russia mobilised, that would certainly be the occasion for the four other Powers to intervene. Would the German Government then maintain its passive attitude, and would it refuse to join with England, France and Italy? Prince Lichnowsky does not think so, since the question would 1 As a matter of fact, while svich instructions were sent by Sir E. Grey the British representative failed to offer this advice to Serbia. See British Blue Book No. 22, July 25, 1914. He gave as his reason that his French and Russian colleagues "have not yet received instructions from their Governments." So far as the French Minister is concerned, this explanation is at variance with the above despatch. 2 This is wrong ; see British Blue Book No. 9, July 24, 1914. 3 This was the British formula of July 24, 1915. On the day of this despatch, however, July 25, Sir E. Grey had changed this formula to read Germany, France, Russia and Great Britain ; see British Blue Book No. 25. 4 This is not so stated in any despatch of this date in the British Blue Book. Cf. British Blue Book No. 25, where the German Ambassador is quoted by Sir E. Grey : "if what I contemplated was mediation between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it." This means that Sir E. Grey's original idea of mediation between Austria and Russia might be acceptable, while its modification, under the pressure of the French Ambassador, of mediation between Austria and Serbia was not acceptable. 152 Official Diplomatic Documents no longer be one of difficulties between Vienna and Belgrade, but of a conflict between Vienna and St. Petersburgh. Sir Edward Grey added this observation, that if war eventually broke out, no Power in Europe would be able to take up a detached attitude l (pourrait s'en desinteresser). De Fleuriau. From Petrngrad French Yellow Book No. 38 M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petersburgh, July 25, 1.914. The Russian Government is about to endeavour to obtain from the Austro-Hungarian Government an extension of the time limit fixed by the ultimatum, in order that the Powers may be able to form an opinion on the judicial dossier, the communication of which is offered to them. 2 M. Sazonof has asked the German Ambassador to point out to his Government the danger of the situation, but he refrained from mak- ing any allusion to the measures 3 which Russia would no doubt be led to take, if either the national independence or the territorial integrity of Servia were threatened. The evasive replies and the recrimina- tions of Count de Pourtales left an unfavourable impression on M. Sazonof. The Ministers will hold a Council to-morrow with the Emperor presiding. M. Sazonof preserves complete moderation. 4 "We must avoid," he said to me, "everything which might precipitate the crisis. I am of opinion that, even if the Austro-Hungarian Government come to blows with Servia, we ought not to break off negotiations." Paleologue. To Vienna Fhench Yellow Book No. 39 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna. Paris, July 25,1914. The Russian Government has instructed its representative at Vienna to ask the Austrian Government for an extension of the time 1 The New York Times translation roads "would be able to remain aloof from it." A comparison of Fleuriau's report of Sir E. Grey's words with the latter's own report nf what he told the German Ambassador, British Blue Book No. 25. reveals that Fleuriau gave his Government (he impression that Sir F. Grey had far more definitely hinted to the German Ambassador that England would fight by the side of France and Russia than Sir E. < Irey himself stated he had done. '•"['his suggests that Sir E. Grey knew of the preparation of the dossier. Ci. notes to British Blue Book No. -Is. .Inly 27, and Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25 (enclosure). 3 This means Russia's intention to go to war ; cf. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914. 1 For his determination, however, see British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914. July 25, French Yellow Book No. 41 153 limit fixed for Servia, so as to enable the Powers to form an opinion on the dossier which Austria has offered to communicate to them, and with a view to avoiding regrettable consequences for everyone. A refusal of this demand by Austria-Hungary would deprive of all meaning the demarche which she made to the Powers by communi- cating her note to them, and would place her in a position of con- flict with international ethics. The Russian Government has asked that you should make a corre- sponding and urgent demarche to Count Berchtold. I beg you to support the request of your colleague. 1 The Russian Government have sent the same request to London, Rome, Berlin and Bucharest. Bienvenu-Martin. From London French Yellow Book No. 40 M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 25, 1914. Sir Edward Grey has had communicated to him this morning the instructions which require the Russian Ambassador at Vienna to ask for an extension of the time limit given to Servia by Austria's note of the day before yesterday. M. Sazonof asked that the Russian demarche should be supported by the British Embassy. Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir M. de Bunsen to take the same action 2 as his Russian colleague, and to refer to Austria's communi- cation which was made to him late last night by Count Mensdorff, according to the terms of which the failure of Servia to comply with the conditions of the ultimatum would only result, as from to-day, in a diplomatic rupture and not in immediate military operations. Sir Edward Grey inferred from this action that time would be left for the Powers to intervene and find means for averting the crisis. De Fleuriau. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 41 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 25, 191 4. This morning the British Charge d'Affaires, acting under instruc- tions from his Government, asked Herr von Jagow if Germany were willing to join with Great Britain, France and Italy with the object of 1 The French Minister did not do so ; cf. French Yellow Book No. 48, same day. For a discussion of his reasons see above. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, July 25, 1914. 2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 26, July 25, 1914 where Sir E. Grey writes : "You may support 171 general terms, etc." 154 Official Diplomatic Documents intervening between Austria and Russia, to prevent a conflict and, in the first instance, to ask Vienna to grant an extension of the time limit imposed on Servia by the ultimatum. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that directly after the receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's despatch informing him of the intentions of Sir Edward Grey, he had already telegraphed this very morning to the German ] Ambassador at Vienna to the effect that he should ask Count Berchtold for this extension. Unfor- tunately Count Berchtold is at Ischl. 2 In any case Herr von Jagow does not think that this request would be granted. The British Charge d'Affaires also enquired of Herr von Jagow, as I had done yesterday, if Germany had had no knowledge of the Austrian note before it was despatched, and he received so clear a reply in the negative that he was not able to carry the matter further ; but he could not refrain from expressing his surprise at the blank cheque given by Germany to Austria. Herr von Jagow having replied to him that the matter was a domestic one for Austria, he remarked that it had become essentially an international one. Jules Cambon. French Yellow Book No. 42 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin. July 25, 1914. The Russian Charge d'Affaires has been instructed to ask the German Government to make strong representations to the Cabinet at Vienna, with a view to obtaining an extension of the time limit of the ultimatum. Herr von Jagow not having made an appointment with him until late in the afternoon, 3 that is to say, till the very moment when the ultimatum will expire, M. Broniewski sent an urgent note addressed to the Secretary of State in which he points out that the lateness of Austria's communication to the Powers makes the effect of this com- munication illusory, inasmuch ;is it docs not give the Powers time to consider the facts brought to their notice before the expiration of the time limit. He insists very strongly on the necessity for extending the time limit, unless the intention be to create a serious crisis. •Tiles ( !ambon. 1 In French text by an obvious error "de la Grande-Bretagne" is printed. '-('omit Berchtold left for Ischl on the 25th in the morning; ef. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, same day. The Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia had been made known to Russia in the evening of July L'.'i ; and bad been known to France and. there- fore, probably to the Entente Powers, in general terms, inclusive of the fact that there would be a time limit, on July 19, mil ; cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 13 and 11. 1 Of. the previous despatch No. 11, where Mr. von Jagow is spoken of as having received the British Charge d'Affaires in (he same matter, and having already re- quested an extension of the time limit. July 25, French Yellow Book No. U 155 French Yellow Book No. 43 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- martin, Acting Minister fur Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 25, 1.914. The Russian Charge d'Affaires has, in accordance with his in- structions, approached the Secretary of State with a view to securing an extension of the time limit of the ultimatum. Herr von Jagow replied that he had already transmitted to Vienna a suggestion of this nature, but that in his opinion all these demarches were too late. M. Broniewski insisted that if the time limit could not be extended, action ' at least might be delayed so as to allow the Powers to exert themselves to avoid a conflict. He added that the Austrian note was couched in terms calculated to wound Servia and to force her into war. Herr von Jagow replied that there was no question of a war, but of an "execution" - in a local matter. The Charge d'Affaires in reply expressed regret that the German Government did not weigh their responsibilities in the event of hos- tilities breaking out, which might extend to the rest of Europe ; to this Herr von Jagow replied that he refused to believe in such con- sequences. The Russian Charge d'Affaires, like myself, has heard the rumour that Austria, while declaring that she did not desire an annexation of territory, would occupy parts of Servia until she had received complete satisfaction. "One knows," he said to me, "what this word 'satisfaction' means." M. Broniewski's impressions of Ger- many's ultimate intentions are very pessimistic. Jules Cambon. From Rome French Yellow Book No. 44 M. Barrerc, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienveuu-Martiii, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Rome, July 25, 1914- The Russian Ambassador has carried out at the Consulta the demarcJie which M. Sazonof requested the representatives of Russia at Paris, Berlin, Rome and Bucharest 3 to undertake, the object of which was to induce these various Cabinets to take action similar to that of Russia at Vienna, with a view of obtaining an extension of the time limit imposed on Servia. 1 Austria-Hungary had already promised that actual military operations would be delayed ; cf. British Blue Book No. 26. July 25. 1914. 2 There is no reason why the official English translation should have retained this French word, instead of translating the. whole phrase which means "no question of war, but of action in a local matter." 3 The occasional appearance of Bucharest in these despatches is noteworthy. 156 Official Diplomatic Documents In the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, M. Salandra and M. di Martino replied that they would put themselves into communi- cation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but that his reply could not reach them until towards 6 o'clock, that is to say, too late to take any step at Vienna. Barrere. From Vienna French Yellow Book No. 45 M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, July 25, 1914- The Russian Charge d'Affaires received instructions from his Government to ask for an extended time limit for the ultimatum to Servia at the very moment 1 that Count Berchtold was leaving for Ischl, with the intention, according to the newspapers, of remaining there near the Emperor until the end of the crisis. Prince KoudachefT informed him nevertheless of the demarche which he had to carry out, by means of two telegrams en clair, one addressed to him on his journey and the other at his destination. He does not expect any result. Baron Macchio, General Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to whom the Prince communicated the tenour of his instruc- tions and of his telegrams, behaved with icy coldness when it was represented to him that to submit for consideration grievances with documentary proofs without leaving time for the dossier to be studied, was nut consonant with international courtesy. 2 Baron Macchio replied that one's interests sometimes exempted one from being courteous. The Austrian Government is determined to inflict humiliation on Servia : it will accept no intervention from any Power until the blow had been delivered and received full in the face by Servia. Dumaine. From Belgrade French Yellow Book No. 46 M. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Belgrade, July 25, 1914- M. Pashitch has just acquainted me with the reply which will be sent this evening to the Austrian Minister. The Servian Government agrees to publish to-morrow in the Journal Officiel the declaration which has been required of them ; they will 1 This was in the morning ; cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, same day. 2 Austria-Hungary was of a different opinion ; cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, July 25, and note 2. July 25, French Yellow Book No. Jfl 157 communicate it also to the army by means of an Order of the Day ; they will dissolve the societies of national defence and all other asso- ciations which might agitate against Austria-Hungary ; they under- take to modify the press law, to dismiss from service in the army, in the ministry of public instruction and in the other Government offices, all officials who shall be proved to have taken part in the propaganda ; they only request that the names of these officials may be communicated to them. As to the participation of Austrian officials in the enquiry, the Government ask that an explanation 1 of the manner in which this will be exercised may be given to them. They c6uld accept no parti- cipation which conflicted with international law or with good and neighbourly relations. They accept all the other demands of the ultimatum and declare that if the Austro-Hungarian Government is not content with this, they are ready to refer the matter to the Hague Tribunal, or to the decision of the Great Powers who took part in the preparation of the declaration of March 31, 1909. Boppe. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 47 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 25, 1.914. Throughout the afternoon there has been a persistent rumour that Servia had submitted to the Austrian demands. This even- ing the newspapers published extra editions which announce a rupture at Belgrade and the departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister. The correspondent of the Agence Hams at the Wilhelmstrasse has just received confirmation of this rumour. Large crowds consisting of several hundred persons are collecting here before the newspaper offices and a demonstration of numbers of young people has just passed through the Pariser-platz shouting cries of "Hurrah" for Germany, and singing patriotic songs. The demonstrators are visiting the Siegessdule, the Austrian and then the Italian 2 Embassy. It is a significant outburst of chauvinism. A German 3 whom I saw this evening confessed to me that it had been feared here that Servia would accept the whole Austrian note, 1 For an explanation of the Austro-Hungarian meaning see the Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 27, of the same day. 1 As early as in 1912 Paul Rohrbach had pointed out, in Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt (translated. German World Policies. The Macmillan Co.) that in a European conflagration Germany could not count on the support of Italy. 3 For a clear understanding of the ante-war days it is unfortunate that the French Ambassador in Berlin not infrequently quotes anonymous Germans whose standing and importance remain obscure. 158 Official Diplomatic Documents reserving to herself the right to discuss the manner in which effect should be given to it, in order to gain time and to allow the efforts of the Powers to develop effectively before the rupture. In financial circles measures are already being taken to meet every eventuality, for no means of averting the crisis is seen, in view of the determined support which Germany is giving to Austria. I, for my part, see in Great Britain the only Power which might be listened to at Berlin. Whatever happens, Paris, St. Petersburgh and London will not suc- ceed in maintaining peace with dignity unless they show a firm and absolutely united front. 1 Jules Cambon. From Vienna French Yellow Book No. 48 M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister far Foreign Affairs. Vienna, July 25, 1914- Your telegram 2 reaches me exactly at the moment when the time limit given to Servia expires. On the other hand I have just informed you under what conditions the Russian Charge d'Affaires has had to carry out his demarche It seems useless to support him when there is no longer any time for it. 3 During the afternoon a rumour spread that Servia had yielded to the ultimatum, while adding that she was appealing to the Powers against it. But the latest news is that at the last moment we are assured that the Austrian Minister has just left Belgrade hurriedly ; he must have thought the Servian Government's acceptance of the conditions imposed by his Government inadequate. Dumaine. French Yellow Book No. 49 Reply of Serbian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note. (Communicated by M. Vesnitch, Serbian Minister, July 27.) 4 [For the text see Austro-Hupgarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914, or ib. No. 25, July 25, 1914.] 'This was Russia's great aim, to secure England's unconditional support; cf. British Blue Book No. 6, June 24, 1914. and no. 17, June 25. - French Yellow Book No. 39, same dav. • Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, same day : "This morning." The time limit was to expire at . Cf., however, French Yellow Book No. 37, same day, where Germany is quoted as refusing to interfere between Austria and Serbia. The Petrograd-Vienna mediation may be called the Sir E. Grey plan, and this Germany accepted on July 25. The Vienna-Belgrade mediation may be called the Paul Cambon modification, and this Germany rejected. 1 All the editions of the British Blue Book including the important one of Sept. 2S, 1914, print here " Russia." In the Collected Diplomatic Documents Sir Edward Grey inserts a footnote to Russia "Should be Italy." A similar footnote had appeared in the New York Tun,:: edition of August, 1914. The fact that "Russia" continued to be printed without, a footnote, even in the official edition of Sept. 2S, which con- tained a number of corrections, raises the presumption that "Russia" bad not only been written, but also meant. It. is true that in British Blue Book No. 17 of the same date, Russia said that she "would be quite ready to stand aside." but this may also imply that mention had been made of her as a member of the "Conference." Cer- tainty on this point is, however, impossible. July 25, British Blue Book No. 20 107 together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the frontier till we had had time to try and arrange matters between them. The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the German Foreign Office saying that his Government had not known before- hand, and had had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Servia, but once she had launched that note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lichnowsky ' said, how- ever, that if what I contemplated was mediation between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it. 2 lie ex- pressed himself as personally favourable to this suggestion. I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title to intervene between Austria and Servia, but as soon as the question became one as between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in which we must all take a hand. 3 I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event of Russian and Austrian mobilisation, the participation of Germany woidd be essen- tial to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do nothing. The French Government were travelling at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, 4 and could not therefore be sure of their views, but I was prepared, if the German Government agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French Government that I thought it the right thing to act upon it. To Vienna British Blue Book No. 26 Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914- The Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following telegram which his Government have sent to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, with instructions to communicate it to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs : — " The delay given to Servia for a reply is so limited that the Powers are prevented from taking any steps to avert the complications which are threatening. The Russian Government trust that the Austrian Government will prolong the time limit, and as the latter have de- clared their willingness to inform the Powers of the data on which they have based their demands on Servia, the Russian Government hope that these particulars will be furnished in order that the Powers may examine the matter. If they found that some of the Austrian re- quests were well founded, they would be in a position to advise the Servian Government accordingly. If the Austrian Government were indisposed to prolong the time limit, not only would they be 1 German Ambassador in London. 2 German White Book, Exhibit 13. same day. 3 This phrase is very much stronger in French Yellow Book No. 37, same day, where Paul Cambon reports what he claims Sir E. Grey told him he had said to the German Ambassador. 4 See, however, the British-French and French-British despatches of July 24, and July 25, 1914. 168 Official Diplomatic Documents acting against international ethics, but they would deprive their communication to the Powers of any practical meaning." You may support in general terms : the step taken by your Russian colleague. Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent, it has been a relief to hear that the steps which the Austrian Govern- ment were taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of relations and to military preparations, and not operations. I trust, therefore, that if the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking any irretrievable steps. To Paris, Berlin, and Petrograd British Blue Book No. 27 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir H. Rumbold, British Charge d'Affaires at Berlin, and Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1.914- I have communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of the Servian reply contained in Mr. Crackanthorpe's telegram of to-day. - I have said that, if Servian reply, when received at Vienna, corre- sponds to this forecast, I hope the German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take a favourable view of it. To? or From? No. 28 [Nil.] Sir Edward Grey has never explained this deleted No. 28. The British Blue Book was not prepared and distributed, as was the German White Book, in a hurry to supply the necessary background to the speeches delivered in Parliament on the strength of which the nation went to war. The Britisli Blue Book was dis- tributed in Parliament several days after England had declared war on Germany. A careless numbering of the despatches seems out of the question. No. 28 very likely was a despatch which Sir E. Grey at the last moment decided not to publish. To Rome British Blue Book No. 29 Sir Edward Grey to Sir B. Rodd, British A mbassador at Rome. Sir, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914- The Italian Ambassador came to see me to-day. I told him in gen- eral terms what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning. 3 1 On this day Sir E. Grey was not yet willing to be known either in Vienna or in Berlin as making common cause with the other Entente Powers. 2 See No. 21, same day. 3 Cf. British Blue Book No. 27, same day. July 25, British Blue Book No. 30 169 The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. He made no secret of the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided. I am, etc. E. Grey. To Belgrade British Blue Book No. 30 Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' 'Affaires at Belgrade. Sir, Foreign Office, July 25, 191^. The Servian Minister called on the 23rd 1 instant and spoke to Sir A. Nicolson 2 on the present strained relations between Servia and Austria-Hungary. He said that his Government were most anxious and disquieted. They were perfectly ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria- Hungary so long as such demands were kept on the "terrain juridique." If the results of the enquiry at Serajevo — an enquiry conducted with so much mystery and secrecy — disclosed the fact that there were any individuals conspiring or organising plots on Servian territory, the Servian Government would be quite ready to take the necessary steps to give satisfaction ; but if Austria transported the question on to the political ground, and said that Servian policy, being inconvenient to her, must undergo a radical change, and that Servia must abandon certain political ideals, 3 no independent State would, or could, submit to such dictation. He mentioned that both the assassins of the Archduke were Austrian subjects — Bosniaks ; 4 that one of them had been in Servia, and that the Servian authorities, considering him suspect and dan- gerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian authorities found that the latter protected him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless individual. Sir A. Nicolson, on being asked by M. Boschkovitch 5 his opinion on the whole question, observed that there were no data on which to base one, though it was to be hoped that the Servian Government woidd endeavour to meet the Austrian demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit. j am et E. Grey. 1 It seems strange that this interview of the 23d should not have been mentioned to the British representative in Belgrade until two days later, the twenty-fifth, es- pecially since the instructions given to the representative in Belgrade in No. 12, July 24, seem to be based on the information given in the interview of the 23d. The inter- view, moreover, appears to have taken place before the presentation of the Austro- Hungarian note. While in a continuous story of events this note does not belong here, the reader will have no difficulty in seeing why it has nevertheless been introduced in this place. 2 British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 3 These certain political ideals were those of a Greater Serbia which could not be realized except at the cost of a dismembered Austria-Hungary. 4 Bosniaks is the term by which Austria-Hungary called the Serbians in Bosnia before the murder of Serajevo, while Serbia called them Serbians. After the murder, the Serbians used the term Bosniaks to indicate that Serbia was innocent, and Austria- Hungary used the term Serbians to show that Serbia was guilty. s Serbian Minister in London. 170 Official Diplomatic Documents Russia : Announcement by the Russian Government Russian Orange Book No. 10 St. Petersburg, July 12 {25), 1914. Recent events and the despatch of an ultimatum to Servia by Austria-Hungary are causing the Russian Government the greatest anxiety. The Government are closely following the course of the dispute between the two countries, to which Russia cannot remain indifferent. From Vienna Russian Orange Book No. 11 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs-. (Telegram.) Vienna, July 12 (25) 1914. Count Berchtold is at Ischl. 1 In view of the impossibility of arriving there in time, I have telegraphed to him our proposal to ex- tend the time limit of the ultimatum, and I have repeated this proposal verbally to Baron Macehio. The latter promised to com- municate it in time to the Minister for Foreign Affairs but added that he had no hesitation in predicting a categorical refusal. Russian Orange Book No. 12 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Vienna to Russian, Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Vienna, July 12 (25), 1914- In continuation of my telegram of to-day I have just heard 2 from Macehio that the Austro-Hungarian Government refuse our proposal to extend the time limit of the note. From Belgrade Russian Orange Book No. 13 Russian Charge a" Affaires at Belgrade to Russia Minister for Foreign A ff airs - Belgrade, July 12 (.25), 1914. (Delayed in transmission, received July 14 (27), 1914). (Telegram.) Following is the reply which the President of the Servian Cabinet to-day handed to the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade before the expiration of the time limit of the ultimatum. [Here follows the text of the Serbian reply, for which see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 25, July 25, and No. 34, July 27, 1014.] 1 He went there during the forenoon of Julv 25. Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 21, and British Blue Book No. 20, July 25, 1914, and French Yellow Book No. 45, same day. - Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 20, and for reasons for the refusal No. 21, July 25, 1914. July 25, Russian Orange Book No. 16 171 From Berlin Russian Orange Book No. 14 Russian Charge (V Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Berlin, July 12 (25), 1.914. I have received your telegrams of the 11th (24th) 1 July and have communicated its contents to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He tells me that the British Government have likewise urged him to advise 2 Vienna to extend the time limit of the ultimatum. He has informed Vienna telegraphically of this step, and he will do the same as regards Russia's action, but he fears that in the absence of Berch- told, who has left for Ischl, and in view of the lack of time, his tele- grams may have no result. Moreover, he has doubts as to the wis- dom of Austria yielding at the last moment, and he is inclined to think that such a step on her part might increase the assurance of Servia. I replied that a great Power such as Austria could give way without impairing her prestige, and I adduced every other similar argument, but failed, nevertheless, to obtain any more definite promise. Even when I gave him to understand that action must be taken at Vienna if the possibility of terrible consequences was to be avoided, the Minister for Foreign Affairs answered each time in the negative. From Paris Russian Orange Hook No. 15 Russian Charge a" Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, July 12 (25), 1014. I have received your telegram of the 11th (24th) 3 July respecting the extension of the time limit of the Austrian ultimatum, and I have made the communication in accordance with your instructions. The French Representative 4 at Vienna has been furnished with similar instructions. From London Russian Orange Book No. 16 Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) London, July 12 (25), 1914. I have received your telegram of the 11th July. 5 Grey has in- structed 6 the British Ambassador at Vienna to support our action 1 Russian Orange Book Nos. 4 and 5, Julv 24. 1914. ! British Blue Book No. 26, July 25, 1914 ; ef. also French Yellow Book Nos. 41, 42, 43, July 25, 1914. 3 Russian Orange Book Nos. 4 and 5, Julv 24, 1914. 4 Cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 39 and 48, July 25, 1914. 6 Russian Calendar, which is July 24 of our calendar ; Russian Orange Book Nos. 6 British Blue Book No. 26, July 25, 1914. 172 Official Diplomatic Documents for the extension of the time limit of the ultimatum. At the same time he explained to me that the Austrian Ambassador had come to see him, 1 and had explained that the Austrian note should not be regarded as an ultimatum. It should be regarded as a step, which, in the event of no reply, or in the event of an unsatisfactory reply within the time fixed, would be followed by a rupture of diplomatic relations and the immediate departure of the Austro-Hungarian Minister from Belgrade; without, however, entailing the immediate opening of hostilities. Grey added that as a result of this explana- tion he had told the British Ambassador at Vienna that, should it be too late to raise the question of extending the time limit of the ulti- matum, the question of preventing hostilities might perhaps serve as a basis for discussion. 2 To London Russian Orange Book No. 17 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London. (Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 12 {25), 1914. In the event of any change for the worse in the situation which might lead to joint action by the Great Powers, we count upon it that England will at once side definitely with Russia and France, in order to maintain the European balance of power, 3 for which she has con- stantly intervened in the past, and which would certainly be com- promised in the event of the triumph of Austria. From the German Ambassador Russian Orange Book No. IS 4 Note verbalc handed to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, July 12 (25), 1014- (Translation.) Il nous revient de source We learn from an authorita- autoritative que la nouvelle tive source that the news spread repandue par quelques journaux by certain newspapers, to the d'apres laquelle la demarche du effect that the action of the Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hon- Austro-Hungarian Government grie a Belgrade aurait ete faite a at Belgrade was instigated by l'instigation de l'Allemagne est Germany, is absolutely false. 1 British Blue Book No. 14, July 25, 1014. 2 ( '(intrust the information here directly transmitted to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs with the latter's reply to the British Ambassador in Petrograd, British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914. 3 Cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, 1914. and note 4. 1 This is only a supplementary declaration to German White Book, Exhibit No. 1, which is the important German declaration, presented in Paris, London and Petrograd. It is printed in British Blue Book No. 9, French Yellow Book No. 2S, July 24, but is omitted in the Russian Orange Book. July 25, Russian Orange Book No. 19 173 absolument fausse. Le Gouverne- meni allemand n'a pas eu con- naissance du texte de la note autrichienne avant qu'elle ait ete remise, et n'a exeree aucune influence sur son contenu. C'est a tort qu'on attribue a, l'AHe- magne une attitude commina- toire. L'Allemagne appuie naturelle- ment comme allie de l'Autriche les revendications a son avis legitimes du Cabinet de Vienne contre la Serbie. Avant tout elle desire, comme elle l'a deja declare des le com- mencement du differend austro- serbe, que ce conflit reste loca- lise. The German Government had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note before it was pre- sented, and exercised no influence upon its contents. A threaten- ing attitude is wrongly attributed to Germany. Germany, as the ally of Austria, naturally supports the claims made by the Vienna Cabinet against Servia, which she considers justified. Above all Germany wishes, as she has already declared from the very beginning of the Austro- Servian dispute, that this conflict should lie localised. From Paris Russian Orange Book No. 19 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Paris to Russia it Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, July 12 (25), 1914. Please refer to my telegram 1 of the 11th (24th) July. A morning paper has to-day published, in a not altogether correct form, 2 the declarations made yesterday by the German Ambassador, and has added comments in which it characterises these utterances as being in the nature of threats. The German Ambassador, who is much upset by these disclosures, to-day visited the Acting Head of the Political Department, and explained to him that his words in no wise bore the threatening character attributed to them. He stated that Austria had presented her note to Servia without any definite understanding with Berlin, but that Germany nevertheless approved of the Austrian point of view, and that undoubtedly " the bolt once fired" (these were his own words), Germany could only be guided bv her duties as an ally. Russian Orange Book No. 8, July 24, 1914. ' Cf. French Yellow Book No. 36, July 25, 1914. 174 Official Diplomatic Documents From London Russian Orange Book No. 20 Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign . Iffairs. (Telegram.) Loudon, July 12 {25), W14- Grey has told me that the German Ambassador has declared to him that the German Government were not informed of the text of the Austrian note, hut that they entirely supported Austria's action. 1 The Ambassador at the same time asked if Great Britain could see her way to bring conciliatory pressure to bear at St. Petersburg. Grey replied that this was quite impossible. He added that, as long- as complications existed between Austria and Servia alone, British interests were only indirectly affected; but he had to look ahead to the fact that Austrian mobilisation would lead to Russian mobilisa- tion, and that from that moment a situation would exist in which the interests of all the Powers would be involved. In that event Great Britain reserved to herself full liberty of action. 2 From Belgrade Russian Orange Book No. 21 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Belgrade, July 12 {25), 1914. In spite of the extremely conciliatory nature of the Servian reply to the ultimatum, the Austrian Minister has just informed the Servian Government, in a note handed in at 6.30 P.M. this evening, that, not having received a satisfactory 3 answer within the time limit fixed, he was leaving Belgrade with the entire staff of the lega- tion. The Skupshtina is convoked for the 14th (27th) July at Nish. The Servian Government and the Diplomatic Body are leaving this evening for that town. From London Russian Orange Book No. 22 Russian Ambassador at London to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) London, July 12 (25), 1014- Grey has told the German Ambassador that in his opinion Austrian mobilisation must lead to Russian mobilisation, that grave danger of a 'See German White Book, Exhibit No. 1, July 23, British Blue Book No. 9, July 24, omitted in the Orange Book. See note to Russian Orange Book No. Is, July IT,. 191 1. ' Cf. British Blue Book No. 25, French Yellow Book No. 37. July 25, 1914. 3 For the reasons of Austria-Hungary why the Serbian note did not satisfy her, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914. July 25, Serbian Blue Book No. 39 175 general war will thereupon arise, and that he sees only one means of reaching a peaceful settlement, namely, that, in view of the Austrian and Russian mobilisations, Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain should abstain from immediate mobilisation, and should at once offer their good offices. Grey told me that the first essential of this plan was the consent of Germany and her promise not to mobilise. He has therefore, as a first step, made an enquiry on this point at Berlin. 1 Serbia : To All Serbian Legations Abroad Serbian Blue Book No. 38 .1/. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad. (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914. A brief summary of the reply of the Royal Government was com- municated to the representatives of the allied Governments 2 at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to-day. 3 They were informed that the reply would be quite conciliatory on all points, and that the Serbian Government would accept the Austro-Hungarian demands as far as possible. The Serbian Government trust that the Austro-Hun- garian Government, unless they are determined to make war at all costs, will see their way to accept the full satisfaction offered in the Serbian reply. The Serbian Reply to Austria-Hungary Serbian Blue Book No. :>0 Reply of Serbian Government to the Austro-Hungarian Note. — Belt/mile, July 12/25, 1914. [For the text see Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 25, July 25, and No. 34, July 27, 1!»14.] 1 No detailed references to the mobilization of Germany. France, Italy and Great Britain are contained in any despatches published in the British Blue Book. 2 This expression is noteworthy, referring no doubt to France, Russia and Eng- land, who are here spoken of either as allied to each other or even allied to Serbia. See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 58, August 4. where Count Mensdorf quotes Sir E. Grey as referring to Great Britain as the ally of France. Cf. also French Yellow Book No. 158, August 4. Since no mention is made of a summary being given to the representatives of the other Powers, " the representatives of the allied Governments " were possibly invited as representing a unit to the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This is, however, not mentioned in French Yellow Book No. 46, July 25, 1914, where the French Minister simply reports "M. Pashitch has just acquainted me, etc." 3 For the delay with which even this summary reached the Powers see French Yellow Book No. 56, July 26, and Russian Orange Book No. 36, July 27. 176 Official Diplomatic Documents Front the Austro-Hungarian Minister Serbian Blue Book No. 40 ' Baron Giesl run Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914. As the time limit stipulated in the note, which, by order of my Government, I handed to His Excellency M. Patchou, on Thursday, the day before yesterday, at 6 P.M., has now expired, and as I have received no satisfactory reply, I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I am leaving Belgrade to-night together with the staff of the Imperial and Royal Legation. The protection of the Imperial and Royal Legation, together with all its appurtenances, annexes, and archives, as well as the care of the subjects and interests of Austria-Hungary in Serbia, is entrusted to the Imperial German Legation. Finally,- I desire to state formally that from the moment this letter reaches Your Excellency the rupture in the diplomatic relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary will have the character of a fait accompli. I have, etc. To All Serbian Legation* Abroad Serbian Blue Book No. 41 2 M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad. Belgrade, July 12/25, 1014. I communicated the reply to the Austro-Hungarian note to-day at 5.45 p.m. You will receive the full text of the reply to-night. From it you will see that we have gone as far as was possible. When I handed the note to the Austro-Hungarian Minister he stated that he would have to compare it with his instructions, and that he would then give an immediate answer. As soon as I returned to the Ministry, I was informed in a note from the Austro-Hungarian Minister that he was not satisfied with our reply, and that he was leaving Belgrade the same evening, with the entire staff of the Legation. The protection of the Legation and its archives, and the care of Austrian and Hungarian interests had been entrusted by him to the German Legation. He stated finally that on receipt of the note diplomatic relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungarv must be considered as definitely broken off. 1 This note should more properly follow No. 41. 2 Parts of this note, from a chronological point of view, should have been printed before No. 40. July 25, Serbian Blue Book No. 1$ 177 The Royal Serbian Government have summoned the Skupshtina to meet on July 14/27 at Nish, whither all the Ministries with their staffs are proceeding this evening. The Crown Prince has issued, in the name of the King, an order for the mobilisation of the army, while to-morrow or the day after a proclamation will be made in which it will be announced that civilians who are not liable to military service should remain peaceably at home, while soldiers should proceed to their appointed posts and defend the country to the best of their ability, in the event of Serbia being attacked. From the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Serbian Blue Book No. 12 Count Leopold, Berchtohl, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna. Sir, Vienna, July 12/25, 1914. As no satisfactory reply 1 has been given to the note which the Im- perial and Royal Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary handed to the Royal Government on the 10/23 instant, I have been compelled to instruct Baron Giesl to leave the Serbian capital and to entrust the protection of the subjects of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty to the German Legation. I regret that the relations which I have had the honour to maintain with you, M. le Ministre, are thus terminated, and I avail myself of this opportunity to place at your disposal the enclosed passports for your return to Serbia, as well as for the return of the staff of the Royal Legation. I have, etc. 1 For Austria-Hungary's reasons why the reply was not satisfactory see Austro- Hungariau Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914. 178 Official Diplomatic Documents Sunday, July 26, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office OF Sent Despatches to Austria-Hungi try London, Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, Petrograd Belgium France ( rermany ! Jreat Britain London, London, etc. Note for Minister London, Paris, Petrograd Paris, Berlin, Rome, Paris Russia Serbia Koine, Vienna, Berlin Petrograd Austro-Hungarian Minister Rome, Petrograd, Vienna, Christ iania, Luxemburg Petrograd Vienna, Berlin, Rome Prague, Paris, Berlin The full Serbian reply and the reasons why it had not satisfied Austria-Hungary remained unknown to the Powers throughout the whole of Sunday, July 2(i. A summary of the Serbian reply reached Paris and also Petrograd with a delay of twenty hours, and there is no indication in the published despatches that it reached the other Foreign Offices sooner. In the absence of accurate information two versions gained currency. First that Serbia's seeming concessions were a sham, anil that she knew them to be so or she would noi have ordered the mobilization of her troops three hours before she sent her reply to Austria-Hungary. Secondly, that she had yielded in every- thing except a few minor points. Austria-Hungary continues her endeavors to prove to the Powers that she had been forced to act harshly with Serbia, but that she did not contemplate any territorial aggrandisement at the expense of Serbia. She orders the mobilization of some of her troops. Germany is greatly concerned about the military preparations going on espe- cially in Russia and warns the Powers of the danger that lies in mobilisation. She endeavors to gain the confidence of France, and France's willingness to intercede in Russia. tinut Britain continues her efforts to bring about a Conference of four Powers; at first, as on the previous days, with a view to mediation between Petrograd and Vienna; afterwards — anil probably owing to French opposition to her original plan — with the view of discovering "an issue which would prevent complica- tions." Russia holds a "long and friendly conversation," as Sazonof describes it. with Austria-Hungary, and suggests the settlement of the Serbian difficulty by means of direct conversations between Petrograd and Vienna. Another suggestion that Serbia should appeal for British intervention is not pressed. Russian mobilization continues. France reverts to her plan that Germany should exert pressure on Austria- Hungary amounting to mediation between her and Serbia. She claims to be convinced of Russia's moderation and pacific intentions, but does not publish the accounts of Russian mobilisation which must have reached her as well as Ger- many. Germany's request that she let it be known that France and Germany are jointly working for peace, she rejects as emphatically as Germany's other request that she should urge moderation in Petrograd. Italy is urged by the Entente Powers to dissociate her interests from those of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and is informed by Russia of the latter's definite determination to come to the assistance of Serbia. Serbia is silent on this day, and Belgium practically so. July 26, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 28 179 Austria-Hungary : From Petrograd Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 28 Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg!/, July 26, 1.914- As the result of reports about measures taken for mobilisation of Russian troops, Count Pourtales has called the Russian Minister's attention in the most serious manner to the fact that nowadays measures of mobilisation ' would be a highly dangerous form of diplo- matic pressure. For, in that event, the purely military consideration of the question by the general staffs would find expression, and if that button were once touched in Germany, the situation would get out of control. M. Sazonof assured the German Ambassador on his word of honour that the reports on the subject were incorrect ; that up to that time not a single horse and not a single reservist had been called up, and that all the measures that were being taken were merely measures of preparation in the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, and perhaps Kasan and Moscow. Immediately afterwards the Imperial German Military Attache received by courier late in the evening an invitation from Suchomlinof, the Minister for War, who explained that Count Pourtales had spoken with the Foreign Minister about the Russian military preparations, and as the Ambassador might have misunderstood certain military details, he was taking the opportunity of giving him more detailed information. In the following telegram 2 from Count Pourtales to Berlin which has been placed at my disposal, the pertinent communi- cations from Major von Eggeling are collected : "The Military Attache reports with regard to a conversation with the Russian Minister of War : M. Sazonof had asked him to make the military position clear to me. The Minister for War gave me his word of honour that as yet no orders for mobilisation of any kind had been issued. For the present merely preparatory measures would be taken, not a horse would be taken, not a reservist called up. If Austria crossed the Servian frontier, the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan, which face Austria, would be mobilised. In no circumstances will mobilisation take place on the German front, Warsaw, Vilna and St. Petersburgh. Peace with Germany is earnestly desired. My question what was the object of the mobilisa- tion against Austria, was met with a shrug of the shoulders and a 1 For the aggressive meaning of mobilisation according to International Law see Elihu Root. President of the American Society of International Law, in the Am, ricart Journal of International Law, July, 1914 : " It is well understood that the exercise of the right of self-protection may and frequently does extend in its effect beyond the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the state exercising it. The strongest example probably would be the mobilisation of an army by another Power immediately across the frontier. Every act done by the other Power may be within its own territory, yet the country threatened by the state of facts is justified in protecting itself by immediate war." 2 Not published in German White Book. 180 Official Diplomatic Documents reference to the diplomatists. I gave the Minister for War to under- stand that his friendly intentions would be appreciated by us, but that we should also consider mobilisation against Austria to be in itself extremely threatening. The Minister emphasised repeatedly and with great stress Russia's urgent need of and earnest wish for peace." To London AuSTRO-HlTNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 29 Count Berchtokl to Count Mensdorff at London. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. IIerr von Tschirschky informed me to-day in pursuance of his instructions that, according to a telegram : from Prince Lichnowsky which had been despatched in London on the 25th of July at 3 p.m., Sir E. Grey had transmitted to the latter the sketch of an answer from Servia, and had remarked in the private letter accompanying it, that he hoped that the Berlin Cabinet in view of the conciliatory tenor of this answer would support its acceptance in Vienna. I consider it desirable that your Excellency should again approach the matter with the Secretary of State, and call his attention to the fact that almost simultaneously with the transmission by him of this letter to Prince Lichnowsky, namely at '■'> P.M. yesterday, Servia had already ordered the general mobilisation - of her army, which proves that no inclination for a peaceful solution existed in Belgrade. It was not till six o'clock, after mobilisation had been proclaimed, that the answer, which had apparently been previously telegraphed to London and the contents of which were not reconcilable with our demands, was delivered to the Imperial and Royal Minister at Bel- grade. To Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, and Petrograd AlJSTRO-HuNGARIAN Red BoOK No. 30 Count Berchtokl to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, and St. Petersburgk. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. We have broken off diplomatic relations with Servia after she had refused 3 the demands we had addressed to her. I beg your Excel- lency now to proceed at once to the Foreign Minister or his deputy, and to express yourself to him approximately to the following effect : — The Royal Servian Government have refused to accept the de- mands which we were forced to address to them in order to secure 1 Not published in German White Book. 2 See Belgian Gray Book No. 5, July 26, 1914, and British Blue Book No. 32, same day. 3 For the reasons why Austria-Hungary deemed the Serbian note unsatisfactory see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914. July 26, French Yellow Book No. 50 181 permanently our most vital interests which were menaced by them, anil have thereby made it clear that they do not intend to abandon their subversive aims, tending towards continuous disorder in some of our frontier provinces and their final disruption from the Monarchy. Reluctantly, therefore, and very much against our wish, we find ourselves obliged to compel Servia by the sharpest measures to make a fundamental change in the attitude of enmity she has up to now pursued. See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 31, July 27, 1914, which describes an interview between Sazonof and the Austrian Ambassador on July 26, 1914. Belgium : From Austro-Hungarian Legation Belgian Gray Book No. 5 Communications made on July 26, 1914, by the Austro-Hungarian Legation at Brussels to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. M. Pasiiitch gave the reply of the Servian Government to the Austro-Hungarian note before 6 o'clock yesterday. This reply not having been considered satisfactory, diplomatic relations have been broken off and the Minister and staff of the Austrian Legation have left Belgrade. Servian mobilisation had already been ordered before 3 o'clock. 1 France : To Viviani, London, etc. French Yellow Book No. 50 M. Bienvenn-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Presi- dent of the Council (on board the ''La France,") and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Peter sburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome. Paris, July 26, 1914. The events of Saturday can be summed up as follows : — refusal of Austria to grant the extension of the time limit asked for by Russia, — departure of the Austrian Minister from Belgrade after receiving a reply from Servia which was considered insufficient although it reached the limit of any possible concession 2 — order for mobilisation given in Servia whose Government retired to Kragou- jewatz, 3 where it was followed by the French and Russian Ministers. The Italian Government, to whom the Austrian note had been communicated on Friday, without any request for support or even 1 Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 29, also British Blue Book No. 32, same day. 2 Cf . French Yellow Book No. 49. printed under July 25. 1914. stating that Serbia did not present her reply to France till the next day. July 27. Cf. also French Yellow Book No. 56, July 26, which states that even the summary was 20 hours late in reaching the Foreign Office. Cf. also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 29, July 26, 1914. and Russian Orange Book No. 36, July 27. See also, Serbian Blue Book No. 3S, July 25. Note 2. 3 Nish, according to Russian Orange Book No. 21, July 25, 1914. 182 Official Diplomatic Documents advice, could not, in the absence of the Marquis di San Giuliano, who does not return till Tuesday, make any reply to the suggestion of the Russian Government proposing to press at Vienna for an ex- tension of time. It appears from a confidential communication by the Italian Ambassador to M. Paleologue that at Vienna people still soothe themselves with the illusion that Russia "will not hold firm." It must not be forgotten that Italy is only bound by the engage- ments of the Triple Alliance if she has been consulted beforehand. From St. Petersburgh we learn that M. Sazonof has advised Servia to ask for British mediation. 1 At the Council of Ministers 2 on the 25th, which was held in presence of the Emperor, the mobilisation of thirteen army corps intended eventually to operate against Austria was considered ; this mobilisation, however, would only be made effective if Austria were to bring armed pressure to bear upon Servia, and not till after notice had been given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, upon whom falls the duty of fixing the day, liberty being left to him to go on with negotiations even if Belgrade should be occupied. Russian opinion makes clear that it is both politically and morally impossible for Russia to allow Servia to be crushed. In London the German demarche* was made on the 25th in the same terms as those used by Baron von Schoen at Paris. Sir Edward Grey has replied to Prince Lichnowsky that if the war were to break out no Power in Europe could take up a detached attitude. He did not express himself more definitely and used very reserved language to the Servian Minister. The communication made on the evening ' of the 25th by the Austrian Ambassador makes Sir Edward Grey more optimistic; since the diplomatic rupture does not necessarily involve immediate military operations, the Secretary of State is still willing to hope that the Powers will have time to intervene. At Berlin 5 the language used by the Secretary of State to the Russian Charge dAffaires is unsatisfactory and dilatory ; when the latter asked him to associate himself with a demarche at Vienna for an extension of the time limit, he replied that he had already taken action in this sense but that it was too late; to the request for an extension of the time limit before active measures were taken, he replied that this had to do with a domestic matter, and not with a war hut with local operations. Ilerr von Jagow pretends not to believe that the Austrian action could lead to general consequences. A real explosion of chauvinism 6 has taken place at Berlin. The 1 This is a new suggestion. Cf. French Yellow Hook No. 46, July 25, where an appeal to the European Powers is contemplated. It reached Paris, moreover, not on the 25th, as this despatch implies, but on the 20th; see below No. 53. French Yellow Book. 2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, 1914. 3 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 36, July 25, 1914, and note. 4 Cf. British Blue Book No. 14, July 25, and its place among the despatches of that date, which makes it more likely that the communication was made early in the morning. It was, moreover, the subject of much diplomatic correspondence throughout the day. 5 For the events described in this paragraph see British Blue Book No. IS, and French Yellow Book No. 37, of July 25, 1914. 6 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 47, July 25, 1914. The rest of the information con- tained in this paragraph is not written in M. Jules Cambon's published despatch. July 2G, French Yellow Book No. 51 183 German Emperor returns direct to Kiel. M. Jules Cambon thinks that, at the first military steps taken by Russia, Germany would immediately reply, and probably would not wait for a pretext before attacking us. At Vienna, the French Ambassador has not had time ' to join in the demarche of his Russian colleague for obtaining an extension of the time limit fixed for Servia ; lie does not regret it, this demarche having been categorically rejected, and England not having had time to give instructions to her representative about it. A note from the British Embassy 2 has been delivered to me : it gives an account of the conversation between the British Ambassa- dor at St. Petersburgh and M. Sazonof and M. Paleologue. Sir Edward Grey thinks that the four Powers who are not directly in- terested ought to press both on Russia and Austria that their armies should not cross the frontier, and that, they should give time to Eng- land, France, Germany and Italy to bring their mediation into play. If Germany accepts, the British Government has reason to think that Italy also would be glad to be associated in the joint action of England and France ; the adherence of Germany is essential, for neither Austria nor Russia would tolerate any intervention except that of impartial friends or allies. Bienvenu-Martin. From Rome French Yellow Book No. 51 M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister far Foreign Affairs. Rome, July 26, 1.914. A telegram from Vienna which has just been received at the Con- sulta informs them that the diplomatic rupture between Austria and Servia has taken place, and that Austria is proceeding to military measures. The Marquis di San Giuliano, who is at Fiuggi, will not return to Rome till the day after to-morrow. To-day I had an interesting conversation with the President of the Council on the situation, the full gravity of which he recognises. From the general drift of his remarks, I have carried away the im- pression that the Italian Government would be willing, in case of war, to keep out of it and to maintain an attitude of observation. 3 M. Salandra said to me on this subject : " We shall make the greatest efforts to prevent peace being broken ; our situation is some- what analogous to that of England. Perhaps we could do some- thing in a pacific sense together with the English." M. Salandra : For the error of this statement see the despatches dealing with this subject on July 25, 1914. and the notes. 2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 24, July 25, 1914. 3 It was obviously in the interest of the Entente Powers, in case of a European war, to secure the separation of Italy from Austria-Hungary and Germany. 184 Official Diplomatic Documents stated definitely to me that the Austrian note had been communi- cated to Rome at the last moment. Barrere. French Yellow Book Nc .1/. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Home, July 26, 1914. M. Sazonof yesterday told the Italian Ambassador at St. Peters- burgh that Russia would employ all diplomatic means to avoid a conflict, and that she did not give up hope that mediation might lead Austria to a less uncompromising attitude; but that Russia could not be asked to allow Servia to be crushed. I observe that the greater part of Italian public opinion is hostile to Austria in this serious business. „ Barrere. To London French Yellow Book No. 53 .1/. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. dc Fleuriau, Charge d 'Affaires at London. Paris. Juli/ 26, 1914. M. Paleologtje sends me the following telegram : — " M. Sazonof advises the Servian Government to ask for the media- tion of the British Government." 2 In concurrence with M. Paul Cambon, 3 I think that the French Government can only say that they hope to see the British Govern- ment accept, if an offer of this kind is made to them. Be good enough to express yourself in this sense at the Foreign Bienvenu-Martin. From Petrograd French Yellow Book No. 54 M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petersburgh, July 26, 1914. The Minister for Foreign Affairs continues with praiseworthy per- severance to seek means to bring about a peaceful solution. "Up 1 This despatch refers to the interview, described in British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914, between the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the British and French Ambassadors. The direct report of this interview by the French Ambassador has not been printed in the French Yellow Book. No valid reason appears why such a roundabout mention of this interview in Petrograd should receive preference in the official publication of the despatches. • See French Yellow Book No. 50, July 26. and note 3 ; contrast British Blue Book No. 44, July 27. 3 No despatch from Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, to this effect has been published in the French Yellow Book. July 26, French Yellow Book No. 55 185 to the last moment," he declared to me, "I shall show myself ready to negotiate." ' It is in this spirit that he has just sent for Count Szapary to come to a "frank and loyal explanation." M. Sazonof commented in his presence on the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, article by article, making clear the insulting character "~ of the principal clauses. "The intention which inspired this document," he said, "is legitimate if you pursued no aim other than the protection of your territory against the intrigues of Servian anarchists ; but the procedure to which you have had recourse is not defensible." He concluded : " Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, and I will guarantee you the result." The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador showed himself moved by this language ; however, while awaiting instructions, he reserves the opinion of his Government. Without being discouraged M. Sazonof has decided to propose 3 this evening to Count Berchtold the opening of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh on the changes to be introduced into the ultimatum. This friendly and semi-official interposition of Russia between Austria and Servia has the advantage of being expeditious. I there- fore believe it to be preferable to any other procedure and likely to * ucceed - Paleologue. From Vienna . French Yellow Book No. 55 M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienrenu-Martin , Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, July 26, 1914. M. Schebeko has returned hastily from a journey to Russia ; he had only undertaken it after he had received an assurance from Count Berchtold that the demands on Servia would be thoroughly acceptable. 4 The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh spoke in the same sense to M. Sazonof the evening before the delivery of the note. This procedure, which is quite usual 5 in the diplomacy of the 1 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 38, July 25, and contrast with British Blue Book No. 17, same day. 2 In the Russian Orange Book No. 25, same day this interview is called "long and friendly." Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 5, same day, and note ; also British Blue Book No. 44, July 27. 3 There is no published despatch showing that he did this. On the contrary in French Yellow Book No. 53, July 26, Sazonof makes an entirely different suggestion. He did, however, revert to the plan proposed here later (see British Blue Book No. 78, July 29) and thereby blocked the plan of a Conference of Ministers in Belgrade. 4 The reader must decide for himself whether Count Berchtold was honest in his belief or.not. From French Yellow Book No. 15, July 21, New York Times translation, it seems that Serbia was willing to accept the demands of Austria-Hungary, if they did not include judicial participation. This demand was dropped in favor of participa- tion in the investigation. See also British Blue Book No. 57, July 27, printed under date of July 28. 5 A subjective judgment of this kind while indicative of the existing suspicion on the part of the French Government cannot, of course, claim to be in the nature of proving the case. 186 Official Diplomatic Documents Monarchy, and which Baron Macchio has also employed towards me, seems to have greatly added to the irritation of the Russian Government. M. Schebeko will make an effort, however, to profit by the delay which is indispensable for mobilisation, in order to make a proposal for an arrangement, which will at least have the advantage of allow- ing ns to measure the value of the pacific declarations of Germany. While we were talking over the situation this evening, in company with Sir M. de Bunsen, 1 the latter received instructions 2 from the Foreign Office with reference to the demarche to be attempted by the representatives of the four Powers less directly interested. I am expecting, therefore, that we may have to consult to-morrow with the Duke d'Avarna and with M. Tschirscky, who, in order to refuse his concurrence, will almost certainly entrench himself behind the principle of localising the conflict. 3 My impression is that the Austro-Hungarian Government, although surprised and perhaps regretting the vigour with which they have been inspired, will believe themselves obliged to commence military- action. T-. Dumaine. To Viv&ani, London, Petrograd, Berlin, Vienna, Rome French Yellow Book No. 56 M. Bienvcuii-Murtin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Presi- dent of the Council (on hoard the " La France,") and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg!), Berlin, Vienna, Rome. Paris, July J!, 101 4. The summary of the Servian reply to the Austrian note only reached us after twenty hours delay. 1 Although the Servian Gov- ernment had given way on all points, with the exception of two small reservations, 5 the Austro-Hungarian Minister has broken off rela- tions, thus proving the determined wish of his Government to pro- ceed to execution on Servia. According to a telegram from M. Jules Cambon, the British Am- bassador thinks that there is a slight yielding; when he observed to Herr von Jagow that Sir Edward Grey did not ask him to intervene between Austria and Servia, but, as this question ceased to be local- ised, to intervene with England, France and Italy at Vienna and St. Petersburgh, the Secretary of State declared that he would do his best to maintain peace. 6 1 The close union of the three Entente Powers is apparent throughout. Cf. British Blue Book No. 40, July 26, HIM, mid Britisli Blue Book No. 6, note 1, Julv 24. - See British Blue Book Nos. 55 and 36, July 26, 1914. 3 Contrast, this paragraph with British Blue Book No. 40, same clay, where the same interview is described. 1 I.e. on Sunday, July 26, at 2 p.m. 6 For the entirely different view of the Austro-Hungarian Government see their Red Book No. 34, July 27. 1914. 6 Germany did more and accepted Sir E. Grey's plan ; German White Book, Exhil.it 13, July 25, 1914. July 26, French Yellow Book No. 57 187 In the course of an interview between M. Barrere and the General Secretary of the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the latter indi- cated that probably the Italian Government would not have ap- proved the Austrian note; but as it was not communicated to them beforehand, the Government consider themselves by this fact re- lieved of all responsibility in the grave step taken by Austria. 1 The German Ambassador came this afternoon to make a com- munication to me relating to an intervention by France with Russia in a pacific sense. " Austria," he said to me, " has declared to Russia that she was not pursuing any territorial aggrandisement nor any attack on the integrity of the Kingdom of Servia ; her only intention is to ensure her own tranquillity and to take police measures. The prevention of war depends on the decision of Russia ; Germany feels herself identified with France in the ardent desire that peace may be maintained, and has the firm hope that France will use her influence in this sense at St. Petersburgh." I replied to this suggestion that Russia was moderate, that she had not committed any act which allowed any doubt as to her modera- tion, and that we were in agreement with her in seeking a peaceful solution of the dispute. It therefore appeared to us that Germany on her side ought to act at Vienna, where her action would certainly be effective, with a view to avoiding military operations leading to the occupation of Servia. 2 The Ambassador having observed to me that this could not be reconciled with the position taken up by Germany "that the ques- tion concerned only Austria and Servia," I told him that the media- tion at Vienna and St. Petersburgh could be the act of the four other Powers less interested in the question. Herr von Schoen then entrenched himself behind his lack of instruc- tions in this respect, and I told him that in these conditions I did not feel myself in a position to take any action at St. Petersburgh alone. The conversation ended by the renewed assurances of the Am- bassador of the peaceful intention of Germany, whom he declared to be on this point identified with France. 3 „ ,„■ BiENYEXT'-MaRTIN. French Yellow Book No. 57 Note for the Minister Paris, Sunday evening, July 26, 1914- After the visit which he paid to the Minister at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, Baron von Schoen went this evening at 7 o'clock to the 1 Cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 51 and 52, same day. 2 The attitude of France, consistently carried out through the next days, is here foreshadowed. Her view is that Austria-Hungary's position was unreasonable, while Russia's was reasonable and moderate. Germany, therefore, should exert pressure on Austria, while she herself refused to exert like pressure on Russia. 3 Germany was trying to work together with France for the maintenance of peace. France refused to appear to act. in accord with Germany for fear of offending Russia, see French Yellow Book No. 62. July 27. 188 Official Diplomatic Documents Direction Politique, to ask that in order to avoid the appearance in the newspapers of comments intended to influence public opinion, such as that in the Echo de Paris of the evening before, 1 and in order to define exactly the sense of the demarches of the German Govern- ment, a brief statement should be communicated to the press on the interview between the German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Herr von Schoen, in order to define what he had in his mind, sug- gested the following terms, which the Acting Political Director took down at his dictation: "During the afternoon the German Ambas- sador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had a fresh interview, in the course of which, in the most amicable spirit, and acting in an identical spirit of peaceful co-operation (sentiment de solidarite paci- fique), they examined the means which might be employed to main- tain general peace." " The Acting Political Director replied at once, "Then, in your opinion, every thing is settled, and you bring us the assurance that Austria accepts the Servian note or will enter into conversations with the Powers on this matter?" The Ambassador having appeared surprised and having vigorously denied the suggestion, it was ex- plained to him that if there was no modification in Germany's nega- tive attitude, the terms of the suggested "note to the press" were exaggerated, and of a nature to give a false security to French opinion by creating illusion on the real situation, the dangers of which were only too evident. To the assurances lavished by the German Ambassador as to the optimistic impressions which he had formed, the Acting Political Director replied by asking if he might speak to him in a manner quite personal and private, as man to man, quite freely anil without regard to their respective functions. Baron von Schoen asked him to do so. M. Berthelot then said that to any simple mind Germany's atti- tude was inexplicable if it did not aim at war; a purely objective analysis of the facts and the psychology of the Austro-German rela- tions led logically to this conclusion. In the face of the repeated statement that Germany was ignorant of the contents of the Aus- trian note, it was no longer permissible to raise any doubt on that point; but was it probable that Germany would have arrayed her- self on the side of Austria in such an adventure with her eyes closed ? Did the psychology of all the past relations of Vienna and Berlin allow one to admit that Austria, could have taken up a position with- out any possible retreat, before having weighed with her ally all the consequences of her uncompromising attitude? How surprising appeared the refusal by Germany to exercise mediating 3 influence at Vienna now that she knew the extraordinary text of the Austrian note ! What responsibility was the German Government assuming 1 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 36, and Russian Orange Book No. 19, July 25, 1914. 2 Cf. preceding despatch and note 0. 3 France was still clinging to the Paul Cambon modification — mediation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia — of the Sir E. Grey plan — mediation between Russia and Austria-Hungary. July 26, French Yellow Book No. 57 189 and what suspicions would rest upon them if they persisted in inter- posing between Austria and the Powers, after what might be called the absolute submission of Servia, and when the slightest advice given by them to Vienna would put an end to the nightmare which weighed on Europe ! The breaking off of diplomatic relations by Austria, her threats of war, and the mobilisation which she was undertaking ' make peculiarly urgent pacific action on the part of Germany, for from the day when Austrian troops crossed the Servian frontier, one would be faced by an act which without doubt would oblige 2 the St. Peters- burgh Cabinet to intervene, and would risk the unloosing of a war which Germany declares that she wishes to avoid. Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed that Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian note, 3 and had only approved it after its delivery ; she thought, however, that Servia had need of a lesson severe enough for her not to be able to forget it, and that Austria owed it to herself to put an end to a situa- tion which was dangerous and intolerable for a great Power. He declared besides that he did not know the text of the Servian reply, and showed his personal surprise that it had not satisfied Austria, if indeed it was such as the papers, which are often ill informed, represented it to be. He insisted again on Germany's peaceful intentions and gave his impressions as to the effect that might arise from good advice given, for instance, at Vienna, by England in a friendly tone. According to him Austria was not uncompromising ; what she rejects is the idea of a formal mediation, the " spectre" of a conference : a peaceful word coming from St. Petersburgh, good words said in a conciliatory tone by the Powers of the Triple Entente, would have a chance of being well received. He added, finally, that he did not say that Germany on her side would not give some advice at Vienna. In these conditions the Political Director announced that he would ask the Minister if it appeared to him opportune to communi- cate to the press a short note in a moderate tone. 1 There is here no reference to Serbia's mobilisation ordered three hours before she sent her reply to Austria-Hungary ; cf. Belgian .Gray Book No. 5, July 26, 1914. 2 France throughout deemed Russia's interest in protecting Serbia more vital than Austria-Hungary's interests in protecting herself from Serbian intrigues. 3 Here the official British publication "Collected Diplomatic Documents" prints the following note, not contained in the French Yellow Book, and does so without any explanation : " Cf. No. 21. Letter from the French Minister in Munich stating that the Bavarian President of the Council said, on July 23, that he had read the Austrian note to Servia. "Cf. also the British Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 95, page ¥4, in which Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, states: — "Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it." The first paragraph in its English translation, is a perversion of the truth. The French text merely says that he "had cognisance," and for this see note to French Yellow Book No. 21, July 23. As to the rest the reader must decide for himself whether the anonymous informant of the British Ambassador deserves more credence than the German Chan- cellor and Secretary of Foreign Affairs who repeatedly said that they had not known the contents of the Austro-Hungarian note until it was officially presented to the Powers. Cf. especially French Yellow Book No. 15, July 21, No. 17, July 22, and No. 30, July 24. 190 Official Diplomatic Documents From Christiania French Yellow Book No. 58 .1/. Chevalley, French Minister tit Christiania, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister far Foreign Affairs. Christiania, July 26, 1914. The whole German fleet ' in Norway has received orders to put to sea. The German authorities at Bergen declare that it is to make straight for Germany. German ships scattered in the Fjords to the north of Bergen were to join those which are in the neighbourhood of Stavanger. ( HEVALLEY. From Luxemburg French Yellow Book Nil 59 ,1/. d'Annoville, French Charge a" Affaires at Luxemburg, to A/. Bien- venu-Martin, Acting Minister jar Foreign Affairs. Luxemburg, July 26, 1914. According to information which I have just received from Thion- ville, the four last classes set at liberty have been ordered to hold themselves at the disposition of the Commandatur at any moment. Without being completely mobilised the reservists are forbidden to go away from their place of residence. Germany : From Petrograd German White Book Exhibit 5 The Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chancellor. Telegram of Jul,/ 26th, 1914- The Austro-IIungarian Ambassador had an extended interview 2 with Sazonof this afternoon. Both parties had a satisfactory im- pression as they told me afterwards. The assurance of the Ambassa- dor that Austria-Hungary had no idea of conquest but wished to obtain peace at last at her frontiers, greatly pacified the Secretary. i Orders to stop the demobilization of the British fleet had been issued, two days earlier. ..u July -'I, 1914, according to French Yellow Book No. 66, July 27, 1914. See also not.- 2, British Blue Hook No. -1, , July 'J7. 2 Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 25, same day. "Ions; and friendly" interview; but contrast impression of this interview on French Ambassador, French Yellow Hook \o 54, same day. where Sazonof is reported as having "made elear the insulting char- acter of the principal clauses." No mention of thi- interview is made in the Austro- Hungarian Red Book. The Russian despatch, No. 25, is sent to Vienna. There can be no doubt that Sazonof gave the impression to both Austria-Hungary and Germany that a ,ti;'i>n>rh,ii},nt between Russia and Austria-Hungary was possible. July 26, German White Book Exhibit 10a 191 German White Book Exhibit 7 Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to the Chancellor on July 26th, 191 4- The military attache requests the following message to be sent to the general staff : I deem it certain that mobilisation has been ordered for Kiev and Odessa. It is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow and improbable elsewhere. To London German White Book Exhibit 10 Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London. Urgent. July 26th, 191J.. Austria-Hungary has declared in St. Petersburg officially and solemnly that it has no desire for territorial gain in Servia; that it will not touch the existence of the Kingdom, but that it desires to establish peaceful conditions. According to news received here, Russia is about to summon several bodies of reservists also against us) If this news proves correct, we shall be forced to countermeasures very much against our own wishes. Our desire to localise the con- flict and to preserve the peace of Europe remains unchanged. We ask to act in this sense at St. Petersburg with all possible emphasis.- To Paris German White Book Exhibit 10a 3 Telegram of the Imperial Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris. July 26th, 1914- After officially declaring to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire territorial gain and to touch the existence of the Kingdom, the decision whether there is to be a European war rests solely with Russia which has to bear the entire responsibility. We depend upon France with which we are at one in the desire for the preservation of the peace of Europe that it will exercise its influence at St. Petersburg in favour of peace. 1 The words in italics are substituted here from the New York Timrx translation for those of the Collected Diplomatic Documents, which is the official British version and follows the official German translation, and reads "the call for several classes of the reserves is expected immediately which is equivalent to mobilisation." It will be noticed that two thoughts are inadvertently omitted here: first that it is Russia who is mobilizing; secondly that she is mobilising "also against us." The editor of the Collected Diplomatic Documents who states, on p. 403, that "a few footnotes have been inserted to point out certain discrepancies between the translation and the Ger- man original," disregards the omission of Russia in his footnote to these words, st:i t iim merely "The German text adds here auch gegen uns (also against us)." - Tin's entire message delivered to Sir E. Grey by the ( lerman Ambassador has been omitted in the British Blue Book. 3 From Russian Orange Book No. 28, July 26, 1914, it appears that this me: was delivered in Paris. It is, however, not printed in the French Yellow Book. In the English Translations published by The Imperial German Foreign Office these "Exhibits" are renumbered and printed as numbers: 10a becomes 11; 106 12. etc. 192 Official Diplomatic Documents To Petrograd German White Book Exhibit 106 l Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg on July 26th, 1914- After Austria's solemn declaration of its territorial disinterested- ness, the responsibility for a possible disturbance of the peace of Europe through a Russian intervention rests solely upon Russia. We trust still that Russia will undertake no steps which will threaten seriously the peace of Europe. For an additional message to Russia see oelow after No. 29 of the Russian Orange Book, July 26, 1914. Great Britain : From Vienna British Blue Book No. 31* Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 26.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914- Servian reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered satisfactory, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister has left Belgrade. War is thought to be imminent. British Blue Book No. '-V2 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 20.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. According to confident belief of German Ambassador, Russia will keep quiet during chastisement of Servia, which Austria-Hungary is resolved to inflict, having received assurances that no Servian terri- tory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my question whether Russian Government might not be compelled by public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he said that everything depended on the personality of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose, the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of Pan-Slav agita- tion in Russia were over and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs would not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to take a step which would probably result in many frontier questions in which Russia is interested, such 1 Like the preceding two messages which have been omitted from the British Blue Book and the French Yellow Book respectively, this message has been omitted from the Russian Orange Book. - The information contained in this despatch had reached England from Belgrade on the previous day ; British Blue Book No. 23. July 20, British Blue Book No. 33 193 as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian, and Persian questions being brought into the melting-pot. France, too, was not at all in a con- dition for facing a war. I replied that matters had, I thought, been made a little difficult for other Powers by the tone of Austro-Hungarian Government's ultimatum to Servia. One naturally sympathised with many of the requirements of the ultimatum, if only the manner of expressing them had been more temperate. It was, however, impossible, ac- cording to the German Ambassador, to speak effectively in any other way to Servia. Servia was about to receive a lesson which she re- quired ; the quarrel, however, ought not to be extended in any way to foreign countries. He doubted Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Servia, acting as if she made any such claim. As for Germany she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter. The German Ambassador had heard of a letter * addressed by you yesterday to the German Ambassador in London in which you ex- pressed the hope that the Servian concessions Would be regarded as satisfactory. He asked whether I had been informed that a pretence of giving way at the last moment had been made by the Servian Government. I had, I said, heard that on practically every point Servia had been willing to give in. His Excellency replied that Ser- vian concessions were all a sham. 2 Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilisation 3 and retirement of Government from Belgrade. From Berlin British Blue Book No. 33 Sir II. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 26.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 26, 1914- Emperor returns suddenly to-night, and Under-Secretary of State says that Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken on His Majesty's own initiative. They fear that His Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and excitement. Under-Secretary of State likewise told me that German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had reported that, in conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Servian ter- ritory Russia would not remain indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia would not act if Austria did not annex territory. 1 Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 29, same day. 2 For the reasons see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914. 3 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 29, Belgian Gray Book No. 5, same day. 194 Official Diplomatic Documents British Blue Hook No. 34 Sir II. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Ore;/. — {Received July 26.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 26, 1914. Under-Secretary of State has just telephoned to me to say that German Ambassador at Vienna lias been instructed to pass on to Austro-Hungarian Government your hopes that they may take a favourable view of Servian reply if it corresponds to the forecast con- tained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July. 1 Under-Secretary of .State considers very fact of their making this communication to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German Government do not see their way to going beyond this. From Rome British Blue Book No. 35 2 Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, in Sir Edward Orey. — (Received July 26.) (Telegraphic.) Rome, July 26, Wl.' t . Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a con- ference, and will instruct Italian Ambassador to-night accordingly. Austrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government this even- ing that Minister in Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did not imply declaration of war. To Paris, Berlin, Rome British But-: Book No. 36 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir II. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, and Sir B. Rodd, British Ambassador at Borne. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 26, 1.914- Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Am- bassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Ger- many, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? 3 You should ask Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Bel- grade, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh should be authorised to request 1 See No. 21, July 25, 1014. - This seems t<> be a reply to No. 36. :t This is no longer the Conference of Sir E. Grey's original plan — mediation be- tween Russia ami Austria-Hungary — nor of the Paul Canibon modification of this plan — mediation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. See note to No. 37. July 2G, British Blue Book No. 39 195 that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference. To Paris British Blue Book No. 37 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 20, 1914. Berlin telegram of 25th July. 1 It is important to know if France will agree to suggested action by the four Powers if necessary. From Borne British Blue Book No. 38 [Here Sir E. Grey prints a despatch from Rome dated July 23, but delayed in transmission. For the text see above under date of July 23, and explanatory note.] British Blue Book No. 39 Reply of Serbian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note. — (Commu- nicated by the Serbian Minister, July 27.) [For the text see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 25, July 25, and No. 34, July 27, 1914. The British Blue Book fails to print the Austro-Hungarian comment.] According to the published despatches none of the Entente Powers had received copies of the Serbian reply on July 26, and even a summary of the reply had reached Paris with a delay of twenty hours, i.e. at 2 P.M. Sunday, July 2li, 1914 (French Yellow Book No. 56, same day also Russian Orange Book No. 36, July 27 ) . As to the reply, however, two versions were current on July 26 : first, that dis- seminated by Russia, Serbia and France, to the effect that Serbia had yielded completely except on one or two minor points ; secondly, that given out by Austria- Hungary and Germany, to the effect that Serbia's concessions were a sham and that the entire reply was unsatisfactory. The only foreign offices cognisant of the reply were, of course, those of Serbia and Austria-Hungary, unless one wishes to understand a passage of British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, (see note 7) to mean that the Russian Cabinet wrote the note for Serbia. Eventually Austria-Hungary sent her commentary on this note to the Powers by mail July 27 (see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 39, July 28). These com- ments, however, were not printed either in the British Blue Book or the French Yellow Book in any of the editions receiving currency in America or in the Collected Diplomatic Documents officially issued by England. Neither does it appear in any of the other books except the Austro-Hungarian Red Book. 1 The official British version contains here a footnote "See No. 18." The Conference there spoken of has in view "working in favour of mediation in Vienna and at St. Petersburgh." It is in short Sir E. Grey's original plan. Despatches Nos. 36 and37, therefore, contain different proposals. France's objections to working in favour of moderation in Petrograd were discussed above in note 5 to French Yellow Book No. 56, July 26. Very probably, therefore, British Blue Book No. 37 should precede No. 36. When Sir E. Grey met determined opposition in Paris to his plan (No. 37) he may have modified it. as expressed in No. 36. No. 36 reached the British Ambassador while he was at a conference with the Russian and French Ambassadors in Vienna in the evening (French Yellow Book No. 55) and his reply, British Blue Book No. 40, while dated July 26, was received in London the next day. All this makes it unlikely that after sending No. 36, Sir E. Grey should have reverted to his original plan in No. 37. From No. 35 it does not appear which plan of a conference was accepted by Italy. 196 Official Diplomatic Documents From Vienna British Blue Book No. 40 ' Sir M. dc Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Receiccd July 27.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1014- Russian Ambassador just returned from leave thinks that Austro- Hungarian Government are determined on war, and that it is im- possible tor Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th instant 2 (last paragraph). When the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant to Paris 3 arrived, I had the French and Russian Ambassadors both with me.' They expressed great satisfaction with its contents, which I commu- nicated to them. They doubted, however, whether the principle of Russia being an interested party entitled to have a say in the settle- ment of a purely Austro-Servian dispute would be accepted by either the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government. Instructions were also given to the Italian Ambassador to support the request of the Russian Government that the time limit should be postponed. They arrived, however, too late for any useful action to be taken. Russia : To Rome Russian Orange Book No. 23 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Rome. (Telegram.) St. PetersburgJi, July 13 {26), 1914. Italy might play a part of the first importance in favour of pre- serving peace, by bringing the necessary influence to bear upon Austria, and by adopting a definitely unfavourable attitude towards the dispute on the ground that it could not be localised. You should express your conviction that Russia cannot possibly avoid coming to the help of Servia. 5 1 No 40 should precede No. 39. for while both despatches are said to have been re II, iu mi July 27, No. 40 was sent on July 26. 2 See No. 26, July 25. See \.>. 36, July 26, 1914. * ( 'f. the French account of this interview, French Yellow Book No. 55, same day. ■ I 'I. French Yellow Book Nos. 51 and 52, July 20, and for Russia's determination to force :i war unless Austria-Hungary yielded. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914, " if she (i.e. Russia) feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war." July 26, Russian Orange Book No. 25 197 From Prague Russian Orange Book No. 24 Acting Russian Consul at Prague to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Prague, July IS (26), 1014. Mobilisation x has been ordered. To Vienna; also Berlin, Paris, London, and Rome Russian Orange Book No. 2."> Russian Minister for Foreign Affairsto Russian Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegram.) St. Petersburgh, July 13 {20), Wl.' t . I had a long and friendly 2 conversation to-day with the Austro- Hungarian Ambassador. After discussing the ten demands addressed to Servia, I drew his attention to the fact that, quite apart from the clumsy form in which they were presented, some of them were quite impracticable, even if the Servian Government agreed to accept them. Thus, for example, points 1 and 2 could not be carried out without recasting the Servian press law and associations law, and to that it might be difficult to obtain the consent of the Skupshtina. As for enforcing points 4 and 5, this might lead to most dangerous consequences, and even to the risk of acts of terrorism directed against the Royal Family and against Pashitch, which clearly could not be the intention of Austria. With regard to the other points it seemed to me that, with certain changes of detail, it would not be difficult to find a basis of mutual agreement, if the accusations con- tained in them were confirmed by sufficient proof. In the interest of the maintenance of peace, which, according to the statements of Szapary, is as much desired by Austria as by all the Powers, it was necessary to end the tension of the present moment as soon as possible. With this object in view it seemed to me most desirable that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador should be authorised to enter into a private exchange of views 3 in order to redraft certain articles of the Austrian note of the 10th (23rd) July in consultation with me. This method of procedure would perhaps enable us to find a formula which w r ould prove acceptable to Servia, while giving satisfaction to Austria in respect of the chief of her demands. Please convey the substance of this telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a judicious and friendly manner. Communicated to Russian Ambassadors in Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy. 1 The despatches probably received in Petrograd announcing the Serbian mobi- lisation on July 25, three hours before Serbia sent her reply to Austria-Hungary. are not published in the Russian Orange Book. See Belgian Gray Book No. 5, July 26, 1914. 2 Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 5, and contrast French Yellow Book No. 54, both of July 26, 1914. For the Austrian Version see Red Book No. 31, July 27, 1914. 3 This is Sazonof's counter proposition to Sir E. Grey's plan of a conference of four Powers. 198 Official Diplomatic Documents To Berlin Russian Orange Book No. 26 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegram.) St. Petersburg, .July 13 (26), 1914. Please communicate the contents of my telegram 1 to Vienna of to-day to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, and express to him the hope that he, on his part, will be able to advise Vienna to meet Russia's proposal in a friendly spirit. From Paris Russian Orange Book No. 27 Russian Charge a" Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign . Iff airs. (Telegram.) Paris, July 13 (26), 1914. The Director of the Political Department informs me that, upon his informing the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador 2 of the contents of the Servian reply to the ultimatum, the Ambassador did not conceal his surprise that it had failed to satisfy Giesl. In the opinion of the Director of the Political Department, Servia's conciliatory 3 attitude should produce the best impression in Europe. Russian Orange Book No. 28 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, July 13 (26), 1914- The German Ambassador again visited the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day, and made to him the following declarations : 4 — (Translation.) "L'Autriche a declare a la "Austria has declared to Russie qu'elle ne recherche pas Russia that she does not desire des acquisitions territoriales et territorial acquisitions, and that qu'elle ne menace pas l'integrite she harbours no designs against de la Serbie. Son but unique the integrity of Servia. Her sole est d'assurer sa propre tranquil- object is to secure her own peace 1 Russian Orange Book No. 25, and sec nolo 'A to that despatch. - The summary of the Serbian reply reached Paris in I he afternoon of July 26, 1914 ; see French Yellow Book No. 56, July 26, where an interview with the German Ambassador is described. The interview here referred to wdth the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador is not mentioned in the French Yellow Book. 3 For a contrary interpretation of the Serbian attitude see British Blue Book No. 32, same day, and note '2. 4 This is the official message, German White Book, Exhibit 10a, sent by the Chan- cellor to the German Ambassador in Paris. It is not printed in the French Yellow Book and is here printed as if it were a personal opinion of the German Ambassador. July 26, Russian Orange Book No. SO 199 lite. Par consequent il depend and quiet, and consequently it de la Russie d'eviter la guerre, rests with Russia to prevent war. L'Allemagne se sent solidaire Germany is at one with France avec la France dans le desir in her ardent desire to preserve ardent de conserver la paix et peace, and she sincerely hopes espere fermement que la France that France will exercise a usera de son influence a Peters- moderating influence at St. bourg dans un sens moderateur." Petersburg." The Minister pointed out that Germany on her part might well act on similar lines at Vienna, especially in view of the conciliatory spirit displayed by Servia. The Ambassador replied that such a course was not possible, owing to the decision not to intervene in the Austro-Servian dispute. The Minister then asked whether the four Powers — Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and France — could not make representations at St. Petersburgh and Vienna, for that the matter amounted, in effect, to a dispute between Austria and Russia. The Ambassador alleged that he had no instructions. Finally, the Minister refused to agree to the German proposal. Russian Orange Book No. 29 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, July IS (26), 1.914. The Director of the Political Department has expressed the per- sonal opinion that the series of representations made by Germany at Paris aim at intimidating l France and at securing her intervention at St. Petersburgh. From Berlin Russian Orange Book No. 30 Russian Charge a" Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Berlin, July 13 (26), 1914. On the news reaching Berlin that the Austrian army had mobilised against Servia, a large crowd, in which the papers 1 Russia also received, on this day, July 26, 1914, the following message from Berlin, which is not printed in the Russian Orange Book. It is here quoted from the German White Book (authorized translation), p. 7 : "Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures which must consist in mobilising the army. " But mobilisation means war. " As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilisation would be directed against both Russia and France. We cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war. Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the exist- ence of the Servian kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume an attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Servia, as Austria-Hungary does not intend to question the latter. It will be easy in the further development of the affair to find a basis for an under- standing." 200 Official Diplomatic Documents report the presence of an Austrian element, gave vent to a series of noisy demonstrations in favour of Austria. Late in the even- ing the crowd several times collected before the Imperial Russian Embassy and some anti-Russian shouting occurred. Hardly any police were present and no precautions were taken. Serbia : Serbia has not published any despatches of July 26, 1914. July 27, 1914. 201 Monday, July 27, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Petrograd, Berlin, Rome London, Paris, Petrograd Petrograd, Berlin Belgium Berlin France London, London etc. Basle, London, Petro- grad, Constantino- ple, Berlin, Rome Serbian reply and Austro-Hungarian Memorandum. Germany London Kovno, Berne, Petro- Great Britain Russia Berlin, Petrograd, Vienna, Rome Paris and London, Berlin, London etc. Czar to Serbian Crown Prince Serbia Vienna, Paris, Berlin, Petrograd, Rome Serbian reply and Austro-Hungarian Memorandum London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna Czar to Serbian Crown Prince. Austria-Hungary sends out for presentation to the Powers the dossier with her proofs of Serbian guilt and issues her comments to the Serbian reply, explaining in detail why she could not accept it as satisfactory, and repeats her declaration that she "does not aim in any way at territorial acquisitions of any sort." France continues to hold Germany responsible for Austria-Hungary's firmness in dealing with Serbia, and refuses Germany's request to intercede in Petrograd. She is troubled by the confidence expressed by the German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors in London that "England would preserve neutrality" and, like Russia, is endeavoring to secure the promise of English support in case of war. Sazonof is represented by the French officials as very moderate and desirous of peace. Sir E. Grey's proposal of a conference to "examine means of finding a solution" is supported but altered to include Belgrade instead of only Vienna and Petrograd, while Jules Cambon in Berlin renews his request that Berlin alone intervene in Vienna. Germany accepts in principle Sir E. Grey's proposal of a conference and "at once starts the mediation proposal in Vienna in the sense desired by Sir Edward Grey." She expects, however, most good from direct conversations between Vienna and Petrograd as suggested by Sazonof. She continues to point out the danger of Russian mobilisation. Great Britain announces the action of keeping her fleet mobilised as of this day while it actually occurred on July 24. It was meant to dissipate the impression that in any event England "would stand aside," which impression Sazonof "deplored." Serbia's reply continues to be represented as satisfactory by Sir E. Grey, who omits from the Blue Book both the dossier and the Austro-Hungarian comments on the Serbian reply. Great Britain repeats her conference proposals to mediate between Petrograd and Vienna or, according to the French Yellow Book, also Belgrade. Sir E. Grey is, however, not unfavourable to Sazonof 's plan of direct conversations. Russia, while not refusing categorically Sir E. Grey's plan, urges her own of direct conversations. She continues her mobilisation, although some of her high officials deny this. 202 Official Diplomatic Documents Serbia officially appeals to Russia for help. Belgium discusses the Serbian reply on information supplied by the British Charge d 'Affaires at Belgrade. Austria-Hungary : From Petrograd AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 31 Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1914- Just had a long conversation with M. Sazonof. 1 Told the Minis- ter I was under the impression that mistaken ideas were prevalent in Russia with regard to the character of our action. We were credited with wishing to push forward into Balkan territory, and to begin a march to Salonica or even to Constantinople. Others, again, went so far as to describe our action merely as the starting point of a pre- ventive war against Russia. I said that all this was erroneous, and that parts of it were absolutely unreasonable. The goal of our action was self-preservation and self-defence against hostile propaganda by word, in writing, and in action, which threatened our integrity. It would occur to no one in Austria-Hungary to threaten Russian in- terests, or indeed to pick a quarrel with Russia. And yet we were absolutely determined to reach the goal which we had set before us, and the path which we had chosen seemed to us the most suitable. As, however, the action under discussion was action in self-defence, I could not conceal from him that we could not allow ourselves to be diverted from it by any consequences, of whatever kind they might be. M. Sazonof agreed with me. Our goal, as I had described it to him, was an entirely legitimate one, but he considered that the path which we were pursuing with a view to attaining it was not the surest. He said that the note which we had delivered was not happy 2 in its form. He had since been studying it, and if I had time, he would like to look it through once more with me. I remarked that I was at his service, but was not authorised either to discuss the text of the note with him or to interpret it. Of course, however, his remarks were of interest. The Minister then took all the points of the note in order, and on this occasion found seven of the ten points admissible without very great difficulty ; only the two points 3 dealing with the collaboration of the Imperial and Royal officials in Servia and the point dealing with the removal of officers and civil servants to be designated by us, 4 seemed to him to be unacceptable in their present > While dated July 27, this interview took place on July 26; cf. Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26, and note 1. The last paragraph of this note, moreover, refers to the Serbian mobilisation, which took place on the 25th, as of "the previous day." - trench Yellow Book No. 54, July 26, quotes Sazonof as having said "insulting.' 3 They are points 5 and 6, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7, July 22, 1914, and the explanation, Red Book No. 27, July 25, 1914. 4 This is point 1 of the note to Serbia, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7, July 22, 1914. July 27, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34 203 form. With, regard to the two first points, I was in a position to give an authentic interpretation in the sense of your Excellency's telegram of the 25th instant ; J with regard to the third, I expressed the opinion that it was a necessary demand. Moreover, matters had already been set in motion. The Servians had mobilised on the previous day 2 and I did not know what had happened since then. To Petrograd Au.STRO-HuNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 32 Count Berchtold to Count Szapary at St. Petcrsburgh. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914. I empower your Excellency to declare to M. Sazonof that, so long as the war between Austria-Hungary and Servia remains local- ised, the Monarchy does not aim in any way at territorial acquisitions of any sort. From Berlin Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 33 Count Szogyeny to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) Berlin, June 27, 1914. M. Sazonof explained to the German Ambassador that he could "guarantee" to him "that on the Russian side no mobilisation had been begun ; though it was true that certain necessary military pre- cautions were being taken." The German military attache at St. Petersburgh reports 3 that "the Russian Minister of War has given him his word of honour that not a man or a horse has been mobilised ; however, naturally, certain military precautions have been taken"; precautions which, as the German military attache adds, apparently spontaneously, to his report, "are to be sure pretty far-reaching." To Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, and Petrograd Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34 Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, London, Paris, and St. Petersburgh. Vienna. July 27, 191 4. Annexed you will find the text, annotated with our remarks, of the note which the Royal Servian Government on the 25th of June transmitted to the Imperial and Royal Minister at Belgrade. 1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book Nos. 21, 26, and 27, July 25, 1914. 2 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 5. Julv 25, 1914. »Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 11, also S and 9, July 27, 1914. 204 Official Diplomatic Documents Enclosure 1 Reply of the Royal Servian Government to the Imperial and Royal Government of the 12/25 July, WI4. (Translation.) The Royal Servian Govern- ment have received the commu- nication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, 2 and are convinced that their reply will remove any mis- understanding which may threaten to impair the good neighbourly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia. Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skupschtina 3 and in the declara- tions and actions of the respon- sible representatives of the State — protests which were cut short by the declarations made by the Servian Government on the lNtli 1 March, 1909 — have not been renewed on any occasion as re- gards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their agents, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Gov- ernment draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment received an entirely satis- factory explanation. Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy dur- 1 For a brief summary see French Yellow Book No. 75 (2), July 28, and footnote. 2 Old style 1 The Serbian Parliament. (Remarks.) The Royal Servian Govern- ment confine themselves to as- serting that, since the declara- tions on the 18th March, 1909, no attempt has been made by the Servian Government and their agents to change the position of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thereby they deliberately and arbitrarily shift the ground on which our demarche was based, as we did not maintain that they and their agents have taken any official action in this direction. Our charge, on the contrary, is to the effect that the Servian Government, notwithstanding the obligations undertaken in the above-quoted note, have neg- lected to suppress the move- ment directed against the terri- torial integrity of the Monarchy. Their obligation, that is to say, was that they should change the whole direction of their policy and adopt a friendly and neigh- bourly attitude towards the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and not merely that they should refrain from officially attacking the incorporation of Bosnia in the Monarchy. July 27, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34 205 ing the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacri- fice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Govern- ment cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies — manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solu- tion of a series of questions which arose between Servia and Aus- tria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbour- ing countries. For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Servia are sup- posed to have participated in the preparations for the crime com- mitted at Serajevo; the Royal Government expected to be in- vited to collaborate in an investi- gation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correct- ness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, The proposition of the Royal Servian Government that utter- ances in the press and the activi- ties of societies are of a private character and are not subject to official control is absolutely an- tagonistic to the institutions of modern States, even those which have the most liberal law with regard to press and associations ; this law has a public character and subjects the press, as well as associations, to State control. Moreover, Servian institutions themselves contemplate some such control. The complaint against the Servian Government is in fact that they have entirely omitted to control their press and their associations, of whose activities in a sense hostile to the Monarchy they were well aware. This proposition is incorrect ; the Servian Government were accurately informed of the suspi- cions which were entertained against quite definite persons and were not only in a position but also bound by their internal laws to initiate spontaneous enquiries. They have done nothing in this direction. 206 Official Diplomatic Documents without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forth- coming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be pub- lished on the first page of the Journal officiel, on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the follow- ing declaration : — "The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary — i.e., the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy ter- ritories belonging to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal con- sequences of these criminal proceedings. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communi- cation from the Imperial and Royal Government, certain Ser- vian officers and functionaries participated in the above-men- tioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neigh- bourly relations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly pledged by the declara- tion of the 31st March, 1909. 1 "The Government, etc. . . ." (identical with the text as de- manded). The Royal Government further undertake : — Our demand ran : — "The Royal Government of Servia condemn the propaganda directed against Austria-Hun- gary. . . ." The alteration made by the Royal Servian Government in the declaration demanded by us implies that no such propaganda directed against Austria-Hun- gary exists, or that they are cog- nisant of no such propaganda. This formula is insincere and dis- ingenuous, as by it the Servian Government reserve for them- selves for later use the evasion that they had not by this decla- ration disavowed the then exist- ing propaganda, and had not admitted that it was hostile to the Monarchy, from which they could further deduce that they had not bound themselves to suppress propaganda similar to that now being carried on. The wording demanded by US ran : — "The Royal Government re- gret that Servian officers and functionaries . . . partici- pated. . . ." By the adoption of this word- ing with the addition "according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment" the Servian Government are pursuing the object that has already been referred to above, namely, that of preserving a free hand for the future. We had demanded of them : — 1. "To suppress any publica- tion which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hun- July 27, Austro-H ungarian Red Book No. 34 207 1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skup- schtina * a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred and contempt of the Aus- tro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria- Hungary. The Government engage at the approaching re- vision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be intro- duced into article 22 of the Con- stitution of such a nature that such publication may be confis- cated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of article 22 of the Con- stitution. garian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy." We wished therefore to ensure that Servia should be obliged to see to it that press attacks of that nature should be discon- tinued in future; we wished therefore to know that a definite result in this connection was assured. Instead of this Servia offers us the enactment of certain laws which would be calculated to serve as means towards this result, viz. : — («) A law under which the press publications in question which are hostile to the Mon- archy are to be punished on their merits (subjeetiv) a matter which is of complete indifference to us, all the more as it is well known that the prosecution of press offences on their merits (subjec- tiv) is only very rarely possible, and, if any law of the sort is laxly administered, even in the few cases of this nature a conviction would not be obtained ; this, therefore, is a proposal which in no way meets our demand as it does not offer us the slightest guarantee for the result which we wish to obtain. (b) A law supplementary to Article 22 of the constitution which would permit confiscation — a proposal which is equally unsatisfactory to us, as the exist- ence of such a law in Servia is of no use to us, but only the obliga- tion of the Government to apply it ; this, however, is not promised us. These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory — all the 1 The Serbian Parliament. 20S Official Diplomatic Documents more so as they are evasive in that we are not told within what period of time these laws would be enacted, and that in the event of the rejection of the Bills by the Skupschtina — apart from the possible resignation of the Gov- ernment — everything would be as it was before. 2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the Narodna Odbrana and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their mem- bers. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the de- mand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dissolve the Narodna Odbrana Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary. 3. The Royal Servian Govern- ment undertake to eliminate with- out delay from public instruction in Servia everything that serves or might serve to foment the propaganda against Austria- The whole of the public life of Servia teems with the propa- ganda against the Monarchy, of the Narodna Odbrana and of so- cieties affiliated to it ; it is there- fore quite impossible to admit the reservation made by the Servian Government when they say that they know nothing about them. Quite apart from this the de- mand we have made is not en- tirely complied with, as we further required : — That the means of propaganda possessed by these associations should be confiscated. That the re-establishment of the dissolved associations under another name and in another form should be prevented. The Belgrade Cabinet main- tains complete silence in both these directions, so that the half consent which has been given us offers no guarantee that it is contemplated to put a definite end to the activities of the asso- ciations hostile to the Monarchy, especially of the Narodna Od- brana, by their dissolution. In this ease also the Servian Government first ask for proofs that propaganda against the Monarchy is fomented in public educational establishments in Servia. when they must know July 27, Austro -Hungarian Red Book No. 34 209 Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda. 4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from the mili- tary service all such persons as the Judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hun- garian Monarchy, and they ex- pect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and functionaries for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them. 5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the that the school books which have been introduced into the Servian schools contain matter of an objectionable nature in this re- spect, and that a large propor- tion of the Servian teachers are enrolled in the ranks of the Narodna Odbrana and the socie- ties affiliated with it. Moreover, here too the Ser- vian Government have not complied with a portion of our de- mand as fully as we required, in- asmuch as in their text they have omitted the addition which we desired "both as regards the teaching body and also as re- gards the methods of instruc- tion" — an addition which cpiite clearly shows in what directions the propaganda against the Mon- archy in the Servian schools is to be looked for. Inasmuch as the Royal Servian Government attach to their con- sent to the removal of the officers and functionaries in question from military and civil service the condition that these persons should have been convicted by Judicial enquiry, their consent is confined to those cases in which these persons are charged with a crime punishable by law. As we, however, demand the removal of those officers and functionaries who foment propaganda against the Monarchy, a proceeding which is not generally punish- able by law in Servia, it appears that our demand under this head also is not complied with. International Law has just as little to do with this question as has criminal procedure. This is purely a matter of State police, which must be settled by way of a separate agreement. Servia 's reservation is therefore unintel- 210 Official Diplomatic Documents representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collab- oration as agrees with the prin- ciple of international law, with criminal procedure, and with g< Kid neighbourly relations. 6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th ' June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot ac- cept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; neverthe- less, in concrete cases communi- cations as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Him- garian agents. ligible, and would be calculated, owing to the vague general form in which it is couched, to lead to unsurmoimtable difficulties when the time comes for concluding the prospective agreement. Our demand was quite clear and did not admit of misinter- pretation. We desired : — (1) The opening of a judicial enquiry (enquete judidaire) against accessories to the plot. (2) The collaboration of repre- sentatives of the Imperial and Royal Government in the inves- tigations relating thereto ("re- cherches" as opposed to " enqvMe judiciaire"). It never occurred to us that representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government should take part in the Servian judicial proceedings ; it was intended that they should collaborate only in the preliminary police inves- tigations, directed to the collec- tion and verification of the material for the enquiry. If the Servian Government misunderstand us on this point they must do so deliberately, for the distinction between "enquete judiciaire" and simple "recher- che*" must be familiar to them. In desiring to be exempted from all control in the proceed- ings which are to be initiated, which if properly carried through would have results of a very un- desirable kind for themselves, and in view of the fact that they have no handle for a plausible refusal of the collaboration of our representatives in the pre- liminary police investigations (numberless precedents exist for Style. July 27, Austro-Hwngarian Red Book No. 211 7. The Royal Government pro- ceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voja Tankosic. As regards Milan Ziganovic, who is a subject of the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th x June was em- ployed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him. The Austro-Hungarian Gov- ernment are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as pos- sible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, is well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry. 8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass. 9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the remarks made by their officials whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Govern- 'Old such police intervention) they have adopted a standpoint which is intended to invest their refusal with an appearance of justifica- tion and to impress on our de- mand the stamp of impractica- bility. This answer is disingenuous. The enquiries set on foot by us show that three days after the crime, when it became known that Ciganovic was implicated in the plot, he went on leave and travelled to Ribari on a commis- sion from the Prefecture of Police at Belgrade. It is, there- fore, in the first place incorrect to say that Ciganovic had left the Servian State Service on the 25th/28th June. To this must be added the fact that the Pre- fect of Police at Belgrade, who had himself contrived the depar- ture of Ciganovic and who knew where he was stopping, declared in an interview that no man of the name of Milan Ciganovic existed in Belgrade. The interviews in question must be quite well known to the Royal Servian Government. By requesting the Imperial and Royal Government to communi- cate to them all kinds of details about these interviews, and keep- Style. 212 Official Diplomatic Document* incut, were hostile towards the Monarchy, as soon as the Im- perial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these re- marks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said offi- cials, although the Royal Govern- ment will themselves take steps to collect evidence and proofs. ID. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execu- tion of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered ami carried out. If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understand- ing, either by referring this ques- tion to the decision of the Inter- national Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (31st) March, 1909. ing in reserve the holding of a formal enquiry into them, they show that they are not willing to comply seriously with this demand either. Belgium : From Berlin Belgian Gray Book No. 6 Huron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Berlin, July 87, 1014- According to a telegram from the British Charge d'Affaires at Belgrade, 1 the Servian Government have given way on all the points 1 Belgium had her own representative in Belgrade. No valid reason appears why the information here published should have come in the roundabout way through the July 27, French Yellow Book No. 61 21.3 of the Austrian note. They even allow the intervention of Austrian officials if such a proceeding is in conformity with the usages of inter- national law. The British Charge d' Affaires considers that this reply should satisfy Austria if she is not desirous of war. Nevertheless, a more hopeful atmosphere prevails here to-day, more particularly because hostilities against Servia have not begun. The British Government suggest mediation by Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy at St. Petersburg and Vienna in order to find some basis for compromise. Germany alone has not yet replied. The decision rests with the Emperor. France : From Basle French Yellow Book No. 60 M. Farges, French Consul-General at Basle, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Basle, July 27, 1914. Four days ago the German officers on leave in this district re- ceived orders to break off their leave and return to Germany. Moreover, I learn from two reliable sources that warning has been given to persons owning motor cars in the Grand Duchy of Baden to prepare to place them at the disposal of the military authorities, two days after a fresh order. Secrecy on the subject of this warning has been directed under penalty of a fine. 1 The population of Basle is very uneasy, and banking facilities are restricted. Farges. To London, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome French Yellow Book No. 61 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, on board the "La France" (for the President of the Council) and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome. Paris, July 27, 1914. The three steps taken by the German Ambassador at Paris seem characteristic : — On Friday he reads a note 2 in which the German British official in Belgrade and the Belgian Minister in Berlin. Since the exhaustive Austro-Hungarian comment on the Serbian reply, Red Book No. 34, same day, was presented to all the great Powers it is significant that no reference to it is here made, and that the British official presents exclusively the Serbian, and one may say, Russian view of the Serbian reply. 1 The accuracy of this statement can neither be proved nor disproved at this writ- ing. German writers have denied it. If the information was true, one should expect to have it reported directly by the French consuls in the Grand Duchy of Baden. On the other hand, precautionary measures would, of course, have been taken near the French frontier earlier than elsewhere. 2 French Yellow Book No. 28, July 24. 214 Official Diplomatic Documents Government categorically place themselves between Austria ami the Powers, approving the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and adding that "Germany warmly desires that the dispute should remain localised, since any intervention of another party must through the play of its alliances provoke incalculable consequences ; " — the second day, Saturday, the effect having been produced, and the Powers hav- ing, on account of the surprise, the shortness of the time-limit, and the risks of general war, advised Servia to yield, 1 Herr von Schoen returns to minimise this step, 2 pretending to be astonished at the impression produced, and protests that intentions are attributed to Germany which she does not harbour, "since," he says, "there was neither concert before nor threat afterwards;" — the third day, Sunday, the result having been obtained, since Servia has yielded, as one might almost say, to all the Austrian demands, the German Ambassador appears on two occasions 3 to insist on Germany's peace- ful intentions, and on her warm desire to co-operate in the mainte- nance of peace, after having registered the Austrian success which closes the first phase of the crisis. The situation at the moment of writing remains disturbing, on account of the incomprehensible 4 refusal of Austria to accept Ser- via's submission, of her operations of mobilisation, and of her threats to invade Servia. The attitude taken up from the beginning by the Austrian Government, with German support, her refusal to accept any conversation with the Powers, practically do not allow the latter to intervene effectively with Austria without the media- tion of Germany. However, time presses, for if the Austrian army crosses the frontier it will be very difficult to circumscribe the crisis, Russia not appearing to lie able to tolerate '° the occupation of Servia after the latter has in reality submitted to the Austrian note, giving every satisfaction and guarantee. Germany, from the very fact of the position taken up by her, is qualified to intervene effectively and be listened to at Vienna ; if she does not do this she justifies all suspicions and assumes the responsibility for the war. The Powers, particularly Russia, France, and England, have by their urgent advice induced Belgrade to yield, 1 they have thus ful- filled their part; now it is for Germany, who is alone able to gain a rapid hearing at Vienna, to give advice to Austria, who has obtained satisfaction and cannot, for a detail easy to adjust, bring about a general war. It is in these circumstances that the proposal made by the Cabinet of London is put forward ; M. Sazonof having said to the British Ambassador that as a consequence of the appeal of Servia to the Powers, 6 Russia would agree to stand aside, Sir Edward Grey has formulated the following suggestion to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin 1 Sec. note to British Blue Book No. 39, July 26, and British Blue Book No. 22, where it appears that the advice was never given. 2 French Yellow Book No. 36, July 25. 3 French Yellow Book Nos. 56 and 57, July 26. 4 For Austria's reasons »■,■ \u.-tro-Himgarian Red Book No. 34, July 27. 'C'f. Note 2, French Yellow Book No. 57, July 26. e This appeal was never made ; ef. also French Yellow Book No. 68, July 27, 1914. July 27, French Yellow Book No. 62 215 and Rome : the French, German and Italian Ambassadors at Lon- don would be instructed to seek with Sir Edward Grey a means of resolving the present difficulties, it being understood that during this conversation Russia, Austria and Servia would abstain from all active military operations. 1 Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this sug- gestion to the German Ambassador, who showed himself favourable to it ; it will be equally well received in Paris, and also at Rome, according to all probability. Here again it is Germany's turn to speak, and she has an opportunity to show her goodwill by other means than words. I would ask you to come to an understanding with your British colleague, and to support his proposal with the German Govern- ment in whatever form appears to you opportune. 2 Biexvenu-Martin. To London, St. Petersburg!!, Berlin, Vienna French Yellow Book No. 62 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Presi- dent of the Council {on board the " La France") and to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg!), Berlin, Vienna. Paris, July 27, 1914. After his demarche of yesterday 3 tending to an intervention by France at St. Petersburgh in favour of peace, the German Ambas- sador returned, as I have informed you, to the Direction Politique on the pretext that it might be desirable to communicate to the press a short note indicating the peaceful and friendly sense of the con- versation ; he even suggested the following terms : — " During the afternoon the German Ambassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had a fresh interview, in the course of which, in the most amicable spirit and acting in an identical spirit of peaceful co-opera- tion, they examined the means which might be employed to main- tain general peace." He was told in answer, that the terms ap- peared exaggerated and of a nature to create in public opinion illusions on the real situation ; that, however, a brief note in the sense indi- cated, that is to say, giving an account of a conversation at which the means employed to safeguard peace had been examined, might be issued if I approved it. The note communicated was as follows: — "The German Am- bassador and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have had a fresh inter- view, in the course of which they sought means of action by the Powers for the maintenance of peace." This phrasing, deliberately colour- less, avoided an appearance of solidarity with Germany which might have been misinterpreted. 1 Note that no engagement is taken to refrain from mobilisation. 2 This last paragraph can refer only to the French Ambassador in Berlin, although the despatch is notjlisted as having been sent also to Berlin. 5 French Yellow Book No. 56 and 57, July 26. 216 Official Diplomatic Documents This morning 1 Herr von Schoen addressed a private letter to the Political Director under pretext of resuming his interview with the Minister, and has added: "Note well the phrase in an identical spirit of peaceful co-operation. This is not an idle phrase, but the sincere expression of the truth." The summary annexed to the letter was drawn up as follows: — "The Cabinet of Vienna has, formally and officially, caused it to lie declared to that of St. Peters- burgh, that it does not seek any territorial acquisition in Servia, and that it has no intention of making any attempt against the integrity of the kingdom; its sole intention is that of assuring its own tran- quillity. At this moment the decision whether a European war must break out depends solely on Russia. The German Govern- ment have firm confidence that the French Government, with which they know that they are at one in the warm desire that European peace should he able to he maintained, will use their whole influence with the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh in a pacific spirit." I have let you know the reply - which has been given (a French demarche at St. Petersburgh would be misunderstood, 3 and must have as corollary a German demarche at Vienna, or, failing that, mediation by the four less interested Powers in both capitals). Ilerr von Schoen's letter is capable of different interpretations; the most probable is that it has for its object, like his demarche itself, an attempt to compromise France with Russia and, in case of failure, to throw the responsibility for an eventual war on Russia and on France 4 ; finally, by pacific assurances which have not been listened to, to mask military action by Austria in Servia intended to com- plete the success of Austria. I communicate this news to you by way of information and for any useful purpose you can put it to. Bienvenu-Martin. From Loudon French Yellow Book No. 63 M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 27, 1914- The German Ambassador and the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador allow it to be understood that they are sure that England would preserve neutrality if a conflict were to break out. Sir Arthur Xicol- 1 From Russian Orange Hook No. 28, July 26, it appears that this declaration was made on July 26. .See German White Book 10a. July 26, giving an official German message to France, which is not printed in its entirety in the Yellow Book. 2 For a similar refusal of Great Britain to exert her conciliatory influence in Petro- grad, see French Yellow Book No. SO. July 28. 3 The Times translation says "would have been difficult to explain." This is the more accurate translation. 4 Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 29, July 26. It seems that the entire French de- spatch refers to events that took place on the previous day. This then is a " rewritten " despatch for the purpose of making the Yellow Book appear to be more complete than it is. July 27, French Yellow Book No. 65 217 son has told me, 1 however, that Prince Lichnowsky cannot, after the conversation which he has had with him to-day, entertain any doubt as to the freedom which the British Government intended to pre- serve of intervening in case they should judge it expedient. The German Ambassador will not have failed to be struck with this declaration, but to make its weight felt in Germany and to avoid a conflict, it seems indispensable that the latter should be brought to know for certain that they will find England and Russia by the side of France. 2 t>. -r, De t leuriau. From St. Petersburgh French Yellow Book No. 64 M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bien- venu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1914. M. Sazonof has used conciliatory language to all my colleagues. In spite of the public excitement, the Russian Government is applying itself successfully to restraining the press ; in particular great moderation towards Germany has been recommended. 3 J\I. Sazonof has not received any information from Vienna or from Berlin since vesterday. n Paleologue. From Constantinople French Yellow Book No. 65 M. Bompard, French Ambassador at Constantinople, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Therapia, July 27, 1914- The Austro-Servian conflict holds the attention of the Ottoman Government, and the Turks are delighted at the misfortunes of Servia, but people here generally are led to believe that the conflict will remain localised. It is generally thought that once again Russia will not intervene in favour of Servia in circumstances which would extend the armed conflict. The unanimous feeling in Ottoman political circles is that Austria, with the support of Germany, will attain her objects and that she will make Servia follow Bulgaria and enter into the orbit of the Triple Alliance. 4 r, r Bompard. 1 This is not given in the British Blue Book. 2 For the culmination of this wish, see French Yellow Book No. 138, August 2, 1914. 3 But even M. Paleologue does not claim that it was observed. See the Russian press of these days. 4 This is a very important statement ; especially since no one had ever claimed that Bulgaria had been forced into "the orbit of the Triple Alliance" by unfair or militaristic means. 218 Official Diplomatic Document* From London French Yellow Book No. 66 M. de Fleuriau, French Charge (V Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 27, 191J+. Sir Edward Grey l told the German Ambassador this morning that if Austria were to invade Servia after the Servian reply, she would make it elear that she was not merely aiming at the settlement of the questions mentioned in her note of July 'l'.\, hut that she wished to crush a small state. "Then," he added, "a European question would arise, and war would follow in which, other Powers would he led to take a part." The attitude of Great Britain is confirmed by the postponement of the demobilisation of the fleet. The First Lord of the Admiralty took this measure quietly on Friday - on his own initiative ; to-night, Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues decided to make it public. This result is due to the conciliatory attitude of Servia and Russia. De Fleuriau. From. Berlin French Yellow Hook No. 67 M. .lutes Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienrenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 27, 1914- To-day I have had a conversation with the Secretary of State on the proposal by England that Germany should join the Cabinets of London, Paris and Rome to prevent hostilities between St. Peters- burgh and Vienna. I remarked to him that Sir Edward Grey's proposal opened the way to a peaceful issue. Ilerr von .Tagow replied that he was dis- posed to join in, but he remarked to me that, if Russia mobilised, Germany would be obliged to mobilise at once, that we should he forced to the same course also, and that then a conflict would be almost inevitable. I asked him if Germany would regard herself as bound to mobilise in the event of Russia mobilising only on the Aus- trian frontier; he told me "No," and authorised me formally to communicate this limitation to you. He also attached the greatest importance to an intervention with Russia by the Powers which were friendly with and allied to her. Finally, he remarked that if Russia attacked Austria, Germany would he obliged to attack at once on her side. The intervention i Cf. British Blue Book No. 46, Julv 27, 1914. 2 Friday was Julv 24 ; of. Sir E. Grev's " to-day," British Blue Book No. 48, July 27. 1914; see also Blue Book No. 47, July 27. 1914. For the effect of this admiralty order on Russia and on bringing on the war, see Editorial, Daily News (London), August 1, 1914. July 27, French Yellow Book No. 69 219 proposed by England at St. Petersburgh and Vienna x could, in his opinion, only come into operation if events were not precipitated. In that case, he does not despair that it might succeed. I expressed my regret that Austria, by her uncompromising attitude had led Europe to the difficult pass through which we were going, but I expressed the hope that intervention would have its effect. Jules Cambon. From London French Yellow Book No. 68 M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 27, 1914- Yesterday in the course of a conversation between M. Sazonof, M. Paleologue and Sir G. Buchanan, the Russian Minister said that Servia was disposed to appeal 2 to the Powers, and that in that case his Government would be prepared to stand aside. Sir E. Grey has taken these words as a text on which to formulate to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin, and Rome a proposal with which Sir Francis Bertie will acquaint your Excellency. The four Powers would intervene in the dispute, and the French, German, and Italian Ambassadors at London would be instructed to seek, with Sir E. Grey, a means of solving the present difficulties. It would be understood that, during the sittings of this little con- ference, Russia, Austria and Servia would abstain from all active military operations. Sir A. Nicolson has spoken of this suggestion to the German Ambassador, who has shown himself favourable to it. De Fleuriau. From London French Yellow Book No. 69 M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 27, 1914. The Servian Minister has not received instructions from his Gov- ernment to ask for the mediation 3 of England ; it is, however, pos- sible that the telegrams from his Government have been stopped on the way. 1 This is Sir E. Grey's first plan. The French wish was to have mediation between Vienna and Belgrade. 2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 61, July 27, and British Blue Book No. 22, July 25, 1914. 3 The proposal of English mediation was one of the many made but never pressed, probably for the reason suggested in French Yellow Book No. 70, same day. The nearest account of something in the nature of such a demand is given in Serbian Blue Book No. 35, July 24 [note the date]. 220 Official Diplomatic Documents However, the British proposal for intervention by the four Powers intimated in my preceding telegram has been put forward, and ought I think to be supported in the first place. ^ T1 v De Fleuriau. To London French Yellow Book No. 70 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. de Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at London. Paris, July 27, 1914. The British Ambassador has communicated to me Sir E. Grey's proposal 1 for common action by England, Germany, France and Italy at Vienna, Belgrade 2 and St. Petersburgh, to stop active mili- tary operations while the German, Italian and French Ambassadors at London examine, with Sir Edward Grey, the means of finding a solution for the present complications. I have this morning directed M. Jules Cambon to talk this over with the British Ambassador at Berlin, and to support his demarche in whatever form he should judge suitable. I authorise you to take part in the meeting proposed by Sir E. Grey. I am also ready to give to our representatives at Vienna, St. Petersburgh and Belgrade, instructions in the sense asked for by the British Government. At the same time I think that the chances of success of Sir E. Grey's proposal depend essentially on the action that Berlin would be disposed to take at Vienna ; a demarche from this side, promoted with a view to obtain a suspension of military operations, would appear to me doomed to failure if Germany's influence were not first exercised. I have also noted, during Baron Von Schoen's observations, that the Austro-Hungarian Government was particularly susceptible when the words "mediation," "intervention," "conference" were used, and was more willing to admit "friendly advice" and "con- versations." „ ,, r Bienvenu-Martin. From London French Yellow Book No. 71 M. ile Fleuriau, French Charge d' Affaires at Loudon, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Loudon, July 27, 1914. I have communicated to Sir Edward Grey your adherence to his proposal for mediation by the four Powers and for a conference at 1 British Blue Book No. 11, July 24 and No. 24, July 25. 2 Belgrade is not contained in the British proposal. British Blue Book No. 11, July 24. It was, however, France's persistent wish to have mediation between Vienna and Belgrade. July 27, French Yellow Book No. 72 221 London. The British Ambassador at Vienna has received the neces- sary instructions to inform the Austro-Hungarian Government as soon as his French, German, and Italian colleagues are authorised to make the same demarche. The Italian Government have accepted intervention by the four Powers with a view to prevent military operations ; they are con- sulting the German Government on the proposal for a conference and the procedure to be followed with regard to the Austro-Hungarian Government. The German Government have not yet replied. De Fleuriau. From Rome French Yellow Book No. 72 M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Rome, July 27, 1914. The Marquis di San Giuliano has returned to Rome this evening, and I saw him immediately after his arrival. He spoke to me of the contents of the Austrian note, and formally assured me that he had not had any previous knowledge of it. 1 He knew, indeed, that this note was to have a rigorous and for- cible character ; but he had not suspected that it could take such a form. I asked him if it was true that he had given at Vienna, as certain papers allege, an approval of the Austrian action and an assurance that Italy would fulfil her duties as an ally towards Aus- tria. "In no way:" the Minister replied : " we were not consulted ; we were told nothing ; it was not for us then to make any such com- munication to Vienna." The Marquis di San Giuliano thinks that Servia would have acted more wisely if she had accepted the note in its entirety ; to-day he still thinks that this would be the only thing to do, being convinced that Austria will not withdraw any of her claims, and will maintain them, even at the risk of bringing about a general conflagration ; he doubts whether Germany is disposed to lend herself to any pressure on her ally. He asserts, however, that Germany at this moment attaches great importance to her relations with London, 2 and he believes that if any Power can determine Berlin in favour of peaceful action, it is England. As for Italy, she will continue to make every effort in favour of peace. It is with this end in view, that he has adhered without hesitation to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a meeting in London of the Ambassadors of those Powers which are not directly interested in the Austro-Servian dispute. Barrere 1 It is noteworthy that the Entente diplomats in none of the published despatches doubted the honesty of Italy's denial of having had previous accurate knowledge of the Austrian note. Cf. also French Yellow Book No. 51, July 26. 2 The opponents of Germany have desired to minimize Germany's wish to be on good terms with England. 222 Official Diplomatic Documents From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 73 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- Mariin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 27, 1914. The British Ambassador, who returned to-day, saw the Secre- tary of State and discussed with him Sir Edward Grey's proposal. In his reply Herr von Jagow continued to manifest his desire for peace, but added that he could not consent to anything which would re- semble a conference of the Powers ; that would be to set up a kind of court of arbitration, the idea of which would only be acceptable if it were asked for by Vienna and St. Petersburg]]. 1 Herr von Jagow's language confirms that used by Baron von Schoen to your Excellency. In fact, a demarche by the four Powers at Vienna and St. Peters- burgh could be brought about by diplomatic means without assum- ing the form of a conference and it is susceptible of many modifica- tions ; the important thing is to make clear at Vienna and at St. Petersburgh the common desire of the four Powers that a conflict should be avoided. A peaceful issue from the present difficulties can only be found by gaining time. T ^ J ' 6 s Jules Cambon. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 74 .1/. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 27, 191 4. I had a conversation to-day with the Secretary of State and gave support to the demarche which Sir E. Goschen had just made. Herr von Jagow replied to me, as he had to the British Ambassa- dor, that he could not accept 2 the proposal that the Italian, French and German Ambassadors should be instructed to endeavour to find with Sir Edward Grey a method of resolving the present difficulties, because that would be to set up a real conference to deal with the affairs of Austria and Russia. 3 I replied to Herr von Jagow that I regretted his answer, but that the great object which Sir Edward Grey had in view went beyond any question of form ; that what was important was the co-operation of Great Britain and France with Germany and Italy in a work of peace; that this co-operation could take effect through common d-marches at St. Petersburgh and at Vienna, 4 that he had often ex- 1 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 70, same day. 2 Cf. French Yellow Book Nos. 70 and 73. same day. 3 See, however, British Blue Book No. 40, same day, where Germany accepts "in principle." 4 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 73, same day. July 27, French Yellow Book No. 74 223 pressed to me his regret at seeing the two allied groups always op- posed to one another in Europe ; that there was here an opportunity of proving that there was a European spirit, by shewing four Powers belonging to the two groups acting in common agreement to prevent a conflict. Herr von Jagow evaded the point by saying that Germany had engagements with Austria. I observed to him that the relations of Germany with Vienna were no closer than those of France with Russia, 1 and that it was he himself who actually was putting the two groups of allies in opposition. The Secretary of State then said to me that he was not refusing to act so as to keep off an Austro-Russian dispute, but that he could not intervene in the Austro-Servian dispute. "The one is the con- sequence of the other," I said, "and it is a question of preventing the appearance of a new factor of such a nature as to lead to inter- vention by Russia." As the Secretary of State persisted in saying that he was obliged to keep his engagements towards Austria, I asked him if he was bound to follow her everywhere with his eyes blindfolded, and if he had taken note of the reply of Servia to Austria which the Servian Charge d Affaires had delivered to him this morning. "I have not yet had time," he said. "I regret it. You would see that except on some points of detail Servia has yielded entirely. It appears then that, since Austria has obtained the satisfaction which your support has procured for her, you might to-day advise her to be content or to examine with Servia the terms of her reply." As Herr von Jagow gave me no clear reply, I asked him whether Germany wished for war. He protested energetically, saying that he knew what was in my mind, but that it was wholly incorrect. "You must then," I replied, "act consistently. When you read the Servian reply, I entreat you in the name of humanity to weigh the terms in your conscience, and do not personally assume a part of the responsibility for the catastrophe which you are allowing to be pre- pared." Herr von Jagow protested anew, adding that he was ready to join England and France in a common effort, but that it was neces- sary to find a form for this intervention which he could accept, and that the Cabinets must come to an understanding on this point. "For the rest," he added, "direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh have been entered upon and are in progress. 2 I expect very good results from them and I am hopeful." As I was leaving I told him that this morning I had had the im- pression that the hour of detente had struck, but I now saw clearly that there was nothing in it. He replied that I was mistaken ; that 1 This has been denied by those who have claimed that the Teutonic alliance was practically for aggressive purposes, while the French-Russian alliance was entirely defensive. 2 Sazonof had proposed this conversation ; cf. Russian Orange Rook No. 25, July 20, and No. 3S, July 27, also French Yellow Book No. 54, July 26 ; also British Blue Book Nos. 55 and 69, July 28. From French Yellow Book No. 54, it appears that Russia had for the time being abandoned the Grey Conference idea, and that the French Ambas- sador to Russia believed Russia's new plan " to be preferable to any other procedure." 224 Official Diplomatic Documents he hoped that matters were on the right road and would perhaps rapidly reach a favourable conclusion. I asked him to take such action in Vienna as would hasten the progress of events, because it was a matter of importance not to allow time for the development in Russia of one of those currents of opinion which carry all before them. In my opinion it would be well to ask Sir Edward Grey, who must have been warned by Sir Edward Goschen of the refusal to his pro- posal in the form in which it was made, to renew it under another form, so that Germany would have no pretext for refusing to asso- ciate herself with it, and would have to assume the responsibilities that belong to her in the eyes of England. Jules Cambon. To London, St. Petersburg}!, Berlin, Vienna, Rome French Yellow Book No. 75 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome. Paris, July 27, 1911 The Austro-IIungarian Ambassador came to see me to hand me a memorandum ' which amounted to an indictment of Servia ; he was instructed by his Government to state that since Servia had not given a satisfactory reply to the requirements of the Imperial Gov- ernment, the latter found themselves obliged to take strong measures to induce Servia to give the satisfaction and guarantees that are re- quired of her. To-morrow the Austrian Government will take steps to that effect. I asked the Ambassador to acquaint me with the measures con- templated by Austria, and Count Scezsen replied that they might be either an ultimatum, or a declaration of war, or the crossing of the frontier, but he had no precise information on this point. I then called the Ambassador's attention to the fact that Servia had accepted Austria's requirements on practically every point, and that the differences that remained on certain points might vanish with a little mutual goodwill, and with the help of the Powers who wished for peace ; by fixing to-morrow as the date for putting her resolution into effect, Austria for the second time was making their co-operation practically impossible, and was assuming a grave respon- sibility in running the risk of precipitating a war the limits of which it was impossible to foresee. I enclose for your information the memorandum that Count Scezsen handed to me. B 1 envenu-Marti n . 1 The so-called dossier, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19. July 25. It was published only in part in the New York Times translation of the French Yellow Book. Sir E. Grey apparently received the dossier on the same day but gave only a very brief summary of it in British Blue Book No. 48, July 27. The dossier itself is not printed in the British Blue Book. July 27, German White Book Exhibit 11 225 Enclosure Memorandum of the A ustro-Hungarian Government, handed by Count Scezsen to M. Bienvenu-Martin on July 27, 191 4- (See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25.) From Serbia The reply of the Serbian Government to the Austro-Hungarian note was communicated to France on this day, July 27, 1914. See French Yellow Book No. 49, July 25, and for text Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27, 1914, except that France did not publish the Austro-Hungarian comment. Germany : From Kovno German White Book Exhibit 8 Telegram of the Imperial Consulate at Kovno to the Chancellor on July 27th, 1914- Kovno has been declared to be in a state of war. From, Berne German White Book Exhibit 9 Telegram of the Imperial Minister at Berne to the Chancellor on July 27th, 1914. Have learned reliably that French XlVth corps has discontinued manoeuvres. From St. Petersburgh German White Book Exhibit 11 Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg to the Chan- cellor on July 27th, WI4: Military Attache reports a conversation with the Secretary of War. Sasonof has requested the latter to enlighten me on the situation. The Secretary of War has given me his word of honour that no order to mobilise has as yet been issued. 1 Though general preparations are being made, no reserves were called and no horses mustered. If Austria crossed the Servian frontier, such military districts as are directed toward Austria, viz., Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are to be mobilised. Under no circumstances those on the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilni, St. Petersburg. Peace with Germany was desired very much. Upon my inquiry into the object of mobilisation against 1 The Czar telegraphed to the Emperor on July 30 that mobilisation had been decided upon five days ago, i.e. July 25. Cf. German White Book, Exhibit 23a, July 30. Cf. also British Blue Book No. 6, July 24, note 5. 226 Official Diplomatic Documents Austria he shrugged his shoulders and referred to the diplomats. I told the Secretary that we appreciated the friendly intentions, but considered mobilisation even against Austria as very menacing. To London German White Book Exhibit 12 Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at London on Juh/ 27th, 1914. We know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey's to hold a quadruple conference in London. 1 It is impossible for us to place our ally in his dispute with Servia before a European tribunal. Our mediation must be limited to the danger of an Austro-Russian conflict. To London German White Book Exhibit 15 Telegram of the Chancellor hi the Imperial Ambassador in London 'on July 27th, 191 4. We have at once started the mediation proposal in Vienna in the sense as desired by Sir Edward Grey. We have communicated be- sides to Count Berchtold the desire of M. Sasonof for a direct parley with Vienna. 2 Great Britain : From Vienna British Blue Book No. 41 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 27.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914. I HAVE had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro- Ilungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable ; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Servia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment. 1 Apparently antedates British Blue Book No. 43, and French Yellow Book No. 67, July 27. 2 Apparently sent in reply to conversation between Mr. von Jagow and the British Ambassador. British Blue Book No. 43, same day. Cf. also British Blue Book No. 46, same day. July 27, British Blue Book No. 43 227 1 propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of His Majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his Excellency whether he can not suggest a way out even now. From Paris British Blue Book No. 42 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey, — (Received July 27.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 27, 1914- Your proposal, 1 as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday, is accepted by the French Government. French Ambassador in London, who returns there this evening, has been instructed ac- cordingly. Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government. Necessary instructions have also been sent to the French representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh, but until it is known that the Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Russian, and British Ambassadors to do so. From Berlin British Blue Book No. 43 Sir B. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received, July 27.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 27, 1914. Your telegram of 26th July. 2 Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practi- cally amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. lie could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that repre- sentatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He main- tained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburgh showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonof 3 to exchange views with Count Berchtold. 4 He thought •The official version prints here as a footnote "Nos. 36 and 37." These two despatches contained different proposals as explained above in note 1 to British Blue Book No. 37, July 26. 2 British Blue Book No. 36, July 26 according to footnote in Official Blue Book. Cf., however, British Blue Book No. 46, where Germany accepts the offer of No. 37. See notes on Nos. 36 and 37, July 26, 1914. 3 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 4 Austro-Hunsarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26, 1914. 228 Official Diplomatic Document* that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await out- come of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian ( rovernments. In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mo- bilised against Germany latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by "mobilising against Germany." lie said that if Russia only mobilised in south, Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilisation was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilisation. Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise. Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburg]! had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation. 1 From St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 44 Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 27.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1914. Austrian Ambassador tried, in a long conversation which he had yesterday- with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain away objectionable features of the recent action taken by the Austro- Hungarian Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that, although he perfectly understood Austria's motives, the ultima- tum had been so drafted that it could not possibly be accepted as a whole by the Servian Government. Although the demands were reasonable enough in some cases, others not only could not possibly be put into immediate execution seeing that they entailed revision of existing Servian laws, but were, moreover, incompatible with Servia's dignity as an independent State. It would be useless for Russia to offer her good offices at Belgrade, in view of the fact that she was the object of such suspicion in Austria. In order, however, to put an end to the present tension, he thought that England and Italy might be willing to collaborate with Austria. 3 The Austrian 1 Cf. German White Book, Exhibit No. 5, July 26. 2 July 26, Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26. French Yellow Book No. 54. July 26. 3 This is a new proposal added to the others that had been offered : (a) Sir Edward Grey's various conference plans. (/>) Sazonof's plan to substitute for the Conference direct conversation with Vienna. Tins last proposal, according to Sir G. Buchanan, was made by Sazonof to (lie Austrian Ambassador. This was, however, not the case. Sir Sazonof's report of the interview, Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26. and the French Ambassador's report. French Yellow Book No. 54, same day. and tin- Austrian Ambassador's report, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 31, July 27. From French Yellow Book No. 52, July 26, it appears that this proposal may have been made to the Italian Ambassador. It was directly made to Rome by Sazonof in Russian Orange Book No. 23, July 26, From tins despatch, where Italy is urged to adopt a definitely unfavourable attitude, it is clear that the proposal was not liima fide, which may be the reason why Sir E. Grey did nut accept it. The prominent fact of the entire in- vestigation is that Sir G. Buchanan's despatch is inaccurate. July 27, British Blue Book No. 46 229 Ambassador undertook to communicate his Excellency's remarks to his Government. On the Minister for Foreign Affairs questioning me, I told him that I had correctly denned the attitude of His Majesty's Government in my conversation with him, which I reported in my telegram of the 24th instant. 1 I added that you could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Govern- ment that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France if they supported Austria by force of arms. 2 Their atti- tude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce her to use her influence at Vienna to avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to preserve peace. His Excellency must not, if our efforts 3 were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a conflict. In these circumstances I trusted that the Russian Government would defer mobilisation ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that until the issue of the Imperial ukase no effective steps towards mobilisation could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit by delay in order to complete her military preparations if it was deferred too long. From St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 45 Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received J uly 27 '.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg]), July 27, 1914- Since my conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as reported in my telegram of to-day, 4 I understand that his Excellency has proposed that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburgh. To Berlin British Blue Book No. 46 Sir Edward Grey to Sir B. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 27, 1914- German Ambassador has informed me that German Government accept in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the 1 See No. 6. July 24. 1914. 2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, 1914. 3 What these efforts were, to preserve peace with dignity for all, or to force Austria- Hungary to submit, is not stated. « See No. 44. 230 Official Diplomatic Documents four Powers, 1 reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked. lie has also been instructed 2 to request me to use influence in St. Petersburgh to localise the war and to keep up the peace of Europe. I have replied that the Servian reply went farther than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia could hardly be expected to accept. 3 I assumed that Servian reply could not have gone as far as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence was now required. If Austria put the Servian reply aside as being worth nothing and marched into Servia, it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be involved. Servian reply should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said German Government should urge this at Vienna. 4 I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the situation if the war could not be localised, and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, with- out any reference to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to sec Austria crushed. 6 -Fust so other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Servia, and would bring other Powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Servian reply it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged. To St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 47 Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Peters- burgh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 27, 1914- See my telegram of to-day to Sir E. Goschen. 6 I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce. 7 1 Cf. German White Bonk Exhibit 15, July 27, in reply to British Blue Book No. 43, July 27. 191 t. 2 This further instruction is not printed in the ( lerman White Book. 3 Confirmation of such a remark by Mr. von Jagow would be valuable. 4 Germany complied with this request; cf. British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. 6 This is a elear reference to one danger threatening Austria-Hungary. The other danger of losing her prestige as a big Power if she failed to punish Serbian intrigues is often mentioned in the despatches. 6 The official British version prints this footnote: "See No. 46." In first edition the reference was given as No. 37. T Cf. British Blue Book No. 6, July 24. where Sazonof hopes that England "would not fail to proclaim her solidarity with Russia and France." Germany and Austria con- tinued to believe until July 29 that England would not do so ; cf. British Blue Book No. 1)16, Julv 30, where the British Ambassador in Rome states that "Germany was now July 27, British Blue Book No. 4$ 231 This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised. 1 We hear from German and Austrian sources that they believe Russia will take no action so long as Austria agrees not to take Servian territory. 2 I pointed this out, and added that it would be absurd if we were to appear more Servian than the Russians 3 in our dealings with the German and Austrian Governments. Ta Vienna British Blue Book No. 48 Sir E. Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. Sir, Foreign Office, July 27, 1014- Count Mensdorff 4 told me by instruction 5 to-day that the Servian Government had not accepted the demands which the Austrian Government were obliged to address to them in order to secure permanently the most vital Austrian interests. Servia showed that she did not intend to abandon her subversive aims, tending to- wards continuous disorder in the Austrian frontier territories and their final disruption from the Austrian Monarchy. Very reluctantly, and against their wish, the Austrian Government were compelled to take more severe measures to enforce a fundamental change of the attitude of enmity pursued up to now by Servia. As the British Government knew, the Austrian Government had for many years endeavoured to find a way to get on with their turbulent neighbour, though this had been made very difficult for them by the continuous provocations of Servia. The Serajevo murder had made clear to everyone what disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us." Cf. also British Blue Book No. 80. July 29, and French Yellow Book No. 96, July 2!). 1 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 66, July 27, where it is stated that the fleet was kept mobilised on July 24. See also letter by Admiral Lord Fisher, New York Evening Sun and Milwaukee Free Press, April 19, 1915, "Mobilisation of the fleet before the war on the innocent pretext of an expected visit from the king." = Cf. British Blue Book No. 33, July 26. 3 Cf. British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, where Sazonof says he could not be "more Servian than Servia." 4 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 6 What follows is a very brief summary in general terms of the dossier, Austro- Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25. This was received in Paris on July 27 ; see French Yellow Book No. 75. of that date. In Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 39, July 2S, it is stated that the dossier had been sent by post, "das Ihnen auf dem Postwege ubermittelte Dossier." And from French Yellow Book No. 75. July 27, it appears that it had been sent early enough to be presented in Paris on July 27. Such documents are generally sent to be presented simultaneously at the various Foreign offices. It is, therefore, practically certain that the dossier was presented also in London on July 27. The official English translation "which is being sent to you by post" conveys the wrong impression that the document could not have been in London on July 27. It is noteworthy that Sir E. Grey did not print the whole dossier anywhere in the British Blue Book, while he even stated in the Preface to the Blue Book edition of Sept. 28, 1914. that he "did not receive any state- ment of the evidence on which Austria had founded her ultimatum till the 7th August." See also note 1 to the dossier, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25, and the Instructions to the several .Ambassadors. 2'.\2 Official Diplomatic Documents appalling consequences the Servian propaganda had already produced and what a permanent threat to Austria it involved. We would understand that the Austrian Government must consider that the moment had arrived to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guarantees for the definite suppression of the Servian aspirations and for the security of peace and order on the southeastern frontier of Austria. As the peaceable means to this effect were exhausted, the Austrian Government must at last appeal to force. They had not taken this decision without reluctance. Their action, which had no sort of aggressive tendency, could not be represented otherwise than as an act of self-defence. Also they thought that they would serve a European interest if they prevented Servia from being henceforth an element of general unrest such as she had been for the last ten years. The high sense of justice of the British nation and of British states- men could not blame the Austrian Government if the latter defended by the sword what was theirs, and cleared up their position with a country whose hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures so costly as to have gravely injured Austrian national prosperity. Finally, the Austrian Government, confiding in their amicable re- lations with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a fight that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localising the fight, if necessary. < 'mint MensdorfT added on his own account that, as long as Servia was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe measures because of her adherence to the policy of the free development of the Balkan States. Now that Servia had doubled her territory and popu- lation without any Austrian interference, the repression of Servian subversive aims was a matter of self-defence and self-preservation on Austria's part. He reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking Servian territory or aggressive designs against Servian territory. 1 I said that I could not understand the construction 2 put by the Austrian Government upon the Servian reply, and I told Count Mens- dorfT the substance of the conversation that I had had with the Ger- man Ambassador this morning about that reply. ( ount MensdorfT admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory ; but the Servians had refused the one thing — the co-operation of Austrian officials and police — which would lie real guarantee that in practice the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against Austria. I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government believed that, even after the Servian reply, they could make war upon Servia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the dispute. If they could make war on Servia and at the same time satisfy Russia, well and good 3 ; but, if not, the consequences would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this phrase from an expression of the views of the German Government. I feared that it would be 1 Of. note No. 3 to the previous despatch. ,J I f. note to British Blue Book No. 39 under date of July 26. 3 Sir E. Grey here expresses an idea contrary to that often mentioned, viz. that. England was the protector of the little nations. July 27, Russian Orange Book No. 31 233 expected in St. Petersburgh that the Servian reply would diminish the tension, and now, when Russia found that there was increased tension, the situation would become increasingly serious. Already the effect on Europe was one of anxiety. I pointed out that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day, 1 but we had felt unable to let it dis- perse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet ; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was im- possible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that was felt. It seemed to me that the Servian reply already involved the greatest humiliation to Servia that I had ever seen a country undergo, 2 and it was very disappointing to me that the reply was treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as unsatisfactory as a blank negative. I am, etc. E. Grey. To Rome British Blue Book No. 49 Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome. Sir, Foreign Office, July 27, 1914. The Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson 3 to-day that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed entirely with my proposal for a conference of four to be held in London. As regards the question of asking Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Servia to suspend military operations pending the result of the con- ference, the Marquis di San Giuliano 4 would recommend the sugges- tion warmly to the German Government, and would enquire what procedure they would propose should be followed at Vienna. I am, etc. E. Grey. British Blue Book No. 39 Reply of Serbian Government to Austro-Hungarian note (communicated bv the Serbian Minister, July 27). See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27. Russia : From London Russian Orange Book No. 31 Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) London, July 14 (27), 1.914. I have received your telegram of the 13th (26th) July. 5 Please inform me by telegraph whether you consider that your direct dis- 1 Cf. note 2 to British Blue Book No. 47, July 27. 2 With this "humiliation" of Serbia compare the fate in recent years of Persia, Morocco, Corea, and other small nations. 3 British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 4 Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 6 Not printed in Russian Orange Book. 234 Official Diplomatic Documents cussions 1 with the Vienna Cabinet harmonise with Grey's scheme for mediation by the four Governments. Having heard from the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that you would be prepared to accept such a combination, Grey decided to turn it into an official proposal, which he communicated yesterday to Berlin, Paris, and Rome. 2 To Paris and London Russian Orange Book No. 32 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Paris and London. (Translation.) St. Petersburg!!, (Telegraphic.) July 27, 1914. The British Ambassador came to ascertain whether we think it desirable that Great Britain should take the initiative in con- voking a conference in London of the representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy to examine the possibility of a way out of the present situa- tion. I replied to the Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Am- bassador under conditions which, I hope, may be favourable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets. If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove impossible, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favourable solu- tion of the conflict. I wish, however, to put an end from this day forth to a mis- understanding which might arise Saint-Petersbourg, (Telegraphique.) le 14 (27)juillet, 1914. L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre est venu s'informer si nous jugeons utile que l'Angleterre prenne ['initiative de convoquer a Londres une conference des representants de l'Angleterre, la France, l'Allemagne et l'ltalie, pour etudier une issue a la situation actuelle. J'ai repondu a l'Ambassadeur que j'ai entame des pourparlers avec l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche- Hongrie, en conditions que j'es- pere favorables. Pourtant je n'ai pas encore recti de reponse a la proposition que j'ai faite d'une revision de la note entre les deux Cabinets. Si des explications directs avec le Cabinet de Vienne se trou- vaient irrealisables, je suis pret a, accepter la proposition anglaise, ou toute autre de nature a resoudre favorablement le conflit. Je voudrais pourtant ecarter des aujourd'hui un malentendu qui pourrait surgir de la reponse 1 See Orange Book No 64, July 27. Sazonof hac note to Serbia on July 27, view of this whole subject 2 British Blue Book No July No. 38, July 27, and French Yellow Book No. roposals of direct discussions of the Austrian S had not yet heard from Vienna. For a re- , British Blue Book No. 07, July 28. 26, also Nos. 43 and 57, July 27. July 27, Russian Orange Book No. 35 235 donnee par le Ministre de la from the answer given by the Justice francais a l'Ambassadeur French Minister of Justice to the d'Allemagne, concernant des con- German Ambassador, regarding seils de moderation a, donner an counsels of moderation to be Cabinet Imperial. given to the Imperial Cabinet. To Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome Russian Orange Book N<>. 33 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome. (Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July U (27), 1914. I have taken note of the reply ! returned by the Servian Govern- ment to Baron Giesl. It exceeds all our expectations in its modera- tion, and in its desire to afford the fullest satisfaction to Austria. We do not see what further demands could be made by Austria, unless the Vienna Cabinet is seeking for a pretext for war with Servia From Paris Russian Orange Book No. 34 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, July U (.37), 101 4. The German Ambassador discussed the situation again to-day at great length with the Director of the Political Department. The Ambassador laid great stress on the utter impossibility of any media- tion or conference. 2 From Paris Russian Orange Book No. 35 Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, July 14 (27), 1914. I discussed the situation with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the presence of Berthelot, directly after my return to Paris. They both confirmed the information respecting the action taken by the German Ambassador, 3 which Sevastopoulo has already tele- graphed to you. This morning Baron von Schoen confirmed his declaration of yesterday in writing, i.e. : 1 . That Austria has declared to Russia that she seeks no territorial acquisitions and that she harbours no designs against the integrity of Servia. Her sole object is to secure her own peace and quiet. 1 See note to British Blue Book No. 39, under date of Julv 26. 2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 01, Julv 27. 3 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 01, July 27. 236 Official Diplomatic Documents 2. That consequently it rests with Russia to avoid war. 3. That Germany and France, entirely at one in their ardent desire to preserve peace, should exercise their moderating influence upon Russia. Baron von Schoen laid special emphasis on the expression of soli- darity of Germany and France. The Minister of Justice is convinced that these steps on the part of Germany are taken with the evident object of alienating Russia and France, of inducing the French Government to make representations at St. Petersburg, and of thus compromising our ally in our eyes ; and finally, in the event of war, of throwing the responsibility not on Germany, who is ostensibly mak- ing every effort to maintain peace, but on Russia and France. From Paris Russian Orange Book No. 36 Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, July 14 {27), 1914- It is clear from your telegrams ' of the 13th (26) July that you were not then aware of the reply of the Servian Government. The tele- gram from Belgrade informing me of it also took twenty hours 2 to reach us. The telegram from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent the day before yesterday at 11 o'clock in the morning, at the special urgent rate, which contained instructions to support our representations, only reached its destination at 6 o'clock. There is no doubt that this telegram was intentionally delayed by the Austrian telegraph office. From Paris Russian Okange Book No. 37 Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, Jul}/ 14 (.37), 1914. On the instructions of his Government, the Austrian Ambassador has informed the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that Servia's answer has not been considered satisfactory in Vienna, and that to-morrow, Tuesday, Austria will proceed to take "energetic action" with the object of forcing Servia to give the necessary guarantees. The Minister having asked what form such action would take, the Ambas- sador replied that he had no exact information on the subject, but it might mean either the crossing of the Servian frontier, or an ultima- tum, or even a declaration of war. 1 Not printed in either the French Yellow Book or the Russian Orange Book. 2 It also reached the French Government with a delay of twentv hours. C'f. French Yellow Book No. 56, July 26. July 27, Russian Orange Book No. Ifi 237 From Berlin Russian Ouange Book No. 38 Russian Charge a" Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Berlin, July 14 (27), 1,914. I begged the Minister for Foreign Affairs to support your proposal in Vienna that Szapary should be authorised to draw up, by means of a private exchange of views with you, a wording of the Austro-Hun- garian demands which would be acceptable to both parties. Jagow answered that he was aware of this proposal and that he agreed with I'ourtales that, as Szapary had begun this conversation, he might as well go on with it. He will telegraph in this sense to the German Ambassador at Vienna. I begged him to press Vienna with greater insistence to adopt this conciliatory line ; Jagow answered that he could not advise Austria to give way. From Berlin Russian Orange Book No. 39 Russian Charge d' Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign. Affairs. (Telegram.) Berlin, July 14 (27), 1914. Before my visit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day his Excellency had received the French Ambassador, who endeavoured to induce him to accept the British proposal for action in favour of peace, such action to be taken simultaneously at St. Petersburgh and at Vienna by Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and France. Cambon suggested that these Powers should give their advice to Vienna in the following terms : "To abstain from all action which might aggravate the existing situation." (S'abstenir de tout acte qui pourrait aggraver la situation de I'heure actuelle.) By adopting this vague formula, all mention of the necessity of refraining from invading Servia might be avoided. Jagow refused point-blank to accept this suggestion ' in spite of the entreaties of the Ambassador, who emphasised, as a good feature of the suggestion, the mixed grouping of the Powers, thanks to which the opposition between the Alliance and the Entente — a matter of which Jagow himself had often complained — was avoided. To Serbia HrssiAN Orange Book No. 40 Telegram from His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His Royal Highness Prince Alexander of Serbia, July 14 (27), 1914- When your Royal Highness applied to me at a time of especial stress, you were not mistaken in the sentiments which I entertain for you, or in my cordial sympathy with the Servian people. 1 For von Jagow's reasons see French Yellow Book No. 74, July 27, also Austro- Hungarian Red Book No. 35, July 28. 238 Official Diplomatic Documents The existing situation is engaging my most serious attention, and my Government are using their utmost endeavour to smooth away the present difficulties. I have no doubt that your Highness and the Royal Servian Government wish to render that task easy by neglecting no step which might lead to a settlement, and thus both prevent the horrors of a new war and safeguard the dignity of Servia. From Vienna Russian Orange Book No. 41 Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Vienna, July 14 {27), 1914. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is away. During a long conver- sation which I had with Macchio to-day I drew his attention, in a perfectly friendly way, to the unfavourable impression produced in Russia by the presentation of demands by Austria to Servia, which it was quite impossible for any independent State, however small, to accept. I added that this method of procedure might lead to the most undesirable complications, and that it had aroused profound surprise and general condemnation in Russia. We can only suppose that Austria, influenced by the assurances given by the German Representative at Vienna, who has egged her on throughout this crisis, has counted on the probable localisation of the dispute with Servia, and on the possibility of inflicting with impunity a serious blow upon that country. The declaration by the Russian Government that Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the face of such con- duct has caused a great sensation here. From London Russian Ouange Book No. 42 Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) London, July 14 {27), 1914. Grey has just informed the German Ambassador, who came to epiestion him as to the possibility of taking action at St. Peters- burg, that such action ought rather to be taken at Vienna, and that the Berlin Cabinet were the best qualified to do so. Grey also pointed out that the Servian reply to the Austrian note had exceeded anything that could have been expected in moderation and in its spirit of conciliation. Grey added that he had therefore come to the conclusion that Russia must have advised Belgrade to return a moderate reply, and that he thought the Servian reply could form the basis of a peaceful and acceptable solution of the question. July 27, Serbian Blue Book No. 43 239 In these circumstances, continued Grey, if Austria were to begin hostilities in spite of that reply, she would prove her intention of crushing Servia. Looked at in this light, the question might give rise to a situation which might lead to a war in which all the Powers would be involved Grey finally declared that the British Government were sincerely anxious to act with the German Government as long as the preser- vation of peace was in question ; but, in the contrary event, Great Britain reserved to herself full liberty of action. Serbia : From St. Petersburg Serbian Blue Book No. 43 His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His Royal Highness the Crown Prince of Serbia. (Telegraphic.) Petrograd, July 14/27, 1914- [See Russian Orange Book No. 40, July 27.] 240 Official Diplomatic Documents Tuesday, July 28, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Austria-Hungary Belgium France Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia &ENT DESPATCHES TO Belgrade, Berlin, London, St. Petersburgh London, Berlin, St. Peters- burgh, Vienna, Rome, Viviani German Governments, St. Petersburgh Emperor to Czar Berlin, St. Petersburgh London All Serbian legations St. Petersburgh Despatch es from Berlin, Tokio Vienna Vienna, London, Ber- lin, St. Petersburgh, Viviani Vienna Paris, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome, Ber- lin, Nish, French and Russian Embassies Fiume, Vienna, Berlin Vienna . 1 ustria-Hungary declares war cm Serbia and endeavours to explain her point of view to England most especially, but also to Russia. Russia's extensive mobilisa- tion results in Austria-Hungary calling on Germany for assistance and urging her to use toward Russia "unambiguous language." Sir E. Grey's proposal trans- mitted by Germany is declared to have come too late. France is resolved to support English and Russian proposals but persists in claiming that mediation should not be between Vienna and Petrograd alone, but include Belgrade. She views with suspicion every act and statement of Germany, and refuses to announce thai she and Germany had agreed to work for peace. She also refuses to use a moderating influence on Russia. Germany : The Chancellor informs the Federal Governments of the serious state of affairs, expressing the hope to be able to maintain peace but announcing it as the duty of Germany to support Austria-Hungary, if "through the interference of Russia the fire " should be spread. At the same time she urges Austria-Hungary to come to an understanding with Russia. The Emperor personally appeals to the Czar in the interest of peace. Great Britain declares that she would find it embarrassing to give Russia "pacific advice." She also does not follow up the advice sent by the British Ambassador in Rome to the effect that "Serbia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers." Her own conference proposal she "would suspend" in favor of Russia's proposal of direct conversations with Vienna. Sir E. Grey even made an alternate proposal, which Germany trans- mitted to Vienna, but which is not mentioned either in the British Blue Book or the French Yellow Book. (See German White Book, Exhibit 1(5.) Russia announces the failure of direct conversations with Vienna at the very moment when Sir E. Grey suspends his proposal, and disregarding Sir E. Grey's conference plan calls for English mediation, apparently between Vienna and Belgrade, which was France's suggestion. Serbia, according to the uncontradicted statement of Vienna (British Blue Book No. 56, under date of July 28) opens hostilities, and asks Russia for help, assuring the latter of her loyalty. July 28, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 38 241 Austria-Hungary : From Berlin Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 35 Count Szdgyeny to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 28, 1914. The proposal for mediation made by Great Britain, that Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France should meet at a conference at London, is declined l so far as Germany is concerned on the ground that it is impossible for Germany to bring her Ally before a European Court in her settlement with Servia. From. Tokio AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 36 Freiherr Jon M idler to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) Tokio, July 28, 1914- To-day's semi-official Japan Times contains a leading article which concludes by saying that Japan is on the best possible terms with the three Great Powers concerned — Austria-Hungary, Genua ny and Russia — while it is in no way interested in Servia. In the case of war, the Imperial Government would, as a matter of course, main- tain the strictest neutrality. To Belgrade AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BoOK No. 37 Con ut Berchtold to the Royal Servian Foreign Office at Belgrade. ( Tra ns- lated from the French.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 191 4. The Royal Servian Government not having answered in a satis- factory manner the note of 23rd July presented by the Austro-Hun- garian Minister at Belgrade, the Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms. Austria-Hungary consequently considers herself henceforward in a state of war 2 with Servia. To Berlin Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 38 Count Berchtold to Count Szdgyeny in Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914- For Your Excellency's information and for communication to the Secretary of State : — 1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 43. July 27. For a later agreement see British Blue Book No. 46, July 27. and German White Book, Exhibits 12 and 15, July 27. 2 For the Austro-Hungarian note announcing to the Powers that war had been declared, see British Blue Book No. 50. July 2s. 242 Official Diplomatic Documents 1 have received the following telegram from Count Mensdorff, dated the 27th inst. : — "I have to-day had the opportunity of explaining at length to Sir Edward Grey, that our action is not one of aggression but of self- defence and of self-preservation, and that we have no intention of making any territorial acquisition, or of destroying Servian independ- ence. 1 What we desire is to obtain a certain measure of satisfaction for what has passed, and guarantees for the future. For this purpose I availed myself of some of the points out of Your Excellency's communications to Count Szapary. Sir E. Grey said to me that he was very much disappointed that we were treating the Servian answer as if it were a complete refusal. He had believed that this answer would furnish a basis on which the four other Governments could arrive at a peaceful solution. This was his idea when he proposed a conference. The conference would meet on the assumption that Austria-Hun- gary as well as Russia would refrain from every military operation during the attempt of the other Powers to find a peaceful issue. (The declaration of Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons to-day amplifies the project of a conference.) When he spoke of our refrain- ing from military operations against Servia, I observed that I feared that it was perhaps already too late. The Secretary of State ex- pressed the view that if we were resolved under any circumstances to go to war with Servia, anil if we assumed that Russia would remain quiet, we were taking a great risk. If we could induce Russia to remain quiet, he had nothing more to say on the question. 2 If we could not, the possibilities and the dangers were incalculable. As a symptom of the feeling of unrest he told me that the British Grand Fleet, which was concentrated in Portsmouth after the manoeuvres, and which should have dispersed to-day, 3 would for the present remain there. "We had not called up any Reserves, but as they are assembled, we cannot at this moment send them home again." His idea of a conference had the aim of preventing, if possible, a collision between the Great Powers, and he also aimed at the isolation of the conflict. If, therefore, Russia mobilises and Germany takes action, the conference necessarily breaks down. I believe that I need not specially point out to Your Excellency that Grey's proposal for a conference, in so far as it relates to our conflict with Servia, appears, in view of the state of war which has arisen, to have been outstripped by events. ' British Blue Book No. 4.S. July 27. 2 This is a refutation of the popular claim that Great Britain went to war in part on Serbia's account, to vindicate the rights of the little nations. 3 This refers to the interview of July 27. See British Blue Book No. 48. July 28, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. Jfi 243 To London Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 39 Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1.914- We attach the greatest importance to the point that Sir E. Grey should appreciate in an impartial manner our action against Servia in general, and in particular our refusal to accept the Servian answer, and I therefore ask Your Excellency to take the opportunity of ex- plaining to the Secretary of State in detail the dossier which is being ' sent to you by post, and that you will emphasise the specially salient passages ; in the same sense Your Excellency should discuss with Sir E. Grey the critical observations on the Servian note (the text of the note without observations has been sent to Your Excellency by post yesterday), 2 and you should make clear to him that the offer of Servia to meet points in our note was only an apparent one, intended to deceive Europe without giving any guarantee for the future. As the Servian Government knew that only an unconditional ac- ceptance of our demands could satisfy us, the Servian tactics can easily be seen through: Servia accepted a number of our demands, with all sorts of reservations, in order to impress public opinion in Europe, trusting that she would not be recpjired to fulfil her promises. In conversing with Sir E. Grey your Excellency should lay special emphasis on the circumstance that the general mobilisa- tion of the Servian army was ordered for the afternoon of the 25th July at 3 o'clock, while the answer to our note was delivered just before the expiration of the time fixed, that is to say, a few minutes before 6 o'clock. Up to then we had no military preparations, but by the Servian mobilisation we were compelled to do so. To St. Petersburgh Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 40 Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914- For your Excellency's information and guidance : The Imperial Russian Ambassador spoke to me to-day in order to inform me of his return from short leave in Russia, and at the same time to execute a telegraphic instruction of M. Sazonof. The latter had informed him that he had had a lengthy and friendly discussion with your Excellency (your Excellency's telegram of the 27th in- stant), 3 in the course of which he had discussed with great readiness 1 This is a wrong translation ; it should read, "which has been despatched to you." and is so translated in the English translation issued by the Austro-Hungarian Gov- ernment. 2 Neither the dossier nor the Austro-Hungarian comments on the Serbian note were printed in the British Blue Book, although the Serbian reply was printed in No. 39 before No. 40 which is a telegram of July 26. For the reason why this Serbian reply is printed in this edition among the July 27 despatches, see note to British Blue Book No. 39, under date of July 20. 3 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 31, July 27. 244 Official Diplomatic Documents the various points of the Servian answer. M. Sazonof was of the opinion that Servia had gone far in meeting our wishes, but that some of tin' demands appeared to him entirely unacceptable, a fact which he had not concealed from your Excellency. It appeared to him under these circumstances that the Servian reply might properly be regarded as furnishing a starting point for an understanding to attain which the Russian Government would gladly lend a hand. M. Sazonof therefore desired to propose to me that the exchange of ideas with your Excellency should be continued, and that your Excellency should receive instructions with this end in view. In reply, I emphasised my inability to concur in such a proposal. No one in our country could understand, nor could anyone approve negotiations with reference to the wording used in the answer which we had designated as unsatisfactory. This was all the more im- possible because, as the Ambassador knew, there was a deep feeling of general excitement which had already mastered public opinion. Moreover, on our side war had to-day been declared against Servia. In reply to the explanations of the Ambassador, which culminated in asserting that we should not in any way suppress the admitted hostile opinion in Servia by a warlike action, but that, on the contrary we should only increase it, I gave him some insight into our present relations towards Servia which made it necessary, quite against our will, and without any selfish secondary object, for us to show our rest- less neighbour, with the necessary emphasis, our firm intention not to permit any longer a movement -which was allowed to exist by the Government, and which was directed against the existence of the Monarchy. The attitude of Servia after the receipt of our note had further not been calculated to make a peaceful solution possible, because Servia, even before she transmitted to us her unsatisfactory reply, had ordered a general mobilisation, and in so doing had already committed a hostile act against us. In spite of this, however, we had waited for three days. Yesterday hostilities were opened against us on the Hungarian frontier on the part of Servia. By this act we were deprived of the possibility of maintaining any longer the patience which we had shown towards Servia. The establishment of a funda- mental but peaceful amelioration of our relations towards Servia had now been made impossible, and we were compelled to meet the Servian provocation in the only form which in the given circumstances was consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy. To London AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 41 Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at London. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 101 /,. The British Ambassador, who discussed matters with me to-day has, in accordance with his instructions, explained the attitude of Sir E. Grey with regard to our conflict with Servia as follows : — July 28, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 41 245 The British Government have followed the previous course of events during the crisis with lively interest, and they attach im- portance to giving us an assurance that they entertain sympathy for us in the point of view we have adopted, and that they completely understand the grievances which we have against Servia. If England has no ground for making our dispute with Servia in itself an object of special consideration, nevertheless this question can- not escape the attention of the Cabinet at London, because this con- flict may affect wider circles and thereby imperil the peace of Europe. To this extent England is affected by the question, and it is only on this ground that Sir E. Grey has been led to send an invitation to the Governments of those countries which are not directly interested in this conflict (Germany, Italy and France), in order to test in com- mon with them by means of a continuous exchange of ideas the possibilities of the situation, and to discuss how the differences may be most quickly settled. Following the precedent of the London con- ference during the last Balkan crisis, the Ambassadors of the various States mentioned resident at London should, according to the view of the British Secretary of State, keep themselves in continual con- tact with him for the purpose indicated. Sir E. Grey had already received answers expressed in very friendly terms from the Govern- ments concerned, in which they concurred in the suggestion put forward. At present it was also the wish of the Secretary of State, if possible, to prevent even at the eleventh hour the outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and if this were not possible at least to prevent the conflict from causing a collision in- volving bloodshed ; if necessary, by the Servians withdrawing with- out accepting battle. The reply which had reached us from Servia appeared to offer the possibility that it might provide the basis of an understanding. England would willingly be prepared in this matter to make her influence felt according to our ideas and wishes. 1 thanked the Ambassador for the communication of Sir E. Grey, and I answered him that I fully appreciated the view of the Secretary of State. His point of view was, however, naturally different from mine, as England was not directly interested in the dispute between us and Servia, and the Secretary of State could not be fully informed concerning the serious significance which the questions at issue had for the Monarchy. If Sir E. Grey spoke of the possibility of prevent- ing the outbreak of hostilities, this suggestion came too late, since our soldiers were yesterday fired at by soldiers from over the Servian frontier, and to-day war has been declared by us against Servia. I had to decline to entertain the idea of a discussion based on the Servian answer. What we asked was the integral acceptance of the ulti- matum. Servia had endeavoured to get out of her difficulty by sub- terfuges. We knew these Servian methods only too well. Through the local knowledge which he has gained here, Sir Maurice de Bunsen was in a position to appreciate fully our point of view, and he would be in a position to give Sir E. Grey an accurate repre- sentation of the facts. 246 Official Diplomatic Documents In so far as Sir E. Grey desired to be of service to the cause of European peace, he would certainly not find any opposition from us. He must, however, reflect that the peace of Europe would not be saved by Great Powers placing themselves behind Servia, and directing their efforts to securing that she should escape punishment. For, even if we consented to entertain such an attempt at an agree- ment, Servia would be all the more encouraged to continue on the path she lias formerly followed, and this would, in a very short time, again imperil the cause of peace. The British Ambassador assured me in conclusion that he fully understood our point of view, but, on the other hand, he regretted that, under these circumstances, the desire of the British Government to arrive at an agreement had, for the time being, no prospect of being realised. He hoped to remain in constant communication with me as that appeared to him, on account of the great danger of a European conflagration, to be of special value. I assured the Ambassador that I was at all times at his disposal, and thereupon our conversation came to an end. To Berlin AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 42 Count Berchtold to Count Szogyiny at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) July 28, 191 4. I request your Excellency to go at once to the Chancellor or the Secretary of State and communicate to him the following in my name : — "According to mutually consistent reports, received from St. Petersburgh, Kieff, Warsaw, Moscow and Odessa, Russia is making extensive military preparations. M. Sazonof has indeed given an assurance on his word of honour, as has also the Russian Minister of War, that mobilisation has not up to now been ordered; the latter has, however, told the German Military Attache that the mili- tary districts which border on Austria-Hungary — Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kasan — will be mobilised, should our troops cross the Servian frontier. 1 " Under these circumstances, I would urgently ask the ( "abinet at Berlin to take into immediate consideration the question whether the attention of Russia should not be drawn, in a friendly manner, to the fact that the mobilisation of the above districts amounts to a threat against Austria-Hungary, and that, therefore, should these measures be carried out, they would be answered by the most exten- sive military counter measures, not only by the Monarchy but by our Ally, the German Empire." In order to make it more easy for Russia to withdraw, it appears to us appropriate that such a step should, in the first place, be taken 1 Genuau White Book, Exhibit 11, July 27. July 28, French Yellow Book No. 75 (2) 247 by Germany alone ; nevertheless we are ready to take this step in conjunction with Germany. Unambiguous language appears to me at the present moment to be the most effective method of making Russia fully conscious of all that is involved in a threatening attitude. 1 To Berlin Austro-Htjngahian Red Book No. 43 Count Berchtold to Count Szdgyiny <\1 Berlin. (Telegraphic.) July 28, 101 4. Information has been received from the Imperial German Ambas- sador that Sir E. Grey has appealed to the German Government to use their influence with the Imperial and Royal Government, in order to induce them either to regard the reply received from Belgrade as satisfactory, or to accept it as a basis for discussion between the * 'ahinets. 2 Herr von Tschirschky was commissioned to bring the British pro- posal before the Vienna Cabinet for their consideration. Belgium : From Vienna Belgian Gray Book No. 7 Count Errembault de Dudzeele, Belgian Minister at Vienna, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Vienna, July 28, W14- The Minister for Foreign Affairs has notified me of the declaration 3 of war by Austria-Hungary against Servia. France : From Vienna French Yellow Book No. 75 (2) Official Communiqui of the Press Bureau.' 1 Vienna, July 28, Wlf t . The Austrian Minister at Belgrade has returned to Vienna and presented the text of the Servian reply. 5 1 This despatch would seem to dispose of the claim sometimes made that Germany's demand on Russia to demobilise brought on the war much against the wishes of Austria- Hungary, who had been dragged in. 2 British Blue Book No. 46, July 27, and No. 67, July 28. 3 See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 37, July 28, and British Blue Book No. 50, same day. 4 This is a brief summary of the Austro-Hungarian comments on the Serbian reply, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27. b The Austrian Minister left Belgrade on the evening of July 25 (see Serbian Blue Book No. 41, July 25), after receiving the Serbian reply. This despatch is dated July 248 Official Diplomatic Documents A spirit of insincerity pervades the whole of this reply ; it makes it clear that the Servian Government have no serious intention of putting an end to the culpable toleration which has given rise to the anti-Austrian intrigues. The Servian reply contains such restric- tions and limitations, not only with regard to the principle of the Austro-Hungarian demarche, but also with regard to the claims ad- vanced by Austria, that the concessions which are made arc without importance. In particular, under an empty pretext, there is a refusal to accept the participation of the Austro-Hungarian officials in the prosecution of the authors of the crimes who are resident in Servian territory. In the same way, the Servian reply to the Austrian demand that the hostile intrigues of the press should lie suppressed, amounts to a refusal. The demand with regard to the measures to be taken to prevent associations hostile to Austria-Hungary from continuing their activity under another name and form after their dissolution, has not even been considered. Inasmuch as these claims constitute the minimum regarded as necessary for the re-establishment of a permanent peace in the south- east of the Monarchy, the Servian reply is considered to lie insufficient. That the Servian Government is aware of this, appears from the fact that they contemplate the settlement of the dispute by arbitra- tion, and also from the fact that on the day on which their reply was due and before it was in fact submitted, they gave orders for mobili- sation. From on board "La France" French Yellow Book No. 76 .1/. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, to M. Bienrenu-Martin. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. On board the "La France," July 28, 1914. I have received from Copenhagen your telegram summarising the events of Saturday ; ' the telegram describing the last visit of the German Ambassador,' 2 that 3 relating to the mediation which Russia 28. Its number is 75 (2), which is unusual. Beginning with the second paragraph this communique is a summary of the Austro-Hungarian comments on the Serbian reply. In short it is the reply to the Serbian reply. See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27. which was presented also in Paris. It is not printed in its entirety in the French Yellow Book. The editor of the French Yellow Book, however, M. Jules ( million, former French Ambassador in Berlin, doubtless felt the unfairness of making no reference to it at all. He therefore, added this communique as an afterthought, which accounts for the strange number 75 (_'). 1 Saturday was July 25. the telegram referred to was sent on July 26. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 50, also No. 56. - ( If. French Yellow Book No. 62, July 27. 3 This is a mistranslation substituted in the official British Blue Book of Sept. 28 and in the "Collected Diplomatic Documents" for the correct translation in the N. Y. Time* version which reads, "also the telegram with regard to," etc. This third tele- gram, however, has been omitted in the French Yellow Book. It would be interesting to know what it contained and wdiat the "British demarches at Berlin" refer to, Cf. end of French Yellow Book No. SO, same day; but see also French Yellow Book No. 74, July 27, which may describe the demarche mentioned here. July 28, French Yellow Book No. 77 249 advises Servia 1 to ask for and to the British demarches at Berlin, as well 2 as vour telegram received this morning directly through the Eiffel Tower. I fully approve the reply which you made to Baron von Schoen; the proposition which you maintained is self-evident ; in the search for a peaceful solution of the dispute, we are fully in agreement with Russia, who is not responsible for the present situation, and has not taken any measure whatever which could arouse the least suspicion ; but it is plain that Germany on her side would find it difficult to refuse to give advice to the Austro-Hungarian Government, whose action has provoked the crisis. We must now continue to use the same language to the German Ambassador. Besides, this advice is in harmony with the two British proposals mentioned in your telegram. 3 I entirely approve the combination suggested by Sir E. Grey, and I am myself requesting M. Paul Cambon to inform him of this. It is essential that it should be known at Berlin and at Vienna that our full concurrence is given to the efforts which the British Government is making with a view to seeking a solution of the Austro-Servian dispute. The action of the four less interested Powers cannot, for the reasons given above, be exerted only at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. In proposing 3 to exert it also at Belgrade, which means in fact between Vienna and Belgrade, Sir E. Grey grasps the logic of the situation; and, in not excluding St. Petersburgh, he offers on the other hand to Germany, a method of withdrawing with perfect dignity from the demarche by which the German Government have caused it to be known at Paris and at London that the affair was looked upon by them as purely Austro-Servian and without any general character. Please communicate the present telegram to our representatives with the great Powers and to our Minister at Belgrade. Rene Viviani. To Viviani French Yellow Book No. 77 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council on board the "La France." Paris, July 28, 1914. In spite of the assurances given, both in Berlin and Paris, by the German representatives, of the desire of their Government to assist in 1 For another proposal by Russia see British Blue Book No. 44, July 27. s The New York Times translation reads : " I have also received this morning your despatch direct from the Eiffel Tower." The only despatch printed under July 28 as sent to Viviani is French Yellow Book No. 77. This latter despatch, therefore, should have been printed before No. 76. It is, of course, possible that the fourth telegram mentioned in No. 76 has not been published as was the case with the third telegram. 3 There were two proposals mentioned in the telegrams to which Viviani seems to reply here ; if. French Yellow Book No. 50. July 26, and No. 77, July 28. The first one contemplates pressure in Petrograd and Vienna. The second includes Belgrade, un- doubtedly as the result of the urging of France, who had always contended that it was a case of mediation between Vienna and Belgrade rather than Vienna and Petro- 250 Official Diplomatic Documents efforts for the maintenance of peace, no sincere action has been taken by them to hold back Austria; the British proposal, which consists in action by the four less-interested Powers to obtain a cessation of military operations at Vienna, Belgrade, and St. Petersburgh, and in a meeting at London of the German, French, and Italian Ambassadors under the chairmanship of Sir E. Grey, with a view of seeking a solu- tion of the Austro-Servian difficulty, meets with objections at Berlin of such a nature as must lead to failure. The Austrian Ambassador has proceeded to announce that his Government will to-morrow take energetic measures to compel Servia to give to them the satisfaction and guarantees which they demand from that Power; Count Szecsen has given no explanation as to those measures; according to our Military Attache at Vienna, mobilisation, dating from July 28, appears to be certain. Bienyent-Martin. To London, Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Rome French Yellow Book No. 7s M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Home. Paris, July 28, 1914- I have had another visit from the German Ambassador this morn- ing ; lie told me that he had no communication or official proposal to make to me, hut that he came, as on the evening before, to talk over the situation and the methods to be employed to avoid action which would be irreparable. When I asked him about Austria's in- tentions, he declared that hi' did not know them, and was ignorant of the nature of the means of coercion which she was preparing. Germany, according to Baron von Schoen, only asks that she may act with France for the maintenance of peace. Upon my observing to him that a proposal for mediation by the four Powers to which we had adhered, and which had obtained assent in principle from Italy and Germany,had been put forward byGreat Britain, the Ambassador said that the German Government really only asked to associate themselves with the action of the Powers, provided that that action did not take the form of arbitration or a conference, which had been rejected by Austria. I replied that, if it was the expression only which was an obstacle to the Austrian Government, the object might be attained by other means ; the German Government are in a good position to ask Austria to allow the Powers time to intervene and find a means of conciliation. Baron von Schoen then observed to me that he had no instructions, and only knew that Germany refused to exercise any pressure on Austria, who does not wish for a conference. He accuses the French papers of attributing to Germany an attitude which she has not taken up, alleging that she is urging Austria on; doubtless she approves Austria's attitude, but she had no knowledge of the Austrian note ; July 28, French Yellow Book No. 80 251 she did not see her way to check her too abruptly, for Austria must have guarantees against the proceedings of the Serbs. Bienvenu-Martin. From Vienna French Yellow Book No. 79 M. Bienvenu-Martin , Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna. Paris, July 28, 191 4. Through the telegrams from our Embassies which I have for- warded to you, you are aware of the British proposal for mediation by the four Powers and for a conference in London, as well as of our ad- herence to that suggestion, and of the conditional acceptance by Italy and of the reservations of Berlin. Please keep yourself in touch on this subject with your British colleague, who had received the necessary instructions to acquaint the Austro-Hungarian Government with the British suggestion, as soon as his three colleagues have been authorised to make the same demarche; you will adapt your attitude to his. From London French Yellow Book No. 80 M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 28, 1914. Sir Edward Grey yesterday received my Austro-Hungarian and German colleagues. The first continued to maintain that the Servian reply was unacceptable. The second used language similar to that of Baron von Schoen at Paris. He emphasised the value of moderating action by Great Britain at St. Petersburg!!. Sir Edward Grey re- plied that Russia had shown herself very moderate from the beginning of the crisis, especially in her advice 1 to the Servian Government, and that he would find it very embarrassing to give her pacific 2 advice. He added that it was at Vienna that it was necessary to act and that Germany's help was indispensable. On the other hand the British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh has telegraphed that M. Sazonof had made a proposal to the Austrian Ambassador for a conversation on the Servian business. This in- formation has been confirmed by the British Ambassador at Vienna, 1 The published despatches nowhere give clear evidence that Russia gave Serbia any advice that had a moderating influence, although the British Ambassador said that Sazonof would do so, British Blue Book No. 55. under date of July 28. 1 Germany has always claimed that Russia could have been restrained by pacific advice from England. The same view was expressed in the London Daily News of August 1, 1914. France had also refused to exert her conciliatory influence on Russia. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 62, July 27. 252 Official Diplomatic Documents who has sent the information that the first interview between the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Count Szapary had produced a good effect at the Ballplatz. Sir Edward Grey and Sir Arthur Nicolson told me that, if an agree- ment could be brought about by direct discussion between St. Peters- burgh and Vienna, it would be a matter for congratulation, but they raised some doubts as to the success of M. Sazonof's attempt. When Sir George Buchanan asked M. Sazonof about the eventual meeting at London of a conference of representatives of Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, to seek a solution for the present situa- tion, the latter replied " that he had begun pourparlers with the Austrian Ambassador under conditions which he hoped were favourable ; that, however, he had not yet received any reply to his proposal for the revision of the Servian note by the two Cabinets." If direct explana- tions with the Cabinet of Vienna are impracticable, 1 M. Sazonof de- clares himself ready to accept the British proposals or any other of such a nature as to bring about a favourable issue of the dispute. In any case, at a moment when the least delay might have serious consequences, it would be very desirable that these direct negotiations should be carried on in such a way as not to hamper Sir E. Grey's action, and not to furnish Austria with a pretext for slipping out of the friendly intervention of the four Powers. The British Ambassador at Berlin having made a determined effort to obtain Herr von Jagow's adherence to Sir E. Grey's sugges- tion, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that it was best to await the result of the conversation which had been begun between St. Petersburgh and Vienna. 2 Sir E. Grey has, in consequence, directed Sir E. Goschen to suspend his demarche for the moment. 3 In addition, the news that Austria has just officially declared war against Servia, opens a new phase of the question. Paul Cambon. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 81 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 28, 1914- M. Sazonof's conversation with Count Szapary 4 was brought to the knowledge of Herr von Jagow by the Russian Charge d'Affaires. 1 This implies that Sazonof had not accepted the British proposals whole-heartedly on the previous day, but had rather pushed his own proposal of direct conversations 2 Cf . British Blue Book Nos. 43 and 46, July 27, and Nos. 67, 68 and 69, July 28, and Austro-Hungarian Red Book, July 27. In British Blue Book Nos. 68, 69, Sir E. Grey seems to prefer Sazonof's proposal of direct conversations to his own of a conference. » It is nowhere stated what this d-marche was, the despatch explaining it having been omitted from the Yellow Book; see note 3 to No. 76, same day. A possible explanation is found in the text of the German White Book, which is illustrated by Exhibit 16, July 28. See the note there. 4 The only published conversation to which this can refer is the one of July 26, two days previous to this despatch. See Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26. July 28, French Yellow Book No. 81 253 The Secretary of State told him that in agreement with the remarks of the German Ambassador in Russia, since the Austrian Govern- ment did not refuse to continue their conversations with the Russian Government after the expiry of the ultimatum, there was ground for hope that Count Berchtold on his side might be able to converse with M. Schebeko, and that it might be possible to find an issue from the present difficulties. The Russian Charge d' Affaires takes a favour- able view of this state of mind, which corresponds to Herr von Jagow's desire to see Vienna and St. Petersburgh enter into direct relations and to release Germany. There is ground, however, for asking whether Austria is not seeking to gain time to make her preparations. To-day I gave my support to the demarche made by my British colleague with the Secretary of State. The latter replied to me, as he did to Sir Edward Goschen, that it was impossible for him to accept the idea of a kind of conference at London between the Ambassadors of the four Powers, and that it would be necessary to give another form to the British suggestion to procure its realisation. I laid stress upon the danger of delay, which might bring on war, and asked him if he wished for war. He protested, and added that direct conversa- tions between Vienna and St. Petersburgh were in progress, and that from now on he expected a favourable result. The British and Italian Ambassadors came to see me this morning together, to talk over with me the conversation which they had had with Herr von Jagow yesterday on the subject of Sir Edward Grey's proposal. To sum up, the Secretary of State used the same language to them as to me ; accepting in principle the idea of joining in a demarche with England, Italy, and ourselves, but rejecting any idea of a conference. My colleagues and I thought that this was only a question of form, and the British Ambassador is going to suggest to his Government that they should change the wording of their proposal, which might take the character of a diplomatic demarche at Vienna and St. Peters- burgh. In consequence of the repugnance shown by Herr von Jagow to any demarche at Vienna, Sir Edward Grey could put him in a dilemma by asking him to state himself precisely how diplomatic action by the Powers to avoid war could be brought about. We ought to associate ourselves with every effort in favour of peace compatible with our engagements towards our ally ; but to place the reponsibility in the proper quarter, we must take care to ask Germany to state precisely what she wishes. Jules Cambon. 254 Official Diplomatic Documents From St. Petersburgh French Yellow Book No. 82 M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affair.'!. St. Petersburgh, July 28, 1914. The Austro-Hungarian Government has not yet replied to the pro- posal of the Russian Government suggesting the opening of direct conversations between St. Petersburgh and Vienna. M. Sazonof received the German and Austro-Hungarian Am- bassadors this afternoon. The impression which he got from this double interview is a bad one; "Certainly," he said to me, "Austria is unwilling to converse." As the result of a conversation which I have just had with my two colleagues I have the same impression of pessimism. Paleologue. From Vienna French Yellow Book No. S3 M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, July 28, 101 4. Count Berchtold has just declared to Sir M. de Bunsen that any intervention, aiming at the resumption of the discussion between Austria and Servia on the basis of the Servian reply, would be useless, and besides that it would be too late, as war had been officially de- clared at mid-day. The attitude of my Russian colleague lias never varied up to the present; in his opinion it is not a question of localising the conflict, but rather of preventing it. The declaration of war will make very difficult the initiation of pourparlers by the four Powers, as well as the continuation of the direct discussions between M. Sazonof and Count Szapary. It is held here that the formula which seemed as if it might obtain the adherence of Germany — "Mediation between Austria and Russia " — is unsuitable, inasmuch as it alleges a dispute between those two Empires which does not exist up to the present. Among the suspicions aroused by the sudden and violent resolution of Austria, the most disquieting is that Germany should have pushed her on to aggressive action against Servia in order to be able herself to enter into war with Russia and France, 1 in circumstances which she supposes ought to be most favourable to herself and under conditions which have been thoroughly considered. Dumaine. 1 If this is written with sincerity it reveals the serious suspicion of Germany enter- tained by France. Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 42. same day, where it ap- pears that it was not Germany who pushed on Austria-Hungary. July 28, German White Book Exhibit 2 255 Germany : To the Governments of Germany German White Book Exhibit 2 The Chancellor to the Federal Governments of Germany. Confidential. Berlin, July 28, 1914. You will make the following report to the Government to which you are accredited : In view of the facts which the Austrian Government has published in its note ! to the Servian Government, the last doubt must disappear that the outrage to which the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne has fallen a victim, was prepared in Servia, to say the least with the connivance of members of the Servian Government and army. It is a product of the pan-Serb intrigues which for a series of years have become a source of permanent disturbance for the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy and for the whole of Europe. The pan-Serb chauvinism appeared especially marked during the Bosnian crisis. Only to the far-reaching self-restraint and modera- tion of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the energetic inter- cession of the Powers is it to be ascribed that the provocations to which Austro-Hungary was exposed at that time, did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of future well-behaviour, which the Servian Government gave at that time, it has not kept. Under the very eyes, at least with the tacit sufferance of official Servia, the pan-Serb prop- aganda has meanwhile continued to increase in scope and intensity. It would be compatible neither with its dignity nor with its right to self-preservation if the Austro-Hungarian Government persisted to view idly any longer the intrigues beyond the frontier, through which the safety and the integrity of the Monarchy are permanently threatened. With this state of affairs, the action as well as the de- mands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can be viewed only as justifiable. The reply of the Servian Government to the demands which the Austro-Hungarian Government put on the 23rd inst., through its representative in Belgrade, shows that the dominating factors in Servia are not inclined to cease their former policies and agitation. There will remain nothing else for the Austro-Hungarian Government than to press its demands, if need be, through military action, unless it renounces for good its position as a great Power. Some Russian personalities deem it their right as a matter of course and a task of Russia's, to actively become a party to Servia in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia. For the European conflagration which would result from a similar step by Russia, the "Nowoje Wremja" believes itself justified in making Germany re- sponsible in so far as it does not induce Austria-Hungary to yield. 1 This is probably an inaccurate reference, for the Chancellor undoubtedly had in mind the dossier (Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25) which was to be presented, and, judging by this despatch, was presented to the foreign offices in Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, Petrograd. and Constantinople. For the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 7, July 22. . 256 Official Diplomatic Documents The Russian press thus turns conditions upside down. It is not Austria-Hungary which has called forth the conflict with Servia, but it is Servia which, through unscrupulous favour toward pan-Serb aspirations, even in parts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, threatens the same in her existence and creates conditions, which eventually found expression in the wanton outrage at Serajewo. If Russia believes that it must champion the cause of Servia in this matter, it certainly has the right to do so. However, it must realise that it makes the Serb activities its own, to undermine the conditions of existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that thus it bears the sole responsibility if out of the Austro-Scrvian affair, which all other Great Powers desire to localise, there arises a European war. This reponsibility of Russia's is evident and it weighs the more heavily as Count Berchtold has officially declared to Russia that Austria-Hungary has no intention to acquire Servian territory or to touch the existence of the Servian Kingdom, but only desires peace against the Servian intrigues threatening its existence. The attitude of the Imperial Government in this question is clearly indicated. The agitation conducted by the pan-Slavs in Austria- Hungary has for its goal, with the destruction of the Austro-Hun- garian Monarchy, the scattering or weakening of the Triple Alliance with a complete isolation of the German Empire in consequence. Our own interest therefore calls us to the side of Austria-Hungary. The duty, if at all possible, to guard Europe against a universal war, points to the support by ourselves of those endeavours which aim at the localisation of the conflict, faithful to the course of those policies which we have carried out successfully for forty-four years in the in- terest of the preservation of the peace of Europe. Should, however, against our hope, through the interference of Russia the fire he spread, we should have to support, faithful to our duty as allies, the neighbour-monarchy with all the power at our com- mand. We shall take the sword only if forced to it, but then in the clear consciousness that we are not guilty of the calamity which war will bring upon the peoples of Europe. Germany : To St. Petersburg German White Book Exhibit 14 Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Petersburg 'on July :2Sth, 1914. We continue ' in our endeavour to induce Vienna to elucidate in St. Petersburg the object and scope of the Austrian action in Servia in a manner both convincing and satisfactory to Russia. The declara- tion of war which has meanwhile ensued alters nothing in this matter. 1 See note to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. See also German White Book, Exhibit 15. July 27. July 28, German White Booh Exhibit 20 257 From Vienna German White Book Exhibit 16 ' Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador at Vienna to the Chancellor on July 28th, 1914. Count Berchtold requests me to express to Your Excellency his thanks for the communication of the English mediation proposal. He states, however, that after the opening of hostilities by Servia and the subsequent declaration of war, the step appears belated. To St. Petersburg German White Book Exhibit 20 I. His Majesty to the Czar. July 28th, IO.45 p.m. I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Servia. The unscru- pulous agitation which has been going on for years in Servia, has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit which made the Servians murder their own King and his consort still dominates that country. Doubtless You will agree with me that both of us, You as well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all those who are responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer their deserved punishment. On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty encoun- tered by You and Your Government to stem the tide of public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire influence to induce Austria- Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope confidently that You will support me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties which may yet arise. Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin, (Signed) Wilhelm. Great Britain : For British Blue Book No. 50 see below under date of July 31, 1914. 1 The paragraph in the Narrative of the German White Book which these Exhibits are to illustrate reads: "We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the Conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna in which he suggested Austria-Hungary should decide that either the Servian reply was sufficient, or that it be used as a basis for further negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government remarked with full appreciation of ovir action it had come too late, the hostilities having already been opened." This second proposal of Sir E. Grey is not mentioned in the British Blue Book. It was probably discussed in the third tele- gram referred to but not printed in the French Yellow Book No. 76, July 28, see also French Yellow Book No. 80, same day. 258 Official Diplomatic Documents From, Paris British Blue Book No. 51 Sir /•'. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July AS, 101 4-) Sir, Paris, duly 27, 1914. I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memo- randum from the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the steps to be taken to prevent an outbreak of hostilities between Austria- Hungary and Servia. I have, etc. Francis Bertie. Enclosure in No. 51 Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Bienvenu-Martin. Par une note en date du 25 de ce inois, son Excellence l'Ain- bassadeur d'Angleterre a fait connaitre au Gouvernement de la Republique que, d'apres Sir Edward Grey, la seule maniere d 'assurer, si e'etait possible, le maintien de la paix dans le cas on les rapports entre la Russie et l'Autriche deviendraient plus tendus serait une demarche com- mune a Vienne et a Saint- Petersbourg des representants de l'Angleterre, de la France, de rAllemagne et de 1'Italie en Autriche et en Russie; et il a exprime le desir de savoir si le Gouvernement de la Republique etait dispose a accueillir favo- rablement cette suggestion. Le Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres par interim a l'honneur de faire connaitre a son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie qu'il a invite M. Jules Cambon ' a se concerter avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre en Allemagne et a appuyer la (Translation.) In a note of the 25th of this month, his Excellency the British Ambassador 2 informed the Gov- ernment of the Republic that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, the only possible way of assuring the maintenance of peace in case of the relations between Russia and Austria becoming more strained would be if the representatives of Great Britain, France, Ger- many, and Italy in Austria and Russia were to take joint action at Vienna and at St. Petersburg ; and he expressed the wish to know if the Government of the Republic were disposed to wel- come such a suggestion. The Minister for Foreign Affairs ad interim has the honour to inform his Excellency Sir F. Bertie that he has requested M. Jules Cambon ' to concert with the British Ambassador in Germany and to support any rep- 1 French Ambassador in Berlin. 2 Acting on instructions contained in British Blue Book No. 10. July 24. For the entire subject see the summary of events of July 24 based on the despatches of that day, where it appears that Sir E. Grey altered his original proposal at the suggestion of France. July 28, British Blur Book No. 51 259 demarche qu'ils jugeront oppor- tune de faire aupres du Cabinet de Berlin. Le Gouvernement de la Re- publique a, d autre part, con- formement an desir exprime par le Gouvernement britannique et que son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie lui a trarismis par une note en i late du 2b de ce mois, autorise M. Paul Cambon ' a prendre part a la reunion proposee par Sir Edward Grey pour rechercher avec lui et les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne et d'ltalie a Lon- dres, les moyens de resoudre les difficultes actuelles. Le Gouvernement de la Re- publique est pret egalement a donner aux agents francais a Petersbourg, a Vienne et a Bel- grade des instructions pour qu'ils obtiennent des Gouvernements russe, autrichien et serbe de s'abstenir de toute operation militaire active en attendant les resultats de cette conference. II estime toutefois que les chances de succes de la proposition de Sir Edward Grey reposent essen- tiellement sur l'aetion que Ber- lin serait disposee a Vienna [sic]. Une demarche aupres du Gou- vernement austro-hongrois pour amener la suspension des opera- tions militaires pa rait vouee a l'echec si l'influence de l'Alle- magne ne s'est pas exercee au prealable sur le Cabinet de Vienne. Le Garde des Seaux, Presi- dent du Conseil et Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres par interim, saisit cette occasion de renou- veler, etc. Paris, le 27 juillet, 1914. resentation which they may con- sider it advisable to make to the Berlin Cabinet. In accordance with the desire expressed by the British Govern- ment and conveyed to them by Sir F. Bertie in his note of the 26th of this month, the Govern- ment of .the Republic have also authorised M. Paul Cambon ' to take part in the conference which Sir E. Grey has proposed with a view to discovering in consulta- tion with himself and the German and Italian Ambassadors in Lon- don a means of settling the pres- ent difficulties. The Government of the Re- public is likewise ready to in- struct the French representa- tives at St. Petersburgh, Vienna, and Belgrade 2 to induce the Russian, Austrian, and Servian Governments to abstain from all active military operations pend- ing the results of this conference. He considers, however, that the chance of Sir E. Grey's proposal being successful depends essen- tially on the action which the Berlin Government would be will- ing to take at Vienna. Repre- sentations made to the Austro- Hungarian Government for the purpose of bringing about a sus- pension of military operations would seem bound to fail unless the German Government do not beforehand exercise their in- fluence on the Vienna Cabinet. The President of the Council ad interim takes the opportunity, etc. Paris, July 27, 1914. 1 French Ambassador in London. 2 The frequency with which France introduces Belgrade, when Sir E. Grey's pro- posal contemplates only Vienna and Petrograd, is noteworthy. 260 Official Diplomatic Documents From Paris British Blue Book No. 52 Note communicated by French Embassy, July 28, 1914- Le Gouvernement de la Re- publique accepte la proposition de Sir Edward Grey relative a une intervention de la Grande- Bretagne, de la France, de l'Alle- magne et de l'ltalie en vue d'eviter les operations militaires actives sur les frontieres autri- chiennes, russes et serbes ; il a autorise M. P. Cambon ' a pren- dre part aux deliberations de la reunion a quatre, qui doit se tenir a Londres. L'Ambassadeur de France a Berlin a recu pour instructions, apres s'etre concerte avec l'Am- bassadeur d'Angleterre a Ber- lin, d'appuyer la demarche de ce dernier dans la forme et la me- sure qui seraient jugees oppor- tunes. M. Viviani 2 est pret a envoyer aux representants francais a Vienne, Saint-Petersbourget Bel- grade des instructions dans le sens suggere par le Gouverne- ment britannique. Ambossade ilc France, Londres, le 27 juillet, 1914. (Translation.) The Government of the Re- public accept Sir Edward Grey's proposal in regard to interven- tion by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy with a view to avoiding active military opera- tions on the frontiers of Austria, Russia, and Servia ; and they have authorised M. P. Cambon l to take part in the deliberations of the four representatives at the meeting which is to be held in London. The French Ambassador in Berlin has received instructions to consult first the British Am- bassador in Berlin, and then to support the action taken by the latter in such manner and degree as may be considered appropriate. M. Viviani 2 is ready to send to the representatives of France in Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Belgrade instructions in the sense suggested by the Biritsh Gov- ernment. French Embassy, July 27, 1914- From St. Petersburg British Blue Book No. 53 M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Bcnchen- dorff, Russian Ambassador in London. — {Communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28.) (See Russian Orange Book No. 32, July 27.) French Ambassador in London. : French Minister for Foreign Affairs. July 28, British Blue Book No. 55 261 From St. Petersburg British Blue Book No. 54 M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for dorff, Russian Ambassador Count Benckendorff, July 28, Saint-Petersbourg, le 15 (28) juillet, 1914. (Telegraphique.) Mes entretiens avec l'Ambas- sadeur d'Allemagne confirmerrt mon impression que I'Allemagne est plutot favorable a l'intransi- geance de l'Autriche. Le Cabinet de Berlin, qui aurait pu arreter tout le develop- pement de la crise, parait n'exer- cer aucune action snr son alliee. L'Ambassadeur trouve insuffi- sante la reponse de la Serbie. Cette attitude allemande est tout particulierement alarmante. II me semble que mieux que toute autre Puissance l'Angle- terre serait en mesure de tenter encore d'agir a Berlin pour en- gager le Gouvernement alle- mand a Taction necessaire. C'est a, Berlin qu'indubitable- ment se trouve la clef de la situation. Foreign Affairs, to Count Bencken- in London. — (Communicated by 1.914.) (Translation.) St. Petersburgh, July 15 {28), 1914. (Telegraphic.) My interviews 1 with the Ger- man Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favour of the un- compromising attitude adopted by Austria. The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented 2 the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be ex- erting no 3 influence on their ally. The Ambassador considers that the Servian reply is insufficient. This attitude of the German Government is most alarming. 4 It seems to me that Great Britain is in a better position than any other Power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action. 5 There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin. From St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 55 Sir (1. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Crey. — (Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 27, 1914. With reference to my telegram of yesterday, 6 I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon and found him very conciliatory and more optimistic. 1 No accounts of interviews between Sazonof and the German Ambassador are men- tioned in the Russian Orange Book in telegrams of July 26, 27, or 28. For Germany's attitude, see note to British Blue Book No. 67, July 2S,'and German White Book, p. 554. 2 This is an assertion for which no proof has been advanced in the pul ilished despatches. 3 See, however. German White Book, Exhibit 15, July 27, and Exhibit 14, July 28. 4 Contrast with this footnote to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. 6 That this action was taken appears from notes to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28, and German White Book. Exhibit 16, same date. 6 British Blue Book No. 44, July 27. 21)2 Official Diplomatic Documents He would, he said, use all his influence l at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to go as far as possible in giving satisfaction to Austria, but her territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her rights as a sovereign State respected, so that she should not become Austria's vassal. He did not know whether Austria would accept friendly exchange of views which he had proposed, but, if she did, lie wished to keep in close contact with the other Powers through- out the conversations that would ensue. lie again referred to the fact that the obligations undertaken by Servia in 190S, alluded to in the Austrian ultimatum, were given to the Powers. I asked if he had heard of your proposal with regard to conference of the four Powers, and on his replying in the affirmative, I told him confidentially of your instructions to me, and enquired whether instead of such a conference he would prefer a direct exchange of views, which he had proposed.- The German Ambassador, to whom I had just spoken, had expressed his personal opinion that a direct exchange of views would he more agreeable to Austria-Hungary. His Excellency said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the Powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place. From Vienna British Blue Book No. 56 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914- The Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversa- tion with Baron Macchio, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He told him that, having just come back from St. Peters- burg]], he was well acquainted with the views of the Russian Govern- ment and the state of Russian public opinion. He could assure him that if actual war broke out with Servia it would be impossible to localise it, for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions, and especially during the annexation crisis of 1909. lb' earnestly hoped that something would be done before Servia was actually invaded. Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been the aggressors. 3 The Rus- sian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place, and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce the ' Of. French Yellow Book N... 4(1. .Inly 27. - Cf. British Blue Book No. 53. same date. 3 If this should prove to have been the case, it would be very important, because a less yielding attitude could be expected of Austria-Hungary if hostilities had actually been befiun, not by Austria-Hungary, but by Serbia. The diplomatic documents con- tain no denial of this assertion. July 28, British Blue Book No. 57 263 Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance. Time so gained should suffice to enable a settlement to be reached. He had just heard of a satis- factory conversation which the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had yesterday 1 with the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg]!. The former had agreed that much of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia had been perfectly reasonable, and in fact they had practically reached an understanding as to the guarantees which Servia might reasonably be asked to give to Austria-Hungary for her future good behaviour. The Russian Ambassador urged that the Austrian Am- bassador at St. Petersburgh should be furnished with full powers to continue discussion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent Power. Baron Macchio promised to submit this suggestion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. From Rome British Blue Book No. 57 Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) Rome, July 27, 1914. Minister for Foreign Affairs greatly doubts whether Germany will be willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the conference, but he had hopes that military action may be practi- cally deferred by the fact of the conference meeting at once. As at present informed, he sees no possibility of Austria receding from any point laid down in her note to Servia, but he believes that if Servia will even now accept it 2 Austria will be satisfied, and if she had rea- son to think that such will be the advice of the Powers, Austria may defer action. Servia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone. 3 Telegrams from Vienna to the press here stating that Austria is favourably impressed with the declarations of the Italian Government have, the Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me, no foundation. He said he has expressed no opinion to Austria with regard to the note. He assured me both before and after communication of the 1 Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 25, July 26 ; and Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 31, July 27. 2 This passage taken together with the previous telegram would seem to imply that on this date the Powers had not yet decided to condemn the Austrian demands as altogether unacceptable. Serbia took the same view, cf. British Blue Book No. 64, same day. 3 If this suggestion had been pressed events might have been different. When Sir R. Rodd sent this telegram on July 27. he may not yet have known of Sir E. Grey's announcement on that date that the British fleet had been kept mobilised. It was this announcement which according to the London Daily News of August 1, 1914, stiffened the backbone of the Russian war party and made war inevitable. 26-4 Official Diplomatic Documents note, and again to-day, that Austrian Government have given him assurances that they demand no territorial sacrifices from Servia. 1 From Paris British Blue Book No. 58 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — ■ (Received July ~S.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 28, 191 1 I communicated to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon the substance of your conversation with the German Ambas- sador, recorded in your telegram 2 to Berlin of the 27th July. His Excellency is grateful for the communication. He said that it confirms what he had heard of your attitude, and he feels confident that your observations to the German Ambassador will have a good effect in the interest of peace. Fro m Paris British Blue Book No. 59 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward drey. — (Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 28, 1914. I INFORMED the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day of your conversation with the Russian Ambassador, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday 3 to St. Petersburgh. He is grateful for the communication, and quite appreciates the impossibility for His Majesty's Government to declare themselves "solidaires" with Russia on a question between Austria and Servia, which in its present condition is not one affecting England. He also sees that you cannot take up an attitude at Berlin and Vienna more Servian than that attributed in German and Austrian sources to the Russian Government. German Ambassador has stated that Austria would respect the integrity of Servia, but when asked whether her independence also would be respected, he gave no assurance. 4 1 By this assurance it was hoped t" satisfy all legitimate demands of Russia, as Austria-Hungary saw them. From British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, it appears that, even Sazoiiof did not categorically reject the proposals made in this telegram. 2 See No. 46, July 27. 1 British Blue Book No. 47, July 27. ' It is difficult to sec how the I ierman Ambassador in Paris could have given assur- ances for Austria-Hungary. July 2S, British Blue Book No. 62 265 From Berlin British Blue Book No. 60 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 28, 1914- Secretary of State spoke yesterday in the same sense as that reported in my telegram of yesterday l to my French and Italian colleagues respecting your proposal. I discussed with my two 2 col- leagues this morning his reply, and we found that, while refusing the proposed conference, he had said to all of us that nevertheless he desired to work with us for the maintenance of general peace. We therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he can only be objecting to the form 3 of your proposal. Perhaps he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us. From Vienna British Blue Book No. 61 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. I saw Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. His Excellency declared that Austria-Hungary cannot delay war- like proceedings against Servia, and would have to decline any sugges- tion of negotiations on basis of Servian reply. 4 Prestige 5 of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent conflict. From Vienna British Blue Book No. 62 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914- I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in the sense of your telegram of 27th July 6 to Berlin. I avoided the word "media- 1 British Blue Book No. 43, July 27. 2 The text would appear to mean the French and Italian Ambassadors, but when only two are mentioned by one of the Entente Ambassadors the reference is generally to the ambassadors of the other two Entente Powers. 3 That this was the case appears from British Blue Book No. 46, July 27. 14- Your telegram of 25th July to Taris. 4 I have communicated substance to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who immediately telegraphed in precisely similar terms to Berlin and Vienna. i "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Columns 931, 932, 933. ■ These just complaints which are here acknowledged to have existed, were a few days later iitin-lv lost si^ht of. ' 1 ( !f. British Blue Book No. 61, July 28. < A footnote in the British Blue Book gives as reference No. 27. This can hardly !„• ilir despatch referred to here. The proper despatch is either not printed, or con- tained in No. 30 or 37. Their dates, however, are July 26. July 28, British Blue Book No. 65 267 From Rome British Blue Book No. 64 Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) Rome, July 28, 1914. At the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I submit the following to you : — In a long conversation this morning Servian Charge d'Affaires had said he thought that if some explanations were given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene under article 5 and article 6, Servia might still accept the whole Austrian note. 1 As it was not to be anticipated that Austria would give such explanations to Servia, they might be given - to Powers engaged in discussions, who might then advise Servia to accept without con- ditions. The Austro-Hungarian Government had in the meantime published a long official explanation of grounds on which Servian reply was considered inadequate. Minister for Foreign Affairs considered many points besides explanation — such as slight verbal difference in sen- tence regarding renunciation of propaganda — quite childish, but there was a passage which might prove useful in facilitating such a course as was considered practicable by the Servian Charge d Affaires. It was stated that co-operation of Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures. Servia was said to have wilfully 3 misinterpreted this. He thought, therefore, that ground might be cleared here. I only reproduce from memory, as I had not yet received text of Austrian declaration. Minister impressed upon me, above all, his anxiety for the imme- diate beginning of discussion. A wide general latitude to accept at once every point or suggestion on which he could be in agreement with ourselves and Germany had been given to Italian Ambassador. From Nish British Blue Book No. 65 Mr. CracJeantkorpe, British Charge d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Ed- ward Grey. — (Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) Nish, July 28, 1914. I have urged on the Servian Government the greatest moderation 4 pending efforts being made towards a peaceful solution. 1 As late as July 28. therefore, Serbia was almost ready to accept the Austro-Hun- garian note. For a discussion of articles 5 and 6, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book Nos. 31 and 34, July 27, and Nos. 21, 26 and 27, July 25. 2 They were so given to Russia, see references given in preceding note. 3 See Austro-Hungarian comment to Serbian replv, Red Book No. 34, July 27. 4 Cf. British Blue Book No. 12. July 24. note 3 and No. 22. July 25. The advice for moderation was not given until after the reply had been sent. 268 Official Diplomatic Documents Two Servian steamers fired on and damaged, and two Servian merchant-vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova. From Nish British Blue Book No. 66 Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Ed- ward Grey. — (Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) Nish, July 28, 1914. Telegram received here that war declared by Austria. To Berlin British Blue Book No. 67 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July .28, 1914. Explanation given in your telegram of the 27th July ' of what was my idea in proposing a conference is quite right. It would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made Tor a settlement. No suggestion would be put forward that had not previously been ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom the mediating Powers could easily keep in touch through their respective allies. But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia, I would suspend - every other sugges- 1 British Blue Book No. 4:S. July 27. 1 < 1. British Blue Book No. 77. .Inly 29. (See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, .July 29. ) In view of the claim that Sir E. Grey consistently pressed his "eon- ference" idea, this passage is of importance. The entire subject has been discussed finin the German point of view l>v ( 'hancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg in his speech before the Reichstag, Aug. 1!), 1915, as follows: Tie statement that the whole war might have been avoided if I had agreed to accept the suggestion of Sir Edward Grey and take part in a conference for the regulation of the Russian-Austrian question at issue has again of late been repeatedly made in England. Here an- the real farts. The English proposals for a conference were de- livered here by the English Ambassador on tie- 27th of .lulv. The English Blue Book also shows that tie- Secretary of State at the Foreign Office m the convi rsation in question with Sir Edward Goschen —a conversation in which the Sea, tary designated tie- means proposed as unsuitable — had communicated to the English Ambassador that, according to his information from Russia, M. Sazonof was inclined to consider a direct exchange of opinion with Count Berchtold. He was of the opinion that a direct conversation between Petrograd and Vienna might lead to a satisfactory result. For that reason it was best to await the results of this conversation. Sir Edward Goschen nmunieated this to London and received a telegraphic answer in which Sir Edward ' Irey used these words: " As long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria and Russia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as 1 entirely agree that it is the most preferable method of all." Thus Sir Edward Grey accepted tin- German point of view at that time, and ex- pressly withdrew his proposal of a conference for the time being. However, unlike Sir Edward < irey, I did not permit matters to rest with the platonic wish that a direct conversation might ensue between Vienna and Petrograd, but did everything within my power to persuade the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian governments to discuss their differences by an exchange ,,f opinions between their respective cabinets. I have once before declared in this very place that our endeavors July 28, British Blue Book No. 67 269 tion, as I entirely agree that it is the most preferable method of all. I understand that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has proposed a friendly exchange of views to the Austrian Government, and, if the latter accepts, it will no doubt relieve the tension and make the situation less critical. It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you. 1 at mediation, especially in Vienna, had been carried on in a manner, which, as I stated at the time, " went to the extreme limits of all that was compatible with our relations as an ally." Since this activity of mine as a mediator in the interests of preserving the peace has been repeatedly called in question in England, I shall prove by the evidence of facts that all these accusations are without foundation. On the evening of July 29 the following communication of the Imperial Ambassador at Petrograd reached Berlin : " M. Sazonof, who has just requested me to see him, communicates to me that the Vienna Cabinet had replied with a categorical refusal to consider the desire he had expressed to enter into direct conversations. There was therefore nothing left to do save to return to the proposal of a conversation of four, as made by Sir Edward Grey." Since the Vienna government had in the meantime declared itself prepared for a direct exchange of views with Petrograd, it was clear that there must be some mis- understanding. I telegraphed to Vienna and made use of the opportunity once more to make a clear announcement of my own conception of the situation as a whole. My instructions to Herr von Tschirschky were as follows: " The communication of Count Pourtales is not in accordance with the represen- tations which Your Excellency has made of the attitude of the Austrian-Hungarian government. Apparently there is some misunderstanding which I beg you to explain. We cannot expect of Austria-Hungary a willingness to negotiate with Serbia, with whom she is already in a state of war.i But the refusal of all interchange of opinion with Petrograd would be a grave mistake. We are indeed prepared to fulfil our duty as an ally, but should Austria-Hungary ignore our advice, we must nevertheless decline to be drawn into a world conflagration, through Austria-Hungary ignoring our advice. Your Excellency will therefore at once and with all emphasis and earnestness express yourself in this sense to Count Berchtold." Herr von Tschirschky in answer to this communicated on July 30: " Count von Berchtold states that, as Your Excellency assumes, there has indeed been some misunderstanding in question, and that on the part of Russia. Having already received word of this misunderstanding also through Count Szapary, the Austrian-Hungarian Ambassador in Petrograd, and having at the same time followed our urgent suggestion that he enter into communication with Russia, he had at once given the necessary instructions to Count Szapary." Gentlemen, I made all this known to the British press, when excitement in England increased shortly before the outbreak of the war, and serious doubts as to our en- deavors to preserve peace became audible. And now after the event, that press makes the insinuation that this occurrence had never taken place at all and that the instructions to Herr von Tschirschky had been invented in order to mislead public opinion in England. You will agree with me that this accusation is unworthy of an answer. I would also allude at the same time to the Austrian Red Book which merely confirms my presentation of the case and shows how after the aforesaid misunder- standing had been cleared up, the conversations between Petrograd and Vienna had begun to take their course, until the general mobilization of the Russian army brought them to an untimely end. I repeat, gentlemen, that we have supported the direct discussion between Vienna and Petrograd with the utmost emphasis and success. The assertion that we, by refusing to accept the English suggestion of a conference, must accept the blame for this war, belongs to the category of those calumnies under cover of which our enemies endeavor to hide their own guilt. The war became un- avoidable onlv through the Russian mobilisation. i Cf. British Blue Book No. 46, July 27, and German White Book, Exhibit 15. same date. The effect of Germany's continued pressure on Austria-Hungary appears from French Yellow Book No. 104, July 30. See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 44, July 29. 270 Official Diplomatic Documents To Berlin British Blue Book No. 6S Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 28, 1014- German Government, having accepted principle of mediation Ik 'tween Austria and Russia by the four Powers, if necessary, I am ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this principle should be applied. I will, however, keep the idea in reserve ! until we see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress. To St. Pctcrxburgh British Blue Book No. 69 Sir Edward drey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Peters- burgh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Offi4 of British Correspondence, July 28, 1014.] From Finnic Russian Orange Book No. 44 Russian Consul General at Fiumc to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Fiume, July 15 (28), 1914. State of siege has been proclaimed in Slavonia, in Croatia, and at Fiume, and the reservists of all classes have also been called up. 1 Again Sir E. Grev defers to Sazonof's direct conversation idea. 2 British Blue Book No. 55, July 27. 3 The proposal referring to the Ministers at Belgrade has been omitted from the despatch No. 55, to which the Official Blue Book refers here. July 28, Russian Orange Book No. Ifi 271 From Vienna Russian Okange Book No. 45 Russian Ambassador at Vienna Affairs. Vienne, le 15 {28) juillet, 1914. (Telegraphique.) J'ai entretenu aujourd'hui le Comte Berchtold ' dans le sens des instructions de votre Ex- cellence. Je lui fis observer, en termes les plus amicaux, combien il etait desirable de trouver une solution qui, en consolidant les bons rapports entre l'Autriche- Hongrie et la Russie, donnerait a la Monarehie austro-hongroise des garanties serieuses pour ses rapports futurs avec la Serbie. J'attirais 1 'attention du Comte Berchtold x sur tous les dangers pour la paix de l'Europe, qu'en- trainerait un conflit arme entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie. Le Comte Berchtold 1 me re- pondit qu'il se rendait parfaite- ment compte du serieux de la situation et des avantages d'une franche explication avec le Cabi- net de Saint-Pet ersbourg. II me dit que d'un autre cote le Gou- vernement austro-hongrois, qui ne s'etait decide que tres mal volontiers aux mesures ener- giques qu'il avait prises contre la Serbie, ne pouvait plus ni reculer, ni entrer en discussion aucune des termes de la note austro- hongroise. Le Comte Berchtold ' ajouta que la crise etait devenue si aigue, et que l'excitation de l'opinion publique avait atteint tel degre, to Russian Minister for Foreign (Translation.) Vienna, July 15 {28), IOI4. (Telegraphic.) I spoke to Count Berchtold ' to-day in the sense of your Excellency's instructions. 2 I brought to his notice, in the most friendly manner, how desir- able it was to find a solution which, while consolidating good relations between Austria-Hun- gary and Russia, would give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy genuine guarantees for its future relations with Servia. I drew Count Berchtold 's ' attention to all the dangers to the peace of Europe which would be involved by an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia. Count Berchtold ' replied that he was well aware of the gravity of the situation and of the ad- vantages of a frank explanation with the St. Petersburgh Cabi- net. He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hun- garian Government, who had only decided much against their will on the energetic measures which they had taken against Servia, could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro- Hungarian note. Count Berchtold ' added that the crisis had become so acute, and that public opinion had risen to such a pitch of excitement, 1 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 2 No despatch containing these instructions is printed in the Russian Orange Book. 272 Official Diplomatic Documents que le Gouvernement, le voulait- that the Government, even if il, ne pouvait plus y consentir, they wished it, could no longer d'autant moins, me dit-il, que consent to such a course. This la n'ponse meme de la Serbie was all the more impossible, he donne la preuve du manque de said, inasmuch as the Servian sincerite de ses promesses pour reply itself furnished proof of l'avenir. the insincerity of Servia's promises for the future. From Berlin Russian Orange Book No. 46 Russian Charge (V Affaires at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Berlin, July 15 {28), int.',. The Wolff Bureau has not published the text of the Servian reply, although it was communicated to them. Up to the present this note has not appeared in extenso in any of the local papers, which, tn all appearances, do not wish to publish it in their columns, being well aware of the calming * effect which it would have on German readers. From Vienna Russian Orange Book No. 47 Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Vienna, July 15 {28), 1914. The order for general mobilisation has been signed. 2 To London Russian Orange Book No. 48 Hussion Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London. (Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 15 {28), 1014. In face of the hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia, it is necessary that Great Britain should take instant mediatory action," and that the military measures undertaken by Austria against 1 Germany undoubtedly waited until she received the Austro-Hungarian com- ments, which were sent by mail from Vienna on July 27 (see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 39, July 28). German newspapers are always antedated, the paper dated July 28 being issued on the evening of July 27. - If "signed" means issued, this information is probably inaccurate. For a com- plete discussion of this subject see M. P. Price, The Diplomatic History of the War. ('has. Scribner's Sons, p. 69, who says "This confirms the supposition that Austria had not mobilised more than eight army corps before August 1st." 3 Sazonof apparently had now given up his plan of direct conversation with Austria, which he had sought since July '-Mi, and also Sir E. Grey's plan of- a conference, and July 28, Serbian Blue Book No. 47 273 Servia should be immediately suspended. Otherwise mediation will only serve as an excuse to make the question drag on, and will meanwhile make it possible for Austria to crush Servia completely and to acquire a dominant position in the Balkans. Sent to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome. Serbia : From Vienna Serbian Blue Book No. 45 ' Count Leopold Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. N. Pashitch, Serbian Prime Minister and Min- ister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 15/28, 1914. The Royal Serbian Government not having answered in a satis- factory manner the note of July 10/23, 1914, presented by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, the Imperial and Royal Government are themselves compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of arms. Austria-Hungary consequently considers herself henceforward in state of war with Serbia. 2 To All Serbian Legations Serbian Blue Book No. 46 M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Serbian Legations abroad. (Telegraphic.) Nish, July 15/28, 1914. The Austro-Hungarian Government declared war on Serbia at noon to-day by an open telegram to the Serbian Government. To Petrograd Serbian Blue Book No. 47 Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Minister at Petrograd, to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Your Excellency, Petrograd, July 15/28, 1914- I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I have received from M. Pashitch the following urgent telegram despatched from Nish at 2.10 p.m. urged the other plan of British direct mediation which probably had been outlined in the third despatch referred to in French Yellow Book No. 76, July 28, but not printed in full in the Yellow Book or in the Blue Book. Cf. also British Blue Book No. 44, July 'J7. 1 For Serbian Blue Book No, 44 see July 30, 1914. 2 This was notified to the Powers in a despatch printed British Blue Book No. 50, July 28. 274 Official Diplomatic Documents "The Austro-Hungarian Government declared war on Serbia to-day at noon by an open telegram to the Serbian Government." I have the honour to inform Your Excellency of this regrettable act, which a Great Power had the courage to commit against a small Slav country which only recently emerged from a long series of heroic but exhausting battles, and I beg leave on this occasion of deep gravity for my country, to express the hope that this act, which disturbs the peace of Europe and revolts her conscience, will be condemned by the whole civilised world and severely punished by Russia, the protector of Serbia. 1 I beg Your Excellency to be so kind as to lay this petition from the whole Serbian nation before the throne of His Majesty. I take this opportunity to assure Your Excellency of my loyalty 2 and respect. I have, etc. 1 Of. also the appeal of the Serbian Crown Prince, Russian Orange Book No. 6, July 24, and the Czar's reply, Russian Orange Book No. 41), July 27. 'According to one's interpretation of the Serbian relations to Russia, the word "loyalty" is either significant or merely a polite phrase. July 29, 1914 275 Wednesday, July 29, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary London, Petrograd, Paris, Berlin, Petro- Paris, and Rome grad Berlin Belgium London etc. France London etc., London Rome, Petrograd, Brus- sels, Frankfort, Mu- nich, Vienna, Berlin, London, Belgrade Germany Paris Emperor to Czar Czar to Emperor Great Britain Rome, Berlin, Paris, Berlin, Petrograd, Vi- Vienna enna, Rome, < nn- stantinople, Nish, from Russian Am- bassador Russia Berlin, London and Berlin, Nish, Paris, Paris, London Paris Serbian Crownprince to Czar. Serbia Austria-Hungary makes renewed efforts to convince the Powers of the justice of her case, and unequivocally accepts Sir E. Grey's first proposal of mediation between Petrograd and Vienna. At the same time, while refusing to discuss the "wording of the note," she is ready to have direct conversations with Petrograd on ' ' a much broader basis of discussion in declaring that she had no desire to injure any Russian interests" nor to annex territory or to touch the "sovereignty of Serbia." She is much disturbed by French and especially Russian mobilisation and announces that the latter may force her to proceed to general mobilisation on her part. Belgium announces that she has "decided to place her army upon a strengthened peace footing." France continues to be suspicious of Germany, whom she holds responsible for Austria-Hungary's determination to put a stop to Serbian intrigues. While publishing many notices to the effect that Germany and Austria-Hungary were mobilising, she makes no mention of the Russian mobilisation except as measures of defence forced upon Russia. Several of the French despatches published on this day are by their contents proved to have been written earlier. Germany is greatly troubled by the mobilisation going on in France and Russia and declares that if it continues she will have to declare Kriegsgefa.hr. The Emperor exchanges telegrams with the Czar begging him to intercede for peace. Germany continues her pressure on Austria to come to an understanding with Russia, and wishes to work together with Great Britain, whose neutrality she wishes to secure in case of war. Great Britain believes direct conversations between Vienna and Petrograd "the best possible solution." Sir E. Grey is erroneously informed that Austria- Hungary has refused them, and reverting to his conference or mediation plan declares his willingness to accept "any method that Germany thought possible in the interests of peace." In case of war, Sir E. Grey declares, England would "have to decide what British interests required." The suggestion of a possible invasion of Belgium first broached on this day is not denounced as wrong. Sir E. Grey also 276 Official Diplomatic Documents suggests that Austria should halt after taking Belgrade to give the Powers the chance of adjusting the difficulties. Russia claims that Russian interests were in this case Serbian interests. She also claims that Austria-Hungary had "categorically refused to continue an exchange of ideas," and mobilises the districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kasan. Receiving France's promise of unconditional support she "hastens" her "military preparations." Serbia dors not publish any documents of this day. Italy suggests that Austria-Hungary "convert into a binding engagement to Europe" her declaration that she wished neither "to destroy the independence of Serbia nor to acquire Serbian territory." Unfortunately this suggestion was not pressed, for Italy believed that thus "Russia might be induced to remain quiet." Austria-Hungary : To St. Petershurgh, London, Paris, and Rome AUSTUO-HUNGARIAN Red Book No. 44 Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal A mbassadors at St. Peters- burgh, London, Paris, and Rome. (Telegraphic. ) Vienna, July 29, 1911,.. For your Excellency's information. I have to-day handed to the Imperial German Ambassador the following memorandum in answer to a demarche made here by him : ' Memorandum The Imperial and Royal Government have received with deep gratitude information of the communication which the Imperial Ger- man Ambassador made to them on the 28th inst. 1 with regard to the request of the British Cabinet that the Imperial German Govern- ment should use their influence with the Vienna Cabinet that they r might regard the answer from Belgrade either as satisfactory, or as a basis for discussion. So far as concerns what was said by the British Secretary of State to Prince Lichnowsky, the Imperial and Royal Government desire in the first place to draw attention to the fact that the Servian answer in no way contains an acceptance of till our demands with one single exception, as Sir E. Grey appears to assume, 2 but rather that on most points reservations are formulated, which materially detract from the value of the concessions which are made. The points which are not accepted are, however, precisely those which contain some guarantee for the real attainment of the end in view. The Imperial and Royal Government cannot conceal their aston- ishment at the assumption that their action against Servia was directed against Russia and Russian influence in the Balkans, for this implies the supposition that the propaganda directed against the Monarchy has not merely a Servian but a Russian origin. 3 The basis 1 This serins to refer to German White Book, Exhibit 15, July 27, and Exhibit 14, July 28. See also British Blue Book No. 84, July 29. - British Bin.- Book Nos. 46 and 48, July 27. 3 The logic of this inference is from the Austro-Hungarian point of view irrefutable. •July 29, Austro-ll ungarian Red Book No. 1±5 277 of our consideration has hitherto been rather that official Russia has no connection with these tendencies, which are hostile to the Mon- archy, and that our present action is directed exclusively against Servia, while our feelings for Russia, as we can assure Sir E. Grey, are entirely friendly. Further, the Imperial and Royal Government must point out that to their great regret they are no longer in a position to adopt an attitude towards the Servian reply in the sense of the British sug- gestion, since at the time of the demarche made by Germany a state of war between the Monarchy and Servia had already arisen, and the Servian reply has accordingly already been outstripped by events. The Imperial and Royal Government take this opportunity of observing that the Royal Servian Government, even before they communicated their reply, had taken steps towards the mobilisation of the Servian forces, and thereafter they allowed three days to elapse without showing any inclination to abandon the point of view con- tained in their reply, whereupon the declaration of war followed on our side. If the British Cabinet is prepared to use its influence on the Rus- sian Government with a view to the maintenance of peace between the Great Powers, and with a view to the localisation of the war which has been forced upon us by many years of Servian intrigues, the Imperial and Royal Government could only welcome this. 1 From Paris AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 45 Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) Park, July 29, 1914. France is unmistakably making certain military preparations as is announced by the newspapers, perhaps with a certain exag- geration. As I learn in strictest confidence, Baron Schoen is commissioned to discuss these preparations 2 with M. Viviani to-day, and to point out that in these circumstances Germany may be compelled to take similar measures which necessarily could not be kept secret, and which could not fail to cause great public excitement when they be- came known. In this way the two countries, although they are only striving for peace, will be compelled to at least a partial mobilisation, which would be dangerous. Further, in accordance with these instructions, Baron Schoen will declare that Germany has a lively desire that the conflict between us and Servia should remain localised, and that in this Germany relies on the support of France. 1 This is an unequivocal acceptance of Sir K. Grey's origirial proposal of mediation between Petrosrrad and Vienna. 2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, referring to "yesterday afternoon," i .e. July 29. 278 Official Diplomatic Documents From Berlin AUSTRO-HUNGAHIAN RED BOOK No. 46 Count Szogyeny to Count Bcrchtold. (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914. As early as Sunday the German Government declared at St. Peters- burgh that Russian mobilisation would have as a consequence German mobilisation. 1 Thereupon there followed on the part of Russia the reply announced in my telegram of the 27th inst. 2 Following this a telegram has to-day been sent to St. Petersburgh, stating that owing to the fur- ther progress of the Russian measures of mobilisation Germany might be brought to mobilise. 3 From St. Petersburgh ArsTKn-IIi ingarian Red Book No. 47 Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 29, 1914. As I have learned from the German Ambassador that M. Sazonof is showing himself greatly excited over your Excellency's alleged disinclination to continue the exchange of ideas with Russia, and over the mobilisation of Austria-Hungary, which is supposed to be much more extensive than is necessary, and, therefore, directed against Russia, I visited the Minister in order to remove certain misunder- standings which seemed to me to exist. The Minister began by making the point that Austria-Hungary categorically refused to continue an exchange of ideas. I agreed in view of your Excellency's telegram of the 28th July that your Excellency had indeed declined, after all that had occurred, to dis- cuss the wording of the note, and in general the Austro-Hungarian- Servian conflict, but said that I must make it clear that I was in a position to suggest a much broader basis of discussion 4 in declaring that we had no desire to injure any Russian interests, that we had no intention, naturally on the assumption that 'the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia remained localised, of annexing Servian territory, and that we also had no idea of touching the sovereignty of Servia. I was convinced that your Excellency would always be ready to keep in touch with St. Petersburgh with regard to Austro-Hun- garian and Russian interests. M. Sazonof gave me to understand that he had been convinced of this so far as territory was concerned, but so far as the sovereignty of 1 Cf. German White Book Exhibits 10 and 10b, July 26. • Sri- Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 33. July 27. 3 Not given in the I lerman White Book or the Russian Orange Book. Cf. Austro- Hungarian Red Book No. 42, July 28. >CI. Chancellor's Speei-h, note to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50, July 30. July 29, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47 279 the country was in question he must continue to hold the opinion that to force on Servia our conditions would result in Servia becoming a vassal State. This, however, would upset the equilibrium in the Balkans, and this was how Russian interests became involved. He returned to the question of a discussion of the note, the action of Sir E. Grey, etc., and he desired again to point out to me that Russia recognised our legitimate interest, and desired to give it full satis- faction, but that this should be clothed in a form which would be acceptable to Servia. I expressed the view that this was not a Rus- sian but a Servian interest, whereupon M. Sazonof claimed that Russian interests x were in this case Servian interests, so that I was obliged to make an end of the vicious circle by going on to a new topic. I mentioned that I had heard that there was a feeling of anxiety in Russia, because we had mobilised eight corps for action against Servia. M. Sazonof assured me that it was not he (who knew nothing about this) but the Chief of the General Staff who had expressed this anxiety. I endeavoured to convince the Minister that any unpreju- diced person could easily be persuaded that our southern corps could not constitute a menace for Russia. I indicated to the Minister that it would be well if his Imperial Master were informed of the true situation, more especially as it was urgently necessary, if it was desired to maintain peace, that a speedy end should be put to the military competition (lizitieren) which now threatened to ensue on account of false news. M. Sazonof very characteristically expressed the view that he could communicate this to the Chief of the General Staff, for he saw His Majesty every day. The Minister further informed me that a Ukase would be signed to-day, which woidd give orders for a mobilisation in a somewhat extended form. He was able, however, to assure me in the most official way that these troops were not intended to attack us. They would only stand to arms in case Russian interests in the Balkans should be in danger. An explanatory note would make this clear, for the question here was one of a measure of precaution which the Emperor Nicholas had found to be justified, since we, who in any case have the advantage of quicker mobilisation, have now also al- ready so great a start. In earnest words I drew M. Sazonof's atten- tion to the impression which such a measure would make in our country. I went on to express doubt whether the explanatory note would be calculated to soften the impression, whereupon the Minister again gave expression to assurances regarding the harmlessness( ! ) of this measure. 1 A possible explanation of the remark that "Russian interests were in this case Serbian interests" may be found in British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, where Sazonof cannot allow "Austria to become the predominant Power in the Balkans." 280 Official Diplomatic Documents To Berlin AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 48 Count Berchtold to Count Szogyeny at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914- I have just heard from Herr von Tschirschky, that the Russian Ambassador has told him that he lias been notified by his Government that the military districts of Kicfi', Odessa, Moscow and Kasan are being mobilised. He said that Russia was outraged in her honour as a Great Power, 1 and was obliged to take corresponding measures. The Russian mobilisation is confirmed by the commanders of our Galician forces, and, according to a communication from the Imperial and Royal Military Attache, in a conversation which M. Sazonof had to-day with the German Ambassador it was no longer denied. 2 I request your Excellency to bring the above without delay to the knowledge of the German Government, and at the same time to emphasise that if the Russian measures of mobilisation are not stopped without delay, our general mobilisation would have, on military grounds, to follow at once. As a last effort to maintain the peace of Europe, I considered it desirable that our representative and the representative of Germany at St. Petersburg]], and, if necessary, at Paris, should at once be instructed to declare to the Governments to whom they are ac- credited in a friendly manner, that the continuance of the Russian mobilisation would have as a result counter-measures in Germany and Austria-Hungary, which must lead to serious consequences. 3 Your Excellency will add that, as can lie understood, in our military operations against Servia we will not allow ourselves to be diverted from our path. The Imperial anil Royal Ambassadors at St. Petersburgh and Paris are receiving identical instructions to make the above declara- tion as soon as their German colleague receives similar instructions. To St. Petersburgh AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 49 Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July -if), 1914- In answer to your Excellency's telegram of the 29th July. I am of course still ready to explain to M. Sazonof, through your Excellency, the various points contained in our note addressed to 1 The reason win- "Russia was outraged in her honour as a Great Power" is nut piven. The interesting part of this passage is that Austria-Hungary was not the only country which believed that her honor as a Great Power demanded a certain course of action of her. - See German White Book. Narrative, pp. 351 to 360. 3 This was evidently an attempt on Austria's part to keep the peace among the nations. July 29, French Yellow Book No. S4 281 Servia which however has already been outstripped by recent events. I should also attach special importance, in accordance with the sug- gestion made to me through M. Schebeko, also to discussing on this occasion in a confidential and friendly manner the questions which affect directly our relations towards Russia. From this it might be hoped that it would be possible to remove the ambiguities which have arisen and to secure the development in a friendly manner of our relations towards our neighbours, which is so desirable an object. 1 Belgium : To Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna, Si. Petersburg}!, Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg Belgian Gray Book No. 8 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, Loudon, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg. Sir, Brussels, July 29, 1,914. The Belgian Government have decided to place the army upon a strengthened peace footing. This step should in no way be confused with mobilisation. Owing to the small extent of her territory, all Belgium consists, in some degree, of a frontier zone. Her army on the ordinary peace footing consists of only one class of armed militia ; on the strengthened peace footing, owing to the recall of three classes, her army divisions and her cavalry division comprise effective units of the same strength as those of the corps permanently maintained in the frontier zones of the neighbouring Powers. This information will enable you to reply to any questions which may be addressed to you. France : From Rome French Yellow Book No. 84 M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Rome, July 29, 1914. The Consulta considers that, in spite of the declaration of war by Austria on Servia, there is no reason why the diplomatic efforts for calling together a conference at London with a view to mediation should be interrupted. Barrere. 1 This is another evidence that Germany's influence upon Vienna was having effect or that Austria-Hungary of her own accord was willing to try and avert a general war by making explanations to Russia. 2S2 Official Diplomatic Documents To St. Petersburgh, London, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople. French Yellow Book No. S5 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to St. Petersburgh, London, Berlin, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople, Belgrade. Paris, July 29, 1914. The Austro-German attitude is becoming clearer. Austria, un- easy concerning the Slav propaganda, has seized the opportunity 1 of tin- crime of Serajevo in order to punish the Servian intrigues, and to obtain in this quarter guarantees which, according as events are allowed to develop or not, will either affect only the Servian Government and army, or become territorial questions. Germany intervenes 2 between her ally and the other Powers and declares that the question is a local one, namely, the punishment of a political crime committed in the past, and for the future sure guarantees that the anti-Austrian intrigues will be put an end to. The German Government thinks that Russia should be content with the official and formal assurances given by Austria, to the effect that she does not seek territorial aggrandisement and that she will respect the in- tegrity of Servia ; in these circumstances the danger of war can only come from Russia, if she seeks to intervene in a question which is well defined. In these circumstances any action for the mainten- ance of peace must therefore take place at St. Petersburgh alone. This sophism, 3 which would relieve Germany from intervening at Vienna, has been maintained unsuccessfully at Paris by Herr von Schoen, who has vainly endeavoured to draw us into identical Franco- German action at St. Petersburgh ; it has been also expounded in London to Sir E. Grey. In France, as in England, a reply was given that the St. Petersburgh Cabinet have, from the beginning, given the greatest proofs of their moderation, especially by associating themselves with the Powers in advising Servia to yield to the re- quirements of the Austrian note. Russia does not therefore in any way threaten peace; it is at Vienna that action must be taken; it is from there that the danger will come, from the moment that they refuse to be content with the almost complete submission of Servia to exorbitant demands; that they refuse to accept the co-operation of the Powers in the discussion of the points which remain to be arranged between Austria and Servia ; and, finally, that they do not hesitate to make a declaration of war as precipitate as the original Austro-Hungarian note. The attitude at Berlin, as at Vienna, is still dilatory. In the former capital, while protesting that the Germans desire to safe- 1 The U. S. diplomatic agent. Mr. F. II. Mallett, reported to the Department of State in Washington at the time that the Serajevo murder was undoubtedly instigated by Serbia, and that a world war might ensue. See X, w York Herald. July 30, 1914. 2 For Germany's explanation of her action, see German White Book, Exhibit 1, and British Blue Book No. (37, July 28, witli not,'. 3 Granting that this term is used in all sincerity, it shows how widely apart France and Germany were in viewing the events leading up to the war, since the expression of Germany's honest belief appeared as a "sophism" to France. July 29, French Yellow Book No. 87 283 guard general peace by common action between the four Powers, the idea of a conference is rejected without any other expedient being suggested, 1 and while they refuse to take any positive action at Vienna. In the Austrian capital they would like to keep St. Peters- burgh in play with the illusion of an entente which might result from direct conversations, while they are taking action against Servia. In these circumstances it seems essential that the St. Petersburgh Cabinet, whose desire to unravel this crisis peacefully is manifest, should immediately give their adherence to the British proposal. 2 This proposal must be strongly supported at Berlin in order to decide Herr von Jagow to take real action at Vienna capable of stopping Austria and preventing her from supplementing her diplomatic ad- vantage by military successes. The Austro-Hungarian Government would, indeed, not be slow to take advantage of it in order to im- pose on Servia, under the elastic expression of "guarantees," condi- tions which, in spite of all assurances that no territorial aggrandise- ment was being sought, would in effect modify the status of Eastern Europe, and would run the risk of gravely compromising the general peace either at once or in the near future. BiENVENU-jNIaRTIN. From. St. Petersburgh French Yellow Book No. 86 M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bienverm- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petersburgh, July 29, 1914. I am now in a position to assure Your Excellency that the Russian Government will acquiesce in any measures which France and Great Britain may propose in order to maintain peace. My British col- league is telegraphing to London to the same effect. 3 Paleologue. From Brussels French Yellow Book No. S7 M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Brussels, July 29, 1914. I report the following impressions of my interview with M. Davignon and with several persons in a position to have exact in- 1 This is an error, see Chancellor's Speech in note to British Blue Book No. 07, July 2S. 2 This shows that Russia had not accepted the conference idea on July 29. France and Russia, therefore, seem to be working somewhat at variance with each other — see, however, next number. 3 British Blue Book No. 7S, July 29, which gives as the reason for Sazonof's willing- ness to have a conference that the "Austrian Government had now definitely declined direct conversation." See, however, Chancellor's Speech in note to British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. 284 Official Diplomatic Documents formation. The attitude of Germany is enigmatical and justifies every apprehension ; it seems improbable that the Austro-Hungarian Government would have taken an initiative which would lead, ac- cording to a pre-conceived plan, to a declaration of war, without previous arrangement with the Emperor William. 1 The German Government stand "with grounded arms" ready to take peaceful or warlike action as circumstances may require, but there is so much anxiety everywhere that a sudden intervention against us would not surprise anybody here. My Russian and British colleagues share this feeling. The Belgian Government are taking steps which harmonise with the statement made to me yesterday by M. Davignon that every- thing will be put in readiness for the defence of the neutrality of the country. Klobukowski. From Frankfort French Yellow Book No. 88 M. Ronssin, French Consul-General at Frankfort, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Frankfort, July 29, 1914. I notify you of important movements of troops yesterday and to-night. This morning several regiments in service dress arrived lure, especially by the roads from Darmstadt, Tassel, and Mayence, which arc full of soldiers. The bridges and railways are guarded under the pretext 2 of preparations for the autumn manoeuvres. Ronssin. From Munich French Yellow Book No. S9 3 M. Allize, French Minister at Munich, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Act- ing Minister for Foreign Affairs. Munich, .July 29, 1914. I am informed that the mills at Illkirch (Alsace-Lorraine) have been asked to stop delivery to their ordinary clients and to keep all their output for the army. From Strassburg information has been received of the transport of motor guns used for firing on aeroplanes and dirigibles. Under the pretext of a change in the autumn manoeuvres the non- commissioned officers and men of the Bavarian infantry regiments at 1 This seems to have been France's firm conviction. For a discussion of Germany's influence or lack of influence on Austria-Hungary see John W. Burgess, The European War. A. C. McClurg& Co., Chicago. J The annual manoeuvres in Germany begin in July. For the subject of German mobilisation see M. G. Price, The Diplomatic History of the War, Chas. Seribner's Sons, and E. von Mach, Germany's Point of View. 3 See note to No. ss. July 29, Fretwh Yellow Book No. 91 285 Metz, who were on leave in Bavaria for the harvest, received orders yesterday to return immediately. Allize. From Vienna French Yellow Book No. 90 ' M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, July 29, 191 4- The French Consul at Prague confirms the mobilisation of the 8th army corps which had already been announced, and that of the Landwehr division of this army corps. The cavalry divisions in Galicia are also mobilising; regiments and cavalry divisions from Vienna and Budapest have already been transported to the Russian frontier. Reservists are now being called together in this district. There is a rumour that the Austro-Hungarian Government, in order to be in a position to meet any danger, and perhaps in order to impress St. Petersburgh, intend to decide on a general mobilisa- tion of their forces on the 30th July, or the 1st August. To conclude, it is certain the Emperor will return from Ischl to Vienna to-morrow. Dumaine. From St. Petersburgh French Yellow Book No. 91 M. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg}:, to M. Bienven it- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petersburgh, July 29, 1914. The direct conversation, to which the Russian Government had invited the Austro-Hungarian Government in a friendly spirit, has been refused by the latter. 2 On the other hand, the Russian General Staff have satisfied them- selves that Austria is hurrying on her military preparations against Russia, and is pressing forward the mobilisation which has begun on the Galician frontier. As a result the order to mobilise will be de- spatched to-night to thirteen army corps, which are destined to operate eventually against Austria. In spite of the failure of his proposal, M. Sazonof accepts 3 the idea of a conference of the four Powers in London; further, he dues not attach any importance to the title officially given to the discus- sions, and will support all British efforts in favour of peace. Paleologue. 1 See note to No. 88. 2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 78, July 29, and for the error in this statement Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. 3 This contains the information given above as a separate telegram, No. 86. 286 Official Diplomatic Documents From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 92 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bieiirnnt- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 29, 191.'+. I asked the Secretary of State to-day ' how the question of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh, which seemed to him yesterday the best means of arriving at a detente, stood. He answered that at St. Petersburgh they seemed well disposed towards them and that he had asked Vienna to take this course. He was awaiting the reply. The British Government, after seeing the sug- gestion of a conference rejected, had let it be known that they would view with favour the inception of such conversations between Austria and Russia, and had asked Germany to urge Austria, which the Im- perial Government are not failing to do. I asked Herr von Jagow if he had at last received the Servian reply to Austria and what he thought of it. He replied that he saw in it a basis for possible negotiation. 2 I added that it was just on that account that I considered the rupture by Austria, after she had received such a document, inexplicable. The Secretary of State then remarked that with Eastern nations one could never obtain sufficient guarantees, and that Austria wished to be able to supervise the carrying out of promises made to her, a supervision which Servia refused. This, in the eyes of the Secretary of State, is the cardinal point. I answered Ilerr von Jagow that Servia, as she wished to remain independent, was bound to reject the control of a single Power, but that an International Commission would not have the same character. The Balkan States have more than one, for instance the Financial Commission at Athens. One could imagine, I said, for instance, among other combinations, a Pro- visional International Commission, charged with the duty of control- ling the police inquiry demanded by Austria ; it was clear, by this instance, that the reply of Servia opened the door to conversations and did not justify a rupture. I then asked the Secretary of State if, leaving aside direct conver- sations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh to which Sir E. Grey had given his adherence, he did not think that common action could be exercised by the four Powers by means of their Ambassadors. He answered in the affirmative, adding that at this moment the London Cabinet were confining themselves to exercising their in- fluence in support of direct conversations. At the end of the afternoon the Imperial Chancellor asked the 1 The contents of this telegram seem to refer to events of the previous day. 2 This cannot possibly have l>een said on July 29. since Austria-Hungary had de- elared war on Serbia, and the latter had begun the hostilities on July 27, cf. British Blue Book No. 56 under date of July 28. July 29, French Yellow Book No. 93 287 British Ambassador to come and see him. 1 He spoke to him of the proposal of Sir E. Grey for the meeting of a conference ; he told him that he had not been able to accept a proposal which seemed to im- pose the authority of the Powers on Austria; he assured my col- league of his sincere desire for peace and of the efforts he was mak- ing to that effect at Vienna, but he added that Russia was alone able to maintain peace or let loose war. Sir E. Goschen answered that he did not agree, and that if war broke out Austria would be chiefly responsible, for it was inadmis- sible for her to have broken with Servia after the reply of the latter. Without discussing this point, the Chancellor said that he was trying his utmost to obtain direct conversations between Austria and Russia ; he knew that England looked on such conversations with a favourable eye. He added that his own action would be rendered very difficult at Vienna, if it were true that Russia had mobilised fourteen army corps on the Austrian frontier. He asked my colleague to call Sir E. Grey's attention to what he had said. Sir E. Goschen has telegraphed to London to this effect. 2 The attitude of the Chancellor is very probably the result of the last interview of Sir E. Grey with Prince Lichnowsky. Up to quite the last days they flattered themselves here that England would remain out of the question, and the impression produced on the Ger- man Government and on the financiers and business men by her attitude is profound. Jules Cambon. From Vienna French Yellow Book No. 93 3 M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Bicnrcrin-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, July 29, 1914. The opinion of my British, Russian and Italian colleagues agrees with mine concerning the impossibility of preventing the outbreak of hostilities between Austria and Servia, since all attempts to avoid the collision have failed. M. Schebeko had asked that the negotiations begun at St. Peters- burgh by MM. Sazonof and Szapary should be continued and made more effective by special powers being conferred on the latter, but Count Berchtold has flatly refused. He showed in this way that Austria-Hungary does not tolerate any intervention which would prevent her from inflicting punishment and humiliation on Servia. The Duke of Avarna admits that it is very probable that the im- minence of a general insurrection among the Southern Slav inhab- 1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 71, July 28, received and listed under July 29. This interview took place on July 28, and proves that this French despatch is wrongly dated. 2 British Blue Book No. 71, July 28, but received and therefore listed under July 29. 3 This despatch, like the previous one, while dated July 29, must have been written before Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, which was on July 28. 288 Official Diplomatic Documents itants precipitated the resolutions of the Monarchy. He still clings to the hope that, after a first success of the Austro-Hungarian arms, but not before this, mediation might be able to limit the conflict. Dumaine. To London, Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Rome, Vienna, Constantinople, Belgrade French Yellow Book No. 94 M. Birnrrnn-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Borne, Vienna, Constantinople, Belgrade, Paris, July 29, 1914. The following communication was semi-officially made to me this morning by the German Ambassador: — "The German Government are still continuing their efforts to obtain the consent of the Austrian Government to a friendly con- versation which would give the latter an opportunity of stating exactly the object and extent of the operations in Servia. The Berlin Cabinet hope to receive declarations which will be of a kind to satisfy Russia. The German efforts are in no way impeded by the declaration of war which has occurred." A similar communication will lie made at St. Petersburgh. During the course of a conversation which I had this morning with Baron von Schoen, the latter stated to me that the German Government did not know what the intentions of Vienna were. When Berlin knows how far Austria wishes to go, there will be a basis of discussion which will make conversations with a view to intervention easier. When I observed that the military operations which had been begun would not perhaps allow any time for conversation, and that the German Government ought to use their influence at Vienna to delay them, the Ambassador answered that Berlin could not exer- cise any pressure, but that he hoped that the operations would not be pushed forward very actively. Bienyent-Martin. To London, Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Constantinople. Rome, lie/grade French Yellow Book No. 95 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Lo>idon, Berlin, St. Petersburgh, Vienna, Constantinople, Rome, Belgrade. Paris, July 29, 1914. M. Isvolsky came to me by order of his Government to commu- nicate a telegram addressed by M. Sazonof to Berlin. 1 It appears 1 This telegram is not published either in the Russian Orange Book or the German White Book. It mav be the telegram British Blue Book No. 70 published under date of July 29. July 29, French Yellow Book No. 90 289 from this information that, in consequence of the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on Servia, the measures of mobilisation already taken with regard to the largest part of the Austro-Hungarian army, and finally the refusal ' of Count Berchtold to continue negotiations between Vienna and St. Petersburgh, Russia had decided to mobilise in the provinces of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kazan. While in- forming the German Government to this effect, the Russian Ambas- sador at Berlin was instructed to add that these military precautions were not in any way directed against Germany, and also did not imply aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary; furthermore the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had not been recalled. The Russian Ambassador also gave me the substance of two tele- grams 2 addressed to London by M. Sazonof: the first, after point- ing out that the declaration of war on Servia put an end to the con- versations of the Russian Minister with the Austrian Ambassador, asked England to exercise her influence, as quickly as possible, with a view to mediation and to the immediate cessation of Austrian military operations (the continuation of which gave Austria time to crush Servia while mediation was dragging on) ; the second com- municated the impression received by M. Sazonof from his conver- sations with the German Ambassador that Germany favours Austria's uncompromising attitude and is not exercising any influence on her. The Russian Minister thinks that the attitude of Germany is very disquieting, 3 and considers that England is in a better position than the other Powers to take steps at Berlin with a view to exercising pressure on Vienna. Bienvenu-Martin. From Rome French Yellow Book No. 96 M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Rome, to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affair*. Rome, July 29, 1914. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has been officially informed by the Russian Ambassador that his Government, in consequence of the declaration of war by Austria on Servia and of the measures of mobilisation which were from this moment being taken by Austria, had given the order to mobilise in the districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan. 4 He added that this step had no aggressive character against Germany, and that the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had not been recalled. In speaking of this communication the Marquis di San Giuliano told me that unfortunately throughout this affair Austria and Ger- many had been, and were still, convinced that Russia would not 1 For the error of this statement see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. 2 British Blue Book Nos. 93, 2 and 3, July 30. 3 This statement is not contained in the despatch presented in London. 4 Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 48, July 29. 290 Official Diplomatic Documents move. In this connection he read to me a despatch from M. Bollati reporting an interview which he had had yesterday with Herr von Jagow, in which the latter had again repeated to him that he did not think that Russia would move. He based this belief on the fact that the Russian Government had just sent an agent to Berlin to treat about some financial questions. The Austrian Ambassador at Berlin also told his British colleague that lie did not believe in a general war, since Russia was not in the mood or in the condition to make war. 1 The Marquis di San Giuliano does not share this opinion. He thinks that if Austria contents herself with humiliating Servia and with exacting, besides the acceptance of the note, some material advantages which do not involve her territory, Russia can still find some means of coining to an agreement with her. But if Austria wishes either to dismember Servia or to destroy her as an independent State, he thinks that it would be impossible for Russia not to inter- vene by military measures. In spite of the extreme gravity of the situation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs does not seem to me to despair of the possibility of an agreement. lie thinks that England can still exercise a great deal of influence at Berlin in the direction of peace. He had yester- day, he told me, a long conversation with the Britisli Ambassador, Sir R. Rodd, 2 in order to show him to what extent British interven- tion might be effective. He said to me in conclusion, "If your Government are of the same opinion, they could on their side make representations to this effect in London." 3 r, B.VRRERE. To London French Yellow Book No. 97 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, Paris, Jul;/ ,.>.<>, 1914. I should be obliged if you would ask Sir E. Grey to be good enough to renew as soon as possible at Berlin, in the form which he may consider most opportune and effective, his proposal of media- tion by the four Bowers, which had in principle 4 obtained the ad- herence of the German Government. The Russian Government on their side will have expressed the same desire directly to the British Government; the declaration of war by Austria on Servia, her sending of troops to the Austro-Rus- sian frontier, •' the consequent Russian mobilisation on the Galician 1 This statement, if true, seems to disprove the assertion popularly made that ( iermany and Austria-Hungary wished to bring about a general war. 2 Of. British Blue Book No. ."iT, written July 27, but received and published under date of July -'s. Barrere says "yesterday," which shows that also this telegram was u i u ten, at least in part, on July 28. ' For this interview see British Blue Book No. SO, July 29. ' British Blue Book No. 40, July 27. '•' There is no proof given for this assertion. July 29, French Yellow Book No. 98 291 frontier have in fact put an end to the direct Austro-Russian con- versations. The explanations which the German Government are going to ask for at Vienna, in accordance with the statement of Baron von Schoen which I have reported to you, in order to learn the intention of the Austrian Government, will allow the four Powers to exercise effective action between Vienna and St. Petersburgh for the main- tenance of peace. I would ask you also to point out to the British Secretary of State how important it would be for him to obtain from the Italian Gov- ernment the most whole-hearted continuance of their support in co-operating in the action of the four Powers in favour of peace. Rene Viviani. From London French Yellow Book No. 98 M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Bienvenu- Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 29, 1914. In his interview to-day with my German colleague, Sir E. Grey observed that, the overtures of M. Sazonof for direct conversations between Russia and Austria not having been accepted 1 at Vienna, it would be well to return to his proposal of friendly intervention by the four Powers which are not directly interested. This sugges- tion has been accepted in principle 2 by the German Government, but they have objected to the idea of a conference or of mediation. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has invited Prince Lich- nowsky to ask his Government that they should themselves propose a new formula. Whatever it may be, if it admits of the maintenance of peace, it will be accepted by Great Britain, France and Italy. The German Ambassador was to have forwarded Sir E. Grey's request to Berlin immediately. In giving me an account of this conversation, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added that Germany's reply to this communication and to that of Russia con- cerning the mobilisation of four army corps on the Austrian frontier would allow us to realise the intentions of the German Government. My German colleague having asked Sir E. Grey what the intentions of the British Government were, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that he had nothing to state for the present. Sir E. Grey did not disguise the fact that he found the situation very grave and that he had little hope of a peaceful solution. Paul Cambon. 1 This error makes the round in the Entente despatches. Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29, where Austria-Hungary, while unwilling to discuss "(lie wording of the note," makes it "clear that I [Austro-Hungarian Ambassador] was in a position to suggest a much broader basis of discussion." * British Blue Book No. 46, July 27. 29- Official Diplomatic Documents From Belgrade French Yellow Book No. 99 .1/. Boppe, French Minister at Belgrade, to M. Biemoemu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Belgrade, July 29, 1014. The Crown Prince, as sunn as the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was received, telegraphed ' to the Tsar to ask his help. My Russian colleague tells me that lie has just communicated to M. Pashitch His Majesty's reply. The Tsar thanks - the Prince for having turned to him at so critical a juncture ; he declares that everything has been done to arrive at a peaceful solution of the dispute, and formally assures the Prince that, if this object cannot he attained, Russia will never cease to interest herself in the fate of Servia. Boppe. From St. Petersburgh French Yellow Book No. 100 .1/. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Bieu- renu-Martin. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petersburgh, July 29, 1914. The German Ambassador came to tell M. Sazonof that if Russia doe-, not stop her military preparations the German army will re- ceive the order to mobilise. M. Sazonof replied that the Russian preparations have been caused. 3 on the one hand, by the obstinate and uncompromising atti- tude of Austria, and on the other hand by the fact that eight Austro- Hungarian army corps are already mobilised. The tone in which Count Pourtales delivered this communication has decided the Russian Government this very night to order the mobilisation of the thirteen army corps which are to operate against Austria. P.VLEOLOGUE. Germany : To Paris German White Book Exhibit 17 f the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Paris on July 29th, 1914. News received here regarding French preparations of war multi- plies from hour to hour. I request that you call the attention of the 1 Russian < (range Book No. 6, July 24. - Russian Orange Book Xo. 40, July 27. 1 i.ccoi ling to this despatch part of the Russian mobilization had t ikon place pre- viously, while part was to be ordered on the evening of July 29. Asreg mobilization orders cf. the word of honor given by the Russian ( Ihief of Staff, 1 White Book. p. 556, that up to :i p.m., July 29, " nowhere there had been a mobilisa- tion, viz. calling in of a single man or h July 20, German. White Book Exhibit 22 293 French Government to this and accentuate that such measures would call forth counter-measures on our part. We should have to pro- claim threatening state of war (drohende Kriegsgefahr), and while this would not mean a call for the reserves or mobilisation, yet the tension would be aggravated. We continue to hope for the preser- vation of peace. From the Czar German White Book Exhibit 21 //. The Czar to His Majesty. Peterhof Palace, July 29th, 1 P.M. I am glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious moment I ask You earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been declared against a weak country and in Russia the indignation which 1 fully share is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war. To prevent su<-h a calamity as a European war would be, I urge You in the name of our old friendship to do all in Your power to restrain Your ally from going too far. (Signed) Nicolas. To St. Petersburgh German White Book Exhibit 22 III. His Majesty to the Czar. July 29th, 6.30 P.M. I have received Your telegram and I share Your desire for the conservation of peace. However : I cannot — as I told You in my first telegram — consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an " igno- minious war." Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the promises of Servia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely unreliable. According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises of Servia are effectively translated into deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian Cabinet that Aus- tria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the expense of Servia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I believe that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between Your Govern- ment and Vienna, an understanding which — as I have already telegraphed You — my Government endeavours to aid with all pos- sible effort. Naturally military measures by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would undermine 294 Official Diplomatic Documents my position as mediator which — upon Your appeal to my friend- ship and aid — I willingly accepted. (Signed) Wilhelm. Great Britain : From St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 70 Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London, July 29, 1914. (1.) Telegram from M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, dated July 28, 191 ',. In consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Ser- via, the Imperial Government will announce to-morrow (29th) the mobilisation in the military circumscriptions of Odessa, Kieff, Mos- cow, and Kazan. Please inform German Government, confirming the absence in Russia of any aggressive intention against Germany. The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from his post. (2.) Telegram to Cmml Benckendorff} The Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end 2 to the idea of direct communications between Austria and Russia. Action by London Cabinet in order to set on foot mediation with a view to suspension of military operations of Austria against Servia is now most urgent. Inlcss military operations are stopped, mediation would only allow matters to drag tin and give Austria time to crush Servia. 3 From Berlin British Blce Book No. 71 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — i Received Jul// 29. ) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 28, 1914. At invitation of Imperial Chancellor, I called upon his Excellency this evening. 4 lie said that he wished me to tell you that he was most anxious that Germany should work together with England for maintenance of general peace, as they had done successfully in the 1 Russian Ambassador in London. •This seems to indicate that Sazonof considered the direct conversations closed. Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29, and footnote 1 to French Yellow Book No. 'is, July L>!>. ' i I French Yellow Book No. 95, July 29, where two telegrams from Sazonof to Count Benckendorff are mentioned. The second one is not given here. It was of a kind li> arouse suspicion of ( iennany. There is. however, nothing either in the British Blue Hook or I he Russian Orange Book that would have borne it out. 4 ( 'f. French Yellow Book No. 92, July 29. July 29, British Blue Book No. 72 295 last European crisis. He had not been able to accept your proposal for a conference l of representatives of the Great Powers, because he did not think that it would be effective, and because such a con- ference would in his opinion have had appearance of an "Areopagus" consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining Powers; but his inability to accept proposed conference must not be regarded as militating against his strong desire for effective co-operation. You could be assured that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and St. Petersburgh to get the two Governments to discuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way. He had great hopes that such discussions would take place and lead to a satisfactory result, but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilised fourteen army corps in the south, he thought situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilising, would have to take similar meas- ures, and if war were to result, Russia would be entirely responsible. 2 I ventured to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Servian note, which, to my mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded by Austria, and which in any case offered a basis for discussion, surely a certain portion of responsibility would, rest with her. His Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do. He reiterated his desire to co-operate with England and his intention to do his utmost to maintain general peace. "A war between the Great Powers must be avoided" were his last words. Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here. 3 From St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 72 Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir FjI- ward Grey. — (Received July 29.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 28, 1911,. Minister for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank you for the language you had held to the German Ambassador, as reported in 1 From British Blue Book No. 46. July 27, it appears that Germany had accepted "in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers." 2 This claim made on July 29 is important because later France wished to make it appear that Germany was not sincere and advanced this argument too late to deserve any credence. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 127, August 1. 3 If true this would seem to disprove the charge that either Germany or Austria- Hungary was plotting to bring about a world war. 296 Official Diplomatic Documents your telegram : to Berlin, substance of which I communicated to his Excellency. He took a pessimistic view of the situation, having received the same disquieting 2 news from Vienna as had reached His Majesty's Government. I said it was important that we should know the real intentions of the Imperial Government, and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurances which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect of Servia's integrity and independence. I added that I was sure any arrangement for averting a European war would be welcomed by His Majesty's Government. In reply his Excellency stated that if Servia were attacked Russia would not he satisfied with any engage- ment which Austria might take on these two points, and that order for mobilisation against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria crossed Servian frontier. I told the German Ambassador, who appealed to me to give moderating counsels to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that from the beginning I had not ceased to do so, and that the German Am- bassador at Vienna should now in his turn use his restraining in- fluence. I made it clear to his Excellency that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not he averted if Servia were attacked by Austria. As regards the suggestion of conference, the Ambassador had received no instructions, and before acting with me the French and Italian Ambassadors are still waiting for their final instructions. From Vienna British Blue Book No. 7:i Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 29.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. I have received note verbale from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that, the Servian Government not having replied to note of 23rd July 3 in a satisfactory manner, Imperial and Royal Government is compelled itself to provide for protection of its rights, and to have recourse for that object to force of arms. Austria-Hungary has ad- dressed to Servia formal declaration according to article 1 of con- vention of 18th October, 1907, relative to opening of hostilities, and considers herself from to-day in state of war with Servia. Austria- Hungary will conform, provided Servia does so, to stipulations of Hague conventions of 18th October, 1907, and to Declaration of London of 26th February, 1909. ' 1 See No. 46, July 27. ' Ci . however, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. 3 See No. -I. July 2 4. J In view of later events this declaration of Austria-Hungary is very important. July 29, British Blue Book No. 75 2 < If. French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, note 1. 1 This information i> printed in British Blue Book No. 10.3. Enclosure 3, July :i0. If the French Yellow Hook prints the original despatch accurately, either Sir E. Grey or the French Ambassador in London must be held responsible for the alterations. For a discussion of these despatches see E. von Mach, Germany's Point of View, pp. 421 IT. 4 This despatch to London should be compared with French Yellow Book No. 101, same day, to Petrograd, which shows that Viviani believed that Germany had not even partiallj mobilised on July .'ilj. July 30, French Yellow Book No. 107 325 our troops ten kilometres from the frontier and forbidden them to approach nearer. Our plan, conceived in the spirit of the offensive, provided, how- ever, that the fighting positions of our covering troops should be as near to the frontier as possible. By leaving a strip of territory undefended against sudden aggression of the enemy, the Government of the Republic hopes to prove that France does not bear, any more than Russia, the responsibility for the attack. In order to be convinced of this it is sufficient to compare the steps taken on the two sides of our frontier ; in France, soldiers who were on leave were not recalled until we were certain that Germany had done so five days before. In Germany, not only have the garrison troops of Metz been pushed up to the frontier, but they have been reinforced by units transported by train from garrisons of the interior such as Treves or Cologne ; nothing like this has been done in France. The arming of the frontier defences (clearing of trees, placing of armament, construction of batteries and strengthening of wire entanglements) was begun in Germany on Saturday, the 25th ; with us it is going to be begun, for France can no longer refrain from taking similar measures. The railway stations were occupied by the military in Germany on Saturday, the 25th ; in France on Tuesday, the 28th. Finally, in Germany the reservists by tens of thousands have been recalled by individual summons, those living abroad (the classes of 1903 to 1911) have been recalled, the officers of reserve have been summoned; in the interior the roads are closed, motor-cars only circulate with permits. It is the last stage before mobilisation. None of these measures has been taken in France. The German army has its outposts on our frontier ; on two occa- sions yesterday German patrols penetrated our territory. The whole Kith army corps from Metz, reinforced by part of the 8th from Treves and Cologne, occupies the frontier from Metz to Luxemburg; the 15th army corps from Strassburg is massed on the frontier. Under penalty of being shot, the inhabitants of the annexed parts of Alsace-Lorraine are forbidden to cross the frontier. Rene Viviani. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 107 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador of Berlin, to M. Rene 1'iviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 30, 191 4. The British Ambassador has not been informed of Germany's reply to Sir E. Grey's request. He told me that Berlin had consulted Vienna and was still waiting to hear from her ally. 1 1 This reply, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 44, July 29, was sent by telegram on that dav to Petrograd, Paris, London, and Rome. See also French Yellow Book No. 104, July 30, and note. 326 Official Diplomatic Documents My Russian colleague has just told me that Herr von Jagow (to whom Count Pourtales had communicated the conciliatory formula suggested by M. Sazonof for an Austro-Russian understanding) had just told him that he found this proposal unacceptable to Austria, thus showing the negative 1 action of German diplomacy at Vienna. Jules Cambon. From London French Yellow Book No. 108 M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister fur Foreign Affairs. London, dull/ SO, 191 4- Prince Lichnowsky has not brought any reply to the request addressed to him by Sir E. Grey yesterday to obtain from the Ger- man Government a formula fur tin- intervention of the four Powers in the interest of peace. But my German colleague questioned the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs about the military preparations of England. 2 Sir E. Grey replied that they were not of an offensive character, but that in the present state of affairs on the continent it was natural to take some precautions ; that in England, as in France, there was a desire to maintain peace, and that if in England, as in France, defen- sive measures were under consideration, it was not with the object of making any aggression. 3 The information 4 which your Excellency has addressed to me on the subject of the military measures taken by Germany on the French frontier gave me the opportunity of remarking to Sir E. Grey that it is no longer a question of a conflict of influence between Russia and Austria-Hungary, but that there is a risk of an act of aggression which might provoke general war. Sir E. Grey understood 5 my feelings perfectly, and he thinks, as I do, that the moment has come to consider and discuss together every hypothesis. Paul Cambon. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 100 .1/. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani, President if the Council, Minister far Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July JO, 1914. In the interview which I had to-day with the Secretary of State, I asked Herr von Jagow what reply he had made to Sir E. Grey, 1 Cf. Chancellor's Speech, note 2, British Blue Book No. 67, Julv 2S, and British Blue Book No. 95, July 30. 2 No such questions are mentioned in the British Blue Book. 3 This is the natural excuse for any modern state to make, since self-defence is the only excuse for military preparations anywhere. 1 French Yellow Book No. 106, same day. 6 From French Yellow Book No. 101, same day, it appeared that Viviani believed thai i lermany had not yet even partially mobilised on July 30. Contrary despatches must have been sent, for effect. Did Sir E. Grey understand this, or was he imposed upon? July 30, German White Book Exhibit 18 327 who had asked him to draw up himself the formula for the interven- tion of the disinterested Powers. He answered that "to gain time," he had decided to act directly, and that he had asked Austria to tell him the ground on which conversations might be opened with her. This answer has the effect, under a pretext of proceeding more quickly, of eliminating Great Britain, France and Italy, and of entrusting to Herr von Tschirscky, whose Pan-German and Russophobe sentiments are well known, the duty of persuading Austria to adopt a conciliatory attitude. Herr von Jagow then spoke to me of the Russian mobilisation on the Austrian frontier ; he told me that this mobilisation com- promised the success of all intervention with Austria, and that everything depended on it. He added that he feared that Austria would mobilise completely as a result of a partial Russian mobilisa- tion, and this might cause as a counter-measure complete Russian mobilisation and consequently that of Germany. I pointed out to the Secretary of State that he had himself told me that Germany would only consider herself obliged to mobilise if Russia mobilised on her German frontiers, 1 and that this was not being done. He replied that this was true, but that the heads of the army were insisting on it, for every delay is a loss of strength for the German army, and " that the words of which I reminded him did not constitute a firm engagement on his part." 2 The impression which I received from this conversation is that the chances of peace have again decreased. Jules Cambon. Germany : From St. Petersburgh German White Book Exhibit 18 Telegram of the Military Attache at St. Petersburgh to H. M. the Kaiser on July SO, 1914- Prince Troubetzki said to me yesterday, 3 after causing Your Majesty's telegram to be delivered at once to Czar Nicolas : Thank God that a telegram of Your Emperor has come. He has just told me the telegram has made a deep impression upon the Czar, but as the mobilisation against Austria had already been ordered and Sazonof had convinced His Majesty that it was no longer possible to retreat His Majesty was sorry he could not change it any more. I then told him that the guilt for the measureless consequences lay at the door of premature mobilisation against Austria-Hungary, which after all was involved merely in a local war with Servia, for Germany's answer was clear and the responsibility rested upon Russia which ignored 1 French Yellow Book No. 67, July 27. * Immediately following the words referred to above Von Jagow had said (Frenrh YeHow Book No. 67, July 27), " If Russia attacked Austria, Germany would be obliged to attack at once on her side." An attack must be preceded by mobilisation. Jagow, therefore, cannot have meant to give a promise in the sense in which it was understood by Jules Cambon. 3 For the French version of this interview see French Yellow Book No. 102, July 30. 328 Official Diplomatic Documents Austria-Hungary's assurance that it had no intentions of territorial gain in Servia. Austria-Hungary mobilised against Servia and not against Russia, and there was no ground for an immediate action on the part of Russia. I further added that in Germany one could not understand any more Russia's phrase that "she could not desert her brethren in Servia," after the horrible crime of Serajevo. I told him finally he need not wonder if Germany's army were to be mobilised. To St. Petersburgh German White Book Exhibit 23 IV. His Majesty to the Czar. July 30th, 1 A.M. My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of Your Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilisa- tion. I have told You the same in my last telegram. Austria-Hun- gary has mobilised only against Servia, ami only a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case, according to Your advice and that of Your Government, mobilises against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator with which You have entrusted me in such friendly manner and which I have accepted upon Your express desire, is threatened if not made impossible. The entire weight of decision now rests upon Your shoulders, You have to bear the responsibility for war or peace. (Signed) Wilhelm. From St. Petersburgh German White Hook Exhibit 23a V. The Czar to His Majesty. Peterhof, July 80th, 1914, 1-20 P.M. I in \xk You from my heart for ^ our quick reply. I am sending to-night Tatisheff (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser) with instruc- tions. The military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago, anil for the reason of defence against the preparations of Austria. I hope with all my heart that these measures will not influence in any manner Your position as mediator which I appraise very highly. We need Your strong pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at with us. NlCOLAS. Great Britain : From St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 93 Telegrams communicated by ('mint Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in Loudon, July 30, H)l.' h (1) Russian Ambassador at Vienna to M. Sazonof [Fur text see Russian Orange Book No. 45, July 28. For 93, (2) and (3), see under date of July 29, Russian Orange Book Nos. 49 and 50.] July 30, British Blue Book No. 95 329 From Vienna British Blue Book No. 94 Sir M. dr Bunsen, Briii.sk Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Becriccd July 30.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914. I learn that mobilisation of Russian corps destined to carry out operations 1 on Austrian frontier has been ordered. My inform- ant is Russian Ambassador. Ministry for Foreign Affairs here has realised, though somewhat late in the day, that Russia will not re- main indifferent in present crisis. I believe that the news of Russian mobilisation will not be a surprise to the Ministry, but so far it is not generally known in Vienna this evening. 2 Unless mediation, which German Government declared themselves ready to offer in concert with three other Great Powers not immediately interested in the Austro-Servian dispute, be brought to bear forthwith, irrevocable steps may be taken in present temper of this country. German Ambassador feigns 3 surprise that Servian affairs should be of such interest to Russia. Both my Russian and French colleagues have spoken to him to-day. Russian Ambassador expressed the hope that it might still be possible to arrange matters, and explained that it was impossible for Russia to do otherwise than take an interest in the present dispute. Russia, he said, had done what she could already at Belgrade to induce Servian Government to meet principal Austrian demand in a favourable spirit; 4 if approached in a proper manner, he thought she would probably go still further in this direc- tion. But she was justly offended at having been completely ig- nored, and she could not consent to be excluded from the settlement. German Ambassador said that if proposals were put forward which opened any propect of possible acceptance by both sides, he per- sonally thought that Germany might consent to act as mediator in concert with the three other Powers. I gather from what Russian Ambassador said to me that he is much afraid of the effect that any serious engagement may have upon Russian public opinion. I gathered, however, that Russia would go a long way to meet Austrian demands on Servia. From Vienna British Blue Book X". '.>."> Sir M. de Bunsen. British . I mbassador at I 'ienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 30.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 30, 1914. Russian Ambassador hopes that Russian mobilisation will be regarded by Austria as what it is, viz., a clear intimation that Russia 1 The meaning of this phrase is not perfectly clear, although it seems to contemplate war. -' C'f. French Yellow Book No. 107, same day. 3 Expressions of this kind, implying motives and not confining themselves to facts. are regrettable in official documents. ' This was denied by Austria-Hungary ; see Red Book No. 34, July 27. 330 . Official Diplomatic Documents must be consulted regarding the fate of Servia, hut he does not know how the Austrian Government are taking it. lie says that Russia must have an assurance that Servia will not be crushed, but she would understand that Austria-Hungary is compelled to exact from Servia measures which will secure her Slav provinces from the continuance of hostile propaganda from Servian territory. 1 The French Ambassador hears from Berlin that the German Ambassador at Vienna is instructed 2 to speak seriously to the Austro- Hungarian Government against acting in a manner calculated to provoke a European war. Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified with extreme anti-Russian and anti-Servian feeling prevalent in Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause of peace with entire sincerity. Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador knew 3 the text of the Austrian ulti- matum to Servia before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it. British Blue Book No. 96 Sir M. de Bun-sen, British Ambassador ut Vienna, to Sir Edward (hey. — (Received July 30.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, Jul;/ 30, 1914. The Russian Ambassador gave the French Ambassador and myself this afternoon at the French Embassy, where I happened to be, an account of his interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he said was quite friendly. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that as Russia had mobilised, Austria must, of course, do the same. This, however, should not be regarded as a threat, but merely as the adoption of military precautions similar to those which had been taken across the frontier. He said he had no objec- tion to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh continuing their conversations, 4 al- though he did not say that they could be resumed on the basis of the Servian reply. On the whole, the Russian Ambassador is not dissatisfied. He had begun to make his preparations for his departure on the strength of 1 This is an eminently fair statement, nor did Austria-Hungary desire more. Cf. Austru-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 20. 2 For the instruction see< chancellor's Speech, note 2, British Blue Book No. 07, July 28. ' Contrast with this, British despatch based on French information, French Yellow Book No. 107, July 30, where Jules Cambou complains of "the negative action of German diplomacy at Vienna." 3 There is no proof for this assertion. 4 This is what Germany had demanded; see Chancellor's Speech, note 2, British Blue Book No. 07, July 2S. July 30, British Blue Book No. 97 331 a rumour that Austria would declare war in reply to mobilisation. He now hopes that something may yet be done to prevent war with Austria. From St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 97 ' Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 30.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July SO, 1914. French Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. His Excellency said that German Ambassador had told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were willing to guarantee that Servian integrity woidd be respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this might be so, but nevertheless Servia would become an Austrian vassal, just as, in similar circumstances, Bokhara had become a Russian vassal. There would be a revolution in Russia, if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs. M. Sazonof 1 told us that absolute proof was in possession of Rus- sian Government that Germany was making military and naval prep- arations against Russia — more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland. German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 2 a.m., when former completely broke down on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof 2 to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof 2 accordingly drew up and handed to Ger- man Ambassador a formula 3 in French, of which following is trans- lation : — " If Austria, recognising that her conflict with Servia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate, from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages to stop all military prepara- tions." 4 Preparations for general mobilisation will be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will be a European war. Excitement here has reached such a pitch that, if Austria refuses to make a concession, Russia cannot hold back, and now that she knows that Germany is arming, she can hardly postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into general mobilisation. 1 This despatch refers to the interview described in French Yellow Book Nos. 102 and 103. July 30. For a full discussion of the British and French presentations, see E. von Mach, Germany's Point of View. pp. 428 ft. 2 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 3 This proposal was altered at the request of the British Ambassador (French Yellow Book No. 113. Julv 31) acting according to the wishes of Sir E. Grey. British Blue Book No. 110, Julv 31. Cf. also British Blue Book 103, July 30, and No. 120, July 31, received and listed under date of August 1. For a fuller discussion of these despatches see E. von Mach, Germany's Point of View, pp. 432 ff. ' The meaning of this phrase is " demobilisation," as appears from British Blue Book No. 99, same day. 3.32 Official Diplomatic Documents From. Berlin British Blue Book No. 98 Sir K. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward (hey. — {Received July 30.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 30, 1914. Secretary of State informs me that immediately on receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's : telegram recording his last conversation 2 with yon lie asked Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions from here, lie has up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian mobili- sation against Austria will have increased difficulties, as Austria- Hungary, who has as yet only mobilised against Servia, will probably find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above basis for an arrange- ment and in persuading her in the meantime to take no steps which might be regarded as an act of aggression against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace may be preserved. He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view of Russian mobilisation and military measures which he hears are being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on leave — a measure which had been officially taken after, and not before, visit of French ambassador yesterday — Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of military preparations. Something, how- ever, would have soon to be done, for it might be too late, and when they mobilised they would have to mobilise on three sides. He regretted this, as he knew France did not desire war, but it would be a military necessity. His Excellency added that telegram 3 received from Prince Lich- nowsky ' last night contains matter which he had heard'with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he thoroughly appre- ciated frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken. He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very late last night ; had it been received earlier Chancellor would, of course, not have spoken to me in the way he had done. 1 German Ambassador in London. 2 This conversation is not mentioned in the British Blue Book, although Sir E. ( Irey related it to the French Ambassador. The reporl of the latter is printed in the French Yellow Hook No. ins, July mi. It had reference to the "military preparations," i.e. the mobilisation of England. Probably during the same conversation the subject of the neutrality of England was discussed along the Ion- mentioned in British Blue Hook No. 102, July 30. The British Blue Hook contains do footnote to "telegram" in the second line of this despatch, hut gives a footnote to "telegram" in the first line of the second before last paragraph, namely "See No. 102." For the importance of the despatch No. 11)2, see note to that despatch. •' See No. 102. July 30, British Blue Book No. 99 333 From Paris British Blue Book No. 99 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 30.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 30, 1914. President of the Republic tells me that the Russian Govern- ment have been informed 1 by the German Government that unless Russia stops her mobilisation Germany would mobilise. But a further report, since received from St. Petersburgh, states that the German communication had been modified, 2 and was now a request to be informed on what conditions Russia would consent to demobili- sation. 3 The answer given is that she agrees to do so on condition that Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the sovereignty of Servia and submit certain of the demands of the Austrian note, which Servia has not accepted, to an international discussion. President thinks that these conditions will not be accepted by Austria. He is convinced that peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France 4 in the event of a conflict between France and Germany as a result of the present differences between Austria and Servia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude. I explained to him how difficult it would be for His Majesty's Government to make such an announcement, but he said that he must maintain that it would be in the interests of peace. France, he said, is pacific. She does not desire war, and all that she has done at present is to make preparations for mobilisation so as not to be taken unawares. The French Government will keep His Majesty's Government informed of everything that may be done in that way. They have reliable information that the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for war. If there were a general war on the Continent it would inevitably draw England into it for the protection of her vital interests. A declara- tion now of her intention to support France, whose desire it is that peace should be maintained, would almost certainly prevent Germany from going to war. 1 Not in Russian Orange Book or German White Book, but given in French Yellow Book No. 100, July 29. 2 French Yellow Book No. 103, July 30, British Blue Book No. 97, and Russian Orange Book No. 60, same day. ^ ^Demobilisation, it appears from this, was the meaning of the phrase "stop all military preparations" given in British Blue Book No. 97, same day. ■" A declaration on the part of England of her "solidarity with Russia and France" had been desired by Sazonof as early as July 24 (British Blue Book No. 6) and again on July 27 (British Blue Book No. 44). Evidently France was now trying to persuade England to take this stand at least so far as France was concerned. 334 Official Diplomatic Documents From Rome British Blue Book No. 100 Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 30.) (Telegraphic.) Rome, July 30, 1.914- German Ambassador told me last night that he thought Germany would he able to prevent Austria from making any exorbitant demands if Servia could be induced to submit, and to ask for peace early, say, as soon as the occupation of Belgrade had been accomplished. I made to his Excellency the personal suggestion that some formula might be devised by Germany which might be acceptable for an ex- change of views. I see, however, that you have already made this suggestion. 1 To Berlin British Blue Book No. 101 - Sir Edward, Grey to Sir B. Goschcn, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. Your telegram of 29th July. 3 His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality * on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies. From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy. Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either. Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Oermany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavour- able and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chan- cellor contemplates. 1 A probable reference to suggestion contained in British Blue Book No. 08, July 28. 2 For the substance of this despatch see No. 102 and note. 3 British Blue Book No. 85, July 29. 4 From subsequent publications by the British and German Governments it ap- pears that the subject of English neutrality had been frequently discussed in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the war. July SO, British Blue Book No. 103 335 You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe ; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be ipso facto improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good-will. And I will say this : If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued : against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. 2 The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto. To Berlin British Blue Book No. 102 3 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July SO, 1914. I have warned Prince Lichnowsky 4 that Germany must not count upon our standing aside in all circumstances. This is doubtless the substance of the telegram from Prince Lichnowsky to German Chancellor, to which reference is made in the last two paragraphs of your telegram of 30th July. 5 To St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 103 Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Peters- burgh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July •<", 1914. German Ambassador informs me that German Government would endeavour to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian 1 Such a promise at this time would seem to he unthinkable unless Germany here- tofore could not have been assured that "no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her." - Sir E. Grey here recognises that through the last Balkan crisis Germany had worked for peace as well as he himself. 3 No reason appears why this despatch should not have been printed immediately after No. 9S to wdiich it refers. The conversation there discussed followed upon the telegram, British Blue Book No. 85, July 29, and may be expected to have contained Sir E. Grey's oral answer to the Chancellor's proposal. Unfortunately the whole conversation is not given in the British Blue Book (see note to No. 98). Numbers 101 and 102, therefore, seem to contain two answers to the Chancellor's enquiry. * German Ambassador in London. 6 See No. 98. 336 Official Diplomatic Documents territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further, while Powers endeavoured to arrange that Servia should give satis- faetion sufficient to pacify Austria. 1 Territory occupied would of course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, and, if it can be obtained, I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides. Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by M. Sazonof, 2 as quoted in your telegram of the 30th July, 3 and fears it cannot be modified; 4 but if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might he changed to read that the Powers would examine how Servia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian sovereign rights or independence. If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighbouring Servian territory, declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete settlement can he arrived at, I hope that Russia would also consent to discussion ami suspension of further military preparations, provided that other Powers did the same. It is a slender chance of preserving peace, hut the only one I can suggest if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agree- ment at Berlin. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs. Tn Paris British Blue Book Xo. 104 Sir Edward drey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914- You should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram to Sir (1. Buchanan 5 of to-day, 6 and say that I know that lie has been urging Russia not to precipitate a cri-ds.' 1 hope he may be able to support this last suggestion at St. Petersburgh. 1 This had been suggested by Sir E. Grey on the previous day, British Blue Book X,. vn Julj 29. - Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, a \,. '.C. 1 It does ii"t appear why the Russian formula needed any modification, agreeing substantially with Germain - to Austria-Hungary. See also Russian Orange Book K I. The altered formula (British Blue Book Xo. 120 under date of August 1 1 was certainly much less acceptable to the Teutonic Powers. s Brin-li Embassador a1 si. Petersburg. f See No 103. 7 Tins must refer to French Yellow Book Xo. 101. July 30. where Viviani begs I not to take "any step which may offer to Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilisation of her forces." It cannot refer to general pacific pressure brought tobearon Russia; for Russian Orange Hook No.36, July 27. and Xo. ">:;. July29 ermanv had vainly tried to set France in do so. See also French Yellow I->i>ok Xo, 62, Juh 27, and French Yellow Book Xo. SO. Julv 2s. July 30, British Blue Book No. 105 337 To Paris British Blue Book No. 105 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. Sir, Foreign Office, July 30, 1.914. M. Cambon reminded me to-day of the letter I had written to him two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was seriously threatened, we would discuss what we were prepared to do. I enclose for convenience of reference copies of the letter in quest ion and of M. Cambon's reply. He said that the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened than it was now. He did not wish to ask me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circumstances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France. He gave me a paper, of which a copy is also enclosed, showing that the German military preparations were more advanced and more on the offensive upon the frontier than anything France had yet done. 1 He anticipated that the aggression would take the form of either a demand that France should cease her preparations, or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things could France admit. I said that the Cabinet 2 was to meet to-morrow morning, and I would see him again to-morrow afternoon. I am, etc. E. Grey. Enclosure 1 in No. 105 Sir Edward Grey to J/. Cambon, French Ambassador in London. My dear Ambassador, Foreign Office, November 22, 1912. From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engage- ment that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for in- stance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war. You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other. 1 From British Blue Book No. 104 it appeared that Sir E. Grey was familiar with Viviani's despatch, French Yellow Book No. 101, which shows that Viviani knew that Germany had not yet proceeded even to partial mobilisation. 2 For a fuller discussion of this and subsequent Cabinet meetings, see E. von Mach, Germany's Point of View, McClurg & Co., pp. 263 ff. 338 Official Diplomatic Documents I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be pre- pared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them. Yours, etc. Enclosure 2 in No. 105 M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London, to Sir Edward Grey. (Translation.) French Embassy, London. November 23, 191 .'. Dear Sir Edward. You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd Novem- ber, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time ; that it had always been understood that these con- sultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consul- tations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventualities ; that, how- ever, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two ( rovern- ments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of ;i third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other. Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state that, L'Ambassade dc France, Londres, ce 23 novembre, 1912. Cher Sir Edward. Par votre lettre en date d'hier, 22 novembre, vous m'avez rap- pele que, dans ces dernieres annees, les autorites militaires et navales de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne s'etaient con- siliums de temps en temps; qu'il avait toujours ete entendu que ecs consultations ne restrei- gnaient pas la liberte, pour chaque Gouvernement, de decider dans Pavenir s'ils se preteraient Fun l'autre le concours de leurs forces armees ; epic, de part et d'autre, ces consultations entre specia- listes n'etaient et ne devaient pas etre considerees comme des engagements obligeant nos Gou- verneinents a agir dans certains cas ; que cependant je vous avais fait observer epic, si l'un ou l'autre des deux Gouvernements avait de graves raisons d'appre- hender vine attaque non provo- quee de la part d'une tierce Puissance, il deviendrait essentiel de savoir s'il pourrait compter sur l'assistance armee de l'autre. Votre lettre repond a cette ob- servation, et je suis autorise a July SO, British Blue Book No. 105 339 vous declarer que, dans Ie cas ou Fun de nos deux Gouvernements aurait un motif grave d'appre- hender soit l'aggression d'une tierce Puissance, soit quelque evenement menacant pour la paix generale, ce Gouvernement examinerait imm6diatement avec l'autre si les deux Gouvernements doivent agir de concert en vue de prevenir l'aggression ou de sauve- garder la paix. Dans ce cas, les deux Gouvernements deli- bereraient sur les mesures qu'ils seraient disposes a prendre en commun ; si ces mesures com- portaient une action, les deux Gouvernements prendraient aus- sitot en consideration les plans de leurs etats majors et decide- raient alors de la suite qui devrait Itre donnee a ces plans. Votre sincerement devoue, Paul Cambon. in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Govern- ments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common ; if those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans. Yours, etc. Paul Cambon. Enclosure 3 in No. 105 ' French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London. (Translation.) The German Army had its advance-posts on our frontiers yesterday ; German patrols twice penetrated on to our territory. Our advance-posts arc withdrawn to a distance of 10 kilom. from the frontier. The local popula- tion is protesting against being thus abandoned to the attack of the enemy's army, but the Government wishes to make it clear to public opinion and to the British Government that in no case will France be the aggres- L'Armee allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bornes-fron- tieres, hier; par deux fois des patrouilles allemandes out pene- tre sur notre territoire. Nos avant-postes sont en retraite a 10 kilom. en arriere de la frontiere. Les populations ainsi abandon- ees a l'attaque de I'armee ad- verse protestent ; mais le Gou- vernement tient a montrer a l'opinion publique et au Gou- vernement britannique que l'agresseur ne sera en aucun cas 1 Enclosure 3 in No. 105 was dated in the first editions of the British Blue Book, namely July 31, while No. 105 itself is dated July 30. The text of the Enclosure should be compared with French Yellow Book No. 106, on which it is based. Whether the French Ambassador or Sir E. Grey is responsible for the errors and transpositions, it is impossible to state. For a full discussion see E. von Mach, Germany's Point of View, pp. 421 ff., and the same author's Why Europe is at War, G. P. Putnam's Sons. 340 Official Diplomatic Documents la France. Tout le 16 e Corps de Metz renforce par une partie du S e venu de Treves et de Cologne occupe la frontiere de Metz au Luxembourg. Le 15 e Corps d'Armee de Strasbourg a serre sur la frontiere. Sous menace d'etre fusilles les Alsaeiens-Lor- rains des pays annexes ne peuvent pas passer la frontiere; des reservistes \r.\r dizaines de niilliers sunt rappeles en Allemagne ; e'est le dernier staile avant la mobilisa- tion : or, nons n'avons rappele aueun reserviste. Comme vous le voyez, l'Alle- magne l'a fait. J'ajoute que toutes nos informations concor- dent pour montrer que les pre- paratifs allemands out commence samedi, 1 le jour meine de la remise de la note autrichienne. Ces elements, ajoutes a ceux contenus dans mon telegramme d'hier, vous permettent de faire la preuve au Gouvernement bri- tannique de la volonte pacifique de 1'iin et des intentions agres- sives !» Russian Charge a" Affaires in Servia t<> Russian Minister fur Foreign Affair,: ' Nish, July 17 (30), mi 4. (Telegram.) The Prince Regent yesterday published a manifesto, signed by all the Servian Ministers, on the declaration of war by Austria against Servia. The manifesto ends with the following words: "Defend your homes and Servia with all your might." At the solemn opening of the Skupschtina the Regent read the speech from the Throne, in his own name. At the beginning of his speech he pointed out that 1 The earlier editions of the British Blue Book contained no footnote to this errone- ous .late. The later ones print this note : "Sic: in original. The actual date of the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum was. in fact. Thursday, .Inly L':-S. The Servian reply was dated Saturday, July -'5, and it is clearly to the latter document that reference is intended." July 30, Russian Orange Book No. 60 341 the place of their convocation showed the importance of present events. He followed this with a summary of recent events — the Austrian ultimatum, the Servian reply, the efforts of the Servian Government to do their utmost to avoid war that was compatible with the dignity of the State, and, finally, the armed aggression of their most powerful neighbour against Servia, at whose side stood Montenegro. Passing in review the attitude of the Powers towards the dispute, the Prince emphasised in the first place the sentiments which animated Russia, and the gracious communication from His Majesty the Emperor that Russia would in no case abandon Servia. 1 At each mention of His Majesty the Czar and of Russia the hall re- sounded with loud bursts of wild cheering. The sympathy shown by France and England 2 was also touched upon in turn, and called forth approving plaudits from the members. The speech from the throne ended by declaring the Skupschtina open, and by expressing the hope that everything possible would be done to lighten the task before the Government. To Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome Russian Orange Book No. 60 Russian Minister for Foreign Affair* in Russian Ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome. St. Petersburgh, July 17 (30), 1914. (Telegram.) The German Ambassador, who has just left me, has asked :; whether Russia would not be satisfied with the promise which Austria might give — that she would not violate the integrity of the Kingdom of Servia — and whether we could not indicate upon what conditions we would agree to suspend our military preparations. I dictated to him the following declaration to be forwarded to Berlin for immediate action : "Si l'Autriche, reconnaissant "If Austria, recognising that que la question austro-serbe a the Austro-Servian question has assume le caractere d'une ques- assumed the character of a ques- tion europeenne, se declare prete tion of European interest, de- a eliminer de son ultimatum les dares herself ready to eliminate points qui portent atteinte aux from her ultimatum points winch droits souverains de la Serbie, violate the sovereign rights of la Russie s'engage a cesser ses Servia, Russia engages to stop preparatifs militaires." her military preparations." Please inform me at once by telegraph what attitude the German Government will adopt in face of this fresh proof of our desire to do 1 See Russian Orange Book No. 40. July 27. 2 For England's attitude a few weeks earlier, see Mr. Asquit.h's speech, London TimesfJuly 1, 1914, referring to the Serajevo murder. "We are once more confronted with one of those incredible crimes which almost make us despair of the progress of mankind." 3 Cf. note 2 to British Blue Book No. 99, July 30. 342 Official Diplomatic Documents the utmost possible for a peaceful settlement of the question, for we cannot allow such discussions to continue solely in order that Germany and Austria may gain time for their military preparations. From Berlin Russian Orange Book No. HP Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Berlin, July 17 {SO), 1914. I learn that the order for the mobilisation of the German army and navy has just been issued. From Berlin Russian Orange I! .. No. 02 Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister fur Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Berlin, Jul;/ 17 (30), 1014- The Minister for Foreign Affairs has just telephoned that the news of the mobilisation of the German army and fleet, which has just been announced, is false ; that the news sheets had been printed in advance so as to lie ready tor all eventualities, and that they were put on sale in the afternoon, but that they have now been confiscated. From Berlin Russian Orange Book No. 63 Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, .lull/ 17 (SO), 1914. i Telegram.) I have received your telegram of Kith (20th) July, 3 and have com- municated the text of your proposal 3 to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I have just seen. He told me that lie had received an identic telegram from the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and lie then declared that he considered it impossible for Austria to accept our proposal. 1 The juxtaposition of Nos. 61 and GO makes it appear as if No. 61 contained the reply to No. 60. This cannot be the ease. From French Yellow Hook No. 113, July 31, and British Blue Book No. 120, July 31, printed under date of August 1. it appears that the formula was changed bj Sazonof probably on .Inly 31. This would have been impossible if Germany had issued her order for the mobilisation of her army and navy on July 30. I 'f. also French Yellow Book No. L01, July 30. Asa matter of fact Germany mobilised on August 1 as of August 2. See British Blue Hook No. 142, August. 1. and the chapter on Mobilisation in M. P. Price, The Diplomatic History of the War. ■ British Blue Book No. 93, July 30. Enclosure No. 2, dated July 29. 3 Tins pioposal was superseded by the proposal of July 30, printed above. Orange Book No. 60. To print this despatch (No. 63) after No. 60 is misleading, because the casual reader may see in it. Austria's refusal to accept the formula of No. 60, which is not the case. July 30, Russian Orange Book No. 65 343 From London Russian Orange Book No. 64 Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) London, July 17 (SO), 1914. I have communicated the substance of your telegrams of the 16th (29th) 1 and 17th (30th) July 2 to Grey, who looks upon the situa- tion as most serious, but wishes to continue the discussions. I pointed out to Grey that — since you agreed with him to accept what- ever proposal he might make in order to preserve peace, provided that Austria did not profit by any ensuing delays to crush Servia — the situation in which you were placed had apparently been modified. At that time our relations with Germany had not been compromised. After the declaration made by the German Ambassador at St. Peters- burg regarding German mobilisation, those relations had changed, and you had returned the only reply to his request that was possible from a Great Power. When the German Ambassador again visited you, and enquired what your conditions were, you had formulated them in altogether special circumstances. I also again emphasised to Grey the necessity of taking into consideration the new situation brought about by the fault of Germany in consequence of the German Ambassador's action. 3 Grey replied that he fully understood this, and that he would remember these arguments. From London Russian Orange Book No. 65 Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) London, July 17 (30), 1914. The German Ambassador has asked Grey 4 why Great Britain was taking military measures both on land and sea. Grey replied that these measures had no aggressive character, but that the situa- tion was such that each Power must be ready. 1 British Blue Book No. 93, Enclosure 2, July 30. Since the Ambassador had com- municated the entire telegram to Sir E. Grey, it does not appear why he should here speak of communicating the substance. Equally confusing is the mixture of two separate proposals. See second note to previous despatch. 2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 97, July 30. and Russian Orange Book No. 60, same day. 3 This action is described in very different terms in British Blue Book No. 97, July 30. 1 Omitted in British Blue Book, see above, note 1 to British Blue Book No. 98, July 30, and French Yellow Book No. 10S, same day. 344 Official Diplomatic Documents Serbia : To St. Pctersburgh Serbian Blue Book No. 44 His Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia. (Telegraphic.) Nish, July 17/30, 1914. [For the text see Russian Orange Book No. 56, undated in the Collected Dip- lomatic Documents, but printed among the despatches of July 2!). No reason is given why a despatch from the Serbian Crown Prince was known in Russia a day before it was published in the Serbian Blue Book as having been sent from Serbia. For Serbian Blue Book Nos. 45 to 47 see under July 28.] From. St. Petersburgh Serbian Blue Book No. 48 M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affair*-, to Dr. M. Spalaiko- vitch, Serbian Minister at Petrograd. Sir, Petrograd, July 17/30, 1914. I had the honour to receive your note of July 15/28, l No. 527, in which you communicated to trie the contents of the telegram re- ceived by you from His Excellency, M. Pashitch, in regard to the declaration of war on Serbia by Austria-Hungary. I sincerely regret this sad event, and will not fail to lay before His Majesty the petition by the Serbian nation, whose interpreter you are. I have, etc. 1 Not published in Russian Orange Book or Serbian Blue Book. If the date of the telegram from Sazonof. July 30, is correct it would seem that Sazonof had waited al least two days before laying Serbia's petition before the Czar. This seems incredible. July 31, Au-stro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51 345 Friday, July 31, 1914 SUMMARY OF DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Austria-Hungary Belgium France Germany Great Britain Sent Despatches to London and Petrograd, All representatives abroad London, Berlin and Paris, All representatives abroad London, etc., Petrograd Rome, Petrograd, Paris Petrograd, Berlin, Paris and Berlin, Brussels, Paris London, etc. ; London Despatches from Petrograd, Paris London, Luxemburg, Petrograd Vienna, Berlin, Brussels London, Luxemburg, Petrograd, Vienna, Berlin, Brussels Vienna, Berlin Russia Serbia Austria-Hungary is prepared to entertain Sir E. Grey's proposal to negotiate between her and Serbia. Russia's mobilisation order, however, posted in the early hours throughout the Russian Empire, induces her to mobilise her own forces in Galicia. She nevertheless continues her direct conversations with Russia. Belgium mobilises her forces but promises to observe strict neutrality. She receives assurances of the French minister de sua, and publishes German assur- ances made in the Reichstag several years ago. France, having promised her unconditional support of Russia on the previous day, is trying to obtain an unconditional promise of support from Great Britain. (!i rmany is deeply stirred by the Russian order of general mobilisation, which came while Emperor and Czar were still exchanging telegrams. She says that this order is making her pacific efforts in Vienna impossible and endangering her safety. She consequently declares "Kriegsgefahrzustand " and asks Russia, in an ultima- tum, to demobilise within 12 hours. At the same time she asks France to reply within 18 hours, whether she will remain neutral in a Russo-German War. Great Britain : The Cabinet refuses the request of France to make her a definite promise of support. Sir E. Grey, however, or his assistant, Sir A. Nicolson, promises to bring the matter up again in the Cabinet on the next day, while Sir E. Grey himself gives Germany to understand that Great Britain would join France in case of war, making thus a declaration contrary to the decision of the Cabinet. Notes are addressed to France and Germany regarding their respective attitudes toward the neutrality of Belgium, which Sir E. Grey declares to be not "a decisive but an important factor, in determining our attitude." Sir E. Grey requests a modification of Sazonof's formula of the previous day. Russia alters her formula of the previous day in which she had promised to stop her military measures, and orders the general mobilisation of her forces. Serbia is silent on this day. Austria-Hungary : To London and St. Petersburgk AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 51 Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at London and St. Petersburgh. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 1914. I am telegraphing as follows to Berlin : — Herr von Tschirschky has in accordance with his instructions yesterday communicated a discussion between Sir E. Grey and Prince 346 Official Diplomatic Documents Lichnowsky in which the British Secretary of State made the following announcement to the German Ambassador : — Sazonof has informed the British Government that after the dec- laration of war by Austria-Hungary against Servia, he is no longer in a position to deal directly with Austria-Hungary, 1 and he there- fore requests that Great Britain will again take up her work of media- tion. The Russian Government regarded the preliminary stoppage of hostilities as a condition precedent to this. To this Russian declaration, Sir E. Grey remarked to Prince Lichnowsky that Great Britain thought of a mediation a quatre, and that she regarded this as urgently necessary if a general war was to be prevented. I ask your Excellency to convey our warm thanks to the Secretary of State for the communications made to us through Herr von Tschirschky, and to declare to him that in spite of the change in the situation which has since arisen through the mobilisation of Russia, we are quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E. Grey to nego- tiate between us and Servia. 2 The conditions of our acceptance are, nevertheless, that our military action against Servia should continue to take its course, and that the British Cabinet should move the Russian Government to bring to a standstill the Russian mobilisation which is directed against us, in which case, of course, we will also at once cancel the defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which are occasioned by the Russian attitude. From si. Petersburgh Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 52 3 Count Szdpdry tt> ('mini Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July SI, 1014- The order for the general mobilisation of the entire Army and Fleet was issued early to-day. To the Imperial and Royal Diplomatic Representatives Austro-Hungarian Red Hook No. 53 ('limit Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Diplomatic Representatives. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 191. '+. V< >i( your information and for use in your dealings with the Govern- ment to which you are accredited. 1 The only published despatch in the British Blue Book and Russian Orange Book tii which this can refer is Russian Orange Book No. 50, .July 211. Here, however, it is Sazonof, while there it is Austria-Hungary who is said to have broken off the conversa- tions. This despatch is not printed in the'. ( ierman White Book. 1 This i- an enormous concession both to Great Britain and France. Heretofore Germany and Austria-Hungary had always refused arbitration between Austria and Serbia while ready to accept arbitration between Austria and Russia. 3 Tlie juxtaposition of these despatches, Nos. 51 and 52, is as unfortunate as that. noted above, Russian ( trance Book Nos. 60 and 61, July 30. The mobilisation was in neither rase the result of the previous despatch. The Russian mobilisation was the result of a decision reached "five days ago," according to the Czar's telegram of July Mil; see German White Book, Exhibit 23a. July 31, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 55 347 As mobilisation has been ordered by the Russian Government on our frontier, we find ourselves obliged to take military measures in Galicia. These measures are purely of a defensive character and arise ex- clusively under the pressure of the Russian measures, which we regret exceedingly, as we ourselves have no aggressive intentions of any kind against Russia, and desire the continuation of the former neigh- bourly relations. Pourparlers between the Cabinets at Vienna and St. Petersburgh appropriate to the situation are meanwhile being continued, 1 and from these we hope that things will quiet down all round. From Paris Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 54 Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 31, 1.91 4. German Ambassador in pursuance of the instructions of his Government has declared here that if the general mobilisation ordered by the Russian Government is not stopped within 12 hours, Germany also will mobilise. At the same time Baron Schoen has asked whether France will remain neutral in the event of a war between Germany and Russia. An answer to this is requested within eighteen hours. The time limit expires to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 o'clock in the after- noon. From. St. Petersburgh Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 55 Count Szapary to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 31, 1.91 4. Your Excellency's telegram 2 of the 30th July has been received. You will have gathered from my telegram 3 of the 29th July, that without waiting for instructions I again resumed conversations with M. Sazonof more or less on the basis which has now been indicated to me, but that the points of view on the two sides had not materially approximated to each other. Meanwhile, however, it has appeared from the conversations between the German Ambassador and the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Russia will not 4 accept as satisfactory the formal declaration that Austria-Hungary will neither diminish the ter- ritory of the Servian Kingdom nor infringe on Servian sovereignty nor injure Russian interests in the Balkans or elsewhere ; since then more- over a general mobilisation 5 has been ordered on the part of Russia. 1 A despatch explaining the resumption of the pourparlers seema to be lacking, unless No. 55, same day, explains it. ■ Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50, July 30. 3 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. 4 In reports of these conversations this is only stated by inference. Cf. British Blue Book No. 97, July 30. 6 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 52, same day. 348 Official Diplomatic Documents Belgium : To Berlin, Paris, London Belgian Gray Book No. 9 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London. Sir, Brussels, July 31, 191 4. The French Minister came to show me a telegram from the Agence Havas reporting a state of war ! in Germany, and said 2 : — " 1 seize this opportunity to declare that no incursion of French troops into Belgium will take place, even if considerable forces are massed upon the frontiers of your country. France does not wish to incur the responsibility, so far as Belgium is concerned, of taking the first hostile act. Instructions in this sense will be given to the French authorities." I thanked M. Klobukowski for his communication, and I felt bound to observe that we had always had the greatest confidence in theloyal observance by both our neighbouring States of their engagements towards us. We have also every reason to believe that the attitude of the German Government will be the same as that of the Govern- ment of the French Republic. To All Belgian Missions Abroad Belgian Gray Book No. LO M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all Heads of Belgian Missions abroad. (Telegram.) Brussels, July 31, 1.914. The Minister of War informs me that mobilisation has been ordered 3 and that Saturday, the 1st August, will be the first day. To Berlin, London, Paris Belgian Gray Book No. 11 .1/. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris. Sir, Brussels, July 31, 1914. The British Minister asked to see me on urgent business, and made the following communication, which he had hoped for some days 1 1 "Sl:iti' 11!' danger of war" (Kriegsgefahrzustand), sec French Yellow Book No. 119, July 31, and British Mine Honk No. 112, same day. -It is an unusual step in diplomacy for the Minister to make such a declaration without authority to that effect having been sent. The formal declaration of the French ( lovernmenl was made later. < '.{. Belgian < iray Book No. 15, August 1. 1 ! 1 1 4 . 'It will be noted that Belgium ordered the mobilisation of her troops our I' earlier than < lermany. Sec I lerman White Book, p. ">."<), August 1 at5 p.m., and Brit- ish Blue Book No. 127, August 1. 4 No explanation is given why the British Minister could not have done so before. July 31, Belgian Gray Book No. 12 349 to be able to present to me : Owing to the possibility of a Euro- pean war, Sir Edward Grey has asked the French and German Governments separately if they were each of them ready to respect Belgian neutrality provided that no other Power violated it : — " In view of existing treaties, I am instructed : to inform the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the above, and to say that Sir Edward Grey presumes that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her neutrality, and that she desires and expects that the other Powers will respect and maintain it." I hastened to thank Sir Francis Villiers for this communication, which the Belgian Government particularly appreciate, and I added that Great Britain and the other nations guaranteeing our independ- ence could rest assured that we would neglect no effort to maintain our neutrality, and that we were convinced that the other Powers, in view of the excellent relations of friendship and confidence which had always existed between us, would respect and maintain that neutrality. I did not fail to state that our military forces, which had been con- siderably developed in consequence of our recent reorganisation, were sufficient to enable us to defend ourselves 2 energetically in the event of the violation of our territory. In the course of the ensuing conversation, Sir Francis seemed to me somewhat surprised at the speed with which we had decided to mobilise our army. I pointed out to him that the Netherlands had come to a similar decision before we had done so, and that, more- over, the recent date of our new military system, and the tem- porary nature of the measures upon which we then had to decide, made it necessary for us to take immediate and thorough precautions. Our neighbours and guarantors should see in this decision our strong desire to uphold our neutrality ourselves. Sir Francis seemed to be satisfied with my reply, and stated that his Government were awaiting this reply before continuing negotiations with France and Germany, the result of which would be communi- cated to me. To Berlin, London, and Paris Belgian Gray Book No. 12 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and Paris. Sir, Brussels, July 31, 1914. In the course of the conversation which the Secretary-General of my Department had with Herr von Below this morning, he ex- 1 British Blue Book No. 115, July 31. 2 This should be read' in the light of the Brussels Documents, published by the German Government, which reveal the close military understanding with Great Britain. The reader should decide for himself whether Belgium was in a position to defend herself also against the Allies. Germany says that this would have been impossible because Belgium had given all her military secrets to Great Britain and, therefore, also to France. 350 Official Diplomatic Documents plained to the German Minister the scope of the military measures which we had taken, and said to him that they were a consequence of our desire to fulfil our international obligations, and that they in no wise implied an attitude of distrust towards our neighbours. The Secretary-General then asked the German Minister if he knew of the conversation which he had had with his predecessor, Herr von Flotow, and of the reply which the Imperial Chancellor had instructed the latter to give. In the course of the controversy which arose in 1911 as a conse- quence of the Dutch scheme for the fortification of Flushing, certain newspapers had maintained that in the ease of a Franco-German war Belgian neutrality ' would be violated by Germany. The Department of Foreign Affairs had suggested that a declara- tion in the German Parliament during a debate on foreign affairs would serve to calm public opinion, and to dispel the mistrust which was so regrettable from the point of view of the relations between the two countries. Ilerr von Bethmann-Hollweg replied that he had fully appreciated the feelings which had inspired our representations. He declared that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality, but he considered that in making a public declaration Germany would weaken her military position in regard to France, who, secured on the northern side, would concentrate all her energies on the east. Baron van der Elst, continuing, said that he perfectly understood the objections raised by Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to the proposed public declaration, and he recalled the fact that since then, in 1913, Herr von Jagow had made reassuring declarations to the Budget Commission of the Reichstag respecting the maintenance of Belgian neutrality. Herr von Below replied that he knew of the conversation with Herr von Flotow, and that he was certain that the sentiments expressed at that time had not changed. Enclosure in Xo. 12 Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Berlin, May ..', 1913. I have the honour to bring to your notice the declarations re- specting Belgian neutrality, as published in the semi-official Nord- deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, made by the Secretary of State and the Minister of War, at the meeting of the Budget Committee of the Reichstag on April 29th : — "A member of the Social Democrat Tarty said: 'The approach of a war between Germany and France is viewed with apprehension 1 For a full discussion of the neutrality of Belgium see A. K. Fuehr, The Neutrality of Belgium, Funk& Wagnalls Co. July 31, French Yellow Book No. 110 351 in Belgium, for it is feared that Germany will not respect the neu- trality of Belgium.' " Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State, replied : ' Belgian neutrality is provided for by International Conventions and Germany is de- termined to respect those Conventions.' "This declaration did not satisfy another member of the Social Democrat Party. Herr von Jagow said that he had nothing to add to the clear statement he had made respecting the relations between Germany and Belgium. " In answer to fresh enquiries by a member of the Social Demo- crat Party, Herr von Heeringen, the Minister of War, replied : 'Belgium plays no part in the causes which justify the proposed re- organisation of the German military system. That proposal is based on the situation in the East. Germany will not lose sight of the fact that the neutrality of Belgium is guaranteed by international treaty.' " A member of the Progressive Party having once again spoken of Belgium, Herr von Jagow repeated that this declaration in regard to Belgium was sufficiently clear." France : From London French Yellow Book No. 110 M. Paul Cam.bon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, July 31. 101 4- At the beginning of our conversation J to-day Sir E. Grey told me that Prince Lichnowsky had asked him this morning if Great Britain would observe neutrality in the conflict which is at hand. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied that, if the conflict became general, Great Britain would not be able to remain neutral, and especially that if France were involved Great Britain would be drawn in. I then asked Sir E. Grey concerning the Cabinet Council which took place this morning. He replied that after having examined the situation, the Cabinet had thought 2 that for the moment the British Government were unable to guarantee to us their inter- vention, that they intended to take steps to obtain from Germany and France an understanding to respect Belgian neutrality, but that before considering intervention it was necessary to wait for the situ- ation to develop. I asked Sir E. Grey if, before intervening, the British Government would await the invasion of French territory. I insisted on the fact 1 This conversation is only very briefly touched upon in British Blue Book No. 116, same day. 2 Cf. British Blue Book No. 119, July 31. This was the first vote of the Cabinet to "intervene" or "pledge support" to France. For the second vote, likewise refusing, see French Yellow Book No. 126, August 1. 352 Official Diplomatic Documents that the measures already taken on our frontier by Germany showed an intention to attack in the near future, and that, if a renewal of the mistake of Europe in 1870 was to be avoided, Great Britain should consider at once the circumstances in which she would give France the help on which she relied. 1 Sir E. Grey replied that the opinion of the Cabinet had only been formed on the situation at the moment, that the situation might be modified, and that in that case a meeting of the Cabinet would be called '-' together at once in order to consider it. Sir A. Nicolson, whom I saw on leaving the room of the Secretary of State, told me that the Cabinet would meet again to-morrow, and confidentially gave me to understand that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would be certain to renew the discussion. According to your instructions, I have taken the necessary steps to secure that the autograph letter 3 which the President of the Re- public has addressed to His Majesty the King of England should be given to the King this evening. This step, which will certainly be communicated to the Prime Minister to-morrow morning, will, I am sure, be taken into serious consideration by the British < labinet. Paul Cambon. From Luxemburg French Yellow Book No. 1 1 1 M. Mallard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Luxemburg, July •>/, 1914. TtlE Minister of State has just left the Legation ; he has just told me that the Germans have dosed the bridges over the Moselle at Schengen and at Remich with vehicles and the bridge at Wormel- dange with ropes. The bridges at Wasserbillig and at D'Echternach over the Sure have not been closed, but the Germans no longer allow the export from Prussia of corn, cattle or motor cars. M. Eyschen requested me— •• and this was the real object of his visit — to ask you for an official declaration to the effect that France will, in case of war, respect the neutrality of Luxemburg. When I asked him if he had received a similar declaration from the German Government, he told me that he was going to the German Minister to get the same declaration. Postscript. — l"p to the present no special measure has been taken by the Cabinet of Luxemburg. M. Eyschen has returned from the German Legation. Me complained of the measures showing sus- picion which were taken against a neutral neighbour. The Minister of State has asked the German Minister for an official declaration 1 If France had not relied on the help of Great. Britain she might not have supported Russia . 2 < Contrast this with the assurance given in the next paragraph. ;l This letter was published bv Sir E. Grev. after repeated requests had been made, on Feb. 20, 1915. July 31, French Yellow Book No. 112 353 from his Government undertaking to respect the neutrality. Herr Von Buch is stated to have replied, "That is a matter of course, but it would be necessary for the French Government to give the same undertaking." MOLLARD. To London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna and Rome French Yellow Book No. 112 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome. Paris, July 81, 1914. The British Ambassador has handed me a note J from his Govern- ment asking the French Government to support a proposal at St. Petersburgh for the peaceful solution of the Austro-Servian conflict. This note shows that the German Ambassador has informed Sir E. Grey of the intention of his Government to try to exercise influence on the Austro-Hungarian Government after the capture of Belgrade and the occupation of the districts bordering on the frontier, in order to obtain a promise not to advance further, while the Powers en- deavoured to secure that Servia should give sufficient satisfaction to Austria ; the occupied territory would be evacuated as soon as she had received satisfaction. Sir E. Grey made this suggestion on the 29th July, 2 and expressed the hope that military preparations would be suspended on all sides. Although the Russian Ambassador at London has informed the Secretary of State that he fears that the Russian condition 3 (if Austria, recognising that her conflict with Servia has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the -points which endanger the principle of Servian sovereignty, Russia undertakes to stop all military prepara- tions) cannot be modified, Sir E. Grey thinks that, if Austria stops her advance after the occupation of Belgrade, the Russian Govern- ment could agree to change their formula in the following way : — That the Powers would examine how Servia should give complete satisfaction to Austria without endangering the sovereignty or in- dependence of the Kingdom. In case Austria after occupying Belgrade and the neighbouring Servian territory should declare her- self ready, in the interests of Europe, to stop her advance and to dis- cuss how an arrangement might be arrived at, Russia could also consent to the discussion and suspend her military preparations, pro- vided that the other Powers acted in the same way. In accordance with the request of Sir E. Grey, the French Govern- ment joined in the British suggestion, and in the following terms 1 See British Blue Book No. 104, July 30, also British Blue Book No. 103, same day. - British Blue Book No. 88, July 29. 3 French Yellow Book No. 103, British Blue Book No. 97, July 30. 2a 354 Official Diplomatic Documents asked their Ambassador at St. Petersburg]! to try to obtain, without delay, the assent ' of the Russian Government : — "Please inform ]\I. Sazonof urgently that the suggestion of Sir E. Grey appears to me to furnish a useful basis for conversation between the Powers, who are equally desirous of working for an honourable arrangement of the Austro-Servian conflict, and of averting in this maimer the dangers which threaten general peace. "The plan proposed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by stopping the advance of the Austrian army and by entrusting to the Powers the duty of examining how Servia could give full satis- faction to Austria without endangering the sovereign rights and the independence of the Kingdom, by thus affording Russia a means of suspending all military preparations, while the other Powers are to act in the same way, is calculated equally to give satisfaction to Russia and to Austria and to provide for Servia an acceptable means of issue from the present difficulty. " I would ask you carefully to be guided by the foregoing considera- tions in earnestly pressing M. Sazonof to give his adherence 2 without delay to the proposal of Sir E. Grey, of which he will have been himself informed." Rene Viviani. From St. Petersburgh French Yellow Book No. 113 M. PaUologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs. St. Petersburgh, Jul;/ 81, 1914. The news of the bombardment of Belgrade 3 during the night and morning of yesterday has provoked very deep feeling in Russia. One cannot understand the attitude of Austria, whose provocations since the beginning of the crisis have regularly followed Russia's attempts at conciliation and the satisfactory conversations exchanged between St. Petersburgh and Vienna. Nevertheless, desirous of leaving nothing undone in order to prove his sincere desire to safeguard peace, M. Sazonof informs me that he has modified 4 his formula, as requested by the British Ambassador, in the following way : — "If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Servian conflict has as- sumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits 1 Austria-Hungary wag " quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E. Grey to negotiate between us ami Serbia" ; see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. .51, July 31. - Russia ordered complete mobilisation instead. 3 Cf. last despatch, offer of Sir E. Grey for an agreement "after the occupation of Belgrade." 4 The modified formula must have been less satisfactory than the original one, French Yellow Book No. 103, July 30, because here Austria has to agree to "stay the march-of her troops" while Russia merely agrees to a "waiting attitude," instead of stopping her military preparations as she had first offered to do. July 31, French Yellow Book No. 114 355 that the great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can accord to the Austro-Hiuigarian Government, without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude." Paleologue. To London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and Constantinople French Yellow Book No. 114 M. Bene Viviani, President of the Council '., Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and Constantinople. Paris, July 31, 1014. The efforts made up till now concurrently by Great Britain and Russia with the earnest support of France (obtained in advance for every peaceful effort) with the object of a direct understanding be- tween Vienna and St. Petersburgh, or of the mediation of the four Powers in the most appropriate form, are being united to-day ; Russia, giving a fresh proof of her desire for an understanding, has hastened to reply to the first appearance of an overture 1 made by Germany since the beginning of the crisis (as to the conditions on which Russia would stop her military preparations) by indicating a formula, and then modifying 2 it in accordance with the request of Great Britain ; there ought to be hope, therefore, negotiations having also been begun again between the Russian and Austrian Ambassadors that British mediation will complete at London that which is being attempted by direct negotiations at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. Nevertheless, the constant attitude of Germany who, since the beginning of the conflict, while ceaselessly protesting to each Power her peaceful intentions, has actually, by- her dilatory or negative 3 attitude, caused the failure of all attempts at agreement, and has not ceased to encourage through her Ambassador the uncompromising attitude of Vienna ; the German military preparations begun since the 25th July 4 and subsequently continued without cessation ; the immediate opposition 6 of Germany to the Russian formula, de- clared at Berlin unacceptable for Austria before that Power had even been consulted ; in conclusion, all the impressions derived from Berlin bring conviction that Germany has sought to humiliate Russia, to disintegrate the Triple Entente, and if these results could not be obtained, to make war. Rene Viviani. 1 French Yellow Book No. 103, July 30. 2 See note 2 to previous despatch. 3 Cf. Chancellor's Speech, note 2, British Blue Book No. 67, July 28. 1 That this was an error appears from French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30. See also the chapters on Mobilization in M. P. Price, The Diplomatic History of the War, Scribner's Sons. 5 There is no proof for this assertion. On the contrary Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31, seems to prove that Germany had agreed, for Austria-Hungary's state- ment that she was " prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E. Grey to negotiate be- tween us and Serbia " came as the result of a communication transmitted to her by Germany. Russian Orange Book No. 67, July 31, while stating that the formula was altered at the request of Great Britain, does not say that Germany had opposed the original formula. 356 Official Diplomatic Documents From Vienna French Yellow Book No. 115 M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, July 31, 1914. General mobilisation for all men from 19 to 42 years of age was declared by the Austro-Hungarian Government this morning at 1 o'clock. My Russian colleague still thinks that this step is not entirely in contradiction to the declaration made yesterday by Count Berchtold. Dumaine. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 116 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 31, 101 4. Herr von Jagow sent for me and has just told me that he was very sorry to inform me that in face of the total mobilisation of the Russian army, Germany, in the interest of the security of the Empire, found herself obliged to take serious precautionary measures. What is called "Kriegsgefahrzustand" (the state of danger of war) has been declared, 1 and this allows the authorities to proclaim, if they deem it expedient, a state of siege, to suspend some of the public services, and to close the frontier. At the same time a demand - is being made at St. Petersburgh that they should demobilise, as well on the Austrian as on the German side, otherwise Germany would be obliged to mobilise on her side. Herr von Jagow told me that Herr von Schoen had been instructed to inform the French Government of the resolution of the Berlin Cabinet and to ask them what attitude they intended to adopt. Jules Cambon. To St. Petersburgh French Yellow Book No. 117 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paleologuc, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. Paris, July 31, 1914. The German Government decided at mid-day to take all military measures implied by the state called "state of danger of war." 1 This proves that the previous references to "Kriegsgefahr" were erroneous. See French Yellow Book No. 1(11. July 30, and Russian Orange Book No. 61, same day. 2 Russian Orange Book No. 7U. August 1 (midnight). July 31, French Yellow Book No. US 357 In communicating this decision to me at 7 o'clock this evening, Baron von Schoen added that the Government required at the same time that Russia should demobilise. If the Russian Government has not given a satisfactory reply within twelve hours Germany will mobilise in her turn. I replied to the German Ambassador that I had no information at all 1 about an alleged total mobilisation of the Russian army and navy which the German Government invoked as the reason for the new military measures which they are taking to-day. Baron von Schoen finally asked me, in the name of his Government, what the attitude of France would be in case of war between Germany and Russia. He told me that he would come for my reply to-morrow (Saturday) at 1 o'clock. I have no intention of making any statement to him on this subject, and I shall confine myself to telling him that France will have regard to her interests. The Government of the Republic need not indeed give any account of her intentions except to her ally. I ask you to inform M. Sazonof of this immediately. As I have already told you, I have no doubt that the Imperial Government, in the highest interests of peace, will do everything on their part to avoid anything that might render inevitable or precipitate the crisis. Rene Viviani. From St. Petersburg!) French Yellow Book No. US M. Paleologue, French- Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Rene Viviani, President of Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petersburgh, July 31, 1914. As a result of the general mobilisation of Austria and of the measures for mobilisation taken secretly, but continuously, by Germany for the last six days, 2 the order for the general mobilisation of the Russian army has been given, Russia not being able, without most serious danger, to allow herself to be further out-distanced ; really she is only taking military measures corresponding to those taken by Ger- many. For imperative reasons of strategy the Russian Government, know- ing that Germany was arming, could no longer delay the conversion of her partial mobilisation into a general mobilisation. Paleologue. 1 This is very strange, since the Russian mobilisation was "ordered during the afternoon of July 31" (German White Book. p. 558). according to M. P. Price. The Diplomatic History of the War, Seribner's Sons, p. 103. and London Times. Sept. 11. letter by Mr. Stephen Graham, who states on the Mongolian frontier in Siberia the first telegram to mobilise came through at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 31st July. 2 For the error of this and similar statements see M. P. Price's book referred to in note to previous despatch. 358 Official Diplomatic Documents From Brussels Fkench Yellow Book No. 119 .1/. Klobulcowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Brussels, July 31, 1914. L'Agence Hay as having announced that the state "of danger of war" had been declared in Germany, I told M. Davignon that I could assure him that the Government of the Republic would respect the neutrality of Belgium. The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that the Government of the King had always thought that this would he so, and thanked inc. The Russian Minister and the British Minister, whom I saw subse- quently, appeared much pleased that in the circumstances I gave this assurance, which further, as the British Minister told me, was in accordance with the declaration of Sir E. Grey. Klobtjkowski. Germany: To Rome German White Book Exhibit 19 Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at Rome on ' J nil/ 'list, 191 ;. We have continued to negotiate between liiissia and Austria- Hungary through a direct exchange of telegrams between His Majesty the kaiser and 1 1 is Majesty the Czar, as well as in conjunction with Sir Edward Grey. Through the mobilisation of Russia all our efforts have been greatly handicapped if they have not become impossible. In spite of pacifying assurances Russia is 1 taking such far-reaching measures against us that the situation is becoming continually more menacing. To St. Petersburgh German White Book Exhibit 24 Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador at St. Peters- burgh on Jul;/ 31st, 1914- Urgent. In spite of negotiations still pending and although we have up to this hour made no preparations for mobilisation, Russia has mobilised her entire army and navy, hence also against us. On account of these Russian measures, we have been forced, for the safety of the country, to proclaim the threatening state of war, which docs not yet imply mobilisation. Mobilisation, however, is bound to follow if Russia does not stop every measure of war against us and against Austria- ' The British edition lias this footnote: "The German test ml. Is here •alien tins zugegangenen Nachrichten zufolge' (according to all the information that has reached us"). July 81, British Blue Book No. 50 359 Hungary within 12 hours, and notifies us definitely to this effect. Please to communicte this at once to M. Sazonof and wire hour of communication. 1 To Paris German White Book Exhibit 25 Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in Paris on July 31st, 1914- Urgent. Russia has ordered mobilisation of her entire army and fleet, there- fore also against us in spite of our still pending mediation. 2 We have therefore declared the threatening state of war which is bound to be followed by mobilisation unless Russia stops within 12 hours all measures of war against us and Austria. Mobilisation inevitably implies war. Please ask French Government whether it intends to remain neutral in a Russo-German war. Reply must be made in 18 hours. Wire at once hour of inquiry. Utmost speed necessary. Great Britain: From Vienna British Blue Book No. 50 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 31.) Sir, Vienna, July 28, 1914. I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the Austro-Hungarian note announcing the declaration of war against Servia. I have, etc. Maurice de Bunsen. Enclosure in No. 50 Copy of note verbale, dated Vienna, July 28, 1914 (Translation.) Pour mettie fin aux menees In order to bring to an end subversives partant de Belgrade the subversive intrigues originat- et dirigees centre l'integrite terri- ing from Belgrade and aimed at toriale de la Monarchic austro- the territorial integrity of the hongroise, le Gouvernement Im- Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, perial et Royal a fait parvenir the Imperial and Royal Govcrn- a la date du 23 juillet, 1914, au ment has delivered to the Royal Serbie une note dans laquelle se Servian Government a note, trouvait formulee une serie de dated July 23, 1914, in which a demandes pour l'acceptation des- series of demands were formu- quelles un delai de quarante-huit lated, for the acceptance of which 1 Presented at midnigjit. See Russian Orange Book No. 70, August 1. 2 The British edition adds here a footnote: "The German text adds here ' und obwohl wir selbst keinerlei Mobilmaehungsmassnahmen getroffen haben' (and al- though we ourselves have taken no measures towards mobilisation"). 360 Official Diplomatic Documents hetires a ete accorde a Gouverne- ment Royal. Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'ayant pas repondu a, cette note d'une maniere satisfaisante, le Gou- vernement Imperial et Royal se trouve dans la necessite n sent notification as soon as pos- sible to the British Government. Fr Rd). British Blue Hook No. 106 ' Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — - Received July 31.) (Telegraphic.) Rome, July 30, 1914- I learnt from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who sent for me this evening, that the Austrian Government had declined 2 to continue 1 While printed here as received "n July 31, the discussion is, especially in the second paragraph, of events and proposals of July 29 and 30.' - Sec, however, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. Cf. also Austro- Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31. July 31, British Blue Book No. 107 361 the direct exchange of views with the Russian Government. But he had reason to believe that Germany was now ' disposed to give more conciliatory advice to Austria, as she seemed convinced that we should act with France and Russia, and was most anxious to avoid issue with us. He said he was telegraphing to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin to ask the German Government to suggest that the idea of an exchange of views between the four Powers should be resumed in any form which Austria would consider acceptable. It seemed to him that Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she would demand from Servia, and give a guarantee that she would neither deprive her of independence nor annex territory. It would be useless to ask for anything less than was contained in the Austrian ultimatum, and Germany would support no proposal that might imply non- success for Austria. We might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once. There was still time so long as Austria had received no check. lie in any case was in favour of continuing an exchange of views with His Majesty's Government if the idea of discussions between the four Powers was impossible. From Berlin British Blue Book No. 107 2 Sir. E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 31.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 30, 1914. I do not know whether you have received a reply from the German Government to the communication 3 which you made to them through the German Ambassador in London asking whether they could suggest any method by which the four Powers could use their mediating influence between Russia and Austria. I was informed last night 4 that they had not had time to send an answer yet. To-day, in reply to an enquiry from the French Ambassador 5 as to whether the Im- perial Government had proposed any course of action, the Secretary of State said that he had felt that time would be saved by com- municating with Vienna direct, and that he had asked the Austro- Hungarian Government what would satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been returned. 6 The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the button" as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he 1 This "now" is significant. Of. British Blue Book No. 80, July 29. 2 See note 1 to previous despatch. 3 See British Blue Book No. 84. Julv 29. * I.e. Julv 29. 6 French Yellow Book No. 109. July 30. 6 For the answer that was returned, see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31. 3G2 Official Diplomatic Documents has not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise. From Berlin British Blue Book No. 10S Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July SI.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 81, H'l',. Chancellor informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilisation against Austria. He lias done everything possible to attain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was alto- gether palatable at the Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave his country defenceless while time was being utilised by other Powers ; and if, as lie learns is the case, military measures are now being taken by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible to him to remain quiet. He wished to tell me that it was quite possible that in a very short time, to-day perhaps, the German Government would take some very serious step ; he was, in fact, just on the point of going to have an audience with the Emperor. 1 1 is Excellency added that the news of the active preparations on the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the Czar had appealed to the Emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to mediate at Vienna, and when the Emperor was actually conforming to that request. From Berlin British Blue Book No. 109 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — [Herri red July 31.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1014. I read to the Chancellor this morning your answer to his appeal for British neutrality in the event of war, as contained in your tele- gram of yesterday. 1 His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier, referred to in my im- mediately preceding telegram, that he received your communication without comment. He asked me to let him have the message that I had just read to him as a memorandum, as he would like to reflect upon it before giving an answer, and his mind was so full of grave matters that he could not be certain of remembering all its points. I therefore handed to him the text of your message on the under- standing that it should be regarded merely as a record of conversa- tion, and not as an official document. 2 His Excellency agreed. 1 British Blue Book No. 101, July 30. 2 From this it would appear that Great Britain at this time did not wish to bind herself by "an official document." July 31, British Blue Book No. Ill 363 To St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 110 Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Peters- burgh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914- I learn from the German Ambassador that, as a result of sug- gestions by the German Government, a conversation has taken place at Vienna between the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Russian Ambassador. The Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh has also been instructed that he may converse with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he should give explana- tions about the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, 1 and discuss suggestions and any questions directly affecting Austro-Russian relations. If the Russian Government object to the Austrians mobilising eight army corps, it might be pointed out that this is not too great a number against 400,000 Servians. The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Govern- ment to show goodwill in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations. It is with great satisfaction that I have learnt that discussions are being resumed between Austria and Russia, and you should express this to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and tell him that I earnestly hope he will encourage them. I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military prep- arations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend - them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia. To Berlin British Blue Book No. Ill Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, UU4- I hope that the conversations which are now proceeding between ivustria and Russia may lead to a satisfactory result. The stumbling- block hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of Servian assurances, and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions with regard to the in- dependence and integrity of Servia. It has occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburgh, Germany might sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburgh, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands 1 Of. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31. 2 Rut Russia had herself offered to "stop all military operations." British Blue Book No. 97, July 30. Cf. also note 2, French Yellow Book No. 113, July 31. 364 Official Diplomatic Documents on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Servian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course suspend further military operations or preparations. You may sound the Secretary of State about this proposal. I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburgh and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences, 1 but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in. 2 You can add this when sounding Chancellor or Secretary of State as to proposal above. From Berlin British Blue Book No. 112 Sir E. flosehen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — ( lieee i red July 31.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 81, 1914. According to information 3 just received by German Govern- ment from their Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, whole Russian army and fleet are being mobilised. Chancellor tells me that " Kriegsgefahr" 4 will be proclaimed at once by German Government, as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilisation is directed. Mobilisation would follow almost immediately. His Excellency added in explanation that " Kriegsgefahr" ' signified the taking of certain precautionary measures consequent upon strained relations with a foreign country. This news from St. Petersburgh, added his Excellency, seemed to him to put an end to all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis. Germany must certainly prepare for all emergencies. 1 This is an eminently fair statement. Unfortunately it did not take into account Russia's mobilisation. From the discussion of Sazonof's formula, moreover (cf. British Blue Book NTo. 97, July 30, and X"- 120, July ::i printed under date of August 1), if appears that Sir E. Grey himself induced Sazonof to withdraw his offer to "stop all inilii try operations." The reason for this action is not explained in any of the pub- - This declaration of Sir E. Grey was made before the Belgian question was seriously raised. The defenders of Germany have always claimed that the invasion of Belgium became neees iry', because Great Britain had decided to join France at all hazards and that the risks of a French-English attack through Belgium were too great for I rerm my to run. 3 See note to French Yellow Book No. 117, July 31. 4 "Imminence of War." July 31, British Blue Book No. 114 365 I asked him whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in general interests to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, 1 and that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter. From St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 113 Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July .31.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 31, 1914- It has been decided to issue orders for general mobilisation. 2 This decision was taken in consequence of report received from Russian Ambassador in Vienna to the effect that Austria is deter- mined not to yield to intervention of Powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia. Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start. 3 To Paris British Blue Book No. 114 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Audmssador at Paris, a nil Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 31, 1914- I still trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view of pros- pect of mobilisation in Germany it becomes essential to His Majesty's Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French (Ger- man) Government are prepared to engage to respect neutrality of Belgium so long as no other Power violates it. 4 A similar request is being addressed to German (French) Govern- ment. It is important to have an early answer. 1 This proposal was accepted bv Austria-Hungary ; see Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31. 2 If this despatch is correctly dated from St. Petersburgh. July 31. the British Am- bassador sent this information rather late. See note to French Yellow Book No. 117. July 31. 3 Considering that the Czar telegraphed on July 30 (German White Book, Exhibit 23a) that " military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago," this is a strange remark. 4 If the quintuple treaty of 1839 was in force (see Sir E. Grey's phrase "existing treaties"), the qualification "so long as no other Power violates it" was contrary to the treaty, for in that case the remaining Powers were bound to make joint cause against the invader. Germany has claimed that she could not rely on Great Britain's defence of Belgium if France should have invaded it. See A. K. Fuehr, The Neu- trality of Belgium, Fuuk & VV agnails Co. 366 Official Diplomatic Documents To Brussels British Blue Book No. 115 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July SI, 1014. In view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have asked French and German Governments whether each is pre- pared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power. You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of their power their neutrality, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and observe. You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired. To Paris British Blue Book No. 116 Sir Edivard Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July SI, 1014. I HAVE received your telegram of yesterday's date. 1 Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is quite different from what it was during the Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute directly involving France, whereas in this case France is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers. 1 believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality. 2 We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged His Majesty's Government to reconsider this decision. 3 I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any pledge at the present moment, but that we will certainly consider the situ- ation again directly there is a new development. From Paris British Blue Book No. 117 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 31 .) (Telegraphic) Paris, Jul// ,11, W14. At 7 o'clock this evening I was sent for by Minister for Foreign Affairs. When I arrived the German Ambassador was leaving his Excellency. 1 British Blue Book No. 99. July 30. 2 This was probably quite true on July 31, but it had not been so up to July 29, see British Blur Book No. 80, July 29, and £6. No. 100, July 30, listed under date of July 31. See also French Yellow Boek No. 92, July 29, last paragraph. 3 French Yellow Book No. 110, July 31. July 31, British Blue Book No. 118 3G7 German Ambassador had informed his Excellency that, in view of the fact that orders had been given for the total mobilisation of Russian army and fleet, German Government have in an ultimatum which they have addressed to the Russian Government required that Russian forces should be demobilised. The German Government will consider it necessary to order the total mobilisation of the German army on the Russian and French frontiers if within twelve hours the Russian Government do not give an undertaking to comply with German demand. The Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate this to you, and enquires what, in these circumstances, will be the attitude of England. German Ambassador could not say when the twelve hours termi- nate. He is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to- morrow (Saturday) at 1 P.M. in order to receive the French Govern- ment's answer as to the attitude they will adopt in the circumstances. He intimated the possibility of his requiring his passports. I am informed by the Russian Ambassador : that he is not aware of any general mobilisation of the Russian forces having taken place. From, Vienna British Blue Book No. US Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 31.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 31, 1914. I ah informed by Count Forgach, Under-Secretary of State, that although Austria was compelled to respond to Russian mobilisation, which he deplored, the Austrian Ambassador in London has received instructions to inform you that mobilisation was not to be regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either side. Telegrams were being exchanged between the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor, and conversations were proceeding between Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. A general war might, he seriously hoped, lie staved off by these efforts. On my expressing my fear that Germany would mobilise, he said that Ger- many must do something, in his opinion, to secure her position. 2 As regards Russian intervention on behalf of Servia, Austria-Hungary found it difficult to recognise such a claim. I called his attention to the fact that during the discussion of the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of Ambassadors the Russian Government had stood behind Servia, and that a compromise between the views of Russia and Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line. 1 This is verv strange : cf. the Czar's telegram of July 30. German White Book, Exhibit 23a. and note to French Yellow Book No. 117, July 31. 2 The statement is important in view of the charge that has been made that Ger- many forced the war by duping Austria-Hungary when the latter was on the point of settling her differences with Russia. 368 Official Diplomatic Documents Although he spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not regard the situ- ation as desperate, I could not get from him any suggestion for a similar compromise in the present case. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the Russian Ambassador, whom I have informed of the above conversation. The Russian Ambassador has explained that Russia has no desire to interfere unduly with Servia ; that, as compared with the late Russian Minister, 1 the present Minister at Belgrade is a man of very moderate views ; and that, as regards Austrian demands, Russia had counselled Servia to yield to them as far as she possibly could without sacrificing her independence. His Excellency is exerting himself strongly in the interests of peace. From Paris British Blue Book No. 119 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. Sir, Foreign Office, July J/, 1914- M. Cambon 2 referred to-day to a telegram 3 that had been shown to Sir Arthur Nicolson ' this morning from the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to whether we would intervene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of Rus- sia and France, it would decide the German attitude in favour of peace. I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene. I had refused overtures 5 to promise that we should remain neutral. I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it. 8 That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside. M. ( !ambon then asked me for mv replv to what he had said yester- day. 7 I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet s to-day, that we could not give any pledge at the present time. Though we 1 Mr. von Hartwig, whose very sudden death after the Serajevo murder has not yet b in explained. 2 French Ambassador in London. 3 i'f. the last paragraph, French Yellow Book No. 92, July 29, 4 British Under-Secretary of State for Fo reign Affairs. ' See British Blue Book No. S.5, July 29. 6 British Blue Book No. 111. July 31. 1 C{. British Blue Book No. 105, July 30. 8 This was the first time the British Cabinet voted against joining France: sec also French Yellow Book No. 110, July 31. On the next day, August 1. the Cabinet re- fused for the second time to declare British solidarity with France. See French Yellow Book No. 126, August 1. July 31, Russian Orange Book No. 66 369 should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance. Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved. Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium 1 might be, I would not say a decisive, 2 but an important factor, in determining our attitude. Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium. M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her. I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement. M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have made for peace. 3 It could not be to Eng- land's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1S70 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous in- crease of German strength, and we should now be repeating the mis- take. He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again. Russia : From Vienna Russian Orange Book No. 66 Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Vienna, July IS (31), 1011,. In spite of the general mobilisation, 4 my exchange of views with Count Berchtold and his colleagues continues. They all dwell upon the absence on Austria's part of any hostile intentions whatso- ever against Russia, and of any designs of conquest at the expense of Servia, but they are all equally insistent that Austria is bound to carry through the action which she has begun and to give Servia a serious lesson, which would constitute a sure guarantee for the future. 1 This is not mentioned in Cambon's report of Sir E. Grey's remarks in French Yellow Book No. 110, July 31. 2 This statement is important. 3 There is no statement here that Sir E. Grey corrected this misconception on the part of the French Ambassador. 4 Tins may refer to the Russian mobilisation or to the counter measure of the Austro-Hungarian mobilisation. 2 B 370 Official Diplomatic Documents From St. Petersburgh Russian Orange Book No. 67 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Nome. (Telegram.) 67. Petersburgh, Juki 18 (31), 1914. Please refer to my telegram of 17 (30) July. 1 The British Am- bassador, on the instructions of his Government, has informed me of the wish of the London Cabinet to make certain modifications - in the formula which I suggested yesterday to the German Am- bassador. I replied that I accepted the British suggestion. I accordingly send you the text of the modified formula which is as follows : — (Translation.) "Si l'Autriche consent a ar- "If Austria consents to stay reter la marche de ses armees the march of her troops on sur le territoire serbe et si, Servian territory ; and if, recog- reconnaissant que le conflit nising that the Austro-Servian austro-serbe a assume le carac- conflict has assumed the character tere d'une question d'inteiet of a question of European inter- europeen, elle admet que les est, she admits that the Great Grandes Puissances examinent Powers may examine the satisfac- la satisfaction que la Serbie tion which Servia can accord to pourrait accorder an Gouverne- the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment d'Autriche-Hongrie sans merit without injury to her rights laisser porter atteinte a ses droits as a sovereign State or her inde- d'Etat souverain et a, son inde- pendenee, Russia undertakes to pendance, — la Russie s'engage a maintain her waiting attitude." conserver son attitude expec- tantc." From Berlin "Russian Orange Book No. 68 Russian Ambassador at Berlin to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Berlin, July IS (31), 1914. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has just told me that our discus- sions, which were already difficult enough on account of the mobilisa- tion against Austria, were becoming even more so in view of the serious military measures that we were taking against Germany. He said that information on this subject was reaching Berlin from all sides, and this must inevitably provoke similar measures on the part of Germany. To this I replied that, according to sure information in my possession, which was confirmed by all our compatriots arriving from 1 Russian Orange Book No. 00, July 30. 2 The reasons for the British wish to have the original formula modified are no- where given. Cf. note to French Yellow Book No. 113, July 31, also British Blue Book No. 110, July 31. July 31, Russian Orange Book No. 09 371 Berlin, Germany also was very actively engaged in taking military measures against Russia. In spite of this, the Minister for Foreign Affairs asserts l that the only step taken in Germany has been the recall of officers from leave and of the troops from manoeuvres. To London Russian Orange Book No. 69 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Ambassador at London. (Telegram.) St. Petersburgh, July IS (31), 101 4. I have requested the British Ambassador to express to Grey my deep gratitude for the firm and friendly tone which he has adopted in the discussions with Germany and Austria, thanks to which the hope of finding a peaceful issue 2 to the present situation need not yet be abandoned. 1 For the truth of this assertion see chapters on mobilisation in M. P. Price, The Diplomatic History of the War, Charles Scribner's Sons. 2 Cf . note 1 British Blue Book No. 119, July 31. Sir E. Grey had at last practically done what Sazonof had wished him to do as early as July 24 ; see British Blue Book No. 6, July 24. 372 Official Diplomatic Documents Saturday, August 1, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Sent Despatches to Austria-Hungary Petrograd Belgium Berlin, Paris and London London etc. London, Berlin France London etc. Berlin, Rome London, Berlin, Brussels etc. London, Luxemburg London, Luxemburg Germany Petrograd Paris Great Britain Berlin, Petrograd, Vienna Petrograd, Berlin, Paris, Vienna, Brussels, Lux- emburg Russia All representatives London, Paris Serbia Austria-Hungary explains her willingness to continue direct conversations with Russia, at the same time expressing her deep concern at the Russian general mobilisation which forces her to decree her own general mobilisation. Belgium receives the official assurance that France will respect the neutrality of Belgium, but "in the event of this neutrality not being respected by another Power, the French Government, to secure their own defence, might find it necessary to modify their attitude." The German "reply is awaited." Belgium instructs her representatives abroad to notify the Powers of her mobilisation in notes prepared and sent out, undated, on July 24. She commits hostile acts against Germany according to the hitler's declaration, a fact which Belgium later categorically denies. France orders general mobilisation, and in despatches to London endeavors to blame Germany for the coming war. She again solicits the armed intervention of Great Britain, and promises to respect Belgian and Luxemburg neutrality, with a proviso. Her assurances to Belgium contain no reference to an existing treaty, anil are in wording contrary to the assumption of the existence of a treaty. Her reply to Germany is "that France would do that which her interests dictated." Germany continues the exchange of royal and imperial telegrams. Russia not having replied to the German ultimatum requesting her to demobilise, Germany declares war on Russia. To the British enquiry whether she would respect Belgian neutrality her Secretary of Foreign Affairs replies that probably no answer would lie returned, because by answering they "could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign"; moreover, Belgium had already committed "certain hostile acts." She orders general mobilisation, to take effect the next day, August 2. Great Britain ; the Cabinet for the second time refuses to commit itself in favor of France. Sir E. Grey, however, repeats his personal promises to France, at the same time refusing the German request that he formulate conditions under which Great Britain would remain neutral. No despatches concerning the mobilisation of the British army arc published on this or any other day. Russia refuses to reply to the German ultimatum and does not demobilise. Serbia is silent on this day. August 1, Belgian Gray Book No. 13 373 Austria-Hungary : From, St. Petersburgh Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 56] Count Szdpdry to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, August 1, 101^. I visited M. Sazonof to-day, and told him that I had received instructions, 1 but that I must premise that I was entirely ignorant of the present condition of affairs created in Vienna, by the general Russian mobilisation, and that in interpreting the instructions which I had received previously, I must leave this condition out of account. I said that the two instructions of Your Excellency dealt with the misunderstanding that we had declined further negotiations with Russia. This was a mistake, as I had already, without instructions, assured him. 2 Your Excellency was not only quite prepared to deal with Russia on the broadest basis possible, but was also especially inclined to subject the text of our note to a discussion so far as its interpretation was concerned. I emphasised how much the instructions of Your Excellency af- forded me a further proof of goodwill, although I had to remind him that the situation created since then by the general mobilisation was unknown to me ; but I could only hope that the course of events had not already taken us too far ; in any case, I regarded it as my duty in the present moment of extreme anxiety to prove once again the goodwill of the Imperial and Royal Government. M. Sazonof replied that he took note with satisfaction of this proof of goodwill, but he desired to draw my attention to the fact that negotiations at St. Peters- burgh for obvious reasons appeared to promise less prospect of success than negotiations on the neutral terrain of London. 3 I replied that Your Excellency, as I had already observed, started from the point of view that direct contact should be maintained at St. Petersburgh, so that I was not in a position to commit myself with regard to his suggestion as to London, but I would communicate on the subject with your Excellency. Belgium : From London Belgian Gray Book No. 13 Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Darignon, Belgian M in ister for Foreign . Iff a irs. (Telegram.) London, August 1, 1914- Great Britain has asked France and Germany separately 4 if they intend to respect Belgian territory in the event of its not being 1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 51. Julv 31. ; ( f. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 55. July 31. 3 If Sazonof is correctly quoted, and this would seem to be the case (cf. Austro- Hungarian Red Book No. 51, July 31. third paragraph), it appears that Russia had changed her attitude, and was not now desirous of direct conversations. See Russian Orange Book No. 69, July 31. ' British Blue Book No. 114, July 31. 374 Official Diplomatic Documents violated by their adversary. Germany's reply is awaited. France has replied in the affirmative. 1 From Berlin Belgian Gray Book No. 14 Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Berlin, August 1, 1014. The British Ambassador has been instructed to Inquire of the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether, in the event of war, Germany would respect Belgian neutrality, and I understand that the Minister replied that he was unable to answer the question. 2 To Berlin, Boris, and London Belgian Gray Book No. 15 3 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London. Sir, Brussels, August 1, 101 4- I have the honour to inform you that the French Minister has made the following verbal communication to me: — (Translation.) "Je suis autorise a declarer "I AM authorised to declare qu'en cas de conflit international, that, in the event of an inter- le Gouvernement de la Repu- national war, the French Govern- blique, ainsi qu'il l'a toujours ment, in accordance with the declare, respectera la neutrality declarations they have always de la Belgique. Dans l'hypo- made, will respect the neutrality these ou cette neutrality ne serait of Belgium. In the event of pas respectee par une autre this neutrality not being re- Puissance, le Gouvernement spected by another Power, the francais, pour assurer sa propre French Government, to secure defense, pourrait etre amene a their own defence, might find modifier son attitude." it necessary to modify their attitude." 4 1 See below, No. 15. same day. -d. British Blue Book No. 122. July 31, printed under date of August 1, and French Yellow Book No. 123, August 1, giving Germany's reason for not answering. 3 This despatch should precede No. 13, same day. where it is referred to. * See British Blue Book No. 1 14, July 31, note 1, and mark the wording of the French announcement, which proceeds from the principle that France is released from any obligation to respect the neutrality of Belgium "in the event of this neutrality not being respected by another Power." Belgium was a buffer state between the bel- ligerents. Small infractions of her neutrality could not have been avoided by either side. The principle, therefore, that any infraction by one side would release theother side from all obligations, and that the other side was. of course, the sole judge of what constituted an infraction, is the chief reason why Belgium was invaded, for if it had not been for this principle no " military necessity " would have existed for either side to contemplate even the invasion of Belgium. It. was the principle accepted by Great Britain (see British Blue Book No. 114, July .'ill and by France, and as events proved also by Germany. Contrast this declaration with French Yellow Book No. 122, same day. August 1, French Yellow Book No. 120 375 I thanked his Excellency and added that we on our side had taken without delay all the measures necessary to ensure that our inde- pendence and our frontiers should be respected. To Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh Belgian Gray Book No. 16 M.Damgnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh. (Telegram.) Brussels, August 1, 1914- Carry out instructions ' contained in my despatch of the 25th July. To Rome, The Hague, Luxemburg Belgian Gray Book No. 17 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers at Hume, The Hague, Luxemburg. (Telegram.) Brussels, August 1, 1914- Carry out instructions 2 contained in my despatch of the 25th July. France : To London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome French Yellow Book No. 120 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome. Paris, August 1, 1914. Two demarches were made yesterday evening by the Austrian Ambassadors — the one at Paris, 3 which was rather vague, the other at St. Petersburgh, 4 precise and conciliatory. Count Szecsen came to explain to me that the Austro-Hungarian Government had officially informed Russia that it had no territorial ambition, and would not touch the sovereignty of Servia ; that it also repudiates any intention of occupying the Sandjak; but that these explanations of disinterestedness only retain their force if the war remains localised to Austria and Servia, as a European war would open out eventualities which it was impossible to foresee. The Austrian Ambassador, in commenting on these explanations, gave me to understand that if his Government could not answer the questions 1 Belgian Gray Book No. 2. July 24, and note. 2 See note to previous despatch and Belgian Gray Book No. 3, July 24. 3 Not mentioned in Austro-Hungarian Red Book. See British Blue Book No. 137, same day. 4 See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 55, July 31, and Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 56, August 1. 376 Official Diplomatic Documents of the Powers speaking in their own name, they would certainly answer Servia, or any single Power asking for these conditions in the name of Servia. He added that a step in this direction was perhaps still possible. At St. Petersburgh the Austrian Ambassador called on M. Sazonof and explained to him that his Government was willing to begin a discussion as to the basis of the ultimatum addressed to Servia. 1 The Russian Minister declared himself satisfied with this declaration, and proposed that the pourparlers- should take place in London with the participation of the Powers. M. Sazonof will have requested the British Government to take the lead in the discussion; he pointed out that it would be very important that Austria should stop her operations in Servia. The deduction from these facts is that Austria would at last show herself ready to come to an agreement, just as the Russian Govern- ment is ready 2 to enter into negotiations on the basis of the British proposal. Unfortunately these arrangements which allowed one to hope for a peaceful solution appear, in fact, to have been rendered useless by the attitude of Germany. 3 This Power has in fact presented an ul- timatum giving the Russian Government twelve hours in which to agree to the demobilisation of their forces not only as against Germany, but also as against Austria ; this time-limit expires at noon. The ultimatum is not justified, for Russia, has accepted the British pro- posal which implies a cessation of military preparation by all the Powers. The attitude of Germany proves that she wishes for war. And she wishes for it against France. 4 Yesterday " when Ilerr von Schoen came to the Quai d'Orsay to ask what attitude France proposed to take in case of a Russo-German conflict, the German Ambassador, although there has been no direct dispute 6 between France and Germany, and although from the beginning of the crisis we have used all our efforts for a peaceful solution 7 and are still continuing to do so, added that he asked me to present his respects ami thanks to the Presi- dent of the Republic, and asked that we would he good enough to make arrangements as to him personally (des dispositions pour sa 1 Viviani calls this an interview "yesterday evening," i.e. .July 31. In theAustro- Hungarian Red Book No. 5(3, it appears as an interview of "to-day," August 1. ' l'lus is a vague description of the Russian attitude. Of. note 3 to Austro-Hun- gari in Red Book No. 56, August 1. 3 Viviani blames Germany for her ultimatum. Germany claimed her ultimatum had Lean forced by Russia's mobilisation (British Blue Book No. 121, August 1) which Viviani 'In" imi deny as having taken place. If the student, therefore, agrees with Viviani that Germany's ultimatum spoiled the prospects of a peaceful solution, the further question arises " Was Germany's ultimatum forced by Russia's mobilisation?" In the next sentence Viviani state-, that the ultimatum was not justified. This isthe crux of the whole matter. For Germany's attitude see German White Rook, pp. 555 ff. 1 Another evidence of the unfortunate suspicion of the French Government. : '7 p.m., July 31, see German White Rook, p 560 ■ Viviani overlooks that France had promised her support to Russia, cf. French Yellow Bonk No. 101, July 3D : British Blue Book No. 0, July 24, French Yellow Book- No. 74, paragraph -4, where ( ' I says that the "relationsof Germany with Vienna were no closer than those of France with Russia." 7 For a fuller discussion of the French attitude, see E. von Much, Germany's Point of View, pp. 216 ff. August 1, French Yellow Booh No. 121 377 propre personne) ; we know also that he has already put the archives of the Embassy in safety. This attitude of breaking off diplomatic relations without any direct dispute, and although he has not received any definitely negative answer, is characteristic of the determination of Germany to make war against France. The want of sincerity in her peaceful protestations is shown by the rupture which she is forcing upon Europe at a time when Austria had at last agreed x with Russia to begin negotiations. Rene Viviani. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 121 M. Jules Camion, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Bene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 1, 1.914- My Russian colleague received yesterday evening two telegrams 2 from M. Sazonof advising him that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had explained 3 that his Government was ready to discuss the note to Servia with the Russian Government even as to its basis; M. Sazonof answered that in his opinion these con- versations should take place in London. The ultimatum to Russia 4 can only do away with the last chances of peace which these conversations still seemed to leave. The ques- tion may lie asked whether in such circumstances the acceptance by Austria was serious, and had not the object of throwing the responsi- bility of the conflict on to Russia. My British colleague during the night made a pressing appeal 5 to Herr von Jagow's feelings of humanity. The latter answered that the matter had gone too far and that they must wait for the Russian answer to the German ultimatum. But he told Sir Edward Goschen that the ultimatum required that the Russians should countermand their mobilisation, not only as against Germany but also as against Austria ; my British colleague was much astonished at this, and said that it did not seem possible for Russia to accept this last point. 6 Germany's ultimatum coming at the very moment when an agree- ment seemed about to be established between Vienna and St. Peters- burgh, is characteristic of her warlike policy. In truth the conflict was between Russia and Austria only, and Germany could only intervene as an ally of Austria ; in these cir- cumstances, as the two Powers which were interested as principals 1 This agreement had been clue to Germany's pressure ; see despatches of previous days. See especially German White Book, Exhibit 14, July 28. 2 Not given in Russian Orange Book. 3 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 56, August 1. * Sent by Germany and presented at midnight, July 31-Aug. 1 ; see German White Book, p. 559. See note 5 to previous despatch. 6 British Blue Book No. 121 under date of August 1. 6 This is different from Sir E. Goschen's own report, see British Blue Book No. 121. 378 Official Diplomatic Documents were prepared for conversations, it is impossible to understand l why Germany should send an ultimatum to Russia instead of continuing like all the other Powers to work for a peaceful solution, unless she desired war on her own account. J. Cambon. To London, Berlin, and Brussels French Yellow Book No. 122 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, Berlin, and to the French Minister at Brussels. Paris, August 1, 1914. The British Ambassador, under the instructions of his Govern- ment, came to ask me what would be the attitude of the French Government as regards Belgium in case of conflict with Germany. I stated that, in accordance with the assurance which we had re- peatedly given the Belgian Government, we intended to respect their neutrality. It would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself brought to enter Belgian territory, with the object of fulfilling her obligations as a guaranteeing Power. 2 Rene Viviani. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 123 M. .1 ides Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 1, W14. The British Ambassador has been instructed 3 by his Government to make to the German Government a communication identical with that which he made to you on the subject of the neutrality of Belgium. Herr von Jagow answered that he would take the instructions of the Emperor and the Chancellor, but that he did not think an answer could be given, for Germany could not disclose her military plans in this way. The British Ambassador will see Herr von Jagow to- morrow afternoon. 4 J. Cambon. 1 A comparison of this view with that presented in the German White Hunk, pp. 557 n. shows how very far apart the governments of France and Germany found themselves. 2 Contrast tin- official French declaration which contains nothing about obliga- tions. Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1. 1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 122, French Yellow Book No. 123, both of August 1. 4 The part of the interview with Sir E. Goschen printed British Blue Book No. 123, in which Germany claims that Belgium has already committed "certain hostile acts" against Germany, has been omitted here. August 1, French Yellow Book No. 125 379 From Borne French Yellow Book No. 124 M. Barrere, French Ambassador at Borne, to M. Bene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Borne, August 1, 1914- I went to see the Marquis di San Giuliano this morning at half- past eight, in order to get precise information from him as to the attitude of Italy in view of the provocative acts of Germany and the results which they may have. The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered that he had seen the German Ambassador yesterday evening. Herr von Flotow had said to him that Germany had requested the Russian Government to suspend mobilisation, and the French Government to inform them as to their intentions ; Germany had given France a time limit of eighteen hours and Russia a time limit of twelve hours. Herr von Flotow as a result of this communication asked what were the intentions of the Italian Government. The Marquis di San Giuliano answered that as the war under- taken by Austria was aggressive and did not fall within the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, particularly in view of the consequences which might result from it according to the declaration of the German Ambassador, Italy could not take part in the war. Barrere. To London, St. Petersburg!!, Berlin, Vienna, Borne, Madrid, Con- stantinople French Yellow Book No. 125 M. Bene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Af- fairs, to the French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople. Paris, August 1, 1914- The German Ambassador came to see me again at 11 o'clock this morning. After having recalled to his memory all the efforts made by France towards an honourable settlement of the Austro- Servian conflict and the difficulty between Austria and Russia which has resulted from it, I put him in possession of the facts as to the pourparlers which have been carried on since yesterday : — (1) A British compromise, 1 proposing, besides other suggestions, suspension of military preparations 2 on the part of Russia, on condition that the other Powers should act in the same way ; adherence of Russia to this proposal. 1 This seems to refer to Sazonof's altered formula. Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 67, Julv 31. 2 This is an error, cf. note to Russian Orange Book no. 67. 380 Official Diplomatic Documents (2) Communications from the Austrian Government : declaring that they did not desire any aggrandisement in Servia, nor even to advance into the Sandjak, and stating that they were ready to discuss even the bads of the Austro-Servian question at London with the other Powers. I drew attention to the attitude of Germany who, abandoning all pourparlers, presented an ultimatum to Russia at the very moment when this Power had just accepted the British formula 2 (which im- plies the cessation of military preparations 3 by all 4 the countries which have been mobilised) and regarded as imminent a diplomatic rupture with France. Baron von Schoen answered that he did not know the develop- ments which had taken place in this matter for the last twenty-four hours, that there was perhaps in them a "glimmer of hope" for some arrangement, that he had not received any fresh communication 5 from his Government, and that he was going to get information. He gave renewed protestations of his sincere desire to unite his efforts to those of France for arriving at a solution of the conflict. I laid stress on the serious responsibility which the Imperial Government would assume if, in circumstances such as these, they took an initia- tive which was not justified and of a kind which would irremediably compromise peace. Baron von Schoen did not allude to his immediate departure and did not make any fresh request for an answer to his question concerning the attitude of France in ease of an Austro-Russian conflict. He confined himself to saying of his own accord that the attitude of France was not doubtful. It would not do to exaggerate the possibilities which may result from my conversation with the German Ambassador for, on their side, the Imperial Government continue the most dangerous prepara- tions on our frontier. However, we must not neglect the possibilities, and we should not cease to work towards an agreement. On her side France is taking all military measures required for protection against too great an advance in German military preparations. She considers that her attempts at solution will only have a chance of success so far as it is felt that she will be ready and resolute if the conflict is forced on her. PiENE VlVIAXI. ■Cf. French Yellow Book No. 120, August 1. - Viviani fails to mention that Russia had declared full mobilisation. 3 But nut demobilisation. The status quo cannot lie long maintained when one country is mobilised and the other is not. 1 The British fleet was mobilised. (See Freneh Yellow Book No. 55, July 27.) Sir E. Grey nowhere offered to demobilise it. Cf. next number. s Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 74, same day. August 1, French Yellow Book No. 127 381 From London French Yellow Book No. 126 M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Paris, 1 August 1, 101 4. Sir Edward Grey said to me that, at a meeting this morning, the Cabinet had again considered the situation. As Germany had asked Great Britain to give a declaration of neutrality and had not obtained it, the British Government remained masters of their action ; this could shape itself in accordance with different hypotheses. In the first place, Belgian neutrality is of great importance to Great Britain. France has immediately renewed her engagement to respect it. Germany has explained "that she was not in a posi- tion to reply." Sir Edward Grey will put the Cabinet in possession of this answer 2 and will ask to be authorised to state on Monday in the House of Commons, that the British Government will not permit a violation of Belgian neutrality. In the second place the British fleet is mobilised, 3 and Sir Edward Grey will propose 4 to his colleagues that he should state that it will oppose the passage of the Straits of Dover by the German fleet, or, if the German fleet should pass through (venaient a le passer), will oppose any demonstration on the French coasts. These two ques- tions will be dealt with at the meeting on Monday. I drew the attention of the Secretary of State to the point that, if during this intervening period any incident took place, it was necessary not to allow a surprise, and that it would be desirable to think of inter- vening in time. Paul Cambon. To London French Yellow Book No. 127 M . Ilcne Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at Loudon. Paris, August 1, 1914. We are warned through several channels that the German and the Austrian Governments are trying at this moment to influence Eng- land by making her believe that the responsibility for war, if it 1 Probably a mistake for London. 2 This appears as if the German "Belgian" reply had not been discussed at the Cabinet meeting here described. Contrast Sir E. Grey's account of the Cabinet meeting of August 1 to the German Ambassador, British Blue Book No. 123, August 1 . 3 Since July 24, see French Yellow Book No. 66, July 27. 4 This phrase and the whole tenor of the despatch imply that the Cabinet had for the second time voted against promising to France British support. For the first refusal to vote so see French Yellow Book No. 110, July 31, where the Cabinet has declared itself unable to promise to France "their intervention?' and British Blue Book No. 119, July 31. Sir E. Grey's promise to "propose" to the Cabinet to be "authorised" to promise help to France would seem to imply that he had assured the French Ambassador of his personal wishes in this matter. He gave this assurance, or from the despatches just cited from the previous date, renewed it on the very day on which he refused Germany's request to formulate conditions under which Great Britain would remain neutral. In refusing this request of Germany, he gave as his reason that " we must keep our hands free." See British Blue Book No. 123, August 1, 1914. 382 Official Diplomatic Documents breaks out, will fall mi Russia. 1 Efforts an- being made to obtain the neutrality of England by disguising the truth. 2 France has not ceased in co-operation with England to advise mod- eration at St. Petersburgh ; 3 this advice has been listened to. From the beginning M. Sazonof has exercised pressure on Servia to make her accept all those clauses of the ultimatum which were not incompatible with her sovereignty. He then engaged in a direct conversation with Austria ; this was fresh evidence of his conciliatory spirit. Finally he has agreed to allow those Towers which are less interested to seek for means of composing the dispute. In accordance with the wish expressed to him by Sir George Buchanan, M. Sazonof consented to modify 1 the first formula which lie had put forward, and he has drawn up a second which is shown not to differ materially from the declaration which Count Szecsen made yesterday to M. de Margerie. Count Szecsen affirms that Austria has no intention of seeking territorial aggrandisement and does not wish to touch the sovereignty of Servia. lie expressly adds that Austria has no designs on the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar. It would then seem that an agreement between Sir Edward Grey's suggestion, M. Sazonof's formula and the Austrian declarations could easily he reconciled. France is determined, in co-operation with England, to work to the very end for the realisation of this. But while these negotiations were going on, and while Russia in the negotiations showed a goodwill which cannot he disputed, Austria was the first ' to proceed to a general mobilisation. Russia has found herself obliged to imitate Austria, so as not to he left in an unfavourable position, but all the time she has con- tinued ready to negotiate. It is not necessary for me to repeat that, so far as we are concerned, we will, in co-operation with England, continue to work for the success of these pourparlers. But the attitude of Germany has made it absolutely compulsory for us to make out the order for mobilisation to-day. Last Wednesday, well in advance of Russian mobilisation, as I 1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 134, same day. I (r "elucidating the r ruth." according to one's reading of all the despatches. i 'ontrast with French Yellow Book No. SO, .Inly 28, where P that Sit- K. Grey " would be much embarrassed in making pacific recommendations to the liussian Government." Also French Yellow Book No. 62, Jul} 27. ["he French step" (Germany had asked France to declare that a solidarity of pacific intentions existed between tiei and Germany) >urgh would have been difficult to explain." ' l;.u -i,m Orange l'""> ! v. 67, July 31, Viviani overlooks, first, that the modified formula 'eptable, because instead of promising to "sto i her military prep- ' to maintain her waiting attitude," while \ Hungary in t he modified formula had " to stay the march of her troops, " which was not demand '1 in the first formula, and secondly that the change was not at Austria's but at 'ii on'- request ; that Russii Followed it up with full is Hi error. Russia's general mobilisation took pla n the night of July :)ii, while iustria-Hungarj ordered general mobilisation on August 1. Tor an ex- haustive discussion of this ind the contradictory evidence see M. P. Price, Scribner's, the chapters on "Preparations and Mobilisation ■ BpokNo. 113, July 31 for Russian mobilisation, and British Blue Book, Nos. 127 and 1.;:., August 1, for Austro-Hungarian mobilisation. August 1, French Yellow Book No. 128 383 have already telegraphed to you, Herr von Schoen announced to me the impending publication of Kriegsgefahrzustand. This measure has been taken ' by Germany, and under the protection of this screen, she immediately began a mobilisation in the proper sense of the word. To-day M. Paleologue telegraphed that Count Pourtales had noti- fied the Russian Government of German mobilisation. 2 Information which has been received by the Ministry of War confirms the fact that this mobilisation is really in full execution. 3 Our decree of mobilisation is then an essential measure of protec- tion. The Government have accompanied it by a proclamation signed by the President of the Republic and by all the Ministers, in which they explain that mobilisation is not war, and that in the present state of affairs it is the best means for France of safeguarding peace, and that the Government of the Republic will redouble their efforts to bring the negotiations to a conclusion. Will you be good enough to bring all these points urgently to the notice of Sir Edward Grey, and to point out to him that we have throughout been governed by the determination not to commit any act of provocation. I am persuaded that in case war were to break out, British opinion would see clearly from which side aggression comes, and that it would realise the strong reasons which we have given to Sir Edward Grey for asking for armed intervention on the part of England in the interest of the future of the European balance of power. 4 Rene Viviani. From Luxemburg French Yellow Book No. 128 M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Rene Viviani, President <>f the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Luxemburg, August 1, 1914- The Minister of State instructs me to ask from the French Gov- ernment an assurance of neutrality similar to that which has been given to Belgium. M. Eyschen has stated that at present, as the declaration in question was made to the President of the Council of the Belgian Government by the French Minister at Brussels, he thought that the same procedure would be most suitable with regard to the Grand Duchy. 5 1 But not as here implied "last Wednesday," i.e. July 29, but on Friday, i.e. July 31 ; see British Blue Book No. 112, July 31. 2 To begin on August 2, German White Book, p. 559, and British Blue Book No. 142, August 1, listed under August 2. 3 Seemingly contradicted by British Blue Book No. 142, same day. 4 France asks for armed British intervention in the interest of the European balance of power. Sir E. Grey had personally committed himself to induce the British Cabinet so to intervene; see notes to previous despatch. This was before German troops entered Belgium. It was, however, subsequent to Germany's refusal to commit herself on the Belgian question ; and no mention of Belgium is made here. 6 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1. and note. The assurance contained no reference to a treaty or an obligation under it. The French Yellow Book despatch, however, No. 122, Aug. 1, contained such a reference. The wording of the assurance given to Luxemburg has not been published. The French despatch (see next number) describing it, however, refers to a treaty. 384 Official Diplomatic Documents This is the reason why lie has abstained from making a request direct to the Government of the Republic. As the Chamber of Deputies meets on Monday, M. Eyschen wishes to have the answer by that date ; a similar demarche is being made at the same time with the German Minister at Luxemburg. , r Mollard. To Luxemburg French Yellow Book No. 129 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg. Paris, August 1, Wl^. Be good enough to state to the President of the Council that in conformity with the Treaty of London, I Mil, 1 the Government of the Republic intends to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, as they have shown by their attitude. The violation of this neutrality by Germany would, however, be an act of a kind which would compel France from that time to be guided in this matter by care for her defence and her interests. Rene Viviani. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 130 2 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, August 1, 1014. Special editions of newspapers are being distributed in the streets of Berlin announcing that the general mobilisation of the army and the navy has been decreed and that the first day of the mobilisation is Sunday, 2nd August. T .-, Jules Cambon. Germany : To St. Petersburg!! German White Book Exhibit 26 Telegram of the Chancellor to the Imperial Ambassador in St. Peters- burgh on August 1st, 12.52 P.M. Urgent. If the Russian Government gives no satisfactory reply to our demand, Your Excellency will please transmit this afternoon 5 o'clock (mid-European time) the following statement: " Le Gouvernement Imperial s'est efforce des les debuts de la crise de la mener a une solution pacifique. Se rendant a un desir que 1 See note to previous despatch. - This despatch should precede No. 127. in which the information it contains is discussed. In thai case, however, No. 127 would hardly have been able to contain tin- "information" that the German mobilisation was "really in full execution" on August 1. Either Viviani had been erroneously informed, or he misinformed the French Ambassador in London. August 1, British Blue Book No. 120 385 lui en avait ete exprime par Sa Majeste l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majeste l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avec l'Angleterre etait applique a accomplir un role mediateur aupres des Cabinets de Vienne et de St. Petersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le resultat, proc6da a la mobilisation de la totalite de ses forces de terre et de mer. "A la suite de cette mesure menacante motivee par aucun pre- paratif militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire Allemand se trouva vis-a-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Imperial eut manque de parer a ce peril il aurait compromis la securite et l'existence meme de l'Allemagne. Par consequent le Gouverne- ini nt Allemand se vit force de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste l'Empereur de toutes les Pussies ensistant sur la cessation des dits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refuse de faire droit a cette demande et ayant manifeste par ce refus, que son action etait dirigee contre l'Allemagne, j'ai l'honneur d'ordre de mon Gouverne- ment de faire savoir a Votre Excellence ce qui suit : " Sa Majeste l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain au nom de l'Em- pire releve le defi et Se considere en etat de guerre avec la Russie." Please wire urgent receipt and time of carrying out this instruction by Russian time. Please ask for your passports and turn over protection and affairs to the American Embassy. From Paris German White Book Exhibit 27 Telegram of the Imperial Ambassador in Paris to the Chancellor on August 1st, 1.05 P.M. Upon my repeated definite inquiry whether France would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war, the Prime Minister de- clared that France would do that which her interests dictated. Great Britain: From St. Petcrsburgh British Blue Book No. 120 Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petcrsburgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Beceived August 1.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, .July 31, 1914. Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me and French Ambassador and asked us to telegraph to our respective Governments subjoined formula 1 as best calculated to amalgamate proposal made by you in your telegram of 30th July 2 with formula recorded in my telegram of 30th July. 3 He trusted it would meet with your approval : 4 — 1 Russian OranEe Book No. 67. July 31. 2 British Blue Book No. 103. July 30. ' British Blue Book No. 97, July 30. 1 There is no desire expressed that it would meet with Austria's approval, which was the all-important thing, if peace was to be preserved. Nor does it appear what 2 c 386 Official Diplomatic Documents "Si l'Autriche consentira a arreter marche y one nation on the frontier of another has always been sufficient cause for the latter to "defend itself by instant war." See Elihu Root quoted above, note 4 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 28, July 26. Sir E. Grey nowhere asked Russia to demobilise. 2 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 3 Russian Ambassador in London. 4 See British Blue Book No. 120, July 31, printed under date of August 1, and Russian Orange Hook No. 67, July 31. 5 Translation. — "Formula amended in accordance with the English proposal: 'If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if. recog- August 1, British Blue Book No. 134 393 From Berlin British Blue Book No. 133 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914- M. De Etter x came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram from M. Sazonof, 2 dated the 31st July, which are as follows : — " The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared 3 the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers. "M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It woidd be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian territory." (The above has been communicated to the six Powers.) From Paris British Blue Book No. 134 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Re- ceived August 1.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914- President of the Republic has informed me that German Govern- ment 4 were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility, that it was only after a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation ; that, although the measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a general mobilisation, they are not so designated ; that a French general mobilisation will become necessary in self- defence, and that France is already forty-eight hours 5 behind Ger- many as regards German military preparations ; that the French troops have ordered not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany, whereas the German troops, on the other nising that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude." 1 Counsellor of Russian Embassy in London. 2 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 3 Cf. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 56, August 1. 4 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 127, August 1, where it reads: "The German and the Austrian Governments." For the several points see the notes to the French Yellow Book despatch. 6 No such claim is made either in French Yellow Book Nos. 125 or 127, same date. 394 Official Diplomatic Documents hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions on it; ' that, notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of Russia lias expressed himself ready to continue his conversations with the ( rerman Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace ; that French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war. From St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 135 Sir Edward Grey to Sir (t. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Peters- burgh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914- INFORMATION reaches me from a most reliable source that Austrian Government have informed German Government that though the situation has been changed by the mobilisation of Russia they would in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace lie ready to consider favourably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The effect of this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Servia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilisation of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military counter-measures in Galieia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilisation. 2 You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilisation, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the matter should be discussed with German Government also by Russian Government. From Paris British Blue Book No. 136 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — ( Received August 1.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914- Minister of War informed military attache this afternoon that orders had been given at 3.40 3 for a general mobilisation of the French Army. This became necessary because the Minister of AVar knows that, under the system of " Kriegszustand," ' the Germans have 1 The German claim was to the very opposite effect; see Speech of the Chancellor, A. must 1, 1914. 'Contrast this with the French claims in despatches of this day that Russia had been forced to general mobilisation by a previous Austrian general mobilisation. ' ( 'I. German White Book, p. 560, 5 p.m., the latter being Berlin instead of Paris time. 4 " State of war." August 1, British Blue Book No. 13? 395 called up six classes. Three classes are sufficient to being their cover- ing troops up to war strength, the remaining three being the reserve. This, he says, being tantamount to mobilisation, is mobilisation under another name. 1 The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight army corps on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. It is therefore of the utmost importance to guard against this. A zone of 10 kilom. has been left between the French troops and German frontier. The French troops will not attack, and the Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilisation is one for purely defensive purposes. From Vienna British Blue Book No. 137 Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British . 1 mbassador at Vienna. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1014- I saw the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador this morning. He supplied me with the substance of a telegram which the Austro- Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. 2 In this telegram his Excellency was given instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment to impair the sovereign rights of Servia or to obtain territorial aggrandisement. The Ambassador added that he was further in- structed to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no truth in the report which had been published in Paris to the effect that Austria-Hungary intended to occupy the sanjak. Count Mensdorff 3 called again later at the Foreign Office. He in- formed me of a telegram 4 sent yesterday to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh by Count Berchtold, 5 and gave me the substance. It states that Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador, whom he sent for yesterday, to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impression in St. Petersburgh that the "door had been banged" by Austria-Hungary on all further conversations. The Russian Ambassador promised to do this. Count Berchtold repeated on this occasion to the Russian Ambassador the assurance which had already been given at St. Petersburgh, to the effect that neither an infraction of Servian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Servian territory was being contempated by Austria-Hungary. Special attention was called by Count Mensdorff 3 to the fact that 1 None of this seems to be based on facts. See M. P. Price. The Diplomatic History of the War, Scribner's, the chapters on "Preparations and Mobilisations." 2 Not printed in French Yellow Book, but mentioned ib. No. 120, same day. 3 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 4 Probably Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50, although this is dated July 30. and Sir E. Grey says "sent yesterday," i.e. July 31. 6 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 396 Official Diplomatic Documents this telegram contains a statement to the effect that conversations at St. Petersburgh had not been broken off by Austria-Hungary. [For British Blue Book Nos. 13S and 139 see under August 2.] From Paris British Blue Book No. 140 Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received August 1.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914- The Minister of War again sent for the military attache this even- ing, as he said he wished to keep him informed of the situation. He laid great stress on the fact that the zone of 10 kilom., which he had arranged between the French troops and the German frontier, and which was still occupied by peasants, was a proof of the French endeavours to commit no provocative act. 1 Russia : To Russian Representatives Abroad Russian Orange Book No. 70 Secret Telegram to Russian Representatives abroad. (Telegram.) July 10 (August 1), 1911 At midnight the German Ambassador announced 2 to me, on the instruction of his Government, that if within 12 hours, that is by mid- night on Saturday, we had not begin to demobilise, not only against ( rermany, but also against Austria, the German Government would be compelled to give the order for mobilisation. To my enquiry whether this meant war, the Ambassador replied in the negative, but added that we were very near it. From Iondon Russian Orange Book No. 71 Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affair*. (Telegram.) London, July 19 (August 1), 1914. Grey tells me that he has telegraphed 3 to Berlin that in his opinion the last formula accepted by the Russian Government oilers thebest prospect as a basis of negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. At the same time he expressed the hope that no Great Power would open hostilities before this formula had been considered. 1 Cf. note 3 to British Blue Book No. 134, August 1. -■ German White Book. Exhibit 24. July 31. 3 Probably British Blue Book No. 131, same day. August 1, Russian Orange Book No. 74 397 From London Russian Orange Book No. 72 Russian Ambassador at London to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) London, July 19 (August 1), 1.914- The British Government have enquired ! of the French and German Governments whether they will respect the neutrality of Belgium. France answered in the affirmative, 2 but the German Government stated 3 that they could not give any definite answer to the question. From Paris Russian Orange Book No. 73 Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, July 19 (August 1), 191 4. The Austrian Ambassador yesterday 4 saw Vivian i and declared to him that Austria, far from harbouring any designs against the integrity of Servia, was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against Servia with the other Powers. The French Government are much exercised at Germany's extraordinary military activity on the French frontier, for they are convinced that, under the guise of Kriegszustand, b mobilisation is in reality being carried out. From Paris Russian Orange Book No. 74 Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, July 19 (August 1), 1914- On the receipt in Paris of the telegram 6 from the French Am- bassador at St. Petersburg, reporting the communication made to you by the German Ambassador respecting Germany's decision to order general mobilisation to-day, the President of the French Repub- lic signed the order for mobilisation. Lists of the reservists recalled to the colours are being posted up in the streets. The German Am- bassador has just visited Viviani, 7 but told him nothing fresh, alleging the impossibility of deciphering the telegrams he has received. 8 1 British Blue Book No. 115, July 31. 2 Belgian Grav Book No. 15, August 1. 3 British Blue Book No. 122, August 1. 4 French Yellow Book No. 120, August 1. British Blue Book No. 137, same day. i Cf. French Yellow Book No. 127, August 1, and notes 5 and 6. 6 No such telegram is printed in the French Yellow Book. On the eventful August 1 not a single despatch exchanged between Paris and Petrograd has been printed in the French Yellow Book. 7 See French Yellow Book No. 125, August 1. 8 Cf. ib., where Viviani quotes the German Ambassador as saying that "he had received no fresh communication from his government." 398 Official Diplomatic Documents Viviani informed him of the signature of the order for mobilisation issued in reply to that of Germany, and expressed to him his amaze- ment that Germany should have taken such a step at a moment when a friendly exehange of views was still in progress between Russia, Austria, and the Powers. He added that mobilisation did not neces- sarily entail war, and that the German Ambassador might stay in Paris as the Russian Ambassador had remained in Vienna and the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg. From Paris Russian Orange Book No. 75 Russian Ambassador at Paris to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, .July 19 (August 1), 1914. I hear from the President that during the last few days the Austrian Ambassador emphatically assured both the President of the Council of Ministers and him that Austria had declared to Russia that she was ready to respect both the territorial integrity of Servia and also her sovereign rights, but 'that Russia had intentionally received this dec- laration in silence. I contradicted this flatly. 1 From Berlin Russian Orange Hook No. 70 Note presented by the German A mbassador at St. Petersburgh on July 19 (August l),at 7.10 I'.M. (Translation.) Le Gouvernement Imperial The Imperial German Gov- s'est cll'orce des les debuts de eminent have used every effort la crise de la mener a une solu- since the beginning of the crisis tion pacifique. Se rendant a to bring about a peaceful settle- un desir qui lui en avait ete ment. In compliance with a exprime par Sa Majeste l'Em- wish expressed to him by His pereur de Russie, Sa Majeste Majesty the Emperor of Uussia, l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'ac- the German Emperor had under- cord avec l'Angleterre s'etait taken, in concert with Great applique 1 a accomplir un role Britain, the part of mediator mediateur aupres des Cabinets between the Cabinets of Vienna de Vienne et de Saint-Peters- and St. Petersburg ; but Russia, bourg, lorsque, la Russie, sans without waiting for any result, en attendre le resultat, proceda proceeded to a general mobilisa- a la mobilisation de la totalite de tion of her forces both on land ses forces de terre et de nicr. A and sea. In consequence of this la suite de cette mesure menu- threatening step, which was not 1 It is not clear whether the Russian Ambassador contradicted the assertion, that Austria-Hungary had made tin- declaration or that Russia had received it in silence. For Austria-Hungary's declaration see Austro-Hungarian Red Book Nos. 47, July L'9, 55, July 31, and 56, August 1. August 1, Russian Orange Book No. 76 399 cante ne motivee par aucun presage militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, l'Empire allemand s'est trouve. vis-a-vis d'un dan- ger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Imperial eut man- que de parer a ce peril, il aurait compromis la securitc et l'existence meme de l'Allemagne. Tar consequent le Gouvernement allemand se vit force de s'adresser au Gouvernement de SaMajeste l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies en insistant sur la cessation des dits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refuse de fa ire droit a (n'ayant pas cru devoir repondre a ') cette demande et ayant mani- feste par ce refus (cette atti- tude 3 ) que son action etait dirigee contre l'Allemagne, j'ai 1'honneur, d'ordre de mon Gou- vernement, de faire savoir a votre Excellence ce qui suit : — Sa Majeste l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom de l'Empire, relevant le defi, se considere en etat de guerre avec la Russie. justified by any military proceed- ings on the part of Germany, 1 the German Empire was faced by a grave and imminent danger. If the German Government had failed to guard against this peril, they would have compromised the safety and the very existence of Germany. The German Government were, therefore, ob- liged to make representations to the Government of His Maj- esty the Emperor of All the Russias and to insist upon a ces- sation of the aforesaid military acts. Russia having refused to comply with (not having con- sidered it necessary to answer 2 ) this demand, and having shown by this refusal (this attitude 3 ) that her action was directed against Germany, I have the honour, on the instructions of my Government, to inform your Excellency as follows : — His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the German Empire, accepts the challenge, and considers him- self at war with Russia. 1 Les mots places entre parentheses se trouvent dans 1'original. II faut supposer que deux variances avaient ete preparees d'avance et que par erreur elles ont ete ins&re-es toutes les deux dans la note. 2 The words in parentheses occur in the original. It must be supposed that two variations had been prepared in advance, and that, by mistake, they were both in- serted in the note. 3 This sentence contains the crux of the question. Students should ask themselves (a) Did Russian mobilisation contain an element of danger for Germany? (b) If it did, was Germany justified in replying to it with an ultimatum ? (c) Was the Russian general mobilisation justified by any military action previously taken by Germany? 400 Official Diplomatic Documents Sunday, August 2, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Berlin Belgium London etc. Luxemburg < lerman Minister France All representatives Luxemburg, Petrograd, London etc. London, German Loudon Ambassador Germany Great Britain Paris, Berlin Berlin, Petrograd, Paris, Vienna, Brussels, Lux- emburg Russia Announcement by Sazonof to all representatives Serbia Austria-Hungary is notified of Germany's declaration of war on Russia. Belgium is notified of Germany's entry on Luxemburg territory, and receives herself an ultimatum from Germany at 7 o'clock in the evening; i.e. many hours after the British Government had promised their support to France. France announces to her representatives instances of Germany's troops crossing her frontier and committing hostile acts, and receives the promise of support from the British Government for which she had been working since July 27. Germany sends troops into Luxemburg, thus violating the neutrality of the duchy, but assuring her that the military measures taken are not a hostile act but are "solely measures intended to assure the use of the railways which have been leased to the Empire" against any attack of the French army. She promises Luxemburg a complete indemnity for any damage. Germany notifies Belgium that she has received "reliable information" of French intentions to march through Belgium, and feels herself therefore forced in self-defence ti> contemplate entering Belgian territory. If Belgium "should oppose the German troops," Germany would "to her regret be compelled to con- sider Belgium as an enemy." If the troops are not opposed, guarantees are offered for the future integrity and independence of Belgium, and the payment for any damage done. Great Britain promises her support to France during the forenoon, independ- ently of whether xt no German troops should invade Belgium. She is silent on the movement of her own troops. Itiis.siu defends herself against Germany's attempt "to foist" on Russia the "responsibility" for the war, claiming that Germany "neither could, nor had the right to, doubt" the many proofs of Russia's "desire for peace." The fact of Russia's general mobilisation is minimised. ■Srrhin is silent. Austria-Hungary : From Berlin Atjstro-Hungaeian Red Book No. 57 Count Szogyeny to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 2, 1914- The Secretary of State has just informed me that no answer has been received from Russia to the German demand. August 2, Belgian Gray Book No. 19 401 The Russian troops have crossed the German frontier at Schwidden (southeast of Bialla). Russia has thus attacked Germany. Germany, therefore, 1 regards herself as at war with Russia. The Russian Ambassador has this morning received his passports ; he intends to leave to-day. Belgium : From Luxemburg Belgian Gray Book No. IS M. Eyschen, President of the Luxemburg Government, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Luxemburg, August 2, 1914. I have the honour to acquaint your Excellency with the following facts: On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasser- billig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occur- rences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neu- trality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical pro- test will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin. To Paris', Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh Belgian Gray Book No. 19 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh Sir, Brussels, August 2, 191 4. I was careful to warn the German Minister through M. de Bassom- pierre that an announcement in the Brussels press by M. Klobukowski, French Minister, would make public the formal declaration which the latter had made to me on the 1st August. When I next met Herr von Below he thanked me for this attention, and added that up to the present he had not been instructed to make us an official commu- nication, but that we knew his personal opinion as to the feelings of security, which we had the right to entertain towards our eastern 1 This is not the reason given in the declaration of war, Russian Orange Book No. 76, August 1. 2d 402 Official Diplomatic Documents neighbours. I at once replied that all that we knew of their inten- tions, as indicated in numerous previous conversations, did not allow us to doubt their perfect correctness towards Belgium. I added, however, that we should attach the greatest importance to the posses- sion of a formal declaration, which the Belgian nation would hear of with joy and gratitude. From Berlin Belgian Gray B -; No. 20 Note 'presented by Uerr von Below Salekse, German Minister at Brussels, td M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Kaiserlich Deutsche Gesandtschaft in Belgien. Briissel, den 2. August, 101 ',. Imperial German Legation in Belgium. — Brussels, August 2, ldlJf.. (Translation: ) (Very Confidential.) x Reliable information has been received by the German Government to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Xamur. This information leaves no doubt as to the inten- tion of France to march through Belgian territory against Ger- many. The German Government can- not but fear that Belgium, in spite of the utmost goodwill, will be unable, without assistance, to repel 2 so considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success to afford an adequate guarantee against danger to Ger- many. It is essential for the self- defence of Germany that she should anticipate any such hostile attack. The German Govern- ment would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium re- garded as an act of hostility 1 This ultimatum was presented at 7 p.m. (see Belgian Gray Book No. 3S, August 4), i.e. many hours after the British Government had promised their support to France; cf. British Blue Book No. 14s, August 2. where Sir E. Grey says : "After the ( !abinet this morning T gave M. Cambon the following memorandum." ; This is the same argument Great Britain advanced in her second military con- versation with Belgium. See p. 5S0 and also note to Belgian Gray Book No. 22, August 3. (Tres Confidential.) Der Kaiserlichen Regierung liegen zuverlassige Nachrichten vor iiber den beabsichtigten Auf- marsch franzosischer Streitkrafte an der Maas-Strecke Givet- Namur. Sic lassen keinen Zweifel iiber die Absicht Frank- reichs, durch belgisches Gebiet gegen Deutschland vorzugehen. Die Kaiserliche Regierung kann sich der Besorgniss nicht erwehren, class Belgien, trotz besten Willens, nicht im Stande sein wird, ohne Hiilfe einen fran- zosischen Vormarsch mit so grosser Aussicht auf Erfolg abzu- wehren, dass darin cine ausrei- chende Sicherheit gegen die Bedrohung Deutschlands gefun- den werden kann. Es ist ein Gebot der Selbsterhaltung fur Deutschland, dem feindlichen An- griffzu vorzukommen. Mit dem grossten Bedauern wiirde esdaher August 2, Belgian Gray Book No. 20 403 die deutsche Regierung erfullen, wenn Belgien einen Akt der Feindseligkeit gegen sich darin erblicken wiirde, dass die Mass- nahmen seiner Gegner Deutsch- land zwingen, zur Gegenwehr auch seinerseits belgisches Gebiet zubetreten. Um jede Missdeutung aus- zuschliesSen, erkliirt die Kaiser- liche Regierung das Folgende : 1. Deutschland beabsichtigt keinerlei Feindseligkeiten gegen Belgien. 1st Belgien gewillt, in dem bevorstehenden Kriege, Deutschland gegeniiber eine wohlwollende Neutralitat einzu- nehmen, so verpflichtet sich die deutsche Regierung, beim Frie- densschluss Besitzstand und Unabhangigkeit des Konigreichs in vollem Umfang zu garantieren. 2. Deutschland verpflichtet sich unter obiger Voraussetzung, das Gebiet des Konigreichs wieder zu raumen, sobald der Friede geschlossen ist. 3. Bei einer freundschaftlicher Haltung Belgiens ist Deutschland bereit, im Einvernehmen mit den Koniglich Belgischen Behorden alle Bediirfnisse seiner Truppen gegen Barzahlung anzukaufen und jeden Schaden zu ersetzen, der etwa durch deutsche Truppen verursacht werden konnte. 4. Sollte Belgien den deutschen Truppen feindlich entgegen tre- ten, insbesondere ihrem Vorgehen durch Widerstand der Maas- Befestigungen oder durch Zer- storungen von Eisenbahnen, Strassen, Tunneln oder sonstigen Kunstbauten Schwierigkeiten be- reiten, so wird Deutschland zu seinem Bedauern gezwungen sein, das Konigreich als Feind zu be- trachten. In diesem Falle wiirde against herself the fact that the measures of Germany's op- ponents force Germany, for her own protection, to enter Belgian territory. In order to exclude any possi- bility of misunderstanding, the German Government make the following declaration : — 1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. In the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain an attitude of friendly neutrality towards Germany, the German Government bind them- selves, at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full. 2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned condition, to evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace. 3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in co-operation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase all neces- saries for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity for any damage that may have been caused by German troops. 4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by a re- sistance of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will, to her re- gret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy. In this event, Germany can undertake no obligations towards 404 Official Diplomatic Documents Deutschland dem Konigreich gegeniiber keine Verpflichtungen iibernehmen konnen, sondern miisste die spatere Regelung des Verhaltnisses beider Staaten zu einander der Entscheidung der Waffen iiberlassen. Die Kaiserliche Regierung giebt sich der bestimmten Hoffnung hin, dass diese Even- tuality nicht eintreten, und dass die Konigliche Belgische Regie- rung die geeigneten Massnahmen zu treffen wissen wird, um zu verhinderen, dass Vorkommnisse, wie die vorstehend erwahnten, sich ereignen. In diesem Falle wiirden die freundschaftlichen Bande, die beide Nachbarstaaten verbinden, eine weitere und dauernde Festigung erfahren. Belgium, but the eventual adjust- ment of the relations between the two States must be left to the decision of arms. The German Government, however, entertain the distinct hope that this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian Government will know how to take the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of inci- dents such as those mentioned. In this case the friendly ties which bind the two neighbouring States will grow stronger and more enduring. France From Luxemburg French Yellow Book No. 131 M. Eyschen, Minister of State for Luxemburg, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Luxemburg, August 2, 191 4-. I have the honour to bring to your Excellence's notice the follow- ing facts : — On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and am- munition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the ( Jrand 1 >uchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic pro- test against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin. The Minister of State, President of the Government. Eyschen. August 2, French Yellow Book No. 134 405 From Luxemburg French Yellow Book No. 132 ' M. Mallard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Rene Viviani, Presi- dent of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Luxemburg, August 2, 1914. The Minister of State for Luxemburg, M. Eyschen, has just re- ceived, through Herr von Buch, German Minister at Luxemburg, a telegram from Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire, saying that the military measures taken by Germany in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile act against this country, but are solely measures tended to assure the use of the railways which have been leased to the Empire against the eventual attack of a French army. Luxemburg will receive a complete indemnity for any damage. Mollard. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 133 Note handed, in by the German Ambassador. Paris, August 2, 1914. The German Ambassador has just been instructed, and hastens to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the military measures taken by Germany in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg do not con- stitute an act of hostility. They must be considered as purely pre- ventive measures taken for the protection of the railways, which, under the treaties between Germany and the Grand Duchy of Luxem- burg, are under German administration. Von Schoen. From St. Peter sburgh French Yellow Book No. 134 W. Paleologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. St. Petersburgh, August 2, 1914. Yesterday at ten minutes past seven in the evening the German Ambassador handed to M. Sazonof a declaration of war by his Govern- ment ; he will leave St. Petersburgh to-day. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has not received any instruc- tions from his Government as to the declaration of war. Paleologue. 1 Cf. British Blue Book No. 129, same day. 4()(i Official Diplomatic Documents In the Representatives of France Abroad French Yellow Book No. 135 .1/. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Representatives of France abroad. Paris, August 2, 101 4. The Russian Ambassador informs me that Germany lias just de- clared war on Russia, notwithstanding the negotiations which are proceeding, and at a moment when Austria-Hungary was agreeing to discuss with the Powers even the basis of her conflict with Servia. Rene Viviani. To London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Con- stantinople French Yellow Book No. 136 .1/. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tin- French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburgh, Berlin, Vienna, Borne, Madrid, Constantinople. Paris, August 2, 1914. This morning, French territory was violated by German troop- at < iry and near Longwy. They arc inarching on the fort which bears the latter name. Elsewhere the Custom House at Delle : has twice Keen fired upon. Finally, German troops have also violated this morning the neutral territory of Luxemburg. You will at once use this information to lay stress on the fact that the German Government is committing itself to acts of war against France without provocation 2 on our part, or any previous declaration of war, whilst we have scrupulously respected the zone of ten kilo- metres which we have maintained, even since the mobilisation, between our troops and the frontier. Rene Viviani. From London French Yellow Hook No. 137 M. Ban! Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, London, August J, 191 4. After the meeting of the Cabinet held this morning, Sir Edward Grey made the following declaration 3 to me : — " I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the < Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile 1 See below, French Yellow Book No. 139. same day. - The German Chancellor in his speech in the Reichstag on August 4 laid the blame for the tirst border hostilities on the French. For translation of this speech see pp. 573- 576 See also for the German charges, Belgian Gray Book No. 21, August 3. 3 For different wording see French Yellow Book No. 143, August 3, and notes to British Blue Book No. 14S, August 2. August 2, French Yellow Book No. 138 407 operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. " This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place." Afterwards in speaking to me of the neutrality of Belgium and that of Luxemburg, the Secretary of State reminded me that the Conven- tion of 1S67, referring to the Grand Duchy, differed from the Treaty referring to Belgium, in that Great Britain was bound to require the observance of this latter convention without the assistance of the other guaranteeing Powers, while with regard to Luxemburg all the guaran- teeing Powers were to act in concert. The protection of Belgian neutrality is here considered so important that Great Britain will regard its violation by Germany as a casus belli. It is a specially British interest ' and there is no doubt that the British Government, faithful to the traditions of their policy, will insist upon it, even if the business world, in which German influence is making tenacious efforts, exercises pressure to prevent the Govern- ment committing itself against Germany. Paul Cambon. To London French Yellow Book No. 13S M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London. Paris, August 2, 101 4. I note the points contained in your telegrams of the 27th, 2 30th, s 31st 4 July and the 1st August, 6 and in that which you have sent to me to-day. 6 In communicating to the Chambers the declaration which Sir Edward Grey has made to you, the text of which is contained in your last telegram, I will add that in it we have obtained from Great Britain a first assistance which is most valuable to us. In addition, I propose to indicate that the help which Great Britain intends to give to France for the protection of the French coasts or the French merchant marine, will be used in such a way that our navy will also, in case of a Franco-German conflict, be sup- ported by the British fleet in the Atlantic as well as in the North 1 This is a very important statement, for if it is true, Great Britain, even if entering the war because Belgian neutrality was infringed, did so for reasons of national self- interest, and not merely to defend the rights of a smaller nation. 2 French Yellow Book No. 63. Other despatches of the same day but without bearing on the question at hand here, are Nos. 68, 69, and 71. '76. No. ins. * lb. No. 110. 5 lb. No. 126. «/6. No. 137. The coupling of these despatches shows that the final promise contained in No. 137 is the result of diplomatic efforts begun by France, certainly not later than on July 27. Cf. French Yellow Book No. 63, July 27. 40S Official Diplomatic Documents Sea and Channel. In addition I would note that British ports could not serve as places for revictualling for the German fleet. Rene Viviani. To Berlin French Yellow Book No. 139 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin. Paris, August 2, 1914- German troops having to-day violated the eastern frontier at several points I request you immediately to protest in writing to the German Government. You will be good enough to take as your text the following note which, in the uncertainty of communications between Paris and Berlin, I have addressed directly to the German Ambassador : — "The French administrative and military authorities in the eastern district have just reported several acts which I have instructed the Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin to bring to the knowledge of the Imperial Government. "The first has taken place at Delle in the district of Belfort ; on two occasions the French Customs station in this locality has been fired upon by a detachment of German soldiers. North of Delle ' two German patrols of the 5th mounted Jaegers crossed the frontier this morning and advanced to the villages of Joncherey and Baron, more than ten kilometres from the frontier. The officer who com- manded the first has blown out the brains of a French soldier. The German cavalry carried oil' sonic horses which the French mayor of Suarce was collecting and forced the inhabitants of the commune to lead the said horses. "The Ambassador of the Republic at Berlin has been instructed to make a formal protest to the Imperial Government against acts which form a flagrant violation of the frontier by German troops in arms, and which are not justified by anything in the present situation. The Government of the Republic can only leave to the Imperial Government the entire responsibility for these acts." Rene Viviani. Great Britain : From Luxemburg British Blue Book No. 129 2 Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August ,.'.) (Translation.) Luxembourg, 2 aoiit, 1914- Luxemburg, August 2, 1914- (TelegraphiqueO (Telegraphic.) Ministke d'Etat du Luxem- The Luxemburg Minister of bourg Eyschen vient de recevoir State, Eyschen, has just received 1 Cf. above, No. 130, same day. 2 Cf. French Yellow Book No. 132, same day. August 2, British Blue Book No. 138 409 par l'intermediaire du Ministre through the German Minister in d'Allemagne a Liuxembourg, M. Luxemburg, M. de Buch, a tele- deBuchjUntelegrammeduChan- gram from the Chancellor of the eelier de FEmpire allemand Beth- German Empire, Bethmann- mann-Hollweg disant que les Hollweg, to the effect that the mesures militaires a, Luxembourg military measures taken in ne constituent pas un acte hostile Luxemburg do not constitute a contre le Luxembourg, mais sont hostile act against Luxemburg, uniquement des mesures destinees but are only intended to insure a. assurer contre attaque even- against a possible attack of a tuelle d'une armee franchise. French army. Full compensa- L'exploitation des voies ferrees tion will be paid to Luxemburg affermees a l'Empire Luxembourg for any damage caused by using recevra complete indemnite pour the railways which are leased to dommages eventuels. the Empire. [For British Blue Book Nos. 130 to 137 see under August 1.] From Berlin British Blue Book No. 138 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1, 1014- Your telegram of to-day. 1 I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secretary of State, and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If therefore Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State said that Austria's readiness to dis- cuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilised against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilise, had caused Germany to mobilise also. Russia had said that her mobilisation did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilised for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situa- tion now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had therefore ordered mobilisation, and the German repre- sentative at St. Petersburgh had been instructed within a certain 1 British Blue Book No. 131, August 1. 410 Official Diplomatic Documents time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Govern- ment must regard their refusal to an answer as creating a state of war. 1 From St. Petersburgh British Blue Book No. 139 Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, August 1, B>L' f . My telegram of 31st July. 2 The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor to the German Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency yesterday. 3 Xo progress whatever was made. In the evening 4 M. Sazonof 5 had an interview with the Austrian Ambassador who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to deflect the conversation towards a general discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Servia. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his desire that these relations should remain friendly, ami said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory ; but the real question which they had to solve at this moment was whether Austria, was to crush Servia and to reduce her to the status of a vassal, 6 or whether she was to leave Servia a free and independent State. In these circumstances, while the Servian question was unsolved, the abstract discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia was a waste of time. The only place where a successful dis- cussion of this question could be expected was London, and any such discussion was being made impossible by the action of Austria- Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually unfortified town, to bombardment. M. Sazonof 7 informed the French Ambassador and myself this morning of his conversation 8 with the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say that during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia, must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Servia. It was clear that Austrian domination of Servia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence 1 Russian Orange Book No. 76, August 1 • British Blue Book No. 120, under 'late of August 1. 3 I.e. yesterday of July 31 or July 30. See French Yellow Book 102, July 30. There is no apparent rea >on why i vent reported in Paris of July 30 and so printed in the French Yellow Book should appear in the British Blue Book under date of August -'. 4 The date of this interview is doubtful. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador re- ceive.] his instructions by telegram sent from Vienna July 30, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 50, and acknowledged by him, it. No. 55, July 31. In this latter despatch he refers to an " uninstructed " interview on July 29. "In the evening" cannot refer to July 31. It may refer to July 30, but since no such interview is mentioned by the Ambassador in Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 5.3, it possibly refers to July 29. 6 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 6 This occurred in interview between Sazonof and the German Ambassador on July 29. See British Blue Book No. 97, July 30. 7 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 8 From the preceding notes it is clear that the date of this conversation cannot be fixed. August 2, British Blue Book No. 141 411 of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austria had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought that she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum ; what mattered was that her intervention with the Aus- trian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburgh : the former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war. 1 M. Sazonof was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavours he had made to avoid a war. No suggestion held out to him had been re- fused. He had accepted the proposal for a conference of four, for mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for direct conversation between Austria and Russia ; but Germany and Austria-Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive replies or had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian Government to order mobilisation, and the mobilisation of Germany had created a desperate situation. 2 M. Sazonof added that the formula, of which the text is contained in my telegram of .'list July, 3 had been forwarded by the Russian Government to Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain its acceptance before the frontier was crossed by German troops. In no case would Russia begin hostilities first. I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the agreement of France and Germany can be obtained to keep their armies mobilised on their own sides of the frontier, as Russia has expressed her readiness to do, 4 pending a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis. [For British Blue Book No. 140 see under August 1.] From Vienna British Blce Book No. 141 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 1, 1914. I am to be received to-morrow by Minister for Foreign Affairs. This afternoon he is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors. I have just been informed by the Russian Ambassador of German 1 For a similar statement see British Blue Book No. 71, July 29. 2 This almost sounds as it Russia claimed that she had a right to mobilise, but that her neighbor had not. 3 British Blue Book No. 120, under date of August 1. 4 For Germany's reason for her belief that Russia could wait, while she could not, see previous despatch. 412 Official Diplomatic Documents ultimatum J requiring that Russia should demobilise within twelve hours. On being asked by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield to this curt sum- mons meant war, the German Ambassador replied that Germany would be forced to mobilise if Russia refused. Russian Ambassador at Vienna thinks that war is almost inevitable, and that as mobilisa- tion is too expensive to be kept for long, Germany will attack Russia at once. He says that the so-called mobilisation of Russia amounted to nothing more than that Russia had taken military measures cor- responding to those taken by Germany. 1 ' There seems to be even greater tension between Germany and Russia than there is between Austria and Russia. Russia would, according to the Russian Am- bassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence. 3 He says that Russia had no intention to attack Austria. He is going again to-day to point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that most terrific consequences must ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time Russia would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his Excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and that his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here. 4 The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first. It is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak earnestly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the extreme danger of the situation, and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being considered. 6 There is great anxiety to know what England will do. I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course, if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany. From Berlin British Blue Book No. 142 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward drey. — I Received August .'.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1, 191 ',. Orders have just 7 been issued for the general mobilisation of the navy and army, the first day of mobilisation to be 2nd August. > This ultimatum was presented on July 31. German White Book, Exhibit 25. It seems incredible thai the Russian Ambassador refrained from telling this to Sir M. .!,> Bunsen until the next day. I i,,. despatches ol the previous days disprove this. Germany sen! her ultimatum after Russia had mobilised, and did not herself order general mobilisation until August 1 t.i take effect on August 2. See British Blue Book No. 138 under date of August 2, and next number. 3 They were guaranteed by Germany on July 29. Sec British Blue Book No. U7. July 30. 1 Cf. previous despatch where he is railed a Russophobe. s This is contradicted by the statement discussed in note 1 (page 411) to the previous despatch. No. 140. 'This statement is unsupported by any evidence contained in the trench bellow 'This despatch disposes of the statements found iu previous despatches to the effect that Germany had mobilised earlier. August 2, British Blue Book No. llfi 413 From Berlin British Blue Book No. 143 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — ■ (Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1, 1914. Detention of British merchant ships at Hamburg. Your telegram of 1st August 1 acted on. Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoy- ance, has promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to pro- ceed without delay. From Berlin British Blue Book No. 144 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin. August 2, 1914. Secretary of State has just informed me that, owing 2 to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now in a state of war. From Berlin British Blue Book No. 145 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 2, 101 4- My telegram of 1st August. 3 Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last night to allow British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says that this must be regarded as a special favour to His Majesty's Government, as no other foreign ships have been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other pre- cautions being taken. From Brussels British Blue Book No. 146 Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 2). (Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 2, 101 4- The news that a German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg has been officially confirmed to the Belgian Government. 4 1 British Blue Book No. 130, August 1. 2 The declaration of war does not contain this reason. Cf. Russian Orange Book No. 76, August 1. 3 See No. 143. 1 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. IS, August 2, and British Blue Book next despatch. 414 Official Diplomatic Documents From. Luxemburg British Blue Book No. 147 Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 2.) (Translation.) (Telegraphique.) Luxembourg, le 2 aoi'd, 1914- J'ai l'honneur de porter a la connaissance de votre Excellence les faits suivants : Dimanche, 2 aout, de grand matin, les troupes allemandes, d'apres les informations qui sont parvenues au Gouvernement Grand ducal a, l'heure actuelle, out penetre sur le territoire luxembourgeois par les ponts de Wasserbillig et de Remich, se dirigeant specialement vers le sml du pays et vers la ville de Luxembourg, capitale du Grand Duche. Un certain nombre de trains blindes avec des troupes et des munitions ont ete ache- mines par la voie de chemin de ferde Wasserbillig a Luxembourg, ou l'ons'attend de les voir arri\ er. D'un instant a l'autre, ces faits impliquent des actes manifeste- ment contraire a la neutrality du Grand Duche garantie ])ar le Traite de Londres de 1867. Le ( rouvernement luxembourgeois n'a pas manque de protester energiquement contre cette agres- sion aupres des representants de Sa Majeste l'Empereur d'AUe- magne a Luxembourg. Une protestation identique va etre transmise telegraphiquement au Secretaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangeres a Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Luxemburg, August 2, 1914- I have the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice the following facts : — On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg terri- tory by the bridges of Wasser- billig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in the direction of Luxem- burg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are mani- festly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaran- teed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Govern- ment have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Em- peror at Luxemburg. An iden- tical protest will be sent by tele- graph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin. August 2, British Blue Book No. 1^8 415 To Paris British Blue Book No. 14S Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 2, 1914- After the Cabinet this morning 1 I gave M. Cambon the follow- ing memorandum : — " I am authorised to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. " This assurance is of course subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding 2 His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place." 3 I pointed out that we had very large questions and most difficult issues to consider, and that Government felt that they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did give a security to France that would enable her to settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet. M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1S67. He asked me what we should say about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much more important matter; we were considering what statement we should make in Parliament to-morrow — in effect, whether we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a casus belli. I told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this point. 4 1 At two previous meetings the Cabinet had refused to make any promises to France; see French Yellow Book Nos. 110, July 31. and 1211, August 1. and note 4. This promise was given before Germany's ultimatum to Belgium, see Belgian Gray Book No. 201, August 2. 2 This is the very opposite of French Yellow Book No. 143, August 3: "is to be regarded as binding the British Government. Sir E. Grey assured me of this." 3 This formula is different from the one given in French Yellow Book No. 143, August 3, and quoted by Viviani in the Chamber of Deputies, French Yellow Book No. 159, August 4. In both the last sentence reads "from that moment on England and Germany would be in a state of war." There are then two distinct formulas. The one appears in British Blue Book No. 14S, French Yellow Book No. 137, Aug. 2, and in the Speech in Parliament by Sir E. Grey printed as an appendix to the British Blue Book. The other occurs in French Yellow Book No. 143, August 3, and No. 159, August 4. 4 British Blue Book No. 123, August 1. 416 Official Diplomatic Documents To Berlin British Blue Book No. 149 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 2, 1914- Yoxjh telegram of 1st August. 1 I regret to learn that 100 tons of sugar was compulsorily unloaded from the British steamship Sappho at Hamburg and detained. Similar action appears to have been taken with regard to other British vessels loaded with sugar. You should inform Secretary of State that, for reasons stated in my telegram of 1st August, 2 I most earnestly trust that the orders already sent to Hamburg to allow the clearance of British ships covers also the release of their cargoes, the detention of which can- not be justified. Russia : Russian Orange Book No. 77 Announcement hi/ the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting Recent Events. July 20 (August 2), 1914. A garbled version of the events of the last few days having ap- peared in the foreign press, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs considers it his duty to publish the following brief account of the diplomatic discussions during the period under review: — On the 10th (23rd) July, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade presented a note to the Prime Minister of Servia, in which the Servian Government were accused of having fostered the pan- Serb movement, which had led to the assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. Austria-Hungary, therefore, demanded of the Servian Government, not only the condemnation in the most formal manner of the above-mentioned propaganda, but also the adoption, under Austrian supervision, of a series of measures for the discovery of the plot, for the punishment of any Servian subjects who had taken part in it, and for the prevention of any future attempts at assassination upon Austrian soil. A time limit of forty- eight hours was given to the Servian Government within which to reply to this note. The Russian Government, to whom the Austro-Hungarian Am- bassador at St. Petersburgh had communicated the text of the note seventeen hours after its presentation at Belgrade, having taken note of the demands contained therein, could not hut perceive that some of these demands were impossible of execution as regards their substance, whilst others were presented in a form which was incom- patible with the dignity of an independent State. Russia considered that the humiliation of Servia, involved in these demands, and 1 British Blue Book No. 143, under date of August 2. 2 British Blue Book No. 130, August 1. August 2, Russian Orange Book No. 77 417 equally the evident intention of Austria-Hungary to secure her own hegemony in the Balkans, which underlay her conditions, 1 were in- admissible. The Russian Government, therefore, pointed out to Austria-Hungary in the most friendly manner that it would be desirable to re-examine the points contained in the Austro-Hun- garian note. The Austro-Hungarian Government did not see their way to agree to a discussion of the note. The moderating influence of the four Powers at Vienna was equally unsuccessful. Despite the fact that Servia had reprobated the crime, 2 and had shown herself ready to give Austria satisfaction to an extent beyond the expectations, 3 not only of Russia, but also of the other Powers — despite these facts, the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade con- sidered the Servian reply insufficient and left the town. Recognising the exaggerated nature of the demands made by Austria, Russia had previously 4 declared that she could not remain indifferent, while not desisting from doing her utmost to find a peace- ful issue which might prove acceptable 5 to Austria, and spare the latter's self-respect as a Great Power. At the same time Russia let it be clearly understood that she could accept a peaceful settlement of the question only so far as it involved no humiliation of Servia as an independent State. Unhappily all the efforts of the Russian Government to this end were fruitless. The Austro-Hungarian Gov- ernment, which had shunned any attempt at conciliatory interven- tion by the Powers in the Austrian dispute with Servia, proceeded to mobilise and declared war officially against Servia, and the follow- ing day Belgrade was bombarded. The manifesto which accom- panied the declaration of war openly accuses Servia of having pre- pared and carried out the crime of Serajevo. Such an accusation of a crime at common law, launched against a whole people and a whole State, aroused, by its evident inanity, 6 widespread sympathy for Servia throughout all classes of European society. In consequence of this behaviour of the Austro-Hungarian Gov- ernment in spite of Russia's declaration that she could not remain indifferent to the fate of Servia, the Russian Government considered it necessary to order mobilisation in the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan. This decision was rendered necessary by the fact that since the date when the Austro-Hungarian note was communicated to the Servian Government, and since the first steps taken by Russia, five days had elapsed, and yet the Vienna Cabinet had not taken one step to meet Russia halfway in her efforts towards peace. Indeed, quite the contrary; for the mobilisation of half of the Austro-Hungarian army had been ordered. The German Government were kept informed of the steps taken 1 This implies to Austria-Hungary a motive which may or may not have been hers. 2 No evidence for this has been given. 3 This is denied by Austria-Hungary. See the despatches of July 26, especially Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 34, July 27. 4 This is not clear. 5 Cf. British Blue Book No. 120, under date of August 1, note 4. 5 The "dossier," Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 19, July 25, takes a different view. 418 Official Diplomatic Documents by Russia. At the same time it was explained to them that these steps were only the result of the Austrian preparations, and that they were not in any way aimed at Germany. Simultaneously, the Russian Government declared that Russia was ready to continue discussions with a view to a peaceful settlement of the dispute, either in the form of direct negotiations with Vienna or< as suggested by Great Britain, in the form of a conference of the four Great Powers not directly interested, that is to say, Great Britain, France, Ger- many, and Italy. This attempt on the part of Russia was, however, equally unsuc- cessful. Austria-Hungary declined 1 a further exchange of views with Russia, and the Vienna Cabinet was unwilling to join the pro- posed conference of the Powers. Nevertheless Russia did not abandon her efforts for peace. When questioned by the German Ambassador as to the conditions on which we would still agree to suspend our preparations, the Minister for Foreign Affairs declared - that these conditions were Austria's recog- nition that the Austro-Serbian question had assumed a European character, ami a declaration by her that she agreed not to insist upon such of her demands as were incompatible with the sovereign rights of Servia. Germany considered 3 this Russian proposal unacceptable to Austria-Hungary. At that very moment news of the proclamation of general mobilisation 4 by Austria-Hungary reached St. Petersburg. All this time hostilities were continuing on Servian territory, and Belgrade was bombarded afresh. The failure of our proposals for peace* compelled us to extend the scope of our precautionary military measures. 5 The Berlin Cabinet questioned us on this, and we replied that Russia was compelled to begin preparations 6 so as to be ready for every emergency. But while taking this precautionary step, Russia, did not on that account abandon her strenuous efforts to find some solution of the situation, and she announced that she was ready to accept any pro- posed settlement of the problem that might be put forward, provided it complied with the conditions laid down by her. In spite (if this conciliatory communication, the German Govern- ment on the 18th (31st) July demanded of the Russian Government that they should suspend their military measures by midday on the 19th July (1st August), and threatened, should they fail to comply, to proceed to general mobilisation. 7 ' This is denied by Austria-Hungary. See Red Book No. 50, July 30. - British Blue Book No. <.)7, July 30. :! There is no evidence of this anywhere. The formula was changed at England's request, British Blue Book No. 132, August 1. 1 Russia's general mobilisation took place on July 31. That of Austria-Hungary on August 1. See British Blue Book No. li-'7. August 1. 5 This is contradicted by the previous note. B "Begin preparations" is hardly the word for general mobilisation. 7 In this sentence the Russian general mobilisation of July 31 is called "military measures" while the German order of August 1 as of August '2, is properly called what it is. general mobilisation. August 2, Russian Orange Book No. 78 419 On the following day, the 19th July (1st August), the German Ambassador, on behalf of his Government, forwarded a declaration of war l to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. To Russian Representatives Abroad Russian Orange Book No. 78 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Russian Representatives abroad. (Telegram.) St. Petersburg, July 20 (August 2), 1914. It is quite evident that Germany is now doing her utmost to foist upon us the responsibility for the rupture. We were forced to mobilise by the immense responsibility which would have fallen upon our shoulders if we had not taken all possible precautionary measures at a time when Austria, while confining herself to discus- sions of a dilatory nature, was bombarding Belgrade and was under- taking 2 general mobilisation. The Emperor of Russia had promised the German Emperor that he would take no aggressive action 3 as long as the discussions with Austria continued. With such a guarantee, and after so many proofs of Russia's desire for peace, 4 Germany neither could, nor had the right to, doubt our declaration that we would joyfully accept any peaceful settlement compatible with the dignity and independ- ence of Servia. Any other solution, besides being entirely incompat- ible with our own dignity, would assuredly have upset the European balance of power by securing the hegemony of Germany. The European — nay, the world-wide — character of this dispute b is infinitely more important than the pretext from which it springs. By her decision to declare war upon us, at a moment when negotia- tions were in progress between the Powers, Germany has assumed a heavy responsibility. 1 Russian Orange Book No. 76, August 1. 2 This statement is more accurate than that contained in previous despatch. See Russian Orange Book No. 77 note 10. 3 General mobilisation is universally looked upon as an aggressive act in itself. 4 Nobody before had called a general mobilisation a "proof of a desire for peace." 5 The previous sentence shows that so far as Russia is concerned she did not believe that Prussianism or frightful ness or the invasion of Belgium, but the European balance of power, would supply the motive for England to enter the war. 420 Official Diplomatic Documents Monday, August 3, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Austria-Hungary Belgium France Sent Despatches : London, etc. King ( reorge German Minister London, London, etc. All representatives Berlin, Munich London The Hague, Brussels, London German Ambassador Germany Great Britain Paris Berlin, Brussels Russia Serbia Austria-Hungary is silent on this day. Belgium refuses to accede to the German ultimatum and appeals to Great Britain for "diplomatic intervention." To the informal offer of military assist- ance she replies, to the French Minister, that she is "making no appeal at present to the guarantee of the Powers." France offers her military assistance to Belgium, who declines it with thanks. She denies the German accusations of having violated Belgian neutrality, and having committed hostile acts against Germany. When the latter declares war on her. she recalls her diplomatic agents from Germany, and lodges with the latter formal protest against her violations of Luxemburg and Belgian neutrality. Germany declares war on France at (i. 1"> p.m. citing as reasons several unlawful and hostile acts on the part of France, whom she also charges with having violated Belgian neutrality. Great Britain issues only one important despatch. It contains the Italian intention not to enter the war on the side of her allies of the Triple Alliance. This Italian declaration is sent by Sir F. < Jrey to the British Ambassador in Paris on the authority of the French Ambassador in London. Russia is silent on this day. Serbia is silent. Belrium : Berlin Belgian Gray Book No. 21 Memorandum of an Interview a. ileal for at 1.30 A.M., on August 8, by Kerr von Below Saleske, Herman Minister, with Baron ran tier Elst, Secretary-General to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. At 1.30 a.m. tlio German Minister asked to see Baron van der Elst. He told hint that he had been instructed By his Government to inform the Belgian Government that French dirigibles had thrown bombs, and that a French cavalry patrol had crossed the frontier in violation of international law, seeing that war had not been declared. 1 The Secretary-General asked Heir von Below where these incidents had happened, and was told that it was in Germany. Baron van der 1 Similar charges against Germany were made bv France; see French Yellow Book No. 136, August .'. August 3, Belgian Gray Book No. 22 421 Elst then observed that in that case he could not understand the object of this communication. Herr von Below stated that these acts, which were contrary to international law, were calculated to lead to the supposition that other acts, contrary to international law, would be committed by France. To Berlin Belgian Gray Book No. 22 Note communicated by M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister. Brussels, August 3, 1914 (7 A.M.). The German Government stated in their note of the 2nd August, 1 1914, that according to reliable information French forces intended to march on the Meuse via Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of the best intentions, would not be in a position to repulse, without assistance, an advance of French troops. 2 The German Government, therefore, considered themselves com- pelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian territory. In these circumstances, Germany proposed to the Belgian Government to adopt a friendly attitude towards her, and undertook, on the con- clusion of peace, to guarantee the integrity of the Kingdom and its possessions to their full extent. The note added that if Belgium put difficulties in the way of the advance of German troops, Germany would be compelled to consider her as an enemy, and to leave the ultimate adjustment of the relations between the two States to the decision of arms. This note had made a deep and painful impression 3 upon the Bel- gian Government. The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contra- diction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1, in the name of the French Government. Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her inter- national obligations and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader. 4 The treaties of 1839, confirmed 6 by the treaties of 1S70, vouch for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and notably of the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia. 1 Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2. 2 This is exactly the same argument advanced by Great Britain in the second of the Brussels documents (see p. 580) when the British officer claimed that the British troops would enter Belgium even unasked. 3 The ring of sincerity in this sentence is lessened after having studied the document mentioned in the previous note. 4 It would, however, have been almost hopeless, for since Great Britain had the mil- itary secrets of Belgium, France had them also, undoubtedly. See documents men- tioned in preceding notes. 5 It had been claimed in Parliament in 1870 that the treaties of 1870 invalidated those of 1839. See the editor's Germany's Point of View, the chapters on Belgium. 422 Official Diplomatic Documents Belgium lias always been faithful to her international obligations, 1 she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, and she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for her neutrality. The attack upon her independence 2 with which the German Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of inter- national law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law. The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals sub- mitted to them, would sacrifice the honour of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe. Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilisation 3 of the world, they refuse to believe that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the violation of her neutrality. If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon their rights. To St. Petersburgh, Berlin, London, Pari*, Vienna, and The Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 23 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, t<> the Belgian Ministers at St. Petersburgh, Berlin, London, Paris, Vienna, The Hague. (Telegram.) Brussels, August J, 1014- At 7 P.M. last night Germany presented a note proposing friendly neutrality. This entailed free passage through Belgian territory, while guaranteeing the maintenance of the independence of Belgium and of her possessions on the conclusion of peace, and threatened, in the event of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time limit of twelve hours was allowed within which to reply. Our answer 4 has been that this infringement of our neutrality would lie a flagrant violation of international law. To accept the German proposal would he to sacrifice the honour of the nation. ( 'onscious of her duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel any attack by all the means in her power. To Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh Belgian" Geay Book No. 24 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh. Sir, Brussels, August ,1, 1914 (1® noon). As you are aware, Germany has delivered to Belgium an ultima- tum which expires this morning, 3rd August, at 7 a.m. As no act of 1 Germany claims that this is not true in view of the Brussels documents. 2 Germany had explicitly disclaimed making any attack on the "independence" of Belgium. 3 The writer here forgot the chapter of Belgian atrocities in the Congo. < See preceding despatch. August 3, Belgian Gray Book No. 25 423 war has occurred up to the present, the Cabinet has decided that there is, for the moment, no need to appeal to the guaranteeing Powers. The French Minister has made the following statement to me upon the subject : — (Translation.) "Sans etre charge d'une decla- "Although I have received no ration de mon Gouvernement, je instructions l to make a declara- crois cependant, m'inspirant de tion from my Government, I feel ses intentions connues, pouvoir justified, in view of their well- dire que si le Gouvernement known intentions, in saying that Royal faisait appel au Gouverne- if the Belgian Government were ment francais, comme Puissance to appeal to the French Govern- garante de sa neutralite, nous ment as one of the Powers repondrions immediatement a guaranteeing their neutrality, the son appel; si cet appel n'etait French Government would at pas formule, il est probable, a once respond to Belgium's ap- moins bien entendu que le souci peal ; 2 if such an appeal were de sa propre defense ne determine not made, it is probable that des mesures exceptionnelles, qu'il — unless of course exceptional attendra pour intervenir que la measures were rendered necessary Belgique ait fait tin acte de in self-defence — the French resistance effective." Government would not intervene until Belgium had taken some effective measure of resistance." I thanked M. Klobukowski for the support which the French Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, ant! I informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal at present to the guarantee of the Powers, and that they would decide later what ought to be done. 3 To King George Belgian Gray Book No. 25 His Majesty the King of the Belgians to His Majesty King Gennje. (Telegram.) Brussels, Augusts, 1914- Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England 1 It is unusual for diplomatic agents to speak without instructions or, as it is called, de suo, and even more unusual to include such informal remarks in the official books of despatches. The French Minister to Belgium had once before spoken de suo. See Belgian Gray Book No. 9, July 31. When M. Davignon gave a running review of the events leading up to August 4. and quoted this despatch (No. 24) in No. 38, he felt constrained to explain the unusual procedure of the French Minister by interpolating the words "in view of the rapid march of events." 2 This appeal it was decided not to make as late as 10 o'clock, August 4. See Belgian Gray Book No. 38. 3 For this reply see also French Yellow Book No. 142, and British Blue Book No. 151, both August 3. In the British Blue Book the French offer consists of "five French army corps." Since that can hardly be interpolated, the above declaration cannot be accurate, although it has been printed in quotation marks. ■i'24 Official Diplomatic Documents in INTO and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention 1 of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium. From London Belgian Gray Book No. 26 Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Bel- gian Minister fur Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) London, August 8, 1914- I showed your telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has laid it before the Cabinet. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed me that if our neutrality is violated it means war with Germany. 2 France : From The Hague French Yellow Book No. 140 M. Marcel in Pellet, French Minister at The Hague, to M. Rene Vi- viani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Hague, August 3, 1914- The German Minister called yesterday on the Minister for For- eign Affairs to explain the necessity under which, as he said, Ger- many was placed of violating the neutral territory of Luxemburg, adding that he would have a fresh communication to make to him to-day. He has now this morning announced the entry of German troops into Belgium in order, as he has explained, to prevent an occupation of that countrv by France. „ Pellet. From Brussels French Yellow Book No. 141 }F Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to J/. Rene Viriani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Brussels, August .!. 1914- Yesterday evening the German Minister handed to the Belgian Government an ultimatum 3 stating that his Government, having learnt that the French were preparing for operations in the districts 1 Cf. No. '-'I, same day, and No. 38, August 4. The appeal here made is only for "diplomatic intervention." Such diplomatic intervention was of course out of the question, since the British Cabinet, L' f - .TrsT as Sir Edward Grey was starting this morning for the meet- ing of the Cabinet, my German colleague, who had already seen him yesterday, came to press him to say that the neutrality of Great Britain did not depend upon respecting Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey refused all conversation on this matter. 4 The German Ambassador has sent to the press a communique saying that if Great Britain remained neutral Germany would give up all naval operations and would not make use of the Belgian coast as a point d'appui. b My answer is that respecting the coast is not respecting the neutrality of the territory, and that the German ultimatum is already a violation of this neutrality. Paul Cambon. 1 For the different wording of this formula see notes to British Blue Brink No. MS. August _', and French Yellow Book No. 137, August 2. ■ despatches mentioned in preceding note. • 3 This is very important, because it suggests that besides the irritten communications which are printed in tne official Books of documents, other communications were ex- changed between London and Paris, and undoubtedly other places too. 4 This may account for the fact that this matter is not mentioned in the British Blue I'HMlk 6 Obviously done to allay any fear of Germany in Great Britain. August 3, French Yellow Book No. 14? 427 From London French Yellow Book No. 145 M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Virion i, President of the Council, Minister fur Foreign Affairs-. Loudon, August 8, 1914- Sir Edward Grey has made the statement regarding the inter- vention of the British fleet. 1 He has explained, in considering the situation, what he proposed to do with regard to Belgian neutrality ; and the reading of a letter from King Albert asking for the support of Great Britain has deeply stirred the House. The House will this evening vote the credit which is asked for ; from this moment its support is secured to the policy of the Govern- ment, and it follows public opinion which is declaring itself more and more in our favour. Paul Cambon. To London French Yellow Book No. 146 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London. Paris August 8, 101 4. I am told that the German Ambassador is said to ha -1 stated to the Foreign Office that yesterday morning eighty French officers in Prussian uniform had attempted to cross the German frontier in twelve motor cars at Walbeck, to the west of Geldern, and that this formed a very serious violation of neutrality on the part of France. Be good enough urgently to contradict this news, which is pure invention, and to draw the attention of the Foreign Office to the German campaign of false news which is beginning. Rene Viviani. From Berlin French Yellow Book No. 147 Letter handed by the German Ambassador to M. Rene Viviani, Presi- dent of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, during his fare- well audience, August 8, 1914, «' '>■'/> PM. M. le President, The German administrative and military authorities have estab- lished a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on Ger- man territory by French military aviators. Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the terri- 1 Which statement did he make, the one of French Yellow Book No. 137, August 2, or of ib. No. 143, August 3? In .Sir E. Grey's speech given in British Blue Book of Sept. 28, the former is given. In Viviani's speech of August 4, French Yellow Book No. 159, the latter is quoted as having been given by Sir E. Grey. 428 Official Diplomatic Documents tory of that country; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel ; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nurei tb I am instructed, and 1 have the honour to inform your Excellency, these acts of aggression the German Empire lers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power. At the same time I have the honour to hrin^ to the knowledge of your Excellency that the German authorities will detain French mercantile vessels in German ports, hut they will i iom if, within forty-eight hours, they arc assured of complete reciprocity. My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end, it only remains for me to request your Excellency furnish me with my passports, and to take the steps you consider suitable to assure my return to Germany, with the stall' of the Em- bassy, as well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the German Consulate General in Paris. Be good enough, M. le President, to receive the assurances of my ' respect. (Signed) Schoen. To the French Representatives Abroad French Yellow Book No. 14S M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Representatives abroad. Paris, August 3, 1914. The German Ambassador has asked for his passports and is leav- ing this evening with the stall's of the Embassy, the German Consu- leneral and the lunarian Legation. Baron von Schoen has given as his reason the establishment by the German administrative and military authorities of arts of hostility which are said to have been committed by Frei ators accused of having flown over territory of the Empire and thrown bombs. The Ambassador adds that the aviators are said to have also violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over Belgian territory. "In the presence of these acts of aggression," says the letter of Baron von Schoen, "the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in con- ce of the arts of this latter Power." 1 formally challenged the inaccurate allegations of the Ambassa- dor, and for my part I reminded him that I had yesterday addressed to him a note - protesting against the flagrant violations of the French frontier committed two days ago by detachments of German troops. Rene Viviani. ' Cf. New York E ening '',, [, July 22, 1916, referring to "Facts about the War" publi bed b; the Paris Chambei oi Commerce, in which Dr. Schwalbe is oil writing in the Deutsche M ' edizinischi Wo ■ m May 18, to the effeel th I his investigations cleared the French of the charge of having dropped bombs on N uremberg. 2 Fn ach Yellow Book Nos. 136 and 139, August 2, and note to No. 136. August 8, French Yellow Book No. 150 429 To Berlin French Yellow Book No. 149 M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegram communicated to French Representatives abroad.) Paris. August 3, 1914. I request you to ask for your passports and to leave Berlin at once with the staff of the Embassy , leaving the charge of French interests and the care of the archives to the Spanish Ambassador. I request you at the same time to protest in writing against the viola- tion of the neutrality of Luxemburg by German troops, of which notice has been given by the Prime [Minister of Luxemburg; against the ultimatum addressed to the Belgian Government by the German Minister at Brussels to force upon them the violation of Belgian neutrality and to require of that country that she should facilitate military operations against France on Belgian territory; finally against the false allegation of an alleged projected invasion of these two countries by French armies, by which he 1 has attempted to justify the state of war which he declares henceforth exists between Germany and France. Rene Viviani. To Munich French Yellow Book No. 150 M. Bene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Allize, French Minister at Munich. Paris, August J, 1914- Be good enough to inform the Royal Bavarian Government that you have received instructions to adapt your attitude to that of our Ambassador at Berlin and to leave Munich. Rene Viviani. 1 "He" does not refer to the last person mentioned, which was the " German Minister at Brussels" (for whose remarks see Belgian Gray Book X... I'D, August 2, 1914). but to tin- German Ambassador in Paris, not mentioned in this despatch, for it was lie who "attempted to justify, etc." (see French Yellow Book No. 147, August 3). This proves parts of the original despatch have been excised. 430 Official Diplomatic Documents To London, St. Petersburg]!, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Berne, Constan- tinople, The Hague, Copenhagen, Christiania, Stockholm, Bucha- rest, Athens, Belgrade. French Yellow Book No. 151 M. Rene Yiriani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Representatives at London, St. Pctersburgh, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, Bern/, Constantinople, The Hague, Co- penhagen, Christiania, Stockholm, Bucharest, Athens, Belgrade. Paris, August 3, 1914- I learn from an official Belgian source 1 that German troops have violated Belgian territory at Gemmerich in the district of Verviers. Rene Viviani. Great Britain : From Berlin British Blue Book No. 150 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received. August S.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 3, HU4- Your telegram of 2nd August : Detention of British ships at Hamburg. No information available. From Brussels British Blue Book No. 151 Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August .:.) (Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 3, 1914- French Government have offered through their military attache the support of five French army corps to the Belgian Government. 2 following reply has been sent to-day: — "We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. Belgian Govern- ment will decide later on the action which they may think it neces- sary to take." 1 No such account is contained in the Belgian Gray Book, according to which, (No. 40. August 4,) the "armed forces of Germany " entered Belgium "this morning." Cf. also Belgian Gray Book No. 30, August 4, which announces the violation of Belgian territory at Gemmerich. This French despatch is, therefore, probably erroneously dated August 3, because no "official Belgian source " could have made the above state- ment truthfully on August 3. • Cf. Belgian ( [ray Book No. 24 and French Yellow Book No. 142, both of August 3, and note 3 to Belgian despatch. August 8, British Blue Book No. 152 431 To Paris British Blue Book No. 152 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. Sir, Foreign Office, August 3, 1914. On the 1st instant the French Ambassador made the following communication : ' — "In reply to the German Government's intimation of the fact that ultimatums had been presented to France and Russia, and to the question as to what were the intentions of Italy, the Marquis di San Giuliano 2 replied : — "'The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Ambassador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance, and in such circumstances Italy would remain neutral.'" In making this communication, M. Cambon 3 was instructed to lay stress upon the Italian declaration that the present war was not a defensive but an aggressive war, and that, for this reason, the casus fwderis under the terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise. I am, etc. E. Grey. : No reason is apparent why this Italian declaration should be sent by Sir E. Grey to the British Ambassador in Paris on the authority of the French Ambassador in London. There should have been an official Italian declaration available. 2 Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 3 French Ambassador in London. 432 Official Diplomatic Documents Tuesday, August 4, 1914. SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES [GN Office op Sent Despatches to Received ia-Hungary London Belgium London, Paris The Hague, Berlin, Madrid, Berlin London ( rerman Mil Belgian Ministers at German Minister Entente capitals Entente Ministers in British Minister Bru; i France Repn if the Bru Powers in Paris London ( Copenhagen Germany Great Britain Berlin, Bru Brussels, Berlin Russia Berlin Austria-Hungary is discussing the possibility of maintaining friendly relations with ( Jreat Britain. Behji '.in; dismi ;ses the ( rerman Minister, and issues to the Entente Mil her version of the events leading up 1 i the break with Germany. She di id lir-,i , ii >: to call on the armed intervention or assistance of the guaranteeing Powers under the Treaty of 1S39, but late in tli lee les to do so. Franci protest on what she calls Germany's violation of the Hague i ions sod the Tr aiy of 1S39, addressing her protest to "the Representa- tives of the Powers at Paris." i Selgium that to her "deepreg o npelled to iake i liose meas ires of defence ah i nsable in view of the mena ; oi France ;" and orders her troops to enter Belgian territory. . ..,:, concerning the neutrality of r, announces herself to be the ally of France, who is at by Germany of the terms of the ultima- tum could not have kept I I n neutral. At the same time she Belgium i 'Cted invasion with force of arms, this being her reply Million, which as the ally of France she could, of course, not render. Russia does nol enter into the discussii n on this day. Serbia recalls her minister and consuls from Germany. Austria-Hungary : From London ArsTiai-IlrxoAKiAx Red Book No. 58 Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold. (Telegraphic.) London, August^ -?•''?/■ I have just seen Sir E. Grey. The British Government have sent to Germany an ultimatum ' on account of Belgium. They expect a reply at 12 o'clock to-night. Sir E. Grey said to me that tit present there was no reason why he 1 British Blue Book No. 159, same day. August 4, Belgian Gray Book No. 27 433 should make any communication to the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment, and there was no cause why a conflict should arise between us, so long as we were not in a condition of war with France. In any case, he hoped that we would not begin hostilities without the for- mality ' of a previous declaration of war. He does not intend to recall Sir M. de Bunsen. Should we be at war with France, it would indeed be difficult for Great Britain, as the ally 2 of France, to co-operate with her in the Atlantic, and not in the Mediterranean. Belgium : From Berlin Belgian Gray Book No. 27 Ilcrr wn Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (The original is in French.) Brussels, August j, 1914 (6 A. .1/.). (Translation.) Monsieur le Ministre, Sir, J'ai ete charge et j'ai 1'honneur In accordance with my instruc- d'informer votre Excellence que tions, I have the honour to inform par suite du refus oppose par le your Excellency that in con- Gouvernement de Sa Majeste le sequence of the refusal of the Roi aux propositions bien inten- Belgian Government to entertain tionnees que lui avait soumises the well-intentioned proposals le Gouvernement Imperial, celui- made to them by the German ei se verra, a son plus vif regret, Government, the latter, to their force d'executer — au besoin par deep regret, find themselves la force des armes — lesmesures compelled to take — if necessary de securite exposees comme indis- by force of arms — those meas- pensables vis-a-vis des menaces ures of defence already fore- francaises. shadowed 3 as indispensable, in Veuillez agreer, etc. view of the menace of France. (Signe) von Below. 1 The use of this word is strange here in view of III Convention 2d Hague < '(in- ference, Article 1 : "The contracting powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence without previous and explicit warning." This Convention had been ratified by Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France. Great Britain, and Russia. In this connection it may bo asked how Belgium could ratify a Convention con- cerning the opening of hostilities, if she was regarded, in 1907, as po i □ uirality guaranteed le 2 If Sir E. i trey is correctly quoted, the use of this word is significant ; and the ques- tion naturally arises " Since when w: in the ally of France?" Sir E. Grey had I n utl orised by the British ( 'abinef in the morning of August 2 (British Blue Book No. 148) to promise France their support. If Great Britain was the ally of France when she sent her ultimatum about Belgium to Germany, the ethics of such a course are doubtful, in view of the fact that France and Germany were at war. CI French Yellow Book No. 158, August t, where President Poincare refers to Great Britain as an ally of France. ( !f. also Serbian Blue Hook No. 38, July 25. The whole sentence is. of course, a future condition, refering to the possibility of a war between Austria-Hungary and France. No futurity idea, however, attaches to the term "as the ally of France." 3 Belgian Liray Book No. 20, August 2. 434 Official Diplomatic Documents From London Belgian Gray Book No. 28 Note communicated by Sir Fraud* VUliers, British Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Brussels, A ugust 4, 1914. I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government that if Germany brings pressure to bear upon Belgium with the object of forcing her to abandon her attitude of neutrality, His Britannic Majesty's Gov- ernment expect Belgium to resist with all the means at her disposal. 1 In that event, His Britannic Majesty's Government are pre- pared to join Russia and France, should Belgium so desire, in ten- dering at once joint assistance to the Belgian Government with a view to resisting any forcible measures adopted by Germany against Belgium, and also offering a guarantee 2 for the maintenance of the future independence ami integrity of Belgium. From the Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 29 Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Bel- gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, The Hague, August 4, 1914- The Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday evening that the Netherlands Government would perhaps be obliged, owing to the gravity of the present situation, to institute war buoying on the Scheldt. M. Loudon read me the draft of the note which would announce this decision to me. I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the note in question which was communicated to me yesterday evening. As you will observe, the Scheldt will only be closed at night. By day navigation will be possible, but only with Dutch pilots who have been furnished with the necessary nautical instructions. In this way both Dutch interests in the defence of their territory, and Belgian interests in the navigation of Antwerp will be safeguarded. You will note that the Netherlands Government further ask that in the event of the war buoying being carried out, we should cause the lightships Wielingen and Wandelaar to be withdrawn in order to facilitate the maintenance of the neutrality of Dutch territory. I would point out that the phrase used in this note, "sailing up the Scheldt," is not sufficiently explicit ; sailing down would be 1 Belgium had asked for British "diplomatic intervention," Belgian Gray Book No. 25, August 3. 2 This is the same guarantee as was offered by Germany, who guaranteed "the possessions and the independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full" (Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2). "Neutrality" is omitted both in the British and German guarantees, Cf. British Blue Book No. 155, August 4. August 4, Belgian Gray Book No. 31 435 permitted under the same conditions. The Minister has, how- ever, given me this assurance. As soon as the Netherlands Government have decided upon this exceptional measure I shall be informed of it. About six hours are necessary to carry out war buoying. I will at once telegraph to you. Note enclosed in No. 29 The Netherlands Government may be compelled, in order to maintain the neutrality of Dutch territory, to institute war buoying upon the Scheldt, that is to say, to move or modify a portion of the actual arrangement of buoys and lights. At the same time this special arrangement of buoys has been so drawn up that when it is brought into force it will still be possible to sail up the Scheldt as far as Antwerp by day, but only with Dutch pilots who have been furnished with the necessary nautical instruc- tions. In thus acting the Netherlands Government are convinced that they will be able to serve equally both the Dutch interests in the defence of Netherlands territory and Belgian interests in the navigation of Antwerp. After the establishment of war buoying on the Scheldt, there would be no further reason to enter the tidal water of Flushing at night, and as the presence of the lightships Wielingen and Wandelaar is not indispensable to navigation by day, the Netherlands Govern- ment would be much obliged if the Belgian Government would be good enough, in the event of the establishment of war buoying, to with- draw these boats in order to facilitate the maintenance of the neu- trality of Dutch territory. To London and Paris Belgian Gray Book No. 30 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Min- isters at London and Paris. (Telegram.) Brussels, August 4, 1914- The General Staff announces that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich. 1 To Berlin Belgian Gray Book No. 31 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels. Sir, Brussels, August 4> 1914- I have the honour to inform your Excellency that from to-day the Belgian Government are unable to recognise your diplomatic- 1 See French Yellow Book No. 151, August 3, and note. 436 Official Diplomatic Documents status and cease to have official relations with you. Your Excel- lency will find enclosed the passports necessary for your departure with the staff of the legation. From. Berlin Belgian Gray Book No. 32 II err von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Brussels, August 4, 1914- I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excel- [ency's note of the 4th August, and to inform you that I have en- trusted the custody of the German Legation of Brussels to the care of my United States colleague. To Mail rid Belgian Gray Book No. 33 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid. (Telegram.) Brussels, August 4, 1914- Please ask the Spanish Government if they will be good enough to take charge of Belgian interests in Germany, and whether in that ( vent they will issue the necessary instructions to their Ambassador at Berlin. To Berlin Belgian Gray Book No. 34 .1/. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affair*, to Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin. (Telegram.) Brussels, August 4> 1914- The German Minister is leaving to-night ; ' you should ask for your passports. We are requesting the Spanish Government to authorise the Spanish Ambassador to be good enough to take charge of Belgian interests in Germany. From, Berlin Belgian Gray Book No. 35 Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Berlin, August 4, 1914. I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of part of the speech made to-day in the Reichstag by the Imperial 1 At the request <>f Belgium : see Belgian Gray Book No. 31, same date. August 4, Belgian Gray Book No. 36 437 Chancellor on the subject of the infamous violation of Belgian neutrality : — " "We are in a state of legitimate defence, and necessity knows no law. "Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have perhaps already entered Belgium. This is contrary to the dictates of international law. France has, it is true, declared at Brussels that she was pre- pared to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as it was respected by her adversary. But we knew that France was ready to invade Belgium. France could wait; we could not. A French attack upon our flank in the region of the Lower Rhine might have been fatal. We were, therefore, compelled to ride roughshod over the legitimate protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. For the wrong which we are thus doing, we will make reparation as soon as our military object is attained. " Anyone in such grave danger as ourselves, and who is struggling for his supreme welfare, can only be concerned with the means of extricating himself; we stand side by side with Austria." It is noteworthy that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg recognises, without the slightest disguise, that Germany is violating international law by her invasion of Belgian territory and that she is committing a wrong against us. From London Belgian Gray Book No. 36 Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Bel- gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, London, August 4, 1914- I HAVE the honour to inform you that in the House of Commons this afternoon the Prime Minister made a fresh statement with regard to the European crisis. After recalling the principal points set forth yesterday by Sir E. Grey, the Prime Minister read : — 1. A telegram received from Sir F. Villiers this morning which gave the substance of the second ultimatum : presented to the Bel- gian Government by the German Government, which had been sent to you this morning (see No. 27). 2. Your telegram informing me of the violation of the frontier at Gemmenich, 2 a copy of which I have given to Sir A. Nicolson. 3. A telegram which the German Government addressed to its Ambassador in London this morning with the evident intention of misleading popular opinion as to its attitude. Here is the translation as published in one of this evening's newspapers : — "Please 3 dispel any mistrust which may subsist on the part of 1 Belgian Gray Book No. 27, same day. This is in no sense a second ultimatum, but rather a declaration of the entrance of armed German forces. 2 lb. No. 30, same day. 3 See British Blue Book No. 157, August 4. 438 Official Diplomatic Documents the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeat- ing most positively the formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. "Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. "It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian terri- tory without making at the time territorial acquisitions at the expense of Holland. "Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. 1 "Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance." Mr. Asquith then informed the House that in answer to this note of the German Government the British Government had repeated their proposal 2 of last week, namely, that the German Government should give the same assurances as to Belgian neutrality as France had given last week both to England and to Belgium. The British Cabinet allowed the Berlin Cabinet till midnight to reply.' 1 From London Belgian Okay Hook No. 37 4 fount de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Bel- gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) London, August J f , 191 Jf. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed the British Min- ters in Norway, Holland, and Belgium, that Great Britain expects that these three kingdoms will resist German pressure and observe neutrality.'' Should they resist they will have the support of Great Britain, who is ready in that event, should the three above-mentioned Governments desire it, to join France and Russia, in offering an alli- ance to the saiil Governments, for the purpose of resisting the use of force by Germany against them, and a guarantee to maintain the 1 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 20. August 2. Germany has not published this in- formation. ' iermany could have, and according to British Blue Book No. 123, August 1. las! tw>> paragraphs, probably would have accepted this proposal if Great Britain would have coupled with it the promise that she would do what she had done in INTO. i.e. agree to make common cause in the interest of Belgium with either France or < rermany againsl the one who would violate Belgian neutrality. Tins Great Britain, however, could not do, because she had promised her support to France on August 2. British Blue Book No. 14s. 3 Cf . Ausi m-Hungarian Red Book No. 5S, same day. Mr. Asquith neglected to tell Parliament that when Great Britain sent her request to Germany concerning Belgium, she was no longer neutral, but hound by a vote of the Cabinet (cf. British Blue Book No. 148, August 2) to support France who since 6.45 p.m. the previous day had been at. war with Germany. 4 This despatch was later cancelled, Belgian Gray Book No. 39, same day. It has been omitted from the British Blue Book. : ' This despatch is important, because Sir E. Grey is here quoted as placing the neutrality of Norway, Holland, and Belgium on a par. It has often been claimed since that Belgian neutrality was of a different order, not voluntary, but imposed by the treat v of 1839. August 4, Belgian Gray Book No. 38 439 future independence and integrity of the three kingdoms. 1 I ob- served to him that Belgium was neutral in perpetuity. The Minister for Foreign Affairs answered : This is in case her neutrality is violated. 2 To Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh Belgian Gray Book No. 38 M. Damgnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Belgian Min- isters at Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh. Sir, Brussels, August 4, 1914- I have the honour to inform you of the course of recent events as regards the relations of Belgium with certain of the Powers which guarantee her neutrality and independence. On the 31st July the British Minister made me a verbal com- munication 3 according to which Sir E. Grey, in anticipation of a European war, had asked the German and French Governments separately if each of them were resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium should that neutrality not be violated by any other Power. In view of existing treaties, Sir F. Villiers was instructed to bring this step to the knowledge of the Belgian Government, adding that Sir E. Grey presumed that Belgium was resolved to maintain her neutrality, and that she expected other Powers to respect it. I told the British Minister that we highly appreciated this com- munication, which was in accordance with our expectation, and I added that Great Britain, as well as the other Powers who had guaranteed our independence, might rest fully assured of our firm determination to maintain our neutrality; nor did it seem pos- sible that our neutrality could be threatened by any of those States, with whom we enjoyed the most cordial and frank relations. The Belgian Government, I added, had given proof of this resolution by taking from now on all such military measures as seemed to them to be necessitated by the situation. In his turn the French Minister made a verbal communication 4 on August 1st to the effect that he was authorised to inform the Belgian Government that in case of an international war the French Government, in conformity with their repeated declarations, would respect Belgian territory, and that they would not be induced to modify their attitude except in the event of the violation of Belgian neutrality by another Power. ■There is no promise here of maintaining the "treaty-imposed neutrality" of Belgium. 2 Cf. the "Brussels documents," pp. 577 ff. The Belgian Minister wished to dis- tinguish between the neutrality of his country, and the neutrality of the other two kingdoms. The omission of Sweden and Denmark in this despatch is noteworthy. 3 Belgian Gray Book No. 11, July 31. 4 Belgian Gray Book No. 15, August 1, but see also ib. No. 9, July 31. 440 Official Diplomatic Documents I thanked his Excellency, and added that we had already taken all the necessary precautions to ensure respect of onr independ- ence and our frontiers. On the morning of the 2nd August I had a fresh conversation ' with Sir F. Villiers, in the course of which he told me that lie had lost no time in telegraphing our conversation of July 31st to his Government, and that he had been careful to quote accurately the solemn declaration which he had received of Belgium's intention to defend her frontiers from whichever side they might be invaded. He added : "We know that France has given you formal assurances, but Great Britain lias received no reply from Berlin on this subject." The latter fact did not particularly affect me, since a declaration from the German Government might appear superfluous in view of existing treaties. 2 Moreover, the Secretary of State had reaffirmed, at the meeting of the committee of the Reichstag of April 29th, 1913, "that the neutrality of Belgium is established by treaty which Ger- many intends to respect." The same day Herr von Below Saleske, the German Minister, called at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 7 o'clock, and handed to me the enclosed note (see No. 2(1). The German Government gave the Belgian Government a. time limit of twelve hours within which to communicate their decision. No hesitation was possible as to the reply called for by the amaz- ing proposal of the German Government. You will find a copy enclosed. (See No. 22.) The ultimatum expired at 7 A.M. on August 3rd. As at 10 o'clock no act of war had been committed, the Belgian Cabinet decided that there was no reason for the moment to appeal to the guaranteeing powers. Towards mid-day the French Minister questioned me upon this point, and said : — "Although in view of the rapid march of events 3 I have as yet received no instructions to make a declaration from my Govern- ment, I feel justified, in view of their well-known intentions, in saying that if the Belgian Government were to appeal to the French rnment as one of the Towers guaranteeing their neutrality, the French Government would a1 once respond to Belgium's appeal; if such an appeal were not made it is probable that — unless, of e, exceptional measures were rendered necessary in self-defence — the French Government would not intervene until Belgium had taken some effective measure of resistance." I thanked M. Klobukowski for the support, which the French Government had been good enough to offer us in ease of need, and I informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal at present to the guarantee of the Bowers, and that they would decide later what ought to lie done. 1 Not previously mentioned in the Belgian Gray Book. = "Treaties" do not seem to have been mentioned in the conversation with the German Minister. See Belgian Cray Book No. 19, August 2. ■ ; ■ .ids are added here to the despatch as published Belgian Gray Book No. 24, August 3. August 4, Belgian Gray Book No. 40 141 Finally, at G a.m. on August 4th, the German Minister made the following communication to me. (See No. 27.) The Cabinet is at the present moment deliberating on the ques- tion of an appeal to the Powers guaranteeing our neutrality. From London Belgian Gray Book No. 39 Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Bel- gian Minister for Foreign Affair*. (Telegram.) London, August 4, 1914- Great Britain this morning called ' upon Germany to respect Belgian neutrality. The ultimatum says that whereas the note addressed by Germany to Belgium threatens the latter with an appeal to the force of arms if she opposes the passage of German troops ; and whereas Belgian territory has been violated at Gem- menich; and whereas Germany has refused to give Great Britain a similar assurance to that given last week by France ; therefore Great Britain must once again demand a satisfactory reply on the subject of the respect of Belgian neutrality and of the treaty to which Germany, no less than Great Britain, is a signatory. The ultimatum expires at midnight. In consequence of the British ultimatum to Germany, the British proposal which I telegraphed to you is cancelled for the time being. (See Xo. 37.) To London, Paris, and SI. Petersburgh Belgian Gray Hook No. 40 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to British, French, and Russian Ministers at Brussels. Sir, Brussels, August 4, 1914- The Belgian Government regret to have to announce to your Excellency that this morning the armed forces of Germany entered Belgian territory in violation of treaty engagements. The Belgian Government are firmly determined to resist by all the means in their power. 2 Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to co- operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory. 3 There should be concerted and joint action, to oppose the forcible measures taken by Germany against Belgium, and, at the same time, to guarantee the future maintenance of the independence and integrity 4 of Belgium. 1 British Blue Book No. 159, August 4. 2 This is in reply to Great Britain's request, Belgian Gray Book Xo. 28, August 4. 'This decision was apparently reached at the Cabinet meeting mentioned in the last paragraph of No. 38, same day. See also Belgian < Iray Book No. 42, August 5. ' Cf. note 2 to Belgian Gray Book No. 28, same day. 442 Official Diplomatic Documents Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake the defence of her fortified places. France : From Brussels French Yellow Book No. 152 M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Brussels, August 4, 1914- The Chief of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sends me a letter by which "the Government of the King declare that they are firmly decided to resist ' the aggression of Germany by all means in their power. Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France and Russia to co-operate as guarantors in the defence of her territory. "There would be a concerted and common action having as its object the resistance of forcible measures employed by Germany against Belgium, and at the same time to guarantee the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Belgium in the future. "Belgium is glad to be able to declare that she will ensure the defence of her fortified places." Klobukowski. From London French Yellow B < No. 153 .1/. Paul Caiubon, French Ambassador at London, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. London, August \, 1914- Sir Edward Grey has asked me to come and see him immediately in order to tell me that the Prime Minister would to-day make a statement 2 in the House of Commons that Germany had been invited to withdraw her ultimatum to Belgium and to give her answer to Great Britain before 12 o'clock to-night. Paul Cambon. From Brussels French Yellow Book No. 154 M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Brussels, August 4, 1914- This morning the German Minister informs 3 the Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, that in consequence of the refusal of the Belgian 1 Belgian Gray Book No. 40, same day. 2 C'f. Belgian Gray Book No. 36, same day. 3 Belgian Gray Book No. 27, same day. August 4, French Yellow Book No. 157 443 Government the Imperial Government find themselves compelled to carry out by force of arms those measures of protection which are rendered indispensable by the French threats. Klobukowski. [For French Yellow Book No. 155 see under August 6, and for No. 156 see under August 5.] To the Representatives of all the Powers at Paris French Yellow Book No. 157 Notification by the French Government to the Representatives of the Powers at Paris. The German Imperial Government, after having allowed its armed forces to cross the frontier, and to permit various acts of murder and pillage on French territory; after having violated the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg in defiance of the stipulations of the Convention of London, 11th May, 1867, and of Convention V. of the Hague, 18th October, 1907, on the rights and duties of Powers and persons in case of war on land (Articles 1 and 2), Conventions which have been signed by the German Govern- ment; after having addressed an ultimatum to the Royal Govern- ment of Belgium with the object of requiring passage for German troops through Belgian territory in violation of the Treaties of the 19th April, 1839, which had been signed by them, 1 and in violation of the above Convention of the Hague Have declared war on France at G.45 P.M. on the 3rd August, 1914. In these circumstances the Government of the Republic find themselves obliged on their side to have recourse to arms. They have in consequence the honour of informing by these presents the Government of . . . that a state of war exists between France and Germany dating from 6.45 p.m. on 3rd August, 1914. The Government of the Republic protest before all civilised nations, and especially those Governments 2 which have signed the Conventions and Treaties referred to above, against the violation by the German Empire of their international engagements, and they reserve full right for reprisals which they might find themselves brought to exercise against an enemy so little regardful of its plighted word. The Government of the Republic, who propose to observe the principles of the law of nations, will, during the hostilities, and assuming that reciprocity will be observed, act in accordance with the International Conventions signed by France concerning the law of war on land and sea. 1 Only in so far as one assumes that signatures of the kingdom of Prussia are bind- ing on the German Empire. In 1S71 the kingdom of Prussia ceased to exist as a Power in relation to foreign Powers, voluntarily sinking herself in the Federation of German States, called the German Empire. See chapter on German Constitution in the editor's Germany's Point of View. - This includes the Government of the United States. The American Government has not published its reply. 444 Official Diplomatic Documents The present notification, made in accordance with Article '2 of the Third Convention of the Hague of the 18th October, 1907, relat- ing to the opening of hostilities and handed to . . . Paris, August 4, 1914, ' P-M. French Yellow Book No. 158 Message from. M. Poincare, President of the Republic, rend at the Extraordinary Session of Parliament, August 4> 1914- (Journal Officiel of the 5th August, 1914.) (The Chamber rises and remains standing during the reading of the message. ) "Gentlemen, "France has just been the object of a violent and premeditated attack, which is an insolent defiance of the law of nations. Before any declaration of war had been sent to us, even before the German Ambassador had asked for his passports, our territory has been violated. 1 The German Empire has waited till yesterday evening to give at this late stage the true name to a state of things which it had already created. " For more than forty years the French, in sincere love of peace, have buried at the bottom of their heart the desire for legitimate reparation. "They have given to the world the example of a great nation which, definitely raised from defeat by the exercise of will, patience and labour, has only used its renewed and rejuvenated strength in the interest of progress and for the good of humanity. "Since the ultimatum 2 of Austria opened a crisis which threat- ened the whole of Europe, France has persisted in following and in recommending on all sides a policy of prudence, wisdom and modera- tion. "To her there can be imputed no act, no movement, no word, which has not been peaceful and conciliatory. "At the hour when the struggle is beginning, she has the right, in justice to herself, of solemnly declaring that she has made, up to the last moment, supreme efforts 3 to avert the war now about to break out, the crushing responsibility for which the German Empire will have to bear before history. ( I r nanimous ami repeated applause. I "On the very morrow of the day when we and our allies ' were i Cf. note to French Yellow Books No. 136, also ib. No. 139, both of August 13; also Belgian Gray Book No. 21, August •!. - Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 8 under 'late of July 22. ■ Srr i in- discussion of t lust- efforts in the editor's Germany's Point of View, chapters on the French Yellow Book. 'Since Km.-m.-i was the only other ally of France at this time, this includes Great Britain, although the time limit of her ultimatum had not expired when this speech was delivered. See also Austro-Hungarian Red Hook No. 58, same day. Even more important is the time reference here. August 1, implying that France considered Great Britain an allv even then in spite of the fact that the British Government had repeatedly denied that an alliance existed between them and France. Cf. below, note 7. August 4, French Yellow Book No. 158 445 publicly expressing our hope of seeing negotiations which had been begun under the auspices of the London Cabinet carried to a peace- ful conclusion, Germany suddenly declared war upon Russia, she has invaded the territory of Luxemburg, she has outrageously in- sulted the noble Belgian nation {loud and unanimous applause), our neighbour and our friend, and attempted treacherously to fall upon us while we were in the midst of diplomatic conversation. {Fresh and repeated unanimous applause.) "But France was watching. As alert as she was peaceful, she was prepared ; 1 and our enemies will meet on their path our valiant covering troops, who are at their post and will provide the screen behind which the mobilisation of our national forces will be methodi- cally completed. "Our fine and courageous army, which France to-day accompanies with her maternal thought {loud applause) has risen eager to defend the honour of the flag and the soil of the country. ( / r nanimous and repeated applause.) "The President of the Republic, interpreting the unanimous feeling of the country, expresses to our troops by land and sea the admira- tion and confidence of every Frenchman {loud and prolonged applause). " Closely united in a common feeling, the nation will persevere with the cool self-restraint of which, since the beginning of the crisis, she has given daily proof. Now, as always, she will know how to harmonise the most noble daring and most ardent enthu- siasm with that self-control which is the sign of enduring energy and is the best guarantee of victory {applause). " In the war which is beginning France will have Right on her side, the eternal power of which cannot with impunity be disregarded by nations any more than by individuals {loud and unanimous applause). "She will be heroically defended by all her sons; nothing will break their sacred union before the enemy; to-day they are joined together as brothers in a common indignation against the aggressor, and in a common patriotic faith {loud ami prolonged applause ami cries of ' Vive la France'). "She is faithfully helped by Russia, her ally {loud and unanimous applause) ; she is supported by the loyal friendship 2 of Great Britain (loud and unanimous applause). "And already from every part of the civilised world sympathy and good wishes are coming to her. For to-day once again she stands before the universe for Liberty, Justice and Reason {loud and re- peated applause). 'Ilaut les cceurs et vive la France I' (unanimous and prolonged applause). "Raymond Poincark." 1 Much injustice has been done to France by her pro-allies friends who have claimed that France was unprepared. 2 Cf. above, note 6. Here, but not there, a distinction is made between the re- lations of France with Russia and those with Great Britain. ■44(i Official Diplomatic Documents French Yellow Book No. 159 Speech delivered by M. Rene Viviani, /'resident of the Council in tlie Chamber of Deputies, August 4, 1014- (Journal Offieiel, August 5, 191 4-) M. Rene Viviani, President of the Council. Gentlemen, The German Ambassador yesterday left Paris after notifying us of the existence of a state of war. The Government owe to Parliament a true account of the events which in less than ten days have unloosed a European war and compelled France, peaceful and valiant, to defend her frontier against an attack, the hateful injustice of which is emphasised by its calcu- lated unexpectedness. This attack, which has no excuse, and which began before we were notified of any declaration of war, is the last act of a plan, whose origin and object I propose to declare before our own democracy and before the opinion of the civilised world. As a consequence of the abominable crime which cost the Austro- Hungarian Heir-Apparent and the Duchess of Hohenburg their lives, difficulties arose between the Cabinets of Vienna and Belgrade. The majority of the Powers were only semiofficially informed of these difficulties up till Friday, July 24th, the date on which the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors communicated to them a circular which the press has published. The object of this circular was to explain and justify an ultimatum delivered the evening before to Servia, by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade. This ultimatum in alleging the complicity of numerous Servian subjects and associations in the Serajevo crime, hinted that the official Servian authorities themselves were no strangers to it. It demanded a reply from Servia by G o'clock on the evening of Satur- day, July 25th. The Austrian demands, or at any rate many of them, 1 without doubt struck a blow at the rights of a sovereign State. Notwith- standing their excessive character, Servia, on July 25th, declared that she submitted to them almost without reserve. 2 This submission, which constituted a success for Austria-Hungary a guarantee for the peace of Europe, was not unconnected with the advice tendered to Belgrade from the first moment by France, Rus- sia and Great Britain. 3 The value of this advice was all the greater since the Austro- 1 Cf. Austro-Hungarian Rod Book No. 31, July 27, where Sazonof "found seven of the ten points admissible without very ureal difficulty; only the two points . . . seemed to him to he unacceptable in their present form," etc. - Cf. Introductory remarks to the despatches of July 20. 3 Cf. the despatches of July 21, 25, 26 where it is pointed out that no such advice was actually given. August 4, French Yellow Book No. 159 4A7 Hungarian demands had been concealed ' from the Chanceries of the Triple Entente, to whom in the three preceding weeks the Austro- Hungarian Government had on several occasions given an assurance that their claims would be extremely moderate. It was, therefore, with natural astonishment that the Cabinets of Paris, St. Petersburgh and London learned on 26th July that the Austrian Minister at Belgrade, after a few minutes' examination, declared that the Servian reply was inacceptable, and broke off diplomatic relations. This astonishment was increased by the fact that on Friday, the 24th, the German Ambassador came and read to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs a note verbale 2 asserting that the Austro-Servian dispute must remain localised, without intervention by the great Powers, or otherwise "incalculable consequences" were to be feared. A similar demarche was made on Saturday, the 25th, 3 at London and at St. Petersburgh. 4 Need I, Gentlemen, point out to you the contrast between the threatening expressions used by the German Ambassador at Paris and the conciliatory sentiments which the Powers of the Triple Entente had just manifested by the advice which they gave to Servia to submit ? 5 Nevertheless, in spite of the extraordinary character of the Ger- man demarche, we immediately, in agreement with our Allies 6 and our friends, took a conciliatory course and invited Germany to join in it. We have had from the first moment regretfully to recognise that our intentions and our efforts met with no response at Berlin. Not only did Germany appear wholly unwilling to give to Austria- Hungary the friendly advice which her position gave her the right to offer, but from this moment and still more in the following days, she seemed to intervene between the Cabinet at Vienna and the com- promises suggested by the other Powers. 7 On Tuesday, 28th July, Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia. This declaration of war, with its aggravation of the state of affairs brought about by the rupture of diplomatic relations three days before, gave ground for believing that there was a deliberate desire for war, and a systematic programme for the enslavement 8 of Servia. Thus there was now involved in the dispute not only the inde- pendence of a brave people, but the balance of power 9 in the Bal- 1 France knew of them before Austria-Hungary published them, French Yellow Book Nos. 13 and 14, July 19. 2 French Yellow Book No. 28, Julv 24. 3 This is a mistake. See British Blue Book No. 9, July 24. 4 Russian Orange Book No. 8, also July 24. 6 See note 3, p. 446. 6 Note the plural which seems to include Great Britain. 7 For the error of this view see the French despatches of those days, and the dis- cussion of them in the editor's Germany's Point of View, chapters on the French Yellow Book. 8 Cf. Austria-Hungary's promise not to annex Serbian territory nor to touch the sovereignty of Serbia. Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 47, July 29. 9 This was the question which interested Russia most; cf. British Blue Book No. 17, July 25, last paragraph. 448 Official Diplomatic Documents kans, embodied in the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, and consecrated by the moral support of all the great Powers. However, at the suggestion of the British Government with its constant and firm attachment to the maintenance of the peace of Europe, the negotiations were continued, or, to speak more accurately, the Powers of the Triple Entente tried to continue them. From this common desire sprang the proposal for action 1 by the Four Powers, England, France, Germany and Italy, which was intended, by assuring to Austria all legitimate satisfaction, to bring about an equitable adjustment of the dispute. On Wednesday, the 29th, 2 the Russian Government, noting the persistent failure of these efforts, and faced by the Austrian mobi- lisation and declaration of war, fearing the military destruction of Servia, decided as a precautionary measure to mobilise the troops of four military districts, that is to say, the formations echeloned along the Austro-Hungarian frontier exclusively. In taking this step, the Russian Government were careful to in- form the German Government that their measures, restricted as they were and without any offensive character towards Austria, were not in any degree directed against Germany. In a conversation with the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs acknowledged this without demur. On the other hand, all the efforts made by Great Britain, with the adherence of Russia, and the support of France, to bring Austria and Servia into touch under the moral patronage of Europe were encountered at Berlin with a predetermined negative of which the diplomatic despatches afford the clearest proof. This was a disquieting situation which made it probable that there existed at Berlin intentions which had not been disclosed. Some hours afterwards this alarming suspicion was destined to become a certainty. In fact Germany's negative attitude gave place thirty-six hours later to positive steps which were truly alarming. On the 31st July Germany, by proclaiming "a, state of danger of war," 3 cut the com- munications between herself and the rest of Europe, and obtained for herself complete freedom to pursue against France in absolute secrecy military preparations which, as you have seen, nothing could justify. Already for some days, and in circumstances difficult to explain, Germany had prepared for the transition of her army from a peace footing to a war footing. 4 From the morning of the 25th July, that is to say even before the expiration of the time limit given to Servia by Austria, she had 1 (.'f. the Introductory Remarks to the despatches of these days, and the letter from the Belgian Minister in Petrograd printed under date of July 30. L ' \< rding to the Czar's telegram to the German Emperor of July 30, the Russian mobilisation was decided upon five days before, i.e. July 25. ' Viviani entirely omits to mention that this was the result of Russia's order of general mobilisat * There is im c-vulrnre for this statement. August 4, French Yellow Book No. 159 44'J confined to barracks the garrisons of Alsace-Lorraine. The same clay she had placed the frontier-works in a complete state of defence. On the 26th, she had indicated to the railways the measures prepara- tory for concentration. On the 27th, she had completed requisi- tions and placed her covering troops in position. On the 28th, the summons of individual reservists had begun and units which were distant from the frontier had been brought up to it. 1 Could all these measures, pursued with implacable method, leave us in doubt of German's intentions? Such was the situation when, on the evening of the 31st July, the Ger- man Government, which, since the 24th, had not participated by any active step in the conciliatory efforts of the Triple Entente, 2 addressed an ultimatum to the Russian Government under the pretext that Russia had ordered a general mobilisation 3 of her armies, and de- manded that this mobilisation should be stopped within twelve hours. This demand, which was all the more insulting in form because a few hours earlier the Emperor Nicholas II., with a movement at once confiding and spontaneous, had asked the German Emperor for his mediation, was put forward at a moment when, on the request of England 4 and with the knowledge of Germany, 5 the Russian Gov- ernment was accepting a formula of such a nature as to lay the foundation for a friendly settlement of the Austro-Servian dispute and of the Austro-Russian difficulties by the simultaneous arrest of military operations and of military preparations. The same day this unfriendly demarche towards Russia was sup- plemented by acts which were frankly hostile towards France ; the rupture of communications by road, railway, telegraph and tele- phone, the seizure of French locomotives on their arrival at the frontier, the placing of machine guns in the middle of the permanent way which had been cut, and the concentration of troops on this frontier. From this moment we were no longer justified in believing in the sincerity of the pacific declarations which the German representative continued to shower upon us {hear, hear). We knew that Germany was mobilising under the shelter of the "state of danger of war." We learnt that six classes of reservists had been called up, and that transport was being collected even for those army corps which were stationed a considerable distance from the frontier. As these events unfolded themselves, the Government, watchful and vigilant, took from day to day, and even from hour to hour, the measures of precaution which the situation required; the general mobilisation of our forces on land and sea was ordered. 1 There is no evidence for these statements, all of which seem to be disproved by French Yellow Book No. 101, July 30, where Viviani acknowledges that Germany had taken, up to then, no steps for even partial mobilisation, for if she had, it would have been impossible to urge Russia not to take any measures which "may offer to Ger- many a pretext for a total or partial mobilisation of her forces." 2 This is disproved by the despatches of those days. 3 No excuse for the general Russian mobilisation is offered. 1 British Blue Book No. 132, August 1, and note 6 No evidence for this statement has been published. 2c 450 Official Diplomatic Documents The same evening, at 7.30, Germany, without waiting l for the acceptance by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh of the English propo- sal, which I have already mentioned, declared war on Russia. The next day, Sunday, the 2nd August, without regard for the extreme moderation of France, in contradiction to the peaceful declarations of the German Ambassador at Paris, and in defiance of the rules of international law, German troops crossed our frontier ;it three different points. At the same time, in violation of the Treaty of 1867, which guar- anteed with the signature of Prussia the neutrality of Luxemburg, they invaded the territory of the Grand Duchy and so gave cause for a protest by the Luxemburg Government. Finally, the neutrality of Belgium also was threatened. The German Minister, on the evening of the 2nd August, presented to the Belgian 'Government an ultimatum 2 requesting facilities in Belgium for military operations against France, under the lying pretext that Belgian neutrality was threatened by us; the Belgian Government refused, and declared 3 that they were resolved to defend with vigour their neutrality, which was respected by France and guaranteed by treaties, and in particular by the King of Prussia. ( I ' niuii limits mill 'prolonged applause.) Since then, Gentlemen, the German attacks have been renewed, multiplied, and accentuated. At more than fifteen points our fron- tier has been violated. Shots have been fired at our soldiers and ( 'ustoms officers. Men have been killed and wounded. Yesterday 4 a German military aviator dropped three bombs on Luneville. 5 The German Ambassador, to whom as well as to all the great Powers, we communicated these facts, did not deny them or express his regrets for them. On the contrary, he came yesterday evening to ask me for his passports, and to notify us of the existence of a state of war, giving as his reason, in the teeth of all the facts, hostile acts committed by French aviators in German territory in the Eifel district, and even on the railway near Carlsruhe and near Nuremberg. This is the letter 6 which he handed to me on the subject : — " M. le President, "The German administrative and military authorities have established a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on German territory by French military aviators. Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Xuremburg. 1 Because the time limit had expired. 2 Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2. ; Belgian Gray Book No. 22, August 3. ' Belgian Gray Book, August 3. 6 For a similar charge made !>y Germain' against France, see Belgian Gray Book, No. 21, August 3. Since the interview there mentioned took place at 1.3U a.m. the French attacks there mentioned must have taken place on August 2. 6 French Yellow Book No. 147, August 3. August 4, French Yellow Book No. 159 451 " I am instructed, and I have the honour to inform your Excellency that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power. "At the same time, I have the honour to bring to the knowl- edge of your Excellency that the German authorities will retain French mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity. " My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end it only re- mains for me to request your Excellency to be good enough to fur- nish me with my passports, and to take the steps you consider suit- able to assure my return to Germany, with the staff of the Embassy, as well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the German Consulate General in Paris. "Be good enough, M. le President, to receive the assurances of my deepest respect. (Signed) Schoen." Need I, Gentlemen, lay stress on the absurdities of these pre- texts which they would put forward as grievances? At no time has any French aviator penetrated into Belgium, nor has any French aviator committed either in Bavaria or any other part of Germany any hostile act. The opinion of Europe has already done justice to these wretched inventions. (Loud and unanimous applause.) Against these attacks, which violate all the laws of justice and all the principles of public law, we have now taken all the necessary steps ; they arc being carried out strictly, regularly, and with calmness. The mobilisation of the Russian army also continues with remark- able vigour and unrestrained enthusiasm (unanimous and pro- longed applause, all the deputies rising from their seats.) The Belgian army, mobilised with 250,000 men, prepares with a splendid passion and magnificent ardour to defend the neutrality and independence of their country. (Renewed loud and unanimous applause.) The entire British fleet is mobilised x and orders have been given to mobilise the land forces. 2 (Loud, cheers, all the deputies rising to their feet.) Since 1912 3 pourparlers had taken place between English and French General Staffs and were concluded by an exchange of letters between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs yesterday evening communicated these letters to the House of Commons, and I have the honour, with the consent of the British Government, to acquaint you with the con- tents of these two documents. My dear Ambassador, Foreign Office, November 22, 1912. From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been 1 And had been mobilised since July 24. See French Yellow Book No. 6(5, July 27. " No date is given for this order, nor is it mentioned in the British Blue Book. 3 This is an error. The letters referred to were of 1912, but these pourparlers had been taking place for years previous. See first line of first letter below. 452 Official Diplomatic Document* understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engage- ment that commits either Government to action in a contingency that lias not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war. You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed resistance of the other. I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threat- ened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should r to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be pre- pared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Stall's would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them. Yours, etc., E. Grey. To this letter our Ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, replied on the 23rd November, 1912: — Dear Sir Edward, Loudon, November 23, 1912. You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consulta- tions should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces ; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements bind- ing our Governments to take action in certain eventualities; that, however, 1 had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essenl ial to know whether h could count on the armed support of the other. Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to ither an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or pre- serve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common ; if those August ,' t , French Yellow Book No. 159 453 measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans. Yours, etc., Paul Cambon. In the House of Commons the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs spoke ' of France amidst the applause of the members in a noble and warm-hearted manner and his language has already found an echo deep in the hearts of all Frenchmen {loud and unani- mous applause). I wish in the name of the Government of the Republic to thank the British Government from this tribune for their cordial words and the Parliament of France will associate itself in this sentiment (renewed, prolonged and unanimous applause). The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made in particular the following declaration : 2 "In case the German fleet came into the Channel or entered the North Sea in order to go round the British Isles with the object of attacking the French coasts or the French navy and of harassing French merchant shipping, the British fleet would intervene in order to give to French shipping its complete protection in such a, way that from that moment Great Britain and Germany would be in a state of war." From now onwards, the British fleet protects our northern and western coasts against a German attack. Gentlemen, the the facts. I believe that the simple recital of them is sufficient to justify the acts of the Government of the Republic. I wish, how- ever, to make clear the conclusion to lie drawn from my story and to give its true meaning to the unheard-of attack of which France is the victim. The victors of 1870 have, at different times, as you know, desired 3 to repeat the blows which they dealt us then. In 1875, the war which was intended to complete the destruction of conquered France was only prevented by the intervention of the two Powers to whom we were to become united at a later date by ties of alliance and of friendship (unanimous applause), by the intervention of Russia and of Great Britain (prolonged applause, all the deputies rising f<> their feet). Since then the French Republic, by the restoration of her national forces and the conclusion of diplomatic agreements unswervingly adhered to, has succeeded in liberating herself from the yoke which even in a period of profound peace Bismarck was able to impose upon Europe. She has re-established the balance of power in Europe, 4 a guarantee of the liberty and dignity of all. 1 No date is here given. It was August 3. See Sir E. Grey's speech of that date. 2 For the wording of this declaration which is different from that published in the British Blue Book see French Yellow Book Xos. 137, August 2 ; and 143, August 3 and notes. 3 Germany has always denied this desire. * A noteworthy reference to this bugbear of European politics. 454 Official Diplomatic Documents Gentleman, I do not know if I am mistaken, but it seems to me that this work of peaceful reparation, of liberation and honour finally ratified in 1 ( ,)04 and 1907, with the genial co-operation of King Edward VII of England and the Government of the Crown {applause), this is what the German Empire wishes to destroy to-day by one daring stroke. Germany can reproach us with nothing. Bearing in silence in our bosom for half a century the wound which ( rermany dealt us we have offered to peace an unprecedented sacrifice (loud and unanimous applause). We have offered other sacrifices in all the discussions which since 1904 German diplomacy has systematically provoked, whether in Morocco or elsewhere in 1905, in 1906, in 1908, in 1911. 1 Russia also has given proof of great moderation at the time of the events of 1908, as she has done in the present crisis. She observed the same moderation, and the Triple Entente with her, when in the Eastern crisis of 1912 Austria and Germanj formu- lated demands, whether against Servia or against Greece, which still were, as the event proved, capable of settlement by discussion. Useless sacrifices, barren negotiations, empty efforts, since to-day in the very act of conciliation we, our allies and ourselves, are attacked by surprise (prolonged applause). No one can honestly believe that we are the aggressors. Vain is the desire to overthrow the sacred principles of right and of liberty to which nations, as well as individuals, arc subject ; Italy with that clarity of insight possessed by the Latin intellect, has notified us that she proposes to preserve neutrality (prolonged applause, all the deputies rising t<> their feet). This decision has found in all France an echo of sincerest joy. I made myself the interpreter of this feeling to the Italian Charge d'Affaires when I told him how much I congratulated myself that the two Latin sisters, who have the same origin and the same ideal, a common and glorious past, are not now opposed to one another (renewed applause). Gentlemen, we proclaim loudly the object of their attack — it is the independence, the honour, the safety, which the Triple Entente has regained in the balance of power 2 for the service of peace. The object of attack is the liberties of Europe, which France, her allies and her friends, are proud to defend (loud applause). We are going to defend these liberties, for it is they that are in dispute, ami all the rest is but a pretext. France, unjustly provoked, did not desire war, she has done evenihing to avert it. Since it is forced upon her, she will defend herself against Germany and against every Power which has not yet declared its intentions, but joins with the latter in a conflict between the two countries. (Applause, all the deputies rising to their feet.) 1 For France's attitude toward Germany as it appears from the despatches of the French Yellow Book, see the editor's Germany's Point of View, chapters on the French Yellow Book. 2 See above. August 4, British Blue Book No. 153 455 A free and valiant people that sustains an eternal ideal, and is wholly united to defend its existence; a democracy which knows how to discipline its military strength, and was not afraid a year ago to increase its burden as an answer to the armaments of its neighbour ; a nation armed, struggling for its own life and for the independence of Europe — here is a sight which we are proud to offer to the on- lookers in this desperate struggle, that has for some days been pre- paring with the greatest calmness and method. We are without reproach. We shall be without fear. (Loud applause, all the depu- ties rising to their feet.) France has often proved in less favourable circumstances that she is a most formidable adversary when she fights, as she does to-day, for liberty and for right (applause). In submitting our actions to you, Gentlemen, who arc our judges, we have, to help us in bearing the burden of our heavy responsibility, the comfort of a clear conscience and the conviction that we have done our duty (prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet). Rene Viviani. Great Britain : To Berlin British Blue Book No. 153 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914. The King of the Belgians has made an appeal i to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms : — "Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium." His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government have delivered to the Belgian Government a note 2 proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours. We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused 3 this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations. His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this vio- lation of a treaty 4 to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made 1 Belgian Gray Book No. 2.5, August 3. 2 Belgian Gray Book No. 20, August 2. 3 Belgian Gray Book No. 22, August 3. * Cf. Sir E. Grey's despatch, Belgian Gray Book No. 37, August 4. 456 Official Diplomatic Documents upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply. From Brussels British Blue Book No. 154 Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — ( Received August 4-) (Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 4, 1914- German Minister has this morning addressed note ' to Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that as Belgian Government have declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces. To Brussels British Blue Book No. 155 Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1014- You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power, 2 and that His Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that His Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offer- ing to the Belgian Government at once common action for the pur- pose of resisting use of force by Germany against them, and a guaran- tee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years. To Berlin British Blue Book No. 156 Sir Edward drey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 191 4- 1 CONTINUE to receive numerous complaints from British firms as to the detention of their ships at Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and other German ports. This action on the part of the German authorities is totally unjustifiable. It is in direct contravention of international i Belgian Gray Book No. 27, same day. 2 This is in reply to the appeal for "diplomatic intervention," see British Blue Book No. L53, same day, and notes to Belgian Gray Book No. 24, August 3, and No. 3S, August 4. August 4, British Blue Book No. 159 457 law and of the assurances given to your Excellency by the Imperial Chancellor. You should demand the immediate release of all British ships if such release has not yet been given. From Berlin British Blue Book No. 157 ' German Foreign Secretary to Prince Lichnowsky , German Ambassador in London. — (Communicated by German Embassy, August 4-) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 4, 1914- Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neu- trality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance. From Brussels British Blue Book No. 158 Sir F. Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 4-) (Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 4> 1914- Military attache has been informed at War Office that German troops have entered Belgian territory, 2 and that Liege has been sum- moned to surrender by small party of Germans who, however, were repulsed. To Berlin British Blue Book No. 159 Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschcn, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 4, 1914- We hear that Germany has addressed note 3 to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be com- 1 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 36, same day. 2 Cf. Belgian Gray Book No. 30, same day. 3 Belgian Gray Book No. 27, same day. 458 Official Diplomatic Documents pelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures con- sidered indispensable. We are also informed x that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenieh. In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined 2 to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning 3 be received here by ll' o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His .Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves. Serbia : From Nish Serbian Blue Book No. 49 M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Charge d' 'Affaires at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Nish, July 22/ August 4, 1914. Please inform the Imperial Government that you have received instructions to leave 4 Germany, together with the staffs of the Lega- tion and Consulate. You should leave immediately. 1 Belgian Gray Book No. 30, same day. 2 British Blue Book No. 122, under date of August 1. 3 British Blue Book No. 153. same date. 4 This was a natural order, because Austria-Hungary was at war with Serbia, and ( iermany was the former's ally. The diplomatic documents do not contain the dec- laration of war between Germany and Serbia. August 5, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 59 459 Wednesday, August 5, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Petrograd Belgium Ministers at Entente London, Berlin, Mad- Capitals rid All Representatives Paris, The Hague abroad British Minister ' Madrid France President's message Viviani's speech Luxemburg Germany Great Britain Russia Serbia Austria-Hungary sends note to her Ambassador in Russia declaring war on Russia. Belgium protests against the invasion of her territory to all "Countries having Diplomatic Relations" with her. France joins Great Britain and Russia in declaring their willingness to co- operate "in the defence of Belgian territory." Germany requests the departure from Luxemburg of the Entente Ministers. Great Britain declares war on Germany as of 11 a.m., and informs Belgium that she considers "joint action with a view to resisting Germany to be in force." Russia declares her willingness to cooperate with France and Great Britain "in the defence of Belgian territory." Austria-Hungary : To St. Petersburgh AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 59 Count Berchtold to Count Szdpdry at St. Petersburgh. (Translated from the French.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 5, 1.914- I ask Your Excellency to hand over the following note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs : — "On the instructions of his Government, the undersigned, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, has the honour to inform His Excel- lency the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs as follows : — " In view of the threatening attitude adopted by Russia in the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Servia ; and of the fact that, according to a communication from the Berlin Cabi- net, Russia has seen fit, as a result of that conflict, to open hostilities against Germany ; and whereas Germany is consequently at war with Russia ; Austria-Hungary therefore considers herself also at war with Russia from the present moment." After handing over this note Your Excellency will ask that pass- ports may be prepared, and you will leave without delay with the 460 Official Diplomatic Documents entire staff of the Embassy with the exception of any members who are to be left behind. At the same time M. Schebeko is being fur- nished with his passport by us. Belgium : From London Belgian Gray Book No. 41 Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Damgnon, Bel- gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) London, August 5, 1914- Germany, having rejected the British proposals, Great Britain has informed her that a state of war existed between the two coun- tries as from 11 o'clock. To Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh Belgian' Gray Book No. 42 M. Damgnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh. (Telegram.) Brussels, August 5, 1914- After the violation of Belgian territory at Gemmenich, 1 Belgium appealed - to Great Britain, France, and Russia through their repre- sentatives at Brussels, to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory. Belgium undertakes the defence of her fortified places. To Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh Belgian Gray Book No. 43 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh. Sir, Brussels, August 5, 1914. In my despatch of August 4 (see No. 38) I had the honour to in- form you of the sequence of events which had attended the inter- national relations of Belgium from July 31st to August 4th. I added that the Cabinet was considering the question whether Belgium, whose territory had been invaded since the morning, should appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. The Cabinet had decided in the affirmative when the British Minister informed me that the proposal which he had communicated to me, and according to which the British Government were disposed to respond favourably to our appeal to her as a guaranteeing Power, was cancelled for the time being. 3 (See No. 37.) 1 Belgian Gray Book No. 30, August 4. 2 Belgian Gray Book No. 40, same day. 3 This paragraph is not clear. What had Sir E. Grey's offer, Belgian Gray Book No. 37, or its cancellation, ib. No. 39, to do with the decision of the Cabinet? August 5, Belgian Gray Book No. 44 461 A telegram from London made it clear that this change of atti- tude was caused by an ultimatum from Great Britain giving Ger- many a time limit of ten hours within which to evacuate Belgian territory and to respect Belgian neutrality. (See No. 39.) During the evening, the Belgian Government addressed to France, Great Britain, and Russia, through their respective representatives at Brus- sels, a note, of which a copy is enclosed herewith. (See No. 40.) As you will observe, Belgium appeals to Great Britain, France, and Russia to co-operate as guaranteeing Powers in the defence of her territory and in the maintenance for the future of the independ- ence and integrity of her territory. She will herself undertake the defence of her fortified places. As yet we are not aware how our appeal has been received. To the Belgian Heads of Missions in all Countries having Diplomatic Relations with Belgium. Belgian Gray Book No. 44 M. Davignon, Belgian. Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Heads of Missions in all Countries l having Diplomatic Relations with Belgium. Sir, Brussels, August 5, 1914. By the treaty of April 18th, 1S39, Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria, and Russia declared themselves guarantors of the treaty concluded on the same day between His Majesty the King of the Belgians and His Majesty the King of the Netherlands. The treaty runs : " Belgium shall form a State independent and perpetually neutral." Belgium has fulfilled all her international obligations, she has accomplished her duty in a spirit of loyal impartiality, 2 she has neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality and to cause that neu- trality to be respected. In these circumstances the Belgian Government have learnt with deep pain that the armed forces of Germany, a Power guaranteeing Belgian neutrality, have entered Belgian territory in violation of the obligations undertaken by treaty. It is our duty to protest with indignation against an outrage against international law provoked by no act of ours. The Belgian Government are firmly determined to repel by all the means in their power the attack thus made upon their neutrality, and they recall the fact that, in virtue of article 10 of The Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the rights and duties of neutral Powers and persons in the case of war by land, if a neutral Power repels, even by force, attacks on her neutrality such action cannot be considered as a hostile act. I have to request that you will ask at once for an audience with 1 This includes the United States. 2 This is denied by Germany in view of the Brussels documents which show that Belgium had given her military secrets to Great Britain. 462 Official Diplomatic Documents the Minister for Foreign Affairs and read this despatch to his Excel- lency, handing him a copy. If the interview cannot be granted at once you should make the communication in question in writing. From Berlin Belgian Gray Book No. 45 Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Berlin, August 5, 1014- I have received my passports and shall leave Berlin to-morrow morning for Holland with the staff of the legation. From Madrid Belcia.v Gray Book No. 4G Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) St. Sebastian, August 5, 101 4- The Spanish Government undertake the custody of Belgian in- terests in Germany, and are to-day sending telegraphic instructions to their Ambassador at Berlin. (See No. 33.) From Paris Belgian Gray Book No. 47 Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian. Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Paris, August .7, 1914. I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the notification of a state of war between France and Germany, which has been communicated to me to-day. Enclosure in No. 47. (See French Yellow Book No. 157, August 4.) From Loudon Belgian Gray Book No. 4S Communication of August 5, from Sir Francis Villiers, British Minis- ter at Brussels, to M . Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. I am instructed to inform the Belgian Government that His Bri- tannic Majesty's Government consider joint action with a view to August 5, Belgian Gray Book No. 52 463 resisting Germany to be in force and to be justified bv the Treaty of 1839. From London Belgian Gray Book No. 49 Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Bel- gian Minister fur Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) London, August 5, 1914- Great Britain agrees to take joint action in her capacity of guaranteeing Power for the defence of Belgian territory. The British fleet will ensure the free passage of the Scheldt for the pro- visioning of Antwerp. From The Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 50 Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Bel- gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) The Hague, August 5, 1914- The war buoying is about to be established. (See No. 29.) To Madrid Belgian Gray Book No. 51 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Grenier, Belgian Minister at Madrid. (Telegram.) Brussels, August 5, 1914- Please express to the Spanish Government the sincere thanks of the Belgian Government. (See No. 46.) To Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh Belgian Gray Book No. 52 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, and St. Petersburgh. Sir, Brussels, August 5, 1914. I have the honour to inform you that the French and Russian Ministers made a communication to me this morning informing me of the willingness of their Governments to respond to our appeal, and to co-operate with Great Britain in the defence of Belgian terri- tory. 464 Official Diplomatic Documents France : From Luxemburg French Yellow Book No. 156 M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to M. Doumergue, Minis- ter for Foreign Affairs. Paris, August 5, 1014- The Minister of State came to see me at the Legation this morn- ing, Tuesday, 4th August, 1914, at about half-past eight o'clock, in order to notify me that the German military authorities required my departure. On my answering that I would only give way to force M. Eyschen said that he understood my feelings in this matter, and it was just for that reason that he had himself come to make this communication which cost him so much, for it was just because force was used that he asked me to leave. He added that he was going to bring me written proof of this. I did not conceal from M. Eyschen the grief and anxiety which I had in leaving my fellow-countrymen without defence, and asked him ti i be good enough to undertake their protection ; this he promised to do. Just as he was leaving he handed me the enclosed letter (En- closure I.) which is the answer of the Luxemburg Government to the declaration which I had made the evening before, according to tele- graphic instructions of M. Viviani. About 10 o'clock, the Minister of State came again to the Lega- tion and left me with a short note from himself, a certified copy of the letter which the German Minister had addressed to him on the subject of mv departure from Luxemburg. (Enclosures II. and III.) At the same time he told me that he had informed Ilerr von Buch that the Luxemburg Government would be entrusted with the pro- tection of the French and would have charge of the Legation and the Chancery. This news did not seem to be agreeable to my Ger- man colleague, who advised M. Eyschen to move me to entrust this responsibility to the Belgian Minister. I explained to the Minister of State that the situation was peculiar. As I was accredited to Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess and as my country was not in a state of war with Luxemburg, it was in these circumstances clearly indicated that it should lie the Luxemburg Government which should look after the safety of my fellow-countrymen. M. Eyschen did not insist, and again accepted the service which I entrusted to him. The Minister of State then asked me to be good enough to leave quietly in order to avoid any demonstration, which, as lie said, would not fail to bring about reprisals on the part of the German military authorities against the French. I answered that I attached too much value to the safety of my countrymen to compromise it and that he hail nothing to fear. August 5, French Yellow Book No. 156 465 My departure, which was required to take place as soon as pos- sible, was fixed for two o'clock ; it was at the same time understood that I should leave in my motor car. As to a safe conduct, M. Eyschen told me that the German Minister was at that very moment at the German headquarters to ask for it, and that he would take care that I received it in good time. At a quarter-past two the Minister of State accompanied by M. Henrion, Councillor of the Government, came to take leave of me and to receive the keys of the Legation and those of the Chancery. He told me that orders had been given for my free passage, and that I must make for Arlon by way of the Merle, Manners and Arlon roads. He added that a German officer would wait for me at the Merle road in order to go in front of my motor car. I then left the Legation and made my way to Arlon by the road which had been determined on, but I did not meet anyone. Your Excellency will have the goodness to find the enclosed text of the letter which I sent to the Minister of State before leaving my post (Enclosure IV.). Mollard. Enclosure I M. Eyschen, Minister of Stale, President of the Government, to M. Mollard, French Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipoten- tiary at Luxemburg. Sir, Luxemburg, August 4, 1914- In an oral communication made yesterday evening, your Excel- lency has had the goodness to bring to my knowledge that in accord- ance with the Treaty of London of 1867, the Government of the Re- public intended to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg as they had shown by their attitude, but that the viola- tion of this neutrality by Germany was nevertheless of such a kind as to compel France henceforth to be influenced in this matter by the care for her defence and her interests. You will allow me to point out clearly that the decision of the Government of the Republic is based solely on the act of a third Power for which in truth the Grand Duchy is not responsible. The rights of Luxemburg must then remain intact. The German Empire has formally declared that only a temporary occupation of Luxemburg entered into their intentions. I am glad to believe that the Government of the Republic will have no difficulty in establishing with me the fact that at all times and in all circumstances the Grand Duchy has fully and loyally ful- filled all the obligations of every kind which rested on it in virtue of the Treaty of 1S67. I remain, etc., Eyschen. Minister of State, President of the Government. 2b 40(3 Official Diplomatic Documents Enclosure II Private Letter from M. Eyschen, Minister of State, President of the Government, to M. Mallard, French Minister, at Luxemburg. Sir, A short time ago I had with very great regret to inform you of the intentions of General von Fuchs with regard to your sojourn in Luxemburg. As I had the honour to tell you, I asked for confirmation in writ- ing of the decision taken by the military authorities in this matter. Enclosed is a copy of a letter which I have at this moment re- ceived from the German Minister. He has assured me that in carrying out this step there will be no want of the respect due to your position and person. Be good enough to receive the renewed expression of my regret and my deep regard. Eyschen. Enclosure III To His Excellency the Minister of State, Ih. Eyschen, Your Excellency, In accordance with the instructions of his Excellency General Fuchs, I have the honour to ask you to be good enough to request the French Minister, M. Mollard, to leave Luxemburg as soon as possible and to return to France; otherwise the German military authorities would find themselves under the painful necessity of placing M. Mollard under the charge of a military escort and in the last extremity of proceeding to his arrest. I beg your Excellency to have the goodness on this occasion to receive the assurance of my deepest regard. Von Buch. Enclosure IV M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxemburg, to His Excellency M. Eyschen, Minister if State, President of the Government of Luxem- burg. Sir, Luxemburg, August 4. 1914- I have just received your communication and I submit to force. Before leaving Luxemburg it is my duty to provide for the for- tunes and safety of my fellow-countrymen. Knowing the spirit of justice and equity of the Luxemburg Government, I have the honour to ask your Excellency to take them under your protection, and to watch over the safety of their lives and goods. August 5, French Yellow Book No. 156 467 At the same time I will ask your Excellency to take charge of the Legation and the offices of the Chancery. I should be much obliged to your Excellency if you would be good enough to lay before Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess the expression of my deepest respect, and my excuses for not having been able myself to express them to her. In thanking you for all the marks of sympathy which you have given me I beg you to receive renewed assurances of my deep regard. Armand Mollard. 468 Official Diplomatic Documents Thursday, August 6, 1914 SUMMARY OF PUBLISHED DESPATCHES Foreign Office of Sent Despatches to Received Despatches from Austria-Hungary Belgium France London The Hague The Hague ( lermany Great Britain Russia Austro-Hungarian Ambassador Serbia German Leg; ition Berlin Austria-Hungary presents her declaration of war to Russia. Belgium is informed by HaUunil of war regulations established for the naviga- tion of the Scheldt. Germany and Serbia sever diplomatic relations, and the former in so doing lays the entire blame for the war on Russia for having ordered general mobilisation just when Germany was hopeful of success in her attempt at mediation. Austria-Hungary : To London Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 60 Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff at Loudon. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 6, 1914. I have received Your Excellency's telegram of the 4th August. 1 I ask you to assure Sir E. Grey that we will in no case open hostili- ties against Great Britain without a previous formal declaration of war, hut that we also expect that Great Britain will observe towards us a similar attitude, and that she will not undertake any hostile act against us before formally declaring war. Belgium : From The Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 53 Jonkheer dc Wcede, Netherlands- Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Brussels, August G, 1914- I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy of the special edition of the Staatscourant, containing the declara- tion of the neutrality of the Netherlands in the war between Bel- gium and Germany, and between Great Britain and Germany. 1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book Xo. 58, August 4. August 6, Belgian Gray Book No. 53 4G9 Enclosure to No. 53 Laws, Decrees, Nominations, etc. Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, and the Colonies. (Translation.) The Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice, Marine, War, and the Colonies, authorised to that effect by her Majesty the Queen, make known to all whom it may concern that the Nether- lands Government will observe strict neutrality in the war which has broken out between Great Britain and Germany, and Belgium and Germany, Powers friendly to the Netherlands, and that, with a view of the observ- ance of this neutrality, the fol- lowing dispositions have been taken : — Les Ministres des Affaires Etrangeres, de la Justice, de la Marine, de la Guerre et des Colonies, autorises a cette fin par Sa Majeste la Heine, portent a la connaissance de tous ceux que la chose concerne, que le Gouverne- ment neerlandais observera dans la guerre qui a eclate entre les Puissances amies des Pays-Bas, Grande-Bretagne et Allemagne, et Belgique et Allemagne, une stricte neutralite, et qu'en vue de l'observation de cette neutralite les dispositions suivantes out ete arretees : Article 1 Dans les limites du territoire de l'Etat, comprenant le territoire du Royaume en Europe, outre les colonies et possessions dans d'autres parties du monde, aucun genre d'hostilites n'est permis et ce territoire ne peut servir de base pour des operations hostiles. Article 2 Ni l'occupation d'une partie quelconque du territoire de l'Etat par un belligerant, . ni le passage a travers ce territoire par voie de terre par des troupes ou des con- vois de munitions appartenanta un des belligerants ne sont permis non plus que le passage a travers le territoire situe a l'interieur des eaux territoriales neerlandaises par des navires de guerre ou des batiments des belligerants as- similes a ceux-ci. Article 1 Within the limits of the terri- tory of the State, including the territory of the Kingdom in Europe and the colonies and possessions in other parts of the world, no hostilities of any kind are permitted, neither may this territory serve as a base for hostile operations. Article 2 Neither the occupation of any part of the territory of the State by a belligerent nor the passage across this territory by land is permitted to the troops or con- voys of munitions belonging to the belligerents, nor is the pas- sage across the territory situated within the territorial waters of the Netherlands by the warships or ships assimilated thereto of the belligerents permitted. 470 Official Diplomatic Documents Article 3 Les troupes ou lt-s militaires, appurtenant aux belligerants ou destines a ceux-ci et arrivant sur le territoire de l'Etat par voie de terre seront immediatement desarmes et internes jusqu'a la fin de la guerre. Les navires de guerre oil bati- ments assimiles a ces derniers, appartenant a, un belligerant, qui contreviendront aux prescriptions des articles 2, 4 ou 7, ne pourront quitter ce territoire avant la fin de la guerre. Article 3 Troops or soldiers belonging to the belligerents or destined for them arriving in the territory of the State by land will be imme- diately disarmed and interned until the termination of the war. Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent, who contravenes the provisions of articles 2, 4, or 7 will not be per- mitted to leave the said territory until the end of the war. Article 4 Les navires de guerre ou bati- ments assimiles a, ces derniers, cpii appartiennent a un belli- gerant, n'auront pas acces an territoire de l'Etat. Article 4 No warships or ships assimi- lated thereto belonging to any of the belligerents shall have access to the said territory. Article 5 La disposition de l'article 4 n'est pas applicable : 1° aux navires de guerre ou batiments d'un belligerant assi- miles a ces derniers, et cpii par suite d'avarie ou de l'etat de la mer sont tenus d'entrer dans un des ports ou rades de l'Etat. Les navires pourront quitter les dits ports ou rades des que les circon- stances qui les ont contraints de s'y refugier auront cesse d'exister ; 2° aux navires de guerre ou batiments assimiles, appartenant a un belligerant, et qui font escale dans un port ou une rade situes dans le territoire des colonies et possessions d'cutre-mer, exclu- sivement dans le but de completer leur provision de denrees alimen- taires ou de combustibles. Ces navires devront repartir des que les eirconstances qui les ont forces Article 5 The provisions of article 4 do not apply to : — 1. Warships or ships assimi- lated thereto which are forced to enter the ports or roadstead of the State on account of damages or the state of the sea. Such ships may leave the said ports or roadsteads as soon as the circum- stances which have driven them to take shelter there shall have ceased to exist. 2. Warships or ships assimi- lated thereto belonging to a bel- ligerent which anchor in a port or roadstead in the colonies or oversea possessions exclusively with the object of completing their provision of foodstuffs or fuel. These ships must leave as soon as the circumstances which have forced them to anchor shall have ceased to exist, subject to August 6, Belgian Gray Book No. 53 471 a faire escale ont cesse d'exister, avec cette condition que le sejour en rade ou dans le port ne pourra durer plus de vingt-quatre heures ; 3° aux navires de guerre ou batiments assimiles, appartenant a un belligerant, et qui sont utilises exclusivement pour une mission religieuse, scientifique, ou humanitaire. the condition that their stay in the roadstead or port shall not exceed twenty-four hours. 3. Warships or ships assimi- lated thereto belonging to a bel- ligerent employed exclusively on a religious, scientific, or human- itarian mission. Article 6 Les navires de guerre ou bati- ments assimiles appartenant a un belligerant, ne peuvent reparer leurs a varies dans les ports ou rades de l'Etat qu'en tant que cette reparation est indispensable a, la securite de la navigation, et ils ne pourront en aucune facon accroitre leurs capacites de combat. Article 6 Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent may only execute such repairs in the ports and roadsteads of the State as are indispensable to their seaworthiness, and they may in no way increase their fighting capacities. Article 7 Les navires de guerre ou bati- ments assimiles, appartenant a un belligerant, et qui, au com- mencement de la guerre, se trou- veraient sur le territoire de l'Etat, sont tenus de le quitter dans les vingt-quatre heures de la publi- cation de la presente. Article 7 Warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent who may at the commencement of war be within the territory of the State must leave within twenty-four hours from the mo- ment of the publication of this declaration. Article 8 Si des navires de guerre ou batiments assimiles appartenant a divers belligerants se trouvent en meme temps, dans les con- ditions visees a l'article 5, dans une meme partie du monde, et sur le territoire de l'Etat, un delai d'au moins vingt-quatre heures doit s'ecouler entre le depart des navires de chacun des belli- gerants. A moins de circon- stances speciales, l'ordre de de- part est determine par l'ordre Article 8 If warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to different bel- ligerents find themselves at the same time, in the conditions set forth in article 5, in the same part of the world and within the terri- tory of the State, a delay of at least twenty-four hours must elapse between the departure of each respective belligerent ship. Except in special circumstances, the. order of departure shall be determined by the order of arrival. Official Diplomatic Documents d'arrivee. Un navire tie guerre ou un batiment assimile, appar- tenant a un belligerant, ne peut quitter le territoire s Government will not close its frontier either to me or to the persons by whom I am accompanied, as I am told that that frontier has been firmly closed to foreigners. " I cannot then accept the proposal that you have made to me unless I have the security which I ask for, and unless I am assured that I shall not be detained for some months outside my country. " Jules Cambon." In answer to this letter on the next morning, Tuesday, the Ith August, Ilerr von Langwerth gave me in writing an assurance that the Austrian and Swiss authorities had received communications to this effect. At the same time M. Miladowski, attached to the Consulate at Berlin, as well as other Frenchmen, was arrested in his own house while in bed. M. Miladowski, for whom a diplomatic passport had been requested, was released after four hours. I was preparing to leave for Vienna when, at a epiarter to five, Herr von Langwerth came back to inform me that I would have to leave with the persons accompanying me at 10 o'clock in the even- ing, but that I should he taken to Denmark. On this new require- ment I asked if I should lie confined in a fortress supposing I did not comply. Herr von Langwerth simply answered that he would re- turn to receive my answer in half an hour. I did not wish to give the German Government the pretext for saying that I had refused to depart from Germany. 1 therefore told Herr von Langwerth when he came back that I would submit to the order which had been given to me but "that 1 protested." I at once wrote to Herr von Jagow a letter of which the following is a copy : August 6, French Yellow Book No. 155 479 "Sir, Berlin, August 4> 1914- "More than once your Excellency has said to me that the Imperial Government, in accordance with the usages of international courtesy, would facilitate my return to my own country and would give me every means of getting back to it quickly. "Yesterday, however, Baron von Langwerth, after refusing me access to Belgium and Holland, informed me that I should travel to Switzerland via Constance. During the night I was informed that I should be sent to Austria, a country which is taking part in the present war on the side of Germany. As I had no knowledge of the intentions of Austria towards me, since on Austrian soil I am noth- ing but an ordinary private individual, I wrote to Baron von Lang- werth that I requested the Imperial Government to give me a promise that the Imperial and Royal Austrian authorities would give me all possible facilities for continuing my journey and that Switzerland would not be closed to inc. Ilerr von Langwerth has been good enough to answer me in writing that I could be assured of an easy journey and that the Austrian authorities would do all that was necessary. "It is nearly five o'clock, and Baron von Langwerth has just an- nounced to me that I shall be sent to Denmark. In view of the present situation, there is no security that I shall find a ship to take me to England and it is this consideration which made me reject this proposal, with the approval of Ilerr von Langwerth. " In truth no liberty is left me and I am treated almost as a prisoner. I am obliged to submit, having no means of obtaining that the rules of international courtesy should be observed towards me, but I hasten to protest to your Excellency against the manner in which I am being treated. Jules Cambon." Whilst my letter was being delivered I was told that the journey would not be made direct but by way of Schleswig. At 10 o'clock in the evening, I left the Embassy with my staff in the middle of a great assembly of foot and mounted police. At the station the Ministry for Foreign Affairs was only repre- sented by an officer of inferior rank. The journey took place with extreme slowness. We took more than twenty-four hours to reach the frontier. It seemed that at every station they had to wait for orders to proceed. I was accom- panied by Major von Rheinbaben of the Alesandra Regiment of the Guard and by a police officer. In the neighbourhood of the Kiel Canal the soldiers entered our carriages. The windows were shut and the curtains of the carriages drawn down ; each of us had to remain isolated in his compartment and was forbidden to get up or to touch his luggage. A soldier stood in the corridor of the carriage before the door of each of our compartments which were kept open, revolver in hand and finger on the trigger. The Russian Charge d 'Affaires, the women and children and everyone were subjected to the same treatment. 480 Official Diplomatic Documents At the last German station about 11 o'clock at night, Major von Rheinbaben came to take leave of me. I handed to him the follow- ing letter to Ilcrr von Jagow. "Sir, Wednesday Evening, August 5, 1914- "Yesterday before leaving Berlin, I protested in writing to your Excellency against the repeated change of route which was imposed upon me by the Imperial Government on my journey from Germany. "To-day, as the train in which I was passed over the Kiel Canal an attempt was made to search all our luggage as if we might have hidden some instrument of destruction. Thanks to the interference of Major von Rheinbaben, we were spared this insult. But they went further. "They obliged us to remain each in his own compartment, the windows and blinds having been closed. During this time, in the corridors of the carriages at the doc if each compartment and fac- ing each one of us, stood a soldier, revolver in hand, finger on the trigger, for nearly half an hour. " I consider it my duty to protest against this threat of violence to the Ambassador of the Republic and the staff of his Embassy, vio- lence which nothing could even have made me anticipate. Yester- day I had the honour of writing to your Excellency that I was being treated almost as a prisoner. To-day I am being treated as a dan- gerous prisoner. Also I must record that during our journey which from Berlin to Denmark has taken twenty-four hours, no food has been prepared nor provided for me nor for the persons who were travelling with me to the frontier. Jules Cambon." I thought that our troubles had finished, when shortly afterwards Major von Rheinbaben came, rather embarrassed, to inform me that the train would not proceed to the Danish frontier if I did not pay the cost of this train. I expressed my astonishment that I had not been made to pay at Berlin and that at any rate I had not been forewarned of this. I offered to pay by a cheque on one of the largest Berlin banks. This facility was refused me. With the help of my companions I was able to collect, in gold, the sum which was re- quired from me at once, and which amounted to 3,611 marks 75 pfennig. This is about 5,000 francs in accordance with the present rate of exchange. 1 After this last incident, I thought it necessary to ask Major von Rheinbaben for his word of honour as an officer and a gentleman that we should be taken to the Danish frontier. He gave it to me, and I required that the policeman who was with us should accompany us. In this way we arrived at the first Danish station, where the Danish Government had had a train made ready to take us to Copenhagen. I am assured that my British colleague and the Belgian Minister, although they left Berlin after I did, travelled by the direct route to 1 Subsequently the sura thus required from M. Jules Cambon was given to the Spanish Ambassador to lie repaid to the French Ambassador. August 6, Serbian Blue Book No. 50 481 Holland. I am struck by this difference of treatment, and as Den- mark and Norway are, at this moment, infested with spies, if I suc- ceed in embarking in Norway, there is a danger that I may be arrested at sea with the officials who accompany me. I do not wish to conclude this despatch without notifying your Excellency of the energy and devotion of which the whole staff of the Embassy has given unceasing proof during the course of this crisis. I shall be glad that account should be taken of the services which on this occasion have been renderea to the Government of the Republic, in particular by the Secretaries of the Embassy and by the Military and Naval Attaches. Jules Cambon. Russia : From Vienna Russian Orange Book No. 79 Note presented by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs on July 24 {August 6), 1914, at 6 P.M. On the instructions of his Government, the undersigned, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, has the honour to inform his Excel- lency the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs as follows : — (Translation.) "Vu l'attitude menacante "in view of the threatening prise par la Russie dans le con- attitude adopted by Russia in flit entre la Monarchie austro- the conflict between the Austro- hongroise et la Serbie et en Hungarian Monarchy and presence du fait qu'en suite de Servia ; and of the fact that, ce conflit la Russie d'apres une according to a communication communication du Cabinet de from the Berlin Cabinet, Russia Berlin a cru devoir ouvrir les has seen fit, as a result of that hostilites contre l'Allemagne et conflict, to open hostilities que celle-ci se trouve par conse- against Germany ; and whereas quent en etat de guerre avec la- Germany is consequently at war dite Puissance, l'Autriche-Hon- with Russia ; Austria-Hungary grie se considere egalement en therefore considers herself also etat de guerre avec la Russie a. at war with Russia from the partir du present moment." present moment." Serbia : To Berlin Serbian Blue Book No. 50 The Royal Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the German Lega- tion at Nish. Nish, July 21 /August 6, 1914. The Royal Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to inform the Imperial Legation that, in view of the state of war 2i 482 Official Diplomatic Documents which now exists between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, and of that between Russia and Germany, the ally of Austria-Hungary, the Royal Serbian Government, in view of the solidarity of her interests with Russia and her allies, considers the mission of Baron Gieslingen, the Imperial German Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraor- dinary, to be at an end. The Royal Serbian Government requests His Excellency to leave Serbian territory with the staff of the Lega- tion. The necessary passports are enclosed herewith. From Berlin Serbian Blue Book No. 51 Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Charge d 'Affaires at Berlin, to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, July 24/ August 6, 1014. On the occasion of my visit to the Under-Secretary of State, M. Zimmermann, for the purpose of breaking oil' diplomatic relations, he stated, in the course of conversation, that Germany had always cherished friendly feelings towards Serbia, and that he regretted that owing to the political groupement cur relations had to be broken off. He blames Russia only, as the instigator of Serbia, for the develop- ments which have occurred, and which will have grave consequences for all nations. If Russia, at the last moment — just when it ap- peared possible that an armed conflict might be avoided — had not ordered the mobilisation of her whole forces, there would have been no war, for Germany had used her whole influence in Austria-Hungary in order to bring about an understanding with Russia. Austria- Hungary would have probably been satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade, when negotiations would have begun with a view to regu- larising the relations between Serbia and Austria. Friday, August 7, 1914 Despatches published only by Belgium who suggests that the European war between the white races be not carried into Africa. To the Hague Belgian Gray Book No, 56 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at the Hague. (Telegram.) Brussels, August ?', 1914- Please express to the Netherlands Government the sincere thanks of the Belgian Government for the measures taken to secure navigation on the Scheldt. The Belgian Government are in agree- August 7, Belgian Gray Book No. 58 483 ment with the Netherlands Government on the subject of the ex- tent of navigation. They had proposed Bath, but accept Hanswert, since this port has better facilities for the exchange of pilots. To Paris and London Belgian Gray Book No. 57 M. Daingnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris and London. (Telegram.) Brussels, August 7, 1911).. Belgium trusts that the war will not be extended to Central Africa. The Governor of the Belgian Congo has received instruc- tions to maintain a strictly defensive attitude. Please ask the French Government [British Government] whether they intend to proclaim the neutrality of the French Congo [British colonies in the conventional basin of the Congo], in accordance with article 11 of the General Act of Berlin. A telegram from Boma reports that hostilities are probable between the French and Germans in the Ubangi. To Paris and London Belgian Gkay Book No. 58 M. Daingnon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian Ministers at Paris and London. Sir, Brussels, August 7, 191 4- With reference to my telegram of this morning, I have the honour to request you to bring to the notice of the French [British] Govern- ment the following information : — While instructions have been sent to the Governor-General of the Congo to take defensive measures on the common frontiers of the Belgian colony and of the German colonies of East Africa and the Cameroons, the Belgian Government have suggested to that officer that he should abstain from all offensive action against those colonies. In view of the civilising mission common to colonising nations, the Belgian Government desire, in effect, for humanitarian reasons, not to extend the field of hostilities to Central Africa. They will, therefore, not take the initiative of putting such a strain on civilisa- tion in that region, and the military forces which they possess there will only go into action in the event of their having to repel a direct attack on their African possessions. I should be glad to learn whether the French [British] Govern- ment share this view and in that case whether it is their intention, during the present conflict, to avail themselves of article 11 of the General Act of Berlin to neutralise such of their colonies as are con- tained in the conventional basin of the Congo. I am addressing an identic communication to your colleague at London (Paris). 4S4 Official Diplomatic Documents Saturday, August 8, 1914 France complains of Austro-Hungarian troops having been sent to Germany; and seems favorably inclined to accept the Belgian proposal that the war be not carried into Africa. Great Britain publishes as an addition to her White Papers (later called Blue Book) Sir E. Goschen's final repoi including a description of the last interview with tL^ German Chancellor in which the now famous expression "a scrap of paper" occurs. Austria-Hungary : From Paris Austro-Hun^ ?ian Red Book No. 61 Count Szecsen to Count Berchtold. (Translated from the French.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, August S, 1914. The Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to go and see him in order to communicate to me that, according to positive information which has readied him, the Innsbruck Army Corps has been brought to the French frontier. M. 1 )oumergue wishes to know without delay if this information is correct, and if it is so, what is the intention of the Imperial and Royal Government. As France is at war with Germany the despatch of our troops to the French frontier is, according to the views held by the Minister, not consistent with the existing condition of peace between Austria-Hungary and France. M. Dumaine is commissioned to make a similar communication to Your Excellency. Belgium : From Paris Belgian Gray Book No. 59 Baron (luiUaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Paris, August 8, 1914. I have had the honour of speaking to the President of the Republic with respect to your telegram of yesterday. I had received it during the evening and had immediately communicated it to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. They asked for time to consider it before answering. M. Poincare has promised me to speak on this subject to-day to the Minister of the Colonies. At first sight he could see little difficulty in proclaiming the neutrality of the French Congo, but he nevertheless reserves his reply. He believes that acts of war have already taken place in the Ubangi. He has taken the opportunity to remind me that the protection accorded us by France extends also to our colonies and that we have nothing to fear. August 8, British Blue Book No. 160 485 Great Britain : From Berlin British Blue Book No. 160 1 Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. Sir, London, August S, 1014- In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant - 1 called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow 3 at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through with- out formidable opposition entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this fait accompli of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back. During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date, 4 and, in compliance with the instructions therein con- tained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves. Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave ■This despatch was not contained in the original edition of the Blue Book. It con- tains Sir E. Goschen's recollections of his last t]uy in Berlin. 2 See No. 153, August 4. 3 German Secretary of State. 4 See No. 159, August 4. 486 Official Diplomatic Documents his Excellency a written summary of your telegram and, pointing out that you had mentioned 1 2 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should lie reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty- four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow ' expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done. I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of see- ing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agi- tated. 2 His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Gov- ernment was terrible to a degree ; just for a word — " neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded — just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who de- sired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable ; it was like striking a man from behind while lir was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow l wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the lattcr's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for break- 1 German Secretary of State. - For the Chancellor's account of this interview .see his speech in the Reichstag, .Tun<' ',, 1916 : " Sir Edward Goschen was during this interview so shaken to his depths that from a natural feeling of decency I have always refrained from speaking of it publicly, since what happened was personal and human." August 8, British Blue Book No. 160 487 ing solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evi- dently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had been for years. Unfor- tunately, notwithstanding our efforts to maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separation from our late fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted this more than I. After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before 9 P.M. It was accepted by that office, but apparently never despatched. 1 At about 9.30 p.m. Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me. After expressing his deep regret that the very friendly official and personal relations between us were about to cease, he asked me casually whether a demand for passports was equivalent to a declaration of war. I said that such an authority on international law as he was known to be must know as well or better than I what was usual in such cases. I added that there were many cases where diplomatic relations had been broken off, and, nevertheless, war had not ensued; but that in this case he would have seen from my instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow 2 a written summary, that His Majesty's Government expected an answer to a definite question by 12 o'clock that night and that in default of a satisfactory answer they would be forced to take such steps as their engagements required. Herr Zimmermann 3 said that that was, in fact, a declaration of war, as the Imperial Government could not possibly give the assurance required either that night or any other night. In the meantime, after Herr Zimmermann 3 left me, a flying sheet, issued by the Berliner Tageblatt, was circulated stating that Great Britain had declared war against Germany. The immediate result of this news was the assemblage of an exceedingly excited and unruly mob before His Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police which had been sent to guard the embassy was soon overpowered, and the attitude of the mob became more threatening. We took no notice of this demonstration as long as it was confined to noise, but when the crash of glass and the landing of cobble stones into the drawing- room, where we were all sitting, warned us that the situation was 1 This telegram never reached the Foreign Office. ! German Secretary of State. 3 German Under-Secretary of State. 488 (Official Diplomatic Documents getting unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign Office an account of what was happening. Herr von Jagow : at once informed the Chief of Police, and an adequate force of mounted police, sent with great promptness, very soon cleared the street. From that mordent on we were well guarded, and no more direct unpleasantness occurred. After order had been restored Herr von Jagow ' came to see me and expressed his most heartfelt regrets at what had occurred. He said that the behaviour of his countrymen had made him feel more ashamed than he had words to express. It was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin. lie said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets had riot been authorised by the Government ; in fact, the ( Ihancellor had asked him by telephone whether he thought that such a statement should be issued, and lie had replied, "Certainly not, until the morning." It was in consequence of his decision to that effect that only a small force of police had been sent to the neighbour- hood of the embassy, as he had thought that the presence of a large force would inevitably attract attention and perhaps lead to dis- turbances. It was the "pestilential 'Tageblatt,'" which had some- how got hold of the news, that had upset his calculations. He had heard rumours that the mob had been excited to violence by gestures made and missiles thrown from the embassy, but he felt sure that that was not true (I was able soon to assure him that the report had no foundation whatever), and even if it was, it was no excuse for the disgraceful scenes which had taken place. He feared that I would take home with me a sorry impression of Berlin manners in moments of excitement. In fact, no apology could have been more full and complete. On the following morning, the 5th August, the Emperor sent one of His Majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following mes- sage : — "The Emperor has charged me to express to your Excellency his regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain in joining with other nations against her old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also begs that you will tell the King that he has been proud of the titles of British Field-Marshal and British Admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now at once divest himself of those titles." I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery. On the other hand, I should like to state that I received all through this trying time nothing but courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow 1 and the officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about 1 1 o'clock on the same morning Count Wedel handed me my passports — which I had earlier in the day demanded in writing — and told me that he had been instructed to confer with me as to the route which I should follow for my return to England. He said that he had understood 1 German Secretary of Slate. August S, British Blue Book No. 160 489 that I preferred the route via the Hook of Holland to that via Copen- hagen ; they had therefore arranged that I should go by the former route, only I should have to wait till the following morning. I agreed to this, and he said that I might be quite assured that there would be no repetition of the disgraceful scenes of the preceding night as full precautions would be taken. He added that they were doing all in their power to have a restaurant car attached to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter. He also brought me a charming letter from Herr von Jagow couched in the most friendly terms. The day was passed in packing up such articles as time allowed. The night passed quietly without any incident. In the morning a strong force of police was posted along the usual route to the Lehrter Station, while the embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to the station by side streets. We there suffered no molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment meted out by the crowd to my Russian and French colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station to say good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and to see that all the arrange- ments ordered for our comfort had been properly carried out. A retired colonel of the Guards accompanied -the train to the Dutch frontier and was exceedingly kind in his efforts to prevent the great crowds which thronged the platforms at every station where we stopped from insulting us ; but beyond the yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and insulting gestures we had really nothing to complain of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier. Before closing this long account of our last days in Berlin I should like to place on record and bring to your notice the quite admirable behaviour of my staff under the most trying circumstances possible. One and all, they worked night and day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise too highly the cheerful zeal with which counsellor, naval and military attaches, secretaries, and the two young attaches buckled to their work and kept their nerve with often a yelling mob outside and inside hundreds of British subjects clamouring for advice and assistance. I was proud to have such a staff to work with, and feel most grateful to them all for the invaluable assistance and support, often exposing them to considerable personal risk, which they so readily and cheerfully gave to me. I should also like to mention the great assistance rendered to us all by my American colleague, Mr. Gerard, 1 and his staff. Undeterred by the hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted by the mob on entering and leaving the embassy, his Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask how he could help us and to make arrange- ments for the safety of stranded British subjects. He extricated many of these from extremely difficult situations at some personal risk to himself, and his calmness and savoir-faire and his firmness in dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full assurance that the protection of British subjects and interests could not have been left in more efficient and able hands. j ] iavc e ^- c W. E. Goschen. 1 American Ambassador in Berlin. 490 Official Diplomatic Documents Sunday, August 9, 1914 Austria-Hungary denies the participation of her troops in the war against France. Belgium receives a courteous note from Germany offering peace, the fortress of Liege having fallen into German hands. France wishes to offer to Germany the neutrality of the possessions in the Congo basin in Africa. Austria-Hungary : To Paris Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 62 Count Berchtold to Count Szecsen at Paris. (Telegraphic.) Vicuna, August 0, 1914. With reference to Your Excellency's telegram of the 8th instant. 1 After conferring with the General Staff I authorise Your Excellency to inform the French Government that the information regarding the participation of our troops in the Franco-German war is a complete invention. I have expressed myself in a similar manner to M. Dumaine. Belgium : From The Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 60 Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Bel- gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Tele-ram.) The Hague, August 9, 1914. The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs has begged me to convey to you the following information, the United States Minister at Brussels having declined to do so : — The fortress of Liege has been taken by assault after a brave de- fence. The German Government most deeply regret that bloody encounters should have resulted from the attitude of the Belgian ( Government towards Germany. Germany is not coming as an enemy into Belgium, it is only through the force of circumstances that she lias had, owing to the military measures of France, to take the grave decision of entering Belgium and occupying Liege as a base for her further military operations. Now that the Belgian army has upheld the honour of its arms by its heroic resistance to a very superior force, the German Government beg the King of the Belgians and the Bel- gian Government to spare Belgium the further horrors of war. The German Government are ready for any compact with Belgium which can he reconciled with their arrangements with France. (See No. 70.) Germany once more gives her solemn assurance that it is not 1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 61. August 10, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 63 491 her intention to appropriate Belgian territory to herself and that such an intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is still ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so. The United States Ambassador had asked his colleague to under- take this attempt at mediation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has accepted this mission without enthusiasm. I have undertaken it to oblige him. From Paris Belgian Gray Book No. 61 Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Paris, August 0, 1914- The French Government are strongly inclined to proclaim the neutrality of the possessions in the conventional basin of the Congo and are begging Spain to make the suggestion at Berlin. Monday, August 10, 1914 France breaks off diplomatic relations with Austria-Hungary. Belgium refuses the German offer of peace. Austria-Hungary : From Paris AlTSTRO-HlTNGARIAN RED BOOK No. 63 Count, Szecsen to Count Berehtold. (Translated from the French.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, August 10, 1.914. I have received your telegram of the 9th August 1 and communi- cated at once the contents to M. I >oumergue. The Minister, who had received a similar telegraphic report from M. Dumaine concerning his conversation with Your Excellency, admitted that our troops arc not on the French frontier, but he maintains that he has positive informa- tion that an Austro-Hungarian army corps has been brought to Ger- many, and that this makes it possible for that Empire to withdraw her troops from those districts which are occupied by our soldiers, and that in the opinion of the Minister this amounts to a facilitation of German military operations. I repeatedly drew the attention of the Minister to the wording of the answer of Your Excellency, and he has admitted that it is not possible to speak of an effective participation of our troops in the Franco-German war, but he insisted that it is unde- niable that our troops are present on German territory, and that this is equivalent to the provision of military assistance to Germany. In 1 Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 62. 492 Official Diplomatic Documents these circumstances he has authorised the French Ambassador at Vienna to ask for his passports without delay, and to leave Vienna to-day with the entire staff of the Embassy. The Minister informed me that in view of this position, my presence here can be of no use ; indeed in view of the excitement of the populace it might give occa- sion to regrettable occurrences which he desired to avoid. He offered to place a train at my disposal from to-night onwards in order that I might leave France. I answered that it was impossible for me to receive instructions from Your Excellency before the evening, but that in view of the recall of M, Dumaine, I asked him to have my passport prepared. Belgium : From The Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 62 Bamn Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Darignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, The Hague, August 10, 1914- In response to a call on the telephone, yesterday evening at 9 o'clock, I went to the Department for Foreign Affairs. Jonkheer Loudon told me that my German colleague had just left his room, and had handed him a document which the United States representative at Brussels had declined to forward to you. The United States official in charge of the German Legation at Brussels stated that he had received no special instructions from Washington to intervene officially with the Belgian Government in the interest of Germany. The United States Minister consequently telegraphed to his col- league at The Hague, who informed the German representative of Mr. Whitlock's refusal. The German Government, therefore, took the initial step by approaching the United States Ambassador at Berlin. In these circumstances, and in view of the urgency of these mat- ters, Herr von Miiller begged Jonkheer Loudon to act as the inter- mediary of the German Government in this negotiation with you. His Excellency read me the German text of the document. I did not hide my astonishment at this attempt at mediation, and its poor chance of success in this form ; but, solely in order to oblige the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, I promised to telegraph to you immediately; and this I did yesterday. You will find the German document enclosed in original and translation. Enclosure 1 in No. 62. Enclosure 2 in No. 62. (Translation) Die Festung Liittich ist nach The fortress of Liege has been tapfrer Gegenwehr im Sturm ge- taken by assault after a brave August 10, Belgian Gray Book No. 62 493 nommen worden. Die Deutsche Regierung bedauert es auf das tiefste, dass es infolge der Stellungnahme der Belgischen Regierung gegen Deutschland zu bliitigen Zusammenstossen gekommen ist. Deutschland kommt nicht als Feind nach Belgien. Nur unter dem Zwang der Verhaltnisse hat es angesichts der militarischen Massnahmen Frankreichs den schweren Ent- schluss fassen miissen, in Belgien einzuriicken und Liittich als Stutzpunkt f iir seine weiteren mi- litarischen Operationen besetzen zu miissen. Nachdem die Belg- ische Armee in heldenmutigem Widerstand gegen die grosse Uberlengenheit ihre Waffenehre auf das glanzendste gewahrt hat, bittet die Deutsche Regierung seine Majestat den Konig und die Belgische Regierung, Belgien die weiteren Schrecken des Krieges zu ersparen. Die Deutsche Regierung ist zu je- dem Abkommen mit Belgien bereit das sich irgendwie mit Riicksicht auf seine {voir piece No. 70) Auseinandersetzung mit Frankreich vereinigen lasst. Deutschland versichert nochmals feierlichst, dass es nicht von der Absicht geleitet gewesen ist sich Belgisches Gebiet anzueignen, und dass ihm diese Absicht durchaus fern liegt. Deutsch- land is noch immer bereit das Belgische Konigreich unverzug- lich zu raumen, sobald die Kriegs- lage es ihm gestattet. " Der hie- sige Amerikanische Botschafter ist mit diesem Vermittlungsver- such seines Briisseler Kollegen einverstanden." defence. The German Govern- ment most deeply regret that bloody encounters should have resulted from the Belgian Gov- ernment's attitude towards Ger- many. Germany is not coming as an enemy into Belgium. It is only through the force of cir- cumstances that she has had, owing to the military measures of France, to take the grave de- cision of entering Belgium and occupying Liege as a base for her further military operations. Now that the Belgian army has upheld the honour of its arms in the most brilliant manner by its heroic resistance to a very su- perior force, the German Gov- ernment beg the King of the Belgians and the Belgian Gov- ernment to spare ''Belgium the horrors of war. The German Government are ready for any compact with Belgium which can in any way be reconciled with their arrangements with France. (See No. 70.) Germany gives once more her solemn assurance that she has not been animated by the intention of appropriating Belgian territory for herself, and that such an intention is far from her thoughts. Germany is still ready to evacuate Belgium as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so. The United States Ambassa- dor here concurs in this attempt at mediation by his colleague in Brussels. 494 Official Diplomatic Documents To The Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 63 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs', to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague. (Telegram.) Brussels, August 10, 1914. The Belgian Government have received the proposals made to them by the German Government through the intermediary of the Netherlands Government. They will forward a reply shortly. (See Xo. 62 Enclosures.) To The Hague Belgian - Gray Book No. 04 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister fur Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague. (Telegram.) Brussels, August 10, 1914- Doubt exists as to the meaning of the word " Auseinander- setzung," which you translate by "arrangement." Please ascertain whether the German Government have in mind any arrangements which we may have come to with France, or a settlement of the dis-. pute between France and Germany. To Loudon, St. Petersburgh, and Paris Belgian Cray Book No. i'i~> M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the British, Russian, and French Ministers at Brussels. Sir, Brussels, August 10, 101 4. I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the Belgian Minister at The Hague, at the request of the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, has forwarded to us the following proposal from the German Government. (See No. 02, Enclosure 2.) The Belgian Government propose to return the following reply to this communication : — (Translation.) "La proposition que nous fait "The proposal made to us by It- Gouvernement allemand re- the German Government repeats produit la proposition qui avait the proposal formulated in their ete formulee dans l'ultimatum du ultimatum of August 2. Faith- 2 aout. Fidele a ses devoirs ful to her international obliga- internationaux, la Belgique ne tions, Belgium can only reiterate peut que reiterer sa reponse a cet her reply to that ultimatum, the ultimatum, d'autant plus que more so as since August 3 her August 10, Belgian Gray Book No. 66 495 depuis le 3 aout sa neutrality a neutrality has been violated, a ete violee, qu'une guerre dou- distressing war has been waged loureuse a ete portee sur son ter- on her territory, and the guar- ritoire, et que les garants de sa antors of her neutrality have neutralite ont loyalement et im- responded loyally and without mediateinent repondu a, son delay to her appeal." appel." The Belgian Government consider that the Powers guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium should have cognisance of these documents. To London, Paris, and St. Petersburgh Belgian Gray Book No. 66 .1/. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Belgian. Ministers at London, Paris, and St. Petersburgh. Sir, Brussels, August 10, 1914. I have the honour to inform you of the circumstances which led to the departure of the Belgian representative from Luxemburg. The General Officer commanding the German troops in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg informed the German Minister in that town, on August 8, of the desire of the military authorities for the de- parture of the Belgian representative at the Grand Ducal Court. Herr von Buch addressed to Monsieur Eyschen, President of the Government, a note, of which the following is a translation : — "Your Excellency, "Luxemburg, August 8, 1914- " In consequence of the completely hostile attitude adopted by Belgium towards Germany, the military authorities find themselves obliged to insist upon the departure of the Belgian Minister from Luxemburg. "His Excellency the General Officer commanding begs Count van den Steen de Jehay to arrange his journey home in such a way that he may be able, within twenty-four hours, to see General von Ploetz at Coblentz, with a view to settling the details of the further stages of his journey. It is impossible for him to travel except via Treves-Coblentz. (Signed) "von Buch." Monsieur Eyschen forwarded this note the same day to Count van den Steen de Jehay, accompanied by a letter in the following terms : — "Sir, "Luxemburg, August S, 1914- "I greatly regret to have to communicate to you the enclosed copy of a note from the German Minister, informing me that the German military authorities demand your departure. "You will find in it the conditions which they attach thereto. "Herr von Buch told me that the military authorities advise you 496 Official Diplomatic Documents to travel by railway, as an attempt to carry out your journey by motor would expose you to being too frequently stopped for reasons connected with the control of the roads. But the choice is left to you. "The German Minister will come to me for your answer. "I cannot tell you how painful it is to me to fulfil my present task. I shall never forget the pleasant relations which have existed between us, and I hope that your journey may be carried out under the best possible conditions. /L ,. ,, ,.„ (Signed) Lyschen. The Belgian Government, considering that the Grand Ducal Government had no choice in their attitude, and that the course they had been obliged to adopt in no way implied any discourteous intentions towards the King of the Belgians or towards Belgium, decided that there was no reason, in these circumstances, for request- ing the Luxemburg Charge d'Affaires to leave Belgium. Tuesday, August 11, 1914 Austria-Hungary endeavors to maintain friendly relations with Great Britain. Austria-Hungary : To London AuSTRO-HuNGARIAN Kl'.l) BOOK No. G4 Count Berchtold to ('mint Mensdorff at London. Vienna, August 11, 1.914- The French Government have commissioned their Ambassador here to ask for his passports on the ground that an Austro-Hungarian army corps lias been sent to Germany, whereby it has been possible for the German army staff to withdraw their troops from thoseGer- man districts which are occupied by our contingents. This measure of our general staff indicates in his view the grant of military assist- ance to Germany. Your Excellency should bring to the knowledge of the British Government that according to information obtained from a reliable source the assertion made by the French Government is unfounded. Belgium : From Washington Belgian Gray Book No. 67 Mr. Whitlock, United States Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Brussels, August 11, 191 4- The United States Legation received a telegram to-day from Washington, conveying the information that the United States Government had, at the request of the German Government, con- August 11, Belgian Gray Book No. 69 497 sented, as a matter of international courtesy, to undertake the pro- tection of German subjects in Belgium. In accordance with the instructions contained in this telegram, we will, therefore, if you see no objection, undertake to use our good and friendly offices with the Belgian Government for the protection of German subjects. The pleasant relations which we have had with you in this matter up to the present convince me that we may continue them with the same object on the same pleasant footing. From London Belgian Gray Book No. 68 Sir Francis Villiers, British Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Brussels, August 11, 1914- I have telegraphed to Sir E. Gray the German communication and the proposed reply. I have received instructions to express to your Excellency the entire concurrence of His Britannic Majesty's Government. The latter can only declare their approval of the terms of the reply which the Belgian Government propose to give to this attempt to sow dis- cord between the Powers at present united for the defence of the treaties violated bv Germanv. From Paris Belgian Gray Book No. 69 M. Klobukowski, French Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Bel- gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Brussels, August 11, 1914. I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the French Government give their entire concurrence to the reply which the Belgian Government propose to return to the new German ultimatum. That reply is one which was to be expected from a Government and a people who have so heroically resisted the hateful violation of their territory . France will continue to fulfil her duties as a guaranteeing Power of Belgian neutrality and as a faithful friend of Belgium. (See No. 65) 2k 498 Official Diplomatic Documents Wednesday, August 12, 1914 Great Britain declares war on Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary : From London Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 65 Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold. (Translated from the French.) (Telegraphic.) London, August 12, 1914. I have just received from Sir E. Grey the following communica- tion : — At the request of the French Government, who are not in a position to communicate direct with your Government, I have to make to you the following communication : — The Austro-Hungarian Government, after declaring war on Servia, and thus taking the first initiative to the hostilities in Europe, have, without any provocation on the part of the Government of the French Republic, extended the war to France : — (1) After Germany had in succession declared war on Russia and France, the Austro-Hungarian Government have joined in the con- flict by declaring war against Russia, which was already fighting on the side of France. (2) According to information from numerous trustworthy sources Austria has sent troops to the German frontier under circumstances which amounted to a direct menace to France. In view of these facts the French Government are obliged to inform the Austro-Hungarian Government that they will take all measures which make it possible for them to answer these actions and these threats. Sir E. Grey adds : — As a breach with France has been brought about in this way the British Government feel themselves obliged to announce that Great Britain and Austria-Hungary will be in a state of war as from 12 o'clock to-night. Belgium : From The Hague Belgian Grai Book No. 70 Hanm Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Bel- gian Minister for Foreign Affair*. (Telegram.) The Hague, August 12, 101 4. The German text contained a mistake: instead of "seine Aus- einandersetzung," it should read " Hire," and thus be translated "their conflict with France." (See Xo. 04.) August 13, Belgian Gray Book No. 73 499 To The Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 71 M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague. (Telegram.) Brussels, August 12, 1914- Please communicate the following telegram to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs : — "The proposal made to us by the German Government repeats the proposal which was formulated in the ultimatum of August 2nd. Faithful to her international obligations, Belgium can only reiterate her reply to that ultimatum, the more so as since August 3rd, her neutrality has been violated, a distressing war has been waged on her territority, and the guarantors of her neutrality have responded loyally and without delay to her appeal. Thursday, August 13, 1914 Belgium : From St. Petersburgh Belgian Gray Book No. 72 M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) St. Petersburgh, August 13, 1914. Please thank the Belgian Government for their communication, and express to them the pleasure which the Russian Government feel at their firm and dignified attitude, upon which they are heartily to be congratulated. (See No. G5.) From The Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 73 Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Bel- gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, The Hague, August 13, 1914. I had the honour to receive your telegram of yesterday, and I at once communicated to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Belgian reply to the second German proposal. His Excellency undertook to forward the Belgian communication to the German Minister forthwith. (See No. 71.) [Of Friday, August 14, and Saturday, August 15, no despatches are published.] 500 Official Diplomatic Document* Sunday, August 16, 1914 France changes her attitude about not carrying the war into Africa. Serbia publishes the recollections of her former Minister in Vienna of the events leading up to the war. Belgium : From Paris Belgian Gray Book No. 74 Baron Guillaume, Belgian Minister at Paris, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Paris, August 16, 101 4. In the course of a conversation which I had this morning with M. de Margerie, I turned the conversation to colonial affairs and to the action which you had instructed me to take in your telegram and your despatch of the 7th instant. M. de Margerie reminded me that the French Government had approached Spain, but the latter had not answered before knowing the views of Great Britain. It seems that the latter has still given no answer. M. de Margerie considered that in view of the present situation Germany should be attacked wherever possible; he believes that such is also the opinion of Great Britain, who certainly has claims to satisfy; France wishes to get back that part of the Congo which she had been compelled to give up in consequence of the Agadir incident. M. de Margerie added that a success would not be difficult to obtain. (See Xos. 57 and 58.) Serbia : From, Vienna Serbian Blue Book No. 52 M. Yur. M. Yovanovitch, Minister at Vienna, to M. X. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, Nish, August 8/16, 1914. Fhom June 17/30 the Serbian Legation at Vienna was practically surrounded by police and gendarmes, while the staff were under constant police supervision. Our movements and our communica- tions with the outer world were, as you can imagine, rendered ex- tremely difficult ; the attitude of the population towards the Legation and its staff was inclined to be menacing. After the beginning of July (o.s.) even telegraphic communication with you became difficult, while matters developed with such rapidity August 16, Serbian Blue Book No. 52 501 that I was unable to report to you some of the events which preceded our armed conflict with Austria-Hungary. I accordingly do so now. Up to the end of June (o.s.) the whole question of the Serajevo outrage appeared to be developing normally. At the commencement of July, however, a change took place as regards the question of the consequences of the Serajevo affair. There were no tangible proofs that a radical change had taken place, but it was to some extent indicated by certain vague signs and symptoms which betrayed the existence of some hidden intentions. First of all, the Vienna and Budapest press, in conformity with instructions issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, ceased to publish reports of the magis- terial enquiry relating to the Serajevo outrage. The press began also to represent the whole matter as a question which must be settled between Serbia and Austria-Hungary alone — eventually by war. Moreover, statements to this effect were communicated to the leading Vienna newspapers by the German Embassy. Exceptions were : the semi-official Fremdenblatt, which was, in general, more moderate in the tone of its articles; Die Zeit; and the Arbeiter Zeitung. Simultaneously with this new attitude on the part of the press, a very unsettled condition of affairs developed on the Bourse, such as it had not witnessed during the whole course of recent events in the Balkans. In private conversations also and in high financial circles the "settlement with Serbia" was declared to be the only way out of the general financial and economic crisis prevailing in Austria- Hungary ever since the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under secret instructions it was ordered that gold should be gradually withdrawn from circulation, and a corresponding rise in exchange took place. A further indication was the clumsy explanation given of the reasons which had induced the Minister for War, Krobatin, and the Chief of the General Staff, Hetzendorf, to interrupt their leave of absence and return to Vienna. The Chief of Staff constantly trav- elled to the south, east, and north of Austria, and at that time had had an interview with the Chief of the German General Staff, Count Moltke, in Bohemia, I believe, at Carlsbad. All the reserves which had been called out for the June manoeuvres in Bosnia and Herzegovina were kept with the colours beyond the stipulated period. The number of soldiers belonging to the permanent establishment in Austria-Hungary allowed to go home on short leave of absence in order to gather in the harvest, and to attend to other private affairs, was much larger than is usually the case ; at the same time those whose duties were of a military-administrative nature were called upon in ever increasing numbers. Another indication was the non-committal nature of the answers given to several interpellations in the Hungarian Diet by the Hun- garian Prime Minister, Count Tisza, a statesman who is very clear in his political statements. 502 Official Diplomatic Documents The attitude of the Ballplatz was especially characteristic. None of the usual weekly receptions by Count Berchtold was held. They suddenly ceased at the Ballplatz to discuss the Serajevo outrage with the representatives of foreign countries; or, if discussion did arise, it seemed as if instructions had been issued on the subject ; that is to say, it was mentioned to everyone in such a manner as to dispel all apprehensions and suspicion that Austria-Hungary was preparing some serious step against Serbia. They acknowledged that some step would be undertaken at Belgrade as soon as the results of the magis- terial enquiry should have sufficiently established the connection between Belgrade and the Serajevo outrage. But at the same time it was said that this step would not be such as to give rise to any uneasiness. The Russian Ambassador, who spoke several times on the subject with Count Forgach, in the absence of Count Berchtold, was unable to discover the true nature of Austria's intentions. M. Schebeko told me that Count Szapary, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Petrograd, who, for family reasons, was at that time stopping in Vienna, had said to him that the step to be taken at Belgrade would be of conciliatory character. According to M. Schebeko, Count Szapary had also assured M. Sazonof that the intended Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia would not be such as to cause Russia any dissatisfaction. The French Ambassador, M. Dumaine, who, under instructions from his Government, had drawn the attention of the Ballplatz to the complications which might arise should the eventual demands which it was intended to make of Serbia not be of a moderate nature, was told by the principal Under-Secretary Baron Macchio, that the Austro-Hungarian Government, appreciating the friendly and conciliatory action of the French Government, would only put forward such demands, embodied in a note to the Serbian Government, as Serbia would be able to accept without difficulty. I drew the attention of the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente to the fact that such an assurance might well conceal the true nature of the intentions of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and that the Powers of the Triple Entente might then be confronted by certain faits accomplis which Europe would be compelled to accept in order to avoid a general European war. The line followed by the Ballplatz was, moreover, comparatively successful, as all those of my colleagues whom I saw during that period were more or less dissuaded from believing that Austria- Hungary contemplated any serious step which could provoke Euro- pean complications. Many of the members of the diplomatic body were so firmly convinced of this that they were preparing at that time to quit Vienna on long leave of absence at various watering places. Nevertheless, it was known that a note was being drawn up at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs which would contain the accusations against Serbia, and also the demands of Austria-Hungary. This task was entrusted to Count Forgach, formerly Austro-Hungarian Min- ister in Serbia. At the same time it was universally believed that of the foreign representatives, the German Ambassador, Herr von August 16, Serbian Blue Book No. 52 503 Tschirsky, was the only one who was kept informed of the note even in its minutest details, while I had reason to believe that he was also co-operating in drafting it. In view of the above, the representatives of the friendly Powers agreed with me in thinking that the note would impose very difficult terms on Serbia, but that there would be no inacceptable demands. When the contents of the note were pub- lished all of them were surprised, not to say dumfounded. In the same way as the contents of the note were kept secret, a similar amount of secrecy was observed in regard to the date of its presentation. On the very day that the note was presented at Bel- grade, the French Ambassador had a prolonged conversation with the Principal Under-Secretary at the Ministry fur Foreign Affairs — Count Berchtold was again absent at Ischl — on the subject of the note. Yet Baron Macehio did not tell M. Dumaine that the note would be presented at Belgrade that afternoon, and published in the newspapers on the following day. On the publication in the Vienna papers on the morning of July 11/24 of the contents of the note, which Baron Giesl had presented to the Serbian Government, a feeling of dejection came over the friends both of Serbia and of the peace of Europe. It was only then realised that serious European complications might ensue, though it was not believed that it was the intention of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment to provoke them. This feeling of depression was increased by the tone of the articles in the Viennese newspapers, with the exception of Die Zeit and Arbeiter Zeitung, and by demonstrations in the streets, which clearly showed that war would be a most welcome solution — a war with Serbia, of course. On that day, after having two or three conversations, I realised that an armed conflict between Serbia and the Dual Monarchy was inevitable, even should Serbia accept all the demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian Note, from the first to the last. The attitude of the people in the streets towards our Legation was such that I expected even personal attacks upon the members of the staff. The French Ambassador, the British Ambassador, and the Russian Charge d'Affaires held the view that the step taken by Austria-Hun- gary should be considered not as a note but as an ultimatum. They disapproved of the form, the contents, and the time limit of the note; they also declared it to be inacceptable. In the course of conversation with them on the subject of the note I pointed out that those passages in it which dealt with the order by the King to the Army, with the dismissal of officers and Govern- ment officials, and especially that which referred to the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian officials in the "Suppression of the subversive movement in Serbia against the territorial integrity of the Mon- archy," would be inacceptable as not being compatible with the dignity and sovereignty of Serbia. Only a victorious war, I said, could enforce the acceptance of conditions which were so humiliat- ing to an independent State. In reply to their enquiry whether it would not perhaps be better to accept the conditions and avoid war 504 Official Diplomatic Documents for the present, I said that the Austro-Hungarian Note, which amounted in fact to a declaration of war upon Serbia, was worded in such a way that, even if Serbia should accept all the conditions without reserve, Austria-Hungary would still find an excuse for her army to march into Serbia at any time. It was in the belief that the conflict would be limited to Serbia and Austria-Hungary that Austria- Hungary had drafted such a note. To M. Dumaine, Sir M. de Bunsen, and the Russian Charge d'Affaires, the unexpected character of the note was the cause not only of surprise but also of alarm, in view of the complications which they feared might ensue. The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, previously to the presentation of the note, had stated on several occasions to his colleagues that Russia could not remain indifferent to any step taken by Austria-Hungary, which might have as an object the humiliation of Serbia. He also expressed the same view at the Ballplatz. Hence the apprehension felt by the three Ambassa- dors, who at once foresaw the possibility of war between Russia and Austria-Hungary. The day after the note was presented, Prince Koudacheff went to see ( 'ount Berchtold to discuss the matter. In reply to his statement, that the note as it stood was inaceeptable, and that Russia could not watch with indifference the humiliation of Serbia, Count Berchtold said that Austria-Hungary had been obliged to take this step, as her very existence was threatened ; that she could not withdraw nor alter the demands made in the note, and that he considered that the matter in dispute concerned Serbia and Austria-Hungary alone and that no other Power had any grounds for interference. Count Berchtold's reply did not allow of any further doubts as to the intention of Austria-Hungary to chastise Serbia by force of arms without the consent of the European concert. From conversations which I had at that time with the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente — who during the whole of that difficult period showed every kind- ness and attention to me and to the staff of the Legation — it seemed quite clear that Austria-Hungary had been assured, and felt con- vinced, that the Serbo-Austro-Hungarian conflict would be localised, as she would otherwise not have decided upon a note which undoubt- edly meant war. It was also clear that Austria-Hungary was con- firmed in this impression especially — and perhaps solely — by Ilerr von Tschirsky, the German Ambassador in Vienna. Ilerr von Tschirsky was the only one who thought, and even stated publicly, that Russia would remain quiet while Austria-Hungary carried out her punitive expedition against Serbia. He declared that the Rus- sian Minister for Foreign Affairs would easily control the Panslavists, in the same way as he had done last year, and that Russia was not disposeil at the moment to begin a discussion of the many vexed questions in Europe and Asia which were her main concern. It was necessary, according to Ilerr von Tschirsky, to give Serbia a lesson. Russia had no right to interfere. As far as Germany, he said, was concerned, she was in the fullest sense of the word conscious of August 17, Belgian Gray Book No. 75 505 what she was doing in giving Austria-Hungary her support in the matter. These statements of Herr von Tschirsky have induced many to hold the opinion that Germany desired to provoke a European war, on the ground that it was better to have war with Russia before the latter had completed her military reorganisation, i.e., before the spring of 1917. This point of view had formerly been freely discussed ami even written about in Vienna. " The longer the matter is postponed the smaller will become the chances of success of the Triple Alliance." On the other hand, rumours from the most authoritative diplomatic sources in Berlin reached me in Vienna, to the effect that the Wilhelm- strasse did not approve of Austria's policy on this question, and that Herr von Tschirsky has exceeded the instructions given to him. The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, on his return from Petrograd, did his utmost at the Ballplatz to obtain an extension of the brief time limit given the Serbian Government for a reply to the Austro-Hungarian Note, and to discover some way which might lead to an exchange of views between Vienna and Petrograd in regard to the whole question, but until July lo/26, when we met, his efforts had proved unavailing. From the conversations I then had with him, I gathered that the Austro-Hungarian Note, in its contents and in its form, was regarded as a challenge to Russia and not to Serbia, and that Russia would not permit the humiliation of Serbia, even if war were to be the price. On the day of my departure from Vienna, M. Schebeko told me that, in spite of the many great difficulties to be overcome, there was a prospect of arriving at a solution by which an armed conflict might be avoided by means of discussion between the Russian Government and Count Szapary. A feeling of depression, however, prevailed in Vienna as soon as reports began to be spread that the Austro-Serbian conflict would bring about a war between Russia and the Dual Monarchy. Monday, August 17, 1914 Great Britain declines the Belgian proposal not to carry the war into Africa. Belgium : From London Belgian Gray Book No. 7."> Count ilr Lalaing, Belgian Minister at London, to M. Davignon, Bel- gian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sir, London, August 17, 1914- In reply to your despatch of August 7th, I have the honour to inform you that the British Government cannot agree to the Bel- 506 Official Diplomatic Documents gian proposal to respect the neutrality of the belligerent powers in the conventional basin of the Congo. German troops from German East Africa have already taken the offensive against the British Central African Protectorate. Furthermore, British troops have already attacked the German port of Dar-es-Salaam, where they have dsetroyed the wireless telegraphy station. In these circumstances, the British Government, even if they were convinced from the political and strategical point of view of the utility of the Belgian proposal, would be unable to adopt it. The British Government believe that the forces they are sending to Africa will be sufficient to overcome all opposition. They will take every step in their power to prevent any risings of the native population. France is of the same opinion as Great Britain on account of Ger- man activity which has been noticed near Bonar and Ekododo. (See Xos. .")7 and 58.) [Of Tuesday, and Wednesday, August 18, and 1'.), no despatches have been published.] Thursday, August 20, 1914 Austria-Hungary receives from Japan a copy of the latter's ultimatum to Ger- many. Austria-Hungary : From Tokio Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 66 The Japanese Ambassador to Count Berchtold. (Translated from the English.) My Lord, Vienna, August 20, WI4. Your Excellency will doubtless have already received information from his Excellency Baron Midler of the ci mmunication which was addressed to the German Government by my Government on the 15th inst. Nevertheless I take the liberty, although I have not received any instructions to do so, to enclose herewith for your Excel- lency's personal information, a copy of a telegram bearing on the matter which I have received from Tokio. Enclosure The Japanese Government, who have taken the present situation into their earnest consideration, have, in accordance with a complete understanding made with the British Government, for the purpose of strengthening and maintaining general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia, which is one of the aims of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, decided to take common action with Great Britain in giving effect to August 22, Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 67 507 the necessary measures for this purpose. Nevertheless, before pro- ceeding with measures of this kind, the Japanese Government have thought it proper to address a friendly request to the German Govern- ment, which was communicated to them on the 15th August, 1914, in the following words : — "(1) All German warships must be withdrawn at once from the waters in the neighbourhood of Japan and China. The ships that cannot be withdrawn must be disarmed. " (2) The German Government must unconditionally and without compensation hand over to the Japanese authorities the whole of the leased territory of Kiao-chau before the 16th September, 1914, for the purpose of handing this territory back to China. "The Japanese Government have informed the German Government that, in case an answer intimating unconditional compliance with the above-mentioned demands is not received before Sunday, the 23rd, at mid-day, they will proceed as appears necessary to them. " It is earnestly to be hoped that the above-mentioned demands, for a reply to which so ample time is given, will be agreed to by the German Government ; should they, however, not comply with this demand, a course of action which would be deplored, the Japanese Government will be obliged to take the necessary measures to attain their end." The grounds on which the Imperial Government base their present attitude is, as already mentioned, none other than to maintain the common interests of Japan and Great Britain, which are set out in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, by establishing a basis of a lasting peace in the territory of Eastern Asia. The Japanese Government have in no respect the intention of embarking upon a policy of terri- torial expansion, nor do they entertain any other selfish designs. For this reason the Imperial Japanese Government are resolved to respect with the greatest care the interests of third Powers in Eastern Asia and to refrain from injuring them in any degree. [Of Friday, August 21, no despatches have been published.] Saturday, August 22, 1914 Austria-Hungary declares war on Belgium. Austria-Hungary : To Brussels AuSTRO-HuNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 67 ' Count Berchtold to Count Clary at Brussels. {Translated from the French.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna. August 22, 1914. I ask your Excellency to communicate the following to the Royal Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs at once : — "I have the honour to bring the following to the knowledge of 1 See Belgian Gray Book No. 77, August 2S. 508 Official Diplomatic Documents your Excellency in accordance with the instructions of our Govern- ment : — Whereas Belgium, having refused to accept the proposals made to her on several occasions by Germany, is affording her military assistance to France and Great Britain, both of which Powers have declared war upon Austria-Hungary, and whereas as lias just been proved, Austrian and Hungarian nationals in Belgium have had to submit, under the very eyes of the Belgian authorities, to treatment contrary to the most primitive demands of humanity, and inadmis- sible even towards subjects of an enemy State, therefore Austria- Hungary finds herself obliged to break off diplomatic relations, and considers herself, from this moment, in a state of war with Belgium. I am leaving the country with the staff of the Legation, and I am entrusting the protection of my countrymen to the Minister of the United States in Belgium. Count Errembault de Dudzeele has received his passports from the Imperial and Royal Government. Sunday, August 23, 1914 Germany refuses to reply to the Japanese ultimatum and gives the Japanese Ambassador his passports. Austria-Hungary : From Berlin AxJSTRO-HlJNGARIAN R.ED BOOK No. 6S Prince Hohenlohe to Count Bercktold. (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 23, Unit. The Foreign Office has informed the Japanese Charged 'Affaires that the Imperial German Government do not intend to send an answer to the Japanese ultimatum. The German Government have instructed their Ambassador at Tokio, after the expiration of the time allowed by Japan at 1 2 o'clock to-day, to leave Japan, and they will, at the same time, furnish the Japanese Charge d'Aff aires herewith his passports. At mid-day the Charge d'Affaires was furnished with his passports, and lie will leave Berlin early to-morrow morning with the staff of the Embassy. Monday, August 24, 1914 Austria-Hungary makes common cause with Germany against Japan. Austria-Hungary : To Tokio AuSTRO-HlTNGARIAN Red BOOK No. 69 Count Bercktold to Freiherr von Midler at Tokio. (Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 24, 1914- The Commander of S.M.S. Elisabeth has been instructed to take part in the fighting at Tsingtau. I ask your Excellency, in view August 28, Belgian Gray Book No. 77 509 of the action taken by Japan against our Ally, the German Empire, to ask for your passports. You should inform the Consulates, and you should travel to America with the colony and the staff of the Embassy and of the Consulates. ^<>ur Excellency should entrust the protection of our countrymen and their interests to the American Ambassador. The Japanese Ambassador here is being furnished with his passports. Wednesday, August 26, 1914 Belgium : From Elizabethville Belgian Gray Book No. 76 M. Tombeur, Belgian Vice-Governor of the Katanga, to M. Renkin, Belgian Minister fur the Colonies. (Telegram.) Elizabethville, August 26, 1914. The Germans are continuing their skirmishes on Tanganyika and attacked the port of Lukuga, on August 22nd. Two of their natives were killed and two wounded. Fresh attacks are expected. [Of Thursday, August 27, 1914, no despatches have been published.] Friday, August 28, 1914 Belgium : From The Hague Belgian Gray Book No. 77 ■ Count Clary and Aldringen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at The Hague, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Forwarded through the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs.) (Telegram.) The Hague, August 28, 1914. On the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to in- form your Excellency as follows : — (Translation.) "Vu que la Belgique, apres " Whereas Belgium, having re- avoir refuse d'accepter les pro- fused to accept the proposals positions qui lui avaient ete made to her on several occasions adressees a plusieurs reprises par by Germany, is affording her I'Allemagne, prete sa cooperation military assistance to France and militaire a la France et a la Great Britain, both of which Grande-Bretagne, qui, toutes Powers have declared war upon deux ont declare la guerre a l'Au- Austria-Hungary, and whereas 1 See Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 67, August 22. No reason appears why this despatch is printed here with a delay of six days. 510 Official Diplomatic Documents triche-Hongrie, et en presence du fait que, comme il vient d'etre constate, les ressortissants autri- chiens et hongrois se trouvant en Belgique ont, sous les yeux 14. The Blue Book recently published by the British Government contains (see No. 122, p. 92) the text of a telegram despatched from Berlin on the 31st .Inly by Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, in which the following passage occurs: — " It appears from what he [his Excellency the Secretary of State] said, that the German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already." The incident to which the German Secretary of State alluded in his conversation with Sir E. Goschen, and which he considered as a hostile act on the part of Belgium, doubtless refers to the application of the Royal decree of the 30th July, which provisionally prohibited the export from Belgium of certain products. As you will see from the explanation in the following paragraph, the incident with which we are reproached has in no wise the character which Germany has wished to attribute to it. The Royal decrees dated the 30th July and published in the Moniteur helge the following day forbade, provisionally, the export, both by land and by sea, of a scries of products, more especially of cereals. On the 31st July the German Minister at Brussels called my attention to the fact that the Antwerp customs were detaining cargoes of grain addressed to Germany, which, as they were merely transshipped in our port, were in reality only in transit. Herr von 1 Not previously printed. - British Blue Book No. 122, July 31, printed under date of August 1. August 20, Belgian, Gray Book No. 79 513 Below Saleske requested that the vessels carrying these cargoes should be allowed to depart freely. The very day on which the German Minister's request was received, the Foreign Office brought the matter to the notice of the Ministry of Finance, and the follow- ing day, the 2nd August, that Department informed us that instruc- tions had been forwarded to the Belgian Customs giving full and entire satisfaction to Germany. I cannot do better than enclose, for your information, copies of the correspondence exchanged on this subject with Herr Below Saleske. You will observe that nothing in our attitude can be taken as show- ing any hostile dispositions towards Germany ; the steps taken by the Belgian Government at that time were nothing more than those simple precautions which it is the right and duty of every State to adopt in such exceptional circumstances. It would be as well that you should address a communication to the British Government in order to explain the real facts of the case. Enclosure 2 in No. 79. Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels, to M. Davignon, Belgian Minister fur Foreign Affairs. Sir, Brussels, July 31, 101 4- I am informed from Antwerp that the Customs have forbidden the despatch of vessels containing cargoes of grain for Germany. In view of the fact that it is not in this case a question of the export of grain, but of grain in transit, the goods in question having been merely transshipped at Antwerp, I have the honour to ask your good offices in order that the vessels in question may be allowed to leave for Germany. At the same time I beg your Excellency to inform me if the port of Antwerp is closed for the transit of those goods specified in the Moniteur of to-day. Awaiting your Excellency's reply at your earliest possible con- venience, I have, etc. Enclosure 3 in No. 79. M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister at Brussels. Sir, Brussels, August 1, 1914- In reply to your Excellency's note of the 31st July, I have the honour to inform you that the Belgian decree of the 30th July con- cerns only the export and not the transit of the products mentioned. I at once communicated your note to the Minister of Finance and begged him to issue precise instructions to the Customs officials in order that any error in the application of the above-mentioned decree might be avoided. 2l s 514 Official Diplomatic Documents Enclosure 4 in No. 79. M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to H err von Be- low Saleske, Herman Minister at Brussels. Sir, Brussels, August 3, 1914. With reference to the note which your Excellency was good enough to address to me on the 31st July, I have the honour to in- form you that the Minister of Finance has instructed the Customs that the prohibitions established by the Royal decrees of the 30th July last, only apply to actual exports, and do not, therefore, extend to goods regularly declared in transit at the time of import. More- oxer, when duty-free goods arc declared to be for actual consump- tion, although they are really intended for export, they are commonly the object of special declarations of free entry which are considered as transit documents. In short, if it should happen that such goods had been declared as for consumption without restriction, as though they were to remain in the country, the Customs would still allow them to leave the country as soon as it had been duly established by despatch receipts, bills of lading, etc., that they were to be exported forthwith in transit. I would add that the export of grain with which your note deals was authorised on the 1st August. (See note, page 509.) Tuesday, September 1, 1914 Great Britain publishes as an addition to her White Papers (later Blue Rook) Sir Maurice de Hansen's, former British Ambassador in Vienna, recollections of the events of the last days preceding the war. From Vienna British Blue Book No. 161 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador in Vienna, 1<> Sir Edward Grey. Sir, London. September 1, 1914. The rapidity of the march of events during the days which led up to the outbreak of the European war made it difficult, at the time, to do more than record their progress by telegraph. I propose now to add a few comments. The delivery at Belgrade on the 23rd July of the Austrian note to Kervia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except Ilerr von Tschirscky, 1 who must have been aware of the tenour if not of the actual words of the note, none of my colleagues were allowed to see through the veil. On the 22nd and 23rd July, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron Macchio, one of the Under-Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, 1 German Ambassador at Vienna. September 1, British Blue Book No. 161 515 by whom he was left under the impression that the words of warning he had been instructed to speak to the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been unavailing, and that the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain nothing with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the second of these interviews he was not even informed that the note was at that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be published in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under-Secre- tary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me on the same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its presen- tation about the time we were speaking. So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was preparing that he actually left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days when events compelled him to return. It might have been supposed that Duke Avarna, Ambassador of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count Berehtold 1 during this critical time. In point of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berehtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on the 15th July the forecast of what was about to happen which I telegraphed to you the follow- ing day. It is true that during all this time the Neue Freie Presse and other leading Viennese newspapers were using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Servia. The official Fremderv- blatt, however, was more cautious, and till the note was published, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria would shrink from courses calculated to involve her in grave European complications. On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common consent it was at once styled an ultimatum. Its integral acceptance by Servia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on the following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known later in the evening that the Servian reply had been rejected and that Baron Giesl '-' had broken off relations at Belgrade, Vienna burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs till the small hours of the morning. The demonstrations were perfectly orderly, consisting for the most part of organised processions through the principal streets ending up at the Ministry of War. One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations against the Russian Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of police which held the approaches to the principal em- bassies during those days. The demeanour of the people at Vienna and, as I was informed, in many other principal cities of the Mon- 1 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 1 Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade. 516 Official Diplomatic Documents archy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Servia, and there can be no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hun- garian statesmen by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense, and it may even be said the determination, of the people, exeept presumably in portions of the provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much disappointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Servia during the annexation crisis in 1908 and again in connection with the recent Balkan war. Count Berchtold's ' peace policy had met with little sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the entire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punish- ment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Servia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as super- seding the necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of Serajevo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the German Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, in- fluenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic nego- tiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servian question by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable consequence en- sued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and decla- ration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilisation against Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisa- tion, and Russia again responded with results which have passed into history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White Paper on the European Crisis. 2 On the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold and urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of media- tion mentioned in your speech in the House of Commons 3 on the previous day should be accepted as offering an honourable and peace- ful settlement of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far; Austria was that day declaring war on Servia, and she could never accept the conference which you had suggested should take place between the less interested Powers on the basis of the 1 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. « "Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1914)." 'S,v " Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, columns 931-933. September 1, British Blue Book No. 161 517 Servian reply. This was a matter which must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to European complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Servia, and pointed out that whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting point of her policy, His Majesty's Government were bound to look at the question primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart. His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversation that, though he had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement which had re- sulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character, in- asmuch as the interests which it sought to harmonise were in them- selves profoundly divergent. His Excellency maintained a most friendly demeanour throughout the interview, but left no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment to proceed with the invasion of Servia. The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr von Tschirscky ' abstained from inviting my co-operation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government. I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szapary '' with full powers to continue at St. Peterslmrgh the hopeful conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonof. 3 ( \>unt Berchtold 4 refused at the time, but two days later (30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised against Aus- tria, he received M. Schebeko 5 again, in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburgh. From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was informed by M. Schebeko' that Count Szapary 2 had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. 1 German Ambassador in Vienna. 2 Augtro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. 3 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. * Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 6 Russian Ambassador in Vienna. 51S Official Diplomatic Documents Sazonof ' that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points in the note to Servia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence. M. Sazonof, 1 M. Schebeko 2 added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st August by Count Mensdorff, 3 to the effect that Austria had. neither "banged the door" on compromise nor cut off the conversa- tions. 4 M. Schebeko 2 to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, 8 and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach, 6 had re- sponded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, and M. Schebeko 2 repeat- edly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise. Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg!] and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburgh and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August. A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history. Russia stil! abstained from attacking Austria, and M. Schebeko 2 had been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be declared against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on the 6th August, when Count Berchtold 5 informed the foreign missions at Vienna that "the Austro-Hungarian Ambas- sador at St. Petersburg!] had been instructed to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austria-Hungary considered herself also at war with Russia." M. Schebeko 2 left quietly in a special train provided by the Austro- Hungarian Government on the 7th August. He had urgently re- quested to be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might be able to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne. M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground that Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. 1 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. '■' Russi m \in'i i isador in Vienn i : \ii-i">-ll ingarian Ambassador in London. 1 See No. 137, August 1. 6 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 1 Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. September 1, British Blue Book No. 161 519 On the 9th August, M. Dumaine had received from Count Berchtold 1 the categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold 's assurance that not only had no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French fron- tier, but that none were moving from Austria in a westerly direction into Germany in such a way that they might replace German troops employed at the front. These two statements were made by Count Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine, under instructions from his Government. The French Ambassador's departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made by the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the steps of the town hall, in which he assured the people that Paris was in the throes of a revolution, and that the President of the Republic had been assassinated. The British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by special editions of the newspapers about midday on the 4th August. An abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons, and also of the German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of the 4th August, appeared the same day, as well as the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events of these days transpired. The Neue Freie Presse was violently in- sulting towards England. The Fremdenblatt was not offensive, but little or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of Belgian neutrality had left His Majesty's Government no alternative but to take part in the war. The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, but scarcely mentioned in the newspapers. On the 5th August I had the honour to receive your instruction of the previous day preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with German\', but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that date at war with Russia and France, you did not desire me to ask for my passport or to make any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government. You stated at the same time that His Majesty's Government of course expected Austria not to commit any act of war against us without the notice required by diplomatic usage. On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to re- ceive your telegram of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform Count Mensdorff , 2 at the request of the French Government, , that a complete rupture had occurred between France and Austria, on the ground that Austria had declared war on Russia who was already fighting on the side of France, and that Austria had sent troops to the German frontier under conditions that were a direct menace to France. The rupture having been brought, about with France in this way, I was to ask for my passport, and your telegram stated, in conclusion, 1 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 2 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. 520 Official Diplomatic Documents that you had informed Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist between the two countries from midnight of the 12th August. After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States Ambassador, who accepted immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency would take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mr. Theo Russell, Counsellor of His Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold ' received me at mid- day. I delivered my message, for which his Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram from Count Mensdorff 2 has just come in but had not yet been brought to him. His Excellency received my communication with the courtesy which never leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complications which were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then at war with France, though diplomatic relations with that coun- try had been broken off. I explained in a few words how circum- stances had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided useless argument. Then 1 ventured to recommend to his Excellency's consideration the case of the numerous stranded British subjects at Carlsbad, Vienna, and other places throughout the country. I had already had some correspondence with him on the subject, and his Excellency took a note of what I said, and promised to see what could be done to get them away when the stress of mobilisation should be over. Count Berchtold agreed to Mr. Phillpotts, till then British consul at Vienna under Consul-General Sir Frederick Duncan, being left by me at the Embassy in the capacity of Charge des Archives. He presumed a similar privilege would not be refused in England if desired on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Government. I took leave of ( !ount Berchtold with sincere regret, having received from the day of my arrival in Vienna, not quite nine months before, many marks of friendship and consideration from his Excellency. As I left 1 begged his Excellency to present my profound respects to the Em- peror Francis Joseph, together with an expression of my hope that llis Majesty would pass through these sad times with unimpaired health and strength. Count Berchtold was pleased to say he would deliver my message. Count Walterskirchen, of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, was deputed the following morning to bring me my passport and to acquaint me with the arrangements made for my departure that evening ( 14th August). In the course of the day ( 'ountess Berchtold and other ladies of Vienna society called to take leave of Lady de Bunsen at the embassy. We left the railway station by special train for the Swiss frontier at 7 p.m. No disagreeable incidents occurred. Count Walterskirchen was present at the station on behalf of Count Berchtold. The journey was necessarily slow, owing to the encum- bered state of the line. We reached Buchs, on the Swiss frontier, 1 Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 2 Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. September 4, French Yellow Book No. 160 521 early in the morning of the 17th August. At the first halting place there had been some hooting and stone throwing on the part of the entraining troops and station officials, but no inconvenience was caused, and at the other large stations on our route we found that ample measures had been taken to preserve us from molestation as well as to provide us with food. I was left in no doubt that the Austro-Hungarian Government had desired that the journey should be performed under the most comfortable conditions possible, and that I should receive on my departure all the marks of consideration due to His Majesty's representative. I was accompanied by my own family and the entire staff of the embassy, for whose untiring zeal and efficient help in trying times I desire to express my sincere thanks. The Swiss Government also showed courtesy in providing comfortable accommodation during our journey from the frontier to Berne, and, after three days' stay there, on to Geneva, at which place we found that every provision had been made by the French Government, at the request of Sir Francis Bertie, for our speedy conveyance to Paris. We reached England on Saturday morning, the 22nd August. I have, etc. Maurice de Bunsen. (See note, p. 509.) Friday, September 4, 1914 France : To the French Ambassadors ami Ministers Abroad French Yellow Book No. 160 DECLARATION OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE (September 4, 1914) Declaration , .1/. Delcasse, Minister for Foreign Affairs, /<> the French Ambassadors and Ministers abroad. „ . r , , , Fans, September 4, 1914- The following declaration has this morning been signed at the Foreign Office at London : — "The undersigned duly authorised thereto by their respective ( rovernments hereby declare as follows : — "The British, French and Russian Governments mutually engage not to conclude peace separately during the present war. The three Governments agree that when terms of peace come to be discussed, no one of the Allies will demand terms of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other Allies. (Signed) " Paul Cambon. Count Benckendorff. Edward Grey." This declaration will be published to-dav. -^ Delcasse. PART TWO THE PARTS OF THE SEVERAL OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS NOT PRINTED UNDER PART ONE I. The Austro-Hungarian Red Book Servian names are spelt as in the German original according to the Croatian system. The following is the signification of the sounds : — s = sh in the English " ship." c = ch in the English " church." c = (the same, softer), c = ts in the English " mats." j = y in the English " yell." gj = dj in the English " adjourn." z = j in the French " jour." INTRODUCTION Since the dynasty of the Karageorgevic ascended the blood-stained throne of Servia, and surrounded itself with those who had conspired against the life of King Alexander, the Kingdom has continually, though by different paths and with varied intensity, pursued the aim of undermining by hostile propaganda and revolutionary plots, those territories of Austria-Hungary which are inhabited by the Southern Slavs, in order to tear them away from the Monarchy, whenever the general political condition might be favourable to the realisation of the Great-Servian claims. To what a pitch the hopes of the kingdom on the Save had been raised, and how near she thought herself to the attainment of their aspirations, appeared in the embittered animosity and the deep dis- appointment which were created in this crazy and deluded country by the anexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and which brought her to the verge of war. Left in the lurch by Russia, the protecting Power, who did not at the moment consider herself sufficiently prepared, in the spring of 1909 the Servian Government found themselves compelled to give a solemn declaration before Europe, that they recognised the new political and international conditions which had been created by the annexation, and to acknowledge that the interests of Servia had not been affected thereby. They were also compelled to dissolve the gangs of armed men which had been raised against the Monarchy, and to undertake for the future to maintain friendly relations with Austria-Hungary. The expectations were not fulfilled that it would now be possible for the Monarchy to live in peace and good neighbourly relations with Servia, as she had lived during the rule of the Obrenovic, and, as was then the case, to show good will to, and further the interests of this State, which owes to Austria-Hungary the recognition of her independence at the Berlin Congress. The Servian Government who, 5^5 526 Official Diplomatic Documents by their promise, were under an obligation to maintain friendly and neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary, permitted their press to foment hatred against the Monarchy in an unprecedented way ; they permitted associations formed on Servian territory under the leader- ship of high officers, civil servants, teachers and judges, publicly to pursue their aims with the object of stirring up revolution in the territories of Austria-Hungary; they did not prevent prominent ' members of their military and civil administration from poisoning the public conscience in such a way that common assassination was regarded as the best weapon in the struggle against the Monarchy. From the atmosphere created by this malicious agitation there sprang up a whole series of murderous attacks on high functionaries of the Monarchy, which ended in the execrable crime against the exalted person of the heir to the throne, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, which had been carefully prepared in Servia. However, the sacrifice of his life for the Fatherland, by which our enemies in their mad folly expected that the downfall of the Monarchy would be accelerated, brought all the peoples of Austria-Hungary together in fiery unanim- ity around the dynasty. The whole world learned how unshakable were the foundations on which the Monarchy rests, and how firmly and loyally her sons cling to one another. All felt it ; there was no room for any doubt that our honour, our self-respect and our deepest interest peremptorily demanded that we should deal with the criminal conspiracies of Servia and obtain guarantees for the security of Austria-Hungary. The unhappy experience which the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment had had with this dishonest neighbour showed us the only way by which our interests could be secured. It was necessary to present to Servia all such demands and to require from her such guarantees as would ensure the punishment of the accomplices in this shameful outrage and the suppression of the Great-Servian projects. Since the unparalleled patience of Austria- Hungary had been interpreted as weakness by Servia, the Belgrade Government must be made to understand that the Monarchy was determined if necessary to go to the utmost limit in order to maintain her prestige and the integrity of her territories; and that she could not tolerate any longer the intrigues of the Save Kingdom, which were meant to deceive the Powers, by an apparent agreement to the de- mands of Austria-Hungary, while at the same time she kept open the possibility of continuing her underhand attack against the Monarchy as she had done after the solemn promise of 1909. Against the usual Servian tactics of using the most reprehensible means to work for the separation of the Southern-Slav territories of Austria-Hungary, and then, when the Monarchy called her to account, of seeking protection and impunity from the Powers, there was only one way open to the Imperial and Royal Government of protecting their territory, and making an end of the injury done to their commercial life by the constant repetition of the intolerable attacks engendered by Servian aspirations if they were to avoid endangering the peace Austro-Hungarian Red Book 527 of Europe. From the beginning, the Imperial and Royal Government met the apprehensions of the Powers with the assurance that the Monarchy would not go beyond what was necessary for the protection of her own interests, and did not propose any annexation of territory. Within these limits, which she had imposed upon herself, she must, however, insist that the controversy with Servia should be carried through as a question directly concerning Austria-Hungary and this State. The request made by Russia for an extension of the time given to Servia for answering our demands would have given the Belgrade Government an opportunity for new subterfuges and for further procrastination, and would have opened the door to the inter- ference of single Powers in the interests of Servia. It was therefore necessary to refuse any prolongation of the time limit. Although before sending her crafty and evasive answer, Servia had ordered general mobilisation, and thereby publicly proclaimed her hostility, the Monarchy waited two days before proceeding to a declaration of war. The suggestion of the British Government that the settle- ment of the Servian controversy should be entrusted to a conference of the Powers did not reach Vienna until after the opening of hostili- ties, and was therefore outstripped by events. This proposal was, however, in itself, not well suited to securing the interests of the Monarchy. Nothing but the integral acceptance of the Austro- Hungarian demands on the part of the Belgrade Government would have given a guarantee for a tolerable relationship with Servia. The Entente Powers, however, were guided by the desire of substituting for the effective demands of Austria-Hungary, which were painful to Servia, a method of compromise, by which every security for a future correct attitude on the part of the Save Kingdom would have been lost, and Servia would have been encouraged to continue her en- deavours to bring about a separation of the Southern territories of Austria-Hungary. When the Imperial and Royal Government demanded from Servia that she should punish those accomplices in the crime of Serajevo who were in Servian territory, and fulfil the duties which are a necessary condition for friendly relationship between neighbouring States, their only object was to protect our dynasty from outrage and the territory of the Monarchy from criminal intrigues. They were repre- senting the common interest of the civilised world that murder and outrage should not be used with impunity as a weapon in political controversy, and that Servia should not continue incessantly to menace the peace of Europe by her aspirations. The Entente Powers were guilty of a serious wrong when, under the spell of their own political interests, they closed their ears to these postulates of public morality and humanity, and ranged themselves beside the Kingdom with its load of guilt. Had they listened to the assurances of the Monarchy which, by her conservative policy and her love of peace during the violent changes which had taken place in the Balkan Peninsula, had gained full right to their confidence, and had they maintained a waiting attitude towards the Servian conflict, the 528 Official Diplomatic Documents world-war would have been avoided. It is they who must be made answerable before history for the immeasurable suffering which has come upon the human race. There can be no doubt that the small Servian State would never have ventured, with an animosity which was scarcely concealed, to work for the separation from the great neighbouring Monarchy of the territories which were inhabited by Southern Slavs, if she had not been sure of the secret approval and protection of Russia, and if she had not been able to depend on the powerful pan-Slavist tendency in the Empire of the Czar forcing the Russian Government, if necessary, to come to the aid of the Kingdom in her struggle for the realisa- tion of the Great-Servian projects. In the course of the two last centuries the Russian Empire has extended over gigantic areas with the elementary force of a glacier, and lias, again and again, subdued fresh races under the Musco- vite rule, suppressing their culture, religion and language. As the supreme and inflexible aim of this restless pressure towards universal dominion there stands before her the possession of the Dardanelles, which would secure tn the Russian Empire predominance in the near East and in x\sia Minor, and gain for Russian exports an opening independent of the will of other countries. As the realisation of these plans would injure important interests of Austria-Hungary and Germany, and as it was therefore bound to encounter the inevitable opposition of these Powers, it was the en- deavour of Russian policy to weaken their power of resistance. The powerful central European union which barred the way to the uni- versal dominion of Russia must be shattered, and Germany must be isolated. The first step was to hem in the Ilapsburg Monarchy by the creation of the Balkan Union, anil to undermine its authority by the pan-Slavist and Servian intrigues in its frontier territories. A necessary condition for carrying out this plan was the overthrow and expulsion of the Turks in order that the increased power of the Christian Balkan States should be available against the two central Powers. When the Balkan Union broke up owing to the quarrel over the territory which had been torn from Turkey, and the Russian plans were threatened with failure, "the Protector of the Slavs" allowed Bulgaria to be overthrown, humiliated and deprived of the largest share of the territory which she had won. The Balkan Union which, after the overthrow of the Turks, could now be directed rather against Austria-Hungary and Germany, and could be used by Russia and France for changing the relations of the European Powers, was to be set on foot again by the prospect of the acquisition of fresh terri- tories, planned at the cost of the Monarchy, through a successive pushing forward of frontier from east to west. In this criminal game of Russian diplomacy, which threatened the existence of the Monarchy and the peace of the world, Servia was a catspaw which Russia would not give up even in order to avoid general war. The Imperial and Royal Government — and the documents pro- Austro-Hungarian Red Book 529 vided in this collection give ample evidence of this — again and again almost up to the outbreak of war assured the Cabinet of St. Peters- burgh that they would not violate any Russian interest, would not annex any Servian territory, and would not touch the sovereignty of Servia, and that they were ready to enter into negotiations with the Russian Government on Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests. Russia, however, had not expressed herself as satisfied with the solemn declarations of the Imperial and Royal Government ; as early as the 24th July, in the communique of that date, she assumed a threatening tone, and on the 29th July, although Austria-Hungary had not mobilised a single man against Russia, she ordered the mobilisation of the military districts of Odessa, KiefY, Moscow and Kasan ; this was a threat to the Monarchy ; on the 31st July she ordered general mobilisation, disregarding the repeated warnings of the Imperial and Royal Ambassador, and the declaration of the German Goverment, which had been made on the 26th, that prepara- tory military measures on the part of Russia would force Germany to counter measures which must consist in the mobilisation of the army, and that mobilisation meant war. On the 24th July the Imperial and Royal Ambassador in conversa- tion with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, laid stress on the peaceful disposition of the Monarchy. Her only object was to make an end to the menace to our dynasty from Servian bombs, and to our territory from the revolutionary machinations of Servia. The attainment of this end was a vital question to the Monarchy. She could not, therefore, allow herself to be terrorised by the possi- bility of a conflict with Russia, in the event of that country taking Servia under her protection ; she must make an end of the intolerable situation, that a Russian charter should give the Servian Kingdom continued impunity in her hostility to Austria-Hungary. On the 30th July the British Secretary of State again suggested that Austria-Hungary, in her conflict with Servia, should avail herself of the mediation of the Powers. Guided by their desire to do the utmost in their power to maintain general peace, the Imperial and Royal Government declared themselves ready to accept this media- tion. The honour and the interest of Austria-Hungary, however, required that this should not take place under the pressure of the threatening measures of Russia. It was, therefore, a paramount necessity for her to require that the hostile measures of mobilisation in the Empire of the Czar should, first of all, be revoked. This demand the St. Petersburgh Cabinet answered by mobilising the whole of the Russian forces. In alliance with the self-seeking policy of Great Britain, and the desire for revanche of the French Republic, the St. Petersburgh Government disdained no means of securing predominance in Europe to the Triple Entente and paving the way for their boldest schemes. Russia's unscrupulous hands tried to weave the threads of her policy into a snare to be cast over the head of the Monarchy. When Austria-Hungary, following the dictates of self-preservation, deter- 530 Official Diplomatic Documents mined to tear the web to pieces, Russia attempted to stay the hand of the Imperial and Royal Government and to humiliate the Monarchy. Exposed to the greatest danger in their vital interests, Austria- Hungary and Germany saw themselves confronted with the choice of protecting their rights and their safety, or of giving way before the threats of Russia. They took the road pointed out by honour and duty. French Yellmo Book 531 II. The French Yellow Book CHAPTER I WARNINGS (1913) No. 1 M. Jules Camhon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affair*. Berlin, March 17, 1913. Our naval and military attaches are sending to their respective Ministers reports on the new German military law. I take this opportunity of drawing the attention of your Excellency to these important documents. The consideration of the financial expedients by which Germany intends to provide for these military measures is the sole cause of the delay in the publication of the definite proposals of the Government. In spite of the patriotism with which the rich classes affect to accept the sacrifices asked of them, they are none the less, particularly the business circles, dissatisfied with the financial measures which have been announced, and they feel that a compulsory levy imposed in times of peace creates a formidable precedent for the future. On the other hand, the Federal Governments have strongly opposed an innovation which grants to the Empire resources derived from direct taxation. Hitherto, taxation of this kind lias been reserved to the Federal States, and the latter see in the surrender of this principle a new declaration of the corporate unity (personalitc) of the Empire, constituting a distinct diminution of their own sovereign power. However this may be, in increasing the strength of the German army the Empire desires to leave nothing to chance in the event of a possible crisis. The German changes have produced a result unexpected by that country, viz., the proposal of the Government of the Republic to re- establish the three years' service, and the manly determination with which this proposal has been welcomed in France. The surprise occasioned by these proposals has been utilised by the Imperial Government for the purpose of insisting on the absolute necessity of an increase of German military strength ; the German proposals are represented as a reply to our own. The reverse is the case, since the immense military effort which France is undertaking is but the conse- quence of German initiative. The Imperial Government is constantly rousing patriotic senti- ment. Every day the Emperor delights to revive memories of 1813. Yesterday evening a military tattoo went through the streets of Berlin, and speeches were delivered in which the present situation was com- pared to that of a hundred years ago. The trend of public opinion will find an echo in the speeches which will be delivered next month 532 Official Diplomatic Documents in the Reichstag, and I have reason to fear that the Chancellor himself will be forced to allude in his statements to the relations of France and Germany. It was of course to be expected that national patri- otism would be worked up just when fresh sacrifices are being required, but to compare the present time to 1813 is to misuse an historical analogy. If, to-day, there is anything corresponding to the movement which a hundred years ago roused Germans to fight the man of genius who aspired to universal dominion, it is in France that such a counter- part would have to be sought, since the French nation seeks but to protect itself against the domination of force. Nevertheless, it is true that the state of public opinion in both countries makes the situation grave. Jules Cambon. Enclosure I Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Serret, Military Attache to the French Embassy at Berlin, to M. Etienne, Minister of War. Berlin, March 15, WIS. The patriotic movement which has manifested itself in France lias caused real anger in certain circles. I do not, indeed, mean to say that the virulent article in the Kiihiische Zeitung is the expression of prevalent opinion. It is rather the angry outburst of an impulsive journalist, which has been im- mediately disavowed by the Government. However, in spite of its want of good manners the article in the Kolnische Zeitung cannot be disregarded; several important news- papers have approved of its substance, if not of its form, and it appears to express a real feeling, a latent anger. It is interesting to note this fact, because it throws very vivid light on the meaning of the present armaments. For some time now it has been quite a common thing to meet people who declare that the military plans of France are extraordinary and unjustified. In a drawing room a member of the Reichstag who is not a fanatic, speaking of the three years' service in France, went so far as to say, " It is a provocation ; we will not allow it." More moderate persons, military and civil, glibly voice the opinion that France with her forty million inhabitants has no right to compete in this way with Germany. To sum up, people arc angry, and this anger is not caused by the shrieking of certain French papers, to which sober-minded people pay little attention. It is a case of vexation. People are angry at realis- ing that in spite of the enormous effort made last year, continued and even increased this year, it will probably not be possible this time to outrun France completely. To outdistance us, since we neither will nor can be allied with her, is Germany's real aim. I cannot insist too much on the fact that the impending legislation, which French public opinion is too apt to con- French Yellow Booh 533 sider as a spontaneous outburst, is but the inevitable and expected consequence of the law of June, 1912. This law, while creating two new army corps, had deliberately, according to German fashion, left regiments and other large units incomplete. It was evident that there would be no long delay in filling in the gaps. 1 The Balkan crisis, coming just at the right mo- ment, furnished a wonderful opportunity for exploiting the centenary of the War of Liberation, and obtaining with greater ease sacrifices through the memory of those made in days gone by, and that too at a time when Germany was opposed to France. In order to show clearly the genesis of this military programme, I beg to recall what was written by my predecessor Colonel Pelle a year ago, when the law of 1912 was published : " We are discovering every day how deep and lasting are the feelings of injured pride and revenge provoked against us by the events of last year. "The Treaty of the 4th November 1911 has proved a complete disillusion. " The feeling is the same in all parties. All Germans, even the Socialists, bear us a grudge for having taken away their share in Morocco. " It seemed a year or so ago, as if the Germans had set out to con- quer the world. They considered themselves so strong that no one would dare to oppose them. Limitless possibilities were opening out for German manufactures, German trade, German expansion. "Needless to say, these ideas and ambitions have not disappeared to-day. Germany still requires outlets for commercial and colonial expansion. They consider that they are entitled to them, because their population is increasing every day, because the future belongs to them. They consider us, with our forty million inhabitants, as a second rate power. "In the crisis of 1911, however, this second rate power successfully withstood them, and the Emperor and the Government gave way. Public opinion has forgiven neither them nor us. People are deter- mined that such a thing shall never happen again." And at the moment when the second and formidable part of the programme is about to be realised, when German military strength is on the point of acquiring that final superiority which, should the occa- sion arise, would force us to submit to humiliation or destruction, France suddenly refuses to abdicate, and shows, as Kenan said, "her eternal power of renaissance and resurrection." The disgust of Germany can well be understood. Of course the Government points to the general situation in Europe and speaks of the "Slav Peril." As far as I can see, however, public opinion really seems indifferent to this "Peril," and yet it has ac- cepted with a good grace, if not with welcome, the enormous burdens of these two successive laws. 1 The problem which is set us to-day would, therefore, only be set again a few years later, and in a much more acute fashion, since the decrease of our contingents is con- tinually lowering the number of our effectives on a peace footing. 534 Official Diplomatic Documents On the 10th March last, being the centenary of the levee en masse of Germany against France, in spite of a downpour of rain, a huge crowd surged to the military parade in front of the Schloss, in the middle of the Tiergarten, in front of the statues of Queen Louise and Frederick William III., which were surrounded by heaps of flowers. These anniversaries, recalling as they do the fight with France, will be repeated the whole year through. In 1914 there will be a centenary of the first campaign in France, the first entry of the Prussians into Paris. To sum up, if public opinion does not actually point at France, as does the Kolnische Zeitung, we arc in fact, and shall long remain, the nation aimed at. Germany considers that for our forty millions of inhabitants our place in the sun is really too large. Germans wish for peace — so they keep on proclaiming, and the Emperor more than anyone — but they do not understand peace as involving either mutual concessions or a balance of armaments. They want to lie feared and they are at present engaged in making the neces- sary sacrifices. If on some occasion their national vanity is wounded, i he confidence which the country will feel in the enormous superiority of its army will be favourable to an explosion of national anger, in the face of which the moderation of the Imperial Government will perhaps be powerless. It must be emphasised again that the Government is doing every- thing to increase patriotic sentiment by celebrating with eclat all the various anniversaries of 1813. The trend of public opinion would result in giving a war a more or less national character. By whatever pretext Germany should justify the European conflagration, nothing can prevent the first decisive blows being struck at France. Enclosure II M. de Faramond, Naval Attache to the French Embassy at Berlin, to M. Baudin, Minister >>f Marine. Berlin, March 15, WIS. In reporting on the examination of the Naval budget by the Finan- cial Committee of the Reichstag, I said that no Naval law would be introduced this year having as its object an increase of the fleet, and that the whole of the military effort would be directed against us. Although the new Bill, having for its object the increase of the German effectives, has not yet been presented to the Reichstag, we know that it deals with " an increase of military strength of immense scope," to use the expression of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. The official newspapers have also referred to the military proposal in terms which enable us to consider the communique of the Lokal Anzeiger as accurate. The German effectives reach at the present moment 720,000 men. We are, therefore, entitled to conclude that on the 1st October, 1914, French Yellow Book 535 the Imperial army will be raised to a figure not far removed from 860,000. The importance of this figure would not be so great if the provisions of the proposed legislation (as far as one can gather from the official newspapers) did not tend, as, in fact, those of the law of 1912 tend, to place the army corps nearest to our frontier in a state which most nearly approaches a war footing, in order to be able on the very day of the outbreak of hostilities, to attack us suddenly with forces very much stronger than our own. It is absolutely imperative for the Imperial Government to obtain success at the very outset of the operations. The conditions under which the German Emperor would nowadays commence a campaign against France are not those of forty years ago. At the commencement of the war of 1870 the Prussian General Staff had considered the possibility of a victorious French offensive, and Moltke, seeing that we might conceivably get as far as Mayence, remarked to his sovereign, " There they will come to a stop." William II. cannot allow a retreat to enter into his calculations, although the German soldier is no longer to-day what he was forty years ago, a plain religious man, ready to die at the order of his king. When it is remembered that at the last elections 4,000,000 votes were cast by the Socialists and that the franchise is only obtained in Germany at the age of 25, it may be presumed that the active army, composed of young men from 20 to 25, must contain in its ranks a considerable proportion of Socialists. It would indeed be foolish to think that the German Socialists will throw down their rifles on the day when France and Germany come to blows ; but it will be very important that the Imperial Government should persuade them that on the one hand we are the aggressors, and on the other that they can have entire confidence in the direction of the campaign and its final result. On the last occasion when the recruits for the Guard took the oath at Potsdam I was struck to hear the Emperor take as a theme for his address to the young soldiers "the duty of being braver and more disciplined in adversity than in success." And it is because a German defeat at the outset would have such an incalculable effect on the Empire, that we find in all the plans worked out by the General Staff proposals for a crushing offensive movement against France. In reality the Imperial Government wishes to be in a position to meet all possible eventualities. It is from the direction of France that the danger seems to them greatest. The Kolnische Zeitung has said as much in an article both spiteful and violent, the form rather than the substance of which has been disavowed by the Wilhelmstrasse. But we must be willing to realise that the opinion expressed by the Kolnische Zeitung is at the present moment that of the immense majority of the German people. In this connection I think it is interesting to quote a conversation which a member of our Embassy had the other evening with the old 536 Official Diplomatic Documents Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck, as it may serve to reflect the opinions which dominate Court circles. Referring to the new German military proposals Prince Donners- marck spoke as follows : — " French people are quite wrong in thinking that we harbour evil designs and want war. But we cannot forget that in 1870 popular opinion forced the French Government to make a foolish attack on us before they were ready. Who can assure us that public opinion, which in France is so easily inflamed, will not force the Government to declare war? It is against this danger that we wish to protect ourselves." And the Prince added : " I have even been considered in France as one of those responsible for the war of 1870. That is quite false. Even if I took part in the war after it had begun, I did my utmost to prevent its outbreak. A short time before the war, happening to be at a dinner where there were some of the most important personages of the Imperial Government, I expressed my regret at the hostile sentiments which were already becoming manifest between France and Prussia. The answer was that, if I spoke like that, it was because I was afraid of a struggle in which the issue would certainly be un- favourable to Prussia. I replied, 'No, it is not because I am afraid that I repudiate the idea of war between France and Prussia, but rather because I think that it is in the interest of both countries to avoid war. And since you have referred to the possible result of such a struggle I will give you my opinion. I am convinced that you will be beaten and for this reason. In spite of the brilliant qualities which I recognise are possessed by the French and which I admire, you are not sufficiently accurate ; by accuracy I do not mean arriving in time at a meeting, but I mean punctuality in the whole sense of the word. Frenchmen, who have a great facility for work, are not as punctual as Germans in the fulfilment of their duty. In the coming war that na- tion will be victorious whose servants from the top of the ladder to the bottom will do their duty with absolute exactitude, however important or small it may be.' " And Prince Donnersmarck added : " An exacti- tude which played so great a role forty years ago in moving an army of 500,000 men will have a far greater importance in the next war, when it will be a question of moving masses far more numerous." In this way the old Prince gave expression to the confidence shared by all Germans in the superiority of their military organisation. When I spoke above of the new German proposal I only alluded to increased effectives. But the proposal will include also an increase of material and of defence works, the details of which are not known, but some idea of which may be gained by the figure estimated to be neces- sary to meet the expenses, viz., 1,250,000,000 francs. The carrying into effect of the law of the quinquennium of 1911 did not necessitate any special financial measures. The military and naval law of 1912 has been provisionally covered by the Budget surplus of the years 1910 and 1911, by the reform of the law with regard to alcohol and by delaying the reduction French Yellow Book 537 of the tax on sugar. (These last two resources only represent to- gether the sum of 60,000,000 francs.) It must also be remembered that large loans have recently been raised by the Empire and Prussia: 500,000,000 marks on the 29th January", 1912, and 350,000,000 marks on the 7th March, 1913. Quite an important part of these loans must have been applied to military expenses. The military law of 1913 will require quite exceptional financial measures. According to the indications given by the semi-official press, the "non-recurring" expenditure will amount to a milliard marks, while the "permanent" annual expenditure resulting from the increase of effectives will exceed 200,000,000 marks. It seems certain that the "non-recurring" expenditure will be covered by a war contribution levied on capital. Small fortunes woidd be exempted and those above 20,000 marks would be subject to a progressive tax. Presented in this guise the war tax would not be objected to by the Socialists, who will be able, in accordance with their usual tactics, to reject the principle of the military law and at the same time to pass the votes which assure its being carried into effect. The Government are afraid that among the rich and bourgeois classes this extraordinary tax of a milliard levied exclusively on acquired capital will cause permanent discontent. Accordingly they are doing everything in their power to persuade those on whom so heavy an exaction is to be levied that the security of the Empire is threatened, establishing for the purpose an analogy between the war- like times of 1813 and the present day. By noisy celebrations of the centenary of the War of Independence it is desired to convince people of the necessity of sacrifice, and to remind them that France is to-day, as 100 years ago, their hereditary enemy. If it is established that the German Government are doing their utmost to secure that the payment of this enormous tax should be made in full, and not by way of instalment, and if, as some of the newspapers say, the whole payment is to be complete before 1st July, 1914, these facts have a formidable significance for us, for nothing can explain such haste on the part of the military authorities to ob- tain war treasure in cash to the amount of a milliard. With regard to the manner in which the permanent expenditure resulting from the application of the laws of 1912 to 1913 is to be met, nothing has yet been said. Further legislation will certainly be neces- sary in order that the required annual amounts may be forthcoming. To sum up : In Germany the execution of military reforms always follows very closely the decision to carry them out. All the provi- sions made by the law of the quinquennium of 1911 and by the law of 1912 have already been put into operation. It is quite possible that part of the material, the purchase of which will be authorised by the new law, is already in course of manufacture. Military secrets 538 Official Diplomatic Documents are so well kept here that it is extremely difficult to follow the changes in personnel and materiel. With 700,000 men under arms (without counting the very large number of reservists who are at the present time in training), a perfect military organisation and a public opinion which can be swayed by the warlike appeals of the Military and Naval Leagues, the German people is at the present moment a very dangerous neighbour. If the three years' service is adopted and immediately applied in France, the conditions will be less unequal next year. The German effectives will still be considerably more numerous than ours, but the call to the Colours of all available contingents will no longer allow any selection, and will bring into the ranks of the German army elements of inferior quality and even some undesirable individuals. The morale of the active army will deteriorate. Germany has wished to upset the equilibrium of the two camps which divide Europe by a supreme effort beyond which they can do little more. They did not think that France was capable of a great sacrifice. Our adoption of the three years' service will upset their calculations. Faramond. No. 2 M. Etienne, Minister of War, to M. Jonnart, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Paris, April ,.', 1913. I have just received from a. reliable source an official secret report concerning the strengthening of the German army. The report is divided into two parts; the first consisting of general statements, the second dealing with technicalities and describing in the greatest detail, for each branch of the service, the measures to be adopted. Especially striking are the instructions with regard to the employ- ment of motor-traction and the utilisation of aircraft. I have the honour to enclose a copy of the first part of _ this docu- ment, which seems to merit your attention. Etienne. Enclosure Memorandum on the strengthening of the German Army. Berlin, March 1.9, 1913. I. — General Memorandum on the new Military Laws The increase has taken place in three stages : — (1) The Conference of Algeciras has removed the last doubt with regard to the existence of an Entente between France, Great Britain, and Russia. Moreover we have seen that Austria-Hungary was French Yellow Book 539 obliged to keep some of her forces mobilised against Servia and Italy; finally our fleet was not at that time sufficiently strong. At the end of the dispute the first matter taken in hand was the strengthen- ing of our coast defences and the increase of our naval forces. To meet the British plan of sending an Expeditionary Force of 100,000 men to the Continent, it would be necessary to make a better forma- tion of reserves to be used according to circumstances in the protec- tion of the Coast, in fortresses and in siege operations. It was already clear at that time that it would be absolutely necessary to make a great effort. (2) The French having violated the Morocco Conventions brought on the incident of Agadir. At that time the progress made by the French army, the moral recovery of the nation, the technical advance in the realm of aviation and of machine guns rendered an attack on France less easy than in the previous period. Further, an attack by the British fleet had to be considered. This difficult situation opened our eyes to the necessity for an increase in the army. This increase was from this moment considered as a minimum. (3) The war in the Balkans might have involved us in a war in support of our ally. The new situation in the south of Austria- Hungary lessened the value of the help which this ally could give us. On the other hand, France was strengthened by a new hi des cadres; it was accordingly necessary to anticipate the date of execution con- templated by the new military law. Public opinion is being prepared for a new increase in the active army, which would ensure Germany an honourable peace and the possibility of properly ensuring her influence in the affairs of the world. The new army law and the supplementary law which should follow will enable her almost completely to attain this end. Neither ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French chauvinists, nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of the Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending Deutsch- tum (German influence) all the world over. The French may arm as much as they wish, they cannot in one day increase their population. The employment of an army of black men in the theatre of European operations will remain for a long time a dream, and in any case be devoid of beauty. II. — Aim and Obligations of our National Policy, of our Army, AND OF THE SPECIAL ORGANISATIONS FOR ARMY PURPOSES Our new army law is only an extension of the military education of the German nation. Our ancestors of 1S13 made greater sacrifices. It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword that has been put into our hands and to hold it ready for defence as well as for offence. We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French. We must accus- tom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity, in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries. We must act 540 Official Diplomatic Documents with prudence so as not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid the crises which might injure our economic existence. We must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, con- siderable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak ( Losschlagen) should be considered as a relief, because after it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We must prepare for war from the financial point of view ; there is much to be dime in this direction. We must not arouse the distrust of our financiers, but there are many things which cannot be concealed. We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand we must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is a means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that we should open up relations, by means of well-chosen agents, with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in the case of a European war. Of course in case of war we should openly recog- nise these secret allies; and on the conclusion of peace we should secure to them the advantages which they had gained. These aims arc capable of realisation. The first attempt which was made some years ago opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately these relations were not sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like it or not it will be necessary to resort to preparations of this kind, in order to bring a campaign rapidly to a conclusion. Risings provoked in time of war by political agents need to be carefully prepared and by material means. They must break out simultaneously with the destruction of the means of communication; they must have a controlling head to be found among the influential leaders, religious or political. The Egyptian School is particularly suited to this purpose; more and more it serves as a bond between the intellectuals of the Mohammedan World. However this may be, we must be strong in order to annihilate at one powerful swoop our enemies in the east and west. But in the next European war it will also be necessary that the small states should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions their armies and their fortified places can be rapidly conquered or neutralised; this would probably be the case with Belgium and Hol- land, so as to prevent our enemy in the west from gaining territory which they could use as a base of operations against our flank. In the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark or Scandinavia, espe- cially as in any event we shall provide for the concentration of a strong northern army, capable of replying to any menace from this direction. In the most unfavourable case, Denmark might be forced by Great Britain to abandon her neutrality; but by this time the decision would already hav been reached both on land and on sea. Our northern army, the strength of which could be largely increased by Dutch formations, would oppose a very active defence to any offen- sive measures from this quarter. In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and French Yellow Book 541 we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against France, and thus protecting our flank. As was stated above, the situation with regard to the small states on our northwestern frontier cannot be viewed in quite the same light. This will be a vital question for us, and our aim must be to take the offensive with a large superiority from the first days. Fortius purpose it will be necessary to concentrate a large army, followed up by strong Landwehr formations, which will induce the small states to follow us or at least to remain inactive in the theatre of operations, and which would crush them in the event of armed resistance. If we could induce these states to organise their system of fortification in such a manner as to constitute an effective protection for our flank we could abandon the proposed invasion. But for this, army reorganisa- tion, particularly in Belgium, would be necessary in order that it might really guarantee an effective resistance. If, on the contrary, their defensive organisation was established against us, thus giving definite advantages to our adversary in the west, we coidd in no circumstances offer Belgium a guarantee for the security of her neutrality. Accordingly, a vast field is open to our diplomacy to work in this country on the lines of our interests. The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after the complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. An ultima- tum with a short time-limit, to be followed immediately by invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action in international law. Such are the duties which devolve on our army and which demand a striking force of considerable numbers. If the enemy attacks us, or if we wish to overcome him, we will act as our brothers did a hun- dred years ago ; the eagle thus provoked will soar in his flight, will seize the enemy in his steel claws and render him harmless. We will then remember that the provinces of the ancient German Empire, the County of Burgundy and a large part of Lorraine, are still in the hands of the French ; that thousands of brother Germans in the Baltic provinces are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national question that Germany's former possessions should be restored to her. No. 3 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign. Affairs. Berlin, May 6, 1913. I was talking this evening to the Secretary of State about the conference of Ambassadors and the results obtained at the meeting in London yesterday. The crisis with which Europe was threatened is in his opinion over, but only temporarily. "It seems to me," said Herr von Jagow, "that we are travelling in a mountainous district. We have just reached a difficult pass and we see other heights rising 542 Official Diplomatic Documents in front of us." "The height which we have just surmounted," I replied, "was, perhaps, the most difficult to cross." The crisis which we have just gone through has been very serious. Here the danger of war has been considered imminent. I have proof of the anxiety of the German Government by a number of facts which it is important that your Excellency should know. I received yesterday a visit from one of my colleagues with whom I maintain special and cordial relations. On the occasion of the visit he paid to Ilerr von Jagow, the latter asked my colleague confiden- tially what was exactly the situation of Russia in the Far East, and whether this Power had at the present time any cause for fear which might necessitate the retention of its troops in that quarter. The Ambassador answered him that he knew of nothing, absolutely noth- ing, which could be a cause of preoccupation for the Russian Govern- ment, and that the latter have their hands free in Europe. I said above that the danger of war had been regarded here as extremely near. The Government have not been satisfied with investigating the position in the Far East ; preparations have even been made here. The mobilisation of the German army is not restricted to the recall of reservists to their barracks. There is in Germany a preliminary measure which we have not got, and which consists in warning officers and men of the reserve -to hold themselves ready for the call, in order that they may make the necessary arrangements. It is a general call to "attention," and it requires an incredible spirit of submission, discipline, and secrecy such as exists in this country, to make a step of this kind possible. If such a warning were given in France, a thrill would run through the whole country, and it would be in the papers the next day. This warning was given in 1911 during the negotiations which I was carrying on with regard to Morocco. Now it has been given again about ten days ago — that is to say, at the moment of the Austro-Albanian tension. I know that this is so, and I have it from several different sources, notably from officers of the reserve who have told it to their friends in the strictest con- fidence. These gentlemen have taken the necessary measures to put aside in a safe the means of existence for their families for a year. It has even been said that it was for this reason that the Crown Prince, who was to make the trial trip on the Imperator, did not embark. The decision which occasioned this preliminary mobilisation order is quite in keeping with the ideas of the General Staff. On this point I have been informed of some remarks made in a German milieu by General von Moltke, who is considered here as the most distinguished officer of the German army. The intention of the General Staff is to act by surprise. " We must put on one side," said General von Moltke, "all commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor. When war has become necessary it is essential to carry it on in such a way as to place all the chances in one's own favour. Success alone justifies war. Germany French Yellow Book 543 cannot and ought not to leave Russia time to mobilise, for she would then be obliged to maintain on her Eastern frontier so large an army that she would be placed in a position of equality, if not of inferiority, to that of France. Acordingly," added the General, "we must anticipate our principal adversary as soon as there are nine chances to one of going to war, and begin it without delay in order ruthlessly to crush all resistance." This represents exactly the attitude of military circles and it cor- responds to that of political circles ; the latter, however, do not con- sider Russia, in contradistinction to us, as a necessary enemy. This is what was being thought and said privately a fortnight ago. From these events the following conclusions may be drawn which comprise the facts stated above ; these people are not afraid of war, they fully accept its possibility and they have consequently taken the necessary steps. They wish to be always ready. As I said, this demands qualities of secrecy, discipline and of per- sistence ; enthusiasm alone is not sufficient. This lesson may form a useful subject of meditation when the Government of the Republic ask Parliament for the means of strengthening the defences of the country. Jules Cambon. No. 4 M. Allize, French Minister in Bavaria, to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Munich, July 10, 1913. From a political point of view people are asking what is the object of the new armaments. Recognising that no one threatens Germany, they consider that German diplomacy had already at its disposal forces sufficiently large and alliances sufficiently powerful to protect German interests with success. As I pointed out the day after the Morocco agreement of 1911, it is thought that the Imperial Chancery will be as incapable in the future as in the past, of adopting an active foreign policy and of achieving, at least in this sphere, successes which would justify the burdens which the nation has assumed. This frame of mind is all the more a cause of anxiety as the Imperial Government would find themselves supported by public opinion in any enterprise on which they might energetically embark, even at the risk of a conflict. The state of war to which all the events in the East have accustomed people's minds for the last two years appears no longer like some distant catastrophe, but as a solution of the polit- ical and economic difficulties which will continue to increase. May the example of Bulgaria exercise a salutary influence on Ger- many. As the Prince Regent recently said to me, "The fortune of war is always uncertain ; every war is an adventure, and the man is a fool who risks it believing himself sure of victory." Allize. 544 Official Diplomatic Documents No. 5 Report to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs (on Public Opinion in Germany according to the Reports of the Diplomatic and Consular Agents). Paris, July SO, 1913. From observations which our agents in Germany have been able to collect from persons having access to the most diverse circles, it is possible to draw the conclusion that two feelings sway and irritate men's minds : — (1) The Treaty of the 4th November, 1912, is considered a dis- appointment for Germany ; (2) France — a new France — undreamed of prior to the summer of 1911 is considered to be a warlike country, and to want war. Members of all the parties in the Reichstag, from the Conservatives to the Socialists, representing the most different districts of Germany, university people from Berlin, Halle, Jena, and Marburg, students, elementary school teachers, commercial clerks, bank clerks, bankers, artisans, merchants, manufacturers, doctors, lawyers, editors of Democratic and Socialistic newspapers, Jewish publicists, members of trade unions, clergymen and shopkeepers from the Mark of Branden- burg, country squires from Ponierania and shoemakers from Stettin celebrating the 505th anniversary of their association, country gentle- men, officials, priests, and large Fanners from Westphalia, are unan- imous on these two points, with very slight differences corresponding to their position in society or their political party. Here is a syn- thesis of all these opinions : The Treaty of the 4th November is a diplomatic defeat, a proof of the incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the Empire is not safe without a new Bismarck ; it is a national humilia- tion, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige, all I he mi ire serious because up to 11)11 the military supremacy of Ger- many was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the powerlessness of the Republic were a sort of German dogma. In July, 1911, the "Coup of Agadir" made the Morocco question for the first time a national question affecting the life and expansion of the Empire. The revelations and the press campaign which followed, have sufficiently proved how the campaign has been organ- ised, what Pan-German greed it hail awakened, and what hatred it had left behind. If the Emperor was discussed, the Chancellor unpopular, Ilerr von Kiderlen was the best-hated man in Germany last winter. However, he begins to lie merely thought little of, for he allows it to lie known that he will have his revenge. Thus, during the summer of 1911, German public opinion became restive when confronted with French opinion with regard to Morocco. And the attitude of France, her calmness, her re-born spiritual unity, her resolution to make good her rights right up to the end, the fact that she has the audacity not to lie afraid of war, these things are the French Yellow Book 545 most persistent and the gravest cause of anxiety and bad temper on the part of German public opinion. Why then did not Germany go to war during the summer of 1911, since public opinion although not so unanimous and determined as French public opinion, was certainly favourable? Apart from the pacific disposition of the Emperor and the Chancellor, military and financial reasons made themselves felt. But these events of 1911 have caused a profound disillusionment in Germany. A new France united, determined, resolved not to be intimidated any longer, has emerged from the shroud in which she had been seen burying herself for the last ten years. Public opinion in Germany, from December to May, from the columns of the press of all parties, which reproached the Imperial Government for their incapacity and cowardice has discovered with surprise mingled with irritation that the country conquered in 1870 had never ceased since then to carry on war, to float her flag and maintain the prestige of her arms in Asia and Africa, and to conquer vast territories; that Ger- many on the other hand had lived on her reputation, that Turkey is the only country in which during the reign of William II. she had made moral conquests, and these were now compromised by the disgrace of the Morocco solution. Each time that France made a colonial conquest this consolation was ottered: — "Yes, but that does not prevent the decadence, anarchy, and dismemberment of France at home." The public were mistaken and public opinion was misled. Given this German public opinion that considers France as longing for war, what can be augured for the future as regards the possibility and proximity of war? German public opinion is divided into two currents on the question of the possibility and proximity of war. There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are unorganised and have no popular leaders. They consider that war would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride, Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armour plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war woidd profit Great Britain. The forces consist of the following elements : — The bulk of the workmen, artisans and peasants, who are peace- loving by instinct. Those members of the nobility detached from military interests and engaged in business, such as the grands seigneurs of Silesia and a few other personages very influential at Court, who are sufficiently en- lightened to realise the disastrous political and social consequences of war, even if successful. Numerous manufacturers, merchants and financiers in a moderate way of business, to whom war, even if successful, would mean bank- ruptcy, because their enterprises depend on credit, and are chiefly supported by foreign capital. Poles, inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, and Schleswig-Holstein — 2> 546 Official Diplomatic Documents conquered, but not assimilated and sullenly hostile to Prussian policy. There are about 7,000,000 of these annexed Germans. Finally, the Governments and the governing classes in the large southern states — Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemburg, and the Grand Duchy of Baden — are divided by these two opinions: — an unsuc- cessful war would compromise the Federation from which they have derived great economic advantages ; a successful war would only profit Prussia and Prussianisation, against which they have diffi- culty in defending their political independence and administrative autonomy. These classes of people either consciously or instinctively prefer peace to war ; but they are only a sort of makeweight in political matters, with limited influence on public opinion, or they are silent social forces, passive and defenceless against the infection of a wave of warlike feeling. An example will make this idea clear : — The 110 Socialist members of the Reichstag are in favour of peace. They would be unable to prevent war, for war does not depend upon a vote of the Reichstag, and in the presence of such an eventuality the greater part of their number would join the rest of the country in a chorus of angry excite- ment and enthusiasm. Finally it must be observed that these supporters of peace believe in war in the mass because they do not see any other solution for the present situation. In certain contracts, especially in publishers' contracts, a clause has been introduced cancelling the contract in the case of war. They hope, however, that the will of the Emperor on the one side, France's difficulties in Morocco on the other, will be for some time a guarantee of peace. Be that as it may, their pes- simism gives free play to those who favour war. People sometimes speak of a military party in Germany. The expression is inaccurate, even if it is intended to convey the idea that Germany is the country where military power is supreme, as it is said of France that it is the country w r here the civil power is supreme. There exists a state of mind which is more worthy of attention than this historical fact, because it constitutes a danger more evident and more recent. There is a war party, with leaders, and followers, a press either convinced or subsidised for the purpose of creating public opinion ; it has means both varied and formidable for the intimida- tion of the Government. It goes to work in the country with clear ideas, burning aspirations, and a determination that is at once thrilling and fixed. Those in favour of war are divided into several categories ; each of these derives from its social caste, its class, its intellectual and moral education, its interests, its hates, special arguments which create a general attitude of mind and increase the strength and rapidity of the stream of warlike desire. Some want war because in the present circumstances they think it is inevitable. And, as far as Germany is concerned, the sooner the better. Others regard war as necessary for economic reasons based on over- French Yellow Book 547 population, over-production, the need for markets and outlets ; or for social reasons, i.e., to provide the outside interests that alone can prevent or retard the rise to power of the democratic and socialist masses. Others, uneasy for the safety of the Empire, and believing that time is on the side of France, think that events should be brought to an immediate head. It is not unusual to meet, in the course of conversa- tion or in the pages of patriotic pamphlets, the vague but deeply rooted conviction that a free Germany and a regenerated France are two historical facts mutually incompatible. Others are bellicose from " Bismarckism " as it may be termed. They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into discussions with France, at being obliged to talk in terms of law and right in negotiations and conferences where they have not always found it easy to get right on their side, even when they have a preponderating force. From their still recent past they derive a sense of pride ever fed by personal memories of former exploits, by oral traditions, and by books, and irritated by the events of recent years. Angry dis- appointment is the unifying force of the Wehrvcreine, and other asso- ciations of Young Germany. Others again want war from a mystic hatred of revolutionary France ; others finally from a feeling of rancour. These last are the people who heap up pretexts for war. Coming to actual facts, these feelings take concrete form as follows : — The country squires represented in the Reichstag by the Conserva- tive party want at all costs to escape the death duties, which are bound to come if peace continues. In the last sitting of the session which has just closed, the Reichstag agreed to these duties in principle. It is a serious attack on the interests and privileges of the landed gentry. On the other hand this aristocracy is military in character, and it is instructive to compare the Army List with the year book of the nobility. War alone can prolong its prestige and support its family interest. During the discussions on the Army Bill, a Conser- vative speaker put forward the need for promotion among officers as an argument in its favour. Finally, this social class which forms a hierarchy with the King of Prussia as its supreme head, realises with dread the democratisation of Germany and the increasing power of the Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered. Not only does a formidable movement hostile to agrarian protection threaten its material interests, but in addition, the number of its political representatives decreases with each legislative period. In the Reichstag of 1878, out of 397 members, 162 belonged to the aristocracy ; in 1898, 83 ; in 1912, 57. Out of this number 27 alone belong to' the Right, 14 to the Centre, 7 to the Left, and one sits among the Socialists. The higher bourgeoisie, represented by the National Liberal Party, the party of the contented spirits, have not the same reasons as the squires for wanting war. With a few exceptions, however, they are bellicose. They have their reasons, social in character. 548 Official Diplomatic Documents The higher bourgeoisie is no less troubled than the aristocracy at the democratisation of Germany. In 1871 they had 125 members in the Reichstag ; in 1874, 155 ; in 1887, 99 ; in 1912, 45. They do not forget that in the years succeeding the war they played the leading role in parliament, helping Bismarck in his schemes against the country squires. Uneasily balanced to-day between Conservative instincts and Liberal ideas, they look to war to settle problems which their parliamentary representatives are painfully incapable of solving. In addition, doctrinaire manufacturers declare that the difficulties between themselves and their workmen originate in France, the home of revolutionary ideas of freedom — without France industrial unrest would lie unknown. Lastly, there are the manufacturers of guns and armour plate, big merchants who demand bigger markets, bankers who are speculating on the coming of the golden age and the next war indemnity — all these regard war as good business. Amongst the "Bismarckians" must be reckoned officials of all kinds, represented fairly closely in the Reichstag by the Free Con- servatives or Imperial Party. This is the party of the "pensioned," whose impetuous sentiments are poured out in the Post. They find disciples and political sympathisers in the various groups of young men whose minds have been trained and formed in the public schools and universities. The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits, develop a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by statistics Ger- many's need for a colonial and commercial empire commensurate with the industrial output of the Empire. There are sociological fanatics who go even further. The armed peace, so they say, is a crushing burden on the nations, it checks improvement in the lot of the masses, and assists the growth of socialism. France by clinging obstinately to her desire for revenge opposes disarmament. Once for all she must be reduced, for a century, to a state of impotence ; that is the best and speediest way of solving the social problem. Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers and other apolo- gists of German Kultur wish to impose upon the world a way of think- ing and feeling specifically German. They wish to wrest from France that intellectual supremacy which according to the clearest thinkers is still her possession. From this source is derived the phraseology of the I'an-Germans and the ideas and adherents of the Kriegsvereine, Wehrvereine and other similar associations too well known to need particular description. It is enough to note that the dissatisfaction caused by the treaty of November 4th has considerably swelled the membership of colonial societies. We come finally to those whose support of the war policy is inspired by rancour and resentment. These are the most dangerous. They are recruited chiefly among diplomatists. German diplomatists are now in very bad odour in public opinion. The most bitter are those who since 1905 have been engaged in the negotiations between France and Germany ; they are heaping together and reckoning up their French Yellow Book 549 grievances against us, and one day they will present their accounts in the war press. It seems as if they were looking for grievances chiefly in Morocco, though an incident is always possible in any part of the globe where^rance and Germany are in contact. They must have their revenge, for they complain that they have been duped. During the discussion on the Army Bill one of these warlike diplomatists exclaimed, "Germany will not be able to have any serious conversation with France until she has every sound man under arms." In what terms will this conversation be couched ? The opinion is fairly widely spread, even in Pan-German circles, that Germany will not declare war in view of the system of defensive alliances and the tendencies of the Emperor. But when the moment comes, she will have to try in every possible way to force France to attack her. Offence will be given if necessary. That is the Prussian tradition. Must war then be considered as inevitable ? It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk, if France can make it clear to the world that the Entente Cord/ale and the Russian alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions but realities which exist and will make themselves felt. The British fleet inspires a wholesome terror. It is well known, however, that victory on sea will leave everything in suspense. On land alone can a decisive issue be ob- tained. As for Russia, even though she carries greater weight in political and military circles than was the case three or four years ago, it is not believed that her co-operation will be sufficiently rapid and energetic to be effective. People's minds are thus getting used to consider the next war as a duel between France and Germanv. No. 6 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, November 22, lull. I HAVE received from an absolutely reliable source an account of a conversation which took place a fornight ago between the Emperor and the King of the Belgians, in the presence, of the Chief of the General Staff — General von Moltke. This conversation, it appears, has made a profound impression on King Albert. I am in no way surprised at the impression he gathered, which corresponds with what I have myself felt for some time. Enmity against us is increas- ing, and the Emperor has ceased to be the friend of peace. The person addressed by the Emperor had thought up till then, as did all the world, that William II., whose personal influence had been exerted on many critical occasions in support of peace, was still in the same state of mind. He found him this time completely changed. The German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of peace against the warlike tendencies of certain parties in Germany. William 550 Official Diplomatic Documents II. has come to think that war with France is inevitable, and that it must come sooner or later. Naturally he believes in the crushing superiority of the German army and in its certain success. General von Moltke spoke exactly in the same strain as his sovereign. He, too, declared war to be necessary and inevitable, but he showed himself still more assured of success, "for," he said to the King, "this time the matter must be settled, and your Majesty can have no con- ception of the irresistible enthusiasm with which the whole German people will be carried away when that day comes." The King of the Belgians protested that it was a travesty of the intentions of the French Government to interpret them in that sense ; and to let oneself be misled as to the sentiments of the French nation by the ebullitions (if a few irresponsible spirits or the intrigues of unscrupulous agitati >rs. The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff nevertheless per- sisted in their point of view. During the course of this conversation the Emperor moreover seemed overstrained and irritable. As William II. advances in years, family traditions, the reactionary tendencies of the court, and espe- eially the impatience of the soldiers, obtain a greater empire over his mind. Perhaps he feels some slight jealousy of the popularity ac- quired by his son, who flatters the passions of the Pan-Germans, and who does not regard the position occupied by the Empire in the world as commensurate with its power. Perhaps the reply of France to the last increase of the German army, the object of which was to establish the incontestable supremacy of Germany, is, to a certain extent, responsible for his bitterness, for, whatever may be said, it is realised that Germany cannot go much further. One may well ponder over the significance of this conversation. The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff may have wished to impress the King of the Belgians and induce him not to make any opposition in the event of a conflict between us. Perhaps Germany would be glad to sec Belgium less hostile to certain aspirations lately manifested here with regard to the Belgian Congo, but this last hypothesis does not seem to me to fit in with the interposition of Gen- eral von Moltke. For the rest, the Emperor William is less master of his impatience than is usually supposed. I have known him more than once to allow his real thoughts escape him. Whatever may have been the object of the conversation related to me, the revelation is none the less of extreme gravity. It tallies with the precariousness of the gen- eral situation and with the state of a certain shade of public opinion in France and Germany. If I may be allowed to draw a conclusion, I would submit that it would be well to take account of this new factor, namely, that the Emperor is becoming used to an order of ideas which were formerly repugnant to him, and that, to borrow from him a phrase which he likes to use, "we must keep our powder dry." Jules Cambon. German White Book 551 III. The German White Book Foreign Office, Berlin, August, 1914- On June 28th the Austro-Hungarian successor to the throne, Arch- Duke Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, were assassinated by a member of a band of Servian conspirators. The investigation of the crime through the Austro-Hungarian authorities has yielded the fact that the conspiracy against the life of the Arch- Duke and successor to the throne was prepared and abetted in Bel- grade with the co-operation of Servian officials, and executed with arms from the Servian State arsenal. This crime must have opened the eyes of the entire civilised world, not only in regard to the aims of the Servian policies directed against the conservation and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but also concerning the criminal means which the pan-Serb propaganda in Servia had no hesitation in employing for the achievement of these aims. The goal of these policies was the gradual revolutionising and final separation of the southeasterly districts from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and their union with Servia. This direction of Servia's policy has not been altered in the least in spite (if the repeated and solemn declarations of Servia in which it vouchsafed a change in these policies towards Austria-Hungary as well as the cultivation of good and neighbourly relations. In this manner for the third time in the course of the last 6 years Servia has led Europe to the brink of a world-war. It could only do this because it believed itself supported in its intentions by Russia. Russia, soon after the events brought about by the Turkish revolu- tion in 1908, endeavoured to found a union of the Balkan states under Russian patronage and directed against the existence of Turkey. This union, which succeeded in 1911 in driving out Turkey from a greater part of her European possessions, collapsed over the quest inn of the distribution of spoils. The Russian policies were not dis- mayed over this failure. According to the idea of the Russian states- men a new Balkan union under Russian patronage should be called into existence, headed no longer against Turkey, now dislodged from the Balkans, but against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. It was the idea that Servia should cede to Bulgaria those parts of Macedonia which it had received during the last Balkan war, in exchange for Bosnia and the Herzegovina which were to be taken from Austria. To oblige Bulgaria to fall in with this plan it was to be isolated, Roumania attached to Russia with the aid of French propa- ganda, and Servia promised Bosnia and the Herzegovina. Under these circumstances it was clear to Austria that it was not compatible with the dignity and the spirit of self-preservation of the monarchy to view idly any longer this agitation across the border. The Imperial and Royal Government appraised Germany of this con- ception and asked for our opinion. With all our heart we were able 552 Official Diplomatic Documents to agree with our ally's estimate of the situation, and assure him that any action considered necessary to end the movement in Servia directed against the conservation of the monarchy would meet with our approval. We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria- Hungary against Servia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies. We could not, however, in these vital interests of Austria- Hungary, which were at stake, advise our ally to take a yielding attitude not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our assistance in these trying days. We could do this all the less as our own interests were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs continued with the aid of Russia and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjec- tion of all the Slavs under one Russian sceptre would be the conse- quence, thus making untenable the position of the Teutonic race in Central Europe. A morally weakened Austria under the pressure of Russian pan-Slavism would be no longer an ally on whom we could count and in whom we could have confidence, as we must be able to have, in view of the ever more menacing attitude of our easterly and westerly neighbours. We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Servia, but have not participated in her preparations. Austria chose the method of presenting to the Servian Govern- ment a note, in which the direct connection between the murder at Serajevo and the pan-Serb movement, as not only countenanced but actively supported by the Servian Government, was explained, and in which a complete cessation of this agitation, as well as a punishment of the guilty, was requested. At the same time Austria-Hungary, demanded as necessary guarantee for the accomplishment of her desire the participation of some Austrian officials in the preliminary examina- tion on Servian territory and the final dissolution of the pan-Serb societies agitating against Austria-Hungary. The Imperial and Royal Government gave a period of 48 hours for the unconditional ac- ceptance of its demands. The Servian Government started the mobilisation of its army one day after the transmission of the Austro-Hungarian note. As after the stipulated date the Servian Government rendered a reply which, though complying in some points with the conditions of Austria-Hungary, yet showed in all essentials the endeavour through procrastination and new negotiations to escape from the just demands of the monarchy, the latter discontinued her diplomatic relations with Servia without indulging in further negotiations or accepting further Servian assurances, whose value, to its loss, she had sufficiently experienced. From this moment Austria was in fact in a state of war with Servia, which it proclaimed officially on the 28th of July by declaring war. From the beginning of the conflict we assumed the position that there were here concerned the a flairs of Austria alone, which it would German White Book See exhibits 1 and 2. See exhibit 3. have to settle with Servia. We therefore directed our efforts toward the localising of the war, and toward con- vincing the other powers that Austria-Hungary had to appeal to arms in justifiable self-defence, forced upon her by the conditions. We emphatically took the position that no civilised country possessed the right to stay the arm of Austria in this struggle with barbarism and politi- cal crime, and to shield the Servians against their just punishment. In this sense we instructed our representa- tives with the foreign powers. Simultaneously the Austro-Hungarian Government com- municated to the Russian Government that the step undertaken against Servia implied merely a defensive measure against the Serb agitation, but that Austria- Hungary must of necessity demand guarantees for a continued friendly behaviour of Servia towards the mon- archy. Austria-Hungary had no intention whatsoever to shift the balance of power in the Balkan. In answer to our declaration that the German Govern- ment desired, and aimed at, a localisation of the conflict, both the French and the English Governments promised an action in the same direction. But these endeavours did not succeed in preventing the interposition of Russia in the Austro-Servian disagreement. The Russian Government submitted an official com- munique on July 24th, according to which Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in the Servo-Austrian conflict. 'The same was declared by the Russian Secre- tary of Foreign Affairs, M. Sasonof, to the German Ambassador, Count Pourtales, in the afternoon of July 26th. The German Government declared again, through its Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only wished peace at her frontiers. After the official explanation by Austria- Hungary to Russia that it did not claim territorial gain in Servia, the decision concerning the peace of the world rested exclusively with St. Petersburgh. 1 Note. — This passage takes a somewhat different form in the German text, a translation of which is as follow.- "The same was declared by the Rus M. Sasonof, to the Imperial Ambassado 4.) On the afternoon of July 26th tin Austrian) Government declare! again Petersburgh that Austria-Hungary had no desire for conquest and only shed peace on her frontiers. (See exhibit 5.) In the course of the ian Secretary fnr Foreign Affairs, ', Gount Pourtales. ( See exhibit Imperial and Royal (thai is the through its Ambassador at St. ibilisati same day, however, the first news of Russiai (See exhibits 6, 7, 8, and 9.) On the evening of t Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersb energetically to point out the danger of this Russii exhibits 10,* 10a, and 106.) After the official ex] Hungary to Russia that she did not claim ferritin decision concerning the peace of the world rested Petersburgh. On the same day the Imperial Ambassador at St. Peters- burgh was also directed to make the following declaration to the Russian Government." eached Berlin, ith, 1 he i lerma rj were instructed ibilisation. (See tii hi by Austria- ain in Servia, the with St. 554 Official Diplomatic Documents See exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9. See exhibits 10, 10a, 10b. The same day the first news of Russian mobilisation readied Berlin in the evening. The German Ambassadors at London, Paris, and St. Petersburgh were instructed to energetically point out the danger of this Russian mobilisation. The Imperial Am- bassador at St. Petersburgh was also directed to make the following declaration to the Russian Government : ' "Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to counter-measures which must consist in mobilising the army. " But mobilisation means war. " As we know the obligations of France towards Russia, this mobilisation would be directed against both Russia and France. We cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war. Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of the Servian kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume an attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of Russia to protect the integrity of Servia as Austria-Hungary docs not intend to question the hitter. It will be easy in the further development of the affair to Hnd a basis for an understanding." On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Suchom- linof, gave the German military attache his word of honour that no order to mobilise had been issued, merely preparations were being made, but not a horse mustered, nor reserves called in. If Austria-Hungary crossed the Servian frontier, the military districts directed towards Austria, i.e., Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, would be mobi- lised, under no circumstances those situated on the German frontier, i.e., St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw. Upon see exhibit inquiry into the object of the mobilisation against Austria- ll. Hungary, the Russian Minister of War replied by shrugging his shoulders and referring to the diplomats. The military attache then pointed to these mobilisation measures against Austria-Hungary as extremely menacing also for Germany. In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobili- sation came at a rapid rate. Among it was also news about preparations on the German-Russian frontier, as for instance the announcement of the state of war in Kovno, the departure of the Warsaw garrison, and the strengthening of the Alexandrovo garrison. ()n July 27th, the first information was received con- cerning preparatory measures taken by France: the 14th Corps discontinued the manoeuvres and returned to its garrison. In the meantime we had endeavoured to localise the conflict by most emphatic steps. 1 See note on preceding page. Gen. White Book 555 On July 26th, Sir Edward Grey had made the proposal to submit the differences between Austria-Hungary and Servia to a conference of the Ambassadors of Germany, France, and Italy under his chairmanship. We declared in regard to this proposal that we could not, however much we approved the idea, participate in such a con- See exhibit f erence > as we could not call Austria in her dispute with 12. Servia before a European tribunal. France consented to the proposal of Sir Edward Grey, but it foundered upon Austria's declining it, as was to be expected. Faithful to our •principle that mediation should not extend to the Austro-Serman conflict, which is to be considered as a purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we continued our endeavours to bring about an understanding between these 8ee exhibits two powers. We further declared ourselves ready, after failure of the conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna in which he suggested Austria-Hungary See exhibit should decide that either the Servian reply teas sufficient, or 15 - that it he used as a basis for further 'negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government remarked with full apprecia- te exhibit ^' on °f '""' '"''"'" "'"' & had come too late, the hostilities 16. having already been opened. In spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost, and we advised I ieuua to show every possible advance com- patible with the dignity of the monarchy. Unfortunately, all these proposals were overtaken by the military preparations of Russia and France. On July 29th, the Russian Government made the official notification in Berlin that four army districts had been mobilised. At the same tune further news was received concerning rapidly progressing military preparations of France, both on water and on land. On the same day the Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburgh had an interview with the Russian Foreign Secretary, in regard to which he reported by telegraph, as follows : "The Secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge my Government to participate in a quadruple conference 1 to find means to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those demands which touch upon the sovereignty of Servia. I could merely promise to report the conversation and took the position that, after Russia had decided upon the baneful step of mobilisation, every exchange of ideas ap- See exhibit 17. 1 Note. — The German word translated "conference" is Konversation : the German text also contains the words auf freundschaftlichem Wege ("in a friendly manner"). 556 Official Diplomatic Documents peared now extremely difficult, if not impossible. Besides, Russia now was demanding from us in regard to Austria- Hungary the same which Austria-Hungary was 1 icing blamed for with regard to Servia, i.e., an infraction of sovereignty. Austria-Hungary having promised to con- sider the Russian interests by disclaiming any territorial aspiration — a great concession on the part of a state engaged in war — should therefore be permitted to attend to its affairs with Servia alone. There would be time at the peace conference to return to the matter of forbearance towards the sovereignty of Servia. "I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire Austro-Servian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general European conflagration, and I endeavoured to present to the Secretary the magnitude of this danger. "It was impossible to dissuade Sasonof from the idea that Servia could not now be deserted by Russia." On July 29th, the German Military Attache at St. Petersburgh wired the following report on a conversation with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian army : "The Chief of the General Stall' has asked me to call on him, and he has told me that he has just come from His Majesty. He has been requested by the Secretary of War to reiterate' once more that everything had remained as the Secretary had informed me two days ago. He offered confirmation in writing and gave me his word of honour in the most solemn manner that nowhere there had been a mobilisation, viz., calling in of a single man or horse up to the present time, i.e., 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He could not assume a guarantee for the future, but he could emphasise that in the fronts directed towards our frontiers His Majesty desired no mobilisation. " As, however, I had received here many pieces of news concerning the calling in of the reserves in different parts of the country, also in Warsaw and in Vilna, I told the general that his statements placed me before a riddle. On his officer's word of honour he replied that such news was wrong, but that possibly here and there a false alarm might have been given. "I must consider this conversation as an attempt to mislead us as to the extent of the measures hitherto taken in view of the abundant and positive information about the calling in of reserves." In reply to various inquiries concerning reasons for its threatening attitude, the Russian Government repeatedly pointed out that Austria-Hungary had commenced no conversation in St. Petersburgh. The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburgh was therefore instructed on July 29th, at our suggestion, to enter into such convcrsa- German White Book 557 tion with Sasonof. Count Szapary was empowered to explain to the Russian minister the note to Servia, though it had been pvertaken by the state of war, and to accept any suggestion on the part of Russia as well as to discuss with Sasonof all questions touching directly upon the Austro-Russian relations. Shoulder to shoulder with England we laboured inces- santly and supported every proposal in Vienna from which we hoped to gain the possibility of a peaceable solution See exhibit f tne CO nflict. We even as late as the 30th of July 19 ' forwarded the English proposal to Vienna, as basis for negotiations, that Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions in Servia, i.e., after her march into Servia. We thought that Russia would accept this ' During the interval from July 29th to July 31st 1 there appeared renewed and cumulative news concerning Russian measures of mobilisation. Accumulation of troops on the East Prussian frontier and the declaration of the state of war over all important parts of the Russian west frontier allowed no further doubt that the Russian mobilisation was in full swing against us, while simultaneously all such measures were denied to our representative in St. Peters- burgh on word of honour. Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding the Anglo-German mediation, whose tendencies and basis must have been known in St. Petersburg^ , could possibly have been received in Berlin, Russia ordered a general mobilisation. During the same days, there took place between His Majesty the Kaiser and Czar Nicolas an exchange of telegrams in which His Majesty called the attention of the Czar to the menacing character of the Russian See exhibits j^o^iiisation during the continuance of his own mediating 22', 23, 23a.' activities. On July 31st, the Czar directed the following telegram to His Majesty the Kaiser : " I thank You cordially for Your mediation which per- mits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military prepa- rations which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilisation. It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give \ mi my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in 1 NoTE _ The following words appear here in the German text : wahrend diese unserr II, un.hu,,,,, u ,,,„ Vermin, lu„„, von crime has ever aroused deeper or more general horror throughout Europe ; none has ever been less justified. Sympathy for Austria was universal. Both the Governments and the public opinion of Europe were ready to support her in any measures, however severe, which she might think it necessary to take for the punishment of the murderer and his accomplices. It immediately appeared, from the reports of our representatives abroad, that the press and public opinion of Austria-Hungary attrib- uted much of the responsibility for the crime to the Servian Govern- ment, which was said to have encouraged a revolutionary movement amongst the Serb populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That there had for many years been a strong Serb nationalist movement in these two provinces there is no doubt. This movement in an earlier form had swept the provinces, then part of the Turkish Empire, into the insurrection against the Turkish Government in the seventies of last century, culminating in the war of 1877-8 between Russia and Turkey. It had continued when Austria took over the administration of the provinces under the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Austria then pledged her word to Turkey that her occupation should not "detract from the rights of sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan over these provinces." Thirty years later, however, in 1908, she suddenly proclaimed their annexation to her Empire. On the 7th October of that year, the annexation was celebrated in Serajevo by the firing of salutes and ringing of cathedral bells, amid scenes of official rejoicing and popular apathy. Servian nationalist feeling immediately asserted itself, and the Servian Government protested to the Powers against the annexation as a "deep injury done to the feelings, interests, and rights of the Servian people." Servia's atti- tude, coupled with the resentment felt by Russia and certain other Great Powers, nearly brought about a European war; but after six months of extreme tension she was induced to make a declaration abandoning her protest and promising to live on good terms with Austria. Her nationalist aspirations still continued, however, and were strengthened by her successes in the Balkan wars of 1912-13 2o 5G2 Official Diplomatic Documents — successes which were compromised by Austria's opposition to her territorial expansion. As Servia grew, Austrian suspicion of her designs deepened. (2) In the light of this history the storm of anti-Servian feeling which swept Austria-Hungary after the Sarajevo murders is easily under- stood. It was a. feeling based on patriotism and loyalty. Europe was disposeil to excuse its exaggerations and to sympathise with its motives. But the dangers to European peace which it involved were imme- diately evident from the reports which reached the Government in London. Anti-Serb riots took place at Serajevo and Agram. The members of (lie Serb party in the Provincial Council of Croatia were assailed by their colleagues with cries of "Servian assassins." Mobs in Vienna threatened the Servian Legation. The Austrian press, almost without exception, used the most unbridled language, and called for the condign punishment of Servia. There were signs that the popular resentment was shared, and perhaps encouraged, by the Austrian Government. Both the British and also the German Government knew that the peace might be disturbed. In view of these reports, it naturally became incumbent on dis- interested Powers to exercise what influence they possessed in a direc- tion which would reconcile justice with peace. Unfortunately, though tlie attitude of public opinion in Austria, and, to a less degree, also in Germany, was plain, the intentions of the Austrian Govern- ment remained almost equally obscure. The Austrian Foreign Office maintained an attitude of reticence towards the British and Russian Ambassadors. On the 7th July the Government were careful to make a public announcement that a joint meeting of the Cabinets of Austria and Hungary, which had just taken place, was only concerned with the question of domestic measures to repress the Pan-Serb propaganda in Bosnia. On the 8th July the Minister-President of Hungary made, on the whole, a pacific speech in the Hungarian Parlia- ment, defending the loyalty of the majority of the Serb subjects of the Empire. On the 11th July the Servian Minister at Vienna had no reason to anticipate a threatening communication from the Austrian Government, and as late as the 22nd July, the day before the Aus- trian ultimatum was delivered at Belgrade, the Minister-President of Hungary stated in Parliament that the situation did not war- rant the opinion that a serious turn of events was necessary or even probable. His Majesty's Government had therefore largely to fall back on conjecture. It was known that the situation might become serious, but it was also known that Servia had made professions of readiness to accept any demands compatible with the sovereignty of an inde- pendent State. It was known that the opinion of the Russian and French — anil also of the German — ■ Governments was that the British Blue Book 563 Servian Government was not itself to blame for the crime, but that Servia must be ready to investigate and put an end to the propaganda which had apparently led to it, and which was said to have originated in part on Servian soil. Sir E. Grey advised Servia to show herself moderate and conciliatory. He promised the German Ambassador to use his influence with the Russian Government in the same direc- tion. More could not be done, for no actual evidence had yet been furnished that Servian territory had in fact been made the base for revolutionary operations. It was only known that a court-martial had been set up at Serajevo, the proceedings before which were secret. The Servian Government stated that they were only waiting for the Austrian Government to communicate the evidence thus collected before setting their own investigations on foot. The Servian Govern- ment also stated that both the assassins implicated were Austrian subjects, and that on a previous occasion the Austrian Government had informed the Servian Government, in reply to enquiries, that one of these men was harmless and was under their protection. It was remembered that Austria had tried on previous occasions to fasten guilt on the Servian Government by means of police evidence brought forward in Austrian courts, and had failed. It was therefore assumed on all sides that, before Austria took any action, she would disclose to the public her case against Servia. When Sir E. Grey said this to the German Ambassador on the 20th July, the latter replied that he certainly assumed that Austria would act upon some case that would be known; but, as a matter of fact, His Majesty's Government did not receive any statement of the evidence on which Austria had founded her ultimatum till the 7th August. It was, therefore, necessary to wait. The situation was as clear as it could be made till Austria would consent to throw off her reticence. There was nothing doubtful in the general international situation, no incalculable element which Austria could not take into full considera- tion. Whatever she did, she would know accurately the consequences of her action. The Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente remained as they had always been. We had been quite recently assured that no new secret element had been introduced into the former, and Sir E. Grey had stated emphatically in Parliament on the 11th June that the latter had remained unchanged so far as we were concerned. Russia's interest in the Balkans was well known. As late as the 23rd May the Russian Minister for Eoreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the Duma the policy of the " Balkans for the Balkans," and it was known that any attack on a Balkan State by any great European Power would be regarded as a menace to that policy. If Servia was, as the Austrian Ambassador said to Sir E. Grey on the 29th July, " regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence"; if Servia was to be humiliated; then assuredly Russia could not remain indifferent. It was not a question of the policy of Russian statesmen at St. Peters- burgh, but of the deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations bred in the Russian people by more than two centuries of development. These things had been, as Sir E. Grey said to Parliament in March, 564 Official Diplomatic Documents 1913, in discussing the Balkan war, "a commonplace in European diplomacy in the past." They were the facts of the European situa- tion, the products of years of development, tested and retested during the last decade. Patient work might change them, but the product of years could not be pushed aside in a day. (3) Yet two days were as much as Austria decided to allow for the task. On the 23rd July she showed her hand. She delivered an ultimatum at Belgrade and required an answer in forty-eight hours. She made ten demands, directed towards the elimination from Servian national life of everything which was hostile to Austria. These demands involved the suppression of newspapers and literature, the suppression of nationalist societies, a reorganisation of the Government schools, the dismissal of officers from the army, the participation of Austrian officials in judicial proceedings in Servia, the arrest of two specified men, the prevention of all traffic in arms across the frontier, a full explanation of anti-Austrian utterances, and immediate notification of the enforcement of these measures. In addition, the Servian Government was to publish on the front page of the Official Journal a prescribed statement, which amounted to a full recantation of her alleged errors, and a promise of amendment. A very brief summary was annexed to the ultimatum, giving the bare findings of the secret trial at Serajevo, with no corroborative evidence. No independent nation had ever been called on to accept a greater humiliation. Between the delivery of this ultimatum and the declaration of war I ict ween Great Britain and Germany there was an interval of only twelve days. In the whirl of negotiations which now followed, there was no time to draw breath and ponder. At the outset, therefore, it may he well to explain definitely the British attitude towards the Austrian ultimatum. Austria was tinder provocation. She had to complain of a danger- ous popular movement against her government. What evidence she might have against the Servian Government no one in Europe then knew. Great Britain had no interest in the Balkans, except one. She desired the consolidation and progressive government of the Balkan States ; she desired, in the words recently used by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Duma, that "the Balkan Governments should recognise that, in the matter of strengthening a State, the acquisition of territory is insufficient ; the devotion and confidence of the new citizens must beenlisted." The dispute between Austria and Servia did not necessarily affect that interest ; it was a dispute between two Governments with which Great Britain had nothing to do. Sir E. Grey, therefore, consistently stated that he had no concern in that dispute ; that he had no title to intervene between Austria and Servia ; that he would express no opinion on the merits of the ultimatum. But there was the other side. If the dispute af- fected the interests of Russia, then the peace of Europe was at stake ; British Blue Book 565 and, from the first, Sir E. Grey told the Austrian Government that he did not see how Russia, interested as she was in Servia, could take any but a most serious view of such a formidable document as the ultimatum. The peace of Europe must be maintained, and it could only be maintained, as Mr. Asquith had said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan crisis, by a "spirit of forbearance, patience, and self-sacrifice" — by a "loyal spirit of give and take on the part of the Great Powers directly concerned." It was as the agent of this spirit of conciliation alone that G rea -t Britain intervened in the European crisis. (4) On the 23rd July the Austrian Ambassador told Sir E. Grey that an ultimatum was being handed to Servia. For the first time Sir E. Grey heard that " there would be something in the nature of a time limit." He immediately expressed his grave alarm. Next morning the text of the ultimatum was handed to him, and he learnt that the time limit was forty-eight hours. He confessed to the German Am- bassador that, as no time had been left for deliberation, he felt helpless. There was no time to advise Russia or to influence Servia. At this critical moment everything depended on Germany. As the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said a little later, " the key of the situation was to lie found in Berlin." What was Germany's attitude ? Privately, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his doubts as to the ultimatum ; officially, the German Government called it " equitable and moderate," and said that they "desired urgently the localisation of the conflict." Everyone desired that; but it was no time for phrases. The same morning the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had summoned the French and British Ambassadors in St. Petersburgh, had said that Austria's step meant imminent war, and had asked for the support of Great Britain and France. The French Ambassador had pledged the support of France, as was well known to be inevitable under the terms of her alliance. The next morning the Russian Government stated publicly that Russia could not remain indifferent to the Austro-Servian conflict. The next evening troops in Vienna had to be called out to guard the Russian Embassy from hos- tile crowds. "Localisation" was a good phrase, but we had to deal with facts. Austria had surprised Europe, and with surprise had come universal alarm. During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts at peace. Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be extended. Great Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great Britain urged Germany to join in pressing the Austrian Government. All that Berlin consented to do was to "pass on" the message to Vienna. Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, German}', and Italy should work together at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour of conciliation. Italy assented; France assented; Russia 566 Official Diplomatic Documents declared herself ready; Germany said she had no objection, "if relations between Austria and Russia became threatening." Thirdly, the Russian, French, and British representatives at Bel- grade were instructed to advise Servia to go as far as possible to meet Austria. But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not ex- tend, had expired ; and after all Servia did not need advice. On the afternoon of .Saturday, the 2.1th, she returned to Austria a reply which amounted to an acceptance of all Austria's demands, subject on certain points to the delays necessary for passing new laws and amending her ( institution, and subject to an explanation by Austria- Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Servian judicial proceedings. The reply went far beyond anything which any Power — Germany not excepted - had ever thought probable. But the same day the British Am- bassador at Vienna reported that the tone of the Austrian press left the impression that a settlement was not desired, and he later reported that the impression left on his mind was that the Austrian note was so drawn, up as to make war inevitable. In spite of the conciliatory nature of Servia's reply, the Austrian Minister left Belgrade the same evening, and Servia ordered a general mobilisation. But an outline of the Servian reply had been communicated to Sir E. Grey an hour or two before it was delivered. He immediately expressed to Germany the hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin again contented itself with "passing on" the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna through the German Ambassador there. The fate of the message so passed on may be guessed from the fact that the German Ambassador told the British Ambassador directly afterwards that Servia had only made a pretence of giving way, and that her concessions were all a sham. (5) Daring the next four days, 26th to 29th July, there was only one question before Europe — how could Russia and Austria be brought to an agreement ? It was evident that Russia did not believe that Austria, would, or could, stop short of the absolute ruin of the Servian State, if she once actually attacked it. Here again, the question was not merely one of Government policy ; the popular sentiment of two nations was involved. Austria indeed professed, no doubt with per- fect honesty, that she would take no territory from Servia. Hut the Austrian Ministers were being borne along on a wave of violent popu- lar enthusiasm. They said themselves that they would be swept from power if they did not follow the popular desire for a conflict with Servia. Would this popular enthusiasm be content with any mere punitive expedition against the enemy? Surely not. Russia, there- fore, openly said that she would have to intervene if .Servia were attacked ; but she promised Austria on the 27th that she would use all her influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to British Blue Book 567 give satisfaction to Austria, and only asked Austria to delay hostili- ties in order to give time for deliberation. Austria refused, saying it was too late. She declared war on Servia on the 28th. Russia ordered a partial mobilisation on the 29th. But meanwhile Sir Edward Grey had proposed that the German, Italian, and French Ambassadors should meet him in London, to dis- cuss the best means towards a settlement. Italy and France at once accepted ; Russia said she was ready to stand aside ; but Germany refused. She did not like what she called "a court of arbitration," and proposed instead direct negotiations between Russia and Austria. These negotiations actually began, as we have seen in the last para- graph, but they were cut short by the Austrian declaration of war against Servia. Austria then apparently considered that the moment for such negotiations was passed. She had, moreover, refused to dis- cuss the Servian reply in any way, and it was difficult to see, after that refusal, what Russia could negotiate with her about. Russia, there- fore, fell back on Sir E. Grey's proposal for a conference of Ambassa- dors in London, which she had originally expressed her readiness to accept. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs urged Sir E. Grey to induce Germany to indicate in what way she would consent to work for a settlement. This brings the narrative of events down to Wednesday, the 29th July. Russia was mobilising partially in her southern provinces. Austrian troops were bombarding Belgrade. But, on the other hand, better news was coming from Berlin. Up to the 2Sth at least, both Germany and Austria had seemed unwilling to admit that the situ- ation was really serious ; Russia, it was said, was unprepared, and France was in no condition to go to war. Germany had said, in reply to Sir E. Grey's repeated advances, that she did not like to make representations to Vienna for fear of stiffening Austria's attitude. But on the evening of the 28th the German Chancellor assured the British Ambassador that he was trying to mediate at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. On the strength of this assurance and similar assur- ances made by the German Ambassador in London on the 29th, Sir E. Grey telegraphed to Berlin once more, in accordance with the request of the Russian Government, urging the German Government, if they did not like the idea of the Ambassadors' conference in the form he had suggested it, to suggest any other form they pleased. "Mediation," he said, "was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would press the button on the interests of peace." The telegram was despatched at about 4 o'clock on the evening of the 29th. (G) This appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange re- sponse. About riiidnight, a telegram arrived at the Foreign Office from His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin. The German Chancellor had sent for him late at night. He had asked if Great Britain would 568 Official Diplomatic Documents promise to remain neutral in a war, provided Germany did not touch Holland and took nothing from France but her colonies. He refused to give any undertaking that Germany would not invade Belgium, but he promised that, if Belgium remained passive, no territory would be taken from her. Sir E. Grey's answer was a peremptory refusal, but he added an exhortation and an offer. The business of Europe was to work for peace. That was the only question with which Great Britain was concerned. If Germany would prove by her actions now that she desired peace, Great Britain would warmly welcome a future agree- ment with her whereby the whole weight of the two nations would be thrown permanently into the scale of peace in years to come. For the next two days peace proposals and negotiations continued, some initiated and all supported by Great Britain. There remained a spark of hope. But from the British point of view the face of Europe henceforward was changed. On the 29th July the only conflict in progress had been on the frontiers of Servia and Austria ; the only fear of further war had lain in the relations of Russia and Austria. Germany's declarations were pacific; Russia had said she desired nothing but a period of peace to allow for her internal develop- ment ; France would not fight except to help her ally. There had seemed no insuperable difficulty in keeping the peace ; it was only a question of allaying the mutual suspicion between Vienna and St. Petersburgh. But now a new element of clanger had been introduced. Great Britain now knew that Germany was contemplating an attack on France. She knew more. The independence of the Low Countries had for centuries been considered as one of the strongest means of securing the peace of Europe. Their position and the nature of the country rendered them the natural battlefield of Northern Europe. If it was made impossible for a Great Power to invade them, war would become increasingly difficult and dangerous. With the growth of the idea of a fixed system of international law founded on treaties, the neutrality of Belgium had been devised as a permanent safeguard to this end. As such, it had been consecrated by two international treaties signed by all the Powers, and recognised by two generations of statesmen. Now, when the peace of Europe was our one object, it was found that Germany was preparing to tear out the main rivet of that peace. Germany's position must be understood. She had fulfilled her treaty obligations in the past ; her action now was not wanton. Bel- gium was of supreme military importance in a war with France; if such a war occurred, it would be one of life and death ; Germany feared that, if she did not occupy Belgium, France might do so. In face of this suspicion, there was only one thing to do. The neutrality of Belgium had not been devised as a pretext for wars, but to prevent the outbreak of wars. The Powers must reaffirm Belgian neutrality in order to prevent the war now threatened. The British Govern- ment, therefore, on Friday, the 31st July, asked the German and French Governments for an engagement to respect Belgium's neutral- British Blue Book 569 ity, and the Belgian Government for an engagement to uphold it. France gave the necessary engagement the same day ; Belgium gave it the day after ; Germany returned no reply. Henceforward there could be no doubt of German designs. Meanwhile, on the 30th and 31st negotiations continued between Russia and Austria. On the 29th Germany had suggested to Austria that she should stop as soon as her troops had occupied Belgrade. Late on the same night Russia offered to stop all military preparations, if Austria would recognise that the conflict with Servia had become a question of general European interest, and would eliminate from her ultimatum the points which involved a violation of the sovereignty of Servia. As the result of this offer, Russia was able to inform His Majesty's Government on the 31st that Austria had at last agreed to do the very thing she had refused to do in the first days of the crisis namely, to discuss the whole question of her ultimatum to Servia. Russia asked the British Government to assume the direction of these discussions. For a few hours there seemed to be a hope of peace. (7) At this moment, on Friday, the 31st, Germany suddenly despatched an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she should countermand her mobilisation within twelve hours. Every allowance must be made for the natural nervousness which, as history has repeatedly shown, overtakes nations when mobilisation is under way. All that can be said is that, according to the information in the possession of His Majesty's Government, mobilisation had not at the time proceeded as far in Russia as in Germany, although general mobilisation was not publicly proclaimed in Germany till the next day, the 1st August. France also began to mobilise on that day. The German Secretary of State refused to discuss a last proposal from Sir E. Grey for joint action with Germany, France, and Italy until Russia's reply should be received, and in the afternoon the German Ambassador at St. Peters- burgh presented a declaration of war. Yet on this same day, Satur- day, the 1st, Russia assured Great Britain that she would on no account commence hostilities if the Germans did not cross the frontier, and France declared that her troops would be kept 6 miles from her frontier so as to prevent a collision. This was the situation when very early on Sunday morning, the 2nd August, German troops invaded Luxemburg, a small independent State whose neutrality had been guaranteed by all the Powers with the same object as the similar guarantee of Belgium. The die was cast. War between Germany, Russia, and France had become inevitable. Only one question now remained for this country. His Majesty's Government failed in their attempts to secure a general peace. Should they now remain neutral ? The grounds on which that question was decided are clearly set forth in the statements of Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith in Parliament, which are contained in this volume, 1 and no ■ See Part II. 570 Official Diplomatic Documents additional explanations are needed here. But one fact may be em- phasised. From the 24th July, when Russia first asked for British support, to the 2nd August, when a conditional promise of naval assistance was given to France, Sir E. Grey had consistently declined to give any promise of support to either of our present allies. He maintained that the position of Great Britain was that of a disinter- ested party whose influence for peace at Berlin and Vienna would he enhanced by the knowledge that we were not committed absolutely to either side in the existing dispute. lie refused to believe that the best road to European peace lay through a show of force. We took no mobilisation measures except to keep our fleet assembled, and we confined ourselves to indicating clearly to Austria on the 27th July, and to Germany on the 29th July, that we could not engage to remain neutral if a European conflagration took place. We gave no pledge to our present allies, but to ( rermany we gave three times — on the 30th July, the 31st July, and the 1st August — a clear warning of the effect which would be produced on our attitude and on the sentiment of the British people by a violation of the neutrality of Belgium. After Germany's declaration of war on Russia on the afternoon of the 1st, the Tsar telegraphed to His Majesty the King as follows : " In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have done all in my power to avert war." It is right to say that His Majesty's Government believe this to be a true statement of the attitude both of Russia and France throughout this crisis. On the other hand, with every wish to be fair and just, it will be admitted that the response of Germany and Austria gave no evidence of a sincere desire to save the peace of Europe. Foreign Office, Sept. 28, 1914. PART THREE DOCUMENTS FREQUENTLY QUOTED BUT NOT CON- TAINED IN THE OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF COL- LECTED DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS I. THE CHANCELLOR'S SPEECH IN THE REICHSTAG August 4, 1914 [Translated from the Berliner Tageblatt of August 5, 1914] A terrible fate is breaking over Europe. For forty-four years after winning in war the respect of the world for our German Em- pire, we have lived in peace, and have guarded the peace of Europe. In peaceful labour we have grown strong and mighty ; and people have envied us. In nervy patience we have suffered hostilities to be fanned in the east and the west, and fetters to be forged against us. The wind was sown there and now we have the whirlwind. We wanted to go on living -and working in peace, and like a silent vow, from the Emperor down to the youngest recruit, this was the will: "Our sword shall not be drawn except in a just cause." Now the day has come when we must draw it. Russia has put the torch to our house. We have been forced into a war with Russia and France. Gentlemen, a number of papers penned in the stress of hurrying events have been distributed to you. Let me single out the facts which characterise our action. From the first moment of the Austrian conflict we strove and la- boured that this conflict might be confined to Austria-Hungary and Servia. All the cabinets, notably the English cabinet, took the same ground, only Russia insisted that she should have to say a word. This was the beginning of the danger threatening Europe. As soon as the first definite news of military preparations in Russia reached us we declared in St. Petersburgh, kindly but firmly, that military prep- arations against us would force us to take similar steps, and that mobilisation and war are not far apart. Russia assured us in the most friendly way that she was taking no measures against us. Eng- land in the meanwhile was trying to mediate between Austria and Servia, and was receiving our hearty support. On July 28, the Emperor telegraphed to the Czar asking him to consider that Austria had the right and the duty to protect herself against the Greater- Servian plots which threatened to undermine her existence. The Emperor called the Czar's attention to their common monarchical interest against the crime of Serajevo, and asked the Czar to help, him personally to smooth away the difficulties between Vienna and St. Petersburg. At about the same time, and before he had received this telegram, the Czar asked the Emperor to help him and to counsel moderation in Vienna. The Emperor accepted the part of mediator, but he had hardly begun to act, when Russia mobilised all her troops 573 574 Official Diplomatic Documents against Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary on the other hand had mobilised only her army corps on the Servian frontier, and two other corps in the north, but far removed from Russia. The Emperor at once pointed out to the Czar that the Russian mobilisation made his mediation, undertaken at the Czar's request, very difficult if not impossible. We nevertheless continued our mediation, — even to the extreme limit permitted by our alliance. During this time, Russia of her own accord repeated her assurance that she was mak- ing no military preparations against us. Then came July 31. In Vienna a decision was due. We had already succeeded so far that Vienna had renewed her personal exchange of opinion with St. Petersburgh, which had stopped for some time. But even before a decision was taken in Vienna, we received the news that Russia was mobilising her entire army — that is, she was mobilising also against us. The Russian Govern- ment, which from our repeated representations knew what a mobili- sation on our frontier meant, did not notify us, and gave us no ex- planatory reply. Nor until the afternoon of July 31st a telegram was received from the Czar in which he. said that his army was tak- ing no provocative attitude toward us. The Russian mobilisation, however, on our frontier had been vigorously begun as early as dur- ing the night of July 30th. Thus while we were still trying to medi- ate in Vienna, at Russia's request, the whole Russian military force rose on our long, almost open frontier. And France, while she was not yet mobilising, confessed that she was making military prepara- tions. And we'/ We had intentionally refrained, up to that mo- ment, from calling a single reservist to the colors — for the sake of the peace of Europe. Should we now be waiting longer, and until the Rowers between whom we are wedged in would choose their own moment of attack'/ To expose Germany to this danger would have been a crime ! For this reason we demanded at once, on July 31st, that Russia demobilise, which action alone could still have preserved the peace of Europe. The Imperial Ambassador in St. Petersburgh was simul- taneously instructed to declare that we should have to consider ourselves at war with Russia if she declined. The Imperial Ambas- sador has followed his instructions. Even to-day we do not yet know Russia's reply to our demand that she demobilise. No telegraphic news has reached us, although the telegraph went on for a while communicating many less impor- tant matters. So it came that when the time limit was long past the Emperor was obliged to mobilise our military forces, at five o'clock in the afternoon of August 1st. At the same time, we had to ask for assurances as to the attitude of France. She replied to our definite enquiry whether she would be neutral in a Russian-German war by saying that she would do what her interests demanded. This was an evasion of our question, if not a negative reply. The Emperor nevertheless ordered that the French frontier be respected in its entirety. This order has been The Chancellor's Speech in the Reichstag 575 rigorously obeyed with one single exception. France, who mobi- lized at the same hour that we did declared that she would respect a zone of ten kilometers on our frontier. And what did really happen ? Bomb throwing, flyers, cavalry scouts, and companies invading Alsace-Lorraine. Thus France attacked us before war had been declared. As regards the one exception mentioned, I have received this report from the General Staff: "As regards France's complaints concerning our transgressing her frontier, only one case is to be ac- knowledged. Contrary to definite orders, a patrol of the 14th Army Corps, led it would seem by an officer, crossed the frontier on August 2d. It appears that all were shot except one man, who returned. But long before this one act of crossing the frontier took place, French flyers dropped bombs as far from France as South Germany, and near the Schlucht pass, French troops made an attack on our frontier guards. Thus far our troops have confined themselves to the protection of our frontier." This is the report of the General Stair'. We have been forced into a state of self-defence, and the necessity of self-defence knows no other law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and have perhaps already been obliged to enter Belgian territory. That is against the rules of international law. It is true that the French government announced in Brussels that it would respect Belgian neutrality as long as its opponents would do so. But we knew that France was ready for an invasion of Belgium. France could afford to wait. We could not wait. An attack on our flank might have been fatal. We were therefore obliged to disregard the protest of the Luxemburg and Belgian governments. For the wrong we have done thereby we shall try to atone, as soon as our military end is obtained. People, who like ourselves, are fighting for their lives and homes must think of naught but how they may survive. 1 Gentlemen, we are standing shoulder to shoulder with Austria- Hungary. As regards the attitude of England, Sir Edward Grey's remarks in the lower house of Parliament yesterday have shown what her stand will be. We have assured the English government that we shall not attack the north coast of France as long as England remains neutral, and that we shall not infringe the territorial integrity and independence of Belgium. This assurance I here repeat before the whole world ; and I may add, that as long as England remains neutral, we shall not even take any hostile measures against the French merchant marine, provided France will treat our merchant- men in the same way. Gentlemen, this was the course of events. Germany enters this war with a clear conscience. We are fighting to protect the fruits 1 The German word durchhauen has been translated in the English press "hack their way through." While the German word hauen and the English word "hark" are akin, their meanings, and even more their connotated meanings are very different. "Hack their way through" suggests brutal methods, which the word durchhauen does not. 576 Official Diplomatic Documents of our peaceful labor and our heritage of the great past : We are fighting for our future. The fifty years are not yet past during which Moltke used to say we should have to remain armed if we were to protect our heritage and our achievements of 1870. Now the supreme hour has come which will test our people. But it finds us ready and full of confidence. Our army is in the field, our fleet is well prepared, and hack of them stands the whole Ger- man people. — The Whole German People ! [For Sir E. Grey's two speeches, August 3, 1914, and Mr. Asquith's three speeches, August 4, 5, 6, 1014, see the facsimile reproduction of the British Blue Book, pp. 89 to its. For President Poincare's message August ■">, and M. Viviani's speech on the same day, see French Yellow Book Nos. 158, 159, August 5, 1914.] The "Brussels" Documents 577 II. THE "BRUSSELS" DOCUMENTS Found by the German Government in Brussels and published in facsimile in a special Supplement to the " Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" of November 25, 1914- (1) (Translation) Letter [from the Chief of the Belgian General Staff] to the [Belgian] Minister of J]'ar respecting the Confidential Interviews. (Confidential.) Sir, Brussels, April 10, 1906. I have the honour to furnish herewith a summary of the conversa- tions which I have had with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, which I have already reported to you verbally. His first visit was in the middle of January. Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston told me of the pre-occupation of the British General Staff concerning the general political situation and the existing possi- bilities of war. Should Belgium be attacked, it was proposed to send about 100,000 men. The lieutenant-colonel having asked me how we should interpret such a step, I answered that, from the military point of view, it could only be advantageous ; but that this question of intervention had also a political side, and that I must accordingly consult the Minister of War. Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston replied that his Minister at Brussels would speak about it to our Minister for Foreign Affairs. He continued as follows : The disembarkation of the British troops would take place on the French coast, in the neighbourhood of Dunkirk and Calais, in such a manner that the operation might be carried out in the quickest possible way. 1 Landing at Antwerp would take much longer, as larger transports would be required, and, more- over, the risk would be greater. This being so, several other points remained to be decided, viz., transport by rail, the question of requisitions to which the British Army might have recourse, the question of the chief command of the allied forces. He enquired whether our arrangements were adequate to secure the defence of the country during the crossing and transport of the British troops — a period which he estimated ^t about ten days. I answered that the fortresses of Xamur and Liege were safe against a surprise attack, and that in four days our field army of 100,000 men 1 The following marginal note occurs in the facsimile : — (Translation) "The entry of the English into Belgium would only take place after the violation of our neutrality by Germany." 2p 578 Official Diplomatic Documents would he ready to take the field. After having expresssed his entire satisfaction at what I had said, my visitor emphasised the following points : (1) Our conversation was absolutely confidential ; (2) it was in no way binding on his Government; (3) his Minister, the British General Staff, he, and myself were the only persons then aware of the matter ; (4) he did not know whether his Sovereign had been consulted. At a subsequent meeting Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston assured me that he had never received any confidential information from other military attaches about our army. lie then gave me a detailed statement of the strength of the British forces : we might rely on it that, in twelve or thirteen days, two army corps, four cavalry brigades, and two brigades of mounted infantry would belauded. lie asked me to study the question of the transport of these forces to that part of the country where they would be most useful, and with this object in view he promised me a detailed statement of the com- position of the landing force. He reverted to the question of the effective strength of our field army, and considered it important that no detaelunents from that army should be sent to Namur and Liege, as those fortresses were provided with adequate garrisons. lie drew my attention to the necessity of letting the British Army take full advantage of the facilities afforded under our regulations respecting military requirements. Finally, he laid stress on the ques- tion of the chief command. 1 replied that I could say nothing on the latter point, and I promised that I would study the other questions with care. Later, the British military attache confirmed his previous estimate : twelve days at least were indispensable to carry out the landing on the coast of France. It would take much longer (from one to two and a half months) to land 1011, 000 men at Antwerp. On my objecting that it would be useless to wait till the disembarka- tion was finished, before beginning the transport by rail, and that it would be better to semi on the troops by degrees as they arrived on the coast, Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston promised me precise details of the daily disembarkation table. With regard to the question of military requirements, I informed my visitor that that question would easily be arranged. As the plans of the British General Staff advanced, the details of the problem were worked out with greater precision. The colonel assured me that half the British Army could be landed in eight days, and the remainder at the end of the twelfth or thirteenth day, except the mounted infantry, on which we could not count till later. Nevertheless, I felt bound once more to urge the necessity of know- ing the numbers to be landed daily, so as to work out the railway arrangements for each day. The British attache then spoke to me of various other questions, viz. : (1) The necessity of maintaining secrecy about the operations, and of ensuring that the Press should observe this carefully ; (2) the advantages there would be in attaching a Belgian officer to each The " Brussels " Documents 579 British staff, an interpreter to each commanding officer, and gen- darmes to each unit to help the British military police. At another interview Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston and I examined the question of combined operations in the event of a German attack directed against Antwerp, and on the hypothesis of our country being crossed in order to reach the French Ardennes. Later on, the colonel signified his concurrence in the scheme I had laid before him, and assured me of the assent of General Grierson, Chief of the British General Staff. Other questions of secondary importance were likewise disposed of, particularly those respecting intermediary officers, interpreters, gendarmes, maps, illustrations of uniforms, English translations of extracts from certain Belgian regulations, the regulation of customs dues chargeable on the British supplies, hospital accommodation for the wounded of the allied army, etc. Nothing was settled as to the possible control of the Press by the Government or the military authorities. In the course of the last meetings which I had with the British attache he communicated to me the daily disembarkation table of the troops to be landed at Boulogne, Calais and Cherbourg. The distance of the latter place, included owing to certain technical considerations, would cause a certain delay. The first corps would be landed on the tenth day, the second corps on the fifteenth day. Our railways would carry out the transport operations in such a way that the arrival of the first corps, either towards Brussels-Louvain or towards Namur- Dinant, would be completed on the eleventh day and that of the second corps on the sixteenth day. I finally urged once again,' as forcibly as was within my power, the necessity of accelerating the transport by sea in order that the British troops might be with us between the eleventh and the twelfth day ; the very best and most favourable results would accrue from the concerted and simultaneous action by the allied forces. On the other hand, a serious check would ensue if such co-operation could not be achieved. Colonel Barnardiston assured me that everything would be done with that end in view. In the course of our conversations I took the opportunity of con- vincing the military attache of our resolve to impede the enemies' movements as far as lay within our power, and not to take refuge in Antwerp from the outset. Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, on his side, informed me that he had at present little confidence in the sup- port or intervention of Holland. He likewise confided to me that his Government intended to move the British base of supplies from the French coast to Antwerp as soon as the North Sea had been cleared of all German warships. At all our interviews the colonel regularly communicated to me any confidential information he possessed respecting the military condi- tion and general situation of our eastern neighbour, etc. At the same time he laid stress on the imperative need for Belgium to keep herself well informed of what was going on in the neighbouring Rhine country. 580 Official Diplomatic Documents I had to admit to him that in our country the intelligence service beyond the frontier was not, in times of peace, directly under our General Staff. We had no military attaches at our legations. I took care, however, not to admit to him that I was unaware whether the secret service, prescribed in our regulations, was organised or not. But it is my duty here to call attention to this state of affairs, which places us in a position of glaring inferiority to that of our neighbours, our possible enemies. Major-General, Chief of General Staff. (Initialled) Note. — When I met General Grierson at Compiegne at the ma- noeuvres of 1906 he assured me that the reorganisation of the British army would result not only in ensuring the landing of 150,000 men, but in enabling them to take the field in a shorter period than had been previously estimated. End of September 1906. (Initialled) (2) (Translation) (Confidential.) The British military attache asked to see General Jungbluth. These gentlemen met on the 23rd April. Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told the general that Great Britain had, available for despatch to the Continent, an army composed of six divisions of infantry and eight brigades of cavalry, in all 160,000 men. She had also all that she needed for home defence. Every- thing was ready. The British Government, at the time of the recent events, would have immediately landed troops on our territory, even if we had not asked for help. The general protested that our consent would be necessary for this. The military attache answered that he knew that, but that as we were not in a position to prevent the Germans passing through our territory, Great Britain would have landed her troops in any event. As to the place of landing, the military attache was not explicit. He said the coast was rather long ; but the general knows that Mr. Bridges made daily visits to Zeebrugge from Ostend during the Easter holidays. The general added that, after all, we were, besides, perfectly able to prevent the Germans from going through. April 24, 1912. The Allied Answer to the "Brussels" Documents 581 III. THE ALLIED ANSWER TO THE "BRUSSELS" DOCUMENTS No. 1 Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Sir F, Villiers, British Minister at Brussels. 1 Sir, Foreign Office, April 7, 1913. In speaking to the Belgian Minister to-day I said, speaking unoffi- cially, that it had been brought to my knowledge that there was apprehension in Belgium lest we should be the first to violate Belgian neutrality. I did not think that this apprehension could have conic from a British source. The Belgian Minister informed me that there had been talk, in a British source which he could not name, of the landing of troops in Belgium by Great Britain, in order to anticipate a possible despatch of German troops through Belgium to France. I said that I was sure that this Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and I did not believe that any British Government would be the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it. What we had to consider, and it was a somewhat embarrassing question, was what it woidd be desirable and necessary for us, as one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, to do if Belgian neutrality was violated by any Power. For us to be the first to violate it and to send troops into Belgium would be to give Germany, for instance, justification for sending troops into Belgium also. What we desired in the case of Belgium, as in that of other neutral countries, was that their neutrality should be respected, and as long as it was not violated by any other Power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their territory. I am, etc., E. Grey.. No. 2 Extract from, a Despatch from Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister at Berlin, to the Belgia n Min isterfor Foreign Affa irs, dated December 23, 1911. {From the " Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung," October 13, 1914.) (Translation) From the French side the danger threatens not only in the south from Luxemburg ; it threatens us along our whole common frontier. For this assertion we are not dependent only on surmises. We have positive facts to go upon. The combinations of the Entente cordiale include, without doubt, the thought of an enveloping movement from the north. If that were 1 A record of this dispatch was communicated by Sir F. Villiers to the Belgian Minis- ter for Foreign Affairs. 582 Official Diplomatic Documents not the case, the plan of fortifying Flushing would not have evoked such an outcry in Paris and London. No secret was made there about the reasons why it was wished that the Scheldt should remain unfortified. The object was to be able to ship a British garrison with- out hindrance to Antwerp, and to obtain in our country a base of oper- ations for an offensive in the direction of the Lower Rhine and West- phalia, and then to carry us along with them, which would not have been difficult. For after giving up our national place of refuge, we should by our own fault have deprived ourselves of any possibility of resisting the demands of our doubtful protectors after being so foolish as to admit them to it. The equally perfidious and naif revelations of Colonel Barnardiston at the time of the conclusion of the Entente cordiale showed us clearly what was intended. When it became evident that we were not to be intimidated by the alleged threaten- ing danger of the closing of the Scheldt, the plan was not indeed abandoned, but altered in so far as the British auxiliary force was not to be landed on the Belgian coast, but in the nearest French harbours. The revelations of Captain Faber, which have been no more denied than the information of the newspapers by which they were confirmed or elaborated in certain particulars, are evidence of this. This British army, landed at Calais and Dunkirk, would not march along our frontier to Longwy in order to reach Germany. It would immediately invade us from the north-west. This would gain for it the advantage of going into action at once, of meeting the Belgian army in a region where we cannot obtain support from any fortress, in the event of our wishing to risk a battle. It would make it possible for it to occupy provinces rich in every kind of resource, but in any case to hinder our mobilisation or to allow it only when we had formally pledged ourselves to complete mobilisation solely for the benefit of Great Britain and her allies. I would strongly urge that a plan of action should be drawn up for this eventuality also. This is demanded as much by the require- ments of our military defence as by the conduct of our foreign policy in the case of a war between Germany and France. No. 3 Circular Telegram, addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Representatives abroad. 1 (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, October 14, 1014- The story of an alleged Anglo-Belgian agreement of 190(i published in the German press, and based on documents said to have been found at Brussels, is only a story which has been reproduced in various forms and denied on several occasions. No such agreement has ever existed. As the Germans well know, General Grierson is dead, and Colonel 1 This telegram was sent on receipt of a summary of the documents contained in No. 4, issued by the German Government on the 13th October in advance of the publi- cation of the documents themselves. The Allied Answer to the "Brussels" Documents 583 (now General) Barnardiston is commanding the British forces before Tsing-tao. In 1906 General Grierson was on the General Staff at the War Office and Colonel Barnardiston was military attache at Brussels. In view of the solemn guarantee given by Great Britain to protect the neutrality of Belgium against violation from any side, some academic discussions may, through the instrumentality of Colonel Barnardiston, have taken place between General Grierson and the Belgian military authorities as to what assistance the British army might be able to afford to Belgium should one of her neighbours violate that neutrality. Some notes with reference to the subject may exist in the archives at Brussels. It should be noted that the date mentioned, namely, 1906, was the year following that in which Germany had, as in 1911, adopted a threatening attitude towards France with regard to Morocco, and, in view of the apprehensions existing of an attack on France through Belgium, it was natural that possible eventualities should be discussed. The impossibility of Belgium having been a party to any agree- ment of the nature indicated, or to any design for the violation of Belgian neutrality, is clearly shown by the reiterated declarations that she has made for many years past that she would resist to the utmost any violation of her neutrality from whatever quarter and in whatever form such violation might come. It is worthy of attention that these charges of aggressive designs on the part of other Powers are made by Germany, who, since 1906, has established an elaborate network of strategical railways leading from the Rhine to the Belgian frontier through a barren thinly-popu- lated tract, deliberately constructed to permit of the sudden attack upon Belgium which was carried out two months ago. No. 4 Viscount Haldane, Lord High Chancellor, to Dr. A. E. Shipley, Master of Christ's College, Cambridge. Dear Master of Christ's, November 14, 1914- The enclosed memoranda have been specially prepared for me by the Foreign Office in answer to your question. Yours truly, (Signed) Haldaxe. Enclosure 1 Memorandum It is quite untrue that the British Government had ever arranged with Belgium to trespass on her country in case of war, or that Belgium had agreed to this. The strategic dispositions of Germany, especially as regards railways, have for some years given rise to the apprehension that Germany would attack France through Belgium. Whatever 584 Official Diplomatic Documents military discussions have taken place before this war have been limited entirely to the suggestion of what could be done to defend France if Germany attacked her through Belgium. The Germans have stated that we contemplated sending troops to Belgium. We had never committed ourselves at all to the sending of troops to the Continent, and we had never contemplated the possibility of sending troops to Belgium to attack Germany. The Germans have stated that British military stores had been placed at Maubeuge, a French fortress near the Belgian frontier, before the outbreak of the war, and that this is evidence of an intention to attack Germany through Belgium. Xo British soldiers and no British stores were landed on the Continent till after Germany had invaded Belgium, and Belgium had appealed to France and England for assistance. It was only after this appeal that British troops were sent to France; and, if the Germans found British munitions of war in Maubeuge, these munitions were sent with our expedition to France after the outbreak of the war. The idea of violating the neutrality of Belgium was never discussed or contemplated by the British Government. The extract enclosed, which is taken from an official publication of the Belgian Government, and the extract from an official statement by the Belgian Minister of War, prove that the Belgian Government had never connived, or been willing to connive, at a breach of the Treaty that made the maintenance of Belgian neutrality an inter- national obligation. The moment that there appeared to be danger that this Treaty might be violated, the British Government made an appeal for an assurance from both France and Germany, as had been done in 1870 by Mr. Gladstone, that neither of those countries would violate the neutrality of Belgium if the other country respected it. The French agreed, the ( rermans declined to agree. The appeal made by the British Government is to be found in the Parliamentary White Paper published after the outbreak of the war (see Xo. 114 of British Correspondence, page 87). The reason, why Germany would not agree was stated very frankly byllerr von Jagow, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Edward Goschen, our Ambassador in Berlin ; and it is recorded in the second White Paper (see Xo. 160 of British Correspondence, page 11(1) that we published. The attitude of the British Government throughout has been to endeavour to preserve the neutrality of Belgium, and we never thought of sending troops to Belgium until Germany had invaded it, ami Belgium had appealed for assistance to maintain the international Treaty. We have known for some years past that, in Holland, in Denmark, and in Norway, the Germans have inspired the apprehension that, if England was at war with Germany, England would violate the neutrality of those countries and seize some of their harbours. This allegation is as baseless as the allegation about our intention to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and events have shown it to be so. But it seems to be a rule with Germany to attribute to others the designs that she herself entertains ; as it is clear now that, for some long time past, it has been a settled part of her strategic plans to attack The Allied Answer to the "Brussels" Documents 585 France through Belgium. A statement is enclosed which was issued by us on October 14 last, dealing with this point. This memorandum and its enclosures should provide ample material for a reply to the German statements. Foreign Office, ,9th November, 1914- Enclosure 2 Despatch No. 22 in the Belgian Gray Book. Enclosure 3 Extract from " The Times" of 30th September, 1.914. Neutrality of Belgium Official Statement The German press has been attempting to persuade the public that if Germany herself had not violated Belgian neutrality France or Great Britain would have done so. It has' declared that French and British troops had marched into Belgium before the outbreak of war. We have received from the Belgian Minister of War an official state- ment which denies absolutely these allegations. It declares, on the one hand, that " before August 3 not a single French soldier had set foot on Belgian territory," and again, "it is untrue that on August 4 there was a single English soldier in Belgium." It adds : — For long past Great Britain knew that the Belgian army would oppose by force a "preventive" disembarkation of British troops in Belgium. The Belgian Government did not hesitate at the time of theAgadir crises to warn foreign Ambassadors, in terms which could not be misunderstood, of its formal intention to compel respect for the neutrality of Belgium by every means at its disposal, and against attempts upon it from any and every quarter. Enclosure 4 Circular Telegram addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Representatives abroad on the 14th October, 1.914- See above No. 3 of " The Allied Answer to the Brussels Documents." 586 Official Diplomatic Documents IV. NEGOTIATIONS OF PRINCE LICHNOWSKY WITH SIR EDWARD GREY (Published in the North German Gazette, September 6, 1914) According to reports to hand, Sir Edward Grey declared in the House of Commons that the publication by the German Govern- ment of the German-English exchange of telegrams before the war was incomplete. Prince Lichnowsky, it is declared, cancelled by telegram his report on the well-known telephone conversation imme- diately he was informed that a misunderstanding existed. This telegram, it is asserted, was not published. The Times, appar- ently upon information from official sources, made the same asser- tion, adding the comment that the telegram had been suppressed by the German Government in order that it might accuse England of perfidy and prove Germany's love of peace. In answer to this we are able to state that such a telegram is non- existent. Apart from the telegram already published, which was dispatched from London at 11 a.m., Prince Lichnowsky on August 1 st sent the following telegram : First, at 1.15 p.m. "... Sir Edward Grey's private secretary has just been to see me to say that the Minister desired to make proposals to me regard- ing England's neutrality, even for the event that we should go to war with Russia as well as with France. I shall see Sir Edward Grey this afternoon, and shall report immediately." Second, at 5.30 p.m. "Sir Edward Grey has just read to me the following declaration, which has been unanimously framed by the cabinet: " 'The reply of the German Government with regard to the neu- trality of Belgium is a matter of very great regret, because the neu- trality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way clear to give the same positive reply as that which has been given by France, it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here, while on the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country.' " In answer to my question as to whether, on condition that we respected the Belgian neutrality, he could give me a definite declara- tion concerning the neutrality of Great Britain, the Minister replied that that was impossible for him to do, but that this epiestion would nevertheless play an important part in public opinion here. If we should violate the Belgian neutrality in a war with France, a reversal of sentiment would certainly result and this would make it difficult for the Government here to assume a friendly neutrality. For the Negotiations of Prince Lichnowsky with Sir Edward Grey 5S7 present there was not the slightest intention of taking hostile action against us. It would be the desire to avoid that if it should be in any way possible. It would, however, be difficult to draw a line marking how far we might go before there would be intervention from here. He recurred again and again to Belgian neutrality and expressed the opinion that this question would play an important part in any event. He had wondered whether it were not possible that we and France should remain armed against each other without attacking each other in case of a Russian war. I asked him whether he was in a position to declare to me that France would enter into a compact to that effect. Since we neither desired to destroy France nor to acquire parts of her territory, I was able to believe that we could enter into an agreement of such a sort, which would insure us the neutrality of Great Britain. " The Minister said he would make inquiries ; he did not overlook the difficulties of holding the armies of both sides inactive." Third, at S.30 p.m. : "My report made early to-day is cancelled by my report of this evening. Since absolutely no positive English proposal has been submitted, further steps along the line of the instructions given me are superfluous." As will be observed, these telegrams contain no sort of indication that there had been a misunderstanding, and nothing concerning the assertion made from the English side of a clearing up of the alleged misunderstanding. 588 Official Diplomatic Documents V. DOCUMENTS FOUND IN THE POSSESSION OF MR. GRANT-WATSON, SECRETARY OF THE BRITISH LEGATION (Published in the North German Gazette, December 15th, 1914) New and important proofs have been found of the Anglo-Belgian complicity. Some time ago Mr. Grant-Watson, the Secretary of the Britisli Legation, was arrested in Brussels. He had remained at the legation quarters, after the legation had been transferred to Ant- werp and later to Havre. The said gentleman was recently caught trying to do away with some documents, which he had carried away unnoticed from the legation when arrested. An examination of the papers revealed that they were official documents, with data of the most intimate character concerning the Belgian mobilisation and the defence nf Antwerp, dating from the years 1913 and 1914. They include circular orders to the higher Belgian officers in command, bearing the signature in facsimile of the Belgian Minister of War and of the Belgian General Staff, and also a note concerning a con- ference of the "Commission tic la base d'approvisionnements a Anvers," on May 27th, 1913. The fact that these papers were found in the British Legation shows sufficiently that the Belgian Government had no military secrets to hide from the British Government, and that both governments, with regard to military matters, are in very close touch with each other. There is also a hand-written note of special interest which was found among the papers that the British Secretary endeavoured to destroy. It follows : Renseignements ' 1. Les ofheiers francais ont recu ordre de rejoindre des le 27, apres-midi. 2. Le meme jour le chef de Gare de Feignies a recu ordre de con- centrer vers Maubeuge tons les wagons fermes disponible, en vue dn transport de troupes. Communique par la Brigade de gendarmerie de Frameries. Feignies, it may he remarked, is a railway station in France on the road from Maubeuge to Mons, about three kilometres from the Belgian frontier ; Frameries is on the same line in Belgium, ten kilo- metres from the frontier. From this notice it must be gathered that France had already made her first mobilisation plans on July 27, and that the British 1 Translation : 1. The French officers have received orders to join tin' colors by tin- 27th in tin' afternoon. 'J. For tin- same 'lay the Superintendent of tin' railw i\ station of Feignies has received orders to collect in the direction of Maubeuge all available closed coaches, with a view to the transport of troops. Documents Found in the Possession of Mr. (! rant-Watson 589 Legation immediately received information thereof from Belgian sources. The material thus discovered furnishes an additional and valu- able proof — if indeed any may be needed — of the relations existing between England and Belgium. It shows anew that Belgium had sacrificed her own neutrality in favor of the Entente, and that she was an active member of the coalition which had been formed to fight the German Empire. For England, on the other hand, Bel- gian neutrality really was nothing but a "scrap of paper," to which she appealed when it was in her interest, and which she disregarded when she found it expedient to do so. It is obvious that the British Government made use of the violation of Belgian neutrality by Ger- many only as a pretext to justify the war against us before the world and before the British people. 590 Official Diplomatic Documents VI. TELEGRAMS AND LETTERS EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE ROYAL AND IMPERIAL COURTS OF LONDON, BERLIN, AND PETROGRAD, AND BETWEEN KING GEORGE AND PRESIDENT POINCARE Telegrams Exchanged between His Majesty King George and His Majesty the Czar (Published in the British Press on the 5th August, 1914) No. 1 Sir Edward (Ircy to Sir (!. Buchanan (St. Petersburgh). Foreign Office, 1st August, 101 1±. You should at once apply for an audience with His Majesty the Emperor, and convey to him the following personal message from the King : — "My Government has received the following statement from the German Government : — " 'On July 29 the Russian Emperor requested the German Emperor by telegraph to mediate between Russia and Austria. The Emperor immediately declared his readiness to do so. He informed the Russian Emperor of this by telegraph, and took the required action at Vienna. Without waiting for the result of this action Russia, mobilised against Austria. By telegraph the German Emperor pointed out to the Russian Emperor that hereby his attempt at media- tion would be rendered illusory. The Emperor further asked the Russian Emperor to suspend the military operations against Austria. This, however, did not happen. In spite of this the German Govern- ment continued its mediation at Vienna. In this matter the German Government have gone to the farthest limit of what can be suggested to a Sovereign State which is the ally of Germany. The proposals made by the German Government at Vienna were conceived entirely on the lines suggested by Great Britain, and the German Government recommended them at Vienna for their serious consideration. They were taken into consideration at Vienna this morning. During the deliberations of the (?Austrian) Cabinet, and before they were con- eluded, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh reported the mobilisation of the entire Russian army and fleet. Owing to this action on the part of Russia the Austrian answer to the German proposals for mediation, which were still under consideration, was not given. This action on the part of Russia is also directed against Germany — that is to say, the Power whose mediation had been in- vi >ke< 1 by the Russian Emperor. We were bound to reply with serious counter measures to this action, which we were obliged to consider as hostile, unless we were prepared to endanger the safety of our Royal and Imperial Telegrams and Letters 591 country. We are unable to remain inactive in face of the Russian mobilisation on our frontier. We have therefore informed Russia that unless she were prepared to suspend within twelve hours the warlike measure against Germany and Austria, we should be obliged to mobilise, and this would mean war. We have asked France if she would remain neutral during a German-Russian war.' " I cannot help thinking that some misunderstanding has pro- duced this deadlock. I am most anxious not to miss any possibility of avoiding the terrible calamity which at present threatens the whole world. I therefore make a personal appeal to you to remove the misapprehension which I feel must have occurred, and to leave still open grounds for negotiation and possible peace. If you think I can in any way contribute to that all-important purpose, I will do everything in my power to assist in reopening the interrupted con- versations between the Powers concerned. I feel confident that you are as anxious as I am that all that is possible should be done to secure the peace of the world." No. 2 His Majesty the Czar to His Majesty King George. 1st August, 1914. I would gladly have accepted your proposals had not German Ambassador this afternoon presented a note to my Government declaring war. Ever since presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade, Russia has devoted all her efforts to finding some pacific solution of the question raised by Austria's action. Object of that action was to crush Servia and make her a vassal of Austria. Effect of this would have been to upset balance of power in Balkans, which is of such vital interest to my Empire. Every proposal, including that of your Government, was rejected by Germany and Austria, and it was only when favourable moment for bringing pressure to bear on Austria had passed that Germany showed any disposition to mediate. Even then she did not put forward any precise proposal. Austria's declara- tion of war on Servia forced me to order a partial mobilisation, though, in view of threatening situation, my military advisers strongly advised a general mobilisation owing to quickness with which Germany can mobilise in comparison with Russia. I was eventually compelled to take this course in consequence of complete Austrian mobilisation, of the bombardment of Belgrade, of concentration of Austrian troops in Galicia, and of secret military preparations being made in Ger- many. That I was justified in doing so is proved by Germany's sudden declaration of war, which was quite unexpected by me, as I have given most categorical assurances to the Emperor William that my troops would not move so long as mediation negotiations continued. In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have 592 Official Diplomatic Documents done all in my power to avert war. Now that it has been forced on me, I trust your country will not fail to support France and Russia. God bless and protect you. II Telegrams Exchanged between London and Berlin, 30th July- 2nd August, 1914 (Published in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zcitung of the 20th August, 1914) No. 1 His Royal Highness Prince Henri/ of Prussia to His Majesty King George, dated SOih July, 1914. I arrived here yesterday and have communicated what you were so good as to say to me at Buckingham Palace last Sunday to William, who was very thankful to receive your message. William, who is very anxious, is doing his utmost to comply with the request of Nicholas to work for the maintenance of peace. He is in continual telegraphic communication with Nicholas, who has to-day confirmed the news that he has ordered military measures which amount to mobilisation, and that these measures were taken five days ago. We have also received information that France is making military preparations while we have not taken measures of any kind, but may be obliged to do so at any moment if our neighbours continue their preparations. This would then mean a European war. If you seriously and earnestly desire to prevent this terrible mis- fortune, may I propose to you to use your influence on France and also on Russia that they should remain neutral. In my view this would be of the greatest use. I consider that this is a certain and, perhaps, the only possible way of maintaining the peace of Europe. I might add that Germany and England should now more than ever give each other mutual support in order to prevent a terrible disaster, which otherwise appears inevitable. Believe me that William is inspired by the greatest sincerity in his efforts for the maintenance of peace. But the military prepara- tions of his two neighbours may end in compelling him to follow their example for the safety of his own country, which otherwise would remain defenceless. I have informed William of my telegram to you, and I hope that yon will receive my communication in the same friendly spirit which has inspired it. (Signed) Henry. No. 2 His Majesty King George to His Royal Highness Prince Henry of Prussia, dated 30th duly, 1914-. Thanks for your telegram. I am very glad to hear of William's efforts to act with Nichi »las for the maintenance of peace. I earnestly Royal and Imperial Telegrams and Letters 593 desire that such a misfortune as a European war — the evil of which could not be remedied — may be prevented. My Government is doing the utmost possible in order to induce Russia and France to postpone further military preparations, provided that Austria declares herself satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighbouring Servian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of her demands, while at the same time the other countries suspend their preparations for war. I rely on William applying his great influence in order to induce Austria to accept this proposal. In this way he will prove that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe. Please assure William that I am doing all I can, and will continue to do all that lies in my power, to maintain the peace of Europe. (Signed) George. No. 3 His Majesty the Emperor William, to His Majesty King George, dated 31st July, 1914- Many thanks for your friendly communication. Your proposals coincide with my ideas and with the communication which I have this evening received from Vienna, and which I have passed on to London. I have just heard from the Chancellor that intelligence has just reached him that Nicholas this evening has ordered the mobilisation of his entire army and fleet. He has not even awaited the result of the mediation in which I am engaged, and he has left me completely without information. I am travelling to Berlin to assure the safety of my eastern frontier, where strong Russian forces have already taken up their position. (Signed) William. No. 4 His Majesty King George to His Majesty the Emperor William, dated 1st August, 1914- Many thanks for your telegram of last night. I have sent an urgent telegram J to Nicholas, in which I have assured him of my readiness to do everything in my power to further the resumption of the negotiations between the powers concerned. (Signed) George. No. 5 German Ambassador at London to the German Imperial Chancellor, dated 1st August, 1914- Sir Edward Grey has just called me to the telephone and has asked me whether I thought I could declare that in the event of 1 See page 590. 2q 594 Official Diplomatic Documents France remaining neutral in a German-Russian war we would not attack the French. I told him that I believed that I could assume responsibility for this. (Signed) Lichnowsky. No. C> His Majesty the Emperor William to His Majesty King George, dated 1st August, 191%. I HAVE just received the communication of your Government offering French neutrality under the guarantee of Great Britain. To this offer there was added the question whether, under these conditions, Germany would refrain from attacking France. For technical reasons the mobilisation which I have already ordered this afternoon on two fronts — east and west — must proceed according to the arrangements made. A counter order cannot now be given, as your telegram unfortunately came too late, hut if France offers me her neutrality, which must he guaranteed by the English army and navy, I will naturally give up the idea of an attack on France and employ my troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not be nervous. The troops on my frontier are at this moment being kept back by telegraph and by telephone from crossing the French frontier. (Signed) William. No. 7 German Imperial Chancellor to the German Ambassador at London, daieil 1st Aligns/, 191 ',. Germany" is ready to agree to the English proposal in the event of England guaranteeing with all her forces the unconditional neutrality of France in the conflict between Germany and Russia. Owing to the Russian challenge German mobilisation occurred to-day before the English proposals were received. In consecpience our advance to the French frontier cannot now be altered. We guarantee, how- ever, that the French frontier will not be crossed by our troops until Monday, the :!r Title: Mediation Proposals. Serbian Reply, 142, 156, 157, 158, 175, 1st), 243. Austrian Commentaries. 529. Austrian Views, 221, 251. British Views, 227, 229, 231. German Views, 192, 193, 19 1. Non-publication of. in German Press, 272. Refusal of Austria-Hungary to accept, 174, 2.31, 241. Russian Views, 235. Special Points to be brought before Great Britain, 57, 65. Time Chosen for Presentation, signif- icance of, 36, 149. Time Limit — Dangers of. 62. Proposals for Extension, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 158, 170, 171, 172, 181. Austrian Refusal, 140, 141. British Attitude. 93. German Views. 103. Italian Views, 196. Russian Views, 00. 145, 243. Unconditional acceptance demanded, 104. War declared by Austria-Hungary, 181, 231, 211. 217, 208, 273. 290. Belgium, Agreement for Joint Action to Resist < iermany, 462, 163. Appeal to Great Britain, France and Russia, 441, 442, 460. Austria declares War, 507, 509. Belgian Reply, 510. Communications with Representatives at — Belgrade, 149. Berlin, 72, 212, 281, 348, 349, 374, 375, 401, 422, 436, 462. Hague, 148, 2sl. 375, 422, 434. 490, 192, 494, 498, 499, 509, 510. London. 72, 281, 348. 349, 373, 374, 375, 401, 422. 424. 435, 437, 438, 439, 441, 400, 463, 483, 495, 505, 512. In dex G01 Belgium — Cont. Communications with Representatives at — Cont. Luxemburg, 148, 281, 375. Madrid, 436, 462, 463. Paris, 72, 281, 348, 349, 374, 375, 401, 422, 435, 439, 400, 462, 463, 4S3, 484, 491, 495, 500. Rome, 148, 281, 375. St. Petersburgh, 72, 281, 375, 401, 422, 439, 460, 463, 495. Vienna, 72, 247, 281, 375, 401, 422. Congo. See that Title. Despatch to Representatives Abroad for Presentation to the respective Governments, 461. Documents of Secret Military Arrange- ments between Great Britain and Belgium, 577. French Offer of Support and Belgian Reply, 422, 425, 430. German Assurance that Territory would not be annexed, 457. German Minister, Departure of, 435, 430. German Minister's Notification to Belgian Foreign Secretary of Breaches of International Law by France, 420. German Proposal to, after Fall of Liege, 490, 492, 494, 498. Belgian Reply, 494, 499. British Approval of Reply, 497. French Approval, 497. Russian Approval, 499. German Request of Free Passage of Troops, through, — Belgian Re- fusal and British Protest, 455. German Ultimatum and Reply, 402. 421, 424. Germany declares War, 452. Germany discovers Documents of Secret Military Arrangements between Great Britain and Belgium, 577. Great Britain, Relations with, previous to the Outbreak of War, 577. Hostile Acts against Germany, 3S7. Belgian Reply, 512. Integrity of — , German Attitude, 303, 357. British Attitude, 456. Interests in Germany entrusted to Span- ish Ambassador, 436, 462, 463. King Albert's Appeal to King George, 423, 455. Military Arrangements between Great Britain and Belgium, 577-5S0. Military Preparations, 72, 283, 281, 442. Minister at Luxemburg, 495. Minister leaves Berlin, 462. Mobilization ordered, 348. Neutrality of — Belgian Request for Assurance from Germany, 401. British Action in case of Violation, 406, 415, 424, 434, 438, 441, 456, 460, 595. British Inquiry to Belgium, 351, 365, 366, 457. Belgium — Cont. Neutrality of — Cont. French Reply, 221, 358, 373, 374, 378, 389. German Reply (Refusal) 374, 378, 381, 387, 388, 397, 457. French Assurances, 348. German Assurance in 1911, 349. German Assurance in 1913, 349. Violation, alleged Violation of Belgian — bv Germany, 424, 430, 435. 441, 442, 457. Violation through Secret Military Ar- rangements between Great Brit- ain and Belgium, 577-580. German Chancellor's View, 436, 437. German Justification, 457. German Note to Belgian Govern- ment, 433, 435, 441. Note sent to Representatives abroad to be delivered to the Various Powers if occasion should arise, 72, 11*. Presentation of, 375. Scheldt, Navigation of — , Correspond- ence with Netherlands, 475, 476, 482. Telegram to Representatives abroad announcing German Ultimatum and Reply, 422. Belgrade, Bombardment of, 354. Berlin, Alleged Attack on British Embassy, 4S5. Demonstrations by Public, 156, 181, 199. Bulgaria, Declaration of Neutrality, 313. Congo, Belgian Attitude as to, 483. British Attitude, 483, 505. French Attitude, 483, 500. France, Ambassador to Germany — , Departure, 476. Army Officers on Leave recalled, 298. Attitude in case of Attack on Great Britain, 337, 451. Attitude in ease of War between Ger- many and Russia, German In- quiry concerning, 347, 356. Austro-Hungarian Troops believed on French Frontier, 484, 490, 491, 496. Austro-Serbian Relations — See Title : Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Relations with — , French Re- ports of Events from Date of Serajevo Murders to Austria's Declaration of War. Ultimatum of 23 July — Advice to Servia regarding Reply, 160. Attitude and Views, 87, 91, 161, 167. Views on and Efforts, 53, 74, 77, 78, 81, 84, 187, 286. See also Title : Mediation Proposals. Belgian Reply to German Proposal after Fall of Liege. 602 Index France — Cont. Belgian Reply — Cont. Approval of, 497. Belgium — Appeal from — , 348, 442. Assurance to, of Respect for Neu- trality, 348. Neutrality of — Agreement for Joint Action in De- fence, 4G3. Reply to British Inquiry, 373, 374, 378, 389, 397. Breach of International Law, 420. Offer of Support to Belgium, 422, 425, 430. Colonies — German refusal to give undertakings as to, 303. Communications with Representa- tives at — Athens, 430. Basic, 213. Bavaria, 543. Belgrade, 75. 77, 78, 84, 156, 282, 2x8, 292, 430. Berlin, 12, 38, 58, 75, 77, 78, 80, 81, 84, 149, 150, 153, 154, 155 157, 181, 186, 213, 217, 218 222, 224, 250, 252, 2S2, 286 288, 323, 325, 326, 353, 355 356, 375, 377, 378, 379, 384 406, 408, 429. Berne, 430. Brussels, 283, 358, 378, 424, 442. Bucharest, 430. Budapest, 19. Christiania, 190, 430. Constantinople. 217, 2^2, 288, 355, 379, 406, 430. Copenhagen, 430, 470. Frankfort, 283. Hague. 424, 430. London, 39, 53, 54, 58, 75, 77. 78, 83, 84, 150, 151, 153, 181, 184, 186, 213, 215, 216, 218, 219, 220, 224, 250, 251, 282, 2S8, 290, 291, 320, 324, 326, 351, 353. 355, 375, 378, 379, 381, 406, 407, 425, 426, 427, 430, 442. Luxemburg, 190. 352, 383, 384, 404. 405, 404. Madrid, 379, 406, 430. Munich, 59, 284, 429. Rome, 39, 53, 58, 75, 77. 78, 84, 155, 181, 183, 184, 1X0, 213, 221, 250, 281, 282. 288, 289, 353, 355, 375, 379, 406, 130. St. Petersburg!!, 15, 39, 53, 58, 75. 77. 78. 82, 81, 1511. 152, 181, 184, lxo, 213, 215, 217. 224, 250. 254, 282, 283, 285, 288, 292, 320, 321, .322, 353. 354. 355, 150, 357, 375, 379, 405, 400, 430. Stockholm, 1, 8, 23, 29, 53, 75, 77, 78, 84, 150, 152, 150, 158. 181, 185, 186, 213, 215, 224. 250, France — Cont. Belgium, Neutrality of — Cont. 251, 282, 285, 287, 288, 323, 353, 355, 356, 375, 379, 406, 430. Vienna, 1, 8, 23, 29, 53, 75, 77, 78, 84. 150, 152, 156, 158, 181, 185, 180, 213, 224, 250, 251, 254, 282, 285, 287, 288, 323, 353, 355, 356, 375, 379, 406, 430. Congo. See that Title. Declaration of Determination to sup- port Russia, 314, 316. Germany, Relations with — German Ambassador leaves Paris, 389, 390. German assurance not to attack France if France remains neutral in case of German-Russian War, 593. German territory violated by French, and French view, 427, 428, 429, 476. War declared by Germany, 427, 429, 462. Government Notification to Repre- sentatives of the Powers at Paris, 443. London Embassy — Note regarding the interview communicated bv, 260. Mediation Proposals, 91, 220, 227, 237, 218, 251, 252, 258, 200, 264, 281,. 290, 313, 314. Military Attache at Berlin — , Letter to Minister of War, 532. Military Preparations, 277, 320. Mobilisation Ordered. 394, 397. Naval Attache at Berlin — , Letter to Minister of Manic-, 534. Peace, Declaration not to conclude separate peace during war, 521. President's Letter to King George, 351, 597. The King's Reply. 598. President's Message to French Parlia- ment (4 August, 1914), 444. President of the Council's Speech in the Chamber of Deputies (4 August, 1914), 440. Press, Note to — suggested by German Ambassador, 187, 215. Report to Minister of Foreign Affairs (30 July, 1913), 541. Summary of Events by Foreign Min- ister. 313. Telegram to French Representatives Abroad on Declaration of War, 129 Territory, German Territory violated, 427, 128, 429, 470. French Allegations of French — vio- lated by Germany. 406, 408, 476. Troops on the Border, 324, 393, 394, 396. Warnings from Reports of Ambassadors in 1913, 531. Index 603 Germany, Africa — Attacks, 505, 509. Aims and Ambitions (French View in 1913), 531. Ambassador preparing to leave Paris, 389, 390. Army Officers on Leave Recalled, 213, 298. Attitude if Russia mobilized on Aus- trian Frontier only, 218, 326. Attitude toward France if she remains Neutral in case of German- Russian War, 544. Austro-Russian Relations, Advice to Austria, 297. See also Title: Mediation Proposals. Austro-Serbian Relations, Localisation of the Dispute desired, 56, 78, 90, 150, 172. Mediation Proposals. .See that Title. Ultimatum of 23 July — Denial of Prior Knowledge, 163, 166,-38, 53, 81, 149, 150, 153, 157, 250, — 172, 173, 174. Prior Knowledge of — , " Private In- formation unable to verify," 329. Redrafting of certain articles pro- posed by Russia, 197, 237. Serbian Reply — Non-publication of — (July 15), 272. Views on, 192, 194. Support of Austrian Action, Views on, 90, 92, — 12, 39, 53, 54, 58, 59, 78, 80, 81, 151, 153, 155, 157, 181, 186, 187, 213, 215, 254, 282, 283, 286, 288, 379, — 97, 172, 173, 174, 198,-21, 25, 27,— 500, 551. See also Title: Mediation Proposals. Belgian Minister leaves Berlin, 462. Belgium, Brussels Documents, 577. Corn for Germany placed under Embargo, 378. Hostile Acts' committed by Belgium against Germany, 378. Military Preparations — Secret Ar- rangements with Germany, 577. Belgian Defence against charges, 510. Neutrality of — Alleged Violation of, 424, 430, 435, 441, 442, 457. Belgian Request for Formal Decla- ration, 401. French Attack upon Germany through Belgium, 457. Necessity to protect German Army from French attack through Belgium, 457. Notification to Belgian Govern- ment, 433, 435, 441. Refusal to Replv to British Inquiry, 374, 387, 388", 397, 475. Proposal after Fall of Liege, 490. 492, 494, 49S. Germany — Conl. Belgium, Neutrality of — Cont. Belgian Reply, 494, 499. British Approval, 497. French Approval, 497. Russian Approval, 499. Request for free Passage of Troops — Belgian Refusal, British Pro- test, 455. Ultimatum to, and Replv, 402, 421, 442. War declared by Germany, 442. British Ambassador's final Interview and Departure from Berlin, 485. Communications with Representatives at — Berne, 225. Kovno, 225. London, 59, 159, 191, 226, 457. Paris, 59, 191, 192, 292, 385, 395. Rome, 358. St. Petersburg, 59, 86, 159, 190, 191, 192, 225, 256, 327, 358, 384. Vienna, 85, 257. Congo. See that Title. Emperor — British Military and Naval Titles, Renunciation of, 488. Conversation with King of the Belgians in the presence of General von Moltke in 1913 — Attitude, 549. Czar's Telegrams from and to, 362, 367, 410, 557, 596. King George, Telegrams to and from, 592, 593, 594. Returns to Berlin (26 July), 193. France, relations with — Allegations of Violations of Terri- tory. 420, 427, 428, 429, 477, — 406, 40S, 477. Inquiry as to Attitude in event of War between Germany and Russia, 347. French Reply: "France would do that which her interests dic- tated," 347, 385. War declared by Germany, 427, 429. French Ambassador's Departure (Re- port) . 476. French Colonies — Refusal to give Undertaking as to, 303. French Military and Naval Attache's Letter to Ministers (1913), 532, 534. Great Britain — Military and Naval Preparations, Assurance that Measures had no aggressive character, 343. Neutrality — Efforts to obtain Assurance of, 303, 3S1, 426. British Replv, 334, 362. Views on, 286. Ships, Detention of, 391, 413, 416, 430, 456. Ultimatum from, 432, 437, 441, 442. 604 Index Germany — Cont. Great Britain — cont. War declared by Great Britain, 460. Imperial Chancellor's S] ch before Reichstag, on 4 August, 573. Interests in Belgium entrusted to United States Minister, 436, 496. Japanese Ultimatum, 506. German decision not to reply, 508. " Kriegsgef ahrzustand " declared, 356, 364. 394. Luxemburg — Neutrality. 352, 401,461, 405, 408, 413, 414, 415, 424, 436. Chancellor's View, 436. Mediation proposals, Attitude towards. 34, 163, 227, 229, 261, 265, 294 301, 363, 310, 329, 360, 361, 362, — 213, 218. 222. 246, 250, 252, 286, 325, 326, 355, — 198, 235. 312. 313, 314, 311, 342, — 212,-159. 226, 241, 256, 257, 554. 555. 557. 564, 595. Military anil Naval Preparations, 331. Commencement, 2S4, 340, 364, 365. Minister leaves Serbia, 481. Mobilization, Action to be taken in event, of Rus- sian Mobilization, 227. 364. Alleged Mobilization of Army and Navy. 342, 384, 412. Official Denial, 323. Ordered. 409. Preliminary Steps. 323. 324, 356, 364. 370. 394. Secret — Alleged Secret Measures, 357, 381, 367. Naval Preparations, 166, 321. Notification to Belgium of Breaches of International Law by Prance, 420. Seeking to gain time — Russian view, 322. Prince Henry — Telegrams to and from King George, 562. Reservists ordered to hold themselves in readiness, French Report, 190. Responsibility for War on Russia. — Russian Defence, 419. Russia, relations with — Ultimatum to Russia requiring De- mobilization, 278, 262, 316, 320, 322. 3 17. 356, 366, 375, 377, 386. 3S6, 36(1, 365, 366, 461. War declared by Germany, 398, 400, 41)5, 466. Secret French Report concerning Arms. Aims and Obligations of the National Policy, 538. Summary of Events, 551. Support of Austria-Hungary, 172, 173, 174, 261. War not desired, 161, 163. Contrary British and French Reports, 375, 377, 411. Great Britain, Ambassador to Austria Hungary — Summary of Events from 22 July, 514. Great Britain — Cont. Ambassador to Berlin, Final Interview and Departure, 185. Assurance to France that Fleet will protect French Coasts and Ship- ping against German Fleet, 415. Attitude if France and Russia reject Reasonable Proposal, 363. Attitude in case of Violation of Bel- gium, 595. Attitude in case of War between Ger- many, Russia and France, 595, 596. Attitude in Event of an Attack on France, or a General War, 174, 216, 23S, 241, 305. 367, 326, 334, 335, 337. 351, 366, 368, 3S1, 388, 415. Correspondence between Sir E. Grey and M. Paul Cambon (Novem- ber, 1612), 337. Russia expects that England will side definitely with her, 172. Austria-Hungary — Relations with, 432, 468. War declared by Great Britain, 49S, 526. Austro-Russian Relations — Attitude, 365. Austro-Servian Relations — Attitude. 54, 74. S3, S4, 150, 151, 153. 181, 213. 218, 219, 243, 244, 261, 365. Sec also Media- tion Proposals. Ultimatum of 23 July — Attitude 66, 86, 61, 92, 93, 161, 165. Servian Reply, Views on, 93, 165, 229. 238, 281. Time-limit, Extension, Proposals for — Attitude, 92 Belgian King's Appeal to King George, 423, 455. Belgian Reply to German Proposal after Fall of Liege, Approval of, 467. Belgium — Appeal from, 442. Neutrality of — Actions to be taken, 466, 415, 424, 426. 434, 438, 441, 456. 460, 595, 596. Agreement for Joint Action. 462, 463. Inquiry to Belgium, 348, 366. Belgian Reply, 391. Inquiry to Prance and Germany, 351, 365, 366, 457. French Reply, 358, 378. German Refusal to Reply, 378, 381. Protest against German Demand to Belgium to allow Free Pas- sage of Troops, 455. Relations previous to the Outbreak of the War, 577. Index 605 Great Britain — Cont. Communications with Representatives at — Belgrade, 90, 93, 164, 165, 196, 267, 268, 302. Berlin, 34, 56, 92, 163, 166, 168, 193, 194, 227, 229, 265, 268, 270, 294, 297, 298, 299, 303, £06, 307, 308, 332, 334, 335, 361, 362, 364, 365, 3S6, 3S7, 388, 391, 392, 393, 409, 412, 413, 416, 430, 455, 456, 457. Brussels, 366, 391, 413, 430, 456, 457. Constantinople, 302. Luxemburg, 408, 414. Paris, 91, 160, 161, 168, 194, 195, 227, 258, 264, 305, 333, 336, 337, 365, 366, 368, 389, 390, 393, 394, 396, 415, 431. Rome, 61. 164, 168, 194, 233, 263, ■ 266, 267, 301, 302, 305, 310, 334, 360. St. Petersburgh, 87, 160, 161, 165, 168, 228, 229, 230, 261, 270, 295, 299, 300, 335, 363, 365, 385, 394, 410. Vienna, 61, 86, 89, 164, 167, 192, 196, 226, 231, 259, 262, 265, 296, 297, 300, 309, 329, 330, 367, 391, 395. 411, 514. Congo. See that Title. Declaration of Intention to support France, 333. Fleet — Mobilized, 381. Non-dispersal of, after Review, 218, 230, 231. Protection assured to French Coasts and French Shipping, 3S1, 406, 407, 425, 453. Germany — Ultimatum to, 432, 437, 441, 442, 457. War declared by Great Britain, 460, 488. King George — ■ Letters from French President, 351, 392. The King's Reply, 598. Personal Message to the Czar, 590. The Czar's Reply, 591. Telegrams from and to German Em- peror, 593, 594. Telegrams to and from Prince Henry of Prussia, 592. Luxemburg — Neutrality, British Atti- tude, 406. Mediation Proposals, 241, 247, — 91, 92, 194, 195, 228, 265, 268, 270, 294, 305, 306, 308, 363, —213 219, 291, — 174, 233, 396, — 590, 592, 593, 594. Military and Naval Preparations — German Inquiry and British Reply, 343. Secret — with Belgium, 577. Navy — See Subheading: Fleet above. Great Britain — Cont. Neutrality of, 87, 161, 165, 230. German Efforts to obtain Assurance of, 303, 381, 426. British Reply, 334, 362. German Views, 286. Parliament — Support of Government Policy, 427. Peace — Agreement not to conclude separate Peace during War, 521. Serbian Appeal, 99, 219. Serbian Prime Minister's Thanks for Speech in House of Commons on 27 July, 302. Ships, Detention of, 391, 413, 416, 430, 456. Holland. See Title: Netherlands. Italy, Austro-Serbian Relations — Mediation Proposals, See Title: Me- diation Proposals. Ultimatum of 23 July, Time limit — Extension, proposals for, and atti- tude, 196. Views on, and Efforts, 28, 53, 78, 168, 181, 183, 184, 267. See also Title: Mediation Proposals. Declaration of Neutrality, 379, 431. Mediation Proposals, 194, 220, 221, 233, 263, 281, 360. Position of, with regard to the Austrian Note to Servia, 149, 181, 183, 184, 186, 221. Japan, Austria-Hungary — Relations broken off, 508. Declaration of Neutrality as regards Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia, while having no interest in Servia, 241. Ultimatum to Germany, 506. German Decision not to Reply, 508. Luxemburg, Belgian Minister's Departure, 495. French Minister's Departure, 464. Minister of State — Telegrams to Sir E. Grey (2 August), 408, 414. Neutrality of — ■ British Attitude, 406. Inquiry to France and Germany, 352, 383. French Reply, 384. German Reply, 405. German Military Measures to insure against attack by French Army, 352. 401, 404, 405, 408, 413, 414, 415, 424. Chancellor's View, 436. Mediation Proposals, 163, 165, 166. Austrian-Hungary, Attitude, 241, 276, 278, 280, 345, 373,-265, 302, 32S, 329, 392, 393, 394, — 254, 375, 377, 397. France, Attitude, 91, 227, 258, 260, 264. — 220, 248, 251, 252, 2S0, 290,-237, 313, 314. 606 Index Mediation Proposals — Conl. Germany, Attitude, 592, 593, 594, — 34, 163, 227, 229. 261, 265, 294, 301, 303, 310, 329, 360, 361, 362,-213, 218, 222, 249, 250, 252, 286, 325. 326, 355, — 19s, 235, 312, 314, 341, 342,-212, — 554, — 159, 220, 241, 250, 257. Great Britain, Attitude, 241, 247, — 590, 592, 593, 594,-91. 92, 194, 195, 228, 205, 268, 270, 299, 305, 306, 308, 363,-213. 219, 291, — 174. 233, 396. Italian Views, 194, 233, 263, 360,— 220. 221, 2S1. Occupation of Belgrade or other point a condition of accepting Media- tion, 332, 335, 353. Russia. Attitude, — 243, 27s, — 590, 596,-260, 261, 202. 294, 297. 299, 328, 385, 392, 393, — 2s:;. 321. 322, 323, 353. 354, 381,— 272, 341, 370. Serbia, Attitude. 53, 54, 58, 78. Urgency of Action, 272. Netherlands, British Information that Great Britain expects — will resist German pres- sure and Offer of Support, 195. Declaration of Neutrality, His. Integrity of — German Assurance, 303. War Buoying in the Scheldt, 434, 463, 475, 476, 482. Norway, British Information that Great Britain expects — will resist. German pressure and Offer of Support, 195. Peace, Agreement of Allies not to conclude separate Peace during War. 521. Efforts. SeeTitle: Mediation Proposals. Russia, Austro-Hungary, Relations with — Direct. Conversations, proposals for, 185, 229, 251, 252, 251, 286, 323, 353. Refusal, 285, 287, 297. Engagement to stop Military Prep- arations if Austria takes cer- tain course, 331, 333. German Advice, 297. Mediation Proposals. See tint Title. War declared I a- Austria, 459, 481 . Austro-Serbian Relations — Austrian Statement that her Declara- tion of Readiness to respect Ser- bian Integrity and Sovereign Rights had been received by Russia in Silence — Contradic- tion by Russian Ambassador in Paris, 398. Ultimatum of 23 July — Redrafting of certain Articles pro- posed by Russia, 197. German Attitude, 237. Serbian Reply, Views on, 235. Russia — Cont. Austro-Serbian Relations — Conl. Ultimatum of 23 July — Cont. Time limit, Extension, proposals for, views on. 100, 107, 196. Views on and Attitude, 71, 179, 202, 278, 280, 347, 373, — 87, 89, 101, 168, 193, 22.S, 201, 367,— 15, 53, 58, 74, 82, 83, ,84, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 181, 184, 185, 217, — 170. 196, 237, 238. See also Mediation Proposals. Belgium — Appeal from. 442. Neutrality of — Agreement for Joint Action, 463. Reply to German Proposal after Fall of Liege, 499. Communications with Representa- tives at — Belgrade, 63, 94, 98, 170, 174. Berlin, 90, 97, 171. 19s, 199, 235, 237, 272, 294, 310, 312, 341. 342, 370. Fiume, 270. London, 260, 261, 294, 32S, — 94, 96, 171, 172, 174, 233, 234, 235. 23S, 271), 272, 312, 314, 341, 333. 370, 371, 396, 397. Nish, 310, 340. Paris, 94. 96, 97, 171, 173, 198, 199, 234, 235, 312, 314. 316, 341. 370. 397, 398. Prague. 197. Rome, 94, 96. 196. 235, 341, 370. Vienna, 94, 170, 197, 235, 238, 271, 272, 328. 341, 309, 370. Czar — Personal Message from King George. 590. The Czar's Reply, 591. Telegrams to and from German Emperor, 302, 367, 410, 454, 596. French Declaration of Determination p. Support, 314. 316. Germany puts Responsibility for War on Russia, 215, 282, 3S1, 482. Germany, Relations with. G3. German Ultimatum requiring De- mobilization, 366, 386, 389, 390, 409, 411. 310, 396, 27S, 347. Germany declares War, 405, 406, — .398, — 400. Germany's Reasons for War with Russia, 551. Great Britain, Expectations that England will side with Russia and France, 172. Mediation Proposals. Attitude and Efforts, 260. 261, 21,2, 29 1, 297, 299, 328, 385, 392, 393, — 2S3, 321, 322, 323, 353, 354, 381,— 237, 341, 370,-243, 278,-586. Mobilisation, 294, 298, 299, 362, 364, 365, 391, -288, 289, 292, 320, 323, 357, — 288, 289, Index 607 Russia — Cont. Mobilisation — Cont. 292, 320, 323, 357,-225,— 312, 370, — 246, 280, 346. Denial, Russian — of Mobilisa- tion, 179. Offer to Stop Military Prepara- tions if Austria takes certain course, 322. Suspension of, 321. Vienna Press did not publish Russian Communication, Ex- planation, 323. Mobilisation against Austria immediately, if Austrian Troops Cross Servian Frontier, 295. Peace, Declaration not to con- clude separate Peace during War, 521. Troops Cross German Frontier, 413. Unreadiness for War, 294. Salonica, Austrian Designs as to, British View, 302. Sandjak, Austria has no intentions to advance into or occupy, 3S5, 389. British View, 302. . Scheldt, War Buoying Measures, 434, 464, 475, 476, 482. Serajevo Murders, 1, 2, 3. 4, 8. Austrian Dossier sent to the Powers, 101 . Austrian and Serbian View, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 25, 27, 28, 31, 500, 527. Austrian Official Reports of State of Serbian Feeling, 2, 3, 6, 14, 36. Criminal Inquiry, Conclusions of, 86. Extracts from Records of the Court at Serajevo' touching the Pro- ceedings against Gavrilo Princip and Confederate, 130. Nish Local Committee of Narodna Odbrana, 138. Origin of the Plot, 131. Origin of the Bombs, 132. Reports from Austria and Serbian Alle- gations, 4, 5, 6, 7. Serbian Press Comments, 135. Transport of Assailants, and of the Wea- pons from Servia to Bosnia, 133. Serbia, Amsfeld Anniversary, Celebration of, 2, 6. Appeal to Great Britain, 99, 219. Appeal to the Powers, 98. Austro-Hungary, Relations with — Austrian Intentions, 302, 369. Austrian Minister leaves Belgrade, 174, — 158, 186, — 165, 192, 194. Austrian Official Reports as to Serbian Feelings towards Austria, 2, 3, 6, 14, 36. Serbia — Cont. Austro-Hungary, Relations with — Cont. Austrian Statement that her Decla- ration of Readiness to Respect Serbian Integrity and Sovereign Rights had been Received by Russia in Silence — Contradic- tion, 398. See also Title: Mediation Proposals. Berlin Press, Attitude, 97. British Attitude, 305,-54, 74, 83, 84, 150, 151, 153, 181, 213. 218, 219, 291, — 174, — 243, 244. See also Title: Mediation Proposals. Events from Date of Serajevo Mur- ders to Presentation of Austrian Note to Serbia of 23 July — French Reports, and French Attitude and Reports. .Sec Title: Austria-Hungary, French Atti- tude and French Reports. German Views and Attitude, 551, — 21, 25, 27,-482, 500,-12, 39, 53, 54, 58, 59, 78, 80, 81, 151, 153, 155, 157, 181, 186, 187, 21.3, 215, 254, 282, 283, 286, 288, 379,-97, 172, 173, 174, 198. See also Title: Mediation Proposals. Italian Views and Attitude, 53, 78, 181, 183, 184,-28. Localisation of the Dispute, — German Statement, 56, 78, 90, 150, 172. Mediation Proposals. Sec that Title. Military Action, 163, 196, 226. Military Operations not to be under- taken immediately, 166, 167. Narodna Odbrana Society — Appeal of, in Servian Official Gazette, 123. Nish Local Committee — Attitude on Serajevo Murders, 13s. Organization and Work of — , 101, 116, 124. Work of — , Deposition by Trifko Krstanovic, 124. Non-interference by the Powers. See Subhead, Localisation of Dispute, above. Occupation of Belgrade or other Towns as a Basis for Negotiations, 332, 335, 353. Russian Views and Attitude, 71, 179, 202, 278, 280, 347, 373, — 168, 193, — 15, 53, 58, 74, 82, 83, 84, 152, 153, 154, 155, 196, 237, 238. See also Title: Mediation Proposals. Serbia's willingness to entertain require- ments, provided that only judi- cial cooperation is asked by Austria, 38. Serbian Appeal to the Powers, Possi- bility of, 161. Serbian Attitude and Views, 53, 54, 78,-4. 6, 31. Serbian Note of 1908, 86, 161, 261. 608 Index Serbia — Cont. Serbian Preparations before Delivery of Austrian Note, 141, ISO. Serbian Press, Hostile Attitude prior to Serajevo Murders, 112. Serbian Territory not to be seized, 14, 203, — 103, 30S, 309, 395. Scrl dan War Office — Pictures of a nature hostile to Austria-Hungary, 140. Situation before Presentation of Ulti- matum of 23 July, 34, 50. 61, 86. Sokol Society Dusan the Strong — Report on the Activities of — , in Kragujevac, 121. Special Points for Great Britain, 243. Turkish Views, 217. Ultimatum of 23 July, 80, 90. — 03, — 04, 98, 99,-7:,. 7s. 158. Austrian Official Commentary, 51. Austrian Statement that Note is not an Ultimatum bu1 a Demarche with a time limit, 160. 161, 236. Austro-Hungarian Views, so, 89. British Views regarding Reply, 93, 165. British Attitude, 66,-86, 91, 92, 93, 101, 165. French Advice to Serbia Regarding Reply, 160. French Attitude and Views, S7, 91, 160, 161,-67. German Attitude and Views, 90, 92. German Denial of Prior Knowledge, 163, 166, —38, 53, 81, 1 19, 150, 153, 1X7, J50, — 172. 173, 174. German Prior Knowledge ("unable to confirm ")i 329. German Support of Austrian Action, 172, 173, 174. Italian Views, 267. Point 5 — Austrian Explanation, 148. Redrafting of certain articles proposed by Russia, 197. German Attitude, 237. Russian Attitude and Views, 69, 70. — 87, 161, 228, 261, 307, 191. Serbian Attitude, 90. Serbian Reply, 164, 169, 175, 195, — 156, 157, 158. Austrian Official Commentaries. Austrian Views, 198, 221, 251. British Views, 229, 231. 238. German Views, 192, 194. 235. Non-publication of in German Press, 272. Serbia — Cont. Ultimatum, Serbian Reply to — Cont. Refusal of Austria to accept. 174. 231, 236. Russian Views, 235. Special Points to be brought before ( ireat Britain, 57, 65. Time Limit — Dangers of, 61. Proposal for Extension, 152-158, 170, 171, 181. Austrian Refusal, 140, 141. British Attitude, 290. German Attitude, 163. Italian Attitude, 196. Russian Attitude, 160, 167, 396. Unconditional Acceptance de- manded, 164. War Declared by Austria-Hungary, 241, 268, 296,-247, —273, 344, 359. British ( 'harm'' d'Affaires Leaves Bel- grade with Serbian Government, 165. Government Leaves Belgrade, 165, 174, 176. Integrity to be respected, 264. Kragujevac — Work of Sokol Society Dusan the Strong, 121. Mediation Proposals, Attitude towards, 53, 54, 58, 7s. Minister Leaves Berlin, 45s. Minister Leaves Vienna, 177. Mobilisation Ordered, 142, 176. Prince Regent — Appeal to the Czar, 292, — 96. The Czar's Reply, 237, 315. Speech from the Throne to the Skupschtina after Declaration of War, 340. Summary of Events by Minister at Vienna, 500. Triple Entente. See also Names of the Powers. Declaration not to conclude separate Peace during War, 521. Turkey, Austro-Servian Relations, Views on, 217. Vienna, Demonstrations, s, 9. War between Great Powers, German Attitude, 294. Printed in the United States of America. APPENDIX THE SEVERAL OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF COLLECTED DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS IN PHOTOGRAPHIC RE- PRODUCTION K. U. K. MINISTERIUM DES AUSSERN. DIPLOMATISCHE AKTENSTUCKE VORGESCHICHTE des RRIEGES 1914. W1EN 1915. AUS DER K. K. HOF UND STAATSDRUCKEREI. INHALTSVERZEICHJMS. Seitc 1. Legationsrat Ritter von Storck, Belgrad, 29. Juni 1914. Freudenkund- gebungen in Belgrad bei der Naehricht von der Ermordung des 'Herrn Erzherzogs Thronfolgers 1 2. Legationsrat Ritter von Storck, Belgrad, 30. Juni 1914. Die serbische Polizei hat keine MaGnahmen getroffen, um die Faden des Attentates in Serbien zu verfolgen 2 3. Generalkonsul Jehlitschka, Uskiib, 1. Juli 1914. Freudenkundgebungen in Uskiib und Pristina bei Bekanntwerden des Attentates in Sarajevo 2 4. Graf Szecsen, Paris, 4. Juli 1914. Der President der franzosischen Republik spricht die Uberzeugung aus, die serbische Regierung werde Osterreich-Ungarn bei der gerichtlichen Untersuchung und der Verfol- gung eventueller Mitsclmldiger Entgegenkommen zeigen 3 5. Gerent Herr Hoflehner, Nisch, 6. Juli 1914. Freudige Genugtuung in Nisch iiber das Sarajevoer Attentat 4 6. Freiherr von Giesl, Belgrad, 21. Juli 1914. Die Politik Serbiens verfolgt nur ein Ziel, die Abtrennung der von Sudslawen bewohnten Gebiete Osterreich-Ungarns und dessen sehlieCliche Vernichtung als GroOmacht. Serbische PreDkampagne voll Liige, Had und Geringseh'atzung. Eine weitere Schadigung der Stellung der Monarchie kann nicht mehr zu- gelassen werden 4 7. An Freiherrn von Giesl in Belgrad, Wien, 22. Juli 1914. Note der k. u. k. Regierung an die serbische Regierung 7 8. An die k. u. k. Botschafter in Berlin, Rom, Paris, London, St. Petersburg und Konstantinopel, Wien, 22. Juli 1914. Mitteilung der an die serbische Regierung gerichteten Note. Kommentar zu dieser Note, in welchem die serbischen Machenschaften und Umtriebe gegen die Monarchie, sowie die Griinde dargelegt werden, aus denen die k. u. k. Regierung der provokatorischen Haltung Serbiens gegenuber so viel Langmut bewahrte , 11 9. An Graf Mensdorff in London, Wien, 23. Juli 1911. Die serbische Regierung hat keinerlei MafJnahmen zur Aufdeokung der nach Belgrad weisenden Spuren des Sarajevoer Attentates ergriffen, sondern vielmehr getrachtet, diese Spuren zu verwischen. Die kurze Befristung der an Serbien gerichteten Forderungen war unerlafilich, urn den der k. u. k. Regierung aus langj'ahrigen Erfahrungen wohlbekannten serbischen Yer- schleppungskunsten keine Handhabe zu bieten 13 10. Graf Mensdorff, London, 24. Juli 1914. Mitteilung der an Serbien ge- richteten Note an Sir E. Grey, der Bedenken gegen die kurze Be- fristung und Besorgnis wegen der Riickwirkung auf den europ'aischen Frieden aufierte. Darlegung des Standpunktes der k. u. k. Regierung: Verteidigung unserer vitalsten Interessen; vollkommener Mifierfolg der Serbien gegeniiber bisber stets beobachteten konzilianten Haltung . . 14 11. Graf Szecsen, Paris, 24. Juli 1914. Mitteilung der an Serbien gerich- teten Note und Darlegung des Standpunktes der k, u. k. Regierung: Es handle sieh um eine Frage, welche dirckt zwischen Osterreich- Ungarn und Serbien ausgetragen werden mufi; das Aufhb'ren der durch die serbische Wuhlarbe.it seit Jahren verursaohten Unrube liege aber im allgemeinen europ'aischon Interesse. Der interimistisohe fran- zosische Minister des AuJlern vermied, die Haltung Serbiens irgend- wie zu beschonigen oder zu verteidigen 15 12. Graf Szeesen, Paris. 24. Juli 1914. Deutseber Botschafter ist beauf- tragt, dem franzosisohen Kabinett die Anffassung seiner Regierung mitzuteilen, dafi serbisoher Streitfall Angelegenheit sei, die nur Oster- reich-Ungarn und Serbien angehe 16 13. Graf Szecsen, Paris, 24. Juli 1914. Deutseber Botschafter hat Auftrag ausgefiihrt. Franzosische Regierung teilt deutsche Auffassung und hofft, dafj die Kontroverse eine direkte und friedliche Losang finden werde • ■ 16 14. Graf Szdpary, St. Petersburg, 24. Juli 1914. Mitteilung der an Serbien gerichteten Note nnd Erorterruig des osterreichisch-ungui- schen Standpunktes. Einwendungen Herrn Sazonows. Auf seine Dar- stellungsweise. .il-s ob Osterreich-Ungarn den Krieg wolle, wurde erwidert, die Monarchie sei die friedliebendste Macbt der Welt, doch miisse der Bedrobung unserer Dvnastie durch serbische Bomben und unseres Territoriums durch die serbischen revolution'aren Umtriebe ein Ende bereitet werden 1? 15. Russiscbes Communique, 24. Juli 1914. Ruliland konne einem oster- reichisch-nngaiisch-serbischen KonHikte gegeniiber nicbt indifferent bleiben 18 Seita 16. Graf Szapary, St. Petersburg, 24. Juli 1914. Der Bemerkung des russischen Ministers des Aufiern gegeniiber, Streitfall zwischen Oster- reich-Ungarn und Serbien sei keine auf diese Staaten beschrankte Angelegenheit und Ruflland kiinne es nieht gleiebgiltig hinnehmen, wenn Osterreich-Ungarn die Absicbt hatte, Serbien n aufzufressen : ', antwortete deutscher Botschafter, Osterreich-Ungarn liege dies vollig feme, eine Einmischung in seine Differenz mit Serbien konne es jedocb nicbt zugeben 18 17. An Graf Mensdorff in London, Wien, 24. Juli 1914. Sohritt in Belgrad hat nieht Charakter eines formellen Ultimatums, sondern einer belristeten Demarche ■ 15 18. An Graf Szapary in St. Petersburg, Wien, 24. Juli 1914. Es wurde dem russischen Geschaftstrager erklart, daO Osterreich-Ungarn keine Demiitigung Serbians und keine Gebietserwerbung bezweeke, sondern. nur die Erbaltung des Bestehenden, sowie die Verurteilung und Unter- druckung der gegen den Bestand der Monarchie gerichteten grofi- serbischen Stromungen • . . 20 19. An die k. u. k. Botscbafter in Berlin, Rom, Paris, London, St. Peters- burg und Konstantinopel, Wien, 25. Juli 1914. Dossier, betreffend die grollserbische Propaganda und ihre Zusammenhange mit dem Sarajevoer Attentate 21 20. An Sektionschef Freiherrn von Maccbio in Wien, Lambncb, 25. Juli 1914. Dem vom russischen Geschaftstrager in Wien gestellten Ver- langen einer Fristerstreckung fiir die an Serbien gerichteten Forde- rungen kann nieht stattgegeben warden C9 1 21. An. Graf Szapary in St. Petersburg, Bad Ischl, 2.5. Juli 1914. Mit- teilung und Begriindung dieses ablebnenden Standpunktes 09 22. Freiherr von Giesl, Belgrad, 25. Juli 1914. Administrative und mil i- tarische Vorbereitungen in Serbien 70 23. Freiherr von Giesl, Semlin, 25. Juli 1914. Allgemeine Mobilisierung in Serbien angeordnet 70 24. Freiherr von Giesl. Semlin. 25. Juli 1914. Abbruch der dijiloma- tisohen Beziehungen zu Serbien infolge ungeniigender Antwort der Belgrader Regierung auf die bsterreichisch-ungarische Note .... 71 25. Note der koniglich serbischen Regierung vom 12./25. Juli 1914 . . 71 26. An Graf Szapary in St. Petersburg, Wien, 25. Juli 1914. Die k. u. k. Regierung konnte sich durch die Moglichkeit eines. Zusammenstotles mit liuliland nieht in ihrer Stellungnahme gegen Serbien beirren lassen, weil grundlegende staatspolitisehe Konsiderationen Osterreich- Ungarn vor die Notwendigkeit stellten, der Situation ein Ende zu bereiten, dali ein russischer Freibrief Serbien die dauernde ungestrafte VI Seite und anstrafbare Bedrohung der Monarchie ermogliche. Die k. u. k. Regierung hofft, daft Rufiland irn Hinblicke 'auf das den Balkanstaaten bisher bewiesene Wohlwollen Osterreich-Ungarns und auf die Erkla- rung der k. u. k. Regierung, dall sie keinerlei territorialen Gewinn anstrebe und die Souveranitat Serbiens nicht antasten wolle, nicht in die Aktion Osterreich-Ungarns gegen Serbien eingreifen werde . . 74 27. An Graf Szapary in St. Petersburg, Wien, 25. Juli 1914. Die For- derung der Beteiligung von k. u. k. Funktionaren bei der Unter- driiekung der subversiven Bewegung in Serbien entsprang lediglicb praktiscben Rucksichten und nicht der Absicht, die Souveranitat Serbiens zu tangieren 77 28. Graf Szapary, St. Petersburg, 26. Juli 1914. Deutscher Botsehafter in St. Petersburg warnt russischen Minister des Aufjern, dall russische MobilisierungsmalSnahmen gegen Deutschland unaufhaltsam den Krieg herbeifuhren wiirden. Deutscher Militiirattache erklart russischem Kriegsminister, Mobilmachung gegen Osterreich-Ungarn wurde eine sehr bedrohliche Situation hervorrufen. Kriegsminister gibt sein Ehrenwort, dall keinerlei Mobilmachungsordre ergangen 77 29. An Graf Mensdorff in London, Wien, 26. Juli 1914. Auftrag, Sir E. Grey aufmerksam zu machen, daG die schon drei Stunden vor Uber- reichung der serbischen Antwortnote angeordnete allgemeine Mobi- lisierung der serbischen Armee beweise, wie weniu Neigunu; in lielgrad zu einer friedlichen Austragung des Streifalles bestand und win unauf- richtig der angeblich versbhulichc Tenor der serbischen Erklarung sei . 78 30. An die k. u. k. Botsehafter in Berlin. Rom, London, Paris und St. Peters- burg, Wien, 26. Juli 1914. Angesichts der Ablehnung der osterreichisch- ungarischen Forderungen seitens der serbischen Regierung sieht sich die k. u. k. Regierung in die Notwendigkeit versetzt, Serbien zu einer grundsatzlichen Anderung seiner bisherigen feindseligen Haltung zu zwingen 7 8 31. Graf Szapary, St. Petersburg, 27. Juli 1914. Der k. u. k. Botsehafter erklart dem russischen Minister des Aufiern, dali Osterreich-Ungarn ein Vorstofi am Balkan oder gar ein Praventivkrieg gegen Rullland vollig feme liege. Das Ziel unserer Aktion sei Selbsterhaltiing und Notwehr. Osterreich-Ungarn habe keineswegs die Absicht. russische Interressen zu bedrohen oder gar mit Rufiland Streit suchen zu wollen. Erorterung der an Serbien gestellten Forderungen Osterreich- 79 32. An Graf Szapary in St. Petersburg, Wien, 27. Juli 1914. K. u. k. Regierung erklart, dall die Monarchic, solange der Krieg zwischen vn Seite Osterreich-Ungarn und Serbian lokalisiert bleibe, keinerlei territoriale , Eroberungen beabsichtige 80 33. Graf Szb'gyeny, Berlin, 27. Juli 1914. „Militarische Vorsorgen" in RuMand 80 34. An die k. n. k. Botschafter in Berlin, Rom, London, Paris und St. Petersburg, Wien, 27. Juli 1914. Mitteilung der Note der konig- lich serbischen Regierung vom 12./25. Juli 1914 und des Kom- mentares der k. u. k. Regierung zu dieser Note 80 35. Graf Szbgyeny, Berlin, 28. Juli 1914. Der englische Vorschlag, den osterreichisch-ungarisch-serbischen StreitfaU einer in London abzu- haltenden Konferenz zur Regelung zu iiberlassen. wurde von Deutsch- land abgelehnt, da es seinen Bundesgenossen in der Auseinander- setzung mit Serbien nicht vor ein europ'aisches Gericht ziehen lassen konne 90 36. Freiherr von Muller, Tokio, 28. Juli, 1914. Erklarung der offizibsen japanischen „Times", daft die japanische Regierung im Kriegsfalle strengste Neutralitat bewahren werde 90 37. Note an das koniglich serbische Ministerium des AufSern, Wien, 28. Juli 1914. Kriegserklarung an Serbien 90 38. An Graf Szbgyeny in Berlin, Wien, 28. Juli 1914. Es ist Sir E. Grey dargelegt vorden, daii Osterreich-Ungarn weder territoriale Erobe- rungen nooh die Vernichtung der serbischen Unabh'angigkeit beab- sichtige. sondern Genugtuung f'iir die Vergangenheit und Garantien fiir die Zukunft verlange. Der englische Konfercnzvorschlag erscheint, insoweit er sich auf unseren Konflikt mit Serbien bezieht, angesichts des eingetretenen Ki-iegszustandes durch die Ereignisse uberholt. Konzenti'ierung der englischen Flotte 91 39. An Graf Mensdorff in London, Wien, 28. Juli 1914. Auftrag, Sir E. Grey die groDserbische Propaganda und ihre Zusammenhiinge mit dem Sarajevoer Morde auseinanderzusetzen und ihm darzulegen, dad das Entgegenkommen der serbischen Antwortnote nui" ein schein- bares war, bestimmt, Europa zu tauschen, so dali keinerlei Garantien fiir die Zukunft geboten w'aren 92 40. An Graf Szapary in St. Petersburg, Wien, 28. Juli 1914. Wunsch der russischen Regierung, mit dem Wiener Kabinette behufs Abanderung einzelner seitens Osterreich-Ungarns an Serbien gerichteten Forde- rungen zu verhandeln. Dieser Wunsch muQte abgelehnt werden, da die gestellten Forderungen unerlalMich sind, um die gegen den Be- stand der Monarchie gerichtete serbische Bewegung zum Stillstand zu bringen. Serbien habe bereits durch Anordnung der allgemeineu vra Seite Mobilisierung einen feindseligen Akt begangen. Trotzdem habe die k. u. k. Regierung noch drei Tage gewartet. Nun habe Serbien die 'Feindseligkeitm an der ungarischen Grenze erbffhet. Eine friedlicbe Sanierung des Yerhaltnisses zu Serbien sei, nunraehr unmbglich . . 93 41. An Graf Mensdorff in London, Wien, 28. Juli 1914. Der englische Botschafter hat den Konferenzvorsohlag Sir E. Greys dem k. u. k. Minister des AuCern auseinandergesetzt und Englands Vermittlung im Konflikte zwischen Osterreich-Ungarn und Serbien angeboten. Es wurde ihm erwidert, dad die Verhinderung der Feindseligkeiten infolge Kriegsausbrucb.es nicht mehr moglich sei. Ein Transigieren auf Grund der serbischen Antwortnote sei angesiehts der woblbekannten serbischen Winkelziige nicht moglich. Der Friede wiirde nicht dadurch gerettet werden, dali sich Groflmachte hinter Serbien stellen und fiir dessen Straffreiheit eintreten. Serbien wiirde ermutigt und der Friede bald wieder in Frage gestellt werden 94' 42. An Graf Szogyeny in Berlin, Wien, 28. Juli 1914. Ersuchen an die deut6che Regierung, das russische Kabinett darauf aufmerksam zu machen. dali die Mobilisierung der Militarbezirke Kiew, Odessa, Moskau und Kasan finer Bedrohung Osterreich-Ungams gleichkame und von der Monarchic und Deutschland mit den weitestgehenden milit'arisehen Gegenmaliregeln beantwortet werden miiilte 96 43. An Graf Szogyeny in Berlin, Wien. 28. Juli 1914. Deutsche Regierung hat Anregung Sir E. Greys, dali das Wiener Kabinett die Ant- wortnote der serbischen Regierung als geniigend betrachte oder als Grundlage fiir Besprechungen unter den Kabinetten annehme, der k. u. k. Regierung zur Erwagung iibermittelt 96 44. An die k. u. k. Botschafter in St. Petersburg, London, Paris und Rom, Wien, 29. Juli 1914. Im Hinblicke auf die oben erwahnte Anregung Sir E. Greys werden die Griinde wiederholt, weshalb die ser- bische Antwortnote nngenugend und hinterhaltig ist. Die Annahme, als ob die Aktion Osterreich-Ungams gegen Serbien Ruilland und dessen Einflufj am Balkan treffen wolle, hatte zur Voraussetzung, dali die gegen die Monarchic gerichtete Propaganda nicht allein serbischen, sondern audi nissisclien Ursprunges sei. Im Zeitpunkte des in Wien gemachten Schrittes der deutschen Regierung war Angelegenheit der serbischen Antwortnote durch Kriegsausbruch schon iiberholt. EinfluC- nahme der englischen Regierung auf Ruilland im Siime der Erhaltung des Fiiedens zwischen den GroDmaohten wiirde dankbar begriifit werden 97 45. Graf Szteen, Paris, 20. Juli 1914. Deutscher Botschafter in Paris wurde beauftragt, dortige Regierung aufmerksam zu machen, dali IX Seite franzosische mibtarische 'Vorbereitungen Deutschland zu gleichen Mali- nahmen zwingen wiirden, wodurch beide Staaten trotz ihrer Friedens- liebe zu gefahrlicher Mobilisierung gedrangt werden kbnnten. Deutsch- land z'ahle auf die Unterstiitzung Frankreichs zur Lokalisierung des Konfliktes zwischen Osterreich-Ungarn und Serbian 98 46. Graf Szogyeny, Berlin, 29. Juli 1914. Deutsche Regierung hat am 26. Juli in St. Petersburg erklaren lassen, dafi sich Deutschland bei einer Fortsetzung der militarisehen Eiistungen RulMands veranlaUt sehen konnte, zu mobilisieren 99 47. Graf Szapary, St. Petersburg, 29. Juli 1914. Der k. u. k. Botschafter betonte Herrn Sazonow gegeniiber, daO das Wiener Kabinett, welches kein russisches [nteresse zu verletzen, kein serbisches Territorium za erwerben und die Souveidnitat Serbiens nicht anzutasten wiinsche, immer bereit sei, mit St. Petersburg iiber bsterreichisch-ungarisehe und russische Interessen Fiihlung zu nehmen. Die Bedenken, daft die gegen Serbien mobilisierten siidlichen Korps Rufiland bedrohen, kbnnten nicht ernst genomraen werden. Es sei dringend geboten, dem zu befiirchtenden militiirisehen Lizitieren ein rasches Ende zu bereiten. Der k. u. k. Botschafter raachte in ernsten Worten auf den Eindruck aufmerksam, den die bevorstehende umfangreiche russische Mobili- sierung in Osterreich-Ungarn hervorrufen wtirde 99 48. An Graf Szogyeny in Berlin, Wien, 29. Juli 1914. Anregung bei der deutschen Regierung, dali die k. u. k. und die deutschen Bot- schafter in St. Petersburg und Paris angewiesen werden, zu erklaren, daft die Fortsetzung der russischen Mobibsierung Gegenmaflregeln in Deutschland und Osterreich-Ungarn zur Folge hatte, die zu ernsten Konsequenzen fiihren miiftten. Osterreich-Ungarn werde sich natiirlich in seiner kriegerischen Aktion gegen Serbien nicht beirren lassen . .101 49. An Graf Szapary in St. Petersburg, Wien, 30. Juli 1914. Die k. u. k. Regierung ist zu einer freundsehafthchen Aiissprache mit dem St. Peters- burger Kabinette iiber die die Beziehungen Osterreich-Ungarns zu Ruliland direkt betre.ffenden Fragen stets bereit 101 50. An Graf Szapary in St. Petersburg, Wien, 30. Juli 1914. Den Klagen Herrn Sazonows gegeniiber, daft kein Gedankenaustausch zwischen Graf Berchtold und dem russischen Botschafter stattgefunden babe, wird auf die jiingste Aiissprache hingewiesen, in welcher weitgehende Zusicherungen beziiglich der Respektierung der terfitorialen und sou- veranen Rechte Serbiens erteilt wurden. Es wird hervorgehoben, wie sehr die russische Diplomatie an dem unleidlichen Verh'altnisse Oster- reich-Ungarns zu Serbien schuld sei. Die Mobibsierung RuHlands Sc!tO gegen Osterreich-Ungarn zwingt die Monarchie, ihre Mobllisierung zu erweitern 102 51. An die k. u. k. Botsehafter in London und St. Petersburg, Wien, .31. Juli 1914. Bussisches Kabinett hat englische Begierung ersucht, ihre Vermittlung zwiscben Osterreich-Ungarn und Serbien wieder auf- zunehmen unter der Bedingung der vorlaufigen Einstellung der Feind- seligkeiten. Sir E. Grey bat die Vermittlung Frankreichs, Englands, Italiens und Deutschlands angeregt. Die k. u. k. Begierung ist gerne bereit, dem Vorschlage Sir E. Greys naherzutreten unter der Voraus- setzung, dafl die militarische Aktion gegen Serbien voilaufig ihren Fortgang nebme und dafl Rufiland die gegen Osterreich-Ungarn gerichtete Mobilisierung zum Stillstande bringe 103 52. Graf Szapary, St. Petersburg, 31. Juli 1914. Allgemeine Mobilisierung. der russischen Arm'ee und Flotte 104 ':<:>. An die k. u. k. Missionen, Wien, 31. Juli 1914. Notwendigkeit mili- tarischer Madnehmen in Galizien angesichts der russischen Mobilisie- rung. Diese sind rein defensiven Charaktera 104 51. Graf Szecs'en, Paris, 31. Juli 1914. Erklarung der deutschen Begie- rung in Paris, dafl pr-iit.elil.iinl gleichfalls mobilisieren werde, wenn die russisehe Mobilisierung nieht binnen zwolf Stunden eingestellt wird. Anfrage, ob Frankreich iin Falle deutsch-russischen Krieges neutral bleiben werde 105 55. Graf Szapary, St. Petersburg, 31. Juli 1914. Rufiland gibt sicb selbst mit der formellen Erklarung nicht zufrieden, dafl Osterreich-Ungarn weder das serbische Territorium schm'alern noch die serbische Souvc- r'anitat antasten, nocb .inch die russischen Balkan- oder sonstigen [nteressen verletzen werde, und hat die allgemeine Mobilisierung angeordnet 105 56. Graf Szapary, St. Petersburg, 1. August 1914. Per k. u. k. Botschafter bringt nochmals Jen guten Willen des Wiener Kabinettes zum Aus- druck, mit Rufiland auf breitester Basis zu verbandeln. Herr Sazonow spricht Ansicht aus, dalJ ihm Unterhandlungen in St. Petersburg weniger erfolgversprechend erseheinen als solche auf dem neutralen Londoner Terrain 100 57. Graf Szogyeny, Berlin, 2. August 1914.' Rufiland hat Kriegsmafinahmen geo-en Osterreich-Ungarn und Deutschland nicht eingestellt. Russisehe. Truppen baben die deutsche Grenze Uberschritten. Deutschland, das somit angegriffen ist, betrachtet sicb als im Kriegszustande mit Rufiland 107 68. Graf Mensdortf, Loudon, 4. August 1914. Ultimatum Englands an Deutschland. Erklarung Sir E. Greys, solange Osterreich-Ungam XI Seite nicht im Kriegszustande mit Frankreich, sei keine Veranlassung zu einem Konflikte zwischen England und der Monarchic . 10T .59. An Graf Szapary in St. Petersburg, Wien, 5. August 1914. Kriegs- zustand zwischen Osterreicb-Ungarn und Ruliland infolge der droben- den Haltung RuGlands im bsterreichisch-ungarisch-serbischen Konflikte und der Erbffnung der Feindseligkeiten gegen Deutsebland .... 108 60. An Graf Mensdorff -in London, Wien, 6. August 1914. Osterreich- Ungarn wird keinesfalis obne vorhergebende formelle Kriegserklarung die Feindseligkeiten gegen England eroffnen. Erwartet analoges Ver- halten Englands 108 61. Graf Szecsen, Paris, 8. August 1914. Anfrage der franzbsischen Regierung, ob die Naehricht ricbtig sei, daO das Innsbrucker Armee- korps an die franzosische Grenze verschoben worden sei 109 62. An Oraf Szecsen in Paris, Wien, 9. August 1914. Naehricht von der Teilnahme eines b'sterreichisch-ungarischen Armeekbrpers am deutsch- franzbsiseben Kriege ist vollst'andig erfunden 109 63. Graf Szecsen, Paris, 10. August 1914. Franzosiscbe Regierung, welcbe Naehricht erbielt, dad ein bsterreichisch-ungarisches Armeekorps nach Deutschland gebracht worden sei, erblickt hierin eine militarische Hilfeleistung an Deutschland und hat daher den franzbsischen Bot- scbafter in Wien beauftragt, seine Passe zu verlangen 109 64. An Graf Mensdorff in London, Wien, 11. August 1914. Auftrag, englischer Regierung mitzuteilen, dali die Naehricht der Entsendung eines bsterreichisch-ungarischen Armeekorps nach Deutschland -vbllig unbegriindet sei 110 65. Graf Mensdorff, London, 12. August 1914. Kriegserklarung Frank- reichs und Englands an Osterreicb-Ungarn Ill 66. Note des japanischen Botschafters in Wien an Graf Berchtold, Wien, 20. August 1914. Mitteilung des am 15. August seitens Japans an Deutschland gerichteten Ultimatums 112 67. An Graf Clary in Briissel, Wien, 22. August 1914. Auftrag, der belgiscben Regierung mitzuteilen, dail Osterreieh-Ungarn angesichts der milit'arischen Kooperation Belgiens mit Frankreich und England gegen Deutschland und der inhumanen Behandlung der bster- reicbischen und ungarischen Staatsangebbrigen in Belgien gezwungen ist, die diplomatischen Beziehnngen zn dem Kbnigreicbe abzubrechen und daO nunmehr der Ivriegs^ustand eingetreten ist 114 xn " Seite 6S. Prinz Hohenlohe, Berlin, 23. August 1914. Deutsche Regierung liifit japanisches Ultimatum unbeantwortet und stellt japanischem Geschatts- trager in Berlin seine Passe zu 114 69. An Freiherrn von Miiller in Tokio, Wien, 24. August 1914. Angesichts des VorgeHens Japans gegen das Deutsche Reich erhielt der Kom- mandant S. M. S. „ Elisabeth" den Auftrag, in Tsingtau mitzu- kampfen, und wird der k. u. k. Botschafter von Tokio abberuien . .115 1. Legationsrat Ritter von Storck an Graf Berchtold. Belgrad, 29. Juni 1914. Wir alle stehen noch immer derart unter dem erschiitternden Eindruck der gestrigen Katastrophe, dad es mir schwer fallt, mit der notigen Fassung, Sach- lichkeit und Ruhe das blutige Drama in Sarajevo von hier aus entsprechend zu beurteilen. Ich bitte daher, niich vorlaufig auf die Registrierung einiger Tat- sachen beschranken zu diirfen. Gestern — den 15./28. — ■ wurde der Jahrestag der Schlacht am Amsel- felde festbicher als sonst begangen und der serbiscbe Patriot Milos ObilicS ge- feiert, der 1389 mit zwei Gefahrten den siegreicben Murad meuchlings er- stocben hat. Wo Serben leben, gilt. Obilic als der Nationalberos. An die Stelle der Tiirken sind aber — dank der unter der Agyde der kb'niglicben Regierung ge- ziicbteten Propaganda und der seit Jabren betriebenen PreChetze — nunmehr wir als die Erbfeinde geti'eten. Den drei jugendlieben Sarajevoer Attentatern Princip, Cabrinovid und dem dritten unbekannten Bombenwerfer scheint daber eine Wiederholung des Dramas auf dem Kossovopolje vorgescbwebt zu haben. Sie haben noch eine unschuldige Frau mitersehossen und oicigen glauben, damit ihr Vorbild noch ubertroffen zu haben. Jahrelang ist in Serbien Haii gegen die Monarchie ges'at worden. Die Saat ist aufgegangen und Mord ward geerntet. Die serbiscbe Regierung hat auf die zirka 5 Uhr nacbmittags bekannt- gewordene Nachricht hin die Obilic- Feier um 10 Uhr abends offiziell abstoppen lassen; inoffiziell und in der Dunkelheit hat sie aber noch geraume Zeit weiter gedauert. Die Leute sollen sich vor Freude in die Arms gefallen sein (Augenzeugen) und man hbrte Bemerkungen wie: „recht ist ihnen geschehen, wir haben das schon lange ervvartet," oder „das ist die Rache fur die Annexion." Legationsrat Ritter von Storck an Graf Berchtold. Telegramm. Belgrad, 30. Juni 1914. Ich richtete heute an den < teneralsekretar des Ausw'artigen Amtes, Herrn Gruid, die naheliegende Frage, welche Mallregeln die kb'nigliche Polizei ergriffen habe, respektive zu crgreifen gedenke, urn die Fiiden des Attentats, welche notorisch nach Serbien hintiberspielen, zu verfolgen. Seine Erwiderung lautete, daft sicb die serbische Polizei bisher mit dem Uegonstand uberhaupt nicht befaftt katte. Generalkonsul Jehlitschka an Graf Berchtold. Vskiib 1. Juli 1914. Am 15./28. Juni wurde in Pristina der Vidov-Dan (Frohnleichnamstag), an welchem sicb diesmal die Schlacht auf dem Amselfelde (1389) zum 525. Male j'ahrte, zum ersten Male offiziell als „Befreiungsfest" der serbiscben Nation gefeiert. Seit vier Monaten hatte ein eigenes Festkomitee daran gearbeitet, dieses Fest zu einem moglichst feierliehen und zu einer grofiartigen nationalserbiseheni Demonstration zu gestalten. Die beziigliche Propaganda setzte gleicbzeitig in Kroatien, Dalmatien und BosnieD, hauptsHchkch aber in Ungarn ein, den Teilnehmcrn wurde freie Fahrt auf den serbiseben Staatsbahnen, billige Unterkunt't und Verpflegung, Unter- stiitzung seitens der Behorden etc. zugesagt. Die Agitation war cine energische und zielbewuftte. Zur Festfeier in Pristina wurden die Gaste mit Extraziigen gebracht. Die verscbiedenen Festreden schwelgten in den historischen Reminiszenzen, welche sicb an den Schauplatz des Festes kniipften. um schlieftlich mehr oder minder das bekannte Tbema von der Vereinigung aller Serben und der ,Be- freiung der unterjocbten Briider" jenseits der Donau und der Save, ferner in Bosnien und Dalmatien zu variieren. AIs sich in den Abendstunden die Nachricht von der entsetzlichen Schand- tat, deren Schauplatz Sarajevo gewesen war, verbreitete, bemachtigte sich der fanatisierten Menge eine Stimmung, welebe ich naoh den zahlreiehen Beifalls- auDei'u'ngen, welehe mir von meinen absolut verlaWiehen Gewahrsmannern ge- meldet werden, nicht anders als unmenschlieh bezeichnen knnn. Angesichts dieser Haltung der Bevolkerung, welehe in gleieher Weise auch in Uskiib zu Tage trat, fallen alle Versuehe der serbischen Presse, die moralisehe Verantwortung fiir die Tat, welehe von einer reprasentativen Versammlung mit solch unverhohlener Genugtuung aufgenommen wird, von Serbien abzusehiitteln, in em erbarmliches Nichts zusammen. Graf SzGcsen an Graf Berchtold. Telegramm. Paris, 4. Jali 1914. Ich habe heme Herrn Poineare den Dank der k. u. k. Regierung fiir sein Beileid ubermittelt. Auf die serbenfeindlichen Demonstrationen bei uns anspielend, erwahnte er, daft nach der Ermordung des Prasidenten Carnot in ganz Frankreich alle Italiener den argsten Verfolgungen seitens der Bevolkerung ausgesetzt waren. Ich machte ihn darauf aufmerksam, daft die damalige Bluttat mit keinerlei antifranzosiseher Agitation in Italien im Zusammenhange stand, wahrend man jetzt zugeben mull, dall in Serbien seit Jahren mit alien erlaubten und unerlaubten Mittehi gegen die Monarchic gehetzt wird. Zum Schlusse sprach Herr Poineare die Uberzeugung aus, die serbisehe Regierung werde tins bei der gerichtlichen Untersuchung und der Verf'olgung eventueller Mitschuldiger das grciftte Entgegenkommen zeigen. Einer solchen PHieht kb'nne sich kein Staat entziehen. Gerent Herr Hoflehner an Graf Berchtold. A'isch, 6. Juli 1914. Die Nachricht vom entsetzlicben, nur zu woblgelungenen Attentate in Sarajevo rief hier Sensation im vollsten Sinno des Wortes hervor. Von Bestiirzung oder aber Entriistung war so gut wie nichts zu bemerken, in weitaus vor- herrscbendera MaOe karaen nur Empfindungen der Genugtuung, ja der Freude, und dies vielfacb ganz unverbiillt, ohne jede Zuriickbaltung, nicht selten in ganz roher Form zum Ausdrueke. Dies gilt hauptsachlicb fiir die sogenannten fuhren- den Kreise, die Intelligenz, wie Berufspolitiker, Lebrpersonen, Beamte, Offiziere und die Studentensehaft. Etwas zuriiekhaltender zeigte sicli nocb die 'Kauf- mannscbaf't. Alle Erklarungen, die seitens serbischer amtlicber Stellen oder einzelner hb'herer Personliehkeiten abgegeben wurden und die Entriistung iiber das Attentat und dessen Verurteilung zum Ausdruek bringen sollen, miissen als bitterste Ironie auf den wirken, der Gelegenheit hatte, in den jiingst ver- flossenen Tagen in nachster Nalie Einblicke in das Gefiihlsleben der serbischen intelligenten Bevolkerung zu gewinnen. Der Gefertigte batte am Tage des Attentates gegen 9 Ubr abends obne Abnung nocb vom Gesebebenen ein biesiges Gartc-nkaffee besuelit und wurde bier zuerst von einem Bekannten iiber das ganz bestimmt aufgetretene Geriieht in Kenntnis gesetzt. Es- war cine Pein sondergleicben zu beobachten und zu horen, wie eine formlich frobliehe Stimmung die zahlreiehen Gaste des Lokales eri'alit hatte, mit welcber eisicbtlichen Genugtuung man iiber die Tat debattierte und wie Ausrufe der Freude, des Holmes und Spottes aufflatterten — selbst den an Ausbriiche des bier herrscbenden politischen Fanatismus seit langem Gewbbnten mullten diese Wahrnebmungen aufs aulierste deprimieren! G. Freiherr von Giesl an Graf Berchtold. Belgrad, 21. Juli 1914. Icb bin nunmehr — nacb dem ungliiekseligen Verbrecben vom 28. Juni — wieder seit einiger Zeit auf meinem Tosten und kann mir erlauben, iiber die bier herrschende Stimmung ein Urteil abzugeben. Seit der Annexionskrise, waren die Beziehungen zwischen dor Monarchie und Serbien auf Seite des letzteren durch nationalen Chauvinismus, Feindselig- keit und eine wirksame Propaganda der groOserbischen Aspirationen in unseren von Sorben bewohnten L'andern vergiftet, seit den letzten beiden Balkankriegen hat der Erfolg Serbiens diesen Chauvinismus zum Paroxismus gesteigert, dessen Ausbriiehe stellenweise den Stempel des Wahnsinns tragen. Es sei mir erspart, hiefiir Beweise und Beispiele erbringen zu miissen, sie sind uberall und immer in den Kreiseu der politiscben Gesellschaft wie unter dem niederen Volke, in alien Parteien billig zu haben! Ich stelle es als bekanntes Axiom hin, dad die Politik Serbiens auf die Abtrennung der von Sudslawen bewohnten Gebiete und in weiterer Folge auf die Vernichtung der Monarchie als Groflmacht aufgebaut ist und nur dieses eine Ziel kennt. Niemand, der auch nur acht Tage in dem hiesigen politisehen Milieu zu Ieben und zu wirken bemulligt ist, wird sieh dieser Wahrheit verschlieflen. Infolge der jiingsten Ereignisse, welche die hiesigen politisehen Stimmungen beeinflussen, und dazu rechne ich das Attentat in Sarajevo, den Tod Hartwigs und die Wahlkampagne, hat sich der HaB gegen die Monarchie noch vertieft. Das Attentat in Sarajevo hat den Serben den bevorstehenden Zerfall der habsburgischen Staaten — auf welohen man sclion friiher seine Hoffnungen setzte — als in kiirzester Zeit zu erwarten, den Abfall der von Sudslawen bewohnten Gebiete der Monarchie, die Revolution in Bosnien-Herzegowina und die Unverlalllichkeit der slawischen Regimenter — als feststehendo Tatsachen vorgegaukelt und brachte System und scheinbare Berechtigung in ihren nationali- stischen Wahnsinn. Das so verhafite Osterreieh-Ungarn erscheint den Serben nunmebr ohn- m'achtig und kaum mehr wiirdig, einen Krieg mit ihm zu fiihren — zura Hasse gesellt sich die Verachtung — es fallt ohne Miihe als zermurbter Korper in den Scholl des in naher Zukunft zu verwirklichenden grollserbischen Reiches. Blatter, welche nicht zu den allerextremsten gehbren, besprechen in t'ag- lichen Artikeln die Ohnmacht und den Zerfall der .Nachbarmonarchie und. beschimpfen ohne Scheu und Furcht vor Ahndung ihre Organe. Sie machen selbst vor der erhabenen Person unseres Herrschers nicht Halt. Sogar das Regierungsorgan weist auf die Zust'ande in Osterreieh-Ungarn als auf die einzigen Ursachen des fluchwtirdigen Verbrechens hin. Die Furcht vor Verant- wortung besteht nicht mehr. Das serbische Yolk wird seit Jahrzehnten durch die Presse erzogen und die jeweilige Politik h'angt von der Parteipresse ab; eine Frucht dieser Erziehung ist die grollserbische Propaganda und ihre abscheu- liche Ausgeburt, das Attentat vom 28. Juni. Ich ubergehe die an Wahnwitz streifenden, von der „Times" als „tob- siichtig" bezeichneten Anklagen und Verd'achtigungen anlafilich des: Todes Hartwigs, iiberhaupt die liigenhaftc Prefikampagne, welche aber die Serben in der Uberzeugung bestarken diirfte, dall die Regierung und die Vertreter Oster- reich-Ungarns vogelfrei sind, und Bezeiclmungen wie Morder, Lump, infamer Osterreicher etc. fiir uns als schmiickende Beiworter gelten miissen. Der Tod Hartwigs hat in der Erkenntnis der Sehwere dieses Verlustes in der serbischen politisehen Welt einen fanatischen Kultus des Verstorbenen aus- gelost und man lielS sich dabei nicht allein von der Dankbarkeit fiir die Ver- gangenhe'it, sondern aueb von der Sorge am die Zukunft leiten und uberbot sich in sklavischer Unterwiirfigkeit vor Ruliland, um dessen Wohlwollen fur kommende Zeiten zu siohern. Als drifter Faktor vereinigt die Wahlkampagne alle Parteien auf der Platt- form der F'eindseligkeiten gegen Osterreich-Ungarn. Keine der auf die Regie- rungsgewalt aspirierenden Parteien will in den Verdacht konimen, eines schwaehliehen Nachgebcns gegeniiber der Monarehie fiir fahig gehalten zu werden. So wird die Wahlkampagne unter dem Schlagworte der Bek'ampfung Osterreich-Ungams gefiihrt. Man halt die Monarchic aus inneren und aufieren Griinden fiir ohnmachtig, zu jedcr energischen Aktion unfahig und glaubt, dali die ernsten Worte, die schon an mailgebenden Stellen bei uns gesprochen worden sind, nur Bluff seien. Die Urlaube des k. u. k. Kriegsministers und Chefs des Gencralstabes haben in der Tjberzeugung best'arkt, daD die Schwache Osteneich-Ungarns nunmchr evident ist. Ich habe die Geduld Euer Exzcllenz etwas liinger in Anspruch zu nehmen mir erlaubt, nicht weil ich mit Vorstehendem etwas Neues zu bringen glaubte, sondern weil ich diese Schilderung als Ausgang zu der sich aufdrangenden Konklusion betrachte, dall einc Abreohnung mit Serbien, ein Krieg um die Grofimachtstellung der Monarehie, ja um ihre Existenz als solche, auf die Dauer nicht zu umgeken ist. Versaumen wir es, Klarheit in unser Verh'altnis zu Serbien zu bringen, so werden wir mitschuldig an den Schwicrigkciten und der Ungunst der Ver- haltnisse bei einem kiinftigen Kampfe, der doch, ob friiher oder spater, aus- getragen werden muC. Fiir den lokalen Beobachter und den Vertreter der ostorreichisch-ungarischen Interessen in Serbien stellt sich die Frage so, dalS wir cine weiteie Sch'adigung unseres Prestiges nicht mehr ertragen kb'nnen. Sollten -wir daher entschlossen sein, weitgehende Forderungen, vcrbunden mit wirksamer Kontrollo — denn nur eino solche konnte den Augiasstall der groflserbischen Wiihlarbeit reinigen — zu stellen, dann muflten alle mbglichen Konsequenzen iiberbliekt werden und es mufi von Anfang an der starke und feste Wille bestehen, durchzuhalten. Halbe Mittel, ein Stellen von Forderungen, langes Parlamentieren und schlieBlieh ein faules Kompromift ware der harteste Schlag, der Osterreich- Ungarns Ansehen in Serbien und seine Machtstellung in Europa treffen konnte. 7. Graf Berchtold an Freiherrn von Giesl in Belgrad. Wien, am 22. Jull 1914. Euer Hochwohlgehoren wollen die nacbt'olgende Note am Donnerstag, den 23. Juli naehmittags, der kb'niglichen Regierung iiberreichen: „Le 31 mars 1909 le Ministre de Serbio a Vienne a fait d'ordre de son Gouvernement au Gouvernement I. et R. la declaration suivante: „„La Serine reoonnait quelle n'a pas &t& atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli cree en Bosnie-Hercegovine et qu'elle se conformera par conse- quent k telle decision que les Puissances prendront par rapport a l'article XXV du Traite de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des Grandes Puissances, la Serbia s'engage des h present a abandonner l'attitude de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a observed a regard de I'annexion depuis l'automne dernier, et elle s'engage, en outre, h changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers i'Autriche- Hongrie pour vivre desormais avec oette derniere sur le pied d'un bon voisinage. "" Or, l'histoire des dernieres annees, et notamment les evenements douloureux dii 28 juin, ont demontre l'existence en Serbie d'un mouvement subversif dont le but est de detacher de la Monarchic austro-hongroise certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement qui a pris jour spus les yeux du Gouverne'- ment Serbe est arrive h. se manifester au dela du territoire du Royaume par des actes de terrorisme, par une serie d'attentats et par des meurtres. Le Gouvernement Royal Serbe, loin de satisfaire aux engagements formels contenus dans la declaration ■ du 31 mars 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement: il a tolere l'activite criminelle des differentes societes et affilia- tions dirigees contre la Monarchic, le langage effrene de la presse, la glorifica- tion des auteurs d'attentats, la participation d'officiers et de fonctionnaires dans les agissements subversifs, une propagande malsaine dans l'instruction publique, tolere enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la population serbe ■h, la haino de la Monarchic et au mepris de ses institutions. Cette tolerance coupable du Gouvernement Royal de Serbio n'avait pas cess6 au moment ou les evenements du 28 join dernier en ont demontre au monde entier les consequences funestes: II resulte des depositions et aveux des anteurs criminels de Fattentat du 28 juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a Hi trame a Belgrade, que les armes et explosifs dont les meurtriers se trouvaient etre munis, leur ont Hi donnes par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes faisant partie de la „Narodna Odbrana" et enfin cfue le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a Hi orga- nist et effectu6 par des chefs du service-frontiere serbe. Les resultats mentionnes de instruction ne permettent pas au Gouverne- ment I. et R. de poursuivre plus longtemps l'attitude de longanimite expectative qu'il avait observed pendant des annees vis-a-vis des agissements concentres a Belgrade et propages de lit sur les territoires de la Monarcbie; ces resultats lui imposent au contraire le devoir de inettre fin a des menees qui forment une menace perpetuelle pour la tranquillity de la Monarcbie. C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement I. et R. se voit oblige de demander au Gouvernement Serbe Fenonciation officielle qu'il condamne la propaganda dirigee contre la Monarcbie austro-bongroise, c'est-a-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu it detacher de la Monarchie des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage a supprimer, par tous les moyens, cctto propagande criminelle et terroriste. Atin de donner un caractere solennel ii cet engagement, le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie fera publier a la premiere page du Journal officiel en date du 26/13 juillet lencinciation suivante: „ r Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigee contre l'Autriehe-Hongrie, c'est-a-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchie austro-bongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il deplore sincerement les consequences funestes de ses agisse- ments criminels. Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient partieipe it la propagande susmentionnee et compromis par la, les relations de bon voisinage auquel le Gouvernement Royal s'ctait solennellement engagtS par sa declaration du 31 mars 1009. Le Gouvernement Royal qui desapprouvc et repudie toute idee ou tenta- tive d'immixtion dans les destinees des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriehe- Hongrie que ce soit, considere de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du Royaume que dorenavaut il pro- cedera avec la derniere rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts it prevenir et a n'priiner." " Cette enonciation sera portee simultanement a la connaissance de l'Armee Royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majesty le Roi et sera pubbee dans le bulletin officiel de l'Armee. Le Gouvernement Royal Serbe s'engage en outre. 1° a supprimer toute publication qui excite a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchic et dont la tendance generale est dirigee contre son integrity territoriale, 2° a dissoudre immediatement la societe dite „Narodna Odbrana", a con- fisquer tous ses moyens de propagande, et a proceder de la meme maniere contre les autres societes et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent a la pro- pagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise; le Gouvernement Royal prendre les mesures necessaires pour que les societes dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activite sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme, 3-° a eliminer sans delai de l'instruction publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait scrvir a fomenter la propagande contre l'Autricbe-Hongrie, 4° a eloigner du service militaire et de l'administration en general tous les officiers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise et dont le Gouvernement I. et R. se reserve de communiquer les noras et les faits au Gouvernement Royal, 5° a accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement I. et R. dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirige contre l'intigrite territoriale de la Monarchie, 6° a ouvrir une enquete judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe; des organes, dengues par le Gouvernement I. et R., prendront part aux recherehes y relatives, 7° a proceder d'urgence a l'arrestation du commandant Voja Tankosi(! et du. nomme Milan Oiganovic', employe de l'Etat Serbe, compromis par les resultats de L'instruction de Sarajevo, 8° a empecher, par des mesures efficaces, le concours des Autorites Serbes dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la frontiere; a licencier et punir severement les fonctionnaires du service-frontiere de Sabac et de Loznica coupables d'avoir aide les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontiere, 9° a donner au Gouvernement I. et R., des explications sur les propos injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qu'a l'etranger qui, malgre leur position officielle, n'ont pas hesittS apres l'attentat du 28 juin de 10 s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une maniere hostile envers la Monarchic austro-hongroise enlin 10° d'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement I. et R. de l'exdcution des mesures comprises dans les points prdcddents. Le Gouvernement I. et R. attend la rdponse du Gouvernement Royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi 25 de ce mois a 6 h du soir. Un mdmoire concernant les resultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo a l'egard des fonctiormaires mentionnds aux points 7 et 8 est annexe 1 a. cette Note." L'instruction eriminelle ouverto par le tribunal de Sarajevo contre Gavrilo Prineip et consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicity y relative, crime commis par eux le 28 juin dr., a jusqu'ici abouti aux constatations suivantes: 1° Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de son sejour k Sarajevo, l'aichidue Francois Ferdinand f'ut formd a. Belgrade par Gavrilo Prineip, Nedeljko Cabrinovid, le nomrnd Milan Ciganovid et Trit'ko Grabez avec le eoncours du commandant Voja Tankosid. 2° Les 6 bombes et les 4 pistolets Browning avec munitions, moyennant lesquels les malfaiteurs ont commis l'attentat, furent livres a Belgrade a Prineip, Cabrinovid et Grabez par le nomme Milan Ciganovid et le commandant Voja Tankosid. 3° Les bombes sont des grenades a la main provenant. du depot d'armes do l'armde serbe a Kragujevae. 4° Pour assurer la reussite de l'attentat, Ciganovid enseigna a Prineip, Cabrinovic et Grabez la maniere de so servir des grenades et donna, dans une foret pres du champ de tir a Topschider, des lecons de tir avec pistolets Browning a Prineip et Grabez. 5° Pour rendre possible a Prineip, Cabrinovid et Grabez de passer la frontier© de Bosnie-Ilereegovine et d'y introduire clandestinement leur contre- bande d'arrnes, un systeme de transport secret fut organisd par Ciganovid. D'apres cette organisation 1 introduction en Bosnie-Hercdgovine des mal- faiteurs et de leurs amies fut opdrde par les Capitaines-fronticre de Sabac (Rade Popovid) et de Loznica ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbid do Loznica avec le eoncours de divers particuliers. Gelegentlich der Ubergabe der vorstehenden Note wollen Euer Hoch- wohlgeboren miindlich hinzufiigen, dafi Sie beauftragt seien — falls Ihnen nicht inzwischen eine vorbehaltlose zustimmende Antwort der kbniglichen Regierung zugekommen sein sollte — naeh Ablauf der in der Note vorgesehenen, vom. Tage und von der Stunde Ihrer Mitteilung an zu rechnenden 48stiindigen Frist, mit dem Personale der k. u. k. Gesandtsehaft Belgrad zu verlassen. Graf Berchtold an die k. u. k. Botschafter in Berlin, Rom, Paris, London, St. Petersburg und Konstantinopel. Wkn, 22. Juli 1914. Le Gouvernement I. et R. s'est vu oblige d'adresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois, par l'entremise du Ministre I. et R. a Belgrade, la Note suivante au Gouvernement Royal de Serbie. (Siehe Weisung an den k. u. k. Gesandten in Belgrad vom 22. Juli 1914.) J'ai l'lionneur d'inviter Votre Excellence de vouloir porter le contenu de eette Note a la connaissance du Gouvernement aupres duquel Vous etes accredits, en accompagnant cette communication du commentaire que voici: Le 31 mars 1909 le Gouvernement Royal Serbs a adressiS a l'Autriche- Hongrie la declaration dont le texte est reproduit ci-dessus. Le lendemain meme de cette declaration la Serbie s'est engagee dans une politique tendant a inspirer des idees subversives aux ressortissants serbes de la Monarchic austro-hongroise et a preparer ainsi la separation des territoires austro-hongrois, limitrophes a la Serbie. La Serbie devint le foyer dune agitation crimin'elle: Des societes et affiliations ne tarderent pas a so former qui, soit ouverte- me.nt, soit clandestinement, etaient destinees a creer des desordres sur le terri- toire austro-hongrois. Ces societes et affiliations eoraptent parmi leurs membres des generaux et des diplomates, des fonctionnaires d'Etat et des juges, bref les sommites du monde offieiel et inofficiel du Royaume. Le journalisme serbe est presque entierement au service de cette propa- gande, dirigee contre rAutriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les organes de la presse serbe n'excitent leurs lecteurs a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchic voisine ou a des attentats diriges plus ou moins ouvertement co'ntre sa surete et son integrite. Un grand nombrc d'agents est appele a soutenir par tous lcs moyens l'agitation contre I'Autriche-Hongiie et a corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays. L'esprit eonspirateur des politicians serbes, e'sprit dont les annales-du Royaume portent les sanglantes empreintes,.a subi une recrudescence depuis la derniere crise balcanique; des individus ayant fait partie des bandcs jusque la occupies en Mace- doine, sont venus se mettre a la disposition de la propagande terroriste contre l'Autriche-Hongrie. En presence de ees agissements auxquels l'Autriche-Hongrie est exposee depuis des annees, le Gouvernement do la Serbie n'a pas oru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi. que le Gouvernement 'Serbe a manque au devoir que lui imposait la declaration solennelle da 31 mars 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en contradiction avec la volonte de l'Europe et avec l'engagement qu'il avait pris vis-a-vis de l'Autriche-Hongrie. La longanimite du Gouvernement I. et R. a l'egard de l'attitude provocatrice de la Serbie 6tait inspirde du desinteressement territorial de la Monarchic austro- hongroise et de l'espoir que le Gouvernement Serbe finirait tout de memo par apprecier a sa jusle valeur l'amitie de l'Autriche-Hongrie. En observant une attitude bienveillante [mur lis interets politiques de la Serbie. le Gouvernement 1. et R. esperait que le Royaume se deciderait finalement a suivre de son cot/' une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autriche-Hongrie s'attendait surtout a une pareille evolution dans les idees politiques en Serbie, lorsque, apres les evenements de l'annee 1912, le Gouvernement I. et R. rendit possible par une attitude desinteressee et sans ranoune l'agrandissement si considerable de la Serbie. Cette bienveillanee. manifestee par l'Autriche-Hongrie a l'egard de l'Etat voisin n'a cependant aucunement modifie les precedes du Royaume qui a continue a tolerer sur son territoire une propagande dont les funestes consequences se sont manife iti c au mondo entiei le 28 juin dr., jour, oil l'heritier presomptif de la Monarchic et son illustre ('-pouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot trame a Belgrade. En presence de cot etat de choses le Gouvernement I. et R. a du se decider ii entreprendre de nouvelles et pressantes demarches a Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouvernement Serbe 5 arreter le mouvement inoendiaire menaeant la surete et l'integrite de la Monanhie austro-hongroise. Le Gouvernement I. et R. est persuade qu'en entreprenant cette-de,marche, il se trouve on plein accord avec les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisees qui ne sauraieat admettre que le regicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impune- ment dans la lutte politique, et que la paix europeenne tut continuellemcnt troublee par les agissements partant de Belgrade. C'est a l'appui de ce qui precede que le Gouvernement 1. et R. tient a la disposition du Gouvernement un dossier 13 elucidant les menses serbea et les rapports existant entrc ses menses et lo meurtre du 28 juin. Une communication identique est adress<;e aux Repr^sentants Imp£riaux et Royaux aupres des aulres Puissances Signatures. Vous etes autoris6 de laissor une copie de cette depeche entre les mains de Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London. Telegramm. Wien, 23. JmH 1914. Da unter den Ententemachten England am ehesten fiir eine objektive Be- urteilung unseres heutigen Sehrittes in Belgrad zu gewinnen sein du'rfte, ersuche icli Euer Exzellenz bei der Konversation. die Sie am 24. 1. M. gelegentlich der (jberreichung der Zirkulamote im Foreign Office haben werden, unter anderem auch darauf hinzuweisen, dafl es Serbien in der Hand gehabt hiitte, den ernsten Schritten, die es unsererseits erwarten muDte, die Spitze abzubrechen, wenn es seinerseits spontan das Notwendige vorgekebrt h'atte, um auf serbisehem Boden eine Untersuchung gegen die serbischen Teilnehmer am Attentat vom 28. Juni 1. J. einzuleiten und die Verbindungen aufzudecken, die hinsichtlich des Attentates erwiesenermafjen von Belgrad nach Sarajevo fiibren. Die serbisehe Regierung hat bis heute, obwohl cine Anzahl notoriscli bekannter Indizien nach Belgrad weisen, in diesem Belange niclit nur nichts unternommen, sie hat vielmehr die vorhandenen Spuren zu verwischen getrachtet. So ist einem telegraphischen Bericht unserer Gesandtschaft in Belgrad zu entnehmen, dali der durch die iibereinstimmenden Aussagen der Attentater kompromittierte serbisehe Staatsbeamte Ciganovic' am Tage des Attentates noch in Belgrad weilte, drei Tage daraut aber, als sein Name in den Zeitungen genannt wurde, die Stadt bereits verlassen hatte. Bekanntlich erklarte auch schon der serbisehe PrefJchef, dall Ciganovic' in Belgrad vbllig unbekannt sei. Was die kurze Befristung unserer Forderungen anbelangt, so ist dieselbe auf unsere langjiihrigen Erfahrungen serbischer Verschleppimgskiinste zuriick- zufiihren. Wir kb'nnen die Forderungen, deren Erfiillung wir von Serbien verlangen und die eigentlich im Verkehr zwischen Staaten, die in Friede und Freundschaft l'eben sollen, nur Selbstverstandliches enthalten, nicht zum Gegenstand von Ver- handlungen und Kompromissen machen und kbnnen mit Rucksicht auf unsere volks- 14 wirtschaftlichen Interessen nicht riskieren, eine politische Methode, wonach Serbien die entstandene Krise nach seinem Belieben zu verlangern in der Hand hatte, zu akzeptieren. 10. Graf Mensdorff an Graf Berchtold. Telegramm. London, 24. Juli 1914. Zirkularnote Sir E. Grey eben iibergeben, der sie aufmerksam durch- gelesen. Bei Punkt 5 fragte er, wie das zu verstehen sei, Einsetzung Organe unserer Regierung in Serbien ware gleichbedeutend mit Aufhoren staatlicher Unabhangigkeit Serbiens. Ich erwiderte, Kollaboration von z. B. Polizeiorganen tangiere keineswegs Staatssouveranitat. Er bedauerte Befristung, weil dadureh die Mbgliehkeit benommen wiirde, die erste Erregung zu beruhigen und auf Belgrnd einzuwirken, uns eine befriedi- gende Antwort zu geben. Ein Ultimatum konne man immer noeh stellen, wenn Antwort nicht annehmbar. Ich fiihrte lange unseren Stand punkt aus (>Iotwendigkeit Abwehr von un- ausgesetzten subversiven Untemehmungen, welche Gebiet der Monarchic bedrohen, "Verteidigung unserer vitalsten Interessen, vollkommenster MiOerfolg der vielfach bewiesenen bisherigen konzilianten Haltung gegeniiber Serbien, das jetzt iiber drei Wochen Zeit hatte, aus eigenem Antrieb Untersuchung gegen Teilnahme Attentat einzuleiten etc.). Der Herr Staatssekretiir wiederholte seine Bedenken gegen kurze Befristung, anerkannte aber, daB das, was iiber Mitschuld an Verbrechen von Sarajevo gesagt wird, sowie manche unserer Verlangen berechtigt seien. Er wiirde ganz bereit sein, die Angelegenheit als eine solche zu betiaehten, die nur Osterreich-Ungarn und Serbien beriihre. Er ist aber sehr „apprehensiv", daG mehrere GrofJm'aehte in einen Krieg verwickelt werden kbnnten. Yon Rufs- land, Deutschland, Frankreich sprechend bemerkte er, die Bestimmungen des franzosisch-russischen Biindnisses diirften ungefahr so lauten, wie die des Drei- bundes. Ich legte ibm ausfuhrlich unseren Standpunkt dar und wiederholte ent- schieden, dail in diesem Falle wir fest bleiben miiliten, um uns doch einiger- mafJen Garantien zu schaffen, nachdem bisherige serbische Erklarungen niemals eingehalten wurden. Ioh begreife, daG er zunachst nur die Frage der Riiek- wirkung auf europaischen Frieden erw'age, er miisse aber auch, um unseren Standpunkt zu wiirdigen, sich in unsere Lage versetzen. Er wollte nicbt in eine n'ahere Diskussion iiber dieses Tbema eingeben, miisse auch noch Note genauer studieren. Er zitiere zunachst den deutschen und den franzosischen Botscbafter, da er mit den Alliierten Osterreich-Ungarns und Rulilands, die aber selbst keine direkten Interessen in Serbien haben, vor allem in Gedankenaustausch treten miisse. 11. Graf Szgcsen an Graf Berchtold. Telegramm. Paris, 24. Juli 1914. Soeben dem mit der Vertretung des abwesenden Ministers des Aussern betrauten Herrn Justizminister Weisung vom 22. 1. M. vorgelesen und Kopie hinterlassen. Herr Bienvenu Martin, der durch heutige Morgenblatter vom Inhalt unserer Demarche in Belgrad beiliiufig informiert . K., V. N. und der kroatisch-slawonische Gendarmerie- leutnant V. K. den Heeresdienst in der Monarchic uuter bedenkliohen Umstanden verlassen und sich nach Serbien gewendet, wo sie inzwischen allerdings manche ihrer Hoffnungen getauscht selien und wenigstens zum Teile daran dcnken, in die von ihnen verratene Heimat zuriickzukehren. Die von Serbien aus in die mittleren Schulen Kroatiens und Bosniens getragene Agitation ist loider so bckannt, dafi sie einer Exomplifizierung nicht bedarf. Weniger bekannt aber ist es, dad die wegen schwerer disziplin'arer \ ergehen aus kroafischen und bosnischen Schulen Ausgeschlossenen in Serbien mit offenen Armen aufgenommen, oft sogar von Staats wegen unterstutzt und zu Feinden der Monarchic erzogen werden. Die serbischen Schulen mit ihren monarchiefeindlichen Lehrbehelfen und ihrer groflen Zahl von Professoren und Lehrern, die in den Rcihen der Narodna odbrana stehen, sind allerdings geeignete Anstalten zur Erziehung derartiger Adepten. Ein besonders beaehtenswerter Fall dieser Art mag hier als Beispiel Erwahmrng tinden. Im M'arz 1914 waren mehrcre Schiiler der Lehrerpriiparandie in Pakrac (Kroatien) wegen eines Streikes relegiert worden. Dieselben wandten sich nach Serbien, wo sie zum Telle sofort als Lehrer Anstellungen erhicltcn, zum Teile in einer Lehrerbildungsanstalt unter- gebraeht wurden. Mit monarehiefeindlichen Kreisen in Verbindung stehend, hat einer dieser Relegierten offentlich erklart, er und seine Leute wiirden zur Zeit dci Anwesenheit des Herrn Erzhorzog-Thronfolgers in Bosnien den Beweis liefern, 29 dafi Bosnien serbisches Land sei. Becht merkwiirdig mutet es an, dafl der koniglich serbisclie Kreisprafekt in Krajna, wie hier erganzend bemerkt sei, dreien aus dem Kreise dieser so arg kompromittierten Studenten gerade zur Zeit dei- Anwesenheit des Herrn Erzherzogs Franz Ferdinand in Bosnien serbische Passe ausstellte, in denen er sie falschlieh als serbische Staatsangeborige bezeicbnete, obwohl er deren kroatische Heimatsberechtigung kennen mufite. Mit diesen Passen ausgeriistet, vermochten die drei Pr'aparandisten unbemerkt nach der Monarehie zu gelangen, wobei sie jedoeh erkannt und angehalten wurden. Mit all dem ware aber die „auswartige" Tatigkeit der Narodna odbrana noch lange nicbt erschb'pfend cbarakterisiert. Sohon seit liingerer Zeit war die k. und k. Regierung duroh konfidentielle Meldungen dariiber unterricbtet, dafl die Narodna odbrana den von ibr gewiinsobten Krieg gegen die Monarehie auch militarisoh insoferne vorbereite, als sie in der Monarehie Emiss'are halte, die naeh gewohnter Bandenart im Falle des Ausbruches von Fekidseligkeiten die Zerstorung von Transport-Mitteln und -Einrichtungen bewirken und Revolten sowie Paniken hervorrufen sollten. (Siehe Beilage 7.) Das im Jahre 1913 beim Kreisgerichte in Sarajevo gegen Jovo Jag'li6i<5 und Genossen eingeleitete Strafverfahren wegen Verbrechens der Ausspahung (Beilage 6) hat die Bestatigung dieser vertraulichen Mitteilungen gebracht. So wie zur Zeit ihrer Griindung steht auch heute noch die Vorbereitung des Bandenkrieges auf dem Programme der Narodna odbrana, wozu noch erganzend die Entwicklung einer Spionagetatigkeit trat. So ist das heutige sogenannte „reorganisierte Programm" der Narodna odbrana in Wahrheit ein erweitertes Programm: Den n Ausrottungskampf " gegen die Monarehie vorzubereiten, ja herbeizuftihren und dann wieder „die alte rote Fahne der Narodna odbrana" zu entfalten. Aus dieser Atmosphare des offen und geheim geschiirten Hasses gegen die Monarchic., verbunden mit einer sich jenseits aller Verantwortlichkeit diinkenden Agitation, die im Kampfe gegen Osterreich-Ungarn alle Mittel fiir zulassig erachtet und hiebei ganz ungescheut den gemeinen Mord als deren wirksamstes empfjehlt, muflten schlieDlich, auch ohne weiteres Zutun der monarchiefeindliohen Kreise Serbiens, Akte des Terrorismus entstehen. Am 8. Juni 1912 gab Lukas Jukic gegen den koniglichen Kommiss'ar in Agram, von Cuvaj, einen SehuO ab, duroh den der im Wagen sitze.nde Banalrat von Hervoid totlich verletzt wurde. Auf der Flucht erscholJ Jukic' einen ihn verfolgenden Polizeimann und verletzte zwei weitere. Wie aus der offentlich durchgefiihrten Hauptverhandlung bekannt ist, finden sich in den Ideen des Jukic die grundlegenden Gedanken der von der Narodna odbrana propagierten Plane wieder. Wenn sich Jukid auch schon seit einiger Zeit mit Attentatsplanen trug, so kamen diese doch erst zur Beife, als er am 30 18. April 1912 den Ausfiug der Agramer Studenten nach Belgrad mitgemacht hatte. Bei den zu Ehren der Besucher veranstalteten rauschenden Festlichkeiten war, Jukic zu verschiedenen Personen in Beziehung getreten, die dem Kreise der Narodna odbrana angehorten und mit derien er politisehe Gespraehe fiihrte. Wenige Tage sp'ater war Jukic wieder in Bidgrad und bier erhielt er von einem serbischen Major eine Bombe und von einem Genossen die Browningpistole, mit der er das Attentat vollfuhrte. Die in Agram aufgefundene Bombe war nach dem Gutachten der Sach- verstandigen in einem Arsenale zu milifarisehen Zwecken erzeugt' worden. Noch war der Anscblag des Jukic nicht vergessen, als am 18. August 1913 der aus Amerika zugereiste Stepban Dojfiid in Agram ein Attentat gegen den koniglichen Kommissar Baron Skerleez veriibte — eine Tat, die der von Serbien aus organisierten Verhetzung der in Amerika lebenden Siidslaven entsprang — gleichfalls ein Werk der ..auswartigen" Propaganda der Narodna odbrana und ihrer Gesinnungsgenossen. Die von dem Serben T. Dimitrijevid verfaCte, in Chicago gedruckte Brosehiire ,,Natrag u staro ognjiste vase" mit ihren malllosen Ausfallen gegen Seine k. und k. Apostolische Majestat und ihrer Aufforderimg an die Serben dor Monarchie, im Hinblicke auf ihre baldige ..Befreiung" nach Serbien heim- zuwandern, zeigt den Parallclismus dieser in Amerika mit voller Freiheit der Bewegung betriebenen, von Serbien aus geleitetcn Propaganda und jener, die von Serbien aus in die Gebiete der Monarchie getragen wird. Und wieder kaum nach Jahresfrist war Agram der Schauplatz eines, diesmal miflgliickten Attentates. Am 20. Mai 1. J. versuchte Jakob Schafer im Agramer Theater einen Anscblag auf den Banus Freiherrn von Skerleez, woran er im letzten Augen- blicka durch einen Polizeibeamten gehindert wurde. Die Untersuchung ergab den Bestand eines Komplottes, dessen Seele Rudolf Hercigonja war. Aus den agen Hercigonjas and seiner funf Mitangeklagten ergab sich, daft auch dies Attentat seinen Ausgang von Serbien nahm. An einem gescheiterten Versuche zur Befreiung des Jukic" beteiligt, war Hercigonja nach Serbien gefliichtet (Oktober 1912). wo er gemeinsam mit seinem Komplizen Marojan Jaksid mit Komitatschis und Mitgliedern der Narodna odbrana verkehrte. Wie schon so oft bei den durch viel zu friihe Beschaftigung mit Fragen der Politik iiberhitzten jugendliehcn Gemiitern, war das Ergebnis dieses korrumpierenden Verkehres auch diesmal ein unheibvclles. Hercigonja kehrte mit dem in Belgrad verkundeten Dogma zuriick, dali die siidslawischen Lander » (sterreich-Ungarns von d.-r Monarchie abgetrennt und mit dem Konig- reiche vereinigt werden mtiflten. Dazu hatte er in dem Kreise, in dem er dort verkehrte, die Lehre eingesogen, daft dieses Ziel durch die Ausfiihrung von Attentaten auf hochstehende Pcrsb'nlichkeiten und fuhrende Politiker der Mon- archie anzustreben sei, da es nur duich diese Mittel verwirklicht werden kbnne. In diesem Sinne wirkte dann Hercigonja in Agram auf seine Freunde cin, deren einige er fur seine Ideen gewann. Im Vordergrunde seiner Plane stand die Veriibung eines Anschlages auf den Tlironfolger Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand. Wenige Monate vorher waren gegen Luka Aljinovie Erhebungen wegen hochverraterischer Propaganda gefiikrt worden. Im Zuge dieses Verfahrens hatten drei Zeugen ausgesagt, Aljinovie habe vor ihnen erklart, er hatte im .lahre 1913 in Belgrad zu Propagandazwecken, speziell aber zur Ausfiihrung eines Attentates auf den Herrn Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand von der Narodna odbrana 100 Dinar und die gleiehe Summe von einer gekeimen Studenten- vereinigung bekommen. Man sieht, wie sich die verbreeberisebe Agitation der Narodna odbrana und der ibr Gleicbgesinnten in letzter Zeit auf die Person des Herrn Erz- herzog-Thronfolgers konzentrierte. Aus alien diesen Feststellungen gelangt man zu dem Scblusse, daft die Narodna odbrana mit den um sie gruppierten monarchiefeindlicben Kreisen Serbiens seit kurzem den Zeitpunkt fiir gekommen erachtete, die von ihr ver- bteiteten Lebren durch Taten verwirklichen zu lassen. Beachtenswert ist aber, daft sie sicb biebei damit begniigte, fiir diese Taten die Anregungen zu geben und dort, wo diese Anregungen auf fruchtbaren Boden gefallen waren, die materiellen Hilfsmittel zu deren Verwirkliebung bei- zustellen, daG sie aber die einzige gefahrliche Rolle bei dieser Propaganda der Tat ausschlieillich der von ibr verhetzten und verfiihrten Jugend der Monarcbie zuschob, die ganz allein die Lasten dieses traurigen „Heldentums" zu tragen hat. Alle Zlige dieser Macbe finden sich in der Entstehungsgeschiehte des tief- betriibenden Attentates vom 28. Juni wieder. (Beilage 8.) Prineip und Grabez tragen den Typus der schon in der Schule von den Gedanken der Narodna odbrana vergifieten Jugend. In Belgrad, im Kreise einer von diesen Ideen erfiillten Studentenschar verkehrend, trug sich Prineip mit Attentatsplanen gegen den Herrn Erzherzog- Thronfolger Franz Ferdinand, gegen den sich damnls aus Anlafl seiner Reise nach den annektierten L'andern der HaO der monarchiefeindlichen Elemente Serbiens besonders akzentuiert hatte. Lam gesellte sieh der im selben Kreise verkehrende Cabrinovii! bei, dessen wechselnde, radikal-revolution'aren Ansiohten naeh seinem eigenen Gestandnisse unter dem Einflusse seiner Belgrader Umgebung und der Lektiire der serbisehen Blatter in die gleiehe monarehiefeindliche und zur Propaganda der Tat neigende Richtung gedr'angt wurden. Dank seiner bereits vorhandenen Dispositionen erlag Grabez diesem Milieu, in das er erst spater h'at, sebr rasch. 32 Soweit aber dieses Komplott auch gediehen und so fest der EntschluQ der Verschworer auch gewesen sein mag, zur Ausfiihrung des Attentates zu schreiten, so ware es doeh nie zu dessen Veriibung gekommen, wenn sich nicht, gleichwie ira Falle Jukic, Leute gefunden fatten, die den Komplizen die Mittel zur Veriibung des Anschlages zur Verfiigung gestellt hatten. Denn es fehlto ibnen, wie Princip und Cabrinovid ausdriicklich bestatigen, an den notigen Waffen, ebenso aber auch an Geld zu deren Anschaffung. Interessant ist es nun zu seben, wo sich die Komplizen ihre Werkzeuge zu versohaffen suchten. Milan Pribifievid und Zivojin Dafiid, diese beiden fiihren- den Manner der Narodna' odbrana, waren die ersten, an die sic als sichere Heifer in ibrer Not dachten, oftenbar deshalb, weil es im Kreise der Attentats- lustigen bereits zur Tradition geworden ist, die Mordwerkzeuge von diesen Repr'asentanten der Narodna odbrana zu beziehen. Der zufallige Umstand, dafl diese beiden Manner zur kritischen Zeit nicht in Belgrad weilten, vereitelte allerdings diesen Plan, doob waren IVincip und Cabrinovic deshalb nicht ver- legen, eine andere Unterstiitzungsstelle zu finden, jenen Milan Ciganovid, einen gewesenen Komitatschi, jetzt Beamten der serbischen Eisenbahndiroktion in Belgrad, gleichfalls ein aktives Mitglied der Narodna odbrana, welcker in deren Geschichte zuerst im Jahre 1909 als Zogling der Bandenschule in Cuprija (Beilage 5) auftauchr. In ihrer Erwartung hatten sich denn auch Prinoip und Cabrinovic nicht getauscht, denn bei Ciganovic fande.n sie sofort die erbetene Unterstutzung. I lieser und durch dessen Vermittlung sein Freund, der schon mehrmals genannte koniglich serbische Major Voja Tankosic, ebenfalls einer der Fiihrer der Narodna odbrana. der im Jahre 190S Leiter der Bandensohule in Cuprija gewesen war (Beilage 51, traten nun als geistige Leiter und entscheidende Forderer an die Spitze des Komplotts, das sic mit einer abstoDenden, fiir die moralischon Qualifaten dec ganzen monarcbiefeindliehen Bewegung bezeichnen- den Selbstverstandlichkeit billigtcn. Nur ein leises Bedcnken hatten sie zuerst — ob die drei Verschworer auch fest entschlossen waren, die Tat zu wagen — ein Bcdenken, das unter ihrer suggestiven Mithilfe allerdings bald schwand. Dann aber waren sie zu jeder Hilfe bereit. Tankosic stelltc i Brownings mit Munition und -Reisegeld zur Verfiigung; 6 Handgranaten aus serbischen Armee- best'anden bildeten die Vervollstandigung der Ausriistung, cine Bewaffnung, die nach ihrer Zusammenstellung und Herkunft Reminiszenzen an den Fall Jukic* wachruft. Una den Erfolg der Aktion besorgt, verfiigte Tankosic die Unter- weisung der Verschworer im Schieften, eine Aufgabe, der sich Ciganovic' mit dem bekannten Erfolge unterzog. Eine spezielle, nicht erbetene Fiirsorgo ent- wickelten aber Tankosic und Ciganovid zur Geheimhaltung des Komplottes: sie stellten Zyankali mit der Weisung bei, dafi sich die Tater nach vollbrachtem Anschlage darn.it entleiben, ein Akt der Fiirsorge, der in erster Lime ihnen re zugute. kommen Mailte, da die Wakrung des Gekeimnisses sie auch nock den geringen Gefahren entrlickte, die sie bei dieser Unternekmung auf sick nekmen mufiten. Der sickere Tod fiir die Opfer ikrer Verfukrung, die voile Sickerkeit fur sick, das ist die bereits bekannte Devise der Narodna odbrana. Um die Ausfiikrung des Attentatsplanes zu ermoglicken, mudten die Bomben und Waffen unbemerkt nach Bosnien eingesckmuggelt werden. Auck hier tritt Ciganovid kelfend auf, er sckreibt den Versckworern eine genaue Reiseroute vor und sickert ikuen fiir ihr Einsckleicken nack Bosnien die Unter- stiitzung der serbiscken Grenzbekorden. Die Art, wie dieser selbst von Prinzip als „mysterios" bezeicknete Transport organisiert war und durckgefiikrt wurde, lalit keinen Zweifel daruber ofifen, dafi dies ein wokl vorbereiteter und fiir die gekeimnisvollen Zwecke der Narodna odbrana sckon oft begangener Schleick- weg war. Mit einer Selbstverstandliekkeit und Sickerkeit, die mir der Gewokn- keit entspringen konnen, stellten die Gienzkauptleute in Sabac und koznica ikren Verwaltungsapparat fiir diesen Zweek zur Verfugung. Okne Stb'rungen vollzog sick dieser gekeimnisvolle Transport mit seinem komplizieiten System von stets wcckselnden Fiihrern, die wie durck Zauberkraft herbeigerufen, immer zur Stelle waren, wenn man sie brauckte. Okne nack dem Zwecke dieser 1 merkwiirdigen Reisc einiger unreifer Studenten zu fragen, liefsen die serbiscken Bekorden, auf die Weisung des ekemaligen Komitatsckis und untergeordneten Baknbeamten Ciganovid kin, diesen glatt funktionierenden Apparat spielen. Sie brauckten iibrigens nickt zu fragen, denn nack den erkaltenen Weisungen war iknen wokl klar, daft kier wieder eine .Mission'' der Narodna- odbrana zu erfiillen war. Der Anblick des Arsenals von Bomben und Kevolvern entlockte denn auck dem Fiuanzwackmanne Grbid nur ein woblwollend zustimmendes Lackeln, wokl ein ausreickender Beweis dafu'r, wie sekr man auf dieser .,.Strafte" an den Anblick derartiger Konterbande gewbbnt war. Sckwere Sckuld kat die kbniglick serbisclie Regierung auf sick geladen, als sie all dies gesckeken lieft. Zur Pflege freundnackbarlicker Beziehungen zu Osterreick-TTngarn ver- pflicktet, kat sie ikrer Presse gestattet, den Haft, gcgen die Monarckie zu ver- breiten; bat sie es zugelassen, daft auf ilirem Boden etablierte Vereinigungen unter Fiikrung koher Offiziere, Staatsbeamter, Lekrer und Rickter bffentlich eine Kampagne gegen die Monarckie fiikren, die auf die Revolutionierung ihrer Burger abzielt; hat sie es nicht verhindert, daft an der Leitung ilirer Militar- und Zivilverwaltung beteiligte, aller moralischen Hemmungen bare Manner das bffentlicke Gewissen derart vergiften, daft ilim in diesem Kampfa der semeiue Meuckelmord als die beste Waffe scheint. Serbische PreSstimmen. a) Die „Politika« brachte am 18. August 1910 anlaMich des 80. Geburts- tages Seiner k. und k. Apostoliscben Majesfat ein grofies Bild des Bogdan Zerajie, der zwei Monate vorher gegen, den Landesohef von Bosnien, Freiherra von Varesanin, ein Attentat verubt hatte. Tn dem dazu gehorigen Ai-tikel hieC es: ,Vor zwei Monaten, am 2. Juni (a. St.), gerade am Tage der Eroffhung des bosniscb-herzegowinischon Landtages, versuchte ein junger Scrbe, der Student Bogdan Zerajid, in Sarajevo den Landes-( Ibef von Bosnien und der Herzegowina, den General Marian Varesanin zu toten. Funf Scbusse feuerte Zerajid auf diesen Renegatei), der sicb seine Karriere im beriibmten Volksaufstande in Rakoviea durch Vergieflung do Blutes seiner leiblichen Briider gesicherl batte, durcb einen merkwiirdigen Zufall gelang es nicbt, ihn zu tb'ten. I lain; jagte sicb der tapfere und selbstbewuflte Zerajid die sechste und letzte Kugel in den Kopf und stu'rzte sofort tot zusammen. In Wien verstanden sir sehr gut, dali Zeraji. : das Attentat nicbt desbalb verubte, weil er russische und revolutionare Scbriften gelesen, sondern dali er dies als edler Sprosse eines Volkes getan hatte, das auf diese blutige Weise gegen die Fremdherrschaft protestieren wollte. Desbalb trachteten sie, diese ganze Sache moglicbst schnell zu vertuscben und — was gegen ihre Gewobnbeit ist — eine Affaire zu vermeiden, welche die osterreichische Regierung in Bosnien und der Herzegowina noch mebr kompromittiert batte. In Wien wunscbte man, dali jedes Andenken an Zerajid ausgeloscht und seinem Attentate jede Bedeutung abgesprocben werde. Abet' gerade , diese Furcbt vor dem toten Zerajid und das Verbot, dali sein Kami in gariz Bosnien und der Herzegowina erwahnt werde, bewirkten, dali sein Name im Volke wie etwas Heiliges genannt wird, beute, am IS. August, vielleiebt mebr als jemals. Am beutigen Tage ziinden aucb vvir eine Kerze auf seinem Grabe an und rufen: „Ehre dem Zerajid!" Ilier.m scbloO sicb ein Gedicbt, dessen Inbalt in Ubersetzung lautet: „Bosnien lebt, uocb ist es nicht tot, Umsonst habt Ihr seinen Leib begraben; Nocb spriiht es Feuer, das gefesselte Opfer, Nock ist's nicbt Zeit, das Grablied zu singen. 35 Mit Satanshand scharrtet auf Ihr die Grabe, Aber der lebende Tote will nicht in die Graft; Kaiser, hbrtest Du? im Blitzen des Revolvers Sausen die bleiernen Kugeln gegen Deinen Thron! Das sind nicht Sklaven, das ist herrliche Freiheit, Die aus der kiihnen Hand des Unterjochten leuchtetl Was zittert so dieses schreckliche Golgatha? Petrus zog das Schwert, Christus zu sehirmen. Seine Hand sank, aber aus dem Blute Werden tausende tapfere Hande sich erheben; Dieser Schuil war nur der erste Bote Der glorreichen Ostern nach Golgathas Peinen." Am 8. Oktober 1910 brachten anl'afilich des Jahrestages der Annexion Bosniens und der Herzegowina „Polirika" und „Mali Journal", von denen letzteres mit schwarzem Rande cr.schien, Artikel, in denen sie sich in heftigen Angriffen gegen Osterreich-Ungarn ergingen. Europa miisse sich iiberzeugen, dafi das serbische Volk noch immer an die Revanche denke. Der Tag der Revanche miisse kommen, dafiir biirgten die fieberhaften Anstrengungen Serbiens zwecks Organisierung seiner Wehrmacht, sowie die Stimmung und der Hali des serbischen Volkes gegen die Nachbar- monarchie. Aus dem gleichen Anlali schrieb die „Samouprava" am 9. Oktober 1910: „ Schimpfworte und Exzesse sind kein Mittel, um den wahren Patrio- tismus zum Ausdruck zu bringen. Nur stille und wiirdige Arbeit i'iihrt zum Zielel" Am 18. April 1911 hiefl es in der „Politika": „Aufier einigen Zynikern wiirde es niemand in Serbien gerne sehen, wenn Konig Peter nach Wien oder Budapest reisen sollte. Durch die Annexion Bosniens und der Herzegowina ist ein fiir allemal die Moglichkeit einer Freundschaft zwischen Serbien .und Osterreich-Ungarn zerstort worden. Das fiihlt jeder Serbe." Die „Beogradske Novine" sohi-eiben am 18. April 1911: „Auch die meisten Regierungsmanner mifibilligen die geplante Reise des Kb'nigs Peter zu Kaiser Franz Joseph. Der Sturm der Entrlistung, der sich wegen des Planes dieser Reise des Konigs des ganzen Serbentums bem'aehtigt hat, ist vollkommen begreiflich." Das „Mali Journal" vom 19. April 1911 sagt: „Ein Besuch des Konigs Peter beim Herrscher von Osterreich-Ungarn ware eine Beleidigung des ganzen Serbentums. Durch diesen Besuch wiirde Serbien das Recht auf die Piemontrolle verheren. Die Interessen Serbiens kbnnen sich niemals mit den Interessen Osterreichs decken." 30 j) Am 23. April 1011 fiihren „Politika a , „Mali Journal", „Tribuna", „Beogradske Novine" und „Vecernje Ncvosti" zu dem Plane eines Besuohes Kbnig Peters am Wienei' ffofe aus: Zwischen Serbian und Osterreich- Ungarn konne niemals Freundschaft existieren. Der geplante Besuch des Konigs Peter sei daher fiir Serbian eine „schandliche Kapitulation", eine ..Demiitignng Serbiuns". eine „feierliehe Sanktionierung aller Verbreclien und Missetaten, tr etwas erz'ahlen, ich kenne Dieh noeh nicht, ob Du mich verraten wirst? Ich sage es Dir trotzdem und wenn Du das Herz hast verrate mich!" Auf die Frage des Jaglieie, urn was es sich denn handle, antwortete Klarid: „Bruder, in Serbien existiert ein Verein „Narodna odbrana". In diesen Verein sollen viele Leute eintrcten; es sind auch schon viele in Bosnien und der Herzegowina sowie in der ganzen Monarchic angeworben; es gibt Leute dabei von Intelligenz und Wohlhabende, das sind grofie Kopfe, und wenn es die keinnen, warum sollen es nicht auch wir tun, damit wir auch etwas dazu bei- tragen". Auf die Frage, welche Ziele dieser Verein verfolgt, antwortete Klarid: „Der Verein verfolgt den Zweck: z. B. Du bist in Kalinovik, Du meldest mir, was es dort Neues gibt, wie viel Milit'ar, Kanonen, Munition, verschiedene Gewehre, wet kommt, wer geht u. dgl. Wir haben eine geheime Scbrift „Chiffre" und korrespondieren mit derselben. Wenn Du treu bist, erhaltst Du sie auch." 55 Jaglicie' hatte Furcht, daft Klaric' ihn nur ausforsche, um ihn dann zu verraten und ersuehte ihn daher, er solle ihm einige Namen von Mitgliedern Dennen, worauf Klaric eine Zeitlang nachdachte und dem Jaglicie; dann einen Namen nannte, der diesem Yertrauen einfliiflte. Hierauf sagte ihm Klaric.: „Soll ich Dir den ....Chiffre"" geben?" Jaglicid war damit einverstanden. KJarir, welcher den Chiffre auswendig kannte, schrieb ihn auf einen Zettel auf und ubergab ihn dem Jaglicie\ Bei einer anderen Gelegenheit erz'ahlte Klarid von seinem Aufenthalt in Banja-Koviljaca (bei Loznica), wo er dutch den serbischen Hauptmann Todorovic'*) Unterricht im Bombenwerfen erhalten hat und sagte auf die Frage des Beschuldigten, warum er dies gelernt habe: „Wenn es zu etwas kommt, wie ich Dir bereits gesagt habe, ist es notwendig, dafi ich mit Bomben umzu- gehen verstehe, dafi ich Dich einiibe und Du dann die anderen, damit Pulver- magazine und sonstige wichtige Objekte in die Luft gesprengt werden, weil wir in diesem Falle Bomben aus Serbien erhalten werden" Hierauf beschrieb Klarid das Aussehen der Bomben und sagte, dafl er bereits Leute angeworben habe, welche im Falle eines Krieges die Telegraphen- und Telephondrahte durchschneiden werden. Bei diesen Zusammenkunften erfuhr Jaglicie" von Klari(! auch, dafl es zu den Aufgaben der Mitglieder der Narodna odbrana gehort, bsterreichisch-unga- rische Soldaten zur Fahnenrlueht zu verleiten, Freiwillige (Komitatschis) anzu- werben, Banden zu organisieren, Objekte und Depots zu sprengen u. s. w. Auch teilte ihm Klarid mit, dafi selbst die chiffi ierte Korrespondenz zwischen den serbischen und bosnischen Mitgliedern nicht der Post anvertraut, sondern durch siehere Boten uber die Grenze befbrdert wird. Klarid hat dem Jaglicid welters etz'ahlt, daft gclegentbch der Prosvjetafeier (im September 1912) mit der zu dieser cntsendeten Deputation aus Seibien auch ein serbischer Major in Sarajevo im Hotel ..Europe" geuohnt hat**) welchem Klarid Mitglieder der Narodna odbrana zufuhrte, die dieser beeidete. Von einem Spione erfuhr Jaglicie', daft Bomben nach Sarajevo kommen werden odei schon gekommen sind, dafi diese das Aussehen von Seifenstucken haben***) und daft man auch diesem Spione 2 — 3 Stiicke senden oder dafi er sich solche abholen werde. *; Hauplmann Kosta Todorovn. war damals lats, : iehlieli Grcn/kommissar und Leiter des serbischen Ktindscliafrsdienstcs fur die Grcnzstrecke Rae*— Ljuboija **J Zu der Prosvjetafeier war der serbische Major Mika Jankovie als serbischer Delegiener erseliieiien ***) Die bei dem Sarajcvocr Altentale gcgen Erxhcrzog Franz Ferdinand verwendeten und die im Jalirc 101*3 in der Save bei Breko gefundenon, aus dem koni;H serbischen Arsenate in Krugujevac staminen- tlcn Bomben kbnncn tatsachlieh mil Seifenstucken veryliehcn werden. Aus konfidentiellen Meldungen iiber die ..Narodna odbrana". Die Leitung der Narodna odbrana besteht aus Vertretern aller Partei- richtuflgen, urn auch die Fortschrittler und die Gegner der Verschworer zu gewinnen. Ihr eigentlicher Spiritus rector ist der jetzige Major Pribicevic\ Die Sekret'arstelle ist iramer mit e.inem beurlaubten Offizier besetzt. Aufgabe der Narodna odbrana ist es, in den sudslawischen Teilen Oster- reich-Ungarns eine wirksame Propaganda in Miliuir- und Zivilkreisen zu ent- wiokeln, urn so eine Revolution vorzubereiten, cventuelle Mobilisierungen zu stbren, Paniken und Revolten bervorzurufen u. s. w. Die Organisation besitzt in der Monarcbie mehrere Vertrauensmanner und Emissaro, die eine stille Propaganda von Maim zu Mann betreiben. Einzelne haben spezielle Missionen, um bei wii htigen Briicken, Knotenpunkten etc. einige Leute — wombglicb Eisenbahnbeamte — anzuwerben, welche die Aufgabe haben, im geeigncten Momente etwa erhaltene Weisungen durehzufuhren oder durchfiihren zu lassen. Der Verkehr zwiscben den Mitgliedern der Narodna odbrana wird mbglichst durch persiinliehe Fiihlungnahme bewerkstelligt. Als Mitglieder werden hauptsachlich junge Leute, Arbeiter, Eisenbabner geworben. Auszug aus den Akten des bosnisch-herzegowinischen Kreisgerichtes in Sarajevo Ober die dort anhangige Untersuchung gegen Gavrilo Princip und Genossen wegen des am 28. Juni 1914 an Seiner k. und k. Hoheit dem Herrn Erzherzoge Franz Ferdinand von Osterreich-Este und Ihrer Hoheit der Frau Herzogin Sophie von Hohenberg verubten Verbrechens des Meuchelmordes. I. Die Tat und die Tatersckaft. Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovirf, Trifko Grabez, Vaso CubriloviiS und Cetres Popovid sind gestandig, in Gemeinsckaft mit dem fliiektigon Mekemed Mekmedbasid ein Komplott zur Ermordung des Herrn Erzkerzogs Franz Ferdinand gebildet und mit Bomben, teilweise auck mit Browningpistolen ausgeriistet, Hbckstdemselben am 28. Juni 19 1 4 auf Seiner Rundt'akrt durck Sarajevo zwecks Veriibung des geplanten Attentates aufgelauert zu kaben. Nedeljko Cabrinovid ist gestandig, als erster unter den Ver'sekworern gegen den Wagen des Herrn Erzkerzogs eine Bombe gesckleudert zu kaben, die ikr Ziel verfeklte und die beim Explodieren lediglick Insassen des dem erzkerzog- lieken Automobile folgenden Wagens verletzte. Gavrilo Princip ist gestandig, aus einer Browningpistole zwei Sckiisse gegen das erzkerzoglicke Automobil abgegeben zu kaben, durck welcke der Herr Erz- kerzog Franz Ferdinand und die Fran Herzogin Sopkie von Hokenberg totlick verletzt wurden. Beide Tater geben die Mordabsickt bei Veriibung der Tat zu. Diese Gestiindnisse kaben durck die gepflogenen Erkebungen ikre voile Bestatigung gefunden und ist festgestellt, dall weiland Herr Erzkerzog Franz Ferdinand und weiland Frau Herzogin Sopkie von Hokenberg an den Folo-en der von Gavrilo Princip auf sie abgegebenen Eevolversckiisse gestorben sind. H. Entstekung des Komplotts. Die Besckuldigten kaben, im wesentlicben iibereinstimmend, vor dem Unter- suckungsrickter nackstekende Angaben gemaekt: Im April 1914 faDte Princip wakrend seines Aufentkaltes in Belgrad, wo ■er in dortigen Kaffeekausern mit vielen serbiscken Studenten verkekrte, den Plan zur Ausfukrung eines Attentates auf weiland Herrn Erzkerzog Franz Ferdinand. 58 Diese Absicht hat er mit dem ihm bekannten, damals gleichfalls in Belgrad anwesenden Cabrinovid besproclien, der sich damals schon mit dem gleichen Gedanken trug und der zur Teilnahme an dem Attentate sofort bereit war. Uber die Veriibung ernes Anscblages auf den Herrn Erzherzog wurde in dem Kreise, in dem Princip und Cabrinovid verkehrten, oft gesprochen, da der Herr Erzherzog als gefahrlicher Feind des serbisehen Volkes gait. Die zur Ausfiihrung der Tat notigen Bomben und Waffen wollten sich Prineip und Cabrinovid, da sie selbst die Mittel zu deren Ankauf nicht besaCen, zuerst von dem serbisehen Major Milan Pribiccvid oder von der Xarodua odbrana besehaffen. Da aber Major Pribidevid und das mafigebende Mitglied des genannten Vereines, Zivojin Dacid, zu jener Zeit verreist waren, beschlossen sie zu traehten, die Waffen von dem ihnen bekannten ehemaligen Komitatsehi und derzeitigen Staatsbahribeamten Milan Ciganovid zn erhalten. Nun trat Princip durch Vermittlung i-ines intimen Bekannten des Ciganovid mit diesem in Verbindung. Ciganovid suchte hierauf den Princip auf, sprach mit ihm uber das geplante Attentat, das er vollkommen billigte und erkl'arte zunachst, daft er es sich noch iiberlegen wolle, ob er die Waffen hiezu beistellen solle. Auch Cabrinovid sprach mit Ciganovid wegen der Waffen. Zu Ostern zog Princip den gleichfalls in Belgrad anwesenden Trifko Grabez ins Vertrauen, der sich nach seinem Gestandnisse gleichfalls zur Mitwirkung an dem Attentate bereit erklarte. In der folgenden Zeit hatte Princip wiederholt Gespracho mil Ciganovid iiber die Ausfiihrung des Attentates. Inzwischen hatte sich Ciganovid wegen des geplanten Attentates auch mit dem ihm eng befreundeten serbisehen Major Voja Tankosic ins Einvernehmen gesetzt, der dann fur diese Zwecke die Browningpistolen zur Vcrfugung stellte. Grabez gesteht in Ubereinstimrnung mit den Angaben des Princip und Cabrinovid zu, am 24. Mai in Begleitung des Ciganovid den Major Tankosid iiber dessen Wunseh in seiner Wohnung besucht zu haben. Nach der Vorstellung babe Tankosid dem Grabez gesagt: „Bist Du dieser, bist Uu entschlossen?" worauf Grabez erwiderte: „Ich bin es". Als Tankosic dann fragte: „Versteht Ihr aus dem Revolver zu schieflen?" und Grabez hierauf verneinend antwortete, sagte Tankosic zu Ciganovic: „Ich werde Dir einen Revolver geben ; gehe und unterrichte sie im Schieflen". Hierauf fiihrte Ciganovic den Princip und den Grabez zur Militarschiefl- st'atte in Topeider und erteilte ihnen in einem bei der Sehieflstatte liegendera Walde Unterricht im Schieflen mit Browningpistolen auf Ziele. Hiebei erwies sich Princip als der bessere Schiitze. Ciganovid hat den Princip, Grabez und Cabrinovid auch mit dem Gebrauche der ihnen spiiter iibergebenen Bomben vertraut gemacht. Am 27. Mai 1914 ubergab Ciganovic dem Princip, Cabrinovie" und Grabez nach deren ubereinstimmenden Gestandnissen 6 Bomben, 4 Browningrevolver und geniigende Mengen Munition, sowie eine Glastubc mit Zyankali, damit sie sich zwecks Wahrung des Geheimnisses nach veriibter Tat vergiften. Uberdies gab iknen Ciganovic! Geld. Schon zu Ostern hatte Prinoip den Danilo Ilii ! . von seinem Attentatsplano unterriehtet. Bei der Kiickkehr nach Sarajevo ersuchte er nun diesen, einige weitere Personen zu werben, die sich an dem Attentate beteiligen, damit es sicher gelinge. Hierauf hat Hid nach seinem Gestiindnisse den Jaso Cubrilovic, Cetro Popovic" und Mehemed Mehmedbasic" hiezu geworben. III. Herkunft der Bomben. Bei Yeriibung des Attentates war nur eine der Bomben zur Verwendung gelangt. Die iibrigcn fiinf Bomben wurden sp'ater von der Polizei in Sarajevo zustande gebracht. Diese Bomben sind nach dem Gutachten der gerichtlichen Sachverstiindigen serbische Handgranaten, die fabriksm'aliig erzeugt wurden und fur miht'arische Zwecke bestimmt waren. Sie sind identisch mit den 21 Bomben, die im Jahre 1913 in der Save bei Brcko gefunden wurden und die sich zum Teile noch in der Originalpackung befanden, aus der sich mit Sicherheit ergab, daQ sie aus dem serbischen Waffenlager in Kragujevac stammten. Damit ist festgestellt, dafi auch die bei dem Attentate gegen den Herrn Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand verwendeten Granaten aus den Vorraten des Kragujevacer Armeedepots stammen. Grabez nennt die ihm und seinen Komplizen iibergcbenen Granaten ganz spontan „Kragujevacer Bomben" rV. Transport der drei Attentater und der Waffen von Serbien nach Bosnien. Prinzip gibt hieruber folgendes an : Ciganovic" sagte dem Cabrinovie", Grabez und Princip, sie sollten ihren Weg iiber Sabac und Loznica nach Tuzla nehmen und sich dort an Misko Jovanovitf wenden, der die Waffen ubernehmen werde. Zun'achst sollten sie nach Sabac gehen und sich dort beim Grenzhauptmanne Major Rade Popovic melden, fur den er ihnen einen Zettel mitgab, den Princip iibernahm. Am 28. Mai verliellen die drei Komplizen mit den Waffen Belgrad. In Sabac ubergab Prinzip den Zettel, den er von Ciganovic erhalten hatte dem Major Popovic", der hierauf alle drei auf das Kommando fuhrte und ihnen einen Passierschein ausstellte, in welchem best'atigt wurde, dafi einer von ihnen Finanzwachmann und die beiden 60 anderen dessen Kameraden seien. Der Passierschein enthielt auch den Namen dieses angeblichen Finanzwachmaniies, doch habe er den Namen vergessen. Gleichzeitig iibergab ihnen Major Popovid ein geschlossenes Sckreiben fiir den Grenzhauptmann in Loznica, der Pravanovid, Prdanovid oder Predojevid hieO. Princip, Cabrinovid und Grabez iibernachteten in Sabac und reisten am n'achsten Morgen mit der Bahn naeh Loznica, und zwar auf Grand des ihnen vom Major Popovid ausgefertigten Passierscheines mit halber Fahrkarte. Mittags kamen sie in Loznica an und iibergaben dem dortigen Grenzhauptmanne den Brief des Majors Popovid, in dcm es hiefi: ,,Schau, dafj Du diese Leute empfangst und sie durchfuhrst, wo Du weiflt." Der Grenzhauptmann sagte, cr werde seine Finanzwachleute von der Grenze rufen und die drei dem sichersten Manne an- vertrauen. Darauf telephouierte er und bestellte die drei Komplizen fiir den n'achsten Morgen, 7 Uhr, in seine Kanzlei. Am anderen Morgen vereinbarten die drei Verschworer, dafj Cabrinovid mit dem Passe des Grabez offen den Weg nach Zvornik nehine, Princip und Grabez aber die Grenze heimlich uberschreiten. Dieser Plan wurde mit dem Grenz- hauptmanne besprochen und hiebei beschlossen, dafj ein Finanzwachmann aus Ljesnica, namens Grbid, den Princip und Grabez in seine Karaula mitnehmen und iiber die Grenze bringen solle. C!abrinovid ging dann zu FufJ nach Banja Koviljada in der Richtung gegen Zvornik. Princip und Grabez fuhren mit dem Finanzwachmanne Grbid nach Ljesnica, wo sie die Bornben und den Revolver in einem Hotelzimmer ablegten. Hiebei sah der Finanzwachmann Grbid diese Objekte. Princip selbst bezeichnete diese Reise als mystis'ch. Grabez sagte im wesentlichen konform mit Princip aus und fiigte erg'anzend bei, Grbid habe gelacht, als er die Bombe und die Revolver sah und lediglich gefragt, wohin in Bosnien sie mit diesen Bomben gingen. Der Finanzwachmann habe sich jedenfalls gedacht, dali Grabez und Princip eine Mission h'atten. Grbid und ein zweiter Finanzwachmann haben den Princip und Grabez auf einem Kahne zu einer Insel in der Drina gebracht. Dort wies sie Grbid an, auf einen Bauer zu warten, der sie abholen werde. Sie iibernachteten auf der Insel in einem Bauernh'auschen, wohin Grbid sie gewiesen hatte. Am n'achsten Tage kam ein Bauer, der sie wahrend der Nacht zuerst durch einen Sumpf und dann iiber das Gebirge bis in die Nahe von Priboj brachte, wo er sie wieder dem dortigen Lehrer Cubrilovid, der bereits auf sie gewartet zu- haben schien, zur Weiterbefb'rderung iibergab. Dieser brachte sie dann weiter nach Tuzla zu Misko Jovanovid. Cabrinovid sagte iiber die Vorgange der Reise bis zu dem Momente, in dem er sich von Princip und Grabez trennte, im wesentlichen iibereinstimmend mit diesen aus und fiigte nur erg'anzend bei, dafj Major Popovid ihnen erzahlt habe, er sei erst am Tage vor ihrer Ankunft in Sabac aus Belgrad gekommen. In Loznica beschlossen Cabrinovic, Princip und Grabez sich zu treDnen, da es zu geiahrlich ware, wenn sie zu dritt gingen. Der Grenzhauptmann in Loznica, dem sie hievon Mitteilung machten, lobte ihren Plan und gab dem Cabrinovic' einen Brief fur den Lehrer M. Jaklojevic* in Mali-Zvornik mit. Cabrinovic' ubergab hierauf die von ihm getragenen Bomben, Browning und Munition dem Princip und Grabez und ging in Begleitung eines ihm beigege- benen Finanzwachmannes nacb Mali-Zvornik. Dort fand er den Lehrer Jaklojevic, dem er den Brief des Grenzhaupt- mannes von Loznica ubergab. Dieser avisierte hierauf den serbischen Grenzposten. Als Cabrinovic 1 spater mit dem Lehrer zu diesem Grenzposten kam, wartete dort bereits ein Mann auf sie, der sie mit einem Kahne iiber die Drina nacb. GroQ-Zvornik in Bosnien brachte. Von dort begab sich dann Cabrinovic' nach Tuzla zu Misko Jovanovic\ Nachtrag. Knapp vor Abschluft dieses Memoires wird vom Kreisgerichte in Sarajevo ein Zeugenprotokoll vorgelegt, aus dem sich ergibt, dafl ein Angehoriger der Monarchic einige Tage vor dem 28. Juni d. J. dem k. Und k. Konsulate in Belgrad die Meldung crstatten wollte, dalS er vermute, es bestehe der Plan auf Erz- herzog Franz Ferdinand w'ahrend seiner Anwesenheit in Bosnien ein Attentat zu veriiben. Dieser Mann soil nun durch Belgrader Polizeiorgane, die ihn unmittelbar vor dem Betreten des k. und k. Konsulates aus nichtigen Grtinden verhafteten, an der Erstattung dieser Meldung verhindert worden sein. Aus den in dem frag- lichen Zeugenprotokolle enthaltenen Angaben wiirde folgen, daO die betreffenden Polizeiorgane von dem geplanten Attentate Kenntnis gehabt und diesen Mann nur verhaftet hatten, um ihn an der Erstattung der Anzeige zu hindern. Da diese Angaben noch nicht nachgepriift sind, kann iiber deren Stichhaltig- keit im gegenwartigen Zeitpunkte noch kein Urteil abgegeben werden. Mit Kiick- sicht auf die hieiiiber schwebenden Erhebungen entziehen sich die naheren. Details der Zeugenaussage derzeit einer genaueren Wiedergabe. Die serbische Presse Uber das Attentat. a) Das Belgrader Blatt „Balkan u schreibt am 29. Juni iiber die beiden Atten- t'ater: Nedeljko Cabrinovid, von Beruf Typography war von anarehistischen Ideen erfullt und als unruhiger Geist bekannt. Er weilte bis vor 20 Tagen in Belgrad, wohin er nach dem Kriege kam und in der Staatsdruckerei besch'aftigt war. Vor seiner Abreise erkliirte er, daC er sicb nacli Triest begebe, wo er in einer neuen Druekerei Arbeit bekommen werde. Gavrilo Prineip weilte gleiebfalls bis vor kurzem in Belgrad. Wahrend des Krieges bat er sicb als Freiwilliger gemeldet, wurde jedoch nicht angenommen. wes- balb er Belgrad veiliefi. Er kehrte aber zu Weihnacbten des vorigen Jahres wieder nacb Belgrad zuriick, besucbte eine Zeitlang das Gymnasium und verliefi Belgrad fast zu gleioher Zeit wie Cabrinovid, jedoeb auf einem anderen Wege als dieser. Prineip war sebweigsam, nervb's, lernte gut, ver- kehrte mit einigen gleiebfalls aus Bosnien und der Herzegowina stammen- den Mittelschiilern und in der letzten Zeit aueh mit Cabrinovid. Er neigte sozialistisohen Ideen zu, obwohl er urspriinglich der fortsehrittlichen Jugend angehb'rt hat. Prineip ist ebenso wie Cabrinovid in Sarajevo aufgewachsen; beide verband seit ihrer Kindbeit eine unzertrennliehe Freundscbaft. b) Der „Piemont" vom 1. Juli verweist darauf, dali nacb dem lauten Proteste des Attentates Zerajic der Protest Princips gefolgt sei. Das Werk des letz- teren finde gleiebfalls seine Aufklarung im bosniscben Begierungssystem. Der Dmstand, dali Prineip den Puichoakt am heiligen Nationaltag Vidovdan veriibte, welcber fiir die Vomabme der Manb'ver gewahlt worden war, lnsse die Yerzweiflungstat des jungen Martyrers veislandlicber .und natiirlicber ersoheinen. (Das Blatt wurde wegen dieses Artikels von der Polizei konfisziert, die Konfiskation jedoch tags darauf von der ersten Instanz des Belgrader Gerichtes annulliert.) \c) Der jungradikale _Odjek" vom 3. Juli sagt: man habe den Herrn Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand am Tage des nationalen Entbusiasmus naeh Sarajevo gesendet, um eine brutale Manifestation dor Gewalt und L'nterwerfung zu feiern. 63 Dieser brutalo Akt muflte brutalc Gefiihle des Widerstandes, des Hasses und der Rache herausfordern. \d) Das nationalistische Partoiorgan „Srpska Zastava" vom 3. Juli sagt in einem Artilcel, betitelt r Verdaehtigungen und Drohungen: „Das Attentat stellt sich immer mehr als ein Erzeugnis der ungesunden Verhaltnisse in der Monarchic dar. Andererseits ruft die wilde Verfolgung des serbischen Volkes in Bosnien und der Herzegowina den Abscheu der ganzen zivilisierten Welt hervor." e) Das fortschrittliehe Blatt ,Pravda" vom 3. Juli schreibt: „Die Wiener Politik ist zynisch. Sie beutet den Tod des ungliicklichen Paares fiir ihre abscheu- lichen Ziele gegen das serbische Volk aus." f) Die „Agence des Balkans" vom 3. Juli meldet: „Die in Bosnien und der Herzegowina gegen die Serben verubten Verbiechen sind unter den Auspizien und auf direkte Anstiftung der bsterreichisch-ungarischen Zivil- und Militar- behbrden begangen worden." jg) Die „Pravda° vom 4. Juli sagt: r AUe bisher in Osterreieh begangenen Morde und Attentate haben stets eine und dieselbe Quelle gehabt. Die unterdriickten Volker der Monarehie muflten zu dieser Art des Protestes greifen, weil ihnen kein andercr Weg mbglieh war. In einem Chaos der Schreekens- herrschaft ist es natiirlich und vollkommen begreiflich, dafl sich die Ara der Attentate eingebiirgert hat. h) Der „ Balkan" vom 5. Juli bemerkt, dafl Osterreich-Ungarn „wegen Ver- folgung Unschuldiger unter internationale Kontrolle gestellt werden muflte"; denn Osterreich-Ungarn sei weniger konsolidiert als die Tiirkei. i) Das „Mali Journal" vom 7. Juli schreibt: „Ein SprolMing des Mittelalters wurde dieser Tage in Sarajevo ermordet. Ermoidet hat ihn ein Knabe, der das Leid um sein geknochtetes engeres Vaterland bis zum Paroxismus fuhlte, das Leid, das ihm die Rauber der Lander seiner Viiter angetan haben. Was hat daraufhin das offizielle Osterreich-Ungarn getan? Es hat mit allgemeinen Massakiierungen, 1'liinderungen und Zerstorungen des ser- bischen Lebens und Eigentums geantwortet. Dutch solches Heldentum zeichnen sich nur die Nichtsnutzigen aus. Die Feigen sind immer grofle Hidden, wenn sie sicher sind, dali ihnen nichts geschehen wild. Man ver- gleiche nur Princip und Cabrinovie mit diesen Helden und man wird gleich den groften Unterschied merken. Zivilisation und Gerechtigkcit sind in Osterreich-Ungarn eine grofle Liige." j) Die „Tribuna" vom 7. Juli sagt: „Wir sind der Ansicht, dafl die Mordtat von .Sarajevo bestellt wurde, um die Ausrottung der Serben mit einem Schlag durchzufiihren." { k) Der n Piemont" vom 8. Juli meldet aus Bajina Baschka, dafl die bsterrei- chischen Behorden in Bosnien ein Christenmassaker vorbereiten. 64 I) Der „Balkan" vom 8. verbffentlieht einen Bericht aus Bosnien unter dem Xitel „Bartholom'ausnaeht in Sarajevo" und tritt fiir einen allgemeineu Boykott gegen alle in Serbien lebenden Osterveicher ein. m) Das „Mali Journal" vom 8. fordert zum Boykott gegen die Donau-Dampf- schiflahrts-Gesellschaft auf. n) Unter dem Titel „Nichts aus Osterreich-Ungarn!" schreibt die n Tribuna" vom 8., es sei am besten, aus Osterreich-Ungarn niehts zu beziehen, aucb. die bsterreiehischen und ungarischen Bader nielit zu besuchen und keine Arzte aus Osterreich-Ungarn zu berufen. Die Privatinitiative kb'nne in der angedeuteten Richtung viel ausrichten. Der Staat und die Behtirden haben sich darein nicht einzumischeu. Es sei genugend, an die Burger zu appellieren. o) Die „Stampa" vom 8. bebauptet, dafl die Sarajevoer Polizei die verhafteten Attentater der unmensclilichsten und scbamlosesten Tortur aussetze, um von ihnen unwahre Gest'andnisse zu erpressen, auf Grund welcher dann Anklagen gegen das serbisehe Volk erboben werden sollen. p) Die „Agence des Balkans" vom 9. meldet aus Belgrad: „ Absolut siohere Privatmeldungen kiindigen an, dafJ in Bosnien und der Herzegowina ein allgemeines Massaker der Serben unmittelbar bevorstehe." y in St. Petersburg. Wien, '2b. Juli 1914. In dem Augenblicke, wo wir uns zu einem ernsten Vorgehen gegen Serbien entschlossen haben, sind wir uns naturlicb auch der Moglichkeit eines sicb aus der serbiscben Differenz entwickelnden Zusammenstoftes mit Rullland bewulit gewesen. Wir konnten uns aber durch diese Eventualitat nicht in unserer Stellungnahme gegeniiber Serbien beirren lassen, weil grundlegende staats- politische Konsiderationen uns vor die Notwendigkeit stellten, der Situation ein Ende zu machen, daft ein russischer Freibrief Serbien die dauernde, ungestrafte und unstrafbare Jiedrohung der Monarchic ermogliche. 75 Fur den Fall, als Rufiland den Moment fiir die grolJe Abrechnung mit den europaischen Zentralmachten bereits fiir gekommen erachten sollte und daher von vorneherein zum Ivrieg entschlossen ware, erscheint allerdings nachstehende Instruierung Euer Exzellenz uberflussig. Es ware aber immerhin denkbar, dafi Rufiland, nach der eventuellen Ab- lehnung unserer Forderungen dureh Serbien und angesichts der sieh fiir uns ergebenden Notwendigkeiu eines bewaffneten Vorgehens, mit sich selbst zu Bate ginge und dad es sogar gewillt sein kbnnte, sieh von den kriegslustigen Elementen nicht mitreiiien zu lassen. Dieser Situation sind die nachfolgenden Darlegungen angepafit, die Euer Exzellenz im gegebenen Moment und in der Ihnen geeignet erscheinenden Weise und nach der von Ihnen zu ermessenden Opportunist bei Herrn Sazonow und dem Herrn Ministerprasidenten verwerten wollen: Ich setze im allgemeine'n voraus, dafi Euer Exzellenz unter den gegen- w'artigen Verhaltnissen ein enges Einvernehruen mit rhrem deutschen Kollegen hergestellt haben, der seitens seiner Regierung gewifi beauftragt worden sein diirfte, der russischen Regierung keinen Zweifel dariiber zu lassen, dafi Oster- reich-Ungarn im Falle eines Konfliktes mit Rufiland nicht allein stehen wiirde. Dariiber gebe ich mieh keiner Illusion bin, daD es nicht leicht sein wird, fiir unseren unvermeidlich gewordenen Schritt in Belgrad bei Herrn Sazonow Verstandnis zu finden. Es gibt aber ein Moment, das seinen Eindrnek auf den russischen Minister des Aullern nicht verfehlcn kann und das ist die Betonung des Umstandes, dafi die osterreicBisch-ungarische Monarchie, dem von ihr seit Jahrzenten fest- gehaltenen Grundsatze entsprechend, auch in der gegenwartigen Ki'ise und bei der bewaffneten Austragung des Gegensatzes zu Serbien keinerlei eigenniitzige Motive verfolgt. Die Monarchie ist territorial saturiert und tragt nach serbischem Besitz kein Verlangen. Wenn der Kampf mit Serbien uns aufgezwungen wird, so wird dies fiir uns kein Kampf nm territorialen Gewinn, sondern lediglieh ein Mittel der Selbstverteidung und Selbsterhaltnng sein. Der Inhalt des Zu-kularerlasses, der an sich schon beredt genug ist, wird in das rechte Licht gertickt durch das Dossier iiber die serbische Propaganda gegen die Monarchie und die Zusammenhange, die zwischen dieser Propaganda und dem Attentat vom 28. Juni bestehen. Auf dieses Dossier wollen Euer Exzellenz die Aufmerksamkeit des Herrn russischen Ministers ganz speziell lenken und dartun, es sei eine in der Ge- schichte singulare Erscheinung, dafi eine Grofimacht die aufruhrerischen Umtiiebe eines angrenzenden kleinen Staates durch so lange Zeit mit so beispiel- loser Langmut geduldet hatte wie Osterreich-Ungarn jene Serbiens. 76 Wir wollten keine Politik gegen das Aufstreben der christliehen Balkan- staaten machen und haben daher — trotzdem uns der geringe Wert serbischer Versprechungen bekannt war — nach der Annexionskrise vom Jahre 1908 zu- gelassen, daft sich Serbien beinahe um das Dnppelte vergrbftere. Seitdem hat die subversive Bewegung, die in Serbien gegen die Monarchic gen'ahrt wird, so exzessive Formen angenommen, daO die Lebensinteressen Osterreich-Ungarns und selbst unsere Dynastie durch die serbische Wuhlarbeit bedroht erscheinen. Wir miissen annehmen, dafl das konservative, kaisertreue UuIMand ein energisches Vorgehen unsererseits gcg liese Bedrohung aller staatlichen Ord- nung begreiflieh rind sogar notwendig finden wird. YYenn Euer Exzellenz in Ihrem Gespr'ach mit Herrn Sazonow an diesem Punkte angelangt sein werden, wird der Moment gekommen sein, an die Auf- stellving unserer Beweggriinde und Absichten den Hinweis zu kniipfen, daft wir zwar — wie Euer Exzellenz bereits in dev Lage gewesen waren darzulegen — keinen territorialen Gewinn anstreben und aueh die Souveranitiit des Konig- reiches nieht anzutasten gedachten, daft wir aber andererseits zur Durebsetzung unserer Forderungen bis zum Auflersten gehen wiirden. Daft wir bisher, soweit es an uns lag, bestrebt waren, den Frieden zu er- halten, den aueh wir als das kostbarstc Gut der Volker betrachten, zeige der Verlauf der letzten 40 Jahre und die geschichtliche Tatsaehe, dall unser Aller- gnadigster Herr Sich den glorreiehen Namen eines Hiiters des Friedens er- worben hat Wir wiirden fine Stb'rung des europaischen Friedens schon deshalb auf das lebhafteste bedauern, weil wir stets der Ansicht waren, daft das Erstarken der Balkanstaaten zur staatlichen und politischen Selbst'andigkeit unseren Bezie- hungen zu Ruftland zum Vortei) gereichen wiirde, aueh alle Moglichkeit <-ines Gegensatzes zwiscben urn und KuftlanJ beseitigen wiirde und weil wir'immer boreit waren, die. grofien politischen interessen Ruftlands bei unserer eigenen politischen Orientiei'ung zu beriicksichtigen. Eine weitere Duldung der serbischen Umtriebe wiirde unsere staatliche Exi- stenz uritergraben und unseren Bestand als Groftmacht, daher aueh das europ'aische Gleichgewicht, in Frage stellen. Wir sind aber iiberzeugt, daft es Ruiilands eigenstes, von seinen tiiedliehen Staatsleitern wohlver'standenes Interesse ist, daft das gegenw'artige europaische, f'iir den Weltfrieden so niitzliehe Gleichgewicht erhalten bleibe. Unsere Aktion gegen Serbien, in welchcr Form immer sie erfolgt, ist eine durchaus konservative und ihr Zweck die notwendige Erhaltung unserer europaischen Stellung. 27. Graf Berchtold an Graf Sz4pa>y in St. Petersburg. Telegramm. Wien, 25. Ju/i 1914. Da Punkt 5 "unserer Foiderungen, n'amlich die Beteiligung von k. u. k. Funktionaren bei der Unterdriiekung der subversive!! Bewegung in Serbien, besonderen Widerspruch Herrn Sazonows hervorgerufen, wollen Euer Exzellenz sich iiber diesen Punkt strong vertraulich dahin 'aufiern, dafi dessen Einschaltung lediglich praktischen Riicksichten entsprang und keineswegs der Absicbt, die Souveranit'at Serbiens zu tangieren. Wir denken bei Punkt 5 „collaboration" an die Erricbtung eines gebeimen „bureau de surete" in Belgrad, welches nach Art der analogen russiscben Einricbtungen in Paris funktionieren und rait der serbischen Polizei und Verwaltungsbehorde kooperieren wiirde. 28. Graf Szapary an Graf Berchtold. Telegramm. St. Petersburg, 26. Ju/i 1914. Aus Anlafi von Geriicbten iiber russische Mobilisierungsmallnahmen bat Graf Pourtales den russiscben Minister in dor ernstesten Weise darauf aufmerksam gemacbt, dafi heutzutage Mobilisierungsmafinahmen als diplomatiscbes Druck- mittel hcichst gefahilich seien. Denn in diesem Falle gelange die rein militarische Erw'agung der Generalst'abe zum Wort und wenn in Deutscbland einmal •auf den Knopf gedriickt werde, sei die Saohe unaufhaltsam. Herr Sazonow ver- sicberte dem deutschen Botschafter unter Ehrenwort, dali die beziiglichen Geriichte unrichtig seien, dali bisber kcin Pferd und kein Reservist eingezogen sei und dali es sich lediglich um vorbereitende MalJnahmen in den Milifar- beziiken Kiew und Odessa, vielleicht Kasan und Moskau handle. Unmittelbar nachher erhielt der kaiserlich deutsche Milit'arattache per Kurier spat abend eine Einladung zu Kriegsminister Suchomlinow, weloher sich darauf berief, dafi Graf Pourtales dem Minister des AufJern iiber die russischen Riistungen gesprochen babe und da der Botschafter einzelne militarische Details mifjverstanden haben konnte, nehme er Gelegenbeit, ihn ausfiihrlicher zu informieren. In folgendem mir zur Verfiigung gestellten Telegramm des Grafen Pourtales nach Berlin sind die diesfalligen Mitteilungon des Majors von Eggeling zusammengefalit : Militarattache meldet iiber Gesprach mit i-ussischem Kriegsminister: Herr Sazonow hat ihn gebeten. mieh iiber militarische Lage aufzukl'aren. Der Herr Kriegsminister gab mir sein Ehrenwort, daft noch keinerlei Mobilmachungsordre ergangen sei. Vorlaufig wiirden lediglich vorbereitende MaGnahmen getroffen, kein Pferd ausgehoben, kein Reservist eingezogen. Wenn Osterreich serbische 78 Orenze uberschreite, werden aaf Osterreich gerichtetc Militarbezirke Kiew, Odessa, Moskau, Kasan mobilisiert. Unicr keinen Umstanden an deutseher Front, Warschau, Wilna, St. Petersburg- Man wiinscht dringend Frieden mit Deutschland. Anf meinc Fragc, zn welchem Zweck die Mobilisierung gegen Osterreich, Achsel- zucken und Hinweis anf Diplomaten Sprach dem Herrn Minister aus, dafi man bei uns Wiirdigung fur freundschaftliche Absicht zeigen, aber auch Mobil- machvmg gegen Osterreicb allein als sehr hedrobhck ansehen werde. Herr Minister betonte nachdriicklichst und wiederholt dringendes Bediirfnis und Wunsch auf Frieden. 29. Graf Berchtold an Graf Mer.sdorff in London. Telegramm. Wiev, 26. Juli 1914. Herr von Tsckirsehky teilte mir auftraggemafl heute mit, laut eines in London am 25. d. M., 3 Ubr nachmittags, aufgegebenen Telegrammes des Fursten Liehnowsky habe Sir E. Grey diesem die Skizze einer Antwortnote Serbiens u'bersendet und in dem begleitenden Privatschreiben bemerkt, dafl er hoffe, das Berliner Kabinett wiirde sich angesicbts des versohnlichen Tenors dieser Antwort in Wien fur deren Annabme verwenden. Ich halte es fiir angezeigt, dall Euer Exzellenz dem Herrn Staatssekretar gegen- iiber auf die Sache zuriickkommen und ibn darauf aufmerksam machen, dafi fast zur selben Zeit, als er dieses Schreiben an Fiirst Lichnowsky richtete, namlich gestern um '6 Ubr nachmittags, Serbien bereits die allgemeine Mobilisierung seiner Arme angeordnet hat, was beweist, dafi in Belgrad zu einer friedlichen Austragung der Saehe keine Neigung bestand. Die Uberreiehung dor, wie es seheint, schon vorher nach London telegraphierten Antwort an den k. und k. Gesandten in Belgrad fand mit emem unseren Forderungen nicht entsprechenden Inhalte erst um C Uhr naeh erfolgter Ausschreibung der Mobilisierung statt. 30. Graf Berchtold an die k. u. k. Botschafter in Berlin, Rom, London, Paris und St. Petersburg. Telegramm. Wien, 26. Juli 1914. Wir haben, nachdem Serbien die ion uns aufgestellten Forderungen ab- gelehnt hat, die diplomatischen Beziehungen zu diesem Lande abgebroehen. Ich ersnche Euer Exzellenz nunmehr, sich sofort zum HeiTn Minister des Auflern oder dessen Stellvertreter zu begeben und sich ihm gegenuber beilaufig in folgender Weise auszusprechen : "79 Die kbniglich serbische Kegierung hat es abgelehnt, die Forderungen, welche wir zur dauernden Sicherung unserer von ihr bedrohten vitalsten Interessen an sie stellen muliten, zu erfiillen, womit sie bekundet hat, dali sie ihre sub- versiven, auf die stete Beunruhigung einiger unserer Grenzgebiete und ihre schlieliliche Lostrennung aus dem Gefiige der Monarohie gerichteten Bestre- bungen aufzugeben, nicht willens sei. Zu unserem Bedauern und sehr gegen unseren Willen sind wir dadurch in die Notwendigkeit versetzt worden, Serbien durch die scharfsten Mittel zu einer grundsatzlichen Anderung seiner bisherigen feindseligen Haltung zu zwingen. 31. Graf SzSpary an Graf Berchtold. Telegramm. St. Petersburg, 27. Juli 1914. Soeben lange Unterredung mit Herrn Sazonow gehabt. Sagte dem Herrn Minister, ich hiitte den Eindruck, dail man iiber den Charakter unserer Aktion in RuQland in Irrtumern befangen sei. Man imputiere uns, hiemit einen Vorstofl auf den Balkan unternehmen und den Marseh nach Salonich oder gar naoh Konstantinopel antreten zu wollen. Andere wieder gingen so vveit, unsere Aktion nur als den Aut'takt eines Pr'aventivkrieges gegen Rullland zu bezeiehnen. All dies sei irrig, zum Teile geradezu unverniinftig. Das Ziel unserer Aktion sei Selbsterhaltung und Notwehr gegenuber einer feindseligen, unsere Integritat bedrohenden Propaganda des Wortes, der Schrift und der Tat. Niemandem in Osterreich-Ungarn falle es ein, russische Interessen bedrohen oder gar Handel mit RulMand suchen zu wollen. Das Ziel jedoeh, das wir uns vorgesetzt, seien wir unbedingt entsehlossen zu erreiohen und der Weg, den wir gewahlt h'atten, schieD uns der zweckdienlichste. Da es sich aber um eine Aktion der Notwehr handle, kbnne ich ihm nicht verhehlen, daO man sich bei einer solchen durch gar keine wie immer gearteten Konsequenzen beirren lassen kbnne. Herr Sazonow stimmte mir bei. Unser Ziel, wie ich es ihm geschildert habe, sei ein vollkommen legitimes, aber er meine, der Weg, den wir zu dessen Erreichung verfolgen, sei nicht der sicherste. Die Note, die wir iiberreicht h'atten, sei in der Form nicht gliicklich. Er habe sie seitdem studiert und wenn ich Zeit h'atte, mochte er sie nochmals mit mir durchschauen. Ich bemerkte, daC ich zu • seiner Disposition sei, aber weder autorisiert sei, den Notentext mit ihm zu diskutieren, noch denselben zu interpretieren. Seine Bemerkungen seien aber natiirlich von Interesse. Der Herr Minister nahm sodann alle Punkte der Note durch und fand heute von den zehn Punkten sieben ohne allzu groOe Schwierig- keiten annehmbar, nur die zwei Punkte, betreffend die Mitwirkung von k. u. k. so Funktion'aren in Serbian und den Punkt, betreffend die Entlassung von unserseits zu bezeichnenden Offizieren und Iieamten, fand er in diesor Form unannehmbar. Beziiglich der beiden erstcn Punkte war ich in der Lage eine authentische Interpretation im Sinne Euer Exzellenz Tolegrammes vom 25 d. M zu geben, beziiglich des dritten meintc ich, dafl er oine notwendige Forderung sei. Ubrigens seien die Dinge im Rollen. Die Serben hatten schon gestern mobili- siert und was sich seither noch ereignet habe, sei mir unbekannt. 32. Graf Berchtold an Graf Sz3pa>y in St. Petersburg. Telegramm. Wien, 27. Juli 1914. Ich erm'achtige Euer Exzellenz, Herrn Sazonow gegeniiber sich dahin aus- zusprechen, dafl, solange der Krieg zwschen Osterreich-Ungam und Serbian lokalisicrt bleibe, die Monarchie irgendwelche temtoriale Eroberungen keineswegs beabsichtige. 33. Graf Szogy^ny an Graf Berchtold. Telegramm. Berlin, 27. Juli 1914. Ilcrr Sazonow erklarte dem deutschen Botschaftor, er konne ihm „garan- tieren, dafi russischerseits kcine Mobflisierung vorgenommen worden sei; aller- dings waren gewisse notwendigste milit'arische Vorsorgen getroffen." Deutseher Militarattache' in St. Petersburg meldet, daC „russiseher Kriegs- minister ihm sein Ehrenwort gegeben habe, dali nicht ein Mann, noch ein Pferd mobilisiert sei; doch seien naturlieherweise gewisse militarische Vorsorgen getroffen worden"; Vorsorgen, die, wie der deutsche Militarattache seiner Meldung als von sich aus hinzufiigt, „allerdings ziemlich weitgehend seien." 34. Graf Berchtold an die k. u. k. Botschafter in Berlin, Rom, London, Paris und St. Petersburg. Wien, 27. Jnli 1.914. In der Anlage erhalten Euer — den mit unseren Bemeikungen versehenen Text der Note, welche die kb'niglich serbische Regierung unterm 25. 1. M. an den k. u. k. Gesandten in Belgrad gerichtet hat. Note der konigl. serbischen Regierung an die k. und k. Regierung vom 12. 25. Juli 1914. tlbcrsetzuiig. Die konigl. serbische Regierung hat die Mitteilung der k. und k. Regierung vom 10. d. M. erhalten und ist uber- zeugt, daO ihre Antwort jedes MiOver- standnis zerstreuen wird, welches die f'reundnachbarlichen Beziehungen zwi- sehen der osterreichisch-ungarischen Mon- archic und dcm Konigreiche Serbien zu stbrcn droht. Die konigliehe Regierung ist sich bewudt, daft der grofien Nachbarmon- archie gegeniiber bei keinera Anlasse jcne Protcstc erneuert warden, dh seinerzeit sowohl in der Skupschtina, als auch in Erklarungen und Hand- lungen der verantwortlichen Vertreter des Staates zum Ausdrucke gebracht wurden und die durch die Erklarung dor serbischen Regierung vom 18. Mar/. 1909 ihren Abschlull gefunden haben, sowio weiters, daft seit jcner Zeit weder von den verschiedenen einander folgen- den Rcgierungen des Konigreiches, noch von deren Organen der Versuch unfer- nommen wurde, den in Bosnien und der Herzegowina geschaftenen politischen und rechtlichen Zustand zu andern. Die konigliehe Regierung stellt fest, dad die k. und k. Regierung in dieser Rich- tung keinerlei Vorstellungen erhoben hat, abgesehen von dem Falle eines Lclnbuches, hinsichtlich dessen die AimicrK ii limn. Die konigl. serbische Regierung beschrankt sich darauf festzustellen, dad seit Abgabe der Erklarung vom 18. Marz 1909 von Seite der serbischen Regie- rung und ihrer Organe kein Versuch zur Anderung der Stellung Bosniens und der Herzegowina unteinommen wurde. Damit veischiebt sie in bewuCt will- kurlicher Weise die Grundlagen unserer Demarche, da wir nicht die Beliauptung aufgestellt haben, dali sie und ihre Or- gane in dieser Richtung ofriziell irgend etwas unternommen hatten. UnserUravamengehtvielmelirdahin, dali sie es trotz der in der zitierten Note ubernomnienen \ crpflichtungen unter- lassen hat, die gegen die territoriale Integritat der Monarchie gerichtete Be- wegung zu unterdrucken. Ihre Verpflichtung bestand also darin, die ganze Richtung ihrer Politik zu andern und zur ostcrreichisch-unga- k. und k. Regierung eine vollkommen be- friedigende Aufklarung erhalten hat. Serbien hat wlihrend der Dauer der Balkankrise in zahlreichen Fallen Be- weise ftir seine pazifistiscbe und ge- m'alligte Politik geliefert und es ist nur Serbien und den Opfern, die es aus- schlielMich im Interesse des europaischen Friedens gebracht hat, zu dauken, wenn dieser Friede erhalten geblieben ist. Die kbnigliche Regierung kann nicht fiir Aullerungen privaten Charakter verantwortlich gemacht werden, wie es Zeitungsartikel und die friedliehe Arbeit von Gesellschaften ist, Auflerungen, die fast in alien Landern ganz gewohnbehe Erscheinungen sind und die sich im allgemeinen der staatlichen Kontrolle entziehen. Dies umsoweniger. als die kiinigliche Regierung bei der Losung einer ganzen Reihe von Fragen, die zwischen Serbien und Osterreich-Ungarn aufgetaueht waren, groiles Entgegen- kommen bewiesen hat, wodurch es ihr gelungen ist, deren grbfJeren Teil zu- gunsten des Fortschrittes der beiden Nachbarlander zu Ibsen. Die konigliche Regierung war des- halb dureh die Behauptungen, dafi An- gehorige Serbiens an der Vorbereitung des in Sarajevo verubten Attentates teil- genoraraen hatten, schraerzlieh uber- raseht. Sie hatte erwartet, zur Mit- wirkung bei den Nachforschungen iiber dieses Verbrechen eingeladen zu werden und war bereit, urn ihre voile Korrekt- heit dureh Taten zu beweisen, gegen alle Personen vorzugehen, hinsiehtlieh rischeu Monarchic iD ein freundnach- barliohes Verhaltnis zn treten, nicht blofl die Zugehorigkeit Bosniens zur Monarchic ofliziell nicht anzutasten. Die Behauptung der kbnigl. serbi- schen Regierung, dall die Aufierungen der Presse und die Tatigkeit von Ver- einen privaten Charakter haben und sich der staatlichen Kontrolle entziehen. steht im vollen Widerspruche zu den Einrich- tungen moderner Staaten, selbst der freiheitliclisten Richtung auf dera Ge- biete des PreG- und Vereinsrechtes, das einen bffentlich rechtlichen Charakter hat und Presse sowie Vereine der staat- lichen Aufsicht unterstellt. Ubrigens sehen auch die serbischen Eiurichtungen eine solche Aufsicht vor. Der gegen die serbische Regierung erhobene, Vorwurf geht eben dahin, dafJ sie es ganzlich unterlassen hat, ihre Presse und ihre Vereine zu beaufsichtigen, deren Wir- ken im monarchiefeindlichen Sinne sie kannte. Diese Behauptung ist unrichtig; die serbische Regierung war liber den gegen ganz bestimmte Personen bestehenden Verdaeht genau unterrichtet und nicht nur in der Lage, sondem auch nach hren internen Gesetzen verpflichtet, S3 welcher ihr Mittellungen zugekommen waren. Den Wiinschen der k. und k. Re- gierung entsprechend, ist die konigliche Regierung somit bereit, dem Gerichte ,ohne Riicksicht auf Stellung und Rang jeden serbischen Staatsangehbrigen zu iibergeben, fur dessen Teilnahme an dem Sarajevoer Verbrechen ihr Beweise geliefert werden sollten; sie verpflichtet sich insbesondere auf der ersten Seite des Amtsblattes vom 13./26. Juli fol- gende Enunziation zu verbffentlichen: „Die konigl. serbische Regierung verurteilt jede Propaganda, die gegen Osterreich-Ungarn gerichtet sein sollte, d. b. die Gesamtheit der Bestrebungen, die in letzter Linie auf die LosreifJung einzelner Gebiete von der osterreichisch- ungarischen Monarcbie abzielen und sie bedauert aufricbtig die traurigen Folgen dieser verbrecberischen Machen- schaften. Die kbniglicbe Regierung bedauert, dali laut der Mitteilung der k. und k. Regierung gewisse serbisehe Offiziere und Funktion'are an der eben genannten Propaganda mitgewirkt und dali diese damit die freundnacbbarlicben Bezie- hungen gefahrdet batten, zu deren Beobaehtung sicb die kbniglicbe Re- gierung durch die Erklarung vom ganz spontan Erhebungen einzuleiten. Sie hat in dieser Richtung gar nichts unternommen. Unsere Forderung lautete: „Die konigl. serbische Regierung verurteilt die gegen Osterreich-Ungarn gerichtete Propaganda . . ." Die von der konigl. serbischen Regierung vorgenommene Anderung der von uns geforderten Erklarung will sagen, daO eine solche gegen Osterreich- Ungarn gerichtete Propaganda nicbt be- stebt oder daf) ihr eine solche nicht bekannt ist. Diese Formel ist unauf- richtig und hinterhaltig, da sicb die serbische Regierung damit fiir sp'ater die Ausflucht reserviert, sie h'atte die derzeit bestehende Propaganda durch diese Erklarung nicht desavouiert und nicht als monarchiefeindlich anerkannt, woraus sie weiter ableiten kbrmte, dafi sie zur Unterdriickung einer der jetzigen Propaganda gleichen nicht verpflichtet sei. Die von uns geforderte Formulie- rung lautete: „Die konigliche Regierung bedauert, dafi serbische Offiziere und Funktion'are mitgewirkt baben " Auch mit dieser Formulierung und dem weiteren Beisatze „laut der Mit- teilung der k. und k. Regierung" ver- folgt die serbische Rcsrierune den ben-its 84 31. M'arz 1909 feierlich veqiflichtet hatte. „Die Regierung. . . ." gleiehlaatend mit dem geforderten Texte. Die konigliche Regierung ver- pflichtet sich weiters: 1. Anlaftlich des nachsten ord- nungsm'aftigen Zusammentrittes der Skupschtina in das Preftgesetz eine Bestimmung einzuschalten, wonach die Autreizung zum Hasse und zur Ver- acbtung gegen die Monarchie sowie jede Publikation strengstens bestraft wiirde, deren allgemeine Tendenz gegen die territoriale Integritat Osterreich- Ungams gerichtet ist. Sie verpflichtet sich anlaftlich der demn'aehst erfolgenden Revision der Verfassung in den Artikel XXII des Verfassungsgesetzes einen Zusatz aufzu- nehmeh, der die Konfiskation derartiger Publikationen gestattet, was nach den klaren Bestimmungen des Artikels XXII der Konstitution derzeit unmoglioh ist. oben angedeateten Zweck, sicb fur die Zukunft freie Hand zu wabren. Wir hatten gefordert: B l. Jede Publikation zu unter- driicken, die zum Hasse und zur Ver- acbtung gegen die Monarchie aufreizt und deren allgemeine Tendenz gegen die territoriale Integritat der Monarchie gerichtet ist. " Wir wollten also die Verpflichtung Serbiens herbeil'iihren, dafur zu sorgen, daft derartige Preftangriffe in Hinkiinft unterbleiben; wir wiinschten also einen bestimmten Erfolg auf diesem Gebiete sichergestellt zu wissen. Statt dessen bietet uns Serbien die Erlassung gewisser Gesetze an, welche als Mittel zu diesem Erfolge dienen sollen, u. zw. : a) ein Gesetz, womit die fraglichen monarcbiefeindliclien Preliaufterungen subjcktiv bestraft werden sollen, was uns ganz gleichgiiltig ist, umsomehr als bekanntermaften die subjektive Ver- folgung von Preftdelikteu 'aufterst selten miiglich ist und bei einer entprechend laxen Behandlung eines sole-hen Gesetzes auch die wenigen Falle dieser Art nicht zur Bestrafung kommen wiirden; also ein Vorschlag, der unserer Forderung in keiner Weise entgegenkommt, da er uns nicht die- geringste Garantie f'iir den von uns gewiinschten Erfolg bietet; I) ein Nachtragsgesetz zu Art. XXII der Konstitution, das die Konfiskation gestatten wiirde — ein Vorschlag, der uns gleichfalls nicht befriedigen kann, da der Bestand eines solchen Uesetzes 85 2. Die Regierung besitzt keinerlei Hcwei.se dafiir und auoh die Note der k. und k. Regierung liefert ihr keine solchen, dafi der Verein n Narodna odbrana" und andere ahnliche Gesell- schaften bis zum heutigen Tage durch eines ihrer Mitglieder irgendwelche ver- breeherischen Handlungen dieser Art begangen h'atten. Nichtsdestoweniger •wird die kb'nigliche Regierung die For- derung der k. und k. Regierung an- nehmen und die Gesellschaft Narodna odbrana sowie jede Gesellschaft, die gegen Osterreieh-Ungarn wirken sollte auflosen. 3. Die koniglich serbische Regie- rung verpflichtet sicli ohne Verzug aus in Serbien uns nichts niitzt, sondern nur die Verpflichtuug der Regierung, es auch anzuwenden, was uns aber nicht versprochen wird. Diese Vorschl'age sind also voll- kommen unbefriedigend — dies umso- mehr, als sie auch in der Ricbtung evasiv sind, dafi uns nicht gesagt wird, nnerhalb welcher Frist diese Gesetze erlassen wiirden und dafi im Falle der Ablehnung der Gesetzvorlage durch die Skupschtina — von der eventuellen Demission der Regierung abgesehen — alles beim alten bliebe. Die monarcbiefeindliohe Propa- ganda der Narodna odbrana und der ihr afh'lierten Vereine erfiillt in Serbien das ganze bffentlieho Leben; es ist daher eine ganz unzulassige Reserve, wenn die serbische Regierung behauptet, dafi ihr dariiber nichts bekannt ist. Ganz abgesehen davon ist die von uns aufgestellte Forderung nicht zur Ganze erfiillt, da wir uberdies verlangt haben: Die Propagandamittel dieser Gesell- schaften zu konfiszieren ; die Neubildung der aufgelbsten Gesellschaften unter anderem Namen und in anderer Gestalt zu verhindern. In diesen beiden Richtungen schweigt das Belgrader Kabinett voll- kommen, so dafi uns auch dareh die gegebene halbe Zusage keine Garantie dafiir geboten ist, dafi dem Treiben der monarcliiel'eindlichen Assoziationen, ins- besondere der Narodna odbrana, durch deren Auflosung definitiv ein Ende be- reitet ware. Auch in diesem Falle verlangt die serbische Regierung erst. Nachw«ise 86 dem bffentlichen Unterrichte in Serbien alles auszuscheiden, was die gegen Osterreich-Ungarn gericktete Pro- paganda fordern konnte, falls ihr die k. und k. Regierung tatsaehliche Nach- weise fiir diese Propaganda liefert. i. Lie konigliehe Eegierung ist auch bereit, jene Offiziere und Beamten aus dem Milit'ar- und Zivildienste zu entlassen, hinsichtlich welcher durch gerichtliche Untersuchung festgestellt wird, dall sic sich Handlungen gegen die (erritoriale Integritat der Monarchic haben zuschulden kommen lassen; sie erwartet, dall ihr die k. und k. Regie- rung zwecks Einleitung des Verfahrens die Namen dieser Offiziere und Beamten und die Tatsachen mitteilt, welcho den- selben zur Last gelegt werden. 5. Die konigliehe Regierung mull bekennen, dall sic sich iiber den Sinn und die Tragweito jenes Begehrens der k. und k. IvC'MCrung nicht voile Rechcn- dafur, dall ira bffentlichen Unterrichte Serbiens eine monarchiefeindliche Pro- paganda gotrieben wird, wiihrend sie docb wissen mufl, dafi die bei den serbisehen Schulen eingefuhrten Lehr- binlier in dieser Richtung zu bean- standenden Stofl' enthalten und dad ein grofser Teil der serbisehen Lebrer im Lager der Narodna odbrana und der ihr affilierten Vereine steht. Ubrigens hat die serbische Regie- rung auch hier einen Teil unserer Forderung nicht so erfullt, wie wir es verlangt haben, indem sie in ihrem Text den von uns gewunschten Bcisatz „so- wohl was den Lehrkorper als auch was die Lelirmittel anbelangt", wegliell — cin Beisatz, welcher ganz klar zeigt, wo die monarchiefeindliche Propaganda in der serbisehen Schule zu suchen ist. Indem die koniglich serbische Re- gierung die Zusage der Entlassung der fraglichen Offiziere und Beamten aus dem Militar- und Zivildienst an den Umstand kniipft, dafJ diese Personen durch ein Gerichtsverfahren scliuldig befunden werden, schrankt sie ihrc Zusage auf jene l'alle ein, in denen diesen Personen ein st'rafgesetzlich zu ahndendes Delikt zur Last liegt. La wir aber die Entfernung jener Ofli/.ierc und Beamten verlangen, die monarchie- feindliche Propaganda betreiben, was ja im allgemeinen in Serbien kein ge- riehtlich strafbarer Tatbestand ist, er- scheint unsere Forderung auch in diesem Pnnkte nicht erfullt. Mit dieser- Frage hat das allgc- meine Vb'lkerrecht ebensowenig etwas zu tun, wie das Stratprozefireeht; es liandelt sich urn eine Angclegenheit K7 schaft geben kann, welches dahin geht, dafi die kbniglieh serbische Regierung sich verpfliehten soil, auf ihrem Gebiete die Mitwirkung von, Organen der k. und k. Regierung zuznlassen, docb erkliirt sie, dafi sie jene Mitwirkung anzunebmen bereit ware, wek-he den Grunds'atzen des Volkerrechtes und des Strafprozesses sowie den freundnachbar- licben Beziehungen enteprechen wiirde. 6. Die kb'nigliche Regierung halt es selbstverstandlich fur ihre Pflicbt gegen alle jene Personen eine Unter- suchung einzuleiten, die an dem Kom- plotte vom 15./28. Juni beteiligt waren oder beteiligt gewesen sein sollen und die sich auf ihrem Gebiete befinden. Was die Mitwirkung von biezu speziell delegierten Organen der k. und k. Re- gierung an dieser Untersuchung anbe- langt, so kann sie eine solcbe nicht annebmen, da dies eine Verletzung der Verfassung und des Strafprozefigesetzes ware. Doch kbnnten den osterreichisch- ungarischen Organen in einzelnen Fallen Mitteilung von dem Ergebnisse der Untersuchung gemacht werden. rein staatspolizeilicher Natur, die im Wege einer besonderen Vereinbarung zu lb'sen ist. Die Reserve Serbiens ist daher unverstandlich und ware bei ihrer vagen, allgemeinen Form geeignet, zu unuberbruckbaren Schwierigkeiten bei AbschlufJ des zu treffenden Abkommens zn fiihren. Unser Verlangen war ganz klar und nicht midzuverstehen. Wir be- gehrten : 1. Einleitung einer gerichtliehen Untersuchung gegen die Theilnehmer am Komplotte. 2. Die Mitwirkung von k. und k. Organen an den hierauf beziiglichen Erhe.bungen („reeherches" im Gegen- satze zu „enquete judiciaire"). Es ist uns nicht beigefallen, k. und k. Organe an dem serbisch'en Gerichts- verfahren teimehmen zu lassen; sie sollten nur an den polizeilichen Vor- erhebuDgin mitwirken, welche das Materiale fur die Untersuchung herbei- zuschaffen und sicherzustellen hatten. Wenn die serbische Regierung uns hier miflversteht, so tut sie dies be- wufJt, denn der Unterschied zwische.n r enquete judiciaire" und den einfachen B recherches" mud ihr gelaufig sein. Da sie sich jeder Kontrolle des einzuleitenden Verfahrens zu entziehen wiinscht, das bei korrekter Durch- fiihrung hochst unenviinschte Ergebnisse fiir sie liefern wiirde und da sie keine Handhabe besitzt, in plausibler Weisc die Mitwirkung unserer Organe am polizeilichen Verfahren abzulehnen (Analogien fiir solche polizeiliche Inter- 88 7. Die konigliche Regierung hat noch am Abend des Tages, an dem ihr die Note zukam, die Verhaftung des Majors Vo'i'slav Tankosii? verfugt. Was aber den Milan Ciganovic! an- belangt, der ein Angehb'riger der iister- reichiseh-ungarischen Monarchic ist und der bis zum 15. Juni (als Aspirant) bei der Eisenbahndirektion bedienstet war. so konnte dieser bisher nieht ausge- forscht werden, weshalb ein Steekbrief gegen ihn erlassen wurde. Die k. und k. Regierung «ird ge- beten, zweeks Durchfuhrung der Unter- suchung so bald als moglich die be- stehenden Ycrdachtsgriinde und die bei der Untersuchung in Sarajevo ge- sammelten Schuldbewcise in deriibliehen Form bekanntzusreben 8. Die serbisehe Regierung wird die bestehenden Mallnahmen wegen Unterdruckung des Schmuggelns von Waffen und Explosivstoffen verscharfen und erweitern. Es ist selbstvorstandlich, dad sie sofort cine Untersuchung einleiten und jene Beamten des Grcnzdienstes in der Linie Sabac — Loznica strong bestrafen wird, die ihre Pfiicht verletzt und die Urhcber des Verbrechens die Grenze haben uberschreiten lassen. 9. Die konigliche Regierung ist gerne bereit, Aufkliirung iiber die ventionen bestehen in grofler Menge), hat siesich auf einenStandpunkt begeben, der ihrer Ablehnung den Schein der Be- rechtigung geben und unserem Ver- langen den Stempel der Unerfiillbar- keit aufdriicken soil. Diese, Antwort ist hinterh'altig. Ciganovic ging laut der von uns veranlaGten Naehforschungen drei Tage naeh dem Attentate, als bekannt wurde, daft Ciganovic an dem Komplotte be- teiligt sei, auf Urlaub und begab sich iiber Auftrag der Polizeipr'afektur in Belgrad nach Ribari. Es ist also zu- nachst unriclitiu, dall Ciganovic sehon am 15./28. Juni aus dem serbischen Staatsdienste schied. Hiezu kommt, dali der Polizeiprafekt von Belgrad, der die Abreise des Ciganovic selbst veranlafJt hat und der wuflte, wo dieser sich auf- halte, in einem Interview erklarte, ein Mann namens Milan Ciganovic existiere in Belgrad nicht. Der kbniglich serbischen Regierung miissen die beziiglichen Interviews ganz 89 Auflerungen zu geben, welche ihre Beamten in Serbien und im Auslande nach dera Attentate in Interviews ge- macht haben und die nach der Be- hauptung der k. und k. Regierung der Monarchie feindselig waren, sobald die k. und k. Regierung die Stellen dieser Ausfuhrungen bezeiehnet und bewiesen haben wird, daft diese Aullerungen von den betreffenden Funktionaren tats'ach- lich gemaeht worden sind. Die konig- liche Regierung'wird selbst Sorge tragen, •die nbtigen Beweise und Uberfiihrungs- mittel hieftir zu sammeln. 10. Die kbnigliche Regierung wird, insofern dies nieht sehon in dieser Note geschehen ist, die k. und k. Regierung •von der Durchfiihrung der in den vor- stehenden Punkten enthaltenen MaB- nahmen in Kenntnis setzeu, sobald eine dieser MaOregeln angeordnet und durch- gefiihrt wird. Die ko'nigl. serbische Regierung glaubt, daft es ira gemeinsamen Interesse liegt, die Lbsung dieser Angelegenheit nicht zu ubersttirzen und ist daher, falls sich die k. und k. Regierung dureh diese Antwort nieht fur befriedigt er- achten sollte, wie immer bereit, eine friedliche Lbsung anzunehmen, sei es durch Ubertragung der Entscheidum dieser Frage an das internationale Ge richt im Haag, sei es durch Uberlassung der Entscheidung an die Grofimachte. welche an der Ausarbeitung der von der serbischen Regierung am 18./31. Marz 1909 abgegebenen Erkl'arung mit- gewirkt haben. genau bekannt sein. Wenn sie von der k. und k. Regierung verlangt, dafi diese ihr allerlei Details iiber diese Interviews liefere und sich eine fbrmliche Unter- suchung hieriiber vorbehiilt, zeig-t sie, dad sie auch diese Forderung nicht ernstlich erfiillen will. 90 35. Graf Szogyeny an Graf Berchtold. Telegramm. Berlin, 28. Juli 1914. Der von England gemachte Vermittlungsvorschlag, cs solltcn Deutsohland, Italien, England und Frankreich zu einei' Konferenz in London zusammenfxeten, ist deutscherseits mit der Begriimbmg abgelehnt worden, daG es fiir Doutschland unmoglich sei, seinen Bundesgeirossen in seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Serbien vor ein europaisches Gerieht zu ziehen. 36. Freiherr von Miiller an Graf Berchtold. Telegramm. Tolio, 28. Juli 1914. Die heutige offiziose japanische Times enthalt einen Leitartikel, der am Schlusse besagt, dal) Japan mit den drei in Betracht kommenden Grolimacbten Osterreich-Ungam, Deutsohland und Rufiland auf bestem FuG stehe, w'ahrend es an Serbien in keiner Weise intcressiert sei. Im Kriegsfalle wiirde die kaiser- lielic Regierung selbstversfandlich strengste Neutral it'at bewahren. 37. Graf Berchtold an das kbniglich serbische Ministerium des AuRern in Belgrad. Telegramm. Wien, 28. Juli 1914. Le Gouvernement. Royal de Serbie. n'ayant pas repondu d'une maniere satisfaisante a la Note qui lui avait &ti remise par le Ministre d'Autriehe- Hongrie a Belgrade a la date du 23 juillet 1914, le Gouvernement I. et R. se trouve dans la necessity de pourvoir lui-meme a la sauvegarde de ses droits et interets et de reconrir a cet effet a la force des armes. LAutriclie-Hongrie se consider* done des ee moment en etat de guerre avec la Serbie. 38. Graf Berchtold an Graf Szbgy6ny in Berlin. Telegramm. Wien, 28. Juli 1914. Zu Euer Exzellenz Information und zur Mitteilung an den Herrn Staats- sekretar: Ich liabe nachstehendes Telegramm des Grafen Mensdorff unterm 27. 1. M. erhalten: „Ick hatte heute Gelegenheit, Sir E. Grey ausfiihrUch darzulegen, dafs unsere Aktion nicht Aggression sondern Selbstverteidigung und Selbsterhaltung sei und wir keine territorialen Eroberungen nock Vernichtung serbischer Unabhangigkeit beabsichtigen. Wir wollen gewisse Genugtuung fur Vergangen- heit und Garantien fur die Zukunft. Hiebei verwertete ich einige Anhaltspunkte aus dem Erlasse Euer Exzellenz an Graf Szapary. Sir E. Grey sagte mir, er sei sehr enttauscht dariiber, daO wir die serbische Antwort so behandeln, als wenn sje ganz ablelinend ware. Er hatte geglaubt, diese Antwort wiirde eine Basis liefern, auf vvelcher die vier anderen Regierungen ein befriedigendes Arrangement ausarbeiten kbnnten. Das war seine Idee beim "Vorscklag einer Konferenz. Die Konferenz wiirde sieh versammeln unter der Voraussetzung, dad sowohl Osterreich-Ungarn wie Rufiland w'ahrend des Versuches der anderen Machte, einen befriedigenden Ausweg zu iinden, sieh jeder militarischen Operation enthaltcn wiirden. (Heutige Erklarung Sir E. Greys im Unterhaus fiihrte Konferenzprojekt aus.) Als er vom Enthalt militarischer Operationen unsererseits gegen Serbien sprach, machte ich die Bemerkung, ich fiirchte, es sei vielleicht schon zu sp'at. Der Herr Staatssekret'ar meinte, wenn wir entschlossen sind, unter alien Dra- st'anden mit Serbien Krieg zu fiihren und voraussetzen, dali Rutland ruhig bleiben wird, so nehmen wir ein grolles Risiko auf uns. Kb'nnen wir Ruflland dazu bewegen, ruhig zu bleiben, habe er nichts mehr zu sagen. Wenn nicht, sind die Moglichkeiten und Gefahren unberechenbar. Als Symptom der Beunruhigung sagte er mir, die grolle englische Flotto, die nach den Manovern in Portsmouth konzentriert wurde und heute auseinander gehen sollte, wiirde vorlaufig dort bleiben. „„Wir hatten keine Reserven ein- berufen, aber nachdem sie versammelt sind, kb'nnen wir sie in diesera Augen- blick nicht nach Hause schicken.^" Seine Idee von Konferenz hat den Zweck, wenn mbglich Kollision zwischen den GrolSmachten hintanzuhalten und er diirfte also auf Isolierung des Konfliktes hinzielen. Falls aber Rufiland mobilisiert und Deutschland in Aktion tritt, so fallt die Konferenz von selbst in Briich." Ich glaube Euer Exzellenz gegeniiber nicht besonders hervorhcben zu sollen, daft der Greysche Konferenzvorschlag, insoweit er sick auf unseren Konflikt mit Serbien bezieht, angesichts des eiligetretenen Kriegszustandes durch die Eroignisse uberholt erscheint. 30. Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London. Telegraram. fVien, 28. Juli 1914. Wir legen das groftte Gewicht darauf, daft Sir E. Grey unser Vorgehen gegen Serbien im allgemeinen und speziell unsere Ablehnung der serbischen Antwort in unparteiischer Weise wiirdige, und ersucbe ich Euer Exzellenz daher, Gelegenheit zu nehmen, deni Herrn Staatssekretar das Ihnen auf dem Post- wege iibermittelte Dossier im Detail und unter Hervorhebung der besonders markanten Stellen auseinanderzusetzen; in demselben Sinne wollen Euer Exzellenz die kritischen Bemerkungen zn der serbischen Note (Text der Note mit unseren Bemerkungen versehen ist gestern an Euer Exzellenz per Post abgegangen) mit Sir E. Grey durchsprechen und ihm klarlegen, daD das serbische Entgegen- kommen nur ein scheinbares war, bestimmt, Europa zu t'auschen, ohne fiir die Zukunft irgendeine Garantie zu bieten. Da die serbische Regierung wulite, dad uns nur erne vorbehaltlose An- nahme unserer Forderungen befriedigen kbnne, ist die serbische Taktik klar zu durchschauen: Serbien akzeptierte, um Eindruck auf die europ'aische Offentlich- keit zu machen, mit allerlei Vorbehalten eine Anzahl unserer Forderungen, darauf bauend, daO es nicht in die Lage kommen werde, seine Zusagen zu erfullen. Ein Hauptgewicht bei der Konversation Euer Exzellenz mit Sir E. Grey ware auf den Umstand zu legen, daft die allgomeine Mobilisierung der serbischen Armee fiir den 25. Juli nachmittags 3 Uhr angeordnet wurde, wahrend die Antwort auf unsere Note erst knapp vor Ablauf der Frist, das hehlt wenige Minuten vor (i Uhr, iiberreicht wurde. Wir hatten vorher keine militarischen Vorbereitungen getrofl'en, durch die serbische Mobilisierunff wurden wir aber zu solchen gezwungen. 93 40. Graf Berchtold an Graf Szapary in St. Petersburg. Telegramm. Wien, 28. Juli 1914. 2>\i Euer Exzellenz Orientierung und Regelung Ihrer Spraohe: Der kaiserlich russisohe Botschafter sprach heute bei mir vor, um mir seine Riickkehr aus Ruftland von kurzcm Urlaube mitzuteilen und gleichzeitig einem telegraphischen Auftrage Herrn Sazonows nachzukommen. Letzterer hatte ihm mitgeteilt, daft er eine langere, freundschafthche Ausspraehe mit Euer Exzellenz gehabt hatte (Euer Exzellenz Telegramm vom 27. d. M.), in deren Verlaufe Hochdieselben mit grofter Bereitwilligkeit die einzelnen Punkte der serbischen Antwortnote durchgesprochen hatten. Herr Sazonow sei der Ansicht, daft Serbien in weitgehendem Mafte unseren Wiinschen entgegengekommen sei, daft aber einige Forderungen ihm ganz unannekmbar schienen. was er auoh Euer Exzellenz nicht verhehlt habe. Es schiene ihm unter diesen Umst'anden, daft die serbische Antwortnote geeignet sei, den AusgangspUnkt zu einer Verstandigung abzugeben, wozu die russisohe Regierung gerne die Hand bieten moohte. Herr Sazonow wolle mir daher vorsohlagen, daft der Gedankenaustausch mit Euer Exzellenz Fortsetzung finde und Euer Exzellenz diesbeziiglich mit Instruktionen versehen werden. In meiner Entgegnung betonte ich, daft ich auf einen derartigen Vorschlag nicht eingehen konne. Eine Verhandlung iiber den Wortlaut der von uns als unbefriedigend bezeichneten Antwortnote konnte bei uns niemand verstehen und niemand billigen. Es ware dies umsoweniger moglich, als sich, wie der Botschafter wisse, bereits eine tiefgehende allgemeine Erregung der offentlichen Meinung bem'achtigt hatte, iiberdies unsererseits heute der Krieg an Serbien erklart worden sei. Auf die Auseinandersetzungen des Botschafters, welche haupts'achlich darin gipfelten, daft wir die durchaus nicht abgeleugnete feindselige Stimmung in Serbien durch eine kriegerische Aktion nicht niederringen, im Gegenteile nur steigern wiirden, gab ich ihm einige Streiflichter hinsichtlich unseres derzeitigen Verhaltnisses zu Serbien, welches es unvermeidlich mache, ganz gegen unseren Willen und ohne jede egoistische Nebenabsicht unserem unruhigen Nachbar mit dem nb'tigen Nachdrucke unsere ernste Absicht zu zeigen, nicht langer eine von der Regierung geduldete, gegen den Bestand der Monarchic gerichtete Bewegung zuzulassen. Die Haltung Serbiens nach Empfang unserer Note sei iibrigens nicht darnach gewesen, eine friedliche Beilegung zu ermoglichen, indem Serbien, nochbevor es uns seine ungentigende Antwort iibergeben lieft, die allgemeine Mobilisierung angeordnet und schon dadurch uns gegeniiber einen feindseligen Akt vorgenommen habe. Trotzdem hatten wir noch drei Tage zugewartet. Gestern seien nun serbischerseits gegen uns die Feindseligkeiten an der ttngarischen Grenze eroffhet worden. Dadurch sei uns die Moglichkeit benommen, bei unserer Serbien gegeniiber bewiesenen Langmut weiter zu beharren. Die Herbeifuhrung einer griindlichen aber friedlichen Sanie.rung unseres Verhaltuisses zu Serbien sei uns nunmehr unmiiglich gemaeht worden und wir seien gezwungen, don serbischen Provokationen in der Form entgegenzutreten, die unter den gegebencn Umstanden der Wiirde der Monaichio allein entspreche. 41. Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London. Telegramra. Wien, 28. Mi 1914. Der engliscbe Botschafter, welcher heute bei mir vorspraoh, hat mir auf- traggem'afi den Standpunkt Sir E. Greys zu unserem Konflikte mit Serbien in folgender Weise auseinandergesetzt: Die englische Regierung habe mit lebhaftem Interesso den bisherigen Ver- lauf der Krise verfolgt und lege Wert darauf, uns zu versichern, dafi sie Sympathien fur unseren Standpunkt bege und unsere Griefs gegen Serbien vollkommen verstehe. Wenn somit England keinen Grund babe, unseren Streitfall rait Serbien an sich zum Gegenstande besonderer PrUokkupation zu machen, so kb'nne der- selbe doeh nicht der Aufmerksamkeit des Londoner Kabinetts entgehen, weil dieser Konflikt weitere Kreise zieben und dadurch den europaischen Frieden in Frage stellen konne. Nur aus diesera fur England in Betracht kommenden Grunde habe sich Sir E. Grey veranlaflt gesehen, eine Einladung an die Iiegierungen jener Staaton zu riehten, die an diesem Kondikte nieht naher interessiert seien (Deutschland, Italien und Frankreicli), uni gemeinschaftlieh mit ihnen im Wege fortlaufenden Gedankenaustausches die Moglichkeiten zu priifen und zu erb'rtern, wie die Differenz mogliehst rasch ausgeglichen werden konnte. Nach dem Muster der Londoner Konferenz wahrend der letzten Balkankrise sollten, nach Ansehauung des englisehen Staatssekret'ars, die Londoner Botschafter der genannten Staaten sich zu dem angegebcnen Zwecke in fortlaufendem Kontakte mit ihm halten. Sir E. Grey habe bereits von den betreffenden Regierungen selir freundschaftlich gehaltene Antworten erhalten, worin dieselben dem angereg-ten Gedanken zustimmen. Gegenwartig ware es der Wunseh des Herrn Staatssekretiirs, wenn nioglich, deu Ausbruch der Feindseligkeiten zwisehen Osterreich-Ungarn 95 und Serbien in elfter Stunde zu verhindcrn, wenn dies aber nicht tunlich ware, doch vorzubeugen, daO es zu einem blutigen Zusammenstolie komme, eventuell dadurch, daC die Serben sich zuriickziehen konnten, ohne den Kampf aufzu- nehmen. Die von Serbien an uns eingelangte Antwort scheine die Mb'glichkeit zu bieten, eine Basis fur eine Verst'andigung abzugeben. England sei gerne bereit, hiebei in unserem Sinne und nach unseren Wiinschen seinen EinfluC zur Geltung zu bringen. Ich dankte dem Herrn Botschafter fiir die Mitteilung Sir E. Greys und erwiderte ihm, daD ich der Auffassung des Herrn Staatssekretars voile Wiirdi- ,gung zu zollen wisse. Sein Standpunkt sei aber von dem meinigen naturgem'afj verschieden, da England an dem Streitfalle zwischen uns und Serbien nicht direkt intci essiert sei und der Herr Staatssekretar wohl kaum griindlich orien- tiert sein konne iiber die schwerwiegende Bedeutung der zu lbsenden Fragen fiir die Monarchic. Wenn Sir E. Grey von der Moglichkeit rede, den Ausbruch der Feindseligkeiten zu verhindern, so komme dieser Gedanke zu spat, da gestern bereits serbischerseits auf unsere Grenzsoldaten geschossen und heute von uns der Krieg an Serbien erklart wurde. Was die Idee eines Tran- sigierens aufGrund der serbischen Antwortnote anbelangt, miisse ich eine solche ablehnen. Wir hatten die integrate Annahme gefordert, Serbien habe sich durch Winkelziige aus der Verlegenheit zu ziehen gesucht. Uns seien diese serbischen Methoden nur zu gut bekannt. Sir Maurice Bunsen konne unseren Standpunkt durch seine hier erworbenen Lokalkenntnisse gewifi richtag einsch'atzen und werde in der Lage sein, Sir E. Grey hieriiber ein genaues Bild zu geben. Insoferne Sir E. Grey dem europaischen Frieden dienen wolle, wiirde er gewifj nicht auf Widerstand bei uns stofien. Er miisse jedoch bedenken, daC der europaische Friede nicht dadurch gerettet wiii-de, dafl sich GroOm'achte hinter Serbien stellen und fiir dessen Straffreiheit eintreten. Denn selbst wenn wir auf einen solehen Ausgleichsversuch eingehen wollten, wiirde dadurch Serbien nur umsomehr ermutig-t, auf dem bisherigen Pfade weiterzugehen, was den Frieden binnen der allerkiirzesten Zeit abermals in Frage stellen mbchte. Der englische Botschafter versickerte mich zum Schlusse, dafJ er unseren Standpunkt vollkommen verstehe, andererseits aber bedauere, dafl unter diesen Umst'anden der Wunsch der englischen Regierung, einen Ausgleich zu erzielen, derzeit keine Aussicht auf Verwirklichung habe. Er hoffe, mit mir weiterhin in Kontakt bleiben zu diirfen, was ihm wegen der groCen Gefahr einer europaischen Konflagration von besonderem Werte ware. Ich erwiderte, ich stiinde dem Herrn Botschafter jederzeit zur Verfiigung, womit unsere Konversation schlofj. 42. Graf Berchtold an Graf Szogy^ny in Berlin. Telegramm. Wien, am 28. Juli 1914. Ich ersuche Euer Exzellenz sieh sofort zum Heixn Reichskanzler oder Staatssekretar zu begeben und ihrn folgendes in meinem Namen mitzuteilen: Nach iibereinstimmenden Nachrichten aus St. Petersburg, Kiew, Warsehau, Moskau und Odessa trifft RuMand umfangreiche militarisehe Vorbereitungen. Ilerr Sazonow bat zw;ir ebenso wie der russische Kriegsmimster unter Ehren- wort versichert, dall eine Mobilisierung bisher nicht angeordnet wurde, der letztere hat jedoch dem deutsehen Militar-Attach£ mitgeteilt, dall die gegen Osterreieh-Ungarn gelegenen Militiirbezirke Kiew, Odessa, Moskau und Kasan mobilisiert vverden wiirden, wenn unsere Truppen die serbische Grenze iiber- scbrirten. Unter diesen Umst'anden mochte ich das Berliner Kabinett dringend er- suchen, der ErwSgung naher zu treten, ob nicht Rutland in freundschaftlicher "Weise darauf aufmerksam geraaeht werden sollte, dafi die Mobilisierung obiger Bezirke einer Bedrohung Osterreieh-Ungarns gleichkame and daker, falls sie tats'achliek erfolgt, sowohl von der Monarchie als vom verbiindeten Deutsehen Reiche mit den weitestgehenden milit'arischen Gegenmallregeln beantwortet ■werden miiflte. Um Ruliland ein eventnelles Einlenken zu erleichtern, sehiene es tins angezeigt, dall ein soldier Schritt vorerst von Deutschland allein unternoramen ■werden sollte: doch waren wir natiirlioh bereit, den Schritt auch zu zweien zu machen. Eine deutliche Sprache sehiene mir in diesem Augenblick das wirksamste Mittel, um Ruliland die ganze Tragweite eines drohenden Verhaltens zum Be- wufltsein zu bringen. 43. Graf Berchtold an Graf Szb'gy^ny in Berlin. Telegramm. Wien, 28. Juli 1914. Der kaiserlieh deutecke Botschafter hat hier mitgeteilt, daO Sir E. Grey sicli mit der Bitte an die deutsche Regierung gewendet habe, sie mb'ge ihren EiiiHul) bei der k. u. k. Regierung geltend machen, daft diese die Antwort aus 97 Belgrad entweder als geniigend betrachte oder als Grundlage fur Besprechungen unter den Kabinetten akzeptiere. Herr von Tschirschky war beauftragt, den englischen Vorschlag dem Wiener Ivabinette zur Erwagung zu unterbreiten. 44. Graf Berchtold an die k. u. k. Botschafter in St. Petersburg, London, Paris und Rom. Telegramm. Wien, 29. Juli 1914. Zu Euer Exzellenz Information: Ich habe heute dem kaiserlich deutschen Botschafter das nachfolgende Memoire in Beantwortung eines von demseiben bei mir unternommenen Schrittes zukommen lassen: Memoire. Die k. u. k. Regierung hat mit dem ergebensten Danke von der Mitteilung Kenntnis genommen, welche ihr der Herr kaiserliche deutsohe Botschafter am 28. 1. M.- uber das Ersuchen des englischen Kabinettes gemacht hat, es mbge die kaiserlich deutsche Regierung ihren Einfluti beim Wiener Kabinette geltend machen, damit dieses die Antwort aus Belgrad entweder als geniigend betrachte oder aber als Grundlage fiir Besprechungen annehme. Was die Atissprache des Herrn englischen Staatssekret'ars zu Fiirst Lichnowsky betrifft, mochte die k. u. k. Regierung zunaohst darauf aufmerksam machen, dali die serbische Antwortnote keineswegs, wie dies Sir E. Grey anzunehmen scheint, eine Zu- stimmung zu alien unseren Forderungen mit einer einzigen Ausnahme enthalte, dafi vielmehr in den meisten Punkten Vorbehalte formuliert sind, welche den Wert der gemachten Zugestandnisse wesentlich herabdriicken. Die Ablehnung betreffe aber gerade jene Punkte, welche einige Garantie fur die faktische Erreiehung des angestrebten Zweckes enthalten. Die k. u. k. Regierung kann ihre ITberraschung iiber die Annahme nicht unterdriicken, als ob ihre Aktion gegen Serbien RulMand und den russischen EinfluO am Balkan treffen wolle, denn dies hatte zur Voraussetzung, dafi die gegen die Monarchic gerichtete Propaganda nicht allein serbisch, sondern russischen Ursprungs sei. Wir sind bisher vielmehr von der Auffassung aus- ns gegangen, dall das offizielle RuCIand diesen der Monarchie feindlichen Tendenzen t<- 1 ti -tehe und richtet sich unsere gegenwartige Aktion ausschliefilich gegen Serbien, wahrend unsere Gef'iihlc fur Rullland, wie wir Sir E. Grey versichern konnen, durchaus ffeundschaftliche sind. Im ubrigen rauB die k. u. k. Eegierung darauf hinweisen, dafl sie zu ihrem lebhaften Bedauern nicht mehr in der Lage ist, zu der serbiselien Antwortnote im Sinnc der englischen Anregung Stellung zu nehmen, da im Zeitpunkte des hier gemachten deutschen Schrittes der Kriegszustand zwischen der Monarchie unci Serbien bereits eingetreten war und die serbische Antwort- note demnr-ch durch die Ereignisse bereits iiberbolt ist. Die k. u. k. Regierung erlaubt sich bei diesem Anlasse darauf aufmerksam zu machen, dall die koniglich serbische Regierung noeh vor Erteilung ihrer Antwort rr.it der Mohilisierung der serbisehen-Streitkrafte vorgegangen ist und dall sie auch nachher drei Tage verstreichen liefi, ohne die Geneigtheit kund- zugeben, den Standpunkt ihrer Antwortnote zu verlassen, worauf unsererseits die Kriegserklarnng erfnlgte. Wenn im iibrigen das englische Kabinett sich bereit findet, seincn Einflull auf die russische Regierung im Sinne der Erhaltung des Friedens zwischen den Grofimachten und der Lokalisierung des uns durch die jahrelangen serbischen Umtriebe aufgezwungenen Krieges geltend zu machen, so kaun dies seitens der k. u. k. Regierung nur begriifit werden. 45, Graf Szecsen an Graf Berchtold. Telegramm. Paris, 29. Juli 1914. Frankreich trifft unzweifelhaft gewisse militarische Vorbereitungen, wie dies von den Zeitungen vielleie.ht mit gewisser Ubertreibung verkiindet wird. Wie ieh streng vertraulich erfahre, ist Baron Schoen beauftragt, diese Vor- bereitungen heute bei Herrn Viviani zur Sprache zu bringen und darauf hin- zmveisen, dad Deutschland unter diesen Umsfanden gezwungen werden. konnte, ahnliche Mallnahmen zu treffen, die natiirlich nicht geheim bleiben konnten und deren Bekanntwerden in der Offentlichkeit grofte Aufregung verursachen wiirde. So konnten beide Lander, trotzdem sie. nur den Krieden anstreben, zu einer wenigstens teilweisei) Mobilisierung gcdrangt werden, was gefahrlich ware. Ferner wird Baron Schoen auftraggemafi erklaren, Deutschland wiinsche lebli.ift, dafi der lvonflikt zwischen uns und Serbien iokalisiert bleibe, wobei Deutschland auf die Unterstiitzung seitens Frankreichs zahle. 99 46. Graf Szogyeny an Graf Berchtold. Telegraram. Berlin, 29. Juli 1914. Bereits Sonntag hat die deutsche Regierung in St. Petersburg erkl'art, daft die russische Moliilisierung die deutsche Mobilisierung zur Folge hiitte. Darauf erfolgte russischeiseits die mit meinem Telegramme vom 27. d. Mts. gemeldete Antwort. Hierauf wurde heute neuerdings nach St. Petersburg tele- graphiert, daft durch das weitere Fortschreiten der russischen Mobilisieiungs- maftnahmen Deutschland veranlaftt werden kb'nnte, zu mobilisieren. 47. Graf Szripary an Graf Berchtold. Telegramm. St. Petersburg, 29. Juli 1914. Da ich vom deutschen Botschafter erfahren habe, Heir Sazonow zeige sieh fiber Euer Exzellenz angebliche Abgeneigtheit, Gedankenaustausch mit Rufiland fortzusetzen und iiber vermeintlich weit iiber das notwendige Mali ausge- dehnte und daher gegen RulMand gerichtete Mobilisierung Osterreich-Ungarns sehr aufgeregt, suehte ich den Herrn Minister auf, um einige rnir vorhanden scheinende Unklarheiten zu beheben. Der Herr Minister begann damit zu konstatieren, daft Osterreich-Ungarn kategorisch weiteren Gedankenaustausch ablehne. Ich stellte auf Gruud Euer Exzellenz Telegrammes vom 28. d. M. richtig, daft Euer Exzellenz es zwar abgelehnt hatten, nach allem, was vorgefallen, iiber die Notentexte und den oster- reichisch-ungarisch-serbischen Konflikt uberhaupt zu diskutieren, daft ich aber fest- stellen miisse, in der Lage gewesen zu sein, eine viel breitere Basis des Gedanken- austausches dadurch anzuregen, daft ich eildiirte, wir wiinschten keine russischen Intercssen zu verletzen, hatten nicht die Absicht, natiirlich unter der Voraus- setzung, daft der Konflikt zwischen Osterreich-Ungarn und Serbien lokalisiert bleibe, serbisches Territorium an uns zu bringen und ged'achten auch die Souyeranitat Serbiens nicht anzutasten. Ich sei iiberzeugt, daft Euer Exzellenz iiber bsterreichisch-ungarische und russische Interessen immer bereit sein wiirden, mit St. Petersburir Fuhlunsr zu nehmen. Herr Sazonow meinte, in territorialer Hinsicht habe or sich iiberzeugen lassen, aber was die Souverrinit'at anbelangt, miisse er den Standpunkt festhalten, die Aufzwingung unserer Bedingungen sei ein Vasallentum. Dieses aber verstofte gegen das Gleichgewicht am Balkan und letzteres sei das in Frage kommende russisohe Interesse. Nun kam er wieder auf die Diskussion iiber die Note, die Akt.ion Sir E. Greys etc. zuriick und wollte mir neuerlich nahelegen, dafl man unser legitimes Interesse zwar anerkenne und voll befriedigen wolle, daf) dies aber in eine fiir Serbien annehmbare Form gekleidet werden sollte. Ich meinte, dies sei kein russisches, sondern ein serbisches Interesse, worauf Herr Sazonow geltend machte, russisohe Interessen seien in diesem Falle eben serbische, so. dali ich dem Circulus vitiosus durch Ubergang auf ein anderes Thema ein Ende machte. Ich erw'ahnte, ich hatte gehb'rt, man sei in Ruflland beunruhigt, weil wir fiir die Aktion gegen Serbien acht Korps mobilisiert haben. Herr Sazonow bestiitigte mir, dali nicht er, der hievon gar nichts gewuBt, sondern der General- stabschef diese Bedenken geauflert habe. Ich suchte dem Herrn Minister darzu- legen, dall jeder Unbefangene sich leicht iiberzeugen konne, unsere siidlichen Korps konnten keine Bcdrohung fiir Ruflland bilden. leh bedeutete dem Herrn Minister, dali es gut ware, wenn sein kaiserlicher Herr iiber die wahre Situation informiert wiirde, umsomehr als es dringend geboten sei, wenn man den Frieden wolle, dem militarischen Lizitieren, welches sieh jetzt auf Grund falscher Nachrichten einzustellen drohe, ein rasches Ende zu bereiten. Herr Sazonow meinte sehr charakteristischerweise, er konne dies dem Generalstabsohef mitteilen, denn dieser sehe Seine Majestat alle 'Page. Der Herr Minister .-agte mir weiter, es werde heute ein Ukas unterzeiebnet, weleher eine Mobilisierung in ziemlich weitem Umfang anordne. Er konne mir aber auf das alleroffiziellste erklaren, dali diese Truppen niebt dazu bestimmt seien, iiber uns herzufallen; sie warden nur Gewebr bei Fuli bereit stehen fiir den Fall, als Ruftlands Balkaninteressen gefahrde.t wiirden. Fine, note explicative werde dies feststellen, denn 'es handle sich nur urn eine VorsichtsmaOregel, die Kaiser Nikolaus gerechtfertigt gefunden habe. da wir, die wir ohnedies den Vorle.il rascherer MobiKsierurjg biitten, nunmehr auch den so grolien Vorsprung liatten. Ich machte Herrn Sazonow in ernsten Worten auf den Eindruck auf- merksam, den eine solche MaGregel bei uns erwecken werde. Ich miisse be- zweifeln, dali die note explicative diesen Eindruck zu mildern geeignet sein werde, worauf der Herr Minister sich nochmals in Versicherungen uber die llarmlosigkeit (!) dieser Verfiigung erging. 101 48. Graf Berchtold an Graf SzogyGny in Berlin. Telegramm. Wien, 29. JuU 1914. Soebeh wurde mir von Herm von Tschirschky mitgeteilt, der russische Botschafter habe ihm gesagt, dali er von seiner Regierung verstandigt worden sei, dali die Militarbezirke von Kiew, Odessa, Moskau nnd Kasan mobilisiert viirden. Rufiland sei in seiner Ehre als Grofimacht gekrankt und genotigt, entsprechende Maftnahmen zu ergreifen. Die russische Mobilisierung wird von unseren galizischen Korpskoramanden bestiitigt nnd wurde, einer Meldung dejs k. u. k. Militarattaches zufolge, heute aucb von Herrn Sazonow dem deutschen Botschafter gegeniiber nicht mehr geleugnet. Ich ersuche Euer Exzellenz, vorstehendes unverziiglich ziir Kenntnis der deutschen Regierung zu bringen und hiebei zu betonen, dafi, wenn die russi- schen MobilisierungsmaOnahnien nicht ohne Siiumen eingestellt werden, unsere allgemeine MobilisierUng aus militarischen Griinden unverziiglich veranlaCt werden miillte. Als letzter Versuch, den europaischen Krieg hintanzuhalten, hielte ich es fiir wiinschenswert, daD unser und der deutsche Vertreter in St. Petersburg eventuell auch in Paris sogleich angewiesen werden, den dortigen Regierungen in freundschaftlicher Weise zu erklaren, dali die Fortsetzung der russischen Mobilisierung GegenmaDregeln in Deutschland und Osterreich-Ungarn zur Folge haben wiirde, die zu ernsten Konsequenzen fiihren miifiten. Euer Exzellenz wollen hinzufugen, dali wir uns selbstverstandlich in unserer kriegerischen Aktion in Serbien nicht beirren lassen werden. Die k. u. k. Botschafter in St. Petersburg und Paris erhalten unter einem die Weisung, die vorerw'ahnte Erklarung abzugeben, sobald ihr deutscher Kollege anologe Instruktionen erhalt. 49. Graf Berchtold an Graf SzSpaYy in St. Petersburg. Telegramm. Wien, 30. Juli 1914. Antwort auf Euer Exzellenz Telegramm vom 29. Juli. Ich bin selbstverstandlich nach wie vor bereit, die einzelnen Punkte unserer durch die Ereignisse iibrigens befeits iiberholten an Serbien gerichteten Note 102 durch Euer Exzellenz Herrn Sazonow erlautern zu lassen. Auch wiirde ich bcson- deren Wert daranf legen, bei dieser Gelegenheit der mir duroh Ilerrn Sobebeko verdolmetschten Anregung entspreehend auch die unsere Beziehungen zu Rut- land direkt betreffenden Fragen einer vertrauensvollen und freundsehaftlichen Aussprache zu unterziehen, wovon sich eine Behebung der in diesem Belange bedauerlicherweise bestehenden Unklarheiten und Sicherstellung der so wiinschens- werten friedliohen Entwicklung unserer Nachbarverhaltnisse erhoii'en lielle. 50. Graf Berchtold an Graf Szdpa>y in St. Petersburg. Telegramm. Wien, 30.Juli 1914. Zu Eurer Exzellenz Orientierung und Regelnng Rarer Sprache: Ich habe heute Herrn Scbebeko auseinandergesetzt, es sei mir gemeldet worden, dali Herr Sazonow iiber meine glatte Ablehnung seiner Proposition bezuglich Aussprache mit Euer Exzellenz peinlieh beruhrt sei, wie nicbt minder daruber, daO kein Gedankenaustausch zwiscben • mir und Herm Schebeko statt- gefunden babe. Bezuglich des ersteren Punktes batte ich Euer Exzellenz bereits telegraphisch freigestellt, auch weiterhin seitens Herrn Sazonows etwa gewiinschte Erl'aute- rungen bezuglich der Note — welche Ubrigens durch den Kriegsausbmch iiberholt erscheint — zu geben. Es kbnne sich dies allerdings nur im Rahmen nachtriiglicher Aufklarungen bewegen, da es niemals in unserer Absicht gelegen war, von den Punkten der Note etwas abhandeln zu lassen. Auch hatte ich Euer Exzellenz erm'achtigt, unsere speziellen Beziehungen zu Ruilland mit Herrn Sazonow fieundsckaftlich zu besprechen. DaO Herr Sazonow sich daruber beklagen konnte, es hatte kein Gedanken- austausch zwischen Herrn Schebeko und mir stattgefunden, mull auf einen Irrtum beruhen, da wir — Herr Schebeko und ich — vor zwei Tagen die aktuellen Fragen durchgesprochen batten, was mir der Herr Botschafter mit drni llemerken bestatigte, er habe Herrn Sazonow in ausfuhrlicher Weise iiber diese Unterredung referiert. Herr Schebeko fiihrte dann avis, warum man in St. Petersburg unser "Vor- gehen gegen Serbien mit solcher Besorgnis betrachte. Wir seien eine Gmft- macht, die gegen den kleinen serbischen Staat vorgehe, ohne dall man in St. Petersburg etwas daruber wisse, was wir mit demselben beabsichtigten, ob wir dessen Souveianitat tangieren, ihn ganz niederweirfen oder gar zertreten wollten. 103 Durch historisehe und andere Bande mit RuOland verbunden, konne letzterem das weitere Schicksal Serbiens nicbt gleichgultig sein. Man habe sioh in St. Petersburg angelegen sein lassen, mit allem Nachdruck auf Belgrad ein- znwirken, dafi es alle unsere Forderungen erfiille, allerdings zu einer Zeit, wo man noch nicht wissen konnte, was fiir Forderungen wir nacbmals gestellt. Aber selbst bezuglich dieser Forderungen wiirde man alles einsetzen, um wenigstens das Mogliche durebzubringen. Ich erinnerte den Herrn Botscbafter daran, dafi wir wiederbolt betont h'atten, wir wollten keine Eroberungspolitik in Serbien treiben, aucb dessen Souver'anit'at nicbt antasten, blofi einen Zustand herstellen, der uns Sicherheit biete gegen Beunruhigung seitens Serbiens. Hieran kniipfte ich eine langere Erb'rterung unseres unleidlicben Verbaltnisses zu Serbien. Aucb gab ich Herrn Schebeko deutlich zu verstehen, in welch hohem Mafie die russische Diplomatie, wenn aucb gewifi gegen den Willen der leitenden Faktoren, an diesen Zustanden schuld sei. Im weiteren Verlaufe unserer Unterredung .erwahnte ich die nunmehr zu meiner Kenntnis gelangte russische Mobilisierung. Nacbdem sich dieselbe auf die Militarbezirke Odessa, Kiew, Moskau und Kasan beschranke, trage dieselbe einen hostilen Charakter . gegen die Monarchie. Was der Grand bievon sei, wisse ich nicht, da ja gar kein Streitfall zwischen uns und RuOland existiere. Osterreicb-Ungarn habe ausschheOlich gegen Serbien mobilisiert, gegen Rufiland nicht einen Mann, was allein aus dem Umstande zu ersehen sei, dali das I., X. und XI. Korps nicht mobilisiert worden seien. Bei dem Umstande jedoch, dali Rufi- land offensichtlich gegen uns mobilisiere, miifiten auch wir unsere Mobilisierung erweitern, wobei ich jedoch ausdrucklich erwahnen wolle, dafi diese Mafinahme selbstverstandlich keinen feindseligen Charakter gegen Rufiland trage und sich lediglich als notwendige Gegenmafinahme gegen die russische Mobilisierung darstelle. Ich bat Herrn Schebeko, dies seiner Regierung zu melden, was er mir zusagte. 51. Graf Berchtold an die k. u. k. Botschafter in London und St. Petersburg. Telegramm. Wien, 31. Juli 1914. Ich telegraphiero wie folgt nach Berlin: Herr von Tsehirsehky hat auftraggemafi gestern hier Mitteilung iiber eine Unterredung zwischen Sir E. Grey und Furst Lichnowsky gernacht, in welcher der englische Staatssekretiir dem deutschen Botschafter das Nachfolgende eroffnete: 104 .Sazonow habe die englische Regierung wissen lassen, daft er nach der Kriegserklarung Osterreich-Ungarns an Serbien nicht mehr in der Lage sei, mit Osterreich-Ungarn direkt zu verhandeln und Jaher die Bitte ausspreche, England moge seine Vermittlung wieder aufbehmon. Als Voraussetzung betrachto die russische Regierung die vorlanfige Einstellung der Feindseligkeiten. Zu dieser russischen Eroffnung bemerkte Sir E. Grey zu Fiirst Lichnowsky, England denke an eine Vermittlung a quatre und halte dieselbe fur dringend geboten, wenn nicht ein Weltkrieg entstehen solle. Ich ersuche Euer Exzellenz, dem Herrn Staatssekretar, fiir die uns durch I Term von Tsehirsehky gemaobten Mitteilungen verbindlichst zu danken und ihm zu erklaren, dad wir trotz der Anderung, die in der Situation sekher durch die Mobilisierung RuDlands eingetreten sei, gerne bereit seien, dem Vorschlag Sir E. Greys, zwischen uns und Serbien zu vermitteln, naher zu treten. Die Voraussetzungen unserer Annahme seien jedoch natiirlich, dafi unsere milit'arische Aktion gegen Serbien einstweilen ihren Fortgang nehme und dall das englische Kabinett die russische Regierung bewege, die gegen uns gerich- tete russische Mobihsierung zum Stillstand zu bringen, in welchem Falle selbst- verstandbch auch wir die uns durch dieselbe anfgezwungenen defensiven mili- t'arischen Gegenmallregeln in Galizien sofort wieder riickgangig machen wiirden. 52. Graf Szapary an Graf Berchtold. Telegramm. St. Petersburg, 31. Jutt 1914. Heute friih Ordre zur allgemeinen Mobilisierung der gesamten Armee und Flotte erfolgt. 53. Graf Berchtold an die k. und k. Missionen. Telegramm. Wien, 31. Juli 1974. Zu Euer etc. Information und Verwertung bei dortiger Regierung: Da von der russischen Regierung Mobilisierungen an unserer Grenze angeordnet worden sind, sehen wir uns zu militarischen JVIallnahmen in Galizien jijezwungen. 105 Diese Mafinahmen sind rein defensiven Charakters und lediglich unter dem Brucke der russischen Vorkekrungen erfolgt, die wir sehr bedauem, da wir selbst keinerlei aggressive Absichten gegen RuOland haben und die Fortdauer der bisherigen guten nachbarlichen Beziehungen wiinschen. Die der Situation entsprechenden Pourparlers zwischen dem Wiener und St. Petersburger Kabinett, von denen wir uns eine allseitige Beruhigung erhoffen, nehmen inzwischen ihren Fortgang. 54. Graf Sz^csen an Graf Berchtold. Telegramrn. Paris, 31. JuU 1914. Deutscher Botschafter hat im Auftrage seiner Regierung hier erklart, dafl, wenn angeordnete russische allgemeine Mobilisierung nicht binnen 12 Stunden eingestellt wird, Peutschland gleicbfalls mobilisieren werde. Gleicbzeitig fragte Baron Schoen, ob Frankreich im Falle deutscb-russischen Krieges neutral bliebo. Diesbeziiglicke Antwort binnen 18 Stunden erbeten. Termin lauft morgen, Samstag, 1 Ubr nachmittags ab. 55. Graf Sz£pa>y an Graf Berchtold. Telegramrn. St. Petersburg, 31. Juli 1914. Euer Exzellenz Telegramrn vom 3& d. M. erhalten. Hochdieselben werden meinem Telegramrn vom 29. d. M. entnommen baben, dall ich', ohne einen Auftrag abzuwarten, Konversation mit Sazonow nahezu auf der mir nunmehr aufgetragenen Grundlage wieder aufgenommen habe, obne da(l sieh die beiderseitigen Standpunkte wesent.lich gen'ahert hatten. Inzwischen hat sich allerdings aus den vom deutschen Botschafter mit russischem Minister des Auflern gefuhrten Konversationen ergeben, daO Ruliland sich selbst mit einer formellen Erkl'arung, Osterreieh-Ucgarn werde weder das serbische Territorium schmalern noch die serbische Souver'anitat antasten, noch russische Balkan- oder sonstige Interessen verletzen, nicht zufriedengeben wlirde, und ist auch seither rnssischerseits die allgemeine Mobilisierung angeordnet worden. 56. Graf SzSpaYy an Graf Berchtold. Telegramm. St Petersburg, 1. August. 1914. Bei einem heutigen Besuehe legte ich Herrn Sazonow dar, daft ich Instruk- tionen erhalten hiitte, ich miisse aber vorausschicken, die augenblickliche, durch die russische. allgemeine Mobilisierung in Wien geschaffene Lage sei mir ganzlich unbekannt, so daft ich von dieser bei Verdolmetschung meiner noch vorher abgegangenen Weisungen vollkommen abseken miisse. Ich sagte, daft die beiden Weisungen Euer Exzellenz von dem Miftvcrst'andnis handeln, als ob wir weitere Verhandlungen mit Ruftland abgelelint hatten. Dies sei, wie ich ihm schon ohne Auftrag versichert hiitte, ein Irrtum. Euer Exzellenz seien nicht nur gerne bereit, mit RuQland auf breitester Basis zu verhandeln, sondern auch speziell geneigt, unseren Notentext einer Besprechung zu unterziehen, sofern es sich um dessen Interpretation handle. Ich betonte, wie sehr die Instruktionen Euer Exzellenz an mich einen weiteren Beweis guten Willens bbten, wenn ich ihm auch noch einmal in Er- innerung rufen miisse, daft mir die durch die seitherige allgemeine Mobilisierung geschaft'ene Situation unbekannt sei, ich konne nur hoffen, daft uns der Gang der Ereignisse nicht schon zu weit gei'iikrt habe; jedeni'alls hiitte ich es fiir meine PHieht gehalten, im gcgenwartigen hochernsten Augenblicke den guten Willen der k. u. k. Regiemng nochmals zu dokumentieren. Herr Sazonow erwiderte, er nehme. von diesem Beweise guten Willens mit Befriedigung Akt; doch mb'ehte or mich aufmerksam machen, daft ihm Unterhandlungen in St. Petersburg aus tiahelicgenden Griinden weniger Erfolg versprechend erschienen als solche auf dem neutralen Londoner Terrain. Ich erwiderte, Euer Exzellenz gingen, wie ich schon dargelegt hiitte, vom Gesichtspunkte einer direkten Fiihlungnahme in St. Petersburg aus, so daft ich nicht in der Lage sei, zu seiner Anregung beziiglich Londons Stellung zu nehmen, doch wiirde ich Euer Exzellenz hievon Middling erstatten. 57. Graf Szngyeny an Graf Berchtold. Telegramm. Berlin, 2. August 1914. Der Herr Staatssekretar sagte mir soeben, daB von RuBland keine Antwort auf deutsche Anfrage eingelangt sei. Russische Truppen haben die deutsche Grenze bei Schwidden (siidb'stlich Bialla) iibersehritten. RuBland hat daher Deutschland angegriffen. Deatschland betrachtet sieh daher im Kriegszustande mit RuBland. Russischer Butschafter hat heute vormittags Piisso zugestellt erhalten; er wird voraussichtlieh noch heute abreisen. 58. Graf Mensdorff an Graf Berchtold. Telegramm. London, 4. August 1.914. Ich habe eben Sir E. Grey gesehen. Englische Regierung hat an Deutsch- land Ultimatum wegen Belgiens gerichtet, erwartet Antwort heute um Mitternacht. Sir E. Grey, sagte mir, er sehe vorlaufig keine Veranlassung zu einer Mitteilung an die k. u. k. Regierung und keine Ursache, mit uns in Konflikt zu geraten, solange wir nicht im Kiiegszustande mit Frankreich sind. Jedenfalls hoffe er, daB wir keine Feindseligkeiten eroftnen wiirden ohne vorherige Formalitat der Kriegserklarung. Er wird Sir M. de Bunsen nicht abberufen. Falls wir mit Frankreich im Kriegszustande wiiren, wiirde es fiir England als Bundesgenosse Frankreichs wohl schwer sein, mit demselben im Atlantisclien Meere zn kooperieren und nicht im Mittellandischen Meer. 59. Graf Berchtold an Graf SzdpaYy in St. Petersburg. Telegramm. Wien, 5. August 1914. Ich ersuche Euer Exzellenz, dem dortigen Minister des AuOern folgende Note zu ubergeben: „D'ordre de son Gouvernement, le soussigne 1 Ambassadeur d'Autricbe- Hongrie a l'honnenr de notifier a Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Affairos Etrangeres de Russie ce qui suit: Vu l'attitude menacante prise par la Russie dans le conflit entre la Miiiiavchie austro-hongroise et la Serbie, et en presence du fait qu'en suite de ce conflit la Russie, d'apres une communication du Cabinet de Berlin, a cru devoir ouvrir les hostility's contre 1'Allemagne et que celle-ci se trouve, par consequent, en etat de guerre avec la dite Puissance, l'Autricbe-Hongrio se considers egalement en £tat de guerre avec la Russie." Nach Uberreichung dieser Note wollen Euer Exzellenz sich die Ausfertigung der Passe erbitten und unges'aumt mit dem gesamten Botsehaftspersonal, aus- genommen etwa zuriickzulassende Organe, abreisen. Herrn von Schebeko wenlen gleichzeitig unsererseits die passe zugestellt. 60. Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London. Telegramm. Wien, 6. August 1914. Erbalten Euer Exzellenz Telegramm vom 4. 1. M. Icb ersuche Hochdieselben Sir E. Grey zu versichern, dafi wir keinesfalls ohne vorhergehende formelle Kriegserklarung Feindseligkeiten gegen England erbffnen wiirden, aber auch erwarteten, dall England uns gegeniiber ein analoges Verhalten beobachteu und vor Eintritt des formellen Kriegszustandes keine liostilen Akte gegen uns unternehmen werde. 61. Graf SzScsen an Graf Berchtold. Telegramm. Paris, S. August 1914. Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres m'a fait appeller pour me dire que, selon des renseignernents positifs qui lui seraient parvenus, le corps d'armee d'lnns- bruck serait transports a la frontiere francaise. Monsieur Doumergue desire savoir d'urgence si eette nouvelle est exacte et -au oas affirmatif quelles sont les intentions du Gouvernement I. et R. La France se trouvant en guerre avec l'Allemagne envoi de nos troupes a la frontiere francaise n'est pas compatible selon l'avis du Ministre avec Stat de paix existant entre FAutricbe-Hongrie et France. Monsieur Dumaine est charge 1 d'une demarche semblable aupres de Votre Excellence. 62. Graf Berchtold an Graf Sz6csen in Paris. Telegramm. Wien, 9. August 1914. Mit Bezug auf Euer Exzellenz Telegramm vom 8. d. M. Nach mit Generalstab genommener Riiekspraehe ermiiehtige ich Euer ENzellenz, franzosischer Regirrung zu erklaren, dal) Nachrichten iiber Teilnahme unserer Truppen an deutsch-franzosischem Krieg vollstandig erfunden. Analog babe icb micb Herrn Dumaine gegeniiber ausgesprocben. 63. Graf Szecsen an Graf Berchtold. Telegramm. Paris, 10. August 1914. Reeu telegramme du 9 aout. Ai immSdiatement communique 1 contenu a Monsieur Doumergue. Ministre qui avait reeu rapport telegraphique analogue de Monsieur Dumaine sur sa conversation avec Votre Excellence a reconnu que nos troupes ne se trouvaient pas a la frontiere francaise, mais il dit avoir renseignernents positifs qu'un corps d'armSe austro-bongrois a ete transports en 110 Allemagne, ce qui permet a celle-ci de retirer ses troupes des territoires allemands occup^s par nos soldats et constitue, selon avis du Miuistre, facili- tation des operations de guerre allemandes. J'ai a difterentes reprises attire attention da Ministre sur le texte de la re|>onse de Votre Excellence, il a reconnu qu'on no pouvait pas parler de participation effective de nos troupes a la guerre franco-allemande, mais il insista sur ce que presence de nos troupes sur territoire allemand £tait incontestable et que ceci constituait aide militaire pret£ a l'Allemagne. Dans ces conditions il a charge Ambassadeur de France a Vienne de dernander immfidiatement ses passeports et de quitter Vienne aujourd'hui avec tout le personnel de l'Ambassade. Le Ministre m'a dit que dans ces circonstances ma presence iei ne saurait efre d'aucune utility, mais que, vu excitation populaire, elle pourrait donner lieu a des incidents regret- tables qu'il de'sirerait e'viter. II m'a offert de mettre des ee soir un train a ma disposition pour quitter la France. J'ai repondu qu'il me serait impossible d'avoir instruction de Votre Excellence jusqu'au soir mais que, vu le rappel de Monsieur Dumaine, je le priai de me faire deRvrer mes passeports. 64. Graf Berchtold an Graf Mensdorff in London. 117™, 11. August 1914. Franzosische Regierung hat ibren hiesigen Botschafter beauftragt, seine Passe mit der Motivierung zu verlangen, daft ein osterreichisch-ungarisches Armeekorps nach Deutschland entsendet worden sei, wodurch es der deutscben Heeresleitung ermoglicht wiirde, ihre Truppen aus den deutscben Gebieten zuriickzuziehen, welcbe von unseren Abteilungen besetzt seien. Diese Maflnahme unseres Generalstabes bedeute eine militarisehe Hilfeleistung an Deutschland. Euer ExzeUenz wollen zur Kenntnis der englischen Regierung bringen, dali den an zustandiger Stelle eingeholten lnformationen zufolge die franzosischerseits aufgestellte Behauptung unbegriindet ist. 65. Graf Mensdorff an Graf Berchtold. Telegramm. London, 12. August 19 14. Jo viens de recevoir de. la part de Sir E. Grey la communication suivante: „Sur la demande du Gouvernement francais qui nest pas a me me do communiqucr directement avec Votre Gouvernement, j'ai a Vous faire la com- munication suivante: „Apres avoir declare la- guerre a la Serbie et pris ainsi la premiere initia- tive des hostility en Europe, le Gouvernement austro-hongmis s'est mis sans aucune provocation du Gouvernement do la Republique francaise en etat de guerre avec la France: I-. Apres que l'Allemagne avait succesivement declare' la guerre a la Russie et a la France, il est intervenu dans ce conflit en declarant la guerre a la Russie qui combattait deja aux cotes de la France. 2. D'apres de nombreuses informations dignes de foi l'Autriche a envoyo des troupes sur la frontiere allemande dans des conditions qui constituent uno menace directe a 1'egard de la France. En presence de cet ensemble de faits le Gouvernement francais se voit oblige de declarer au Gouvernement austro-hongrois qu'il va prendre toutes les niesures qui lui permettront de repondre a ees actes et a ces menaces." Sir E. Grey ajoute: Rupture avec la France ayant et£ amenee de cette maniere, le Gouvernement de Sa Majoste britannique se voit oblige d'annoncer que l'ctat de guerre existe entre la Grande-Bretagne et l'Autriclie- Ilongrie a partir de minuit. 66. Der japanische Botschafter an Graf Berchtold. Wien, 20. August 1914. Monsieur le Comte, No doubt Your Excellency have already been informed by His Excellency Baron Muller of the nature of the communication made ito the German Government by my Government on the 15 th inst. ; but, for Your Excellency's personal information, I beg to enclose therewith a copy of a telegram received from Tokio on the subject although I have no instruction to do so. 113 The Japanese Government, taking into serious consideration the present situation, and as the result of full communication with the British Government for the purpose of consolidating and maintaining the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia which forms one of the objects of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, have come to the decision of taking the necessary measures therefore in common with Great Britain; but before taking such measures, the Japanese Government thought it proper to once approach the German Government with a friendly advice which was communicated to them to the following effect on the 15"' of August 1914. 1. All German vessels of war to be immediately withdrawn from the waters in the neighbourhood of Japan and China. The vessels, which cannot be so withdrawn, to be disarmed. '2. The German Government to deliver, unconditionally and without com- pensation, to the Japanese authorities, the entire leased territory of Kiau-Chau before the 16 th of September 1914, for the purpose of returning it to China. The Japanese Government have declared to the German Government that unless their reply of unconditional acceptance of the above advice should be received before noon of Sundav the 23 nl instant, the Japanese Government shall take such action as they deem necessary. It is sincerely hoped that the above advice, with such ample allowance of time for reply, may be accepted by the German Government; but should, unfortunately, the German Government not accept the advice of the Japanese Government the latter will be obbged to take the necessary measures in order to accomplish their object. The reason that led the Imperial Government to assume the present attitude is, as already mentioned, none other than to safeguard the common interests of Japan and Great Britain mentioned in the Anglo-Japanese alliance by con- solidating the foundation of permanent peace in the regions of Eastern Asia, and the Japanese Government have no intention whatever of embarking on a policy of territorial expansion or any other design of self-interest. Consequently, the Imperial Japanese Government are resolved to respect, with the utmost care, the interests of third powers in Eastern Asia and not in the least to injure them. 67. Graf Berchtold an Graf Clary in Brtissel. Telegramm. Wien, 22. August 1914. Ich ersuche Euer Exzellenz, dem kbniglieh belgischen Minister des AuOern sofort folgendes mitzuteilen: „D'ordre de mon Gouvernement j'ai l'honneur de notifier a Votre Excellence ce qui suit: Vu que la Belgique, apres avoir refuse^ d'accepter les propositions qui lui avaient 6t6 adresse^es a plusieurs reprises par 1'Allemagne, prete sa cooperation militaire a la France et a la Grande-Bretagne qui, toutes deux, ont declare la guerre a l'Autriche-Hongrie, et en presence du fait que, comme il vient d'etre constats, les ressortissants autrichiens et hongro'is se trouvant en Belgique ont, sous les yeux des autorites Royales. du subir un traitement contraire anx exigences les plus primitives de l'numanite' et inadmissible meme vis-a-vis des sujets d'un Etat ennemi, l'Autriche-Hongrie se voit dans la necessity de rompre les relations diplomatiques et se considere des ce moment en elat de guerre avec la Belgique. Je quitte le pays avec le personnel de la Legation et confie la protection de mes administr^s au Ministre des Etats-Unis d'Ame>ique en Belgique. De la part du Gouvernement I. et R. les passeports sont remis au Comte Errcmbault de Dudzeele. 68. Prinz Hohenlohe an Graf Berchtold. Telegramm. Berlitz, 23. August 1914. Dem hiesigen japanischen Geschaftstrager wurde heute durch das Aus- wartige Amt mitgeteilt, dafl die kaiserlich deutsche Regierung nicht die Absicht habe, eine Antwort auf das japanisehe Ultimatum zu erteilen. Die deutsche Regierung habe ihrem Botschafter in Tokio den Auftrag erteilt, naeh Ablauf der von Japan fur heute 12 Uhr gestellten Frist Japan zu verlassen und sie werde zu gleicher Zeit dem hiesigen japanischen Geschaftstrager seine Passe zustellen. Zu Mittag wurden dann dem Herrn Geschaftstrager die Passe zugestellt und wird derselbe mit dem Botschaftspersonal Berlin morgen friih verlassen. 69. Graf Berchtold an Freiherrn von Miiller in Tokio. Telegramm. Wien, 24. Augtist 1914. Der Kommandant S. M. S. „ Elisabeth" erhielt den Auftrag, in Tsingtau mitzuk'ampfen. Ersuche Euer Exzellenz, mit Riicksicht auf das Vorgehen Japans gegen das uns verbiindete Deutsche Reich Ihre Passe zu verlangen. Konsulate zu verstandigen und mit Kolonie und Botschafts- und Konsulatspersonal nach Amerika abzureisen. Schutz unserer Staatsangehorigen und Interessen wollen Euer Exzellenz amerikanischem Botsehafter anvertrauen. Hiesigem japanischen Botschafter werden Passe zugestellt. ROYAUME DE BELGIQUE. MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES. m .: *;>* ■ M - J3 W Correspondance diplomatique RELATIVE A LA Guerre de 1914. (24 JUILLET-29 AOUT. ANVERS. I.WRIMERIE ET PUBLICITE FtOR BURTON. SOCIETE ANONVME. COURTE RUE NEUVE. 28. TABLE DES MATIERES. Dat( 24 juillei 24 juillet 25 juillet 26juillet 27 juillet 28juiUet 2!< juillet M. Davignon aux Legatior A Paris, Berlin, Londre: Vienne et S'-Petersbourg. M Davignon aux Legations a Rome. La Haye et Lu- xembourg. Le Comte Clary et Aldringen a M. Davignon. Le Baron Beyens a M. Davi- gnon. Le Comte Errembault de Dudzeele a M. Davignon. M. Davignon aux Legations. A. Berlin. Pans. Londres. Vienne. Saint-Pelersbourg. Rome. ,La Haye. Luxem- bourg. M. Davignon a tous les Chefs a l'etranger. Le Baron Beyens a, M. Davi- gnon. Communication du texte de rultimatum aus- tro-hongrois a la 'Serbie Envoi d'une note a remettre eventuellement aux Ministres respectifs des Affaires Etran- geres pour leur faire connaitre la volonte de la Belgique de rester neutre en cas de conflit europeen Les dites Legations remettront aux Ministres des Affaires Etrangeres une note identique a'celle qui aura ele- communiques aux cinq Puissances garantes de la neutrality beige. Communication de la r£ponse du Gouverne- ment serbe a 1'ultimatum austro-hongrois. Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois juge la reponse de la Serbie insuffisante et rompt les relations diplomatiques avec elle. . . . Le Gouvernement britannique propose l'inter- vention a Vienne et a Saint-Petersbourg de l'Angleterre, de la France, de 1'AllemagTie et de l'ltalie pour trouver un terrain de con- ciliation. L'AUemagne seule n'a pas encore repondu Le Gouvernement beige a mis l'arm^e sur le pied de paix renforc6. Cette mesure ne doit pas etre confondue avec la mobilisation. . La France donne l'assurance a la Belgique qu'aucune incursion des troupes franchises n'aura lieu en Belgique mSme si des forces importantes etaient massees sur les fron- tieres beiges La mobilisation de l'armSe beige est deb- tee et le samedi l er aout en est le premier jour Le Gouvernement anglais a demand^ sSpare- ment aux Gouvernements francais et alle- mand si chaeun d'eux etait pret a respecter la neutrality de la Belgique pourvu que l'autre Puissance ne la viole pas Le Baron van der Elst rappelle au Ministre d'Allemagne les assurances donnees par 1'Empire a la Belgique au sujet du respect de sa neutrality La France a accepts la proposition de l'An- gleterre de ne pas violer la neutrality beige dans le cas ou celle-ci serait respecter par l'Allemagne. (Voir n° 11.) L'AUemagne refuse de repondre a la proposi- tion anglaise de respecter la neutralit6 de la Belgique. (Voir n° 11.) La France explique les conditions dans las- quelles elle respectera la neutrality de la Belgique M Davignon aux Legations a Rome. La Haye, Luxem- bourg. M Eyschen A M. Davignon M. Davignon aux Legations pre.s des Puissances garan- M. de Below Saleske a M. Davignon. Entrevue entre M de Below Saleske "et le Baron van der Elst. M Davignon aux Legations ;i Pans, Londres, Vienne. Berlin, s;nnt-Fetersbouig, La Haye. M Da\u'non aux Legations a. Berlin. Paris. Londres. Vienne et S l -P£tersbourg S. M. le Roi a S M le Roi d'Angleterre. Le Comte de Lalaing 'a. M Davignon. M. de Below Saleske a M Davignon. Sir F H Villiers a M Da\i- Le Baron Fallon a M Dav Ex6cutez les instructions donnt-es par la let- tre du 24 juillet (voir n u 2} Ex6cutez les instructions donnees par la let- tre du 2o juillet (voir n° 3) Le President du Gouvernement luxembour- geois proteste contre La violation de la neu le.iltte du Grand-Duche garantie par le traite de Londres de 18S7 Le Minisire de France a rendu publique sa declaration du 1" aout. La Belgique atta- cherait le plus grand prix a recevoir de l'AUemagne une assurance analogue & celle donnee par la France Remise de l'ultimatum de l'AUemagne. L'Em- pire somme la Belgique de ne pas s'opposer au passage des troupes allemandes. . . . L'AUemagne se plaint a la Belgique de la violation de ses frontieres par des dirigea- bles et une patrouille venant de France. Response du Gouvernement beige a l'ultima- tum allemand. La Belgique ne peut faillir aux devoirs que lui imposent les traites de 1839. ..." Tfilegramme adressf pour faire connaitre aux Ministres du Roi pies des grandes Puissan- ces le sens de l'ultimatum allemand et de la reponse du Gouvernement beige. . . . La Belgique a fait savoir a la France que pour l'instant elle ne faisait pas appel 4 la garantie des Puissances Elle apprGciera ulterieurement ce qu'il y aura lieu de faire La Belgique fait un supreme appel au Gou- vernement anglais pour la sauvegarde de sa neutrality L'Angleterre declare qu'elle fera la guerre a l'AUemagne si la neutrality de la Belgique est- violee. (Voir n° 23 ) L'AUemagne executera. au besoin par la force des armes, les mesures de s£curit£ qu'elle juge indispensables vis a ' vis des menaces franchises L'Angleterre s'attend a ce que la Belgique r6- siste par tous les moyens possibles a la pression de l'Allemagne tendant a lui faire abandonner son nMe de pays neutre et a ce qu'elle fasse appel aux Puissances garantes La Hollande fait savoir au Gouvernement ' beige qu'elle sera peut-£tre obligee d'insti- tuer sur l'Escaut le balisage de guerre. . . Violation du territoire national a Gemmenich M. de Below Saleske a M. Davignon. M. Davignon au Baron Gre- nier. Remise des passeports au Ministre d'Alle- magne • • L'AUemagne remet aux Etats-Unis le soin de la protection des interets allemands en Belgique Le Gouvernement beige demande au Gouver- nement espagnol de se charger de la pro- tection des intents beiges en Allemagne. . N° Date | 1 RESUME Pago 34 4 aout M. Davignon au Baron Beyens. 12 35 4 aout Le Baron Beyens k M. Davi- gnon. Discours prononce' par M. de Bethmann-Hol- - weg au Reichstag et dans kquel le Chance- lier de l'Empire reconnait que l'Allemagne commet une injustice en passant outre aux protestations des Gouvernements luxem- bourgeois et beige IS 36 4 aout Le Comte de Lalaing a M. Davignon. Expose de l'attitude de l'Angleterre dans le conflit europGen 1.1 1 37 4 aout Le Comte de Lalaing a M. Davignon (telegramme). L'Angleterre s'attend a ce que la Norvege. la Hollande et la Belgique rSsistent a la pression de l'Allemagne et gardent la neu- trality Elles seront soutenues dans ce cas 13 38 4 aout M. Davignon aux Minislres du Boi a Paris. Londres et Saint-Petersbourg. Resum6 de la situation diplomatique. Comme aucun fait de guerre ne s'est produit a 1'ex- piration de rultimatum. le Conseil des Ministres a decide, le 3 aout, a 10 heures. de ne pas encore faire appel aux Puissan- ces garantes 13 39 4 aout Le Comte de. Lalaing a M. Davignon. L'Angleterre a somme PAllemagne de respec- ter la neutrality de la Belgique. L'ultimatum expire a minuit 14 40 4 aout M. Davignon aux Ministres de Grande Bretagne. Fran- ce et Bussie a Bruxelles. Les forces allemandes ayant penStre en Bel- gique, le Gouvernement du Roi fait appel a l'Angleterre, a la France et a la Russie pour cooperer, comme garantes. a la defense de son territoire 14 41 5 aoOt Le Comte de Lalaing a M Davignon. L'Angleterre a declare la guerre a l'Allema- 15 42 5 aoiit M. Davignon aux Legations k Paris, Londres et Saint- Petersbourg. La Belgique fait appel aux Puissances ga- rantes de sa neutrality 15 43 5 aout M. Davignon aux Legations a Paris, Londres et Saint- Petersbourg. Expose de la situation diplomatique. . 15 44 5 aout M. Davignon a tous les Chefs de mission a l'etranger. En vi de Particle 10 de la V 6 Convention de La Haye de 1907, la Belgique, en repoussant par la force une atteinte a sa neutrality, ne pose pas un acte hostile 15 45 5 aout Le Baron Beyens a M. Davi- gnon. La Mission da Roi en Allemagne quittera 15 46 5 aout Le Baron Grenier a M. Davi- gnon. Le Gouvernement espagnol se charge de la protection ties interets beiges en Allemagne. 16 41 5 aout Le Baron Guillaume a M Davignon. L'Allemagne a declare" la guerre a la France 16 48 5 aout Sir F H. Villiers a M. Davi- gnon. L'Angleterre accepte de cooperer comme ga- rante a la defense du territoire beige. . . 16 49 5 aout Le Comte de Lalaing a M. Davignon. La flotte anglaise assurera le libre passage de l'Escaut pour le ravitaillement d'Anvers. 16 50 5 aout Le Baron Fallon a M. Davi- Le balisage de guerre va etre etabll (Voir 51 5 aout M. Davignon au Baron Gre- nier. Le Gouvernement du Roi remercie le Gouver- nement espagnol de bien vouloir se charger de la protection des interets beiges en Alle- 52 5 aout M. Davignon aux Legations a Paris. Londres et Saint- Petersbourg. La France et la Russie acceptent de cooperer avec l'Angleterre a la defense du territoire 16 S a out 9 aoiil M de w eede a M Da^ 11 non M Davignon au Bai n I al Ion Le Baton Fallon a Al. Davi- M Davignon au Baron Fal- M D ivie i aux i i ration ,i Paris el a Londi I li gramme Le Baron Fallo M Davignon aux n de Ru: sie el I I M Davignon au x I a Londres, Paris el Sai P6tersbourg. M. Brand Whitlock a M Da \ ignon n \ rs a M Davi- . J] M Klobukbwski Le Baron Fallon a M Davi- gnon. M. Davignon au Baron Pal- '.nmniuiiii.'.iUon i 11 sitions «in Gouvernement allemand et y repondra prochainement, ... ■ hi .ouvenitTnent allemand le sn qu'il attache au mot ■ auseinandi i Le i vernemenl du Roi communique aux Repn sentants des Puissances gai mti - le ,,..,:,. de la seconde note allemande ainsi que i ,, de la response qu'il -■■ propose de i irt a cette communication embou oi it prii ■ in Roi pres la i oui Gr; nd-Dui all de quitter Luxemb i V'u les < rconstances le Gouvernemenl belgi n'a p . pris urn me ie a ■ I ■ esentanl tlu Luxemboui Bru: 1 1 - i i ; * .: \. Lqu i u cepti ni de i ro- ■ ■ i en Belgiqut ive la repon e que le G iuvi 1 1 emenl bi tge propose d ■ second ultimatum de I'Allemagne. (Voir M ' ' ■ rnement de la R6publique donne ,..!:,, fe] I i a ce projet d ■ reponse (Voir n° 65 I Le ti xte allemand contenait une faute I ■ ti i onflit avec la Franca ■ i | ■ position allemande repri osition formulee dans l'ultimatum du 2 aoat. La Belgique ne peul (rue n reponse a eel ultimatum. N* Date RESUME Pace 72 13 aout M. Sazonow a M. Davignon. Le Gouvernement russe felicite la Belgique de son attitude ferine et digne, (Voir n° 65.) 22 73 13 aout Le Baron Fallon a M. Davi- gnon. La reponse du Gouvernement beige a la se- conde proposition allemande a et6 remise le 13 aout 22 74 16 aotit Le Baron Guillaume a M. Davignon. La France n'est plus d'avis de neutraliser le bassin conventional du Congo, (Voir n ' 57 Zl 75 17 aout Le Comte de Lalaing a M. Davignon. Le Gouvernement anglais refuse de se rallier & la proposition beige de neutraliser le bas- 23 76 £6 aout M. Tombeur a M. Renkin. Les Allemands ont attaque le 22 aout le 23 77 28 aout Le Comte Clary a M. Davi- gnon. L'Autriche-Hongrie declare la guerre a la 23 78 29 aout M. Davignon au Baron Fal- lon. Reponse du Gouvernement beige a la declara- tion de guerre de l'Autriche-Hongrie. . . 23 79 29 aout M. Davignon a tous les Chefs de mission a 1'etranger. Renseignement sur des allegations alleman- des contre la Belgique mentionnees au Blue 24 CORRESPONDANCE DIPLOMATIQUE RELATIVE A LA GUERRE DE 1914. (24 juillet— 29 aout.) Lellre adresste par le Ministre du Roi a Vienne a M . Davignon, Ministre des Af /aires Elrangeres Vienne, le 24 juillet 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai l'lionneur de vous faire parvenir, sous ce pli, le texte de l'ultiinatum de FAutriche- Hongrie a la Serbie. Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Comte Errembault de Dudzeele. Annexe au N» 1. Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal s'est vu oblige d'adresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois, par l'entremise du Ministre Imperial et Royal a Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouvernement Royaf de Serbie : ■ Le 31 mars 1909 le Ministre de Serbie a Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, au Gouvernement Imperial et Royal la decla- ration suivante : ii La Serbie reconnait qu'elle n'a pas et6 atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli cree en Bosnie-Herzegovine et qu'elle se con- formera par consequent a telle decision que les Puissances prendront par rapport a Farti- cle 25 du Traits de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des Grandes Puissances, la Serbie s'engage des a present a abandonner l'attitude de protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a obser- ved a regard de l'annexion depuis Fautomne dernier, et elle s'engage, en outre, a changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envcrs FAu- triche-Hongrie pour vivre desormais avec cette derniere sur le pied d'un bon voisinage. » Or, l'histoire des dernieres annexes, et notam- ment les ev6nements douloureux du 28-juin, ont demontre l'existence en Serbie d'un mou- vement subversif dont le but est de detacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise .certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe, est arrive a se manifester au dela du territoire du royaume par des actes de terro- risme, par une serie d'attentats et par des meurtres. Le Gouvernement Royal serbe, loin de satis- faire aux engagements formels contenus dans la declaration du 31 mars 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement : il a tolere i'activite criminelle des diffexentes societ^s et affiliations dingoes contre la Monarchie, le langage effrene de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d'attentats, la participation d'offi- ciers et de fonctionnaires dans les agisse- ments subversifs, une propagande malsaine dans l'instruction publique, tolere enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la population serbe a la haine de la Monarchic et au mepris de ses institutions. Cette tolerance coupable du Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'avait pas cesse au moment oil les evenemenls du 28 juin dernier en ont demontrti au monde entier les consequences funestes. II resulte des depositions et aveux des au- teurs criminels de l'attentat du 28 juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a fete tram6 a Belgrade, que les armes et explosits donl lis nirurlriers se trouvaient etre munis leur ont ete donnes par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes fai- sant partie de la nNarodna Odbrana", et enfin que le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a ete organist et effectue par des chefs du service-frontiere serbe. Les r£sultats mentionnfe de l'instruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement Imperial et Royal de poursuivre plus longtemps l'attitude de longanimity expectative qu'il avait observer pendant des ann^es vis-a-vis des agisseinrnis concentres a Belgrade et propages de la sur les territoires de la Monarchie; ces resultats lui imposent au contraire le devoir de mettre fin a des menses qui forment une menace perpetuelle pour la tranquillity de la Monar- chie. C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouver- nement Imperial et Royal se voit oblige de demander au Gouvernement serbe l'enoncia- tion offioielle qu'il condamne la propaganda' dirigee cnnlre la Monarchie austro-hongroise, e'est-a-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspi- ri'iil en dernier lieu a deliii'tier de la Monar- chie des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage a supprimer, par tous les moyens, cette propagande criminelle et terroriste. Afin de donner un caractere solennel a cet engagement, le Gouvernement Royal.de Serbie fi t.i i Miblier a la premiere page du "Journal officiels en date du 26 juin (13 juillet) I'enon- ciation suivante : ii Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie con- damne la propagande dinge> contre l'Autriche- Hongrie, e'est-a-dire l'ensemble des tendances .Tui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il deplore sincerement les consequences funestes de ces agissements cri- minels. » Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient parli- cipe a la propagande susmentionnee et com- promis par li les .relations de bon voisinage auquel le Gouvernement Royal s'^tait solen- nellement engage par sa declaration du 31 mars 1909. » Le Gouvernement Royal, qui dfeapprouve et repudie toute id6e du tentative d'immixiion dans les destinfes des habitants de quelque partie de I'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soil, con sidere de sun devoir d'avertir for llemenl les offjciers, les fonetionnaires et tout.- la po pulation du royaume que dorenavant il pro- cedera avec la derniere nsueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements qu'il mettra tons ses ef- forts a prevenir et a reprimer. » Cette enonciation sera portee simultanement a I i connaissance de l'Armee.Royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majesty le Roi et sera publiee dans le "Bulletin officiel.. de l'armee. Le Gouvernement Royal serbe s'engage en outre: 1° a supprinur toute publication qui excite a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchie el dont la tendance gene>ale est dirigeis contre son inlegnte territoriale, 2° a dissoudre immediatement la societe dite « Narodna Odbrana », a confisquer to moyens de propagande, et h pr der di la meme maniere contre les autres societes el affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent a la pro- pagande contre la Monarchie austro hongroi- se; le Gouvernement Royal prendra lis mesu- res necessaires pour que lis societes rl ne jmissent pas continuer leur ai livik- sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme, 3° a elimincr sins delai .1.- l'instruction publique en Serbie, tint on ce qui concerne U- corps enseignanl que Irs moyens destruc- tion, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir a fomenter la propagande contre I'Autriche- Hongrie, V a eloigner du service militaire et de ['administration en general tons les officiers et fonetionnaires coupables de In propa>.,inile contre la Monarchie auslro-hungroise el ■). ,n I le Gouvernement Imperial ef Royal de communiquer les noms et les faits au Gou- vernement Royal, 5" a accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement Imperial it Ro il dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirige contre l'integrite territoriale de la Mo narchie, 6° a ouvrir une enqueue judiciaire contre les partisans du complol du 28 juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe; des organes, delevues par le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, prendronl pari aux recher- ches y relatives 7° a proceder d'urgence a I'arrestation du Commandant Voija Tankosic el du nomine Milan Ciganovic, employ^ de l'Etat serbe.com promts par les resultats de I'instrucl de Sarajevo, 8" a empScher, par des mesures efficaces, le concours des autorites serbes dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la frontiere; a licencier et punir severement les fonetion- naires du serviee-froniieiv de Schabatz et de Loznica coupables d'avoir aide les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontiere, 9° a donner au Gouvernement Imperial et Royal des explications sur les propos injus- tifiahles de hauts fonetionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qua l'elranger, qui, malgre leur position officielle, n'ont pas hesite apres l'at- tentat du 28 juin de s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une maniere hostile envers la Monarchie austro-hongroise, enfin to" d'avertir sins retard, le Gouvernement Imperial el Royal de I'execution des mesures comprises dans les points precedents. Le Gouvernement Imperial el Ro; al attend la reponse du Gouvernemenl Royal au plus l.'inl jusqu'au sumedi, 2£ de ce mois, a 6 hcu- n du soir Un memoire concernanl les resultats de ['in- struction ile Sarajevo a I'egard di s fonction naires mentionnes aux points 7 et 8 esl annexe a cette note J'ai l'honneur d'inviter voire Excellence de vouloir purler le contenu de cede note a la connaissance du Gouvernemenl aupres duquel vous etes accredits, en accompagnanl cette communication du commentaire que voici : Le 31 mars 1909, le Gouvernement Roval serbe a adresse a I'Autriche-Hongrie la decla- rati lonl le texte esl reprbduil ci-dessus. Le Iendemain meme de cette declaration la Serbie s'esl engagee dans une politique ten- dant a inspirer des Kites subversives aux res- sortiss ints - rbi - de i i Monarchie austro-hon- groise et a prep irer ainsi la si p iration des territoires austro-hongrois, limitrophes a la Serbie. La Serine devint le foyer d'une agitation criminelle. Des societes et affiliations ne tarderent pas a se former qui, soil ouvertement, soil, cl.m- destinement, etaionl destinies a creer des dfc- ordres sur le territoire austro-hongrois i !i s - 'ei'i: 5 et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des generauj el des diplomates, di s fonetionnaires d'Etat el des juges, bref les sommites du monde officiel et inofficiel du royaume. Le jnurnalisnie serbe est presque entiere- meiii au service de cette propagande, dirigee contre I'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les organes de la pressi ■ rbi n exciti 'lit leurs lecteurs a la haine et au m£- pns de la Monarchie voisine ou a des attentats diriges plus ou moins ouvertement contre sa Mini,' el son integrite. In grand nombre d'agents est appele. a sou- tenir par Ions les moyens l'agitation contre I'Autriche-Hongrie el a corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays L'espril conspirateur des politiciens esprit dont les annates du royaume portent les sanglantes empreintes, a subi une recru- descence depuis la derniere ense lialkanique des individus ayanl fait partie des bandes jus- qno-la OCCUpeeS en Mae, di une sent Venus se nieiire ei 1 1 disposition de la propagande ter- roriste contre I'Autrfche-Hongrii En pri sence de ces agissements, auxquels I'Autriche-Hongrie est exposee depuis des n nei - le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a pa? cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'esJ ainsi que le Gouvernement serbe a manque 1 au devoir que lui imposait la declaration solen- nelle du 31 mars 1909, et e'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en c mtradiction avec la volonle de I'Eu- rope et avec 1'engagemenl qu'il avail pris vis- a-vis de I'Autriche-Hongrie. La longanimite du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal ii I'egard de 1'attitude provocatrice d ■ I i s irbie i tail inspiree du desinteressemenl territorial de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et de l'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe fini- rait tout de meme par apprecier a sa juste valeur l'amitie de l'Autriche-Hongrie. En ob- servant une attitude bienveillante pour les interels politiques de la Serbie, le Gouverne- ment Imperial et Royal esperait que le royau- me se deciderait finalement a suivre de son cote une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autri- chi Hongrie s'attendait surtout ii une pareille evolution dans les idees politiques en Serbie, lorsque, apres les evenements de l'annee 1912, le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal rendit pos- sible, par une attitude desinteressee et sans rancune, t'agrandissement si considerable de la Serbie. Cette bienveillance manifestee par l'Autri- che-Hongrie a l'egard de l'Etat voisin n'a ce- pi ndant aucunement modifie les precedes du royaume, qui a continue a tolerer sur son territoire une propagande, dont les funestes consequences se sont manifestoes au monde entier le 28 juin dernier, jour oii l'heritier presomptif de la Monarchie et son illustre epouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot trame a Belgrade. En presence de cet etat de choses le Gou- vernement Imperial et Royal a du se decider a entreprendre de nouvellcs et pressantes de- marches a Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouver- nement serbe a arr^ter le mouvement incen- diaire menacant la surete et 1'integrite de la Monarchie austro-hongroise. Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal est per- suade qu'en entreprenant cette demarche il se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisees.qui ne sauraii i admettre que le regicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impuneinenl dans la lutte politique, et que la paix europeerme fut con- tinuellement troublee par les agissements par- tant de Belgrade C'est a l'appui de ce qui precede que le Gouvernement Imperial el Royal tient a la disposition du Gouvernement Royal de Gran- de-Bretagne un dossier elucidanl les mi - serbes et les rapports existant entre ces menees et le meurtre du 28 juin Une communication identique est adressee aux representanls Imperiaux et Royaux au- pres des autres Puissances signataires. Vous etes aulorise de laisser une copie de cette depeche entre les mains de M. le Mi- nistre des Affaires Elrangeres. Vienne le 24 juillet 1914. Annexe. L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le Tri- bunal de Sarajevo contre Gavrila Princip el consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicity y relative — crime commis par eux le 28 juin dernier — a jusqu'ici abouti aux constatations suivanles 1" Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, "lors de son sejour a Sarajevo, 1'Archiduc Francois-Ferdinand fut forme a Belgrade par Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, le noni- me Milan Ciganovic et Trifko Grabez avec le concours du commandant Voija Tankosic. 2° Les 6 bombes et les 4 pistolets Browning avec munition, moyennant lesquels les inal faiteurs ont commis l'attentat, furent livres a. Belgrade a Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez par le nomme Milan Ciganovic et le comman- dant Voija Tankosic 3" Les bombes sont des grenades a la main provenant du depot d'armes de l'armee serbe a Kragujevac. 4° Pour assurer la reussite de l'attentat, Ciganovic enseigna a Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez la maniere de se servir des grenades et donna, dans une forfil pres du champ de tir a Topschider, des lecons de tir avec pistolets Browning a Princip et Grabez. 5° Pour rendre possible a Princip, Cabri- novic ct Grabez de passer la frontiere de Bos- nie-Herzegovine et d'y introduire clandestine- ment leur contrebande d'armes, un sysUVme de transport secret fut organise par Ciganovic. D'apres cette organisation l'introduction en Bosnie-Herzegovine des malfaiteurs et de leurs armes fut operee par les capitaines-frontieres de Chabac (Rade Popovic) et de Lozniea ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbic de Loz- niea avec le concours de divers particuliers. N" 2. Leitre adressee par M Davignon, Mvnish des Ajfairi . Hrange-res, aux Xfinislres ilif.il I' l'armee beige sera de-- cretee, si. contrairement a noire sincere espoir, el aux apparences de solution paoifique, nos i nseignements nous amenaient a prendre cette inesure extreme de precaution. Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Davignon. Annexe au N° 2. Monsieur le Ministre, La situation internationale est grave; l'even- tualite d'un conflit entre plusieurs puissances ne peut filre 6cart6e dcs preoccupations du gouvernement du Roi. La Belgique a observe avec la plus scrupu- lous- exactitude les devoirs d'Etat neutre que lui imposent les traitfe du 10 avril 1839. Ces devoirs, elle s'attachera infibranlablement a les remplir, quelles que soienl les circonstan- ces. Les dispositions amicales dcs puissances a son egard ont ete affirmees si souvenl que la Belgique a la contiance de voir son territoire demeurer hors de toute atteinte si .lis Imsli- liles venaienl a se produire a ses frontieres. Toutes lis mesures necei res pour assurer I'observation de sa neutrality n'en ont pas ii i- ete prises oar te Gouvernement du Roi. L'armec beige est mobilised el se porte sur les posil sstrategiq u .1 - poui assurer la defense du pays i ' Ii n p ct d. i neutra- lity Li s forts d'Anvers i ! di la Mi use sont • ii etal de defense. II esl a peine necessaire, Monsieur le Mi- nistry d'insister sur le caractere de ces mesu- res. Elles n'onl d'autre but que de mettre la Belgique en situation de remplir ses obliga- tions internationales; i Hi 3 ne soul et n'ont pu etn inspires, cela \ a de soi, m par le dessein de prendre pari a une lutte arm£e des puis- s nun s in par iin sentimenl de defiance envers aucune d'elles Mr conformant aux ordres recus, j'ai l'hon- neur de remettre a Voire Excellence une copie ii- l.i .I. claration du gouvernemenl .In Roi el tie La prier de bien vouloir en prendre acte. Une em unication identique a ele faite aux autres Puissances garantes de la neutrality beige Je saisis, etc. lellrc adressee par 1/ Davignon, Minis/re des Affaires Elrangen - aui Minislres du [tin n Rome, I a lliiin- el Luxembourg. Bruxelles, le 25 juillet 1914 Monsieur Ii Ministre, J'ai adresse a vos Collegues accredits au- pres des Puissances garantes dc I'indfipen- dance et de la neutrality de la Belgique one circulaire, sins date, dont vous trouverez le texle sens ce pli. Si la menace dune guerre franco-allemande devenail imminente, cette circulaire serail communiquee aux Gouvemements des Puis- - inces garantes, pour leur faire connaitre no- i i, olution bien arretee de remplir les de- voirs intemationaux que nous imposenl les trades de 1839 La communication donl il s'agit ne serait efn - in [ue sur un ordre teleigraphique de in. i part Si les eiiv. instances m'amenent a donner cet ordre, je vous prierai, egalement par la voie lelem'aplnque, de dollller laissaliee de no- ire demarche an gouvernemenl aupres duque! vous .1. - i. .hie. . ii lui communiquanl une copie dc la circulaire ci-jointe, a litre de ren- s. i- le ment, et sans demander qu'il vous soil donne aclc de cette . ommunication Mon telegramme vous indiquerait, eventuel- leineni, l.i date qui devrait etre attril e a la circulaire, dale que vous auriez sum d'in- senre sur la copie que vous remettriez au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. II va de soi que la presente depeche et Son annexe doivent consfrver un caractere slnc- tement confidentiel, jusqu'au recu de nouvei- les instructions dc ma part. (s) Davignon, Annexe au N" 3. (Voir I'annexe au N" 2.) I.i-iin- adressie par h Ministre au Roi me suis empress^ de remercier Sir Fran- cis Villiers de cette comm ation que le Gouverhement beige apprecie particulierement el j'ai ajoule que la Grande-Bretagne el lis autres nations garantes de notre independance pouvaient etre assurees que nous ne neglige- rions aucun effort pour maintenir notre neu- trality, et que nous el ions convaincus que les autres puissances, vu les excellents rapports d'amitic el de confiance, que nous avions toujours entretenus avec elles, observeraient et maintiendraienl cette neutralite. Je n'af pas manqui d'af firmer que nos forces militaires corisiderabl meni developpees a la suile de notre reorganisation recente, etaient a meme de nuns permettre de nous defendre energiquement en cas de violation de notre territoire. Au cours de la conversation qui a suivi, Sir-Francis m'a pun un pen surpris de la rapidite avec laquelle nous avions decide la mobilisation de notre am J'ai fail remar- qner que les Pays-Bas avaienl pi is une n solu- tion identique avant nous el qui d'autre part la date recente de notre nouveau regime mili- taire et les mesures transitoires que nous avions du decider a cette occasion, nous impo- saient des mesures urgentes el completes. Nos voisins et garants devaienl voir dans celle resolution le desir de manifester notre pro- fonde volonte de inamtenir nous-memes noire neutralite. Sir Francis m'a paru satisfait de ma reponse et m'a annonce que son Gouvernemenl atten- rt lit cette reponse pour conlinuer les negoeia- tions avec la France et l'Allemagne, negocia- tions dont la conclusion me serait communi- quee. Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Davignon. Leltre adressci par 1/ Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Minislres'du Roi a Berlin, Londres et Puns. Bruxelles, le 31 pullet 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, Ce matin, au cours d'unc conversation que le Secretaire General de mon Deparlement a eue avec M. de Below, il a explique' au Mi- nistre d'Alleinagne la portee des mesures mili- taires que nous avons prises et lui a dit qu'el- les etaient une consequence de notre volonte d'accomplir nos obligations internationales, qu'elles n'impliquaient en aucune facon une attitude de defiance covers nos voisins.' Li Secretaire General a demande ensinle an Ministre d'AUemagne s'il avait connaissancc de la conversation qu'il avait eue avec son predecesseur M de Flotow, et de la reponse que le Chancelier de l'Empire avait charge celui-ci de lui faire. Vu cours de la polemique soulevee en 1011 par le d6pdl du projel hollandais concernant lis Fortifications de Flessingue, certains jour- naux avaienl affirine qu'cii cas de guerre fran- co-allemande. noire neutralite serail violee par l'Allemagne. Le Deparlenient des Affaires Etrangeres avait sugg£r£ 1'idee qu'une declaration faite au Parlemenl allemand a ['occasion d'un debal sur la politique etrangere serail de nature a apaiser I'opinion publique el a calmer ses defiances, si regrettables au point de vue ilis relations des deux pays. M, de Bethman-Holweg fit repondre qu'il avail eie tres sensible aux sentiments qui aviieiit inspire noire demarche. II declarail que l'Allemagne n'avail pas l'intention de vio- ler notre neutralite, mais il estimait qu'en faisanl publiquement une declaration, l'Alle- magne affaiblirait sa situation militaire • a \is ieur ux Etats l'un vis-a-vis de I'autre .i la in des amies. I. note a provoque ch. lu Roi un profond et douloureux edonne- Les intentions qu'elle attribue a la France sont en contradicl avec ti s declarations for- melles qui nous onl ete faites le ler aout, au nom du Gouvernement de la Republique, D'ailleurs si contrairement a notre atti nt une. \ iolal ion de la neutralite beige venail a i tre * ommise par la France, la Belgique rem plirail I iu - devoirs internationaux et sun armee oppos rail a I'envahisseur la plus vi- goureuse n sistanci Les traites de 1839 confirmed par les traites de 1870 consacrenl 1'independance et la neu- trality de la Belgique sous la garantie des Puissances el not.unment du Gouvernement de Sa Majesty le Roi de Prusse. La Belgique a toujours •■<<■ fidele a ses obli- gations internationales; elle a accompli ses devoirs dans un esprit de loyale impartiality elle n'a neglige aucun effort pour maintenir mi faire respecter sa neutrality. L'atteinte a son independance dont la me- nace '■ Gouvernement allemand cOnstituerait une flagrante violation du droit des gens. Aucun interet strategique ne justifie la viola- lion du droit Le Gouvernement beige en acceptant les propositions qui lui sont notifiees sacrifierait i'honneur de la nation en mcnie temps qu'il trahirait ses devoirs vis-a-vis de l'Europe. Conscient du role que la Belgique joue depuis plus de 80 ans dans la civilisation du monde, d se refuse a croire quo 1'independance de la Belgique ne puisse etre conserves qu'au prix de la violation de sa neutralite. Si cet espoir etait decu le Gouvernement beige est fermemenl decide a repousser par tous les moyens en son pouvoir toute atteinte a son droit. N" 23. Tele 'in:, adressi par 1/ Davignon, Mi- nistre des iffaires Elrangkres, aux Ministres du Ii.'i. ii Saint-Petersbourg Berlin, LonOn s, Paris, Vienne, Lu Hayc. Bruxelles, le 3 aout 1014 1. Ulemagne a ri ens hii r soir 7 heures une la neutralite amicale compor- l.llll le I aintien de l'jndepi ndance du Ro; . i ; ■ 1 1 1 el de ses possessions a conclu la paix, ne i.'.r'ii i en cas de n fus d imme ennemie, d p hi-.- fixe a dou:! ,- ores Nous avons repondu que l'atteinte a noire neutralite serail. une vio- lation flagrante du droit des gens. L'a lion de la proposition allemande sacrifierait I'honneur de la nation. Consciento de son de- voir la Belgique est. fermement. deadfe a re- pousser mu' agression par tous nionns (si Davignon. N" 24. Lellre adresste par 17. Davignon, Ministre des Aft n ' I '•:' islri s du Roi it Paris, Berlin, Londres, Vienne et Saint-Pi- tersbourg Bruxelles, le 3 aout, 1914. (a. midi). Monsii ur le Ministre, Comme vous le savez, I'Allemagne a a la Belgique un ultimatum expiranl ce ma 3 aout, a 7 heures. Aucun (ait de guerre ne s'etant encore produit a l'heure actuelle, le Conseil des Ministres a decide qu'il n'y avail pas lieu, pour le moment, de faire appel aux Puissances garantes. Le Ministre de France m'a dit a ce sujet : «Sans etre charge d'une declaration de mon Gouvemement, je crois cependant, m'inspi- rant de ses intentions connues, pouvoir dire que si le Gouvemement royal faisait appel au Gouvernement franca is, comme puissance ga- rante de sa neutralite, nous repondrions im- mediatement a son appel; si cet appel n'elait pas formule, il est probable, a moins bien entendu que le souci de sa propre defense ne determine des mesures exceptionnelles, qu'il attendra pour mtervenir que la Belgique ait fait un acte de resistance effective." J'ai remercie M. Klobukowski de l'appui que le Gouvernement francais voulait bien nous offrir eventuellement et lui ai dit que le Gouvernement du Roi ne faisait pas appel, pour l'instant, a la garantie des Puissances et se reservait d'apprecier ulterieurement ce qu'il y aura lieu de faire. (s) Davignon. TMegramme adressi pa? S. M. le Roi a S. M. le Roi d'Angleterre. Bruxelles, le 3 aout 1914. Me souvenant des nombreuses marques d'a- mitie de Votre Majeste et de ses predecesseurs, de l'attitude amicale de l'Angleterre en 1870, et de la preuve de sympathie qu'elle vient encore de nous donner, je fais un supreme appel a 1'intervention diplomatique du Gou- vernement de Sa Majeste pour la sauvegarde de la neutrality de la Belgique. (s) Albert. THtgrarnme adress£ par le Ministre du Roi a Londres a M. Davignon, Ministre des Af- faires Etrangeres. Londres, 3 aoiit 1914. J'ai montre votre telegramme au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres qui l'a communique au Conseil des Ministres. Le Ministre des Af- faires Etrangeres m'a dit que si notre neu- trality etait violee.'c'etait la guerre avec l'Al- lemagne. (s) Comte de Lalaing. (Voir piece N° 23.) N» 27. Lettre adresse'e par M. de Below Saleske, Ministre d'Allemagne, a M. Davignon, Minis- tre des Affaires Etrangeres (L'original est en francais). Bruxelles, le 4 aout 1914. (6 heures du matin). Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai ete charge^ et j'ai l'honneur d'informer Votre Excellence que par suite du refus oppo- se par le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste le Roi aux propositions bien intentionnees que lui avait soumises le Gouvernement Imperial, ce- lui-ci se verra, a son plus vif regret, forc6 d'executer — au besoin par la force des armes — les mesures de securite exposees comme indispensables vis-a-vis des menaces francai- ses. Veuillez agreer, Monsieur le Ministre, les assurances de ma haute consideration. (s) von Below. Note remise par Sir Francis H. Villiers, Mi- nistrc d'Angleterre, it M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Bruxelles, le 4 aoiit 1914. Je suis charge d'informer le Gouvernement beige que si l'AHemagne exerce une pression dans le but d'obliger la Belgique a abandonner son role de pays neutre, le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste britannique s'attend a ce que la Belgique rtsiste par tous les moyens possi- bles. Le Gouvernement de S. M. Britannique, dans ce cas, est prSt a se joindre a la Russie et a la France, si la Belgique le dfeire, pour offrir au Gouvernement beige sans delai une action commune, qui aurait comme but de register aux mesures de force employ&s par l'Allemagne contre la. Belgique et en meme temps d'offrir une garantie pour maintenir l'independance et l'integritS de la Belgique dans l'avenir. LelVre adresse'e par le Ministre du Roi a La Rage a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. La Haye, le 4 aout 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres m'a dit hier soir que le Gouvernement de la Reine serait peut-etre obliged dans les circonstances graves actuelles, d'instituer sur l'Escaut le balisage de guerre. Le Jhr. Loudon m'a lu un projet de note qui allait m'annoncer cette decision. J'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre, sous ce pli, une copie de la note en question qui m'a ile remise dans la soiree d'hier. Comme vous le verrez, l'Escaut ne sera fer- mi que pendant la nuit. Pendant le jour, la navigation sera possible mais seulement avec des pilotes neerlandais qui ont et6 munis des indications nautiques necessaires a ce sujet. De cette facon les interets de la defense du territoire neerlandais et ceux de la navigation beige d'Anvers sont sauvegarde's. Vous -emarquerez qu'ensuite le Gouverne- ment des Pays-Bas nous demande qu'en cas oil le balisage de guerre serait institue, nous fassions retirer les bateaux-phare «Wielingen» et «Wandelaar» en vue de faciliter le maintien de la neutralite du territoire des Pays-Bas. Je vous ferai remarquer que le terme em- ploye dans cette note «remonter l'Escaut» n'est pas assez explicite; descendre le fleuve sera permis dans les memes conditions. Le Minis- tre vient de m'en donner l'assurance. Aussitot que le Gouvernement neerlandais aura decide cette mesure d'exception j'en serai informed II (aut environ six heures pour effectuer ce balisage de guerre. Je vous telegraphierai aussitot. Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Baron Fallon. Note annexee au N° 29. Le Gouvernement de la Reine pourrail s* voir oblige dans l'interel du maintien de la neutrality du terntoire des Pays-Bas d'msti- tuer sur l'Escaut le balisage de guerre, c'est- a-dire d'enlever ou de modifier unc partie du 'balisage actuel et des pharos. Toulefois, ce balisage de guerre a ete concu de maniere a ce qu'apres son institution ll sera encore possible de remonter l'Escaut pour gagner Anvers pendant le jour, mais seule- ment avec des pilotes neerlandais, qui ont ete munis des indications nauiiques necessaires a ce sujet. En agissant de la sorte, le Gouver- nement de la Reine est convaincu de pouvoir tenir compte egalement des interets de la de- fense du territoire neerlandais et de ceux de la navigation beige d'Anvers. Apres l'institution du balisage de guerre sur l'Escaut, il n'y aurait plus de raison d'entrer dans la passe de mer de Flessingue pendant Ja nuit et comme la presence des bateaux- phare «Wielingen» et «Wandelaar» nest pas indispensable pour la navigation pendant le jour, le Gouvernement Neerlandais mettrait un haul prix a ce que le Gouvernement Royal Beige vouliit bien, au cas ou le balisage de guerre serait institue' par lui, faire retirer lesdits bateaux en vue de faciliter le maintien de la neutrality du terntoire des Pays-Bas. Tiligramme adressi par M. Davignon, Mi- mslre des Affaires Etrangires. aiu Ministres du Rot a Londres el a Paris. Bruxelles, le 4 aout 1914. L'Etat Major fait savoir que le territoire national a ete violS a Gemmenich. (s) Davignon. Leltrc adressie par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangires, a M de Below Sales- ke, Ministre d'Allemagne Bruxelles, le i aout 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai l'honneur de faire savoir a Votre Ex- cellence que des aujourd'liui le Gouvernement du Roi ne saurait plus Lui reconnaitre de caractere diplomatique et cesse d'avoir des relations officielles avec Elle. Votre Excellence trouvera sous ce pli les passeporls qui sont lires a son depart et a celui du per- sonnel de la Legation. Je saisis, etc. (s) Davignon. Lettre adressie par M. de Below Saleske, Mimisl/re d'Allemagne, a M. Davignon, Mi- nistry des Affaires Elrangeres. Bruxelles, le 4 aoiit 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai l'honneur d'accuser reception a Votre Excellence de sa lettre du 4 aout et de Lui faire savoir que j'ai remis la garde de la Legation Imperiale a Bruxelles aux soins de mon collegue des Etats-Unis. Je saisis, etc. (st de Below. Tiligramme adressi par M Davignon, Mi- nistre des Affaires Etrangires, a M. le Baron Grenier, Ministre du Rm a Madrid. Bruxelles, le 4 aout 1914. Veuillez demander au Gouvernement espa- gnol s'il veut bien se charger de la protection des interets beiges en Allemagne et, dans ce cas, donner les instructions necessaires a son Ambassadeur a Berlin. (s) Davignon. N 34. Tiligramme adressi par 1/ Davignon, Mi- nistre des Af/aires Etrangires, a M le Baron Beyens, Ministre du Roi a Berlin. Bruxelles, le 4 aout 19i4. Le Ministre d'Allemagne quitte le pays ce soir; demandez vos passeporls. Nous prions le gouvernement de Madrid d'autoriser l'Am- bassadeur d'Espagne de vouloir bien se char- ger de la protection des interets beiges en Allemagne. (s) Davignon. N" 35. Lellrc adressie par le Ministre de Belgique a Berlin a M Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangires. Berlin, 4 aout 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai l'honneur de vous faire parvenir, ci- apres en traduction, la partie du discours pro- nonce aujourd'hui a la tribune du Reichstag par le Chancelier de l'Empire et relative a l'odieuse violation de notre neutrality : » Nous nous trouvons en etat de legitime defense et la necessity ne connait pas de lois. Nos troupes onl occupe Luxembourg et ont. peut-etre, deja penetre en Belgique. Cela est .n contradiction avec les prescriptions du droit des gens. La France a, il est vrai, declare a Bruxelles qu'elle etait resolue a res- pecter la neutrality de la Belgique, aussi longtemps que l'adversaire la respecterait Mais nous savions que la France se tenail prete pour envahir la Belgique La France I vail attendre. Nous pas Une attaque fran- chise sur notre flanc dans la region du Rhin infeneur aurail pu devenir fatale, C'esl ainsi que nous avons ete forces de passer outre aux protestations justifiees des Gouvernements lu- xembuurgeois et beige. L'injuslice que nous commettons de cette facon, nous la reparerons des que noire but militaire sera alteint. » A celui qui est menace au point oil nous le sommes et qui lutte pour son bien supreme, il n'est permis que de songer au moyen de se degager; nous nous trouvons cote a cote avec l'Autriche.» II est a remarquer que M. de Bethmann- Hollweg reconnait, sans le moindre detour, que l'Allemagne viole le droit international en envahissant le territoire beige et qu'elle commet une injustice a notre egard. Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Baron Beyens. N° 36. Lettre adresste par le Ministre du Roi a Londres a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Londres, le 4 aout 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que le Premier Ministre a fait cet apres-midi a la Chambre des Communes une nouvelle de- claration relativement a la cnse europeenne. Apres avoir rappele les principaux points exposes hier par Sir E. Grey, le Premier Ministre a donne. lecture : P d'un telegramme de Sir F. Villiers, recu ce matin, qui iait connaitre la leneur du se- cond ultimatum adresse par le Gouvernement allemand au Gouvernement beige et qui vous a ete remis ce matin; (voir N° 27). 2° du telegramme par lequel vous m'annon- cez la violation de la frontiere a Gemmenich, dont j'ai remis copie a Sir A. Nicolson; 3° d'un telegramme adresse ce matin par le Gouvernement allemand a son Ambassa- deur a Londres dans le but evident d'egarer I'opinion publique sur son attitude. En voici la traduction d'apres un journal de ce soir : "Veuillez dissiper toute mefiance que. le Gou- vernement Britannique pourrait avoir au su- jet de nos intentions, en repetant, de la ma- niere la plus positive, l'assurance formelle que meme en cas de conflit arme. avec la Belgique, l'Allemagne n'annexera sous aucun pretexte le territoire beige. ■> La sincerity de cette declaration est cor- roboree par le fait que l'Allemagne a solen- nellement donne sa parole a la Hollande de son intention de respecter sa neutrahte. » II est evident que nous ne pourrions nous annexer le territoire beige d'une maniere avantageuse sans faire, en meme temps, une acquisition terntoriale au detriment de la Hollande. » Priere de faire bien comprendre a Sir E. Grey qu'il etait impossible d'exposer lar- me.e allemande a une attaque franchise portee en traversant la Belgique, attaque qui, d'apres des informations absolument incontestables, etait projetee. » En consequence l'Allemagne n'a pas tenu compte de la neutralite beige afin d'eviter ce qui est pour elle une question de vie ou de mort, une attaque franchise par la Bel- gique. » M. Asquith a ensuite expose a la Chambre qu'en reponse a cette note du Gouvernement allemand le Gouvernement britannique lui avait renouvele sa proposition de la semaine derniere, a, savoir de donner au sujet de la neutralite beige les memcs assurances que la France en avait donnees la semaine derniere, tant a l'Angleterre qu'a la Belgique. Le Cabi- net anglais accordait a celui de Berlin jusqu'a minuit pour lui faire connaitre sa reponse. Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Comte de Lalaing. N^ 37. THigramme adresse par le Ministre du Rot a Londres ii M. Davignon, Ministre des Af- faires Etrangeres. Londres, 4 aout 1914. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a fait savoir aux Mmistres anglais en Norvege, Hol- lande, Belgique, que l'Angleterre s'attend a ce que ces trois Royaumes resistent a la pres- sion de l'Allemagne et gardent la neutralite. Dans leur resistance ils seront soutenus par l'Angleterre qui, dans ce cas, est prete a cooperer avec la France et la Russie si tel est le desir de ces trois Gouvernements en offrant alliance aux dits Gouvernements, pour repousser l'emploi contre eux de la force par l'Allemagiie, et garantie, pour le maintien futur de l'independance et de I'integrite des trois Royaumes. J'ai fait remarquer que la Belgique est neutre ,i perpetuite. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a repondu : c'est pour le cas de neutralite violee. (s) Comte de Lalaing. Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, aux Mmistres du Rot a Paris, Londres el Saint-Petersbourg . Briixelles, le 4 aoiit 1914. Monsieur le Ministre., J'ai l'honneur de porter a votre connaissan- ce l'ordre des faits successifs qui ont marque pendant les derniers jours les relations de la Belgique avec certaines des Puissances garan- tes de sa neutralite et de son mdependance. Le 31 juillet le Ministre d'Angleterre me fit une communication verbale aux termes de laquelle, en prevision d'une guerre europeen- ne, Sir E. Grey avait demands aux Gouver- nements allemand et francais, separement, si chacun d'eux etait resolu a respecter la neutralite de la Belgique dans l'eventualite oil cette neutralite ne serait pas violee par aucune autre puissance. En raison des traites existants, Sir Francis Villiers etait charge do porter cette demarche a la connaissance du Gouvernement du Roi en ajoutant que Sir E. Grey presumait que la Belgique etait resolue ii maintenir sa neu- tralite et qu'elle s'attendait a ce que les autres puissances la respectent. J'ai dit a M. le Ministre d'Angleterre que nous appreciions hautement cette communcia- tion qui repondait a notre attente et j'ai ajoute que la Grande-Bretagne ainsi que les autres Puissances garantes de notre independance pourraient etre pleinement assurees de notre ferme volonte de maintenir notre neutralite, celle-ci ne nous paraissant d'ailleurs pas pou- voir Stre menacee par aucun de ces Etats avec lesquels nous entretenons les rapports les plus cordiaux et les plus confiants. Le Gouverne- ment, ai-je fait remarquer, avait donne une preuve de cette resolution en prenant des a presenl toutes les mesures militaires que la situation 1 lii paraissait cuuiporter. A son tour, M. le Ministre.de France se dei lara, le 1" aout, dans une conversation verbale, autonse Jx faire connaitre au Gou- vernement beige, qu'en cas de conflit inter- national, le Gouvernement de la Republique, conformement a ses declarations constantes, respecterait le territoire de la Belgique et qu'il in' sorait amene a modifier son attitude que dans le cas de violation de la neutralite beige par une autre Puissance. Je remerciai Son Excellence et ajoutai que nous, avians deja pns toutes les dispositions requises pour assurer le respect de notre independance et de nos frontieres. Le '.' aout, dans la matinee, j'eus avec Sir Francis Villiers un nouvel entrelien au cours duquel il me fit part de ce qu'il avail transmis telegraphiquement samedi, des la premiere heure, a son Gouvernement noire conversation du 31 juillet en ayant soin de reproduire fide- lement la declaration solennelle qu'il avail recu. 1 1 1 it- de la volonte de la Belgique de ,1. fendre ses frontieres, de quelque cote qu'el- les soienl envahies, II ajouta : "Nous savons que la France vous a donne des assurances formelles, niais l'Angleterre n'a recu a ce sujet aucune reponse de Berlin. Ce dernier fait ne provoqua en moi aucune emotion particuliere, parce que la declaration du Gouvernement allemand pouvait paraitre surabondante en presence des trailes exis- tants. D'ailleurs le Secretaire d'Etat aux af- faires Etrangeres avait affirme a la seance de la commission du Reichstag du 29 avnl I'M:', ..que la neutralite de la Belgique est etablie conventionnellement et que l'AUema- gne a I'intention de respecter ce trade" Le meme jour, M. de Below Saleske, Minis- tre d'AUemagne, se presenta au Mimstere des Affaires Etrangeres a 19 heures et me remit la note ci-jointe (voir piece N° 20). Le Gou^ vernement allemand accordait au Gouverne- ment beige un delai de douze heures p.our lui faire connaitre sa decision. Aucune hesitation ne pouvait se manifes- ler au sujet .If la reponse qu'appelait la pro- position surprenante du Gouvernement alle- mand. Vous en trouverez une copie sous ce pli (Voir i'ir, e \ ' -'.' L'ultimalum expirait le 3 aoiit, a 7 heures .In matin ; comme a 10 heures aucun fait de guerre ne s'etait produit, le Conseil des Minis- tres decida qu'il n'y avail pas lieu, pour le anoinrnt, de faire appel aux Puissances ga- ranl. s. Vers iin.li, le Ministre de France m'inter- rogi a sur ce point et me dit : « Bien qu'en raison de la soudainetS des evenements je ne sois encore charged d'aucune declaration, je crois cependant, m'inspirant des intentions bien connues de mon Gouver- nement, pouvoir dire que si le Gouvernement Royal f.usait appel au Gouvernement fran- cais comme puissance garante de sa neutra- lite. il repondrait immediatenient a son appel. Si eel appel n'elait pas formule il .'si proba- ble, a minus bien entendu que le souci de sa propre defense ne determine des mesures ex- .- I'll. .un. lies, qu'il attendrait, pour interve- nir, que la Belgique ait fait un acte de resis- tance effective. » J'ai reinercie M. Klobukowski de l'appui flue le Gouvernement francais voulait bien nous offrir eventuellement et lui ai dit que le Gouvernement du Roi ne faisait pas appel, pour 1'instant, a la garantie des Puissances et se reservait d'apprecier ulterieurement ce qu il y aura lieu de lan. Enfin, le 4 aout, a 6 heures du matin, le Ministre d'AUemagne me fit la communica- tion Sllivanle : (voir piece N" 'il}. Le Conseil des Mimslres delibere en ce mo- ment an sujet de I'appel aux Puissances ga- rantes de notre neutralite. Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Davignon. Tiligramme adresst par le Ministre du Roi a Lrni, Ires a M . Davignon, Ministre des Af- faires Etrangeres, Londres, 4 aoiit 1914. L'Angleterre a somme ce matin l'Allemagne it.' respecter la neutralite beige. L'ultimatum dit que vu la note adressee par l'Allemagne a la Belgique menacant cette derniere de la for- ce des armes si elle s'oppose au passage de ses troupes, vu la violation du territoire beige a Gemmenich, vu le fait que l'Allemagne a refuse de donner a l'Angleterre la meme as- surance que celle donnee la semaine derniere par la France, l'Angleterre doit demander a nouveau une reponse satisfaisante au sujet du respect de la neutralite beige et d'un traite dont l'Allemagne est signataire aussi bien qu'elle-meme. L'ultimatum expire a minuit. En consequence de l'ultimatum de l'Angle- terre a l'Allemagne, la proposition anglaise que je vous ai transmise par telegramme est annulee pour le moment. (s) Comte de Lalaing. (Voir piece N" 37.) Lellre adressie par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etramjeres, aux Mimslres de Grande-ISretagne, de France et de Russie. BriLxelles, le 4 aout 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, Le Gouvernement beige a le regret de de- voir annoncer a Votre Excellence que ce ma- tin les forces armees de l'Allemagne ont pe- netre sur le territoire beige en violation des engagements qui ont ele pns par traite. Le Gouvernement du Roi est fermement decide a resister par tous les moyens en son pouvoir. La Belgique fait appel a l'Angleterre, a la France et a la Russie pour cooperer, comme garantes, a la defense de son territoire. 11 y aurail une action concertee et commune ayant pour but de resister aux mesures de- forces employees par l'Allemagne contre la Belgique et en meme temps de garantir le rnaintien de 1'independance et de 1'mtegrite de la Belgique dans 1'avenir. La. Belgique est heureuse de pouvoir decla- rer qu'elle assumera ]a defense des places for- tes. Je saisis, etc. is 1 Davignon. 15 TtUgrnmme adresse par le Ministre du Roi A Londres a M. Davignon, Ministre des Af- faires Elrangeres Londres, 5 aout 1914. L'Allemagne ayant fejete les propositions anglaises, l'Angleterre lui a declare que l'etat de guerre existait entre les deux pays, a partir de onze heures (si Comte. de Lalaing Tilegramme adressi par M Davignon Mi- nistre des Affaires Elrangeres, aux Ministres du Roi a Paris, Londres cl Sainl-Pelersbourg. Bruxeiles, le 5 aout 1914. Apres la violation du territoire a Gemme- nich, la Belgique a fait appel, par l'intcrme- diaire de leurs Representanls accreditees a Bruxeiles, a l'Angleterre, a la France et a la Russie pour coope>er, comme garantes, a la defense de son territoire. La Belgique assume la defense des places fortes. (s) Davignon. letlre adressie par M. Davignon, Ministre. \des Affaires Elrangeres, aux Ministres du Roi \a Paris, Londres el Saint-Pitersbourg. Bruxeiles, le 5 aout 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, Par ma dep^che du 4 aout (voir piece A' 38), j'ai eu l'honneur de vous exposer la suite des ev^nements qui ont marqu£ les relations in- lernationales de la Belgique du 31 juillel au 4 aout. J'ajoutais que le Conseil des Ministres examinait la question»de savoir si la Belgique, dont. le territoire avait £te envahl depuis le matin, ferait appel a la garanlie. Le Conseil venait de se decider en faveur de laffirmative, larsque le Ministre d'Angle- terre me fit savoir que. la proposition dont il m'avait saisi et d'apres laquelle le Gouverne- ment britannique £tait dispose a repondre a notre appel en garantie, elait annulee pour le moment. (Voir piece N° 37). Un telegramme de Londres m'apprit que ce changement d'attitude etait motive par un ullimatum de l'Angleterre laissant a l'Alle- magne un d£lai de dix heures pour 6vacuer le sol beige et respecter la neutrality de la Belgique (Voir piece N° 39). Dans la soiree, le Gouvernement du Roi a adresse, par Tin lermMiaire de leurs repre'sentants respectifs a Bruxeiles. a la France, a la Grande-Breta- gne et a la Russie, la note dont vous trouverez la copie ci-jointe. (Voir niece N° 401 Comme vous le Temarquerez la Belgique fait appel k l'Angleterre, a la France et a la Russie pour cooperer comme garants a la defense de son territoire et au maintien dans 1'avenir de l'inde'pendance et de l'integritS du territoire. Elle assurcra .la defense des places fortes. Jusqu'ici nous ne connaissons pas l'accueil qui a Hi reserved a notre appel. Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Davignon. N" 44. l.eitre adrcssle par M Davignon, Ministre des iffaires Etrangires, aux Chefs dc mission dans tons les pays enlrelenant avec la Belgi- que des rwpports dvplomaUques Bruxeiles, le 5 aout 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, Par le traite du 18 avril 1839, la Prusse, la France, l'Angleterre, l'Autriche et la Russie se sunt declarers garantes du traite conclu le meme jour entre S. M. le Roi des Beiges et s M le Roi des Pays-Bas.Ce traite porte : » La Belgique formera un Etat mdependant et per- petuellement neutre.» La Belgique a rempli toutes ses obligations internationales, elle a accompli ses devoirs dans un esprit de loyalc impartiality, elle n'a neglige^ aucun effort pour maintenir et faire respecter sa neutra- lity Aussi esl-ce avec line pinible emotion que I" Gouvernement du Roi a appris que les forces armees de l'Allemagne, puissance ga- rante de notre neutrality, ont penetre sur le territoire de la Belgique en violation des en- gagements qui ont el.e pris par traite. II est de notre devoir de protester avec in- dignation contre un attentat au droit des gens qu'aucun acte de notre pari n'a pu provoquer. Le Gouvernement du Roi est fermement decide a repousser par tous les moyens en son pouvoir l'atteinte portee a sa neutrality et il rappelle qu'en vertu de l'article 10 de la convention de La Haye de 1907, concernant les droits et les devoirs des Puissances et des personnes neutres en cas de guerre sir terre, ne peut etre considered comme un acte hostile le fait, par une Puissance neutre, de repousser, meme par la force, les atteintes a sa neutrality. Vous voudrez bien demander d'urgence une audience au Ministre des Affaires Elrangeres et donner lecture a Son Excellence, de la prteente lettre dont vous lui laisserez copie. Si I'audience ne pouvait vous etre immediale- ment accordfe, vous ferez par e>crit la com- munication dont il s'agit. Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Davignon. N- 45. Ttlearamirte adresse par le Ministre du Ftni a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affai- res Elrangeres. Berlin, le 5 aout 1914. J'ai recu mes passeports. Je quitterai Berlin demain matin avec personnel pour la Hollan- ds Is) Baron Beyens. N° 46. TeUqramme adresse" par le Ministre du Roi a Madrid, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Af- faires Elrangeres. Saint-Sebastien, 5 aout 1914. Le Gouvernement espagnol se charge des inlerets beiges en Allemagne. Il donne au- jourd'hui telegrapln.pi. nnnl fits instructioi a son Ambassadeur a Bt'rlin. (s) Baron Grenier. (Voir piece N" 33 ) L, Par. Elm Hire ad, Is a M. ngeres. ,-,.„■,■ Davig par le \hn mm, Mi, ■11,1 isl de rf. u Roi a Affaires Paris, le 5 ao nl 1914. Mor isieur le Ministre, I J'ai l'honneur de vous faire parveriir, sous ce pli, line copie de la notification de I'etat de guerre existanl enlre la France et l'Alle- magne, qui m'a 6t6 remise aujo'ufd'hui. Veuillez agreer, etc. (s) Baron Guillaume. Annexe au N" 47. Le Gouvernement Imperial Allemand, apres avoir laisse ses forces arinees franchir la fron- tiere el si- livrer sur le territoire frai divers actes de nieurtre et de violence; apres aveir vioIS la neutrality du Grand Duche de Luxembourg au mepris des stipulations de la convention de Londres du 11 mai 1867 et de la convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907 ir les droits el devoirs l ir rcccinment par le Gouvernement an- glais. J'ai l'honneur de placer sous vos yeux une c ipii di ci tte lettre et de ses annexes. Veuil- lez, je vous prie, en donner connaissance au Gouvernemenl aupres duquel vous etes accre- dlte Vcuillez agreer, etc. (s) Davignon. I" Annexe au N" 79. Lettre adressie par M. Davignon, Minisire des Af/aires Etrangires, au ('mute de La- laing, Minisire du Hoi a Londres. BriLxclles, le 17 aout 1914. Monsieur le Comte, Le Blue Bool; public recemment par le Gou- vernement britannique reproduit, sous le n" U'l' [page 65), le, texte d'un teJegramme de Berlin, le 31 juillet, par Sir E, Gro- schen a Sir E. Grey, telegramme dont j'ex- trais le passage suivanl . n It appears from what he (His E.\r. Ile'ncj o The Secretary ol Slate) said that German i) Government consider that certain hostile " aels have been already committed by Bel- li gium. As an instance at this, lie a d « that a consignemenl of corn of Germany u had been placed under an embargo al- ii read.\ » Le fait auquel le Secretaire d'Etat allcniand des Affaires Etrangeres a fait allusion dans son entretien avec Sir E. Groschen, et qu'il considerait comme -un acte hostile de la part de la Belgique, se rapporte sans doute a ['ap- plication des arretes royaux du 30 juillet, qui ont prohihc provisoirement l'exportation de Belgique de certains produils. Comme vous le constaterez par l'expose que je tiens a vous faire ci-apres, le fait qui nous est reproche n'a nullement Ir caractere qu'on a voulu lui don- ncr en Allemagne, Pes arretes royaux- dates du 30 juillet et publics au Monitcur beige du lendemain ont prohibe a litre provisoire, par toutes les fron- tieres do terre et de mep, l'exportation d'une serio de produits, des cereales notamment. Sous la date du 31 juillet, M. le Ministre d'Allemagne a Bruxellcs me signala que la douane d' Anvers retenait des chargements de grains a destination de 1' Allemagne qui, sim- plement transbqrdes dans notre port, ne fai- saient fen realile qu'y transiter. M. de Below Salesko demandait la libre sortie des bateaux porlant ces chargements. Le jour meme ou i) recut la reclamation du Ministre d'Allema- gne, mon Department en saisit le Ministers des Finances, et des le surlendemain 2 aout, celui-ci nous annonca qu'il avait ete, transmis a la douane beige des instructions donnanl pleine et eiitiere satisfaction a l'AUemagne, Je crois ne pouvoir mieux faire, Monsieup le Comte, que de placer sous vos yeux una copie de la correspondance echangee a cs sujet avei M it' Below Saleske. Vous y ver- rez que rien dans notre attitude ne pouvait etre considers comme teriioignant de dispo- sitions bust i les a l'egard de l'AUemagne ; les mcsiiivs prises par le Gouvernement beige a ee momenl ne constituaient one les simples precautions que tout Etat a le droit et le de- voir de prendre dans des circonstances aussi exceptionnelles. II scrait bon que vous adressiez au Gouver- nement de S. M. Britannique une communi- cation aim de 1'eelairer sur la realitu des fails. Vcuillcz agreer, etc. (s) Davignon. 2™ Annexe au N° 79. Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, a M. de Below Sa- leske, Ministre d'Allemagne. Bruxelles, 3 aout 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, Comme suite a la lettre que Votre Excel- lence a liien voulu m'adresser le 31 juillet j'ai l'honneur de Lui faire savoir que mon col- l ' - ii- des Finances a porte a la connaissance" du service des douanes que les prohibitions etablies par Irs arretes royaux du 30 juillet ecoule i visent qui I exportation propn ment ilr. el i -'''inl'iil done pas aux marchan- dises regulieremenl aeclarees en transit lors de 1'importatiah.Au surplus, lorsque des mar- chandises libres de droits sont declarers en consuin mation, bien qu'elles soient en realite destinies .i l'exportation, elles font commune- menl I'objel de declarations de libre entree sp6ciales qui sonl considerees comme des documents de transit. Enfin, s'h arrivait que de telles marchandises avaient ete declarees en consommation sans restrictions, comme si elles di'v.innt rester effectivement dans le pays, la douane en permettraii encore la sor- tie du moment ou il serail dument etabli, par lis documents dexpeditioi manifestes, connaissemenls, etc., qu'elles devaient etre exporters immediatemenl en transit. .Ii puis ajouter que l'exportation des grains auxquels se rapportait la lettre precitee de la Legation Imperiale a ele autorise le 1" aout. Je saisis, etc. (si Davignon. Letlic adressie par M. Uavujnon, Minislre ties Affaires Etrangeres, a Jf. de Below Sa- leske, Minislre d'AUemagne. le 1" aout 1014. Mo iieur lr Minislre, En reponse a la lettre do Votre Excellence du 31 juUlel, j'ai l'honneur de Lui lain; savoir que l'arrete beige du 30 juillet ne vise, que ['exportation ~et nun le transit des produils cites. J'ai cu soin de faire part de votre commu- nication a mon eollegue des finances, en ie priant de vouloir bien donner aux bureaux de la douane des instructions precises de na- ture a prevenir toute erreur dans l'application de l'arrete precite. Je saiis, etc. (s) Davignon, 4™ Annexe au N° 79. LctlTa adressee par M. de Below Saleske, minislre d'AUemagne, a M. Davignon, Mi- nistrc des A I Inircs Etrangeres. Bruxelles, le 31 juillet 1914. Monsieur le Minislre, On m'a informe d'Anver's que la douane a defendu le depart des bateaux charges de grams pour I'Allemagne. Vu qu'il ne s'agit pas dans ces cas d'uno exportation de grains, mais d'un transit, parce que la marchandise ,i ete seulement transbor- dee a Anvers,' j'ai 1'honneur de recourir a votre ibienveillante enlremise afin qu'on laisse partir pour I'Allemagne les bateaux en question. En meme temps, je prio Voire Excellence de me faire savoir si le purl d'Anvers est fer- ine pour le transit des marchandises enume- rees au Moniteur d'aujourd'hui. En attendant la reponse de Votre Excellen- ce dans le plus href delai possible, je profile de cetle occasion, etc. (s) de Below Saleske. MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES 1914 LA GUERRE EUROPEENNE 1 PIECES RELATIVES AUX NEGOCIATIONS QUI ONT PRECEDE LES DECLARATIONS DE GUERRE! DE L'ALLEMAGNE A LA RUSSIE ( 1" AOIJT 1914) ET A LA FRANCE (3 AOLIT 1914) DECLARATION DU h SEPTEMBRE 1914 PARIS IMPRIMERIE NATIONALE MDCCCCXIV MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES GUERRE EUROPEENNE TABLE DES MATIERES. .OS. NOMS LIEU et SOMMAIRE. ,«„. CHAPITOE PREMIER.' AVERTISSEMENTS. (1913.) 191.1. 1 M.Jul s Camkoin Berlin, 17 mars . . Transmission lie rapports de I'altacbe militaire et de ('atta- che naval a Berlin sur la nouvelle loi raililaire. Efforts du Gouvernement allemand pour represenler cette loi comme une reponse au projet francais de loi de trois ans et pour exaller dans les masses le sentiment guerrier. . . . Annexe 1. — Rapport du lieutenant-colonel Serret. Les armemenls allemands sont destines a mettre la France dans un elal d'lnferiorile deGn.tif. Colere provoquee dans les milieux officiels par les mesures de precaution franraises. Annexe 11. — Rapport de M. de Faramond. Le projet de loi militaire a pour objet de rendre facile une offen- sive foudroyante contre la France ConBance des Alle- mands dans la superiority de leur armee. Mesures finan- cieres projclees pour couvrir les depenses militaires. 3 2 M. En ENNE Paris. 2 avril .... Envoi d'un rapport officii'! el secret allemand sur le renfor- 9 Annexe. — Texte de ce rapport. Apercu riHrospeclif sur les armements successes provoques par la Conference d'Algesiras, I'affaire d'Agadir et la guerre balkanioue. Ni Scessite d'accomplir un nouvel efforr, d'habiluer 1'opi- nion publiquc a l'ldee de guerre, de susciler des troubles dans les colonies franchises ou anglaises et de prevoir I'in- vasion de la Belgique et de la Hollaode. 3 M Ju'le Berlin. 6 mai Fin de la ense ballaniejue. Elle a failli ainener I'Alleraagne 4 .6 M. All Note au M. Jule Munich, lojuillc.. Paris. 3ojtiilIel.. Berlin, 22 nov.... comme destines a provoquer une guerre dans laquelle elle s'habitue a voir la seule solution possible au\ dilficulles 14 15 21 Sentiments dominants dans i'opinion allemande : desir d'une revanche tT.Agndtr, crainte de resurrection d'une France forte Impinssanee du parti de la paiv. Formation, com- position el developpemenl croissant d'un parti de la guerre, encourage dans ses ambitions par la faiblcsse pre- Conversation du Roi des Beiges avec I'Empereur. qui a cesse d'etre pacifique, cede au courant belliqueux donl son fils est le centre, et se familiarise avec la perspective d'un CHAPITRE II. PRELIMINA1RES. DE LA MORT DE L'ARCinDUC HErilTlER (28 JU1N 191^) X LA REMISE DE LA NOTE AUTRICHIE.NNE X LA SERBIE (23 JUILLET I9 1^ M. DC MAINE M. DrMAi.NE M. de Manbeville M. PALEOLOGDE M. D'ApCHrEB M. DoMAIKE M. DCMAINE Rapporl * consulaire de Vienne. M. Jules Camdon M. ElENTENC-MABTnt M. BlENTENC-MARTm M. Ddmafne M. Paul Cambox M. BlENTENC-MARTm M. Allies 1914. Vienne. a 8juin... Vienne, 1 juillct.. Berlin, ft juillet... Petcrsbourg,6juiIl. Budapest, 1 ijuill.. Vienne, i5 juillet. Vienne, » 9 juillet. Vienne, igjuillel. Berlin, si Juillet.. Paris, 11 juillet.. Paris, aa juillet.. Vienne, 13 juillet. Londres, 23 juillcl. Paris. i3 juillet . . Munich, 33 juillet. Nouvelle de I t de l'archi'duc Francois-Ferdinand A Exploitation de eet e\£nement par le parti militaire autri chien ConGance aflecU'e du Gouvernemenl allemand dtuis un ar rangement a 1'amiable du differend auslro-serbe M. Sazonoffa a^erti PAmbassadcur d'Autricbe que le Gou vernemenl ru^se ne saurait accepter que I'nssassinat de i'Arrbiduc servU c!e pretcxle a une action sur terriloire Oplii mc office! de coi preparalifs milita nde, rontraslanl avec de sd en Hongrie ,es journaux officieux aulricbiens pnchcnlune guerre an panserbismc , la Ru^sie el la France leur par 1. (■(■■■ d'etat d'inlenenir apport consula Les milieux politiques aulricbiens M. BienvenuMabtin Vienne. la juillet. Paris. 24 juillet.. Texte de la Note autrichienne a la Serbie , communiquee dans la matinee du ik juillet par le Comte Siecsen a 40 Analyse de cette Note. Le Comte Szecsen a ele avise, lors- qu'il l'a apportee, de la penible impression que ne pou- vaient manquer de produire, spijcialement dans les conditions acluelles , I'elendue des exigences autricbiennes, comme la brievele du delai fixe a la Serbie pour la re» 26 M. Biesvenu-Mabtin Paris, 24 juiUet.. Conseil donne par le Gouvernement francais au Gouvernc- ment serbe d'accepter les demandes de 1'Aulricbe dans tout ce qu'elles peuvent avoir d'admissible et de proposer 46 27 28 29 M. Biesvekh-Mastin M. Jules CamdOS Paris, a4 juillet.. Paris, 2 4 juillet. . Berlin, 24 juillet.. Renseignements donnes a nos ambassadeurs sur les ten- dances belliqueuses du parti militoire autrichien, sur la difficulle pour la Serbie d'accepter I'lntegralite des exi- gences autricbiennes et sur le ton menacant de 1# presse 47 48 Demarche de M. de Schoen au Quai d'Orsay pour appuyer, au nom de son Gouvernement, la demarche de 1'Aulricbe- Hongrie, approuver sa Note, et faire ressortir les « conse- quences incalculable qu'enlralnerait , en raison du jeu des alliances, loute tentative d'immixtion d'une tierce Manifestations austrophiles et chauvines a Berlin; pessi- 30 3t 32 Berlin. r.i juillet.. Pelersbourg, a4 j*. Londres, a \ juillet. M. de Jagow declare approuver la Note autrichienne, mais si- defend absolument d'en avoir counu prealablement le conlenu. 11 espere que ja Serbie recevra de ses amis le conseil de ceder. La presse olTicielle se solidarise egale- 50 5i 52 Dispositions pacifiques du Gouvernement russe, malgre .'emotion profonde produile dans le public par la remise Sir E. Grey expose a M. Paul Cambon son projet de media- lion a quatre, Pessimisme du Comte Bencltendorf au Documents diplomatiques. — Guerre europeenne. -* NO MS LIEU SOMMA1BE. f AC E , 33 34 3D 36 37 38 30 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 M. Paul CiMBOK Paris. 24 j Berlin, i5 Paris, 25 j Londres , 2 Pelersbour Paris. 25 j Londres, 2 Berlin, 25 Berlin, 25 Berlin, 25 Rome, 25 Vienne. 2 Belgrade, Berlin, »5 a juillet. uillel... juillet.. uiUel... jjmllel. ;,?5j'- uillct... ijuMlet. udlel. . udlel. . juillet. . juillet. . juillet. ijuillet juillet. . Une intervention officieuse de l'AIIemagne a Vienna semble a M. Paul Cambon le meilleur moyen d'arreter le conllit. Sir E. Grey veut proposer a I'Allemagne il'agir en commun a Vienne el a Pelersbourg . en vue de soumettre le conQit austro-serbe a la mediation des qualrc puissances non mlcressees dans la queslnm. Conseils de prudence donnes 53 53 54 55 56 56 58 58 59 09 60 60 61 62 Lc Mini-tre de Belgique a Berlin loit dans la' crise en cours I'execution ,1c projets de guerre premedites par I'AUe- Rfaume de la situation. A Paris, M. de Scboen vient de- mentir au Qua! d'Orsay le caractere menacant de sa de- marche de la veille. A Londres, I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche declare que la Note autrichienne n'a pas 1c caractere dun ultimatum. Sir E. Grey fait donner des conseils de prudence a Belgrade et expose a I'Ambassadeur d'Alle- Le Gouvernement allemand se refusant it inlervenir entre Vienne et Belgrade, Sir E. Grey fait remarquer au prince Licbnowsky que celte altitude conlnbuera a amener un conllit general dans lequel PAngleterre ne saurait rester Efforts de conciliation de M. Sazonoff : il demande i Vienne une prolongation du delai impart! a la Serbie pour sa M. Jules Cambon M. Jules Cambon M. Dumajsk Le Gouverfiemcnt francais appuie cette demande de prolon- Le Gouveriiemcnt anglais s'associe egalement a cette dc- M. de Jagow declare de nouve lategoriquement n'avoir pas <■■ connaissance de la Note autrichienne avant sa re- mise. II repood evasivement a one demande du Charge d'Affaircs d'Angleterre pour inlervenir a Vienne en vue ,!.- prevenir un conflit et de prolonger le delai de Le Charge d'AIfaires de Itussie prescnle a son lour eelle deffniere demande a Berlin. II insiste sur t'urgencc dune Sur un,- nouvellc demarche pressante du Charge d'Affaircs de Uiismc , M ,lt Jagow declare qu',1 COnsidere le diffc- rend austro-serbe comme une affaire purcment locale. qui duil rester limitce a I'Autrid t a la Serine el qui ne lui parait pas susceptible d'amenec des .lilln illes ml. r- l.'Andai ...il'ur de Bessie a Rome demande au gonverne- ment italitn dml a w i ,,< |„,ur la iirolmigalion du delai Le i verne il autrichien elude la demande de prolon- gation du delai, qu'a prcscnlee a Vienne le Charge d' Af- faires de Itussie Resume de !., reponse scrbe a la Note autrichienne La nonvelle du depart de Belgrade du Minislre, d'Autriche provoqur ii I'.eilni <\> , ni am legations de rhauvim-nie l.es m* NOMS DES SIGNATAIRES. LIEU SOMMAIRE. «-. 48 Vienne, a5 juillet . L'Ambassadeur tii|i't "le mediation a quatre prOconise Le Gouvernement francais accepte la proposition anglai qu'une action siocerement moderalricc de t'Allemagn Vienne tmurrait tnuifluis srulr hurc aboutir ent italicn accepte egalemenl la Le Marquis de San Giuliano declare n'avoii sance preaiable de la Nolo autricliienne hesiter, a la proposition de Sir E. Grey. M. de Jagow repousse Pidee d'une conft sances, tout en proteslant de son desi se derobe ii de nouvelles instances de M, Jules Cambon ii cet egard. Opportunity de renouveler sous une forme ciif- lerenle la proposition anglais.- pour, mi'llre I'Alkniaghe re Comte Siersen vient remeltre.au Quai. d'Orsay u morandum de son Gouvernement pour juslifier le: contre la Serbie. — Texte de ce memorandum . . . . BOS. NOM LIEU et SOMMAIRE. PACES. 75.£u. Communique du Bureau tie la Pressc. Vienne. 28 juillet. Communique oflicieux du Bureau de la Presse viennoisc au sujet de la reponse serbe, representee comme insuffisanle. 96 76 M. Rene Vitiam A [>orues du Gouvernement anglais au sujet de son attitude: ne pas donner a 1'Allemagne de fausse impression sur ("abstention possible de 1'Angleterre, ne pas prendre d' engagement 180 P b Sir E. GtiEY Londres, agjuillct. Comple-rendu d'un entretien avec I'AmbaasadeUB d'Alle- magne pour I'avertir que i'Antrlelerre ne s'engageail nul- lement a ne pas intervenir si (a crise se developpail el si IS1 NOM S1GNATAIRE. LIEU et fE D'ESVOI. . 3ojuillet.. Conversation avec le President de la Republi'que, qui estime qu'une declaration de l'Angleterre affirmant son inten- tion de soutenir la France, don't la volonte pacifique est certaine, arreterait l'Alleniagne dans ses velleites de guerre Declaration faite a 1'Ambassadeur de France que, au point ou en est la crise, le Gouvernement anglais ne peut prendre aucun engagement definitif , Assurance donnee relativement a la protection des coles et de la marine franchises par la flotte angtaise contra toute altaque de la flotte allemande par la Pas-de-Calais ou la mer du Nord EXTRAITS DD LIVRE BLEU RELATIFS AUX PROPOSITIONS FAITES PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT ALLEMAND AU GOUVERNEMENT ANGLAIS EN TOE D'OBTENIR LA NEUTRALITE DE L'ANGLETERRE. Sir E. Goschen . Berlin, 29 juillet. Londrcs, 3o juillet OfFres faites par le Chancelier de 1'Empire a I'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre pour tenter d'obtenir la neutralite anglaise : promesse de respecter I'integrile du territoire francais, mais non de ses colonies; intentions a 1'egard de la Hollande et de la Belgique. Proposition d'une entente generate de neutralite entro I'Allrmagne et l'Angleterre . . Rcfus des propositions allemandes, non seulement inaccep- tables en fait, mais dont 1'acccptation sei-ait une honte pour la reputation de l'Angleterre. Inutilite d'examiner la perspective d'une convention generate de neulralite entre l'Ang eterre et 1'AH ;magne poi r Taven ir. L'Ang eterre veut garder so iere liberte d'action et conti mer a coop rer au m aintien de la pa x en El rop b: e'es t pour 1'Alle magne la facon de n: de bonni tions Compte rendu d'une conversation avec I'Ambassadeur d'AHe- magne relativement a la neutralite beige. Le prince Licbnowsky insiste pour que le Gouvernement anglais formule les conditions aaxquelles l'Angleterre garderait la neutralite; il lui est repondu que le Gouvernement anglais refuse definitivement toute p: neutre et veut garder les mains libres. ANNEXE II bis. TENTATIVES ALLEMANDES POUR OBTENIR, SOUS LE COUVERT D'UN « MALENTENDU ■, LA GAR AN TIE, PAR L'ANGLETERRE DE LA NEUTRALITE DE LA FRANCE dans une guerre germano-russe (Gazette de l'Allemagne du Nord), 20 aout uji4). Londres, 3t juillet. Compte rendu d'une soi-disant demande telephonique visant on engagement eventuel de l'Allemagne de ne pas attaquer la France si celie-ci reste neutre dans une guerre entre l'Allemagne et la Russ>e Tel de PEmpereur Guillaume au Roi George V pou declarer qu'il ne peut arrSter sa mobilisation contro 1 Russie et la France, mais n'attaquera pas la France dans l'bypothesa ou celte puissance offrirait sa neulralit garantte par I'armee el la flotte anglaises EOS. NOM LIEU et SOMMAIRE. «_. 3 ti M. DE BETHMArfN HOLLWEG. S. M. le Roi George V... Berlin, i" aout... Londres, i"aoitt . . Telegramme au prince Lichnowsky, repruduisant I'engage- 189 189 Telegramme du Roi d'Angleterre a 1'Empereur d'Allemagne declarant que 1'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne s'est mepris el que sir Edward Grey n'a parle avec le prince Lichnowsy, que des movens de retander un conflit arme entre ia France ct t'AIiemagne jusqu'a ce qu'un terrain d'entente definitif ait ete trouve enlre 1'Autriche-Hongrie et !a 5 Prince LicQNOwSE.'v Londres. 2 ao6l.. ■ Avis donne a M. de Belhmann Hollweg que les conversations donl il avail fait etatont ete abandonnees comme *futHes». 189 EXTRAITS DU LIVItE BLEU DANS I ANNEXE III. VISANT LE REFUS DE L'ANGLETERRE D'ADMETTRE LE POINT DE VIE ALLEMAND A QUESTION DE LA VIOLATION DE LV NEUTRALITE BELOE. 153 Londres, k aout. . Demande d'engagement immediat de I'Allemagne, qu'elle 190 155 Londres, U aout. . . Declaration a la Belgique que I'Anglelerre est prfite a s'unir a la France et a la Russie pour resister a unc aiioque de I'AHemagne contre la Belgique ft puur garanlir 1'inte- 190 157 M DE J Berlin, U aout. . . . Declaration communiqupe par 1'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a Londres que malgrc la violation jugee necessaire de la Belgique aucune annexion de terntoire n'aura lieu. Preuve dnnnt-e de la sincerite de eclte declaration par I'affinna- tion que la neutralite de la Hoi Ian tie sera respectee, une annexion da territolre beleu pres certain que les depenses non renouvelables seront couvertes par une contribution de guerre predevee sur le capital. On exempterait les petites fortunes et Ton frapperait dune taxe progressive les fortunes superieures a 20,000 marks. Presente sous cette forme limpot de gurrre ne saurait deplaire aux socialistes, qui pourront ainsi, sui- vant lour tactique habituelle, repousser le principe de la loi militaire et voter les credils qui en assurent l'execution. Le Gouveinement craint qu<' parmi les classes riches et bourgeoises, cette imposition extraordinaire dun milliard portant exclusivement sur la fortune acquise ne cree un durable mecontentement; aussi fait-il tout ee qui est en son pouvoir pour persuader ceux qu'il va ranconner si durement que la s^curite de l'Empire est menaeee et pour etablir une analogic entre lis temps belliqueux de 1 8 1 3 <'t la periode actuelle. En letant bruyammenl le centenaire de la guerre de I'JndependancCi on veut convaincre — 9 — le peuple de la necessite du sacrifice et iui rappeler que la France est , aujourd'hui comme il y a cent ans, 1'ennemi here'dilaire. Si nous constatons que le Gouvernement allemand s'efforce d'obtenir que cette enorme taxe ne soit pas acquiltee en plusieurs echeances; et si comme le disent certains journaux, le payement integral devait etre realise avant le l" juillet 1 9 1 k , il y aurait la pour nous une indication redoutable, car rien ne saurait expliquer une telle hate des autorites militaires a posseder un tresor de guerre liquide d'un milliard dans leur caisse. En ce qui eoncerne la couverture des depenses permanentes qui resulleront de 1'applica- tion des lois de 1912 et igi3, rien n'a encore ele dit. Une nouvelle legislation sera evi demment necessaire pour procurer les ressources annuelles. Je conclus : en Allemagne 1'execution d'une reforme militaire suit toujours de tres pres la decision prise de 1'accomplir. Toutes les dispositions nouvelles prevues par la loi du quinqucnnat de 191 1 et par la loi de 1912 sont deja mises en vigueur. 11 est fort possible qu'une partie du materiel dont la nouvelle loi va autoriser l'achat soit en cours de fabri- cation. Les secrets militaires sont si bien gardes ici qu'il est extremement difficile de suivre les mouvements du personnel et du materiel. Avec 700,000 homines sous les arnies (sans compter les reservistes lort nombreux qui sont actuellement en instruction) une organisation militaire parlaite et une opinion publique qui se laisse dominer par les appels belliqueux de la Ligue militaire et de la Ligue navale, le peuple allemand est a cette heure un voisin bien dangereux. Si le service de trois ans est adopte et immediatement applique en France, les conditions seront moins inegales fan prochain. Les eflectifs allemands seront encore sensiblement plus considerables que les notres, mais l'appel de tout le contingent disponible ne permettra plus la selection et amenera dans les rangs de larmee allemande des elements de second ordre et meme des unites peu desirables. La valeur morale de I'armee active y perdra. Les Allemands ont voulu rompre lequilibre des deux camps qui divisent l'Europe , par Un grand effort supreme, au dela duquel ils ne peuvent plus grand'ehose. lis n'avaient pas cru la France capable d'un grand sacrifice. L'adoption du service de tfois ans chez nous dejouera leurs calculs. Faramond. N° 2. M. Etienne, Ministre de la Guerre, a M. Jonnart, Ministre fles Affaires etransjeres. Paris, le 2 avril 1913. Je viens de recevoir d'une source sure communication d'un rapport officiel et secret .sur le renforcement de I'armee allemande : il se divise en deux parties: une premiere de generalites, et une seconde, d'ordre technique, precisant dans le plus grand Documents diplomatiques. — Guerre euiopecnne, 7 — 10 — detail, arme par arme, les mesures a prendre ; ce qui concerne l'emploi des auto- mobiles et l'utilisation de l'aeronautique est parliculierement frappant. Tai l'honneur de vous adresser ei-joint une copie de la premiere partie de ce docu- ment, qui me parait devoir retenir votre attention. Etienne. Annexe. Note Jiir le renjorccment dc I'armee allemande. Berlin, le 19 mars 1913. 1. — - GeNERALITES SUB LES NOL'VELLES LOIS MIL1TAIRES. /./augmentation a eu lieu en trois eta pes : 1° La Conference d'Algesiras a enleve les derniers doutes sur l'existence dune entente entre la France, l'Angleterre et la Russie. Nous avons vn, d'autre part, que I'Autriche- Hongrie etait obligee d immobiliser des forces contre la Serbie et I'ltalie ; enfin, notre flotte n'etait pas, a ce moment-la, assez forte. A la fin du conflit, on s'occupa done en premiere ligne de renforcer 'a defense de nos cotes, d'augmenter notre force navale. Contre l'inten- tion anglaise d'envoyer un corps d'expedition de 100,000 hommes sur le continent, on devait repondre par une meilleure formation des reserves, qui devaientetre employees, d'apres les circonstances, au service sur les cotes, dans les forleresses el dans les sieges. II etait clair deja a celle epoque qui! sorait indispensable de faire un grand effort. 2° Les Francais ayant viole les conventions marocaines, auienerent ('incident d'Agadir. A cetle epoque, les progres de I'armee franchise, le relevement moral de la nation, 1'avance technique prise dans le domaine x d'avoir la guerre, et la commencer sans attendre pour ecraser brutalement toute resistance. » — 14 — Voila exactemenl 1'etat d'ame ties milieux militaires, qui repond a l'elat dame des milieux politiques, ceux-ci ne considerant pas la Russie, au contraire de nous, comme un ennemi necessaire. Voila ce qu'on pensait el disail entre soi il y a quinze jours. II faut retenir de cetle aventure la legon que renferment les faits que j'ai presente's plus haut : ces gens-ci ne craignent pas la guerre, ils en aeceptent pleinement la pos- sibility et ils out pris leurs mesures en consequence. Ils vealent elrc tnujnurs prels. Comme je le disais, cela exige des conditions de secret et de discipline et une volonte perseverante : l'entliousiasme ne suffit pas a tout. Cette lecon peut etre utile a mediler dans le moment oil le Gouvernemenl de la Republique demande au Par- lement les moyens de fortifier le pays. Jules Cambon. N°- 4. M. Allize, Ministre de la Republique en Baviere, a M. Stephen Pichon, Minislre des Affaires etrangeres. Munich, le 10 juillet lQl3. Au point de vue politique, on se demande a quoi serviront les nouveaux arme- ments. Reconnaissant que personne ne menace 1'AUemagne, on considere que la diplomatic allemande disposail deja de forces assez considerables el dalliances assez puissantes pour defendre avec succes les interets allemands. Comme je le relevais deja au lendemain de 1'accord marocain de ign. on estime que la Chancellerie imperiale sera aussi incapable dans I'avenir que dans le passe d'adopter une politique exterieure active et de remporter, lout au raoins sur ce terrain, des succes qui justi- fieraient les sacrifices que la nation s'impose. ' Cet etat d'esprit est d'autanl plus inquietant que le Gouvernemenl imperial se trouverait actuellement soutenu par I'opinion publique dans toute enlreprise oil il s*engagerait vigoureusement , meme aux risques d'un conflit. L'etal de guerre, auqucl tous les evenements d'Orient habituent les esprits depuis deux ans, apparait, non plus comme une catastrophe lointaine, mats comme une solution aux difficulty politiques et economiques qui n'ironl qu'en s'aggravant. Puisse 1'exemple de la Bulgarie exercer en Allemagne une influence salutaire. Comme me le disait naguere le Prince-Regent : • Le sort des armes est toujours incertain; toute guerre est une aventure, el bien fou est celui qui la court se croyant assure de la victoire. » Aluze. — 15 N° 5. Note a M. Stephen Pichon , Mimstre des Affaires e/rangeres (surl'opinion publique en Allemagne, d'apresles rapports des agents diplomat iques et consulages), Paris, le 3o juillet 1913. Des observations que nos agents en Allemagne ont pu recueillir aupres de per- sonnes en mesure de penetrer dans les milieux les plus divers. Ion peut tirer cettb conclusion que deux sentiments dominent et irritent les esprits : i" Le traite du /t novembre 1911 serait, pour l'Allemagne, un deboire; 2° La France — une France nouvelle — insoupe.onnee jusqu'a 1'ete de 1911 — serait belliqueu.se. Elle voudrait la guerre. Deputes de tous les partis du Reichstag, depuis les conservateurs jusqu'aux socia- listes, et representant les contrees les plus differenles de l'Allemagne, universitaires de Berlin, de Halle, d'lena et de Marbourg, etudiauts, inslituteurs, employes de commerce, commis de banque, banquiers, artisans, commenjants, industriels, rae- decins, avocats,' redactcurs de journaux democrates et de journaux sociahstes, publicistes juifs, membres des syndicate ouvriers, pasteurs et boutiquiers de la Marche de Brandcbourg, hobereaux de Pomeranie el cordonniers de Stettin felaut le 5o5 e anniversaire de leur association, chatelains, fonctionnaires, cures et gros cultivateurs de Westphalie sont uuanimes sur ces deux points, sans nuances notables, selon les milieux et les partis. Voici la synlhese de toutes ces opinions : Le traite du /( novembre est une defaite diplomatique, une preuve de I incapacity de la diplomatie allemande et de l'incurie du Gouvernement, si souvent denoncees, la preuve que l'avenir de l'Empire nest pas assure sans un nouveau Bismarck, une humiliation nationale, une deconsideralion europeenne, une atleinte au prestige allemand, d'aulant plus grave que, jusqu'en 1911, la suprematie militaire de rAlle- magne etait incontestee et que 1'anarchie fran^aise, limpuissance de la Bepublique etaient une sorte de dogme allemand. En juillet 191 1, le « coup d'Agadir » posa vraiment, pour la premiere fois, la question marocaine comme une question nationale, important a la vie ft a l'expan- sion de 1'Empire. Les revelations et proces de presse qui suivirent out suffisamment demontre comment la campagne avait ete organisee, quelles convoitises panger- maniques elle avait allumees et quelles rancunes elle a laissees. Si 1'Empereur est discute, le Chancelier impopulaire, M. de Kiderlen, fut l'homme le plus hai de l'Allemagne, l'hiver dernier. Cependant d commence a n'etre plus que deconsidere, car il laisse entendre qu'il prendra sa revanche. Done, pendant 1'ete de 1911, lopiiuon publique allemande se cabra en face de 1'opinion fran^aise pour le Maroc. Et 1'attitude de la France, son calme tranquille, son unite morale refaite, sa resolution de faire valoir son droit jusqu'au bout, le — 16 — fait qu'elle a 1'insolence de n'avoir pas peur de la guerre, sont le plus constant, \& plus grave sujet d'inquietude et de mauvaise humeur de lopinion publique allemande. Pourquoi done 1'Allemagne n'a-t-elle pas fait la guerre pendant 1'ele de 1 9 1 1 , puisque lopinion publique, encore que moins unanime et resolue que 1'opinion franchise, y etait cependant favorable? Oulre la volonte pacifique de l'Empereur et du Chancelier, on fait valoir dans les milieux competents des raisons militaires et financieres. Mais ces evenements de 1911 ont cause line profonde desillusion en Allemagne. Une France nouvelle, unie, resolue, decidee a ne plus se Iaisser intimider, est sortie du suaire dans lequel on la contemplait s'ensevelissant depuis dix ans. Avec une surprise melee d'irritation , lopinion publique allemande a decouvert, de de- cembre a mai, a travers la presse de tons les partis qui reprocbaient au Gouvernement imperial son incapacity, sa lachete : que la vaincue de 1 870 n'avait cesse depuis de guerroyer, de promener en Asie et en Afrique son drapeau et le prestige de ses amies, de conquerir de vastes territoires; que 1'Allemagne avait vecu d'heroisme honoraire, que la Turquie est le seul pays oil elle ait fait, sous le regne de Guil- laume II, des conquetes morales, bien compromises maintenant par la bonle de la solution marocaine. Cbaque fois que la France faisait une conquete coloniale, on consolait cette meme opinion en disant « Oui, mais cela n'empeche pas la decadence, 1'anarchie, la decomposition de la France a 1'interieur. » On se trompait, et on trompait I'opmion. Etant donne ces sentiments de lopinion publique allemande, qui tient la France pour belbqueuse, que peut-011 augurer de l'avenir au point de vue dune guerre pos- sible el prochaine? L'opinion publique allemande est divisee, sur la question de 1'eventualite d'une guerre possible et prochaine, en deux courants. Jl y a dans le pays des forces de paix , mais inorganiques et sans cbefs populaires. Elles considerent que la guerre serait un malheur social pour 1'Allemagne, que l'or- gueil de caste, la domination prussienne et les fabricants de canons et de plaques de cuirasses en tireraient le meilleur benefice, que la guerre profilerait surtout a J'Angleterre. Elles se decomposent ainsi qu'il suit : La masse prolonde des ouvriers, des artisans et des paysans qui sont pacifiques -d'inslinct. La noblesse degagee des interets de carriere militaire et engagee dans les affaires industrielles — tels les grands seigneurs de Silesie et quelques autres personnables ties influentes a la Cour — - et assez eclairee pour se rendre compte des consequences politiques et sociales desastreuses d'une guerre, meme victorieuse. Un grand nombre d'industriels, de commei\;ants et de financiers de moyenne importance, dont la guerre, meme victorieuse, amenerait la banqueroute, parce que leurs entreprises vivent de credit et sont surtout commanditees par des capitaux etrangers. Les Polonais, les Alsaciens-Lorrains, les habitants du Scblesvvig-Holstein conquis, — 17 _ fnais non assimiles, et en hostilite sourde contre la politique prussienne, soit environ" 7 millions d'Ailemands annexes. Enfin, les Gouvernements et les classes dirigeantes des grands Etats du Slid, la Saxe, la Baviere, le Wurtemberg et le Grand-Duche de Bade, sont partages entre ce double sentiment : une guerre malbeureuse compromettrait la Confederation, dont ils ont tire de grands a vantages economiques; une guerre victorieuse ne profi- terait qu'a la Prusse et a la prussianisation, contre laquelle ils defendent avec peine leur independance politique et leur autonomie administrative. Ces elements preferent, par raison ou par instinct, la paix a la guerre; mais ce ne sont que des forces poliliques de contrepoids, dont le credit sur 1'opinion est limite, ou des forces sociales de silence, passives et sans defense contre la contagion d'une poussee belliqueuse. Uq exemple eclairera cette idee : les 1 1 o deputes socialistes sont des partisans de la paix. lis ne sauraient empecher la guerre, car elle ne depend pas d'un vote du Reiclistag, et, en presence de cette eventualite, le gros de leurs troupes ferait chorus dans la colere ou dans 1'enlhousiasme avec le reste du pays. II faut noter enfin que ces partisans de la paix dans la masse croient a la guerre, parce qu'ils ne voient pas de solution a la situation actuelle. Dans certains contrats, notamment dans les contrats d'editeurs, on a introduit la clause de resiliation en cas de guerre. Ils esperent cependant que la volonte de l'Empereur, d'une part, et les difficulles de la France an Maroc, d'autre part, sont pour quelque temps des garan- lies de paix. Quoi qu'il en soit, leur pessimisme laisse libre jeu aux partisans de la guerre. On parle quelquefois de parti militaire allemand. L'expression est inexacte, meme pour dire que I'Alleniagne est le pays de la suprematie du pouvoir militaire, comme on dit que la France est le pays de la suprematie du pouvoir civil. II y a un etal d'espritplus digne d'altenlion que ce fait historique, parce qui! constitue un ■danger plus evident et plus prochain. II y a un parti de la guerre, avec des chefs, des troupes, une presse convaincue ou payee pour fabriquer 1'opinion, des moyens varies et redoutables pour intimider le Gouvernement. II agit sur le pays avec des idees claires, des sentiments ardents, une volonte fremissante et lendue. Les partisans de la guerre se divisent en plusieurs categories, chacun tire de sa caste, de sa classe, de sa formation intellectuelle et morale, de ses interets, de ses rancunes, des raisons particulieres qui creent en un etat d'esprit general et accroissent la force et la rapidite du courant belliqueux. Les uns veulent la guerre parce qu'elle est inevitable etant donnees les circon- stances actuelles. Et pour 1'AUemagne, il vaut mieux plus tot que plus tard. D'autres la considerent comme necessaire pour des raisons economiques tirees de la surpopulation, de la surproduction, du besoin de marches et de debouches; ou pour des raisons sociales : la diversion a l'exterieur peut seule empecher ou relardcr la montee vers le pouvoir des masses democratiques et socialistes. D'autres, insuffisamment rassures sur 1'avenir de 1'Empire , et croyant que le temps travaille pour la France, pensent qu'il faut precipiler i'evenement.. II n est pas rare de rencontrer, a la traverse des conversations ou des brochures patrioliques, le senti- Docdments DinoaiAiiQCES. — Cucrrc curopeeDne. 3 — 18 — ment obscur, mais profond, qu'une Allemagne libre et une France ressuscitee sont deux fails historiques incompalibles. D'autres soul bclliqueux par » Bismarckisme », si Ton peut ainsi dire. lis se sentent humifies d'avoir a disculer avec des Francais, a parler droit, raisOn, dans des nego- ciations ou des conferences oil ils n'ont pas facilement eu toujours raison, alors qu'ils < > u t la force plus decisive, lis tirent dun passe recent un orgueil sans cesse alimente par des souvenirs vecus, par la tradition orale et par leslivres, et blesse par les evenements de ces dernieres annees. Le depit irrite caraclerise 1'esprit disso- ciation des « VVehrvereine » et autres groupements de la Jeune Allemagne. D'autres veulent la guerre par haine mystique de la France revolutionnaire. D'autres enfin, par rancune. Ce sont cesderniers qui amassent les pretexlcs. Dans la realite, ces sentiments se concretised ainsi : les hobereaux, representes au Reichstag par le parti conservateur, veulent eluder a tout prix l'impol sur les successions, inevitable si la paix se prolonge. Le Reichstag, dans la derniere seanoe de la session qui vient de se clore, en a vote le principe. C'est une atleinte grave aux interets et aux privileges de la noblesse terrienne. D'aUtre part, cette noblesse est une aristocratie militaire, et il est inslructif de comparer 1'annuaire de farmee avec I'annuaire de la noblesse. La guerre seule peut faire durer son prestige el servir ses interets familiaux. Dans la discussion de la loi militaire, un orateur du parti a fait valoir en faveur du vote la necessite de ravancement des olliciers. Enfin, cette classe sociale, qui forme une hierarchic dont le roi de Prusse est le couronnement supreme, constate avec terreur la democratisation lie I' Allemagne et la force grandis- sante du parti socialiste el considere que ses jours sont comptes. Non seulement ses interets maleriels sont menaces par un formidable mouvement hostile au protec- tionnisme agraire, mais encore sa representation politique diminue a chaque legisla- ture. Dans le Reichstag de 1878, i| y avait 162 membres (sur 397) appartenant a la noblesse; dans celui de 1898, 83; dans le Reichstag de 1912, 57. Sur ce der- nier nombre, 27 seulement siegenl a droite, \k au centre, 7 a gauche, un sur les bancs socialistes. La grande bourgeoisie, representee par le parti national liberal, parti des satis- faits, n'a pas les memes raisons que les hobereaux de vouloir la guerre. Elle esl belh- queuse cependant, sauf exceptions. Elle a ses raisons d'ordre social. La grande bourgeoisie n'est pas moins affligee que la noblesse de la democratisation de l'Allemagne. En 1871, elle avait 1 a5 representants au Reichstag; 1 53 en 187/1; 99 en 1887; en 1912, 45. Elle n'oublie pas qu'ils jouerenl le grand role parlemen- laire au lenclemain de la guerre en servant les desseins de Bismarck contre les hobe- reaux. Aujourd'hui, mal assise entre des instincts conservateurs et des idees libe- rales, elle demande a la guerre des solutions que ne trouvent pas ses representants incapables el piloyables. En outre, les industriels doctrinaires professent que les difficulles qu'ils ont aveo leurs ouvriers ont leurs origines en France, loyer revolu- tionnaire des idees d'eniancipation — sans la France, l'industrie serait tranquille. Enfin, fabricants de canons el de plaques d'acier, grands marehands qui deman- dent de plus grands marches, banquiers qui speculcnt sur l'age d'or el la prochaine indemnite de guerre, pensent que la guerre serait une bonne affaire. — 19 — Parmi les « Bismarckiens » il faut compter les fonctionnaires de toutes carrieres, representees assez exactement au Reichstag par les conservateurs libres ou parti d'Em- pire, parli des retraites dont les idees fougueuses se deversent dans la Post. Ds font ecole et souche dans les groupements de jeunes gens dont 1'esprit a etc prepare et tendu par 1'ecole on l'universite. L'universite, exception faite pour quelques esprils distingues, developpe une ideologie guerriere. Les eebnomistes demontrent a coups de statistiques'Ia necessite pour 1'Allemagne d'avoir un empire colonial et commercial qui reponde au rende- ment Industrie) de FEmpire. II y a des sociologues fanatiques qui vont plus loin. La paix armee, disent-ils, est un ecrasant fardeau pour les nations, elle empeche 1'ame- lioration du sort des masses et favorise la poussee socialisle. La France, en s'obsti- n'ant a vouloir la revanche, s'oppose au desarmement. H faut une fois pour toutes la redmre a 1'impuissance pour un siecle, c'est la meilleure et la plus rapide faqon de resoudre la question sociale. Historiens, philosophes, publicistes politiques et autres apologistes de la » deutsche Kultur » veulent imposer au monde une maniere de sentir et de penser qui soit spe- cifiquement allemande. lis veident conquerir la suprematie intellectuelle qui, de l'avis des esprits lucides, reste a la France. C'est a cette source que s'alimente la phraseologie des pangermanistes comme aussi les sentiments et les contingents des Kriegcsvereine., des Wehrvereine et autres associations de ce genre, trop connues pour qu'il soit necessaire d'insister sur ce point. II convient de rioter seulement que le mecontentemcnt cause par le traite du !\ novembre a considerablement accru le nombre des membres des societes coloniales. II y a enfin les partisans de la guerre par rancune, par • ressentinient. Ce sont les plus dangereux. lis se recrutent surtout parmi les diplomates. Les diplomates alle- mands onl tres mauvaise presse dans 1'opinion publique. Les plus acharnes sont ceux qui, depuis ioo5, ont ete meles aux negociations entre la France et 1'Alle- magne; ils accumulenl et additionnent les griefs contre nous, et un jour, ils preseiv leront des comptes dans la presse belliqueuse. On a 1'impression que c'est surtout au Maroc qu'ds les chercheront, bien qu'un incident soit toujours possible sur tousles points du globe ou la France et 1'Allemagne sont en contact. II leur faut une revanche, car ils se plaignent d'avoir ete dupes. Pendant la discus- sion de la loi militaire, un de ces diplomates belliqueux declarait : « L'Allcmagne ne pourra causer serieusement avec la France que quand elle aura tous ses hommes vahdes sous les armes ». Comment s'engagera cette conversation? C'est une opinion assez repandue, meme dans les milieux pangermanistes, que 1'Allemagne ne declarerait pas la guerre, etant donne le systeme d'alliances defensives et les dispositions de 1'Empereur. Mais quand le moment sera venu, il devra, par tous les moyens, contraindre la France a 1'altaquer. On 1'offensera, s'il le laut. C'est la tradition prussienne. Faut-il done tenir la guerre pour falale? II est peu probable que 1'Allemagne ose risquer 1'aventure, si la France peut faire aux yeux de 1'opinion la preuve decisive que 1'entente cordiale et l'alliance russe ne sont pas seulement des fictions diplomatiques, mais des reaiites qui existent et qui — 20 — joueront. La flotte anglaise inspire une salutaire terreur. Mais on sait bicn (|ue la vic- toire sur mer laissera tout en suspens, que e'est sur terre que se regleront les comptes decisifs. Quant a la Russie, si elle a dans l'opinion un poids plus considerable qu'il y a trois ou quatre ans, dans les milieux poliliques et militaires, on ne croit pas que son concours soit assez rapide et energique pour etre efficace. Les esprits s'habituent ainsi a considerer la prochaine guerre comme un duel enlre la France et 1'AIlemaene. N" 6. M. Jules Cambon-, Ambassadeur de la Republique franqaise a Berlin, a M. Stephen Pichon, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. Berlin, le 22 novembre 1913. Je tiens d'une source absolument sure la relation d'une conversation que l'Empe- r.eur aufait cue avec le Roi des Beiges, en presence du Chef d'Elat-Major General de Moltke, il y a une quinzaine de jours, conversation qui aurait, parait-il, vivement frappe le Roi Albert; je ne suis nullement surpris de son impression, qui repond a celle que moi-meme je ressens depuis quelque temps : I'hoslilite conlre nous s'ac- centue el 1'Empereur a cesse d'etre partisan de la paix. L'interlocuteur de 1'Empereur d'AUemagne pensait jusqu'ici, comme tout le monde, que Guillaume II, dont 1'inllueuce personnelle s'etait exercee dans bien des circon- stances critiques au profit du maintien de la paix, etait toujours dans les memes dispositions d'esprit. Cette fois, il 1'aurait trouve completement change : 1'Empereur d'AUemagne n'est plus a ses yeux le champion de la paix contre les tendances belli- queuses de certains partis allemands. Guillaume II en est venu a penser que la guerre avec la France est inevitable et qu'd faudra en venir la un jour ou 1'autre. II croit naturellementa la superiorite ecrasante de I'armee allemande et a son succes certain. Le General de Moltke parla exactemeiu comme son souverain. Lui aussi, il declara la guerre necessaire et inevitable, mais il se montra plus assure encore du succes, « car, dit-il au Roi, cette fois, il faut en finir, et Voire Majeste ne peut se douter de 1'enthousiasme irresistible qui, ce jour-la, enlrainerale peuple allemand tout entier-'. Le Roi des Beiges protests que c'elait travestir les intentions du Gouvernemenl francais que les traduire de la sorte el se laisser abuser sur les sentiments de la nation lranc,aise par les manifestations de quelques esprits exaltes ou d'intrigants sans conscience. L'Empereur et son Chef d'Elat-Major n'en persisterent pas moins dansleurmaniere de voir. Au cours de celte conversation 1'Empereur etait, du resle, apparu surmene et kritable. A mesure que les annees s'appesanlissent sur Guillaume II, les traditions — 21 — familiales, les sentiments retrogrades de !a Cour, et surtout 1'impatience des militaires prennent plus d'empire sur son esprit. Peut-etre eprouve-t-il on ne sail quelle jalousie de la popularile acquise. par son fils, qui llalte les passions des pangermanistes et ne trouve pas la situation de 1'Empire dans le monde egale a sa puissance. Peut-elre aussi la replique de la France a la derniere augmentation de 1'armee allemande, donl l'objet elait d'elablir sans conleste la supe- riorile germanique, est-elle pour quelque chose dans ces amerlumes, car, quoi qu'on dise, on sent qu'on ne pent gut-re aller plus loin. On peut se demander ce qu'il y a au fond de cette conversation. L'Empereur et son Chef d'Etat-Major General ont pu avoir pour objectif d'impressionner le Roi des Beiges et de le disposer a ne point opposer de resistance au cas oil un conflit avec .nous se produirait. Peut-etre aussi voudralt-on la Belgique moms hostile a cerlaines ambitions quise mamfeslent ici a propos du Congo beige, mais cette derniere hypo- these ne me parait pas concorder avec I'intervention du General de Mollke.. Au reste, 1'Empereur Guillaume est moins maitre de ces impatiences qu'on ne le croil comnumement. Je 1'ai vu plus d'une fois laisser echapper le fond de sa pensee. Quel qu'ait ete son objeclif dans la conversation qui m'a ete rapportee. la confidence n'en a pas moins le caraclere le plus grave. Elle correspond a la precarite de la situa- tion generale et a l'elat d'une cerlaine partie de l'opinion en France el en Allemagne. S'il metait pe'rmis de conduce, je dirais qu'il est bon de lenir compte de ce fait nouveau que 1'Empereur se familiarise avec un ordre d'idees qui lui repugnait autre- fois, et que, pour lui emprunler une loculion qu'il aime a employer, nous devons tenir notre poudre seche. Jules Cambon. — 23 CHAPITKE II PRELIMINAIRES DE LA MORT DE L'ARCHIDUC IIERITIER (28 JUIN 1914) A LA REMISE DE LA NOTE AUTRICHIENNE A LA SERBIE (23 JllLLET 1914) - 25 — N°7. M. Dumaine, Ambassadeur do France a Vienne, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des. Affaires etran- geres. Vienne, le 28 juin 1914. La nouvelle vient de parvenir a Vienne que I'Archiduc heritier d'Aulriclic et sa femme ont ele assassines aujourd'hui a Serajevo par un eludiant originaire de Grahovo. Quelques instants avant l'altentat auquel lis ont succombe, lis avaicut echappe a 1'explosion d'une bombe qui a blesse piusieurs olbciers de leur suite. L'Empereur, en ce moment a Ischl, en a ete aussitot avise tele^rapliiqiument. Dumaine. IN" 8. M. Dumaine, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Vienne, h 3 juillet 191 i. Le crime de Serajevo suscite les plus vives rancunes dans les milieux mililaires autrichiens et chez tous ceux. qui ne se resignent pas a laisser la Serbie garder dans les Balkans le rang qu'elle a conquis. L'enquete sur les origines de 1'atlentat qu'on voudrait exiger du Gouvernement de Belgrade dans des conditions intolerables pour sa dignite, fournirait, a la suite d'un refus, le grief permettant de proceder a une execution militaire. Dumaine. N°9. M. de Manneville, Charge d'affaires de France a Berlin, a M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Berlin, le !x juillet 1914. Le Sous-Secretaire d'Etat des Affaires etrangeres ma dit hier, et a repete aujour- d'hui a 1'Ambassadeur de Russie, qu'il esperait que la Serbie dounerait satisfaction aux demandes que 1'Autriche pouvait avoir a lui adresser en vue de la recherche et de la poursuite des complices du crime de Serajevo. II a ajoute qu'il avait confiance quit en serait ainsi parce que la Serbie , si elle agissait autrement , aurait contre elle l'opinion de tout le monde civilise. Le Gouvernement allemand ne parait done pas partager les inquietudes qui se manifestent dans une partie de la presse allemande au sujet d'une tension possible des rapports entre les Gouvernements de Vienne et de Belgrade, ou du moius il n« veut pas en avoir lapparence. de Manneville. N° 10. M. Paleologoe, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Petersbonrg, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Sainl-Petersbourg, 6juillet 1 9 1 4. Au cours d'un entretien qu'il avait term a avoir avec le Charge d'aflaires d'Autriche- Hongrie, M. SazonolT a signale amicalement a ce diplomate liintation inquietante que les attaques de la presse autricbienne contre la Serbie risquent de produire dans son pays. Le Comte Czernin ayant laisse entendre que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois — 27 — serait peut-etre oblige de rechercher sur le territoire serbe les instigateurs de 1'attentat de Serajevo, M. Sazonoff 1'interrompit : « Aucun pays plus que la Russie, a-t-il dit, n'a eu a souffrir des attentats prepares sur territoire etranger. Avons-nous jamais pretendu employer contre un pays quelconque les precedes dont vos journaux menacent la Serbie? Ne vous engagez pas dans cette voie ». Puisse cet avertissement n'etre pas perdu. Paleologue. N° 11. M. d'Apchier le Maugin, Consul general de France a Budapest, a M. ReneViviANi, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Budapest, le il juillet 1914. Interpelle a la Chambre sur 1'etat de la question austro-serbe , M. Tisza a declare qu'il fallait avant toute cbose attendre le resultat de l'enquete judiciaire, dont il s'est refuse pour 1'instant a reveler quoi que ce soit. Et la Chanibre l'a approuve haute- ment. II s'est montre tout aussi discret sur les decisions prises dans la reunion des ministres a Vienne, et n'a pas iaisse deviner si on donnerait suite au projet de demarche a Belgrade dont les journaux des deux mondes ont retenti. La Chambre s'est inclinee derechef. En ce qui concerne cette demarche, il semble qu'il y ait un mot d'ordre pour en attenuer la portee : la colere hongroise s'est comme evaporee a travers les articles virulents de la presse , unanime maintenant a deconseiller ce pas qui pourrait etre dangereux. Les journaux officieux notamment voudraient que 1'on substituat a ce mot de « demarche", aux apparences comminatoires, le terme qui leur parait plus amical et plus poli de « pourparlers ». Ainsi, officiellement, pour le quart d'heure, tout est a la paix. Tout est a la paix, dans les journaux. Mais le gros public ici croit a la guerre et la craint. Et par ailleurs, des personnes en qui j'ai toute raison d'avoir confiance m'ont affirme savoir que chaque jour des canons et des munitions etaient diriges en masse vers la frontiere. Vrai ou non, ce bruit ma ete rapporte de divers cotes avec des details concordanls; il indique au moins quelles sont les preoccupations generates Le Gouvernement, soit qu'il veuille sincerement la paix, soit qu'il prepare un coup, — 28 — fait maintenant tout son possible pour calmer ces inquietudes. Et c'est pourquoi le. ton des journaux gouvernementaux a baisse d'une note, puis de deux, pour etre i 1 1'heure actuelle presque optimiste. Mais ils avaient eux-memes propage 1'alarme a plaisir. Leur optiniisme de commande est actuellement sans echo, la nervosite de la Bourse, barometre que Ion ne saurait negliger, en est une preuve certaine; les valeurs sans exception sont tombees a des coins invraisemblablement bas; la rente bongroise 4 o/o etait colee hier 79,95, cours qui n'a jamais ete cote depuis la pre- miere emission. d'Apchier le Maugin. N° 12. M. Dumaine, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Vienne, te 1 5 juillot 1914. Certains organes de la presse viennoise, discutant 1'organisation militaire de la France et de la Russie, presentent ces deux pays comme hors d'etat de dire leur mot dans les affaires europeennes, ce qui assurerait a la nionarchie dualiste, soutenue par 1'Allemagne, d'appreciables facilites pour soumettre la Serbie au regime qu'il plairait de lui imposer. La Militdrische Rundschau 1'avoue sans ambage. « L'instant nous est encore favorable. Si nous ne nous decidons pas a la guerre, celle que nous devrons faire dans deux ou trois ans au plus tard s'engagera dans des circonstances beaucoup moins propices. Actuellement, c'est a nous qu'appartient 1'initiative : la Russie n'est pas prete, les facteurs moraux et le bon droit sont pour nous, de meme que la force. Puisqu'un jour nous devrons accepter la lutte, provoquons-la tout de suite. Notre prestige, notre situation de grande Puissance, notre bonueur sont en question : plus encore, car vraisemblablement il s'agirait de notre existence, d'etre ou ne pas etre, ce qui reellement est aujourd'hui la grande affaire. » En rencherissant sur elle-meme, la Neue Frcie Presse de ce jour s'en prend au Comte Tisza de la moderation de son second discours, oil il a dit : « nos relations avec la Serbie auraient toutefois besoin d'etre clarifiees ». Ces mots provoquent son indignation. Pour elle, 1'apaisement, la securite ne peuvent resulter que d'une guerre au couleau contre le panserbisme, el c'est au nom de 1'humanite quelle reclame lex- termination de la maudite race serbe. Dumaine. — 29 — N° 13. M. Dumaine, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, a M. Rene: Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etraa- geres. Vienne. 1 9 juillet 191^. Le Chancelie.r du Consulat qui m'a remis son rapport semestnel resumant les fails divers d'ordre economique qui out fait 1'objet de ses etudes depuis le debut de l'annee, y a joint une partie d'information politique provenant dune source serieuse. Je 1'ai prie de rediger brievement les renseignements qu'il a recueillis sur la remise prochaine de la Note autrichienne a la Serbie, que les journaux annoncent depuis quelques jours avec insi stance. Vous trouverez ci-joint le texte de cette note d'information, mteressante en raison de sa precision. Dumaine. N° 14. Note. {Extrait d'un rapport consulaire sur la situation economique et politique en Autriche.) Vienne, le 20 juillet 1914. II resulte de renseignements fournis par une personnalite particulierement au courant des nouvelles officielles que le Gouvernement fran^ais aurait tort de s'en rapporter aux semeurs d'optimisme : on exigera beaucoup de la Serbie, on lui imposera la dissolution de plusieurs societes de propagande , on la sommera de reprimer le nalionalisme, de surveiller la frontiere en collaboration avec des com- missaires autricbiens, de faire la police des ecoles au point de vue de l'espril anti- autrichien, et il est bien difficile qu'un Gouvernement acceple de se faire ainsi le sergent de ville d'un Gouvernement etranger. On compte avec les echappaloires par lesquelles la Serbie voudra sans doute esquiver une reponse claire et directe; c'est — 30 — pourquoi on lui fixera peul-etre un delai bref pour declarer si elle accepte oui ou non. La teneur de la Nolo et son allure imperative garantissent presque surement que Belgrade refusera. Alors, on operera militairement. II y a ici, el pareillement a Berlin, un clan qui accepte 1'idee du conflita dimen- sions generahsees, en d'autres termes, la conflagration. L'idee directrice est pro- bablement qu'd faudrait marcher avant que la Bussie ait terrnine ses grands perfec- tionnements de l'armee et des voies ferrees, et avant que la France ait mis au point son organisation militaire. Mais ici, il n'y a pas accord dans les hautes spheres : du cote du comte Berchtold et des diploma tes, on voudrait lout au plus utie operation, localisee contre la Serbie. Mais tout doit etre envisage comme possible. On signale un fait singulier : generalement 1'agence telegraphique officielle, dans ses resumes et revues de presse etrangere, ne tient compte que des journaux ollicieux et des organes les plus importants; elle omet toule citation, toute mention des autres. C'est une regie et une tradition. Or, depuis une dizaine de jours, 1'agence offi- cielle fournit quotidienuement a la presse d'Autriche-Hongrie une revue complete de toute la presse serbe, en donnant une large place aux journaux les plus ignores, les plus petits et insignifiants, qui par cela meme out un langage plus libre, plus hardi, plus agressif et souvent injurieux. Ce travail de l'Agence officielle a visible- ment pour but d'exciter le sentiment public et de creer une opinion favorable a la guerre. Le fait est siirnificatif. X I"). M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, .1 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Berlin, le 21 juillet 1914. II me revient que le representant de la Serbie a Berlin aurait fait hier une demarche a la \\ ilhelmstrasse pour dire que son Gouvernement etait pret a accueillir ia requete de 1'Aulriche motivee par l'altentat de Serajevo, pourvu qu'elle ne demandat que des concours judiciaires en vue de la repression et de ia prevention des attentats politiques, mais il aurait etc charge de prevenir le Gouvernement allemand qu'il serait dangereux de chercher par cette enquete a porter atteinte au prestige de la Serbie. Confidentiellement, je puis dire egalement a Votre Excellence que le Charge d'affaires de Russie, a l'audience diplomatique d'aujourd'hui, a parle de cette ques- — 31 — tion a M. de Jagow. II lui a dit qu'il supposait que le Gouvernement allemand con- naissait actuellement tres bien la Note preparee par 1'Autriche et etait par suite a meme de dormer 1'assurance que les difficultes austro-serbes seraient localisees. Le Secretaire d'Etat a proteste qu'il ignorait absolument le contenu de cette Note et s'est exprime de meme avec moi. Je n'ai pu que m'etonner d'une declaration aussi peu conforme a ce que les circonstances conduisent a penser. II m'a ete assure d'ailleurs que, des mainlenant, les avis preliminaires de mobili- sation qui doivent mettre 1'Allemagne dans une sorte de « garde a vous » pendant les epoques de tension, ont ete adresses ici aux classes qui doivent les recevoir en pareil cas. C'est la une mesurg ii laquelle les Allemands, etant donne leurs habitudes, peuvent recourir sans s'exposer a des indiscretions et sans emouvoir la population. Elle ne revet pas un caractere sensationnel , et nest pas forcemeat suivie de mobili- sation effective ainsi que nous 1'avons deja vu, mais elle n'en est pas moins signifi- cative. Jules Cambon. N° 16. M. Bienyenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. , a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Vienne, Rome. Paris, ic 21 juillet igi4. J'attire specialement votre allenlion sur des informations que je re^ois de Berlin : TAmbassadeur de France signale 1' extreme faiblesse de la Bourse de Berlin d'hier, et 1'attribue aux inquietudes que la question serbe commence a provoquer. M. Jules Cambon a des raisons tres serieuses de croire que lorsque lAutriche fera i Belgrade la demarche qu'elle juge necessaire a la suite de 1'attentat de Seraievo, lAllemagne l'appuiera de son autorite, sans chercher a jouer un role de mediation. Bienvenu-VIartin. - 32 - N° 17. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Vienne, Rome. Paris, If 2? juillct 191 4. M. Jules Cambon ayant interroge M. de Jagovv sur la leneur de la Note autri- chienne a Belgrade, ce dernier lui a repondu qu'il n'en connaissait nullement le libelle ; notre Ambassadeur en a marque toute sa surprise. II constate que la baisse de la Bourse de Berlin conlinue et que des nouvelles pessimistes circulent." M. Barrere a egalement enlretenu de la menie question le Marquis de San Gin- liano, qui s'en montre inquiet et assure qu'il agit a Vienne pour qu'il ne soit demande a la Serbie que des clioses realisables, par exemple la dissolution du Club bosniaque ct non une enquete judiciaire sur les causes de l'altentat de Serajevo. Dans les circonstances presentcs, la supposition la plus favorable qu'on puisse faire est que le Cabinet de Vienne, se sentant deborde par sa presse ct par le parti mili- taire, cberche a obtenir le maximum de la Serbie par une intimidation prealable, directe et indirecte, et s'appuie sur l'Allemagne a cet effet. J'ai prie 1'Ambassadeur de France a Vienne d'user de toute son influence sur le Comte Bercbtold pour lui representee dans une conversation amicalc, combien la moderation du Gouvernement autnehien serait appreciee en Europe, et quelle repercussion risquerait d'avoir une pression brutale sur la Serbie. Bienvenu-Martin. !N° 18. M. Duviaine, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, a M. Bilnvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Vienne, le 11 juillet 19 i4. On ne sait rien en,coie des decisions que le Comte Bercbtold, prolongeant son sejour a Ischl, tente d'obtenir de l'Empereur. On attribuait au Gouvernement l'inten- — 33 — tion d'agir avec la plus grande rigueur envers la Serbie, d'en finir avec elle, «de la traiter comme une autre Pologne ». Huit corps d'armee seraient prets a entrer en campagne, mais M. Tisza, tres inquiet de 1'agitation en Croatie, serait intervenu acti- vement dans un sens moderateur. En tous cas, on croit que la d-marche a Belgrade aura lieu cette seuiaine. Les de- mandes du Gouvernement austro-hongrois relativement a la repression de 1'attentat ct a certaines garanties de surveillance et de police paraissent acceptables pour la dignite des Serbes; M. Jovanovich croit qu'elles scront accueillies. M. Pacbitch desire un arrangement pacifique, mais se declare pret a toute resistance. II a conOance dans la force de 1'armee serbe ; il compte, en outre, sur 1'uuion de tous les Slaves de la Monarchie pour paralyser leffort dirige contre son pays. A moins dun aveuglement absolu, on devrait reconnaitre ici qu'un coup de force a les plus grandes chances d'etre funeste, aussi bien aux troupes austro-hongroises qu'a la cohesion deja si compromise des nationalites gouvernees par 1'Empereur. L'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne, M. de Tchirsky, se montre partisan des resolutions violentes, tout en laissant volontiers entendre que la Chancellerie impdriale ne serait pas entierement d'accord avec lui sur ce point. L'Ambassadeur de Russie, parti hier pour la campagne, en raison des declarations rassurautes qui lui ont ete faites au Ministere des Affaires etrangeres, m'a confie que son Gouvernement n'aura pas d'ob- jection contre des demarches visant la punition des coupables et la dissolution des associations notoirement revolutionnaires, mais ne pouvait admettre des exigences humiliantes pour le sentiment national serbe. DOUAINE. N°19. M. Paul Cambon , Ambassadeur de France a Londres , a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Londres, le 2 2juillet 1914. Votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire part des impressions recueillies par notre Ambassadeur a Berlin, relativement aux consequences de la demarche que le Gou- \erncment auslro-hongrois se propose de faire a Belgrade. Ccs impressions m'ont ete confirmees par une conversation que j'ai eue hier avec le Principal Secretaire d'Etat pour les Affaires etrangeres. Sir E. Grey m'a dit avoir recula visite de 1'Ambassadeurd'AUemagne, qui lui a declare qu'a Berlin on s'attendait a une demarche du Gouvernement austro-hongrois aupres du Gouvernement serbe. Le Prince Lichnowski a assure que le Gouvernement allemand s'employait a retenir cl a moderer le Cabinet de Vienne, mais que jusqu'a present il n'y reussissait pas et qu'il n'etait pas sans inquietude sur les suites d'une telle demarche. Sir E. Grey a re- Doccments diplouatiqdes. — Ciii-rre curopeconc S — 34 — pondu au Prince Lichnowski qu'il voulait croire qu'avant d'intervenir a Belgrade, ie Gouvemement austro-hongrois se serait bien renseigne sur les circonstances du com- plot dont 1'archiduc heritier et la duchesse de Hohenberg ont ete victimes, se serait assure que le Gouvemement serbe en ayait eu connaissance et n'avait pas fait tout ce qui dependait de lui pour en prevenir les effets. Car s'il ne pouvait pas etre prouve que la responsabilite du Gouvemement serbe fiit imphquee dans une certaine mesure , I'intervention du Gouvemement austro-hongrois ne se justifierait pas et souleverait contre lui 1'opinion europeenne. La communication du Prince Lichnowski avait laisse Sir E. Grey sous une impres- sion d'inqui£tude qu'il ne m'a pas dissimulee. La meme impression m'a ete donnee. par 1'Ambassadeur d'llalie qui redoute, lui aussi, l'eventualite dune nouvelle ten- sion des rapports austro-serbes. Ce matin, j'ai recu la visile du Minisfre de Serbie, qui partage egalement les ap- prehensions de Sir E. Grey. II craint que l'Autriche ne' mette le Gouvemement serbe en presence d'une demande que la dignite de celui-ci et surtout la suscepti- bilite de 1'opinion publique ne lui permettent pas d'accueillir sans protestation. Comme je lui objectais le calme qui parait regner a Vienne et dont temoignent tous les Ambassadeurs accredites dans cette capitale, ll m'a repondu que ce calme officiel n'elait qu'apparent et recouvrait les dispositions les plus foncierement hostiles contre la Serbie. Or, a-t-il ajoute, si ces dispositions viennent a se manifester par une de- marche depourvue de la mesure desirable, il y aura lieu de tenir compte de 1'opinion publique serbe, surexcitee par les mauvais procedes dont l'Autriche a abreuve ce pays et rendue moins patiente par le souvenir encore tout frais de deux guerres vic- torieuses. Malgre les sacrifices dont la Serbie a paye ses recentes victoires, elle peut mettre encore sur pied 4oo,ooo hommes et 1'opinion publique, qui le sait., n'est pas disposee i tolerer une humiliation. Sir E. Grey dans un eotretien avec rAmbassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie l'a prie de recommander a son Gouvemement de ne pas s'ecarter de la prudence et de la moderation necessaires pour eviter de nouvelles complications, de ne demander a la Serbie que des mesures auxquelles celle-ci puisse raisonnablement se preter et de ne pas se laisser entrainer an dela. Paul C\MbON. — 35 - N° 20. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., a Londres, Berlin, Saint-Petersbourg et Rome. Paris, le 2 3 juillet 191 i. Les premieres intentions du Gouvernement austro-hongrois avaient ete, selon les informations recueillies par 1'Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, d'agir avec la plus grande rigueur contre la Serbie, en tenant huit corps d'armee prets a entrer en campagne. Ses dispositions actuelles seraient plus conciliantes : en reponse a une question que lui posait M. Dumaine , a qui j'avais present d'appeler 1'attention du Gouvernement autrichien sur les inquietudes eveillees en Europe, le baron Macchio a affirme a notre Ambassadeur que le ton et les demandes qui seront formulees dans la note autrichenne permettent de compter sur un denouement pacilique. Je ne sais quelle foi il faut accorder a ces assurances, en raison des habitudes de la chancellerie im- periale. Dans tous les cas, la note autricliienne sera remise dans un tres bref delai. Le Ministre de Serbie estime que M. Pachitch acceptera, par desir d'un arrangement, les demandes relatives a la repression de l'attentat et a des garanties de surveillance et de police , mais qu'il resistera a ce qui attenterait a la souverainete et a la dignite de son pays. Dans les cercles diplomatiques de Vienne, 1'Ambassadeur dAUemagne preconise des resolutions violentes, tout en convenant que peut-elre la Chancellerie impe- riale n'est pas entierement d'accord avec lui sur ce point; 1'Ambassadeur de Russie, se fiant aux assurances qui lui ont ete donnees, s'est absente de Vienne et a confie, avant son depart, a M. Dumaine, que son Gouvernement n'elevera pas d'objections contre la punition des coupables et la dissolution des associations revolutionnaires, mais qu'il ne pourrait tolerer des exigences humiliantes pour le sentiment national de la Serbie. Bienvenu-Martin. N° 21. M. Allize, Ministre de France a Munich, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Munich, le 2 3 juillet 1914* La presse bavaroise parait croire qu'une solution pacifique de 1'incident au'stro- serbe est non seulement possible, mais meme vraisemblable; dans les spheres offi- — 36 — cielles, au contrairc, on aflecle, depuis quelque temps, avec plus ou rnoins de since- rity, un reel pessimisme. Le President dn Conseil nolamment m'a dil aujourd'hui que la note aulricliienne, donl il avait connaissancc , etait, i son avis, redigoe dans des termes acceptables pour Ja Serbie, mais que la situation actuelle ne lui en paraissait pas moins ties serieuse. Alluc. 37 — CHAPITRE III LA NOTE AUTRICHIENNE ET LA REPOINSF SERBE DU VENDRED1 24 JLILLET AU SAMEDI 25 JUIL1 ET) — 39 — IV 2'2. M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Je vons serais oblige de Iransmettre d'urgence a M. Dumaine les informations et instructions suivantes : Reval, ie 2 4 juillet 1914, a 1 hcure du matin. Au cours de mes entretiens avec le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres russe, nous avons ete amenes a envisager les dangers qui pourraient resulter d'une demarche eventuelle de 1'Autriche-Hongrie a 1'egard de la Serbie, relativement a 1'attentat dont a ete victime 1'archiduc heritier. Nous sommes tombes d'accord pour penser qu'il convenait de ne rien negliger pour prevenir une demande d'explications ou quelque mise en demeure qui equivaudraient a une intervention dans les affaires interieures de la Serbie, et que celle-ci pourrait considerer comme une atteinte a sa souverai- nete et a son independance. En consequence, nous avons estime qu'il y avait lieu, dans une conversation amicale avecle ComteBerchtold, delui donner des conseils de moderation, propres a lui faire comprendre combien serait mal inspiree une intervention a Belgrade, oil Ion pourrait voir une menace de la part du Cabinet de Vienne. L'Anibassadeur dAngleterre, mis au courant par M. Sazonovv, a exprime 1'idee que son Gouvernement se joindrait sans doute a une demarche tendant a ecarter un danger qui peut menacer la paix generale, et a telegraphie dans ce sens a son Gou- vernement. M. Sazonow a adresse des instructions a cet efiet i M. Schebeko. Sans qu'il s'agisse ici d'une action collective ou concertee des representants de la Triple Entente a Vienne, je vous prie de vous entretenir de la question avec les Ambassadeurs de Russie et dAngleterre, et de vous entendre avec eux sur le meilleur moyen , pour chacun de vous, de faire entendre sans retard au Comte Berchtold les conseils de moderation que nous parait reclamer la situation presente. J'ajoute qu'il y aurait lieu de prier M. Paul Cambon de faire valoir aupres de Sir E. Grey l'utilite de cette demarche , et d'appuyer la suggestion que l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre en Russie a du presenter 4 cet effet au Foreign Office. Le Comte Benc- kendorfi est charge de faire une recommandation analogue. Rene VrviAM. — 40 — I\° 23. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, a bord de la France. Paris, le 24 jnillet lgii. J'ai transmis d'urgence a" Vienne vos instructions, niais il resulte des informations de presse de ce matin que la Note autrichienne a ele remise hier soir a six heures a Belgrade. Cette note, dont 1'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie ne nous a pas encore remis le texte officiel. parait tres accenluee; elle tendrait non seulement a obtenir la pour- suite des Serbes meles direclement a latlenlat de Serajevo, mais demanderait la repression immediate dans la presse et dans 1'armee serbe de toute propagande anti- autrichienne. Elle donnerait jusqu'a samedi soir, a six beures, a la Serbie pour s'executer. En transmettant vos instructions a M. Dumaine, je l'ai prie de se concerter avec ses collegues anglais et russe. Bienvenu-Martin. N° 24. Texte de la Note auliichienne. (Notecommuniqute par leComte Szecsen, Ambassadeur d'AutricheHongrie, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., le vendredi 2 !x juillet 1914, a 10 h. 1/2 du matin.) Vienne, le 2 4 juillet 1914. Le Gouvernement imperial et royal s'est vu oblige d'adresser jeudi 2 3 juillet cou- rant, par 1'entremise du Ministre imperial et royal a Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouvernement royal de Serbie : .. Le 3 1 mars 1 909 le Ministre de Serbie a Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouver- nement au Gouvernement imperial et royal la declaration suivante : •> La Serbie reconnait qu'elle n'a pas ete atteinle dans ses droits par le fait accompli cree en Bosnie-Herzegovine et qu'elle se conformera par consequent a telle decision que les Puissances prendront par rapport a 1'article XXV du Traite de Berlin. Se ren- dant aux conseils des grandes puissances, la Serbie s'engage des a present a abandonner 1'attitude do protestation et d'opposition qu'elle a observee a I'egard de lannexion depuis i'aulotnne dernier et elle s'engage, en outre, a changer le cours de sa politique actuelle envers 1'Autriche-Hongrie pour vivre desormais avec cette derniere sur le pied d'un bon voisinage. » — 41 — Or, 1'hisloire des dernieres annees, et notamment les evenements douloureux du 28 juin ont demontre l'existcnce en Serbie d'un mouvemont subversif dont le but est de detacher de la Monarchie auslro-bongroise certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe est arrive a se manifester au deli du territoire du royaume par des actes de terrorisme, par une se'rie d'atlenlats et par des meurlres. Le Gouvernement royal serbe, loin de satislaire aux engagements formels contenus dans la declaration du 3i mars 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement. II a tolere 1'aclivile criminelle des difierentes socieles et affiliations dirigees contre la Monarcbie, le langage eU'rene de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d'altentals, la participation d'officiers et de fonctionnaires dans des agissements subversifs, une propagandc malsaine dans linstruclion publique, tolere enlin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induice la population serbe a la haine dc la Monarchie et au mepris de ses institutions. Cettc tolerance coupable du Gouvernement royal de Serbie n'avait pas ccsse au moment ou les evenements du 28 juin dernier en ont demontre au monde entier les consequences funestcs. II resulte des depositions et aveux des auteurs cnminels de l'attentat du 28 juin que le meurtre de Serajevo a ete trame a Belgrade, que les armes et explosifs dont les meurtriers se trouvaient etre munis, leur ont ete donnes par des officiers et fonc- tionnaires serbes faisant parlie de la « Narodna Odbrana » et enfin que le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs armes a ete organise et eflectue par des chefs du service-frontiere serbe. Les resultats mentionnes de l'instruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement im- perial et royal de poursuivre plus Iongtemps l'attilude de longanimite expectative qu'il avait observee pendant des annees vis-a-vis des agissements concentres a Belgrade, et propages de la sur les territoires de la Monarchie r res resultats lui imposent au contraire le devoir de metlre fin a des nienecs qui forment une menace perpetuelle pour la tranquillile de la Monarchie. C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernement imperial et royal se voit oblige de demander au Gouvernement serbe I'enonciation olficielle qu'il condamne la pro- pagande dirigee contre la Monarchie auslro-bongroise, e'est-a-dire 1'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarcbie des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage a supprimer, par lous les moyens, cette propagande criminelle el lerroriste. Afin de donncr un caractere solennel a cet engagement le Gouvernement roval de Serbie fera publier a la premiere page du Journal ojpcicl en date du 13/2G juillet I'enonciation suivante : « Le Gouvernement royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigee contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, e'est-a-dire l'ensemble des tolerances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchie austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il deplore sincerement les consequences funesles de ces agissements criminels. Le Gouveriiement royal regrelte que des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participe a la propagande sus mentionnee et compromis par la les relations de bon Docdments DlPLOMATlQtES. — Guerre europtennc. 6 - 42 — voisinage auquel le Gouvernement royal s'etait solennellement engage par ses decla- rations du 3 i mars 1909. Le Gouvernement royal qui desapprouve et repudie toute idee ou tentative d'im- mixtion dans les destinees des habitants de quelque partie de I'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considere de son devoir d'avertir formellement les ofliciers, les lonctionilaires et toute la population du royaume que dorenavant il procedera avec la derniere- rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts a prevenir et a reprimer. » Cette enonciation sera portee simultanement a la connaissance de larrnee royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majesle le Roi et sera pubhee dans le BulLiin ojjiciel de I'armce. Le Gouvernement royal serbe s'engage en outre : 1° A supprimer toute publication qui excite a la haine et au mepris de la Mo- narchie, et dont la tendance generale est dirigee contre son integrite territoriale. 2° A dissoudre immediatement la societe dite « Narodna Odbrana », a confisquer, tous ses moyens de propagande, et a proceder de la meme maniere contre les autres societes et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent a la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise, le Gouvernement royal preudra les mesures necessaires pour que les societes dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activite sous uu autre noui et sous uiie autie forme. 3" A eliminer sans delai de 1'instruction publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui con- cerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d instruction, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir a fomenter la propagande contre 1'Autriche-Hongrie. ^i" A eloigner du service militaire et de l'adrninistration en general tous les offi- ciers et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchie austro-hon- groise et dont le Gouvernement imperial et royal se reserve de comiuuniquer les horns et les faits au Gouvernement royal. 5° A accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement imperial et royal dans h suppression du mouvement subversif dirige contre l'inlegrite territo- riale de la Monarchie. 6° A ouvrir une enquete judiciaire contre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur lerritoire serbe; des organes di'legu^s par le Gouvernement imperial et royal prendront part aUx recherches y relatives. 7° A proceder d'urgence a 1'arrestation du commaudant Voija Tankosic et du nomme Milan Ciganovic, employe de 1'Etat serbe, compromis par les resultats de 1'instruction de Serajevo. 8" A empeeher, par des mesures efficaces, le concours des autoriles serbes dans le tralic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la frontiere; A licencier et punir sevefetncnl les fonctionnaires du service-frontiere de Scliabatz et de Loznica coupables d'avoir aide les auteurs du crime de Serajevo en leur facili- iant le passage de la frontiere. 9° A donner au. Gouvernement imperial et royal. des explications sur les propos — 43 — injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qua 1'etranger qui, malgre leur position officielle, n'ont pas hesite apres i'attentat du 28 juin de s'expnmer dans des interwiews dune maniere hostile envers la Monarchic austro-hongroise. Enfin; lo° D'avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement imperial et royal de i'execution des mesures comprises dans les points precedents. Le Gouvernement imperial et royal attend la reponse du Gouvernement royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi 2 5 de ce mois a cinq heures du soir (1). Un memoire concernant les resultats de 1'instruction de Serajevo a 1'egard des fonctionnaires mentionnes aux points 7 et 8 est annexfe a cette note. J'ai l'honneur d'inviter voire Excellence de vouloir bien porter le contenu de cette Note a la connaissance du Gouvernement aupres duquel vous etes accredite, en accompagnant cette communication du commentaire que voici : Le 3 1 mars i 909 le Gouvernement royal serbe a adresse a rAutriche-Hongrie la declaration dont le texte est reproduit ci-dessus. Le lendemain meme de cette declaration , la Serbie s'est engagee dans une politique tendant a inspirer des idees subversives aux ressortissants serbes de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et a preparer ainsi la separation des territoires austro-hongrois, limilrophes a la Serbie. La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agitation criminelle : Des socictes et affiliations ne tarderent pas a se former qui, soit ouvertement, soil clandestinement, etaient destinees a creer des desordres sur le territoire austro-hon- grois. Ces societes et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des generaux et des diplomates, des fonctionnaires d'Etat et des juges, bref, les sommites du monde officiel et inofliciel du royaume. Le journalisme serbe est presque entierement au service de cette propagande, dirigee contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les organes de la presse serbe n'excitent leurs lecteurs a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchie voisine ou a des attentats diriges plus ou moins ouvertement contre sa surete et son integrite. Un grand nombre d'agents est appele a soutenir par tons les moyens 1'agitation contre l'Autriche-Hongrie et a corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays. L'esprit conspirateur des poliliciens serbes, esprit dont les annales du royaume portent les sanglantes cmpreintes, a subi une recrudescence depuis la derniere crise balkanique; des individus ayant fait parlie des bandes jusque-li occupees en Mace- doine, sont venus se mettre a la disposition de la propagande terroriste contre l'Au- triche-Hongrie. (1) L'Amkissadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a adresse au Ministre des AITaires elrangeres, par lellre parti- culicre, la rectification suivante, dans la journee du 2i juillet : «Dans )a enpie de ta depeclie que j'ai eu t'honncur de remettre ce matin a Voire Excellence, il etail dit que mon Gouvernement attendait la reponse du Cabinet de Belgrade au plus tard jusqu'au samedi 2 - 5 de ce mois a cinq heures du soir. Notre Ministre a Belgrade n'ayant remis sa note hier qu',i six heures du soir, le delai pour la reponse se trouve proroge de ce fait jusqu'a demain samedi six heures du soir. ■ « J'ai cru de mon devoir d'informer Votre Excellence de cette legere modification dans Texpii-ation du delai fixe pour la reponse du Gouvernement serJ>e. 6. — Ilk — En presence de ces agissements auxquels l'Autriclie-Hongrie est exposee dcpuis des annees, le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi que le Gouvernement serbe a manque au devoir que lui imposait la declaration solennelle du 3i mars 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en contra- diction avec la volonte de l'Europe et avec 1'engagement qu'il avail pris vis-a-vis de l'Autriclie-Hongrie. La longanimite du Gouvernement imperial et royal a legard de l'altitude provo- catrice de la Serbie etait inspiree du desmteressement territorial de la Monarchie austro-bongroise et de 1'espoir que le Gouvernement serbe finirait lout de meme par apprecier a sa juste valeur l'amitie de I'Autriche-Hongrie. En observant une altitude bienveillante pour les interets poliliques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement imperial et roval espdrait que le royaume se deciderait finalement a suivre de son cole une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Aulriche-Hongrie s'allendail surloul a une pareille evolution dans les idees poliliques en Serbie, lorsque, apres les evenements de 1'annee 1912, le Gouvernement imperial el royal rendit possible, par une attitude desintcressee et sans rancune, l'agrandissement si considerable de la Serbie. Cetle bienveillance manifestee par l'Autriclie-Hongrie a l'egard de 1'Elat voisin n'a cependant aucunement modifie les precedes du royaume, qui a continue a lolerer sur son territoire une propagande dont les funestes consequences se sont manifestoes au monde entier le 28 juin dernier, jour oil 1'heritier presomplif de la Monarchie et son illustre epouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot trame a Belgrade. En presence de eel elat de choses, le Gouvernement imperial et royal a du se decider a enlreprendre de nouvelles et pressantes demarches a Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouvernement serbe a arreter le mouvement incendiaire menacant la surete et 1'integrite de la Monarchie auslro-hongroise. Le Gouvernement imperial et royal est persuade qu'en entreprenanl cette demarche, il se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments de loules les nations civilisees qui ne sauraienl admettre que le regicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impune- ineiil dans la littte politique, et que la paix europeenne fut continuellement troublee par les agissements partant de Belgrade. C'est a l'appui de ce qui precede que le Gouvernement imperial et royal tient a la disposition du Gouvernement de la Republique franchise un dossier elucidant les menees serbes el les rapports exislant enlre ces menees et le meurlre du 28 juin. I omrnunicalion identique est adressee aux representanls imperiaux et royaux aupres des autres Puissances signataires. Vous etes aulorise de laisser une copie de cette depeche entre les mains de M. le Ministrc des Affaires etrangeres. Annexe. L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le tribunal de Serajevo contre Gravillo Princip et consorts du chel d'assassinat et de complicite y relative-, crime commis par eux le 28 jum dernier, a jusqu'ici abouli aux conslatalions suivantes : — lib — 1° Le complot ayant pour hut d'assassiner, lors de son sejour ;'i Serajevo, i'archiduc Francois-Ferdinand fut forme a Belgrade par Gravillo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, le nommiS Milan Ciganovic et Trifko Grabez avec le concours du commandant VoijaTankosic. 2° Les six bombes et les qualre pistolcts Browning avec munitions, moyennant lesquels les malfaiteurs ont commis 1'attentat, furent livres a Belgrade a Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez par le nomine Milan Ciganovic et le commandant Voija Tankosic. 3° Les bombes sont des grenades J main provenant du depot d'armes de l'armee serbe a Kragujevaks. W Pour assurer la reussite de 1'attentat, Ciganovic enseigna a Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez la maniere de se servir des grenades et donna, dans une foret pres du champ de tir a Topschider, des lemons de tir avec pistolets Browning a Princip et a Grabez. 5° Pour rendre possible a Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez de passer la frontiere de Bosnie- Herzegovine et d'y introduiie clandestinement leur contrebande d'armes, tin systeme de transport secret fut organise par Ciganovic. D'apres cette organisation, l'introduction en Bosnie-Herzegovine des mallaiteurs et de ieurs amies fut operee par les capitaines-frontieres de Sabac (Popovic) et de Loznica, ainsi que par le douanier Budivoj Grbic de Loznica, avec le concours de divers particuliers. N° 25 M. BiE?(VEi\u-MARTiN, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, a bord de la France, et a Londres, Berlin, Vienne, Saint-Petersbourg, Rome, Belgrade. Paris, le i!i juillet igia\ J'ai 1'honneur de vous informer que la Note autrichienne, remise a Belgrade ieudi soir, ma ele laissee en copie, ce matin, par l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie. Le comte Szecsen m'a fait connaitre que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois attend la reponse du Gouvernement serbe jusqu'a samedi a5, a cinq heures du soir (l). La Note s'appuie sur l'engagement pris par la Serbie , le 3 l mars 1909, de recon- nailre lannexion de la Bosnie-Herzegovine et reproche au Gouvernement serbe d'avoir tolere une propagande anti-autrichienne, a laquefie cut pris part les fonction- naires, l'armee et la presse, propagande menacante pour la securile et 1'integrite de l'Autricbe, et dont le crime du 28 juin, trame a Belgrade , selon les constatations de l'instruction, a demontre les dangers. Le Gouvernement autrichien se declare oblige de mettre fin a une propagande qui constitue un danger permanent pour sa tranquillite, et d'exiger du Gouvernement serbe une enonciation officielle de sa volonte de la condamner et reprimer, par la publication, au Journal ojjicicl du 26, d'une declaration dont les termes sont indiques, reprouvant, regrettant et mena<;ant de sevir. Un ordre du jour du Roi a l'armee serbe porterait egalemenl cette declaration a sa connaissance. En outre, le Gouver- (1) Voir note page 43. — lib _ nrniPiil serbe s'engngerait a supprimerles publications, \ dissoudreles Socieles, arevo- quer les officiers el fonclionnaires dont les noms seraient communiques par le Gou- Ternemctit aulrichien, a accepter la collaboration de fonclionnaires autrichiens pour k suppression de Taction subversive signalee, ainsi que pour 1'enquete sur l'atterjtat de Serajevo, eniin a proceder a Tarrestation immediate d'un officier el dun employe serbes qui y sont compromis. An memorandum aulricbien est annexee une Note, resumant les constalations de 1'instruction du crime de Serajevo et affirmant qu'il a ete trame a Belgrade, que les borabes out ete fournies au* assassins et emanent dun depot de 1'armee serbe, enfin que les assassins ©at ete exerces et aides par des olficiers et employes serbes. En rendant visite, aussilot apres cette communication an Directeur politique p. i. le Comte Szecsen la informe, sans aucun commeutaire, de la remise de la Note. M. Berlbelot n'a pu que signaler, sur me.s indications, a l'Ambassadeur d'Autricbe-Hongrie, 1'impression d'inquietude eveillee par les informations parues dans la matinee sur le contenu de la Note autriehienne, et le sentimenl pemble que jie roanquerait pas d'eveiller, dans 1'opir.ion francaise, le moment choisi pour une demarche si imperative et de si court delai; c'esl-a-dire 1'heure on le Presi- dent de la Republique et le President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres de la Republique avaient quittc Petersbourg et se rrouvaient en mer, par consequent hors d'etat d'exercer, d'accord avec les Puissances qui n'etaient pas directernent inte- ressees, Taction apaisante si desirable entre la Serbie et l'Autriche, dans Tinteret de la paix generale. Le Ministre de Serbie n'a encore aucune donnee sur les intentions de son Gou- vernement. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a demande a etre requ par moi, cet apres-rnidi, a cinq heures. Bienvenu-Martis. IN 26 M. BiENVENu-MARTtN, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. a M. Tiiieiuut, Ministre dc France a Stockholm (pour le President du Conseil) et a Belgrade, Vienne, Londres, Berlin, Rome, Pe- tersbourg. Paris, le 24 juillet 191^. M. Vesnitchn'avait, ce matin encore, recude son Gouvernement aucuu telegramme de nature a le renseigner s.ur ses intentions et ne connaissait pas le contenu de la Note autrichienne. A la demande de conseil qu'il formulait a la Direction politique, M. Berthelot Jul a dit, a litre tout personnel, que la Serbie devait chercher a gagner du temps, le — 47 — lenne de 48 heures constituant peul-etre plulot une « mise en demeure » qu'un ultimatum proprement dit; qu'il pouvait y avoir lieu, par exemple, d'oflirir imme- diatcment satisfaction sur tous les points qui n'etaient pas inconciliablos avec la dignite et la souverainete de la Serbie ; il Iui a ete conseille de faire remarquer que les constatations de ['instruction autriGluenne de Serajevo etaienl rnilalerales, et que la Serbie, tout en elant prelc a seur contre tous les complices d'un crime qu'elle reprouvait hautement, demandait a etre mise au courant des preuves, pour pouvoir les verifier rapidement; de chercher surtout a echapper a la prise directe de FAutriche, en se declarant prete a se soumettre a 1'arbitrage de 1'Europe. J'ai demande a Londres et a Petersbourg les vues et les intentions des Gouverne- ments anglais el russe. II resulte, d'aulre part, de nos informations, que l'ltalie n'a recu qu'aujourd'liui communication de la Note autrichienne, au sujet de laquelle clle n'avait ete ni pressentie ni meme avertie. BrENVENU-MARTIN. IN" 27 M. Bienvenu-JVIartin, Ministre des Afl'aires etrangeres a Stockholm (pour le President du Conseil), Belgrade, Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Berlin, Bome. Paris, le 2i juillet igi4- L'Ambassadeur de France a Vicnne me fait savoir que l'opinion a etc surprise par la soudainete et 1'exageiation des demandes autrichiennes, mais que le parti mili- taire parait craindre surtout que la Serbie ne cede. Le Ministre de Serbie en Autriche pense que son Gouvernement se montrera tres conciliant en ce qui concerne la punition des complices de I'altentat el les garauties i donner en vue de la suppression de la propagande anli-autricbienne, mais qu'il ne saurait accepter un ordre du jour a 1'armee dicle au Roi, ni le licenciement d'olTiciers suspects a 1' Autriche, ni 1'intervention de fonctionnaires etrangers en Serbie. M. Jovanovitcli estime que s'il etait possible d'engager une discussion, le conflit pourrait encore s'arranger, avec le concours des Puissances.. Notre Ambassadeur a Berlm rend compte de lemotion provoquee par la Note autrichienne et de l'etat d'esprit du Charge d'affaires de Russie, qui pense qu'une grande partie de l'opinion en Allemagne souhaiterait la guerre. Le ton de la presse est menacanl et parait avoir pour but d'intimider la Russie. Notre Ambassadeur doit voir ce soir M. de Jagow. M Barrere informe que l'ltalie agit a Vienne dans un sens moderaleur et cherche a enter des complications. Bif.kvenu-Martin. — 48 — N° 28 M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministredes Affaires etrangeres p. i. a Stockholm (pour le President du Conseil), et a Belgrade, Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Berlin, Vienne, Rome. Paris, le 2& juillet 191A. M. de Schoen est venu me communiquer, sans vouloir men laisser une copie, mais en men donnant lecture a deux reprises, sur ma demande, une Note de son Gouvernement. Celte Note s'exprime presque textuellement de la maniere suivante : « Les declarations des journaux austro-hongrois relatives aux circonstances dans lesquelles l'attentat sur la personne de I'heritier du trone d'Autriche et de son epouse a eu lieu, devoilent nettement le but que la propagande panserbe s'etait propose et les moyens dont elle s'est servie pour latteindre. D'apres les faits connus, il ne peut non plus y avoir aucun doute, que cost a Belgrade qu'il faut chercher le centre d'action des agitations qui tendaient a detacher de l'Autriche-Hongrie les provinces slaves du Sud pour les reunir au royaume dc Serbie et que c'est la tout au moins que s'est developpee son aclivile, avec la connivence de membres du Gouvernement el de 1'armee. « Les menees serbes remonlent a un grand nombre d'annees. Le chauvinisnie pan- serbe s'est particulierement manifesto pendant la crise bosniaque. C'est a la modera- tion du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, a son grand empire sur lui-meme, a 1'inter- vention energique des Puissances que Ton est redevable si les provocations aux- quelles l'Aulricbe-Hongrie a ete, a cette epoque, en buttede la part de la Serbie, n'ont pas suscite un conflit. La promesse faite alors par le Gouvernement serbe d'adopter une attitude irreprochable n'a pas ete tenue. Sous les yeux, tout au moins avec la tolerance tacite de la Serbie ofDcielle, la propagande panserbe a continue, dans I'enlretemps, a croitre en etendue et intensite. C'est sur son coniple qu'il faut mettre ce dernier forfait, dont on doit recherclier la trame a Belgrade. II est indubi- table quil ne serail conciliable ni avec la dignite ni avec 1'esprit de conservation de la Monarchic austro-hongroise de rester plus longtemps inactive en presence de 1'agita- tion qui se poursuit de ce cole-la de sa frontiere et qui constitue une menace perpe- tuelle pour la surete et 1'integrite de ses territoires. En raison de cet etat de choses, la conduile dc merae que les revendicalions du Gouvernement austro-hongrois doivcnl elre considiirees comme juslifiees. Cependant l'atlitude que l'opinion pu- blique aussi bien que le Gouvernement ont adoptee dans ces derniers temps en Serbie, n'exclul pas la crainle que le Gouvernement serbe se refusera a acceder a ces reclamations el mime qu'il se laissera cntrainer a une attitude provocalrice a l'egard de lAutriche-Hongrie. Si celle-ci ne veut pas renoncer definilivement a son rang de Grande Puissance, il ne rcstera au Gouvernement auslro-hongrois plus rien d'autre a faire qu'a poursuivre ses revindications aupres du Gouvernement serbe. en exercant une forle pression et au besoin en prenant des mesures militaires dont le choix des moyens doit lui elre laisse. » — 49 — L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a appele parliculierement mon attention sur les deux derniers paragraphes de sa Note, indiquant avec insistance, avant de les lire, que c'etait la le point capital. J'en ai note litteralement le texte, que voici : « Le Gouver- nement allemand estime que la question actuelle est une aETaire a rtgler exclusi- vement entre l'Autriche-Hongrie el la Serbie et que les Puissances ont le plus serieux inleret a la restreindre aun deux Parties interessees. « Le Gouvernement' allemand desire ardcmment que le conflit soil localise, toule intervention dune autre Puissance devant, par le |eu naturel des alliances, pro- voquer des consequences incalculables. » J'ai fait remarquer a l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne qu'autanl ll paraitrait legitime qu'on demandatla punition de tons les complices de 1'attentat de Serajevo, autant, au contraire, il semblait difficile d'exiger des mesures inacceptablcs pour la dignite et la souverainete de la Serbie : le Gouvernement serbe, meme s'il voulait s'v sou- mettre, risquerait d'etre emporte par une revolution. J'ai egalemenl fait observer a M. de Schoen que sa Note n'envisageait que deux hypotheses : celle d'un refus pur et simple, ou celle d'une attitude de provocation de la Serbie. Une troisieme hypothese (qui laisserait la porte ouverte a un accom- modement) devrait en tous cas etre envisagee : celle d'une acceptation de la Serbie, qui consentirait a donner immediatement toutes les satisfactions pour la punition des complices et toutes les garanties pour la repression de la propagande anti-autrichienne, compatibles avec sa souverainete et sa dignite. J'ai ajoute que si, dans celte limile, les satisfactions poursuivies par I'Aulriche etaient admissibles, les modalites de leur application pourraient etre examinees; si la Serbie donnait des preuves evidentes de bonne volonte, on ne pourrait comprendre que l'Autriche refusat de se preler a la conversation. Peut-etre ne fallait-il pas rendre trop difficile a de tierces Puissances, qui ne sau- raient ni moralement ni sentimentalement se desinteresser'de la Serbie, une attitude conforme au desir exprime par I'Allemagne de localiser le conflit. M. de Schoen a reconnu la valeur de ces considerations et a declare vaguemenl que 1'espoir restait toujours possible. Comme je lui demandais s'il fallait attribuer a la Note autrichieune le caractere d'une simple mise en demeure, permettant une discussion, ou d'un ultimatum, il a repondu qu'il n'avait pas de sentiment personnel. Bienvenu-Mabtin. N° 29. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Berlin, le ih juillet 1914. La remise de la Note autrichieune a la Serbie a cause une profonde emotion. L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche declare que son Gouvernement ne saurait rien relran- Doccments DIPLOMATIQDE5. — Guerre europeenne. 7 - 50 — cher de ses exigences. A. la Wilhelmstras.se , ainsique dans lapresse, ontient le mOme langage. La plupart des Charges daffiiires presents a Berlin sont venus me voir ce matin. lis manifestent pen d'espoir dans une issue pacifique. Le Charge d'affaires de Russie a remarque aveo amertume que 1'Autriche avait remis sa Note au moment meme ou le President de la Republique ef le President du Conseil avaient quitte Pclersbourg. E inchnc a penser qu'une grandc partie de 1'opinion en Allemagne souhaite la guerre et voudrait saisir cette occasion dans laquelle 1'Autriche se montrera sansdoute plus unie que par le passe et ou 1'Empereur d' Allemagne, par un sentiment de solidarity monarchique et par liorreor de ['attentat, est moins porte a se montrer conciliant. M. de Jagow doit me recevoir a la fin de lapres-midi. Jules Cambom. IS" 30. |M. Jules Cambon, Ainbassadeur de la Republique franchise a Berlin, a M. Bien\ end-Martin, Ministre des AQaires etrangeres p. i. Berlin, le 2a juillet 1914. J'ai dernandeau Secretaire d'Etal, dans L'entrevue que j'ai eue avec lui, aujuurd'hui, s'il elait exact, comme I'annoncaienl les journaux, que 1'Autriche eiil remis une Note aux Puissances sur son difierend avec la Serbie, s'il lavait rei;ue, et comment il l'ap- preciait. M. de Jagow m'a repondu affirmativement, ajoutant que la note elait euergique , el qu'il l'approuvait, le Gouvernement Serbe ayant depuis longtemps. lasse la patience autncliienne. 11 considere d'ailleurs cette question comme d'ordre interieur pour 1'Autriche et il espere quelle sera localisee. J'ai continue eu lui disant que n'ayant recju encore aucune instruction, je ne vou- lais echanger avec lui que des vues toutes personnelles. Je lui ai demande alors si vraiment le Cabinet de Berlin avait totalement ignore les exigences aulrichiennes avant qu'elles fussent communiquees a Belgrade et, comme il me I'afnrmail, je lui ai manifesto ma surprise de le voir ainsi s'engager a soulenir des pretentions dont il ignorait la limite et la portee. «C'estbien, m'a dit M. de Jagow en m'interrompant , parce que nous causons enlre nous personnellement que je vous laisse me dire cela. » « Cerlainement, ai-je dit; mais si Pierre l or s'humiiie, la Serbie sera probablement livree a des troubles interieurs, cela ouvrira la porte a de nouvelles eventuahtes, et savez-vous ou vous serez conduit par Vienne ? » J'ai ajoute que le langage desjournaux allemands n'etait pas le langage de gens indillerents et Strangers a I'affaire, mais annoncait un appui actif. Enfin, j'ai remarque que la brievete du delai imparti a la Serbie pourse soumetlre, impressionnerait facheusement I'Euiope. — 51 — M. de Jagow me repondit qu'il s'attendait bicn a « un peu d'emotion » de la part des amis de la Serbie, mais qu'il complait qu'ils lui donneraient de bons conseils. « Je ne doute pas, lui dis-je alors, que la Russie fasse effort aupres du Cabinet de Belgrade pour 1'amener aux concessions acceptables; mais ce qu'on demande a l'un pourquoi ne pas le demander a l'autre; et si Ton compte que des conseils seront donnes a Belgrade, n'est-il pas legitime de compter que, d'un autre cote , des conseils seront aussi donnes a Vienne? » Le Secretaire d'Etat se laissa aller a dire que cela dependait des circonstances.mais se reprenant aussitot, il reptita que l'affaire devait etre localisee. II me dcmanda si vraiment je trouvaisla situation grave. " Assurement, lui repondis-je, car, si ce qui se passe a ete reflechi, je ne comprends pas qu'on ait coupe les ponts derriere soi. » Tout indique que l'AHemagne se dispose a appuyer d'une facon singulierement energique 1'attitude de l'Autriche. La faiblesse, manifestee depuis quelques annees par lalliee austro-hongroise , affaiblissait la confiance que Ton avait ici en elle. On la trouvait lourde a trainer. Les mauvais proces, comme 1'aflaire d'Agram et 1'affaire Friedjung, rendaient sa police odieuse en la couvrant de ridicule. On ne lui deman- dait que d'etre forte, mais Ion est satisfait quelle soit brutale. Un article paru dans le Lokal Anzeigcr de ce soir indique aussi dans la Chancel- lerie allemande un etat d'esprit dont, a Paris, nous sommes naturellementportesane pas tenir assez de compte , je veux parler du sentiment de la solidarite monarchique. Je suis convaincu que ce point de vue doit etre grandement considere pour apprecter 1'attitude de 1'Empereur Guillaume, dont la nature impressionnable a du etre sensible 4 1'assassinat dun Prince qui l'avait rei^u quelques jours auparavant. H n'en est pas moins frappant de voir le soin avec lequel M. de Jagow, et tous les fonctionnaires places sous ses ordres, affectent de dire k tout le monde qu'ils igno- raient la portee de la Note autrichienne remise a la Serbie. Jules Camion, N° 31. M. Paleologde, Ambassadeur de France a 'Sa'ini-Petersbourg, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etraiigeres p. i. Fitersbourg, Is 24 juillet 19 14. L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a donni communication aM. Sazonoff d'une note comminatoire k la Serbie. Les dispositions de 1'Empereur de Russie et de ses Ministres sonj des plus pa.ci« — 52 — fiques, ainsi que Ie President de la Republique et le President du Consefl ont pti s'en assurer directement; mais {'ultimatum que le Gouvernement austro-liongrois vient de remettre au Cabinet de Belgrade apporte dans la situation un element nou- veau et inquietant. L'opinion publique russe ne lolererait pas que 1'Autriche fit violence a la Serbie. La brievete du delai assigne pour l'ultimatum rend plus difficile encore Paction mo- deralrice que les Puissances de la Triple Entente pourraient exercer a Vienne. D'autre part, M. Sazonoff presume que I'AUemagne voudra soutenir son alliee, et je crains que cette impression ne soil exacte. La solidarity de la Triple Entente, en s'affirmant, peut seule empechei les Puissances germaniques d'accentuer leur atti- tude provocante. Paleologue. N° 32. M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Londres, le 2 i juillet 1914. Sir Ed. Grey m'ayant entretenu de son desir de ne rien negliger pour conjurer la crise, nous avons et6 d'accord pour penser que le Cabinet anglais pourrait demander au Gouvernement allemand de prendre l'initiative d'une demarche a Vienne pour offrir une mediation ..entre 1'Autriche et la Serbie, des quatre Puissances non direc- tement interessees. Si 1'AUemagne s'y prete, on gagnera du temps et c'est l'essentiel. Sir Ed. Grey m'a dit qu'il entretiendrait le Prince Lichnowsky du projet que je viens d'exposer. J'en ai fait part a mon CoUegue de Russie, qui apprehende une surprise de I'AUemagne et suppose que 1'Autriche n'aurait pas envoye son ultimatum sans accord prealable avec Berlin. Le Comte Benckendorff m'a dit que le Prince Lichnowsky, a son retour de conge, il y a un mois environ, lui avait temoigne des vues pessimistes au sujet des rapports entre Petersbourg et Berlin. 11 avait note 1'inquietude causee dans ceite derniere capitale par les bruits d'entente navale entre la Russie et 1'Angleterre. par la visitc du Tzar a Bucarest et par le renforcement de 1'armee russe. Le Comte Benckendorff en avait conclu qu'on envisagerait volontiers en Allemagne une guerre avec la Russie. Le Sous-Secretaire d'Etat a ete frappe , comme nous tous de 1'air soucieux du Prince Lichnowsky depuis son retour de Berlin et il pense que si I'AUemagne l'avait voulu, elle aurait pu empecher la remise de f ultimatum. — - 53 — La situation est done des plus graves, et nous ne voyons aucun moyen d'enrayer la marche des evenements. Cependant le Comte Benckendorff croit bon de tenter la demarche sur laquelle je me suis mis d'accord avec Sir Ed. Grey. Paul Cambon. N° 33. M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Londres, le ilx juillet igi4. Le Ministre serbe a re?u cette nuit de M. Pachitch un telegramme disant que le Gouvernernent austro-hongrois lui avait adresse son ultimatum dont le delai expire demain, soit samedi a 6 heures. M. Pachitch ne donne pas les tennes de la commu- nication autrichienne, mais, si elle est telle que le Times de ce jour le rapporte, il semble impossible que le Gouvernernent serbe puisse 1'accepter. Nous nous sommes demande avec mon Collegue russe, qui considere comme extremement difficile pour son Gouvernernent de ne pas soutenir la Serbie, quelle intervention pourrait arreter le conflit. Sir Ed. Grey m'ayant convoque pour cet apres-midi, je me propose de lui suggerer de reclamer Intervention officieuse du Gouvernernent allemand a Vienne pour empecher une attaque subite. Paul Cambon. IN 34. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., a Stockholm (pour le President du Conseil) , Belgrade, Saint-Peters- bourg, Berlin, Vienne, Rome. Paris, le ik juillet igi4- L'Ambassadeur d'Aulriche ayant communique la Note de son Gouvernernent & Sir Ed. Grey, celui-ci a fait observer que jamais declaration aussi formidable n'avait ete adressee par un Gouvernernent a un autre; il a attire 1'attention du Comte Mensdorff sur les responsabitites assumees par 1'Autriche. — 54 — Envisageant une possibility de couilit enLre PAutriche et la Russic, Sir Ed. Grey se propose de reclamer le concours du Gouvernement ailemand en vue d'une mediation des quatre Puissances non interessees directement dans I'affaire Serbe : Angletcrre, France, Italie et Allemagne; cette mediation s'exercerait a la fois a Vienne et a Petersbourg. J'ai donne au Ministre de Serbie des conseils de prudence et suis dispose a m'associer a toute action conciliante a Vienne, dans Fespoir que FAutriche ne main- tiendra pas Fintegralite de ses exigences vis-a-vis d'un petit Etat, si celui-ci se montre dispose a donner toutes les satisfactions jugees compatibles avec son independance et sa souverainete. Bienvenu-Martin. N° 35. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Berlin, ie 25 juillct 191 A. Le Ministre de Belgique se montre tres preoccupe des evenements. II considere que PAutriche et PAllemagne ont voulu profiter du coikx>uts de cir- constances qui fait qu'en ce moment la Russie et lAngleterre leur paraissent mena- cees de troubles inteneurs, et qu'en France le regime mditaire est discute; aussi ne croit-il pas a Pignorance que le Gouvernement de Berlin affecte au sujet de la demarche de PAutriche. II pense que si la forme n'en a pas ete soumise au cabinet de Berlin, le moment en a ele babilement choisi avec lui pour s,urprendre la Triple Entente dans un moment de tk'sorganisation. II a vu PAmbassadeur d'ltalie qui vient d'interrompre son conge pour rentrer. II paraitrait que PItalie serait surprise, pour ne pas dire plus, d'avoir ete tenue a l'ecart de toute 1'adaire par ses deux alfiees. Jules Cambon. — 55 N° 36. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. , a Stockholm (pour le President du Conseil), et a Londres, Berlin, Petersbourg, Vienne. Paris, le 25 juillet njii. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagae est venu protester a midi contre un article de L'Echo de Paris, qui qualiliait de « menace allemande » sa demarche d'hier. M. de Schoen a dit a un certain nombre de journahstes, et est venu affirmer a la Direction politique, qu'il n*y a pas eu « concert » entre 1'Autriche et l'Allemagne pour la Note autrichienne et que le Gouvernement allemand ignorait celle-ci, bien qu'il Petit approuvee ulterieurement, quand elle lui a ete communiquee, en meme temps qu'aux autres Puissances. Le Baron de Schoen a ajoote qa'iL n'y avail pas davanlage « menace » : le Gouver- nement allemand s'etait contente d'indiquer qu'il estimait desirable de localiser le conflit et que l'intervention d'autres Puissances risquerait de 1'aggraver. Le Directcur politique p. L a pris acte de la demarche du Baron de Schoen. L'ayant prie de repeter les termes memes des deux, derniers parag raphes de sa Note, il lui a fait remarquer que les termes indiquaient la volonte de l'Allemagne de s'in- terposer entre les Puissances et l'Aulriche. M. Berthelot a ajoute qu'aucune confi- dence n'ayant d'ailleurs ete faite a aucun journaliste, l'information de L'Echo dc Paris n'engageait que ce journal, et marquait seulement que la demarche allemande parais- sait avoir ete connue autre part qu'au Ouai d'Orsay, et en dehors de lui. L'Ambas- sadeur d'Allemagne n'a pas releve 1'allusion. D'aulre part, l'Ambassadeur d'Aulriche a Londres est venu egalement rassurer Sir Edward Grey, en lui disant que la Note autrichienne ne constituait pas un « ulti- matum «, mais une « demande de reponse avec limitation de temps »; ce qui signifiait que, si les demandes aulnchiennes ne sont pas acceptees ce soir a six heures, le Ministre d'Aulriche quittera Belgrade, et le Gouvernement auslro-hongrois commen- cera les actes de « preparation • mihtaire, mais non les » operations » rnilitaires. Le Cabinet de Londres, comme ceux de Paris et de Petersbourg, a fait donner a Belgrade le conseil d'exprimer des regrets pour les complicites qui pourraient etre prouvees dans I'attentat de Serajevo et de promettre a cet egard les plus larges satisfactions. II a ajoute que, pour le reste, c'est a la Serbie qu'il appartient de repondre, dans les termes que l'interet du pays lui paraitra conseiller. Le Ministre d'Anglelerre a Belgrade doit consulter ses Collegues fran^ais et russe et conseiller au Gouvernement serbe, si ceux-ci en ont egalement linstruction, de donner satisfac- tion sur tous les points ou il jugera pouvoir le faire. Sir E. Grey a dit au Prince Lichnowsky (qui ne lui a fait jusqu'ici aucunc commu- nication analogue a celle de M. de Schoen a Pans) que, si la Note autricliienne n'ame- nart aucune dilliculte entre l'Aulriche et la Puissie, le Gouvernement anglais n'aurait, — 56 — pas a s'en occuper, mais qu'il elait a craindre que la raideur dc la Note et la brievete du delai indique n'amenassent une tension. Dans ces conditions, la seule chance qu'on aperc,oive d'eviter un conflit consisterait dans une mediation de la France, de l'Allemagne, de 1'Italie el de I'Anglelerre, l'Allemagne seule pouvant exercer dans ce sens une action sur le Gouvernement de Vienne. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a repondu qu'il Iransmeltrait cette suggestion a Berlin, mais a laisse entendre a 1'Ambassadeur de Russie, qui est son parent, que l'Allemagne ne se preterait a aucune demarche a Vienne. Bienvenu-Martin'. N° 37. M. de Fleuriau, Charge d'Affaires de France a Londres, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Londres, le a5 juillet 1914. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne est venu au Foreign Office affirmer que son Gouver- nement refuserait de s'immiscer dans le conflit qui divise 1'Autriche et la Serbie. Sir E. Grey a repondu que, sans le concours de l'Allemagne a Vienne, 1'Angleterre ne saurait agir a Petersbourg. Si cependant 1'Autriche et la Russie mobilisaient toutes deux, ce serait bien 1'occasion d'une intervention des quatre autres Puissances. Le Gouvernement allemand maintiendrait-il alors son attitude passive et refuserait-il de sejoindre a 1'Angleterre, a la France et a l'llalie? Le Prince Lichnousky ne le pense pas, puisqu'il ne s'agirait plus de difficulty's entre Vienne et Belgrade, mais d'un conflit entre Vienne et Petersbourg. Sir E. Grey a ajoute cette observation que, si la guerre venait a eclater, aucune Puissance en Europe ne pourrait s'en desinteresser. de Fleuriau. N° 38. M. PaLeolocue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Petersbourg, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Petersbourg, le 25 juillet 191^. Le Gou,vernement Russe va s'efforcer d'obtenir du Gouvernement austro-hongrois une prolongation du delai assigne par 1'ullimalum, afin que les Puissances puissent — 57 — se former une opinion sur le dossier judiciaire dont la communication leur est offerte. M. Sazonoff a prie l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne de signaler a son Gouvernement le danger de la situation; il s'est abstenu toutefois de faire allusion aux mesures que la Russie serait sans doute amenee a prendre, si la Serbie. etait menacee dans, son independance nationale ou dans lintegrite de son territoire; les reponses evasives et les recriminations du Comte de Pourtales ont laisse a M. Sazonoff une impression defavorable. Un Conseil des ministres sera tenu demain sous la presidence de 1'Empereur. M. Sazonoff garde toute sa moderation : « II faut eviter, m'a-t-il dit, tout ce qui pour- rait pre'cipiter la crise. J'estime que, meme si le Gouvernement austro-hongrois passait a Taction contre la Serbie, nous ne devrions pas rompre les negociations. » Paleologue. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., a M. Dumaine, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne. Paris, le 25 juillet 191/1. Le Gouvernement russe a donne comme instructions a son representant a Vienne de demander au Gouvernement aulrichien une prolongation du delai fixe a la Serbie, pour permettre aux Puissances de se faire une opinion sur le dossier que I'Autriche a offert de leur communiquer, et en vue d'eviter des consequences regrettables pour tous. Un refus oppose par l'Autriche-Hongrie a cette demande oterait toute signification a la demarche qu'elle a faite aupres des Puissances, en leur communiquant sa Note, et la mettrait en contradiction avec la morale internationale. Le Gouvernement russe a demande que vous fassiez d'urgence une demarche analogue aupres du Comte Berchtold; je vous prie d'appuyer la demande de votre Collegue. Le Gouvernement russe a adresse la meme demande a Londres, Rome, Berlin et Bucarest. Bienvenu-Martin. Documents diplomatiques. — Gu 58 N° 40. M. de Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires de Fiance a Londres, a M. Bienvemj-Martiin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Londres, le 25 juiildt 191ft- SirEd. Grey a recu communication ce matin des instructions qui prescrivenl a I'Am- bassadeur de Kussie a Vienne , de detnander la prolongation du delai donne a la Serine par la Note autrichienne d'avant-hier. M. Sazonoff demandait que la demarche russe flit appuyee par I'Ambassade d'Anglelerre. Sir Ed. Grey a tclegraphie a Sir M. de Bunsen de s'exprimer dans le meme sens que son collegue russe et de rappeler la communication autrichienne qui lui a ete faite hier soir tard par le Comte Mensdorf, communication aux termes de laquelle le defaut d'adhesion de la Serbie aux conditions de 1'ultimatum n'entralnerait, des aujourd'hui, qu'une rupture diplomatique et non des operations militaires imme- diates. Sir Ed. Grey en concluait que le temps serait laisse aux Puissances pour intervenir, et chercher les moyens de denouer la crise. de Fleuriau. N° 41. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Berlin, le a5 juillet j 9 1 ^ . Ce matin , le "Charge d'affaires d'Angleterre a demande a M. de Jagow, d'apres les ordres de son Gouvernement, siTAllemagne voudrait se joindre a TAnglcterre, a la France et a'l'Italie, pour intervenir aupres de l'Autriche et de la Russie afin d'ernpe- cher un conflit et, en premier lieu, pour demander'a Vienne une prolongation du delai imparti a la Serbie par 1'ultimatum. Le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires etrangeres a repondu qu'il avait deja, des la reception de ^a depeche du Prince Lichnowsky lui faisant part des intentions de Sir E. Grey, telegraphie ce matin meme a V Ambassadeur de la Grande-Bretagne a Vienne pour qu'il demandat cette prolongation au Gomte Berchtold. Malheureusement le Comte Berchtold est a fschl. Au reste, M. de Jagow ne croit pas que cette demande soit accueillie. Le Charge d'alTaires d'Angleterre s'est egalement enquis aupres de M. de Jagow, — 59 — comme je L'avais fait hier, si 1'AUemagne n'avait eu. aucune connaissance de la Note autrichienne avant quelle fut loncee,. et a regu une reponse si nettement negative qu'il ne pourrait insister; mais- il n'a pu s'empecher de s'etonner du blanc-seing, donne par 1'AUemagne a i'Autriche. M. de Jagow lui ayant repondu que la question etait pour I'Autriche une question inlerieure, il a remarque quelle etait devenue au premier chef Internationale. Jules Cambon. N" 42. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, a M. le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Berlin, le 25 juillet 1914. Le Charge d'affaires de Russie a recu pour instruction de demander au Gouver- nemenl aliemand d'insister aupres du Cabinet de Vienne, en vue de faire prolonger le delai de 1'ultimatum. M. de Jagow ne lui ayant donne rendez-vous qu'a la fin de rapres-midi', c'est-a- dire au moment oil 1'ultimatum viendra a echeance, M. Broniewski a envoye d'urgence une note ecrite au Secretaire d'Etal, dans laquelle il marque que le retard de la communication faite par I'Autriche aux Puissances rend 1'effet de cette communi- cation illusoire, puisqu'elle ne leur laisse pas le temps de prendre. connaissance des faits allegues, avant 1'expi'ration du delai fixe. II insiste tres vivement sur la necessite' de le prolonger, si 1'on n'a pas en vue de creer une grande crise. Jules Cambon. N° 43. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Berlin, le 25 juillet 1914- Le Charge d'affaires de Russie a fait aupres du Secretaire d'Etat la demarche qui lui etait prescrite, en vue d'une prolongation du delai de 1'ultimatum; M. de Jagow lui a repondu qu'il avait deja transmis une indication de ce genre a Vienne, mais qu'il estimait que toutes ces demarches etaient trop tardives. M. Broniewski a insiste, en disant que si le delai ne pouvait etre prolonge, les — 60 — mesures d'execution pouvaient au moins etre retardees, de maniere a permettre aux Puissances de s'emplover a eviter un confiit. II a ajoute que la Note autrichienne etait coneue dans des termes calcules pour blesser la Serbie et la forcer a la guerre. M. de Jagow lui a repondu qu'il ne s'agissait pas d'une guerre, mais dune « execution » dans une affaire locale. Le Charge d'affaires a repris, en exprimant le regret que le Gouverneraent allemand ne mesurat pas ses responsabilites dans le cas oil des hostilites se produiraient . qui pourraient s'etendre au reste de l'Europe : a quoi, M. de Jagow a repondu qu'il se refusait a croire a de pareilles consequences. Le Charge d'affaires de Russie a recueilli comme nioi le bruil que l'Autriche , tout en declarant ne vouloir aucune annexion de lerritoire, occuperait des parties de la Serbie jusqu'a cequ'elle ait complete satisfaction. « On sait, m'a-t-il dil, ce que signilie ce mot satisfaction. ■> Les impressions de M. Broniewski sur les arrieres-pensees de 1'Allemagne sont tres pes.simistes. Jules Cambox. N° Mt. M Barrere, Ambassadeur de France a Rome, a M. BiENVENU-MARTiN,Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Rome, le 2 5 juillet igii. L'Ambassadeur de Russie a fait ,i la Consulta la demarche prescrite par M. Sazonoff aux representants de la Russie a Paris, Berlin, Rome, Bucarest, et qui tendait a obtenir de ces dilferents Cabinets qu'ils associent leur action a celle de la Russie a Vienne en vue d'obtenir une prolongation du delai impart! a la Serbie. En 1'absence du Marquis de San Giuliano, M. Salandra et M. de Martino ont repondu qu'ils se mettraient en rapport avec le Ministre des AITaires etrangeres, mais que sa reponse ne pourrait leur parvenir que vers six beures, c'est-a-dire trop tard pour enlreprendre une demarche a Vienne. Barrere. M. Dumaine, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Vienne, le 25 juillet igi4. Le Charge d'affaires de Russie a req;u de son Gouvernement 1'ordre de demander un delai pour rultimatum a la Serbie, au moment meme oil le Comle Berchtold — 01 — parlaitpour Isclil avec ('intention, au dire des joumaux, d'y rester pres de l'Empereur jusqu'a la fin de la crise. Le Prince Koudachell la neanmoins informe de la. demarche qu'il avait a remplir par deuiftelegrammes en clair, lun en cours de route, lautre a destination. II n'en attend aucun elTet. Le Baron Macchio, Secretaire general du Ministere des AMaires etrangeres, a qui le Prince a communique le sens de ses instructions et de sa demarche telegraphique, a teinoigne unc froideur glaciale quand son interlocuteur lui a represente que donner a juger des griefs avec pieces justificaiives, sans laisser le temps d'etudier le dossier, est contraire a la courtoisie internationale; le Baron Macchio a replique que parfois 1'interet dispense d'etre courlois. Le Gouvernement aulrichien est resolu a infliger J la Serbie une humiliation : il n'acceptera lintervention d'aucune puissance, jusqu'a ce que le coup ait ete porte et recu en pleine face par la Serbie. Dumaine. N° 46. M. Boppe, Ministre de France a Belgrade, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Belgrade, 25 juillet i()i4- M. Paolutrh vient de me donner connaissance de la reponse qui sera remise ce soir au Ministre d'Autriche. Le Gouvernement serbe accepte de pubher demain au Journal offtciel la declaration qui lui est demandee; il la communiquera egalement a larmee, par un ordre du jour; il dissoudra les societes de defense nationale et toutes aulres associations suscep- tibles d'agir contre l'Autriche-IIongrie; il s'engage a modifier la loi sur la presse, a renvoyer du service de 1'armee, de 1'instruction publique et des autres administrations, tous fonclionnaires dont la participation dans la propagande sera prouvee ; il demande seulement que le nom de ces fonclionnaires lui soit communique. Quant a la participation dans l'enquete de fonclionnaires autrichiens, il demande qu'on lui explique comment elle s'exercerait; il ne pourrait accepter que celle qui correspondrait au droit international ou aux relations de bon voisinage. II accepte toutes les autres exigences de ('ultimatum et declare que si le Gouver- nement austro-hongrois ne sen contente pas, il est pret a s'en remettre a la decision du tribunal de La Haye, ou a celle des grandes Puissances qui ont pris part a l'elabo- ration de la declaration du 3i mars 1909. Boppe. N° 47. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, a M. Bienve.nu-Marun, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Berlin, le 15 juiffrt 19 14. Pendant tout l'apxes-midi le bruit, a couru avec persistans que la Serbie se sou- niertaJL aux exigences autricliiennes; ce sorr les journaux pubhent des supplements annonrant la rupture a Belgrade et le depart du Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie. Ce. bruit vient d'etre confirme au correspondant de I'Agence Havas a la Wilhelm- strasse. Des groupes considerables de plusieurs centaines de personnes slalionnenl ict devant les bureaux des journaux, el une nombrense manifestation de jeunes gens vient de passer sur Pariser-platz en poussant des cris de « hurrah ! » pour 1'Allemagne, et en chantant des chants patriotiques ; elle se rend a la Colonne de la Victoire, a 1'Ambassade d'Autriche, puis a celle d'ltahe. C'est une explosion significative de chauvinisme. Une personnalite allemande, que j'ai vue ce soir, m'a avoue qu'on avait craint ici que la Serbie n'aceeptat en bloc la note autrichienne, en se reservant d'en discuter I'application., pour gagner du temps et permettre aux efforts des Puissances de se produire utilement avant la rupture. Dans les milieux, financiers, on prend deja des mesures pour parer a toute even- tualite, cor on n'y apercoit pas le moyen d'eurayer la ense, en presence de L'appui determine que donne 1'Allemagne a 1'Autriehe. Je ne vois, pour moi, que 1'Anglelerre qui puisse, en Europe, etre ecoutee i Berlin. Quoi qu'il arrive, Paris, Petersbourg et Londres ne pan-iendront a maintenir dignei ment la paix qu en se montranl fermement et absolument unis. Jules Caubon. M. Domaine, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, a M. Bif.nvem -Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Vieone, le 2&juillet 19 1 i. On me remet votre telegramme prerisement a 1'heure oil expire le delai imparti a la Serbie. D'autre part, je viens de vous fairesavoir dans cpaelles conditions le Charge d'affaires de Russie a du executer sa demarche. II semble inutile de 1'appuyer quand il n'en est plus temps. Dans l'apres-midi, le bruit s'etait repandu que la Serbie avait cede a 1'ultimatum tout en ajoutant quelle eu appelait aux Puissances. Mais on assure, au dernier - 63 — frioment, que le Ministre d'Autriche vieot de quitter precipitamment Belgrade; il auraitjuge insuflisante 1'adhesion du Gouvernement serbe aux conditions posees par son Gouvernement. DUMAINE. N° 49. Reponse da Gouwnmmcnl serbe a la Note austrd-^honijroise. ( Comm unique par M. Vssnittli, Ministre de Serbie, le 27 juillet. ) Belgrade, le 2 5 juillet 1914. Le Gouvernement royal serbe a recu la communication du Gouvernement imperial et royal du io/a3 de ce mois et il est persuade que sa reponse eloignera tout malen- lendu qui menace de comprometlre les lions rapports de voisinage entre la Monarchie auslro-hongroise et le Royaume dc Serbie. Le Gouvernement royal a conscience que les protestations qui ont apparu taut a la tribune de la Skoupchtina nalionale que dans les declarations et les actes des representanls responsables de l'Etat , protestations auxquelies coupa court la declaration du Gouvernement serbe faite le 1 8/3 1 mars 1909, ne se sont plus renouvelees vis- a-vis de la grande Monarchie voisine en aucune occasion, et que depuis cc temps, autant de la part des Gouvernements royaux qui se sont succede que de la part de leurs organes, aucune tentative n'a ete faite dans le but de changer l'etat de choses politique et juridique cree en Bosnie-Herzegovine. Le Gouvernement royal constate que sous ce rapport le Gouvernement imperial et royal n'a fait aucune representation, sauf en ce qui concerne un Iivre scolaire, representation au sujet de laquelle le Gouvernement imperial et royal a rec;u line explication entierement satisfaisante. La Serbie a, a de nombreuses reprises, donne des preuves de sa politique pacifique et moderee pendant la duree de la crise balkainque, et e'est grace a la Serbie ct aux sacrilices qu'elle a faits dans l'interet exclusif de la paix europeenne, que cette paix a ete preservee. Le Gouvernement royal ne ,peut pas elre .rendu responsable des manifestations d'un caracteTc.prive telles que les articles des journaux et les agissements des socieles, manifestations qui se produisent dans presque tous les pays comme une chose ordi- naire et qui echappent en regie gencrale au controle ofCciel, d'autant moins que le Gouvernement royal, lors de la solution de toute une serie de questions qui se sont preseritecs entre la Serbie et 1'Autriche-Hongrie, a montre une grande prevenance et a reussi, de cette faijon, a en regler le plus grand nombre au profit du progress des deux pays voisins. C'est pourquoi'le Gouvernement royal a ete peniblemerit surpris par les affirma- tions d'apres lesquelles des personnes du royaume de Serbie auraient parlieipe a la preparation de lattentat commis a Sarajevo. II s'attendait a etre invito a collaborer a la reoherche de tout ce qui.se rapporte a ce crime etal etait pret, pour.prouver par — 04 — ties actes son entiere correction, a agir contre toutes les personnes a 1'egard desquelles des communications lui sentient faites. Se rendant done au desir du Gouvernement imperial et royal, le Gouvernemenl royal est dispose a remettre anx tribunaux tout sujet serbe, sans egard a sa situation el a son rang, pour la complicate duquel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, des preuves lui seraient fournies. II s'engage specialement a fane publier a la premiere page du Journal ojjiciel en date du 1 3/a 6 juiilet I'enonciation suivante : « Le Gouvernement royal de Serbie condamne toute propagande qui serait dirigee contre l'Autriclie-Hongrie, e'est-a-dire 1'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en der- nier lieu a detacher de la Monarchic austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partie , et il deplore sincerement les consequences funestes de ces agissements criminels. « Le Gouvernement royal regrette que certains officiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participe, d'apres la communication du Gouvernement imperial et royal, a la propagande susmentionnee et fompromis par la les relations de bon voisinage aux- quelles le Gouvernement royal s'elait solennellement engage par la declaration du 1 8/3 1 mars 1 909. Le Gouvernemenl, qui desapprouve et repudie toute idee ou tentative dune immixtion dans les destinees des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autnche-Hongrie que ce soit, considere qu'il est de son devoir d'averlir formellement les ofliciers, les fonclionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorenavant il procedera avec la derniere rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils. agissements, qu'il mettra tous ses efforts a prevenir et a reprimer. » Cetle enonciation sqra portee a la connaissance de 1'armee royale par un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majeste le roi par S. A. \\. le prince^ heritier Alexandre, et sera publiee dans le prochain Bulletin officiel de 1 annuo Le Gouvernement royal s'engage en outre : .i" A introduire dans la premiere convocation reguliere de la Skoupchtina une disposition dans la loi de l.i presse par laquelle sera punie de la maniere la plus severe la provocation a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchic austro-hongroise, ainsi que contre toute publication dont la tendance generate serait dirigee contre 1'integrite territoriale de 1'Autriche-Hongrie. II se charge, lors de la revision de la Constitution, qui est prochaine, de faire introduire dans ['article 22 de la Constitution un amendement de telle sorte que les publications ci-dessus puissent etre confisquees, ce qui, actuellement , aux termes categoriques de I'article 22 de la Constitution , est impossible. 2° Le gouvernement ne possede aucune preuve et la Note du gouvernement imperial et royal ne lui en fournit non plus aucune que la Societe Norodna Obrana et les autres societes similaires aient commis jusqu'a ce jour quelque acte criminel de ce genre par le fait d'un de leurs membres. Neanmoins le gouvernement royal acceptera la demande du gouvernement imperial et royal et dissoudra la Societe Norodna Obrana et toute autre societe qui agirait contre i'Autriche-Hongrie. 3° Le gouvernement royal serbe s'engage a eliminer sans delai de linstruction — 65 — publique en Serbie tout ce quisert ou pourrait servira fomenterla propagande contre I'Autriche-Hongrie, quand le gouvernement imperial et royal lui fournira des fails et des preuves de cette propagande. l\° Le gouvernement royal accepte du moins d'eloigner du service milifaire ceux dont lenquete judiciaire aura prouve qu'ils sont coupables d'actes diriges conlre lintegrite du territoire de la monarchie austro-hongroise ; il attend que le gouverne- ment imperial et royal lui communique ulterieurement les noms et les faits de ces officiers et fonctionnaires aux fins de la procedure qui doit s'ensuivre. 5° Le gouvernement royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens et de la portee de la demande du gouvernement imperial el royal tendant a ce que la Serbie s'engage a accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du gouvernement imperial et royal. Mais il declare qu'il admeltra toute collaboration qui repondrait aux pnncipes du droit international et a la procedure criminelle, ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisi- nage. 6° Le gouvernement royal, cela va de soi, considere de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquete contre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, eventuellement, auraient ete meles au complol du l 5/28 juinet qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du royaume. Quant a la participation a cette enquete des agents des autorites austro-hongroises qui seraient delegues a cet effet par le gouvernement imperial et royal, le gouvernement royal ne peut pas l'accepter, car ce serait une violation de la Constitution et dela loi sur la procedure criminelle. Cependant, dans des cas concrets, des communications sur les resultats de 1'instruction en question pourraient etre donnees aux organes austro- hongrois. 7 Le gouvernement royal a fait proceder des le soir merne de la remise de la note a 1'arrastation du commandant Voija- Tankositch. Quant a Milan Ciganovitcli, qui est sujet de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et qui jusqu'au 1 5/28 juin elait employe (comme aspirant) a la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore etre joint. Le gouvernement imperial el royal est prie de vouloir bien, dans la forme accou- tumee, faire connaitre le plus tot possible les presomptions de culpabilite, ainsi que les preuves eventuelles de culpa-bilite qui ont ete recueillies jusqu a ce jour par 1'enquele a Sarajevo, aux finsd'enquetes ulterieures. 8° Le gouvernement serbe renforcera et etendrales mesures prises pour empecher le trafic illicile d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la frontiere. II va de soi qu'il ordon- nera tout de suite une enquete et punira severement les fonctionnaires des fron- tieres sur la ligne Schabac-Loznica, qui ont manque a leur devoir et laisse passer les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo. 9 Le gouvernement royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les propos que ces fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie qu'a l'etranger, ont tenus apres 1'attenlat dans des interviews et qui, d apres raffirmation du gouvernement imperial et royal, ont ete hostiles a la Monarchie, des que le gouvernement imperial et royal lui aura commu- nique les passages en question de ces propos, et des qu'il aura demontre que les propos employes ont en effet ete tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, propos au sujet Documents diplomatiques. — Guerre europeeone. 9 — 66 — desquels le gouvernement royal lui-meme aura soin de recueillir dps preuves et con- victions. i o° Le gouvernement royal informe le gouvernement imperial et royal de l'exe- culion des mesure9 comprises dans les points precedents en taut que cela n'a pas etc deja fait par la presente note. Aussitot que chaque mesure aura ete ordonnee et executee , dans le cas oil le gouvernement imperial et royal ne serait pas satisfait de cette reponse, le gouvernement royal serbe, considerant qu'il est de l'interet com- mun de ne pas precipiter la solution de cette question, est pret, comme toujours, occepter une entente pacifique, en remettant cette question soit a la decision du Tribunal international de La Haye , soit aux grandes Puissances qui ont pris part ■j 1 elaboration de la declaration que le gouvernement serbe a faite le 1 8/3 1 niar^ ■9°9- 67 CHAPITRE IV DE LA RUPTURE DES RELATIONS DIPLOMATIQUES (25 JUILLET 19H), A LA DECLARATION DE GUERRE DE L'AUTRICHE A LA SERRIE (28 JUILLET 1914) 69 — N° 50. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. I.» a bord de la France (pour le President du Conseil), et a MM. les Am- bassadeursde France a Londres, Petersbourg, Berlin, Vienne, Bome. Paris, le 26 juillet 1 9i4- On peut resunier ainsi les evenements de samedi : refus de l'Aulriche d'acceder a la prolongation de delai demandee par la Russie, — depart du Ministre d'Autriche de Belgrade apres remise dune reponse a la Serbie, eslimee insuflisante, bien quelle eut atteint la limite des concessions jugees possibles, — ordre de mobilisation donne en Serbie, dont le Gouvernement s'est retire a Kragoujewatz, oil il est suivi par les Ministres de France et de Russie. Le Gouvernement italien, a qui la note autrichienne a ete communiquee ven- dredi, sans demande d'appui ui meme d'avis, n'apas, en 1'absence du Marquis de San Giuliano qui ne rentre que mardi, pu repondre a la suggestion du Gouverne- ment russe qui proposait d'insister a Vienne pour une prolongation de delai. II resulte d'une confidence de 1'Ambassadeur d'ltalie a M. Paleologue qua Vienne on continue a se bercer de l'illusion que la Bussie « ne liendra pas le coup ». II ne faut pas oublier que I'ltalie n'est lenue par les engagements de la Triple Alliance que si elle a ete prea- lablement consultee. De Petersbourg, nous apprenons que M. Sazonoff a conseille a la Serbie de demander la mediation anglaise. Dans le Conseil des Ministres du 25, lenu en pre- sence de 1'Empereur, la mobilisation des treize corps d'armee eventuellement destines a operer conlre lAutriche a ete envisagee; cette mobilisation ne serait toutcfois rendue effective que si lAutriche contraignait la Serbie par la force des amies, et seulement apres avis du Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a qui le soin incombe de fixer la date, liberie lui elant laissee de continuer les negociations meme dans le cas oil Belgrade serait occupee. L'opinion russe manifeste 1'impossibilite politique et morale pour la Bussie de laisscr ecraser la Serbie. A Londres, la demarche allemande a ete faite le a5, dans les memes termes que par le Baron de Schoen a Paris. Sir E. Grey a repondu au Prince Lichnovvski que, si la guerre venait a eclaler, aucune puissance en Europe ne pourrait s'en desinte- resser. II n'apas precise, davantage et a tenu un langage tres reserve au Ministre de Serbie. La communication faite le 25 au soir par 1'Ambassadeur d'Autriche rend Sir E. Grey plus oplimisle; puisque la rupture diplomatique ne doit pas entrainer des operations militaires immediates, le Secretaire d'Etat veut encore esperer que les Puissances auront le temps d'intervenir. A Berlin, le langage tenu par le Secretaire d'Elat au Charge d'Affaires de Russie est peu salisfaisant el dilaloire; comme celui-ci lui demandait de s'associer a une de- marche a Vienne pour une prolongation de delai, il a repondu qu'il avail deja agi dans ce sens, maisque c'etait trop tard; a la demande d'oblenir un delai pour prolonger — 70 — les mesures d'execution, ll a replique qu'il s'agissait dune question interieure et non pas d'une guerre mais d'une execution locale. M. de Jagow feint de ne pas croire que Paction autrichienne puisse entrainer des consequences generates. II se produit une veritable explosion de chauvinisme a Berlin. L'Empereur d'Alle- magne revient directement a Kiel. M. Jules Camion eslime que, aux premieres mesures militaires de la Russie, 1'AHemagne repondrait immedialement et n'attendrait vraisemblablement pas un pretexte pour nous attaquer. A Vienne, 1'Ambassadeur de France n'a pas eu le temps de se joindre a la de- marche de son collegue russe pour obtenir une prolongation du delai fixe a la Serbie; ll ne le regrette pas, celte demarche ayant ete repoussee categoriquement, et l'Angleterre n'ayant pas non plus eu le temps de donner des instructions a cet egard a son agent. Une note de 1'Ambassade d'Anglcterre m'a die remise : elle rend compte de la conference de 1'Ambassadeur britannique a Petersbourg avec M. Sazonofl et M. Paleologue. Sir Edward Grey estime que les quatre Puissances non interessees devraient insister aupres de la Russie et de I'Autriche pour que leurs armees ne fran- chissent pas ta frontiere et donnent le temps a l'Angleterre, a la France, a 1'Allemagne et a I'ltalie d'exercer feur mediation. Si rAllemagnc accepte, le Gouvernement anglais a des raisons de penser que I'ltalie serait heureuse de s'associer egalement a Paction [Ointe de l'Angleterre et de la France: Padhesion de PAUemagne est essentielle, car pas plus I'Autriche que la Russie ne lolererait d'autre intervention que d'amis impar- liaux ou d'allies. Bienvenu-Martin. N" 51. M. Barrere, Ambassadeur de France a Rome, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Rome, le 26 juiilet 1914. Un lelegramme de Vienne recn a Pinstant a la Consulta lui fait connaitre que la rupture diplomatique est effective entre I'Autriche et la Serbie. et que I'Autriche procede a des mesures militaires. Le Marquis di San Giuliano, qui est a Fiuggi, ne reviendra i Rome qu'apres- demain. J'ai eu aujourdhui avec le President du Conseil un interessant entretien sur la situation, dont il reconnait toute la gravite. De lensemble de ses propos, j'ai emporte 1c sentiment que le Gouvernement italien voudrait, en cas de conflit, se tenir en dehors et rester dans une attitude d'observation. M. Salandra ma dit, a ce propos : « Nous ferons les plus grands efforts pour em- _ 71 — pecher la paix d'etre rompue : notre situation est un peu analogue a celle de 1'Angle- terre. Peut-elre pourrions-nous faire quelque chose dans un sens pacifique avec leS Anglais ». M. Salandram'a conlirme que la note autrichienne avait ete communiquee a Rome a la derniere heure. Barrere. N° 52. M. Barrere, x\mbassadeur de France a Rome, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. L Rome, le 20 juilk-t 1914. M. Sazonoff a dit hier a FAmbassadeur d'ltalie a Petersbourg que la Russie se servirait de tons les moyens diploraatiques pour eviter le conllit et quelle ne renon- cait pas a lespoir qu'une mediation pourrait amener 1'Autriche a une attitude moins intransigeante ; mais qu'on ne pouvait cependant lui demander de laisser ecraser la Serbie. Je remarque qrie la majeure partie de l'opinion publique italieime est hostile a 1'Autriche dans cette grave affaire. Barrere. N" 53. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., a M. de Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires a Londres. Paris, le 26 juillet 191S. M. Paleologue m'adresse le tetegramnie suivant : « M. Sazonoff conseille au Gou- vernement serbe de solliciter la mediation du Gouvernement britannique. » D'accord avec M. Paul Cambon, je pense que le Gouvernement francais ne peut qu'exprimer l'espoir de voir le Gouvernement anglais accepter, si une offre de celte nature lui etait faite. Veuillez vous exprimer dans ce sens aupres du Foreign Office. Bienvenu-Martix. 72 — N° 54. M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Pefersbourg, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Saint-Pttersbourg, le 26 juillet 1914. Le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres continue avec une louable perseverance a rechercher les moyens de faire prevaloir une solution pacifique. « Jusqu'au dernier instant, m'a-t-il declare, je me montrerai pret a negocier. » C'est dans cet esprit qu'il vient de mander le Comte Szapary pour le convier a une « franche et loyale explication ». Article par article, M. Sazonoff a commente devant lui l'ultiuiatum auslro-hongrois, en faisant ressortir le caractere injurieux des princi- pales clauses. « L'intention qui a inspire ce document, a-t-il dit, est legitime si vous n'avez poursuivi d'autre but que de proteger votre territoire contre les menees des anarcliisles serbes; mais le procede auquel vous avez eu recours n'cst pas defen- dable. » II a conclu : « Reprenez votre ultimatum, modifiez-en la forme, et je vous garantis le resultat ». L' Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie s'est monlre toucbe de ce langage; toutefois, en attendant des instructions, il reserve 1'opinion de son Gouvernement. Sans se de- courager, M. Sazonoff a decide de proposer, des ce soir, au Comte Berchtold 1'ou- verture d'une conversation direcle entre Vienne et Petersbourg sur les changements a introduire dans 1'ultimalum. Cette entremise amicale et officieuse de la Russie entre 1 Autricbe et la Serbic a 1'avantage d'etre expeditive. Je la crois done preferable a loute autre procedure, et de nature a aboutir. Paleologue. N° 55. M. Dumaine, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Vienne, le 26 juillct 1914. M. Schebeko est revenu precipitamment d'un voyage en Russie; il ne 1'avait entrepris qu'apres l'assurance donnee par le Comte Berchtold que les reclamations contre la Serbie seraient des plus acceptables. L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a Petersbourg avait parle dans le meme sens a M. Sazonoff la veille de la remise de la note. Ce procede, tres habituel dans la diplo- matic de la Monarchie, et qui a servi egalement au Baron Macchio envers moi, parail avoir beaucoup ajoute a l'irritation du Gouvernement russe. — 73 — M. Schebeko va s'efforcer, cependant, de profiter du delai indispensable a la mo- bilisation pour introduire une proposition d'arrangement, qui aura au moins l'avan- tage de permettre de mesurer la valeur des declarations pacifiques de 1'AUemagne. Pendant que nous en deliberions ce soir, en compagnie de Sir M. de Bunsen, celui-ci a reiju des instructions du Foreign Office concernant la demarche a tenter par les representants des quatre Puissances moins directement interessees. Je m'at- tends done a ce que nous ayons a nous concerter deniain avec le due d'Avarna et M. de Tschirsky, lequel se retranchera presque surement derriere le principe de la localisation du conflit pour refuser son concours. Mon impression est, d'ailleurs, que le Gouvernement auslro-hongrois, quoique surpris et peut etre au regret de 1'energie qu'on lui a inspiree, se croira oblige a un commencement d'action militaire. Dumaine. N° 56. ,M- Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. a bord de la France (pour le President du Conseil) et a MM. les Ambas- sadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Berlin, Vienne, Rome. Paris, ie 26 juillct 191 li. Le resume de la reponse serbe a la note autrichienne ne nous est parvenu qu'avec vingt heures de retard. Bien que le Gouvernement serbe eiit cede sur tous les points, sauf deux petites reserves, le Ministre d'Autnclie-Hongne a rompu les relations, prou- vant ainsi la volonte arretee de son gouvernement de proceder a lexecution de la Serbie. D apres un telegramme de M . Jules Cambon , I'Ambassadeur d'Anglet'erre a le sen- timent d'un peu de flechissement; comme il faisait observer a M. de Jagow que Sir Ed. Grey ne lui demandait pas d'intervenir entre l'Autnche et la Serbie, mais, celte question cessant d'etre localisee, d'intervenir avec 1'Angleterre, la France et lltalie a Vienne et Petersbourg, le Secretaire d'Etat a declare qu'il ferait son possible pour maintenir la paix. Au cours dun entretien de M. Barrere avec le Secretaire general du Minislere des Affaires etrangeres italien, celui-ci a indique que le Gouvernement italien n'aurait vraisemblablement pas approuve la note autrichienne; mais comme elle ne lui a pas ete prealablement communiquee, ilse trouve, de cefait, libere de toute responsabi- lite dans la grave initiative prise par 1'Aulriche. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne est venu cet apres-midi me faire une communication, tendant k Une intervention de la France aupres de la Piussie dans un sens paciRque. L'Autriche, m'a-t-il dit, a fait declarer a la Russie qu'elle ne poursuivait ni agrandis- sement territorial, ni atteinte a 1'integrile du Royaume de Serbie; sa s?ule intention est d'assurer sa propre tranquillite et de faire la police. C'est des decisions de la Russie qu'il depend qu'une guerre soil evitee; l'Allemagne se sent solidaire de la France dans l'ardent desir que la paix puisse etre .maintenus, ei a le ferme espoir que la France Bsera de son influence dans un sens apaisant a Petersbourg. DocOME»rs DiPLOMingcES. — Cuerre curopeenne. 10 — 74 — J'ai rt'pondu & cette suggestion que la Russie 6tait moderle', qu'elle n'avait accom- pli aucun acte qui put faire douter de sa moderation et que nous etions d'accord avec elle pour rechercher la solution pacifique dece conflit. II nous paraiss ait doncqu a titre de contre-partie, l'Allemagne devait agir a Vienne, oil 1'efEcacite de son action Etait certaine en vue d'eviter des operations militaires tendant a loccupation de la Serbie. L'Ambassadeur m'ayant fait remarquer que cela etait inconciliable avec la position prise par l'Allemagne « que la question ne regardait que 1'Autriche et la Serbie », je iui ai dit que la mediation a Vienne et i Petersbourg pourrait etre le fait des quatre aulres Puissances moins interessecs dans la question. M. de Schoen se retrancha alors derriere le manque destructions a cet egard, et je lui dis que, dans ces conditions, je ne me sentais pas en mesure d'exercer une ac- tion seulement a Petersbourg. La conversation se termina sur 1'assurance, renouvelee par l'Ambassadeur, des in- tentions pacifiques de l'Allemagne, qu'il declarait solidaire, sur ce, point, de la France. Bienvem-Martin. N° 57. Note pour le Ministre. Dimanche soir, 26 juillet 1914. Apres la visite qu'il avait faite au Ministre a 5 heures de 1'apres-midi, le Baron de Schoen s'est rendu, ce soira 7 heures, a la Direction politique, pour demander qu'en vue d'eviter des commentaires tendancieux des journaux, comme celui de YEcho de Paris la veille, et afindebienpreciserle sens des demarches du Gouvernement allemand, un bref communique fit donne i la presse sur 1'entrevue de l'Ambas- sadeur d'Allemagne et du Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. M. de Schoen suggera, pour precisersa pensee, les termes suivants, dont le Direc- teur politique p. i.prit note sous sadictee: « L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne el le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres ont eu, pendant l'apres-midi, un nouvel entretien, au cours duquel ils ont examine, dans I'esprit le plus amical et dans un sentiment de solidarity pacilique, les movens qui pourraient etre employes pour maintenir la paix gene- rale. Le Directeur politique p. i. repondit aussitot,: « Alors, tout est regie dans votre esprit, et vous nous apportez 1'assurance que 1'Autriche accepte la note serbe, ou se pretera aux conversations avec les Puissances k cet egard? » L'Ambassadeur ayant paru surpris et fait une vive delegation, il lui fut expose que si rien n'etait modifie dans 1'attitude negative de l'Allemagne, les termes de la « Note a la presse » suggeree etaient excessifs et de nature a donner a I'opinion fran^aise une fausse securile, en creant des illusions sur la situation reelle, dont les dangers n'e'taient que trop evidents. Aux assurances que prodiguait l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne sur fimpression opti- — 75 — rnisle qu'il eprouvait, le Direeteur politique p. i. repondit en lui demandant s'illui per- mettait de lui parler a titre tout personnel et prive, d'liomme a homme, en toute liberte, et sans tenir compte de leurs fonctions respectives. Le Baron de Schoen le pria de le faire. M. Berthelot dit alors que pour tout esprit simple, l'attitude de 1'Allemagne ne pouvait s'expliquer, si elle ne tendait pas a la guerre : une analyse purement objective des fails et la psychologie des rapports austro-allemands conduisaient logiquement a cette conclusion. Devant l'affirmationrepetee que 1'Allemagne ignorait le contenu de la note autrichienne, il n'etait plus permis dVlever de doutes sur ce point; etait-il vraisem- blable, cependant, que 1'Allemagne se fut rangee, les yeux fermes, a cote de 1'Au- triche, dans une pareille aventure? La psychologie de toutes les relations passees de Vienne et de Berlin permeltait-elle d'admettre que l'Aulriche eiil pris une position sans recul possible, avant d'avoir pese, avec son alliee, tcJutes les consequences de son intransigeance? Combien le refus de 1'Allemagne de donner un conseil de mediation a Vienne paraissait surprenant, maintenant quelle connaissait le texte extraordinaire de la note autrichienne! Quelle responsabilite le Gouvernement allemand prcndrait, et queliss suspicions peseraient sur lui, s'il persistait a s'inlerposer entre 1'Autriche et les Puissances, apres la soumission pour ainsi dire absolue de la Serbie, et quand le moindre conseil donne par lui a Vienne mettrait fin au cauchemar qui pesait sur 1'Europe! La rupture des relations diplomatiques par l'Aulriche, ses menaces de guerre et la mobilisation quelle poursuit, donnent une particuhere urgence'a faction pacifica- trice de 1'Allemagne , car du jour ou les troupes autrichiennes auraient franchi la frontiere serbe, on se tronverait en presence d'un fait qui obligerait sans doute le Cabinet de Petersbourg a intervenir et risquerait de dechainer une guerre que 1'Al- lemagne declare vouloir eviter. M. de Schoen, qui ecoulait en souriant, aflirma de nouveau que 1'Allemagne avait ignore le texte de la note autrichienne ( 1 ) et ne l'avait approuvee qu'apressa remise ; elle estimail toujours que la Serbie avait besoin d'une lecon assez severe pour qu'elle ne put l'oublier, et que 1'Autriche se devait a elle-meme de meltre fin a une situation dangereuse et intolerable pour une grande puissance. II declara, d'ailleurs, ne pas connaitre le texte de la reponse serbe, et se montra personnellcment surpris qu'elle n'eut pas satisfait 1'Autriche, si toutefois elle etail telle qtie les journaux, souvent mal informes, la representaient. II insista encore sur les intentions paciliques de 1'Allemagne et donna son impres- sion sur lefiet que pourraient avoir de bons conseils adresses, par exemple a Vienne, par l'Angleterre, sur un ton anneal. Selon lui, 1'Autriche n'etait pas intransigeante; ce qu'elle repousse, e'est l'idee d'une mediation formelle, le « spectre » dune confe- rence : un mot pacifique venu de Petersbourg , de bonnes paroles dites dun ton con- ( l ) Voir pifcee n° 2 1 . Leltre du Ministre de France a Munich relalant que le Presidentdu Conseil bavarois a dit, le 23 juillet, avoir connaissance du texte de la note autrichienne a la Serbie. V. aussi Lime Bleu, la piece n° 95 oil Sir M. de Bunsen, ambassadeur d'Angleterre a Vienne, declare : " Quoique je ne puisse pas le verifier, je liens d'une source privee que l'Ambassadeur allemand connaissait le texte de t'ultimatutn autrichien a la Serbie avant qu'il ne liit expedie et qu'il l'a telegraphic a I'Erape- reur d'AUemagne ; je sais par l'Ambassadeur allemand lui-meme qu'il en approuve chaque ligne. » ciliant paries Puissances de la Triple Entente, auraient chance d'etre bien accneillies. H ajouta enfin qu'il ne disait pas que l'AUemagne, de son cote, ne donnerait pas quelques conseils a Vienne. Dans ces conditions, leDirecteur politique declara qu'il demanderait au Ministre s'il lui paraissait opporlun de coramuniquer a la presse une courte note de ton modere. IN 58. M. Chevalley, Ministre de France a Christiania, a M. Biekvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Christiauia, Ie 26 juillct 1 9 1 i. Toute la flotle allemandc en Norvege a recu 1'ordre de prendre la mer. Les auto- rites allemandes a Bergen declarent que cost pour rallier directement l'AUemagne. Les navires allemands disperses dans les fiords au nord de Bergen rejoindraient ceux qui sont aux fnvirons de Stavanger. Chevalley. N° 59. M. d'Ankoville, Charge d'affaires de France a Luxembourg, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Luxembourg, Ie 26 juillct 1914. D'apres des renseignements que je viens de receyoir de Thionville, les quatre der- nieres classes liberties out ordre de se tcmr a la disposition de la Kommandatur a toute heure. Sans rtre completement mobilises, les reservistes out interdiction de s'absenter du lieu de leur domicile. d'Annoville. 77 — N° 60. M. Farges, Consul general de France a Bale, a M. Bienvenu-Martin. Ministredes Affaires etrangeres p~i. Bale, le 27 juillet 1914. Les officiers allemands en vacances dans cetle region ont recu, il y a quatre jours, 1'ordre de les interrompre pour regagaer 1'AlIemagne. D'autre part, j'apprends de deux sources serieuses qu'avis a ete donne aux pro- prietaires de voitures automobiles du Grand-Duche de Bade de se preparer a les metlre a la disposition des autorites rnilitaires, deux jours apres un nouvet ordre. Le secret, sous peine d'amende, a ete recoramande sur cet avis. La population baloise est tres inquiete et les facilites bancaires se ressenenL Farges. N° 61. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Minlstre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., a M. Jules Cambon, Arabassadeur de France a Berlin, cornmuniaue a bord de la France (pour le President du Conseil) et a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Vienne, Rome. Paris, le 27 juillet 191/1. Les trois demarches de 1'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a Paris semblent caracteris- tiques : — le vendredi, il lit une note oil leGouvernementallemandse pose categorique- ment enlre l'Autriclie et les Puissances, approuvant I'liltimatum autrichien a la Serbie et ajoutant que « l'Allemagne desire ardemment que le condit resle localise, toute intervention d'une autre Puissance devant, par le jeu de ses alliances, provoquer d'incal ulables consequences »; — le second jour, le samedi. I'efFetayant ete. produit et lis Puissances ayant, en raison de la surprise, de la brievetedu delai et des risques de guerre generate, conseille a la Serbie de ceder, M. de Schoen revient attenuer sa demarche, feignant de s'etonner de 1'impression produite et proteste qu'on prete a l'Allemagne des intentions qu'elle n'a pas, puisque, dit-il.il n'y a eu ni concert avant, ni menace apres; — le troisicmejour, ledimanche. le resultat ayant ete obtenu, puisque la Serbie a cede en fait pour ainsi dire a toutes les exigences de i'Aulriche, 1 Ambas- sadeur d'Allemagne reparait a deux reprises, pour insisler sur les intentions pacitiques — 78 — de l'AHemagne et sur son desir ardent dc collaborer au maintien de la paix, apres avoir enregistre le succes autnchien, qui clot la premiere phase de la crise. La situation a 1'he.ure actuelle reste inquietante, en raison du refus incomprehen- sible de 1'Aulriche d'accepter la sournission serbe, de ses operations de mobilisation et de'ses menaces d'envahir la Serbie. L'attitude prise depuis le debut, avec 1'appui allemand, par le Gouvernement autricbien, son refus d'accepter aucune conversation des P uissancesne permettant pas, en pratique, a celles-cid'intervenir utilement aupres deluisans 1'intermediaire de 1'Allemagne. Cependant le temps presse, car si I'armee autrichienne franchit la frontiere, il sera tres difficile d'enrayer la crise, laRussie ne paraissant p-as pouvoir tolerer l'occupation de la Serbie, apres que celle-ci s'e'st en realite soumise a la Note autrichienne en lui donnanl loutes satisfactions et garanlies. L'AHemagne, du fait meme de la position prise par elle, est qualifiee pour intervenir utilement et etre ecoutee a Vienne; si elle ne le fait pas, elle justifie tous les soupcons et assume la responsabihle de la guerre. Les Puissances, et en particulier la Russie, la France et l'Angleterre ont determine par leurs pressants conseils Belgrade a ceder;-eHes ont done remph leur role; main- tenant e'est a 1'Allemagne, seule en situation d'etre entendue rapidement a Vienne, a donner des conseils a l'Autriche qui a obtenu satisfaction et ne peut, pour un detail facile a regler, dechainer la guerre generale. C'est dans ces conditions que se presente la proposition faite par le cabinet de Lon- dres; M. Sazonoff ayant dit a 1'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre qu'a la suite de 1'appel dela Serbie aux Puissances, la Russie accepteraitde se tenir a lecart. Sir E. Grey a formule aupres des Cabinets de Paris, Berlin et Rome, la suggestion suivante : les Ambassa- deurs de France, d'AUemagne et d'ltalie a Londres seraient charges de chercher avec Sir E. Grey un moyeh de resoudre les diffieultes actuelles, elant er.tendu que pendant cette conversation, la Russie, l'Autriche et la Serbie s'abstiendraient de toute opera- tion militaire active. Sir A. Nicolson a parle de cette suggestion a 1'Ambassadeur d'AUe- magne, qui s'y est montre favorable; elle sera egalement bien accueillie a Paris et aussi a Rome, selon toute vraisemblance. Ici encore, la parole est a l'AHemagne, qui a 1'occasion de temoigner autrement qu'en paroles sa bonne volonte. Je vous prie de vous concerter avec votre collegue anglais et d'appuyer aupres du Gouvernement allemand sa demarche dans la forme qui vous paraitra opportune. Bienvenu-Martin. N° 62'. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., a bord de la France (pour le President du Conseil) et a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Berlin, Vienne. Paris, It' 27 juillet 1 gid- Apres sa demarche d'hier tendant a une intervention apaisante de la France a Petersbourg, 1'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne etait revenu, ainsi que je vous en ai in- forme, a la Direction politique, sous le pretexte qu'il pourrait y avoir interet a com- — 79 — muniquer a la presse une courte note indiquant le sens pacifiquc et arnica! de la conversation ; il avait meme suggere les termes suivants : « L'Ambassadeur et le Mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres ont eu, pendant 1'apres-midi , un nouvel entretien au cours duquel on a examine, dans 1'esprit le plus arnica! et dans un sentiment de solidarity pacifique, los moyens qui pourraient etre employes pour maintenir la paix gene-rale. » II fut repondu de suite que les termes paraissaient excessifs et de nature a donner a {'opinion des illusions sur la situation reelle, que cependant une breve note dans le sens indiqu6 , c'est-a-dire'rendant compte d'une conversation oil avaient ete examines les moyens employes pour sauvegarder !a paix, pourrait etre donnee sije 1'approuvais. La note communiquee a ete la suivante : o L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne et le Mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres ont eu un nouvel entretien, au cours duquel ils ont recherche les moyens d'action des Puissances pour le maintien de la paix. » Cette redaction, volonlairement terne, evitait une solidarity avec l'Allemagne qui pourrait etre mal interpretee. Ce matin , M. de Schoen a adresse une lettre particuliere au Directeur politique , sous le pretexte de resumer son entretien avec le Ministre , et a ajoute : « Notez bien la phrase sur la solidarity des sentiments pacifiques. Ce n'est pas une phrase banale, mais la sincere expression de la realite. » Le resume joint a la lettre etait ainsi con^u : « Le Cabinet de Vienne a fait formellement et officiellement declarer a celui de Petersbourg qu'il ne poursuit aucune acquisition territoriale en Serbie et qu'il ne veut point porter atleinte a 1'integrite du royaume; sa seule intention est celle d'assurer sa tranquillite. En ce moment, la decision, si une guerre europeenne doit eclater, depend uniquement de la Russie. Le Gouvernement Allemand a la ferme confiance que le Gouvernement Francjais, avec lequel il se sait solidaire dans l'ardent desir que la paix europeenne puisse etre mainlenue , usera de toute son influence dans un esprit apaisant aupres du Cabinet de Petersbourg. » Je vous ai fait connaitre la reponse qui avait et6 faite (une demarche franchise a Petersbourg s'expliquait mal et devait avoir pour corollaire une d-marche allemande a Vienne, ou, a defaut, une mediation, dans les deux capitales, des qualre Puissances moins interessees). La lettre de M. de Schoen est susceptible de diverses interpretations : la plus vrai- semblable est qu'elle tend, comme sa demarche meme, a chercher a compromettre la France au regard de la Russie, quitte, en cas d'echec, a rejeter sur la Russie et sur la France la responsabitite d'une guerre eventuelle, enfin a masquer, par des assu- rances pacifiques non ecoutees.une action militaire de rAutriche'en Serbie, destinee a completer le succes autrichien. Je vous communique ces renseignements k titre d'information et a toutes fins utiles- Bienvenu-Mabtin. — 80 — N° (53. M. de Fleuriau, Charge d'Affaires de France a Londres, a M. Bienvenu-Martin. Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Londres, le 27 juillet 1914. L'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne ct I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie laissent en- tendre qu'ils sont surs que 1'Angleterre garderait la neulralite si un conflit venait i eclater. Sir Arlliur Nicolson m'a (Jit que, cependant, le Prince Lichnowski ne pou- vait, apre la conversation qu il a eue avec lui aujourd'hui, conserver aucun doute sur la liberie qu'enteildait garder le Gouvernement britannique d'inlervenir, au cas oil il le jugerait utile. L'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne n'aura pas manque d'etre frappe de cette declaration, mais pour peser sur 1'AHemagne et pour eviter un conflit, il semble' indispensable que celle-ci soit amenee a tenir pour certain qu'elle Irouverait 1'Angleterre et la Kussie aux cotes de la France. de Fleuriau. N° U. M. Paleolocue, Ambassadeur de France a Sainb-Petersbourg, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Saint-Pelersbourg, 2 7 juillet 191 A. M. SazonofT a tenu a lous mes collegues un langage conciliant. Malgrc I'cniotion publique, le Gouvernement Russe s'applique et reussit a contenir la presse; on a notamment recommande une grand e moderation envers 1'Allemagne. Depuis bier, M. Sazonofl n'a recu de Vienne ni de Berlin aucune information. Paleologoe. N° 65. M. Bompard, Ambassadeur de France a Constantinople, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Ther.lpia, le 27juili»t 1914. Le conflit auslro-serbe retient I'attention du Gouvernement Ottoman el les Turo se rejouissent des epreuves de la Serine, mais on est porle a croire ici en general que — 81 — ce eonflit restera localise. L'on estinie generalement que, cetle fois encore, la Russie ninterviendra pas en faveurde la/ Serbie dons des conditions qui elendraient le conflil arme. Le sentiment unanime, dans les milieux politiques ottomans, est que l'Autriche, avec 1'appui de 1'Allemagne, arrivera a ses fms et quelle fera entrer la Serbie, apres la Bulgarie, dans l'orbite de la Triple Alliance. Bompard. N° 66. M. de Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires a Londres, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires elrangeres p. i. I.ondres, le 27 juillet 191A,. Sir Ed. Grey a dil ce matin a l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que si 1'Aulriche envahissait la Serbie apres la reponse serbe, elle demonlrerait qu'elle ne poursuivail pas seulement le reglement des questions mentionnees dans sa note du 2 3 juillet, mais qu'elle voulait ecraser un petit Etat. «Alors, a-t-il ajoute, se poserait une question europeenne, et il s'ensuivrait une guerre, a laquelle d'aulres Puissances seraient amenees a prendre part ». L'attitude de la Grande-Bretagne s'affirme par 1'arret de la demobilisation de sa flotte. Le Premier Lord de l'Amiraute avail pris discretement cette mesure des vendredi, de sa propre initiative; cetle nuit, sir Edward Grey et ses collegues onl decide de la publier. Ce resullat est du a l'attitude concilrante de la Serbie et de la Russie. de Fleuriau. N° 67. M. Jules Cambois, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Berlin, 1c 27 juillet 1914. J'ai entretenu aujourd'hui le Secretaire d'Etat de la demarche de 1'Angleterre ten- dant 4 ce que 1'Allemagne se joigne aux Cabinets de Londres, Paris et Rome pour empecher les hostilites entre Petersbourg et Vienne. Documents diplomatiques. — Cuerre europeenne. 1 1 — 82 — Je lui ai fait remarquer que la proposition de sir Edward Grey ouvrail la voie a une issue pacifique. M. de Jagow ma repondu qu'il elait dispose a y entrer, mais il m'a fait Temarquer que si la Russie mobilisait, I'Allemagne serait obligee de mobilise r aussitot, que nous y serions forces egalement et qu'alors le con (lit serait presque inevitable. Je lui ai demande si I'Allemagne se croirait engagee a mobiliser dans le cas oti la Russie ne mobihserait que sur la frontiere autrichienne ; il m'a dil que non et m'a aulorise forraellement a vous faire connaitre cette restric lion. Aussi attacherait-il la plus grande importance a ce que les puissances amirs et all iees dc la Russie intervinssent aupres d'elle. Enfin il a rernarque que si la Russie attaquait I'Autriche, rAllemagne- devraii attaquer aussitot de son cole. L'intervention proposee par 1'Angleterre a Petcrsbo urg et a Vienne nepourrait done s'exercer a ses yeu\. que si les evenements'ne. se preci- pitaient pas. II ne desespere pas dans ce cas quelle puisse reussir. J'ai exprime le regret que I'Autriche, par son inlransigeance, cut conduit 1'Europe au pas difficile que nuns traversoris, mais j'ai temoigue 1'espoir que 1 intervention aboutirait. Jules Cambon. N° 68. M. de Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires a Londres, a, M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrarigeres p. i.. Londres, le 27 juillet 1 9 1 i- Hier, au cours d'une conversation entre M. SazonolT, M. Paleologue et Sir G. Bu- chanan, le Ministre russe aurait dit que la Serbie etait disposee a en appeler au\ Puissances, et, qn'en ce cas, son Gouvernement accepterait de se tenir a 1'ecarl. Sir Ed. Grey a pris texte de ces paroles pour formuler aupres des Cabinets de Paris, de Berlin et dr Rome une proposition dont Sir Francis Bertie saisira Votre Exi ill. muc. Les quatre puissances uiterviendraienl dans le conflit , et les Ambassadeurs de France, d'AUemagne et d'llalie a Londres seraient charges de chercher, avec Sir Ed. Grey, un moyen de resoudre les dillicultes actuelles. II serait entendu que, pendant les debals de cette petite conference, la Russie, l'Autri:lie et la Serbie s'abstiendraient de toute operation militaire active. Sir A. Ni- coKon a parle de cette suggestion a I'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne qui s'y est monlre favorable. Dt Flevriau. — 83 - N° 69. M. de Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires a Londres, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires elrangeres p. i. Londres, le 27 juillet laii. Le Ministre de Serbie n'a pas recu d'instructions de son Gouvernement en vue de demander la mediation de 1'Angleterre; il est d'ailleurs possible que les telegrammes de son Gouvernement soient arreles en route. La proposition anglaise d'intervenir a quatre, indiquee dans mon telegramme precedent, est d'ailleurs lancee, et me parait devoir etre soutenue en premier lieu. de Fleuriau. N° 70. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. a M. de Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires de France a Londres. Paris, le 27 juillet i 9 1 4 ■ L'Ambassadeurd'Angleterre m'a communique la proposition de Sir Ed. Grey ten- dant a une action commune de 1'Angleterre, de I'Allemagne, de la France et de 1'Italie a Vienne, Belgrade et Pelersbourg pour arreter les operations militaires actives, pen- dant que les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne, d'ltalic et de France a Londres examine- raient, avec Sir E. Grey, les moyens de trouver une solution aux complications presentes. J'ai present ce matin a M. Jules Cambon de se concerter avec 1'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a Berlin, et d'appuyer sa demarche, dans la lorme oil il le jugerait opportun. Je vous autorise a prendre part a la reunion projete* par Sir E. Grey. Je suis pret egalement a donner a nos agents a Vienne, Petersbourg et Belgrade des instructions dans le sens demande par le Gouvernement anglais. Toutefois, j'estime que les chanoes de succes de la proposition de Sir E. Grey reposent esseniiellement sur Taction qi>e Berlin serait dispose a exercer a Vienne; une demarche de ce cote pour amener la suspension des operations militaires me paraitrait vouee a lechec, si 1'influence de I'Allemagne ne s'etait pas exercee au prealable. J'ai egalement note parmi les observations de M. de Schoen, que le Gouvernement — 84 — austro-hongrois etait specialement susceptible quand on pronon^ait les termes de o mediation », « intervention •,« conference », el plus capable d'admettre des » conseils amicaux » et des « conversations ». Bienvenu-Martin. N° 71. M. de Fleuriau, Charge d'affaires de France, a Londres, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Londres, le 27 juillet 191A. J'ai fail connaitre a Sir E. Grey votre adhesion a sa proposition de mediation a quatre et de conference a Londres. L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a Vienne a recu les instructions necessaires pour saisir le Gouvernement austro-hongrois des que ses collegues francais, allemand 011 ilalien auront ete autorises a faire la meme de- marche. Le Gouvernement italien a accepte rintervention a quatre en vue de prevenir les operations militaires; il consulte le Gouvernement allemand sur la proposition de conference et la procedure a suivre a I'egard du Gouvernement austro-hongrois. Le Gouvernement allemand n'a pas encore repondu. de Flectriad. W 72. M. BARRiRE, Ambassadeur de France a Rome. a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Rome, le 27 juillet io,i4. Le Marquis de San Giuliano, est renlre a Rome ce soir et je l'ai vu aussitol apres son arrivee. 11 m'a parle du content! de la Note autrichienne et m'a assure formel- lement qu'd n'en a eu aucune connaissance prealable. II savait bien que cette Note devait avoir un caractere rigoureux et energique ; mais il ne s'etait pas doute quelle put prendre une telle forme. Je lui ai demande s'il etait vrai qu'il eut fait exprimer a Vienne a ce propos , comme le pretendent certains journaux, une approbation de l'aclion autrichienne el 1'assurance que l'ltalie remplirait a I'egard de TAulriche ses devoirs d'alliee. « En aucune facon, m'a repondu le Ministre : nous n'avons pas ete consultes, on ne nous a rien dit ; nous n'avons done eu a faire aucune communication de cette nature a Vienne ■>. — 85 — Le Marquis de San Giuliano estime que la Serbie aurait agi plus sagement en acceptant la note dans son integralile; aujourd'hui encore il estime que ce serait la seule chose a faire, etant couvaincu que I'Autnche ne retirera aucune de ses pre- tentions, et lesmaintiendra, meme au risque d'amener une conflagration generale; il doute que 1'Allemagne soil disposee a se preter a une action aupres de son alliee. II constate toulefois que 1'Allemagne tient en ce moment un grand comple de ses rapports avec Londres, et il croit que si une Puissance pcut determiner Berlin a une action pacifique, c'est 1'Angleterre. Quant a 1'Italie, elle continuera a faire tous ses efforts en faveur de la paix. C'est a cet effel qu'il a adhere sans hesiter a la proposition de Sir Ed. Grey de r^unir a Londres les Ambassadeurs des Puissances, qui ne sont pas directement interessees dans le condil austro-serbe. Barrere. N" 73. M. Jule. Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Berlin, le 37 juillet 1914. L'Ambassadeur d'Anglelerre , qui est rentre aujourd'hui, a vu le Secretaire d'Etat el 1'a enlretenu de la suggestion de Sir Ed. Grey. M. de Jagow lui a repondu en manifestant toujours son desir de la paix, mais en ajoulant qu'il ne pourrait consentir a ce qui ressemblerait a une conference des Puissances; ce serait instituer une espece de cour d'arbilrage, dont l'idee ne serait acceptable que si elle etait demandee par Vienne et Petersbourg. Le langage de M. de Jagow confirme celui de M. de Schoen a Voire Excellence. A la verile une demarche des quatre Puissances a Vienne et Petersbourg peut se produire par la voie diplomatique, sans prendre la forme d'une conference et est susceptible de bien des modalites ; ce qui importerait c'est de manifester a Vienne et a Petersbourg le desir commun des quatre Puissances qu'un conflit soil evite. La lemporisation permettrait seule d'arriver a 'une issue pacifique des diflicultes pre- sentes. Jules Cambon. N° 74. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a BerJin, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Berlin, le 27 juillet 1914. Je me suis entretenu aujourd'hui avec le Secretaire d'Etat el j'ai appuye aupros de lui la demarche que venait de faire Sir E. Goschen. M. de Jagow m'a repondu, comme il l'avait fait a 1'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, qu'il ne pouvait accepter la proposition de charger les Ambassadeurs d'ltalie, de France et d'Allemagne de chercher avec Sir Ed. Grey les moyens de resoudre les difficultes actuelles, parce que ce serait instituer une veritable conference pour traiter des affaires de 1'Autriche et de la Russie. J'ai replique a M. de Jagow que je regrettais sa reponse, mais que le grand objet que Sir Edw. Grey avait en vue depassait une question de forme; que ce qui impor- tait c'etait 1'association de 1'Angleterre et de la France avec 1'Allemagne et lltalie pour travailler a une ceuvre de paix; que cette association pouvait se manifester par des demarches communes a Petersbourg et a Vienne; qu'il m'avait souvent exprime son regret de voir les deux groupes d'alKance opposes toujours 1'un a 1'autre en Europe; qui! avait la 1'occasion de prouver qu'il y avait un esprit europeen, en mon- trant quatre Puissances appartenant aux deux groupes agissant dun common accord, pour empecher un conflit. M. de Jagow s'est derobe en disant que 1'Allemagne avait des engagements avec 1'Autriche. Je lui ai fait remarquer que les rapports de l'AUemagne avec Vienne n'elaient pas plus etroits que ceux de la France avec la Russie et que c'etait lui-rnerne qui mettait dans 1'espece les deux groupes dalliance en opposition. Le Secretaire d'Etat m'a dit alors qu'il ne se refusait pas k agir pour ecarter le conflil austro-russe , mais qu'il ne pouvait pas intervenir dans le conflit austro-serbe. « L'un est la consequence de 1'autre, ai-je dit, et il importe d'empecher quil ne sur- o vienne un etat de fait nouveau, de nature a amener une intervention de la Russie. » Comme le Secretaire d'Etat persistait a dire qu'il etait oblige de tenir ses eugage- menls i.l'egard de 1'Autriche, je lui ai deinande s'd s'etait engage a la suivie partout, les yeux bandes, et s'il avait pris connaissance de la reponse de la Serbie a 1'Autriche , que le Charge d'affaires de Serbie lui avait remise ce matin. « Je n'en ai pas encore « eu le temps, » me dit-il. « Je le regrette. Yous verriez que, sauf sur des points de « detail, la Serbie se soumet entierement. II semble done que, puisque I'Autricbe a .. oblenu les satisfactions que votre appui lui a procurees, vous pouvez aujourd'hui « lui conseiller de s'en contenter ou d'examiner avec la Serbie les termes de la reponse « de celle-ci. » Comme M. Jagow ne me repondait pas clairement, je lui ai demande si 1'Alle- magne voulait la guerre. D a proteste vivement , disant qu'il savait que c'etait *na pensee, mais que c'etait tout a fait inexact. « II faut done, ai-je repris, agir en — 87 - "Consequence. Quand vous lirez la reponse serbe, pesez-en les termes avec voire € conscience, je vous en prie, au nom de 1'humanite, et n'assumez pas personnelle- « ment une part de responsabilite dans les catastrophes que vous laissci preparer. • M. de Jagow a proleste de nouveau, ajoutanl qu'il etait pret a s'unir a 1'Angleterre et a la France dans un elTort commun, mais qu'il fallait trouver a cette intervention une forme qu'il put accepter et que les Cabinets clevaient s'entendre a ce sujet. « Au reste, a-t-il ajoute, les conversations directes entre Vienne et Petersbourg « sont entamees et se poursuivent : )'en augure beaucoup de bien et j'espere. » Au moment de le quitter, je lui dis que j'avais eu ce matin 1'anpression que 1'heure de la detente avait sonne, mais que je voyais bien qu'il n'en etait rien. 11 ma repondu que je me trompais; qu'il esperait que les choses etaient en bonne v6ie et abouti- raient peut-etre rapidement. Je lui ai deraande d'agir a Vienne pour qu'elles marchent vite-, parce qu'il importait de ne pas Iaisser se creer en Russie un de ces courants d'opinion qui emportent tout. A mon sentiment, il y aurait lieu de demander a Sir E. Grey, qui a du etre avise par Sir E. Goschen du refus oppose a sa proposition dans la forme qui lui etait donnee, de la renouveler sous une autre forme, de telle fac.on que 1'AUemagne n'ail pas de pretexte pour refuser de s'y associer et prenne ses responsabilites aux yeux de 1'Angleterre. Jules Cambon. N" 75. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre ties Affaires etrangeres p^ i. a MM. les Ambassadeurs de Fiance a Londres, Sain t-Petersbourg , Berlin, Vienne, Rome. Paris, le if juillet 19 14. L'Ambassadeur d'Autnche-Hongrie est venu me voir pour me remettre un me- moire, veritable acte daccusation contre la Serbie; il m'a declare, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, que la Serbie n'ayant pas repondu d'une maniere satisfaisanle aux demandes du Gouvernement imperial, cetui-ci se voit contraint d'employer des moyens energiques pour amener la Serbie a donner les satisfactions et guaranties qui sont reclamees d'elle. Cest demain que le Gouvernement autricliien prendra les mesures a cet eflet. J*ai prie TAmbassadeur de me faire connaitre les mesures envisageesparl'Autriche, et le Comte Szecsea ma repondu que cela pourrait etre soil un ultimatum, soit une declaration de guerre, soit le passage de la frontiere, mais qu'il n'avait aucune indi- cation precise sur ce point. J'ai alors fait reinarquer 4 l'Auibassadeur que la Serbie avait accepte sur presque tous les points les exigences de lAutricue, que la divergence qui subsistail sur quelques points pourrait disparailre avec un peu de bonne volonte reciproque, et par I'aide des Puissances amies de la paix; en fixant a demain l'execulion de ses resolu- tions, l'Autriclie reudait, pour la seconde fois, leur concours presque impossible et assumait une lourde responsabilite en risquant de dechainer une guerre, dont on ne pourrait mesurer l'extension. Je vous communique, a tilre d'information , le memoire que m'a remis le Comte Szecsen. Bienvenu-Martin. Annexe. Memoirs da'Goavernement auslro-hongrois , remis parte Comte Szeesen h M. Bienvenu-Martin le 27 juillet 191b. L'agitation serbe, qui s'est donne pour but d'arriver a la separation de la Monarchie aulri- ehienne des partis slaves du Sud pour les rattacher a un grand Etat serbe, remonte tres loin en arriere. Cette propagande sur le sol serbe, toujours la meme quant a son but final, quoique diverse dans ses moyens et intensites, avait atteint son plus baut point lors de la crisr de I'anncxion, Rejetant le mantean protecteur du secret , elle s'etait montree alors avec toute la franchise de ses tendances et avait montre sous le patronage du Gouvernement serbe son intention de realiser ses desseins avec lous les moyens disponibles. Tandis que la Presse serbe tout cntiere appelait au combat contre la Monarchie par des cris haineux ct en denaturant les faits, il se creait des associations pour encourager a cette lutte — meme abstraction faile d'autres moyens de propagande. L'association qui est devenue la plus importante est la ■ Narodna Odbrana ». Issue d'un comite revolutionnaire qui existait alors, elle fut constitute en Society privee, cependant, sous forme d'organisation dependant du Departement des Affaires etrangeres de Belgrade par des fonctionnaires serbes militaires et civils. Parmi ces fondateurs, on doit citer notam- ment : le general Buzo Jankovic, les anciens ministres Ljuba Jovanovic, Ljuba Davidovic et Valislav V'alovic, le directeur de 1'Imprimerie nationale Zivojin Dacic, et les anciens capi- taines, maintenant commandants, Voja Tankovic et Milan Pribicevic. Cette association s'etait impose conime but la creation et 1'organisation de bandes en vue de la guerre esperee contre la Monarchie. On trouvera une description saisissante de 1'activile. d'alors de la « Narodna Odbrana » , notamment dans les declarations du sujet bosneo-herzegovinien Trifko Krstanovic, entendu comme temoin par le conseil de guerre de Sarajevo, qui se trouvait alors a Belgrade et qui, avec d'autres sujets de la Monarchie, a ete accepte comme comi- tadji par la « Narodna Odbrana". Avec environ cent quarante autres, Krstanovic avait ete amene a une ecole creee pour la formation de nouveHes bandes a Cuprija, district de Jago- dina, et dirigce par les capitaines Voja Tankosic et Dusan Putnick. 11 n'y avait comme maitres dans cette ecole que des officicrs serbes; le general Bozo Jankovic et le capitaine Milan Pribicevic donnerent une grande r^gularitc a ces cours d'organisation de bandes, qui duraient trois mois. Les comitadji y recevaient un enseignement complet du tir, du jet des bombes, des mines, de la destruction des chemins de fer, tunnels, ponts et telegraphes. Leur devoir etait, d'apres — 89 — leurs chefs, de mettre en pratique les connaissances nouvcllement acquises en Bosnie-Her- zegovine. Par cette action de la « Narodna Odbrana » exercee de la maniere la plus publique et favo- risee par le Gouvernement Serbe, a et6 repandue la guerilla des bandes contre la Monar- chic. Par la, les sujets de la Monarchic elaient conduits a la Irahison contre leur patrie, et amenes systematiquement a pratiquer comme emissaires serbes des attaques secretes contre les moyens de defense de leur palrie. Cette periode des aspirations agressives s'est terminee avec la declaration faite par le Gou- vernement serbe le 3i mars 1909, dans laquelle celui-ci se declarait pret a accepter le nouvel etat de choses cree par 1'annexion de la Bosnie-Herzegovine au point de vue du droit public, et a promis solennellement vouloir vivre en relations amicales de bon voisinage, dans 1'avenir, avec la Monarchie. Avec cette declaration, il semblait que dut prendre fin 1'agitadon constituant une source permanente de troubles contre 1'Autriche-Hongrie et qu'on eut trouve un moyen do, rappro- chement arnica! entre la Serbie et la Monarchie. Privee de lappui du Gouvernement serbe, et comhatlue par lui conformement a ces engagements, la propagande hostile n'aurait pu durer que d'une nianiere occulte, vouee a une prompte destruction. Par contre, les poinls de contact exislant entre les partis slaves du Sud de la Monarchie et la Serbie dans le domaine de la langue, des races et de la culture auraient du conduire a la realisation d'un travail de developpement commun inspire d'amities reciproques et d'interets paralleles. Cependant ces espoirs ne se sont pas realises. Les aspirations hostiles a la Monarchie ont subsiste, et, sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe qui n'a rien fait pour etouffer cette agi- tation , la propagande institute contre, 1'Autriche n'a fait que gagner en etendue et prolondeur. La haine contre la Monarchie a ete tenue en haleine et s'est transformee en un sentiment irreconciliable. Le peuple serbe, tant par les moyens anciens, mieux adaptes a ia situation, que par des methodes plus completes, a ete appele « au combat d'aneantissement ineluc table » contre I'Autriche. Systematiquement, des fils secrets ont ele tisses vers les domaines slaves du sud de la Monarchie , dont les sujets ont ete incites a la trahison. Par-dessus tout, c'est la presse serbe qui n'a cesse d'agir dans cet esprit. Pas moins de quatre-vingt un journaux paraissant en Serbie ont du 4tre retires de la circu- lation postale jusqu'aujourd'hui, en raison de leur contenu qui tomba sous le coup de la loi peuale. II nest guere une loi penale protegeant la personne sacree du Monarque et des membres de la famille impenale ou l'integrite de 1 Etat qui n'ait ete violee par les feuilles serbes. On trouvera a 1'annexe I quelques-unes des nombreuses preuves donnees par la presse dans l'ordre d'idees ci-dessus. Sans entrer dans un examen detaille des manieres de voir de l'opinion publique serbe, il y a lieu d'observer que la presse n'a cesse de considerer 1'annexion de la Bosnie-Herzegovine, malgre la reconnaissance formelle serbe, apres comme avant, comme un 'rapt exerce contre la Serbie ayant besoin d'etre repare\ Cette pensee ne revient pas settlement dans les feuilles d'opinion avancee, niais aussi dans la «Samuprava» qui tient de si pres a 1'Office des Affaires etrangeres de Belgrade, ou elle est exprimee sous une forme a peine envelopp^e (voir annexe I1 B ). On ne peut pas non plus negliger de considerer comment l'attentat commis le 1 5 juin 1910a Sarajevo par Bogdan Zerajic contre le Gouverneur de Bosnie-Herzegovine, mailre tie camp von Varesanin , a ete loue par la presse. On se souvient que Zerajic s'etait tue immediatement apres son acte et avait brule, avant de le commettre, tous ses papiers. Pour ces raisons, il n'avait pas ete possible de mettre en lumiere pleinement les motifs de cet attentat, on a cependant puconclure d'une piece trouvee DOCUMEMS DIPLOUAT1QCEG. — GuClTe europtCIUie. J.J — 90 — pres de lui qu'il etait partisaD des idees de Kropotkine. Les indices releves ont egalement conduit a penser qu'il s'agissait d'un attentat d'un caractere anarchiste. C.eci n'empecha pas cepondant la presse serbe de celebrer le criminel comrae mi heros national serbe et de louer son acte. Meme, le « Politika s'est eleve conlre l'idee que Zerajic fut un anarchiste et 1'a reclame comrae un a heros serbe dont le nom sera repete par tous les Serbes avec respect et douleur ». Le « Politika > considere la date du 18 aout de la meme annee «jour de naissanco de S. M. ImpeViale et Royale » comme une occasion favorable pour parler a nouveau de Zerajic « dont le nom sera dans le peuple qoelque chose comme celui d'un saint » et pour louer solerrn-llement lattentat en une poesie (annexe n" 1). C'e5t ainsi qu'a.ete exploits ce crime n'ayant rien de commun avec les aspirations sur des territoires de la Monarchic, pour ie progres de cette idee et que le meurtre a etc rec.onnu de la maniere la plus explicite comme un moyen glorieux et dignc d'imitation dans la lutte pour la realisation de cette pensee. Cette sanetification du meurtre comme une methode pleinement admissible dans la lutte contre la Monarchie revient plus tard dans les feuilles parlant de lattentat commis par Jukic contre le Commissaire royal de Cuvaj (annexe 1 E ). Ces journaux repandus , non pas seulement en Serbie, mais comme on 1'a vu plus tard par des voies secretes bien organisees et par fraudes dans la Monarchie qui ont amene et maintenu eveillee dans les grandes masses cette disposition, laqueile a fourni un terrain nourricier, favorable pour les meTaits des associations hostiles a la Monarchie. Cest la « Narodna Odbrana v qui est devenue le centre de 1'agitation menee par les asso- ciations. Les menies personnel qui, au temps de l'annexion, etaieni a sa tete, sent encore celles qui la dirigent. On retrouve parmi elles comme organisatetirs e'nergiques et pleins d'action les plus violentsopp >s:mts de la Monarchie cites plus haul. Organise'e sur une base large et profonde et possedant une hierarchic (voir annexe II « organisation »), la « Narodna Odbrana » posseda bientot environ quatre cents adherents, qui rcpandirent une agitation tres active. En outre , la Narodna s'est mise en association etroite avec la « Federation des Tirenrs » (762 societes), 1'association des Sokol « Dusan Silni (2,5oo membres), le Club olympique, 1' Association des cavaliers « Knez Mihajlo », la Societe des chasseurs et la Ligue de de>elop- pement, ainsi que de nombreuses autres associations, qui toutes, conduites et protegees par la Narodna, agissaient dans le meme esprit. Se penetrant de plus en plus les unes les autres, ces associations parvinrent a une fusion complete, de telle maniere qu'elles ne sont plus aujourd'hui que des membres du Corps unique de la Narodna. Ainsi cette derniere a con- stituc sur toute la Serbie un reseau tres serre d'agitation et a attire a toutes ses idees tous ceux capables de les recevoir. Quel est l'esprit de l'action de la Narodna, cest ce que demontre avec une sufTisante elarte les publications officielles de cette Societe. Dans ses statuts, revetns de l'apparence d'une societe de developpement ne se preoccu- pant que du perfectionnement spiritucl et corporel dc la population serbe et de son Tenfor- cement materiel, la Narodna devoile dans son organe corporatif (voir annexe II) le vrai et unique mobile de son existence, en ce quelle appelle son « programme reorganise ». Prccher au peuple serbe notamment «la verite sainje par un travail fanatique et infati- gable n sous 1'allegation que la Monarcbie'veut « lui prendre sa liberte et sa langue et meme detruire la Serbie »; qu'il est une necessite ineluctable de conduire contre rAutriche-llon- grie, son premier et plus grand enrremi, ie o combat de destruction avec fusils et canons » et de preparer le peuple a ce combat « par tous les moyens » , pour la liberation des territoires soumis, dans lesquels sont sous 1'opprobe et le joug sept millions de freres. Tous les neHbrts - 91 — pour le deWeloppement » de la Narodna sont au service exclusif de cette idee comnie simple moyen potir 1'organisation et leducation du peuple en vue de la lutte pour l'an£anlissement prevu. C'est dans le meme esprit que fravaillcnt toutes les associations aflilides a la Narodna i i'egard desquelles 1'association des "Sokolo de Kragujevac peut servir comme exemple (voir annexe HI). Comme pour la Narodna, ce sont des officiers, professeurs et agents de 1'Etat qui sont a. sa tete. Le disco-ins par iequel son President, major Kovacevic, a ouvert 1'assemblee annuelle de 1 q 1 4 renonc'e totalement a mentionner la gymnastique , ce qui est cependant le but veri- table des « Sokol » et ne parle que de la « preparation a la gueiTe » cootre « 1'Ennenni dange- reux, sans coeur, odieux et envahissant du Nord » qui enleve a des millions de freres serbes leurs liberies et leurs droits et les niaintient dans 1'esclavage et les fers. Dans les rapports administratifs de cette association, les developpements tecbniques passent totalement a 1'arriere-plan et ne servent que de rubriques pour la connaissance du veritable « but de l'.iclivite de l'administration », notanimcnt « la preparation ihi diveloppement national et la neccssite dcjorlijtcr la « nation ecrasec « clans I'objectif quelle puisse ainsi mener a. bien son "programme nan encore rempli, sa tdche non encore accomplie*, et accomphr cette •> grande action qui doit s'accomplir dans I'avenir prochain : la liberation dcsj'reres vivemt aa ielii ■ dc la Drina qui endurenl le martyre des crucifih ». II n'est pas jusqu'au tresorier qui ne fasse servir son rapport financier pour lancer cet appel que 1'on doit « clever des faucons » (pi sont en mesure « d'apporter la liberie aux freres non encore liberes. » De meme que les aspirations au de veloppement dans la Narodna , 1'activite en gymnastique des « Sokol » n'est pas le but lui-meme , mais un simple, moyen au service de la meme propa- gande menee avec les memes intentions pour ne pas dire avec les memes mots exactement.' Lorsque la Narodna appelle au combat d'aneantissement contre la Monarcbie, elle ne| s'adresse passeulement au peuple de la Monarcbie, mais a tous les peuples slaves du sud.l Pour la Narodna , les territoires slaves du sud de la Monarcbie font partie de « nos terri- toires serbes soumis » (voir aussi annexe IV). De meme les sujets slaves du sud de la mo- narcbie doivent prendre part a cette « oeuvre nationale »,. de meme cette activite « saine et necessaire » doit s'exercer de 1'autre cote de la frontiere serbe et meme sur le sol de la monarcbie, la Narodna recberche ses « beros pour la guerre sainte », dont Obilic, 1'assassin de Mourad, est cite comme exemple digne d'imitation du sacrifice a la patrie. Mais, pour amener les freres «hors de Serbie » a participer au ■ travail d'initiative privee » la Narodna entretient une association intime avec les « Freres de ce cote-ci de la frontiere ». Comment cette intimite est exercee, c'est ce qui n'est pas dit, sans doute parce que cela appartienl a cette partie da ■ travail d'cnscmble » qui « pour des raisons nombreuses ne peut ni ne doit etre explique ». Combien cette branche de son activite est etendue, c'est ce que montre le fait que non seulement le Comite central de la Narodna, mais encore certains de ses comites regionaux, possede des sections speciales pour « lesaflaires exterieiires >, L activity exterieure de la Narodna et de ses affilies est particulierement variee. Celle qui est relativement la moins dangereuse parce que controlable officiellement, con- siste en tournees de conferences qu'entrep'rennent les membres influents de la Narodna vers les parties sud-ouest de la Monarcbie oil ils parlent dans diverses societes sur des sujets natio- naux ou de culture. Ces occasions permettent aux orateurs d'exposer aux cercles les plus — 92 — releves de leiirs adherents, en paroles plus on moins gazees, comprehensibles pourceux qui soul deja au courant, les veritables tendances de [association. Parmi ces emissaires, un desplus connus est le Directeur de I'lmprimerie d'Etat Zivojin Daciodeja nommt; c'est lui qui, le 8 aoul igog, a lance un appel au peuple serbe, dans lequcl il a designe PAutriche comme « 1'enncmi dc la Serbie » et la invite a se preparer au combat contre la Monarcliie. A plusieurs reprises, il a entrepris des voyages d'agitation de ce genre. A Karlova (en 1912) il a meme abandonne toute prudence et a parle dans le sens dc « l'union de tous les Serbes contre 1'ennemi commun ». Plus dangereuses sont 1 les relations entretenues par les associations imbues de 1'esprit de la Narodna, sous le manteau de la communautc des intercts et de la culture, avec les asso- ciations dans la Monarchic; car les envoyes respectifs et les visites corporatives de ces asso- ciation-, qui echappent a tout controle, sont utilisees par les Serbes a toules especes de machinations contre. la Monarchic C'est ainsi, par exemple, qu'un envoye de la Narodna a la fete de Sarajevo en sep- tembre i 9 1 2 (annexe VI) ne s'est pas gene, pour recruter en secret des adherents bosniaques a sa societe. L'envoi d'un representant de l'association des Sokol de Kragujevac a cette fete di vail signifier pour les freres de Bosnie : « Nous ne vous avons pas oublies, les ailes de faucon de sumadija sont encore puissantes. » Une pensee qui, dans la circulation intime, aura trouve sans doute une toute autre expression conforme aux tendances ci-dessus exposees de la Narodna (annexe III). Quant aux evenements qui se passent lors des reunions du meme genre en Serbie, il est Evident qu'ils echappent a un controle quelconque des autorites Imperiales et Royales qui ne possedent a cet egard que des informations confidentielles diflicilement oontrolables. En relation avec ces faits il y aurait lieu d'elever des doutes sur la visite des etttdiants d'Agram en Serbie (avril 1912) qui ont recu du cote serbe. un accueil olficiel presque militaire accompagne meme d'une parade, d'une revue de troupes en leur honneur et cela d'une maniere asses suggestive pour que l'association des Sokol de Kragujevac puisse dire : « Cet ev^nement signifie le commencement et la clef d'un grand acte qui doit s'aceom- plir.dans un evenement rapproche, c'est un germe qui murira lorsque lame du peuple sVvanouira jusqu'a ce qu'il n'y ait plus aucune barriere qui ne soit detruite. » Ce n'est que recemment tru'il est parvenu a la connaissance des autorites austro-hongroises que les associations de Sokol serbes ont reussi k determiner quelques corporations analogues de la Monarchic a se mettre avec elles dans un lieu jusqu'a present secret dont le carartere nest pas encore completement eclairci; car les constatations a cet egard continucnt a etre iilevics. Jusqu'a present ccpendant les renseignements obtenus permettent d'estimer que 1'on a de'eouvert les ti'aces d'un des moyens par lesquels les tendances subversives des Sokol serbes ont detourne et conduit a 1'erreur certains groupes de personnes dans la Monarcliie. Cette propagande dans les cercles de plus en plus diflerents parait cependant relegut^c au second plan si on lui compare celle du « travail exterieur » qui est conduite par la Narodna et ses amis vers une agitation d'hommea bomme. C'est dans ce domaine que se constatent les resullats les plus tristes. Par ses hommes de confiance et emissaires secrets, elle apporte le poison de la mutinerie dans les cercles des gens dage comme dans ceux de la jeunesse irresponsable. C'est ainsi par exemple que, detournes par Mian Pribicevitch les anciens officiers deHonved V. B. D. K. V. N. et le lieutenant de gendarmerie de Croatie Esclavone V. K. ont abandonne le service de 1'armee de la Monarcliie dans les conditions les plus suspectes et se sont tournes vers la Serbie; ilsvirent entre temps la plupart de leurs esperances decues ou du nioins en partie, et pensent a retourner dans la patrie qu'ils ont trahie. L'agitation inlroduite de Serbie dans les ecoles moyennes de Croatie et de Bosnie, est malheureusement si connue qu'elle a a — 93 — peine besoin d'exemples. Ce qui est moins connu, cest que ceux qui ont ete elimin^s pour infraction disciplinaire grave des ecoles croates et bosniaques sont accueillis en Serbie les bras ouverls et souvent meme proteges par I'Elat et entretenus comme des adversaires de la Monarchic. Les ecoles serbes avec leurs maitres hostiies a 1'Autriche, qui sont en grande partie adherents de la Narodna, sont cvidemment des etablissements tout a fait appropries pour I'cducation d'adeptes de ce genre. Un cas particulierement notable doit etre cite ici. En mars dernier, plusieurs ecoliers des ecoles normales de maitres de Pakrac (Croalie) ont etc expuls£s pour raison de greve. lis se sont retournes vers la Serbie oil ils ont obtenu illico des positions de maitres d'ecole ou ont ete admis dans des ecoles normales de maitres. Un de ces relegues, en relations avec des cercles hostiies a la Monarchie a declare publiqhement que lui et ses gens donneraient le conseil, emettraient 1'opinion pendant la duree du sejour de 1'arcliiduc heritier en Bosnie, que cette province est une terre serbe. II est particuliere- ment a remarquer que le Prefet du cercle serbe de Krajna a accorde a trois de ces etudiants si compromis, pendant la duree du sejour de 1'Archiduc Francois-Ferdinand en Bosnie, des passeports serbes dans lesquels il les designe faussement comme des sujets serbes, quoiqu'il eut du connaitre leur qualite de Croates. Munis de ces passeports, les trois agitateurs ont pu gagner la Monarchie sans etre remarques, oil cependant ils ont fini par etre reeonnus et arretes. Mais ce qui precede ne suffil pas a caracteriser inlegralement lactivite « exterieure » de la Narodna. Depuis longtemps cleja le Gouvernement imperial et royal a ete inform^ par des infor- mations confidentielles que la Narodna a prepare la guerre quelle a desire 1 a 1'encontre de la Monarchie par des moyens militaires en ce sens quelle y envoie des emissaires charges a la maniere des bandes de tenter, des 1'ouverture des hoslililes, la destruction des moyens de transport et d'amener des revokes ou des paniques (voir annexe VII). La procedure criminelle intentee en i g i 3 par le Conseil de guerre de Sarajevo contre Jovo Jajlicic et consorts pour crimes d'espionnage a amene la confirmation de ces informa- tions confidentielles. Comme au temps de sa fondation, aujourd'hui encore, la preparation de la guerre par bandes armees, figure encore au programme de la Narodna , auquel est venu se joindre en plus toute une activite dans l'ordre de l'espionnage. Cest pour cela que le pro- gramme dit « reorganise » de la Narodna est en realite tin programme Hendu. Dune atmo- sphere de. haine ainsi exasperee publiquement et secretement, d'une agitation echappant a toute responsabilitc pour lesquelles dans la lullc- contre 1'Autriche tous les moyens sont bons jusques et y compris, sans en avoir honte, le meurtre vulgaire, devait finalement resulter des actes de terrorisme. Le 8 juin 1912, le nomine Jukic a tire sur le Commissaire royal a Agram , von Cuvaj , ce qui a amene la blessure mortelle du conseiller von Hervvic assis dans la meme voiture; dans sa fuite, a tue un policier qui le poursuivait et en a blesse deux autres. II est connu par les poursuites que Jukic etait imbu des idees et des plans de la Narodna , meme si Jukic se livrait deja depuis quelque temps a des projets d'attentat, ccux-ci n'arri- verent cependant a maturite qu'apres qu'il eut fait le 18 a'vril 1912 avec les Etudiants d'Agram 1'excursion de Belgrade aux fetes preparees pour honorer ces visiteurs, ce Jukic est entre en rapports avec diverses pcrsonnes appartenant aux cercles de la Narodna et avec lesquelles il a discut£ de politique. Peu de jours apres, il est revenu a Belgrade et la il a recu dun major serbe anc bomhc cl dim camarade un browning, avec lesquels il a execute ('at- tentat. La bombe trouvee a Agram provenait, d'apreS les experts, d'un arsenal militaire. Le coup de Jukic n'etait pas encore oublie lorsque, le 18 aout 1913, Stephan Dojcic. revenu d'Amdrique a Agram, a commis un attentat contre le Commissaire royal baron — 94 — Skerlecz, attentat resultant des actions organisees par les Serbes parmi les eercles des Slaves du Sud vivant en Amerique, et qui etait 1'oeuvre de la propagande extei'ieure de la Narodna. line brochure du serbe T. Dimitrijevitch imprimee a Chicago, avec ses attaques sans mesmvs contrt S. M. lmperiale et Rovale et ses appels aux Serbes de la Monarchic touchant leur prochaine « delivranee » les poussant a rentrer en Serbie montre le parallelisme de la propagande menee par les Serbes en toute liberte en Amerique , ct de celle menee de Serbie dans les domaines de la Monarchie. Et de nouveau, a peine un an apres, Agrara etait le theatre d'un nouvel attentat, manqud cette fois. Le 20 mai igi3, Jacob Schafer a tente, au theatre d'Agram, sur le ban Freiherr von Skerlecz, un attentat qui a ete arrete au dernier moment par un policier. L'enquete a mis au jour 1'existence d'un complot dont fame etait Rudolf Hercigonja. Des declarations de ce dernier et de ses cinq co-inculpes, il resulte que cet attentat aussi avait son origine en Serbie. Ayant pris part' a une tentative manquee pour mettre en liberte Jukic, Hercigonja s'etait sauv£ en Serbie (octobre 1912) oil il frequentait avec son complice Marojan Jakcic, des comitadji et des membres de la Narodna. Comme cela est arrive frequemme.nt avec des esprits juveniles s'occupant trop tot de questions politiques, ces frequentations ont amene les plus mauvais resultats. Hercigonja rentra chez lui avec le dogme preche a Belgrade que les pays slaves du sud de la Monarchic doivent en etre separes pour etre reunis au royaume serbe. 11 avait en outre ete persuade par I'enseignement recu de ses amis que ce but devait etre poursuivi par l'ex^cution d'attentat sur de bauts personnages ayant part a la politique de la Monarchie. C'est dans cet esprit qu'Hercigonja a Agram a exerce son action sur ses amis et les a amenes a ses id£es. Au premier plan de ses projets, etait 1' execution d'un attentat sur Iheri- tier du trone. Peu de mois auparavant, des poursuites en haute trahiscn avaient ete intentees conlre Suka Alginovic. Au cours de ce proces, trois temoins ont declare qu'Alginovic -avait dit devant eux avoii- re(;u cent dina de la Narodna et autant dune association secrete d'etudiants pour debut de propagande, mais principaleinent pour 1'execution d'un attentat sur larchi- duc Francois-Ferdinand. Un voit a quel point lagitation criminelle de In Narodna et de ceux qui partagent ses opinions, s'est concentree ees derniers temps sur la personne de t'archiduc livritier. De toutesces constatntions, on arrive a la conclusion que la Narodna ainsi que les eercles hostiles a la Monarchie groupes autour d'elle consideraient depuis pcu le moment venu de lane realiser leur enseignement par des actes. li est remarquable quelle se contente pour ces actes de donner lincitation et la oil cette incitation etait tombee sur un sol fertile de placer les moyens de secours matenels « leur dispo- sition, mais quelle a fait reposer tout le role dangereux de cette propagande par le fait, uniquement sur la jeunesse de la Monarchie excite'' el deiournee par elle qui doit supporter seule le fardeau de ce tl'iste « heroisme ». Tous les traits de cette facon de faire se retrouvent dans 1'histoire et 1'origine de 1'attentat profondement regrettable du 28 juin. Princip et Grabez sont des exemples de cette jeunesse empoisonnee des 1'ecole par les pensees de la Narodna. A Belgrade, frequentant les eercles d'dtudiants imbus de ces idees, Princip s'esl occupe de plans d'attentat eontre l'Aichiduc heritier contre lequel s'exeroait la — 95 — haine particulierement aigue des elements hostiles a la monarchie , a l'occasion de son voyage dans les pays annexes. II se lia d'amitie avec Kabrinovilch qui frequentait les memes cercles et dont les opinions radicalement revolutionnaires, d'apres ses propres aveux, 1'amenaient au meme sentiment hostile a la Monarchic et a la propagande par le fait. Mais, si soigneusement qu'ait ete pre- pare ce compiot, etsi decides qu'aient ete les conjures, cependant lattentat n'aurait jamais ete accompli s'il ne setait pas trouve, comme dans le cas Jukic, des gens pour donner aux complices les moyens d'executer leur agression , car Princip et Kabrinovitch font expresse- ment reconnu, ils manqiiaient autant des armes necessaires que d'argent pour les acheter. II est interessant de volt oil les complices se sont procure leurs armes. Milan Prihicevic et Zivojin Dacic, ces deux homines principaux de la Narodna sont les premiers auxquels les complices se sont adresses dans leur besoin comme a une aide sure sans doute parce qu'il etait deja devenu une traduction dans le cercte de ceux qui sont prets a commettre des atten- tats qu'il etait possible d'oblenir des representants de la Narodna des instruments de meurtre. Le fait aceidcntel que ces deux hommes, au moment critique, ne se trouvaient pas a Bel- grade, dejoua sans doute ce projet, cependant Princip et Kabrinovic ne furenl pas embar- rasses pour trouver une autre assistance, celle de Milan Ciganovic, un ancien comitadji, maintenant fonctionnaire des chemins de fer a Belgrade et membre de la Narodna. Ce der- nier et son ami, le major Voja Tankosic deja nomme\ egalement un des chefs de la Narodna qui aili en 1908 le chef de 1'ecole des bandes armees de Kuprija (annexe V) apparaissent maintenant comme les chefs spirituels du compiot. Ils nleurent qu'une hesitation , legere au debut, a savoir si les trois conjures etaient reellement decides a commettre cet acte, hesita- tion qui disparut bientot grace a leurs suggestions. Des lors, ils furent prets a fournir toute . assistance, Tankosic a procure quatre brownings et des munitions et de largent pour le voyage. Six grenades a main provenantde 1'armee serbe constituaient le complement d'arme- ment, ce qui nous rappelle le cas Jukic. Preoccupe du succes, Tankosic proeura lenseigne- ment du tir, mais Tankosic et Ciganovic se sont preoccupes en outre d'assurer un moyen special mm desire d'assurer le secret du compiot. Ils aposterent Zian Kali avec Tindication que les deux auteurs, apres lattentat, devaient se tuer, acte'de precaution qui devait leur profiter en premiere ligne, carle secret leur enlevait le faible danger qu'ils avaienf assume dans cette entreprise. La mart sure pour les viclimes de leur dilourncmenl , la pleine sieuriU pour elle-memc , telle est la devise, connue maintenant , de la Narodna. Pour rendre possible fexecution de lattentat, il fallait que les armes' et bombes par- vinssent en fraude 6t sans etre apercues em Bosnie. La encore, Ciganovic a donne' toute son assistance , il present aux conjures une route determinee el leur assure la protection des autorites frontieres serbes. La maniere dans laquelle ce voyage decrit par Princip comme « mysterieux » a ete organise et execute ne laisse subsister aucun doute qu'il s'agit d'une voie secrete bien prepares et deja parcourue souvent en vue de desseins secrets de la Narodna. Avec une simplicity et une siiret£ resultant de la seule habitude, les capitaines de la fron- tiere a Sabak et Losnika ont prete dans ce but leur oiganisation administrative ; sans difficulte s'est eflectue ce transport secret, avec son systeme compiique de guides toujours changeants qui, appeles comme par miracle, se trouvaient toujours sur place quand on avail besoin d'eux. Sans s'enquerir du but de ce voyage curieux de quelques etudiants trop jeunes, les autorites serbes ont laisse sur 1'indication de 1'ancien comitadji et du fonctionnaire subal- terne des chemins de fer Ciganovic, jouer cet appareil fonctionnant si facilemenl. lis n'avaient d'ailleurs pas besoin de demander, car d'apres les indications recues, il etait clair pour eux qu'il s'agissait de remplir de nouveau une mission de la » Narodna ». La vue de 1'arsenal de bombes et de revolvers arrachait seulement au surveillant Grbie. un sourire bien- — 96 — veillant d'approbation dormant la preuve complete combien Ton etait habitue sur cette route a rencontrer une contrebande de ce genre. Le Gouvernement royal serbe s'est charge d'une faute lourde en laissant s'accomplir tout cela. Tenu a culliver des relations de bon voisinage avec I'Autriehe-Hongrie, il a permis a la presse de repandre la haine contre la Monarchie , tolere que des associations elablies sur son sol sous la conduite d'ofliciers eleves, de fonctionnaires, de maitres et de juges,"se livrent contre la Monarchie a une campagne publique menant ses citoyens aux idees revolution- naires, il n'a pas empeche que des homines ayant une part a la direction de son administra- tion militaire et civile empoisonnent la conscience publique contre tous les sentiments moraux au point que, dans cette lutte, 1'assassinat vulgaire par guet-apens apparaisse comme l'arme la plus recommandable. N° 75 bis. Communique ojjicicnx du bureau de la Presse : Vienne, 28 juillet 1914. Le Minislre autrichien a Belgrade a presente des son retour a Vienne le texte de la reponse serbe. Celle reponse est remplie d'un esprit de manque de sincerite : elle laisse appa- raitre que le Gouvernement serbe est sans intention serieuse de meltre fin 4 la tole- rance coupable grace a laquelle ont etc permises les menees anti-autrichiennes. La reponse serbe contient de telles restrictions et limitations, non seulemenl surle prin- cipe meme de la demarche auslro-hongroise, mais encore en ce qui concerne les revendications exposees par 1'Autriche, que les concessions faites sont sans impor- tance. En particulier, refus sous pretexte vain, d'accepter la participation des oiganes autro-hongrois pour la poursuite des auteurs des attentats residant en territoire serbe. .De meme la reponse serbe a la demande autrichienne pour mettre fin aux menees hostiles de la presse equivaut a un refus. La demande relative aux mesures qui devraient etre prises pour, que les associa- tions hostiles a I'Autriehe-Hongrie ne puissent, apres leur dissolution, continuer leur action sous un autre nom et forme , n'a pas meme ete envisagee. Ces revendications conslituant le minimum necessaire au retablissement du calme permanent dans le Sud-Est de la Monarchic, la reponse serbe est consideree comme insuffisante. Le Gouvernement serbe en a conscience d'ailleurs, puisqu'il envisage le reglement du conllit par voie d'arbitrage, et que le jour oil sa reponse devait etre remise et avant cette remise, il avait ordonne la mobilisation. 97 — N 76. M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres p. i. A bord de la France, le 28 juillet 191&. J'ai recu par Copenhague votre telegramme resumant les faits de samedi, le tele- gramme relatant la derniere visite de i'ambassadeur d'Allemagne, celui relatif a la mediation que la Russie conseille a la Serbie de demander et aux demarches anglaises a Berlin , ainsi que votre telegramme venu ce matin direclement par la tour Eiffel. J'approuve pleinement la reponse que vous avez faite au baron de Schoen; la these que vous avez soutenue est l'evidence meme : dans la recherche d'une solution pacifique du conflit, nous sommes pleinement d'accord avec la Russie, qui n'est pas responsable de la situation actuelle, et n'a encore procede a aucune mesure quel- conque pouvant eveiller le moindre soupcon; mais il est evident qua titre de contre- partie 1'Allemagne ne saurait se refuser a donner des conseils au Gouvernement austro-hongrois, dont Taction a ouvert la crise. U y a done lieu de continuer a tenir a l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne le meme langage. Ce conseil est d'ailleurs en harmonie avec la double proposition anglaise menlionnee dans votre telegramme. J'approuve entieremenl la combinaison suggeree par sir Edward Grey et j'invite directement M. Paul Cambon a le lui faire savoir. II est essentiel que 1'on sache a Berlin et a Vienne que notre plein concours est acquis aux efforts que poursuit le Gouvernement britannique en vue de chercher une solution au conflit austro-serbe. L'action des quatre puissances moins interessees ne peut, pour les raisons exposees ci-dessus, s'exercer uniquement a Vienne et a Petersbourg. En pro- posant de 1'exercer aussi a Belgrade, ce qui veut dire surtout, en fait, entre Vienne et Belgrade, sir Edward Grey rentre clans la logique de la situation; et, en n'excluant pas Petersbourg, il oflre, d'autre part, a 1'Allemagne, un moyen de se dep^irtir, en toute dignite, de la demarche parlaquelle le Gouvernement allemand a fait savoir a Paris et a Londres que l'affaire etait envisagee par lui comme purement autro-serbe et de- pourvue de caractere general. Je vous prie de communiquer le present telegramme a nos representants aupres des grandes puissances et a notre Ministre a Belgrade. Rene Viviani. DOCCMENTS DIPLOMATIQCES. Guerre eurOp£ei — 98 — N° 77. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres p. i. a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, a bord de la France. Paris, 28 juillet 191A. Malgre. les assurances donnees, .tant a Berlin qa.a Paris, par les agents aJIemands, du desir de leur gouveraement de conicourir aux. efforts pour le maintien de la paix, aucune action sincere n'est exercee par eux pour retenir 1'Autriche ; la proposition anglaise, qui consiste dans une action des quatre puissances moius interessees poar oblenir un arret des operations, militaires a Vienne, Belgrade el Petersboarg, et dans une reunion. a Londres des Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne , de Franca et d'ltalie, sous la presidence de Sir E. Grey en vue de chercher une solution aux. difnculles austro- serbes, rencontre, a Berlin des objections de nature aJa faire echouer. L'Ambassadeur d'Autrkhe a fait une demarche pour annoncer que son gouverae- ment prendrait deraain des mesures energiques pour contraindre la Serbie a lui donner les satisfactions et les garanties qu'il exige de cette puissance; le Comte Sificsenme s'est pas explique sur ces mesures; la mobilisatioa, a paxtir du 28 juillet, parait certaine d'apres notre attache niililaire a Vienne. Bienvenu-Martin. N" 78. M..Biknvbnu-Martin, Mini&tre des Affaires Etrangeres p. L. a Londres, Berlin, Petersbourg, Vienne, Rome. Paris, le 28 juillet 19m. J'ai eu de nouveau la visite de 1'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne ce matin; il m'a dit qu'il n'avait pas de communication, pas de proposition officielle a me faire, mais qu'il vcnait,,comme la veille, causer de la situation et des moyens a employer pour eviter des actes irreparables. Interroge sur les intentions de 1'Autriche, il a declare ne pas les connaitre, et ignorer la nature des moyens de coercition qu'elle prepare. L'Allemagne, selon le Baron de Sclioen, ne deraande qua agir avec la France pour le maintien de la paix. Sur 1'observalion qui lui etait faite qu'un projet de mediation des quatre puissances , auquel nous avons adhere , et qui a obtenu 1'assentiment de prin- cipe de l'ltalie et de 1'AUemagne, a ete mis en avant par l'Angleterre, l'ambassadeur a dit que le Gouvernemem allemand ne demandait en eflet qua s'associer a Paction des — 00 — puissanees, pourvu que -cette action n'ad'ecle pas la forme d'un arbitrage au d'une conference, repousses' par l'Autriche. J'ai repondu que si le mot seul arrete le Gouvernement autrichien, le but pent etre atteint par d'autres moyens; le Gouvernement allemand est bien place pour demander a l'Autriche de laisser aux puissances le temps d'intervenir, de trouver une conciliation. M. de Schoen m'a fait alors observer qu'il n'a pas destructions et sait seulement que 1'Allemagne se refuse a exercer une pression sur l'Autriche, qui ne veut pas de conference. 11 reproche aux journaux francais de preter a 1'AUemagne une attitude quelle n'a pas, en pretendant qu'elle pousse 1'A.utriche : sans doute elle approuve son attitude, mais elle n'a pas connu sa note; elle ne saurait 1'arreter trop brusque- menl, car l'Autriche a besoin degaranties contre les' precedes serbes. Bienvbsu-Martin. iN° 79. M. Bienvenu-Martw, Ministre des Affaires etrsngeres p. i. a M. Dumaine, Ambassarleur de France a Vienne, Paris, le.28 juillet lflid- Vous connaissez, par les telegrammes de nos Ambassades, que jevous ai transmis, la propobition anglaise de mediation a quatre et de conference a Londres, ainsi que noire adhesion a cette suggestion, 1'acceptation conditionnelle de l'ltalie et les reserves de Berlin. Je vous prie de vous tenir en contact a ce siijet avec votre Collegue d'Angleterre, qui a recu les instructions necessaires pour saisir le Gouvernement austro-hongrois de la suggestion anglaise, des que ses trois Collegues auront ete autorises a fane la meme demarche; vous vous conformerez a son attitude. 1N° 80. M. Paul Cajibon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, a M. BtEN'YE.NU-lVlARTiN, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Londres, le 28 juillet 1914. Sir Ed. Grey a recu hiermes Collegues d'Autriche Hongrie et d'Allemagne. Le pre- Tnier a continue a soutenir que la reponse serbe etait inacceptable. Le seeond aitenu — 100 — uii langage analogue a celui de M. de Schoen a Paris. II a insiste sur. lutilite dune action rnoderatrice de 1'Angleterre a Petersbourg. Sir Ed. Grey lui a repondu que la Russie s'etait montree Ires moderee depuis l'ouverture dela crise, notamment dans ses conseils au Gouvernement serbe, et qu'd serait tres embarrasse de lui faire des recommandations pacifiques. II a ajoute que c'etait a Vienne qu'il convenait d'agir et que le concours de 1'Allemagne etait indispensable. D'autre part 1'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a Petersbourg a telegraphie que M. Sazo- noff avait propose a 1'Ambassadeur d'Autriche une conversation sur l'afFaire serbe. Celte information a ete confirmee par 1'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a Vienne qui a fait savoir qu'un premier entretien entre le Ministre russe des Affaires etrangeres et le Comte Szapary avait produit un bon effet au Ballplalz. Sir Ed. Grey et Sir A. Nicolson m'ont dit que, si un accord pouvait s'etablir directe- ment entre Petersbourg et Vienne, il faudrait s'en feliciter, mais ils ont eleve quelques doutes sur le succes de rinkiative de M. Sazonoff. Interroge par Sir G. Buchanan sur la convocation eventuelle a Londres d'une Conference des Representants de 1'Angleterre, de la France, de 1'Allemagne et de 1'Italie pour chercher une issue a la situation acluelle, M. Sazonoff a repondu : « qu'il avail entame des pourparlers avec 1'Ambassadeur d'Autriche dans des conditions qu'il esperait favorables; que cependant d n'avait pas encore recu de reponse a sa proposi- tion d'une revision de la Note serbe par les deux Cabinets. » Si des explications directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne sont irrealisables , M. Sazonoff se declare pret a accepter la proposition anglaise ou toute autre de nature a resoudre favorablement le conflit. II serait, en tous cas, tres desirable que cette negociation directe, a un moment ou le moindre retard peut avoir de si serieuses consequences, fut menee de maniere a ne pas enlraver faction de Sir Ed. Grey et a ne pas fournir a 1'Autriche un pretexte pour se derober a 1'intervention amicale des quatie puissances. L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a Berlin ayant insiste aupres de M. de Jagow pour obtenirune adhesion a la suggestion de Sir Ed. Grey, le Ministre alleniand des Affaires etrangeres a repondu qu'il convenait d'attendre le resultat de la conversation engagee entre Petersbourg et Vienne. Sir Ed. Grey a, en consequence, present a Sir Ed. Goschen de suspendre pour le moment ses demarches. Au surplus l'annonce que 1'Autriche vient de notifier officiellement sa declaration de guerre a la Serbie fait entrer la question dans une nouvelle phase. Paul Cambon. N° 81. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France ;i Berlin, a M. Bienvemj-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Berlin, le 28 juillet 1914. La conversation que M. Sazonoff a eue avec le Comte Szapary a ete portee a la connaissance de M. de Jagow par le Charge d'Affaires de Russie. Le Secretaire d'Etat — 101 — lui a dit que , conforaienient aux remarques de l'Ambassadeur d'AUeraagne en Russie , puisque apres 1'expiralion de l'ultimatum de 1'Autriche le Gouverneraent de Vienne ne se refusait pas a causer avec le Gouvernement de Petersbourg, il y avait lieu d'esperer que de son cote le Comte Berchtokl pourrait causer avec M. Schebeko et qu'une issue pourrait etre trouvee aux diflicultes actuelles. Le Charge d'affaires russe voit avec faveur cette disposition des esprits, qui correspond aux desirs de M. de Jagow de voir Vienne et Petersbourg s'entendre directement et degager l'Allemagne. II y a lieu de se demander seulement si 1'Autriche ne cherche pas a gagner du temps pour se preparer. J'ai aujourd'hui appuye la demarche de mon Collegue d'Angleterre aupres du Secretaire d'Etat. Celui-ci ma repondu comme a Sir Ed. Goschen, qu'il lui etait impossible d'accepter l'idee d'une sorte de conference a Londres entre les Ambas- sadeurs des quatre Puissances, et qu'il faudrait donner a la suggestion anglaise une autre forme, pour quelle put etre realisee. Je lui ai fait valoir le danger d'un retard, qui pouvait amener la guerre, et lui ai demande s'il la souhaitait. II a proteste et a ajoute que les conversations directes entre Vienne et Petersbourg etaienl entamees, et que, des maintenant, il en attendait une suite favorable. L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre et l'Ambassadeur d'llalie sont venus me voir ce matin ensemble , pour m'entretenir des conversations qu'ils avaient eues avec M. de Jagow bier au sujet de la proposition de Sir Ed. Grey. Le Secretaire d'Etat leur a, somme toute, tenu le meme langage qu'a moi : acceptant en principe de s'unir dans une demarche commune a 1'Angleterre, a I'ltalie et a nous-memes, mais repoussant toute idee de conference. Nous avons pense, mes collegues et moi, qu'il n'y avait la qu'une question de forme et l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre va suggerer a son Gouvernement de libeller autrement sa proposition, qui pourrait prendre le caractere d'une demarche diplo- matique a Vienne et a Petersbourg. En raison de la repugnance manifestee par M. de Jagow contre toute demarche a Vienne , Sir Ed. Grey pourrait le mettre au pied ,du mur, en lui demandant de for- muler lui-meme comment pourrait se produire Taction diplomatique des puissances pour eviter la guerre. Nous devons nous associer a tous les efforts en faveur de la paix compatibles avec nos engagements vis-a-vis de notre alliee; mais, pour laisser les responsabilite's oil elles sont, il importe d'avoir soin de demander a l'Allemagne de preciser ce qu'elle veut. Jules Cambo.n. — 102 — IV 82. M. Paleolocde, Ambassadeur de France a Petersbourg, a M. BiENVEN.u-MARTW,.Ministre des Affaires etrangeres ,p. i. Petersbourg, le 28 juillet 191 4. Le Gouvernemert auslro-hongrois n'a pas encore repondu a la proposition Ju Gouvernement russo, tendanta l'ouvcrtuie d'unc conversation directe entre Peters- bourg et Vienne. M. SazonofT a recu cet apres-midi les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne et d'Aulriche- Hongrie; l'impression qu'il a.gardee de son double entretien est mauvaise.: » Decide- ment, tn'a-t-il dit, 1'Autriche ne veul pas causer ». A la suite d'une conversation queje viens d'avoir avec mes deux collegues , j'e- prouvcla meme impression de pessimisme. Paleoxocue. N° S3. M. Di Maine, Ambassadeur de France a Vienne, a M. Blenvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Vienne, le 28 juillet 191 i. Le Comte Berchtold vient de declarer a Sir M. de Buxtsen que toute intervention tendant a la reprise de la discussion entre 1'Autriche et la Serbie, sur la base de la reponse serbe, serait inutile, et d'ailleurs trop tardive, la guerre ayant etc cilli. ielle- ment declaree a midi. L'attitude de mon collegue russe n'a jusqu'a present pas varie : il ne s'agissait pas a son avis de localiser le conflit, mais bien de I'empecher. La declaration de guerre rendra bien difficile ['engagement 'des pourparlers aquatre, ainsi qu'e'la continu ti in des edtretiens directs entre M. Sazonoff et le Comte Szapary. On pretexte ici que la formule qui paraissait pouvoir obtenir ['adhesion de l'Alle- magne, « mediation entre 1'Autriche et la lltissie », a I'inconvenient d'accuser entre ces deux empires un conflit qui n'existe pas, jusqu'a present. Parmi les soupcons qu'inspire la soudaine et violente resolution de 1'Autriche, le plus inquietant est que 1'Allemagne 1'aurait poussee a l'agression con Ire la Serbie alin de pouvoir elle-meme entrer en lulle avec la Russie et la France, dans les circon- stances qu'elle suppose devoir Iui etre le plus favorables, et dans des conditions dehberees. Ddmaine. — 103 — CHAPITRE V DE LA DECLARATION DE GUERRE DE L'AIITRICHE A LA SERRIE (28 Jl'ILLET 1914 A L'ULTIMATUM DE L'ALLEMAGNE A LA RUSSIE (31 JU1LLET 1914) — 105 — N° 84. M. Barrere, Ambassadeur de France a Rome, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Rome, le 29 juillet 1914. La Consulta estime que, malgre la declaration de guerre de 1'Autriche & la Serbie , il n'y a pas lieu d'interrompre les efforts diplomatiques tendant a la reunion d'une Conference & Londres en vue d'une mediation. Barrere. N° 85. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., a Saint-Petersbourg, Londres, Berlin, Rome, Vienne, Constantinople, Belgrade. Paris, le 29 juillet 1914. L'attitude austro-alleraande se precise. L'Autriche, inquiete de la propagande slave, a saisi 1'occasion de, 1'attentat de Serajevo pour chatier les menees serbes, el prendre de ce cote, des garanties qui peuvent, selon que Ton laissera ou non se developper les evenements, ne porter que sur le Gouvernement et 1'armee serbes, ou devenir territoriales. L'Allemagne s'inlerpose entre son alliee et les autres puis- sances, en declarant qu'il s'agit d'une question locale, chatiment d'un crime politique dans le passe, garanties certaines pour 1'avenir que les menees anti-autrichiennes prendront fin. Le Gouvernement allemand estime que la Russie doit se contenter des assurances officielles et formelles donnees par 1'Autriche quelle ne poursuit pas d'agrandissement territorial et respectera 1'integrite de la Serbie; dans ces con- ditions, c'est de la Russie seide, si elle voulait intervenir dans une question bien delimitee, que peut venir un danger de guerre. Dans ces conditions c'est a Peters- bourg seulement qu'il faut agir pour le maintien de la paix. Ce sophisme, qui dispenserait 1'AUemagne d'intervenir & Vienne, a ete soutenu sans succes 4 Paris par M. de Schben, qui a vainement tente de nous entrainer dans une action solidaire franco-allemande a Petersbourg; il a ete egalement developpe a Londres aupres de Sir E. Grey : en France comme en Angleterre, on a repondu que le cabinet de Petersbourg a donne, depuis le debut, les plus grandes preuveS de sa moderation, en particulier en s'associant aux puissances pour donner a la Documents diplomatiqces. • — Guerre europeenne. 1 4 — 106 — Serbie le conscil de ceder aux exigences de la note autrichienne. La Russie ne menace done nullement la paix; e'est a ^ ienne qu'il faut agir, e'est de la que vient le danger, du moment qu'on y refuse de se contenter de la soumission presque totale de la Serbie a des exigences exorbitantes et qu'on ne veut pas accepter la collaboration des puissances pour la discussion des points restant a regler entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, et enfm qu'on n'hesile pas devant une declaration de guerre aussi precipitee que la note primitive de l'Autriche-Hongrie. L'attitude a Berlin, comme a Vienne, reste dilatoire. Dans la premiere capilale, tout en protestant du desir allemand de sauvegarder la paix generale par une action commune des quatre puissances, on repousse lidee d'une Conference, sans suggerer aucun autre moyen et en refusant d'agir positiyement a Vienne. Dans la capitale autrichienne, on voudrait amuser Petersbourg par 1'illusion d'une entente pouvant resulter lie conversations directes, el Ton agit contre la Serbie. Dans ces conditions, il parait essentiel que le cabinet de Petersbourg, dont le desir de denouer pacifiquement la ense est manifeste, adhere immediatement a la proposition anglaise. Celle-ci .1 besoin d'etre ties appuyee a Berlin pour decider M. de Jagow .1 une action reelle sur Vienne, susceptible d'arreter PAutriche et d'empecher que son avantage diplomatique se double d'un succes militaire. Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois ne manquerail pas en eflet d'en profiler pour imposer a la Serbie, suns le Hum elastique de garanties, des conditions qui modifieraient en fail, malgre toutes les assurances de desinteressement territorial, le stalut de I'Europe orientate, et risqueraient de compromettre gravement, soit des niamtenant, soil dans un avenir prochain, la paix generale. Bienvenu-Martin. IN 86. M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Petersbourg , a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Sainl-PeterslxMirg, le 29 juillet igi4- Des maintenant, je suis en mesure d'assurer a Votre Excellence que le Gouverne- ment russe acquiesce a toutes les procedures que la France el 1'Angleterre lui propo- seronl pour sauvegarder la paix. Mon collegue d'Angleterre lelegraphie dans le meme sens a Londres. Paleologue. — 107 — N° 87. M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France a Bruxelles, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Bruxelles, le 29 juillet 191a. De mon entretien avec M. Davignon et diverses personnes en mesure d'etre exac- tement informees, je rapporte 1'impression suivante : 1'attitude de i'Ailemagne est enigmatique et autorise toutes les apprehensions. II parait invraisemblable que le Gouvernement auslro-hongrois ait pris une initiative le conduisant, suivant un plan precon^u, a une declaration de guerre sans accord prealable avec l'empereur Guil- laume. Le Gouvernement allemand reste 1'arme au pied, reservant, selon les circon- stances, son action pacilique ou guerriere, mais 1'inquietude est telle dans tous les milieux qu'une intervention brusque contre nous ne surprendrait ici personne. Mes Collegues de Russie et d'Angleterre partagent ce sentiment. Le Gouvernement beige prend des dispositions conformes a la declaration que m'a faite hier soir M. Davignon que tout sera mis en ceuvre pour la defense de la neu- tralite du pays. Klobukowski. N° 88. M. Ronsstn, Consul general de France a Francfort, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Francfort, le 29 juillet 1914. Je vous signale d'importants mouvements de troupes hier et cette nuit. Ce matin, plusieurs regiments sont arrives en tenue de campagne , notamment par les routes de Darmstadt, Cassel et Mayence , qui sont remplies de militaires. Les ponts etchemins de fer sont gardes sous pretexte de preparer les manoeuvres d'automne. Ronssin. 108 N° 89. M. Allize, Ministre de France a Munich, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Munich, le 29 juillet 1914. On m'assure que les moulins d'Dlkirch (Alsace-Lorraine) ont ete invites i cesser de livrer a leur clientele ordinaire et a reserver toule leur production pour 1'armee. De Strasbourg sont signales des transports de canons automobiles employes pour le tir sur aeroplanes et dirigeables. Sous pre'texle de modification dans les exercices d'automne, les sous-officiers et soldals des regiments d'infanterie bavaroise de Metz, qui etaient en pennission en Bavierc a 1'occasion des recolles, ont recu l'ordie bier de renlrer immedialement. Allize. IV 90. M. Dumalne, ambassadeur de France a Vienne, a M. Biemvenu-Martin,. Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Vienne, le '29 juillet 19 ih. Le Consul de France a Prague me confirme la mobilisation du 8 e corps d'armee deja annoncee, et celle de la division de landwehr de ce corps d'armee. Les divisions de cavalerie de Galicie mobdisent egalement; des regiments, des divisions de rava- lerie de Vienne et de Buda-Pest ont deja ete transported a la fronliere russe. Des ((invocations de reservistes ont acluellement lieu dans cette region. En vue de faire face a toute menace, el peut-etre pour en imposer a Peteisbourg, le bruit court que le Gouvernemcnt auslro-hongrois aurail rintcnlion de decider le 3o juillet (in le 1 01 aout, la mobilisation generate des armees. EnKn le relour de 1'Empe.reur d'lschl a Vienne est assure pour domain. DUMAINE. — 109 N° 91. M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Petersbourg, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires elrangeres p. i. SaintPetersboorg, le 29 juillet 19 li. La conversation directe & laquelle le Gouvernement russe avail aniicalement convie le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est refusec par celui-ci. D'autre part, 1'Etal-Major russe a constate que l'Autriche precipile ses preparatifs militaires contre la Russie et aclive sa mobilisation, qui a commence sur la frontiere de Galicie. En consequence, 1'ordre de mobilisation sera expedie, cetle nuit, aux treize corps d'armee destines & operer eventuellement contre l'Autriche. Malgre l'echec de sa proposition, M. Sazonoff accepte 1'idee d'une conference des quatre Puissances a Londres; il n'attache d'ailleurs aucune importance au titre officiel de cette deliberation et se pretera a toutes les tentatives anglaises en faveur de la paix. Paleologue. IT 92. M. Jides Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i. Berlin, le 29 juillet 1914. J'ai demande aujourd'hui au Secretaire d'Etat oil en elait la question des conver- sations directes eotre Vienne et Petersbourg, qui lui semblait hier la meilleure pro- cedure pour arriver k une detente. U m'a repondu qui Petersbourg les dispositions sur ce point etaient bonnes et qu'il avail demande a Vienne d'entrer dans cette voic. II allendait la reponse. Le Gouvernement brilannique, apres avoir vu repousser la suggestion d'une conference, avait fail connaitre qu'il verrait avec faveur ces conver- sations s'ouvrir entre l'Autriche et la Russie et avait demande que 1'Allemagne y poussat l'Autriche, ce que le Gouvernement imperial ne manque pas de faire. J'ai demande a M. de Jagow s'il avait enfin la reponse de la Serbie a 1'Autriche, ot ce qu'il en pensait. II ma repondu qu'il y voyait une base de negocialion possible. J'ai repris que e'est justeinent pour cela que je trouvais inexplicable la rupture dc l'Autriche apres la reception dun document pared. Le Secretaire d'Etat a alors fait remarquer qu'avec les peuples d'Orient on n'avait jamais assez, de suretes et que l'Autriche voulait controler l'execution des promesses — 110 — qui lui etaient faites, controle que la Serine refusait. C'est la aux yeux du Secretaire d'Etat, le point capital. J'ai replique a M. de Jagovv que, voulant rester indepen- dante, la Serbie devait repousser le controle d'une seule Puissance, mais qu'une Commission international ne presenterait pas le meme caractere. Les Etats Balka- niques en comptent plus dune , a comuiencer par la Commission finailcrere a Athenes. On pourrait par exeoiple, ai-je dit, imaginer, entre autres combinaisons, une Com- mission internalionale provisoire chargee de controler l'enquete de police demandee par l'Autriche;. il etait clair par cet exemple que la reponse de la Serbie ouvrait la porte a des conversations et ne justifiait pas une rupture. Tai ensuite demaridc au Secretaire d'Etat si, en dehors des conversations directes entre Vienne et Petersbourg, auxquelles Sir Ed. Grey s'etait rallie, il ne pensait pas que Taction commune des quatre Puissances pourrait s'exercer par l'intermediaire de leurs Ambassadeurs; II ma repondu affirmativement ajoutanl qu'acluellemenl le Cabinet de Londres se cont'entait d'appuyer dans le sensdes conversations directes. A la fin de lapres-midi, le Chancelier de l'Empire a prie 1'Ambassadeur d'Angle- terre de venir le voir. 11 lui a parle de la proposition de Sir E. Grey tendant a la reunion d'une Conference; illui a dit qu'il n'avait pas pu accepter une proposition qui semblait imposer Pantorite des Puissances a l'Autriche; il a assure mon Collegue de son sincere desir de la paix et des efforts qu'il faisait a Vienne, mais il a ajoute que, la Russie etait seule la maitresse de maintenir la paix ou de dechainer la guerre. Sir Ed. Goschen lui a repondu 'qu'il ne partageait pas son sentiment et que si la guerre eclatait, l'Autriche aurait la plus grosse part de responsabilite, car il etait inadmissible qu'elle eiit rompu avec la Serbie apres la reponse de celle-ci. Sans discuter sur ce point, le Chancelier a dit qu'il poussait autant qu'il le pouvait aux conversations directes entre l'Autriche et la Russie; il savait que 1'Angleterre voyait cette conversation d'un ceil favorable. II a ajoute que sa propre action serait bien difficile a Vienne, s'il etait vrai que la Russie eut mobilise sur la Irontiere au- trichienne quatorze corps d'armee. II a prie mon collegue d'appeler sur toutesces observations 1'attefttion de Sir Ed. Grey. Sir E. Goschen a telegraphie dans ce sens a Londres. L'attitude du Chancelier est tres probablement la consequence du dernier entre- Iien de Sir Ed. Grey avec le prince Lichnowski. Jusqu'a ces tout derniers jours, on s'est flatte ici que 1'Angleterre resterait hors du debat, et 1'impression produite par son attitude est provide sur le Gouvernement allemand et sur les financiers et hommes d'affaires. Jules Cambon. — Ill — N° 93. M. Dumaine, Arubassadeur de France a Vienne, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Allaires etrangeres p. i. Vienne, le 29 juillet 1 9 1 4- L'opinion de mes collegues anglais, russe et italien Concorde avec la mienne con- cernant l'impossibilite d'empecher une premiere lutte entre l'Autriche et la Serbie, loutes les tentatives pour retarder le choc ayant echoue. M. Scliebeko avait demande que les pourparlers engages a Petersbourg entre MM. Sazonoff et Szapary fussent poursuivis et rendus plus eflicaces par des pouvoirs specialement conferes a celui-ci, le comle Berchtold s'y est nettement oppose. 11 marquait ainsi que 1'Autriche-Hongrie ne tolere aucune intervention qui 1'empeche- rait d'mfliger a la Serbie. un chatiment et une humiliation. Le due d'Avarna admet conime Ires vraisemblable que 1'imminence d'une insurrec- lion generale de ses sujels Siid-Slaves ait precipite les resolutions de la Monarchic 11 s'attache encore a 1'espoir qu'apres un premier succes des armees austro-hongroises, mais pas [ilustot, une mediation pourrait limiler le conflit. DuMAINE. IN" 94. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Allaires etrangeres, p. i. , a Londres, Berlin, Saint-Petersbourg, Rome, Vienne, Constantinople, Belgrade. Paris, le 20 juiiiet 191^. Ce matin, la communication suivaute m'a ete faite par l'Ambassadcur d'Allumague a titre ofiicieux : le Gouvernement allemand poursuit ses efforts en vue d'amener le Gouvemement autrichien a une conversation ainicale qui permettra a ce dernier de faire connaitre exactement le but el 1'eitension des operations en Serbie. Le Cabinet de Berlin espere recevoir des precisions qui seraient de nature a donner satisfaction a la Russie. Les efforts allemands ne sont aucunement entraves par la declaration de guerre intervenue. I ne communication semblable sera faite a Petersbourg. Au cours dune conversation que j'ai eue ce matin avec le baron de Schoen, celui-ci m'a declare que le Gouvernement allemand ignorait les intentions de Vienne. Quand Berlin saura iusqu'ou l'Autriche veut aller, on aura une base de discussion, qui rendra plus faciles les conversations en vue d'une intervention. — 112 — Sur mon observation que les operations militaires engagers ne laisseraient peut- etre pas le temps de causer, et que le Gouvemement allemand devrait user de son influence a Vienne en vue de les retarder, l'ambassadeur m'a repondu que Berlin ne pouvait exercer de pression, mais qu'il esperait que les operations ne seraient pas poussees tres activement. Bienvenu-Martin. N 95. M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres p. i., a Londres, Berlin, Saint-Petersbourg, Vienne, Constantinople, Rome, Belgrade. Paris, le 2gjuillet 1914. D'ordre de son Gouvemement, M, lswolsky est venu me commuuiquer un tele- gramme adresse par M. Sazonoll a Berlin. 11 resulle de cette information que la Russie, a la suite de la declaration de guerre de I'Autriche-Hongrie a la Serbie. des mesures de mobilisation deja appliquees a la plus grande partie de l'armee austro-hongroise, enfm du refus du comte Berchtold de continuer les pourparlers entre Vienne et Saint-Petersbourg, avail decide la mobilisation dans les arrondissements d'Odessa, Kiew, Moscou et Kazan. Kn portant ce fail a la connaissance du Gouvemement alle- mand, I'Ambassadeur de Russie a Berlin a ete charge d'ajouter que ces precautions militaires n'etaient a aucun degre dirigees contre 1'Allemagne, el ne prejugeaient pas 11011 plus des mesures agressives contre rAulriche-Hongrie ; I'Ambassadeur de Russie a Vienne n'etait, d'ailleurs, pas rappele de son poste. L Ambassadeurde Russie m'a donne egalement le sensde deux telegrammes adresses 4 Londres par M. SazonofT : le premier, indiquant que la declaration de guerre a la Serbie meltail fin aux conversations du Ministre russe avec I'Ambassadeur d'Aulriche, demandait a 1'Angletcrre d'exercer aussi rapidement que possibleson action dans le sens de la mediation et de l'arrcl immediat des operations de guerre de 1'Autriche (dont la continuation donnait le temps a 1'Autriche d'ecraser la Serbie pendant que la mediation trainerait); le second communiquait 1'impression gardee par M. Sazonoff do ses conversations avec rAmbassadeurallemand, que 1'Allemagne favorise I'intran- srgeance de 1'Autriche et n'exerce pas d'action sur elle. Le Ministre russe considere I'attilude de 1'Allemagne comme ties inquietante et croil que 1'Angleterre est en meil- leure posture que les autres Puissances pour entreprendre des 'demarches a Berlin , en vue d'une action sur Vienne. Bienvenu-Martin. — 113 — N° 96. M. Bahrere, Ambassadeur de France a Rome, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres j). i. Rome, le 29 juillet 1914. Le Ministre des Aflaires etrangeres a ete informe officiellement par l'Ambassadeur de Russie que son Gouvernement, a la suite de la declaration de guerre de l'Autriche. a laSerbie et des mesures de mobilisation prises d'ores et deja par l'Autriche, avait donne 1'ordre de mobiliser dans les districts de Kiew, Odessa, Moscou et Kazan. II a ajoute que cette mesure n'avait pas un caractere agressif contre l'AHemagne et que l'Ambassadeur de Russie a Vienne n'avait pas ete rappele. En commentant cette communication, le Marquis de San Giuliano m'a dit que malheureusement dans toute cette affaire ia conviction de l'Autriche et celle de 1'Al- lemagne avaient ete et etaient encore que la Russie ne marcherait pas. II m'a lu a ce propos une depeche de M. Bollati lui rendant compte d'un entretien qu'il avait eu aujourd'hui avec M. de Jagow, et 011 ce dernier lui avait encore repete qu'il ne croyait pas que la Russie marcherait. II fondait cette croyance sur )e fait que le Gouverne- ment russe venait d'envoyer a Berlin un agent pour traiter de certaines questions linancieres. L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a Berlin a dit egalement a son Collegue anglais qu'il ne croyait pas a une guerre generate , la Russie n'etanl ni en huroeur ni en etat de faire la guerre. Le Marquis de San Giuliano nc partage pas du tout cette opinion. II cstime que si l'Autriche se conlente d'humilier la Serbie, et d'exiger, en outre de l'ac- ceptation de la note, certains avantages materiels qui ne touchent pas a son terri- toire, la Russie peut encore trouver matiere a composition avec elle. Mais si l'Au- triche veut soil demembrer la Serbie, soit la detrtiire comme Etat indepeudant, il considere comme impossible a la Russie de ne pas intervenir militairement. Malgre 1'extreme gravite de la situation , le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres ne me parait pas desesperer de la possibilile dun arrangement. II croit que l'Angleterre peut encore exercer beaucoup d'influence a Berlin dans un sens pacifique. II a eu hier soir, m'a-tdl dit, une longue conversation avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, Sir R. Rodd, pour lui demontrer combien 1'intervention anglaise pourrait etre eCG- cace. II m'a dit en terminant : « Si tel est aussi l'avis de voire Gouvernement, il pour- rait, de son cote, insister dans ce sens a Londres. » BarrAre. 114 — N° 97. M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des AfFaires e^rangeres, a M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France, a Londres. Paris, le 29 juiJIet 1914. Je vous serais oblige de prier Sir Ed. Grey de bien vouloir reprendre le plus tot possible a Berlin, sous la forme qu'il jugera la plus opportune et la plus efficace, sa proposition de mediation des quatre Puissances, qui avait obtenu 1'adhesion de principe du Gouvernement aliemand. Le Gouvernement russe a du, de son cote, faire exprimer directement le meme d^sir au Gouvernement anglais; la declaration de guerre de 1'Autriche a la Serbie, ses envois de troupes sur la frontiere austro-russe , la mobilisation russe consecutive sur la frontiere de Galicie, ont en effet mis fin aux conversations directes austro-russes. Les precisions que le Gouvernement aliemand va demander a Vienne , conforme- ment a la declaration du baron de Schoen que je vous ai fait connaitre, pour s'infor- mer des intentions du Gouvernement aulrichien, permettront aux quatre Puissances d'exercer une action utile entre Vienne et Petersbourg pour le maintien de la paix. Je vous prie de signaler egalement au Secretaire d'Elat anglais combien U serait important qu'il obtint du Gouvernement italien le maintien de son concours le plus entier pour sa collaboration a faction des quatre Puissances en faveur de la paix. Rene Viviani. N° 98. M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France, a Londres, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Affaires e^rangeres p. i. Londres, le 29 juillet 1914. Dans son entretien d'aujourd'hui avec mon collegue d'AUemagne, Sir Ed. Grey a fait observer que l'ouverture de M. Sazonoff pour une conversation directe entre la Russie et 1'Autriche n'ayant pas ete accueillie a Vienne, il conviendrait d'en revenir a sa proposition d'intervenlion amicale des quatre Puissances non directement interessees. Cette suggestion a ete acceptee en principe par le Gouvernement Aliemand, mais il a fait des objections a 1'idee dune conference ou dune mediation. Le Secretaire d'Etat des Affaires etrangeres a invite le Prince Lichnowski a prier son Gouvernement de — 115 — proposer lui-meme une formule. Quelle quelle soit, si elle permet de maintenir la paix, elle sera agreee par l'Angleterre, la France et lltalie. L'Ambassadeur d'AlIemagne a du transjnellre immediatement a Berlin la demande de Sir Ed. Grey. En me rendant corapte de cetle conversation, le Secretaire d'Etat des Aflaires elrangeres a ajoute que la reponse de I'Allemagne a cette communication , ainsi qu'a celle de la Russie relative a la mobilisation de quatre corps d'armee sur la frontiere autrichienne, nou-* permettra de nous rendre compte des intentions du Gouvernement allemand. Mon collegue d'AlIemagne ayant interroge Sir Ed. Grey sur les intentions du Gouvernement britannique, le Secretaire d'Etat aux Aflaires elrangeres a repondu qu'il n'avait pas a se prononcer quant a present. Sir Ed. Grey ne ma pas cache qu'il trouvait la situation lies grave et qu'il gardait peu d'espoir dans une solution pacifique. Paul Cambon. N° 99. M. Boppe, Ministre de France a Belgrade, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Aflaires etrangeres p. i. Belgrade, le 29 juillet 1914. Le Prince beritier avait, des la remise de l'ultimatum austro-hongrois, telegraphie au Tzar pour demander sa protection. Mon collegue de Russie me conlie qu'H vient de communiquer a M. Pacbitch la reponse de Sa Majeste. Le Tzar remercie le Prince de s'etre adresse a lui dans une circonstance aussi cri- tique ; il declare que toutes les dispositions sont prises pour arriver a une solution pacifique du conflit, et donne au Prince l'assurance formelle que, si ce but ne peut etrc atteint, la Russie ne se desinleressera jamais du sort de la Serbie. Boppe. N° 100. M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France ;i Sainl-Pelersbourg, a M. Bienvenu-Martin, Ministre des Aflaires etrangeres p. i. Saint-Petcrsbourg, le 29 juillet 19 ii. L'Ambassadeur d'AlIemagne est venu declarer a M. Sazonofl que si la Russie n'ar- rete pas ses preparatifs militaires, l'aruiee allemande recevra 1'ordre de mobibser. — 116 — M. Sazonoff a repondu que les preparatifs russes sont motives: dun cote, par 1'intransigeance obstinee de 1'Autriche ; d'autre part, par le fait que huit corps austro-hongrois sont deja mobilises. Le ton sur lequel le comte de Pourtales s'est acquitte de la notification a decidd le Gouvernement russe, cette nuit meme, a ordonner la mobilisation des treize corps destines a operer contre 1'Autriche. Paleologue. N° 101. M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, auv Ambassadeurs de France a Sainl-IVtersbourg et Londres. Paris, le 3o juillet 191 k M. Iswolski est venu cette nuit me dire que I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a nolifie a M. Sazonoff 'la decision de son Gouvernement de mobiliser ses forces armees, si la Russie ne cesse pas ses preparatifs mililaires. Le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres du Tsar fait remarquer que ces preparatifs n'ont ete commences qua la suite de la mobilisation par 1'Autriche de huit corps d'armee et du refus de cette puissance de regler pacifiquement son dilferend avec la Serbie. M. Sazonoff declare que, dans ces conditions, la Russie ne peut que hater ses armements et envisager I'imminence de la guerre, qu'elle compte sur le secours d'alhee de la France et qu'elle considere comme desirable que l'Angleterre se joigne sans perdre de temps a la Russie et a la France. La France est resolue a remplir toutes les obligations de 1'alliance. Elle ne neghgera, d'ailleurs, aucun eflort en vue de la solution du conllit dans 1'interet de la paix generate. La conversation engagee entre les Puissances moins direc- tement interessees permel d'esperer encore que la paix puisse etre preservee; j'estime done qu'il serait opportun que, dans les mesures de precaution et de defense aux- quelles la Russie croit devoir proceder, elle ne prit immediatement aucune dispo- sition qui offrit a 1'Allemagne un pretexte pour une mobilisation lotalc ou partielle de ses forces. L'Ambassadeur dAllemagne est venu a la fin de l'apres-midi d'hier me parler des mesures militaires que prenait le Gouvernement de la Republique en ajoutant que la France etait libre d'agir ainsi, mais qu'en Allemagne les preparatifs ne pouvaient etre secrets et qu'il ne faudrait pas que lopinion francaise s'alarmat si I'Alleuiagnc s'y decidait. J'ai repondu que le Gouvernement francais n'avait prls aucune mesure dont ses — 117 — voisins pussent elre inquiets et que sa volonte de se preLer a toute negociation pour le maintien de la paix ne pouvait elre mise en doute. Rene Viviani. N° 102. M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Petersbourg, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Saint-Petersbourg, le 3ojuillet 19 1'4> M. Sazonoff, a qui j'ai fait connaitre voire desir de voir eviter toute mesure mili- taire qui pourrait oQrir a I'AUemagne un pretexte a la mobilisation gt-nerale, m'arepondu que juSlement, dans le cours de la nuit derniere, I'Etat-Major avail fait surseoir a des mesures de precaution militaire pour eviter toute equivoque. Hier, le Chef d'Etat- Major general russe a convoque i'Altache militaire de l'Ambassade d'Allemagne, et lui a donne sa parole d'honneur que la mobilisation ordonnee ce matin vise exclusive- ment l'Autriche. Toutefois, dans un enlretien qu'il a eu cet apres-midi avec le comte de Pourtales, M. Sazonoff a du se convaincre que l'Allemagne ne veut pas prononcer a Vienne la parole decisive qui sauvegarderait la paix. L'empereur Nicolas garde la meme impres- sion dun ecliange de telegrammes qu'il vient d'avoir personnellement avec l'empereur Guillaume. D'autre part, l'Etat-Major et 1'Amiraute russes ont recu d'inquietants renseigne- ments sur les preparatifs de 1'armee et de la marine allemandes. En me donnant ces informations, M. Sazonoff a ajoute que le Gouvernement russe ne continue pasmoins ses efforts de conciliation. 11 ma repete : « Jusqu'au der- nier instant, je negocierai. » Paleologle. IN" 103. M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Petersbourg, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Saint-Petersbourg, le So^uillet ig'4. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne est venu cette nuit insister de nouveau, mais dans des termes moins categoriques, aupres de M. Sazonoff pour que la Russie cesse — 118 — ses preparatifs militaires, en affirmant que l'Autriche ne porterait pas atteinte a 1'inlegrite territoriale de la Serbie : ■ Ce n'esl pas seuleruent 1'integrite territoriale de la Serbie que nous devons sau- • vegarder, a repondu M. SazonolT, c'est encore son independance el sa souverainete. ■ Nous ne pouvons pas admettre que la Serbie devienne vassale de l'Autriche. » M. S.izonoff a ajoule : ■ L'heure est trop grave pour que je ne vous declare pas toute ma pensee. En intervenant a Petersbourg, tandis qu'elle refuse d'intervenir a Vienne, rAHemagne ne rherclie qu'a gagner du temps, afin de permeltre a 1'Au- triche d'ecraser le petit royaume serin- avant que la Russie n'ait pu le secourir. Mais I'empereur Nicolas a un lei desir de conjurer la guerre que je vais vous faire en son nom une nouvelle proposition : » Si l'Autriche, reconnaissant que son confiil avec la Serbie a assume le caractere d'une question d'interet europeen, se declare prele a eliminer de son ultimatum les clauses qui portent atteinte a la souverainete de la Serbie, la Russie s'engage a cesser toutes mesures militaires. » Le comle de Pourtales a promis d'appuyer cette proposition aupres de son Gou- vernement. Dans la pensee de M. Sazonoll, 1'acceptation de sa proposition par l'Autriche aurait pour corollaire logique louverlure dune deliberation des Puissances a Londres. Le Gouvernement russe montre, une Ibis encore, par son altitude, qu'il ne neglige rien pour enrayer le conllit. Paleolocue. ,N° 104. M. Dumaine, Anibassadeur de France a Vienne, a M. Rene Viviani, Ministre des Affaires elrangeres. Vieune, le 3o juillet 19 ii- Malgre la communication faite lner par 1'Ambassadeur de Russie a plusieurs de.ses collegues, dont celui d'Allemagne, an sujet de la mobilisation partielle dans son pays, la presse de Vienne setait abslenue den publier la nouvelle. Ce silence impose vient de s'expliquer dans un entretien de haute importance entre M. Schebeko el le conite Berchtold, qui ont longuement envisage les redoutables difficultes presentes, avec une egale bonne volonte d'y adapter des solutions reciproquement acceptables. Les preparatifs militaires du cote russe, a explique M. Schebeko, n'ont d'autre but que de repondre a ceux de l'Autriche et d'indiquer 1'intention el Les droits du Tzar d'emettre son avis dans le reglemenl de la question serbe. Les mesures de mobilisa- tion prises en Galicie, a repondu le comte Berchtold, n'impliquent nou plus aucune intention agressive et visent seulement a maintenir la situation sur le meme pied. De — 119 — part'et d'autre on s'appliquera a ce que ces mesures ne soient pas interpretees comtne des marques d'hostilite. Pour le reglement du conflit austro-serbe , il a ete convenu que les pourparlers seraient repris a Petersbourg entre M. SazonolT et le comte Szapary; s'ils ont ete interrompus c'est par suite dun malentendu, le comte Berchtold croyant que le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres de Russie reclamait pour son interlocuteur des pou- voirs qui lui permettraient de modifier les terraes de I'ultimatum aulrichien. Le comte Szapary sera seulement autorise a discuter quel accommodement serait com- patible avec la dignite et le prestige dont les deux Empires ont un souci egal. Ce serait done, pour le moment, sous celte forme directe et reduite aux deux plus inleressees qu'aurait lieu 1'examen que Sir Ed. Grey proposait de Conner aux quatre Puissances non directement interessees. Sir M. de Bunsen, qui se trouvait chez moi, a aussitot declare a M. Schebeko que le Foreign Office approuvera entierement cette nouvelle procedure. Repetant lexpose fait par lui au Ballplalz, l'Ambassadeur de Russie a aflirme que son Gouvernement tiendra un compte beaucoup plus large qu'on ne le suppose des exigences de la Mo- narchic; rien n'a ete neglige par M. Schebeko pour convaincre le comte Berchtold de la sincerite du desir de la Russie d'arriver a une entente acceptable pour les deux Empires. L'entretien s'etait mainlenu dans un ton amical et permettait de croire que toute chance de localiser le conflit n'etait pas perdue, lorsque la nouvelle de la mobilisation allemande est parvenue a Vjenne. DlJMAINE. N° 105. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Berlin, le 3o juillet igii. M. de Jagow m'a telephone a deux heures cpie la nouvelle de la mobilisation alle- mande, repandue une beure auparavant, etait fausse, et m'a prie de vous en informer d'urgence ; le Gouvernement imperial fait saisir les supplements de journaux qui lan- noncaient. Mais ni cette communication ni ces mesures ne diminuent mes apprehen- sions au sujet des projets de l'Allemagne. H parait certain que le Conseil extraordinaire tenu hier soir a Potsdam avec les autorites militaires et sous la presidence de 1'Empereur avait decide la mobilisation, ce qui explique la preparation de ['edition speciale du Lokal An:cigcr, mais que sous des influences diverses (declaration de I'Angleterre qu'elle reserve son entiere liberie — 1-20 — d'action, ecbange de telegrammes entre le Tzar et Guillaumc II) Ics graves mesures arretees ont ete suspendues. Lin des Ambassadeurs avcc lequcl je suis le plus lie a vu, a deux heures, M. Zim- mcrmann. D'apresle Sous-Secretaire d'Etat, les autorites militaires pressent beaucoup pour que la mobilisation soit decretee, parce que tout retard fait perdre a I'Allemagne quelques-uns de ses avantages. Cependant, jusqu'a present on aurait reussi a com- baltre la bate de 1'Etat-Major qui, dans la mobilisation, voit la guerre. Quoi qu'il en soit, la mobilisation peut etre decidee d'un moment a 1'autre. Je ne sais qui a lance dans le Lol.al Anzeiger, journal generalement oflicieux, une nouvelle prematuree de nature a soulever les esprils en France. J'ai les plus fortes raisons de penser, d'ailleurs, que toutes les mesures de mobi- lisation qui peuvent etre realisees avant la publication de 1'ordre general de mobilisa- tion sont prises ici, oil 1'on voudrait nous faire publier notre mobilisation les pre- miers pour nous en atlribuer la responsabilite. Jules Cambon. N" 106. M. Rene Viviani, President du Consed, Ministre des Affaires et range res, a M. Paid Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres. Taris, le 3o juillet igi4- Je vous pne de porter a la connaissance de Sir Edward Grey les renseignemenls suivants touchsnt les preparatifs militaires francais et allemands. L'Angleterre y verra que si la France est resolue, ce n'cst pas elle qui prend des mesures d'agression. Vous atlirerez I'attention de Sir Edward Grey sur la decision prise par le Conseil des Mmislres de ce matin : bien que I'Allemagne ait pus ses dispositifs de couverlure a quelques centaines de metres de la frontiere, sur tout le front du Luxembourg aux Vosgcs, et porte ses troupes de couverlure sur leurs positions de combat, nous avons retenu nos troupes a 1 o kilometres de la frontiere, en leur interdisant de s'en rappro- cher davantage. Noire plan, concu dans tin esprit d'olfensive, prevovait pourlant que les positions de combat de nos troupes de couverlure seraient aussi rapprochees tjue possible de la frontiere. En livranl ainsi une bande du lerritoire sans defense a 1'agression sou- dainc de 1'ennemi, le Gouvernement de la Republique tienl .i montrer que la France, pas plus que la Russie, n'a la responsabilite de 1'attaque. Pour s'en assurer, il suffit de comparer les mesures prises des deux cotes de noire frontiere : en France, les permissionnaires n'ont etc rappeles qu'apres que nous avons acquis la certitude que I'Allemagne lavait fail depuis cinq jours. — 121 — En Allemagne, non settlement les troupes en garnison a Metz ont ete poussees jusqu'a la frontiere, mais encore elles ont ete renforcees par des elements transposes en chemin de fer de garnisons de l'interieur, telles que celles de Treves ou de Cologne. Rien d'analogue n'a ete fait en France. L'armement des places de la frontiere (deboisements, mise en place de 1'arme- ment, construction de batteries, renforcement des reseaux de fil de fer) a ete com- mence en Allemagne des le samedi 20; chez nous, il va Petre, la France ne pouvant plus se dispenser de prendre les memes mesures. Les gares ont ete occupees milttairement en Allemagne le samedi 25, en France le manli 28. Enlin, en Allemagne, les reservistes, par dizaine de milliers, ont 6te rappeles par convocations individuelles, ceux residant a 1'etranger (classes de 1903 a 1 y 1 1) rappe- les, les officiers de reserve convoques; a l'interieur, les routes sont barrees, les auto- mobiles ne circulent qu'avec un permis. Cost le dernier stade avant la mobilisation. Aucune de ces mesures n'a ete prise en France. L'armee allemande a ses avant-postes sur nos bomes frontieres; par deux fois, bier, des patrouilles allemandes ont penelre sur notre territoire. Tout le XVF Corps de Metz, renforce par une partie dn VIII'" venu de Treves et de Cologne, occupe la frontiere de Metz an Luxembourg; le XV" Corps d'armee de Strasbourg a serre sur la frontiere. Sous menace d'etre fusilles, les Alsaciens-Lorrains des pays annexes ont defense de passer la frontiere. Rene Viviani. N° 107. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin , a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires (Hran- geres. Berlin , le 3o j uillit 191/1. L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre n'a pas recu communication de la reponse de 1' Alle- magne a la demande de Sir E. Grey. II m'a dit que Berlin avait consulle Vienne et attendait encore l'avis de son allie. Mon collegue de Russie vient de me faire connaitre, de son cote, que M. de Jagow (auquel le Comte de Pourtales avail communique la formule de conciliation suggeree par M. Sazonoff pour une entente austro-russe) venait de lui declarer qu'il trouvait cetle proposition iuacceptable pour I'Autriche, marquant ainsi faction nega- tive de la diplomatic allemande a Vienne. Jules Cambon. - 122 — N° 10S. M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Londres, )e 3o juillet lgii. Le Prince Lichnowski n'a pas apporte de reponse a la demande que lui avait adressee hier Sir Ed. Grey pour obtenir du Gouvernement allemand une formule d'intervention des quatre puissances dans linteret de la pane Mais raon collegue d'Allemagne a questionne le Secretaire d'Etat des Affaires etrangeres sur les prepa- ralife rnilitaires de 1'Angleterre. Sir Ed. Grey lui a repondu qu'ils n'avaient aucun caractere ollensif, mais que , dans letat actuel des affaires sur le continent, il etait naturel de prendre quelques precautions; qu'en Angleterre, comme en France, on desirait le maintien de la paix, et que si, en Angleterre, comme en France, on envisageait des mesures defensives, ce n'etait pas dans le but de preparer une agression. Les renseignements que Votre Excellence m'a adresses au sujet des mesures mili- taires prises par 1'Allemagne sur la frontiere Irancaise m'ont permis de marquer a Sir Edward Grey qu'il ne s'agit plus seulement aujourd'hui dun condit d'influence entre la Russie et lAutriche-Hongrie; une agression risque d'etre commise qui pourrait provoquer une guerre generale. Sir Edward Grey a parfaitement compris mon sentiment et, comme moi, il estime que le momeDt serait venu d'envisager toutes les hypotheses et de les discuter en commun. Paul Cambon^ N° 109. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Berlin, le 3o juillet 191&. Dans l'entrerue que jai eue aujourd'hui avec le Secretaire d'Etat, j'ai demande a M. de Jagow quelle reponse il avait faite a Sir Ed. Grey, qui lui avait demande de donner lui-meme la formule de 1'intervention des puissances desinteressees. — 123 — 11 m'a repondu que, « pour gagner du temps », il avait decide d'agir directeruent et qui! avait demande a 1'Autriclie de dire sur quel terram on pourrait causer avec elle. CetLe reponse a pour effet, sous pretexte d'aller plus vite, d'eliminer l'An- gleterre , la France et lltalie et de ronfier a M. de Tchirsky, dont le* sentiments pangermanistes et russophobes sont connus, le soin d'amener 1'Autriche a une attitude conciliante. M. de Jagow m'a parle ensuile de la mobilisation russe sur la froutiere autrichienne; il m'a dit que cette mobilisation compromettait le succes de toute intervention aupres de 1'Autriche , et que tout dependait de la. 11 a ajoute qu'il craignait que I'Autriche ne mobUisat completement a la suite de la mobilisation partielle russe, ce qui pou- •vait entrainer par contre-coup la mobilisation lotale russe, et par suite celle de 1A1- lemagne. J'ai fait remarquer au Secretaire d'Etat qu'il m avail dit lui-meme que l'Allemagne ne se considererait comme obligee de mobdiser que si la Russie mobilisait sur les frontieres aEemandes et que tel n'etait pas le cas. II m'a repondu que c'etait vrai, mais que les cbefs de 1'Arniee insistaient, car tout retard est une perte de forces- pour l'armee allemande, et « que les paroles que je rappelais ne constituaient pas, de sa part, un engagement ferme ». L'impression 'que je rapporte de cet entretien est que les chances de paix ont encore decru. Jules Cambon. N" 110. M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des AlTaires etran- geres. Londres, fe3LJuulef 1914. Au debut de noire entretien d'aujourd'hui, Sir E. Grey m'a dit que le Prince Lichnowski lui avait demande ce matin si l'Angleterre observerait la neutralite dans le conflit qui se prepare. Le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires etrangeres lui a repondu. que, si le conflit devenait general, l'Angleterre ne pourrait pas rester neutre et, notamment, que si la France y etait impliquee, 1'Angleterre y serait entrainee. J'ai inlerroge alors Sir E. Grey sur la deliberation du Cabinet qui avait eu lieu ce matin. II m'a repondu qu'apres avoir examine la situation, le Cabinet avait pense que pour le moment le Gouvernement britannique ne pouvait nous garantir son inter- vention, qu'il avait l'intention de s'entremettre pour obtenir de l'Allemagne et de la France lengagement de respecter la neutralite beige, mais- que pour envisage!" une intervention il convenait d'atlendre que la situation se developpat. J'ai demande a Sir E. Grey si, pour intervenir, le Gouvernement britannique altendrait I'envahissement du territoire francais. J'ai insiste sur le fait que les me- — 124 — sures de|a adoptees sur notre frontiere par PAUemagne revelaient des intentions degression prochaine, et que si Ion voulait eviter de voir se renouveler i'erreur de l'Europe en 1870, il convenait que l'Angleterre envisage.it des maintenant les con- ditions dans lesquelles elle noiis donnerait le concours sur lequel la France comptait. Sir E. Grey m'a repondu que l'opinion du Cabinet ne s'etait formee que sur la situation actuelle, que cette situation pouvait so modifier et que, dans ce cas, on appellerait aussitot le Conseil des Minislres a en deliberer. Sir A. Nicolson, quej'ai vu en sortant du Cabinet du Secretaire d'Etat, m'a dit que le Conseil se reunirait de nouveau deniain, et, confidentiellement, m'a fait entendre que le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires elrangeres ne manquerait pas de reprendre la discussion. Conformement a vos instructions, j'ai fait le necessaire pour que la lettre auto- graphe que M. le President de la Republique adresse a Sa Majeste le Roi d'Angleterre soit remise ce soir au Roi. Cette demarche, qui sera certainement communiquee au Premier Ministre, des demain matin, sera, je n'en doute pas, prise en serieuse con- sideration par le Cabinet britannique. Paul Cambon. N° 111. M. Mollard, Ministre de France a Luxembourg-, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Luxembourg, !e 3 1 juillet 1914. Le Ministre d'Etat sort de la Legation, il venait de me dire que les Allemands avaient lei me les pouts sur la Moselle de Schengen et de Remich avec des voitures, celui de Wormeldange avec des cordes. Sur la Sure, les ponts de Wasserbillig et d'Echternach ne son! pas condamnes, mais les Allemands ne laissent plus sortir de Prusse ni ble, ni betail, ni automobiles. M. Eysi ben m'a prie, et c'est le vrai but de sa visite, de vous demander une decla- ration oflicielle assurant que la France respectera en cas de conflit la neulralite du Luxembourg. Comme je lui demandais s'il avait recu une declaration analogue du Gouvemement allemand, il m'a dit qu'il allait se rendre chez le Ministre d'AUemagne pour avoir la meme declaration. Post-scriptum. — Jusqu'a present, aucune mesure particuliere n'a ete prise par le Gouv ernemenl luxembourgeois. M. Eyschen revient de la Legation d'AUemagne, il s'est plaint des mesures de suspicion prises contre un voisin neutre. Le Ministre d'Etat a demande au Ministre d'AUemagne une declaration oflicielle de son Gouvemement, prenant 1'engagement de respecter la neulralite. M. de Buch lui aurait repondu : « Cela va de soi rnais il faudrait que le Gouvemement francais prit le meme enga- gement ». Mollard. — 125 N° 112. M. Rene Vivianj, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeies, a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Berlin , Vienne et Rome. Paris, ie 3i juillet 1914. L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre ma remis une note de son Gouvernement demandant au Gouvernement francais d'appuyer a Saint-Petersbourg une proposition tendant a la solution pacifique du conflit austro-serbe. Cette note expose que TAmbassadeur d'Allemagne a inform^ Sir Edw. Grey de 1'intention qu'a son Gouvernement de s'eflbrcer d'agir sur le Gouvernement austro- hongrois, apres la prise de Belgrade et 1'occupation des regions voisines de la fron- tiere, pour obtenir la promesse de ne pas avancer davantage, pendant que les Puis- sances chercheraient a obtenir que la Serbie donnat des satisfactions sullisantes a lAulriclie; le territoire occupe serait evacue. une fois qu'elle aurait reeu satisfaction. Sir Edw. Grey a fait cette suggestion le 29 juillet et exprime l'espoir que les preparatifs militaires seront suspendus de tous cotes. Bien que 1'Ambassadeur de Russie a Londres ait informe le Secretaire d'Etat qu'd craint que la condition russe (si I'Aulriche, reconnaissanC que son conjlit avcc la Serbie a assume le caracterc d'une question d'interct curopcen, se declare prete a eliminer de son ultimatum les points ijui portent atteinle au principe de la souverainele serbe, la Russie s'cngacje a arreter tous pre'paratifs militaires).ne puisse etre modifiee, Sir Edw. Grey pense que, si lAu- triche arrete son avance apres 1'occupation de Belgrade, le Gouvernement russe pourrait accepter de changer sa formule, dans ce sens que les Puissances examineraient comment la Serbie donnerait des satisfactions completes a lAutriche sans porter atteinle a la souverainele on a 1'independance du Royaume. Dans le cas 011 lAutriche, ayant occupe Belgrade et le territoire serbe voisin, se declarerait prete, dans linterct: de l'Europe, a cesser d'avancer et a discuter comment 1'on pourrait arriver a un arrangement, la Russie pourrait aussi consentir a la discussion et suspendre ses pre- paratifs militaires, pourvu que les autres Puissances agissent de Heme. Conformemerit a la demande de Sir Edw. Grey, le Gouvernement francais s'esl rallie a la suggestion anglaise et a prie dans les termes suivants son Ambassadeur i Petersbourg de s'efforcer d'obtenir sans retard 1'assentiment du Gouvernement russe : « Je vous prie de faire connaitre d'urgence a M. Sazonoff que la suggestion de Sir Ed. Grey ,me par ait fournir une base utile de conversation entre les Puissances ega- lement desireuses de travailler a un reglement honorable du conflit auslro-serbe et d'ecarter ainsi les dangers qui menacent la paix gerierale. « Le plan propose par le Principal Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires etrangeres, en arretant la marche en avant de Farmee autrichienne, et en confiant aux Puissances le soin d'examiner comment la Serbie pourrait donner pleine satisfaction a l'Autric'ne — 126 — sans porter atteinte aux droits souverains et a 1'independance du Royaume, en donnant ainsi un moyen a la Russie de suspendre tous preparatifs mililaires, les autres Puis- sances devant agir de meme, est de nature a donner egalement satisfaction a la Russie et a l'Autriche et a menager a la Serbie une sortie acceptable de la difliculte actuelle. « Je vous prie de vous inspirer des considerations qui precedent pour engager ties instamment M. Sazonofl a donner sans retard son adhesion a la proposition de Sir Ed. Grey doot il a du etre saisi de son cote. » Kene ViviANI. N" 113. M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de Fiance a Sainl-Petersbourg, a M. Rene. Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des AQaires etran- geres. Saint-Petersbourg, le ii juillel 1914. La nouvelle du bonibardement de Belgrade dans la nuit et la matinee d'hier a provoque en Russie la plus vive emotion. On ne parvieiit pas a s'expliquer l'altitude de l'Autriche, dont les provocations ont constamment suivi, drpuis le debut de la crise. les tentatives de conciliation de la Russie et les conversations satisfaisantes echangees entre Petersbourg et Vienne. Quoi qu'd en soil, desireux de ne rien negliger pour prouver la sincerite de son desir de sauvegarder la paix, M. Sazonofl m'informe qu'il a modifie sa formule, a la demande de lambassadcur d'Angleterre, de la mamere suivante : " Si l'Autriche consent a arreter la man lie de ses troupes sin le lerritoire serbe et si , reconnaissant que le conflit auslro-serbe a assume le caractere dune question d'in- tercl europeen, elle admel que les grandes Puissam es exuminenl le-- satisfactions que la Serbie pourrait accorder au Gouvernement austro-hongrois, sans porter atleinte a ses droits souverains >'t a son independance, la Russie s'engage a conserver son attitude expectanle. » Paleologue. 127 — N° 114. M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a MM. les Ambassadenrs de France, a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Berlin, Vienne, Rome, Constantinople. Paris, le 3i juillet 191^. Les efforts poursuivis jusqu'ici parallelement par l'Angleterre et la Russie, avec le concours empresse de la France (acquis d'avance a toute tentative pacifique), en vue d'une entente directe entre Vienne et Saint-Petersbourg ou d'une mediation des quatre puissances sous la forme la plus appropnee, se rejoignent aujourdhui : la Russie , donnant une nouvelle preuve de sondesir d'entente , s'est empressee de rcpondre a la premiere apparence d'ouverture faite par l'Allemagne dcpuis le. debut de la crise (sur les conditions auxquelles la Russie arreterait ses preparatifs militaires), en indi- quant une formule et la modifiant de suite confoimement a la demande de 1'Angle- terre; on devrait done esperer, les pourparlers ayanl repris d'autre part entre les ambassadenrs russe et autrichien, que la mediation anglaise viendra achever a Londres l'eflort des negociations directes de Vienne et Saint-Petersbourg. Toutefois l'attitude constante de l'Allemagne qui, depuis le commencement du conflit, tout en protestant sans cesse aupres de chacunc des puissances de ses inten- tions pacifiques, a lait echouer en fait, par son attitude ou dilatoire ou negative, toutes les tentatives d'accord et n'a pas cesse d'encourager par son ambassadeur l'in- transigeance de Vienne; les preparatifs militaires allcmands, commences desle 2 5 juillet et poursuivis sans arret depuis; 1'opposition immediate de l'Allemagne a la formuie russe, declaree a Berlin inacceptable pour 1'Autricbe avant meme d'avoir consulte cette Puissance; enfin toutes les impressions venues de Berlin imposent la conviction que l'Allemagne a poursuivi Thumiliation de la Russie, la desagregation de la Triple- Entente et, si ces resultats ne pouvaient etre obtenus, la guerre. Rene Viviani. N" 115. M. Dumaine, Amiassadeur de France a Vienne, a M. Rene VtviANi, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Vieone, le 3i juillet 1914. La mobilisation generale atteignant tous les hommes de 19 4 42 ans a ete decre - tee par le Goirvernement auslro-hongrois ce matin a la premiere heure. Mon collegue russe estime encore que cette mesure n'est pas neltement en contra- diction avec les declarations du Comte Bercbtold d'hier. Ddmaine. 128 - N" 116. M. .Jules Camcox, Ambassadeurde France a Berlin, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Berlin, lo 3i juillct 191A. M'ayant fait demander, M. de Jagow vient de me dire qu'd avait le grand regret de me faire connailre qu'en presence de la mobilisation totale de 1'armee russe, I'AI- lemagnc, dans I'inleret de la securite de I'Empire, se voyait obligee de prendre de graves mesures de precaution. On a decrete ce qu'on appelle « Rnegsgefahrzustand » (l'etat de danger de guerre), qui permet a 1'autorite de proclamer, si elle le juge utile, l'etat de siege, de suspendre certains services publics et de ferjner la frontiere. En meme temps, on demande a Petersbourg de demobihser, aussi bien du cote aulrii bien que du cote allemand, sans quoi l'Allemagne serait obligee de mobiliser de son cole. M. de Jagow m'a fait connaitre que M. de Schoen etait charge d'informer le Gonvernement francais des resolutions du cabinet de Berlin, et de lui demander quelle attitude il pensait adopter. Jules Cambox. N° 117. M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a M. Paleologue, Atnbassadeur de France a Petersbourg. Paris, le 3i juillet 191 A. Le Gonvernement allemand a decide a midi de prendre toutes les dispositions militaires que comporte l'etat dit « etat de danger de guerre ». En me communiquant cette decision, ce soir a 7 heures, le Baron de Schoen a aioute que le Gouvernement exigeait en meme temps que la Russie demobilise. Si" le Gouvernement russe n'a pas donne une reponse satisfaisante dans un delai de douze heures, l'Allemagne mobilisera a son tour. J'ai repondu a 1'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que je n'etais nullement renseigne sur une prelendue mobilisation totale de 1'armee et de la (lotte russes, que le Gouver- nement allemand invoquait comme raison des nouvelles mesures militaires quil prend des. aujourd'hui. Le Baron de Schoen m'a demande en terminant, au nom de son Gouvernement, quelle serait, en cas de conflit entre l'Allemagne et la Russie, I'attitnde de la France. II m'a dit qu'il viendrait prendre ma reponse demain samedi a une heure. — 129 — Je n'ai pas I'intention de lui faire une declaration a ce sujet et je me bornerai a lui dire que la France s'inspirera de ses interets. Le Gouvernement de la R6publique ne doit, en effet, compte de ses intentions qu'a son allied. Je vous prie de porter immediatement ce qui precede a la connaissance de M. Sazonoff. Ainsi que je vous l'ai deja fait connaitre, je ne doute pas que le Gou- vernement imperial, dans 1'interet superieur de la paix, n'evite pour sa part tout ce qui pourrait rendre inevitable ou precipiter la crise. Rene Viviani. IN" 118. M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-Petersbourg, a M. Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. Saint-Petersbourg, le 3i juillet 1914. En raison de la mobilisation generate de 1'Autriche et des mesures de mobilisation, prises secretement, mais d'une maniere continue, par 1'Allemagne depuis six jours, 1'ordre de mobilisation generale de l'armee russe a ete donne, la Russie ne pouvant, sans le plus grave danger, se laisser davantage devancer; en realite, elle ne fait que prendre des mesures militaires correspondant a celles prises par 1'Allemagne. Pour des raisons strategiques imperieuses, le Gouvernement russe ne pouvait plus, sachant que 1'Allemagne s'armait, retarder la conversion de sa mobilisation par- tielle en mobilisation generale. Paleologue. N° 119. M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France a Bruxeiles, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Bruxeiles, le 3i juillet 1914. L'Agence Havas ayant annonce que I'etat « de danger de guerre » etait decrete en Allemagne, j'ai dit k M. Davignon que je pouvais lui donner 1'assurance que le Gouvernement de la Republique respecterait la neutralite de la Relgique. Oocdments DiPLOMATlQCES, — Guerre europeenae- 1 7 — 130 — Le Minislre ties Affaires elrangeres m'a repondu que le Gouvernement royal avuit toujours pease qu'il en serait ainsi et m'a remercie. Le Minislre de Russie et le Minislre d'Angleterre, que j'ai vus ensuite, se sont montres tres salisfaits qu'en la circonsUucc j aie donne celte assurance, conforme d'ailleurs, m'a ditle Minislre anglais, a la declaration de Sir Edw. Grey. Klobukowski — 131 CHAPITRE VI DECLARATION DE GUERRE DE L'ALLEMAGNE A LA RUSSIE (SAMEDI 1 ER AOUT, A 19" 10) ET A LA FRANCE (LUNDI 3 AOUT, A 18" 45) — 133 — N° 120. M.Ttehe Viviani, President dn Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg-, Berlin, Vienne, Rome. Paris, le 1" aoit 191 4. Deux demarches ont ete faites hier soir par les Ambassadeurs d'Autriche, 1'une assez vague a Paris, lautre precise a Petersbourg dans un sens conciliant. Le Comte Szecsen est venu me declarer que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois avait avise olliciellement la Russie qu'il n'avait aucune ambition territoriale et ne tou- chera pas a la souverainete d'Etat de la Serbie; qu'il repudie fgalement toute intention d'occuper le sandjak; mais que ces declarations de desinteressement ne conservent leur valeur que si la guerre reste localisee a l'Autriche et a la Serbie, une guerre europeenne ouvrant des eventualites impossibles a prevoir. L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche, en commentant ces declarations, a laisse entendre que, si son Gouverne- ment ne pouvait repondre aux questions des Puissances parlant en leur propre nom, il pourrait sans doute repondre a la Serbie ou a une Puissance lui demandant ses conditions au nom de la Serbie. II ajoutait qu'il y aurait la peut-elre encore une possibility. A Petersbourg, 1'Ambassadeur d'Autriche est venu voir M. Sazonoff et lui a de- clare que son Gouvernement consentait a entamer une discussion quant au fond de ('ultimatum adresse a la Serbie. Le Ministre russe s'est declare satisfait de celte declaration et a propose que les pourparlers aient lieu a Londres avec la parti- cipation des Puissances. M. Sazonoff a du demander au Gouvernement anglais de se charger de la direction de la negociation ; il a indique qu'il serait tres important que l'Autriche arretat ses operations en Serbie. II resulte de ces fails que l'Autriche se montrerait eniin disposee a un arrangement, de meme que le Gouvernement russe est pret a entrer en negociations sur la base de la proposition anglaise. Malheureusement ces dispositions, qui permettraient d'esperer une solution paci- fique, paraissent en fait devoir etre annulees par 1'attitude de I'Allemagne. Cette Puissance a en effet pose un ultimatum donnant douze heures au Gouvernement russe pour accepter de demobiliser, non seulement du cote allemand, mais aussi du cote autrichien; c'est a midi que le delai expire. L'ultimatum ne se justifie pas, puisque la Russie a accepte la proposition anglaise qui implique un arret des pr6- paratifs militaires de toutes les Puissances. L'altitude de I'Allemagne prouve qu'elle veut la guerre. Et elle la veut contre la France. Hier, lorsque M. de Schoen est venu demander au quai d'Orsay quelle atti- tude la France comptait prendre en cas de condit russo-allemand, 1'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, bien qu'il n'y ait directement entre la France et I'Allemagne aucun conflit et que nous ayons employe depuis le debut de la crise et employions encore ^ous nos efforts en vue dune solution pacifique , a ajoute qu'il me priait de presenter — 134 — au President de la Republique ses hommages et remerciements, et dernandait que Ion voulut bien prendre « des dispositions pour sa propre personne » ; nous savons egalement qu'il a deja mis en surete les archives de 1'Ambassade. Cette attitude de rupture des relations diplornatiques sans conflit direct, et bieu qu'aucune reponse negative precise ne lui ait ele faite, est caracterislique de la volonte arretee de l'AHe- magne de faire ia guerre a la France. Le defaut de sincerite de ses protestations pacifiques est demonlre par la rupture qu'elle impose a 1'Europe, lorsque les uego- ciations etaient enfin acceptees par l'Autriche, d'accord avec la Russie. Rene VlVUNI. N° 121. M. Jules C\mbon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Mjnistre des Affaires etran- geres. Berlin,, le 1" aout 19 li. Mon CoHegue de Russie a recu hier soir deux telegrammes de M. Sazonoflf 1'avi- sjul que 1'Ambassadeur d'Autriche a Petersbourg avait declare que son Gouverne- ment etait pret a disinter avec le Gouvernement russe ia note a la Serbie, meme quant an fond; M. SazonofJ lui aurait repondu que ces conversations devraient, a sesyeux, avoir lieu a Londres. L'ultimalum a la Russie ne peut qu'ecarter les deroiercs chances de paix que ces conversations semblaient laisser subsister. On peut so demander si, dans de pareilles renditions, 1'acceptation de l'Autriche etait serieuse et n'avait pas pour objet de faire pesei la responsabilite du conllit sur la Russie. Mon CoHegue d'Angleterre a fail dans la unit un appel pressant aux sentiments d'humanilc de M. de Jagovv. Celui-ci lui a repondu que la question etait trop enga- ger et qu'il fallait altendre la reponse russe a rultimatum allemand. Or il a dil a sir E. Goschen que 1'ulliraatum reeiamait le retrait de Ia mobilisation russe 11011 settle- ment du cote de l'Allemagne, inais encore du cote de l'Autriche; mon CoHegue anglais sen est vivetnent etonne et lui a declare que ce dernier point scniblait inac- ceplable pour la Russie. L'ultimalum de l'AHemagne, intcrvenant a . l'lieure precise ou 1'accord semble pres de s'etablir entre Vienne et Saint-Pclersbourg, est significatif de sa politique belli— queuse. Le conllit n'existait en fait qu'entre la l'uisxir et lAiitnche, l'Allemagne n'ayant a intervenir que comme aUice de l'Autriche; dans ces conditions, les deux Puissances pnncipalement inleressees elant disposees a causer, si 1'AUemagne ne desirait pas la — 135 — guerre pour son propre comple, il est incomprehensible qu'elle cnvoie un ultima- tum a la Russie, au lieu de continuer a travailler, comme toutes les autres Puis- sances, a une solution pacifique. J. Cambon. N° 122. M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Berlin, et au Ministre de France a Bruxelles. Paris, le l"" aout 191^. L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre est venu, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, me deman- der quelle serait, en cas de conflit avec 1'AUemagne, l'atlitude du Gouvernement Franqais vis-a-vis de la Belgique. J'ai declare que , comme nous l'avions repele a plusieurs reprises au Gouverne- ment Beige, nous entendions respecter sa neutrahte. ' Ce serait seulement dans le cas oil cette neutrality serait violee par une autre Puis- sance que la France, pour remplir ses obligations de Puissance garante, pourrait etre amenee a penetrer sur le territoire belee. bene Viviani. N° 123. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Berlin, le 1" aout igi4- L'Ambassadeur dAngleterre a ete charge par son Gouvernement de faire aupres du Gouvernement Allemand la meme demarche qui a ete faite aupres de vous au sujet de la neutralite de la Belgique. M. de Jagow a repondu qu'il prendrait les ordres de FEmpereur et du Chancelier, mais qu'il doutail rru'une reponse put etre donnee, car 1'AUemagne ne pouvait ainsi decourrir ses projets militaires. L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre reverra demain M. de Jagow dans 1'apres-midi. J. Cambon. — 13(3 — N° 124. M. Barrere, Ambassadeur de France a Rome, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires elran- geres. Rome, le l" aout 1 g 1 4- J'ai ete ce matin a 8 hemes 1/2 chez le Marquis de San Giuliano pour connaitre de lui d'une facon precise quelle serait 1'allitude de l'ltalie en presence des actes provocateurs de 1'Allemagiie et des suites qu'ils peuvent avoir. Le Ministre des AiTaires elrangeres ra'a repondu qu'il avail recu hier soir la visite de 1'Ambassadeur d Allemagne. M. de Flotow lui aurait dit que I'Allemagne avait demande au Gouvernement Russe de suspendre sa mobilisation et au Gouvernement Francois d'indiquer ce qu'il avait I'intention de faire; 1'Allemagne avait donne a la France un delai de dix-huit heures et ii la Russie un delai de douze heures pour repondre. M. de Flotow a demande, a la suite de cette communication, quelles etaient les intentions du Gouvernement [talien. Le Marquis de San Giuliano a repondu que la guerre entreprise par I'Autriche, elant donne surtout les consequences qui pouvaient en sortir d'apres les paroles de 1'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne , ayant un caractere agressif ne cadrant pas avec le caractere purement defensif de la Triple-Alliance, l'ltalie ne pourrait participer a la guerre. Barrere. IN" 125. M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg, Berlin, Vienne, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople. Paris, le 1" aout 1914. L'Ambassadeur d'AUemagne est revenu me voir ce matin a 1 1 heures. Apres lui avoir rappele tous les efforts poursuivis par la France en vue d'un reglement hono- rable du conllit austro-serbe et de la difficulte qui s'en est suivie entre I'Autriche et la Russie, je lai mis au courant des pourparlers continues depuis hier : i° Proposition transactionnelle anglaise prevoyant, entre autres, de la part de la Russie, la suspension des preparatifs militaires, a condition que les aulres Puissances en fassent autant; adhesion de la Russie a cette proposition; 2° Communications du Gouvernement Autrichien declarant ne vouloir ni s'agrandir en Serbie, ni meme penetrer dans le sandjak et se disant pret a discuter a Londres avec les aulres Puissances \efond meme de la question austro-serbe. J'ai mis en regard Pattitude de rAllemagne qui, abaudonnanl tout pourparler, posait a la Russie un ultimatum au moment meme oil cette Puissance vient d'accepter la formule anglaise (qui implique 1'arret des preparatifs militaires de tous les pays ayant mobilise) et envisageait comrne imminente une rupture diplomatique avec la France. _ 137 — Le Baron de Schoen m'a repondu qu'il ignorait les developpements survenus dans cette question depuis vingt-qualre heures. qu'il y avait peul-etre la une « lueur d'espoir » pour unaccommodement, qu'il n'avait recu aucune nouvelle communication de son Gouvernemcnt et qu'il allait s'informer. II a de nouveau proteste de son sin- cere desir de joindre ses efforts a ceux de la France pour arriver a la solution du cODflit. J'ai insiste sur la grave responsabilite qu'a'ssumeraif le Gouvernement Imperial si, dans de pareilles circonstances, il prenait des initiatives non justifiees et de nature a compromettre irremediabtement la paix. Le Baron de Schoen n'a plus fail allusion a son depart immediat et ne m'a plus- demande de.repondre a sa question concernant 1'altitude de la France en cas de conflit auslro-russe. II s'est borne a dire de hii-meme qu'elle n'etait pas douteuse. II ne convient a aucun degre d'exagerer les possibiKtes qui peuvent resulter de ma conversation avec 1'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, car, de son cote, le Gouvernement Imperial continue les plus dangereux preparatifs sur notre frontiere. II ne faut pas les negliger cependant et nous ne devons pas cesser de travailler a un arrangement. La France, de son cote, procede a toutes les mesures militaires propres a la garantir contre une avance trop grande des preparatifs militaires allemands. Elle estime que ses tentatives de conciliation n'auront de chances d'aboutir que dans la mesure ou on la sentira prete et resolue, si la lutte lui est imposee. Rene Viviani. N" 126. M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseii, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Paris, le l" aout 1914. Sir Edward Grey m'a dit que, dans le Conseii de ce matin, le Cabinet avait de nouveau envisage la situation. L'Allemagne ayant reclame de l'Angleterre une decla- ration de neutralite et ne layant pas obtenue, le Gouvernement britannique demeu- rait maitre de son action et celle-ci pourrait se manifester dans differentes hypotheses. En premier lieu, la neutralite beige importe beaucoup a l'Angleterre. La France a renouvele immedialement 1'engagement de la respecter. L'Allemagne a declare « n'etre pas en etat de repondre ». Sir Edward Grey saisira le Cabinet de cette reponse et demandera ['automation de dire lundi a la Chambre des Communes que le Gouver- nement britannique nc permettra pas une violation de la neutralite beige. En second lieu, les escadres anglaises sont mobilisees el Sir Edward Grey propo- sera a ses collegues de declarer qu'elles s'opposeront au passage du Detroit par les escadres allemandes ou, si elles venaient a le passer, 4 toute demonstration sur les cotes franchises. Le Conseii de lundi traitera ces deux questions; j'ai fait remarquer au Principal Secretaire d'Etat que si, d'ici la , quelque incident venait a se produire, il ne fallait pas se laisser surprendre et qu'il conviendrait de songer a intervenir a temps. Paul Cambon. Documents diplomatiqces. — Guerre europeenne. 18 — 138 — N" 127. M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, a M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France, a Londres. Paris, le i" aoilt 1914. Nous sommes avisos par plusieurs voies que le Gouverneroent allemand et le Gouvernement aulrichien essaient en ce moment d'impressionner l'Angleterre en lui faisant croire que la Vesponsabilite de la guerre, si elle eclate, incombera a la Russie. On fait effort pour . obtenir la neutrality de l'Angleterre en denaturant la verite". La France n'a cesse de doiiner, d'accord avec l'Angleterre, des conseils de moderation a Petersbourg; ces conseils ont ete ecoutes. Des le debut, M. Sazonoff a fait pression sur la Serbie pour qu'elle acceptal toutes celles des clauses de 1'ultimalum qui etaient compalibles avec sa souverainete. II a ensuite engage avec l'Autriche unc conversation directe qui etait un nouveau temoignage de son esprit de conciliation. II a enfin accept^ de laisser les puissances les moins interessees recbercher les moyens d'apaiser le conflit. Conformement au desir qui lui a ete exprime par Sir G. Buchanan, M. Sazo- noff a consenti a modifier la premiere formule qu'il avait presentee et il en a redige une seconde qui ne s'eloigne pas sensiblement des declarations qui ont ete faites hier a M. de Margerie par le comte Szecsen. Ce dernier affirrne que l'Autriche n'a aucune intention d'acquisition territoriale et quelle ne vent pas toucher a la souve- rainete de la Serbie. II ajoute expressement que l'Autriche n'a aucune visee sur le Sandjak de Novi-Bazar. II semblerait done que 1'accord fut facile a etablir entre la suggestion de Sir Edward Grey, la formule de M. SazonofT et les declarations de l'Autriche. La France est resolue a poursuivre jusqu'au bout, avec l'Angleterre, la realisation de cet accord. Mais pendant que Ton negociait et que la Russie montrait dans la negociation une bonne volonte incontestable, l'Autriche a, la premiere , pi'ocede a une mobilisation generate. La Russia s'est vue lorcee de 1'imher pour ne pas se trouver en etat d'inferiorite, mais elle est toujours restee prete a negocier. Je n'ai pas hesoin de repeter -que, quant a nous, nous continuerons a travailler, avec l'Angleterre, au succes de ces pourparlers. Mais lattitude de 1'Allemagne nous a mis dans 1'obligation absolue de prendre au- jourd'hui le di'cret de mobilisation. Bien avant la mobilisation russe, des mercredi dernier, ainsi que je vous l'ai dejS telegraphic, M.de Schoenm'avait ajinonce la publication prochaine du « Kriegsgefahr- — 139 — zustand ». Cette mesure a ete prise par I'AUemagne et, a 1'abri de ce paravent, elle a immediatement commence sa mobilisation proprement dite. Aujourd'hui M. Paleologue a telegraphie que le Comte de Pourtales avait an-! nonce au Gouvernement russe la mobilisation allemande. Des renseignements parvenus au Ministere de la Guerre confirment que cette mobilisation est eflectivement en pleine execution. Notre decrct de mobilisation est done une mesure essentielle de preservation. Le Gouvernement I'a accompagnee d'une proclamation signee du President de la Re- publique et de tous les Ministres, et dans laquelle il explique que la mobilisation nest pas la guerre, qu'en 1'etat actuel e'est pour la France le meilleur moyen de sauvegarder la paix, et que le Gouvernement de la Republique multipliera ses efforts pour faire aboutir les negociations. Veuillez transmettre d'urgence toutes ces indications a Sir Edward Grey et lui marquer que nous avons obei constamment a la preoccupation de ne commettre aucun acte de provocation. Je suis persuade que, au cas oii la guerre, eclaterait, 1'opinion anglaise verrait clairement de quel cote vient 1'agression , et qu'elle saisirait les raisons si fortes que nous avons donnees 4 Sir Edward Grey pour reclamer une intervention armee de I'Angleterre dans 1'interet de Tavenirde 1'equilibre europeen. Rene Viviani. K 128. M. Mollard, Ministre de France a Luxembourg, a M. Ren6 Viviami, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires 6tran- geres. Luxembourg, te l" aout igi4. Le Ministre d'Etat me cbarge de demander, au Gouvernement francais une assu- rance de neutrality semblable a celle qui a ete donnee a la Belgique. M. Eyschen m'a declare qu'a present, du fait que e'est le Ministre de France a Bruxelles qui a fait la declaration en question au President du Conseil du Gouvernement beige, il a pense que la meme procedure conviendrait le mieux vis-a-vis du Grand-Duche. C'est pourquoi il s'est abstenu de faire la demande directement au Gouvernement de la Republique. Comme la Cbambre des deputes se reunit lundi , M. Eyschen desire etre en possession de la reponse a cette date; une demarche analogue est faite en meme temps aupres du Ministre d'Alleniagne a Luxemljourg. MoLLiai). — 140 — N° 129. M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a M. Mollard, Ministre de France a Luxembourg. Paris, le 1" aout 1914. Veuillez declarer au President du Conseil que, conformernent au traits' de Londres de 1867, le Gouvernement de la Republique entend respecter la neutralite du Grand-Duche du Luxembourg, comme il la demontre par son altitude. La violation de cette neutralite par l'Allemagne serait toutefois de nature a obliger la France a s'inspirer desormais, a cet egard, du souci de sa defense et de ses interets. Rene Viviani. N° 130. M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Berlin. a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Berlin, lc i"aout 1914. On dislribue dans les rues de Berlin des editions speciales desjournaux annoncant que la mobilisation generate de l'armee et de la flotte est ordonnee etque le i er jour de la mobilisation est le dimancbe 2 aout. Jules Cambon. IN" 131. M. Eyschen, Ministre d'Etat du Luxembourg, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Luxembourg, ie 2 aout 1914. J'ai l'houneur de porter a la connaissance de Votre Excellence les tails suivants. Diraanche 2 aout de grand matin les troupes allemandes, d'apres les informations qui sont parvenues au Gouvernement Grand-Ducal a l'heure actuelle, out penetre sur le territoire Luxembourgeois par les ponts de VVasserbillig el de Remich, se — 141 — dirigeant specialement vers le Sud du pays, et vers la ville de Luxembourg, capitale du Grand-Duche ; un certain nombre de trains blindes avec des troupes et des mu- nitions ont ete achemines par la voie de chemin de fer de Wasserbillig a Luxembourg ou Ton s'attend a les voir arriver d'un instant a l'autre. Ces faits impliauent des actes manifeslement contraires a la neutrality du Grand- Duche, garantie par le traite de Londres de 1867. Le Gouvernement Luxembour- geois n'a pas manque de protester energiquement contre cette agression aupres des representants de Sa Majeste l'Empereur d'Allemagne a Luxembourg ; une protesta- tion idenlique va etre transmise telegraphiquement au Secretaire d'Etat pour les Affaires elrangeres a Berlin. Le Minislre d'Etat, President du Gouvernement, Eyschen, N° 132. M. Mollard, Ministre de France a Luxembourg, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Luxembourg, le 2 aout 1914. Le Ministre d'Etat du Luxembourg, M. Eyschen, vient de recevoir, par I'interme- diaire du Ministre d'Allemagne a Luxembourg, M. de Buch, un telegramme du Chancelier de l'Empire allemand Bethmann Hollvveg, disant que les mesures militaires prises par 1'AUemagne en Luxembourg ne constituent pas un acte hostile contre ce pays, mais sont unicmement des mesures destinees a assurer contre 1'atlaque 6ven- tuelle dune armee fran^aise lexploitation des voies ferrees aflermees a l'Empire. Le Luxembourg recevra une complete indemuite pour les dommages eventuels. Mollard. — 142 — IN" 133. JVote remise par l 'Ambassadeur ctAUemagne., Paris, le 2 aout igii. L'Ambassadeur d'Allernagne vient d'etre charge et s'empresse de faire savoir air Ministere des Affaires etrangeres que les mesures mililaires prises par l'Allemagne dans le Grand-Uuche de Luxembourg ne constituent pas un acle d'hostilite. EUes doivent etre considerees comme des mesures purement preventives prises pour la protection des chemins de fer qui, par suite des traites existant entre l'Allemagne e» le Grand-Duche de Luxembourg, se trouvent sous 1'administration allemande. N° .134. M. Paleologue, Ambassadeur de France a Saint-PEtersbourg, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres. Pilersbourg, le 1 aout 191/1. L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a remis a M. Sazonoff, hier, a 7 h. 10 du soir, la declaration de guerre de son Gouvernement; il quittera Petersbourg aujourd'hui. L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie n'a recu aucune instruction de son gouverne- ment pour la declaration de guerre. Paleologue. r 135. M. Rene Vivuni, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres , a MM. les Representants de la France a l'&ranger. Paris, le 2 aout 1914. L'Ambassadeur de Russie me fait connaitre que l'Allemagne vient de declarer la guerre a la Russie, malgre les negociations en cours, et au moment oil 1'Autriche- Honcrie acceptait de discuter avec les- puissances le fond meme de son conflit avec [la Serbie. Rene VrviANi. 133 — N° 136. M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires 6trangeres, a MM. les Ambassadeurs de France a Londres, Saint-P6tersbourg, Berlin, Vienne, Rome, Madrid, Constantinople. Paris, le 2 aoAt roii. Le territoire fran^ais a ete viole ce matin par les troupes allemandes a Cirey et pres de Longwy. EUes marcbent sur le fort qui porte ce dernier nom. D'autre part, le poste douanier de Delle a ete assailli par une double fusillade. Enfm, les troupes allemandes ont viole ce matin aussi le territoire neutre du Luxembourg. Vous utiliserez ces renseignements sans retard pour faire constater comment le Gouvernement Allemand se livre contre la France a des actes de guerre sans provo- cation de notre part, ni declaration de guerre prealable, alors que nous avons scrupuleusement respecte la zone de dix kilometres que nous avons maintenue meme depuis la mobilisation, entre nos troupes et la frontiere. Rene Viviani. N° 137. M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Londres, le 2 aout 1914. A Tissue du Conseil des Miriistres tenu ce matin, Sir Edward Grey m'a fait la d6- claration suivante : «Je.suis autorise a donner l'assurance que si la flotte allemande penfelre dans la Mauche ou traverse la mer du Nord afin d'entreprendre des operations de guerre contie la cote fran^aise ou la marine marchande francaise, la flotte britannique don- nera toute la protection en son pouvoir. « Cette assurance est naturellement donnee sous la reserve que la politique du Gouvernement de Sa Majesle sera approuvee par le Parlement britannique et ne doit — 144 — pas etre consid^ree comme obligeant le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste a agir jusqu'a ce que I'eventualite ri-dessus mentionnee dune action de la (lotte alleniande se soit produite ». Me parlant ensuite de la neutrality de la Belgique et de telle du Luxembourg, le Principal Secretaire d'litat m'a rappele que la Convention de 1867 relative au Grand- Ducbe diflerait du Traite relatif a la Belgique en ce hens que I'Angleterre etait tenue de faire respecter cette derniere convention wir le concours des autres Puiss ;es garantes, tandis que, pour- le Luxembourg, toutes les Puissances garantes devaient agir de concert. La sauvegarde de la neutrality beige est consideree ici comme si importante que I'Angleterre envisagerait sa violation par I'Allemagne comme un casus belli. C'est la un interet proprement anglais, et on ne peut douter que le Gouvernement brilan- nique, fidele aux traditions de sa politique, ne le fasse prevaloir, meme si le monde des affaires, oil 1'influence allemande poursuit des efforts tenaces, prelendait exercer une pression pour empecher le Gouvernement de ^'engager contre I'Allemagne. Paul CuiuoN. N° 138. M. ReneVivtANi, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres. Paris, le 2 aoiit 19 14- Je prends note des indications contenues dans vos telegrammes des 27, 3o, 3 1 juillet.et 1" aoiit et dans celui que vous m'avez adresse aujourd'hui. Kn communiquaut aux Chambres la declaration meme que vous a faite Sir Edward Grey el dont votre dernier telegramme me donne le texte, j'ajouterai que nous avons obtenu la de la Grande-Bretagne un premier concours dont la valeur nous est pre- cieuse. Je me propose, en outre, d'indiquer que lassistance de la Grande-Bretagne a l'in- tention de donner a la France en vue de proteger les cotes de France ou la marine marchande fran^aise s'appliquerait de telle facjon que notre marine de guerre fut egalement soutenue par la (lotte anglaise, en cas de conllit Iranco-allemand , dans 1'Atlantique, comme dans la mer du Nord et dans la Manche. Je noterais, en outre, que les ports anglais ne pourraient pas servir de points de ravitaillement a la llotte allemande. Rene Viviani. 145 IN" 139. M. Rene Vivi.vni, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a M. Jules Cambon, Anibassadeur de France a Berlin. Paris, le 2 aoiit igi4- Les troupes allemandes ayanl aujourd'hui viole la frontiere de 1'Est sur plusieurs points, je vous prie de protester sans retard par 6crit aupres du Gouverneraent alle- mand. Vous youdrez bien vous inspirer de la note suivante que, dans 1'incertitude des communications entre Paris et Berlin, j'ai adresse directement a 1'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne : « Les autorit^s administratives et militaires franchises de la region de l'Est viennent de signaler plusieurs faits que j'ai charge 1'Ambassadeur de la Republique a Berlin de porter a la connaissance du Gouvernement Imperial. ' L'un s'est produit a Delle, dans la region de Belfort : a deux reprises, le poste de douaniers francais statioone dans cette localite a ele 1'objet d'une fusillade de la part dun detachement de soldats allemands. Au nord de Delle, deux patrouilles alle- mandes du 5 r chasseurs a cheval ont franchi la frontiere dans la matinee d'aujourd'hui et p6n£tre jusqu'aux villages de Joncherey et Baron a plus de l o kilometres de la frontiere. L'officier qui commandait la premiere a brule la cervelle a un soldat francais. Les cavaliers allemands ont emmene des chevaux que le maire francais de Suarce etait en train de reunir et ont force les habitants de la commune a conduire les dits chevaux. « L'Ambassadeur de la Republique a Berlin a ete charge de protester formellement aupres du Gouvernement Imperial contre des faits qui constituent une violation caracterisee de la frontiere par des troupes allemandes en amies et que rien ne Justine dans 1'etat actuel. Le Gouvernement de la Republique ne peut que laisser au Gou- vernement Imperial 1'entiere responsabilite de ces actes ». Rene VlvuNl. N° 140. M. Marcelin Pellet, Ministre de France a La Haye, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. La Haye, le 3 aotil lgid. Le Ministre d'Allemagne s'est rendu hier chez le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres pour lui expliquer la necessite oii s'etait trouvee 1'Allemagne, a-t-il dit, de violer la DoctmEras diplqmatiqces. — ■ Guerre europeenne. if) — 146 — neutrality du Luxembourg, ajoutant qu'il aurait aujourd'hui une nouvelle commu- nication a lui faire. En effet,ce matin, il a annonce l'entree des troupes allemandes en Belgique pour eviter, a-t-il declare, une occupation de ce pays par la France. Pellet. N° 141. M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France a Bruxellesj a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. BruxeUes, le 3 aout 1914. Le Ministre d'Allemagne a reniis hier soir au Gouvemement beige un ultimatum oil il est dit que son Gouvernement, ayantappris que les Francois se preparaient a des operations dans les regions de Givet et de Namur, se voyait dans I'obligation de prendre desmesures dont la premiere etait d'inviter le Gouvernement beige a lui faire savoir, dans les sept heures, s'il etait dispose a lui faciliter en Belgique les operations mili- taires contre la France. En cas de refus, le sort des armes d^ciderait. Le Gouvernement du Roi a repondu que les renseignements sur les mouvements francais lui paraissaient inexacts en raison des assurances formelles, toutes recentes encore, donnees par la France; que la Belgique qui, depuis sa constitution, s'est pre- occupee d'assurer la sauvegarde de sa dignite et de ses interets et a consacre tous ses efforts au developpement pacifique du progres, proteste hautement contre toute violation de son territoire, d'ou qu'elle vienne, ct que, dans cette eventuality, elle saura defendre energiquement sa neutralite, garar.tie par les puissances et notauiment par le Roi de Prusse. Klobukowski. N° 142. M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France a Bruxeiles, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. Bruxeiles, le 3 aout io,i4.. A I'assurance que je lui donnais que, si la Belgique faisait appel a la garantie des Puissances, contre la violation de sa neutralite par 1'AUemagne, la France W-pondrait imm^diatement a son appel, le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres m'a repondu : — 147 — « C'est bien sincerement que nous remercions le Gouvememeut de la Repu- blique de 1'appui^ eventuel qu'U pourrait nous ofl'rir, mais dans la circonstance actuelle, nous ne faisons pas appel a la garantie des Puissances. Ulterieurement le Gouvernement du Roi appreciera ce qu'il y a lieu de faire ». N° 143. M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, a M. Rene Vivian i» President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. Londres , le 3 aout i 9 1 i . Sir Ed. Grey m'a autorisd a vous faire savoir que vous pourriez declarer au Parle- ment qu'il ferait aux Communes des declarations sur l'attitude actuelle du Gouver- nement Britannique et que la principale de ces declarations serait la suivante : « Dans le cas oil 1'escadre allemande franchirait le detroit ou remonterait la Mer du Nord pour doubler les iles britanniques dans le but d'attaquer les cotes franchises ou la marine de guerre francaise et d'inquieter la marine marchande francaise, 1'escadre anglaise interviendrait pour prefer a la marine francaise son entiere protec- tion, en sorte que des ce moment I'Angleterre et 1'Allemagne seraient en etat de guerre. » Sir Ed. Grey m'a fait observer que la mention d'une operation par la Mer du Nord impliquait la protection contre une demonstration dans 1'Ocean Atlantique. La declaration concernant Intervention de la ffotte anglaise doit etre considered comme liant le Gouvernement britannique. Sir E. Grey m'en a donne 1'assurance et a ajoute que le Gouvernement fran nit 1 9 1 h ■ Veuillez faire connaitre au Gouvernement royal bavarois que vous avez re^u pour instruction de conformer votre attitude 4 celle de 1'Ambassadeur de la Republique a 'Berlin et de quitter Munich, Rene Viviani. 151 — N° 151. M. Ren6 Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a MM. les Representants de la France a Londres, Saint-Petersbourg. Vienne, Rome, Madrid, Berne, Constantinople, La Haye, Copen- hague, Christiania, Stokholm, Bucarest, Athenes, Belgrade. Paris, le 3 aout 191 U. J'apprends de source officielle beige que les troupes allemandes out viole le terri- toire beige a Gemmerich dans la region de Verviers. Rene Vivuni. N° 152. M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France a Bruxelles, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Consed, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Bruxelles, le 4 aout 1914. Le Chef de Cabinet du Ministere des Affaires etrangeres me remet une lettre par laquelle le « Gouvernement du Roi declare etre fermement decide a resister par tous les moyens en son pouvoir a 1'agression de l'Allemagne. La Belgique fait appel a l'Angleterre , la France et la Russie pour cooperer comme garantes a la defense de son territoire. k II y aurait une action concertee et commune ayant pour but de resisler aux mesures de force, employees par l'Allemagne contre la Belgique, et en meme temps de garantir le maintien de l'independance et de 1'integrite de la Belgique dans l'avenir. • La Belgique est heureuse de pouvoir declarer qu'elle assurera la defense des places fortes. » KiOBUKOWStl. — 152 — N° 153. M. Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France a Londres, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Gonseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. Londres, le 4 aout 191.4. Sir Edw. Grey m'a prie de venir le voir a 1'instant pour me dire que le premier Ministre declarerait aujourd'hui a la Chambre des Communes que 1'Allemagne avail, ele invitee a retirer son ultimatum a la Belgique et a donner sa reponse a 1'Angleterre ce soir avant minuit. Paul Cambon. N" 154. M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France a BruxeHes, a M. Rene Viviani, President du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires etran- geres. BruxeHes, le 4 aout 1911. Le Ministre d'Allemagne informe ce matin le Ministere des Affaires elrangeres beige que, par suite du refus du Gouverment beige, le Gouvernement imperial se voit force d'executer, par la force des armes, les mesures de securite indispensables vis-a-vis des menaces franchises. Klobukowski. 155. M. Bapst, Ministre de France a Copenhague, a M. Doumergue, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. Copenhague, 6 aoiit 191 4- L'Ambassadeur de France a Berlin me prie de communiquer a votre Excellence le telegramme suivant : J'ai ele dirige par le Gouvernement allemand sur le Danemark. Je viens d'arriver a Copenbague. Tout le personnel de l'Ambassade et le Cbarge d'affaires de Russie a Darmstadt avec sa famille, m'accompagnaient. On a use de tels precedes a notre egard que je crois. utile d'en faire le rapport complet a Votre Excellence par le lelegraphe. Lundi matin, 3 aoiit, apres que j'avais, conformement a vos instructions, adresse a M. de Jagow une protestation contre les actes d'agression commis sur le territoire — 153 — francais par les troupes allemandes, le Secretaire d'Etat vint me voir. M. de Jagow venait se plaindre d'actes d'agression qu'il pretendait avoir ete commis en AUemagne, a Nuremberg et a Coblentz notamment, par des aviateurs francais qui, selon lui, « seraient venus de Belgique ». — Je repondis que je n'avais pas la moindre donnee sur les faits dont il voulait faire etat et dont l'invraisemblanee me paraissait evidente; je lui demandai a mon tour s'il avait pris connaissance de la Note que je lui avais adressee au sujet de 1'envahissement de notre territoire par des detachements de l'armee allemande. — Comme le Secretaire d'Etat me disait n'avoir pas encore lu cette Note, je lui en donnai connaissance. J'appelai son attention sur l'acte commis par l'olTicier commandant un de ces detachements qui s'etait avance jusqu'au village frantjais de Joncherey, a 10 kilometres a l'interieur de nos frontieres, et avait briile la cervelle a un soldat francais qu'il y avait rencontre. Apres avoir qualifie cet acte, j'ajoutai : — « Vous reconnaitrez qu'en aucune hypothese il ne saurait etre compare a un vol d'aeroplane sur territoire etranger, accompli par des particuliers animes de cet esprit d'audace individuelle qui distingue les aviateurs. Un acte d'agression commis sur le territoire d'un voisin par des detachements de troupes regulieres commandes par desofficiers presente une gravite toute autre. » M. de Jagow me declara qu'il ignorait les fails dont je lui parlais et il conclut qu'il etait difficile qu'il ne s'en produisit pas de cette nature lorsque deux armees, remplies des sentiments qui animaient nos troupes, se trouvaient face a face de chaque cote de la frontiere. A ce moment, les atlroupements qui se trouvaient sur la Parezer Platz, devant 1'Ambassade el que nous apercevions a travels la fenetre entr'ouverte de mon cabinet , pousserent des cris contre la France. Je demandai au Secretaire d'Etat quand tout cela fmirait. « Le Gouvernement n'a pas encore pris de decision, me repondit M. de Jagow. II est probable que M. de Schoen recevra aujourd'hi 1'ordre de demander ses passe- ports, et ensuite, vous recevrez les votres ». — Le Secretaire d'Etat m'assura que du reste je n'avais aucune preoccupation a avoir au sujet de mon depart et que toutes les convenances seraient observees a mon egard ainsi qu'a 1'egard de mon personnel. Nous ne devions plus nous voir et nous primes conge lun de 1'autre, apres un entre- tien qui avait ete courtois et qui ne pouvait me faire prevoir ce que Ton me reser- vait. Avant de quitter M. de Jagow, je lui avais exprime le desir de faire une visite personnelle au Chancelier, puisque ce serait la dermere fois que j'aurais 1'occasion de le voir. M. de Jagow me repondit qu'il ne m'engageait pas a donner suite a cette intention, car cette entrevue ne servirait a rien et ne pourrait etre que penible. A 6 heures du soir, M. de Langwerlh m'a apporte mes passeports. II refusa au nom de son Gouvernement d'acceder au desir que je lui exprimais de me laisser par' tir par la Hollande ou la Belgique. II me proposa de partir soit par Copenhague, bien qu'il ne put m'assurer le libre passage de la mer, soit par la Suisse, via Constance. J'acceplai cette derniere voie; M. de Langwerth m'ayant demande de partir le plus tot possible, il fut convenu, en raison de la necessite oil j'etais de m'entendre avec Doci;mhms DiPLOMiTiQCES. — Guerre europeenne. 20 — 154 — TAmbassadeur d'Espagne, qui prend nosinterets en main, que je quitterais I'Ambas- sade le lendemain mardi l\ aoiit, a io heures du soir. Line iieure apres le depart de M. de Langvverth, a 7 heures, M. de Lancken, ancien Conseiller d'Ambassade a Paris, vint me dire de la part du Ministere des Affaires etratigeres, d'inviter le personnel de mon Ambassade a tie plus prendre ses repas dans les restaurants. Cette consigne etait si slricte que le lendemain mardi j'eus besoin de recourir a lautorite de la Wilhelmstrasse pour que 1'hotel Bristol nous envoyat nos repas a 1'Ambassade. Le meme soir, lundi a 1 1 heures, M. de Langvverth revint m'apprendre que son Gouvernement me refusait le retour par la Suisse sous le pretexte qu'il faudrait trois jours et trois nuits pour me conduire a Constance. II m'annonca que je serais dirige sur Vienne. Je ne consentis a ce changemenl que sous reserve et dans la nuit j'ecrivis a M. de Langwerth la lettre suivante :, « Berlin, 3 aodt 1914. M. le Baron, « Je reflechis a la route dont vous etes venu me parler ce soir pour me faire rentrer dans mon pays. Vous me proposez de passer par Vienne. Je suis expose a me trouver retenu dans cette ville, sinon du fait du Gouvernement autricliien, du moins du fait des circonstances de sa mobilisation, qui lui cree des dilhcultes analogues a celles de 1'AHemagne pour la circulation des trains. ■ Dans ces conditions, je crois devoir reclamer du Gouvernement allemand lengage- ment d'honneur que le Gouvernement autricliien me dirigera sur la Suisse et que le Gouvernement suisse ne fermera ni a moi, ni aux personnes qui m'accompagnent, sa frontiere qu'on me dit justement fermee aux et'rangers. " Je ne puis done accepter la proposition que vousm'avez faite que si j'ai les suretes que je reclame et si je suis assure de ne pas etre retenu quelques mois hors de mon pays. . Jules Cambon. En reponse a cette lettre, le lendemain matin, mardi 4 aout, M. de Langwerth me donna par ecrit Insurance que les autorites autrichiennes et suisses avaient reru les communications necessaires. En meme temps, on arretait chez lui, dans son lit, M. Miladowski , attache an Consulat de Berlin, ainsi (jue d'antres Frani;ais. M. Miladowski, pour qui 11 n passe- port diplomatique avail ete demande, put etre relache an bout de lx heures. Je me preparais a partir pour Vienne, quand, a /( heures 45, M. de Langwerth revint m'annoncer que je devrais partir avec les personnes m'accompagnant a 1 o heures du soir, mais que je serais conduit en Danemark. Devant celte exigence nouvelle, je demandai si 1'on me mettrait dans une forteresse, au cas oil je ne 1'accep- terais pas. M. de Langvverth me repondit simplement qu'il reviendrait chercher la reponse dans une demi-heure. Je ne voulais pas donner au Gouvernement allemand le pretexte de dire que je m'etais refuse a sortir d'Allemagne. Je declarai done a M. de Langwerth. lorsqu'il revint, que je me soumetlrais a l'ordre qui m'etait donne, mais 1 que je protestais ». — 155 — J'ecrivis aussitot a M. de Jagow la leltre, dont la copiesuit : • Berlin, 4 aoilt 1914. « Monsieur le Secretaire d'Etat, • Votre Excellence m'avait dit a plusieurs reprises que le Gouvemement imperial, conformement aux usages de la courtoisie intemationale , me faciliterait mon retour dans rr.on pays et me donnerait tous les moyens d'y rentrer rapidement. « Cependant hier, apres m'avoir refuse 1'acces de la Belgique et de la Hollande, M. le baron de Langwerth m'a informe que je passerais par la Suisse via Constance. Dans la nuit, j'ai ete avisS que ]e serais envoye en Autriche, pays qui prend part du cote de 1'Allemagne a la presente guerre. Comme j'ignorais les intentions de 1' Au- triche a mon egard, puisque sur son sol je ne suis qu'un simple particulier, j'ai ecrit au baron de Langwerth que je demandais au Gouvemement imperial 1'engagement que les autorites imperiales et royales autrichiennes me donneraient toutes les faci- lites possibles pour continuer ma route, et que la Suisse ne se fermerait pas devant moi. M. de Langwerth a bien voulu me repondre par ecrit que je pouvais etre assure d'un voyage facile et que les autorites autrichiennes feraient tout le necessaire. « II est pres de 5 heures et le baron de Langwerth vient de m'annoncer que je serai dirige sur le Danemark. Etant donne les evenements, je ne suis pas assure de trou- ver un batiinent pour me transporter en Angleterre, et c'est cette consideration qui m'avait fait ecarter cette proposition, d'accord avec M. de Langwerth. "Enreahte, on ne me laisse aucuneliberte, et on me traite presque en prisonnier, Je suis oblige de me soumettre, n'ayant aucun moyen d'obtenir qu'il soit tenu compte des regies de la courtoisie intemationale a mon egard, maisje liens a protes- ter entre les mains de Votre Excellence contre lafacon dont je suis traite. Jules Cambon. Pendant qu'on portait ma leltre, j'elais avis6 que le voyage ne s'effectuerait pas direclement, mais par la voie du Schleswig. A 10 heures du soir, je quiltais 1'Am- bassade, avec mon personnel, au milieu d'un grand concours de police a pied et a cheval. A la gare, un employe inferieur du Ministire des Affaires Etrangeres representait seul celte administration. Le voyage s'est effectufi avec une lenteur extreme. Nous avons mis plus de vingt- quatre heures pour gagner la frontiere. II a semble qua chaque station on attendait des ordres pour repartir. J'etais accompagne du major von Rheinbaben, du regi- ment Alexandre de la Garde, et d'un fonctionnaire de la police. Aux environs du canal de Kiel, la troupe a envahi nos wagons. On a fait fermer les fenetres et les rideaux des voitures; chacun de nous a du se tenir isolement dans son compartiment avec defense de se lever el de toucher a ses sacs de voyage. Dans le couloir des wagons, devant la porte de chacun de nos compartiments maintenue ouverte, se tenait un soldat, le revolver au poing et le doigt sur la gachette. Le charge d'affaires de Russie, les femmes, les enfants, tout le monde a ete soumis au meme traitement. A la derniere station allemande, vers i i heures du soir, le major von Rheinbaben — 156 — est venu prendre conge de moi. Je lui ai rerais, pour M. de Jagow, la lettrc [ni suit : • Mercredi soir, 5 aout 1914. > MoNSIEtR LF. SECRETAIRE d'EtAT, •< Hier, avant de quitter Berlin, j'ai proteste par ecrit aupres de Votre Excellence contre les changements successifs de direction qui m'ont ete imposes par le Gouver- nement imperial, pour sortir d'Allemagne. "Aujourd'hui, lors du passage du train qui m'emportait au-dessus du canal de Kiel, on a voulu visiter tous nos bagages, comme si nous pouvions cacher quelque instrument de destruction. Grace a lintervention dn major von Kheinbaben, cet affront nous a etc epargne. « Mais on a fait plus. « On nous a oblige de rester chacun dans nos compartiments, dont les fenetres et les rideaux elaient fermes. Pendant ce temps, dans le couloir des voitures, a la porte de chaque compartiment et faisanl face a chacun de nous, se tenait un soldat, le revolver a la main, le doigt sur la gachette, durant pros dune demi-heure. « Je crois devoir protester contre cette menace de violences a l'egard de l'Ambassa- deur de la Republique et du personnel de son Ambassade, violences que rien n'avait pu seulement me faire pressentir. J'avais 1'honneur d'ecrire hier a Votre Excellence que j'etais traite presque en prisonnier. Aujourd'hui, rest en prisonnier dangereux que j'ai ete traite. Je dois noter que, dans le cours du voyage qui, depuis Berlin jusqu'au Danemaik, a pris vingt-quatre heures, aucun repas n'a ete prepare , 111 fourni a moi, non plus qu'aux personnes reconduites avec rnoi jusqu'a la frontiere. Jules Cambon. Je croyais tout termine, lorsque peu apres le major von Rheinbaben vint, un pen confus, m'annoncer que le train ne poursuivrait pas jusqu'a la frontiere danoise si je ne payais pas le prix de ce train. Je m'etonnai qu'on ne me 1'eut pas fait payer a Berlin et, qu'en tout cas, on ne m'eut pas prevenu. Je proposai de payer par un cheque sur une des plus grandes banques de Berlin ; cette facilite me fut refusee. Avec le concours de mes compagnons, je pus reunir en or la somme qui m'elait demandee immediatement et qui s'elevait a 3,Gii marks 75, soit a environ 5,ooo francs au taux actuel du change (1). Apres ce dernier incident, je crus devoir demander a M. de Rheinbaben sa parole d'olhcier et de gentilhomme qu'on allait me conduire jusqu'a la frontiere danoise. II me la donna etj'exigeai quel'hommede police qui etait avec nous novsaccompagnat. Nous arrivames ainsi a la premiere station danoise oil le Gouvernement danois avait fait preparer un train pour nous conduire a Copenhague. On m'assure que mon collegue d'Angleterre et le Ministre de Belgique, bien qu'ils aient quitte Berlin apres moi, sont partis directement pour la Hollande. Je suis frapp^- de cette difference de traitement. Et comme le Danemark et la Norvege sont remplis en ce moment d'espions, si je reussis a m'embarquer en Norvege, on crarnt que je ne sois arrete en mer, avec les officiers qui m'accompagnent. (1) UlterieuremeDt la somme ainsi demandee a M. Jutes Cambon a ete reversee a 1'Ambassadeur d'Es- pagoe a Berlin pour £tre remboursee a. l'Ambassadeur de France. — 157 — Je ne veux pas terminer celte depeche saiis signaler a votre Excellence le devour- ment et fenergie dont tout le personnel de 1'Ambassade n'a pas cesse de faire preuve pendant la duree de cette crise; je serais heureux qu'il lui fut tenu compte des ser- vices rendus a cette occasion an Gouvernement de la Republique, en particular par les Secretaires de 1'Ambassade ainsi que par l'Attache militaire et l'Attache naval. Jules Cambon. IS" 156. M. Mollard, Ministre de France a Luxembourg, a M. Doumergue. Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. Paris, le 4 aoiit 1914. Le Ministre d'Etat est venu mardi matin l\ aoiit, vers huit heures et demie, a la Legation pour me notifier que les autorites militaires allemandes exigeaient mon depart. Sur ma reponse que je ne cederais que devant la force, M. Eyschen me dit qu'il counaissait mes sentiments a ce sujet et que c'etait precisement pour cela qu'il etait venu lui-meme me faire cette communication qui lui coutait beaucoup , car c'etait effeclivement devant la force qu'il me priait de parlir. 11 ajouta qu'il allait m'en apporter la preuve ecrite. Je ne cachai pas a M. Eyschen la tristesse et 1'inquietude que j'avais de laisser mes compatriotes sans defense et lui demandai de vouloir bien se charger de leur pro- tection, ce qu'il accepta. Au moment de partir, il me remit la lettre ci-jointe (annexe I), qui est la reponse du Gouvernement luxembourgeois a la declaration que j'avais faite la veille au soir, selon les instructions telegraphiques de M. Viviani. Vers dix heures, le Ministre d'Etat vint de nouveau a la Legation et me laissa, avec un mot de lui, une copic certifiee de la lettre que lui avait adressee le Ministre d'Allemagne au sujet de mon depart du Luxembourg (annexes II et III). II me dit egalement qu'il avait fait connaitre a M. von Buch que le Gouvernement luxembourgeois serait charge de la protection des Francois et aurait la garde de la Legation et de la Chancellerie. Cette nouvelle ne parut pas plaire a mon collegue d'Allemagne, qui conseillaa M. Eyschen de m'inciler a confier ce soin au Ministre de Belgique. J expliquai au Ministre d'Etat que la situation etait particuliere. Etant accredite aupres de S, A. R. la Grande-Duchesse et mon pays n'etant pas en etat de guerre avec le Luxembourg, il etait, dans ces conditions, tout indique que ce tut le Gouvernement luxembourgeois qui assurat la sauvegarde de mes, compatriotes. M. Eyschen n'insista pas et accepta de nouveau la mission que je lui confiai. Le Ministre d'Etat me demanda alorsde vouloir bien partir sans bruit, alin d'eviter des manifestations qui ne manqueraient pas, me dit-il, d'amener des represailles vis- a-vis des Francois de la part des autorites militaires allemandes. Je lui repondis que j'altachais trop de'prix a la securite de mes compatriotes pour la compromeltre et qu'il n'avait rien 4 craindre. — 158 — Mon depart, qu'on exigeait le plus tot possible, Put fixe a 2 heures, il fut egale- ment entendu que je partirais dans mon automobile. Pour le sauf-conduit, M. Evsrhen me dit que le Ministre d'Allemagne etait actuellement au quartier general allemand pour le demander et qu'il aurait soin de me le faire lenir en temps utile. A 2 heures un quart, M. le Ministre d'Etat , accompagne de M. Henrion, Conseiller du Gouvernement, vint me faire ses adieux et recevoir les clefs de la Legation et cellos de la Chancellci i :. II me fit connaitre que les ordres avaient ete donnes pour mon fibre passage el que je devais gagner A- Ion par la route de Merle, la route de Mamers et la route d'Ailun. 11 ajouta qu'un officier allemand m'attendrait route de. Merle pour preceder ma voiture. Je quittai alors la Legation el me rendis a Arlon par 1'itineraire fixe, mais je ne rencontrai personne. Votre Excellence voudra bien trOuver ci-contre (annexe IV) le texte de la lettre que j'ai remise a M. le Ministre d'Etat avant de quitter mon poste. MoLLARD. Annexe I. M. Evschen, Ministre d'Etat, President du Gouvernement, a M. Mollard, Envoye extraordinaire et Ministre plenipotentiaire de France a Luxembourg. Luxembourg, le h aout 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, Par sa communication vcrbale d'hier soir, Votre Excellence a eu la haute obbgeance de porter a ma connaissance que, conformement au trailc de Londres de 1867, le Gouverne- ment de la Republique entendait respecter la neutrality du Grand-Duche. de Luxembourg, comme il l'avait montre par son attitude, mais que la violation de cette neutrality par l'Alle- magne. etait toutefois de nature a obliger la France a s'inspirer desormais a cet egard du souci de sa defense et de ses interests. Vous me peimettrez de constater, Monsieur le Ministre, que la decision du Gouverne- ment de la Republique est uniquement basee sur le fait d'une tierce Puissance dont, certes, le Grand-Duche n'est pas responsable. Les droits du Luxembourg doivent done rester intacts. L'Empire allemand a formellement declare que seule une occupation temporaire du Luxembourg entrait dans ses intentions. J'aime a croire, Monsieur le Ministre, que le Gouvernement de la Republique n'aura p;« de peine a constater avec moi que de tout temps et en toutes circonstances, le Grand-Duche a pleinement et loyalement rempli toutes les obligations generalement quelconques qui lui incombaient en vertu du traitede 1867. Veuillez agreer, etc. Le Ministre d'Etat. President du Gouvernement, EvSCHEN. — 159 Annexe If. Lettre particuliere adressee par M. Eyschen, Ministre d'Etat, President du Gouverne- nient, a M. Mollard, Ministre de France ft Luxembourg. Monsieur le Ministre, Tout a 1'heure, j'ai eu le tres vif regret de vous faire connaitre les intentions du General von Fuchs au sujet de votre sejour a Luxembourg. Comme j'ai eu l'honneur de vous le dire, j'avais demande une constatation par £crit de la decision prise a ce sujet par 1'autorite militaire. Ci-joint copie d'une lettre que je viens de recevoir a {'instant de la part du Ministre d'Allemagne. II m'a ete assure que, dans l'execution de la mesure, on ne manquera d'avoir tous les [egards dus ft votre quality etft votre personne. Veuillez recevoir {'expression reiteree de tous mes regTets et de mes sentiments les meil- fleurs. EYSCHEN. Annexe III. A Son Excellence le Ministre d'Etat, M. le D r Eyschen. J'ai l'honneur, conformement aux instructions de Son Excellence M. le general Fuclis, de vous prier de vouloir bien inviter le Ministre de France, M. Mollard, a quitter aussitot que possible le Luxembourg et a se rendre en France; autrcment les autorites militaires allemandes se trouveraient dans la penible obligation de placer M. Mollard sous la surveillance d'une escorte militaire et en cas extreme de proceder a son arrestation. Je prie Votre Excellence de vouloir bien agreer a cette occasion l'assurance de ma consi- deration la plus distinguee. von Bdch. 100 — Annexe IV. M. Mollard, Ministre de France a Luxembourg, a Son Excellence M. Eyschen, Ministre d'Etat, President du Gouvernement de Luxembourg. Luxembourg, le 4 -tout 1 q 1 4 - Monsieur le Ministre . Je viens de recevoir votre communication el m'incline devant la force. Avant de quitter le Luxembourg, j'ai \<- ilr\,,ii de me preoccuper du sort et de la securite de mes eompalriolcs. Connaissant l'csprit do justice et d'equite. du Gouvernement luxem- bourgeois, j'ai 1'honneur de prier Votre Excellence de les prendre sous sa haute protection et de \.iller a la sauvegarde de leur vie et de leurs biens. Je demanderai egalement a Voire Excellence d'assurer la garde de l'lioiel de la Legation et des bureaux de la Chanceilerie. Je serais (res oblige a Votre Excellence dc vouloir bien fairc agreer a S. A. R. Madame la Grande-Duchesse rhommage de mon profond respect et toutes mes excuses de n'avoir pu aller le lui exprimer moi-meme. En vous remerciant. Monsieur le Ministre, de toutes les marques de sympathic que vous m'avez donnees, je vous prie d'agreer la nouvellf assurance de ma haute consideration. Armand Molhrd. V 157. Notification dv Gouvernement francais aux Representants des Puissances a Paris., Le Gouvernement imperial allemand, apres avoir laisse ses forces armees franchir la frontiere et se livrer sur le terriloire francais a divers actes de meurtre et de pillage; apres avoir viole la neutrality du Grand-Duche de Luxembourg, au mepris des stipulations de la Convention de Londres du i i mai i 867 et de la Convention V de la Haye du 1 8 octobre 1 907, sur les droits ct devoirs des puissances et des personnes en cas'de gncrre sur terrc (articles I el II), conventions signees de lui; apres avoir adresse un ultimatum au Gouvernement royal de Belgiq'ue tendant a exiger le passage des forces allemandes par le territoire beige, en violation des Traites du 19 avril 1839, egalement signes de lui et de la susdite Convention de La Have A declare la guerre a la France le 3 aot'it 1 9 1 h , a 18 heures 45. Le Gouvernement de la Republique se voit, dans ces conditions, oblige, dc son le , de rccourir a la force des amies. — 161 — II a, en consequence, l'honneur de (aire savoir, par la presente, au Gouvernement de que letat de guerre exrste entre la France et l'Allemagne a dater du 3 aout 191^, 1 8 h. 45. Le Gouvernement de la Republique proteste aupres de toutes les nations civilisees et specialement aupres des Gouvernements signataires des Conventions et Traites sus rappeles, contre la violation par l'Empire allemand de ses engagements interna- tionaux; ll fait toutes reserves quant aux represailles qu'il pourrait se voir amener a exercer contre un ennemi aussi peu soucieux de la parole donnee. Le Gouvernement de la Republique qui entend observer les principes du droit des gens, se conformera, durant les hostilites et sous r&erve de reciprocite, aux disposi- tions des Conventions internationales signees par la France, concernant le droit de la guerre sur terre et sur mer. La presente notification, faite en conformite de ('article 2 de la 11I C Convention de La Haye du 1 8 octobre 1907, relative a l'ouverture des hostilites, et remise a . . . . . A Paris, le./i aoiit 1 9 1 4 , a 1 1\ heures. N" 158. Message de M. Poincare, President de la Republique, a la seance extraordinaire du Parlcment, le k aout 19lb. {Journal ofiiciel llu 5 aout iqi4.) \La Chambre e conic , debout, la lecture du message.) t Messieurs les Deputes, « La France vient d'etre 1'objet d'une agression brutale et premeditee, qui est un insolent defi au droit des gens. Avant qu'une declaration de guerre nous eut encore ete adressee, avant memo que 1'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne eut demande ses passe- ports, noire territoire a ete viole. L'Empire d'AUemagne n'a fait hier soir que donner tardivement le nom veritable a un etat de fait qu'il avail deja cree. « Depuis plus de quarante ans, les Francois, dans un sincere amour de fa paix, ont refoule au fond de leur cceur le desir des reparations legitimes. «Ils ont donne au monde l'e\emple d'une grande nation qui, definitivement relevee de la defaite par la volonte, la patience et le travail, n'a use de sa force re- nouvelee et rajeunie que dans linteret du progres et pour le bieu de l'humanite. « Depuis que 1' ultimatum de l'Autriche a ouvert une crise menaCsante pour 1'Europe enliere, la France s'est attachee a suivre et a recommander partout une politique de prudence, de sagesse et de moderation. « On ne peut lui imputer aucun acte, aucun geste, aucun mot qui n'ait ete paci- fique et conciliant. « A 1'heure des premiers combats, elle a le droit de se rendre solennellement cette Doccmests diplomatioces. — Guerre europ^enne. a i — 162 — justice, qu'elle a fait, jusqu'au dernier moment, des ell'orts supremes pour conjurer la guerre qui vient d'eclater et dont TEmpire d'AUemagne supportera, devant l'his- toire, 1'ecrasante responsabilite. (Applaudisscmcnts unanimes ct repetes.) « Au lendemain meme du jour oil nos allies et nous, nous exprimions publique- iient I'esperance de voir se poursuivre pacifiquement les negociations engagees sous les auspices du Cabinet de Londres, 1'Allemagne a declare subitement la guerre a la Russie, pile a envahi le territoire du Luxembourg, elle a outrageusement insulte la noble nation beige (Vifs applaudissemenls unanimes), notre voisiue et noire amie, et elle a essaye de nous surprendre traitreusement en pleine conversation diploma- tique. (Nomeaax applaudisscmcnts unanimes et repetes.) « Mais la France veillait. Aussi attentive que pacifique, elle s'etait preparee; et nos ennemis vont rencontrer sur lour chemin nos vaillantes troupes de couverture, qui sont a leurs postes de bataille et a 1'abri desquelles s'achevera melhodiquement la mobilisation de toutes nos forces nationales. « Notre belle et courageuse armee, que la France accompagne aujourd'hui de sa pensee maternelle [Vifs applaudisscmcnts), s'est levee toute fremissante pour de- fendre l'honneur du drapeou et le sol de la patrie. (Applaudisscmcnts unanimes et repetes. ) « Le President de la Republique, inlerprete de funanimite du pays, exprime a nos troupes de lerre et de mer l'admiration el la confiance de tous les Francais. [Vifs applaudissemenls prolonges.) « Etroitement unie en un meme sentiment , la Nation perseverera dans le sang-froid dont elle a donne, depuis 1'ouverture de la crise, la preuve quotidienne. Elle saura, comme toujours, concilier les plus genereux elans et les ardeurs les plus enthou- siastes avec cette maitrise de soi qvii est le signe des energies durables et la meilleure garantie de la victoire. (Applaudissements.) « Dans la guerre qui s'engage, la France aura pour elle le Droit, dont les peuples, non plus que les individus, ne sauraient impunement meconnaitre lelernelle puis- sance morale. (Vifs applaudisscmcnts unanimes.) a Elle sera heroiquement defendue par tous ses Gls, dont rien ne brisera devant lennemi l'union sacree et qui sont ajourd'bui fraternellement assembles dans une meme indignation contre l'agresseur et dans une meme foi patriotique. ( Vifs applau- dissemenls prolonges et cris de : vive la France.) « Eile est iidelement secondee par la Russie, son alliee (Vifs applaudissements una- nimes) ; elle est soutenue par la loyale amitie de l'Angleterre. ( Vifs applaudissements unanimes.) » Et deja de tous les points du monde civilise viennent a elle les sympathies et les voeux. Car elle represente aujourd'bui, une fois de plus, devant l'univers, la liberie, la justice et la raison. (Vifs applaudissemenls repetes.) « Haut les coeurs et vive la France! (Applaudissements unanimes ct prolonges. ) » Raymond Poincare. 163 N 159. Discoubs prononce par M. Bene Viviani, President da Conseil, a la Chambre des Deputes le U aoiit 191U. {Journal officiel du 5 aout 1914.) M. Rene Viviani, President da Conseil. Messieurs, l'ambassadeur d'AUemagne a quilte hier Paris, apres nous avoir notifie fetal de guerre. Le Gouvernement doit au Parlcrnent le recit veridirrue des evenements qui, en moins de dix jours, out dechaine la guerre europeenne et oblige la France pacifique et forte a defendre sa frontiere contre une agression dont la soudamete calculee sou- ligne l'odieuse injustice. Cette agression, que rien n'excuse et qui a commence avant qu'aucune declaration de. guerre nous Petit notiliee, est le dernier acte d'un plan dont j'entends affirmer, devant notre democratie et devanl 1'opinion civilisee, lorigine et le but. A la suite du crime abominable qui a coute la vie a l'archiduc heritier d'Autriehe- Ilongrie et a la duchesse de Hohenberg, des difDcultes se sont elevees entre le cabi- net de Vienne et le cabinet de Belgrade. La plupart des puissances n'en ont ete qu'officieusement informees jusqu'au ven- dredi il\ juillet, date a laquelle les ambassadeurs d'Autricbe-Hongrie leur ont rcmis une circulaire que la presse a publiee. Cette circulaire avait pour objet d'expliquer et de justifier un ultimatum adresse la veille au soir a la Serbie par le Ministre d'Autricbe-Hongrie a Belgrade. Cet ultimatum, en affirmant la complicite de nombreux sujets et associations serbes dans le crime de Serajevo, insinuait que les aulorites officielles serbes elles- memes n'y etaient pas etrangeres. II exigeail pour le saniedi 2 5 juillet a six heures du soir, une reponse de la Serbie. Les satisfactions exigees, ou du moins plusieurs d'entre elles, portaient indiscuta- blement atteinte aux droits d'un Etat souverain. Malgre leur caractere excessif, la Serbie, le 20 juillet, declara s'y soumetlre, presque saus aucune reserve. A cette soumission, qui constituait pour l'Autricbe-Hongrie un succes, pour la paix europeenne une garantie, les conseils de la France, de la Russie et de la Grande-Bre- tagne, adresses a Belgrade, des la premiere beure, n'etaient pas etrangers. Ces conseils avaient d'autant plus de valeur que les exigences austro-hongroises avaient ete dissimulees aux chancelleries de la Triple Entente a qui, dans les trois semaines precedentes, le Gouvernement austro-bongrois avait donne a plusieurs re- prises l'assurance que ses revindications seraient extremement moderees. C'est done avec un juste etonnement que les cabinets de Paris, de Samt-Peters- bourg et de Londres apprirent le 26 juillet que le ministre d'Autriche a Belgrade, apres un examen de quelques minutes, avait declare unacceptable la reponse serbe et rompu les relations diplomatiques. Cet etonnement s'aggravait de ce fait que, des le vendredi 24, l'ambassadeur d'AUemagne elail venu lire au ministre fran^ais des affaires etrangeres une note ver- — 164 — bale affirmant que le conflil auslro-serbe de\ail demeurer localise, sans intervention des grandes puissances, faute de quoi on en pouvait redouter des "consequences incalculables^. Line demarche analogue fut faite le samedi 25 a Londres et a Saint- Petersbourg. Est-d besoin, messieurs, de vous signaler combien les termes mena^ants employes par l'ambassadeur d'AUemagne a Paris conlrastaient avec les sentiments conciliants dont les puissances de la Triple Entente venaient de fournir la preuve par les conseils de soumission qu'elles avaient donnes a la Serbie? Neanmoins, sans nous arreter au caractere anormal de la demarche allemande, nous ayons, d'accord avec nos allies el nos amis, immedialement engage une action de conciliation en invitant l'Allemagne a s'y associer. Nous avons eu, des la premiere heure, le regret de constater que nos dispositions et nos efforts ne rencontraient a Berlin aucun echo. Non seulement l'Allemagne ne paraissait nullemenl disposee a donner a l'Autriche- Hongrie les conseils amicaux que sa situation 1'autorisait a formuler, mais, des ce moment, et pl.us encore dans les jours suivants, elle semblait s'interposer entre le cabinet de Vienne et les propositions transactionnelles emanant des autres puissances. Le mardi 28 juillet, 1'Autriche-Hongrie declara la guerre a la Serbie. Cette decla- ration de guerre aggravant, a trois jours de distance, l'etat de choses cree par la rupture des relations diplomaliques , permeltait de croire a une volonte refle- chie de guerre, a un programme systematique tendant a 1'asservissement de la Serbie. Ainsi so trouvait mis en cause, non seulement l'independauce d'un peuple vail- lant, mais l'equilibre des Balkans, inscrit dans [e traite de Bucarest de 191.1, et con- sacre par 1'adhesion morale de toutes les grandes puissances. Cependant, a la suggestion du Gouvernemenl Bntannique, toujours attache de la fac;on la plus ferme au maintien de la paix europeenne, les negociations se poursui- vaient on, plus exactement, les Puissances de la Triple Entente essayaient de les poursuivre. De ce desir commun est sortie la proposition dune action a qualre. Angletcrre, France, Allemagne, Italie, destinee, en assurant ii I'Autriche toutes les satisfactions legitimes, a menager un reglement equitable du conflit. Le mercredi 21), le Gouvernement Husse, constatant lechec persistant de ces ten- tatives, et en presence de la mobilisation et de la declaration do guerre autrichiennes, redoutant pour la Serbie un ecrasement militaire, decida, a litre preventif, la mobi- lisation des troupes de quatre arrondisssements militaires, e'est-a-dire des formations echelonnees le long de la frontiere auslro-hongroise exclusivemenl. Ce faisant, il prenait soin d'aviser le Gouvernemenl allemand <|ue cette 'mesure , lunilee et sans caractere offensil a legard de I ' \ui.rii |ie, n'elait, a aucun degrt, dirigee contre l'Allemagne. Ujus une conversation a\ec l'ambassadeui de Kussie, a Berlin, le Secretaire d'Elat allemand aux affaires elrangeres ne faisait point ditficulte de le reconnaitre. Par contre, tout ce que tentait la Grande-Bretagne, avec 1'adhesion de la hiissie el I apjiui de la France, pour etablir le contact entre I'Autriche et la Serbie sous le — 165 — patronage moral de I'Europe, se lieurlait, a Berlin, a un parti pris negatif dont les depeches diplomatiques fournissenl la preuve peremptoire. C'etail la une situation troublante et qui rendait vraisemblable l'existence a Berlin de certaines arriere-pensees. Quelques heures apres, ces hypotheses et ces craintes devaient se transformer en certitudes. En effet, 1' attitude negative de 1'Allemagne faisail place trente-six heures plus tard a des initiatives justement alarmanles : le 3 1 juillet, 1'Allemagne, en proclamant l'etat de « danger de guerre », coupait les communications entre elle et le reste de I'Europe et se donnait toute liberie de poursuivre contre la France, dans un secret absolu, des preparatifs militaires que rien, vous l'avez vu, ne pouvait juslilier. Depuis plusieurs jours deja, et dans des conditions difficiles a expliquer, 1'Alle- magne avait prepare le passage de son armee du pied de paix au pied de guerre. Des le 25 juillet au matin, c'est-a-dire avant meme 1'expiralion du delai assigne a la Serbie par l'Autriche, elle avait consigne les garnisons d'Alsace-Lorraine. Le meme jour, elle avait mis en etat d'armement les ouvrages proches de la frontiere. Le 26, elle avait prescrit aux chemins de fer les mesures preparatoires de la concentration. Le 27, elle avait effectue les requisitions et mis en place ses troupes de couverlure. Le 28, les appels individuels de reservistes avaient commence et les elements eloigner de la frontiere en avaient ete rapproches. Toutes ces mesures, poursuivies avec une methode implaccable, pouvaient-elles nous laisser des doutes sur les intentions de I'AUeniagneP Telle etait fa situation, lorsque, le 3i juillet au soir, le Gouvernement alleuiand, qui depuis le 2/1, n'avail parlicipe par aucun acte positif aux efforts concihants de la Triple Entente, adressa au Gouvernement russe un ultimatum, sous pretexte que la Bussie avait ordonne la mobilisation generate de ses armees, et d exigea dans un delai de dou/.e heures 1'arret de cette mobilisation. Cette exigence, d'autant plus blessante dans la forme que, quelques heures plus tot, 1'empereur Nicolas II, dans un geste de conliance spontanee, avait demande a 1'empereur d'Allemagne sa mediation, se produisait au moment oil, a la demande de 1'Angleterre et au sii de 1'Allemagne, le Gouvernement russe acceptait une formule de nature a preparer un reglement amiable du conflil austro-serbe et des diflicultes austro-russes par 1'arret simultane des operations et preparatifs militaires. Le meme jour, cette demarche inamicale a l'egard de la Bussie se doublait d'actes nettement hosliles a l'egard de la France : rupture des communications par routes, voies ferrees, lelegraphes et telephones, saisie des locomotives fran^aisesa leur arri- vee a la frontiere, placement de mitrailleuses au milieu de la voie ferree (|ui avait ete coupee, concentration de troupes a cette frontiere. Des ce moment, il ne nous etait plus permis de croire a la sincerite des declarations pacifiques que le representant de 1'Allemagne conlinuait a nous prodiguer. (Mou- vemcnt. ) Nous savions qu'a 1'abri de l'etat de "danger de guerre • proclame, 1'Allemagne mobilisait. Nous apprenions ([ue six classes de reservistes avaient ete appelees et que les trans- ports de concentration se poursuivaient pour des corps d'armee meme stationnes a une notable distance de la frontiere. — 166 — A mesure que ces evenements se deroulaient, le Gouvernement, attentif et vigi- lant, prenait de jour en jour, et meme d'heure en heure, les mesures de sauvegarde qu'imposait la situation; la mobilisation generale de nos armees de terre et de mer etait ordonnee. Le meme soir, aseptheures trente, 1'Allemagne, sans s'arreter ai'acceptation parle cabinet de Saint-Petersbourg de la proposition anglaise que j'ai rappelee plus haul, declarait la guerre a la Russie. Le lendemain, dimancbe 2 aout, sans egard a l'extreme moderation de la France, en contradiction avec les declarations pacifiques de 1'ambassadeur d'Aliemagne a Paris, au mepris des regies du droit international, les troupes allemandes franchis- saient en trois points difjferents notre frontiere. En meme temps, en violation du traile de l 867, qui a garanti avec la signature, de la Prusse la neutralite du Luxembourg, elles envabissaient le territoire du Grand- Duche, motivant ainsi la protestation du Gouvernement luxembourgeois. Enlin la neutralite de la Belgique meme etait menacee : le ministre d'Aliemagne remettait le 2 aout au soir au Gouvernement beige un ultimatum 1'invitant a faciliter en Belgique les operations militaires contre la France, sous le pretexte mensonger que la neutralite beige etait menacee par nous; le Gouvernement beige s'y refusa, declarant quil etait resolu a defendre energiquement sa neutralite, respectee par la France et garantie par les traites, en particulier par le roi de Prusse. (Applaudissements ananimcs ct prolonrjh.) Depuis lors, messieurs, les agressions se sont renouvelees, multipliees et accen- tuees. Sur plus de quinze points notre frontiere a etc violee. Des coups de fusil ont etc tires contre nos soldatset nos douaniers. II y aeudesmorts et des blesses. Hier, un aviateur mibtaire allemand a lance trois bombes sur Luneville. L'Ambassadeur dAUemagne, a qui nous avons communique cesfaits, ainsi qu'a toutes les grandes Puissances, ne les a pas dementis el n'en a pas exprime de regrets. Par contre, ll est venu bier soir me demander ses passeports et nous nolifier l'etat de guerre, en arguant, contre toute verite, d'actes d'boslilite commis par des aviateurs francais en territoire allemand dans la region de 1'EilTel et meme sur le chemin de fe r pres de Carlsruhe et pies de Nuremberg. V oici la leltre qu'il m'a remise a ce sujet : « Monsieur le President, « Les autontes administralives et militaires allemandes ont constate un certain nombre d'actes d'boslilite caracterisee commis sur territoire allemand par des avia- teurs militaires francais. Plusieurs de ces derniers ont manifestement viole la neutra- lite de la Belgique survolanl le territoire de ce pa)s. L'un a essaye de detruire des constructions pres de Wesel, d'autrcs ont etc- apercais sur la region de 1'Eiffel, un autre ■< jete des bombes sur le chemin de fer pres de Karlsruhe el de Nuremberg. « Je suis charge et j'ai l'lionneur de faire connaitre a Votre Excellence qu'eu pre- sence de ces agressions, 1'Empire allemand se considere en etat de guerre avec la Fram e du fail de cclte derniere Puissance. « J'ai en meme temps 1'honneur de porter a la connaissance de Votre Excellence que les aulorites allemandes retiendront les unices marchands francais dans des purls — 167 — allcrnand>, mais qu'elles les relacheront si, dans les quarante-huit heures, la recipro- city complete est assuree. « Ma mission diplomatique ayant ainsi pris fin, U ne me reste plus qu'a prier Voire Excellence de vouloir bien me munir de mes passepork et de prendre les mesures qu'elle jugeralt utiles pour assurer mon retour en Allemagne *avec le personnel de 1'ambassade ainsi qu'avec le personnel de la Legation de Baviere et du Consulat ge- neral'd'Allemagne 4 Paris. o Veuillez agreer, monsieur le president, 1'expression de ma tres haute considera- tion. ■ Signe : Schoen. » Ai-je hesoin, messieurs, d'insister sur I'absurdite de ces prctextes que Ton vou- drait presenter comme des griefs? A aucun moment, aucun avialeur francais n'a penetre en Belgique, aucun aviateur francais n'a commis, ni en Baviere, ni dans aucune autre parlie de l'Allemagne, aucun acle d'hostilite. L'opinion europeenne a deja fait justice de ces inventions miserables. ( Vifs applaudissemenls nnanimes.) Contre ces attaques qui violent toutes les lois de l'equile et toutes les regies du droit public, nous avons, des maintenant, pris toutes les dispositions necessaires; l'execution s'en poursuit avec une rigoureuse methode et un absolu sang-froid. La mobilisation de l'armee russe se continue egalement .avec une energie remar- quable et un enlhousiasme sans restriction. (La Chambrc enticre se leve. — Applau- dissemenls unanimes et prolonged.) L'armee beige, mobilisee a 2.5o,ooo hommes, se dispose a defendre avec une magnifique ardeur la neutrality et I'independance de son pavs. (Nouveaax applaudis- scments vifs el unanimes. ) La flotte anglaise est mobilisee tout entiere et 1'ordre a ele donne de mobibser l'armee de lerre. (Tous les deputes se levcnt et applaudisscnt lonrjuemcnt.) Des 1912, des pourparlers avaient eu lieu entre les Etats-Majors anglais et fran- cais, termines par un echange de lettres entre Sir Edward Grey et M. Paul Cambon. Le Secretaire d'Elat aux aflaires elrangeres a donne, bier soir, a la Chambre des communes, communication des lettres echangees, et je vais avoir fhonneur, d'accord avec le Gouvernement britannique, de porter a votre connaissance le contenu de ce» deux documents : FOREIGN OFFICE. Umdres.le 25 oovembre 1911. 0M0N CHER AmB\SSADETTR, « A differentes reprises, aueoursdesdernieres annees, les Etats-Majors militaires et navals de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne ont echange leur vues. II a toujours k\& entendu que ces echanges de vues ne portent pas atteinte a la liberie de 1'un et 1'autre Gouvernement de decider a n'irjnporte quel moment dans 1'avenir s'il doit ou non sou- tenir 1'autre avec ses forces arraees. Nous avons admis que des echanges de vues entre — 168 — techniciens ne constituent pas et ne doivent pas etre regardes comme constituant un engagement qui oblige l'un ou l'autre Gouvernement a intervenir dans une eventualite qui ne s'est pas encore presentee et qui peut ne jamais naitre. Par exemple, la repartition actuelle des flottes franchises et anglaises ne repose pas sur un engagement de coilaborer en temps de guerre. a Vous avez cependant fait remarquer que si l'un ou l'autre Gouvernement avait de graves raisons de redouter une attaque de la part d'une tierce puissance sans aucune provocation, il pourrait etre essentiel de savoir si, dans cette circonstance , il pourrait compter sur 1 assistance militaire de l'autre puissance. « J'accepte que si l'un ou l'autre gouvernement a de graves raisons de craindre une attaque sans provocation de la part dune tierce puissance, ou tout autre evene- ment menac;ant pour la paix generate , ce gouvernement devrait examiner immedia- tement aver, l'autre s'ils ne doivent pas agir tous deux ensemble pour empecber l'agression et maintenir la paix et, dans ce cas, recbercher les mesures qu'ils seraient disposes a prendre en commun. Si ces mesures comportaient une action militaire, les plans des Etats-Majors generaux seraient aussitot pris en consideration et les deux Gouvernements decideraienl alors la suite qu'il conviendrait de leur donner. « Sincerement voire, « Sitrne : E. Grey. » A cette lettre, a la date du 23 novembre 1912, notre ambassadeur, M. Paul Cam- bon, repondait : • Londres, ie 23 novembre 1912. Cher Sir Edward, • Par \otre lettre en date d'hier, 22 novembre, vous m'avez rappele que, dans ces dernieres annees, les autorites militaires el navales de la France et de la Grande- Bretagne s'etaient consultees de temps en temps; qu'il avait toujoursete entendu que ces consultations ne restreignaient pas la liberie, pour cbaque Gouvernement, de decider dans 1'avenir s'ils se preleraient lun l'autre le coneours de leurs forces armies; que, de part et d'autre, ces consultations entre spccialistes n'etaient et ne devaient pas etre considerees comme des engagements obligeant nos Gouvernements a agir dans certains cas; que cependant je vous avais fait observer que, si l'un ou l'autre des deux Gouvernements avait de graves raisons d'apprehender une attaque nun provoquee de la part d'une tierce puissance, il deviendrait essentiel de savoir sil pourrait compter sur l'assistance annee de l'autre. « Votre lettre repond a cette observation et je suis autorise a vous declarer que, dans le cas oil l'un de nos deux Gouvernements aurait un motif grave d'apprehender soil l'agression d'une tierce puissance, soit quelque evdnement menacant pour la paix gem 1 ile, ce Gouvernement examinerait immedialement avec l'autre si les deux Gou- vernements doivent agir de concert en vue de prevenir l'agression ou de S3uvegarder la paix. Dans ce cas, les deux Gouvernements delibercraient sur les mesures qu'ils seraient disposes a prendre en commun ; si cos mesures comportaient une action, les — 169 — deux Gouvernements prendraient aussitot en consideration les plans de leurs etats- majors et decideraient alors de la suite qui devrait etre donnee a ces plans. <■ Sincerement a vous. < Signe : P. Cambon. » A la Chambre des Communes, le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires etrangeres a parle de la France, aux applaudissements des deputes, dans des termes eleves et chaleu- reux, et son langage a deja profondement retenti dans tous les cceurs fran^ais. (Vifs applaudissemenls unanimes.) Je tiens, au nom du Gouvernement de la Republique, a remercier, du baut de la tribune, le Gouvernement anglais de la cordialite de ses paroles et le Parlement francais s'associera a ce sentiment. ( Nouveaux applaudissemenls prolonges et unanimes. Le Secretaire d'Etat aux AlTaires etrangeres a fait, notamment, la declaration sui- vante : « Dans le cas oil l'escadre allemande franchirait le detroit ou remonterait la mer du Nord pour doubler les lles-Brilanniques dans le but d'atlaquer les cotes francaises ou la marine de guerre francaise, et d'inquieter la marine marchande francaise, l'es- cadre anglaise interviendrait pour prefer a la marine francaise son entiere protec- tion, de sorte que, des ce moment, 1'Angleterre et 1'Allemagne seraient en etat de guerre. « (Applaudissemenls repi'les el prolonges.) Des maintenant, la flotte anglaise couvre done nos cotes du Nord et de 1'Ouest contre line agression allemande. Messieurs, voila les fails. Je crois que, dans leur rigoureux enchainement, ils suf- fisent a justifier les actes du Gouvernement de la Republique. Je veux cependant de ce recit degager la conclusion, donner son veritable sens a l'agression inouie dont la France est victime. Les vainqueurs de 1870 ont eu, vous le savez, a diverses reprises, le desir de re- doubler les coups qu'ils nous avaient portes. En 1875, la guerre destinie a achever la France vaincue n'a ete empecbee que par 1'inlervention des deux Puissances a qui devaient nous unir plus lard les liens de 1'alliance et de i'amitie [Applaudissemenls unanimes), par 1'intervention de la Russie et par celle de la Grande-Bretagne. (Tous les deputes se livcnt el applaudissenl longuement.) Depuis lors, la Republique francaise, par la restauration des forces nationales el la conclusion d'accords diplomatiques invariablement pratiques, a reussi a se liberer du joug qu'au sein meme de la paix, Bismarck avait su faire peser sur 1'Europe. Elle a retabli l'equilibre europeen, garant de la liberte et de la dignite de cbacun. Messieurs, je ne sais si j-; ne m'abuse, mais ilm'apparait que cette oeuvre de repa- ration pacifique, d'affrancliissemenl et de dignite definitivemenl scellee en 190/t et 1907 avec le concours genial du roi Edouard VII d'Angleterre et du gouvernement de laCouronne [Vifs applaudissemenls), e'est cela que lempire allemand veut delruire aujourd'liui par un audacieux coup de force., L'Allemagne n'a rien a nous reprocber. Nous avons consenti a la paix un sacrifice sans precedent en portant un demi- Doccments diplom,ti(.'Ues'. — Cuerre curopeciiRC. 22 — 170 — siecle silencieux a nos (lanes ia blessure ouverte par elle. ( Vifs applaudissemcnts una- nimcs.) Nous en avons consenli d'aulres dans tous les debats que, depuis i 904, la diplo- ma! ie imperiale a systematiquement pr.ovoqu.es soit au Maroc, soit ailleurs, aussi bien en 1905 qu'en 190G, en igoS qu'en 1911. La Russie, elle aussi, a fait preuve d'une grande moderation lors des evenements de 1908, comme danslacrise actuelle. Elle a observe la meme moderation, et la TripleJEntente avec elle quand, dans la crise orientale de 1 9 1 2 , 1'Aatriche et l'AUemagne ont formule, soit contre la Serbie, soit contre la Gre.ce des exigences, discutables pourtant, levenement la prouve. Imitiles sacrifices, steriles transactions, vains efforts, puisqu'aujourd'hui, en pleine action de conciliation, nous sommes, uos allies et nous, altaque.s par surprise. I \pplaudissemenls prolonged.) Nul ne peut croire de bonne foi que nous sommes les agresseurs. Vainement Ion veul troubler les principes sacres de droit et de liberie qui regissent les nations comme les individus : lltalie, dans la claire conscience du genie latin, nous a notifie qu'elle entendait garder la neutrality. ( Tons les deputes se levent cl applaudissent lon- gucment.) Cette decision a rencontre dans toute la France 1'echo de la joie la plus sincere. Je ni'i'ii Mils fait 1'interprete aupres du ebarge d'affaires d'ltalie en lui disant combien je mi- felicitais que les deux sceurs latines, qui ont meme origme et meme ideal, un passe de gloire commun, ne se trouvent pas opposees. (Nouveaux applaudissemenls.) Ce qu'on attaque , messieurs, nous le declarons tres haut, c'esl cette independance, cetle (lignite, cette securite que la Triple Entente a reconquises dans l'equilibre au service de la paix. Ce qu'on attaque. ce sont les. liberies de 1'Europe, dont la France, ses alliees et ses amis sont fiers d'etre les defenseurs. ( I ifs applaudissemenls.) Ces liberies, nous allons les defendre, car ce sont elles qui sont en cause et tout le reste n'a ete que pretextes. La France, in|ustement provoquee, n'a pas voulu la guerre, elle a tout fait pour la conjurer. Puisqu'on la lui impose, elle se defendra contre l'AUemagne et contre toute puissance qui, n'ayant pas encore fait connaitre son sentiment, prendrait part aux cotes de celte dcraiere au conilit enlre les deux pays. ( Tous les deputes se levent ct applaudissent. ) Un peuple libre et fort qui soutient un ideal seculaire et s'unit tout entier pour la sauvegarde de son existence ; one democratic qui a su discipliner son effort militaire et n'a pas craint, Ian passe, den alourdir le poids pour repondre aux armements voisins; une nation armee luttant pour sa vie propre et pour lindependance de l'Eu- rope, voilii le spectacle que nous nous honorons d'oflrir aux temoins de cette lutte formidable qui, depuis quelques jours, se prepare dans le calme le plus metbodique. Nous sommes sans reprocbes. Nous serous sans peur. ( Tous les deputes se levent et ap- ploudissent lom/uement.) La France a prouve souvent dans des conditions moins favorables, qu'elle est le — 171 — plus redoutable adversaire quand elle se bat, comme c'est le cas aujourd'Iiui, pour la liberie et pour le droit. (Applaadisscmenls.) En vous soumetlant nos acles, a vous. Messieurs, qui etes uos |uges, nous avons pour porter le poids de notre lourde responsabilite, le reconfort d'une conscience sans trouble et la certitude du devoir accompli. ( Tons les deputes sc levent el ap- ptaudisscnt longuemenl. ) Rene Viviani. . — 173 CHAPITRE VII DECLARATION DE LA TRIPLE ENTENTE (4 SEPTEMBRE 1914) 175 — DECLARATION. M. Delcasse, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a MM. les Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France a 1'etranger. Paris, lc !\ septembre igii La declaration suivante a ete signee ce matin au Foreign Office . a Londres. « Les soussignes, dument aulonses par leurs gouvernements respectifs font la declaration suivante : «Les Gouvernements britannique, francais et russe s'engagent mutuellenient a ne pas conclure de paix. separee au cours de la presente guerre. «Les trois gouvernements conviennent que, lorsqu'il y aura lieu de discuter les termes de la paix, aucune des Puissances alliees ne pourra poser des conditions de paix sans accord prealable avec chacun des auties allies. » Signe : Paul Cambon. Comte Benckendorfe. Edward Gi;e\. Cette declaration sera publiee aujourd'hui. Delcasse 177 — ANNEXES EXTRAITS DU "LIVRE BLEU" (ANGLAIS), DU "LIVRE GRIS" (BELGE), DU "LIVRE BLANC" (ALLEMAND), DU "LIVRE ORANGE" (RUSSE) Documents diflqmatiqijes. — Gu 179 Annexe I. Extraits du « Livre bleu >t relatifs a la position prise par le Gouvernement anglais a l'egard de la Russie, de l'Allemagne et de la France pendant les pourparlers qui ont pricedev la guerre. N" 6. Sir G. Buchanan, Ambassadeur de Grande-Brelagne a Sairit-Petersbourg, a Sir Edward Grey. Saint-Petersbourg, 24 juillet 19 14- J'ai recu ce matin un message telephonique de M. SazonoDTm'informant que le texle de ['ultimatum autrichien venait de lui parvenir. Son Excellence ajoula qu'une reponse etait exig<5e dans les quarante-huit heures et ilrme pria de venir le trouver a l'Ambassade de France pour discuter 1'affaire. car la d-marche autrichienne voulait dire clairement que la guerre etait imminente. Le Minislre des Affaires etrangeres dit que la conduite de l'Autriche etait tout a la fois provocanle et immorale; elle n'aurait jamais agi ainsi a moins que l'Allemagne n'ait ile prealablement consultee; quelques-unes de ses demandes etaient tout a fait impossibles a accepter. II esperait que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste ne manquerait pas de proclamer sa solidarite avec la Russie et la Franco. L'Ambassadeur de France me donna a entendre que la France remplirait, si cela devenait necessaire, toutes les obligations que lui imposait son alliance avec la Russie, outre quelle seconderait fortement la Russie dans toutes les negociations diplomatiques. J'ai dit que je vous telegrapbierais un rapport complet de ce que leurs Excellences- venaient de me dire. Je ne pouvais pas, naturellement, parler au nom du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste; mais, personnellement, je ne voyais aucune raison de s'attendre a une declara- tion de solidarity de la part du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste qui cntrainerait un engagement absolu de sa part de soutenir la Russie et la France par la force des armes. Les interet's directs de la Grande-Bretagne en Serbie etaient nuls , et une guerre en favour de ce pays ne serait jamais sanctionnee par l'opinion publique de la Grande-Bretagne. A ceci, M. Sazonoff r^pondit qu'il ne fallait pas que nous oubliiohs que la question generale europienne etait impliquee, la question de la Serbie n'en formant qu'une partie et que la Grande-Bretagne ne pourrait pas en fait se degager des problemes maintenant en jeu. En reponse a ces remarques, j'ai fait observer que je comprenais, de ce qu'il disait, que Son Excellence proposal t que la Grande-Bretagne se joignit a une communication qui serait' faite a rAutriche a 1'effet qu'une intervention active par elle dans les affaires interieures de la .Serbie ne pourrait pas elre tolepee. Mais supposant que l'Autriche, neanmoins, allait avoir recours a des mesures mililaires contre la Serbie malgrie nos representations, etait-ce ('inten- tion du Gouvernement russe de declarer de suite la guerre a l'Autriche ? M. Sazonoff dit que lui-m6me pensait que tout au moins la mobilisation russe devait etre faite, mais qu'il y avait un Conseil des Ministres cet apres-midi pour examiner la question dans toute son etendue. Un autre Conseil , preside par 1'Empereur, serait tenu probablement demain , quand une decision serait prise. j3. — 180 — J'ai dit qu'il me paraissait que le point important eHait de persuader 1'Autriehe d'etendre la limite de temps, et que la premiere chose a faire e^ait de faire peser sur I'Autriche une influence ayant ce but en vue. L'Ambassadeur de France, cependant, croyait que, ou I'Autriche avait decide d'agir de suite ou elle bluffait. Dans n'importe quel cas, notre seule chance d'eviter la guerre <;tait d'adopter une attitude ferme et unie. 11 ne pensait pas qu'il y avait le tomps de donner suite a ma proposition. La-dessus, j'ai dit qu'il me semblait desi- rable pour nous de connaitre exactement jusqu'a quel point la Serbie serait disposee a aller pour accepter les demandes formulees par 1'Autriche dans sa note. M. Sazonoffre'pondit qu'il fallait d'abord qu'il consultat ses collegues a ce sujet, mais que, sans doute, quelques-unes des demandes de I'Autriche pourraicnt etre acceptees par la Serbie. L'Ambassadeur de France et M. Sa/.onoff continuerent tous deux a me pressor pour une declaration de solidarity complete ilu Gouvernement de Sa Majeste avec les Gouvernements francais et russe, et j'ai, en consequence, dit qu'il me semblait possible que vous voudriez, peut-etre, consentir a faire de fortes representations aux deux Gouvernements allemand et autrichien , faisant valoir aupres d'eux qu'une attaque sur la Serbie par I'Autriche mettrait en danger la pais entiere de 1'Europe. Peut-etre pourriez-vous trouver-moyen de leur dire qu'uhe telle action de la part de I'Autriche amenerait probablement une intervention russe, qui impliquerait la France et 1'Allemagne, et qu'il serait difficile a la Grande-Bretagne de rester a 1'ecart si la guerre devenait generate. M. SazonolT repondit que tot ou tard nous serions entraines a la guerre si elle eclatait; nous aurions rendu la guerre plus probable si, des le debut , nous ne faisions pas cause commune avec son pays et avec la France; en tout cas, il esperait que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste exprimerait une forte reprobation de la deci- sion prise par I'Autriche. G. Buchanan. N° 87. Sir Edward Grey, a Sir F. Bertie, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Paris. Foreign Oflice, 29 juillet lgid. Monsieur, Apres avoir expose a M. Cambon aujourd'hui combien la situation me paraissait grave, je lui ai declare quej'avais 1'intentionde dire a 1'Ambassadeur allemand aujourd'hui qu'il ne fal- lait pas qu'il se laissat aller, a raison du ton amical de nos conversatious, a un sentiment de fausse certitude que nous resterions a 1'ecart si tous les efforts pour conserver la paix , que nous faisions actuellement en commun avec 1'Allemagne, echouaient. Mais j'ai continue en disant ii M. Cambon que je trouvais necessaire de liii dire aussi que 1'opinion publique ici envisageait la difficulte actuelle d'un point de vue tout a fait different de celui qu'on avait adople pendant la difficulte au sujet du Maroc il y a quelques annees. Dans le cas du Maroc, it s'agissait d'un, conllit dans lequel la France etait la principale inte- ressee et ou il paraissait que 1'Allemagne , dans un effort pour ecraser la France , lui cherchait querelle a 1'occasion dune question qui formait l'objet d'une convention speciale entre la France et nous-memes. Dans le oas acluel, ie djJTereild entre I'Autriche et la Serbie n'etaitpas — 181 — nn cas ou nous nous senlions appeles o joucr un role actif. Meme si la question arrivait a se poser entre I'Autriche et la Russie , nous ne nous sentirions pas appeles a y jouer un role. Ce serait alors une question de suprematie entre le Teuton et le Slave dans les Balkans et notre id(!e avail toujours eli d'eviler d'etre entraines dans une guerre pour une question balka- nique. Si l'Allemagne se trouvait entrainee dans la lutte et si par suite la France y etait a son tour impliquee, nous n'avions pas decide ce que nous ferions. Ce serait un cas que nous aurions a examiner. La France aurait &le alors enlrainee dans une querelle qui n'6tait pas la sienne, mais dans laquelle, par suite de son alliance, son honneur et ses interets 1'obligeaient a s'en j gager. Nous etions libres d'engagements et nous aurions a decider ce que les interets britan- niques exigeaient que nous fissions. J'estimais qu'il etait necessaire de dire cela, parce que, com me il le savait, nous prenions touies les precautions au sujet de noire Flotte, et que j'dtais sur le point d'avertir le Prince Lichnowski de ne pas compter que nous restions a 1'ecart; mais il ne serait pas jusle que je laisse M. Cambon s'egarer jusqu'ii supposer que ceci voulait dire que nous avions decide ce que nous ferions dans une eventuality, qui comme je 1'esperais encore, pouvait ne pas se presenter. M. Cambon ni'a dit que j'avais expose la situation tres clairement. II comprenait que je voulais dire que dans une querelle balkanique et dans une lutte pour la suprematie entre le TeDton et le Slave, nous ne nous sentirions pas appeles a intervenir; mais que si d'autres questions surgissaient et si la France et 1'Allemagne se trouvaient impliquees de telle sorteque la question de l'hcgemonie en Europe se posat, nous d^ciderions alors ce qu'il nous serait ne- cessaire de faire. 11 a paru tout a fait prepare a cette declaration et n'y fit aucune objec- tion. L'Ambassadeur de France ajouta que 1'opinion francaise etait ealme mais decidee. II s'at- tendait a ce que 1'Allemagne demandat que la France restat neutre pendant que 1'Allemagne atlaquerait la Russie. Cetle assurance naturellement la France ne pouvait pas la donner;elle ^tait obligee a aider la Russie si la Russie 6tait attaquee. E. Grey. N° 88. Sir Edward Grey, a Sir E. Goschen, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Berlin. Foreign Office, 29 juillet 1914. MonsieoR , Apres avoir cause cet apres-midi avec l'Ambassadeurallemand au sujet de la situation eu- ropeenne , j'ai dit que je desirais lui dire, dune facon tout a fait particuliere et amicale, quelque chose, que j'avais dans 1'esprit. La situation etait tres grave. Tant qu'elle se limitait aux questions actuellement posees, nous n'avions aucune intention d'intervenir. Mais si 1'Al- lemagne s'y trouvait engagee et ensuite la France, la question pourrait £tre si vaste qu'elle impliquerait tous les interets enropi5ens; et je ne voulais pas qu'il fut trompe par le ton ami- cal de notre conversation — lequel persisterait, comme je l'esperais — jusqu'a croire que nous resterions a 1'icart. — 182 — II a dit qu'il comprenail parfaitement, mais il a demande si je voulais dire que nous inter - viendrions dans certaines circonstances. Je repondis que je ne desirais pas dire cela, ni quoi que ce fut qui ressemblat a une me- nace ou a un essai d'exercer une pression en declarant que, si les choses allaient plus tnal, nous interviendrions. II ne serait pas question de notre intervention si 1'Allemagne n etail pas impliquee, ou m erne si la France n'etait pas impliquee; mais nous savions fort bien que si la question devenait telle que nous croyions que les intiWts britanniques exigeaient notre in- tervention, il faudrait que nous inttrvenions imm£diatement, et que la decision fut tres ra- pide, exactement comme les decisions des autres puissances auraient a 1'etre. J'esperais que le ton amical de nos conversations continuerait comme a present, et queje pourrais conser- verdes rapports aussi etroits avecle Gouvernement allemand en travaillant pour la puix. Mais si nous echouions dans nos efforts pour conserver la paix, et si la question s'elargissait de fa- con a impliquer pour ainsi diretous les interets europeens, je ne voulais pas etre expose a aucun reproche de sa part, que le ton amical de toutes nos conversations lavait egare, lui ou son gouvernemenl, a supposer que nous n'agirions pas au reproche que s'il n'avait pas Hi ainsi egare\ le cours des eVenements aurait pu etre different. L'Ambassadeur allemand n'a fait aucune objection a ce que j'ai dit, au contraire, il m'a dit que cela s'accordait avec ce qu'il avail deja fait savoir a Berlin comme sa maniere per- sonnels d'envisager la situation. N° 99. Sir F. Bertie, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne, a Paris, a Sir Edward Grey. Paris, 3o juillet 1914. Le President de la Republique me fait savoir que le Gouvernement russe a ete inform^ par le Gouvernement allemand que 1'Allemagne mobiliserait a moins que la Russie n'arretat sa mobilisation. Mais un rapport supplemental recu depuis de Saint-Petersbourg declare que le communique allemand avail ete modifie et prenait maintenant la forme d'une demande d'information a quelles conditions la Russie consentirait a demobiliser. La rfponse donnee est qu'elle consent ale faire a la condition que l'Aulriche-Hongrie donne 1'assurance quelle respectera la souverainete de la Serbie et soumettra certaines demandes formulees dans la noleautrichienne, et non accepti5es par la Serbie a une discussion internationale. Le President est d'avis que ces conditions ne seront pas acceptees par 1'Autriche; il est convaincu que la paix entre les Puissances est entre les mains de la Grande-Bretagne. Si le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste annoncjiit que 1'Angleterre viendrait en aide a la France, dans le cas d'un conflit entre la France et 1'Allemagne, resultant des differences actuelles entre 1'Autriche et la Serbie, il n'y aurait pas de guerre, car 1'Allemagne modifierait aussitot son attitude. Je luiaiexpliqudcombien il serait difficile au Gouvernement deSa Majeste de faire une telle declaration, mais il m'a repondu qu'il maintenait que cela serait dans linteret de la paix. La France, disait-il, est pacifique. EUe ne desire pas la guerre et tout ce qu'elle a fait jusqu'a present est de se preparer pour une mobilisation afin de ne pas etre prise au depourvu. Le Gouvernement fran$ais tiendra le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste au courant de tout ce qui se - 183 — fera dans ce sens. On a des renseignenients serieux que les troupes allemandes sont concen- trees dans les environs, de Thionville et de Meti, pretes a la guerre. S'il y avait une guerre generate sur le continent, 1'Angleterre y serait entrainee pour ia protection de ses inte>6ls vitaux. Une declaration des a present de son intention de soutenir la France, dont c'est le desir que la paix soit maintenue, empecherait presque certainement 1'Allemagne de partir en guerre. F. Bertie. N° 119. Sir Ed. Grey, a Sir Francis Bertie; Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne , a Paris. Foreign-Office , 3i juillet 1914. Monsieur, M. Cambon s'est refere aujourd'hui a un telegramme qui avait £te montre ce matin a Sir Arthur Nicolson qui provenait de 1'Ambassadeur de France a Berlin et qui disait que 1'incertitude concernant notre intervention etait l'element encourageant a Berlin et que, si nous voulions seulement nous declarer definitivement du cote de la Russie et de la France, cela deciderait l'attitude allemande en faveur de la paix. J'ai dit qu'il etait tout a fait injuste de supposer que nous avions laisse 1'Allemagne sous 1'impression que nous n'interviendrons pas. J'avais refuse des ouvertures pour promettre que nous resterions neulres. Non seulement j'avais refus£ de dire que nous resterions neutres, mais j'avais et^ ce matin jusqu'a dire a 1'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que, si la France et 1'Allemagne se trouvaient engagers dans une guerre, nous y serions entraines. Cela, bien entendu, n'elait pas la meme chose que de prendre un engagement avec la France, et j'ai dit cela a M. Cambon, seulement pour montrer que nous n'avions pas laisse 1'Allemagne sous 1'impression que nous resterions a l'ecart. M. Cambon ma alors demande ma reponse a ce qu'il avait dit hier. J'ai dit que nous etions arrives a la conclusion, dans le Cabinet d'aujourd'hui, que nous ne pouvions donner aucun gage en ce moment. Bien que nous ayons a exposer notre poli- tique devant le Parlement, nous ne pouvions pas engager le Parlement d'avance. Jusqu'a present, nous ne ressentions pas, et l'opinion publique ne ressentait pas,.qu'aucun traite ni obligation de ce pays fussent engages. Des developpements ulterieurs pourraient modifier cette situation et obliger le Gouvernement et le Parlement a considerer qu'une intervention etait justifiee. La protection de la neutralite de la Belgique pourrait etre, je ne dirai pas un decisif, mais un important facteur, dans la determination de notre attitude. Que nous pro- posions au Parlement d'intervenir ou de ne pas intervenir dans une guerre, le Parlement desirerait savoir comment nous etions places a l'egard de la neutralite de la Belgique , et il se pourrait que je demande et a la France et a 1'Allemagne si chacune etait disposee a prendre 1'engagement qu'elLe ne serait pas la premiere a violer la neutrality de la Belgique. M. Cambon a renouvel£ la question pour savoir si nous seconderions la France au casoii 1'Allemagne 1'attaquerait. J'ai dit que je pouvais seulement m'en tenir a la reponse et que, au point oil les choses en sont en ce moment, nous ne pouvions prendre aucun engagement. M. Cambon a fait valoir que 1'Allemagne avait, depuis le commencement, rejeti les pro- — 184 — positions qui auraient peut-etre amene la paix. II ne pouvait pas etre dans 1'interet de 1'An- gleterre que la France soit ecrasee par 1'Allemagne, nous serions alors dans une position tres amoindrie vis-a-vis de 1'Allemagne. En 1870, nous avions commis une grande faute en permettant un accroissement enorme de la force allemande, et nous repeterions maintenant cette faute. II ma demande si je ne pouvais pas soumettre a nouveau cette question au Cabinet. J'ai dit que le Cabinet serait certainemeot convoque aussitot qu'il y aurait de nouveaux developpements, mais quant a present, la seule reponse que je pouvais donner etait que nous ne pouvions prendre aucun engagement definitif. E. Grey. IN° 148. Sir Edward Gbet a Sir F. Bertie, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Paris. Foreign Office, 2 aoiit 191 It. Apres le Conseil de Cabinet de ce matin, j'ai remis a M. Cambon la note suivante : ■1 Je suis autorise a donner l'assurance que si la flotte allemande pinetre dans le Pas-de- Calais ou dans la mer du Nord pour entreprendre des boslilites contre les cotes ou les bateaux francais, la flotte anglaise donnera toute la protection en son pouvoir. u Cette assurance est naturellement soumise a 1'approbation du Parlement et ne doit pas etre consideree comme engageant le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste jusqu'a ce qu'une telle action se produise de la part de la flotte allemande. » J'ai fait remarquer que nous avions des questions extremement graves et delicates a consi- derer et que le Gouvernement ne pouvait s'engager a declarer la guerre a 1'Allemagne si la guerre eclatait demain entre la France et 1'Allemagne, mais qu'il etait essentiel que le Gou- vernement francais, donl la flotte etait depuis longtemps concentree dans la Mediterranee, sut quelles dispositions prendre, la cdte septentrionale elant enlierement sans defense. II nous a done paru necessaire de lui donner cette assurance. Cela ne nous engage pas a declarer la guerre a 1'Allemagne, a moins que la llotle allemande n'agisse comme il est indique ci-dessus, mais cela donne a la France une securite qui lui permcttra de regler la disposition de sa flotte mediterraneenne. M. Cambon m'a interroge au sujet de la violation du Luxembourg. Je lui ai fait part de la doctrine etablie sur ce point en 1 867 par lord Derby et lord Clarendon. II m'a demande ce que nous dirions en cas de violation de la neulralite beige. J'ai repondu que cetait la une affaire beaucoup plus imporlante et que nous examinions ipiclle declaration nous ferions demain a ce suji't au Parlement, e'est-a-dire si nous declarerionsque la violation de la neulralite beige est un casus belli. Je lui ai rapporte ce qui avait ete dit sur ce point a 1'Ambassadeur allemand. E. Gi\ev. 185 Annexe n° II. Extraits du n Livre bleu » relatifs aux propositions f aites par le Gouvernement allera and au Gouvernement anglais pour obtenir la neutralite de l'Angleterre. N° 85. Sir E. Goschen, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Berlin, a Sir Edward Grey. Berlin, 29 juillet 1914. On m'a prie d'aller voir le Chancelier ce soir. Son Excellence venait de rentrer de Potsdam. II me dit que , si la Russie attaquait 1'Autriclie , il craignait qu'une conflagration europe'enne ne devint inevitable, etant donnees les obligations qu'imposait a l'AUemagne son alliance avec I'Autriche, malgre les eflorts qui) ne cessait de faire pour le maintien de la paix. Ceci dit, il continua la conversation en oflrant une forte enchcie pour s'assurer la neutra- lity britannique. II me dit que, selon sa conception du principe essential de la politique bri- tannique, la Grande-Bretagne ne jaraai a nil' a lecart de facon a laisser ecraser la France dans un conflit qui pourrait avoir lieu. La , cependant , n'etait pas le but de l'AUemagne. Si la neutralite de la Grande-Bretagne etait assuree, son Gouvernement rece- vrait toutes les assurances que le Gouvernement imperial n'avait pour but aucune acqui in territoriale aux frais de la France, en supposant que la guerre s'ensuivit et quelle se t . . ..mat a 1'avantage de l'AUemagne. J'ai pose a Son Excellence une question au sujet des colonies francaises. II me repondit qu'il ne pouvait s'engager d'une maniere semblable a cet egard, Pour la Hollande, Son Excellence me dit que, tant que les adversaires de l'AUemagne res- pecti raient ('integrite' et la neutralite des Pays-Bas, l'AUemagne serait prete a assurer le Gouvernement de Sa Majcste quelle en ferait autant. Les operations que l'AUemagne pourrait se trouver dans la necessite d'entreprendre en Belgique dependraient de ce que ferait la France ; apres la guerre , 1'integrite de la Bel- gique serait respectee, si ce pays nese rangeait pas contre l'AUemagne. En terminant, Son Excellence me declara que, depuis le jour oil il devint Chancelier, il avait eu pour but, ainsi que vous le saviez, d'arriver a une entente avec l'Angleterre; il espe- rait que ces assurances pourraient devenir la base de 1'entente qui lui tenait tant a cceur. II pensait a une entente generate de neutralite entre 1'Allemagne et l'Angleterre ; et , quoi- qu'il flit encore trop tot pour en discuter les details , i'assurance de la neutralite britannique dans le conflit que pourrait peut-etre provoquer la crise actuelle lui permettrait d'entrevoir )a realisation de son desir. Son Excellence m'ayant demands mon opinion en ce qui concerne la maniere dont vous Documents diplouatiqdes. — Guerre europeenne. a4 — 186 — envisageriez sa demande, je lui repondis qua mon avis il £tait peu probable que, dans les circonstances acluelles, vous fussiez dispose a vous engager dune facon quelconque et que vous desireriez garder une entiere liberte d'action. E. Goschen. N° 101. Sir Edward Grey, a Sir E. Goschen, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Berlin. Foreign Office, 3o juillet 19 14. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste ne peut pas accueiilir un seul instant la proposition du Chancelier de s'engager a rester neutre dans de telles conditions. Ce qu'il nous demande, en elTet , c'est de nous engager a rester a l'e"cart , en attendant qu'on saisit des colonies francaises et que la France fut battue, pourvu que l'Allemagne ne prenne pas de territoire francais, exception faite des colonies. Au point de vue materiel, une telle proposition est inacceptable, car la France, sans qu'on lui enlevat de territoire en Europe, pourrait etre £crasee au point de perdre sa posi- tion de grande puissance et de se trouver desormais subordonnee a la politique allemande. En general , tout ceci a part , ce serait une honte pour nous que de passer ce marchS avec l'Allemagne aux dtpens de la France, une honte de laquelle la boane renommee de ce pays ne se remettrait jamais. Le Chancelier nous demande en outre de marc'n.inder toutes les obligations ou interets que nous pouvons avoir dans la neutralite de la Bel^ique. Nous ne saurions en aucune facon accueiilir ce marche non plus. Ceci dit, il n'est pas necessaire d'examiner si la perspective d'une convention generale de neutralite dans 1'avenir entre l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne offrirait des avantages positifs sulri- sants pour nous d6dommager de nous £tre lie les mains aujourd'hui. Nous devons conserver notre entiere liberty d'agir comme les circonstancss nous paraitront lexiger en eas dun deve- loppement defavorable et regrettable de la crise actuelle, tel que le Chancelier le prevoit. Jevous prie de parler au Chancelier dans le sens susindique' et d'ajouter tres serieusement que la seule facon de maintenir les bonnes relations entre l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne est qu'elles continuent a eqoperer au maintien de la paix de 1'Europe. Si nous obtenons ce resultat, les relations mutuelles de l'Allemagne et de l'Angleterre seront, j'en snis convaincu, ameliorates et renforcees ipso facto. A cet elTet, le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste travaillera dans ce sens avec un bon vouloir et une sincerite entiers. Et j'ajouterai ceci : Si Ion peut conserver la paix de f Europe et traverser sans accident la crise actuelle, mon effort personnel sera de prendre 1'initiative d'un arrangement auquel l'Allemagne puisse souscrire et par lequel elle pourra etre assume qu' aucune politique agres- sive ou hostile ne sera poursuivie contre elle ou ses allies par la France , la Russie et nous- infimes, soit ensemble, soit se'pare^ment. J'ai desirf ceci et travaille dans ce sens autant que je lai pu pendant la derniere crise balkanique, et, comme l'Allemagne avait un but sem- blable, nos relations se sont sensiblement ameliorfes. Cette id£e a et^ jusqu'aujourd'hui trop utopique pour faire 1'objet de propositions definies, mais si la crise actuelle, beaucoup plus aigue que toutes celles par lesquelles 1'Europe a passS depuis plusieurs generations , est — 187 — traversee sans accident, j'ai l'espoir que le soulagement et la reaction qui suivront rendront possible un rapprochement plus precis entre les Puissances qu'il n'a £te possible jusqu'au- jourd'hui. E. Grev. N° 123. Sir Edward Gret, a Sir Goschen', Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Berhn. Foreign Office, i™ aout 1914. Monsieur, J'ai dit a 1'Ambassadeur allemand aujourdliui qae la re'ponse du Gouvernement alle- mand au sujet de la neutralite de la Belgique etait tres regrettable, car cette neutralite affecte l'opuiion publique en Angleterre. Si 1'Allemagne pouvait donner les memes assurances que la France, cela contribuerait d'une manierc appreciable a diminuer ici 1'inquietude et la tension generates. D'autre part, si 1'un des Belligerants violait la neutralite de la Belgique pendant que l'autre la respectait, il serait tres difficile de contenir le sentiment public en Angleterre. J'ai dit que nousavions discute cette question auConseil de Cabinet et que, etant autorise a faire cette declaration, je lui remettais une note a cet effet. II me demanda si, au cas ou 1'Allemagne promettrait de ne pas violer la neutrality beige, nous nous engagerions a rester neutres. J'ai repondu que je ne pouvais pas faire de promesses, que nos mains etaient encore libres et que nous etions en voie de considerer quelle serait notre attitude. Tout ce que je pouvais dire, cest que noire attitude serait en grande partie dictee par ['opinion publique en Angleterre, pour qui la neutralite beige avait une grande importance. Je ne pensais pas pouvoir donner une assurance de neutralite sous cette seule condition. L'Ambassadeur me pressa de formuler les conditions moyennant lesquelles nous garde- rions la neutralite. 11 suggeVa meme que 1'Allemagne pourrait garantir 1'integrite de la France et de ses colonies. J'ai repondu que j'etais oblige de refuser definitivement toute promesse de rester neutre dans de telles conditions et que je ne pouvais que repe'ter qu'il nous fallait garder les mains libres. E. Grev. Annexe n° II bis. Tentatives allemandes pour obtenir, sous le couvert d'un cc malentendu » , la garantie par l'Angleterre de la neutrality de la France dans une guerre germano-russe. (Publication offieieuse de la Gazette de I'AlIemagne da Nord, 50 aout 191 4.) N° 1. Le Prince Lichnowsky, Ambassadeur d'AIIemagne a Londres, a M. de Bethmann-Hollweg , Chancelier de I'Empire d'AIIemagne. Londres, 3i juillet 191/1. Sir Edward Grey vient de m'appeler au telephone et m'a demands si je pensais pouvoir declarer que nous n'attaquerions pas la France si la France restait neutre dans une guerre germano-russe. J'ai dit que je pensais pouvoir assumer la responsabilite de cette declaration. N° 2. Telegramme de I'Empereur Guillaume aa Ftoi George V. Berlin, 1" aoiit 191a. Je viens de recevoir la communication de votre Gouvernement m'oflrant la neutralite de la France avec la garantie de la Grande-Bretagne. A cette odre etait liee la question de savoir si, a cette condition, I'AlIemagne n'attaquerait pas la France. Pour des raisons techniques, ma mobilisation, qui a etc ordonnee cet apres-midi sur les deux fronts, Est et Ouest, doit s'accomplir selon les preparatifs commences. Des contre-ordres ne peuvent etre donnes et votre telegramme est malheureusement venu trop tard. Mais si la France ofTre sa neutralite, qui sera alors garantie par la flotte et l'armee anglaises, je m'abstiendrai d'attaquer la France et j'emploierai mes troupes ailleurs. Je sou- haite crue la France ne montre aucune nervosite. Les troupes, sur ma frontiere, sont en ce moment arretees par ordres telegraphiques et tel£phoniques, dans leur marche en avant au dela de la frontiere franchise. Guillaume. — 189 N° M. de Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancelier de 1'Empire, a M. le Prince Lichnowsky, Ambassadeur d'AUemagne a Londres. Berlin, 1" aoiit iai4. L'AIlemagne est prete a acquiescer aux propositions anglaiscs si TAngleterre garantit avec ses forces militaires et navales la neutrality francaise dans le conQit russo-allemand. La mobilisation allemande s'est eflectuee aujourd'hui , en riponse aux provocations russes, et avant 1'arrivee des propositions anglaises. Par consequent, noire concentration a la frontiere francaise ne peut etre modifiee. Nous garantissons d'ailleurs que, d'ici au lundi 3 auut, a sept heures du soir, la frontiere francaise ne sera pas franchie si l'assentiment de l'Angleterro nous est parvenu a ce moment. Bethmann-Hollweg. Telegramme dn Roi George V a I'Emperear Guillaume. Londres, 1" aoiit 1914. En reponse a votre telegramme qui vient de me parvenir, je pense qu'il s'est produit un malentendu a propos de la suggestion qui aurait ete iaite au cours dune conversation ami- cale entre le prince Lichnowsky et Sir Edward Grey, ou its discutaient comment un conllit arme entre i'AIlemagne et la France pourrait etre retards jusqu'a ce qu'on ait trouve' un moyen d'entente entre 1'Autriche-Hongrie et la Hussie. Sir Edward Grey verra le prince Lichnowsky demain matin pour determiner qui! y a bien eu malentendu de la part de ce dernier. George. N° 5. Le Prince Lichnowsky, Ambassadeur d'AUemagne aLoDdres, a M. de Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancelier de 1'Empire d'AUemagne. Londres, 2 aout 191/1. Les suggestions de Sir Edward Grey, basees sur le disir de garder la neutrality , de la part de TAngleterre, ont ete faites sans accord prealable avec la France et ont H6, depuis, aban- donees comme futiles. Lichnowsky. — 190 — Annexe HI. Extrai ts du " Livre Bleu » relatifs au refus de l'Angleterre d'admettre le point de vuc allemand dans la question de la violation de la neutralite beige. N° 153. Sir Edward Grey, a Sir E. Goschen, Atubassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Berlin. Foreign Office, 4 aoOt 1914. Le Roi des Beiges a adresse un appei a S. M. le Roi en vue d'une intervention diploma- tique en faveur de la Belgique dans les termes suivants : ■1 Me rappelant les nombreuses preuves d'amitie de Votre Majesty et de son predecesseur, ainsi que l'attitude amicale de l'Angleterre en 1870 et le temoignage d'amitie que vous venez de nous donner encore, jc fais un supreme appel a 1'intervention diplomatique du Gouver- nement de Votre Majeste pour la sauvegarde de 1'integrite de la Belgique. » Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste est egalement informe que le Gouvernement allemand a remis au Gouvernement beige une note proposant une neutralite amicale permettant le libre passage en territoire beige et s'engageant a maintenir I'independance du royaume et de ses possessions a la conclusion de la paix; au cas contraire, la Belgique serait traitee en ennemie. Une reponse est exigee dans un delai maximum de douze heures. Nous apprenons aussi que la Belgique a oppose un refus formel a ce quelle considere comme une violation flagrante de la loi des nations. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste est oblige de protester contre cette violation d'un traite que 1'Allemagne a signe aussi bien que nous-memes; il lui faut des assurances que la demande faite a la Belgique ne sera pas suivie d'ellet et que sa neutrabte sera respectee par 1'Alle- magne. Vous demanderez une reponse immediate. E. Grev. N° 155. Sir Edward Grey, a Sir F Villiers, Ministre de Grande-Bretagne a Bruxelles. Foreign Office, 4 aout 191 4. Informez le Gouvernement beige que , si 1'Allemagne exerce une pression sur lui pour le faire se departir de la neutralite, le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste s'attendra a ce que la Bel- gique rtsiste par tous les moyens en son pouvoir; que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste 1'ai.dera a resister; que, dans ce cas, le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste est pret a s'unir k la Russie et a la France, s'il y a lieu, pour offrir immediatement au Gouvernement beige une action commune pour resister a 1'emploi par 1'Allemagne de la force contre la Belgique et una garantie pour le maintien de son integrite et de son independance dans 1'avenir. E. Grky. — 191 — IV 157. Le Secretaire cTEtat aux Affaires etrangeres d'Allemagne, au Prince Lichnowsky, Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a Londres (communique par 1'Ambassade allemande, 4 aout). Berlin, 4 aoflt iai4. Priere de dissiper taut soupcon qui pourrait subsister dans 1'esprit du Gouvernement bri- tannique au sujet de nos intentions. Repetez positivement i'assurance formelle que, meme en cas de conflit arme avec la Bel gique, 1'Allemagne ne s'annexera du territoire beige sous aucun pretexte. La sincerite de cette declaration est prouvee par notre engagement solennel a 1'egard de la Hollande de respecter strictement sa neutralite. II est evident que nons nc pourrions annexer proftablement du territoire beige sans noas agrandir en meme temps aux dipens de la Hollande. Faites bien coniprendre a Sir Edward Grey que 1'armee allemande ne saurait s'exposer a une attaque francaise par la Belgique, attaque qui a ete envisagee selon des informations absolument sfires. L'Allemagne est done obligee de ne pas tenir compte de' la neutralite beige: e'est pour elle une question de vie ou de mort de prevenir favance de 1 armee francaise. Jagow. N° 159. Sir Edward Gret, a Sir E. Goschen, Ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne a Berlin. Foreign Office, 4 aout 1914. Nous apprenons que 1'AJlemagne a adresse une note au Ministre des Affaires etrangeres beige , declarant que le Gouvernement allemand serait oblige de mettre a execution , au besoiii par la force des armes, des mesures considerees comme iudispensables. Nous sommes egalement informes que le territoire beige a ete viole a Gemmerich. Dans ces conditions et etant donne crue I'AUemagne a refuse de nous donner au sujet de la Belgique les memes assurances que celles que nous a donnees la France la semaine der- mere en reponse a notre demande faite simultanement a Berlin et a Paris, il nous faut reiterer cette demande et exiger une reponse satisfaisante, ainsi qua mon telegramme de ce matin, qui devra etre recue avant minuil ce soir. Sinon, vous demanderez vos passeports et vous declarerez que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste sevoit oblige de prendre toutes les mesures en son pouvoir pour maintenir la neu- trality de la Belgique et le respect d'un traite auquel 1'Allemagne a souscrit autant que nous memes. E. Grey. _ 192 - N° 160. Sir E. Goschen, A Sir Edward Grey. MoNSIEUB , Londres, 8 aout 191 4. Conform^ment aux instructions contenues dans votre telegramme du 4 couranl, je sqjs a!16 voir cet apres-midi le Secretaire d'Etat et lui ai demands, au nora du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste britannique, si le Gouvernement imperial s'absliendrait de violer la neutrality de la Belgique. M. de Jagow a repliqui tout de suite qu'il Mail fiche d'avoir a dire que sa reponse de- vaitetre : « Non », elant donne que, puisque les troupes allemandes avaient franchi la fron- tiere ce matin, la neutrality de la Belgique se trouvait d'ores et deja violee. M, de Jagow s'est e^endu a nouveau sur les raisons qui avaient oblige le Gouvernement imperial A prendre cette mesure : c'est a savoir qu'il leur 1. ill.nl p^netrer en France par la yoie la plus rapide et la plus facile, de manure A prendre une bonne avance dans leurs operations et s'efforcer de frapper quelque coup decisif le plus tot possible. C'esl pour nous, a-t-il dit, une question de vie ou de mort, car, si nous avions passe par la route plus au Sud, nous n'aurionspu, vu le petit nombre de cbemins et la force des forteresses, espe>er passer sans rencontrer une opposition formidable, impliquant une grosse peile de temps. Cette peite de temps aurait ili autant do temps gagne par les Russes pour amener leurs troupes sur la fronliere allemande. Agir avec rapidite, voila, a-l-il ajoute, le maUre-atout de I'Allemagne; celui de la Russie est d'avoir d'inepuisables ressources en soldats. J'ai fait remarquer A M. de Jagow que ce fait accompli, la violation de ia frontiere beige , rendait, comme il le comprenait facilement, la situation excessiveinent grave, etje lui ai demands s'il n'etait pas temps encore de faire un pas en arriere et d'eviter la possibilite de consequences que lui et moi deplorerions. II a repondu que, pour les raisons qu'il m'avait donnees, il (5tait mnintenant impossible au Gouvernement allemand de faire un pas en arriere. Au cours de l'apres-midi, j'ai recu votre nouveau tejegrammede la memedate, et, ob6is- sant aux instructions y contenues, me suis rendu a nouveau au Ministere imperial des Affaires etrangeres, ou j'ai informe le Secretaire d'Etat qua moins que le Gouvernement imperial put donner ce soir avant minuitl'assurance de ne pas pousser plus loin sa violation de la frontiere beige et d'arr6ler sa marche, j'avais recu des instructions pour demander mes passeports et pour informer [le. Gouvernement imperial que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste britannique prendrait toutes les mesures en son pouvoir pour maintenir la neutra- lise de la Belgique et l'observation d'un trait4 auquel I'Allemagne etait autant partie que lui-meme. M. de Jagow a repondu qu'A son grand regret il nepouvait donner auc.une reponse autre que celle qu'il m'avait donnie plus tot dans la journSe, c'est A savoir que la se"curite de 1'Empire rendait absolument necessaire la marche des troupes imperiales A travers la Bel- gique. J'ai remis a Son Excellence un resumS t'crit de votre telegramme et, en faisant remarquer que vous indiquiez minuil comme l'heure A laquelle le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste britannique s'attendrait A une rfponse, lui ai demande si, vu les consequences ierribles qui suivraienl necessairement, il ne serait pas possible, m£me au dernier moment , — 193 — au Gouvernement imperial de reviser sa reponse. II m'a repondu que quand bien mgme le temps accords serait de vingt-quatre heures ou davantage, il fallait que sa reponse restat la meme. J'ai dit que dans ce cas j'aurais a demander mes passeports. L'entrevue dont il s'agit a eu lieu vers sept heures. Au cours d'un Lrel entretien qui la suivit, M. de Jagow a exprime son poignant regret de voir s'ecrouler toute sa politique et celle du Chancelier, qui a ete de devenir amis avec la Grande-Bretagne et ensuite, par elle, de se rapprocher de la France. Je lui ai dit que cetle terminaison soudaine de mon travail a Berlin etait pour moi aussi nne cause de profond regret et de deconvenue; mais qu'il lui fallait bien comprendre que dans les circonstances et vu nos engagements, il eut ete tout a fait impossible au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste britannique d'agir autrement qu'il n'avait fait. J'ai dit ensuite que j'etais d<5sireux d'aller faire visite au Chancelier, car ce serait peut-etre ia derniere fois que j'aurais 1'occasion de le voir. II m'a pric5 de le faire. J'ai trouve' le Chancelier ties agite\ Son Excellence a commence' tout de suite une harangue qui a dure environ vingt minutes. II a dit que la mesure prise par le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste britannique etait terrible au dernier point; juste pour un mot — « neutrality », un mot dont en temps de guerre on n'a si souvent tenu aucun compte, — juste pour un chiffon de papier la Grande-Bretagne allait faire la guerre a une nation a elle apparentie, qui ne desirait rien tant que d'etre son amie. Tous ses efforts en ce Sens ont, a-t-il continue^ eli rendus inutiles par cette derniere et terrible mesure; la politique a laquelle, commeje le savais, il s'etait voue depuis son arrivee au pouvoir, etait tombee comme un chateau de cartes. 11 s'est eerie que ce que nous avons fait est inconcevable; e'est comme frapperpar derriere un homme au moment ou il defend sa vie contre deux assaillants. II tient la Grande-Brelagnepour responsable de tous les terribles tenements qui pourrontse produire. J'ai protests avec force contre cette declaration et ai dit que, de meme que lui-meme et M. de Jagow desiraient me faire comprendre que pourdes raisons strategiques, e'etait pour 1'Allemagne une affaire de vie ou de mort d'avancer a travers la Belgique et de violer la neutrality de celte derniere, de meme je desirais qu'il comprit que e'etait pour ainsi dire une affaire de « vie ou de mort » pour 1'honneur de ia Grande-Bretagne que de tenir 1'en- gagement solennel pris par elle de faire en cas d'attaque tout son possible pour defendre la neulralite de la Belgique. II est, ai-je insisle, tout simplement nfeessaire de tenir ce pacte solennel, sans quoi quelle confiance n'importe qui pourrait-il avoir a 1'avenir dans les en- gagements pris par la Grande-Bretagne? Le Chancelier a repris : « Mais a quel prix ce pacte oura-t-il ili tenu? Le Gouvernement britannique y a-t-il songe? » J'ai insinue i Son Excellence, avec toute la clarte qui me fut possible, que la crainte des consequences ne pouvait guere etre considered comme une excuse pour la rupture d'engagements solennels; mais Son Excellence etait dans un tel etat d'exci- tation, il etait si evidemment demonte par la nouvelle de notre action et si peu dispose a entendre raison que je m'abstins de jeter de 1'huile sur le feu en argumentant davantage. Comme je prenais conge de lui , il a dit que le coup que la Grande-Bretagne portait a 1'Allemagne en s'unissant a ses ennemis etait d'aulant plus violent que presque jusqu'au dernier moment lui et son Gouvernement avaient travaille avec nous et appuye nos efforts en vue du maintien de la paix entre 1'Autriche et la Russie. Je repondis que e'etait bien ce qu'il y avait de tragique que de voir deux nations tomber en garde precisement au moment ou les rapports entre elles se trouvaient plus amicaux et plus cordiaux qu'ils ne 1'avaient et4 depuis des annees. J'ai ajoute que, par malheur, nonobstant nos efforts pour sauvegarder la paix entre la Russie et 1'Aulriche, la guerre s'etait propagee et nous avait mis face a face avec une position qu'il nous etait impossible d'esquiver si nous tenions nos engagements, Documents diplomatiqles. — Guerre europeennc. 25 — 194 — situation qui malheureusemenl impliquait separation davec nos aociens collaborateurs. Jai termini en disant qu'il n'aurait point de dilBculte a coraprendre que personne ne le regret- tait plus que moi-meme. Apres cette entrevue plutot penible, je suis renlri a I'Ambassade et ai redige un compte rendu telpgraphique de ce qui s'etait passe. Ge t^legramme a ete remis au bureau de teJ6- graphe central de Berlin, un peu avant 9 heures du soir. 11 a ete accepte par ledit bureau, mais semble n'avoir jamais eliS transmis. Vers 9 heures et demie du soir, le Sous-Secretaire d'Etat, M. de Zimmermann, est venu me voir. Apres avoir exprime son profond regret que les rapports officiels et personnels, si cordiaux entre nous, fussent sur le point de cesser, il me demanda inciderument si la demande de mes passeports 6quivaudrail a une declaration de guerre. Je lui ai dit qu'une personne faisant aussi notoirement que lui autorite en rnatiere de droit international devait savoir aussi bien ou inieux que moi quelle etail la coutume en pared cas. Jai ajoute qu'il y avail des exemples nombreux ou la rupture des rapports diplomatiques n'avait point M suivie de guerre; mais que dans le cas actuel il avait sans doute vu d'apres mes instructions , dont j'avais donnS un resume par ecrit aM. de Jagow, que le. Gouvernement de Sa Majeste britannique s'altendait a une reponse a une question definie ce soir avant minuit et qu'a defaut de reponse satisfaisante ledit Gouvernement se verrait force de prendre les mesures necessities par ses engagements. M. de Zimmermann declara que cela etait, de fait, une declaration de guerre, 6tant donn6 qu'il £tait de toute impossibility pour le Gouvernement Imperial de donner les assurances requises ni ce soir, ni aucun autre soir. E. Goscben. — 195 — Annexe IV. Ext raits du iildvre Gri s» indiquant les conditio ns dans lesquelles l'AIlemagne a viole la neutrality beige. N" 2. Lettbe adressce par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires Etrangcres , aux Ministres du. Roi a Paris, Berlin, Vienne , Londrcs el Sainl-Petersbourg. Bruxelles, le ih juillet 1914- Monsieor le Ministre, Le Gouverncment du Roi s'est demands si, dans les circonstances actuelles, il n'y aurait pas lieu d'adresser aux Puissances qui ont garanti son independance et sa neutrality, une communication destinee a leur conlirmer sa resolution de remplir les devoirs internationaux que iui imposenl les traites au cas 011 une guerre viendrait a eclater aux frontieres de la Belgique. II a ete. amcne a la conclusion qu'une telle communication serait premaluree a l'heure presente mais que les evenements pourraient se precipiter et ne point lui laisser le temps de (aire parvenir, au moment voulu, les instructions opportunes a ses repr&enlants a letranger. Dans cette situation , j'ai propose au Roi et a mes coIJegues du Cabinet , qui se sont rallies a ma maniere de voir, de vous donncr, des a present, des indications precises sur la demarche que vous auriez a faire si l'eventualite d'une guerre franco-allemande devenait plus menacante. Vous trouverez, sous ce pli, une lettre signee, mais non datee, dont vous aurez a donner lecture et a laisser copie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres si les circonstances exigent cette communication. Je vous indiquerai par telegramme le moment d'agir. Le telegramme vous sera adresse a l'heure on la mobilisation de l'armee beige sera decretee, si, contrairement a notre sincere espoir, et aux apparences de solution pacifique, nos renseignements nous amenaient a prendre cette mesure extreme de precaution. Veuillez agreer, etc. Davignon. Annexe ad n° 2. Monsieur le Ministre, La situation international est grave; l'eventualite d'un conflit entre plusieurs Puissances ne pent etre ecartee des preoccupations du Gouvernement du Roi. La Belgique a observe avec la plus scrupuleuse exactitude les devoirs d'Etat neutre que lui — 196 — Lmposent les traites du 19 avril 1839. Ces devoirs, elle s'attachera in^branlablement a les remplir, quelles que soient les circonstances. Les dispositions amicaies des Puissances a son egard ont ete affirmees si souvent que la Belgique a la conGance de voir son territoire demeurer hors de toute atleinte si des hostilites venaient a se produire a ses frontieres. Toutes les mesures necessaires pour assurer i'observation de sa neutrality n'en ont pas moins ete prises par le Gouvernenient du Roi. L'armee beige est mobilisee et se porte sur les positions strategiques choisies pour assurer la defense du pays et le respect de sa neutrality. Les forts d'Anvers et de la Meuse sont en etat de defense. II est a peine necessaire, Monsieur le Ministre, d'insister sur le caractere de ces mesures. Elles n'ont d'autre but que de mettre la Belgique en situation de remplir ses obligations internationales; elles ne sont et n'ont pu etre inspirees, cela va de soi, ni par !e dessein de prendre part a une lutte armee des Puissances, ni par un sentiment de defianorenvers aucune d'elles. Me conformant aux ordres recus, j'ai l'bonneur de remettre a Votre Excellence une copie de la declaration du Gouvernenient du Roi et de La prier de bien vouloir en prendre sct^. Une communication identique a ete' faite aux autres Puissances garantes de la neutrality beige. Je saisis, etc. N° 8. Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires c'trangeres, aux Ministres da Roi a Berlin, Paris, Londres , Vienne, Saint - Petersbourg , Rome, La Haye, Luxembourg. Bruxelles, le 29 juillet 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, Le Gouvernement du Roi a decide de mettre l'armee sur le pied de paix renforci. Cette mesure ne doit etre en aucune facon conlondue avec la mobilisation. A cause du peu d'etendue de son territoire, la Belgique tout entiere constitue en quelque sorte une zone frontiere. Son armee, sur le pied de paix ordinaire, ne comporte qu'une classe de milice sous les armes. Sur le pied de paix renforce, ses divisions d'armee et sa division de cavalerie, grace au rappel de trois classes ont des effectifs analogues a ceux |des corps entretenus en permanence dans les zones frontieres des Puissances voisines. Ces renseignements vous permettraient de repondre aux questions qui pourraient vous etre posees. Veuillez agreer, etc, Davignon. N° 9. Lettre adresse'e par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires clrangeres, aur Ministres da Roi a Berlin, Paris et Londres. Bruxelles, le 3i juillet 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, M. le Ministre de France etant venu me montrer un telegramme de 1'Agence Havas, decretant 1'etat de guerre en Allemagne, m'a dit : « Je profile de cette occasion pour vous — 197 — declarer qu'aucune incursion des troupes franchises n'aura lieu en Belgique, meme si des forces importantes Staient massees sur les frontieres de voire pays. La France ne veut pas avoir la responsabiliti$ d'accomplir, vis-a-vis de la Belgique, le premier acte d'hostilite. Des instructions dans ce sens seront donnees aux autorites franchises. » J'ai remercie M. Klobukowski de sa communication et j'ai cru devoir lui faire remarquer que nous avions toujours eu la plus grande confiance dans la loyaute que nos deux Etats voisins mettraient a lenir leurs engagements a notre egard. Nous avons aussi tout lieu de croire que 1'attitude du Gouvernement allemand sera identique a celle du Gouvernement de la Republique fran9aise. Veuillez agreer, etc. Davignon. N° 11. LettAe adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires e'trangires , aax Ministres da Roi a Berlin, Londres et Paris. Brnxelles, le 3i juillet lQl/i. Monsieur le Ministbe , Le Ministre d'Angleterre a demands a me voir d'urgence et m'a fait la communication suivante, qu'il souhaitait etre a meme de m'exposer depuis plusieurs jours. En raison de la possibility d'une guerre europeenne, sir Edward Grey a demande aux Gouvernements fran- cais et allemand, separeuient, si chacun d'eux etait pret a respecter la neutralite de la Bel- gique pourvu qu'aucune Puissance ne la viole. o Vu les traites qui existent, je suis charge d'informer le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres de Belgique de ce qui precede et de dire que Sir Edward Grey presume que la Belgique fera tout son possible pour maintenir sa neutralite et quelle desire et s'attend a ce que les autres Puissances lobservent et la maintiennenl. » Je me suis empresse de remercier Sir Francis Vilbers de cette communication que le Gouvernement beige apprecie particulierement et j'ai ajoute que la Grande-Bretagne et les autres nations garantes de notre independance pouvaient gtre assurees que nous ne neglige- rions aucun effort pour maintenir notre neutralite, et que nous etions convaincus que les autres Puissances, vu les exoellents rapports d'amitie et de confiance, que nous avions tou- jours entretenus avec elles, observeraient et maintiendraient cette neutralite. Je n'ai pas manque d'affirmer que nos forces militaires, considerablement developp<5es a la suite de notre reorganisation recente, £taient a meme de nous permettre de nous defendre ftiergiquement en cas de violation de notre territoire. Au cours de la conversation qui a suivi , Sir Francis m'a paru un pen surpris de la rapidite avec laquelle nous avions decide' la mobilisation de notre armee. J'ai fait remarquer que les Pays-Bas avaient pris une resolution identique avant nous et que d'autre. part la date recente de notre nouveau regime militaire et les mesures transitoires que nous avions du decider a cette occasion nous imposaient des mesures urgentes et completes. Nos voisins et garants devaient voir dans cette resolution le d^sir de manifester notre profonde volonte de main- tenir nous-memes notre neutrality. — 198 — Sir Francis ra'a paru satisfait de ma response et m'a annonc£ que son Gouvernement atlendait cette reponse pour continuer les negociations avec la France et l'Allemagne, nego- ciations dont la conclusion me serait communiques. Veuillez agreer, etc. Davignon. N° 12. Letthe adrcssee par M. Davignon, Minislre des Affaires elrangeres, aux Ministres da Hoi a Berlin, Londres et Paris. Bruxelles, le 3i juillet ioi4. Monsieur le Ministre, Ce matin, au cours d'une conversation que le Secretaire general de mon departement a eue avec M. de Bulow, d a explique au Ministre d'AUeniagne la portee des mesures mili- tants que nous avons prises et lui a dit qu'elles etaieht une consequence de notre volonte d'accomplir nos obligations Internationales, qu'elles n'impliquaient en aucune faqon une atti- tude de defiance envers nos voisins. Le Secretaire general a demande ensuite au Ministre d'AUeniagne s'il avait connaissance de la conversation qu'il avait eue avec son predecesseur, M. de Flotow, et de la reponse que le Chancelier de l'Empire avait charge celui-ci de lui faire. Au cours de la poiemique soulevee en 1911 par le depot du projet hollandais concernant les fortifications de Flessingue, certains joumau.x avaient affirme qu'en cas de guerre franco- allemande, notre neutrality serait violee par l'Allemagne. Le departement des Affaires Etrangeres avait suggere l'idee qu'une declaration faite au Parieuient allemand a 1'occasion dun debat sur la politique etrangere serait de nature a apaijer 1'opinion publique et a calmer ses defiances, si regrettables au point de vue des rela- tions des deux pays. M. de Bethman-Holweg lit repondre qu'il avait ete ties sensible aux sentiments qui avaient inspire notre demarclie. II declarait que l'Allemagne n'avait pas (intention de violer notre neutrality, maisilestiniait qu'en laisant publiquement une declaration, l'Allemagne allaibli- rait sa situation milhaire vis-a-vis de ia France qui, rassuree du cote du Nord, porterait toutes ses forces du cote de l'Est. Le baron vender Der Fist, ponrsuivant, dit qu'il comprenait parfaitement les objections qu'avaient failed M. de Bethman-Holweg a la declaration publique suggerte et il rappela que depuis lors en igi3, M. de Jagow avait fait, a la Commission du budget du Reichstag, des declarations rassurantes quant au respect de la neutralite de la Belgique. M. de Bulow repondit qu'il etait au courant de la conversation avec M. de Flotow et qu'd etait certain que les sentiments exprimes a cette epoque n'avaient pas change. Veuillez agreer, etc Davignon. 199 — Annexe au N° 12. Lettre adirssc'e par le Ministre da Roi a Berlin a M. Davignon, Minislre des Affaires etrangeres. Berlin Ie2 mai 191 3 Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai l'honncur de vous, faire connaitre, d'apres I'officieuse Norddentsche Allgemeine Zeilung, les declarations faites au cours de la seance du 29 avril de la Commission du budget du Reichstag , par le Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangeres et le Ministre de la Guerre, relativement a la neu- tralite de la Belgique. u Un membre du parti social-democrate dit : « En Belgique on voit avec apprehension s'approcher • une guerre franco-allemande, car on craint que I'Allemagne ne respectera pas la neutralite de la « Belgique ■. • M. de Jagow, Secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires etrangeres r^pondit : la neutralite de la Belgique nest determiuee par des conventions Internationales et l'Allernagne est decidee a respecter ces con- « ventions. ■ Cette declaration ne satisfit pas un autre membre du parti social-democrate. M. de Jagow "observa qu'il n'avait nen a ajouter aux paroles claiies qu'il avait prononcees relativement aux rela- n tions de I'Allemagne avec la Belgique. « A de nouvelles interrogations d'un membre du parti social-democrate, M. de Heeringen , • Ministre de la Guerre, repondit : la Belgique ne joue aucun role dans la justification du projet de "reorganisation militaire alleniand; celui-ci se trouve justiGe par la situation en Orient. L'Alle- « magne ne perdra pas de vue que la neutralite beige est garantie par les traites internationaux «. « Un membre du parti progressiste ayant encore parle de la Belgique, M. de Jagow fil remarquer a nouveau que sa declaration concernant la Belgique etait suffisamment claire. ■ Veuillez agreer, etc. Baron Bevens. N° 13. TitEGKAMUE adresse par le Comte de Lalaing, Ministre da Roi a Londres, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. Londres, 1" aout 1914. L'Angleterre a demands separement a La France et a I'Allemagne si elies respecteraient le territoire de la Belgique dans le cas oil leur adversaire ne La violerait pas. On attend la reponse allemande. La France a accepte. N° 14. TAlegrammb adresse par le Baron Beyens, Ministre du Roi, a Berlin, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. Berlin, 1" aout 191 4. L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a ete charge de demander au Ministre des Affaires etrangeres si, en cas de guerre, I'Allemagne respecterait la neutralite de la Belgique et le Ministre aurait dit qu'il ne peut pas repondre a cette question. — 200 — N° 15. Lettrb adressee par M. Davignon, Minislre des Affaires etrangires, aux Ministres du Roi a Berlin, Paris el Londres. Bruxelles, 1" aout 1914. Monsieur le Misistbe, J'ai I'honneur de vous faire savoir que le Ministre de France ma fait verbalement !a com- munication suivante : « Je suis autorise' a declarer qu'en cas de conflit international, le Gouvernement de la B£publique, ainsi qu'il l'a toujours declare^ respectera la neutrality de la Belgique. Dans I'hypothese 06 cette neutrality ne serait pas respectee par une autre puissance, le Gouver- nement francais, pour assurer sa propre defense, pourrait etre araeni a modifier son atti- tude •. J'ai remerci6 son Excellence et ai ajout£ que, de notre cote\ nous avions pris sans aucun retard toutes les mesurcs voulues pour faire respecter notre independance et nos frontieres. Veuillez agr£er, etc . . . Davignon. IT 19. Lettre. adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires c'trangeres , aux Ministres da Roi a Paris, Berlin, Londres, Vienne el Saint-Pctersboarg. Bruxelles, le 2 aout 191(1. MoNSlEOR LE MlNISTRE, J'avais eu soin de faire avertir par M. de Bassompierre le Ministre d'Allemagne, qu'un communique de M. Klobukowski, Ministre de France, a la presse bruxelloise, annoncerait la declaration formelle que ce dernier m'avait laite le 1™ aout. Rencontrant M. de Bulow, ce dernier m'a remercid de cette attention et a ajoute' que, jusqu'a present, il n'avait pas et6 charge de nous faire une communication officielle, mais que nous connaissions son opinion personnelle sur la securite avec laquelle nous avions le droit de consid£rer nos voisins de I'Est. J'ai immedialement repondu que tout ce que nous connaissions des intentions de* ceux-ci, intentions indiquees dans les multiples entretiens anteneurs, ne nous permettait pas de douter de leur parfaite correction vis-a-vis de la Belgique; je tenais cependant a ajouter que nous altacherions le plus grand prix a etre en possession d'une declaration formelle dont la nation prendrait connaissance avec joie et reconnaissance. Veuillez agr£er, etc. . . Davignon. 201 1N° 20. Note remise le 2 aovU, a 19 heures, par M. de Below Saleske, Minislre d'Allemagne, a M. Davitjnun, Minislre des Affaires elrangires. Bruxelles, 2 aoiit 19 id. Le Gouvernement allemand a recu des nouvelles sures d'apres lesquelles ies forces fran- chises auraient 1'intention de marcher sur la Meuse par Givet et Namur. Ces nouvelles ne laissent aucun doute sur 1'intention de la France de marcher sur 1'Allemagne par le terri- toire beige. Le Gouvernement imperial allemand ne peut s'empecher de craindre que la Belgique, malgre sa meilleure volonte\ ne sera pas en mesure de repousser sans secours une marche francaise dun si grand developpement. Dans ce fait, on trouve ( une certitude suffisante dune menace dirigee contre 1'Allemagne. C'est un devoir imperieux de conservation pour 1'Allemagne de pr£venir cette attaque de 1'ennemi. Le Gouvernement allemand regretterait tres vivement que la Belgique regardat comme un acte d'hostilitd contre elle le fait que les mesures des ennemis de 1'Allemagne 1'obligent de violer de son cote le, territoire beige. Afin de dissiper tout malentendu , le Gouvernement allemand declare ce qui suit : I. L'Allemagne n'a en vue aucun acte d'hostilite contre la Belgique. Si la Belgique consent, dans la guerre qui va commencer, a prendre une attitude de neutrality amicale vis- a-vis de 1'Allemagne, le Gouvernement allemand de son cote s'engage, au moment de la paix , a garanlir le royaume et ses possessions dans toute leur etendue. II. L'Allemagne s'engage, sous la condition enoncee, a evacuer le territoire beige aussitot la paix conclue. III. Si la Belgique observe une attitude amicale, 1'Allemagne est prete, d'accord avec les autorit£s du Gouvernement beige a acheter contre argent comptant lout ce qui est necessaire a ses troupes et a indemniser pour les dommages causes en Belgique. IV. Si la Belgique se comporte d'une fa^on hostile contre les troupes allemandes et parti- culierement fait des difficult^ a leur marche en avant par une opposition de fortifications de la Meuse ou par des destructions de routes , de chemins de fer, tunnels ou autres ouvrages d'art, 1'Allemagne sera obligee de conside>er la Belgique en ennemie. Dans ce cas, 1'Alleniagne ne prendra aucun engagement vis-a-vis du royaume, mais elle laissera le reglement ulteneur des rapports des deux £tats Vun vis-a-vis de 1' autre 4 la decision des armes. Le Gouvernement allemand a 1'espoir justified que cette eventuality ne se produira pas et que le Gouvernement beige saura prendre les mesures appropri^es pour l'empecher de se produire. Dans ce cas, les relations d'amitie qui unisseut les deux Etats voisins deviendront plus etroites et durables. Documents diplomatiqubs. — Guerre europeenfte. — 202 — N° 22. Note remise par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a M. de Below Saleske, Minislre d'AUemagne. Bruxelles, le 3 aout 19 id (7 heures du matin). Par sa note du 1 aout 1 9 1 4 , le Gouvernement allemand a fait connaitre que d'apres des nouvelles sures , les forces francaises auraient 1'intention de marcher sur la Meuse par Givet et Namur, et que la Belgique , malgre sa meilleure volonte, ne serait pas en etat de repousser sans secours une marche en avant des troupes francaises. Le Gouvernement allemand s'estimerait dans 1'obligalion de prevenir cette attaque et de violer le territoire beige. Dans ces conditions, 1'Allemagne propose au Gouvernement du Roi de prendre vis-a-vis d'elle une attitude amicale et s'engage au moment de la paix a garantir 1'integrite du Royaume et de ses possessions dans toute leur etendue. La note ajoute que si \.\ Belgique fait des difficultes a la marche en avant des troupes allemandes, 1'Alle- magne sera obligee de la considerer comme ennemie et de laisser le reglement ulterieur des deux Etats 1'un vis-a-vis de 1'autre a la decision des armes. Cette note a provoquc chez le Gouvernement du Roi un profond et douloureux etonne- ment. Les intentions quelle attribue a la France sont en contradiction avec les declarations for- melles qui nous ont £te faites le 1" aout, au nom du Gouvernement de la Republique. D'ailleurs si contrairement a noire attente une violation de la neutrality beige venait a etre commise par la France, la Belgique remplirait tons ses devoirs international^ et son armee opposerait a 1'envahisseur la plus vigoureuse resistance. Les traites de i83g confirmes par les traites de 1870 consacrent findependance et la neutrality de la Belgique «>us la garantie des Puissances et notamment du Gouvernement de Sa Majeste le Roi de Prusse. La Belgique a toujours ete fidele a ses obligations Internationales; elles a accompli ses devoirs dans un esprit de loyale impartialitf- ; elle n'a neglig£ aucun effort pour maintenif ou faire respecter sa neutrality. L'atteinte a son independance dont la menace du Gouvernement constituerait une fla- grante violation du droit des gens. Aucun iriteret strategique ne justifie la violation du droit. Le Gouvernement beige en acceptant les propositions qui lui sont notifiees sacrifierait 1'honneur de la nation en meme temps qu'il trahirait ses devoirs vis-a-vis de 1'Europe. Conscient du role que la Belgique joue depuis plus de quatre-vingts ans dans la civi- lisation du monde , il se refuse a croire que findependance de la Belgique ne puisse etre conserved qu'au prix de la violation de sa neutrality. Si cetespoir etait deru,le Gouvernement beige est fermement decide a repousser par tous les tnoyens en son pouvoir toute atteinte a son droit. Davignon. — 203 — N° 27. Lettkb adressee par M. de- Below Saleske, Ministre d'AUemagm, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etrangcres. (L'original est en francais). Bruxelles, le i aout 1914 (6 heuresdu matin). Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai et& charge et j'ai 1'honneur d'informer Votre Excellence que par suite du refus oppose 1 par le Gouvernement de Sa MajestS le Roi aux propositions bien intentionn^es que lui avait soumises le Gouvernement imperial, celui-ci se verra, a son plus vif regret, forcS d'executer — au besoin par la force des armes — les mesures de securite expos£es comme indispen-r sables vis-a-vis des menaces francaises. Veuillez agreer, Monsieur le Ministre , les assurances de ma haute consideration. von Below. N° 28. Note remise par Sir Francis H. Villiers, Ministre d'Angleterre, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres. firuxellcs, le A aout xy iA. Je suis charge' d'informer le Gouvernement beige que si 1'Allemagne exerce une pression dans le but d'obliger la Belgique a abandonner son r61e de pays neutre, le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste britannique s'attend a ce que la Belgique r£siste par tous les moyens possibles. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesty britannique, dans ce cas, est pr£t a se joindre i la Russie et a la France, si la Belgique le desire, pour onrir au Gouvernement beige, sans delai, une action commune, qui aurait comme but de resister aax mesures de force employees par 1'Allemagne contre la Belgique et en meme temps d'ofirir une garantie pom - maintenir l'in- dependance et 1'integrite de la Belgique dans 1'avenir. Sir Francis H. Villiers. N° 30. Telegramme adresse par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etranghes, aax Minislres du Roi a Londres et a Paris. Broxelles, le 1 aout 1914. L'Etat-Major fait savoir que le territoire national a hi viole a Gemmenich. Davignon. 204 N" 31. Lettre adressee par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etranyeres , a M. de Below Saleske, Ministre a" Altemagne. Bruxelles, le h aoiit 19 ii. MoNSIEHR LE MiNISTRE , J'at 1'honneur de faire savoir a Votrc Excellence, que des aujourd'hui le Gouvernement du Boi ne saurait plus Lui reconnaitre de caractere diplomatique et cesse d'avoir des relations ollicielles avec Elle. Votre Excellence trouvera sous ce pli les passeports qui sont necessaires a son depart et a celui du personnel de la Legation. Je saisis, etc. Davignon. N° 35. Lettre adressee par le Ministre de Belgique a Berlin a M. I)avitjnon, Ministre des Affaires etranycres. Berlin, a aoiit 1 9 1 4. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ni I'honneur de vous faire parvenir, ci-apres en traduction, la partie du discours pro- nonce aujourd'hui a la tribune du Reichstag par le Chancelier de 1'Empire et relative a 1'odieuse violation de notre neutr: !.'> ; « Nous nous trouvons en etat er, comme garantes , a la defense de son territoire. II y aurait une action concerted et commune ayant pour but de register aux mesures de force employees par 1'Allemagne contre la Belgique et en meme temps de garantir le main- tien de lind^pendance et de I'lntegrite de la Belgique dans 1'avenir. La Belgique est heureuse de pouvoir declarer quelle assumera la deTense des places fortes. Je saisis, etc Davignon. — 206 l\° 41. Telegramme adresse par le Minislrc da Roi a Londres, a M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etrange'res. Londres, 5 aout iqi4- L'Allemagne ayant rejete les propositions anglaises, I'Angleterre lui a declare que letat de guerre existait entre les deux pays, a partir de onze heures. Corate de Lalaing. N° 44. Lettke adrcssce par M- Davignon , Minis/re ties Affaires etrange'res , am Chefs de mis- sion dans tous les pays enirelenanl avec la Belgique des rapports diplomatiques. Bruxelles, le 5 aout 191 4. MONSIEDR LE MlHISTRE, Par le traite du 18 avril 1M9, la Prusse, la France, I'Angleterre, l'Autriche et la Russie se sont declarces garantes du Iraite conclu le nicme jour entre S. M. le roi des Beiges et S. M. le roi des Pays-Bas. Ce traite porte : « La Belgique forniera un Elat indt'pendant et perpetuellement neutre ». La Belgique a rempli toutes ses obligations internationales, elle a accompli ses devoirs dans un esprit de loyale impartiality, elle n'a neglige aucun effort pour maintenir et faire respecter sa neutrality. Aussi est-ce avec une penible emotion que le Gouvernement du Roi a appris que les forces armies de L'Allemagne . puissance garante de notre neutrality ont p^netre sur le terri- toire de la Belgique en violation des engagements qui ont ete pris par traite. II est de notre devoir de protester avec indignation contre un attentat au droit des gens qu'aucun acte de notre part n'a pu provoquer. Le Gouvernement du Roi est fermement decide a repousser par tous les moyens en son pouvoir l'atteinte portee a sa neutrality et il rappelle qu'en vertu de 1'article 10 de la Con- vention dc La Haye de 1 907 concernant les droits et les devoirs des Puissances et des per- sonnes neutres [en cas de guerre sur terre ne peut etre considere comme un acte hostile le fait, par une puissance neutre, de repousser meme par la force les atteintes a sa neu- trality. Vous voudrez bien demander d'urgence audience au Ministre des Affaires etrangerec et donner lecture a Son Excellence de la presente lettre dont vous lui laisserez copie. Si ['au- dience ne pouvait vous etre immediatement accordee, vous ferez par ecrit la communica- tion dont it s'agit. Veuillez agreer, etc. Davignon. — 207 — N° 48. Communication faile le 5 aonl par Sir Francis Villiers, Minislre d"Angl'lerre, a M. Davignon, Minislre des Affaires clrangeres. Je suis charge d'informer le Gouvernement Beige que le Gouvernement de Sa Majeste britannique considere Taction commune dans le but de resister a 1'Allemagne comme etant en vigueur et justifiee par le traite de 1 83a. N° 52. Lettre adressee par M. Davignon. Ministre des Affaires clrangeres, aux Ministres du Roi a Paris, Londres et Saint-Pelersbourg. Bruxelles, le 5 aoiit 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que les Minislres de France et de Russie ont fait ce matin une demarche aupres de moi pour me faire connaitre la volont<5 de leurs Gouverne- ments de repondre a notre appel et de cooperer avec l'Angleterre a la defense de notre territoire. Veuillez agreer, etc. Davignon. N° 60. Telegramme adressc par le Ministre du Roi a La Haye a M. Davignon, Minislre des Affaires clrangeres. La Haye, le 9 aout 1.914. Le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres m'a prie de vous transmettre les informations suivantes parce que le Ministre d'Amerique a Bruxelles s'y refuse. La forteresse de Liege a £te prise d'assaut apres une defense courageuse. Le Gouverne- ment Allemand regrette tres profondement, que par suite de 1'attitude du Gouvernement Beige contre 1'Allemagne , on en est arrive^ a des rencontres sanglantes. L'Allemagne ne vient pas en ennemie en Belgique, e'est seulement par la force des evenements quelle a du, a cause des mesures militaires de la France, prendre la grave determination d'entrer en Belgique et d'occuper Liege comme point d'appui pour ses operations militaires ulterieures. Apres que 1'armee beige a, par sa resistance heroique contre une grande superiorite, main- tenu l'honneur de ses armes, le Gouvernement Allemand prie le Roi des Beiges et le Gou- vernement Beige deviter a la Belgique les horreurs ulterieures de la guerre. Le Gouverne- ment est pret a tous accords avec la Belgique qui peuvent se concilier avec son conflit avec — 208 — la France. L'AHemagne assure encore solenneliement quelle n'a pas l'intention de s'appro- prier le territoire beige et que cette intention est loin d'elle. L'Allemagne est toujours prete a evacuer la Belgique aussitot que 1'etat de guerre le lui permettra. L'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis avait prie son collegue de se charger de cette tentative de mediation. Le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres a accepte sans enlhousiasme cette mission. Je mVn suis charge pour lui faire plaisir. Baron Fallon. N° 71. Telegramme adresse par M. Davignon, Ministre des Affaires etrangeres a M. le baron Fallon, Ministre dti Rot a La Haye. Bruxelles, le 12 aout 1914. Priere de remettre le telegramme suivant au Ministre des Aflaires etrangeres : « La propo- sition que nous fait le Gouvernement Allemand reproduit la proposition qui avait et£ for- mulee dans 1'ullimatum du 1 aout. Fidele a ses devoirs internationaux, la Belgique ne peut que reiterer sa reponse a cet ultimatum, d'autant plus que depuis le 3 aoiit sa neutralite a ete violee, qu'une guerre douloureuse a ete ported sur son territoire et que les garants de sa neutrality ont iojalement et immediatement repondua son appel. » Davignon. — 209 — Annexe V. Telegrammes £chang3 juillet a. c. le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie a Belgrade presenta an Ministre President serbe une note oil le Gouvernement serbe etait accuse d'avoir favoris£ le mouve- ment panserbe qui avait abouli a I'assassinat de 1'heritier du trone austro-hongrois. En conse- quence I'Autriche-Hongric demandait au Gouvernement serbe non seulement de condamner sous line forme solennelle la susdite propagande, mais aussi de prendre, sous le controle de I'Aulriclie-Hongrie, une serie de mesures tendant a la decouverte du coniplot, a la punition des sujetsserbes y ayant participe et a la prevention dans 1'avcnir de tout attentat sur le sol du Royaume. Un del ni de quarante-huit heures fut five' au Gouvernement serbe pour la reponse a [a susdite note. Le Gouvernement imperial , auquel I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a Saint-Petersboui'g avait communique le textcdela note dix-sept heures apressa remise a Belgrade, ayant priscon- naissance des demandes y contenues, dut s'apercevoir que quelques-unes parnii elles etaient inexecutables quant au fond, tandis que d'autres etaient presentees sous une forme incompa- tible avec la dignite d'un etat independant. Trouvant inadmissibles la diminution de la dignite de la Serbie, contenue dans ees demandes, ainsi que la tendance de I'Autriche- Hongrie d'assurer sa preponderance dans les Balkans demontree par ces memes exigences, le Gouvernement russe fit observer dans la forme la plus amicale a l'Autriclie-Hongrie qu'il serait desirable de soumettre a un nouvel examen les points contenus dans la note austro- hongroise. Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois ne crut pas possible de consentir a une discussion de la note. L action moderatrice des autres Puissances a Vienne ne fut non plus couronneo de succes. Malgre que la Serbie eut reprouve le crime et se fut montree prete a donner satisfaction .i 1'Auh iche dans une mesure qui depassat les previsions non seulement de la Russie , mils aussi des autres Puissances, le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie a Belgrade jugea la reponse serbe insuffisante et quitta cette vilie. Reconnaissant le caractere exagere des demandes presentees par I'Autriche, la Russie avait declare encore auparavant qu'il lui serait impossible de tester indiuerente , sans se refuser toutefois a employer tous sis efforts pour trouver une issue pacilique qui fut accep- table pour l'Autriche et nien.ige.it son amour-propre de grande puissance. En meme temps la Russie etablit fermemenl quelle admettail une solution pacilique de la question seulement dans une mesure qui n'impliquerait pas la diminution de la dignite de la Serbie comme Etat independant. Malheureusement tous les efforts deployes par le Gouvernement imperial dans cetle direction resterent sans elTet. Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois, apres s'etre dernbe ii toute intervention conciliatricc des Puissances dans son condit avec la Serbie, proceda a la mobilisation, declara officiellement la guerre a la Serbie, et le jour suivant, Belgrade fut bombardee. Le manifeste qui a accompagne la declaration de guerre accuse ouvertement la Serbie d'avoir prepare et execute le crime de Sarajevo. Une pareille accusation d'un crime de droit commun lancee contre tout un peuple et tout un Etat attira a la Serbie par son inanite evidente les larges sympathies des cercles de la societe europeenne. A la suite de cette inaniere d'agir du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, malgre la declara- tion de la Russie quelle ne pourrait resler indifferente au sort de la Serbie, le Gouverne- ment imperial jugea necessaire d'ordonner la mobilisation des circonscriptions militaires de Kiew, d'Odessa, de Moscou et de Kazan. Une telle decision s'imposait parce que depuis la date de la remise de la note austro-hongroise au Gouvernement serbe et les premieres demarches de la, Russie cinq jours s'etaient ecoules, et cependant le Cabinet de Vienne n'avait fait aucun pas pour aller au-devant de nos efforts paciiiques; au contraire la mobili- sation de la moiu£ de l'armee austro-hongroise avait ete decretee. Le GouvernemeDt allemand fut mis au courant des mesures prises par la Russie; il lui — 215 — fut en meme temps explique qu'elles n'etaient que la consequence des armemenls autri- chiens et nullement dingoes contre I'AHemagne. En mtlme temps, le Gouvernement impe- rial declara que la Russie etait pretc a continucr les pourparlers en vue dune solution paci- fique du conflit, soit par la voie de negotiations direcles avec le Cabinet de Vienne, soil, en auivant la proposition de la Grande-Bretagne, par la voie d'une Conference des- quatre grandes Puissances non interessdes directeinent , voire 1'Angleterre , la France, i'AHemagne et l'ltalie. Cependant cette tentative de la Russie £choua egalement. L'Autriche-Hongrie declina un echange de vues ulteVieur avec nous , et le Cabinet de Vienne se deroba a la participation a la Conference des Puissances projetee. Neanmoins, la Russie ne discontinua pas ses efforts en faveur de la pnix. Repondant a la question de I'AHemagne, a quelles conditions nous consentirions encore a suspendre nos armemenls, le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres declara que ces conditions seraient la recon- naissance par I'Autiiche-IIongrie que la question austro-serbe avail revetu le caractere dune question europeenne, et la declaration de cette meme Puissance quelle consentait a ne pas insister sur des demandes incompatibles avec les droits souverains de la Serbie. La proposition de la Russie fut juge> par I'AHemagne inacceptable pour 1'Autriche-Hon- grie. Simultan^ment on recut a Saint-Petersbourg la nouvelle de la proclamation de la mobilisation generals par l'Autriche-Hongrie. En memo temps les hostilites continuaient sur le territoire serbe et Belgrade fut bom- bardee derechef. L'insucces do nos propositions nous obligea d'elargir les mesures de precautions mili- tates. Le Cabinet de Berlin nous ayant adress£ une question a ce sujet, il lui fut repondu que la Russie etait foreee de commencer ses armements pour se premunir contre toutes eVentua- litfe. Tout en prenant cette mesure de precaution, la Russie n'en discontinuait pas moins de rechercher de toutes ses forces une issue de cette situation et declara etre prete a accepter tout moyen de solution du conflit qui comporterait l'observation des conditions posees par nous. Malgre cette communication conciliante, le Gouvernement allemand, le 1 8/3 1 juillet, adressa au Gouvernement russe la demande d'avoir a suspendre ses mesures militaires a midi du ig juillet/i" aout, en menacant, dans le cas contraire, de proceder a une mobili- sation generate. Le lendemain, 19 juillet/i" aout, 1'Ambassadeur d'AHemagne transmit au Ministre des Affaires etrangeres, au nom de son Gouvernement, la declaration de guerre. Sazonoff. N° 78. Le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres aux Reprresentants de S. M. i'Empereur k i etranger. [telegrmmie.) Saint-Petersbourg, le 20 juillet/2 aoiit 1914. 11 est absolument clair que I'AHemagne s'efforce des a present de rejeter sur nous la res- ponsabilite' de la rupture. Notre mobilisation a Me provoquee par l'enorme responsabilite — 216 — que nous aurions assumee, si nous n'avions pas pris toutes les mesures de precaution a un moment ou 1'Autriche , se bornant a des pourparlers d'un caractere dilatoire, bombardait Belgrade et proc^dait a une mobilisation generate. Sa Majeste I'Empereur s'etait engagee visa-vis de 1'Empereur d'Allemagne par sa parole a n'entreprendre aucun acte agressif tant que dureraient les pourparlers avec l'Autriche. Apres une telle garantie et apres toutes les preuves de f amour de la Russie pour la paix, l'Alle- magne ne pouvait ni n'avait le droit de douter de notre declaration, que nous accepterions avec joie toute issue pacifique compatible avec la dignite et 1'independance de la Serbie. Une autre issue, tout en etant completement incompatible avec notre propre dignite aurait cer- tainement ebranle l'equilibre europien, en assurant l'hegemonie de 1'Allemagne. Ce carac- tere europeen, voire mondial, du conflit est infiniment plus important que le pretexte qui la cr^e. Par sa decision de nous declarer la guerre a un moment ou se poursuivaient les negociations entre les Puissances, 1'Allemagne a assume une lourde responsabilite. Sazonoff. iDent ftyxift unh HhenftMe )wn Hxie$mmbxucn > fetbifdicn ©epotd aiidgefiibtt wurbc. ies lierbvcdjcn ntufite bet ganjen jiciliftctten SBcIt bie Slugen offucn, uidjt nut iibet bie gegen ben SBeftanb unb bie ^ntegrital bet bftetrcid)ijdvungatifd)cn SSlottotdjte geriditcten 3'tcte bet fetbifdjcn Spofitif, fonbern aud) iibet bie Betbredjcrifdjcn OTittct, bie bic gtojjfet6ifd)e p:opaganba in Sctbicn jur lhteid)ung biefev %\de anjuwenben fid) nid)t fd)eute. ©a8 Snbjicl biefet 'Politic' War bic attmat)lid)e SReBofationierung unb fdjtiefjlidje Cosircnnimg bet fubofUidjcn ©ebietdteile bei bfteraid)tfdj(icrung miitbe gcmad)t, iHumdnicn butd) cine init >5ilfe ,"Hanfreid)d untcruomnicnc 'Ptopaganba an iRufjtanb gefettct, Setbien auf Sodnien unb bie SctjegoftHua gewiefen wctben. Untet bicfen llmftdnbcn mufjtc fiftctteid) fid) fagen, bafj ed webet mit bet' TOutbe nod) mit bet Selbftci Ejaltung bet SJlonardjie oeteiubat wdte, bem iteiben jenfeitd bet ©tenjc nod) Idnget tatcntod jujufcijen. Die t. unb f. SRegictung be- nad)tid)tigte und Bon biefet Sluffaifung unb etbat uufctc 2lnfid)t. Slud Bollem 5etjcn V fonntcn ivir unfcrcm Sunbcsigcnoffen unfcr GinBerfianbniS mit feincr Ginfd)a|ung ber Sadiioge gcbcu unb ifjm Berfidjern, bof; cine Slftion, bic cr fur notiocnbig Ijieltc, inn bcr gegen ben SJcftanb ber ItJonarcfiie geridjteten SSeroeguug in ©erbien rin Gnbc ju uiadicn, Unfere Bitligung finben rourbe. SJBir luaicii unS [)icvbci moid bcmujjt, bafj ein ettnaigcS EriegcrifdjeS SSorgeljen Ofterrcidj-Ungarus gegen ©erbien Siiifjlanb auf ben *P£an bringen unb 11113 liiranit unferer 5>nnbcS- BfUcbt cntfprcdicnb in oinrn Rrieg oermicfetn fbnnte. 5Cir fonntcn abcr in bcr Gr- fenntniS bcr Bitalen Jntcreffcn Oftcrrcid) Uiig.iriis, bic oiif bem Spic(e ftanben, unfcrcm 8unbe§genoffcn locbcr ju ciner mit fciucv SBurbe nicl)t ju Bereinbarenben Wacbgicbigfcit ratcn nod) aud) ibm uufcrcu Seiftnnb in bicfem fdt)rDeven SJloment Berfagen. SBit fonntcn bic» urn fo memger, a!3 and) unfere ^ntereffen burd) bic cinbauernbe fcrbifdje 5Bu§(> arbcit auf ba3 cinpfinblirbftc bebrobt roatcn. fflenn c3 ben ©erben mit SRufjtonbS unb granfreidjS Sitfe nodi Kinger geftattet gcblicbcn marc, ben Seftanb bcr 9cad)6m> monarchic ju gefaljrbcn, fo roiirbc bic3 ben nlliual)lid)cn Sufammenbrudj Cftctreidjs unb cine Unterroerfung be? gefamten ©(amentumS untcr rnf fifcficm ©jeBter jur falgc (jaben, tooburd) bie ©teltung bcr gennanifeben Piaffe in 93citte(europa nnhaltbar hjflrbe. Gin moralifd) gcfcbmaditcs, burd) bag SSorbringcn bc« ruffifcr)en SpanflaroiSmug ju> fammenbrcdjenheg Dfterrcidj marc fur uns (ein StinbcSgcnoffe tneb^r, mit bem mir redjnen fonntcn, unb auf ben loir 11113 Bertaffen fonntcn, mie roil cs angcfid)t3 bcr immcr brotyenber roerbenben 5altung unferer oftlidjcn imb roefilidjen Scadjbnrn muffen. Sir licficn babcr Dftcrreidj obllig frcic §anb in feincr '-lltion gegen ©erbien. Sir l)aben an ben Borbereitungen ba;u nidjt teilgenommeu. Oftcrreidj uuiblte ten 5Ceg, in ciner Scote bcr ferbifdjett SRcgierung au3fubrlid) ben burd) bie llntcrfudjung bcS 3Jcorbc« bon ©arajeroo feftgeftcttten unmittclbaren 3ufammcn[)iing jmifeben bem ?})orbc unb bcr Don bcr ferbifrfjen Sicgicning niri.t uur gebulbcten, fonbern unterflugteii grojjferbifdjen SBeroegung barjutegen unb fon ibr cine BoQftanbige Jlbftcttung bicfesS JreibcnS foloie S3cftrafung bev ©djulbigcn ju forbcrn. ©leidjjeitig oerlaugtc Ofterreid) Uugarn als ©arautie fur bie Durdjfiiljruug bc§ 33crfaljren§ 'ieiluabnie feincr Organc an bcr !luteifud)ung auf (cibifduiu ©cbict unb befiuitioe Sluflofung bcr gegen Ofterreidj-Ungam louljlcnbcn grofjferbifctjen S3creine. Tic f. u. t. SRegitrung ftclltc cine Tviift Don 48 ©tunben jur bebingunggfofen Jlnuafjmc iljrcr ^orbcrungen. 'Pie fcibifcbc SJegicrung [)at eiiien 'Jag nad) Ubcvrcidumg ber Bfierretd)ifd)'ungarifd)eit ?)otc bie 3)lo6i[ifation begonncn. 81(8 nadi Slblauf bcr grift bic jcibifd)e SRegicrung cine Stntmort evtcilte, bie jioar in einigen 'Punften bic Siinfcfie Ofterrcid) Ungarn3 erfudte, im rcefentlidjen abcr tcut(id) ba8 Seftreben erfcniun licjt, bind) Sjerfdjleppung unb ncue S3er§anb(ungen ficb ben gcrcditcn tjorberungen bcr OTonarcfjie ju entjicljen, brad) bicfe bic biplonuitifdicn 2?ejicf)ungcn 511 ©erbien 06, olinc fid) auf teeitere Scrlianbliingcn einjulaffen obcr fid) Bon fcrbifdicn Serfidjcningen l)in[)altcn ju laffen, bcrcn SDert eg gcuugfam — ju feinem ©djaben — tcunt. S5on bicfem Slngenblicf an befanb fid) frftevreid) tatfad)licb im firtegSjlijranbt mit ©crbien, ben cS bann nod) burd) bic offijiedc Sricg^erflarung Bom 28. b.3J!t3. offcutlid) protlainierte. Com erften Slnfang bes Sconfliftg an fjaben loir auf bem.ctanbpimft geftanben, bafj ti fid) tiierbci 11m cine ^lugclegenfieit Ofiencid)3 tjanbclte, bic eg affein mit — 5 — ©erbicn jum HuStrag ju btingcn fjnben njiitbc. ©it l)abm bnb/t imfct gaiijc? 53cfttebcn batauf gctiditct, ben ficicg ju (ofalijieren unb bie anbeten Sftadjtc bauon ju iiberjeugen, bap Ojlerreidj Ungarn in bcred)tigtet Scoftocljt unb butd) bie Bcrbaltnijfe gejloungen fid) jum Slppcll nn bie SBaffen [jabe entfcfyliejjcn muffen. TOit [jaben nod)- briirflieb beu ©tanbpunft tterttctcn, bnjj fcin fiulttnfiaat bag Jterfjt (jabe, in bicfem fiampf gegen Uiifultut unb politifdje SSerbtedjennoral Oflcrrcirfj in ben Sinn ju fallen unb bie ©ctben ihrct gevedjtcn ©trafe ju entjicfyen. 3" bicfem Sinue fjaben wit uufetc S?cttvctct im Slusfanb iufh'uicvt ^ ©leidijcitig tcilte bie 6fterrcia)ifdj Ungarifdje SRegicnmg bcr SRuffifdjen mit, bafj. bet pon it)t bci ©erbien unteroominene ©djtitt lebiglid) cine befenfiuc SRajjregel gegen- iibet ben [ctbifrf)cn ffiuljlevcicn jum giclc t)abe, baf; abet Oftetteidv llngatii uotge- btungen ©atanticn fiir ciu irciictcii ftcuubfd)aft[id)csS SSettjaltcn Sctbicnii ber SRonaidjie gegeniibet Dctlangc. G£ liege Cftctteidj4Iugarn ganjlicb, fern, ctioa einc SSerfdjiebung bet SRadjtBet^dttnijfe auf bem Saltan (jetbeijufubrcn. Sluf unfete fit- Elatung, baf! bie ©cutfdic SRegietung bie Cofalijierung bcS fionfliftS toiinfefye unb ct- fltcbc, icutbe fonjol)! Don bet graiijofifdjoi ali bet Englifdjen SRegietung einc 5Bit> fung in bem gleidn-n ©innc jugefagt. ©icfen Seflvcbungcn getang cS inbcffeii nidjt, cine Cinmifdjung SRnjjianbS in bie bjlencidnfd^fevbifdjc Sluscinaubctfefumg 311 Bcvbiiibetn. Die 3?ujfifd)c SJcgietuug ctlicft am 24. 3uli cin amtfidjeii ftommunique, mo- nad) SRujjianb uuntbglicb in bem fevbifdi bfieneidiifdicn fiouftitt inbiffetcnt blcibcn fbnntc. £a;S gtcidjc ctftattc bet rufjifdie SBtinifier bc3 SluStoavtigen, Sett ©affononi, bem fiaifettidjen Sotfdjafter ©tafen ^outtateg, Sim Dtadjmittng beg 26. 3 U K 'iff' ^> c f. U. f Sicgictung abetmale; butd) i()tcn S3otfd)aftct ©t. ^Petersburg cttlatcn, Daji Oflcttcid) Ungatn fcinctlci EroberungSplane t)ab nub nut cnMid) an feinen ©tenjen 3!uf)c (jaben ivotle. 3m Caufe bc3 glcidicn Sages! gelangtcn inbes betcitij bie ctjlcn 5JJclbuugtn iibet ruffifcbe Sftobidnacfnmgcn . nad) SBcttin. 9}odj am 2fi. abenbd ftutben bie Saifctlidjen Sotfdjaftct in Bonbon, ortlid), bajj nod) fciuc SDtobiimadjungBotbte crgaugcu fci. G8 nnirben Icbi.ilidi SJorbereitungiSmafu'cgeln getroffcn, fein 9Pfetb nusgcljobcn, fcin SHe- feroift eingcjogen. 2Benn Oftetrcidviltigani bic fcrbifdjc @rctt;c ubcrfd)rcitc, roiitbcn bie auf oftetteich getidjteten SBMiUdtbejitfe SVieio, Obeffa, 9Jto3fau, Rafan mobUijiert. Untet fcincn Umftduben bic an bcr bcutfnjcn Jront Itegenbcn : 'Petersburg, ffiilna unb ffiatfdmu. Sluf bic i^ragc bes SJcUitorflttac^eg, 311 rocId)cm ~,\vcdc bic SRobil- x v niadnmg gegen feficrrcid) Ungatn crfolgc, aiitroortete bcr tuffifdje Kriegsminiftcr mit 54dife[> rf^< jucfen unb bcm SiimieiiS auf bic Dipfomaten 15er SBtititdtattacfye bejetdjnere batauf bic 9Hobifmad)uiigsinflfjnaI)tMn gegen Dftctteid) Ungatn a(8 audi fut rcutfcblanb bodift bebroblid). 3" ben batauf fotgenben Jagcn fotgten fid) bic 9cadjticf)tcn fiber ruffifdje SRobiiijietungen in fcbnellcm iempo. Untcr bicfen roarcn and) 9tiidiricrjtcn fibet SJorbetcitungcn nn ber beutfeben ©rcnjc, fo bic Serfjdugung bes ftriegs- ju|tanbe3 iiber fiorono unb bcr Slbmatfdj bcr ffiarfdjauet ©arnifon, SSetftatfung bet ©atnifon Slfejanbtowo. Sim 27. ^u'li ttafen bic ttjten 9Mbungen ubet Botbetettenbe Sftajjnaljmcn and; gtonfteidjs cin. ©08 14. JfotpS brad) bic SianbBet ab unb fetjrtc in bic ©atnifon jurticf. ^njvoifdicn fmb mir bemfibt geblicbcn, burcfi iiadibtiirflicbfrc Giiinnrtung auf bic fiabinette cine Sofalijictung be-.? SonftiftB burebjufeften. Sim 2f>. ij'ittc ©ir Gbuwb ©teB, ben Sotfdjfag gemadjt, bic riffcrenjen jloifdjcn Ofterrcid)-Ungarn unb ©erbien cincr untcr feinem 53otfi$ tagenben .VU'iifcrenj bcr 53otfd)aftcr Deutfd)(aiibs, granftcidjg unb 3tali«n§ ju untcrbrcitcn. 3" biefcm S3orfd)lag b/ibcn mit crtUirt, voir fonnten una, fo fehr nur fciuc 'Jctibenj billigten, A. nn cincr berartigen fionfctciij nid)t bctciligcn, ba mir Cjtcrreicb in fcinct Sluseinanber* $/' fcjjung mit ©crbicn nidjt oor cin curopai|\lfe3 ©cricbt jitictcn fonnten. gtanfteidj bat bein iiorfd)lag ©it Gbmarb Steps jugeftimmt, ct ift jebod) fd)licf}lid) baran gefdjeitert, baft Dftettcid) fid) it/m gegenub'cr, loie Porausjufctjen, afa icbncnb uerbiclt. ©etrcu unfcrcin ©runbfafe, bajj cine 33cmiirtclungsattiou fid) nidit nuf ben (ebig-' lid) cine oftetteidjifeb/ungatifdje Slngcfegenljcit batftcllenben ofletteicbifdj-fetbifdjen Son- flitt, foubciu nut auf bas 53ett;dltui8 ^mifdicu Oftetreid)-!Ingatn unb SRujjlanb bejicben foniite, ()abcu loir unfere 93emul)iingen fottgefegt, eineSBetftdnbigung ,ioifcbcn bicfen bciben SWdrfjten bcibctiiifiibrcn. Sir baku una abet aucb 6ereitgefiinben, mid) Jlblebnung bcr Sonfeteiijibee cincn locitcrcii Sotfdjlag ©it Sbroatb ©reus mid) JtUcu 311 uber^ mittdn, inbem cr antegt, Oftetteidj^Ungatn inoditc pdj eutfdjliejjcn, entmeber bic ferbifdje s «j. Slntwott abi geuiigenb ju bettadjtcn obct abet al^ ©tunbiage fut roeitere Btfptea^ungen. t^p^ t)ic Cftcrrcid)ifcb'ungarifd;c Stegictung bat unter roller 5Biitbigung uufcrcr »etmitte(nben N «, 'Jatigtcit ju bicfem S3otfcb,(ag bemctft, boji er nad) Gioffnuiig bcr geinbfcligfcitcn •0X ju (pat Eomme 'JroUbcm baben loir unfete SletmittelungSBetfucbe bis }uiti Suficrftcn fortgefc^t unb babcu in 'ffiicn gcratcn, jebes mit bcr ffiiirbe bcr ^louardiic Beteinbate Snt- gegcutommen 311 jcigen. Pcibet fmb aHe bicfe 'Bctmittetuiigsaftioiien Don ben taiLi- _ 7 — tdrifdjcn Sorbeteitungcii 9iujj(aub§ unb grnnfrcidiS ubtitjoU roorbcn. Sim 29. 3"1 tjat bie Siuffifdic JUcgierung in Scrlin amtlidj uiitgcteitt, bap fie lucr SlrmcebeiitEe mobilificrt f)abc. ©leidijcitig trafcn recitcrc 'Sletbuugen fiber fd)itcd fortfdjrcitcube mi[itdrifa)e Sorbcrcitnngen ^rantm^S ju ffiaffcr unb 311 ftinbc cin. fin bcmfclbcn 3&ge Ejattc bet ftaifcrlid)c SJotfdjaftet in ^eterSbutg elne Untcrrcbuug init bem ruffifrijeu SRiniftn bc3 JluSindrtigcn, fiber bic cr teiegrap()ifd) bai golgcnbe bericfjtetc: »(letrcid)'Ungani ju bctucgen, bie- jenigen gorbcrungen aufjugeben, bie bie SouBcrdnitrit ©erbieng antaftcu. 3d) l) a & e j inbem id) iebiglid) bie ffiiebergabe bet llntettebung jufagtc, mid) auf ben ©tanb- punft gefleilt, bap mir, nad)bem Si'uplnnb fid) ju bem Der()angnigDoUen ©djrittc bet SJlobitmadjung cntfdjloffeu [)abe, jebet ©ebanfenaufitaufd) Ijieruber fer)t fd)roierig, fecnu nid)t unmSgfidp etfdjeinc. SaS SKuptanb jejjt Don unsi 6(lervcid)'Ungavn gcgciiiiber Bertange, fci bagfeibe, was CfterreidyUngarn ©erbicn gegeniiber Dorgctuorfcn luerbe: einen Giugriff in ©ouBcrdnitdt3rcd)tc, Ofterrcicb/Ungatn fjabe Bcrfprod)en, burd) Grddrung .fcinca territoriaicn ^cgintcrcfjcments SRueffidjt auf ruffifebe 3nt«effen ju netjmen, eiit gropcS Sugefidubnis fcitensi cincg friegfiifjrenben ©laatea. 9)tan folltc be^^alB bic "Doppefmonardjic itjrc 2lngc(egcnr)cit mit ©ev6ien attein regcln (affen. G3 roerbe bcim griebensfdjiup immct nod) 3eit (cin, auf ©djonung bcr ferbifdjen SouBerdnitdt juriidjufommen. ©eljr ernft b,abe id) fjinjugcfiigt, bap augenbiicflirf) bie ganjc aufttoferbifdje -2lugc(cgenf)cit bet ©cfaijr ciner eurnpdifdjen Ronflagratitm gegeniiber in ben i&inter- grunb trete, unb fjabe mir atte SJciilje gegeben, bem SJiinijler bie ©rope biefcr ©cfaljr Dot Slugcn ju fiiljren. Gs loar nidjt moglid), ©afonoro Don bem ©ebanfen abjubringen, bag ©er&icn Bon SJuplanb je^t nid)t im ©tid) gclaffen raerben burfe«. GbenfaHs am 29. beridjtete bcr Sliiitdrattacbe in Petersburg tetegrapljifdj. iiber cine Untcrrcbung mit bem ©cncralftabscbcf bet ruffifd)eu 3lrmce: • 'tier ®enera((lab8d)cf Ejat mid) ju fid) bitten [affen unb mir etoffnet, bap et ■Bon ©einer Siajcftdt foeben fomme. Gr fci com fi'rieggminifter bcauftragt (Botben, mir uod)mat§ ju beftatigen, eg fei attc3 fo gebticben, ioie es mir Bor jnjct Sagen ber OTinifter mitgctcilt [)abc. Gr bot mir fdjriftlidic Sefidtigung an unb gab mit fein Gijrenlrort in feicrlidjftcr 3 orm i Da 6 nirgenbs cine SDlobitmadjung, b. f). Sin' jietiung tined eiiijigcn 2)}anne8 ober ?Pfcrbc3 bii jur ©tunbe, 'A Ul)r nad)> mittagg, erfolgt fci. Gr tonne fid) bafiir fur bie gufunft nidjt Dcrburgen, abcr root)! nad)briidlid)ft bc|tiitigen, bap in ben ^ronten, bic auf unfere ©renjen ge- ridjtet feinen, Bon ©ciner 95Jaje|tat fcine iDcobiUjterung genjiinfd)t roiirbe. Gj finb abcr tjier iiber erfolgte Gitijiel)ting oon SJcferoiften in perfd)icbentn ieilen be8 iRcid)3, aud) in fflarfdjau unb in SBilna, Bielfacbc 9Jad)rid)ten eingegangen. 3^ Ijabe bc§t)alb bem ©eneral oorgc^atten, bap id) burd) bie mit Bon ifrni gemadjten, Groffnungen cor cin Stdtfci gejtcilt fei. 3luf DffijicrSparole erttiberte .cr mit jcbod). bap foidje 5cad)rid)ten unrid)tig feiettj e* moge ^ie unb ba aHenfatU cin falfdjet SHatm ootliegen. _ s _ 3dj mujj bag ©efBtddj in 'Jlnbetradjt bet pofiticen, jafjlteidjeh, fiber ctfolgt» (Sinjief)uiigeil Dorliegenben 91ud)riditcn als eincn SBerfudj bctradjtcn, un3 fiber ben Umfang bet bisljerigcn 93}ajjuaf)men iitejufiitjrcn • ra bic jRufpfdje SRegievung auf bie terfdjiebenen SInfragen fiber bic ©runbe iljtcr brplicnbcn Saltung bc8 bfteren bnrauf (unities, baft 6ftraeie6/Ungarn nod) fcinc Konterfation in ^Petersburg begonnen t)abe, cr[)iclt bet ofterreidpifdj-ungartfdje 25otfd)qfter in speterSBntg am 29. juli auf unfete Sluregung bic SBetfung, mit Vicrrn ©affonoio bic Sonuerfntion ju beginnen ©raf ©japan; iff ermddjtigt rootben, bic burdj ben Seginn bes firiegSjujtanbtS aderbingS iiLu-iEjoftc SJott an ©ctbicn bcin tuffifdjen SJrintjlet gegeiifiber ju ertdutern unb jebe Jlnrcgung entgegenjunetymen, bic ton ruffifdjei gcitc au3 nod) roeitcr crfolgeu f elite, fotoie mit ©affonoro nttc bitctt bie , ojlcrtcicbidj'tujfifdien Sejieljungen tangierenben gragen jii befprcdjen. ©d)u(tcr an ©adulter mit Englanb r)abcn wir uuausgcfcijt an bet 33ermitte- tungSaftion fottgearbcitet unb jcbcn Borfdjlag in ®icn unterftujjt, ton bem wir bie 3Jtoglid)teit cinec frieblidjen t'bfuug bes .ftonflifts cvf)cffen ju fbiiuen glaubtcn. SBir Ijaben nod) am 30. cineii englifd)en Sotfdjfag nadj ICicti roeitergegeben, bet als Sap bet 3Setf)anblungen aufftettte, Oflcireid)-llngatn folic uad) crfolgtem @in- matfd) in ©erbien bott (cine Sebingungen bittictcn. SBit mufjten annetnnen, bafj 9!u[jlanb bicfc 3?aji3 afjepticten rourbe. ffidljteub in bet 3cit torn 29. b\i 31.3"'! biefe unfete Semutjungen urn 55crniittclung, Bon bet cnglifdicii Diplomatic untcrfrujit, mit fteigenbet SringlidjEeit fortgeffiE)rt wutben, Eamen immci ctneute unb fid) tjattfenbe SJlelbungen iiber ruffifdje MobilifierungSmafjnafjmen. ituppcnanfammlungcn an bet oftpteufufdien ©tciijc, bie Stofjdngung bes KriegSjujranbeS fiber fdmtlidje roid)tige'n cn o' c 'Acn Sagcn fanb jroifdjen ©eiuct SRajejtdt bem Scaifer unb Svbnig unb bem 3 aven DtifofauS cin 'Jelegranimmcdifcl fiatr, in bem ©eine SSajejidt ben %axtn auf ben broiifnbcn ^[)araftet bet ruffifdien SJJobilmadjung unb bie gottbaucr fciuet cigencu tetmittclubcn Satigfeit aufmcilfam madjte. Jim 31. 3 ul ' tid)tetc bet 3 av an ©tine SKajefifit ben .ftaifct folgcnbe* Setcgramm: •>3d) banfc Dir ton fierjen fiit Tciuc Bermittlung, bie cine Soffnung aufleucbttn lafjt, ba(j bod) nod) adeS ftieblidi enben tbnnte. ISs ift tcdjnijd) unmbglid), unfere militdtifd)cn SJorbereitungen ciuiuflcllcn, bic bind) 6(lerreid)8 9Sobilifictung notitcnbig gemotben fuib. 5Bit fi n b itcit baton cntfetnt, eincn ftrieg ju wunfeben. .©olange roie bie 'Cctbanblungcn mit Oftctrcid) iibct ©ctbicn anbauern, tterben meine Sruppen fcinc Ejetauefotbcrnbe Jlttion uutcincf)mcu. ~}d) gebe ?it mcin feictlidie? 'Bott batauf. 3d) tcrttaue mit allet Sraft auf ©otte§ ©nabe unb boffc auf ben ISrfolg Deinet SCetmittlung in Sicu fiit bic ©oljlfaljtt unfetct Canber unb ben grieben SutopaS. ©ein Vix b,n$[\d) etgebener 91ico(au3.« — 9 — 9ftit biefcm Sctegtamm bti ^am\ frcujtc fid) folgenbcS cbenfa(I>3 qui 31. 3»i' urn 2 lll)t p. m. abgtfanbteS Sctegramm Seiner SJJnjejlat id SaiftvS: »3luf 'rcincn Sipped an ^tcinc greunbfdjaft unb ©einc v 8ittc urn Mciuc ©life babe icb, cine SSermittctungSaftion jtBifcfjcn ©cinct unb bcr 6jlcrrcid)ifd)-l.lngarifd)Oi SRegwnmg aufgenommen. SBatjrenb bicfe Slfticu im fflaugc war, fiub IVinc Snippet! gegen ba3 mil Bcrbunbete Oflcvvcid) Uugatn mobilipcrt Worben, njobnvd), \vk 3d) T>ir fdjon mitgeteiit Ijabe, SJlcinc SSermittclung beinalje illuforifd) gemad)t loorben iff. Srojibem babe 3* fie fovrgefefct. Olunmeljr crfyalte 3 r 6 jitBerlnffige Jiadjvidjten fiber ernfle RriegSBotBereitungcn audi an S&einet Dfltidjeii ©renje. Vic SSerantroortimg fur bic ©idicrljcit SJJeiueS SReidjeS jtmngt OTid) ju befenfiocn ©cgenmafjregeln. 3d) bin mil 3Rcineii Semtifjungen mn bic Erfjattung beS SJeltfriebenS bis an bic aufjerfie ©renje bc3 mbg(id)cn gegangen 9Udjt 3d) trage bic SerauttBortung fiiv ba3 Unljcif, bag je|t bcr ganjen jiBilijierten Sclt broljt. 9}od) in biefcm Slugcn&litfc licgt e3 in Deincr §anb, cs abjuroenben. Sliemanb bebrob,t bic Gbre unb SJtadjt SliitfdanbG, ba3 root)! auf ben Sifolg SJleinet S3ermitteiung biittc marten fonueu. ©ie "Mir Don SDleinem ©rojjBater auf bent Sotcnbctte uberfommene ftreunbfd)aft fur Did) unb ©ein iReid) ifl 2>lir immer tyeitig gewefen, unb 3^) f) abe frcu J" JRujjtanb geftanben, menu e3 in fdjrocrcr 8cbrangni§ rrar, befonberti in fciucm ichten Sriege. ©et, griebe GurcpaS fann Don ©ir nod) jejjt crl)itltcn roerben, loenn !Hufj- (anb fid) entfdjttejjt, bic militdrifdjen SDlajjnaljmen einjiificHcn, bic Deutfd)(anb unb Ofierrcidj'Ungarn bebrot)cn. « 91od) cbc bic« Mcgramm fcine S3eftimmung crrcidjte, teat bic BereitS am 53or- mittag bcSfelben SagcS angcorbnetc, offenfidjtlich gegen un3 geriditete, SRobitipcmng ber gefamten tufjifdicn Strcitfrdftc in rollcm ©angc. ©a$ Sclcgramm beS 3 llren abcr trar uin 2 Ubr nadjmittagS aufgegeben. 9tad) Sefanntteetben bcr rufjifdtcu ©cfamtmobilifation in Scrlin erljiclt am ^ 9lad)intttag besj 31. 3 11 " ^ ct Saiferlidje SSotfcBafter in ^3ttcr8biivg ben Sefcljl, bcr x SRufftfdjtn Siegierung 311 eroffnen, Beutfdjtanb l)abc alS ©cgcnmnBt'cgci gegen bic ad- gemcinc SJlobitifietung bcr ruffifdicn ?lrmee unb giottc ben Hrieggjujiaiib berhinbet, bem bic SRobilifation folgen miiffc, irenn SRufjtaub nicbt binncn 12 'Stunbcn fcinc militdrifdjen ?)uipiiat)ineu gegen ©eutfdjtanb unb C'jicri'cidj-lliigarn cinficlle unb Peutfd)- lanb bacon in SenntniS fchc. ®(cid)jcitig trurbc bcr 5raifcrlid)e S^ptfdjaftcr in ?Pari8 angewiefcii, con bcr granjbfifcbcn iKcgicrung binncn 18 Stunbcn cine Grfldruug }u Bcrlangcn, ob fte in ^ft, einem ruffifd) bcutfd)cn Stricgc neutral biciben tnoQc. ©ic SRufjifdje Siegicrung [;at burcb iijrc bic ©id)cv[)cit bct< 9Jcid)8 gcfdljrbenbc 9Ro6i(ntad)itng bic miibfamc S3etmttte(ung8arbeit ber curopdifdien StaatStanjlcicn furj Bor bem Grfoigc jcrfd)(agen. "Die 2J!obilifierungSniaf;rcgcIn, iiber bercu Grnft bcr 9iuffifd)cn Sicgicrung son Slnfang an fcine 3 l0C 'f E ' gelajfcn nourben, in fficrbinbung ttiit ifjrcr fortgefejttcn vH'tciignung jcigen flar, bafj SRuJIanb ben S«ieg hjolite. ©et S^aifcrlidjc Sotfdjaftex in Petersburg i)at bic i[)m aufgetragene Slittciiung an 5Evrn Safonom am 31. 3 11 '' um 12 Ub^r nad)t3 gemadjt. Giuc Slntivort ber iKuffifdien Kcgicruug (jierauf t)at un* nic crrcidjt. 2 Stunbcn uad) Jlbtflttf bcr in bicfer SDlittcilung gcftcdtcn ^riil t)at ber 3?t an <2einc 2J}ajeftdt ben Saifer tclegrapljiert: 3 — 10 — • 3d) §a&e 'Mil Jelcgtamm etfyaltcn, id> uctficljc, baft ©u gejroungcn bift, mobil ju marf)cn, abet id) mbcbtc ton ©it bicfclbe ©atantie l)aben, bie id) ©it ge- geben fjnbe, ndtitlicf), bap bicfc ?)taftuabmcn nid)t Krieg bcbcutcn unb bafj luit fovt- fasten rociben, ju ocrfjnnbeln, jum yScik unferet bcibcn i'anbct unb bea attgemeinen jltiebcna, bcr iinfercn §crjen fo tcucr tjl. Unferet langbcroaljrtcu greunbfdjafi muft ea mit ©ottee yilfc gclingeii, Stutoergiejjen ju r>crl)inbcrn. ©ringcnb cuoarie id) ' poll SJerttauen ©eine Slntroort - vucrauf t)at Seine SJlajeflat bcr ffaifer geantroortet: -3d) banfc ©it fur 3>iit 'Selegtamin, id) l)abe ©einct SHegierung geftetn ben SBeg angegeben, burdi ben allein nod) bcr Sricg rcrmieben rocrben fann. 06- rooljl id) um cine Slntroott flit beute mittag crfudjt f)atte, bat midi bis jejjt nod) fein 2clegramm SReinea 33otfd)nfters mit einec Jlntroort ©einct iRcgictung erteid)t. 3d) bin babct gejiuungeii icorben, meine Slrmee ju mobilifierem Gtne fofortige flare unb unmijjBetftanblidje Slntroott Ccincr Ilicgicrung ijl bet cinjige 5Bcg, um enblofca Slcnb ju Dermeibcn. His id) bieje Slntwort crbaltcn babe, bin id) ju meiiiet Sjettubnia nidjt in bet Cage, nuf ben ©egenftanb ©einca SetegrammB einjugeljen. 3d) mu ft au f ba& ernflefte oon ©ir ccrlangen, baft ©u unDerjugiidj ©ciuen Jtuppen ben syefctjt gibft, untct fcincn Umftdnbcn aud) nut bie leifeftc Serlcjjuug unferet ©tenjen ju begel)en..i ©a bie SKujjlanb geftellte gtift Dctfttidien mat, ob)ne baft tine Slntroort auf unfete Jlnfrage cingegangen mare, f)at Seine SSlajeftdt bet Saifet unb Sonig am 1. Stuguft um 5 Ubr p. m. bie 5Ttobilmadning bea gefamteu beutfd)en Seerea unb bet fiaiferlidjen 3Jtarine befol)len. ©et Saifetlid)e 53otfd)aftcr in *Petetsbutg [)atte injroifeben ben Sluftrag erlialten, faQ8 bie Stuffifdje SRegicrung innetb)alb ker . il)t geftellten jjrifl feinc beftiebigenbe Slntroort ertcilen rourbe, ifjt ju erflarcn, baft Wit nad) Jlblebnung unfetet ,lorb mittage, an bem ba« cben ctnjiibnte Jclegtamm bea 3 are n abgefanbt Irat, unfete ©tenje unb tudten auf beiitfdicm ©cbict Dot. JSiermit bat SKuftlanb ben ictieg gegen una begonuen. 3njlt>ifd)cn t»atte bet fiaifetlidje 5?otfd)aftet in *Patia bie ifim befoljlcne 21n- ftagc an baa ftanjofifrfje fiabinctt am 31. 3 U I> um 7 Ufjt nadjmittaga gcflcHt. ©et ftanjofifdjc OTinifietptafibent ^at batauf am 1. Sluguft um 1 U^t nadj- mittaga einc jiroibeutige unb uubefticbigenbe Slntroott etteilt, bic ubct bie @teDung< nabme 3 vi,n f rc id)a fein flatea SMtb gibt, ba et fid) batauf befdjvanfte, ju etftaten, gtanfteid) routbe baa tun, roaa feine 3 nf t rf ff cn t^m. geboten., ®enigc ©tunben batauf, um 5 Utjt nadjmittaga, routbe bie Sftobilijietung bet gefamtcn ftaiijbfifdjen Sltmec unb glotte angeotbnet. Sim OTotgcn bea nad)jlen 'Jagea etoffnete gtanheid) bie geinbfeUgfeitett.', Slbgefd)loffen am 2. Slugufl mittags. — 11 _ HorWeutfcbe H\l$emeine 3dtung. 25. 3uli 1914. t)tc Hotc Ofterrci&'Ungame cm SerbUn. 33erlin, beu 24. 3uli. c ©efanbtc in Selgrab ubetreicfjfe gefJttn abenb 6 Ut;r ber ferbiftf)cn SRegierung eine 5Jerbalnote mit ben gorberungen bet oflerreicijif^'tingnrifctien iRcgierung. • jn ber Diotc mitb bie Slnttuort BiS ©onnabcnb, ben 25. 3 u( >/ *> Ufjr abenbg, Bcrlangt. — ©ie i)at folgenben SBotttaut: Sim 31. SRdrj 1909 bat bev ftontglicb ©erbifebe ©efanbte am Wiener gofe im Stufttage feinct SRegierung bet ftaifcvlicfycii unb ftoniglirfjen iRcgierung folgeube Grfldrung abgegeben: »©erbien ancrfennt, bafs eg buret; bie in S3o8nicn gefdjaffene Jatfarfje in feinen iRccfjten nicbt beriit)rt rourbe, unb bajj c8 jitf) bemgemdf) ben Gnt' fdjliefjungen anpaffen ttnrb, roclcfyc bie 5Jcdcf/te in bejug auf Slrtifel 25 beg SSerlinet 33ertragg treffen rcerben. 3 n ^ em ©tvbicn ben SKatfdjldgen ber ©rofjmdcbte golge leiftct, vcrBfttcbtct eg fief), bie ftaltung beg 'Protefteg unb beg Sffiiberftanbeg, bie eg rjinftrbtlicti ber Slnnejton feit Bergangenem Dftobcr eingenommen t)at, aufjugeben, unb Bcrbflict;tct fief; fcrner, bie SRicfitung feiner gegeulodrtigen s Dolitif gegeniiber Oftcrrcicb- Ungurn ju anbern unb funftigljin mit biefem leftcrcn auf bem ^ufte freunbnacf)bat< lict/er S3ejiel)ungen ju leben. Die ©cfcfjirbte ber le|ten 3 a ^ re nun > u "b iugbefonbere ber frbmerjlicljcn Ereignijfe beg 28. 3 un '/ t)a6en bag t!orf)anbcn[ein eiucr fuboerfiBen 33eroegung in ©erbicn einriefen, beren 3W $ if 1 / Mn &*t o fretrcicr)tf cf) ■ uitgattf cben OTonarcijic ge- roiffe J.eile iijxei ©ebietg logjutretmen. Diefe Scrocgung, bie unter ben Wugen ber fcrbifdjen SRegicrung cntftanb, b,at in ber golge jenfeitg beg ©ebietg beg Kbnigreidjg buret) ?lfte beg 3;ctrorismu8, buret; cine 9ieit;e Ben Slttcntaten unb buret; 9Rorbe Jlugbrucf gefunben. SEeit cutfernt, bie in ber Srfldrung Bom. 31. SStdtj 1909 entljaltenen formcllen 3Jercflia)tuiigei\ ju crfullcn, t)at bie ttbniglicf; ©etBifet)e SRegicrung nicf)tg getan, um biefe Seroegung ju unterbrucfen. ©ic bulbete bag Bcr6rect;crifcr;e Jreiben ber Ber- fdjiebenen gegen bie SBionarcfjic gerid)teten s Bcreine unb Sereinigungen, bie jiigtllofe ©Bradjc ber ?ref[c, bie 'Berljerrlicbung ber Urt)eber Bon Jlttentaten, bie Jeilnafjme Bon Offijieren unb Seamtcn an fuboerfmen Umrrieben, fte bulbete eine ungefunbe "ProBaganba im bffcntlicfyen Unterridjt unb bulbete fctjlieflicf; aHe SRanifefktionen, roe(cf;e bie ferbiftt)e SeBolterung jum ©ajje gegen bie SDlonardjie unb jut Setadjtung itjrer @inriet)tungcn Bcrleiten tonnten. bet ganjen Sclt bie grauenb;aften golgen foldjet ©ulbung jeigten. Gs* erbtlit ous ben SluSfagen unb ©ejlcmbniffen btr Btrbrcefitrifebcn Urljebtr bc3 SlttentatS Bom 2S. 3uni, bajs ber SSlotb Bon tScrajcluo in SMgrab austgtbtcft itrnrbt, biif, bit SWorbet bit ffiaffen unb Somben, mit benen fit ausgtftattet rcaren, Bon ferbifdjen Offijiereu unb Scamtcn crbitltcn, bit btr SRarobna Obbrana ongt' tjbrtcn, unb bafi fd)liejj[itf) bie SBefbrbeiung btu iierbrcdjer unb btttn SBafjen nnrf) 83o8iiien Bon (citenben fovbifdjen ©tenjDrganen Bcranftalttt unb bura)gefut)rt nnirbe. ■Jit angeffitjtten gvgebniffe ber Uiilcrfudjung gtftattcn cS bev t. unb f SRc- gietung uicbt, nod) [anger bie &altung juiBartenbcr Cangmut ju bcobaebtcn, bie fie tin"* \ibre jenen Jtcibereieii gegeniibet eingenommen t)atte, bit ibren SJiittelpunft in SMgrab Ijnbcn unb Bon ba auf bit ©efciete bet SDJonardjie ubertragen lotrbtn. ©iefe Grgebniffc (egen ber f. unb f. SRegierung Bieluicbr bit Spfiidjt auf, llmtriebcn tin Gnbe ju bcrcitcn, bit cine bcftaiibige S3ebroI)ung fur bie SRulje ber OTonarefjie bilben. Urn biefen ^lofif 511 erreidjen, ficfjt fief) bie E. unb f. SRegierung gejtoungen, Bon ber ferbifdjen SRegierung cine offijiette Strfidjtrung ju Bcrlangen, bnf) fie bie gegen Ofierrcid) Utigarn gcricbtett Sptopaganba Btrurtcitt, ba8 t)cif;t bie ©efamrljeit btr SBeftrcbungcn, bcren Gnbjicl a ift, Bon ber SBionardiie ©ebictc [oSjufofeii, bie ibr augehbicu, unb baf; fie fid) BcrBf lidjttt, biefc Ber- brerf)erifd)c unb terroriftifd)t *proBagauba mit nllcn SJlitteln ju unter> briiden. Urn bitfeu 33erpf[id)tungcn cinen feicr(id)en Stjarafter ju geben, mirb bie fioniglid) Scrbifdjc SRegierung auf ber crficn eeite ibrts offtjitHtu Organs Bom 26./13. 3u(' nadjfotgenbe ErMarung Btvbffentlidicn : -Tie S?6niglid) ©erbifctje SRegierung oerurtcitt bit gegen Oflerretcb/Mngarn gerictjtete SPropaganba, bafj bcif;t bie ©efamttjei't jencv 33e|tre6ungen, bercn 3't' '* ifi, Bon btr 6fierrcid)ifd) ungarifcb)en SJeonardiic ©ebiete (oSjutrennen, bit if»r angt> (ibven, unb fit btbautvt aufridjiigfl bit graucnljaftcn gotgen bitftr oerbtedjertfdjen Sanblungen, i ric fioniglid) Serbifdje SRegierung bebauett, bafj fcrbifdit Cffijitrc unb Statute an ber oorgenaunten Spropaganba teilgcnommcn unb baimt bit fvcunbnadjbarlieben SSejieljungcn gefa^tbet Oaten, bit 311 pflegcn fub bie ftbniglidje SRegierung burd) iljre Erffarung Bom 31. SKarj 1909 feicrliebft Berpflid)tet t)atte Tic Sibniglidje SRegierung, bie jeben ©ebanfen obcr \c^m 33erfudj eintr Gin' mifdjung in bit Wcfebid'c btr SStinoIjntv ion;! imintr eiut'5 icilej &jterreid) UngaraS ini|6illigt unb juriicEtBcifr, eradjtet ti fur it)re Spftidjt, bit Ofpjtere unb Seamten unb bie gefamtc SeBblferung bc8 fionigreid)3 gunj auSbrucflidj aufmerffam ju madjeu, baf, fie funftig^in mit fiu^erftet ©ttenge gegen jene *ptrfontu oorgctjen wirb, bit fid) berartiger ©anblungen fdmlbig matficn fodtcii, fianblungcn, btntn Dorjubeugcn unb bit ju untcrbrudtn fie altc Slnftrcngungtu nuidicn mitb.« Biefe GrfKrung roitb gteidjjeitig jut Svtnntnia ber Roniglidjen ?lrmee bind) eintn iageSbcftf)! ©einct OTajtftdt be8 SonigS gtbraebt unb in bem offijicden Organ ber 5lrmet Berbifeiitlidit mtrben. Tie Roniglidj Serbifdje SRegierung Berpflidjtet fid) iibtrbitS, 1. jebe ^Publication 311 uutctbriidtu, bit 311111 yaft unb jut SSeradjtung ber 3)Ionard)ie aufreijt unb bertn aOgemcine Senbtnj gegen bie tervitoriale 3nttgritdt btr [tbteren gtridjttt ift, — 13 — 2. fofort mit facv Jluffofnug bcs SSereinS »9cnrobnn Obbrmin. l)orjiijc[)cn ; bcffcn gefamtc Spropagonbamittel ju fonfiijjicren unb in bcrfctbcn Sfficifc gcgen bic nnbcrcii 33ereinc unb Scrcinigungen in ©erbien eiiljufrijreitcn, bic fid) mit bov 'Propngnnbn, gcgen Cjlcrvoirb llnjiirn befdjaftigen Tic Kbniglitbc Wcgicrung loirb bit nbtigcn SJlafiregeln tveffen , bnmit bic aufgcloftcn SScrcine nidjt etloa iljre Satigfeit nntcv onbcrem Stamen ober in anberev gorin fortfejjen, 3. ol)nc Scrjug nuS bcm offcntl ichcn Untciridit in ©erbien, fovoo[)[ lonl beu Bet)rtdrper alii and) bie 5?et)rmittc[ betrifft, allcs ju befeitigen, mass baju bicnt obcr bicncn fonnte, bie *Propagauba gcgen Ofierreicb/Ungarn ju itaQren, 4. auS bcm Siilitarbienft unb bev Bcvloaltung im aUgemciucu afle Offijicre unb Seamte 311 entferncu, bic bcr fSropaganbn gcgen Oftcrrcid) Ungarn fdjulbig finb, unb bcrcn 9(amcn nntcv SJlitlciluug bes gcgen fie uorlicgcubcn J91ateri8 '" feinblid)er 5Beife gegcu Oftcrteid) Ungarn ausjufprccben, 10. bic t. u. t. 9icgicrung ob)nc SScrjug 0011 bet Dutdjfurjrung ber in ben oorigeu 'Puntten jufammengefajjten 3Rajjnar)rnen ju oerftdnbigen. "Die i. u. f Sicgierung crroartet bie Slntiooii bet ftoniglidkn SKegietmtg fpatcfkns bis; Sonnabenb, ben 25. b. IWtS., um 6 Uf)r nadimittaga. Eine Slcmoite iiber bie Ergcbnifje bcr Untcvfucbung con ©erajetto, fotoeit fie fid) auf bic in < ]3untt 7 unb 8 genannten gunftionare bejic[)cn, ift biefcr s llote bei- gcfd)[offen. Bcilage. £>ie bci bem ©erid)t in ©erajcioo gcgen ben ©abvilo ^3riucip unb ©enoffen loegen beS am 28. 3uni b. 3- begangencn 3Rcud)clmotbcii bcjicbungswcifc recgen iKitfd)u[b b)ieran an[)angige ©trafunterfudjung l)at bisljer ju folgenbcn geft- fteduugen gcfiitjrt: 1. Xcr ^(an, ben (Srs^eijog granj gerbinanb roaljrenb fciueS ?lufcnt()a[te« in ©crajewo 511 cvmorbcu, tontbe in Selgrab Bon ©abriio 'Princip, 9!cbeIjfo ©abvinoric, — 14 — eincm geroiffen N 5iilan GiganoBic unb "Jriffp ©rabej imtet 53eit)ilfe bc$ WajorsS 33oja ianttoftc au3geb,ecft. 2. jT'ic fcd)3 Sombeii unb Bier Stoioningpiftolen, beren fid) bie Sirtjrcdjer al§ SBetfjeuge bcbicutcn, rourbem bcm Ptincip, ©abtinoBic unb ©raBej in SSclgrab Don cincm geroiffen SMati EiganoBic unb bcm SJiajot 53oja Sanffofie Betfctjafft unb iibergcbcn. 3. Tic Sombcn fmb vuinbgranatcn, bic bem Saffenbcpot bet fcrbifdicn Jlrmee in firaaujeoac ciitflamnicn 4 Urn bus ©elingeu bcS ?lttentnt§ ju fid)ern, unferroieg SJlilan ISiganoBic bca 9ptincip, bcu ©abtinoBic unb ©rabcj in bev ©ciiibljabung bcr ©ranatcn unb gab in einera 'i.'atbc neben bcm ©cr/iejjfetbe Don lopfdjtbet bem ^Srincip unb ©raBej Unter- ridjt im Sctjicjjcit init SBroroningpiftolen. 5. II in bcm T'riunp, ©abtinoBic unb ©rnbci ben Qbetgaiig fiber bic boSnifdj- [jeijegonnnifrfje ©tenje unb bic Sinfdjmuggehing ibrer SBaffen ju ermogtidjen, rourbe cin gnnjc3 gcbcimcc. Jran^povtfnflein butdj EiganoBic organifiert Per Gintritt bcr Scrbredier fnmt ilircn Waffcn nadi 58o3nien unb bcr oetjegotoiua rourbe oon ben ©renjljauptieuten Bon Sdtiibah (!lv\ibc SPopoBic) unb Cojiiicn foroie Bon ben 3°Q' oraancn SRubiBoj ©tbic Bon Cojnica mit v 3cibilfc mer)teret anberer 'pcrfoncn burdv gcful)rt. Hor^cutfcbc Mlgemeine 3eitim». 3nJi I»14. ©fkiTrictvilnctani unb bic fcrbififrc Xlotc. Si en, 27. ;}uli. Tic 91ote bcr Sonigltdj ©erbifd)cn SRegietung oom 12./25. 3uli 1914 [autct in bcutfdicr iibcrfckuua, tote folgt: Die ffbniglidje SRegietung l)a[)renb ber Daucr ber SJalfanfrife in ja^lteidjen fallen Scmeifc fur feine pajipftifrbe unb gcmdfjigtc 'Politit geliefett, unb c^ if! nut Scrbicn unb ben Cpferu, bic e8 au«fd)liefilid) im 3ntcrcffc beS curopaifrben ^riebenS gcbradjt b,at, ju banfen, rcenn bicfer gricbe crtjaltcn gcblicbcn ijl. — 15 — Dqjii bemctrt bie OftcttcicbifdjUngarifdje Segictiinjp ■Die Sconig(id) @etbifd)e Si'egietung befefytantt fid) bavanf, fc|rjufk[Ien,_bajj fctE ^Ibgabe bet Eiflotung »om 18. 9}}dtj 1909 ppn fcitcn bet ®ctbifd)cn SNegictiliig) unb U;ver Orgnnc fcin SSerfudj jut fliibevung bet Stclluug 2?o8iitc«8 uiib bet »3 el 'j c- ' gotpina imtcrnoinmcn murbe. Samit Beifdjicbf fie in bchmfit ipiilfiivlidjct Wcifc bic ©rmiMagcn unfetet art 'f e ' U1,D ^' e fricblicfie Sltbeit uon ®efc(lfd)aftcn finb, Slufjeiungen, bic fajl in alien Cdnbem ganj gclpbfynlicfye 6t- fdjcrhuiigen fmb, unb bie fid) im aQgcmcincn bet ftaatlid)cn fipnttoUe cntjiet)cn.. Dicg urn fo ipeniget, alg bie Sbuiglidic SRegietung bci bet Cbfung einct ganjen Sieilje Ben 3tagcn, bie jlpifd)en <£etbicn unb Qfietteicb/Ungatn aufgctaudjt (paten, grofje^ Gnrgegenfpmmeu bclpiefcn hat, lpobutd) eg ibt geluugcn ifi, beten gtijftctcn "Jeil jugunften beg gottfdjtitts bet bciben Scadjbatlanbei ju lofen. Slnintrfung bet f. unb f SJcgictung: et gegen bie Seibifdjc SHegierung erbobene BoriDiirf gct/t cben baijin, biifj fie eg gcmjlid) untetlaffen l)nt, i[)te 'Pteffe unb iljre iCcteiue ju bcauf- fidjtigen, beten SBitfung im momucijicteinblidjen ©inue fie tanntc. ©ie 9}pte SctbienS fat)tt fott: die Sbnig[id)c Sicgictung mat best)al6 butd) bic 25c()auptuugcn, bap ?lngcl)Ptige ©etbicnS an bet Sorbereitung beg in Sctajemo sctiibtcn SlttentatS teiigenpinmcn' (fatten, fdjmctjlid) ubettafebt. Sic ^atte etreattet, jut 5)!itipitfung bci ben 9!acb- fptfajungen ubct bicfeg Sctbtccbcn eingciaben 511 loetbcn, unb war bctcit, um ib,te BoQtommcne Stottctttjcit buret) laten ju bcipcifen, gegen alle ^Jetfonen Botjugeb^en,: ()infid)tlid) wcldjct it)t 5)(ittcilungcn jugcfpinmcn ipatcn. Slnmctfung bet f. unb f. SRegietung: "Dicfe S3e&auptuiig ift uiuid)tig. ®ie @etbifd)e Siegietung n?at ubet ben gegen ganj beflimmte s Peifonen beficbenben "Setbacbt genau untcttid)tet unb nid)t nut in — 16 — bcr Page, fonbern and) nadj Ujrcn iuterncn ©tfejjtii ncrpflid)tet ; ganj fpontan Crr- b,ebungcn einjuteiten. Sic tjat in bicfer SRid)tung geir ni i c n S : ©en SBunfdjen bet f. imb E. SRegierung entfprcdjcnb ift bic ftoniglid)e SRegicruug forait tacit, bem ©etidjt otjne SRud'firfjt auf ©tetlung unb SRang jcben fcrbifrficn iSt.iat3iiiigel)6rigen ju fibetgeben, fiir beffen Seilnarjme an bem Cscrajcrooet S8etbrcd)en itji Seroeife gcliefcrt wetben fotltcn. ©ic t>crpflicE>tct fid) insbefonbete fluf bcr crflcn ©cite beg SlmttMattS com 13/26 Juli fotgenbe tinuntiation ju Betbffcnriicben : ©ic Konigiid) Setbifdje SRegietung octurteilt jebe SPtopaganba, bie gegen 6fierteid)-llngntn getidjtet fcin folltc, b b bie ©efatntfjeit bcr Scftrcbungcn, bic in letter Ginie auj bic Poiireifjung einjetner ©cbictc Don bcr oflcrrcirfiifd)- ungatifdjen SJionatdjie abjieitn, unb (ic bebauett auftidjtig bic rrautigen gotgen bicfer Uerbted)erifd)en SDtadjenfdjaften Slnmetfung bcr f. unb f. SRegietung: Unfcrc gorbetung liiutctc. -Tic ffouiglid) Setbifdje SKegierung Bcnuteili ore gegen OftcrrcirfvUugarn gerirbtctc ^propaganba. . . « Tic con bcr Sonigiid) Setbifdjen SRegietung Botgenommene tfinbetung bet Bon im3 geforberten Etftatung roill fagen, bafj einc fotdjc gegen fifterteidj-ilngatn getidjtete n, unb jWflr: a) Gin ©cfcfe, roomit bie ftnglief)en monaidiiefeinblieben prejjemfjetungen fub< jeftio befttaft roerben foden, was umi gang gleicbgiiltig ift, um fo mer)r, nl8 befanntet" majieu bie fubjeftioe Cerfofgung Bon Sptefbeliften aufjerfi feften mbglicft ijt, unb bei einet entfpiecbenb Iar.en 8et)anb[ung cities foldjen ©cfekcel Quel) bie rocnigen S>dHe bicfer 51 tt nirbt nir Seflrafung fommen wiirben; alfo ein 33orfd)Iag, ber unfetet [Jorberung in feinct 5Beife entgegenfommt, baljet una niefjt bie getingflc ©atautie fur bcu I'ou unS geirmufchtcn Grfolg bictet ; b) ein 9lae§trag3gefe|j ju Slrtifel XXII bet fionfiitution, bafi bie Koufigfation geftattct roilrbe — ein 53orfd)lag, bet un3 gleidjfattg. nid)t beftiebigen faun, ba bet SSejlanb einei* foldjen ©cfe|e§ in Serbicn umi nidjtii niift, fonbetn nut bie 3kt- pflid)tung bet 9?egictung, eg and) anjumenben, roa8 uns! abet nidjt oetfprocben mitb. ©iefc 53orfd)ldge finb alfo t>oflfommen unbeftiebigenb — btcs um fo meb)t, al§ fie auef) in bet SKicfytung cbafm finb, baf uns uid)t gefagt mitb, innetljalb rocldjer ^rifi biefe ©efehe erlaffen ttnirben, nub bafi im galle ber Slblebnung bet ©efejjcS- Botlagen buret) bie ©fupfd)tina — con ber ccentuettcn ©emiffion ber SRegittung ab- gcfcb)en — alleS bcim alien bliebe. 9Jote SerbieuS: 2. ©ie Sxegierung befif>t feincrlci Scrceifc bafiir unb aueb bie 5lote ber f. unb f. iRcgicrung liefevt il)r feinc fold)cn, bafs ber Serein »9iarobna Obbrana- unb anbere dbnliebe ©efellfdjaften 6iS jum tjeutigen 'Jagc buret) cineS it)rcr Sftitglicbcr itgeubmeld)e Betbrcd)etifrf)en yvinblungcn biefet SItt begangen t)dtten. 9fict)t(Sbefioroenigct mirb bie Hbniglid)e SRegierung bie g° trcl:un 3 ^ Er '■ llnb '■ Scgierung annebmen unb bie ®cfcllfet)aft r3!arobna Obbtana* foioie febe ©efellfdjaft, bie gegen 6|lcrrcid)- Ungarn roirfen follte, auflofen. Jtumerfung ber t. unb f. SHegierung: ©ie monaref)iefeinblid)e s 5topaganba ber »5iarobna Obbrana« unb ber it)t afplierten 33ercine crfullt in iscrbicn ba§ ganje bffentlicbe V'cben, ei ift baf)er eine ganj unjuldffige WtfeiBc, roenn bie fetbifd)e 9(egietung betjauptet, bafj itjt bariiber nid)t3 befannt iji. 5 — 18 — ©anj abgefc^cn batjon ift bie Don ung aufgefteltte gotberung nidjt jut ©anje etfutlt, ba roit ubttbieS tierlangt t)aben. bie ( Propaganbamittel bicfer ©efeOfdjaften ju fonpSjieren j bie Stcubilbung bcr aufgcloften ©cfclljdviftcu uuter anberem Stamen unb in nnbevet ©cftalt ju Dettjinbern. 3n biefen beiben 9tid)tungen fdjmeigt bas Selgraber Sabinctt boQfommen, fo bajj unS aud) butd) bie gcgebene tjalbe 3 u f a 8 c IC ' ue ©arantie bafut gebotcn ift, bafj bem "Jreiben bcr monatd)icfeinbtid)cn Jlffojiationen, iniSbcfonbcrc bet »9larobna Obbrami«, burd; bevcn Sluflofung bepnitio ein Enbe bctcitet ware. Stote <3erbien3: 3. lue ftoniglid) ©etbifdie SRegietung tmpflicbtct fid) obuc 33etjug aui bem offentlidjen Unterritbt in Setbien aHeS auBjufd)etben, l»«8 bie gcgen Cftcrteidvllngarn gcridjtetc ^ropaganba foibcvn fonnte, faQg ir)r bie t. unb f. SRegietung tatfad)lid)e SBeroeife fitr biefe ^ropaganba liefert. Slumetfung bet t. unb f. SRegietung: Stud) in biefcm galte betlangt bie fetbifdje Stegietung etft 3?ett>eifc bafiit, bafj im bffcntlidicn llnterrid)te ©ctbicnS cine monard)iefcinblid)c s Jkopaganba getrieben roirb, roiii)icnb fie bod) roiffen mufj, bajj bie bei ben ferbifrficn t3rf)ulcn eingcfiitjrten ftljrbudjer in biefct SRid)tung ju beanftanbenben istoff cntbalteu, unb bafj ein gtojjet $eit ber ferbifd)cn t'e^tet im S'ager bet »5tatobna Dbbraua« unb bet iljt affUicttcn Siereine fteljt. UbtigenS ()at bie ©etbifdje SRegierung aud) filet einen Jed unfetet rsurberungen nidjt fo crfiillt, mic mil e3 Oetlangt f)aben, inbem fie in intern Jegte ben con un3 genjunfebten Beifajj -foroofjl mas ben Sefjrfotpet, als aud) mas bie t'et)rmittt[ aiv 6efangt«, mcglicfi, — ein Scifafc, rcelcr/er ganj flat jcigt, mo bie monarducfeinbfiebe S)3topaganba in bev ferbifdjen ©d)ule ju fudjen ift. 5totc ©ctbienS: 4. 25ie ftbniglidic SRegietung ift audi Bereit, jene Ofpjiete unb SScamten au3 bem 5Mitdt< unb girjitbienji ju cntlaffen, t)iiifid)tlid) mcUter butd) geriditlitbe Unter- fuctiung feftgeftcQt roitb, baft fie fid) .vianbfungen gegen bie tettitotiale Jntegtitat bet 9Jlonard)ie baben jufrfnilbcn tommen laffen; fie erraartct, bafj ifyr bie f. unb f. SRegienmg jmerfa Einleitung bct, bajj bie Sbniglid) ©etbifcbe SRegietung fid) Berpflidjten foQ, auf it)ten ©ejiieten bic SSKtnritfung Don Drganen bet f. f. SRegietung juju« [ajfeit, bod) ertlatt fie, bag (ie jebe SSlitrcitfung anjuncfjmen bevcit ware, wcidje ben ©tunbfajjcn bc3 336lfetredjt3 unb beS ©ttafptojcffcS foreic ben fieunbnadjbatlidjcn 33cjie()ungen entfptcdjen toiitbc. Slnmcifung bet f. unb f. SRegietung: S?it biefct Stage Ijat bag aUgetneine BoHettedjt ebenfolBcnig ttnai ju tun loie ba3 ©trafprojejjtedjt: Gii tjaubelt fid) urn cine Jlngctcgtiibcit rein (laatspolijei- lidjei SRalut, bie im SBege einer befoubeten S3crciubatung ju [ofen ift. ©ie DlefetBe ©ctbicnS ift bnfjet unBerftanblid) unb irate bet iljtet Bagen allgemeinen gorm gecignet, ju umiberbriidbatcn ©djhnetigfeiten 6ei 3lbfd)[ufj bcii 311 trejfenben SlbfommcnS ju fiitjten. SRote bet jtbnigiid) ©etbifdjen SRegietung: 6. ©it Sijniglicbe SRegietung [jiilt t$ fclbftBctfiiinblid) fill ibre spflicfjt, gegen atte jene Spcrfunen cine Untctfudjung einjuleiten, bie an bem ftomplott Bom 15./28. 3 l "ii betciiigt waten obet bcteiligt gewefeu fein folien unb bie fid) auf itjteni ©ebietc befinben. 2Ba3 bic Sffiitnurfun'g Bon tjierju fpejied betegietten Otganen bet f. unb f. SRegietung an bicfet Untetfudjung anbeiangt, fo fann fie cine foldje nicbt annchmen, ba bic3 cine SBcrichung bet SOetfaffung unb bc3 StrafptojefjgefejjeS rcate. ©ocfi Eonnte ben ijfletteidjifcfj ungavifd)cii Otganen in einjcdien gotten SSJittciiung Bon ben (Sigebniffcn ber Untctfudjung gemndjt merben. Slnmerfuug ber f. unb f. SRegietung: Unfet SSettangen mat ganj fiat unb nid)t mijijubcutcn. ©it begctjtten 1. Ginleitung cinct geridjtlicbcn Untctfudjung gcgen bic ^eilneijmct beg SompiottS, 2. 'Jeidiaijmc Bon t. unb f. Otganen an ben Inctauf bcjiiglidjcn Gvljebungcn (SRcd)etdjc im ©egenfajj ju enquete judiciaire), 3. cS ift uug uidjt bcigcfaUcn, {. unb f. Otgane an bctu fcrbifdjen ©etid)t»octfa()ten tcilneljmcn ju (ajfen: ©ie fodtcn nur an ben polijei(i<§en SBotertjebungen mitiuitfen, nxtdjc baef SStatetiat fiit bie Untetfudjung tjer&eijufdjafjcn unb fidicijufiellen batten. SBenn bie ©etbifdje SRegietung un8 tjiet mifjpcrftcEjt, fo tut fie bicsS bcioujU, benn bet Untetfdjitb jloifdjcn enquete judiciaire unb ben cinfad)en SRed)evd)en mufj it)t getaufig fein. ©a fie fid) jebct fionttode besS einjutcitenben SBetfatjrenS ju eittjietjen tminfdjtc. ba3 bei torrettet ©utd)fut)tung l)bd)|l unctlruufdjtc Grgebniffe fiit fie (iefevit triitbe, unb ba fit fcine §anbbabe bcft|t, in plaufibier SSSeife bit SBitwitfung uufetct Otgane an bem polijcilidjen 23ctfat)rcn abju(cf)iicn (Slnaiogien fiit fold)e polijcilidjcn 3ntctoentioncu beftctjen in gro^et SKenge), Ijat fie fid) auf eiiien Statibpuuft begeben, bet i()ttt ?lblebnung ben ©d)ein bet S3ered)tigung gcbcn unb unferem Bcttangen btn ©tempcl bet UnevfuUbattett aufbriiden foil. — 20 — SRotc ber ©crbifdjen SRegierung: 7. 'Die fioniglidie SRegierung f>at nod) cm ?lbcnb bti $agcS, an bem ifjr tie SRote jufam, bie S3rtjjaftwig bei SSlajorS BoiSlar ^Janfofic Bcrfiigt. 53?aS aber ben 3Ri(an Giganooic anbclaugt, bcr cm Jlngc[)6riger bet oftcrreicbifdi ungatifdjen 3Ron« archie ift, unb bcr b\i jiim 15. 3"ni (afg Slfpiraut) bei bcr Eifen6afjnbireftio.n be- bienftet loar, fo fomttc bicfer bi6f)cr nid)t auSgeforfcbt toerfeen, n>esl)alb ein ©teefbrief gegen ifjii crlaffcn ttmrbe. "Die f. unb f. SRegierung ttiirb gebcten, jroeefs* ©urdjfufjrung ber Untcrfud)ung fobalb a[$ mogtidj bie bcftcbcnbcn SBerbadjtSgtunbe unb bie bei bcr Untcrfudiuug in ©crajetoo gcfammeltcn ©d)U(boen>etfe in bcr bcjcidjnctcn ^orm befanntjugeben. Slnmcrfung ber f. unb f. SRegierung: ©iefc Slntroort i(l fjintcrlu'iltig. Giganouic ging taut bcr bon unS Beranlafiten SRacbforfcbuug bvei 'Jagc uad) bem Jlttentat, aI3 befannt unirbc, biijj GiganoBic an bem Somplottc beteiligt war, auf llrlaub unb begab fief) im Jluftrog bcr Spotijei- prafeftur in SSclgrab mid) SRibari. G8 ift alfo jiincicfjfi unticfjtig, bafi Siganooic fcftott flm 15./28. 3 un ' mli > ccm ferbifdjen ©taatSbienft fd)icb. Joierju fommt, bafi ber 'Polijeiprafcft Don Setgrab, ber bie Jlbrcifc bes GiganoBic fcibft ocranlajit S)at unb bcr iruijjtc, too bicfer ftd) auffjielt, in eiucm 3 n ' ct biem erf'larte, cin SRann namenS SSiilan Siganooic criftieic in SBetgrab nid}t. SRotc bcr ©cvbifd)cu SRegierung: 8. Die ©erbifdic SRegierung ivirb bie bcflcbcnben 9Rafjnar)men gcgcn bie Kilter- btiicfung bc3 ©djmuggefnS Bon ffiaffen unb (SjpfofiBftoffen Berfdjarfen unb crmcitmi. G3 ift fclbftDcrftiinblirb, bafi fie fofort cine Uiitcrfucbuiig einteiten unb jene Seainten bcS ©venjbienftes in bcr Vinic ©abae-vojuica ftreng beftvafeu n?itb, bie iljrc 'Pflicbt Berleht unb bie Urtjebcr bes SBcrbicdicnS bie ©renje [jaben libcvfrfivciteu laffen. 9i Tic Sbniglidje SRegierung ift gem bcrcit, Grtlaruiigcii iibcv bie Suftcrungen jii geben, rocicbe it)re SSeamten in €crbicn unb im SluSfanb nadi bem Attentat in ^ntenncirsj gemadjt Ijaim uitb bie uarb bcr iBe£)auphing bcr t unb t. SRegierung bcr Monarchic fcinbfdig loaren, fobalb bie t. unb t SRegierung bie Stellen bicfer Slu3fufjtungen bejeidjnet unb bewiefen baben n>ivb, bay bicfc Siufjetungen Don ben bctvcffcnbcn gunftionaren tatfad)licb gcmad)t loorben finb. ?ic Koniajidjc Slicgicrung mirb fcibft ©orge trogen, bie nbtigen Sewcife unb Ubcifulirungeunittcl l)tctfur ju fammcln. Stnmcrfung bcr t unb t SRegierung: Tcv Soniglid) ecibifd)cn JRegterung miiffen bie Bejiiglidjcn 3 nicrr, i e,pg 3 an 3 geuau Bcfanni feiu ffienn fie Don ber t unb f. SRegierung ocrlaugr, bap biefe ihr alterlci I^etaiU iibcr bicfc ^ntcnnelos liefcrc unb fid) cine fbrmlicbe Untcrfudpung tjicviibcr oorbctjiilt, jeigt fie, bafj fie aud) bie gorbemng uid)t ernftlid) crfiiQcn Will. Oiotc ber ©erbifd)cn SRegierung: 10. ®ie Sbniglidie SRegierung reirb, fofcrn bieS nidjt febcut in bicfer DJotc gcjAchcu ift, bie f. unb t. SRegierung Bon bcr Durd)fuf)tung bcr in ben »orflct)cnbcn ^Puntten cutljaltencn SSJafnatjmen in ScnntniS fe|en, fobalb cine bicfer SOtafjrcgcln .angcotbnet unb burcbgcfuljrt wirb. - 21 — <£)ie fioniglidj Setbifdje JJegiening giaubt, bajj c8 im gemeinfamen 3nteteffe flegt, bie Cofung bicfer ?lngelegenl)eit nicht ju ubetftutjeu unb i|1 ballet, falls fict> bie f. unb f. Siegictung butdj biefc Slntmoit niif>t fiit befticbigt etad)ten foHte, rcic immer bcveit, cine frieblidje Cbfung anjimefymen, fei e§ butdj Uberttagung bet Giitfdjeibung biefcr gtage an bai 3 ntern(lt ' Dliale ©etiem 6fterrdct>ifc^«unctartf4>cn UTCatcrial. SSSien, 27. 3uti. egung, bie fid) jum gitle gefe&t Ijat, bie fiiblidjcn Seite £>ftetteid)- UngatnS Bon bet 9J}onavd)ie [oSjuieifjen, urn fte mit ©etbien ju einet ftaatlidjen Ginljeit ju Bctbinbcn, weit juturfgreift. ©iefe in ifjten Gnbjicicn flct? gieidjbieibenbe unb nut in i()tcn 2J!ittein unb an Jntenptat n>ed)fe(nbe 'ptopaganba evteidjte jut gcit bet SinnejionSftife i()ten £>6ljepunft unb ttat bamaU offeu mit iljten Senbenjen Ijetoot. 2Bdl)tcnb etnerfeitS bie gefamte fctbifrfje 'Pteffe jum Kambfe gegen bie 93?onatd)ie aitfrief , bilbctcn fid) — Bon anbeten U ' C - 5' ut § ^"jot Dja 'Janfooic unb 'SlUm ftetteid) ift al8 etflct unb gtofjtct ^cinb 6ejeid)net. SBie bie 91atobna Obbtana bie StotiBcnbigfeit bca JtampfeS mit fefleneld) ptebigt, ptebigt fte eine tjeilige ©ab^tb^eit unfetet natioualcn Cage. 'SaS Sd)hif)faBite[ entb^att einen Jlpelt an bie iHegietung unb ba3 Bolt Setbien§, fid) mit alien SUittetn fiit ben ffamBf Botjubeteiten, ben bie Slnneyon Botaugejeigt b^at. DaS SRemoite fajilbett nad) einet JiuSfage cincS oon bet 9Jatobna Obbtana augeiBotbenen fiomitat|"d)i8 bie bamaiige JAtigfeit bet 91atobna Obbtana, bie eine boh jvoei SauBtleuteu, batuntet "JantoBic, gcicitete ©d)u(e jut 2lu3- bilbung Bon Sanben untctijiclt, ©cb,ulen, lBeld)e Bon ©cnetal 3' ln f'" , ic unb Bon 6 _ 22 — Sauptmann Wilan affcn licferte, roie aucb bie SJodc eineS gemiffen liiganooic, etneS gemefeuen Koiuitatfd)i unb jeju'gen Scamten bet ferbifdjen ©fciibaljnbirettion SBclgtab, bet fd)on lS)0i) ali %6g,l\na, bet !Baubcnfd)uIe bet bamaligcn 9}arobna Obbtana auftaud)te. Qernct firb bie ?ht batgelegt, lr>ic Somben unb ©affen unbemevEt nad) SoSnien cingefdjmiiggclt routben, bie feinen 3 a,e 'fet eariiber Idjjt, bafj bie3 ein root)! oorbcrcitetet unb fur bie gc[)cimni8t>oUen ^nxde bet 9larobna oft begangener Sd)leid)rocg Wax. Sine Heilage enttjdtt einen SluiSjug aui ben Slften beg fiteUgctidjtg in ©erajcroo uber bie llntcrfud)iing beS ?lttcntatd gegen ben IStjljcrjog $tanj Qctbinaub unb bejfen ©emafiliu. ©anad) fmb Tuincip, Sabtinooic, ©rabej, Etupilomc unb ^apoDtc geflanbig, in ©emeinfetyaft mit bem fliid)tigen OTc^inebbafic ein Honlplott jut Stmotbung bc£ Stjljerjogii gebilbct uub ifm ju biefcm 3 Wft f c aufgclauctt ju Ijabcn. Eabrinooic ifl geflanbig, bie Sombc gcluorfen uub fflabtilo <]3tinup bass Slttentai mit bet SBtorcmingptftole au§gefub,tt ju E)abcu. S^cibc inter gabeu ju, bei bet Berubung bet iat bie Jlbfidjt beS ?)cotbci$ get)abt flu Ijabcn. T)k lcfitctcu ieile bet Slnlagc cvt)nlten nxitcte Slngaben bet Sefd)ulbigtcn Dor bem Untctfiid)ung3tid)tct iibct 6ntftel)ung be8 fiomplotto - , yetfitnft bet 2?omben, roeldjc fabtifmafjig Ijctgeftellt rourben, fiir militdtifdje gwecfe beftimmt toaten unb it)rer Otigiualpactung nad) aui bem fctbifd)eu SPaffenlaget aui firagujeoac (lammten. Gublia) gibt bie Scilagc Sluafunft ubet ben iranSport bet btci Slttentatet unb bet SBaffen Don ©erbien nad) SoSnien. ?lug bem roeitcten 3eugeuptotofoH etgibt fid), bafs ein Jlngeljbriger bet 9?!onard)ie einige iagc Dot bem ?lttentat bem oftetteidjifdiuugatifdjen fionfufat in Selgmb^MbuiigponbcrStomutungerftattcnrcolIte, bafj ein >JMan jutSBetu6ung be8?lttcntat3 gegen ben Grjljeijog rodt)renb beffen 5lnrocfenljeit in SoSnien beftche. iHefer Sftann foil nun butd) Seigraber 'Polijeiotganc, meld)e if)n unmittelbat cot Setreten beg Sonfutate au8 nidjttgen ©tutiben octljaftcten, an bet (St|tattung bet SMbung t>etb,inbett rootben fein. 5Beitet ge()e aui bem 3 tu 3 c|1- ptotofoll b,et»ot, boji bie betteffenben 'Polijeiotgnne con bem geplantcn attentat SenutiiiS gefyabt flatten. 1)a biefe Jlngaben nodi md)t nacb,geptiift fmb, fann iibet beteu i£tid)l)altigfeit Botlaufig nod) fein Utteit abgegeben roetben. 3" oet Spoilage jinn Wemoite b)ei^t ciS: iBot bem GmpfangSfaot beg fetbifd)cn S'UiegS' minifteriumS befinben fid) nn bet 5Banb Diet nHegorifcb,e Silbet, »on bencn btei 5)atfteHungen fetbifdjet fitieflSetfolge fmb, wdljtenb i>ai oicttc bie 23ttn)itfiid)ung bet monottfiiefeinblidicn Jeubenjen ©etbicn8 Uetfinnbilbtidit. flbet einct t'anbfd)aft, bie tettS ©ebitge (Sognicn), teil8 Gbene (©flbungatn), batftellt, gef)t bie 3 0ta i M' SSotgentote bet fetbifdtcn 6offn«ngcn, auf. 3" 1 23otbctgninbe ftel)t eine beroaffnete Jraucngcftalt, auf betcn ©*ilbc bie 9)ainen allct »nodj ju befreienben 93toBinjen«: S?o8nicn, s^etjegolcina, ffioiwobina, ©ntmien, Talmatien uf». fleljen. aCittaflc lb. ®er 5!cidj3fauj(er an bie ftaifcvlitr/en Sotfdjafter in *Patt§, Ponbon, St. fcferS' Burg com 23. 3uli 1914: ©ie SBeto ffentf i c^wngen bcr Oflevrcirf>ifcf) ungarifcfjcii SRegievung uber bit llmftanbc, untcr bcncu ba8 Slttentdt auf ben bjtcrrcid)ifd«'n -Unonfolgcr unb feinc ©emflljtin jlattgcfiinbcn t)at, cntljulicn off en bit S'^i ^k fid) bie gvofifevbifdje "Propaganba gefekt Ijot, unb bie Wittel, boveu fie jicf) jut S3erroitE(i<§ung bcrfelben bebicnt. s 3lud> inujfcii bind) bit befannt gegebcnen iatfad>en bic lelUen 3 ll,c if e ' barubet fdmnnbcn, iaf) ba8 SlftionSjenttum bcr SScjtvcbiingcn, bic auf 2o8l6fung bcr fiibflamifcbeu el)errfd)img, unb SRfifjiguug bcr Oftcvvcicbitdvungavifcben SRcgicruug unb bcm energifctyen Ginfdncitcn tcr ©rojjmadjte Wat e8 jiijufrijreiBen, locnu bic 5ptot>ofationen' f nxltfjcn oficrrcirb- JIngarn in bicfev 3eit Bon fcitcn SetBien? auSgefejst roar, nid)t 511m ftonftifte fiiljvtcn. ©ic '^uficherung fiinftigcu S8or)[Btrr)a[ten§, bic bic ©erbifd)c SRegietung bama(8 gegeben bat, hat fie nirf)t cingchalten. llnter ben Slugen, jum minbeften untcr fiittfdjroeigenbcr fnlbung beS amtlicbcn Scrbieng, (jat bic grofsfcrbifebe 'Pro. Baganba injroifd)cn fovtgcfefet an Slu8betynung unb 3 n ' c "fitat jugenommen j auf iljr j?onto ijt bai jiingfte Berbrcdjeu ju fchen, beffen gdbcu nari) Selgrab fiit)rcn. 68 ijnt fid) in unjtBeibeutiget ffieife Eunbgetan, bafi csS rocber mit bcr 'ffiiirbc nod) mit 5>er SelBftertjaltung bcr bjierreidjifer) ■iiiigarifcbcii 3JJonard)ie BereinB.at fcin toiirbe, bcm CJvciben jenfeitel bcv ©renje nod) [finger tatenloS juiufchcn, bur* ba8 bic ©idjetfjeit unb bic j'degvkiit i()rcr (Scbictc bancrub bebvoht roivb 5ei bicfev Sadjtage fonnen ba8 S3otger)en fonrie bic jforberungen bcv C|lenciif>ifdwuuiarifdien SRegietung unr a!8 geredjifettigt angefe^en roctben. 'Jvohbcm fdjliefjt bie .vmUuuii, bic bic offentlidic SReinung foroot)! a!8 audj bic SRegietung in ©crbien in (ejjtct p;cit eingenommen [jat, bic Sefurdjtung nidjt an?, bafi bic ®evbifd)c SRegietung e8 abichncn mirb, bicfeu gorberuugcu 111 cntfpvcdicii, unb baji fie fid) ju cinev pvoBofatovifrhcn 5attung Oftcrreidj Ungnrn iicgemibcv liinveificn [apt. (Js iviivbc bcr r|terrcid)ifd)ungavifd)cn SRcgierung, mill fie nicbt auf iljvc SteHung aU Wvofjmad)t enbgiiltig 53erjid)t lei|1eu r uid)t6 anbcrcS librigblciben, altf il)re gotberungen bet bcv Scvbifdjen SRegietung bind) ciiicu ftavtcn Druct unb nbtigenfallS untcr bcv Ergtcifung militavifdicv ?1}ajjnahincu burt^jufefeen, luobei ibr tie 35Jat)( bcr Witlcl iibcrlajfeu blcibcu mufj. S». ufto bcehve id) mid) ju erfiidjcu, fid) in tiovfteljcnbem ©tune (bein bcv- ^eitigen SBcvtretct be« gcttn JSioiani) (Sir Gbiuarb Wren) (Serrn Safanow) gcgciv iibcv au«jiifbrcd)cn unb bubci inSBefonbere bcr Jlnfdjauuug nnri)bnidlicb Jliicibrnrf ju Bcvlcihcn, ba^ ci fid; in ber Borlicgcnbcn gvage urn cine Icbiglicl) Jioifdjcn Cftcvvciet;- — 25 — Ifttgatn unb ©crbien jum 2lu§trag ju bringcnbe SIngetegenrjett rjanbete, bit nuf t)ie bciben bitcft Screiligtcii ju bcfriirdnfcn bag etnftc ^cftteben bcr ??Kicf)te fein miiffe. ffiit tounfdjen bringenb bic GofalijUrung tti ftonflittS, rocit jcbet! Gingrcifcn eincr oiibcrtii Stact)i infotge bet Berfdjiebenerl SBunbni^oetpfliditungen unabfebbatc Sonfequcnjcn, Had) fid) jierjtn lourbe. Gincm gefdlligcii te[cgrapt)ifd)cn 3?etid)t uber ben Sevfauf 3') rcr Unteivebunj roetbe id) mit 3ntcreffc entgcgenfeljcn. aCntaae 2. 3Der &cid>0fan?Ur an £>ic 23un£>csrco(icrungcn. »crtraulidi! Sctlin, bm 28. 3uti 1914. Guer pp. reoHcn bcr iRcgicrting, bei bet Sic begfaubigt finb, fotgenbc SDftt* tettung madjen: SlngefidjtS bet Satfadjen, bic bic fificrrcicbifdj.Ungarifcf/e JNcgicnmg in iljret 91otc an bic ©erbifdje SRcgierung befanntgegebcu bat, mnffen bic [ehtcn 'Jnxifcl barubct fdjtoinben, bap bag attentat, bem bet bficrrcidjifch ungarifebe Stvtonfoiger unb feiuc ©ema()[in jum Dpfet gcfaHen finb, in ©erbien jum minbcflen mit bet KonntBenj. Don Slngttjbrigcn bcr ©ctbifdjen SKegierung unb Slnnce Borbereitct motben ift. GiS ift ein probuft bet grojjfer6ifd)en Scjttebungen, bic feit einct !Kei()e Ben ^ifjteu cine Quelle bauetnbet Seuiivufjigungen fiit bic Dftccrcid)i[d)>Ungatifd)e ?5ionard)ie unb fur ganj Europa geroorben finb. 3« befonbcrS matfantcr %oxm trat bcr groftferbifebe EbatlbiniSmuS iDat)tenb bet boamfdicn ftrifiS in bie Grfdjcinuug. Slur bet iDcitgcl)cnbcn ©elbfl6eljerrfd)ung nub SRafjigung bet Oftetreicbifcb Ungarifcben SKcgicrung unb bem cnctgifdicn 6in> fd)teiten bet ©rofiinadjte roar e3 }Ujufd)reiben, menu bie ^JroBotatioueii, mcldjcn Cflctrcid) Uiigatn in biefct 3 f 't Bon feitcn ©erbienii ausgefeht rear, nid)t jum Son- fliftc fuljitcn. ric 3ufid)crung Cunftigen ffioljiBerljaiteng, bic bic ©erbifrfjc SRcgierung bamalii gegeben (jat, bat fie nidjt eingcfjaltcu. Unter ben 5lugcn, jum minbcflen untct ftiUfdjtveigenber 'Dulbung beei amtlidjen ©erbiens*, 6,at bic grojjferbifdje "Propa- ganba in;roifd)eu fortgcfc|t an Sluabcljnung unb ^I'cufitdt jugenonvmen. GsS roiirbc rocbet mit bet IPiitbe nod) mit it)tem 9iccbt auf ©clbflerljaltung Bereinbat fein, rootlte bic cftctrcidiifd) Ungarifdjc Svegierung bem Sreibcu jcufeitg bcr ©ren^e nod) (angct tatentoS jufeben, burd) ba3 bie ©id)ctbcit unb bic 3"tegtitat i()tet ©cbicte bauernb bebtoljt roirb. S?ci bicfet ©ad)Iage iniiffcn ba3 33orger)en foroic bic gorbe- tungen bet Qfterceidjtfdj Ungatifdjcn Dicgicrung a\i getcdjtfettigt augcfeljen roetben. 7 — 26 — (Die Slntwort bet ©erbifdjen SHegierung anf bit gotbetungen, tocldjc bic Ofter< rcidiifdvungaufdic Kcgicrung am 23. b. 9)lt8. butd) itjrcn Skrtreter in 23clgtab .bat ftcUen (iijjcn, Iaftt inbeffen ctfenuen, baft bit maftgebenben Tsattorcn in ©ctbicn nidjt gefonnen fiub, Hire 6i8b,erige 'Politif unb ngitatorifcr)e 'Jatigfeit aufjugeben. cll)aftcn Jut Bott ©crajemo iljrcn 2lu8btud gefuubcu Ijaben. SBenn SRufjlanb in bicfcin Konflitte fiit ©erbien cinttcicn ju ntiiffen gtaubt, fo ift baa an fid) getoijj ein gute8 Sfledjt. 68 mufi pel) abet baritber flat fein, baft e8 bamtt bie fctbifdien Seftrebungen auf Untcr- (jofjlung bet SjiftenjBebingungen bet bfterreidjifeb/ungarifdjen ©onardiic jii ben feinigen mnri)t, unb bafi c8 allciu bie SDerantmortung bafiit ttdgt, tocnu au8 bem Sfterrcidiifdj' feibifdicn S>inbcl, ben allt iibrigen ®ro|jnidd)te ju tofatificren wiiufdicn, ein curopd- ifd)ct firieg cutftctjt. "Diefe SSerantwortung 9tuftlaub8 liegt flat jutagc unb wiegt urn fo frliwcrcr, at8 ©raf Serdjtolb Siufttanb ofpjiefl etttdtt l) llt ; C ci|t uni gleidijcitig batauf bin, biejeuigen Se- ftrcbungen ju untetftiijcn, bie auf bie Gofalifietung be8 ifoiiflitt-5 binjiclcn, gctteu ben Jlviditlinicn betjenigen "Pclilif, bic wit fcit nunmel)t 44 ~\al)xtn im 3"'" c Fl c bet ?luftcditetl)altung be8 cutopdifdicn gtieben? mit t^tfolg burdjgeffl^tt Ijabcn. ©oUtt inbeS toiebev titboffen butdi ein Singreifen SRufttanbS bev SStanMicib cine Ettoeiteruug eifaljien, fo miitben mit gettcu uuferet SunbcSpftic^t mit bet ganjen 3Bad)t beg SReid)8 bic 9Jad)6armonntd)ie ju uutctftii^cu Ijabcn. 91ur gejtoungen toetben wit jum ©diwette gteifen, bann abet in bem tuliigcu Scwufttfein, baft wit au bem Llnljcit tciue ©diulb ttagen, bas ein i\ticg ubet Suto'pai Bolter btiugen inuftte. — 27 — GTeleoframm fces jKaiferlidvn 25otfd>aftere in tOim an ben Xeid>efamler vom 24. Ouli 1914. ©rof Serdjtotb tjat ()cute ben 9tuffifd)en ©efefjaftstrager ju fid) gebcten, urn iljm ciugefycnb nub freunbfd)aft(id) ben ©tnnbpimft Oftcueicb/Ungani'j ©crbicn gegen^ iiber auiieinanbeiiiifchcii Wad) Siefapitulienmg bev l)iftorifd)en Gntluicfehmg bcr tefctcn 3 a b re bctonte cr, bajj bic SBionardjie n icE> t baraii benfe, ©erbien gegeniiber crobevnb aufjutrtten. Qftertetd) Ungarn reevbe fciu fcrbifdjes Scnitoiium beaufurua)cn. S3 tjaltc fttitft batan f eft, baft bcr ©cbritt nut cine befiuiti»c 5VajjrcgcI gegeniiber ben fcrbifcr/eu SJSuljfeteien jinn 3'dc l)a6e. Dcotgcbrungen muffe dftcrreidi-Uiigam ©arantien fiiv cin iceitcres frciiitbfcf>af tUct)td 23erl)a[ten ©er&icnS ber 9J!onard)ie gcgemiber Oct' (angcii. 68 [iege it)m fern, einc 33crfcf)icbitng ber 9Jtacr)tDerI)altiuj|'e im Saltan t)er< bcifub,reu 311 ureHen. ©cr Wcfcbdftstragcr, bcr nod) fcinc ®eifungcn an3 ^Petersburg f;atte, tjat bic ?lu8fut)uuigen bcS 5Dcint|rer8 ad referendum genommen mit bcr 3ufage, fie fofort ©afanore ju unterbreiten. 3tiilaqe 4. Celearamm be& Kaiferlicben 25otfd>afrers in Petersburg an ben Xeid)0?an?ler vom 24. 3uli 1914. ©en ^nfyalt bc3 6rln[feS 502 tjabe id) focben in einer langcn Untcrrcbung init ©afanoro cingcr)enb oertoertet. 5>cr SRinifiet erging fid) gcgen Oftei'reid) Ungarn in mafjtofen Jlntlagen unb rear ferjr erregt 5luf baei beftimmtcfte erttdrtc cr: baf} tie fevbifd) bflcvrcidiifd)c Differenj jroifdjen ben SBeteiligten allcin auSgetragen recrbc, tonne SRufjtanb nnmbglid; jutaffen. gintoge 5. t)ev 2CaiferlieJ>c 23offd>aftcr in Petersburg an ben Xeid;6fan?ler. £elegramm t>om 26. 3uli 1914. ©er &ftcrrcid)ifayilngarifd)c Sotfd)after i)attc l)entc nad)mi(tag cine langcre Unterrebung mit ©afanore. Scibe Bctciligte batten, reic fie mir naditjcr fagtcn, eincn befricbigenben Ginbrncf. 'Die Sterfidjerung bcS SotfdjafteiiS, baf! ffterrcid)' Ungarn tcinc Groberung8plafteri5 in Petersburg on ben 3\eid>sfan?lcr vom 25. 3ulx 1914. 3)le(bung fiit ©. 9fi. eon ©cneral eon Cycling. 3 m KraSnoefager toutben kute bie $ruppenu6ungen ploMirb abgebroctyen, nnb bic SKcgtmcntcv fcljren in if>rc ©atnifoncn fofort jutucf. Tic 2Jlanb»er jinb abgcfagt ttorben. Tic StiegSft^fllet murben hcutc fliitt im loerbfi ju Ofpjimn befbrbevt. liber ba? 33orgcfjcn Cflcrrcictya fjerrfdjt im 50famler r>om 2(5. Juli J 91 4. ©er OTilitdrottarljr' bittct urn fibcrmittetung nad)|teljcnbcr 2Mbung on ben ©encralftab : 3ri) t)nlte eS fiir firmer, bag fiiv Sicro unb Obejfa bic SJlobitmadjung bcfo()tcn roorben ift. S3ti 5Qarfe$au unb SJloSfau ift bic3 fraglirf) unb 6et ben anbeven roofjt norb nicbt ber Jnlt. iMnlaflc 8. en Uonfulaf0t>ert»efers in 2Coumo an &en Ketdxsratnler vom 27. jtali 1914. Ju Sorono SriegSjujranb cvfldvt. Ccleanimm c»ee Kaiferlidpen <6efancefamler vom 27. duli 1914. Grfatjic jtiuedaffig, bojj fraiij6pfcb,e3 XIV. J?orp3 Slanbwr nbbwa). Mnlqge 10. £ele#ramm bes Xricbsran^lers an ben KaiferUcfcen 23orfcbafter in £onfcon. ZJringcnb. 26. Jul i 1914. 0|terreidvUngarn [)at in Petersburg offijiclt unb feierlid) ertlart, bag ti feinen tcrritorialen ©eroinn in Serbien 6ea6fict>tigt, ben Scftanb be3 fii>nigrcid)8 nic^t antafien, fonbern nur 3!u[)c fctjajfen rootle. 9cad) l)ier eingegangenen 9aifd)en grieben ju err)alten. ffiir bitten bat)er in biefem Sinne in ^Petersburg mit aHem 9(ad)brucf ju roirfen. gtnlttflC 10a. £Vleafter in Paris. X>om 26. Ouli 1914. 31iid)bem Cfierreid)-Ungarn !Ku|lanb offijicH ertlart b,at, bag eiS teinen territorialcn ©eroinn beabfidjtigc, ben SScfranb beg SonigreidjS nid)t antaftcn rootle, liegt bic Gntfdjeibung, ob cin europdifdjer .ftrieg eutfleljen fott, nur bei iRufilanb, bag bie gefamte S3erantroortung ju tragen fiat. SBir oertrauen auf ftrantreicf), mit bem mir un3 in bem 2Bnnfd)C urn bie Grtjaltung bcS europaifd)en ^ricbenij einS roiffen, bag eS in Petersburg jcinen Ginflufs in berurjigenbem £inne gettenb madjen roirb. 3tnfqflc 10 b. ^Tdccjramm bce> Xeicbsfan^lers an ben "Kaifevlicfyen 23offd>aftt'r tn Petersburg vom 26. Juli 1914. 9!ad)bem Ofterrcid) fein tcrritorialeS ©caintereffement feierlid) ertlart b)at, rul)t bie Beranttoortung fiir cine enentuclle ©totung bet! europaifdien gticbens burd) eine rtifjifdjc ^nterocntion "Kein auf ^lufilmib. SBir Oertrauen immer nod) barauf, H\\ SJufjlanb leinc @d)ritte unternefymen tuirb, bie ben europaifdjen gricbcii etnjilid) gefaljrben roiirben. -JlnlrtflC 11. telegramm bee "Eaiferlicben 23otfcbaffcr0 in Petersburg an ben Xei4>efanjlcr vom 27. 3ult 1914. 5t!ilitdrattad)e mclbct iiber ©cfprtic^ mit ®rieg3mini|tcr: ©afanoro tmbe bicfen tektereu gebeten, mid) tiber t>ic Cage aufjutfoten. Ser fiiicgSininifler I)at mil fcin GE)renroott bornuf gcgeben, bafj nod) feinc SDiibilinadjungg. otbte ergangen fci. S.i itnitben Icbiglid) oorlaufig Sorbereitungsmafittaljnitii getvoffen, abcr c3 fci fcin 9iefert>i|t eingejogen unb fcin Spferb ou8gef)o6en. 2Benn Ofteraid) bic ferbifd)c ©tenje iibcrfdjreitcn locrbc, fo toerben bicjenigen Mitatbejirfe, bie nuf Oftetreirb, gcvidjtct finb, Hicm, Obcffa, SDloSfou, fiafan, mobilijicrt toerben. "Dicjenigcn an bcr beutfdjen 3ront ; 3Bar|"d)au f ffiilna, ^Petersburg untcr fcincn Umfianben. SJlan uninfdic ben grieben mit Deutfdjtanb brtngenb. Sluf mcine Jrage imd) bent ^mit ber 9Jcobi(mar$ung gegen Ojterreid) erfotgte 5ld)[c(juden, unb eg tourbe ouf bic ®iplo- matic (jingetoiefen. 3* f a 9 tf bem 3Jcini|tei, bafj man bic frcunb|'d)aftlid)cn Slbjidjtert bet un3 tourbige, aber aud) bie altein gegen Oftcrrcid) gcrid)tete 3)}obilmad)ung als fctjr bcbrotilid) anfetjen merbe. atwiaflc 13. Cdegramm bee Keiebetanylere an ben Kaifcrlicben 25otfdxifter in tonbon vom 27. 3uli 19J4. Son eincm S3orfdjtag Sir Gbrcarb ©rcn't), eittc fionferenj in Bonbon ju oieren abjufjalten, ift l)icr bidder nid)tS befannt. G8 ift fur uttd unmoglid), unferen SSunbeS- genp(|en in feinet SluSeinanberfefjung mit Serbicn not cin euiopjifrtics ©erid)t ju jiet)cn. Unfevc SermitteumgStatigfeit nuijt ftct> auf bie ©efaijr eincs Dfterreidiifd}. mf[ifd)en fionfliftes bcfdirdnfen. 3( illume i:t. Celcoframm bee Keicbefamlere an ben "Kaiferlicfyen 25otfcbafter in Conbon vom 25. 3uli 1914. Die oon ©ir Ebtoarb ©rci) jwifdjen bftcvvcid)ifd) ■ ferbifebem unb ojierreidt/ifd)' riiffififjem fionflitte gemad)te Untevfd)cibung tvifjt pollfommen ju. SBir tooden cben- foroenig lvic Snglanb un3 in erfteren einmifdjen, unb naaj toie uor oertreten air ben — 31 — Stanbpunft, tufj bicfe 3 rn 3 c baburrf) lofnlifiett blciben miifi, bnjj alle ?)!5d)te fid) bcr Ginmifduing entbaltcn. Gs ijt besl)Dttuiig unb bee GrnftcS bet Situation. 5Cit fiub, falls tin 6ftctteid)ifd)-riif(ifd)ct ©trcit entftcljen fofltc, bctcit, BorBetjaltlidj inifcrcr beEannteu SunbniSppidjtcn, jroifefyen !)iu[j' lanb unb Cflerteidj mit ben anbeven ©tojjtndd)ten jufommen cine Skrmittlung cm- tteten ju laffen. "itiilitflc 14. Cclecrramm ^ce Xcic^sfan^lcrs an ben JKaifcrlicbcn 23otfcbafrcr in Petersburg t>om 28. 3uli 1914. SSSit bemiiljen uns unausgefcht, SDicu ju oetanlaffcn, in 'Petersburg ^intd unb llmfang bes 6f[errcid)ifd)cn Sorgebens in ©etbien in einet unaujedjtbatcn unb Bojfcnt- lid) Siujjlanb befriebigenben JCcife flatjulcgen. £>ietan dnbett aud) bie iiijroifdjen cr- folgtc SriegsctEldtung nid)ts. 3tiitnfle 15. Telegvamm bee> Keicbsran^lers an ben 2faifcrlicben 23otfd>afrcr in Condon vom 27. Juli 1914. 3Bit Ijabcn bie Setmittelungsaftion in SQJien in bem Bon ©it Gbroatb ©ten, ge)t>unfd)tcn Sinne fofott cingeleitet. ilbetbieS t)aben mit ©taf 8ctd)tolb and) ben 2Bunfd) be3 yevtn ©afanott) auf biteftc 5lusfprad)e mit ®ien mitgeteilt. 31ntage 16. {Telegramm bes Kaifcrlidvn 23offcbaffcr0 in 5Pien an bm Xcicbsfan?ler vom 28. 3uli J 9! 4. ©raf Sctdjtolb bittct mid), Gucrer Gjjellciij fetneit Betbinblidjen TuinE fur SJJitteiiung bee englifdjcn 4>evmitte[ungsnetfd)laga ju fagen. Gt bemertt jcbod) baju, bafj nnd) Gtbffuuug bet geinbfeligfeiten fcitens ©etbiens unb nad) bet injwifdjeo erfolgten fttiegsevElatung et ben ©djtitt Guglaubs aid Bcrfpatct anfeljcn miiffe. — 32 — {Tcligramm fcce Xcicberan^ers an ^ctt tKaifcrlicben 25otfcbafrer in Paris t>om 29. Ouli. £>ie ung liber ftanjbfifd)e ^ticgSoorbcteitungen jugctjenben 9iad)iid)ten mcb^rcn (let) foil ©tunbe ju ©tunbe. 3$ Site bicS bei bcr granjofijcben SHegietnng jut ©pracbe ju bringen unb fie eiubringlid)ft batauf bjnjiitceifen, baff un8 berartige SRajjiiafmun ju ©rt)u^maj)rege[u jlinngcn roiitben. 5Dir roiitben fitiegttgefafjr profla- mieren miiffen, unb roenrt bici aud) nod) fcine Ginbcrufungen unb nod) nidjt SJtobUifierung bebcute, fo roiirbe baburcb, immetljin bie ©pannung erl)Sf)t toeiben. Sir fyofften fovtgcfe^t nocf> auf Erfjattuug bc3 3vieben8. Tekgxamm bee ^1?ilitarba>oUmdcbricjren in St. Peters* buroj an B. 1TI. ben Haifa r»om 30. 3uli. ©eflern fagte mit gurfl 'Jtoubeffi, nacfjbem er riernniajjt fjatte, ba§ Guet SJlajefiat Jeiegramm on ftaifet 9lifoIaud fofott ubcrmittelt itmtbe: ©ottlob, bap eiu ^elegramm 3') r e3 RolfwB gefommen iff. Gr fagte mit nun foebcu, ba3 Jelegramm Ejdttc auf ben ftaifer tiefen Ginbrucf gemadjt, abet ba bie Wobitifieruug gegen Oftcrreict) bereits befofjlen getoefen unb ©afonoto Seine Sftajeftiit u»ot)[ baDoii fiber- jeugt tjeitte, bafj ciS vitttjt me^r moglid) fei, juriirfjitroeidjen, fo tonne Seine SKajeftat Icibet nid)t3 mebr dnbetn. 3^ f a il' c ") m barauf, bie ©d)ulb an ben uuabfebbaren golgen trage bie fvii[)jeitige 9Jlobi(ifietung gegen bus) bocf) nut in cinen lofalen Srieg mit ©crbien oerioitfcltc Ofterreitb/Ungarn, beim a6e gegen ©crbien unb nidjt gegen SRujjtanb mobilifiert, unb jum fofortigen Gingreifen fei fein ffltuub fiit SKufjfanb. 3^ f u 3 ie ^ eg torittten fjinju, bafi man in Tieutfcblanb bie SRebensatt iWnjjIanbS »roir fonnen unfete Stfibet in ©etbien nia)t im Sticf; (afjen •< nad) bem futrfitbatcu l!crbred)t'n von Scrajeroo nid)t me()t »er|M)e [}om 31. 3uli 1914. gottgefejjt ift Bon ung jiinfrficti Stujjlanb unb 6jretrcic6/Ungatn fomoljt butd) biteften Depefdjenlr'edjfet Seiner Sftajeftat bc3 KaifetS mit ©einet 5)?ajejtat bein given als and) im Seneljmen mit ©it Cbroatb ©vet) oermittclt ttovben. ©utd) bie Sftobili- jictung SRufjIanbS (inb jcborft nlle unfete S?emu[)ungen fc E»r etfcljwctt, lBcnn nid)t unmbgticfi, gemadit. 'Jro| bevubigeubet S3er[u§erungen ttifft SJufjIanb alien uu8 ju- gegangeiieu Starfjrirljtcn jufolge fo lveitge[)enbc SJiajinaljmen audi gegen unii, ba(i bie Page immcc bebioI)lid)et roirb. 3tnt<»fle 30. I. Seine TITajcflat an ben 3aren. 28. 3u(i 10-45 p.m. SDJit ber gtofiten 58euntul)igung [)6te id) Don bem Sinbruct, ben Oftetteidj'Ungatng S3orge!)cn gegen ©crbien in ©einem 9(eid)e Ijetuottuft. ©ic fftupeltofe Agitation, bie feit 3 llr ) ven '" Setbien gettieben movben ift, Ijat jn bem emboteuben SBerbtcdjen gefii()vt, beffen Dpfer Erjljetjog granj ?i ero ' nall ' ) geworben ifl. ©ct ®cijt, bcr bie ©etben ifjren eigenen Sbnig nnb feinc ©emafjlin morben [iejj, l)ertfd)t t)eutc nod) in jencm t'anbe. Stoeifelloii »r>irfl ©n mit mit baiin ubevcinftimmen, baji toil beibe, ©u nnb id) fomoljt, al8 atie SouDetane ein geineinfamei! 3 n ^ re il c baton rjaben, batauf ju 6efteE)cn, bajj nOe biejenigen, bie fiit ben fdjeujjlid)en SJtorb mo- ta(ifd) Detailttuottlidj (inb, iljre betbiente (Strafe eticiben. SlnbeterfeitS iibctfetje id) feineBtuegS, trie fdjmierig e3 fiit ©id) unb ©eine SRegietung ift, ben ©tiomungen bet bffentlicbcn SJlcinung entgegenjuheten. Gingebcnf bet [)etjlid)en gteunbfcrjaft, bie un8 beibc (eit (anger 3 c 't "lit feftem Sanb »et= Binbet, fche id) baljet meinen ganjen Einftujj ein, urn Oftetteicb/Uugain baju ju beftimmen, tine offene nnb beftiebigenbe Betftanbigung mit Stufifalib anjuftrc&en. 3$ ^offe jit- »crfid)tlid), ba§ ©u mid) in mcincn Semufjungeit, alle ©djiuicrigfeiten, bie nod) ent< fte()cn tbnnen, ju befeitigen, untetftiijjen roitft. ©ein fc[)t aufvid)tiget nnb crgebenet gteunb unb S3ettet gej. 5Bilb;elm. — 34 — II. Der 3ar an Seine tffajeftat. ff- Calais, 20. 3uti 1 p. m. 3cf) Bin erfteut, bajj ©u juriicf in ©cntfd)[anb Bift. 3 11 bicfem fo ernftcn Jlugenblirf bittc id) inftiinbig ink ju t)elfeii. Gin fdimSblidjer ftrieg ift nn cin fdm\id)cg Canb cvflait morben, bic Gntrufiung bictiibcv, bic id) Dodig tcile, i(l in Siufilanb ungefjeuet. 3$ f cl ) e &onu8, t>a§ id) fer)r Balb bcra ©turf, bev anf mid; au8geii6t luirb, nid)t inc[)r metbe u>iberftct)en fbnncn unb gejtoungen fein mcrbe, Sftajjrcgetn jii ngveifen, bic jum Rriege f u Ejren incrben. Urn cincni Unghlcf, reie ti rin eutopaifdjei firieg fein hnitbe, Dorjubeugcn, bittc id) ©id) im Jiamen iinfcrct nltcn greunbfd)f)ft, alle§ ©it mbglictje ju tun, urn ©cinen BiinbeSgcnoffcn bauon jiitiictju^aUcn, JU locit ju get)eu. gcj. JHfolaua. 3(ntafte as. III. Seine BTajelfaf an ^en 3aren. 29. >li 0.30 p.m. 3d) [)nbc ©cin $e(egramm erfynttcu unb teite ©cincn ffiunfd) nnd) 6rr)altung lt$ 3ricben3. 3 cbcrt ) f ann id) — te't iff) ©it in niciucm crftcn Jetegtamm fagte — Ofterreicb/itngarna SBotgefjen nid)t ali i>fd)mac)lid)en fivicg* bctrad)tcn. 6ftcrteid)- Ungarn ivcifs mis Grfaljtiing, ba(j @er6ien§ SSetfptedjungen, train fie nut auf bem Ropier ftcfjen, ganjfid) unjuberlaffig jinb. SWeinet Jlnfidjt nadi ift 6ftctteid)ifd)en Deinet SRegietung unb SBien mSglid) unb n>unfd)en8metl ift, cine SSetftdnbi' gung, bic — ivie id) ©ir fd)on te(egtapt)ierte — meine SRegietung mit aftcn ftrdftcn ju forbetn Bcmul)t ift. SRaturlid) luiivbcn inititStifdje SJkfjnatjmen Shift- [anb§, iDc(d)c feftetreidj-Ungatn nisi ©tot)ung auffaffen Ebimtc, ein UngfucE 6efd)[eunigen, bad iL'iv Beibe 311 I'cvmcibcn toiinfdjen, unb miirben and) meine ©tetiung afS Bet- mittlcr, bic id) — auf ©cincn Sipped on meine Jjveunbfdjiift nub §itfe — beteit' nullig angenommen fjiibe, unteigrabcn. gcj ©itticlin. jgwloge 33. IV. Seine ^TajefMt an fcen 3arcn. 30. 3uti 1 a. m. SDieiu ¥otfdiaftet ift nngefticfen, ©cine iRegietung auf bie ©efabjen unb frfiiuetcn fionfequetijcn einet 2)?obilifation fjinjuttxifciij bas! gfeic^e [)n6e id) T5it in mcinem lejjtcn Seicgtaimn gefagt. fefterteidi-Ungatn hat mir gegen Setbien mobiii- fictt, unb jWar nut eincn %nl feiliet Slnnec. SBcnn SRufilanb, roie e§ je|}t nadj ■Deiner unb ©einet Megietung OTittciiung bet %a& iff, gcgen fiftctteicb/Ungatn inobii madjt, fo ttmb bic SScrmittfcrrodc, mit bet ©u mid) in freunbfefjafttirfter ®eife betvauteft nnb bit id) auf ©eine auSbtudiidjc SSittc augenommen ()nbe, gefafytbet, roenn nid)t uumbglid) gemadjt. ©ie ganje ©d)tBete btv Gntfd)eibung tub,t jejjt auf ©eincn ©cfyultctn, fie fyaben bie SSctantioottung fiit Sticg obct 3™°™ 3" ttagen. gej. 5Billjc[ni 3tn(ac|c 23 a. V. Der 3ar an Seine "Xdajeftdt. ^etethof, ben 30. 3u(i 1914, 1>> 20 p.m. 3d) banfe ©it Bon Joetjen fur ©eine tafd)e Jlntioott. 3 C ^ entfenbe (jeute Slbcnb Satifljeff mit 3"ftuftion. ©ic jcgt in fitaft ttetenben militavifdjen SJlafj- nabmen finb fdjon boi 5 Jagen bcfdilofjcn tBOvben, unb jloat aug ©tiinbeii bet Set- ttibigung gcgen bic 33orbmitungen Oftcncid)8. 3$ ^ ff c Bon 9 an 3 cm S e tj en / bajj bicfc SRajjnaljmen in tciner 5Ceife ©cine ©tedimg a(3 Setmittiet bccinfluffcn rcetben, bie 3^) f c f) r ') ot fy anfdjtagc. 2Bit btaucben ©eincn flatten ©tud auf Sfteneid), bamit ci ju cinct Sctftiinbigung mit un3 fommt. 9lico[au3. -jlnlnnc 24. Celearamm Z»c& Xeicbefan^rs an ben Kaifcrlicbcn 23otfcbafter in pdersbura vom 31. Juli 19J4. iDrino5of)l wit felbft bii jut ©tunbe (einertci 9ftobiImad)ung3majiuaf)mcu gettoffen fjaben, f)at 9?ufjianb ganje Jltmce unb Jliottc, alfo aud) gegen unS, mobilifiert. ©utd) bicfc tuffifdjcn SJlnjjnafymen finb wit gtjloungen tuorben, jut ©idjerung bc3 Sicidjg bie btol)cnbc StiegSgefa^r auBjufptedjen, bie nod) nicbt 2Jiobitifictung bebcutet. ©ie 5ftobiIijierung mufj abet fotgcu, fails nid)t SJufjlanb binnen jwblf Stunbcn jebc SticgsSmafjnahme gegen unS unb Oftctteidj-Ungatn einjlcdt unb un3 Ijictubet beftimmte Gttlatung abgibt. SMtte bie3 fofott ©ertn ©ajonow mittciien unb ©tunbe bet Sftitteilung btat)ten. — 36 — Mwtnflc as. Cclcgramm be& Xricbsfanjlcrs an ben Kaifen 23orfcbaftcr in Parts t»om 31. Ouli 1914. 2)rino(cn&. SRujjianb [)at tvo^ unfcrcr nod) fcbvoebenbcn BermitteiungiSaftion unb obroobl h>it felbft fcinerlei SJlobiImadc)ung8majjnaf)men getroffen bcibcn, 5)lobi[jrmcr/utig fciner gefaintcn Jlrmee unb ftiotte, alfo audj gegeu un§, Dcrfiigt. 5Bir babcn bamuf brobcnbcu SriegSjufranb erftatt, bcm SJlobiimadjung folgen mu[i, fads' uid)t JRuglanb 6innen 12 Stunben altc firiegSmajjnaljmen gegcn un3 unb Ofterrcicb cinftetle. Die SStobilmadjung bcbcutct unticrineiblid) ftricg Sitte fraiij6|ifd)e SKegicrung friigcn, ob fie in einem ruffifcbbeutfcbcn Sricgc neutral bleiben roiU. 5lntroott mufi binnen 18 iStunbcn crfoigen. ©ofort ©tunbe bcr geftcltten Mnftage brazen, ©rofjtc Sile ge6otcn. iintafte 26. Teiegvamm bce> Xcicbefan^lers an ^en Kaiferlicben 23otfcbaffcr in Petersburg t>om I. 2(ugufr 12 52 p. m. iDringcni*. ftalli* bic Siuffifdic SRegierung fcinc befricbigenbe 5lnt»ort auf unfttt ftorbennig crteilt, \o tuoden (Sucre Erellciij ibr l)cute nad)mittag§ 5 Uljr (mitte[europdifd)e 3 e 't) folgenbc Grfiatung uberreidjen: Le Gouvernement Imperial s'est efforce des les debuts de la crise do la mener a une solution pacifique. Se rendant a un desir que lui en avait ete expriine par Sa Majeste l'Empereur de Russie, Sa Majeste l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avee l'Angleterre etait applique a accomplir un rdle mediateur aupres des Cabinets de Vienne et de St. Petersbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attendre le resultat, proceda a la mobilisation de la totalite de ses forces de terre et de mer. A la suite de eette mesure menaeante motivee par aucun preparatif militaire de la part de l'Allemagne, I'Empire Allemand se trouva vis-a-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouvernement Imperial cut manque de parer a ce peril il aurait eompromis la seeurite et l'existence meme de l'Allemagne. Par consequent le Gouvernement Allemand se vit force de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste l'Empereur de toutes les Russies en sistant sur la cessation des dits actes militaires. La Russie ayant refuse de faire droit a cette demande et ayant manifesto par ce refus, que son action — 37 — etait dirigee contre l'AHemagne, j'ai 1'honneur d'ordre de mon Gouverne- ment de faire savoir a Votre Excellence ce qui suit: Sa Majeste l'Empereur, mon auguste Souverain, au nom de l'Empire releve le defi et Se considere en etat de guerre avec la Russie. Sitte Singang unb 3cttputift bet SluSfuljrung biefer Jnftruftion nad) tuffifd)cr 3eit bringcnb brafyten. SSirtc 3^" ^Pdffe fotbcvn" unb ©d)uj unb ©efdjaftc Slmcvifamfd)et Sotfdjaft ubctgeben. £degramm be& ICaifcrticbcn "&otfd?aftev& in parte an den Xcichef angler pom J. 2tuguft 1 il^r 5 XlTin. nm. Sluf meinc roiebctfjoitc 6e(limmte ftragc, °& Jtanfteid) im ^atfe eincS beutfd)- ruffifrfjcn fitiegeS neutral BlciBc, evflSrte bcr 3)liui|1erpra(ibent mir, bajj Qtaufreid) ba8 tun tocrbc, lvag fcine 3 ntorc (T etl ^ m gcf>6tcn. Bdliii, grbnidt In brt WiidjBbru [Croion Copyright Reserved. GREAT BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN CRISIS. CORRESPONDENCE, AND STATEMENTS IN PARLIAMENT, TOGETHER WITH AN INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS. LONDON : FEINTED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OP HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE Bt HAZELL, WATSON & VINEY, Ld., London and Aylesbury, Printers by Appointment to His Majesty the King. To be purchased, either directly or through any Bookseller, from WYMAN & SONS, Ltd., 29, Breams Buildings, Fetter Lane, E.C., and 54, St. Mary Street Cardiff ; or H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE (Scottish Branch). 23, Fsrth Street, Edinburgh • or B. PONSONBY, Ltd , 11G, Grafton Street, Dublin; or from the Agencies in the British Colonies and Dependencies, the United States of America, the Continent of Europe and Abroad, of T. FISHER UNW1N, London, W.C. 1914. Price One Penny. CONTENTS. Introductory Narrative of Events Table of Contents of Correspondence laid before Parliament List of Principal Persons mentioned in the Corre- spondence, showing their official positions Part I. — Correspondence laid before Parliament Part II. — Speeches in the House of Commons : — (1) Sir Edward Grey (August 3, 1914) (2) Sir Edward Grey (August 3, 1914) (3) Mr. Asquith (August 4, 1914) (4) Mr. Asquith (August 5, 1911) (5) Mr. Asquith (August 6, 1914) XXVI. 1 89 97 97 98 INTRODUCTORY NARRATIVE OF EVENTS. (1.1 On the 23rd June, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, nephew of the Emperor of Austria, Heir to the Throne, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, left Vienna to attend army manoeuvres in the Province of Bosnia. On Sunday, the 28th, he visitod Sarajevo, the capital of the province, and made a progress through the town accompanied by his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg. While passing through the streets their automobile was fired on by an assassin. Both the Archduke and Duchess were killed. No crime has ever aroused deeper or more general horror throughout Europe ; none has ever been less justified. Sympathy for Austria was universal. Both the Governments and the public opinion of Europe were ready to support her in any measures, however severe, which she might think it necessary to take for the punishment of the murderer and his accomplices. It immediately appeared, from the reports of our representatives abroad, that the press and public opinion of Austria-Hungary attributed much of the responsibdity for the crime to the Servian Government, which was said to have encouraged a revolutionary movement amongst the Serb populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That there had for many years been a strong Serb nationalist movement in these two provinces there is no doubt. This movement in an earlier form had swept the provinces, then part of the Turkish Empire, into the insurrection against the Turkish Government in the seventies of last century, culminating in the war of 1877-8 between Russia and Turkey. It had continued when Austria took over the administration of the provinces under the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Austria then pledged her word to Turkey that her occupation should not " detract from the rights of sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan over these provinces." Thirty years later, however, in 1908, she suddenly pro- claimed their annexation to her Empire. On the 7th October of that year, the annexation was celebrated in Sarajevo by the firing of salutes and ringing of cathedral bells, amid scenes of official rejoicing and popular apathy. Servian nationalist feeling immediately asserted itself, and the Servian Government protested to tho Powers against the annexation as a "deep injury done to the feelings, interests, and rights of the Servian people." Servia's attitude, coupled with the resentment felt by Russia and certain other Great Powers, nearly brought about a European war ; but after six months of extreme tension she was induced to make a declaration abandoning her protest and promising to live on good terms with Austria. Her nationalist aspirations still continued, however, and were strengthened by her successes in the Balkan wars of 1912-115 — successes which were compromised by Austria's opposition to her territorial expansion. As Servia grew, Austrian suspicion of her designs deepened. (2.) In the light of this history the storm of anti-Servian feeling which swept Austria-Hungary after the Sarajevo murders is easily understood. It was a feeling based on patriotism and loyalty. Europe was disposed to excuse its exaggerations and to sympathise with its motives. But the dangers to European peaco which it involved were immediately evident from the reports which reached the Government in London. Anti-Serb riots took place at Sarajevo and Agram. The members of tho Serb party in tho Provincial Council of Croatia were assailed by their colleagues with cries of "Servian assassins." Mobs in Vienna threatened the Servian Legation. The Austrian press, almost without exception, used the most unbridled lan- guage, and called for the condign punishment of Servia. There were signs a2 that the popular resentment was shared, and perhaps encouraged, hy tho Austrian Government. Both the British and also the German Government 1 knew that the peace might he disturbed. In view of these reports, it naturally became incumbent on disinterested Powers to exercise what influence they possessed in a direction which would reconcile justice with peace. Unfortunately, though the attitude of public opinion in Austria, and, to a less degree, also in Germany, was plain, the inten- tions of the Austrian Government remained almost equally obscure. The Austrian Foreign Office maintained an attitude of reticence towards the British and Russian Ambassadors. On the 7th July the Government were careful to make a public announcement that a joint meeting of the Cabinets of Austria and Hungary, which had just taken place, was only concerned with the question of domestic measures to repress the Pan-Serb propaganda in Bosnia. On the Sth July the Minister-President of Hungary made, on the whole, a pacific speech in the Hungarian Parliament, defending the loyalty of the majority of the Serb subjects of the Empire. On the 11th July the Servian Minister at Vienna had no reason to anticipate a threatening communication from the Austrian Government, and as late as the 22nd July, the day before the Austrian ultimatum was delivered at Belgrade, the Minister-President of Hungary stated in Parliament that the situation did not warrant the opinion that a serious turn of events was necessary or even probable. His Majesty's Government had therefore largely to fall back on conjecture. It was known that the situation might become serious, but it was also known that Servia had made professions of readiness to accept any demands com- patible with the sovereignty of an independent State. It was known that the opinion of the Russian and French — and also of the German — Governments was that the Servian Government was not itself to blame for the crime, but that Servia must be ready to investigate and put an end to the propaganda which had apparently led to it, and which was -said to have originated in part on Ser- vian soil. Sir E. Grey advised Servia to show herself moderate and conciliatory. He promised the German Ambassador to use his influence with the Russian Government in the same direction. More could not be done, for no actual evidence had yet been furnished that Servian territory had in fact been made the base for revolutionary operations. It was only known that a court-marth'l had been set up at Sarajevo, the proceedings before which were secret. The Servian Government stated that they were only waiting for the Austrian Govern- ment to communicate the evidence thus collected before setting their own investi- gations on foot. The Servian Government also stated that both the assassins implicated were Austrian subjects, and that on a previous occasion the Austrian Government had informed the Servian Government, in reply to enquiries, that one of these men was harmless and was under their protection. It was remem- bered that Austria had tried on previous occasions to fasten guilt on the Ser- vian Government by means of police evidence brought forward in Austrian courts, and had failed. It was therefore assumed on all sides that, before Austria took any action, she would disclose to the public her case against Servia. When Sir E. Grey said this to the German Ambassador on the 20th July, the latter replied that he certainly assumed that Austria would act upon some case that would be known ; hut, as a matter of fact, His Majesty's Govern- ment did not receive any statement of the evidence on which Austria had founded her ultimatum till the 7th August. It was, therefore, necessary to wait. The situation was as clear as it could be made till Austria would consent to throw off her reticence. There was nothing doubtful in the general international situation, no incalculable element which Austria could not take into full consideration. Whatever she did, she would know accurately the consequences of her action. The Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente remained as they had always been. We had been quite recently assured that no new secret .'lenient had been introduced into the former, and Sir E. Grey had stated emphatically in Parliament on the 11th June that tin 1 latter had remained unchanged so tar as we were concerned. Russia's interest in the Balkans was well known. As late as the 23rd May the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had reaffirmed in the Duma the policy of tho " Balkans for the Balkans," and it was known that any attack on a Balkan State by any great European Power would be regarded as a menace, to that policy. If Servia was, as the Austrian Ambassador said to Sir E. Grey on the 29th July, "regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence"; if Servia was to be humiliated ; then assuredly Russia could not remain indifferent. It was not a question of the policy of Russian statesmen at St. Petersburgh, but of the deep hereditary feeling for the Balkan populations bred in the Russian people by more than two centuries of development. These things had been, as Sir E. Grey said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan war, "a commonplace in European diplomacy in the past." They were, the facts of the European situation, the products of years of development, tested and retested during the last decade. Patient work might change them, but the product of years could not be pushed aside in a day. (3.) Yet two days were as much as Austria decided to allow for the task. On the 23rd July she showed her hand. She delivered an ultimatum at Belgrade and required an answer in forty-eight hours. She made ten demands, directed towards the elimination from Servian national life of everything which was hostile to Austria. These demands involved the suppression of newspapers and literature, the suppression of nationalist societies, a reorganisation of the Government schools, the dismissal of officers from the army, the participation of Austrian officials in judicial proceedings in Servia, the arrest of two specified men, the prevention of all traffic in arms across the frontier, a full explanation of anti-Austrian utterances, and immediate notification of the enforcement of these measures. In addition, the Servian Government was to publish on the front page of tho " Official Journal " a prescribed statement, which amounted to i. full recantation of her alleged errors, and a promise of amendment. A very brief summary was annexed to the ultimatum, giving the bare findings of the secret trial at Sarajevo, with no corroborative evidence. No independent nation had ever been called on to accept a greater humiliation. Between the delivery of this ultimatum and the declaration of war between Great Britain and Germany there was an interval of only twelve days. In the whirl of negotiations which now followed, there was no time to draw breath and ponder. At tho outset, therefore, it may be well to explain definitely the British attitude towards the Austrian ultimatum. Austria was under provocation. She had to complain of a dangerous popular movement against her government. What evidence she might have against the Servian Government no one in Europe then knew. Great Britain had no interest in the Balkans, except one. She desired the consolidation and pro- gressive government of the Balkan States; she desired, in the words recently used by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Duma, that "the Balkan Governments should recognise that, in the matter of strengthening a State, tho acquisition of territory is insufficient; the devotion and confidence of the new citizens must be enlisted." The dispute between Austria and Servia did not necessarily affect that interest ; it was a dispute between two Govern- ments with which Great Britain had nothing to do. Sir E. Grey, therefore, consistently stated that he had no concern in that dispute; that he had no title to intervene between Austria and Servia; that he would express no opinion on the merits of the ultimatum. But there was the other side. If the dispute affected the interests of Russia, then tho peace of Europe was at stake; and, from the first, Sir E. Grey told the Austrian Government that ho did not seo how Russia, interested as sho was in Servia, could take any but a most serious view of such a formidable document as the ultimatum. The peace of Europe must be maintained, and it could only be maintained, as Mr. Asquith had said to Parliament in March, 1913, in discussing the Balkan crisis, by a "spirit of forbearance, patience, and self-sacrifice" — by a "loyal spirit of give and take on the part of the Great Powers directly concerned." It was as the agent of this spirit of conciliation alone that Great Britain intervened in the European erisis. (4.) On the 23rd July the Austrian Ambassador told Sir E. Grey that an ulti- matum was being handed to Servia. For the first time Sir E. Grey heard that "there would be something in the nature of a time limit." He immediately expressed his grave alarm. Next morning the text of the ultimatum was handed to him, and he learnt that the time limit was forty-eight hours. He confessed to the German Ambassador that, as no time had been left for delibera- tion, he felt helpless. There was no time to advise Russia or to influence Servia. At this critical moment everything depended on Germany. As the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said a little later, "the key of the situation was to be found in Berlin." What was Germany's attitude? Privately, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his doubts as to the ultimatum ; officially, the German Government called it "equitable and moderate," and said that they "desired urgently the localisation of the conflict." Everyone desired that; but it was no time for phrases. The same morning the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs had summoned the French and British Ambassa- dors in St. Pctersburgh, had said that Austria's step meant imminent war, and had asked for the support of Great Britain and France. The French Ambassador had pledged the support of France, as was well known to be in- evitable under the terms of her alliance. The next morning the Russian Government stated publicly that Russia could not remain indifferent to the Austro-Servian conflict. The next evening troops in Vienna had to be called out to guard the Russian Embassy from hostile crowds. "Localisation" was a good phrase, but we had to deal with facts. Austria had surprised Europe, and with surprise had come universal alarm. During these forty-eight hours Great Britain made three attempts at peace. Before all things, the time-limit of the ultimatum had to be extended. Great Britain and Russia urged this at Vienna. Great Britain urged Germany to join in pressing the Austrian Government. All that Berlin consented to do was to " pass on " the message to Vienna. Secondly, Sir E. Grey urged that Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy should work together at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour of con- ciliation. Italy assented; France assented; Russia declared herself ready; Germany said she had no objection, "if relations between Austria and Russia became threatening." Thirdly, the Russian, French, and British representatives at Belgrade were instructed to advise Servia to go as far as possible to meet Austria. But it was too late. The time-limit, which Austria would not extend, had expired ; and after all Servia did uot need advice. On the afternoon of Saturday, the 25th, she returned to Austria a reply which amounted to an acceptance of all Austria's demands, subject on certain points to the delays necessary for passing new laws and amending her Constitution, and subject to an explanation by Austria-Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Servian judicial proceedings. The reply went far beyond anything which any Power — Germany not excepted — had ever thought probable. But the same day the British Ambassador at Vienna reported that the tone of the Austrian press left the impression that a settlement was not desired, and he later reported that the impression left on his mind was that the Austrian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable. In spite of the conciliatory nature of Servia's reply, the Austrian Minister left Belgrade the same evening, and Servia ordered a general mobilisation. But an outline of the Servian reply had been communicated to Sir E. Grey an hour or two before it was delivered. lie immediately expressed to Germany the hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin again contented itself with " passing on " the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna through the German Ambassador there. The fate of the message so passed on may bo guessed from the fact that the German Ambassador told the British Ambassador directly afterwards that Servia had only made a pretence of giving way, and that her concessions were all a sham. (5.) During the next four days, 26th to 29th July, there was only one cpjestion before Europe— how could Russia and Austria be brought to an agreement? It was evident that Russia did not believe that Austria would, or could, stop short of the absolute ruin of the Servian State, if she once actually attacked it. Here again, the question was not merely one of Government policy; the popular sentiment of two great nations was involved. Austria indeed pro- fessed, no doubt with perfect honesty, that she would take no territory from Servia. But the Austrian Ministers were being borne along on a wave of violent popular enthusiasm. They said themselve3 that they would he swept from power if they did not follow the popular desire for a conflict with Servia. Would this popular enthusiasm be content with any mere punitive expedition against the enemy? Surely not. Russia, therefore, openly said that sho would have to intervene if Servia were attacked ; but she promised Austria on the 27th that sho would use all her influence at Belgrade to induce the Servian Government to give satisfaction to Austria, and only asked Austria to delay hostilities in order to give time for deliberation. Austria refused, saying it was too late. Sho declared war on Servia on tho 28th. Russia ordered a partial mobilisation on the 29th. But meanwhile Sir Edward Grey had proposed that the German, Italian, and French Ambassadors should meet him in London, to discuss tho best means towards a settlement. Italy and France at once accepted ; Russia said she- was ready to stand aside, ; but Germany refused. She did not like what sho called "a court of arbitration," and proposed instead direct negotiations between Russia and Austria. These negotiations actually began, as we have seen in the last paragraph, but they were cut short by tho Austrian declaration of war against Servia. Austria then apparently considered that the moment for such negotiations was passed. She had, moreover, refused to discuss tlie Servian reply in any way, and it was difficult to see, after that refusal, what Russia could negotiate with her about. Russia, therefore, fell back on Sir E. Grey's proposal for a conference of Ambassadors in London, which she had originally expressed her readiness to accept. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs urged Sir E. Grey to induce Germany to indicate in what way sho would consent to work for a settlement. This brings the narrative of events down to Wednesday, tho 29th July. Russia was mobilising partially in her southern provinces. Austrian troops were bombarding Belgrade. But, on the other hand, better news was coming from Berlin. Up to the 28th at least, both Germany and Austria had seemed unwilling to admit that the situation was really serious; Russia, it was said, was unprepared, and France was in no condition to go to war. Germany had said, in reply to Sir E. Grey's repeated advances, that she did not like to make representations to Vienna for fear of stiffening Austria's attitude. But on the evening of the 28th tho German Chancellor assured the British Ambassador that he was trying to mediate at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. On the strength of this assurance and similar assurances made by the German Ambassador in London on tho 29th, Sir E. Grey telegraphed to Berlin once more, in accord- ance with the request of the Russian Government, urging the German Govern- ment, if they did not like the idea of the Ambassadors' conference in the form he had suggested it, to suggest any other form they pleased. "Mediation," he said, "was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would press the button in tho interests of peace." The telegram was despatched at about 4 o'clock ori the evening of the 29th. (6.) This appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange response. About midnight, a telegram arrived at the Foreign Office from His Majesty's. Ambassa- dor at Berlin. The German Chancellor had sent for him late at night. He had asked if Great Britain would promise to remain neutral in a war, provided Germany did not touch Holland and took nothing from Franco but her colonies. He refused to give any undertaking that Germany would not invado Belgium, but he promised that, if Belgium remained passive, no territory woul i be taken from her. Sir E. Grey's answer was a peremptory refusal, hut he added an exhortation and an offer. The business of Europe was to work for peace. That was the only question with which Great Britain was concerned. If Germany would prove by her actions now that she desired peace, Great Britain would warmly welcome a future agreement with her whereby the wholo weight of the two nations would be thrown permanently into the scale of peace in years to come. For the next .two days peace proposals and negotiations continued, so"mo initiated and all supported by Great Britain. There remained a spark of hope. But from the British point of view the faco of Europe henceforward was changed. On the 29th July the only conflict in progress had been on tho frontiers of Servia and Austria ; the only fear of further war had lain in tho Vlli relations of Russia and Austria. Germany's declarations were pacific; Russia had said she desired nothing but a period of peace to allow for her internal development ; France would not fight except to help her ally. There had seemed no insuperable difliculty in keeping the peace; it was only a question of allaying the mutual suspicion between Vienna and St. Petersburgh. But now a new filement of danger had been introduced. Great Britain now know that Geirnany was contemplating an attack on France. She knew more. The independence of the Low Countries had for centuries been considered as one of the strongest means of securing the peace of Europe. Their position and tho nature of the country rendered them the natural battlefield of Northern Euiope. Tf it was made impossible for a Oreat Power to invade them, war would become increasingly diikcult and dangerous. With the growth of the idea of a fixed system of international law founded on treaties, the neutrality of Belgium had been devised 8s a permanent safeguard to this end. As such, it had been consecrated by two international treaties signed by all the Powers, and recognised by two generations of statesmen. Now, when the peace of Europe was our one object, it was found that Germany was preparing to tear out the main rivet of that peace. Germany's position must lie understood. She had fulfilled her treaty obliga- tions in the past; her action now was not wanton. Belgium was of supremo military importance in a war with France; if such a war occurred, it would be one of life and death ^Germany feared that, if she did not occupy Belgium, France might do so. In face of this suspicion, there was only one thing to do> The neutrality of Belgium bad not been devised as a pretext for wars, but to prevent the outbreak of wars. The Powers must reaffirm Belgian neutrality in order to prevent the war now threatened The British Government, therefore, on Friday, the 31st July, asked the German and French Governments for an engagement to respect Belgium's neutrality, and the Belgian Government for an engagement to uphold it. France gave the nocessarv engagement the same day; Belgium gave it the day after; Germany returned no reply. Hence- forward there could be no doitbt of German de-signs. Meanwhile, on the 30th and 31st negotiations continued between Russia and Austria. On the '3tlt.li Germany bad suggested to Austria that she should stop as soon as her troops had occupied Belgrade. Bate on tho same night Russia offered to stop all military preparations, if Austria would recognise that the conflict with Servia bad become a question of general European interest, and would eliminate from her ultimatum tho points whioh involved a violation of the sovereignty of Servis. As tho result of tins offer, Russia was able to inform His Majesty's Government on the 31st that Austria bad at last agreed to do the very thing she bad refused to do in the first days of the crisis, namely, to discuss the whole question of her ultimatum to Servia. Russia asked the British Government to assume the direction of theso discussions. For a few hours there seemed to be a hope of peace. (7.) At this moment, on Friday, the 31st, Germany suddenly despatched an ultimatum to Russia, demanding that she should countermand her mobilisation within twelve hours. F.very allowance must be made for the natural nervous- ness which, as history has repeatedly shown, overtakes nations when mobilisa- tion is under way. All that can be said is that, according to the information in the possession of His Majesty's Government, mobilisation had not at the timo proceeded as far in Russia as in Germany, although general mobilisation was not publicly proclaimed in Germany -till the next day, the 1st August. France also began to mobilise on that day. The German Secretary of State refused to discuss a last proposal from Sir E. Grey for joint action with Ger- many, France, and Italy until Russia's reply should bo received, and in the afternoon tho Gorman Ambassador at St. Petersburgh presented a declaration of war. Yet on this same day, Saturday, the 1st, Russia assured Great Britain that she would on no account commence hostilities if the Germans did not cross tho frontier, and France declared that her troops would be kept 6 miles from her frontier so as to prevent a collision. This was the situation when very early on Sunday morning, tho 2nd August, German troops invaded Luxemburg, a small independent State whose neutrality had heen guaranteed by all the Powers with the same object as the similar guarantee of Belgium. The die was cast. War between Germany, Russia, and France had become inevitable. Only one question now remained for this country. His Majesty's Govern- ment failed in their attempts to secure a general peace. Should they now remain neutral? The grounds on which that question was decided are clearly set forth in the statements of Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith in Parliament, which are contained in this volume,* and no additional explanations are needed here. But one fact may be emphasised. From the 24th July, when Russia first asked for British support, to the 2nd August, when a conditional promise of naval assistance was given to France, Sir E. Grey had consistently declined to give any promise of support to either of our present allies. He maintained that the position of Great Britain was that of a disinterested party whose influence for peace at Berlin and Vienna would be enhanced by the. knowledge that we were not committed absolutely to either side in the existing dispute. He refused to believe that the best road to European peace lay through a show of force. We took no mobilisation measures except to keep our fleet assembled, and we confined ourselves to indicating clearly to Austria on the 27th July, and to Germany on the 29th July, that we could not engage to remain neutral if a European conflagration took place. We gave no pledge to our present allies, but to Germany we gave three times— on the 30th July, the 31st July, and the 1st August— a clear warning of the effect which would be produced on our atti- tude and on the sentiment of the British people by a violation of the neutrality of Belgium. After Germany's declaration of war on Russia on the afternoon of the 1st, the Tsar telegraphed to His Majesty the King as' follows: "In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have done all in my power to avert war." It is right to say that His Majesty's Government believe this to be a true state- ment of the attitude both of Russia and France throughout this crisis. On the other hand, with every wish to be fair and just, it will be admitted that the response of Germany and Austria gave no evidence of a sincere desire to save the peace of Europe. Foreign Office, Sept. 28, 1914. * See Part II. TABLE OF CONTENTS OF CORRESPONDENCE LAID BEFORE PARLIAMENT. NOTE. (1) Documents Nos. 1-159 have been published as a White Paper, Miscellaneous No. 6 (1914) [Cd. 7467]. (2) Document No. 160 has been published as a White Paper, Miscellaneous No. 8 (1914) [Cd. 7445]. (3) Document No. 161 has been published as a White Paper, Miscellaneous No. 10 (1914) [Cd. 7596]. TABLE OF CONTENTS. To Sir H. Rumbold Sir H. Rumbold ... (Telegraphic) To Sir M. de Bunsen Communicated by Austro- Hungarian Ambassador To Sir M. de Bunsen (Telegraphic) Sir G. Buchanan . (Telegraphic) Sir M. de Bunsen (Telegraphic) Mr. Crackanthorpe (Telegraphic) German Ambassador To Sir F. Bertie .. To Sir H. Rumbold (Telegraphic) To Mr. Crackan- thorpe (Telegraphic) 1914. July 20 Conversation with German Ambassador respecting disquieting situation between Austria-Hungary and Servia. Sir E. Grey assumes that Austria-Hungary will publish her case against Servia before taking any action, and thus facilitate Russia counselling moderation at Belgrade Attitude of German Government. Secretary of State prefers not to interfere, and considers that Austria- Hungary has shown great forbearance towards Servia in the past Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador' re- specting note to be sent to Servian Government. Objections urged to insertion of time-limit. Dangers of European conflagration Text of Austro-Hungarian note to Servia Austro-Hungarian note to Servia. Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador. Sir E. Grey de- precates Austrian demands as inconsistent with maintenance of Servian independent sovereignty ... Conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting results of M. Poincare's visit to St. Pctersburgh. Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador urged that His Majesty's Government should proclaim solidarity with them. Former hoped in any case His Majesty's Govern- ment would express strong reprobation of Austro- Hungarian action Views of Russian Charge d'Affaires on situation as expressed to Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs Servian Prime Minister hopes ^ that His Majesty's Government will use influence in moderating Austro- Hungarian demands Views of German Government on situation. . German Government defend attitude of Austria-Hungary towards Servia, and consider matter concerns those States alone Conversation with French Ambassador respecting Austro-Hungarian note and possibility of mediation by the four Powers Conversation with German Ambassador, who justified Austin-Hungarian action and demands, and urged localisation of conflict. Question of using influence at St. Petersburgh and Vienna in favour of modera- tion. Ambassador says Servian reply must not be a rrcro negativo Suggests lines of Servian reply to Austria-Hungary. To consult with Russian and French colleagues as to giving advice to Servian Government. Favour- able reply should be given on as many points as possible TAELB OF CONTENTS. Communicated by Russian Ambassa- dor To Sir F. Bertie ... Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic) Sir F. Bertie (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) Sir G. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic) Sir H. Rumbold ... (Telegraphic! 19 Sir R. Rodd (Telegraphic) 20 Sir M. de Bunse-n ... (Telegraphic) 21 Mr Crackanthorpe (Telegraphic) 22 (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) To Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic) To Sir H. Rumbold (Telegraphic' To Sir M. de Bunsen (Telegraphic) 1914 July 25 Russian Ambassador at Vienna instruoted to request extension of time-limit allowed to Servia, and to urge that Austria-Hungary should inform Powers of basis of accusations against Servia. Recommends similar instructions to His Majesty's Ambassador ... Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has stated that step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum. Austro- Hungarian Government did not threaten actual mili- tary operations. To inform Minister for Foreign Affairs , French Government have given Servia advice similar to that advocated by His Majesty's Government (see No. 12) Acting French Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests that moderating advice be given at Vienna as well as at Belgrade Russian Government consider, that, in view of early expiry of time-limit, it is too late to counsel modera- tion at Belgrade Russia prepared to stand aside if mediation of four Powers is accepted. Minister for Foreign Affairs urges that Great Britain should act with France and Russia. Situation will be des- perate unless Germany can restrain Austria-Hungary Gorman Secretary of Stato admits intention of Austria- Hungary to take military action against Servia. His Excellency considers crisis might be localised. He disclaims all previous knowledge of terms of Austro-Hungarian note Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs says Austria- Hungary will only be satisfied with unconditional acceptance of her note Austro-Hungarian press comments snow that Servian surrender is neither expected nor desired. Austro- Hungarian Minister will leave Belgrade failing un- conditional acceptance of note by 6 P.M. to-day Brief summary of projected Servian reply Russian and French representatives still without in- structions. In view of this and of proposed con- ciliatory Servian reply ho has abstained from advising Servian Government. Probable that Russia has already urged utmost moderation on Servian Government Departure of Austro-Hungarian Minister. Govern- ment has left for Nish with diplomatio representa- tives Refers to No. 6. Approves statement as to attitude of His Majesty's Government. Latter cannot do more, but are anxious to .prevent war. Suggests that four other Powers should mediate at Vienna and St. Petersburgh if Austria-Hungary and Russia mobilise. German co-operation essential Conversation with German Ambassador respecting questionfor mediation between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Ambassador thinks Austria might accept it Russian communication to Austria-Hungary, asking for an extension of time limit of ultimatum to Servia, and enquiring data on which Austria bases her demands. He should support his Russian colleague TABLE OF CONTEXTS. To Sir F. Bertie ... Sir H. Rumbold Sir G. Buchanan fNil-1 To Sir R. Rodd ... To Mr. thorpe Crackan- Sir M. do Bunsen ... (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic] Sir H. Rumbold ... (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) Sir R. Rodd (Telegraphic) To Sir F. Bertie „ Sir H. Rumbold „ Sir R. Rodd ... (Telegraphic) To Sir F. Bertie Sir R. Rodd Communicated by Servian Minister Sir M. de Bunsen (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic Sir F. Bertie (Telegraphic) Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic) 1914. July 25 Has informed German Ambassador of projected Ser- vian reply (see No. 21), and expressed hope that Germany will influence Austria-Hungary to receive it favourably ... ... Has informed Italian Ambassador of statements made to German Ambassador (see No. 25). His Excel- lency states that Italy is anxious to see war avoided Conversation with Servian Minister. Although ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria- Hungary, Servian Government could not agree to abandon certain political ideals Servian reply considered unsatisfactory. War regarded as imminent ... Reports conversation with German Ambassador. Latter considers that Russia will remain inactive ... Reports sudden return of Emperor to Berlin. German Under-Secretary of State of opinion that Russia will not move unless Servian territory is annexed ... German Ambassador at Vienna instructed to pass on to Austro-Hungarian Government hope of His Majesty's Government that they will take favourable view of Servian reply. German Government cannot go beyond this • Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes proposal for conference, and Italian Ambassador at Vienna will be instructed accordingly To ascertain whether Minister for Foreign Affairs will agree to a conference in London, and to ask that French, German, and Italian representatives at Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Belgrade should urge on respective Governments that, pending deci- sion, all activo military operations should be sus- pended It is important to know if Fiance will agree to sug- gestion that the four Powers should urge moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburgh Conversation with Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who considers gravity of situation lies in conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that their prestige is involved Text of Servian reply to Austro-Hungarian note ... Conversation with Russian Ambassador. Russian Government will not press for moro time. Russia cannot possibly remain indifferent if Scrvia is attacked Considers that Austria-Hungary is fully determined on war with Scrvia French Government accept proposals respecting con- ference. Necessary instructions sent to French repre- sentatives at Berlin, Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburgh German Secretary of State is opposed to British pro- posal for a conference. In favour of direct exchange of views between Vienna and St. Petersburgh. Ger- many's position in the event of Russian mobilisation. Secretary of State more hopeful TABLE Of CONTENTS. Sir G. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) To Sir E. Goschen... (Telegraphic) To Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic) To Sir M. de Bunsen To Sir R. Rodd ... Sir M. de Bunsen ... Sir F. Bertie French Ambassador Communicated by Russian Ambassa- dor Sir G. Buchanan ; .. (Telegraphic) 1014. July 27 Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs* conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador respecting note to Servia. Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that Entente Powers should present solid front to Germany Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has decided to propose direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburgh German Ambassador informed that Sir E. Grey desires to keep in touch with Germany so long as the latter works for peace. _ Germany should urge moderation at Vienna. Servian reply might form basis for dis- cussion Russian Ambassador informed of British attitude. Question whether Russia would take action if Austria-Hungary agreed not to annex Servian territory Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, who reviewed Servian question at length. Sir E. Grey expressed surprise at Austrian attitude towards Servian reply, which seems already to involvo deep humiliation of Servia. British fleet will be kept assembled, but this is no moro than proof of anxiety felt in country Conversation with Italian Ambassador, who agrees in proposal for conference. His Excellency will recom- mend to German Government that Austria-Hun- gary, Russia, and Servia should suspend military operations pending conference Text of declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Servia ... French Government agree to proposals of His Majesty's Government for conference between the four Powers in London French Government in favour of British proposal for conference, and are ready to send instructions accordingly Communicates telegram from Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that Russian Govern- ment are in favour of British proposal for confer- ence, failing commencement of direct Austro-Rus- sian conversations Communicates telegram received from Russian Minis- ter for Foreign Affairs to effect that German Govern- ment appear to havo taken no measures to induce Austria Hungary to modify attitude towards Servia- and suggesting His Majesty's Government approach- ing the German Government. Key of the situation really at Berlin Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs will use all his influence at Belgrado to induco Servia to give, satis- faction to Austria, but Servian territorial integrity must be guaranteed and sovereign rights be re- spected. He has proposed direct conversations with Austria, _ but would bo perfectly ready to stand aside if idea of conference accepted TABLE OF CONTENTS. 1914. Bunsen ... July -7 (Telegraphic) R. Rodd (Telegraphic) tTelegraphic) (Telegraphic) E. Goschcn (Telegraphic) Sir M. de Bunser (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) Sir R. Rodd (Ttiegraphi. (Telegraphy Mr. Crack.antharpe .. (Telegraphic) (Telegraph! To Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic: (Telegraphi Reports conversation between Russian Ambassador and Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Russia will be unable to localiso war. Russia will restrain Scrvia as long as possible, in order to give time for a settlement. Russian Am- bassador urged that conversations should be con- tinued at St. Petersburgh Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs* views as to con- ference and suspension of hostilities. Possibility of Scrvia accepting Austrian note in its entirety on recommendation of four Powers Has communicated substance of No. 46 to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is confident that Sir E. Grey's observations to German Ambassador will tend towards peace ... Has communicated No. 47 to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who fully appreciates standpoint of His Maji sty's Government. Gorman Ambassador has informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria- Hungary would respect integrity of Scrvia, but gave no assurance, respecting her independence ... ... Refers to No. 43. German Secretary of Stato has used similar language to' French and Italian Ambas- sadors. Agrees with his two colleagues in thinking that German Government object only to form of proposal respecting conference. Suggests Herr von Jagow might himself be induced to suggest lines of cooperation Minister for Foreign Affairs .states that Austria cannot delay proceedings against Scrvia, and would decline any negotiations on basis of Servian reply. Nothing could now prevent conflict Conversai ion with Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who says that war will bo declared to-day, and that no mediation could bo accepted. Has appealed to him to place peace of Europe first and quarrel with Scrvia second Has informed Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs of substance of No. 27. He is telegraphing similar instructions to Berlin and Vienna Informs of conversation between Servian Charge d' Affaires and Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs; Scrvia might still accept whole Austrian note if certain explanations were given her. Such explana- tions should bo given to the Powers, who should then advise Servia to accept without conditions ... Has urged greatest moderation on Servian Govern- ment pending result of offorts for peaceful solution Declaration of by Austria-Hungary against Refers to No. 45. Proposed conference would not I . i rati I .it private and informal discussion to find a settlement. Agrees that direct con- versations between St. Petcrsbufgh and Vienna would be preferable Ready to propose that German Secretary of State -V ill ; ; < st method of mediation by four Powers. Will keep the idea in reserve till result of Austro- Russian conversations is seen TABLE OF CONTENTS. Subject. 1914 To Sir G. Buchanan July 28 (Telegraphic) 70 Communicated by Count Bencken dorff Sir E. Gosehen (Telegraphic) Sir G. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic) Sir M. de Bunsen .. (Telegraphic] (Telegraphic] Sir E. Gosehen (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) To Sir E. Gosehen... (Telegraphic) Sir G. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic) M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic) Refers to No. 55. Expresses satisfaction at prospect of direct Austro-Russian conversations. Enquires fur- ther as to proposed action at Belgrade Communicates text of two telegrams from Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that Rus- sian Government will announce partial mobilisation on the 29th July; that. Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled ; and that mediation by His Majesty's Government is most urgent Conversation with Imperial Chancellor, who ex- pressed anxiety to work in concert with England. Reasons for German refusal to support proposed con- ference. As Russia had mobilised, he could no longer urge moderation at Vienna. General opinion at Berlin that Russia is unprepared for war Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs grateful for Sir E. Grey's language to German Ambassador (see No. 46). If Austria crossed Servian frontier Russia would mobilise. Has informed German Ambassador that Germany should use her influence at Vienna ... Informs of Austrian declaration of war against Servia Russian Ambassador states that Austro-Hungarian Government have declined Russian Government's suggestion of direct discussion between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Austrian Ambas- sador at St. Petersburgh. Russian Ambassador con- siders conference in London of less interested Powers the only solution Chancellor states it is too late to act on British sug- gestion that Servian reply might form basis of dis- cussion. German Government had informed Aus- trian Government that they quite Understood that latter could not rest satisfied unless guaranteed that demands on Servia should be carried out in their entirety. Austrian Government had been advised to say openly that hostilities had that exclusive object .. German Secretary of State states that any appearance of pressing moderation on Austria would probably precipitate matters. His Excellency is troubled by reports of military measures in Russia and Franco Refers to No. 75. Much appreciates language of Chan- cellor, and will be very grateful if he can save the peace of Europe. This country will continue to make every effort in that direction Partial Russian mobilisation ordered. Has communi- cated substanee of No. 68 to Minister for Foreign Affairs. Mobilisation only directed against Austria. As Austria has definitely declined direct conversa- tions. Minister for Foreign Affairs will suggest to German Ambassador return to idea of conference. Views of Minister for Foreign Affairs on Italian proposals (see Nos. 57 and 69). German Ambassador says his Government are continuing to exert friendly influence at Vienna French and Italian Ambassadors agree that no steps can now be taken to stop war with Servia. _ Italian Ambassador thinks that Russia might remain quiet if Austro-Hungarian Government gave binding engagement to Europe not to acquire Servian terri- tory or destroy independence of Servia TABLE OF CONTENTS. Sir R. Rode! (Telegraphic) To Sir R. Rodd (Telegraphic) Mr. Beaumont (Telegraphic) Mr. Crackonthorpo (Telegraphic) To Sir E. Goschen.. (Telegraphic' Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic) Sir R. RocTd (Telegraphic) To Sir F. Bertie To Sir E. Goschen.. 1914. July 29 Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests that German Secretary of State might propose formula, and that this might be concomitant with direct Austro-Russian conversations Understands that Austria will not accept any form of mediation between Austria and Servia. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs should speak at Berlin and Vienna Designs of Austria likely to extend considerably beyond the sanjak and the punitive occupation of Servian territory. Expected assistance for Austrian army from Mussulman population in Servia Has been asked by Servian Prime Minister to convey his thanks for statement in the House of Commons on the 27th July German Ambassador states that Chancellor is endea- vouring to mediate between Austria and Russia. His Majesty's Government urge that Germany should suggest some method by which the four Powers could preserve the peace between Austria and Russia German Secretary of State offers that in return for British neutrality German Government would give every assurance that they would mako no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France. He was .unable to give similar assurance as regards French colonics. If neutrality of Holland were respected by Germany's adversaries, Germany would give assur- ances to do likewise. Operations of Germany in Bel- gium depend on action of France, but at end of war Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany In view of partial Russian mobilisation, Italian Minis- ter for Foreign Affairs thinks moment is passed for further discussions on basis of Servian note. His utmost hope is that Germany will influence Vienna to prevent or moderate any further Austrian demands on Servia Conversation with French Ambassador respecting policy of His Majesty's Government. Has told M. Cambon of intention to warn German Ambassador that His Majesty's Government will not necessarily stand aside if efforts for peace fail. On the other hand, the present case is different from that of ico a few yens back, and if France becomes involved His Majesty's Government, who are free from engagements, will have to deride on their attitude in the light of British interests Conversation with German Ambassador. Austro- Hungarian declaration of war having rendered direct conversation between Vienna and St. Petersburg!! impossible, it is most important, in the event of German Chancellor failing in his efforts at media- tion, that Germany should propose some method of co-operation between the four Powers Has warned German ^ Ambassador of possibility of British intervention in certain .eventualities Has communicated to German Ambassador text of Italian proposals and of reply returned thereto (see Nos. 61- and 81). Discussion of question of mediation TABLE OF CONTENTS. To Sir M. de Biinsen To Sir R. Rodd Communicated by Count Bencken- dorff Sir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic) Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic) Sir F. Bertie (Telegraphic) Conversation with Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, who attempted to justify attitude of his Government in spite of readiness of Powers to assist in obtaining satisfaction from Servia Conversation with Italian Ambassador. Italian Govern- ment suggest that German objections to mediation might bo met by some change in procedure Communicates telegraphic correspondence between himself, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Russian Ambassador at Vienna. (1) Austro- Hungarian Government have been urged by Russian Ambassador at Vienna to be moderate towards Servia ; (2) negotiations with German Government through Russian Ambassador at Berlin ; (3) Austro-Hungarian Government decline direct conversations with Russian Government In present temper of Austria-Hungary, irrevocable steps may be taken unless Germany with the other three Powers can mediate at once. Russian Ambas- sador fears effect on Russian opinion if serious engagement takes place before agreement is reached. Reports interviews between the Russian and French Ambassadors and the German Ambassador ... Conversation with Russian Ambassador. Russia could not see Servia crushed, but would acquiesce in mea- sures that would safeguard Austria-Hungary's Slav provinces from further hostile propaganda. Extreme anti-Servian and anti-Russian sentiments of German Ambassador to whom text of Austro-Hungarian note was probably known beforehand Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed Russian Ambassador that, as Russia had mobilised, Austria must do likewise. No threat meant. No objection to direct Austro-Hungarian conversations being continued at St. Petersburg)!. Russian Ambassador more hopeful German Ambassador has informed Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that his Government would guarantee that Austria should respect Servian tegrity. Russia could not, however, agree to salage of Servia to Austria. Formula of conditions subject to which Russia would stop military pre- parations German Government .have asked Austrian Govern menfc whether they would accept mediation on basis of occupation of Belgrade by Austrian troops and issue of conditions from there. Could His Majesty's Government induco Russia to agree to above basis for a,n arrangement? German Secretary of State says that Russian mobilisation has increased diffi- culties of situation. German Government have mado no special military preparations Conversation with President of the Republic regard- ing German communication to St. Petersburgh as to Russian mobilisation. Russia consents to demo- bilise subject to assurance from Austria to respect sovereignty of Servia and submit certain point, in the Austrian note to international discussion. Peace depended on attitude of His Majesty's Government. Pacific attitude of France. A British declaration to support Franco would prevent Germany going to war. Explained difficulty of such a declaration TABLE OF CONTENTS. Rorld (Telegraphic) E. Goschen ... (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) G. Buchanan (Telegraphic) To Sir F. Bertie ... (Telegraphic) Sir R. Rodd (Telegraphic) Sir K. Goschen (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) To Sir G Buchanan (Telegraphic) 1914 July 30 German Ambassador at Rome thinks Germany Could prevent Austria from making exorbitant demands if Servia would submit on occupation of Belgrade ... Replies to No. 85. His Majesty's Government cannot entertain German proposals to sccuro British neu- trality. For many reasons suoh a bargain with Ger- many at tho expense of Franco would be a disgraco to Great Britain. His Majesty's Government cannot bargain away her obligations regarding Belgian neutrality. His Majesty's Government must pre- serve full freedom of action. Best way of main- taining good relations with Great Britain is for Germany to work with her for the preservation of peace Has warned German Ambassador that Germany must not count on Great Britain standing aside in all circumstances ■ German Ambassador states that German Government would adviso Austria not to advance beyond Bel- grade and adjoining territories, whilst Powers urged Scrvia to give satisfaction sufficient to placate Austria. Earnest hope that this may be agreed to. Suggests change in the formula proposed by Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs (seo No. 97) in order to meet existing situation To inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of telegram to Sir G. Buchanan (seo No 103). Trusts that French Ambassador at St. Potersburgh will be nbic to induce Russian Government not to precipi- tate a crisis Conversation with French Ambassador respecting atti- tude of Great Britain in event of conflict between Franco and Germany ; encloses copies of notes ex- changed with French Ambassador in 1912, and dis- cmsi s their scope. Cabinet to meet to-morrow Austria has declined to continue direct conversations with Russia. Germany believed to be more dis- posed to gjvo conciliatory advice at Vienna owing to likelihood of British support for Russia and France. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs is in favour of working with His Majesty's Government even if idea of discussions between four Powers is impossible Has asked German Secretary of State if he can sug- gest any course of action. Latter replied that he' was in communication with Vienna to save time. Chancellor was ''pressing the button" at Vienna to utmost of his power, and feared ho had perhaps gone too far German Chancellor states that owing to Russian mobilisation Germany cannot remain quiet. These proceedings had come just when the Czar had ap- pealed to the Emperor and when the latter was about to mediate at Vienna Reports having read to Chancellor reply of His Majesty's Government to his appeal for British neutrality (see No. 101). Chancellor desires time to reflect on it German Ambassador states that Austro-Russian con- versations have been resumed at Vienna and St. Petersburgh. German Ambassador Iras asked that Russia should suspend military preparations in mean- while. Has informed his Excellency that His TABLE OF CONTENTS. To Sir E. Gosehen... (Telegraphic) Sir E. Gosehen (Telegraphic) Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic) To Sir F. Bertie .. „ Sir E. Gosehen.. (Telegraphic To Sir F. Villiers .. [Telegraphic) To Sir E. Bertie (Telegraphic) Sir F. Bertie (Telegraphic) Sir M. de Bunsen ... (Telegraphic) To Sir F. Bertie Sir G. Buchanan ... (Telegraphic! 121 Sir E. Gosehen (Telegraphic^ July 31 Majesty's Government cannot ask Russia to do this unless Austria consents to limit advance of her troops into Servia. Expresses satisfaction at resumption of conversations If settlement cannot bo reached by direct Austro- Kussian conversations, suggests that four Powers should undertake to obtain full satisfaction of Aus- trian demands from Servia, provided latter's sovereignty and integrity remain intact. Has in- formed German Ambassador that if Austria and Ger- many could bring forward any fair proposal, His Majesty's Government would support it strongly at Paris and St. Petersburgh German Government are about to proclaim "Kriegs- gefahr," to bo followed by immediate mobilisation. Germany preparing for all emergencies Russian general mobilisation ordered, owing to Austro-Hungarian movements of troops against her. Germany also making military preparations. Russia cannot allow Germany to get a start Enquires whether France and Germany will engage to respect neutrality of Belgium To inform Belgium Government of No. 114. Sir E. Grey assumes that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her neutrality French Ambassador informed that His Majesty's Government cannot undertake definite pledge to intervene in war, but that situation will be recon- sidered in presence of any new development Informs of German ultimatum to Russia. German Ambassador demands answer from French Govern- ment by 1 r.M. to-morrow as to French attitude ... Under-Secretary of State says that mobilisation was not necessarily a hostile act. Austria-Hungary re- sents Russian intervention on behalf of Servia. Rus- sian Ambassador states that his Government have advised Servian compliance with Austrian demands so far as compatible with independence Has denied to French Ambassador that His Majesty's Government had given German Government the impression that they would remain neutral. His Majesty's Government could not, however, at the present moment give France any pledge, though fur- ther developments might justify intervention New formula proposed by Russian Government. Rus- sian Government will maintain waiting attitude if Austria agrees to stop advance of her troops and to allow consideration by Great Powers of satisfac- tion to be given by Servia to Austria-Hungary with- out prejudice to her independence. Czar has under- taken that no Russian soldier will cross frontier so long as conversation with Austria continues German Government appreciate Sir E. Grey's efforts to maintain peace, but cannot consider any pro- posal pending Russian reply to ultimatum presented by Germany relating to Russian mobilisation. TABLE OF CONTENTS. Sir E. Goschen iTelegraphic) To Sir E. Goschen... Sir F. Bertie (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) Sir M. de Bunsen .. (Telegraphic Sir F. Villiers (Telegraphic) Luxemburg Ministei of State To Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphio) (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic) (Telegraphic 134 Sir F. Bertie (Telegraphic) 1914 July 31 Aug. 1 July 31 Belgian neutrality. Refers to No. 114. Secretary of State cannot reply to British request until he has consulted Emperor and Chancellor. " Ho doubts, however, whether German Government can give any answer. German Government alleges commis- sion of hostile acts by Belgium Conversation with German Ambassador respecting tho possible effect on British public opinion of any violation of tho neutrality of Belgium. Any pro- mise that His Majesty's Government should stand aside definitely refused ... i GermaD ultimatum to Russia. French Government anxious to know at once attitude of His Majesty's Government Neutrality of Belgium (see No 114). French Govern- ment are resolved to respect neutrality of Belgium unless compelled to act otherwise by reason of violation at tho hands of another Power German Ambassador has been informed that French Government fail to understand reason for German communication respecting attitude of France in the event of a Russo-German war (see No. 117) Ger- man Ambassador will see Minister for Foreign Affairs in the evening Mpbilisation of Austrian army and fleet Belgian neutrality. Refers to No. 115 Belgium ex- pects Powers to observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power , German Government have informed Luxemburg that tho German military measures in that countiy do not constitute a hostile act. but are only to insure against attack from France British merchnnt ships hove been detained at Ham- burg To request immediate release Points out deplorable effect on British public opinion if deten- tion continued Russian Government report readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and to accept basis of mediation not open to objections raised in regard to original Russian formula (see No 971 Hopes that German Government may be able to make use of Russian communication in order to avoid tension Russia consents to British formula for basis of media- tion (see No. 103) Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has informed Russian Government that Austro-Hungarian Government are ready to discuss substance of Austrian ultimatum to Servia. Russian Government hope that these discussions will take place in London with partici- pation of Great Powers, and that His Majesty's Government will assume direction of them, Conversation with President of Republic. German Government are trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility for present situation. President jus- tifies Russian action. Germany is practically mobi- lising, so France must also. French troops are kept 10 kilom. from frontier, whereas Germans have made incursions into French territory. French Govern- ment do not yet despair of possibility of avoiding war TABLE OF CONTENTS. To Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic) Bertie (Telegraphic) To Sir M. de Bimscn (Telegraphic) Sir E. Goschen (Telegraphic) Sir G. Buchanan (Telegraphic) Sir F. Bertie (Telegraphic) Sir M. de Bunse.n (Telegraphic) Sir E. Goschcn (Telegraphic) (Tejegraphic) (Telegraphic) Has received reliable information that Austria-Hun- gary has informed German Government that she would accept Sir E. Grey's proposal for mediation between Austria-Hungary and Scrvia. Military action would continue against Scrvia for present, but Russian mobilisation and Austro-Hungarian counter measures would cease. He should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs General mobilisation in Franco ordered owing to Gor- man military measures. French troops have left a zone of 10 kilom. between them and the frontier ... Austro-Hungarian Ambassador has given assurance that Austrian? will respect territorial integrity cf Scrvia, and will not occupy sanjak. Austria has not "banged the door" on further conversations with Russia Conversation with German Secretary of State. Ger- man Government have ordered mobilisation. Ab- sence of reply to German ultimatum must be re- garded as creating a stato of war. Russian Govern- ment will be so informed Unsatisfactory result of discussions between German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors with the Czar and Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respectively. Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs says that- Austrian domination of Scrvia would vitally affect Russia, and that he is weary of his ceaseless efforts to avoid war. Action of Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment and German preparations have forced Rus- sian Government to order mobilisation, and mobi- lisation of Germany has created desperate situation. M. Sazouof would adhere to formula contained in No. 120, if its acceptance could be secured before the Germans cross frontier. In no case will Russia commence hostilities. Fear of general conflagration in the Balkans French Mini-tor for War has impressed on British military attache that only way of securing peace was for Great Britain to take military action. Minis- tor cf War maintains that France has, by with- drawing from frontier, given proof of her desiro to abstain from any provocative act Conversation with Russian Ambassador at Vienna respecting German ultimatum to Russia. His Ex- cellency thinks that German Government desired war from tho first. Explains nature of Russian mobilisation, and says that Russia had no intention of attacking Austria. French Ambassador to speak earnestly to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Anxiety as to attitude of Great Britain General mobilisation of German army and navy Detention of British steamers. German Secretary of State has promised to send orders to rolease steamers without delay German Secretary of State says that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia arc in a stato of war TABLE OP CONTENTS. E. Goschen (Telegraphic) Sir F. Villiers (Telegraphic) Luxemburg Minister of Slate (Telegraphic) To Sir F. Bertie ... (Telegraphic) To Sir E. Goachen (Telegraphic) Sir E. Goschein (Telegraphic) Sir F. Villiers (Telegraphic) To Sir F. Bertie To Sir E. Gosr-hen (Telegraphic) 151 Sir F. Villiers (Telegraphic) To Sir F. Villiers To Sir E Goschen... (Telegraphic) Communicated by German Ambassa- dor (Telegraphic) Sir F. Villiers (Telegraphic) 1914. Aug. 2 Subject. Orders sent last night to allow British ships detained in Hamburg to proceed. This as a special favour to His Majesty's Government. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other pre- cautions taken Belgian Government confirms report that German force has entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg Acts of German troops in Luxemburg territory aro manifestly contrary to tho neutrality of the Grand Duchy guaranteed by Treaty of London of 1867. Protest has been made to the German representa- tives at Luxemburg and also to German Secretary of State Assurance given to French Ambassador respecting protection by British fleet of French coasts or ship- ping subject to consent of Parliament. Question of despatch of British force to assist France. Effect of violation of Luxemburg and Belgian neutrality ... Detention of British steamers. Sugar unloaded by force from British vessels at Hamburg and detained. Should inform Secretary of State that His Majesty's Government trust that order already sent for release of British vessels covers also release of cargoes (see No. 1«) Detent i infon; n of British steamers. Refers to No. 149. No ation available French Government have offered five army corps to Belgian Government. Belgian Government reply that whilst sincerely grateful they do not- propose to appeal to tho guarantee of the Powers, and will decide later on their action Communication of French Ambassador to effect that Italy docs not consider casus feedcris has arisen ... Belgian neutrality. His Majesty's Government have been informed that German Government have pro- posed to Belgium friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and of German threat, in case of refusal. Belgian Government have declined offer. Should ask for immediate assurance from German Government that they will not pro- ceed with threat or violate Belgian territory Belgian neutrality (see No. 153). In view of Belgian reply. German Government have threatened to carry out their proposals by force To inform Belgian Government that His Majesty's Government expect that thoy will resist attempt to infringe their neutrality. His Majesty's Govern- ment prepared to join with Russia and France in assisting Belgian Government to resist German aggression and to guarantee independence and in- tegrity in future years To deman detained immediate German ports release of British ships Assurance that Germany will in no case annex Belgian territory. Germany forced to disregard Belgian neutrality owing to knowledge of French plans ... 4 German troops have entered Belgian territory. Liego summoned to surrender TABLE OF CONTENTS. To Six E. Goach«n... (Telegraphic) Sir E. Goschen Sir M. de Bunaan 1914. Aug. 4 8 Sept. 1 Subject. Belgian neutrality threatened by Germany. Unless German Government prepared to give assurance by 12 midnight to respect neutrality of Belgium, His Majesty's Ambassador is to ask for passports and to say that His Majesty's Government feci bound to take, all steps in their power to uphold then- treaty obligations Reports final negotiations at Berlin. Records depar- ture from Berlin and journey to England Reviews negotiations with Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment at Vienna, and incidents upon rupture of diplomatic negotiations. Reports departure from Vienna upon declaration of war LIST OF PRINCIPAL PERSONS MENTIONED IN THE COR- RESPONDENCE, SHOWING THEIR OFFICIAL POSITIONS. GREAT BRITAIN. Secretary of Slate for Foreign Affairs Permanent Under Secretary of Slate for Foreign Affairs French Ambassador ... . . Russian Ambassador ... German Ambassador . Austro-llungarian Ambassador Belgian Minister Servian Minister FRANCE. Pn si-dent of the Ilcpublio President of the Council and Minister fur Foreign Affairs Minister of Justice and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs British Ambassador ... Russian Ambassador ... German Ambassador ... Austrian Ambassador RUSSIA. Minister for Foreign. Affairs' British Ambassador ... French Ambassador German Ambassador ... Austro-llu ngarian Ambassador GERMANY. Imperial Chancellor Secretary of St ite Undersecretary of State British Ambassxd •>■ Sir Edward Grey. Sir A. Nicolson. Monsieur Paul Cambon. Count Benckendori'f. Monsieur de Etter (Counsellor of Embassy-). Prince Lichnowsky. Count Mcusdorff. Count Lalaing. Monsieur Boschkovitch. Monsieur Poincare. MoDsieur Viviani. Monsieur Bienvenu. Martin. Sir Francis Bertie. Monsieur Isvolsky. Baron von Schoen. Count Scczsen. Monsieur Sazonof. Sir George Buchanan. Monsieur PaU'ologue. Count Pourtalcs. Count SzapSry. .. Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg. .. Ilerr von Jagow. .. 11' rr von Ziinmermann. Sir Edward Gosclien. Sir Horace Eumbold (Counsellor Embassy). .. Monsieur Swerbeiev. .. "Monsieur Jules Cambon. .. Count Szogycny. Russian Ambassador ... French Ambassador ... Austro-linngarian A mbassador AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ... Count Berchtold. Under Secretaries of State for Foreign f Baron Macohio. Affairs I Count Forgach British Ambassador Sir Maurice de Bunsen. French Ambissador Monsieur Dumaine. Russian A mbas ador ... ... ... ... Monsieur Sohebeko. German Ambassador Herr von Tschirscky. ITALY. Mnisterfor Foreign Affairs... British Ambassador BELGIUM. British Minister SERYIA. Prime Minister British dlinistcr Austro-IIungarian Minister Marquis di San Giuliano. Sir Kennell Rodd. Sir Francis Villiers. ... Monsieur Pashitch. ... Mr. des Graz. Mr. Crackantkorpe {First Secretary). -,. Baron Giesl. PART I. CORRESPONDENCE LAID BEFORE PARLIAMENT. No. 1. Sir Edward Grey to Sir IT. Runibold, British Charge d? Affaires at Berlin. Sir, Foreign Office, July 20, 1914. I asked the German Ambassador to-day if he had any news of what was going on in Vienna with regard to Servia. He said that he had not, but Austria was certainly going to take some Step, and he regarded the situation as very uncomfortable. I said that I had not heard anything recently, except that Count Berchtold,* in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but had said that it should be cleared up. The German Ambassador said that it would be a very desirable thing if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Servia. I said that I assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything until they had first disclosed to the public their case against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had discovered at the trial. The Ambassador said that he certainly assumed tha't they would act upon some case that would be known. I said that this would make it easier for others, such as Russia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade. In fact, the more Austria could keep her demand within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she could produce for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing things over. I hated the idea of a war between any of the Great Powers, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Servia would be detestable. The Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly in this sentiment. I am, aus reprcsentants Imperiaux .: Royaux anpres des autres Puis- sances signataires. Vous etes autorise de laisser une copie de cette depeehe entre les mains de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etran- geres. Vienne, h 24 juilkt, 1914. hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particu- lar, Austria-Hungary expected a de- velopment of this kind in the political ideas of Servia, when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made such a con- siderable aggrandisement of Servia possible. The benevolence which Austria-Hun- gary showed towards the neighbouring State had no restraining effect on the proceedings of the kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the fatal con- sequences were demonstrated to the whole world on tho 28th June last, when the Heir Presumptive to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched at Bel- grade. In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and integrity of the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy. The Imperial and Royal Govern- ment are convinced that in taking this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the sentiments of all civilised nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon that can he employed with impunity in political strife, and the pence of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade. In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government hold at tho disposal of the British Government a elucidating the Servian in- trigues, and the connection between these intrigues and the murder of the 28th June. An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial and Royal representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers. You are authorised to leave a copy of this despatch in the hands of tho Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, Jvbj 24, 1914. Annexe. L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le Tribunal de Sarajevo contre Gavrilo Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicite y relative— crime com- Anxex. The criminal enquiry opened by the Court of Serajevo against Gavrilo Princip and his accessories in and before the act of assassination com- mis par eux le 28 juin dernier— a jus- qu'ici abouti aux constations sui- vantes : 1°. Le complot ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de son sejour a Sara- jevo, de l'Archiduo Francois-Ferd.i- nand fut forme a Belgrade par Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic le noil) me Milan Ciganovic et Trifko Grabez, avec le coneours du comman- dant Voija Tankosid. 2°. Les six bombes et les quatre pis- tolets Browning avec munition, moyen- nant lesquels les malfaiteurs ont com- mis l'attentat, furent livres a Bel- grade a Princip, Cabrinovic. et Grabez par le nomme Milan Ciganovic et le commandant Voija Tankosic. 3°. Les bombes sont des grenades a la main provenant du depot d'armes do l'armee serbe a Kragujevac -1°. Pour assurer la reussite de l'at- tentat, Ciganovic enseigna a Princip, Cabrinovic et Grabez la manierc de- se servir des grenades et donna, dans un foret pres du champ de tir a Topschider, des lecons de tir avec pistolets Brown- ing a Princip et Grabez. 5°. Pour re'ndre possible a Princip, Cabrinovio et Grabez de passer la fron- tiere de Bosnie-Herzegovine et d'y in- troduiro clandestinement leur contre- bande d'armes, un systeme de trans- port secret fut organise par Ciganovic. D'apres cette organisation l'intro- duction en Bosnie-Herzegovine des malfaiteurs et de leurs armes fut operee par les capitaines-frontieres de Chabac (Bade Popovic) et de Loznica ainsi que par le douanier Rudivoj Grbic de Loznica avec le coneours de divers particuliers. mitted by them on the 28th June last has up to the present led to the follow- ing conclusions: — 1. The plot, having as its object the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the time of his visit to Serajevo, was formed at Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovic, one Milan Ciganovic, and Trifko Grabez, with the assistance of Com- mander Voija Tankosic. 2. The six bombs and the four Browning pistols and ammunition with which the guilty parties com- mitted the act were delivered to Princip, Cabrinovic and Grabez, by the man Milan Ciganovic and Com- mander Voija Tankosic at Belgrade. 3. The bombs are hand-grenades coming from the arms depot of the Servian Army at Kragujevac. 4. In order to ensure the success of the act, Ciganovic taught Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez how to use the bombs, and gave lessons ia firing Browning pistols to Princip rfnd Grabez in a forest near the sbooting ground at Topschider. 5. To enable Princip, Cabrinovic, and Grabez to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina and smuggle in their contraband of arms secretly, a secret system of transport was orga- nised by Ciganovic. By this arrangement the introduc- tion into Bosnia-Herzegovina of crimi- nals and their arms was effected by the officials controlling the frontiers at Chabac (Bade Popovic) and Loznica, as well as by the customs officer Budivoj Grbic, of Loznica, with the assistance of various individuals. No. 5. Sit Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bwisen, British Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. Note addressed to Servia, together with an explanation of the reasons leading up to it, has been communicated to me by Count Mensdorff.* In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency, I Temarked that it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Servia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time 1 had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Servia. I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the concern of His Majesty's Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made in order to d merits * Austro-Hungarian Ambu ndon. B 2 10 I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other Powers, and that I must await their views as to what could bo done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation. Count Mensdorff* replied that the present situation might never have arisen if Servia had held out a hand after the murder of the Archduke; Servia had, however, shown no sign of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already elapsed since the murder; a time limit, said his Excellency, was essential, owing to the procrastination on Servia's part. I said that if Servia had procrastinated in replying, a time limit could have been introduced later ; but, as things now stood, the terms of the Servian reply had been dictated by Austria, who had -not been content to limit herself to a demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from its presentation./ * AusUo-Hmigarian Ambassador in London. No. 6. Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey. — [Received July 24.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1914. I had a telephone message this morning from M. Sazonof* to the effect that ithe text of the Austrian ultimatum had just -reached him His Excellency added that a reply within forty-eight hours was demanded, i and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy to discuss matters, as Austrian step clearly meant that war" was imminent. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provoca- tive and immoral ; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had first been consulted ; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France. The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfil all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations. I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to.me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of His Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion. To this M. Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general European question was involved, the Servian question being but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue In reply to these remarks, I observed that I gathered from what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great Britain should join in making a communication tp Austria to the effect that active intervention by her in the internal affairs of Servia could not be tolerated. But supposing Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military measures against Servia in spite of our representations, was it the intention of the Russian Government forth- with to declare war on Austria ? M. Sazonof* said that he himself thought that Russian mobilisation would at any rate have to be carried out; but a council of Ministers was being held this afternoon to consider the whole question. A further council would be held, probably to-morrow, at which the Empercr would preside, when a decision ■would be come to I said that it seemed to me that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring an influence to bear on Austria with that ond in view ; French Ambassador, however, thought that either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or that she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, our only chance of averting war was for us to adopt a firm and united attitude. He did not think there was time to carry out my suggestion. Thereupon I said that it seemed to mo desirable that we should know just how far Servia was prepared to go to meet the * Russian Minister for Foreign .Affairs. 11 demands formulated by Austria in her note. M. Sazonof replied that he must first consult his colleagues on this point, but that doubtless some of the Austrian demands could be accepted by Servia. French Ambassador and M. Sazonof both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible ■that you might perhaps be willing tfo make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack by Austria upon Servia would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out ; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France ; at any rate, he hoped His Majesty's Government would express strong reprobation of action taken by Austria. . President of French Republic and President of the Council cannot reach France, on their return from Russia, for four or five days, and it looks as though Austria purposely chose this moment to present their ultimatum. It seems to me, from the language held by French Ambassador, that, even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand. No. 7. Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 24.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 24, 1914. Before departing on leave of absence, I was assured by Russian Ambassador that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Servia could not leave Russia indifferent. _ Russian Charge d'Affaires was received this morning by Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own personal view, that Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under instructions to leave Bel- grade unless Austrian demands were accepted integrally by 4 p.m.. to-morrow. His Excellency added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at stake ; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction throughout the country. Ho did not think that objections to what had been done could be raised by any Power. No. 8. Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edivard Grey. — {Received July 24.) (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 24, 1914. Austrian demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Servian Government, who earnestly trust that His M a J es ty's Government may see their way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them. This request was conveyed to me by Servian Primo Minister, who returned early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is clearly very anxious as to developments that may arise. No. 9. Note communicated by German Ambassador, July 24,-1914. The publications of the Austro-Hungarian Government concerning the circumstances under which tile assassination of the Austrian heir presumptive and his consort has taken place disclose unmistakably the aims which the Great Servian propaganda has set itself, and the means it employs to realise Jhem. ' The facts now made known must also do away with the last dqubts 12 that the centre of activity of all those tendencies which are directed towards the detachment of the Southern Slav provinces from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and their incorporation into the Servian Kingdom is to be found in Belgrade, and is at work there with at least the connivance of members of Government and army. The Servian intrigues have been going on for many years. In an especially marked form the Great Servian chauvinism manifested itself during the Bosnian crisis. It was only owing to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government and to the energetic inter- ference of the Great Powers that the Servian provocations to which Austria- Hungary was then exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in future which was given by the Servian Government at that time has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission of official Servia, the Great Servian propaganda has continuously increased in extension and intensity ; to its account must be set the recent crime, the threads of which lead to Belgrade. It has become clearly evident that it would not be consistent either with the dignity or with the self-preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy still longer to remain inactive in face of this movement on the other side of the frontier, by which the security and the integrity of her territories are constantly menaced. Under these circum- stances, the course of procedure and demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as equitable and moderate. In spite of that, the attitude which public opinion as well as the Government in Servia have recently adopted does not exclude the apprehension that the Servian Govern- ment might refuse to comply with those demands, and might allow themselves to be carried away into a provocative attitude against Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Government, if it does not wish . definitely to abandon Austria's position as a Great Power, would then have no choice but to obtain the fulfilment of their demands from the Servian Government by strong pressure and, if necessary, by using military measures, the choice of the means having to be left to them. The Imperial Government want to emphasise their opinion that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that tho Great Powers ought seriously to endeavour to reserve it to thoso two immediately concerned. The Imperial Government desire urgently the localisation of the conflict, because every interference of another Power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences. No. 10. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Basis. Sir, Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. After telling M. Cambon* to-day of the Austrian communication to Servia, which I had received this morning, and of the comment 1 had made to Count Mensdorflt upon it yesterday, I told M. Cambon that this afternoon I was to see the German Ambassador, who some days ago had asked me privately to exercise moderating influence in St. Petersburgh. I would say to the Ambas- sador that, of course, if tho presentation of this ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about it; but, if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which it seemed to me that any Power interested in Servia would take, I should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. I would say that I thought the only" chance of any mediating or moderating influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves, who had not direct interests in Servia, should act together for the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St. Petersburgh. M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four Powers, he had no doubt that bis Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburgh till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept * French Ambassador in London, t Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. lo- the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and therefore, once tho Austrians had attacked Servia, it would be too late for any mediation. I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St. Petersburgh until after it was clear that there must be trouble between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did move into Servia, and Russia then mobilised, it would bo possible for the four Powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, arid Russia also to stop hers,, pending mediation. But it would be essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany should participato in it. M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once moved against Servia. Tho important thing was to gain time by mediation in Vienna. Tho best chance of tins being accepted wouki be that Germany should proposo it to the other Powers. I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and Servia. He replied that it was so. I said that I would talk to the German Ambassador this afternoon on tho subject. I am, &c. E. GREY. No. 11. Sir Edward Grey to Sir /I. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. German Ambassador has communicated to me the view of the German Government about' the Austrian demand in Servia. I understand the German Government is making tho same communication to tho Powers. I said that if the Austrian ultimatum to Servia did not lead to trouble between Austria and Russia I had no concern with it ; I had heard nothing yet from St. Petersburgh, but I was very apprehensive of the view Russia would take of the situation. I reminded tho German Ambassador that some d$ys ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavotir to exerciso moderating influence at St. Petersburgh, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of the time allowed, and tho wide scope of the demands upon Servia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any Power could exercii* influence alone. Tho only chance I could see of mediating or moderating influence being effective, was that the four Powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves, should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour of moderation in the event of the relations between Austria and Russia becom- ing threatening. Tho immediate danger was that in a few hours Austria might march into Servia and Russian Slav opinion demand that Russia should march to help Servia ; it would be very desirable to get Austria not to precipitate military action and so to gain more time. But none of us could influence Austria in this direction unless Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna. You should inform Secretary of State. Prince Lichnowsky* said that Austria might be expected to move when the time limit expired unless Servia could give unconditional acceptance of Austrian demands in toto. Speaking privately, his Excellency suggested that a negative reply must m no case be returned by Servia; a reply favourable on some points must be sent at once, so that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded to Austria. :: ' German Ambassador in London. No. 12. Sir Edward Grey to Jlr. Croc!,"', tin ,■/>;■. British Cha ye a" Affaires at Btl grade. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914. Servia ought to promise that, if it is proved that Servian officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices in the murder of. the Archduke at 14 Serajevo, she will give Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in Servian interests. It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria when time limit expires can be averted by anything but unconditional acceptance of her de- mands, but only chance appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying favourably to as many points as the time limit allows. Servian Minister here has begged that His Majesty's Government will- express their views, bat T cannot undertake responsibility of saying more than I have said above, and I do not like to say even that without knowing what is being said at Belgrade by French and Russian. Governments. You should therefore consult your French and Russian colleagues as to repeating what my views are, as. expressed above, to Servian Government. I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not precipitate military action. Note communicated by Rust M. Sazonof telegraphic an Charge d'Affaires de Russie a Vionne en date du 11 (24) juillet, 1914: "La communication du Gouverne- ment austro-hongrois aux Puissances le lendemain de la presentation de ('ultimatum a Belgrade ne laissp aux Puissances qu'un dJlai tout a fait m- suffisant pour entreprendre quoi qu'il soit d'utile pour 1'aplanissenient des complications surgics. "Pour prevenir les consequences in- calculables et egalement uefastes pour toutes les Puissances qui peuvent suivre le mode d'aetion du Gouverne- ment austro-hongrois, i! nous parait indispensable qu'avant tout le delai donne a la Serbie pour repondre soit prolonge. L'Autfiche-Hongrie. se de- clarant disposee a informer les Puis- sances des donnees de lenquete sur lesquelles le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal base ses accusations, devrait leur donner egalement le temps de s'en rendre compte. "En ce cas, si les Puissances se eon- vainquaient du bien-fonde de certames des exigences autrichiennes, elles se trouveraient en mesure de faire par- venir an Gouvernement serbe des con- seils en consequence. " Un refus de prolonger le terme de 1'ultimatum priverait de toute portee la demarche du Gouvernement austro- hongrois aupres des Puissances et se trouvcrait en contradiction avec les bases memo des relations interna- tionales. " Le Prince Koudachef est charge de communiquer ce qui precede au Cabi- net de Vienne." M. Sazonof espere que le Gouverne- ment de Sa Majeste britanniquc ad- iiin Ambassador. July 25. (Translation.) M. Sazonof telegraphs to the Russian Charge d Affaires at Vienna on the 11th i24th* Ii.lv. 1914 ■ The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the Powers which is quite insuffi- cient to enable them to take any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen. "In order to present the conse- quences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hunganan Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended. Austria- Hungary. having declared her readiness to inform the Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment base their accusations, should eqia'ly allow them sufficient time to study them. " In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Servian Government. "A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro- Hnngarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international felations. "Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet at Vienna.'' M. Sazonof hopes that His Britannic Majesty's Government will adhere to 15 herera au point munir l'Ambassadeur way to furnish similar instructions to d'Angleterre a Vienne d'instructions the British Ambassador at Vienna, con formes. No. 14. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, and to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. Austrian Ambassador has been 'authorised to explain to me that the step taken at Belgrade was not an ultimatum, but a demarche with a time limit, and that if the Austrian demands were not complied with within the time limit the Austro-Hungarian Government would break off diplomatic relations and begin military preparations, not operations. In case Austro-Hungarian Government have not given the same informa- tion at Paris (St. Petersburgh), you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs as soon as possible; it makes the immediate situation rather less acute. No. 15. Sir P. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (RicJved-July 25.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 25, 1914. I learn from the Acting Political Director that the French Government have not yet received the explanation from the Austrian Government con- tained in your telegram of to-day.* They have, however, through the Servian Minister here, given similar advice to Servia as was contained in your telegram to Belgrade of yesterday.t * See No. 14. t See No. 12. No. 16. Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 25, 1914. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has no suggestions to make except that moderating advice might be given at Vienna as well as Belgrade. Ho hopes that the Servian Government's answer to the Austrian ultimatum will be sufficiently favourable to obviate extreme measures being taken by the Austrian Government. He says, however, that there would be a revolution in Servia if she were to accept the Austrian demands in their entirety. No. 17. Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Irei/. — -(Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) .St. Petersburgh, July 25, 1914. I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and communicated to his Excellency the substance of your telegram of to-day to Paris,* and this afternoon I discussed with him the communication which the French Ambassa- dor suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as recorded in your telegr.am of yesterday to Belgrade. t The Minister for Foreign Affairs said, as regards the former, that the explanations of the Austrian Ambassador did not quite correspond with the information which had reached him from German quarters. As regards the latter, both his Excellency and the French Ambassador agreed that it is too late to make such a communication, as the time limit expires this evening. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no inde- pendent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversa- * See No. 14. + See No. 12. 16 tion which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event/ of the- Austriaus attacking Servia,' the. Servian Qovernment would abandon Belgrade, and withdraws their forces into the interior, while they would at the tamo time appeal to the Powers to help them. His Excellency was in favour of their making this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers. If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to submit the question to arbitration. On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take fio action until it was forced upon her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkan?, and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude .was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war. I said that England could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her eounsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at. once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality. I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with more mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His Excellency replied that E.ussia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, tnd. if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate. No. 18. Sir 11. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received, July 25.) (Telegraphic) Berlin, July 25, 1914. Your telegram of the 24th July* acted on. Secretary of State says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he immediately instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion foi an extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it. Unfortunately it appeared from press that Count Borchtoldt is at Ischl, and Secretary oi State thought that in these circumstances there would be delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended. Secretary of State said tli at he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that Atistro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro- Hungarian demands. Secretary of State said that a reassuring feature of situation was that Count JBerchtold had sent tor Russian representative at Vienna and had told him that Austria-Hungary bad no intention of seizing Servian territory. This step should, in his opinion, exercise a calming influence at St. Petersburgh. I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military action against Servia. Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. He remained of opinion that crisis could be localised. I said thai * ! i tms from Russia in this morning's papers did not look very reassuring, but he maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia. He * Sec No. 11. t A'^tro Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 17 said that he had given the Russian Government to understand that last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all in his power to prevent sueh a calamity. If the relations between Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall in with your suggestion as to the four Powers working in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg!!. Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note left much' to be desired as a diplomatic document. 1 J • ■ repeated very earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all about the contents of that note, be had in fact had no such knowledge. No. 19. Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Romp, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) Borne, July 25, 1914. I saw the Secretary-General this morning and found that he knew of the suggestion that France, Italy, Germany, and ourselves should work at Vienna and St. Petersburgh in favour of moderation, if the relations between Austria and Servia become menacing. In his opinion Austria will only he restrained by the unconditional accept- ance by tho Servian Government of her note. There is reliable information that Austria intends to seize the Salonica Railway. ■ No. 20. Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914. Language of press this morning leaves the impression that the surrender' of Servia is neither expected nor really desired. It is officially announced that the Austrian Minister is instructed to leave Belgrade with staff pf legation failing unconditional acceptance of note at C p.m. to-day. Minister for Foreign Affairs goes to Ischl to-day to communicate personally to the Emperor Servian reply when it comes. No. 21. Mr. Cracl-anthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Recdved July 25.) (Telegraphic.) • Belgrade. Jvly 25, 1914. The Council of Ministprs is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible. The following is a brief summary of the projected reply: — The Servian Government consent to the publication oi.a declaration in the ''Official Gazette." Tho ten points are accepted with reservations. Servian Government declare themselves ready to agree to a mixed commission of enquiry so long as the appointment of the commission can be shown to be in accordance with international usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute those officers who can be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already arrested the officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are prepared to suppress the Narodna Odbrana. The Servian Government consider that, unless the Austrian Government 'want war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction offered in the Servian reply. No. 22. Mr, Crackanthorpe, British Charge a" Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey.— {Rj'cemed July 25.) (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. I have seen the new French Minister, who has just arrived from Con- stantinople, and my Russian colleague, and informed them of your views. '. They have not yet received instructions from their Governments, and in 18 mow of this and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Servian reply, I nave up to now abstained from offering advice to the Servian Government. I think it is highly probable that the Russian Government have already urged the utmost moderation on the Servian Government. No. 23. Mr. Cracl-anthorpe, British Charge d' Affaires at Belgrade, to !iir Edward Grey. — [Received July 25.) (Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914. The Austrian Minister left at 6.30. The Government nave left for Nish, where the Skuptchina* will meet on Monday. I am leaving with my other colleagues, but the vice-consul ia remaining in charge of the archives. * The Servian Parliament. No. 24. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Fctersburyh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. You spoke quite rightly in very difficult circumstances as to the attitude cf His Majesty's Government. I entirely approve what you said, as reported in your telegram of yesterday,* and I cannot promise more on behalf of the Government. I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to sanction our going to war over a Servian quarrel. If, however, war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it. The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian demarche makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilised against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Pctersburgh to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate. No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and included the allies or friends of both. The co-operation of Germany would, therefore, be essential. * See No. 6. No. 25. Sir Eduiard Grey to Sir H. Bumbold, British Charye'd' Affaires at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. The Austrian Ambassador has been authorised to inform me that the Austrian method of procedure on expiry of the time. limit would be to break off diplomatic relations and commence military preparations, but not military operations. In informing the German Ambassador of this, I said that it inter- posed a stage of mobilisation before the frontier was actually crossed, which 1 had urged yesterday should be delayed. Apparently we should now soon be face to face with the mobilisation of Austria and Russia. The only chance of peace, if this did happen, would be for Germany, France, Russia, and ourselves to keep together, and to join in asking Austria and Russia not to cross the frontier till we had had time to try and arrange matters between them. The German Ambassador read me a telegram from the German Foreign Office saying that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Servia, but once she had launched that note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lio'jiiowsky* said, however, that if what I contemplated was mediation German Ambassador in London. 19 between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it.^ He expressed himself as personally favourable to this suggestion. I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title; to inter- vene between Austria and Servia, but as soon as the question became one as between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in which we must all take a hand I impressed upon the Ambassador that, in the event of Russian and Austrian mobilisation, the participation of Germany woidd be essential to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do nothing. The French Govern- ment were travelling at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, and could not therefore be sure of their views, but I was prepared, if tho German Government agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French Govern- ment that I thought it the right thing to act upon it. No. 2G. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Jivmsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. The Russian Ambassador has communicated to me the following telegram which his Government have sent to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, with instructions to communicate it tc the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs: — "The delay given to Servia for a reply is so limited that the Powers are prevented from taking any steps to avert the complications which are threatening. The Russian Government trust that the Austrian Government will prolong the time limit, and as the latter have declared their willingness to inform the Powers of the data on which they have based their demands on Servia, the Russian Government hope that these particulars will be furnished in order that the Powers may examine the matter. If they found that some of the Austrian requests were well founded, they would be in a position to advise the Servian Government accordingly. If the Austrian Government were indisposed to piolong the time limit, not only would they be acting against international ethics, but they would deprive their communication to tho Powers of any practical meaning." You may support in general terms the step taken by your Russian colleague. Since the telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna was sent, it has been a relief to hear that the steps, which the Austrian Government were taking were to be limited for the moment to the rupture of relations and to military preparations, and not operations. I trust, therefore, that if the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking any irretrievable steps. No. 27. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, Sir II. Rmnbold, British Charge d'Affaires at Berlin, and Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 23, 1914. I have communicated to German Ambassador the forecast of the Servian reply contained in Mr. Craekanthorpe's telegram of to-day." I have said that, if Servian reply, when received at Vienna, corresponds to this forecast, I hope tho German Government will feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take a favourable view of it. * See No. 21. No. 28. [Nil.] 20 No. 29. Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. liodd, British Ambassador at Rome. J Sir, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. The Italian Ambassador came to we me to-day. I told him in general terms what I had said to the German Ambassador this morning. The Italian Ambassador cordially approved of this. Ho made no secret of the fact that Italy was most desirous to see war avoided. I am, &c. E. GREY. No. 30. Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Crac.'cant'torpe, British Charge d 'Affaires at Belgrade. Sir, Foreign Office, July 25, 1914. The Servian Minister called on the 23rd instant and spoke to Sir A. Nicolson* on the present strained relations between Servia and Austria-Hungary. He said that his Government were most anxious and disquieted. They were perfectly ready to meet any reasonable demands of Austria-Hungary so long as such demands were kept on the "terrain juridique." If the results of the enquiry at Serajevo — an enquiry conducted with so much mystery and secrecy — disclosed the fact that there were any individuals conspiring or organising plots on Servian territory, the Servian Government would be quite ready to take the necessary steps "to give satisfaction ; but if Austria trans- ported the question on to the political ground, and said that Servian policy, being inconvenient to her, must undergo a radical change, and that Servia must abandon certain political ideals, no independent State would, or could, submit to such dictation. He mentioned that both the assassins of the Archduke were Austrian subjects — Bosniaks ; that one of them had been in Servia, and that the Servian authorities, considering him suspect and dangerous, had des'ied to expel him, but on applying to the Austrian authorities found that the latter protected him, and said that he was an innocent and harmless individual. Sir A. Nicolson, on being asked by M. Boschkovitcht his opinion on the whole question, observed that there were no data on which to base one, though it was to be hoped that the Servian Government would endeavour to meet the Austrian demands in a conciliatory and moderate spirit. I am, &c. E. GREY. * British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. + Servian Minister in London. No. 31. Sir M. de Bans-.n, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.~— (Received July 26.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 25, 1914. Servian reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands is not considered satis- factory, and the Austro-Hungarian Minister has left Belgrade. War is thought to be imminent. No. 32. ,S7r M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — i (Received July 26.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. According to confident belief of German Ambassador, Rus^a will keep quiet during chastisement of Servia, which Austria-Hungary is resolved to indict, having received assurances that no Servian territory will be annexed by Austria-Hungary. In reply to my question whether Russian Government might not be compelled by public opinion to intervene on behalf of kindred nationality, he said that everything depended on tiie personality of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who could resist easily, if he chose, the pressure of a few newspapers. He pointed out that the days of Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were over and that Moscow was perfectly quiet. The Russian Minister 21 For Foreign Affairs would not, his Excellency thought, be so imprudent as to take a step which wourd probably result in many frontier questions in which Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, Ruthene, Roumanian, and Persian questions being brought into the melting-pot. France, too, was not at all in a condition for facing a war. I replied that matters had, I thought, been made a little difficult for other Powers by the tone of Austro-Huugarian Government's ultimatum to Servia. One naturally sympathised with many of the requirements of the ultimatum, if only the manner of expressing them had been more temperate. It was, however, impossible, according to the German Ambassador, to speak effectively in any other way to Servia. Servia was about to receive a lesson which she required ; the quarrel, however, ought not to be extended in any way to foreign countries. He doubted Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Servia, acting as if she made, any such claim. As for Germany she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter. The German Ambassador had heard of a letter addressed by you yesterday to the German Ambassador in London in which you expressed the hope that the Servian concessions would be regarded as satisfactory. Ho asked whether I had been informed that a pretence of giving way at the last moment had been made by the Servian Government. I had, I said, heard that on practically every point Servia had been willing to give in. His Excellency replied that Servian concessions were all a sham. Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilisation and retirement of Government from Belgrade. No. 33. Sir II. Rambold, British Charge cV Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 2G.) (Telegraphic.) 'Berlin, July 26, 1914. Emperor returns suddenly to-night, and Under-Secretary of State says that Foreign Office regret this step, which was taken on His Majesty's own initiative. They fear that His Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and excite- ment. Under-Secretary of Stato likewise told me that German Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had reported that, in conversation with Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, latter had said that if Austria annexed bits of Servian territory Russia would not remain indifferent. Under-Secretary of State drew conclusion that Russia would not act if Austria did not annex territory. No. 34. Sir U. Rumbold, British Charge d' Affaires at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 26.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 26, 1914. Under-Secretary of State has just telephoned to me to say that German Ambassador at Vienna has been instructed to pass on to Austro-Hunganan Government your hopes that they may take a favourable view of Servian reply if it corresponds to the forecast contained in Belgrade telegram of 25th July.* Under-Secretary of State considers very fact of their making this communi- cation to Austro-Hungarian Government implies that they associate themselves to a certain extent with your hope. German Government do not see their way to going beyond this. * See No. 21. No. 30. Sir R. Rvdd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — R ceivi d July 26.) (Telegraphic.) Rome, July 20, 1914. Minister for Foreign Affairs welcomes your proposal for a conference, and will instruct Italian Ambassador to-night accordingly.' Austrian Ambassador has informed Italian Government this evening that Minister in Belgrade had been recalled, but that this did not imply declaration of war. 22 No. 36. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, 'British Ambassador at Paris, Sir H. Rumbold, British Gharg'e d'Affuires at Berlin, and Sir R. Boeld, British Ambassador at Rome. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 26, 1914. Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? You should ask -Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestion to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersbu rgh should be authorised to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of conference. No. 37. Sir Edward Grey In Sir F. Bertie, British J. t6, m lor it Paris. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 26, 1914. Berlin telegram of 25th July.'" It is important to know il France will agree to suggested action by the four Powers if necessary. Sec No. 18. No. 38. Sir B. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Ore//. — (Received July 27.) g; r> Borne, July 23, 1914. I gather that the Italian Government have been made cognisant of the terms of the communication which will be addressed to Servia. Secretary- General, whom I saw this morning at the Italian Foreign Office, took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austr.o- Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after the many disillusions which the turn of events in the Balkans lias occasioned, to score a definite success. I have, Ac. RENXELL RODD No. 39. Reply of Servian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note. — {Communicated by the Servian Minister, July 27.) (Translation.) Le Gouvernomcnt Royal serbe a The Royal Servian Government rccu la communication du Gouverne- have received the communication of ment Imperial et Royal du *10 do re the Imperial and Royal Government mois et il est persuade que sa reponse of the 10th instant,' and are con- eloignera tout malentendu qui menace vinced that their reply will remove ,i.. gater les bons rapports de voisinage any misunderstanding which may cntre la Monarchic austro-hongroise et threaten to impair the good neigh- le Royaume de Serbie. hourly relation-, between the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy and the King- dom (if Servia. Lo Gouvernement Royal conscient Conscious of the fact that the pro- qu< les protestations qui out apparu tests which were made both from the tant do la tribune de la Skoupchtina tribune of the national Skuptehinat nationale que dans les declarations et. and in the declarations ami actions of le.s aetes des representants rcspon- the responsible representatives of the sables de l'fitat, protestations qui State — protests which were cut short i'urent coupees court par les declara- by the declarations made by the lions du Gouvernement serbe, faites le Servian Government on the 18th* "18 mars, 1909, ne se sont plus renou- March, 1909 — have not been renewed * Old style. t The Servian Parliament. 2:-! velees vis-a-vis de la grande Monarchie voisine en aucune occasion et que, de- piiis ce temps, autant de la part des Gouvernements Royaux qui se sont succede que de la part de leurs or- ganes, aucune tentative n'a ete faitc dans le but de changer l'etat de choses politique et juridique cree en Bosnie et Hcrzegovine, le Gouvernement Royal constate que sous CO rapport le Gou- vcrr.eincnt Imperial et Royal n'a fait aucune representation, sauf en ce qui concerno mi livre scolaire, et an sujet de laquelle le Gouverncment Imperial ct Royal a 1-090 line explication en- tierenient satisfaisantc. La Serbie a de nombreuses fois donne des preuves de sa politique .pacifiquo et moderee pendant la duree de la crise balkanique, ei c'i it grace a la Serbie et au sacrifice qu'ello a fait dans l'interet exclusif de la pais europeenne que cette paix a etc pieservee. Le Gouvernement Royal no pent pas etre rendu respousable pour les manifestations d'un caractere prive, telles que les articles des jour- naux et le travail paisible des societes, manifestations qui se produisent dans prcsque tons !es pays comme une chose ordinaire et qui echappent, en regie generate, au controls oificiel, d'autant moins que le Gouverncment Royal, lors de la solution de toute une serie de questions qui se sont presentees entre la Serbie et l'Autrielie-Hongrie, a montre une grande prevenance et a re- ussi, de cette facon, a en regler le plus grand nombre au profit du progres des deux pays voisins. Cost pourquoi lo Gouvernement Royal a ete peniblement surpris par les affirmations, d'apres lesquelles des per- sonnes du Royaume de Serbie auraient partieipe a la preparation de l'attentat commis a Sarajevo; il s'attendait a ce qu'il soit invite a collaborer a la re- cherche dc tout ce qui se rapporte a ce crime, et il etait pret, pour prouver son entiere collection, a agir contre toutes les personnes a l'egard des- quelles des communications lui seraient faites, se rendant done au desir du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, est dispose a rernettre au Tribunal tout sujet serbe, sans egard a sa situation et a son rang, pour la complicite du- quel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, des preuves lui seraient fournies, et spe- cialement, il s'engage a l'aire publier a la premiere page du "Journal ofnciel " en date du 13 (26) juillet, l'enonciation suirante : "Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie on any occasion as regards the great neighbouring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of affairs created in Bosnia and Herze- govina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this con- nection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representa- tion except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government re- ceived an entirely satisfactory explana- tion.- Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private charac- ter, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies — mani- festations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less respon- sible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of ques- tions which arose between Servia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advantage of the two neighbouring countries. For these reasons the Royal Govern- ment have been pained and surprised at the statements, according to which members of the Kingdom of Servia are supposed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo ; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations were made to them. Failing in, therefore, with the desiro of the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Sera- jevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the "Journal officiel," on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declara- tion ■ — "The Royal Government of Servia 21 condamne toute propagande qui serait dirigee eontre l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est- a-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchic austro-hongroise des terri- toires qui en font partie, et il deplore sincerement les consequences funestes de ccs agissements eriminels. Le Gou- vernement Royal regrette que certains officiers en fonctionnaires serbes aient participe, d'apres la communication du Gouvernement Royal et Imperial, a la propagande susmentionnee, et compro- mis par la les relations de bon voisi- nage auxquelles le Gouvernement Royal serbe etait solennellemcnt en- gage par sa declaration du 31 mars, 1909,* qui desapprouve et repudie toute idee ou tentative d'une immix- tion dans les destinees des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que se soit, considere de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers et fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que, dorenavant il proce- dera avec la derniere rigueur centre les personnes qui se rendraient coupablea de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra tons ses efforts a prevenir et a re- primer." Cette enonciation sera portee a la connaissance de l'armee Royale par mi ordre du jour, an com de Sa Majeste le Roi, par Son Altesse Royale le Prince heritier Alexandre, et sera publie dans le prochain bulletin officiel de l'armee. Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage en outre : 1. D'introduire dans la premiere con- vocation reguliere de la Skoupchtinat line disposition dans la loi de la presse, par laquelle sera punie de la maniere la plus severe ia provocation a la liaine et au mepris de la Monarchic austro- hongroise, ainsi que eontre toute publi- cation dont la tendance generate serait dirigee eontre l'integrite territoriale de l'Autriche-Hongrie. II se charge, lors de la revision do la Constitution, qui est prochaine, a faire introduce clans l'article 22 de la Constitution un aniendement de telle sorte que les publications ci-dessus puissent etre confisquees, ce qui actuellement aux termes categoriques de l'article 22 de la Constitution est impossible. 2. Le Gouvernement ne po^sede au- cune preuve et la note du Gouverne- ment Imperial et Royal ne lui en four- nit non plus aucune que la societe condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from tho Austro-Hungarian Monarchy terri- tories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal move- ments. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment, certain Servian officers and officials should have taken part in the above-mentioned propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighbourly re- lations to which the Royal Servian Government was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909,* which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of tho inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officers, officials, and entire population of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavour.'' This declaration will bo brought to tho knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of His Majesty the King, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alex- ander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin. The Royal Government further undertake : — 1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of tho Skuptchinat a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of in- citement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial in- tegrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engage at the approach- ing revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categori- cal terms of article 22 of the Constitu- tion. 2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Im- perial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the "Narodna XL- style. t Tli. in Parliament. 25 "Narodna Odbrana " et autres societes similaircs aient commis, jusqu'a ce jour quelques actes criminels de ce genre, par le fait d'un do lenrs membrcs. Neanmoins, )e Gouvornonient Royal acceptera la domando du Gouveine- ment Imperial et Royal et dissoudra la societe "Nnrodun Odbrana " et toute autre societe qui agirnit centre l'Autricho-Hongrie. 3. Le Gouvomcmont Royal serbe s'engngo a eliminor sans delais de l'in- stniction publique en Serine tout co qui sort on pourrait sorvir a fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hon- grie, q 11 and le Gouveinement Imperial et Royal lui fournira des faits et des preuves de cette propagande. 4. Le Gouveinement Royal accepte de memo a eloigner du service mili- tairo ceux pour qui l'cnquete judi- ciairc aura prouve qu'ils sont coupables d'aetes diriges contre l'integrite du territoire de la Monarchic austro-hon- groise, et il attend que le Gouveine- ment Imperial et Royal lui com- munique ulterieureinent les noms et les faits do cos officiers et fonctionnaires aux fins de la procedure qui doit s'en- suivre. 5. Le Gouveinement Royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas claircment compto du sens et de la -portee de la demande du Gouveinement Imperial et Royal que la Serine s'engage a accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du Gouveinement Imperial et Royal, niais il declare qu'il admettra la collaboration qui repondrait aux. prin- cipes du droit international et a la procedure criminelle ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisinagc. G. Le Gouveinement Royal, tela va de soi, considerc de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquete contre tons ceux qui sont on qui, event uellemont, auraient o'te meles an complot du 13* juin, et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du royaume. Quant a la participation a, cette enquete des agents on autorites austro-hongrois qui seraient deiegues a cot effet par le Gouvernenient Imperial ot Royal, le Gouveinement Royal ne pent pas 1'acceptcr. car ce serait une violation de I.: Constitution et de la loi sur la procedure criminelle; cependant dans des cas concrets des communica- tions sur les resultats de l'instruction Odbrana " and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government, and will dis- solve the " Narodna Odbrana " Society and every other society which may bo directing its efforts against Austria- Hungary. 3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to remove without delay troni their public educational estab- lishments in Servia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda, against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda. 4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Im- perial and Royal Government to com- municate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them. •5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the de- mand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall under- take to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the prin- ciple of international law, with crimi- nal procedure, and with good neigh- bourly relations. 6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th* June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. ' As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authori- ties appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a viola- tion of the Constitution and of the law. of criminal procedure; neverthe- less, in concrete cases communications 26 en question pourraient etre dennees aux agents austro-hongrois. 7. Le Gouvernement Royal a fait proceder, des le soir menie de la remise de la note, a l'arrestation du Com- mandant Voislav Tankossitch. Quant a Milan Ziganovitch, qui est sujet de la Monarchic austro-hongroiso et qui jusqu'au 15* juin etait employe (comme aspirant) a la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore etre arrete. Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois est prie de vouloir bien, dans la forme ac- coutumee, faire connaitre le plus tot possible, les presomptions de culpabilite ainsi que les preuves eventuellos de leur culpabilite qui ont ete recueillies jusqu'a ce jour par 1'enquete a Sara- jevo, aux fins d'enq"eto ulterieure, 8. Le Gouvernement serbe- renfor- cora et etendra les mesures prises pour empecher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la frontiere. II va de soi qu'il ordonnera de suite une onquete et punira severement ies fonc- tionnaires des frontieres sur la ligne Schabatz-Loznitza qui ont manque a leurs devoirs et loisso passer les au- teurs du crime de Sarajevo. 0. Le Gouvernement Royal donnera vofontiers des explications sut ■ les propos que ses fouctionnaires, tant en Serbie qu'a l'etranger, ont eu apres l'attentat dans des entrevues et qui, d'apres 1'affirruation du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, ont ete hostiles envers la Monarclrie, des que le Gou- vernement Imperial et Royal lui aura communique les passages en question de ces propos, et des qu'il aura demontre que les propos employes ont, en effet, ete teuus par lesdits Idnctionnaires, quoique le Gouvernement Royal lui- meme aura soiu de rccueillir des preuves et convictions. 10. Le Gouvernement Royal infor- mera le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal de I'execution des mesures com- prises dans les points precedents en tant que cela n'a pas ete deja fait par la presente note, aussitot que chaque mesure aura ete ordonnee et executae. Dans le cas oil lo Gouvernement Im- perial et Royal ne serait pas salisfait de cctte reponse, le Gouvernemeut serbe, eonside'rant qu'il est de l'in- teret commun de ne pas precipiter la solution de cette question, est pret comme toujours d'accepter line en- as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents. 7. The Royal Government pro- ceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest -Com- mandant Voislav Tankossitch. As re- gards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th* June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him. The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the cus- tomary form, the presumptive evi- dence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been col- lected up to the present, at the enquiry at Serajevo for the purposes of the later enquiry. 8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the froutier. It goes without saying that they will immediately order an enquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Scbabatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass. 9. The Royal • Government will gladly give explanations of the re- marks made by their officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime which accordiug to the statement of the Imperial and Roval Government were hostile to- wards the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs. 10. The Royal Government will in- form the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has cot already been done by the present note, as Soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out If the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment are not satisfied with this reply, the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this ques- tion, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by refer- * Old Stylo. 27 tente pacifique, soit en reinet'tant cette ring this question to the decision of question a la decision du Tribunal iu- the International Tribunal of The ternational de La Haye, soit aux Hague, or to the Great Powers which Grandes Puissances qui ont pris part a took part in the drawing up of tho l'elaboration de la declaration que le declaration made by the Servian Gouvcrnement serbo a faite lo 18 (31) Government on the 18th (31st) March, mars, 1909. 1909. Belgrade, le 12 (25) juillet, 1914. Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1914. No. 40. Sir M. dc Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Receive I July 27.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 26, 1914. RUSSIAN Ambassador just returned from leave thinks that Austro-Hun- garian Government are determined on war, and that it is impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in tho sense of your telegram of tho 25th instant* (last paragraph). When the repetition of your telegram of the 26th instant to Parist arrived, I had the French and Russian Ambassadors both with me. They expressed great satisfaction with its contents, which I communicated to them. They doubted, however, whether the principle of Russia being an interested party entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely Austro-Servian dispute would be accepted by either the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government. Instructions were also given to the Italian Ambassador to support the request of the Russian Government that the time limit should be postponed. They arrived, however, too late for any useful action to be taken. * See No. 26. t See No. 36. No. 41. Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 27.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914. I HAVK had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia ; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake ; and that until punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Servia, and its postponement or prevention "would undoubtedly be a great disappointment. I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the hope of His Majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to avoid war, and to ask his Excellency whether he cannot suggest a way out even now. No. 42. Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.— (Received July 27.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, July 27, 1914. YOUR proposal, as stated in your two telegrams of yesterday,* is accepted by the French Government. French Ambassador in London, who returns there this evening, has been instructed accordingly. Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Berlin to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of their speaking jointly to the German Government. Necessary instructions have also been sent to the French representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersbmgh, but until it is known that the Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success, it would, in the opinion of tho Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be dangerous for the French, Russian, and British Ambassadors to do so. * Nos. 56 and 37. No. 43. Sit E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 27.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 27, 1914. YOUR telegram of 26th July.* Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, hut meant that representatives of the. four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a. dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable. He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburg!] showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonoft to exchange views with Count Berchtold.J He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austiia was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilised against Ger- many latter would have to follow suit. I asked him what he meant by "mobilising against Germany." He said that if Russia only mobilised in south,' Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilisation was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilisation. Germany would there- fore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise. Finally, Secretary of State said that news- from St. Petersburgh had caused him to take more hopeful view cf the general situation. * See No. 36. t Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. X Austro-Hungarian Mini&t 1D14 . I INFORMED the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day of vour conversation with the Russian Ambassador, as recorded in your telegram of yesterday* to St. Petersburgh. He is grateful for the communication, and quite appreciates the impossi- bility for His Majesty's Government to declare themselves " solidaires " with Russia on a question between Austria and Servia, which in its present condi- tion is not one affecting England. He also sees that you cannot take up an attitude at Berlin and Vienna more Servian than that attributed in German and Austrian sources to the Russian Government. German Ambassador has stated that Austria would respect the integrity Of Servia, but when asked whether her independence also would be respected, he gave no assurance. * See No. 47. 37 No. 60. Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 28, 1914. SECRETARY of State spoke yesterday in the same sense as that reported in my telegram of yesterday* to my French and Italian colleagues respecting your proposal. I discussed with my two colleagues this morning his reply, and we found that, while refusing the proposed conference, he had said to all of us that nevertheless he desired to work with us for the maintenance of general peace. We therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he can only be objecting to the form of your proposal. Perhaps he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us. * See No. 43. No. 61. Sir M. da Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. I SAW Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. His Excellency declared that Austria-Hungary cannot delay warlike pro- ceedings against Servia, and would have to decline any suggestion of negotia- tions on basis of Servian reply. Prestige of Dual Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now prevent conflict. No. 62. Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 28.) (Telegraphic) Vienna, July 28, 1914. I SPOKE to Minister for Foreign Affair3 to-day in the sense of your tele- gram of 27th July* to Berlin. I avoided the word "mediation," but said that, as mentioned in your speech, t which he had just read to me, you had hopes that conversations in London between the four Powers less interested might yet lead to an arrangement which Austro-Hungarian Government would accept as satisfactory and as rendering actual hostilities unnecessary. I added that you had regarded Servian reply as having gone far to meet just demands of Austria-Hungary ; that you thought it constituted a fair basis of discussion during which warlike operations might remain in abeyance, and that Austrian Ambassador in Berlin was speaking in this sense. Minister for Foreign Affairs Baid quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be accepted on basis of Servian note ; that war would be declared to-day, and that well-known pacific character of Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable. This was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said that you would hear with regret that hostilities could not now bo arrested, as you feared that they might lead to complications threatening the peace of Europe. In taking leave of his Excellency, I begged him to believe that, if in the course of present grave crisis our point of view should sometimes differ from his, this would arise, not from want of sympathy with the many just complaints which Austria-Hungary had against Servia, but from the fact that, whereas Austria-Hungary put first her quarrel with Servia, you were anxious in the first instance for peace of Europe. I trusted this larger aspect of the question would appeal with equal force to his Excellency. He said he had it also in ■mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandisement and which could no longer be postponed. » See No. 46. + "Hansard," Vol. 65, No. 107, Columns 931, 932, 933. 33 No. 63. Sir R. Eodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Svr Edward Grey.-— (Recewid July 28.) (Telegraphic.') Borne, Juhj 28, 1914. YOUR telegram of 25th July to Paris.* I have communicated substance, to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who, immediately telegraphed in precisely similar terms to Berlin and Vienna. * See No. 27. No. 64. Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rone, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) Rome, Juhj 28, 1914. AT the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs I submit the following to you : — In a long conversation this morning Servian Charge d' Affaires had said he thought that if some explanations were given regarding mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene under article 5 and article 6, Servia might still accept the whole Austrian note. As it was not to be anticipated that Austria would give such explanations to Servia, they might be given to Powers engaged in discussions, who might then advise Servia to accept without conditions. The Austro-Hungarian Government had in the meantime published a long official explanation of grounds on which Servian reply was considered inade- quate. Minister for Foreign Affairs considered many points besides explanation — such as slight verbal difference in sentence regarding renunciation of propa- ganda—quite childish, but there was a passage which might prove useful in facilitating such a course as was considered practicable by the Servian Charge d'Affaires. It was stated that co-operation of Austrian agents in Servia was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or administrative measures. Servia was said to have wilfully misinterpreted this. He thought, therefore, that ground might be cleared here. I only reproduce from memory, as I had not yet received text of Austrian declaration. Minister impressed upon me, above all, his anxiety for the immediate beginning of discussion. A wide general latitude to accept at once every point or suggestion on which he could be in agreement with ourselves and Germany had been given to Italian Ambassador. No. 65. Mr. Grackantkorpe, British Charge d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Ed/uiard Grey. — (Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) Nish, Juhj 28, 1914. I HAVE urged on the Servian Government the greatest moderation pending efforts being made towards a peaceful solution. Two Servian steamers fired on and damaged, and two Servian merchant- vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova. No. 66. Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Charge d'Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 28.) (Telegraphic.) Nish, July 28, 1914. TELEGRAM received here that war declared by Austria. No. 07. iS'tV Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Btrlim. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, Juhj 28, 1914. EXPLANATION given in your telegram of the 27th July* of what was my idea in proposing a conference is quite right. It would not be an arbitration, » See No. 43. 39 but a private and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion could bo mada tor a settlement. No suggestion would be put forward that had not previously been ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Russia, with whom the mediating Powers could easily ' keep in touch through their respective allies. But as long as there is a prospect of a direct exchange of views between Austria and iiussia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as I entirely agree that it is the most preferable method of all. I understand *'iat the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has proposed a friendly exchange of views to "the Austrian GoVernmerlt, and, if the latter accepts, ft will no doubt relieve the tension and make the situation less critical. It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversa- tion recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.* * See No. 46. No. 68. Sir Edward Grey le Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 28, 1914. GERMAN Government, having accepted principle, of mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, if necessary, ,1 am ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should suggest the lines on which this principle should be applied. I will, however, keep the idea in reserve until we see how the conversations between Austria and Russia progress. No. 69. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. (Telegraphic.) « Foreign Office, July 28, 1914. IT is most satisfactory that there is a prospect of direct exchange of views between the Russian and Austrian Governments, as reported in your telegram of the 27th July.* I am ready to put forward any practical proposal that would facilitate this, but I. am not quite clear as to what the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs proposes the Ministers at Belgrade should do.' Could he not first mention in an exchange of views with Austria his willingness to co-operate in some such scheme? It might then take more concrete shape. * See No. 55. No. 70. Telegrams communicated by Count Benckendorff, Russian Amhasmior in London, July 29, 1914. (1.) Telegram from M. Sazonof to Russian Ambassador at Berlin, dated July 28, 1914. IN consequence of the declaration of war by Austria against Servia, the Imperial Government will announce to-morrow (29th) the mobilisation- in the military circonscriptions of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan. Please inform German Government, confirming the absence in Russia of any aggressive inten- tion against Germany. The Russian Ambassador at Vienna has not been recalled from his post. (2) Telegram to Count Benckendorff." The Austrian declaration of war clearly puts an end to .the idea of direct communications between Austria and Russia. Action by London Cabinet in order to set on foot mediation with a view to suspension of military operations of Austria against Servia is now most urgent. Unless military operations are stopped, mediation would only allow matters to drag on and give Austria time to crush Servia. * Russian Ambassador in London. 40 No. 71. Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.— (Receiaed Jidy 29.) ■ (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 28, 1914. AT invitation of Imperial Chancellor, I called upon his Excellency this evening. He said that he wished me to tell .von that he was most anxious that Germany should work together with England for maintenance of general peace, as they had done successfully in the last European crisis... He had not been able to accept your proposal for a conference of representatives of the Great Powers, because he did not think that it would be effective, and because such a conference would in his opinion have had appearance of an " Areopagus " consisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining Powers; but his inability to accept the proposed conference must not be regarded as militating against his strong desire for effective co-operation. You could be assured that he was doing his very best both at Vienna and "St. Petersburgh to get the two Governments to discuss the situation directly with each other and in a friendly way. He had great hopes that such discussions would take place and lead to a satisfactory result, but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilised fourteen army corps in the south, he thought situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilising, would have to take similar measures, and if war were to result, Russia would' be entirely responsible. I ventured to say that if Austria refused to take any notice of Servian note, which, to my mind, gave way in nearly every point demanded by Austria, and which in any caso-bfl'ered a basis for discussion, surely a certain portion of responsibility would test with her. His Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss Servian note/fut that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do. He reiterated his desire to co-operate with England and his intention to do his utmost to maintain general peace. "A war between the Great Powers must be avoided " were his last words. Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war. I think that that opinion is shared byvrnany people here. No. 72. Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey.- ^Received July 29.) (Telegraphic.; St. Vctcrsburgh, July 28, 1914. MINISTER for Foreign Affairs begged me to thank yon tor the language you had held to the German Ambassador, as reported in your telegram* to Berlin, substance of which I communicated tu his Excellency. lie took a pessimistic view of the situation, having received the same disquieting news from Vienna as had reached His Majesty's Government. 1 said it was important that wo should know the real intentions of the Imperial Government, and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurances which the Austrian Ambassador had, 1 understood, been instructed to give in respect of Servia's integrity and independence. I added that I was sure any arrangement for averts ins a European war would be welcomed "by His Majesty's Government. In reply In- Excellency stated that if Servia were attacked Russia would not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points, and that order for mobilisation against Austria would be issued on the day that Austria crossed Servian frontier I told the German Ambassador, who appealed to me to give moderating counsels to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that from the beginning I had 'not ceased to do so, and that the German Ambassador at Vienna should now in bis turn use his restraining influence. I made it cleai to his Excellency that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not be averted if Servia were attacked by Austria. * See No. #>. 41 As regards the suggestion of conference, the Ambassador had received no instructions, and before acting with me the French and Italian Ambassadors are still waiting for their final instructions. No. 73. Sir M. de, Bunatn, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 29.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 28, 1914. I HAVE received note vcrbale from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, stating that, the Servian Government not having replied to note of 23rd July* in a satisfactory manner, Imperial and Royal Government is compelled itself to provide for protection of its rights, and to have recourse for that object to force of arms. Austria-Hungary has addressed to Servia formal declaration according to article 1 of convention of 18th October, 1907, relative to opening of hostilities, and considers herself from to-day in state of war with Servia. Austria-Hungary will conform, provided Servia does so, to stipulations of Hague conventions of 18th October, 1907, and to Declaration of London of 2Gth February, 1009 * See No. 4. No. 74. *SV M. de Hansen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 29.) (Telegraphic. ) Vienna, July 28, Vjll. I AM informed by the Russian Ambassador that the Russian Government's suggestion has been declined by the Austro-Hungarian Government. The suggestion was to the effect that the means of settling the Austro-Servian conflict should be discussed directly between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, who should be authorised accordingly. The Russiau Amoassador thinks that a conference in London of the less interested Powers, such as you have proposed, offers now the only prospect of preserving peace of Europe, and he is sure that the Russian Government will acquiesce willingly in your proposal. So long as opposing armies have not actually 'come in contact, all hope need not be abandoned. No. 7.j. ,Sir E. Gosc/ten, British Ambassa/or at Berlin, to Sir Edward Gre>i. — (Received July 29.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914. I WAS sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, u ho told me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late to act upon your suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of discussion. His Excellency had, on receiving their reply, despatched a message to Vienna, in which he explained that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, been shown in the Servian reply to meet the demands of Austria, he understood entirely that, without some sure guarantees that Servia would carry out in their entirety the demands made upon her, the Austro-Hungarian Government could not rest satisfied in view of their past experience. He had then gone on to say that the hostilities which were about to be undertaken against Servia had presumably the exclusive object of securing such guarantees, seeing that the Austrian Government already assured the Russian Government that they had no territorial designs. He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view be correct, to speak openly in this sense. The holding of such language would, he honed, eliminate all possible misunderstandings. As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna. From the fact that he had gone so far in tlio matter of giving advise at Vienna, his Excellency hoped that you would realise- that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of European complications. The fact of his communicating this information to you was a proof of the confidence which he felt in you and evidence of his anxiety that you should know he was doing his hest to support your efforts in the cause of general peace, efforts which he sincerely appreciated. No. 7G. Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received July 29.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 29, 1914. I FOUND Secretary of State very depressed to-day. He reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters and present a fait accompli. This had, in fact, now happened, and he was not sure that his communication of your suggestion that Servia's reply offered a basis for discussion had not hastened declaration of war. He was much troubled by reports of mobilisation in Russia, and of certain military measures, winch he did not specify, being taken in France. He subse- quently spoke of these measures to my French colleague, who informed him that French Government had done nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, recalled officers on leave. His Excellency denied German Government had done this, but as a matter of fact it is true. My French colleague said to Under-Secretary of State, in course of conversation, that it seemed to him that when Austria had entered Servia, and so satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favourable for four disinterested Powers to discuss situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing graver complications. Under-Secretary of State seemed to think idea worthy of consideration, as ho replied that would be a different matter from conference proposed by you. Russian Ambassador returned to-day, and has informed Imperial Govern- ment that Russia is mobilising in four southern governments. No. 77. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Gosclten, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office-, July 29, 1914. I .MUCH appreciate the language of Chancellor, as reported in your telegram of to-day.* His Excellency may rely upon it that this country will continue, as heretofore, to strain every effort to secure peace and to avert the calamity we all fear. If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to his Excellency for having saved the peace of Europe * Sc« No. 75. JMo. 78. Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir EdVoari Grey. — (Received July 2 9.) (Telegraphic.) St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914. PARTIAL mobilisation was ordered to-day. I communicated the substance of your telegram of the 28th instant* to Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in accordance with your instructions, and informed him confidentially of remarks as to mobilisation which the German Secretary of State had made to the British Ambassador at Berlin. This had already reached his Excellency from another source. The mobilisation, he explained, would only be directed against Austria. Austrian Government had now definitely declined direct conversation botween Vienna and St. Petersburgh. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had proposed such an exchange of views on advice of German Ambassador. He proposed, when informing German Ambassador of this refusal of Austria's, * See No. 67. 43 to urge that a return should be made to your proposal for a conference of four Ambassadors, or, at all events, for an exchange of views between the three Ambassadors less directly interested, yourself, and also the -Austrian Ambassador if you thought it advisable. Any arrangement approved by France and England would be acceptable to him, and he did not care what form such conversations took. No time was to be lost,, and the only way to avert war was for you to succeed in arriving, by means of conversations with Ambassadors cither collectively or individually, at some formula which Austria could bo induced to accept. Throughout Russian Government had been perfectly frank and conciliatory, and had done all in their power to maintain peace. If their efforts to maintain peace failed, he trusted that it would be realised by the British public that it was not the fault of the Russian Government. I asked him whether he would raise objections if the suggestion made in Rome telegram of the 27th July,* which 1 mentioned to him, were carried out. Ir/ reply his Excellency said that he would agree to anything arranged by the four Powers provided it was acceptable to Servia ; he could not, he said, be more Servian than Servia. Some supplementary statement or explanations would, however, have to be made in order to tone down the sharpness of the ultimatum. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram of the 28th instantt was one of secondary importance. Under altered cir- cumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it. Further, the German Ambassador had informed his Excellency, so the latter told me, that his Government were continuing at Vienna to exert friendly influence. I fear that the German Ambassador will not help to smooth matters over, if he uses to his own Government the same language as he did to mo to-day He accused the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilisa- tion, and said, when I referred to all that had been recently done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters. I called his attention to the fact that Austrian consuls had warned all Austrian subjects liable to military service to join the colours, that Austria had already partially mobilised, and had now declared war on Servia. From what had passed during the Balkan crisis she knew that this act was one which it was impossible without humiliation for Russia to submit to. Had not Russia by mobilising shown that she was in earnest, Austria would have traded on Russia's desire for peace, and would have believed that she could go to any lengths. Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier immediately, and a week or more would, in any case, elapse before mobilisation was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile ail work together * See No. 57. t Seo No. 69. No. 79 Sir J/ tie liunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey {Received July 29.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 29, 1914. '1HERE is at present no step which we could usefully take to stop war with Servia, to which Austro-Hungarian Government are now fully committed by the Emperor's appeal to his people which has been published this morning, and by the declaration of war. French and Italian Ambassadors agree with me in this view. If the Austro-Hungarian Government would convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which has been made :it St Petcrsburgh to the effect that she desires neither to destroy the independence of Servia nor to acquire Servian territory, the Italian Ambassador thinks thai Russia might bo induced to remain quiet. This, however, the Italian Amba - sadu is convinced the Austrian Government would refuse to do. 44 No. 80. Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received July 29.) (Telegraphic.) Borne, July 29, 1914. IN your telegram of the 27th instant* to Berlin, German Ambassador was reported to have accepted in principle the idea of a conference. This is in contradiction with the telegram of the 27th instantt from Berlin. Information received by the Italian Government from Berlin shows that German view is correctly represented in Sir E. Goschen's telegram of the 27th July,t but what creates difficulty is rather the "conference," so the Minister for Foreign Affairs understands, than the principle. He is going to urge, in a telegram which he is sending to Berlin to-night, adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in London. He suggests that the German Secre- tary of State might propose a formula acceptable to his Government. Minister for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that this exchange of views would keep the door open if direct communication between Vienna and St. Petersburgh fails to- have any result. He thinks that this exchange of views might be con- comitant with such direct communication. The German Government are also being informed that the Italian Govern- ment would not be pardoned by public opinion here unless they had taken every possible step so as to avoid war. He is urging that the German Govern- ment must lend their co-operation in this. He added that there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As Germany, however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France he thought it would have a great effect. Even should it prove impossible to induce Germany to take part, he would till advocate that England and Italy, each as representing one group, should continue to exchange views. * Sec No. 46. + See No. 43. No. 81. Sir Edicard Grey to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 29, 1914. WITH reference to your telegram of yesterday.* It is impossible for mo to initiate discussions with Ambassadors here, as I understand from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that Austria will not accept any discussion on basis of Servian note, and the inference of all I have heard from Vienna and Berlin is that Austria will not accept any form of mediation by the Powers as between Austria and Servia. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs must therefore speak at Berlin and Vienna. I shall be glad if a favourable reception is given to any suggestions he can make there. * See No. 64. No. 82. Mr. Beaumont, British Charge" d' Affaires at Constantinople, to Sir Edward <;r,y.— (L : .e Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Fo.eign Office, July 30, 1914. I HAVE warned Prince Lichnowsky* that Germany must not count upon our standing aside in all circumstances. Tins is doubtless the substance of the telegram from Prince Lichnowsky to German Chancellor, to which reference is made in the last two paragraphs of your telegram of 30th July.t German Ambassador in London. 1 Sea No. 98. No. 103. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Bach man, British Ambassalor at St. Petsrsbuiyh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. GERMAN Ambassador informs me that German Government would endeavour to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance further, while Powers endeavoured to arrange that Servia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria. Territory occupied would of course be evacuated when Austria was satisfied. I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the situation, and, if it can be obtained, I would earnestly hope that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations on all sides. Russian Ambassador has told me of condition laid down by M. Sazonof,* as quoted in your telegram of the 30th July.t and fears it cannot be modified ; but if Austrian advanco were stopped after occupation of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs' formula might be changed to read that the Powers would examine how Servia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Servian sovereign rights or independence. If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighbouring Servian territory, declares herself ready, in the interest of European peace, to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia would also consent to discussion and suspension of further military prepara- tions, provided that other Powers did the same. It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I can suggest if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to no agreement at Berlin. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs. * Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. + See No. 97. No. 104. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. YOU should inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my telegram to Sir G. Buchanan* of to-day, + and say that I know that he has been urging Russia not to precipitate a crisis. I hope he may be able to support this last sugges- "tion at St. Petersburgh. « British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. t Sea No. 103. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris. Sir, Foreign Office, July 30, 1914. M. CAMBON* reminded me to-day of the letter I had written to him two years ago, in which we agreed that, if the peace of Europe was seriously threatened, -we would discuss what we were prepared to do. I enclose for convenience of reference copies of the letter in question and of M. Cambon's reply. He said that the peace of Europe was never more seriously threatened than it was now. He did not wish to ask me to say directly that we would intervene, but he would like me to say what we should do if certain circum- stances arose. The particular hypothesis he had in mind was an aggression by Germany on France. He gave me a paper, of which a copy is also enclosed, showing that the German military preparations were more advanced and moro on the offensive upon the frontier than anything France had yet done. He anticipated that the aggression would take the form of either a demand that/ France should cease her preparations, or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things could France admit. I said that the Cabinet v, as to meet to-morrow morning, and I would see him again to-morrow afternoon. I am, &c. E. GREY. * French Ambassador in London. Enclosure 1 in No. 105. Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London. My dear Ambassador, Foreign Office, November 22, 1912. " FROM time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood C7 that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war. You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other. I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unpro- voked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Govern- ments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once bo taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them. Yours, &c, E. GREY. Enclosure 2 in No. 105. M. Camhon, French Ambassador L' Ambassadc de France, Londrrs, cc 23 novembre, 1912. Cher Sir Edward, PAR votre lettre en date d'hier, 22 novembre, vous m'avez rappele que, dans ces dernieres annees, les autorites militaires et navales de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne s'etaient consul- tecs de temps en temps ; qu'il avait tou- jours ete entendu quo ces consulta- tions ne restreignaient pas la liberte, pour chaque Gouvernement, do decider dans l'avenir s'ils se preteraient Pun l'autre le concours de leurs forces armees; -que, de part et d'autre, ces consultations entre specialist! s n'etaient et ne devaient pas etre eon- siderees comme des engagements obli- geant nos Gouvernements a agir dans certains cas; que cependant je vous avais fait observer que, si l'un on l'autre des deux Gouvernements avait de graves raisons d'apprehender line attaque non provoquee de la part d'une tierce Puissance, il deviendrait essen- tiel de savoir s'il pourrait compter sur l'assistance armee de l'autre. Votre lettre repond a cette observa- tion, et je suis autorise a vous declarer que, dans le cas oil l'un de nos deux Gouvernements aurait rai motif grave d'ariprehender soit l'agression d'une tierce puissance, soit quelque evene- ment menacant pour la paix generale, ce Gouvernement examinerait immedia- tement avec l'autre si les deux Gou- vernements doivent agir de concert en vue de prevenir l'agression ou de sauvegarder la paix. Dans ce cas, les in London, to Sir Edward Grey. (Translation.) Trench Embassy, London, November 23, 1912. Dear Sir Edward, YOU reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time ; that it had always been understood that these consulta- tions should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces ; that, on either side, these con- sultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain eventuali- ties ; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other. Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state that, in tho event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would imme- diately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would de- 58 deux Gouvernements delibereraient sur les mesures^qu'ils seraient disposes a prendre en commun ; si ces mesures comportaient une action, les deux Gou- vernements prendraient nussitot en consideration les plans de leurs etats majors et decidcraiont alors de la suite qui devrait etre donnee a ces plans Votre sincerement devoue, PAUL CAMBON. liberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common.; if those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into im- mediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would then de- cide as to the effect to be given to those plans. Yours, dfcc, PAUL CAMBON. French Minister for t Enclosure 3 in No. 105. vreign Affairs to M. Camion, French Ambassador in London- (Translation.) THE German Army had its advance- posts on our frontiers yesterday; German patrols twice penetrated on to our territory. Our advance-posts are withdrawn to a distance of 10 kilom. from the frontier. The local population is protesting against being thus abandoned to the attack of the enemy's army, but the Government wishes to make it clear to public opinion and to the British Government that in no case will France be the aggressor. The whole 16th corps from Metz, reinforced by a part of the 8th from Treves and Cologne, is occupying the frontier at Metz on the Luxemburg side. The 15th army corps from Strassburg lias closed up on the frontier. The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are prevented by the threat of being shot from crossing the frontier. Reservists have been called back to Germany by- tens of thousands. This is the last stage before mobilisation, whereas we have not called back a single reservist. As you see, Germany has done so. I would add that all my information goes to show that the German prepara- tions began on Saturday,* the very day on which the Austrian note was handed in. These facts, added to t>hose contained in my telegram of yesterday, will enable you to prove to the British Government the pacific intentions of the one party and the aggressive in- tentions of the other. L'AKMtE allemande a tes avant- postes sur ;:os bornos-frontieres, hier ; par deux fois des patrouilles alle- mandcs ont penetre sur not're terri- toire. Nos avant-postes sont en re- traite a 10 kilom. en arriere de la fron- tiere. Lcs populations ainsi abandon- ees a 1'attaque de l'armee adverse protestent; mais le Gouvernement tient a montrer a l'opinion publique et au Gouvernement britannique que l'agres- seur tie sera en aucun cas la France. Tout le 16 c Corps de Metz renforce par line partie du 8° venu de Treves et de Cologne occupe la frontiere do Metz au Luxembourg. Le 15" Corps d'Armee de Strasbourg a serre sur la frontiere. Sous menace d'etre fusilles les Al- saciens-Lorrains des pays annexes ne peuvent pas passer la frontiere; des reservistes par dizaines de milliers sont rappeles en Allemagne; e'est le dernier stade avant la mobilisation : or, nous n'avons rappele aucun reser- viste'. Comrae vous le voyez, l'Alleinagne l'a fait. J'ajoute que toutes nos in- formations concordent pour montrer que les preparatifs allemands ont com- mence samedi,* le jour meme de la remise de la note autrichienne. Ces elements, ajoutes a ceux contenus dans mon telegramme d'hier, vous per- mettent de faire la preuve au Gou- vernement britannique de la volonte pacifique de l'un et des intention:, agressives de I'antre. Sic: in original. Tlio actual date of the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum et, Thursday, July 23. The Servian reply was St> E. Gosclien, British Ambassador at JBerlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 1.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914. 'YOUR telegram of 31st July.* I spent an hour witn Secretary of State .urging him most earnestly to accept your proposal and make another effort to prevent terriblo catastrophe of a European war. He expressed himself very sympathetically towards your proposal, and appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but said it was impos- sible for the Imperial Government to consider any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to their communication of to-day; this com- munication, which he admitted had the form of an ultimatum, being that, unless Russia could inform the Imperial Government within twelve hours that she would immediately countermand her mobilisation against Germany and Austria, Germany would be obliged on her side to mobilise at once. I asked his Excellency why they had made their demand even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilise in south 'as well. He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia from saying all her mobilisation was only directed against Austria. His Excellency said that if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited favourable consideration', and in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor, but ho repeated that it was no use discussing it until the Russian Government had -sent in their answer to the German demand. Ho again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia, ana the German Foreign Office had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions — and tele- graphic and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature — but Russia's mobilisation had spoilt everything. * See No. 111. No. 122. Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — ■ (Received August 1 ) (Telegraphicl Berlin, July 31, 1914. NEUTRALITY of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st, July to Sir F. Bertie.* I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that ho must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. 1 gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan cf campaign in the event ol war ensuing, and ho was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all. His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request. It appears from what ho said that German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium. As an instance of this, he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany had been placed under an embargo already. I hope to see his Excellency to-morrow again to discuss the matter further, hut the prospect of obtaining a definite answer seems to me remote. In speaking to. mo to-day the Chancellor made it clear that Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you by the French Government. No. 123. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin. Sir, Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. I TOLD the German Ambassador to-day that the reply* of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very * See No. 122. GG great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by Franco it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be ex- tremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was -authorised to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it. He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium neutrality we would engage to remain neutral. I replied that I could not say that ; our hands were still free, and we wero considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude, would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone. The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutrai. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed. I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free. I am, Ac, E. GREY. No. 124. Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 1.) ^Telegraphic.) Tan's-, .7«7t/ 31, 1914. ON the receipt at 8.30 to-night of your telegram of this afternoon,* I sent a message to Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting to see him. He received me at 10.30 to-night at the Elysee, where a Cabinet Council was being held. Ho took a note of the enquiry as to the respecting by France of the neutrality of Belgium which you instructed me to make. He told me that a communication had been made to you by the German Ambassador in London of the intention of Germany to order a general mobili- sation of her army if Russia do not demobilise at once. He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will be in the circumstances, and begs an answer may bo made by His Majesty's Government at the earliest moment possible. Minister for Foreign Affairs also told me that the German Embassy is packing up. « S.-e No. 114. No. 125. Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.— (Received August 1.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, .Tuhj 31, 1914. MY immediately preceding telegram.* Political Director has brought me the reply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to your enquiry respecting the neutrality of Belgium. It is as follows:— French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and lid only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality t! at France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defence of her own security, to act. otherwise. This assurance has been given several timi President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French- Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day. " See No. 124. 67 No. 126. Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 1 ) (Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1014. I HAVE had conversation with the Political Director, who states that the German Ambassador was informed, on calling at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning, that the French Government failed to comprehend the reason which prompted his communication of yesterday evening. It was pointed out to his Excellency that general mobilisation in Russia had not been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general mobilisation, and that the Russian Government were ready to demobilise if all Powers did likewise. It seemed strange to the French Government that in view of this and of the fact that Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Government should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St. Petersburgh requiring immediate demobilisation by Russia. There were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French Government and had requested an answer the next day, intimating that he would have to break off relations and leave Paris if the reply were not satisfactory. The Ambassador was in- formed that the French Government considered that this was an extraordinary proceeding. The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs again this evening, said nothing about demanding his passports, but he stated that lie had packed up. No. 127. Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 1 ) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 1, 1914. GENERAL mobilisation of army and fleet. No. 128. Sir F. VUliers, British Minister at Brussels, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 1 .) (Telegraphic.) Brussels, August 1, 1914. BELGIAN neutrality. The instructions conveyed in your telegram of yesterday* have been acted upon. Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Bolgium and her neighbours were excellent, and thero was no reason to suspect their intentions ; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies. * Seo No. 115. No. 129. Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received Augttst 2.) (Translation.) Luxembourg, 2aout, 1914. Luxemburg, August 2, 1914. (Telegraphique.) (Telegraphic.) MINISTRE d'Etat du Luxembourg The Luxemburg Minister of State, Eyschen vient de recovoir par l'inter- Eyshen, has just received through the mediaire du Ministre d'Allemagne a German Minister in Luxemburg, M. de Luxembourg, M. de Buch, un tele- Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor gramme du Chancelier de l'Empire of the German Empire, Bethmann- 6S allemand Bethmann-Hollweg disant Hollweg, to the effect that the military que les mesures militaires a Luxem- measures taken in Luxemburg do not bourg in? constituent pas un aete hos- constitute a hostile act against Luxem- tile contre le Luxembourg, mais sont burg, but are only intended to insure uniquement des mesures destint'es a against a possible attack of a French assurer contre attaque cventuelle d'une army. Full compensation will be paid armee franchise. L'exploitation des to Luxemburg for any damage caused voies ferries affermees a l'Enipire by using the railways which are leased Luxembourg recevra complete indem- to the Empire. nite pour dommages eventuels. No. 130. Sir Ed /card Grey to Sir E Gosclicn, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, Avgu.it 1, 1914. WE are informed that authorities at Hamburg have forcibly detained steamers belonging to the Great Central Company and other British merchant- ships. I cannot ascertain on what grounds the detention of British ships has been ordered. You should request German Government to send immediate orders that they should be allowed to proceed without delay. The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this is done. His Majesty's Government, on their side, are most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, and the German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not to take any step which would make the situation between us impossible. X... 131. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Am T rtss:idor at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Officr. August 1, 101-1. I STILL believe that it might bo possible to secure peace if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power begins war. The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness of Austria to discuss with Russia and the readiness of Austria to accept a basis of media- tion which is not open to the objections raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested. Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse, and I hope that German Government may be able to make use of the Russian communications referred to above, in order to avoid tension. Hi> Majesty's Government are carefully abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters. No. 132. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Gosc'ten, Britis 7 : Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Fore'rjn Office, August 1, 1014. FOLLOWING telegram from M. Sazonof* to Count Bcnckendorfft of the Slst July communicated to me to-day: — ■ (Urgent.) "Formiile amendee conformement a la proposition anglaise : 'Si Autriche consent a arreter la marche de ses troupes sur le territoire scrbe et si, recon- naissant que h- conflit austio serbc a assume le caractere d'une question d'interet purop in, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que. la Seibie pourrait aceorder an Gouvernement austro-hongrois sans laisser porter * Russian Minister fur Foreign Affairs, t Russian Ambassador in London. 69 attointe a ses droits d'L'tat souverain et a son indupendance, la Russio s' engage a conserver son attitude expectant©.' "* (Above communicated to all -the Powers.) * TitAXSLATiON. — " Formula amended in accordance with the English proposal: 'If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Scrvian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude.' " No. 133. Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschcn, British Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. M. DE ETTER- came to-day to communicate the contents of a telegram from M. Sazonof, t dated the 31st July, which are as follows: — "The Austro-Hungnrian Ambassador declared the readiness of his Govern- ment to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable that the dis- cussions should take place in London with the participation of the Great Powers. "M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would bo thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to -her military action on Servian. territory." (The above has been communicated to the six Powers.) "* Counsellor of Russian Embassy in London, t Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. No. 134. Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received A utjuit 1.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, Augiist 1, 1914. PRESIDENT of the Republic has informed me that German Government were trying to saddle Russia with the responsibility; that it was only after a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria that the Emperor of Russia ordered a general mobilisation ; that, although the measures which the German Government have already taken are in effect a general mobilisa- tion, they are not so designated; that a French general mobilisation will become necessary in self-defence, and that France is already forty-eight hours behind Germany as regards German military preparations ; that the French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of 10 kilom. so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany, ■whereas the German troops, on the other hand, are actually on the French frontier and have made incursions on it ; that, notwithstanding mobilisations, the Emperor of Russia has expressed himself ready to continue his conversa- tions with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving the peace; that French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific, sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war. No. 135. Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. INFORMATION reaches me from a most reliablo source that Austrian Government have informed German Government that though the situation has been changed by the mobilisation of Russia they would in full appreciation of the efforts of England for the preservation of peace be ready to consider favour- ably my proposal for mediation between Austria and Servia. The effect of this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military action against Servia would continue for the present, and that the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobilisation of troops directed against Austria, in which case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russian mobilisation. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say that if, in the con- sideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilisation, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the matter should be discussed with German Government, also by Russian Government. No. 136. Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 1.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, Avgust 1, 1914. MINISTER of War informed military attache this afternoon that orders had been given at 3.40 for a general mobilisation of the French Army. This been me necessary because the Minister of War knows that, under the system of " Kriegszustand,"* the Germans have called up six classes^ Three classes are sufficient to bring their covering troops up to war strength, the remaining three being the reserve. This, he says, being tantamount to mobilisation, is mobilisation under another name. The French forces on the frontier have opposed to them eight army corps on a war footing, and an attack is expected at any moment. It is therefore of the utmost importance to guard against this. A zone of 10 kilom. has been left between the French troops and German frontier. The French troops will not attack, and the Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that this act of mobilisation is one for purely defensive purposes. * "State of war." No. 137. Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914. I SAW the Austro-Hungaj-ian Ambassador this morning. He supplied mo with the substance of a telegram which the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs had sent to the Austrian Ambassador in Paris. In this telegram bis Excellency was given instructions to assure the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that there was no intention in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian Government to impair the, sovereign rights of Servia or to obtain territorial aggrandisement. The Ambassador added that he was further instructed to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that thcTe was no truth in the report which had been published in Paris to the effect that Austria-Hungary intended to occupy the sanjak. Count Mensdorff* called again later at the Foreign Office. He informed me of a telegram sent yesterday to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at .St. Petersburgh by Count Berchtold.t and gave me the substance. It states that Count Berchtold begged the Russian Ambassador, whom he sent for yesterday, to do his best to remove the wholly erroneous impression in St. Petersburgh that the " door had been banged " by Austria-Hungary on all further conversations. The Russian Ambassador promised to do this. Count Berchtold repeated on this occasion to the Russian Ambassador the assurance which had already been given at St. Petersburgh, to the effect that neither an infraction of Servian sovereign rights nor the acquisition of Servian territory was being contemplated by Austria-Hungary. Special attention was called by Count Mensdorff* to the fact that this tele- gram contains a statement to the effect that conversations at St. Petersburgh had not been broken off by Austria-Hungary. * Austro-Hungairian Ambassador in London. t Austro-Hungarian Ministor for Foreign Affaire. 71 No. 138. Sir E. Goscluen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.—r {Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1, 1914. YOUR telegram of to-day.* I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secretary of State, and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If therefore Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilised against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilise, had caused Germany to mobilise also. Russia had said that her mobilisation did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilised for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire, forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had therefore ordered mobilisation, and the German representative at St. Petersburgk had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to an answer as ereating a state of war. * Sa« No. 131. No. 139. Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg]/, to Sir Edward Grey. — {Received A%ujast 2.) (Telegraphic.) St. Pctersburgh, August 1, 1914. ' MY telegram of 31st July.* The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the German Emperor to the German Ambassador at the audience given to his Excellency yesterday. No progress whatever was made. In the evening M. Sazonoff had an interview with the Austrian Ambassa- dor, who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to deflect' the conversation towards a general discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Seryia. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his desire that these relations should remain friendly, and said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory ; but the real question which they had to solve at this moment was whether Austria was to crush Servia and to reduce her to the status of a vassal, or whether she was to leave Servia a free and independent State. In these circumstances, while the Servian question was unsolved, the abstract discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia was a waste of time. The only place where a successful discussion of this question could be expected was London, and any such discussion was being made impos- sible by the action of Austria-Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually unfortified town, to bombardment. M. Sazonoft informed the French Ambassador and myself this morning of his conversation with the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say that during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Servia. It was clear that Austrian domination of Servia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germanv would be to Great Britain. It was. in fact, for Russia a question of life and death. The policy of Austria had throughout been both tortuous and immoral, and she thought that sho could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German ally. * See No. 120. t Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 72 Similarly the policy of Germany had been aa equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburgh : the former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war. M. Sazonof* was completely weary of the ceaseless endeavours he had made to avoid a war. No suggestion held out to him had been refused. Ho had accepted the pro- posal tor a conference of four, for mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for direct conversation between Austria and Russia; but Germany and Austria- Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by evasive replies or had refused them altogether. The action of the Austro-Hungarian Government and the German preparations had forced the Russian Government to order mobilisation, and the mobilisation of Germany had created a desperate situation. M. Sazonof* added that the formula, of which the text is contained in my telegram of 31st July,t had been forwarded by the Russian Government to Vienna, and he would adhere to it if you could obtain its acceptance before the frontier was crossed by German troops. i In no case would Russia begin hos- tilities first. I now see no possibility of a general war being avoided unless the agree- ment of France and Germany can be obtained to keep their armies mobilised on their own sides of the frontier,' as Russia has expressed her readiness to do, pending a last attempt to reach a settlement of the present crisis. * Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. t See No. 120. No. 140. Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, to Sir Edward Grey.— (Received August 1.) (Telegraphic.) Paris, August 1, 1914. THE Minister of War again sent for the military attache this evening, as he said he wished to keep him, informed of the situation. He laid great stress on the fact that the zone of 10 kilom., which he had arranged between the French troops and the German frontier, and which was still occupied by peasants, was a proof of the French endeavours to commit no provocative act. No. 141. Sir M. de Bimsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey.— (Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Vienna, August 1, 1914. I AM to be received to-morrow by Minister for Foreign Affairs. This after- noon he is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors. I have just been informed by the Russian Ambassador of German ultimatum requiring that Russia should demobilise within twelve hours. On being asked by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield to this curt summons meant war, the German Ambassador replied that Ger- many would be forced to mobilise if Russia refused. Russian Ambassador at Vienna thinks that war is almost inevitable, and that as mobilisation is too expensive to be kept for long, Germany will attack Russia at once. He says that the so-called mobilisation of Russia amounted to nothing more than that Russia had taken military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany. There seems to be even greater tension between Germany and Russia than there is between Austria and Russia. Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence. He says that Russia had no intention to attack Austria. He is going again to-day to point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that most terrific consequences must ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time Russia would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his Excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the 73 first, and that his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first. It is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak earnestly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the extreme danger of the situation, and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis- of mediation from any quarter are being considered. There is great anxiety to know what England will do. I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment to proceed on their present course, if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany. No. 112. Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — [Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1, 1914. ORDERS have just been issued for the general mobilisation of the navy and army, the first day of mobilisation to be 2nd August. No. 143. Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 1,' 1914. DETENTION of British merchant ships at Hamburg. Your telegram of 1st August* acted on. Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance, has promised to send orders at once to allow steamers^to proceed without delay. * See No. 130. No. 144. Sir E. Goschen, British Ambussador at Berlin, to Sir Edicard Grey. — (Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 2, 1914. SECRETARY of State has just informed me that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now in a state of war. No. 14o. Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received August 2.) (Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 2, 1914 MY telegram of 1st August.* Secretary of State informs me that orders were sent last night to al!oeak to the Austro-Hungarian Government had not been unavailing, and that the note which was being drawn up would be found to contain nothing with which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. At the second of these interviews he was not even informed that the note was at that very moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it would be pub- lished in Vienna on the following morning. Count Forgach, the other Under- Secretary of State, had indeed been good enough to confide to me on the same day the true character of the note, and the fact of its presentation about the time we were speaking. So little had the Russian Ambassador been made aware of what was pre- paring that he actuallv left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about the 20th July. He had only been absent a few days when events compelled him to return. It might have been supposed that Duke Avarna. Ambassador of tho allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to be so closely affected by fresh complications in the Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confidence of Count Berchtoldt during this critical time. In mv-t of fact his Excellency was left completely in the dark. As for myself, no indication was given me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm, and it was from a private source that I received on the ICth Julv the fore"ast of what was about to happen which I telegraphed to you the following dav. It is true that during all this time tho " None Freie Prcsse " and other leading Viennee newspapers were using language which pointed unmistakably to war with Servia The official '■ Fremdenblatt," however, was more cautious, and till the note was published, the prevailing opinion among my colleagues was that Austria would shrink- from courses calculated to involve her in grave European complications. On the 24th July the note was published in the newspapers. By common consent it was at once stvled an uWmatum. Its integral acceptance by Servia was neither expected nor desired, and when, on the following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it had been unconditionally accepted, Ih-ro was a niom-nt of keen disappointment. The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon as it was known later in the evening that the Servian reply had been rejected and tint Baron Gies't had broken off relations at Belgrade Vienna burst into a frerrzv of delight, vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs till the smMI hours of the morning. The demonstrations were perfe-tly orderlv. oonriniiig for the most part of organised processions through the principal streets end ; nij ur> at the Ministry of War One or two attempts to make hostile manifestations against tho * German Ambassador at Vienna, i Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. X Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade. 82 Russian 'Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of police which held the approaches to the principal embassies during those days. The demeanour of the people, at Vienna and, as I was informed, in many other principal cities of ill- Monarchy, showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Servia, and there can lie no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged rightly the sense. an I it may even be said the determination, of the people, except presumably in pcrLions cf the provinces inhabited by the Slav races. There had been much di appointment in many quarters at the avoidance of war with Servia during the annexation crisis in 1903 and again in connection with the recent Balkan war. Count Borchtold's* peace policy had met with little sympathy in the Delegation. Now the flood-gates were opened, and the entire people and press clamoured impatiently for immediate and condign punishment of the hated Servian race. The country certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Servia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands. But a peaceful solution should first have been attempted. Few a emed to reflect that the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the Balkans must inevitably call other Great Powers into the field. So just was the cause of Austria held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable that any country should place itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of Serajcvo. The conviction had been expressed to me by the German Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside. This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servian question by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the future. Instead of adopting this cour-c the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war. The inevitable consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilisation against Austria. Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisation, and Russia again responded with results which have passed into history. The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty's Government for the pre- servation of peace is recorded in the White Paper on the European Crisis.t On the 28th July I saw Count Bcrchtold and urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned in your speech in the House of Commonst on the previous day should be accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of the question at issue. His Excellency himself read to me a tele- graphic report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far ; Austria was that day declaring war on Servia, and she could never accept the confer- ence which you had suggested should take place between the less interested Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This was a matter which must be. settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned. I said His Majesty's Government would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to European complications. I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Servia, and pointed out that whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting point of her policy, His Majesty's Government were bound to look at the question primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe. In this way the two countries might easily drift apart. His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the question in sight. He thought, however, that Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving bis assurance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement. His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversa- tion that, thoneh he had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never bad much belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought to harmonise were in themselves pro- foundly divergent. His Excellency maintained a most friendly demeanour * Au tro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. + "'Miscelkncot;s. No. 6 (1911)." J Sec Hansard, Vol. -65, No. 107, columns 931-935. 83 throughout the interview, but left no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austi'o-Hungarian Government to proceed with the invasion of Servia. The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace. Herr von Tsc'hirscky* abstained from inviting my co-operation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro- Hungarian Government. 1 was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of Irs own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Govornment to furnish Count Szaparyt with full powers to continue at St. Petersburgh the hopeful conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonof.+ Count Berchtold§ refused at the time, but two days later (3Uth July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised against Austria, he received M. Schebeko|| again, in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburgh. From now onwards the tension between Russia and Ger- many was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was informed by M. Schebekoll that Count Szapary* had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof* that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points in the note to Servia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance ol Servian independence. M. Sazouof.I M. Schebekoll added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual invasion of Servia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peacelul issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st August by Count Mensdorfi,^ to the effect that Austria had neither "banged the door" on compromise nor cut off the conversations." M. Schebekoll to the end was working hard for peace. He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, § and he informed mo that the latter, as well as Count Forgach,++ had responded in the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, and M Schebekoll repeatedly told me he wa» prepared to accept any reasonable compromise. Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburgh and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia, Germany intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburgh and Paris. The ulti- matums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the Srd August. A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history. Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and M Rrhehekol! had been instructed to remain at his post till war should actually be declared against her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This only happened on the Gtfi August when Count BerchtoldS informed the foreign i is-inns at Vienna that "the Austro-f Inngarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh had been instructed to notify the Russian Government that, in view of the menacing attitude of Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact that Russia had commenced hostilities against Germany, Austro-Hungary considered herself also at war with Russia." M. Schebekoll left quietly in a special train provided by the Austro- Hungarian Government on the 7th August. He had urgently requested to fie conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he might be ab'e to proceed to his own country, but was taken instead to the Swiss frontier, and ten days later I found him at Berne. M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till the 12th August. On the previous day he had been instructed to demand his passport on the ground that * German Ambassador in Vienna. t Ai'stro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh. J Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. § Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affaire. II Russian Ambassador in Vienna. IT Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London. - S( e N 137 tt Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary of State ior Foreign Affairs. 84 Austrian troops were being employed against France. This point was not fully cleared up when I left Vienna. On the 9th August, M. Dumaine had received from Count Berchtold* the categorical declaration that no Austrian troops were being moved to Alsace. The next day this statement was supplemented by a further one, in writing, giving Count Berchtold's assurance that not only had no Austrian troops been moved actually to the French frontier, but that none were moving from Austria in a westerly direction into Germany in such a way that they might replace German troops employed at the front. These two ( i ncnts were made by Count' Berchtold in reply to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine, under instructions from his Government. The French Amba: ;ador's departure was not attended by any hostile demonstration, but his Excellency before leaving had been justly offended by a harangue made by the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna to the crowd assembled before the steps of the town hall, in which he assured the people that Paris was in the throes of a revolution, and that the President oi the Republic had been assassinated. British declaration of war on Germany was made known in Vienna by pei ill editions of the newspapers about midday on the 4th August. An abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons, and also of the German Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag of the 4th August, appeared the same day, as well as the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events of these days transpired. The " Ncue Freie Presse " was violently The " Fremdenblatt " was not offensive, but little or nothing was said in the columns of any Vienna paper to explain that the violation of Belgium neutrality had bit His Majesty's Government no alterna- tive but to take part in the war. The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly felt in Vienna, hut scarcely mentioned in the newspapers. On the 5th August I had the honour to receive year instruction of the previous daj preparing me for the immediate outbreak of war with Germany, but adding that, Austria being understood to be not yet at that date at war with 1! d Fi ince, you did not desire me to ask for my passport or to make any particular communication to the Austro-Hungarian Government. You staled at tin ;ami time that His .Majesty's Government of course expected Austria not to commit any act of war against us without the notice required by diplomatic usage. On Thursday morning, the 13th August, I had the honour to receive your a of the 12th, stating that you had been compelled to inform Count - li.t at the request of the French Government, that a complete rupture . i -Mi-red -between Fiance and Austria, on the ground that Austria had declared war on Russia who was already fighting on the side of France, and that Austria had sent troops to the German frontier under conditions that were a din ,-t menace to France. The rupture having been brought about with France in (Ins way, I was to ask for my passport, and your telegram stated, in con- clusion, that you had informed Count Mensdorff that a state of war would exist ] -i ,i pen 1 hi 1 « o countries from midnight of the 12th August . Alter seeing Mr. Penfleld, the United States Ambassador, who accepted immediately in the most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency would take charge provisionally of British interests in Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate interruption of relations, I proceeded, with .Air. Theo Russell, lior of His Majesty's Embassy, to the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold* c-eived me at midday. 1 delivered my message, for which his Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although he told me that a long telegram from Count Mensdorfft had just come in but had not yet been brought to him. His Excellency received my communication with the courtesy which never leaves He deplored the unhappy complications which were drawing such good friends as Austria and England into war. In point of fact, he added, Austria did not consider herself then at war with France, though diplomatic relations with that country had been broken off. I explained in a. few words how cir- cumstances had forced this unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided use- less argument. Then I ventured to recommend to his Excellency's consideration the case of the numerous stranded British subjects at Carlsbad, Vienna, and * Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, i A'JiiTo-Hungariao Ambassador in London. 85 other places throughout the country. I had- already had some correspondence with him on the subject, and his Excellency took a note of what I said, and promised to see what could be done to got thorn away when the stress of mobilisation should be over. Count Berchtold agreed to Mr. Phillpotts, till then British consul at Vienna under Consul-General Sir Frederick Duncan, being left by mo at the Embassy in the capacity of Charge des Archives. He pre- sumed a similar privilege would not lie refused in England if desired on behalf of the Austro-Hungarian Government. I took leave of Count Berchtold with sincere regret, having received from the clay of my arrival in Vienna, not quite nine months before, many marks of friendship and consideration from his Excellency. As I left I begged his Excellency to present my profound respects to the Emperor Francis Joseph, together with an expression of my hope that His Majesty would pass through these sad times with unimpaired health and strength. Count Berchtold was pleased to say he would deliver my message. Count Walterskirchen, of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, was deputed the following morning to bring me my passport and to acquaint me with the arrangements made for my departure that evening (14th August). In the course of the day Countess Berchtold and other ladies of Vienna society called to take leave of Lady de Bunson at the embassy. We loft the railway station by special train for the Swiss frontier at 7 p.m. No disagreeable incidents occurred. Count Walterskirchen was present at the station on behalf of Count Berchtold. x The journey was necessarily slow, owing to the encumbered state of the line. We readied Buchs, on the Swiss frontier, early in the morning of the 17th August. At the first halting place there had been some hooting and stone throwing on the part of the entraining troops and station officials, but no inconvenience was caused, and at the other large stations on our route we found that ample measures had been taken to preserve us from molestation as well as to provide us with food. I was left in no doubt that the Austro-Hungarian Government had desired that the journey should be performed under the most comfortable con- ditions possible, and that I should receive on my departure all the marks of consideration due to His Majesty's representative. I was accompanied by my own family and the entire staff of the embassy, for whose untiring zeaf anil efficient help in trying times I desire to express my sincere thanks. The Swiss Government also showed courtesy in providing comfortable accommodation during our journey from the frontier to Borne, and, after three days' stay there, on to Geneva, at which place wo found that every provision had been made by the French Government, or the request of Sir Francis Bertie, for our speedy conveyance to Paris. We reached England on Saturday morning, the 22nd August, I have, &c, MAURICE DE BUNSEN. PART II. SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. (1) Sii Sii (3) Mi (4) Mi (5) Mi Edward Grey (August 3, 1914) Edward Grey (August 3, 1914) Asquith (August. 4, 1914) Asquith (August 5, 1914) Asquith (August G, 1914) .... Pago 89 97 97 98 ... ... 98 PART II. SPEECHES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. (1) STATEMENT BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 3, 1914. Last week I staled that we were working for peace not only for this country, but to preserve the peace of Europe. To-day events move so rapidly that it is exceedingly difficult to state with technical accuracy the actual state of affairs, but it is clear that the peace of Europe cannot be preserved. Russia and Germany, at any rate, have declared war upon each other. Before I proceed to state the position of His Majesty's Government, I would like to clear the ground so that, before I come to state to the House what our attitude is with regard to the present crisis, the House may know exactly under what obligations the Government is, or the House can be said to be, in coming to a decision on the matter. First of all let me say, very shortly, that we have consistently worked with a single mind, with all the earnestness in our power, to preserve peace. The House may be satisfied on that point. We have always done it. During these last years, as far as His Majesty's Government are con- cerned, we would have no difficulty in proving that we have done so. Through- out the Balkan crisis, by general admission, we worked for peace. The co- operation of the Great Powers of Europe was successful in working for peace in tin' Balkan crisis. It is true that some of the Powers had great difficulty in adjusting their points of view. It took much time and labour and discussion before they could settle their differences, but peace was secured, because peace was their main object, and they were willing to give time and trouble rather than accentuate differences rapidly. In the present crisis, it has not been possible to secure the peace of Europe ; because there has been little time, and there has been a disposition — at any rate in some quarters on which I will not dwell — to force things rapidly to an issue, at any rate to the great risk of peace, and, as we now know, the result of that is that the policy of peace as far as the Great Powers generally are concerned, is in danger. I do not want to dwell on that, and to comment on it, and to say where the blame seems to us to lie, which Powers were most in favour of peace, which were most disposed to risk or endanger peace, because I would like the House to approach this crisis in which we are now from the point of view of British interests, British honour, and British obligations, free •from all passion as to why peace has not been preserved. We shall publish papers as soon as we can regarding what took place last week when we were working for peace; and when those papers are published I have no doubt that to every human being they will make it clear how strenuous and genuine and whole-hearted our efforts for peace Were, and that they will enable people to form their own judgment as to what forces were at work which operated against peace. I com? first, now, to the question of British obligations. I have assured the House — and the Prime Minister has assured the House more than once — that if any crisis such as this arose we should come before the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British attitude should be, that we would have no secret engagement which we should spring upon the House, and tell the House that because we had entered into that engagement there was an obligation of honour upon the country. I will deal with that point to clear the ground first. There have hern in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and what came to be called the Triple Entente, for some years past. The Triple Entente was not an alliance — it was a diplomatic group. The House will remember that in 1903 there was a crisis — also a Balkan crisis — originating in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to London, because his visit wa; planned before the crisis broke out. I told him definitely then, this being a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, 1 did not consider that public opinion in this country would justify us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic 90 support. Moro was never asked from us, more was never given, and more was never promised. In tins present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise of anything more than diplomatic support — up till yesterday no promise of more than diplomatic support. Now 1 must make this question of obligation clear to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906. That was the time of the Algeciras Conference, and it came at a time of very great difficulty to His Majesty's Government when a general election was in progress, and Ministers were scattered over the country, and I — spending three days a week in my constituency and three days at the Foreign Office — was asked tho question whether, if that crisis developed into war between France and Germany, we would give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to any foreign Power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole- hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco — a question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides — that if out of that agreement war was forced on France at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France. I gavn no promise, but I expessed that opinion during the crisis, as far as I remember almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador at the time. 1 made no promise, and I used no threats; but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted by tho Frencli Government, but they said to me at the time, and I think very reasonably, "If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to givo that, support, even if you wish it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military exports." There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorised those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed heween military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose. As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election was in prospect; I had to take tho responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer bad to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, tho Prime Minister ; I consulted, I remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War; and the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the most I could do, and they authorised that, on the distinct understanding that it left tho hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose. The fact that conversations between military and naval experts took place was later on — I think much later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing (eased lo be of importance — hut later on it. was brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet. The Agadir crisis came — another Morocco crisis — and throughout, that 1 took precisely the same line that had been taken in 190B. But subsequently, in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the Cabinet, it was decided that we ought to have a definite understanding in writing, which was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter, that these conversations which took place were not binding .upon the freedom of either Government ; and on the 22nd of November. 1912, I wrote to the French Ambassador the letter which I will now read to the House, and I received from him a letter in similar terms in reply. The letter which I have to read to the House is this, and it will be known to the public now as the record that, whatever took place between military and naval experts, they were n .t binding engagements upon the Governments : — " My dear Ambassador, "From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted togpther. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an engage- ment that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for 91 instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war. " You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might becomo essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other. " I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened tho general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggres- sion and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common." Lord Charles lieresford. — What is the date of that? . Sir E. Guy. — The 22nd November, 1912. That is the starting point for the Government with regard to the present crisis. I think it makes it clear that what the Prime .Minister and I said to the House of Commons was perfectly justified, and that, as regards our freedom to decide in a crisis what our line should be, whether we should intervene or whether we should abstain, the Government remained perfectly free, and o fortiori, the House of Commons remains perfectly free. That I say to clear the ground from the point of view of obligation. I think it was due to prove our good faith to the House of Commons that I should give that full information to the House now, and say what I think is obvious from the letter I have just read, that we do not construe, anything which has previously taken place in our diplomatic relations with other Powers in thjs matter as restricting the freedom of the Government to decido what attitude they should take now, or restrict the freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude should be. Well, Sir, I will go further, and I will say this: The situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question. In tho Morocco question it was primarily a dispute which concerned France— a dispute which concerned France and France primarily — a dispute, as it seemed to us, affecting France out of an agreement subsisting between us and France, and published to tho whole world, in which we engaged to give France diplomatic support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support ; we were, at any rate, pledged by a definite public agreement to stand with France diplomatically in that question. The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated with regard to Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything with which we had a special agreement with France ; it has not originated with anything which primarily concerned France. It has originated in a dispute between Austria and Servia. I can say this with the most absolute confidence — no Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria and Servia than the Government and the country of France. They are involved in it because of their obligation of honour under a definite alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation of honour cannot apply in the same wa-y to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even know the terms of that alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground with regard to the question of obligation. I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. For many years we have had a long-standing friendship with France. I remember well the feeling in the House— and my own feeling— for I spoke on the subject, I think, when the late Government made their agreement with France — the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that these two nations, who had had per- petual differences in the past, had cleared these differences away; I remember saying, I think, that it seemed to me that some benign influence had been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible. But how far that friendship entails obligation— it has been a friendship between tho nations and ratified by the nations — how far that entails an obligation, let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge upon anyone else more than their feelings dictate as to what they should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and collectively, may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my own feeling in the matter. The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the northern and western 02 coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet being concen- trated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has given them a senso of security that there was nothing to be feared from us. The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which Franco had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended roasts of France, we could not stand aside, and see this going'on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing. 1 believe that would bo the feeling ol this country. There are times when one feels that if those circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling ivhich would spread with irresistible force throughout the laud. But 1 also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the point of view of British interests, and it is on that that 1 am going to base and justify what I ai. presently going to .say to the House. If we say nothing at this moment, what is France to do with her fleet in the Mediterranean ? If she leai it there, with no statement from us as to what we will do, she leaves her northern and western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming down the Channel to do as it pleases iu a war which is a war ot life and death between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet is withdrawn from the .Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European conflagration j can anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of it? Let us assume that to-day we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, .saying, "No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party in this con- Bict." Let us suppose the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean; and let us assume that the consequences— which are already tremendous in what has happened in Europe even to countries which are at peace— in fact, equally whether countries are at peace or at war — let us assume that out of that come consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in defence of vital British interests, wo should go to war; and let us assume — which is quite possibli — that Italy, who is now neutral — because, as I understand, sho considers that this war is an aggressive war, and the Triple Alliance being a defensive alliance, her obligation did not arise — let us assume that consequences which are not yet foreseen ami which, perfectly legitimately consulting her own interests, make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when wo are forced in defence of vital British interests ourselves to fight — what then will be the position in the Mediterranean? It might be that at some critical moment those consequences would be forced upon us because our trade routes in the Mediterranean might be vital to this country. Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any parti- cular trade route, the keeping open of which may not be vital to this country. What will be our position then ? We have not kept a fleet in the .Mediterranean which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other fleets in the Medi- terranean. It would be the very moment when we could not detach more ships to the Mediterranean, and we might have exposed this country from our nega- tive attitude at the present moment to the most appalling risk. I say that from I lie point of view of British interests. We feel strongly that France was entitled to know— and to know at once— whether or not in the event of attack upon her unprotected northern and western coasts she could dopend upon British sup- port. In that emergency, and in these compelling circumstances, yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the following statement: — " 1 am authorised to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile opera- tions against the French coasts or shipping, the British licet will give all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of cour.se, subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Govern- ment to take any action until the above contingency of action by tho German fleet takes place." I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war on our part, not as entailing immediate aggressive action on our part, but as binding us to take ■<■:. ie sivc action should that contingency arise. Things move very hurriedly from hour to hour. Fresh news conies in, and I cannot give this in any very formal 93 way; but I understand that the German Government would bo prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the northern coast of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came to the House, but it is far too narrow an engagement for us. And, Sir, there is the more serious consideration — becoming more serious every hour — there is the question of the neutrality of Belgium. I shall have to put before the House at some length what is our position in regard to Belgium. The governing factor is the treaty of 1839, but this is a treaty with a history — a history accumulated since. In 1870, when there was war between France and Germany, the question of the neutrality of Belgium arose, and various things were said. Amongst other things, Prince Bismarck gave an assurance to Belgium that — confirming his verbal assurance, he gave in. writing a declaration which he said was superfluous in reference to the treaty in existence — that the German Confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium, it being always understood that that neutrality would bo respected by the other belligerent Powers. That is valuable as a recognition in 1870 on the part of Germany of the sacredness of these treaty rights. What was our own attitude? The people who laid down the attitude of the British Government were Lord Granville in the .House of Lords and Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons. Lord Granville on the 8th August, 1870, used these words. He said : — •' We might have explained to the country and to foreign nations, that we could not think this country was bound cither morally or inter- nationally, or that its interests were concerned in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium; though this course might have had some conveniences, though it might have been easy to adhere to .it, though it might have saved us from some immediate danger, it is a course which Her Majesty's Government thought it impossible to adopt in the name of the country with any due regard to the country's honour or to the country's interests." Mr. Gladstone spoke as follows two days later: — "There is, I admit, the obligation of the treaty. It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of that treaty ; but I am not able to sub- scribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion, tiiat the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. The great authori- ties upon foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen, such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never to my knowledge took that rigid and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of the guarantee. The circumstance that there is already an existing guarantee in force is, of -necessity, an important fact, and a weighty element in the case, to which we are bound to give full and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration, the force of which we must all feel most deeply, and that is, the common interests against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power whatever." The treaty is an old treaty — 1839— and that was the view taken of it in 1870. It is one of those treaties which are founded, not only on consideration for Belgium, which benefits under the treaty, but in the interests of those who guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. The honour and interests are, at least, as strong to-day as in 1870, and we cannot take a more narrow view or a less serious view of our obligations, and of the importance of those obligations, than was taken by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1870. I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject. When mobilisation was beginning, I knew that this question must be a most important element in our policy — a most important subject for the House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both Paris and Berlin to say that it was essential for us to know whether the French and German Governments respectively were prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the neutrality of Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French Government this reply :— "The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Pow< r 91 violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure the defence of her security, to act other- wise. This assurance has been given several times. The President ot the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French -Minister at Brussels lias spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day." From the German Government the reply was: — " The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor.'' Sir Edward Goschen, to whom 1 had said it was important to have an answer Soon, said ho hoped the answer would not bo too long delayed. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to understand that he rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of dis- closing, to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign. I telegraphed at the same time to Brussels to the Belgian Government, and I got the following reply from Sir Francis Villiers: — "Belgium expects and desires that other Powers will observe and. uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that, in the event of the viola- tion of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a posi- tion to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbours were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies." It now appears from the news I have received to-day — which has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate form — that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium. Well, Sir, until one has these things absolutely definitely, up to the last moment, I do not wish to say all that one would say if one were in a position to give the House full, complete, and absolute information upon the point. We were sounded in the course of last week as to whether, if a guarantee were given that, after the war, Belgian integrity would be preserved, that would content us. We replied that wo could not bargain away whatever interests or obliga- tions we had in Belgian neutrality. Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following telegram had been received from the King of the Belgians by our King — King George: — "Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessors, and the friendly attitude of England in 18"0, and the proof of friendship she has just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium." Diplomatic intervention took place last week cm our' part. What can diplomatic intervention do now? We have great and vital interests in the independence— and integrity is the least part — of Belgium. If Belgium is compelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her neutrality, it is clear she could only do so under duress. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask but one thing. Their one desire is that they should be left alone and independent. The one thing they fear is, I think, no! SO much that their integrity but that their independence should be inter- fered with. If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants violate its neutrality and no .action be taken to resent it, .at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may he, the independence will he gone. I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to what he thought about the independence of Belgium. It "ill be found in "Hansard," volume 203, p. 1787. I have not had time to read the whole speech and verify the context, but the thing seems to me so clear that no context could make any difference to the meaning of it. Mr. Gladstone said:- " We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether, under- 95 the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it. is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpe- tration of the direst crime tiiat ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin." No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of an ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality, whatever may have been otiered to her in return, her independence is gone if that holds. If her independence goes, the independence of Holland will follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British interests to consider what may no at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses, her position as a great Power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself — consequences which I do not anticipate, because 1 am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often — still, if that weie to happen, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Glad- stones words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandisement of any Power? It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, and that, whatever happened in the course of this war, at the end of it intervene with effect to put things right, and to adjust them to our own point of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away from those obligations of honour aud interest as regards the Belgian treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in fate of tho respect that we should have lost. And do not believe, whether a great Power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of it to exert its superior strength. For us, with a powerful fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside. We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end. Continental nations engaged in war — all their populations, all their energies, all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle — they cannot carry on the trade with us that they are carrying on in times of peace, whether we are parties to the war or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment that at the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had happoned in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the West of Europe opposite to us — if that had been the result of the war— falling under the domination of a single Power, and I am quite sure that our moral position would be such as to have lost us all respect. I can only say that I have put the question of Belgium somewhat hypothetically, because I am not yet sure of all the facts, but, if the facts turn out to be as they have reached us at present, it is quite clear that there is an obligation on this country to do its utmost to prevent the consequences to which those facts will lead if they are undisputed. t have read to the Houso the only engagements that we have yet taken definitely with regard to the use of force. I think it is due to the House to say that we have taken no engagement yet with regard to sending an expedi- tionary armed force out of tho country. Mobilisation of the fleet has taken place; mobilisation of the army is taking place; but we have as yet taken no engagement, because I feel that— in the ease of a European conflagration such as this, unprecedented, with our enormous responsibilities in India and other parts of the Empire, or in countries in British occupation, with all the unknown factors— we must take very carefully into consideration the use which we make of sending an expeditionary force out of tho country until we know how wo stand. One thing I would say. The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. The general feeling throughout Ireland— and I would like this to bo clearly under- stood abroad— does not make the Irish question a consideration which w-e feel we have now to take into account. I have -told the House how far we-have at present gone in commitments and the conditions which influence our policy, and I have put to the Hoi:sc and dwelt at length upon how vital is the condition of the neutrality of Belgium. What other policv is there before the Housp ? There is but one way in which 9G the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would he that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France that I have read to the House which prevents us doing that. Wo have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any uncon- ditional neutrality, and, without these conditions absolutely satisfied and satis- factory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the t/5e of all the force's in our power. If we did take that line by saying, "We will havo nothing what- ever to do with this matter" under no conditions— the Belgian treaty obliga- tions, the possible position in the Mediterranean, with damage to British interests, and what may happen In France from our failure to support France — il we were to say that all those thing;, mattered nothing, were as nothing, and to say we would stand aside, wo should, 1 believe, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the world, and should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences. iUy object has been to explain the view of the Government, and to place before the House the issue and the choice. I do not for a moment conceal, after what I have said, and after the information, incomplete a.s it is, that I havo given to the House with regard to Belgium, that we must he prepared, and wo arc prepared, for the consequence ol having to use all the strength we have at any moment — we know not how soon— to defend ourselves and to take our part. We know, if the facts all be as I have stated them, though I have announced no intending aggressive a< tio'n on our part, no final decision to resort to force at a i oment's noti know the whole of the case, that the uso of it may I"' forced upon us. A : far as the forces of the Crown are concerned, we are ready. 1 believe the Prime Minister and my right hon. friend the First Lord of the Admiralty have no doubt whatever that the readiness and the efficiency of those forci .vi roil vci u n highei marl; than they a ro to-day, and never was there a time win n i e iv: n ore ju titled in tho power of the navy to protect mr comm : < ■ and to proti ct our shores. The thought is with us always of the suffering and miser} en ■ 1, from which no country in Europe will escape by abstention, and from which no neutrality will save us. Tho amount of harm that can he done by an encmj trad i infinitesimal, compared with the amount of harm that must he done by th momic con- : on the Continent. The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in deciding wdiat to advise the House of Commons to do. We have disclosed our mind to the House of Commons. We have disclosed the issue, the information which we have, and made clear to the House, I trust, that we are prepared to face that situation, and that should it develop, as probably it may develop, we will face it. We worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond the last moment. How hard, how persistently, and hov i i we strove for peace last week tho Hon: e will see from tin 1 papers that will be before it. But that is over, as far : the peace of Europe is concerned. We are now face to faci with a. situation and all the i i which it may yet have to unfold. We believe we shall have the support of the House at largo in pro- ceeding to whatei r ' n i [U uo may be and whatever measures may be forced upon us by the development of facts or action taken by others. I believe the country, so quickly has the situation been forced upon it, has not had time to realise the i aie. It perhaps is still thinking ol tl b tween Austria and Scrvia, and no( the complications of thi matter which have gi iwn out of Austria and Servia. Russia and Germany wo know arc at war. We do not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany is to support, is yet at war with Russia. Wo know that a good deal has been happening on the French frontier. We do not know that the German Ambas- sador has left Paris. Tho situation has developed so rapidly that technically, as regards tho con- dition of the war, it is most difficult to describe what has actually happened. I wanted to bring out the underlying issues which would affect our own conduct, and our own policy, and to put them clearly. I have now put the vital facts before the House, and if, as seems not improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, to take our stand upon those issues, then I believe, when the country realises what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magnitude of the impending dangers in the West of Europe, which I have endeavoured to describe to the House, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, but by tho determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of tho whole country. 97 (2) FURTHER STATEMENT MADE BY SIR EDWARD GREY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. AUGUST 3, 1914. German? and Belgium. I want to give the House some information which I have received, and which was not in niy possession when 1 made my statement this afternoon. It is information I have received from the Belgian Legation in London, and is to the following effect — "Germany sent yesterday evening at 7 o'clock a note proposing to Belgium friendly neutrality, covering free passage on Belgian terri- tory, and promising maintenance of independence of the kingdom and possession at the conclusion of peace, and threatening, in case of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time limit of twelve hours was fixed for the reply The Belgians have answered that an attack on their neutrality would be a flagrant violation of the rights of nations, and that to accept the German proposal would be to sacri- fice the honour of a nation. Conscious of its duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel aggression by all possible means." Of course, I can only say that the Government are prepared to take into grave consideration the information which it has received I make no further comment upon it (3) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 4, 1914. Mr Bono:- Law —I wish to ask the Prime Minister whether he has any statement that he can now make to the House? The Prime Minister (Mr Auxuith).— In conformity with the statement of policy made here by my right lion friend the Foreign Secretary yesterday, a telegram was early this morning sent by him to our Ambassador in Berlin. It was to this effect — " The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium. His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government has delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the king- dom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy An answer was requested within twelve hours. We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against tins violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common « ith themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand marie upon Belgium may not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany You should ask for an immediate reply.'' We received this morning from oui Minister at Brussels the following telegram — "German Minister has this morning addressed note to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that, as Belgian Government have declined the well-intended proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces." Simultaneously — almost immediately afterwards — we received from the Belgian Legation here m London the following telegram — 'General staff announces that territory has been violated at Gemmenich (near Aix-la-Chapelle)." Subsequent information tended to show that the German force has pene- trate! still further into Belgian territory We also received this morning from the Go' man Ambassador here the telegram sent to him by the German Foreign Secretary, and communicated by the Ambassador to us. It is in these terms- — "Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intention; by repeating most posi- 98 tivcly formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland .strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we cotdd not profitably annex Belgic territory withou.t making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable informa- tion. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance." I hare to add this on behalf of His Majesty's Government: We cannot regard this as in any sense a satisfactory communication. Wo have, in reply ti it, repeated the request we made last week to the German Government, that they should give us the same assurance in regard to Belgian neutrality as was given to us and to Belgium by France last week. Wo have asked that a reply to that request and a satisfactory answer to the telegram of this jnoming — which I have read to the House — should be given before midnight. (4) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST 5, 1914. Mr. Ttrmar Lnw. — May I ask the Prime Minister if he has any information lie can give us to-day? The Prime Minister. — Our Ambassador at Berlin received his passports at 7 o'clock last evening, and since 11 o'clock last night a state of war has existed between Germany and ourselves. We have received from our Minister at Brussels the following telegram: — "I have just received from Minister for Foreign Affairs" —that is the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs — " a note of which the following is a literal translation : — " ' Belgian Government regret to have to inform His Majesty's Govern- ment that this morning armed forces of Germany penetrated into Belgian territory in violation of engagements assumed by treaty. " ' Belgian Government are further resolved to resist by all means in their power. "'Belgium appeals to Great Britain and France and Russia to co- c. pel ate, as guarantors, in defence of her territory. " ' There would be concerted and common action with the object of resisting the forcible measures employed by Germany against Bel- gium, and at the sarno time of guarding the maintenance for future of the independence and integrity of Belgium. " ' Belgium is happy to be able to declare that- she will assume defence ol her fortified places.' " We have also received to-day from the French Ambassador here the follow- ing telegram received by the French Government from the French Minister at Bi lis els — "The Chef du Cabinet of the Belgian Ministry of War has asked the French military attache to prepare at once for the co-operation and contact of French troops with the Belgian army pending tho results of the appeal to the guaranteeing Powers now being made. Orders have therefore been given to Belgian provincial Governors not to regard movements of French troops as a violation of the frontier." This is all the information I am at the moment ablo to give to the House. but I take the opportunity of giving notice that to-morrow, in Committee ,,f Supply, I shall move a vote of credit of 100,000,000/. (5) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, AUGUST ti. 1914. Motion made, and Question proposed, "That a sum. not exceeding £100,000 000, he granted to His Majesty, beyond the ordinary grants of Parlia- ment, towards defraying expenses that may be incurred during the year ending March 31st, 1915, for all measures which may be taken for the security of the 99 country, for the conduct of Naval and Military operations, for assisting the food supply, for promoting the continuance of trade, industry, and business com- munications, whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk, or other- wise for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war " The Prune Minister (Mr Asquitli) — In asking the House to agree to the resolution which Mr Speaker has just read from the Chair. I do not propose, because I do not think it is in any way necessary, to traverse the ground again which was coveicd by my right hon friend the Foreign Secretary two or three nights ago He stated— and I do not think any of the statements he made are capable of answer and certainly have not yet been answered — the grounds upon which, with the utmost reluctance and with infinite regret, His Majesty's Government have been compelled to put this country in a state of war with what, for many years and indeed generations past, has been a friendly Power But, Sir, the papers which have since been presented to Parliament, and which are now in the hands ot hon Members, will, I think, show how strenuous, how unremitting, how persistent, even when the last glimmer of hope seemed to have faded away, were the efforts of my right hon. friend to secure for Europe an honourable and a lasting peace. Everyone knows, in the great crisis which occurred last year in the East of Europe, it was largely, if not mainly, by the acknowledgment of all Europe, due to the steps taken by my right hon. friend that the area of the conflict was limited, and that, so far as the great Powers are concerned, peace was maintained. If his efforts upon this occasion have, unhappily, been less successful, I am certain that this House and the country, and I will add posterity and history, will accord to- him what is, after all, the best tribute that can be paid to any statesman : that, never derogating for an instant or by an inch from the honour and interests of his own country, he has striven, as few men have striven, to maintain and preserve the greatest interest of all countries — universal peace. These papers which are now in the hands of hon Members show something more than that. They show what were the terms which were offered to us in exchange for our neutrality. I trust that not only the Members of this House, but all our fellow-subjects everywhere, will read the communications, will read, learn and mark the communications which passed only a week ago to-day between Berlin and London in this matter. The terms by which it was sought to buy our neutrality are contained in the com- munication made by the German Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen on the 20th July, No. 85 of the published Paper.* I think I must refer to them for a moment. After referring to the state of things ns between Austria and Russia. Sir Edward Goschen goes on — "He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neu- trality He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Ger- many aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were cer- tain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government " Let the House observe these words — "aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue." Sir Edward Goschen proceeded to put a very pertinent question : — " I questioned His Excellency about the French colonies " What are the French colonics? They mean every part of the dominions and possessions of France outside the geographical area of Europe— "and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect." Let me come to what, in my mind, personally, has always been the crucial, and almost the governing consideration, namely, the position of the small States:— "As regards Holland, however, His Excellency said that so long as Ger- many's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise." Then we come to Belgium :— "It depended upon the action of Franco what operations Germany might be forced to enter : upon in Belgium, but, when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany." * Sec Part II, No. 85, page 64. 100 Lot the House observe the distinction between those two cases. In regard to Holland it was not only independence and integrity but also neutrality, but in regard to Belgium, there was no mention ot neutrality at all, nothing but an assurance that after the war came to an end the integrity of Belgium would be respected. Then His Excellency added : — "Ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been to bring about an understanding with England. He trusted that these assurances " the assurances I have read out to the House — "might form the basis of that understanding which ho so much desired." What does that amount to? Let me just ask the House.- I do so, not with the object of inflaming passion, certainly not with the object of exciting feeling against Germany, but I do so to vindicate and make clear the position of the British Government in this matter. What did that proposal amount to? In the first place, it meant this: That behind the back of France— they were not made a party to these communications— we should have given, if we had assented to that, a free licence to Germany to annex, in the event of a successful war, the whole of the extra-European dominions and possessions of France. What did it mean as regards Belgium? When she addressed, as she has addressed in these last few days, her moving appeal to us to fulfil our solemn guarantee of her neutrality, what reply should we have given? What reply should we have given to that Belgian appeal? We should have been obliged to say that, with- out her knowledge, we had bartered away to the Power threatening her our obligation to keep our plighted word. The House has read, and the country has read, of course, in the last few hours, the most pathetic appeal addressed by the King of Belgium, and 1 do not envy Hie man who can read that appeal with an unmoved heart. Belgians are fighting and losing their lives. What would have been the position of Great Britain to-day in the face of that spec- tacle, if we had assented to this infamous proposal? Yes, and what are we to get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of our obliga- tions? What are we to get in return? A promise — nothing more; a promise as to what Germany would do in certain eventualities; a promise, be it observed — I am sorry to have to say it, but it must be put upon record— given by a Power which was at that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treatv and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied or temporised, we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves with dishonour, and we should have betrayed the interests of this country, of which we are trustees. I am glad, and I think the country will be glad, to turn to the reply which my right hon. friend made, and of which I will read to the House two of the more salient passages. This document. No. 101 of my Paper,* puts on record a week ago the attitude of the British Government, and, as I believe, of the British people. My right hon. friend says:— "His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chan- cellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French Colonies are taken if France is beaten, so long as Germany docs not take French territory as distinct from the Colonies. From the material point of view " My right lion, friend, as he always does, used very temperate language: — "such a proposal is unacceptable, for Fiance, without further terri- tory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy." That is the material aspc-t. But he proceeded: — "Altogether, apart from that, it would he a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regard-, the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either." He then says :— "We must preserve our full freedom io act, as circumstances may seem to us to require." And he added, I think, in sentences which the House will appreciate: — "You should . . , add most earnestly that the one way of main- taining the good relations between England and Germany is that Sec Part II, No. 101, page 77. 101 they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe. . . . For that object tnis Government will work in that way with all sincerity and good will. If the peace cf Europe can lie preserved and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will 1 be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it" Til© statement was never more true— "as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis and Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, bo safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto." That document, in my opinion, states clearly, in temperate and convincing language the attitude of this Government. Can anyone who reads it fail to appreciate the tone of obvious sincerity and earnestness which underlies it ; can anyone honestly doubt that the Government of this country in spite of great provocation — and I regard the proposals made to us as proposals which we might have thrown aside without consideration and almost without answer — can anyone doubt that in spite of great provocation the right hon. Gentleman, who had already earned the title — and no one ever more deserved it — of Peace Maker of Europe, persisted to the very last moment of the last hour in that beneficent but unhappily frustrated purpose? I am entitled to say, and I do so on behalf of this country — I speak not foi a party, I speak for the country as a whole — that we made every effort any Government could possibly make for peace. But this war has been forced upon us. What is it we are fighting for? Every one knows, and no one knows better than the Government, the terrible incalculable suffering, economic, social, personal and political, which war, and especially a war between the Great Powers of the world, must entail. There is no man amongst us sitting upon this bench in these trying days — more trying perhaps than any body of statesmen for a hundred years have had to pass through, there is not a man amongst us who has not, during the whole of that time, had clearly before his vision the almost unequalled suffering which war, even in a just cause, must bring about, not only to the peoples who are for the moment living in this country and in the other countries of the world, but to posterity and to the whole prospects of European civilisation. Every step we took we took with that vision before our eyes, and with a sense of responsibility which it is impossible to describe. Unhappily, if — in spite of all our efforts to keep the peace, and with that full and overpowering consciousness of the result, if the issue be decided in favour of war — we have, nevertheless, thought it to be the duty as well as the interest of this country to go to war, the House may be well assured it was because we believe, and I am certain the country will believe, we are unsheathing our sword in a just cause. If I am asked what we are fighting for, I reply in two sentences. In the first place to fulfil a solemn international obligation, an obligation which, if it had been entered into between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life, would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law but of honour, which no self-respecting man could possibly have repudiated. I say, secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle which, in these days when force, material force, sometimes seems to be the dominant influence and factor in the develop- ment of mankind, we are fighting to vindicate the principle that, small nation- alities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good' faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong and over-mastering Power. I do not believe any nation ever entered into a great controversy — and this is one of the greatest history will ever know — with a clearer conscience and stronger conviction that it is fighting not for aggression, not for the maintenance even of its own selfish interest, but that it is fighting in defence of principles, the maintenance of which is vital to the civilisation of the world. With a full conviction, not only of the wisdom and justice, but of the obligations which lay upon us to challenge this great issue, we are entering into the struggle. Let lis now make sure that all the resources, not only of this United Kingdom, but of the vast Empire of which it is the centre, shall be thrown into the scale, and it is that that object mav be adequately secured that I am now about to ask this Committee— to make the very unusual demand upon it— to give the Government a Vote of Credit of 100,000,000?. I am not going, and I am sure the Committee do not wish it. into the technical distinctions between Votes of Credit and Supple- 102 mentary Estimates and all the rarities and refinements which arise in that connection. There is a much highei point of view than that. If it were neces- sary, I could justify, upon purely technical grounds, the course we propose to adopt, but I am not going to do so, because I think it would be foreign to tho temper and disposition of the Committee. There is one thing to which I do call attention, that is, the Title and Heading of the Bill. As a rule, in the past, Votes of this kind have been taken simply for naval and military opera- tions, but we have thought it right to ask the Committee to give us its confi- dence in the extension of the traditional area of Votes of Credit so that this money, which we are asking them to allow us to expend, may be applied not only for strictly naval and military operations, but to assist the food supplies, promote the continuance of trade ; industry, business, and communications — whether by means of insurance or indemnity against risk or otherwise — for the relief of distress, and generally for all expenses arising out of the existence of a state of war. I believe the Committee will agree with us that it was wise to extend the area of the Vote of Credit so as to include all these various matters. It gives the Government a free hand. Of course, the Treasury will account for it, and any expenditure that takes place will be subject to the approval of tho House. I think it would be a great pity— in fact, a great disaster— if, in a crisis of this magnitude, we were not enabled to make provision— provision far more needed now than it was under the simpler conditions that prevailed in the old days — for all the various ramifications and developments of expenditure which the existence of a state of war between the great Powers of Europe must entail on any one of them. I am asking also in my character of Secretary of State for War — a position which I held until this morning — for a Supplementary Estimate for men for the Army. Perhaps the. Committee will allow me for a moment just to say on that personal matter that I took upon myself the office of Secretary of State for War under conditions, upon which I need not go back but which are fresh in th'e-minds of everyone, in the hope and with the object that tho condition of things in the Army, which all of us deplored, might speedily be brought to an end and complete confidence re-established. I believe that is the case ; in fact, I know it to be. There is no more loyal and united body, no body in which the spirit and habit of discipline are more deeply ingrained and cherished than in the British Army. Glad as I should have been to continue the work of that office, and I would have done so under normal conditions, it would not be fair to the Army, it would not be just to the country, that any Minister should divide his attention between that Department and another, still less that tho First Minister of the Crown, who has to look into the affairs of all departments and who is ultimately responsible for the whole policy of the Cabinet, should give, as he could only give, perfunctory attention to the affairs of our Army in a great war. I am very glad to say that a very distinguished soldier and administrator, in the person of Lord Kitchener, with that great public spirit and patriotism that everyono would expect from him, at my request stepped into the breach. Lord Kitchener, as everyone knows, is not a politician. His association with the Government as a Member of the Cabinet for this purpose must not be taken as in any way identifying him with any set of political opinions. He has, at a great public emergency, responded to a great public call, and I am certain he will have with him, in the discharge of one of the most arduous tasks that has ever fallen upon a Minister, the complete confi- dence of all parties and all opinions. I am asking on his behalf for the Armv, power to increase the number of men of all ranks, in addition to the number already voted, by no - less than 500,000. I am certain the Committee will not refuse its sanction, for we are encouraged to ask for it not only by our own sense of the gravity and the necessities of the case, but by the knowledge that India is prepared to send us certainly two Divisions, and that every one of our self-governing Dominions,' spontaneously and unasked, has already tendered to the utmost limits of their possibilities, both in men and in monev, every help they can afford to the Empire in a moment of need. Sir, the Mother Country must set the example, while she responds with gratitude and affection to those filial overtures from the outlving members of her family. Sir, I will say no more. This is not an occasion for controversial discussion. In all that I have said. I believe I have not gone, either in the statement of our rase or in my general descriotion of the provision we think it necessary to make, beyond the strict bounds of truth. It is not mv purpose — it is not the purpose of any patriotic man — to inflame feeling, to indulge in rhetoric, to excite inter- national animosities. The occasion is far too grave for that. We have a great duty to perform, we have a great trust to fulfil, and confidently we believe that Parliament and the country will enable us to do it. UAZELl, WATSON MINISTERS DBS AFFAIRES ETRANIiERES. RECUEIL U IIGUIENTS DIPLOMATIQUE^. Negotiations ajant precede la guerre. "/a Juillet - 24 6 J „*' 1914- Petrograde. Imprimerie de 1' Etat. 1914. J6 1. Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Belgrade, le «•/„ Juillet 1914. (TOSgramme). Le Ministre d'Autricbe vient de transmettre, a 6 heures du soir, au Ministre des Finances Pa tchou, qui remplace Pachitch, une note ultimative de son Gouvernement f ixant un d61ai de 48 heures pour I'acceptation des demandes y contenues. Giesl a ajoute verbaleraent que pour le cas ou la note ne serait pas acceptee int6gralement dans un d61ai de 48 heures, il avait 1'ordre de quitter Belgrade avec le personnel de la Legation. Pachitch et les autres Ministres qui se trouvent en tournee electorate ont 6te* rappeles et sont attendus a Belgrade domain Vendredi a 10 heures du matin. Patchou qui m'a communique le contenu de la note, sollicite l'aide de la Russie et declare qu'aucun Gouvernement Serbe ne pourra accepter les demandes de l'Autriche (Sign6) Strand tman. JV° 2. Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Belgrade, le •%, Juillet 1914. (TCWgramme). Textedela note qui a et6 transmis" aujnnrd'hui par le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie au gouvernement Serbe: Le 31 Mara 1909 le Ministre de Serbie a Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, au Gouvernement Let R.la declaration suivante: La Serbie reconnait qu'elle n'a pas 6te atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli cr66 en Bosnie Herzegovine et qu'elle se conforraera — 3 — pnr consequent a telle decision que les Puissances preudront par rapport a Particle 25 du Traite de Berlin. Se rendant aux Conseils des Grandes Puissances. laSerbie s'engagedes a present a. abandonnei Pattitude de protestation et opposition qu'elle a observee h regard de l'nnnexion depuis Pautomne dernier, et elle s'engage, en outre, a changer le cours de sa politique actuclle envers PAutriche-Hongrie pour vi\Te desormais avec ccttedernierc sur le pied d'un bon voisinage*. Or, Phistoire des dcrnieres annees, et notamment les evenements douloureux du 28 Juin, ont demontre Pexistence en Serbie d'un mouveraent subversif dont le but est de detacher de la Monarchic Austro-HongToise certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement Serbe est arrive a se manifester au dela du territoire du Royaume par des actes de terro- risme, par une serie d'attentats et par des nieurtres. Le Gouvernement Royal Serbe. loin de satisfaire aux engagements formels eontenus dans la declaration du 31 Mars 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimer ce mouvement: il a tolere Pactivite criminelle des differentes socieies et affiliations dirigees centre la Monarchic, le langage effrenede la presse, la glorification des auteurs de Pattentat, la participation d'officiers et de fonctionnaires dans les agissements subversifs, une propagande malsaine dans P instruction publique, tolere enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la popula- tion serbe a la haine de la Monarchic et au ruepris de ses institutions. Cette tolerance eoupable du Gouvernement Royal de Serbie n'avait pas cesse. au moment ou les evenements du 28 Juin dernier en ont demontr£ au ninnde entier les consequences funestes: II resulte des depositions et aveux des auteurs criminels de Patten- tat du 28 Juin que le meurtre de Sarajevo a et£ trame a Belgrade, que les amies et explosifs dont les meurtri?rs se trouvaient etre munis, leur ont ete donn6s par des offieiers et fonctionnaires Serbes faisant partie de la «Narodna Odbrana» et enfin que le passage en Bosnie des criminels et de leurs amies a 6te organise et effectue par des chefs du scrviee-frontiere serbe. Les resultats mentionnes de Pinstruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement I. et R. de poursuivre plus longtemps Pattitude de longanimite expectative qu'il avait observe pendant des annees vis-a-vis deg agissements concentres a Belgrade et propag^s de la sur les territoires de la Monarchie; ces resultats lui imjiosent au contraire le devoir tie mettre fin a des menees qui furiuent une menace perpe- tuelle pour la tranquillite de la Monarchic. Cost pour atteindre ce but que le Gouvernenient I. et R. se voit oblige de demander au Gouvernenient Serbe l'cinonciation officielle (|u'il condamne la propagande dirigee contre la Monarchie Austro- Hongroise, c'est a dire, l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchie des territoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage a supprimer, par tous les inoyens, cette pro- pagande criminelle et terroriste. Afin de donner un earactere solennel a cet engagement, le Gouvcr- nement Royal de Serbie fera publier a la premiere page du journal officiel en date du 26/13 Juillet l'enonciation suivante: «Le Gouvernenient Royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigee contre 1'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est a diiv l'ensemble des ten- dances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchie Austro- Hongroise des territoires qui en font partie, et il deplore sincerement les consequences funestes de ces agissements criminels. Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que des officiers et fonction- naires serbes aient participe" a la propagande susmentionnee et com- promis par la les relations de bon voisinage auquel le Gouvernenient 1 Royal s'etait solennellement engage par sa declaration du 31 Mars 1909. Le Gouvernement Royal, qui dfisapprouve et r6pudie toute ide> ou tentative d'immixtion dans les destinies des habitants de quelque partie de 1'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considere de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du Royaume que dorfnavant il procedera avec la der- niere rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de parti Is agissements, agissements qu'il mettra tous ses efforts a prevenir et a reprimep). Cette enonciation sera portee simultanenient a la connaissance de l'Armee Royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majeste" le Roi et sera publiee dans le bulletin officiel de l'Armee. Le Gouvernement Royal Serbe s'engage en outre: 1) a supprimer toute publication qui excite a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchie et dont la tendance generale est dirigee contre son integrity territoriale, 2) a dissoudre imniediatement la sociele" dite «Karodna Odbrana». a confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande et & proceder de la meme inauiere contre les autres societes et affiliations en Serbie qui s'adonncnta la propaganda contre la Monarchic Austro-Hongroise; lc Gouvernement Royal prendra les inesures necessaires pour que les societes dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activite sous uji autre noin et sous une autre forme, 3) a eliminer sans d61ai de l'instruction publique en Serbie, tant en ce qui concerne le corps enseignant que les moyens d'instruc- tion, tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir a fomenter la propagandc contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, 4) a eloigner du service militaire et de radministration en gen6- ral tous les officiors et fonctionnaires coupables de la propagande contre la Monarchic Austro-Hongroise et dont le Gouvernement I. et R. se reserve de communiquer les noms et les faits au Gouvernement Royal, 5) a accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gou- vernement I. et R. dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirige contre Tintegrit^ territoriale de la Monarchic 6) a ouvrir une enquete judiciaire contre les partisans du com' plot du 28 Juin se trouvant sur territoire serbe; des organes delegues par le Gouvernement I. et R. prendront part aux recherches y relatives; 7) a proceder d'urgence a l'arrestation du commandant Voija Tankosic et du nomme Milan Ciganovic, employe de l'etat Serbe, compromis par les resultats de l'instruction de Sarajevo, 8) a empecher, par des mesures efficaces le concours des autorit^s Serbes dans le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la fron- tiere, a licencier et punir severeraent les fonctionnaires du service fruntieredeSchabatzetde Loznica coupables d'avoir aide les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontiere, 9) a donner au Gouvernement I. et R. des explications sur les prupos injustifiables de hauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Serbie qu'a retranger qui, malgr^ Icurs positions officielles, n'ont pas h^site apres 1 'attentat du 28 Juin de s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une nianiere hostile envers la Monarchic Austro-Hongroise, enfin, lOjd'avertir sans retard le Gouvernement I. et R. de l'execution Jcs mesures comprises dans les points precedents. — 6 — Le Gouvernement I. et R. attend la response du Gouvernement Royal au plus tard ju6qu'au Samidi 25 do ee mois, a. 6 heures du soir. Un mSmoirc concernant les r&ultate de l'instruction de Sarajevo a regard des fonctionnaires mentionnes aux points 7 et 8 est ann6x6 k cette note», (Signe) Strandtman. A"? 3. Note Verbal e transinlse personiielleiueut par 1'Ambas- sadeur d'Autricbe-Hongrie a St.-Petersbourg au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres le u / u Juillet 1914 a 10 heures du matin. Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal s'est trouve dans la neces- sity de remettre le Jeudi 10 /s 3 du mois courant, par Tentreniise du Ministre Imperial et Royal a Belgrade, la note suivante au Gouver- nement Royal de Serbie: (Suit le texte de la note). Voir document A° 2. JV? 4. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres au (barge d'affaires en Autricbe-Hougrie. St.-Petersbourg, le »/„ Juillet 1914. (Tel^granime). Veuillez transmettre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres d'Au- triche-Hongrie ce qui suit. La communication du Gouvernement austro-hongrois aux Puis- sances le lendemain de la presentation de l'ultimatum a Belgrade ne laisse aux Puissances qu'un d61ai tout-a-fait insuffisant pour entreprendre quoi qu'il soit d'utile pour 1'aplanissement des complications surgies. Pour prevenir les consequences incal- - 7 - culables et egalemcut nefastes pour toutes les Puissances qui |H'uvent suivre le mode d'aetion du Gouvernement austro- nongrois, il nous parait indispensable qu'avant tout le delai donne a la Serbie pour repondre soit prolonge. L'Autriche- Hongrie se declarant dispose* a informer les Puissances des donnees de l'enquete sur lesquelles le Gouvernement Imperial et Roval base ses accusations, devrait leur donner egalement le temps de s'en rendre compte. En ce cas, si les Puissances se convainquaient du bienlonde de certaines des exigences autrichiennes, elles se trouveraient en mesure de faire parvenir au Gouvernement Serbe des conseils en consequence. Un refus de proloiiger le terme de Taltimatuiii priverait de toute portee la demarche du Gouvernement austro-hongrois aupres des Puis- sances et se trouverait en contradiction avec les bases memes des relations internationales. Communique a bmdres, Rome, Paris, Belgrade. (Signe) Sazonow. N° 5. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Represent ants de Sa Majeste rEmpereiir en Angleterre, en Alleniagne, en Italie et en France. St.-Petersbourg, le "/,, Juillet 1914. (Telegramme). Me refere a men telegramme a Koudachew d'aujnurd'hui; nous psperons que le Gouvernement aupres duquel Vous etes accredit^ partagera notre point de vue et prescrira d'urgence a son Rcpre- sentant a Vienne de se prononccr dans le meme sens. Communique a Belgrade. (Signe) Sazonow. J£6. Telegranmie de Son Altesse Royale le Prince Regent de Serbie a Sa Majeste 1'Empereur. Belgrade, le u / ti Juillet 1914. Le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois a reniis hier soir au Gouver- nement serbe une note concernant l'attentat de Sarajevo. Conseiente de ses devoirs internationaux. la Serbie des les premiers jours de l'ho- rible crime a dexlar^qu'ellelecondamnaitetqu'elleetaitpreteaonvrir uneenquetesursonterritoire si la complicity de certains de ses sujets etait prouvee au cours du proces instruit par les autorites Austrc- hongroises. Cepcndant les demandes contenues dans la note Austro- hongroise sont inutilenient humiliantes pour la Serbie et incom- patibles avec sadignitecomme Etat independant. Ainsi on nous de- mandesurun ton peremptoire une declaration du gouvernement dans l'officiel et un ordre du souverain a l'armee, ou nous reprimerion? I'esprit hostile contre 1'Autriehe en nous faisant a nous menies des reproches d'une faiblesse criminelle envers nos menees perfides. — On nous impose ensuite l'admission des fonctionnaires austro-hon- grois en Serbie pour participer avec les notrts a l'instruction et pour surveiller lexecution des autres conditions indiquees dans la note. Nous avons rec;u un delai de 48 heures pour accepter le tout, faute de quoi la Legation d'Autriche-Hotigrie quittera Belgrade. Nous sommes prets a accepter les conditions austro-hongroises qui sont compatibles avec la situation d'un Etat independant. ainsi que celles dont 1'acception nous sera conseillee par Votre Majeste; touted les personnes dont la participition a l'attentat sera deninntree seront severement punis par nous. Certaines parmi ces demandes ne pour- raient etre executees SDns des changements de notre legislation, ce qui exige du temps. On nous a donne un delai trop court. Nous pouvons etreattaques apres l'expiration du delai par l'annce austro-hongroise qui se concentre sur notre frontiere. II nous est imposible de nous de- fendre et nous supplions Votre Majeste de nous donner Son aide le plus tot possible. La bienveillance precieuse de Votre Majeste qui s'est manifested tant de fois a notre egard nous fait esperer ferme- inent que cette fois encore notre appel sera entendu par Son genereux coeur slave. -5 - 2 En ces moments difficiles J'interprete les sentiments du peuple serbe qui supplie Yotre Majeste de vouloir bien s'interesser au sort du Royaume de Serbie. (SignS) Alexandre. jNs 7. Le Charge d'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etraugeres. Berlin, le »»/„ Juillet 1914. (T6l£gramme). Tous les journaux du matin, menie ceux, rares, qui reconnaissent I'lmpossibilitS pour la Serbie d'aeeepter les conditions posees, accueillent avec une grande sympathie le ton Snergique adopte par 1'Autriehe. L'offieieux «Local-Anzeiger» est particulierement agressif; il qualifie de superflus les recours 6ventuels de la Serbie k St. Peters- bourg, h Paris, a Athenes et a Buearest, et termine en disant que le peuple allemand respirera librement quand il aura appris que la situation dans la p£ninsule Balcanique va enfin s'exlaircir. (Signe) Bronewsky. JV? 8. Le Charg* d'Affaires en France au Ministre des Affaire* Etrangeres. Paris, le »/», Juillet 1914. (TiKgramme). La copiedela note officiellement remise a Belgrade a 6t6 commu- niques par 1'Ambassadeur d'Autriche au Gouvernement Francais. Plus tard 1'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a visits le Ministre et lui a lu une communication reproduisant les arguments autri- chiens et indiquant qu'en cas de refus de la part de la Serbie, 1'Autriche serait obligee de recourir a. une pression et, en cas - 10 - de besoin, a des inesures militaires; la communication se termi- nait par la remarquc qu'4 l'avis de l'AUemagne cette question devrait etre r6solue directement entre l'Autriche et la Serbie et qu'il Stait de l'inteiet des Puissances de circonscrire l'affaire en l'abandonnant aux Parties inteiessees. Le Gerant du Departe- ment Politique, qui assistait a I'entretien, demanda a PAmbassa- deur s'il fallait considerer Taction autrichienne comme un ultimatum — en d'autres termes, si, dans le cas ou la Ssrbie ne se soumettrait pas entierement aux demandes autrichiennes, les hostility Gtaient inevitables? L'ambassadeur e>ita une reponse directe en alleguant l'absence d 'instructions. (Signe) Sevastopoulo. JV? 9. Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre pendant la dure> de la crise balca- nique, et c'est grace k la Serbie et au sacrifice qu'elle a fait dans l'interet exclusif de la paix europ6enne, que cette paix a 6t6 pr&erv6e. Le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas etre rendu responsable des manifestations d'un caractere priv6 telles que les articles des jouxnaux - 13 - et le travail paisible des societes, manifestations qui se produisent dans presque tons les pays conune une chose ordinaire et qui echap- pent, en regie generate, au controle officiel, d'antant moins que le Gouvernement Royal, lors de la solution de toute une serie de questions qui se sont presentees entre la Serbie et rAutriche-Hongrie, a montr6 une grande prevenance et a reussi, de cette facon, a en regler le plus grand nombre au profit du progres des deux pays voisins. C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Royal a et6 peniblement surpris par les affirmations, d'apres lesquelles des personnes du royaume de Serbie auraient participe a la preparation de l'attentat commis k Sarajevo. 11 s'attendait a etre invito a collaborer a la recherche de tout ce qui se rapporte a ce crime et il 6tait pret, pour prouver par des actes son cntiere correction, k agir contre toutes les personnes a Kegard desquelles des communications lui seraient faites. Se rendant done au d6sir du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, le Gouvernement Royal est disposed a remettre aux tribunaux tout sujet serbe, sans egard a sa situation et a son rang, pour la complicity duquel, dans le crime de Sarajevo, des preuves lui seraient fournies. 11 s'engage specialement a faire publier a la premiere page du Journal officiel en date du 13—26 juillet, l'enonciation suivante: «Le Gouvernement Royal de Serbie eondamne toute propagande qui serait dirigee contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, e'est-i-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu k detacher de la Monarchic Austro-Hongroisedes territoires qui en font partie, et il deplore sin- cerement les consequences funestes de ces agissements criminels. «Le GouverneniPiit Royal regrette que certains officiers et fon- etioiinaires serbes aient participS, d'apres la communication du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, a la propagande susmentionnee et compromis par la les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le Gouvernement Royal s'Stait solennellement engag6 par sa declaration du 18/31 mars 1909. «Le Gouvernement Royal, qui desapprouve etrepudie toute id6e ou tentative d*une immixtion dans les destinees des habitants de quelque partie de rAutriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considere qu'il est de son devoir d'avertir formellement les officiers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du royaume que dorenavant il proc6dera avec la der- - 14 - mere rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables do pareils agissements, qu'il mcttra tous ses efforts a prtvenir et a re-primer*. Cette 6nonciation sera portee alaconnaissance de l'armee Koyale par un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majeste le Roi par S. A. R. le Prince he>itier Alexandre, et sera publie* dans le prochain Bulletin officiel de l'armec. Le Gouvernement Royal s'engage ep outre: 1) A introduire dans la premiere convocation reguliere de la Skoupchtina une disposition dans la loi de la presse par laquelle sera punie de la maniere la plus severe la provocation a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchic Austro-Hongroise, ainsi que contre toute publication dont la tendance, g&ierale serait dirigSe contre Tinte- grit6 territoriale de rAutriche-Hongrie. II se charge, lors de la revision de la Constitution, qui est pro- chaine, de faire introduire dans l'article 22 de la Constitution un amendement, de telle sorte que les publications ci-dessus puissent etre coniisquees, ce qui, actuellemcnt. aux termes eategoriques de l'article 22 de la Constitution, est impossible. 2) Le Gouvernement ne possede aucune preuve, et la note da Gouvernement Imperial et Royal ne lui en fournit non plus aueune, que la SoeiSte Narodna Obrana et les autres societes similaires aient commis jusqu'a ce jour quclque acte criminel de ce genre par le fait d'un de leurs membres. Neanmoins,le Gouvernement Royal acceptera la demande du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal et dissoudra la So- ci6te Narodna Obrana et toute autre societe. qui agirait contre l'Autriche-Hongrie. 3) Le Gouvernement Royal Serbe s'engage a eliminer sans d^lai de l'instruction publique en Serbie tout ce qui sert ou pourrait ser- vir a fomenter la propagande contre l'Autriche-Hougrie, quand le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal lui fournira des faits et des preuves de cette propagande. 4) Le Gouvernement Royal accepte de meme d'6Ioigner du service militaire ceux pour qui Tcnquete judiciaire aura prouv6 qu'ils sont coupables d'actcs diriges contre l'integrit6 du territo^re de la Monarchic Austro-Hongroise; il attend que le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal lui communique ulterieurement les nouis et les faits de ces officiers et fonctionnaires aux fins de la procedure qui doit $'ensuivre. - 15 - 5) Le Gouvernement Royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas claire- ment comptedu sens et de la portSe de la demande du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal tendant a ce que la Serine s'engage a accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du Gouvernement Imperial et Royal. Mais il declare qu'il admettra toute collaboration qui rSpondrait aux prineipcs du droit international et a- la procedure criminelle, ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisinage. 6) Le Gouvernement Royal,, cela va de soi, considere de son devoir d'ouvrir une enquete contre tous eeux qui sont ou qui, e>entuellement, auraient 6t6 melees au complot du 15 juin et qui se trouveraient sur le territoire du royaunie. Quant a la participation a cette enquete des agints des autoriti&s austro-hongroises qui seraient d616gu6s a cet effet par le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal, le Gouvernement Royal ne peut pas l'accepter,carceseraitune violation de la Constitu- tion ot de la loi sur la procedure criminelle. Cependant, dan3 des cas concrets, des communications sur les r£sultats de 1'instruction en question pourraient etre donne>s aux organes austro-hongrois. 7) Le Gouvernement Royal a fait p roceder des le soir meme de la remise de la note a 1'arrestation du commandant Voija Tankositeh. Quant a Milan Ciganovitch, qui est sujet de la Monarchie Austro- Hongroiseet qui jusqu'au 15 juin 6tait employe (eomme aspirant) a la direction des chemins de fer, il n'a pas pu encore etre joint. Le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal est prie" de vouloir bien, dans la forme accoutumee, faire connaitre le plus tot possible les preemptions de culpability, ainsi que les preuves Gventuelles de culpability qui ont et6 recueillies jusqu'a ce jour par l'enquete a Sarajevo, aux fins d'enquetes ultexieures. 8) Le Gouvernement Serbe renforcera et etendra les mesures prises pour empecher le trafic illicite d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la frontiere. II va de soi qu'il ordonnera tout de suite une enquete et punira s6verement les fonctionnaires des frontieres sur la ligne Schabatz-Loznica, qui ont manque a leur devoir et laisse passer les auteurs du crime de Sarajevo. 9) Le Gouvernement Royal donnera volontiers des explications sur les propos que ses fonctionnaires, tant en Serbie qu'a l'etranger, ont tenus aprgs l'attcntat dans des entrevues et qui, d'apres l'affirmationdu Gouvernement I. et R., ont 6t6hostilesenversla Monarchie, des que le - 16 - Gouvernement I. et R. lui aura communique les passages en ques- tion de ces propos, et des qu'il aura demontre que les propos employes out en effet ete tenus par les dits fonctionnaires, quoi- que le Gouvernement Royal lui meme aura soin de recueillir des preuves et convictions. 10) Le Gouvernement Royal informera le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal de ['execution desmesures comprises dans les points prece- dents, en tant que cela n'apasete" deja fait par la presente note,aussitot que chaque mesure aura ete ordonnee et executee. Dans le cas ou le Gouvernement Imperial et Royal neseraitpas satisfaitdecette reponse, le Gouvernement Royal Serbe, considerant qu'il est de I'interet com- mun de ne pas precipiter la solution de cette question, est pret, comme toujours, a accepter une entente pacifique, en remettant cette que- stion, soit a la decision du tribunal international de la Haye, soit aux Grandes Puissances qui out pris part a Telaboration de la declaration que le Gouvernement serbe a faite le 18/31 Mars 1909». (Signei Strandtman. .Ni 14. Le Charge d'affaires en Allemagiie au Ministre des affaires Etrangeres. Berlin, le '=,„ Juillet 1914. (Telegramme). Ai recu Votre t616grarame du "/« Juillet. Ai communique son contenu au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. II me dit que le Gouvernement Anglais l'a egalement pri6 de conseiller a Vienne la prolongation du d£lai de l'ulti malum; il a communique cette d-marche teiegraphiquement a Vierme, il va en faire autant pour notre d-- marche, mais il craint qu'a la suite de l'absence de Berchtold parti .pour Ischl, et vu le manque de temps, ses telegrammes ne restent sans resultats: il a, en outre, des doutes sur l'opportunit§ pour l'Autriche de c6der au dernier moment et il se demande si cela ne pouvait pas augmenter l'assurance de la Serbie. J'ai repondu qu'une grande Puissance eomrae l'Autriche pourrait ceder sans porter atteinte a son prestige et ai fait valoir tous les arguments conformes eependant je n'ai pu obtenir des promesses plus precises. Meme lors- que je laissais entendre qu'il fallait agir 4 Vienne pour eviter la possibility de consequences rcdoutables, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres repondait chaque fois negativement. (Sign6) Bronewsky. N° 15. Le Charge d'affaires en France an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Paris, le 'V, 5 Juillet 1914. (T616gramme). Ai recu le t61egramme du "/»» Juillet concernant la prolonga- tion du delai de l'ultimatura autrichien et ai fait la communication prescrite. Le Reprtsentant de France a- Vienne a 6t6 muni d'instruc- tions conformes. (Sign6) Sevastopoulo. J* 16. L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Londres, le "/,» Juillet 1914. (T616gramme). Recu t&egramnie du 11 Juillet. Grey a prcscrit a. 1'Ambas- sadeur d'Angleterre h Vienne d'appuyer notre d-marche concernant la prolongation du d£lai de l'ultimatum. II ra'a dit en meme temps que l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche ii&it venu le voir et avait explique" qu'on ne devrait pas attribuer k la note autrichienne le caractere d'un ultimatum;il faudrait la consider comme une d-marche qui, en cas d'absencede rtponseouen cas de reponse insufiisante au terme fix6,aurait comme suite la rupture des relations diplomatiques et le depart imm&liat - 18 - de Belgrade du Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie, sans entrainer cependant lc commencement immSdiat des hostilites.— Grey a ajoute' qu' a la suite de cette explication il a indique a PAmbassadeur d'Angle- tcrre a Vienne que dans le cas ou il serait trop tard pour soulever la question de la prolongation du delai de Pultimatum, celle de Parret des hostility pourrait peut r etrc servir de base a la discussion. (Signe) Benckendorif. M 17. Le v Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur a Londres. St.-Petersbourg, le »/„ Juillet 1914. (T£16gramme). Dans le cas d'une nouvelle aggravation de la situation, pouvant provoquer de la part des Grandes Puissances des actions confonnes, nous comptons que PAngleterre ne tardera pas de se ranger nettement du cot6 de la Russie et de la France, en vue de maintenir Pequilibre europSen, en faveur duquel elle est intervenue constamment dans le passS et qui serait sans aucun doute compromis dans le cas du triomphe de PAutriche. (Signe) Sazonow. J* 18. Note verbale remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres le "A, Juillet 1914. II nous revient de source autoritative que la nouvelle repandue par quelques journaux d'apres laquelle la demarche du Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie a Belgrade aurait 6t£ faite a Pinstigation de PAllemagne est absolument fausse. Le Gouvernement Allemand n'a pas eu connaissance du texte de la note Autrichicnne avant qu'elle ait 6t6 remise et n'a exercS - 19 - * aucune influence sur son contenu. C'est a tort qu'on attribue a 1'Allemagne une attitude comminatoire. L'Allemagne appuie naturellement comme allie de l'Autriche les revendications a son avis legitimes du Cabinet de Vienne contre la Serbie. Avant tout elle desire comme elle l'a d£ja declare" des le commencement du differend Austro-Serbe que ce conflit reste localise. J\» 19. Le Charge d'afflaire en France au Ministre des affaires Etrangeres. Paris, le "/„ Juillet 1914. (Telegramme). Me refere a mon telegramme du "/ 2I Juillet. Aujourd'hui un journal du matin a public, sous une forme pas entierement exacte, les declarations d'hier de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, en les faisant suivre de commentaires qui attri- buent a cette demarche le caraetere d'une menace. L'Ambassa- deur d'Allemagne, tres impressionne parces divulgations, a visite aujourd'hui le Gerant du D6partement Politique pour lui dire que ses paroles n'avaient nullement eu le caraetere de menace qu'on lew attribue. II a declare" que l'Autriche avait presents sa note a la Serbie sans entente precise avec Berlin, mais que cependant 1'Allemagne approuvait le point de vue de l'Autriche et que certainement «la fleche une fois partie» (ce sont la ses propres paroles), 1'Allemagne ne pouvait se laisser guider que par ses devoirs ,d'alliee. (Signe) Sevastopoulo. - 20 - J6 20. L'ambassadeur en Anglcterre au Hinistre des Affaires Etrangeres. Londres, le "/„ Juillet 1914. (ra^gramme). Grey m'a dit que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemague lui a declare que le Gouvernement Allemand n'avait pas 6t6 informe du texte de la note autrichienne, mais qu'il soutenait entierement la d-marche autrichienne. L'Ambassadeur a demands eu meme temps si 1' Anglcterre pouvait consentir a agir k St.-P6tersbourg dans un esprit de conciliation. Grey a rtpondu que cela 6tait completement impossible. Le Ministre a ajoute que tant que les complications n'existaient qu'entrc l'Autriche et la Serbie, les int6rets Anglais n'etaient engages qu'indirecte- ment, mais qu'il devait prevoir que la mobilisation autrichienne aurait comme suite la mobilisation de la Russie et que des ce mo- ment on se trouverait en presence d'une situation a laquelle seraient interessees toutes les Puissances. L'Angleterre se reservait pour ce cas une complete liberie d'action. (Sign6) Benckendorff. Jfc 21. Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Belgrade le »/„ Juillet 1914. (T^l^gramme). Malgre le caractere extremement conciliant de la reponse serbe a 1'ultimatum, le Ministre d'Autriche vient d'infonner, a 6V 2 du soir, le Gouvernement Serbe par note, que n'ayant pas recu au delai fixe" une reponse satisfaisante il quitte Belgrade avec tout le personnel de la Legation. La Scoupchtina est convoquee a Nich pour le "/ S7 Juil- let. Le Gouvernement Serbe et le Corps Diplomatique partent ce soir pour la meme ville. (Signe) Strandman. - 21 - JTj 22. L'Ambassadeur en Anglctetre au Miuistre des Affaires Etrangeres. Londres le 'Vas Juillet 1914. (Til^gramme). Grey a dit a l'Ambassadeur d'Alleruagne qu'a. son avis la mobilisation autrichienne devait entrainer la mobilisation de la Russie, qu'alors surgirait le danger aign d'une guerre generate et qu'il ne vovait qu'un seul moyen pour une solution pacifique: qu'en presence des mobilisations autrichienne etrusse, rAllemagne, la France, l'ltalie et l'Angleterre s'abstiennent d'une mobilisation immediate et proposent tout d'abord leurs bons offices. Grey m'a dit que ce plan necessitait avant tout l'agreinent de l'AIlemagne et l'engage- ment de cette Puissance de ne pas inobiliser. En consequence il a adresse tout d'abord a Berlin une question a ce sujet. (Signe) Benckendorff. m 23. Le Miuistre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur en Italic St. Petersbourg, le "/so Juillet 1914. (Tel£gramme). L'ltalie pourraitjouer un role detout premier ordre en faveur du maintien de la paix, enexercant l'influence necessaire sur l'Autriche et en adoptant une attitude nettement defavorable au conflit, car ce dernier ne saurait etre localise. II est desirable que vous expri- miez la conviction qu'il est impossible pour la Russie de ne pas venir en aide a la Serbie. (Sign6) Sazonow. JV? 24. Le^Gerant du Consulat a Prague an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Prague, le ,3 / 46 Juillet 1914. (TiUgramme). La mobilisation a ete decrelee. (Signe) Kazanslant du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres que la re- ponse de la Serbie a ete jugee insuffisante a Vienne et que demain, inardi , 1' Autriche proc6derait a des «actions energiques* dont le but serai t de forcer la Serbie de Iui donner les garanties nScessaires. Le Ministre avant demand^ en quoi consisteraient ces actions, 1' Ambassadeur repondit qu'il n'avait pas de renseignements exacts a ce sujet, mais qu'il pouvait s'agir d'un passage da la frontiere serbe, d'un ultima- tum et meme d'une declaration de guerre. (Signe) bwolsky. M 38. *.e Charge d'affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Berlin, le "/„ Juillet 1914. (TdlSgramme).' J'ai pri6 le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres d'appuyer a Vienne votre proposition tendant a autoriser Szapary d'61aborer, parlavoie d'un ^change de vues prive avec Vous, unc redaction des demandes — 30 - austro-hongroises acceptable pour les deux parties. Jagow a rgpondu qu'il etait au courant de cette proposition et qu'il partageait l'avis de Pourtales que, puisque Szapary avail commence" cette conversation, il pourrait aussi bien la continuer. D telegraphiera dans ce sens k 1'AEibassadeur d'Allsmagne k Vienne. Je l'ai prie" de conseiller d'une facon plus pressante a Vienne de s'engager dans cette voie de conciliation; Jagow a repondu qu'il ne pouvait pas conseiller a l'Autriche de cider. (Sign6) Bronewsky. jY» 39. Le Charge d'AHaii < ,s eu Alleinagiie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Berlin, le "/« JuiUet 1914., (T616gramme). Aujourd'hui, avant ma visite au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, ce dernier avait recu celle de rAmbassadeur de France qui avait tente" de lui faire accepter la proposition anglaise relative k une action en favour de la paix, action qui serait exercee simultanfrnent a St.-P6tersbourg eta Vienne par rAngleterre, rAllemagne, 1'Italie et la France. Cambon a propose" que ces Puissances donnent a Vienne un conseil dans les termes suivants: «S'abstenir de tout acte qui pourrait aggraver la situation de l'heure actuelle*. En adoptant cette formule voi!6e on 6viterait de mentionner la n6cessite de s'abstenir d'une invasion de la Serbie. Jagow a oppose a cette proposition un refus categorique, et oela malgre" les instances de l'Ambassadetfr qui a fait valoir, comme un bon cote de la proposition, le groupement mixte des Puissances grace auquel on 6vitait l'opposition de PAlliance k l'Entente, ce dont s'6tait si souvent plaint Jagow lui meme. (Sign6) Bronewsky. — 31 — J6 40. Telegrainme de Sa Majeste Impcriale rEmpereur a Son Altesse Royale le Prince Alexandre de Serbie en date du l % J uillet 1914. Votre Altesse Royale en s'adressant a Moi dans un moment particulierenieut difficile ne s'est pas trompee sur les sentiments qui M'aniinent a Son egard et stir Ma sympathie cordiale pour le peuple serbe. Ma plus serieuse attention est attirSe par la situation actuelle et Mon Gouvernements'applique de toutes ses forces a aplanir les pre- sentes difficultes. Je ne doute point que Votre Altesse et le Gouver- nement Royal ne veuillent faciliter cette tache en ne negligeant rien pour arriver a une solution qui permette de prevenir les horreurs d'une nonvelle guerre tout en sauvegardant la dignite de la Serbie. Tant qu'il y a le moindre espoir d'eviter une effusion de sang, tous nos efforts doivent tendre vers ce but. Si, malgre Notre plus sincere desir, Nous ne reussissons pas, Votre Altesse peut etre assuree qu'en aucun cas la Russie ne se desinteressera du sort de la Serbie. (Signe) Nicolas. A» 41. L'Anibassadeui' en Autriclie-Hougrie an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Vienne le '«/„ juillet 1914. (Tel^gramme). Le Ministredes Affaires Etrangeres est absent. Pendant un entre- tien prolonge, que j'ai eu aujourd'hui avec Macchio, j'ai, en termes tout a fait amicaux, attire son attention sur l'impression defa- vorablc qu'a produite en Russie la presentation par l'Autriche a la Serbie de demandes absolument inacceptables pour chaque etat independant, bien que petit. J'ai ajoute que ce proc6de, qui pour- rait ame.ner des complications les moins desirables, a provoque en Rus- sie une profonde surprise et une reprobation generale. II faut sup- - 32 — poser que l'Autriche, sous l'influencc des assurances du Represen- tant Allemand k Vienne, lequel pendant toute cctte erise a jou6 un role d'instigateur, a compt6 sur la probability do la localisation de son conflit avec la Serbie et sur la possibility de porter a cette der- nierc impunement un coup grave. La declaration du Gouvernement Imperial concernant l'impossibilit£ pour la Russie de rester indif- ferente en presence d'un tel precede" a provoqne ici une grande impres- sion. (Sign6) Sch6b6ko. JVs 42. L'Ainbassadeur en Angleterrc au Ministre des Affaires Etrangtres. Londres, le »/„ Juillet 1914. (Teltgramme). Grey vient de repondre a l'Ambassadeur d' Allemagne, qui efalt vemi le questionner sur la possibility d'ime action a St.-Petersbourg, que cette action devrait se produire a Vienne et que le cabinet de Berlin serait le mieux qualifie pour l'exercer. Grey afaitobserverenmeme temps que la reponse serbe k la note autrichienne d£passait par sa moderation ct son esprit de conciliation tout ce k quoi on pouvait s'attendre. Grey a ajoutS qu'il en concluait que la Russie avait conseill6 k Belgrade de donner une reponse moder6e et qu'il pensait que la reponse serbe pouvait servir de base a une solution pacifique et acceptable de la question. Dans ces conditions, a continue Grey, si 1'Autriche malgre cette reponse commenQait les hostilites, elle prouverait son intention d'aneantir la Serbie. La question placed sur ce terrain produirait une situation qui pourrait amener une guerre dans laquelle seraient im- pliquSes toutes les Puissances. Grey a enfin declare que le Gouvernement Anglais etait bien sincerement dispose k collaborer avec le gouvernement Allemand taut qu'il s'agirait de la conservation de la paix; mais que pour le cas contraire l'Angleterre se r&ervait une pleine liberty (Taction. (Sign6) Benckendorff. — 33 — 5 J* 43. Le Ministre des Affaires Etraiigeres a rAiiibassadeur en Angleterre. St.-Peiersbourg, le "/„ Juillet 1914. (T61£gramme). Mes entretiens avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne confirment mon impression que l'Alleiuague est plutot favorable a Pintransigeance de PAutriche. Le Cabinet de Berlin, qui aurait pu arreter tout le d6velop- pement de la erise, parait n'exereer aucune action sur son alliee. L'ainbassadeur trouve insuffisante la reponse de la Serbie. Cette attitude allemande est tout partieulieremcnt alarmante. 11 me senible que mieux que toute autre Puissance PAngleterre serait en mesure de tenter encore d'agir a. Berlin pour engager le Gouvernement Allemand a Taction neeessaire. C'est a Berlin qu'iudu- bitablement se trouve la clef de la situation. (Sign6) Sazonow. JS» 44. Le Consul general a Fiume an Ministrc des Affaires Kf ran- Seres. Fiume le ,s / i8 Juillet 19J4. (T£16gramme). L'etat de siege a ct6 proclame. en Slavonic, on Croatie et k Fiume et en meme temps les reservistes de toutes les categories ontetfc mobilises. (Signe) Salviati. 3* - M45. L'AmbaSsadeur en Autiiche-!loii£rie an Minis! re deS AITai- ivs Etrangeros. Vieiinele IS / i8 Juillct 1914. (Tfldgramme). J'ai entretenu aujourd'hui le Comte Berchtold dans le sens dos instructions de Votre Excellence. Jo lui fis observer, en termes lcs plus amieaux, combien il 6tait desirable de trouver une solu- tion qui, en consolidant les bons rapports entre 1'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, donnerait h la Monarchic Austro-Hongroise des garan- ties sexicuses pour ses rapports futurs avec la Serbie. J'attirais l'attcntion du Comte Berchtold sur tous les dangers pour la paix de l'Europe qu'entrainerait un conflit arm6 entre 1'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie. Le Comte Berchtold me repondit qu'il se rendait parfaitement oompte du serieux de la situation et des avantages d'une tranche explication avec le Cabinet de Saint-Petersbourg. II me dit que d'un autre cote le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois, qui ne s'etait decide que tres mal volontiers aux mesures ener- giques qu'il avait prises contre la Serbie, ne pouvait plusni reculer, ni entrer en discussion aucune des termes de la, note Austro-Hongroise. Le Comte Berchtold ajouta que la crise etait devenue si aigue, et que l'excitation de l'opinion publique avait atteint tel degr6 t que le Gouvernement, le voulait il, ne pouvait plus y consentir, d'autant moins, me dit-il, que la reponse meme de la Serbie donne la preuve du manque de sineente de ses promesses pour l'avcnir. (Signe) Schebeko. K° 40. Le Charge d'affaires en Allemagiie an Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Berlin, le »/.. JuiUet 1914. (TWgramme). Le Bureau Wolff n'a pas publie le texte de la note respon- sive serbe qui lui avait ete communique. Jusqu'a ce moment - 36 — »ette note n'a pnru in extenso dans aucun des journaux loeaux; qui selon toute Evidence ne veulent pas lui donner place dans leurs colonnos, se rendant compte de l'effot calmant que cette publication produirait sur les lecteurs Allcinands. (Signe) Bronewsky. Jfc 47. L'Ambassadeur en Aiitridse-Hcmgrie au Minislre des Altai- res Etrangeres. Vienne, le l5 / l8 Juillet, 1914. (T61egramme). Le decret sur la mobilisation generate a etc signe. (Signe) Schebeko. X° 48. Le Minislre des Affaires Etrangeres a TAinbassatleur a Loud res. St.-Petersbourg, le l5 / i8 Juillet, 1914. (Telfgramme). En presence des hostilites entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Serbie il est neeessaire que l'Angleterre entreprenne d'urgence uue action mediatrice et que Taction militaire de 1'Autrichc contre la Serbie soit immediatement suspendue. Autrement la mediation ne servira que de pretexte pour tirer en longueur la solution de la question et donnera entre temps a l'Autriche la possibility d'eeraser eompletement la Serbie et d'occuper une situation dominante dans les Balcans. Communique a Paris, Berlin, Vienne et Rome. (Signed) Sazonow. — 36 — As 49. Lc Miuistrc des Affaires Etrangeres au Charge d'Affaircs en Alleinague. St.-Petersbourg, lc ie /, 9 Juillet, 1914. (T616gramme). L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'informe, au nora du Chanee- lier, que l'AUemagne n'a pas cesse" d'exercer a Vienne une influence moderatrice et qu'elle continuera cette action meme apres la declaration de guerre. Jusqu'a. ce matin il n'y avait aucune nou- velle que les armies autrichiennes aient franchi la frontiere Serbe. J'ai pri6 rAmbassadeur de transmettre au Chancelier mes remerciments pour la teneur amicale de cette communication. Je l'ai inform^ des mesures militaries prises par la Eussie, dont au- cune, lui dis-je, n'etait dirigee contre l'AUemagne; j'ajoutais qu'elles ne prSjugeaient pas non plus des mesures agressives contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, ces mesures s'expliquant par la mobilisation de- la plus grande partie de l'armee austro-hongroise. L'ambassadeur se prononcant en faveur d'explieations directes entre le Cabinet de Vienne et nous, je repondis que j'y etais tout dispose, pour peu que les conseils du Cabinet de Berlin dont il parlait trouvent 6cho k Vienne. En meme temps je signaiais que nous 6tions tout disposes a accepter le projet d'une conference des quatre Puissances, un projet auquel, paraissait-il, l'AUemagne ne syrapathisait pas entierement. Je dis que, dans mon opinion, le meilleur moyen pour mettre k profit tous" les moyens propres a produire une solution pacifique consisterait en une action parallels des pourparlers d'une conference a. quatre de l'AUemagne, de la France, de TAngleterre et de 1'Ita- lie et d'un contact direct entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie, a l'instar a. peu pres de ce qui avait eu lieu aux moments les plus critiques de la crise de l'an dernier. Je dis k rAmbassadeur qu'apres les concessions faites par la Serbie, un terrain de compromis pour les questions resides ou- vertea ne serait pas tres difficile a trouver, a condition toutefois de - 37 — quelque bonne voloute de la part do 1'Autriche ct a condition que toutes les Puissances usent de toute leur influence dans un sens de conciliation. Communique aux Ambassadeurs en Angleterre, en France, en Autriehe-Hongrie et en Italic (Signe) Sazonow. JV? 50. Le Minis! re des Affaires Etrangeres aux. Ambassadeurs en Augleterre et eu France. St.-Petersbourg, le ie / M Juillet 1914. (T61£gramme). Lors de mon entretien avec I'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, dont traite mon telegramme precedent, je n'avais pas encore recu le telegramme du ,s / iS Juillet de M. Schebeko. Le contenu de ce telegramme constitue un refus du Cabinet de Vienne de proceder a un echange d'idees direct avec le Gouver- nement Imperial. Des lors, il ne nous reste plus qu'a nous en remettrc entiere- ment au Gouvernement britannique pour l'initiative des demarches qu'il jugera utile de provoquer. Communique a Vienne, Rome et Berlin. (Signe) Sazonow. J* 51. Le Charge d 'Affaires en Allemagne au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Berlin, le 18 /,, Juillet 1914. (T61£gramme). Sur ma question s'il avait une reponse de Vienne relativement a Votre proposition de pourparlers prives a St.-Petersbourg, le Secre- taire d'Etat a repondu negativement. — 38 — II declare qu'il lui est fort difficile d'agir sur Vienne, surtout ouvertement. Parlant a. Cambon, il a meme ajout£ qu'en cas d'une pression trop evidente l'Autriche se haterait de mettre l'Allemagne en presence d'un fait accompli. Le Secretaire d'Etat dit qu'il a fecu aujourd'hui un telegramme de Pourtales d'ou il constate que plus que les premiers jours Vousetes dispose a trouver un compromis acceptable pour tous. J'ai replique' que probablement Vous avez 6t6 des le commencement en faveur d'un compromis bien entendu a la condition qu'il soit acceptable non seulement pour l'Autriche, mais egalement pour bous. II m'a dit ensuite qu'il paraissait que nous avions commence a mobiliser sur la frontiere autrichienne et qu'il craignait que ceci rendrait plus difficile pour l'Autriche la possibility de s'entendre avec nous, d'autant plus que l'Autriche ne mobilisait que centre la Serbie et ne faisait pas de preparatifs sur notre frontiere. J'ai repondu que, d'apres les renseignements dont je disposais, l'Autriche mobilisait egalement sur notre frontiere et que par consequent nous devions prendre des mesures analogues. J'ai ajoute que les mesures que nous avons peut- etre prises de notre cote n'etaient nullement dirigees contre l'Allemagne. (Sign6) Bronewsky. A? 52. Le Charge d'affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Nich, le •«/„ Juillet 1914. (TCtegramme). Aujourd'hui. le Ministre de Bulgarie, au nom de son Gonverne- ment, a declare a Pachitch que la Bulgarie observerait la neutrality. (Sign6) Strandtman. - 39 - Ko 53. L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des AH'aires Etrangeres. Paris, le »/„ Juillet 1914. (TtWgramme). Al'occasion de Parrivee du President de la Republique Francaise le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres avait prepare tin court expose de la situation politique aetuelle, a. pen pres dans les termes suivants: L'Autriche, craignant la decomposition interieure. s'est emparee du pretexte de Passassinat de PArehiduc pour essayer d'obtenir des garauties qui pourrontrevetir la forme de Poccupation des communi- cations militaires serbes ou meme du territoire serbe. L'Allemagne soutient PAutriche. Le maintien de la paix depend de la seule Russie, parce qu'il s'agit d'une affaire qui doit etre «localisee» entre PAutriche et la Serbie. c'est a dire de la punition de la politique precedente de la Serbie et des garanties pour Pavenir. De ceci PAllemagne conclue qu'il faut exercer uue action moderatrice a Petersbourg. Ce sophisme a ete refute a Paris connne a Londres. A Paris, le Baron de Schoen a envaintached'entrainer la France a une action solidaire avec PAlle- magne sur la Russie en faveur du maintien de la paix. Les memes tentatives out ete faites a Londres. Dans les deux capitales il a ete repondu que Paction devrait etre exercee a Vienne, car les demandes exeessives de PAutriche, son refus de discuter les rares reserves de la Serbie, et la declaration de guerre menacent de provoquer la guerre generate. La France et PAngleterre ne peuvent exercer une action moderatrice sur la Russie laquelle jusqu'ici a fait preuve de la plus grande moderation, surtout en conseillant a la Serbie d'accepter ce qui etait possible de la note autrichienne. Aujourd'hui PAllemagne parait renoncer a Pidee d'une action sur la Russie seule et incline vers une action mediatrice a Petersbourg et a Vienne, mais en meme temps PAllemagne comme PAutriche tachent de faire trainer l'affaire. L'Allemagne s'oppose a la Conference sans indiquer aucune autre maniere d'agir pratique. L'Autriche mene des pourparl(;rs manifeste- ment dilatoires a. Petersbourg. En meme temps elle prend des mesures actives, et si ces mesures sont tolerees, ses pretentions augmenteront proportionellcment. II est tr^s desirable que la Russie prete tout — 40 — son appui au projet de mediation que presentera Sir E. Grey. Dans Ie cas contraire l'Autriche, sous prfitexte de ogarantie*, pourra, en fait, changer le statut territorial de l'Europe orientale. (Signe) Iswolsky. J6 54. L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Londres. le "/ S9 Juillet 1914. (TWgramme). Ai communique le contenu de Vos telegrammes du l5 /*8 Juillet a Grey. II a declare aujourd'hui a l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne que les pourparlers directs entre la Russie et l'Autriche avaient echoue. et que les correspondants des journaux mandaient de St.-Peters- bourg que la Russie mobilisait contre l'Autriche a la suite de la mobilisation de cette demiere. Grey dit qu'en principe le Gouver- nement Allemand s'est declare en faveur de la mediation, mais qu"il rencontre des dit'ficultes quant a la forme. Grey a insiste pour que le Gouvernement Allemand indiquat la forme laquelle a l'avis de l'Allemagne pourrait permettre aux 4 Puissances d'exercer leur media- tion pour Gviter la guerre; vu le consentement de la France, de l'ltalie et de l'Angleterrc la mediation pourrait avoir lieu seulement dans le cas ou l'Allemagne consentirait a se ranger du cote de la paix. (Signe) Benckendorff. .N? 55. L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etra ngeres. Paris, le I8 / M Juillet 1914. (TiUgramme). Viviani vient de me confirmer l'entiere resolution du Gouverne- ment Francois d'agir d'accord avec nous. Cette resolution est sou- - 41 - 6 tenne par les cercles les plus Gtendus et par les partis y conipris les radicaux-socialistes qui viennent de lui presenter ime declaration expritnant la eonfiance absolue et les dispositions patriotiques dugroupe. Des son arrivee a Paris, Viviani a telegraphic d'urgence h Londres que vu la cessation des pourparlers directs entre Petersbourg et Vienne il etait necessaire que le Cabinet de Londres renouvelat le plus tot possible sous telle ou autre forme sa propesition coucernant la me- diation des Puissances. Avant moi Viviani a recuaujourd'hui PAmbas- sadeur d'AUeniagne qui lui a renouvelS l'assurance des tendances pacifiques de l'Allemagne. Viviani ayant fait observer que si l'Alle- niagne desirait la paix elle devrait se hater d'adbirer a la proposition de mediation anglaise, le Baron Schoen a repondu que les mots confe- rence* ou «arbitr.age» effrayaient l'Autriche. Viviani a repliqu6 qu'il ne s'agissait pas de mots et qu'il serait facile de trouver une autre forme de mediation. D'apres l'avis du Baron de Schoen, pour le succes des negoeiations entre les Puissances il serait necessaire de savoir ce que l'Autriche compterait demander a la Serbie. Viviani a repondu que le Cabinet de Berlin pourrait bien facilement s'eu enquerir aupres de 1'Autricho, mais qu'en attendant la note responsive serbe pour- rait servir de base a la discussion; il a ajoute que la France desirait sineerement la paix. mais qu Vile etait en meiue temps r6solue d'agir en pleine harmonie avec ses allies et amis, et que lui, le Baron de Schoen, avait pu se convaincreque cette resolution rencontrait la plus vive approbation du pays. (Signed Iswolsky. JY» 56. Telegramme de son Altesse Koyale le Prince Alexandre de Serbie a sa Majeste l'L'mpereur. Profondement touche par le telegramme que Votre Majeste a bien voulu M'adresserhier, Je M'empresse de Laremercierde toutmon coeur. Je prie Votre Majeste d'etre persuade>que la cordialesympathie, dont Votre Majesty estanimee envers Mon pays, nous est particulie.- rement precieuse et remplit notre ame de l'espoir que l'avenir de la Serbie est assure^ 6tant devenu l'objet de la Haute sollicitude de _ 42 - Votre Majeste.— Ces moments penibles ne peuvent queraffermir les liens de l'attachement profond qui unissent la Serbie a la sainte Russie slave, et les sentiments de reconnaissance eternelle pour l'aide et la protection de Votre Majeste seront conserves pieusement dans I'ame de tous les serbes. (Sign6) Alexandre. J* 57. Le Charge d' Affaires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Et range res. Nich le ,e / i9 Juillet 1914. (T616gramme). J'ai communique a Pachitch le texte du telegrarame responsif de Sa Majeste. l'Empereur au Prince Alexandre. Pachitch apres l'avoir lu.sesigna et dit: «Seigneur! Le Tzar est grand et clement*! Ensuite il m'embrassa, ne pouvant contenir l'emotion qui l'avait gagne. L'heritier est attendu a Nich dans la.nuit. (Signe) Strandtman. JV?58. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres a l'Ambassadeur en France. St. Petersbourg le "•/*. Juillet 1914. (T61egramme). Aujourd'hui l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne m'a communique la resolution prise par son gouvernement de mobiliser, si la Russie ne cessait pas ses preparatifs militaires. Or, nous n'avons commence ces derniers qu'a. la suite de la mobilisation A laquelle avait deja procede l'Autriche et vu l'absence evidente chez cette demiere du desir d'accepter un mode quelconque d'une solution pacifique de son conflit avec la Serbie. - 43 - Puisque nous ne pouvons pas aecider au desir de l'Allemagne, il ne nous reste que d'accelerer nos propres armcments et de compter avec l'inevitabilite probable de la guerre. — Veuillez en avertir le Gouvenienient Francais et lui exprimer en nieine temps notre sincere reconnaissance pour la declaration que l'Ambassadeur de France m'a faite en son nom en disant que nous pouvons compter entie- rement sur l'appui de notre allie> la France. Dans les circonstances actuelles cette declaration nous est particulierement precieuse. Communique aux Ambassadeurs en Angleterre, Autriche-Hongrie, Italic. Allemagne. (Signe) Sazonovr. X? 59. Le Charge d'A 11 aires en Serbie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres. Nich, le »/„ Juillet 1914. (T41egramme). Le Prince-Regent a public hier un manifeste signe par tous les Ministres a l'occasion de la declaration de la guerre par l'Autriche a la Serbie. Le manifeste se termine pax les paroles suivantes: «De- fendez de toutes vos forces vos foyers et la Serbie». Lors de l'ouver- ture solennelle de la Scouptchina, le Regent lut en son non le discours du trone, au d6but duquel il indiqua que le lieu de la con- vocation demontrait l'importance des Svenernents actuels. Suit l'expose des faits des derniers jours — l'ultimatum autrichien, la reponse serbe, les efforts du gouvernement Royal de faire tout ce qui etait compatible avec la dignite le l'Etat pour 6viter la guerre et enfin l'agression armee du voisin plus puissant contre la Serbie. aux cotes de laquelle se tient le Montenegro. En passant a l'examen d» Pattitude des Puissances en presence du conflit, le Prince insista. tout d'abord sur les sentiments dont est anime> la Russie et sur la Toute Gracieuse Communication de sa Majeste l'Empereur disant que la Russie en aucun cas n'abandonnera la Serbie. A chaque mention du nom de Sa Majeste Imperial?- et de la Russie un «jivio> - 44 - formidable et febrile secouait la salle des seances. Les marques de sympathie de la part de la France et de l'Angleterre furent aussi relevees separement et provoquerent des «jivio» d'approbation de la part des deputes. Le discours du trone se termine pax la declaration d'ouverture de la Scouptchina et par 1 'expression du voeu que toutes les mesures soient prises pour faci liter la tache du Gouvernement. (Signe) Strandtuian ■N? 60. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ainbassadeurs en Alleniagne, en Autriche-Hongrie. en France, en Angleterre. et en Italie. St. Petersbourg, le n / 30 Juillet 1914. (T61<; gramme). L'Ambassadetir d'Allemagne qui vient de me quitter m'a de- mand? si nous ne pouvions pas nous contenter de la promesse que 1'Autriehe pourrait donner — de ne pas porter atteinte a l'intesrite du Royaume de Serbie — et indiquer a quelles conditions nous pourrions encore consentir a suspendre nos arniements; je lui ai dicte, pour etre transmise d'urgence a Berlin, la declaration snivante: «Si 1'Autriche, reconnaissant que la question austro-serbe a assume le earactere d'une question europeenne, se declare prete a eliminer de son ultimatum les points qui portent atteinte aux droits souverains de la Serbie, la Russie s'engage a cesser ses preparatifs militaires». Veuillez t61egraphier d'urgence quelle sera l'attitude du Gouver : nement Allemand en presence de cette nouvelle preuve de notre desir de faire le possible pour la solution pacifique de la question, car nous nc pouvons pas admettre que de seniblables pourparlers ne servent qua faire gagner du temps a l'AIlemagne et a I'Autriche pour leurs preparatifs militaires. (Signe) Sazonow. - 45 Jti 81. L'Ambassadeur en AUemague au Miuistre lies Affaires Etrangcres. Berlin, le 1T / 3 o Juillet 1914. (Ttlegramme). J'apprends que le d£cret de mobilisation de l'armGe et de la l'lotte" allemandes vient d'etre proinulgue. (Signe) SwerbGew. A? 62. L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Miuistre des Affaires Etrangeres. Berlin, le "/„ Juillet 1914. (TSlegramme). Le Miuistre des Affaires Etrangeres vient de me telephoner pour me communiquer que la nouvelle lancee tout a l'heure de la mobili- sation de 1'annee ct de la; flotte allemandes est fausse; que les feuillets des journaux etaient imprimes d'avance en prevision de toutes even- tualites, et mis en vente a l'heure de l'apres midi, mais que main- tenant ils sont confisquSs. (Signe) Swerbeew. J* 63. L'Ambassadeur en Alleinague au Miuistre des Affaires Etrangeres. Berlin, le "/ 3 , Juillet 1914. (TSlfgramme). Ai re$u Votre tSlegramme du 16 — 29 Juillet et ai transmis le texte de Votre proposition au Ministry des Affaires Etrangeres que je - 46 - viens de voir; il in'a dit qu'il avait recu un telegramme identiquc de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a St.-P6tersbourg et m'a declare ensuite qu'il tfouvait notre proposition inacceptable pour l'Autriche. (Sign6) Swerb£ew. X 64,- L'Anibassaricur en AiigleteiTC au Minis tie des Afl'aires Etrangeies. Londres, le 17/30 Juillet 1914. (Telegramme). Ai communique le contenu de Vos t£legrammes du 16 et 1? Juillet a Grey lequel considere la situation comme tres serieuse,mais desire tontinuer let; pourparlers. J'ai fait observer a Grey que depuis que Vous lui aviez fait la proposition d'accepter tout ce qu'il propose- rait en faveur du maintien de la paix, pourvu que rAutriche ne put proliter de ces atermoiemeuts pour ^eraser la Serbie, la situation dans laquelle Vous vous trouviez s'etait apparemment modifiee. A cette epoque nos rapports avec l'Allemagnen'etaicnt pas compromis. Apres la declaration de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a St.-P6tersbourg concernant la mubilisation allemande, ces rapports avaient change et sa demande avait recu de Votre part la seule reponse que pouvait donner une grande Puissance. Lorsque l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne 6tait rcvenu aupres de Vous et s'etait enquis de Vos conditions, Vous les aviez formulas dans des circonstances tout-a- fait speciales. J'ai en meme temps de nouveau insists aupres de Grey sur la necessite de prendre en consideration la- situation uouvelle cr£6e parlafaute de l'Allemagne a la suite de Taction de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne. Grey a repoudu qu'il le comprenait et qu'il tiendrait compte de ces arguments. (Sign£) Benckendorff. - 47 - M G5. L'Ambassadeur en Angleterre au Ministre des Affaires Etraugeres. Londres, le "/„ Juillet 1914. (T616gramrae). L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a demands k Grey pour quelle raison l'Angletcrre prenait des raesures railitaires sur terre et sur mer. Grey a rSpondu que ces mesures n'avaient pas un caractere agressif . mais que la situation 6tait telle que chaque Puissance devait se preparer. (Sign6) Benckendorff. JVv 66. L'Ambassadeur en Autriche-Hongrie au Ministre des Affaires Etrangercs. Vienne, le 18 /„ Juillet 1914. (T616gramme). Malgre" la mobilisation generate je continue a exchanger des vues avec le Comte Berchtold et ses collaborateurs Tous insistent sur l'absence chez l'Autriche d'intentions aggressives quelconques contre laRussieetdevis^esdeconqueteaTSgarddelaSerbie, mais tous insistent egalement sur la nteessite" pour l'Autriche de poursuivre jusqu'au bout Taction commenced et de donner a la Serbie une lepon seYieuse qui pourrait constituer une certaine garantie pour l'avenir. (Sign6) ScMbflco. — 48 M 67. Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres aux Ambassadeurs en Allemagne, Autriche-Hongrie, en France, en Angleterre ef en Italic. St. Petersburg, le '*/,, Juillet 1914. (T61egramme) Me r6fere k mon telegramme du 'Yio" Juillet. D'ordre de son gouvernement, l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre m'a transmis le desir du Cabinet de Londres d'introduire quelques modifications dans la for- mule que j'ai proposee hier k l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagae. J'ai re- pondu que j'aeceptais la proposition anglaise. Ci dessous je vous transmets la formule modified en consequence. «Si l'Autriche consent a arreter la marche de ses armees sur le territoire Serbe et si, reconnaissant que le conflit austro-serbe a assume^ le caraetere d'une question d'interet europeen, elle admet que les Grandes Puissances examinent la satisfaction que la Serbie poinrait accorder au gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie sans laisser porter atteinte k ses droits d'Etat souverain et a son independance,— la Russie s'engage a conserver son attitude expectante». (Sign6) Sazonow. M 68. L'Ambassadeur en Allemagne au Ministre des Alfaires Etrangeres. Berlin, le 18 / 31 Juliet 1914. (T616gramme). Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres vient de me dire que uos pourparlers, qui 6taient deja difficiles a la suite de la mobilisation contre l'Autriche, le deviennent encore davantage en presence des graves mesures militaires que nous prenonscontrel' Allemagne; des nouvelles y relatives sont, d'apres lui,re'cues ici de tous les cotes et devront prOvo- quer ine>itableinent des mesures analogues de la part de 1'Allemagne. — 49 — 1 A cela j'ai re.pondu que, d'apres des renseignements 8urs dont je disposals et qui ctaient confirmed par tous nos conipatriotcs arrivant a Berlin, la prise contra nous desmesuressusdite6se poursuivait e.gale- nient en Allemagne avecgrande activite. Malgrd cela, Ie Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres affirme qu'ici on n'a fait que rappeler les offi- ciers de leurs conges et les troupes des champs de manoeuvres. (Signe) Swerbeew. A» 69. Lo Ministre > se produit une veri- table mobilisation. (Signe) Iswolsky. m 74. L'Amnassadeur en Fiance au Ministre des Affaires Etrangferes. Paris, la 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914. (T616gramme). A la reception ir-i du t61£gramme de 1'Ambassadeur de France a St.-P£tersbourg contenant la communication que Vous a faitc I'Anibassadeur Alleniand cuncernant la resolution do 1'Allemagne de decreter aujourd'hui la mobilisation generale, le President dc la Republique a signe le d£cret de mobilisation. Dans les rues on precede a l'affichage des listes d'appel des reservistes. L'Amhassadeur d'Allcmagne vient de rendre visite a Viviani, mais ne lui a fait aucune nouvellc communication, en alleguant l'impossibilite de de.chiffrer les telegrammes qu'il a reeus. Viviani l'a informe de la signature du decret dc mobilisation en r6ponse a la mobilisation allemande et lui a fait part de son eionnement de ce que 1'Allemagne eut pris une telle mesure a un moment ou se poursuivait encore un exchange de vucs amical cntre la Russie, l'Autriche et les Puissances; il a ajoute - 52 - que la mobilisation ne prSjugeait pas nexessairement la guerre et que l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne pourrait rester a Paris comme l'Ambassadeur de Russie est reste" a Vienne et celui d'Autriche a St.-P6tersbourg. (SignS) Iswolsky. K? 75. L'Ambassadeur en France au Ministre des Affaires Etran seres. Paris, le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914. (T£16gramme). Jetiensdu President que pendant les dernieres journeys I'Ambas- sadeur d'Autriche a assur6 avec force le President du Conseil des Ministres et bii meme, que l'Autriche nous aurait declare" etre prete a respecter non seulement I'jnt6grit6 territoriale de la Serbie, mais aussi ses droits souverains, mais que nous aurions inten- tionnellement fait le silence sur cette declaration." J'ai oppose" un dementi catSgorique a cela.. (Sign6) Iswolsky. A'? 70. Note remise par l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne a S. -Peters- burg le 19 Juillet 1914 a 7 h. 10 du soir. Le Gouvernemont Imperial s'est efforee" des les debuts de lacrise de la mener a une solution pacifique. Se rendant a un dfcir qui lui en avait £t6 exprimS par Sa Majesty l'Empereur de. Russie, Sa Majcste l'Empereur d'Allemagne d'accord avee l'Angleterre s'fetait appliqu6 a accomplir un role m6diatuur aupres des Cabinets de Vienne et de St.-Petcrsbourg, lorsque la Russie, sans en attcndre le resultat, procSda a la mobili- sation de la totality de ses forces de terre et de mer. A la suite -de cette mesure menacante motiv^e par aucun presage militaire de la part de l'Allemagne l'Empire Allemand c'est trouv6 vis-a-vis d'un danger grave et imminent. Si le Gouverne- - 53 - ment Imperial out manque de parer a ce peril, il aurait compro- mis la security et Pexistencc meme de rAllemagne. Par conse- quent le Gouverneraent Allemand se vit force de s'adresser au Gouvernement de Sa Majeste l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies en insistant sur la cessation des dits actes inilitaires. La Russie ayant refuse de faire droit a (n'ayant pas cru devoir repondre a 1 ) cette demand? et ayant manifesto par ce refus (cette atti- tude 1 ) que son action etait dirigSe contre l'Allemagne, j'ai Thonneur, d'ordre de mon Gouverneraent, de faire savoir a Votre Excellence ce qui suit: Sa Majeste l'Empereur Mon Augtistc Souverain au nom de 1' Empire, relevant le defi se considere en etat de guerre avec la Russie. St.-Petersbourg, le 19 Juillet/1 Aout 1914. (Signe) F. Pourtales. jY« 77. Communique du Ministre des Affaires Etranceres concer- iiiint les eveuemeuts des deruiers jours. Le 20 Juillet/2 Aout 1914. Un exposfi defigurant les eveneraents des derniers jours ayant parti dans la presse etrangerc, le Ministcre des Affaires Etrangcres croit de son devoir de publier l'aperiju suivant des pourparlers diplomatiques pendant le temps susvise. Le 10/23 Juillet a. c. le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie a Belgrade presenta an Ministre President Serbe une note ou le Gouvernement Serbe etait accuse d'avoir favorise le mouve- ment panserbe qui avait abouti a l'assassinat de l'heritier du trone austro-hongrois. En consequence l'Autriche-Hongrie ') Les mots places entre pannthSses se trouvent dans l'original. II faut siippijser que deux variantes avaient et6 preparers d'avance et que par crreur clJes ont ete insertes tmtes les deux daus la note. — 54 — demandait au Gouvernement Serbe non seulement de condamncr sous unc forme solennelle la susdite propagande, mais aussi de prendre, sous le controle de l'Autriche-Hongrie, une serie de mesures tendant a la decouverte du coniplot, a la punition des sujets serbes y ayant participe et a la- prevention dans l'avcnir dc tout attentat sur le sol du Roayume. Un delai de 48 heures fut fix6 au Gouvernement Serbe pour la reponse a la susdite note. Le Gouvernement Imperial, auquel l'Ambassadeur d'Autriche- Hongrie a St.-Petersbourg avait communique le texte de la note 17 heures apres sa remise a Belgrade, ayant pris connais- sance des demandes y contenuos, dut s'apereevoir que quelques uncs parmi elles etaient inexecutables quant au fond, tandisque d'autres etaient presentees sous une forme incompatible avec la dignite d'un Etat independant. Trouvant inadmissibles la diminution de la (lignite de la Scrbie contenue dans ces deman- des, ainsi que la tendance de l'Autriche-Hongrie d'assurer sa preponderance dans lcs Balcans demontree par ces meraes exi- gences, le Gouvernement Russe fit observer dans la forme la plus amicale a 1'Autriche-Hongrie qu'il serait desirable de soumettre a un nouvel examen les points contenus dans la note austro-hongroise. Le Gouvernement Austro-Hongrois ne crut possible de consentir k une discussion de la note. L'action moderatrice des autres Puissances a Vienne ne fut non plus couronn£e de sueces. Malgre que la Serbie eut reprouve le crime et se fut mon- trde prete a donner satisfaction a l'Autriche dans une mesure qui depassa les provisions non seulement de la Russie, mais aussi des autres Puissances, le Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie a Belgrade jugea la reponse serbe insuffisante et quitta cette villc. Reeonnaissant le caractere exagere des demandes presentees par l'Autriche, la Russie avait declare encore auparavant qu'il lui serait impossible de rester indifferente, sans se refuser toutefois a employer tous ses efforts pour trouver une issue pacifique qui fut acceptable pour l'Autriche et menageat son amour-propre de grande puissance. En meme temps la Russie etablit fermement qu'elle admettait une solution pacifique de la question seulement dans une — !).') — mesure qui n'impliquerait pas la diminution do la dignit6 do la Serbie coinme Etat indepondant. Malliourousement tons les efforts d6ploy6s par If Gouvernoinent Imperial dans cette direction rosterent sans effot. Le Gouvornement Austro-Hongrois, apres s'etre derob6 atoutft intervention coneiliatrice des Puissances dans son uouflitavccla Serbie, proeeda a la mobilisation, dSelara oificielleinont la guerre k la Serbio, et le jour suivant Belgrade fut bombarded. Le manifesto qui a accoin- pagne la declaration do guorre accuse ouvortemont la Serbio d'avoir prepare et execute le crime do Seraiewo. Uno paroille accusation d'un crime do droit cotnmun laneee centre tout tin peuple et tout un 6 tat attira a. la Serbie par son inanite cvidonte les larges sympathies des oercles do la societe europeenne. A la suite de cette maniere d'agir du Gouvernempiit Austro- Hougrois. malgre la declaration de la Russie qu'elle ne pourrait roster indifterente au sort de la Serbie, le Gouvornement Imperial jugea necessaire d'ordonner la mobilisation des circumscriptions inilitiires de Kiow,d'Odessa,do Moseou ot do Kazan. One telle d6cision s'impo- sait parcoque dopuis la date do la remise de la note austro-hon- groiso au Gouvornement Serbo et les premieres demarches de la Russie cinq jours s'etaient ecoules, ot cependant le Cabinet d>' Vienne n'avait fait aucun pas pour aller au devant de nos efforts pacifiques; au contraire, la mobilisation de la inoitie" de Parmee austro-hongroiso avait ele decretee. Le Gouvornement Allemand fut mis au courant des mesures prises par la Russie; il lui fut en memo temps explique" qu'olles n'etaient que la consequence des armements autrichiens ot nullement dirigees contre rAllemagne. En memo temps, le Gouvornement Imperial deelara quo la Russie etait prete a continuer les pourparlers en vue d'une solution pacifique du conflit, soit par la voie de nego- ciations directes avec le Cabinet de Vienne.soit, en suivant la pro- position de la Grande Bretagne, par la voie d'une Conference des quatre GrandesPuissanrr.s non interesseesdtrectement, voire, l'Angle- terre, la Franco, 1'Allemagno et l'ltalie. Cependant cette tentative de la Russie eclioua egalomont. L'Au- triche-Hongri'' deelina un eehauge do vues ultericur avee nous, et le Cabinet do Vienne se doroba a la participation a la Conference dos Puissances projete>. - r,c - Neanmoins, la Russie ne discontinua pas ses efforts en faveur de la paix Repondant k la question de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, a quelles conditions nous consentirions encore asuspendrenosaxmements, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres declara que ces conditions seraient la reconnaissance par I'Aurriche-Hongrie que la question Austro-Serhe avaitrevetu le caraetere d'une question europeenne, et la declaration de cette meme Puissance qu'elle consentait a ne pas insister sur des demandes incompatibles avec les droits souverains de la Serbie. La proposition de la Russie flit jugee par l'Alleniagne inaccep- table pour 1 Autriche-Hongrie. Simultanement on recuta St.-Peters- bourg la nouvelle de la proclamation de la mobilisation generate par rAutriche-Hongrie. En meme temps les hostilites continuaient sur le territoirre Serbc et Belgrade fut bombardee de rechef. L'insucces de nos propositions pacifiques nous obligea d'elargir les mesures de precaution militaires. Le Cabinet de Berlin nous ayant adresse une question a cesujet, il lui fut repondu que la Russie etait forcee de commencer ses arme- meuts pour se premunir contre toutes eventualites. Tout en prenant cette mesure de precaution, la Russie n'en dV continpit pas moins de rechercher de toutes ses forces une issue de cette situation et declara etre prete a accepter tout moyen de solution du conflit qui comporte/ait l'observation des conditions posees par nous. Malgre cette communication conciliante, le Gouvemement Alle- mancl,le 18 /3iJuillet,adressaauGouvernement Russe la demanded avoir a suspendre ses mesures militaires a midi du 19 Juillet/1 Aout, en menacant, dans le cas contraire, de proceder a une mobilisation generale. Le lendemain, 19 Juillet/1 Aout, l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne transmit au Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, an nom de son Gouver- nement, la declaration de guerre. - 57 JV° 78. Le Miuistre des Affaires Etraugeres aux Kepresentaiits de S. M. l'Empereur a l'etraiiger. St.-Petersbourg, le 20 Juillet/2 Aout 1914. (TMegramine). II est absolument clair que l'Allemagne s'efforce des a present de rejeter sur nous la responsabilite" de la rupture. Notre mobilisation a ete provoquee par l'enornie responsabilite que nous aurions assumee, si nous n'avions pas pris toutes les mesures de precaution a un moment ou l'Autriche, se bornanta des pourparlers d'un caractere dilatoire, bombardait Belgrade et procedait a une mobilisation generale. Sa Majesty l'Empereur s'etait engage vis-a-vis de l'Empereur d'Allemagne par sa parole a n'entreprendre aucun acte agressif tant que dureraient les pourparlers avec l'Autriehe. Apres une telle garantie et apres toutes les preuves de l'amour de la Russie pour la paix, l'Alle- inagne ne pouvait ni avait le droit de douter de notre declaration que nous accepterions avec joie toute issue pacifique compatible avec la diguite et l'independance de la Serbie. Une. autre issue, tout en etant eompletement incompatible avec notre propre dignite, aurait certainemont efaranle l'equilibre Europeen, enassurant l'h^geraonie de l'Allemagne. Ce caractere Europeen, voire mondial, du conflit est infi- niment plus important que le pretexte qui l'a cree. Par sa decision de nous declarer la guerre a un moment ou se poursuivaient les nego- ciations entre les Puissances, rAUemagne a assume une lourde responsabilite. (Signe) Sazonow. M79. Note remise par I'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie a St.-Petersbourg au Miuistre des Affaires Etraiigeres le 24 Jiiillet a 6 h, du soir. D'ordre de son Gouvernem^nt le soussigne Ambassadeur d'Au- triche-Hongrie a l'honneur de notifier a Son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres de Russie ce qui suit: - 58 — «Vu l'attitude menacante prise par la Russie dans le conflict entre la Monarchic Austro-Hongroise et la Serbie ct en presence du fait qu'en suite de ce conflict la Russie d'apres une communication du Cabinet de Berlin a cru devoir ouvrir les hostility contre l'Allemagne et que celle-ci se trouve par consequent en Stat de guerre avec la dite Puissance, l'Autriche-Hongrie se considere egaleraent en £tat de guerre avec la Russie a partir du present moment. (Sign6) Szapary. St.-Petersbourg. 6 Aout/24 Juillet 1914. 59 — PAGES D'HISTOIRE - 1914 2* Serie Les Pourparlers Diplomatiques 16/29 JOIN — 3/16 AOUT IV LE LIVRE BLEU SERBE NEGOCIATIONS AYANT PRECEDE LA GUERRE L1BRAIR1E MlLlTAIRE BERGER-LEVRAULT PARIS NANCY 5-7, RUE DES BEAOX ARTS t8, RUE PES CLACIS 2H Prix : 60 cen/iines Les Pourparlers • t m • Correspondance diplomatique du Gouvernement serbe 11 a ete tire de ce volume cinqnante-cinq exem- plaires numerotes a lapresse, dont : 5 sur papier clu Japon (N os I a 5) ; 5o sur papier de Hollancle (N oi 6 a 55). Diplomatiques Correspondance diplomatique du Gouvernement serbe N° 1 M. Jov. M. Jovanovitch, ministre a Vienne, a M. N. Paclritch, president du Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres. (Telegramme.) Vienne, le 16/29 juin 191-1. Les journaux de Vienne affirment que l'ins- truction judiciaire, ouverte centre les auteurs de l'attentat, a etabli que le crime avait ete prepare a Belgrade, que tout un com plot sur une base plus large avait etc organise a Belgrade parmi la jeu- nesse inspiree par l'idee panserbe, et que les journaux de Belgrade alarment le public par leurs peintures de la gravite de la situation en Bosnie. Ceci, d'apres eux, exerce une influence 4 PAGES D'HISTOIRE considerable, vu quecesjournaux sont introduits en Bosnie, en cachette, en grand nombre. N° 2 M. Jov. M. Jooanovitch, ministre a Vienne,' a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrangeres. (TYlegramme.) Vienne, le 17/30 juin 1914. La tendance est de plus en plus 6vidente a Vienne de donner a l'Europe l'impression que l'attentat commis contre l'archiduc - heritier d'Autriche-Hongrie est le resultat d'un complot prepare en Serbie. On a l'intention de s'en ser- vir comrue d'un moyen politique conlre nous. AussiVa.ut-il surveiller avec la plus grande atten- tion le langage de nos journaux sur l'e>enement de Serajevo. N° 3 M. le D' M. Jovanovitch, charge d'affaires a Ber- lin, a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrangeres. (Telegramme.) Berlin, le 11/30 juin 191-1. Les journaux de Berlin publient, d'apres les informations de Vienne et de Budapest, les ar- LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 5 tides oil l'attentat de Serajevo est rattacbe a la Serbie : on induit ainsi en erreur l'opinion pu- blique alleroande. M. le D T M. Jovanovitch, charge d'affaires a Berlin, a 31. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrang'eres. (TClegramme.) Berlin, le 17/30 juin 1914. L'bostilite de l'opinion publique en Allemagne envers nous dure toujours, entretenue jjar des nouvelles mensongeres, envoyees de Yienne et de Budapest, que presque tous les journaux alle- mands, malgre nos dementis, repandcnt avec zele par l'interinediaire de certains journaux. et agences. N" 5 M. Jov. M. Jovanovitch, ministre a Vienne, a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrangeres. Vienne, le 17/30 juin 1914. Monsieur le President, Couime le comte Bercbtold n'a pu me rece- voir, j'ai eu, sur l'attentat de Serajevo, un entre- 6 PAGES D'HISTOIRE tien avcc le premier chef de section du niinis- lere des Affaires ctrangeres. Au cours de notre conversation, je lui ai diten resume ceci : << Le Gouverncment Royal reprouve de la maniere la plus cnergique l'attentat de Serajevo et de son cote fera, certainement et le plus loya- lement, tout pour prouver que sur son territoire il nc souffrira aucune agitation ou entreprisc passible d'une peine et pouvant nuire a nos relations deja si dedicates avec l'Autriche-IIon- grie. Jcpense que le Gouvernement de Belgrade estpret a mettre en jugement les complices, s'il est prouve qu'il y en ait en Serbie, en depit de tous les obstacles qu'y a apportes la diplomatic austro-hongroise (creation d'une Albanie inde- pendante, opposition a une sortie libre du Royaume serbe sur l'Adriatique, demande de revision du traite de Bucarest, ultimatum du mois de septembre, etc.), lc Gouvernement serbe a persiste dans son desir de retablir sur des bases solides nos relations de voisinage. Vous savcz que dans cette voie quelque chose a ete fait et obtenu. La Serbie veut iioursuivre cet ell'ort, convaincue qu'il peut et doit etre con- tinue. L'attentat de Serajevo ne doit pas et ne peut pas entraver cette tache. » Le baron Macchio a pris note en se chargeant de communiquer au comte Berchtold tout ce que jc lui ai dit. Lc meme jour, j'ai communique le fond de mon enlrctien aux ambassadeurs de France et de Russie. Veuillez, etc. LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 7 N° 6 M. M. Georgecitch, charge d'affaires a Cons- tantinople, a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires e'trangeres. Constantinople, le 17/30 juin 1914. Monsieur le President, J'ai eu aujourd'bui, a propos de l'attentat de Serajevo, une assez longue conversation avec l'ambassadeur d'Autricbe-Hongrie. J'ai exprime l'espoir que ce triste evenement, quoi qu'on en dise dans certains cercles diplomatiques, ne nui- rait pas aux relations entrc la Serbie et l'Au- tricbe-Hongrie, considerablement ameliorees dans ces derniers temps. II ma repondu qu'il ne faut pas meine avoir de crainte a ce sujet. II trouve, lui aussi, que les rapports entre la Serbie et l'Autricke-Hongrie sont devenus bien meilleurs ces derniers temps. II a ajoute cpi'il faut continuer dans cette voie. II m'a dit que ses derniers entrctiens avec le comte Bercbtold l'avaient convaincu que celui-ci etait content de l'attitudc du Gouvernement serbe et que, pour sa part, il desire sincerement les rela- tions amicales avec la Serbie. Veuillez, etc. N° 7 M. M. S. Bochkovitch, ministre a Londres, a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires e"trangeres. (Telogramme.) Londres, le 18 juin/l" juillet 191-1. Presque tous les journaux anglais annoncent, 8 PAGES D'HISTOIRE d'apres Ics sources autriehiennes, que l'attentat de Serajevo est l'oeuvre des revolutionnaires serbes. N° 8 M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil, ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a toules les Legations Royales. Belgrade, le 18 juin/1" juillet 1M4. La presse austro-hongroise accuse de plus en plus la Serbie de l'attentat de Serajevo. Le but est evident: ruiner le grand credit moral dont la Serbie jouit aujourd'hui en Europe et exploiter politiquemcnt coutre la Serbie la folic entreprise d'un jeune fanatique exalte. Cependant l'attentat de Serajevo a rencontre en Serbie la reprobation la plus severe dans toutes les classes sociales; dans les cercles officiels ct non officiels, tous ont immediatement compris que cet evenement aurait la repercussion la plus defavorable sur nos relations de bon voisinage et sur la vie des Serbes d'Autrichc-Hougrie, ce que les derniers evenements ont confirme. Au moment ou la Ser- bie fait tout pour que les relations avec la Mo- narchic voisine deviennent meilleures et de plus en plus amicales, il scrait absurde de penser qu'elle aurait pu, soit directement soit indirecte- ment, inspircr de pareils actes. Tout au contraire, il etait dans l'interet vital de la Serbie elle-meme que ce crime fut evite. Par malbeur, cela n'etait LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 9 pas en son pouvoir, les deux auteurs de l'attentat etant sujets autrichiens. La Serbie a toujours veille, et depuis les derniers evenements elle re- doublera de vigilance, sur les elements anar- chistes; si elle en decouvre en Serbie, elle pren- dra contre eux, avec energie, les inesures les plus severes. De-plus, elle fera tout son devoir, et par tous les moyens en son pouvoir, pour cal- mer, a l'interieur de ses frontieres, les esprits exaltes. Seulement, elle ne peut nullement per- mettre que la presse austro-bongroise induise en erreur l'opinion publique en Europe et que, dans un but purement politique, elle fasse re- tomber la lourde responsabilite du crime d'un sujet autricbien sur la Serbie et tout le peuple serbe, auxquels de pareils actes ne peuvent cau- ser que des dommages sans leur apporter aucun profit. Je vous prie d'agir, en cet esprit, par tous les moyens propices, pour mcttre fin le plus tot pos- sible a la campagne antiserbe devant l'opinion publique europeenne. N° 9 M. Joe. M. Jovanovitch, ministre a Vienne, a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres. (TeK-gramme.) Vienne, le IS juin/1" juillet 1014. Des de'monstrations ont eu lieu bier soir devant la Legation. Je peux dire que la police s'est mon- 10 PAGES D'HISTOIRE tr£e energique. L'ordre et la tranquillity ont 616 inaintenus. Si j'apprenais que le drapeau national ait 616 brule, je ferais une d-marche aupres de qui de droit et vous informcrais du resultat. Ge sont surtout les cerclcs catholiques inferieurs, la presse et les cercles militaires qui prfichent la haine contre les Serbes etla Serbie. Je vous prie de faire le necessaire pour que les demonstrations soient evitees chez nous et pour que le ton de la presse de Belgrade soit mesure' autant que pos- sible. Les dispositions coulre nous restent ici les monies. On croit que l'attitude a prendre, vis-a-vis de la Serbie et des Serbes, sera decidee apres les funerailles de l'Archiduc. N° 10 M . le D T M. R. Vesnitch, ministre a Paris, a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires ctrangeres . (Telegramme.) Paris, le 19 juin/2 juillet 1914. Le Gouvernement frangais nous conseille d'ob- server le plus grand sang-froid et le recueille- meut aussi bien dans nos cercles officiels que dans l'opinion publiquc. LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 11 N° 11 M. Joe. M. Joeanovitch, ministre a Vienne, a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires etrangires. Vienne, le 20 juin/3 juillet 1914. Monsieur le President, Hier, jour du transfert des depouilles mor- telles de l'archiduc Francois-Ferdinand et de sa femmc, de Sarajevo, j'ai fait hisser et mettre en berne, a mon domicile, Ic drapeau national. Cet evencment a donne lieu hier soir aux pro- testations du concierge, des locataires, du gerant et du proprietaire meme de l'immeuble, qui exi- gerent qu'on enlevAt le drapeau. Les explications n'ayant servi a rien, on a requis le concours de la police qui a demande, non officiellement, l'en- levement du drapeau pour eviter les desordres. Le drapeau a ete maintenu , et ce fait a provoque hier soir des demonstrations vehementes devant la Legation. La police fut energique et aucune atteinte ne fut portee ni au batiment, ni au dra- peau. Vers 2 heures du matin, les manifes- tants furent repousses de mon domicile. Les jour- naux d'aujourd'hui, surtout ceux de la nuance clerico-populaire, ont publie des articles sous le titre : « Les provocations du ministre de Ser- bie » en representant d'une facon infidele toute ectte affaii-e. Le drapeau est reste hisse sur l'immeuble de la Legation jusqu'a la fin de la messe funebre celebree, dans l'eglise de la Cour, pour les de- funts, puis il a ete retire. 12 PAGES D'HISTOIRE lous les habitants tin quartier que j'habite sout alles a la police, a l'Hotel de Ville, a la pre- sidence du Conseil des miuistres, pour reclamer l'enlevcment de notre drapeau. Les manifestauts furent harangues par le doc- teur Funder, le directcur principal du journal catholique Reichspost, Hermengild Wagner et Leopold Mandl, qui sont connus comme les prin- cipaux instigateurs de la campagne dirigee ilans la presse autrichienne et allemande centre la Serbie ct les Serbes. Veuillez, etc. N» 12 M. Jov. M. Jovanovitch, ministre a Vienna, a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres. Vienno, le 20 juin/3 juillet 1914. Monsieur le President, Dans la conversation que j'ai eue a propos de l'attentat de Serajevo avec le premier chef de section au ministere des Affaires etrangeres, le baron Macchio a attaque tres vivement la presse de Belgrade. 11 a cite des exemplcs atin de prou- ver qu'elle etait elTrene'e et qu'elle faisait die lleizercien gegen die Monarchic (des excitations contre la Monarchic). Je lui ai dit que la presse etait cliez nous completeinent libre et que les particuliers et le Gouvcrnement en souffrent sou- vent, mais que nous n'avions d'autres moyens contre elle que le recours aux tribunaux. J'ai ajoute que, dans le cas present, la presse autri- LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 13 chienne et hougroise, que le Gouvernenient com- mun tenait entre ses mains, avait commence : n'est-ce pas la presse autrithicnne et hongroise qui, depuis presque deux ans, administre des coups aux Serbes et a la Serbie, en touchant les points les plus sensibles? Ces jours-ci, il y avait juste un an depuis la malhcureuse guerre avec les Bulgares. J'ai ete temoin du manque de res- pect avec lequel la presse de Viennc avait traite la Serbie et son armee pendant et apres la cam- pagne, puis dans beaucoup d'autres questions. La presse de Belgrade a ete beaucoup plus modere'e. Aujourd'hui aussi, apres cet horrible crime, c'est d'ici qu'on envoie dans le monde des telegrammes accusant tout le peuple serbe et la Serbie comme s'ils avaient ete meles a l'odieux attentat de Serajevo. Tous les journaux de la Monarchie e"crivent en ce sens. Peut-on rester indifferent devant tout cela?Si l'auteur de l'at- tentat est de race serbe, tout le peuple serbe et le royaume de Serbie n'en sont pas coupables, et on ne peut pas les en accuser comme on le fait a present Le baron Macchio m'a repondu : — Personne n'accuse le Royaume, ni le Gou- vernement serbe, ni tout le peuple serbe. Nous accusons seulement ceux qui entretiennent les projets panserbes et qui travaillent a leur reali- sation... — II m'a paru des le premier moment, lui repondis-je, qu'on insistait sur la race de l'auteur pour le rattacher a Belgrade et provoquer l'im- pression que le crime avait ete prepare en Ser- bie. Ceci m'a frappe de suite, car je savais que jusqu'a present on appelait les Serbes en Bosnie 14 PAGES D'HISTOIRE die Bosniaken (les Bosniaques), et que Ton disait bosnische Sprache (la languc bosniaque), die Orlhodoxen aim Bosnien (les orthcdoxes de Bos- nie); maintenant on dit que l'auteur de l'attentat est ein Serbe (un Serbe), mais sans ajouter qu'il etait de Bosnie et sujet autricbien... — Jo vous repete, reprit le baron Macehio, que nous n'accusons ni le Gcuvernemcnt serbe, ni le peuple serbe, mais certains agilateurs... Je f'ai prie d'agir sur la presse de Viennc, afin qu"en ecs heures di'Ticiies oil Ton met a serieuse epreuve les relations enire la Serbie et l'Au- triehe-Hongrie, clle n'aggrave pas eette crise par de telles accusations. Veuillez, etc. N" 13 31. le D' M. R. Vesnitch, minis tre a Paris, a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et rni- nistre des Affaires etrangeres. Pans, le 21 juin/4 juillet 1914. Monsieur le President, J'ai eu, mercredi, a propos de l'attentat de Sera- jevo, un assez long entretien avec le nouveau ministre des Affaires etrangeres, M. Viviani, que cet evenement a rendu passablement inquiet. J'ai profite de cette occasion pour lui exposer a grands traits les causes qui ont provoque cet attentat, a savoir, en jiremier lieu, lintolerable systeme de gouvernenient dans les provinces annexees, surtout l'attitude des organes officiels LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 15 et toute la politique du Gouvernement bosniaque vis-a-vis de tout ce qui toucbe a la religion ortho- doxe. II a compris la situation; cependant il a exprime le desir ct l'espoir que le sang-froid et la dignite seront gardes chez nous, afin de ne j)as donner des motifs pour de nouvelles accusa- tions de Viennc. Apres la premiere emotion, 1'opinion publique francaise s'est ressaisie a tel point que le presi- dent du Conseil lui-meme a juge convenable d'adoueir au Palais-Bourbon les termes de la declaration qu'ii propos de cet evenement, il avait faite anterieurement au Senat. Veuillez, etc. N° 14 M. leD'' M. Spalaikovitch, ministre a Petrograd, a M^ N. Pachitch, president du Conseil, mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres. (Tetegramme.) Petrograd, le 21 juin/4 juillet 1914. Le ministre des Affaires etrangeres m'a dit que les cruautes commises sur les Serbes en Bosnie accroitront les sympathies de l'Europe pour nous. II croit que le monde ne pretera pas foi aux accu- sations lancets de Vienne contre nous. II est essentiel que l'opinion publique en Serbie reste calme. 16 PACES D'HISTOIRE N» 15 M. Joe. Jovanovitch, ministre a Vienne, a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires elrangeres. (Telegrammc.) Vienne, le 23 juin/6 juillct 1911. L'emotion dans les cercles militaires et gouvcr- nementaux contre la Serbie augmente sans cesse, par suite des articles de nos journaux que la Lega- tion austro-hongroise a Belgrade exploite avec zele. N° 16 M. Joe. Jovanovitch, ministre d Vienne, a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil, mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres. Vienne, le 23 juin/6 juillet 1914. Monsieur le President, La tendance geuerale des journaux de Vienne au sujet de l'attentat est la suivante : Des le dimanche i5 juin, dans l'apres-midi, les editions speciales des journaux annoncaient en gros caracteres que les deux auteurs de l'at- tentat etaieut des Serbes, de facon a faire croire qu'il s'agissait de Serbes de Serbie. Dans les comptes rendus publics plus tard, on remarque la tendance constante d'etablir un lien entre cet evenemeut et la Serbie, en insistant particuliere- LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 17 merit sur deux circonslanccs qui scmblaient prou- ver que les origines de l'attentat devraient etre reeherchecs a Belgrade : i° le sejour dc deux au- teurs de l'attentat a Belgrade et i" l'origine des bombes. Coinine troisieme ct demiere de leurs preuves, les journaux d'ici ont commence a pu- blier les dires des auteurs de l'attentat a l'ins- truction. II est caracteristique que ces « dires » n 'ont dte connus que par le Bureau hongrois de correspondance et les journaux magyars, surtout le journal Az Est. Ces dires se resument a ceci : i" qu'il est prouve que les auteurs de l'attentat avaient frequents a Belgrade le comitadji Michel Ciganovitcb et 2 que l'organisateur et l'instiga- teur de l'attentat avait ete le commandant Pri- bitchevitch. En meme temps, une nouvelle tendance de faire retombcr la responsabilite sur l'association « Na- rodna Odbrana » (la Defense nationale) com- mencait a se faire jour, de sorte que le dernier communique du Bureau hongrois de correspon- dance aux journaux, vendredi dernier, a ete concu dans ces termes : « L' instruction poursuivie jusqu'ici a demon- tre, d'une facon qui exclut le moindre doute, que eet attentat etait le rtSsultat d'un complot. En dehors de deux auteurs de l'attentat, on a arrete un certain nombre de personnes, pour la plupart des jeunes gens; d'apres ce qui est demontre, ils avaient ete, comme les auteurs de l'attentat, en- gages par la>« Narodna Odbrana » de Belgrade pour commettre le ciime et e'etait a Belgrade qu'on leur avait remis les bombes et les revol- vei*s. » Le nieme jour, tard dans la nuit, le meme Bu- 2 18 PAGES D'HISTOIRE reau avait adresse aux journaux la demande sui- vante : « Nous prions l'bonorable redaction de ne pas publier la ntmvelle au sujet de l'attentat de Serajevo, inseree dans notre edition de Ge soir. » En menie temps, le Bureau de correspondance de Viennc a publie le communique suivant : « On affirme en lieu competent que l'instruc- tion au sujet de l'attentat se poursuit dans le plus grand secret. Tous les details publies la- dessus doivent etre acceptes sous reserves. » Neanmoins, on ne cessait pas de publier a Budapest les pretendus comptes rendu* de l'ins- truction. Dans le dernier comjjte rendu publie par le journal A Nap et reproduit par les jour- naux viennois d'hier, la tendance a faire retom- ber la responsabilite de l'attentat sur la « Na- rodna Odbrana » est encore plus accentuee : on pretend que l'accuse Cabrinovilch aurait designe le general Jankovitch comme le principal insti- gateur. Veuillez, etc. N° 17 M. Jov. M. Jovanovitch, ministre a Vienne, a M. N. Pachitch, president da Conseil et mi- nistre (les Affaires itrangeres. Vienne, le 24 jum/7 juillet 1914. Monsieur le President, L'emotion produite par l'attentat de Serajevo LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 19 subsiste toujours dans les ccrclcs competenls. Bien que l'Empereur ait adresse aux presidents des Conseils autrichien et hongrois et au ministre coramua des Finances, M. Bilinski, une lettre qui invite au calrae, on ne pout tout de memo pas preciser quelle attitude le Gouvernenicnt commun prendra a notrc egard. Pour cux, une chose est claire : avcc ou sans preuve que l'at- tcntat ait ete inspire a Belgrade, ils doivent re- gies une fois pour toutes la question des soi- disant agitations panserbes dans les limites de la Monarchic des Habsbourg. II n'est pas encore decide de quelle facon ils procederont et quels moyens ils emploieront pour atteindre leur but; on en delibere, surtout dans les hautcs spheres catholiqucs et militaires. La decision ne sera prise certainement qu'apres qu'on aura appris cc que les juges d'inslruction auront trouve a Scrajevo. C'est d'apres ce qu'on aura trouve que la decision sera prise. A cet egard, l'Aulriche-Hongrie aura a ehoisir cntre deux solutions : ou considerer le crime de Serajevo conime uu raalhcur national, raais au^. i comme un acte criminel qui doit etre juge sui- vant les preuves etablies, en demandant a la Serbie de lui preter aide dans cette tache, afin que les coupables ne puissent pas se soustraire a la condamnation la plus severe; ou faire dc l'at- tentat de Serajevo un complot pauserbe, jougo- slave, panslavc, avec toutes les manifestations de la haine envers le monde slave, haine jusqu'ici dissiuiulee. II y a plusieurs signes qu'on pousse les cercles competents vers cette seconde solution, et c'est pour cela qu'il faut etre pret pour la de- fense. Au cas oil la premiere solution serait 20 PAGES D'HISTOIRE adoptee, ce qui serait un signe de grande sagesse r il nous faudrait nous y rallier completement. Veuillez, etc. N° 18 M. A r . Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires ,etrangeres, a toutes les Legations royales. (Telegramme.) Belgrade, le 26 juin/9 juillet 1914. Presque tous les jours, le Prinee-heritier recoit d'Autriche - Hongrie des lettres de menace de mort. Mettez au courant de ce fait dans vos con- versations vos collegues et les journalistes. N° 19 M. le D' M. Jovanovitch, charge d'affaires a Berlin, a M. N. Pachitch, president da Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrangeres. (Telegramme.) Berlin, le 1"/16 juillet 1914. Le secretaire d'Etat a declare qu'il ne compre- nait pas l'attitude provocante de la presse serbe et ses attaques contre 1'Autriche-Hongrie, que celle-ci, comme grande puissance, ne peut sup- porter. LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 21 N° 20 M. N. Pachitch , president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a toutes les Legations royales. (Telegramme.) Belgrade, le I«/14 juillet 1914. i* Le Correspondenz Bureau imperial et royal alarnie l'opinion europeenne dans un but spe- cial. II ne represente pas l'attitude de la press* de Belgrade d'une fa von exacte et vraie. II choi- sit a dessein les expressions les plus fortes dans les articles des journaux qui publient des res- ponses aux injures, aux menaces et aux men- songes tendancieux, et les sert au public en Au- triche-Hongrie ; 2° Le Correspondenz Bureau cite surtout les extraits des journaux, qui ne sont les organes ni des partis, ni des corporations; 3° L'Autriclie-Hongrie a interdit, depuis l'an- nexion bosniaque, l'importation sur son terri- toirc des organes de nos partis ainsi que de tous les autres journaux paraissant en Serbie, de sorte que ceux-ci ne pourraient jias exciter l'opi- nion publique en Autriche-Hongrie et en Europe, si le Correspondenz Bureau ne faisait pas ressor- tir et repandre les nouvelles dont il fait choix dans les diflerents journaux en aggravant leur contcnu. II y a six jours, VOd/ek, organe du parti radical independant, a ete fraj>pe d'inter- diction ; maintenant aucun journal serbe ne peut passer en Autriche-Hongrie ; 4° La presse est completement librechez nous; 22 PAGES D'HISTOIRE les journaux ne peuvent fitre confisqucs que pour le crime de lese-majeste ou bien au cas d'une excitation a la revolution. Iln'existe aucune cen- sure preventive. En cetetat de choses, expliquez a qui de droit, rien qu'a titre de renseignement, que nous ne possedons aucun moyen constitutionncl ou legal de changer la maniere d'ecrire de nos journaux. Cependant si Ton compare la maniere d'ecrire des journaux serbes avec celle des journaux d'Au- triche-IIongrie, on voit clairement que ce sont ces derniers quicommencent la polemique et que nos journaux nc font que riposter. Insistez de meme sur le fait que 1'opinion publique cfoez nous est relativement calme et que, de notre cote, persoune ne desire provoquer ou blesser l'Autriche-Hongrie. De ce que nos journaux pu- blient, personne en Europe n'en saurait rien, si le Correspondenz Bureau dc Vienne ne le re- pandaitdans le seul bat de nuire a la Serbie. N° 21 M. N. Pachitch, president da Conseil et minis- tre des Affaires etrang'eres, a toutes les Lega- tions royales. (T616gramme.) Belgrade, le 1-/14 juillet 1914. Les journaux austro-bongrois ont rcpanduces derniers jours le bruit que des demonstrations contre la legation d'Autricbe-Hongrie auraient LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUE S 23 lieu a Belgrade, que certains correspondants des journaux austro-hongrois auraientete assassines, que les sujets austro-hongrois sont maltraites et qu'ils sont pris de panique, que les etudiants serbes ont manifesto eontre le ministre d'Autri- che-Hongrie lors des funerailles de feu Hariwig, ministre de Russie, etc.-.. Toutes ces nouvelles sont absolument fausses et inventees. La tran- quillite absolue regne a Belgrade; aucune de- monstration n'a eu lieu celte annee; personne n'a eu l'intention de provoquer des desordres. Ce n'est pas seulement le ministre d'Autriche- Hongrie et ses fonctionnaires qui se promenent librement en ville ; mais encore aucune injure, soit par des actes soit par des paroles, n'a ete faite a aucun sujet austro-hongrois, comme les journaux de Vienne le pretendent, de meme qu'aueuu n'a vu sa maison attaquee ni ses fenetres brisees ; aucun sujet austro-hongrois n'a eu des motifs pour cxprimer la moindre plainte. Toutes ces fausses nouvelles ne sont re- pandues que dans le but d'emouvoir et d'aigrir l'opinion publique en Autriche-Hongrie eontre la Serbie. Toute la population de Belgrade a pris part aux obseques de M. Hartwig, tout le corps diplo- matique y assistait, et aucune manifestation eon- tre qui que ce soit n'a ete signalee. Toute la cere- monie s'est passee dans un ordre exemplaire, de sorte que les etrangers en furent surpris. Je vous prie de porter ces renseignements a la connais- sance du Gouvernement et de la presse. 24 PAGES d'iiistoire N° 22 M. Joi>. M, Jovanovitch, ministre a Vienne, a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires etrang'eres. Vienne, le 1°'/14 juillet 1914. Monsieur le President, C'est le Bureau de la presse du ministere des Affaires etrangeres qui, cette fois encore, a dirige l'opinion publique contre nous. Sauf la Zeit et YArbeiter Zeitung, tous les journauxauslro-hon- grois ont etc renseignes et diriges par lui pour leurs articles sur l'attentat de Serajevo. Vous avez vu quels furent ces renseignemenls et le ton de leurs articles. Je tiens d'une source sQrc que les cercles offi- ciels alleraands d'icisont les plus hostiles contre nous. Ces cercles ont exerctS une certaino in- fluence sur la facon d'ecrire des journaux de Vienne, particulierement sur celle de la Nou- i'elle Presse Libre. Ce journal esttoujours anime d'un esprit anti- serbe a outrance. La Nouvelle Presse Libre qui a assez de lecteurs et d'amis dans les hauls cer- cles financiers et qui, lorsqu'il le faut, ecrit sui- A r ant les instructions du Bureau de la presse de Vienne, resume 1'afFaire en quelques mots : « Nous devons regler nos affaires avec la Serbie par la force des armes ; il est evident qu'il n'est pas possible d'y arriver par des moyens pacifi- ques. Et puisqu'on arrivera a la gueri'eplus tard, il vaut mieux en finir tout de suite! » LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 25 La Bourse est tres mauvaise. Une pareille baisse n'a pas eu lieu depuislongtemps. Certains papiers ont baisse de 4^ couronncs. Veuillez, etc. N° 23 M. Joe. M. Jocanocitch, ministre a Vienne, a M. N. Pachitch, president da Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrangeres. Viennei le 2/15 juillet 1914. Monsieur le President, La chose qui doit le plus nous interesser, c'est le geste que le Gouvemement austro-hongrois a l'intention de faire a propos de l'attentat de Sera- jevo. Jusqu'a present, je n'ai pas pu me rensei- gner a ce sujet; mes collegues non plus. La devise est ici maintenant : « Ne rien communiquer a pcrsonne. » Une reunion des ministres communs a eu lieu la semaine demiere a Vienne. On n'a pas appris beaucoup de choses sur les deliberations et les resultats de ce conseil. Le communique en fut court et peu clair. 11 semble qu'on y a discute longuement sur les consequences de l'attentat de Serajevo, mais qu'aucune decision n'a ete prise. On n'est pa's sur que le chef d'elat-major gene- ral et le chef de la marine aient assiste a cette seance, comme on l'avait dit. Api'es cette seance, le comte Berchtold est alle a Ischl pour en rendre compte & 1'Empereur qui y etait reparti 26 PAGES d'histoire apres les funerailles de Francois-Ferdinand, dans un etat de sante et d'esprit parfait. Au Parle- meut de Hongrie, Tisza a repondu aux interpel- lations de l'opposition sur l'evenement de Sera- jevo ; vous savez ce qu'il a dit. Son discours n'etait pas clair; je pense qu'il n'etait pas elair a dessein. D'aucuns y ont vu un ton rassurant pour le developpement des choses et pour l'atti- tude du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, et d'au- cuns, les intentions dissimulees pour — dirai-je — une action encore non decidee. On s'est apercu qu'il ne £allait point s'aventurer avant de con- naitre les re'sultats de l'instruction. Apres cela, un certain temps se passa; on parla, on discuta, on ecrivit, on inventa, jiuis survinrenlla mort de Hartwig et l'alarme du baron Giesl. A ce propos, de nouvelles interpellations I'urent adressees au comte Tisza au Parlement hongrois; vous avez lu sa seconde reponse egalement. Plusicurs per- sonnes trouvent ici que ce discours est beaucoup plus rassurant que le premier et qu'il est du a la lettre de 1'Euipereur. La Bourse est meilleure main tenant ; les deux ministres de la Guerre et le chef d'etat -major general sont partis en conge. Je m'abstiens de toutc appreciation. Ce qui frappe dans ce dernier discours, e'est que l'hypothese d'une guerre n'est pas exclue, au cas ou les reclamations austro-hongroises au sujet des consequences de l'attentat de Serajevo n'ob- tiendraient pas satisfaction. Une chose est d'ores et deja sure : l'Autriche- Hongrie fera des demarches diplomatiques a Belgrade aussitot que l'instruction aura ete close a Serajevo, et l'affaire presentee au tribunal. VeuUlez, etc. LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 27 N°- 24 M. Joi'. M. Jovanovitch, ministre a Vienne, a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrangbres. Vienne, le a/15 juillet 1914. Monsieur lc President, On est d'avis ici que ni l'instruction, ni l'en- quete sur l'attentat cdmmis a Serajcvo n'ont fourni de preuve suffisante pour qu'on puisse accuser la Serbie officielle ; mais on croit que la Sei'bie sera accusee d'avoir tolcre sur son terri- toire certains elements revolutionnaires. On cri- tique et on condamne dans les cercles diploma- tiques d'ici les procedes du Gouvernement austro-hongrois, surtout l'attitude du Correspon- denz Bureau, du Ballplatz et de la presse vien- noise depuis l'attentat jusqu'aujourd'hui. Un tres grand nombre de pcrsonnes ajiprouvent notre attitude, la jugeant correcte et digne d'un pays serieux. Elles desapprouvent seulement les articles de certains de nos journaux, quoiqu'elles reconnaissent toutes que ces articles ont ete pro- voques par la presse viennoise. Bien qu'il paraisse que le ministere des Affaires etrangeres allemand n'approuve pas la politique de Vienne contre la Serbie, l'ambassade d'Alle- magne a Vienne eneourage cette politique preci- sement en ce moment-ci. Veuillez, etc. 28 PAGES D'lIISTOIRE No 25 M. Jov. M. Jovanovitch, minislre a Vienne, a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi- nistre dcs Affaires etrang'eres. Vienne, le 2/15 juillet 1&14. Monsieur le President, Quelles demarches seront faites? Sous quelle forme? Que va demander a la Serbie l'Autricbe- Hongrie? Je ne erois pas qu'au Ballplatz meine, on puisse repondre aujourd'hui a ces questions d'une maniere claire et precise. Je pense que cela s'elabore maintenant et que le comte For- gacb. y est rcdevenu le facteur principal. Dans un de mes rapports precedents, j'ai men- tionne que l'Autriche-Hongrie avait a choisir entre deux voies : considdrer l'attentat de Sera- jevo comme une affaire interieure en nous invi- tant a lui preter aide pour decouvrir les cou- pables et les punir ; ou bien faire de la tragedie de Serajevoun proces contre les Scrbes et la Ser- bie et meme contre la Jougo-slavie. A en juger i^ar tout ce qui se prepare et ce qui se fait, il me semble que l'Aulriche-Hongrie choisira cette seconde voie. Elle fera cela, convaincue qu'elle obtiendra l'approbation de 1'Europe; pourquoi ne pas en profiter pour nous humilieret, jusqu'a un certain point, justifier le proces Friedjung et celui d'Agram? En outre, elle justifierait devant ses peuples et devant 1'Europe les mesures severes et reactionnaires qu'elle a l'iniention de prendi'e dans le pays, pour reprimer la propa- LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 29 gande panserbe et l'idee jougo-slave. Enfin, ce Gouvernement croira faire quelque cliose aussi en faveur de son prestige, convaincu que. cela le relevera a l'exterieur ainsi qu'a l'interieur de la Monarchic Je pense que le Gouvernement austro-hon- grois redigera un memoire, plutot une accusa- tion contre la Serbie. Dans cet acta d'accusation, on exposera tout ce qui a ete recueilli contre nous depuis avril 1909 jusqu'aujourd'hui, et je crois que cet acte sera assez long. Cet acte d'ac- cusation, il le transmettra aux cabinets des Puissances europe"ennes, en ajoutant que les faits exposes lui conferent le droit de faire a Bel- grade des demarches diplomatiques et de deman- der que la Serbie remplisse a l'ayenir toutes les obligations d'un voisin loyal. En meme temps, le Gouvernement de Vienne nous remettra, a nous aussi, une note oil sera consigne tout ce que la Monarchic dualiste desire que nous execu- tions sans discussion. Veuillez, etc... N° 26 M. le D r M. Jovanovilch, charge" d'affaires a Berlin; a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrangeres. (Telegramme.) Berlin, le 3/16 juillet 1914. Le secretaire d'Etat m'a declare qu'il a acquis 30 PAGES D'HISTOIRE la conviction, d'apres les rapports du ministrc d'AUemagne a Belgrade, de l'existenec d'une propagande panserbe, que le Gouvcrnemcnt devrait energiquement reprimer, dans l'interet de scs bonnes relations avee rAutriche-Hongrie. N' 1 27 M. M. S. Bochkovitch, ministrc a Londres, a M. N. Pachilch, president, du Conseil et mi- nistrc des Affaires etrangeres. (Telegramma.) Londres, le -1/17 juillet 1911. L'ambassade d'Autricbe fait les plus grands efforts pour exciter la pi^esse anglaise contre nous et la gagn.M' a l'idee que la Monarchic doit donncr unc bonne logon a la Scrbie. L'ambas- sade remet aux redactions les coupurcs de nos journaux comme preuves de la facon dont notre presse est redigee. La situation pcut s'aggraver au cours des semaincs a veuir. II ne faut pas se tier aux declarations pacifiques, bien calculees, des cercles austro-hongrois, car on prepare une pression sur la Serbic, qui peut se transformer en unc attaque a main armee. II est a croire que rAutriche-Hongrie changera d'attitude et cher- chera a humilier la Serbic, ties qu'elle aura fait unc demarche a Belgrade. LES POURPARLERS DR>LOMATIQUES 31 N° 28 M. Ljdub. Michailovitcli, ministre a Rome, a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres. (Tclegramme.) Rome, le 4/17 juillet 1914. J'ai des informations siires que le marquis de San Giuliano a declare a 1'ambassadeur d'Au- triche-Hongrie, qu'une demarche quelconque de l'Autriche-Hongrie, dirigee contre Ja Serbie et ne'lui temoignant pas les egards dus par une nation a une nation, rencontrerait la reproba- tion de l'opinion publique en Italie, et que le Gouvernement italien tient a ce que l'entiere independance de la Serbie soit maintenue. N° 29 M. le D T M. Spalalkooitch, ministre a Petro- grad, a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrangeres. (Telegramme.) Petrograd, le 5/18 juillet 1914. J'ai eu un entretien avec l'adjoint du ministre des Affaires etrangeres au sujet de l'attitude provocante du Correspondenz Bureau de Vienne et de la presse austro-hongroise. M. Sazonoff m'a dit, il y a quelques jours, qu'il etait etonne 32 PAGES D'HISTOIRE que lc Gouveriiement austro-hongrois n'eiit pris aucune mesure pour raetlre fin a celte agitation sterile dc la presse de Vienne qui abcutit a n'emouvoir personne et qui ne nuit qu'a l'Au- triche-Honffrie. N° 30 M. N. Pachitch, president da Conseil et ministre eles Affaires etrang'eres a toules les Legations royales. (Telegramme.) Belgrade, le 6/10 juillet 1914. Des l'attentat tie Serajevo, la presse austro- hongroise a commence a rejeter Q ur la Serbie la responsabilitc de cc crime horrible qui, a son avis, etait le resultat de l'idee panserbe. Elle a ensuite affirme que cette idee avait ete soutcnuc ct propagee par les differentcs associations comme « Narodna Odbrana », « Kolo Srpskih Sestara » (cercle des Soeurs serbes), etc., que le Gouver- ncment serbe avait tolere'es. Cependant, des l'arrivee de la nouvelle dc l'at- teutat, la Cour et le Gouvernement serbes ont exprime non seulement leurs condoleances, mais leur vive reprobation et leur borreur contre un tel crime. Toutes les rejouissances qui devaient avoir lieu ce jour-la a Belgrade furent sus- pendues. Neanmoins la presse de la Monarchic voisine n'a cess6 de rendre la Serbie responsable de l'eve- nement de Serajevo. De plus elle a commence a LES POURPARLERS DU>LOMATIQUES 33 ce.propos a lancer differentes nouvelles tendan- cieuses et fausses qui ont provoque la presse de Belgrade a y repondre, a se defendre et quelque- fois a atlaquer aussi, indignee de la voir denatu- rer ainsi les evenements. Voyant que c'est avec intention que la presse austro-hongroise attirait la presse de Belgrade dans cette discussion deli- cate et desagreable, le Gouvernemcnt serbe s'est empresse de conseiller a la presse de Belgrade et meme de lui recommander de garder le sang- froid et dc se borner a dementir et a refuter les fausses et tendancieuses nouvelles. Cette de- marche du Gouvernement serbe est restee sans resultat aupres de certains journaux de moiudre importance, surtout parce qu'on nc cessait de lancer de nouvelles inventions dont la tendance etait d'exploiter l'attentat au point de vue poli- tique, non sculeinent contre la Serbie, mais aussi contre les Serbes d'Auti'iche-Hongrie. Le Gou- vernement serbe n'a pas ete a meme de mettre fin a cette polemique entre les presses serbe et austro-bongroise; la loi et meme les clauses de la Constitution garantissent en Serbie l'cnticre liberie de la presse et interdisent tdute mesure preventive et meme la confiscation des journaux. Cette polemique a ete cependant aggravee par ce fait que les journaux de Vienne et de Budapest avaient pris des extraits de cei'tains de nos jour- naux, qui n'exercent aucune influence sur l'ox)i- nion publique, aggrave encore leur ton et, de- formes de cette facon, les avaient repandus dans la presse etrangere dans le but evident d'emou- voir Topinion publique dans les autres Etats euro- peens et de representer la Serbie comme coupable. Ceux qui out suivi cette polemique savent que 34 PAGES D'HISTOIRE les journaux de Belgrade n'ont fait que se de- fendrc et se bonier a repousser des atlaqucs, a refuter des mensongss tendancieux. Les Gouver- nements etrangers, occupes par d'aulres affaires, n'ont pas eu le loisir de bien voir le but poursuivi par la presse austro-bongroise qui est d'emou- voir l'opinion jmblique dans la Monarcbie et a l'etrangcr. Des le commencement, le Gouverne- raent serbe s'est declai-e pret a traduire devant les tribunaux tout sujet serbe dont il aurait etc prouve" qu'il eut pris part a l'attcntat de Serajevo. En outre, il a declare qu'il avait prepare un pro- jet de loi pour rendre plus efllcaces les mesures deja prises contre tout abus d'explosifs. Ce projet de loi etait deja soumis au Conseil d'Etat, mais il n'a pas pu etre prdsente a la Skoupcbtina, celle-ci ayant et^ dissoutc. Eniin, le Gouverne- ment serbe a declare qu'il etait pret a l'avenir comme par le passe a remplir tous les devoirs de voisinage, auicquels l'oblige sa position d'litat europeen. Depuis que l'attentat a ete commis, le Gouver- nenient austro-bongrois ne s'est jamais adi-esse au Gouvernemenl serbe pour un concours quel- conque au sujet de l'attentat. II n'a "reclame pour aucun des complices. ni rouTerture d'une instruc- tion ni la mise en jugeraent. Une seule fois, il a demande des reuseignements sur le domicile actuel de quelques eleves expulses de l'Ecolc normale primaire de Fakrac, qui avaient passe en Serbie pour continuer leurs etudes. Tous les reuseignements qui ont pu etre recueillis a ce sujet lui ont et^ transmis. Cependant la campagne contre la Serbie conti- nuait dans la presse austro-hongroise, et on exci- LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 35 tait contre la Serbie l'opinion publique en Au- triche-Hongi'ie et en Europe. On a pousse" si loin dans cette voie que des chefs eniinents de jtartis poliliques en Autriche-Hongrie ont commence a interpeller au Parlement au sujct de 1'attentat, et que le President du Conseil hongrois leur a re- pondu. Des discussions engagees a ce sujet, il apparait que l'Autriche-Hongrie a l'intention de faire certaines demarches, mais on ne voit pas dans quel sens. On ne dit pas si les mesures prises, surtout les mesures militaires, depen- dront de la reponse et de l'esprit de conciliation du Gouvernement sei*be. De loin, on fait entre- voir la possibility d'un conflit, an cas ou le Gou- vernement serbe ne pourrait pas donner une reponse categorique et salisfaisanle. Lors de la mort subitc du ministre russe Hartwig a Belgrade, au domicile du ministre dAutriche, la polemique de presse a ete encore ranimec; mais ce triste evenement n'a provoque aucun desordre, lors des funerailles. Cependantla legation dAutriche-Hongrie, par suite de fausses nouvelles recues parelle, s'etait e"mue a tel point, que les sujets austro-hongrois avaient commence a se cacher dans des hotels de Semlin et de Bel- grade, et certains a la Legation meme. Le jour de l'anniversaire du Roi, qui s'est passe dans un ordre parfait, le ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie, par l'intcrmediaire du vice-consul Podgradski, ma informe, vers 5 heures de l'apres-midi, que des agressions contre la legation d'Autriche- Hongrie et contre les sujets austro-hongrois a Belgrade etaient projetees pour cette nuit meme. II m'a prie de prendre les mesures ne'eessaires pour la protection des sujets austro-hongrois et 36 PAGES D'HISTOIRE de la Legation, en ajoutant qu'il rendrait la Serbie responsable de tout ce qui arriverait. Je lui ai repondu que le Gouverneruent responsable du Royaume de Serbie n'avait aucun renseigne- ment sur n'importe quels preparaiifs de cette nature, mais que j'en ini'ormerais tout de meme, sans retard, le ministrc de lTnterieur et lui de- manderais en meme temps de prendre toutes les mesures nece-saires. Le lendemain a demontre que la legation d'Autriche-Hongrie avait ete trompee parde fauxi-enseignements, etantdonne qu'aucune agression n'a ete tentee, aucun prepa- ratif d'attaque n'ayant ete fait. Neanmoins, la presse austro-bongroise a explode cette affaire encore dans le but deprouver que l'opinion serbc est exeitee et prete a tout. Elle est alle'e meme plus loin et a essaye d'affirmei'd qu'en effet quel- que cbose devait se passer, car M. Pacbitch, lui- meme, avait dit qu'il en avait entendu parler ». Tout cela demontre d'une facon evidente l'inten- tion d'exeiter l'opinion publique centre la Serbie dans cbaque occasion et a pro]^os de tout evene- ment. Si Ion prend en consideration tout ce qui a etc dit au Parle men t bongrois au sujet de la tragedie •le Sarajevo, on aura des raisons de s'inquieter ct de croire qu'on prepare contre nous une de- marcbe qui pourrait avoir des consequences de- sagreables pour les relations entre la Serbie et l'Autricbe-Hongrie. Cette inquietude est d'autant plus justifiee qu'il semble. d'api-es tout, que l'ins- truction ouverte ne se bornerait pas aux seuls coupabies et aux complices eventuels de l'at- tentat, mais qu'elle engloberait aussi la Serbie et l'idee panslave. LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUE S §7 Par son attitude et ses procedcs, le Gouverae- ment serbe a donne des preuves irrefutables qu'il travaille a l'apaisement des esprits, dans l'interet de la.paix et du maintien des bons rap- ports avec tous ses voisins. II a donne surtout des preuves de son desir de regler et d'ameliorer ses relations avec la Monarchic austro-hongroise qui, dans ces derniers temps, s'etaicnt refroidies, a cause de la guerre balkanique et des questions qui en ont de'coule. Dans ce but, le Gouverne- ment serbe a procede au reglement des chemin s de fer orientaux, de nouveaux chemins de fer et du transit des produits auslro-hongrois pour Constantinople, Solia, Salonique et Athenes. Le Gouvcrnement serbe considere que ses in- terets vitaux lui imposent que la paix et la tran- quillite dans les Balkans soient consobdees au mieux et pour la dure'e la plus longue possible. Et c'est parce qu'il desire cela qu'il craint main- tenant que la surexcilation de l'opinionpublique en Autricbe-Hongric ne fournissc au Gouverne- ment austro hongrois des motii's pour faire une demarche qui tendrait a humilier la dignite de l'Etat serbe et pour faire presenter des reclama- tions qui ne pourraient pas etre acceptees. C'est pour cela que j'ai l'honneur de vous prier de faire, aupres du Gouvernement aupres duquel vous etes accredite, tout ce qui est neces- saire pour qu'il prenne note de notre desir sin- cere de maintenir des relations amicales avec l'Autriche-Hongrie, et de'reprimer sur notre ter- ritoire toute tentative pouvant porter atteinte a la tranquillite et a la securite de la Monarchie voisine. De meme, nous accueillerons les recla- mations de lAutriche-Honaric au cas oil elle 38 PAGES D'HISTOIRE deniandcrait que certains complices se trouvant en Scrbie — s'il y en a, bien entendu — soient traduits devant nos tribunaux inde'pendants, pour etre juges. Mais nous ne pourrons jamais accepter des reclamations qui iraient contre la dignite de la Scrbie et que ne saurait accepter aucun Etat qui respectc son independance et qui veut la conserver. Dans le desir de voir les bons rapports de voi- sinage avec la Monarcbie dualiste se consolidev et se maintenir, nous prions les Gouvcrnements amis de prendre note de notre declaration et d'agir dans un esprit paciiique lorsque l'occasion se pre'scntcra ou lorsque le besoin 1'exigera. N° 31 M. Joe. M. Joi'anovitch, minis tre a Vienne, a M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil, minislre des Affaires etrangeres. Vienne, le 7/20 juillet 1914. Monsieur le President, II est Ires difficile, presque impossible d'ap- prendre ici quelque chose de positif sur les veri- tables intentions de rAutriche-Hongrie. Le mot d'ordre pour tout ce qui se fait est d'en gardcr le secret absolu. A en iuger par ce que nos jour- naux ecrivent, on est optimi-te a Belgrade en ce qui concerne nos rapports avec rAutriche-Hon- LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 39 grie. Cepcndant, on ne peut pas etre optimiste. II n'est pas flouteux que 1'Autriche-Hongrie pre- pare quelquc chose de serieux. Ce qu'on devrait craindre le plus, et ce qui est tres a croire, e'est qu'elle prepare une guerre contre la Serbie.'La conviction generale ici est que ne rien faire cette fois-ci encore contre la Serbie equivaudrait pour l'Autriche-Hongrie a un veritable suicide. En outre, l'idee que la Serbie, apres deux guerres, est completement epuisee et qu'une guerre en- treprise contre elle serait en fait une simple expedition Icrminee par une prompte occupation, a pris des racines encore plus profondes. On croit aussi qu'une telle guerre serait tcrrainee avant que l'Europe ait pu intervenir. Les preparatifs militaires qu'on est en train de faire, surlout sur la frontiere serbe, prouvent que les intentions de l'Autriche sont serieuses. Veuillez, etc. N° 32 M. le baron Giesl de Gieslingen, ministre d'Au- Iriche-Hongrie a Belgrade, a M. Lata Patchoa, president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrangeres par interim. Belgrade, le 10/23 juillet 1914. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai l'honneur de remettre a Votre Excellence la Jiote ci-jointe que j'ai recue de mon Gouverne- 40 PACES D'HISTOIRE meat et qui est adressee au Gouvernement du Royaume de Serbie. Yeuillez, etc. Remis personnellement a 6 heures de l'aprcs-midi. « Le 3 1 mars 1909, Ie ministre de Serbie a Vienne a fait, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, au Gouvernement imperial et royal, la declaration suivanle : « La Serbie reconnait qu'elle n'a pas ete atteinte dans ses droits par le fait accompli cree en Bos- nie-Herzegovine et qu'elle se conformera par consequent a telle decision que les Puissances prcndront par rapport a l'arlicle 25 du traite de Berlin. Se rendant aux conseils des grandes Puissances, la Serbie s'engage des a present a abandonner l'attitude de protestation et d'oppo- sition qu'elle a observec a regard de l'anncxion dermis l'automue dernier et elle s'engage, en outre, a cbanger le cours de sa politique actuelle envers 1'Autriche-Hongrie pour vivre desormais avec cette derniere sur le pied d'un bon voisi- nage. » Or, l'bistoire des dernieres annees et notam- ment les cvenements douloureux du 28 juin ont demontre l'existence en Serbie d'un mouveinent subversif dont lc but est de detacher de la Mo- narchic austro-bongroise certaines parties de ses territoires. Ce mouvement, qui a pris jour sous les yeux du Gouvernement serbe, est arrive a se manifester au dela du territoire du royaume par des actes de terrorisme, par une serie d'attentats et par des meurtres. Le Gouvernement roval serbe, loin de satis- LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 41 faire aux engagements forrnels contenus dans la declaration du 3i mars 1909, n'a rien fait pour supprimcr ce mouvemcnt : il a tolere l'activite criminelle des differences societes et affiliations dirigees contre la Monarchic, le langage effrene de la presse, la glorification des auteurs d'atten- tats, la participation d'officiers et dc fonction- naires dans des agissements subversil's, une pro- pagande malsaine dans l'enseignement, tolere enfin toutes les manifestations qui pouvaient induire la population serbe a la hainc de la Monarchie et au mepris dc ses institutions. Gettc tolerance coupable du Gouvernement royal de Sorbie n'avait pas cesse au moment ou les evenements du 28 juin dernier en ont de- iaontre au monde entier les consequences fu- nestcs. II resulte des dejwsitions et aveux des auteurs de l'attentat du 28 juin que lc meurtre de Sera- jevo a etc trarne a Belgrade, que les armes et les explosifs dont les mcurtriers se trouvaient etre munis leur ont ete donnes par des officiers et fonctionnaires serbes faisant partic de la « Na- rodna Odbrana » el enfin que le passage en Bos- nie des criminels et de leurs armes a ete orga- nise el effectuepar des chefs du service-frontiere serbe. Les resultats mentionnes de l'instruction ne permettent pas au Gouvernement imperial et royal de poursuivre plus longtemps lattitude dc longanimite expectative qu'il avait obser- vee pendant des annees vis-a-vis des agissements de Belgrade propages de la sur les territoires de la Monarchie. Ces resultats lui imposent au contraire le devoir de mettre fin a des menees qui 42 PAGES d'histoire forment une menace perpetuelle pour la tran- quillite de la Monarchic C'est pour atteindre ce but que le Gouveme- ment imperial et royal se voit oblige de denian- der au. Gouvernement serbe d'enoncer officielle- ment qu'il condamne la propagande dirigee contre la Monarchie austro-hongroise, c'est- a-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchic des ter- ritoires qui en font partie, et qu'il s'engage a supprimer, par tous les moyens, cette propa- gande criminelle et terrorisle. Aiin de donncr un caractere solennel a cet engagement, le Gouvernement royal de Serbie fera publier a la premiere page du Journal Of fi- de I en date du i3/a6 juillet l'enonciaiion sui- vante : c< Le Gouvernement royal de Serbie condamne la propagande dirigee contre l'Autriche-Hongric, e'est-a-dire l'ensemble des tendances qui aspirent en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchic ans- tro-hongroisc des territoires qui en font partie, et il deplore sincerement les consequences fu- ncsles de ces agissements criminels. « Le Gouvernement royal regrettc que ses of- ficiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient participe' a la propagande susmentionnee et compromis par la les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le Gouvernement royal s'etait solennellcment en- gage par ses declaralions du 3i mars 1909. « Le Gouvernement royal, qui desappi'ouve et repudie toute idee ou tentative d'immixtion dans les deslinees des habitants de quelque partie de rAniriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considere de son devoir d'avertir i'ormellement les officiers, les LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 43 fonctionnaires et toute la population duroyaume que dorenavant il procedera avecla dcrnierc ri- gueur contre les personues qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agisscraents, qu'il mcttra tous ses efforts a prevenir et a reprimer. » Cette enoneiation sera porte'e en meme temps a la connaissance de l'armee royale par un ordre du jour de Sa Majeste le Roi etserapubli£e dans le Bulletin Offlciel de VArthee. Le Gouvernement royal serbe s'engage, en outre : i° A interdirc toute publication qui excite a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchic et dont la tendance generale est dirigee contre son integrity territoriale; 2° A dissoudre immediatement la Societe dite « Narodna Odbrana », a confisquer tous ses moyens de propagande et a proceder de la ratoie maniere contre les autres societes et afliliations en Serbie qui s'adonnent a la propagande contre la Monarchic austro-hongroise. Le Gouvernement royal prcadra les mesures necessaires pour que les societes dissoutes ne puissent pas continuer leur activite sous un autre nom et sous une autre forme; 3° A eliminer sans delai de l'enseignement pu- blic en Serbie, tant du corps enseignant que des moyens d'instruction, tout ce qui sert ou pour- rait servir a fomenter la propagande contre TAu- triche-Hongrie; /J° A eloigner du service militaire et del'adini- nistration en general tous les officiers et fonction- naires coupables de propagande contre la Mo- narchic austro-hongroise et dont le Gouverne- ment imperial et royal se reserve decommuni- 44 PAGES D'HISTOIRE quer les noms et les actes au Gouvernement royal ; 5° A accepter la collaboration en Serbie des organes du Gouvernement imperial et royal dans la suppression du mouvement subversif dirige eontre 1'integrite territoriale de le Monarchic ; G° A ouvrir une enquete judiciaire eontre les partisans du complot du 28 juin se trouvant sur le territoire serbe; des organes delegues par le Gouvernement irnjierial ct royal prendront part aux reeherches; 7 A procederd'urgencea l'arrestation du com- mandant Yoia Tankositch et du nomme Milan Ciganovitek, employe del'Etat serbe, compromis par les resultats de l'instruction de Serajevo; 8° A empecher par des mesures ef'icaces le concours des autorites serbes dans le trade illi- cite d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la frontiere; a licencier et punir severement les fonction- naires du service frontiere de Chabatz et de Loz- nitza coupables d'avoir aide les auteurs du crime de Serajevo en leur facilitant le passage de la frontiere ; 9 A donner au Gouvernement imperial et royal des explications sur les jjropos injustifia- bles de bauts fonctionnaires serbes tant en Ser- bie qu'a l'etranger qui, rnalgre leur position oflicielle, n'ont pas hesite, apres l'attenlat du 28 juin, a s'exprimer dans des interviews d'une maniere bostile envers la Monarchic austro- hongroise; io° Avertir, sans retard, le Gouvernement imperial et royal de l'exccution des mesures pre- ce"dentes. Le Gouvernement imperial et royal attend la LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 45 reponse du Gouvernement royal au plus tard jusqu'au samedi 25 de ce mois a 5 heures du soir. Le memoire relatif aux resultats de l'instruc- tion ouverte a Serajevo, eii ce qui concerne les fonctionnaires mentionn.es sous les n os j et 8, est joint a cette note. L'instruction criminelle ouverte par le tribu- nal de Serajevo contre Gavrilo Princip et consorts du chef d'assassinat et de complicity y relative, crime commis par eux le 28 juin der- nier, a jusqu'ici abouti aux constatations sui- vantes : i° Le complot, ayant pour but d'assassiner, lors de son sejour a Serajevo, 1'archiduc Fran- cois-Ferdinand, fut forme a Belgrade par Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Cabrinovitch, le nomme Milan Ciganovitch et Trifko Grabez, avec le concours du commandant Voi'a Tankositch ; 2 Les six bombes etlesquatre pistolets brow- nings, au moyen desquels les malfaiteurs ont com- mis l'attentat, furent livres a Belgrade a Princip, Cabrinovitch et Grabez par le nomme Milan Ci- ganovitch et le commandant Vo'ia Tankositch ; 3° Les bombes sont des grenades a main prove- nant du depot d'armes de l'armee serbe a Kragu- jevats; 4" Pour assurer la reussite de l'attentat, Ciga- novitch enseigna a Princip, Cabrinovitch et Grabez la maniere de se servir des grenades et donna, dans une foret pres du champ de tir a Topchidere, des lecons de tir avec pistolets brow- nings a Princip et a Gi'abez ; •iO PAGES D HISTOIRE 5° Pour rendre possible a Princip, Cabrinovitch et Grabez dc passer la frontiere de Bosnie-Herze- govine et d'y introduire clandestinement leur contrebande d'armes, un systeme de transport secret fut organise par Ciganovitch. D'apres cette organisation, l'introduction en Bosnie-Herzegovine des malfaiteurs et de leurs armes fut operee par les eapitaines-frontieres de Chabatz (Rado Popovitch) et eelui de Loznitza, ainsi que par le douanier Radivoj Grbiteh de Loznitza avec le concours de divers particuliers. K 8 33 31. le D' L. Patchou, president du Conseil et ini- nistre des Affaires ctrang'eres par interim, a toutes les Legations royales. (Telegramme.) Belgrade, le 10/23 juillet 1914. A propos de l'attentat de Serajevo, le ministre d'Autriehe-Hongrie m'a remis aujourd'hui a six heures de Papres-midi une note contcnant les reclamations du Gouvernement auslro-bongrois et a demande une reponse du Gouvernement serbo dans un delai de deux jours, e'est-a-dire avant samedi a 6 heures de l'apres-midi. II m'a informe" verbalemcnt qu'il qujilerait Belgrade avec son personnel au cas oil il n'aurait pas recu une reponse satisi'aisante dans le delai fixe. Le Gouvernement serbe n'a encore pris aucune decision, tons les uiinislres n'etant pas presents LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 47 a Belgrade; mais, des niaintenant, je puis dire que ces reclamations sont telles qu'aucun Gou- vernement serbe ne pourrait les accepter en entier. N°34 M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrang'eres, a M. N. Spalaikovitch, ministre a Peirograd. (Telegramme.) "Belgrade, le 11/24 juillet 1914. J'ai inforrae le charge d'affaires russe que je remettrai la reponse a l'ultimatum austro-hon- grois demain saniedi avant 6 beures de l'apres- midi. Je lui ai dit que le Gouvernement serbe demaudera aux Etats amis de protege r l'indepen- dance de la Serbie. Au cas ou la guerre serait inevitable, ajoutai-je, la Serbie la fera. N» 36 M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrang'eres. a M. M. Bochkovitch, ministre a Londres. (Telegramme.) Belgrade, le 11/84 juillet 1914. J'ai informe aujourd'bui le charge d'alTaires anglais que les reclamations de l'Autriche'Hon- 48 PAGES D'HISTOIRE grie etaient telles que Ie Gouverncinent d'aucun pays independant ne pourrait les accepter en entier. Je lui ai e.xprime l'espoir que le Gouver- nement anglais pourrait agir aupres du Gouver- nement austro-hongrois pour que ce dernier altenue ses reclamations. Je ne lui ai pas cache que j'etais inquiet, a cause des evenements qui pourraient survenir. N» 33 M. le D' N. Spalaikovitch, ministre a Petrograd, a M. N. Pachitch, president da Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres . (Telegramme.) Petrograd, le 11/24 Juillet 1914. En sortant du cabinctde M. Sazonow, a qui j'ai fait connaitrc le texlcde l'ultimatum austro-hon- grois, j'ai rencontre 1'ambassadcur d'Allernagne. II avait Fair d'etre de tres bonne humeur. Dans la conversation que j'ai engagee avec le conite de Pourtales au sujet de la demarche austro-hon- groise, je l'ai prie de m'indiquer la maniere dont on j>ourrait sortir de la situation cree'e par l'ulti- matum austro-hongrois. L'ambassadeur m'a re- pond u que cela ne dependrait que de la Serbie, puisqu'il s'agit d'une question qui doit etre reglee entre 1'Autriche et la Serbie seules et dont per- sonne autre ne pourrait semeler. J'ai rcpondu au conite de Pourtales qu'il se trompait et qu'il se convaincrait bientot qu'il s'agissaitnon pas d'une LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQTJES 49 question entre la Serbie et l'Autriche, mais d'une question europeenne. N°37 S. A. It. le prince heritier Alexandre a S. M. VEmpereur de Riissie. (Teldgramme.) Belgrade, le 11/24 juillet 1911. Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois a remis hier soir au Gouvernement serbe une note eon- cernant l'attentat de Serajevo. Gonsciente de ses devoirs internationaux, la Serbie, des les pre- miers jours qui suivirent l'horrible crime, a declare qu'elle le condamnait et qu'elle etait prete a ouvrir une enquete sur son territoire si la com- plicity de certains de ses sujets etait prouvee au cours du proces instruitpar les autorites austro- bongi'oises. Cependant, les demandes contenues dans la note austro-hongroise sont inutilcmcnt humi- liantes pour la Serbie et incompatibles avec sa dignite d'Etat independant. Ainsi on nous de- mande sur un ton peremptoire une declaration du Gouvernement dans VOfficiel et un ordre du Souveraina l'armeeou nous reprimerions l'esprit hostile contre l'Autriche, en nous faisant a nous- mfimes des reproches d'une faiblesse criminelle envers nos mene'es pei'fides. On nous impose en- suite l'admission de fonctionnaires austro-hon- grois en Serbie pour participer avec les notres a 4 50 PAGES D'HISTOIRE l'instruction et pour surveiller l'cxecution des autres conditions indiquees dans la note. Nous avons recu un delai de quarante-huit heures pour accepter le tout, faute de quoi la legation d'Autriche-Hongrie quittera Belgrade. Nous sommes prets a accepter les conditions austro-hongroises qui sont compatibles avec la situation d'un Etat inde'pendant, ainsi que celles dont l'acceptation nous sera conseille'e par Votre Majeste; toutes lcs personnes dont la participa- tion a l'attentat sera demonti-ee seront severe- ment punies par nous. Certaines, parnii ces de- mandes, ne pourraicnt etre executees sans dcs cbangements de notre legislation, ce qui exige du temps. On nous a donne un delai trop court. Nous pouvons etre attaques apres l'expiration du delai par l'armee austro-hongroise qui se con- centre sur notre frontiere. II nous est imjiossible de nous defend re et nous supplions Votre Ma- jeste de nous donner son aide le plus tot pos- sible. La bienveillance precieuse de Votre Ma- jeste, qui s'est manifestee tant de ibis a notre egard, nous fait esperer icrmement que, cctte ibis encore, notre appel sera entendu par son gene- reux coaur slave. Eu ces moments difficiles, j'interprete les sen- timents du peuple serbe qui supplie Votre Ma- jeste de vouloir bien s'interesser au sort du Royaume de Sei'bie. Alexandre. LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 51 N» 38 M. N. Packitch, president da Conseil el ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a toutes les Legations royales. (Telegramme.) Belgrade, le 12/25 juillet 1914. J'ai communique aujourd'hui aux represen- tants des Jitats amis les grands traits de la re- ponse du Gouvernemcnt royal. Je leur ai dit que la reponse sera tout a fait conciliante et que le Gouvernement serbe acceptera toutes les recla- mations austro bongroises dans la mesure ou il sera possible de le faire. Le Gouvernement serbe espere que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois, sauf dans le cas ou il desirerait a tout prix la guerre, ne pourra qu'accepter la satisfaction com- plete que lui donne la reponse serbe. N» 39 Reponse du Gouvernement royal serbe a la note de V Autriche-Hongrie. Belgrade, le 12/25 juillet 1914. Le Gouvernement royal serbe a recu la com- munication du Gouvernement imperial et royal du io/23 de ce mois et il est persuade que sa re- ponse eloignera tout malentendu qui menace de 52 PAGES D'lIISTOIRE compromettre les bons rapports de voisinagc entre la Monarchic austro-kongroise et le Royauine de Serbie. Le Gouvernenicnt royal a conscience que les protestations qui ont apparu tant a la tribune de la Skoupchtina nationale que dans les declara- tions et les actes des representants responsables de l'Etat, protestations auxquelles coupa court la declaration du Gouvernement serbe faite le 18/ 3i mars 1909, ne se sontplus renouvelees vis- a-vis de la grande Monarchic voisine en aucune occasion ct que, depuis ce temps, aulant de la part des GouverMemcnts royaux qui se son! -:c- ee'de que de la part de ieurs organes, aucune ten- tative n'a etc faite dans le but de changer l'etat de choses politique ct juridique cree en Bosnic- Herzegovine. Le Gouvernement royal constate que sous ce rapport le Gouvernement imperial et royal n'a fait aucune representation, sauf eu ce qui con- cerne un livre scolaire, au sujet de laqueiie repre- sentation le Gouvernement imperial et royal a recu une explication entierement satisfaisante. La Serbie a, a de nombreuses reprises, donne des preuves de sa politique pacifique et mederee pendant la duree de la crise balkanique, et e'est grace a la Serbie ct aux sacrifices qu'elle a faits dans l'interet exclusif de lapaix euroj)eenne, que cette paix a etc preservee, Le Gouvernement royal nepeut pas etre rendu responsable des manifestations d'un caractere prive tellcs que les articles des journaux et les agissements des societes, manifestations qui se produi9ent dans presque tous les pays comme une chose ordinaire et qui echappent en regie LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 53 generate au controlc officiel — d'autant moias que le Gouvernement royal, lors dc la solution do toute une seric do questions qui so sent pre- sentees entrc la Serbie et l'Autriehe-Hongrie, a montre une grande prevenance ct a reussi, de celte facon, a en regler le plus grand nombre au profit du progres des deux pays voisins. G'est pourquoi le Gouvernement royal a ete peniblemcnt surpris par lcs affirmations d'apres lesquelles des sujets du Royaume de Serbie au- raient participe a la preparation dc l'attentat commis a Serajevo. II s'attendait a etre inviie a collaborer a la recherche de tout ce qui so rap- porte a ce crime ct il etait pret, pour prouver par des acles son entiere correction, a agir contre toutes les personnes a 1'e'gard desquelles des communications lui'seraient faites. Se reudaut done au desir du Gouvernement imperial et royal, le Gouvernement royal est dis- pose a remeltre aux tribunaux sans e'gard a sa situation et a son rang, tout sujet serbc. pour la complicity duquel, dans le crime de Serajevo, des prcuves lui seraient fourmes. II s'engage specialement a fairc publicr a !a premiere page du Journal Officiel en date du i3/aG juillet I'enonciation suivante : « Le Gouvernement royal de Serbie condamne toute propagande qui serait dirigce contre l'Au- triche-Hongrie, e'est-a-dire l'cnsemble des ten- dances qui aspircnt en dernier lieu a detacher de la Monarchic austro-hongroise des territoires qui en font partio et il deplore siuccrement les consequences fuaestes dc ces agissements crimi- nels. « Le Gouvernement royal regrelle que cer- 54 PAGES D'HISTOIRE tains ofticiers et fonctionnaires serbes aient par- ticipe, d'apres la communication du Gouverne^ ment imperial et royal, a la propagande sus- mentionnee et compromis par la les relations de bon voisinage auxquelles le Gouvcrnement royal s'etait solennellement engage par la declaration du 1 8/3 1 mars 1909. « Le Gouvcrnement, qui desapprouve et repu- die toute idee ou tentative d'une immixtion dans les destinees des habitants de quelque partie de l'Autriche-Hongrie que ce soit, considere qu'il est de son devoir d'avertir formellement les offl- ciers, les fonctionnaires et toute la population du Royaume que dorenavant il procedera avec la derniere rigueur contre les personnes qui se rendraient coupables de pareils agissements, qu'il mettra tous ses efforts a pre'venir et a re- primer. » Cette enonciation sera portee a la connaissance de l'armee royale jjar un ordre du jour, au nom de Sa Majeste le Roi par S. A. R. le Prince heritier Alexandre, et sera publiee dans le pro- chain Bulletin officiel de VArmee. Le Gouvernement royal s'engage, en outre : i° A introduire dans la premiere convocation reguliere de la Skoupchtina une disj^osition dans la loi sur la presse par laquelle sera punie de la maniere la plus severe la provocation a la haine et au mepris de la Monarchie austro-hongroise, ainsi que contre toute publication dont la ten- dance generale sera dirigee contre l'integrite territoriale de l'Aiitriche-Hongrie. II se charge, lors de la revision de la Constitu- tion, qui est pi-ochaine, de faire introduire dans l'article 22 de la Constitution, un amendement LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 55 de telle sorte que les publications ci-dessus puissent etre confisquees, ce qui, actuellement, aux termes categoriques de l'article 22 de la Constitution, est impossible ; 2 Le Gouverncmcnt ne possedc aucune preuve ct la note du Gouvcrnement imperial et royal ne lui en l'ournit non plus aucune, que la soci"ite « Narodna Odbrana » ct les autres societes similaircs aient commis jusqu'a ce jour quelque acte criminel de ce genre par le fait d'un de leurs membres. Neanmoins, le Gouvernement royal acceptera la demande du Gouvernement imperial et royal et dissoudra la societe « Na- rodna Odbrana » et toute autre societe qui agirait contre l'Autriche-Hongrie ; 3" Le Gouvernement royal scrbe s'engage a elimir.er sans delai de 1'instruction publique en Serine tout ce qui sert ou pourrait servir a fo- mcuter la propagande contre l'Autricbe-Hon- grie, quand le Gouvernement imperial et royal lui fournira des faits et des preuves de cette propagande ; 4° Le Gouvernement royal acccpte, du moins, d'eloigner du service militaire ceux dont l'en- quete judiciaire aura prouve qu'ils sont cou- pables d'actes diriges contre l'integrite du terri- toire de la Monarcbie austrodiongroise ; il attend que le Gouvernement imperial et royal lui com- munique ulterieurement les noms et les faits de ces ofliciers et fonctiounaires aux fins de la pro- cedure qui doit s'ensuivre ; 5° Le Gouvernement royal doit avouer qu'il ne se rend pas clairement compte du sens et de la portee de la demande du Gouvernement impe- rial et royal tendant a ce que la Serbie s'engage 56 PAGES D'HISTOIRE a accepter sur son territoire la collaboration des organes du Gouverneraent imperial et royal. Mais il declare qu'il admettra toute collabora- tion qui repondrait aux principcs du droit inter^ national et a la procedure criminelle, ainsi qu'aux bons rapports de voisinagc ; 6° Le Gouvernement royal, cela va de syi, considere de son devoir d'ouvrir une cnquete centre tous ceux qui sont ou qui, eventuellement, auraient ete meles au complot du 16/28 jufft et qui se ti-ouveraient surle territoire du Royaime. Quant a la participation a cette enquete des agents des autorites austro-bongroises qu se- raient delegues a cet effel par le Gouvernement imperial et royal, le Gouvernement royal ne peut pas l'accepter, car cc serait line violation de la Constitution et de la loi sur la procedure criminelle. Gependant, dans des cas coijcrets, des communications sur les resultats de Ins- truction en question pourraient etre donnees aux organes austro-bongrois ; j" Le Gouvernement royal a fait f)roceder des le soir me me de la remise de la note a l'srresta- tion du commandant Voia Tankositch. Quant a Milan Ciganovitcb, qui est sujet de la Monarcbie austro-bongroise et qui, jusqu'au 15/28 juin, etait employe (comme aspirant) a la direction des cbemins de i'er, il n'a pas pu encore etre joint. Le Gouvernement imperial et royal est prie de vouloir bien, dans la forme accoutumee, faire connaltre le plus tot possible les presomp- tions de culpabilite, ainsi que les preuves even- tuelles de culpabilite qui ont et^ rccueillies jus- qu'a ce jour par l'enquete de Serajevo, aux tins d'enquetes ulterieures; LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUE S 57 8° Le Gouvcrnement serbe renfoi'cera et eten- dra les raesures prises pour empecker le trafic illicile d'armes et d'explosifs a travers la fron- tiere. II va de soi qu'il ordonnera tout de suite une enquete et punira severcment les fonetion- naires des frontieres sur la ligne Ckabatz-Loz- nitza qui ont manque a leur devoir et laisse passer les auteurs du crime de Serajevo ; 9° Le Gouvernement royal donnera voloniiers des explications sur les propos que ses fonclion- naires, tant en Serbie qu'a l'etranger, ont tenu apres l'attentat dans des interviews et qui, d'apres l'affirmation du Gouvernement imperial et royal, ont ete hostiles a la Monarchic, des que le Gouvernement imperial et, royal lui aura communique les passages en question de ces propos, et des qu'il aura demontre que les pro- pos employes ont en eiTet ete tenus par lesdits fonctionnaires, propos au sujet desquels le Gou- vernement royal lui-meme aura soin de re- cueillir des prcuves et convictions ; io° Le Gouvernement royal informera le Gou- vernement imperial et royal de l'execution des mesures comprises dans les points precedents en tant que cela n'a pas etc deja fait par la pre- cedente note. A issitdt que cbaque mesure aura ete ordonnee et executee, dans le cas oil le Gou- vernement imperial et royal ne serait pas satis- fait de ce.tte reponse, le Gouvernement royal sorbe, considerant qu'il est de l'interet commuu de ne pas precipiter la solution de cette ques- tion, est pret, comme toujours, a accepter une entente pacifique, en remettant cette question soit a la decision du tribunal international de La Haye, soit aux grandes puissances qui out pris 58 PAGES D'HISTOIRE part a I'elaboration de la declaration que 1c Gouvernement serbe a f'aite le i8/3i mars 1909. N" 40 M. le baron Gies! de Gicslingen, ministre d'Au- triche-Hongrie a Belgrade, a M. N. Pachiteh, president da Conscil et ministre des Affaires ctrangcres. Belgrade;, le 12/15 juillet 1914, 6 heures de l'apres-midi. Monsieur le President, Etant donne que le delai fixe par la note que j'ai remise sur l'ordre de mon Gouvernement a Son Excellence M. Patchou avant-hier, jeuili, a six lieures de l'aprc -midi, a expire, et que je n'ai pas recu une repon *e satisl'aisante, j'ai l'honneur d'informer Yotre Excellence que je quitte Bel- grade ce soir avec le personnel de la legatioD imperiale et royalc. La protection de la legation imperiale et royale avec tout ce qui s'y rattache, avec ses annexes et ses archives, ainsi que la protection des sujets et interets autrichiens et hongrois en Serbic sont confiees a la legation im2>erialc d'Al- lemagne. Le.-; chanceliers Ferdinand Jovanovitch et Mi- lan Mekoviteh, qui resteront a Belgrade, sont rattaclies a la legation imperiale d'Allemagne. Enfin, je constate que, des le moment oil Yotre Excellence aura recu cette lcttre, la rup- LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 59 ture des relations diplomatiques entre la Serine et l'Autriche-Hongrie revetira le caractere d un fait accompli. Veuillez, etc. N°41 M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrangeres, a toutes les Legations royales. Belgrade, le 12/25 juillet 1914. C'est aujourd'hui a 5 h. et 3/4 cle l'apres-midi que j'ai remis la reponse a la note austro-hon- groise. Vous en recevrez ce soir le texte integral. Vous y verrez que nous soinmes alles jusqu'aux limites extremes oil nous pouvions aller. Lors- qu'il a recu la note, le ministre d'Autriche- Hongrie a declare qu'il devait la comparer avec les instructions et qu'il donnerait immediate- ment sa reponse. Des mon retour au ministere, le ministre d'Autriclie-Hongrie ma informe par lettre qu'il n'etait pas satisfait de notre reponse et qu'il quittera Belgrade ce soir meme avec tout le personnel de' la legation. II remet au ministre d'Allemagne la protection de la legation avec tout le mobilier et les archives, ainsi que la protection des sujets et des interets austro-hon- orois en Serbie. Enfin, il declare que, par le fait de la remise de sa lettre, les relations diploma- tiques entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie sont completement rompues. Le Gouvernement royal a convoque la Skoup- chtina pour le 14/27 juillet a Nich, oil partent 60 PACES D'HISTOIRE des ce soir tous les ministeres avec leur person ncl. Au nom du Roi, le Prince beritier a signe" l'ordre de mobilisation de l'armee ; demain ou apres-demain, paraitra une proclamation par la- quelle les citoyens qui ne sor.l pas militaircs seront invites a rester tranquillement chez eux, et les militaircs a rejoindre leurs drapeaux et a defendre la Serbie selon leurs forces, au cas ou elle serait attaque>. N° 4J M. le comte Leopold Berchlold, minish'e des Affaires etranghres d'Autrichc-Hongrie, a M. Joe. M. Jovanovitch, ministre de Serbie a Viennc, Vienne, Is 12/^r. juillct 1014. Etant donne que la note que l'envoye extraor- dinaire et ministre plenipotentiaire imperial et royal a remise au Gouvcrnement royal le io/u3 de ce mois, est restee sans reponse favorable, j'ai ete contraint d'envoycr l'ordre au baron Giesl de quitter la capitalc serbe ct de rcmcttre la protection des sujeis de Sa Majeste Imperiale et Royalc apostolique au ministre d'Allemagne. Ayant le regret de voir par la se terminer les rapports (jue j'ai eu l'honneur d'entretenir avec vous, Monsieur le Ministre, je n'ai pu manquer ile mettre a votre disposition les passeports ci-joinls pour votre retour en Serbie et pour le retour du personnel de la legation royale. Veuillez, etc. LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 6i N° 43 Sa Majeste Imperiale VEmpereur de Rnssie a Son Allesse Royale le Prince heritier de Ser- bie, Alexandre. (Tiilegi-amme.) Peti-ograd, le 14/27 juillet 191 1. Votre Altesse Royale, en s'adressant a Moi dans ua moment particulierement difficile, ne s'est pas trompee sur les sentiments qui m'animent a Son egard et sur Ma sympatliio cordiale pour le peuple serbe. Ma plus serieuse attention est attiree sur la situation actuelle et Mon Gouvernement s'ap- plique de toutes ses forces a aplanir les presentes difficultes. Je ne doute point que Votre Altesse et le Gouvernement royal ne veuillent faciliter cette tiche en ne ncgligeant rien. pour arriver a une solution qui permette de prevenir les lior- reui's d'une nouvelle guerre, tout en sauvegar- dant la dignile de la Serbie. Taut qu'il y a le moindre espoir d'eviter une effusion de sang, tous mes efforts doivent tendre vers ce but. Si, malgre notre plus sincere desir, Nous ne reussissons pas, Votre Altesse peut etre assuree qu'en aucun cas, la Russie ne se desinte% ressera du sort de la Serbie. Nicolas. 62 PAGES D'HISTOIRE N° 44 Son Altesse Royale le Prince heritier de Serbie Alexandre a Sa Majeste Imperiale VEmpereur de Russie. (T616gramme.) Nich, le 17/30 juillet 1914. Profondement touclie par le telegrammc que Votre Majeste a bien voulu M'adresser hier, je m'empresse de La remercicr de tout Mon cceur. Je prie Votre Majeste d'etre persuadee que la cordiale sympathie dont Votre Majeste est ani- mee envcrs Mon pays nous est particulicrement precieuse et remplit notre ame de l'espoir que l'avtnir de la Serbie est assure, etant devenu l'objet de la haute sollieitude de Votre Majeste. Ces moments peniblcs ne peuvent que rafler- mir les liens d'attachement profond qui unissent la Serbie a la sai'nte Russie slave et les senti ments de reconnaissance eteruelle pour l'aide et la protection de Votre Majeste seront conserves preeieusement dans l'ame de tous les Serbes. Alexandre. N° 45 M. le comte Leopold Berchtold, ministre des Affaires etrangeres d'Aatriche-Hongrie, a M. N. Pachitch, president da Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres de Serbie. (Telegramme.) Vienne, le 15/28 juillet 1914. Le Gouvernement royal serbe n'ayant pas idonne une reponse favorable a la note que le LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 63 ministre d'Autriehe-Hongrie lui a remise le ■23/10 juillet 1914. le Gouvernement imperial ct royal se voit oblige de pourvoir lui-meme a la protection de ses droits et interets ct de recou- l'ir, dans ce but, a la force des armes. L'Au- triche-Hongrie se considere done, des ce mo- ment, en etat de guerre avec la Serbie. N» 46 M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires e'trangcres, a toutes les Legations royales. (Telegramme.) Nich, le 15/28 juillet 1914. Le Gouvernement de l'Autriche - Hongrie a declare la guerre aujourd'hui, a midi, par un telegramme en clair adresse au Gouvernement serbe. N» 47 M. le D r Spala'ikovitch, ministre a Petrograd., a M. S. D. Sazonow, ministre russe des Affaires etrangeres. Petrograd, le 15/28 juillet 1914. Excellence, J'ai l'honneur de porter a votre connaissance que je viens de recevoir de M. N. Pachitcb, pre- sident du Conseil, ce telegramme urgent envoye 64 PAGES D'HISTOIRE dc Nich aujourd'hui a 2 h. 10 dans l'apr&s-niidi. « Lc Gouvcrncraent dc l'Autrichc-Hongric a declare la guerre aujourd'hui, a midi, par un telegramme en clair adresse au Gouvernement serbe. 9 « Pachitcii. » En portant a votre connaissance l'acto qu'uno grande Puissance a eu le triste courage de com- mettre vis-a-vis d'un petit pays slave qui vient a peine de sortir d'une longue serie de luttes aussi heroi'ques qu'epuisantes, je prends la liberie, en une circonstance si grave pour mon pays, d'ex- primer l'cspoir que cct acte, qui brise la paix de l'Europe et revolte sa conscience, sera rdprouve par tout lc monde civilise et severement puni par la Russie, protectrice de la Serbie. Jo pric "Votre Excellence de vouloir bien porter devant le trone de Sa Majeste cette priere de tout le peuple serbe et de vouloir bien agreer l'assu- rance dc mon devoueinent et de mon respect. Veuillez, etc. N° 48 M. S. D. Sazonow, ministre des Affaires etran- geres russc, a M. le D T Spalaikovitch, ministre de Serbie a Petrograrf. Petrograd, le 17/30 juillet 1911. Monsieur le Ministre, J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 15/28 juillet, n° 527, par laquelle vous avez bien voulu me communiquer le telegramme de Son LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 65 Excellence M. N. Pachitcli au sujct de la decla- ration do guerre de l'Autriche- Hongrie a la Serbie. En regrettant sineerement ce triste ev6- nemeiit, je m einpresse de vous informer, Mon- sieur le Mini.vtre, que je ne manquerai pas de soumettre a Sa Majeste l'Empereur la demande du peuple serbe, dont vous etes l'interprete. Veuillez, etc. N* 49 M. N. Pachitch, president du Conseil el ntinistre des AJJ aires elrangeres, a M. le D' Jovanovitch, charge d'affaires a Berlin. (Telegram me.) Nich, le 22 juillet/4 aoul 1914. Je vous prie d'informer le Gouvernement impe- rial que vous avez recu l'ordre de quitter l'Alle- magne avec le personnel de la legation et du consulat. Je vous prie de partir saus retard. N« 50 , Le Minisl'ere des Affaires elrangeres serbe a la Legation d'Allemagne a Nich. Nich, le 24 juillet/6 aoiit 1914. Le Ministere royal des Affaires etrangercs a l'honneur d'informer la Legation imperiale d'Al- 5 66 PAGES d'histoire lemagne que, vu l'etat de guerre existant entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, alliee de l'Alle- magne, ainsi que l'etat de guerre existant entre la Russie et l'Allemagne, alliee de l'Autriche- Hongrie, le Gouvernement royal serbe, se soli- darisant avec la Russie et ses allies, considere com me terminee la mission en Serbie de Son Excellence le baron Griesinger, envoye extraor- dinaire et ministre plenipotentiaire dAllemagne. II prie Son Excellence de quitter, avec le person- nel de la legation, le tcrritoire dc la Serbie et lui remet ci-joint les passeports necessaires. M. le D' Jocanocitch, charge d'affaires a Berlin, A M. Pachitch, president du Conseil et ministre des Affaires etrangeres. Berlin, le 24 juillet/6 aout 1914. Lors de la visite que j'ai faite au sous-secre- taire d Etat, M. Zimmermann, pour lui notifier la rupture des rapports diplomatiques, il m'a, entre autres choses, declare que l'Allemagne avait tou- jours ete animee de sentiments amicaux envers la Serbie et qu'elle regrettait que les relations entre la Serbie et l'Allemagne, a cause des com- binaisons politiques, dussent etre rompues. II tient la Russie, qui a sans cesse excite la Serbie, pour seule responsable des eveneraents qui sont survenus et qui auront de lourdes consequences LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 67 pour tous les peuples. Si la Russie n'avait pas, au dernier moment, alors qu'il paraissait deja possible d eviter un conflit arrue, mobilise toute sa Cone militaire, on n'en serait pas arrive a la guerre, car l'Allemagne avait use de toute son influence sur l'Autriche-Hongrie pour qu'elle s'enlendit avec la Russie. Peut-etre l'Autriche- Hongrie se serait-elle contentee d'occuper Bel- grade, et alors des negociations se seraient enga- gers dans le but de regler les raj>ports austro- serbes. N" 52 M. Jo(>. M; Joi>anovitch, ministre a Vienne, a M. N. Pac flitch, president du Conseil et mi- nistre des Affaires etrangeres. Nicli, le 3/16 aout 1914. Monsieur le President, Depuis le i7/3o juin, la legation de Serbie a Yienne a ete assiegee par la police et la gendar- merie, et son personnel soumis sans cesse a la sur- veillance des fonctionnaires de la Surete. Nos mouvcments et nos communications avec le monde exterieur furent rendus, comme vous pouvez le penser, considerablement plus diffi- cilcs; lattitude de la rue avait quelque chose de menacant envers la legation et son personnel. Des le commencement du moisdejuillet, me'me les communications telegraphiques avec vous de- vinrent plus dilnciles et les evenements se sont 68 PAGES D'lIISTOIRE develojipes si vite que je n'ai pas pu vous com- muniquer certains details relatifsa ce qui a pre- cede notre conflit arme avec l'Autriche-Hongrie. C'est pourquoi je le f'ais maintenant. Jusqu'a la fin du mois de juin, il parut que toute 1'aH'aire de Serajevo se developpait normale- ment. Mais au commencement du mois de juillet un revirement s'opera. II n'y avait pas de signes patents de ce revirement : c'etaient plutdt des in- dices et des symptomes imprecis qui trahissaient certaines intentions dissimulees. Tout d'abord, les journaux de Vienne et de Budapest, sur les ins- tructions du Bureau de la presse du ministere des Ail'aires etrangeres, suspendirent la publica- tion des informations sur 1c cours de Instruc- tion au sujet de l'attentat de Serajevo. Cette meme presse commenca a representer toute l'af- faire comme une question qui devait etre reglee entre la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, eventuelle- ment par la force des armes D'ailleurs, les grands journaux de Vienne rece- vaient des communications pareilles provenant de l'ambassade d'Allemagne; exception doit etre faite pour le semi-otficiel Fremdenb/att qui etait, en general, plus modere, comme aussi pour la Zeii et YArbeiler Zeitung. A cette nouvelle attitude de la presse, vint s'ajouter un etat d'insecurite de la Bourse tel qu'on n'en avait pas connu de pared durant tout le cours des derniers evenements dans les Balkans. Dans les conversations privees des hauts cercles financiers, on denoncait le « compte a regler avec la Serbie », comme la seule issue de la crise gene- rale, financiere et economique, oil l'Autriche- Hongrie etait entree depuis l'annexion de la Bos- LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUE9 69 nie-Herzegovine. Puis, par uoe circulaire secrete, on ordonna le retra'it graduei de la monnaie d'or et en meme temps la hausse graduelle de son cours. On ne tarissait pas u'explications sur ['in- terruption du conge du ministre de la Guerre Krobatin et du chef d'eiat-niajor Hcetzendorf, sur leur retour et leur sejour a Vienne. Le chei d'etat-major general etait tantot dans le Sud, tantot dans l'Est, tantot dans le Nord de la Mo- narchic, oil il se rencontrait avec le chef d'etat- major allcmand, comte de Moltke, en Boheme, a Karlsbad, je crois. Tous les reservistes, qui avaient ete convoques pour les. manoeuvres de juin en Bosnie-Heivego- vine, furent maintenus sous les drapeaux. Les soldats des cadres en Autriche et en Hongrie obtenaient -en nombre beaucoup plus conside- rable que d'ordinaire de courtes permissions dans le but de terminer les travaux des champs et autres, el les reservistes charges des services administrates dans I'armec etaient convoques de plus en plus. Ajoutcz les interpellations au Par- lement hongrois et les reponses ambigues du president du Conseil, le comte Tisza, un homme d'Etat qui, jusque-la, avait ete tres clair dans ses declarations politiques. L'attitude du Ballplatz fut la plus earacteris- tique. Les receptions hebdomadaires cliez le comte Berclitold furent suspendues. Tout d'un coup, les conversations au sujet de l'evenement de Serajevo avec les representants des Ktats etran- gers cesserent, ou, lorsqu'on en parlait, c'etait toujours com me par ordre et pour dissiper la crainte ou le doute que l'Autriche-Hongrie pre- parat une action serieuse contre la Serbie. On y 70 PAGES D'HISTOIRE avouait que certaines demarches seraient faites a Belgrade des que les resultats de l'instruction ouverte au sujet de l'attentat de Serajevo en auraient suffisamment prouve les attaches avec Belgrade. Mais, eu meme temps, on disait que ces demarches ne seraient pas telles qu on dut s'en inquieter beaucoup. L'ambassadeur de Rus- sie qui, en l'absence du eomte Berchtold, avait plusieurs ibis cause a ce sujet avec le comte For- gaeh, n'a jamais pu saisir les veritables inten- tions de l'Autriche-Hongrie. M. Schebeko m'a dit que le comte Szapary, ambassadeur d'Autriche- Hougrie a Petrograd, qui, pour des raisons de familie, se trouvait en Autriche-Hongrie, lui avait dit que les demarches qui seraient faites a Belgrade auraient le caractere conciliant. Le "comtCj d'apres les dires de M. Schebeko a M. Sazonow, a donne 1'assurance que la note que 1' Autriche-Hongrie avait l'intention d'adresser a la Serbie serait telle que les Russes n'en seraient pas meeontents. M. Dumaine, ambassadeur de France, qui, sur 1'ordre de son Gouvernement, avait attire l'attention du Gouvernement de Vienne sur les complications qui pourraient sur- gir au cas oil les reclamations eventuelles qu'on avait l'intcntion d'adresser a la Serbie ne seraient pas modcrees, recut du baron Macchio, premier chef de section au ministere des Affaires etran- geres, la reponse que le Gt^vernement austro- hougrois appreciait les demarches amicales et conciliantes de la France et que les conditions de la note a la Serbie seraient de nature a etr acceptees par celle-ci sans grande hesitation. Je fis remarquer aux ambassadeurs des puissances de la Triple-Entente que de telles assurances pou- LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 71 vaient cacher les vraies intentions du Gouverne- raeut austro-hongrois afin de mettre les puis- sances devant certains iaits accomplis que l'Eu- rope serai t obligee d'accepter pour eviter une guerre generate. Cependant, les precedes du Ballplatz eurent un certain succes, car tous mes collegues, que j'eus l'occasion de voir ces jours-la, croyaient a peine que 1'Autriche-Hongrie voulut entrcprendre une action serieuse qui put provoque-r des com- plications europeennes. Plusieurs membres du corps diplomatique e'taient si confiants que, ces jours-la, ils faisaient des preparatifs pour leur depart en long conge ou dans les villes d'eaux. Malgre tout, on savait qu'on preparait au mi- nistere une note qui contiendrait les griefs et les reclamations de rAutriche-Hongrie contre la Serbie. Ce travail fut confie au eomte Forgach, ancien ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie en Serbie. On croyait generalement que, parmi les repr6- sentants etrangers, seul l'ambassadeur d'Alle- magne, M. Tschirsky, avait ete tenu au courant de ce travail, et j'ai eu des raisons de croire qu'il a memo collabore a la redaction de la note. Aussi les represeutants des Etats qui nous etaient favo- rables etaient-ils d'accord avec moi pour penser que, redigee par ces deux auteurs, la note con- tiendrait des conditions tres dures pour la Ser- bie, mais non pas telles qu'elle ne put les accep- ter. Lorsque le texte de la note fut public, ils en furent tous surpris, pour ne pas dire constern^s. Autant on a fait mystere avec soin du contenu de la note, autant on a cache la date oil elle ser.ait presentee. Le jour de la remise de rultimatum a Belgrade, rambassadeur de France eut, a ce 72 PAGES D'HISTOIRE sujet, une longue conversation avec le premier- chef de section au ministere des Affaires etran- geres, le comte Berektold s'etant trouve de nou- veau a Ischl. Or, le baron Macchio n'avait pas dit a M. Dumaine que ce jour-la, dans I'apres- midi, la note serait remise a Belgrade et que le lendemain elle serait publiee par les journaux. Lorsque le 11/24 juillet, au matin, les journaux viennois publierent le contenu de la note quele baron Giesl avait remise au Gouvernement serbe, ane inquietude s'empara de nos amis et des amis de la paix europeenne. C'est alors seulement qu'on comprit que de grands evenements euro- peens pourraient survenir, bien qu'on ne criit pas que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois eut i'intention de les provoquer. Ce sentiment fut fortifie par les violents articles de tous les jour- naux de Vienne, excepte le Zeit et YArbeiter Zeitung, ainsi que par les demonstrations de la rue qui prouvaient d'une facon evidente que la guerre bien entendu une guerre eontre la Ser- bie, — serait la solution la plus desirable. Apres deux, trois conversations que j'ai eues ce jour-la, je me suis rendu compte qu'un conflit arme entre la Serbie et la Monarchic etait inevi- table, nifime au cas oil la Serbie accepterait tou- tes les conditions austro-hongroises, de la pre- miere a la derniere. L'attitude de la rue erivers notre legation etait deja telle que je m'attendais meine a des voies de fait eontre le personnel de la legation. L'ambassadeur de France aussi bien que celui d'Anglcterre, et le charge d'affaires de Russie considercrcnt que la demarche du Gouverne- ment austro-hongrois etait, non pas une simple LES POURPARLERS DIPLOMATIQUES 73 note, mais un ultimatum. lis furent indignes de la forme aussi bien que du fond et du delai fixe par la note, et ils la jugerent, eux aussi, inacceptable. Dans les conversations que j'ai eues avec eux au sujet de cette note, je leur expliquai qu'en particulier les passages relatifs a l'ordre du jour du Roi a l'armee, a la destitu- tion des fonctionnaires et officiers, et surtout a la participation des fonctionnaires austro-hon- grois a la « repression du mouvement existant en Serbie contre l'integrite de la Monarchic », ne pourraient absolument pas 6tre acceptes, etant contraires a la dignite et a la souverainete natio- nales. Ce n'est qu'une guerre victorieuse, dis-je, qui pourrait amener l'acceptation de conditions aussi humiliantes pour un pays independant. A leur question : s'il ne valait pas mieux les accep- ter pour le moment et eviter la guerre, j'ai repondu que la note austro-hongroise, qui en fait e'tait une declaration de guerre a la Serbie, etait redigee de i'acon que, m£me au cas ou la Serbie l'aurait acceptee sansaucune reserve, l'Autriche- Hongrie y aurait trouve a tout instant des motifs pour faire entrer ses troupes en Serbie. C'est dans la conviction que le conflit resterait limits a nous deux qu'elle avait redige une telle note. M. Dumaine, Sir Maurice de Bunsen et le prince Koudachelf, charge d'all'aires russe, furent sur- pris de cette note inattendue, autant qu inquiets des complications qu'elle menacait d'amener. Avant la remise de la note austro-hongroise, M. Schebeko, ambassadeur de Russie, avait dit k plusieurs reprises a ses collegues que la Russie ne pourrait pas rester indifl'erente a une demarche 74 PAGES D'HISTOIRE de l'Autriche-Hongrie qui tendrait a humilier la Serbie. Cette opinion, il l'avait ouverternent ex- primee au Ballplatz. D'oii, I'inquietude chez les ambassadeurs qui envisageaient la possibility d'une guerre entre la Russie et l'Autriche-Hon- grie. Le lendemain du jour oil la note fut remise a Belgrade, le prince Koudachefl" alia en parler au comte Berchtold. A sa de'claration que la note, telle quelle, etait inacceptable et que la Russie ne pouvait pas regarder avec indifference une humi- liation de la Serbie, le comte Berchtold repondit que l'Autriche-Hongrie s'etait trouvee forcee de faire une telle d-marche en Serbie, son existence meme etant mise en question, que l'Autriche- Hongrie ne pourrait pas renoncer a ses demarches ni changer les conditions de la note, et qu'elle esti- mait que ce dillerend ne regardait que la Serbie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, c'est-a-dire qu'aucune autre puissance n'avait de raisons de s'en meler. Cette reponse du comte Berchtold ne laissait pas de doutes sur 1'intention de l'Autriche-Hon- grie d'infliger une correction a main arraee a Ja Serbie, sans jugemenl de l'Europe l'y autorisant. Des conversations que j'ai eues alors avec les ambassadeurs des puissances de la Triple-En- tente, — qui, durant ces jours penibles, lurent a tous egards accueillants et bienveillants envers moi et envers le personnel de la legation, — il ressortait clairement que, du moment ou elle s'etait decidee a adresser cette note qui signifiait sans aucun doute la guerre, l'Autriche-Hongrie avait re